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diff --git a/.gitattributes b/.gitattributes new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d7b82bc --- /dev/null +++ b/.gitattributes @@ -0,0 +1,4 @@ +*.txt text eol=lf +*.htm text eol=lf +*.html text eol=lf +*.md text eol=lf diff --git a/LICENSE.txt b/LICENSE.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6312041 --- /dev/null +++ b/LICENSE.txt @@ -0,0 +1,11 @@ +This eBook, including all associated images, markup, improvements, +metadata, and any other content or labor, has been confirmed to be +in the PUBLIC DOMAIN IN THE UNITED STATES. + +Procedures for determining public domain status are described in +the "Copyright How-To" at https://www.gutenberg.org. + +No investigation has been made concerning possible copyrights in +jurisdictions other than the United States. Anyone seeking to utilize +this eBook outside of the United States should confirm copyright +status under the laws that apply to them. diff --git a/README.md b/README.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ee0640e --- /dev/null +++ b/README.md @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +Project Gutenberg (https://www.gutenberg.org) public repository for +eBook #51882 (https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/51882) diff --git a/old/51882-0.txt b/old/51882-0.txt deleted file mode 100644 index 103f8b6..0000000 --- a/old/51882-0.txt +++ /dev/null @@ -1,24573 +0,0 @@ -The Project Gutenberg EBook of Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the -International Military Tribunal, Volume II, by Various - -This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and most -other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions -whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms of -the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online at -www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the United States, you'll have -to check the laws of the country where you are located before using this ebook. - -Title: Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal, Volume II - Nuremburg 14 November 1945-1 October 1946 - -Author: Various - -Release Date: April 28, 2016 [EBook #51882] - -Language: English - -Character set encoding: UTF-8 - -*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK TRIAL--MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS, VOL II *** - - - - -Produced by Larry Harrison, Cindy Beyer and the online -Distributed Proofreaders Canada team at -http://www.pgdpcanada.net with images provided by The -Internet Archives-US - - - - - - TRIAL - OF - THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS - - BEFORE - - THE INTERNATIONAL - MILITARY TRIBUNAL - - N U R E M B E R G - 14 NOVEMBER 1945-1 OCTOBER 1946 - - [Illustration] - - - P U B L I S H E D A T N U R E M B E R G , G E R M A N Y - 1 9 4 7 - - - - - This volume is published in accordance with the - direction of the International Military Tribunal by - the Secretariat of the Tribunal, under the jurisdiction - of the Allied Control Authority for Germany. - - - - - VOLUME II - - - - O F F I C I A L T E X T - - I N T H E - - ENGLISH LANGUAGE - - - - - P R O C E E D I N G S - - 14 November 1945-30 November 1945 - - - - - CONTENTS - - Preliminary Hearing, Wednesday, 14 November 1945 1 - - Preliminary Hearing, Thursday, 15 November 1945 18 - - Preliminary Hearing, Saturday, 17 November 1945 26 - - First Day, Tuesday, 20 November 1945, - Morning Session 29 - Afternoon Session 57 - - Second Day, Wednesday, 21 November 1945, - Morning Session 95 - Afternoon Session 118 - - Third Day, Thursday, 22 November 1945, - Morning Session 156 - Afternoon Session 178 - - Fourth Day, Friday, 23 November 1945, - Morning Session 203 - Afternoon Session 226 - - Fifth Day, Monday, 26 November 1945, - Morning Session 254 - Afternoon Session 277 - - Sixth Day, Tuesday, 27 November 1945, - Morning Session 302 - Afternoon Session 323 - - Seventh Day, Wednesday, 28 November 1945, - Morning Session 348 - Afternoon Session 375 - - Eighth Day, Thursday, 29 November 1945, - Morning Session 394 - Afternoon Session 417 - - Ninth Day, Friday, 30 November 1945, - Morning Session 435 - Afternoon Session 456 - - - - - PRELIMINARY HEARING - Wednesday, 14 November 1945 - - -THE PRESIDENT (Lord Justice Lawrence): Is Counsel for Gustav Krupp von -Bohlen in Court? - -DR. THEODOR KLEFISCH (Counsel for Defendant Krupp von Bohlen): Yes. - -THE PRESIDENT: Do you wish to make your motion now? - -DR. KLEFISCH: Yes. - -THE PRESIDENT: Will you make your motion? - -DR. KLEFISCH: Mr. President, gentlemen: As defense counsel for Krupp von -Bohlen und Halbach, I repeat the request which has already been made in -writing, to suspend the proceedings against this defendant, at any rate, -not to carry out the Trial against this defendant. I leave it to this -High Court to decide whether it should suspend proceedings against Krupp -for the time being or altogether. - -According to the opinion of the specialists, who were appointed by this -Court for the investigation of the illness of Krupp, Krupp von Bohlen -und Halbach is not able, on account of his serious illness, to appear at -this Trial without danger to his life. Their opinion is that he is -suffering from an organic disturbance of the brain and that mental -decline makes the defendant incapable of reacting normally to his -surroundings. - -From that it follows that Krupp is not capable of informing his defense. -Furthermore, the report states that the deterioration of his physical -and mental powers has already been going on for several years and that -since Krupp was involved in an auto accident on 4 December 1944, he can -only speak a few disconnected words now and again, and during the last -two months has not even been able to recognize his relatives and -friends. On the basis of these facts one can only establish that Krupp -has no knowledge of the serving of the Indictment of 19 October. Thus he -does not know that he is accused and why. - -The question now arises whether, in spite of this permanent inability to -appear for trial, in spite of this inability to inform his defense, and -in spite of his not knowing of the Indictment and its contents, Krupp -can be tried in absentia. Article 12 of the Charter gives the right to -the Tribunal to take proceedings against people who are absent, under -two conditions: First, if the accused cannot be found; second, if the -Tribunal, for other reasons, thinks it is necessary in the interests of -justice, to try him _in absentia_. Since the first condition, -impossibility of finding the defendant, is immediately eliminated, it -must be examined whether the second condition can be applied, that is, -whether it is necessary, in the interests of justice, to try Krupp. - -The Defense is of the opinion that justice does not demand a trial -against Krupp _in absentia_, that this would even be contrary to -justice. I want to quote the following reasons: The decision on this -question must come from the concept of justice in the sense of Article -12 of the Charter. We must take into account here that the 12th Article -is purely a regulation concerning procedure. The question arises, -however, whether the Trial against Krupp in his absence would be a just -procedure. In my opinion, a just procedure is only then given if it is, -as a whole or in its particular regulations, fashioned in such a way -that an equitable judgment is guaranteed. That is a judgment whereby the -convicted defendant will be punished accordingly and the innocent -exonerated from guilt and punishment. - -Is it possible that a just judgment can be guaranteed if a defendant is -tried _in absentia_, who through no fault of his own, cannot appear and -defend himself, who cannot inform his defense counsel, and who does not -even know that he is accused and for what reason? To ask this question -is to deny it. Even the regulations of the Charter concerning the rights -of the defendant in the preliminary procedure and in the main Trial, -oblige us to answer this question with “no”. - -The following regulations are applicable here: - -According to Article 16 (a), the accused shall receive a copy of the -Indictment before the Trial. - -According to Article 16 (b), the defendant in the preliminary procedure, -and in the main Trial, has the right to declare his own position in the -face of each accusation. - -According to Article 16 (c), a preliminary interrogation of the -defendant should take place. - -According to Article 16 (d), the defendant shall decide whether he -wishes to defend himself or to have somebody else defend him. - -According to Article 16 (e), the defendant has the right to submit -evidence himself and to cross-examine each witness. - -The Defendant Krupp could not make use of any of these rights. - -According to Article 24 the same also applies to the special rights, -which have been accorded the defendants for the main Trial: The -defendant should declare his position in the main Trial, that is, -whether he pleads guilty or not. - -In my opinion, this is a declaration which is extremely significant for -the course of the Trial and of the decision, and the defendant can only -do this in persona. I do not know whether it is admissible that Defense -Counsel may make this declaration of “guilty” or “not guilty” for the -defendant, and even if this were admissible, Defense Counsel would not -be able to make this declaration because he had no opportunity to come -to any understanding with the defendant. - -Finally, the accused, who is not present, cannot exercise his right of a -final plea. - -The Charter, which has decreed so many and such decisive regulations for -the rights of the defendant, thereby recognizes that the personal -exercise of these rights which were granted to the accused is an -important source of knowledge for the finding of an equitable judgment, -and that a trial against such a defendant, who is incapable of -exercising these rights through no fault of his own, cannot be -recognized as a just procedure in the sense of Article 12. - -I should like to go further, however, by saying that the procedure _in -absentia_ against Krupp, would be contrary to justice, not only -according to the provisions of the Charter but also according to the -generally recognized principles of the law of procedure of civilized -states. - -So far as I am informed, no law of procedure of a continental state -permits a court procedure against somebody who is absent, mentally -deranged, and completely incapable of arguing his case. According to the -German Law of Procedure, the trial must be postponed in such a case -(Paragraph 205 of the German Code of Criminal Law). If prohibiting the -trial of a defendant, who is incapable of being tried, is a generally -recognized principle of procedure (_principe général de droit reconnu -par des nations civilisées_) in the sense of Paragraph 38 (c) of the -Statute of the International Court in The Hague, then a tribunal upon -which the attention of the whole world is, and the attention of future -generations will be directed, cannot ignore this prohibition. - -The foreign press, which in the last days and weeks has repeatedly been -concerned with the law of the Charter, almost unanimously stresses that -the formal penal procedure must not deviate from the customs and -regulations of a fair trial, as is customary in civilized countries; but -it does not object, as far as the penal code is concerned, to a -departure from the principles recognized heretofore, because justice and -high political considerations demand the establishment of a new -international criminal code with retroactive effect in order to be able -to punish war criminals. - -I wish to add another point here, which may be important for the -decision on the question discussed. This High Court would naturally not -be able to acquire an impression of the personality of Krupp, an -impression which in such an extraordinarily significant trial is a -valuable means of perception, which cannot be underestimated for the -judgment of the incriminating evidence. If, in the Charter, trial _in -absentia_ is permitted on principle against defendants who cannot be -located, then corresponding laws of procedure of all states, and even of -the German Code of Criminal Procedure agree to that. - -A defendant who has escaped is absolutely different from a defendant who -cannot argue his case, because in contrast to the latter, he has the -possibility of appearing in court and thus, of defending himself. If he -deliberately avoids this possibility, then he arbitrarily makes himself -responsible for the disadvantages and dangers entailed by his absence. -In this case, naturally, there would be no question of an unjust trial. - -The view has been expressed in recent days and weeks that world opinion -demands a trial against the Defendant Krupp under all circumstances, and -even _in absentia_, because Krupp is the owner of the greatest German -armament works and also one of the principal war criminals. So far as -this demand of world opinion is based on the assumption that Krupp is -one of the principal war criminals, it must be replied that this -accusation is as yet only a thesis of the Prosecution, which must first -be proved in the Trial. - -The essential thing, however, in my opinion, is that it is not important -whether world opinion or, perhaps, to use an expression forged in the -Nazi work-shop, “the healthy instincts of the people,” or even political -considerations play a part in the decision of this question, but that -the question (Article 12) must be decided uniquely from the point of -view of whether justice demands the trial against Krupp. I do not want -to deny that the cries of justice may be the same as the cries echoing -world opinion. However, the demands of world opinion and the demands of -justice may be in contradiction to each other. - -In the present case, however, a contradiction between the demands of -world opinion for a trial against Krupp _in absentia_ and the demands of -justice exists because, as I just related, it would violate the -recognized principles of the legal procedures of all states and -especially Article 12 of the Charter, to try a mentally deranged man who -cannot defend himself in a trial in which everything is at stake for the -defendant,—his honor, his existence, and above all, the question of -whether he belongs to the accursed circle of the arch-war criminals who -brought such frightful misery to humanity and to their own Fatherland. I -do not even wish, however, to put the disadvantages and dangers for the -man and the interests of the defendant into the foreground. Much more -significant are the dangers and disadvantages of such an unusual -procedure for basic justice, because the procedure against such a -defendant, who is unfit for trial due to his total inability to conduct -his defense properly, cannot guarantee a just and right decision. This -danger for basic justice, must, in my opinion, be avoided by a court of -such unequalled world historical importance, which has assumed the noble -and holy task, by punishment of the war criminals, of preventing the -repetition of such a horrible war as the second World War and of opening -the gates to permanent peace for all peoples of the earth. - -THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Justice Jackson, do you oppose the motion? - -MR. JUSTICE ROBERT H. JACKSON (Chief of Counsel for the United States): -Appearing in opposition to this motion, I should, perhaps, first file -with the Tribunal my commission from President Truman to represent the -United States in this proceeding. I will exhibit the original commission -and hand a photostat to the Secretary. - -I also speak in opposition to this motion on behalf of the Soviet Union -and with the concurrence of the French Delegation which is present. I -fully appreciate the difficulties which have been presented to this -Tribunal in a very loyal fashion by the distinguished representative of -the German legal profession who has appeared to protect the interests of -Krupp, and nothing that I say in opposing this motion is to imply any -criticism of Counsel for Krupp who is endeavoring to protect the -interest of his client, as it is his duty to do, but he has a client -whose interests are very clear. - -We represent three nations of the earth, one of which has been invaded -three times with Krupp armaments, one of which has suffered in this war -in the East as no people have ever suffered under the impact of war, and -one of which has twice crossed the Atlantic to put at rest controversies -insofar as its contribution could do so, which were stirred by German -militarism. The channel by which this Tribunal is to interpret the -Charter in reference to this matter is the interest of justice, and it -cannot ignore the interests that are engaged in the Prosecution any more -than it should ignore the interests of Krupp. - -Of course, trial _in absentia_ has great disadvantages. It would not -comply with the constitutional standard for citizens of the United -States in prosecutions conducted in our country. It presents grave -difficulties to counsel under the circumstances of this case. Yet, in -framing the Charter, we had to take into account that all manner of -avoidances of trial would be in the interests of the defendants, and -therefore, the Charter authorized trial _in absentia_ when in the -interests of justice, leaving this broad generality as the only guide to -the Court’s discretion. - -I do not suggest that Counsel has overstated his difficulties, but the -Court should not overlook the fact that of all the defendants at this -Bar, Krupp is unquestionably in the best position, from the point of -view of resources and assistance, to be defended. The sources of -evidence are not secret. The great Krupp organization is the source of -most of the evidence that we have against him and would be the source of -any justification. When all has been said that can be said, trial _in -absentia_ still remains a difficult and an unsatisfactory method of -trial, but the question is whether it is so unsatisfactory that the -interests of these nations in arraigning before your Bar the armament -and munitions industry through its most eminent and persistent -representative should be defeated. In a written answer, with which I -assume the members of the Tribunal are familiar, the United States has -set forth the history of the background of the Defendant Krupp, which -indicates the nature of the public interest that pleads for a hearing in -this case. - -I will not repeat what is contained beyond summarizing that for over 130 -years the Krupp enterprise has flourished by furnishing the German -military machine its implements of war. During the interval between the -two world wars, the present defendant, Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach, was -the responsible manager, and during that time his son, his eldest son, -Alfried, was initiated into the business in the expectation that he -would carry on this tradition. The activities were not confined to -filling orders by the Government. The activities included the active -participation in the incitement to war, the active breaking up through -Germany’s withdrawal of a disarmament conference and the League of -Nations; the active political campaigning in support of the Nazi program -of aggression in its entirety. - -It was not without profit to the Krupp enterprises, and we have recited -the spectacular rise of its profits through aiding to prepare Germany -for aggressive war. So outstanding were these services that this -enterprise was made an exception to the nationalization policy and was -perpetuated by Nazi decrees as a family enterprise in the hands of the -eldest son, Alfried. - -Now it seems to us that in a trial in which we seek to establish the -principle juridically, as it has been established by treaties, -conventions, and international custom, that the incitement of an -aggressive war is a crime, it would be unbelievable that the enterprise -which I have outlined to you should be omitted from consideration. - -Three of the prosecuting nations ask the permission of this Tribunal -immediately to file an amendment to the Indictment, which will add the -name of Alfried Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach at each point in the -Indictment after the name of Gustav Krupp von Bohlen, and that the -Tribunal make immediate service of the Indictment on son Alfried, now -reported to be in the hands of the British Army of the Rhine. - -I have to face the problem whether this will cause delay. All of the -nations at your Bar deplore delay. None deplore it more than I, who have -long been active in this task, but if the task in which we are engaged -is worth doing at all, it is worth doing well; and I do not see how we -can justify the placing of our convenience or a response to an -uninformed demand for haste ahead of doing this task thoroughly. I know -there is impatience to be on with the trial, but I venture to say that -very few litigations in the United States involving one plaintiff and -one defendant under local transactions in a regularly established court -come to trial in 8 months after the event, and 8 months ago the German -Army was in possession of this room and in possession of the evidence -that we have now. So we make no apology for the time that has been taken -in getting together a case which covers a continent, a decade of time, -and the affairs of most of the nations of the earth. - -We do not think the addition of Alfried Krupp need delay this Trial by -the usual allowance of time to the defendant. The work already done on -behalf of Krupp von Bohlen would no doubt be available to Alfried. The -organization Krupp is the source of the documents and of most of the -evidence on which the Defense will depend. If this request of the United -States of America, the Soviet Union, and the French Republic is granted, -and Alfried Krupp is joined, we would then have no Objection to the -dismissal, which is the real substance of the motion, of the elder -Krupp, whose condition doubtless precludes his being brought to trial in -person. - -THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Justice Jackson, may I draw your attention to Page 5 -of the written statement of the United States? At the bottom of Page 5 -you say, “the prosecutors representing the Soviet Union, the French -Republic, and the United Kingdom unanimously oppose inclusion of Alfried -Krupp”, and then you go on to say on the fourth line of Page 6, -“immediately upon service of the Indictment, learning the serious -condition of Krupp, the United States again called a meeting of -prosecutors and proposed an amendment to include Alfried Krupp. Again -the proposal of the United States was defeated by a vote of three to -one.” Are you now telling the Tribunal that there has been another -meeting at which the prosecutors have reversed their two previous -decisions? - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Your Honor, I understand the French Delegation has -filed a statement with the Secretary of the Tribunal, which joins in the -position of the United States. I have just been called, on behalf of the -Soviet Prosecutor, General Rudenko, who is now in Moscow, to advise us -that the Soviet Delegation now joins, and I was this morning authorized -to speak in their behalf. Both those delegations desire to reduce, as, -of course, do we, any possible delay to a minimum. - -I may say that the disagreement at the outset over the inclusion of -Alfried was due not to any difference of opinion as to whether this -industry should be represented in this Trial, but it was not understood -that the condition of the elder Krupp was such as would preclude his -trial. It was believed that it was. . . . - -THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Justice Jackson, forgive my interrupting you, but the -words that I have just read show that the condition of Krupp was -comprehended at the time. The words are: “Immediately upon service of -the Indictment, learning of the serious condition of Krupp, the United -States again called a meeting of Prosecutors, and again the proposal of -the United States was defeated by a vote of three to one.” - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Your Honor is referring to the meeting which was -held after the Indictment had been served. I am referring to the -original framing of the Indictment, so we are speaking of two different -points of time. - -THE PRESIDENT: I see. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: It was felt that it would be very difficult to -manage a trial which included too many defendants, and that inasmuch as -Gustav Krupp von Bohlen was in, it was unnecessary to have others. When -the Indictment was served, the information came to us of his condition, -and we called the meeting. It was not then anticipated with certainty -that the Trial could not proceed. His condition was then, we knew, -serious, but the extent of it was not known to us as definitely as it is -now; and it was felt by the other three prosecuting nations at that time -that it would not be necessary to make this substitution. - -In the light of what has now happened, both the Soviet Union and the -French Republic join in the position of the United States. - -THE PRESIDENT: Then may I ask you how long [a] delay you suggest should -be given, if your motion for the addition of Alfried Krupp were granted? - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Of course I hesitate to say what might be -reasonable from the point of view of the defendants, but it would seem -to me that in the first place, he might be willing to step into his -father’s place without delay; but in any case that the delay should not -postpone the commencement of this trial beyond the 2d day of December, -which I think is Monday, which would enable him, it seems to me, with -the work that has been done, to prepare adequately, and would enable us -to serve immediately. If permission is granted, we can immediately make -the service; and, of course, they have already had full information of -the charges, and access to the documents. - -THE PRESIDENT: Is he not entitled under the Charter and the rules of -procedure to 30 days from the service of the Indictment upon him? - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I think the Charter makes no such requirement, and -I understand that the rules of the Court are within the control of the -Court itself. - -THE PRESIDENT: Would you suggest that he should be given less time than -the other defendants? - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I have no hesitation in sponsoring that suggestion, -for the reason that the work that has already been done presumably would -be available to him; and as I have suggested, of all the defendants, the -Krupp family is in the best position to defend, from the point of view -of resources, from the point of view of the reach of their organization; -and, I am sure you will agree, they are not at all handicapped in the -ability of counsel. - -THE PRESIDENT: I have one last question to put to you: Can it be in the -interest of justice to find a man guilty, who, owing to illness, is -unable to make his defense properly? - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Assuming the hypothesis that Your Honor states, I -should have no hesitation in saying that it would not be in the -interests of justice to find a man guilty who cannot properly be -defended. I do not think it follows that the character of charges that -we have made in this case against Krupp, Gustav Krupp von Bohlen, cannot -be properly tried _in absentia_. That is an arguable question; but it -can be assumed that all of the acts which we charge him with are either -documentary, or they were public acts. We are not charging him with the -sort of thing for which one resorts to private sources. The one serious -thing that seems to me, is that he would not be able to take the stand -himself in his defense, and I am not altogether sure that he would want -to do that, even if he were present. - -THE PRESIDENT: But you have stated, have you not, and you would agree, -that according to the Municipal Law of the United States of America, a -man in the physical and mental condition of Krupp could not be tried. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I think that would be true in most of the -jurisdictions. - -THE PRESIDENT: Thank you. - -Mr. Attorney General. - -SIR HARTLEY SHAWCROSS (Chief Prosecutor for the United Kingdom): May it -please you, Mr. President: The matters which I desire to submit to the -Tribunal can be shortly stated, and first amongst them I should say -this: There is no kind of difference of principle between myself and my -colleagues, representing the other three prosecution Powers, none -whatsoever. Our difference is as to method and as to procedure. In the -view of the British Government, this Trial has been enough delayed, and -matters ought now to proceed without further postponement. - -Before I say anything in regard to the application which is before the -Tribunal, on behalf of Gustav Krupp von Bohlen, may I say just one word -about our position in regard to industrialists generally. Representing, -as I do, the present British Government, it may be safely assumed by the -Tribunal that I am certainly not less anxious than the representatives -of any other state the part played by industrialists in the preparation -and conduct of the war should be fully exposed to the Tribunal and to -the world. That will be done, and that will be done in the course of -this Trial, whether Gustav Krupp von Bohlen or Alfried Krupp are parties -to the proceedings or not. The defendants who are at present before the -Tribunal, are indicted for conspiring not only with each other, but with -divers other persons; and if it should be the decision of the Tribunal -that Gustav Krupp von Bohlen should be dismissed from the present -proceedings, the evidence as to the part which he, his firm, his -associates, and other industrialists played in the preparation and -conduct of the war, would still be given to this Tribunal, as forming -part of the general conspiracy in which these defendants were involved -with divers other persons, not now before the Court. - -Now, then, in regard to the application which is before the Court on -behalf of Gustav Krupp von Bohlen, the matter is, as it seems to me, -entirely one for the Tribunal; and I would only wish to say this about -it: It is an application which, in my submission, must be treated on its -own merits. This is a court of justice, not a game in which you can play -a substitute, if one member of a team falls sick. If this defendant is -unfit to stand his trial before this Tribunal, and whether he is fit or -unfit is a matter for the Tribunal, he will be none the less unfit -because the Tribunal decides not to join some other person, not at -present a party to the proceedings. - -There is provision under the Charter for trial _in absentia_. I do not -wish to add anything which has been said in regard to that aspect of the -matter by my friend, Mr. Justice Jackson, but I ask the Tribunal to deal -with the application, made on behalf of Gustav Krupp von Bohlen, quite -independently of any considerations as to the joinder of some other -person, considerations which, in my submission, are relevant to that -application. There is, however, before the Tribunal, an independent -application to permit the joinder of a new defendant at this late state. -I think I should perhaps say this: That as you, Mr. President, pointed -out, at the last meeting of the Chief Prosecutors, at which this -possibility was discussed, not for the first time, the representatives -of the Provisional Government of France and of the Soviet Government -were, like ourselves, as representing the British Government, opposed to -the addition of any defendant involving any delay in the commencement of -these proceedings. I take no technical point upon that at all. I am -content that you should deal with the matter now, as if the Chief -Prosecutors had had a further meeting, and as a committee, in the way -that they are required to act under the Charter, had by majority decided -to make this application. I mention the matter only to explain the -position in which I find myself, as the representative of the British -Government, in regard to it. At the last meeting of Chief Prosecutors, -there was agreement with the British view. The representatives of the -other two States, as they were quite entitled to do, have since that -meeting come to a different conclusion. Well, now, Sir, so far as that -application is concerned, I would say only this: The case against the -existing defendants, whether Gustav Krupp von Bohlen is included amongst -them or not, can be fully established without the joinder of any -additional person, whoever he might be. The general part played by the -industrialists can be fully established without the joinder of any -particular industrialist, whoever he might be. That case will indeed be -developed, and will be made clear in the course of this Trial. That is -not to say that Alfried Krupp should not be brought to justice. There is -provision under the Charter for the holding of further trials, and it -may be according to the result of the present proceedings, that -hereafter other proceedings ought to be taken, possibly against Alfried -Krupp, possibly against other industrialists, possibly against other -people as well. At present, we are concerned with the existing -defendants. For our part, the case against them has been ready for some -time, and it can be shortly and succinctly stated; and in my submission -to the Tribunal, the interests of justice demand, and world opinion -expects, that these men should be put upon their defense without further -delay. - -And I respectfully remind the Tribunal of what was said at the opening -session in Berlin by General Nikitchenko, in these terms: - - “The individual defendants in custody will be notified that they - must be ready for trial within 30 days after the service of the - Indictment upon them. Promptly thereafter, the Tribunal shall - fix and announce the date of the Trial in Nuremberg, to take - place not less than 30 days after the service of the Indictment; - and the defendants shall be advised of such date as soon as it - is fixed.” - -And then these words: - - “It must be understood that the Tribunal, which is directed by - the Charter to secure an expeditious hearing of the issues - raised by the charges will not permit any delay, either in the - preparation of the defense, or of the Trial.” - -Of course, if it happened that Alfried Krupp were prepared to step into -his father’s shoes in this matter, without any delay in the proceedings, -the British Prosecutors would welcome that procedure, but if his joinder -involves any further delay in the Trial of the existing defendants, we -are opposed to it. - -THE PRESIDENT: May I ask you: Do you agree that according to the -Municipal Law of Great Britain, in the same way that I understood it to -be the law of the United States of America, a man in the mental and -physical condition of Gustav Krupp could not be tried? - -SIR HARTLEY SHAWCROSS: I do, Sir. I take the same view, if I may say so, -with respect, as Mr. Justice Jackson took upon the question you -addressed to him. - -THE PRESIDENT: And in such circumstances, the prosecution against him -would not be dismissed, but he would be detained during the pleasure of -the sovereign power concerned. - -SIR HARTLEY SHAWCROSS: Yes, Sir. - -THE PRESIDENT: That is one question that I wanted to put to you. - -Do you then suggest that, in the present circumstances, Gustav Krupp -ought to be tried in his absence, in view of the medical reports that we -have before us? - -SIR HARTLEY SHAWCROSS: Well, it is a matter which is entirely in the -discretion of the Tribunal, and which I do not wish to press in any way; -but as the evidence involving his firm will in any event be laid before -the Tribunal, it might be convenient that he should be represented by -counsel, and that the Tribunal, in arriving at its decision, should take -account, as it necessarily would, of his then condition. - -THE PRESIDENT: Is there any precedent for such a course as that, to hold -that he could not be tried and found guilty or not guilty and yet to -retain counsel to appear for him before the Tribunal? - -SIR HARTLEY SHAWCROSS: No, Sir, I was not suggesting that he should not -be treated as being an existing defendant before the Tribunal and held -guilty or not. I was dealing with the subsequent course which the -Tribunal might adopt in regard to him if they held him guilty of some or -all of these offenses. - -THE PRESIDENT: But I thought you agreed that according to, at any rate, -Municipal Law, a man in his physical condition ought not be tried. - -SIR HARTLEY SHAWCROSS: I am not agreed that according to English -Municipal Law he could not be tried. - -THE PRESIDENT: And that law is based upon the interests of justice? - -SIR HARTLEY SHAWCROSS: Mr. President, I cannot dispute that, but our law -of course contains no provision at all for trial _in absentia_. Express -provision is made for such trials in the Charter constituting this -Tribunal, provided that the Tribunal considers it in the interests of -justice. - -THE PRESIDENT: What exactly is it you are suggesting to us, that he -should be tried in absence or that he should not be tried in absence? - -SIR HARTLEY SHAWCROSS: Mr. President, we have suggested that advantage -should be taken of the provision for trial _in absentia_, but as I said -at the beginning, it is, as it appears to me, entirely a matter for the -discretion of the Tribunal, not one in which I wish to press any -particular view. - -THE PRESIDENT: Does the Chief Prosecutor for the Soviet Union desire to -speak? You were authorized, I think, Mr. Justice Jackson, to speak on -behalf of the Chief Prosecutor of the Soviet Union. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I was authorized to state that they take the same -position as the United States. I don’t know that in answering their -questions I would have always given the answers that they would have -given. I understand, for example, that they do try cases _in absentia_, -and I think their position on that would be somewhat different from the -position I have given. - -THE PRESIDENT: This question I asked you, of course, was directed solely -to the Municipal Law of the United States. Does the Chief Prosecutor of -the Soviet Union wish to address the Tribunal? - -COLONEL Y. V. POKROVSKY (Deputy Chief Prosecutor for the U.S.S.R.): No. - -THE PRESIDENT: Then does the Chief Prosecutor for the French Republic -wish to address the Tribunal? - -M. CHARLES DUBOST (Deputy Chief Prosecutor for the French Republic): It -would be easy to justify the position taken today by the French -Delegation by merely reminding oneself that on numerous occasions the -French Delegation has advocated the immediate preparation of a second -trial in order that it might be possible to proceed with it as soon as -the first trial was completed. We could in this way have prosecuted the -German industrialists without any interruption. This point of view has -never been adopted. We have rallied to the point of view of the United -States as being the most expedient and most susceptible of giving -complete satisfaction to French interests. We are anxious that Krupp the -son should be tried. There are serious charges against him, and no one -could possibly understand that there should be no representative in this -trial of the greatest German industrial enterprise, as being one of the -principal guilty parties in this war. We should have preferred that a -second trial be made against the industrialists, but since this second -trial is not to take place, we consider the presence of Alfried Krupp to -be absolutely necessary. - -THE PRESIDENT: What is the position, which you take up if the -substitution of Alfried Krupp would necessarily lead to delay? - -M. DUBOST: I beg your pardon, Mr. President, but I believe you have in -your hand a second note which I submitted this morning to the Court -after having received a telephone call from Paris. - -THE PRESIDENT: I have in my hand a document of 13 November 1945, signed -by you, I think. - -M. DUBOST: That is right. There is, however, a supplementary note, which -I submitted this morning, according to which I adopt the same viewpoint -as that expressed by Mr. Justice Jackson. I was in fact able to find out -between the document of last night and that of this morning the -consequences that would be brought about. . . . - -THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps the best course would be to read this document -which has now been put before us. - - M. DUBOST: “We consider that the trial of Krupp’s father is not - possible at the present time. The trial of a dying old man who - is unable to attend is out of the question. We are anxious that - Krupp’s son should be prosecuted for there are very serious - charges against him. We had asked up to this point that he - should be prosecuted without any delay in the trial, but for - reasons of expediency which led us to adopt this point of view, - this has ceased to be a pressing problem since the Soviet - Delegation has adopted the point of view of Mr. Justice Jackson. - Consequently we no longer raise any objection, and we likewise - have come to this point of view.” - -THE PRESIDENT: Does what you say now mean that you wish Alfried Krupp to -be substituted notwithstanding the fact that it must cause delay? - -M. DUBOST: Yes, that’s right. - -THE PRESIDENT: Are you suggesting on behalf of France that Gustav should -be tried in his absence or not? - -M. DUBOST: No, no, not that, no. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Volchkov): What does the French prosecutor and the -French Republic offer so far as Gustav Krupp is concerned? - -M. DUBOST: As to Krupp, the father, we consider it is not possible to -prosecute him because of the state of his health; he will not be able to -appear before the Court. He will not be able to defend himself. He will -not be able to tell us about his acts. It is necessary to drop his case -or to postpone the Trial to a time when he shall be cured, unless before -that he appears before the judgment of God. We also believe, since we -cannot obtain a second trial against the industrialists, that it is -necessary to substitute Krupp, the son, against whom serious charges -exist, for Krupp, the father, who cannot be tried. - -THE PRESIDENT: Do you agree or disagree with the Attorney General for -Great Britain that in the course of the Trial, whether Gustav Krupp or -Alfried Krupp are included as defendants, the evidence against the -industrialists of Germany must be exposed? - -M. DUBOST: We have been anxious, Mr. President, that a second trial -should be prepared immediately to follow the first trial in which the -question of the industrialists would be thoroughly examined. Since it is -not possible to have a second trial, we are anxious that one of the -representatives of the Krupp firm, who is personally responsible and -against whom there are charges, shall be called upon to appear before -this Tribunal to defend himself against the charges that we shall bring -against the Krupp firm, and in a more general manner also against the -industrialists who were associated with the Krupp firm and who -participated in the conspiracy which is presented in the Indictment, who -supported the seizure of power by the Nazis, supported the Nazi -Government and propaganda, financed the Nazis and finally helped the -rearmament of Germany in order that it might continue its war of -aggression. - -THE PRESIDENT: Forgive me. I don’t think you have answered the question -which I put to you. Do you agree with the Attorney General that whether -Gustav Krupp or Alfried Krupp are or are not defendants in this Trial, -the evidence against the German industrialists will necessarily be -thoroughly exposed in the course of bringing forward the evidence of the -conspiracy charged? - -M. DUBOST: I agree that it is possible to bring the proof of a -conspiracy without this or that member of the Krupp family being brought -before the Court, but it will only be fragmentary proof and evidence, -because there are personal responsibilities which go beyond the general -responsibilities of the authors of the conspiracy, and these personal -responsibilities are particularly attributable to Krupp the son and -Krupp the father. - -THE TRIBUNAL (M. De Vabres): You said just now that it was your opinion -that the name of Krupp the son should be substituted for that of Krupp -the father? Do you really mean the word “substitute”? Did you use this -word intentionally or do you not rather wish to say that it was your -opinion that there should be an amendment to the Indictment and that we -should apply a supplement to the Indictment? Do you consider that you -can propose to the Court to substitute one name for another in the -Indictment or do you suggest on the contrary a supplement be added to -the Indictment? - -M. DUBOST: I have thought for a long time that it was necessary to -propose an amendment to the Indictment. It is still my opinion, but it -is not legally possible to modify the Indictment by a supplement. - -THE PRESIDENT: Thank you. Does counsel for the Defendant Gustav Krupp -wish to address the Tribunal again? - -DR. KLEFISCH: I deduce from the explanation of the Prosecution that the -principal objection against our point of view is that it would not be in -accordance with justice if the Trial were to be carried out in absence -of Krupp senior. When, in representing the opposite point of view, it is -pointed out that the public opinion of the entire world demands the -trial against the defendant, Mr. Krupp, then the main reason offered is -that Krupp senior is to be regarded as one of the principal war -criminals. I have already pointed out that this reasoning would be an -anticipation of the final judgment of the Court. It is my opinion, that -this is not the place and the time to discuss these questions and I wish -to limit myself to what I already said before: Namely, that all that has -been said in this direction is for the moment only a thesis of the -Prosecution, which, in the course of the Trial, will be confronted with -an antithesis of the Defense, so that then the High Court can arrive at -a synthesis of this thesis and antithesis and make a fair judgment. - -One more point regarding this question: - -It has also been pointed out that Krupp senior, could be tried _in -absentia_ for the reason that the entire evidence regarding the question -of guilt has already been presented and was no secret. In view of the -facts this is not correct. - -So far we have seen only a part of the evidence, that is, that which is -contained in the bundle of documents. But may I point out that from the -firm of Krupp and the private quarters of the Krupp family, the entire -written material which consisted of whole truck-loads was confiscated, -and we did not see any of this material. Thus, the defense is difficult -to undertake, since, due to the confiscation of this entire material, -only the Defendant Krupp senior would be in a position to describe at -least to a certain extent the documents necessary for his defense, so -that they could be submitted in the regular form of application for -evidence to this High Court. - -As far as the question of an additional indictment against the son, -Alfried Krupp, is concerned I wish to state first of all that I have not -officially been charged with the defense of this defendant. I suppose, -however, that I will be charged with the defense and that is why, with -the permission of the Court, I wish to say a few words here about this -motion, perhaps as a representative without commission. I do not know -whether it is possible, that is, legally possible, subsequently to put -Mr. Alfried Krupp on the list of the principal war criminals. However, -even if I were to let this legal possibility open to discussion, I -should like to call attention to the following: - -In view of the changed situation, it seems to me to be a bit strange, to -say the least, if Alfried Krupp were to be put on the list as a -principal war criminal now, not because he was marked as one from the -beginning, but because his father cannot be tried. I see in that a -certain game played by the representative of the United States which -cannot be sanctioned by the Court in my opinion. - -In addition, I wish to make the following brief remark: - -In case a supplementary indictment should be made against Alfried Krupp, -and if I were definitely charged with his defense, my conscience would -oblige me to request that the period of 30 days between the serving of -the Indictment and the main Trial as provided in Rule 2 (a), would have -to be kept under all circumstances. - -Finally, I should like to point out the following: - -In conclusion, I should like to emphasize that, so far as I am informed, -the circumstances and facts regarding the person of Alfried Krupp are -basically different from the circumstances concerning the person of the -present defendant, Krupp senior. In the documents that have been put at -our disposal so far, and which are bound in one volume, I have hardly -found a single word about any complicity or participation of Alfried -Krupp in the crimes with which Krupp senior is charged. I should also -like to emphasize that, as has already been discussed, Alfried Krupp -became the owner of the Krupp firm, I believe, only in November 1943 and -that previously, from 1937 to 1943, he was merely director of one -department of the entire concern, but in this capacity he did not have -the slightest influence on the management of the firm, nor did he have -anything to do with orders for the production and delivery of war -materials. - -For the reasons stated, I believe I am justified in expressing the wish -to refrain from introducing Alfried Krupp into this Trial of the -principal war criminals. - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn now and announce its decision -on this application later. - - [_The Tribunal adjourned until 15 November 1945 at 1000 hours._] - - - - - PRELIMINARY HEARING - Thursday, 15 November 1945 - - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal has invited the Defense Counsel to be -present here today as it desires that they shall thoroughly understand -the course which the Tribunal proposes the proceedings at trial should -take. - -The Tribunal is aware that the procedure provided for by the Charter is -in some respects different from the procedure to which Defense Counsel -are accustomed. They therefore desire that Defense Counsel should be -under no misapprehension as to course which must be followed. - -Article 24 of the Charter provides for the reading of the Indictment in -Court, but in view of its length, and the fact that its contents are now -probably well known, it may be that Defense Counsel will not think it -necessary that it should be read in full. - -The opening of cases for the Prosecution will necessarily take a long -time, and during that time Defense Counsel will have an opportunity to -complete their preparations for defense. - -When witnesses for the Prosecution are called, it must be understood -that it is the function of Counsel for the Defense to cross-examine the -witnesses, and that it is not the intention of the Tribunal to -cross-examine the witnesses themselves. - -The Tribunal will not call upon the Defense Counsel to state what -evidence they wish to submit until the case for the Prosecution has been -closed. - -As Defense Counsel already know, the General Secretary of the Tribunal -makes every effort to obtain such evidence, both witnesses and -documents, as the Defense wish to adduce and the Tribunal approves. - -The General Secretary is providing, and will provide, lodging, food, and -transportation for Defense Counsel and witnesses while in Nuremberg. And -though the living conditions provided may not be all that can be -desired, Defense Counsel will understand that there are great -difficulties in the present circumstances and efforts will be made to -meet any reasonable request. - -Defense Counsel have been provided with a Document Room and an -Information Center where documents translated into German are available -for the Defense, subject to the necessary security regulations. It is -important that Defense Counsel should notify the General Secretary as -long as possible, and at least 3 weeks in ordinary cases, in advance, of -witnesses or documents they require. - -The services which Defense Counsel are performing are important public -services for the interests of justice, and they will have the protection -of the Tribunal in the performance of their duties. - -In order that the Trial should proceed with due expedition, it would -seem desirable that Defense Counsel should settle among themselves the -order in which they wish to cross-examine the Prosecution witnesses and -propose to present their defenses, and that they should communicate -their wishes in this regard to the General Secretary. - -I hope that what I have said will be of assistance to Defense Counsel in -the preparation of their defenses. If there are any questions in -connection with what I have said which they wish to ask, I will endeavor -to answer them. - -DR. ALFRED THOMA (Counsel for Defendant Rosenberg): Mr. President. - -THE PRESIDENT: Will you come to the desk please, if you wish to speak. -Will you state your name and for whom you appear here? - -DR. THOMA: Dr. Thoma, defense counsel for the Defendant Rosenberg. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes. - -DR. THOMA: I should like to ask whether the Defense will immediately get -copies of the interrogation of witnesses. - -THE PRESIDENT: Copies of the Indictment? Those have been served upon -each defendant. Do I understand that you want further copies for the use -of defendants’ counsel? - -DR. THOMA: May I put my question more precisely? I presume that all the -statements of the defendants are to be taken down in shorthand, and I -would like to ask whether these will then be translated into German and -given to the Defense Counsel as soon as possible. - -THE PRESIDENT: If you mean a transcript of the evidence which is given -before the Tribunal, that will be taken down, and if it is given in a -language other than German it will be translated into German and copies -furnished to defendants’ counsel. If it is in German it will be -furnished to them in German. - -DR. THOMA: Will we get copies of the interrogation of all witnesses? - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes; that is what I meant by a transcript of the evidence -given before the Tribunal. That will be a copy, in German, of the -evidence of each witness. - -DR. THOMA: Thank you. - -DR. RUDOLPH DIX (Counsel for Defendant Schacht): Your Lordship, -gentlemen of the Tribunal, my colleagues of the Defense have entrusted -me with the honorable task of expressing our thanks for the words you -have addressed to the Defense Counsel. We members of the Defense -consider ourselves the associates of the Tribunal in reaching a just -verdict and we have full confidence in Your Lordship’s wise and -experienced conduct of the Trial proceedings. - -Your Lordship may be convinced that in this spirit we shall participate -in the difficult task of reaching a just decision, in the case before -the Tribunal. - -THE PRESIDENT: I assume that there are no further questions at the -present stage which Counsel for the Defense wish to ask. They will -understand that if at any stage in the future they have inquiries which -they wish to make, they should address them to the General Secretary and -they will then be considered by the Tribunal. - -The Tribunal will now adjourn until 2 o’clock, when the application on -behalf of the Defendant Streicher will be heard. - - [_The Tribunal adjourned until 1400 hours._] - -THE PRESIDENT: I understand that there are some counsel for the -defendants present here today, who were not here yesterday and who may -not understand the use of these earphones and dials. Therefore, I -explain to them that Number 1 on the dial will enable them to hear the -evidence in the language in which it is given, Number 2 will be in -English, Number 3 in Russian, Number 4 in French, and Number 5 in -German. - -I will now read the judgment of the Tribunal in the matter of the -application of counsel for Gustav Krupp von Bohlen for postponement of -the proceedings against the defendant. - -Counsel for Gustav Krupp von Bohlen has applied to the Tribunal for -postponement of the proceedings against this defendant on the ground -that his physical and mental condition are such that he is incapable of -understanding the proceedings against him and of presenting any defense -that he may have. - -On November 5 the Tribunal appointed a medical commission composed of -the following physicians: - -R. E. Tunbridge, Brigadier, O.B.E., M.D., M.Sc., F.R.C.P., Consulting -Physician, British Army of the Rhine. - -René Piedelièvre, M.D., Professor on the Faculty of Medicine of Paris; -Expert for the Tribunal. - -Nicholas Kurshakov, M.D., Professor of Medicine, Medical Institute of -Moscow; Chief Internist, Commissariat of Public Health, Union of Soviet -Socialist Republics. - -Eugene Sepp, M.D., Emeritus Professor of Neurology, Medical Institute of -Moscow; Member, Academy of Medical Science, Union of Soviet Socialist -Republics. - -Eugene Krasnushkin, M.D., Professor of Psychiatry, Medical Institute of -Moscow. - -Bertram Schaffner, Major, Medical Corps, Neuropsychiatrist, Army of the -United States. - -The commission has reported to the Tribunal that it is unanimously of -the opinion that Gustav Krupp von Bohlen suffers from senile softening -of the brain; that his mental condition is such that he is incapable of -understanding court procedure and of understanding or cooperating in -interrogations; that his physical state is such that he cannot be moved -without endangering his life; and that his condition is unlikely to -improve but rather will deteriorate further. - -The Tribunal accepts the findings of the medical commission, to which -exception is taken neither by the Prosecution nor by the Defense. - -Article 12 of the Charter authorizes the trial of a defendant _in -absentia_ if found by the Tribunal to be “necessary in the interests of -justice.” It is contended on behalf of the Chief Prosecutors that in the -interest of justice, Gustav Krupp von Bohlen should be tried _in -absentia_, despite his physical and mental condition. - -It is the decision of the Tribunal that upon the facts presented the -interests of justice do not require that Gustav Krupp von Bohlen be -tried _in absentia._ The Charter of the Tribunal envisages a fair trial, -in which the Chief Prosecutors may present the evidence in support of an -indictment and the defendants may present such defense as they may -believe themselves to have. Where nature rather than flight or contumacy -has rendered such a trial impossible, it is not in accordance with -justice that the case should proceed in the absence of a defendant. - -For the foregoing reasons, the Tribunal orders that: - -1. The application for postponement of the proceedings against Gustav -Krupp von Bohlen is granted. - -2. The charges in the Indictment against Gustav Krupp von Bohlen shall -be retained upon the docket of the Tribunal for trial hereafter, if the -physical and mental condition of the defendant should permit. - -Further questions raised by the Chief Prosecutors, including the -question of adding another name to the Indictment, will be considered -later. - -The Tribunal will now hear the application on behalf of the Defendant -Streicher. - -Will the Counsel state his name? - -DR. HANS MARX (Counsel for Defendant Streicher): Your Honors, as Counsel -for the Defendant Julius Streicher, I took the liberty some time ago of -requesting a postponement in the opening date of the Trial, because the -time at my disposal for making preparations appeared to me insufficient, -in view of the importance of the case. - -This morning, however, the President of the Court outlined the course of -the proceedings of the Trial and his explanations have made it quite -clear that the Defense will have adequate time at its disposal to -continue preparations for the case of each client even after the opening -of the Trial. Any objections on my part are thereby removed, and -accordingly I withdraw my application as unsubstantiated. - -Your Honors, may I use this opportunity to make a suggestion with regard -to the case of the Defendant Streicher. - -In view of the exceptional nature of the case and of the difficulties -facing the Defense in handling it, may I suggest that the Tribunal -consider whether a psychiatric examination of the Defendant Streicher -would not be proper. Defense Counsel should have at his disposal all the -evidence on the nature, personality, and motives of the defendant which -appears necessary to enable him to form a clear picture of his client. - -And this, of course, is also true of the Tribunal. - -In my own interests I consider it essential that such an examination be -authorized by the Tribunal. I emphasize particularly that this is not a -formal motion: “It is not a motion but a proposal.” [_Note: These words -were spoken in English._] I deem it necessary as a precaution in my own -interests, since my client does not desire an examination of this sort, -and is of the opinion that he is mentally completely normal. I myself -cannot determine that; it must be decided by a psychiatrist. - -I, therefore, ask the Tribunal to consider this proposal, and, if the -suggestion, under the circumstances, appears both requisite and -necessary, to choose and appoint a competent expert to conduct the -examination. - -That is what I wished to say before the opening of the proceedings. - -THE PRESIDENT: One moment. It appears to the Tribunal that such -suggestions as you have now made, ought to be in the form of a formal -motion or application and that it ought to be in writing and that if, as -you say, the Defendant Streicher does not wish it or is unwilling that -such an examination should be made, then your application ought to state -in writing that the Defendant Streicher refuses to sign the application. - -If you wish to make such a motion you are at liberty to make it, in -writing. - -DR. MARX: Mr. President, may I be allowed to say briefly that it is -precisely because the defendant does object to my submitting such an -application that I feel obliged to make this request here publicly, and -inform the Tribunal that I am bound by my client’s attitude and -therefore not in a position to submit this suggestion in writing. -Without my client’s permission I cannot make this suggestion in writing, -and I am consequently forced to convey it to the Tribunal verbally, -since I myself consider it necessary as a precaution in my own interest. - -THE PRESIDENT: But you understand from what I say to you, that if you -wish to make this suggestion, you must make the motion in writing and -you can, on that writing, state that the Defendant Streicher is not -prepared to sign the application. - -DR. MARX: Thank you, Mr. President, for your statement; I shall not fail -to act, as you suggest. - -THE PRESIDENT: Do the Chief Prosecutors wish to make any statement? - -COLONEL ROBERT G. STOREY (Executive Trial Counsel for the United -States): May it please the Court: - -The position of Counsel for Defendant Streicher emphasizes a suggestion -made by the Prosecutors this morning, namely, that all motions and all -requests from Counsel be reduced to writing, prior to submission to the -Court and the suggestions, in writing, were filed with the General -Secretary since the meeting this morning. - -While I am on my feet, if it may please the Court, may I make a brief -statement in connection with the efforts of the Prosecutors to furnish -to the Defense Counsel evidence and documents in which they may be -interested, if that meets with the approval of the Court. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes. - -COL. STOREY: With reference to Defendant Streicher’s second point in his -motion, namely, that the Prosecutors be required to furnish certain -documents, they are being furnished, and will be furnished in the -future. - -Secondly, with reference to the film on concentration camps, which he -requests be shown to Defense Counsel in advance of the time of -presenting the film, this request will also be complied with by the -Prosecutors. - -Also, for the information of the Defense Counsel, there has been -established in Room 54, in this Courthouse, what is known as the -Defendants’ Information Center, operated jointly by the four Chief -Prosecutors. In that room there has been deposited a list of documents -upon which the Prosecution relies. Secondly, if further documents are -relied upon by the prosecutors, lists will be furnished to Defense -Counsel before they are introduced into evidence or offered to the -Court, and also, they will have the opportunity to examine copies of -those documents in their own language. - -May I also suggest that most Defense Counsel have availed themselves of -that privilege and those who had not, have been notified and they are -now, as of this date, all of them, making use of the facilities -provided, which include rooms for conferences, typewriters, when -necessary, and other assistance. - -I want to make that statement for the information of the Defense -Counsel. - -THE PRESIDENT: I understand the Soviet Chief Prosecutor wishes to -address the Tribunal. - -COL. POKROVSKY: In connection with the evidence just submitted to the -Tribunal by Counsel representing the interests of Defendant Streicher, I -consider it my duty to inform the Tribunal that during the last -interrogation made by the Delegation of the Soviet Union, the Defendant -Streicher, about whom it is specifically said in the Indictment, Counts -One and Four, that he had incited to the persecution of the Jews, stated -that he had been speaking from a Zionist point of view. - -This declaration or, more precisely, this testimony, immediately -produced certain doubts as to the mental stability of the defendant. - -It is not the first time that persons, now standing their trial, have -attempted to delude us about their mental condition. I refer in -particular to the Defendant Hess. In the case of Hess the Tribunal, to -my knowledge already possesses. . . . - -THE PRESIDENT: One moment. We are not hearing any application with -reference to Streicher’s sanity now, nor any application with reference -to Hess. We have simply informed Counsel for Streicher that if he wishes -to make an application in respect of his defendant’s sanity or mental -condition, he must make that application in writing. If he does make -such an application in writing you will have full opportunity of -opposing the application. - -COL. POKROVSKY: What I have in mind is not to offer an opinion on the -deductions and the petition of the Defense, but to inform the Tribunal -of a fact which may cause much complication if we do not act on it -immediately. Seeing that the Tribunal has at its disposal a number of -competent medical personnel, it would appear to me most expedient that -the Tribunal should entrust these specialists with the examination of -the Defendant Streicher in order to establish definitely whether he is -or is not in full possession of his mental capacities. - -If we do not do so now, the necessity may arise in the course of the -Trial and if the question of Streicher’s sanity arises after the -beginning of the Trial, then it may delay the proceedings and impede our -work. If the Tribunal deems my suggestion in order, we would, before the -Trial starts, have sufficient time to request from this commission of -specialists a statement on his mental condition. - -THE PRESIDENT: One moment. If I rightly understand what the Chief Soviet -Prosecutor says, it is this: That if any question of the sanity of the -Defendant Streicher arises it will be convenient that he should be -examined now at once whilst the medical officers of the Soviet Union are -in Nuremberg. If that is so, then if you think it is more convenient -that Streicher should be examined by doctors at the present moment on -account of the presence of the distinguished doctors from the Soviet -Union being in Nuremberg, you are at liberty to make a written motion to -that effect to the Tribunal at any time. - -Do any of the other Chief Prosecutors wish to address the Tribunal? - -(There was no response.) - -Then the Tribunal will deal with the application of the Defendant -Streicher as follows: - -His application for postponement, which is numbered 1 on his written -application, has been withdrawn. His other two applications, numbered 2 -and 3, which are agreed to by the Chief Prosecutors, are granted. - -The Tribunal will now adjourn. - - [_The Tribunal adjourned until 17 November 1945 at 1000 hours._] - - - - - PRELIMINARY HEARING - Saturday, 17 November 1945 - - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal would like to know whether the Chief -Prosecutors wish to make a statement with reference to the Defendant -Bormann. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE (Deputy Chief Prosecutor for the United Kingdom): -May it please the Tribunal, as the Tribunal are aware, the Defendant -Bormann was included in the Indictment, which was filed before the -Tribunal. There has been no change in the position with regard to the -Defendant Bormann; nor has any further information come to the notice of -the Chief Prosecutors. I think that the Tribunal are aware of the state -of our information when the Indictment was filed, but it might be as -well, if the Tribunal approves, if I explained what was the state of our -information at the time of the filing of the Indictment, which is also -the state of our information today. - -There is evidence that Hitler and Bormann were together, with a number -of Nazi officials, in the Chancellery area in Berlin on 30 April 1945, -and were, at one stage on that day, together in Hitler’s underground air -raid shelter in the Chancellery gardens. - -On 1 May Bormann and other Germans tried to break out of the Chancellery -area in a tank. They got as far as the river Spree and tried to cross a -bridge over it. A hand grenade was thrown into the tank by Russian -soldiers. Three members of the party who were with Bormann in this tank -have been interrogated. Two think that Bormann was killed, and the third -that he was wounded. The position is, therefore, that the Prosecution -cannot say that the matter is beyond probability that Bormann is dead. -There is still the clear possibility that he is alive. - -In these circumstances I should submit that he comes within the exact -words of Article 12 of the Charter: - - “The Tribunal shall have the right to take proceedings against a - person charged with crimes set out in Article 6 of this Charter - in his absence, if he has not been found.” - -In other words, it is not necessary to hold the man in these -circumstances. The Tribunal laid down in its Rules of Procedure in Rule -2 (b) the procedure applicable to this situation: - - “Any individual Defendant not in custody shall be informed of - the Indictment against him and of his right to receive the - documents specified in sub-paragraph (a) above, by notice in - such form and manner as the Tribunal may prescribe.” - -The Tribunal prescribed that notice to the Defendant Bormann should be -given in the following manner: - -The notice should be read over the radio once a week for 4 weeks, the -first reading to be during the week of 22 October. It should also be -published in four separate issues of a newspaper circulated in the home -city of Martin Bormann. - -The broadcast was given in the weeks after 22 October, as ordered, over -Radio Hamburg and Radio Langenberg, that is, Cologne. The Defendant -Bormann’s last place of residence was in Berlin. The notice was, -therefore, published in four Berlin papers: The _Tägliche Rundschau_, -the _Berliner Zeitung_, _Der Berliner_, and the _Allgemeine Zeitung_ for -the 4 weeks which the Tribunal had ordered. - -In my respectful submission, the Charter and Rules of Procedure have -been complied with. The Tribunal, therefore, has the right to take -proceedings _in absentia_ under Article 12. It is, of course, a matter -for the Tribunal to decide whether it will exercise that right. - -The Chief Prosecutors submit, however, that there is no change in the -position since they indicted Bormann and that, unless the Tribunal has -any different view, this is a proper case for trial _in absentia_. - -I am authorized to make this statement not only on behalf of the British -Delegation, but on behalf of the United States and the French Republic. -I consulted my friend and colleague, Colonel Pokrovsky, yesterday and he -had to take instructions on the matter, and I notice he is here today. I -haven’t had the opportunity of speaking to him this morning and no doubt -he will be able to tell the Tribunal any thing if he so desires. - -I hope that that explains the basis of the matter to the Tribunal. If -there are any other facts, I should be only too happy to answer any -point. - -THE PRESIDENT: It is suggested to me that you should file with the -General Secretary proof of the publication to which you have referred. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: With proof of the publication! If it please My -Lord, that will be done. - -THE PRESIDENT: Thank you, Sir David. Then I will ask the Chief -Prosecutor for the Soviet Union if he wishes to address the Tribunal. - -COL. POKROVSKY: I thank the Tribunal for their wish to hear the opinion -of the Soviet Delegation. I shall avail myself of the privilege granted -by the Tribunal to express the complete concurrence of the Soviet -Delegation, and to inform you of the attitude adopted by my colleagues -where Bormann is concerned. We consider that the Tribunal has every -justification, under Article 12 of the Charter, to accept in evidence -all the material relative to Bormann’s case and to start proceedings -against him in his absence. - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn for a short time and hopes it -will be able to give its decision shortly. - - [_A recess was taken._] - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal has decided that in pursuance of Article 12 -of the Charter, it will try the Defendant Bormann in his absence, and it -announces that Counsel will be appointed to defend the Defendant -Bormann. - -The Tribunal will now adjourn. - - [_The Tribunal adjourned until 1500 hours._] - -THE PRESIDENT: The motion to amend the indictment by adding the name of -Alfried Krupp has been considered by the Tribunal in all its aspects and -the application is rejected. - -The Tribunal will now adjourn. - - [_The Tribunal adjourned until 20 November 1945 at 1000 hours._] - - - - - FIRST DAY - Tuesday, 20 November 1945 - - - _Morning Session_ - -THE PRESIDENT: Before the defendants in this case are called upon to -make their pleas to the Indictment which has been lodged against them, -and in which they are charged with Crimes against Peace, War Crimes, and -Crimes against Humanity, and with a Common Plan or Conspiracy to commit -those crimes, it is the wish of the Tribunal that I should make a very -brief statement on behalf of the Tribunal. - -This International Military Tribunal has been established pursuant to -the Agreement of London, dated the 8th of August 1945, and the Charter -of the Tribunal as annexed thereto, and the purpose for which the -Tribunal has been established is stated in Article 1 of the Charter to -be the just and prompt trial and punishment of the major war criminals -of the European Axis. - -The Signatories to the Agreement and Charter are the Government of the -United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Government of -the United States of America, the Provisional Government of the French -Republic, and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. - -The Committee of the Chief Prosecutors, appointed by the four -Signatories, have settled the final designation of the war criminals to -be tried by the Tribunal, and have approved the Indictment on which the -present defendants stand charged here today. - -On Thursday, the 18th of October 1945, in Berlin, the Indictment was -lodged with the Tribunal and a copy of that Indictment in the German -language has been furnished to each defendant, and has been in his -possession for more than 30 days. - -All the defendants are represented by counsel. In almost all cases the -counsel appearing for the defendants have been chosen by the defendants -themselves, but in cases where counsel could not be obtained the -Tribunal has itself selected suitable counsel agreeable to the -defendant. - -The Tribunal has heard with great satisfaction of the steps which have -been taken by the Chief Prosecutors to make available to defending -counsel the numerous documents upon which the Prosecution rely, with the -aim of giving to the defendants every possibility for a just defense. - -The Trial which is now about to begin is unique in the history of the -jurisprudence of the world and it is of supreme importance to millions -of people all over the globe. For these reasons, there is laid upon -everybody who takes any part in this Trial a solemn responsibility to -discharge their duties without fear or favor, in accordance with the -sacred principles of law and justice. - -The four Signatories having invoked the judicial process, it is the duty -of all concerned to see that the Trial in no way departs from those -principles and traditions which alone give justice its authority and the -place it ought to occupy in the affairs of all civilized states. - -This Trial is a public Trial in the fullest sense of those words, and I -must, therefore, remind the public that the Tribunal will insist upon -the complete maintenance of order and decorum, and will take the -strictest measures to enforce it. It only remains for me to direct, in -accordance with the provisions of the Charter, that the Indictment shall -now be read. - -MR. SIDNEY S. ALDERMAN (Associate Trial Counsel for the United States): -May it please the Tribunal: - -I. The United States of America, the French Republic, the United Kingdom -of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the Union of Soviet Socialist -Republics by the undersigned, Robert H. Jackson, François de Menthon, -Hartley Shawcross, and R. A. Rudenko, duly appointed to represent their -respective governments in the investigation of the charges against and -the prosecution of the major war criminals, pursuant to the Agreement of -London dated 8 August 1945, and the Charter of this Tribunal annexed -thereto, hereby accuse as guilty, in the respects hereinafter set forth, -of Crimes against Peace, War Crimes, and Crimes against Humanity, and of -a Common Plan or Conspiracy to commit those Crimes, all as defined in -the Charter of the Tribunal, and accordingly name as defendants in this -cause and as indicted on the Counts hereinafter set out: - -Hermann Wilhelm Göring, Rudolf Hess, Joachim von Ribbentrop, Robert Ley, -Wilhelm Keitel, Ernst Kaltenbrunner, Alfred Rosenberg, Hans Frank, -Wilhelm Frick, Julius Streicher, Walter Funk, Hjalmar Schacht, Gustav -Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach, Karl Dönitz, Erich Raeder, Baldur von -Schirach, Fritz Sauckel, Alfred Jodl, Martin Bormann, Franz von Papen, -Arthur Seyss-Inquart, Albert Speer, Constantin von Neurath and Hans -Fritzsche, individually and as members of any of the groups or -organizations next hereinafter named. - -II. The following are named as groups or organizations (since dissolved) -which should be declared criminal by reason of their aims and the means -used for the accomplishment thereof, and in connection with the -conviction of such of the named defendants as were members thereof: - -Die Reichsregierung (Reich Cabinet); das Korps der Politischen Leiter -der Nationalsozialistischen Deutschen Arbeiterpartei (Leadership Corps -of the Nazi Party); die Schutzstaffeln der Nationalsozialistischen -Arbeiterpartei (commonly known as the “SS”) and including the -Sicherheitsdienst (commonly known as the “SD”); die Geheime -Staatspolizei (Secret State Police, commonly known as the “Gestapo”); -die Sturmabteilungen der NSDAP (commonly known as the “SA”); and the -General Staff and the High Command of the German Armed Forces. The -identity and membership of the groups or organizations referred to in -the foregoing titles are hereinafter in Appendix B more particularly -defined. - -COUNT ONE—THE COMMON PLAN OR CONSPIRACY. Reference: the Charter, -Article 6, especially Article 6 (a). - -III. _Statement of the Offense._ - -All the defendants, with divers other persons, during a period of years -preceding 8 May 1945, participated as leaders, organizers, instigators, -or accomplices in the formulation or execution of a Common Plan or -Conspiracy to commit, or which involved the commission of, Crimes -against Peace, War Crimes, and Crimes against Humanity, as defined in -the Charter of this Tribunal, and, in accordance with the provisions of -the Charter, are individually responsible for their own acts and for all -acts committed by any persons in the execution of such plan and -conspiracy. The Common Plan or Conspiracy embraced the commission of -Crimes against Peace, in that the defendants planned, prepared, -initiated, and waged wars of aggression, which were also wars in -violation of international treaties, agreements, or assurances. In the -development and course of the Common Plan or Conspiracy it came to -embrace the commission of War Crimes, in that it contemplated, and the -defendants determined upon and carried out, ruthless wars against -countries and populations, in violation of the rules and customs of war, -including as typical and systematic means by which the wars were -prosecuted, murder, ill-treatment, deportation for slave labor and for -other purposes of civilian populations of occupied territories, murder -and ill-treatment of prisoners of war and of persons on the High Seas, -the taking and killing of hostages, the plunder of public and private -property, the wanton destruction of cities, towns, and villages, and -devastation not justified by military necessity. The Common Plan or -Conspiracy contemplated and came to embrace as typical and systematic -means, and the defendants determined upon and committed, Crimes against -Humanity, both within Germany and within occupied territories, including -murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts -committed against civilian populations before and during the war, and -persecutions on political, racial, or religious grounds, in execution of -the plan for preparing and prosecuting aggressive or illegal wars, many -of such acts and persecutions being violations of the domestic laws of -the countries where perpetrated. - -IV. _Particulars of the Nature and Development of the Common Plan or -Conspiracy._ - -(A) The Nazi Party as the central core of the Common Plan or Conspiracy. - -In 1921 Adolf Hitler became the supreme leader or Führer of the -Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei (National Socialist -German Workers Party), also known as the Nazi Party, which had been -founded in Germany in 1920. He continued as such throughout the period -covered by this Indictment. The Nazi Party, together with certain of its -subsidiary organizations, became the instrument of cohesion among the -defendants and their co-conspirators and an instrument for the carrying -out of the aims and purposes of their conspiracy. Each defendant became -a member of the Nazi Party and of the conspiracy, with knowledge of -their aims and purposes, or, with such knowledge, became an accessory to -their aims and purposes at some stage of the development of the -conspiracy. - -(B) Common objectives and methods of conspiracy. - -The aims and purposes of the Nazi Party and of the defendants and divers -other persons from time to time associated as leaders, members, -supporters, or adherents of the Nazi Party (hereinafter called -collectively the “Nazi conspirators”) were, or came to be, to accomplish -the following by any means deemed opportune, including unlawful means, -and contemplating ultimate resort to threat of force, force, and -aggressive war: (1) to abrogate and overthrow the Treaty of Versailles -and its restrictions upon the military armament and activity of Germany; -(2) to acquire the territories lost by Germany as the result of the -World War of 1914-18 and other territories in Europe asserted by the -Nazi conspirators to be occupied principally by so-called “racial -Germans”; (3) to acquire still further territories in continental Europe -and elsewhere claimed by the Nazi conspirators to be required by the -“racial Germans” as “Lebensraum,” or living space, all at the expense of -neighboring and other countries. The aims and purposes of the Nazi -conspirators were not fixed or static, but evolved and expanded as they -acquired progressively greater power and became able to make more -effective application of threats of force and threats of aggressive war. -When their expanding aims and purposes became finally so great as to -provoke such strength of resistance as could be overthrown only by armed -force and aggressive war, and not simply by the opportunistic methods -theretofore used, such as fraud, deceit, threats, intimidation, -fifth-column activities, and propaganda, the Nazi conspirators -deliberately planned, determined upon and launched their aggressive wars -and wars in violation of international treaties, agreements, and -assurances by the phases and steps hereinafter more particularly -described. - -(C) Doctrinal techniques of the Common Plan or Conspiracy. - -To incite others to join in the Common Plan or Conspiracy, and as a -means of securing for the Nazi conspirators their highest degree of -control over the German community, they put forth, disseminated, and -exploited certain doctrines, among others, as follows: - -1. That persons of so-called “German blood” (as specified by the Nazi -conspirators) were a “master race” and were accordingly entitled to -subjugate, dominate, or exterminate other “races” and peoples; - -2. That the German people should be ruled under the Führerprinzip -(Leadership Principle) according to which power was to reside in a -Führer from whom sub-leaders were to derive authority in a hierarchical -order, each sub-leader to owe unconditional obedience to his immediate -superior but to be absolute in his own sphere of jurisdiction; and the -power of the leadership was to be unlimited, extending to all phases of -public and private life; - -3. That war was a noble and necessary activity of Germans; - -4. That the leadership of the Nazi Party, as the sole bearer of the -foregoing and other doctrines of the Nazi Party, was entitled to shape -the structure, policies, and practices of the German State and all -related institutions, to direct and supervise the activities of all -individuals within the State, and to destroy all opponents. - -(D) The acquiring of totalitarian control of Germany: political. - -1. First steps in acquisition of control of State machinery: - -In order to accomplish their aims and purposes, the Nazi conspirators -prepared to seize totalitarian control over Germany to assure that no -effective resistance against them could arise within Germany itself. -After the failure of the Munich Putsch of 1923 aimed at the overthrow of -the Weimar Republic by direct action, the Nazi conspirators set out -through the Nazi Party to undermine and capture the German Government by -“legal” forms supported by terrorism. They created and utilized, as a -Party formation, Die Sturmabteilungen (SA), a semi-military, voluntary -organization of young men trained for and committed to the use of -violence, whose mission was to make the Party the master of the streets. - -2. Control acquired: - -On 30 January 1933 Hitler became Chancellor of the German Republic. -After the Reichstag fire of 28 February 1933, clauses of the Weimar -constitution guaranteeing personal liberty, freedom of speech, of the -press, of association, and assembly were suspended. The Nazi -conspirators secured the passage by the Reichstag of a “Law for the -Protection of the People and the Reich” giving Hitler and the members of -his then cabinet plenary powers of legislation. The Nazi conspirators -retained such powers after having changed the members of the cabinet. -The conspirators caused all political parties except the Nazi Party to -be prohibited. They caused the Nazi Party to be established as a -para-governmental organization with extensive and extraordinary -privileges. - -3. Consolidation of control: - -Thus possessed of the machinery of the German State, the Nazi -conspirators set about the consolidation of their position of power -within Germany, the extermination of potential internal resistance, and -the placing of the German nation on a military footing, - -(a) The Nazi conspirators reduced the Reichstag to a body of their own -nominees and curtailed the freedom of popular elections throughout the -country. They transformed the several states, provinces, and -municipalities, which had formerly exercised semi-autonomous powers, -into hardly more than administrative organs of the central Government. -They united the offices of the President and the Chancellor in the -person of Hitler, instituted a widespread purge of civil servants, and -severely restricted the independence of the judiciary and rendered it -subservient to Nazi ends. The conspirators greatly enlarged existing -State and Party organizations, established a network of new State and -Party organizations, and “co-ordinated” State agencies with the Nazi -Party and its branches and affiliates, with the result that German life -was dominated by Nazi doctrine and practice and progressively mobilized -for the accomplishment of their aims. - -(b) In order to make their rule secure from attack and to instill fear -in the hearts of the German people, the Nazi conspirators established -and extended a system of terror against opponents and supposed or -suspected opponents of the regime. They imprisoned such persons without -judicial process, holding them in “protective custody” and concentration -camps, and subjected them to persecution, degradation, despoilment, -enslavement, torture, and murder. These concentration camps were -established early in 1933 under the direction of the Defendant Göring -and expanded as a fixed part of the terroristic policy and method of the -conspirators and used by them for the commission of the Crimes against -Humanity hereinafter alleged. Among the principal agencies utilized in -the perpetration of these crimes were the SS and the Gestapo, which, -together with other favored branches or agencies of the State and Party, -were permitted to operate without restraint of law. - -(c) The Nazi conspirators conceived that, in addition to the suppression -of distinctively political opposition, it was necessary to suppress or -exterminate certain other movements or groups which they regarded as -obstacles to their retention of total control in Germany and to the -aggressive aims of the conspiracy abroad. Accordingly: - -(1) The Nazi conspirators destroyed the free trade unions in Germany by -confiscating their funds and properties, persecuting their leaders, -prohibiting their activities, and supplanting them by an affiliated -Party organization. The Leadership Principle was introduced into -industrial relations, the entrepreneur becoming the leader and the -workers becoming his followers. Thus any potential resistance of the -workers was frustrated and the productive labor capacity of the German -nation was brought under the effective control of the conspirators. - -(2) The Nazi conspirators, by promoting beliefs and practices -incompatible with Christian teaching, sought to subvert the influence of -the churches over the people and in particular over the youth of -Germany. They avowed their aim to eliminate the Christian churches in -Germany and sought to substitute therefore Nazi institutions and Nazi -beliefs and pursued a program of persecution of priests, clergy, and -members of monastic orders whom they deemed opposed to their purposes, -and confiscated church property. - -(3) The persecution by the Nazi conspirators of pacifist groups, -including religious movements dedicated to pacifism, was particularly -relentless and cruel. - -(d) Implementing their “master race” policy, the conspirators joined in -a program of relentless persecution of the Jews, designed to exterminate -them. Annihilation of the Jews became an official State policy, carried -out both by official action and by incitements to mob and individual -violence. The conspirators openly avowed their purpose. For example, the -Defendant Rosenberg stated: “Anti-Semitism is the unifying element of -the reconstruction of Germany.” On another occasion he also stated: - - “Germany will regard the Jewish question as solved only after - the very last Jew has left the greater German living - space. . . . Europe will have its Jewish question solved only - after the very last Jew has left the continent.” - -The Defendant Ley declared: - - “We swear we are not going to abandon the struggle until the - last Jew in Europe has been exterminated and is actually dead. - It is not enough to isolate the Jewish enemy of mankind—the Jew - has got to be exterminated.” - -On another occasion he also declared: - - “The second German secret weapon is anti-Semitism, because if it - is consistently pursued by Germany, it will become a universal - problem which all nations will be forced to consider.” - -The Defendant Streicher declared: - - “The sun will not shine on the nations of the earth until the - last Jew is dead.” - -These avowals and incitements were typical of the declarations of the -Nazi conspirators throughout the course of their conspiracy. The program -of action against the Jews included disfranchisement, stigmatization, -denial of civil liberties, subjecting their persons and property to -violence, deportation, enslavement, enforced labor, starvation, murder -and mass extermination. The extent to which the conspirators succeeded -in their purpose can only be estimated, but the annihilation was -substantially complete in many localities of Europe. Of the 9,600,000 -Jews who lived in the parts of Europe under Nazi domination, it is -conservatively estimated that 5,700,000 have disappeared, most of them -deliberately put to death by the Nazi conspirators. Only remnants of the -Jewish population of Europe remain. - -(e) In order to make the German people amenable to their will, and to -prepare them psychologically for war, the Nazi conspirators reshaped the -educational system and particularly the education and training of the -German youth. The Leadership Principle was introduced into the schools, -and the Party and affiliated organizations were given wide supervisory -powers over education. The Nazi conspirators imposed a supervision of -all cultural activities, controlled the dissemination of information and -the expression of opinion within Germany as well as the movement of -intelligence of all kinds from and into Germany, and created a vast -propaganda machine. - -(f) The Nazi conspirators placed a considerable number of their -dominated organizations on a progressively militarized footing with a -view to the rapid transformation and use of such organizations whenever -necessary as instruments of war. - -(E) The acquiring of totalitarian control in Germany: economic; and the -economic planning and mobilization for aggressive war. - -Having gained political power, the conspirators organized Germany’s -economy to give effect to their political aims. - -1. In order to eliminate the possibility of resistance in the economic -sphere, they deprived labor of its rights of free industrial and -political association as particularized in paragraph (D) 3 (c) (1) -herein. - -2. They used organizations of German business as instruments of economic -mobilization for war. - -3. They directed Germany’s economy towards preparation and equipment of -the military machine. To this end they directed finance, capital -investment, and foreign trade. - -4. The Nazi conspirators, and in particular the industrialists among -them, embarked upon a huge re-armament program and set out to produce -and develop huge quantities of materials of war and to create a powerful -military potential. - -5. With the object of carrying through the preparation for war the Nazi -conspirators set up a series of administrative agencies and authorities. -For example, in 1936 they established for this purpose the office of the -Four Year Plan with the Defendant Göring as Plenipotentiary, vesting it -with overriding control over Germany’s economy. Furthermore, on 28 -August 1939, immediately before launching their aggression against -Poland, they appointed the Defendant Funk Plenipotentiary for Economics; -and on 30 August 1939 they set up the Ministerial Council for the -Defense of the Reich to act as a War Cabinet. - -(F) Utilization of Nazi control for foreign aggression. - -1. Status of the conspiracy by the middle of 1933 and projected plans. - -By the middle of the year 1933 the Nazi conspirators, having acquired -governmental control over Germany, were in a position to enter upon -further and more detailed planning with particular relationship to -foreign policy. Their plan was to re-arm and to reoccupy and fortify the -Rhineland, in violation of the Treaty of Versailles and other treaties, -in order to acquire military strength and political bargaining power to -be used against other nations. - -2. The Nazi conspirators decided that for their purpose the Treaty of -Versailles must definitely be abrogated and specific plans were made by -them and put into operation by 7 March 1936, all of which opened the way -for the major aggressive steps to follow, as hereinafter set forth. In -the execution of this phase of the conspiracy the Nazi conspirators did -the following acts: - -(a) They led Germany to enter upon a course of secret rearmament from -1933 to March 1935, including the training of military personnel and the -production of munitions of war, and the building of an air force. - -(b) On 14 October 1933 they led Germany to leave the International -Disarmament Conference and the League of Nations. - -(c) On 10 March 1935 the Defendant Göring announced that Germany was -building a military air force. - -(d) On 16 March 1935 the Nazi conspirators promulgated a law for -universal military service, in which they stated the peace time strength -of the German Army would be fixed at 500,000 men. - -(e) On 21 May 1935 they falsely announced to the world, with intent to -deceive and allay fears of aggressive intentions, that they would -respect the territorial limitations of the Versailles Treaty and comply -with the Locarno Pacts. - -(f) On 7 March 1936 they reoccupied and fortified the Rhineland, in -violation of the Treaty of Versailles and the Rhine Pact of Locarno of -16 October 1925, and falsely announced to the world that “we have no -territorial demands to make in Europe.” - -3. Aggressive action against Austria and Czechoslovakia. - -(a) The 1936-38 phase of the plan: planning for the assault on Austria -and Czechoslovakia. - -The Nazi conspirators next entered upon the specific planning for the -acquisition of Austria and Czechoslovakia, realizing it would be -necessary, for military reasons, first to seize Austria before -assaulting Czechoslovakia. On 21 May 1935 in a speech to the Reichstag, -Hitler stated that: - - “Germany neither intends, nor wishes to interfere in the - internal affairs of Austria, to annex Austria or to conclude an - Anschluss.” - -On 1 May 1936, within 2 months after the re-occupation of the Rhineland, -Hitler stated: - - “The lie goes forth again that Germany tomorrow or the day after - will fall upon Austria or Czechoslovakia.” - -Thereafter, the Nazi conspirators caused a treaty to be entered into -between Austria and Germany on 11 July 1936, Article I of which stated -that: - - “The German Government recognizes the full sovereignty of the - Federated State of Austria in the spirit of the pronouncements - of the German Führer and Chancellor of 21 May 1935.” - -Meanwhile, plans for aggression in violation of that treaty were being -made. By the autumn of 1937 all noteworthy opposition within the Reich -had been crushed. Military preparation for the Austrian action was -virtually concluded. An influential group of the Nazi conspirators met -with Hitler on 5 November 1937, to review the situation. It was -reaffirmed that Nazi Germany must have “Lebensraum” in Central Europe. -It was recognized that such conquest would probably meet resistance -which would have to be crushed by force and that their decision might -lead to a general war, but this prospect was discounted as a risk worth -taking. There emerged from this meeting three possible plans for the -conquest of Austria and Czechoslovakia. Which of the three was to be -used was to depend upon the developments in the political and military -situation in Europe. It was contemplated during this meeting that the -conquest of Austria and Czechoslovakia would, through compulsory -emigration of 2 million persons from Czechoslovakia and 1 million -persons from Austria, provide additional food to the Reich for 5 million -to 6 million people, strengthen it militarily by providing shorter and -better frontiers, and make possible the constituting of new armies up to -about twelve divisions. Thus, the aim of the plan against Austria and -Czechoslovakia was conceived of not as an end in itself but as a -preparatory measure toward the next aggressive steps in the Nazi -conspiracy. - -(b) The execution of the plan to invade Austria: November 1937 to March -1938. - -Hitler, on 8 February 1938, called Chancellor Schuschnigg to a -conference at Berchtesgaden. At the meeting of 12 February 1938, under -threat of invasion, Schuschnigg yielded a promise of amnesty to -imprisoned Nazis and appointment of Nazis to ministerial posts—meaning -in Austria. He agreed to remain silent until Hitler’s next speech in -which Austria’s independence was to be re-affirmed, but Hitler in that -speech, instead of affirming Austrian independence, declared himself -protector of all Germans. Meanwhile, subversive activities of Nazis in -Austria increased. Schuschnigg, on 9 March 1938, announced a plebiscite -for the following Sunday on the question of Austrian independence. On 11 -March Hitler sent an ultimatum, demanding that the plebiscite be called -off or that Germany would invade Austria. Later the same day a second -ultimatum threatened invasion unless Schuschnigg should resign in 3 -hours. Schuschnigg resigned. The Defendant Seyss-Inquart, who was -appointed Chancellor, immediately invited Hitler to send German troops -into Austria to “preserve order.” The invasion began on 12 March 1938. -On 13 March Hitler by proclamation assumed office as Chief of State of -Austria and took command of its armed forces. By a law of the same date -Austria was annexed to Germany. - -(c) The execution of the plan to invade Czechoslovakia: April 1938 to -March 1939. - -(1) Simultaneously with their annexation of Austria, the Nazi -conspirators gave false assurances to the Czechoslovak Government that -they would not attack that country. But within a month they met to plan -specific ways and means of attacking Czechoslovakia, and to revise, in -the light of the acquisition of Austria, the previous plans for -aggression against Czechoslovakia. - -(2) On 21 April 1938 the Nazi conspirators met and prepared to launch an -attack on Czechoslovakia not later than 1 October 1938. They planned to -create an “incident” to “justify” the attack. They decided to launch a -military attack only after a period of diplomatic squabbling which, -growing more serious, would lead to an excuse for war, or, in the -alternative, to unleash a lightning attack as a result of an “incident” -of their own creation. Consideration was given to assassinating the -German Ambassador at Prague to create the requisite incident. From and -after 21 April 1938, the Nazi conspirators caused to be prepared -detailed and precise military plans designed to carry out such an attack -at any opportune moment and calculated to overthrow all Czech resistance -within 4 days, thus presenting the world with a _fait accompli_, and so -forestalling outside resistance. Throughout the months of May, June, -July, August, and September, these plans were made more specific and -detailed, and by 3 September 1938 it was decided that all troops were to -be ready for action on 28 September 1938. - -(3) Throughout this same period, the Nazi conspirators were agitating -the minorities question in Czechoslovakia, and particularly in the -Sudetenland, leading to a diplomatic crisis in August and September -1938. After the Nazi conspirators threatened war, the United Kingdom and -France concluded a pact with Germany and Italy at Munich on 29 September -1938, involving the cession of the Sudetenland by Czechoslovakia to -Germany. Czechoslovakia was required to acquiesce. On 1 October 1938 -German troops occupied the Sudetenland. - -(4) On 15 March 1939, contrary to the provisions of the Munich Pact -itself, the Nazi conspirators caused the completion of their plan by -seizing and occupying the major part of Czechoslovakia, i.e. Bohemia and -Moravia, not ceded to Germany by the Munich Pact. - -4. Formulation of the plan to attack Poland: preparation and initiation -of aggressive war: March 1939 to September 1939. - -(a) With these aggressions successfully consummated, the conspirators -had obtained much desired resources and bases and were ready to -undertake further aggressions by means of war. Following the assurances -to the world of peaceful intentions, an influential group of the -conspirators met on 23 May 1939 to consider the further implementation -of their plan. The situation was reviewed, and it was observed that “the -past six years have been put to good use and all measures have been -taken in correct sequence and in accordance with our aims,” that the -national-political unity of the Germans had been substantially achieved, -and that further successes could not be achieved without war and -bloodshed. It was decided nevertheless next to attack Poland at the -first suitable opportunity. It was admitted that the questions -concerning Danzig which they had agitated with Poland were not true -questions, but rather that the question was one of aggressive expansion -for food and “Lebensraum.” It was recognized that Poland would fight if -attacked and that a repetition of the Nazi success against -Czechoslovakia without war could not be expected. Accordingly, it was -determined that the problem was to isolate Poland and, if possible, -prevent a simultaneous conflict with the Western Powers. Nevertheless, -it was agreed that England was an enemy to their aspirations, and that -war with England and her ally France must eventually result, and -therefore that in that war every attempt must be made to overwhelm -England with a “Blitzkrieg”, or lightning war. It was thereupon -determined immediately to prepare detailed plans for an attack on Poland -at the first suitable opportunity and thereafter for an attack on -England and France, together with plans for the simultaneous occupation -by armed force of air bases in the Netherlands and Belgium. - -(b) Accordingly, after having denounced the German-Polish Pact of 1934 -on false grounds, the Nazi conspirators proceeded to stir up the Danzig -issue, to prepare frontier “incidents” to “justify” the attack, and to -make demands for the cession of Polish territory. Upon refusal by Poland -to yield, they caused German Armed Forces to invade Poland on 1 -September 1939, thus precipitating war also with the United Kingdom and -France. - -5. Expansion of the war into a general war of aggression: planning and -execution of attacks on Denmark, Norway, Belgium, the Netherlands, -Luxembourg, Yugoslavia, and Greece: 1939 to April 1941. - -Thus the aggressive war prepared for by the Nazi conspirators through -their attacks on Austria and Czechoslovakia was actively launched by -their attack on Poland, in violation of the terms of the Briand-Kellogg -Pact, 1928. After the total defeat of Poland, in order to facilitate the -carrying out of their military operations against France and the United -Kingdom, the Nazi conspirators made active preparations for an extension -of the war in Europe. In accordance with these plans, they caused the -German Armed Forces to invade Denmark and Norway on 9 April 1940; -Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg on 10 May 1940; Yugoslavia and -Greece on 6 April 1941. All these invasions had been specifically -planned in advance. - -6. German invasion on 22 June 1941 of the U.S.S.R. territory in -violation of the Non-Aggression Pact of 23 August 1939. - -On 22 June 1941 the Nazi conspirators deceitfully denounced the -Non-Aggression Pact between Germany and the U.S.S.R. and without any -declaration of war invaded Soviet territory, thereby beginning a war of -aggression against the U.S.S.R. - -From the first day of launching their attack on Soviet territory the -Nazi conspirators, in accordance with their detailed plans, began to -carry out the destruction of cities, towns, and villages, the demolition -of factories, collective farms, electric stations, and railroads, the -robbery and barbaric devastation of the natural cultural institutions of -the peoples of the U.S.S.R., the devastation of museums, churches, -historic monuments, the mass deportation of the Soviet citizens for -slave labor to Germany, as well as the annihilation of old people, -women, and children, especially Bielorussians and Ukrainians. The -extermination of Jews was committed throughout the territory of the -Soviet Union. - -The above-mentioned criminal offenses were perpetrated by the German -troops in accordance with the orders of the Nazi Government and the -General Staff and High Command of the German Armed Forces. - -7. Collaboration with Italy and Japan and aggressive war against the -United States: November 1936 to December 1941. - -After the initiation of the Nazi wars of aggression the Nazi -conspirators brought about a German-Italian-Japanese 10-year -military-economic alliance signed at Berlin on 27 September 1940. This -agreement, representing a strengthening of the bonds among those three -nations established by the earlier but more limited pact of 25 November -1936, stated: “The Governments of Germany, Italy, and Japan, considering -it as a condition precedent of any lasting peace that all nations of the -world be given each its own proper place, have decided to stand by and -co-operate with one another in regard of their efforts in Greater East -Asia and regions of Europe respectively wherein it is their prime -purpose to establish and maintain a new order of things calculated to -promote the mutual prosperity and welfare of the peoples concerned.” The -Nazi conspirators conceived that Japanese aggression would weaken and -handicap those nations with which they were at war, and those with whom -they contemplated war. Accordingly, the Nazi conspirators exhorted Japan -to seek “a new order of things.” Taking advantage of the wars of -aggression then being waged by the Nazi conspirators, Japan commenced an -attack on 7 December 1941 against the United States of America at Pearl -Harbor and the Philippines, and against the British Commonwealth of -Nations, French Indo-China, and the Netherlands in the Southwest -Pacific. Germany declared war against the United States on 11 December -1941. - -(G) War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity committed in the course of -executing the conspiracy for which the conspirators are responsible. - -1. Beginning with the initiation of the aggressive war on 1 September -1939, and throughout its extension into wars involving almost the entire -world, the Nazi conspirators carried out their Common Plan or Conspiracy -to wage war in ruthless and complete disregard and violation of the laws -and customs of war. In the course of executing the Common Plan or -Conspiracy, there were committed the War Crimes detailed hereinafter in -Count Three of this Indictment. - -2. Beginning with the initiation of their plan to seize and retain total -control of the German State, and thereafter throughout their utilization -of that control for foreign aggression, the Nazi conspirators carried -out their Common Plan or Conspiracy in ruthless and complete disregard -and violation of the laws of humanity. In the course of executing the -Common Plan or Conspiracy there were committed the Crimes against -Humanity detailed hereinafter in Count Four of this Indictment. - -3. By reason of all the foregoing, the defendants with divers other -persons are guilty of a Common Plan or Conspiracy for the accomplishment -of Crimes against Peace; of a conspiracy to commit Crimes against -Humanity in the course of preparation for war and in the course of -prosecution of war, and of a conspiracy to commit War Crimes not only -against the armed forces of their enemies but also against -non-belligerent civilian populations. - -(H) Individual, group and organization responsibility for the offense -stated in Count One. - -Reference is hereby made to Appendix A of this Indictment for a -statement of the responsibility of the individual defendants for the -offense set forth in this Count One of the Indictment. Reference is -hereby made to Appendix B of this Indictment for a statement of the -responsibility of the groups and organizations named herein as criminal -groups and organizations for the offenses set forth in this Count One of -the Indictment. - -If the Tribunal please, that ends Count One, which is America’s -responsibility. Great Britain will present Count Two. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If your Lordships please: - -COUNT TWO—CRIMES AGAINST PEACE. Charter, Article 6 (a). - -V. _Statement of the Offense._ - -All the defendants with divers other persons, during a period of years -preceding 8 May 1945, participated in the planning, preparation, -initiation, and waging of wars of aggression, which were also wars in -violation of international treaties, agreements, and assurances. - -VI. _Particulars of the Wars Planned, Prepared, Initiated, and Waged._ - -(A) The wars referred to in the statement of offense in this Count Two -of the Indictment and the dates of their initiation were the following: -against Poland, 1 September 1939; against the United Kingdom and France, -3 September 1939; against Denmark and Norway, 9 April 1940; against -Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg, 10 May 1940; against -Yugoslavia and Greece, 6 April 1941; against the U.S.S.R., 22 June 1941; -and against the United States of America, 11 December 1941. - -(B) Reference is hereby made to Count One of the Indictment for the -allegations charging that these wars were wars of aggression on the part -of the defendants. - -(C) Reference is hereby made to Appendix C annexed to this Indictment -for a statement of particulars of the charges of violations of -international treaties, agreements, and assurances caused by the -defendants in the course of planning, preparing, and initiating these -wars. - -VII. _Individual, Group and Organization Responsibility for the Offense -Stated in Count Two._ - -Reference is hereby made to Appendix A of this Indictment for a -statement of the responsibility of the individual defendants for the -offense set forth in this Count Two of the Indictment. Reference is -hereby made to Appendix B of this Indictment for a statement of the -responsibility of the groups and organizations named herein as criminal -groups and organizations for the offense set forth in this Count Two of -the Indictment. - -That finishes, Mr. President, Count Two of the Indictment. - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will now adjourn for 15 minutes. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If your Lordship pleases, the reading will be -resumed by a representative of the French Republic. - - [_A recess was taken._] - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal understands that the Defendant Ernst -Kaltenbrunner is temporarily ill. The Trial will continue in his -absence. I call upon the Chief Prosecutor for the Provisional Government -of the French Republic. - -M. PIERRE MOUNIER (Assistant Prosecutor for the French Republic): - -COUNT THREE—WAR CRIMES. Charter, Article 6, especially 6 (b). - -VIII. _Statement of the Offense._ - -All the defendants committed War Crimes between 1 September 1939 and 8 -May 1945, in Germany and in all those countries and territories occupied -by the German Armed Forces since 1 September 1939, and in Austria, -Czechoslovakia, and Italy, and on the High Seas. - -All the defendants, acting in concert with others, formulated and -executed a Common Plan or Conspiracy to commit War Crimes as defined in -Article 6 (b) of the Charter. This plan involved, among other things, -the practice of “total war” including methods of combat and of military -occupation in direct conflict with the laws and customs of war, and the -perpetration of crimes committed on the field of battle during -encounters with enemy armies, against prisoners of war, and in occupied -territories against the civilian population of such territories. - -The said War Crimes were committed by the defendants and by other -persons for whose acts the defendants are responsible (under Article 6 -of the Charter) as such other persons when committing the said War -Crimes performed their acts in execution of a Common Plan and Conspiracy -to commit the said War Crimes, in the formulation and execution of which -plan and conspiracy all the defendants participated as leaders, -organizers, instigators, and accomplices. - -These methods and crimes constituted violations of international -conventions, of internal penal laws, and of the general principles of -criminal law as derived from the criminal law of all civilized nations, -and were involved in and part of a systematic course of conduct. - -(A) Murder and ill-treatment of civilian populations of or in occupied -territory and on the High Seas. - -Throughout the period of their occupation of territories overrun by -their armed forces, the defendants, for the purpose of systematically -terrorizing the inhabitants, ill-treated civilians, imprisoned them -without legal process, tortured, and murdered them. - -The murders and ill-treatment were carried out by divers means, such as -shooting, hanging, gassing, starvation, gross overcrowding, systematic -undernutrition, systematic imposition of labor tasks beyond the strength -of those ordered to carry them out, inadequate provision of surgical and -medical services, kickings, beatings, brutality and torture of all -kinds, including the use of hot irons and pulling out of fingernails and -the performance of experiments by means of operations and otherwise on -living human subjects. In some occupied territories the defendants -interfered with religious services, persecuted members of the clergy and -monastic orders, and expropriated church property. They conducted -deliberate and systematic genocide; viz., the extermination of racial -and national groups, against the civilian population of certain occupied -territories in order to destroy particular races and classes of people, -and national, racial, or religious groups, particularly Jews, Poles, and -Gypsies. - -Civilians were systematically subjected to tortures of all kinds, with -the object of obtaining information. - -Civilians of occupied countries were subjected systematically to -“protective arrests”, that is to say they were arrested and imprisoned -without any trial and any of the ordinary protections of the law, and -they were imprisoned under the most unhealthy and inhumane conditions. - -In the concentration camps were many prisoners who were classified -“Nacht und Nebel”. These were entirely cut off from the world and were -allowed neither to receive nor to send letters. They disappeared without -trace and no announcement of their fate was ever made by the German -authorities. - -Such crimes and ill-treatment are contrary to international conventions, -in particular to Article 46 of the Hague Regulations, 1907, the laws and -customs of war, the general principles of criminal law as derived from -the criminal laws of all civilized nations, the internal penal laws of -the countries in which such crimes were committed, and to Article 6 (b) -of the Charter. - -The following particulars and all the particulars appearing later in -this Count are set out herein by way of example only, are not exclusive -of other particular cases, and are stated without prejudice to the right -of the Prosecution to adduce evidence of other cases of murder and -ill-treatment of civilians. - -1. In France, Belgium, Holland, Denmark, Norway, Luxembourg, Italy, and -the Channel Islands, (hereinafter called the “Western Countries”), and -in that part of Germany which lies west of a line drawn due north and -south through the center of Berlin (hereinafter called “Western -Germany”). - -Such murder and ill-treatment took place in concentration camps and -similar establishments set up by the defendants, and particularly in the -concentration camps set up at Belsen, Buchenwald, Dachau, Breendonck, -Grini, Natzweiler, Ravensbrück, Vught, and Amersfoort, and in numerous -cities, towns, and villages, including Oradour sur Glane, Trondheim, and -Oslo. - -Crimes committed in France or against French citizens took the following -forms: - -Arbitrary arrests were carried out under political or racial pretexts; -they were either individual or collective; notably in Paris (round-up of -the 18th Arrondissement by the Field Gendarmerie, round-up of the Jewish -population of the 11th Arrondissement in August 1941, round-up in July -1942); at Clermont-Ferrand (round-up of professors and students of the -University of Strasbourg, which had been evacuated to Clermont-Ferrand, -on 25 November 1943); at Lyons; at Marseilles (round-up of 40,000 -persons in January 1943); at Grenoble (round-up of 24 December 1943); at -Cluny (round-up on 24 December 1943); at Figeac (round-up in May 1944); -at Saint Pol de Léon (round-up in July 1944); at Locminé (round-up on 3 -July 1944); at Eysieux (round-up in May 1944); and at Meaux-Moussey -(round-up in September 1944). These arrests were followed by brutal -treatment and tortures carried out by the most diverse methods, such as -immersion in icy water, asphyxiation, torture of the limbs, and the use -of instruments of torture, such as the iron helmet and electric current, -and practiced in all the prisons of France, notably in Paris, Lyons, -Marseilles, Rennes, Metz, Clermont-Ferrand, Toulouse, Nice, Grenoble, -Annecy, Arras, Béthune, Lille, Loos, Valenciennes, Nancy, Troyes, and -Caen, and in the torture chambers fitted up at the Gestapo centers. - -In the concentration camps, the health regime and the labor regime were -such that the rate of mortality (alleged to be from natural causes) -attained enormous proportions, for instance: - -1. Out of a convoy of 250 French women deported from Compiègne to -Auschwitz in January 1943, 180 had died of exhaustion at the end of 4 -months. - -2. 143 Frenchmen died of exhaustion between 23 March and 6 May 1943 in -Block 8 at Dachau. - -3. 1,797 Frenchmen died of exhaustion between 21 November 1943 and 15 -March 1945 in the block at Dora. - -4. 465 Frenchmen died of general debility in November 1944 at Dora. - -5. 22,761 deportees died of exhaustion at Buchenwald between 1 January -1943 and 15 April 1945. - -6. 11,560 detainees died of exhaustion at Dachau Camp (most of them in -Block 30 reserved for the sick and the infirm) between 1 January and 15 -April 1945. - -7. 780 priests died of exhaustion at Mauthausen. - -8. Out of 2,200 Frenchmen registered at Flossenburg Camp, 1,600 died -from supposedly natural causes. - -Methods used for the work of extermination in concentration camps were: - -Bad treatment, pseudo-scientific experiments (sterilization of women at -Auschwitz and at Ravensbrück, study of the evolution of cancer of the -womb at Auschwitz, of typhus at Buchenwald, anatomical research at -Natzweiler, heart injections at Buchenwald, bone grafting and muscular -excisions at Ravensbrück, _et cetera_), and by gas chambers, gas wagons, -and crematory ovens. Of 228,000 French political and racial deportees in -concentration camps, only 28,000 survived. - -In France also systematic extermination was practised, notably at Asq on -1 April 1944, at Colpo on 22 July 1944, at Buzet sur Tarn on 6 July 1944 -and on 17 August 1944, at Pluvignier on 8 July 1944, at Rennes on 8 June -1944, at Grenoble on 8 July 1944, at Saint Flour on 10 June 1944, at -Ruisnes on 10 June 1944, at Nimes, at Tulle, and at Nice, where, in July -1944, the victims of torture were exposed to the population, and at -Oradour sur Glane where the entire village population was shot or burned -alive in the church. - -The many charnel pits give proof of anonymous massacres. Most notable of -these are the charnel pits of Paris (Cascade du Bois de Boulogne), -Lyons, Saint Genis-Laval, Besançon, Petit Saint Bernard, Aulnat, Caen, -Port Louis, Charleval, Fontainebleau, Bouconne, Gabaudet, L’hermitage -Lorges, Morlaas, Bordelongue, Signe. - -In the course of a premeditated campaign of terrorism, initiated in -Denmark by the Germans in the latter part of 1943, 600 Danish subjects -were murdered and, in addition, throughout the German occupation of -Denmark large numbers of Danish subjects were subjected to torture and -ill-treatment of all sorts. In addition, approximately five hundred -Danish subjects were murdered, by torture and otherwise, in German -prisons and concentration camps. - -In Belgium, between 1940 and 1944, torture by various means, but -identical in each place, was carried out at Brussels, Liége, Mons, -Ghent, Namur, Antwerp, Tournai, Arlon, Charleroi, and Dinant. - -At Vught, in Holland, when the camp was evacuated, about four hundred -persons were shot. - -In Luxembourg, during the German occupation, 500 persons were murdered -and, in addition, another 521 were illegally executed, by order of such -special tribunals as the so-called “Sondergericht”. Many more persons in -Luxembourg were subjected to torture and ill-treatment by the Gestapo. -At least 4,000 Luxembourg nationals were imprisoned during the period of -German occupation, and of these at least 400 were murdered. - -Between March 1944 and April 1945, in Italy, at least 7,500 men, women, -and children, ranging in years from infancy to extreme old age were -murdered by the German soldiery at Civitella, in the Ardeatine Caves in -Rome, and at other places. - -(B) Deportation, for slave labor and for other purposes, of the civilian -populations of and in occupied territories. - -During the whole period of the occupation by Germany of both the Western -and the Eastern Countries, it was the policy of the German Government -and of the German High Command to deport able-bodied citizens from such -occupied countries to Germany and to other occupied countries to force -them to work on fortifications, in factories, and in other tasks -connected with the German war effort. - -In pursuance of such policy there were mass deportations from all the -Western and Eastern Countries for such purposes during the whole period -of the occupation. - -These deportations were contrary to the international conventions, in -particular to Article 46 of the Hague Regulations, 1907, the laws and -customs of war, the general principles of criminal law as derived from -the criminal laws of all civilized nations, the internal penal laws of -the countries in which such crimes were committed, and to Article 6 (b) -of the Charter. - -Particulars of deportations, by way of example only and without -prejudice to the production of evidence of other cases, are as follows: - -1. From the Western Countries: - -From France the following “deportations” of persons for political and -racial reasons took place—each of which consisted of from 1,500 to -2,500 deportees: - -1940, 3 transports; 1941, 14 transports; 1942, 104 transports; 1943, 257 -transports; 1944, 326 transports. - -These deportees were subjected to the most barbarous conditions of -overcrowding; they were provided with wholly insufficient clothing and -were given little or no food for several days. - -The conditions of transport were such that many deportees died in the -course of the voyage, for example: - -In one of the wagons of the train which left Compiègne for Buchenwald, -on the 17th of September 1943, 80 men died out of 130. - -On 4 June 1944, 484 bodies were taken out of a train at Sarrebourg. - -In a train which left Compiègne on 2 July 1944 for Dachau, more than 600 -dead were found on arrival, i.e. one-third of the total number. - -In a train which left Compiègne on 16th of January 1944 for Buchenwald, -more than 100 persons were confined in each wagon, the dead and the -wounded being heaped in the last wagon during the voyage. - -In April 1945, of 12,000 internees evacuated from Buchenwald 4,000 only -were still alive when the marching column arrived near Regensburg. - -During the German occupation of Denmark, 5,200 Danish subjects were -deported to Germany and there imprisoned in concentration camps and -other places. - -In 1942 and thereafter, 6,000 nationals of Luxembourg were deported from -their country under deplorable conditions and many of them perished. - -From Belgium, between 1940 and 1944, at least 190,000 civilians were -deported to Germany and used as slave labor. Such deportees were -subjected to ill-treatment and many of them were compelled to work in -armament factories. - -From Holland, between 1940 and 1944, nearly half a million civilians -were deported to Germany and to other occupied countries. - -(C) Murder and ill-treatment of prisoners of war, and of other members -of the armed forces of the countries with whom Germany was at war, and -of persons on the High Seas. - -The defendants ill-treated and murdered prisoners of war by denying them -suitable food, shelter, clothing, and medical care and other attention; -by forcing them to labor in inhumane conditions; by humiliating them, -torturing them, and by killing them. The German Government and the -German High Command imprisoned prisoners of war in various concentration -camps, where they were killed or subjected to inhuman treatment by the -various methods set forth in Paragraph VIII (A). - -Members of the armed forces of the countries with whom Germany was at -war were frequently murdered while in the act of surrendering. - -These murders and ill-treatment were contrary to international -conventions, particularly Articles 4, 5, 6, and 7 of the Hague -Regulations, 1907, and to Articles 2, 3, 4, and 6 of the Prisoners of -War Convention, Geneva, 1929, the laws and customs of war, the general -principles of criminal law as derived from the criminal laws of all -civilized nations, the internal penal laws of the countries in which -such crimes were committed, and to Article 6 (b) of the Charter. - -Particulars by way of example and without prejudice to the production of -evidence of other cases, are as follows: - -In the Western Countries: - -French officers who escaped from Oflag X C were handed over to the -Gestapo and disappeared; others were murdered by their guards; others -sent to concentration camps and exterminated. Among others, the men of -Stalag VI C were sent to Buchenwald. - -Frequently prisoners captured on the Western Front were obliged to march -to the camps until they completely collapsed. Some of them walked more -than 600 kilometers with hardly any food; they marched on for 48 hours -running, without being fed; among them a certain number died of -exhaustion or of hunger; stragglers were systematically murdered. - -The same crimes were committed in 1943, 1944, and 1945, when the -occupants of the camps were withdrawn before the Allied advance, -particularly during the withdrawal of the prisoners from Sagan on -February 8th, 1945. - -Bodily punishments were inflicted upon non-commissioned officers and -cadets who refused to work. On December 24th, 1943, three French -non-commissioned officers were murdered for that motive in Stalag IV A. -Much ill-treatment was inflicted without motive on other ranks; stabbing -with bayonets, striking with rifle-butts, and whipping; in Stalag XX B -the sick themselves were beaten many times by sentries; in Stalag III B -and Stalag III C worn-out prisoners were murdered or grievously wounded. -In military jails, in Graudenz for instance, in reprisal camps, as in -Rava-Ruska, the food was so insufficient that the men lost more than 15 -kilograms in a few weeks. In May 1942, one loaf of bread only was -distributed in Rava-Ruska to each group of 35 men. - -Orders were given to transfer French officers in chains to the camp of -Mauthausen after they had tried to escape. At their arrival in camp they -were murdered, either by shooting or by gas, and their bodies destroyed -in the crematorium. - -American prisoners, officers and men, were murdered in Normandy during -the summer of 1944 and in the Ardennes in December 1944. American -prisoners were starved, beaten, and mutilated in various ways in -numerous Stalags in Germany or in the occupied countries, particularly -in 1943, 1944, and 1945. - -(D) Killing of hostages. - -Throughout the territories occupied by the German Armed Forces in the -course of waging their aggressive wars, the defendants adopted and put -into effect on a wide scale the practice of taking and killing hostages -from the civilian population. These acts were contrary to international -conventions, particularly Article 50 of the Hague Regulations, 1907, the -laws and customs of war, the general principles of criminal law as -derived from the criminal laws of all civilized nations, the internal -penal laws of the countries in which such crimes were committed, and to -Article 6 (b) of the Charter. - -Particulars, by way of example and without prejudice to the production -of evidence of other cases, are as follows: - -In the Western Countries: - -In France hostages were executed either individually or collectively; -these executions took place in all the big cities of France, among -others in Paris, Bordeaux, and Nantes, as well as at Chateaubriant. - -In Holland many hundreds of hostages were shot at the following among -other places: Rotterdam, Apeldoorn, Amsterdam, Benshop, and Haarlem. - -In Belgium many hundreds of hostages were shot during the period 1940 to -1944. - -M. CHARLES GERTHOFFER (Assistant Prosecutor for the French Republic) -[_Continuing the reading of the Indictment_]: - -(E) Plunder of public and private property. - -The defendants ruthlessly exploited the people and the material -resources of the countries they occupied, in order to strengthen the -Nazi war machine, to depopulate and impoverish the rest of Europe, to -enrich themselves and their adherents, and to promote German economic -supremacy over Europe. - -The defendants engaged in the following acts and practices, among -others: - -1. They degraded the standard of life of the people of occupied -countries and caused starvation by stripping occupied countries of -foodstuffs for removal to Germany. - -2. They seized raw materials and industrial machinery in all of the -occupied countries, removed them to Germany and used them in the -interest of the German war effort and the German economy. - -3. In all the occupied countries, in varying degrees, they confiscated -businesses, plants, and other property. - -4. In an attempt to give color of legality to illegal acquisitions of -property, they forced owners of property to go through the forms of -“voluntary” and “legal” transfers. - -5. They established comprehensive controls over the economies of all of -the occupied countries and directed their resources, their production, -and their labor in the interests of the German war economy, depriving -the local populations of the products of essential industries. - -6. By a variety of financial mechanisms, they despoiled all of the -occupied countries of essential commodities and accumulated wealth, -debased the local currency systems and disrupted the local economies. -They financed extensive purchases in occupied countries through clearing -arrangements by which they exacted loans from the occupied countries. -They imposed occupation levies, exacted financial contributions, and -issued occupation currency, far in excess of occupation costs. They used -these excess funds to finance the purchase of business properties and -supplies in the occupied countries. - -7. They abrogated the rights of the local populations in the occupied -portions of the U.S.S.R. and in Poland and in other countries to develop -or manage agricultural and industrial properties, and reserved this area -for exclusive settlement, development, and ownership by Germans and -their so-called racial brethren. - -8. In further development of their plan of criminal exploitation, they -destroyed industrial cities, cultural monuments, scientific -institutions, and property of all types in the occupied territories to -eliminate the possibility of competition with Germany. - -9. From their program of terror, slavery, spoliation, and organized -outrage, the Nazi conspirators created an instrument for the personal -profit and aggrandizement of themselves and their adherents. They -secured for themselves and their adherents: - -(a) Positions in administration of business involving power, influence, -and lucrative prerequisites; - -(b) The use of cheap forced labor; - -(c) The acquisition on advantageous terms of foreign properties, raw -materials, and business interests; - -(d) The basis for the industrial supremacy of Germany. - -These acts were contrary to international conventions, particularly -Articles 46 to 56 inclusive of the Hague Regulations, 1907, the laws and -customs of war, the general principles of criminal law as derived from -the criminal laws of all civilized nations, the internal penal laws of -the countries in which such crimes were committed, and to Article 6 (b) -of the Charter. - -Particulars, by way of example and without prejudice to the production -of evidence of other cases, are as follows: - -1. Western Countries: - -There was plundered from the Western Countries from 1940 to 1944, works -of art, artistic objects, pictures, plastics, furniture, textiles, -antique pieces, and similar articles of enormous value to the number of -21,903. - -In France statistics show the following: - -Removal of raw materials: - -Coal, 63,000,000 tons; electric energy, 20,976 Mkwh; petrol and fuel, -1,943,750 tons; iron ore, 74,848,000 tons; siderurgical products, -3,822,000 tons; bauxite, 1,211,800 tons; cement, 5,984,000 tons; lime, -1,888,000 tons; quarry products, 25,872,000 tons; and various other -products to a total value of 79,961,423,000 francs. - -Removal of industrial equipment: total—9,759,861,000 francs, of which -2,626,479,000 francs of machine tools. - -Removal of agricultural produce: total—126,655,852,000 francs; i.e. for -the principal products: - -Wheat, 2,947,337 tons; oats, 2,354,080 tons; milk, 790,000 hectolitres, -(concentrated and in powder, 460,000 hectolitres); butter, 76,000 tons, -cheese, 49,000 tons; potatoes, 725,975 tons; various vegetables, 575,000 -tons; wine, 7,647,000 hectolitres; champagne, 87,000,000 bottles; beer -3,821,520 hectolitres; various kinds of alcohol, 1,830,000 hectolitres. - -Removal of manufactured products to a total of 184,640,000,000 francs. - -Plundering: Francs 257,020,024,000 from private enterprise, Francs -55,000,100,000 from the State. - -Financial exploitation: From June 1940 to September 1944 the French -Treasury was compelled to pay to Germany 631,866,000,000 francs. - -Looting and destruction of works of art: The museums of Nantes, Nancy, -Old-Marseilles were looted. - -Private collections of great value were stolen. In this way, Raphaels, -Vermeers, Van Dycks, and works of Rubens, Holbein, Rembrandt, Watteau, -Boucher disappeared. Germany compelled France to deliver up “The Mystic -Lamb” by Van Eyck, which Belgium had entrusted to her. - -In Norway and other occupied countries decrees were made by which the -property of many civilians, societies, _et cetera_, was confiscated. An -immense amount of property of every kind was plundered from France, -Belgium, Norway, Holland, and Luxembourg. - -As a result of the economic plundering of Belgium between 1940 and 1944 -the damage suffered amounted to 175 billions of Belgian francs. - -(F) The exaction of collective penalties. - -The Germans pursued a systematic policy of inflicting, in all the -occupied countries, collective penalties, pecuniary and otherwise, upon -the population for acts of individuals for which it could not be -regarded as collectively responsible; this was done at many places, -including Oslo, Stavanger, Trondheim, and Rogaland. - -Similar instances occurred in France, among others in Dijon, Nantes, and -as regards the Jewish population in the occupied territories. The total -amount of fines imposed on French communities adds up to 1,157,179,484 -francs made up as follows: A fine on the Jewish population, -1,000,000,000; various fines, 157,179,484. - -These acts violated Article 50, Hague Regulations, 1907, the laws and -customs of war, the general principles of criminal law as derived from -the criminal laws of all civilized nations, the internal penal laws of -the countries in which such crimes were committed, and Article 6 (b) of -the Charter. - -(G) Wanton destruction of cities, towns, and villages, and devastation -not justified by military necessity. - -The defendants wantonly destroyed cities, towns, and villages, and -committed other acts of devastation without military justification or -necessity. These acts violated Articles 46 and 50 of the Hague -Regulations, 1907, the laws and customs of war, the general principles -of criminal law as derived from the criminal laws of all civilized -nations, the internal penal laws of the countries in which such crimes -were committed, and Article 6 (b) of the Charter. - -Particulars, by way of example only and without prejudice to the -production of evidence of other cases, are as follows: - -1. Western Countries: - -In March 1941 part of Lofoten in Norway was destroyed. In April 1942 the -town of Telerag in Norway was destroyed. - -Entire villages were destroyed in France, among others, Oradour sur -Glane, Saint Nizier in Gascogne, La Mure, Vassieu, La Chappelle en -Vercors. The town of Saint Dié was burnt down and destroyed. The Old -Port District of Marseilles was dynamited in the beginning of 1943 and -resorts along the Atlantic and the Mediterranean coasts, particularly -the town of Sanary, were demolished. - -In Holland there was most widespread and extensive destruction, not -justified by military necessity, including the destruction of harbors, -locks, dykes, and bridges; immense devastation was also caused by -inundations which equally were not justified by military necessity. - -(H) Conscription of civilian labor. - -Throughout the occupied territories the defendants conscripted and -forced the inhabitants to labor and requisitioned their services for -purposes other than meeting the needs of the armies of occupation and to -an extent far out of proportion to the resources of the countries -involved. All the civilians so conscripted were forced to work for the -German war effort. Civilians were required to register and many of those -who registered were forced to join the Todt Organization and the Speer -Legion, both of which were semi-military organizations involving some -military training. These acts violated Articles 46 and 52 of the Hague -Regulations, 1907, the laws and customs of war, the general principles -of criminal law as derived from the criminal laws of all civilized -nations, the internal penal laws of the countries in which such crimes -were committed, and Article 6 (b) of the Charter. - -Particulars, by way of example only and without prejudice to the -production of evidence of other cases, are as follows: - -1. Western Countries: - -In France, from 1942 to 1944, 963,813 persons were compelled to work in -Germany and 737,000 to work in France for the German Army. - -In Luxembourg, in 1944 alone, 2,500 men and 500 girls were conscripted -for forced labor. - -(I) Forcing civilians of occupied territories to swear allegiance to a -hostile power. - -Civilians who joined the Speer Legion, as set forth in Paragraph (H) -were required, under threat of depriving them of food, money, and -identity papers, to swear a solemn oath acknowledging unconditional -obedience to Adolf Hitler, the Führer of Germany, which was to them a -hostile power. - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will now adjourn until 2 o’clock. - - [_The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours._] - - - - - _Afternoon Session_ - -THE PRESIDENT: Will the Chief Prosecutor for the French Republic -continue the reading of the Indictment. - -M. MOUNIER: In Lorraine, civil servants were obliged, in order to retain -their positions, to sign a declaration by which they acknowledged the -“return of their country to the Reich”, pledged themselves to obey -without reservation the orders of their chiefs and put themselves “at -the active service of the Führer and of National Socialist greater -Germany.” - -A similar pledge was imposed on Alsatian civil servants, by threat of -deportation or internment. - -These acts violated Article 45 of the Hague Regulations, 1907, the laws -and customs of war, the general principles of international law, and -Article 6 (b) of the Charter. - -(J) Germanization of occupied territories. - -In certain occupied territories purportedly annexed to Germany the -defendants methodically and pursuant to plan endeavoured to assimilate -those territories politically, culturally, socially, and economically -into the German Reich. They endeavoured to obliterate the former -national character of these territories. In pursuance of these plans, -the defendants forcibly deported inhabitants who were predominantly -non-German and replaced them by thousands of German colonists. - -Their plan included economic domination, physical conquest, installation -of puppet governments, purported _de jure_ annexation and enforced -conscription into the German Armed Forces. - -This was carried out in most of the occupied countries especially in -Norway, France (particularly in the Departments of Upper Rhine, Lower -Rhine, Moselle, Ardennes, Aisne, Nord, Meurthe and Moselle), in -Luxembourg, the Soviet Union, Denmark, Belgium, and Holland. - -In France in the Departments of Aisne, Nord, Meurthe and Moselle, and -especially in that of the Ardennes, rural properties were confiscated by -a German state organization which tried to work them under German -management. - -The landowners of these holdings were dispossessed and turned into -agricultural laborers. In the Departments of Upper Rhine, Lower Rhine, -and Moselle the methods of Germanization were those of annexation -followed by conscription. - -1. From the month of August 1940 officials who refused to take the oath -of allegiance to the Reich were expelled. On September 21st the -expulsion and deportation of population began, and on November 22d, 1940 -more than 70,000 Lorrainers or Alsatians were driven into the south zone -of France. From July 31, 1941 onwards, more than 100,000 persons were -deported into the eastern regions of the Reich or to Poland. All the -property of the deportees or expelled persons was confiscated. At the -same time, 80,000 Germans coming from the Saar or from Westphalia were -installed in Lorraine and 2,000 farms belonging to French people were -transferred to Germans. - -2. From 2 January 1942 all the young people of the Departments of Upper -Rhine and Lower Rhine, aged from 10 to 18 years, were incorporated in -the Hitler Youth. The same measures were taken in the Moselle from 4 -August 1942. From 1940 all the French schools were closed, their staffs -expelled, and the German school system was introduced in the three -departments. - -3. On the 28th of September 1940 an order applicable to the Department -of the Moselle ordained the Germanization of all the surnames and -Christian names which were French in form. The same measure was taken on -the 15th January 1943 in the Departments of Upper Rhine and Lower Rhine. - -4. Two orders of the 23rd and 24th August 1942 imposed by force German -nationality on French citizens. - -5. On the 8th May 1941 for Upper Rhine and Lower Rhine, and on the 23rd -April 1941 for the Moselle, orders were promulgated enforcing compulsory -labor service on all French citizens of either sex aged from 17 to 25 -years. From the 1st January 1942 for young men, and from the 26th -January 1942 for young women, national labor service was effectively -organized in the Moselle. This measure came into force on the 27th -August 1942 in Upper Rhine and Lower Rhine, but for young men only. The -classes of 1940, 1941, 1942 were called up. - -6. These contingents were drafted into the Wehrmacht on the expiration -of their time in the labor service. - -On the 19th August 1942 an order instituted compulsory military service -in the Moselle, and on the 25th August 1942 the contingents of 1940 to -1944 were called up in the three Departments. - -Conscription was enforced by the German authorities in conformity with -the provisions of German legislation. The first induction board took -place on the 3rd September 1942. Later, in the Upper Rhine and Lower -Rhine new levies were effected everywhere of the contingents from 1928 -to 1939 inclusive. The French men who refused to obey these laws were -considered as deserters and their families were deported, while their -property was confiscated. - -These acts violated Articles 43, 46, 55, and 56 of the Hague -Regulations, 1907, the laws and customs of war, the general principles -of criminal law as derived from the criminal laws of all civilized -nations, the internal penal laws of the countries in which such crimes -were committed, and Article 6 (b) of the Charter. - -IX. _Individual, Group and Organization Responsibility for the Crimes -Stated in Count Three._ - -Reference is hereby made to Appendix A of this Indictment for a -statement of the responsibility of the individual defendants for the -charge set forth in Count Three of the Indictment. - -Reference is hereby made to Appendix B of this Indictment for a -statement of the responsibility of the groups and organizations named -herein as criminal groups and organizations for the crime set forth in -this part three of the Indictment. - -THE PRESIDENT: I will now call upon the Chief Prosecutor for the Soviet -Union. - -LIEUTENANT COLONEL J. A. OZOL (Assistant Prosecutor for the U.S.S.R.): -COUNT THREE—WAR CRIMES. - -All the defendants committed War Crimes between 1 September 1939 and 8 -May 1945 in Germany and in all those countries and territories occupied -by the German Armed Forces since 1 September 1939, and in Austria, -Czechoslovakia, Italy, and on the High Seas. - -All the defendants, acting in concert with others, formulated and -executed a Common Plan or Conspiracy to commit War Crimes as defined in -Article 6 (b) of the Charter. This plan involved, among other things, -the practice of “total war” including methods of combat and of military -occupation in direct conflict with the laws and customs of war, and the -commission of crimes perpetrated on the field of battle during -encounters with enemy armies, and against prisoners of war, and in -occupied territories against the civilian population of such -territories. - -The said War Crimes were committed by the defendants and by other -persons for whose acts the defendants are responsible (under Article 6 -of the Charter) as such other persons when committing the said War -Crimes performed their acts in execution of a common plan and conspiracy -to commit the said War Crimes, in the formulation and execution of which -plan and conspiracy all the defendants participated as leaders, -organizers, instigators, and accomplices. - -These methods and crimes constituted violations of international -conventions, of internal penal laws, and of the general principles of -criminal law as derived from the criminal law of all civilized nations, -and were involved in and part of a systematic course of conduct. - -(A) Murder and ill-treatment of civilian populations of or in occupied -territory and on the High Seas. - -Throughout the period of their occupation of territories overrun by -their armed forces the defendants, for the purpose of systematically -terrorizing the inhabitants, murdered and tortured civilians, and -ill-treated them, and imprisoned them without legal process. - -The murders and ill-treatment were carried out by divers means, -including shooting, hanging, gassing, starvation, gross overcrowding, -systematic undernutrition, systematic imposition of labor tasks beyond -the strength of those ordered to carry them out, inadequate provision of -surgical and medical services, kickings, beatings, brutality, and -torture of all kinds, including the use of hot irons and pulling out of -fingernails and the performance of experiments by means of operations -and otherwise on living human subjects. In some occupied territories the -defendants interfered with religious services, persecuted members of the -clergy and monastic orders, and expropriated church property. They -conducted deliberate and systematic genocide, viz. the extermination of -racial and national groups, against the civilian populations of certain -occupied territories in order to destroy particular races and classes of -people, and national, racial, or religious groups, particularly Jews, -Poles, and Gypsies and others. - -Civilians were systematically subjected to tortures of all kinds, with -the object of obtaining information. - -Civilians of occupied countries were subjected systematically to -“protective arrests” whereby they were arrested and imprisoned without -any trial and any of the ordinary protections of the law, and they were -imprisoned under the most unhealthy and inhumane conditions. - -In the concentration camps were many prisoners who were classified -“Nacht und Nebel”. These were entirely cut off from the world and were -allowed neither to receive nor to send letters. They disappeared without -trace and no announcement of their fate was ever made by the German -authorities. - -Such murders and ill-treatment were contrary to international -conventions, in particular to Article 46 of the Hague Regulations, 1907, -the laws and customs of war, the general principles of criminal law as -derived from the criminal laws of all civilized nations, the internal -penal laws of the countries in which such crimes were committed, and to -Article 6 (b) of the Charter. - -The following particulars and all the particulars appearing later in -this Count are set out herein by way of example only, are not exclusive -of other particular cases, and are stated without prejudice to the right -of the Prosecution to adduce evidence of other cases of murder and -ill-treatment of civilians. - -[2.] In the U.S.S.R., i.e. in the Bielorussian, Ukrainian, Estonian, -Latvian, Lithuanian, Karelo-Finnish, and Moldavian Soviet Socialist -Republics, in 19 regions of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist -Republic, and in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Greece, and the -Balkans (hereinafter called the “Eastern Countries”). - -From the 1st September 1939, when the German Armed Forces invaded -Poland, and from the 22nd June 1941, when they invaded the U.S.S.R., the -German Government and the German High Command adopted a systematic -policy of murder and ill-treatment of the civilian populations of and in -the Eastern Countries as they were successively occupied by the German -Armed Forces. These murders and ill-treatments were carried on -continuously until the German Armed Forces were driven out of the said -countries. - -Such murders and ill-treatments included: - -(a) Murders and ill-treatments at concentration camps and similar -establishments set up by the Germans in the Eastern Countries and in -Eastern Germany including those set up at Maidanek and Auschwitz. - -The said murders and ill-treatments were carried out by divers means -including all those set out above, as follows: - -About 1½ million persons were, exterminated in Maidanek and about 4 -million persons were exterminated in Auschwitz, among whom were citizens -of Poland, the U.S.S.R., the United States of America, Great Britain, -Czechoslovakia, France, and other countries. - -In the Lwow region and in the city of Lwow the Germans exterminated -about 700,000 Soviet people, including 70 persons in the field of the -arts, science, and technology, and also citizens of the U.S.A., Great -Britain, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Holland, brought to this region -from other concentration camps. - -In the Jewish ghetto from 7 September 1941 to 6 July 1943 over 133,000 -persons were tortured and shot. - -Mass shooting of the population occurred in the suburbs of the city and -in the Livenitz forest. - -In the Ganov camp 200,000 citizens were exterminated. The most refined -methods of cruelty were employed in this extermination, such as -disembowelling and the freezing of human beings in tubs of water. Mass -shootings took place to the accompaniment of the music of an orchestra -recruited from the persons interned. - -Beginning with June 1943 the Germans carried out measures to hide the -evidence of their crimes. They exhumed and burned corpses, and they -crushed the bones with machines and used them for fertilizer. - -At the beginning of 1944, in the Ozarichi region of the Bielorussian -S.S.R., before liberation by the Red Army, the Germans established three -concentration camps without shelters, to which they committed tens of -thousands of persons from the neighbouring territories. They -intentionally brought many people to these camps from typhus hospitals, -for the purpose of infecting the other persons interned and for -spreading the disease in territories from which the Germans were driven -by the Red Army. In these camps there were many murders and crimes. - -In the Estonian S.S.R. they shot tens of thousands of persons and in one -day alone, 19 September 1944, in Camp Kloga, the Germans shot 2,000 -peaceful citizens. They burned the bodies on bonfires. - -In the Lithuanian S.S.R. there were mass killings of Soviet citizens, -namely: in Panerai at least 100,000; in Kaunas more than 70,000; in -Alitus about 60,000; at Prenai more than 3,000; in Villiampol about -8,000; in Mariampol about 7,000; in Trakai and neighbouring towns -37,640. - -In the Latvian S.S.R. 577,000 persons were murdered. - -As a result of the whole system of internal order maintained in all -camps, the interned persons were doomed to die. - -In a secret instruction entitled “The Internal Regime in Concentration -Camps”, signed personally by Himmler in 1941 severe measures of -punishment were set forth for the internees. Masses of prisoners of war -were shot, or died from the cold and torture. - -(b) Murders and ill-treatments at places in the Eastern Countries and in -the Soviet Union, other than in the camps referred to in (a) above, -included, on various dates during the occupation by the German Armed -Forces: - -The destruction in the Smolensk region of over 135,000 Soviet citizens. - -Among these, near the village of Kholmetz of the Sychev region, when the -military authorities were required to remove the mines from an area, on -the order of the commander of the 101st German Infantry Division, Major -General Fisler, the German soldiers gathered the inhabitants of the -village of Kholmetz and forced them to remove mines from the road. All -of these people lost their lives as a result of exploding mines. - -In the Leningrad region there were shot and tortured over 172,000 -persons, including 20,000 persons who were killed in the city of -Leningrad by the barbarous artillery barrage and the bombings. - -In the Stavropol region in an anti-tank trench close to the station of -Mineralniye Vodi, and in other cities, tens of thousands of persons were -exterminated. - -In Pyatigorsk many were subjected to torture and criminal treatment, -including suspension from the ceiling and other methods. Many of the -victims of these tortures were then shot. - -In Krasnodar some 6,700 civilians were murdered by poison gas in gas -vans, or were shot and tortured. - -In the Stalingrad region more than 40,000 persons were killed and -tortured. After the Germans were expelled from Stalingrad, more than a -thousand mutilated bodies of local inhabitants were found with marks of -torture. One hundred and thirty-nine women had their arms painfully bent -backward and held by wires. From some their breasts had been cut off and -their ears, fingers, and toes had been amputated. The bodies bore the -marks of burns. On the bodies of the men the five-pointed star was -burned with an iron or cut with a knife. Some were disembowelled. - -In Orel over 5,000 persons were murdered. - -In Novgorod and in the Novgorod region many thousands of Soviet citizens -were killed by shooting, starvation, and torture. In Minsk tens of -thousands of citizens were similarly killed. - -In the Crimea peaceful citizens were gathered on barges, taken out to -sea and drowned, over 144,000 persons being exterminated in this manner. - -In the Soviet Ukraine there were monstrous criminal acts of the Nazi -conspirators. In Babi Yar, near Kiev, they shot over 100,000 men, women, -children, and old people. In this city in January 1941, after the -explosion in German headquarters on Dzerzhinsky Street the Germans -arrested as hostages 1,250 persons—old men, minors, women with nursing -infants. In Kiev they killed over 195,000 persons. - -In Rovno and the Rovno region they killed and tortured over 100,000 -peaceful citizens. - -In Dnepropetrovsk, near the Transport Institute, they shot or threw -alive into a great ravine 11,000 women, old men, and children. - -In Kamenetz-Podolsk region 31,000 Jews were shot and exterminated, -including 13,000 persons brought there from Hungary. - -In the Odessa region at least 200,000 Soviet citizens were killed. - -In Kharkov about 195,000 persons were either tortured to death, shot, or -gassed in gas vans. - -In Gomel the Germans rounded up the population in prison, and tortured -and tormented them, and then took them to the center of the city and -shot them in public. - -In the city of Lyda in the Grodnen region, on 8 May 1942, 5,670 persons -were completely undressed, driven into pens in groups of 100, and then -shot by machine guns. Many were thrown in the graves while they were -still alive. - -Along with adults the Nazi conspirators mercilessly destroyed even -children. They killed them with their parents, in groups and alone. They -killed them in children’s homes and hospitals, burying the living in the -graves, throwing them into flames, stabbing them with bayonets, -poisoning them, conducting experiments upon them, extracting their blood -for the use of the German Army, throwing them into prison and Gestapo -torture chambers and concentration camps, where the children died from -hunger, torture, and epidemic diseases. - -From 6 September to 24 November 1942, in the region of Brest, Pinsk, -Kobren, Dyvina, Malority, and Berezy-Kartuzsky about 400 children were -shot by German punitive units. - -In the Yanov camp in the city of Lwow the Germans killed 8,000 children -in two months. - -In the resort of Tiberda the Germans annihilated 500 children suffering -from tuberculosis of the bone, who were in the sanatorium for the cure. - -On the territory of the Latvian S.S.R. the German usurpers killed -thousands of children, which they had brought there with their parents -from the Bielorussian S.S.R., and from the Kalinin, Kaluga, and other -regions of the R.S.F.S.R. - -In Czechoslovakia as a result of torture, beating, hanging, and -shooting, there were annihilated in Gestapo prisons in Brno, Seim, and -other places over 20,000 persons. Moreover many thousands of internees -were subjected to criminal treatment, beatings, and torture. - -Both before the war as well as during the war thousands of Czech -patriots, in particular Catholics and Protestants, lawyers, doctors, -teachers, et cetera, were arrested as hostages and imprisoned. A large -number of these hostages were killed by the Germans. - -In Greece in October 1941 the male populations between 16 and 60 years -of age of the Greek villages Amelofito, Kliston, Kizonia Mesovunos, -Selli, Ano-Kerzilion, and Kato-Kerzilion were shot—in all 416 persons. - -In Yugoslavia many thousands of civilians were murdered. Other examples -are given under Paragraph (D), “Killing of Hostages”, below. - -THE PRESIDENT: Paragraph (B) on Page 16 was read by the Chief Prosecutor -for the French Republic. Paragraph 2 on Page 17 was omitted by him. So -had you better not go on at Paragraph 2 at Page 17? - -LT. COL. OZOL: 2. From the Eastern Countries: - -The German occupying authorities deported from the Soviet Union to -slavery about 4,978,000 Soviet citizens. - -Seven hundred fifty thousand Czechoslovakian citizens were taken away -from Czechoslovakia and forced to work in the German war machine in the -interior of Germany. - -On June 4, 1941 in the city of Zagreb, Yugoslavia, a meeting of German -representatives was called with the Councillor Von Troll presiding. The -purpose was to set up the means of deporting the Yugoslav population -from Slovenia. Tens of thousands of persons were deported in carrying -out this plan. - -Murder and ill-treatment of prisoners of war, and of other. . . . - -THE PRESIDENT: Will you read Paragraph 2 at page 18? - -LT. COL. OZOL: 2. In the Eastern Countries: - -At Orel prisoners of war were exterminated by starvation, shooting, -exposure, and poisoning. - -Soviet prisoners of war were murdered _en masse_ on orders from the High -Command and the headquarters of the SIPO and SD. Tens of thousands of -Soviet prisoners of war were tortured and murdered at the “Gross -Lazaret” at Slavuta. - -In addition, many thousands of the persons referred to in Paragraph VIII -(A) 2, above, were Soviet prisoners of war. - -Prisoners of war who escaped and were recaptured were handed over to -SIPO and SD for shooting. - -Frenchmen fighting with the Soviet Army who were captured were handed -over to the Vichy Government for “proceedings.” - -In March 1944, 50 R.A.F. officers who escaped from Stalag Luft III at -Sagan were murdered when captured. - -In September 1941, 11,000 Polish officers who were prisoners of war were -killed in the Katyn Forest near Smolensk. - -In Yugoslavia the German Command and the occupying authorities in the -person of the chief officials of the police, the SS troops (Police -Lieutenant General Rosener) and the Divisional Group Command (General -Kubler and others) in the period 1941-43 ordered the shooting of -prisoners of war. - -THE PRESIDENT: Now, Paragraph 2 of (D). - -CAPTAIN V. V. KUCHIN (Assistant Prosecutor for the U.S.S.R.) -[_Continuing the reading of the Indictment_]: 2. In the Eastern -Countries: - -At Kragnevatz in Yugoslavia 2,300 hostages were shot in October 1941. At -Kraljero in Yugoslavia 5,000 hostages were shot. - -THE PRESIDENT: Will you turn now to (E), Paragraph 2, page 21? - -CAPT. KUCHIN: 2. Eastern Countries: - -During the occupation of the Eastern Countries the German Government and -the German High Command carried out, as a systematic policy, a -continuous course of plunder and destruction including: - -On the territory of the Soviet Union the Nazi conspirators destroyed or -severely damaged 1,710 cities and more than 70,000 villages and hamlets, -more than 6 million buildings and rendered homeless about 25 million -persons. - -Among the cities which suffered most destruction are Stalingrad, -Sevastopol, Kiev, Minsk, Odessa, Smolensk, Novgorod, Pskov, Orel, -Kharkov, Voronezh, Rostov-on-Don, Stalino, and Leningrad. - -As is evident from an official memorandum of the German Command, the -Nazi conspirators planned the complete annihilation of entire Soviet -cities. In a completely secret order of the Chief of the Naval Staff -(SKL Ia No. 1601/41, dated 29 September 1941) addressed only to Staff -officers, it was said: - - “The Führer has decided to erase Petersburg from the face of the - earth. The existence of this large city will have no further - interest after Soviet Russia is destroyed. Finland has also said - that the existence of this city on her new border is not - desirable from her point of view. The original request of the - Navy that docks, harbor, et cetera, necessary for the fleet be - preserved is known to the Supreme Command of the German Armed - Forces, but the basic principles of carrying out operations - against Petersburg do not make it possible to satisfy this - request. - - “It is proposed to approach near to the city and to destroy it - with the aid of an artillery barrage from weapons of different - calibers and with long air attacks. . . . - - “The problem of the lives of the population and of their - provisioning is a problem which cannot and must not be decided - by us. - - “In this war . . . we are not interested in preserving even a - part of the population of this large city.” - -The Germans destroyed 427 museums, among them the wealthy museums of -Leningrad, Smolensk, Stalingrad, Novgorod, Poltava, and others. - -In Pyatigorsk the art objects brought there from the Rostov museum were -seized. - -The losses suffered by the coal mining industry alone in the Stalin -region amount to 2 billion rubles. There was colossal destruction of -industrial establishments in Makerevka, Carlovka, Yenakievo, -Konstantinovka, Mariupol, from which most of the machinery and factories -were removed. - -Stealing of huge dimensions and the destruction of industrial, cultural, -and other property was typified in Kiev. More than 4 million books, -magazines, and manuscripts (many of which were very valuable and even -unique) and a large number of artistic productions and divers valuables -were stolen and carried away. - -Many valuable art productions were taken away from Riga. - -The extent of the plunder of cultural valuables is evidenced by the fact -that 100,000 valuable volumes and 70 cases of ancient periodicals and -precious monographs were carried away by Rosenberg’s staff alone. - -Among further examples of these crimes are: - -Wanton devastation of the city of Novgorod and of many historical and -artistic monuments there; wanton devastation and plunder of the city of -Rovno and of its province; the destruction of the industrial, cultural, -and other property in Odessa; the destruction of cities and villages in -Soviet Karelia; the destruction in Estonia of cultural, industrial, and -other buildings; the destruction of medical and prophylactic institutes; -the destruction of agriculture and industry in Lithuania; the -destruction of cities in Latvia. - -The Germans approached monuments of culture, dear to the Soviet people, -with special hatred. They broke up the estate of the poet Pushkin in -Mikhailovskoye, desecrated his grave, and destroyed the neighboring -villages and the Svyatogor monastery. - -They destroyed the estate and museum of Leo Tolstoy, “Yasnaya Polyana” -and desecrated the grave of the great writer. They destroyed, in Klin, -the museum of Tchaikovsky and, in Penaty, the museum of the painter -Repin and many others. - -The Nazi conspirators destroyed 1,670 Greek Orthodox churches, 237 Roman -Catholic churches, 67 chapels, 532 synagogues, _et cetera_. - -They also broke up, desecrated and senselessly destroyed the most -valuable monuments of the Christian Church, such as the -Kievo-Pecherskaya Lavra, Novy Jerusalem in the Istrin region, and the -most ancient monasteries and churches. - -Destruction in Estonia of cultural, industrial, and other premises; -burning down of many thousands of residential buildings; removal of -10,000 works of art; destruction of medical and prophylactic -institutions; plunder and removal to Germany of immense quantities of -agricultural stock including horses, cows, pigs, poultry, beehives, and -agricultural machines of all kinds. - -Destruction of agriculture, enslavement of peasants, and looting of -stock and produce in Lithuania. - -In the Latvian Republic destruction of the agriculture by the looting of -all stock, machinery, and produce. - -Carrying away by Rosenberg’s headquarters of 100,000 valuable volumes -and 70 cases of ancient periodicals and precious monographs; wanton -destruction of libraries and other cultural buildings. - -The result of this policy of plunder and destruction was to lay waste -the land and cause utter desolation. - -The over-all value of the material loss which the U.S.S.R. has borne, is -computed to be 679 billion rubles, in State prices of 1941. - -Following the German occupation of Czechoslovakia on 15 March 1939 the -defendants seized and stole large stocks of raw materials, copper, tin, -iron, cotton, and food; caused to be taken to Germany large amounts of -railway rolling stock, and many engines, carriages, steam vessels and -trolley buses; robbed libraries, laboratories, and art museums of books, -pictures, objects of art, scientific apparatus, and furniture; stole all -gold reserves and foreign exchange of Czechoslovakia, including 23,000 -kilograms of gold, of a nominal value of 5,265,000 Pounds; fraudulently -acquired control and thereafter looted the Czech banks and many Czech -industrial enterprises; and otherwise stole, looted, and misappropriated -Czechoslovak public and private property. The total sum of defendants’ -economic spoliation of Czechoslovakia from 1938 to 1945 is estimated at -200 billion Czechoslovak crowns. - -(G) Wanton destruction of cities, towns, and villages, and devastation -not justified by military necessity. - -The defendants wantonly destroyed cities. . . . - -THE PRESIDENT: Will you go to Paragraph 2 of (G)? The French read the -first paragraph. Do you want to go to Paragraph 2 of (G)? - -CAPT. KUCHIN: I have begun. . . . - -THE PRESIDENT: I thought we had read Paragraph 1. We might take up at -Paragraph 2, beginning “In the Eastern Countries the defendants -pursued. . . .” - -CAPT. KUCHIN: 2. Eastern Countries: - -In the Eastern Countries the defendants pursued a policy of wanton -destruction and devastation; some particulars of this, without prejudice -to the production of evidence of other cases, are set out above under -the heading “Plunder of Public and Private Property”. - -In Greece in 1941 the villages of Amelofito, Kliston, Kizonia, -Messovunos, Selli, Ano-Kerzilion, and Kato-Kerzilion were utterly -destroyed. - -In Yugoslavia on 15 August 1941 the German military command officially -announced that the village of Skela was burned to the ground and the -inhabitants killed on the order of the command. - -On the order of the Field Commander Hoersterberg a punitive expedition -from the SS troops and the field police destroyed the villages of -Machkovats and Kriva Reka in Serbia and all the inhabitants were killed. - -General Fritz Neidhold (369 Infantry Division), on 11 September 1944, -gave an order to destroy the villages of Zagniezde and Udora, hanging -all the men and driving away all the women and children. - -In Czechoslovakia the Nazi conspirators also practiced the senseless -destruction of populated places. Lezaky and Lidice were burnt to the -ground and the inhabitants killed. - -(H) Conscription of civilian labor. - -Throughout the occupied territories the defendants conscripted and -forced the inhabitants to labor and requisitioned their services. . . . - -THE PRESIDENT: I think Paragraph (H) has been read, the first paragraph -of it. There only remains for you to read Paragraph 2 of (H). - -CAPT. KUCHIN: 2. Eastern Countries: - -Of the large number of citizens of the Soviet Union and of -Czechoslovakia, referred to under Count Three VIII (B) 2 above, many -were so conscripted for forced labor. - -IX. Individual, group and organization responsibility for the offense -stated in Count Three. - -Reference is hereby made to Appendix A of this Indictment for a -statement of the responsibility of the individual defendants for the -offense set forth in this Count Three of the Indictment. Reference is -hereby made to Appendix B of this Indictment for a statement of the -responsibility of the groups and organizations named herein as criminal -groups and organizations for the offense set forth in this Count Three -of the Indictment. - -COUNT FOUR—CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY, Charter, Article 6, especially 6 -(c). - -X. Statement of the offense. - -All the defendants committed Crimes against Humanity during a period of -years preceding 8 May 1945, in Germany and in all those countries and -territories occupied by the German Armed Forces since 1 September 1939, -and in Austria and Czechoslovakia and in Italy and on the High Seas. - -All the defendants, acting in concert with others, formulated and -executed a Common Plan or Conspiracy to commit Crimes against Humanity -as defined in Article 6 (c) of the Charter. This plan involved, among -other things, the murder and persecution of all who were or who were -suspected of being hostile to the Nazi Party and all who were or who -were suspected of being opposed to the common plan alleged in Count One. - -The said Crimes against Humanity were committed by the defendants, and -by other persons for whose acts the defendants are responsible (under -Article 6 of the Charter) as such other persons, when committing the -said War Crimes, performed their acts in execution of a Common Plan and -Conspiracy to commit the said War Crimes, in the formulation and -execution of which plan and conspiracy all the defendants participated -as leaders, organizers, instigators, and accomplices. - -These methods and crimes constituted violations of international -conventions, of internal penal laws, of the general principles of -criminal law as derived from the criminal law of all civilized nations, -and were involved in and part of a systematic course of conduct. The -said acts were contrary to Article 6 of the Charter. - -The Prosecution will rely upon the facts pleaded under Count Three as -also constituting Crimes against Humanity. - -(A) Murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane -acts committed against civilian populations before and during the war. - -For the purposes set out above, the defendants adopted a policy of -persecution, repression, and extermination of all civilians in Germany -who were, or who were believed to, or who were believed likely to -become, hostile to the Nazi Government and the Common Plan or Conspiracy -described in Count One. They imprisoned such persons without judicial -process, holding them in “protective custody” and concentration camps, -and subjected them to persecution, degradation, despoilment, -enslavement, torture, and murder. - -Special courts were established to carry out the will of the -conspirators; favored branches or agencies of the State and Party were -permitted to operate outside the range even of nazified law and to crush -all tendencies and elements which were considered “undesirable”. The -various concentration camps included Buchenwald, which was established -in 1933, and Dachau, which was established in 1934. At these and other -camps the civilians were put to slave labor and murdered and ill-treated -by divers means, including those set out in Count Three above, and these -acts and policies were continued and extended to the occupied countries -after the 1st September 1939 and until 8th May 1945. - -(B) Persecution on political, racial, and religious grounds in execution -of and in connection with the common plan mentioned in Count One. - -As above stated, in execution of and in connection with the common plan -mentioned in Count One, opponents of the German Government were -exterminated and persecuted. These persecutions were directed against -Jews. They were also directed against persons whose political belief or -spiritual aspirations were deemed to be in conflict with the aims of the -Nazis. - -Jews were systematically persecuted since 1933; they were deprived of -liberty, thrown into concentration camps where they were murdered and -ill-treated. Their property was confiscated. Hundreds of thousands of -Jews were so treated before the 1st September 1939. - -Since the 1st September 1939 the persecution of the Jews was redoubled; -millions of Jews from Germany and from the occupied Western Countries -were sent to the Eastern Countries for extermination. - -Particulars by way of example and without prejudice to the production of -evidence of other cases are as follows: - -The Nazis murdered amongst others Chancellor Dollfuss, the Social -Democrat Breitscheid, and the Communist Thälmann. They imprisoned in -concentration camps numerous political and religious personages, for -example, Chancellor Schuschnigg and Pastor Niemöller. - -In November 1938, by orders of the Chief of the Gestapo, anti-Jewish -demonstrations all over Germany took place. Jewish property was -destroyed; 30,000 Jews were arrested and sent to concentration camps and -their property confiscated. - -Under paragraph VIII (A), above, millions of the persons there mentioned -as having been murdered and ill-treated were Jews. - -Among other mass murders of Jews were the following: - -At Kislovodsk all Jews were made to give up their property; 2,000 were -shot in an anti-tank ditch at Mineralniye Vodi; 4,300 other Jews were -shot in the same ditch; 60,000 Jews were shot on an island on the Dvina -near Riga; 20,000 Jews were shot at Lutsk; 32,000 Jews were shot at -Sarny; 60,000 Jews were shot at Kiev and Dniepropetrovsk. - -Thousands of Jews were gassed weekly by means of gas-wagons which broke -down from overwork. - -As the Germans retreated before the Soviet Army they exterminated Jews -rather than allow them to be liberated. Many concentration camps and -ghettos were set up in which Jews were incarcerated and tortured, -starved, subjected to merciless atrocities, and finally exterminated. - -About 70,000 Jews were exterminated in Yugoslavia. - -XI. Individual, group and organization responsibility for the offense -stated in Count Four. - -Reference is hereby made to Appendix A of this Indictment for a -statement of the responsibility of the individual defendants for the -offense set forth in this Count Four of the Indictment. Reference is -hereby made to Appendix B of this Indictment for a statement of the -responsibility of the groups and organizations named herein as criminal -groups and organizations for the offense set forth in the Count Four of -the Indictment. - -Wherefore, this Indictment is lodged with the Tribunal in English, -French, and Russian, each text having equal authenticity, and the -charges herein made against the above-named defendants are hereby -presented to the Tribunal. - -Hartley Shawcross, acting on behalf of the United Kingdom of Great -Britain and Northern Ireland; Robert H. Jackson, acting on behalf of the -United States of America; François de Menthon, acting on behalf of the -French Republic; R. Rudenko, acting on behalf of the Union of Soviet -Socialist Republics. Berlin, 6th October 1945. - -THE PRESIDENT: Has anybody been designated to read the appendices? - -MR. ALDERMAN: May it please the Tribunal, I shall read Appendix A and -Appendix B, and the British Delegation will read Appendix C. One word of -explanation as to Appendix A. The Court will have observed that the -defendants are seated in the dock in the same order in which they are -named in the Indictment. By a mechanical slip-up they are not named in -Appendix A in exactly the same order. I think it would be too much -difficulty for the interpreters or for me to arrange them in the same -order, and if the Court will permit I will read Appendix A as it is -printed. - -APPENDIX A—STATEMENT OF INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR CRIMES SET OUT IN -COUNTS ONE, TWO, THREE, AND FOUR. - -The statements hereinafter set forth following the name of each -individual defendant constitute matters upon which the Prosecution will -rely _inter alia_ as pursuant to Article 6 establishing the individual -responsibility of the defendant: - -GÖRING. The Defendant Göring between 1932 and 1945 was a member of the -Nazi Party, Supreme Leader of the SA, general in the SS, a member and -President of the Reichstag, Minister of the Interior of Prussia, Chief -of the Prussian Police and Prussian Secret State Police, Chief of the -Prussian State Council, Trustee of the Four Year Plan, Reich Minister -for Air, Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force, President of the Council -of Ministers for the Defense of the Reich, member of the Secret Cabinet -Council, head of the Hermann Göring Industrial Combine, and Successor -Designate to Hitler. The Defendant Göring used the foregoing positions, -his personal influence, and his intimate connection with the Führer in -such a manner that: - -He promoted the accession to power of the Nazi conspirators and the -consolidation of their control over Germany set forth in Count One of -the Indictment; he promoted the military and economic preparation for -war set forth in Count One of the Indictment; he participated in the -planning and preparation of the Nazi conspirators for wars of aggression -and wars in violation of international treaties, agreements, and -assurances set forth in Counts One and Two of the Indictment; and he -authorized, directed, and participated in the War Crimes set forth in -Count Three of the Indictment, and the Crimes against Humanity set forth -in Count Four of the Indictment, including a wide variety of crimes -against persons and property. - -RIBBENTROP. The Defendant Ribbentrop between 1932 and 1945 was a member -of the Nazi Party, a member of the Nazi Reichstag, advisor to the Führer -on matters of foreign policy, representative of the Nazi Party for -matters of foreign policy, special German delegate for disarmament -questions, Ambassador extraordinary, Ambassador in London, organizer and -director of Dienststelle Ribbentrop, Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs, -member of the Secret Cabinet Council, member of the Führer’s political -staff at general headquarters, and general in the SS. The Defendant -Ribbentrop used the foregoing positions, his personal influence, and his -intimate connection with the Führer in such a manner that: - -He promoted the accession to power of the Nazi conspirators as set forth -in Count One of the Indictment; he promoted the preparations for war set -forth in Count One of the Indictment; he participated in the political -planning and preparation of the Nazi conspirators for wars of aggression -and wars in violation of international treaties, agreements, and -assurances as set forth in Counts One and Two of the Indictment; in -accordance with the Führer Principle he executed and assumed -responsibility for the execution of the foreign policy plans of the Nazi -conspirators set forth in Count One of the Indictment; and he -authorized, directed, and participated in the War Crimes set forth in -Count Three of the Indictment and the Crimes against Humanity set forth -in Count Four of the Indictment, including more particularly the crimes -against persons and property in occupied territories. - -HESS. The Defendant Hess between 1921 and 1941 was a member of the Nazi -Party, Deputy to the Führer, Reich Minister without Portfolio, member of -the Reichstag, member of the Council of Ministers for the Defense of the -Reich, member of the Secret Cabinet Council, Successor Designate to the -Führer after the Defendant Göring, a general in the SS and a general in -the SA. The Defendant Hess used the foregoing positions, his personal -influence, and his intimate connection with the Führer in such a manner -that: - -He promoted the accession to power of the Nazi conspirators and the -consolidation of their control over Germany set forth in Count One of -the Indictment; he promoted the military, economic, and psychological -preparations for war set forth in Count One of the Indictment; he -participated in the political planning and preparation for wars of -aggression and wars in violation of international treaties, agreements, -and assurances set forth in Counts One and Two of the Indictment; he -participated in the preparation and planning of foreign policy plans of -the Nazi conspirators set forth in Count One of the Indictment; he -authorized, directed, and participated in the War Crimes set forth in -Count Three of the Indictment and the Crimes against Humanity set forth -in Count Four of the Indictment, including a wide variety of crimes -against persons and property. - -KALTENBRUNNER. The Defendant Kaltenbrunner between 1932 and 1945 was a -member of the Nazi Party, a general in the SS, a member of the -Reichstag, a general of the Police, State Secretary for Security in -Austria in charge of the Austrian Police, Police Leader of Vienna, Lower -and Upper Austria, Head of the Reich Main Security Office and Chief of -the Security Police and Security Service. The Defendant Kaltenbrunner -used the foregoing positions and his personal influence in such a manner -that: - -He promoted the consolidation of control over Austria seized by the Nazi -conspirators as set forth in Count One of the Indictment; and he -authorized, directed, and participated in the War Crimes set forth in -Count Three of the Indictment and the Crimes against Humanity set forth -in Count Four of the Indictment including particularly the Crimes -against Humanity involved in the system of concentration camps. - -ROSENBERG. The Defendant Rosenberg between 1920 and 1945 was a member of -the Nazi Party, Nazi member of the Reichstag, Reichsleiter in the Nazi -Party for Ideology and Foreign Policy, the editor of the Nazi newspaper -_Völkischer Beobachter_, or “People’s Observer”, and the _NS -Monatshefte_, head of the Foreign Political Office of the Nazi Party, -Special Delegate for the entire Spiritual and Ideological Training of -the Nazi Party, Reich Minister for the Eastern Occupied Territories, -organizer of the “Einsatzstab Rosenberg”, a general in the SS and a -general in the SA. The Defendant Rosenberg used the foregoing positions, -his personal influence and his intimate connection with the Führer in -such a manner that: - -He developed, disseminated, and exploited the doctrinal techniques of -the Nazi conspirators set forth in Count One of the Indictment; he -promoted the accession to power of the Nazi conspirators and the -consolidation of their control over Germany set forth in Count One of -the Indictment; he promoted the psychological preparations for war set -forth in Count One of the Indictment; he participated in the political -planning and preparation for wars of aggression and wars in violation of -international treaties, agreements, and assurances set forth in Counts -One and Two of the Indictment; and he authorized, directed, and -participated in the War Crimes set forth in Count Three of the -Indictment and the Crimes against Humanity set forth in Count Four of -the Indictment, including a wide variety of crimes against persons and -property. - -FRANK. The Defendant Frank between 1932 and 1945 was a member of the -Nazi Party, a general in the SS, a member of the Reichstag, Reich -Minister without Portfolio, Reich Commissar for the Coordination of -Justice, President of the International Chamber of Law and Academy of -German Law, Chief of the Civil Administration of Lodz, Supreme -Administrative Chief of the military district of West Prussia, Poznan, -Lodz, and Krakow, and Governor General of the occupied Polish -territories. The Defendant Frank used the foregoing positions, his -personal influence, and his intimate connection with the Führer in such -a manner that: - -He promoted the accession to power of the Nazi conspirators and the -consolidation of their control over Germany set forth in Count One of -the Indictment; he authorized, directed, and participated in the War -Crimes set forth in Count Three of the Indictment and the Crimes against -Humanity set forth in Count Four of the Indictment, including -particularly the War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity involved in the -administration of occupied territories. - -BORMANN. The Defendant Bormann between 1925 and 1945 was a member of the -Nazi Party, member of the Reichstag, a member of the Staff of the -Supreme Command of the SA, founder and head of “Hilfskasse der NSDAP”, -Reichsleiter, Chief of Staff Office of the Führer’s Deputy, head of the -Party Chancery, Secretary of the Führer, member of the Council of -Ministers for the Defense of the Reich, organizer and head of the -Volkssturm, a general in the SS, and a general in the SA. The Defendant -Bormann used the foregoing positions, his personal influence, and his -intimate connection with the Führer in such a manner that: - -He promoted the accession to power of the Nazi conspirators and the -consolidation of their control over Germany set forth in Count One of -the Indictment; he promoted the preparations for war set forth in Count -One of the Indictment; and he authorized, directed, and participated in -the War Crimes set forth in Count Three of the Indictment and the Crimes -against Humanity set forth in Count Four of the Indictment, including a -wide variety of crimes against persons and property. - -FRICK. The Defendant Frick between 1932 and 1945 was a member of the -Nazi Party, Reichsleiter, general in the SS, member of the Reichstag, -Reich Minister of the Interior, Prussian Minister of the Interior, Reich -Director of Elections, General Plenipotentiary for the Administration of -the Reich, head of the Central Office for the Reunification of Austria -and the German Reich, Director of the Central Office for the -Incorporation of Sudetenland, Memel, Danzig, the Eastern Occupied -Territories, Eupen, Malmedy, and Moresnet, Director of the Central -Office for the Protectorate of Bohemia, Moravia, the Government General, -Lower Styria, Upper Carinthia, Norway, Alsace, Lorraine, and all other -occupied territories, and Reich Protector for Bohemia and Moravia. The -Defendant Frick used the foregoing positions, his personal influence, -and his intimate connection with the Führer in such a manner that: - -He promoted the accession to power of the Nazi conspirators and the -consolidation of their control over Germany set forth in Count One of -the Indictment; he participated in the planning and preparation of the -Nazi conspirators for wars of aggression and wars in violation of -international treaties, agreements, and assurances set forth in Counts -One and Two of the Indictment; and he authorized, directed, and -participated in the War Crimes set forth in Count Three of the -Indictment and the Crimes against Humanity set forth in Count Four of -the Indictment, including more particularly the crimes against persons -and property in occupied territories. - -LEY. The Defendant Ley between 1932 and 1945 was a member of the Nazi -Party, Reichsleiter, Nazi Party Organization Manager, member of the -Reichstag, leader of the German Labor Front, a general in the SA, and -Joint Organizer of the Central Inspection for the Care of Foreign -Workers. The Defendant Ley used the foregoing positions, his personal -influence and his intimate connection with the Führer in such a manner -that: - -He promoted the accession to power of the Nazi conspirators and the -consolidation of their control over Germany as set forth in Count One of -the Indictment; he promoted the preparation for war set forth in Count -One of the Indictment; he authorized, directed, and participated in the -War Crimes set forth in Count Three of the Indictment, and in the Crimes -against Humanity set forth in Count Four of the Indictment, including -particularly the War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity relating to the -abuse of human beings for labor in the conduct of the aggressive wars. - -SAUCKEL. The Defendant Sauckel between 1921 and 1945 was a member of the -Nazi Party, Gauleiter and Reichsstatthalter of Thuringia, a member of -the Reichstag, General Plenipotentiary for the Employment of Labor under -the Four Year Plan, Joint Organizer with the Defendant Ley of the -Central Inspection for the Care of Foreign Workers, a general in the SS, -and a general in the SA. The Defendant Sauckel used the foregoing -positions and his personal influence in such manner that: - -He promoted the accession to power of the Nazi conspirators set forth in -Count One of the Indictment; he participated in the economic -preparations for wars of aggression and wars in violation of treaties, -agreements, and assurances set forth in Counts One and Two of the -Indictment; he authorized, directed, and participated in the War Crimes -set forth in Count Three of the Indictment, and the Crimes against -Humanity set forth in Count Four of the Indictment, including -particularly the War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity involved in -forcing the inhabitants of occupied countries to work as slave laborers -in occupied countries and in Germany. - -SPEER. The Defendant Speer between 1932 and 1945 was a member of the -Nazi Party, Reichsleiter, member of the Reichstag, Reich Minister for -Armament and Munitions, Chief of the Organization Todt, General -Plenipotentiary for Armaments in the Office of the Four Year Plan, and -Chairman of the Armaments Council. The Defendant Speer used the -foregoing positions and his personal influence in such a manner that: - -He participated in the military and economic planning and preparation of -the Nazi conspirators for wars of aggression and wars in violation of -international treaties, agreements, and assurances set forth in Counts -One and Two of the Indictment; and he authorized, directed, and -participated in the War Crimes set forth in Count Three of the -Indictment and the Crimes against Humanity set forth in Count Four of -the Indictment, including more particularly the abuse and exploitation -of human beings for forced labor in the conduct of aggressive war. - -FUNK. The Defendant Funk between 1932 and 1945 was a member of the Nazi -Party, Economic Adviser of Hitler, National Socialist Deputy to the -Reichstag, Press Chief of the Reich Government, State Secretary of the -Reich Ministry of Public Enlightenment and Propaganda, Reich Minister of -Economics, Prussian Minister of Economics, President of the German -Reichsbank, Plenipotentiary for Economy, and member of the Ministerial -Council for the Defense of the Reich. The Defendant Funk used the -foregoing positions, his personal influence, and his close connection -with the Führer in such a manner that: - -He promoted the accession to power of the Nazi conspirators and the -consolidation of their control over Germany set forth in Count One of -the Indictment; he promoted the preparations for war set forth in Count -One of the Indictment; he participated in the military and economic -planning and preparation of the Nazi conspirators for wars of aggression -and wars in violation of international treaties, agreements, and -assurances set forth in Counts One and Two of the Indictment; and he -authorized, directed, and participated in the War Crimes set forth in -Count Three of the Indictment and the Crimes against Humanity set forth -in Count Four of the Indictment, including more particularly crimes -against persons and property in connection with the economic -exploitation of occupied territories. - -SCHACHT. The Defendant Schacht between 1932 and 1945 was a member of the -Nazi Party, a member of the Reichstag, Reich Minister of Economics, -Reich Minister without Portfolio and President of the German Reichsbank. -The Defendant Schacht used the foregoing positions, his personal -influence, and his connection with the Führer in such a manner that: - -He promoted the accession to power of the Nazi conspirators and the -consolidation of their control over Germany set forth in Count One of -the Indictment; he promoted the preparations for war set forth in Count -One of the Indictment; and he participated in the military and economic -plans and preparation of the Nazi conspirators for wars of aggression, -and wars in violation of international treaties, agreements, and -assurances set forth in Counts One and Two of the Indictment. - -PAPEN. The Defendant Papen between 1932 and 1945 was a member of the -Nazi Party, a member of the Reichstag, Reich Chancellor under Hitler, -special Plenipotentiary for the Saar, negotiator of the Concordat with -the Vatican, Ambassador in Vienna, and Ambassador in Turkey. The -Defendant Papen used the foregoing positions, his personal influence, -and his close connection with the Führer in such a manner that: - -He promoted the accession to power of the Nazi conspirators and -participated in the consolidation of their control over Germany set -forth in Count One of the Indictment; he promoted the preparations for -war set forth in Count One of the Indictment; and he participated in the -political planning and preparation of the Nazi conspirators for wars of -aggression and wars in violation of international treaties, agreements, -and assurances set forth in Counts One and Two of the Indictment. - -KRUPP. The Defendant Krupp between 1932 and 1945 was head of Friedrich -KRUPP A. G., a member of the General Economic Council, President of the -Reich Union of German Industry, and head of the Group for Mining and -Production of Iron and Metals under the Reich Ministry of Economics. The -Defendant Krupp used the foregoing positions, his personal influence, -and his connection with the Führer in such a manner that: - -He promoted the accession to power of the Nazi conspirators and the -consolidation of their control over Germany set forth in Count One of -the Indictment; he promoted the preparation for war set forth in Count -One of the Indictment; he participated in the military and economic -planning and preparation of the Nazi conspirators for wars of aggression -and wars in violation of international treaties, agreements, and -assurances set forth in Counts One and Two of the Indictment; and he -authorized, directed, and participated in the War Crimes set forth in -Count Three of the Indictment and the Crimes against Humanity set forth -in Count Four of the Indictment, including more particularly the -exploitation and abuse of human beings for labor in the conduct of -aggressive wars. - -NEURATH. The Defendant Neurath between 1932 and 1945 was a member of the -Nazi Party, a general in the SS, a member of the Reichstag, Reich -Minister, Reich Minister of Foreign Affairs, President of the Secret -Cabinet Council, and Reich Protector for Bohemia and Moravia. The -Defendant Neurath used the foregoing positions, his personal influence, -and his close connection with the Führer in such a manner that: - -He promoted the accession to power of the Nazi conspirators set forth in -Count One of the Indictment; he promoted the preparations for war set -forth in Count One of the Indictment; he participated in the political -planning and preparation of the Nazi conspirators for wars of aggression -and wars in violation of international treaties, agreements, and -assurances set forth in Counts One and Two of the Indictment; in -accordance with the Führer Principle he executed, and assumed -responsibility for the execution of the foreign policy plans of the Nazi -conspirators set forth in Count One of the Indictment; and he -authorized, directed, and participated in the War Crimes set forth in -Count Three of the Indictment and the Crimes against Humanity set forth -in Count Four of the Indictment, including particularly the crimes -against persons and property in the occupied territories. - -SCHIRACH. The Defendant Schirach between 1924 and 1945 was a member of -the Nazi Party, a member of the Reichstag, Reich Youth Leader on the -Staff of the SA Supreme Command, Reichsleiter in the Nazi Party for -Youth Education, Leader of Youth of the German Reich, head of the Hitler -Jugend, Reich Defense Commissioner, and Reichsstatthalter and Gauleiter -of Vienna. The Defendant Schirach used the foregoing positions, his -personal influence, and his intimate connection with the Führer in such -a manner that: - -He promoted the accession to power of the Nazi conspirators and the -consolidation of their control over Germany set forth in Count One of -the Indictment; he promoted the psychological and educational -preparations for war and the militarization of Nazi-dominated -organizations set forth in Count One of the Indictment; and he -authorized, directed, and participated in the Crimes against Humanity -set forth in Count Four of the Indictment, including, particularly, -anti-Jewish measures. - -SEYSS-INQUART. The Defendant Seyss-Inquart between 1932 and 1945 was a -member of the Nazi Party, a general in the SS, State Councillor of -Austria, Minister of the Interior and Security of Austria, Chancellor of -Austria, a member of the Reichstag, a member of the Reich Cabinet, Reich -Minister without Portfolio, Chief of the Civil Administration in South -Poland, Deputy Governor-General of the Polish occupied territory, and -Reich Commissar for the occupied Netherlands. The Defendant -Seyss-Inquart used the foregoing positions and his personal influence in -such a manner that: - -He promoted the seizure and the consolidation of control over Austria by -the Nazi conspirators set forth in Count One of the Indictment; he -participated in the political planning and preparation of the Nazi -conspirators for wars of aggression and wars in violation of -international treaties, agreements, and assurances set forth in Counts -One and Two of the Indictment; and he authorized, directed, and -participated in the War Crimes set forth in Count Three of the -Indictment and the Crimes against Humanity set forth in Count Four of -the Indictment, including a wide variety of crimes against persons and -property. - -STREICHER. The Defendant Streicher between 1932 and 1945 was a member of -the Nazi Party, a member of the Reichstag, a general in the SA, -Gauleiter of Franconia, editor in chief of the anti-Semitic newspaper -_Der Stürmer_. The Defendant Streicher used the foregoing positions, his -personal influence, and his close connection with the Führer in such a -manner that: - -He promoted the accession to power of the Nazi conspirators and the -consolidation of their control over Germany set forth in Count One of -the Indictment; he authorized, directed, and participated in the Crimes -against Humanity set forth in Count Four of the Indictment, including -particularly the incitement of the persecution of the Jews set forth in -Count One and Count Four of the Indictment. - -KEITEL. The Defendant Keitel between 1938 and 1945 was Chief of the High -Command of the German Armed Forces, member of the Secret Cabinet -Council, member of the Council of Ministers for the Defense of the -Reich, and Field Marshal. The Defendant Keitel used the foregoing -positions, his personal influence, and his intimate connection with the -Führer in such a manner that: - -He promoted the military preparations for war set forth in Count One of -the Indictment; he participated in the political planning and -preparation of the Nazi conspirators for wars of aggression and wars in -violation of international treaties, agreements, and assurances set -forth in Counts One and Two of the Indictment; he executed and assumed -responsibility for the execution of the plans of the Nazi conspirators -for wars of aggression and wars in violation, of international treaties, -agreements, and assurances set forth in Counts One and Two of the -Indictment; he authorized, directed, and participated in the War Crimes -set forth in Count Three of the Indictment and the Crimes against -Humanity set forth in Count Four of the Indictment, including -particularly the War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity involved in the -ill-treatment of prisoners of war and of the civilian population of -occupied territories. - -JODL. The Defendant Jodl between 1932 and 1945 was lieutenant colonel, -Army Operations Department of the Wehrmacht, Colonel, Chief of OKW -Operations Department, major general and Chief of Staff OKW and colonel -general. The Defendant Jodl used, the foregoing positions, his personal -influence, and his close connection with the Führer in such a manner -that: - -He promoted the accession to power of the Nazi conspirators and the -consolidation, of their control over Germany set forth in Count One of -the Indictment; he promoted the preparations for war set forth in Count -One of the Indictment; he participated in the military planning and -preparation of the Nazi conspirators for wars of aggression and wars in -violation of international treaties, agreements, and assurances set -forth in Counts One and Two of the Indictment; and he authorized, -directed, and participated in the War Crimes set forth in Count Three of -the Indictment and the Crimes against Humanity set forth in Count Four -of the Indictment, including a wide variety of crimes against persons -and property. - -RAEDER. The Defendant Raeder between 1928 and 1945 was -Commander-in-Chief of the German Navy, Generaladmiral, Grossadmiral, -Admiralinspekteur of the German Navy, and a member of the Secret Cabinet -Council. The Defendant Raeder used the foregoing positions and his -personal influence in such a manner that: - -He promoted the preparations for war set forth in Count One of the -Indictment; he participated in the political planning and preparation of -the Nazi conspirators for wars of aggression and wars in violation of -international treaties, agreements, and assurances set forth in Counts -One and Two of the Indictment; he executed, and assumed responsibility -for the execution of the plans of the Nazi conspirators for wars of -aggression and wars in violation of international treaties, agreements, -and assurances set forth in Counts One and Two of the Indictment; and he -authorized, directed, and participated in the War Crimes set forth in -Count Three of the Indictment, including particularly War Crimes arising -out of sea warfare. - -DÖNITZ. The Defendant Dönitz between 1932 and 1945 was Commanding -Officer of the Weddigen U-boat Flotilla, Commander-in-Chief of the -U-boat arm, Vice-Admiral, Admiral, Grossadmiral, and Commander-in-Chief -of the German Navy, advisor to Hitler, and successor to Hitler as head -of the German Government. The Defendant Dönitz used the foregoing -positions, his personal influence, and his intimate connection with the -Führer in such a manner that: - -He promoted the preparations for war set forth in Count One of the -Indictment; he participated in the military planning and preparation of -the Nazi conspirators for wars of aggression and wars in violation of -international treaties, agreements, and assurances set forth in Counts -One and Two of the Indictment; and he authorized, directed, and -participated in the War Crimes set forth in Count Three of the -Indictment, including particularly the crimes against persons and -property on the High Seas. - -FRITZSCHE. The Defendant Fritzsche between 1933 and 1945 was a member of -the Nazi Party, editor-in-chief of the official German news agency, -“Deutsches Nachrichten Büro”, head of the Wireless News Service and of -the Home Press Division of the Reich Ministry of Propaganda, -Ministerialdirektor of the Reich Ministry of Propaganda, Head of the -Radio Division of the Propaganda Department of the Nazi Party, and -Plenipotentiary for the Political Organization of the Greater German -Radio. The Defendant Fritzsche used the foregoing positions and his -personal influence to disseminate and exploit the principal doctrines of -the Nazi conspirators set forth in Count One of the Indictment, and to -advocate, encourage, and incite the commission of the War Crimes set -forth in Count Three of the Indictment and the Crimes against Humanity -set forth in Count Four of the Indictment including, particularly, -anti-Jewish measures and the ruthless exploitation of occupied -territories. - -APPENDIX B—STATEMENT OF CRIMINALITY OF GROUPS AND ORGANIZATIONS. - -The statements hereinafter set forth, following the name of each group -or organization named in the Indictment as one which should be declared -criminal, constitute matters upon which the Prosecution will rely _inter -alia_ as establishing the criminality of the group or organization: - -“Die Reichsregierung (Reich Cabinet)” referred to in the Indictment -consists of persons who were: - -(i) Members of the ordinary cabinet after 30 January 1933, the date on -which Hitler became Chancellor of the German Republic. The term -“ordinary cabinet” as used herein means the Reich Ministers, i.e., heads -of departments of the central Government; Reich Ministers without -portfolio; State Ministers acting as Reich Ministers; and other -officials entitled to take part in meetings of this cabinet. - -(ii) Members of Der Ministerrat für die Reichsverteidigung (Council of -Ministers for the Defense of the Reich). - -(iii) Members of Der Geheime Kabinettsrat (Secret Cabinet Council). -Under the Führer, these persons functioning in the foregoing capacities -and in association as a group, possessed and exercised legislative, -executive, administrative, and political powers and functions of a very -high order in the system of German Government. Accordingly, they are -charged with responsibility for the policies adopted and put into effect -by the Government including those which comprehended and involved the -commission of the crimes referred to in Counts One, Two, Three, and Four -of the Indictment. - -“Das Korps der Politischen Leiter der Nationalsozialistischen Deutschen -Arbeiterpartei (Leadership Corps of the Nazi Party)” referred to in the -Indictment consists of persons who were at any time, according to common -Nazi terminology, “Politische Leiter” (Political Leaders) of any grade -or rank. - -The Politischen Leiter comprised the leaders of the various functional -offices of the Party (for example, the Reichsleitung or Party Reich -Directorate, and the Gauleitung, or Party Gau Directorate), as well as -the territorial leaders of the Party (for example, the Gauleiter). - -The Politischen Leiter were a distinctive and elite group within the -Nazi Party proper and as such were vested with special prerogatives. -They were organized according to the Leadership Principle and were -charged with planning, developing, and imposing upon their followers the -policies of the Nazi Party. Thus the territorial leaders among them were -called Hoheitsträger, or bearers of sovereignty, and were entitled to -call upon and utilize the various Party formations when necessary for -the execution of Party policies. - -Reference is hereby made to the allegations in Count One of the -Indictment showing that the Nazi Party was the central core of the -Common Plan or Conspiracy therein set forth. The Politischen Leiter, as -a major power within the Nazi Party proper, and functioning in the -capacities above described and in association as a group, joined in the -Common Plan or Conspiracy, and accordingly share responsibility for the -crimes set forth in Counts One, Two, Three, and Four of the Indictment. - -The Prosecution expressly reserves the right to request, at any time -before sentence is pronounced, that Politischer Leiter of subordinate -grades or ranks or of other types or classes, to be specified by the -prosecution, be excepted from further proceedings in this Case Number 1, -but without prejudice to other proceedings or actions against them. - -“Die Schutzstaffeln der Nationalsozialistischen Deutschen Arbeiterpartei -(commonly known as the SS) including Der Sicherheitsdienst (commonly -known as the SD)” referred to in the Indictment consists of the entire -corps of the SS and all offices, departments, services, agencies, -branches, formations, organizations, and groups of which it was at any -time comprised or which were at any time integrated in it, including but -not limited to, the Allgemeine SS, the Waffen SS, the SS Totenkopf -Verbände, SS Polizei Regimenter, and the Sicherheitsdienst des -Reichsführers SS (commonly known as the SD). - -The SS, originally established by Hitler in 1925 as an elite section of -the SA to furnish a protective guard for the Führer and Nazi Party -leaders, became an independent formation of the Nazi Party in 1934 under -the leadership of the Reichsführer SS, Heinrich Himmler. It was composed -of voluntary members, selected in accordance with Nazi biological, -racial, and political theories, completely indoctrinated in Nazi -ideology and pledged to uncompromising obedience to the Führer. After -the accession of the Nazi conspirators to power, it developed many -departments, agencies, formations, and branches and extended its -influence and control over numerous fields of governmental and Party -activity. Through Heinrich Himmler, as Reichsführer SS and Chief of the -German Police, agencies and units of the SS and of the Reich were joined -in operation to form a unified repressive police force. The -Sicherheitsdienst des Reichsführers SS (commonly known as the SD), a -department of the SS, was developed into a vast espionage and -counter-intelligence system which operated in conjunction with the -Gestapo and criminal police in detecting, suppressing, and eliminating -tendencies, groups, and individuals deemed hostile or potentially -hostile to the Nazi Party, its leaders, principles, and objectives, and -eventually was combined with the Gestapo and criminal police in a single -security police department, the Reich Main Security Office. - -Other branches of the SS developed into an armed force and served in the -wars of aggression referred to in Counts One and Two of the Indictment. -Through other departments and branches the SS controlled the -administration of concentration camps and the execution of Nazi racial, -biological, and resettlement policies. Through its numerous functions -and activities it served as the instrument for insuring the domination -of Nazi ideology and protecting and extending the Nazi regime over -Germany and occupied territories. It thus participated in and is -responsible for the crimes referred to in Counts One, Two, Three, and -Four of the Indictment. - -“Die Geheime Staatspolizei (Secret State Police, commonly known as the -Gestapo)” referred to in the Indictment consists of the headquarters, -departments, offices, branches, and all the forces and personnel of the -Geheime Staatspolizei organized or existing at any time after 30 January -1933, including the Geheime Staatspolizei of Prussia and equivalent -secret or political police forces of the Reich and the components -thereof. - -The Gestapo was created by the Nazi conspirators immediately after their -accession to power, first in Prussia by the Defendant Göring and shortly -thereafter in all other states in the Reich. These separate secret and -political police forces were developed into a centralized, uniform -organization operating through a central headquarters and through a -network of regional offices in Germany and in occupied territories. Its -officials and operatives were selected on the basis of unconditional -acceptance of Nazi ideology, were largely drawn from members of the SS, -and were trained in SS and SD schools. It acted to suppress and -eliminate tendencies, groups, and individuals deemed hostile or -potentially hostile to the Nazi Party, its leaders, principles, and -objectives, and to repress resistance and potential resistance to German -control in occupied territories. In performing these functions it -operated free from legal control, taking any measures it deemed -necessary for the accomplishment of its missions. - -Through its purposes, activities and the means it used, it participated -in and is responsible for the commission of the crimes set forth in -Counts One, Two, Three, and Four of the Indictment. - -“Die Sturmabteilungen der Nationalsozialistischen Deutschen -Arbeiterpartei (commonly known as the SA).” That organization referred -to in the Indictment was a formation of the Nazi Party under the -immediate jurisdiction of the Führer, organized on military lines, whose -membership was composed of volunteers serving as political soldiers of -the Party. It was one of the earliest formations of the Nazi Party and -the original guardian of the National Socialist movement. Founded in -1921 as a voluntary military formation, it was developed by the Nazi -conspirators before their accession to power into a vast private army -and utilized for the purpose of creating disorder, and terrorizing and -eliminating political opponents. It continued to serve as an instrument -for the physical, ideological, and military training of Party members -and as a reserve for the German Armed Forces. After the launching of the -wars of aggression, referred to in Counts One and Two of the Indictment, -the SA not only operated as an organization for military training but -provided auxiliary police and security forces in occupied territories, -guarded prisoner-of-war camps and concentration camps and supervised and -controlled persons forced to labor in Germany and occupied territories. - -Through its purposes and activities and the means it used it -participated in and is responsible for the commission of the crimes set -forth in Counts One, Two, Three, and Four of the Indictment. - -The “General Staff and High Command of the German Armed Forces” referred -to in the Indictment consists of those individuals who between February -1938 and May 1945 were the highest commanders of the Wehrmacht, the -Army, the Navy, and the Air Forces. The individuals comprising this -group are the persons who held the following appointments: - -Oberbefehlshaber der Kriegsmarine (Commander in Chief of the Navy); Chef -(and, formerly, Chef des Stabes) der Seekriegsleitung (Chief of Naval -War Staff); Oberbefehlshaber des Heeres (Commander in Chief of the -Army); Chef des Generalstabes des Heeres (Chief of the General Staff of -the Army); Oberbefehlshaber der Luftwaffe (Commander in Chief of the Air -Force); Chef des Generalstabes der Luftwaffe (Chief of the General Staff -of the Air Force); Chef des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht (Chief of the -High Command of the Armed Forces); Chef des Führungsstabes des -Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht (Chief of the Operations Staff of the High -Command of the Armed Forces); Stellvertretender Chef des Führungsstabes -des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht (Deputy Chief of the Operations Staff of -the High Command of the Armed Forces); Commanders-in-Chief in the field, -with the status of Oberbefehlshaber, of the Wehrmacht, Navy, Army, Air -Force. - -Functioning in such capacities and in association as a group at the -highest level in the German Armed Forces organization, these persons had -a major responsibility for the planning, preparation, initiation, and -waging of illegal war as set forth in Counts One and Two of the -Indictment and for the War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity involved -in the execution of the Common Plan or Conspiracy set forth in Counts -Three and Four of the Indictment. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE (Continuing the reading of the Indictment): - -APPENDIX C—CHARGES AND PARTICULARS OF VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL -TREATIES, AGREEMENTS, AND ASSURANCES CAUSED BY THE DEFENDANTS IN THE -COURSE OF PLANNING, PREPARING AND INITIATING THE WARS. - -I. Charge: - -Violation of the Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International -Disputes signed at The Hague, 29 July 1899. - -Particulars: In that Germany did, by force and arms, on the dates -specified in Column 1, invade the territory of the Sovereigns specified -in Column 2, respectively, without first having attempted to settle its -disputes with the said Sovereigns by pacific means. - - (Column 1) (Column 2) - 6 April 1941 Kingdom of Greece - 6 April 1941 Kingdom of Yugoslavia - -II. Charge: - -Violation of the Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International -Disputes signed at The Hague, 18 October 1907. - -Particulars: In that Germany did, on or about the dates specified in -Column 1, by force of arms invade the territory of the Sovereigns -specified in Column 2, respectively, without having first attempted to -settle its disputes with the said Sovereigns by pacific means. - - (Column 1) (Column 2) - 1 September 1939 Republic of Poland - 9 April 1940 Kingdom of Norway - 9 April 1940 Kingdom of Denmark - 10 May 1940 Grand-Duchy of Luxembourg - 10 May 1940 Kingdom of Belgium - 10 May 1940 Kingdom of the Netherlands - 22 June 1941 Union of Soviet Socialist - Republics - -III. Charge: - -Violation of Hague Convention III, Relative to the Opening of -Hostilities, signed 18 October 1907. - -Particulars: In that Germany did, on or about the dates specified in -Column 1, commence hostilities against the countries specified in Column -2, respectively, without previous warning in the form of a reasoned -declaration of war or an ultimatum with conditional declaration of war. - - (Column 1) (Column 2) - 1 September 1939 Republic of Poland - 9 April 1940 Kingdom of Norway - 9 April 1940 Kingdom of Denmark - 10 May 1940 Kingdom of Belgium - 10 May 1940 Kingdom of the Netherlands - 10 May 1940 Grand-Duchy of Luxembourg - 22 June 1941 Union of Soviet Socialist - Republics - -IV. Charge: - -Violation of Hague Convention V, Respecting the Rights and Duties of -Neutral Powers and Persons in Case of War on Land, signed 18 October -1907. - -Particulars: - -In that Germany did, on or about the dates specified in Column 1, by -force and arms of its military forces, cross into, invade, and occupy -the territories of the Sovereigns specified in Column 2, respectively, -then and thereby violating the neutrality of said Sovereigns. - - (Column 1) (Column 2) - 9 April 1940 Kingdom of Norway - 9 April 1940 Kingdom of Denmark - 10 May 1940 Grand-Duchy of Luxembourg - 10 May 1940 Kingdom of Belgium - 10 May 1940 Kingdom of the Netherlands - 22 June 1941 Union of Soviet Socialist - Republics - -V. Charge: - -Violation of the Treaty of Peace between the Allied and Associated -Powers and Germany, signed at Versailles, 28 June 1919, known as the -Versailles Treaty. - -Particulars: - -(1) In that Germany did, on and after 7 March 1936, maintain and -assemble armed forces and maintain and construct military fortifications -in the demilitarized zone of the Rhineland in violation of the -provisions of Articles 42 to 44 of the Treaty of Versailles. - -(2) In that Germany did, on or about 13 March 1938, annex Austria into -the German Reich in violation of the provisions of Article 80 of the -Treaty of Versailles. - -(3) In that Germany did, on or about 22 March 1939, incorporate the -District of Memel into the German Reich in violation of the provisions -of Article 99 of the Treaty of Versailles. - -(4) In that Germany did, on or about 1 September 1939, incorporate the -Free City of Danzig into the German Reich in violation of the provisions -of Article 100 of the Treaty of Versailles. - -(5) In that Germany did, on or about 16 March 1939, incorporate the -provinces of Bohemia and Moravia, formerly part of Czechoslovakia, into -the German Reich in violation of the provisions of Article 81 of the -Treaty of Versailles. - -(6) In that Germany did, at various times in March 1935 and thereafter, -repudiate various parts of Part V, Military, Naval, and Air Clauses of -the Treaty of Versailles, by creating an air force, by use of compulsory -military service, by increasing the size of the army beyond treaty -limits, and by increasing the size of the navy beyond treaty limits. - -VI. Charge: - -Violation of the Treaty between the United States and Germany Restoring -Friendly Relations, signed at Berlin, 25 August 1921. - -Particulars: - -In that Germany did, at various times in March 1935 and thereafter, -repudiate various parts of Part V, Military, Naval, and Air Clauses of -the Treaty between the United States and Germany Restoring Friendly -Relations by creating an air force, by use of compulsory military -service, by increasing the size of the army beyond treaty limits, and by -increasing the size of the navy beyond treaty limits. - -VII. Charge: - -Violation of the Treaty of Mutual Guarantee between Germany, Belgium, -France, Great Britain and Italy, done at Locarno, 16 October 1925. - -Particulars: - -(1) In that Germany did, on or about 7 March 1936, unlawfully send armed -forces into the Rhineland demilitarized zone of Germany, in violation of -Article 1 of the Treaty of Mutual Guarantee. - -(2) In that Germany did, in or about March 1936, and thereafter, -unlawfully maintain armed forces in the Rhineland demilitarized zone of -Germany, in violation of Article 1 of the Treaty of Mutual Guarantee. - -(3) In that Germany did, on or about 7 March 1936, and thereafter, -unlawfully construct and maintain fortifications in the Rhineland -demilitarized zone of Germany, in violation of Article 1 of the Treaty -of Mutual Guarantee. - -(4) In that Germany did, on or about 10 May 1940, unlawfully attack and -invade Belgium, in violation of Article 2 of the Treaty of Mutual -Guarantee. - -(5) In that Germany did, on or about 10 May 1940, unlawfully attack and -invade Belgium, without first having attempted to settle its dispute -with Belgium by peaceful means, in violation of Article 3 of the Treaty -of Mutual Guarantee. - -VIII. Charge: - -Violation of the Arbitration Treaty between Germany and Czechoslovakia, -done at Locarno, 16 October 1925. - -Particulars: - -In that Germany did, on or about 15 March 1939, unlawfully by duress and -threats of military might force Czechoslovakia to deliver the destiny of -Czechoslovakia and its inhabitants into the hands of the Führer and -Reichschancellor of Germany without having attempted to settle its -dispute with Czechoslovakia by peaceful means. - -IX. Charge: - -Violation of the Arbitration Convention between Germany and Belgium, -done at Locarno, 16 October 1925. - -Particulars: - -In that Germany did, on or about 10 May 1940, unlawfully attack and -invade Belgium without first having attempted to settle its dispute with -Belgium by peaceful means. - -X. Charge: - -Violation of the Arbitration Treaty between Germany and Poland, done at -Locarno, 16 October 1925. - -Particulars: - -In that Germany did, on or about 1 September 1939, unlawfully attack and -invade Poland without first having attempted to settle its dispute with -Poland by peaceful means. - -XI. Charge: - -Violation of Convention of Arbitration and Conciliation entered into -between Germany and the Netherlands on 20 May 1926. - -Particulars: - -In that Germany, without warning, and notwithstanding its solemn -covenant to settle by peaceful means all disputes of any nature whatever -which might arise between it and the Netherlands which were not capable -of settlement by diplomacy and which had not been referred by mutual -agreement to the Permanent Court of International Justice, did, on or -about 10 May 1940, with a military force, attack, invade, and occupy the -Netherlands, thereby violating its neutrality and territorial integrity -and destroying its sovereign independence. - -XII. Charge: - -Violation of Convention of Arbitration and Conciliation entered into -between Germany and Denmark on 2 June 1926. - -Particulars: - -In that Germany, without warning, and notwithstanding its solemn -covenant to settle by peaceful means all disputes of any nature whatever -which might arise between it and Denmark which were not capable of -settlement by diplomacy and which had not been referred by mutual -agreement to the Permanent Court of International Justice, did, on or -about 9 April 1940, with a military force, attack, invade, and occupy -Denmark, thereby violating its neutrality and territorial integrity and -destroying its sovereign independence. - -XIII. Charge: - -Violation of Treaty between Germany and other Powers Providing for -Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National Policy, signed at Paris -27 August 1928, known as the Kellogg-Briand Pact. - -Particulars: - -In that Germany did, on or about the dates specified in Column 1, with a -military force, attack the Sovereigns specified in Column 2, -respectively, and resort to war against such Sovereigns, in violation of -its solemn declaration condemning recourse to war for the solution of -international controversies, its solemn renunciation of war as an -instrument of national policy in its relations with such Sovereigns, and -its solemn covenant that settlement or solution of all disputes or -conflicts of whatever nature or origin arising between it and such -Sovereigns should never be sought except by pacific means - - (Column 1) (Column 2) - 1 September 1939 Republic of Poland - 9 April 1940 Kingdom of Norway - 9 April 1940 Kingdom of Denmark - 10 May 1940 Kingdom of Belgium - 10 May 1940 Grand-Duchy of Luxembourg - 10 May 1940 Kingdom of the Netherlands - 6 April 1941 Kingdom of Greece - 6 April 1941 Kingdom of Yugoslavia - 22 June 1941 Union of Soviet Socialist - Republics - 11 December 1941 United States of America - -XIV. Charge: - -Violation of Treaty of Arbitration and Conciliation entered into between -Germany and Luxembourg on 11 September 1929. - -Particulars: - -In that Germany, without warning, and notwithstanding its solemn -covenant to settle by peaceful means all disputes which might arise -between it and Luxembourg which were not capable of settlement by -diplomacy, did, on or about 10 May 1940, with a military force, attack, -invade, and occupy Luxembourg, thereby violating its neutrality and -territorial integrity and destroying its sovereign independence. - -XV. Charge: - -Violation of the Declaration of Non-Aggression entered into between -Germany and Poland on 26 January 1934. - -Particulars: - -In that Germany proceeding to the application of force for the purpose -of reaching a decision did, on or about 1 September 1939, at various -places along the German-Polish frontier employ military forces to -attack, invade, and commit other acts of aggression against Poland. - -XVI. Charge: - -Violation of German assurance given on 21 May 1935 that the -inviolability and integrity of the Federal State of Austria would be -recognized. - -Particulars: - -In that Germany did, on or about 12 March 1938, at various points and -places along the German-Austria frontier, with a military force and in -violation of its solemn declaration and assurance, invade and annex to -Germany the territory of the Federal State of Austria. - -XVII. Charge: - -Violation of Austro-German Agreement of 11 July 1936. - -Particulars: - -In that Germany during the period from 12 February 1938 to 13 March 1938 -did by duress and various aggressive acts, including the use of military -force, cause the Federal State of Austria to yield up its sovereignty to -the German State in violation of Germany’s agreement to recognize the -full sovereignty of the Federal State of Austria. - -XVIII. Charge: - -Violation of German assurances given on 30 January 1937, 28 April 1939, -26 August 1939, and 6 October 1939 to respect the neutrality and -territorial inviolability of the Netherlands. - -Particulars: - -In that Germany, without warning, and without recourse to peaceful means -of settling any considered differences did, on or about 10 May 1940, -with a military force and in violation of its solemn assurances, invade, -occupy, and attempt to subjugate the sovereign territory of the -Netherlands. - -XIX. Charge: - -Violation of German assurances given on 30 January 1937, 13 October -1937, 28 April 1939, 26 August 1939 and 6 October 1939, to respect the -neutrality and territorial integrity and inviolability of Belgium. - -Particulars: - -In that Germany, without warning, did on or about 10 May 1940, with a -military force and in violation of its solemn assurances and -declarations, attack, invade, and occupy the sovereign territory of -Belgium. - -XX. Charge: - -Violation of assurances given on 11 March 1938 and 26 September 1938 to -Czechoslovakia. - -Particulars: - -In that Germany, on or about 15 March 1939 did, by establishing a -Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia under duress and by the threat of -force, violate the assurance given on 11 March 1938 to respect the -territorial integrity of the Czechoslovak Republic and the assurance -given on 26 September 1938 that, if the so-called Sudeten territories -were ceded to Germany, no further German territorial claims on -Czechoslovakia would be made. - -XXI. Charge: - -Violation of the Munich Agreement and Annexes of 29 September 1938. - -Particulars: - -(1) In that Germany, on or about 15 March 1939, did by duress and the -threat of military intervention force the Republic of Czechoslovakia to -deliver the destiny of the Czech people and country into the hands of -the Führer of the German Reich. - -(2) In that Germany refused and failed to join in an international -guarantee of the new boundaries of the Czechoslovakian State as provided -for in Annex No. 1 to the Munich Agreement. - -XXII. Charge: - -Violation of the solemn assurances of Germany given on 3 September 1939, -28 April 1939, and 6 October 1939 that they would not violate the -independence or sovereignty of the Kingdom of Norway. - -Particulars: - -In that Germany, without warning did, on or about 9 April 1940, with its -military and naval forces attack, invade, and commit other acts of -aggression against the Kingdom of Norway. - -XXIII. Charge: - -Violation of German assurances given on 28 April 1939 and 26 August 1939 -to respect the neutrality and territorial inviolability of Luxembourg. - -Particulars: - -In that Germany, without warning, and without recourse to peaceful means -of settling any considered differences, did, on or about 10 May 1940, -with a military force and in violation of the solemn assurances, invade, -occupy, and absorb into Germany the sovereign territory of Luxembourg. - -XXIV. Charge: - -Violation of the Treaty of Non-Aggression between Germany and Denmark -signed at Berlin 31 May 1939. - -Particulars: - -In that Germany without prior warning, did, on or about 9 April 1940, -with its military forces, attack, invade, and commit other acts of -aggression against the Kingdom of Denmark. - -XXV. Charge: - -Violation of Treaty of Non-Aggression entered into between Germany and -U.S.S.R. on 23 August 1939. - -Particulars: - -(1) In that Germany did, on or about 22 June 1941, employ military -forces to attack and commit acts of aggression against the U.S.S.R. - -(2) In that Germany without warning or recourse to a friendly exchange -of views or arbitration did, on or about 22 June 1941, employ military -forces to attack and commit acts of aggression against the U.S.S.R. - -XXVI. Charge: - -Violation of German assurance given on 6 October 1939 to respect the -neutrality and territorial integrity of Yugoslavia. - -Particulars: - -In that Germany without prior warning did, on or about 6 April 1941, -with its military forces attack, invade and commit other acts of -aggression against the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will now adjourn until 10 o’clock tomorrow -morning. - - [_The Tribunal adjourned until 21 November 1945 at 1000 hours._] - - - - - SECOND DAY - Wednesday, 21 November 1945 - - - _Morning Session_ - -THE PRESIDENT: A motion has been filed with the Tribunal and the -Tribunal has given it consideration, and insofar as it may be a plea to -the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, it conflicts with Article 3 of the -Charter and will not be entertained. Insofar as it may contain other -arguments which may be open to the defendants, they may be heard at a -later stage. - -And now, in accordance with Article 24 of the Charter, which provides -that, after the Indictment has been read in court, the defendants shall -be called upon to plead guilty or not guilty, I now direct the -defendants to plead either guilty or not guilty. - -DR. DIX: May I speak to Your Lordship for just a moment? - -THE PRESIDENT: You may not speak to me in support of the motion with -which I have just dealt on behalf of the Tribunal. I have told you that -so far as that motion is a plea to the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, it -conflicts with Article 3 of the Charter and will not be entertained. -Insofar as it contains or may contain arguments which may be open to the -defendants, those arguments may be heard hereafter. - -DR. DIX: I do not wish to speak on the subject of a motion. As speaker -for the Defense I should like to broach a technical question and voice a -question to this effect on behalf of the Defense. May I do so? The -Defense Counsel were forbidden to talk to the defendants this morning. -It is absolutely necessary that the Defense Counsel should be able to -speak to the defendants before the session. It often happens that after -the session one cannot reach one’s client at night. It is quite possible -that counsel may have prepared something overnight which he wishes to -discuss with the defendant before the session. According to our -experience it is always permissible for the Defense Counsel to speak to -the defendant before the session. The question of conferring between -Defense Counsel and clients during sessions could be dealt with at a -later date. - -At present I request, on behalf of the entire Defense, that we be -allowed to confer with our clients in the courtroom, into which they -usually are brought at a very early hour. Otherwise, we shall not be in -a position to conduct the defense in an efficient and appropriate -manner. - -THE PRESIDENT: I am afraid that you cannot consult with your clients in -the courtroom except by written communication. When you are out of the -courtroom, security regulations can be carried out and, so far as those -security regulations go, you have full opportunity to consult with your -clients. In the courtroom we must confine you to written communications -to your clients. At the end of each day’s sitting, you will have full -opportunity to consult with them in private. - -DR. DIX: I shall discuss this with my colleagues of the Defense and we -should like if possible to return to this question. - -DR. THOMA: May I have the floor? - -THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your name please. - -DR. THOMA: Dr. Ralph Thoma. I represent the Defendant Rosenberg. -Yesterday my client gave me a statement as regards the question of guilt -or innocence. I took this statement and promised him to talk with him -about it. Neither last night nor this morning have I had an opportunity -to talk with him; and, consequently, neither I nor my client are in a -position to make a statement today as to whether he is guilty or not -guilty. I therefore request that the proceedings be interrupted so that -I may speak with my client. - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Thoma, the Tribunal will be prepared to adjourn for -15 minutes in order that you may have an opportunity of consulting with -your clients. - -DR. THOMA: Thank you. I should like to make another statement. Some of -my colleagues have just told me that they are in the same position as I, -particularly Dr. Sauter. . . . - -THE PRESIDENT: I meant that all defendants’ counsel should have an -opportunity of consulting with their clients; but I would point out to -the defendants’ counsel that they have had several weeks’ preparation -for this Trial, and that they must have anticipated that the provisions -of Article 24 would be followed. But now we will adjourn for 15 minutes -in which all of you may consult with your clients. - -DR. THOMA: May I say something further in that respect, Your Honor. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes. - -DR. THOMA: The Defense asked whether the question of guilty or not -guilty could only be answered with “yes”, or “no” or whether a more -extensive and longer statement could be made. We obtained information on -this point only the day before yesterday. We therefore have had no -opportunity to confer at length with our clients on this matter. - -THE PRESIDENT: One moment. The question will have to be answered in the -words of Article 24 of the Charter, and those words are printed in -italics: “The Tribunal shall ask each defendant whether he pleads guilty -or not guilty.” That is what they have got to do at that stage. Of -course, the defendants will have a full opportunity themselves, if they -are called as witnesses, and by their counsel, to make their defense -fully at a later stage. - - [_A recess was taken._] - -THE PRESIDENT: I will now call upon the defendants to plead guilty or -not guilty to the charges against them. They will proceed in turn to a -point in the dock opposite to the microphone. - -Hermann Wilhelm Göring. - -HERMANN WILHELM GÖRING: Before I answer the question of the Tribunal -whether or not I am guilty. . . . - -THE PRESIDENT: I informed the Court that defendants were not entitled to -make a statement. You must plead guilty or not guilty. - -GÖRING: I declare myself in the sense of the Indictment not guilty. - -THE PRESIDENT: Rudolf Hess. - -RUDOLF HESS: No. - -THE PRESIDENT: That will be entered as a plea of not guilty. [Laughter.] - -THE PRESIDENT: If there is any disturbance in court, those who make it -will have to leave the court. - -Joachim von Ribbentrop. - -JOACHIM VON RIBBENTROP: I declare myself in the sense of the Indictment -not guilty. - -THE PRESIDENT: Wilhelm Keitel. - -WILHELM KEITEL: I declare myself not guilty. - -THE PRESIDENT: In the absence of Ernst Kaltenbrunner, the Trial will -proceed against him, but he will have an opportunity of pleading when he -is sufficiently well to be brought back into court. - -Alfred Rosenberg. - -ALFRED ROSENBERG: I declare myself in the sense of the Indictment not -guilty. - -THE PRESIDENT: Hans Frank. - -HANS FRANK: I declare myself not guilty. - -THE PRESIDENT: Wilhelm Frick. - -WILHELM FRICK: Not guilty. - -THE PRESIDENT: Julius Streicher. - -JULIUS STREICHER: Not guilty. - -THE PRESIDENT: Walter Funk. - -WALTER FUNK: I declare myself not guilty. - -THE PRESIDENT: Hjalmar Schacht. - -HJALMAR SCHACHT: I am not guilty in any respect. - -THE PRESIDENT: Karl Dönitz. - -KARL DÖNITZ: Not guilty. - -THE PRESIDENT: Erich Raeder. - -ERICH RAEDER: I declare myself not guilty. - -THE PRESIDENT: Baldur von Schirach. - -BALDUR VON SCHIRACH: I declare myself in the sense of the Indictment not -guilty. - -THE PRESIDENT: Fritz Sauckel. - -FRITZ SAUCKEL: I declare myself in the sense of the Indictment, before -God and the world and particularly before my people, not guilty. - -THE PRESIDENT: Alfred Jodl. - -ALFRED JODL: Not guilty. For what I have done or had to do, I have a -pure conscience before God, before history and my people. - -THE PRESIDENT: Franz von Papen. - -FRANZ VON PAPEN: I declare myself in no way guilty. - -THE PRESIDENT: Arthur Seyss-Inquart. - -ARTHUR SEYSS-INQUART: I declare myself not guilty. - -THE PRESIDENT: Albert Speer. - -ALBERT SPEER: Not guilty. - -THE PRESIDENT: Constantin von Neurath. - -CONSTANTIN VON NEURATH: I answer the question in the negative. - -THE PRESIDENT: Hans Fritzsche. - -HANS FRITZSCHE: As regards this Indictment, not guilty. - -[_At this point Defendant Göring stood up in the prisoner’s dock and -attempted to address the Tribunal._] - -THE PRESIDENT: You are not entitled to address the Tribunal except -through your counsel, at the present time. - -I will now call upon the Chief Prosecutor for the United States of -America. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: May it please Your Honors: - -The privilege of opening the first trial in history for crimes against -the peace of the world imposes a grave responsibility. The wrongs which -we seek to condemn and punish have been so calculated, so malignant, and -so devastating, that civilization cannot tolerate their being ignored, -because it cannot survive their being repeated. That four great nations, -flushed with victory and stung with injury stay the hand of vengeance -and voluntarily submit their captive enemies to the judgment of the law -is one of the most significant tributes that Power has ever paid to -Reason. - -This Tribunal, while it is novel and experimental, is not the product of -abstract speculations nor is it created to vindicate legalistic -theories. This inquest represents the practical effort of four of the -most mighty of nations, with the support of 17 more, to utilize -international law to meet the greatest menace of our times—aggressive -war. The common sense of mankind demands that law shall not stop with -the punishment of petty crimes by little people. It must also reach men -who possess themselves of great power and make deliberate and concerted -use of it to set in motion evils which leave no home in the world -untouched. It is a cause of that magnitude that the United Nations will -lay before Your Honors. - -In the prisoners’ dock sit twenty-odd broken men. Reproached by the -humiliation of those they have led almost as bitterly as by the -desolation of those they have attacked, their personal capacity for evil -is forever past. It is hard now to perceive in these men as captives the -power by which as Nazi leaders they once dominated much of the world and -terrified most of it. Merely as individuals their fate is of little -consequence to the world. - -What makes this inquest significant is that these prisoners represent -sinister influences that will lurk in the world long after their bodies -have returned to dust. We will show them to be living symbols of racial -hatreds, of terrorism and violence, and of the arrogance and cruelty of -power. They are symbols of fierce nationalisms and of militarism, of -intrigue and war-making which have embroiled Europe generation after -generation, crushing its manhood, destroying its homes, and -impoverishing its life. They have so identified themselves with the -philosophies they conceived and with the forces they directed that any -tenderness to them is a victory and an encouragement to all the evils -which are attached to their names. Civilization can afford no compromise -with the social forces which would gain renewed strength if we deal -ambiguously or indecisively with the men in whom those forces now -precariously survive. - -What these men stand for we will patiently and temperately disclose. We -will give you undeniable proofs of incredible events. The catalog of -crimes will omit nothing that could be conceived by a pathological -pride, cruelty, and lust for power. These men created in Germany, under -the “Führerprinzip”, a National Socialist despotism equalled only by the -dynasties of the ancient East. They took from the German people all -those dignities and freedoms that we hold natural and inalienable rights -in every human being. The people were compensated by inflaming and -gratifying hatreds towards those who were marked as “scapegoats”. -Against their opponents, including Jews, Catholics, and free labor, the -Nazis directed such a campaign of arrogance, brutality, and annihilation -as the world has not witnessed since the pre-Christian ages. They -excited the German ambition to be a “master race”, which of course -implies serfdom for others. They led their people on a mad gamble for -domination. They diverted social energies and resources to the creation -of what they thought to be an invincible war machine. They overran their -neighbors. To sustain the “master race” in its war-making, they enslaved -millions of human beings and brought them into Germany, where these -hapless creatures now wander as “displaced persons”. At length -bestiality and bad faith reached such excess that they aroused the -sleeping strength of imperiled Civilization. Its united efforts have -ground the German war machine to fragments. But the struggle has left -Europe a liberated yet prostrate land where a demoralized society -struggles to survive. These are the fruits of the sinister forces that -sit with these defendants in the prisoners’ dock. - -In justice to the nations and the men associated in this prosecution, I -must remind you of certain difficulties which may leave their mark on -this case. Never before in legal history has an effort been made to -bring within the scope of a single litigation the developments of a -decade, covering a whole continent, and involving a score of nations, -countless individuals, and innumerable events. Despite the magnitude of -the task, the world has demanded immediate action. This demand has had -to be met, though perhaps at the cost of finished craftsmanship. In my -country, established courts, following familiar procedures, applying -well-thumbed precedents, and dealing with the legal consequences of -local and limited events seldom commence a trial within a year of the -event in litigation. Yet less than 8 months ago today the courtroom in -which you sit was an enemy fortress in the hands of German SS troops. -Less than 8 months ago nearly all our witnesses and documents were in -enemy hands. The law had not been codified, no procedures had been -established, no tribunal was in existence, no usable courthouse stood -here, none of the hundreds of tons of official German documents had been -examined, no prosecuting staff had been assembled, nearly all of the -present defendants were at large, and the four prosecuting powers had -not yet joined in common cause to try them. I should be the last to deny -that the case may well suffer from incomplete researches and quite -likely will not be the example of professional work which any of the -prosecuting nations would normally wish to sponsor. It is, however, a -completely adequate case to the judgment we shall ask you to render, and -its full development we shall be obliged to leave to historians. - -Before I discuss particulars of evidence, some general considerations -which may affect the credit of this trial in the eyes of the world -should be candidly faced. There is a dramatic disparity between the -circumstances of the accusers and of the accused that might discredit -our work if we should falter, in even minor matters, in being fair and -temperate. - -Unfortunately, the nature of these crimes is such that both prosecution -and judgment must be by victor nations over vanquished foes. The -worldwide scope of the aggressions carried out by these men has left but -few real neutrals. Either the victors must judge the vanquished or we -must leave the defeated to judge themselves. After the first World War, -we learned the futility of the latter course. The former high station of -these defendants, the notoriety of their acts, and the adaptability of -their conduct to provoke retaliation make it hard to distinguish between -the demand for a just and measured retribution, and the unthinking cry -for vengeance which arises from the anguish of war. It is our task, so -far as humanly possible, to draw the line between the two. We must never -forget that the record on which we judge these defendants today is the -record on which history will judge us tomorrow. To pass these defendants -a poisoned chalice is to put it to our own lips as well. We must summon -such detachment and intellectual integrity to our task that this Trial -will commend itself to posterity as fulfilling humanity’s aspirations to -do justice. - -At the very outset, let us dispose of the contention that to put these -men to trial is to do them an injustice entitling them to some special -consideration. These defendants may be hard pressed but they are not ill -used. Let us see what alternative they would have to being tried. - -More than a majority of these prisoners surrendered to or were tracked -down by the forces of the United States. Could they expect us to make -American custody a shelter for our enemies against the just wrath of our -Allies? Did we spend American lives to capture them only to save them -from punishment? Under the principles of the Moscow Declaration, those -suspected war criminals who are not to be tried internationally must be -turned over to individual governments for trial at the scene of their -outrages. Many less responsible and less culpable American-held -prisoners have been and will continue to be turned over to other United -Nations for local trial. If these defendants should succeed, for any -reason, in escaping the condemnation of this Tribunal, or if they -obstruct or abort this trial, those who are American-held prisoners will -be delivered up to our continental Allies. For these defendants, -however, we have set up an International Tribunal and have undertaken -the burden of participating in a complicated effort to give them fair -and dispassionate hearings. That is the best-known protection to any man -with a defense worthy of being heard. - -If these men are the first war leaders of a defeated nation to be -prosecuted in the name of the law, they are also the first to be given a -chance to plead for their lives in the name of the law. Realistically, -the Charter of this Tribunal, which gives them a hearing, is also the -source of their only hope. It may be that these men of troubled -conscience, whose only wish is that the world forget them, do not regard -a trial as a favor. But they do have a fair opportunity to defend -themselves—a favor which these men, when in power, rarely extended to -their fellow countrymen. Despite the fact that public opinion already -condemns their acts, we agree that here they must be given a presumption -of innocence, and we accept the burden of proving criminal acts and the -responsibility of these defendants for their commission. - -When I say that we do not ask for convictions unless we prove crime, I -do not mean mere technical or incidental transgression of international -conventions. We charge guilt on planned and intended conduct that -involves moral as well as legal wrong. And we do not mean conduct that -is a natural and human, even if illegal, cutting of corners, such as -many of us might well have committed had we been in the defendants’ -positions. It is not because they yielded to the normal frailties of -human beings that we accuse them. It is their abnormal and inhuman -conduct which brings them to this bar. - -We will not ask you to convict these men on the testimony of their foes. -There is no count in the Indictment that cannot be proved by books and -records. The Germans were always meticulous record keepers, and these -defendants had their share of the Teutonic passion for thoroughness in -putting things on paper. Nor were they without vanity. They arranged -frequently to be photographed in action. We will show you their own -films. You will see their own conduct and hear their own voices as these -defendants re-enact for you, from the screen, some of the events in the -course of the conspiracy. - -We would also make clear that we have no purpose to incriminate the -whole German people. We know that the Nazi Party was not put in power by -a majority of the German vote. We know it came to power by an evil -alliance between the most extreme of the Nazi revolutionists, the most -unrestrained of the German reactionaries, and the most aggressive of the -German militarists. If the German populace had willingly accepted the -Nazi program, no Storm-troopers would have been needed in the early days -of the Party and there would have been no need for concentration camps -or the Gestapo, both of which institutions were inaugurated as soon as -the Nazis gained control of the German State. Only after these lawless -innovations proved successful at home were they taken abroad. - -The German people should know by now that the people of the United -States hold them in no fear, and in no hate. It is true that the Germans -have taught us the horrors of modern warfare, but the ruin that lies -from the Rhine to the Danube shows that we, like our Allies, have not -been dull pupils. If we are not awed by German fortitude and proficiency -in war, and if we are not persuaded of their political maturity, we do -respect their skill in the arts of peace, their technical competence, -and the sober, industrious, and self-disciplined character of the masses -of the German people. In 1933 we saw the German people recovering -prestige in the commercial, industrial, and artistic world after the -set-back of the last war. We beheld their progress neither with envy nor -malice. The Nazi regime interrupted this advance. The recoil of the Nazi -aggression has left Germany in ruins. The Nazi readiness to pledge the -German word without hesitation and to break it without shame has -fastened upon German diplomacy a reputation for duplicity that will -handicap it for years. Nazi arrogance has made the boast of the “master -race” a taunt that will be thrown at Germans the world over for -generations. The Nazi nightmare has given the German name a new and -sinister significance throughout the world which will retard Germany a -century. The German, no less than the non-German world, has accounts to -settle with these defendants. - -The fact of the war and the course of the war, which is the central -theme of our case, is history. From September 1st, 1939, when the German -armies crossed the Polish frontier, until September 1942, when they met -epic resistance at Stalingrad, German arms seemed invincible. Denmark -and Norway, the Netherlands and France, Belgium and Luxembourg, the -Balkans and Africa, Poland and the Baltic States, and parts of Russia, -all had been overrun and conquered by swift, powerful, well-aimed blows. -That attack on the peace of the world is the crime against international -society which brings into international cognizance crimes in its aid and -preparation which otherwise might be only internal concerns. It was -aggressive war, which the nations of the world had renounced. It was war -in violation of treaties, by which the peace of the world was sought to -be safe-guarded. - -This war did not just happen—it was planned and prepared for over a -long period of time and with no small skill and cunning. The world has -perhaps never seen such a concentration and stimulation of the energies -of any people as that which enabled Germany 20 years after it was -defeated, disarmed, and dismembered to come so near carrying out its -plan to dominate Europe. Whatever else we may say of those who were the -authors of this war, they did achieve a stupendous work in organization, -and our first task is to examine the means by which these defendants and -their fellow conspirators prepared and incited Germany to go to war. - -In general, our case will disclose these defendants all uniting at some -time with the Nazi Party in a plan which they well knew could be -accomplished only by an outbreak of war in Europe. Their seizure of the -German State, their subjugation of the German people, their terrorism -and extermination of dissident elements, their planning and waging of -war, their calculated and planned ruthlessness in the conduct of -warfare, their deliberate and planned criminality toward conquered -peoples,—all these are ends for which they acted in concert; and all -these are phases of the conspiracy, a conspiracy which reached one goal -only to set out for another and more ambitious one. We shall also trace -for you the intricate web of organizations which these men formed and -utilized to accomplish these ends. We will show how the entire structure -of offices and officials was dedicated to the criminal purposes and -committed to the use of the criminal methods planned by these defendants -and their co-conspirators, many of whom war and suicide have put beyond -reach. - -It is my purpose to open the case, particularly under Count One of the -Indictment, and to deal with the Common Plan or Conspiracy to achieve -ends possible only by resort to Crimes against Peace, War Crimes, and -Crimes against Humanity. My emphasis will not be on individual -barbarities and perversions which may have occurred independently of any -central plan. One of the dangers ever present is that this Trial may be -protracted by details of particular wrongs and that we will become lost -in a “wilderness of single instances”. Nor will I now dwell on the -activity of individual defendants except as it may contribute to -exposition of the common plan. - -The case as presented by the United States will be concerned with the -brains and authority back of all the crimes. These defendants were men -of a station and rank which does not soil its own hands with blood. They -were men who knew how to use lesser folk as tools. We want to reach the -planners and designers, the inciters and leaders without whose evil -architecture the world would not have been for so long scourged with the -violence and lawlessness, and wracked with the agonies and convulsions, -of this terrible war. - -_The Lawless Road to Power_: - -The chief instrumentality of cohesion in plan and action was the -National Socialist German Workers Party, known as the Nazi Party. Some -of the defendants were with it from the beginning. Others joined only -after success seemed to have validated its lawlessness or power had -invested it with immunity from the processes of the law. Adolf Hitler -became its supreme leader or “Führer” in 1921. - -On the 24th of February 1920, at Munich, it publicly had proclaimed its -program (1708-PS). Some of its purposes would commend themselves to many -good citizens, such as the demands for “profit-sharing in the great -industries,” “generous development of provision for old age,” “creation -and maintenance of a healthy middle class,” “a land reform suitable to -our national requirements,” and “raising the standard of health.” It -also made a strong appeal to that sort of nationalism which in ourselves -we call patriotism and in our rivals chauvinism. It demanded “equality -of rights for the German people in its dealing with other nations, and -the abolition of the peace treaties of Versailles and St. Germain.” It -demanded the “union of all Germans on the basis of the right of -self-determination of peoples to form a Great Germany.” It demanded -“land and territory (colonies) for the enrichment of our people and the -settlement of our surplus population.” All of these, of course, were -legitimate objectives if they were to be attained without resort to -aggressive warfare. - -The Nazi Party from its inception, however, contemplated war. It -demanded the “abolition of mercenary troops and the formation of a -national army.” It proclaimed that: - - “In view of the enormous sacrifice of life and property demanded - of a nation by every war, personal enrichment through war must - be regarded as a crime against the nation. We demand, therefore, - ruthless confiscation of all war profits.” - -I do not criticize this policy. Indeed, I wish it were universal. I -merely wish to point out that in a time of peace, war was a -preoccupation of the Party, and it started the work of making war less -offensive to the masses of the people. With this it combined a program -of physical training and sports for youth that became, as we shall see, -the cloak for a secret program of military training. - -The Nazi Party declaration also committed its members to an anti-Semitic -program. It declared that no Jew or any person of non-German blood could -be a member of the nation. Such persons were to be disfranchised, -disqualified for office, subject to the alien laws, and entitled to -nourishment only after the German population had first been provided -for. All who had entered Germany after August 2, 1914 were to be -required forthwith to depart, and all non-German immigration was to be -prohibited. - -The Party also avowed, even in those early days, an authoritarian and -totalitarian program for Germany. It demanded creation of a strong -central power with unconditional authority, nationalization of all -businesses which had been “amalgamated,” and a “reconstruction” of the -national system of education which “must aim at teaching the pupil to -understand the idea of the State (state sociology).” Its hostility to -civil liberties and freedom of the press was distinctly announced in -these words: - - “It must be forbidden to publish newspapers which do not conduce - to the national welfare. We demand the legal prosecution of all - tendencies in art or literature of a kind likely to disintegrate - our life as a nation and the suppression of institutions which - might militate against the above requirements.” - -The forecast of religious persecution was clothed in the language of -religious liberty, for the Nazi program stated, “We demand liberty for -all religious denominations in the State.” But, it continues with the -limitation, “so far as they are not a danger to it and do not militate -against the morality and moral sense of the German race.” - -The Party program foreshadowed the campaign of terrorism. It announced, -“We demand ruthless war upon those whose activities are injurious to the -common interests”, and it demanded that such offenses be punished with -death. - -It is significant that the leaders of this Party interpreted this -program as a belligerent one, certain to precipitate conflict. The Party -platform concluded, “The leaders of the Party swear to proceed -regardless of consequences—if necessary, at the sacrifice of their -lives—toward the fulfillment of the foregoing points.” It is this -Leadership Corps of the Party, not its entire membership, that stands -accused before you as a criminal organization. - -Let us now see how the leaders of the Party fulfilled their pledge to -proceed regardless of consequences. Obviously, their foreign objectives, -which were nothing less than to undo international treaties and to wrest -territory from foreign control, as well as most of their internal -program, could be accomplished only by possession of the machinery of -the German State. The first effort, accordingly, was to subvert the -Weimar Republic by violent revolution. An abortive putsch at Munich in -1923 landed many of them in jail. A period of meditation which followed -produced _Mein Kampf_, henceforth the source of law for the Party -workers and a source of considerable revenue to its supreme leader. The -Nazi plans for the violent overthrow of the feeble Republic then turned -to plans for its capture. - -No greater mistake could be made than to think of the Nazi Party in -terms of the loose organizations which we of the western world call -“political parties”. In discipline, structure, and method the Nazi Party -was not adapted to the democratic process of persuasion. It was an -instrument of conspiracy and of coercion. The Party was not organized to -take over power in the German State by winning support of a majority of -the German people; it was organized to seize power in defiance of the -will of the people. - -The Nazi Party, under the “Führerprinzip,” was bound by an iron -discipline into a pyramid, with the Führer, Adolf Hitler, at the top and -broadening into a numerous Leadership Corps, composed of overlords of a -very extensive Party membership at the base. By no means all of those -who may have supported the movement in one way or another were actual -Party members. The membership took the Party oath which in effect -amounted to an abdication of personal intelligence and moral -responsibility. This was the oath: “I vow inviolable fidelity to Adolf -Hitler; I vow absolute obedience to him and to the leaders he designates -for me.” The membership in daily practice followed its leaders with an -idolatry and self-surrender more Oriental than Western. - -We will not be obliged to guess as to the motives or goal of the Nazi -Party. The immediate aim was to undermine the Weimar Republic. The order -to all Party members to work to that end was given in a letter from -Hitler of August 24, 1931 to Rosenberg, of which we will produce the -original. Hitler wrote: - - “I am just reading in the _Völkischer Beobachter_, edition - 235/236, page 1, an article entitled “Does Wirth Intend To Come - over?” The tendency of the article is to prevent on our part a - crumbling away from the present form of government. I myself am - travelling all over Germany to achieve exactly the opposite. May - I therefore ask that my own paper will not stab me in the back - with tactically unwise articles. . . .” (047-PS) - -Captured film enables us to present the Defendant Alfred Rosenberg, who -from the screen will himself tell you the story. The SA practiced -violent interference with elections. We have the reports of the SD -describing in detail how its members later violated the secrecy of -elections in order to identify those who opposed them. One of the -reports makes this explanation: - - “. . . . The control was effected in the following way: some - members of the election committee marked all the ballot papers - with numbers. During the ballot itself, a voters’ list was made - up. The ballot-papers were handed out in numerical order, - therefore it was possible afterwards with the aid of this list - to find out the persons who cast ‘No’—votes or invalid votes. - One sample of these marked ballot-papers is enclosed. The - marking was done on the back of the ballot-papers with skimmed - milk. . . .” (R-142) - -The Party activity, in addition to all the familiar forms of political -contest, took on the aspect of a rehearsal for warfare. It utilized a -Party formation, “Die Sturmabteilungen”, commonly known as the SA. This -was a voluntary organization of youthful and fanatical Nazis trained for -the use of violence under semi-military discipline. Its members began by -acting as bodyguards for the Nazi leaders and rapidly expanded from -defensive to offensive tactics. They became disciplined ruffians for the -breaking up of opposition meetings and the terrorization of adversaries. -They boasted that their task was to make the Nazi Party “master of the -streets”. The SA was the parent organization of a number of others. Its -offspring include “Die Schutzstaffeln”, commonly known as the SS, formed -in 1925 and distinguished for the fanaticism and cruelty of its members; -“Der Sicherheitsdienst”, known as the SD; and “Die Geheime -Staatspolizei”, the Secret State Police, the infamous Gestapo formed in -1934 after Nazi accession to power. - -A glance at a chart of the Party organization is enough to show how -completely it differed from the political parties we know. It had its -own source of law in the Führer and sub-Führer. It had its own courts -and its own police. The conspirators set up a government within the -Party to exercise outside the law every sanction that any legitimate -state could exercise and many that it could not. Its chain of command -was military, and its formations were martial in name as well as in -function. They were composed of battalions set up to bear arms under -military discipline, motorized corps, flying corps, and the infamous -“Death Head Corps”, which was not misnamed. The Party had its own secret -police, its security units, its intelligence and espionage division, its -raiding forces, and its youth forces. It established elaborate -administrative mechanisms to identify and liquidate spies and informers, -to manage concentration camps, to operate death vans, and to finance the -whole movement. Through concentric circles of authority, the Nazi Party, -as its leadership later boasted, eventually organized and dominated -every phase of German life—but not until they had waged a bitter -internal struggle characterized by brutal criminality we charge here. In -preparation for this phase of their struggle, they created a Party -police system. This became the pattern and the instrument of the police -state, which was the first goal in their plan. - -The Party formations, including the Leadership Corps of the Party, the -SD, the SS, the SA, and the infamous Secret State Police, or -Gestapo,—all these stand accused before you as criminal organizations; -organizations which, as we will prove from their own documents, were -recruited only from recklessly devoted Nazis, ready in conviction and -temperament to do the most violent of deeds to advance the common -program. They terrorized and silenced democratic opposition and were -able at length to combine with political opportunists, militarists, -industrialists, monarchists, and political reactionaries. - -On January 30, 1933 Adolf Hitler became Chancellor of the German -Republic. An evil combination, represented in the prisoners’ dock by its -most eminent survivors, had succeeded in possessing itself of the -machinery of the German Government, a facade behind which they -thenceforth would operate to make a reality of the war of conquest they -so long had plotted. The conspiracy had passed into its second phase. - -_The Consolidation of Nazi Power_: - -We shall now consider the steps, which embraced the most hideous of -Crimes against Humanity, to which the conspirators resorted in -perfecting control of the German State and in preparing Germany for the -aggressive war indispensable to their ends. - -The Germans of the 1920’s were a frustrated and baffled people as a -result of defeat and the disintegration of their traditional government. -The democratic elements, which were trying to govern Germany through the -new and feeble machinery of the Weimar Republic, got inadequate support -from the democratic forces of the rest of the world, including my -country. It is not to be denied that Germany, when worldwide depression -was added to her other problems, was faced with urgent and intricate -pressures in her economic and political life which necessitated bold -measures. - -The internal measures by which a nation attempts to solve its problems -are ordinarily of no concern to other nations. But the Nazi program from -the first was recognized as a desperate program for a people still -suffering the effects of an unsuccessful war. The Nazi policy embraced -ends recognized as attainable only by a renewal and a more successful -outcome of war, in Europe. The conspirators’ answer to Germany’s -problems was nothing less than to plot the regaining of territories lost -in the First World War and the acquisition of other fertile lands of -Central Europe by dispossessing or exterminating those who inhabited -them. They also contemplated destroying or permanently weakening all -other neighboring peoples so as to win virtual domination over Europe -and probably of the world. The precise limits of their ambition we need -not define for it was and is as illegal to wage aggressive war for small -stakes as for large ones. - -We find at this period two governments in Germany—the real and the -ostensible. The forms of the German Republic were maintained for a time, -and it was the outward and visible government. But the real authority in -the State was outside and above the law and rested in the Leadership -Corps of the Nazi Party. - -On February 27, 1933, less than a month after Hitler became Chancellor, -the Reichstag building was set on fire. The burning of this symbol of -free parliamentary government was so providential for the Nazis that it -was believed they staged the fire themselves. Certainly when we -contemplate their known crimes, we cannot believe they would shrink from -mere arson. It is not necessary, however, to resolve the controversy as -to who set the fire. The significant point is in the use that was made -of the fire and of the state of public mind it produced. The Nazis -immediately accused the Communist Party of instigating and committing -the crime, and turned every effort to portray this single act of arson -as the beginning of a communist revolution. Then, taking advantage of -the hysteria, the Nazis met this phantom revolution with a real one. In -the following December the German Supreme Court with commendable courage -and independence acquitted the accused Communists, but it was too late -to influence the tragic course of events which the Nazi conspirators had -set rushing forward. - -Hitler, on the morning after the fire, obtained from the aged and ailing -President Von Hindenburg a presidential decree suspending the extensive -guarantees of individual liberty contained in the constitution of the -Weimar Republic. The decree provided that: - - “Sections 114, 115, 117, 118, 123, 124, and 153 of the - Constitution of the German Reich are suspended until further - notice. Thus, restrictions on personal liberty, on the right of - free expression of opinion, including freedom of the press, on - the right of assembly and the right of association, and - violations of the privacy of postal, telegraphic, and telephonic - communications, and warrants for house-searches, orders for - confiscations as well as restrictions on property, are also - permissible beyond the legal limits otherwise prescribed.” - (1390-PS) - -The extent of the restriction on personal liberty under the decree of -February 28, 1933 may be understood by reference to the rights under the -Weimar constitution which were suspended: - - “_Article 114._ The freedom of the person is inviolable. - Curtailment or deprivation of personal freedom by a public - authority is only permissible on a legal basis. - - “Persons who have been deprived of their freedom must be - informed at the latest on the following day by whose authority - and for what reasons the deprivation of freedom was ordered; - opportunity shall be afforded them without delay of submitting - objections to their deprivation of freedom. - - “_Article 115._ Every German’s home is his sanctuary and is - inviolable. Exceptions may only be made as provided by law. - - “_Article 117._ The secrecy of letters and all postal, - telegraphic, and telephone communications is inviolable. - Exceptions are inadmissible except by Reich law. - - “_Article 118._ Every German has the right, within the limits of - the general laws, to express his opinions freely in speech, in - writing, in print, in picture form, or in any other way. No - conditions of work or employment may detract from this right and - no disadvantage may accrue to him from any person for making use - of this right. . . . - - “_Article 123._ All Germans have the right to assemble - peacefully and unarmed without giving notice and without special - permission. - - “A Reich law may make previous notification obligatory for - assemblies in the open air, and may prohibit them in case of - immediate danger to the public safety. - - “_Article 124._ All the Germans have the right to form - associations or societies for purposes not contrary to criminal - law. This right may not be curtailed by preventive measures. The - same provisions apply to religious associations and societies. - - “Every association may become incorporated (Erwerb der - Rechtsfähigkeit) according to the provisions of the civil law. - The right may not be refused to any association on the grounds - that its aims are political, social-political, or religious. - - “_Article 153._ Property is guaranteed by the Constitution. Its - content and limits are defined by the laws. - - “Expropriation can only take place for the public benefit and on - a legal basis. Adequate compensation shall be granted, unless a - Reich law orders otherwise. In the case of dispute concerning - the amount of compensation, it shall be possible to submit the - matter to the ordinary civil courts, unless Reich laws determine - otherwise. Compensation must be paid if the Reich expropriates - property belonging to the Lands, Communes, or public utility - associations. - - “Property carries obligations. Its use shall also serve the - common good.” (2050-PS) - -It must be said in fairness to Von Hindenburg that the constitution -itself authorized him temporarily to suspend these fundamental rights -“if the public safety and order in the German Reich are considerably -disturbed or endangered.” It must also be acknowledged that President -Ebert previously had invoked this power. - -But the National Socialist coup was made possible because the terms of -the Hitler-Hindenburg decree departed from all previous ones in which -the power of suspension had been invoked. Whenever Ebert had suspended -constitutional guarantees of individual rights, his decree had expressly -revived the Protective Custody Act adopted by the Reichstag in 1916 -during the previous war. This act guaranteed a judicial hearing within -24 hours of arrest, gave a right to have counsel and to inspect all -relevant records, provided for appeal, and authorized compensation from -Treasury funds for erroneous arrests. - -The Hitler-Hindenburg decree of February 28, 1933 contained no such -safeguards. The omission may not have been noted by Von Hindenburg. -Certainly he did not appreciate its effect. It left the Nazi police and -party formations, already existing and functioning under Hitler, -completely unrestrained and irresponsible. Secret arrest and indefinite -detention, without charges, without evidence, without hearing, without -counsel, became the method of inflicting inhuman punishment on any whom -the Nazi police suspected or disliked. No court could issue an -injunction, or writ of _habeas corpus_, or _certiorari_. The German -people were in the hands of the police, the police were in the hands of -the Nazi Party, and the Party was in the hands of a ring of evil men, of -whom the defendants here before you are surviving and representative -leaders. - -The Nazi conspiracy, as we shall show, always contemplated not merely -overcoming current opposition but exterminating elements which could not -be reconciled with its philosophy of the state. It not only sought to -establish the Nazi “new order” but to secure its sway, as Hitler -predicted, “for a thousand years.” Nazis were never in doubt or -disagreement as to what these dissident elements were. They were -concisely described by one of them, Colonel General Von Fritsch, on -December 11, 1938 in these words: - - “Shortly after the first war I came to the conclusion that we - should have to be victorious in three battles if Germany were to - become powerful again: 1. The battle against the working - class—Hitler has won this. 2. Against the Catholic Church, - perhaps better expressed against Ultramontanism. 3. Against the - Jews.” (1947-PS) - -The warfare against these elements was continuous. The battle in Germany -was but a practice skirmish for the worldwide drive against them. We -have in point of geography and of time two groups of Crimes against -Humanity—one within Germany before and during the war, the other in -occupied territory during the war. But the two are not separated in Nazi -planning. They are a continuous unfolding of the Nazi plan to -exterminate peoples and institutions which might serve as a focus or -instrument for overturning their “new world order” at any time. We -consider these crimes against humanity in this address as manifestations -of the one Nazi plan and discuss them according to General Von Fritsch’s -classification. - -_1. The Battle against the Working Class_: - -When Hitler came to power, there were in Germany three groups of trade -unions. The General German Trade Union Confederation (ADGB) with 28 -affiliated unions, and the General Independent Employees Confederation -(AFA) with 13 federated unions together numbered more than 4,500,000 -members. The Christian Trade Union had over 1,250,000 members. - -The working people of Germany, like the working people of other nations, -had little to gain personally by war. While labor is usually brought -around to the support of the nation at war, labor by and large is a -pacific, though by no means a pacifist force in the world. The working -people of Germany had not forgotten in 1933 how heavy the yoke of the -war lord can be. It was the workingmen who had joined the sailors and -soldiers in the revolt of 1918 to end the first World War. The Nazis had -neither forgiven nor forgotten. The Nazi program required that this part -of the German population not only be stripped of power to resist -diversion of its scanty comforts to armament, but also be wheedled or -whipped into new and unheard of sacrifices as a part of the Nazi war -preparation. Labor must be cowed, and that meant its organizations and -means of cohesion and defense must be destroyed. - -The purpose to regiment labor for the Nazi Party was avowed by Ley in a -speech to workers on May 2, 1933 as follows: - - “You may say what else do you want, you have the absolute power. - True we have the power, but we do not have the whole people, we - do not have you workers 100 per cent, and it is you whom we - want; we will not let you be until you stand with us in - complete, genuine acknowledgment.” (614-PS) - -The first Nazi attack was upon the two larger unions. On April 21, 1933 -an order not even in the name of the Government, but of the Nazi Party -was issued by the conspirator Robert Ley as “Chief of Staff of the -political organization of the NSDAP,” applicable to the Trade Union -Confederation and the Independent Employees Confederation. It directed -seizure of their properties and arrest of their principal leaders. The -Party order directed Party organs which we here denounce as criminal -associations, the SA and SS “to be employed for the occupation of the -trade union properties, and for the taking into custody of personalities -who come into question.” And it directed the taking into “protective -custody” of all chairmen and district secretaries of such unions and -branch directors of the labor bank. (392-PS) - -These orders were carried out on May 2, 1933. All funds of the labor -unions, including pension and benefit funds, were seized. Union leaders -were sent to concentration camps. A few days later, on May 10, 1933, -Hitler appointed Ley leader of the German Labor Front (Deutsche -Arbeitsfront) which succeeded to the confiscated union funds. The German -Labor Front, a Nazi controlled labor bureau, was set up under Ley to -teach the Nazi philosophy to German workers and to weed out from -industrial employment all who were backward in their lessons. (1940-PS) -“Factory troops” were organized as an “ideological shock squad within -the factory” (1817-PS). The Party order provided that “outside of the -German Labor Front, no other organization (whether of workers or of -employees) is to exist.” On June 24, 1933 the remaining Christian Trade -Unions were seized, pursuant to an order of the Nazi Party signed by -Ley. - -On May 19, 1933, this time by a government decree, it was provided that -“trustees” of labor appointed by Hitler, should regulate the conditions -of all labor contracts, replacing the former process of collective -bargaining (405-PS). On November 30, 1934 a decree “regulating national -labor” introduced the Führer Principle into industrial relations. It -provided that the owners of enterprises should be the “Führer” and the -workers should be the followers. The “enterprise-Führer” should “make -decisions for employees and laborers in all matters concerning the -enterprise” (1861-PS). It was by such bait that the great German -industrialists were induced to support the Nazi cause, to their own -ultimate ruin. - -Not only did the Nazis dominate and regiment German labor, but they -forced the youth into the ranks of the laboring people they had thus led -into chains. Under a compulsory labor service decree on 26 June 1935 -young men and women between the ages of 18 and 25 were conscripted for -labor (1654-PS). Thus was the purpose to subjugate German labor -accomplished. In the words of Ley, this accomplishment consisted “in -eliminating the association character of the trade union and employees’ -associations, and in its place we have substituted the conception -‘soldiers of work’.” The productive manpower of the German nation was in -Nazi control. By these steps the defendants won the battle to liquidate -labor unions as potential opposition and were enabled to impose upon the -working class the burdens of preparing for aggressive warfare. - -Robert Ley, the field marshal of the battle against labor, answered our -Indictment with suicide. Apparently he knew no better answer. - -_2. The Battle against the Churches_: - -The Nazi Party always was predominantly anti-Christian in its ideology. -But we who believe in freedom of conscience and of religion base no -charge of criminality on anybody’s ideology. It is not because the Nazi -themselves were irreligious or pagan, but because they persecuted others -of the Christian faith that they become guilty of crime, and it is -because the persecution was a step in the preparation for aggressive -warfare that the offense becomes one of international consequence. To -remove every moderating influence among the German people and to put its -population on a total war footing, the conspirators devised and carried -out a systematic and relentless repression of all Christian sects and -churches. - -We will ask you to convict the Nazis on their own evidence. Martin -Bormann, in June 1941, issued a secret decree on the relation of -Christianity and National Socialism. The decree provided: - - “For the first time in German history the Führer consciously and - completely has the leadership of the people in his own hand. - With the Party, its components, and attached units the Führer - has created for himself and thereby the German Reich leadership - an instrument which makes him independent of the church. All - influences which might impair or damage the leadership of the - people exercised by the Führer with help of the NSDAP, must be - eliminated. More and more the people must be separated from the - churches and their organs, the pastors. Of course, the churches - must and will, seen from their viewpoint, defend themselves - against this loss of power. But never again must an influence on - leadership of the people be yielded to the churches. This - (influence) must be broken completely and finally. - - “Only the Reich Government and by its direction the Party, its - components, and attached units have a right to leadership of the - people. Just as the deleterious influences of astrologers, - seers, and other fakers are eliminated and suppressed by the - State, so must the possibility of church influence also be - totally removed. Not until this has happened, does the State - leadership have influence on the individual citizens. Not until - then are people and Reich secure in their existence for all the - future.” (D-75) - -And how the Party had been securing the Reich from Christian influence, -will be proved by such items as this teletype from the Gestapo, Berlin, -to the Gestapo, Nuremberg, on July 24, 1938. Let us hear their own -account of events in Rottenburg. - - “The Party on 23 July 1939 from 2100 on carried out the third - demonstration against Bishop Sproll. Participants about - 2500-3000 were brought in from outside by bus, etc. The - Rottenburg populace again did not participate in the - demonstration. This town took rather a hostile attitude to the - demonstrations. The action got completely out of hand of the - Party member responsible for it. The demonstrators stormed the - palace, beat in the gates and doors. About 150 to 200 people - forced their way into the palace, searched the rooms, threw - files out of the windows and rummaged through the beds in the - rooms of the palace. One bed was ignited. Before the fire got to - the other objects of equipment in the rooms and the palace, the - flaming bed could be thrown from the window and the fire - extinguished. The Bishop was with Archbishop Groeber of Freiburg - and the ladies and gentlemen of his menage in the chapel at - prayer. About 25 to 30 people pressed into this chapel and - molested those present. Bishop Groeber was taken for Bishop - Sproll. He was grabbed by the robe and dragged back and forth. - Finally the intruders realized that Bishop Groeber is not the - one they are seeking. They could then be persuaded to leave the - building. After the evacuation of the palace by the - demonstrators I had an interview with Archbishop Groeber who - left Rottenburg in the night. Groeber wants to turn to the - Führer and Reich Minister of the Interior, Dr. Frick, anew. On - the course of the action, the damage done as well as the homage - of the Rottenburg populace beginning today for the Bishop I - shall immediately hand in a full report, after I am in the act - of suppressing counter mass meetings. . . . - - “In case the Führer has instructions to give in this matter, I - request that these be transmitted most quickly. . . .” (848-PS) - -Later, Defendant Rosenberg wrote to Bormann reviewing the proposal of -Kerrl as Church Minister to place the Protestant Church under State -tutelage and proclaim Hitler its supreme head. Rosenberg was opposed, -hinting that nazism was to suppress the Christian Church completely -after the war (See also 098-PS). - -The persecution of all pacifist and dissenting sects, such as Jehovah’s -Witnesses and the Pentecostal Association, was peculiarly relentless and -cruel. The policy toward the Evangelical Churches, however, was to use -their influence for the Nazis’ own purposes. In September 1933 Mueller -was appointed the Führer’s representative with power to deal with the -“affairs of the Evangelical Church” in its relations to the State. -Eventually, steps were taken to create a Reich Bishop vested with power -to control this Church. A long conflict followed, Pastor Niemöller was -sent to concentration camp, and extended interference with the internal -discipline and administration of the churches occurred. - -A most intense drive was directed against the Roman Catholic Church. -After a strategic concordat with the Holy See, signed in July 1933 in -Rome, which never was observed by the Nazi Party, a long and persistent -persecution of the Catholic Church, its priesthood, and its members, was -carried out. Church schools and educational institutions were suppressed -or subjected to requirements of Nazi teaching inconsistent with the -Christian faith. The property of the Church was confiscated and inspired -vandalism directed against Church property was left unpunished. -Religious instruction was impeded and the exercise of religion made -difficult. Priests and bishops were laid upon, riots were stimulated to -harass them, and many were sent to concentration camps. - -After occupation of foreign soil, these persecutions went on with -greater vigor than ever. We will present to you from the files of the -Vatican the earnest protests made by the Vatican to Ribbentrop -summarizing the persecutions to which the priesthood and the Church had -been subjected in this twentieth century under the Nazi regime. -Ribbentrop never answered them. He could not deny. He dared not justify. - -I now come to “Crimes against the Jews.” - -THE PRESIDENT: We shall now take our noon recess. - - [_A recess was taken until 1400 hours._] - - - - - _Afternoon Session_ - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn for 15 minutes at half past 3 -and will then continue until half past 4. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I was about to take up the “Crimes Committed -against the Jews.” - -_3. Crimes against the Jews_: - -The most savage and numerous crimes planned and committed by the Nazis -were those against the Jews. Those in Germany in 1933 numbered about -500,000. In the aggregate, they had made for themselves positions which -excited envy, and had accumulated properties which excited the avarice -of the Nazis. They were few enough to be helpless and numerous enough to -be held up as a menace. - -Let there be no misunderstanding about the charge of persecuting Jews. -What we charge against these defendants is not those arrogances and -pretensions which frequently accompany the intermingling of different -peoples and which are likely, despite the honest efforts of government, -to produce regrettable crimes and convulsions. It is my purpose to show -a plan and design, to which all Nazis were fanatically committed, to -annihilate all Jewish people. These crimes were organized and promoted -by the Party leadership, executed and protected by the Nazi officials, -as we shall convince you by written orders of the Secret State Police -itself. - -The persecution of the Jews was a continuous and deliberate policy. It -was a policy directed against other nations as well as against the Jews -themselves. Anti-Semitism was promoted to divide and embitter the -democratic peoples and to soften their resistance to the Nazi -aggression. As Robert Ley declared in _Der Angriff_ on 14 May 1944: “The -second German secret weapon is Anti-Semitism because if it is constantly -pursued by Germany, it will become a universal problem which all nations -will be forced to consider.” - -Anti-Semitism also has been aptly credited with being a “spearhead of -terror.” The ghetto was the laboratory for testing repressive measures. -Jewish property was the first to be expropriated, but the custom grew -and included similar measures against anti-Nazi Germans, Poles, Czechs, -Frenchmen, and Belgians. Extermination of the Jews enabled the Nazis to -bring a practiced hand to similar measures against Poles, Serbs, and -Greeks. The plight of the Jew was a constant threat to opposition or -discontent among other elements of Europe’s population—pacifists, -conservatives, Communists, Catholics, Protestants, Socialists. It was in -fact, a threat to every dissenting opinion and to every non-Nazi’s life. - -The persecution policy against the Jews commenced with non-violent -measures, such as disfranchisement and discriminations against their -religion, and the placing of impediments in the way of success in -economic life. It moved rapidly to organized mass violence against them, -physical isolation in ghettos, deportation, forced labor, mass -starvation, and extermination. The Government, the Party formations -indicted before you as criminal organizations, the Secret State Police, -the Army, private and semi-public associations, and “spontaneous” mobs -that were carefully inspired from official sources, were all agencies -that were concerned in this persecution. Nor was it directed against -individual Jews for personal bad citizenship or unpopularity. The avowed -purpose was the destruction of the Jewish people as a whole, as an end -in itself, as a measure of preparation for war, and as a discipline of -conquered peoples. - -The conspiracy or common plan to exterminate the Jew was so methodically -and thoroughly pursued, that despite the German defeat and Nazi -prostration this Nazi aim largely has succeeded. Only remnants of the -European Jewish population remain in Germany, in the countries which -Germany occupied, and in those which were her satellites or -collaborators. Of the 9,600,000 Jews who lived in Nazi-dominated Europe, -60 percent are authoritatively estimated to have perished. Five million -seven hundred thousand Jews are missing from the countries in which they -formerly lived, and over 4,500,000 cannot be accounted for by the normal -death rate nor by immigration; nor are they included among displaced -persons. History does not record a crime ever perpetrated against so -many victims or one ever carried out with such calculated cruelty. - -You will have difficulty, as I have, to look into the faces of these -defendants and believe that in this twentieth century human beings could -inflict such sufferings as will be proved here on their own countrymen -as well as upon their so-called “inferior” enemies. Particular crimes, -and the responsibility of defendants for them, are to be dealt with by -the Soviet Government’s counsel, when committed in the East, and by -counsel for the Republic of France when committed in the West. I advert -to them only to show their magnitude as evidence of a purpose and a -knowledge common to all defendants, of an official plan rather than of a -capricious policy of some individual commander, and to show such a -continuity of Jewish persecution from the rise of the Nazi conspiracy to -its collapse as forbids us to believe that any person could be -identified with any part of Nazi action without approving this most -conspicuous item in their program. - -The Indictment itself recites many evidences of the anti-Semitic -persecutions. The Defendant Streicher led the Nazis in anti-Semitic -bitterness and extremism. In an article appearing in _Der Stürmer_ on 19 -March 1942 he complained that Christian teachings have stood in the way -of “racial solution of the Jewish question in Europe”, and quoted -enthusiastically as the twentieth century solution the Führer’s -proclamation of February 24, 1942 that “the Jew will be exterminated.” -And on November 4, 1943 Streicher declared in _Der Stürmer_ that the -Jews “have disappeared from Europe and that the Jewish ‘Reservoir of the -East’ from which the Jewish plague has for centuries beset the people of -Europe, has ceased to exist.” Streicher now has the effrontery to tell -us he is “only a Zionist”—he says he wants only to return the Jews to -Palestine. But on May 7, 1942 his newspaper, _Der Stürmer_, had this to -say: - - “It is also not only a European problem! _The Jewish question is - a world question!_ Not only is Germany not safe in the face of - the Jews as long as one Jew lives in Europe, but also the Jewish - question is hardly solved in Europe so long as Jews live in the - rest of the world.” - -And the Defendant Hans Frank, a lawyer by profession, I say with shame, -summarized in his diary in 1944 the Nazi policy thus: “The Jews are a -race which has to be eliminated; whenever we catch one, it is his end” -(2233-PS, 4 March 1944, P. 26). And earlier, speaking of his function as -Governor General of Poland, he confided to his diary this sentiment: “Of -course I cannot eliminate all lice and Jews in only a year’s time” -(2233-PS, Vol. IV, 1940, P. 1158). I could multiply endlessly this kind -of Nazi ranting but I will leave it to the evidence and turn to the -fruit of this perverted thinking. - -The most serious of the actions against Jews were outside of any law, -but the law itself was employed to some extent. There were the infamous -Nuremberg decrees of September 15, 1935 (_Reichsgesetzblatt_ 1935, Part. -I, P. 1146). The Jews were segregated into ghettos and put into forced -labor; they were expelled from their professions; their property was -expropriated; all cultural life, the press, the theater, and schools -were prohibited them; and the SD was made responsible for them (212-PS, -069-PS). This was an ominous, guardianship, as the following order for -“The Handling of the Jewish Question” shows: - - “The competency of the Chief of the Security Police and Security - Service, who is charged with the mission of solving the European - Jewish question, extends even to the Occupied Eastern - Provinces. . . . - - “An eventual act by the civilian population against the Jews is - not to be prevented as long as this is compatible with the - maintenance of order and security in the rear of the fighting - troops. . . . - - “The first main goal of the German measures must be strict - segregation of Jewry from the rest of the population. In the - execution of this, first of all is the seizing of the Jewish - populace by the introduction of a registration order and similar - appropriate measures. . . . - - “Then immediately, the wearing of the recognition sign - consisting of a yellow Jewish star is to be brought about and - all rights of freedom for Jews are to be withdrawn. They are to - be placed in ghettos and at the same time are to be separated - according to sexes. The presence of many more or less closed - Jewish settlements in White Ruthenia and in the Ukraine makes - this mission easier. Moreover, places are to be chosen which - make possible the full use of the Jewish manpower in case labor - needs are present. . . . - - “The entire Jewish property is to be seized and confiscated with - exception of that which is necessary for a bare existence. As - far as the economical situation permits, the power of disposal - of their property is to be taken from the Jews as soon as - possible through orders and other measures given by the - commissariat, so that the moving of property will quickly cease. - - “Any cultural activity will be completely forbidden, to the Jew. - This includes the outlawing of the Jewish press, the Jewish - theaters, and schools. - - “The slaughtering of animals according to Jewish rites is also - to be prohibited. . . .” (212-PS) - -The anti-Jewish campaign became furious in Germany following the -assassination in Paris of the German Legation Councillor Von Rath. -Heydrich, Gestapo head, sent a teletype to all Gestapo and SD offices -with directions for handling “spontaneous” uprising anticipated for the -nights of November 9 and 10, 1938 so as to aid in destruction of -Jewish-owned property and protect only that of Germans. No more cynical -document ever came into evidence. Then there is a report by an SS -brigade leader, Dr. Stahlecker, to Himmler, which recites that: - - “. . . Similarly, native anti-Semitic forces were induced to - start pogroms against Jews during the first hours after capture, - though this inducement proved to be very difficult. Following - out orders, the Security Police was determined to solve the - Jewish question with all possible means and most decisively. But - it was desirable that the Security Police should not put in an - immediate appearance, at least in the beginning, since the - extraordinarily harsh measures were apt to stir even German - circles. It had to be shown to the world that the native - population itself took the first action by way of natural - reaction against the suppression by Jews during several decades - and against the terror exercised by the Communists during the - preceding period. . . .” - - “. . . In view of the extension of the area of operations and - the great number of duties which had to be performed by the - Security Police, it was intended from the very beginning to - obtain the co-operation of the reliable population for the fight - against vermin—that is mainly the Jews and Communists. Beyond - our directing of the first spontaneous actions of - self-cleansing, which will be reported elsewhere, care had to be - taken that reliable people should be put to the cleansing job - and that they were appointed auxiliary members of the Security - Police. . . .” - - “. . . Kovno. To our surprise it was not easy at first to set in - motion an extensive pogrom against Jews. Klimatis, the leader of - the partisan unit, mentioned above, who was used for this - purpose primarily, succeeded in starting a pogrom on the basis - of advice given to him by a small advanced detachment acting in - Kovno, and in such a way that no German order or German - instigation was noticed from the outside. During the first - pogrom in the night from 25 to 26 June the Lithuanian partisans - did away with more than 1,500 Jews, set fire to several - synagogues or destroyed them by other means and burned down a - Jewish dwelling district consisting of about 60 houses. During - the following nights about 2,300 Jews were made harmless in a - similar way. In other parts of Lithuania similar actions - followed the example of Kovno, though smaller and extending to - the Communists who had been left behind. - - “These self-cleansing actions went smoothly because the Army - authorities who had been informed showed understanding for this - procedure. From the beginning it was obvious that only the first - days after the occupation would offer the opportunity for - carrying out pogroms. After the disarmament of the partisans the - self-cleansing actions ceased necessarily. - - “It proved much more difficult to set in motion similar - cleansing actions in Latvia. . . .” (L-180) - -Of course, it is self-evident that these “uprisings” were managed by the -Government and the Nazi Party. If we were in doubt, we could resort to -Streicher’s memorandum of April 14, 1939 which says: - - “The anti-Jewish action of November 1938 did not arise - spontaneously from the people. . . . Part of the Party formation - have been charged with the execution of the anti-Jewish action.” - (406-PS) - -Jews as a whole were fined a billion Reichsmarks. They were excluded -from all businesses, and claims against insurance companies for their -burned properties were confiscated, all by decree of the Defendant -Göring. (_Reichsgesetzblatt_, 1938, Part I, Pp. 1579-82) - -Synagogues were the objects of a special vengeance. On November 10, 1938 -the following order was given: - - “By order of the Group Commander: - - All Jewish synagogues in the area of Brigade 50 have to be blown - up or set afire. . . . The operation will be carried out in - civilian clothing. . . . Execution of the order will be - reported. . . .” (1721-PS) - -Some 40 teletype messages from various police headquarters will tell the -fury with which all Jews were pursued in Germany on those awful November -nights. The SS troops were turned loose and the Gestapo supervised. -Jewish-owned property was authorized to be destroyed. The Gestapo -ordered twenty to thirty thousand “well-to-do-Jews” to be arrested. -Concentration camps were to receive them. Healthy Jews, fit for labor, -were to be taken. (3051-PS) - -As the German frontiers were expanded by war, so the campaign against -the Jews expanded. The Nazi plan never was limited to extermination in -Germany; always it contemplated extinguishing the Jew in Europe and -often in the world. In the West, the Jews were killed and their property -taken over. But the campaign achieved its zenith of savagery in the -East. The eastern Jew has suffered as no people ever suffered. Their -sufferings were carefully reported to the Nazi authorities to show -faithful adherence to the Nazi design. I shall refer only to enough of -the evidence of these to show the extent of the Nazi design for killing -Jews. - -If I should recite these horrors in words of my own, you would think me -intemperate and unreliable. Fortunately, we need not take the word of -any witness but the Germans themselves. I invite you now to look at a -few of the vast number of captured German orders and reports that will -be offered in evidence, to see what a Nazi invasion meant. We will -present such evidence as the report of “Einsatzgruppe (Action Group) A” -of October 15, 1941 which boasts that in overrunning the Baltic States, -“Native anti-Semitic forces were induced to start pogroms against the -Jews during the first hours after occupation. . . .” The report -continues: - - “From the beginning it was to be expected that the Jewish - problem in the East could not be solved by pogroms alone. In - accordance with the basic orders received, however, the - cleansing activities of the Security Police had to aim at a - complete annihilation of the Jews. Special detachments - reinforced by selected units—in Lithuania partisan detachments, - in Latvia units of the Latvian auxiliary police—therefore - performed extensive executions both in the towns and in rural - areas. The actions of the execution detachments were performed - smoothly.” - - “The sum total of the Jews liquidated in Lithuania amounts to - 71,105. During the pogroms in Kovno 3,800 Jews were eliminated, - in the smaller towns about 1,200 Jews.” - - “In Latvia, up to now a total of 30,000 Jews were executed. Five - hundred were eliminated by pogroms in Riga.” (L-180) - -This is a captured report from the Commissioner of Sluzk on October 30, -1941 which describes the scene in more detail. It says: - - “. . . The first lieutenant explained that the police battalion - had received the assignment to effect the liquidation of all - Jews here in the town of Sluzk, within two days. . . . Then I - requested him to postpone the action one day. However, he - rejected this with the remark that he had to carry out this - action everywhere and in all towns and that only two days were - allotted for Sluzk. Within these two days, the town of Sluzk had - to be cleared of Jews by all means. . . . All Jews without - exception were taken out of the factories and shops and deported - in spite of our agreement. It is true that part of the Jews was - moved by way of the ghetto where many of them were processed and - still segregated by me, but a large part was loaded directly on - trucks and liquidated without further delay outside of the - town. . . . For the rest, as regards the execution of the - action, I must point out to my deepest regret that the latter - bordered already on sadism. The town itself offered a picture of - horror during the action. With indescribable brutality on the - part of both the German police officers and particularly the - Lithuanian partisans, the Jewish people, but also among them - White Ruthenians, were taken out of their dwellings and herded - together. Everywhere in the town shots were to be heard and in - different streets the corpses of shot Jews accumulated. The - White Ruthenians were in greatest distress to free themselves - from the encirclement. Regardless of the fact that the Jewish - people, among whom were also tradesmen, were mistreated in a - terribly barbarous way in the face of the White Ruthenian - people, the White Ruthenians themselves were also worked over - with rubber clubs and rifle butts. There was no question of an - action against the Jews any more. It rather looked like a - revolution. . . .” - -There are reports which merely tabulate the numbers slaughtered. An -example is an account of the work of Einsatzgruppen of SIPO and SD in -the East, which relates that: - -In Estonia, all Jews were arrested immediately upon the arrival of the -Wehrmacht. Jewish men and women above the age of 16 and capable of work -were drafted for forced labor. Jews were subjected to all sorts of -restrictions and all Jewish property was confiscated. All Jewish males -above the age of 16 were executed, with the exception of doctors and -elders. Only 500 of an original 4,500 Jews remained. Thirty-seven -thousand, one hundred eighty persons have been liquidated by the SIPO -and SD in White Ruthenia during October. In one town, 337 Jewish women -were executed for demonstrating a ‘provocative attitude.’ In another, -380 Jews were shot for spreading vicious propaganda. - -And so the report continues, listing town after town, where hundreds of -Jews were murdered: - -In Vitebsk 3,000 Jews were liquidated because of the danger of -epidemics. In Kiev 33,771 Jews were executed on September 29 and 30 in -retaliation for some fires which were set off there. In Shitomir 3,145 -Jews ‘had to be shot’ because, judging from experience they had to be -considered as the carriers of Bolshevik propaganda. In Cherson 410 Jews -were executed in reprisal against acts of sabotage. In the territory -east of the Dnieper, the Jewish problem was ’solved’ by the liquidation -of 4,891 Jews and by putting the remainder into labor battalions of up -to 1,000 persons. (R-102) - -Other accounts tell not of the slaughter so much as of the depths of -degradation to which the tormentors stooped. For example, we will show -the report made to Defendant Rosenberg about the army and the SS in the -area under Rosenberg’s jurisdiction, which recited the following: - -“Details: In presence of SS man, a Jewish dentist has to break all gold -teeth and fillings out of mouth of German and Russian Jews _before_ they -are executed.” - -Men, women and children are locked into barns and burned alive. - -Peasants, women and children are shot on the pretext that they are -suspected of belonging to bands. (R-135) - -We of the Western World heard of gas wagons in which Jews and political -opponents were asphyxiated. We could not believe it. But here we have -the report of May 16, 1942 from the German SS Officer Becker to his -supervisor in Berlin which tells this story: - -Gas vans in C group can be driven to execution spot, which is generally -stationed 10 to 15 kms. from main road, only in dry weather. Since those -to be executed become frantic if conducted to this place, such vans -become immobilized in wet weather. - -Gas vans in D group were camouflaged as cabin trailers, but vehicles -well known to authorities and civilian population which calls them -‘death vans’. - -Writer of letter (Becker) ordered all men to keep as far away as -possible during gassing. Unloading van has ‘atrocious spiritual and -physical effect’ on men and they should be ordered not to participate in -such work. (501-PS) - -I shall not dwell on this subject longer than to quote one more -sickening document which evidences the planned and systematic character -of the Jewish persecutions. I hold a report written with Teutonic -devotion to detail, illustrated with photographs to authenticate its -almost incredible text, and beautifully bound in leather with the loving -care bestowed on a proud work. It is the original report of the SS -Brigadier General Stroop in charge of the destruction of the Warsaw -Ghetto, and its title page carries the inscription, “The Jewish ghetto -in Warsaw no longer exists.” It is characteristic that one of the -captions explains that the photograph concerned shows the driving out of -Jewish “bandits”; those whom the photograph shows being driven out are -almost entirely women and little children. It contains a day-by-day -account of the killings mainly carried out by the SS organization, too -long to relate, but let me quote General Stroop’s summary: - - “The resistance put up by the Jews and bandits could only be - suppressed by energetic actions of our troops day and night. - _The Reichsführer SS ordered, therefore, on 23 April 1943, the - cleaning out of the ghetto with utter ruthlessness and merciless - tenacity._ I, therefore, decided to destroy and burn down the - entire ghetto without regard to the armament factories. These - factories were systematically dismantled and then burned. Jews - usually left their hideouts, but frequently remained in the - burning buildings and jumped out of the windows only when the - heat became unbearable. They then tried to crawl with broken - bones across the street into buildings which were not afire. - Sometimes they changed their hideouts during the night into the - ruins of burned buildings. Life in the sewers was not pleasant - after the first week. Many times we could hear loud voices in - the sewers. SS men or policemen climbed bravely through the - manholes to capture these Jews. Sometimes they stumbled over - Jewish corpses; sometimes they were shot at. Tear gas bombs were - thrown into the manholes and the Jews driven out of the sewers - and captured. Countless numbers of Jews were liquidated in - sewers and bunkers through blasting. The longer the resistance - continued the tougher became the members of the Waffen SS, - Police and Wehrmacht who always discharged their duties in an - exemplary manner. Frequently Jews who tried to replenish their - food supplies during the night or to communicate with - neighboring groups were exterminated. - - “This action eliminated,” says the SS commander, “a proved total - of 56,065. To that, we have to add the number killed through - blasting, fire, etc., which cannot be counted.” (1061-PS) - -We charge that all atrocities against Jews were the manifestation and -culmination of the Nazi plan to which every defendant here was a party. -I know very well that some of these men did take steps to spare some -particular Jew for some personal reason from the horrors that awaited -the unrescued Jew. Some protested that particular atrocities were -excessive, and discredited the general policy. While a few defendants -may show efforts to make specific exceptions to the policy of Jewish -extermination, I have found no instance in which any defendant opposed -the policy itself or sought to revoke or even modify it. - -Determination to destroy the Jews was a binding force which at all times -cemented the elements of this conspiracy. On many internal policies -there were differences among the defendants. But there is not one of -them who has not echoed the rallying cry of nazism: “Deutschland -erwache, Juda verrecke!” (Germany awake, Jewry perish!). - -_Terrorism and Preparation for War_: - -How a government treats its own inhabitants generally is thought to be -no concern of other governments or of international society. Certainly -few oppressions or cruelties would warrant the intervention of foreign -powers. But the German mistreatment of Germans is now known to pass in -magnitude and savagery any limits of what is tolerable by modern -civilization. Other nations, by silence, would take a consenting part in -such crimes. These Nazi persecutions, moreover, take character as -international crimes because of the purpose for which they were -undertaken. - -The purpose, as we have seen, of getting rid of the influence of free -labor, the churches, and the Jews was to clear their obstruction to the -precipitation of aggressive war. If aggressive warfare in violation of -treaty obligation is a matter of international cognizance the -preparations for it must also be of concern to the international -community. Terrorism was the chief instrument for securing the cohesion -of the German people in war purposes. Moreover, these cruelties in -Germany served as atrocity practice to discipline the membership of the -criminal organization to follow the pattern later in occupied countries. - -Through the police formations that are before you accused as criminal -organizations, the Nazi Party leaders, aided at some point in their -basic and notorious purpose by each of the individual defendants, -instituted a reign of terror. These espionage and police organizations -were utilized to hunt down every form of opposition and to penalize -every nonconformity. These organizations early founded and administered -concentration camps—Buchenwald in 1933, Dachau in 1934. But these -notorious names were not alone. Concentration camps came to dot the -German map and to number scores. At first they met with resistance from -some Germans. We have a captured letter from Minister of Justice Gürtner -to Hitler which is revealing. A Gestapo official had been prosecuted for -crimes committed in the camp at Hohnstein, and the Nazi Governor of -Saxony had promptly asked that the proceeding be quashed. The Minister -of Justice in June of 1935 protested because, as he said: - - “In this camp unusually grave mistreatments of prisoners have - occurred at least since summer 1933. The prisoners not only were - beaten with whips without cause, similarly as in the - Concentration Camp Bredow near Stettin till they lost - consciousness, but they were also tortured in other manners, - e.g. with the help of a dripping apparatus constructed - exclusively for this purpose, under which prisoners had to stand - until they were suffering from serious purulent wounds of the - scalp. . . .” (787-PS) - -I shall not take time to detail the ghastly proceedings in these -concentration camps. Beatings, starvings, tortures, and killings were -routine—so routine that the tormentors became blasé and careless. We -have a report of discovery that in Plötzensee one night, 186 persons -were executed while there were orders for only 180. Another report -describes how the family of one victim received two urns of ashes by -mistake. - -Inmates were compelled to execute each other. In 1942 they were paid -five Reichsmarks per execution, but on June 27, 1942 SS General Glücks -ordered commandants of all concentration camps to reduce this honorarium -to three cigarettes. In 1943 the Reich leader of the SS and Chief of -German Police ordered the corporal punishments on Russian women to be -applied by Polish women and vice versa, but the price was not frozen. He -said that as reward, a few cigarettes was authorized. Under the Nazis, -human life had been progressively devalued, until it finally became -worth less than a handful of tobacco—ersatz tobacco. There were, -however, some traces of the milk of human kindness. On August 11, 1942 -an order went from Himmler to the commanders of 14 concentration camps -that only German prisoners are allowed to beat other German prisoners -(2189-PS). - -Mystery and suspense was added to cruelty in order to spread torture -from the inmate to his family and friends. Men and women disappeared -from their homes or business or from the streets, and no word came of -them. The omission of notice was not due to overworked staff; it was due -to policy. The Chief of the SD and SIPO reported that in accordance with -orders from the Führer anxiety should be created in the minds of the -family of the arrested person. (668-PS) Deportations and secret arrests -were labeled, with a Nazi wit which seems a little ghoulish, “Nacht und -Nebel” (Night and Fog) (L-90, 833-PS). One of the many orders for these -actions gave this explanation: - - “The decree carries a basic innovation. The Führer and - Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces commands that crimes of - the specified sort committed by civilians of the occupied - territories are to be punished by the pertinent courts-martial - in the occupied territories _only_ when (a) the sentence calls - for the death penalty, and (b) the sentence is pronounced within - eight days after the arrest. - - “Only when both conditions are met does the Führer and - Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces hope for the desired - deterrent effect from the conduct of punitive proceedings in the - occupied territories. - - “In other cases, in the future, the accused are to be secretly - brought to Germany, and the further conduct of the trial carried - on here. The deterrent effect of these measures lies (a) in - allowing the disappearance of the accused without a trace, (b) - therein that no information whatsoever may be given about their - whereabouts and their fate.” (833-PS) - -To clumsy cruelty, scientific skill was added. “Undesirables” were -exterminated by injection of drugs into the bloodstream, by asphyxiation -in gas chambers. They were shot with poison bullets, to study the -effects. (L-103) - -Then, to cruel experiments the Nazi added obscene ones. These were not -the work of underling-degenerates but of master-minds high in the Nazi -conspiracy. On May 20, 1942 General Field Marshal Milch authorized SS -General Wolff to go ahead at Dachau Camp with so-called “cold -experiments”; and four female gypsies were supplied for the purpose. -Himmler gave permission to carry on these “experiments” also in other -camps. (1617-PS) At Dachau, the reports of the “doctor” in charge show -that victims were immersed in cold water until their body temperature -was reduced to 28 degrees centigrade (82.4 degrees Farenheit), when they -all died immediately (1618-PS). This was in August 1942. But the -“doctor’s” technique improved. By February 1943 he was able to report -that 30 persons were chilled to 27 to 29 degrees, their hands and feet -frozen white, and their bodies “rewarmed” by a hot bath. But the Nazi -scientific triumph was “rewarming with animal heat.” The victim, all but -frozen to death, was surrounded with bodies of living women until he -revived and responded to his environment by having sexual intercourse. -(1616-PS) Here Nazi degeneracy reached its nadir. - -I dislike to encumber the record with such morbid tales, but we are in -the grim business of trying men as criminals, and these are the things -that their own agents say happened. We will show you these concentration -camps in motion pictures, just as the Allied armies found them when they -arrived, and the measures General Eisenhower had to take to clean them -up. Our proof will be disgusting and you will say I have robbed you of -your sleep. But these are the things which have turned the stomach of -the world and set every civilized hand against Nazi Germany. - -Germany became one vast torture chamber. Cries of its victims were heard -round the world and brought shudders to civilized people everywhere. I -am one who received during this war most atrocity tales with suspicion -and scepticism. But the proof here will be so overwhelming that I -venture to predict not one word I have spoken will be denied. These -defendants will only deny personal responsibility or knowledge. - -Under the clutch of the most intricate web of espionage and intrigue -that any modern state has endured, and persecution and torture of a kind -that has not been visited upon the world in many centuries, the elements -of the German population which were both decent and courageous were -annihilated. Those which were decent but weak were intimidated. Open -resistance, which had never been more than feeble and irresolute, -disappeared. But resistance, I am happy to say, always remained, -although it was manifest in only such events as the abortive effort to -assassinate Hitler on July 20, 1944. With resistance driven underground, -the Nazi had the German State in his own hands. - -But the Nazis not only silenced discordant voices. They created positive -controls as effective as their negative ones. Propaganda organs, on a -scale never before known, stimulated the Party and Party formations with -a permanent enthusiasm and abandon such as we, democratic people, can -work up only for a few days before a general election. They inculcated -and practiced the Führerprinzip which centralized control of the Party -and of the Party-controlled State over the lives and thought of the -German people, who are accustomed to look upon the German State, by -whomever controlled, with a mysticism that is incomprehensible to my -people. - -All these controls from their inception were exerted with unparalleled -energy and single-mindedness to put Germany on a war footing. We will -show from the Nazis’ own documents their secret training of military -personnel, their secret creation of a military air force. Finally, a -conscript army was brought into being. Financiers, economists, -industrialists joined in the plan and promoted elaborate alterations in -industry and finance to support an unprecedented concentration of -resources and energies upon preparations for war. Germany’s rearmament -so outstripped the strength of her neighbors that in about a year she -was able to crush the whole military force of continental Europe, -exclusive of that of Soviet Russia, and then to push the Russian armies -back to the Volga. These preparations were of a magnitude which -surpassed all need of defense, and every defendant, and every -intelligent German, well understood them to be for aggressive purposes. - -_Experiments in Aggression_: - -Before resorting to open aggressive warfare, the Nazis undertook some -rather cautious experiments to test the spirit of resistance of those -who lay across their path. They advanced, but only as others yielded, -and kept in a position to draw back if they found a temperament that -made persistence dangerous. - -On 7 March 1936 the Nazis reoccupied the Rhineland and then proceeded to -fortify it in violation of the Treaty of Versailles and the Pact of -Locarno. They encountered no substantial resistance and were emboldened -to take the next step, which was the acquisition of Austria. Despite -repeated assurances that Germany had no designs on Austria, invasion was -perfected. Threat of attack forced Schuschnigg to resign as Chancellor -of Austria and put the Nazi Defendant Seyss-Inquart in his place. The -latter immediately opened the frontier and invited Hitler to invade -Austria “to preserve order”. On March 12th invasion began. The next day, -Hitler proclaimed himself Chief of the Austrian State, took command of -its armed forces, and a law was enacted annexing Austria to Germany. - -Threats of aggression had succeeded without arousing resistance. Fears -nevertheless had been stirred. They were lulled by an assurance to the -Czechoslovak Government that there would be no attack on that country. -We will show that the Nazi Government already had detailed plans for the -attack. We will lay before you the documents in which these conspirators -planned to create an incident to justify their attack. They even gave -consideration to assassinating their own Ambassador at Prague in order -to create a sufficiently dramatic incident. They did precipitate a -diplomatic crisis which endured throughout the summer. Hitler set -September 30th as the day when troops should be ready for action. Under -the threat of immediate war, the United Kingdom and France concluded a -pact with Germany and Italy at Munich on September 29, 1938, which -required Czechoslovakia to acquiesce in the cession of the Sudetenland -to Germany. It was consummated by German occupation on October 1, 1938. - -The Munich Pact pledged no further aggression against Czechoslovakia, -but the Nazi pledge was lightly given and quickly broken. On the 15th of -March 1939, in defiance of the treaty of Munich itself, the Nazis seized -and occupied Bohemia and Moravia, which constituted the major part of -Czechoslovakia not already ceded to Germany. Once again the West stood -aghast, but it dreaded war, it saw no remedy except war, and it hoped -against hope that the Nazi fever for expansion had run its course. But -the Nazi world was intoxicated by these unresisted successes in open -alliance with Mussolini and in covert alliance with Franco. Then, having -made a deceitful, delaying peace with Russia, the conspirators entered -upon the final phase of the plan to renew war. - -_War of Aggression_: - -I will not prolong this address by detailing the steps leading to the -war of aggression which began with the invasion of Poland on September -1, 1939. The further story will be unfolded to you from documents -including those of the German High Command itself. The plans had been -laid long in advance. As early as 1935 Hitler appointed the Defendant -Schacht to the position of General Deputy for the War Economy (2261-PS). -We have the diary of General Jodl (1780-PS); the “Plan Otto,” Hitler’s -own order for attack on Austria in case trickery failed (C-102); the -“Plan Green” which was the blueprint for attack on Czechoslovakia -(388-PS); plans for the war in the West (375-PS, 376-PS); Funk’s letter -to Hitler dated August 25, 1939 detailing the long course of economic -preparation (699-PS); Keitel’s top-secret mobilization order for 1939-40 -prescribing secret steps to be taken during a “period of tension” during -which no “‘state of war’ will be publicly declared even if open war -measures against the foreign enemy will be taken.” This letter order -(1639A-PS) is in our possession despite a secret order issued on March -16, 1945, when Allied troops were advancing into the heart of Germany, -to burn these plans. We have also Hitler’s directive, dated December 18, -1940, for the “Barbarossa Contingency” outlining the strategy of the -attack upon Russia (446-PS). That plan in the original bears the -initials of the Defendants Keitel and Jodl. They were planning the -attack and planning it long in advance of the declaration of war. We -have detailed information concerning “Case White,” the plan for attack -on Poland (C-120). That attack began the war. The plan was issued by -Keitel on April 3rd, 1939. The attack did not come until September. -Steps in preparation for the attack were taken by subordinate -commanders, one of whom issued an order on June 14, providing that: - - “The Commander-in-Chief of the Army has ordered the working out - of a _plan of deployment against Poland_ which takes in account - the demands of the political leadership _for the opening of war - by surprise and for quick success_. . . . - - “I declare it the duty of the commanding generals, the - divisional commanders, and the commandants to limit as much as - possible the number of persons who will be informed, and to - limit the extent of the information, and ask that all suitable - measures be taken to prevent persons not concerned from getting - information. . . . - - “The operation, in order to forestall an orderly Polish - mobilization and concentration, is to be opened by surprise with - forces which are for the most part armored and motorized, placed - on alert in the neighborhood of the border. The initial - superiority over the Polish frontier guards and surprise that - can be expected with certainty are to be maintained by quickly - bringing up other parts of the Army as well to counteract the - marching up of the Polish Army. . . . - - “If the development of the political situation should show that - a surprise at the beginning of the war is out of question, - because of well-advanced defense preparations on the part of the - Polish Army, the Commander-in-Chief of the Army will order the - opening of the hostilities only after the assembling of - sufficient additional forces. The basis of all preparations will - be to surprise the enemy. . . .” (2327-PS) - -We have also the order for the invasion of England, signed by Hitler and -initialed by Keitel and Jodl. It is interesting that it commences with a -recognition that although the British military position is “hopeless,” -they show not the slightest sign of giving in. (442-PS) - -Not the least incriminating are the minutes of Hitler’s meeting with his -high advisers. As early as November 5, 1937 Hitler told Defendants -Göring, Raeder, and Neurath, among others, that German rearmament was -practically accomplished and that he had decided to secure by force, -starting with a lightning attack on Czechoslovakia and Austria, greater -living space for Germans in Europe no later than 1943-45 and perhaps as -early as 1938 (386-PS). On the 23rd of May, 1939 the Führer advised his -staff that: - - “It is a question of expanding our living space in the East and - of securing our food supplies. . . . Over and above the natural - fertility, thorough-going German exploitation will enormously - increase the surplus. - - “There is therefore no question of sparing Poland, and we are - left with the decision: _To attack Poland at the first suitable - opportunity_. We cannot expect a repetition of the Czech affair. - There will be war.” (L-79) - -On August 22nd, 1939 Hitler again addressed members of the High Command, -telling them when the start of military operations would be ordered. He -disclosed that for propaganda purposes, he would provocate a good -reason. “It will make no difference,” he announced, “whether this reason -will sound convincing or not. After all, the victor will not be asked -whether he talked the truth or not. We have to proceed brutally. The -stronger is always right.” (1014-PS) On 23 November 1939, after the -Germans had invaded Poland, Hitler made this explanation: - - “. . . For the first time in history we have to fight on only - one front, the other front is at present free. But no one can - know how long that will remain so. I have doubted for a long - time whether I should strike in the East and then in the West. - Basically I did not organize the armed forces in order not to - strike. The decision to strike was always in me. Earlier or - later I wanted to solve the problem. Under pressure it was - decided that the East was to be attacked first. . . .” (789-PS) - -We know the bloody sequel. Frontier incidents were staged. Demands were -made for cession of territory. When Poland refused, the German forces -invaded on September 1st, 1939. Warsaw was destroyed; Poland fell. The -Nazis, in accordance with plan, moved swiftly to extend their aggression -throughout Europe and to gain the advantage of surprise over their -unprepared neighbors. Despite repeated and solemn assurances of peaceful -intentions, they invaded Denmark and Norway on 9th April 1940; Belgium, -The Netherlands, and Luxembourg on 10th May 1940; Yugoslavia and Greece -on 6th April 1941. - -As part of the Nazi preparation for aggression against Poland and her -allies, Germany, on 23rd August 1939, had entered into a non-aggression -pact with Soviet Russia. It was only a delaying treaty intended to be -kept no longer than necessary to prepare for its violation. On June 22, -1941, pursuant to long-matured plans, the Nazis hurled troops into -Soviet territory without any declaration of war. The entire European -world was aflame. - -_Conspiracy with Japan_: - -The Nazi plans of aggression called for use of Asiatic allies and they -found among the Japanese men of kindred mind and purpose. They were -brothers, under the skin. - -Himmler records a conversation he had on January 31, 1939 with General -Oshima, Japanese Ambassador at Berlin. He wrote: - - “Furthermore, he (Oshima) had succeeded up to now to send 10 - Russians with bombs across the Caucasian frontier. These - Russians had the mission to kill Stalin. A number of additional - Russians, whom he had also sent across, had been shot at the - frontier.” (2195-PS) - -On September 27th, 1940 the Nazis concluded a German-Italian-Japanese -10-year military and economic alliance by which those powers agreed “to -stand by and cooperate with one another in regard to their efforts in -Greater East Asia and regions of Europe respectively wherein it is their -prime purpose to establish and maintain a new order of things.” - -On March 5, 1941 a top-secret directive was issued by Defendant Keitel. -It stated that the Führer had ordered instigation of Japan’s active -participation in the war and directed that Japan’s military power has to -be strengthened by the disclosure of German war experiences and support -of a military, economic, and technical nature has to be given. The aim -was stated to be to crush England quickly thereby keeping the United -States out of the war. (C-75) - -On March 29, 1941 Ribbentrop told Matsuoka, the Japanese Foreign -Minister, that the German Army was ready to strike against Russia. -Matsuoka reassured Ribbentrop about the Far East. Japan, he reported, -was acting at the moment as though she had no interest whatever in -Singapore, but intends to strike when the right moment comes. (1877-PS) - -On April 5, 1941 Ribbentrop urged Matsuoka that entry of Japan into the -war would “hasten the victory” and would be more in the interest of -Japan than of Germany since it would give Japan a unique chance to -fulfill her national aims and to play a leading part in Eastern Asia -(1882-PS). - -The proofs in this case will also show that the leaders of Germany were -planning war against the United States from its Atlantic as well as -instigating it from its Pacific approaches. A captured memorandum from -the Führer’s headquarters, dated October 29, 1940, asks certain -information as to air bases and supply and reports further that: - - “The Führer is at present occupied with the question of the - occupation of the Atlantic islands with a view to the - prosecution of war against America at a later date. - Deliberations on this subject are being embarked upon here.” - (376-PS) - -On December 7th, 1941, a day which the late President Roosevelt declared -“will live in infamy,” victory for German aggression seemed certain. The -Wehrmacht was at the gates of Moscow. Taking advantage of the situation, -and while her plenipotentiaries were creating a diplomatic diversion in -Washington, Japan without declaration of war treacherously attacked the -United States at Pearl Harbor and the Philippines. Attacks followed -swiftly on the British Commonwealth, and The Netherlands in the -Southwest Pacific. These aggressions were met in the only way that they -could be met, with instant declarations of war and with armed resistance -which mounted slowly through many long months of reverse until finally -the Axis was crushed to earth and deliverance for its victims was won. - -Your Honor, I am about to take up “Crimes in the Conduct of War”, which -is quite a separate subject. We are within 5 minutes of the recessing -time. It will be very convenient for me if it will be agreeable to you. - -THE PRESIDENT: We will sit again in 15 minutes’ time. - - [_The Tribunal recessed until 1550 hours._] - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal must request that if it adjourns for 15 -minutes members of the bar and others are back in their seats after an -interval of 15 minutes. Mr. Justice Jackson, I understand that you wish -to continue to 5:15, when you may be able to conclude your speech? - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I think that would be the most orderly way. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes, the Tribunal will be glad to do so. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: May it please your Honor, I will now take up the -subject of “Crimes in the Conduct of War”. - -Even the most warlike of peoples have recognized in the name of humanity -some limitations on the savagery of warfare. Rules to that end have been -embodied in international conventions to which Germany became a party. -This code had prescribed certain restraints as to the treatment of -belligerents. The enemy was entitled to surrender and to receive quarter -and good treatment as a prisoner of war. We will show by German -documents that these rights were denied, that prisoners of war were -given brutal treatment and often murdered. This was particularly true in -the case of captured airmen, often my countrymen. - -It was ordered that captured English and American airmen should no -longer be granted the status of prisoners of war. They were to be -treated as criminals and the Army was ordered to refrain from protecting -them against lynching by the populace. (R-118) The Nazi Government, -through its police and propaganda agencies, took pains to incite the -civilian population to attack and kill airmen who crash-landed. The -order, given by the Reichsführer SS Himmler on 10 August 1943, directed -that: “It is not the task of the police to interfere in clashes between -German and English and American flyers who have bailed out”. This order -was transmitted on the same day by SS Obersturmbannführer Brand of -Himmler’s personal staff to all senior executive SS and Police officers, -with these directions: - - “I am sending you the inclosed order with the request that the - Chief of the Regular Police and of the Security Police be - informed. They are to make this instruction known to their - subordinate officers verbally.” (R-110) - -Similarly, we will show Hitler’s top secret order, dated 18 October -1942, that Commandos, regardless of condition, were “to be slaughtered -to the last man” after capture (498-PS). We will show the circulation of -secret orders, one of which was signed by Hess, to be passed orally to -civilians, that enemy fliers or parachutists were to be arrested or -liquidated (062-PS). By such means were murders incited and directed. - -This Nazi campaign of ruthless treatment of enemy forces assumed its -greatest proportions in the fight against Russia. Eventually all -prisoners of war were taken out of control of the Army and put in the -hands of Himmler and the SS (058-PS). In the East, the German fury spent -itself. Russian prisoners were ordered to be branded. They were starved. -I shall quote passages from a letter written February 28, 1942 by -Defendant Rosenberg to Defendant Keitel: - - “The fate of the Soviet prisoners of war in Germany is on the - contrary a tragedy of the greatest extent. Of 3,600,000 - prisoners of war, only several hundred thousand are still able - to work fully. A large part of them has starved, or died, - because of the hazards of the weather. Thousands also died from - spotted fever. . . . - - “The camp commanders have forbidden the civilian population to - put food at the disposal of the prisoners, and they have rather - let them starve to death. . . . - - “In many cases, when prisoners of war could no longer keep up on - the march because of hunger and exhaustion, they were shot - before the eyes of the horrified population, and the corpses - were left. - - “In numerous camps, no shelter for the prisoners of war was - provided at all. They lay under the open sky during rain or - snow. Even tools were not made available to dig holes or - caves. . . . - - “Finally, the shooting of prisoners of war must be mentioned; - for instance, in various camps, all the ‘Asiatics’ were shot”. - (081-PS) - -Civilized usage and conventions to which Germany was a party had -prescribed certain immunities for civilian populations unfortunate -enough to dwell in lands overrun by hostile armies. The German -occupation forces, controlled or commanded by men on trial before you, -committed a long series of outrages against the inhabitants of occupied -territory that would be incredible except for captured orders and -captured reports which show the fidelity with which those orders were -executed. - -We deal here with a phase of common criminality designed by the -conspirators as part of the common plan. We can appreciate why these -crimes against their European enemies were not of a casual character but -were planned and disciplined crimes when we get at the reason for them. -Hitler told his officers on August 22, 1939 that: “The main objective in -Poland is the destruction of the enemy and not the reaching of a certain -geographical line” (1014-PS). The project of deporting promising youth -from occupied territories was approved by Rosenberg on the theory that -“a desired weakening of the biological force” of the conquered people is -being achieved (031-PS). To Germanize or to destroy was the program. -Himmler announced, “Either we win over any good blood that we can use -for ourselves and give it a place in our people or, gentlemen—you may -call this cruel, but nature is cruel,—we destroy this blood.” As to -“racially good types” Himmler further advised, “Therefore, I think that -it is our duty to take their children with us, to remove them from their -environment, if necessary by robbing or stealing them” (L-70). He urged -deportation of Slavic children to deprive potential enemies of future -soldiers. - -The Nazi purpose was to leave Germany’s neighbors so weakened that even -if she should eventually lose the war, she would still be the most -powerful nation in Europe. Against this background, we must view the -plan for ruthless warfare, which means a plan for the commission of War -Crimes and Crimes against Humanity. - -Hostages in large numbers were demanded and killed. Mass punishments -were inflicted, so savage that whole communities were extinguished. -Rosenberg was advised of the annihilation of three unidentified villages -in Slovakia. (970-PS) In May of 1943 another village of about 40 farms -and 220 inhabitants was ordered wiped out. The entire population was -ordered shot, the cattle and property impounded, and the order required -that “the village will be destroyed totally by fire.” (163-PS) A secret -report from Rosenberg’s Reich Ministry of Eastern Territory reveals -that: - - “Food rations allowed the Russian population are so low that - they fail to secure their existence and provide only for minimum - subsistence of limited duration. The population does not know if - they will still live tomorrow. They are faced with death by - starvation. . . . - - “The roads are clogged by hundreds of thousands of people, - sometimes as many as one million according to the estimate of - experts, who wander around in search of nourishment. . . . - - “Sauckel’s action has caused unrest among the civilians. . . . - Russian girls were deloused by men, nude photos in forced - positions were taken, women doctors were locked into freight - cars for the pleasure of the transport commanders, women in - night shirts were fettered and forced through the Russian towns - to the railroad station, etc. All this material has been sent to - the OKH.” (1381-PS) - -Perhaps the deportation to slave labor was the most horrible and -extensive slaving operation in history. On few other subjects is our -evidence so abundant or so damaging. In a speech made on January 25, -1944 the Defendant Frank, Governor General of Poland, boasted, “I have -sent 1,300,000 Polish workers into the Reich” (059-PS, P. 2). The -Defendant Sauckel reported that “out of the 5 million foreign workers -who arrived in Germany not even 200,000 came voluntarily.” This fact was -reported to the Führer and Defendants Speer, Göring, and Keitel. (R-24) -Children of 10 to 14 years were impressed into service by telegraphic -order of Rosenberg’s Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories: - - “The Command is further charged with the transferring of - worthwhile Russian youth between 10-14 years of age, to the - Reich. The authority is not affected by the changes connected - with the evacuation and transportation to the reception camps of - Bialystok, Krajewo, and Olitei. The Führer wishes that this - activity be increased even more.” (200-PS) - -When enough labor was not forthcoming, prisoners of war were forced into -war work in flagrant violation of international conventions (016-PS). -Slave labor came from France, Belgium, Holland, Italy, and the East. -Methods of recruitment were violent (R-124, 018-PS, 204-PS). The -treatment of these slave laborers was stated in general terms, not -difficult to translate into concrete deprivations, in a letter to the -Defendant Rosenberg from the Defendant Sauckel, which stated: - - “All _prisoners of war_, from the _territories_ of the West as - well as of the East, actually in Germany, must be completely - incorporated into the German armament and munition industries. - Their production must be brought to the highest possible - level. . . . - - “The complete employment of all prisoners of war as well as the - use of a gigantic number of new foreign civilian workers, men - and women, has become an indisputable necessity for the solution - of the mobilization of labor program in this war. - - “All the men must be fed, sheltered, and treated in such a way - as to exploit them to the highest possible extent at the lowest - conceivable degrees of expenditure. . . .” (016-PS) - -In pursuance of the Nazi plan permanently to reduce the living standards -of their neighbors and to weaken them physically and economically, a -long series of crimes were committed. There was extensive destruction, -serving no military purpose, of the property of civilians. Dikes were -thrown open in Holland almost at the close of the war not to achieve -military ends but to destroy the resources and retard the economy of the -thrifty Netherlanders. - -There was carefully planned economic syphoning off of the assets of -occupied countries. An example of the planning is shown by a report on -France dated December 7, 1942 made by the Economic Research Department -of the Reichsbank. The question arose whether French occupation costs -should be increased from 15 million Reichsmarks per day to 25 million -Reichsmarks per day. The Reichsbank analyzed French economy to determine -whether it could bear the burden. It pointed out that the armistice had -burdened France to that date to the extent of 18½ billion Reichsmarks, -equalling 370 billion francs. It pointed out that the burden of these -payments within 2½ years equalled the aggregate French national income -in the year 1940, and that the amount of payments handed over to Germany -in the first 6 months of 1942 corresponded to the estimate for the total -French revenue for that whole year. The report concluded: - - “In any case, the conclusion is inescapable that relatively - heavier tributes have been imposed on France since the armistice - in June 1940 than upon Germany after the World War. In this - connection, it must be noted that the economic powers of France - never equalled those of the German Reich and that the vanquished - France could not draw on foreign economic and financial - resources in the same degree as Germany after the last World - War.” - -The Defendant Funk was the Reich Minister of Economics and President of -the Reichsbank; the Defendant Ribbentrop was Foreign Minister; the -Defendant Göring was Plenipotentiary of the Four Year Plan; and all of -them participated in the exchange of views of which this captured -document is a part. (2149-PS) Notwithstanding this analysis by the -Reichsbank, they proceeded to increase the imposition on France from 15 -million Reichsmarks daily to 25 million per day. - -It is small wonder that the bottom has been knocked out of French -economy. The plan and purpose of the thing appears in a letter from -General Stülpnagel, head of the German Armistice Commission, to the -Defendant Jodl as early as 14 September 1940 when he wrote, “The slogan -‘Systematic weakening of France’ has already been surpassed by far in -reality” (1756-PS). - -Not only was there a purpose to debilitate and demoralize the economy of -Germany’s neighbors for the purpose of destroying their competitive -position, but there was looting and pilfering on an unprecedented scale. -We need not be hypocritical about this business of looting. I recognize -that no army moves through occupied territory without some pilfering as -it goes. Usually the amount of pilfering increases as discipline wanes. -If the evidence in this case showed no looting except of that sort, I -certainly would ask no conviction of these defendants for it. - -But we will show you that looting was not due to the lack of discipline -or to the ordinary weaknesses of human nature. The German organized -plundering, planned it, disciplined it, and made it official just as he -organized everything else, and then he compiled the most meticulous -records to show that he had done the best job of looting that was -possible under the circumstances. And we have those records. - -The Defendant Rosenberg was put in charge of a systematic plundering of -the art objects of Europe by direct order of Hitler dated 29 January -1940 (136-PS). On the 16th of April 1943 Rosenberg reported that up to -the 7th of April, 92 railway cars with 2,775 cases containing art -objects had been sent to Germany; and that 53 pieces of art had been -shipped to Hitler direct, and 594 to the Defendant Göring. The report -mentioned something like 20,000 pieces of seized art and the main -locations where they were stored. (015-PS) - -Moreover this looting was glorified by Rosenberg. Here we have 39 -leather-bound tabulated volumes of his inventory, which in due time we -will offer in evidence. One cannot but admire the artistry of this -Rosenberg report. The Nazi taste was cosmopolitan. Of the 9,455 articles -inventoried, there were included 5,255 paintings, 297 sculptures, 1,372 -pieces of antique furniture, 307 textiles, and 2,224 small objects of -art. Rosenberg observed that there were approximately 10,000 more -objects still to be inventoried. (015-PS) Rosenberg himself estimated -that the values involved would come close to a billion dollars (090-PS). - -I shall not go into further details of the War Crimes and Crimes against -Humanity committed by the gangster ring whose leaders are before you. It -is not the purpose in my part of this case to deal with the individual -crimes. I am dealing with the Common Plan or design for crime and will -not dwell upon individual offenses. My task is to show the scale on -which these crimes occurred, and to show that these are the men who were -in the responsible positions and who conceived the plan and design which -renders them answerable, regardless of the fact that the plan was -actually executed by others. - -At length, this reckless and lawless course outraged the world. It -recovered from the demoralization of surprise attack, assembled its -forces and stopped these men in their tracks. Once success deserted -their banners, one by one the Nazi satellites fell away. Sawdust Caesar -collapsed. Resistance forces in every occupied country arose to harry -the invader. Even at home, Germans saw that Germany was being led to -ruin by these mad men, and the attempt on July 20, 1944 to assassinate -Hitler, an attempt fostered by men of highest station, was a desperate -effort by internal forces in Germany to stop short of ruin. Quarrels -broke out among the failing conspirators, and the decline of the Nazi -power was more swift than its ascendancy. German Armed Forces -surrendered, its Government disintegrated, its leaders committed suicide -by the dozen, and by the fortunes of war these defendants fell into our -hands. Although they are not, by any means, all the guilty ones, they -are survivors among the most responsible. Their names appear over and -over in the documents and their faces grace the photographic evidence. -We have here the surviving top politicians, militarists, financiers, -diplomats, administrators, and propagandists, of the Nazi movement. Who -was responsible for these crimes if they were not? - -_The Law of the Case_: - -The end of the war and capture of these prisoners presented the -victorious Allies with the question whether there is any legal -responsibility on high-ranking men for acts which I have described. Must -such wrongs either be ignored or redressed in hot blood? Is there no -standard in the law for a deliberate and reasoned judgment on such -conduct? - -The Charter of this Tribunal evidences a faith that the law is not only -to govern the conduct of little men, but that even rulers are, as Lord -Chief Justice Coke put it to King James, “under God and the law.” The -United States believed that the law long has afforded standards by which -a juridical hearing could be conducted to make sure that we punish only -the right men and for the right reasons. Following the instructions of -the late President Roosevelt and the decision of the Yalta conference -President Truman directed representatives of the United States to -formulate a proposed International Agreement, which was submitted during -the San Francisco Conference to Foreign Ministers of the United Kingdom, -the Soviet Union, and the Provisional Government of France. With many -modifications, that proposal has become the Charter of this Tribunal. - -But the Agreement which sets up the standards by which these prisoners -are to be judged does not express the views of the signatory nations -alone. Other nations with diverse but highly respected systems of -jurisprudence also have signified adherence to it. These are Belgium, -The Netherlands, Denmark, Norway, Czechoslovakia, Luxembourg, Poland, -Greece, Yugoslavia, Ethiopia, Australia, Haiti, Honduras, Panama, New -Zealand, Venezuela, and India. You judge, therefore, under an organic -act which represents the wisdom, the sense of justice, and the will of -21 governments, representing an overwhelming majority of all civilized -people. - -The Charter by which this Tribunal has its being, embodies certain legal -concepts which are inseparable from its jurisdiction and which must -govern its decision. These, as I have said, also are conditions attached -to the grant of any hearing to defendants. The validity of the -provisions of the Charter is conclusive upon us all, whether we have -accepted the duty of judging or of prosecuting under it, as well as upon -the defendants, who can point to no other law which gives them a right -to be heard at all. My able and experienced colleagues believe, as do I, -that it will contribute to the expedition and clarity of this Trial if I -expound briefly the application of the legal philosophy of the Charter -to the facts I have recited. - -While this declaration of the law by the Charter is final, it may be -contended that the prisoners on trial are entitled to have it applied to -their conduct only most charitably if at all. It may be said that this -is new law, not authoritatively declared at the time they did the acts -it condemns, and that this declaration of the law has taken them by -surprise. - -I cannot, of course, deny that these men are surprised that this is the -law; they really are surprised that there is any such thing as law. -These defendants did not rely on any law at all. Their program ignored -and defied all law. That this is so will appear from many acts and -statements, of which I cite but a few. - -In the Führer’s speech to all military commanders on November 23, 1939 -he reminded them that at the moment Germany had a pact with Russia, but -declared: “Agreements are to be kept only as long as they serve a -certain purpose.” Later in the same speech he announced: “A violation of -the neutrality of Holland and Belgium will be of no importance” -(789-PS). A top secret document, entitled “Warfare as a Problem of -Organization,” dispatched by the Chief of the High Command to all -commanders on April 19, 1938 declared that “the normal rules of war -towards neutrals may be considered to apply on the basis whether -operation of rules will create greater advantages or disadvantages for -the belligerents” (L-211). And from the files of the German Navy Staff, -we have a “Memorandum on Intensified Naval War,” dated October 15, 1939, -which begins by stating a desire to comply with International Law. -“However,” it continues, “if decisive successes are expected from any -measure considered as a war necessity, it must be carried through even -if it is not in agreement with international law.” (L-184) International -law, natural law, German law, any law at all was to these men simply a -propaganda device to be invoked when it helped and to be ignored when it -would condemn what they wanted to do. That men may be protected in -relying upon the law at the time they act is the reason we find laws of -retrospective operations unjust. But these men cannot bring themselves -within the reason of the rule which in some systems of jurisprudence -prohibits _ex post facto_ laws. They cannot show that they ever relied -upon international law in any state or paid it the slightest regard. - -The third Count of the Indictment is based on the definition of War -Crimes contained in the Charter. I have outlined to you the systematic -course of conduct toward civilian populations and combat forces which -violates international conventions to which Germany was a party. Of the -criminal nature of these acts at least, the defendants had, as we shall -show, clear knowledge. Accordingly, they took pains to conceal their -violations. It will appear that the Defendants Keitel and Jodl were -informed by official legal advisors that the orders to brand Russian -prisoners of war, to shackle British prisoners of war, and to execute -commando prisoners were clear violations of international law. -Nevertheless, these orders were put into effect. The same is true of -orders issued for the assassination of General Giraud and General -Weygand, which failed to be executed only because of a ruse on the part -of Admiral Canaris, who was himself later executed for his part in the -plot to take Hitler’s life on July 20, 1944. - -The fourth Count of the Indictment is based on Crimes against Humanity. -Chief among these are mass killings of countless human beings in cold -blood. Does it take these men by surprise that murder is treated as a -crime? - -The first and second Counts of the Indictment add to these crimes the -crime of plotting and waging wars of aggression and wars in violation of -nine treaties to which Germany was a party. There was a time, in fact, I -think the time of the first World War, when it could not have been said -that war-inciting or war making was a crime in law, however -reprehensible in morals. - -Of course, it was, under the law of all civilized peoples, a crime for -one man with his bare knuckles to assault another. How did it come that -multiplying this crime by a million, and adding fire arms to bare -knuckles, made it a legally innocent act? The doctrine was that one -could not be regarded as criminal for committing the usual violent acts -in the conduct of legitimate warfare. The age of imperialistic expansion -during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries added the foul doctrine, -contrary to the teachings of early Christian and international law -scholars such as Grotius, that all wars are to be regarded as legitimate -wars. The sum of these two doctrines was to give war-making a complete -immunity from accountability to law. - -This was intolerable for an age that called itself civilized. Plain -people with their earthy common sense, revolted at such fictions and -legalisms so contrary to ethical principles and demanded checks on war -immunities. Statesmen and international lawyers at first cautiously -responded by adopting rules of warfare designed to make the conduct of -war more civilized. The effort was to set legal limits to the violence -that could be done to civilian populations and to combatants as well. - -The common sense of men after the first World War demanded, however, -that the law’s condemnation of war reach deeper, and that the law -condemn not merely uncivilized ways of waging war, but also the waging -in any way of uncivilized wars—wars of aggression. The world’s -statesmen again went only as far as they were forced to go. Their -efforts were timid and cautious and often less explicit than we might -have hoped. But the 1920’s did outlaw aggressive war. - -The re-establishment of the principle that there are unjust wars and -that unjust wars are illegal is traceable in many steps. One of the most -significant is the Briand-Kellogg Pact of 1928, by which Germany, Italy, -and Japan, in common with practically all nations of the world, -renounced war as an instrument of national policy, bound themselves to -seek the settlement of disputes only by pacific means, and condemned -recourse to war for the solution of international controversies. This -pact altered the legal status of a war of aggression. As Mr. Stimson, -the United States Secretary of State put it in 1932, such a war: - - “. . . is no longer to be the source and subject of rights. It - is no longer to be the principle around which the duties, the - conduct, and the rights of nations revolve. It is an illegal - thing. . . . By that very act, we have made obsolete many legal - precedents and have given the legal profession the task of - re-examining many of its codes and treaties.” - -The Geneva Protocol of 1924 for the Pacific Settlement of International -Disputes, signed by the representatives of 48 governments, declared that -“a war of aggression constitutes . . . an international crime.” The -Eighth Assembly of the League of Nations in 1927, on unanimous -resolution of the representatives of 48 member nations, including -Germany, declared that a war of aggression constitutes an international -crime. At the Sixth Pan-American Conference of 1928, the 21 American -Republics unanimously adopted a resolution stating that “war of -aggression constitutes an international crime against the human -species.” - -A failure of these Nazis to heed, or to understand the force and meaning -of this evolution in the legal thought of the world, is not a defense or -a mitigation. If anything, it aggravates their offense and makes it the -more mandatory that the law they have flouted be vindicated by juridical -application to their lawless conduct. Indeed, by their own law—had they -heeded any law—these principles were binding on these defendants. -Article 4 of the Weimar constitution provided that: “The generally -accepted rules of international law are to be considered as binding -integral parts of the law of the German Reich” (2050-PS). Can there be -any doubt that the outlawry of aggressive war was one of the “generally -accepted rules of international law” in 1939? - -Any resort to war—to any kind of a war—is a resort to means that are -inherently criminal. War inevitably is a course of killings, assaults, -deprivations of liberty, and destruction of property. An honestly -defensive war is, of course, legal and saves those lawfully conducting -it from criminality. But inherently criminal acts cannot be defended by -showing that those who committed them were engaged in a war, when war -itself is illegal. The very minimum legal consequence of the treaties -making aggressive wars illegal is to strip those who incite or wage them -of every defense the law ever gave, and to leave war-makers subject to -judgment by the usually accepted principles of the law of crimes. - -But if it be thought that the Charter, whose declarations concededly -bind us all, does contain new law I still do not shrink from demanding -its strict application by this Tribunal. The rule of law in the world, -flouted by the lawlessness incited by these defendants, had to be -restored at the cost to my country of over a million casualties, not to -mention those of other nations. I cannot subscribe to the perverted -reasoning that society may advance and strengthen the rule of law by the -expenditure of morally innocent lives but that progress in the law may -never be made at the price of morally guilty lives. - -It is true of course, that we have no judicial precedent for the -Charter. But international law is more than a scholarly collection of -abstract and immutable principles. It is an outgrowth of treaties and -agreements between nations and of accepted customs. Yet every custom has -its origin in some single act, and every agreement has to be initiated -by the action of some state. Unless we are prepared to abandon every -principle of growth for international law, we cannot deny that our own -day has the right to institute customs and to conclude agreements that -will themselves become sources of a newer and strengthened international -law. International law is not capable of development by the normal -processes of legislation, for there is no continuing international -legislative authority. Innovations and revisions in international law -are brought about by the action of governments such as those I have -cited, designed to meet a change in circumstances. It grows, as did the -common law, through decisions reached from time to time in adapting -settled principles to new situations. The fact is that when the law -evolves by the case method, as did the common law and as international -law must do if it is to advance at all, it advances at the expense of -those who wrongly guessed the law and learned too late their error. The -law, so far as international law can be decreed, had been clearly -pronounced when these acts took place. Hence, I am not disturbed by the -lack of judicial precedent for the inquiry it is proposed to conduct. - -The events I have earlier recited clearly fall within the standards of -crimes, set out in the Charter, whose perpetrators this Tribunal is -convened to judge and punish fittingly. The standards for War Crimes and -Crimes against Humanity are too familiar to need comment. There are, -however, certain novel problems in applying other precepts of the -Charter which I should call to your attention. - -_The Crime against Peace_: - -A basic provision of the Charter is that to plan, prepare, initiate, or -wage a war of aggression, or a war in violation of international -treaties, agreements, and assurances, or to conspire or participate in a -common plan to do so, is a crime. - -It is perhaps a weakness in this Charter that it fails itself to define -a war of aggression. Abstractly, the subject is full of difficulty and -all kinds of troublesome hypothetical cases can be conjured up. It is a -subject which, if the defense should be permitted to go afield beyond -the very narrow charge in the Indictment, would prolong the Trial and -involve the Tribunal in insoluble political issues. But so far as the -question can properly be involved in this case, the issue is one of no -novelty and is one on which legal opinion has well crystallized. - -One of the most authoritative sources of international law on this -subject is the Convention for the Definition of Aggression signed at -London on July 3, 1933 by Romania, Estonia, Latvia, Poland, Turkey, the -Soviet Union, Persia, and Afghanistan. The subject has also been -considered by international committees and by commentators whose views -are entitled to the greatest respect. It had been little discussed prior -to the first World War but has received much attention as international -law has evolved its outlawry of aggressive war. In the light of these -materials of international law, and so far as relevant to the evidence -in this case, I suggest that an “aggressor” is generally held to be that -state which is the first to commit any of the following actions: - -(1) Declaration of war upon another state; - -(2) Invasion by its armed forces, with or without a declaration of war, -of the territory of another state; - -(3) Attack by its land, naval, or air forces, with or without a -declaration of war, on the territory, vessels or aircraft of another -state; and - -(4) Provision of support to armed bands formed in the territory of -another state, or refusal, notwithstanding the request of the invaded -state, to take in its own territory, all the measures in its power to -deprive those bands of all assistance or protection. - -And I further suggest that it is the general view that no political, -military, economic, or other considerations shall serve as an excuse or -justification for such actions; but exercise of the right of legitimate -self-defense, that is to say, resistance to an act of aggression, or -action to assist a state which has been subjected to aggression, shall -not constitute a war of aggression. - -It is upon such an understanding of the law that our evidence of a -conspiracy to provoke and wage an aggressive war is prepared and -presented. By this test each of the series of wars begun by these Nazi -leaders was unambiguously aggressive. - -It is important to the duration and scope of this Trial that we bear in -mind the difference between our charge that this war was one of -aggression and a position that Germany had no grievances. We are not -inquiring into the conditions which contributed to causing this war. -They are for history to unravel. It is no part of our task to vindicate -the European _status quo_ as of 1933, or as of any other date. The -United States does not desire to enter into discussion of the -complicated pre-war currents of European politics, and it hopes this -trial will not be protracted by their consideration. The remote -causations avowed are too insincere and inconsistent, too complicated -and doctrinaire to be the subject of profitable inquiry in this trial. A -familiar example is to be found in the “Lebensraum” slogan, which -summarized the contention that Germany needed more living space as a -justification for expansion. At the same time that the Nazis were -demanding more space for the German people, they were demanding more -German people to occupy space. Every known means to increase the birth -rate, legitimate and illegitimate, was utilized. “Lebensraum” -represented a vicious circle of demand—from neighbors more space, and -from Germans more progeny. We do not need to investigate the verity of -doctrines which led to constantly expanding circles of aggression. It is -the plot and the act of aggression which we charge to be crimes. - -Our position is that whatever grievances a nation may have, however -objectionable it finds the _status quo_, aggressive warfare is an -illegal means for settling those grievances or for altering those -conditions. It may be that the Germany of the 1920’s and 1930’s faced -desperate problems, problems that would have warranted the boldest -measures short of war. All other methods—persuasion, propaganda, -economic competition, diplomacy—were open to an aggrieved country, but -aggressive warfare was outlawed. These defendants did make aggressive -war, a war in violation of treaties. They did attack and invade their -neighbors in order to effectuate a foreign policy which they knew could -not be accomplished by measures short of war. And that is as far as we -accuse or propose to inquire. - -_The Law of Individual Responsibility_: - -The Charter also recognizes individual responsibility on the part of -those who commit acts defined as crimes, or who incite others to do so, -or who join a common plan with other persons, groups or organizations to -bring about their commission. The principle of individual responsibility -for piracy and brigandage, which have long been recognized as crimes -punishable under international law, is old and well established. That is -what illegal warfare is. This principle of personal liability is a -necessary as well as logical one if international law is to render real -help to the maintenance of peace. An international law which operates -only on states can be enforced only by war because the most practicable -method of coercing a state is warfare. Those familiar with American -history know that one of the compelling reasons for adoption of our -constitution was that the laws of the Confederation, which operated only -on constituent states, were found ineffective to maintain order among -them. The only answer to recalcitrance was impotence or war. Only -sanctions which reach individuals can peacefully and effectively be -enforced. Hence, the principle of the criminality of aggressive war is -implemented by the Charter with the principle of personal -responsibility. - -Of course, the idea that a state, any more than a corporation, commits -crimes, is a fiction. Crimes always are committed only by persons. While -it is quite proper to employ the fiction of responsibility of a state or -corporation for the purpose of imposing a collective liability, it is -quite intolerable to let such a legalism become the basis of personal -immunity. - -The Charter recognizes that one who has committed criminal acts may not -take refuge in superior orders nor in the doctrine that his crimes were -acts of states. These twin principles working together have heretofore -resulted in immunity for practically everyone concerned in the really -great crimes against peace and mankind. Those in lower ranks were -protected against liability by the orders of their superiors. The -superiors were protected because their orders were called acts of state. -Under the Charter, no defense based on either of these doctrines can be -entertained. Modern civilization puts unlimited weapons of destruction -in the hands of men. It cannot tolerate so vast an area of legal -irresponsibility. - -Even the German Military Code provides that: - - “If the execution of a military order in the course of duty - violates the criminal law, then the superior officer giving the - order will bear the sole responsibility therefor. However, the - obeying subordinate will share the punishment of the - participant: (1) if he has exceeded the order given to him, or - (2) if it was within his knowledge that the order of his - superior officer concerned an act by which it was intended to - commit a civil or military crime or transgression.” - (_Reichsgesetzblatt_, 1926 No. 37, P. 278, Art. 47) - -Of course, we do not argue that the circumstances under which one -commits an act should be disregarded in judging its legal effect. A -conscripted private on a firing squad cannot expect to hold an inquest -on the validity of the execution. The Charter implies common sense -limits to liability just as it places common sense limits upon immunity. -But none of these men before you acted in minor parts. Each of them was -entrusted with broad discretion and exercised great power. Their -responsibility is correspondingly great and may not be shifted to that -fictional being, “the State”, which cannot be produced for trial, cannot -testify, and cannot be sentenced. - -The Charter also recognizes a vicarious liability, which responsibility -is recognized by most modern systems of law, for acts committed by -others in carrying out a common plan or conspiracy to which a defendant -has become a party. I need not discuss the familiar principles of such -liability. Every day in the courts of countries associated in this -prosecution, men are convicted for acts that they did not personally -commit, but for which they were held responsible because of membership -in illegal combinations or plans or conspiracies. - -_The Political, Police, and Military Organizations_: - -Accused before this Tribunal as criminal organizations are certain -political and police organizations which the evidence will show to have -been instruments of cohesion in planning and executing the crimes I have -detailed. Perhaps the worst of the movement were the Leadership Corps of -the NSDAP, the Schutzstaffeln or “SS”, and the Sturmabteilungen or “SA”, -and the subsidiary formations which these include. These were the Nazi -Party leadership, espionage, and policing groups. They were the real -government, above and outside of any law. Also accused as organizations -are the Reich Cabinet and the Secret Police, or Gestapo, which were -fixtures of the Government but animated solely by the Party. - -Except for a late period when some compulsory recruiting was done in the -SS, membership in all these militarized organizations was voluntary. The -police organizations were recruited from ardent partisans who enlisted -blindly to do the dirty work the leaders planned. The Reich Cabinet was -the governmental facade for Nazi Party Government and in its members -legal, as well as actual responsibility was vested for the entire -program. Collectively they were responsible for the program in general, -individually they were especially responsible for segments of it. The -finding which we ask you to make, that these are criminal organizations, -will subject members to punishment to be hereafter determined by -appropriate tribunals, unless some personal defense—such as becoming a -member under threat to person, to family, or inducement by false -representation, or the like—be established. Every member will have a -chance to be heard in the subsequent forum on his personal relation to -the organization, but your finding in this trial will conclusively -establish the criminal character of the organization as a whole. - -We have also accused as criminal organizations the High Command and the -General Staff of the German Armed Forces. We recognize that to plan -warfare is the business of professional soldiers in all countries. But -it is one thing to plan strategic moves in the event war comes, and it -is another thing to plot and intrigue to bring on that war. We will -prove the leaders of the German General Staff and of the High Command to -have been guilty of just that. Military men are not before you because -they served their country. They are here because they mastered it, along -with these others, and drove it to war. They are not here because they -lost the war, but because they started it. Politicians may have thought -of them as soldiers, but soldiers know they were politicians. We ask -that the General Staff and the High Command, as defined in the -Indictment, be condemned as a criminal group whose existence and -tradition constitute a standing menace to the peace of the world. - -These individual defendants did not stand alone in crime and will not -stand alone in punishment. Your verdict of “guilty” against these -organizations will render _prima facie_ guilty, as nearly as we can -learn, thousands upon thousands of members now in custody of United -States forces and of other armies. - -_The responsibility of this Tribunal_: - -To apply the sanctions of the law to those whose conduct is found -criminal by the standards I have outlined, is the responsibility -committed to this Tribunal. It is the first court ever to undertake the -difficult task of overcoming the confusion of many tongues and the -conflicting concepts of just procedure among divers systems of law, so -as to reach a common judgment. The tasks of all of us are such as to -make heavy demands on patience and good will. Although the need for -prompt action has admittedly resulted in imperfect work on the part of -the Prosecution, four great nations bring you their hurriedly assembled -contributions of evidence. What remains undiscovered we can only guess. -We could, with witnesses’ testimony, prolong the recitals of crime for -years—but to what avail. We shall rest the case when we have offered -what seems convincing and adequate proof of the crimes charged without -unnecessary cumulation of evidence. We doubt very much whether it will -be seriously denied that the crimes I have outlined took place. The -effort will undoubtedly be to mitigate or escape personal -responsibility. - -Among the nations which unite in accusing these defendants the United -States is perhaps in a position to be the most dispassionate, for, -having sustained the least injury, it is perhaps the least animated by -vengeance. Our American cities have not been bombed by day and by night, -by humans, and by robots. It is not our temples that had been laid in -ruins. Our countrymen have not had their homes destroyed over their -heads. The menace of Nazi aggression, except to those in actual service, -has seemed less personal and immediate to us than to European peoples. -But while the United States is not first in rancor, it is not second in -determination that the forces of law and order be made equal to the task -of dealing with such international lawlessness as I have recited here. - -Twice in my lifetime, the United States has sent its young manhood -across the Atlantic, drained its resources, and burdened itself with -debt to help defeat Germany. But the real hope and faith that has -sustained the American people in these great efforts was that victory -for ourselves and our Allies would lay the basis for an ordered -international relationship in Europe and would end the centuries of -strife on this embattled continent. - -Twice we have held back in the early stages of European conflict in the -belief that it might be confined to a purely European affair. In the -United States, we have tried to build an economy without armament, a -system of government without militarism, and a society where men are not -regimented for war. This purpose, we know now, can never be realized if -the world periodically is to be embroiled in war. The United States -cannot, generation after generation, throw its youth or its resources on -to the battlefields of Europe to redress the lack of balance between -Germany’s strength and that of her enemies, and to keep the battles from -our shores. - -The American dream of a peace-and-plenty economy, as well as the hopes -of other nations, can never be fulfilled if those nations are involved -in a war every generation so vast and devastating as to crush the -generation that fights and burden the generation that follows. But -experience has shown that wars are no longer local. All modern wars -become world wars eventually. And none of the big nations at least can -stay out. If we cannot stay out of wars, our only hope is to prevent -wars. - -I am too well aware of the weaknesses of juridical action alone to -contend that in itself your decision under this Charter can prevent -future wars. Judicial action always comes after the event. Wars are -started only on the theory and in the confidence that they can be won. -Personal punishment, to be suffered only in the event the war is lost, -will probably not be a sufficient deterrent to prevent a war where the -warmakers feel the chances of defeat to be negligible. - -But the ultimate step in avoiding periodic wars, which are inevitable in -a system of international lawlessness, is to make statesmen responsible -to law. And let me make clear that while this law is first applied -against German aggressors, the law includes, and if it is to serve a -useful purpose it must condemn aggression by any other nations, -including those which sit here now in judgment. We are able to do away -with domestic tyranny and violence and aggression by those in power -against the rights of their own people only when we make all men -answerable to the law. This trial represents mankind’s desperate effort -to apply the discipline of the law to statesmen who have used their -powers of state to attack the foundations of the world’s peace and to -commit aggressions against the rights of their neighbors. - -The usefulness of this effort to do justice is not to be measured by -considering the law or your judgment in isolation. This trial is part of -the great effort to make the peace more secure. One step in this -direction is the United Nations organization, which may take joint -political action to prevent war if possible, and joint military action -to insure that any nation which starts a war will lose it. This Charter -and this Trial, implementing the Kellogg-Briand Pact, constitute another -step in the same direction—juridical action of a kind to ensure that -those who start a war will pay for it personally. - -While the defendants and the prosecutors stand before you as -individuals, it is not the triumph of either group alone that is -committed to your judgment. Above all personalities there are anonymous -and impersonal forces whose conflict makes up much of human history. It -is yours to throw the strength of the law back of either the one or the -other of these forces for at least another generation. What are the real -forces that are contending before you? - -No charity can disguise the fact that the forces which these defendants -represent, the forces that would advantage and delight in their -acquittal, are the darkest and most sinister forces in -society—dictatorship and oppression, malevolence and passion, -militarism and lawlessness. By their fruits we best know them. Their -acts have bathed the world in blood and set civilization back a century. -They have subjected their European neighbors to every outrage and -torture, every spoliation and deprivation that insolence, cruelty, and -greed could inflict. They have brought the German people to the lowest -pitch of wretchedness, from which they can entertain no hope of early -deliverance. They have stirred hatreds and incited domestic violence on -every continent. These are the things that stand in the dock shoulder to -shoulder with these prisoners. - -The real complaining party at your bar is Civilization. In all our -countries it is still a struggling and imperfect thing. It does not -plead that the United States, or any other country, has been blameless -of the conditions which made the German people easy victims to the -blandishments and intimidations of the Nazi conspirators. - -But it points to the dreadful sequence of aggressions and crimes I have -recited, it points to the weariness of flesh, the exhaustion of -resources, and the destruction of all that was beautiful or useful in so -much of the world, and to greater potentialities for destruction in the -days to come. It is not necessary among the ruins of this ancient and -beautiful city with untold members of its civilian inhabitants still -buried in its rubble, to argue the proposition that to start or wage an -aggressive war has the moral qualities of the worst of crimes. The -refuge of the defendants can be only their hope that international law -will lag so far behind the moral sense of mankind that conduct which is -crime in the moral sense must be regarded as innocent in law. - -Civilization asks whether law is so laggard as to be utterly helpless to -deal with crimes of this magnitude by criminals of this order of -importance. It does not expect that you can make war impossible. It does -expect that your juridical action will put the forces of international -law, its precepts, its prohibitions and, most of all, its sanctions, on -the side of peace, so that men and women of good will, in all countries, -may have “leave to live by no man’s leave, underneath the law.” - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will now adjourn until 10 o’clock tomorrow -morning. - - [_The Tribunal adjourned until 22 November 1945 at 1000 hours._] - - - - - THIRD DAY - Thursday, 22 November 1945 - - - _Morning Session_ - -THE PRESIDENT: Before the Chief Prosecutor for the United States -proceeds to present the evidence on Count One, the Tribunal wishes me to -announce the decision on the application made on behalf of the Defendant -Julius Streicher by his counsel that his condition should be examined. -It has been examined by three medical experts on behalf of the Tribunal -and their report has been submitted to and considered by the Tribunal; -and it is as follows: - - “1. The Defendant Julius Streicher is sane. - - “2. The Defendant Julius Streicher is fit to appear before the - Tribunal, and to present his defense. - - “3. It being the unanimous conclusion of the examiners that - Julius Streicher is sane, he is for that reason capable of - understanding the nature and policy of his acts during the - period of time covered by the Indictment.” - -The Tribunal accepts the report of the medical experts and the trial -against Julius Streicher will, therefore, proceed. - -The other matter to which I have to refer is a motion on behalf of -counsel for Bormann, whom the Tribunal have decided to try in his -absence in pursuance of Article 12 of the Charter. Counsel for Bormann -has made a motion that the trial against him should be postponed, but, -in view of the fact that the provisions of the Charter and the -Tribunal’s rules of procedure have been strictly carried out in the -notices which have been given, and the fact that counsel for Bormann -will have ample time before he is called upon to present defense on his -behalf, the motion is denied. - -I will now call upon counsel for the United States to present the -evidence on Count One. - -COL. STOREY: May it please the Tribunal, as the first order of business -concerning the evidence, it shall be my purpose to outline the method of -capturing, assembling, processing, and authenticating documents to be -presented in evidence by the United States. I shall also describe and -illustrate the plan of presenting documents and briefs relating to the -United States’ case-in-chief. - -As the United States Army advanced into German territory, there were -attached to each Army and subordinate organization specialized military -personnel whose duties were to capture and preserve enemy information in -the form of documents, records, reports, and other files. The Germans -kept accurate and voluminous records. They were found in Army -headquarters, Government buildings, and elsewhere. During the later -stages of the war, particularly, such documents were found in salt -mines, buried in the ground, behind false walls, and many other places -believed secure by the Germans. For example, the personal correspondence -and diaries of the Defendant Rosenberg, including his Nazi -correspondence, were found behind a false wall in an old castle in -eastern Bavaria. The records of the OKL, or Luftwaffe, of which the -Defendant Göring was Commander-in-Chief—equivalent to the records of -the Headquarters of the Air Staff of the United States Army Air -Forces—were found in various places in the Bavarian Alps. Most of such -Luftwaffe records were assembled and processed by the Army at -Berchtesgaden. - -When the Army first captured documents and records, they immediately -placed the materials under guard and later assembled them in temporary -document centers. Many times the records were so voluminous that they -were hauled by fleets of Army trucks to document centers. Finally, as -the territory seized was made secure, Army zones were established and -each Army established a fixed document center to which were transported -the assembled documents and records. Later this material was indexed and -cataloged, which was a slow process. - -Beginning last June, Mr. Justice Jackson requested me to direct the -assembling of documentary evidence on the continent for the United -States case. Field teams from our office were organized under the -direction of Major William H. Coogan, who established United States -liaison officers at the main Army document centers. Such officers were -directed to screen and analyze the mass of captured documents, and -select those having evidentiary value for our case. Literally hundreds -of tons of enemy documents and records were screened and examined and -those selected were forwarded to Nuremberg for processing. I now offer -in evidence an affidavit by Major Coogan, dated November 19, 1945, -attached hereto, describing the method of procedure, capture, screening -and delivery of such documents to Nuremberg. (Document Number 001 A-PS, -Exhibit USA-1) - -At this time, if Your Honors please, and in order to present this matter -to the Tribunal, I believe it wise to read at least substantial portions -of this affidavit. It is dated November 19, 1945. - - “I, Major William H. Coogan, 0-455814, Q.M.C., a commissioned - officer of the United States of America, do hereby certify as - follows: - - “1. The United States Chief of Counsel in July 1945 charged the - Field Branch of the Documentation Division with the - responsibility of collecting, evaluating, and assembling - documentary evidence in the European Theater for use in the - prosecution of the major Axis War Criminals before the - International Military Tribunal. I was appointed Chief of the - Field Branch on 20 July 1945. I am now the Chief of the - Documentation Division, Office of United States Chief of - Counsel. - - “2. I have served in the United States Army for more than 4 - years and am a practicing attorney by profession. Based upon my - experience as an attorney and as a United States Army officer, I - am familiar with the operation of the United States Army in - connection with seizing and processing captured enemy documents. - In my capacity as Chief of the Documentation Division, Office of - the United States Chief of Counsel, I am familiar with and have - supervised the processing, filing, translating, and photostating - of all documentary evidence for the United States Chief of - Counsel.” - - I skip to paragraph 4. - - “4. The Field Branch of the Documentation Division was staffed - by personnel thoroughly conversant with the German language. - Their task was to search for and select captured enemy documents - in the European Theater which disclosed information relating to - the prosecution of the major Axis war criminals. Officers under - my command were placed on duty at various document centers and - also dispatched on individual missions to obtain original - documents. When the documents were located, my representatives - made a record of the circumstances under which they were found - and all information available concerning their authenticity was - recorded. Such documents were further identified by Field Branch - pre-trial serial numbers, assigned by my representatives who - would then periodically dispatch the original documents by - courier to the Office of the United States Chief of Counsel. - - “5. Upon receipt of these documents they were duly recorded and - indexed. After this operation, they were delivered to the - Screening and Analysis Branch of the Documentation Division of - the Office of United States Chief of Counsel, which Branch - re-examined the documents in order to finally determine whether - or not they should be retained as evidence for the prosecutors. - This final screening was done by German-speaking analysts on the - staff of the United States Chief of Counsel. When the document - passed the screeners, it was then transmitted to the Document - Room of the Office of United States Chief of Counsel, with a - covering sheet prepared by the screeners showing the title or - nature of the document, the personalities involved, and its - importance. In the Document Room, a trial identification number - was given to each document and to each group of documents, in - cases where it was desirable for the sake of clarity to file - several documents together. - - “6. United States documents were given trial identification - numbers in one of five series designated by the letters: “PS”, - “L”, “R”, “C”, and “EC”, indicating the means of acquisition of - the documents. Within each series documents were listed - numerically. - - “7. After a document was so numbered, it was then sent to a - German-speaking analyst who prepared a summary of the document - with appropriate references to personalities involved, index - headings, information as to the source of the document as - indicated by the Field Branch, and the importance of the - document to a particular phase of the case. Next, the original - document was returned to the Document Room and then checked out - to the Photostating Department, where photostatic copies were - made. Upon return from photostating, it was placed in an - envelope in one of the several fireproof safes in the rear of - the Document Room. One of the photostatic copies of the document - was sent to the translators, thereafter leaving the original - itself in the safe. A commissioned officer has been, and is, - responsible for the documents in the safe. At all times when he - is not present the safe is locked and a military guard is on - duty outside the only door. If the officers preparing the - certified translation, or one of the officers working on the - briefs, found it necessary to examine the original document, - this was done within the Document Room in the section set aside - for that purpose. The only exception to this strict rule has - been where it has been occasionally necessary to present the - original document to Defense Counsel for examination. In this - case, the document was entrusted to a responsible officer of the - Prosecution staff. - - “8. All original documents are now located in safes in the - Document Room, where they will be secured until they are - presented by the Prosecution to the court during the progress of - this Trial. - - “9. Some of the documents which will be offered in evidence by - the United States were seized and processed by the British Army. - Also, personnel from the Office of the United States Chief of - Counsel and the British War Crimes Executive have acted jointly - in locating, seizing and processing such documents. - - “10. Substantially the same system of acquiring documentary - evidence was utilized by the British Army and the British War - Crimes Executive as above set forth with respect to the United - States Army and the Office of the United States Chief of - Counsel. - - “11. Therefore, I certify in my official capacity as hereinabove - stated, to the best of my knowledge and belief, that the - documents captured in the British Zone of Operations and - Occupation, which will be offered in evidence by the United - States Chief of Counsel, have been authenticated, translated, - and processed in substantially the same manner as hereinabove - set forth with respect to the operations of the United States - Chief of Counsel. - - “12. Finally, I certify that all documentary evidence offered by - the United States Chief of Counsel, including those documents - from British Army sources, are in the same condition as captured - by the United States and British Armies; that they have been - translated by competent and qualified translators; that all - photostatic copies are true and correct copies of the originals - and that they have been correctly filed, numbered, and processed - as above outlined.” - - Signed by: “William H. Coogan, Major, QMC, 0-455814.” - -After the documents selected by the screening process outlined reached -our office, they were again examined, re-screened, and translated by -expert U.S. Army personnel, as outlined by Major Coogan. - -Finally, more than 2,500 documents were selected and filed here in this -Court House. At least several hundred will be offered in evidence. They -have been photographed, translated into English, filed, indexed, and -processed. The same general procedure was followed by the British War -Crimes Executive with regard to documents captured by the British Army, -and there has been complete integration and cooperation of activities -with the British in that regard. - -In order to present our case and to assist the Tribunal, we have -prepared written briefs on each phase of our case which cite the -documents by appropriate numbers. Legal propositions of the United -States will also be presented in such briefs. The briefs and documents -will cover each allegation of the Indictment which is the United States’ -responsibility. I hold in my hand one of the trial briefs entitled -“Reshaping of Education, Training of Youth,” which will be offered later -on this day. Accompanying each brief is a document book containing true -copies in English of all documents referred to in the brief. I hold in -my hand the document book that will be submitted to this Tribunal in -support of the brief which I have just exhibited to your Honors. -Likewise, copies in German have been, or will be, furnished to Defense -counsel at the time such documents are offered in evidence. Upon -conclusion of the presentation of each phase or section of our case by -counsel, the entire book of documents will be offered in evidence, such -as this book. At the same time, Lieutenant Barrett who will sit right -here all during the Trial and who is on our staff, will hand to the -clerk of this Tribunal the original documents that may be offered in -evidence in this form. It will have the seal of the Tribunal, will be -Exhibit USA, 2836-PS, and in turn Lieutenant Barrett will hand that -original document to the Tribunal. In the same manner, the document book -will be passed by Lieutenant Barrett to the clerk of the Court, and -these trial briefs for the assistance of the Tribunal will be made -available to the Court and to Defense Counsel. Likewise, copies of -documents actually introduced in evidence will be made available to the -press. Thus, may Your Honors please, it is hoped that by this procedure -the usual laborious and tedious method of introducing documentary -evidence may be expedited. - -May I, therefore, respectfully inquire of the Tribunal and of Defense -counsel if there is any objection to the procedure outlined? If not, the -United States will proceed with the presentation of the documentary and -trial briefs as outlined herein. - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal has no objection to the course that you -propose. - -COL. STOREY: If Your Honors please, may I now announce what will be -presented immediately following by the United States? - -THE PRESIDENT: I think perhaps that I ought to say to counsel for the -defendants that their silence will be taken as their assent to the -course proposed. In the absence of any objection by them to the course -proposed by Colonel Storey on behalf of the Chief Prosecutor for the -United States, the Tribunal will take it that they agree that the course -is convenient. - -Thank you, gentlemen. - -COL. STOREY: If Your Honors please, the next presentation will be the -briefs and documents on the Common Plan or Conspiracy up to 1939. We -will open by presentation of charts of the Nazi Party and Reich -Government with exhibits and explanation by Mr. Albrecht. That will be -followed by a presentation of the trial briefs and documents on the -other phases of the Common Plan or Conspiracy up to 1939. - -RALPH G. ALBRECHT (Associate Trial Counsel for the United States): May -it please the Tribunal, the Prosecution will now allude briefly to -certain facts, which may well be considered to be within judicial -purview, the consideration of which the Prosecution has found useful in -understanding and evaluating the evidence that will be presented in the -course of the Trial, in support of the allegations of the Indictment. - -In the opinion of the Prosecution, some preliminary references must be -made to the National Socialist German Labor Party, the NSDAP, which in -itself is not one of the defendant organizations in this proceeding, but -which is represented among the defendant organizations by its most -important formations, namely the Leadership Corps of the NSDAP, which -you will hear referred to as Das Korps der Politischen Leiter der NSDAP, -the SS (Die Schutzstaffeln der NSDAP), and the SA (Die Sturmabteilungen) -of the Party. - -With the permission of the Tribunal the Prosecution will offer at this -point, as its first exhibit, a chart showing the structure and -organization of the NSDAP, substantially as it existed at the peak of -its development in March 1945. This chart has been prepared by the -Prosecution on the basis of information contained in important and -well-known official publications of the National Socialist Party with -which the defendants must be presumed to have been well acquainted. We -refer particularly to the _Organization Book of the Party_, (_Das -Organisationsbuch der NSDAP_), and to the _National Socialist Year -Book_, (_Nationalsozialistisches Jahrbuch_), of both of which, be it -noted, the late Defendant Robert Ley was the chief editor or publisher. -Both books appeared, in the course of time, in many editions and in -hundreds of thousands of copies, throughout the period when the National -Socialist Party was in control of the German Reich and of the German -people. The chart, furthermore, which we are offering has been certified -on its face as correct by a high official of the Nazi Party, namely -Franz Xaver Schwarz, its treasurer (Reichsschatzmeister der NSDAP) and -its official in charge of Party administration; and his affidavit is -being submitted with the chart, and I now wish to offer this chart in -evidence. (Document Number 2903-PS, Exhibit USA-2.) - -We have been able to have this chart duplicated, and, with the -permission of the Tribunal, we are making it available to all concerned. - -Before I offer some remarks of explanation concerning the organization -of the National Socialist German Labor Party, which, we believe, will be -found useful in connection with the Prosecution’s case, I would just -like to call the attention of the Tribunal to the fact that the larger -chart which now appears is a simplification of the duplicated chart -which Your Honors have been furnished. For if it had been reproduced in -the same detail, I am afraid many of the boxes would not have appeared -intelligible from this point. - -I would like to call your attention first of all to an organization with -which we will have to become very familiar: the Leadership Corps of the -NSDAP, (the Reichsleiter), which has been named as a defendant -organization and which comprises the sum of the officials and leaders of -the Nazi Party. If Your Honors will be good enough to follow me down the -center line of the chart, we come to the main horizontal line of -division where the word “Reichsleiter” appears. That is the first -category of the Leadership Corps, I should say, the main category, -perhaps, of the Leadership Corps. - -The Führer, of course, stands above it. As we follow the vertical line -of division to the lower part of the chart, we reach five additional -boxes, which may be referred to collectively as the Hoheitsträger, the -bearers of the sovereignty of the Party, and those, are the Gauleiter, -the Kreisleiter, the Ortsgruppenleiter, the Zellenleiter, and the -Blockleiter. - -The Führer at the top of our chart is the supreme and the only leader in -the Nazi hierarchy. His successor-designate was first the Defendant Hess -and subsequently the Defendant Göring. - -The Reichsleiter, of whom 16 are shown on this chart, comprise -collectively the Party Directorate (Reichsleitung). Through them, -coordination of the Party and State machinery was achieved. A number of -these Reichsleiter, each of whom, at some time, was in charge of at -least one office within the Party Directorate, were also the heads of -other Party formations and affiliated and supervised organizations of -the Party and also of agencies of the State, and they even held -ministerial positions. The Reichsleitung may be said to represent the -horizontal organization of the Party according to functions, within -which all threads controlling the varied life of the German people met. -Each office within the Reichsleitung of the NSDAP executed definite -tasks assigned to it by the Führer, or by the leader of the Party -Chancellery (Chef der Parteikanzlei), who on the chart before you -appears directly under the Führer. - -In 1945 the chief of the Party Chancellery was Martin Bormann, the -defendant in this proceeding, and before him, and until his flight to -England in 1941, the Defendant Rudolf Hess. It was the duty of the -Reichsleitung to make certain that these tasks assigned to it by the -Führer were carried out with expedition and without interruption, in -order that the will of the Führer quickly and rapidly was communicated -to the lowest Party echelon, the lowliest Zelle or Block. The individual -offices of the Reichsleitung had the mission to remain in constant and -closest contact with the life of the people through the agency of the -subdivisions of the component Party organizations in the Gaue, within -the Kreis, or the Ort or the lower group. These leaders had been taught -that the right to organize human beings accrued through the appreciation -of the fact that a people must be educated ideologically; -“weltanschaulich”, the Germans call it, that is to say, according to the -philosophy of National Socialism. - -Among the Reichsleiter, on trial in this cause, may be included the -following defendants: - -If Your Honors will follow me to this broad, horizontal line, we start -at the extreme left at the box marked with the Defendant Frank’s name. -At one time, although not in March 1945, he was the head of the Legal -Office of the Party. He was the Reichsleiter des Reichsrechtsamtes. - -In the third square appears the Defendant Rosenberg, the delegate of the -Führer for Ideological Training and Education of the Party. He was -called “Der Beauftragte des Führers für die Überwachung der gesamten -geistigen und weltanschaulichen Schulung der NSDAP.” Next to him, to the -right, is the Defendant Von Schirach, leader of youth education, (Leiter -für die Jugenderziehung). Next to him, appears the late Defendant Robert -Ley, at one time head of the Party Organization -(Reichsorganisationsleiter der NSDAP) and also the leader of the German -Labor Front, the DAF (Leiter der Deutschen Arbeitsfront). - -Then, if we cross the vertical line, and proceed to the right—in -passing I might allude to the box marked with the name of Schwarz. He -was the Party official and Reichsleiter, who certified to the chart -before the Tribunal. - -As we proceed further to the right, next to the last box, we find the -name of the Defendant Frick, who was the leader of the Reichstag -fraction (Leiter der NS Reichstagsfraktion). - -The next categories to be considered are the Hoheitsträger, at the -bottom of the vertical line, in the center of the chart. The National -Socialists called them the bearers of sovereignty. To them was assigned -the political sovereignty over specially designated subdivisions of the -State, of which they were the appointed leaders. The Hoheitsträger may -be said to represent the vertical organization of the Party. - -These leaders, these Hoheitsträger included all Gauleiter, of whom there -were 42 within the Reich in 1945. A Gauleiter was a political leader of -the largest subdivision of the State. He was charged by the Führer with -the political, cultural, and economic control over all forms and -manifestations of the life of the people and the coordination of the -same with National Socialist philosophy and ideology. - -A number of the defendants before the bar of this Tribunal were former -Gauleiter of the NSDAP. I mention, in this connection, the Defendant -Streicher, Gauleiter of Franconia, “Franken-Führer” they called him, -whose seat was in the city of Nuremberg. Von Schirach was Gauleiter of -Vienna and the Defendant Sauckel was Gauleiter of Thuringia. - -The next lower category on the chart were the Kreisleiter, the political -leaders of the largest subdivision within a Gau. Then follow the -Ortsgruppenleiter, the political leaders of the largest subdivision -within the Kreis. And a Kreis consisted perhaps of several towns or -villages or, in the case of a larger city, anywhere from 1,500 to 3,000 -households. - -The next Hoheitsträger were the Zellenleiter, the political leaders of a -group from four to eight city blocks, or of a corresponding group within -country districts, and then follow the Blockleiter, the political -leaders of from 40 to 60 households. - -Now, each of these political leaders, of these Hoheitsträger, or bearers -of sovereignty, was directly responsible to the next highest leader in -the Nazi hierarchy. The Gauleiter was directly responsible to the Führer -himself; the Kreisleiter was directly responsible to the Gauleiter, the -Ortsgruppenleiter to the Kreisleiter, and so on. - -The Führer himself reserved to himself, in accordance with the -philosophy that runs through the Party, the right to name all Führer. It -was he, personally, that named the Reichsleiter, all members of the -Party Directorate. It was he that appointed all Gauleiter and -Kreisleiter and all political leaders, down to the grade of -Gauamtsleiter, which was a lower classification of political leader -within the Party organization of the Gau. - -These Hoheitsträger, together with the Reichsleitung, constituted the -all-powerful group of leaders by means of which the Nazi Party reached -right down into the lives of the people, consolidated its control of -them and compelled them to conform to the National Socialist pattern. -For this purpose broad powers were given to them, including the right to -call upon all Party formations to effectuate their plans. They could -requisition the services of the SA and of the SS, as well as of the HJ -and of the NSKK. If I may direct your attention, for the moment, to the -Party organizations that appear at the extreme left of the chart, I -would just like to say that structurally these organizations were -organized regionally to accord with the offices and regions controlled -by the Hoheitsträger. If I might be more explicit, let us take the SA. -The subsidiary formations of the SA came down and corresponded, in its -lower organizations, to the Gau, so that we have a Gauleitung in the SA, -and further down, to the Kreis, so that we have a Kreisleitung in the -SA, so that the Gauleiter and the Kreisleiter, to cite two examples, -charged with a particular duty by the Führer, could call on these -organizations for assistance in carrying out their tasks. - -These sinister implications of the use of this power will become more -apparent as the Prosecution’s case develops, and as the wealth of -evidentiary material is introduced into evidence to prove the -criminality of the defendant organizations. - -The component Party-organizations, called “Gliederungen” within the -Party, are shown at the extreme left of the chart, and are the -organizations to which I directed the attention of Your Honors a moment -ago. These organizations actually constitute the Party itself, and -substantially the entire Party-membership is contained within these -organizations. The four principal organizations are sometimes referred -to as “para-military” organizations. They were uniformed organizations -and they were armed. These organizations were the notorious SA and SS, -which are named as party-defendants in this case, the HJ (Hitler Youth), -and the NSKK—the Motor Corps of the Party (Kraftfahrkorps). Then there -were also the National Socialist Women’s Organization, the National -Socialist German Students’ Bund (Nationalsozialistischer Deutscher -Studentenbund), and the National Socialist University Teachers’ -Organization (Nationalsozialistischer Dozentenbund). - -There are additional organizations that were officially designated -within the Party, as affiliated organizations, not Gliederungen or -controlled organizations, but affiliated organizations (Angeschlossene -Verbände der NSDAP). Among those organizations we have the German Labor -Front (Deutsche Arbeitsfront)—the DAF; we have an organization that -controlled the civil service (Reichsbund der Deutschen Beamten). There -were the physicians within the National Socialist Deutscher Ärztebund; -there were the teachers in the National Socialist Lehrerbund; there were -the lawyers within the National Socialist Rechtswahrerbund, of which, at -one time, the Defendant Frank was the head. - -There is another group of organizations which was officially known as -supervised organizations (Betreute Organisationen der NSDAP), -organizations that included certain specialized women’s organizations -(Deutsches Frauenwerk), certain student societies -(Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Studentenschaft), former university -students (Altherrenbund der Deutschen Studenten). There was a group that -had reference to the German communes (Nationalsozialistischer Deutscher -Gemeindetag), and there was a Reichsbund für Leibesübungen that -interested itself in controlling all those interested in physical -exercise. - -According to the official Party designations applicable to the various -organizations and associations that controlled German life there was a -fourth category, which is the last organization that appears to the -right on the chart before Your Honors, which is sometimes simply called -“Weitere Nationalsozialistische Organisationen”, and here, in some -respects, we are in “No man’s land”, because the Party was not static, -it was dynamic and our latest information is now to the effect that the -organizations that ordinarily came within this category, well-known -organizations like the RAD (Reich Labor Service) and the NSFK (the -National Socialist Fliegerkorps) or Flying Corps may no longer be -included there. At least that was the opinion of the Party treasurer, -who certified to this chart. - -I think with these few remarks, I have given some general impression of -the structure of the Party, with which we are dealing in this proceeding -before Your Honors. - -Before leaving the chart, perhaps I would just like to point out several -other instances where some of the defendants appear in this set-up. - -At the very top, to the left of the Führer, as marked on the chart -before Your Honors, are the successors-designate of the Führer. First is -the Defendant Hess, until 1941, and followed by the Defendant Göring. -Under the Führer appears the chief of the Party Chancellery, the -Defendant Martin Bormann, and then, if we come to the level of the -Reichsleiter, and go to the left, opposite Rosenberg’s name, we find -that somewhat below that his name is repeated as the head of an office -on a lower level, namely, the Foreign Relations Office of the Party, -which played such a sinister influence in the early work of the Party, -as will later appear in the documentary evidence to be presented to Your -Honors. - -We then come to the late Defendant Ley’s name, on the main horizontal -division, and follow the dotted line to a lower level, and we will find -he was the chief of the German Labor Front, and if we come closer to the -vertical line, to a lower level, below the Reichsleitung, we find the -Defendant Speer in the Hauptamt für Technik (the Office of Technical -Affairs), and below that as the chief of the Bund Deutscher Technik -(German Technological League). - -With the permission of the Tribunal, the Prosecution will now pass to -the consideration of the governmental machinery of the German State, -which, like the organization of the Nazi Party, requires some brief -observations before the Prosecution proceeds with the submission of -proof on the Common Plan of Conspiracy, with which the defendants have -been charged. - -If the Tribunal will allow, the Prosecution will offer as its second -exhibit, another chart, delineating substantially the governmental -structure of the Reich Government as it existed in March 1945, and also -the chief Leadership Corps of the Reich Government and the Reich -Administration during those years. (Document Number 2905-PS, Exhibit -USA-3) - -This chart has been prepared by the Prosecution on the basis of -information contained in two official publications, _Das Taschenbuch für -Verwaltungsbeamte_, (_the Manual for Administrative Officers_) and the -_National Sozialistisches Jahrbuch_, to which I have already alluded, -edited by the Defendant Ley. - -This chart has been examined, corrected, and certified by the Defendant -Wilhelm Frick, whose affidavit is submitted with the chart. In fact, it -is reproduced directly on the copies of the charts before Your Honors. - -It seems plain that the Defendant Frick, a former Minister of Interior -of the Reich from January 1933 to August 1943, was well qualified, by -reason of his position and long service in public office during the -National Socialist regime, to certify to the substantial accuracy of the -facts disclosed in this chart. - -Now, with the permission of the Tribunal, I would like to make some -brief comments on this chart. - -First of all, we refer to the Reichsregierung, which is the big box in -the center of the chart on the vertical line, directly below Hitler. The -Reichsregierung is a word that may not be translated literally as -“government of the Reich.” The word “Reichsregierung” is a word of art -and is applied collectively to the ministers who composed the German -Cabinet. - -The Reichsregierung has been named as a defendant in this proceeding, -and as used in the Indictment the expression “Reichsregierung” -identifies a group which, we will urge, should be declared to have been -a criminal organization. - -This group includes all the men named in that center box, who were -members of the Cabinet after 30 January 1933, that is, Reich ministers -with and without portfolio, and all other officials entitled to -participate in the deliberations of the Cabinet. - -Secondly, it includes members of the Counsel of Ministers for the -Defense of the Reich. It is called “Ministerrat für die -Reichsverteidigung”, which is the large box to the right of the vertical -line. - -Then, it includes the members of the Secret Cabinet Council, which is -the small box to the left of the vertical line, the Geheimer -Kabinettsrat, of which the Defendant Von Neurath was the President. - -Unlike the Cabinets and Ministerial Councils in countries that were not -within the orbit of the Axis, the Reichsregierung, after 30 January, -1933 when Adolf Hitler became Chancellor of the German Reich, did not -remain merely the executive branch of the Government. In short order it -also came to be possessed, and it exercised legislative, and other -functions as well, in the governmental system into which the German -Government developed while under the domination of the National -Socialist Party. - -It is proper to observe here that unlike such Party organizations as the -SA and SS, the Reichsregierung, before 1933, certainly, was not a body -created exclusively or even predominantly for the purpose of committing -illegal acts. The Reichsregierung was an instrument of government -provided for by the Weimar constitution. Under the Nazi regime, however, -the Reichsregierung gradually became a primary agent of the Party, with -functions formulated in accordance with the objectives and methods of -the Party itself. The Party to all intents and purposes, was intended to -be a Führerorden, an order of Führer, a pool of political leaders. And -while the Party was, in the words of a German law, “the bearer of the -concept of the German State,” it was not identical with the State. - -Thus, in order to realize its ideological and political objectives and -to reach the German people, the Party had to avail itself of official -state channels. - -The Reichsregierung, and such agencies and offices established by it, -were the chosen instruments, by means of which the Party policies were -converted into legislative and administrative acts, binding upon the -German people as a whole. - -In order to accomplish this result, the Reichsregierung was thoroughly -remodelled by the Party. Some of the steps may be here recorded, by -which the coordination of Party and State machinery was assured in order -to impose the will of the Führer on the German people. - -On January 30, 1933, the date that the Führer became Reich Chancellor, -there were few National Socialists that were Cabinet members. But, as -the power of the Party in the Reich grew, the Cabinet came to include an -ever increasing number of Nazis, until by January 1937 no non-Party -member remained in the Reichsregierung. New cabinet-posts were created -and Nazis appointed to them. Many of these cabinet members were also in -the Reichsleitung of the Party. - -To give but a few examples: - -The Defendant Rosenberg, whose name Your Honors will find in that -central box on the vertical line, the delegate of the Führer for -Ideological Training and Education of the Party, was a member of the -Reichsregierung in his capacity as Minister for the Occupied Eastern -Areas, the Reichsminister für die besetzten Ostgebiete. - -And if Your Honors will follow me on the vertical line to the main -horizontal line and proceed to the very end, you will find a box marked -“Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories”, of which the head was -the Defendant Rosenberg. - -The Defendant Frick, the leader of the National Socialist fraction in -the Reichstag, was also Minister of the Interior. - -If Your Honors will follow me down to the main horizontal line and two -boxes over you will find the Ministry presided over by the Defendant -Frick. Goebbels, the Reichsleiter für Propaganda, also sat in the -Cabinet as Minister for Public Enlightenment and Propaganda -(Reichsminister für Volksaufklärung und Propaganda). He is in the next -box to the right from the Ministry of the Interior. - -After the 25th of July 1934 Party participation in the work of the -Cabinet was at all times achieved through the person of the Defendant -Rudolf Hess, the deputy of the Führer. By a decree of Hitler the -Defendant Hess was invested with the power to take part in the editing -of legislative bills with all the departments of the Reich. Later this -power of the Führer’s deputy was expanded to include all executive -decisions and orders that were published in the _Reichsgesetzblatt_, the -official volume in which are contained the decrees of the State. After -Hess’s flight to England in 1941, the Defendant Martin Bormann, as his -successor, took over the same functions, and in addition he was given -the authority of a Reichsminister so that he could sit in the Cabinet. - -Now, another item of importance: - -On the 30th of January 1937, four years after Hitler became Chancellor, -the Führer executed the acceptances into the Party of those last few -Cabinet members who still remained out of the Party. Only one Cabinet -member had the strength of character to reject membership in the Party. -That was the Minister of Transportation and Minister of Posts, Mr. -Eltz-Rübenach. His example was not followed by the Defendant Von -Neurath. His example was not followed by the Defendant Raeder. And if -the Defendant Schacht was not yet at that time a member of the Party, I -might say that his example was not followed by the Defendant Schacht. - -The chart shows many other instances where Party members on the highest, -as well as subordinate levels, occupied corresponding or other positions -in the organization of the State. Take Hitler himself. The Führer of the -NSDAP was also the Chancellor of the Reich, with which office, -furthermore, the office of President of the Reich was joined and merged -after the death of President Von Hindenburg in 1934. - -Take the Defendant Göring, the successor-designate of Hitler. As Führer -of the SA, he sat in the Cabinet as Air Minister (Luftfahrtminister) and -he also held many other important positions, including that of -Commander-in-Chief of the Luftwaffe (the German Air Force) and that of -Delegate for the Four Year Plan. - -Himmler, the notorious head of the SS, the Reichsführer SS, was also the -chief of the German Police, reporting to the Defendant Frick. He himself -later became Minister of the Interior after the attempted assassination -of Hitler on June 20, 1944, which event also catapulted him into the -position of Commander-in-Chief of the German Reserve Army. - -Now, at the extreme upper left of the chart is a small box that is -labeled “Reichstag” (the former German parliament). - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn for 10 minutes, and 10 minutes -only. - - [_A recess was taken._] - -MR. ALBRECHT: The Reichstag presents an anomaly in this picture. Under -the republic it had been the supreme law-making body of the Reich, -subject only to a limited check by the Reichsrat (the Council of the -Reich), by the President, and by the people themselves by way of -initiative and referendum. - -Putting their opposition to all forms of Parliamentarianism into effect -at once, the Nazis proceeded to curtail the powers of the Reichstag, to -eliminate the Reichsrat, and to merge the Presidency with the Office of -Chancellor occupied by the Führer. By the Act of 24th of March 1933 the -Cabinet was given unlimited legislative powers, including the right to -deviate from the constitution. Subsequently, as I stated, the Reichsrat -was abolished, and with that act the residuum of the power to legislate -in the Reichstag was reduced to a minimum. I say the power was reduced -to a minimum because the actual power to legislate was never taken away -from the Reichstag, but certainly after the advent of the Party to power -it was never permitted to exercise as a legislature. - -The Reichsregierung retained its legislative powers throughout, even -though from time to time other agencies of the Reichsregierung, such as -the Plenipotentiary for Administration, in the upper right of the chart, -(the Generalbevollmächtigter für die Reichsverwaltung), the -Plenipotentiary for Economy, also in the right-hand corner of the chart, -(the Generalbevollmächtigter für die Wirtschaft), and the Council of -Ministers for the Defense of the Reich, were created. That is the big -box to the right of the vertical line. And these agencies of the -Reichsregierung received certain concurrent legislative powers. - -The development of the Reichstag into an emasculated legislative body -was, however, only an intermediate step on the road to rule by Führer -decrees. That was the ultimate goal of the Party, and a goal which they -achieved. - -The Nazis then proceeded to delegate some of the powers of the Reich -Cabinet to all sorts of newly created agencies, some of which I have -already mentioned. Cabinet functions were delegated first of all to the -Reich Defense Council, the Reichsverteidigungsrat, possibly as early as -the 4th of April 1933, but we believe certainly not later than 1935. I -might say in this connection that with respect to a number of these -agencies of the Reichsregierung which received delegated powers, we are -moving in a somewhat shadowy land, because in developing this -organization we are dealing—to some extent, at least—with decrees and -actions that were secret, or secretive, in character. - -A number of these decrees were never definitely fixed in time. A number -of them were never published and the German people themselves never -became acquainted with them. And that is why I say that the Reich -Defense Council may possibly have been created as early as two and -one-half months after the advent of Hitler to power but we believe that -we will be able to show to the satisfaction of the Tribunal that that -important body in the Government of the Reich was created certainly not -later than May 1935. - -I say it is an important body. This was the war-planning group, of which -Hitler himself was chairman and the Defendant Göring the alternate. It -was a large war-planning body, as Your Honors will note, that included -many Cabinet members, and there was also a working committee—the true -numerical size of which does not appear from the chart—which was -presided over by the Defendant Keitel. That also was composed of Cabinet -members and of Reich defense officials, the majority of whom were -appointed by Cabinet officers and subject to their control. Other powers -were delegated to the Plenipotentiary, whom I have named before, for -Administration, appearing at the extreme right of the chart. That was -the Defendant Frick, and later the notorious Himmler. - -Subordinate to Frick in his capacity as Plenipotentiary for -Administration were complete ministries, the Ministry of the Interior -(Frick’s old ministry), Ministry of Justice, Education, Church Affairs, -and Raumordnung (the Ministry for Special Planning). - -Other powers went to the delegate for the Four Year Plan, again the -Defendant Göring, whose box appears to the left of the median line, half -way to the edge. - -There were certain other powers that went to an organization within the -shadow-land I mentioned, and which, unfortunately, does not have its -name appear on this chart, the Dreierkollegium (the College of Three), -which title should really be imposed over the last three boxes in the -upper right hand corner; because the Dreierkollegium consisted not alone -of the Plenipotentiary for Administration, but also the Plenipotentiary -for War Economy, and the chairman of that group who, I believe, was the -Defendant Keitel, as the head of the OKW, the Wehrmacht, all the armed -forces. The duties of the Dreierkollegium would seem to have included -the drafting of decrees in preparation of and for use during war. To the -Secret Cabinet Council, the Geheimer Kabinettsrat, of which the -Defendant Von Neurath was chairman,—or President, I believe was his -title, went other powers. That Secret Cabinet Council was created by a -decree of the Führer in 1938. - -Certain other delegation of power took place to the Ministerrat für die -Reichsverteidigung (the Ministerial Council for the Defense of the -Realm), which is the smallest box appearing under the large box of the -Reich Defense Council, to the right of the vertical line. - -The Council of Ministers for the Defense of the Reich was responsible to -the Führer alone. Its membership, as would seem to be indicated on the -chart, was taken from the Reich Defense Council. It had broad powers to -issue decrees with the force of law in so far as the Reichsregierung -itself had not legislated on the subject. - -It should be stressed that this delegation of Cabinet functions to -various groups, composed largely of its own members, helped to conceal -some of the important policies of the Reichsregierung, namely, those -relating to the preparation of war, which delegated the necessary -authority to secret and semi-secret agencies. Thus in a general way, as -I have outlined, did the National Socialist Party succeed in putting -Nazi policies into effect through its dummy, through the machinery of -the State, the Reichsregierung, in its revised form. - -I think it might be helpful if Your Honors will permit me to point out -on this chart the large number of instances in which the defendants’ -names reappear in connection with the functions of the Government of the -Reich. - -Now, first of all, the Reichsregierung itself—I am sorry to say in that -connection that there is one omission, a very important omission. It is -the name of the Vice Chancellor under Hitler, Von Papen, who was Vice -Chancellor from the seizure of power until some time around the purge in -June 1934. - -Your Honors will see a grouping of Reich Ministers with portfolio, and -under it of Ministers without portfolio, in which mostly the names of -the defendants in court are listed. There are State Ministers listed -acting as Reich Ministers, and you will note the name of the Defendant -Frank. There are other participants in Cabinet meetings, among which you -will notice the name of the Defendant Von Schirach. - -Now, this whole line on which the Cabinet hangs is the level of the -Reich Cabinet, and as I have stated, organizations that grew out of this -maternal organism, the Reichsregierung. - -To the left the Secret Cabinet Council includes the names of the -defendants. Still further to the left is the delegate for the Four Year -Plan. And over to the very end is the Reichstag, of which the President -was the Defendant Göring, and the leader of the Reichstagsfraktion, the -Defendant Frick. - -If we proceed to the right of the median line, we have the Reich Defense -Council, with Hitler himself as chairman, the Reich Defense Committee -under it, and the Ministerial Council for the Defense of the Realm, -which grew out of the Reich Defense Council. And we see mostly the names -of Cabinet ministers, including, if I may advert to that fact, -particularly the names of purely military leaders, such as the Defendant -Raeder and the Defendant Keitel. - -And farther to the right, all names mentioned as defendants in these -proceedings, Schacht, the first Plenipotentiary for War Economy, later -succeeded by Funk; Field Marshal Keitel as the Chief of the OKW, and the -Defendant Frick again as Plenipotentiary for Administration, in the -triangle which became known as the “Dreierkollegium.” - -If we descend the vertical line to the horizontal line in the middle, we -have the various ministries over which these Cabinet ministers, this -Reichsregierung, presided. We have also at the extreme left and the -extreme right, very important and special offices that were set up at -the instigation of the Party, and those offices reported directly to the -Führer himself. - -If I may start at the extreme left, I will point out that as the civil -government moved after the military machine into the lowlands, the -Defendant Seyss-Inquart became the Reichskommissar for the Netherlands. - -A few names below that of Seyss-Inquart is the name of the Defendant Von -Neurath, the Reichsprotektor for Bohemia and Moravia, who was later -succeeded by the Defendant Frick; and under those names, the name of the -Defendant Frank, the General-gouverneur of Poland. - -Adjoining the box of these administrators who reported directly to the -Reich Chancellor and President was the Foreign Office, presided over -first by the Defendant Von Neurath, and subsequently by the Defendant -Von Ribbentrop. - -If we proceed down below the elongation under the smaller box dealing -with German legations, there should, of course, in any itemized, -detailed treatment of that box appear the name of the Defendant Von -Papen, the representative of the Reich in Austria for a time, and later -in Turkey. - -The next box on the horizontal line is the Ministry of Economics, (the -Reichswirtschaftsministerium). First is the name of the Defendant -Schacht, followed by the name of the Defendant Göring, and by the name -of the Defendant Funk. - -The next box, the Ministry for Armament and War Production (the -Reichsministerium für Rüstung und Kriegsproduktion), was presided over -by the Defendant Speer. And out of this organization, and subordinate to -it, in the box devoted to the Organization Todt, again the name of the -Defendant Speer, who succeeded Todt to the leadership of that -organization upon the death of Todt. - -Two boxes over, the Ministry of Justice, if Your Honors will follow me, -down close to the bottom of the page to the last left-hand box, -appearing under the Ministry of Justice, is the -Reichsrechtsanwaltskammer—I am sorry, the box next to the bottom at the -left which is devoted to the Academy for German Law (Die Akademie für -deutsches Recht), over which the Defendant Frank presided for a time. - -Almost at the vertical line, the Air Ministry, of which the Defendant -Göring was Oberkommandant; and next to it again the Ministry of the -Interior, presided over by the Defendant Frick. - -If Your Honors will follow me again to the bottom of all the squares to -the small horizontal line at the bottom of the Ministry of the Interior, -we come to certain state officials, called “Reich Governors” -(Reichsstatthalter). And if those boxes were sufficiently detailed there -would appear thereon the names, among others, of the Defendant Sauckel, -who besides being the Gauleiter of Thuringia, was also the -Reichsstatthalter or Governor there. There would also appear the name of -the Defendant Von Schirach, who was not only the Gauleiter of Vienna, -but also the State representative there—the Governor—the -Reichsstatthalter of Vienna. - -And springing out of the Ministry of the Interior is the box or boxes -devoted to the German police, and in the first sub-division appearing to -the right, the Chief of the Security Police and SD, the name of the -Defendant Kaltenbrunner. - -In the Ministry of Propaganda, about midway down in this box, appears -the name of the Defendant Fritzsche, who, although as the chart is -drawn, would not appear in the position of one of the chief directing -heads of the Ministry, actually was very much more important than his -position there will indicate; and proof will be submitted to Your Honors -in support of that contention. - -At the end of the horizontal line is the Ministry for the Occupied -Eastern Territories (the Reichsministerium für die Besetzten Ostgebiete) -of which the Defendant Rosenberg was the head. - -And to the right of that box, among the agencies immediately subordinate -to Hitler as Reichskanzler and President, there is the office of General -Inspector for Highways, with the name of the Defendant Speer associated -with it; the General Inspector for Water and Energy, again with the name -of the Defendant Speer associated with it. - -There follows the Reich Office for Forestry (the Reichsforstamt) under -the Defendant Göring; the Reichsjugendführer (the leader of the Reich -Youth), the Defendant Von Schirach; the Reich Housing Commissioner -(Reichswohnungskommissar), the late Defendant Robert Ley; and among the -subsequent agencies, that of the important Reichsbank, over which the -Defendant Schacht presided, to be succeeded subsequently by the -Defendant Funk; the General Inspector for the Reich Capital -(Generalbauinspekteur für die Reichshauptstadt), the Defendant Speer. - -I think I have named all of the defendants as they appear on this chart, -and of those now before Your Honors in this cause I think they all -appear on this chart in one capacity or another, in one or more -capacities,—all, I might add, except the Defendant Jodl. Jodl was the -Chief of Staff of all the Armed Forces. He was the head of the Wehrmacht -Führungsstab, and in the chart as evidential material which will be -subsequently brought before Your Honors, the name Jodl will figure -prominently in connection with the organization of the Armed Forces. - -If I may make one correction at this point, a slip of the tongue that -was called to my attention, in discussing the chart of the Party, in the -small box to the left containing the designates of the Führer to succeed -him to the Party leadership, I made the statement that Göring succeeded -Hess as Führer-designate. Actually, when the designations were announced -by the Führer, Göring was always the first designate, and the Defendant -Hess the second. - -In Annex A of the Indictment the various offices, Party functions, and -State offices which these defendants held in the course of the period -under discussion, these various offices are mentioned. And we would like -to submit at this time and offer into evidence as exhibits proof of the -offices that were occupied by these defendants. This proof consists of -17 statements, more or less, signed by the defendants themselves and/or -their counsel, certifying to the Party and State offices that they have -held from time to time. Some of these statements were not as complete as -we desired to have them, and we have appended thereto a statement -showing such additional offices or proof of Party membership as was -available to us. I would like to offer those into evidence. - -MR. ALBRECHT: And now, if Your Honors please, I offer into evidence the -two charts to which my remarks have been addressed in the course of the -morning. - -THE PRESIDENT: Will counsel for the United States continue the evidence -until half past 12? - -COL. STOREY: If Your Honor please, it lacks 2 minutes until half past -12. Mr. Albrecht has finished, and will it be convenient for Your Honors -for Major Wallis to start at 2 o’clock? - -THE PRESIDENT: Very well. - - [_The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours._] - - - - - _Afternoon Session_ - -COL. STOREY: If the Tribunal please, Major Frank Wallis will now present -the briefs and documents supporting the briefs in behalf of the phase of -the case known as the Common Plan or Conspiracy, up through 1939. - -Major Wallis. - -MAJOR FRANK B. WALLIS (Assistant Trial Counsel for the United States): -Mr. President, members of the Tribunal: - -It will be my purpose to establish most of the material allegations of -the Indictment running from Paragraph IV on Page 3, to Subparagraph E on -Page 6. The subjects involved are: - -The aims of the Nazi Party, their doctrinal techniques, their rise to -power, and the consolidation of control over Germany between 1933 and -1939 in preparation for aggressive war. - -This story has already been sketched by the American Chief Prosecutor. -Moreover, it is history, beyond challenge by the defendants. For the -most part, we rely upon the Tribunal to take judicial notice of it. What -we offer is merely illustrative material—including statements by the -defendants and other Nazi leaders—laws, decrees, and the like. We do -not need to rest upon captured documents or other special sources, -although some have been used. - -For the convenience of the court and Defense counsel, the illustrative -material has been put together in document books, and the arguments -derived from them have been set out in trial briefs. - -I intend only to comment briefly on some of the materials and to -summarize the main lines of the briefs. - -What is the charge in Count One? - -The charge in Count One is that the defendants, with divers other -persons, participated in the formulation or execution of a Common Plan -or Conspiracy to commit, or which involved the commission of Crimes -against Humanity (both within and without Germany), War Crimes, and -Crimes against Peace. - -The charge is, further, that the instrument of cohesion among the -defendants, as well as an instrument for the execution of the purposes -of the conspiracy, was the Nazi Party, of which each defendant was a -member or to which he became an adherent. - -The scope of the proof which I shall offer is: - -First, that the Nazi Party set for itself certain aims and objectives, -involving basically the acquisition of “Lebensraum”, or living space, -for all “racial” Germans. - -Second, that it was committed to the use of any methods, whether or not -legal, in attaining these objectives, and that it did in fact use -illegal methods. - -Third, that it put forward and disseminated various lines of propaganda, -and used various propaganda techniques to assist it in its unprincipled -rise to power. - -Fourth, that it ultimately did seize all governmental power in Germany. - -Fifth, that it used this power to complete the political conquest of the -State, to crush all opposition, and to prepare the nation -psychologically and otherwise for the foreign aggression upon which it -was bent from the outset. - -In general we undertake to outline, so far as relevant to the charge, -what happened in Germany during the pre-war period, leaving it to others -to carry the story and proof through the war years. - -The aims of this conspiracy were open and notorious. It was far -different from any other conspiracy ever unfolded before a court of -justice, not only because of the gigantic number of people involved, the -period of time covered, the magnitude and audacity of it, but because, -unlike other criminal conspirators, these conspirators often boastfully -proclaimed to the world what they planned to do, before they did it. - -As an illustration, Hitler, in his speech of 30 January 1941, said: - - “My program was to abolish the Versailles Treaty. It is futile - nonsense for the rest of the world to pretend today that I did - not reveal this program until 1933 or 1935 or 1937. Instead of - listening to the foolish chatter of emigres, these gentlemen - would have been wiser to read what I have written thousands of - times. No human being has declared or recorded what he wanted - more than I. Again and again I wrote these words, ‘The abolition - of the Treaty of Versailles’.” - -First, a brief reference to the history of the Nazi Party. - -The Court will no doubt recollect that the National Socialist Party had -its origin in the German Labor Party, which was founded on 5 January -1919 in Munich. It was this organization which Hitler joined as seventh -member on 12 September 1919. At a meeting of the German Labor Party held -on 24 February 1920, Hitler announced to the world the “25 Theses” that -subsequently became known as the “unalterable” program of the National -Socialist German Workers Party. - -A few days later, on 4 March 1920, the name of the German Labor Party -was changed to the “National Socialist German Workers Party,” frequently -referred to as the NSDAP, or Nazi Party. It is under that name that the -Nazi Party continued to exist until its dissolution after the collapse -and unconditional surrender of Germany in 1945. - -The disagreements and intrigues within the Party between Hitler’s -followers and those who opposed him were finally resolved on 29 July -1921, when Hitler became “First Chairman” and was invested with -extraordinary powers. Hitler immediately reorganized the Party and -imposed upon it the Führerprinzip—the leadership principle—of which -you will hear more later. Thereafter Hitler, the Führer, determined all -questions and made all decisions for the Party. - -The main objectives of the Party, which are fastened upon the defendants -and their co-conspirators by reason of their membership in, or knowing -adherence to the Party, were openly and notoriously avowed. They were -set out in the Party program of 1920, were publicized in _Mein Kampf_ -and in Nazi literature generally, and were obvious from the continuous -pattern of public action of the Party from the date of its founding. - -Now two consequences, of importance in the Trial of this case, derive -from the fact that the major objectives of the Party were publicly and -repeatedly proclaimed: - -First, the Court may take judicial notice of them. - -Second, the defendants and their co-conspirators cannot be heard to deny -them or to assert that they were ignorant of them. - -The Prosecution offers proof of the major objectives of the Party—and -hence of the objectives of the conspiracy—only to refresh or implement -judicial recollection. The main objectives were: - -First, to overthrow the Treaty of Versailles and its restrictions on -military armament and activity in Germany; - -Second, to acquire territories lost by Germany in World War I; - -Third, to acquire other territories inhabited by so-called “racial -Germans”; - -and - -Fourth, to acquire still further territories said to be needed as living -space by the racial Germans so incorporated—all at the expense of -neighboring and other countries. - -In speaking of the first aim, Hitler made an admission which applied -equally to the other aims, namely, that he had stated and written a -thousand times or more that he demanded the abolition of the Versailles -Treaty. - -These aims are fully documented in the evidence offered by the -Prosecution on this phase of the case, and it is not my purpose at this -time to recite to the Court numerous declarations made by the defendants -and others with respect to these aims. - -Moreover, these conspirators again and again publicly announced to the -still unbelieving world that they proposed to accomplish these -objectives by any means found opportune, including illegal means and -resort to threat of force, force, and aggressive war. The use of force -was distinctly sanctioned, in fact guaranteed, by official statements -and directives of the conspirators which made activism and -aggressiveness a political quality obligatory for Party members. As -Hitler stated in _Mein Kampf_: - - “What we needed and still need are not a hundred or two hundred - reckless conspirators, but a hundred thousand and a second - hundred thousand fighters for our philosophy of life.” - -In 1929 Hitler stated: - - “We confess further that we will tear anyone to pieces who would - dare hinder us in this undertaking. Our rights will be protected - only when the German Reich is again supported by the point of - the German dagger.” - -Hitler, in 1934, addressing the Party Congress at Nuremberg, stated the -duties of Party members in the following terms: - - “Only a part of the people will consist of really active - fighters. It is they who were fighters of the National Socialist - revolution. Of them, more is demanded than of the millions among - the rest of the population. For them it is not sufficient to - confess, ‘I believe’, but to swear, ‘I fight’.” - -In proof of the fact that the Party was committed to the use of any -means, whether or not legal or honorable, it is only necessary to remind -the Court that the Party virtually opened its public career by staging a -revolution—the Munich Putsch of 1923. - -Now let us consider for a moment the doctrinal techniques of the Common -Plan or Conspiracy which are alleged in the Indictment. - -To incite others to join in the Common Plan, or Conspiracy and as a -means of securing for the Nazi conspirators the highest degree of -control over the German community, they disseminated and exploited -certain doctrines. - -The first of these was the “master race” doctrine—that persons of -so-called “German blood” were a master race. This doctrine of racial -supremacy was incorporated as Point 4 in the Party program, which -provided: - - “Only a member of the race can be a citizen. A member of the - race can only be one who is of German blood without - consideration of confession. Consequently, no Jew can be a - member of the race.” - -They outlined this master race doctrine as a new religion—the faith of -the blood—superseding in individual allegiance all other religions and -institutions. The Defendant Rosenberg and the Defendant Streicher were -particularly prominent in disseminating this doctrine. Much of the -evidence to be offered in this case will illustrate the Nazi -conspirators’ continued espousal and exploitation of this master race -doctrine. - -This doctrine had an eliminatory purpose. Call anything “non-German” or -Jewish, and you have a clear right, indeed a duty, to cast it out. In -fact purges did not stop at so-called racial lines, but went far beyond. - -The second important doctrine which permeates the entire conspiracy and -is one of the important links in establishing the guilt of each of these -defendants is the doctrine or concept of the Führerprinzip, or -leadership principle. - -This doctrine permeated the Nazi Party and all its formations and allied -organizations and eventually permeated the Nazi State and all -institutions, and is of such importance that I would like to dwell upon -it for a few moments and attempt to explain the concepts which it -embraces. - -The Führerprinzip embodies two major political concepts: - -1. Authoritarianism; - -2. Totalitarianism. - -Authoritarianism implies the following: All authority is concentrated at -the top and is vested in one person only, the Führer. It further implies -that the Führer is infallible as well as omnipotent. The Party manual -states: - -“Under the Commandments of the National Socialists: The Führer is always -right. . . .” - -Also, there are no legal or political limits to the authority of the -Führer. Whatever authority is wielded by others is derived from the -authority of the Führer. Moreover, within the sphere of jurisdiction -allotted to him, each appointee of the Führer manipulates his power in -equally unrestricted fashion, subordinate only to the command of those -above him. Each appointee owes unconditional obedience to the Führer and -to the superior Party leaders in the hierarchy. - -Each Political Leader was sworn in yearly. According to the Party -manual, which will be introduced in evidence, the wording of the oath -was as follows: - - “I pledge eternal allegiance to Adolf Hitler. I pledge - unconditional obedience to him and the Führer appointed by him.” - -The Party manual also provides that: - - “The Political Leader is inseparably tied to the ideology and - the organization of the NSDAP. His oath only ends with his death - or with his expulsion from the National Socialist Community.” - -As the Defendant Hans Frank stated in one of his publications: - - “Leadership principle in the administration means: - - “Always to replace decision by majority, by decision on the part - of a specific person with clear jurisdiction and with sole - responsibility to those above, and to entrust to his authority - the realization of the decision to those below.” - -And finally the concept of authoritarianism contained in the -Führerprinzip implies: The authority of the Führer extends into all -spheres of public and private life. - -The second main concept of the Führerprinzip is totalitarianism which -implies the following: - -The authority of the Führer, his appointees, and through them, of the -Party as a whole, extends into all spheres of public and private life. - -The Party dominates the State. - -The Party dominates the Armed Forces. - -The Party dominates all individuals within the State. - -The Party eliminates all institutions, groups, and individuals unwilling -to accept the leadership of its Führer. - -As the Party manual states: - - “Only those organizations can lay claim to the institution of - the leadership principle and to the National Socialist meaning - of the State and people in the National Socialist meaning of the - term, which . . . have been integrated into, supervised and - formed by the Party and which, in the future, will continue to - do so.” - -The manual goes on to state: - - “All others which conduct an organizational life of their own - are to be rejected as outsiders and will either have to adjust - themselves or disappear from public life.” - -Illustrations of the Führerprinzip and its application to the Party, the -State and allied organizations are fully set forth in the brief and -accompanying documents, which will be offered in evidence. - -The third doctrine or technique employed by the Nazi conspirators to -make the German people amenable to their will and aims was the doctrine -that war was a noble and necessary activity of Germans. The purpose of -this doctrine was well expressed by Hitler in _Mein Kampf_ when he said: - - “The question of restoration of German power is not a question - of how to fabricate arms, but a question of how to create the - spirit which makes a people capable of bearing arms. If this - spirit dominates a people, the will finds a thousand ways to - secure weapons.” - -Hitler’s writings and public utterances are replete with declarations -rationalizing the use of force and glorifying war. The following is -typical, when he said: - - “Always before God and the world, the stronger has the right to - carry through his will. History proves it! He who has no might - has no use for right.” - -As will be shown in subsequent proof, this doctrine of the glorification -of war played a major part in the education of the German youth of the -pre-war era. - -I now offer the documents which establish the aims of the Nazi Party and -their doctrinal techniques. I also have for the assistance of the Court -and Defense Counsel, briefs which make the argument from these -documents. - -I now direct your attention to the rise to power of the Nazi Party. - -The first attempt to acquire political control was by force. In fact at -no time during this period did the Party participate in any electoral -campaigns, nor did it see fit to collaborate with other political. . . . - -THE PRESIDENT: Major Wallis, have you got copies of these for -defendants’ counsel? - -MAJOR WALLIS: In Room 54, Sir. - -THE PRESIDENT: Well, they will be wanting to follow them now. - -MAJOR WALLIS: Mr. President, my remarks, which I am proceeding toward, -will cover an entirely different subject than in the briefs before you. -The briefs cover what I have already said, Sir. - -THE PRESIDENT: Are you depositing a copy of these briefs for each of the -defendants’ counsel? - -MAJOR WALLIS: I am informed, if Your Honor pleases, that the same -procedure has been followed with respect to these briefs as has been -followed with respect to the documents, namely, a total of six has been -made available to the defendants in Room 54. If Your Honor does not deem -that number sufficient, I feel sure that I can give assurance, on behalf -of the Chief Prosecutor of the United States, that before the close of -the day an ample supply of copies will be there for use. - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal thinks that the Defense Counsel should each -have a copy of these briefs. - -MAJOR WALLIS: That will be done, Sir. - -THE PRESIDENT: Members of the Defense Counsel: You will understand that -I have directed on behalf of the Tribunal that you should each have a -copy of this brief. - -DR. DIX: We are very grateful for this directive, but none of us has -seen any of these documents so far. I assume and hope that these -documents will be given to the Defense in the German translation. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes, Major Wallis. - -MAJOR WALLIS: I now direct your attention to the rise to power of the -Nazi Party. - -The 9th of November 1923 warranted the end as well as the beginning of -an era. On the 9th of November occurred the historical fact popularly -known as the Hitler Putsch. During the night of November 8th to 9th -Hitler, supported by the SA under the Defendant Göring, at a meeting in -Munich, proclaimed the National Revolution and his dictatorship of -Germany, and announced himself as the Chancellor of the Reich. On the -following morning the duly constituted authorities of the State, after -some bloodshed in Munich, put an end to this illegal attempt to seize -the Government. Hitler and some of his followers were arrested and -tried, and sentenced to imprisonment. - -The new era in the National Socialist movement commences with Hitler’s -parole from prison in December 1924. With the return of its leader, the -Party took up its fight for power once again. The prohibitions invoked -by the Government against the Nazi Party at the time of the Munich -Putsch gradually were removed and Hitler the Führer of the Party, -formally announced that in seeking to achieve its aims to overthrow the -Weimar Government, the Party would resort only to “legal” means. A valid -inference from these facts may well be suggested, namely that the -Party’s resort to “legality” was in reality only a condition on which it -was permitted to carry on its activities in a democratically organized -state. But consistent with its professed resort to “legality”, the Party -now participated in the popular elections of the German people and -generally took part in political activity. At the same time it engaged -in feverish activity to expand the Party membership, its organizational -structure and activities. The SA and the SS recruited numerous new -members. Hitler’s _Mein Kampf_ appeared in 1925. The Hitler Youth was -founded. Newspapers were published, among them the _Völkischer -Beobachter_ of which the Defendant Rosenberg was editor, and _Der -Angriff_ published by Goebbels, later the notorious Minister of -Propaganda and Public Enlightenment. Meetings of other political parties -were interfered with and broken up, and there was much street brawling. - -The results of the Party’s attempt to win political power made little -headway for a number of years, despite the strenuous efforts exerted to -that end. In 30 elections in which the National Socialists participated -from 1925 to 1930 for seats in the Reichstag and in the Landtage or -Provincial Diets of the various German states, the Nazis received -mandates in but 16 and gained no seats at all in 14 elections. The -National Socialist vote in the 1927 elections did not exceed 4 per cent -of the total number of votes cast. The year 1929 marks the first modest -success at the polls in the State of Thuringia. The Nazi received over -11 per cent of the popular vote, elected 6 representatives out of the -total of 53 to the Diet, and the Defendant Frick became Minister of -Interior of Thuringia, the first National Socialist chosen to -ministerial rank. - -With such encouragement and proof of the success of its methods to win -support, the Nazi Party redoubled its traditional efforts (by means of -terror and coercion). These met with some rebuff on the part of the -Reich and various German states. Prussia required its civil servants to -terminate their membership in the Party and forbade the wearing of brown -shirts, which were worn by the SA of the Party. Baden likewise ruled -against the wearing of brown shirts, and Bavaria prohibited the wearing -of uniforms by political organizations. New National Socialist writings -appeared in Germany. The new _National Socialist Monthly_ appeared under -the editorship of the Defendant Rosenberg, and shortly thereafter, in -June 1930, Rosenberg’s _Myth of the 20th Century_ was published. - -Against this background—President Von Hindenburg having meanwhile -dissolved the Reichstag when Chancellor Brüning failed to obtain a vote -of confidence—Germany moved to the polls once more on the 14th -September 1930. By this election their representation in the Reichstag -was increased from 12 seats to 107 seats out of a total of 577. - -The new Reichstag met and 107 Nazis marched into the session dressed in -brown shirts. Rowdy opposition at once developed, intent on causing the -fall of the Brüning Cabinet. Taking advantage of the issues caused by -the then prevailing general economic distress, the Nazis sought a vote -of non-confidence and dissolution of the Reichstag. Failing in these -obstructionary tactics, the Nazis walked out on the Reichstag. - -With 107 members in the Reichstag the Nazi propaganda increased in -violence. The obstruction by the Nazi deputies of the Reichstag -continued with the same pattern of conduct. Repeatedly motions of -non-confidence in Brüning and for dissolution of the Reichstag were -offered and were lost. And after every failure the Nazi members stalked -out of the chamber anew. - -By spring of 1932, Brüning’s position became untenable and the Defendant -Von Papen was appointed Chancellor. The Reichstag was dissolved and new -elections held in which the Nazis increased the number of their seats to -230 out of a total of 608. The Nazi Party was becoming a strong party in -Germany, but it had failed to become the majority party. The obstructive -tactics of the Nazi deputies in the Reichstag continued, and by the fall -of 1932 Von Papen’s Government was no longer able to continue. President -Von Hindenburg again dissolved the Reichstag, and in the new elections -of November the Nazi representation in the Reichstag actually decreased -to 196 seats. The short-lived Von Schleicher Government then came into -being—it was the 3rd December 1932—and by the end of January 1933 it -went out of existence. With the support of the Nationalist Party under -Hugenberg and other political assistance, Hitler became Chancellor of -Germany by designation of Von Hindenburg. - -That is the end of the prologue, as it were, to the dramatic and -sinister story that will be developed by the Prosecution in the course -of this Trial. Let it be noted here, however, and remembered, as the -story of the misdeeds and crimes of these defendants and their fellow -conspirators are exposed, that at no time in the course of their alleged -“legal” efforts to gain possession of the State, did the conspirators -represent a majority of the people. - -Now it is commonly said that the Nazi conspirators “seized control” when -Hitler became Chancellor of the German Republic on 30 January 1933. It -may be more truly said that they seized control upon securing the -passage of the Law for the Protection of the People and the State on 24 -March 1933. The steps leading to this actual seizure of power are worthy -of recital. The Nazi conspirators were fully cognizant of their lack of -control over the legislative powers of the republic. They needed, if -they were to carry out the first steps of their grand conspiracy under -the cloak of law, an enabling act which, would vest supreme legislative -power in Hitler’s Cabinet, free from all restraints of the Weimar -constitution. Such an enabling act however required a change in the -constitution which, in turn, required two-thirds of the regular members -of the Reichstag to be present, and at least two-thirds of the votes of -those present. - -The time-table of events leading up to the passage of this enabling act, -known as the Law for the Protection of the People and the State, is as -follows: - -1. On January 30th, 1933 Hitler held his first Cabinet meeting and we -have the original minutes of that meeting, which will be offered in -evidence. The Defendants Von Papen, Von Neurath, Frick, Göring, and Funk -were present. According to the minutes of this meeting, Hitler pointed -out that the adjournment of the Reichstag would be impossible without -the collaboration of the Center Party. He went on to say: - - “We might, however, consider suppressing the Communist Party to - eliminate its votes in the Reichstag and by this measure achieve - a majority in the Reichstag.” - -He expressed the fear, however, that this might result in a general -strike. The Reich Minister of Economy, according to these official -minutes, stated that in his opinion, it was impossible to avoid the -suppression of the Communist Party of Germany, for, if that were not -done they could not achieve a majority in the Reichstag, certainly not a -majority of two-thirds; that, after the suppression of the Communist -Party, the passage of an enabling act through the Reichstag would be -possible. The Defendant Frick suggested that it would be best initially -to request an enabling law from the Reichstag. At this meeting Hitler -agreed to contact representatives of the Center Party the next morning -to see what could be done by way of making a deal with them. - -2. The next event in this time-table was the Reichstag fire on the 28th -of February 1933. - -3. Taking advantage of the uncertainty and unrest created by the -Reichstag fire, and the disturbances being created by the SA, the -provisions of the Weimar constitution guaranteeing personal freedom, and -other personal liberties were suspended by a decree of the Reich -President on February 28, 1933. - -Then on 5th of March 1933, elections to the Reichstag were held. The -Nazis acquired 288 seats out of a total of 647. - -On the 15th of March 1933, another meeting of the Reich Cabinet was -held, and we also have the original official minutes of that meeting -which bears the initials, opposite their names, of the defendants who -were present at that meeting, signifying that they have read—I contend -that it is a reasonable inference to state that it signifies that they -read these minutes and approved them. The following defendants were -present at this meeting: Von Papen, Von Neurath, Frick, Göring, and -Funk. At this meeting, according to these official minutes Hitler stated -that the putting over of the enabling act in the Reichstag by a -two-thirds vote would, in his opinion, meet with no opposition. The -Defendant Frick pointed out that the Reichstag had to ratify the -enabling act with a constitutional majority within three days, and that -the Center Party had not expressed itself negatively. He went on to say -that the enabling act would have to be broadly conceived in a manner to -allow for deviation from the provisions of the Constitution of the -Reich. He further stated that as far as the constitutional requirements -of a two-thirds majority was concerned, a total of 432 delegates would -have to be present for the ratification of the enabling act. The -Defendant Göring expressed his conviction at this meeting that the -enabling act would be ratified with the required two-thirds vote for, if -necessary, the majority could be obtained by refusing admittance to the -Reichstag of some Social Democrats. - -Now on the 20th of March another Cabinet meeting was held, and we also -have the official, original records of this meeting which will be -offered in evidence. The Defendants Frick, Von Papen, Von Neurath, -Göring, and Funk were present. The proposed enabling act was again the -subject of a discussion. Hitler reported on the conference he had -completed with the representatives of the Center Party. The Defendant -Neurath proposed a note concerning the arrangement to be agreed to by -the representatives of the Center Party. The Defendant Frick expounded -to the meeting the contents of the draft of the proposed law, and -further stated that changes in the standing orders or rules of the -Reichstag were also necessary, that an explicit rule must be made that -unexcused absent delegates be considered present, and if that was done -it would probably be possible to ratify the enabling act on the -following Thursday in all three readings. - -It is interesting to note that among the things recorded in the official -minutes of this Cabinet meeting was the Defendant Göring’s announcement -that he had ordered SA troops on the Polish border to be cautious and -not to show themselves in uniform, and that the Defendant Neurath -recommended also that the SA be cautious, especially in Danzig. In -addition, the Defendant Neurath pointed out that Communists in SA -uniforms were being caught continuously. These stool pigeons had to be -hanged. Justice had to find means and ways to make possible such -punishment for Communist stool pigeons, according to the Defendant -Neurath. - -On 14th March 1933 the Defendant Frick announced: - - “When the Reichstag meets the 21st of March, the Communists will - be prevented by urgent labor elsewhere from participation in the - session. In concentration camps they will be re-educated for - productive work. We will know how to render harmless - permanently, sub-humans who don’t want to be re-educated.” - -During this period, taking advantage of the decree suspending -constitutional guarantees of freedom, a large number of Communists, -including Party officials and Reichstag deputies, and a smaller number -of Social Democrat officials and deputies, were placed in protective -custody. On 23 March 1933, in urging the passage of the enabling act, -Hitler stated before the Reichstag: - - “It is up to you gentlemen, to make the decision now. It will be - for peace or war.” - -On 24 March 1933 only 535 out of the regular 747 deputies of the -Reichstag were present. The absence of some was unexcused; they were in -protective custody in concentration camps. Subject to the full weight of -the Nazi pressure and terror, the Reichstag passed an enabling act known -as the “Law for the Protection of the People and State,” with a vote of -441 in favor. This law marks the real seizure of political control by -the conspirators. Article 1 provided: that the Reich laws can be enacted -by the Reich Cabinet. Article 2 provided: the National laws enacted by -the Reich Cabinet may deviate from the constitution. Article 3 provided: -National Laws enacted by the Reich Cabinet are prepared by the -Chancellor and published in the Reichsgesetzblatt. Article 4 provided: -Treaties of the Reich with foreign states, which concern matters of -national legislation, do not require the consent of the parties -participating in legislation. The Reich Cabinet is empowered to issue -the necessary provisions for the execution of these treaties. - -Thus the Nazis acquired full political control, completely unrestrained -by any provision of the Weimar constitution. - -I now offer the documents which establish the facts which I have just -stated, and I also present, for the assistance of the Court and the -Defense Counsel, the briefs covering this portion of the case. - -THE PRESIDENT: I wish to speak to Major Wallis. Would it be possible for -the Prosecution to let defendants’ counsel have at least one copy -between each two of them here in court? If not today, then tomorrow? - -COL. STOREY: If the Tribunal please, there has been some -misunderstanding and the briefs were delivered to the Defendants’ -Document Room. We have sent for some of them and they should be here -shortly. However, Sir, in all fairness the briefs themselves are not in -the German language, because we had intended to take the trial brief and -the lawyers follow it over the translating system and thus, when it was -finished, it would be translated into all languages. - -However, in order to shorten the proceeding, Major Wallis has made a -summary, and he is giving the summary and will offer the documents in -evidence and later the briefs, as needed, to the Tribunal, and to -Defense Counsel, and unfortunately, in the rush of time, they have been -put down in the Defendants’ Document Room and we have sent for some of -them. We understand, also, if the Tribunal please, that Dr. Kempner -approached some of the distinguished counsel for the Defense, and -learned that a great many of them not only speak English, but understand -it when they read it, and to save the tremendous physical burden on -facilities, the briefs have not, as yet, been translated into German. If -there is objection, the only thing we can do is to withhold them at this -time, but we understood it would be agreeable to pass them to them in -English, and that is what we propose to do at the present moment, and -have German speaking officers in the Document Room who will translate -for any of them who may not be able to read German—pardon me, to read -English. - -DR. DIX: I have one request. We are here, as German Defense Counsel, and -in face of great difficulties. These proceedings are conducted according -to Anglo-American customs. We are doing our best to make our way through -these principles, and would be very grateful if the President would take -into consideration our difficult situation. - -I have heard—I am not quite sure if it was right—that according to -these Anglo-American principles, it is necessary to prepare objections -immediately, if one has any objections to the contents of a document, -and that this is not possible unless one does it at once. This is a -point on which I would like to make my request. I am convinced that both -the trial brief and the documents will be made available to us, and we -will see if we can have a German translation of one or the other. If -this trouble can be spared, if the Defense Counsel needs a translation, -we shall have it, but I should like—I have one request—that we have -leisure to raise an objection later when we have had a chance to discuss -it. I think in that way we shall easily overcome the difficulties raised -by the present situation, and we are trying to cooperate in order to -overcome any difficulties. - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal is glad that defendants’ counsel are making -efforts to cooperate in the Trial. After the adjournment, the Tribunal -will consider the best method of providing defendants’ counsel with as -many translations as possible, and you are right in thinking that you -will be able to make objections to any document after you have had time -to consider it. - -DR. DIX: Thank you, Sir. - -MAJOR WALLIS: Having acquired full political control, the Nazi -conspirators now proceeded to consolidate their power, and at this point -I would like to impress upon the Tribunal once again that with the -exception of a very few documents, the subject matter of my remarks is -within the purview of judicial notice of the Court, a matter of history -well known to these defendants and their counsel. Their first step in -the consolidation of power was ruthlessly to purge their political -opponents by confining them to concentration camps or by murder. -Concentration camps made their first appearance in 1933 and were first -used as means of putting political opponents out of circulation by -confining them to a so-called “protective custody.” This system of -concentration camps grew and expanded within Germany. At a subsequent -stage in these proceedings full and complete evidence of the -concentration camp system and the atrocities committed therein will be -presented to the Court, both by documents and films. - -Illustrative documentary evidence of the arrest, mistreatment, and -murder by the Nazi conspirators of their political opponents is -contained in the documentary evidence offered by the United States. - -As an illustration, affidavit of Raymond H. Geist, former American -Consul and First Secretary of the Embassy in Berlin from 1929 to 1938, -states (which will be offered): - - “Immediately in 1933, the concentration camps were established - and put under charge of the Gestapo. Only political prisoners - were held in concentration camps. - - “The first wave of terroristic acts began in March 1933, more - particularly from March 6 to 13, 1933, accompanied by unusual - mob violence. When the Nazi Party won the elections in March - 1933, the accumulated passion blew off in wholesale attacks on - the Communists, Jews, and others suspected of being either. Mobs - of SA men roamed the streets, beating up, looting and even - killing persons. - - “For Germans taken into custody by the Gestapo there was a - regular pattern of brutality and terror. All over Germany - victims were numbered by the hundred thousand.” - -On the 30th of June and 1 and 2 July 1934 the conspirators proceeded to -destroy opposition within their own ranks by wholesale murder. In -discussing this purge, the Defendant Frick stated, in an affidavit under -oath, signed on the 19th day of November 1945, in the presence of his -Defense Counsel, as follows. This is document number 2950-PS. It has not -yet been introduced in evidence, Sir: - - “Himmler, in June of 1934, was able to convince Hitler that Röhm - wanted to start a Putsch. The Führer ordered Himmler to suppress - the Putsch which was supposed to take place at the Tegernsee, - where all of the SA leaders were coming together. For northern - Germany, the Führer gave the order to suppress the Putsch to - Göring.” - -Frick goes on to say: - - “Pursuant to this order, a great many people were arrested and - something like a hundred, and possibly more, were even put to - death, accused of high treason; all this was done without - judicial process.” They were just killed on the spot. Many - people were killed—I don’t know how many—who actually did not - have anything to do with the Putsch. People who just weren’t - liked very well as, for instance, Schleicher, the former Reich - Chancellor, were killed. Schleicher’s wife was also killed. Also - Gregor Strasser, who had been the Reich Organization Leader and - second man in the Party after Hitler. Strasser, at the time he - was murdered, was not active in political affairs any more; he - had however separated himself from the Führer in November or - December of 1932”. - -Frick goes on to say: - - “The SS was used by Himmler for the execution of these orders to - suppress the Putsch.” - -During this period the conspirators created, by a series of decrees of -the Reich Cabinet, a number of new political crimes. Any act or -statement contrary to the Nazi Party was deemed to be treason and -punished accordingly. The formations of the Party, the SA, SS, as well -as the SD and the Gestapo, were the vicious tools used in the -extermination of all opposition, real or potential. As the Defendant -Göring said on July 24th, 1933—I refer to Document Number 2494-PS, -which will be introduced in evidence: - - “Whoever in the future raises a hand against a representative of - the National Socialist movement or of the State, must know that - he will lose his life in a very short while. Furthermore, it - will be entirely sufficient, if he is proven to have intended - the act, or, if the act results not in a death, but only in an - injury.” - -The Defendant Frank stated, in a magazine of the Academy for German Law, -1936, which will be introduced as Document Number 2533-PS, as follows: - - “By the world we are blamed again and again because of the - concentration camps. We are asked, ‘Why do you arrest without a - warrant of arrest?’ I say, ‘Put yourself into the position of - our nation.’ Don’t forget that the very great and still - untouched world of Bolshevism cannot forget that we have made - final victory for them impossible in Europe, right here on - German soil.” - -And Raymond Geist, whose affidavit I previously referred to, being -Document Number 1759-PS, states: - - “The German people were well-acquainted with what was happening - in concentration camps, and it was well known that the fate of - anyone too actively opposed to any part of the Nazi program was - liable to be one of great suffering. Indeed, before the Hitler - regime was many months old, almost every family in Germany had - received first-hand accounts of the brutalities inflicted in the - concentration camps from someone, either in the family circle or - in the circle of friends who had served a sentence, and - consequently the fear of such camps was a very effective brake - on any possible opposition.” - -And as the Defendant Göring said in 1934,—and I refer to Document -Number 2344-PS, which will be offered in evidence: - - “Against the enemies of the State, we must proceed ruthlessly - . . . therefore the concentration camps have been created, where - we have first confined thousands of Communist and Socialist - Democrat functionaries.” - -In addition to ruthlessly purging all political opponents, the Nazi -conspirators further consolidated their position by promptly proceeding -to eliminate all other political parties. On 21 March 1933, the -Defendant Frick announced that the Communists would be prevented from -taking part in the Reichstag proceedings. This was accomplished, as has -been pointed out, by placing them in “protective custody in -concentration camps.” On the 26th May 1933 a Reich Cabinet decree, -signed by Hitler and the Defendant Frick, provided for the confiscation -of the Communist property. On 22 June 1933 the Social Democratic Party -was suppressed in Prussia, it previously having been seriously weakened -by placing a number of its members in concentration camps. On the 7th of -July 1933 a Reich decree eliminated Social Democrats from the Reichstag -and from the governing bodies of the provinces and municipalities. On -the 14 of July 1933, by a decree of the Reich Cabinet, the property of -the Social Democrats was confiscated, and the Nazi Party was constituted -as the sole political party in Germany, and thereupon it became illegal -to maintain or to form any other political party. Thus, Hitler was able -to say within hardly more than 5 months after becoming Chancellor, I -quote: “The Party has become the State.” - -The Nazi conspirators immediately proceeded to make that statement a -recorded fact, for on the 1st of December 1933 the Reich Cabinet issued -a law for “Securing the Unity of Party and State.” This law was signed -by Hitler and the Defendant Frick. - -Article 1 provided that the Nazi Party: - - “. . . is the bearer of the concept of the State and is - inseparably the State. It will be a part of the public law. Its - organization will be determined by the Führer.” - -Article 2 provided: - - “The Deputy of the Führer and the Chief of Staff of the SA will - become members of the Reich Cabinet in order to insure close - cooperation of the offices of the Party and SA with public - authorities.” - -Article 3 provided: - - “The members of the National Socialist German Workers Party and - the SA (including their subordinate organizations) as the - leading and driving force of the National Socialist State will - bear greater responsibility toward Führer, People, and State.” - - [_A recess was taken._] - -COL. STOREY: During the recess defendants’ counsel and the Prosecution -arrived at an agreement for the furnishing of briefs to the defendants, -which I understand to be this: - -Copies of the documents offered in evidence in German will be delivered -in the Defendants’ Information Center, with the understanding that if -any Defense Counsel needs to show the German photostatic copy to his -client he may do so in the defendants’ counsel room adjacent thereto; -that the briefs which we are passing to the Tribunal as an aid will -likewise be passed to defendants’ counsel in English, and that if any of -them have trouble in the translation of any portion of the briefs, we -have German-speaking officers in the Defendants’ Information Center who -will assist counsel. I understand that all of these defendants’ counsel -have so agreed. - -THE PRESIDENT: Thank you. Now, Major Wallis. - -MAJOR WALLIS: May it please the Court, at the moment of recess I was -referring to the law which was passed on 1 December 1933, for securing -the unity of Party and State. - -Article 6 of that law provided: - - “The public authorities have to grant legal and administrative - assistance to the offices of the Party and the SA which are - entrusted with the execution of the jurisdiction of the Party - and SA.” - -Article 8 provided: - - “The Reich Chancellor as Führer of the National Socialistic - German Workers Party and, as the supreme commander of the SA, - will issue the regulations necessary for the execution and - augmentation of this law, particularly with respect to the - organization and procedure of the jurisdiction of the Party and - SA.” - -Thus by this law the Nazi Party became a para-governmental organization -in Germany. - -The further merger of the Party and State occurred on the death of -Hindenburg. Instead of holding an election to fill the office of -President, the merger of the offices of President and Chancellor, in the -person of Hitler, was accomplished by the law of 1 August 1934, signed -by the entire Reich Cabinet. One of the significant consequences of this -law was to give to Hitler the supreme command of the German Armed -Forces, always a prerequisite of the presidency, and every soldier was -immediately required to take an oath of loyalty and unconditional -obedience to Hitler. On 4 February 1938 Hitler issued a decree which -stated in part—and I quote from Document Number 1915-PS, which will be -offered in the document book at the close of my remarks—as follows: -“From now on, I take over directly the command of the whole Armed -Forces.” - -As a further step in the consolidation of their political control, the -Nazi conspirators reduced national elections to mere formalities devoid -of the element of freedom of choice. Elections, properly speaking, could -not take place under the Nazi system. In the first place, the basic -doctrine of the Führerprinzip dictated that all subordinates must be -appointed by their superiors in the Government hierarchy. Although it -had already become the practice, in 1938 it was specifically provided by -law that only one list of candidates was to be submitted to the people. -By the end of this pre-war period little of substance remained in the -election law. The majority of the substantive provisions had become -obsolete. - -By a series of laws and decrees the Nazi conspirators reduced the powers -of regional and local governments and substantially transformed them -into territorial subdivisions of the Reich Government. With the -abolition of representative assemblies and elective officials in the -Länder and the municipalities, regional and local elections ceased to -exist. On 31 January 1934 the last vestiges of Land independence was -destroyed by the Law for the Reconstruction of the Reich. The Defendant -Frick, Minister of the Interior throughout this period, has written of -this Law for the Reconstruction of the Reich as follows: - - “The reconstruction law abolished the sovereign rights and - executive powers of the Länder and made the Reich the sole - bearer of the rights of sovereignty. The supreme powers of the - Länder do not exist any longer. The natural result of this was - the subordination of the Land government to the Reich Government - and the Land ministers to the corresponding Reich ministers. On - 30 January, 1934 the German Reich became one state.” - -Another step taken by the Nazi conspirators in consolidating their -political power was the purge of civil servants on racial and political -grounds and their replacement by Party members and supporters. This -purge was accomplished through a series of Nazi laws and decrees. The -first was on 7 April 1933, entitled: “Law for the Restoration of the -Professional Civil Service.” Article 3 of the law applied the Nazi blood -and master race theories in providing that officials who were not of -Aryan descent were to be retired. The political purge provision of the -law is contained in Article 4, and I quote: - - “Officials who, because of their previous political activities, - do not offer security that they will assert themselves for the - National State without reservations may be dismissed.” - -The effect of this law and the decrees and regulations issued thereunder -was to fill every responsible position in the Government with a Nazi and -to prevent the appointment of any applicant opposed, or suspected of -being opposed, to the Nazi program and policy. - -Even the judiciary did not escape the purge of the Nazi conspirators. -All judges who failed to fulfill the racial and political requirements -of the conspirators were quickly removed. In addition, the Nazis set up -a new system of special criminal courts independent of the regular -judiciary and directly subservient to the Party program. Moreover, the -Nazis controlled all judges through special directives and orders from -the central Government, their aim being, as expressed by one Gerland, -one of the leading Nazi lawyers of that time: “. . . to make the word -‘terrorization’ in the penal law respectable again.” - -As their control was consolidated, the conspirators greatly enlarged -existing State and Party organizations and established an elaborate -network of new formations and agencies. The Party spread octopus-like -throughout all of Germany. This process of growth was summed up late in -1937 in an official statement of the Party Chancellery, as follows: - - “In order to control the whole German nation in all spheres of - life”—and I repeat, in order to control the whole German nation - in all spheres of life—“the NSDAP, after assuming power, set up - under its leadership, the new Party formations and affiliated - organizations.” - -At this point I would like to offer to the Court the document book which -contains the laws and conditions which I have referred to in this part -of my presentation together with the briefs covering this part of it. - -Labor unions: - -I would like to direct the Tribunal’s attention to some case histories -in the consolidation of control by the conspirators. - -The first case history in the consolidation of the Nazi conspirators’ -control of Germany is the destruction of the free trade unions and the -obtaining of control over the productive labor capacity of the German -nation. - -The position of organized labor in Germany, at the time of the Nazi -seizure of power, the obstacles they afforded to the Nazi plans, the -speed with which they were destroyed, the terror and maltreatment -ranging from assault to murder of union leaders, were fully outlined in -the opening address of the Chief Prosecutor of the United States, and -are fully set forth in the document book which I will present to the -Court on this phase of the case. - -The result achieved by the Nazi conspirators is best expressed in the -Words of Robert Ley. Ley’s confidence in the Nazis’ effective control -over the productive labor capacity of Germany in peace or in war was -declared as early as 1936 to the Nuremberg Party Congress. I refer to -Document 2283-PS which is included in the document book which will be -presented on this phase of the case. He stated: - - “The idea of the factory troops is making good progress in the - plants, and I am able to report to you, my Führer, that security - and peace in the factories has been guaranteed, not only in - normal times, but also in times of the most serious crisis. - Disturbances, such as the munitions strikes of the traitor Ebert - and confederates, are out of the question. National Socialism - has conquered the factories. Factory troops are the National - Socialist shock troops within the factory, and their motto is: - The Führer is always right.” - -At this time I would like to offer to the Court the document book -containing the documents on this phase of the case, namely, “The -destruction of labor unions and the gaining of control of all productive -labor in Germany,” together with the brief on that subject. At the same -time, if it please the Court, I would like to offer the document book -concerning the consolidation of control with respect to the utilization -and molding of political machinery, which is, in law, a decree which I -referred to just prior to my discussion of the destruction of labor -unions. - -I would now direct your attention to the second case history in the -consolidation of control. - -The Nazi conspirators early realized that the influence of the Christian -churches in Germany was an obstacle to their complete domination of the -German people and contrary to their master race dogma. As the Defendant -Martin Bormann stated in a secret decree of the Party Chancellery signed -by him and distributed to all Gauleiter on 7 June 1941—it is identified -as Document Number D-75 and will be included in the document book which -will be presented to the Court—he stated as follows: - - “More and more must the people be separated from the churches - and their organizations and pastors .... Not until this has - happened does the State leadership have influence on the - individual citizens.” - -Accordingly, the Nazi conspirators, seeking to subvert the influence of -the churches over the people of Germany, proceeded to attempt to -eliminate these churches: - -1. By promoting beliefs and practices incompatible with Christian -teachings. - -2. By persecuting priests, clergy, and members of monastic orders. This -persecution, as the documentary evidence will show, ran the gauntlet of -insults and indignities, physical assault, confinement in concentration -camps, and murder. - -3. By the confiscation of church properties. - -4. By suppressing religious publications. - -5. By the suppression of religious organizations. In addition, they also -suppressed religious education. This is illustrated by the secret decree -of the Party Chancellery which I just referred to in Document D-75, when -the Defendant Bormann stated: - - “No human being would know anything of Christianity if it had - not been drilled into him in his childhood by his pastors. The - so-called “dear God” in no wise gives knowledge of His existence - to young people in advance, but in an astonishing manner, in - spite of His omnipotence, leaves this to the efforts of the - pastors. If, therefore, in the future our youth learns nothing - more of this Christianity, whose doctrines are far below ours, - Christianity will disappear by itself.” - -At a subsequent stage in these proceedings, additional documentary -evidence of the acts of the conspirators in their attempt to subvert the -influence of the Christian churches will be offered. At this time I -offer the document book in support of this phase of the case together -with the accompanying brief. - -We now come to what might be called the third case history, the -persecution of the Jews. The Nazi conspirators adopted and publicized a -program of ruthless persecution of Jews. - -It is not our purpose at this time to present to the Court a full and -complete story, in all its sickening details, of the Nazi conspirators’ -plans and acts for the elimination and liquidation of the Jewish -population of Europe. This will be done in due course, at a subsequent -stage of these proceedings, but it is our purpose at this time to bring -before you, as one of the elements in the Nazi scheme for the -consolidation of their control of Germany, the action which was planned -and taken with respect to the Jews within Germany during the pre-war -period. - -As a means of implementing their master race policy and as a means of -rallying otherwise discordant elements behind the Nazi banner, the -conspirators adopted and publicized a program of relentless persecution -of Jews. This program was contained in the official, unalterable 25 -points of the Nazi Party, of which 6 were devoted to the master race -doctrine. The Defendants Göring, Hess, Rosenberg, Frank, Frick, -Streicher, Funk, Schirach, Bormann, and others, all took prominent parts -in publicizing this program. Upon the Nazis coming into power, this -Party program became the official State program. - -The first organized act was the boycott of Jewish enterprises on 1 April -1933. The Defendant Streicher, in a signed statement, admits that he was -in charge of this program only for one day. We, of course, reserve the -right to show additional evidence with respect to that fact. The Nazi -conspirators then embarked upon a legislative program which was gradual -and which dates from 7 April 1933 until September 1935. During this -period a series of laws was passed removing the Jews from civil service, -from the professions and from the schools and military service. - -It was clear, however, that the Nazi conspirators had a far more -ambitious program for the Jewish problem and only put off its -realization for reasons of expediency. After the usual propaganda -barrage, in which the speeches and writings of the Defendant Streicher -were most prominent, the Nazi conspirators initiated the second period -of anti-Jewish legislation, namely, from 15 September 1935 to September -1938. In this period the infamous Nuremberg Laws were passed, depriving -the Jews of their rights as citizens, forbidding them to marry Aryans, -and eliminating them from additional professions. In the autumn of 1938 -the Nazi conspirators began to put into effect a program of complete -elimination of the Jews from German life. The measures taken were partly -presented as a retaliation against world Jewry in connection with the -killing of a German embassy official in Paris. Unlike the boycott action -in April 1933, when care was taken to avoid extensive violence, an -allegedly spontaneous pogrom was staged and carried out all over -Germany. The legislative measures which followed were discussed and -approved in their final form at a meeting on 12 November 1938 under the -chairmanship of the Defendant Göring, with the participation of the -Defendants Frick and Funk and others. I refer to Document 1816-PS, which -will appear in the document book. The meeting was called following -Hitler’s orders “requesting that the Jewish question be now, once and -for all, coordinated and solved one way or the other.” The participants -agreed on measures to be taken for the elimination of the Jew from -German economy. The laws issued in this period were signed mostly by the -Defendant Göring in his capacity as Deputy of the Four Year Plan, and -were thus strictly connected with the consolidation of control of the -German economy and preparation for aggressive war. These laws obliged -all German Jews to pay a collective fine of 1 billion Reichsmarks; -barred the Jews from trades and crafts; limited movement of Jews to -certain localities and hours; limited the time for the sale or -liquidation of Jewish enterprises; forced Jews to deposit shares and -securities held by them; forbade the sale or acquisition of gold or -precious stones by a Jew; granted landlords the right to give notice to -Jewish tenants before legal expiration of the leases; and forced all -Jews over 6 years of age to wear the Star of David. - -In the final period of the anti-Jewish crusade of the Nazi conspirators -within Germany, very few legislative measures were passed. The Jews were -just delivered to the SS, Gestapo, and the various extermination staffs. -The last law dealing with Jews in Germany put them entirely outside the -law and ordered the confiscation by the State of the property of dead -Jews. This law was a weak reflection of a factual situation already in -existence. As Dr. Stuckart, assistant to the Defendant Frick, stated, at -the time: - - “The aim of the racial legislation may be regarded as already - achieved and consequently the racial legislation as essentially - closed. It led to the temporary solution of the Jewish problem - and at the same time essentially prepared for the final - solution. Many regulations will lose their practical importance - as Germany approaches the achievement of the final goal on the - Jewish problem.” - -Hitler, on January 30, 1939, in a speech before the Reichstag, made the -following prophesy: “The result (of a war) will be the annihilation of -the Jewish race in Europe.” - -I will leave to others in this case the task of presenting to the Court -the evidence as to how well that prophesy was fulfilled. - -I would now offer to the Court the document book which contains the laws -referred to, with respect to the persecution of the Jews, and the brief -outlining that subject. - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will now adjourn until 10 o’clock tomorrow -morning. - - [_The Tribunal adjourned until 23 November 1945 at 1000 hours._] - - - - - FOURTH DAY - Friday, 23 November 1945 - - - _Morning Session_ - -DR. OTTO NELTE (Counsel for Defendant Keitel): Mr. President, you -advised the Defense in yesterday’s session that the Defense should -already at this stage of the Trial raise objections if they believe they -have any against the documentary evidence introduced by the Prosecution. - -The Chief Prosecutor introduced in Court yesterday a graphic -presentation concerning the Reich Ministries and other bureaus and -offices at the highest level of the German Government. My client is of -the opinion that this presentation is erroneous in the following -respects which concern his own person: - -1. A Reich Defense Council has never existed. The Reich Defense Law, -which provided for a Reich Defense Council in the event of war, has -never been published; a session of a Reich Defense Council has never -taken place. For this reason, the Defendant Keitel was never a member of -a Reich Defense Council. - -2. The Secret Cabinet Council which was to be created in accordance with -the law of February 4, 1938, never came into existence. It was never -constituted; it never held a session. - -3. The Defendant Keitel never was Reich Minister. Like the -Commanders-in-Chief of the Army and the Navy, he merely had the rank of -a Reich Minister. Consequently, he never was a Minister without -portfolio either. He did not participate in any advisory Cabinet -session. - -I should like to ask the Court for its opinion as to whether these -objections may be made the object of an examination at this stage of the -Trial or whether they are to be reserved for a later stage? - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal rules that the documents are admissible, but -the defendants can prove at a later stage any matters which are relevant -to the documents. It is not necessary for the defendants to make -objections at this stage. At a later stage they can prove any matters -which are relevant to the weight of the documents. - -DR. DIX: May I ask the Tribunal a question? - -We have now been able to see, in part, the briefs and documents which -were introduced in court yesterday. In that connection we have -established that some of the documents submitted by the Prosecution -yesterday were not quoted in their entirety, nor were they presented in -substance. My question now is: Shall the contents, the entire contents, -of all the documents which were presented to Court form the basis for -the Court’s decision, even in cases where the Prosecutor who presented -the documents did not refer to their contents? - -In other words, must we consider all of the documents presented in -Court—including those the contents of which were not verbally referred -to—as a basis for the judgment and, consequently, should they be -examined with a view to determining whether the defendants wish to raise -any objections? - -Finally I wish to ask the Tribunal whether the entire contents of all -the documents which were submitted to the Court yesterday, and which may -possibly be submitted in the future, are to be understood by us as a -basis for judgment even if the Prosecution does not present them word -for word or in substance or refer to them in any other way. - -THE PRESIDENT: Every document, when it is put in, becomes a part of the -record and is in evidence before the Tribunal, but it is open to the -defendants to criticize and comment upon any part of the document when -their case is presented. - -DR. DIX: Thank you. The question is clarified herewith. - -THE PRESIDENT: There are three announcements which I have to make on -behalf of the Tribunal; and the first is this: - -That we propose that the Tribunal shall not sit on Saturday morning in -this week, in order that defendants’ counsel may have more time for the -consideration of the documents and arguments, which have been made up to -that time. That is the first matter. - -The second matter is that the Tribunal desires that all motions and -applications shall, as far as practicable, be made in writing, both by -the Prosecution and by the Defense. There are occasions, of course, such -as this morning when motions and applications for the purposes of -explanation, are more conveniently made orally, but as far as -practicable, it is the desire of the Tribunal that they shall be made in -writing, both by the Prosecution and by the Defense. - -And the other matter is an observation, which the Tribunal desires me to -make to the Prosecution, and to suggest to them that it would be more -convenient to the Tribunal and possibly also to the Defense, that their -briefs and volumes of documents should be presented to the Tribunal -before Counsel speaking begins that branch of the case, so that the -brief and volume of documents should be before the Tribunal whilst -Counsel is addressing the Tribunal upon that branch of the case; and -also that it would be convenient to the Tribunal—if it is convenient to -Counsel for the Prosecution—that he should give a short -explanation—not a prolonged explanation—of the documents, which he is -presenting to the Court, drawing their attention to any passages in the -documents, which he particularly wishes to draw attention to. - -I will call upon the Chief Prosecutor for the United States to continue -his address. - -COL. STOREY: May it please the Tribunal, yesterday afternoon it appeared -that there was some question about the identification of documents -formally offered in evidence yesterday. Therefore, with the Tribunal’s -permission I should like to offer them by number, formally, so that the -Clerk can get them on his record and may be identified, with Your -Honors’ permission. - -The United States—and may I say, Sir, that we offer each one of these -exhibits in evidence, requesting that they be received and filed as -evidence for the United States of America, with the understanding that -Defense Council may later interpose objections. If that is agreeable, -Sir, the first is United States Exhibit Number 1, the affidavit of Major -William H. Coogan, concerning the capture, processing and authentication -of documents, together with Robert G. Storey’s accompanying statement: - -United States Exhibit Number 2, being 2903-PS, being the Nazi Party -chart, together with authentication certificates; - -United States Exhibit Number 3, 2905-PS, the Nazi State chart, together -with authentication certificates; - -United States Exhibit Number 4, 2836-PS, the original statement of -Defendant Göring as to positions held; - -United States Exhibit Number 5, Document 2829-PS, the same, concerning -Defendant Ribbentrop. . . . - -THE PRESIDENT: Could not all this be done by the General Secretary . . . -the numbering of these documents? - -COL. STOREY: Yes, Sir, that is correct. That is agreeable with us, Sir, -but the General Secretary raised the question that it was not in the -record. We have the complete tabulation describing each document by -number, and if it is agreeable with Your Honors, I will offer the -description on this page, correctly describing, by exhibit number, each -one that was offered in evidence yesterday. - -THE PRESIDENT: We will authorize the General Secretary to accept the -documents so numbered. - -COL. STOREY: Thank you, Sir. The tabulation referred to is set forth in -the following words and figures: - - USA-1, Major Coogan’s affidavit with Colonel Storey’s statement; - USA-2, 2903-PS, Nazi Party chart and authenticating papers; - USA-3, 2905-PS, Nazi State chart and authenticating papers; - USA-4, 2836-PS, original statement of Göring’s positions; - USA-5, 2829-PS, original statement of Ribbentrop’s positions; - USA-6, 2851-PS, original statement of Rosenberg’s positions; - USA-7, 2979-PS, original statement of Frank’s positions; - USA-8, 2978-PS, original statement of Frick’s positions; - USA-9, 2975-PS, original statement of Streicher’s positions; - USA-10, 2977-PS, original statement of Funk’s positions; - USA-11, 3021-PS, original statement of Schacht’s positions; - USA-12, 2887-PS, original statement of Dönitz’s positions; - USA-13, 2888-PS, original statement of Raeder’s positions; - USA-14, 2973-PS, original statement of Von Schirach’s positions; - USA-15, 2974-PS, original statement of Sauckel’s positions; - USA-16, 2965-PS, original statement of Jodl’s positions; - USA-17, 2910-PS, original statement of Seyss-Inquart’s positions; - USA-18, 2980-PS, original statement of Speer’s positions; - USA-19, 2972-PS, original statement of Von Neurath’s positions; - USA-20, 2976-PS, original statement of Fritzsche’s positions. - -Document books: - -USA-A, Common Objectives, Methods, and Doctrines of Conspiracy; - -USA-B, The Acquiring of Totalitarian Control over Germany; Political; -First Steps; Control Acquired; - -USA-C, Consolidation of Control; (Utilization and Molding of Political -Machinery); - -USA-F, Purge of Political Opponents; Terrorization; - -USA-G, Destruction of Trade Unions and Acquisition of Control over -Productive Labor Capacity in Germany; - -USA-H, Suppression of the Christian Churches in Germany; - -USA-I, Adoption and Publication of the Program for Persecution of the -Jews. - -May it please the Tribunal, Mr. Justice Jackson called my -attention—while we are offering all of these on behalf of the United -States, naturally they are for the benefit and on the behalf of all the -other nations who are cooperating in this case. - -THE PRESIDENT: That is understood. - -MAJOR WALLIS: May it please the Court, when we adjourned yesterday -afternoon, I was in the process of developing the various means by which -these conspirators acquired a totalitarian control of Germany. I wish to -continue on that subject this morning, and I will first discuss the -reshaping of education and the training of youth; and in accordance with -Your Honors’ suggestion, I offer the document book, United States -Exhibit D, and would call to the Court’s attention that this book -contains translations of the documents which we rely upon with respect -to this portion of the case. These documents consist of German writings, -German speeches of the defendants and other Nazi leaders, and are -matters that we suggest are clearly within the purview of judicial -notice of the Court. And in the brief which is offered for the -assistance of the Court in connection with this subject, the exact -portions of the documents which are desired to be brought to the -attention of the Tribunal are set forth either by quotation from the -documents, or by reference to the specific page number of the documents. - -Meanwhile, during this entire pre-war period, the nation was being -prepared psychologically for war, and one of the most important steps -was the reshaping of the educational system so as to educate the German -youth to be amenable to their will. Hitler publicly announced this -purpose in November 1933, and I am quoting from Document 2455-PS. He -said: - - “When an opponent declares, ‘I will not come over to your side, - and you will not get me on your side’, I calmly say, ‘Your child - belongs to me already. A people lives forever. What are you? You - will pass on. Your descendants, however, now stand in the new - camps. In a short time they will know nothing else but this new - community’.” - -He further said in May 1937, and I refer to Document Number 2454-PS: - - “This new Reich will give its youth to no one, but will itself - take youth and give to youth its education and its own - upbringing.” - -The first steps taken in making the German schools the tools of the Nazi -educational system were two decrees in May 1934, whereby the Reich -Ministry of Education was established and the control of education by -local authorities was replaced by the absolute authority of the Reich in -all educational matters. These decrees are set out in Documents 2078-PS, -2088-PS, 2392-PS. Thereafter, the curricula and organization of the -German schools and universities were modified by a series of decrees in -order to make these schools effective instruments for the teaching of -Nazi doctrines. - -The Civil Service Law of 1933, which was presented in evidence -yesterday, made it possible for the Nazi conspirators to re-examine -thoroughly all German teachers and to remove all “harmful and unworthy -elements”, harmful and unworthy in the Nazi opinion. Many teachers and -professors, mostly Jews, were dismissed and were replaced with -State-spirited teachers. All teachers were required to belong to the -National Socialist Teachers’ League, which organization was charged with -the training of all teachers in the theories and doctrines of the NSDAP. -This is set forth in Document 2452-PS. The Führerprinzip was introduced -into the schools and universities. I refer to Document 2393-PS. - -In addition, the Nazi conspirators supplemented the school system by -training the youth through the Hitler Jugend. The law of the Hitler -Jugend, which is set forth in Document 1392-PS, states: - - “The German youth, besides being reared within the family and - school, shall be educated physically, intellectually, and - morally in the spirit of National Socialism to serve the people - and community through the Hitler Youth.” - -In 1925 the Hitler Youth was officially recognized by the Nazi Party and -became a junior branch of the SA. In 1931 the Defendant Schirach was -appointed Reich Youth Leader of the NSDAP with the rank of SA -Gruppenführer. I refer to Document 1458-PS. In June 1933 the Defendant -Schirach was appointed Youth Leader of the German Reich. I refer to the -same document, 1458-PS. In that same month, on orders of the Defendant -Schirach, the Nazi conspirators destroyed or took over all other youth -organizations. This was accomplished by force in the first instance. The -Defendant Schirach, by decree dated 22 June, 1933—I refer to Document -2229-PS—dissolved the Reich Committee of the German Youth Associations -and took over their property. By similar decrees, all of which are set -forth in the document book, all the youth organizations of Germany were -destroyed. Then the Nazi conspirators made membership in the Hitler -Jugend compulsory. I refer to Document 1392-PS. - -The Hitler Jugend from its inception had been a formation of the Nazi -Party. By virtue of the 1936 Youth Law, making membership compulsory, it -became an agency of the Reich Government while still retaining its -position as a formation of the Nazi Party. This is set forth in Document -1392-PS. By 1940 membership in the Hitler Jugend was over seven million. -I refer you to Document 2435-PS. Through the Hitler Jugend the Nazi -conspirators imbued the youth with Nazi ideology. The master race -doctrine and anti-Semitism, including physical attack on the Jews, were -systematically taught in the training program. I refer you to Document -2436-PS. The Hitler Jugend indoctrinated the youth with the idea that -war is a noble activity. I refer to Document 1458-PS. One of the most -important functions of the Hitler Jugend was to prepare the youth for -membership in the Party and its formations. The Hitler Jugend was the -agency used for extensive pre-military and military training of youth. I -refer to Document 1850-PS. In addition to general military training, -special training was given in special formations. These included flying -units, naval units, motorized units, signal units, et cetera. - -The full details with the accompanying documents of the methods used by -the Nazi conspirators in reshaping the educational system and -supplementing it with the Hitler Jugend so as to educate the German -youth to be amenable to the Nazi will and prepare youth for war are set -forth in the document book which has been offered, and in the -accompanying briefs. - -Now I would like to direct your attention to the weapon of propaganda -that was used during this period, and for this purpose I offer United -States Exhibit Number E with the accompanying brief. This document book -and the briefs which accompany it. . . . - -THE PRESIDENT: Have any copies of these documents been provided for the -Defense Counsel? - -COL. STOREY: I understand, Sir, they have been sent to the Defendants’ -Information Center. I may say, Sir, that with tomorrow we will have them -in advance to everybody, including the Court and the Defense Counsel. - -THE PRESIDENT: Very well. - -MAJOR WALLIS: This document book and the accompanying brief is entitled -“Propaganda Censorship and Supervision of Cultural Activities.” - -During this period one of the strongest weapons of the conspirators was -propaganda. From the outset they appreciated the urgency of the task of -inculcating the German masses with the National Socialist principles and -ideology. The early utterances of Hitler and his fellow conspirators -evidenced full recognition of the fact that their power could endure -only if it rested on general acceptance of their political and social -views. - -Immediately following their accession to power, the Nazi conspirators -instituted a determined program for wholesale organization of the masses -by seizing control of all vehicles of public expression. The wide-spread -use of propaganda by the powerful machine thus created became a key -device in establishing control over all phases of the German economy, -public and private. They conceived that the proper function of -propaganda was to prepare the ground psychologically for political -action and military aggression and to guarantee popular support of a -system which was based on a permanent and steadily intensified -application of terror and aggression both in the sphere of domestic -politics and foreign relations. - -To attain these objectives, propaganda was used to create specific -thought patterns designed to make the people amenable to the aims and -program of the Nazis and to foster their active participation therein to -the greatest extent possible. The nature of this propaganda is within -the judicial purview of the Court. As Goebbels put it, it was aimed at -“the conquest of the masses.” Its intended effect was the elimination of -all serious resistance in the masses. To achieve this result, as will be -shown later in the evidence, the Nazi conspirators were utterly -unscrupulous in their choice of means, a total disregard of veracity -that presented their case purely from the standpoint of political -expediency and their conception of national self-interest. Inasmuch as -propaganda was the means to an end, “the conquest of the masses,” it -required different strategy at different times, depending on the -objectives issued and pursued by the Nazi conspirators at any given -moment. According to Hitler: “the first task of propaganda is the -gaining of people for the future organization.” - -The recruiting of people for enlistment in the Party and supervised -organizations was the primary objective in the years preceding and -immediately following the seizure of power. After the rise to power, -this task was broadened to include the enlistment of the people as a -whole for the active support of the regime and its policies. As the -Reich Propaganda Leader of the Party and Reich Minister for Propaganda, -Goebbels stated: - -“Propaganda, the strongest weapon in the conquest of the State, remains -the strongest weapon in the consolidation and building up of the State.” - -The methods which they used to control this strongest weapon in the -power of the State are set forth in a chart which I would like to call -to the Court’s attention at this time, and would like to introduce in -evidence as USA Exhibit Number 21. - -As you will note from the chart, there were three separate levels of -control within the German Reich. The first level was the Party controls, -which are represented on the chart by the top block. And you will see -that the Party through its Examining Commission controlled the books and -magazines, and issued books and magazines setting forth the ideology of -the Party. - -The second block, the Press Leader Division, supervised all publishers, -headed Party newspapers and book publishers. - -The third block, Press Chief,—this office controlled the Press -Political Office, the Press Personnel Office, and supervised Party -treatment of the press and treatment of Party affairs in the press. - -The center block, the Office of Propaganda Leader, had under its control -not only the press, but exhibits and fairs, speakers’ bureaus, films, -radio, culture, and other means of expression and dissemination of the -ideology of the Party and its purposes. - -The next block, Ideology, was devoted exclusively to the ideology of the -Party headed by the Defendant Rosenberg. It supplied all the training -materials, prepared the curricula for the schools, and the -indoctrination of the people into the ideology of the Party. On that -same level is Youth Education, presided over by the Defendant Schirach, -who had under his control the Hitler Jugend; and then there were the -University Students and Teachers Division of the Party controls. - -On the next level you have the controls that were exercised by the -State, and reading from left to right you have the Propaganda -Coordination, Foreign Coordination and Cooperation, the radio, which was -under the control of the Defendant Fritzsche, film, literature, the -German press, periodicals, theater, arts, other cultural things, and the -Ministry for Education. - -Then, in the last tier, what is known as the corporate controls. These -were under a semi-official control of both the Party and the State. -These are the so-called cultural chambers. Their purpose was to have -full control over the personnel engaged in the various arts and -cultures, and engaged in the preparation and dissemination of news. -First was the press—all reporters and writers belonged to that section. -The next section is the fine arts, music, theater, film, literature, -radio,—then going over into the Educational Branch the organization -which the University teachers, the students and former corps members of -the universities had to belong to. - -By means of this vast network of propaganda machinery, the Nazi -conspirators had full control over the expression and dissemination of -all thought, cultural activities, and dissemination of news within the -Reich. Nothing was or could be published in Germany that did not have -the approval, express or implied, of the Party and State. The Defendant -Schacht in his personal notes explains the effect of the killing of a -piece of news in a totalitarian dictatorship. As he states it, it has -never become publicly known that there have been thousands of martyrs in -the Hitler regime. They have all disappeared in the cells or graves of -the concentration camps, without ever having been heard of again; and he -goes on to say, “what is the use of martyrdom in the fight against -terror if it has no chance of becoming known and thus serving as an -example for others.” - -THE PRESIDENT: Before you pass from this subject, there is a docket on -the documents which shows that certain documents are missing. What does -that mean? 1708, 2030. - -MAJOR WALLIS: Those documents are in the process of being reproduced and -will be furnished to the Court, I hope, before the close of the day, -Sir. They have been added to that book and, as yet, have not been -completed in their process of reproduction. - -THE PRESIDENT: Thank you. Have they been translated? - -MAJOR WALLIS: Yes, Sir, they have been translated, and the translations -are in the process of being reproduced. - -THE PRESIDENT: Are the documents in their original form in German? - -MAJOR WALLIS: Yes, I believe they are, Sir. - -THE PRESIDENT: Very well. - -MAJOR WALLIS: I would now like to direct the Court’s attention to the -militarization of Nazi-dominated organizations during this pre-war -period and for that purpose I offer United States Exhibit Number J, -which consists of a document book with English translations, and I -present to the Court also a brief which accompanies this portion of the -case. - -Throughout this pre-war period, and while the Nazi conspirators were -achieving and consolidating their totalitarian control of Germany, they -did not lose sight of their main objective—aggressive war. Accordingly, -they placed a considerable number of their dominated organizations on a -progressively militarized footing, with a view to the rapid -transformation of these organizations whenever necessary, as instruments -of war. These organizations were the SS, the SA, the Hitler Jugend, the -NSKK (or National Socialist Motor Corps), the NSFK (which is the -National Socialist Aviation Corps), the RAD (which is the Reich Labor -Service), and the OT (which is the Todt Organization). - -The manner in which the militarization was accomplished is detailed in -part in the documents, which have been presented to the Court and will -be detailed further when the particular organizations are taken up and -discussed and their criminality established at subsequent stages in the -case. At this time, I would like to call the Court’s attention to a -chart, and while the chart is physically being placed on the board, I -would offer United States Exhibit Number 22, which is Document 2833-PS -and is a reproduction of Page 15 of the book entitled, _History of the -Nazi Party_. You will note that on the left lower corner of the chart -placed on the board, there are some papers attached. The top paper is an -affidavit which reads as follows: “I certify that the above enlargement -is a true and correct copy prepared under my direct supervision, of -Document Number 2833-PS, Page 15 of the book entitled _History of the -Party_,” and you will note that underneath is a second paper and this -affidavit states it is a correct photographic copy, which appears in the -left-hand corner of the panel. This affidavit is signed by David -Zablodowsky, sworn to and subscribed the 23rd day of November 1945 at -Nuremberg, Germany, before James H. Johnson, First Lieutenant, Office of -the United States Chief of Counsel. - -This chart visualizes, as vividly as possible, just how this -militarization took place in Germany. The chart is entitled, “The -Organic Incorporation of German Nationals into the National Socialist -System, and the Way to Political Leadership.” - -Starting at the bottom of the chart, you see the young folk, between the -ages of 10 and 14. The arrows point both right and left. The arrow to -the right is the Adolf Hitler School, for youth between the ages of 12 -and 18. Both from the school and from the young folk, they proceed to -the Hitler Jugend. At 18 years of age, they graduate from the Hitler -Jugend into the various Party formations, the SA, the SS, the NSKK, the -NSFK. At the age of 20, they continue from these Party formations into -the Labor Front, and from the Labor Front, after they have served their -period of time there, back again to the Party formations, of the SA, the -SS, NSKK, NSFK, until they reach the age of 21. Then they proceed into -the Army, serve in the Army from the ages of 21 to 23, and then back -again into the Party formations of SA, SS, et cetera. - -And then from that group, the select move up to be Political Leaders -(Leiter) of the Nazi Party, and from that group are selected the cream -of the crop who go to the Nazi Party Special Schools and from these -schools, as is represented on the top of the chart, graduate the -political Führer of the people. - -I would emphasize again to the Court that this chart is not anything -that was prepared by Counsel in this case. It was prepared by the Nazi -Party people and it comes from their own history. - -Thus, by the end of the pre-war period, the Nazi conspirators had -achieved one of the first major steps in their grand conspiracy. All -phases of German life were dominated by Nazi doctrine and practice and -mobilized for the accomplishment of their militant aims. The extent to -which this was accomplished can be no better expressed than in the words -of Hitler when he spoke to the Reichstag on 20 February 1938. I refer to -Document 2715-PS. He said: - - “Only now have we succeeded in setting before us the great tasks - and in possessing the material things which are the - prerequisites for the realization of great creative plans in all - fields of our national existence. Thus, National Socialism has - made up with a few years for what centuries before it had - omitted. . . . National Socialism has given the German people - that leadership which as Party not only mobilizes the nation but - also organizes it, so that on the basis of the natural principle - of selection, the continuance of a stable political leadership - is safeguarded forever. . . . National Socialism possesses - Germany entirely and completely since the day when, 5 years ago, - I left the house in Wilhelmsplatz as Reich Chancellor. There is - no institution in this state which is not National Socialist. - Above all, however, the National Socialist Party in these 5 - years not only has made the nation National Socialist, but also - has given itself the perfect organizational structure which - guarantees its permanence for all future. The greatest guarantee - of the National Socialist revolution lies in the complete - domination of the Reich and all its institutions and - organizations, internally and externally, by the National - Socialist Party. Its protection against the world abroad, - however, lies in its new National Socialist armed forces. . . . - - “In this Reich, anybody who has a responsible position is a - National Socialist. . . . Every institution of this Reich is - under the orders of the supreme political leadership. . . . The - Party leads the Reich politically, the Armed Forces defend it - militarily. . . . There is nobody in any responsible position in - this state who doubts that I am the authorized leader of the - Reich.” - -Thus spoke Adolf Hitler at the end of this period on the 20th of -February 1938. - -COL. STOREY: If the Tribunal please. . . . - -DR. ALFRED SEIDL (Counsel for Defendant Frank): Mr. President, may I -make a few short remarks in this connection? The defendants were given, -along with the Indictment, a list of the documents. This list contains -the following preamble: - - “Each of the defendants is hereby informed that the Prosecution - will use some or all of the documents listed in the appendix in - order to corroborate the points enumerated in the Indictment.” - -Now, the Chief Prosecutor introduced in court this morning about 12 -documents and a scrutiny of that list revealed that not a single one of -the documents is mentioned. Thus, already now, at the very beginning of -the Trial, we are confronted with the fact that not only are documents -presented to the Court without the defendant being acquainted with their -contents, but that documents are being used as documentary evidence -which are not even listed. - -Not a single one of these documents is mentioned in the list and I must -confess that an adequate defense is altogether impossible under these -circumstances. I therefore move: - -1. That the Tribunal direct the Prosecution to submit a list of all -documents which will be placed before the Court during examination; - -2. To instruct the Prosecution to make available to the defendants and -their counsel—at the latest on the day when documents are being -presented to the Court—a copy of the German text; and - -3. That the main proceedings be suspended until the Prosecution is in a -position to comply with these requests. Otherwise, I, at least, will not -be able to proceed with the defense. - -THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Storey, or Counsel for the Prosecution, will you -say what answer you have to make to this objection? - -COL. STOREY: If the Tribunal please, in the first place practically -every document referred to by Major Wallis is a document of which the -Court would take judicial knowledge. In the second place, a list of -documents was filed in the Defense Information Center on November 1st. I -am not sure as to whether all of these or a part of them were included. -In the third place each attorney presenting each segment of the case -sends down to the Defense Information Center a list of the documents -which he proposes to offer in evidence upon his presentation. In the -fourth place, I wonder if the Tribunal and Defense Counsel realize the -physical problems that are imposed? I am informed that copies of these -documents in English, as well as copies of the briefs, were delivered -either last night or this morning in defendants’ Information Center. -Lastly, other presentations that follow—we will abide by the Tribunal’s -request: namely, that prior to the presentation the Court will be -furnished with these document books, with these briefs, and Defense -Counsel will also be furnished with them in advance. The weekend will -permit us to do that. - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal thinks that the Trial must now continue -without any adjournment, but that in future as soon as possible the -Defendants’ Counsel will be furnished with copies of the documents which -are to be put in evidence. - -DR. ROBERT SERVATIUS (Counsel for Defendant Sauckel): I should like to -present the following: The documents are presented to the Court also in -an English translation. An examination of these translations should be -made available to the Defense. I point out particularly that the -translation of technical terms could possibly lead to misunderstandings. -Moreover, the documents are provided with an introductory remark and a -table of contents. The Defense should also have opportunity to read -through this table of contents and examine it. - -I make the motion that these English translations and their preliminary -remarks be made available to the Defense. - -THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Storey, I understood from you that you proposed -to make available to the defendants the trial briefs which contain -certain observations upon the documents put in. - -COL. STOREY: That is right, Sir. They have been, are now, and will be -completed during the weekend, and, as I understood Defense Counsel were -willing for the briefs to be furnished in English, and if they want a -translation, there will be German speaking officers in defendants’ -Information Center at their service. I understood that was agreeable -yesterday. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes. - -COL. STOREY: Now sir, while I am on my feet, and in order to obviate -some misapprehension, for the benefit of Defense Counsel, when we refer -to document numbers as, say, 1850-PS, in many instances that is a -document which is a copy of a citation or a decree in the -_Reichsgesetzblatt_, and, therefore, is not a separate document of ours, -and we have placed in the defendants’ Information Center ample copies -and sets of the _Reichsgesetzblatt_, and I dare say that one-half of the -documents referred to in Major Wallis’ presentation will be found in the -_Reichsgesetzblatt_, and I assure Your Honors that over the weekend we -will do the utmost to explain to Defense Counsel and to make available -to them all information that we have and will do so in the future in -advance. - -THE PRESIDENT: Thank you, Colonel Storey. The Tribunal will now adjourn -for 10 minutes. - - [_A recess was taken._] - -COL. STOREY: If Your Honors please, the next subject to be presented is -the economic preparation for aggressive war, by Mr. Dodd. - -MR. THOMAS J. DODD (Executive Trial Counsel for the United States): May -it please the Tribunal, Mr. President and Members of the Tribunal: - -In view of the discussions which took place just before the recess -period, I believe it proper for me to inform the Tribunal that the -documents to which I shall make reference,—a list of those documents -has been lodged in the defendants’ Information Center, and, as well, -photostatic copies of the originals have been placed there this morning. - -It is my responsibility on behalf of the Chief Prosecutor for the United -States of America to present the proof with reference to the allegations -of the Indictment under Section IV (E), on [A]Page 6 of the English -version of the Indictment, and particularly beginning with the second -paragraph under (E), which is entitled, “The Acquiring of Totalitarian -Control in Germany, Economic, and the Economic Planning and Mobilization -for Aggressive War.” - ------ - -[A] Page numbers used in references throughout the Proceedings are to -the original documents and do not apply to pagination used in the -present volumes. - ------ - -The second paragraph: - - “2. They used organizations of German business as instruments of - economic mobilization for war. - - “3. They directed Germany’s economy towards preparation and - equipment of the military machine. To this end they directed - finance, capital investment, and foreign trade. - - “4. The Nazi conspirators, and in particular the industrialists - among them, embarked upon a huge rearmament program, and set out - to produce and develop huge quantities of materials of war and - to create a powerful military potential.” - -The fifth paragraph under that same heading (E), and the final one in so -far as my responsibility goes this morning, is that which reads: - - “With the object of carrying through the preparation for war the - Nazi conspirators set up a series of administrative agencies and - authorities. For example, in 1936 they established for this - purpose the office of the Four Year Plan with the Defendant - Göring as Plenipotentiary, vesting it with overriding control - over Germany’s economy. Furthermore, on the 28th of August 1939, - immediately before launching their aggression against Poland, - they appointed the Defendant Funk Plenipotentiary for Economics; - and on the 30th of August 1939 they set up the Ministerial - Council for the Defense of the Reich to act as a War Cabinet.” - -I will not take the time of this Tribunal to prove what the world -already knows: that the Nazi conspirators rearmed Germany on a vast -scale. I propose to place in evidence the secret records of the plans -and deliberations of the inner councils of the Nazis, which prove that -the reorganization of the German Government, the financial wizardry of -the Defendant Schacht, and the total mobilization of the German economy -largely under the Defendant Schacht, Göring, and Funk, were directed at -a single goal: aggressive war. - -I should like to hand to the Court at this point the so-called document -book, which contains the English translation of the original German -document. I do not make an offer at this time of these documents in -evidence, but hand them to the Court for the purpose of easing the task -of the Court in following the discussion concerning these documents. I -might say at this point also that I should like to submit at a little -later date a brief for the assistance of the Court after I have -concluded my remarks before it this morning. - -The significance of the economic measures adopted and applied by the -conspirators can, of course, be properly appraised only if they are -placed in the larger social and political context of Nazi Germany. The -economic measures were adopted while the conspirators were, as has -already been shown, directing their vast propaganda apparatus to the -glorification of war. They were adopted while the conspirators were -perverting physical training into training for war. They were adopted -while, as my colleagues will show, these conspirators were threatening -to use force and were planning to use force to achieve their territorial -and political objects. In short, if Your Honors please, these measures -constitute in the field of economics and government administration the -same preparation for aggressive war which dominated every aspect of the -Nazi State. - -In 1939 and 1940 after the Nazi aggression upon Poland, Holland, -Belgium, and France it became perfectly clear to the world that the Nazi -conspirators had created probably the greatest instrument of aggression -in history. - -That machine was built up almost in its entirety in a period of less -than one decade. In May of 1939 Major General George Thomas, former -Chief of the Military-Economic Staff in the Reich War Ministry, reported -that the German Army had grown from seven Infantry divisions in 1933 to -thirty-nine Infantry divisions, among them four fully motorized and -three mountain divisions, eighteen Corps Headquarters, five Panzer -divisions, twenty-two machine gun battalions. Moreover, General Thomas -stated that the German Navy had greatly expanded by the launching, among -other vessels, of two battleships of 35,000 tons, four heavy cruisers of -10,000 tons, and other warships; further, that the Luftwaffe had grown -to a point where it had a strength of 260,000 men, 21 squadrons, -consisting of 240 echelons, and 33 anti-aircraft batteries. - -He likewise reported that out of the few factories permitted by the -Versailles Treaty there had arisen, and I am quoting, if Your Honors -please, from the document bearing our number EC-28, which consists of a -lecture delivered by Major General Thomas on the 24th of May 1939 in the -Nazi Foreign Office. General Thomas said in part—or rather he -reported—that out of the few factories permitted by the Versailles -Treaty there had arisen: - - “. . . the mightiest armament industry now existing in the - world. It has attained the performances which in part equal the - German wartime performances and in part even surpass them. - Germany’s crude steel production is today the largest in the - world after America’s. The aluminum production exceeds that of - America and of the other countries of the world very - considerably. The output of our rifle, machine gun, and - artillery factories is at present larger than that of any other - state.” - -That quotation, I repeat, was from a document bearing the lettering “EC” -and the number after the dash “28”. It is United States of America -Exhibit 23. - -These results—the results which General Thomas spoke about in his -lecture in May of 1939—were achieved only by making preparation for war -the dominating objective of German economy. And, to quote General Thomas -again, he stated: - - “History will know only a few examples of cases where a country - has directed, even in peace time, all its economic forces so - deliberately and systematically towards the requirements of war, - as Germany was compelled to do in the period between the two - World Wars.” - -That quotation from General Thomas will be found in the document bearing -our Number 2353-PS. It is another quotation from General Thomas, but -from another writing of his. - -The task of mobilizing the German economy for aggressive war began -promptly after the Nazi conspirators’ seizure of power. It was entrusted -principally to the Defendants Schacht, Göring, and Funk. - -The Defendant Schacht, as is well known, was appointed President of the -Reichsbank in March of 1933 and Minister of Economics in August of 1934. -The world did not know, however, that the responsibility for the -execution of this program was entrusted to the office of the Four Year -Plan under the Defendant Göring. - -I should now like to call to Your Honors’ attention a document bearing -the number EC-408, and I should also like to refer at this time to -another document for Your Honors’ attention while I discuss the -material—Number 2261-PS. - -And I continue to say that the world did not know, as well, that the -Defendant Schacht was designated Plenipotentiary for the War Economy on -May 21, 1935, with complete control over the German civilian economy for -war production in the Reich Defense Council, established by a top-secret -Hitler decree. - -I invite Your Honors’ attention to the Document 2261-PS, which I -referred to a few minutes ago. - -The Defendant Schacht recognized that the preparation for war came -before all else for, in a memorandum concerning the problems of -financing rearmament, written on the 3rd of May 1935, he stated that his -comments were based on the assumption that the accomplishment of the -armament program. . . . - -THE PRESIDENT [Interposing]: Pardon me, but you referred us to Document -2261. - -MR. DODD: Yes, Your Honor. - -THE PRESIDENT: But you haven’t read anything from it. - -MR. DODD: I did not; I merely referred the Court to it since it. . . . - -THE PRESIDENT [Interposing]: It would help us, I think, if, when you -refer to a document, you refer to some particular passage in it. - -MR. DODD: Very well. - -THE PRESIDENT: I think it must be the middle paragraph in the document: -“The Führer has nominated the President of the Directorate of the -Reichsbank, Dr. Schacht. . . .” - -MR. DODD: Yes, that is the paragraph to which I wish to make reference. -If Your Honors please, I refer to the second paragraph, or the middle -paragraph, which states, in a letter dated June 24, 1935 at Berlin: - - “The Führer and Reich Chancellor has nominated the President of - the Directorate of the Reichsbank, Dr. Schacht, to be - Plenipotentiary General for the War Economy.” - -I might point out, in addition to the second paragraph, the last -paragraph of that letter or the last sentence of the letter, which -reads: “I point out the necessity of strictest secrecy once more”—the -letter being signed, “Von Blomberg.” - -Through Schacht’s financial genius monetary measures were devised to -restore German industry to full production; and through the control of -imports and exports, which he devised under his plan of 1934, German -production was channeled in accordance with the requirements of the -German war machine. - -I shall, with the Court’s permission, later discuss the details of -documentary proof of this assertion. - -In 1936, with an eye to the experience in the first World War, the Nazi -conspirators embarked on an ambitious plan to make Germany completely -self-sufficient in strategic war materials such as rubber, gasoline, and -steel, in a period of 4 years, so that the Nazi conspirators would be -fully prepared for aggressive war. The responsibility for the execution -of this program was entrusted to the office of the Four Year Plan under -the Defendant Göring—and at this point I should like to refer to the -document bearing the number and the lettering EC-408. It is dated the -30th day of December 1936, marked “Secret Command Matter”, and entitled -the “Report Memorandum on the Four Year Plan and Preparation of the War -Economy.” - -It sets out that the Führer and Reich Chancellor has conferred powers in -regard to mobilization preparations in the economic field that need -further definition, and in the third paragraph it refers specifically to -Minister President, Generaloberst Göring as Commissioner of the Four -Year Plan, by authority of the Führer and Reich Chancellor granted the -18th day of October 1936. The existence of this program involved the -reorganization and control of the whole German economy for war. - -Again referring to Major General Thomas—and specifically to our -document marked EC-27—General Thomas, in a lecture on the 28th of -February 1939, made at the Staff instructor’s course, stated: - - “The National Socialist State, soon after taking over power, - reorganized the German economy in all sections and directed it - towards a military viewpoint, which had been requested by the - Army for years. Due to the reorganization, agriculture, commerce - and professions become those powerful instruments the Führer - needs for his extensive plans, and we can say today that - Hitler’s mobile politics, as well as the powerful efforts of the - Army and economy, would not have been possible without the - necessary reorganization by the National Socialist Government. - We can now say that the economic organization as a whole - corresponds with the needs, although slight adjustments will - have to be made yet. Those reorganizations made a new system of - economics possible which was necessary in view of our internal - and foreign political situation as well as our financial - problems. The directed economy, as we have it today concerning - agriculture, commerce, and industry, is not only the expression - of the present State principles, but at the same time also the - economy of the country’s defense.” - -If Your Honors please, this program was not undertaken in a vacuum; it -was deliberately designed and executed to provide the necessary -instrument of the Nazi conspirators’ plans for aggressive war. - -In September of 1934 the Defendant Schacht frankly acknowledged to the -American Ambassador in Berlin that the Hitler Party was absolutely -committed to war, and the people too were ready and willing; and that -quotation is found in Ambassador Dodd’s diary and is document bearing -our Number 2832-PS and United States Exhibit Number 29, particularly on -page 176 of Ambassador Dodd’s diary. - -At the same time, the Defendant Schacht promulgated his new plan for the -control of imports and exports in the interest of rearmament. A year -later he was appointed Plenipotentiary for the War Economy by the -top-secret decree referred to a few minutes ago. - -In September 1936 the Defendant Göring announced—at a meeting attended -by the Defendant Schacht and others—that Hitler had issued instructions -to the Reich War Minister on the basis that the show-down with Russia is -inevitable, and added that “all measures have to be taken just as if we -were actually in the stage of imminent danger of war.” - -I refer the Court to the document bearing the letters EC-416 and -particularly. . . . Before I discuss the quotation I might indicate that -this document is also marked a secret Reich matter in the minutes of the -Cabinet meeting of the 4th of September 1936, at 12 o’clock noon. It -tells who was present: the Defendant Göring, Von Blomberg, the Defendant -Schacht, and others. - -And on the second page of that document, in the second paragraph, is -found the quotation by the Defendant Göring. It starts from the basic -thought that: - - “The show-down with Russia is inevitable. What Russia has done - in the field of reconstruction we too can do.” - -On the third page of that document, in the second paragraph, the -Defendant Göring stated: “All measures have to be taken just as if we -were actually in the stage of imminent danger of war.” - -In the same month the office of the Four Year Plan was created with the -mission of making Germany self-sufficient for war in 4 years. I refer -back, at this point, to the Document Number EC-408, and particularly -refer Your Honors to the third paragraph, again, of that document, where -the statement is made as regards the war economy: - - “Minister President Generaloberst Göring sees it as his task, - within 4 years, to put the entire economy in a state of - readiness for war.” - -The Nazi Government officials provided the leadership in preparing -Germany for war. They received, however, the enthusiastic cooperation of -the German industrialists, and the role played by industrialists in -converting Germany to a war economy is an important one, and I turn -briefly to that aspect of the economic picture. - -On the invitation of the Defendant Göring, approximately 25 of the -leading industrialists of Germany, and the Defendant Schacht, attended a -meeting in Berlin on the 20th day of February, 1933. This was shortly -before the election of March 5, 1933 in Germany. At this meeting Hitler -announced the conspirators’ aim to seize totalitarian control over -Germany, to destroy the parliamentary system, to crush all opposition by -force, and to restore the power of the Wehrmacht. - -Among those present on that day, in February of 1933 in Berlin, were -Gustav Krupp, head of the huge munitions firm Friedrich Krupp, A.G.; -four leading officials of the I.G. Farben, one of the world’s largest -chemical concerns; present, I repeat, was also the Defendant Schacht, -and Albert Vögler was also there, the head of the huge steel trusts, the -United Steel Works of Germany, and there were other leading -industrialists there. - -In support of the assertion with respect to that meeting at that time -and in that place, I refer Your Honors to the document bearing the -number EC-439, it being an affidavit of George von Schnitzler, and it -reads as follows: - - “I George von Schnitzler, a member of the Vorstand of I.G. - Farben, make the following deposition under oath: - - “At the end of February 1933 four members of the Vorstand of - I.G. Farben, including Dr. Bosch, the head of the Vorstand, and - myself, were asked by the office of the President of the - Reichstag to attend a meeting in his house, the purpose of which - was not given. I do not remember the two other colleagues of - mine who were also invited. I believe the invitation reached me - during one of my business trips to Berlin. I went to the meeting - which was attended by about twenty persons, who I believe were - mostly leading industrialists from the Ruhr. - - “Among those present I remember: - - “Dr. Schacht, who at that time was not yet head of the - Reichsbank again and not yet Minister of Economics; - - “Krupp von Bohlen, who in the beginning of 1933 presided the - Reichsverband der Deutschen Industrie, which later on was - changed in the semi-official organization ‘Reichsgruppe - Industrie’; - - “Dr. Albert Vögler, the leading man of the Vereinigte - Stahlwerke; - - “Von Loewenfeld from an industrial work in Essen; - - “Dr. Stein, head of the Gewerkschaft Auguste Victoria, a mine - which belongs to the I.G. Dr. Stein was an active member of the - Deutsche Volkspartei. - - “I remember that Dr. Schacht acted as a kind of host. - - “While I had expected the appearance of Göring, Hitler entered - the room, shook hands with everybody and took a seat at the - table. In a long speech he talked mainly about the danger of - communism over which he pretended that he just had won a - decisive victory. - - “He then talked about the Bündnis (alliance) into which his - party and the Deutschnationale Volkspartei had entered. This - latter party, in the meantime, had been reorganized by Herr Von - Papen. At the end he came to the point which seemed to me the - purpose of the meeting. Hitler stressed the importance that the - two aforementioned parties should gain the majority in the - coming Reichstag election. Krupp von Bohlen thanked Hitler for - his speech. After Hitler had left the room, Dr. Schacht proposed - to the meeting the raising of an election fund of, as far as I - remember, RM 3 million. The fund should be distributed between - the two ‘allies’ according to their relative strength at the - time being. Dr. Stein suggested that the Deutsche Volkspartei - should be included. . . .” - -THE PRESIDENT [Interposing]: Mr. Dodd, it seems to me that really all -that that document shows is that there was a meeting at which Mr. -Schacht was present, and at which it was determined to subscribe an -election fund in 1933. - -MR. DODD: That is quite so, Your Honor. I will not labor the Court by -reading all of it. There were some other references, but not of major -importance, in the last paragraph, to a division of the election fund. I -just call Your Honors’ attention to it in passing. - -I should like, at this point, to call Your Honors’ attention to the -document bearing the Number D-203. It is three-page document: D-203. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes. - -MR. DODD: I wish to read only excerpts from it very briefly. It is the -speech delivered to the industrialists by Hitler, and I refer -particularly to the second paragraph of that document: “Private -enterprise cannot be maintained in the age of democracy. . . .” - -THE PRESIDENT [Interposing]: What is the date of that? - -MR. DODD: It is the speech made at the meeting on the 20th of February -1933 at Berlin. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes. - -MR. DODD: - - “Private enterprise cannot be maintained in the age of - democracy; it is conceivable only if the people have a sound - idea of authority and personality.” - -I refer to Page 2 of the document, and I should like to read an excerpt -from that first paragraph on Page 2, about 13 sentences down, beginning -with the words: - - “I recognized even while in the hospital that one had to search - for new ideas conducive to reconstruction. I found them in - Nationalism, in the value of . . . strength and power of - individual personality.” - -And, a little further down, the next to the last and the last sentence -of that same paragraph, Hitler said: - - “If one rejects pacifism, one must put a new idea in its place - immediately. Everything must be pushed aside, must be replaced - by something better.” - -And, in the third paragraph, the last sentence beginning: - - “We must not forget that all the benefits of culture must be - introduced more or less with an iron fist, just as once upon a - time the farmers were forced to plant potatoes.” - -Then finally, on that page, in the fourth paragraph—nearly at the end -of it: - - “With the very same courage with which we go to work to make up - for what had been sinned during the last 14 years, we have - withstood all attempts to move us off the right way.” - -Then, on the top of the next page, the second paragraph, these words: - - “Now we stand before the last election. Regardless of the - outcome there will be no retreat, even if the coming election - does not bring about a decision.” - -THE PRESIDENT: Why did you not read the last line on Page 2? - -MR. DODD: Beginning with the words “while still gaining power”? - -THE PRESIDENT: The sentence before: - - “We must first gain complete power if we want to crush the other - side completely. While still gaining power, one should not start - the struggle against the opponent. Only when one knows that one - has readied the pinnacle of power, that there is no further - possible development, shall one strike.” - -MR. DODD: I was going to refer to that, if Your Honor pleases, in a -minute. However, I think it is quite proper to have it inserted here. - -Before starting to read this last paragraph, I suggest that it is nearly -the accustomed recess time, as I understand it, and it is a rather -lengthy paragraph. . . . - -THE PRESIDENT [Interposing]: Yes, we will adjourn until 2 o’clock. - - [_The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours._] - - - - - _Afternoon Session_ - -MR. DODD: If Your Honor pleases, if I may go back for just a very little -bit to take up the train of thought where I left off at the noon recess. - -We were discussing the document, bearing the number D-203, and I had -referred particularly to the third page of that document, and even more -particularly to the second paragraph on that page; and I wish to read -from a sentence approximately 8 or 10 lines down in that second -paragraph, which reads as follows: - - “The question of restoration of the Wehrmacht will not be - decided at Geneva but in Germany, when we have gained internal - strength through internal peace.” - -I wish to refer again to the same page of the same document, and to the -last paragraph and the last sentence, with reference to the Defendant -Göring, who was present at that same meeting to which this document -refers, the meeting of February 20, 1933 in Berlin. Göring said that the -sacrifices asked for surely would be so much easier for industry to bear -if it realized that the election of March 5th will surely be the last -one for the next 10 years, probably even for the next 100 years. - -In a memorandum dated the 22d day of February 1933, and for the -information of the Court, in the document book bearing the number D-204, -Gustav Krupp described this meeting briefly, and in the memorandum wrote -that he had expressed to Hitler the gratitude of the 25 industrialists -present at the meeting on February 20, 1933. - -There are other expressions in that memorandum, which we do not deem to -be particularly pertinent to the allegations of the Indictment with -which we are now concerned. It is also to establish the corroboration of -the affidavit of Puhl that the meeting was held. - -I might point out to the Court that this memorandum, together with the -report of the speech of Hitler, were found by the British and the United -States armies in the personal files of the Defendant Krupp. - -I am aware, if Your Honors please, that the method I am pursuing here is -a little tedious, because I am trying to refer specifically to the -documents, and particularly to the excerpts referred to in my remarks, -and therefore this presentation differs very considerably from that -which has gone before. I trust, however, that you will bear with me, -because this part of the case requires some rather careful and detailed -explanations. - -In April of 1933, after Hitler had entrenched himself in power, Gustav -Krupp, as chairman of the Reich Association of German Industry, which -was the largest association of German industrialists, submitted to -Hitler the plan of that Association for the reorganization of German -industry, and in connection therewith, undertook to bring the -Association into line with the aims of the conspirators, and to make it -an effective instrument for the execution of their policies. - -In a letter of transmittal, Krupp stated that the plan of reorganization -which he submitted on behalf of the Association of industrialists, was -characterized by the desire to coordinate economic measures and -political necessity, adopting the Führer conception of the new German -State. A copy of that letter of transmittal is set out in the document -book under the Number D-157. - -In the plan of reorganization itself, Krupp stated: - - “The turn of political events is in line with the wishes which I - myself and the board of directors have cherished for a long - time. . . . In reorganizing the Reich Association of German - Industry, I shall be guided by the idea of bringing the new - organization into agreement with the political aims of the Reich - Government.” - -The ideas expressed by Krupp on behalf of the members of the Reich -Association of German Industry for introducing the Leadership Principle -into industry, were subsequently adopted. - -I respectfully refer the Court to the _Reichsgesetzblatt_ of 1934, Part -I, Page 1194, Sections 11, 12, and 16. - -Under the decree introducing the Leadership Principle into industry, -each group of industry was required to have a leader who was to serve -without compensation. The leaders were to be appointed and could be -removed at the discretion of the Minister of Economics. The charter of -each group was to be decreed by the leader, who was obligated to lead -his group in accordance with the principles of the National Socialist -State. - -I think it is fair to argue that the introduction of the Leadership -Principle into the organizations of business permitted the -centralization of authority, and guaranteed the efficient execution of -orders, which the Government issued to business, in the interest of a -promotion of a war economy. And the overwhelming support given by German -industrialists to the Nazi war program is very vividly described in a -speech prepared by Gustav Krupp in January of 1944, for delivery at the -University of Berlin; and I must again respectfully refer Your Honors to -the document in your book bearing the identification Number D-317. - -I shall not, of course, bore this court with a reading of that whole -document, but I should like to quote from it without wrenching any of -the material from its true context. - -And this statement is found beginning in the third and the fourth -paragraphs, being the first large paragraph on the first page: - - “War material is lifesaving for one’s own people, and whoever - works and performs in those spheres can be proud of it. Here, - enterprise as a whole finds its highest justification of - existence. This justification, I may inject this here, - crystallized especially during the time of interregnum between - 1919 and 1933, when Germany was dying down disarmed. . . .” - -And further on: - - “It is the one great merit of the entire German war economy that - it did not remain idle during those bad years, even though its - activity could not be brought to light for obvious reasons. - Through years of secret work, scientific and basic groundwork - was laid in order to be ready again to work for the German Armed - Forces at the appointed hour without loss of time or - experience.” - -And further quoting from that same speech, and the last paragraph, -particularly on the first page: - - “Only through this secret activity of German enterprise, - together with the experience gained meanwhile through production - of peacetime goods, was it possible, after 1933, to fall into - step with the new tasks arrived at, restoring Germany’s military - power. Only through all that could the entirely new and various - problems, brought up by the Führer’s Four Year Plan for German - enterprise, be mastered. It was necessary to exploit new raw - materials, to explore and experiment, to invest capital in order - to make German economy independent and strong—in short, to make - it war-worthy.” - -Quoting even further from this same speech: - - “I think I may state here that the German enterprises followed - the new ways enthusiastically, that they made the great - intentions of the Führer their own, by fair competition and - conscious gratitude, and became his faithful followers. How else - could the tasks between 1933 and 1939, and especially those - after 1939, have been overcome?” - -It must be emphasized that this secret rearmament program was launched -immediately upon the seizure of power by the Nazi conspirators. On April -4, 1933 the Reich Cabinet passed a resolution establishing a Reich -Defense Council. The function of this Council was secretly to mobilize -for war; and at the second meeting of the working committee of the -Councillors for Reich Defense, which was, by the way, the predecessor of -the Reich Defense Council,—at that second meeting which was held on May -22nd of 1933, the chairman was the Defendant Keitel, then Colonel -Keitel; and he stated that the Reich Defense Council would immediately -undertake to prepare for war emergency. He stressed the urgency of the -task of organizing a war economy, and announced that the Council stood -ready to brush aside all of their obstacles. Fully aware of the fact -that their action was in flagrant violation of the Treaty of Versailles, -the Defendant Keitel emphasized the extreme importance of absolute -secrecy when he said, and I quote from the document bearing the number -EC-177, on Page 5 of that document. Colonel Keitel is speaking, and he -said: - - “No document ought to be lost, since otherwise it may fall into - the hands of the enemies’ intelligence service. Orally - transmitted matters are not provable; they can be denied by us - in Geneva.” - -The singleness of purpose with which the Nazi conspirators geared the -German economy to the forging of a war machine is even further shown by -the secret minutes of the sixth meeting of the working committee of the -so-called Reich Defense Council, held on the 7th of February 1934, as -shown in the document bearing the number EC-404, marked “Secret Command -Matter”, and dated the 7th of February 1934. At this meeting, Lieutenant -General Beck pointed out that: “The actual state of preparation is the -purpose of this session.” - -Parenthetically, I might say that on the first page of that document it -appears that besides Lieutenant General Beck, the Defendant Jodl was -present, then Lieutenant Colonel Jodl. There was a Captain Schmundt; and -there was a Colonel Guderian there; and there was a Major General Von -Reichenau; there was a Major Warlimont; and these are names that Your -Honors will hear more of in the course of the presentation of this case. - -Detailed measures of financing a future war were discussed and it was -pointed out that the financial aspects of the war economy would be -regulated by the Reich Finance Ministry and the Reichsbank, which was -headed by the Defendant Schacht. - -On May 31st of 1935—as stated earlier in this morning’s discussion—the -Defendant Schacht was secretly appointed plenipotentiary-general of the -war economy, and he had the express function of placing all economic -forces of the nation in the services of the Nazi war machine. - -By the secret defense law of May 21, 1935, under which Schacht received -this secret appointment, he was in effect, given charge of the entire -war economy. In case of war, he was to be virtual economic dictator of -Germany. His task was to place all economic forces into the service for -the conduct of the war and to secure economically the life of the German -people. The Ministers of Economy, of Food, Agriculture, Labor, Forestry, -as well as all Reich agencies directly under the Führer, were -subordinated to him. He was to be responsible for the financing as well -as for the conduct of the war; and he was even authorized to issue -ordinances within his sphere of responsibility, even if these deviated -from the existing laws. - -The rearmament of Germany proceeded at an amazingly rapid pace. By the -summer of 1935, the Nazi conspirators were emboldened to make plans for -the reoccupation of the Rhineland; and at the tenth meeting of this same -working committee of the Council, the question of measures to be taken -in connection with the proposed reoccupation of the Rhineland were -discussed. - -I refer to the document bearing the number EC-405. - -At that meeting, held on the 26th day of June 1935, it was said that the -Rhineland required special treatment, because of the assurances given by -Hitler to the French that no military action was being undertaken in the -de-militarized zone. Among the matters requiring special treatment was -the preparation of economic mobilization, a task specifically entrusted -to the Defendant Schacht, as secret Plenipotentiary for the War Economy. - -THE PRESIDENT: Are you reading from this document? - -MR. DODD: I am quoting in part from it, Your Honor, and it is upon the -document that I base my statements which can be found therein on Pages 4 -and 5. I dislike annoying the Court with constant references to these -documents, but I thought it would be the best way to proceed so as fully -to inform the Court. - -THE PRESIDENT: Well if you tell us where it is in the document we can -follow it in the document. - -MR. DODD: On Page 4, the middle of the page, the fifth paragraph, the -first sentence: “The de-militarized zone requires special treatment.” -And on Page 5, (j), under “the preparations,” “Preparation of economic -mobilization.” On Page 4, the last paragraph just before the setting-out -of the (a), (b), (c), and (d), it is said. . . . - -THE PRESIDENT: I think you ought to read on Page 4, the last paragraph -but one: “Since political entanglements. . . .” - -MR. DODD: - - “Since political entanglements abroad must be avoided at present - under all circumstances . . . only those preparatory measures - that are urgently necessary may be carried out. The existence of - such preparations, or the intention of them must be kept in - strictest secrecy in the zone itself as well as in the rest of - the Reich.” - -The preparations are then set out, and they include, as I have indicated -a few minutes ago, as the last one in the list, the preparations for -economic mobilization. - -There are many others, of course. The preliminary mustering of -horse-drawn and motor vehicles, preparation for evacuation measures, and -so forth. We say—passing now from that document—we say the rapid -success of the German re-armament is attributable to the greatest extent -to the work of the Defendant Schacht. In the fall of 1934, the Nazi -conspirators announced the so-called “New Plan,” aiming at the control -of imports and exports in order to obtain the raw materials which were -needed for armaments and the foreign currency which was required to -sustain the armament program. This new plan was the creation of the -Defendant Schacht, and under the plan, the Defendant Schacht controlled -imports by extending the system of supervisory boards for import -control, which was previously limited to the main groups of raw -materials, to all goods imported into Germany, whether raw materials, -semi-manufactured goods, or finished products. The requirement of -licenses for imports enabled the Nazi conspirators to restrict imports -to those commodities which served their war aims. - -Subsequently, in February of 1935, the “Devisen” Law was passed which -can be found by reference in the _Reichsgesetzblatt_ of 1935, Part I, -Page 105; and under it, all transactions involving foreign exchange were -subject to the approval of Devisenstellen (the Foreign Exchange Control -Offices). By thus controlling the disposition of foreign exchange, the -conspirators were able to manipulate foreign trade so as to serve their -needs and desires. - -Thus every aspect of the German economy was being geared to war under -the guidance particularly of the Defendant Schacht. In a study of the -economic mobilization for war as of 30 September 1934, it was stated -that steps had already been taken to build up stock piles, to construct -new facilities for the production of scarce goods, and to redeploy -industry, to secure areas and to control fiscal and trade policies. -References were made to the fact that the task of stock piling had been -hampered by the requirement of secrecy and camouflage. Reserves of -automobile fuels and stocks of coal were being accumulated and the -production of synthetic oil was accelerated. Civilian supply was -purposely organized so that most plants would be working for the German -Armed Forces. Studies were made of the possibility of barter trade with -supposedly neutral countries in case of war. - -The matter of financing the armament program presented a difficult -problem for the conspirators. In 1934 and 1935 the German economy could -by no possibility have raised funds for their extensive rearmament -program through taxes and public loans. From the outset, the armament -program involved “the engagement of the last reserves.” - -Apart from the problem of raising the huge sums required to sustain this -program, the Nazi conspirators were exceedingly anxious, in the early -stages, to conceal the extent of their feverish armament activities. - -After considering various techniques of financing the armament program, -the Defendant Schacht proposed the use of so-called “mefo” bills. One of -the primary advantages of this method was the fact that figures -indicating the extent of rearmament that would have become public -through the use of other methods could be kept secret through the use of -mefo bills, and mefo bills were used exclusively for armament financing. - -Transactions in mefo bills worked as follows: - -Mefo bills were drawn by armament contractors and accepted by a limited -liability company, [_The Metallurgische Forschungsgesellschaft m. b. -H._], the initials of which spell mefo from whence the transaction takes -its name. This company had a nominal capital of 1 million Reichsmarks -and was therefore merely a dummy organization. The bills were received -by all German banks for possible rediscounting with the Reichsbank, and -the bills were guaranteed by the Reich. Their secrecy was assured by the -fact that they appeared neither in the published statements of the -Reichsbank nor in the budget figures. - -The mefo bill system continued to be used until April 1 of 1938. To that -date, 12 billion Reichsmarks of mefo bills for the financing of -rearmament had been issued. Since it was no longer deemed necessary in -April of 1938 to conceal the vast progress of German rearmament, mefo -financing was discontinued at that time. - -A further source of funds which the Defendant Schacht drew upon to -finance the Secret Armament Program were the funds of political -opponents of the Nazi regime, and marks of foreigners on deposit in the -Reichsbank. As Schacht stated—and I am quoting: “Our armaments are also -financed partly with the credits of our political opponents.” - -That statement may be found in a memorandum from the Defendant Schacht -to Hitler, dated 3 May 1935, and it bears the number in the document -book of 1168-PS, and the specific sentence is found in the second -paragraph. - -The outstanding mefo bills at all times represented a threat to the -stability of the currency because they could be tendered to the -Reichsbank for discount, in which case the currency circulation would -automatically have to be increased. Thus, there was an ever-present -threat of inflation. The Defendant Schacht continued on his course, -because he stands, he said, “with unswerving loyalty to the Führer -because he fully recognizes the basic ideas of National Socialism and -because at the end, the disturbances, compared to the great task, can be -considered irrelevant.” - -High-ranking military officers paid tribute to the Defendant Schacht’s -contrivances on behalf of the Nazi war machine. In an article written -for the _Military Weekly Gazette_ in January of 1937, it is said: - - “The German Defense Force commemorates Dr. Schacht today as one - of the men who have done imperishable things for it and its - development in accordance with the directions from the Führer - and Reich Chancellor. The Defense Force owes it to Schacht’s - skill and great ability that, in defiance of all currency - difficulties, it, according to plan, has been able to grow up to - its present strength from an army of 100,000 men.” - -After the reoccupation of the Rhineland, the Nazi conspirators -re-doubled their efforts to prepare Germany for a major war. The Four -Year Plan, as we have indicated earlier, was proclaimed by Hitler in his -address at the Nuremberg Party convention on the 9th day of September in -1936, and it was given a statutory foundation by the decree concerning -the execution of the Four Year Plan dated the 18th day of October, 1936, -which is found in the _Reichsgesetzblatt_ of 1936, in the first part, on -Page 887. By this decree the Defendant Göring was put in charge of the -plan. He was authorized to enact any legal and administrative measures -deemed necessary by him for the accomplishment of his task, and to issue -orders and instructions to all Government agencies, including the -highest Reich authorities. - -The purpose of the plan was to enable Nazi Germany to attain complete -self-sufficiency in essential raw materials, notably motor fuel, rubber, -textile fiber, and non-ferrous metals, and to intensify preparations for -war. The development of synthetic products was greatly accelerated -despite their high costs. - -Apart from the self-sufficiency program, however, the Nazi conspirators -required foreign exchange to finance propaganda and espionage activities -abroad; Thus, in a speech on November 1 of 1937, before the -Wehrmachtakademie, General Thomas stated: - - “If you consider that one will need during the war considerable - means in order to organize the necessary propaganda in order to - pay for the espionage service and for similar purposes, then one - should be clear that our internal mark would be of no use - therefore, and that foreign exchange will be needed.” - -This particular need for foreign exchange was reduced in part by the -virtue of the espionage and propaganda services rendered free of charge -to the Nazi State by some leading German industrial concerns. - -I hold in my hand a document bearing the number D-206. It is dated at -Essen the 12th day of October 1935. It was found in the files of the -Krupp Company by representatives of the United States and the British -armies. I shall not read all of it unless Your Honors require it, but -I’ll start at the beginning by way of establishing its purpose and the -information contained therein. It is entitled “Memorandum.” There is a -subheading: “Concerns: Distribution of official propaganda literature -abroad with the help of our foreign connections.” It goes on to say -that: - - “On the morning of October 11 the district representative of - Ribbentrop’s private foreign office (Dienststelle Ribbentrop) - made an appointment for a conference by telephone.”—and - that—“A Mr. Lackmann arrived at the appointed time. . . . “In - answer to my question with whom I was dealing, and which - official bureau he represented, he informed me that he was not - himself the district representative of Ribbentrop’s private - foreign office, that a Mr. Landrat Bollmann was such, and that - he himself had come at Mr. Bollmann’s order.” - -The next paragraph states: - - “. . . that there exists a great mixup in the field of foreign - propaganda, and that Ribbentrop’s private foreign office wants - to create a tighter organization for foreign propaganda. For - this purpose the support of our firm and above all an index of - addresses . . . were needed.” - -In the next sentence, of the third paragraph, I would like to read: - - “I informed Mr. L that our firm had put itself years ago at the - disposal of official bureaus for purposes of foreign propaganda, - and that we had supported all requests addressed to us to the - utmost.” - -I now hold in my hand the document bearing the number D-167, which is -also a copy of a document found in the files of the Krupp Company by -representatives of the American and the British Armies. It is dated the -14th day of October 1937, and states that it is a memorandum of Herr -Sonnenberg on the meeting at Essen on the 12th day of October 1937 and -it indicates that one Menzel representing the intelligence of the -Combined Services Ministry, his department coming under the Defense -Office, asked for intelligence on foreign armaments, but not including -matters published in newspapers, intelligence received by Krupp from -their agents abroad and through other channels to be passed on to the -Combined Services Intelligence. - -Finally, the third paragraph states that: “On our part we undertook to -supply information to the Combined Services Ministry . . . as required.” - -I have concluded reading from that document, and I pass now to discuss -the conspirators’ program, which proceeded, as I have said so many times -here today, with amazing—really amazing speed. The production of steel, -for example, as shown in official German publications, rose as follows: - -In the year of 1933, 74,000 tons were produced; in 1934, 105,000 tons; -1935, 145,000 tons; 1936, 186,000 tons; 1937, 217,000 tons; and in 1938, -477,000 tons. The production of gasoline increased at even a greater -tempo: from 370,000 tons in 1934 to 1,494,000 tons in 1938. - -The Nazi conspirators pressed the completion of the armament program -with a sense of urgency which clearly indicated their awareness of the -imminence of war. At a 4th of September meeting in 1936 Göring pointed -out that “all measures have to be taken just as if we were actually in -the state of imminent danger of war.” He pointed out that “if war should -break out tomorrow we would be forced to take measures from which we -might . . . shy away at the present moment. They are therefore to be -taken.” The extreme urgency was manifested by Göring’s remark that -“Existing reserves will have to be touched for the purpose of carrying -us over this difficulty until the goal ordered by the Führer has been -reached . . . in case of war,” he added, “they are not a reliable -backing in any case.” - -By a letter marked “Top Secret”, on the 21 of August of 1936, the -Defendant Schacht was advised that Hitler had ordered that all -formations of the Air Force be ready by April 1 of 1937. This served to -accentuate the urgent sense of immediacy that had pervaded the Nazi war -economy from the outset. Flushed with their successes in the Rhineland, -the Nazi conspirators were laying the groundwork for further aggressive -action. - -THE PRESIDENT: Insofar as I understand you, you have not referred us to -any document since Document 167. - -MR. DODD: No, Your Honor, the figures on the production of steel and of -oil are from the statistical year book for the German Reich of 1939 and -1940 and the statistical year book for the German Reich of 1941 and -’42—that is, with respect to the steel figures. And the figures which I -quoted with respect to the production of gasoline are from the -statistical year book for the German Reich in 1941 and 1942. The -statements of the Defendant Göring are based upon the document marked -EC-416, in the document book. - -THE PRESIDENT: That is the document you have already referred to, isn’t -it? - -MR. DODD: Yes, it has been referred to heretofore, I believe. Some of -these documents contain references to more than one part of the -presentation, and I have to refer to them at different times in the -presentation. . . . - -THE PRESIDENT: All right. Go on, if you want to refer to it. - -MR. DODD: The sixth paragraph on the first page: - - “Existing reserves will have to be touched for the purpose of - carrying us over this difficulty until the goal ordered by the - Führer has been reached, and then in case of war, they are not a - reliable backing in any case.” - -And on the second page, the eighth paragraph down: - - “If war should break out tomorrow, we would be forced to take - measures from which we might possibly still shy away at the - present moment. They are therefore to be taken.” - -With reference to the assertion that the Defendant Schacht was advised -that Hitler had ordered that all formations of the Air Force be ready by -April 1, 1937, I respectfully refer to Document 1301-PS, dated 31 August -1936. I am advised that that document should bear an additional number. -It should read 1301-PS-7. On the first page, if Your Honor pleases, the -third paragraph, or the paragraph marked “3” and after the words “air -force” . . . states that according to an order of the Führer, the -setting up of all Air Force units had to be completed on April 1, 1937; -and if Your Honors will turn the page to Page 20, about midway in the -page, you will observe that a copy of this document was sent to the -president of the Reichsbank, Dr. Schacht. - -After their successes in Austria and in the Sudetenland, the Nazi -conspirators redoubled their efforts to equip themselves for a war of -aggression, and in a conference on October 14, 1938, shortly before the -Nazi conspirators made their first demands on Poland, the Defendant -Göring stated that the Führer had instructed him to carry out a gigantic -program, by comparison with which the performances thus far were -insignificant. This faced difficulties which he would overcome with the -greatest energy and ruthlessness. And that statement may be found in the -Document 1301-PS, on Page 25 of that document, and particularly the -second sentence of the opening paragraph: - - “Everybody knows from the press what the world situation looks - like, and therefore the Führer has issued an order to him to - carry out a gigantic program compared to which previous - achievements are insignificant. There are difficulties in the - way which he will overcome with the utmost energy and - ruthlessness.” - -The supply of foreign currency had shrunk because of preparations for -the invasion of Czechoslovakia, and it was considered necessary to -replenish it. “These”—and I am now referring to the third paragraph of -that same Page 25 of Document 1301-PS: - - “These gains made through the export are to be used for an - increased armament. The armament should not be curtailed by the - export activities. He received the order from the Führer to - increase the armament to an abnormal extent, the Air Force - having first priority. Within the shortest time, the Air Force - is to be increased fivefold; also the Navy should get on more - rapidly, and the Army should procure large amounts of offensive - weapons at a faster rate, particularly heavy artillery pieces - and heavy tanks. Along with this manufactured armaments must go, - especially fuel, powder and explosives are to be moved into the - foreground. It should be coupled with the accelerated - construction of highways, canals, and particularly of the - railroads.” - -In the course of these preparations for war, a clash of wills ensued -between two men, the Defendant Göring and the Defendant Schacht, as a -result of which the Defendant Schacht resigned his position as head of -the Ministry of Economics and plenipotentiary for the war economy in -November of 1937 and was removed from the presidency of the Reichsbank -in January of 1939. I do not propose, at this moment, to go into the -details of this controversy. There will be more said on that subject at -a later stage in these proceedings, but for the present, I should like -to have it noted that it is our contention that Schacht’s departure in -no way implied any disagreement with the major war aims of the Nazis. -The Defendant Schacht took particular pride in his vast attainments in -the financial and economic fields in aid of the Nazi war machine. And in -the document bearing the number EC-257, which is a copy of a letter from -the Defendant Schacht to General Thomas, in the first paragraph of the -letter: - - “I think back with much satisfaction to the work in the Ministry - of Economics which afforded me the opportunity to assist in the - rearmament of the German people in the most critical period, not - only in the financial but also in the economic sphere. I have - always considered a rearmament of the German people as _conditio - sine qua non_ of the establishment of a new German nation.” - -The second paragraph is of a more personal nature and has no real -bearing on the issues before us at this time. - -In the document labeled EC-252, a letter written to General Von -Blomberg, dated the 8th day of July 1937, the Defendant Schacht wrote: - - “The direction of the war economy by the plenipotentiary would - in that event never take place entirely independent from the - rest of the war mechanism, but would be aimed at accomplishment - of the political war purpose with the assistance of all economic - forces. I am entirely willing, therefore, to participate in this - way in the preparation of the forthcoming order giving effect to - the Defense Act.” - -In the spring of 1937, the Defendant Schacht participated with -representatives of the three branches of the Armed Forces in war games -in war economy which was something new by way of military exercises. The -war games in war economy were held at Godesberg, Germany. And I refer to -the document bearing the label EC-174. It has as a heading, or -subheading, under the summary: “War economy trip to Godesberg undertaken -by General Staff between the 25th of May and the 2d of June,” and it -goes on to outline in some slight detail that there was a welcome to the -General Staff war economy trip. It tells something in a rather vague and -not altogether clear way of just how a war game in war economy was -conducted but it leaves no doubt in the mind that such a war game in war -economy had been conducted at Godesberg at that time. And on the second -page of this document, the last paragraph is the translation of Part 1 -of the speech welcoming Dr. Schacht. It says: - - “Before I start with the discussion of the war game in war - economy, I have to express how grateful we all are that you, - President Dr. Schacht, have gone to the trouble to personally - participate in our final discussion today despite all your other - activities. This proves to us your deep interest in war economy - tasks shown at all times and your presence here is renewed proof - that you are willing to facilitate for us soldiers the difficult - war-economic preparations and to strengthen a harmonious - cooperation with your offices.” - -I should also like to call the Court’s attention to the next to the last -paragraph on the first page. It is a one-sentence paragraph, and it -simply says, “I want to point out, however, that all material and all -information received has to be kept in strict secrecy,” and it refers to -the preceding paragraph concerning the war games in war economy. - -It appears that the annexation of Austria was a goal which the Defendant -Schacht had long sought, for in a speech to the employees of the former -Austrian National Bank, as set out in the document bearing the label -EC-297, and particularly the second paragraph of the first page of that -document, nearly at the end, four or five lines from the end of that -paragraph, we find these words immediately after “large applause”: - - “Austria has certainly a great mission, namely, to be the bearer - of German culture, to insure respect and regard for the German - name, especially in the direction of the southeast. Such a - mission can only be performed within the Great German Reich and - based on the power of a nation of 75 millions, which, regardless - of the wish of the opponents, forms the heart and the soul of - Europe.” - -Dr. Schacht goes on to say: - - “We have read a lot in the foreign press during the last few - days that this aim, the union of both countries, is to a certain - degree justified, but that the method of effecting this union - was terrible. . . . This method, which certainly did not suit - one or another foreigner, is nothing but the consequence of - countless perfidies and brutal acts of violence which foreign - countries have practiced against us.” - -And I refer now to Page 3 of this same document and to the fourth -paragraph, about the center of the page, and reading from it: - - “I am known for sometimes expressing thoughts which give offense - and there I would not like to depart from this custom. I know - that there are even here, in this country a few people—I - believe they are not too numerous—who find fault with the - events of the last few days; but nobody, I believe, doubts the - goal, and it should be said to all grumblers that you can’t - satisfy everybody. One person says he would have done it maybe - in one way, but the remarkable thing is that they did not do it, - and that it was only done by our Adolf Hitler; and if there is - still something left to be improved, then those grumblers should - try to bring about these improvements from the German Reich, and - within the German community, but not to disturb it from - without.” - -In the memorandum of the 7th of January 1939, written by the Defendant -Schacht and other directors of the Reichsbank to Hitler, urging a -balancing of the budget in view of the threatening danger of inflation, -it was stated—and I now refer to the document bearing the label EC-369 -and particularly to the paragraph at the bottom of the first page of -that document: - - “From the beginning the Reichsbank has been aware of the fact - that a successful foreign policy can be attained only by the - reconstruction of the German Armed Forces. It (the Reichsbank) - therefore assumed to a very great extent the responsibility to - finance the rearmament in spite of the inherent dangers to the - currency. The justification thereof was the necessity, which - pushed all other considerations into the background, to carry - through the armament at once, out of nothing, and furthermore - under camouflage, which made a respect-commanding foreign policy - possible.” - -The Reichsbank directors, as experts on money, believed that a point had -been reached where greater production of armaments was no longer -possible. We say that was merely a judgment on the situation and not a -moral principle, for there was no opposition to Hitler’s policy of -aggression. Doubts were ascertained only as to whether he could finance -that policy. Hitler’s letter to Schacht on the occasion of Schacht’s -departure from the Reichsbank, as contained in Document EC-397, pays -high tribute to Schacht’s great efforts in furthering the program of the -Nazi conspirators. The Armed Forces by now had enabled Hitler to take -Austria and the Sudetenland. We say Schacht’s task up to that point had -been well done. And to quote from Document EC-397 in the words of -Hitler, in a letter which he wrote to the Defendant Schacht, “Your name, -above all, will always be connected with the first epoch of the national -rearmament.” - -Even though dismissed from the presidency of the Reichsbank, Schacht was -retained as a Minister without portfolio and special confidential -adviser to Hitler. The Defendant Funk stepped into Schacht’s position as -President of the Reichsbank. And I ask at this point that the Court -might take judicial notice of the _Völkischer Beobachter_ of January 21, -1939. The Defendant Funk was completely uninhibited by fears of -inflation, for like Göring, under whom he had served in the Four Year -Plan, he recognized no obstacles to the plan to attack Poland. - -In Document 699-PS, in a letter from the Defendant Funk to Hitler, -written on August 25 of 1939, only a few days before the attack on -Poland, the Defendant Funk reported to Hitler that the Reichsbank was -prepared to withstand any disturbances of the international currency and -credit system occasioned by a large-scale war. He said that he had -secretly transferred all available funds of the Reichsbank abroad into -gold, and that Germany stood ready to meet the financial and economic -tasks which lay ahead. - -And so it seems plain and clear from the writings, from the acts, from -the speeches of the Nazi conspirators themselves, that they did in fact -direct the whole of the German economy toward preparation for aggressive -war. To paraphrase the words that the Defendant Göring once used, these -conspirators gave the German people “guns instead of butter,” and we say -they also gave history its most striking example of a nation gearing -itself in time of peace to the single purpose of aggressive war. Their -economic preparations, formulated and applied with the ruthless energy -of the Defendant Göring, with the cynical financial wizardry of the -Defendant Schacht, and the willing complicity of Funk, among others, -were the indispensable first act in the heart-breaking tragedy which -their aggression inflicted upon the world. - -I should like to offer, if I may at this time, Your Honor, those -documents which I have referred to in the course of this discussion. We -have here the original documents in the folders, and they compare with -the translations which have been submitted to the Court. - -THE PRESIDENT: Have the defendants had the opportunity of inspecting -these documents? - -MR. DODD: I doubt that they have had full opportunity to inspect them, -Your Honor. The photostats are there, but I don’t think they have had -time to inspect them because they haven’t been there long enough for -that. - -THE PRESIDENT: I think that they should have full opportunity of -inspecting them and comparing with the copies which have been submitted -to us before the originals are put in. - -MR. DODD: Very well, Your Honor. We may offer them at a later date, as I -understand, Your Honor? - -THE PRESIDENT: Certainly. The Tribunal will adjourn for 10 minutes. - - [_A recess was taken._] - -COLONEL STOREY: May it please the Tribunal: The U. S. Prosecution now -passes into the aggressive war phase of the case and it will be -presented by Mr. Alderman. - -MR. ALDERMAN: May it please the Tribunal: I rise to present on behalf of -the United States Chief of Counsel, evidence to support the allegation -of Count One of the Indictment relating to the planning, preparation, -initiation, and waging of illegal and aggressive war, and relating to -the conspiracy to commit that crime. - -The aggressive war phase of the case, the aggressive war phase of the -conspiracy case under Count One, and the aggressive war phase of the -entire case is really, we think, the heart of the case. If we did not -reach it in our presentation we would not reach the heart of the case. -If we did not present it to the Tribunal in the necessary detail, we -would fail to present what is necessary to the heart of the case. - -After all, everything else in this case, however dramatic, however -sordid, however shocking and revolting to the common instincts of -civilized peoples, is incidental to, or subordinate to, the aggressive -war aspect of the case. - -All the dramatic story of what went on in Germany in the early phases of -the conspiracy—the ideologies used, the techniques of terror used, the -suppressions of human freedom employed in the seizure of power, and even -the concentration camps and the Crimes against Humanity, the -persecutions, tortures, and murders committed—all these things would -have little juridical international significance except for the fact -that they were the preparation for the commission of aggressions against -peaceful neighboring peoples. - -Even the aspects of the case involving War Crimes in the strict sense -are aspects which are merely the inevitable, proximate result of the -wars of aggression launched and waged by these conspirators, and of the -kind of warfare they waged—that is—total war, the natural result of -the totalitarian party-dominated state that waged it, and atrocious war, -the natural result of the atrocious doctrines, designs, and purposes of -these war-makers. - -For these reasons, I repeat that in our view the phases of the case -dealing with territorial gains acquired by threats of force and with -actual aggressions and aggressive wars constitute the real heart of the -case. Accordingly, we ask the indulgence of the Tribunal if for these -reasons we make the presentation of this part of the case as detailed as -seems to us necessary in view of the outstanding importance of the -subject matter. - -The general scope of the case to be presented by the American -Prosecution has been stated in the opening address by Mr. Justice -Jackson. That address indicated to the Tribunal the general nature and -character of the evidence to be offered by the American Prosecution in -support of the allegations with which I shall deal. However, before -approaching the actual presentation of that evidence, it seems to us -that it would be helpful to an orderly presentation of the case, to -address the Tribunal in an introductory way concerning this specific -segment of the Prosecution’s case. In doing so, I shall not attempt to -retrace the ground so ably covered by Mr. Justice Jackson. On the -contrary, I shall confine my introductory remarks to matters -specifically and peculiarly applicable to that part of the American case -relating to the crime of illegal warfare, and the Common Plan or -Conspiracy to commit that crime. - -The substantive rule of law which must guide the considerations of the -Tribunal on this aspect of the case, and the rule of law which must be -controlling in the final judgment of the Tribunal on this part of the -case, is stated in Article 6 of the Charter of the International -Military Tribunal. Article 6, so far as pertinent here, reads as -follows: - - “_Article_ 6. The Tribunal established by the Agreement referred - to in Article 1 hereof for the trial and punishment of the major - war criminals of the European Axis countries shall have the - power to try and punish persons who, acting in the interests of - the European Axis countries, whether as individuals or as - members of organizations, committed any of the following crimes. - - “The following acts, or any of them, are crimes coming within - the jurisdiction of the Tribunal for which there shall be - individual responsibility: - - “(a) _CRIMES AGAINST PEACE_: namely, planning, preparation, - initiation or waging of a war of aggression, or a war in - violation of international treaties, agreements or assurances, - or participation in a Common Plan or Conspiracy for the - accomplishment of any of the foregoing. . . .” - -Subparagraphs (b) and (c) of Article 6 are not pertinent to this aspect -of the case. However, the unnumbered final paragraph of Article 6 is of -controlling importance on this aspect of the case. That paragraph reads: - - “Leaders, organizers, instigators, and accomplices participating - in the formulation or execution of a Common Plan or Conspiracy - to commit any of the foregoing crimes are responsible for all - acts performed by any persons in execution of such plan.” - -In receiving evidence on this aspect of the case I would request the -Tribunal to have in mind five principles derived from the portions of -the Charter I have just read: - -(1) The Charter imposes “individual responsibility” for acts -constituting “Crimes against Peace”; - -(2) The term “Crimes against Peace” embraces planning, preparation, -initiation, or waging of illegal war; - -(3) The term “Crimes against Peace” also embraces participation in a -Common Plan or Conspiracy to commit illegal war; - -(4) An illegal war consists of either a war of aggression, or a war in -violation of international treaties, agreements, or assurances. These -two kinds of illegal war might not necessarily be the same. It will be -sufficient for the Prosecution to show that the war was aggressive -irrespective of breach of international treaties, agreements, or -assurances. On the other hand it would be sufficient for the Prosecution -to show that the war was in violation of international treaties, -agreements, or assurances irrespective of whether or not it was a war of -aggression. We think the evidence in this case will establish -conclusively that the wars planned, prepared, initiated, and waged by -these defendants, and the wars which were the object of their common -plan and conspiracy, were illegal for both reasons. - -The fifth principle which I ask you to bear in mind, is that individual -criminal responsibility of a defendant is imposed by the Charter not -merely by reason of direct, immediate participation in the crime. It is -sufficient for the Prosecution to show that a defendant was a leader, an -organizer, instigator, or accomplice who participated either in the -formulation or in the execution of a Common Plan or Conspiracy to commit -Crimes against Peace. In the case of many of the defendants the evidence -will show direct and immediate personal participation in the substantive -crime itself. In the case of some of the defendants the evidence goes to -their participation in the formulation and execution of a Common Plan or -Conspiracy. In the case of each defendant, we think, the evidence will -establish full individual responsibility for Crimes against Peace, as -defined in the Charter of this Tribunal. In this connection I wish to -emphasize that the Charter declares that the responsibility of -conspirators extends not only to their own acts, but also to all acts -performed by any persons in execution of the conspiracy. - -It is familiar law in my country that if two or more persons set out to -rob a bank, in accordance with a criminal scheme to that end, and in the -course of carrying out their scheme one of the conspirators commits the -crime of murder, all of the participants in the planning and execution -of the bank robbery are guilty of murder, whether or not they had any -other personal participation in the killing. This is a simple rule of -law declared in the Charter. All the parties to a Common Plan or -Conspiracy are the agents of each other and each is responsible as -principal for the acts of all the others as his agents. - -So much for the terms of the Charter having a bearing on this aspect of -the case. - -I invite the attention of the Tribunal to the portions of the Indictment -lodged against the defendants on trial which relate to the crimes of -illegal war or war of aggression. Particularly I ask the Tribunal to -advert to the statements of offense under Count One and Count Two of the -Indictment in this case. - -The statement of offense under Count One of the Indictment is contained -in Paragraph III. The offense there stated, so far as pertinent to the -present discussion, is: - - “All the defendants, with divers other persons, during a period - of years preceding 8th May 1945, participated as leaders, - organizers, instigators, or accomplices in the formulation or - execution of a Common Plan or Conspiracy to commit, or which - involved the commission of, Crimes against Peace, as defined in - the Charter of this Tribunal. . . . The Common Plan or - Conspiracy embraced the commission of Crimes against Peace, in - that the defendants planned, prepared, initiated, and waged wars - of aggression, which were also wars in violation of - international treaties, agreements, or assurances.” - -The statement of offense under Count Two of the Indictment is also -relevant at this point. It must be obvious that essentially Counts One -and Two interlock in this Indictment. The substance of the offense -stated under Count Two, Paragraph V of the Indictment is this: - - “All the defendants with divers other persons, during a period - of years preceding 8 May 1945, participated in the planning, - preparation, incitation, and waging of wars of aggression which - were also wars in violation of international treaties, - agreements, and assurances.” - -The emphasis in the statement of offense under Count One of the -Indictment is on the Common Plan or Conspiracy. The emphasis under Count -Two of the Indictment is on the substantive crimes to which the -conspiracy related and which were committed in the course of and -pursuant to that conspiracy. - -I should hasten to add at this point that in the division of the case as -between the Chief Prosecutors of the four Prosecuting Governments, -primary responsibility for the presentation of evidence supporting Count -One has been placed on the American prosecutor, and primary -responsibility for the presentation of the evidence supporting Count Two -of the Indictment has been placed on the British prosecutor. - -But as we shall show somewhat later, there will to some extent be a -cooperative effort as between the two prosecutors to present certain -phases of both counts together. In addition to the statement of offense -relating to illegal war in Paragraph III under Count One of the -Indictment, Count One also contains what amounts to a bill of -particulars of that offense. In so far as those particulars relate to -illegal war, they are contained in Paragraph IV (F) of the Indictment -which is set out in the English text on Page 7 through the top of Page -10 under the general heading “Utilization of Nazi Control for Foreign -Aggression.” The allegations of this bill of particulars have been read -in open court, in the presence of the defendants, and the Tribunal, as -well as the defendants, are certainly familiar with the contents of -those allegations. I call attention to them now, however, in order to -focus attention on the parts of the Indictment which are relevant in -consideration of the evidence which I intend to bring before the -Tribunal. - -My introduction to the presentation of evidence in this matter would be -faulty if I did not invite the Tribunal to consider with me the -relationship between history and the evidence in this case. Neither -counsel nor Tribunal can orient themselves to the problem at -hand—neither counsel nor Tribunal can present or consider the evidence -in this case in its proper context, neither can argue or evaluate the -staggering implications of the evidence to be presented—without reading -that history, reading that evidence against the background of recorded -history. And by recorded history, I mean the history merely of the last -12 years. - -Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, of the U. S. Supreme Court, found in his -judicial experience that “a page of history is worth a volume of logic.” -My recollection is that he stated it perhaps better, earlier in the -preface to his book on the common law where he said, I think, “The life -of the law has been not logic but experience.” I submit that in the -present case a page of history is worth a hundred tons of evidence. As -lawyers and judges we cannot blind ourselves to what we know as men. The -history of the past 12 years is a burning, living thing in our immediate -memory. The facts of history crowd themselves upon us and demand our -attention. - -It is common ground among all systems of jurisprudence that matters of -common knowledge need not be proved, but may receive the judicial notice -of courts without other evidence. The Charter of this Tribunal, drawing -on this uniformly recognized principle, declares in Article 21: - - “The Tribunal shall not require proof of facts of common - knowledge but shall take judicial notice thereof.” - -The facts of recorded history are the prime example of facts of common -knowledge which require no proof. No court would require evidence to -prove that the Battle of Hastings occurred in the year 1066, or that the -Bastille fell on the 14th of July 1789, or that Czar Alexander I freed -the serfs in 1863, or that George Washington was the first President of -the United States or that George III was the reigning King of England at -that time. - -If I may be allowed to interpolate, an old law professor of mine used to -present the curiosity of the law: that a judge is held to responsibility -for no knowledge of the law whatsoever, that a lawyer is held to a -reasonable knowledge of the law, and a layman is held to an absolute -knowledge of all the laws. It works inversely as to facts, or facts of -common knowledge. There, the judge is imputed to know all of those -facts, however many of them he may have forgotten as an individual man. -So one of the purposes of this presentation will be to implement the -judicial knowledge which by hypothesis exists, and which probably -actually exists. - -It is not our purpose however, to convert the record of these -proceedings into a history book. The evidence which we offer in this -case is evidence which for the moment has been concealed from -historians. It will fill in recorded history, but it must be read -against the background which common knowledge provides. The evidence in -this case consists primarily of captured documents. These documents fill -in the inside story underlying the historical record which we all -already knew. This evidence which we will offer constitutes an -illustrative spot check on history—on the history of the recent times -as the world knows it. The evidence to be offered is not a substitute -for history. We hope the Tribunal will find it to be an authentication -of history. The evidence which we have drawn from captured documents -establishes the validity of the recent history of the past 12 years—a -history of many aggressions by the Nazi conspirators accused in this -case. - -As I offer to the Tribunal document after document, I ask the Court to -see in those documents definite additions to history, the addition of -new elements long suspected and now proved. The elements which the -captured documents on this particular aspect of the case will add to -recorded history are the following: - -(1) The conspiratorial nature of the planning and preparation which -underlay the Nazi aggressions already known to history; - -(2) The deliberate premeditation which preceded those acts of -aggression; - -(3) The evil motives which led to the crimes; - -(4) The individual participation of named persons in the Nazi conspiracy -for aggression; - -(5) The deliberate falsification of the pretexts claimed by the Nazi -aggressors as the reasons for their criminal activities. - -These elements the captured documents will demonstrate beyond possible -doubt, and these elements, in the context of historical facts, we think -are all that need to be shown. - -The critical period between the Nazi seizure of power and the initiation -of the first war of aggression was a very short period. This critical -period of a lawless preparation and illegal scheming which ultimately -set the whole world aflame was unbelievably short. It covered only 6 -years, 1933 to 1939. The speed with which all this was accomplished -evidences at once the fanatical intensity of the conspirators and their -diabolical efficiency. Crowded into these 6 short years is the making of -the greatest tragedy that has ever befallen mankind. - -A full understanding of these 6 years, and of the vibrant 6 years of war -that followed, demands that we see this period of time divided into -rather definite phases, phases that reflect the development and -execution of the Nazi master plan. I suggest that the Tribunal as it -receives evidence, fit it into five phases. The first was primarily -preparatory, although it did involve overt acts. That phase covers -roughly the period from 1933 to 1936. In that period the Nazi -conspirators, having acquired governmental control of Germany by the -middle of 1933, turned their attention toward utilization of that -control for foreign aggression. Their plan at this stage was to acquire -military strength and political bargaining power to be used against -other nations. In this they succeeded. The second phase of their -aggression was shorter. It is rather interesting to see that as the -conspiracy gained strength it gained speed. During each phase the -conspirators succeeded in accomplishing more and more in less and less -time until, toward the end of the period, the rate of acceleration of -their conspiratorial movement was enormous. The second phase of their -utilization of control for foreign aggression involved the actual -seizure and absorption of Austria and Czechoslovakia in that order. By -March, the third month of 1939, they had succeeded in that phase. The -third phase may be measured in months rather than years: from March 1939 -to September 1939. The previous aggression being successful, having been -consummated without the necessity of resorting to actual war, the -conspirators had obtained much desired resources and bases and were -ready to undertake further aggressions, by means of war if necessary. By -September 1939 war was upon the world. The fourth phase of the -aggression consisted of expanding the war into a general European war of -aggression. By April 1941 the war which had theretofore involved Poland, -the United Kingdom, and France, had been expanded by invasions into -Scandinavia and into the Low Countries and into the Balkans. In the next -phase the Nazi conspirators carried the war eastward by invasion of the -territory of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and finally, -through their Pacific ally, Japan, precipitated the attack on the United -States at Pearl Harbor. - -The final result of these aggressions is fresh in the minds of all of -us. - -I turn now to certain outstanding evidence at hand. While on this phase -of the case we shall not rest exclusively on them alone; the essential -elements of the crime which I have already pointed out can be made out -by a mere handful of captured documents. My order of presentation of -these will be first to present one by one this handful of documents, -documents which prove the essential elements of the case on aggressive -war up to the hilt. These documents will leave no reasonable doubt -concerning the aggressive character of the Nazi war or concerning the -conspiratorial premeditation of that war. Some of this group of -documents are the specific basis for particular allegations in the -Indictment. As I reach those documents, I shall invite the attention of -the Tribunal to the allegations of the Indictment which are specifically -supported by them. Having proved the corpus of the crime in this way, I -will follow the presentation of this evidence with a more or less -chronological presentation of the details of the case on aggressive war -producing more detailed evidence of the relevant activities of the -conspirators from 1933 to 1941. - -The documents which we have selected for single presentation at this -point, before developing the case in detail, are 10 in number. The -documents have been selected to establish the basic facts concerning -each phase of the development of the Nazi conspiracy for aggression. -Each document is conspiratorial in nature. Each document is one, I -believe, heretofore unknown to history and each document is -self-contained and tells its own story. Those are the three standards of -selection which we have sought to apply. - -I turn to the period of 1933 to 1936, a period characterized by an -orderly, planned sequence of preparations for war. This is the period -covered by Paragraphs 1 and 2 of Section IV (F) of the Indictment, to be -found at Page 7 of the printed English text. The essential character of -this period was the formulation and execution of the plan to re-arm and -to re-occupy and fortify the Rhineland, in violation of the Treaty of -Versailles and other treaties, in order to acquire military strength and -political bargaining power to be used against other nations. - -If the Tribunal please, we have what have been referred to as document -books. They are English translations of German documents, in some cases -German versions. I shall ask that they be handed up and we will hand one -copy at the moment to counsel for the defendants. It has been physically -impossible to prepare 21 sets of them. If possible we shall try to -furnish further copies to the defendants, the original German -documents. . . . - -DR. DIX: I would be very much obliged. In order that there should be no -misunderstanding we have arranged that tomorrow we will discuss with the -Prosecution in what way the whole of the evidence may be made available -to all the Defense Counsel. It is, of course, necessary that no one -should have the advantage over the other. For this reason, while I -appreciate the good will of the Prosecution to overcome the -difficulties, I must refuse their kind offer of a copy of the book, -because I feel that in so doing I would have an unfair advantage over -the others. I am not in a position during the proceedings to hand the -evidentiary document to my colleagues. I ask you therefore to appreciate -the reasons why I have refused this document. I am convinced that -tomorrow we shall be able to agree about the way in which we can receive -evidence, and I suggest that today we try to continue as we have done up -to now. - -THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Alderman, can you inform the Tribunal how many copies -of these documents you will be able to furnish to the Tribunal by -Monday? - -MR. ALDERMAN: I cannot at the moment. If Your Honor pleases: may I make -this suggestion in connection with it, which I think may be of help to -all concerned? I think many of us have underestimated the contribution -of this interpreting system to this Trial. We all see how it has speeded -the proceeding, but in so far as my presentation of German documents is -concerned, I shall let the documents speak. I expect to read the -pertinent parts of the documents into the system so that they will go -into the transcript of record. Counsel for the German defendants will -get their transcripts in German; our French and Russian Allies will get -their transcripts in their language, and it seems to me that that is the -most helpful way to overcome this language barrier. I can recognize that -for Dr. Dix to receive a volume of documents which are English -translations of German documents might not seem very helpful to him. -Further, as an aid, we will have original German documents in court—one -copy; and if the Court will allow, I would ask that the original German -document, from which I shall read, would be passed to the German -interpreter under Colonel Dostert, so that instead of undertaking to -translate an English translation back into perhaps a bad German, he will -have the original German document before him and in that way, the exact -German text will be delivered in the daily transcript to all of the -counsel for the defendants. I hope that may be a helpful suggestion. - -THE PRESIDENT: That to some extent depends, does it not, upon how much -of the document you omit? - -MR. ALDERMAN: That is quite true, Sir. As to these 10 documents with -which I propose to deal immediately, I expect to read into the -transcript practically the whole of the documents, because the whole of -them is significant, much more significant than anything I could say. -Also all of these 10 documents were listed in the list of documents -which we furnished counsel for the defendants, I believe, the 1st of -November. - -THE PRESIDENT: You say that they were. . . . - -MR. ALDERMAN: In the list. But of course I recognize that a list of -documents is very different from the documents themselves. - -THE PRESIDENT: Are the documents very long? - -MR. ALDERMAN: Some of them are very long and some of them are very -short; you can’t generalize. Whenever it is a speech of Adolf Hitler you -can count it is fairly long. - -THE PRESIDENT: Can you not by Monday have in the hands of every member -of the Defense Counsel copies of these 10 documents? It is suggested to -me that photostating could be done quite easily. - -MR. ALDERMAN: I understand that both our photostatic facilities and our -mimeographing facilities are right up to the hilt with work. It is a -very difficult mechanical problem. - -COL. STOREY: If the Tribunal please: In further explanation, the -documents which Mr. Alderman intends to offer were on the defendants’ -list filed in the Document Center on the 1st day of November 1945. -Lieutenant Barrett had 23 copies of each one photostated as far as he -could on that list. Six copies went into the defendants’ Information -Center. Now, we can’t say at this time whether six copies—that, is -photostatic copies of each one—have been furnished to the defendants, -but whenever they wanted copies of any particular one, either the -original was exhibited to them or photostatic copies were made. - -Again, Sir, I call attention to the physical problems that are almost -insurmountable: to make 23 photostatic copies which are required of -every document. Now then, Sir. . . . - -THE PRESIDENT: If I may interrupt you, I imagine that the list which was -deposited on the 1st of November didn’t contain only these 10 documents -but contained a great number of other documents. - -COL. STOREY: That is correct, Sir. - -THE PRESIDENT: So that the defendants’ counsel wouldn’t know which out -of that list of documents were going to be relied upon. - -COL. STOREY: Except, Sir, they were notified that the Prosecution would -use all or some of those documents if necessary, and if the copies were -not furnished upon request, they have been made and delivered to them. - -May I say, Sir, that working 24 hours a day, we are trying to furnish 10 -sets of all of these to defendants’ counsel, and they will be. . . . One -complete set was delivered to defendants’ counsel here now as a -convenience to follow. The other sets, I feel certain, will be in their -hands sometime Sunday, but one complete list we now turn over to -them—not a list, complete copies. - -DR. WALTER SIEMERS (Counsel for Defendant Raeder): I should like to -point out one fact. The Prosecution declared this morning that the -documents that will be put before us today are contained in the list -which was submitted on the 1st of November, that is—in the list which -was submitted this morning. This morning a list was made available to us -in room 54. I have it in my hand. This morning nine documents were -named. Of these nine documents, only one, contrary to what the -Prosecution said, was found in the old list; the other eight documents -were neither in the old list nor in the new list. The eight other -documents are, as I ascertained at lunch time today, not in the document -room. Neither are they available in photostatic copies, so they could -not be made available to me. I think, gentlemen, that it will not be -possible for us to work on this basis. I therefore request that we -should be allowed to wait until we know the result of the discussion -which we are told will take place tomorrow with the Prosecution, so that -we may then. . . . - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal proposes to adjourn now and to give Defense -Counsel the opportunity of meeting Counsel for the Prosecution tomorrow -morning. Both Counsel for the Prosecution and Defense Counsel appear to -be perfectly ready to make every possible effort to deal with the case -in the most reasonable way, and at that meeting you will be able to -discuss these documents which you say have been omitted and the Counsel -for the Prosecution will try to satisfy you with reference to the other -documents. - -DR. SIEMERS: Yes, I have one more request. The Prosecution has just said -that it will hardly be possible to make 23 photostatic copies. I -believe, gentlemen, that if these documents are as important as the -Prosecution said today, it is a _conditio sine qua non_ that every -defense counsel and every defendant should have a photostatic copy of -these documents. - -As we all know it is easy to produce a photostat in a few hours. With -the excellent apparatus here available to the Prosecution it should, in -my opinion, be easy to produce 20 or 40 photostats of these 10 documents -in 48 hours. - -THE PRESIDENT: Well, you will meet the Counsel for the Prosecution -tomorrow and attempt to come to some satisfactory arrangement with them -then; and now the Tribunal will adjourn. - - [_The Tribunal adjourned until 26 November 1945 at 1000 hours._] - - - - - FIFTH DAY - Monday, 26 November 1945 - - - _Morning Session_ - -DR. FRITZ SAUTER (Counsel for Defendant Von Ribbentrop): May it please -the Court, I should like to make an application. I am Dr. Sauter, -counsel for the Defendant Von Ribbentrop. On 30 October the Defendant -Von Ribbentrop requested that his former secretary, Margareta Blank, at -that time in the Remand Prison in Nuremberg, be placed at his disposal -in order that he might dictate his reply to the Indictment, as well as a -description of the manner in which he performed his official duties in -the last 7 or 8 years. - -On 11 November 1945 the Tribunal allowed this request. The Defendant Von -Ribbentrop was therefore able to dictate for a few hours, but this was -stopped for reasons unknown to him. Neither has the Defendant Von -Ribbentrop had returned to him the shorthand notes or the typed -transcript. He has not been able to dictate any more to Fräulein Blank. - -On 15 November Ribbentrop repeated his request regarding the witness -Blank, but up to the present she has not been placed again at his -disposal. The Defendant Ribbentrop therefore requests the President to -give instructions that his former secretary, Margareta Blank, again be -placed at his disposal in order to take down the necessary notes from -dictation. Such permission appears to be absolutely essential to enable -the Defendant Ribbentrop properly to prepare his own testimony and the -testimony of the defense witnesses. - -Particularly in the case of Von Ribbentrop, the material to be treated -is so voluminous, that no other way of treating it appears feasible to -us. The Defendant Von Ribbentrop has a further request to make. He has -repeatedly asked that some of his former colleagues, in particular -Ambassador Gauss, Ambassador Von Rintelen, Minister Von Sonnleitner, -Professor Fritz Berber, and Under State Secretary Henke, be brought to -Nuremberg as witnesses, and that he be permitted to speak to these -witnesses in the presence of his counsel. This request had in part been -refused by the Court on 10 November. The remaining part has not yet been -decided. - -It is quite impossible for the Defendant Von Ribbentrop to give a clear -and exhaustive account of the entire foreign policy for the last 7 or 8 -years if nothing is placed at his disposal except a pencil and a block -of writing paper. Even the White Books of the Foreign Office, for which -he has asked, could not be placed at his disposal. In view of the fact -that the data concerning Germany’s foreign policy during the last 7 or 8 -years is so extensive, the Defendant Von Ribbentrop cannot possibly -recall every single date, every event, every document, _et cetera_, -unless his memory is refreshed by his being able to speak with his -former colleagues. - -Apart from this the Defendant Von Ribbentrop has been in the habit of -taking a great many soporifics during the last 4 years, especially -bromides, and his memory has suffered in consequence. It would not be -very helpful to the investigation of historical truth in a field which -interests not only this Court, but also, to an even greater extent, the -outside world, if Von Ribbentrop during his examination, might have to -state at every turn that he could no longer recollect these details. - -Defendant Von Ribbentrop therefore applies to the Court and begs that -his above-mentioned colleagues be brought here and that he receive -permission to discuss with them matters pertaining to the Trial, in -order that he may prepare for further proceedings. - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal has already intimated to defendant’s counsel -that all applications should, as far as practicable, be made in writing, -and they consider that the applications which have how been made orally -should have been made in writing. They will consider the facts with -reference to the applications in respect of the Defendant Von -Ribbentrop’s secretary. The other applications as to witnesses and -documents, which have been made in writing, have been considered, or -will be considered by the Tribunal. - -DR. SAUTER: Mr. President, may I say in this connection that the -applications which I have today submitted have been repeatedly lodged -with the Court in writing, but my client is anxious lest he experience -difficulties in preparing for his own hearing and the hearing of the -defense witnesses. - -THE PRESIDENT: As was announced at the sitting on Friday, Counsel for -the Prosecution were to try to arrange with defendants’ counsel some -satisfactory arrangement with reference to the production of documents -in the German language. In accordance with that announcement, Counsel -for the Prosecution saw Counsel for the Defense, and representatives of -the Prosecution and the Defense appeared before the Tribunal and the -Tribunal has provisionally made the following arrangement: - -1. That in the future, only such parts of documents as are read in court -by the Prosecution shall in the first instance be part of the record. In -that way those parts of the documents will be conveyed to defendants’ -counsel through the earphones in German. - -2. In order that defendants and their counsel may have an opportunity of -inspecting such documents in their entirety in German, a photostatic -copy of the original and one copy thereof shall be deposited in the -defendants’ counsel room at the same time that they are produced in -court. - -3. The defendants’ counsel may at any time refer to any other part of -such documents. - -4. Prosecuting counsel will furnish defendants’ counsel with 10 copies -of their trial briefs in English and five copies of their books of -documents in English, at the time such briefs and books are furnished to -the Tribunal. - -5. Defendants’ counsel will be furnished with one copy of each of the -transcripts of the proceedings. - -That is all. I call upon the prosecuting counsel for the United States. - -MR. ALDERMAN: If it pleases the Tribunal, may I make, Mr. President, one -inquiry with regard to your reference to trial briefs? On my section of -the case I shall not expect to hand up trial briefs to the Court. -Whatever I have in the nature of trial briefs will be put over the -microphone. I wonder if that is satisfactory? - -THE PRESIDENT: I think what I said meets that case. - -MR. ALDERMAN: I thought so, yes. - -THE PRESIDENT: Because what I said was that the defendants’ counsel -would be furnished with 10 copies of the trial briefs in English at the -same time that they are furnished to the Tribunal. Therefore, if you -don’t furnish the trial briefs to the Tribunal, none will be furnished -to the defendants’ counsel. - -MR. ALDERMAN: Yes. When the Tribunal rose on Friday last, I had just -completed an introductory statement preliminary to the presentation of -evidence on the aggressive war aspect of the case. In that introductory -statement I had invited attention to the parts of the Charter and to the -parts of the Indictment which are pertinent to this aspect of the case. -I had also discussed the relationship between recorded history and the -evidence to be presented, indicating what sort of additions to recorded -history would be made by the evidence contained in the captured -documents. - -I then indicated to the Court that I would first proceed by presenting -singly a handful of captured documents, which, in our opinion, prove the -corpus of the crime of aggressive war, leaving no reasonable doubt -concerning the aggressive character of the Nazi war, or concerning the -conspiratorial premeditation of that war. I indicated to the Tribunal -that after proving the corpus of the crime in this way I would follow -the presentation of this evidence with a more or less chronological -presentation of the case on aggressive war, producing evidence in -greater detail of the relevant activities of the conspirators from 1933 -to 1941. - -As the members of the Tribunal may understand, it is easier to make -plans about presentation than to keep them. There have been, by -necessity, some changes in our plans. I indicated on Friday that to a -certain extent the American case under Count One and the British case -under Count Two would interlock. The British Chief Prosecutor, Sir -Hartley Shawcross, is by force of circumstances, required to be in -London this week. He expects to be back next week. The intention now is -that when he returns Monday he will make his opening statement covering -Count Two of the Indictment and such interrelated parts of Count One of -the Indictment as have not by then been presented. So that what is at -the moment planned, if it meets with the Court’s views, is that I shall -continue, as far as I may within 2 days of this week, on the detailed -story as to aggressive war; that thereupon we shall alter the -presentation and present some other matters coming under Count One. -Then, following the British Chief Prosecutor’s opening statement on -Monday of next week, we shall continue jointly with the chapters on -Poland, Russia, and Japan, as parts of both Count One and Two. While -that may not be strictly logical, it seems to us the best method with -which to proceed under the circumstances. - -I turn now to the period of 1933 to 1936, a period characterized by an -orderly, planned sequence of preparations for war. This is the period -covered by Paragraphs 1 and 2 of IV (F) of the Indictment. This may be -found at Page 7 of the printed English text of the Indictment. - -The essential character of this period was the formulation and execution -of the plan to rearm and to reoccupy and fortify the Rhineland in -violation of the Treaty of Versailles and other treaties, in order to -acquire military strength and political bargaining power to be used -against other nations. - -Hitler’s own eloquence in a secret speech delivered to all Supreme -Commanders on 23 November 1939, at 1200 hours, is sufficient to -characterize this phase of the Nazi conspiracy. This document comes to -hand as a captured document found in the OKW files—OKW is Ober Kommando -der Wehrmacht (the High Command of the Army, Chief of the High Command -of the Armed Forces)—and was captured at Flensburg. The document is -numbered 789-PS in our numbered series of documents. - -I have in my hand, if the Court please, the German original of this -document in the condition in which it was captured, and I wish to offer -the document in evidence and have it given the proper serial number as -the United States prosecutor’s exhibit. The serial number, I understand, -is United States Exhibit 23. I would ask that the German text of the -original be handed to the German interpreters. - -If the Court please, understanding the ruling just made by the presiding -justice, although I have offered the entire document, as it is a very -long speech, I shall not read into the record the entire speech. Of -course the presiding judge said defense counsel may insert any other -parts of it as they wish. - -I shall begin reading at the beginning, and read a little more than half -of the first page in the English text. I am advised that the German -original is marked with a blue pencil at the point where I shall stop -reading. I will read the English translation: - - “November 23, 1939, 1200 hours. Conference with the Führer, to - which all Supreme Commanders are ordered. The Führer gives the - following speech: - - “The purpose of this conference is to give you an idea of the - world of my thoughts, which takes charge of me, in the face of - future events, and to tell you my decisions. The building up of - our Armed Forces was only possible in connection with the - ideological”—the German word is “weltanschaulich”—“education - of the German people by the Party.” - -If I may interpolate just to comment on that interesting German word -“weltanschaulich”, I take it that ideological is about as close a -translation as we can get, but the word means more than that. It means a -whole attitude towards the world, a way of looking on the world. - - “When I started my political task”—I am quoting again—“in - 1919, my strong belief in final success was based on a thorough - observation of the events of the day and the study of the - reasons for their occurrence. Therefore, I never lost my belief - in the midst of setbacks which were not spared me during my - period of struggle. Providence has had the last word and brought - me success. Moreover, I had a clear recognition of the probable - course of historical events and the firm will to make brutal - decisions. The first decision was in 1919 when I, after long - internal conflict, became a politician and took up the struggle - against my enemies. That was the hardest of all decisions. I - had, however, the firm belief that I would arrive at my goal. - First of all, I desired a new system of selection. I wanted to - educate a minority which would take over the leadership. After - 15 years I arrived at my goal, after strenuous struggles and - many setbacks. When I came to power in 1933, a period of the - most difficult struggle lay behind me. Everything existing - before that had collapsed. I had to reorganize everything, - beginning with the mass of the people and extending it to the - Armed Forces. First, reorganization of the interior, abolishment - of appearances of decay and defeatist ideas, education to - heroism. While reorganizing the interior, I undertook the second - task: To release Germany from its international ties. Two - particular characteristics are to be pointed out: Secession from - the League of Nations and denunciation of the Disarmament - Conference. It was a hard decision. The number of prophets who - predicted that it would lead to the occupation of the Rhineland - was large, the number of believers was very small. I was - supported by the nation, which stood firmly behind me, when I - carried out my intentions. After that the order for rearmament. - Here again there were numerous prophets who predicted - misfortunes, and only a few believers. In 1935 the introduction - of compulsory armed service. After that, militarization of the - Rhineland, again a process believed to be impossible at that - time. The number of people who put trust in me was very small. - Then, beginning of the fortification of the whole country, - especially in the west. - - “One year later, Austria came.”—I suppose he meant Austria - went.—“This step also was considered doubtful. It brought about - a considerable reinforcement of the Reich. The next step was - Bohemia, Moravia, and Poland. This step also was not possible to - accomplish in one campaign. First of all, the western - fortification had to be finished. It was not possible to reach - the goal in one effort. It was clear to me from the first moment - that I could not be satisfied with the Sudeten-German territory. - That was only a partial solution. The decision to march into - Bohemia was made. Then followed the erection of the - Protectorate, and with that the basis for the action against - Poland was laid, but I wasn’t quite clear at that time whether I - should start first against the East and then in the West, or - vice versa.” - -There are some curious antitheses of thought in that speech, as in most -of Adolf Hitler’s speeches. In one sentence he combines guidance by -Providence with the making of brutal decisions. He constantly speaks of -how very few people were with him, and yet the mass of the German people -were with him. But he does give a brief summary of the gist of what is -contained in the allegations of the Indictment, to which I have invited -your attention: - -The organization of the mass of the people, then extending to the Armed -Forces, and the various brutal decisions that he did make, about which -history knows. - -That long document contains other material of great interest. It may be -that we shall advert to other portions of it later. At this point, -however, I have simply asked the Court to focus attention on the matter -I have just read and its bearing on the development of the conspiracy -during the period 1933 to 1936. - -Another captured document is sufficient to demonstrate the preparations -for war in which the Nazi conspirators were engaged during this period. -I refer to a top-secret letter dated 24 June 1935 from General Von -Brauchitsch to the Supreme Commanders of the Army, Navy, and Air Forces. -Attached to that letter is a copy of a secret Reich Defense Law of 21 -May 1935 and a copy of a decision of the Reich Cabinet of 21 May 1935 on -the Council for the Defense of the Reich. - -These documents were captured in the OKW files at Fechenheim. This group -of documents is numbered 2261-PS in our numbered series of documents. It -seems to us one of the most significant evidences of secret and direct -preparations for aggressive war. - -I gave expression to a typographical error. That was General Von -Blomberg instead of Brauchitsch. - -I have the original of these documents. I ask that they be admitted into -evidence as Exhibit USA-24. - -The top page of that document, which I shall read in full, is the letter -signed “Von Blomberg, Berlin, 21 June 1935, Top Secret”; headed “The -Reich Minister of War and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, No. -1820/35 Top Secret L II a.” - - “To: The Supreme Commander of the Army, the Supreme Commander of - the Navy, the Supreme Commander of the Air Forces. - - “In the appendix I transmit one copy each of the law for the - defense of the Reich of 21 May 1935, and of a decision of the - Reich Cabinet of 21 May 1935 concerning the Reich Defense - Council. The publication of the Reich Defense Law is temporarily - suspended by order of the Führer and Reich Chancellor. - - “The Führer and Reich Chancellor has nominated the President of - the Directorate of the Reichsbank, Dr. Schacht, to be - ‘Plenipotentiary-General for War Economy.’ - - “I request that the copies of the Reich Defense Law needed - within the units of the Armed Forces, be ordered before 1 July - 1935 at Armed Forces Office (L) where it is to be established - with the request that the law should only be distributed down to - corps headquarters outside of the Reich Ministry of War. - - “I point out the necessity of strictest secrecy once more.” - - Signed by “Von Blomberg.” Underneath that is an indorsement: - - “Berlin, 3 September 1935; No. 1820/35 L Top Secret II a. To - Defense-Economic Group G-3, copy transmitted (signed) Jodl.” - -“There is attached thereto, if the Tribunal please, the statute referred -to as the Reich Defense Law of 21 May 1935, or rather it was enacted by -the Reich Cabinet, and it starts with the statement: “The Reich Cabinet -has enacted the following law that is hereby made public.” - -There follows a law in detail covering preparations for state of -defense, mobilization, appointment of this Plenipotentiary-General for -War Economy, with plenipotentiary authority for the economic preparation -of the war, and a Part III providing for setting of penalties. - -The law is signed: - -“The Führer and Reich Chancellor, Adolf Hitler; the Reich Minister of -War, Von Blomberg; the Reich Minister of the Interior, Frick,” one of -the defendants. And at the bottom of it there is this note—that is on -Sheet 4 of the original German, I think: - - “Note on the Law for the Defense of the Reich of 21 May 1935. - The publication of the Law for the Defense of the Reich of 21 - May 1935 will be suspended. The law became effective 21 May - 1935. The Führer and Reich Chancellor, Adolf Hitler.” - -So that although the law itself stated that it was made public, the -publication was suspended by Adolf Hitler; although the law became -immediately effective. - -There is further attached a copy of the decision of the Reich Cabinet of -21 May 1935 on the council for the defense of the realm which deals -largely with organization for economic preparation for the war and which -I think was discussed by my colleague, Mr. Dodd, last week. - -There can be no question that this law of May 21, 1935 was the -cornerstone of war preparations of the Nazi conspirators. The -relationship of the Defendant Schacht to this preparation is made -transparently clear by this captured document. - -So much, for the time being, on the preparatory phase of the conspiracy, -1933 to 1936. - -As indicated earlier, the next phase of aggression was the formulation -and execution of plans to attack Austria and Czechoslovakia, in that -order. - -This is the phase of the aggression covered by Paragraphs 3 (a), (b), -and (c) of Section IV (F) of the Indictment, appearing at Pages 7 to 8 -of the printed English text. - -One of the most striking and revealing of all the captured documents -which have come to hand is a document which we have come to know as the -Hossbach notes of a conference in the Reich Chancellery on 5 November -1937 from 1615 to 2030 hours, in the course of which Hitler outlined to -those present the possibilities and necessities of expanding their -foreign policy, and requested—I quote: “That his statements be looked -upon in the case of his death as his last will and testament.” And so -with this document we shall present to the Tribunal and to the public -the last will and testament of Adolf Hitler as he contemplated that last -will and testament on 5 November 1937. The document comes to hand -through the United States Department of State and it is authenticated by -the seal of the Secretary of State of the United States. It is Document -Number 386-PS in our series of numbered documents. I offer it in -evidence as Exhibit USA-25. - -Before reading it, I note at the start that the recorder of the minutes -of this meeting, then Colonel Hossbach, was the Führer’s adjutant. I -note also the presence at this conspiratorial meeting of the Defendant -Erich Raeder. The Defendant Constantin von Neurath was present. The -Defendant Hermann Wilhelm Göring was present. The minutes of this -meeting reveal a crystalization towards the end of 1937 in the policy of -the Nazi regime. Austria and Czechoslovakia were to be acquired by -force. They would provide Lebensraum (living space) and improve -Germany’s military position for further operations. While it is true -that actual events unfolded themselves in a somewhat different manner -than that outlined at this meeting, in essence the purposes stated at -the meeting were carried out. The document destroys any possible doubt -concerning the Nazis’ premeditation of their Crimes against Peace. This -document is of such tremendous importance that I feel obliged to read it -in full into the record: - - “Berlin, 10 November 1937. Notes on the conference in the - Reichskanzlei on 5 November 1937 from 1615 to 2030 hours. - - “Present: The Führer and Reich Chancellor; the Reich Minister - for War, Generalfeldmarschall Von Blomberg; the C-in-C Army, - Generaloberst Freiherr Von Fritsch; the C-in-C Navy, - Generaladmiral Dr. H. C. Raeder; the C-in-C Luftwaffe, - Generaloberst Göring; the Reichsminister for Foreign Affairs, - Freiherr Von Neurath; Oberst Hossbach” (the adjutant who took - the minutes). - - “The Führer stated initially that the subject matter of today’s - conference was of such high importance that its detailed - discussion would certainly in other states take place before the - Cabinet in full session. However, he, the Führer, had decided - not to discuss this matter in the larger circle of the Reich - Cabinet, because of its importance. His subsequent statements - were the result of detailed deliberations and of the experiences - of his 4½ years in government; he desired to explain to those - present his fundamental ideas on the possibilities and - necessities of expanding our foreign policy, and in the - interests of a far-sighted policy he requested that his - statements be looked upon, in the case of his death, as his last - will and testament. - - “The Führer then stated: The aim of German policy is the - security and the preservation of the nation and its propagation. - This is consequently a problem of space. The German nation - comprises 85 million people, which, because of the number of - individuals and the compactness of habitation, form a - homogeneous European racial body, the like of which cannot be - found in any other country. On the other hand it justifies the - demand for larger living space more than for any other nation. - If there have been no political consequences to meet the demands - of this racial body for living space, then that is the result of - historical development spread over several centuries and should - this political condition continue to exist, it will represent - the greatest danger to the preservation of the German - nation”—The German word used there, is not “nation”; it is - “Volkstum”—“at its present high level. An arrest of the - decrease of the German element in Austria and in Czechoslovakia - is just as little possible as the preservation of the present - state in Germany itself.” - -I interpolate that I can but think that this is not a good translation -of the German because to me the sentence seems meaningless. - - “Instead of growth, sterility will be introduced, and as a - consequence, tensions of a social nature will appear after a - number, of years, because political and philosophical ideas are - of a permanent nature only as long as they are able to produce - the basis for the realization of the actual claim of the - existence of a nation. The German future is therefore dependent - exclusively on the solution of the need for living space. Such a - solution can be sought naturally only for a limited period, - about one to three generations. - - “Before touching upon the question of solving the need for - living space, it must be decided whether a solution of the - German position with a good future can be attained, either by - way of an autarchy or by way of an increased share in universal - commerce and industry. - - “Autarchy: Execution will be possible only with strict National - Socialist State policy, which is the basis”—that is the basis - of autarchy—“Assuming this can be achieved the results are as - follows: - - “A. In the sphere of raw materials, only limited, but not total - autarchy can be attained: - - “1. Wherever coal can be used for the extraction of raw - materials, autarchy is feasible. - - “2. In the case of ores the position is much more difficult. - Requirements in iron and light metals can be covered by - ourselves. Copper and tin, however, cannot. - - “3. Cellular materials can be covered by ourselves as long as - sufficient wood supplies exist. A permanent solution is not - possible. - - “4. Edible fats—possible. - - “B. In the case of foods, the question of an autarchy must be - answered with a definite capital NO. - - “The general increase of living standards, compared with 30 to - 40 years ago, brought about a simultaneous increase of the - demand and an increase of personal consumption among the - producers, the farmers themselves. The proceeds from the - production increase in agriculture have been used for covering - the increased demand, therefore they represent no actual - increase in production. A further increase in production by - making greater demands on the soil is not possible because it - already shows signs of deterioration due to the use of - artificial fertilizers, and it is therefore certain that, even - with the greatest possible increase in production, participation - in the world market could not be avoided.” - -I interpolate, that if I understand him he means by that, “no autarchy; -we must participate in world trade and commerce.” - - “The considerable expenditure of foreign currency to secure food - by import, even in periods when harvests are good, increases - catastrophically when the harvest is really poor. The - possibility of this catastrophe increases correspondingly to the - increase in population, and the annual 560,000 excess in births - would bring about an increased consumption in bread, because the - child is a greater bread eater than the adult. - - “Permanently to counter the difficulties of food supplies by - lowering the standard of living and by rationalization is - impossible in a continent which has developed an approximately - equivalent standard of living. As the solving of the - unemployment problem has brought into effect the complete power - of consumption, some small corrections in our agricultural home - production will be possible, but not a wholesale alteration of - the standard of food consumption. Consequently autarchy becomes - impossible, specifically in the sphere of food supplies, as well - as generally. - - “Participation in world economy: There are limits to this which - we are unable to transgress. The market fluctuation would be an - obstacle to a secure foundation of the German position; - international commercial agreements do not offer any guarantee - for practical execution. It must be considered on principle that - since the World War (1914-18) an industrialization has taken - place in countries which formerly exported food. We live in a - period of economic empires, in which the tendency to colonies, - again approaches the condition which originally motivated - colonization; in Japan and Italy economic motives are the basis - of their will to expand, and economic need will also drive - Germany to it. Countries outside the great economic empires have - special difficulties in expanding economically. - - “The upward tendency, which has been caused in world economy, - due to armament competition, can never form a permanent basis - for an economic settlement, and this latter is also hampered by - the economic disruption caused by Bolshevism. There is a - pronounced military weakness in those states which base their - existence on export. As our exports and imports are carried out - over those sea lanes which are dominated by Britain, it is more - a question of security of transport rather than one of foreign - currency and this explains the great weakness of our food - situation in wartime. The only way out, and one which may appear - imaginary, is the securing of greater living space, an endeavor - which at all times has been the cause of the formation of states - and of movements of nations. It is explicable that this tendency - finds no interest in Geneva and in satisfied states. Should the - security of our food situation be our foremost thought, then the - space required for this can only be sought in Europe, but we - will not copy liberal capitalistic policies which rely on - exploiting colonies. It is not a case of conquering people, but - of conquering agriculturally useful space. It would also be more - to the purpose to seek raw material-producing territory in - Europe directly adjoining the Reich and not overseas, and this - solution would have to be brought into effect for one or two - generations. What would be required at a later date over and - above this must be left to subsequent generations. The - development of great world-wide national bodies is naturally a - slow process and the German people, with its strong racial - root”—I interpolate, there is that German word “Rassekern” - again (the racial root)—“has for this purpose the most - favorable foundations in the heart of the European continent. - The history of all times—Roman Empire, British Empire—has - proved that, every space, expansion can only be effected by - breaking resistance and taking risks. Even setbacks are - unavoidable; neither formerly nor today has space been found - without an owner; the attacker always comes up against the - proprietor.” - - [_A recess was taken._] - -MR. ALDERMAN: May it please the Tribunal, after the somewhat jumbled -discussion which I have just read of geopolitical economic theory and of -the need for expansion and Lebensraum, Adolf Hitler, in these Hossbach -notes, posed this question—and I quote: - - “The question for Germany is where the greatest possible - conquest could be made at lowest cost. - - “German politics must reckon with its two hateful enemies, - England and France, to whom a strong German colossus in the - center of Europe would be intolerable. Both these states would - oppose a further reinforcement of Germany, both in Europe and - overseas, and in this opposition they would have the support of - all parties. Both countries would view the building of German - military strong points overseas as a threat to their overseas - communications, as a security measure for German commerce, and - retroactively a strengthening of the German position in Europe. - - “England is not in a position to cede any of her colonial - possessions to us, owing to the resistance which she experiences - in the Dominions. After the loss of prestige which England has - suffered owing to the transfer of Abyssinia to Italian - ownership, a return of East Africa can no longer be expected. - Any resistance on England’s part would at best consist in the - readiness to satisfy our colonial claims by taking away colonies - which at the present moment are not in British hands, for - example, Angola. French favors would probably be of the same - nature. - - “A serious discussion regarding the return of colonies to us - could be considered only at a time when England is in a state of - emergency and the German Reich is strong and well armed. The - Führer does not share the opinion that the Empire is - unshakeable.”—Meaning, I take it, the British Empire.— - - “Resistance against the Empire is to be found less in conquered - territories than amongst its competitors. The British Empire and - the Roman Empire cannot be compared with one another in regard - to durability; after the Punic Wars the latter did not have a - serious political enemy. Only the dissolving effects which - originated in Christendom, and the signs of age which creep into - all states, made it possible for the ancient Germans to - subjugate ancient Rome. - - “Alongside the British Empire today a number of states exist - which are stronger than it. The British mother country is able - to defend its colonial possession only allied with other states - and not by its own power. How could England alone, for example, - defend Canada against attack by America, or its Far Eastern - interests against an attack by Japan? - - “The singling out of the British Crown as the bearer of Empire - unity is in itself an admission that the universal empire cannot - be maintained permanently by power politics. The following are - significant pointers in this respect: - - “(a) Ireland’s struggle for independence. - - “(b) Constitutional disputes in India where England, by her half - measures, left the door open for Indians, at a later date, to - utilize the non-fulfilment of constitutional promises as a - weapon against Britain. - - “(c) The weakening of the British position in the Far East by - Japan. - - “(d) The opposition in the Mediterranean to Italy which—by - virtue of its history, driven by necessity and led by a - genius—expands its power position and must consequently - infringe British interests to an increasing extent. The outcome - of the Abyssinian war is a loss of prestige for Britain which - Italy is endeavoring to increase by stirring up discontent in - the Mohammedan world. - - “It must be established in conclusion that the Empire cannot be - held permanently by power politics by 45 million Britons, in - spite of all the solidity of their ideals. The proportion of the - populations in the Empire, compared with that of the motherland, - is nine to one, and it should act as a warning to us that if we - expand in space, we must not allow the level of our population - to become too low.” - -I take it he meant by that: “Keep the population of occupied territories -low in comparison with ours.” - - “France’s position is more favorable than that of England. The - French Empire is better placed geographically; the population of - its colonial possessions represents a potential military - increase. But France is faced with difficulties of internal - politics. In the life of the nations, parliamentary governments - ruled only 10 per cent of the time, approximately; whereas, - totalitarian governments ruled 90 per cent of the time. - Nevertheless, we have to take the following into our political - consideration as power factors: - - “Britain, France, Russia, and the adjoining smaller states. - - “The German question can be solved only by way of force, and - this is never without risk. The battles of Frederick the Great - for Silesia, and Bismarck’s wars against Austria and France had - been a tremendous risk and the speed of Prussian action in 1870 - had prevented Austria from participating in the war. If we place - the decision to apply force with risk at the head of the - following expositions, then we are left to reply to the - questions ‘when’ and ‘how’. In this regard we have to decide - upon three different cases.” - -I interpolate: The Tribunal will recall the specific allegation in the -Indictment that at this meeting there emerged three different plans, any -of which might be utilized. - - “Case 1. Period 1943-45: After this we can only expect a change - for the worse. The rearming of the Army, the Navy, and the Air - Force, as well as the formation of the Officers’ Corps, are - practically concluded.” - -I remind the Tribunal that this meeting was on 5 November 1937, but he -is contemplating the period 1943-45. - - “Our material equipment and armaments are modern; with further - delay the danger of their becoming out-of-date will increase. In - particular, the secrecy of ‘special weapons’ cannot always be - safeguarded. Enlistment of reserves would be limited to the - current recruiting age groups and an addition from older - untrained groups would be no longer available. - - “In comparison with the rearmament, which will have been carried - out at that time by other nations, we shall decrease in relative - power. Should we not act until 1943-45, then, dependent on the - absence of reserves, any year could bring about the food crisis, - for the countering of which we do not possess the necessary - foreign currency. This must be considered a point of weakness in - the regime. Over and above that, the world will anticipate our - action and will increase counter-measures yearly. Whilst other - nations isolate themselves, we should be forced on the - offensive. - - “What the actual position would be in the years 1943-45, no one - knows today. It is certain, however, that we can wait no longer. - - “On the one side the large armed forces, with the necessity for - securing their upkeep, the aging of the Nazi movement and of its - leaders, and on the other side the prospect of a lowering of the - standard of living and a drop in the birth rate, leaves us no - other choice but to act. If the Führer is still living, then it - will be his irrevocable decision to solve the German space - problem no later than 1943-45. The necessity for action before - 1943-45 will come under consideration in cases 2 and 3. - - “Case 2. Should the social tensions in France lead to an - internal political crisis of such dimensions that it absorbs the - French Army and thus renders it incapable for employment in war - against Germany, then the time for action against Czechoslovakia - has come. - - “Case 3. It would be equally possible to act against - Czechoslovakia if France should be so tied up by a war against - another state that it cannot proceed against Germany. - - “For the improvement of our military political position it must - be our first aim, in every case of entanglement by war, to - conquer Czechoslovakia and Austria, simultaneously, in order to - remove any threat from the flanks in case of a possible advance - westwards. In the case of a conflict with France it would hardly - be necessary to assume that Czechoslovakia would declare war on - the same day as France. However, Czechoslovakia’s desire to - participate in the war will increase proportionally to the - degree to which we are being weakened. Its actual participation - could make itself felt by an attack on Silesia, either towards - the north or the west. - - “Once Czechoslovakia is conquered—and a mutual frontier, - Germany-Hungary is obtained—then a neutral attitude by Poland - in a German-French conflict could more easily be relied upon. - Our agreements with Poland remain valid only as long as - Germany’s strength remains unshakable; should Germany have any - setbacks then an attack by Poland against East Prussia, perhaps - also against Pomerania, and Silesia, must be taken into account. - - “Assuming a development of the situation, which would lead to a - planned attack on our part in the years 1943-45, then the - behavior of France, England, Poland, and Russia would probably - have to be judged in the following manner: - - “The Führer believes personally, that in all probability England - and perhaps also France, have already silently written off - Czechoslovakia, and that they have got used to the idea that - this question would one day be cleaned up by Germany. The - difficulties in the British Empire and the prospect of being - entangled in another long, drawn-out European war, would be - decisive factors in the non-participation of England in a war - against Germany. The British attitude would certainly not remain - without influence on France’s attitude. An attack by France, - without British support, is hardly probable, assuming that its - offensive would stagnate along our western fortifications. - Without England’s support it would also not be necessary to take - into consideration a march by France through Belgium and - Holland, and this would also not have to be reckoned with by us - in case of a conflict with France, as in every case it would - have, as a consequence, the enmity of Great Britain. Naturally, - we should in every case have to bar our frontier during the - operation of our attacks against Czechoslovakia and Austria. It - must be taken into consideration here that Czechoslovakia’s - defense measures will increase in strength from year to year and - that a consolidation of the inside values of the Austrian Army - will also be effected in the course of years. Although the - population of Czechoslovakia in the first place is not a thin - one, the embodiment of Czechoslovakia and Austria would - nevertheless constitute the conquest of food for 5 to 6 million - people, on the basis that a compulsory emigration of 2 million - from Czechoslovakia, and of 1 million from Austria could be - carried out. The annexation of the two States to Germany, - militarily and politically, would constitute a considerable - relief, owing to shorter and better frontiers, the freeing of - fighting personnel for other purposes, and the possibility of - reconstituting new armies up to a strength of about 12 - divisions, representing a new division per 1 million population. - - “No opposition to the removal of Czechoslovakia is expected on - the part of Italy; however, it cannot be judged today what would - be her attitude in the Austrian question, since it would depend - largely on whether the Duce were alive at the time or not. - - “The measure and speed of our action would decide Poland’s - attitude. Poland will have little inclination to enter the war - against a victorious Germany, with Russia in the rear. - - “Military participation by Russia must be countered by the speed - of our operations; it is a question whether this needs to be - taken into consideration at all, in view of Japan’s attitude. - - “Should case 2 occur—paralyzation of France by a civil - war—then the situation should be utilized at any time for - operations against Czechoslovakia, as Germany’s most dangerous - enemy would be eliminated. - - “The Führer sees case 3 looming nearer; it could develop from - the existing tensions in the Mediterranean, and should it occur, - he has firmly decided to make use of it any time, perhaps even - as early as 1938. - - “Following recent experiences in the course of the events of the - war in Spain, the Führer does not see an early end to - hostilities there. - - “Taking into consideration the time required for past offensives - by Franco,”—the English text says “France”; it means - “Franco”—“a further 3 years’ duration of war is within the - bounds of possibility. On the other hand, from the German point - of view, a 100 per cent victory by Franco is not desirable; we - are more interested in a continuation of the war and - preservation of the tensions in the Mediterranean. Should Franco - be in sole possession of the Spanish peninsula, it would mean - the end of Italian intervention and of the presence of Italy in - the Balearic Isles. As our interests are directed towards - continuing the war in Spain, it must be the task of our future - policy to strengthen Italy in her fight to hold on to the - Balearic Isles. However, a solidification of Italian positions - in the Balearic Isles cannot be tolerated either by France or by - England and could lead to a war by France and England against - Italy, in which case Spain, if entirely in White (that is, - Franco’s) hands, could participate on the side of Italy’s - enemies. A subjugation of Italy in such a war appears very - unlikely. Additional raw materials could be brought to Italy via - Germany. The Führer believes that Italy’s military strategy - would be to remain on the defensive against France on the - western frontier and carry out operations against France from - Libya, against the North African French colonial possessions. - - “As a landing of French and British troops on the Italian coast - can be discounted, and as a French offensive via the Alps to - upper Italy would be extremely difficult, and would probably - stagnate before the strong Italian fortifications, French lines - of communication by the Italian fleet will, to a great extent, - paralyze the transport of fighting personnel from North Africa - to France, so that at its frontiers with Italy and Germany, - France will have at its disposal solely the metropolitan - fighting forces.” - -There again I think that must be a defective English translation. -“French lines of communication by the Italian fleet,” must mean “fresh -lines,” or something in that connection. - - “If Germany profits from this war by disposing of the - Czechoslovakian and the Austrian questions, the probability must - be assumed that England, being at war with Italy, would not - decide to commence operations against Germany. Without British - support, a warlike action by France against Germany is not to be - anticipated. - - “The date of our attack on Czechoslovakia and Austria must be - made depending upon the course of the Italian-French-English war - and would not be simultaneous with the commencement of military - operations by these three States. The Führer was also not - thinking of military agreements with Italy, but in complete - independence and by exploiting this unique favorable - opportunity, he wishes to begin to carry out operations against - Czechoslovakia. The attack on Czechoslovakia would have to take - place with the speed of lightning.”—The German words are - “blitzartig schnell.” - - “Feldmarschall Von Blomberg and Generaloberst Von Fritsch, in - giving their estimate on the situation, repeatedly pointed out - that we should not run the risk that England and France become - our enemies: - - “They stated that the war with Italy would not bind the French - Army to such an extent that it would not be in a position to - commence operations on our western frontier with superior - forces. Generaloberst Von Fritsch estimated the French forces - which would presumably be employed on the Alpine frontier - against Italy to be in the region of 20 divisions, so that a - strong French superiority would still remain on our western - frontier. The French would, according to German reasoning, - attempt to advance into the Rhineland. We should consider the - lead which France has in mobilization and, quite apart from the - very small value of our then-existing fortifications, which was - pointed out particularly by General Feldmarschall Von Blomberg; - the four motorized divisions which had been laid down for the - West would be more or less incapable of movement. - - “With regard to our offensive in a southeasterly direction, - Feldmarschall Von Blomberg drew special attention to the - strength of the Czechoslovakian fortifications, the building of - which had assumed the character of a Maginot Line and which - would present extreme difficulties to our attack. - - “Generaloberst Von Fritsch mentioned that it was the purpose of - a study which he had laid on for this winter to investigate the - possibilities of carrying out operations against Czechoslovakia, - with special consideration of the conquest of the - Czechoslovakian system of fortifications; the Generaloberst also - stated that, owing to the prevailing conditions, he would have - to relinquish his leave abroad, which was to begin on 10 - November. This intention was countermanded by the Führer, who - gave as a reason that the possibility of the conflict was not to - be regarded as being so imminent. In reply to statements by - General Feldmarschall Von Blomberg and Generaloberst Von Fritsch - regarding England and France’s attitude, the Führer repeated his - previous statements and said that he was convinced of Britain’s - non-participation and that consequently he did not believe in - military action by France against Germany. Should the - Mediterranean conflict, already mentioned, lead to a general - mobilization in Europe, then we should have to commence - operations against Czechoslovakia immediately. If, however, the - powers who are not participating in the war should declare their - disinterestedness, then Germany would, for the time being, have - to side with this attitude. - - “In view of the information given by the Führer, Generaloberst - Göring considered it imperative to think of a reduction of our - military undertaking in Spain. The Führer agreed to this, - insofar as he believed this decision should be postponed for a - suitable date. - - “The second part of the discussion concerned material armament - questions. (Signed) Hossbach.”—There are other notations. - -In this connection I invite the Court’s attention to the allegation in -Paragraph 3 (a) of Section IV (F) of the Indictment; Page 7 of the -printed English text, relating to a meeting of an influential group of -Nazi conspirators on 5 November 1937. The document just introduced and -read in evidence gives the specific evidentiary support for that -allegation. - -The record of what happened thereafter is well known to history. The -Anschluss with Austria, under military pressure from the Nazis, occurred -in March 1938. We shall give you detailed evidence concerning that in -due course. So will we as to details of the aggression against -Czechoslovakia, including the pressure on Czechoslovakia that resulted -in the Munich Pact of September 1938, and the violation of that Pact -itself by Germany, on 15 March 1939. There is much of interest in the -secret documents relating to those aggressions. - -At this point, however, I desire to bring to the attention of the -Tribunal one more captured document, which reveals in all its nakedness -the truth concerning the deliberateness of the aggression against -Czechoslovakia. This document consists of a file, a file kept by Colonel -Schmundt, Hitler’s adjutant. The file was found by one of the units of -the 327th Glider Infantry, in a cellar of the Platterhof, Obersalzberg, -near Berchtesgaden. The file represents a work-file of originals and -duplicates, incidental to the preparations for the annexation of -Czechoslovakia. I should like to ask the Tribunal to examine -particularly the photostat of the original German of this file. We have -copies of those photostats. Something in physical form is lost in -transcribing a translation. The picture of the original file, including -photographs of the telegrams, gives a sense of the reality of the -evidence that is lost in the transcribed translation. The file is -Document Number 388-PS, in our numbered series of documents. I have here -the original file, as found. - -I thought perhaps I might read the German title. It is “Chefsache Fall -Grün,” that is the main plan for “Case Green,” “Green” being a code word -for the aggression against Czechoslovakia. - -I offer the entire file in evidence as Exhibit USA-26 and will ask that -photostats be passed to the Court. I offer the file, if the Tribunal -please, with, of course, the understanding and realization that only -such parts of it as I read will immediately go into evidence; but we -shall refer to other parts from time to time later, in the presentation -of the case. The material in this file will be dealt with in greater -detail at a later point in my presentation. However, at this point, I -desire to call attention to item number 2 in the file. - -Item number 2 is dated 22 April 1938. It is the second sheet of the -English translation. It is a summary, prepared by Schmundt, the -adjutant, of a discussion on 21 April 1938 between Hitler and the -Defendant Wilhelm Keitel. This item, like the other items in the file, -relates to Fall Grün, or Case Green. As I said, Case Green was a secret -code word for the planned operations against Czechoslovakia. This -meeting occurred within approximately 1 month following the successful -annexation of Austria. In the carrying out of the conspiracy, it became -necessary to revise the Plan Grün to take into account the changed -attitude, as a result of the bloodless success against Austria. I shall -now read item number 2 of this file: - - “Berlin, 22 April 1938. Bases of the Dissertation on ‘Grün.’ - - “Summary of discussion between Führer and General Keitel of 21 - April: - - “A. Political aspect. - - “1. Strategic surprise attack, out of a clear sky without any - cause or possibility of justification, has been turned down. As - result would be: hostile world opinion which can lead to a - critical situation. Such a measure is justified only for the - elimination of the last opponent on the mainland. - - “2. Action after a time of diplomatic clashes, which gradually - come to a crisis and lead to war. - - “3. Lightning-swift action as the result of an incident (for - example, the assassination of German Ambassador in connection - with an anti-German demonstration.) - - “B. Military conclusions. - - “1. The preparations are to be made for the political - possibilities (2 and 3). Case 2 is the undesired one since Grün - will have taken security measures. - - “2. The loss of time caused by transporting the bulk of the - divisions by rail—which is unavoidable, but should be cut down - as far as possible—must not impede a lightning-swift blow at - the time of the action. - - “3. ‘Separate thrusts’ are to be carried out immediately with a - view to penetrating the enemy fortification lines at numerous - points and in a strategically favorable direction. The thrusts - are to be worked out to the smallest detail (knowledge of roads, - of targets, composition of the columns according to their - individual tasks). Simultaneous attacks by the Army and Air - Force. - - “The Air Force is to support the individual columns (for example - dive-bombers; sealing of installations at penetration points, - hampering the bringing up of reserves, destroying signal - communications traffic, thereby isolating the garrisons). - - “4. Politically, the first 4 days of military action are the - decisive ones. If there are no effective military successes, a - European crisis will certainly arise. Accomplished facts must - prove the senselessness of foreign military intervention, draw - Allies into the scheme (division of spoils) and demoralize - ‘Grün.’ - - “Therefore: bridging the time gap between first penetration and - employment of the forces to be brought up, by a determined and - ruthless thrust by a motorized army (for example via Pilsen, - Prague). - - “5. If possible, separation of transport movement ‘Rot’ from - ‘Grün’.” - -‘Rot’ was the code name for their then plan against the West. - - “A simultaneous strategic concentration ‘Rot’ can lead ‘Rot’ to - undesired measures. On the other hand, it must be possible to - put ‘Fall Rot’ (Case Red) into operation at any time. - - “C. Propaganda. - - “1. Leaflets on the conduct of Germans in Czechoslovakia - (Grünland). - - “2. Leaflets with threats for intimidation of the Czechs - (Grünen).” - -This is initialled by Schmundt. - -In the reading of this document, the Tribunal doubtless noted -particularly Paragraph 3, under the heading “Political Aspect,” which -reads as follows: “Lightning-swift action as the result of an incident -(example: Assassination of German Ambassador as an upshot of an -anti-German demonstration).” The document as a whole, establishes that -the conspirators were planning the creation of an incident to justify to -the world their own aggression against Czechoslovakia. It establishes, I -submit, that consideration was being given to assassinating the German -Ambassador at Prague to create the requisite incident. This is alleged -in Paragraph 3 (c) of Section IV (F) of the Indictment, appearing at -Page 8 of the printed English text. - -As the Indictment was being read, at the opening of the case, when this -particular allegation was reached, the Defendant Göring shook his head -slowly and solemnly in the negative. I can well understand that he would -have shaken his head, if he believed the allegation of the Indictments -to be untrue. In the course of Mr. Justice Jackson’s opening address, -when this same matter was referred to, the Defendant Göring again -solemnly shook his head. On this allegation the Prosecution stands on -the evidence just submitted, the denials of the Defendant Göring, -notwithstanding. - -If the Court please, would this be a convenient time to recess? - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn now until 2 o’clock. - - [_The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours._] - - - - - _Afternoon Session_ - -THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Alderman. - -MR. ALDERMAN: May it please the Tribunal, as I suggested earlier, the -next phase of the aggression was the formulation and execution of the -plan to attack Poland and with it the resulting initiation of aggressive -war in Poland in September 1939. This is covered by Paragraphs 4 (a) and -(b) of Section IV (F) of the Indictment appearing on Page 9 of the -printed English text. - -Here again the careful and meticulous record-keeping of the Adjutant -Schmundt has provided us with a document in his own handwriting, which -lets the cat out of the bag. That may be a troublesome colloquialism to -translate. I do not know. The document consists of minutes of a -conference held on 23 May 1939. The place of the conference was the -Führer’s study in the New Reich Chancellery. The Defendant Göring was -present. - -[_The Defendant Frick interrupted at this point and said: “This year is -surely not correct.” This statement in German was not translated._] - -MR. ALDERMAN: I think one of the defendants indicated I had referred to -the wrong year. My notes show 23 May 1939. That is shown by the original -document. - -THE PRESIDENT: Which is the document to which you are referring? - -MR. ALDERMAN: That is Document. L-79. As I said, the Defendant Göring -was present. The Defendant Raeder was present. The Defendant Keitel was -present. The subject of the meeting was, I quote: “Indoctrination on the -Political Situation and Future Aims.” This document is of historical -importance, second not even to the political will and testament of the -Führer, recorded by Adjutant Hossbach. - -The original of this document when captured, found its way through the -complicated channels across the Atlantic to the United States. There, it -was found by members of the staff of the American Prosecution, by them -taken to London, and thence to Nuremberg. The “L” on the identifying -number indicates that it is one of the documents which was assembled in -London and brought here from there. We think the document is of -unquestioned validity. Its authenticity and its accuracy, as a record of -what transpired at the meeting of 23 May 1939, stands admitted by the -Defendant Keitel in one of his interrogations. As I say, the number is -Document L-79 in our numbered series. I offer it in evidence as Exhibit -USA-27. - -This document also is of such great importance historically and as -bearing on the issues now presented to the Tribunal, that I feel obliged -to read most of it. At the top: - - “Top Secret (Geheime Reichssache). To be transmitted by officer - only. - - “Minutes of a conference on 23 May 1939. Place: The Führer’s - study, New Reich Chancellery. Adjutant on duty: Lieutenant - Colonel (G. S.) Schmundt. - - “Present: The Führer, Field Marshal Göring, Grand Admiral - Raeder, Colonel General Von Brauchitsch, Colonel General Keitel, - Colonel General Milch, General (of Artillery) Halder, General - Bodenschatz, Rear Admiral Schniewindt, Colonel (G. S.) - Jeschonnek, Colonel (G. S.) Warlimont, Lieutenant Colonel (G. - S.) Schmundt, Captain Engel (Army), Lieutenant Commander - Albrecht, Captain V. Below (Army). - - “Subject: Indoctrination on the Political Situation and Future - Aims. - - “The Führer defined as the purpose of the conference: - - “1. Analysis of the situation; - - “2. Definition of the tasks for the Armed Forces arising from - that situation; - - “3. Exposition of the consequences of those tasks; - - “4. Ensuring the secrecy of all decisions and work resulting - from those consequences. Secrecy is the first essential for - success. - - “The Führer’s observations are given in accordance with their - meaning. Our present situation must be considered from two - points of view: 1) The actual development of events between 1933 - and 1939; 2) the permanent and unchanging situation in which - Germany lies. - - “In the period 1933-39, progress was made in all fields. Our - military situation improved enormously. - - “Our situation with regard to the rest of the world has remained - the same. - - “Germany had dropped from the circle of Great Powers. The - balance of power had been effected without the participation of - Germany. - - “This equilibrium is disturbed when Germany’s demands for the - necessities of life make themselves felt, and Germany re-emerges - as a Great Power. All demands are regarded as ‘encroachments’. - The English are more afraid of dangers in the economic sphere - than of the simple threat of force. - - “A mass of 80 million people has solved the problems of ideals. - So, too, must the economic problems be solved. No German can - evade the creation of the necessary economic conditions for - this. The solution of the problems demands courage. The - principle by which one evades solving the problem by adapting - oneself to circumstances is inadmissible. Circumstances must - rather be adapted to aims. This is impossible without invasion - of foreign states or attacks upon foreign property. - - “Living space, in proportion to the magnitude of the state, is - the basis of all power. One may refuse for a time to face the - problem, but finally it is solved one way or the other. The - choice is between advancement or decline. In 15 or 20 years’ - time we shall be compelled to find a solution. No German - statesman can evade the question longer than that. - - “We are at present in a state of patriotic fervor, which is - shared by two other nations: Italy and Japan. - - “The period which lies behind us has indeed been put to good - use. All measures have been taken in the correct sequence and in - harmony with our aims. - - “After 6 years, the situation is today as follows: - - “The national political unity of the Germans has been achieved, - apart from minor exceptions.”—I suppose they were those in the - concentration camps.—“Further successes cannot be attained - without the shedding of blood. - - “The demarcation of frontiers is of military importance. - - “The Pole is no ‘supplementary enemy’. Poland will always be on - the side of our adversaries. In spite of treaties of friendship, - Poland has always had the secret intention of exploiting every - opportunity to do us harm. - - “Danzig is not the subject of the dispute at all. It is a - question of expanding our living space in the East and of - securing our food supplies, of the settlement of the Baltic - problem. Food supplies can be expected only from thinly - populated areas. Over and above the natural fertility, - thoroughgoing German exploitation will enormously increase the - surplus. - - “There is no other possibility for Europe. - - “Colonies: Beware of gifts of colonial territory. This does not - solve the food problem. Remember: blockade. - - “If fate brings us into conflict with the West, the possession - of extensive areas in the East will be advantageous. We shall be - able to rely upon record harvests even less in time of war than - in peace. - - “The population of non-German areas will perform no military - service, and will be available as a source of labor. - - “The Polish problem is inseparable from conflict with the West. - - “Poland’s internal power of resistance to Bolshevism is - doubtful. Thus Poland is of doubtful value as a barrier against - Russia. - - “It is questionable whether military success in the West can be - achieved by a quick decision; questionable too is the attitude - of Poland. - - “The Polish Government will not resist pressure from Russia. - Poland sees danger in a German victory in the West, and will - attempt to rob us of the victory. - - “There is therefore no question of sparing Poland, and we are - left with the decision: _To attack Poland at the first suitable - opportunity_”.—That, if the Court please, is underscored in the - original German text.— - - “We cannot expect a repetition of the Czech affair. There will - be fighting. Our task is to isolate Poland. The success of the - isolation will be decisive. - - “Therefore, the Führer must reserve the right to give the final - order to attack. There must be no simultaneous conflict with the - Western Powers (France and England). - - “If it is not certain that a German-Polish conflict will not - lead to war in the West, then the fight must be primarily - against England and France. - - “Fundamentally, therefore: Conflict with Poland, beginning with - an attack on Poland, will only be successful if the Western - Powers keep out of it. If this is impossible, then it will be - better to attack in the West and to settle Poland at the same - time. - - “The isolation of Poland is a matter of skillful politics. - - “Japan is a weighty problem. Even if at first, for various - reasons, her collaboration with us appears to be somewhat cool - and restricted, it is nevertheless in Japan’s own interest to - take the initiative in attacking Russia in good time. - - “Economic relations with Russia are possible only if political - relations have improved. A cautious trend is apparent in press - comment. It is not impossible that Russia will show herself to - be disinterested in the destruction of Poland. Should Russia - take steps to oppose us, our relations with Japan may become - closer. - - “If there were an alliance of France, England, and Russia - against Germany, Italy, and Japan, I would be constrained to - attack England and France with a few annihilating blows. The - Führer doubts the possibility of a peaceful settlement with - England. We must prepare ourselves for the conflict. England - sees in our development the foundation of a hegemony which would - weaken England. England is therefore our enemy, and the conflict - with England will be a life-and-death struggle. - - “_What will this struggle be like?_”—Underscored in the German - original.— - - “England cannot deal with Germany and subjugate us with a few - powerful blows. It is imperative for England that the war should - be brought as near to the Ruhr Basin as possible. French blood - will not be spared (West Wall). The possession of the Ruhr Basin - will determine the duration of our resistance. - - “The Dutch and Belgian air bases must be occupied by armed - forces. Declarations of neutrality cannot be relied upon. If - England and France intend the war between Germany and Poland to - lead to a conflict, they will support Holland and Belgium in - their neutrality and make them build fortifications in order - finally to force them into cooperation. - - “Albeit under protest, Belgium and Holland will yield to - pressure. - - “Therefore, if England intends to intervene in the Polish war, - we must occupy Holland with lightning speed. We must aim at - securing a new defense line on Dutch soil up to the Zuider Zee. - - “The war with England and France will be a life-and-death - struggle. - - “The idea that we can get off cheaply is dangerous; there is no - such possibility. We must burn our boats, and it is no longer a - question of justice or injustice, but of life or death for 80 - million human beings. - - “Question: Short or long war? - - “Every country’s armed forces or government must aim at a short - war. The government, however, must also be prepared for a war of - 10 to 15 years’ duration. - - “History has always shown that people have believed that wars - would be short. In 1914 the opinion still prevailed that it was - impossible to finance a long war. Even today this idea still - persists in many minds. But on the contrary, every state will - hold out as long as possible, unless it immediately suffers some - grave weakening (for example Ruhr Basin). England has similar - weaknesses. - - “England knows that to lose a war will mean the end of her world - power. - -“England is the driving force against Germany.”—which translated -literally means: “England is the motor driving against Germany.” I -suppose that is the French “force motrice.” - - “Her strength lies in the following: - - “1. The British themselves are proud, courageous, tenacious, - firm in resistance, and gifted as organizers. They know how to - exploit every new development. They have the love of adventure - and the bravery of the Nordic race. Quality is lowered by - dispersal. The German average is higher. - - “2. World power in itself. It has been constant for 300 years. - Extended by the acquisition of allies, this power is not merely - something concrete, but must also be considered as a - psychological force embracing the entire world. Add to this - immeasurable wealth, with consequential financial credit. - - “3. Geopolitical safety and protection by strong sea power and a - courageous air force. - - “England’s weakness: - - “If in the World War I we had had two battleships and two - cruisers more, and if the battle of Jutland had been begun in - the morning, the British Fleet would have been defeated and - England brought to her knees. It would have meant the end of - this war.”—that war, I take it—“It was formerly not sufficient - to defeat the Fleet. Landings had to be made in order to defeat - England. England could provide her own food supplies. Today that - is no longer possible. - - “The moment England’s food supply routes are cut, she is forced - to capitulate. The import of food and oil depends on the Fleet’s - protection. - - “If the German Air Force attacks English territory, England will - not be forced to capitulate in one day. But if the Fleet is - destroyed, immediate capitulation will be the result. - - “There is no doubt that a surprise attack can lead to a quick - decision. It would be criminal, however, for the Government to - rely entirely on the element of surprise. - - “Experience has shown that surprise may be nullified by: - - “1. Disclosure coming from a large circle of military experts - concerned; - - “2. Mere chance, which may cause the collapse of the whole - enterprise; - - “3. Human failings; - - “4. Weather conditions. - - “The final date for striking must be fixed well in advance. - Beyond that time the tension cannot be endured for long. It must - be borne in mind that weather conditions can render any surprise - intervention by Navy and Air Force impossible. - - “This must be regarded as a most unfavorable basis of action. - - “1. An effort must be made to deal the enemy a significant or - the final decisive blow. Considerations of right and wrong or - treaties do not enter into the matter. This will only be - possible if we are not involved in a war with England on account - of Poland. - - “2. In addition to the surprise attack, preparations for a long - war must be made, while opportunities on the continent for - England are eliminated. - - “The Army will have to hold positions essential to the Navy and - Air Force. If Holland and Belgium are successfully occupied and - held, and if France is also defeated, the fundamental conditions - for a successful war against England will have been secured. - - “England can then be blockaded from western France at close - quarters by the Air Force, while the Navy with its submarines - can extend the range of the blockade. - - “Consequences: - - “England will not be able to fight on the continent; daily - attacks by the Air Force and Navy will cut all her life-lines; - time will not be on England’s side; Germany will not bleed to - death on land. - - “Such strategy has been shown to be necessary by World War I and - subsequent military operations. World War I is responsible for - the following strategic considerations which are imperative: - - “1. With a more powerful Navy at the outbreak of the War, or a - wheeling movement by the Army towards the Channel ports, the end - would have been different. - - “2. A country cannot be brought to defeat by an air force. It is - impossible to attack all objectives simultaneously, and the - lapse of time of a few minutes would evoke defense counter - measures. - - “3. The unrestricted use of all resources is essential. - - “4. Once the Army, in cooperation with the Air Force and Navy, - has taken the most important positions, industrial production - will cease to flow into the bottomless pit of the Army’s - battles, and can be diverted to benefit the Air Force and Navy. - - “The Army must, therefore, be capable of taking these positions. - Systematic preparation must be made for the attack. - - “Study to this end is of the utmost importance. - - “The aim will always be to force England to her knees. - - “A weapon will only be of decisive importance in winning - battles, so long as the enemy does not possess it. - - “This applies to gas, submarines, and air force. It would be - true of the latter, for instance, as long as the English Fleet - had no available countermeasures; it will no longer be the case - in 1940 and 1941. Against Poland, for example, tanks will be - effective, as the Polish Army possesses no countermeasures. - - “Where straightforward pressure is no longer considered to be - decisive, its place must be taken by the elements of surprise - and by masterly handling.” - -The rest of the document, if the Tribunal please, deals more in detail -with military plans and preparations. I think it unnecessary to read -further. - -The document just read is the evidence which specifically supports the -allegations in Paragraph 4 (a) of Section IV (F) of the Indictment, -appearing on Page 9 of the printed English text, relating to the meeting -of 23 May 1939. We think it leaves nothing unproved in those -allegations. - -THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Alderman, perhaps you ought to read the last page and -the last five lines, because they refer in terms to one of the -defendants. - -MR. ALDERMAN: I didn’t read these, Mr. President, simply because I am -convinced that they are mistranslated in the English. I will be glad to -have them read in the original German. - -THE PRESIDENT: Very well, if you are of that opinion. - -MR. ALDERMAN: We could get it from the original German. - -THE PRESIDENT: You mean that the English translation is wrong? - -MR. ALDERMAN: Yes. - -THE PRESIDENT: You had better inform us then if it is wrong. - -MR. ALDERMAN: Did you have reference to the last paragraph headed -“Working principles”? - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes, the one after that. - -MR. ALDERMAN: Yes. Might I ask that the German interpreter read that, as -it can be translated into the other languages. It is on Page 16 of the -original. - -BY THE INTERPRETER: “Page 16. Purpose: - - “1. Study of the entire problem; - - “2. Study of the events; - - “3. Study of the means needed; - - “4. Study of the necessary training. - - “Men with great powers of imagination and high technical - training must belong to the staff, as well as officers with - sober sceptic powers of understanding. - - “Working principles: - - “1. No one is to take part in this, who does not have to know of - it. - - “2. No one can find out more than he must know. - - “3. When must the person in question know it at the very latest? - No one may know anything before it is necessary that he know it. - - “On Göring’s question, the Führer decided that: - - a) The armed forces determine what shall be built; - - b) In the shipbuilding program nothing is to be changed; - - c) The armament programs are to be modeled on the years 1943 or - 1944.”—Schmundt certified this text. - -MR. ALDERMAN: Mr. President, the translation was closer than I had -anticipated. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes. - -MR. ALDERMAN: We think, as I have just said, that this document leaves -nothing unproved in those allegations in the Indictment. It demonstrates -that the Nazi conspirators were proceeding in accordance with a plan. It -demonstrates the cold-blooded premeditation of the assault on Poland. It -demonstrates that the questions concerning Danzig, which the Nazis had -agitated with Poland as a political pretext, were not true questions, -but were false issues, issues agitated to conceal their motive of -aggressive expansion for food and “Lebensraum.” - -In this presentation of condemning documents, concerning the initiation -of war in September 1939, I must bring to the attention of the Tribunal -a group of documents concerning an address by Hitler to his chief -military commanders, at Obersalzberg on 22 August 1939, just one week -prior to the launching of the attack on Poland. - -We have three of these documents, related and constituting a single -group. The first one I do not intend to offer as evidence. The other two -I shall offer. - -The reason for that is this: The first of the three documents came into -our possession through the medium of an American newspaperman and -purported to be original minutes of this meeting at Obersalzberg, -transmitted to this American newspaperman by some other person; and we -had no proof of the actual delivery to the intermediary by the person -who took the notes. That document, therefore, merely served to alert our -Prosecution to see if it could find something better. Fortunately, we -did get the other two documents, which indicate that Hitler on that day -made two speeches, perhaps one in the morning, one in the afternoon, as -indicated by the original minutes, which we captured. By comparison of -those two documents with the first document, we concluded that the first -document was a slightly garbled merger of the two speeches. - -On 22 August 1939 Hitler had called together at Obersalzberg the three -Supreme Commanders of the three branches of the Armed Forces, as well as -the commanding generals bearing the title Commanders-in-Chief -(Oberbefehlshaber). - -I have indicated how, upon discovering this first document, the -Prosecution set out to find better evidence of what happened on this -day. In this the Prosecution succeeded. In the files of the OKW at -Flensburg, the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (Chief of the High Command of -the Armed Forces), there were uncovered two speeches delivered by Hitler -at Obersalzberg, on 22 August 1939. These are Documents Numbers 798-PS -and 1014-PS, in our series of documents. - -In order to keep serial numbers consecutive, if the Tribunal please, we -have had the first document, which I do not intend to offer, marked for -identification Exhibit USA-28. Accordingly, I offer the second document, -798-PS, in evidence as Exhibit USA-29, and the third document, 1014-PS, -as Exhibit USA-30. - -These are again, especially the first one, rather lengthy speeches, and -I shall not necessarily read the entire speech. - -Reading from 798-PS, which is Exhibit USA-29, the Führer speaks to the -Commanders-in-Chief on 22 August 1939: “I have called you -together. . . .” - -THE PRESIDENT: Is there anything to show where the speech took place? - -MR. ALDERMAN: Obersalzberg. - -THE PRESIDENT: How do you show that? - -MR. ALDERMAN: You mean on the document? - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes. - -MR. ALDERMAN: I am afraid the indication “Obersalzberg” came from the -first document which I have not offered in evidence. I have no doubt -that the defendants will admit that Obersalzberg was the place of this -speech. - -The place is not very significant; it is the time. - -THE PRESIDENT: Very well. - -MR. ALDERMAN [Reading]: - - “I have called you together to give you a picture of the - political situation, in order that you may have insight into the - individual element on which I base my decision to act, and in - order to strengthen your confidence. After this, we will discuss - military details. - - “It was clear to me that a conflict with Poland had to come - sooner or later. I had already made this decision in the - spring.”—I interpolate, I think he is there referring to the - May document, which I have already read, L-79.—“But I thought I - would first turn against the West in a few years, and only - afterwards against the East. But the sequence cannot be fixed. - One cannot close one’s eyes even before a threatening situation. - I wanted to establish an acceptable relationship with Poland, in - order to fight first against the West, but this plan, which was - agreeable to me, could not be executed, since the essential - points have changed. - - “It became clear to me that Poland would attack us, in case of a - conflict with the West. - - “Poland wants access to the sea. - - “The further development became obvious after the occupation of - the Memel region, and it became clear to me that under the - circumstances a conflict with Poland could arise at an - inopportune moment. - - “I enumerate as reasons for this reflection, first of all, two - personal constitutions”—I suppose he means “personalities”; - that probably is an inapt translation—“my own personality, and - that of Mussolini. Essentially, it depends on me, my existence, - because of my political ability.” - -I interpolate to comment on the tremendous significance of the fact of a -war, which engulfed almost the whole world, depending upon one man’s -personality. - - “Furthermore, the fact that probably no one will ever again have - the confidence of the whole German people as I do. There will - probably never again be a man in the future with more authority - than I have. My existence is, therefore, a factor of great - value. But I can be eliminated at any time by a criminal or an - idiot. - - “The second personal factor is Il Duce. His existence is also - decisive. If something happens to him, Italy’s loyalty to the - Alliance will no longer be certain. The basic attitude of the - Italian Court is against the Duce. Above all, the Court sees in - the expansion of the empire a burden. The Duce is the man with - the strongest nerves in Italy. - - “The third factor favorable for us is Franco. We can ask only - benevolent neutrality from Spain, but this depends on Franco’s - personality. He guarantees a certain uniformity and steadiness - of the present system in Spain. We must take into account the - fact that Spain does not as yet have a Fascist Party of our - internal unity. - - “On the other side, a negative picture, as far as decisive - personalities are concerned: There is no outstanding personality - in England or France.”—I interpolate: I think Adolf Hitler must - have overlooked one in England, perhaps many.— - - “For us it is easy to make decisions. We have nothing to - lose—we can only gain. Our economic situation is such, because - of our restrictions, that we cannot hold out more than a few - years. Göring can confirm this. We have no other choice; we must - act. Our opponents risk much and can gain only a little. - England’s stake in a war is unimaginably great. Our enemies have - men who are below average. No personalities, no masters, no men - of action.” - -I interpolate again. Perhaps that last sentence explains what he meant -by no personalities—no masters having the authority that he had over -his nation. - - “Besides the personal factor, the political situation is - favorable for us; in the Mediterranean rivalry between Italy, - France, and England; in the Orient tension, which leads to the - alarming of the Mohammedan world. - - “The English empire did not emerge from the last war - strengthened. From a maritime point of view, nothing was - achieved; conflict between England and Ireland, the South - African Union became more independent, concessions had to be - made to India, England is in great danger, unhealthy industries. - A British statesman can look into the future only with concern. - - “France’s position has also deteriorated, particularly in the - Mediterranean. - - “Further favorable factors for us are these: - - “Since Albania, there is an equilibrium of power in the Balkans. - Yugoslavia carries the germ of collapse because of her internal - situation. - - “Rumania did not grow stronger. She is liable to attack and - vulnerable. She is threatened by Hungary and Bulgaria. Since - Kemal’s death Turkey has been ruled by small minds, unsteady - weak men. - - “All these fortunate circumstances will no longer prevail in 2 - or 3 years. No one knows how long I shall live. Therefore - conflict better now. - - “The creation of Greater Germany was a great achievement - politically, but militarily it was questionable, since it was - achieved through a bluff of the political leaders. It is - necessary to test the military, if at all possible, not by - general settlement, but by solving individual tasks. - - “The relation to Poland has become unbearable. My Polish policy - hitherto was in contrast to the ideas of the people. My - propositions to Poland, the Danzig corridor, were disturbed by - England’s intervention. Poland changed her tune towards us. The - initiative cannot be allowed to pass to the others. This moment - is more favorable than in 2 to 3 years. An attempt on my life or - Mussolini’s would change the situation to our disadvantage. One - cannot eternally stand opposite one another with cocked rifle. A - suggested compromise would have demanded that we change our - convictions and make agreeable gestures. They talked to us again - in the language of Versailles. There was danger of losing - prestige. Now the probability is still great that the West will - not interfere. We must accept the risk with reckless resolution. - A politician must accept a risk as much as a military leader. We - are facing the alternative to strike or be destroyed with - certainty sooner or later.”—We skip two paragraphs.— - - “Now it is also a great risk. Iron nerves, iron - resolution. . . .” - -A long discussion follows which I think it is unnecessary to read, and -then towards the end, four paragraphs from the bottom, I resume: - - “We need not be afraid of a blockade. The East will supply us - with grain, cattle, coal, lead, and zinc. It is a big aim, which - demands great efforts. I am only afraid that at the last minute - some ‘Schweinehund’ will make a proposal for mediation.”—And - then the last paragraph of one sentence—“Göring answers with - thanks to the Führer and the assurance that the Armed Forces - will do their duty.” - -I believe I have already offered Exhibit 30, which is a shorter note -entitled: “Second Speech of the Führer on 22 August 1939.” Reading then -from United States Exhibit 30, headed “Second Speech by the Führer on 22 -August 1939: - - “It may also turn out differently regarding England and France. - One cannot predict it with certainty. I figure on a trade - barrier, not on blockade, and with severance of relations. Most - iron determination on our side. Retreat before nothing. - Everybody shall have to make a point of it, that we were - determined from the beginning to fight the Western Powers. A - struggle for life or death. Germany has won every war as long as - she was united. Iron, unflinching attitude of all superiors, - greatest confidence, faith in victory, overcoming of the past by - getting used to the heaviest strain. A long period of peace - would not do us any good. Therefore it is necessary to expect - everything. Manly bearing. It is not machines that fight each - other, but men. We have the better quality of men. Mental - factors are decisive. The opposite camp has weaker people. In - 1918 the Nation fell down because the mental pre-requisites were - not sufficient. Frederick the Great secured final success only - through his mental power. - - “Destruction of Poland in the foreground. The aim is the - elimination of living forces, not the arrival at a certain line. - Even if war should break out in the West, the destruction of - Poland shall be the primary objective. Quick decision because of - the season. - - “I shall give a propagandistic cause for starting the war, never - mind whether it be plausible or not. The victor shall not be - asked, later on, whether we told the truth or not. In starting - and making a war, not the Right is what matters, but Victory. - - “Have no pity. Brutal attitude. Eighty million people shall get - what is their right. Their existence has to be secured. The - strongest has the right. Greatest severity. - - “Quick decision necessary. Unshakeable faith in the German - soldier. A crisis may happen only if the nerves of the leaders - give way. - - “First aim: Advance to the Vistula and Narew. Our technical - superiority will break the nerves of the Poles. Every newly - created Polish force shall again be broken at once. Constant war - of attrition. - - “New German frontier according to healthy principle. Possibly a - protectorate as a buffer. Military operations shall not be - influenced by these reflections. Complete destruction of Poland - is the military aim. To be fast is the main thing. Pursuit until - complete elimination. - - “Conviction that the German Wehrmacht is up to the requirements. - The start shall be ordered, probably by Saturday morning.” - -That ends the quotation. The Tribunal will recall that in fact the start -was actually postponed until September 1. - -DR. OTTO STAHMER (Counsel for Defendant Göring): Mr. President, may I -make a short statement on the two documents which have just been read. -Both the documents which were read and also the third which was not read -but to which reference was made, are not recognized by the Defense. I do -not wish this objection to appear unjustified; may I therefore give this -explanation: - -Both the documents which were read contain a number of factual errors. -They are not signed. Moreover, only one meeting took place, and that is -the cause for the inaccuracy of these documents. No one present at that -meeting was charged with taking down the events in the meeting -stenographically, and since there are no signatures, it cannot be -determined who wrote the documents and who is responsible for their -reliability. The third document which was not read is, according to the -photostatic copy in the Defense’s document room, simply typewritten. -There is no indication of place or time of execution. - -THE PRESIDENT: Well, we have got nothing to do with the third document, -because it has not been read. - -DR. STAHMER: Mr. President, this document has nevertheless been -published in the press and was apparently given to the press by the -Prosecution. Consequently both the Defense and the defendants have a -lively interest in giving a short explanation of the facts concerning -these documents. - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal is trying this case in accordance with the -evidence and not in accordance with what is in the press, and the third -document is not in evidence before us. - -MR. ALDERMAN: May it please the Tribunal, I recognize that counsel -wonder how these two documents which I have just read are in our hands. -They come to us from an authentic source. They are German documents. -They were found in the OKW files. If they aren’t correct records of what -occurred, it surprises us that with the great thoroughness with which -the Germans kept accurate records, they would have had these records -that didn’t represent the truth in their OKW files. - -THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Alderman, the Tribunal will of course hear what -evidence the defendants choose to give with reference to the documents. - -MR. ALDERMAN: It has occurred to me in that connection that if any of -these defendants have in their possession what is a more correct -transcription of the Führer’s words on this occasion, the Court should -consider that. On the other question referred to by counsel, I feel -somewhat guilty. It is quite true that, by a mechanical slip, the press -got the first document, which we never at all intended them to have. I -feel somewhat responsible. It happened to be included in the document -books that were handed up to the Court on Friday, because we had only -intended to refer to it and give it an identification mark and not to -offer it. I had thought that no documents would be released to the press -until they were actually offered in evidence. With as large an -organization as we have, it is very difficult to police all those -matters. - -THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Alderman, the Tribunal would like to know how many of -these documents are given to the press. - -MR. ALDERMAN: I can’t answer that. - -COL. STOREY: May it please the Tribunal, it is my understanding that as -and when documents are introduced in evidence, then they are made -available to the press. - -THE PRESIDENT: In what numbers? - -COL. STOREY: I think about 250 copies of each one, about 200 or 250 -mimeographed copies. - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal think that the defendants’ counsel should -have copies of these documents before any of them are handed to the -press. I mean to say that in preference to gentlemen of the press the -defendants’ counsel should have the documents. - -COL. STOREY: Your Honor, if it please the Court, I understand that these -gentlemen had the 10 documents on Saturday morning or Sunday morning. -They had them for 24 hours, copies of the originals of these documents -that have been read today, down in the Information Center. - -THE PRESIDENT: I stated, in accordance with the provisional arrangement -which was made, and which was made upon your representations, that 10 -copies of the trial briefs and five copies of the volumes of documents -should be given to the defendants’ counsel. - -COL. STOREY: Sir, I had the receipts that they were deposited in the -room. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes, but what I am pointing out to you, Colonel Storey, -is that if 250 copies of the documents can be given to the press, then -the defendants’ counsel should not be limited to five copies. - -COL. STOREY: If Your Honor pleases, the 250 copies are the mimeographed -copies in English when they are introduced in evidence. I hold in my -hands, or in my briefcase here, a receipt that the document books and -the briefs were delivered 24 hours in advance. - -THE PRESIDENT: You don’t seem to understand what I am putting to you, -which is this: That if you can afford to give 250 copies of the -documents in English to the press, you can afford to give more than five -copies to the defendants’ counsel—one each. Well, we do not need to -discuss it further. In the future that will be done. - -DR. DIX: May I say, then, that of every document in evidence each -defense counsel will receive one copy; it will not be just one for -several members of the Defense. - -THE PRESIDENT: Go on, Mr. Alderman. - -MR. ALDERMAN: The aggressive war having been initiated in September -1939, and Poland having been totally defeated shortly after the initial -assaults, the Nazi aggressors converted the war into a general war of -aggression extending into Scandinavia, into the Low Countries, and into -the Balkans. Under the division of the case between the Four Chief -Prosecutors, this aspect of the matter is left to presentation by the -British Chief Prosecutor. - -Another change that we have made in our plan, which I perhaps should -mention, is that following the opening statement by the British Chief -Prosecutor on Count Two, we expect to resume the detailed handling of -the later phases of the aggressive war phase of the case. The British, -instead of the Americans, will deal with the details of aggression -against Poland. Then with this expansion of the war in Europe and then, -as a joint part of the American case under Count One and the British -case under Count Two, I shall take up the aggression against Russia and -the Japanese aggression in detail. So that the remaining two subjects, -with which I shall ultimately deal in more detail, and now by -presentation of specifically significant documents, are the case of the -attack on the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the 22nd of June -1941 and the case on collaboration between Italy and Japan and Germany -and the resulting attack on the United States on the 7th of December -1941. - -As to the case on aggression against the Soviet Union, I shall at this -point present two documents. The first of these two documents -establishes the premeditation and deliberation which preceded the -attack. Just as, in the case of aggression against Czechoslovakia, the -Nazis had a code name for the secret operation “Case Green”, so in the -case of aggression against the Soviet Union, they had a code name “Case -Barbarossa.” - -THE PRESIDENT: How do you spell that? - -MR. ALDERMAN: B-a-r-b-a-r-o-s-s-a, after Barbarossa of Kaiser -Friederich. From the files of the OKW at Flensburg we have a secret -directive, Number 21, issued from the Führer’s headquarters on 18 -December 1940, relating to Case Barbarossa. This directive is more than -six months in advance of the attack. Other evidence will show that the -planning occurred even earlier. The document is signed by Hitler and is -initialled by the Defendant Jodl and the Defendant Keitel. This secret -order was issued in nine copies. The captured document is the fourth of -these nine copies. It is Document Number 446-PS in our numbered series. - -I offer it in evidence as Exhibit USA-31. - -If the Tribunal please, I think it will be sufficient for me to read the -first page of that directive, the first page of the English translation. -The paging may differ in the German original. - -It is headed “The Führer and Commander-in-Chief of the German Armed -Forces,” with a number of initials, the meaning of which I don’t know, -except OKW. It seems to be indicated to go to GK chiefs, which I suppose -to be General Kommando chiefs: - - “The Führer’s headquarters, 18 December 1940. Secret. Only - through officer. Nine copies. 4th copy. Directive Number 21, - Case Barbarossa. - - “The German Armed Forces must be prepared to crush Soviet Russia - in a quick campaign before the end of the war against England. - (Case Barbarossa.) - - “For this purpose the Army will have to employ all available - units with the reservation that the occupied territories will - have to be safeguarded against surprise attacks. - - “For the Eastern campaign the Air Force will have to free such - strong forces for the support of the Army that a quick - completion of the ground operations may be expected and that - damage of the eastern German territories will be avoided as much - as possible. This concentration of the main effort in the East - is limited by the following reservation: That the entire battle - and armament area dominated by us must remain sufficiently - protected against enemy air attacks and that the attacks on - England, and especially the supply for them, must not be - permitted to break down. - - “Concentration of the main effort of the Navy remains - unequivocally against England also during an Eastern campaign. - - “If occasion arises I will order the concentration of troops for - action against Soviet Russia eight weeks before the intended - beginning of operations. - - “Preparations requiring more time to start are—if this has not - yet been done—to begin presently and are to be completed by 15 - May 1941. - - “Great caution has to be exercised that the intention of an - attack will not be recognized. - - “The preparations of the High Command are to be made on the - following basis: - - “1. General Purpose: - - “The mass of the Russian Army in western Russia is to be - destroyed in daring operations by driving forward deep wedges - with tanks, and the retreat of intact battle-ready troops into - the wide spaces of Russia is to be prevented. - - “In quick pursuit, a line is to be reached from where the - Russian Air Force will no longer be able to attack German Reich - territory. The first goal of operations is the protection from - Asiatic Russia from the general line Volga-Archangel. In case of - necessity, the last industrial area in the Urals left to Russia - could be eliminated by the Luftwaffe. - - “In the course of these operations the Russian Baltic Sea Fleet - will quickly erase its bases and will no longer be ready to - fight. - - “Effective intervention by the Russian Air Force is to be - prevented through powerful blows at the beginning of the - operations.” - -Another secret document, captured from the OKW files. . . . - -THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Alderman, perhaps that would be a convenient time to -adjourn for 10 minutes. - - [_A recess was taken._] - -MR. ALDERMAN: If it pleases the Tribunal, another secret document -captured from the OKW files, we think establishes the motive for the -attack on the Soviet Union. It also establishes the full awareness of -the Nazi conspirators of the Crimes against Humanity which would result -from their attack. The document is a memorandum of 2 May 1941, -concerning the result of a discussion on that day with the state -secretaries concerning the Case Barbarossa. The document is initialled -by a Major Von Gusovius, a member of the staff of General Thomas set up -to handle the economic exploitations of the territory occupied by the -Germans during the course of the aggression against Russia. The document -is numbered 2718-PS in our numbered series of documents. I offer it in -evidence as Exhibit USA-32. - -I shall simply read the first two paragraphs of this document, including -the introductory matter: - - “Matter for Chief; 2 copies; first copy to files 1a. Second copy - to General Schubert, May 2, 1941.” - - “Memorandum about the result of today’s discussion with the - state secretaries about Barbarossa. - - “1. The War can only be continued if all Armed Forces are fed by - Russia in the third year of war. - - “2. There is no doubt that as a result many millions of people - will be starved to death if we take out of the country the - things necessary for us.” - -That document has already been commented on and quoted from in Mr. -Justice Jackson’s opening statement. The staggering implications of that -document are hard to realize. In the words of the document, the motive -for the attack was that the war which the Nazi conspirators had launched -in September 1939 “can only be continued if all Armed Forces are fed by -Russia in the third year of the war.” Perhaps, there never was a more -sinister sentence written than the sentence in this document which -reads: - - “There is no doubt that as a result many millions of people will - be starved to death if we take out of the country the things - necessary for us.” - -The result is known to all of us. - -I turn now to the Nazi collaboration with Italy and Japan and the -resulting attack on the United States on 7 December 1941. With the -unleashing of the German aggressive war against the Soviet Union in June -1941, the Nazi conspirators, and in particular, the Defendant -Ribbentrop, called upon the eastern co-architect of the New Order, -Japan, to attack in the rear. Our evidence will show that they incited -and kept in motion a force reasonably calculated to result in an attack -on the United States. For a time, they maintained their preference that -the United States not be involved in the conflict, realizing the -military implication of an entry of the United States into the war. -However, their incitement did result in the attack on Pearl Harbor, and -long prior to that attack, they had assured the Japanese that they would -declare war on the United States should a United States-Japanese -conflict break out. It was in reliance on those assurances that the -Japanese struck at Pearl Harbor. - -On the present discussion of this phase of the case, I shall offer only -one document to prove this point. The document was captured from the -files of the German Foreign Office. It consists of notes dated 4 April -1941, signed by “Schmidt,” regarding discussions between the Führer and -the Japanese Foreign Minister Matsuoka, in the presence of the Defendant -Ribbentrop. The document is numbered 1881-PS in our numbered series, and -I offer it in evidence as Exhibit USA-33. In the original, it is in very -large, typewritten form in German. I shall read what I deem to be the -pertinent parts of this document, beginning with the four paragraphs; -first reading the heading, the heading being: - - “Notes regarding the discussion between the Führer and the - Japanese Foreign Minister Matsuoka, in the presence of the Reich - Foreign Minister and the Reich Minister of State Meissner, in - Berlin, on 4 April 1941. - - “Matsuoka then also expressed the request that the Führer should - instruct the proper authorities in Germany to meet as - broad-mindedly as possible the wishes of the Japanese Military - Commission. Japan was in need of German help particularly - concerning the U-boat warfare, which could be given by making - available to them the latest experiences of the war as well as - the latest technical improvements and inventions.”—For the - record, I am reading on what is page 6 of the German original.— - - “Japan would do her utmost to avoid a war with the United - States. In case that country should decide to attack Singapore, - the Japanese Navy, of course, had to be prepared for a fight - with the United States, because in that case America probably - would side with Great Britain. He (Matsuoka) personally believed - that the United States could be restrained, by diplomatic - exertions, from entering the war at the side of Great Britain. - Army and Navy had, however, to count on the worst - situation,—that is, with war against America. They were of the - opinion that such a war would extend for 5 years or longer, and - would take the form of guerilla warfare in the Pacific, and - would be fought out in the South Sea. For this reason the German - experiences in her guerilla warfare are of the greatest value to - Japan. It was a question how such a war would best be conducted - and how all the technical improvements of submarines, in all - details such as periscopes and such like, could best be - exploited by Japan. - - “To sum up, Matsuoka requested that the Führer should see to it - that the proper German authorities would place at the disposal - of the Japanese those developments and inventions concerning - navy and army which were needed by the Japanese. - - “The Führer promised this and pointed out that Germany, too, - considered a conflict with the United States undesirable, but - that it had already made allowances for such a contingency. In - Germany one was of the opinion that America’s contributions - depended upon the possibilities of transportation, and that this - again is conditioned by the available tonnage. Germany’s war - against tonnage, however, means a decisive weakening, not merely - against England, but also against America. Germany has made her - preparations so that no American could land in Europe. She would - conduct a most energetic fight against America with her U-boats - and her Luftwaffe, and due to her superior experience, which - would still have to be acquired by the United States, she would - be vastly superior, and that quite apart from the fact that the - German soldiers naturally rank high above the Americans. - - “In the further course of the discussion, the Führer pointed out - that Germany, on her part, would immediately take the - consequences if Japan would get involved with the United States. - It did not matter with whom the United States would first get - involved, whether with Germany or with Japan. They would always - try to eliminate one country at a time, not to come to an - understanding with the other country subsequently, but to - liquidate this one just the same. Therefore Germany would - strike, as already mentioned, without delay in case of a - conflict between Japan and America, because the strength of the - tripartite powers lies in their joint action; their weakness - would be if they would let themselves be beaten individually. - - “Matsuoka once more repeated his request that the Führer might - give the necessary instructions, in order that the proper German - authorities would place at the disposal of the Japanese the - latest improvements and inventions, which are of interest to - them because the Japanese Navy had to prepare immediately for a - conflict with the United States. - - “As regards Japanese-American relationship, Matsuoka explained - further that he has always declared in his country that sooner - or later a war with the United States would be unavoidable, if - Japan continued to drift along as at present. In his opinion - this conflict would happen rather sooner than later. His - argumentation went on, why should Japan, therefore, not - decisively strike at the right moment and take the risk upon - herself of a fight against America? Just thus would she perhaps - avoid a war for generations, particularly if she gained - predominance in the South Seas. There are, to be sure, in Japan, - many who hesitate to follow those trends of thought. Matsuoka - was considered in those circles a dangerous man with dangerous - thoughts. He, however, stated that if Japan continued to walk - along her present path, one day she would have to fight anyway - and that this would then be under less favorable circumstances - than at present. - - “The Führer replied that he could well understand the situation - of Matsuoka, because he himself had been in similar situations - (the clearing of the Rhineland, declaration of sovereignty of - Armed Forces). He too was of the opinion that he had to exploit - favorable conditions and accept the risk of an anyhow - unavoidable fight, at a time when he himself was still young and - full of vigor. How right he was in his attitude was proven by - events. Europe now was free. He would not hesitate a moment to - reply instantly to any widening of the war, be it by Russia, be - it by America. Providence favored those who will not let dangers - come to them, but who will bravely face them. - - “Matsuoka replied that the United States, or rather their ruling - politicians, had recently still attempted a last maneuver - towards Japan, by declaring that America would not fight Japan - on account of China or the South Seas, provided that Japan gave - free passage to the consignment of rubber and tin to America to - their place of destination. However, America would war against - Japan the moment she felt that Japan entered the war with the - intention to assist in the destruction of Great Britain. Such an - argumentation naturally did not miss its effect upon the - Japanese, because of the education oriented on English lines - which many had received. - - “The Führer commented on this, that this attitude of America did - not mean anything, but that the United States had the hope that, - as long as the British World Empire existed, one day they could - advance against Japan together with Great Britain, whereas, in - case of the collapse of the World Empire, they would be totally - isolated and could not do anything against Japan. - - “The Reich Foreign Minister interjected that the Americans - precisely under all circumstances wanted to maintain the - powerful position of England in East Asia, but that on the other - hand it is proved by this attitude, to what extent she fears a - joint action of Japan and Germany. - - “Matsuoka continued that it seemed to him of importance to give - to the Führer an absolutely clear picture of the real attitude - inside Japan. For this reason he also had to inform him - regretfully of the fact that he, Matsuoka, in his capacity as - Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs, could not utter in Japan - a single word of all that he had expounded before the Führer and - the Reich Foreign Minister regarding his plans. This would cause - him serious damage in political and financial circles. Once - before, he had committed the mistake, before he became Japanese - Minister for Foreign Affairs, to tell a close friend something - about his intentions. It seems that the latter had spread these - things, and thus brought about all sorts of rumors, which he, as - Foreign Minister, had to oppose energetically, though as a rule - he always tells the truth. Under these circumstances he also - could not indicate how soon he could report on the questions - discussed to the Japanese Premier or to the Emperor. He would - have to study exactly and carefully, in the first place, the - development in Japan, so as to make his decision at a favorable - moment, to make a clear breast of his proper plans towards the - Prince Konoye and the Emperor. Then the decision would have to - be made within a few days, because the plans would otherwise be - spoiled by talk. - - “Should he, Matsuoka, fail to carry out his intentions, that - would be proof that he is lacking in influence, in power of - conviction, and in tactical capabilities. However, should he - succeed, it would prove that he had great influence in Japan. He - himself felt confident that he would succeed. - - “On his return, being questioned, he would indeed admit to the - Emperor, the Premier and the Ministers for the Navy and the - Army, that Singapore had been discussed; he would, however, - state that it was only on a hypothetical basis. - - “Besides this, Matsuoka made the express request not to cable in - the matter of Singapore, because he had reason to fear that by - cabling, something might leak out. If necessary, he would send a - courier. - - “The Führer agreed and assured, after all, that he could rest - entirely assured of German reticence. - - “Matsuoka replied he believed indeed in German reticence, but - unfortunately could not say the same for Japan. - - “The discussion was terminated after the exchange of some - personal parting words. - - “Berlin, the 4th of April 1941. (Signed) Schmidt.” - -This completes the presentation of what I have called the “handful of -selected documents,” offered not as a detailed treatment of any of these -wars of aggression, but merely to prove the deliberate planning, the -deliberate premeditation with which each of these aggressions was -carried out. - -I turn to a more detailed and more or less chronological presentation of -the various stages of the aggression. - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will now adjourn until 10 o’clock tomorrow. - - [_The Tribunal adjourned until 27 November 1945 at 1000 hours._] - - - - - SIXTH DAY - Tuesday, 27 November 1945 - - - _Morning Session_ - -THE PRESIDENT: I call on the counsel for the United States. Mr. -Alderman, before you begin, I think it would be better, for the purpose -of the Tribunal, when citing documents, if you would refer to them not -only by the United States exhibit number and the PS document number, but -also by the document book identification. Each document book, as I -understand it, has either a letter or a number. They are numbered -alphabetically, I think. If that is not done, when we have got a great -number of document books before us, it is very difficult to find where -the particular exhibit is. - -MR. ALDERMAN: I can see that, yes. - -May it please the Tribunal, the handful of selected documents which I -presented yesterday constitute a cross section of the aggressive war -case, as a whole. They do not purport to cover the details of any of the -phases of the aggressive war case. In effect they do amount to a running -account of the entire matter. - -Before moving ahead with more detailed evidence, I think it might be -helpful to pause at this point, to present to the Tribunal a chart. This -chart presents visually some of the key points in the development of the -Nazi aggression. The Tribunal may find it helpful as a kind of visual -summary of some of the evidence received yesterday and also as a -background for some of the evidence which remains to be introduced. I am -quite certain that, as your minds go back to those days, you remember -the maps that appeared from time to time in the public press, as these -tremendous movements developed in Europe. I am quite certain that you -must have formed the concept, as I did in those days, of the gradually -developing head of a wolf. - -In that first chart you only have an incipient wolf. He lacks a lower -jaw, the part shown in red, but when that wolf moved forward and took -over Austria—the Anschluss—that red portion became solid black. It -became the jaw of the wolf, and when that lower jaw was acquired, -Czechoslovakia was already, with its head and the main part of its body, -in the mouth of the wolf. - -Then on chart two you see the mountainous portions, the fortified -portions of Czechoslovakia. In red, you see the Sudetenland territories -which were first taken over by the Pact of Munich, whereupon -Czechoslovakia’s head became diminutive in the mouth of the wolf. - -And in chart three you see the diminishing head in red, with its neck -practically broken, and all that was necessary was the taking over of -Bohemia and Moravia and the wolf’s head became a solid, black blot on -the map of Europe, with arrows indicating incipient further aggressions, -which, of course, occurred. - -That is the visual picture that I have never been able to wipe out of my -mind, because it seems to demonstrate the inevitability of everything -that went along after the taking over of Austria. - -The detailed more or less chronological presentation of the aggressive -war case will be divided into seven distinct sections. The first section -is that concerning preparation for aggression during the period of 1933 -to 1936, roughly. The second section deals with aggression against -Austria. The third section deals with aggression against Czechoslovakia. -The fourth section deals with aggression against Poland and the -initiation of actual war. For reasons of convenience, the details of the -Polish section will be presented after the British Chief Prosecutor -presents his opening statement to the Tribunal. The fifth section deals -with the expansion of the war into a general war of aggression, by -invasions into Scandinavia, the Lowlands, and the Balkans. The details -on this section of the case will be presented by the British Chief -Prosecutor. The sixth section deals with aggression against the Soviet -Union, which I shall expect to present. For reasons of convenience -again, the details on this section, like the details on aggression -against Poland, will be presented after the British Prosecutor has made -his opening statement to the Tribunal. The seventh section will deal -with collaboration with Italy and Japan and the aggression against the -United States. - -I turn now to the first of these sections, the part of the case -concerning preparation for aggression during the period 1933 to 1936. -The particular section of the Indictment to which this discussion -addresses itself is paragraph IV (F) and sub-paragraph 2 (a), (b), (c), -(d), (e), and (f), which I need not read at a glance, as the Tribunal -will recall the allegation. It will be necessary, as I proceed, to make -reference to certain provisions of the Charter, and to certain -provisions of the Treaty of Versailles, and the Treaty between the -United States and Germany restoring friendly relations, 25 August 1921, -which incorporates certain provisions of the Treaty of Versailles and -certain provisions of the Rhine Treaty of Locarno of 16 October 1925. - -THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Alderman, is it not intended that this document book -should have some identifying letter or number? - -MR. ALDERMAN: “M”, I am informed. I do not offer those treaties in -evidence at this time, because the British will offer all the pertinent -treaties in their aspect of the case. - -The Nazi plans for aggressive war started very soon after World War I. -Their modest origin and rather fantastic nature, and the fact that they -could have been interrupted at numerous points, do not detract from the -continuity of the planning. The focus of this part of the Indictment on -the period from 1933 to 1945, does not disassociate these events from -what occurred in the entire preceding period. Thus, the ascendancy of -Hitler and the Nazis to political power in 1933, was already a -well-advanced milestone on the German road to progress. - -By 1933 the Nazi Party, the NSDAP, had reached very substantial -proportions. At that time, their plans called for the acquisition of -political control of Germany. This was indispensable for the -consolidation within the country of all the internal resources and -potentialities. - -As soon as there was sufficient indication of successful progress along -this line of internal consolidation, the next step was to become -disengaged from some of the external disadvantages of existing -international limitations and obligations. The restrictions of the -Versailles Treaty were a bar to the development of strength in all the -fields necessary, if one were to make war. Although there had been an -increasing amount of circumvention and violation from the very time that -Versailles came into effect, such operations under disguise and -subterfuge could not attain proportions adequate for the objectives of -the Nazis. To get the Treaty of Versailles out of the way was -indispensable to the development of the extensive military power which -they had to have for their purposes. Similarly, as part of the same plan -and for the same reasons, Germany withdrew from the Disarmament -Conference and from the League of Nations. It was impossible to carry -out their plans on the basis of existing international obligations or of -the orthodox kind of future commitments. - -The points mentioned in this Paragraph IV (F) 2 of the indictment are -now historical facts of which we expect the Tribunal to take judicial -notice. - -It goes without saying that every military and diplomatic operation was -preceded by a plan of action and a careful coordination of all -participating forces. At the same time each point was part of a -long-prepared plan of aggression. Each represents a necessary step in -the direction of the specific aggression which was subsequently -committed. - -To develop an extensive argument would, perhaps, be the unnecessary -laboring of the obvious. What I intend to say is largely the bringing to -light of information disclosed in illustrative documents which were -hitherto unavailable. - -The three things of immediate international significance referred to in -this Paragraph IV (F) 2 of the Indictment are: - -First, the withdrawal from the Disarmament Conference and the League of -Nations; second, the institution of compulsory military service; and, -third, the reoccupation of the demilitarized zone of the Rhineland. Each -of these steps was progressively more serious than the matter of -international relations. In each of these steps Germany anticipated the -possibility of sanction being applied by other countries and, in -particular, a strong military action from France, with the possible -assistance of England. However, the conspirators were determined that -nothing less than a preventive war would stop them, and they also -estimated correctly, that no one or combination of Big Powers would -undertake the responsibility of such a war. The withdrawal from the -Disarmament Conference and from the League of Nations was, of course, -action that did not violate any international obligation. The League -Covenant provided the procedure for withdrawal. However, in this case -and as part of the bigger plan, the significance of these actions cannot -be disassociated from the general conspiracy and the plans for -aggression. The announcement of the institution of universal military -service was a more daring action with a more overt significance. It was -a violation of Versailles, but they got away with it. Then, came the -outright military defiance, the occupation of the demilitarized zone of -the Rhineland. - -Still on the Indictment, Paragraph IV (F) 2, which alleges the -determination of the Nazi conspirators to remove the restrictions of -Versailles, the fact that the Nazi plans in this respect started very -early is not only confirmed by their own statements, but they boasted -about their long planning and careful execution. - -I read to you yesterday at length from our Exhibit 789-PS, Exhibit -USA-23, Hitler’s speech to all Supreme Commanders, 23 November 1939. I -need not read it again. He stated there that his primary goal was to -wipe out Versailles. After 4 years of actual war, the Defendant Jodl, as -Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces, delivered an address to -the Reich and to the Gauleiter in which he traced the development of -German strength. The seizure of power to him meant the restoration of -fighting sovereignty, including conscription, occupation of the -Rhineland, and rearmament, with special emphasis on modern armor and air -forces. - -I have, if the Tribunal please, our Document Number L-172. It is a -photostat of a microfilm of a speech by General Jodl, and I offer that -photostat as Exhibit USA-34. I shall read, if the Tribunal please, only -a part of that, but starting at the beginning. - -The speech is entitled “The Strategic Position at the Beginning of the -Fifth Year of War.” It is a kind of retrospective summary by the -Defendant General Jodl. “A lecture by the Chief of the General Staff of -the Armed Forces to the Reich- and Gauleiter, delivered in Munich on 7 -November 1943.” I am reading from the English translation: - - “Introduction: Reichsleiter Bormann has requested me to give you - a review today of the strategic position at the beginning of the - fifth year of war. - - “I must admit that it was not without hesitation that I - undertook this none-too-easy task. It is not possible to do it - justice with a few generalities. It is not necessary to talk - about what will come but one must say frankly what the situation - is. No one, the Führer has ordered, may know more or be told - more than he needs for his own immediate task, but I have no - doubt at all in my mind, gentlemen, but that you need a great - deal, in order to be able to cope with your tasks. It is in your - Gaue, after all, and among their inhabitants that all the - widespread enemy propaganda, defeatism, and malicious rumors are - concentrated. Up and down the country the devil of subversion - strides. All the cowards are seeking a way out, or—as they call - it—a political solution. They say we must negotiate while there - is still something in hand, and all these slogans are made use - of to attack the natural feeling of the people, that in this war - there can only be a fight to the end. Capitulation is the end of - the nation; the end of Germany. Against this wave of enemy - propaganda and cowardice you need more than force. You need to - know the true situation, and for this reason I believe that I am - justified in giving you a perfectly open and unvarnished account - of the present state of affairs. This is no forbidden disclosure - of secrets, but a weapon which may perhaps help you to fortify - the morale of the people. For this war will not only be decided - by force of arms, but by the will to resist of the entire - people. Germany was broken in 1918 not at the front but at home. - Italy suffered not military defeat but moral defeat. She broke - down internally. The result has been not the peace she expected - but—through the cowardice of these criminal traitors—a fate a - thousand times harder than continuation of the war at our side - would have brought to the Italian people. I can rely on you, - gentlemen, that since I give concrete figures and data - concerning our own strength, you will treat these details as - your secret; all the rest is at your disposal, without - restriction, for application in your activities as leaders of - the people. - - “The necessity and objectives of this war were clear to all and - everyone at the moment when we entered upon the War of - Liberation of Greater Germany and, by attacking, parried the - danger which menaced us . . . both from Poland and from the - Western Powers. Our further incursions into Scandinavia, in the - direction of the Mediterranean and into Russia—these also - aroused no doubts concerning the general conduct of the war, so - long as we were successful. It was not until more serious - set-backs were encountered and our general situation began to - become increasingly acute, that the German people began to ask - themselves whether, perhaps, we had not undertaken more than we - could do and set our aims too high. To provide an answer to this - questioning and to furnish you with certain points of view for - use in your own work of enlightenment, is one of the main points - of my present lecture. I shall divide it into three parts: - - “I. A review of the most important questions of past - developments; - - “II. Consideration of the present situation; - - “III. The foundations of our confidence in victory. - - “In view of my position as Military Advisor to the Führer, I - shall confine myself in my remarks to the problems of my own - personal sphere of action, fully appreciating at the same time, - that in view of the Protean nature of this war, I shall in this - way, be giving expression to only one aspect of the events. - - “I. The review: - - “1. The fact that the National Socialist movement and its - struggle for internal power were the preparatory stage of the - outer liberation from the bonds of the dictate of Versailles, is - not one on which I need expatiate, in this circle. I should - like, however, to mention at this point how clearly all - thoughtful professional soldiers realize what an important part - has been played by the National Socialist movement in - reawakening the military spirit (the Wehrwille), in nurturing - fighting strength (the Wehrkraft), and in rearming the German - people. In spite of all the virtue inherent in it, the - numerically small Reichswehr would never have been able to cope - with this task, if only because of its own restricted radius of - action. Indeed, what the Führer aimed at—and has so happily - been successful in bringing about—was the fusion of these two - forces. - - “2. The seizure of power . . .”—I invite the Tribunal’s - attention to the frequency with which that expression occurs in - all of these documents.—“The seizure of power by the Nazi Party - in its turn had meant, in the first place, the restoration of - military sovereignty.” - -That is the German word “Wehrhoheit”—a kind of euphemism there—“the -highness of defense.” I think it really means “fighting sovereignty.” -Wehrhoheit also meant conscription, occupation of the Rhineland and -rearmament, with special emphasis being laid on the creation of a modern -armored and air arm. - - “3. The Austrian Anschluss . . .”—Anschluss means “locking on - to,” I think. They latched on to Austria and—“The Austrian - Anschluss, in its turn, brought with it not only the fulfillment - of an old national aim, but also had the effect both of - reinforcing our fighting strength and of materially improving - our strategic position. Whereas, up until then, the territory of - Czechoslovakia had projected in a most menacing way right into - Germany (a wasp waist in the direction of France and an air base - for the Allies, in particular Russia), Czechoslovakia herself - was now enclosed by pincers.” - -I wish the Tribunal would contemplate the chart a moment and see that -worm-like form of Czechoslovakia, which General Jodl calls a “wasp waist -in the direction of France,” and then he very accurately described what -happened when Austria was taken by the Anschluss, that the “wasp waist” -was “enclosed in the pincers.” - -I resume reading: - - “Her own strategic position had now become so unfavorable that - she was bound to fall a victim to any attack pressed home with - vigor before effective aid from the West could be expected to - arrive. - - “This possibility of aid was furthermore made more difficult by - the construction of the West Wall, which, in contradistinction - to the Maginot Line, was not a measure based on debility and - resignation but one intended to afford rear coverage for an - active policy in the East. - - “4. The bloodless solution of the Czech conflict in the autumn - of 1938 and spring of 1939”—that is—the two phases in - Czechoslovakia—“and the annexation of Slovakia rounded off the - territory of Greater Germany in such a way that it now became - possible to consider the Polish problem on the basis of more or - less favorable strategic premises.”—I think it needs nothing - more than a glance at the progressive chart to see what those - favorable strategic premises were.— - - “5. This brings me to the actual outbreak of the present war, - and the question which next arises is whether the moment for the - struggle with Poland, in itself unavoidable, was favorably - selected or not. The answer to this question is all the less in - doubt, because the relatively strong opponent collapsed more - quickly than expected, and the Western Powers who were Poland’s - friends, although they did declare war on us and form a second - front, nevertheless made no use of the possibilities open to - them of wresting the initiative from our hands. Concerning the - course taken by the Polish campaign, nothing further need be - said but that it proved to an extent which surprised the whole - world a fact which until then had not been certain by any means, - namely, the high state of efficiency of the young armed forces - of Greater Germany.” - -If the Court please, there is a long review by General Jodl in this -document. I could read on with interest and some enthusiasm, but I -believe I have read enough to show that General Jodl by this document -identifies himself fully with the Nazi movement. This document shows -that he was not a mere soldier. Insofar as he is concerned, it -identifies the military with the political, and the immediate point on -which I had offered the document was to show the deliberation with which -the Treaty of Versailles was abrogated by Germany and the demilitarized -zone of the Rhineland was militarized and fortified. - -In one of Adolf Hitler’s reviews of the 6-year period between his -ascendancy to power and the outbreak of hostilities, he not only -admitted but boasted about the orderly and coordinated long-range -planning. I bring up again, if the Tribunal please, the Document L-79, -which was offered in evidence yesterday as Exhibit USA-27. That is the -minutes of a conference of the Führer by Schmundt, his adjutant. In as -large a staff as ours we inevitably fall into a kind of patois or lingo, -as Americans say. We also refer to this as “Little Schmundt.” The large -file that I offered yesterday, we call “Big Schmundt.” - -At this point, I merely wish to read two sentences from Page 1 of that -document which we call “Little Schmundt.” - - “In the period 1933 to 1939 progress was made in all fields. Our - military system improved enormously.” - -And then, just above the middle of the second page of the English -translation: - - “The period which lies behind us has indeed been put to good - use. All measures have been taken in the correct sequence and in - harmony with our aims.” - -One of the most significant direct preparations for aggressive war is -found in the secret Reich Defense Law of 21 May 1935, which I offered in -evidence yesterday as Exhibit USA-24 and commented on then. I need not -repeat that comment. The law went into effect upon its passage. It -stated at the outset that it was to be made public instantly, but at the -end of it Adolf Hitler signed the decree ordering that it be kept -secret. I commented on that sufficiently yesterday. - -General Thomas, Thomas, as we call him, who was in charge of War and -Armament Economy and for some time a high ranking member of the German -High Council, refers to this law as “the cornerstone of war -preparations.” He points out that, although the law was not made public -until the outbreak of war, it was put into immediate execution as a -program of preparation. - -I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of General Thomas’ work, _A -History of the German War- and Armament-Economy, 1923-1944_, Page 25. We -have the volume here, in German, so that anyone who wishes may examine -it. I don’t care to offer the entire volume in evidence unless the Court -think I should. We do give it an exhibit number, Exhibit USA-35, but I -simply should like to place it in the files as a reference work -implementing judicial notice, if that is practicable. - -THE PRESIDENT: You want it simply for the purpose of showing that -General Thomas said that that law was the cornerstone of war? That has -already been passed into the record. - -MR. ALDERMAN: I want to say to counsel for the defendants that it is -here if they care to consult it at any time. - -THE PRESIDENT: Very well. - -MR. ALDERMAN: I should have identified it by our number, 2353-PS. - -This secret law remained in effect until 4 September 1938, at which time -it was replaced by another secret Defense Law, revising the system of -defense organization and directing more detailed preparations for the -approaching status of mobilization, which I think was the euphemism for -war. - -These laws will be discussed more extensively in connection with other -sections of our presentation. They have been discussed by Mr. Dodd in -connection with the economic preparations for the war. - -The second secret Defense Law I offer in evidence, as our serial number -2194-PS. I offer it as Exhibit USA-36. - -As to that document I only intend to read the two covering letters: - - “Reich Defense Law; the Ministry for Economy and Labor, Saxony; - Dresden 6; 4 September 1939; Telephone: 52.151, long distance; - Top Secret. - - “Transportation Section, attention of Construction Chief - Counsellor Hirche or representative in the office; stamp of - receipt of the Reich Protector in Bohemia and Moravia; received - Prague, 5 September 1939, No. 274. - - “Enclosed please find a copy of the Reich Defense Law of 4 - September 1938 and a copy each of the decrees of the Reich - Minister of Transportation, dated 7 October 1938, RL/W/ - 10.2212/38, Top Secret, and 17 July 1939, RL/LV 1.2173/39, Top - Secret, for your information and observance. - - “By order, signed Kretschmar. 3 inclosures. Stamp: complete to - Dresden, 4 September 1939, signed Schneider. - - “Receipt for the letter of 4 September 1939, with 3 inclosures, - signed 5 September 1939, and returned to Construction Counsellor - Kretschmar.” - -The whole point being that it was enclosing a second secret Reich -Defense Law under top-secret cover. - -Now, next I refer to Indictment, Paragraph IV (F) 2 (a). That paragraph -of the Indictment refers to four points: - -(1) Secret rearmament from 1933 to March 1935; (2) the training of -military personnel (that includes secret or camouflage training); (3) -production of munitions of war; and, (4) the building of an air force. - -All four of these points are included in the general plan for the breach -of the Treaty of Versailles and for the ensuing aggressions. The facts -of rearmament and of its secrecy are self-evident from the events that -followed. The significant phase of this activity insofar as the -Indictment is concerned, lies in the fact that all this was necessary in -order to break the barriers of the Versailles Treaty and of the Locarno -Pact, and necessary to the aggressive wars which were to follow. The -extent and nature of those activities could only have been for -aggressive purposes, and the highest importance which the Government -attached to the secrecy of the program is emphasized by the disguised -financing, both before and after the announcement of conscription and -the rebuilding of the Army, 16 March 1935. - -I have, if the Court please, an unsigned memorandum by the Defendant -Schacht dated 3 May 1935 entitled “The Financing of the Armament -Program” (Finanzierung der Rüstung). As I say, it is not signed by the -Defendant Schacht, but he identified it as being his memorandum in an -interrogation on the 16th of October 1945. I would assume that he would -still admit that it is his memorandum. That memorandum has been referred -to but I believe not introduced or accepted in evidence. I identify it -by our Number 1168-PS, and I offer it in evidence as Exhibit USA-37. - -I think it is quite significant, and with the permission of the Court I -shall read the entire memorandum, reminding you that the German -interpreter has the original German before him to read into the -transcript. “Memorandum from Schacht to Hitler” identified by Schacht as -Exhibit A, interrogation 16 October 1945, Page 40. May 3, 1935 is the -date of the memorandum. - - “Financing of Armament. The following explanations are based - upon the thought that the accomplishment of the armament program - with speed and in quantity is the problem of German politics; - that everything else therefore should be subordinated to this - purpose as long as the main purpose is not imperiled by - neglecting all other questions. Even after March 16, 1935 the - difficulty remains that one cannot undertake the open - propagandistic treatment of the German people for support of - armament without endangering our position internationally - (without loss to our foreign trade). The already nearly - impossible financing of the armament program is rendered hereby - exceptionally difficult. - - “Another supposition must also be emphasized. The printing press - can be used only for the financing of armament to such a degree - as permitted by maintaining of the money value. Every inflation - increases the prices of foreign raw materials and increases the - domestic prices and is therefore like a snake biting its own - tail. The circumstance that our armament had to be camouflaged - completely till 16 March 1935, and since this date the - camouflage had to be continued to an even larger extent, made it - necessary to use the printing press (bank note press) already at - the beginning of the whole armament program, while it would have - been natural to start it (i.e., the printing press) at the final - point of finance. In the portfolio of the Reichsbank are - segregated bills of exchange for this purpose (that is, - armament) of 3,775 millions and 866 millions, altogether 4,641 - millions, out of which bills of exchange for armament amount to - 2,374 million Reichsmark, that is of April 30, 1935. The - Reichsbank has invested the amount of marks under its - jurisdiction, but belonging to foreigners, in bank notes of - armament. - - “Our armaments are also financed partly with the credits of our - political opponents. Furthermore, 500 million Reichsmark were - used for financing of armaments which originated out of the - federal loans which were invested in the saving banks in the - year 1935. In the regular budget the following amounts were - provided for the Armed Forces: - - “For the budget period 1933 to 1934—750 million Reichsmark; for - the budget period 1934 to 1935—1,100 million Reichsmark; and - for the budget period 1935 to 1936—2,500 million Reichsmark. - - “The amount of deficits of the budget since 1928 increases after - the budget 1935 to 1936 to 5 to 6 billion Reichsmark. This total - deficit is already financed at the present time by short-term - credits of the money market. It therefore reduces in advance the - possibilities of utilization of the public market for the - armament. The Reichsfinanzminister”—Minister of - Finance—“correctly points out at the defense of the budget: - - “‘As a permanent yearly deficit is an impossibility, as we - cannot figure with security increased tax revenues in an amount - balancing the deficit and any other previous debits, as on the - other hand a balanced budget is the only secure basis for the - impending great task of military policy,’”—I interpolate that - evidently the Defendant Schacht knew about the impending great - military task to be faced by Germany.—“‘for all these reasons - we have to put in motion a fundamental and conscious budget - policy, which solves the problem of armament financing by - organic and planned reduction of other expenditures, not only - from the point of receipt, but also from the point of - expenditure, that is, by saving.’ - - “How urgent this question is, can be deduced from the following, - that very many tasks have been undertaken by the State and - Party”—it isn’t ever just the State; it is the State and the - Party—“and are now in process, all of which are not covered by - the budget, but from contributions and credits, which have to be - raised by industry in addition to the regular taxes. The - existence of various budgets side by side, which serve more or - less public tasks, is the greatest impediment for gaining a - clear view of the possibilities of financing the armaments. A - large number of ministries and various branches of the Party - have their own budgets, and for this reason have possibilities - of incomes and expenses, though based on the sovereignty of - finance of the State, but not subject to the control of the - Finanzminister”—Minister of Finance—“and therefore also not - subject to the control of the Cabinet. Just as in the sphere of - politics the much too far-reaching delegation of legislative - powers to individuals brought about various states within the - State, exactly in the same way the condition of various branches - of State and Party, working side by side and against each other, - has a devastating effect on the possibility of finance. If, in - this territory, concentration and unified control is not - introduced very soon, the solution of the already impossible - task of armament finance is endangered. - - “We have the following tasks: - - “(1) A deputy is entrusted with, I suppose, finding all sources - and revenues, which have origin in contributions to the Federal - Government, to the State and Party, and in profits of public and - Party enterprises. - - “(2) Furthermore experts entrusted by the Führer have to examine - how these amounts were used and which of these amounts in the - future can be withdrawn from their previous purpose. - - “(3) The same experts have to examine the investments of all - public and Party organizations, to what extent this property can - be used for the purpose of armament financing. - - “(4) The federal Ministry of Finances is to be entrusted to - examine the possibilities of increased revenues by way of new - taxes or the increasing of existing taxes. - - “The up-to-date financing of armaments by the Reichsbank, under - existing political conditions, was a necessity, and the - political success proved the correctness of this action. The - other possibilities of armament financing have to be started now - under any circumstance. For this purpose all absolutely - nonessential expenditures for other purposes must not take - place, and the total financial strength of Germany, limited as - it is, has to be concentrated for the one purpose of armament - financing. Whether the problem of financing as outlined in this - program succeeds remains to be seen, but without such - concentration it will fail with absolute certainty.” - -Being sort of a hand in finance myself, I can feel some sympathy with -the Defendant Schacht as he was wrestling with these problems. - -THE PRESIDENT: Would that be a convenient time to adjourn for 10 -minutes? - -MR. ALDERMAN: Yes. - - [_A recess was taken._] - -MR. ALDERMAN: 21 May 1935 was a very important date in the Nazi -calendar. As I have already indicated, it was on that date that they -passed the secret Reich Defense Law, which is our Document 2261-PS. The -secrecy of their armament operations had already reached the point -beyond which they could no longer maintain successful camouflage and, -since their program called for still further expansion, they made a -unilateral renunciation of the armament provisions of the Versailles -Treaty on the same date, 21 May 1935. - -I refer to Hitler’s speech to the Reichstag on 21 May 1935; our Document -Number 2288-PS. We have here the original volume of the _Völkische -Beobachter_ (the “Popular Observer”, I suppose, is the correct -translation), Volume 48, 1935, 122-151, May, and the date 22 May 1935, -which gave his speech under the heading (if I may translate, perhaps): -“The Führer Notifies the World of the Way to Real Peace.” - -I offer that part of that volume identified as our Number 2288-PS, as -Exhibit USA-38, and from that I shall read, beginning with the fifth -paragraph in the English translation. I am sorry, I said the fifth -paragraph—this indicates on Page 3. It is after he discusses some -general conclusions and then there is a paragraph numbered 1, that says: - - “1. The German Reich Government refuses to adhere to the Geneva - Resolution of 17 March. . . . - - “The Treaty of Versailles was not broken by Germany - unilaterally, but the well-known paragraphs of the Dictate of - Versailles were violated, and consequently invalidated by those - powers who could not make up their minds to follow the - disarmament requested of Germany with their own disarmament as - agreed upon by the Treaty. - - “2. Because the other powers did not live up to their - obligations under the disarmament program, the Government of the - German Reich no longer considers itself bound to those articles, - which are nothing but a discrimination of the German nation”—I - suppose “against the German nation”—“for an unlimited period of - time, since through them, Germany is being nailed down in a - unilateral manner, contrary to the spirit of the agreement.” - -If the Tribunal please, needless to say, when I cite Adolf Hitler, I -don’t necessarily vouch for the absolute truth of everything that he -presents. This is a public speech he made before the world, and it is -for the Tribunal to judge whether he is presenting a pretext or whether -he is presenting the truth. - -In conjunction with other phases of planning and preparation for -aggressive war, there were various programs for direct and indirect -training of a military nature. This included not only the training of -military personnel, but also the establishment and training of other -para-military organizations, such as the police force, which could be, -and were absorbed by, the Army. - -These are shown in other parts of the case presented by the Prosecution. -However, the extent of this program for military training is indicated -by Hitler’s boast of the expenditure of 90 billion Reichsmark during the -period of 1933 to 1939 in the building up of the Armed Forces. - -I have another volume of the _Völkischer Beobachter_, Volume 52, 1939—I -think the issue of 2 and 3 September 1939—which I offer in evidence as -Exhibit USA-39; and there appears a speech by Adolf Hitler, with his -picture, under the heading which, if I may be permitted to try to -translate, reads: “The Führer Announces the Battle for the Justice and -Security of the Reich.” - -That is a speech, if the Court please, by Adolf Hitler, on 1 September -1939, the date of the attack on Poland, identified by our number -2322-PS, and I read from the bottom of Page 3, the last paragraph -starting on the page: - - “For more than 6 years now, I have been engaged in building up - the German Armed Forces. During this period more than 90 billion - Reichsmark were spent building up the Wehrmacht. Today, ours are - the best-equipped armed forces in the world, and they are - superior to those of 1914. My confidence in them can never be - shaken.” - -The secret nature of this training program and the fact of its early -development is illustrated by a reference to the secret training of -flying personnel, back in 1932, as well as the early plans to build a -military air force. A report was sent to the Defendant Hess in a letter -from one Schickedantz to the Defendant Rosenberg for delivery to Hess. I -suppose that Schickedantz was very anxious that no one but Hess should -get this letter, and therefore sent it to Rosenberg for personal -delivery. - -This document points out that the civilian pilots should be so organized -as to enable their transfer into the military air force organization. - -This letter is our Document 1143-PS, dated 20 October 1932, and I now -offer it in evidence as U. S. Exhibit 40. It starts: “Lieber Alfred” -(referring to Alfred Rosenberg), and is signed: “Mit bestem Gruss, Dein -Amo.” Amo, I think, was the first name of Schickedantz. - - “Dear Alfred: I am sending you enclosed a communication from the - RWM forwarded to me by our confidential - man”—Vertrauensmann—“which indeed is very interesting. I - believe we will have to take some steps so that the matter will - not be procured secretly for the Stahlhelm. This report is not - known to anybody else. I intentionally did not inform even our - long friend.” - -I suppose that means “our tall friend.” I may interpolate that the -Defendant Rosenberg, in an interrogation on 5 October 1945, identified -this “big friend” or “tall friend” as being one Von Alvensleben. - - “I am enclosing an additional copy for Hess, and ask you to - transmit the letter to Hess by messenger, as I do not want to - write a letter to Hess for fear that it might be read somewhere. - Mit bestem Gruss, Dein Amo.” - -Then enclosed with that is “Air Force Organization”: - - “Purpose: Preparation of material and training of personnel to - provide for the case of the armament of the Air Force. - - “Entire management as a civilian organization will be - transferred to Colonel Von Willberg, at present Commander of - Breslau, who, retaining his position in the Reichswehr, is going - on leave of absence. - - “(a) Organizing the pilots of civilian air-lines in such a way - as to enable their transfer to the air force organization. - - “(b) Prospects to train crews for military flying. Training to - be done within the organization for military flying of the - Stahlhelm”—I believe that means the “steel helmet”—“which is - being turned over to Colonel Hänel, retired. - - “All existing organizations for sport-flying are to be used for - military flying. Directions on kinds and tasks of military - flying will be issued by this Stahlhelm directorate. The - Stahlhelm organization will pay the military pilots 50 marks per - hour flight. These are due to the owner of the plane in case he - himself carries out the flight. They are to be divided in case - of non-owners of the plane, between flight organization, - proprietor, and crew, in the proportion of 10-20-20. . . . - Military flying is now paid better than flying for advertisement - (40). We therefore have to expect that most proprietors of - planes or flying associations will go over to the Stahlhelm - organization. It must be achieved that equal conditions will be - granted by the RWM, also the NSDAP organization.” - -The program of rearmament and the objectives of circumventing and -breaching the Versailles Treaty are forcefully shown by a number of Navy -documents, showing the participation and cooperation of the German Navy -in this rearmament program, secret at first. - -When they deemed it safe to say so, they openly acknowledged that it had -always been their objective to break Versailles. - -In 1937 the Navy High Command published a secret book entitled _The -Fight of the Navy Against Versailles, 1919 to 1935_. The preface refers -to the fight of the Navy against the unbearable regulations of the Peace -Treaty of Versailles. The table of contents includes a variety of Navy -activities, such as saving of coastal guns from destruction as required -by Versailles; independent armament measures behind the back of the -Government and behind the back of the legislative bodies; resurrection -of the U-boat arm; economic rearmament and camouflage rearmament from -1933 to the freedom from the restrictions in 1935. - -This document points out the significant effect of the seizure of power -by the Nazis in 1933 on increasing the size and determining the nature -of the rearmament program. It also refers to the far-reaching -independence in the building and development of the Navy, which was only -hampered in so far as concealment of rearmament had to be considered in -compliance with the Versailles Treaty. - -With the restoration of what was called the military sovereignty of the -Reich in 1935 and the reoccupation of the demilitarized zone of the -Rhineland, the external camouflage of rearmament was eliminated. - -We have, if the Court please, a photostat of the German printed book to -which I have referred, entitled _Der Kampf der Marine gegen Versailles_ -(The Fight of the Navy against Versailles) _1919 to 1935_, written by -Sea Captain Schüssler. It has the symbol of the Nazi Party with the -swastika in the spread eagle on the cover sheet, and it is headed -“_Secret_”, underscored. It is our Document C-156. It is a book of 76 -pages of text, followed by index lists and charts. I offer it in -evidence as Exhibit USA-41. I may say that the Defendant Raeder -identified this book in a recent interrogation and explained that the -Navy tried to fulfill the letter of the Versailles Treaty and at the -same time to make progress in naval development. I should like to read -from this book, if the Court please, the preface and one or two other -portions of the book: - - “The object and aim of this memorandum, under the heading - ‘Preface’, is to draw a technically reliable picture based on - documentary records and the evidence of those who took part in - the fight of the Navy against the unbearable regulations of the - Peace Treaty of Versailles. It shows that the Reich Navy, after - the liberating activities of the Free Corps and of Scapa Flow, - did not rest but found ways and means to lay with unquenchable - enthusiasm, in addition to the building up of the 15,000-man - Navy, the basis for a greater development in the future, and so - create, by the work of soldiers and technicians, the primary - condition for a later rearmament. It must also distinguish more - clearly the services of these men, who, without being known in - wide circles, applied themselves with extraordinary zeal and - responsibility in the service of the fight against the Peace - Treaty. Thereby stimulated by the highest feeling of duty, they - risked, particularly in the early days of their fight, - themselves and their positions unrestrainedly in the partially - self-ordained tasks. This compilation makes it clearer, however, - that even such ideal and ambitious plans can be realized only to - a small degree if the concentrated and united strength of the - whole people is not behind the courageous activity of the - soldier. Only when the Führer had created the second and even - more important condition for an effective rearmament in the - coordination of the whole nation and in the fusion of the - political, financial, and spiritual power, could the work of the - soldier find its fulfillment. The framework of this Peace - Treaty, the most shameful known in world history, collapsed - under the driving power of this united will. - - “Signed, the Compiler.” - -Now I wish to invite the Court’s attention merely to the summary of -contents because the chapter titles are sufficiently significant for my -present purpose. - - “I. Defensive actions against the execution of the Treaty of - Versailles (from the end of the war to the occupation of the - Ruhr, 1923). - - “1. Saving of coastal guns from destruction. - - “2. Removal of artillery equipment and ammunition, hand and - machine weapons. - - “3. Limitation of destruction in Helgoland. - - “II. Independent armament measures behind the back of the Reich - Government and of the legislative body (from 1923 to the Lohmann - case in 1927). - - “1. Attempt to increase the personnel strength of the Reich - Navy. - - “2. Contribution to the strengthening of patriotism among the - people. - - “3. Activities of Captain Lohmann. - -I am ashamed to say, if the Court please, that I am not familiar with -the story about Captain Lohmann. - - “4. Preparation for the resurrection of the German U-boat arm. - - “5. Building up of the Air Force. - - “6. Attempt to strengthen our mine arm. - - “7. Economic rearmament. - - “8. Miscellaneous measures: a. The N. V. Aerogeodetic; b. Secret - reconnaissance. - - “III. Planned armament works countenanced by the Reich - Government but behind the back of the legislative body from 1928 - to the seizure of power in 1933. - - “IV. Rearmament under the leadership of the Reich Government in - camouflaged form (from 1933 to the freedom from restrictions, - 1935).” - -Now if the interpreter who has the original German volume will turn to -Chapter IV, Page 75—“Aufrüstung”—Concealed rearmament under the -leadership of the Government of the Reich (from 1933 until military -freedom in 1935): - - “The unification of the whole nation which was combined with the - taking over of power on 30 January 1933 was of decisive - influence on the size and shape of further rearmament. - - “While the Reichsrat approached its dissolution and withdrew as - a legislative body, the Reichstag assumed a composition which - could only take a decisive attitude toward the rearmament of the - Armed Forces. The Government took over the management of the - rearmament program upon this foundation. . . .” - -Then a heading—“Development of the Armed Forces”: - - “This taking over of the management by the Reich Government - developed for the Armed Forces in such a manner that the War - Minister, General Von Blomberg, and through him the three - branches of the Armed Forces, received far-reaching powers from - the Reich Cabinet for the development of the Armed Forces. The - whole organization of the Reich was included in this work. In - view of these powers, the collaboration of the former inspecting - body in the management of the secret expenditure was from then - on dispensed with. There remained only the inspecting duties of - the accounting office of the German Reich.” - -Another heading—“Independence of the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy”: - - “The Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, Admiral Raeder, honorary - doctor, had received thereby a far-reaching independence in the - building and development of the Navy. This was only hampered in - so far as the previous concealment of rearmament had to be - continued in consideration of the Versailles Treaty. Besides the - ordinary budget there remained the previous special budget, - which was greatly increased in view of the considerable credit - for the provision of labor, which was made available by the - Reich. Wide powers in the handling of these credits were given - to the Director of the Budget Department of the Navy, up to 1934 - Commodore Schüssler, afterwards Commodore Foerste. These took - into consideration the increased responsibility of the Chief of - the Budget.” - -Another heading—“Declaration of Military Freedom”: - - “When the Führer, relying upon the strengthening of the Armed - Forces, executed in the meanwhile, announced the restoration of - the military sovereignty of the German Reich, the last-mentioned - limitation on rearmament works, namely, the external camouflage, - was eliminated. Freed from all the shackles which have hampered - our ability to move freely on and under water, on land, and in - the air, for one and a half decades, and carried by the - newly-awakened fighting spirit of the whole nation, the Armed - Forces, and as a part of it, the Navy, can lead with full - strength towards its completion, the rearmament already under - way with the goal of securing for the Reich its rightful - position in the world.” - -If the Tribunal please, at this moment I have a new problem about proof -which I believe we have not discussed. I have in my hand an English -translation of an interrogation of the Defendant Erich Raeder. Of course -he knows he was interrogated; he knows what he said. I don’t believe we -have furnished copies of this interrogation to defendants’ counsel. I -don’t know whether under the circumstances I am at liberty to read from -it or not. If I do read from it I suggest that the defendants’ counsel -will all get the complete text of it—I mean of what I read into the -transcript. - -THE PRESIDENT: Has the counsel for the Defendant Raeder any objection to -this interrogation being read? - -DR. SIEMERS: As far as I have understood the proceedings to date, I -believe that it is a question of a procedure in which either proof by -way of documents or proof by way of witnesses will be furnished. I am -surprised that the Prosecution wishes to furnish proof by way of records -of interrogations, taken at a time when the Defense was not present. I -should be obliged to the Court if I could be told whether, in principle, -I, as a defense counsel, may resort to producing evidence in this form, -i.e. present documents of the interrogation of witnesses; that is to -say, documents in which I myself interrogated witnesses the same as the -Prosecution without putting witnesses on the stand. - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal thinks that if interrogations of defendants -are to be used, copies of such interrogations should be furnished to -defendant’s counsel beforehand. The question which the Tribunal wished -to ask you was whether on this occasion you objected to this -interrogation being used without such a copy having been furnished to -you. With regard to your observation as to your own rights with -reference to interrogating your defendants, the Tribunal considers that -you must call them as witnesses upon the witness stand and cannot -interrogate them and put in the interrogations. The question for you now -is whether you object to this interrogation being laid before the -Tribunal at this stage. - -DR. SIEMERS: I should like first of all to have an opportunity of seeing -every record before it is submitted in Court. Only then shall I be able -to decide whether interrogations can be read, the contents of which I as -a defense counsel am not familiar with. - -THE PRESIDENT: Very well, the Tribunal will adjourn now and it -anticipates that the interrogation can be handed to you during the -adjournment and then can be used afterwards. - - [_The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours._] - - - - - _Afternoon Session_ - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: May it please the Tribunal. I should like to ask -the Tribunal to note the presence and appearance, on behalf of the Union -of Soviet Socialist Republics, of Mr. A. I. Vishinsky of the Foreign -Office, and General K. P. Gorshenin, Chief Prosecutor of the Soviet -Republic who has been able to join us in the Prosecution only now. - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal notes what Mr. Justice Jackson has said, and -observes that Mr. Vishinsky has taken his seat with the Soviet -Delegation of Chief Prosecutors. - -DR. SIEMERS: In the meanwhile during the lunch hour I have seen the -minutes. I should like to observe that I don’t think it is very -agreeable that the Prosecution should not depart from their point that -the Defense should only receive the documents during the proceedings, or -just before the proceedings, or at times, even after the proceedings. I -should be grateful if the Prosecution could see to it in the future that -we are informed in good time. - -Yesterday a list of the documents which were to be presented today was -made in our room, number 54. I find that the documents presented today -are not included in yesterday’s list. You will understand that the task -of the Defense is thereby rendered comparatively difficult. On -principle, I cannot in my statement of today, give my agreement to the -reading of minutes of interrogations. In order to facilitate matters, I -should like to follow the Court’s suggestion, and declare that I am -agreeable to the minutes presented here being read. I request, -however—and I believe I have already been assured by the Prosecution to -that effect—that only the part be read which refers to Document C-156, -as I had no time to discuss the remaining points with the defendants. - -As to the remaining points, five other documents are cited. Moreover I -request that the part which refers to the book by Kapitän zur See -Schüssler, should be read in full, and I believe that the prosecutor -agrees with this. - -THE PRESIDENT: I understood from the counsel for Raeder that you were -substantially in agreement as to what parts of this interrogation you -should read. Is that right, Mr. Alderman? - -MR. ALDERMAN: If I understood the counsel correctly, he asked that I -read the entire part of the interrogation which deals with Document -C-156, but I understood that he did not agree for me to read other parts -that referred to other documents. I handed counsel the original of my -copy of the interrogation before the lunch hour, and when he returned it -to me after the lunch hour, I substituted in his hands a carbon copy. I -didn’t quite understand his statement about documents being introduced -which hadn’t been furnished to the defendant. We did file the document -book. - -THE PRESIDENT: Is this document in the document book? - -MR. ALDERMAN: My understanding is that the document book contains all -the documents except these interrogations. They did not contain the -interrogation. - -THE PRESIDENT: Then he is right in saying that. - -MR. ALDERMAN: He is right as to the interrogation, yes. - -THE PRESIDENT: Are you in agreement with him then, that you can read -what you want to read now, and that it is not necessary for you to read -the parts to which he objects. - -MR. ALDERMAN: I think so. I understand he objects to my reading anything -other than the part concerned with C-156. I would anticipate that he -might be willing for me to read the other parts tomorrow. - -This deals with the book which I offered in evidence this morning, -Document C-156, Exhibit USA-41. The Defendant Raeder identified that -book, and explained that the Navy tried to fulfill the letter of the -Versailles Treaty and at the same time make progress in naval -development. I refer to the interrogation of the Defendant Raeder at the -part we had under discussion: - - “Q. I have here a Document C-156, which is a photostatic copy of - a work prepared by the High Command of the Navy and covers the - struggle of the Navy against the Versailles Treaty from 1919 to - 1935. I ask you initially whether you are familiar with the - work. - - “A. I know this book. I read it once when it was edited. - - “Q. Was that an official publication of the German Navy? - - “A. This Captain Schüssler (indicating the author) was a - commander in the Admiralty. Published by the OKM, it was an idea - of this officer to put all these things together. - - “Q. Do you recall the circumstances under which the - authorization to prepare such a work was given to him? - - “A. I think he told me that he would write such a book as he - tells here in the foreword. - - “Q. And in the preparation of this work he had access to the - official Navy files and based his work on the items contained - therein? - - “A. Yes, I think so. He would have spoken with other persons, - and he would have had the files which were necessary. - - “Q. Do you know whether, before the work was published, a draft - of it was circulated among the officers in the Admiralty for - comment? - - “A. No, I don’t think so. Not before it was published. I saw it - only when it was published. - - “Q. Was it circulated freely after its publication? - - “A. It was a secret object. I think all upper commands in the - Navy had knowledge of it. - - “Q. It was not circulated outside of Navy circles? - - “A. No. - - “Q. What then is your opinion concerning the comments contained - in the work, regarding the circumventing of the provisions of - Versailles? - - “A. I don’t remember very exactly what is in here. I can only - remember that the Navy had always the object to fulfill the word - of the Versailles Treaty, but in order to have some advantages. - But the flying men were exercised 1 year before they went into - the Navy. Quite young men. So that the word of the Treaty of - Versailles was filled. They did not belong to the Navy, as long - as they were exercised in flying, and the submarines were - developed, but not in Germany and not in the Navy, but in - Holland. There was a civil bureau, and in Spain there was an - industrialist; in Finland, too, and they were built only much - later, when we began to act with the English Government about - the Treaty of 35 to 100, because we could see that then the - Treaty of Versailles would be destroyed by such a treaty with - England, and so, in order to keep the word of Versailles, we - tried to fulfill the word of Versailles, but we tried to have - advantages. - - “Q. Would a fair statement be that the Navy High Command was - interested in avoiding the limiting provisions of the Treaty of - Versailles regarding personnel and the limits of armaments, but - would attempt to fulfill the letter of the Treaty, although - actually avoiding it? - - “A. That was our endeavor.” - -MR. ALDERMAN: Now the rest of this is the portion that counsel for the -defendant asked me to read: - - “Q. Why was such a policy adopted? - - “A. We were much menaced in the first years after the first war - by the danger that the Poles would attack East Prussia, and so - we tried to strengthen a little our very, very weak forces in - this way; and so all our efforts were directed to the aim of - having a little more strength against the Poles should they - attack us. It was nonsense to think of attacking Poland in this - stage by the Navy. A second aim was to have some defense against - the entering of French forces into the Ostsee (East Sea), - because we knew that the French had the intention to sustain the - Poles. Their ships came into the Ostsee, Gdynia, and so the Navy - was a defense against an attack of Poland and against the - entrance of French ships into the East Sea; quite defensive - aims. - - “Q. When did this fear of an attack from Poland first show - itself in official circles in Germany, would you say? - - “A. In all the first years. They took Vilna; in the same minute - we thought they would come to East Prussia. I don’t know exactly - the year, because those judgments were the judgments of the - German Government Ministers, the Army and Navy Ministers—Gröner - and Noske. - - “Q. Then those views, in your opinion, were generally held and - existed perhaps as early as 1919-1920, after the end of the - first World War? - - “A. Oh, but the whole situation was very, very uncertain, and - about those years in the beginning I cannot give you a very - exact picture, because I was then 2 years in the Navy Archives - to write a book about the War and the fighting capacity of - cruisers. For 2 years I was not with those things.” - -MR. ALDERMAN: Likewise the same kind of planning and purposes are -reflected in the table of contents of a history of the German Navy, 1919 -to 1939, found in captured official files of the German Navy. Although a -copy of the book has not been found by us, the project was to have been -written by Oberst Scherff, Hitler’s personal military historian. We have -found the table of contents; it refers by numbers to groups of documents -and notes of documents, which evidently were intended as the working -materials for the basis of chapters, to be written in accordance with -the table of contents. The titles in this table of contents clearly -establish the Navy planning and preparation to get the Versailles Treaty -out of the way and to rebuild the naval strength necessary for -aggressive war. - -We have here the original captured document which is, as I say, the -German typewritten table of contents of this projected work, with a -German cover, typewritten, entitled _Geschichte der Deutschen Marine, -1919-1939_ (_History of the German Navy, 1919-1939_). We identify it as -our series C-17 and I offer it in evidence as Exhibit USA-42. This table -of contents includes such general headings—perhaps I had better read -some of the actual headings: - - “Part A, 1919—The Year of Transition. Chapter VII: First - efforts to circumvent the Versailles Treaty and to limit its - effects. - - “(a) Demilitarization of the Administration, incorporation of - naval offices in Civil Ministries _et cetera_. (For example: - Incorporation of greater sections of the German maritime - observation station and the sea-mark system in Helgoland and - Kiel, of the Ems-Jade Canal _et cetera_ into the Reich Transport - Ministry up to 1934: Noske’s proposal of 11. 8. 1919 to - incorporate the Naval Construction Department in the Technical - High School, Berlin; formation of the Naval Arsenal - Kiel.)”—With a reference to a group of documents numbered - 75.—” - - “(b) The saving from destruction of coastal fortifications and - guns. - - “(1) North Sea (strengthening of fortifications with new - batteries and modern guns between the signing and the taking - effect of the Versailles Treaty; dealings with the Control - Commission—information, drawings, visits of inspection, result - of efforts.)”—referring to the group of documents numbered - 85.— - - “(2) Baltic (taking over by the Navy of fortresses Pillau and - Swinemünde; salvage for the Army of 185 movable guns and mortars - there.)”—I may interpolate that when the British offer in - evidence the Treaty of Versailles, you will see the detailed - limitations which this document indicates an effort to avoid.— - - “(3) The beginnings of coastal air defense. - - “Part B, 1920-1924—The Organizational New Order. Chapter V: The - Navy. Fulfillment and avoidance of the Versailles Treaty. - Foreign countries. - - “(a) The Interallied Control Commissions. - - “(b) Defense measures against the fulfillment of the Versailles - Treaty and independent arming behind the back of the Reich - Government and the legislative bodies. - - “(1) Dispersal of artillery gear and munitions, of hand and - automatic weapons. - - “(2) Limitation of demolition work in Helgoland. - - “(3) Attempt to strengthen personnel of the Navy, from 1923. - - “(4) The activities of Captain Lohmann (founding of numerous - associations at home and abroad, participations, formation of - ‘sports’ unions and clubs, interesting the film industry in - naval recruitment). - - “(5) Preparation for re-establishing the German U-boat arm since - 1920 (projects and deliveries for Japan, Holland, Turkey, - Argentina, and Finland; torpedo testing). - - “(6) Participation in the preparation for building of the - Luftwaffe (preservation of airdromes, aircraft construction, - teaching of courses, instruction of midshipmen in anti-air-raid - defense, training of pilots). - - “(7) Attempt to strengthen the mining branch. - - “Part C (1925-1932—Replacement of tonnage). Chapter IV: The - Navy, the Versailles Treaty, foreign countries. - - “(a) The activities of the Interallied Control Commission (up to - 31. 1. 27; discontinuance of the activity of the Naval Peace - Commission). - - “(b) Independent armament measures behind the back of the Reich - Government and legislative bodies up to the Lohmann case. - - “(1) The activities of Captain Lohmann (continuation) their - significance as a foundation for the rapid reconstruction work - from 1935. - - “(2) Preparation for the restrengthening of the German U-boat - arm from 1925 (continuation), the merit of Lohmann in connection - with the preparation for rapid construction in 1925, - relationship to Spain, Argentina, Turkey; the first post-war - U-boat construction of the German Navy in Spain since 1927 . . . - 250-ton specimen in Finland, preparation for rapid assembly; - electric torpedo; training of U-boat personnel abroad in Spain - and Finland. Formation of U-boat school in 1932 disguised as an - anti-U-boat school. - - “(3) Participation in the preparation for the reconstruction of - the Luftwaffe (continuation). Preparation for a Naval Air Arm, - Finance Aircraft Company Severa, later Luftdienst”—or Air - Service—“GMBH; Naval Flying School Warnemünde; air station - list, training of sea cadet candidates, military tactical - questions ‘Air Defense Journeys,’ technical development, - experimental station planning, trials, flying boat development - Do X _et cetera_, catapult aircraft, arming, engines, ground - organization, aircraft torpedoes, the Deutschland flight 1925, - and the seaplane race 1926. - - “(4) Economic rearmament (‘The Tebeg’—Technical Advice and - Supply Company as a disguised naval office abroad for - investigating the position of raw materials for industrial - capacity and other war economic questions). - - “(5) Various measures (the NV Aerogeodetic Company—secret - investigations). - - “(c) Planned armament work with the tacit approval of the Reich - Government, but behind the backs of the legislative bodies (1928 - to the taking over of power). - - “(1) The effect of the Lohmann case on the secret preparations; - winding up of works which could not be advocated; resumption and - carrying on of other work. - - “(2) Finance question (‘Black Funds’ and the ‘Special Budget’). - - “(3) The Labor Committee and its objectives. - - “(d) The question of Marine attachés (the continuation under - disguise; open reappointment 1932-1933). - - “(e) The question of disarmament of the fleet abroad and in - Germany (the Geneva Disarmament Conference 1927; the London - Naval Treaty of 1930; the Anglo-French-Italian Agreement 1931; - the League of Nations Disarmament Conference 1932). - - “Part D (1933-1939—The German Navy during the military freedom - period).” - -—which goes beyond the period with which I am at the moment dealing. A -glance at the chapter headings following that will indicate the scope of -this proposed work. Whether the history was ever actually written by -Scherff, I do not know. - -I would like to call attention just to the first two or three headings, -under this “Part D—The German Navy during the military freedom period”: - - “I. National Socialism and the question of the fleet and of - prestige at sea. - - “II. Incorporation of the Navy in the National Socialist - State.”—The main heading III in the middle of the page—“The - Rearmament of the Navy under the direction of the Reich - Government in a disguised way.” - -The policy development of the Navy is also reflected from the financial -side. The planned organization of the Navy budget for armament measures -was based on a co-ordination of military developments and political -objectives. Military political development was accelerated after the -withdrawal from the League of Nations. - -I have here, if the Court please, a captured document, in German, headed -“Der Chef der Marineleitung, Berlin, 12 May 1934,” and marked in large -blue printing “Geheime Kommandosache” (Secret Commando Matter), which is -identified as our C-153. It has the facsimile signature of Raeder at the -end. I assume it is the facsimile; it may have been written with a -stylus on a stencil; I can’t tell. I offer it in evidence as Exhibit -USA-43. It is headed with the title: “Armament Plan (R. P.) for the 3rd -Armament Phase.” This document of 12 May 1934 speaks of war tasks, war -and operational plans, armament targets, _et cetera_, and shows that it -was distributed to many of the High Command of the Navy. It shows that a -primary objective was readiness for a war without any alert period. - -I quote from the third numbered paragraph: - - “The planned organization of armament measures is necessary for - the realization of this target; this again requires a - co-ordinated and planned expenditure in peace time. This - organization of financial measures over a number of years, - according to the military viewpoint, is found in the armament - program and provides: (a) for the military leader a sound basis - for his operational considerations, and (b) for the political - leader a clear picture of what may be achieved with the military - means available at a given time.” - -One other sentence from Paragraph 7 of that document: - - “All theoretical and practical R-preparations”—I assume that - means armament preparations—“are to be drawn up with a primary - view to readiness for a war _without any alert period_.”—And - “without any alert period” is underscored in the original. - -The conspiratorial nature of these Nazi plans and preparations long -before the outbreak of hostilities is illustrated in many other ways. -Thus, in 1934, Hitler instructed Raeder to keep secret the U-boat -construction program; also the actual displacement and speed of certain -ships. Work on U-boats had been going on, as already indicated, in -Holland and Spain. - -The Nazi theory was rather clever on that. The Versailles Treaty forbade -rearming by the Germans in Germany, but they said it didn’t forbid them -to rearm in Holland, Spain, and Finland. - -Secrecy was equally important then because of the pending naval -negotiations with England. We have a captured document, which is a -manuscript in German script, of a conversation between the Defendant -Raeder and Adolf Hitler in June 1934. It is not signed by the Defendant -Raeder. I might ask his counsel if he objects to my stating that the -Defendant Raeder, in an interrogation on 8 November 1945, admitted that -this was a record of this conversation and that it was in his -handwriting, though he did not sign his name at the end. - -That document is identified in our series as C-189, and I offer it in -evidence as Exhibit USA-44. - -It is headed: “Conversation with the Führer in June 1934 on the occasion -of the resignation of the Commanding Officer of the ‘Karlsruhe.’” - - “1. Report by the C-in-C Navy concerning increased displacement - of D. and E. (defensive weapons). - - “Führer’s instructions: No mention must be made of a - displacement of 25-26,000 tons, but only of improved 10,000-ton - ships. Also, the speed over 26 nautical miles may not be stated. - - “2. C-in-C Navy expresses the opinion that later on, the Fleet - must anyhow be developed to oppose England, that therefore from - 1936 onwards, the large ships must be armed with 35-centimeter - guns (like the King George class.) - - “3. The Führer demands to keep the construction of the U-boats - secret, in consideration of the Saar plebiscite.” - -In order to continue the vital increase of the Navy, as planned, the -Navy needed more funds than it had available; so Hitler proposed to put -funds of the Labor Front at the disposal of the Navy. - -We have another Raeder memorandum of a conversation between Raeder and -Hitler on 2 November 1934. Of this I have a photostatic copy of the -German typed memorandum, identified as our C-190. This one, again, is -not signed, but it was found in Raeder’s personal file and I think he -will not deny that it is his memorandum. I offer it in evidence as -Exhibit USA-45. - -It is headed: “Conversation with the Führer on 2. 11. 34 at the time of -the announcement by the Commanding Officer of the ‘Emden’. - - “1. When I mentioned that the total funds to be made available - for the Armed Forces for 1935 would presumably represent only a - fraction of the required sum, and that therefore it was possible - that the Navy might be hindered in its plans, he replied that he - did not think the funds would be greatly decreased. He - considered it necessary that the Navy be speedily increased by - 1938 with the deadlines mentioned. In case of need he will get - Dr. Ley to put 120 to 150 million from the Labor Front at the - disposal of the Navy, as the money would still benefit the - workers. Later, in a conversation with Minister Göring and - myself, he went on to say that he considered it vital that the - Navy be increased as planned, as no war could be carried on if - the Navy was not able to safeguard the ore imports from - Scandinavia. - - “2. Then, when I mentioned that it would be desirable to have - six U-boats assembled at the time of the critical political - situation in the first quarter of 1935,”—that’s the following - year, foreseeing—“he stated that he would keep this point in - mind, and tell me when the situation demanded that the - assembling should commence.” - -Then, there is an apostrophe and a note at the bottom: - - “The order was not sent out. The first boats were launched in - the middle of June ’35 according to plan.” - -The development of the armament industry by the use of foreign markets -was a program encouraged by the Navy, so that this industry would be -able to supply the requirements of the Navy in case of need. - -We have an original German document, again headed “Geheime -Kommandosache” (secret commando matter)—a directive of 31 January 1933 -by the Defendant Raeder for the German industry to support the armament -of the Navy. - -It is identified in our series as C-29. I offer it in evidence as -Exhibit USA-46: - - “Top Secret. - - “General directions for support given by the German Navy to the - German armament industry. - - “The effects of the present economic depression have led here - and there to the conclusion that there are no prospects of an - active participation of the German armament industry abroad, - even if the Versailles terms are no longer kept. There is no - profit in it and it is therefore not worth promoting. - Furthermore, the view has been taken that the increasing - ‘self-sufficiency’ would in any case make such participation - superfluous. - - “However obvious these opinions may seem, formed because of the - situation as it is today, I am nevertheless forced to make the - following contradictory corrective points: - - “a) The economic crisis and its present effects must perforce be - overcome sooner or later. Though equality of rights in war - politics is not fully recognized today, it will, by the - assimilation of weapons, be achieved at some period, at least to - a certain extent. - - “b) The consequent estimation of the duties of the German - armament industry lies mainly in the military-political sphere. - It is impossible for this industry to satisfy, militarily and - economically, the growing demands made of it by limiting the - deliveries to our Armed Forces. Its capacity must therefore be - increased by the delivery of supplies to foreign countries over - and above our own requirements. - - “c) Almost every country is working to the same end today, even - those which, unlike Germany, are not tied down by restrictions. - Britain, France, North America, Japan, and especially Italy, are - making supreme efforts to ensure markets for their armament - industries. The use of their diplomatic representations, of the - propaganda voyages of their most modern ships and vessels, of - sending missions and also of the guaranteeing of loans and - insurance against deficits, are not merely to gain commercially - advantageous orders for their armament industries, but first and - foremost, to expand their output from the point of view of - military policy. - - “d) It is just when the efforts to do away with the restrictions - imposed on us have succeeded, that the German Navy has an ever - increasing and really vital interest in furthering the German - armament industry and preparing the way for it in every - direction in the competitive battle against the rest of the - world. - - “e) If, however, the German armament industry is to be able to - compete in foreign countries, it must inspire the confidence of - its purchasers. The condition for this is that secrecy for our - own ends be not carried too far. The amount of material to be - kept secret under all circumstances, in the interest of the - defense of the country, is comparatively small. I would like to - issue a warning against the assumption that at the present stage - of technical development in foreign industrial states, a problem - of vital military importance which we perhaps have solved, has - not been solved there. Solutions arrived at today, which may - become known, if divulged to a third person by naturally always - possible indiscretion, have often been already superseded by new - better solutions on our part, even at that time or at any rate - after the copy has been made. It is of greater importance that - we should be technically well to the fore in any really - fundamental matters, than that less important points should be - kept secret unnecessarily and excessively. - - “f) To conclude: I attach particular importance to guaranteeing - the continuous support of the industry concerned by the Navy, - even after the present restrictions have been relaxed. If the - purchasers are not made confident that something better is being - offered them, the industry will not be able to stand up to the - competitive battle and therefore will not be able to supply the - requirements of the German Navy in case of need.” - -This Navy program of surreptitious rearmament, in violation of the -Treaty obligations, starting even before the Nazis came into power, is -illustrated by a 1932 order of the Defendant Raeder, Chief of the Naval -Command, addressed to the main Naval Command, regarding the concealed -construction of torpedo-tubes for S-boats. He ordered that torpedo-tubes -be removed and stored in the Naval Arsenal, but be kept ready for -immediate refitting. By using only the permitted number—that is, -permitted under the Treaty—at a given time, and storing them after -satisfactory testing, the actual number of operationally effective -S-boats was constantly increased. - -We have this German order, with the facsimile signature of Raeder, with -the heading: “Der Chef der Marine Leitung, Berlin, 10 February 1932.” -Our series number is C-141. I offer it in evidence as Exhibit USA-47, -the order for concealed armament of S-boats. That is C-141. I read from -the first paragraph of the text: - - “In view of our Treaty obligations and the Disarmament - Conference, steps must be taken to prevent the first S-boat - half-flotilla, which in a few months will consist of exactly - similar, newly built S-boats, from appearing openly as a - formation of torpedo-carrying boats”—the German word being - “Torpedoträger”—“and it is not intended to count these S-boats - against the number of torpedo-carrying boats allowed to us. - - “I therefore order: - - “1. S2-S5 will be commissioned in the shipyard Lürssen, - Vegesack, without armament and will be fitted with easily - removable cover-sheetmetal on the spaces necessary for - torpedo-tubes. The same will be arranged by T.M.I.”—a - translator’s note at the bottom says with reference to T.M.I. - (Inspectorate of Torpedoes and Mining)—“In agreement with the - Naval Arsenal, for the Boat S-1 which will dismantle its - torpedo-tubes on completion of the practice shooting, for - fitting on another boat. - - “2. The torpedo-tubes of all S-boats will be stored in the Naval - Arsenal ready for immediate fitting. During the trial runs the - torpedo-tubes will be taken on board one after the other for a - short time to be fitted and for practice shooting, so that only - one boat at a time carries torpedo armament. For public - consumption this boat will be in service for the purpose of - temporary trials by the T.V.A.” - -—I suppose that is not the Tennessee Valley Authority; the translator’s -note calls it the Technical Research Establishment.— - - “It should not anchor together with the other unarmed boats of - the half-flotilla because of the obvious similarity of the type. - The duration of firing, and consequently the length of time the - torpedo-tubes are aboard, is to be as short as possible. - - “3. Fitting the torpedo-tubes on all S-boats is intended as soon - as the situation of the political control allows it.” - -Interestingly enough, that memorandum by the Defendant Raeder, written -in 1932, was talking about “as soon as the situation of the political -control allows it.” The seizure of power was the following year. - -Along similar lines the Navy was also carrying on the concealed -preparation of auxiliary cruisers, under the disguised designation of -‘Transport Ships 0’. The preparations under this order were to be -completed by 1 April 1935. At the very time of construction of these -ships as commercial ships, plans were made for their conversion. - -We have the original German document, again top secret, identified by -our Number C-166, order from the Command Office of the Navy, dated 12 -March 1934, and signed in draft by Groos. It has the seal of the -Reichswehrministerium, Marineleitung, over the draft signature. I offer -it in evidence as Exhibit USA-48. I think the Defendant Raeder will -admit, or at least will not deny, that this is an official document. - - “Subject: Preparation of auxiliary cruisers. - - “It is intended to include in the Establishment Organization 35 - (AG Aufstellungsgliederung) a certain number of auxiliary - cruisers which are intended for use in operations in foreign - waters. - - “In order to disguise the intention and all the preparations, - the ships will be referred to as ‘Transport Ships 0’. It is - requested that in future this designation only be used.” - -The short paragraph says: “The preparations are to be arranged, so that -they can be completed by 1. 4. 35.” - -Among official Navy files, OKM files, which we have, there are notes -kept year by year, from 1927 to 1940, on the reconstruction of the -German Navy, and in these notes are numerous examples of the Navy’s -activities and policies of which I should like to point out some -illustrations. - -One of these documents discloses that the displacement of the -battleships “Scharnhorst-Gneisenau” and “F/G”—whatever that is—was -actually greater than the tonnages which had been notified to the -British under the Treaty. This document, our C-23, I offer in evidence -as Exhibit USA-49. That is a set really of three separate documents -joined together. I read from that document: - - “The true displacement of the battleships - ‘Scharnhorst-Gneisenau’ and the ‘F/G’ exceeds by 20 percent, in - both cases, the displacement reported to the British.” - -And then there is a table with reference to different ships, and two -columns headed “Displacement by Type”: one column “Actual Displacement” -and the other column “Notified Displacement.” - -On the “Scharnhorst” the actual was 31,300 tons; the notified was 26,000 -tons. On the “F”—actual 41,700 tons, the notified 35,000. On the -“HI”—actual 56,200 tons, notified 46,850, and so down the list. I need -not read them all. - -On the second document in that group towards the end, Page 2 on the -English version, is the statement: - - “In a clear cut program for the construction, the Führer and - Reich Chancellor has set the Navy the task of carrying out the - aims of his foreign policy.” - -The German Navy constantly planned and committed violations of armament -limitation and with characteristic German thoroughness had prepared -superficial explanations or pretexts to explain away these violations. - -Following a conference with the chief of “A” section, an elaborate -survey list was prepared and compiled, giving a careful list of the -quantity and type of German naval armament and ammunition on hand under -manufacture or construction, and in many instances proposed together -with a statement of the justification or defense that might be used in -those instances where the Versailles Treaty was violated or its -allotment has been exceeded. - -The list contained 30 items under “Material Measures” and 14 items under -“Measures of Organization.” The variety of details covered necessarily -involved several sources within the Navy, which must have realized their -significance. As I understand it, the “A” section was the military -department of the Navy. - -We have this very interesting document among the captured documents -identified by our Number C-32. I offer it in evidence as Exhibit USA-50. -It again is Geheime Kommandosache and it is headed “A Survey Report of -German Naval Armament after Conference with Chief of ‘A’ Section”, dated -9 September 1933, and captured among official German Navy files. - -This is a long document, if the Tribunal please, but I should like to -call attention to a few of the more interesting items. - -There are three columns, one headed “Measure”, one headed “Material -Measures, Details,” and the most interesting one is headed “Remarks.” -The remarks contain the pretext or justification for explaining away the -violations of the Treaty. They are numbered, so I can conveniently refer -to the numbers: - - “Number 1. Exceeding the permitted number of mines.”—Then - figures are given. Remarks—“Further mines are in part ordered, - in part being delivered.” - - “Number 2. Continuous storing of guns from the North Sea area - for Baltic artillery batteries.”—In the remarks - column—“Justification: Necessity for overhauling. Cheaper - repairs.” - - “Number 6. Laying gun-platforms in the Kiel area.” Remarks: “The - offense over and above that in Serial Number 3 lies in the fact - that all fortifications are forbidden in the Kiel area. This - justification will make it less severe; pure defense measures.” - - “Number 7. Exceeding the caliber permitted for coastal - batteries.” The explanation: “Possible justification is that, - though the caliber is larger, the number of guns is less.” - - “Number 8. Arming of minesweepers. The reply to any remonstrance - against this breach: the guns are taken from the Fleet reserve - stores, have been temporarily installed only for training - purposes. All nations arm their mine sweeping forces (equality - of rights).” - -—Here is one that is rather amusing—“Number 13. Exceeding the number -of machine guns _et cetera_, permitted.” Remarks: “Can be made light -of.” - - “Number 18. Construction of U-boat parts.” This remark is quite - characteristic: “Difficult to detect. If necessary can be - denied.” - - “Number 20. Arming of fishing vessels.” Remarks: “For warning - shots. Make little of it.”—And so on throughout the list. - -I think quite obviously that must have been used as a guide for -negotiators who were attending the Disarmament Conference as to the -position that they might take. - -Now to Paragraph IV (F) 2 (b) of the Indictment: the allegation that “On -14 October 1933 they led Germany to leave the International Disarmament -Conference and the League of Nations.” - -That is an historical fact of which I ask the Tribunal to take judicial -notice. The Nazis took this opportunity to break away from the -international negotiations and to take an aggressive position on an -issue which would not be serious enough to provoke reprisal from other -countries. At the same time Germany attached so much importance to this -action, that they considered the possibility of the application of -sanctions by other countries. Anticipating the probable nature of such -sanctions and the countries which might apply them, plans were made for -military preparations for armed resistance on land, at sea, and in the -air, in a directive from the Reichsminister for Defense Blomberg, to the -Head of the Army High Command Fritsch, the Head of the Navy High Command -Raeder, and the Reichsminister of Air Göring. - -We have this captured document in our series C-140, which I offer in -evidence as Exhibit USA-151. It is a directive dated 25 October 1933, 11 -days after the withdrawal from the Disarmament Conference and the League -of Nations. - - “1) The enclosed directive gives the basis for preparations of - the Armed Forces in the case of sanctions being applied against - Germany. - - “2) I request the Chiefs of the Army and Navy High Commands and - the Reichsminister for Air to carry out the preparations in - accordance with the following points: - - “(a) Strictest secrecy. It is of the utmost importance that no - facts become known to the outside world from which preparation - for resistance against sanctions can be inferred or which is - incompatible with Germany’s existing obligations in the sphere - of foreign policy regarding the demilitarized zone. If - necessary, the preparations must take second place to this - necessity.” - -I think that makes the point without further reading. One of the -immediate consequences of the action was that following the withdrawal -from the League of Nations, Germany’s armament program was still further -increased. - -I introduced this morning document C-153, as Exhibit USA-43, so that is -already in. From that, at this point, I wish to read Paragraph 5. That, -as you recall, was a document dated 12 May 1934. - - “5) Owing to the speed of military political development, since - Germany quitted Geneva, and based on the progress of the Army, - the new R-plan will only be drawn up for a period of 2 years. - The third ‘A’ phase lasts accordingly from 1. 4. 34 to 31. 3. - 36.” - -Then the next allegation of the Indictment, if the Tribunal please: “On -10 March 1935 the Defendant Göring announced that Germany was building a -military air force.” - -That is an historical fact of which I ask the Court to take judicial -notice, and I am quite certain that the Defendant Göring would not -dispute it. - -We have a copy of the German publication known as _Das Archiv_—the -number of March 1935; and it is Page 1830 to which I refer, and I would -offer that in evidence, identifying it as our number 2292-PS; I offer it -as Exhibit USA-52. It is an announcement concerning the German Air -Force: - - “The Reich Minister for Aviation, General of the Airmen, Göring, - in his talk with the special correspondent of the _Daily Mail_, - Ward Price, expressed himself on the subject of the German Air - Force. - - “General Göring said: - - “‘In the extension of our national defenses’”—Sicherheit—“‘it - was necessary, as we repeatedly told the world, to take care of - defense in the air. As far as that is concerned, I restricted - myself to those measures absolutely necessary. The guiding line - of my actions was, not the creation of an aggressive force which - would threaten other nations, but merely the completion of a - military aviation which would be strong enough to repel, at any - time, attacks on Germany.’” - -Then, at the end of that section of the article in _Das Archiv_: - - “In conclusion, the correspondent asks whether the German Air - Force will be capable of repelling attacks on Germany. - -General Göring replied to that exactly as follows: - - “‘The German Air Force is just as passionately permeated with - the will to defend the Fatherland to the last as it is - convinced, on the other hand, that it will never be employed to - threaten the peace of other nations.’” - -As I said; I believe, this morning, when we cite assurances of that kind -from Nazi leaders, we take it that we are not foreclosed from showing -that they had different intentions from those announced. - -The next allegation of the Indictment is the promulgating of the law for -compulsory military service, universal military service. - -Having gone as far as they could on rearmament and the secret training -of personnel, the next step necessary to the program for aggressive war -was a large-scale increase in military strength. This could no longer be -done under disguise and camouflage, and would have to be known to the -world. Accordingly, on 16 March 1935, there was promulgated a law for -universal military service, in violation of Article 173 of the -Versailles Treaty. - -I ask the Court to take judicial notice of that law as it appears in the -_Reichsgesetzblatt_, which is the official compilation of laws, in the -Title I of Volume I, yearly volume 1935, or Jahrgang, at Page 369 and I -think I need not offer the book or the law in evidence. - -The text of the law itself is very brief and I might read that. It is -right at the end of the article. I should refer to that as our Document -Number 1654-PS, so as to identify it: - - “In this spirit the German Reich Cabinet has today passed the - following law: - - “Law for the Organization of the Armed Forces of March 16, 1935. - - “The Reich Cabinet has passed the following law which is - herewith promulgated: - - “Paragraph 1. Service in the Armed Forces is based upon - compulsory military duty. - - “Paragraph 2. In peace time, the German Army, including the - police troops transferred to it, is organized into 12 corps and - 36 divisions.”—There is a typographical error in the English - version of that. It says “16 divisions”, but the original German - says 36 divisions.— - - “Paragraph 3. The Reich Minister of War is charged with the duty - of submitting immediately to the Reich Ministry detailed laws on - compulsory military duty.” - - Signed: “Berlin, 16 March 1935.” - -It is signed first by the Führer and Reich Chancellor Adolf Hitler, and -then many other officials, including the following defendants in this -case: - -Von Neurath, Frick, Schacht, Göring, Hess, Frank. - -Does the Court contemplate a short recess? - -THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn for 10 minutes. - - [_A recess was taken._] - -COL. STOREY: If the Tribunal please, the Prosecution expects, on -tomorrow, to offer in evidence some captured enemy moving pictures and -in order to give Defense Counsel an opportunity to see them before they -are offered in evidence—and in response to their request made to the -Tribunal some time ago—the showing of these films for Defense Counsel -will be held in this court room this evening at 8 o’clock, for the -Defense Counsel. - -THE PRESIDENT: Very well, Colonel Storey. - -MR. ALDERMAN: May it please the Tribunal, I have reached now Paragraph -IV, F, 2 (e) of the Indictment, which alleges: - - “On 21 May 1935 they falsely announced to the world, with intent - to deceive and allay fears of aggressive intentions, that they - would respect the territorial limitations of the Versailles - Treaty and comply with the Locarno Pact.” - -As a part of their program to weaken resistance in possible enemy -states, the Nazis followed a policy of making false assurances, thereby -tending to create confusion and a false sense of security. Thus on the -same date on which Germany renounced the armament provisions of the -Versailles Treaty, Hitler announced the intent of the German Government -to respect the territorial limitations of Versailles and Locarno. - -I offered in evidence this morning, as Exhibit USA-38, our Document -2288-PS, the pertinent volume of the issue of the _Völkischer -Beobachter_ of 21 May 1935, containing Hitler’s speech in the Reichstag -on that date. In that speech he said: - - “Therefore, the Government of the German Reich shall absolutely - respect all other articles pertaining to the - cooperation”—Zusammenleben, really meaning the living together - in harmony—“of the various nations, including territorial - agreements. Revisions which will be unavoidable as time goes by - it will carry out by way of a friendly understanding only. - - “The Government of the German Reich has the intention not to - sign any treaty which it believes not to be able to fulfill. - However, it will live up to every treaty signed voluntarily even - if it was composed before this Government took over. Therefore, - it will in particular adhere to all the obligations under the - Locarno Pact, as long as the other partners of the Pact also - adhere to it.” - -For convenient reference, the territorial limitations in the Locarno and -Versailles Treaties include the following: The Rhine Pact of Locarno, 16 -October 1925, Article 1: - - “The High Contracting Parties, collectively and severally, - guarantee, in the manner provided in the following Articles: the - maintenance of the territorial _status quo_, resulting from the - frontiers between Germany and Belgium, and between Germany and - France, and the inviolability of the said frontiers, as fixed - by, or in pursuance of the Treaty of Peace, signed at - Versailles, on June 28, 1919, and also the observance of the - stipulations of Articles 42 and 43 of the said Treaty, - concerning the demilitarized zone.” - -That has reference, of course, to the demilitarized zone of the -Rhineland. - -Then from the Versailles Treaty, 28 June 1919, Article 42: - - “Germany is forbidden to maintain or construct any - fortifications, either on the left bank of the Rhine or on the - right bank, to the West of the line drawn 50 kilometers to the - East of the Rhine. - - “Article 43: In the area defined above, the maintenance and the - assembly of armed forces, either permanently or temporarily and - military maneuvers of any kind, as well as the upkeep of all - permanent works for mobilization, are in the same way - forbidden.” - -The next allegation of the Indictment (f): - - “On 7 March 1936, they reoccupied and fortified the Rhineland, - in violation of the Treaty of Versailles and the Rhine Pact of - Locarno of 16 October 1925, and falsely announced to the world - that ‘we have no territorial demands to make in Europe.’” - -The demilitarized zone of the Rhineland obviously was a sore wound with -the Nazis ever since its establishment, after World War I. Not only was -this a blow to their increasing pride, but it was a bar to any effective -strong position which Germany might want to take on any vital issues. In -the event of any sanctions against Germany, in the form of military -action, the French and other powers would get well into Germany, east of -the Rhine, before any German resistance could even be put up. Therefore, -any German plans to threaten or breach international obligations or for -any kind of aggression, required the preliminary reoccupation and -refortification of this open Rhineland territory. Plans and preparations -for the reoccupation of the Rhineland started very early. - -We have a document, a German captured document, in German script, which -we identify as C-139, and which appears to be signed by the handwriting -of Blomberg. I offer it in evidence as Exhibit USA-53. - -The document deals with what is called “Operation Schulung”, which means -schooling, or training. It is dated 2 May 1935 and even refers to prior -Staff discussions on the subject dealt with. It is addressed to the -Chief of the Army Command, who at that time, I believe, was Fritsch, the -Chief of the Navy High Command, Raeder, and the Reich Minister for Air, -Göring. - -It does not use the name “Rhineland” and does not, in terms, refer to -it. It is our view that it was a military plan for the military -reoccupation of the Rhineland, in violation of the Treaty of Versailles -and the Rhine Pact of Locarno. - -I read from the first part of the document which is headed “top secret”: - - “For the operation suggested in the last Staff talks of the - Armed Forces, I lay down the code name ‘Schulung’”—training.— - - “The supreme direction of Operation Schulung rests with the - Reich Minister of Defense as this is a joint undertaking of the - three services. - - “Preparations for the operation will begin forthwith according - to the following directives: - - “1. General. - - “(1) The operation must, on issue of the code words ‘Carry out - Schulung’, be executed by a surprise blow at lightning speed. - Strictest secrecy is necessary in the preparations and only the - very smallest number of officers should be informed and employed - in the drafting of reports, drawings, _et cetera_, and these - officers only in person. - - “(2) There is no time for mobilization of the forces taking - part. These will be employed in their peacetime strength and - with their peacetime equipment. - - “(3) The preparation for the operation will be made without - regard to the present inadequate state of our armaments. Every - improvement of the state of our armaments will make possible a - greater measure of preparedness and thus result in better - prospects of success.” - -The rest of the order deals with military details and I think it is -unnecessary to read it. - -There are certain points, in the face of this order, which are -inconsistent with any theory that it was merely a training order, or -that it might have been defensive in nature. The operation was to be -carried out as a surprise blow at lightning speed (Schlagartig als -Überfall). - -The air forces were to provide support for the attack. There was to be -reinforcement by the East Prussian division. Furthermore, this document -is dated 2 May 1935, which is about 6 weeks after the promulgation of -the Conscription Law on 16 March 1935, and so it could hardly have been -planned as a defensive measure against any expected sanctions which -might have been applied by reason of the passage of the Conscription -Law. - -Of course the actual reoccupation of the Rhineland did not take place -until 7 March 1936, so that this early plan would necessarily have been -totally revised to suit the existing conditions and specific objectives. -As I say, although the plan does not mention the Rhineland, it has all -of the indications of a Rhineland operation plan. That the details of -this particular plan were not ultimately the ones that were carried out -in reoccupying the Rhineland does not at all detract from the vital fact -that as early as 2 May 1935 the Germans had already planned that -operation, not merely as a Staff plan but as a definite operation. It -was evidently not on their timetable to carry out the operation so soon -if it could be avoided. But they were prepared to do so, if necessary, -to resist French sanctions against their Conscription Law. - -It is significant to note the date of this document is the same as the -date of the signature of the Franco-Russian Pact, which the Nazis later -asserted as their excuse for the Rhineland reoccupation. - -The military orders on the basis of which the Rhineland reoccupation was -actually carried into execution, on 7 March 1936, were issued on 2 March -1936 by the War Minister and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces -Blomberg, and addressed to the Commander-in-Chief of the Army Fritsch, -the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy Raeder, and Air Minister and -Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force Göring. We have that order signed by -Blomberg, headed, as usual, “top secret,” identified by us as C-159. I -offer it in evidence as Exhibit USA-54. - -The German copy of that document bears the Defendant Raeder’s initial in -green pencil, with a red pencil note: “To be submitted to the C-in-C of -the Navy.” - -The first part of the order reads: - - “Supreme Command of the Navy: - - “1. The Führer and Reich Chancellor has made the following - decision: - - “By reason of the Franco-Russian Mutual Assistance Pact, the - obligations accepted by Germany in the Locarno Treaty, as far as - they apply to Articles 42 and 43, of the Treaty of Versailles - which referred to the demilitarized zone, are to be regarded as - obsolete. - - “2. Sections of the Army and Air Force will therefore be - transferred simultaneously in a surprise move to garrisons of - the demilitarized zone. In this connection, I issue the - following orders. . . .” - -There follow the detailed orders for the military operation. - -We also have the orders for naval cooperation. The original German -document, which we identify as C-194, was issued on 6 March 1936, in the -form of an order on behalf of the Reich Minister for War, Blomberg, -signed by Keitel, and addressed to the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy -Raeder, setting out detailed instructions for the Commander-in-Chief of -the fleet and the admirals commanding the Baltic and North Sea. I offer -the document in evidence as Exhibit USA-55. - -The short covering letter is as follows: - - “To: C-in-C Navy. - - “The Minister has decided the following after the meeting: - - “1. The inconspicuous air reconnaissance in the German bay, not - over the line Texel-Doggerbank, from midday on Z-Day onward, has - been approved. C-in-C Air Force will instruct the Air Command VI - from midday 7 March to hold in readiness single reconnaissance - aircraft to be at the disposal of the C-in-C fleet. - - “2. The Minister will reserve the decision to set up a U-boat - reconnaissance line until the evening of 7 March. The immediate - transfer of U-boats from Kiel to Wilhelmshafen has been - approved. - - “3. The proposed advance measures for the most part exceed - Degree of Emergency A and therefore are out of the question as - the first countermeasures to be taken against military - preparations of neighboring states. It is far more essential to - examine the advance measures included in Degree of Emergency A, - to see whether one or other of the especially conspicuous - measures could not be omitted.” - -That is signed “Keitel”. - -The rest of the documents are detailed naval orders—operational -orders—and I think I need not read further. - -For the historical emphasis of this occasion, Hitler made a momentous -speech on 7 March 1936. I have the volume of the _Völkischer -Beobachter_, Berlin, Sunday, 8 March 1936, our Document 2289-PS, which I -offer in evidence as Exhibit USA-56. - -This is a long speech which the world remembers and of which I shall -only read a short portion: - - “Men of the German Reichstag! France has replied to the repeated - friendly offers and peaceful assurances made by Germany by - infringing the Rhine Pact through a military alliance with the - Soviet Union exclusively directed against Germany. In this - manner, however, the Locarno Rhine Pact has lost its inner - meaning and ceased in practice to exist. Consequently, Germany - regards herself, for her part, as no longer bound by this - dissolved treaty. The German Government is now constrained to - face the new situation created by this alliance, a situation - which is rendered more acute by the fact that the Franco-Soviet - treaty has been supplemented by a Treaty of Alliance between - Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union exactly parallel in form. In - accordance with the fundamental right of a nation to secure its - frontiers and ensure its possibilities of defense, the German - Government has today restored the full and unrestricted - sovereignty of Germany in the demilitarized zone of the - Rhineland.” - -The whole matter of the German reoccupation of the demilitarized zone of -the Rhineland caused extensive international repercussions and study. As -a result of the protests lodged with the League of Nations, the Council -of the League made an investigation and announced the following finding, -of which I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice, as being carried in -the _League of Nations Monthly Summary_, March 1936, Volume 16, Page 78; -and it is also quoted in an article by Quincy Wright, in the _American -Journal of International Law_, Page 487, 1936. - -The finding is this: - - “That the German Government has committed a breach of Article 43 - of the Treaty of Versailles by causing, on March 7, 1936, - military forces to enter and establish themselves in the - demilitarized zone referred to, in Article 42 and the following - articles of that Treaty, and in the Treaty of Locarno.” - -At the same time, on 7 March 1936, as the Germans reoccupied the -Rhineland in flagrant violation of the Versailles and Locarno Treaties, -they again tried to allay the fears of other European powers and lead -them into a false sense of security by announcing to the world: “We have -no territorial demands to make in Europe.” - -That appears in this same speech of Hitler’s, which I have offered in -evidence as Exhibit USA-56, which is Document 2289-PS. The language will -be found on Page 6, Column 1: - - “We have no territorial claims to make in Europe. We know above - all that all the tensions resulting either from false - territorial settlements or from the disproportion of the numbers - of inhabitants to their living spaces cannot, in Europe, be - solved by war.” - -Most of the acts set forth in the paragraph of the Indictment which I -have been discussing, I think do not need judicial proof because they -are historical facts. We have been able to bring you a number of -interesting documents illuminating that history. The existence of prior -plans and preparations is indisputable from the very nature of things. -The method and sequence of these plans and their accomplishment are -clearly indicative of the progressing and increasingly aggressive -character of the Nazi objectives, international obligations and -considerations of humanity notwithstanding. - -The detailed presentation of the violations of treaties and -international law will be presented by our British colleagues, in -support of Count Two of the Indictment. - -In clear relief, there is shown the determination of the Nazi -conspirators to use whatever means were necessary to abrogate and -overthrow the Treaty of Versailles and its restrictions upon the -military armament and activity of Germany. In this process, they -conspired and engaged in secret rearmament and training, the secret -production of munitions of war, and they built up an air force. They -withdrew from the International Disarmament Conference and the League of -Nations on October 14, 1933. They instituted universal military service -on March 16, 1935. On May 21, 1935 they falsely announced that they -would respect the territorial limitations of Versailles and Locarno. On -March 7, 1936 they reoccupied and fortified the Rhineland and at the -same time, falsely announced that they had no territorial demands in -Europe. - -The objectives of the conspirators were vast and mighty, requiring long -and extensive preparations. The process involved the evasion, -circumvention, and violation of international obligations and treaties. -They stopped at nothing. - -The accomplishment of all those things, together with getting Versailles -out of the way, constituted an opening of the gates toward the specific -aggressions which followed. - -I pass next, if the Tribunal please, to the presentation of the story of -the aggression against Austria. I do not know whether Your Honor desires -me to start on that or not. I am perfectly willing to do so. - -THE PRESIDENT: Are you going to use this volume of documents marked “M” -tomorrow? - -MR. ALDERMAN: There will be a new one marked “N”. - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn until 10 o’clock tomorrow -morning. - - [_The Tribunal adjourned until 28 November 1945 at 1000 hours._] - - - - - SEVENTH DAY - Wednesday, 28 November 1945 - - - _Morning Session_ - -THE PRESIDENT: I call upon counsel for the United States. - -MR. ALDERMAN: May it please the Tribunal, at this point we distribute -document book lettered “N”, which will cover the next phase of the case, -as I will now undertake to present it. Of the five large phases of -aggressive warfare, which I undertake to present to the Tribunal, I have -now completed the presentation of the documents on the first phase, the -phase lasting from 1933 to 1936, consisting of the preparation for -aggression. - -The second large phase of the program of the conspirators for aggression -lasted from approximately 1936 to March 1939, when they had completed -the absorption of Austria and the occupation of all of Czechoslovakia. I -again invite the Court’s attention to the chart on the wall. You may be -interested in glancing at it from time to time as the presentation -progresses. - -The relevant portions of the Indictment to the present subject are set -forth in Subsection 3, under Section IV (F), appearing on Pages 7 and 8 -of the printed English text. This portion of the Indictment is divided -into three parts: First, the 1936 to 1938 phase of the plan, planning -for the assault on Austria and Czechoslovakia; second, the execution of -the plan to invade Austria, November 1937 to March 1938; third, the -execution of the plan to invade Czechoslovakia, April 1938 to March -1939. - -As I previously indicated to the Tribunal, the portion of the Indictment -headed “(a) Planning for the assault on Austria and Czechoslovakia” is -proved for the most part by Document Number 386-PS, which I introduced -on Monday. That is Exhibit USA-25. That was one of the handful of -documents with which I began my presentation of this part of the case. -The minutes taken by Colonel Hossbach of the meeting in the Reich -Chancellery on 5 November 1937, when Hitler developed his political last -will and testament, reviewed the desire of Nazi Germany for more room in -central Europe, and made preparations for the conquest of Austria and -Czechoslovakia as a means of strengthening Germany for the general -pattern of the Nazi conspiracy for aggression. - -I shall present the material on this second, or Austrian phase of -aggression, in two separate parts. I shall first present the materials -and documents relating to the aggression against Austria. They have been -gathered together in the document book which has just been distributed. -Later I shall present the material relating to the aggression against -Czechoslovakia. They will be gathered in a separate document book. - -First, we have the events leading up to the autumn of 1937, and the -strategic position of the National Socialists in Austria. I suggest at -this point, if the Tribunal please, that in this phase we see the first -full flowering of what has come to be known as Fifth Column infiltration -techniques in another country, and first under that, the National -Socialist aim of absorption of Austria. - -In order to understand more clearly how the Nazi conspirators proceeded, -after the meeting of 5 November 1937, covered by the Hossbach minutes, -it is advisable to review the steps which had already been taken in -Austria by the Nazi Socialists of both Germany and Austria. The position -which the Nazis had reached by the fall of 1937 made it possible for -them to complete their absorption of Austria much sooner and with much -less cost than had been contemplated at the time of the meeting covered -by the Hossbach minutes. - -The acquisition of Austria had long been a central aim of the German -National Socialists. On the first page of _Mein Kampf_ Hitler said: -“German Austria must return to the Great German Motherland.” He -continued by stating that this purpose of having common blood in a -common Reich could not be satisfied by a mere economic union. Moreover, -this aim of absorption of Austria was an aim from 1933 on and was -regarded as a serious program which the Nazis were determined to carry -out. - -At this point, I should like to offer in evidence our Document Number -1760-PS, which, if admitted, would be Exhibit USA-57. This document is -an affidavit executed in Mexico City on 28 August of this year by George -S. Messersmith, United States Ambassador, now in Mexico City. Before I -quote from Mr. Messersmith’s affidavit, I should like to point out -briefly that Mr. Messersmith was Consul General of the United States of -America in Berlin from 1930 to late spring of 1934. He was then made -American Minister in Vienna where he stayed until 1937. - -In this affidavit he states that the nature of his work brought him into -frequent contact with German Government officials, and he reports in -this affidavit that the Nazi Government officials, with whom he had -contact, were on most occasions amazingly frank in their conversation -and concealed none of their aims. - -If the Court please, this affidavit, which is quite long, presents a -somewhat novel problem of treatment in the presentation of this case. In -lieu of reading this entire affidavit into the record, I should like, if -it might be done in that way, to offer in evidence, not merely the -English original of the affidavit, but also a translation into German, -which has been mimeographed. This translation of the affidavit into -German has been distributed to counsel for the defendants. - -DR. EGON KUBUSCHOK (Counsel for Defendant Von Papen): An affidavit of a -witness who is obtainable has just been turned over to the Court. The -content of the affidavit offers so many subjective opinions of the -witness, that it is imperative we hear the witness personally in this -matter. - -I should like to take this occasion to ask that it be decided as a -matter of principle, whether that which a witness can testify from his -own knowledge may, without further ado, be presented in the form of an -affidavit; or whether if a witness is living and can be reached the -principle of oral proceedings should be applied, that is, the witness -should be heard directly. - -MR. ALDERMAN: If the Tribunal please, I should like to be heard briefly -on the matter. - -THE PRESIDENT: You have finished what you had to say, I understand? - -DR. KUBUSCHOK: Yes. - -THE PRESIDENT: Very well, we will hear Mr. Alderman. - -MR. ALDERMAN: May it please the Tribunal, I recognize, of course, the -inherent weakness of an affidavit as evidence where the witness is not -present and subject to cross-examination. Mr. Messersmith is an elderly -gentleman. He is not in good health. It was entirely impracticable to -try to bring him here; otherwise, we should have done so. - -I remind the Court of Article 19 of the Charter: - - “The Tribunal shall not be bound by technical rules of evidence. - It shall adopt and apply to the greatest possible extent - expeditious and non-technical procedure, and shall admit any - evidence, which it deems to have probative value.” - -Of course, the Court would not treat anything in an affidavit such as -this as having probative value unless the Court deemed it to have -probative value; and if the defendants have countering evidence, which -is strong enough to overcome whatever is probative in this affidavit, of -course the Court will treat the probative value of all the evidence in -accordance with this provision of the Charter. - -By and large, this affidavit and another affidavit by Mr. Messersmith -which we shall undertake to present cover background material which is a -matter of historical knowledge, of which the Court could take judicial -notice. Where he does quote these amazingly frank expressions by Nazi -leaders, it is entirely open to any of them, who may be quoted, to -challenge what is said, or to tell Your Honors what they believe was -said. In any event, it seems to me that the Court can accept an -affidavit of this character, made by a well-known American diplomat, and -give it whatever probative value the Court thinks it has. - -As to the question of reading the entire affidavit, I understand the -ruling of the Court to be that only those parts of documents, which are -quoted in the record, will be considered to be in the record. It will be -based upon the necessity of giving the German counsel knowledge of what -was being used. As to these affidavits, we have furnished them complete -German translations. It seems to us that a different rule might obtain -where that has been done. - -THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Alderman, have you finished what you had to say? - -MR. ALDERMAN: Yes, sir. - -DR. KUBUSCHOK: The representative of the Prosecution takes the point of -view that the age and state of health of the witness makes it impossible -to summon him as a witness. I do not know the witness personally. -Consequently, I am not in a position to state to what extent he is -actually incapacitated. Nevertheless, I have profound doubts regarding -the presentation of evidence of such an old and incapacitated person. I -am not speaking specifically now about Mr. Messersmith. I do not think -the Court can judge to what extent old age and infirmity can possibly -influence memory and reasoning powers; so, personal presence would seem -absolutely indispensable. - -Furthermore, it is important to know what questions, _in toto_, were put -to the witness. An affidavit only reiterates the answers to questions -which were put to the person. Very often conclusions can be drawn from -unanswered questions. It is here a question of evidence solely on the -basis of an affidavit. For that reason we are not in a position to -assume, with absolute certainty, that the evidence of the witness is -complete. - -I cannot sanction the intention of the Prosecution in this case to -introduce two methods of giving evidence of different value; namely, a -fully valid one through direct evidence of a witness, and a less -complete one through evidence laid down in an affidavit. The situation -is this: Either the evidence is sufficient, or it is not. I think the -Tribunal should confine itself to complete and fully valid evidence. - -THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Alderman, did you wish to add anything? - -MR. ALDERMAN: I wish to make this correction, perhaps of what I said. I -did not mean to leave the implication that Mr. Messersmith is in any way -incapacitated. He is an elderly man, about 70 years old. He is on active -duty in Mexico City; the main difficulty is that we did not feel we -could take him away from his duties in that post, combined with a long -trip and his age. - -THE PRESIDENT: That is all, is it? - -MR. ALDERMAN: Yes. - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal has considered the objection which has been -raised. In view of the powers which the Tribunal has under Article 19 of -the Charter, which provides that the Tribunal shall not be bound by -technical rules of evidence, but shall adopt and apply to the greatest -possible extent expeditious and nontechnical procedure and shall admit -any evidence which it deems to have probative value, the Tribunal holds -that affidavits can be presented, and that in the present case it is a -proper course. - -The question of the probative value of an affidavit as compared with a -witness who has been cross-examined would, of course, be considered by -the Tribunal. If, at a later stage, the Tribunal thinks the presence of -a witness is of extreme importance, the matter can be reconsidered. I -add this: If the defense wish to put interrogatories to the witness, -they will be at liberty to do so. - -MR. ALDERMAN: Thank you, Your Honor. I offer then our Document 1760-PS -as Exhibit USA-57, affidavit by George S. Messersmith. Rather than -reading the entire affidavit, unless the Court wishes me to do so, I -intend to paraphrase and state the substance of what is covered in -various parts of the affidavit. - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal think it would be better to adhere to the -rule which we have laid down: That only what is read in the court will -form part of the record. - -MR. ALDERMAN: I shall read then, if the Tribunal please, from the fourth -paragraph on the third page of the English copy, the following list of -names, headed by President Miklas of Austria and Chancellor Dollfuss: - - “From the very beginnings of the Nazi Government, I was told by - both high and secondary government officials in Germany that - incorporation of Austria into Germany was a political and - economic necessity and that this incorporation was going to be - accomplished ‘by whatever means were necessary.’ Although I - cannot assign definite times and places, I am sure that at - various times and places, every one of the German officials whom - I have listed earlier in this statement told me this, with the - exception of Schacht, Von Krosigk and Krupp von Bohlen. I can - assert that it was fully understood by everyone in Germany who - had any knowledge whatever of what was going on that Hitler and - the Nazi Government were irrevocably committed to this end, and - the only doubt which ever existed in conversations or statements - to me was how and when.” - -In connection with that paragraph, I invite your attention to the list -of German officials to whom he refers on Page 2 of the affidavit. They -are listed as Hermann Göring, General Milch, Hjalmar Schacht, Hans -Frank, Wilhelm Frick, Count Schwerin von Krosigk, Joseph Goebbels, -Richard Walter Darré, Robert Ley, Hans Heinrich Lammers, Otto Meissner, -Franz von Papen, Walter Funk, General Wilhelm Keitel, Admiral Erich von -Raeder, Admiral Karl Dönitz, Dr. Bohle, Dr. Stuckert, Dr. Krupp von -Bohlen, and Dr. Davidson. The affiant states he was sure that at various -times and places, everyone of those listed German officials had made -these statements to him, with the exception of Schacht, Von Krosigk, and -Krupp von Bohlen. I shall continue with the next paragraph: - - “At the beginning of the Nazi regime in 1933, Germany was, of - course, far too weak to permit any open threats of force against - any country, such as the threats which the Nazis made in 1938. - Instead it was the avowed and declared policy of the Nazi - Government to accomplish the same results which they later - accomplished through force, through the methods which had proved - so successful for them in Germany: Obtain a foothold in the - Cabinet, particularly in the Ministry of the Interior, which - controlled the police, and then quickly eliminate opposition - elements. During my stay in Austria, I was told on any number of - occasions by Chancellor Dollfuss, Chancellor Schuschnigg, - President Miklas, and other high officials of the Austrian - Government that the German Government kept up constant and - unceasing pressure upon the Austrian Government to agree to the - inclusion of a number of ministers with Nazi orientation. The - English and French ministers in Vienna, with whom I was in - constant and close contact, confirmed this information through - statements which they made to me of conversations which they had - with high Austrian officials.” - -I shall read other portions of the affidavit as the presentation -proceeds, on the question of pressure used against Austria, including -terror and intimidation, culminating in the unsuccessful Putsch of July -26, 1934. To achieve their ends the Nazis used various kinds of -pressure. In the first place, they used economic pressure. A law of 24 -March 1933, a German law, imposed a prohibitive 1,000 Reichsmark penalty -on trips to Austria. It brought great hardship to this country which -relied very heavily on its tourist trade. For that I cite the -_Reichsgesetzblatt_, 1933, Part I, Page 311, and ask the Court to take -judicial notice of that German law. - -The Nazis used propaganda and they used terroristic acts, primarily -bombings. Mr. Messersmith’s affidavit, Document 1760-PS, from which I -have already read, goes into some detail with respect to these outrages. -I read again from Page 4 of the affidavit, the English version: - - “The outrages were an almost constant occurrence, but there were - three distinct periods during which they rose to a peak. During - the first two of these periods, in mid-1933 and in early 1934, I - was still in Berlin. However, during that period I was told by - high Nazi officials in conversation with them, that these waves - of terror were being instigated and directed by them. I found no - concealment in my conversations with high Nazi officials of the - fact that they were responsible for these activities in Austria. - These admissions were entirely consistent with the Nazi thesis - that terror is necessary and must be used to impose the will of - the Party not only in Germany but in other countries. I recall - specifically that General Milch was one of those who spoke - frankly that these outrages in Austria were being directed by - the Nazi Party, and expressed his concern with respect thereto - and his disagreement with this definite policy of the Party. - - “During the wave of terroristic acts in May and June 1934, I had - already assumed my duties as American Minister in Vienna. The - bomb outrages during this period were directed primarily at - railways, tourist centers, and the Catholic Church, which - latter, in the eyes of the Nazis, was one of the strongest - organizations opposing them. I recall, however, that these - outrages diminished markedly for a few days during the meeting - of Hitler and Mussolini in Venice in mid-June 1934. At that time - Mussolini was strongly supporting the Austrian Government and - was strongly and deeply interested in maintaining Austrian - independence and sovereignty, and in keeping down Nazi influence - and activity in Austria. At that time also Hitler could not - afford an open break with Mussolini and undoubtedly agreed to - the short cessation of these bomb outrages on the insistence of - Mussolini because he, Hitler, wished to achieve as favorable an - atmosphere for the meeting between him and Mussolini as - possible. The cessation of the bomb outrages during the - Hitler-Mussolini conversations was considered by me and by the - Austrian authorities and by all observers at that time as an - open admission on the part of Hitler and the German Government - that the outrages were systematically and completely instigated - and controlled from Germany.” - -Turning to Page 7 of the English version, following the line which -reads, “Official dispatch from Vienna” dated July 26, 1934, I quote the -following paragraph: - - “In addition to these outrages, the Nazis attempted to bring - pressure upon Austria by means of the ‘Austrian Legion’. This - organization, a para-military force of several thousand men, was - stationed near the Austrian border in Germany as a constant and - direct threat of violent action against Austria. It was without - any question sanctioned by the Nazi Government of Germany, as it - could otherwise not have existed, and it was armed by them. It - was made up of Austrian Nazis who had fled from Austria after - committing various crimes in Austria, and by Austrians in - Germany who were attracted by the idle life and pay given by the - German authorities.” - -These terroristic activities of the Nazis in Austria continued until -July 25, 1934. It is a well-known historical fact of which I ask the -Court to take judicial notice that on that day members of the NSDAP, the -Nazi Party, attempted a revolutionary Putsch in Austria and killed -Chancellor Dollfuss. - -At this point I should like to invite your attention to the fact that -the Indictment alleges in Count Four, Crimes against Humanity, Paragraph -B on Page 26 of the English printed text, that the Nazis murdered -amongst others Chancellor Dollfuss. I do not have available an official -authenticated account of the details of that Putsch but I think that it -will suffice if I briefly recall to the Court what is, after all, a -well-known matter of history. - -On July 25, 1934, about noon, 100 men dressed in the uniform of the -Austrian Army seized the Federal Chancellery. Chancellor Dollfuss was -wounded trying to escape, being shot twice at close quarters. The radio -building in the center of the town was overwhelmed, and the announcer -was compelled to broadcast the news that Dollfuss had resigned and that -Dr. Rintelen had taken his place as Chancellor. Although the Putsch -failed, the insurgents kept control of the Chancellery building, and -agreed to give it up only after they had a safe conduct to the German -border. The insurgents contacted the German Minister Dr. Rieth by -telephone and subsequently had private negotiations with him in the -building. At about 7 p.m. they yielded the building, but Chancellor -Dollfuss breathed his last about 6 p.m., not having had the services of -a doctor. - -It is also a well-known historical fact that the German Government -denied all complicity in this Putsch and in this assassination. Hitler -removed Dr. Rieth as Minister on the ground that he had offered a safe -conduct to the rebels without making inquiry of the German Government, -and had thus without reason dragged the German Reich into an internal -Austrian affair in public sight. - -This statement appears in a letter which Hitler sent to Defendant Papen -on July 26, 1934. I shall offer that letter a little later. - -Although the German Government denied any knowledge or complicity in -this Putsch, we think there is ample basis for the conclusion that the -German Nazis bear responsibility for these events. It is not my purpose, -with respect to this somewhat minor consideration, to review the -extensive record in the trial of the Austrian Nazi Planetta and others -who were convicted for the murder of Dollfuss. Similarly I have no -intention of presenting to the Court the contents of the Austrian -_Braunbuch_, issued after July 25. The Court will, I think, take -judicial notice. - -I should like, instead, to mention a few brief items which seem to us -sufficient for the purpose. I quote again from our Exhibit Number -1760-PS, from the Messersmith affidavit, USA-57, on Page 7, the -paragraph in the middle of the page: - - “The events of the Putsch of July 25, 1934, are too well known - for me to repeat them in this statement. I need say here only - that there can be no doubt that the Putsch was ordered and - organized by the Nazi officials from Germany through their - organization in Austria made up of German Nazis and Austrian - Nazis. Dr. Rieth, the German Minister in Vienna, was fully - familiar with all that was going to happen and that was being - planned. The German Legation was located directly across the - street from the British Legation, and the Austrian secret police - kept close watch on the persons who entered the German Legation. - - “The British had their own secret service in Vienna at the time, - and they also kept a discreet surveillance over the people - entering the German Legation. I was told by both British and - Austrian officials that a number of men who were later found - guilty by the Austrian courts of having been implicated in the - Putsch had frequented the German Legation. In addition, I - personally followed very closely the activities of Dr. Rieth, - and I never doubted, on the basis of all my information, that - Dr. Rieth was in close touch and constant touch with the Nazi - agents in Austria, these agents being both German and Austrian. - Dr. Rieth could not have been unfamiliar with the Putsch and the - details in connection therewith. I recall, too, very definitely - from my conversations with the highest officials of the Austrian - Government after the Putsch their informing me that Dr. Rieth - had been in touch with Von Rintelen, who, it had been planned by - the Nazis, was to succeed Chancellor Dollfuss, had the Putsch - been successful. - - “It may be that Dr. Rieth was himself not personally sympathetic - with the plans for the Putsch, but there is no question that he - was fully familiar with all these plans and must have given his - assent thereto and connived therein. - - “As this Putsch was so important and was a definite attempt to - overthrow the Austrian Government and resulted in the murder of - the Chancellor of Austria, I took occasion to verify at the time - for myself various other items of evidence indicating that the - Putsch was not only made with the knowledge of the German - Government but engineered by it. I found and verified that - almost a month before the Putsch Goebbels told Signor Cerruti, - the Italian Ambassador in Berlin, that there would be a Nazi - government in Vienna in a month.” - -I should also like to offer in evidence Ambassador Dodd’s diary, -1933-38, a book published in 1941, our Document 2832-PS, and -particularly the entry for July 26, 1934. We have the book with the two -pages to which I have reference. I should like to offer that portion of -the book in evidence as Exhibit USA-58, further identified as our -Document 2832-PS. - -Mr. Dodd, then Ambassador to Berlin, made the following observations in -that entry. First he noted that in February 1934 Ernst Hanfstaengl -advised Mr. Dodd that he brought what was virtually an order from -Mussolini to Hitler to leave Austria alone and to dismiss and silence -Theodor Habicht, the German agent in Munich, who had been agitating for -annexation of Austria. On June 18 in Venice, Hitler was reported to have -promised Mussolini to leave Austria alone. Mr. Dodd further states, and -I quote from his entry of July 26, 1934: - - “On Monday, July 23, after repeated bombings in Austria by - Nazis, a boat loaded with explosives was seized on Lake - Constance by the Swiss police. It was a shipment of German bombs - and shells to Austria from some arms plant. That looked ominous - to me, but events of that kind had been so common that I did not - report it to Washington. - - “Today evidence came to my desk that last night, as late as 11 - o’clock, the Government issued formal statements to the - newspapers rejoicing at the fall of Dollfuss and proclaiming the - Greater Germany that must follow. The German Minister in Vienna - had actually helped to form the new cabinet. He had, as we now - know, exacted a promise that the gang of Austrian Nazi murderers - should be allowed to go into Germany undisturbed, but it was - realized about 12 o’clock that although Dollfuss was dead the - Loyal Austrians had surrounded the Government Palace and - prevented the organization of a new Nazi regime. They held the - murderers prisoners. The German Propaganda Ministry therefore - forbade publication of the news sent out an hour before and - tried to collect all the releases that had been distributed. A - copy was brought to me today by a friend. - - “All the German papers this morning lamented the cruel murder - and declared that it was simply an attack of discontented - Austrians, not Nazis. News from Bavaria shows that thousands of - Austrian Nazis living for a year in Bavaria on German support - had been active for 10 days before, some getting across the - border contrary to law, all drilling and making ready to return - to Austria. The German propagandist Habicht was still making - radio speeches about the necessity of annexing the ancient realm - of the Hapsburgs to the Third Reich, in spite of all the - promises of Hitler to silence him. But now that the drive has - failed and the assassins are in prison in Vienna, the German - Government denounces all who say there was any support from - Berlin. - - “I think it will be clear one day that millions of dollars and - many arms have been pouring into Austria since the spring of - 1933. Once more, the whole world is condemning the Hitler - regime. No people in all modern history has been quite so - unpopular as Nazi Germany. This stroke completes the picture. I - expect to read a series of bitter denunciations in the American - papers when they arrive about 10 days from now.” - -As I stated before, the German Government denied any connection with the -Putsch and the murder of Dollfuss. In this connection, I should like to -invite attention to the letter of appointment which Hitler wrote to the -Defendant Von Papen on 26 July 1934. This letter appears in a standard -German reference work _Dokumente der Deutschen Politik_, Volume 2, Page -83. For convenience we have identified it as Document 2799-PS, and a -copy translated into English is included in the document book. The -defendants may examine the German text in the _Dokumente der Deutschen -Politik_, a copy of which is present in my hand, Page 83 of Volume 2. - -I ask the Court if it will take judicial notice of this original German -typing. - -I should like to read this letter which Chancellor Hitler sent to Vice -Chancellor Von Papen. I think it will provide us with a little -historical perspective and perhaps freshen our recollection of the ways -in which the Nazi conspirators worked. In considering Hitler’s letter to -the Defendant Von Papen on July 26, we might bear in mind as an -interesting sidelight, the widespread report at that time, and I mention -this only as a widespread report, that the Defendant Von Papen narrowly -missed being purged on June 30, 1934, along with the Nazi Ernst Roehm -and others. The letter from Hitler to Von Papen is as follows: - - “Dear Herr Von Papen: - - “As a result of the events in Vienna, I am compelled to suggest - to the Reich President the removal of the German Minister to - Vienna, Dr. Rieth, from his post, because he, at the suggestion - of Austrian Federal Ministers and the Austrian rebels, - respectively consented to an agreement made by both these - parties concerning the safe conduct and retreat of the rebels to - Germany without making inquiry of the German Reich Government. - Thus, the Minister has dragged the German Reich into an internal - Austrian affair without any reason. - - “The assassination of the Austrian Federal Chancellor which was - strictly condemned and regretted by the German Government has - made the situation in Europe, already fluid, more acute, without - any fault of ours. Therefore, it is my desire to bring about, if - possible, an easing of the general situation, and especially to - direct the relations with the German Austrian State, which have - been so strained for a long time, again into normal and friendly - channels. - - “For this reason, I request you, dear Herr Von Papen, to take - over this important task, just because you have possessed, and - continue to possess, my most complete and unlimited confidence - ever since we have worked together in the Cabinet. - - “Therefore, I have suggested to the Reich President that you, - upon leaving the Reich Cabinet and upon release from the office - of Commissioner for the Saar, be called on a special mission to - the post of the German Minister in Vienna for a limited period - of time. In this position you will be directly subordinated to - me. - - “Thanking once more for all that you have at one time done for - the co-ordination of the Government of the National Revolution, - and since then together with us for Germany, I remain, yours - very sincerely, Adolf Hitler.” - -Now let us look at the situation 4 years later, on July 25, 1938, after -the Anschluss with Austria. At that time the German officials no longer -expressed regrets over the death of Dollfuss. They were eager and -willing to reveal what the world already knew, that they were identified -with and sponsors of the murder of the former Chancellor. - -I offer in evidence at this point Document L-273, which I offer as -Exhibit USA-59. That document is a dispatch from the American Consul -General, Vienna, to the Secretary of State, dated July 26, 1938. -Unfortunately, through a mechanical slip, this document which is in -English in the original, was not mimeographed in English and is not in -your document book. However, it was translated into German, and is in -the document book which counsel for the defendants have. I read from a -photostatic copy of the dispatch: - - “The two high points of the celebration”—here was a - celebration—“were the memorial assembly on the 24th at - Klagenfurt, capital of the Province of Carinthia, where in 1934 - the Vienna Nazi revolt found its widest response and the march - on the 25th to the former Federal Chancellery in Vienna by the - surviving members of the SS Standarte 89, which made the attack - on the Chancellery in 1934.”—a reconstitution of the crime, so - to say. - - “The assembled thousands at Klagenfurt were addressed by the - Führer’s deputy, Rudolf Hess, in the presence of the families of - the 13 National Socialists who were hanged for their part in the - July Putsch. The Klagenfurt memorial celebration was also made - the occasion for the solemn swearing in of the seven recently - appointed Gauleiter of the Ostmark. From the point of view of - the outside world, this speech of Reich Minister Hess was - chiefly remarkable for the fact that after devoting the first - half of his speech to the expected praise of the sacrifices of - the men, women, and youths of Austria in the struggle for - Greater Germany, he then launched into a defense of the - occupation of Austria, an attack on the ‘lying foreign press’ - and on those who spread the idea of a new war. The world was - fortunate, declared Hess, that Germany’s leader was a man who - would not allow himself to be provoked. The Führer does what is - necessary for his people in sovereign calm and labors for the - peace of Europe, even though provocators ‘completely ignoring - the deliberate threat of the peace of certain small states,’ - deceitfully claim that he is a menace to the peace of Europe. - - “The march on the former Federal Chancellery,”—referring back - to the Putsch of 4 years before—“now the Reichsstatthalterei, - followed the exact route and time schedule of the original - attack. The marchers were met at the Chancellery by - Reichsstatthalter Seyss-Inquart, who addressed them and unveiled - a memorial tablet. From the Reichsstatthalterei the - Standarte”—that is the SS organization which made the original - attack and which marched on this occasion 4 years - later—“marched from the old Ravag broadcasting center, from - which false news of the resignation of Dollfuss had been - broadcast, and there unveiled a second memorial tablet. - Steinhaeusel, the present Police President of Vienna, is a - member of the SS Standarte 89.” - -Today that original memorial plaque, if the Court please, is rubble, -like so much of Nuremberg; but we found a photograph of it in the -National Library in Vienna. I should like to offer this photograph in -evidence. It was taken on this occasion 4 years later. The Nazi wreath -encircles the memorial tablet. A large wreath of flowers with a very -distinct swastika Nazi symbol was laid before the wreath. I offer that -photograph identified as 2968-PS in evidence. I offer it as Exhibit -USA-60. You will find that in the document book. I know of no more -interesting or shocking document at which you could look. We call -celebrating a murder 4 years later, “Murder by ratification.” - -As that photograph shows, this plaque which was erected to celebrate -this sinister occasion reads: “One hundred and fifty-four German men of -the 89th SS Standarte stood up here for Germany on July 25, 1934. Seven -found death in the hands of the hangman.” - -The Tribunal may notice that the number “154” at the top of the plaque -is concealed in the photograph by the Nazi wreath surrounding the -plaque. I must confess that I find myself curiously interested in this -tablet and in the photograph which was taken and carefully filed. The -words chosen for this marble tablet, and surely we can presume that they -were words chosen carefully, tell us clearly that the men involved were -not mere malcontent Austrian revolutionaries, but were regarded as -German men, were members of a para-military organization, and stood up -here for Germany. - -In 1934 Hitler repudiated Doctor Rieth because he dragged the German -Reich into an internal Austrian affair without any reason. In 1938 Nazi -Germany proudly identified itself with this murder, took credit for it, -and took responsibility for it. Further proof in the conventional sense, -it seems to us, is hardly necessary. - -Next we refer to the program culminating in the Pact of July 11, 1936. -In considering the activities of the Nazi conspirators in Austria -between July 25, 1934 and November 1937 there is a distinct intermediate -point, the Pact of July 11, 1936. Accordingly, I shall first review -developments in the 2-year period, July 1934-36. - -First, we must consider the continued aim of eliminating Austria’s -independence, with particular relation to the Defendant Von Papen’s -conversation and activity. The first point that should be mentioned is -this: The Nazi conspirators pretended to respect the independence and -sovereignty of Austria, notwithstanding the aim of Anschluss stated in -_Mein Kampf_. But in truth and in fact they were working from the very -beginning to destroy the Austrian State. - -A dramatic recital of the position of Defendant Von Papen in this regard -is provided in Mr. Messersmith’s affidavit, from which I have already -quoted. I quote now from Page 9 of the English copy, the second -paragraph, 1760-PS, Exhibit USA-57: - - “That the policy of Anschluss remained wholly unchanged was - confirmed to me by Franz von Papen when he arrived in Vienna as - German Minister. It will be recalled that he accepted this - assignment as German Minister even though he knew that he had - been marked for execution in the St. Bartholomew’s massacre of - 30 June 1934. When, in accordance with protocol, he paid me a - visit shortly after his arrival in Vienna, I determined that - during this call there would be no reference to anything of - importance, and I limited the conversation strictly to - platitudes which I was able to do as he was calling on me in my - office. I deemed it expedient to delay my return call for - several weeks in order to make it clear to Von Papen that I had - no sympathy with, and on the other hand was familiar with the - objectives of his mission in Austria. When I did call on Von - Papen in the German Legation, he greeted me with ‘Now you are in - my Legation and I can control the conversation.’ - - “In the boldest and most cynical manner he then proceeded to - tell me that all of southeastern Europe, to the borders of - Turkey, was Germany’s natural hinterland, and that he had been - charged with the mission of facilitating German economic and - political control over all this region for Germany. He blandly - and directly said that getting control of Austria was to be the - first step. He definitely stated that he was in Austria to - undermine and weaken the Austrian Government and from Vienna to - work towards the weakening of the Governments in the other - states to the south and southeast. He said that he intended to - use his reputation as a good Catholic to gain influence with - certain Austrians, such as Cardinal Innitzer, towards that end. - He said that he was telling me this because the German - Government was bound on this objective of getting this control - of southeastern Europe and that there was nothing which could - stop it, and that our own policy and that of France and England - was not realistic. - - “The circumstances were such, as I was calling on him in the - German Legation, that I had to listen to what he had to say and - of course, I was prepared to hear what he had to say although I - already knew what his instructions were. I was nevertheless - shocked to have him speak so boldly to me, and when he finished - I got up and told him how shocked I was to hear the accredited - representative of a supposedly friendly state to Austria admit - that he was proposing to engage in activities to undermine and - destroy that Government to which he was accredited. He merely - smiled and said of course this conversation was between us, and - that he would of course not be talking to others so clearly - about his objectives. I have gone into this detail with regard - to this conversation, as it is characteristic of the absolute - frankness and directness with which high Nazi officials spoke of - their objectives.” - -And again, reading from the same document on Page 10, beginning at the -last paragraph at the bottom of the page: - - “On the surface, however, German activities consisted - principally of efforts to win the support of prominent and - influential men through insidious efforts of all kinds, - including the use of the German diplomatic mission in Vienna and - its facilities and personnel. - - “Von Papen as German Minister entertained frequently and on a - lavish scale. He approached almost every member of the Austrian - Cabinet, telling them, as several of them later informed me, - that Germany was bound to prevail in the long run, and that they - should join the winning side if they wished to enjoy positions - of power and influence under German control. Of course, openly - and outwardly he gave solemn assurance that Germany would - respect Austrian independence and that all that she wished to do - was to get rid of elements in the Austrian Government like the - Chancellor Schuschnigg and Starhemberg as head of the Heimwehr, - and others, and replace them by a few ‘nationally-minded’ - Austrians, which of course meant the Nazis. The whole basic - effort of Von Papen was to bring about the Anschluss. - - “In early 1935 the Austrian Foreign Minister, Berger-Waldenegg, - informed me that in the course of a conversation with Von Papen, - the latter had remarked, ‘Yes, you have your French and English - friends now, and you can have your independence a little - longer.’ The Foreign Minister, of course, told me this remark in - German, but the foregoing is an accurate translation. The - Foreign Minister told me that he had replied to Von Papen, ‘I am - glad to have from your own lips your own opinion which agrees - with what your Chief has just said in the Saar and which you - have taken such pains to deny.’ Von Papen appeared to be - terribly upset when he realized just what he had said and tried - to cover his statements, but according to Berger-Waldenegg, kept - constantly getting into deeper water. - - “Von Papen undoubtedly achieved some success, particularly with - men like Glaise-Horstenau and others who had long favored the - Grossdeutschtum idea, but who nevertheless had been greatly - disturbed by the fate of the Catholic Church. Without conscience - or scruple, Von Papen exploited his reputation and that of his - wife as ardent and devout Catholics to overcome the fears of - these Austrians in this respect.” - -May I inquire if the Court expect to take a short recess? - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes. We will adjourn now for 10 minutes. - - [_A recess was taken._] - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal wishes to make it clear, if I did not make -it clear when I spoke before, that if Defense Counsel wish to put -interrogatories to Mr. Messersmith upon his affidavit they may submit -such interrogatories to the Tribunal in writing for them to be sent to -Mr. Messersmith to answer. - -FLOTTENRICHTER OTTO KRANZBÜHLER (Counsel for Defendant Dönitz): I do not -know whether my question has yet been answered, or by what it has been -made known by the President of the Court. - -In the testimony of Mr. Messersmith, Dönitz’ name was mentioned. It -appears on Page 4 of the German version. I should like to read the whole -paragraph: - - “Admiral Karl Dönitz was not always in an amicable frame of - mind. He was not a National Socialist when the National - Socialists came to power”. . . . - -THE PRESIDENT: This passage was not read in evidence, was it? - -DR. KRANZBÜHLER: No, only the name was mentioned. - -THE PRESIDENT: I don’t think the name was mentioned, because this part -of the affidavit was not read. - -DR. KRANZBÜHLER: The name was read, Mr. President. - -THE PRESIDENT: Very well, go on. - -DR. KRANZBÜHLER: [_Continuing._] - - “Nevertheless, he became one of the first high officers in the - Army and fleet and was in complete agreement with the concepts - and aims of National Socialism.” - -As an introduction to this paragraph, Mr. Messersmith said, in Document -Number 1760, on Page 2, the last sentence before the Number 1: - - “Among those whom I saw frequently and to whom I have reference - in many of my statements were the following. . . .” - -Then after Number 16 Dönitz’ name appears. My client has informed me -that he has heard the name “Messersmith” today for the first time; that -he does not know the witness Messersmith, has never seen him, nor has he -ever spoken to him. - -I therefore request that the witness Messersmith be brought before the -Court to state when and where he spoke to the Defendant Dönitz. - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal has already ruled that the affidavit is -admissible; that its probative value will of course be considered by the -Tribunal, and the defendants’ counsel have the right, if they wish, to -submit interrogatories for the examination of Messersmith. Of course -defendants will have the opportunity of giving evidence when their turn -comes, then Admiral Dönitz, if he thinks it right, will be able to deny -the statements of the affidavit. - -DR. KRANZBÜHLER: Thank you. - -MR. ALDERMAN: I want to call the Court’s attention to a slight -mistranslation into German of one sentence of the Messersmith affidavit. -In the German translation the word “nicht” crept in when the negative -was not in the English. - -The English statement was: - - “I deemed it expedient to delay my return call for several weeks - in order to make it clear to Von Papen that I had no sympathy - with and on the other hand was familiar with the objectives of - his mission in Austria.” - -The German text contains the negative: “Und dass ich anderseits nicht -mit den Zielen seiner Berufung in Österreich vertraut war.” The “nicht” -should not be in the German text. - -The continued existence of Nazi organizations was a program of armed -preparedness. The wiles of the Defendant Von Papen represented only one -part of the total program of Nazi conspiracy. At the same time Nazi -activities in Austria, forced underground during this period, were -carried on. - -Mr. Messersmith’s affidavit on Pages 9 and 10, the English text, -discloses the following. Reading from the last main paragraph on Page 9: - - “Nazi activities, forced underground in this period, were by no - means neglected. The Party was greatly weakened for a time as a - result of the energetic measures taken against the Putsch and as - a result of public indignation. Reorganization work was soon - begun. In October 1934 the Austrian Foreign Minister, - Berger-Waldenegg, furnished me the following memorandum, which - he told me had been supplied to the Austrian Government by a - person who participated in the meeting under reference.” - -I quote the first paragraph of the memorandum: - - “A meeting of the chiefs of the Austrian National Socialist - Party was held on 29 and 30 September 1934, at Bad Aibling in - Bavaria.” - -Then, skipping four paragraphs and resuming on the fifth one: - - “The Agents of the Party Direction in Germany have received - orders in every Austrian district to prepare lists of all those - persons who are known to support actively the present Government - and who are prepared closely to cooperate with it. - - “When the next action against the Government takes place those - persons are to be proceeded against just as brutally as against - all those other persons, without distinction of party, who are - known to be adversaries of National Socialism. - - “In a report of the Party leaders for Austria the following - principles have been emphasized: - - “A. The taking over of the power in Austria remains the - principal duty of the Austrian National Socialist Party. Austria - has for the German Reich a much greater significance and value - than the Saar. The Austrian problem is the problem. All combat - methods are consecrated by the end which they are to serve. - - “B. We must, on every occasion which presents itself, appear to - be disposed to negotiate, but arm at the same time for the - struggle. The new phase of the struggle will be particularly - serious and there will be this time two centers of terror, one - along the German frontier and the other along the Yugoslav - frontier.” - -That ends the quotation from the memorandum. I proceed with the next -paragraph of the affidavit: - - “The Austrian Legion was kept in readiness in Germany. Although - it was taken back some miles further from the Austrian frontier, - it remained undissolved in spite of the engagement which had - been taken to dissolve it. The Austrian Government received - positive information to this effect from time to time which it - passed on to me and I had direct information to the same effect - from reliable persons coming from Germany to Vienna who actually - saw the Legion.” - -The fact of the reorganization of the Nazi Party in Austria is -corroborated by a report of one of the Austrian Nazis. - -I offer in evidence our Document Number 812-PS, as Exhibit USA-61. It -contains three parts. First, there is a letter dated August 22, 1939 -from Mr. Rainer, then Gauleiter at Salzburg, to the Defendant -Seyss-Inquart, then Austrian Reich Minister. That letter encloses a -letter dated July 6, 1939 written by Rainer to Reich Commissioner and -Gauleiter Josef Bürckel. - -DR. HANS LATERNSER: (Co-counsel for Defendant Seyss-Inquart): I object -to the presentation of the letters contained in Document Number 812. Of -course, I cannot object to the presentation of this evidence to the -extent that this evidence is to prove that these letters were actually -written. However, if these letters are to serve as proof for the -correctness of their contents, then I must object to the use of these -letters, for the following reason: Particularly, the third document: It -is a letter which, as is manifest from its contents, has a certain bias, -for this reason, that in this letter it is explained to what extent the -Austrian Nazi Party participated in the Anschluss. - -It purports, further, to expose the leading role played by the Party -group Rainer-Klausner. - -From the bias that is manifest in the contents of this letter, this -letter cannot serve as proof for the facts brought forth in it, -particularly since the witness Rainer, who wrote this letter, is -available as a witness. I have discovered he is at present in Nuremberg. - -I object to the use of this letter to the extent that it is to be used -to prove the correctness of its contents, because the witness who can -testify to that is at our disposal in Nuremberg. - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will hear Mr. Alderman in answer to what has -been said. The Tribunal has not yet read the letter. - -MR. ALDERMAN: I think perhaps it would be better to read the letter -before we argue about the significance of its contents. - -THE PRESIDENT: Are you relying upon the letter as evidence of the facts -stated in it? - -MR. ALDERMAN: Yes. - -THE PRESIDENT: From whom is the letter, and to whom is it addressed? - -MR. ALDERMAN: The first letter is from Mr. Rainer who was at that time -Gauleiter at Salzburg, to the Defendant Seyss-Inquart, then Reich -Minister of Austria. - -That letter encloses a letter dated July 6, 1939, written by Rainer to -Reich Commissioner and Gauleiter Josef Bürckel. In that letter, in turn, -Rainer enclosed a report on the events in the NSDAP of Austria from 1933 -to March 11, 1938, the day before the invasion of Austria. - -I had some other matters in connection with this that I did want to -bring to the attention of the Tribunal before it passes upon the -admissibility. - -THE PRESIDENT: I don’t think that the defendant’s counsel is really -challenging the admissibility of the document; he challenges the -contents of the document. - -MR. ALDERMAN: Yes. On that, in the first place, we are advised by -defendant’s counsel that this man Rainer is in Nuremberg. I would assume -he is there. - -We have also an affidavit by Rainer stating that what is stated in these -communications is the truth. However, it seems to us that the -communications themselves, as contemporaneous reports by a Party officer -at the time, are much more probative evidence than anything that he -might testify to before you today. - -DR. LATERNSER: I have already said that this letter has these -characteristics, that it is biased, that it tends to emphasize and -exaggerate the participation of the Austrian Nazi Party on the -Anschluss. Therefore, I must object to the use of this letter as -objective evidence. It was not written with the thought in mind that the -letter would be used as evidence before a court. If the writer had known -that, the letter undoubtedly would have been formulated differently, -considering his political activity. - -I believe, although I am not sure, that the witness is in Nuremberg. In -that case, according to a principle which is basic for all trial -procedure, the witness should be presented to the Court personally, -particularly since, in this case, the difficulties inherent in the -question of Messersmith do not here pertain. - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal is of the opinion that the letters are -admissible. They were written to and received by the Defendant -Seyss-Inquart. The defendant can challenge the contents of the letters -by his evidence. - -If it is true that Rainer is in Nuremberg, it is open to the defendant -to apply to the Tribunal for leave to call Rainer in due course. He can -then challenge the contents of these letters, both by the Defendant -Seyss-Inquart’s evidence and by Rainer’s evidence. The letters -themselves are admitted. - -MR. ALDERMAN: May it please the Tribunal, I agree quite fully with the -statement that if it had been known that these letters were to be -offered in evidence in a court of justice, they very probably would have -been differently written. That applies to a great part of the evidence -that we shall offer in this case. And I would say that if the -photographer who took the photograph of the Memorial Plaque had known -that his photographs would be introduced in evidence in a conspiracy -case, he probably never would have snapped the shutter. - -The letter from Rainer to Bürckel indicates that he was asked to prepare -a short history of the role of the Party. Perhaps I had better read the -covering letter, addressed to the Defendant Seyss-Inquart: - - “Dear Dr. Seyss: - - “I have received your letter of 19 August 1939, in which you - asked me to inform you what I know of those matters which, among - others, are the subject of your correspondence with Bürckel. - - “I do not wish to discuss sundry talks and all that which has - been brought to my notice in the course of time by different - people. I wish to clarify essentially my own attitude. - - “On 5 July 1939 I was asked by telephone by the Reich - Commissioner Gauleiter Bürckel if I was in possession of the - memorandum of Globus regarding the events of March. I told him - that I did not have this memorandum, that I never possessed a - single part of it; that I, furthermore, did not then participate - in the matter and do not know its content. Because of official - requests by Bürckel, I have entrusted him with a report - accompanied by a letter written on 6 July. - - “If Bürckel now writes to you that certain statements were - confirmed by me, I feel obliged to entrust you with a copy each - of my copies of those two documents, which were only written in - single originals. I shall specially inform Bürckel of this, - adding that I have given—apart from, those written - explanations—no confirmations, declarations, or criticisms - whatsoever regarding you and your attitude and that I have - authorized nobody to refer to any statements of mine. - - “Since the beginning of our collaboration, I have always - expressed and represented forcefully my ideas regarding yourself - and my opinion of your personality. This conception of mine was - the very basis of our collaboration. The events of February and - March have not changed this, especially since I considered the - political success of 11 March merely as a confirmation of the - intentions and convictions which have equally induced both of us - to collaborate. - - “As far as Globus is concerned, you are fully, aware of his - nature, which I judged always and in every situation only by its - good side. I believe that you have already talked to Globus - about the occurrences between the 11 March 1938 and today, and I - am convinced that he will tell you everything that is bothering - him, if you will speak to him about this matter, as is your - intention. - - “With best regards and Heil Hitler! - - Yours, Friedl Rainer.” - -And so Rainer writes his report, which is enclosed with this letter, to -show that the Party as a whole is entitled to the glory which was -excessively ascribed to one person, Dr. Seyss-Inquart. - -I refer to the third paragraph of the first enclosure, the report to -Reich Commissioner Gauleiter Josef Bürckel: - - “We saw in March and April how a false picture about the actual - leadership conditions developed from this fact which could not - be corrected in spite of our attempts to that effect. This was - an important factor for the varying moods of Globocnik who hoped - especially from you that you would emphasize for Hitler, and - also for the public, the role of the Party during the events - preceding 12 March 1938. I limited myself to address this verbal - and written declaration to Party member Hess, and furthermore to - secure the documents from the March days. In addition, I spoke - at every available opportunity about the fight of the Party. I - did not undertake steps to give just credit to other persons for - the glory which was excessively ascribed to one person, Dr. - Seyss-Inquart, and I would not do that, primarily because I - appear as a beneficiary, and furthermore, because I believe that - I would not gladden Hitler by doing so. - - “I am also convinced that Dr. Seyss-Inquart did not act - crookedly, and furthermore, that Hitler does not want to commit - an act of historical justice by special preference of his - person, but rather that he is attracted to him personally. It - really is of no great account to Hitler if this or that person - were more or less meritorious in this sector of the great fight - of the movement. Because, in the last analysis, by far the - greatest part is to be ascribed only to him; he alone will be - considered by history as the liberator of Austria. I, therefore, - considered it best to accept existing conditions and look for - new fertile fields of endeavor in the Party. - - “If I should be asked to describe—without personal - interest—the role of the Party according to my best conviction, - I am ready to do so at any time. For this reason I promised - yesterday to submit to you again a short summary, and to make it - available for your confidential use. Of this letter and of this - abbreviated description I retain the sole copy. - - “Heil Hitler! Rainer.” - -Now, of course, all of these enclosures went to the Defendant -Seyss-Inquart, and he had knowledge of the contents of all of them. - -It is an historical fact of which the Court will take judicial notice, -that Seyss-Inquart was the original Quisling. It so happened that the -Norwegian Seyss-Inquart gave his name to posterity as a meaningful name, -but all Quislings are alike. - -The Tribunal will observe from this that the Rainer report is hardly -likely to be tendentious, as counsel says, or to be prejudiced in favor -of Defendant Seyss-Inquart’s contribution to the Anschluss. It tends, on -the contrary, to show that Seyss-Inquart was not quite so important as -he might have thought he was. Even so, Rainer gives Seyss-Inquart credit -enough. - -The Rainer report further tells of the disorganization of the Nazi Party -in Austria and of its reconstitution. I now quote the second and third -paragraphs of the report, appearing on Pages 3 and 4 of the English text -of 812-PS, which is Exhibit USA-61; and I believe it is on Pages 1 and 2 -of the original German of the report or Bericht, which is the third part -of the document: - - “Thus the first stage of battle commenced which ended with the - July rising of 1934. The decision for the July rising was right, - the execution of it was faulty. The result was a complete - destruction of the organization; the loss of entire groups of - fighters through imprisonment or flight into the Alt-Reich, and - with regard to the political relationship of Germany to Austria, - a formal acknowledgment of the existence of the Austrian State - by the German Government. With the telegram to Papen, - instructing him to reinstitute normal relationships between the - two States, the Führer had liquidated the first stage of the - battle, and a new method of political penetration was to begin. - By order of the Führer the Landesleitung Munich was dissolved, - and the Party in Austria was left to its own resources. - - “There was no acknowledged leader for the entire Party in - Austria. New leaderships were forming in the new Gaue. The - process was again and again interrupted by the interference of - the police; there was no liaison between the formations, and - frequently there were two, three, or more rival leaderships. The - first evident, acknowledged speaker of almost all the Gaue in - Autumn 1934 was Engineer Reinthaler (already appointed - Landesbauernführer, leader of the country’s farmers, by Hess). - He endeavored to bring about a political appeasement by - negotiations with the Government with the purpose of giving the - NSDAP legal status again, thus permitting its political - activities. Simultaneously, Reinthaler started the - reconstruction of the illegal political organization at the head - of which he had placed Engineer Neubacher.” - -Next we have secret contacts between German officials, including the -Defendant Von Papen, and the Austrian Nazis; the use by the Austrian -Nazis of front personalities. - -There are two cardinal factors concerning the Nazi organization in -Austria which should be borne in mind. - -First, although the Führer had, on the surface, cast the Austrian Nazis -adrift—as indicated in the document I have just read—in fact, as we -shall show, German officials, including Von Papen, maintained secret -contact with the Austrian Nazis in line with Hitler’s desires. German -officials consulted and gave advice and support to the organization of -the Austrian Nazis. - -In the second place, the Austrian Nazis remained an illegal organization -in Austria, organizing for the eventual use of force in a so-called -emergency. But in the meantime they deemed it expedient to act behind -front personalities, such as the Defendant Seyss-Inquart, who had no -apparent taint of illegality in his status in Austria. - -Mr. Messersmith relates, in his affidavit, that he got hold of a copy of -a document outlining this Nazi program. I quote from Page 8 of Document -1760-PS, USA-57, the following: - - “For 2 years following the failure of the July 25 Putsch, the - Nazis remained relatively quiet in Austria. Very few terroristic - acts occurred during the remainder of 1934 and, as I recall, in - 1935 and most of 1936, this inactivity was in accordance with - directives from Berlin, as direct evidence to that effect which - came to my knowledge at that time, proved. Early in January the - Austrian Foreign Minister Berger-Waldenegg, furnished me a - document which I considered accurate in all respects, and which - stated: - - “‘The German Minister here, Von Papen, on the occasion of his - last visit to Berlin, was received three times by Chancellor - Hitler for fairly long conversations and he also took this - opportunity to call on Schacht and Von Neurath. In these - conversations the following instructions were given to him: - - “‘During the next 2 years nothing can be undertaken which will - give Germany external political difficulties. On this ground, - everything must be avoided which could awaken the appearance of - Germany interfering in the internal affairs of Austria. - Chancellor Hitler will, therefore, also for this reason, not - endeavor to intervene in the present prevailing difficult crisis - in the National Socialist Party in Austria, although he is - convinced that order could be brought into the Party at once - through a word from him. This word, however, he will not give - for foreign political reasons, being convinced that ends desired - by him may be reached also in another way. Naturally, Chancellor - Hitler declared to the German Minister here, this does not - indicate any disinterestedness in Austria’s independence. Also, - before everything, Germany cannot for the present withdraw Party - members in Austria, and must therefore, in spite of the very - real exchange difficulties, make every effort to bring help to - the persecuted National Socialist sufferers in Austria. - - “‘As a result, Minister of Commerce Schacht finally gave the - authorization that from then on, 200,000 marks a month were to - be set aside for this end (support of National Socialists in - Austria). The control and supervision of this monthly sum was to - be entrusted to Engineer Reinthaler, who, through the fact that - he alone had control over the money, would have a definite - influence on the Party followers. In this way it would be - possible to end most quickly and most easily the prevailing - difficulties and divisions in the Austrian National Socialist - Party. - - “‘The hope was also expressed to Herr Von Papen that the - recently authorized foundation of German Ortsgruppen of the - National Socialist Party in Austria, made up of German citizens - in Austria, would be so arranged as not to give the appearance - that Germany is planning to interfere in Austrian internal - affairs.’” - -The report of Gauleiter Rainer to Reich Commissar Bürckel in July 1939 -outlines the further history of the Party and the leadership squabbles -following the retirement of Reinthaler. - -THE PRESIDENT: Do you think this would be a convenient time to break off -until 2 o’clock? - -MR. ALDERMAN: Yes, sir. - - [_The Tribunal adjourned until 1400 hours._] - - - - - _Afternoon Session_ - -MR. ALDERMAN: May it please the Tribunal, I had just referred again to -the report of Gauleiter Rainer to Reich Commissioner Bürckel in July -1939, which outlines the further history of the Party and the leadership -problem following the retirement of Reinthaler. - -In referring to the situation in 1935, he mentioned some of the contacts -with the Reich Government, that is, the German Government, in the -following terms. I quote from Page 4 of the English text of that report, -and I believe from Page 4 of the German text of the Rainer report, which -is 812-PS, that is Exhibit USA-61: - - “In August some further arrests took place, the victims of which - were, apart from the Gauleiter”—Gau leaders—“also Globocnik - and Rainer. Schattenfroh then claimed, because of an instruction - received from the imprisoned Leopold, to have been made deputy - country leader. A group led by engineer Raffelsberger had at - this time also established connection with departments of the - Alt-Reich (Ministry of Propaganda, German racial agency, _et - cetera_), and made an attempt to formulate a political motto in - the form of a program for the fighting movement of Austria.” - -And, again, the Rainer report sets forth the situation a little later in -1936. I quote from Page 6 of the English text, and I think Page 5 of the -German text: - - “The principles of the construction were: - - “The organization is the bearer of the illegal fight and the - trustee of the idea to create a secret organization, in a simple - manner and without compromise, according to the principle of - organizing an elite to be available to the illegal Land Party - Council upon any emergency. Besides this, all political - opportunities should be taken and all legal people and legal - chances should be used without revealing any ties with the - illegal organization. Therefore, cooperation between the illegal - Party organization and the legal political aides was anchored at - the top of the Party leadership. All connections with the Party - in Germany were kept secret in accordance with the orders of the - Führer. These said that the German State should officially be - omitted from the creation of an Austrian NSDAP and that - auxiliary centers for propaganda, press, refugees, welfare, _et - cetera_, should be established in the foreign countries - bordering Austria. - - “Hinterleitner already contacted the lawyer Seyss-Inquart, who - had connection with Dr. Waechter which originated from - Seyss-Inquart’s support of the July uprising. On the other side, - Seyss-Inquart had a good position in the legal field and - especially well-established relations with Christian Social - politicians. Dr. Seyss-Inquart came from the ranks of the - Styrian Heimatschutz”—home defense—“and became a Party member - when the entire Styrian Heimatschutz was incorporated into the - NSDAP. Another personality who had a good position in the legal - field was Colonel Glaise-Horstenau who had contacts with both - sides. The agreement of 11 July 1936 was strongly influenced by - the activities of these two persons of whom Glaise-Horstenau was - designed as trustee to the Führer.” - -The Rainer report thus discloses the dual tactics of the Austrian Nazis -during this period of keeping quiet and awaiting developments. They were -maintaining their secret contacts with Reich officials, and using native -personalities such as Glaise-Horstenau and Seyss-Inquart. The Nazis made -good use of such figures, who were more discreet in their activities and -could be referred to as nationalists. They presented, supported, and -obtained consideration of demands which could not be negotiated by other -Nazis like Captain Leopold. - -Seyss-Inquart did not hold any public office until January 1937, when he -was made Counsellor of State. But Rainer, describing him as a -trustworthy member of the Party through the ranks of this Styrian -Heimatschutz, points him out as one who strongly influenced the -agreement of July 11, 1936. The strategic importance of that agreement -will be considered a little later. Rainer’s report, as I have said -before, was hardly likely to over emphasize the significance of -Seyss-Inquart’s contribution. - -That the Nazis, but not the Austrian Government, did well to trust -Seyss-Inquart is indicated by the next document. I propose to offer in -evidence Document 2219-PS as Exhibit USA-62. This is a letter dated 14 -July 1939, addressed to Field Marshal Göring. The document is a typed -carbon of the letter. It ends with the “Heil Hitler” termination, and it -is not signed, but we think it was undoubtedly written by Defendant -Seyss-Inquart. It was the carbon copy found among Seyss-Inquart’s -personal files, and such carbon copies kept by authors of letters -usually are not signed. On the first page of the letter there appears a -note in ink, not indicated in the partial English translation, reading, -“Air Mail, 15 July, 1515 hours, Berlin, brought to Göring’s office.” The -main text of the letter consists of a plea for intercession on behalf of -one Mühlmann, whose name we shall meet later, and who, unfortunately, -got into Bürckel’s bad graces. I shall quote the extract part of the -document which has been translated into English, and which starts, I -believe, on Page 7 of the German text: - - “At present in Vienna, 14 July 1939; - - “To the General Field Marshal - - “Sir: - - “If I may add something about myself, it is the following: I - know that I am not of an active fighting nature, unless final - decisions are at stake. At this time of pronounced - activism”—Aktivismus—“this will certainly be regarded as a - fault of my personality. Yet I know that I cling with - unconquerable tenacity to the goal in which I believe, that is - Greater Germany”—Grossdeutschland—“and the Führer. And if some - people are already tired out from the struggle and some have - been killed in the fight, I am still around somewhere and ready - to go into action. This, after all, was also the development - until the year 1938. Until July 1934, I conducted myself as a - regular member of the Party. And if I had quietly, in whatever - form, paid my membership dues (the first one, according to a - receipt, I paid in December 1931) I probably would have been an - undisputed, comparatively old fighter and Party member of - Austria, but I would not have done any more for the union. I - told myself in July 1934 that we must fight this clerical regime - on its own ground in order to give the Führer a chance to use - whatever method he desired.”—I would like to call particular - attention to that sentence.—“I told myself that this Austria - was worth a mass. I have stuck to this attitude with an iron - determination because I and my friends had to fight against the - whole political church, the Freemasonry, the Jewry, in short, - against everything in Austria. The slightest weakness which we - might have displayed would undoubtedly have led to our political - annihilation; it would have deprived the Führer of the means and - tools to carry out his ingenious political solution for Austria, - as became evident in the days of March 1938. I have been fully - conscious of the fact that I am following a path which is not - comprehensible to the masses and also not to my Party comrades. - I followed it calmly and would without hesitation follow it - again, because I am satisfied that at one point I could serve - the Führer as a tool in his work, even though my former attitude - even now gives occasion to very worthy and honorable Party - comrades to doubt my trustworthiness. I have never paid - attention to such things because I am satisfied with the opinion - which the Führer and the men close to him have of me.” - -That letter was written to one of the men close to him—Field Marshal -Göring. I think that suffices to demonstrate Seyss-Inquart as one whose -loyalty to Hitler, a foreign dictator, and to the aims of the Nazi -conspiracy, led him to fight for the Anschluss with all the means at his -disposal. - -It is appropriate at this time to offer in evidence a document from the -Defendant Von Papen, and to see how he thought the doctrines of National -Socialism could be used to effect the aim of the Anschluss. I offer -Document 2248-PS as Exhibit USA-63. This document is a letter from Von -Papen to Hitler, dated July 27, 1935. It consists of a report entitled, -“Review and Outlook 1 Year after the Death of Chancellor Dollfuss.” -After reviewing the success that the Austrian Government had had in -establishing Dollfuss as a martyr, and his principles as the patriotic -principles of Austria, Von Papen stated—and I quote the last paragraph -of the letter, beginning on Page 1 (Page 146 of the German text): - - “National Socialism must and will overpower the new Austrian - ideology. If today it is contended in Austria that the NSDAP is - only a centralized Reich German Party and therefore unable to - transfer the spirit of thought of National Socialism to groups - of people of a different political makeup, the answer must - rightly be that the national revolution in Germany could not - have been brought about in a different way. But when the - creation of the people’s community in the Reich will be - completed, National Socialism could, in a much wider sense than - this is possible through the present Party organization—at - least apparently—certainly become the rallying point for all - racially German units beyond the borders. Spiritual progress in - regard to Austria cannot be achieved today with any centralized - tendency. If this recognition would once and for all be stated - clearly from within the Reich, then it would easily become - possible to effect a break-through into the front of the New - Austria. A Nuremberg Party Day designated as ‘The German Day’ as - in old times and the proclamation of a National Socialistic - peoples’ front would be a stirring event for all beyond the - borders of the Reich. Such attacks would win us also the - particularistic Austrian circles, whose spokesman, the - legitimistic Count Dubsky, wrote in his pamphlet about the - Anschluss: ‘The Third Reich will be with Austria, or it will not - be at all. National Socialism must win it or perish if it is - unable to solve this task.’” - -We have other reports from Von Papen to Hitler which I shall offer in -evidence presently, showing that he maintained covert contact with the -National Socialist groups in Austria. It is certainly interesting that -from the very start of his mission, Defendant Von Papen was thinking of -ways and means of using the principle of National Socialism for national -Germans outside the border of Germany. Papen was working for the -Anschluss, although he preferred to use the principles of National -Socialism rather than rely on the Party organization as a necessary -means of establishing those principles in the German Reich. - -Next we have some assurance and reassurance to Austria. The German -Government did no more than keep up a pretense of non-interference with -Austrian groups. It employed the psychological inducement of providing -assurances that it had no designs on Austrian independence. If Austria -could find hope for the execution of those assurances, she could find -her way clear to the granting of concessions and obtain relief from the -economic and internal pressure. - -I offer Document 2247-PS in evidence as Exhibit USA-64. It is a letter -from Von Papen, while in Berlin, to Hitler, dated May 17, 1935. - -Von Papen’s letter indicated to Hitler that a forthright credible -statement by Germany reassuring Austria, would be most useful for German -diplomatic purposes and for the improvement of relationship between -Austria and German groups in Austria. - -He had a scheme for pitting Schuschnigg and his Christian Social forces -against Starhemberg, the Vice Chancellor of Austria, who was backed by -Mussolini. Von Papen hoped to persuade Schuschnigg to ally his forces -with the NSDAP in order to emerge victorious over Starhemberg. Von Papen -indicates that he obtained this idea from Captain Leopold, leader of the -illegal National Socialists in Austria. - -I quote from his letter, starting at the second paragraph of the second -page. This is Von Papen writing to “Mein Führer” Hitler: - - “I suggest that we take an active part in this game. The - fundamental idea should be to pit Schuschnigg and his Christian - Social forces, who are opposed to a home-front dictatorship, - against Starhemberg. The possibility of thwarting the measures - arranged between Mussolini and Starhemberg should be afforded to - him in such a way that he would submit the offer to the - Government of a definitive German-Austrian compromise of - interests. According to the convincing opinion of the leader of - the NSDAP in Austria, Captain Leopold, the totalitarian - principle of the NSDAP in Austria must be replaced in the - beginning by a combination of that part of the Christian Social - elements which favors the Greater Germany idea and the NSDAP. If - Germany recognizes the national independence of Austria and - guarantees full freedom to the Austrian national opposition, - then, as a result of such a compromise, the Austrian Government - would be formed in the beginning by a coalition of these - forces. . . . A further consequence of this step would be the - possibility of the participation of Germany in the Danube Pact, - which would take the sting out of its acuteness due to the - settlement of relations between Germany and Austria. Such a - measure would have a most beneficial influence on the European - situation, and especially on our relationship with England. - - “One may object that Schuschnigg will hardly be determined to - follow such a pattern, that he will rather in all probability - immediately communicate our offer to our opponents. - - “Of course, one should first of all explore the possibility of - setting Schuschnigg against Starhemberg through the use of - go-betweens. The possibility exists. If Herr Schuschnigg finally - says ‘no’ and makes our offer known in Rome, then the situation - would not be any worse, but on the contrary, the efforts of the - Reich Government to make peace with Austria would be revealed, - without prejudice to other interests. Therefore, even in the - case of refusal this last attempt would be an asset. I consider - it completely possible, that in view of the farspread dislike in - the Alpine countries of the pro-Italian course, and in view of - the sharp tensions between the Federal - Government”—Bundesregierung—“Herr Schuschnigg will grasp this - last straw, always under the supposition that the offer could - not be interpreted as a trap by the opponents, but that it bears - all the marks of an actually honest compromise with Austria. - - “Assuming success of this step we would again establish our - active intervention in central European politics, which, as - opposed to the French, Czech, and Russian political maneuvers, - would be a tremendous success, both morally and practically. - - “Since there are 2 weeks left to accomplish very much work in - the way of explorations and conferences, an immediate decision - is necessary. - - “The Reich Army Minister”—Reichswehrminister—“shares the - opinion presented above, and the Reich Foreign - Minister”—Reichsaussenminister—“wants to discuss it with you, - my Führer.”—Signed—“Papen.” - -In other words, Von Papen wanted a strong assurance and a credible -assurance of the preservation of Austria’s independence. As he put it, -Germany had nothing to lose with what it could always call a mere effort -at peace, and she might be able to convince Schuschnigg to establish an -Austrian coalition government with the NSDAP. If she did this, she would -vastly strengthen her position in Europe. Finally Von Papen urged haste. - -Exactly 4 days later, in a Reichstag address, Hitler responded to Von -Papen’s suggestion, and asserted: - - “Germany neither intends nor wishes, to interfere in the - internal affairs of Austria, to annex Austria or to conclude an - Anschluss.” - -The British will present a document covering that speech. I merely -wanted to use one sentence at this point. It is a sentence quite well -known to history. - -It is appropriate to take notice of this assurance at this point, and to -note that for a complexity of reasons Von Papen suggested, and Hitler -announced, a policy completely at variance with their intentions, which -had been, and continued to be, to interfere in Austria’s internal -affairs and to conclude an Anschluss. - -There was then a temporary continuance of a quiet pressure policy. - -On May 1, 1936, Hitler blandly in a public speech branded as a lie any -statement that “tomorrow or the day after” Germany would fall upon -Austria. I invite the Court’s attention to the version of the speech -appearing in the _Völkischer Beobachter_, SD—that is South Germany—2 -to 3 May 1936, Page 2, and translated in our Document 2367-PS. - -Without offering that document, I ask the Court to take judicial notice -of that statement in that well-known speech. - -If Hitler meant what he said, it was only in the most literal and -misleading sense, that is, that he would not actually fall upon Austria -“tomorrow or the day after tomorrow.” For the conspirators well knew -that the successful execution of their purpose required for a little -while longer the quiet policy they had been pursuing in Austria. - -I now offer in evidence our Document L-150, “Memorandum of Conversation -between Ambassador Bullitt and the Defendant Von Neurath, on 18 May -1936” as Exhibit USA-65. This document unfortunately again appears in -your document books in German. Due to an error, it has not been -mimeographed in English. German counsel have the German copies. - -I shall read from it and at the same time, hand to the interpreter -reading the German, a marked copy of a German translation. I might read -one sentence from the first paragraph: - - “I called on Von Neurath, Minister of Foreign Affairs, on May 18 - and had a long talk on the general European situation. - - “Von Neurath said that it was the policy of the German - Government to do nothing active in foreign affairs until the - Rhineland had been ‘digested.’ - - “He explained that he meant until the German fortifications had - been constructed on the French and Belgian frontiers, the German - Government would do everything possible to prevent, rather than - encourage, an outbreak by the Nazis in Austria and would pursue - a quiet line with regard to Czechoslovakia. ‘As soon as our - fortifications are constructed and the countries of Central - Europe realize that France cannot enter German territory, all - these countries will begin to feel very differently about their - foreign policies and a new constellation will develop.’” - -I skip then two paragraphs. - - “Von Neurath then stated that no understanding had been reached - between Germany and Italy, and admitted that the demonstrations - of friendship between Germany and Italy were mere demonstrations - without basis in reality. He went on to say that at the present - time he could see no way to reconcile the conflicting interests - of Germany and Italy in Austria. He said that there were three - chief reasons why the German Government was urging the Austrian - Nazis to remain quiet at the present time: - - “The first was that Mussolini had today the greater part of his - army mobilized on the Austrian border, ready to strike, and that - he would certainly strike if he should have a good excuse. - - “The second reason for urging Austrian Nazis to remain quiet for - the present was that the Nazi movement was growing stronger - daily in Austria. The youth of Austria was turning more and more - towards the Nazis, and the dominance of the Nazi Party in - Austria was inevitable and only a question of time.” - -The third reason was that until the German fortifications had been -constructed on the French border, an involvement of Germany in war with -Italy might lead to a French attack on Germany. - -But if Germany was not yet ready for open conflict in Austria, her -diplomatic position was vastly improved over 1934, a fact which -influenced Austria’s willingness to make concessions to Germany and to -come to terms. - -I quote again from the Messersmith affidavit, Page 11 of the English -text. That is Document 1760-PS. - - “Developments in the fall of 1935 and the spring of 1936 gave - Germany an opportunity to take more positive steps in the - direction of the nazification of Austria. Italy, which had given - Austria assurance of support of the most definite character - against external German aggression and on one occasion, by - mobilizing her forces, had undoubtedly stopped German aggressive - action which had been planned against Austria, embarked on her - Abyssinian adventure. This and the re-occupation of the - Rhineland in 1936 completely upset the balance in Europe. It is - quite obvious that after Italy had launched her Abyssinian - adventure, she was no longer in any position to counter German - aggressive moves against Austria.” - -This weakening of Austria helped to pave the way for the pact of July -11, 1936. On July 11, 1936 the Governments of Austria and Germany -concluded an accord. That will be offered in evidence also by the -British Delegation. - -I merely ask at this point, that the Tribunal take judicial notice of -the fact that such an accord was entered into. The formal part of the -agreement of July 11, 1936 will also be proved by our British -colleagues. For convenient reference, it will be found in the Document -which the British will offer, TC-22, and the substance of it is also -contained on Pages 11 and 12 of Mr. Messersmith’s affidavit, 1760-PS. - -Upon the basis of this fight alone, the agreement looked like a great -triumph for Austria. It contains a confusing provision to the effect -that Austria in her policy, especially with regard to Germany, would -regard herself as a German state, but the other two provisions clearly -state that Germany recognizes the full sovereignty of Austria and -regards the inner political order of Austria, including the question of -Austria and National Socialism, as an internal concern of Austria upon -which Germany will exercise neither direct nor indirect influence. But -there was much more substance to the day’s events than appears in the -text of the accord. I refer to Mr. Messersmith’s summary as set forth on -Page 12 of his affidavit, 1760-PS, as follows: - - “Even more important than the terms of the agreement published - in the official communiqué, was the contemporaneous informal - understanding, the most important provisions of which were that - Austria would: - - “(1) Appoint a number of individuals enjoying the Chancellor’s - confidence but friendly to Germany, to positions in the Cabinet; - (2) with the devised means to give the national opposition a - role in the political life of Austria within the framework of - the Patriotic Front; and (3) with amnesty for all Nazis, save - those convicted of the most serious offenses.” - -This amnesty was duly announced by the Austrian Government and thousands -of Nazis were released, and the first penetration of Deutsch-National -into the Austrian Government was accomplished by the appointment of Dr. -Guido Schmidt as Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and Dr. Edmund -Glaise-Horstenau as Minister without portfolio. - -I now offer in evidence Document 2994-PS, which is an affidavit by Kurt -von Schuschnigg, Foreign Chancellor of Austria, executed at Nuremberg, -Germany, on 19 November 1945. I offer this as Exhibit USA-66. The -defendants have received German translations of that evidence. - -DR. LATERNSER: In the name of the accused, Seyss-Inquart, I wish to -protest against the presentation of written evidence by the witness Von -Schuschnigg for the following reasons: Today, when a resolution was -announced, with respect to the use to be made of the written evidence of -Mr. Messersmith, the Court was of the opinion that in a case of very -great importance it might possibly take a different view of the matter. -With respect to the Austrian conflict this is the case, since -Schuschnigg is the most important witness, the witness who was affected -at the time in his position as Federal Chancellor. In the case of such -an important witness, the principle of direct evidence must be adhered -to, in order that the Court be in a position to ascertain the actual -truth in this case. The accused and his defense counsel would feel -prejudiced in his rights granted by the Charter, should direct evidence -be circumvented. I must, therefore, uphold my viewpoint since it can be -assumed that the witness Von Schuschnigg will be able to confirm certain -facts which are in favor of the accused Seyss-Inquart. - -I therefore make the motion to the Court that the written evidence of -the witness Von Schuschnigg be not admitted. - -THE PRESIDENT: If you have finished, the Tribunal will hear Mr. -Alderman. - -MR. ALDERMAN: May it please the Tribunal, at this point I am simply -proposing to offer this affidavit for the purpose of showing the terms -of the secret understanding between the German and Austrian Governments -in connection with this accord. It is not for any purpose to incriminate -the Defendant Seyss-Inquart that it is being offered at this point. - -DR. LATERNSER: May I add to my motion that the witness, Von Schuschnigg, -on 19 November 1945, was questioned in Nuremberg, and that if an -interrogation on 19 November was possible, then a short time later—that -is now—it ought to be possible to call him before the Court, especially -as the interrogation before this court is of special importance. - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will recess now to consider this question. - - [_A recess was taken._] - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal has considered the objection to the -affidavit of Von Schuschnigg and upholds the objection. - -If the Prosecution desires to call Von Schuschnigg as a witness, it can -apply to do so. Equally if the Defense wishes to call Von Schuschnigg as -a witness, it can apply to do so. In the event Von Schuschnigg is not -able to be produced, the question of affidavit-evidence by Von -Schuschnigg being given will be reconsidered. - -MR. ALDERMAN: May it please the Tribunal, in view of the strategy and -tactics of the Nazis’ concessions as indicated in the portion of the -Messersmith affidavit that I read, substantial concessions were made by -Austria to obtain Germany’s diplomatic formal assurance of Austrian -independence and non-intervention in Austrian internal affairs. - -The release of imprisoned Nazis presented potential police problems, and -as Mr. Messersmith pointed out in a 1934 dispatch to the United States -State Department quoted on Pages 12 to 13 of his affidavit: - - “Any prospect that the National Socialists might come to power - would make it more difficult to obtain effective police and - judicial action against the Nazis for fear of reprisals by the - future Nazi Government against those taking action against Nazis - even in the line of duty. The preservation of internal peace in - Austria was less dependent upon Germany’s living up to her - obligations under the accord.” - -Next, Germany’s continuing program of weakening the Austrian Government. -In the pact of 11 July 1936 Germany agreed not to influence directly or -indirectly the internal affairs of Austria, including the matter of -Austrian National Socialism. - -On 16 July 1936, just 5 days later, Hitler violated that provision. I -quote from Document 812-PS, which is Exhibit USA-61, the reports of -Gauleiter Rainer to Commissioner Bürckel, all of which were forwarded to -the Defendant Seyss-Inquart—Page 6 of the English, and I believe, also -Page 6 of the German version. - - “At that time the Führer wished to see the leaders of the Party - in Austria in order to tell them his opinion on what Austrian - National Socialists should do. Meanwhile Hinterleitner was - arrested, and Dr. Rainer became his successor and leader of the - Austrian Party. On 16 July 1936 Doctor Rainer and Globocnik - visited the Führer at the Obersalzberg where they received a - clear explanation of the situation and the wishes of the Führer. - On 17 July 1936 all illegal Gauleiter met in Anif near Salzburg, - where they received a complete report from Rainer on the - statement of the Führer and his political instructions for - carrying out the fight. At this same conference the Gauleiter - received organizational instructions from Globocnik and - Hiedler.” - -Then skipping a paragraph I quote further from this report—in the -English that paragraph which I am skipping is omitted, so I am skipping -a paragraph in the German version: - - “Upon the proposal of Globocnik, the Führer named Lieutenant - General”—Gruppenführer—“Keppler as chief of the mixed - commission which was appointed, in accordance with the State - Treaty of 11 July 1936, to supervise the correct execution of - the agreement. At the same time Keppler was given full authority - by the Führer for the Party in Austria. After Keppler was - unsuccessful in his efforts to cooperate with Leopold, he worked - together with Doctor Rainer, Globocnik, Reinthaler as leader of - the peasants, Kaltenbrunner”—that is the Defendant - Kaltenbrunner in this case—“as leader of the SS, and Doctor - Jury as deputy leader of the Austrian Party, as well as with - Glaise-Horstenau and Seyss-Inquart.” - -A new strategy was developed for the Austrian Nazis. Mr. Messersmith -describes it briefly, and I quote from Page 13 of his affidavit, -1760-PS: - - “The sequel of the agreement was the only one which could have - been expected in view of all the facts and previous recorded - happenings. Active Nazi operations in Austria were resumed under - the leadership of a certain Captain Leopold who, as was known - definitely, was in frequent touch with Hitler. The Nazi program - was now to form an organization through which the Nazis could - carry on their operations openly and with legal sanction in - Austria. There were formed in Austria several organizations - which had a legal basis, but which were simply a device by which - the Nazis in Austria could organize and later seek inclusion as - a unit in the Patriotic Front. The most important of these was - the Union of the East Mark,”—Ostmärkische Verein—“the sponsor - of which was the Minister of the Interior Glaise-Horstenau. - Through the influence of Glaise-Horstenau and pro-Nazi - Neustädter-Stürmer, this organization was declared legal by the - courts. I made specific mention of the foregoing because it - shows the degree to which the situation in Austria had - disintegrated as a result of the underground and open Nazi - activities directed from Germany.” - -At this point I offer in evidence Document 2246-PS as Exhibit USA-67, a -captured German document which is a report from Von Papen to Hitler -dated September 1, 1936. This document is most interesting because it -indicates Von Papen’s strategy after July 11, 1936 for destroying -Austria’s independence. Von Papen had taken a substantial step forward -with the agreement of July 11. It should be noted incidentally, that -after that agreement he was promoted from Minister to Ambassador. Now -his tactics were developed in the following terms—I quote the last -three paragraphs of his letter of September 1, 1936 to the Führer and -Reich Chancellor. Those three paragraphs are all joined as one paragraph -in the English text: - - “The progress of normalizing relations with Germany at the - present time is obstructed by the continued persistence of the - Ministry of Security, occupied by the old anti National - Socialistic officials. Changes in personnel are therefore of - utmost importance. But they are definitely not to be expected - prior to the conference on the abolishing of the control of - finances at Geneva. The Chancellor of the League has informed - Minister Von Glaise-Horstenau of his intention to offer him the - portfolio of the Ministry of the Interior. As a guiding - principle”—Marschroute (a German word meaning the route of - march)—“I recommend on the tactical side, continued, patient, - psychological treatment, with slowly intensified pressure - directed at changing the regime. The proposed conference on - economic relations, taking place at the end of October, will be - a very useful tool for the realization of some of our projects. - In discussion with Government officials as well as with leaders - of the illegal Party (Leopold and Schattenfroh) who conform - completely with the agreement of 11 July I am trying to direct - the next developments in such a manner to aim at corporative - representation of the movement in the Fatherland Front, but - nevertheless refraining from putting National Socialists in - important positions for the time being. However, such positions - are to be occupied only by personalities having the support and - the confidence of the movement. I have a willing collaborator in - this respect in Minister Glaise-Horstenau.”—Signature—“Papen.” - -To recapitulate, this report by Von Papen to Hitler discloses the -following plan: - -(a) Obtaining a change in personnel in the Austrian Ministry of Security -in due course; - -(b) Obtaining corporative representation of the Nazi movement in the -Fatherland Front; - -(c) Not putting avowed National Socialists in important positions yet, -but using nationalist personalities; - -(d) Using economic pressure and patient psychological treatment with -slowly intensified pressure directed at changing the regime. - -My next subject is Germany’s diplomatic preparations for the conquest of -Austria. - -The program of the Nazi conspiracy with respect to Austria consisted of -weakening that country externally and internally by removing its support -from without, as well as by penetrating within. This program was of the -utmost significance, especially since, as the Court will remember, the -events of 25 July 1934 inside Austria were overshadowed in the news of -the day by the fact that Mussolini had brought his troops to the Brenner -Pass and posed there as a strong protector of his northern neighbor, -Austria. - -Accordingly, interference in the affairs of Austria and steady increase -in the pressure needed to acquire control over that country, required -removal of the possibility that Italy or any other country would come to -its aid. But the foreign policy program of the conspiracy for the -weakening and isolation of Austria was integrated with their foreign -policy program in Europe generally. - -I should like, therefore, at this juncture, to digress for a moment from -the presentation of evidence bearing on Austria alone and to consider -with the Tribunal the general foreign policy program of the Nazis. It is -not my intention to examine this subject in any detail. Historians and -scholars exhausting the archives will have many years of probing all the -details and ramifications of European diplomacy during this fateful -decade. - -It is instead my purpose to mention very briefly the highlights of the -Nazis’ diplomatic preparation for war. - -In this connection I should like to offer to the Tribunal Document -Number 2385-PS, a second affidavit of George S. Messersmith executed on -30 August 1945 at Mexico City. This has been made available to the -defendants in German, as well as in English. - -This is a different affidavit from Document Number 1760-PS which was -executed August 28. This second affidavit, which I offer as Exhibit -USA-68, consists of a presentation of the diplomatic portion of the -program of the Nazi Party. To a considerable extent it merely states -facts of common knowledge, facts that many people who are generally well -informed already know. It also gives us facts which are common knowledge -in the circle of diplomats or of students of foreign affairs. It -consists of some 11 mimeographed pages, single-spaced. I read first from -the third paragraph in the affidavit: - - “As early as 1933, while I served in Germany, the German and - Nazi contacts which I had in the highest and secondary - categories openly acknowledged Germany’s ambitions to dominate - southeastern Europe from Czechoslovakia down to Turkey. As they - freely stated, the objective was territorial expansion in the - case of Austria and Czechoslovakia. The professed objectives in - the earlier stages of the Nazi regime, in the remainder of - southeastern Europe, were political and economic control and - they did not, at that time, speak so definitely of actual - absorption and destruction of sovereignty. Their ambitions, - however, were not limited to southeastern Europe. From the very - beginnings of 1933, and even before the Nazis came into power, - important Nazis speaking of the Ukraine freely said that ‘it - must be our granary’ and that ‘even with southeastern Europe - under our control, Germany needs and must have the greater part - of the Ukraine in order to be able to feed the people of greater - Germany.’ After I left Germany in the middle of 1934 for my post - in Austria, I continued to receive information as to the German - designs in southeastern Europe. In a conversation with Von Papen - shortly after his appointment as German Minister to Austria in - 1934, Von Papen frankly stated to me that ‘southeastern Europe - to Turkey is Germany’s hinterland and I have been designated to - carry through the task of bringing it within the fold. Austria - is first on the program.’ - - “As I learned through my diplomatic colleagues, Von Papen in - Vienna and his colleague Von Mackensen in Budapest were openly - propagating the idea of the dismemberment and final absorption - of Czechoslovakia as early as 1935.” - -Then, skipping a short paragraph, I resume: - - “Immediately after the Nazis came into power, they started a - vast rearmament program. This was one of the primary immediate - objectives of the Nazi regime. As a matter of fact the two - immediate objectives of the Nazi regime when it came into power, - had to be and were, according to their own statements frequently - made to me: First, to bring about the complete and absolute - establishment of their power over Germany and the German people, - so that they would become in every respect willing and capable - instruments of the regime to carry through its ends; Second, the - establishment of a tremendous armed power within Germany in - order that the political and economic program in southeastern - Europe and in Europe could be carried through by force if - necessary, but probably by a threat of force. It was - characteristic that in carrying through this second aim, they - emphasized from the very outset the building of an overpowering - air force. Göring and Milch often said to me or in my presence - that the Nazis had decided to concentrate on air power as the - weapon of terror most likely to give Germany a dominant position - and the weapon which could be developed the most rapidly and in - the shortest time.” - -Skipping to the end of that paragraph, and resuming at the next: - - “At the same time that this rearmament was in progress, the Nazi - regime took all possible measures to prepare the German people - for war in the psychological sense. Throughout Germany, for - example, one saw everywhere German youth of all ages engaged in - military exercises, drilling, field maneuvers, practicing the - throwing of hand grenades, et cetera. In this connection I wrote - in an official communication in November 1933, from Berlin as - follows: - - “‘ . . . Everything that is being done in the country today has - for its object to make the people believe that Germany is being - threatened vitally in every aspect of its life by outside - influences and by other countries. Everything is being done to - use this feeling to stimulate military training and exercises, - and innumerable measures are being taken to develop the German - people into a hardy, sturdy race which will be able to meet all - comers. The military spirit is constantly growing. It cannot be - otherwise. The leaders of Germany today have no desire for peace - unless it is a peace which the world makes at the expense of - complete compliance with German desires and ambitions. Hitler - and his associates really and sincerely want peace for the - moment, but only to have a chance to get ready to use force if - it is found finally essential. They are preparing their way so - carefully that there is not in my mind any question but that the - German people will be with them when they want to use force and - when they feel that they have the necessary means to carry - through their objects. . . .’” - -One further sentence following that I quote: - - “Military preparation and psychological preparation were coupled - with diplomatic preparation designed so to disunite and isolate - their intended victims as to render them defenseless against - German aggression.” - -In 1933 the difficulties facing Germany in the political and diplomatic -field loomed large. France was the dominant military power on the -continent. She had a system of mutual assistance in the West and in the -East. - - “The Locarno Pact of 1928, supplemented by the Franco-Belgian - Alliance, guaranteed the territorial _status quo_ in the West. - Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, and Romania were allied in the - Little Entente and each, in turn, was united with France by - mutual assistance pacts. Since 1922 France and Poland had - likewise been allied against external aggression. Italy had made - plain her special interest in Austrian independence.” - -Nazi Germany launched a vigorous diplomatic campaign to break up the -existing alliances and understandings, to create divisions among the -members of the Little Entente and the other eastern European powers. - -Specifically, Nazi Germany countered these alliances with promises of -economic gain for cooperating with Germany. To some of these countries -she offered extravagant promises of territorial and economic rewards. -She offered Carinthia in Austria to Yugoslavia. She offered part of -Czechoslovakia to Hungary and part to Poland. She offered Yugoslav -territory to Hungary at the same time that she was offering land in -Hungary to Yugoslavia. - -As Mr. Messersmith states in his affidavit—that is 2385-PS, on Page 5: - - “Austria and Czechoslovakia were the first on the German program - of aggression. As early as 1934, Germany began to woo neighbors - of these countries with the promises of a share in the loot. To - Yugoslavia in particular they offered Carinthia. Concerning the - Yugoslav reaction, I reported at the time: - - “‘The major factor in the internal situation in the last week - has been the increase in tension with respect to the Austrian - Nazi refugees in Yugoslavia. . . . There is very little doubt - but that Göring, when he made his trip to various capitals in - southeastern Europe about 6 months ago, told the Yugoslavs that - they would get a part of Carinthia when a National Socialist - Government came into power in Austria. . . . The Nazi seed sown - in Yugoslavia had been sufficient to cause trouble and there are - undoubtedly a good many people there who look with a great deal - of benevolence on those Nazi refugees who went to Yugoslavia in - the days following July 25.’ - - “Germany made like promises of territorial gains to Hungary and - to Poland in order to gain their cooperation or at least their - acquiescence in the proposed dismemberment of Czechoslovakia. As - I learned from my diplomatic colleagues in Vienna, Von Papen and - Von Mackensen in Vienna and in Budapest in 1935 were spreading - the idea of division of Czechoslovakia, in which division - Germany was to get Bohemia, Hungary to get Slovakia, and Poland - the rest. This did not deceive any of these countries for they - knew that the intention of Nazi Germany was to take all. - - “The Nazi German Government did not hesitate to make - inconsistent promises when it suited its immediate objective. I - recall the Yugoslav Minister in Vienna saying to me in 1934 or - 1935 that Germany had made promises to Hungary of Yugoslav - territory while at the same time promising to Yugoslavs portions - of Hungarian territory. The Hungarian Minister in Vienna later - gave me the same information. - - “I should emphasize here in this statement that the men who made - these promises were not only the ‘dyed in the wool’ Nazis but - more conservative Germans who already had begun willingly to - lend themselves to the Nazi program. In an official dispatch to - the Department of State from Vienna dated October 10, 1935, I - wrote as follows: - - “‘Europe will not get away from the myth that Neurath, Papen, - and Mackensen are not dangerous people and that they are - “diplomats of the old school.” They are in fact servile - instruments of the regime and just because the outside world - looks upon them as harmless, they are able to work more - effectively. They are able to sow discord just because they - propagate the myth that they are not in sympathy with the - regime.’” - -I find that last paragraph very important and worthy of emphasis. In -other words, Nazi Germany was able to promote these divisions and -increase its own aggressive strength by using as its agents in making -these promises men who on outward appearances were merely conservative -diplomats. It is true that the Nazis openly scoffed at any notion of -international obligations, as I shall show in a moment. It is true that -the real trump in Germany’s hand was its rearmament and more than that, -its willingness to go to war. And yet the attitude of the various -countries was not influenced by those considerations alone. - -With all those countries, and I suppose with all persons, we are not -always completely rational, we tend to believe what we want to believe, -and if an apparently substantial and conservative person like the -Defendant Von Neurath, for example, is saying these things, one might be -apt to believe them, or at least to act upon that hypothesis. And it -would be the more impressive if one were also under the impression that -the person involved was not a Nazi and would not stoop to go along with -the designs of the Nazis. - -Germany’s approach toward Great Britain and France was in terms of -limited expansion as the price of peace. They signed a naval limitations -treaty with England and discussed a Locarno air pact. In the case of -both France and England, they limited their statement of intentions and -harped on fears of communism and war. - -In making these various promises, Germany was untroubled by notions of -the sanctity of international obligations. High ranking Nazis, including -Göring, Frick, and Frank, openly stated to Mr. Messersmith that Germany -would observe her international undertakings only so long as it suited -Germany’s interest to do so. - -I quote from the affidavit, Document 2385-PS, Page 4, beginning on the -10th line: - - “High ranking Nazis with whom I had to maintain official - contact, particularly men such as Göring, Goebbels, Ley, Frick, - Frank, Darré, and others, repeatedly scoffed at my position as - to the binding character of treaties and openly stated to me - that Germany would observe her international undertakings only - so long as it suited Germany’s interest to do so. Although these - statements were openly made to me as they were, I am sure, made - to others, these Nazi leaders were not really disclosing any - secret, for on many occasions they expressed the same idea - publicly.” - -France and Italy worked actively in southeastern Europe to counter -Germany’s moves. - -THE PRESIDENT: Would that be a convenient time to adjourn? - -MR. ALDERMAN: Yes, sir. - -THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn until 10 o’clock tomorrow morning. - - [_The Tribunal adjourned until 29 November 1945 at 1000 hours._] - - - - - EIGHTH DAY - Thursday, 29 November 1945 - - - _Morning Session_ - -MR. ALDERMAN: May it please the Tribunal. Before I resume the -consideration of Mr. Messersmith’s second affidavit, Document 2385-PS, -Exhibit USA-68, I should like to consider briefly the status of the -proof before this Tribunal of the matter stated in the first Messersmith -affidavit, introduced by the United States, Document 1760-PS, Exhibit -USA-57. You will recall that Mr. Messersmith in that affidavit made the -following general statements: - -First, that although Nazi Germany stated that she would respect the -independence of Austria, in fact she intended from the very beginning to -conclude an Anschluss, and that Defendant Von Papen was working toward -that end. - -Second, that although Nazi Germany pretended, on the surface, to have -nothing to do with the Austrian Nazis, in fact she kept up contact with -them and gave them support and instruction. - -Third, that while they were getting ready for their eventual use of -force in Austria, if necessary, the Nazis were using quiet infiltrating -tactics to weaken Austria internally, through the use of Christian-front -personalities who were not flagrantly Nazi and could be called what they -referred to as Nationalist Opposition, and through the device of -developing new names for Nazi organizations, so that they could be -brought into the Fatherland Front of Austria corporatively—that is as -an entire group. - -Now let us see briefly what some of our German documents proved, in -support of these general statements in the Messersmith affidavit. The -excerpts I have already read out of the report from Rainer to Bürckel, -enclosed in the letter to Seyss-Inquart, Document 812-PS, Exhibit -USA-61, showed: - -First, that the Austrian Nazi groups kept up contacts with the Reich -although they did it secretly in accordance with instructions from the -Führer. - -Second, that they continued their organization on a secret basis so as -to be ready in what they referred to as an emergency. - -Third, that they used persons like Seyss-Inquart and Glaise-Horstenau, -who had what they called good legal positions, but who could be trusted -by the Nazis; and that 5 days after the Pact of July 11, 1936 between -Germany and Austria, a pact which specifically pledged the German -Government not to interfere either directly or indirectly in the -internal affairs of Austria, including the question of Austrian National -Socialism, the Austrian Nazis met with Hitler at Obersalzberg and -received new instructions; and finally, that Hitler then used Keppler, -whose name we shall again meet in a short while in a significant manner -as his “contact man” with the Austrian Nazis, with full authority to act -for the Führer in Austria and to work with the leaders of the Austrian -Nazis. - -Then we offered Document 2247-PS, Exhibit USA-64, Von Papen’s letter to -Hitler of May 17, 1935 that showed that Von Papen had been in contact -with Captain Leopold and it showed how Von Papen got Hitler to make a -solemn promise of Austria’s independence in order to further Papen’s -internal political gain in Austria. - -Then we offered Document 2248-PS, Exhibit USA-63, Von Papen’s letter of -July 27, 1935, which reviewed the situation 1 year after Dollfuss’ -death, and pointed out how National Socialism could be made the link for -the Anschluss and how National Socialism could overcome the Austrian -ideologies, and in which he identified himself completely with the -National Socialist goal. - -We offered Document 2246-PS, Exhibit USA-67, Von Papen’s letter to -Hitler of September 1, 1936, which showed how Von Papen advised using -both economic and continuing psychological pressure; that he had -conferences with the leaders of the illegal Austrian Party; that he was -trying to direct the next developments in such a way as to get -corporative representation of the Nazi movement in the Fatherland Front, -and that meanwhile he was not ready to urge that avowed National -Socialists be put in prominent positions, but was quite satisfied with -collaborators like Glaise-Horstenau. - -I think that practically all of the statements in Mr. Messersmith’s -affidavits have been fully supported by these documents, German -documents, which we have introduced. Certain parts of the affidavits -cannot be corroborated by documents, in the very nature of things, and I -refer specifically to Mr. Messersmith’s conversation with the Defendant -Von Papen in 1934, which I read to the Tribunal yesterday. But I think -those matters are manifestly just as true and just as clear of the -defendant’s guilt and complicity. - -Yesterday I was reading to the Tribunal selected excerpts from Mr. -Messersmith’s second affidavit, 2385-PS, Exhibit USA-68, relating to the -diplomatic preparations for war. Prior to adjournment, I had read to the -Tribunal excerpts which established the following propositions: - -First, Nazi Germany undertook a vigorous campaign to break up the -diplomatic agreements existing in 1933; first—in the West the Locarno -Pact supplemented by the French-Belgium Agreement; second—in the East -the Little Entente, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, and Poland, and their -respective mutual assistance pacts with France, and the French-Polish -Pact; third—as for Austria, the special concern of Italy for her -independence, that is for Austrian independence. - -In the second place, Nazi Germany countered these alliances with -extravagant and sometimes inconsistent promises of territorial gain to -countries in southeastern Europe, Yugoslavia, Hungary, and Poland. - -In the third place, Mr. Messersmith wrote an official communication to -the State Department, pointing out that persons like Von Neurath and Von -Papen were able to work more effectively in making these promises and in -doing their other work, just because they, and I quote: “propagated the -myth that they are not in sympathy with the regime.” - -In the fourth place, in fact, high-ranking Nazis openly stated that -Germany would honor her international obligations only so long as it -suited her to do so. - -There are two more excerpts which I wish to read from this affidavit: - -France and Italy worked actively in southeastern Europe to counter -German moves, as I said yesterday. France made attempts to promote an -east Locarno pact and to foster an economic accord between Austria and -the other Danubian powers. Italy’s effort was to organize an economic -bloc of Austria, Hungary, and Italy. But Germany foiled these efforts by -redoubling her promises of loot, by continuing her armament, and by -another very significant strategy, that is the Fifth-Column strategy; -that the Nazis stirred up internal dissensions within neighboring -countries to disunite and weaken their intended victims. - -I read now from Page 7 of the English copy of the second Messersmith -affidavit, Document 2385-PS, Exhibit USA-68, the paragraph beginning in -the middle of the page: - - “At the same time that Germany held out such promises of reward - for cooperation in her program, she stirred up internal - dissensions within these countries themselves, and in Austria - and Czechoslovakia in particular, all of which was designed so - to weaken all opposition and strengthen the pro-Nazi and Fascist - groups as to insure peaceful acquiescence in the German program. - Her machinations in Austria I have related in detail, as they - came under my direct observation, in a separate affidavit. In - Czechoslovakia they followed the same tactics with the Sudeten - Germans. I was reliably informed that the Nazi Party spent over - 6,000,000 marks in financing the Henlein Party in the elections - in the spring of 1935 alone. In Yugoslavia she played on the old - differences between the Croats and the Serbs and the fear of the - restoration of the Hapsburg in Austria. It may be remarked here - that this latter was one of the principal instruments, and a - most effective one, which Nazi Germany used, as the fear in - Yugoslavia in particular of a restoration of the Hapsburg was - very real. In Hungary she played upon the agrarian difficulties - and at the same time so openly encouraged the Nazi German - elements in Hungary as to provoke the Government of Hungary to - demand the recall of Von Mackensen in 1936. In Hungary and in - Poland she played on the fear of communism and communist Russia. - In Romania she aggravated the existing anti-Semitism, - emphasizing the important role of the Jews in Romanian industry - and the Jewish ancestry of Lupescu. Germany undoubtedly also - financed the fascist Iron Guard through Codreanou. - - “Such ‘diplomatic’ measures reinforced by Germany’s vast - rearmament program had a considerable effect, particularly in - Yugoslavia, Poland, and Hungary, and sufficient at least to - deter these countries from joining any combination opposed to - German designs, even if not enough to persuade them actively to - ally themselves with Nazi Germany. - - “Important political leaders of Yugoslavia began to become - convinced that the Nazi regime would remain in power and would - gain its ends, and that the course of safety for Yugoslavia was - to play along with Germany.” - -I shall not take the time of the Tribunal to read into evidence the -detailed official dispatches which Mr. Messersmith sent to the American -State Department, showing that Yugoslavia, Hungary, and Poland were -beginning to follow the German line. - -As for Italy, Germany’s initial objective was to sow discord between -Yugoslavia and Italy, by promising Yugoslavia Italian territory, -particularly Trieste. This was to prevent France from reaching agreement -with them and to block an east Locarno pact. On that I quote again from -Document 2385-PS, Exhibit USA-68, the second Messersmith affidavit, in -the middle of Page 21 of the English version: - - “While Italy openly opposed efforts at Anschluss with Austria in - 1934, Italian ambitions in Abyssinia provided Germany with the - opportunity to sow discord between Italy and France and England, - and to win Italy over to acceptance of Germany’s program in - exchange for German support of Italy’s plans in Abyssinia.” - -That, if the Tribunal please, paved the way for the Austro-German -Declaration or Pact of 11 July 1936; and in the fall of 1936 Germany -extended the hand of friendship and common purpose to Italy, in an -alliance which they called the “Rome-Berlin Axis.” This, together with -Germany’s alliance with Japan, put increasing pressure on England and -greatly increased the relative strength of Germany. - -And so by means of careful preparation in the diplomatic field, among -others, the Nazi conspirators had woven a position for themselves, so -that they could seriously consider plans for war and begin to outline -time tables, not binding time tables and not specific ones in terms of -months and days, but still general time tables, in terms of years, which -were the necessary foundation for further aggressive planning, and a -spur to more specific planning. And that time table was developed, as -the Tribunal has already seen, in the conference of 5 November 1937, -contained in our Document Number 386-PS, Exhibit USA-25, the Hossbach -minutes of that conference, which I adverted to in detail on Monday -last. - -In those minutes, we see the crystallization of the plan to wage -aggressive war in Europe, and to seize both Austria and Czechoslovakia, -and in that order. - -In connection with the exposition of the aggression on Austria, I have -shown first the purpose of the Nazi conspiracy, with respect to the -absorption of Austria, and then the steps taken by them in Austria up to -this period, that is, November 1937. - -I have also outlined for the Tribunal the general diplomatic -preparations of the Nazi conspirators, with respect to their program in -Europe generally, and with respect to Austria in particular. - -It may now be profitable to reconsider the minutes of the meeting of 5 -November 1937, in the light of this more-detailed background. It will be -recalled that in that meeting, the Führer insisted that Germany must -have more space in Europe. He concluded that the space required must be -taken by force; and three different possible cases were outlined for -different eventualities but all reaching the conclusion that the problem -would certainly have to be solved before 1943 to 1945. - -Then there was envisaged the nature of a war in the near future, -specifically against Austria and Czechoslovakia. Hitler said that for -the improvement of Germany’s military and political positions, it must -be the first aim of the Nazis, in every case of entanglement by war, to -conquer Czechoslovakia and Austria simultaneously in order to remove any -threat from the flanks in case of a possible advance westward. - -Hitler then considered that the embodiment into Germany of -Czechoslovakia and Austria would constitute the conquest of food for -from 5 to 6 million people, including the assumption that the -comprehensive forced emigration of 1 million people from Austria could -be carried out. And he further pointed out that the annexation of the -two States to Germany, both militarily and politically, would constitute -a considerable relief since they would provide shorter and better -frontiers, would free fighting personnel for other purposes, and would -make possible the reconstitution of large new German armies. - -Insofar as Austria is concerned, those minutes reveal a crystallization -in the policy of the Nazi conspirators. It had always been their aim to -acquire Austria. At the outset a revolutionary Putsch was attempted, but -that failed. The next period was one of surface recognition of the -independence of Austria and the use of devious means to strengthen the -position of Nazis internally in Austria. - -Now, however, it became clear that the need, or the greed, for Austria, -in the light of the larger aggressive purpose of the Nazi conspirators -was sufficiently great to warrant the use of force in order to obtain -Austria with the speed that was designed. In fact, as we shall see -later, the Nazis were actually able to secure Austria, after having -weakened it internally and removed from it the support of other nations, -merely by setting the German military machine into motion and making a -threat of force. - -The German armies were able to cross the border and secure the country -without the necessity of firing a shot. Their careful planning for war -and their readiness to use war as an instrument of political action made -it possible, in the end, for them to pluck this plum without having to -fight a blow for it. - -The German High Command had, of course, previously considered -preparation against Austria. - -I offer in evidence another German document, C-175, as Exhibit USA-69. -It, again, is “top secret”, with the added legend in German: “Chefsache -nur durch Offizier” (matter for the chief only to be delivered through -an officer). - -This was a top-secret directive of 24 June 1937 of the Reichsminister -for War and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, General Von -Blomberg. The importance of this top-secret directive is indicated by -the fact that the carbon copy, received by the Commander-in-Chief of the -Navy, was one of only four copies establishing the directive for a -unified preparation for war of all the Armed Forces. - -This directive from General Von Blomberg states that although the -political situation indicates that Germany need not consider an attack -from any side it also states that Germany does not intend to unleash a -European war. It then states in Part 1, and I quote from Page 2 of the -English text, which, I believe, is Page 4, third paragraph, of the -German text: - - “The intention to unleash a European war is held just as little - by Germany. Nevertheless, the politically fluid world situation, - which does not preclude surprising incidents, demands a - continued preparedness for war by the German Armed Forces: (a) - To counter attacks at any time; (b) To enable the military - exploitation of politically favorable opportunities, should they - occur.” - -The directive then indicates that there will be certain preparations for -war of a general nature. I quote the first two portions of Paragraph 2, -on Page 2 of the English text, and I think Page 5 of the German text: - - “(2) The preparations of a general nature include: - - “(a) The permanent preparedness for mobilization of the German - Armed Forces, even before the completion of rearmament, and full - preparedness for war. - - “(b) The further working on ‘mobilization without public - announcement’ in order to put the Armed Forces in a position to - begin a war suddenly and by surprise, both as regards strength - and time.” - -And the directive finally indicates that there might be special -preparations for war against Austria. I quote from Part 3, (1) Special -Case Otto, Page 4 of the English text, and Page 19 of the German text. -“Case Otto”, as you will repeatedly see, was the standing code name for -aggressive war against Austria. I quote: - - “Armed intervention in Austria in the event of her restoring the - monarchy. - - “The object of this operation will be to compel Austria by armed - force to give up a restoration. - - “Making use of the domestic political divisions of the Austrian - people, the march in will be made in the general direction of - Vienna, and will break any resistance.” - -I should now like to call attention to two conversations, held by United -States Ambassador Bullitt with the Defendants Schacht and Göring, in -November 1937. - -PROFESSOR DR. FRANZ EXNER (Counsel for Defendant Jodl): I should like to -state my objection to the manner in which Document C-175 has been -treated. This document is a study made by the General Staff, which was -conceived to meet many different eventualities of war. It even mentions -the possibility that Germany might have to go to war with Spain, and -might have to carry out a military attack on her. - -Only part of this document was read, the part relating to Austria; and -thus the impression was given that a plan had been made to march against -Austria, whereas it actually says the German Reich had no intention to -attack at that time, but was merely preparing for all eventualities. - -I should like to request that the reading of this document be -supplemented by reading at least the headings of the paragraphs of this -document. If these paragraphs of the document are placed before the -Court, it will be seen that this was not a plan to march against -Austria, but simply a document preparing for all eventualities. - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Exner, your objection does not appear to be to the -admissibility of the document, but to the weight of the document. The -Tribunal has already informed defendants’ counsel that they will have an -opportunity at the appropriate time, when they come to prepare their -defense, to refer to any documents, parts of which have been put in by -the Prosecution, and to read such parts as they think necessary then, -and to make what criticism they think necessary then. - -Your objection is therefore premature, because it does not go to the -admissibility of the document. It simply indicates a wish that more of -it should be read. You will have the opportunity later to read any parts -of the documents which you wish. - -MR. ALDERMAN: I suppose, if the Tribunal please, that the fundamental -basis of the objection just stated by the distinguished counsel, must -have been his theory that Germany never made any plans to invade -Austria, and if so, it would seem to follow that Germany never invaded -Austria, and perhaps history is mistaken. - -I had adverted to two conversations, held by United States Ambassador -Bullitt with the Defendant Schacht and the Defendant Göring, in November -1937. - -For this purpose, I offer in evidence our Document L-151, offered as -Exhibit USA-70. It is a dispatch from Mr. Bullitt, American Ambassador -in Paris, to the American Secretary of State on 23 November 1937. - -Now, again, if the Tribunal please, we are embarrassed because that -document is not in the document book before the members of the Tribunal. -It has been furnished in German translation to the Defense Counsel. - -If the Tribunal will permit, I will read from the original exhibit. On -top is a letter from Ambassador Bullitt to the Secretary of State, -November 23, 1937, stating that he visited Warsaw, stopped in Berlin en -route, where he had conversations with Schacht and Göring, among others. - -On the conversation with Schacht, I read from Page 2 of the report: - - “Schacht said that in his opinion, the best way to begin to deal - with Hitler was not through political discussion but through - economic discussion. Hitler was not in the least interested in - economic matters. He regarded money as filth. It was therefore - possible to enter into negotiations with him in the economic - domain without arousing his emotional antipathy, and it might be - possible through the conversations thus begun to lead him into - arrangements in the political and military field, in which he - was intensely interested. Hitler was determined to have Austria - eventually attached to Germany, and to obtain at least autonomy - for the Germans of Bohemia. At the present moment he was not - vitally concerned about the Polish Corridor and in his”—that is - Schacht’s—“opinion, it might be possible to maintain the - Corridor, provided Danzig were permitted to join East Prussia, - and provided some sort of a bridge could be built across the - Corridor, uniting Danzig and East Prussia with Germany.” - -And for the Defendant Göring’s statements to Ambassador Bullitt, I read -from the second memorandum, “Memorandum of Conversation between -Ambassador Bullitt and General Hermann Göring,” on Page 2 of that -document, following a part of a sentence which is underlined, just below -the middle of the page: - - “The sole source of friction between Germany and France was the - refusal of France to permit Germany to achieve certain vital - national necessities. - - “If France, instead of accepting collaboration with Germany, - should continue to follow a policy of building up alliances in - Eastern Europe to prevent Germany from the achievement of her - legitimate aims, it was obvious that there would be conflict - between France and Germany. - - “I asked Göring what aims especially he had in mind. He replied: - - “‘We are determined to join to the German Reich all Germans who - are contiguous to the Reich and are divided from the great body - of the German race merely by the artificial barriers imposed by - the Treaty of Versailles.’ - - “I asked Göring if he meant that Germany was absolutely - determined to annex Austria to the Reich. He replied that this - was an absolute determination of the German Government. The - German Government, at the present time, was not pressing this - matter because of certain momentary political considerations, - especially in their relations with Italy. But Germany would - tolerate no solution of the Austrian question other than the - consolidation of Austria in the German Reich. - - “He then added a statement which went further than any I have - heard on this subject. He said: - - “‘There are schemes being pushed now for a union of Austria, - Hungary, and Czechoslovakia, either with or without a Hapsburg - at the head of the union. Such a solution is absolutely - unacceptable to us, and for us the conclusion of such an - agreement would be an immediate _casus belli_.’ Göring used the - Latin expression _casus belli_; it is not a translation from the - German, in which that conversation was carried on. - - “I asked Göring if the German Government was as decided in its - views with regard to the Germans in Bohemia, as it was with - regard to Austria. He replied that there could be only one final - solution of this question. The Sudeten Germans must enter the - German Reich as all other Germans who lived contiguous to the - Reich.” - -These, if the Tribunal please, are official reports made by the -accredited representative of the United States in the regular course of -business. They carry with them the guarantee of truthfulness of a report -made by a responsible official to his own government, recording -contemporaneous conversations and events. - -My next subject is pressure and threats resulting in further concessions -by Austria: a meeting at Berchtesgaden, 12 February 1938. - -As I have stated before, the Austrian Government was laboring under -great difficulties imposed by its neighbor. There was economic pressure, -including the curtailment of the important tourist trade; and there was -what the Defendant Von Papen called “slowly intensified psychological -pressure.” There were increasing demonstrations, plots, and -conspiracies. Demands were being presented by Captain Leopold and -approval of the Nazis was being espoused by the Defendant Seyss-Inquart, -the new Councillor of the State of Austria. In this situation, -Chancellor Schuschnigg decided to visit Hitler at Berchtesgaden. - -The official communiqué of this conference is quite calm; I invite the -Tribunal to take judicial notice of it. It is Document 2461-PS, the -official German communiqué of the meeting of Hitler and Schuschnigg at -Obersalzberg, 12 February 1938, taken from the official _Dokumente der -Deutschen Politik_, Volume 6, I, Page 124, Number 21-a. - -The communiqué states that the unofficial meeting was caused by the -mutual desire to clarify by personal conversation the questions relating -to the relationship between the German Reich and Austria. - -The communiqué lists among those present: - -Schuschnigg and his Foreign Minister Schmidt, Hitler and his Foreign -Minister Ribbentrop, and the Defendant Von Papen. - -The communiqué concludes on a rather bright note saying, and I quote: - - “Both statesmen are convinced that the measures taken by them - constitute at the same time an effective contribution toward the - peaceful development of the European situation.” - -A similar communiqué was issued by the Austrian Government. But in fact, -and as I think history well knows, the conference was a very unusual and -a very harsh one. Great concessions were obtained by the German -Government from Austria. The principal concessions are contained in the -official Austrian communiqué of the reorganization of the Cabinet and -the general political amnesty, dated 16 February 1938. - -That communiqué, as taken from the _Dokumente der Deutschen Politik_, -Volume 6, Page 125, Number 21-b, is translated in our Document 2464-PS -and I invite the Court’s judicial notice of that communiqué. - -That communiqué announced a reorganization of the Austrian Cabinet, -including, most significantly, the appointment of the Defendant -Seyss-Inquart to the position of Minister of Security and Interior, -where he would have control of the police. In addition, announcement was -made of a general political amnesty to Nazis convicted of crimes. - -Two days later another concession was divulged. - -I invite the Court’s judicial notice to our Document 2469-PS, a -translation of the official German and Austrian communiqué concerning -the so-called equal rights of Austrian National Socialists in Austria, -18 February 1938, _Dokumente der Deutschen Politik_, Volume 6, I, Page -128; Number 21-d. - -That communiqué announced that pursuant to the Berchtesgaden conference, -the Austrian National Socialists would be taken into the Fatherland -Front, the single legal political party of Austria. - -THE PRESIDENT: Did you tell us what exhibit numbers those two documents -were? - -MR. ALDERMAN: I am sorry, Sir; Document 2469-PS. - -THE PRESIDENT: We haven’t had that yet. We have had 2461-PS, which is -exhibit what? - -MR. ALDERMAN: Well, I hadn’t read it in. I was asking the Tribunal to -take judicial notice of this as an official communiqué. - -THE PRESIDENT: You are not going to give it an exhibit number? - -MR. ALDERMAN: No, Sir. - -THE PRESIDENT: Nor 2469? - -MR. ALDERMAN: No, Sir. - -In actual fact, great pressure was put on Schuschnigg at Berchtesgaden. -The fact that pressure was exerted, and pressure of a military nature -involving the threat of the use of troops, can be sufficiently -established from captured German documents. - -I have our Document 1544-PS, a captured German document, which I offer -in evidence as Exhibit USA-71. - -This document consists of the Defendant Von Papen’s own notes on his -last meeting with Schuschnigg, on February 26, 1938. I quote the last -two paragraphs of these notes. This is Von Papen speaking, in his own -notes: - - “I then introduced into the conversation the widespread opinion - that he”—that is, Schuschnigg—“had acted under ‘brutal - pressure’ in Berchtesgaden. I myself had been present and been - able to state that he had always and at every point had complete - freedom of decision. The Chancellor replied that he had actually - been under considerable moral pressure; he could not deny that. - He had made notes on the talk which, bore that out. I reminded - him that despite this talk he had not seen his way clear to make - any concessions, and I asked him whether without the pressure he - would have been ready to make the concessions he made late in - the evening. He answered: ‘To be honest, no.’” - -And then Von Papen says: - - “It appears to me of importance to record this statement. - - “In parting I asked the Chancellor never to deceive himself that - Austria could have maintained her status with the help of - non-German, European combinations. This question could be - decided only according to the interests of the German people. He - asserted that he held the same conviction and would act - accordingly.” - -Thus we have, through the words of Von Papen, Schuschnigg’s contemporary -statement to Papen of the pressure which had been exerted upon him as -recorded by Von Papen in an original, contemporaneous entry. - -For diplomatic purposes, Papen, who had been at Berchtesgaden, kept up -the pretense that there had been no pressure applied. - -But the Defendant General Jodl, writing the account of current events in -his diary, was much more candid. We are fortunate in having General -Jodl’s handwritten diary in German script which I can’t read. It is our -Document 1780-PS, and I offer it in evidence as Exhibit USA-72. - -I may say that General Jodl, in interrogations, has admitted that this -is his genuine diary in his handwriting. - -This diary discloses not only the pressure at Berchtesgaden, but also -the fact that for some days thereafter Defendant Keitel and Admiral -Canaris worked out a scheme for shamming military pressure in order, -obviously, to coerce President Miklas of Austria into ratifying the -agreement. It started from Schuschnigg at Berchtesgaden. It will be -noted that the approval of President Miklas was needed to ratify the -Berchtesgaden agreement; that is, with respect to naming Seyss-Inquart -as Minister of the Interior and Security. - -And so the Nazi conspirators kept up the military pressure with threats -of invasion for some days after the Berchtesgaden conference in order to -produce the desired effect on President Miklas. - -I quote from General Jodl’s diary, the entries for February 11, February -13, and February 14, 1938. The entry of 11 February: - - “In the evening and on 12 February General K.”—Keitel—“with - General Von Reichenau and Sperrle at the Obersalzberg. - Schuschnigg together with G. Schmidt are being put under - heaviest political and military pressure. At 2300 hours - Schuschnigg signs protocol. - - “13 February: In the afternoon General K.”—Keitel—“asks - Admiral C.”—Canaris—“and myself to come to his apartment. He - tells us that the Führer’s order is to the effect that military - pressure, by shamming military action, should be kept up until - the 15th. Proposals for these deceptive maneuvers are drafted - and submitted to the Führer by telephone for approval. - - “14 February: At 2:40 o’clock the agreement of the Führer - arrives. Canaris went to Munich to the Counter-Intelligence - Office VII and initiates the different measures. - - “The effect is quick and strong. In Austria the impression is - created that Germany is undertaking serious military - preparations.” - -The proposal for deceptive maneuvers reported on by Defendant Jodl are -set forth in Document 1775-PS, a captured German document, which I offer -in evidence as Exhibit USA-73. - -The proposals are signed by the Defendant Keitel. Underneath his -signature appears a note that the Führer approved the proposal. In the -original document that note is handwritten in pencil. - -The rumors which Keitel proposed for the intimidation of Austria make -very interesting reading. I quote the first three paragraphs of the -suggested order: - - “1. To take no real preparatory measures in the Army or - Luftwaffe. No troop movements or redeployments. - - “2. Spread false but quite credible news which may lead to the - conclusion of military preparations against Austria: - - “(a) Through V-men”—V-Männer—“in Austria. - - “(b) Through our customs personnel”—staff—“at the frontier. - - “(c) Through travelling agents. - - “3. Such news could be: - - “(a) Furloughs are supposed to have been barred in the sector of - the VII A.K. - - “(b) Rolling stock is being assembled in Munich, Augsburg, and - Regensburg. - - “(c) Major General Muff, the Military Attaché in Vienna, has - been called for a conference to Berlin. As a matter of fact, - this is the case.” - -—That reminds me of a lawyer from my own home town who used to argue a -matter at great length, and then he would end up by saying, “and, -incidentally, it is the truth.” - - “(d) The police stations located at the frontier of Austria have - called up reinforcements. - - “(e) Custom officials report about the imminent maneuvers of the - Mountain Brigade”—Gebirgsbrigade—“in the region of - Freilassing, Reichenhall, and Berchtesgaden.” - -The total pattern of intimidation and rumor was effective, for in due -course, as, we have already seen from the communiqués referred to, -President Miklas verified the Berchtesgaden Agreement which foreshadowed -National Socialist Austria and then the events culminating in the actual -German invasion on 12 March 1938. - -Mr. President, would this be a convenient moment for a recess? - -THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn for 10 minutes. - - [_A recess was taken._] - -MR. ALDERMAN: May it please the Tribunal, I had reached the subject of -the events culminating in the German invasion of Austria on 12 March -1938, and first under that, the plebiscite and the preparations for both -German and Austrian National Socialists. - -The day after his appointment as Minister of the Interior of Austria, -Seyss-Inquart flew to Berlin for a conference with Hitler. I invite the -Court to take judicial notice of the official German communiqué covering -that visit of Seyss-Inquart to Hitler, as it appears in the _Dokumente -der Deutschen Politik_, Volume 6, I, Page 128, Number 21-c, a copy of -which will be found in our Document 2484-PS. - -On March 9, 1938, 3 weeks after Seyss-Inquart had been put in charge of -the police of Austria and was in a position to direct their handling of -the National Socialists in Austria—3 weeks after the Nazis began to -exploit their new prestige and position with their quota of further -victories—Schuschnigg made an important announcement. - -On March 9, 1938, Schuschnigg announced that he would hold a plebiscite -throughout Austria the following Sunday, March 13, 1938. The question to -be submitted in the plebiscite was: “Are you for an independent and -social, a Christian, German, and united Austria?” A “yes” answer to this -question was certainly compatible with the agreement made by the German -Government on 11 July 1936 and carried forward at Berchtesgaden on 12 -February 1938. Moreover, for a long while the Nazis had been demanding a -plebiscite on the question of Anschluss, but the Nazis apparently -appreciated the likelihood of a strong “yes” vote on the question put by -Schuschnigg in the plebiscite, and they could not tolerate the -possibility of such a vote of confidence in the Schuschnigg Government. - -In any case, as events showed, they took this occasion to overturn the -Austrian Government. Although the plebiscite was not announced until the -evening of 9 March, the Nazi organization received word about it earlier -in that day. It was determined by the Nazis that they had to ask Hitler -what to do about the situation (that is, the Austrian Nazis), and that -they would prepare a letter of protest against the plebiscite from -Seyss-Inquart to Schuschnigg; and that, pending Hitler’s approval, -Seyss-Inquart would pretend to negotiate with Schuschnigg about details -of the plebiscite. - -This information is all contained in the report of Gauleiter Rainer to -Reich Commissioner Bürckel, transmitted as I have already pointed out to -Seyss-Inquart, and which has already been received in evidence—our -Document 812-PS, Exhibit USA-61. - -I quote briefly from Page 7 of the English text, the paragraph beginning -on Page 11 of the German original: - - “The Landesleitung received word about the planned plebiscite - through illegal information services, on 9 March 1938 at 10 a.m. - At the session which was called immediately afterwards, - Seyss-Inquart explained that he had known about this for only a - few hours, but that he could not talk about it because he had - given his word to keep silent on this subject. But during the - talks he made us understand that the illegal information we - received was based on truth, and that in view of the new - situation, he had been cooperating with the Landesleitung from - the very first moment. Klausner, Jury, Rainer, Globocnik, and - Seyss-Inquart were present at the first talks which were held at - 10 a.m. There it was decided that: - - “First, the Führer had to be informed immediately; secondly, the - opportunity for the Führer to intervene must be given to him by - way of an official declaration made by Minister Seyss-Inquart to - Schuschnigg; and thirdly, Seyss-Inquart must negotiate with the - Government until clear instructions and orders were received - from the Führer. Seyss-Inquart and Rainer together composed a - letter to Schuschnigg, and only one copy of it was brought to - the Führer by Globocnik, who flew to him on the afternoon of 9 - March 1938. - - “Negotiations with the Government were not successful. - Therefore, they were stopped by Seyss-Inquart in accordance with - the instructions he received from the Führer. . . . On 10 March - all the preparations for future revolutionary actions already - had been made . . . and the necessary orders given to all unit - leaders . . . . During the night of the 10 to 11, Globocnik - returned from the Führer with the announcement that the Führer - gave the Party freedom of action . . . and that he would back it - in everything it did.” - -—That means the Austrian Nazi Party. - -Next, Germany’s actual preparations for the invasion and the use of -force. - -When news of the plebiscite reached Berlin, it started a tremendous -amount of activity. Hitler, as history knows, was determined not to -tolerate the plebiscite. Accordingly, he called his military advisers -and ordered the preparation of the march into Austria. - -On the diplomatic side he started a letter to Mussolini indicating why -he was going to march into Austria, and in the absence of the Defendant -Ribbentrop (who was temporarily detained in London), the Defendant Von -Neurath took over the affairs of the Foreign Office again. - -The terse and somewhat disconnected notes in General Jodl’s diary give a -vivid account of the activities in Berlin. I quote from the entry of 10 -March: - - “By surprise and without consulting his Ministers, Schuschnigg - ordered a plebiscite for Sunday, 13 March, which should bring - strong majority for the Legitimists in the absence of plan or - preparation. The Führer is determined not to tolerate it. - - “This same night, March 9 to 10, he calls for Göring. General - Von Reichenau is called back from the Cairo Olympic Committee. - General Von Schobert is ordered to come as well as Minister - Glaise-Horstenau, who is with the district leader, Gauleiter - Bürckel, in the Palatinate. General Keitel communicates the - facts at 9:45. He drives to the Reichskanzlei at 10 o’clock. I - follow at 10:15, according to the wish of General Von Viebahn, - to give him all drafts. ‘Prepare Case Otto.’ - - “1300 hours, General K.”—which I think plainly means - Keitel—“informs Chief of Operational Staff and Admiral Canaris, - Ribbentrop is being detained in London. Neurath takes over the - Foreign Office. Führer wants to transmit ultimatum to the - Austrian Cabinet. A personal letter is dispatched to Mussolini - and the reasons are developed which forced the Führer to take - action. - - “1830 hours, mobilization order is given to the Commander of the - 8th Army (Corps Area 3), 7th and 13th Army Corps, without - Reserve Army.” (Document Number 1780-PS, Exhibit USA-72). - -Now, it is to be noted that Defendant Von Neurath was at this critical -hour acting as Foreign Minister. The previous February the Defendant -Ribbentrop had become Foreign Minister, and Von Neurath had become -President of the Secret Cabinet Council. But in this critical hour of -foreign policy the Defendant Ribbentrop was in London handling the -diplomatic consequences of the Austrian transaction. As Foreign Minister -in this hour of aggression, involving mobilization and movement of -troops, use of force and threats to eliminate the independence of a -neighboring country, the Defendant Von Neurath resumed his former -position in the Nazi conspiracy. - -I now offer in evidence our Document C-102 as Exhibit USA-74, a captured -German document, top secret, the directive of the Supreme High Command -of the Armed Forces, 11 March 1938. This directive by Hitler, initialed -by the Defendants Jodl and Keitel, stated Hitler’s mixed political and -military intentions. I quote Paragraphs 1, 4, and 5 of the directive. -First the caption, “The Supreme Command of the Armed Forces” with some -initials; “referring to Operation Otto; 30 copies.” This is the 11th -copy; top secret: - - “1. If other measures prove unsuccessful I intend to invade - Austria with armed forces to establish constitutional conditions - and to prevent further outrages against the pro-German - population. - - “4. The forces of the Army and Air Force detailed for this - operation must be ready for invasion and/or ready for action on - 12 March 1938 at the latest from 1200 hours. I reserve the right - to give permission for crossing and flying over the frontier and - to decide the actual moment for invasion. - - “5. The behavior of the troops must give the impression that we - do not want to wage war against our Austrian brother; it is in - our interest that the whole operation shall be carried out - without any violence, but in the form of a peaceful entry - welcomed by the population. Therefore any provocation is to be - avoided. If, however, resistance is offered it must be broken - ruthlessly by force of arms.” - -I also offer in evidence captured German Document C-103 as Exhibit -USA-75. This was an implementing directive issued by the Defendant Jodl, -and it provided as follows: - - “Top secret; 11 March 1938; 40 copies, sixth copy. - - “Special Instruction Number 1 to the Supreme Commander of the - Armed Forces Number 427/38,”—with some symbols.— - - “Directive for policy toward Czechoslovakian and Italian troops - or militia units on Austrian soil. - - “1. If Czechoslovakian troops or militia units are encountered - in Austria they are to be regarded as hostile. - - “2. The Italians are everywhere to be treated as friends, - especially as Mussolini has declared himself disinterested in - the solution of the Austrian question. The Chief of the Supreme - Command of the Armed Forces, by order, Jodl.” - -Next, the actual events of 11 March 1938 in Austria are available to us -in two separate accounts. Although these accounts differ in some minor -details, such as precise words used and precise times when they were -used, they afford each other almost complete corroboration. We think it -appropriate for this Tribunal to have before it a relatively full -account of the way in which the German Government on 11 March 1938 -deprived Austria of her sovereignty. First I shall give the report of -the day’s events in Austria as given by the Austrian Nazis. I refer to -Document 812-PS, Exhibit USA-61, a report from Gauleiter Rainer to Reich -Commissioner Bürckel, and I shall read from Page 8 of the English -version. For the benefit of the German interpreter I am starting -following a tabulation: First case, second case, third case, and -following the sentence, “Dr. Seyss-Inquart took part in these talks with -the Gauleiter.” - - “On Friday, 11 March, the Minister Glaise-Horstenau arrived in - Vienna after a visit with the Führer. After talks with - Seyss-Inquart he went to see the Chancellor. At 11:30 a.m. the - Landesleitung had a meeting at which Klausner, Rainer, - Globocnik, Jury, Seyss-Inquart, Glaise-Horstenau, Fischböck, and - Mühlmann participated. Dr. Seyss-Inquart reported on his talks - with Dr. Schuschnigg which had ended in a rejection of the - proposal of the two ministers. - - “In regard to Rainer’s proposal, Von Klausner ordered that the - Government be presented with an ultimatum, expiring at 1400 - hours, signed by legal political ‘front’ men, including both - Ministers and also State Councillors Fishböck and Jury, for the - establishment of a voting date in 3 weeks and a free and secret - ballot in accordance with the constitution. - - “On the basis of written evidence which Glaise-Horstenau had - brought with him, a leaflet, to be printed in millions of - copies, and a telegram to the Führer calling for help were - prepared. - - “Klausner placed the leadership of the final political actions - in the hands of Rainer and Globocnik. Schuschnigg called a - session of all ministers for 2 p.m. Rainer agreed with - Seyss-Inquart that Rainer would send the telegram to the Führer - and the statement to the population at 3 p.m. and at the same - time he would start all necessary actions to take over power - unless he received news from the session of the Ministers’ - Council before that time. During this time all measures had been - prepared. At 2:30 Seyss-Inquart telephoned Rainer and informed - him that Schuschnigg had been unable to take the pressure and - had recalled the plebiscite but that he refused to call a new - plebiscite and had ordered the strongest police measures for - maintaining order. Rainer asked whether the two Ministers had - resigned, and Seyss-Inquart answered, ‘No.’ Rainer informed the - Reichskanzlei through the German Embassy, and received an answer - from Göring through the same channels, that the Führer will not - consent to partial solutions and that Schuschnigg must resign. - Seyss-Inquart was informed of this by Globocnik and Mühlmann. - Talks were held between Seyss-Inquart and Schuschnigg. - Schuschnigg resigned. Seyss-Inquart asked Rainer what measures - the Party wished taken. Rainer’s answer: Reestablishment of the - Government by Seyss-Inquart, legalization of the Party, and - calling up of the SS and SA as auxiliaries to the police force. - Seyss-Inquart promised to have these measures carried out, but - very soon the announcement followed that everything might be - threatened by the resistance of Miklas, the President. Meanwhile - word arrived from the German Embassy that the Führer expected - the establishment of a government under Seyss-Inquart with a - national majority, the legalization of the Party, and permission - for the Legion”—that is the Austrian Legion in Germany—“to - return, all within the specified time of 7:30 p.m.; otherwise - German troops would cross the border at 8 p.m. At 5 p.m. Rainer - and Globocnik, accompanied by Mühlmann, went to the Chancellor’s - office to carry out this errand. - - “Situation: Miklas negotiated with Ender for the creation of a - government which included Blacks, Reds, and National Socialists, - and proposed the post of Vice-Chancellor to Seyss-Inquart. The - latter rejected it and told Rainer that he was not able to - negotiate by himself because he was personally involved, and - therefore a weak and unfavorable political situation for the - cause might result. Rainer negotiated with Zernatto. Director of - the Cabinet Hüber, Guido Schmidt, Glaise-Horstenau, Legation - Councillor Stein, Military Attaché General Muff, and the - Gruppenführer Keppler,”—whose name I told you would reappear - significantly—“who had arrived in the meantime, were already - negotiating. At 7 p.m. Seyss-Inquart entered the negotiations - again. Situation at 7:30 p.m.: Stubborn refusal of Miklas to - appoint Seyss-Inquart as Chancellor; appeal to the world in case - of a German invasion. - - “Gruppenführer Keppler explained that the Führer did not yet - have an urgent reason for the invasion. This reason must first - be created. The situation in Vienna and in the country is most - dangerous. It is feared that street fights will break out any - moment because Rainer ordered the entire Party to demonstrate at - 3 o’clock. Rainer proposed storming and seizing the Chancellor’s - palace in order to force the reconstruction of the Government. - The proposal was rejected by Keppler but was carried out by - Rainer after he discussed it with Globocnik. After 8 p.m. the SA - and the SS marched in and occupied the Government buildings and - all important positions in the city of Vienna. At 8:30 p.m. - Rainer, with the approval of Klausner, ordered all Gauleiter of - Austria to take over power in all eight gaue of Austria, with - the help of the SS and SA and with instructions that all - Government representatives who try to resist, should be told - that this action was taken on order of Chancellor Seyss-Inquart. - - “With this the revolution broke out, and this resulted in the - complete occupation of Austria within 3 hours and the taking - over of all important posts by the Party. - - “The seizure of power was the work of the Party supported by the - Führer’s threat of invasion and the legal standing of - Seyss-Inquart in the Government. The national result in the form - of the taking over of the Government by Seyss-Inquart was due to - the actual seizure of power by the Party on one hand, and the - political efficiency of Dr. Seyss-Inquart in his territory on - the other; but both factors may be considered only in relation - to the Führer’s decision on 9 March 1938 to solve the Austrian - problem under any circumstances and the orders consequently - issued by the Führer.” - -We have at hand another document which permits us virtually to live -again through the events of March 11, 1938, and to live through them in -most lively and interesting fashion. Thanks to the efficiency of the -Defendant Göring and his Luftwaffe organization we have a highly -interesting document, obviously an official document from the Luftwaffe -headquarters headed as usual “Geheime Reichssache” (top secret). The -letterhead is stamped “Reichsluftfahrtministerium Forschungsamt”. If I -can get the significance of the German, Forschungsamt means the Research -Department of Göring’s Air Ministry. The document is in a characteristic -German folder and on the back it says, “Gespräche Fall Österreich” -(Conversations about the Austria Case) and the paper cover on the inside -has German script writing, which in time, I will ask the interpreter to -read; but it looks to me as if it is “Privat, Geheime Archive,” which is -Secret Archive, Berlin, “Gespräche Fall Österreich” (Case Austria). I -offer that set of documents in the original file as they were found in -the Air Ministry, identified as our 2949-PS. I offer them as Exhibit -USA-76, and, offering them, I am reminded of Job’s outcry, “Oh, that -mine enemy would write a book!” - -The covering letter in that file, signed by some member of this research -organization within the Air Ministry, and addressed to the Defendant -Göring, states in substance—well, I will read the English translation. -It starts; “To the General Field Marshal. Enclosed I submit, as ordered, -the copies of your telephone conversations.” - -Evidently the defendant wanted to keep a record of important telephone -conversations which he had with important persons regarding the Case -Austria, and had the transcriptions provided by his Research Department. -Most of the conversations transcribed and recorded in the volume I have -offered, were conducted by the Defendant Göring, although at least one -interesting one was conducted by Hitler. For purposes of convenience our -staff has marked these telephone calls in pencil with an identifying -letter running from “A” through “Z” and then to “AA.” Eleven of these -conversations have been determined by a screening process to be relevant -to the evidence of this particular time. All the conversations which -have been translated have been mimeographed and are included in the -document books handed to the defendants. The original binder contains, -of course, the complete set of conversations. A very extensive and -interesting account of events with which we are much concerned can be -developed from quotations from these translated conversations. - -I turn now to copies of the telephone conversations. The first group in -Part A of the binder took place between Field Marshal Göring, who was -identified by the letter “F” for Field Marshal, and Seyss-Inquart, who -was identified as “S”. The transcript prepared by the Research Institute -of the Air Ministry is in part in the language of these two persons and -is in part a summary of the actual conversations. I quote from Part A of -this binder, and because of the corroborated nature of this transcript -and its obvious authenticity, I propose to quote this conversation in -full. - -“F”—hereafter I shall use Göring and Seyss-Inquart— - - “F: ‘How do you do, doctor? My brother-in-law, is he with you?’ - - “Seyss-Inquart: ‘No.’” - -Thereupon the conversation took approximately the following turn: - - “Göring: ‘How are things with you? Have you resigned or do you - have any news?’ - - “Seyss-Inquart: ‘The Chancellor has cancelled the elections for - Sunday, and therefore he has put S’”—Seyss-Inquart—“‘and the - other gentlemen in a difficult situation. Besides having called - off the elections, extensive precautionary measures are being - ordered; among others, curfew at 8 p.m.’ - - “Göring replied that in his opinion the measures taken by - Chancellor Schuschnigg were not satisfactory in any respect. At - this moment he could not commit himself officially. Göring will - take a clear stand very shortly. In calling off the elections he - could see a postponement only, not a change of the present - situation which had been brought about by the behavior of the - Chancellor Schuschnigg in breaking the Berchtesgaden agreement. - - “Thereafter a conversation took place between Göring and the - Führer. Afterwards Göring again telephoned Seyss-Inquart. This - conversation was held at 15:05. - - “Göring told Seyss-Inquart that Berlin did not agree whatsoever - with the decision made by Chancellor Schuschnigg since he did - not enjoy any more the confidence of our Government because he - had broken the Berchtesgaden Agreement, and therefore further - confidence in his future actions did not exist. Consequently the - national Ministers, Seyss-Inquart, and the others are being - requested immediately to hand in their resignations to the - Chancellor, and also to ask the Chancellor to resign. Göring - added that if after a period of 1 hour no report had come - through, the assumption would be made that Seyss-Inquart would - no more be in a position to telephone. That would mean that the - gentlemen had handed in their resignations. Seyss-Inquart was - then told to send the telegram to the Führer as agreed upon. As - a matter of course, an immediate commission by the Federal - President for Seyss-Inquart to form a new cabinet would follow - Schuschnigg’s resignation.” - -Thus you see that at 2:45 p.m. Göring told Seyss-Inquart over the -telephone that it was not enough for Schuschnigg to cancel the -elections; and 20 minutes later he telephoned Seyss-Inquart to state -that Schuschnigg must resign. That is your second ultimatum. When -informed about an hour later that Schuschnigg had resigned he pointed -out that in addition it was necessary to have Seyss-Inquart at the head -of the Cabinet. Shall I go into another one of these? - -THE PRESIDENT: I think we had better adjourn now until 2 o’clock. - - [_The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours._] - - - - - _Afternoon Session_ - -MR. ALDERMAN: May it please the Tribunal, an hour later, following the -conversation between Göring and Seyss-Inquart with which I dealt this -morning, the Defendant Göring telephoned to Dombrowski in the German -Legation in Vienna. I have reference to the telephone conversation -marked “TT” on Page 2, Part C, of Document 2949-PS. In that -conversation, in the first place, the Defendant Göring showed concern -that the Nazi Party and all of its organizations should be definitely -legalized promptly. I quote from Page 2 of the transcript: - - “Göring: ‘Now to go on, the Party has definitely been - legalized?’ - - “Dombrowski: ‘But that is—it is not necessary even to discuss - that?’ - - “Göring: ‘With all of its organizations.’ - - “Dombrowski: ‘With all of its organizations within this - country.’ - - “Göring: ‘In uniform?’ - - “Dombrowski: ‘In uniform.’ - - “Göring: ‘Good.’ - - “Dombrowski calls attention to the fact that the SA and SS have - already been on duty for one-half hour, which means everything - is all right.” - -In addition, Göring stated that the Cabinet—the Austrian Cabinet—must -be formed by 7:30 p.m. and he transmitted instructions to be delivered -to Seyss-Inquart as to who should be appointed to the Cabinet. I quote -from Page 3 of the English text of the transcript of the conversation: - - “Göring: ‘Yes, and by 7:30 he also must talk with the Führer, - and as to the Cabinet, Keppler will bring you the names. One - thing I have forgotten: Fischböck must have the Department of - Economy and Commerce.’ - - “Dombrowski: ‘That is understood.’ - - “Göring: ‘Kaltenbrunner is to have the Department of Security - and Bahr is to have the Armed Forces. The Austrian Army is to be - taken by Seyss-Inquart himself and you know all about the - Justice Department.’ - - “Dombrowski: ‘Yes, yes.’ - - “Göring: ‘Give me the name.’ - - “Dombrowski: ‘Well, your brother-in-law, isn’t that right?’” - - —That is Hüber, the brother-in-law of the Defendant Göring.— - - “Göring: ‘Yes.’ - - “Dombrowski: ‘Yes.’ - - “Göring: ‘That’s right, and then also Fischböck.’” - -And about 20 minutes later, at 5:26 p.m., Göring was faced with the news -that Miklas, the President, was refusing to appoint Seyss-Inquart as -Chancellor, and he issued instructions as to the ultimatum that was to -be delivered to Miklas. I quote from the telephone conversation between -Göring and Seyss-Inquart, in Part E of the folder, the part marked with -capital R, Pages 1 and 2: - - “Göring: ‘Now remember the following: You go immediately, - together with Lieutenant General Muff, and tell the Federal - President that if the conditions which are known to you are not - accepted immediately, the troops who are already stationed at - and advancing to the frontier, will march in tonight along the - whole line, and Austria will cease to exist. Lieutenant General - Muff should go with you and demand to be admitted for conference - immediately. Please inform us immediately about Miklas’ - position. Tell him there is no time now for any joke. Just - through the false report we received before, action was delayed, - but now the situation is such that tonight the invasion will - begin from all the corners of Austria. The invasion will be - stopped and the troops will be held at the border only if we are - informed by 7:30 that Miklas has entrusted you with the Federal - Chancellorship.’” - - —There follows in the transcript a sentence which is broken - up.—“‘M.’”—I suppose that means Lieutenant General - Muff.—“‘does not matter whatever it might be, the immediate - restoration of the Party with all its organizations.’” - - —There is again an interruption in the transcript.—“‘And then - call out all the National Socialists all over the country. They - should now be in the streets; so remember, report must be given - by 7:30. Lieutenant General Muff is supposed to come along with - you. I shall inform him immediately. If Miklas could not - understand it in 4 hours, we shall make him understand it now in - 4 minutes.’” - -An hour later, at 6:28 p.m., Göring had an extensively interrupted -telephone conversation with Keppler and Muff and Seyss-Inquart. When he -told Keppler that Miklas had refused to appoint Seyss-Inquart, Göring -said—I read from Part H, about a third of the way down on the page: - - “Göring: ‘Well, then Seyss-Inquart has to dismiss him. Just go - upstairs again and just tell him plainly that S. - I.’”—Seyss-Inquart—“‘shall call on the National Socialist - guard, and in 5 minutes the troops will march in by my order.’” - -After an interruption, Seyss-Inquart came to the telephone and informed -the Defendant Göring that Miklas was still sticking to his old -viewpoint, although a new person had gone in to talk to him, and there -might be definite word in about 10 minutes. The conversation proceeded -as follows—I quote from Page 2 of Part H, beginning about the middle of -the page: - - “Göring: ‘Listen, so I shall wait a few more minutes, till he - comes back; then you inform me via Blitz conversation in the - Reich Chancery as usual, but it has to be done fast. I can - hardly justify it as a matter of fact. I am not entitled to do - so; if it cannot be done, then you have to take over the power. - All right?’ - - “Seyss-Inquart: ‘But if he threatens?’ - - “Göring: ‘Yes.’ - - “Seyss-Inquart: ‘Well, I see; then we shall be ready.’ - - “Göring: ‘Call me via Blitz.’” - -In other words, Göring and Seyss-Inquart had agreed on a plan for -Seyss-Inquart to take over power if Miklas remained obdurate. The plan -which was already discussed involved the use of both the National -Socialist forces in Austria and the German troops who had been crossing -the borders. Later that night Göring and Seyss-Inquart had another -conversation at about 11 o’clock. This was after the ultimatum had -expired. Seyss-Inquart informed Göring that Miklas was still refusing to -name Seyss-Inquart as Chancellor. The conversation then proceeded as -follows, and I quote from Part I of this folder: - - “Göring: ‘OK’”—What’s the German word for OK? Schön.—“‘I shall - give the order to march in and then you make sure that you get - the power. Notify the leading people about the following which I - shall tell you now. Everyone who offers resistance or organizes - resistance will immediately be subjected to our court martial, - the court martial of our invading troops. Is that clear?’ - - “Seyss-Inquart: ‘Yes.’ - - “Göring: ‘Including leading personalities; it does not make any - difference.’ - - “Seyss-Inquart: ‘Yes, they have given the order not to offer any - resistance.’ - - “Göring: ‘Yes, it does not matter; the Federal President did not - authorize you, and that also can be considered as resistance.’ - - “Seyss-Inquart: ‘Yes.’ - - “Göring: ‘Well, now you are officially authorized.’ - - “Seyss-Inquart: ‘Yes.’ - - “Göring: ‘Well, good luck, Heil Hitler.’” - -I am sorry; that conversation took place at 8 o’clock, instead of 11. I -meant to say 8 o’clock. It is quite interesting to me that when the -Defendant Göring was planning to invade a peaceful neighboring state, he -planned to try what he referred to as major war criminals before German -court martial, the leading personalities. - -So much for the conversation with respect to the plan of action for -taking over power. Something else very significant was sent on that -subject over the telephone, at least so far as those transcripts -indicate. But there was another historical event which was discussed -over the telephone. I refer to the famous telegram which Seyss-Inquart -sent to the German Government requesting the German Government to send -troops into Austria to help Seyss-Inquart put down disorder. A -conversation held at 8:48 that night between Göring and Keppler -proceeded as follows—I read from Page 1 of Part L: - - “Göring: ‘Well, I do not know yet. Listen, the main thing is - that if Inquart takes over all powers of Government he keeps the - radio stations occupied.’ - - “Keppler: ‘Well, we represent the Government now.’ - - “Göring: ‘Yes, that’s it. You are the Government. Listen - carefully. The following telegram should be sent here by - Seyss-Inquart. Take the notes: The provisional Austrian - Government which, after the dismissal of the Schuschnigg - Government, considered it its task to establish peace and order - in Austria, sends to the German Government the urgent request - for support in its task of preventing bloodshed. For this - purpose, it asks the German Government to send German troops as - soon as possible.’ - - “Keppler: ‘Well, SA and SS are marching through the streets but - everything is quiet. Everything has collapsed with the - professional groups.’” - -Now let us talk about sending German troops to put down disorder. The SA -and the SS were marching in the streets, but everything was quiet. And a -few minutes later, the conversation continued thus, reading from Page 2 -of Part L: - - “Göring: ‘Then our troops will cross the border today.’ - - “Keppler: ‘Yes.’ - - “Göring: ‘Well, and he should send the telegram as soon as - possible.’ - - “Keppler: ‘Well, send the telegram to Seyss-Inquart in the - office of the Federal Chancellor.’ - - “Göring: ‘Please show him the text of the telegram and do tell - him that we are asking him—well, he does not even need to send - the telegram. All he needs to do is to say, “Agreed.”’ - - “Keppler: ‘Yes.’ - - “Göring: ‘He should call me at the Führer’s or at my place. - Well, good luck. Heil Hitler.’” - -Well, of course, he did not need to send the telegram because Göring -wrote the telegram. He already had it. It must be recalled that in the -first conversation, Part A, held at 3:05 p.m., Göring had requested -Seyss-Inquart to send the telegram agreed upon, but now the matter was -so urgent that Göring dictated the exact wording of the telegram over -the telephone. And an hour later, at 9:54 p.m. a conversation between -Dr. Dietrich in Berlin and Keppler in Vienna went on as follows, reading -from Part M: - - “Dietrich: ‘I need the telegram urgently.’ - - “Keppler: ‘Tell the General Field Marshal that Seyss-Inquart - agrees.’ - - “Dietrich: ‘This is marvelous. Thank you.’ - - “Keppler: ‘Listen to the radio. News will be given.’ - - “Dietrich: ‘Where?’ - - “Keppler: ‘From Vienna.’ - - “Dietrich: ‘So Seyss-Inquart agrees?’ - - “Keppler: ‘Jawohl.’” - -Next the actual order to invade Austria. Communications with Austria -were now suspended but the German military machine had been set in -motion. To demonstrate that, I now offer in evidence captured Document -C-182, offered as Exhibit USA-77, a directive of 11 March 1938 at 2045 -hours, from the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces. This directive, -initialed by General Jodl and signed by Hitler, orders the invasion of -Austria in view of its failure to comply with the German ultimatum. The -directive reads: - - “Top secret; Berlin, 11 March 1938, 2045 hours; Supreme - Commander of the Armed Forces, OKW,”—with other symbols—“35 - copies, 6th copy. C-in-C Navy”—pencil note—“has been informed. - Re: Operation Otto. Directive No. 2. - - “1) The demands of the German ultimatum to the Austrian - Government have not been fulfilled. - - “2) The Austrian Armed Forces have been ordered to withdraw - before the entry of German troops and to avoid fighting. The - Austrian Government has ceased to function of its own accord. - - “3) To avoid further bloodshed in Austrian towns, the entry of - the German Armed Forces into Austria will commence, according to - Directive No. 1, at daybreak on 12.3. - - “I expect the set objectives to be reached by exerting all - forces to the full as quickly as possible.” - -Signed Adolf Hitler; initialed by Jodl and by a name that looks like -Warlimont. - -And then some interesting communications with Rome to avoid possibility -of disaster from that source. At the very time that Hitler and Göring -had embarked on this military undertaking, they still had a question -mark in their minds, and that was Italy. Italy had massed on the Italian -border in 1934 on the occasion of July 25, 1934—the Putsch. Italy had -traditionally been the political protector of Austria. - -With what a sigh of relief did Hitler hear at 10:25 p.m. that night from -Prince Phillipp von Hessen, his Ambassador at Rome, that he had just -come back from the Palazzo Venezia, and Mussolini had accepted the whole -thing in a very friendly manner. The situation can really be grasped by -the rereading of the conversation. The record of the conversation shows -the excitement under which Hitler was operating when he spoke over the -telephone. It is a short conversation, and I shall read the first half -of it from Part N of the transcript of 2949-PS. I am afraid your title -Part N may be blurred on the mimeographed copy. “H” is Hessen and “F” is -the Führer. - - “Hessen: ‘I have just come back from Palazzo Venezia. Il Duce - accepted the whole thing in a very friendly manner. He sends you - his regards. He had been informed from Austria; Schuschnigg gave - him the news. He had then said it would be a complete - impossibility; it would be a bluff; such a thing could not be - done. So he was told that it was unfortunately arranged thus, - and it could not be changed any more. Then Mussolini said that - Austria would be immaterial to him.’ - - “Hitler: ‘Then please tell Mussolini I will never forget him for - this.’ - - “Hessen: ‘Yes.’ - - “Hitler: ‘Never, never, never, whatever happens. I am still - ready to make a quite different agreement with him.’ - - “Hessen: ‘Yes, I told him that, too.’ - - “Hitler: ‘As soon as the Austrian affair has been settled, I - shall be ready to go with him through thick and thin; nothing - matters.’ - - “Hessen: ‘Yes, my Führer.’ - - “Hitler: ‘Listen, I shall make any agreement, I am no longer in - fear of the terrible position which would have existed - militarily in case we had gotten into a conflict. You may tell - him that I do thank him ever so much, never, never shall I - forget that.’ - - “Hessen: ‘Yes, my Führer.’ - - “Hitler: ‘I will never forget it, whatever will happen. If he - should ever need any help or be in any danger, he can be - convinced that I shall stick to him whatever might happen, even - if the whole world were against him.’ - - “Hessen: ‘Yes, my Führer.’ - -The Tribunal will recall the reference in Jodl’s diary to the letter -which Hitler had sent to Mussolini. It is dated March 11. It may be -found in the official publication _Dokumente der Deutschen Politik_, -Volume 6, I, Page 135, Number 24-a. I ask the Court to take judicial -notice of it, and you will find a translation of it appearing in our -Document 2510-PS. In this letter, after stating that Austria had been -declining into anarchy, Hitler wrote—and I quote: - - “I have decided to re-establish order in my fatherland—order - and tranquility—and to give to the popular will the possibility - of settling its own fate in unmistakable fashion openly and by - its own decision.” - -He stated that this was an act of self-defense; that he had no hostile -intentions towards Italy. And after the invasion, when Hitler was at -Linz, Austria, he communicated his gratitude to Mussolini once more in -the famous telegram which the world so well remembers. I again cite -_Dokumente der Deutschen Politik_, Volume 6, Page 156, Number 29, the -translation of the telegram being in our Document 2467-PS, and the -document reads: “Mussolini, I will never forget you for this.” - -We now shift our scene from Vienna to Berlin. We have shifted our scene, -I meant, from Vienna to Berlin. It may now be appropriate to come back -to Vienna just long enough to recall that late in the evening of March -11, President Miklas did appoint Defendant Seyss-Inquart as Chancellor. -The radio announcement of Seyss-Inquart’s appointment was made at 11:15 -p.m. This is noted in _Dokumente der Deutschen Politik_, Volume 6, I, -Page 137, Number 25-a, and a translation of the announcement is in our -Document 2465-PS. - -Then something had to be done in London to smooth things over there and, -accordingly, one more act played on the international scene is set down -in the Air Ministry telephone transcript. On Sunday, March 13, 1938, the -day after the invasion, Defendant Göring who had been left in Berlin in -charge of the Reich by Hitler, who had gone to his fatherland, phoned -Defendant Ribbentrop in London. I find this conversation very -illuminating as to the way in which these defendants operated, using, if -I may employ American vernacular, a kind of international “double talk” -to soothe and mislead other nations. I quote from Part 1 of item W of -Document 2949-PS: - - “Göring:”—speaking to Ribbentrop in London:—“‘As you know, the - Führer has entrusted me with the administration of the current - government procedures (Führung der Regierungsgeschäfte), and - therefore I wanted to inform you. There is overwhelming joy in - Austria, that you can hear over the radio.’ - - “Ribbentrop: ‘Yes, it is fantastic, is it not?’ - - “Göring: ‘Yes, the last march into the Rhineland is completely - overshadowed. The Führer was deeply moved, when he talked to me - last night. You must remember it was the first time that he saw - his homeland again. Now, I mainly want to talk about political - things. Well, this story that we had given an ultimatum is just - foolish gossip. From the very beginning the National Socialist - Ministers and the representatives of the people - (Volksreferenten) have presented the ultimatum. Later on more - and more prominent people of the movement participated, and as a - natural result, the Austrian National Socialist Ministers asked - us to back them up so that they would not be completely beaten - up again and be subjected to terror and civil war. Then we told - them we would not allow Schuschnigg to provoke a civil war, - under any circumstances. Whether by Schuschnigg’s direct order - or with his consent, the communists and the Reds had been armed - and were already making demonstrations, which were photographed - with “Heil Moskau” and so on. Naturally, all these facts caused - some danger for Wiener-Neustadt. Then you have to consider that - Schuschnigg made his speeches, telling them the Vaterländische - Front would fight to the last man. One could not know that they - would capitulate like that, and therefore Seyss-Inquart, who - already had taken over the Government, asked us to march in - immediately. We had already marched up to the frontier before - this, since we could not know whether or not there would be a - civil war. These are the actual facts which can be proved by - documents.’” - -There the Defendant Göring was giving to the Defendant Ribbentrop the -proper line that he should take in London as to how to explain what had -happened in Austria. Of course, when the Defendant Göring said that his -story about this matter could be proved by documents, I don’t think he -had in mind that his own telephone calls might constitute documents. - -Another rather interesting item begins on Page 3 of the English text of -this Part W—still Göring talking to Ribbentrop in London. This is at -the bottom of the page: - - “Göring: ‘No, no, I think so, too. Only, I did not know if you - had spoken already to these people. I want you once more,—but - no, not at all once more, but generally speaking—tell the - following to Halifax and Chamberlain: It is not correct that - Germany has given an ultimatum. This is a lie by Schuschnigg, - because the ultimatum was presented to him by Seyss-Inquart, - Glaise-Horstenau, and Jury. Furthermore, it is not true that we - have presented an ultimatum to the Federal President, but that - it also was given by the others, and as far as I know, just a - military attaché came along, asked by Seyss-Inquart, because of - a technical question.’”—you will recall that he was a - lieutenant general directed by Göring to go along—“‘He was - supposed to ask whether, in case Seyss-Inquart would ask for the - support of German troops, Germany would grant this request. - Furthermore, I want to state that Seyss-Inquart asked us - expressly, by phone and by telegram, to send troops because he - did not know about the situation in Wiener-Neustadt, Vienna, and - so on; because arms had been distributed there. And then he - could not know how the Fatherland Front might react since they - always had had such a big mouth.’ - - “Ribbentrop: ‘Herr Göring, tell me, how is the situation in - Vienna; is everything settled yet?’ - - “Göring: ‘Yes. Yesterday I landed hundreds of airplanes with - some companies, in order to secure the airfields, and they were - received with joy. Today the advance unit of the 17th division - marches in, together with the Austrian troops. Also, I want to - point out that the Austrian troops did not withdraw, but that - they got together and fraternized immediately with the German - troops, wherever they were stationed.’” - -These are quite interesting explanations that the ultimatum was by -Seyss-Inquart alone and not by Göring; that Lieutenant General Muff, the -military attaché, was along just to answer a technical question, and -that Seyss-Inquart asked expressly by telephone and telegram for troops. -But, perhaps to understand this conversation, we must try to create -again the actual physical scene of the time and place as Göring talked -over the phone. I quote eight lines from Page 11 of the English text, -about in the middle, Part W: - - “Göring: ‘Well, do come! I shall be delighted to see you.’ - - “Ribbentrop: ‘I shall see you this afternoon.’ - - “Göring: ‘The weather is wonderful here—blue sky. I am sitting - here on my balcony—all covered with blankets—in the fresh air, - drinking my coffee. Later on I have to drive in. I have to make - the speech. And the birds are twittering, and here and there I - can hear over the radio the enthusiasm, which must be wonderful - over there.’”—that is, Vienna. - - “Ribbentrop: ‘That is marvelous.’” - -May it please the Tribunal, I have practically come to the end of the -material relating to the aggression against Austria. In a moment I shall -take up quite briefly the effects of the Anschluss, some of the -developments which took place after the German troops marched across the -border. What is to come after that is an epilogue, but before developing -the epilogue, it may be appropriate to pause briefly for just a moment. -I think that the facts which I have related to the Tribunal today show -plainly certain things about the defendants involved in the conspiracy, -and among the conspirators who particularly took action in the Austrian -matter were Von Papen, Seyss-Inquart, Ribbentrop, Von Neurath, and -Göring. - -First, I think it is plain that these men were dangerous men. They used -their power without a bridle. They used their power to override the -independence and freedom of others. And they were more than bullies -squeezing a smaller foe. They were very sly bullies. They compounded -their force with fraud. They coupled threats with legal technicalities -and devious maneuvers, wearing a sanctimonious mask to cover their -duplicity. I think they are dangerous men. - -In accordance with the directive of March 11, our Document C-182, -Exhibit USA-77, the German Army crossed the Austrian border at daybreak, -12 March 1938. Hitler issued a proclamation to the German people -announcing the invasion, and purporting to justify it. I refer again to -_Dokumente der Deutschen Politik_, Volume 6, Page 140, Number 27, -“Proclamation of Hitler.” The British Government and the French -Government filed protests. The German Government and the Austrian -National Socialists swiftly secured their grip on Austria. Seyss-Inquart -welcomed Hitler at Linz, and they both expressed their joy over the -events of the day. Seyss-Inquart in his speech declared Article 88 of -the Treaty of St. Germain inoperative. I refer to the speech of -Seyss-Inquart at Linz on 12 March 1938, as contained in the _Dokumente -der Deutschen Politik_, Volume 6, I, Page 144, Number 28-a, of which I -ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice, and which you will find -translated in our Document 2485-PS. - -For a view of what was happening in Vienna, I offer in evidence our -Document L-292, telegram 70, American Legation, Vienna, to the American -Secretary of State, 12 March 1938, and I offer it as Exhibit USA-78. I -quote it in full: - - “Secretary of State, Washington; March 12, noon. - - “Numerous German bombers flying over Vienna dropping leaflets - ‘National Socialist Germany greets its possession, National - Socialist Austria and her new Government in true indivisible - Union.’ - - “Continual rumors small German troop movements into Austria and - impending arrival Austrian Legion. SS and SA in undisputed - control in Vienna. Police wear swastika arm bands. Schuschnigg - and Schmidt rumored arrested. Himmler and Hess - here.”—Signed—“Wiley.” - -The law-making machine was put to work immediately on the task of -consolidation. For all of this material I shall merely refer the -Tribunal to the German sources and to the document number of the English -translation, but I think I need not offer these legislative acts in -evidence but shall merely invite the Court to take judicial notice of -them. - -First, Miklas was forced to resign as President. I refer to _Dokumente -der Deutschen Politik_, Volume 6, I, Page 147, Number 30-b. Our -translation is in our Document 2466-PS. - -In this connection the Court will no doubt recall Göring’s telephone -conversation as shown in Document 2949-PS, that in view of Miklas’ delay -in appointing Seyss-Inquart, Miklas would be dismissed. Seyss-Inquart -became both Chancellor and President. - -He then signed a Federal Constitutional Law of March 13, 1938 for the -reunion of Austria with the German Reich, which in turn was incorporated -into the Reich Statute of Reunion, passed the same day, German law. I -cite for that the _Reichsgesetzblatt_ 1938, Volume 1, Page 237, Number -21, a translation of which will be found in our Document 2307-PS. - -This Federal Constitutional Law declared Austria to be a province of the -German Reich. By annexing Austria into the German Reich, Germany -violated Article 80 of the Treaty of Versailles, which provided (by the -way, on the Constitutional Law to which I just referred there appear as -signatories the following names: - -Adolf Hitler, Führer and Reich Chancellor; Göring, General Field -Marshal, Reich Minister of Aviation; Frick, Reich Minister of the -Interior; Von Ribbentrop, Reich Minister of Foreign Affairs; R. Hess, -Deputy Führer.) - -By annexing Austria into the German Reich, Germany violated Article 80 -of the Treaty of Versailles, which provides, and I quote: - - “Germany acknowledges and will respect the independence of - Austria within the frontier, which may be fixed in a treaty - between that state and the principal Allied and Associated - Powers. She agrees that this independence shall be inalienable.” - (JN-2) - -Similarly, the Austrian action violated Article 88 of the Treaty of St. -Germain, which provides: - - “The independence of Austria is inalienable, otherwise than with - the consent of the Council of the League of Nations. - Consequently, Austria undertakes, in the absence of the consent - of the said Council, to abstain from any act which might - directly or indirectly or by any means whatever compromise her - independence, particularly until her admission to membership of - the League of Nations, by participation in the affairs of - another power.” (JN-3) - -This basic Constitutional Law provided for a plebiscite to be held on 10 -April 1938 on the question of reunion, but this was a mere formality. -The plebiscite could only confirm the union declared in the law. It -could not undo Germany’s union with, and control over, Austria. - -To illustrate the way in which legal consolidation was swiftly assured -under conditions of occupation of Austria by troops, it is not necessary -to do more than review some of the acts passed within the month. - -Hitler placed the Austrian Federal Army under his own command and -required all members of the Army to take an oath of allegiance to Hitler -as their Supreme Commander. A translation of the pertinent document will -be found in our 2936-PS, and I refer to the instruction of the Führer -and Reich Chancellor, concerning the Austrian Federal Army, March 13, -1938, _Dokumente der Deutschen Politik_, Volume 6, I, Page 150. - -Public officials of the Province of Austria were required to take an -oath of office swearing allegiance to Hitler, Führer of the German Reich -and people. Jewish officials as defined were not permitted to take the -oath. - -I refer to a decree of the Führer and Reich Chancellor concerning the -administration of oath to the officials of the Province of Austria, -March 15, 1938, _Reichsgesetzblatt_ 1938, Volume 1, Page 245, Number 24, -the translation being in our Document 2311-PS. - -Hitler and Frick signed a decree applying to Austria various Reich Laws, -including the law of 1933 against the formation of new political -parties, and the 1933 Law for the Preservation of Unity of Party and -State. - -I refer to the first decree of the Führer and Reich Chancellor -concerning the introduction of German Reich Law into Austria, 15 March -1938, _Reichsgesetzblatt_ 1938, Volume 1, Page 247, Number 25, the -translation being in our Document 2310-PS. - -Hitler, Frick, and Göring ordered that the Reich Minister of the -Interior be the central authority for carrying out the reunion of -Austria with the German Reich. I cite the order pursuant to the law -concerning the reunion of Austria with the German Reich, March 16, 1938, -_Reichsgesetzblatt_ 1938, Volume 1, Page 249, Number 25, translated in -our 1060-PS. - -In connection with Germany’s extensive propaganda campaign to insure -acceptability of the German regime, it may be noted that Goebbels -established a Reich Propaganda Office in Vienna. - -I cite the order concerning the establishment of a Reich Propaganda -Office in Vienna, March 31, 1938, _Reichsgesetzblatt_ 1938, Volume 1, -Page 350, Number 46, translated in our Document 2935-PS. - -The ballot addressed to soldiers of the former Austrian Army as “German -soldiers” asked the voters whether they agreed with the accomplishment -and ratification on March 13, 1938 of the reuniting of Austria with -Germany. - -I cite the second order concerning plebiscite and election for the -Greater German Reichstag of March 24, 1938, _Reichsgesetzblatt_ 1938, -Volume 1, Page 303, translated in our Document 1659-PS. - -The ground work was fully laid before the holding of the plebiscite “for -German men and women of Austria” promised in the basic law of March 13. - -Then, the importance of Austria in further aggression. Could we run that -screen up, or is the chart still behind it? Well, the Court will -remember the chart. - -The seizure of Austria had now formed that lower jaw to the head of the -wolf around the head of Czechoslovakia. Germany’s desire to consummate -the Anschluss with Austria and her determination to execute that aim in -the way and at the time that she did—that is, with threat of military -force, quickly, and despite political risk—was due to the importance of -Austria in her further plans of aggression. - -The conference held November 5, 1937, planning for aggressive war in -Europe, outlined as objectives in Austria the conquest of food through -expulsion of a million people and the effective increase in fighting -strength, in part through the improvement in the frontier. - -I cite again Document 386-PS, Exhibit USA-25. Austria was to yield to -Germany material resources, and moreover, she provided ready cash taken -from the Jews and from the Austrian Government. - -One of the first orders passed after the Anschluss was an order signed -by Hitler, Frick, Schwerin von Krosigk and Schacht for the transfer to -the Reich of the assets of the Austrian National Bank. I refer to the -order for the transfer of the Austrian National Bank to the Reichsbank, -March 17, 1938, _Reichsgesetzblatt_ 1938, Volume 1, Page 254, Number 27, -translated in our 2313-PS. - -Austria also yielded human resources. Three months after the Anschluss -there was enacted a decree requiring the 21-year-old men, Austrian men, -to report for active military service. I refer to the decree regarding -registration for active military service in Austria during 1938, -_Reichsgesetzblatt_ 1938, Volume 1, Page 634, translated in our 1660-PS. - -And the acquisition of Austria improved the military strategic position -of the German Army. I invite the Court’s attention to a document which I -introduced in the case on preparation for aggression, L-172, Exhibit -USA-34, which was a lecture delivered by General Jodl, Chief of the -German Staff of the Armed Forces, on 7 November 1943, at Munich, to the -Gauleiter. Only one page of that lecture appears in this particular -document book, and I quote from one paragraph on Page 5 of the English -text, which is Page 7 of Jodl’s lecture, which reviewed the situation in -1938: - - “The Austrian Anschluss, in its turn, brought with it not only - the fulfillment of an old national aim but also had the effect - both of reinforcing our fighting strength and of materially - improving our strategic position. Whereas, until then the - territory of Czechoslovakia had projected in a most menacing way - right into Germany—a wasp waist in the direction of France and - an air base for the Allies, in particular Russia—Czechoslovakia - herself was now enclosed by pincers. Her own strategic position - had now become so unfavorable that she was bound to fall a - victim to any attack pressed home with vigor before effective - aid from the west could be expected to arrive.” - -The Nazi conspirators were now ready to carry out the second part of -this second phase of their aggression and to take over Czechoslovakia. - -Logically, if the Tribunal please, we should proceed at this point with -the story about Czechoslovakia. For reasons that I explained earlier in -the week we have had to change our plans somewhat from a strictly -logical order, and the plan at present is that on Monday I shall go -forward with the Czechoslovakian part of the aggressive war case. - -At this point it is planned by our staff to show a motion picture, and -it will take some few minutes to make the physical arrangements in the -courtroom, so that if the Court should feel like recessing, those -arrangements could be made. - -THE PRESIDENT: Could you tell me how long the showing of the picture -will take? - -MR. ALDERMAN: My understanding is about an hour. - -THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn for 10 minutes then, shall we now, or -until the picture is ready? - - [_A recess was taken._] - -COL. STOREY: If the Tribunal please, Sir, supplementing what Mr. -Alderman has said, we have had to readjust our presentation to some -extent. Tomorrow morning, a witness will be offered for interrogation. -Then Mr. Alderman on Monday; and Sir Hartley Shawcross will make the -opening statement for the British Empire on Tuesday morning. - -The film this afternoon, at the request of defendants’ counsel, made in -writing to the Court, has been exhibited to defendants’ counsel on day -before yesterday evening in this courtroom. I personally requested Dr. -Dix to convey the invitation to Defense Counsel to witness the film. -Eight of them came. Dr. Dix advised me kindly that he would not come -unless he was forced to come. - -I now present Mr. Dodd, who will have charge of the presentation. - -MR. DODD: If it please the Tribunal, the Prosecution for the United -States will at this time present to the Tribunal, with its permission, a -documentary film on concentration camps. This is by no means the entire -proof which the prosecution will offer with respect to the subject of -concentration camps, but this film which we offer represents in a brief -and unforgettable form an explanation of what the words “concentration -camp” imply. - -This subject arises appropriately in the narrative of events leading up -to the actual outbreak of aggressive war, which, as Mr. Alderman’s -presentation shows, was planned and prepared by the Nazi conspirators. -We propose to show that concentration camps were not an end in -themselves but rather they were an integral part of the Nazi system of -government. As we shall show, the black-shirted guards of the SS and the -Gestapo stood ranged behind the official pages of the -_Reichsgesetzblatt_. - -We intend to prove that each and every one of these defendants knew of -the existence of these concentration camps; that fear and terror and -nameless horror of the concentration camps were instruments by which the -defendants retained power and suppressed opposition to any of their -policies, including, of course, their plans for aggressive war. By this -means they enforced the controls imposed upon the German people, as -required to execute these plans, and obliterated freedom in Germany and -in the countries invaded and occupied by the armies of the Third Reich. - -Finally, we ask the Tribunal in viewing this film to bear in mind the -fact that the proof to be offered at a later stage of this Trial will -show that on some of the organizations charged in this Indictment lies -the responsibility for the origination, the control, and the maintenance -of the whole concentration camp system: Upon the SS, the SD—a part of -the SS which tracked down the victims—upon the Gestapo, which committed -the victims to the camps, and upon other branches of the SS which were -in charge of the atrocities committed therein. - -Commander James Donovan will introduce the film with a statement -explaining its source and its authenticity. - -COMMANDER JAMES BRITT DONOVAN, USNR. (Prosecution Counsel for the United -States): May it please the Tribunal, I refer to Document Number 2430-PS, -concerning the motion picture entitled “Nazi Concentration Camps” and to -the affidavits of Commander James B. Donovan, Lieutenant Colonel George -C. Stevens, Lieutenant E. R. Kellogg and Colonel Erik Tiebold contained -therein. The affidavits of Colonel Stevens and of Lieutenant Kellogg are -also contained in the motion picture, and thus will be in the record of -the Tribunal. With the permission of the Tribunal, I shall now, however, -read into the record those affidavits not appearing in the film. - -THE PRESIDENT: In the absence of any objection by the Defense Counsel, -we don’t think it is necessary to read these formal affidavits. - -COMMANDER DONOVAN: Yes, Sir. The United States now offers in evidence an -official documentary motion picture report on Nazi concentration camps. -This report has been compiled from motion pictures taken by Allied -military photographers as the Allied armies in the West liberated the -areas in which these camps were located. The accompanying narration is -taken directly from the reports of the military photographers who filmed -the camps. - -While these motion pictures speak for themselves in evidencing life and -death in Nazi concentration camps, proper authentication of the films is -contained in the affidavits of the United States Army and Navy officers -to which I have referred. - -As has been stated, this motion picture has been made available to all -defense counsel and they possess copies in their Information Room of the -supporting affidavits duly translated. - -If the Tribunal please, we shall proceed with the projection of the -film, Document 2430-PS, Exhibit USA-79. - -[_Photographs were then projected on the screen showing the following -affidavits while at the same time the voices of the respective affiants -were reproduced reading them._] - - “I, George C. Stevens, Lieutenant Colonel, Army of the United - States, hereby certify: - - “1. From 1 March 1945 to 8 May 1945 I was on active duty with - the United States Army Signal Corps attached to the Supreme - Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces, and among my official - duties was direction of the photographing of the Nazi - concentration camps and prison camps as liberated by Allied - Forces. - - “2. The motion pictures which will be shown following this - affidavit were taken by official Allied photographic teams in - the course of their military duties, each team being composed of - military personnel under the direction of a commissioned - officer. - - “3. To the best of my knowledge and belief, these motion - pictures constitute a true representation of the individuals and - scenes photographed. They have not been altered in any respect - since the exposures were made. The accompanying narration is a - true statement of the facts and circumstances under which these - pictures were made. - - “(Signed) George C. Stevens, Lieutenant Colonel, AUS. - - “Sworn to before me this 2nd day of October 1945. - - “(Signed) James B. Donovan, Commander, United States Naval - Reserve.” - - “I, E. R. Kellogg, Lieutenant, United States Navy, hereby - certify that: - - “1. From 1929 to 1941 I was employed at the Twentieth Century - Fox Studios in Hollywood, California, as a director of film - effects, and am familiar with all photographic techniques. Since - 6 September 1941 to the present date of 27 August 1945, I have - been on active duty with the United States Navy. - - “2. I have carefully examined the motion picture film to be - shown following this affidavit and I certify that the images of - these excerpts from the original negative have not been - retouched, distorted or otherwise altered in any respect and are - true copies of the originals held in the vaults of the United - States Army Signal Corps. These excerpts comprise 6,000 feet of - film selected from 80,000 feet, all of which I have reviewed and - all of which is similar in character to these excerpts. - - “(Signed) E. R. Kellogg, Lieutenant, United States Navy. - - “Sworn to before me this 27 day of August 1945. - - “(Signed) John Ford, Captain, United States Navy.” - -[_The film was then shown._] - -COL. STOREY: That concludes the presentation. - - [_The Tribunal adjourned until 30 November 1945 at 1000 hours._] - - - - - NINTH DAY - Friday, 30 November 1945 - - - _Morning Session_ - -THE PRESIDENT: I call on the Prosecutor for the United States. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Colonel Amen will represent the United States this -morning. - -COLONEL JOHN HARLAN AMEN (Associate Trial Counsel for the United -States): May it please the Tribunal, I propose to call as the first -witness for the Prosecution, Major General Erwin Lahousen. - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal wish me to state that the evidence of the -witness whom you propose to call must be strictly confined to the count -with which the United States are dealing, Count One. - -COL. AMEN: May I have a moment to discuss that with the Chief Counsel of -the United States? - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes, certainly. - -DR. OTTO NELTE (Counsel for Defendant Keitel): Mr. President, so far as -I know the Prosecution . . . - -THE PRESIDENT: Would you state for whom you appear? Do you appear for -the Defendant Keitel? - -DR. NELTE: Yes. As far as I know, an agreement was reached between the -Prosecution and the Defense, to the effect that whenever possible, -questions to be brought up in the proceedings on the following day -should be announced beforehand. The obvious purpose of this very -reasonable understanding was to enable Defense Counsel to discuss -forthcoming questions with their clients, and thus to assure a rapid and -even progress of the Trial. - -I was not informed that the witness Lahousen was to be called by the -Prosecution today, nor was I told on what questions he was to be heard. - -It was particularly important to know this, because today, I believe, -the witness Lahousen was not to be heard on questions connected with the -Prosecution’s case as presented during the past days. - -THE PRESIDENT: That is the contrary of what I said. What I said was that -the witness was to be confined to evidence relating to Count One, which -is the Count that has been solely discussed up to the present date. - -DR. NELTE: Do you mean, Mr. President, that in order to enable the -Defense to cross-examine the witness, there will be a recess after the -interrogation by the Prosecution during which Counsel may discuss the -questions with their clients? The witness Lahousen, as far as I recall, -has never until now been mentioned by the Prosecution. - -THE PRESIDENT: Is that all you have to say? - -DR. NELTE: Yes. - -THE PRESIDENT: I think the Tribunal would like to hear Counsel for the -United States upon the agreement which counsel for the Defendant Keitel -alleges, namely, an agreement that what was to be discussed on the -following day should be communicated to defendants’ counsel beforehand. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I know of no agreement to inform defendants’ -counsel of any witness, nor of his testimony; nor would I want to make -such. There are security reasons involved in disclosing to Defense -Counsel the names of witnesses, which I don’t need to enlarge upon, I am -quite sure. - -We did advise them that they would be given information as to the -documentary matters, and I think that has been kept. - -As to witnesses, however, a matter of policy arises. These witnesses are -not always prisoners. They have to be treated in somewhat different -fashion than prisoners; and the protection of their security is a very -important consideration where we are trying this case, in the very -hotbed of the Nazi organization with which some of Defense Counsel were -identified. - -THE PRESIDENT: I think, Mr. Justice Jackson, that that is sufficient. If -you tell the Tribunal that there was no such agreement, the Tribunal -will, of course, accept that. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I know of nothing of that character, relating to -witnesses. That does apply to documents. - -We find it very difficult to know just the meaning of the ruling which -the Court has just announced. Count One of the Indictment is a -conspiracy count, covering the entire substantive part of the -Indictment. There are problems, of course, of overlapping, which I had -supposed had been worked out between the prosecutors until this morning. -It is impossible, trying a conspiracy case, to keep from mentioning the -fact that the act, which was the object of the conspiracy, was -performed. In fact, that is a part of the evidence of the conspiracy. - -I know I don’t need to enlarge upon the wide scope of evidence in a -conspiracy case. I think, perhaps, the best way to do is to swear the -witness, and that the other prosecutors, if they feel their field is -being trespassed upon, or the judges, if they feel that we are -exceeding, raise the objection specifically; because I don’t know how we -can separate, particularly on a moment’s notice, Count One from the -other Counts. - -We have tried our best to work out an arrangement that would be fair, as -between ourselves and the other prosecutors, but we find it impossible -always to please everybody. - -With the greatest deference to the ruling of the Court, I would like to -suggest that we proceed. I don’t know just what the bounds of the ruling -might be, but I think the only way we can find out is to proceed, and -have specific objections to the specific things which anyone feels have -been transgressed; and in doing that, I want to say that we do it with -the greatest respect to the ruling, but that we may find ourselves in -conflict with it, because of the difficulty of any boundary on the -subject. - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Stahmer? - -DR. STAHMER: Mr. President, I must return to the matter raised by Doctor -Nelte, namely his statement that before the beginning of the Trial the -Defense and the Prosecution reached an agreement to the effect that the -next day’s program should always be made known to the Defense on the -previous day. Such an agreement was actually reached, and I cannot -understand why the Prosecution was not informed of it. We considered the -possibility and then reached this agreement in a conference with Doctor -Kempner, who was acting as our liaison man. I should like further to -point out the following: - -The Prosecution stated that for security reasons the Defense could not -be furnished with the names of witnesses to be called during the next -day’s proceedings. The press however received, as early as yesterday, -information on the witnesses to be called today. We heard of this -through representatives of the press this morning and, as far as I know, -the information also appeared in today’s papers. I cannot understand, -therefore, why it was withheld from us, and why we were told that for -security reasons, it could not be communicated to us. I think this -amounts to a mistrust of the Defense’s discretion that is quite -unjustified. It is, furthermore, incorrect that we are now receiving -documents in good time; they still reach us belatedly. For instance, a -document which is to be dealt with in court today was put on our desks -only this morning, moreover, in a language which many of the defending -counsel cannot understand, since they do not have complete mastery of -English. - -As I have already submitted this complaint to the Prosecution in -writing, may I ask the Tribunal to reach a decision in this matter as -soon as possible. - -THE PRESIDENT: Have you finished? - -DR. STAHMER: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: It is quite correct that the name of the witness -who is to be used today was given to the press. The question of our -policy as to giving witnesses’ names was submitted to me last night -after Court recessed, because we had not been using witnesses -heretofore; and I then stated to Colonel Storey that witnesses’ names -must not be given to the Defense Counsel for security reasons. - -He communicated that, I believe, to Doctor Dix. I found that later it -had been given to the press. They, of course, have had adequate -information therefore as to this witness. However, I am speaking about -the policy. We cannot be under an obligation to inform these counsel of -the names of witnesses who will be called, who are here in Nuremberg, -but not in prison; the situation does not permit that. Neither can we -furnish transcripts of testimony or that sort of thing of witnesses in -advance. - -Now we want to give the Defense Counsel everything that, in the fair -conduct of the Trial, they ought to have. They are now receiving much -more than any citizen of the United States gets on trial in the courts -of the United States, in some respects, as to advance information and -copies and help and service, and I do think that to ask us to disclose -to them in advance either the names or substance of -testimony—oftentimes the substance would disclose the witness—would -not be proper. It was stated yesterday that we would take up a witness -today. - -THE PRESIDENT: We have already heard two of the counsel on behalf of the -Defense. Have you anything to add which is different to what they have -said? - -DR. DIX: Yes, I believe I can explain a misunderstanding and clarify the -whole problem. - -Mr. President, as far as I am informed—I do not know what was discussed -in my absence—the situation is this: - -Though discussions took place, no agreement was reached between the -Prosecution and the Defense. There is, as Your Lordship knows, only a -decision of the Tribunal regarding documents; that decision is known and -I need not repeat. As far as witnesses are concerned I think I may -assume that we are all agreed that the desire of the Defense to know the -names of witnesses ahead of time is justified. - -The Tribunal must decide to what extent security reasons interfere with -this desire, which is in itself justified. That is a matter which the -Defense cannot determine. I think I understand Mr. Justice Jackson -correctly in saying that if the press is being told what witnesses will -appear on the next day, then it is a matter of course that the same -information should be given to Defense Counsel at the same time. This -was only a series of unhappy circumstances, which can be overcome by -mutual understanding and good will. - -As I said, I do not know what was agreed upon before I was present here. -I cannot therefore contradict my colleague, Dr. Stahmer, in this matter. -I think it possible, however, that the misunderstanding arose as a -result of the decision of the Court to have documents submitted to us 48 -hours in advance and to have the film shown to us beforehand, a decision -which led my colleague to the conclusion—and I consider it a justified -conclusion—that all matters of this sort were to be submitted to us in -advance. We do not, of course, expect to be informed of the contents of -the witness’ testimony. - -After this elucidation I should like to state my request that in the -future we be informed as soon as possible which witness is to be called; -and I should also like to ask that the security considerations be guided -by the knowledge that the Defense as a body is reliable, determined and -capable of assisting the Court in reaching its verdict by submitting to -the discipline of the proceedings. I ask, therefore, that the cases in -which the security officer believes that he should not communicate the -name of the witness beforehand, should be reduced to an absolute -minimum. - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will consider the submissions which have -been made to them on behalf of Defense Counsel with reference to what -shall or what shall not be communicated to them. With reference to the -witness whom the United States desire to call, they will now be -permitted to call him. With reference to what I said about confining his -evidence to the first count, the Tribunal thinks that the best course -would be for the other prosecutors to have the opportunity now to ask -any questions which they think right, and that they may have the -opportunity, if they wish, of calling the witness later upon their own -counts. - -As to cross-examination by the defendants’ counsel, that will be allowed -to them in the most convenient way possible, so that if they wish to -have an opportunity of communicating with their clients before they -cross-examine, they may have the opportunity of doing so. Now we will -continue. - -COL. AMEN: May we have General Lahousen brought before the Tribunal? -What is your name? - -ERWIN LAHOUSEN (Witness): Erwin Lahousen. - -COL. AMEN: Will you please spell it? - -LAHOUSEN: L-a-h-o-u-s-e-n. - -COL. AMEN: Will you say this oath after me: “I swear by God—the -Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will -withhold and add nothing.” - -[_The witness repeated the oath._] - -THE PRESIDENT: Don’t you think the witness had better sit down? - -COL. AMEN: I think he should be allowed to sit down, particularly since -he has a heart condition which may be aggravated. - -THE PRESIDENT: Very well; you may sit down. - -COL. AMEN: Where were you born? - -LAHOUSEN: I was born in Vienna. - -COL. AMEN: On what date? - -LAHOUSEN: On 25 October 1897. - -COL. AMEN: What has been your occupation? - -LAHOUSEN: I was a professional soldier. - -COL. AMEN: Where were you trained? - -LAHOUSEN: I was trained in Austria, in the Military Academy in -Wiener-Neustadt. - -COL. AMEN: Were you immediately commissioned as an officer? - -LAHOUSEN: In 1915 I was commissioned as a second lieutenant in the -infantry. - -COL. AMEN: Did you serve in the first World War? - -LAHOUSEN: Yes, as second and first lieutenant in the infantry. - -COL. AMEN: Were you promoted from time to time thereafter? - -LAHOUSEN: Yes, I was promoted under the normal regulations valid in -Austria at the time. - -COL. AMEN: By 1930 what rank had you attained? - -LAHOUSEN: In 1930 I was a captain. - -COL. AMEN: And commencing in 1930 did you take any additional training? - -LAHOUSEN: In 1930 I entered the Austrian War School, which corresponds -to the Military Academy in the German Army. There I received the -training of an officer of the General Staff. - -COL. AMEN: How long did this training last? - -LAHOUSEN: This training lasted 3 years. - -COL. AMEN: In 1933 to what regular army unit were you assigned? - -LAHOUSEN: In 1933 I was serving in the Second Austrian Division, that -was the Vienna Division. - -COL. AMEN: What type of work did you do there? - -LAHOUSEN: I was an intelligence officer; that branch of the service for -which I was already destined at the end of my training. - -COL. AMEN: Did you then receive a further promotion? - -LAHOUSEN: I was promoted normally in accordance with the regulations -valid in Austria, and roughly at the end of 1933 I became a major. About -1935 or the beginning of 1936 I was transferred to the General Staff, -and in June, or at any rate, in the summer of 1936, I became a -lieutenant colonel of the Austrian General Staff. - -COL. AMEN: And were you assigned to the Intelligence Division at or -about that time? - -LAHOUSEN: I entered the Austrian Intelligence Division which corresponds -technically to the Abwehr in the German Army. I must add that an -Intelligence Division was only added to the Austrian Army about this -time, i.e. 1936; before that year it did not exist. Since it was planned -to re-establish within the framework of the Austrian Federal Army the -military Intelligence Division which had ceased to exist after the -collapse of the Austrian-Hungarian Empire, I was trained to assist in -organizing this division within the framework of the Austrian Army. - -COL. AMEN: After being assigned to the Intelligence Division, how were -your activities principally directed? - -LAHOUSEN: My responsible chief, or more exactly, the responsible chief -at that time, was Colonel of the General Staff Böhme. He was the -division chief to whom I was subordinate, the Chief of the Intelligence -Division, the man to whom I was responsible, from whom I received my -orders and instructions; later on it was the Chief of the Austrian -General Staff. - -THE PRESIDENT: Can’t you shorten this, Colonel Amen? We really need not -have all this detail. - -COL. AMEN: Very good, Sir. It is, however, I think important for the -Tribunal to understand more of this information than you ordinarily -would by virtue of the fact that he was taken over subsequently to a -corresponding position in the German Army, which I did want the Tribunal -to appreciate. - -Now, will you state to the Tribunal what your principal activities were -after being assigned to the Intelligence Division? What information were -you interested in and seeking to obtain? - -LAHOUSEN: May I repeat—I don’t know if I understood you correctly—I -was a member of the Austrian Intelligence Division, and not of the -German Abwehr. - -COL. AMEN: After the Anschluss, what position did you assume? - -LAHOUSEN: After the Anschluss I was automatically taken into the High -Command of the German Armed Forces, where I did the same work. In that -position I was then a member of the Abwehr and my chief was Admiral -Canaris. - -COL. AMEN: And what was the position of Admiral Canaris? - -LAHOUSEN: Canaris was at that time Chief of the German Abwehr, the -German Intelligence. - -COL. AMEN: And will you explain briefly the responsibility of the -principal departments of the Abwehr under Admiral Canaris? - -LAHOUSEN: When, after the Anschluss in 1938, I entered the Amt -Ausland-Abwehr there were three Abwehr divisions, and the division -called “Ausland,” and together they formed the organization known as -“Ausland-Abwehr.” That was the set-up of the organization in my time. -How it was composed before I became a member of it, I cannot say -exactly. - -COL. AMEN: And what were your duties? - -LAHOUSEN: First, I automatically came into Abwehr Division I. That was -the division concerned with collecting information. It was also called -the Secret Information Service. I worked under a divisional chief, the -then Colonel in the General Staff Pieckenbrock, whom I knew already from -my Austrian past. I also knew Canaris from my time in Austria. - -COL. AMEN: Admiral Canaris was your immediate superior? - -LAHOUSEN: Admiral Canaris was my immediate superior. - -COL. AMEN: From time to time did you act as his personal representative? - -LAHOUSEN: Yes, in all cases and on all occasions when his actual -deputy—namely, Colonel Pieckenbrock—was not present, or when Canaris, -for one reason or another, considered it necessary or advisable to have -me appear as his representative. - -COL. AMEN: And in this capacity did you have any contact with Field -Marshal Keitel? - -LAHOUSEN: Yes. - -COL. AMEN: Did you also have contact with Jodl? - -LAHOUSEN: Yes, occasionally, but to a much lesser extent. - -COL. AMEN: And did you occasionally attend conferences at which Herr -Hitler was also present? - -LAHOUSEN: Yes, I attended a few of the sessions or discussions at which -Hitler was present and which he conducted. - -COL. AMEN: Will you tell the Tribunal whether the leaders of the Abwehr -were in sympathy with Hitler’s war program? - -LAHOUSEN: I have to make clear in this connection that, at that time, we -chiefs in the Abwehr were deeply influenced and captivated by the -personality of Canaris, his inner bearing was perfectly clear and -unequivocal to a small group of us. - -COL. AMEN: And was there a particular group or groups in the Abwehr who -worked against the Nazis? - -LAHOUSEN: Within the Amt Ausland-Abwehr there were two groups which in -their aims and actions were closely connected, but which, nevertheless, -must somehow be kept apart. - -COL. AMEN: And what were those two groups? - -LAHOUSEN: Before I answer this question, I must briefly picture the -personality of Canaris, who was the spiritual leader and focus of this -group. - -COL. AMEN: Please make it as brief as you can. - -LAHOUSEN: Canaris was a pure intellect, an interesting, highly -individual, and complicated personality, who hated violence as such and -therefore hated and abominated war, Hitler, his system, and particularly -his methods. In whatever way one may look on him, Canaris was a human -being. - -COL. AMEN: Now, will you refer back to the two groups of which you spoke -and tell me about each of those two groups and their respective -memberships? - -LAHOUSEN: One might characterize the first of the groups as Canaris’ -circle. It included the heads of the Amt Ausland-Abwehr: - -Canaris himself as its spiritual leader; General Oster, Chief of the -Central Division (the head of the Abwehr); my predecessor, Lieutenant -Colonel Grosscurth, who had introduced me into the circle of Canaris in -Vienna in 1938; the Chief of Abwehr Division I, Colonel Pieckenbrock, -who was a close friend of Canaris; Pieckenbrock’s successor, Colonel -Hansen, who was executed after July; my successor, Colonel Von Freytag -Loringhoven, who committed suicide on 26 July 1944, before arrest; also, -in a somewhat different way, what applies to all these persons, the -Chief of Abwehr Division III, Colonel Von Bentivegni, and then various -people in all these divisions, most of whom were executed or imprisoned -in connection with the events of July 20, 1944. - -I must also name here a man who did not belong to this group but who -knew of the actions designed to prevent the execution or issuing of -orders for murder and other atrocities, namely, Admiral Bürckner who was -Chief of the Ausland Division at that time. Those, in the main, are the -leaders of the first group called the Canaris circle. - -The second and much smaller group was centered around General Oster as -its spiritual leader. This group included members of the Ausland-Abwehr -who, as early as 1938—I recognized this clearly by 1939-40 and later -on—were actively concerned with schemes and plans designed to remove -the originator of this catastrophe, Hitler, by force. - -COL. AMEN: What was the purpose of the group to which you belonged; that -is, Canaris’ inner circle? - -LAHOUSEN: On its political motives or aims, I was not informed. I can -only reiterate the thoughts and considerations which I, since I was one -of Canaris’ most intimate confidants, knew well. His inner attitude, -which influenced and moulded not only my own actions but also those of -the other men whom I mentioned, can be described as follows: - -We did not succeed in preventing this war of aggression. The war implies -the end of Germany and of ourselves, a misfortune and a catastrophe of -very great extent. However, a misfortune even greater than this -catastrophe would be a triumph of this system. To prevent this by all -possible means was the ultimate aim and purpose of our struggle. - -The sense of what I have just said was often expressed by Canaris among -the group of which I am speaking. - -COL. AMEN: Now, did this group of which you and Canaris were members -meet frequently? - -LAHOUSEN: I must explain that his group or circle was not to be regarded -as an organization in the technical sense, or as a sort of conspirators’ -club. That would have been quite contradictory to Canaris’ nature. It -was rather, a spiritual organization of men holding the same -convictions, of men who had vision and knowledge—their official -functions provided them with knowledge—of men who understood each other -and acted, but each in his own way and in accordance with his own -individuality. - -This is also the reason for the differentiation of which I spoke -earlier. The same demands were not made on each individual, but Canaris -always approached the person whose attitude he knew from personal -knowledge to be the most suitable to carry out a certain task. - -COL. AMEN: Did you have conversations at these official meetings, at -which Canaris expressed his views with respect to the use of force in -Poland, for example? - -LAHOUSEN: These and similar methods were repeatedly, I may say always, -discussed in our circle and they were naturally repudiated by all of us. - -COL. AMEN: Do you recall what Canaris said about the Polish war at the -time of its commencement? - -LAHOUSEN: I very clearly recall the hour at which Canaris entered, -completely shattered, to tell us that the situation had after all become -serious, although it had earlier appeared as if the matter might still -be postponed. He told us then: “This is the end.” - -COL. AMEN: Did you have conversations with Canaris and the other members -of your group with respect to eliminating Nazis from your staff? - -LAHOUSEN: While I was still in Vienna, before I took up my post in the -OKW, I received instructions from Canaris not to bring any National -Socialists with me to his department in Berlin. I was also instructed, -whenever possible not to employ Party members or officers sympathizing -with the Party in my division, especially in high positions. Thus the -actual organization. . . . - -COL. AMEN: Did Canaris keep a diary? - -LAHOUSEN: Yes, Canaris kept a diary. He did so even before the beginning -of the war—a diary to which I personally had to contribute and did -contribute much. - -COL. AMEN: Was it a part of your duties to make entries in that diary? - -LAHOUSEN: No, it was not a part of my actual duties, but it naturally -fell to me to write entries on the conferences which I attended with -Canaris or as his representative. - -COL. AMEN: And did you keep copies of the entries which you made in -Canaris’ diary? - -LAHOUSEN: Yes, I kept copies, with Canaris’ knowledge and approval. - -COL. AMEN: Do you have the original of some of those copies with you -here today? - -LAHOUSEN: I do not have them on me, but they are available here. - -COL. AMEN: And you have refreshed your recollection in reference to -those entries? - -LAHOUSEN: Yes. - -COL. AMEN: What was the purpose of Canaris in keeping such a diary? - -LAHOUSEN: As a truthful answer to this question I must repeat what -Canaris himself said to me on this subject: - - “The purpose and intention of this diary is to portray to the - German people and to the world, at some future date, the leaders - who are now guiding the fate of their nation.” - -COL. AMEN: Now, do you recall attending conferences with Canaris at the -Führer’s headquarters, just prior to the fall of Warsaw? - -LAHOUSEN: Canaris and I took part in discussions not in the Führer’s -headquarters, but in the Führer’s special train, shortly before the fall -of Warsaw. - -COL. AMEN: And having refreshed your recollection from reference to the -entries in Canaris’ diary, can you tell the Tribunal the date of those -conferences? - -LAHOUSEN: According to the notes and documents at my disposal it was on -September 12, 1939. - -COL. AMEN: Did each of these conferences take place on the same day? - -LAHOUSEN: The discussions in the Führer’s train took place on the same -day: September 12, 1939. - -COL. AMEN: And was there more than one conference on that day? Were they -split into several conferences? - -LAHOUSEN: One cannot really call them conferences; they were -discussions, conversations, of varying duration. - -COL. AMEN: And who was present on this occasion? - -LAHOUSEN: Present, regardless of location and time, were the following: -Foreign Minister Von Ribbentrop; Keitel, the Chief of the OKW; Jodl, -head of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff; Canaris; and myself. - -COL. AMEN: Do you see Ribbentrop in this courtroom? - -LAHOUSEN: Yes. - -COL. AMEN: Will you indicate for the record where he is sitting? - -LAHOUSEN: Over there. [_Indicating._] In the first row, third from the -left. - -COL. AMEN: Do you also see Keitel in the courtroom? - -LAHOUSEN: Yes; he is next to Ribbentrop. - -COL. AMEN: Do you also see Jodl in the courtroom? - -LAHOUSEN: Yes; he is in the second row, next to Herr Von Papen. - -COL. AMEN: Now, to the best of your knowledge and recollection, will you -please explain, in as much detail as possible, to the Tribunal, exactly -what was said and what took place at this conference in the Führer’s -train? - -LAHOUSEN: First of all, Canaris had a short talk with Ribbentrop, in -which the latter explained the general political aims with regard to -Poland and in connection with the Ukrainian question. The Chief of the -OKW took up the Ukrainian question in subsequent discussions which took -place in his private carriage. These are recorded in the files which I -immediately prepared on Canaris’ order. While we were still in the -carriage of the Chief of the OKW, Canaris expressed his serious -misgivings regarding the proposed bombardment of Warsaw, of which he -knew. Canaris stressed the devastating repercussions which this -bombardment would have in the foreign political field. The Chief of the -OKW, Keitel, replied that these measures had been agreed upon directly -by the Führer and Göring, and that he, Keitel, had had no influence on -these decisions. I quote Keitel’s own words here—naturally only after -re-reading my notes. Keitel said: “The Führer and Göring are in frequent -telephone communication; sometimes I also hear something of what was -said, but not always.” - -Secondly, Canaris very urgently warned against the measures which had -come to his knowledge, namely the proposed shootings and extermination -measures directed particularly against the Polish intelligentsia, the -nobility, the clergy, and in fact all elements which could be regarded -as leaders of a national resistance. Canaris said at that time—I am -quoting his approximate words: “One day the world will also hold the -Wehrmacht, under whose eyes these events occurred, responsible for such -methods.” - -The Chief of the OKW replied—and this is also based on my notes, which -I re-read a few days ago—that these things had been decided upon by the -Führer, and that the Führer, the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, had let -it be known that, should the Armed Forces be unwilling to carry through -these measures, or should they not agree with them, they would have to -accept the presence at their side of the SS, the SIPO and similar units -who would carry them through. A civilian official would then be -appointed to function with each military commander. This, in outlines, -was our discussion on the proposed shooting and extermination measures -in Poland. - -COL. AMEN: Was anything said about a so-called “political -housecleaning”? - -LAHOUSEN: Yes, the Chief of the OKW used an expression which was -certainly derived from Hitler and which characterized these measures as -“political housecleaning”. I recall this expression very clearly, even -without the aid of my notes. - -COL. AMEN: In order that the record may be perfectly clear, exactly what -measures did Keitel say had already been agreed upon? - -LAHOUSEN: According to the Chief of the OKW, the bombardment of Warsaw -and the shooting of the categories of people which I mentioned before -had been agreed upon already. - -COL. AMEN: And what were they? - -LAHOUSEN: Mainly the Polish intelligentsia, the nobility, the clergy, -and, of course, the Jews. - -COL. AMEN: What, if anything, was said about possible cooperation with a -Ukrainian group? - -LAHOUSEN: Canaris was ordered by the Chief of the OKW, who stated that -he was transmitting a directive which he had apparently received from -Ribbentrop since he spoke of it in connection with the political plans -of the Foreign Minister, to instigate in the Galician Ukraine an -uprising aimed at the extermination of Jews and Poles. - -COL. AMEN: At what point did Hitler and Jodl enter this meeting? - -LAHOUSEN: Hitler and Jodl entered either after the discussions I have -just described or towards the conclusion of the whole discussion of this -subject, when Canaris had already begun his report on the situation in -the West; that is, on the news which had meanwhile come in on the -reaction of the French Army at the West Wall. - -COL. AMEN: And what further discussions took place then? - -LAHOUSEN: After this discussion in the private carriage of the Chief of -the OKW, Canaris left the coach and had another short talk with -Ribbentrop, who, returning to the subject of the Ukraine, told him once -more that the uprising should be so staged that all farms and dwellings -of the Poles should go up in flames, and all Jews be killed. - -COL. AMEN: Who said that? - -LAHOUSEN: The Foreign Minister of that time, Ribbentrop, said that to -Canaris. I was standing next to him. - -COL. AMEN: Is there any slightest doubt in your mind about that? - -LAHOUSEN: No. I have not the slightest doubt about that. I remember with -particular clarity the somewhat new phrasing that “all farms and -dwellings should go up in flames”. Previously there had only been talk -of “liquidation” and “elimination.” - -COL. AMEN: Was there any note in Canaris’ diary which helped to refresh -your recollection on that point also? - -LAHOUSEN: No. - -COL. AMEN: What, if anything, was said on the subject of France? - -LAHOUSEN: On the subject of France a discussion took place in the -carriage of the Chief of the OKW, in which Canaris described the -situation in the West on the basis of Abwehr reports, and said that in -his opinion a great attack was being prepared by the French in the -sector of Saarbrücken. Hitler, who had entered the room in the meantime, -intervened, took charge of the discussion, rejected in a lively manner -the opinion which Canaris had just expressed, and put forward arguments -which, looking back now, I must recognize as factually correct. - -COL. AMEN: Do you recall whether, in the course of this conference, -Ribbentrop said anything about the Jews? - -LAHOUSEN: During the conversation, which was taking place in the private -coach of the Chief of the OKW, Ribbentrop was not present. - -COL. AMEN: Do you recall whether at any time in the course of the -conferences Ribbentrop said anything about the Jews? - -LAHOUSEN: I repeat, in this discussion, which took place in the coach, -no. - -COL. AMEN: For purposes of keeping the record straight, whenever you -have referred to the Chief of the OKW, you were referring to Keitel? - -LAHOUSEN: Yes. - -COL. AMEN: Was the Wehrmacht ever asked to furnish any assistance for -the Polish campaign? - -LAHOUSEN: Yes. - -COL. AMEN: Did that undertaking have any special name? - -LAHOUSEN: As is recorded in the diary of my division the name of this -undertaking which took place just before the Polish campaign, was -“Undertaking Himmler”. - -COL. AMEN: Will you explain to the Tribunal the nature of the assistance -required? - -LAHOUSEN: The affair on which I am now giving testimony is one of the -most mysterious actions which took place within the Amt Ausland-Abwehr. -A few days, or sometime before—I believe it was the middle of -August—the precise date can be found in the diary of the -division—Abwehr Division I, as well as my division, Abwehr Division II, -were given the task of providing Polish uniforms and equipment, such as -identification cards and so on, for an Undertaking Himmler. This -request, according to an entry in the diary of the division which was -kept not by me, but by my adjutant, was received by Canaris from the -Wehrmacht Operations Staff or from the National Defense Department. I -believe the name of General Warlimont is mentioned. - -COL. AMEN: Do you know where this request originated? - -LAHOUSEN: Where the request originated I cannot say, I can only say that -it reached us in the form of an order. It was, to be sure, an order on -which we, the divisional chiefs concerned, already had some misgivings -without knowing what, in the last analysis, it meant. The name Himmler, -however, spoke for itself, and that is also evident from entries of the -diary which record my question why Herr Himmler should come to receive -uniforms from us. - -COL. AMEN: To whom was the Polish material to be furnished by the -Abwehr? - -LAHOUSEN: These articles of equipment had to be kept in readiness, and -one day some man from the SS or the SD—the name is given in the -official war diary of the division—collected them. - -COL. AMEN: At what time was the Abwehr informed as to how this Polish -material was to be used? - -LAHOUSEN: The real purpose was unknown to us then; we do not know its -details even today. All of us, however, had the reasonable suspicion -that something entirely crooked was being planned; the name of the -undertaking was sufficient guarantee for that. - -COL. AMEN: Did you subsequently find out from Canaris what in fact had -happened? - -LAHOUSEN: The actual course of events was the following: When the first -Wehrmacht communiqué spoke of the attack of Polish units on German -territory, Pieckenbrock, holding the communiqué in his hand, and reading -it aloud, observed that now we knew why our uniforms had been needed. On -the same day or a few days later, I cannot say exactly, Canaris informed -us that people from concentration camps had been disguised in these -uniforms and had been ordered to make a military attack on the radio -station at Gleiwitz. I cannot recall whether any other locality was -mentioned. Although we were extremely interested, particularly General -Oster, to know details of this action, that is, where it had occurred -and what had happened—actually we could well imagine it, but we did not -know how it was carried out—I cannot even today say exactly what -happened. - -COL. AMEN: Did you ever find out what happened to the men from the -concentration camps who wore the Polish uniforms and created the -incident? - -LAHOUSEN: It is strange. This matter has always held my interest, and -even after the capitulation I spoke about these matters with an SS -Hauptsturmführer—he was a Viennese—in the hospital in which both of us -were staying, and I asked him for details on what had taken place. The -man—his name was Birckel—told me: “It is odd, that even our circles -heard of this matter only very much later, and then only by intimation.” -He added: “So far as I know, even all members of the SD who took part in -that action were put out of the way, that is, killed.” That was the last -I heard of this matter. - -COL. AMEN: Do you recall attending a meeting in 1940 at which the name -of Weygand was under discussion? - -LAHOUSEN: Yes. - -COL. AMEN: Do you happen to recall the particular month in which this -discussion took place? - -LAHOUSEN: The discussion took place in the winter of 1940, either in -November or December, as far as I recall. I have recorded the precise -date in my personal notes, with the knowledge and desire of Canaris. - -COL. AMEN: To the best of your knowledge and recollection, who was -present? - -LAHOUSEN: The three divisional chiefs and the Chief of the Ausland -Division, Admiral Bürckner, were present nearly every day during the -daily conference on the situation. - -COL. AMEN: What were you told at this meeting by Canaris? - -LAHOUSEN: In this discussion Canaris revealed to us that already for -some considerable time Keitel had put pressure on him to arrange for the -elimination of the French Marshal, Weygand; and that naturally I—that -is my division—would be charged with the execution of this task. - -COL. AMEN: When you say “elimination”, what do you mean? - -LAHOUSEN: Killing. - -COL. AMEN: What was Weygand doing at this time? - -LAHOUSEN: Weygand was, so far as I recall, in North Africa at that time. - -COL. AMEN: What was the reason given for attempting to kill Weygand? - -LAHOUSEN: The reason given was the fear that Weygand together with the -unconquered part of the French Army might form a center of resistance in -North Africa. That, in the main, was the reason, as far as I remember -today; it may be that there were other contributing factors. - -COL. AMEN: After you were so informed by Canaris, what else was said at -this meeting? - -LAHOUSEN: This request which was first put to the military Abwehr so -openly and in such an undisguised form by a representative of the Armed -Forces, was decidedly and indignantly rejected by all those present. I, -myself, as the person most involved, since my division was expected to -carry out this task, indicated flatly before all present that I had not -the slightest intention of executing this order. My division and my -officers are prepared to fight but they are neither a murderers’ -organization nor murderers. - -COL. AMEN: What then did Canaris say? - -LAHOUSEN: Canaris said: “Calm down. We’ll have a word together later,” -or something to that effect. - -COL. AMEN: Did you then talk it over later with Canaris? - -LAHOUSEN: When the other gentlemen had left the room, I spoke with -Canaris alone and he told me immediately: “It is quite obvious that this -order will not only not be carried out, but it will not even be -communicated to anybody else,” and that, in fact, happened. - -COL. AMEN: Were you subsequently questioned as to whether you had -carried out this order? - -LAHOUSEN: On one occasion when Canaris was reporting to Keitel, and I -was present, Keitel mentioned the subject to me, and asked me what had -happened or what had been done in this matter up to now. The date of -this incident was recorded in my notes, on Canaris’ suggestion and with -his knowledge. - -COL. AMEN: What reply did you make to Keitel? - -LAHOUSEN: I cannot, of course, recall my precise words, but one thing is -certain; I did not answer that I had no intention of carrying out this -order. That I could not tell him, and did not tell him; otherwise, I -would not be sitting here today. Probably, as in many similar cases, I -replied that it was very difficult but everything possible would be -done, or something of that sort. Naturally, I cannot recall my precise -words. - -COL. AMEN: Incidentally, are you the only one of this intimate Canaris -group who is still alive today? - -LAHOUSEN: I believe I am at least one of the very few. Possibly -Pieckenbrock is still alive; perhaps Bentivegni, who, however, did not -belong to the inner circle. Most of the others were liquidated as a -result of the events on July 20. - -COL. AMEN: I have another subject to take up now. In 1941 did you attend -a conference at which General Reinecke was present? - -LAHOUSEN: Yes. - -COL. AMEN: Who was General Reinecke? - -LAHOUSEN: General Reinecke was at that time Chief of the General -Wehrmacht Department, which was part of the OKW. - -COL. AMEN: Do you recall the approximate date of that meeting? - -LAHOUSEN: It was roughly in the summer of 1941, shortly after the -beginning of the Russian campaign; approximately in July. - -COL. AMEN: To the best of your knowledge and recollection, will you -state exactly who was present at that conference? - -LAHOUSEN: At this conference, which is also recorded in the notes taken -for Canaris, and in which I participated as his representative, the -following were present: - -General Reinecke as the presiding officer, Obergruppenführer Müller of -the RSHA, Colonel Breuer representing the Prisoners of War Department, -and I, as the representative of Canaris, of Ausland-Abwehr. - -COL. AMEN: Will you explain who Müller was and why he was at this -meeting? - -LAHOUSEN: Müller was a division chief in the Reich Central Office of -Security (RSHA), and took part in the session because he was responsible -for putting into practice the measures for the treatment of Russian -prisoners of war, that is, responsible for carrying out the executions. - -COL. AMEN: Will you explain who Colonel Breuer was and why he was there? - -LAHOUSEN: Colonel Breuer was the representative of the Prisoners of War -Department. I do not know of which organization this department was a -part at that time. At any rate, he was responsible in the OKW for -questions relating to prisoners of war. - -COL. AMEN: What was the purpose of this conference? - -LAHOUSEN: The purpose of this conference was to examine the orders -issued for the treatment of Russian prisoners of war, to comment on -them, to explain and account for them on reasonable grounds. - -COL. AMEN: Did you learn from the conversation at this conference what -the substance of these orders under discussion was? - -LAHOUSEN: These orders dealt with two groups of measures which were to -be taken. Firstly, the killing of Russian commissars, and secondly, the -killing of all those elements among the Russian prisoners of war who, -under a special selection program of the SD, could be identified as -thoroughly bolshevized or as active representatives of the Bolshevist -ideology. - -COL. AMEN: Did you also learn from the conversation what the basis for -these orders was? - -LAHOUSEN: The basis for these orders was explained by General Reinecke -in its outlines as follows: - -The war between Germany and Russia is not a war between two states or -two armies, but between two ideologies—namely, the National Socialist -and the Bolshevist ideology. The Red Army soldier must not be looked -upon as a soldier in the sense of the word applying to our western -opponents, but as an ideological enemy. He must be regarded as the -archenemy of National Socialism, and must be treated accordingly. - -COL. AMEN: Did Canaris tell you why he was selecting you to go to this -conference? - -LAHOUSEN: Canaris gave me two or perhaps three reasons and motives for -ordering me to this conference although he himself was in Berlin. -Firstly, he wanted to avoid a meeting with Reinecke, for whom, as the -prototype of the ever-compliant National Socialist general, he possessed -strong personal dislike. Secondly, he told and directed me to attempt -through factual argument—that is, through appeals to reason—to have -this brutal and completely senseless order rescinded or at least -mitigated in its effects as far as possible. He also selected me for -tactical reasons since he, as department chief, could by no means be as -outspoken as I, who, thanks to my subordinate position, could use much -stronger language. Thirdly, he was well acquainted with my personal -attitude, especially in this question, an attitude which I manifested -wherever possible during my many journeys and trips to the front where I -witnessed ill-treatment of prisoners of war. This is also clearly -recorded in my notes. - -COL. AMEN: Did Canaris and the other members of your group have a -particular name for Reinecke? - -LAHOUSEN: Not only among our group but also in other circles, he was -known as the “little Keitel” or the “other Keitel”. - -COL. AMEN: Prior to your going to this conference, did Canaris make any -other comment on these orders? - -LAHOUSEN: Even at the time when these orders were issued, Canaris -expressed strong opposition to them in our circles—when I say our -circles, I mean mainly the divisional chiefs—and had a protest made -through the Ausland Division, that is, through Bürckner. I no longer -remember whether it was made in writing or whether Bürckner made it -orally to Keitel directly; I think it was done in both ways. Bürckner -should be well informed about this. - -COL. AMEN: When you say “protested through Bürckner,” what do you mean? - -LAHOUSEN: When I say Bürckner, I mean his division, or a group, or -perhaps even a representative in his office, where questions of -international law were dealt with by Count Moltke who, incidentally, -also among the circle. . . . - -COL. AMEN: Will you repeat that? - -LAHOUSEN: This protest or this counter-argument on the question of the -treatment of Russian prisoners of war was forwarded by Canaris through -the Ausland Division, that is, through Bürckner. The Ausland Division -included a section which dealt with questions of international law, and -the competent authority in that section was Count Moltke who was a -member of Oster’s inner circle, and who was executed after the 20th of -July. - -THE PRESIDENT: Would that be a convenient time to break off? - -COL. AMEN: Yes, Sir. - -THE PRESIDENT: Until 2 o’clock. - - [_A recess was taken until 1400 hours._] - - - - - _Afternoon Session_ - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes, Colonel Amen. - -[_Witness Lahousen resumed the stand._] - -COL. AMEN: Prior to the luncheon recess you were testifying about a -conference in 1941 with Reinecke and others. Prior to that conference -did Canaris tell you what kind of appeal to make to those present at the -meeting? - -LAHOUSEN: Before the discussion Canaris said, as I have already pointed -out, that I should use factual arguments in order to have this order -withdrawn or at least to weaken its effects, but that otherwise I should -not take it into my head to use arguments of a humanitarian nature lest -I make a fool of myself. - -COL. AMEN: And now will you explain to the Tribunal, to the best of your -recollection, exactly what happened and what was said in the course of -that conference? - -LAHOUSEN: The discussion was opened by General Reinecke, and he -explained these orders in the manner in which I described them before -the recess. He said that these measures were necessary and that it was -essential that this idea should also be made clear to the Wehrmacht, and -particularly to the officers’ corps, since they apparently were still -entertaining ideas which belonged to the Ice Age and not to the present -age of National Socialism. - -COL. AMEN: What views did you present at this conference? - -LAHOUSEN: According to instructions I held the view of the Amt Ausland -Abwehr—that is of Canaris—and in the main I pointed out, first of all, -the most unfavorable effect of such measures on the troops, namely on -the front troops, that they would never understand such orders, -particularly not the simple soldier. Besides, we had reports that the -executions were sometimes carried out before their eyes. - -Secondly, I brought forward the objections of my office in regard to -activities of the office itself, the unfavorable effect of these -measures on the enemy, that is, the virtual hindering of Russians, who -were surrendering to the last man without resistance, from deserting; -and furthermore, the great difficulties which beset the Abwehr Division -in acquiring agents, that is, people who, for various reasons, had -voluntarily declared themselves ready to help the Germans. - -COL. AMEN: In order that this may be clear on the record, because I -think there was quite a bit of confusion in the translation, I want to -point out one or two of those arguments again. What did you say at this -conference about the effect of the execution of these orders on Russian -soldiers? - -LAHOUSEN: I pointed out, first of all, that through these orders some -elements among the Russian soldiers who were inclined to surrender were -prevented from doing so. Secondly, that people who for any reason would -have offered their services to the Abwehr would also be hindered by -these measures. And that, _in summa_, an effect opposite to that which -they had desired would result and the resistance of the Red Army -soldiers would be increased to the utmost. - -COL. AMEN: And in order that we may be perfectly clear, what did you say -about the effect of the execution of these orders on the German troops? - -LAHOUSEN: I said, that from several reports we had from the front, the -effect on the morale and on the discipline of the troops was -devastating. - -COL. AMEN: Was there any discussion about international law at this -conference? - -LAHOUSEN: No. In this connection there was no discussion of -international law. The manner of selection of the prisoners of war was -particularly stressed. It was completely arbitrary apart from the -general order in itself. - -COL. AMEN: We will get to that in a moment. Were your views accepted at -this conference? - -LAHOUSEN: My views which were the views of the Amt Abwehr, which I was -representing, were opposed in the sharpest possible manner by Müller, -who with the usual cliches rejected the arguments that I had produced, -and who made the sole concession that the executions, out of -consideration for the feelings of the troops, should not take place -before them but at a place some distance apart. He also made a few -concessions in the question of the selection, which was completely -arbitrary, and was just left to the Kommando leaders or to the prejudice -of the Kommando leaders. - -COL. AMEN: And subsequent to this conference did you learn whether an -order was issued with respect to having these killings take place -outside the sight of the German troops? - -LAHOUSEN: Except for Müller’s promise, which I have just mentioned, I -heard no more about it at the time. I found a confirmation of the -results of this conference and the promises then made to me in an order -which was submitted to me only now. - -COL. AMEN: Was there a conversation at this conference about the manner -in which these orders for the killings were being executed? - -LAHOUSEN: Yes. In the course of discussions the entire problem was under -discussion including the manner in which these orders were carried -out—according to my recollection—by the Einsatzkommandos of the SD. -These SD squads were in charge both of singling out of persons in camps -and in assembly centers for prisoners of war, and of carrying out the -executions. - -Reinecke also discussed measures regarding the treatment of Russian -prisoners of war in the camps. Reinecke emphatically accepted the -arguments put forth, not by me but by Müller, and voiced his conviction -in very decisive and excessively sharp manner. - -COL. AMEN: Now, will you explain to the Tribunal from what you learned -at this conference the exact manner in which the sorting of these -prisoners was made and in what way it was determined which of the -prisoners should be killed? - -LAHOUSEN: The prisoners were sorted out by Kommandos of the SD and -according to peculiar and utterly arbitrary ways of procedure. Some of -the leaders of these Einsatzkommandos were guided by racial -considerations; particularly, of course, if someone were a Jew or of -Jewish type or could otherwise be classified as racially inferior, he -was picked for execution. Other leaders of the Einsatzkommando selected -people according to their intelligence. Some had views all of their own -and usually most peculiar, so that I felt compelled to ask Müller, “Tell -me, according to what principles does this selection take place? Do you -determine it by the height of a person or the size of his shoes?” - -Müller was very emphatic in rejecting these and any other objections, -and Reinecke adopted rigidly the same point of view as Müller, instead -of accepting my opinions, that is, those of the Amt Ausland Abwehr, -which were offered him as a “golden bridge” for his acceptance. That was -essentially the contents of the discussion in which I participated. - -COL. AMEN: And had you received knowledge about the manner in which -these orders were executed through official reports which you received? - -LAHOUSEN: We were currently informed of all happenings by our officials -at the front or in the camps. Officers of the Abwehr Division III were -active in these camps, and in this way, that is, through the normal -service channels, we were informed by reports and oral presentation of -all these measures and of their effects. - -COL. AMEN: Was the information which you received secret and -confidential information not open to others? - -LAHOUSEN: The information was confidential in accordance with the manner -in which our offices were run. _De facto_, however, the happenings in -the camps and the occurrences taking place at the selections were known -to large groups of the Wehrmacht. - -COL. AMEN: Now, at this conference did you learn anything from Reinecke -with respect to the treatment of Russian prisoners in prison camps? - -LAHOUSEN: In this discussion the treatment of Russian prisoners in the -camps was discussed by Reinecke, and Reinecke was of the opinion that in -the camps their treatment must not be the same as the treatment of other -allied prisoners of war, but that here, too, appropriate and -discriminating measures must be applied. The camp guards, at all events, -had to be furnished with whips, and at the slightest sign of an -attempted escape or other undesirable act, the guards should have the -right to resort to arms. - -COL. AMEN: Besides the whips, what other equipment were the Stalag -guards given? - -LAHOUSEN: Those are details which I do not remember for the moment. I -can only say what was mentioned in this discussion. - -COL. AMEN: What, if anything, did Reinecke say about the whips? - -LAHOUSEN: Reinecke said that the guards, that is, the guard details, -should make use of their whips or sticks or whatever instruments they -had. - -COL. AMEN: Now, through official channels did you learn of an order for -the branding of Russian prisoners of war? - -THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Amen, I think you should refer to them as -“Soviet”, not “Russian” prisoners. - -COL. AMEN: Yes, Your Honor. - -[_Continuing the interrogation._] Did you learn of such an order? - -LAHOUSEN: I have heard about it in one of the discussions at which most -of the previously mentioned divisional chiefs were usually present. At -least a majority of them must have been present. - -COL. AMEN: Do you know whether any protests were made with respect to -that order? - -LAHOUSEN: When the intention of branding these Soviet prisoners was made -known, a very sharp protest was voiced at once by Canaris through the -Amt Ausland, that is, by Bürckner himself. - -COL. AMEN: What, if anything, did Canaris tell you with regard to this -order? - -LAHOUSEN: Canaris told us that the question had already been expounded -in a medical opinion by some physicians; and that there were actually -people to lend themselves to treating such a mad subject in a written -medical opinion. That was the main topic of this discussion. - -COL. Amen: What information, if any, did you receive through official -channels regarding plans to bring Soviet prisoners back to German -territory? - -LAHOUSEN: In the same context and in the same circle—I must always -repeat it—that is, in discussions between Canaris and the chiefs of his -divisions I learned that the General Staff had prepared to bring Soviet -prisoners into Germany, but that their transportation was suddenly -abandoned. I remember that this was by direct order of Hitler—which -resulted in the conditions developing in camps in the theater of -operations where prisoners were crowded together, could not be fed, and -could not be adequately clothed or housed, so that epidemics and -cannibalism resulted in these camps. - -COL. AMEN: I am not sure but what we missed some of your previous -answer. Will you start again to tell us about the change which was made -in these orders? - -LAHOUSEN: Will you please repeat the question? - -COL. AMEN: You referred to a change in the plans to take the Soviet -prisoners back to German territory. Is that correct? - -LAHOUSEN: Yes, they were not brought back into Germany. - -COL. AMEN: And what was the result of this action, namely of their not -being brought back at the direct order of Hitler? - -LAHOUSEN: The result was as described just now. - -COL. AMEN: But I want you to repeat it because we lost some of the -answer in the interpreting process. Please just repeat it again. - -LAHOUSEN: The enormous crowds of prisoners of war remained in the -theater of operation, without proper care—care in the sense of prisoner -of war conventions—with regard to housing, food, medical care; and many -of them died on the bare floor. Epidemics broke out, and -cannibalism—human beings driven by hunger devouring one -another—manifested itself. - -COL. AMEN: Were you personally at the front to observe these conditions? - -LAHOUSEN: I made several trips with Canaris and I saw some of these -things which I have just described, with my own eyes. At the time I made -notes of my impressions which were found amongst my papers. - -COL. AMEN: Did you also obtain information as to these matters through -official channels of the Abwehr? - -LAHOUSEN: Yes, I received this information through the office -subordinate to me and through the Amt Ausland. - -COL. AMEN: From your official information, to what extent was the -Wehrmacht involved in the mistreatment of these prisoners? - -LAHOUSEN: According to my information, the Wehrmacht was involved in all -matters which referred to prisoners of war, except the executions, which -were the concern of the Kommandos of the SD and the -Reichssicherheitshauptamt. - -COL. AMEN: But is it not a fact that the prisoner-of-war camps were -entirely under the jurisdiction of the Wehrmacht? - -LAHOUSEN: Yes, prisoners of war were under the jurisdiction of the -Supreme Command of the Wehrmacht. - -COL. AMEN: But before they were placed in these camps, the Special -Purpose Kommandos of the SS were responsible primarily for the -executions and the selection of the people to be executed, is that -correct? - -LAHOUSEN: Yes. - -COL. AMEN: Did you receive through official channels information -regarding the existence of an order for the killing of British -Commandos? - -LAHOUSEN: Yes. - -COL. AMEN: What action, if any, did Canaris or yourself take with -respect to this order? - -LAHOUSEN: The order, and as far as I remember, even the mere intention -that such an order was to be issued, was discussed in our circle, that -is between Canaris and his section chiefs. We all, of course, -unanimously agreed on its rejection. The reasons, apart from the aspects -of international law, were that the Amt Ausland had under its command a -formation, which was attached to our section named “Regiment -Brandenburg” which had a task similar to the Commandos. As the head of -the section to which this regiment was attached and for which I -considered myself responsible, I immediately and most emphatically -protested against it in view of the retaliation measures which were to -be expected as a result of this order. - -COL. AMEN: Did you personally assist in the drafting of these protests? - -LAHOUSEN: I know that twice a protest was lodged against this order by -Canaris, and by Amt Ausland, through Bürckner. The first time orally, or -in writing as soon as the order was issued, and the second time after -the first executions had been carried out in pursuance of this order. I -myself helped to draft one of these written protests—I do not know -whether the first or the second—making a contribution in the interest -of my section, and the Regiment Brandenburg, whose functions were -similar, very similar, to those of the Commandos. - -COL. AMEN: To whom in the ordinary course did these protests go? - -LAHOUSEN: The protests were addressed to Canaris’ superior officer, that -is to say, to the Chief of the OKW. - -COL. AMEN: Who was that? - -LAHOUSEN: It was Keitel, at that time. - -COL. AMEN: Did these protests in the ordinary course go also to Jodl? - -LAHOUSEN: That I cannot say, but it is possible. - -COL. AMEN: Now, will you tell the Tribunal what were the grounds of the -protests which you made? - -LAHOUSEN: The grounds were above all, that it was contrary to the -interpretation of international law that soldiers, that is to say, not -agents or spies, but soldiers clearly recognizable as such, should be -killed after they had been taken prisoner. That was the main point which -was also of concern to my section since it also comprised soldiers who -had to carry out such or similar tasks in their capacity as soldiers. - -COL. AMEN: Were there any other grounds urged in protest against these -orders? - -LAHOUSEN: Certainly. Other reasons were also mentioned in accordance -with the interests of the different sections affected by these orders. -For the Amt Ausland, it was the point of view of international law. The -Abwehr Division III was particularly interested in the interrogation of -soldiers captured in commando raids, but never in seeing them killed. - -COL. AMEN: Were there any other chiefs of the Abwehr Department who -assisted in the preparation of these protests? - -LAHOUSEN: As far as I remember today, no. - -COL. AMEN: You mentioned Admiral Bürckner, did you not? - -LAHOUSEN: Yes, Bürckner was not the chief of the Amt Ausland Abwehr, but -only of the Amt Ausland. - -COL. AMEN: Now, have you ever heard of an operation known as “Gustav”? - -LAHOUSEN: The name “Gustav” was applied not to an operation but to an -undertaking similar to the one which was demanded for the elimination of -Marshal Weygand. - -COL. AMEN: Will you tell the Tribunal what was the meaning of “Gustav”? - -LAHOUSEN: “Gustav” was the expression used by the Chief of the OKW as a -cover name to be used in conversations on the question of General -Giraud. - -COL. AMEN: When you say the Chief of the OKW, are you referring to -Keitel? - -LAHOUSEN: Yes. - -COL. AMEN: And are you referring to General Giraud of the French Army? - -LAHOUSEN: Yes, General Giraud of the French Army, who, according to my -recollection, fled from Königstein in 1942. - -COL. AMEN: Do you know of any order issued with respect to General -Giraud? - -LAHOUSEN: Yes. - -COL. AMEN: Who issued such an order? - -LAHOUSEN: The Chief of the OKW, Keitel, gave an order of this kind to -Canaris, not in writing but an oral order. - -COL. AMEN: How did you come to know about this order? - -LAHOUSEN: I knew of this order in the same way as certain other chiefs -of the sections, that is Bentivegni, Chief of Abwehr Section I, -Pieckenbrock and a few other officers. We all heard it at a discussion -with Canaris. - -COL. AMEN: What was the substance of the order? - -LAHOUSEN: The essential part of this order was to eliminate Giraud, in a -fashion similar to Weygand. - -COL. AMEN: When you say “eliminate” what do you mean? - -LAHOUSEN: I mean the same as in the case of Marshal Weygand, that is, it -was intended and ordered that he was to be killed. - -COL. AMEN: Do you recall the approximate date when this order was given -by Keitel to Canaris? - -LAHOUSEN: This order was given to Canaris several times. I cannot say -for certain when it was given for the first time as I was not present in -person. It was probably after the flight of Giraud from Königstein and -prior to the attempt on the life of Heydrich, in Prague. According to my -notes, this subject was discussed with me by Keitel in July of the same -year, in the presence of Canaris. - -COL. AMEN: Well now, what did Keitel first say to you personally about -this affair? - -LAHOUSEN: I cannot repeat his exact words, but the meaning was that he -proclaimed the intention of having Giraud killed, and asked me, as in -the case of Weygand, how the matter was progressing or had progressed so -far. - -COL. AMEN: And what did you say to him on that occasion? - -LAHOUSEN: I cannot remember the exact words. I probably gave some -evasive answer, or one that would permit gaining time. - -COL. AMEN: Now, was this question later discussed by you at any time? - -LAHOUSEN: According to my recollection, this question was once more -discussed in August. The exact date can be found in my notes. Canaris -telephoned me in my private apartment one evening and said impatiently -that Keitel was urging him again about Giraud, and the section chiefs -were to meet the next day on this question. - -The next day the conference was held and Canaris repeated in this larger -circle what he had said to me over the phone the night before. That is, -he was being continually pressed by Keitel that something must at last -be done in this matter. Our attitude was the same as in the matter of -Weygand. All those present rejected flatly this new demand to initiate -and to carry out a murder. We mentioned our decision to Canaris, who -also was of the same opinion and Canaris thereupon went down to Keitel -in order to induce him to leave the Military Abwehr out of all such -matters and requested that, as agreed prior to this, such matters should -be left entirely to the SD. - -In the meantime, while we were all there, I remember Pieckenbrock spoke, -and I remember every word he said. He said it was about time that Keitel -was told clearly that he should tell his Herr Hitler that we, the -Military Abwehr, were no murder organization like the SD or the SS. -After a short time, Canaris came back and said it was now quite clear -that he had convinced Keitel that we, the Military Abwehr, were to be -left out of such matters and further measures were to be left to the SD. - -I must observe here and recall that Canaris had said to me, once this -order had been given, that the execution must be prevented at any cost. -He would take care of that and I was to support him. - -COL. AMEN: I don’t think you have yet told us just who was present at -this conference. - -LAHOUSEN: The three Abwehr chiefs were present, Colonel Pieckenbrock, -whom I have already mentioned, Colonel General Bentivegni, and I. -Probably, also General Oster, and possibly Bürckner, but I cannot -remember clearly. In my notes only those three chiefs are mentioned who -all strictly rejected the proposal. - -COL. AMEN: What was the next occasion when this matter was again brought -to your attention? - -LAHOUSEN: A little later, it must have been September, the exact date -has been recorded, Keitel, then chief of the OKW, rang me up in my -private apartment. He asked me, “What about ‘Gustav’? You know what I -mean by ‘Gustav’?” I said, “Yes, I know.” “How is the matter -progressing? I must know, it is very urgent.” I answered, “I have no -information on the subject. Canaris has reserved this matter for -himself, and Canaris is not here, he is in Paris.” Then came the order -from Keitel, or rather, before he gave the order, he put one more -question: “You know that the others are to carry out the order?” By “the -others,” he meant the SS and SD. I answered, “Yes, I know.” Then came an -order from Keitel to immediately inquire of Müller how the whole matter -was progressing. “I must know it immediately,” he said. I said, “Yes,” -but went at once to the office of the Ausland Abwehr, General Oster, and -informed him what had happened, and asked for his advice as to what was -to be done in this matter which was so extremely critical and difficult -for Canaris and me. I told him—Oster already knew as it was—that -Canaris so far had not breathed a word to the SD concerning what it was -to do, that is, murder Giraud. General Oster advised me to fly to Paris -immediately and to inform Canaris and to warn him. I flew the next day -to Paris and met Canaris at a hotel at dinner in a small circle, which -included Admiral Bürckner, and I told Canaris what had happened. Canaris -was horrified and amazed, and for a moment he saw no way out. - -During the dinner Canaris asked me in the presence of Bürckner and two -other officers, that is, Colonel Rudolph, and another officer whose name -I have forgotten, as to the date when Giraud had fled from Königstein -and when the Abwehr III conference had been held in Prague and at what -time the assassination of Heydrich had taken place. I gave these dates, -which I did not know by memory, to Canaris. When he had the three dates, -he was visibly relieved, and his saddened countenance took on new life. -He was certainly relieved in every way. I must add that—at this -important conference of the Abwehr III Heydrich was present. It was a -meeting between Abwehr III and SD officials who were collaborating with -it—officials who were also in the counter-intelligence. - -Canaris then based his whole plan on these three dates. His plan was to -attempt to show that at this conference he had passed on the order to -Heydrich, to carry out the action. That is to say, his plan was to -exploit Heydrich’s death to wreck the whole affair. The next day we flew -to Berlin, and Canaris reported to Keitel that the matter was taking its -course, and that Canaris had given Heydrich the necessary instructions -at the Abwehr III conference in Prague, and that Heydrich had prepared -everything, that is, a special purpose action had been started in order -to have Giraud murdered, and with that the matter was settled and -brought to ruin. - -COL. AMEN: There was a mistake I think in the translation back a little -way. So if you don’t mind, will you please go back to where you first -referred to Heydrich in the conversation with Canaris, and repeat the -story, because I think that the translation was incorrect. In other -words, go back to the point where Canaris suddenly seemed relieved, and -started to tell you what the apparent solution might be. - -LAHOUSEN: All those present saw that Canaris was much relieved, as he -heard the three dates from me. His whole plan or his maneuvering—and -that was typical of his personality—was a purely intellectual or -spiritual combination, built up on these three dates, essential being -the date of the escape of Giraud, and the Abwehr III conference, for if -the Abwehr III conference had taken place prior to Giraud’s escape, then -this combination would probably not have stood the test. - -THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Amen, what is the reason for the repetition? - -COL. AMEN: There was a mistake in the record. If it is the wish of the -Tribunal, I shall not have him repeat it any further. - -THE PRESIDENT: It seems clear to the Tribunal what was said. - -COL. AMEN: Very well. - -COL. AMEN: What, if anything, happened next insofar as the affair Giraud -was concerned? - -LAHOUSEN: Nothing more happened. Giraud fled to North Africa, and much -later only I heard that Hitler was very indignant about this escape, and -said that the SD had failed miserably—so it is said to be written in -shorthand notes in the records of the Hauptquartier of the Führer. The -man who told me this is in the American zone. - -COL. AMEN: Were you acquainted with Colonel Rowehl? - -LAHOUSEN: Yes. - -COL. AMEN: Who was he? - -LAHOUSEN: He was an officer. He was a colonel of the Luftwaffe. - -COL. AMEN: What was the work of the special squadron to which he was -attached? - -LAHOUSEN: Rowehl had a special squadron for altitude flying which -operated together with the Ausland Abwehr for the reconnaissance of -certain territories or states. - -COL. AMEN: Were you ever present when he reported to Canaris? - -LAHOUSEN: I was present occasionally. - -COL. AMEN: Do you recall what Rowehl told Canaris on those occasions? - -LAHOUSEN: He reported on the results of the reconnaissance flights and -submitted his photographs, I believe, to Abwehr I, Section Luft which, -competent for this work, made some evaluation of them. - -COL. AMEN: Did you know over what territories these reconnaissance -flights had been made? - -LAHOUSEN: They were taken over Poland, England and in southeastern -Europe; I cannot be more explicit as I do not know the specific -territories or countries of southeastern Europe. All I know is that this -squadron was stationed in Budapest for the purpose of making such -reconnoitering flights. - -COL. AMEN: Did you personally see some of these photographs? - -LAHOUSEN: Yes. - -COL. AMEN: Now will you tell the Tribunal the dates when you know that -these reconnaissance flights over London and Leningrad were being made? - -LAHOUSEN: I cannot give the exact dates. I only remember, being present -at discussions between Rowehl and Canaris—sometimes Pieckenbrock was -there too—that these reconnaissance flights did take place in the -aforementioned areas, that photographic material was furnished and that -the squadron operated from Hungarian air fields in the vicinity of -Budapest. I know this because once I myself flew back from Budapest to -Berlin in such a plane, and also from knowing some of the pilots and -their activities. - -COL. AMEN: What I am going to ask you about now is the year, or years we -will say, when these reconnaissance flights were being made. - -LAHOUSEN: They were undertaken in 1939 before the beginning of the -Polish campaign. - -COL. AMEN: Were these flights kept secret? - -LAHOUSEN: Yes, of course they were secret. - -COL. AMEN: And why were these flights being made from Hungary, if you -know? - -LAHOUSEN: A Luftwaffe expert would have to give this information. - -COL. AMEN: Do you have in your possession a report of the treatment of -the Jews in certain territories? - -LAHOUSEN: Yes, I have a report which probably came to us through Abwehr -Department III, and I made several copies for Canaris and one for -myself. This report deals with the shooting of Jews in Borrisov. - -COL. AMEN: Is that an official report? - -LAHOUSEN: Yes, it is. The report came by way of the Abwehr. The files -would show from what office it came to us. In connection with these -shootings of Jews in Borrisov the name of a counter-intelligence -officer, whom I knew quite well and who was an Austrian like me, was -mentioned. - -COL. AMEN: Now, may it please the Tribunal, I should like to offer in -evidence a photostatic copy, or copies, of the entries made by the -witness in every detail, together with a photostatic copy of the report. -The originals are here in court, but cannot be lifted out of the box in -which they are contained. They are so much damaged by a bomb explosion -that if they were to be lifted out of the box, they would be destroyed -beyond use, but we have had them photostated, and the photostatic copies -are now available. That letter would be Exhibit USA-80, 3047-PS. - -THE PRESIDENT: Do I understand, Colonel Amen, that only such portions of -these documents as are read in Court will be in evidence? - -COL. AMEN: Well, these have been used by the witness to refresh his -recollection. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I know they have. - -COL. AMEN: And none of them have been read in full in court, but they -may be so read at any time, Sir. - -THE PRESIDENT: If you want them to go into evidence as documents, you -must read them, of course. Colonel Amen, do you want to use the -documents any more than you already used them for the purpose of -refreshing the witness’ memory? - -COL. AMEN: I do not, Sir, except having used them in this fashion, I now -think it is only fair to offer them in evidence for the information and -scrutiny of the Tribunal; as far as I’m concerned they have served their -purpose. - -THE PRESIDENT: If the Defense wants to see them for the purpose of -cross-examination, of course, they may do so. - -COL. AMEN: Oh, yes, Sir. I have offered them already Sir, to be Exhibit -USA-80, 3047-PS. - -THE PRESIDENT: But otherwise they may not be put in evidence. - -COL. AMEN: Correct. - -THE PRESIDENT: From this damaged paper, it seems to contain a report on -the execution of Jews in Borrisov. - -COL. AMEN: Yes. - -THE PRESIDENT: That again will not be in evidence unless you read it. - -COL. AMEN: Correct, Sir. We will include that in the offer which I just -made to you, that unless what we are offering is desired by the Court I -will not offer it in evidence or read it. - -THE PRESIDENT: Very well, the Court does not desire it. - -COL. AMEN: Very well. [_Turning to witness._] As a member of the Abwehr, -were you generally well informed on the plans of the German Reich for -the waging of war? - -LAHOUSEN: Insofar as the effects of the plans concerned the preparatory -activities or co-operation of the Amt Ausland Abwehr. - -COL. AMEN: Did any intelligence information ever come to your attention -which was not available to an ordinary person, or to an ordinary officer -in the Army? - -LAHOUSEN: Yes, certainly. That was in the nature of my office. - -COL. AMEN: And, on the basis of the knowledge which you so obtained, did -you in your group come to any decisions as to whether or not the attack -on Poland, for example, was an unprovoked act of aggression? - -THE PRESIDENT: Well. . . . - -LAHOUSEN: Would you be kind enough to repeat the question? - -THE PRESIDENT: That is one principal question which this Court has to -decide. You cannot produce evidence upon a question which is within the -province of the Court to decide. - -COL. AMEN: Very well, Sir. The witness is now available for -cross-examination. - -THE PRESIDENT: Is it the Soviet Prosecutor’s wish to ask any questions -of this witness? General Rudenko? - -GENERAL R. A. RUDENKO (Chief Prosecutor for the U.S.S.R.): Witness -Lahousen, you have made definite replies to questions by Colonel Amen -and I should like to have certain details. Am I to understand you -rightly that the insurgent units of the Ukrainian nationalists were -organized under the direction of the German High Command? - -LAHOUSEN: They were Ukrainian immigrants from Galicia. - -GEN. RUDENKO: And from these immigrants were formed Commandos? - -LAHOUSEN: Yes. “Commando” perhaps is not quite the right expression. -They were people who were brought together in camps and were given a -military or a semi-military training. - -GEN. RUDENKO: What was the function of these Commandos? - -LAHOUSEN: They were organizations of immigrants from the Galicia -Ukraine, as I already previously stated, who worked together with the -Amt Ausland Abwehr. - -GEN. RUDENKO: What were these troops supposed actually to accomplish? - -LAHOUSEN: Tasks were assigned to them before each combat by the office -in charge of the command, that is, in the case of orders originating -from the office to which I belonged, they were determined by the OKW. - -GEN. RUDENKO: What functions did these groups have? - -LAHOUSEN: These Commandos were to carry out sabotage of all kinds behind -the enemy’s front line. - -GEN. RUDENKO: That is to say in what territory? - -LAHOUSEN: In those territories with which Germany had entered into war, -or speaking of the concrete case here in question, with Poland, or to be -more correct in Poland. - -GEN. RUDENKO: Of course in Poland. Well, sabotage and what else? - -LAHOUSEN: Sabotage, such as wrecking of bridges and other objectives of -military importance. The Wehrmacht operational staff determined what was -of military importance; details of that activity I have just described, -namely, destruction of militarily important objectives or objectives -important for a particular operation. - -GEN. RUDENKO: But what about terroristic activities? I am asking you -about the terroristic activities of these units. - -LAHOUSEN: Political tasks were not assigned to them by us, that is, by -the Amt Ausland Abwehr. Political assignments were made by the -respective Reich offices responsible, where it should be said, often as -a result of erroneous. . . . - -GEN. RUDENKO: You have misunderstood me. You are speaking about sabotage -and I was asking you concerning terroristic acts of these organizations. -Do you understand me? Was terror one of their tasks? Let me repeat -again, as well as the sabotage acts, were there any terror acts assigned -to them? - -LAHOUSEN: On our part never. - -GEN. RUDENKO: You have told me that from your side there was no question -of terrorism; from whose side was the question put, who worked on this -aspect? - -LAHOUSEN: Well, that was the whole point all the time. Each one of these -military Abwehr units was asked again and again to combine our purely -military tasks which were determined by the needs of the Wehrmacht -leadership with political or terroristic measures, as is clearly shown -by the memorandum on our files concerning preparation of the campaign -against Poland. - -GEN. RUDENKO: Answering the question of Colonel Amen as to whether the -Red Army man was looked upon as an ideological enemy and was subjected -to corresponding measures, what do you mean by corresponding measures? I -repeat the question. You have said that the Red Army man was looked upon -by you, I mean by the German High Command as an ideological enemy and -was to be subjected to corresponding measures. What does it mean? What -do you mean by saying corresponding measures? - -LAHOUSEN: By special measures I mean quite clearly all those brutal -methods which were actually used and which I have already mentioned and -of which I am convinced there were many more, more than I could possibly -have seen in my restricted field and more than was known to me. - -GEN. RUDENKO: You already told the Tribunal that there were special -Commandos for the screening of prisoners of war. I understand that they -were screened in the following way: Into those who were to be killed and -the others who were to be interned in camps, is that right? - -LAHOUSEN: Yes, these special Commandos of the SD were concerned, -however, solely with the execution of those selected amongst the -prisoners of war. - -GEN. RUDENKO: That of course makes the chief of the Commandos -responsible and decisive for the question as to who was to die and who -was not to die. - -LAHOUSEN: Yes, in the course of a discussion with Reinecke, the question -was raised whether to give to the head of one such Commando unit the -right to decide who, in view of the order, was to be looked upon as -Bolshevistically tainted or not. - -GEN. RUDENKO: And the chief of the Commando unit decided upon his own -authority, what to do with them. - -LAHOUSEN: Yes, at least up to the date of the discussion in which I -participated, upon an order from Canaris. This point was one of the most -important ones of this discussion. - -GEN. RUDENKO: You have told us about your protest and the protest of -Canaris against these atrocities, killings, and so forth. What were the -results of these protests? - -LAHOUSEN: As I have already stated, there were some very modest results, -so modest that, you can hardly call them results at all. For the fact -that executions were not to take place in sight of the troops but only -at a distance of 500 meters can in no way be called a good result. - -GEN. RUDENKO: What conversation did you have with Müller on this -subject, concerning concessions he had made? You told us when you were -asked by General Alexandrov. . . . - -LAHOUSEN: Who was Alexandrov? - -GEN. RUDENKO: You were questioned by Colonel Rosenblith, a -representative of the Soviet Delegation. I am sorry I made a mistake. -Perhaps you will remember your communication to Colonel Rosenblith -regarding the conversation and the concessions that Müller made. I shall -ask you to tell us that part again. - -LAHOUSEN: The name of Alexandrov does not mean anything to me. What has -the name Alexandrov to do in this connection? - -GEN. RUDENKO: Alexandrov was a mistake on my part. Forget it. I am -interested in the question of Müller, concerning the shootings, -torturings, and so forth. - -LAHOUSEN: I had a long conversation with Müller, especially with regard -to making the selections. I cited, to be concrete, as an example of the -methods used, the case of the Crimean Tartars, Soviet Russian soldiers -who, according to their nationality, originated from the Crimea; and -cases where, for certain reasons, Mohammedan people were declared Jews, -and were then executed. Thus, aside from the brutality of these and all -other similar measures, this proved the entirely irrational point of -view, incomprehensible to any normal person, which characterized the -handling of the entire matter. To that, among other things, I made -reference. - -GEN. RUDENKO: You told us how these measures were carried out. - -THE PRESIDENT: He doesn’t hear you, carry on but go a little bit more -slowly. - -GEN. RUDENKO: Have you finished your report concerning the conversation -with Müller? - -LAHOUSEN: No, I didn’t quite finish, I had many discussions with Müller -on the subject—it was the central point of all these conversations. All -the subjects about which I have given evidence were discussed first with -Müller, who was the competent man, at least in his sector. As for -Reinecke, he then merely decided according to his ideas, which were -contrary to those held by me and my office. I would be grateful if you -would tell me what particular points you would like to have me explain -and I would gladly repeat anything. - -GEN. RUDENKO: Your usual topic of discussion was murders, shootings, and -so forth, especially shootings. I am interested in all that. What did -Müller say about it? How were shootings to take place, especially in -relation to your protests? - -LAHOUSEN: He told me in a rather cynical way, that if the troops were so -terribly disturbed by these shootings, as you claim, and their morale is -suffering therefrom the shootings would simply take place at some -distance, et cetera. That was the main meaning of what he said. - -GEN. RUDENKO: That was the result of your protests? - -LAHOUSEN: Yes, that was the very poor result of the protest, and then -still a certain concession. . . . - -GEN. RUDENKO: And one last question. The conditions of the concentration -camps where Soviet prisoners were taken and where mass destruction of -prisoners was committed was all this dependent on directives of the -German High Command? - -LAHOUSEN: In some sort of cooperation with the competent authorities, -the Reich Main Security Office. In addition to all I have stated, I must -point out that at the time, I myself did not read the orders and that I -learned of the collaboration, or the coordination in this question -mainly from the conversation with Reinecke, who came to me as a -representative of the OKW and with the aforementioned Müller. - -GEN. RUDENKO: Excuse me, did you get that information in private or -official sessions or conversations? - -LAHOUSEN: It was a strictly official meeting called by General Reinecke -as chairman. I was not there as “Lahousen,” but as a representative of -the Amt Ausland Abwehr. - -GEN. RUDENKO: Did the orders which were passed on in these sessions come -to you directly from the German High Command? - -LAHOUSEN: They came from the German High Command and from one of the -highest offices of the RSHA according to what Reinecke said. I have -never seen or read them with my own eyes, therefore this is all I can -state. - -GEN. RUDENKO: But you have heard during these meetings where they were -discussed and when they were discussed. - -LAHOUSEN: Yes, during the discussion, the course of which I have already -described, or at least its essential aspects, of course. - -GEN. RUDENKO: And during these sessions which you mentioned were the -questions raised about murders and burning of cities? - -LAHOUSEN: There was no talk at these discussions about setting on fire, -but mention was made of the orders which had been issued with respect to -the prisoners. - -GEN. RUDENKO: About the murders only. - -LAHOUSEN: About the executions. - -GEN. RUDENKO: That is all. - -THE PRESIDENT: Does the French Prosecutor wish to ask any questions? - -MR. DUBOST: One single question. Who gave the orders for the liquidation -of the Commandos? - -LAHOUSEN: What was it exactly that you meant? Presumably the killing of -members of the Commando troops? - -MR. DUBOST: Who gave the orders for the execution? - -LAHOUSEN: I did not read the order myself, but according to what was -said in our circles about this subject, the idea came from Hitler -himself; but who was responsible for transforming this idea into an -order, I do not know. - -MR. DUBOST: The Defendants Keitel, Jodl—what orders did they handle; -what orders did they give? - -LAHOUSEN: I cannot say that because I do not know it. - -MR. DUBOST: What were the reasons for these orders, as far as you know? - -LAHOUSEN: Not merely was it my opinion, but it was common knowledge, -that the reasons for these orders were to cause an intimidating effect -and thus to prevent and paralyze the activity of the Commandos. - -MR. DUBOST: Who gave the order to have General Giraud executed or -murdered? - -LAHOUSEN: I did not hear the first part of the question. - -MR. DUBOST: Who gave the order to kill Weygand and Giraud? - -LAHOUSEN: The order to liquidate, that is, to be explicit, to murder -Weygand and Giraud, was given to me by Canaris, who received it from -Keitel. This order and this intention regarding the matter Weygand, were -furthermore transmitted to me through direct speech with Keitel. Keitel -asked me after Canaris had read to him a report in my presence, on -December 23, 1940, according to my notes, about the progress in the case -Weygand. - -As regards the second case, that is the case Giraud, I had it from -Canaris himself that the order was sent to him by Keitel—as did also -the other chiefs who were present. I further heard of it a second time -during a report from Canaris to Keitel, in my presence, in July 1942, -when this order was communicated to me in a manner similar to that of -the case Weygand, and, finally, I received it in a direct manner from -Keitel through telephone conversation which I described here, and -transmitted as urgent intelligence. - - [_The British Prosecutor indicated that he had no questions._] - -THE PRESIDENT: Do you want to ask any questions, Dr. Nelte? - -DR. NELTE: The witness, Lahousen, has given very important evidence, -particularly charging in a grave manner the Defendant Keitel, -represented by me. . . . - -THE PRESIDENT: Are you going to make a speech now? - -DR. NELTE: My client, the Defendant Keitel, would like to put numerous -questions to the witness after he has had a discussion with me. I -therefore ask the Tribunal to allow either that there may be a -considerable adjournment now or that at the next session these questions -may be discussed in cross-examination. - -THE PRESIDENT: Very well. You shall have an opportunity to cross-examine -at 10 o’clock tomorrow. Does any member of the Tribunal wish to ask any -questions of the witness now? - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): I should like to ask the witness whether the -orders to kill the Russians and in connection therewith the treatment of -the prisoners were in writing. - -LAHOUSEN: As far as I know, yes, but I did not see or read these orders -myself. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Were they official orders? - -LAHOUSEN: Yes, they were official orders, of course, though the facts -were brought out in a roundabout way. It was these orders which Reinecke -and the others discussed and this is how I learned about the essential -points of these orders. I did not read them myself at that time. But I -knew that they were not oral agreements because they were commented -upon; consequently I knew that something existed in writing. Only I -could not and cannot say whether there were one or more orders, and who -signed them. This I did not claim to know. I submitted my knowledge -which is based solely on discussions and reports from which I quite -clearly could deduct the existence of orders. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Do you know to whom or to what organizations -such orders were usually addressed? - -LAHOUSEN: Orders of this kind, involving the question of principle, went -to the OKW, because things relating to prisoners of war were and had to -be the concern of the OKW, and in particular of Reinecke, which also -explains the discussions with Reinecke. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): So usually the members or some of the members -of the General Staff would have known of such orders, would they not? - -LAHOUSEN: Certainly, many members of the Wehrmacht knew of the essential -contents of this order, for the reaction of the Wehrmacht against this -order was tremendous. Apart from official discussions which I have -reported here, these orders were discussed a great deal in casino clubs -and elsewhere, because all these matters became manifest in the most -undesirable form and had a most undesirable effect on the troops. As a -matter of fact, officers, and high-ranking officers at the front, either -did not transmit these orders or sought to evade them in some way and -this was discussed a great deal. I have named some of these officers; -some are listed in the notes, diary, _et cetera_. It was not an everyday -occurrence, and it was then the topic of the day. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): And were the orders known to the leaders of -the SA and SD? - -LAHOUSEN: They must have been known to them, for the ordinary soldiers -who watched all these proceedings knew and spoke about them. To a -certain extent they were even known to the civilian populace; civilians -learned far more details about these matters from wounded soldiers -returning from the front than I could tell here. - -THE PRESIDENT: General Nikitchenko wants to ask a question. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Major General I. T. Nikitchenko): You have told us that -you received instructions about the murder of prisoners of war and -brutal treatment. You received these orders from Reinecke? - -LAHOUSEN: Well, I must correct something that I said. It is not I and -not the Amt Ausland Abwehr who got the order, because we had nothing to -do with it, but I knew about it, as I was present at this conference as -a representative of the Amt Ausland Abwehr. But we ourselves had nothing -to do with the treatment of prisoners of war, and certainly not in this -negative sense. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): Apart from these meetings, the meetings -of the High Command, were such instructions ever given? Were there any -meetings of the High Command headquarters about killings and -ill-treatment of prisoners of war? - -LAHOUSEN: There certainly must have been a number of discussions on this -subject, but I was present at only one of them, which I have already -described, so I cannot say anything more about it. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): At headquarters? - -LAHOUSEN: In the OKW—at headquarters. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): At the headquarters of the German Army? - -LAHOUSEN: Certainly in the OKW where Amt Ausland Abwehr had sent a -delegate in my person, if for no other reason than to enter protest. As -a matter of fact our Amt had nothing to do with prisoners of war in this -sense. But contrarywise we were, because of technical and easily -understandable reasons, interested in proper treatment of the prisoners. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): The meetings were not about good -treatment of prisoners, but rather about ill-treatment and killing them? -Was Ribbentrop also present at these meetings? - -LAHOUSEN: No! On no account. This discussion—I mean the one conference -about which I have given testimony—took place after the accomplished -fact. Everything had already happened; executions had taken place, and -now effects began to make themselves felt. Protests of all kinds, from -the front and from other places, such as, for example, our own office, -Amt Ausland Abwehr, followed. This conference was intended to show the -necessity for the orders which had already been given, and to justify -measures already taken. These discussions took place after the beginning -of the operations, after the orders which had been given had already -been carried out, and all that I have touched upon or stated had already -happened and produced its evil effects. The accomplished fact had been -thoroughly discussed with the idea of making one more attempt, a last -attempt on our part, to put to an end, and break off, the matter. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): Did all these conversations bring about -results? - -LAHOUSEN: That is what I talked about, and that was the subject of the -discussions with Reinecke in which I took part. I did not take part in -the other discussions and therefore can say nothing about them. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): At which other meetings had orders been -given about killings of Ukrainians and burning of towns and villages in -Galicia? - -LAHOUSEN: I would like to achieve clarity relative to what the General -has in mind. Am I being asked about the conference in the Führer’s train -in 1939 prior to the fall of Warsaw? According to the entries in -Canaris’ diary, it took place on 12 September 1939. This order or -directive which Ribbentrop issued and which Keitel transmitted to -Canaris, Ribbentrop also giving it to Canaris during a brief discussion, -was in reference to the organizations of National Ukrainians with which -Amt Abwehr cooperated along military lines, and which were to bring -about an uprising in Poland, an uprising which aimed to exterminate the -Poles and the Jews; that is to say, above all, such elements as were -always being discussed in these conferences. When Poles are mentioned, -the intelligentsia especially are meant, and all those persons who -embodied the national will of resistance. This was the order given to -Canaris in the connection I have already described and as it has already -been noted in the memorandum. The idea was not to kill Ukrainians but, -on the contrary, to carry out this task of a purely political and -terroristic nature together with the Ukrainians. The cooperation between -Amt Ausland Abwehr and these people who numbered only about 500 or 1000, -and what actually occurred can be clearly seen from the diary. This was -simply a preparation for military sabotage. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): These instructions were received from -Ribbentrop and Keitel? - -LAHOUSEN: They came from Ribbentrop. Such orders which concerned -political aims couldn’t possibly come from Amt Ausland Abwehr because -any. . . . - -THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): I am not asking you whether they could -or could not. I am asking you where they came from. - -LAHOUSEN: They came from Ribbentrop, as is seen from the memorandum. -This is the memorandum that I made for Canaris. - -DR. DIX: I have three short questions. May I put them? - -THE PRESIDENT: It is now past 4, and we have to hear the requests of the -Defendant Hess, and the Court has to be cleared for them. So I think you -had better postpone them until tomorrow. - -[_A recess was taken and all defendants except Hess were removed from the - courtroom._] - -THE PRESIDENT: I call upon counsel for the Defendant Hess. - -DR. GÜNTHER VON ROHRSCHEIDT (Counsel for Defendant Hess): May it please -the Tribunal, I am speaking as counsel for the Defendant Rudolf Hess. - -In the proceedings which have already been opened against Hess, the -Court is to decide solely the question whether the defendant is fit or -unfit to be heard, and further, whether he might even be considered -entirely irresponsible. - -The Court itself has posed this question affecting the proceedings -against Hess by asking the experts to state their opinion, firstly, on -whether the defendant is in a position to plead on the charge; secondly, -on his state of mind, whether he is mentally sound or not. - -With regard to question 1 (Is the defendant in a position to plead?) the -Tribunal asked the experts specifically whether the defendant is -sufficiently in possession of his mental faculties to understand the -proceedings and to conduct his defense adequately—that is, to repudiate -a witness to whom he has objections and to understand details of the -evidence. - -The experts to whom this task was entrusted have, in separate groups, -examined Hess for a few days and have stated their expert opinion on -these questions in writing. As the defendant’s counsel I consider it my -duty, after studying the reports of these experts, which unfortunately, -I could not do as carefully as I desired since time was short, and in -view of my knowledge of the defendant and my experience in almost daily -contact with him, to state my opinion that the defendant Hess is not in -a position to plead in the case against him. - -I am therefore obliged to file the following applications on behalf of -the Defendant Hess: - -Firstly, I request a ruling to suspend the proceedings against Hess -temporarily. Secondly, if his inability to plead is recognized by the -Tribunal, I request that the proceedings against the defendant be not -conducted in his absence. Thirdly, if the Tribunal rules that Hess is -fit to plead, I request that in addition other competent psychiatrists -be consulted for an authoritative opinion. - -Before I come to the reasons for my applications, I should like to say, -at the request of the defendant, that he himself considers he is fit to -plead and would himself like to inform the Court to that effect. - -May I now state the reasons for my application: - -In regard to my first application: If the defendant is not fit to plead, -I request that the proceedings against Hess be temporarily suspended. - -In this connection may I refer to the opinions already submitted to the -Tribunal. - -After examining the questions placed before them by the Tribunal, the -experts have come to the conclusion which is embodied in what I may call -the main report signed by a mixed delegation consisting as far as I -could determine of English, Soviet, and American experts, and dated 14 -November 1945. - -This report states, I quote: “The ability of the Defendant Hess is -impaired”—that is—“the ability to defend himself, to face a witness, -and to understand details of the evidence.” I have cited this part of -the report because it is closest to the questions put to the experts by -the Tribunal. - -Another opinion says that “. . . even if Hess’ amnesia does not prevent -the defendant from understanding what happens around him and to follow -the proceedings in Court. . . .” - -THE PRESIDENT [_Interposing_]: Would you speak a little more slowly? The -interpreters are not able to interpret so fast. - -Would you also refer us expressly to those parts of the medical reports -to which you wish to draw our attention? - -Do you understand what I said? - -DR. VON ROHRSCHEIDT: Yes. I am sorry I cannot refer to the pages of the -original or English text, as I only have the German translation; so I -can only say that the first quotation. . . . - -THE PRESIDENT [_Interposing_]: You can read the words in German, and -they will be translated into English. - -Which report are you referring to? - -DR. VON ROHRSCHEIDT: I was referring to the report of 14 November as far -as I can see from my German translation. This report seems to have been -drawn up by a delegation of English, Soviet, and American experts, and -accompanied the report of 17 November 1945. What I quoted was the -following—may I repeat: - - “The ability of the Defendant Hess to defend himself, to face a - witness, and to understand details of the evidence is impaired.” - -I ask the Tribunal to tell me. . . . - -THE PRESIDENT: Can you say which of the doctors you are quoting? - -DR. VON ROHRSCHEIDT: It is the report which, in my copy, is dated 14 -November 1945, and, as I said, was presumably signed by Soviet, -American, and English doctors. - -Unfortunately, when returning the material yesterday evening after -translation into German I could not get the original text, and my -attempt to obtain it now failed through lack of time. - -THE PRESIDENT: Have the English prosecutors got a copy, and can you tell -us which it is? - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I’m sorry, My Lord, I think I am in the same -difficulties as your Lordship. On the order that I have, I have copies -of four medical reports. Your Lordship will see at the end of the -document headed “Order,” it says, “Copies of four medical reports are -attached.” - -The first one of these is signed by three English doctors on the 19th of -November. The second is signed by three American doctors and a French -doctor, dated the 20th of November 1945. And then there is a report -signed by three Soviet doctors, dated the 17th of November. And one is -signed by three Soviet doctors and the French doctor dated the 16th of -November. These are the only ones which I have with the Court’s order. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes. - -I don’t know what this report is that you are referring to. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Dr. Von Rohrscheidt seems to have an unsigned -report of the 14th. - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Von Rohrscheidt, have you got the four reports which -are really before us? I will read them out to you. - -The first one I have got in my hand is the 19th of November 1945, by -Lord Moran, Dr. Rees, and Dr. Riddoch. Have you got that? That is the -English report. - -DR. VON ROHRSCHEIDT: I only have this report in the German translation -and not in the original. - -THE PRESIDENT: But if you have got it in the German translation, that is -quite good enough. - -Then the next one is dated the 20th of November 1945, by Dr. Jean Delay, -Dr. Nolan Lewis, Dr. Cameron, and Colonel Paul Schroeder. Have you got -that? - -DR. VON ROHRSCHEIDT: Yes, I have that. - -THE PRESIDENT: That is two. - -Then, the next one is dated the 16th of November, and is signed by three -Soviet doctors and one French doctor, Dr. Jean Delay, dated the 16th of -November. Have you got that? - -DR. VON ROHRSCHEIDT: Yes. - -THE PRESIDENT: Then there is another report of the 17th, signed by the -three Soviet doctors alone, without the French doctor. - -DR. VON ROHRSCHEIDT: Yes, I have that one. - -THE PRESIDENT: Now, will you refer us to the passages in those reports -upon which you rely? - -There is another report by two English doctors which is practically the -same. That is the one I have already referred to, that does not contain -the name of Lord Moran on it, dated the 19th of November. - -DR. VON ROHRSCHEIDT: Yes, I think I can shorten the proceedings by -saying that in my opinion all the reports surely agree—even if not in -the same words—that the ability of the accused Hess to defend himself, -to face a witness, and to understand details of the evidence is -impaired. And under this assumption that all the medical opinions agree -on this point I, as the defendant’s counsel, must come to the conclusion -that the defendant is unable to plead. The reduced capacity of the -defendant to defend himself, which is caused by his mental defect, -recognized by all experts as amnesia and described as a mental condition -of a mixed character, but more than mere mental abnormality, must be -accepted as meaning that he is unfit to plead. - -I am of the opinion that the conclusion reached by the medical experts -implies that, in the way the question was formulated, the Defendant Hess -cannot adequately defend himself on account of this mental defect, -namely, amnesia. The medical reports also state that the defendant is -not insane. That is not the important point at the moment because in my -view it can already be convincingly stated, on the basis of the reports -as such that on account of his reduced mental ability the defendant is -not in a condition to understand the entire proceedings. - -I myself believe—and I think that my opinion on this agrees with the -medical opinion—that the defendant is completely incapable of making -himself understood in a manner expected from a mentally normal -defendant. - -In view of my own experience with him I consider that the defendant is -incapable of grasping the charges which the Prosecution will bring -against him to the extent required for his defense, since his memory is -completely impaired. On account of his loss of memory he neither -remembers events of the past nor the persons with whom he associated in -the past. I am, therefore, of the opinion that defendant’s own claim -that he is fit to plead is irrelevant. And since, as the medical report -says, his condition cannot be rectified within appreciable time, I think -that the proceedings against him should be suspended. - -Whether the narco-synthesis treatment suggested by the medical experts -will bring about the desired effect is uncertain. It is also uncertain -within what period of time this treatment would result in the complete -recovery of the defendant’s health. The medical reports accuse the -defendant of deliberately refusing to undergo such medical treatment. -The defendant himself, however, tells me that, on the contrary, he would -readily undergo treatment but that he refuses the suggested cure because -firstly, he believes that he is completely sound and fit to plead, that -therefore this cure is unnecessary; secondly, because he disapproves on -principle of such violent intervention, and finally because he thinks -that such an intervention at this time might render him unfit to plead -and to take part in the proceedings—and that is the very thing he -wishes to avoid. - -If, however, the defendant is incapable of pleading, or of defending -himself, as is stated in the medical report, and if this condition is -likely to last for a long time, then in my opinion, a basis exists for -the temporary suspension of the proceedings against him. - -Coming now to my second application: - -If the Tribunal accepts my arguments and declares the Defendant Hess -unfit to plead, then, according to Article 12 of the Charter, it would -be possible to proceed against the defendant _in absentia_. Article 12 -provides that the Tribunal has the right to proceed against a defendant -in his absence if he cannot be found, or if for other reasons the -Tribunal deems it necessary in the interests of justice. The question -then is whether it is in the interest of justice to proceed against the -defendant _in absentia_. In my opinion it is incompatible with real -justice to proceed against the defendant if he is prevented by his -impaired condition—namely, amnesia which is recognized by all the -medical experts—from personally safeguarding his rights by attending -the proceedings. - -In a trial in which charges being brought against the defendant are so -grave that they might entail the death penalty, it seems to me -incompatible with real justice that the defendant should on account of -his impaired condition, be deprived of the rights granted him under -Article 16 of the Charter. This Article of the Charter makes provisions -for the defendant’s own defense, for the opportunity of giving evidence -personally, and for the possibility of cross-examining every witness -called by the Prosecution. All this is of such great importance for the -Defense, that exclusion from any of these rights would, in my opinion, -constitute a grave injustice to the defendant. A trial _in absentia_ -could therefore not be regarded as a fair trial. - -If as I have stated the defendant’s capacity to defend himself is -reduced for the reasons agreed on and to the extent established in the -reports of the experts, then he is also not in a position to give his -counsel the information necessary for a defense conducted in the -defendant’s absence. - -Since the Charter has clearly laid down these rights of the defendant’s, -it seems unjust to me as defense counsel, that the defendant should be -deprived of them because his illness prevents him from personally -safeguarding them by attending the proceedings. - -The provisions in Article 12 of the Charter for trying a defendant in -his absence must surely be looked upon as applying in an exceptional -case of a defendant who endeavors to evade the proceedings although able -to plead. But the Defendant Hess has told me, and he will probably -emphasize it to the Tribunal, that he wishes to attend the proceedings; -that he will therefore consider it particularly unjust if the -proceedings are conducted in his absence, despite his good will, despite -the fact that he wishes to attend them. - -I therefore request the Tribunal, if it declares the defendant unfit to -plead, that it will not proceed against him in his absence. - -And now my third application: - -If the Tribunal considers the Defendant Hess fit to plead, thereby -overruling my opinion and what I think is also the conclusion of the -medical reports, I request that additional medical experts be consulted -to re-examine this question since as far as I saw from the reports, each -of the doctors examined and talked to the defendant for only a few hours -on one day, one of them on two days. In a case of such outstanding -importance as this one I think it would be necessary to place the -defendant into a suitable hospital to obtain a reliable picture based on -several weeks of examination and observation. The experts themselves -are, obviously, not quite sure whether Defendant Hess beyond his -inability to plead, is insane or at least not of sound mind. That is -clear from the fact that all the medical statements end by emphasizing -that if the Tribunal does not consider the defendant unfit to plead, he -should again be subjected to a psychiatric examination. - -I think therefore that this suggestion of the psychiatrists who have -already examined him should be followed, and I request, that if the -Tribunal considers the defendant fit to plead another exhaustive medical -examination be authorized. - -THE PRESIDENT: I want to ask you one question: Is it not consistent with -all the medical opinions that the defendant is capable of understanding -the course of the proceedings, and that the only defect from which he is -suffering is forgetfulness about what happened before he flew to -England? - -DR. VON ROHRSCHEIDT: Mr. President, it is true that the experts consider -the Defendant Hess capable of following the proceedings. But, on the -other hand, in answer to the questions put to them, they emphasize that -the defendant is not capable of defending himself. The Tribunal asked -the experts to give their opinion on the question—may I read it again, -under the second point: “Is the defendant sane or not?” The question was -answered in the affirmative by all experts, but that does not exclude -the fact that the defendant might, at this moment, be incapable of -pleading. The Tribunal’s question was this: “. . . the Tribunal wishes -to be advised whether the defendant is of sufficient intellect to -comprehend the course of the proceedings of the Trial so as to make a -proper defense, to challenge a witness, to whom he might wish to object, -and to understand the details of the evidence.” This is the wording of -the translation in my possession. In my view this question is answered -by the experts to the effect that the defendant is incapable of -adequately defending himself, of rejecting the testimony of a witness -and of comprehending evidence submitted. That, as I see it, is the -conclusion of all the experts’ reports with the exception of the one -signed by the Russians. - -May I refer to the report signed by the American Delegation, dated 20 -November 1945, it is stated there under Number 1: - - “We find as a result of our examinations and investigations, - that Rudolf Hess is suffering from hysteria characterized in - part by loss of memory.” - -Now comes the passage to which I should like to draw the Tribunal’s -attention: - - “The loss of memory is such that it will not interfere with his - comprehension of the proceedings, but it will interfere with his - response to questions relating to his past and will interfere - with his undertaking his defense.” - -This report thus establishes that Hess’ defense will be impaired. And I -believe that if the experts go so far as to admit that his memory is -affected, then one may assume that to a great degree he is not fit to -plead. The report of the Soviet-French representatives, signed by the -Russian professors and by Professor Jean Delay goes even further in -stating that, although the defendant is able to comprehend all that -happens around him, the amnesia affects his capacity to defend himself -and to understand details of the past and that it must be considered an -impediment. As I see it, the report clearly means that, although the -defendant is not insane, and although he can follow the proceedings as -such, he cannot defend himself as he is suffering from a form of amnesia -which is based on hysteria and which can be believed. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Do you accept the opinion of the experts? - -DR. VON ROHRSCHEIDT: Yes. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): I should like to draw the attention of -Defense Counsel to the fact that he has referred inaccurately to the -decision reached by the Soviet and French experts. He has rendered this -decision in a free translation which does not correspond to the original -contents. - -DR. VON ROHRSCHEIDT: May I ask whether the report of November 16 is -meant? May I once more read what my translation says? I can only refer -to the translation of the English text that was given to me; this -translation was made in the Translation Division of the Secretariat and -handed to me. - -May I repeat that the translation in my possession refers to the report -of November 16, 1945 signed by members of the Soviet Delegation and by -Professor Delay of Paris. - -Under point 3 of this report the following is stated: - - “At present he is not insane in the strict sense of the word. - His amnesia does not prevent him completely from understanding - what is going on around him but it will interfere with his - ability to conduct his defense and to understand details of the - past which would appear as factual data.” - -That is the text which I have here before me in the authentic German -version. - -THE PRESIDENT: That is all we wish to ask you. Does the Chief Prosecutor -for the United States wish to address the Tribunal? - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I think General Rudenko would like to open -discussion, if that is agreeable. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes. Are you going on? - -GEN. RUDENKO: In connection with the statement made by counsel for the -defendant, on the results of the evidence of Hess’ certified -psychological condition, I consider it essential to make the following -declaration: - -The defendant’s psychological condition was confirmed by experts -appointed by the Tribunal. These experts came to the unanimous -conclusion that he is sane and responsible for his actions. The Chief -Prosecutors, after discussing the results of the decision and acting in -accordance with the order of the Tribunal, make the following reply to -the inquiry of the Tribunal: - -First of all, we do not question or doubt the findings of the -commission. We consider that the Defendant, Rudolf Hess, is perfectly -able to stand his trial. This is the unanimous opinion of the Chief -Prosecutors. I consider that the findings of the examinations by the -experts are quite sufficient to declare Hess sane and able to stand his -trial. We therefore request the Tribunal to make the requisite decision -this very day. - -In stating his reasons for the postponement of the proceedings or for -the settlement of the defendant’s case, defense counsel referred to the -decision of the experts. I must state, however, that this decision—and -I do not know on what principle it was reached—was quoted quite -inaccurately. In the summary submitted by defense counsel, it is pointed -out that the mental condition of the Defendant Hess does not permit him -to defend himself, to reply to the witnesses or to understand all the -details of the evidence. This is contrary to the decision submitted by -the experts in their statement. The final conclusion of the experts -definitely states that his loss of memory would not entirely prevent him -from understanding the trial; it would, however, make it impossible for -him to defend himself and to remember particulars of the past. I -consider that these particulars, which Hess is unable to remember, would -not unduly interest the Tribunal. The most important point is that -emphasized by the experts in their decision, a point which they -themselves never doubted and which, incidentally, was never doubted by -Hess’ defense counsel, namely—that Hess is sane; and in that case Hess -comes under the jurisdiction of the International Tribunal. On the basis -of these facts I consider that the application of the Defense should be -denied as being unsubstantiated. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: May it please the Tribunal, it has been -suggested that I might say just a word, and as shortly as the Tribunal -desires, as to the legal conceptions which govern the position with -which the Tribunal and this defendant are placed at the present time. - -The question before the Tribunal is whether this defendant is able to -plead to the Indictment and should be tried at the present time. - -If I might very briefly refer the Tribunal to the short passages in the -report, which I submit are relevant, it might be useful at the present -time. According to the attachments to the order, which I have, the first -report is that signed by the British doctors on the 19th November 1945. -And in that report I beg the Tribunal to refer to Paragraph 3, in which -the signatories say that at the moment he is not insane in the strict -sense. His loss of memory will not entirely interfere with his -comprehension of the proceedings, but it will interfere with his ability -to make his defense and to understand details of the past, which arise -in evidence. - -The next report is that signed by the American and French doctors, and -in Paragraph 1, the Tribunal will see: - - “We find, as a result of our examinations and investigations, - that Rudolf Hess is suffering from hysteria characterized in - part by loss of memory. The nature of this loss of memory is - such that it will not interfere with his comprehension of the - proceedings, but it will interfere with his response to - questions relating to his past and will interfere with his - undertaking his defense.” - -If the Tribunal will proceed to the third report, signed by the Soviet -doctors, at the foot of Page 1 of the copy that I have there is a -paragraph beginning “Psychologically . . .” which I submit is of -importance: - - “Psychologically, Hess is in a state of clear consciousness; - knows that he is in prison at Nuremberg, under indictment as a - war criminal; has read, and, according to his own words, is - acquainted with the charges against him. He answers questions - rapidly and to the point. His speech is coherent, his thoughts - formed with precision and correctness and they are accompanied - by sufficient emotionally expressive movements. Also, there is - no kind of evidence of paralogism. - - “It should also be noted here, that the present psychological - examination, which was conducted by Lieutenant Gilbert, Ph. D., - bears out the testimony, that the intelligence of Hess is normal - and in some instances, above the average. His movements are - natural and not forced.” - -Now, if I may come to the next report, I am sorry—the report which is -signed by the three Soviet doctors and Professor Delay of Paris, dated -the 16th, which is the last in my bundle, that says in Paragraph 3: - - “At present, he is not insane in the strict sense of the word. - His amnesia does not prevent him completely from understanding - what is going on around him, but it will interfere with his - ability to conduct his defense and to understand details of the - past, which would appear as factual data.” - -I refer, without quoting, because I do not consider that they are of -such importance on this point, to the explanation of the kind and reason -of the amnesia which appeared in the Soviet report, dated 17 November, -under the numbers 1, 2, and 3 at the end of the report. But I remind the -Tribunal that all these reports unite in saying that there is no form of -insanity. - -In these circumstances, the question in English law—and I respectfully -submit that to the consideration of the Tribunal as being representative -of natural justice in this regard—is, in deciding whether the defendant -is fit to plead, whether the defendant be insane or not, and the time -which is relevant for the deciding of that issue is at the date of the -arraignment and not at any prior time. - -Different views have been expressed as to the party on whom the onus of -proof lies in that issue, but the later, and logically the better view, -is that the onus is on the Defense, because it is always presumed that a -person is sane until the contrary is proved. - -Now, if I might refer the Court to one case which I suspect, if I may so -use my mind, has not been absent from the Court’s mind, because of the -wording of the notice which we are discussing today, it is the case of -Pritchard in 7 Carrington and Pike, which is referred to in Archibolds’ -_Criminal Pleading_ in the 1943 edition, at Page 147. - -In Pritchard’s case, where a prisoner arraigned on an indictment for -felony appeared to be deaf, dumb, and also of non-sane mind, Baron -Alderson put three distinct issues to the jury, directing the jury to be -sworn separately on each: Whether the prisoner was mute of malice, or by -the visitation of God; (2) whether he was able to plead; (3) whether he -was sane or not. And on the last issue they were directed to inquire -whether the prisoner was of sufficient intellect to comprehend the -course of the proceedings of the trial so as to make a proper defense, -to challenge a juror, that is, a member of the jury, to whom he might -wish to object and to understand the details of the evidence; and he -directed the jury that if there was no certain mode of communicating to -the prisoner the details of the evidence so that he could clearly -understand them, and be able properly to make his defense to the charge -against him, the jury ought to find that he was not of sane mind. - -I submit to the Tribunal that the words there quoted, “to comprehend the -course of the proceedings of the trial so as to make a proper defense,” -emphasize that the material time, the only time which should be -considered, is whether at the moment of plea and of trial the defendant -understands what is charged against him and the evidence by which it is -supported. - -THE PRESIDENT: And does not relate to his memory at that time. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is, I respectfully agree with Your -Lordship, it does not relate to his memory. It has never, in English -jurisprudence, to my knowledge, been held to be a bar either to trial or -punishment, that a person who comprehends the charge and the evidence -has not got a memory as to what happened at the time. That, of course, -is entirely a different question which does not arise either on these -reports or on this application as to what was the defendant’s state of -mind when the acts were committed. No one here suggests that the -defendant’s state of mind when the action charged was committed was -abnormal, and it does not come into this case. - -THE PRESIDENT: He will, it seems to me, be able to put forward his -amnesia as part of his defense. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Certainly, My Lord. - -THE PRESIDENT: And to say, “I should have been able to make a better -defense if I had been able to remember what took place at the time.” - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, My Lord. If I might compare a very simple -case within my experience, and I am sure within the experience of -members of the Court where this has arisen scores of times in English -courts, after a motor accident when a man is charged with manslaughter -or doing grievous bodily harm, he is often in the position of saying, -“Because of the accident my memory is not good or fails as to the acts -charged.” That should not, and no one has ever suggested that it could, -be a matter of relief from criminal responsibility. I hope that the -Tribunal will not think that I have occupied too much of their time, but -I thought it was useful just to present the matter on the basis of the -English law as I understand it. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Sir David, so I can understand you, one of -the tests under the Pritchard case is whether or not the defendant can -make a proper defense, is it not? - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: With the greatest respect, you have got to read -that with the preceding words, which limit it. They say, “Whether a -prisoner was of sufficient intellect to comprehend the course of the -proceedings of the trial so as to make a proper defense.” - -THE TRIBUNAL: (Mr. Biddle): And would you interpret that to mean that -this defendant could make a proper defense under the procedure of the -trial if you also find as a fact, which you, I think, do not dispute, -and which you quoted in fact, that although not insane—now I quote that -he did not understand, or rather: - - “His amnesia does not prevent him completely from understanding - what is going on around him, but it will interfere with his - ability to conduct his defense, and understand details of the - past. . . .” - -You don’t think that is inconsistent with that finding? - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: No, I am submitting it is not. It is part of his -defense, and it may well be, “I don’t remember anything about that at -all.” And he could actually add to that, “From my general behavior or -from other acts which I undoubtedly have done, it is extremely unlikely -that I should do it.” That is the defense which is left to him. And he -must take that defense. That is my submission. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): So even if we assume, for the purpose of -argument, that his amnesia is complete, and that he remembers nothing -that occurred before the indictment though now understanding the -proceedings, you think he should be tried? - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I submit he should be tried. That is my -submission as to the legal position. I especially didn’t discuss, of -course, as the Tribunal will appreciate—I didn’t discuss the quantum of -amnesia here because I am putting that to the Tribunal. I wanted to put -before the Tribunal the legal basis on which this application is -opposed. Therefore I accept readily the extreme case which the learned -American judge has put to me. - -THE PRESIDENT: M. Donnedieu de Vabres would like to ask a question. - -THE TRIBUNAL (M. De Vabres): I would like to know in what period the -real amnesia of Hess applies. He pretends to have forgotten facts which -occurred more than 15 days ago. It may be simulation or, as they say in -the report, it may be real simulation. I would like to know if according -to the reports Hess has really lost his memory of facts which are -referred to in the Indictment, facts which pertain to the past covered -by the Indictment. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: The facts which are included in the Indictment, -the explanation that the doctors give as to his amnesia, is most clearly -set out in these paragraphs of the Soviet report. That is the third -report dated the 17th of November 1945, Page 2, and the numbered -paragraphs 1 to 3. They say first: - - “In the psychological personality of Hess there are no changes - typical of the progressive schizophrenic disease”—that is, - there are no changes typical of a progressive double personality - developing.—“and therefore, the delusions, from which he - suffered periodically while in England, cannot be considered as - manifestations of a schizophrenic paranoia, and must be - recognized as the expression of a psychogenic paranoic reaction, - that is, the psychologically comprehensible reaction”—now I ask - the learned French judge to note the next sentence—“of an - unstable personality to the situation (the failure of his - mission, arrest, and incarceration). Such is the interpretation - of the delirious statements of Hess in England as is bespoken by - their disappearance, appearance, and repeated disappearance - depending on external circumstances which affected the mental - state of Hess.” - -Paragraph 2: - - “The loss of memory by Hess is not the result of some kind of - mental disease but represents hysterical amnesia, the basis of - which is a subconscious inclination towards self-defense”—now I - ask the learned French judge to note again the next words—“as - well as a deliberate and conscious tendency towards it. Such - behavior often terminates when the hysterical person is faced - with an unavoidable necessity of conducting himself correctly. - Therefore the amnesia of Hess may end upon his being brought to - trial.” - -Paragraph 3: - - “Rudolf Hess, prior to his flight to England, did not suffer - from any kind of insanity, nor is he now suffering from it. At - the present time he exhibits hysterical behavior with signs - of”—and again I ask the learned French judge to note this - point—“with signs of a conscious-intentional (simulated) - character, which does not exonerate him from his responsibility - under the Indictment.” - -The last sentence is a matter for the Tribunal. But in these -circumstances it would be impossible to say that the amnesia may -continue to be complete or is entirely unconscious. That is deliberately -avoided by the learned doctors. Therefore the Prosecution do not say -that that is the case, but they do say that even if it were complete, -the legal basis which I have suggested to the Court is a correct one for -action in this matter. - -THE PRESIDENT: Thank you, Sir David. Would Dr. Rohrscheidt like to add -anything by way of reply? One moment. Mr. Justice Jackson, I gathered -from what Sir David said that he was speaking on behalf of you and of -the French Prosecution, is that correct? - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I intend to adopt all that he said. I would only -add a few more words, if I may. - -THE PRESIDENT: Doctor Rohrscheidt, Mr. Justice Jackson has something to -say first of all. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I adopt all that has been said, and will not -repeat. We have three applications before the Tribunal. One is for -another examination. I will spend very little time on that. I think that -we have made, up to this point with this examination, medical history in -having seven psychiatrists from five nations who are completely in -agreement. An achievement of that kind is not likely to be risked. - -The only reason suggested here is that a relatively short time has been -devoted to the examination, but I suggest to Your Honors that that is -not the situation, because there have been available the examinations -and observations and medical history during the incarceration of Hess in -England, extending from 1941, and the reports of the psychiatrists of -the American forces since he was brought to Nuremberg, and they all -agree. So that there is a more complete medical history in this case -than in most cases. - -The next application was as to trial in absentia. I shall spend no time -on that, for there seems to be no occasion for trying Hess _in absentia_ -if he shouldn’t be tried in his presence. If he is unable to be tried, -why, he simply shouldn’t be tried at all. That is all I can see to it. - -I would like to call your attention to the one thing in all this, the -one statement on which any case can be made here for postponement. That -is the statement with which we all agree: That Hess’ condition will -interfere with his response to questions relating to his past and will -interfere with his undertaking his defense. Now, I think it will -interfere with his defense if he persists in it, and I am sure that -counsel has a very difficult task. But Hess has refused the treatment, -and I have filed with the court the report of Major Kelly, the American -psychiatrist, in whose care he was placed immediately after he was -brought here. - -He has refused every simple treatment that has been suggested. He has -refused to submit to the ordinary things that we submit to every -day—blood tests, examinations—and says he will submit to nothing until -after the trial. The medication which was suggested to bring him out of -this hysterical situation—every psychiatrist agrees that this is simply -an hysterical situation if it is genuine at all—was the use of -intravenous drugs of the barbital series, either sodium amytal or sodium -phenotal, the ordinary sort of sedative that you perhaps take on a -sleepless night. We did not dare administer that, to be perfectly -candid, against his objection, because we felt if that, however -harmless—and in over a thousand cases observed by Major Kelly there -have been no ill effects although some cases are reported where there -have—we felt that if should he be struck by lightning a month afterward -it would still be charged that something that we had done had caused his -death; and we did not desire to impose any such treatment upon him. - -But I respectfully suggest that a man cannot stand at the bar of the -Court and assert that his amnesia is a defense to his being tried, and -at the same time refuse the simple medical expedients which all agree -might be useful. - -He is in the volunteer class with his amnesia. When he was in England, -as the reports show, he is reported to have made the statement that his -earlier amnesia was simulated. He came out of this state during a period -in England, and went back into it. It is now highly selective. That is -to say, you can’t be sure what Hess will remember and what he will not -remember. His amnesia is not of the type which is a complete blotting -out of the personality, of the type that would be fatal to his defense. - -So we feel that so long as Hess refuses the ordinary, simple expedients, -even if his amnesia is genuine, that he is not in a position to continue -to assert that he must not be brought to trial. We think he should be -tried, not in absentia, but that this trial should proceed. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Isn’t Hess asserting that he wants to be -tried? - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, I don’t know about that. He has been -interrogated and interrogated by us, interrogated by his co-defendants, -and I wouldn’t attempt to say what he would now say he wants. I haven’t -observed that it is causing him any great distress. Frankly, I doubt -very much if he would like to be absent, but I wouldn’t attempt to speak -for him. - -THE PRESIDENT: Does M. Dubost wish to add anything? - -[_M. Dubost indicated that he did not._] - -DR. VON ROHRSCHEIDT: May I just say a few words to the Tribunal to -explain my point of view once more? - -Firstly, it is a fact that the Defendant Hess, according to the -unanimous reports of the doctors, is not insane, that his mental -faculties are not impaired. - -Secondly, as all reports agree, the Defendant Hess is suffering from -amnesia. The reports vary on whether this amnesia is founded on a -pathological, a psychogenic, or hysterical basis, but they agree that it -exists as an unsound mental condition. The defendant is therefore, not -insane, but has a mental defect. Legally, therefore, he cannot claim -that he is not to be held responsible for his actions; for at the time -when the actions with which he is charged were committed, he was -certainly not insane, and consequently can be held responsible. It is a -different question, however, at least according to German law, whether -the defendant is at this moment in a position to follow the proceedings -of a trial, that is, whether he is fit to plead. And on the basis of the -medical reports which I quoted, I think this question should be answered -negatively. He is not fit to plead. - -I admit that doubts are possible, that the Tribunal may have doubts -whether the answers of the experts are sufficient to establish that the -defendant’s ability to plead is actually impaired, that he cannot, as -the Tribunal perhaps deliberately phrased it, defend himself adequately. -I think that perhaps the emphasis should be on this last point. It is my -opinion that the amnesia—this loss of memory confirmed by all -experts—is such that the defendant is unable to make an adequate -defense. It may be, of course, that he can defend himself on one point -or another, that he can raise objections on some points, and that he may -be able to follow the proceedings as such. But his defense could not be -termed adequate in the sense in which the defense of a person in full -possession of his mental faculties would be adequate. - -May I add one word. I already mentioned that the defendant told me that -he would like to attend the proceedings, as he does not consider himself -unfit to plead, but that, in the opinion of the Defense, is quite -irrelevant. It is a question which the Tribunal must examine, and in -which the personal opinion of the defendant is of no account. - -With regard to the conclusion which the American prosecutor draws from -the defendant’s refusal to undergo the narco-synthesis treatment -suggested by the doctors—that _is_ not a question of truculence. He -refused it only because, as he assured me, he was afraid that the -intravenous injections at this particular moment might incapacitate him -in his weakened condition and make it impossible for him to follow the -proceedings; he wants, however, to attend the trial. He refused also -because, as I have already mentioned, he himself thinks that he is sound -and therefore says, “I do not need any intravenous injections, I shall -recover in the course of time.” The defendant also told me that he has -an abhorrence of such treatments. I know that to be true, because in the -unhappy times of the National Socialist regime, he was always in favor -of natural remedies. He even founded the Rudolf Hess Hospital in -Dresden, which uses natural and not medical remedies. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: May I make one observation, Your Honors? - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: The argument illustrates the selectivity of the -memory of which I spoke to you. Hess apparently can inform his counsel -about his attitude toward this particular matter during the National -Socialist regime. His counsel is able to tell us how he felt about -medical things during the National Socialist regime, but when we ask him -about anything in which he participated that might have a criminal -aspect, the memory becomes bad. I hope that the Court has not overlooked -the statement of the matters that he does well recollect. - -DR. VON ROHRSCHEIDT: May I make a correction? - -THE PRESIDENT: It is unusual to hear counsel in a second reply, but as -Mr. Justice Jackson has spoken again we will hear what you have to say. - -DR. VON ROHRSCHEIDT: I merely want to say that I was misunderstood. It -was not the defendant who told me that he always favored natural -remedies; I said that from my own knowledge. I said it from my own -experience to show that he has an instinctive aversion for medical -interference. My remark was not based on the memory of the defendant, -but on knowledge of my own. - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Rohrscheidt, the Tribunal would like, if you consider -it proper, that the Defendant Hess should state what his views on this -question are. - -DR. VON ROHRSCHEIDT: As his defense counsel, I have certainly no -objection, and in my opinion it is the defendant’s own wish to be heard. -The Tribunal would then be able to gain a personal impression of his -condition. - -THE PRESIDENT: He can state whether he considers himself fit to plead -from where he is. - -HESS: Mr. President, I would like to say this. At the beginning of the -proceedings this afternoon I gave my defense counsel a note saying that -I thought the proceedings could be shortened if I would be allowed to -speak. I wish to say the following: - -In order to forestall the possibility of my being pronounced incapable -of pleading, in spite of my willingness to take part in the proceedings -and to hear the verdict alongside my comrades, I would like to make the -following declaration before the Tribunal, although, originally, I -intended to make it during a later stage of the trial: - -Henceforth my memory will again respond to the outside world. The -reasons for simulating loss of memory were of a tactical nature. Only my -ability to concentrate is, in fact, somewhat reduced. But my capacity to -follow the trial, to defend myself, to put questions to witnesses, or to -answer questions myself is not affected thereby. - -I emphasize that I bear full responsibility for everything that I did, -signed or co-signed. My fundamental attitude that the Tribunal is not -competent, is not affected by the statement I have just made. I also -simulated loss of memory in consultations with my officially appointed -defense counsel. He has, therefore, represented it in good faith. - -THE PRESIDENT: The trial is adjourned. - - [_The Tribunal adjourned until 1 December 1945 at 1000 hours._] - - - - - TRANSCRIBER NOTES - -Punctuation and spelling has been maintained except where obvious -printer errors have occurred such as missing periods or commas for -periods. English and American spellings occur throughout the document -depending on the author. Multiple occurrences of the following spellings -which differ and are found throughout this volume are as follows: - - cooperate co-operate - coordidnated co-ordinated - gas wagons gas-wagons - peace time peacetime - Ausland Abwehr Ausland-Abwehr - Governor General Governor-General - -Although some sentences may appear to have incorrect spellings or verb -tenses, the original text has been maintained as it represents what the -tribunal read into the record and reflects the actual translations -between the German, English, Russian and French documents presented in -the trial(s). - -An attempt has been made to produce this ebook in a format as close as -possible to the original document's presentation and layout. - -[The end of _Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International -Military Tribunal: Nuremberg 14 November 1945-1 October 1946 (Vol. 2)_, -by Various.] - - - - - -End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of Trial of the Major War Criminals -Before the International Militar, by Various - -*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK TRIAL--MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS, VOL II *** - -***** This file should be named 51882-0.txt or 51882-0.zip ***** -This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: - http://www.gutenberg.org/5/1/8/8/51882/ - -Produced by Larry Harrison, Cindy Beyer and the online -Distributed Proofreaders Canada team at -http://www.pgdpcanada.net with images provided by The -Internet Archives-US - -Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions will -be renamed. - -Creating the works from print editions not protected by U.S. copyright -law means that no one owns a United States copyright in these works, -so the Foundation (and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United -States without permission and without paying copyright -royalties. 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} - </style> - <style type="text/css"> - h1 { font-size:1.5em; text-align:center; line-height:150%; } - h2 { font-size:1.2em; text-align:center; } - .literal-container { margin-top:.5em; margin-bottom:.5em } - div.lgc { margin-top:.5em; margin-bottom:.5em } - p { margin-top: 0em; margin-bottom: 0em; } - div.blockquote { margin-top:.5em; margin-bottom:.5em; } - body { font-size:100%; } - </style> - </head> - <body> - - -<pre> - -The Project Gutenberg EBook of Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the -International Military Tribunal, Volume II, by Various - -This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and most -other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions -whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms of -the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online at -www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the United States, you'll have -to check the laws of the country where you are located before using this ebook. - -Title: Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal, Volume II - Nuremburg 14 November 1945-1 October 1946 - -Author: Various - -Release Date: April 28, 2016 [EBook #51882] - -Language: English - -Character set encoding: UTF-8 - -*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK TRIAL--MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS, VOL II *** - - - - -Produced by Larry Harrison, Cindy Beyer and the online -Project Gutenberg team at -http://www.pgdpcanada.net with images provided by The -Internet Archives-US - - - - - - -</pre> - -<div class='figcenter'> -<img src='images/cover.jpg' alt='' id='iid-0000' style='width:350px;height:auto;'/> -</div> - -<hr class='pbk'/> - -<div class='lgc' style=''> <!-- rend=';' --> -<p class='line' style='margin-top:2em;font-size:1.5em;'>TRIAL</p> -<p class='line' style='margin-top:.2em;margin-bottom:.2em;font-size:.7em;'>OF</p> -<p class='line' style='font-size:1.5em;'>THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS</p> -<p class='line'> </p> -<p class='line' style='font-size:.7em;'>BEFORE</p> -<p class='line'> </p> -<p class='line' style='font-size:1.2em;'>THE INTERNATIONAL</p> -<p class='line' style='font-size:1.2em;'>MILITARY TRIBUNAL</p> -<p class='line'> </p> -<p class='line' style='font-size:.7em;'><span class='gesp'>NUREMBERG</span></p> -<p class='line' style='margin-top:.2em;font-size:.7em;'>14 NOVEMBER 1945-1 OCTOBER 1946</p> -<p class='line'> </p> -<div class='figcenter'> -<img src='images/title.jpg' alt='' id='iid-0001' style='width:80px;height:auto;'/> -</div> -<p class='line'> </p> -<p class='line'> </p> -<p class='line' style='font-size:.7em;'><span class='gesp'>PUBLISHED AT NUREMBERG, GERMANY</span></p> -<p class='line' style='margin-top:.2em;font-size:.7em;'><span class='gesp'>1947</span></p> -</div> <!-- end rend --> - -<hr class='pbk'/> - -<div class='literal-container' style='margin-top:4em;margin-bottom:20em;'><div class='literal'> <!-- rend=';fs:.8em;' --> -<p class='line' style='font-size:.8em;'>This volume is published in accordance with the</p> -<p class='line' style='font-size:.8em;'>direction of the International Military Tribunal by</p> -<p class='line' style='font-size:.8em;'>the Secretariat of the Tribunal, under the jurisdiction</p> -<p class='line' style='font-size:.8em;'>of the Allied Control Authority for Germany.</p> -</div></div> <!-- end rend --> - -<hr class='pbk'/> - -<div class='lgc' style='margin-top:8em;margin-bottom:4em;'> <!-- rend=';' --> -<p class='line'>VOLUME II</p> -<p class='line'> </p> -<p class='line'> </p> -<hr class='tbk100'/> -<p class='line'> </p> -<p class='line' style='font-size:1.2em;'><span class='gesp'>OFFICIAL TEXT</span></p> -<p class='line'> </p> -<p class='line' style='font-size:.8em;'><span class='gesp'>IN THE</span></p> -<p class='line'> </p> -<p class='line' style='font-size:1.2em;'>ENGLISH LANGUAGE</p> -<p class='line'> </p> -<hr class='tbk101'/> -<p class='line'> </p> -<p class='line'> </p> -<p class='line'> </p> -<p class='line' style='font-size:1.2em;'><span class='gesp'>PROCEEDINGS</span></p> -<p class='line'> </p> -<p class='line' style='font-size:1.2em;'>14 November 1945-30 November 1945</p> -</div> <!-- end rend --> - -<hr class='pbk'/> - -<p class='line' style='text-align:center;margin-top:4em;margin-bottom:2em;font-size:1.5em;'>CONTENTS</p> - -<table id='tab1' summary='' class='center'> -<colgroup> -<col span='1' style='width: 7em;'/> -<col span='1' style='width: 20em;'/> -<col span='1' style='width: 2em;'/> -</colgroup> -<tr><td class='tab1c1 tab1c1-col2 tdStyle0' colspan='2'>Preliminary Hearing, Wednesday, 14 November 1945</td><td class='tab1c3 tdStyle1'><a href='#Page_1'>1</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class='tab1c1 tdStyle0'></td><td class='tab1c2 tdStyle0'> </td><td class='tab1c3 tdStyle1'> </td></tr> -<tr><td class='tab1c1 tab1c1-col2 tdStyle0' colspan='2'>Preliminary Hearing, Thursday, 15 November 1945</td><td class='tab1c3 tdStyle1'><a href='#Page_18'>18</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class='tab1c1 tdStyle0'></td><td class='tab1c2 tdStyle0'> </td><td class='tab1c3 tdStyle1'> </td></tr> -<tr><td class='tab1c1 tab1c1-col2 tdStyle0' colspan='2'>Preliminary Hearing, Saturday, 17 November 1945</td><td class='tab1c3 tdStyle1'><a href='#Page_26'>26</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class='tab1c1 tdStyle0'></td><td class='tab1c2 tdStyle0'> </td><td class='tab1c3 tdStyle1'> </td></tr> -<tr><td class='tab1c1 tdStyle0'>First Day,</td><td class='tab1c2 tdStyle0'>Tuesday, 20 November 1945,</td><td class='tab1c3 tdStyle1'></td></tr> -<tr><td class='tab1c1 tdStyle0'></td><td class='tab1c2 tdStyle0'>Morning Session</td><td class='tab1c3 tdStyle1'><a href='#Page_29'>29</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class='tab1c1 tdStyle0'></td><td class='tab1c2 tdStyle0'>Afternoon Session</td><td class='tab1c3 tdStyle1'><a href='#Page_57'>57</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class='tab1c1 tdStyle0'></td><td class='tab1c2 tdStyle0'> </td><td class='tab1c3 tdStyle1'> </td></tr> -<tr><td class='tab1c1 tdStyle0'>Second Day,</td><td class='tab1c2 tdStyle0'>Wednesday, 21 November 1945,</td><td class='tab1c3 tdStyle1'></td></tr> -<tr><td class='tab1c1 tdStyle0'></td><td class='tab1c2 tdStyle0'>Morning Session</td><td class='tab1c3 tdStyle1'><a href='#Page_95'>95</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class='tab1c1 tdStyle0'></td><td class='tab1c2 tdStyle0'>Afternoon Session</td><td class='tab1c3 tdStyle1'><a href='#Page_118'>118</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class='tab1c1 tdStyle0'></td><td class='tab1c2 tdStyle0'> </td><td class='tab1c3 tdStyle1'> </td></tr> -<tr><td class='tab1c1 tdStyle0'>Third Day,</td><td class='tab1c2 tdStyle0'>Thursday, 22 November 1945,</td><td class='tab1c3 tdStyle1'></td></tr> -<tr><td class='tab1c1 tdStyle0'></td><td class='tab1c2 tdStyle0'>Morning Session</td><td class='tab1c3 tdStyle1'><a href='#Page_156'>156</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class='tab1c1 tdStyle0'></td><td class='tab1c2 tdStyle0'>Afternoon Session</td><td class='tab1c3 tdStyle1'><a href='#Page_178'>178</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class='tab1c1 tdStyle0'></td><td class='tab1c2 tdStyle0'> </td><td class='tab1c3 tdStyle1'> </td></tr> -<tr><td class='tab1c1 tdStyle0'>Fourth Day,</td><td class='tab1c2 tdStyle0'>Friday, 23 November 1945,</td><td class='tab1c3 tdStyle1'></td></tr> -<tr><td class='tab1c1 tdStyle0'></td><td class='tab1c2 tdStyle0'>Morning Session</td><td class='tab1c3 tdStyle1'><a href='#Page_203'>203</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class='tab1c1 tdStyle0'></td><td class='tab1c2 tdStyle0'>Afternoon Session</td><td class='tab1c3 tdStyle1'><a href='#Page_226'>226</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class='tab1c1 tdStyle0'></td><td class='tab1c2 tdStyle0'> </td><td class='tab1c3 tdStyle1'> </td></tr> -<tr><td class='tab1c1 tdStyle0'>Fifth Day,</td><td class='tab1c2 tdStyle0'>Monday, 26 November 1945,</td><td class='tab1c3 tdStyle1'></td></tr> -<tr><td class='tab1c1 tdStyle0'></td><td class='tab1c2 tdStyle0'>Morning Session</td><td class='tab1c3 tdStyle1'><a href='#Page_254'>254</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class='tab1c1 tdStyle0'></td><td class='tab1c2 tdStyle0'>Afternoon Session</td><td class='tab1c3 tdStyle1'><a href='#Page_277'>277</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class='tab1c1 tdStyle0'></td><td class='tab1c2 tdStyle0'> </td><td class='tab1c3 tdStyle1'> </td></tr> -<tr><td class='tab1c1 tdStyle0'>Sixth Day,</td><td class='tab1c2 tdStyle0'>Tuesday, 27 November 1945,</td><td class='tab1c3 tdStyle1'></td></tr> -<tr><td class='tab1c1 tdStyle0'></td><td class='tab1c2 tdStyle0'>Morning Session</td><td class='tab1c3 tdStyle1'><a href='#Page_302'>302</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class='tab1c1 tdStyle0'></td><td class='tab1c2 tdStyle0'>Afternoon Session</td><td class='tab1c3 tdStyle1'><a href='#Page_323'>323</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class='tab1c1 tdStyle0'></td><td class='tab1c2 tdStyle0'> </td><td class='tab1c3 tdStyle1'> </td></tr> -<tr><td class='tab1c1 tdStyle0'>Seventh Day,</td><td class='tab1c2 tdStyle0'>Wednesday, 28 November 1945,</td><td class='tab1c3 tdStyle1'></td></tr> -<tr><td class='tab1c1 tdStyle0'></td><td class='tab1c2 tdStyle0'>Morning Session</td><td class='tab1c3 tdStyle1'><a href='#Page_348'>348</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class='tab1c1 tdStyle0'></td><td class='tab1c2 tdStyle0'>Afternoon Session</td><td class='tab1c3 tdStyle1'><a href='#Page_375'>375</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class='tab1c1 tdStyle0'></td><td class='tab1c2 tdStyle0'> </td><td class='tab1c3 tdStyle1'> </td></tr> -<tr><td class='tab1c1 tdStyle0'>Eighth Day,</td><td class='tab1c2 tdStyle0'>Thursday, 29 November 1945,</td><td class='tab1c3 tdStyle1'></td></tr> -<tr><td class='tab1c1 tdStyle0'></td><td class='tab1c2 tdStyle0'>Morning Session</td><td class='tab1c3 tdStyle1'><a href='#Page_394'>394</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class='tab1c1 tdStyle0'></td><td class='tab1c2 tdStyle0'>Afternoon Session</td><td class='tab1c3 tdStyle1'><a href='#Page_417'>417</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class='tab1c1 tdStyle0'></td><td class='tab1c2 tdStyle0'> </td><td class='tab1c3 tdStyle1'> </td></tr> -<tr><td class='tab1c1 tdStyle0'>Ninth Day,</td><td class='tab1c2 tdStyle0'>Friday, 30 November 1945,</td><td class='tab1c3 tdStyle1'></td></tr> -<tr><td class='tab1c1 tdStyle0'></td><td class='tab1c2 tdStyle0'>Morning Session</td><td class='tab1c3 tdStyle1'><a href='#Page_435'>435</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class='tab1c1 tdStyle0'></td><td class='tab1c2 tdStyle0'>Afternoon Session</td><td class='tab1c3 tdStyle1'><a href='#Page_456'>456</a></td></tr> -</table> - -<hr class='pbk'/> - -<div><span class='pageno' title='1' id='Page_1'></span><h1>PRELIMINARY HEARING<br/> <span style='font-size:smaller'>Wednesday, 14 November 1945</span></h1></div> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT (Lord Justice Lawrence): Is Counsel for -Gustav Krupp von Bohlen in Court?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. THEODOR KLEFISCH (Counsel for Defendant Krupp von -Bohlen): Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Do you wish to make your motion now?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. KLEFISCH: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Will you make your motion?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. KLEFISCH: Mr. President, gentlemen: As defense counsel -for Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach, I repeat the request which has -already been made in writing, to suspend the proceedings against -this defendant, at any rate, not to carry out the Trial against this -defendant. I leave it to this High Court to decide whether it should -suspend proceedings against Krupp for the time being or altogether.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>According to the opinion of the specialists, who were appointed -by this Court for the investigation of the illness of Krupp, Krupp -von Bohlen und Halbach is not able, on account of his serious -illness, to appear at this Trial without danger to his life. Their -opinion is that he is suffering from an organic disturbance of the -brain and that mental decline makes the defendant incapable of -reacting normally to his surroundings.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>From that it follows that Krupp is not capable of informing his -defense. Furthermore, the report states that the deterioration of -his physical and mental powers has already been going on for -several years and that since Krupp was involved in an auto accident -on 4 December 1944, he can only speak a few disconnected words -now and again, and during the last two months has not even been -able to recognize his relatives and friends. On the basis of these -facts one can only establish that Krupp has no knowledge of the -serving of the Indictment of 19 October. Thus he does not know -that he is accused and why.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The question now arises whether, in spite of this permanent -inability to appear for trial, in spite of this inability to inform -his defense, and in spite of his not knowing of the Indictment -and its contents, Krupp can be tried in absentia. Article 12 of the -Charter gives the right to the Tribunal to take proceedings against -people who are absent, under two conditions: First, if the accused -cannot be found; second, if the Tribunal, for other reasons, thinks -it is necessary in the interests of justice, to try him <span class='it'>in absentia</span>. -<span class='pageno' title='2' id='Page_2'></span> -Since the first condition, impossibility of finding the defendant, is -immediately eliminated, it must be examined whether the second -condition can be applied, that is, whether it is necessary, in the interests -of justice, to try Krupp.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The Defense is of the opinion that justice does not demand a -trial against Krupp <span class='it'>in absentia</span>, that this would even be contrary -to justice. I want to quote the following reasons: The decision on -this question must come from the concept of justice in the sense -of Article 12 of the Charter. We must take into account here that -the 12th Article is purely a regulation concerning procedure. The -question arises, however, whether the Trial against Krupp in his -absence would be a just procedure. In my opinion, a just procedure -is only then given if it is, as a whole or in its particular regulations, -fashioned in such a way that an equitable judgment is guaranteed. -That is a judgment whereby the convicted defendant will be punished -accordingly and the innocent exonerated from guilt and -punishment.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Is it possible that a just judgment can be guaranteed if a defendant -is tried <span class='it'>in absentia</span>, who through no fault of his own, cannot -appear and defend himself, who cannot inform his defense counsel, -and who does not even know that he is accused and for what -reason? To ask this question is to deny it. Even the regulations of -the Charter concerning the rights of the defendant in the preliminary -procedure and in the main Trial, oblige us to answer this -question with “no”.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The following regulations are applicable here:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>According to Article 16 (a), the accused shall receive a copy of -the Indictment before the Trial.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>According to Article 16 (b), the defendant in the preliminary -procedure, and in the main Trial, has the right to declare his own -position in the face of each accusation.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>According to Article 16 (c), a preliminary interrogation of the -defendant should take place.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>According to Article 16 (d), the defendant shall decide whether -he wishes to defend himself or to have somebody else defend him.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>According to Article 16 (e), the defendant has the right to submit -evidence himself and to cross-examine each witness.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The Defendant Krupp could not make use of any of these rights.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>According to Article 24 the same also applies to the special -rights, which have been accorded the defendants for the main -Trial: The defendant should declare his position in the main Trial, -that is, whether he pleads guilty or not.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In my opinion, this is a declaration which is extremely significant -for the course of the Trial and of the decision, and the defendant -can only do this in persona. I do not know whether it is admissible -<span class='pageno' title='3' id='Page_3'></span> -that Defense Counsel may make this declaration of “guilty” or “not -guilty” for the defendant, and even if this were admissible, Defense -Counsel would not be able to make this declaration because he had -no opportunity to come to any understanding with the defendant.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Finally, the accused, who is not present, cannot exercise his right -of a final plea.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The Charter, which has decreed so many and such decisive regulations -for the rights of the defendant, thereby recognizes that the -personal exercise of these rights which were granted to the accused -is an important source of knowledge for the finding of an equitable -judgment, and that a trial against such a defendant, who is incapable -of exercising these rights through no fault of his own, -cannot be recognized as a just procedure in the sense of Article 12.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I should like to go further, however, by saying that the procedure -<span class='it'>in absentia</span> against Krupp, would be contrary to justice, not -only according to the provisions of the Charter but also according -to the generally recognized principles of the law of procedure of -civilized states.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>So far as I am informed, no law of procedure of a continental -state permits a court procedure against somebody who is absent, -mentally deranged, and completely incapable of arguing his case. -According to the German Law of Procedure, the trial must be postponed -in such a case (Paragraph 205 of the German Code of Criminal -Law). If prohibiting the trial of a defendant, who is incapable -of being tried, is a generally recognized principle of procedure -(<span class='it'>principe général de droit reconnu par des nations civilisées</span>) in -the sense of Paragraph 38 (c) of the Statute of the International -Court in The Hague, then a tribunal upon which the attention of -the whole world is, and the attention of future generations will be -directed, cannot ignore this prohibition.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The foreign press, which in the last days and weeks has repeatedly -been concerned with the law of the Charter, almost -unanimously stresses that the formal penal procedure must not -deviate from the customs and regulations of a fair trial, as is -customary in civilized countries; but it does not object, as far as -the penal code is concerned, to a departure from the principles -recognized heretofore, because justice and high political considerations -demand the establishment of a new international criminal -code with retroactive effect in order to be able to punish war -criminals.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I wish to add another point here, which may be important for -the decision on the question discussed. This High Court would -naturally not be able to acquire an impression of the personality -of Krupp, an impression which in such an extraordinarily significant -trial is a valuable means of perception, which cannot be underestimated -for the judgment of the incriminating evidence. If, in the -<span class='pageno' title='4' id='Page_4'></span> -Charter, trial <span class='it'>in absentia</span> is permitted on principle against defendants -who cannot be located, then corresponding laws of procedure -of all states, and even of the German Code of Criminal Procedure -agree to that.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>A defendant who has escaped is absolutely different from a -defendant who cannot argue his case, because in contrast to the -latter, he has the possibility of appearing in court and thus, of -defending himself. If he deliberately avoids this possibility, then -he arbitrarily makes himself responsible for the disadvantages and -dangers entailed by his absence. In this case, naturally, there would -be no question of an unjust trial.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The view has been expressed in recent days and weeks that -world opinion demands a trial against the Defendant Krupp under -all circumstances, and even <span class='it'>in absentia</span>, because Krupp is the owner -of the greatest German armament works and also one of the principal -war criminals. So far as this demand of world opinion is based -on the assumption that Krupp is one of the principal war criminals, -it must be replied that this accusation is as yet only a thesis of -the Prosecution, which must first be proved in the Trial.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The essential thing, however, in my opinion, is that it is not -important whether world opinion or, perhaps, to use an expression -forged in the Nazi work-shop, “the healthy instincts of the people,” -or even political considerations play a part in the decision of this -question, but that the question (Article 12) must be decided uniquely -from the point of view of whether justice demands the trial against -Krupp. I do not want to deny that the cries of justice may be the -same as the cries echoing world opinion. However, the demands -of world opinion and the demands of justice may be in contradiction -to each other.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In the present case, however, a contradiction between the demands -of world opinion for a trial against Krupp <span class='it'>in absentia</span> and -the demands of justice exists because, as I just related, it would -violate the recognized principles of the legal procedures of all states -and especially Article 12 of the Charter, to try a mentally deranged -man who cannot defend himself in a trial in which everything is -at stake for the defendant,—his honor, his existence, and above -all, the question of whether he belongs to the accursed circle of -the arch-war criminals who brought such frightful misery to humanity -and to their own Fatherland. I do not even wish, however, -to put the disadvantages and dangers for the man and the interests -of the defendant into the foreground. Much more significant are -the dangers and disadvantages of such an unusual procedure for -basic justice, because the procedure against such a defendant, who -is unfit for trial due to his total inability to conduct his defense -properly, cannot guarantee a just and right decision. This danger -for basic justice, must, in my opinion, be avoided by a court of -<span class='pageno' title='5' id='Page_5'></span> -such unequalled world historical importance, which has assumed the -noble and holy task, by punishment of the war criminals, of preventing -the repetition of such a horrible war as the second World -War and of opening the gates to permanent peace for all peoples of -the earth.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Justice Jackson, do you oppose the -motion?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE ROBERT H. JACKSON (Chief of Counsel for the -United States): Appearing in opposition to this motion, I should, -perhaps, first file with the Tribunal my commission from President -Truman to represent the United States in this proceeding. I will -exhibit the original commission and hand a photostat to the Secretary.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I also speak in opposition to this motion on behalf of the Soviet -Union and with the concurrence of the French Delegation which is -present. I fully appreciate the difficulties which have been presented -to this Tribunal in a very loyal fashion by the distinguished -representative of the German legal profession who has appeared -to protect the interests of Krupp, and nothing that I say in opposing -this motion is to imply any criticism of Counsel for Krupp who is -endeavoring to protect the interest of his client, as it is his duty -to do, but he has a client whose interests are very clear.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>We represent three nations of the earth, one of which has been -invaded three times with Krupp armaments, one of which has -suffered in this war in the East as no people have ever suffered under -the impact of war, and one of which has twice crossed the Atlantic -to put at rest controversies insofar as its contribution could do so, -which were stirred by German militarism. The channel by which -this Tribunal is to interpret the Charter in reference to this matter -is the interest of justice, and it cannot ignore the interests that -are engaged in the Prosecution any more than it should ignore the -interests of Krupp.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Of course, trial <span class='it'>in absentia</span> has great disadvantages. It would -not comply with the constitutional standard for citizens of the -United States in prosecutions conducted in our country. It presents -grave difficulties to counsel under the circumstances of this case. -Yet, in framing the Charter, we had to take into account that all -manner of avoidances of trial would be in the interests of the -defendants, and therefore, the Charter authorized trial <span class='it'>in absentia</span> -when in the interests of justice, leaving this broad generality as the -only guide to the Court’s discretion.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I do not suggest that Counsel has overstated his difficulties, but -the Court should not overlook the fact that of all the defendants -at this Bar, Krupp is unquestionably in the best position, from the -point of view of resources and assistance, to be defended. The -<span class='pageno' title='6' id='Page_6'></span> -sources of evidence are not secret. The great Krupp organization -is the source of most of the evidence that we have against him and -would be the source of any justification. When all has been said -that can be said, trial <span class='it'>in absentia</span> still remains a difficult and an -unsatisfactory method of trial, but the question is whether it is -so unsatisfactory that the interests of these nations in arraigning -before your Bar the armament and munitions industry through -its most eminent and persistent representative should be defeated. -In a written answer, with which I assume the members of the -Tribunal are familiar, the United States has set forth the history -of the background of the Defendant Krupp, which indicates the -nature of the public interest that pleads for a hearing in this case.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I will not repeat what is contained beyond summarizing that -for over 130 years the Krupp enterprise has flourished by furnishing -the German military machine its implements of war. During the -interval between the two world wars, the present defendant, Krupp -von Bohlen und Halbach, was the responsible manager, and during -that time his son, his eldest son, Alfried, was initiated into the -business in the expectation that he would carry on this tradition. -The activities were not confined to filling orders by the Government. -The activities included the active participation in the -incitement to war, the active breaking up through Germany’s withdrawal -of a disarmament conference and the League of Nations; -the active political campaigning in support of the Nazi program -of aggression in its entirety.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>It was not without profit to the Krupp enterprises, and we have -recited the spectacular rise of its profits through aiding to prepare -Germany for aggressive war. So outstanding were these services -that this enterprise was made an exception to the nationalization -policy and was perpetuated by Nazi decrees as a family enterprise -in the hands of the eldest son, Alfried.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Now it seems to us that in a trial in which we seek to establish -the principle juridically, as it has been established by treaties, -conventions, and international custom, that the incitement of an -aggressive war is a crime, it would be unbelievable that the -enterprise which I have outlined to you should be omitted from -consideration.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Three of the prosecuting nations ask the permission of this -Tribunal immediately to file an amendment to the Indictment, -which will add the name of Alfried Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach -at each point in the Indictment after the name of Gustav Krupp -von Bohlen, and that the Tribunal make immediate service of the -Indictment on son Alfried, now reported to be in the hands of the -British Army of the Rhine.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I have to face the problem whether this will cause delay. All -of the nations at your Bar deplore delay. None deplore it more -<span class='pageno' title='7' id='Page_7'></span> -than I, who have long been active in this task, but if the task in -which we are engaged is worth doing at all, it is worth doing well; -and I do not see how we can justify the placing of our convenience -or a response to an uninformed demand for haste ahead of doing -this task thoroughly. I know there is impatience to be on with the -trial, but I venture to say that very few litigations in the United -States involving one plaintiff and one defendant under local -transactions in a regularly established court come to trial in 8 -months after the event, and 8 months ago the German Army -was in possession of this room and in possession of the evidence -that we have now. So we make no apology for the time that has -been taken in getting together a case which covers a continent, a -decade of time, and the affairs of most of the nations of the earth.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>We do not think the addition of Alfried Krupp need delay this -Trial by the usual allowance of time to the defendant. The work -already done on behalf of Krupp von Bohlen would no doubt be -available to Alfried. The organization Krupp is the source of the -documents and of most of the evidence on which the Defense will -depend. If this request of the United States of America, the Soviet -Union, and the French Republic is granted, and Alfried Krupp is -joined, we would then have no Objection to the dismissal, which is -the real substance of the motion, of the elder Krupp, whose -condition doubtless precludes his being brought to trial in person.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Justice Jackson, may I draw your -attention to Page 5 of the written statement of the United States? -At the bottom of Page 5 you say, “the prosecutors representing the -Soviet Union, the French Republic, and the United Kingdom -unanimously oppose inclusion of Alfried Krupp”, and then you -go on to say on the fourth line of Page 6, “immediately upon service -of the Indictment, learning the serious condition of Krupp, the -United States again called a meeting of prosecutors and proposed -an amendment to include Alfried Krupp. Again the proposal of the -United States was defeated by a vote of three to one.” Are you -now telling the Tribunal that there has been another meeting at -which the prosecutors have reversed their two previous decisions?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Your Honor, I understand the French -Delegation has filed a statement with the Secretary of the Tribunal, -which joins in the position of the United States. I have just been -called, on behalf of the Soviet Prosecutor, General Rudenko, who -is now in Moscow, to advise us that the Soviet Delegation now -joins, and I was this morning authorized to speak in their behalf. -Both those delegations desire to reduce, as, of course, do we, any -possible delay to a minimum.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I may say that the disagreement at the outset over the inclusion -of Alfried was due not to any difference of opinion as to whether -<span class='pageno' title='8' id='Page_8'></span> -this industry should be represented in this Trial, but it was not -understood that the condition of the elder Krupp was such as -would preclude his trial. It was believed that it was. . . .</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Justice Jackson, forgive my interrupting -you, but the words that I have just read show that the condition -of Krupp was comprehended at the time. The words are: -“Immediately upon service of the Indictment, learning of the serious -condition of Krupp, the United States again called a meeting of -Prosecutors, and again the proposal of the United States was -defeated by a vote of three to one.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Your Honor is referring to the meeting -which was held after the Indictment had been served. I am referring -to the original framing of the Indictment, so we are speaking -of two different points of time.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I see.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: It was felt that it would be very -difficult to manage a trial which included too many defendants, and -that inasmuch as Gustav Krupp von Bohlen was in, it was -unnecessary to have others. When the Indictment was served, the -information came to us of his condition, and we called the meeting. -It was not then anticipated with certainty that the Trial could not -proceed. His condition was then, we knew, serious, but the extent -of it was not known to us as definitely as it is now; and it was -felt by the other three prosecuting nations at that time that it -would not be necessary to make this substitution.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In the light of what has now happened, both the Soviet Union -and the French Republic join in the position of the United States.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Then may I ask you how long [a] delay you -suggest should be given, if your motion for the addition of Alfried -Krupp were granted?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Of course I hesitate to say what -might be reasonable from the point of view of the defendants, but -it would seem to me that in the first place, he might be willing -to step into his father’s place without delay; but in any case that -the delay should not postpone the commencement of this trial -beyond the 2d day of December, which I think is Monday, which -would enable him, it seems to me, with the work that has been -done, to prepare adequately, and would enable us to serve -immediately. If permission is granted, we can immediately make -the service; and, of course, they have already had full information -of the charges, and access to the documents.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Is he not entitled under the Charter and the -rules of procedure to 30 days from the service of the Indictment -upon him? -<span class='pageno' title='9' id='Page_9'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I think the Charter makes no such -requirement, and I understand that the rules of the Court are -within the control of the Court itself.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Would you suggest that he should be given -less time than the other defendants?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I have no hesitation in sponsoring -that suggestion, for the reason that the work that has already been -done presumably would be available to him; and as I have -suggested, of all the defendants, the Krupp family is in the best -position to defend, from the point of view of resources, from the -point of view of the reach of their organization; and, I am sure you -will agree, they are not at all handicapped in the ability of counsel.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I have one last question to put to you: Can -it be in the interest of justice to find a man guilty, who, owing to -illness, is unable to make his defense properly?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Assuming the hypothesis that Your -Honor states, I should have no hesitation in saying that it would not -be in the interests of justice to find a man guilty who cannot properly -be defended. I do not think it follows that the character of charges -that we have made in this case against Krupp, Gustav Krupp -von Bohlen, cannot be properly tried <span class='it'>in absentia</span>. That is an arguable -question; but it can be assumed that all of the acts which we charge -him with are either documentary, or they were public acts. We are -not charging him with the sort of thing for which one resorts to -private sources. The one serious thing that seems to me, is that he -would not be able to take the stand himself in his defense, and I -am not altogether sure that he would want to do that, even if he -were present.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: But you have stated, have you not, and you -would agree, that according to the Municipal Law of the United -States of America, a man in the physical and mental condition of -Krupp could not be tried.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I think that would be true in most of -the jurisdictions.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Thank you.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Mr. Attorney General.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR HARTLEY SHAWCROSS (Chief Prosecutor for the United -Kingdom): May it please you, Mr. President: The matters which -I desire to submit to the Tribunal can be shortly stated, and first -amongst them I should say this: There is no kind of difference of -principle between myself and my colleagues, representing the other -three prosecution Powers, none whatsoever. Our difference is as to -method and as to procedure. In the view of the British Government, -<span class='pageno' title='10' id='Page_10'></span> -this Trial has been enough delayed, and matters ought now to -proceed without further postponement.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Before I say anything in regard to the application which is before -the Tribunal, on behalf of Gustav Krupp von Bohlen, may I say just -one word about our position in regard to industrialists generally. -Representing, as I do, the present British Government, it may be -safely assumed by the Tribunal that I am certainly not less anxious -than the representatives of any other state the part played by -industrialists in the preparation and conduct of the war should be -fully exposed to the Tribunal and to the world. That will be done, -and that will be done in the course of this Trial, whether Gustav -Krupp von Bohlen or Alfried Krupp are parties to the proceedings -or not. The defendants who are at present before the Tribunal, are -indicted for conspiring not only with each other, but with divers -other persons; and if it should be the decision of the Tribunal that -Gustav Krupp von Bohlen should be dismissed from the present -proceedings, the evidence as to the part which he, his firm, his -associates, and other industrialists played in the preparation and -conduct of the war, would still be given to this Tribunal, as forming -part of the general conspiracy in which these defendants were -involved with divers other persons, not now before the Court.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Now, then, in regard to the application which is before the Court -on behalf of Gustav Krupp von Bohlen, the matter is, as it seems -to me, entirely one for the Tribunal; and I would only wish to say -this about it: It is an application which, in my submission, must be -treated on its own merits. This is a court of justice, not a game in -which you can play a substitute, if one member of a team falls sick. -If this defendant is unfit to stand his trial before this Tribunal, and -whether he is fit or unfit is a matter for the Tribunal, he will be -none the less unfit because the Tribunal decides not to join some -other person, not at present a party to the proceedings.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>There is provision under the Charter for trial <span class='it'>in absentia</span>. I do -not wish to add anything which has been said in regard to that -aspect of the matter by my friend, Mr. Justice Jackson, but I ask the -Tribunal to deal with the application, made on behalf of Gustav -Krupp von Bohlen, quite independently of any considerations as to -the joinder of some other person, considerations which, in my -submission, are relevant to that application. There is, however, -before the Tribunal, an independent application to permit the -joinder of a new defendant at this late state. I think I should -perhaps say this: That as you, Mr. President, pointed out, at the -last meeting of the Chief Prosecutors, at which this possibility -was discussed, not for the first time, the representatives of the -Provisional Government of France and of the Soviet Government -were, like ourselves, as representing the British Government, -<span class='pageno' title='11' id='Page_11'></span> -opposed to the addition of any defendant involving any delay in -the commencement of these proceedings. I take no technical point -upon that at all. I am content that you should deal with the matter -now, as if the Chief Prosecutors had had a further meeting, and -as a committee, in the way that they are required to act under -the Charter, had by majority decided to make this application. I -mention the matter only to explain the position in which I find -myself, as the representative of the British Government, in regard -to it. At the last meeting of Chief Prosecutors, there was agreement -with the British view. The representatives of the other two States, -as they were quite entitled to do, have since that meeting come to -a different conclusion. Well, now, Sir, so far as that application is -concerned, I would say only this: The case against the existing -defendants, whether Gustav Krupp von Bohlen is included amongst -them or not, can be fully established without the joinder of any -additional person, whoever he might be. The general part played -by the industrialists can be fully established without the joinder of -any particular industrialist, whoever he might be. That case will -indeed be developed, and will be made clear in the course of this -Trial. That is not to say that Alfried Krupp should not be brought -to justice. There is provision under the Charter for the holding of -further trials, and it may be according to the result of the present -proceedings, that hereafter other proceedings ought to be taken, -possibly against Alfried Krupp, possibly against other industrialists, -possibly against other people as well. At present, we are concerned -with the existing defendants. For our part, the case against -them has been ready for some time, and it can be shortly and -succinctly stated; and in my submission to the Tribunal, the interests -of justice demand, and world opinion expects, that these men -should be put upon their defense without further delay.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>And I respectfully remind the Tribunal of what was said at -the opening session in Berlin by General Nikitchenko, in these terms:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“The individual defendants in custody will be notified that -they must be ready for trial within 30 days after the service -of the Indictment upon them. Promptly thereafter, the -Tribunal shall fix and announce the date of the Trial in -Nuremberg, to take place not less than 30 days after the -service of the Indictment; and the defendants shall be advised -of such date as soon as it is fixed.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='noindent'>And then these words:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“It must be understood that the Tribunal, which is directed -by the Charter to secure an expeditious hearing of the issues -raised by the charges will not permit any delay, either in the -preparation of the defense, or of the Trial.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Of course, if it happened that Alfried Krupp were prepared to -step into his father’s shoes in this matter, without any delay in the -<span class='pageno' title='12' id='Page_12'></span> -proceedings, the British Prosecutors would welcome that procedure, -but if his joinder involves any further delay in the Trial of the -existing defendants, we are opposed to it.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: May I ask you: Do you agree that according -to the Municipal Law of Great Britain, in the same way that I -understood it to be the law of the United States of America, a man -in the mental and physical condition of Gustav Krupp could not -be tried?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR HARTLEY SHAWCROSS: I do, Sir. I take the same view, -if I may say so, with respect, as Mr. Justice Jackson took upon the -question you addressed to him.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: And in such circumstances, the prosecution -against him would not be dismissed, but he would be detained -during the pleasure of the sovereign power concerned.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR HARTLEY SHAWCROSS: Yes, Sir.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: That is one question that I wanted to put -to you.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Do you then suggest that, in the present circumstances, Gustav -Krupp ought to be tried in his absence, in view of the medical -reports that we have before us?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR HARTLEY SHAWCROSS: Well, it is a matter which is -entirely in the discretion of the Tribunal, and which I do not wish -to press in any way; but as the evidence involving his firm will -in any event be laid before the Tribunal, it might be convenient -that he should be represented by counsel, and that the Tribunal, -in arriving at its decision, should take account, as it necessarily -would, of his then condition.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Is there any precedent for such a course as -that, to hold that he could not be tried and found guilty or not -guilty and yet to retain counsel to appear for him before the -Tribunal?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR HARTLEY SHAWCROSS: No, Sir, I was not suggesting that -he should not be treated as being an existing defendant before the -Tribunal and held guilty or not. I was dealing with the subsequent -course which the Tribunal might adopt in regard to him if they -held him guilty of some or all of these offenses.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: But I thought you agreed that according to, -at any rate, Municipal Law, a man in his physical condition ought -not be tried.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR HARTLEY SHAWCROSS: I am not agreed that according -to English Municipal Law he could not be tried.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: And that law is based upon the interests -of justice? -<span class='pageno' title='13' id='Page_13'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR HARTLEY SHAWCROSS: Mr. President, I cannot dispute -that, but our law of course contains no provision at all for trial -<span class='it'>in absentia</span>. Express provision is made for such trials in the Charter -constituting this Tribunal, provided that the Tribunal considers it -in the interests of justice.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: What exactly is it you are suggesting to us, -that he should be tried in absence or that he should not be tried -in absence?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR HARTLEY SHAWCROSS: Mr. President, we have suggested -that advantage should be taken of the provision for trial <span class='it'>in absentia</span>, -but as I said at the beginning, it is, as it appears to me, entirely a -matter for the discretion of the Tribunal, not one in which I wish -to press any particular view.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Does the Chief Prosecutor for the Soviet -Union desire to speak? You were authorized, I think, Mr. Justice -Jackson, to speak on behalf of the Chief Prosecutor of the Soviet -Union.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I was authorized to state that they -take the same position as the United States. I don’t know that in -answering their questions I would have always given the answers -that they would have given. I understand, for example, that they -do try cases <span class='it'>in absentia</span>, and I think their position on that would -be somewhat different from the position I have given.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: This question I asked you, of course, was -directed solely to the Municipal Law of the United States. Does -the Chief Prosecutor of the Soviet Union wish to address the -Tribunal?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COLONEL Y. V. POKROVSKY (Deputy Chief Prosecutor for -the U.S.S.R.): No.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Then does the Chief Prosecutor for the -French Republic wish to address the Tribunal?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>M. CHARLES DUBOST (Deputy Chief Prosecutor for the -French Republic): It would be easy to justify the position taken -today by the French Delegation by merely reminding oneself that -on numerous occasions the French Delegation has advocated the -immediate preparation of a second trial in order that it might be -possible to proceed with it as soon as the first trial was completed. -We could in this way have prosecuted the German industrialists -without any interruption. This point of view has never been -adopted. We have rallied to the point of view of the United States -as being the most expedient and most susceptible of giving complete -satisfaction to French interests. We are anxious that Krupp the -son should be tried. There are serious charges against him, and -no one could possibly understand that there should be no -<span class='pageno' title='14' id='Page_14'></span> -representative in this trial of the greatest German industrial -enterprise, as being one of the principal guilty parties in this war. -We should have preferred that a second trial be made against the -industrialists, but since this second trial is not to take place, we -consider the presence of Alfried Krupp to be absolutely necessary.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: What is the position, which you take up if -the substitution of Alfried Krupp would necessarily lead to delay?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>M. DUBOST: I beg your pardon, Mr. President, but I believe -you have in your hand a second note which I submitted this morning -to the Court after having received a telephone call from Paris.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I have in my hand a document of 13 November -1945, signed by you, I think.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>M. DUBOST: That is right. There is, however, a supplementary -note, which I submitted this morning, according to which I adopt -the same viewpoint as that expressed by Mr. Justice Jackson. I was -in fact able to find out between the document of last night and that -of this morning the consequences that would be brought about. . . .</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps the best course would be to read this -document which has now been put before us.</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>M. DUBOST: “We consider that the trial of Krupp’s father -is not possible at the present time. The trial of a dying old -man who is unable to attend is out of the question. We are -anxious that Krupp’s son should be prosecuted for there are -very serious charges against him. We had asked up to this -point that he should be prosecuted without any delay in the -trial, but for reasons of expediency which led us to adopt -this point of view, this has ceased to be a pressing problem -since the Soviet Delegation has adopted the point of view of -Mr. Justice Jackson. Consequently we no longer raise any -objection, and we likewise have come to this point of view.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Does what you say now mean that you wish -Alfried Krupp to be substituted notwithstanding the fact that it -must cause delay?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>M. DUBOST: Yes, that’s right.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Are you suggesting on behalf of France that -Gustav should be tried in his absence or not?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>M. DUBOST: No, no, not that, no.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Volchkov): What does the French prosecutor -and the French Republic offer so far as Gustav Krupp is concerned?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>M. DUBOST: As to Krupp, the father, we consider it is not -possible to prosecute him because of the state of his health; he -will not be able to appear before the Court. He will not be able -to defend himself. He will not be able to tell us about his acts. -<span class='pageno' title='15' id='Page_15'></span> -It is necessary to drop his case or to postpone the Trial to a time -when he shall be cured, unless before that he appears before the -judgment of God. We also believe, since we cannot obtain a second -trial against the industrialists, that it is necessary to substitute -Krupp, the son, against whom serious charges exist, for Krupp, -the father, who cannot be tried.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Do you agree or disagree with the Attorney -General for Great Britain that in the course of the Trial, whether -Gustav Krupp or Alfried Krupp are included as defendants, the -evidence against the industrialists of Germany must be exposed?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>M. DUBOST: We have been anxious, Mr. President, that a second -trial should be prepared immediately to follow the first trial in -which the question of the industrialists would be thoroughly -examined. Since it is not possible to have a second trial, we are -anxious that one of the representatives of the Krupp firm, who is -personally responsible and against whom there are charges, shall be -called upon to appear before this Tribunal to defend himself against -the charges that we shall bring against the Krupp firm, and in a -more general manner also against the industrialists who were -associated with the Krupp firm and who participated in the conspiracy -which is presented in the Indictment, who supported the -seizure of power by the Nazis, supported the Nazi Government and -propaganda, financed the Nazis and finally helped the rearmament -of Germany in order that it might continue its war of aggression.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Forgive me. I don’t think you have answered -the question which I put to you. Do you agree with the Attorney -General that whether Gustav Krupp or Alfried Krupp are or are -not defendants in this Trial, the evidence against the German industrialists -will necessarily be thoroughly exposed in the course -of bringing forward the evidence of the conspiracy charged?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>M. DUBOST: I agree that it is possible to bring the proof of -a conspiracy without this or that member of the Krupp family -being brought before the Court, but it will only be fragmentary -proof and evidence, because there are personal responsibilities which -go beyond the general responsibilities of the authors of the conspiracy, -and these personal responsibilities are particularly attributable -to Krupp the son and Krupp the father.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE TRIBUNAL (M. De Vabres): You said just now that it -was your opinion that the name of Krupp the son should be substituted -for that of Krupp the father? Do you really mean the -word “substitute”? Did you use this word intentionally or do you -not rather wish to say that it was your opinion that there should -be an amendment to the Indictment and that we should apply a -supplement to the Indictment? Do you consider that you can propose -to the Court to substitute one name for another in the Indictment -<span class='pageno' title='16' id='Page_16'></span> -or do you suggest on the contrary a supplement be added to -the Indictment?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>M. DUBOST: I have thought for a long time that it was necessary -to propose an amendment to the Indictment. It is still my opinion, -but it is not legally possible to modify the Indictment by a supplement.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Thank you. Does counsel for the Defendant -Gustav Krupp wish to address the Tribunal again?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. KLEFISCH: I deduce from the explanation of the Prosecution -that the principal objection against our point of view is that -it would not be in accordance with justice if the Trial were to be -carried out in absence of Krupp senior. When, in representing the -opposite point of view, it is pointed out that the public opinion of -the entire world demands the trial against the defendant, Mr. Krupp, -then the main reason offered is that Krupp senior is to be regarded -as one of the principal war criminals. I have already pointed out -that this reasoning would be an anticipation of the final judgment -of the Court. It is my opinion, that this is not the place and the -time to discuss these questions and I wish to limit myself to what -I already said before: Namely, that all that has been said in this -direction is for the moment only a thesis of the Prosecution, which, -in the course of the Trial, will be confronted with an antithesis of -the Defense, so that then the High Court can arrive at a synthesis -of this thesis and antithesis and make a fair judgment.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>One more point regarding this question:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>It has also been pointed out that Krupp senior, could be tried -<span class='it'>in absentia</span> for the reason that the entire evidence regarding the -question of guilt has already been presented and was no secret. -In view of the facts this is not correct.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>So far we have seen only a part of the evidence, that is, that -which is contained in the bundle of documents. But may I point -out that from the firm of Krupp and the private quarters of the -Krupp family, the entire written material which consisted of whole -truck-loads was confiscated, and we did not see any of this material. -Thus, the defense is difficult to undertake, since, due to the confiscation -of this entire material, only the Defendant Krupp senior -would be in a position to describe at least to a certain extent the -documents necessary for his defense, so that they could be submitted -in the regular form of application for evidence to this High Court.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>As far as the question of an additional indictment against the -son, Alfried Krupp, is concerned I wish to state first of all that -I have not officially been charged with the defense of this defendant. -I suppose, however, that I will be charged with the defense -and that is why, with the permission of the Court, I wish to say -a few words here about this motion, perhaps as a representative -<span class='pageno' title='17' id='Page_17'></span> -without commission. I do not know whether it is possible, that is, -legally possible, subsequently to put Mr. Alfried Krupp on the list -of the principal war criminals. However, even if I were to let this -legal possibility open to discussion, I should like to call attention -to the following:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In view of the changed situation, it seems to me to be a bit -strange, to say the least, if Alfried Krupp were to be put on the -list as a principal war criminal now, not because he was marked as -one from the beginning, but because his father cannot be tried. -I see in that a certain game played by the representative of the -United States which cannot be sanctioned by the Court in my -opinion.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In addition, I wish to make the following brief remark:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In case a supplementary indictment should be made against -Alfried Krupp, and if I were definitely charged with his defense, -my conscience would oblige me to request that the period of 30 days -between the serving of the Indictment and the main Trial as provided -in Rule 2 (a), would have to be kept under all circumstances.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Finally, I should like to point out the following:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In conclusion, I should like to emphasize that, so far as I am -informed, the circumstances and facts regarding the person of -Alfried Krupp are basically different from the circumstances concerning -the person of the present defendant, Krupp senior. In the -documents that have been put at our disposal so far, and which are -bound in one volume, I have hardly found a single word about -any complicity or participation of Alfried Krupp in the crimes with -which Krupp senior is charged. I should also like to emphasize that, -as has already been discussed, Alfried Krupp became the owner of -the Krupp firm, I believe, only in November 1943 and that previously, -from 1937 to 1943, he was merely director of one department -of the entire concern, but in this capacity he did not have the -slightest influence on the management of the firm, nor did he have -anything to do with orders for the production and delivery of war -materials.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>For the reasons stated, I believe I am justified in expressing the -wish to refrain from introducing Alfried Krupp into this Trial of -the principal war criminals.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn now and announce -its decision on this application later.</p> - -<p class='line' style='text-align:center;margin-top:2em;margin-bottom:2em;'>[<span class='it'>The Tribunal adjourned until 15 November 1945 at 1000 hours.</span>]</p> - -<hr class='pbk'/> - -<div><span class='pageno' title='18' id='Page_18'></span><h1>PRELIMINARY HEARING<br/> <span style='font-size:smaller'>Thursday, 15 November 1945</span></h1></div> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal has invited the Defense Counsel -to be present here today as it desires that they shall thoroughly -understand the course which the Tribunal proposes the proceedings -at trial should take.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The Tribunal is aware that the procedure provided for by the -Charter is in some respects different from the procedure to which -Defense Counsel are accustomed. They therefore desire that Defense -Counsel should be under no misapprehension as to course which -must be followed.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Article 24 of the Charter provides for the reading of the Indictment -in Court, but in view of its length, and the fact that its -contents are now probably well known, it may be that Defense -Counsel will not think it necessary that it should be read in full.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The opening of cases for the Prosecution will necessarily take a -long time, and during that time Defense Counsel will have an -opportunity to complete their preparations for defense.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>When witnesses for the Prosecution are called, it must be understood -that it is the function of Counsel for the Defense to cross-examine -the witnesses, and that it is not the intention of the -Tribunal to cross-examine the witnesses themselves.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The Tribunal will not call upon the Defense Counsel to state -what evidence they wish to submit until the case for the Prosecution -has been closed.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>As Defense Counsel already know, the General Secretary of the -Tribunal makes every effort to obtain such evidence, both witnesses -and documents, as the Defense wish to adduce and the Tribunal -approves.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The General Secretary is providing, and will provide, lodging, -food, and transportation for Defense Counsel and witnesses while in -Nuremberg. And though the living conditions provided may not be -all that can be desired, Defense Counsel will understand that there -are great difficulties in the present circumstances and efforts will -be made to meet any reasonable request.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Defense Counsel have been provided with a Document Room -and an Information Center where documents translated into German -are available for the Defense, subject to the necessary security -regulations. It is important that Defense Counsel should notify the -General Secretary as long as possible, and at least 3 weeks in -ordinary cases, in advance, of witnesses or documents they require. -<span class='pageno' title='19' id='Page_19'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>The services which Defense Counsel are performing are important -public services for the interests of justice, and they will have the -protection of the Tribunal in the performance of their duties.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In order that the Trial should proceed with due expedition, it -would seem desirable that Defense Counsel should settle among -themselves the order in which they wish to cross-examine the -Prosecution witnesses and propose to present their defenses, and -that they should communicate their wishes in this regard to the -General Secretary.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I hope that what I have said will be of assistance to Defense -Counsel in the preparation of their defenses. If there are any -questions in connection with what I have said which they wish to -ask, I will endeavor to answer them.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. ALFRED THOMA (Counsel for Defendant Rosenberg): Mr. -President.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Will you come to the desk please, if you -wish to speak. Will you state your name and for whom you appear -here?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. THOMA: Dr. Thoma, defense counsel for the Defendant -Rosenberg.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. THOMA: I should like to ask whether the Defense will -immediately get copies of the interrogation of witnesses.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Copies of the Indictment? Those have been -served upon each defendant. Do I understand that you want -further copies for the use of defendants’ counsel?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. THOMA: May I put my question more precisely? I presume -that all the statements of the defendants are to be taken down in -shorthand, and I would like to ask whether these will then be -translated into German and given to the Defense Counsel as soon -as possible.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: If you mean a transcript of the evidence -which is given before the Tribunal, that will be taken down, and -if it is given in a language other than German it will be translated -into German and copies furnished to defendants’ counsel. If it is -in German it will be furnished to them in German.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. THOMA: Will we get copies of the interrogation of all -witnesses?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes; that is what I meant by a transcript -of the evidence given before the Tribunal. That will be a copy, in -German, of the evidence of each witness.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. THOMA: Thank you.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. RUDOLPH DIX (Counsel for Defendant Schacht): Your -Lordship, gentlemen of the Tribunal, my colleagues of the Defense -<span class='pageno' title='20' id='Page_20'></span> -have entrusted me with the honorable task of expressing our thanks -for the words you have addressed to the Defense Counsel. We -members of the Defense consider ourselves the associates of the -Tribunal in reaching a just verdict and we have full confidence in -Your Lordship’s wise and experienced conduct of the Trial -proceedings.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Your Lordship may be convinced that in this spirit we shall -participate in the difficult task of reaching a just decision, in the -case before the Tribunal.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I assume that there are no further questions -at the present stage which Counsel for the Defense wish to ask. -They will understand that if at any stage in the future they have -inquiries which they wish to make, they should address them to -the General Secretary and they will then be considered by the -Tribunal.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The Tribunal will now adjourn until 2 o’clock, when the application -on behalf of the Defendant Streicher will be heard.</p> - -<p class='line' style='text-align:center;margin-top:1em;margin-bottom:4em;'>[<span class='it'>The Tribunal adjourned until 1400 hours.</span>]</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I understand that there are some counsel -for the defendants present here today, who were not here yesterday -and who may not understand the use of these earphones and dials. -Therefore, I explain to them that Number 1 on the dial will enable -them to hear the evidence in the language in which it is given, -Number 2 will be in English, Number 3 in Russian, Number 4 in -French, and Number 5 in German.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I will now read the judgment of the Tribunal in the matter -of the application of counsel for Gustav Krupp von Bohlen for -postponement of the proceedings against the defendant.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Counsel for Gustav Krupp von Bohlen has applied to the -Tribunal for postponement of the proceedings against this defendant -on the ground that his physical and mental condition are such that -he is incapable of understanding the proceedings against him and -of presenting any defense that he may have.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>On November 5 the Tribunal appointed a medical commission -composed of the following physicians:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>R. E. Tunbridge, Brigadier, O.B.E., M.D., M.Sc., F.R.C.P., -Consulting Physician, British Army of the Rhine.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>René Piedelièvre, M.D., Professor on the Faculty of Medicine of -Paris; Expert for the Tribunal.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Nicholas Kurshakov, M.D., Professor of Medicine, Medical Institute -of Moscow; Chief Internist, Commissariat of Public Health, -Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. -<span class='pageno' title='21' id='Page_21'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>Eugene Sepp, M.D., Emeritus Professor of Neurology, Medical -Institute of Moscow; Member, Academy of Medical Science, Union -of Soviet Socialist Republics.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Eugene Krasnushkin, M.D., Professor of Psychiatry, Medical -Institute of Moscow.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Bertram Schaffner, Major, Medical Corps, Neuropsychiatrist, -Army of the United States.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The commission has reported to the Tribunal that it is unanimously -of the opinion that Gustav Krupp von Bohlen suffers from -senile softening of the brain; that his mental condition is such that -he is incapable of understanding court procedure and of understanding -or cooperating in interrogations; that his physical state is such -that he cannot be moved without endangering his life; and that his -condition is unlikely to improve but rather will deteriorate further.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The Tribunal accepts the findings of the medical commission, to -which exception is taken neither by the Prosecution nor by the -Defense.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Article 12 of the Charter authorizes the trial of a defendant -<span class='it'>in absentia</span> if found by the Tribunal to be “necessary in the interests -of justice.” It is contended on behalf of the Chief Prosecutors that -in the interest of justice, Gustav Krupp von Bohlen should be tried -<span class='it'>in absentia</span>, despite his physical and mental condition.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>It is the decision of the Tribunal that upon the facts presented -the interests of justice do not require that Gustav Krupp von Bohlen -be tried <span class='it'>in absentia.</span> The Charter of the Tribunal envisages a fair -trial, in which the Chief Prosecutors may present the evidence in -support of an indictment and the defendants may present such defense -as they may believe themselves to have. Where nature rather -than flight or contumacy has rendered such a trial impossible, it is -not in accordance with justice that the case should proceed in the -absence of a defendant.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>For the foregoing reasons, the Tribunal orders that:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>1. The application for postponement of the proceedings against -Gustav Krupp von Bohlen is granted.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>2. The charges in the Indictment against Gustav Krupp von -Bohlen shall be retained upon the docket of the Tribunal for trial -hereafter, if the physical and mental condition of the defendant -should permit.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Further questions raised by the Chief Prosecutors, including the -question of adding another name to the Indictment, will be considered -later.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The Tribunal will now hear the application on behalf of the -Defendant Streicher.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Will the Counsel state his name? -<span class='pageno' title='22' id='Page_22'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. HANS MARX (Counsel for Defendant Streicher): Your Honors, -as Counsel for the Defendant Julius Streicher, I took the liberty -some time ago of requesting a postponement in the opening date of -the Trial, because the time at my disposal for making preparations -appeared to me insufficient, in view of the importance of the case.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>This morning, however, the President of the Court outlined the -course of the proceedings of the Trial and his explanations have -made it quite clear that the Defense will have adequate time at its -disposal to continue preparations for the case of each client even -after the opening of the Trial. Any objections on my part are thereby -removed, and accordingly I withdraw my application as unsubstantiated.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Your Honors, may I use this opportunity to make a suggestion -with regard to the case of the Defendant Streicher.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In view of the exceptional nature of the case and of the difficulties -facing the Defense in handling it, may I suggest that the -Tribunal consider whether a psychiatric examination of the Defendant -Streicher would not be proper. Defense Counsel should have -at his disposal all the evidence on the nature, personality, and -motives of the defendant which appears necessary to enable him to -form a clear picture of his client.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>And this, of course, is also true of the Tribunal.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In my own interests I consider it essential that such an examination -be authorized by the Tribunal. I emphasize particularly -that this is not a formal motion: “It is not a motion but a proposal.” -[<span class='it'>Note: These words were spoken in English.</span>] I deem it necessary as -a precaution in my own interests, since my client does not desire -an examination of this sort, and is of the opinion that he is mentally -completely normal. I myself cannot determine that; it must be -decided by a psychiatrist.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I, therefore, ask the Tribunal to consider this proposal, and, if -the suggestion, under the circumstances, appears both requisite and -necessary, to choose and appoint a competent expert to conduct the -examination.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>That is what I wished to say before the opening of the proceedings.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: One moment. It appears to the Tribunal that -such suggestions as you have now made, ought to be in the form -of a formal motion or application and that it ought to be in writing -and that if, as you say, the Defendant Streicher does not wish it or -is unwilling that such an examination should be made, then your -application ought to state in writing that the Defendant Streicher -refuses to sign the application.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>If you wish to make such a motion you are at liberty to make -it, in writing. -<span class='pageno' title='23' id='Page_23'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: Mr. President, may I be allowed to say briefly that it -is precisely because the defendant does object to my submitting such -an application that I feel obliged to make this request here publicly, -and inform the Tribunal that I am bound by my client’s attitude -and therefore not in a position to submit this suggestion in writing. -Without my client’s permission I cannot make this suggestion in -writing, and I am consequently forced to convey it to the Tribunal -verbally, since I myself consider it necessary as a precaution in my -own interest.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: But you understand from what I say to you, -that if you wish to make this suggestion, you must make the motion -in writing and you can, on that writing, state that the Defendant -Streicher is not prepared to sign the application.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARX: Thank you, Mr. President, for your statement; I -shall not fail to act, as you suggest.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Do the Chief Prosecutors wish to make any -statement?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COLONEL ROBERT G. STOREY (Executive Trial Counsel for -the United States): May it please the Court:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The position of Counsel for Defendant Streicher emphasizes a -suggestion made by the Prosecutors this morning, namely, that all -motions and all requests from Counsel be reduced to writing, prior -to submission to the Court and the suggestions, in writing, were -filed with the General Secretary since the meeting this morning.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>While I am on my feet, if it may please the Court, may I make -a brief statement in connection with the efforts of the Prosecutors -to furnish to the Defense Counsel evidence and documents in which -they may be interested, if that meets with the approval of the Court.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. STOREY: With reference to Defendant Streicher’s second -point in his motion, namely, that the Prosecutors be required -to furnish certain documents, they are being furnished, and will be -furnished in the future.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Secondly, with reference to the film on concentration camps, -which he requests be shown to Defense Counsel in advance of the -time of presenting the film, this request will also be complied with -by the Prosecutors.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Also, for the information of the Defense Counsel, there has been -established in Room 54, in this Courthouse, what is known as the -Defendants’ Information Center, operated jointly by the four Chief -Prosecutors. In that room there has been deposited a list of documents -upon which the Prosecution relies. Secondly, if further documents -are relied upon by the prosecutors, lists will be furnished -to Defense Counsel before they are introduced into evidence or -<span class='pageno' title='24' id='Page_24'></span> -offered to the Court, and also, they will have the opportunity to -examine copies of those documents in their own language.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>May I also suggest that most Defense Counsel have availed themselves -of that privilege and those who had not, have been notified -and they are now, as of this date, all of them, making use of the -facilities provided, which include rooms for conferences, typewriters, -when necessary, and other assistance.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I want to make that statement for the information of the Defense -Counsel.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I understand the Soviet Chief Prosecutor -wishes to address the Tribunal.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. POKROVSKY: In connection with the evidence just -submitted to the Tribunal by Counsel representing the interests of -Defendant Streicher, I consider it my duty to inform the Tribunal -that during the last interrogation made by the Delegation of the -Soviet Union, the Defendant Streicher, about whom it is specifically -said in the Indictment, Counts One and Four, that he had incited to -the persecution of the Jews, stated that he had been speaking from -a Zionist point of view.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>This declaration or, more precisely, this testimony, immediately -produced certain doubts as to the mental stability of the defendant.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>It is not the first time that persons, now standing their trial, -have attempted to delude us about their mental condition. I refer in -particular to the Defendant Hess. In the case of Hess the Tribunal, -to my knowledge already possesses. . . .</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: One moment. We are not hearing any application -with reference to Streicher’s sanity now, nor any application -with reference to Hess. We have simply informed Counsel for -Streicher that if he wishes to make an application in respect of his -defendant’s sanity or mental condition, he must make that application -in writing. If he does make such an application in writing -you will have full opportunity of opposing the application.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. POKROVSKY: What I have in mind is not to offer -an opinion on the deductions and the petition of the Defense, but to -inform the Tribunal of a fact which may cause much complication -if we do not act on it immediately. Seeing that the Tribunal has at -its disposal a number of competent medical personnel, it would -appear to me most expedient that the Tribunal should entrust these -specialists with the examination of the Defendant Streicher in order -to establish definitely whether he is or is not in full possession of -his mental capacities.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>If we do not do so now, the necessity may arise in the -course of the Trial and if the question of Streicher’s sanity -arises after the beginning of the Trial, then it may delay the proceedings -<span class='pageno' title='25' id='Page_25'></span> -and impede our work. If the Tribunal deems my suggestion -in order, we would, before the Trial starts, have sufficient -time to request from this commission of specialists a statement on -his mental condition.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: One moment. If I rightly understand what -the Chief Soviet Prosecutor says, it is this: That if any question of -the sanity of the Defendant Streicher arises it will be convenient -that he should be examined now at once whilst the medical officers -of the Soviet Union are in Nuremberg. If that is so, then if you -think it is more convenient that Streicher should be examined by -doctors at the present moment on account of the presence of the -distinguished doctors from the Soviet Union being in Nuremberg, -you are at liberty to make a written motion to that effect to the -Tribunal at any time.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Do any of the other Chief Prosecutors wish to address the -Tribunal?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>(There was no response.)</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Then the Tribunal will deal with the application of the Defendant -Streicher as follows:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>His application for postponement, which is numbered 1 on his -written application, has been withdrawn. His other two applications, -numbered 2 and 3, which are agreed to by the Chief Prosecutors, -are granted.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The Tribunal will now adjourn.</p> - -<p class='line' style='text-align:center;margin-top:2em;margin-bottom:2em;'>[<span class='it'>The Tribunal adjourned until 17 November 1945 at 1000 hours.</span>]</p> - -<hr class='pbk'/> - -<div><span class='pageno' title='26' id='Page_26'></span><h1>PRELIMINARY HEARING<br/> <span style='font-size:smaller'>Saturday, 17 November 1945</span></h1></div> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal would like to know whether -the Chief Prosecutors wish to make a statement with reference to -the Defendant Bormann.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE (Deputy Chief Prosecutor for the -United Kingdom): May it please the Tribunal, as the Tribunal are -aware, the Defendant Bormann was included in the Indictment, -which was filed before the Tribunal. There has been no change in -the position with regard to the Defendant Bormann; nor has any -further information come to the notice of the Chief Prosecutors. -I think that the Tribunal are aware of the state of our information -when the Indictment was filed, but it might be as well, if the Tribunal -approves, if I explained what was the state of our information -at the time of the filing of the Indictment, which is also the state -of our information today.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>There is evidence that Hitler and Bormann were together, with a -number of Nazi officials, in the Chancellery area in Berlin on -30 April 1945, and were, at one stage on that day, together in -Hitler’s underground air raid shelter in the Chancellery gardens.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>On 1 May Bormann and other Germans tried to break out of the -Chancellery area in a tank. They got as far as the river Spree and -tried to cross a bridge over it. A hand grenade was thrown into the -tank by Russian soldiers. Three members of the party who were -with Bormann in this tank have been interrogated. Two think that -Bormann was killed, and the third that he was wounded. The -position is, therefore, that the Prosecution cannot say that the -matter is beyond probability that Bormann is dead. There is still -the clear possibility that he is alive.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In these circumstances I should submit that he comes within the -exact words of Article 12 of the Charter:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“The Tribunal shall have the right to take proceedings against -a person charged with crimes set out in Article 6 of this -Charter in his absence, if he has not been found.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>In other words, it is not necessary to hold the man in these circumstances. -The Tribunal laid down in its Rules of Procedure in -Rule 2 (b) the procedure applicable to this situation:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“Any individual Defendant not in custody shall be informed -of the Indictment against him and of his right to receive the -<span class='pageno' title='27' id='Page_27'></span> -documents specified in sub-paragraph (a) above, by notice in -such form and manner as the Tribunal may prescribe.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>The Tribunal prescribed that notice to the Defendant Bormann -should be given in the following manner:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The notice should be read over the radio once a week for 4 weeks, -the first reading to be during the week of 22 October. It should -also be published in four separate issues of a newspaper circulated -in the home city of Martin Bormann.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The broadcast was given in the weeks after 22 October, as -ordered, over Radio Hamburg and Radio Langenberg, that is, Cologne. -The Defendant Bormann’s last place of residence was in -Berlin. The notice was, therefore, published in four Berlin papers: -The <span class='it'>Tägliche Rundschau</span>, the <span class='it'>Berliner Zeitung</span>, <span class='it'>Der Berliner</span>, and -the <span class='it'>Allgemeine Zeitung</span> for the 4 weeks which the Tribunal had -ordered.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In my respectful submission, the Charter and Rules of Procedure -have been complied with. The Tribunal, therefore, has the -right to take proceedings <span class='it'>in absentia</span> under Article 12. It is, of -course, a matter for the Tribunal to decide whether it will exercise -that right.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The Chief Prosecutors submit, however, that there is no change -in the position since they indicted Bormann and that, unless the -Tribunal has any different view, this is a proper case for trial <span class='it'>in -absentia</span>.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I am authorized to make this statement not only on behalf of -the British Delegation, but on behalf of the United States and the -French Republic. I consulted my friend and colleague, Colonel -Pokrovsky, yesterday and he had to take instructions on the matter, -and I notice he is here today. I haven’t had the opportunity of -speaking to him this morning and no doubt he will be able to tell -the Tribunal any thing if he so desires.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I hope that that explains the basis of the matter to the Tribunal. -If there are any other facts, I should be only too happy to answer -any point.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: It is suggested to me that you should file -with the General Secretary proof of the publication to which you -have referred.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: With proof of the publication! -If it please My Lord, that will be done.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Thank you, Sir David. Then I will ask the -Chief Prosecutor for the Soviet Union if he wishes to address the -Tribunal.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. POKROVSKY: I thank the Tribunal for their wish -to hear the opinion of the Soviet Delegation. I shall avail myself -<span class='pageno' title='28' id='Page_28'></span> -of the privilege granted by the Tribunal to express the complete -concurrence of the Soviet Delegation, and to inform you of the -attitude adopted by my colleagues where Bormann is concerned. -We consider that the Tribunal has every justification, under Article -12 of the Charter, to accept in evidence all the material relative to -Bormann’s case and to start proceedings against him in his absence.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn for a short time -and hopes it will be able to give its decision shortly.</p> - -<p class='line' style='text-align:center;margin-top:2em;margin-bottom:2em;'>[<span class='it'>A recess was taken.</span>]</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal has decided that in pursuance -of Article 12 of the Charter, it will try the Defendant Bormann in his -absence, and it announces that Counsel will be appointed to defend -the Defendant Bormann.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The Tribunal will now adjourn.</p> - -<p class='line' style='text-align:center;margin-top:1em;margin-bottom:4em;'>[<span class='it'>The Tribunal adjourned until 1500 hours.</span>]</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The motion to amend the indictment by adding -the name of Alfried Krupp has been considered by the Tribunal -in all its aspects and the application is rejected.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The Tribunal will now adjourn.</p> - -<p class='line' style='text-align:center;margin-top:2em;margin-bottom:2em;'>[<span class='it'>The Tribunal adjourned until 20 November 1945 at 1000 hours.</span>]</p> - -<hr class='pbk'/> - -<div><span class='pageno' title='29' id='Page_29'></span><h1>FIRST DAY<br/> <span style='font-size:smaller'>Tuesday, 20 November 1945</span></h1></div> - -<h2 class='nobreak'><span class='it'>Morning Session</span></h2> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Before the defendants in this case are called -upon to make their pleas to the Indictment which has been lodged -against them, and in which they are charged with Crimes against -Peace, War Crimes, and Crimes against Humanity, and with a -Common Plan or Conspiracy to commit those crimes, it is the wish -of the Tribunal that I should make a very brief statement on behalf -of the Tribunal.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>This International Military Tribunal has been established pursuant -to the Agreement of London, dated the 8th of August 1945, -and the Charter of the Tribunal as annexed thereto, and the purpose -for which the Tribunal has been established is stated in -Article 1 of the Charter to be the just and prompt trial and punishment -of the major war criminals of the European Axis.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The Signatories to the Agreement and Charter are the Government -of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, -the Government of the United States of America, the Provisional -Government of the French Republic, and the Government of the -Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The Committee of the Chief Prosecutors, appointed by the four -Signatories, have settled the final designation of the war criminals -to be tried by the Tribunal, and have approved the Indictment on -which the present defendants stand charged here today.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>On Thursday, the 18th of October 1945, in Berlin, the Indictment -was lodged with the Tribunal and a copy of that Indictment in the -German language has been furnished to each defendant, and has -been in his possession for more than 30 days.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>All the defendants are represented by counsel. In almost all -cases the counsel appearing for the defendants have been chosen by -the defendants themselves, but in cases where counsel could not -be obtained the Tribunal has itself selected suitable counsel agreeable -to the defendant.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The Tribunal has heard with great satisfaction of the steps -which have been taken by the Chief Prosecutors to make available -to defending counsel the numerous documents upon which the Prosecution -rely, with the aim of giving to the defendants every possibility -for a just defense. -<span class='pageno' title='30' id='Page_30'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>The Trial which is now about to begin is unique in the history -of the jurisprudence of the world and it is of supreme importance -to millions of people all over the globe. For these reasons, there -is laid upon everybody who takes any part in this Trial a solemn -responsibility to discharge their duties without fear or favor, in -accordance with the sacred principles of law and justice.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The four Signatories having invoked the judicial process, it is -the duty of all concerned to see that the Trial in no way departs -from those principles and traditions which alone give justice its -authority and the place it ought to occupy in the affairs of all -civilized states.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>This Trial is a public Trial in the fullest sense of those words, -and I must, therefore, remind the public that the Tribunal will -insist upon the complete maintenance of order and decorum, and -will take the strictest measures to enforce it. It only remains for -me to direct, in accordance with the provisions of the Charter, that -the Indictment shall now be read.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. SIDNEY S. ALDERMAN (Associate Trial Counsel for the -United States): May it please the Tribunal:</p> - -<p class='line'> </p> - -<p class='pindent'>I. The United States of America, the French Republic, the -United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the -Union of Soviet Socialist Republics by the undersigned, Robert H. -Jackson, François de Menthon, Hartley Shawcross, and R. A. Rudenko, -duly appointed to represent their respective governments in -the investigation of the charges against and the prosecution of the -major war criminals, pursuant to the Agreement of London dated -8 August 1945, and the Charter of this Tribunal annexed thereto, -hereby accuse as guilty, in the respects hereinafter set forth, of -Crimes against Peace, War Crimes, and Crimes against Humanity, -and of a Common Plan or Conspiracy to commit those Crimes, all -as defined in the Charter of the Tribunal, and accordingly name as -defendants in this cause and as indicted on the Counts hereinafter -set out:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Hermann Wilhelm Göring, Rudolf Hess, Joachim von Ribbentrop, -Robert Ley, Wilhelm Keitel, Ernst Kaltenbrunner, -Alfred Rosenberg, Hans Frank, Wilhelm Frick, Julius Streicher, -Walter Funk, Hjalmar Schacht, Gustav Krupp von Bohlen und -Halbach, Karl Dönitz, Erich Raeder, Baldur von Schirach, Fritz -Sauckel, Alfred Jodl, Martin Bormann, Franz von Papen, Arthur -Seyss-Inquart, Albert Speer, Constantin von Neurath and Hans -Fritzsche, individually and as members of any of the groups or -organizations next hereinafter named.</p> - -<p class='line'> </p> - -<p class='pindent'>II. The following are named as groups or organizations (since -dissolved) which should be declared criminal by reason of their -aims and the means used for the accomplishment thereof, and in -<span class='pageno' title='31' id='Page_31'></span> -connection with the conviction of such of the named defendants as -were members thereof:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Die Reichsregierung (Reich Cabinet); das Korps der Politischen -Leiter der Nationalsozialistischen Deutschen Arbeiterpartei (Leadership -Corps of the Nazi Party); die Schutzstaffeln der Nationalsozialistischen -Arbeiterpartei (commonly known as the “SS”) and -including the Sicherheitsdienst (commonly known as the “SD”); die -Geheime Staatspolizei (Secret State Police, commonly known as the -“Gestapo”); die Sturmabteilungen der NSDAP (commonly known as -the “SA”); and the General Staff and the High Command of the -German Armed Forces. The identity and membership of the groups -or organizations referred to in the foregoing titles are hereinafter -in Appendix B more particularly defined.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COUNT ONE—THE COMMON PLAN OR CONSPIRACY. Reference: -the Charter, Article 6, especially Article 6 (a).</p> - -<p class='line'> </p> - -<p class='pindent'>III. <span class='it'>Statement of the Offense.</span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>All the defendants, with divers other persons, during a period -of years preceding 8 May 1945, participated as leaders, organizers, -instigators, or accomplices in the formulation or execution of a -Common Plan or Conspiracy to commit, or which involved the commission -of, Crimes against Peace, War Crimes, and Crimes against -Humanity, as defined in the Charter of this Tribunal, and, in accordance -with the provisions of the Charter, are individually responsible -for their own acts and for all acts committed by any persons in -the execution of such plan and conspiracy. The Common Plan or -Conspiracy embraced the commission of Crimes against Peace, in -that the defendants planned, prepared, initiated, and waged wars -of aggression, which were also wars in violation of international -treaties, agreements, or assurances. In the development and course -of the Common Plan or Conspiracy it came to embrace the commission -of War Crimes, in that it contemplated, and the defendants -determined upon and carried out, ruthless wars against countries -and populations, in violation of the rules and customs of war, including -as typical and systematic means by which the wars were -prosecuted, murder, ill-treatment, deportation for slave labor and -for other purposes of civilian populations of occupied territories, -murder and ill-treatment of prisoners of war and of persons on the -High Seas, the taking and killing of hostages, the plunder of public -and private property, the wanton destruction of cities, towns, and -villages, and devastation not justified by military necessity. The -Common Plan or Conspiracy contemplated and came to embrace as -typical and systematic means, and the defendants determined upon -and committed, Crimes against Humanity, both within Germany -and within occupied territories, including murder, extermination, -enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts committed -<span class='pageno' title='32' id='Page_32'></span> -against civilian populations before and during the war, and persecutions -on political, racial, or religious grounds, in execution of the -plan for preparing and prosecuting aggressive or illegal wars, many -of such acts and persecutions being violations of the domestic laws -of the countries where perpetrated.</p> - -<p class='line'> </p> - -<p class='pindent'>IV. <span class='it'>Particulars of the Nature and Development of the Common -Plan or Conspiracy.</span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>(A) The Nazi Party as the central core of the Common Plan -or Conspiracy.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In 1921 Adolf Hitler became the supreme leader or Führer of the -Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei (National Socialist -German Workers Party), also known as the Nazi Party, which had -been founded in Germany in 1920. He continued as such throughout -the period covered by this Indictment. The Nazi Party, together -with certain of its subsidiary organizations, became the instrument -of cohesion among the defendants and their co-conspirators and an -instrument for the carrying out of the aims and purposes of their -conspiracy. Each defendant became a member of the Nazi Party and -of the conspiracy, with knowledge of their aims and purposes, or, -with such knowledge, became an accessory to their aims and purposes -at some stage of the development of the conspiracy.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>(B) Common objectives and methods of conspiracy.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The aims and purposes of the Nazi Party and of the defendants -and divers other persons from time to time associated as leaders, -members, supporters, or adherents of the Nazi Party (hereinafter -called collectively the “Nazi conspirators”) were, or came to be, to -accomplish the following by any means deemed opportune, including -unlawful means, and contemplating ultimate resort to threat of -force, force, and aggressive war: (1) to abrogate and overthrow the -Treaty of Versailles and its restrictions upon the military armament -and activity of Germany; (2) to acquire the territories lost by Germany -as the result of the World War of 1914-18 and other territories -in Europe asserted by the Nazi conspirators to be occupied -principally by so-called “racial Germans”; (3) to acquire still -further territories in continental Europe and elsewhere claimed by -the Nazi conspirators to be required by the “racial Germans” as -“Lebensraum,” or living space, all at the expense of neighboring -and other countries. The aims and purposes of the Nazi conspirators -were not fixed or static, but evolved and expanded as they acquired -progressively greater power and became able to make more effective -application of threats of force and threats of aggressive war. -When their expanding aims and purposes became finally so great -as to provoke such strength of resistance as could be overthrown -only by armed force and aggressive war, and not simply by the -<span class='pageno' title='33' id='Page_33'></span> -opportunistic methods theretofore used, such as fraud, deceit, threats, -intimidation, fifth-column activities, and propaganda, the Nazi conspirators -deliberately planned, determined upon and launched their -aggressive wars and wars in violation of international treaties, -agreements, and assurances by the phases and steps hereinafter -more particularly described.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>(C) Doctrinal techniques of the Common Plan or Conspiracy.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>To incite others to join in the Common Plan or Conspiracy, and -as a means of securing for the Nazi conspirators their highest -degree of control over the German community, they put forth, -disseminated, and exploited certain doctrines, among others, as -follows:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>1. That persons of so-called “German blood” (as specified by the -Nazi conspirators) were a “master race” and were accordingly -entitled to subjugate, dominate, or exterminate other “races” and -peoples;</p> - -<p class='pindent'>2. That the German people should be ruled under the Führerprinzip -(Leadership Principle) according to which power was to -reside in a Führer from whom sub-leaders were to derive authority -in a hierarchical order, each sub-leader to owe unconditional obedience -to his immediate superior but to be absolute in his own -sphere of jurisdiction; and the power of the leadership was to be -unlimited, extending to all phases of public and private life;</p> - -<p class='pindent'>3. That war was a noble and necessary activity of Germans;</p> - -<p class='pindent'>4. That the leadership of the Nazi Party, as the sole bearer of -the foregoing and other doctrines of the Nazi Party, was entitled to -shape the structure, policies, and practices of the German State and -all related institutions, to direct and supervise the activities of all -individuals within the State, and to destroy all opponents.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>(D) The acquiring of totalitarian control of Germany: political.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>1. First steps in acquisition of control of State machinery:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In order to accomplish their aims and purposes, the Nazi conspirators -prepared to seize totalitarian control over Germany to -assure that no effective resistance against them could arise within -Germany itself. After the failure of the Munich Putsch of 1923 -aimed at the overthrow of the Weimar Republic by direct action, -the Nazi conspirators set out through the Nazi Party to undermine -and capture the German Government by “legal” forms supported -by terrorism. They created and utilized, as a Party formation, Die -Sturmabteilungen (SA), a semi-military, voluntary organization of -young men trained for and committed to the use of violence, whose -mission was to make the Party the master of the streets. -<span class='pageno' title='34' id='Page_34'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>2. Control acquired:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>On 30 January 1933 Hitler became Chancellor of the German -Republic. After the Reichstag fire of 28 February 1933, clauses -of the Weimar constitution guaranteeing personal liberty, freedom -of speech, of the press, of association, and assembly were suspended. -The Nazi conspirators secured the passage by the Reichstag of a -“Law for the Protection of the People and the Reich” giving Hitler -and the members of his then cabinet plenary powers of legislation. -The Nazi conspirators retained such powers after having changed -the members of the cabinet. The conspirators caused all political -parties except the Nazi Party to be prohibited. They caused the -Nazi Party to be established as a para-governmental organization -with extensive and extraordinary privileges.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>3. Consolidation of control:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Thus possessed of the machinery of the German State, the Nazi -conspirators set about the consolidation of their position of power -within Germany, the extermination of potential internal resistance, -and the placing of the German nation on a military footing,</p> - -<p class='pindent'>(a) The Nazi conspirators reduced the Reichstag to a body of -their own nominees and curtailed the freedom of popular elections -throughout the country. They transformed the several states, provinces, -and municipalities, which had formerly exercised semi-autonomous -powers, into hardly more than administrative organs of the -central Government. They united the offices of the President and -the Chancellor in the person of Hitler, instituted a widespread -purge of civil servants, and severely restricted the independence of -the judiciary and rendered it subservient to Nazi ends. The conspirators -greatly enlarged existing State and Party organizations, -established a network of new State and Party organizations, and -“co-ordinated” State agencies with the Nazi Party and its branches -and affiliates, with the result that German life was dominated by -Nazi doctrine and practice and progressively mobilized for the -accomplishment of their aims.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>(b) In order to make their rule secure from attack and to instill -fear in the hearts of the German people, the Nazi conspirators -established and extended a system of terror against opponents and -supposed or suspected opponents of the regime. They imprisoned -such persons without judicial process, holding them in “protective -custody” and concentration camps, and subjected them to persecution, -degradation, despoilment, enslavement, torture, and murder. -These concentration camps were established early in 1933 -under the direction of the Defendant Göring and expanded as a -fixed part of the terroristic policy and method of the conspirators -and used by them for the commission of the Crimes against -<span class='pageno' title='35' id='Page_35'></span> -Humanity hereinafter alleged. Among the principal agencies utilized -in the perpetration of these crimes were the SS and the Gestapo, -which, together with other favored branches or agencies of the State -and Party, were permitted to operate without restraint of law.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>(c) The Nazi conspirators conceived that, in addition to the suppression -of distinctively political opposition, it was necessary to -suppress or exterminate certain other movements or groups which -they regarded as obstacles to their retention of total control in -Germany and to the aggressive aims of the conspiracy abroad. -Accordingly:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>(1) The Nazi conspirators destroyed the free trade unions in -Germany by confiscating their funds and properties, persecuting -their leaders, prohibiting their activities, and supplanting them by -an affiliated Party organization. The Leadership Principle was -introduced into industrial relations, the entrepreneur becoming the -leader and the workers becoming his followers. Thus any potential -resistance of the workers was frustrated and the productive labor -capacity of the German nation was brought under the effective control -of the conspirators.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>(2) The Nazi conspirators, by promoting beliefs and practices -incompatible with Christian teaching, sought to subvert the influence -of the churches over the people and in particular over the youth -of Germany. They avowed their aim to eliminate the Christian -churches in Germany and sought to substitute therefore Nazi institutions -and Nazi beliefs and pursued a program of persecution -of priests, clergy, and members of monastic orders whom they -deemed opposed to their purposes, and confiscated church property.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>(3) The persecution by the Nazi conspirators of pacifist groups, -including religious movements dedicated to pacifism, was particularly -relentless and cruel.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>(d) Implementing their “master race” policy, the conspirators -joined in a program of relentless persecution of the Jews, designed -to exterminate them. Annihilation of the Jews became an official -State policy, carried out both by official action and by incitements -to mob and individual violence. The conspirators openly avowed -their purpose. For example, the Defendant Rosenberg stated: -“Anti-Semitism is the unifying element of the reconstruction of Germany.” -On another occasion he also stated:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“Germany will regard the Jewish question as solved only -after the very last Jew has left the greater German living -space. . . . Europe will have its Jewish question solved only -after the very last Jew has left the continent.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'><span class='pageno' title='36' id='Page_36'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>The Defendant Ley declared:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“We swear we are not going to abandon the struggle until -the last Jew in Europe has been exterminated and is actually -dead. It is not enough to isolate the Jewish enemy of mankind—the -Jew has got to be exterminated.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>On another occasion he also declared:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“The second German secret weapon is anti-Semitism, because -if it is consistently pursued by Germany, it will become a -universal problem which all nations will be forced to consider.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>The Defendant Streicher declared:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“The sun will not shine on the nations of the earth until -the last Jew is dead.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>These avowals and incitements were typical of the declarations -of the Nazi conspirators throughout the course of their conspiracy. -The program of action against the Jews included disfranchisement, -stigmatization, denial of civil liberties, subjecting their persons and -property to violence, deportation, enslavement, enforced labor, starvation, -murder and mass extermination. The extent to which the -conspirators succeeded in their purpose can only be estimated, but -the annihilation was substantially complete in many localities of -Europe. Of the 9,600,000 Jews who lived in the parts of Europe -under Nazi domination, it is conservatively estimated that 5,700,000 -have disappeared, most of them deliberately put to death by the -Nazi conspirators. Only remnants of the Jewish population of -Europe remain.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>(e) In order to make the German people amenable to their will, -and to prepare them psychologically for war, the Nazi conspirators -reshaped the educational system and particularly the education and -training of the German youth. The Leadership Principle was -introduced into the schools, and the Party and affiliated organizations -were given wide supervisory powers over education. The Nazi -conspirators imposed a supervision of all cultural activities, controlled -the dissemination of information and the expression of -opinion within Germany as well as the movement of intelligence -of all kinds from and into Germany, and created a vast propaganda -machine.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>(f) The Nazi conspirators placed a considerable number of their -dominated organizations on a progressively militarized footing with -a view to the rapid transformation and use of such organizations -whenever necessary as instruments of war.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>(E) The acquiring of totalitarian control in Germany: economic; -and the economic planning and mobilization for aggressive war. -<span class='pageno' title='37' id='Page_37'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>Having gained political power, the conspirators organized Germany’s -economy to give effect to their political aims.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>1. In order to eliminate the possibility of resistance in the economic -sphere, they deprived labor of its rights of free industrial and -political association as particularized in paragraph (D) 3 (c) (1) -herein.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>2. They used organizations of German business as instruments -of economic mobilization for war.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>3. They directed Germany’s economy towards preparation and -equipment of the military machine. To this end they directed -finance, capital investment, and foreign trade.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>4. The Nazi conspirators, and in particular the industrialists -among them, embarked upon a huge re-armament program and set -out to produce and develop huge quantities of materials of war and -to create a powerful military potential.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>5. With the object of carrying through the preparation for war -the Nazi conspirators set up a series of administrative agencies and -authorities. For example, in 1936 they established for this purpose -the office of the Four Year Plan with the Defendant Göring as -Plenipotentiary, vesting it with overriding control over Germany’s -economy. Furthermore, on 28 August 1939, immediately before -launching their aggression against Poland, they appointed the Defendant -Funk Plenipotentiary for Economics; and on 30 August 1939 -they set up the Ministerial Council for the Defense of the Reich -to act as a War Cabinet.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>(F) Utilization of Nazi control for foreign aggression.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>1. Status of the conspiracy by the middle of 1933 and projected -plans.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>By the middle of the year 1933 the Nazi conspirators, having -acquired governmental control over Germany, were in a position -to enter upon further and more detailed planning with particular -relationship to foreign policy. Their plan was to re-arm and to reoccupy -and fortify the Rhineland, in violation of the Treaty of Versailles -and other treaties, in order to acquire military strength and -political bargaining power to be used against other nations.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>2. The Nazi conspirators decided that for their purpose the -Treaty of Versailles must definitely be abrogated and specific plans -were made by them and put into operation by 7 March 1936, all of -which opened the way for the major aggressive steps to follow, as -hereinafter set forth. In the execution of this phase of the conspiracy -the Nazi conspirators did the following acts:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>(a) They led Germany to enter upon a course of secret rearmament -from 1933 to March 1935, including the training of military -<span class='pageno' title='38' id='Page_38'></span> -personnel and the production of munitions of war, and the building -of an air force.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>(b) On 14 October 1933 they led Germany to leave the International -Disarmament Conference and the League of Nations.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>(c) On 10 March 1935 the Defendant Göring announced that Germany -was building a military air force.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>(d) On 16 March 1935 the Nazi conspirators promulgated a law -for universal military service, in which they stated the peace time -strength of the German Army would be fixed at 500,000 men.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>(e) On 21 May 1935 they falsely announced to the world, with -intent to deceive and allay fears of aggressive intentions, that they -would respect the territorial limitations of the Versailles Treaty -and comply with the Locarno Pacts.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>(f) On 7 March 1936 they reoccupied and fortified the Rhineland, -in violation of the Treaty of Versailles and the Rhine Pact -of Locarno of 16 October 1925, and falsely announced to the world -that “we have no territorial demands to make in Europe.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>3. Aggressive action against Austria and Czechoslovakia.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>(a) The 1936-38 phase of the plan: planning for the assault on -Austria and Czechoslovakia.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The Nazi conspirators next entered upon the specific planning -for the acquisition of Austria and Czechoslovakia, realizing it would -be necessary, for military reasons, first to seize Austria before -assaulting Czechoslovakia. On 21 May 1935 in a speech to the -Reichstag, Hitler stated that:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“Germany neither intends, nor wishes to interfere in the -internal affairs of Austria, to annex Austria or to conclude -an Anschluss.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>On 1 May 1936, within 2 months after the re-occupation of the -Rhineland, Hitler stated:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“The lie goes forth again that Germany tomorrow or the day -after will fall upon Austria or Czechoslovakia.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Thereafter, the Nazi conspirators caused a treaty to be entered -into between Austria and Germany on 11 July 1936, Article I of -which stated that:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“The German Government recognizes the full sovereignty of -the Federated State of Austria in the spirit of the pronouncements -of the German Führer and Chancellor of 21 May -1935.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Meanwhile, plans for aggression in violation of that treaty -were being made. By the autumn of 1937 all noteworthy -opposition within the Reich had been crushed. Military preparation -for the Austrian action was virtually concluded. An -influential group of the Nazi conspirators met with Hitler on -<span class='pageno' title='39' id='Page_39'></span> -5 November 1937, to review the situation. It was reaffirmed -that Nazi Germany must have “Lebensraum” in Central Europe. -It was recognized that such conquest would probably meet resistance -which would have to be crushed by force and that their -decision might lead to a general war, but this prospect was discounted -as a risk worth taking. There emerged from this meeting -three possible plans for the conquest of Austria and Czechoslovakia. -Which of the three was to be used was to depend upon the developments -in the political and military situation in Europe. It was contemplated -during this meeting that the conquest of Austria and -Czechoslovakia would, through compulsory emigration of 2 million -persons from Czechoslovakia and 1 million persons from Austria, -provide additional food to the Reich for 5 million to 6 million -people, strengthen it militarily by providing shorter and better -frontiers, and make possible the constituting of new armies up to -about twelve divisions. Thus, the aim of the plan against Austria -and Czechoslovakia was conceived of not as an end in itself but as -a preparatory measure toward the next aggressive steps in the Nazi -conspiracy.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>(b) The execution of the plan to invade Austria: November 1937 -to March 1938.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Hitler, on 8 February 1938, called Chancellor Schuschnigg to a -conference at Berchtesgaden. At the meeting of 12 February 1938, -under threat of invasion, Schuschnigg yielded a promise of amnesty -to imprisoned Nazis and appointment of Nazis to ministerial posts—meaning -in Austria. He agreed to remain silent until Hitler’s -next speech in which Austria’s independence was to be re-affirmed, -but Hitler in that speech, instead of affirming Austrian independence, -declared himself protector of all Germans. Meanwhile, subversive -activities of Nazis in Austria increased. Schuschnigg, on -9 March 1938, announced a plebiscite for the following Sunday on -the question of Austrian independence. On 11 March Hitler sent -an ultimatum, demanding that the plebiscite be called off or that -Germany would invade Austria. Later the same day a second -ultimatum threatened invasion unless Schuschnigg should resign in -3 hours. Schuschnigg resigned. The Defendant Seyss-Inquart, -who was appointed Chancellor, immediately invited Hitler to send -German troops into Austria to “preserve order.” The invasion began -on 12 March 1938. On 13 March Hitler by proclamation assumed -office as Chief of State of Austria and took command of its armed -forces. By a law of the same date Austria was annexed to Germany.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>(c) The execution of the plan to invade Czechoslovakia: April -1938 to March 1939.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>(1) Simultaneously with their annexation of Austria, the Nazi -conspirators gave false assurances to the Czechoslovak Government -<span class='pageno' title='40' id='Page_40'></span> -that they would not attack that country. But within a month they -met to plan specific ways and means of attacking Czechoslovakia, -and to revise, in the light of the acquisition of Austria, the previous -plans for aggression against Czechoslovakia.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>(2) On 21 April 1938 the Nazi conspirators met and prepared to -launch an attack on Czechoslovakia not later than 1 October 1938. -They planned to create an “incident” to “justify” the attack. They -decided to launch a military attack only after a period of diplomatic -squabbling which, growing more serious, would lead to an excuse -for war, or, in the alternative, to unleash a lightning attack as a -result of an “incident” of their own creation. Consideration was -given to assassinating the German Ambassador at Prague to create -the requisite incident. From and after 21 April 1938, the Nazi conspirators -caused to be prepared detailed and precise military plans -designed to carry out such an attack at any opportune moment and -calculated to overthrow all Czech resistance within 4 days, thus -presenting the world with a <span class='it'>fait accompli</span>, and so forestalling outside -resistance. Throughout the months of May, June, July, August, -and September, these plans were made more specific and detailed, -and by 3 September 1938 it was decided that all troops were to be -ready for action on 28 September 1938.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>(3) Throughout this same period, the Nazi conspirators were -agitating the minorities question in Czechoslovakia, and particularly -in the Sudetenland, leading to a diplomatic crisis in August and -September 1938. After the Nazi conspirators threatened war, the -United Kingdom and France concluded a pact with Germany and -Italy at Munich on 29 September 1938, involving the cession of the -Sudetenland by Czechoslovakia to Germany. Czechoslovakia was -required to acquiesce. On 1 October 1938 German troops occupied -the Sudetenland.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>(4) On 15 March 1939, contrary to the provisions of the Munich -Pact itself, the Nazi conspirators caused the completion of their -plan by seizing and occupying the major part of Czechoslovakia, -i.e. Bohemia and Moravia, not ceded to Germany by the Munich -Pact.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>4. Formulation of the plan to attack Poland: preparation and -initiation of aggressive war: March 1939 to September 1939.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>(a) With these aggressions successfully consummated, the conspirators -had obtained much desired resources and bases and were -ready to undertake further aggressions by means of war. Following -the assurances to the world of peaceful intentions, an influential -group of the conspirators met on 23 May 1939 to consider the further -implementation of their plan. The situation was reviewed, and it -was observed that “the past six years have been put to good use -and all measures have been taken in correct sequence and in -<span class='pageno' title='41' id='Page_41'></span> -accordance with our aims,” that the national-political unity of the -Germans had been substantially achieved, and that further successes -could not be achieved without war and bloodshed. It was decided -nevertheless next to attack Poland at the first suitable opportunity. -It was admitted that the questions concerning Danzig which they -had agitated with Poland were not true questions, but rather that -the question was one of aggressive expansion for food and “Lebensraum.” -It was recognized that Poland would fight if attacked and -that a repetition of the Nazi success against Czechoslovakia without -war could not be expected. Accordingly, it was determined that -the problem was to isolate Poland and, if possible, prevent a -simultaneous conflict with the Western Powers. Nevertheless, it -was agreed that England was an enemy to their aspirations, and -that war with England and her ally France must eventually result, -and therefore that in that war every attempt must be made to -overwhelm England with a “Blitzkrieg”, or lightning war. It was -thereupon determined immediately to prepare detailed plans for an -attack on Poland at the first suitable opportunity and thereafter -for an attack on England and France, together with plans for the -simultaneous occupation by armed force of air bases in the Netherlands -and Belgium.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>(b) Accordingly, after having denounced the German-Polish Pact -of 1934 on false grounds, the Nazi conspirators proceeded to stir -up the Danzig issue, to prepare frontier “incidents” to “justify” the -attack, and to make demands for the cession of Polish territory. -Upon refusal by Poland to yield, they caused German Armed Forces -to invade Poland on 1 September 1939, thus precipitating war also -with the United Kingdom and France.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>5. Expansion of the war into a general war of aggression: planning -and execution of attacks on Denmark, Norway, Belgium, the -Netherlands, Luxembourg, Yugoslavia, and Greece: 1939 to April 1941.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Thus the aggressive war prepared for by the Nazi conspirators -through their attacks on Austria and Czechoslovakia was actively -launched by their attack on Poland, in violation of the terms of -the Briand-Kellogg Pact, 1928. After the total defeat of Poland, in -order to facilitate the carrying out of their military operations -against France and the United Kingdom, the Nazi conspirators made -active preparations for an extension of the war in Europe. In -accordance with these plans, they caused the German Armed -Forces to invade Denmark and Norway on 9 April 1940; Belgium, -the Netherlands, and Luxembourg on 10 May 1940; Yugoslavia and -Greece on 6 April 1941. All these invasions had been specifically -planned in advance.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>6. German invasion on 22 June 1941 of the U.S.S.R. territory in -violation of the Non-Aggression Pact of 23 August 1939. -<span class='pageno' title='42' id='Page_42'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>On 22 June 1941 the Nazi conspirators deceitfully denounced the -Non-Aggression Pact between Germany and the U.S.S.R. and without -any declaration of war invaded Soviet territory, thereby beginning -a war of aggression against the U.S.S.R.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>From the first day of launching their attack on Soviet territory -the Nazi conspirators, in accordance with their detailed plans, began -to carry out the destruction of cities, towns, and villages, the -demolition of factories, collective farms, electric stations, and railroads, -the robbery and barbaric devastation of the natural cultural -institutions of the peoples of the U.S.S.R., the devastation of -museums, churches, historic monuments, the mass deportation of -the Soviet citizens for slave labor to Germany, as well as the -annihilation of old people, women, and children, especially Bielorussians -and Ukrainians. The extermination of Jews was committed -throughout the territory of the Soviet Union.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The above-mentioned criminal offenses were perpetrated by the -German troops in accordance with the orders of the Nazi Government -and the General Staff and High Command of the German -Armed Forces.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>7. Collaboration with Italy and Japan and aggressive war against -the United States: November 1936 to December 1941.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>After the initiation of the Nazi wars of aggression the Nazi conspirators -brought about a German-Italian-Japanese 10-year military-economic -alliance signed at Berlin on 27 September 1940. This -agreement, representing a strengthening of the bonds among those -three nations established by the earlier but more limited pact of -25 November 1936, stated: “The Governments of Germany, Italy, -and Japan, considering it as a condition precedent of any lasting -peace that all nations of the world be given each its own proper -place, have decided to stand by and co-operate with one another -in regard of their efforts in Greater East Asia and regions of -Europe respectively wherein it is their prime purpose to establish -and maintain a new order of things calculated to promote the -mutual prosperity and welfare of the peoples concerned.” The Nazi -conspirators conceived that Japanese aggression would weaken and -handicap those nations with which they were at war, and those -with whom they contemplated war. Accordingly, the Nazi conspirators -exhorted Japan to seek “a new order of things.” Taking -advantage of the wars of aggression then being waged by the Nazi -conspirators, Japan commenced an attack on 7 December 1941 -against the United States of America at Pearl Harbor and the -Philippines, and against the British Commonwealth of Nations, -French Indo-China, and the Netherlands in the Southwest Pacific. -Germany declared war against the United States on 11 December 1941. -<span class='pageno' title='43' id='Page_43'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>(G) War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity committed in the -course of executing the conspiracy for which the conspirators are -responsible.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>1. Beginning with the initiation of the aggressive war on 1 September -1939, and throughout its extension into wars involving -almost the entire world, the Nazi conspirators carried out their -Common Plan or Conspiracy to wage war in ruthless and complete -disregard and violation of the laws and customs of war. In the -course of executing the Common Plan or Conspiracy, there were -committed the War Crimes detailed hereinafter in Count Three of -this Indictment.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>2. Beginning with the initiation of their plan to seize and retain -total control of the German State, and thereafter throughout their -utilization of that control for foreign aggression, the Nazi conspirators -carried out their Common Plan or Conspiracy in ruthless -and complete disregard and violation of the laws of humanity. In -the course of executing the Common Plan or Conspiracy there were -committed the Crimes against Humanity detailed hereinafter in -Count Four of this Indictment.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>3. By reason of all the foregoing, the defendants with divers -other persons are guilty of a Common Plan or Conspiracy for the -accomplishment of Crimes against Peace; of a conspiracy to commit -Crimes against Humanity in the course of preparation for war and -in the course of prosecution of war, and of a conspiracy to commit -War Crimes not only against the armed forces of their enemies but -also against non-belligerent civilian populations.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>(H) Individual, group and organization responsibility for the -offense stated in Count One.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Reference is hereby made to Appendix A of this Indictment -for a statement of the responsibility of the individual defendants -for the offense set forth in this Count One of the Indictment. -Reference is hereby made to Appendix B of this Indictment for a -statement of the responsibility of the groups and organizations -named herein as criminal groups and organizations for the offenses -set forth in this Count One of the Indictment.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>If the Tribunal please, that ends Count One, which is America’s -responsibility. Great Britain will present Count Two.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If your Lordships please:</p> - -<p class='line'> </p> - -<p class='pindent'>COUNT TWO—CRIMES AGAINST PEACE. Charter, Article -6 (a).</p> - -<p class='line'> </p> - -<p class='pindent'>V. <span class='it'>Statement of the Offense.</span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>All the defendants with divers other persons, during a period -of years preceding 8 May 1945, participated in the planning, preparation, -<span class='pageno' title='44' id='Page_44'></span> -initiation, and waging of wars of aggression, which were -also wars in violation of international treaties, agreements, and -assurances.</p> - -<p class='line'> </p> - -<p class='pindent'>VI. <span class='it'>Particulars of the Wars Planned, Prepared, Initiated, and -Waged.</span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>(A) The wars referred to in the statement of offense in this -Count Two of the Indictment and the dates of their initiation were -the following: against Poland, 1 September 1939; against the United -Kingdom and France, 3 September 1939; against Denmark and Norway, -9 April 1940; against Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg, -10 May 1940; against Yugoslavia and Greece, 6 April 1941; -against the U.S.S.R., 22 June 1941; and against the United States -of America, 11 December 1941.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>(B) Reference is hereby made to Count One of the Indictment -for the allegations charging that these wars were wars of aggression -on the part of the defendants.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>(C) Reference is hereby made to Appendix C annexed to this -Indictment for a statement of particulars of the charges of violations -of international treaties, agreements, and assurances caused by the -defendants in the course of planning, preparing, and initiating -these wars.</p> - -<p class='line'> </p> - -<p class='pindent'>VII. <span class='it'>Individual, Group and Organization Responsibility for the -Offense Stated in Count Two.</span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>Reference is hereby made to Appendix A of this Indictment for -a statement of the responsibility of the individual defendants for -the offense set forth in this Count Two of the Indictment. Reference -is hereby made to Appendix B of this Indictment for a statement -of the responsibility of the groups and organizations named herein -as criminal groups and organizations for the offense set forth in -this Count Two of the Indictment.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>That finishes, Mr. President, Count Two of the Indictment.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will now adjourn for 15 minutes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If your Lordship pleases, the -reading will be resumed by a representative of the French Republic.</p> - -<p class='line' style='text-align:center;margin-top:2em;margin-bottom:2em;'>[<span class='it'>A recess was taken.</span>]</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal understands that the Defendant -Ernst Kaltenbrunner is temporarily ill. The Trial will continue in -his absence. I call upon the Chief Prosecutor for the Provisional -Government of the French Republic.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>M. PIERRE MOUNIER (Assistant Prosecutor for the French -Republic):</p> - -<p class='line'> </p> - -<p class='pindent'>COUNT THREE—WAR CRIMES. Charter, Article 6, -especially 6 (b). -<span class='pageno' title='45' id='Page_45'></span></p> - -<p class='line'> </p> - -<p class='pindent'>VIII. <span class='it'>Statement of the Offense.</span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>All the defendants committed War Crimes between 1 September -1939 and 8 May 1945, in Germany and in all those countries and -territories occupied by the German Armed Forces since 1 September -1939, and in Austria, Czechoslovakia, and Italy, and on the -High Seas.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>All the defendants, acting in concert with others, formulated -and executed a Common Plan or Conspiracy to commit War Crimes -as defined in Article 6 (b) of the Charter. This plan involved, among -other things, the practice of “total war” including methods of combat -and of military occupation in direct conflict with the laws and -customs of war, and the perpetration of crimes committed on the -field of battle during encounters with enemy armies, against prisoners -of war, and in occupied territories against the civilian population -of such territories.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The said War Crimes were committed by the defendants and by -other persons for whose acts the defendants are responsible (under -Article 6 of the Charter) as such other persons when committing -the said War Crimes performed their acts in execution of a Common -Plan and Conspiracy to commit the said War Crimes, in the -formulation and execution of which plan and conspiracy all the -defendants participated as leaders, organizers, instigators, and -accomplices.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>These methods and crimes constituted violations of international -conventions, of internal penal laws, and of the general principles -of criminal law as derived from the criminal law of all civilized -nations, and were involved in and part of a systematic course of -conduct.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>(A) Murder and ill-treatment of civilian populations of or in -occupied territory and on the High Seas.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Throughout the period of their occupation of territories overrun -by their armed forces, the defendants, for the purpose of systematically -terrorizing the inhabitants, ill-treated civilians, imprisoned -them without legal process, tortured, and murdered them.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The murders and ill-treatment were carried out by divers means, -such as shooting, hanging, gassing, starvation, gross overcrowding, -systematic undernutrition, systematic imposition of labor tasks beyond -the strength of those ordered to carry them out, inadequate -provision of surgical and medical services, kickings, beatings, -brutality and torture of all kinds, including the use of hot irons and -pulling out of fingernails and the performance of experiments by -means of operations and otherwise on living human subjects. In -some occupied territories the defendants interfered with religious -services, persecuted members of the clergy and monastic orders, -and expropriated church property. They conducted deliberate and -<span class='pageno' title='46' id='Page_46'></span> -systematic genocide; viz., the extermination of racial and national -groups, against the civilian population of certain occupied territories -in order to destroy particular races and classes of people, and -national, racial, or religious groups, particularly Jews, Poles, and -Gypsies.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Civilians were systematically subjected to tortures of all kinds, -with the object of obtaining information.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Civilians of occupied countries were subjected systematically -to “protective arrests”, that is to say they were arrested and imprisoned -without any trial and any of the ordinary protections of the -law, and they were imprisoned under the most unhealthy and inhumane -conditions.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In the concentration camps were many prisoners who were -classified “Nacht und Nebel”. These were entirely cut off from the -world and were allowed neither to receive nor to send letters. They -disappeared without trace and no announcement of their fate was -ever made by the German authorities.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Such crimes and ill-treatment are contrary to international conventions, -in particular to Article 46 of the Hague Regulations, 1907, -the laws and customs of war, the general principles of criminal -law as derived from the criminal laws of all civilized nations, the -internal penal laws of the countries in which such crimes were -committed, and to Article 6 (b) of the Charter.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The following particulars and all the particulars appearing later -in this Count are set out herein by way of example only, are not -exclusive of other particular cases, and are stated without prejudice -to the right of the Prosecution to adduce evidence of other cases -of murder and ill-treatment of civilians.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>1. In France, Belgium, Holland, Denmark, Norway, Luxembourg, -Italy, and the Channel Islands, (hereinafter called the “Western -Countries”), and in that part of Germany which lies west of a line -drawn due north and south through the center of Berlin (hereinafter -called “Western Germany”).</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Such murder and ill-treatment took place in concentration -camps and similar establishments set up by the defendants, and particularly -in the concentration camps set up at Belsen, Buchenwald, -Dachau, Breendonck, Grini, Natzweiler, Ravensbrück, Vught, and -Amersfoort, and in numerous cities, towns, and villages, including -Oradour sur Glane, Trondheim, and Oslo.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Crimes committed in France or against French citizens took the -following forms:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Arbitrary arrests were carried out under political or racial -pretexts; they were either individual or collective; notably in Paris -(round-up of the 18th Arrondissement by the Field Gendarmerie, -<span class='pageno' title='47' id='Page_47'></span> -round-up of the Jewish population of the 11th Arrondissement in -August 1941, round-up in July 1942); at Clermont-Ferrand (round-up -of professors and students of the University of Strasbourg, which -had been evacuated to Clermont-Ferrand, on 25 November 1943); at -Lyons; at Marseilles (round-up of 40,000 persons in January 1943); -at Grenoble (round-up of 24 December 1943); at Cluny (round-up -on 24 December 1943); at Figeac (round-up in May 1944); at Saint -Pol de Léon (round-up in July 1944); at Locminé (round-up on -3 July 1944); at Eysieux (round-up in May 1944); and at Meaux-Moussey -(round-up in September 1944). These arrests were followed -by brutal treatment and tortures carried out by the most diverse -methods, such as immersion in icy water, asphyxiation, torture of -the limbs, and the use of instruments of torture, such as the iron -helmet and electric current, and practiced in all the prisons of -France, notably in Paris, Lyons, Marseilles, Rennes, Metz, Clermont-Ferrand, -Toulouse, Nice, Grenoble, Annecy, Arras, Béthune, Lille, -Loos, Valenciennes, Nancy, Troyes, and Caen, and in the torture -chambers fitted up at the Gestapo centers.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In the concentration camps, the health regime and the labor -regime were such that the rate of mortality (alleged to be from -natural causes) attained enormous proportions, for instance:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>1. Out of a convoy of 250 French women deported from Compiègne -to Auschwitz in January 1943, 180 had died of exhaustion at -the end of 4 months.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>2. 143 Frenchmen died of exhaustion between 23 March and -6 May 1943 in Block 8 at Dachau.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>3. 1,797 Frenchmen died of exhaustion between 21 November -1943 and 15 March 1945 in the block at Dora.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>4. 465 Frenchmen died of general debility in November 1944 -at Dora.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>5. 22,761 deportees died of exhaustion at Buchenwald between -1 January 1943 and 15 April 1945.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>6. 11,560 detainees died of exhaustion at Dachau Camp (most -of them in Block 30 reserved for the sick and the infirm) between -1 January and 15 April 1945.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>7. 780 priests died of exhaustion at Mauthausen.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>8. Out of 2,200 Frenchmen registered at Flossenburg Camp, -1,600 died from supposedly natural causes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Methods used for the work of extermination in concentration -camps were:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Bad treatment, pseudo-scientific experiments (sterilization of -women at Auschwitz and at Ravensbrück, study of the evolution -of cancer of the womb at Auschwitz, of typhus at Buchenwald, -anatomical research at Natzweiler, heart injections at Buchenwald, -<span class='pageno' title='48' id='Page_48'></span> -bone grafting and muscular excisions at Ravensbrück, <span class='it'>et cetera</span>), -and by gas chambers, gas wagons, and crematory ovens. Of 228,000 -French political and racial deportees in concentration camps, only -28,000 survived.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In France also systematic extermination was practised, notably -at Asq on 1 April 1944, at Colpo on 22 July 1944, at Buzet sur -Tarn on 6 July 1944 and on 17 August 1944, at Pluvignier on 8 July -1944, at Rennes on 8 June 1944, at Grenoble on 8 July 1944, at -Saint Flour on 10 June 1944, at Ruisnes on 10 June 1944, at Nimes, -at Tulle, and at Nice, where, in July 1944, the victims of torture -were exposed to the population, and at Oradour sur Glane where -the entire village population was shot or burned alive in the -church.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The many charnel pits give proof of anonymous massacres. -Most notable of these are the charnel pits of Paris (Cascade du -Bois de Boulogne), Lyons, Saint Genis-Laval, Besançon, Petit Saint -Bernard, Aulnat, Caen, Port Louis, Charleval, Fontainebleau, Bouconne, -Gabaudet, L’hermitage Lorges, Morlaas, Bordelongue, Signe.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In the course of a premeditated campaign of terrorism, initiated -in Denmark by the Germans in the latter part of 1943, 600 Danish -subjects were murdered and, in addition, throughout the German -occupation of Denmark large numbers of Danish subjects were -subjected to torture and ill-treatment of all sorts. In addition, -approximately five hundred Danish subjects were murdered, by -torture and otherwise, in German prisons and concentration camps.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In Belgium, between 1940 and 1944, torture by various means, -but identical in each place, was carried out at Brussels, Liége, -Mons, Ghent, Namur, Antwerp, Tournai, Arlon, Charleroi, and -Dinant.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>At Vught, in Holland, when the camp was evacuated, about four -hundred persons were shot.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In Luxembourg, during the German occupation, 500 persons were -murdered and, in addition, another 521 were illegally executed, by -order of such special tribunals as the so-called “Sondergericht”. -Many more persons in Luxembourg were subjected to torture and -ill-treatment by the Gestapo. At least 4,000 Luxembourg nationals -were imprisoned during the period of German occupation, and of -these at least 400 were murdered.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Between March 1944 and April 1945, in Italy, at least 7,500 men, -women, and children, ranging in years from infancy to extreme -old age were murdered by the German soldiery at Civitella, in the -Ardeatine Caves in Rome, and at other places.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>(B) Deportation, for slave labor and for other purposes, of the -civilian populations of and in occupied territories. -<span class='pageno' title='49' id='Page_49'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>During the whole period of the occupation by Germany of -both the Western and the Eastern Countries, it was the policy of -the German Government and of the German High Command to -deport able-bodied citizens from such occupied countries to Germany -and to other occupied countries to force them to work on -fortifications, in factories, and in other tasks connected with the -German war effort.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In pursuance of such policy there were mass deportations from -all the Western and Eastern Countries for such purposes during -the whole period of the occupation.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>These deportations were contrary to the international conventions, -in particular to Article 46 of the Hague Regulations, 1907, -the laws and customs of war, the general principles of criminal -law as derived from the criminal laws of all civilized nations, the -internal penal laws of the countries in which such crimes were -committed, and to Article 6 (b) of the Charter.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Particulars of deportations, by way of example only and without -prejudice to the production of evidence of other cases, are as -follows:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>1. From the Western Countries:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>From France the following “deportations” of persons for political -and racial reasons took place—each of which consisted of from -1,500 to 2,500 deportees:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>1940, 3 transports; 1941, 14 transports; 1942, 104 transports; 1943, -257 transports; 1944, 326 transports.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>These deportees were subjected to the most barbarous conditions -of overcrowding; they were provided with wholly insufficient -clothing and were given little or no food for several days.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The conditions of transport were such that many deportees died -in the course of the voyage, for example:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In one of the wagons of the train which left Compiègne for -Buchenwald, on the 17th of September 1943, 80 men died out of 130.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>On 4 June 1944, 484 bodies were taken out of a train at Sarrebourg.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In a train which left Compiègne on 2 July 1944 for Dachau, -more than 600 dead were found on arrival, i.e. one-third of the -total number.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In a train which left Compiègne on 16th of January 1944 for -Buchenwald, more than 100 persons were confined in each wagon, -the dead and the wounded being heaped in the last wagon during -the voyage.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In April 1945, of 12,000 internees evacuated from Buchenwald -4,000 only were still alive when the marching column arrived near -Regensburg. -<span class='pageno' title='50' id='Page_50'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>During the German occupation of Denmark, 5,200 Danish subjects -were deported to Germany and there imprisoned in concentration -camps and other places.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In 1942 and thereafter, 6,000 nationals of Luxembourg were -deported from their country under deplorable conditions and many -of them perished.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>From Belgium, between 1940 and 1944, at least 190,000 civilians -were deported to Germany and used as slave labor. Such deportees -were subjected to ill-treatment and many of them were compelled -to work in armament factories.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>From Holland, between 1940 and 1944, nearly half a million -civilians were deported to Germany and to other occupied countries.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>(C) Murder and ill-treatment of prisoners of war, and of other -members of the armed forces of the countries with whom Germany -was at war, and of persons on the High Seas.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The defendants ill-treated and murdered prisoners of war by -denying them suitable food, shelter, clothing, and medical care and -other attention; by forcing them to labor in inhumane conditions; -by humiliating them, torturing them, and by killing them. The -German Government and the German High Command imprisoned -prisoners of war in various concentration camps, where they were -killed or subjected to inhuman treatment by the various methods -set forth in Paragraph VIII (A).</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Members of the armed forces of the countries with whom Germany -was at war were frequently murdered while in the act of -surrendering.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>These murders and ill-treatment were contrary to international -conventions, particularly Articles 4, 5, 6, and 7 of the Hague -Regulations, 1907, and to Articles 2, 3, 4, and 6 of the Prisoners of -War Convention, Geneva, 1929, the laws and customs of war, the -general principles of criminal law as derived from the criminal -laws of all civilized nations, the internal penal laws of the countries -in which such crimes were committed, and to Article 6 (b) of the -Charter.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Particulars by way of example and without prejudice to the -production of evidence of other cases, are as follows:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In the Western Countries:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>French officers who escaped from Oflag X C were handed over -to the Gestapo and disappeared; others were murdered by their -guards; others sent to concentration camps and exterminated. Among -others, the men of Stalag VI C were sent to Buchenwald.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Frequently prisoners captured on the Western Front were obliged -to march to the camps until they completely collapsed. Some of -them walked more than 600 kilometers with hardly any food; they -<span class='pageno' title='51' id='Page_51'></span> -marched on for 48 hours running, without being fed; among them -a certain number died of exhaustion or of hunger; stragglers were -systematically murdered.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The same crimes were committed in 1943, 1944, and 1945, when -the occupants of the camps were withdrawn before the Allied -advance, particularly during the withdrawal of the prisoners from -Sagan on February 8th, 1945.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Bodily punishments were inflicted upon non-commissioned officers -and cadets who refused to work. On December 24th, 1943, -three French non-commissioned officers were murdered for that -motive in Stalag IV A. Much ill-treatment was inflicted without -motive on other ranks; stabbing with bayonets, striking with rifle-butts, -and whipping; in Stalag XX B the sick themselves were -beaten many times by sentries; in Stalag III B and Stalag III C -worn-out prisoners were murdered or grievously wounded. In military -jails, in Graudenz for instance, in reprisal camps, as in Rava-Ruska, -the food was so insufficient that the men lost more than -15 kilograms in a few weeks. In May 1942, one loaf of bread only -was distributed in Rava-Ruska to each group of 35 men.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Orders were given to transfer French officers in chains to the -camp of Mauthausen after they had tried to escape. At their arrival -in camp they were murdered, either by shooting or by gas, and -their bodies destroyed in the crematorium.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>American prisoners, officers and men, were murdered in Normandy -during the summer of 1944 and in the Ardennes in December -1944. American prisoners were starved, beaten, and mutilated -in various ways in numerous Stalags in Germany or in the occupied -countries, particularly in 1943, 1944, and 1945.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>(D) Killing of hostages.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Throughout the territories occupied by the German Armed Forces -in the course of waging their aggressive wars, the defendants -adopted and put into effect on a wide scale the practice of taking -and killing hostages from the civilian population. These acts were -contrary to international conventions, particularly Article 50 of the -Hague Regulations, 1907, the laws and customs of war, the general -principles of criminal law as derived from the criminal laws of all -civilized nations, the internal penal laws of the countries in which -such crimes were committed, and to Article 6 (b) of the Charter.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Particulars, by way of example and without prejudice to the -production of evidence of other cases, are as follows:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In the Western Countries:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In France hostages were executed either individually or collectively; -these executions took place in all the big cities of France, -among others in Paris, Bordeaux, and Nantes, as well as at Chateaubriant. -<span class='pageno' title='52' id='Page_52'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>In Holland many hundreds of hostages were shot at the following -among other places: Rotterdam, Apeldoorn, Amsterdam, Benshop, -and Haarlem.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In Belgium many hundreds of hostages were shot during the -period 1940 to 1944.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>M. CHARLES GERTHOFFER (Assistant Prosecutor for the -French Republic) [<span class='it'>Continuing the reading of the Indictment</span>]:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>(E) Plunder of public and private property.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The defendants ruthlessly exploited the people and the material -resources of the countries they occupied, in order to strengthen the -Nazi war machine, to depopulate and impoverish the rest of Europe, -to enrich themselves and their adherents, and to promote German -economic supremacy over Europe.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The defendants engaged in the following acts and practices, -among others:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>1. They degraded the standard of life of the people of occupied -countries and caused starvation by stripping occupied countries -of foodstuffs for removal to Germany.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>2. They seized raw materials and industrial machinery in all -of the occupied countries, removed them to Germany and used them -in the interest of the German war effort and the German economy.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>3. In all the occupied countries, in varying degrees, they confiscated -businesses, plants, and other property.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>4. In an attempt to give color of legality to illegal acquisitions -of property, they forced owners of property to go through the -forms of “voluntary” and “legal” transfers.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>5. They established comprehensive controls over the economies -of all of the occupied countries and directed their resources, their -production, and their labor in the interests of the German war -economy, depriving the local populations of the products of essential -industries.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>6. By a variety of financial mechanisms, they despoiled all of -the occupied countries of essential commodities and accumulated -wealth, debased the local currency systems and disrupted the local -economies. They financed extensive purchases in occupied countries -through clearing arrangements by which they exacted loans from -the occupied countries. They imposed occupation levies, exacted -financial contributions, and issued occupation currency, far in excess -of occupation costs. They used these excess funds to finance the -purchase of business properties and supplies in the occupied countries.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>7. They abrogated the rights of the local populations in the -occupied portions of the U.S.S.R. and in Poland and in other -<span class='pageno' title='53' id='Page_53'></span> -countries to develop or manage agricultural and industrial properties, -and reserved this area for exclusive settlement, development, -and ownership by Germans and their so-called racial brethren.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>8. In further development of their plan of criminal exploitation, -they destroyed industrial cities, cultural monuments, scientific institutions, -and property of all types in the occupied territories to eliminate -the possibility of competition with Germany.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>9. From their program of terror, slavery, spoliation, and organized -outrage, the Nazi conspirators created an instrument for -the personal profit and aggrandizement of themselves and their -adherents. They secured for themselves and their adherents:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>(a) Positions in administration of business involving power, influence, -and lucrative prerequisites;</p> - -<p class='pindent'>(b) The use of cheap forced labor;</p> - -<p class='pindent'>(c) The acquisition on advantageous terms of foreign properties, -raw materials, and business interests;</p> - -<p class='pindent'>(d) The basis for the industrial supremacy of Germany.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>These acts were contrary to international conventions, particularly -Articles 46 to 56 inclusive of the Hague Regulations, 1907, the -laws and customs of war, the general principles of criminal law as -derived from the criminal laws of all civilized nations, the internal -penal laws of the countries in which such crimes were committed, -and to Article 6 (b) of the Charter.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Particulars, by way of example and without prejudice to the -production of evidence of other cases, are as follows:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>1. Western Countries:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>There was plundered from the Western Countries from 1940 to -1944, works of art, artistic objects, pictures, plastics, furniture, textiles, -antique pieces, and similar articles of enormous value to the -number of 21,903.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In France statistics show the following:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Removal of raw materials:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Coal, 63,000,000 tons; electric energy, 20,976 Mkwh; petrol and -fuel, 1,943,750 tons; iron ore, 74,848,000 tons; siderurgical products, -3,822,000 tons; bauxite, 1,211,800 tons; cement, 5,984,000 tons; lime, -1,888,000 tons; quarry products, 25,872,000 tons; and various other -products to a total value of 79,961,423,000 francs.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Removal of industrial equipment: total—9,759,861,000 francs, of -which 2,626,479,000 francs of machine tools.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Removal of agricultural produce: total—126,655,852,000 francs; -i.e. for the principal products:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Wheat, 2,947,337 tons; oats, 2,354,080 tons; milk, 790,000 hectolitres, -(concentrated and in powder, 460,000 hectolitres); butter, -76,000 tons, cheese, 49,000 tons; potatoes, 725,975 tons; various vegetables, -<span class='pageno' title='54' id='Page_54'></span> -575,000 tons; wine, 7,647,000 hectolitres; champagne, 87,000,000 -bottles; beer 3,821,520 hectolitres; various kinds of alcohol, 1,830,000 -hectolitres.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Removal of manufactured products to a total of 184,640,000,000 -francs.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Plundering: Francs 257,020,024,000 from private enterprise, -Francs 55,000,100,000 from the State.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Financial exploitation: From June 1940 to September 1944 the -French Treasury was compelled to pay to Germany 631,866,000,000 -francs.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Looting and destruction of works of art: The museums of Nantes, -Nancy, Old-Marseilles were looted.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Private collections of great value were stolen. In this way, -Raphaels, Vermeers, Van Dycks, and works of Rubens, Holbein, -Rembrandt, Watteau, Boucher disappeared. Germany compelled -France to deliver up “The Mystic Lamb” by Van Eyck, which Belgium -had entrusted to her.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In Norway and other occupied countries decrees were made by -which the property of many civilians, societies, <span class='it'>et cetera</span>, was confiscated. -An immense amount of property of every kind was plundered -from France, Belgium, Norway, Holland, and Luxembourg.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>As a result of the economic plundering of Belgium between 1940 -and 1944 the damage suffered amounted to 175 billions of Belgian -francs.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>(F) The exaction of collective penalties.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The Germans pursued a systematic policy of inflicting, in all the -occupied countries, collective penalties, pecuniary and otherwise, -upon the population for acts of individuals for which it could not -be regarded as collectively responsible; this was done at many -places, including Oslo, Stavanger, Trondheim, and Rogaland.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Similar instances occurred in France, among others in Dijon, -Nantes, and as regards the Jewish population in the occupied territories. -The total amount of fines imposed on French communities -adds up to 1,157,179,484 francs made up as follows: A fine on the -Jewish population, 1,000,000,000; various fines, 157,179,484.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>These acts violated Article 50, Hague Regulations, 1907, the laws -and customs of war, the general principles of criminal law as -derived from the criminal laws of all civilized nations, the internal -penal laws of the countries in which such crimes were committed, -and Article 6 (b) of the Charter.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>(G) Wanton destruction of cities, towns, and villages, and devastation -not justified by military necessity.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The defendants wantonly destroyed cities, towns, and villages, -and committed other acts of devastation without military justification -<span class='pageno' title='55' id='Page_55'></span> -or necessity. These acts violated Articles 46 and 50 of the -Hague Regulations, 1907, the laws and customs of war, the general -principles of criminal law as derived from the criminal laws of all -civilized nations, the internal penal laws of the countries in which -such crimes were committed, and Article 6 (b) of the Charter.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Particulars, by way of example only and without prejudice to -the production of evidence of other cases, are as follows:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>1. Western Countries:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In March 1941 part of Lofoten in Norway was destroyed. In -April 1942 the town of Telerag in Norway was destroyed.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Entire villages were destroyed in France, among others, Oradour -sur Glane, Saint Nizier in Gascogne, La Mure, Vassieu, La Chappelle -en Vercors. The town of Saint Dié was burnt down and -destroyed. The Old Port District of Marseilles was dynamited in -the beginning of 1943 and resorts along the Atlantic and the Mediterranean -coasts, particularly the town of Sanary, were demolished.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In Holland there was most widespread and extensive destruction, -not justified by military necessity, including the destruction of harbors, -locks, dykes, and bridges; immense devastation was also caused -by inundations which equally were not justified by military necessity.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>(H) Conscription of civilian labor.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Throughout the occupied territories the defendants conscripted -and forced the inhabitants to labor and requisitioned their services -for purposes other than meeting the needs of the armies of occupation -and to an extent far out of proportion to the resources of the -countries involved. All the civilians so conscripted were forced to -work for the German war effort. Civilians were required to register -and many of those who registered were forced to join the Todt -Organization and the Speer Legion, both of which were semi-military -organizations involving some military training. These acts -violated Articles 46 and 52 of the Hague Regulations, 1907, the -laws and customs of war, the general principles of criminal law -as derived from the criminal laws of all civilized nations, the internal -penal laws of the countries in which such crimes were committed, -and Article 6 (b) of the Charter.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Particulars, by way of example only and without prejudice to -the production of evidence of other cases, are as follows:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>1. Western Countries:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In France, from 1942 to 1944, 963,813 persons were compelled to -work in Germany and 737,000 to work in France for the German -Army.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In Luxembourg, in 1944 alone, 2,500 men and 500 girls were -conscripted for forced labor. -<span class='pageno' title='56' id='Page_56'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>(I) Forcing civilians of occupied territories to swear allegiance -to a hostile power.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Civilians who joined the Speer Legion, as set forth in Paragraph -(H) were required, under threat of depriving them of food, -money, and identity papers, to swear a solemn oath acknowledging -unconditional obedience to Adolf Hitler, the Führer of Germany, -which was to them a hostile power.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will now adjourn until 2 o’clock.</p> - -<p class='line' style='text-align:center;margin-top:2em;margin-bottom:2em;'>[<span class='it'>The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours.</span>]</p> - -<hr class='pbk'/> - -<h2><span class='pageno' title='57' id='Page_57'></span><span class='it'>Afternoon Session</span></h2> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Will the Chief Prosecutor for the French -Republic continue the reading of the Indictment.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>M. MOUNIER: In Lorraine, civil servants were obliged, in order -to retain their positions, to sign a declaration by which they acknowledged -the “return of their country to the Reich”, pledged themselves -to obey without reservation the orders of their chiefs and -put themselves “at the active service of the Führer and of National -Socialist greater Germany.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>A similar pledge was imposed on Alsatian civil servants, by -threat of deportation or internment.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>These acts violated Article 45 of the Hague Regulations, 1907, -the laws and customs of war, the general principles of international -law, and Article 6 (b) of the Charter.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>(J) Germanization of occupied territories.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In certain occupied territories purportedly annexed to Germany -the defendants methodically and pursuant to plan endeavoured to -assimilate those territories politically, culturally, socially, and economically -into the German Reich. They endeavoured to obliterate -the former national character of these territories. In pursuance of -these plans, the defendants forcibly deported inhabitants who were -predominantly non-German and replaced them by thousands of -German colonists.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Their plan included economic domination, physical conquest, -installation of puppet governments, purported <span class='it'>de jure</span> annexation -and enforced conscription into the German Armed Forces.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>This was carried out in most of the occupied countries especially -in Norway, France (particularly in the Departments of Upper -Rhine, Lower Rhine, Moselle, Ardennes, Aisne, Nord, Meurthe and -Moselle), in Luxembourg, the Soviet Union, Denmark, Belgium, and -Holland.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In France in the Departments of Aisne, Nord, Meurthe and -Moselle, and especially in that of the Ardennes, rural properties -were confiscated by a German state organization which tried to -work them under German management.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The landowners of these holdings were dispossessed and turned -into agricultural laborers. In the Departments of Upper Rhine, -Lower Rhine, and Moselle the methods of Germanization were -those of annexation followed by conscription.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>1. From the month of August 1940 officials who refused to take -the oath of allegiance to the Reich were expelled. On September -21st the expulsion and deportation of population began, and on -November 22d, 1940 more than 70,000 Lorrainers or Alsatians were -<span class='pageno' title='58' id='Page_58'></span> -driven into the south zone of France. From July 31, 1941 onwards, -more than 100,000 persons were deported into the eastern regions -of the Reich or to Poland. All the property of the deportees or -expelled persons was confiscated. At the same time, 80,000 Germans -coming from the Saar or from Westphalia were installed in -Lorraine and 2,000 farms belonging to French people were transferred -to Germans.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>2. From 2 January 1942 all the young people of the Departments -of Upper Rhine and Lower Rhine, aged from 10 to 18 years, were -incorporated in the Hitler Youth. The same measures were taken -in the Moselle from 4 August 1942. From 1940 all the French -schools were closed, their staffs expelled, and the German school -system was introduced in the three departments.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>3. On the 28th of September 1940 an order applicable to the -Department of the Moselle ordained the Germanization of all the -surnames and Christian names which were French in form. The -same measure was taken on the 15th January 1943 in the Departments -of Upper Rhine and Lower Rhine.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>4. Two orders of the 23rd and 24th August 1942 imposed by -force German nationality on French citizens.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>5. On the 8th May 1941 for Upper Rhine and Lower Rhine, -and on the 23rd April 1941 for the Moselle, orders were promulgated -enforcing compulsory labor service on all French citizens of -either sex aged from 17 to 25 years. From the 1st January 1942 for -young men, and from the 26th January 1942 for young women, -national labor service was effectively organized in the Moselle. -This measure came into force on the 27th August 1942 in Upper -Rhine and Lower Rhine, but for young men only. The classes of -1940, 1941, 1942 were called up.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>6. These contingents were drafted into the Wehrmacht on the -expiration of their time in the labor service.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>On the 19th August 1942 an order instituted compulsory military -service in the Moselle, and on the 25th August 1942 the contingents -of 1940 to 1944 were called up in the three Departments.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Conscription was enforced by the German authorities in conformity -with the provisions of German legislation. The first induction -board took place on the 3rd September 1942. Later, in the -Upper Rhine and Lower Rhine new levies were effected everywhere -of the contingents from 1928 to 1939 inclusive. The French men -who refused to obey these laws were considered as deserters and -their families were deported, while their property was confiscated.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>These acts violated Articles 43, 46, 55, and 56 of the Hague -Regulations, 1907, the laws and customs of war, the general principles -of criminal law as derived from the criminal laws of all -<span class='pageno' title='59' id='Page_59'></span> -civilized nations, the internal penal laws of the countries in which -such crimes were committed, and Article 6 (b) of the Charter.</p> - -<p class='line'> </p> - -<p class='pindent'>IX. <span class='it'>Individual, Group and Organization Responsibility for the -Crimes Stated in Count Three.</span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>Reference is hereby made to Appendix A of this Indictment for -a statement of the responsibility of the individual defendants for -the charge set forth in Count Three of the Indictment.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Reference is hereby made to Appendix B of this Indictment for -a statement of the responsibility of the groups and organizations -named herein as criminal groups and organizations for the crime -set forth in this part three of the Indictment.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I will now call upon the Chief Prosecutor -for the Soviet Union.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LIEUTENANT COLONEL J. A. OZOL (Assistant Prosecutor for -the U.S.S.R.): COUNT THREE—WAR CRIMES.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>All the defendants committed War Crimes between 1 September -1939 and 8 May 1945 in Germany and in all those countries and -territories occupied by the German Armed Forces since 1 September -1939, and in Austria, Czechoslovakia, Italy, and on the High -Seas.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>All the defendants, acting in concert with others, formulated -and executed a Common Plan or Conspiracy to commit War Crimes -as defined in Article 6 (b) of the Charter. This plan involved, among -other things, the practice of “total war” including methods of combat -and of military occupation in direct conflict with the laws and -customs of war, and the commission of crimes perpetrated on the -field of battle during encounters with enemy armies, and against -prisoners of war, and in occupied territories against the civilian -population of such territories.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The said War Crimes were committed by the defendants and -by other persons for whose acts the defendants are responsible -(under Article 6 of the Charter) as such other persons when committing -the said War Crimes performed their acts in execution of -a common plan and conspiracy to commit the said War Crimes, in -the formulation and execution of which plan and conspiracy all -the defendants participated as leaders, organizers, instigators, and -accomplices.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>These methods and crimes constituted violations of international -conventions, of internal penal laws, and of the general principles -of criminal law as derived from the criminal law of all civilized -nations, and were involved in and part of a systematic course of -conduct.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>(A) Murder and ill-treatment of civilian populations of or in -occupied territory and on the High Seas. -<span class='pageno' title='60' id='Page_60'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>Throughout the period of their occupation of territories overrun -by their armed forces the defendants, for the purpose of systematically -terrorizing the inhabitants, murdered and tortured civilians, -and ill-treated them, and imprisoned them without legal process.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The murders and ill-treatment were carried out by divers means, -including shooting, hanging, gassing, starvation, gross overcrowding, -systematic undernutrition, systematic imposition of labor tasks -beyond the strength of those ordered to carry them out, inadequate -provision of surgical and medical services, kickings, beatings, -brutality, and torture of all kinds, including the use of hot irons -and pulling out of fingernails and the performance of experiments -by means of operations and otherwise on living human subjects. -In some occupied territories the defendants interfered with religious -services, persecuted members of the clergy and monastic -orders, and expropriated church property. They conducted deliberate -and systematic genocide, viz. the extermination of racial and -national groups, against the civilian populations of certain occupied -territories in order to destroy particular races and classes of people, -and national, racial, or religious groups, particularly Jews, Poles, -and Gypsies and others.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Civilians were systematically subjected to tortures of all kinds, -with the object of obtaining information.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Civilians of occupied countries were subjected systematically to -“protective arrests” whereby they were arrested and imprisoned -without any trial and any of the ordinary protections of the law, -and they were imprisoned under the most unhealthy and inhumane -conditions.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In the concentration camps were many prisoners who were -classified “Nacht und Nebel”. These were entirely cut off from the -world and were allowed neither to receive nor to send letters. They -disappeared without trace and no announcement of their fate was -ever made by the German authorities.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Such murders and ill-treatment were contrary to international -conventions, in particular to Article 46 of the Hague Regulations, -1907, the laws and customs of war, the general principles of criminal -law as derived from the criminal laws of all civilized nations, the -internal penal laws of the countries in which such crimes were -committed, and to Article 6 (b) of the Charter.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The following particulars and all the particulars appearing later -in this Count are set out herein by way of example only, are not -exclusive of other particular cases, and are stated without prejudice -to the right of the Prosecution to adduce evidence of other cases of -murder and ill-treatment of civilians.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>[2.] In the U.S.S.R., i.e. in the Bielorussian, Ukrainian, Estonian, -Latvian, Lithuanian, Karelo-Finnish, and Moldavian Soviet -<span class='pageno' title='61' id='Page_61'></span> -Socialist Republics, in 19 regions of the Russian Soviet Federated -Socialist Republic, and in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, -Greece, and the Balkans (hereinafter called the “Eastern Countries”).</p> - -<p class='pindent'>From the 1st September 1939, when the German Armed Forces -invaded Poland, and from the 22nd June 1941, when they invaded -the U.S.S.R., the German Government and the German High Command -adopted a systematic policy of murder and ill-treatment of -the civilian populations of and in the Eastern Countries as they -were successively occupied by the German Armed Forces. These -murders and ill-treatments were carried on continuously until the -German Armed Forces were driven out of the said countries.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Such murders and ill-treatments included:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>(a) Murders and ill-treatments at concentration camps and -similar establishments set up by the Germans in the Eastern Countries -and in Eastern Germany including those set up at Maidanek -and Auschwitz.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The said murders and ill-treatments were carried out by divers -means including all those set out above, as follows:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>About 1½ million persons were, exterminated in Maidanek and -about 4 million persons were exterminated in Auschwitz, among -whom were citizens of Poland, the U.S.S.R., the United States of -America, Great Britain, Czechoslovakia, France, and other countries.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In the Lwow region and in the city of Lwow the Germans -exterminated about 700,000 Soviet people, including 70 persons in -the field of the arts, science, and technology, and also citizens of -the U.S.A., Great Britain, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Holland, -brought to this region from other concentration camps.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In the Jewish ghetto from 7 September 1941 to 6 July 1943 over -133,000 persons were tortured and shot.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Mass shooting of the population occurred in the suburbs of the -city and in the Livenitz forest.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In the Ganov camp 200,000 citizens were exterminated. The most -refined methods of cruelty were employed in this extermination, -such as disembowelling and the freezing of human beings in tubs -of water. Mass shootings took place to the accompaniment of the -music of an orchestra recruited from the persons interned.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Beginning with June 1943 the Germans carried out measures -to hide the evidence of their crimes. They exhumed and burned -corpses, and they crushed the bones with machines and used them -for fertilizer.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>At the beginning of 1944, in the Ozarichi region of the Bielorussian -S.S.R., before liberation by the Red Army, the Germans -established three concentration camps without shelters, to which -they committed tens of thousands of persons from the neighbouring -territories. They intentionally brought many people to these camps -<span class='pageno' title='62' id='Page_62'></span> -from typhus hospitals, for the purpose of infecting the other persons -interned and for spreading the disease in territories from which -the Germans were driven by the Red Army. In these camps there -were many murders and crimes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In the Estonian S.S.R. they shot tens of thousands of persons -and in one day alone, 19 September 1944, in Camp Kloga, the Germans -shot 2,000 peaceful citizens. They burned the bodies on -bonfires.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In the Lithuanian S.S.R. there were mass killings of Soviet -citizens, namely: in Panerai at least 100,000; in Kaunas more than -70,000; in Alitus about 60,000; at Prenai more than 3,000; in Villiampol -about 8,000; in Mariampol about 7,000; in Trakai and neighbouring -towns 37,640.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In the Latvian S.S.R. 577,000 persons were murdered.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>As a result of the whole system of internal order maintained -in all camps, the interned persons were doomed to die.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In a secret instruction entitled “The Internal Regime in Concentration -Camps”, signed personally by Himmler in 1941 severe -measures of punishment were set forth for the internees. Masses -of prisoners of war were shot, or died from the cold and torture.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>(b) Murders and ill-treatments at places in the Eastern Countries -and in the Soviet Union, other than in the camps referred to -in (a) above, included, on various dates during the occupation by -the German Armed Forces:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The destruction in the Smolensk region of over 135,000 Soviet -citizens.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Among these, near the village of Kholmetz of the Sychev -region, when the military authorities were required to remove -the mines from an area, on the order of the commander of the -101st German Infantry Division, Major General Fisler, the German -soldiers gathered the inhabitants of the village of Kholmetz and -forced them to remove mines from the road. All of these people -lost their lives as a result of exploding mines.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In the Leningrad region there were shot and tortured over -172,000 persons, including 20,000 persons who were killed in the -city of Leningrad by the barbarous artillery barrage and the bombings.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In the Stavropol region in an anti-tank trench close to the -station of Mineralniye Vodi, and in other cities, tens of thousands -of persons were exterminated.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In Pyatigorsk many were subjected to torture and criminal -treatment, including suspension from the ceiling and other methods. -Many of the victims of these tortures were then shot. -<span class='pageno' title='63' id='Page_63'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>In Krasnodar some 6,700 civilians were murdered by poison gas -in gas vans, or were shot and tortured.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In the Stalingrad region more than 40,000 persons were killed -and tortured. After the Germans were expelled from Stalingrad, -more than a thousand mutilated bodies of local inhabitants were -found with marks of torture. One hundred and thirty-nine women -had their arms painfully bent backward and held by wires. From -some their breasts had been cut off and their ears, fingers, and -toes had been amputated. The bodies bore the marks of burns. On -the bodies of the men the five-pointed star was burned with an -iron or cut with a knife. Some were disembowelled.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In Orel over 5,000 persons were murdered.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In Novgorod and in the Novgorod region many thousands of -Soviet citizens were killed by shooting, starvation, and torture. In -Minsk tens of thousands of citizens were similarly killed.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In the Crimea peaceful citizens were gathered on barges, taken -out to sea and drowned, over 144,000 persons being exterminated -in this manner.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In the Soviet Ukraine there were monstrous criminal acts of -the Nazi conspirators. In Babi Yar, near Kiev, they shot over -100,000 men, women, children, and old people. In this city in -January 1941, after the explosion in German headquarters on -Dzerzhinsky Street the Germans arrested as hostages 1,250 persons—old -men, minors, women with nursing infants. In Kiev they -killed over 195,000 persons.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In Rovno and the Rovno region they killed and tortured over -100,000 peaceful citizens.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In Dnepropetrovsk, near the Transport Institute, they shot or -threw alive into a great ravine 11,000 women, old men, and children.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In Kamenetz-Podolsk region 31,000 Jews were shot and exterminated, -including 13,000 persons brought there from Hungary.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In the Odessa region at least 200,000 Soviet citizens were killed.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In Kharkov about 195,000 persons were either tortured to death, -shot, or gassed in gas vans.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In Gomel the Germans rounded up the population in prison, -and tortured and tormented them, and then took them to the center -of the city and shot them in public.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In the city of Lyda in the Grodnen region, on 8 May 1942, 5,670 -persons were completely undressed, driven into pens in groups of -100, and then shot by machine guns. Many were thrown in the -graves while they were still alive.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Along with adults the Nazi conspirators mercilessly destroyed -even children. They killed them with their parents, in groups and -alone. They killed them in children’s homes and hospitals, burying -the living in the graves, throwing them into flames, stabbing them -<span class='pageno' title='64' id='Page_64'></span> -with bayonets, poisoning them, conducting experiments upon them, -extracting their blood for the use of the German Army, throwing -them into prison and Gestapo torture chambers and concentration -camps, where the children died from hunger, torture, and epidemic -diseases.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>From 6 September to 24 November 1942, in the region of Brest, -Pinsk, Kobren, Dyvina, Malority, and Berezy-Kartuzsky about 400 -children were shot by German punitive units.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In the Yanov camp in the city of Lwow the Germans killed -8,000 children in two months.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In the resort of Tiberda the Germans annihilated 500 children -suffering from tuberculosis of the bone, who were in the sanatorium -for the cure.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>On the territory of the Latvian S.S.R. the German usurpers -killed thousands of children, which they had brought there with -their parents from the Bielorussian S.S.R., and from the Kalinin, -Kaluga, and other regions of the R.S.F.S.R.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In Czechoslovakia as a result of torture, beating, hanging, and -shooting, there were annihilated in Gestapo prisons in Brno, Seim, -and other places over 20,000 persons. Moreover many thousands -of internees were subjected to criminal treatment, beatings, and -torture.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Both before the war as well as during the war thousands of -Czech patriots, in particular Catholics and Protestants, lawyers, -doctors, teachers, et cetera, were arrested as hostages and imprisoned. -A large number of these hostages were killed by the Germans.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In Greece in October 1941 the male populations between 16 and -60 years of age of the Greek villages Amelofito, Kliston, Kizonia -Mesovunos, Selli, Ano-Kerzilion, and Kato-Kerzilion were shot—in -all 416 persons.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In Yugoslavia many thousands of civilians were murdered. Other -examples are given under Paragraph (D), “Killing of Hostages”, -below.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Paragraph (B) on Page 16 was read by the -Chief Prosecutor for the French Republic. Paragraph 2 on Page 17 -was omitted by him. So had you better not go on at Paragraph 2 -at Page 17?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. OZOL: 2. From the Eastern Countries:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The German occupying authorities deported from the Soviet -Union to slavery about 4,978,000 Soviet citizens.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Seven hundred fifty thousand Czechoslovakian citizens were taken -away from Czechoslovakia and forced to work in the German war -machine in the interior of Germany. -<span class='pageno' title='65' id='Page_65'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>On June 4, 1941 in the city of Zagreb, Yugoslavia, a meeting -of German representatives was called with the Councillor Von Troll -presiding. The purpose was to set up the means of deporting the -Yugoslav population from Slovenia. Tens of thousands of persons -were deported in carrying out this plan.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Murder and ill-treatment of prisoners of war, and of other. . . .</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Will you read Paragraph 2 at page 18?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LT. COL. OZOL: 2. In the Eastern Countries:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>At Orel prisoners of war were exterminated by starvation, shooting, -exposure, and poisoning.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Soviet prisoners of war were murdered <span class='it'>en masse</span> on orders from -the High Command and the headquarters of the SIPO and SD. Tens -of thousands of Soviet prisoners of war were tortured and murdered -at the “Gross Lazaret” at Slavuta.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In addition, many thousands of the persons referred to in Paragraph -VIII (A) 2, above, were Soviet prisoners of war.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Prisoners of war who escaped and were recaptured were handed -over to SIPO and SD for shooting.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Frenchmen fighting with the Soviet Army who were captured -were handed over to the Vichy Government for “proceedings.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In March 1944, 50 R.A.F. officers who escaped from Stalag -Luft III at Sagan were murdered when captured.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In September 1941, 11,000 Polish officers who were prisoners -of war were killed in the Katyn Forest near Smolensk.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In Yugoslavia the German Command and the occupying authorities -in the person of the chief officials of the police, the SS troops -(Police Lieutenant General Rosener) and the Divisional Group Command -(General Kubler and others) in the period 1941-43 ordered the -shooting of prisoners of war.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Now, Paragraph 2 of (D).</p> - -<p class='pindent'>CAPTAIN V. V. KUCHIN (Assistant Prosecutor for the U.S.S.R.) -[<span class='it'>Continuing the reading of the Indictment</span>]: 2. In the Eastern -Countries:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>At Kragnevatz in Yugoslavia 2,300 hostages were shot in October -1941. At Kraljero in Yugoslavia 5,000 hostages were shot.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Will you turn now to (E), Paragraph 2, -page 21?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>CAPT. KUCHIN: 2. Eastern Countries:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>During the occupation of the Eastern Countries the German -Government and the German High Command carried out, as a -systematic policy, a continuous course of plunder and destruction -including:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>On the territory of the Soviet Union the Nazi conspirators -destroyed or severely damaged 1,710 cities and more than 70,000 -<span class='pageno' title='66' id='Page_66'></span> -villages and hamlets, more than 6 million buildings and rendered -homeless about 25 million persons.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Among the cities which suffered most destruction are Stalingrad, -Sevastopol, Kiev, Minsk, Odessa, Smolensk, Novgorod, -Pskov, Orel, Kharkov, Voronezh, Rostov-on-Don, Stalino, and -Leningrad.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>As is evident from an official memorandum of the German Command, -the Nazi conspirators planned the complete annihilation of -entire Soviet cities. In a completely secret order of the Chief of -the Naval Staff (SKL Ia No. 1601/41, dated 29 September 1941) -addressed only to Staff officers, it was said:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“The Führer has decided to erase Petersburg from the face -of the earth. The existence of this large city will have no -further interest after Soviet Russia is destroyed. Finland has -also said that the existence of this city on her new border -is not desirable from her point of view. The original request -of the Navy that docks, harbor, et cetera, necessary for the -fleet be preserved is known to the Supreme Command of the -German Armed Forces, but the basic principles of carrying -out operations against Petersburg do not make it possible to -satisfy this request.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“It is proposed to approach near to the city and to destroy -it with the aid of an artillery barrage from weapons of different -calibers and with long air attacks. . . .</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“The problem of the lives of the population and of their -provisioning is a problem which cannot and must not be -decided by us.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“In this war . . . we are not interested in preserving even -a part of the population of this large city.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>The Germans destroyed 427 museums, among them the wealthy -museums of Leningrad, Smolensk, Stalingrad, Novgorod, Poltava, -and others.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In Pyatigorsk the art objects brought there from the Rostov -museum were seized.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The losses suffered by the coal mining industry alone in the -Stalin region amount to 2 billion rubles. There was colossal destruction -of industrial establishments in Makerevka, Carlovka, -Yenakievo, Konstantinovka, Mariupol, from which most of the -machinery and factories were removed.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Stealing of huge dimensions and the destruction of industrial, -cultural, and other property was typified in Kiev. More than -4 million books, magazines, and manuscripts (many of which were -very valuable and even unique) and a large number of artistic productions -and divers valuables were stolen and carried away.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Many valuable art productions were taken away from Riga. -<span class='pageno' title='67' id='Page_67'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>The extent of the plunder of cultural valuables is evidenced by -the fact that 100,000 valuable volumes and 70 cases of ancient -periodicals and precious monographs were carried away by Rosenberg’s -staff alone.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Among further examples of these crimes are:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Wanton devastation of the city of Novgorod and of many historical -and artistic monuments there; wanton devastation and plunder -of the city of Rovno and of its province; the destruction of the industrial, -cultural, and other property in Odessa; the destruction of -cities and villages in Soviet Karelia; the destruction in Estonia of -cultural, industrial, and other buildings; the destruction of medical -and prophylactic institutes; the destruction of agriculture and industry -in Lithuania; the destruction of cities in Latvia.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The Germans approached monuments of culture, dear to the -Soviet people, with special hatred. They broke up the estate of -the poet Pushkin in Mikhailovskoye, desecrated his grave, and -destroyed the neighboring villages and the Svyatogor monastery.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>They destroyed the estate and museum of Leo Tolstoy, “Yasnaya -Polyana” and desecrated the grave of the great writer. They destroyed, -in Klin, the museum of Tchaikovsky and, in Penaty, the -museum of the painter Repin and many others.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The Nazi conspirators destroyed 1,670 Greek Orthodox churches, -237 Roman Catholic churches, 67 chapels, 532 synagogues, <span class='it'>et cetera</span>.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>They also broke up, desecrated and senselessly destroyed the -most valuable monuments of the Christian Church, such as the -Kievo-Pecherskaya Lavra, Novy Jerusalem in the Istrin region, -and the most ancient monasteries and churches.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Destruction in Estonia of cultural, industrial, and other premises; -burning down of many thousands of residential buildings; removal -of 10,000 works of art; destruction of medical and prophylactic -institutions; plunder and removal to Germany of immense quantities -of agricultural stock including horses, cows, pigs, poultry, -beehives, and agricultural machines of all kinds.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Destruction of agriculture, enslavement of peasants, and looting -of stock and produce in Lithuania.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In the Latvian Republic destruction of the agriculture by the -looting of all stock, machinery, and produce.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Carrying away by Rosenberg’s headquarters of 100,000 valuable -volumes and 70 cases of ancient periodicals and precious monographs; -wanton destruction of libraries and other cultural buildings.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The result of this policy of plunder and destruction was to lay -waste the land and cause utter desolation.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The over-all value of the material loss which the U.S.S.R. has -borne, is computed to be 679 billion rubles, in State prices of 1941. -<span class='pageno' title='68' id='Page_68'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>Following the German occupation of Czechoslovakia on 15 March -1939 the defendants seized and stole large stocks of raw materials, -copper, tin, iron, cotton, and food; caused to be taken to Germany -large amounts of railway rolling stock, and many engines, carriages, -steam vessels and trolley buses; robbed libraries, laboratories, and -art museums of books, pictures, objects of art, scientific apparatus, -and furniture; stole all gold reserves and foreign exchange of -Czechoslovakia, including 23,000 kilograms of gold, of a nominal -value of 5,265,000 Pounds; fraudulently acquired control and thereafter -looted the Czech banks and many Czech industrial enterprises; -and otherwise stole, looted, and misappropriated Czechoslovak -public and private property. The total sum of defendants’ -economic spoliation of Czechoslovakia from 1938 to 1945 is estimated -at 200 billion Czechoslovak crowns.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>(G) Wanton destruction of cities, towns, and villages, and devastation -not justified by military necessity.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The defendants wantonly destroyed cities. . . .</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Will you go to Paragraph 2 of (G)? The -French read the first paragraph. Do you want to go to Paragraph 2 -of (G)?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>CAPT. KUCHIN: I have begun. . . .</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I thought we had read Paragraph 1. We might -take up at Paragraph 2, beginning “In the Eastern Countries the -defendants pursued. . . .”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>CAPT. KUCHIN: 2. Eastern Countries:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In the Eastern Countries the defendants pursued a policy of -wanton destruction and devastation; some particulars of this, without -prejudice to the production of evidence of other cases, are set -out above under the heading “Plunder of Public and Private -Property”.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In Greece in 1941 the villages of Amelofito, Kliston, Kizonia, -Messovunos, Selli, Ano-Kerzilion, and Kato-Kerzilion were utterly -destroyed.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In Yugoslavia on 15 August 1941 the German military command -officially announced that the village of Skela was burned to the -ground and the inhabitants killed on the order of the command.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>On the order of the Field Commander Hoersterberg a punitive -expedition from the SS troops and the field police destroyed the -villages of Machkovats and Kriva Reka in Serbia and all the inhabitants -were killed.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>General Fritz Neidhold (369 Infantry Division), on 11 September -1944, gave an order to destroy the villages of Zagniezde and -Udora, hanging all the men and driving away all the women and -children. -<span class='pageno' title='69' id='Page_69'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>In Czechoslovakia the Nazi conspirators also practiced the senseless -destruction of populated places. Lezaky and Lidice were -burnt to the ground and the inhabitants killed.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>(H) Conscription of civilian labor.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Throughout the occupied territories the defendants conscripted -and forced the inhabitants to labor and requisitioned their services. -. . .</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I think Paragraph (H) has been read, the -first paragraph of it. There only remains for you to read Paragraph -2 of (H).</p> - -<p class='pindent'>CAPT. KUCHIN: 2. Eastern Countries:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Of the large number of citizens of the Soviet Union and of -Czechoslovakia, referred to under Count Three VIII (B) 2 above, -many were so conscripted for forced labor.</p> - -<p class='line'> </p> - -<p class='pindent'>IX. Individual, group and organization responsibility for the -offense stated in Count Three.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Reference is hereby made to Appendix A of this Indictment for -a statement of the responsibility of the individual defendants for -the offense set forth in this Count Three of the Indictment. Reference -is hereby made to Appendix B of this Indictment for a -statement of the responsibility of the groups and organizations -named herein as criminal groups and organizations for the offense -set forth in this Count Three of the Indictment.</p> - -<p class='line'> </p> - -<p class='pindent'>COUNT FOUR—CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY, Charter, Article -6, especially 6 (c).</p> - -<p class='line'> </p> - -<p class='pindent'>X. Statement of the offense.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>All the defendants committed Crimes against Humanity during -a period of years preceding 8 May 1945, in Germany and in all -those countries and territories occupied by the German Armed -Forces since 1 September 1939, and in Austria and Czechoslovakia -and in Italy and on the High Seas.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>All the defendants, acting in concert with others, formulated -and executed a Common Plan or Conspiracy to commit Crimes -against Humanity as defined in Article 6 (c) of the Charter. This -plan involved, among other things, the murder and persecution of -all who were or who were suspected of being hostile to the Nazi -Party and all who were or who were suspected of being opposed -to the common plan alleged in Count One.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The said Crimes against Humanity were committed by the -defendants, and by other persons for whose acts the defendants -are responsible (under Article 6 of the Charter) as such other persons, -when committing the said War Crimes, performed their acts -in execution of a Common Plan and Conspiracy to commit the said -<span class='pageno' title='70' id='Page_70'></span> -War Crimes, in the formulation and execution of which plan and -conspiracy all the defendants participated as leaders, organizers, -instigators, and accomplices.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>These methods and crimes constituted violations of international -conventions, of internal penal laws, of the general principles of -criminal law as derived from the criminal law of all civilized -nations, and were involved in and part of a systematic course of -conduct. The said acts were contrary to Article 6 of the Charter.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The Prosecution will rely upon the facts pleaded under Count -Three as also constituting Crimes against Humanity.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>(A) Murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other -inhumane acts committed against civilian populations before and -during the war.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>For the purposes set out above, the defendants adopted a policy -of persecution, repression, and extermination of all civilians in Germany -who were, or who were believed to, or who were believed -likely to become, hostile to the Nazi Government and the Common -Plan or Conspiracy described in Count One. They imprisoned such -persons without judicial process, holding them in “protective custody” -and concentration camps, and subjected them to persecution, -degradation, despoilment, enslavement, torture, and murder.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Special courts were established to carry out the will of the conspirators; -favored branches or agencies of the State and Party were -permitted to operate outside the range even of nazified law and to -crush all tendencies and elements which were considered “undesirable”. -The various concentration camps included Buchenwald, -which was established in 1933, and Dachau, which was established -in 1934. At these and other camps the civilians were put to slave -labor and murdered and ill-treated by divers means, including those -set out in Count Three above, and these acts and policies were continued -and extended to the occupied countries after the 1st September -1939 and until 8th May 1945.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>(B) Persecution on political, racial, and religious grounds in execution -of and in connection with the common plan mentioned in -Count One.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>As above stated, in execution of and in connection with the -common plan mentioned in Count One, opponents of the German -Government were exterminated and persecuted. These persecutions -were directed against Jews. They were also directed against persons -whose political belief or spiritual aspirations were deemed to -be in conflict with the aims of the Nazis.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Jews were systematically persecuted since 1933; they were deprived -of liberty, thrown into concentration camps where they -were murdered and ill-treated. Their property was confiscated. -<span class='pageno' title='71' id='Page_71'></span> -Hundreds of thousands of Jews were so treated before the 1st September -1939.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Since the 1st September 1939 the persecution of the Jews was -redoubled; millions of Jews from Germany and from the occupied -Western Countries were sent to the Eastern Countries for extermination.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Particulars by way of example and without prejudice to the -production of evidence of other cases are as follows:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The Nazis murdered amongst others Chancellor Dollfuss, the Social -Democrat Breitscheid, and the Communist Thälmann. They -imprisoned in concentration camps numerous political and religious -personages, for example, Chancellor Schuschnigg and Pastor Niemöller.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In November 1938, by orders of the Chief of the Gestapo, anti-Jewish -demonstrations all over Germany took place. Jewish property -was destroyed; 30,000 Jews were arrested and sent to concentration -camps and their property confiscated.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Under paragraph VIII (A), above, millions of the persons there -mentioned as having been murdered and ill-treated were Jews.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Among other mass murders of Jews were the following:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>At Kislovodsk all Jews were made to give up their property; -2,000 were shot in an anti-tank ditch at Mineralniye Vodi; 4,300 -other Jews were shot in the same ditch; 60,000 Jews were shot on -an island on the Dvina near Riga; 20,000 Jews were shot at Lutsk; -32,000 Jews were shot at Sarny; 60,000 Jews were shot at Kiev -and Dniepropetrovsk.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Thousands of Jews were gassed weekly by means of gas-wagons -which broke down from overwork.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>As the Germans retreated before the Soviet Army they exterminated -Jews rather than allow them to be liberated. Many concentration -camps and ghettos were set up in which Jews were -incarcerated and tortured, starved, subjected to merciless atrocities, -and finally exterminated.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>About 70,000 Jews were exterminated in Yugoslavia.</p> - -<p class='line'> </p> - -<p class='pindent'>XI. Individual, group and organization responsibility for the -offense stated in Count Four.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Reference is hereby made to Appendix A of this Indictment for -a statement of the responsibility of the individual defendants for -the offense set forth in this Count Four of the Indictment. Reference -is hereby made to Appendix B of this Indictment for a -statement of the responsibility of the groups and organizations -named herein as criminal groups and organizations for the offense -set forth in the Count Four of the Indictment. -<span class='pageno' title='72' id='Page_72'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>Wherefore, this Indictment is lodged with the Tribunal in English, -French, and Russian, each text having equal authenticity, and -the charges herein made against the above-named defendants are -hereby presented to the Tribunal.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Hartley Shawcross, acting on behalf of the United Kingdom of -Great Britain and Northern Ireland; Robert H. Jackson, acting on -behalf of the United States of America; François de Menthon, -acting on behalf of the French Republic; R. Rudenko, acting on -behalf of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Berlin, -6th October 1945.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Has anybody been designated to read the -appendices?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. ALDERMAN: May it please the Tribunal, I shall read -Appendix A and Appendix B, and the British Delegation will read -Appendix C. One word of explanation as to Appendix A. The -Court will have observed that the defendants are seated in the -dock in the same order in which they are named in the Indictment. -By a mechanical slip-up they are not named in Appendix A in -exactly the same order. I think it would be too much difficulty for -the interpreters or for me to arrange them in the same order, -and if the Court will permit I will read Appendix A as it is printed.</p> - -<p class='line'> </p> - -<p class='pindent'>APPENDIX A—STATEMENT OF INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBILITY -FOR CRIMES SET OUT IN COUNTS ONE, TWO, THREE, -AND FOUR.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The statements hereinafter set forth following the name of each -individual defendant constitute matters upon which the Prosecution -will rely <span class='it'>inter alia</span> as pursuant to Article 6 establishing the individual -responsibility of the defendant:</p> - -<p class='line'> </p> - -<p class='pindent'>GÖRING. The Defendant Göring between 1932 and 1945 was -a member of the Nazi Party, Supreme Leader of the SA, general -in the SS, a member and President of the Reichstag, Minister of the -Interior of Prussia, Chief of the Prussian Police and Prussian -Secret State Police, Chief of the Prussian State Council, Trustee -of the Four Year Plan, Reich Minister for Air, Commander-in-Chief -of the Air Force, President of the Council of Ministers for the Defense -of the Reich, member of the Secret Cabinet Council, head -of the Hermann Göring Industrial Combine, and Successor Designate -to Hitler. The Defendant Göring used the foregoing positions, his -personal influence, and his intimate connection with the Führer -in such a manner that:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>He promoted the accession to power of the Nazi conspirators and -the consolidation of their control over Germany set forth in Count -<span class='pageno' title='73' id='Page_73'></span> -One of the Indictment; he promoted the military and economic -preparation for war set forth in Count One of the Indictment; he -participated in the planning and preparation of the Nazi -conspirators for wars of aggression and wars in violation of international -treaties, agreements, and assurances set forth in Counts -One and Two of the Indictment; and he authorized, directed, and -participated in the War Crimes set forth in Count Three of the -Indictment, and the Crimes against Humanity set forth in Count -Four of the Indictment, including a wide variety of crimes against -persons and property.</p> - -<p class='line'> </p> - -<p class='pindent'>RIBBENTROP. The Defendant Ribbentrop between 1932 and -1945 was a member of the Nazi Party, a member of the Nazi -Reichstag, advisor to the Führer on matters of foreign policy, representative -of the Nazi Party for matters of foreign policy, special -German delegate for disarmament questions, Ambassador extraordinary, -Ambassador in London, organizer and director of Dienststelle -Ribbentrop, Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs, member of -the Secret Cabinet Council, member of the Führer’s political staff -at general headquarters, and general in the SS. The Defendant -Ribbentrop used the foregoing positions, his personal influence, and -his intimate connection with the Führer in such a manner that:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>He promoted the accession to power of the Nazi conspirators as -set forth in Count One of the Indictment; he promoted the preparations -for war set forth in Count One of the Indictment; he participated -in the political planning and preparation of the Nazi conspirators -for wars of aggression and wars in violation of international -treaties, agreements, and assurances as set forth in Counts -One and Two of the Indictment; in accordance with the Führer -Principle he executed and assumed responsibility for the execution -of the foreign policy plans of the Nazi conspirators set forth in -Count One of the Indictment; and he authorized, directed, and -participated in the War Crimes set forth in Count Three of the -Indictment and the Crimes against Humanity set forth in Count -Four of the Indictment, including more particularly the crimes -against persons and property in occupied territories.</p> - -<p class='line'> </p> - -<p class='pindent'>HESS. The Defendant Hess between 1921 and 1941 was a member -of the Nazi Party, Deputy to the Führer, Reich Minister without -Portfolio, member of the Reichstag, member of the Council of -Ministers for the Defense of the Reich, member of the Secret Cabinet -Council, Successor Designate to the Führer after the Defendant -Göring, a general in the SS and a general in the SA. The Defendant -Hess used the foregoing positions, his personal influence, and -his intimate connection with the Führer in such a manner that: -<span class='pageno' title='74' id='Page_74'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>He promoted the accession to power of the Nazi conspirators -and the consolidation of their control over Germany set forth in -Count One of the Indictment; he promoted the military, economic, -and psychological preparations for war set forth in Count One of -the Indictment; he participated in the political planning and preparation -for wars of aggression and wars in violation of international -treaties, agreements, and assurances set forth in Counts -One and Two of the Indictment; he participated in the preparation -and planning of foreign policy plans of the Nazi conspirators set -forth in Count One of the Indictment; he authorized, directed, and -participated in the War Crimes set forth in Count Three of the -Indictment and the Crimes against Humanity set forth in Count -Four of the Indictment, including a wide variety of crimes against -persons and property.</p> - -<p class='line'> </p> - -<p class='pindent'>KALTENBRUNNER. The Defendant Kaltenbrunner between -1932 and 1945 was a member of the Nazi Party, a general in the -SS, a member of the Reichstag, a general of the Police, State Secretary -for Security in Austria in charge of the Austrian Police, Police -Leader of Vienna, Lower and Upper Austria, Head of the Reich -Main Security Office and Chief of the Security Police and Security -Service. The Defendant Kaltenbrunner used the foregoing positions -and his personal influence in such a manner that:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>He promoted the consolidation of control over Austria seized by -the Nazi conspirators as set forth in Count One of the Indictment; -and he authorized, directed, and participated in the War Crimes set -forth in Count Three of the Indictment and the Crimes against -Humanity set forth in Count Four of the Indictment including particularly -the Crimes against Humanity involved in the system of -concentration camps.</p> - -<p class='line'> </p> - -<p class='pindent'>ROSENBERG. The Defendant Rosenberg between 1920 and 1945 -was a member of the Nazi Party, Nazi member of the Reichstag, -Reichsleiter in the Nazi Party for Ideology and Foreign Policy, the -editor of the Nazi newspaper <span class='it'>Völkischer Beobachter</span>, or “People’s -Observer”, and the <span class='it'>NS Monatshefte</span>, head of the Foreign Political -Office of the Nazi Party, Special Delegate for the entire Spiritual -and Ideological Training of the Nazi Party, Reich Minister for the -Eastern Occupied Territories, organizer of the “Einsatzstab Rosenberg”, -a general in the SS and a general in the SA. The Defendant -Rosenberg used the foregoing positions, his personal influence and -his intimate connection with the Führer in such a manner that:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>He developed, disseminated, and exploited the doctrinal techniques -of the Nazi conspirators set forth in Count One of the Indictment; -he promoted the accession to power of the Nazi conspirators -and the consolidation of their control over Germany set -<span class='pageno' title='75' id='Page_75'></span> -forth in Count One of the Indictment; he promoted the psychological -preparations for war set forth in Count One of the Indictment; -he participated in the political planning and preparation for wars -of aggression and wars in violation of international treaties, agreements, -and assurances set forth in Counts One and Two of the -Indictment; and he authorized, directed, and participated in the -War Crimes set forth in Count Three of the Indictment and the -Crimes against Humanity set forth in Count Four of the Indictment, -including a wide variety of crimes against persons and property.</p> - -<p class='line'> </p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRANK. The Defendant Frank between 1932 and 1945 was a -member of the Nazi Party, a general in the SS, a member of the -Reichstag, Reich Minister without Portfolio, Reich Commissar for -the Coordination of Justice, President of the International Chamber -of Law and Academy of German Law, Chief of the Civil Administration -of Lodz, Supreme Administrative Chief of the military -district of West Prussia, Poznan, Lodz, and Krakow, and Governor -General of the occupied Polish territories. The Defendant Frank -used the foregoing positions, his personal influence, and his intimate -connection with the Führer in such a manner that:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>He promoted the accession to power of the Nazi conspirators -and the consolidation of their control over Germany set forth in -Count One of the Indictment; he authorized, directed, and participated -in the War Crimes set forth in Count Three of the Indictment -and the Crimes against Humanity set forth in Count Four of -the Indictment, including particularly the War Crimes and Crimes -against Humanity involved in the administration of occupied territories.</p> - -<p class='line'> </p> - -<p class='pindent'>BORMANN. The Defendant Bormann between 1925 and 1945 was -a member of the Nazi Party, member of the Reichstag, a member -of the Staff of the Supreme Command of the SA, founder and head -of “Hilfskasse der NSDAP”, Reichsleiter, Chief of Staff Office of the -Führer’s Deputy, head of the Party Chancery, Secretary of the -Führer, member of the Council of Ministers for the Defense of the -Reich, organizer and head of the Volkssturm, a general in the SS, -and a general in the SA. The Defendant Bormann used the foregoing -positions, his personal influence, and his intimate connection -with the Führer in such a manner that:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>He promoted the accession to power of the Nazi conspirators -and the consolidation of their control over Germany set forth in -Count One of the Indictment; he promoted the preparations for war -set forth in Count One of the Indictment; and he authorized, directed, -and participated in the War Crimes set forth in Count Three of the -Indictment and the Crimes against Humanity set forth in Count -<span class='pageno' title='76' id='Page_76'></span> -Four of the Indictment, including a wide variety of crimes against -persons and property.</p> - -<p class='line'> </p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRICK. The Defendant Frick between 1932 and 1945 was a -member of the Nazi Party, Reichsleiter, general in the SS, member -of the Reichstag, Reich Minister of the Interior, Prussian Minister -of the Interior, Reich Director of Elections, General Plenipotentiary -for the Administration of the Reich, head of the Central Office for -the Reunification of Austria and the German Reich, Director of the -Central Office for the Incorporation of Sudetenland, Memel, Danzig, -the Eastern Occupied Territories, Eupen, Malmedy, and Moresnet, -Director of the Central Office for the Protectorate of Bohemia, -Moravia, the Government General, Lower Styria, Upper Carinthia, -Norway, Alsace, Lorraine, and all other occupied territories, and -Reich Protector for Bohemia and Moravia. The Defendant Frick -used the foregoing positions, his personal influence, and his intimate -connection with the Führer in such a manner that:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>He promoted the accession to power of the Nazi conspirators -and the consolidation of their control over Germany set forth in -Count One of the Indictment; he participated in the planning and -preparation of the Nazi conspirators for wars of aggression and -wars in violation of international treaties, agreements, and assurances -set forth in Counts One and Two of the Indictment; and he -authorized, directed, and participated in the War Crimes set forth -in Count Three of the Indictment and the Crimes against Humanity -set forth in Count Four of the Indictment, including more particularly -the crimes against persons and property in occupied territories.</p> - -<p class='line'> </p> - -<p class='pindent'>LEY. The Defendant Ley between 1932 and 1945 was a member -of the Nazi Party, Reichsleiter, Nazi Party Organization Manager, -member of the Reichstag, leader of the German Labor Front, a -general in the SA, and Joint Organizer of the Central Inspection for -the Care of Foreign Workers. The Defendant Ley used the foregoing -positions, his personal influence and his intimate connection -with the Führer in such a manner that:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>He promoted the accession to power of the Nazi conspirators and -the consolidation of their control over Germany as set forth in -Count One of the Indictment; he promoted the preparation for war -set forth in Count One of the Indictment; he authorized, directed, -and participated in the War Crimes set forth in Count Three of the -Indictment, and in the Crimes against Humanity set forth in Count -Four of the Indictment, including particularly the War Crimes and -Crimes against Humanity relating to the abuse of human beings -for labor in the conduct of the aggressive wars.</p> - -<p class='line'> </p> - -<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL. The Defendant Sauckel between 1921 and 1945 was -a member of the Nazi Party, Gauleiter and Reichsstatthalter of -<span class='pageno' title='77' id='Page_77'></span> -Thuringia, a member of the Reichstag, General Plenipotentiary for -the Employment of Labor under the Four Year Plan, Joint -Organizer with the Defendant Ley of the Central Inspection for the -Care of Foreign Workers, a general in the SS, and a general in the -SA. The Defendant Sauckel used the foregoing positions and his -personal influence in such manner that:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>He promoted the accession to power of the Nazi conspirators set -forth in Count One of the Indictment; he participated in the economic -preparations for wars of aggression and wars in violation of -treaties, agreements, and assurances set forth in Counts One and -Two of the Indictment; he authorized, directed, and participated in -the War Crimes set forth in Count Three of the Indictment, and -the Crimes against Humanity set forth in Count Four of the Indictment, -including particularly the War Crimes and Crimes against -Humanity involved in forcing the inhabitants of occupied countries -to work as slave laborers in occupied countries and in Germany.</p> - -<p class='line'> </p> - -<p class='pindent'>SPEER. The Defendant Speer between 1932 and 1945 was a -member of the Nazi Party, Reichsleiter, member of the Reichstag, -Reich Minister for Armament and Munitions, Chief of the Organization -Todt, General Plenipotentiary for Armaments in the Office -of the Four Year Plan, and Chairman of the Armaments Council. -The Defendant Speer used the foregoing positions and his personal -influence in such a manner that:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>He participated in the military and economic planning and preparation -of the Nazi conspirators for wars of aggression and wars -in violation of international treaties, agreements, and assurances set -forth in Counts One and Two of the Indictment; and he authorized, -directed, and participated in the War Crimes set forth in Count -Three of the Indictment and the Crimes against Humanity set forth -in Count Four of the Indictment, including more particularly the -abuse and exploitation of human beings for forced labor in the -conduct of aggressive war.</p> - -<p class='line'> </p> - -<p class='pindent'>FUNK. The Defendant Funk between 1932 and 1945 was a -member of the Nazi Party, Economic Adviser of Hitler, National -Socialist Deputy to the Reichstag, Press Chief of the Reich Government, -State Secretary of the Reich Ministry of Public Enlightenment -and Propaganda, Reich Minister of Economics, Prussian Minister -of Economics, President of the German Reichsbank, Plenipotentiary -for Economy, and member of the Ministerial Council -for the Defense of the Reich. The Defendant Funk used the foregoing -positions, his personal influence, and his close connection with -the Führer in such a manner that:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>He promoted the accession to power of the Nazi conspirators -and the consolidation of their control over Germany set forth in -<span class='pageno' title='78' id='Page_78'></span> -Count One of the Indictment; he promoted the preparations for -war set forth in Count One of the Indictment; he participated in -the military and economic planning and preparation of the Nazi -conspirators for wars of aggression and wars in violation of international -treaties, agreements, and assurances set forth in Counts -One and Two of the Indictment; and he authorized, directed, and -participated in the War Crimes set forth in Count Three of the -Indictment and the Crimes against Humanity set forth in Count -Four of the Indictment, including more particularly crimes against -persons and property in connection with the economic exploitation -of occupied territories.</p> - -<p class='line'> </p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHACHT. The Defendant Schacht between 1932 and 1945 was -a member of the Nazi Party, a member of the Reichstag, Reich -Minister of Economics, Reich Minister without Portfolio and President -of the German Reichsbank. The Defendant Schacht used the -foregoing positions, his personal influence, and his connection with -the Führer in such a manner that:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>He promoted the accession to power of the Nazi conspirators -and the consolidation of their control over Germany set forth in -Count One of the Indictment; he promoted the preparations for -war set forth in Count One of the Indictment; and he participated -in the military and economic plans and preparation of the Nazi -conspirators for wars of aggression, and wars in violation of international -treaties, agreements, and assurances set forth in Counts -One and Two of the Indictment.</p> - -<p class='line'> </p> - -<p class='pindent'>PAPEN. The Defendant Papen between 1932 and 1945 was a -member of the Nazi Party, a member of the Reichstag, Reich Chancellor -under Hitler, special Plenipotentiary for the Saar, negotiator -of the Concordat with the Vatican, Ambassador in Vienna, and -Ambassador in Turkey. The Defendant Papen used the foregoing -positions, his personal influence, and his close connection with the -Führer in such a manner that:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>He promoted the accession to power of the Nazi conspirators -and participated in the consolidation of their control over Germany -set forth in Count One of the Indictment; he promoted the preparations -for war set forth in Count One of the Indictment; and -he participated in the political planning and preparation of the -Nazi conspirators for wars of aggression and wars in violation of -international treaties, agreements, and assurances set forth in -Counts One and Two of the Indictment.</p> - -<p class='line'> </p> - -<p class='pindent'>KRUPP. The Defendant Krupp between 1932 and 1945 was head -of Friedrich KRUPP A. G., a member of the General Economic -<span class='pageno' title='79' id='Page_79'></span> -Council, President of the Reich Union of German Industry, and head -of the Group for Mining and Production of Iron and Metals under -the Reich Ministry of Economics. The Defendant Krupp used the -foregoing positions, his personal influence, and his connection with -the Führer in such a manner that:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>He promoted the accession to power of the Nazi conspirators and -the consolidation of their control over Germany set forth in Count -One of the Indictment; he promoted the preparation for war set -forth in Count One of the Indictment; he participated in the military -and economic planning and preparation of the Nazi conspirators -for wars of aggression and wars in violation of international treaties, -agreements, and assurances set forth in Counts One and Two of -the Indictment; and he authorized, directed, and participated in the -War Crimes set forth in Count Three of the Indictment and the -Crimes against Humanity set forth in Count Four of the Indictment, -including more particularly the exploitation and abuse of -human beings for labor in the conduct of aggressive wars.</p> - -<p class='line'> </p> - -<p class='pindent'>NEURATH. The Defendant Neurath between 1932 and 1945 was -a member of the Nazi Party, a general in the SS, a member of the -Reichstag, Reich Minister, Reich Minister of Foreign Affairs, President -of the Secret Cabinet Council, and Reich Protector for -Bohemia and Moravia. The Defendant Neurath used the foregoing -positions, his personal influence, and his close connection with the -Führer in such a manner that:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>He promoted the accession to power of the Nazi conspirators set -forth in Count One of the Indictment; he promoted the preparations -for war set forth in Count One of the Indictment; he participated -in the political planning and preparation of the Nazi conspirators -for wars of aggression and wars in violation of international treaties, -agreements, and assurances set forth in Counts One and Two of -the Indictment; in accordance with the Führer Principle he executed, -and assumed responsibility for the execution of the foreign -policy plans of the Nazi conspirators set forth in Count One of the -Indictment; and he authorized, directed, and participated in the -War Crimes set forth in Count Three of the Indictment and the -Crimes against Humanity set forth in Count Four of the Indictment, -including particularly the crimes against persons and property -in the occupied territories.</p> - -<p class='line'> </p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHIRACH. The Defendant Schirach between 1924 and 1945 -was a member of the Nazi Party, a member of the Reichstag, Reich -Youth Leader on the Staff of the SA Supreme Command, Reichsleiter -in the Nazi Party for Youth Education, Leader of Youth of -the German Reich, head of the Hitler Jugend, Reich Defense Commissioner, -and Reichsstatthalter and Gauleiter of Vienna. The -<span class='pageno' title='80' id='Page_80'></span> -Defendant Schirach used the foregoing positions, his personal influence, -and his intimate connection with the Führer in such a -manner that:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>He promoted the accession to power of the Nazi conspirators -and the consolidation of their control over Germany set forth in -Count One of the Indictment; he promoted the psychological and -educational preparations for war and the militarization of Nazi-dominated -organizations set forth in Count One of the Indictment; -and he authorized, directed, and participated in the Crimes against -Humanity set forth in Count Four of the Indictment, including, -particularly, anti-Jewish measures.</p> - -<p class='line'> </p> - -<p class='pindent'>SEYSS-INQUART. The Defendant Seyss-Inquart between 1932 -and 1945 was a member of the Nazi Party, a general in the SS, -State Councillor of Austria, Minister of the Interior and Security -of Austria, Chancellor of Austria, a member of the Reichstag, a -member of the Reich Cabinet, Reich Minister without Portfolio, -Chief of the Civil Administration in South Poland, Deputy Governor-General -of the Polish occupied territory, and Reich Commissar -for the occupied Netherlands. The Defendant Seyss-Inquart -used the foregoing positions and his personal influence in such a -manner that:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>He promoted the seizure and the consolidation of control over -Austria by the Nazi conspirators set forth in Count One of the -Indictment; he participated in the political planning and preparation -of the Nazi conspirators for wars of aggression and wars in -violation of international treaties, agreements, and assurances set -forth in Counts One and Two of the Indictment; and he authorized, -directed, and participated in the War Crimes set forth in Count -Three of the Indictment and the Crimes against Humanity set forth -in Count Four of the Indictment, including a wide variety of crimes -against persons and property.</p> - -<p class='line'> </p> - -<p class='pindent'>STREICHER. The Defendant Streicher between 1932 and 1945 -was a member of the Nazi Party, a member of the Reichstag, a -general in the SA, Gauleiter of Franconia, editor in chief of the -anti-Semitic newspaper <span class='it'>Der Stürmer</span>. The Defendant Streicher used -the foregoing positions, his personal influence, and his close connection -with the Führer in such a manner that:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>He promoted the accession to power of the Nazi conspirators -and the consolidation of their control over Germany set forth in -Count One of the Indictment; he authorized, directed, and participated -in the Crimes against Humanity set forth in Count Four of -the Indictment, including particularly the incitement of the persecution -of the Jews set forth in Count One and Count Four of the -Indictment. -<span class='pageno' title='81' id='Page_81'></span></p> - -<p class='line'> </p> - -<p class='pindent'>KEITEL. The Defendant Keitel between 1938 and 1945 was -Chief of the High Command of the German Armed Forces, member -of the Secret Cabinet Council, member of the Council of Ministers -for the Defense of the Reich, and Field Marshal. The Defendant -Keitel used the foregoing positions, his personal influence, and his -intimate connection with the Führer in such a manner that:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>He promoted the military preparations for war set forth in -Count One of the Indictment; he participated in the political planning -and preparation of the Nazi conspirators for wars of aggression -and wars in violation of international treaties, agreements, and -assurances set forth in Counts One and Two of the Indictment; he -executed and assumed responsibility for the execution of the plans -of the Nazi conspirators for wars of aggression and wars in violation, -of international treaties, agreements, and assurances set forth in -Counts One and Two of the Indictment; he authorized, directed, -and participated in the War Crimes set forth in Count Three of the -Indictment and the Crimes against Humanity set forth in Count -Four of the Indictment, including particularly the War Crimes and -Crimes against Humanity involved in the ill-treatment of prisoners -of war and of the civilian population of occupied territories.</p> - -<p class='line'> </p> - -<p class='pindent'>JODL. The Defendant Jodl between 1932 and 1945 was lieutenant -colonel, Army Operations Department of the Wehrmacht, -Colonel, Chief of OKW Operations Department, major general and -Chief of Staff OKW and colonel general. The Defendant Jodl used, -the foregoing positions, his personal influence, and his close connection -with the Führer in such a manner that:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>He promoted the accession to power of the Nazi conspirators -and the consolidation, of their control over Germany set forth in -Count One of the Indictment; he promoted the preparations for war -set forth in Count One of the Indictment; he participated in the -military planning and preparation of the Nazi conspirators for wars -of aggression and wars in violation of international treaties, agreements, -and assurances set forth in Counts One and Two of the -Indictment; and he authorized, directed, and participated in the -War Crimes set forth in Count Three of the Indictment and the -Crimes against Humanity set forth in Count Four of the Indictment, -including a wide variety of crimes against persons and property.</p> - -<p class='line'> </p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER. The Defendant Raeder between 1928 and 1945 was -Commander-in-Chief of the German Navy, Generaladmiral, Grossadmiral, -Admiralinspekteur of the German Navy, and a member -of the Secret Cabinet Council. The Defendant Raeder used the -foregoing positions and his personal influence in such a manner that:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>He promoted the preparations for war set forth in Count One of -the Indictment; he participated in the political planning and preparation -<span class='pageno' title='82' id='Page_82'></span> -of the Nazi conspirators for wars of aggression and wars -in violation of international treaties, agreements, and assurances set -forth in Counts One and Two of the Indictment; he executed, and -assumed responsibility for the execution of the plans of the Nazi -conspirators for wars of aggression and wars in violation of international -treaties, agreements, and assurances set forth in Counts -One and Two of the Indictment; and he authorized, directed, and -participated in the War Crimes set forth in Count Three of the -Indictment, including particularly War Crimes arising out of sea -warfare.</p> - -<p class='line'> </p> - -<p class='pindent'>DÖNITZ. The Defendant Dönitz between 1932 and 1945 was -Commanding Officer of the Weddigen U-boat Flotilla, Commander-in-Chief -of the U-boat arm, Vice-Admiral, Admiral, Grossadmiral, -and Commander-in-Chief of the German Navy, advisor to Hitler, -and successor to Hitler as head of the German Government. The -Defendant Dönitz used the foregoing positions, his personal influence, -and his intimate connection with the Führer in such a -manner that:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>He promoted the preparations for war set forth in Count One -of the Indictment; he participated in the military planning and preparation -of the Nazi conspirators for wars of aggression and wars -in violation of international treaties, agreements, and assurances set -forth in Counts One and Two of the Indictment; and he authorized, -directed, and participated in the War Crimes set forth in Count -Three of the Indictment, including particularly the crimes against -persons and property on the High Seas.</p> - -<p class='line'> </p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRITZSCHE. The Defendant Fritzsche between 1933 and 1945 -was a member of the Nazi Party, editor-in-chief of the official -German news agency, “Deutsches Nachrichten Büro”, head of the -Wireless News Service and of the Home Press Division of the Reich -Ministry of Propaganda, Ministerialdirektor of the Reich Ministry -of Propaganda, Head of the Radio Division of the Propaganda Department -of the Nazi Party, and Plenipotentiary for the Political -Organization of the Greater German Radio. The Defendant Fritzsche -used the foregoing positions and his personal influence to disseminate -and exploit the principal doctrines of the Nazi conspirators set -forth in Count One of the Indictment, and to advocate, encourage, -and incite the commission of the War Crimes set forth in Count -Three of the Indictment and the Crimes against Humanity set forth -in Count Four of the Indictment including, particularly, anti-Jewish -measures and the ruthless exploitation of occupied territories. -<span class='pageno' title='83' id='Page_83'></span></p> - -<p class='line'> </p> - -<p class='pindent'>APPENDIX B—STATEMENT OF CRIMINALITY OF GROUPS -AND ORGANIZATIONS.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The statements hereinafter set forth, following the name of each -group or organization named in the Indictment as one which should -be declared criminal, constitute matters upon which the Prosecution -will rely <span class='it'>inter alia</span> as establishing the criminality of the group or -organization:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>“Die Reichsregierung (Reich Cabinet)” referred to in the Indictment -consists of persons who were:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>(i) Members of the ordinary cabinet after 30 January 1933, the -date on which Hitler became Chancellor of the German Republic. -The term “ordinary cabinet” as used herein means the Reich Ministers, -i.e., heads of departments of the central Government; Reich -Ministers without portfolio; State Ministers acting as Reich Ministers; -and other officials entitled to take part in meetings of this -cabinet.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>(ii) Members of Der Ministerrat für die Reichsverteidigung -(Council of Ministers for the Defense of the Reich).</p> - -<p class='pindent'>(iii) Members of Der Geheime Kabinettsrat (Secret Cabinet -Council). Under the Führer, these persons functioning in the foregoing -capacities and in association as a group, possessed and exercised -legislative, executive, administrative, and political powers -and functions of a very high order in the system of German Government. -Accordingly, they are charged with responsibility for the -policies adopted and put into effect by the Government including -those which comprehended and involved the commission of the -crimes referred to in Counts One, Two, Three, and Four of the -Indictment.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>“Das Korps der Politischen Leiter der Nationalsozialistischen -Deutschen Arbeiterpartei (Leadership Corps of the Nazi Party)” -referred to in the Indictment consists of persons who were at any -time, according to common Nazi terminology, “Politische Leiter” -(Political Leaders) of any grade or rank.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The Politischen Leiter comprised the leaders of the various functional -offices of the Party (for example, the Reichsleitung or Party -Reich Directorate, and the Gauleitung, or Party Gau Directorate), -as well as the territorial leaders of the Party (for example, the -Gauleiter).</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The Politischen Leiter were a distinctive and elite group within -the Nazi Party proper and as such were vested with special prerogatives. -They were organized according to the Leadership Principle -and were charged with planning, developing, and imposing -upon their followers the policies of the Nazi Party. Thus the territorial -leaders among them were called Hoheitsträger, or bearers -<span class='pageno' title='84' id='Page_84'></span> -of sovereignty, and were entitled to call upon and utilize the various -Party formations when necessary for the execution of Party policies.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Reference is hereby made to the allegations in Count One of -the Indictment showing that the Nazi Party was the central core -of the Common Plan or Conspiracy therein set forth. The Politischen -Leiter, as a major power within the Nazi Party proper, and functioning -in the capacities above described and in association as a -group, joined in the Common Plan or Conspiracy, and accordingly -share responsibility for the crimes set forth in Counts One, Two, -Three, and Four of the Indictment.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The Prosecution expressly reserves the right to request, at any -time before sentence is pronounced, that Politischer Leiter of subordinate -grades or ranks or of other types or classes, to be specified -by the prosecution, be excepted from further proceedings in this -Case Number 1, but without prejudice to other proceedings or -actions against them.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>“Die Schutzstaffeln der Nationalsozialistischen Deutschen Arbeiterpartei -(commonly known as the SS) including Der Sicherheitsdienst -(commonly known as the SD)” referred to in the Indictment -consists of the entire corps of the SS and all offices, departments, -services, agencies, branches, formations, organizations, and groups -of which it was at any time comprised or which were at any time -integrated in it, including but not limited to, the Allgemeine SS, -the Waffen SS, the SS Totenkopf Verbände, SS Polizei Regimenter, -and the Sicherheitsdienst des Reichsführers SS (commonly known -as the SD).</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The SS, originally established by Hitler in 1925 as an elite section -of the SA to furnish a protective guard for the Führer and -Nazi Party leaders, became an independent formation of the Nazi -Party in 1934 under the leadership of the Reichsführer SS, Heinrich -Himmler. It was composed of voluntary members, selected in accordance -with Nazi biological, racial, and political theories, completely -indoctrinated in Nazi ideology and pledged to uncompromising -obedience to the Führer. After the accession of the Nazi -conspirators to power, it developed many departments, agencies, -formations, and branches and extended its influence and control -over numerous fields of governmental and Party activity. Through -Heinrich Himmler, as Reichsführer SS and Chief of the German -Police, agencies and units of the SS and of the Reich were joined in -operation to form a unified repressive police force. The Sicherheitsdienst -des Reichsführers SS (commonly known as the SD), a -department of the SS, was developed into a vast espionage and -counter-intelligence system which operated in conjunction with the -Gestapo and criminal police in detecting, suppressing, and eliminating -tendencies, groups, and individuals deemed hostile or potentially -<span class='pageno' title='85' id='Page_85'></span> -hostile to the Nazi Party, its leaders, principles, and objectives, -and eventually was combined with the Gestapo and criminal -police in a single security police department, the Reich Main Security -Office.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Other branches of the SS developed into an armed force and -served in the wars of aggression referred to in Counts One and -Two of the Indictment. Through other departments and branches -the SS controlled the administration of concentration camps and the -execution of Nazi racial, biological, and resettlement policies. -Through its numerous functions and activities it served as the instrument -for insuring the domination of Nazi ideology and protecting -and extending the Nazi regime over Germany and occupied -territories. It thus participated in and is responsible for the crimes -referred to in Counts One, Two, Three, and Four of the Indictment.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>“Die Geheime Staatspolizei (Secret State Police, commonly -known as the Gestapo)” referred to in the Indictment consists of -the headquarters, departments, offices, branches, and all the forces -and personnel of the Geheime Staatspolizei organized or existing -at any time after 30 January 1933, including the Geheime Staatspolizei -of Prussia and equivalent secret or political police forces of -the Reich and the components thereof.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The Gestapo was created by the Nazi conspirators immediately -after their accession to power, first in Prussia by the Defendant -Göring and shortly thereafter in all other states in the Reich. -These separate secret and political police forces were developed -into a centralized, uniform organization operating through a central -headquarters and through a network of regional offices in Germany -and in occupied territories. Its officials and operatives were selected -on the basis of unconditional acceptance of Nazi ideology, were -largely drawn from members of the SS, and were trained in SS -and SD schools. It acted to suppress and eliminate tendencies, -groups, and individuals deemed hostile or potentially hostile to the -Nazi Party, its leaders, principles, and objectives, and to repress -resistance and potential resistance to German control in occupied -territories. In performing these functions it operated free from -legal control, taking any measures it deemed necessary for the -accomplishment of its missions.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Through its purposes, activities and the means it used, it participated -in and is responsible for the commission of the crimes -set forth in Counts One, Two, Three, and Four of the Indictment.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>“Die Sturmabteilungen der Nationalsozialistischen Deutschen -Arbeiterpartei (commonly known as the SA).” That organization -referred to in the Indictment was a formation of the Nazi Party -under the immediate jurisdiction of the Führer, organized on military -lines, whose membership was composed of volunteers serving -<span class='pageno' title='86' id='Page_86'></span> -as political soldiers of the Party. It was one of the earliest formations -of the Nazi Party and the original guardian of the National -Socialist movement. Founded in 1921 as a voluntary military formation, -it was developed by the Nazi conspirators before their -accession to power into a vast private army and utilized for the -purpose of creating disorder, and terrorizing and eliminating political -opponents. It continued to serve as an instrument for the -physical, ideological, and military training of Party members and -as a reserve for the German Armed Forces. After the launching -of the wars of aggression, referred to in Counts One and Two of the -Indictment, the SA not only operated as an organization for military -training but provided auxiliary police and security forces in occupied -territories, guarded prisoner-of-war camps and concentration -camps and supervised and controlled persons forced to labor in -Germany and occupied territories.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Through its purposes and activities and the means it used it -participated in and is responsible for the commission of the crimes -set forth in Counts One, Two, Three, and Four of the Indictment.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The “General Staff and High Command of the German Armed -Forces” referred to in the Indictment consists of those individuals -who between February 1938 and May 1945 were the highest commanders -of the Wehrmacht, the Army, the Navy, and the Air Forces. -The individuals comprising this group are the persons who -held the following appointments:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Oberbefehlshaber der Kriegsmarine (Commander in Chief of the -Navy); Chef (and, formerly, Chef des Stabes) der Seekriegsleitung -(Chief of Naval War Staff); Oberbefehlshaber des Heeres (Commander -in Chief of the Army); Chef des Generalstabes des Heeres -(Chief of the General Staff of the Army); Oberbefehlshaber der -Luftwaffe (Commander in Chief of the Air Force); Chef des Generalstabes -der Luftwaffe (Chief of the General Staff of the Air Force); -Chef des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht (Chief of the High Command -of the Armed Forces); Chef des Führungsstabes des Oberkommandos -der Wehrmacht (Chief of the Operations Staff of the -High Command of the Armed Forces); Stellvertretender Chef des -Führungsstabes des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht (Deputy Chief -of the Operations Staff of the High Command of the Armed Forces); -Commanders-in-Chief in the field, with the status of Oberbefehlshaber, -of the Wehrmacht, Navy, Army, Air Force.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Functioning in such capacities and in association as a group -at the highest level in the German Armed Forces organization, -these persons had a major responsibility for the planning, preparation, -initiation, and waging of illegal war as set forth in Counts -One and Two of the Indictment and for the War Crimes and Crimes -<span class='pageno' title='87' id='Page_87'></span> -against Humanity involved in the execution of the Common Plan -or Conspiracy set forth in Counts Three and Four of the Indictment.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE (Continuing the reading of the -Indictment):</p> - -<p class='line'> </p> - -<p class='pindent'>APPENDIX C—CHARGES AND PARTICULARS OF -VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL TREATIES, AGREEMENTS, -AND ASSURANCES CAUSED BY THE DEFENDANTS IN THE -COURSE OF PLANNING, PREPARING AND INITIATING THE -WARS.</p> - -<p class='line'> </p> - -<p class='pindent'>I. Charge:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Violation of the Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International -Disputes signed at The Hague, 29 July 1899.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Particulars: In that Germany did, by force and arms, on the -dates specified in Column 1, invade the territory of the Sovereigns -specified in Column 2, respectively, without first having attempted -to settle its disputes with the said Sovereigns by pacific means.</p> - -<table id='tab2' summary='' class='center'> -<colgroup> -<col span='1' style='width: 2em;'/> -<col span='1' style='width: 10em;'/> -<col span='1' style='width: 15em;'/> -</colgroup> -<tr><td class='tab2c1 tdStyle1'></td><td class='tab2c2 tdStyle0'>(Column 1)</td><td class='tab2c3 tdStyle0'> (Column 2)</td></tr> -<tr><td class='tab2c1 tdStyle1'>6</td><td class='tab2c2 tdStyle0'>April 1941</td><td class='tab2c3 tdStyle0'>Kingdom of Greece</td></tr> -<tr><td class='tab2c1 tdStyle1'>6</td><td class='tab2c2 tdStyle0'>April 1941</td><td class='tab2c3 tdStyle0'>Kingdom of Yugoslavia</td></tr> -</table> - -<p class='line'> </p> - -<p class='pindent'>II. Charge:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Violation of the Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International -Disputes signed at The Hague, 18 October 1907.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Particulars: In that Germany did, on or about the dates specified -in Column 1, by force of arms invade the territory of the Sovereigns -specified in Column 2, respectively, without having first -attempted to settle its disputes with the said Sovereigns by pacific -means.</p> - -<table id='tab3' summary='' class='center'> -<colgroup> -<col span='1' style='width: 2em;'/> -<col span='1' style='width: 10em;'/> -<col span='1' style='width: 15em;'/> -</colgroup> -<tr><td class='tab3c1 tdStyle1'></td><td class='tab3c2 tdStyle0'>(Column 1)</td><td class='tab3c3 tdStyle0'> (Column 2)</td></tr> -<tr><td class='tab3c1 tdStyle1'>1</td><td class='tab3c2 tdStyle0'>September 1939</td><td class='tab3c3 tdStyle0'>Republic of Poland</td></tr> -<tr><td class='tab3c1 tdStyle1'>9</td><td class='tab3c2 tdStyle0'>April 1940</td><td class='tab3c3 tdStyle0'>Kingdom of Norway</td></tr> -<tr><td class='tab3c1 tdStyle1'>9</td><td class='tab3c2 tdStyle0'>April 1940</td><td class='tab3c3 tdStyle0'>Kingdom of Denmark</td></tr> -<tr><td class='tab3c1 tdStyle1'>10</td><td class='tab3c2 tdStyle0'>May 1940</td><td class='tab3c3 tdStyle0'>Grand-Duchy of Luxembourg</td></tr> -<tr><td class='tab3c1 tdStyle1'>10</td><td class='tab3c2 tdStyle0'>May 1940</td><td class='tab3c3 tdStyle0'>Kingdom of Belgium</td></tr> -<tr><td class='tab3c1 tdStyle1'>10</td><td class='tab3c2 tdStyle0'>May 1940</td><td class='tab3c3 tdStyle0'>Kingdom of the Netherlands</td></tr> -<tr><td class='tab3c1 tdStyle1'>22</td><td class='tab3c2 tdStyle0'>June 1941</td><td class='tab3c3 tdStyle0'>Union of Soviet Socialist Republics</td></tr> -</table> - -<p class='line'> </p> - -<p class='pindent'>III. Charge:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Violation of Hague Convention III, Relative to the Opening of -Hostilities, signed 18 October 1907.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Particulars: In that Germany did, on or about the dates specified -in Column 1, commence hostilities against the countries specified in -Column 2, respectively, without previous warning in the form of -a reasoned declaration of war or an ultimatum with conditional -declaration of war. -<span class='pageno' title='88' id='Page_88'></span></p> - -<table id='tab4' summary='' class='center'> -<colgroup> -<col span='1' style='width: 2em;'/> -<col span='1' style='width: 10em;'/> -<col span='1' style='width: 15em;'/> -</colgroup> -<tr><td class='tab4c1 tdStyle1'></td><td class='tab4c2 tdStyle0'>(Column 1)</td><td class='tab4c3 tdStyle0'> (Column 2)</td></tr> -<tr><td class='tab4c1 tdStyle1'>1</td><td class='tab4c2 tdStyle0'>September 1939</td><td class='tab4c3 tdStyle0'>Republic of Poland</td></tr> -<tr><td class='tab4c1 tdStyle1'>9</td><td class='tab4c2 tdStyle0'>April 1940</td><td class='tab4c3 tdStyle0'>Kingdom of Norway</td></tr> -<tr><td class='tab4c1 tdStyle1'>9</td><td class='tab4c2 tdStyle0'>April 1940</td><td class='tab4c3 tdStyle0'>Kingdom of Denmark</td></tr> -<tr><td class='tab4c1 tdStyle1'>10</td><td class='tab4c2 tdStyle0'>May 1940</td><td class='tab4c3 tdStyle0'>Kingdom of Belgium</td></tr> -<tr><td class='tab4c1 tdStyle1'>10</td><td class='tab4c2 tdStyle0'>May 1940</td><td class='tab4c3 tdStyle0'>Kingdom of the Netherlands</td></tr> -<tr><td class='tab4c1 tdStyle1'>10</td><td class='tab4c2 tdStyle0'>May 1940</td><td class='tab4c3 tdStyle0'>Grand-Duchy of Luxembourg</td></tr> -<tr><td class='tab4c1 tdStyle1'>22</td><td class='tab4c2 tdStyle0'>June 1941</td><td class='tab4c3 tdStyle0'>Union of Soviet Socialist Republics</td></tr> -</table> - -<p class='line'> </p> - -<p class='pindent'>IV. Charge:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Violation of Hague Convention V, Respecting the Rights and -Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons in Case of War on Land, -signed 18 October 1907.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Particulars:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In that Germany did, on or about the dates specified in Column -1, by force and arms of its military forces, cross into, invade, -and occupy the territories of the Sovereigns specified in Column 2, -respectively, then and thereby violating the neutrality of said Sovereigns.</p> - -<table id='tab5' summary='' class='center'> -<colgroup> -<col span='1' style='width: 2em;'/> -<col span='1' style='width: 10em;'/> -<col span='1' style='width: 15em;'/> -</colgroup> -<tr><td class='tab5c1 tdStyle1'></td><td class='tab5c2 tdStyle0'>(Column 1)</td><td class='tab5c3 tdStyle0'> (Column 2)</td></tr> -<tr><td class='tab5c1 tdStyle1'>9</td><td class='tab5c2 tdStyle0'>April 1940</td><td class='tab5c3 tdStyle0'>Kingdom of Norway</td></tr> -<tr><td class='tab5c1 tdStyle1'>9</td><td class='tab5c2 tdStyle0'>April 1940</td><td class='tab5c3 tdStyle0'>Kingdom of Denmark</td></tr> -<tr><td class='tab5c1 tdStyle1'>10</td><td class='tab5c2 tdStyle0'>May 1940</td><td class='tab5c3 tdStyle0'>Grand-Duchy of Luxembourg</td></tr> -<tr><td class='tab5c1 tdStyle1'>10</td><td class='tab5c2 tdStyle0'>May 1940</td><td class='tab5c3 tdStyle0'>Kingdom of Belgium</td></tr> -<tr><td class='tab5c1 tdStyle1'>10</td><td class='tab5c2 tdStyle0'>May 1940</td><td class='tab5c3 tdStyle0'>Kingdom of the Netherlands</td></tr> -<tr><td class='tab5c1 tdStyle1'>22</td><td class='tab5c2 tdStyle0'>June 1941</td><td class='tab5c3 tdStyle0'>Union of Soviet Socialist Republics</td></tr> -</table> - -<p class='line'> </p> - -<p class='pindent'>V. Charge:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Violation of the Treaty of Peace between the Allied and Associated -Powers and Germany, signed at Versailles, 28 June 1919, -known as the Versailles Treaty.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Particulars:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>(1) In that Germany did, on and after 7 March 1936, maintain -and assemble armed forces and maintain and construct military -fortifications in the demilitarized zone of the Rhineland in violation -of the provisions of Articles 42 to 44 of the Treaty of Versailles.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>(2) In that Germany did, on or about 13 March 1938, annex -Austria into the German Reich in violation of the provisions of -Article 80 of the Treaty of Versailles.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>(3) In that Germany did, on or about 22 March 1939, incorporate -the District of Memel into the German Reich in violation of the -provisions of Article 99 of the Treaty of Versailles.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>(4) In that Germany did, on or about 1 September 1939, incorporate -the Free City of Danzig into the German Reich in violation -of the provisions of Article 100 of the Treaty of Versailles. -<span class='pageno' title='89' id='Page_89'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>(5) In that Germany did, on or about 16 March 1939, incorporate -the provinces of Bohemia and Moravia, formerly part of Czechoslovakia, -into the German Reich in violation of the provisions of -Article 81 of the Treaty of Versailles.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>(6) In that Germany did, at various times in March 1935 and -thereafter, repudiate various parts of Part V, Military, Naval, and -Air Clauses of the Treaty of Versailles, by creating an air force, -by use of compulsory military service, by increasing the size of -the army beyond treaty limits, and by increasing the size of the -navy beyond treaty limits.</p> - -<p class='line'> </p> - -<p class='pindent'>VI. Charge:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Violation of the Treaty between the United States and Germany -Restoring Friendly Relations, signed at Berlin, 25 August 1921.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Particulars:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In that Germany did, at various times in March 1935 and thereafter, -repudiate various parts of Part V, Military, Naval, and Air -Clauses of the Treaty between the United States and Germany -Restoring Friendly Relations by creating an air force, by use of -compulsory military service, by increasing the size of the army -beyond treaty limits, and by increasing the size of the navy beyond -treaty limits.</p> - -<p class='line'> </p> - -<p class='pindent'>VII. Charge:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Violation of the Treaty of Mutual Guarantee between Germany, -Belgium, France, Great Britain and Italy, done at Locarno, 16 October -1925.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Particulars:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>(1) In that Germany did, on or about 7 March 1936, unlawfully -send armed forces into the Rhineland demilitarized zone of -Germany, in violation of Article 1 of the Treaty of Mutual -Guarantee.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>(2) In that Germany did, in or about March 1936, and thereafter, -unlawfully maintain armed forces in the Rhineland demilitarized -zone of Germany, in violation of Article 1 of the Treaty of -Mutual Guarantee.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>(3) In that Germany did, on or about 7 March 1936, and thereafter, -unlawfully construct and maintain fortifications in the -Rhineland demilitarized zone of Germany, in violation of Article 1 -of the Treaty of Mutual Guarantee.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>(4) In that Germany did, on or about 10 May 1940, unlawfully -attack and invade Belgium, in violation of Article 2 of the Treaty -of Mutual Guarantee.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>(5) In that Germany did, on or about 10 May 1940, unlawfully -attack and invade Belgium, without first having attempted to settle -<span class='pageno' title='90' id='Page_90'></span> -its dispute with Belgium by peaceful means, in violation of Article -3 of the Treaty of Mutual Guarantee.</p> - -<p class='line'> </p> - -<p class='pindent'>VIII. Charge:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Violation of the Arbitration Treaty between Germany and -Czechoslovakia, done at Locarno, 16 October 1925.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Particulars:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In that Germany did, on or about 15 March 1939, unlawfully -by duress and threats of military might force Czechoslovakia to -deliver the destiny of Czechoslovakia and its inhabitants into the -hands of the Führer and Reichschancellor of Germany without -having attempted to settle its dispute with Czechoslovakia by -peaceful means.</p> - -<p class='line'> </p> - -<p class='pindent'>IX. Charge:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Violation of the Arbitration Convention between Germany and -Belgium, done at Locarno, 16 October 1925.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Particulars:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In that Germany did, on or about 10 May 1940, unlawfully -attack and invade Belgium without first having attempted to settle -its dispute with Belgium by peaceful means.</p> - -<p class='line'> </p> - -<p class='pindent'>X. Charge:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Violation of the Arbitration Treaty between Germany and -Poland, done at Locarno, 16 October 1925.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Particulars:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In that Germany did, on or about 1 September 1939, unlawfully -attack and invade Poland without first having attempted to -settle its dispute with Poland by peaceful means.</p> - -<p class='line'> </p> - -<p class='pindent'>XI. Charge:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Violation of Convention of Arbitration and Conciliation entered -into between Germany and the Netherlands on 20 May 1926.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Particulars:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In that Germany, without warning, and notwithstanding its -solemn covenant to settle by peaceful means all disputes of any -nature whatever which might arise between it and the Netherlands -which were not capable of settlement by diplomacy and which had -not been referred by mutual agreement to the Permanent Court -of International Justice, did, on or about 10 May 1940, with a -military force, attack, invade, and occupy the Netherlands, thereby -violating its neutrality and territorial integrity and destroying its -sovereign independence.</p> - -<p class='line'> </p> - -<p class='pindent'>XII. Charge:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Violation of Convention of Arbitration and Conciliation entered -into between Germany and Denmark on 2 June 1926. -<span class='pageno' title='91' id='Page_91'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>Particulars:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In that Germany, without warning, and notwithstanding its -solemn covenant to settle by peaceful means all disputes of any -nature whatever which might arise between it and Denmark which -were not capable of settlement by diplomacy and which had not -been referred by mutual agreement to the Permanent Court of -International Justice, did, on or about 9 April 1940, with a military -force, attack, invade, and occupy Denmark, thereby violating its -neutrality and territorial integrity and destroying its sovereign -independence.</p> - -<p class='line'> </p> - -<p class='pindent'>XIII. Charge:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Violation of Treaty between Germany and other Powers Providing -for Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National Policy, -signed at Paris 27 August 1928, known as the Kellogg-Briand Pact.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Particulars:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In that Germany did, on or about the dates specified in -Column 1, with a military force, attack the Sovereigns specified in -Column 2, respectively, and resort to war against such Sovereigns, -in violation of its solemn declaration condemning recourse to war -for the solution of international controversies, its solemn renunciation -of war as an instrument of national policy in its relations -with such Sovereigns, and its solemn covenant that settlement or -solution of all disputes or conflicts of whatever nature or origin -arising between it and such Sovereigns should never be sought -except by pacific means</p> - -<table id='tab6' summary='' class='center'> -<colgroup> -<col span='1' style='width: 2em;'/> -<col span='1' style='width: 10em;'/> -<col span='1' style='width: 15em;'/> -</colgroup> -<tr><td class='tab6c1 tdStyle1'></td><td class='tab6c2 tdStyle0'>(Column 1)</td><td class='tab6c3 tdStyle0'> (Column 2)</td></tr> -<tr><td class='tab6c1 tdStyle1'>1</td><td class='tab6c2 tdStyle0'>September 1939</td><td class='tab6c3 tdStyle0'>Republic of Poland</td></tr> -<tr><td class='tab6c1 tdStyle1'>9</td><td class='tab6c2 tdStyle0'>April 1940</td><td class='tab6c3 tdStyle0'>Kingdom of Norway</td></tr> -<tr><td class='tab6c1 tdStyle1'>9</td><td class='tab6c2 tdStyle0'>April 1940</td><td class='tab6c3 tdStyle0'>Kingdom of Denmark</td></tr> -<tr><td class='tab6c1 tdStyle1'>10</td><td class='tab6c2 tdStyle0'>May 1940</td><td class='tab6c3 tdStyle0'>Kingdom of Belgium</td></tr> -<tr><td class='tab6c1 tdStyle1'>10</td><td class='tab6c2 tdStyle0'>May 1940</td><td class='tab6c3 tdStyle0'>Grand-Duchy of Luxembourg</td></tr> -<tr><td class='tab6c1 tdStyle1'>10</td><td class='tab6c2 tdStyle0'>May 1940</td><td class='tab6c3 tdStyle0'>Kingdom of the Netherlands</td></tr> -<tr><td class='tab6c1 tdStyle1'>6</td><td class='tab6c2 tdStyle0'>April 1941</td><td class='tab6c3 tdStyle0'>Kingdom of Greece</td></tr> -<tr><td class='tab6c1 tdStyle1'>6</td><td class='tab6c2 tdStyle0'>April 1941</td><td class='tab6c3 tdStyle0'>Kingdom of Yugoslavia</td></tr> -<tr><td class='tab6c1 tdStyle1'>22</td><td class='tab6c2 tdStyle0'>June 1941</td><td class='tab6c3 tdStyle0'>Union of Soviet Socialist Republics</td></tr> -<tr><td class='tab6c1 tdStyle1'>11</td><td class='tab6c2 tdStyle0'>December 1941</td><td class='tab6c3 tdStyle0'>United States of America</td></tr> -</table> - -<p class='line'> </p> - -<p class='pindent'>XIV. Charge:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Violation of Treaty of Arbitration and Conciliation entered into -between Germany and Luxembourg on 11 September 1929.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Particulars:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In that Germany, without warning, and notwithstanding its -solemn covenant to settle by peaceful means all disputes which -might arise between it and Luxembourg which were not capable -<span class='pageno' title='92' id='Page_92'></span> -of settlement by diplomacy, did, on or about 10 May 1940, with a -military force, attack, invade, and occupy Luxembourg, thereby -violating its neutrality and territorial integrity and destroying its -sovereign independence.</p> - -<p class='line'> </p> - -<p class='pindent'>XV. Charge:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Violation of the Declaration of Non-Aggression entered into between -Germany and Poland on 26 January 1934.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Particulars:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In that Germany proceeding to the application of force for the -purpose of reaching a decision did, on or about 1 September 1939, -at various places along the German-Polish frontier employ military -forces to attack, invade, and commit other acts of aggression -against Poland.</p> - -<p class='line'> </p> - -<p class='pindent'>XVI. Charge:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Violation of German assurance given on 21 May 1935 that the -inviolability and integrity of the Federal State of Austria would -be recognized.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Particulars:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In that Germany did, on or about 12 March 1938, at various -points and places along the German-Austria frontier, with a military -force and in violation of its solemn declaration and assurance, -invade and annex to Germany the territory of the Federal State -of Austria.</p> - -<p class='line'> </p> - -<p class='pindent'>XVII. Charge:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Violation of Austro-German Agreement of 11 July 1936.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Particulars:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In that Germany during the period from 12 February 1938 to -13 March 1938 did by duress and various aggressive acts, including -the use of military force, cause the Federal State of Austria to -yield up its sovereignty to the German State in violation of Germany’s -agreement to recognize the full sovereignty of the Federal -State of Austria.</p> - -<p class='line'> </p> - -<p class='pindent'>XVIII. Charge:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Violation of German assurances given on 30 January 1937, -28 April 1939, 26 August 1939, and 6 October 1939 to respect the -neutrality and territorial inviolability of the Netherlands.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Particulars:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In that Germany, without warning, and without recourse to -peaceful means of settling any considered differences did, on or -about 10 May 1940, with a military force and in violation of its -solemn assurances, invade, occupy, and attempt to subjugate the -sovereign territory of the Netherlands. -<span class='pageno' title='93' id='Page_93'></span></p> - -<p class='line'> </p> - -<p class='pindent'>XIX. Charge:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Violation of German assurances given on 30 January 1937, 13 October -1937, 28 April 1939, 26 August 1939 and 6 October 1939, to -respect the neutrality and territorial integrity and inviolability of -Belgium.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Particulars:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In that Germany, without warning, did on or about 10 May -1940, with a military force and in violation of its solemn assurances -and declarations, attack, invade, and occupy the sovereign -territory of Belgium.</p> - -<p class='line'> </p> - -<p class='pindent'>XX. Charge:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Violation of assurances given on 11 March 1938 and 26 September -1938 to Czechoslovakia.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Particulars:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In that Germany, on or about 15 March 1939 did, by establishing -a Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia under duress and by -the threat of force, violate the assurance given on 11 March 1938 -to respect the territorial integrity of the Czechoslovak Republic -and the assurance given on 26 September 1938 that, if the so-called -Sudeten territories were ceded to Germany, no further German -territorial claims on Czechoslovakia would be made.</p> - -<p class='line'> </p> - -<p class='pindent'>XXI. Charge:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Violation of the Munich Agreement and Annexes of 29 September -1938.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Particulars:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>(1) In that Germany, on or about 15 March 1939, did by duress -and the threat of military intervention force the Republic of -Czechoslovakia to deliver the destiny of the Czech people and -country into the hands of the Führer of the German Reich.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>(2) In that Germany refused and failed to join in an international -guarantee of the new boundaries of the Czechoslovakian -State as provided for in Annex No. 1 to the Munich Agreement.</p> - -<p class='line'> </p> - -<p class='pindent'>XXII. Charge:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Violation of the solemn assurances of Germany given on 3 September -1939, 28 April 1939, and 6 October 1939 that they would -not violate the independence or sovereignty of the Kingdom of -Norway.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Particulars:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In that Germany, without warning did, on or about 9 April -1940, with its military and naval forces attack, invade, and commit -other acts of aggression against the Kingdom of Norway. -<span class='pageno' title='94' id='Page_94'></span></p> - -<p class='line'> </p> - -<p class='pindent'>XXIII. Charge:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Violation of German assurances given on 28 April 1939 and -26 August 1939 to respect the neutrality and territorial inviolability -of Luxembourg.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Particulars:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In that Germany, without warning, and without recourse to -peaceful means of settling any considered differences, did, on or -about 10 May 1940, with a military force and in violation of the -solemn assurances, invade, occupy, and absorb into Germany the -sovereign territory of Luxembourg.</p> - -<p class='line'> </p> - -<p class='pindent'>XXIV. Charge:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Violation of the Treaty of Non-Aggression between Germany -and Denmark signed at Berlin 31 May 1939.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Particulars:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In that Germany without prior warning, did, on or about -9 April 1940, with its military forces, attack, invade, and commit -other acts of aggression against the Kingdom of Denmark.</p> - -<p class='line'> </p> - -<p class='pindent'>XXV. Charge:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Violation of Treaty of Non-Aggression entered into between Germany -and U.S.S.R. on 23 August 1939.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Particulars:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>(1) In that Germany did, on or about 22 June 1941, employ -military forces to attack and commit acts of aggression against the -U.S.S.R.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>(2) In that Germany without warning or recourse to a friendly -exchange of views or arbitration did, on or about 22 June 1941, -employ military forces to attack and commit acts of aggression -against the U.S.S.R.</p> - -<p class='line'> </p> - -<p class='pindent'>XXVI. Charge:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Violation of German assurance given on 6 October 1939 to -respect the neutrality and territorial integrity of Yugoslavia.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Particulars:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In that Germany without prior warning did, on or about 6 April -1941, with its military forces attack, invade and commit other acts -of aggression against the Kingdom of Yugoslavia.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will now adjourn until 10 o’clock -tomorrow morning.</p> - -<p class='line' style='text-align:center;margin-top:2em;margin-bottom:2em;'>[<span class='it'>The Tribunal adjourned until 21 November 1945 at 1000 hours.</span>]</p> - -<hr class='pbk'/> - -<div><span class='pageno' title='95' id='Page_95'></span><h1>SECOND DAY<br/> <span style='font-size:smaller'>Wednesday, 21 November 1945</span></h1></div> - -<h2 class='nobreak'><span class='it'>Morning Session</span></h2> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: A motion has been filed with the Tribunal -and the Tribunal has given it consideration, and insofar as it may -be a plea to the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, it conflicts with Article -3 of the Charter and will not be entertained. Insofar as it may -contain other arguments which may be open to the defendants, -they may be heard at a later stage.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>And now, in accordance with Article 24 of the Charter, which -provides that, after the Indictment has been read in court, the defendants -shall be called upon to plead guilty or not guilty, I now -direct the defendants to plead either guilty or not guilty.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: May I speak to Your Lordship for just a moment?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: You may not speak to me in support of the -motion with which I have just dealt on behalf of the Tribunal. -I have told you that so far as that motion is a plea to the jurisdiction -of the Tribunal, it conflicts with Article 3 of the Charter -and will not be entertained. Insofar as it contains or may contain -arguments which may be open to the defendants, those arguments -may be heard hereafter.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: I do not wish to speak on the subject of a motion. -As speaker for the Defense I should like to broach a technical -question and voice a question to this effect on behalf of the Defense. -May I do so? The Defense Counsel were forbidden to talk -to the defendants this morning. It is absolutely necessary that the -Defense Counsel should be able to speak to the defendants before -the session. It often happens that after the session one cannot reach -one’s client at night. It is quite possible that counsel may have -prepared something overnight which he wishes to discuss with the -defendant before the session. According to our experience it is always -permissible for the Defense Counsel to speak to the defendant -before the session. The question of conferring between Defense -Counsel and clients during sessions could be dealt with at a later -date.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>At present I request, on behalf of the entire Defense, that we -be allowed to confer with our clients in the courtroom, into which -they usually are brought at a very early hour. Otherwise, we shall -<span class='pageno' title='96' id='Page_96'></span> -not be in a position to conduct the defense in an efficient and appropriate -manner.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I am afraid that you cannot consult with -your clients in the courtroom except by written communication. -When you are out of the courtroom, security regulations can be -carried out and, so far as those security regulations go, you have -full opportunity to consult with your clients. In the courtroom we -must confine you to written communications to your clients. At the -end of each day’s sitting, you will have full opportunity to consult -with them in private.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: I shall discuss this with my colleagues of the Defense -and we should like if possible to return to this question.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. THOMA: May I have the floor?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your name please.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. THOMA: Dr. Ralph Thoma. I represent the Defendant Rosenberg. -Yesterday my client gave me a statement as regards the -question of guilt or innocence. I took this statement and promised -him to talk with him about it. Neither last night nor this morning -have I had an opportunity to talk with him; and, consequently, -neither I nor my client are in a position to make a statement today -as to whether he is guilty or not guilty. I therefore request that -the proceedings be interrupted so that I may speak with my client.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Thoma, the Tribunal will be prepared -to adjourn for 15 minutes in order that you may have an opportunity -of consulting with your clients.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. THOMA: Thank you. I should like to make another statement. -Some of my colleagues have just told me that they are in -the same position as I, particularly Dr. Sauter. . . .</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I meant that all defendants’ counsel should -have an opportunity of consulting with their clients; but I would -point out to the defendants’ counsel that they have had several -weeks’ preparation for this Trial, and that they must have anticipated -that the provisions of Article 24 would be followed. But -now we will adjourn for 15 minutes in which all of you may consult -with your clients.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. THOMA: May I say something further in that respect, Your -Honor.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. THOMA: The Defense asked whether the question of guilty -or not guilty could only be answered with “yes”, or “no” or whether -a more extensive and longer statement could be made. We -obtained information on this point only the day before yesterday. -<span class='pageno' title='97' id='Page_97'></span> -We therefore have had no opportunity to confer at length with our -clients on this matter.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: One moment. The question will have to be -answered in the words of Article 24 of the Charter, and those words -are printed in italics: “The Tribunal shall ask each defendant -whether he pleads guilty or not guilty.” That is what they have -got to do at that stage. Of course, the defendants will have a full -opportunity themselves, if they are called as witnesses, and by -their counsel, to make their defense fully at a later stage.</p> - -<p class='line' style='text-align:center;margin-top:2em;margin-bottom:2em;'>[<span class='it'>A recess was taken.</span>]</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I will now call upon the defendants to plead -guilty or not guilty to the charges against them. They will proceed -in turn to a point in the dock opposite to the microphone.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Hermann Wilhelm Göring.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>HERMANN WILHELM GÖRING: Before I answer the question -of the Tribunal whether or not I am guilty. . . .</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I informed the Court that defendants were -not entitled to make a statement. You must plead guilty or not -guilty.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GÖRING: I declare myself in the sense of the Indictment not -guilty.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Rudolf Hess.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RUDOLF HESS: No.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: That will be entered as a plea of not guilty. -[Laughter.]</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: If there is any disturbance in court, those -who make it will have to leave the court.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Joachim von Ribbentrop.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>JOACHIM VON RIBBENTROP: I declare myself in the sense -of the Indictment not guilty.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Wilhelm Keitel.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>WILHELM KEITEL: I declare myself not guilty.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: In the absence of Ernst Kaltenbrunner, the -Trial will proceed against him, but he will have an opportunity of -pleading when he is sufficiently well to be brought back into court.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Alfred Rosenberg.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>ALFRED ROSENBERG: I declare myself in the sense of the -Indictment not guilty.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Hans Frank.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>HANS FRANK: I declare myself not guilty.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Wilhelm Frick. -<span class='pageno' title='98' id='Page_98'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>WILHELM FRICK: Not guilty.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Julius Streicher.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>JULIUS STREICHER: Not guilty.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Walter Funk.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>WALTER FUNK: I declare myself not guilty.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Hjalmar Schacht.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>HJALMAR SCHACHT: I am not guilty in any respect.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Karl Dönitz.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>KARL DÖNITZ: Not guilty.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Erich Raeder.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>ERICH RAEDER: I declare myself not guilty.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Baldur von Schirach.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>BALDUR VON SCHIRACH: I declare myself in the sense of the -Indictment not guilty.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Fritz Sauckel.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRITZ SAUCKEL: I declare myself in the sense of the Indictment, -before God and the world and particularly before my people, -not guilty.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Alfred Jodl.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>ALFRED JODL: Not guilty. For what I have done or had to -do, I have a pure conscience before God, before history and my -people.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Franz von Papen.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRANZ VON PAPEN: I declare myself in no way guilty.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Arthur Seyss-Inquart.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>ARTHUR SEYSS-INQUART: I declare myself not guilty.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Albert Speer.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>ALBERT SPEER: Not guilty.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Constantin von Neurath.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>CONSTANTIN VON NEURATH: I answer the question in the -negative.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Hans Fritzsche.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>HANS FRITZSCHE: As regards this Indictment, not guilty.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>At this point Defendant Göring stood up in the prisoner’s -dock and attempted to address the Tribunal.</span>]</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: You are not entitled to address the Tribunal -except through your counsel, at the present time.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I will now call upon the Chief Prosecutor for the United States -of America.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: May it please Your Honors:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The privilege of opening the first trial in history for crimes -against the peace of the world imposes a grave responsibility. The -<span class='pageno' title='99' id='Page_99'></span> -wrongs which we seek to condemn and punish have been so calculated, -so malignant, and so devastating, that civilization cannot -tolerate their being ignored, because it cannot survive their being -repeated. That four great nations, flushed with victory and stung -with injury stay the hand of vengeance and voluntarily submit -their captive enemies to the judgment of the law is one of the most -significant tributes that Power has ever paid to Reason.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>This Tribunal, while it is novel and experimental, is not the -product of abstract speculations nor is it created to vindicate legalistic -theories. This inquest represents the practical effort of four of -the most mighty of nations, with the support of 17 more, to utilize -international law to meet the greatest menace of our times—aggressive -war. The common sense of mankind demands that law -shall not stop with the punishment of petty crimes by little people. -It must also reach men who possess themselves of great power and -make deliberate and concerted use of it to set in motion evils which -leave no home in the world untouched. It is a cause of that magnitude -that the United Nations will lay before Your Honors.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In the prisoners’ dock sit twenty-odd broken men. Reproached -by the humiliation of those they have led almost as bitterly as by -the desolation of those they have attacked, their personal capacity -for evil is forever past. It is hard now to perceive in these men as -captives the power by which as Nazi leaders they once dominated -much of the world and terrified most of it. Merely as individuals -their fate is of little consequence to the world.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>What makes this inquest significant is that these prisoners represent -sinister influences that will lurk in the world long after -their bodies have returned to dust. We will show them to be living -symbols of racial hatreds, of terrorism and violence, and of the -arrogance and cruelty of power. They are symbols of fierce nationalisms -and of militarism, of intrigue and war-making which have -embroiled Europe generation after generation, crushing its manhood, -destroying its homes, and impoverishing its life. They have so identified -themselves with the philosophies they conceived and with the -forces they directed that any tenderness to them is a victory and -an encouragement to all the evils which are attached to their names. -Civilization can afford no compromise with the social forces which -would gain renewed strength if we deal ambiguously or indecisively -with the men in whom those forces now precariously survive.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>What these men stand for we will patiently and temperately -disclose. We will give you undeniable proofs of incredible events. -The catalog of crimes will omit nothing that could be conceived by -a pathological pride, cruelty, and lust for power. These men created -in Germany, under the “Führerprinzip”, a National Socialist despotism -<span class='pageno' title='100' id='Page_100'></span> -equalled only by the dynasties of the ancient East. They took -from the German people all those dignities and freedoms that we -hold natural and inalienable rights in every human being. The -people were compensated by inflaming and gratifying hatreds -towards those who were marked as “scapegoats”. Against their -opponents, including Jews, Catholics, and free labor, the Nazis directed -such a campaign of arrogance, brutality, and annihilation -as the world has not witnessed since the pre-Christian ages. They -excited the German ambition to be a “master race”, which of course -implies serfdom for others. They led their people on a mad gamble -for domination. They diverted social energies and resources to the -creation of what they thought to be an invincible war machine. -They overran their neighbors. To sustain the “master race” in its -war-making, they enslaved millions of human beings and brought -them into Germany, where these hapless creatures now wander as -“displaced persons”. At length bestiality and bad faith reached -such excess that they aroused the sleeping strength of imperiled -Civilization. Its united efforts have ground the German war -machine to fragments. But the struggle has left Europe a liberated -yet prostrate land where a demoralized society struggles to survive. -These are the fruits of the sinister forces that sit with these defendants -in the prisoners’ dock.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In justice to the nations and the men associated in this prosecution, -I must remind you of certain difficulties which may leave -their mark on this case. Never before in legal history has an effort -been made to bring within the scope of a single litigation the developments -of a decade, covering a whole continent, and involving -a score of nations, countless individuals, and innumerable events. -Despite the magnitude of the task, the world has demanded immediate -action. This demand has had to be met, though perhaps -at the cost of finished craftsmanship. In my country, established -courts, following familiar procedures, applying well-thumbed precedents, -and dealing with the legal consequences of local and -limited events seldom commence a trial within a year of the event -in litigation. Yet less than 8 months ago today the courtroom in -which you sit was an enemy fortress in the hands of German SS -troops. Less than 8 months ago nearly all our witnesses and documents -were in enemy hands. The law had not been codified, no -procedures had been established, no tribunal was in existence, no -usable courthouse stood here, none of the hundreds of tons of official -German documents had been examined, no prosecuting staff -had been assembled, nearly all of the present defendants were at -large, and the four prosecuting powers had not yet joined in common -cause to try them. I should be the last to deny that the case -<span class='pageno' title='101' id='Page_101'></span> -may well suffer from incomplete researches and quite likely will -not be the example of professional work which any of the prosecuting -nations would normally wish to sponsor. It is, however, a -completely adequate case to the judgment we shall ask you to -render, and its full development we shall be obliged to leave to -historians.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Before I discuss particulars of evidence, some general considerations -which may affect the credit of this trial in the eyes of -the world should be candidly faced. There is a dramatic disparity -between the circumstances of the accusers and of the accused that -might discredit our work if we should falter, in even minor matters, -in being fair and temperate.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Unfortunately, the nature of these crimes is such that both -prosecution and judgment must be by victor nations over vanquished -foes. The worldwide scope of the aggressions carried out -by these men has left but few real neutrals. Either the victors must -judge the vanquished or we must leave the defeated to judge themselves. -After the first World War, we learned the futility of the -latter course. The former high station of these defendants, the notoriety -of their acts, and the adaptability of their conduct to provoke -retaliation make it hard to distinguish between the demand -for a just and measured retribution, and the unthinking cry for -vengeance which arises from the anguish of war. It is our task, so -far as humanly possible, to draw the line between the two. We -must never forget that the record on which we judge these defendants -today is the record on which history will judge us tomorrow. -To pass these defendants a poisoned chalice is to put it to our own -lips as well. We must summon such detachment and intellectual -integrity to our task that this Trial will commend itself to posterity -as fulfilling humanity’s aspirations to do justice.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>At the very outset, let us dispose of the contention that to put -these men to trial is to do them an injustice entitling them to some -special consideration. These defendants may be hard pressed but -they are not ill used. Let us see what alternative they would have -to being tried.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>More than a majority of these prisoners surrendered to or were -tracked down by the forces of the United States. Could they expect -us to make American custody a shelter for our enemies against the -just wrath of our Allies? Did we spend American lives to capture -them only to save them from punishment? Under the principles of -the Moscow Declaration, those suspected war criminals who are not -to be tried internationally must be turned over to individual governments -for trial at the scene of their outrages. Many less responsible -and less culpable American-held prisoners have been and will continue -to be turned over to other United Nations for local trial. If -<span class='pageno' title='102' id='Page_102'></span> -these defendants should succeed, for any reason, in escaping the -condemnation of this Tribunal, or if they obstruct or abort this -trial, those who are American-held prisoners will be delivered up -to our continental Allies. For these defendants, however, we have -set up an International Tribunal and have undertaken the burden -of participating in a complicated effort to give them fair and dispassionate -hearings. That is the best-known protection to any man -with a defense worthy of being heard.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>If these men are the first war leaders of a defeated nation to be -prosecuted in the name of the law, they are also the first to be -given a chance to plead for their lives in the name of the law. -Realistically, the Charter of this Tribunal, which gives them a hearing, -is also the source of their only hope. It may be that these -men of troubled conscience, whose only wish is that the world -forget them, do not regard a trial as a favor. But they do have -a fair opportunity to defend themselves—a favor which these -men, when in power, rarely extended to their fellow countrymen. -Despite the fact that public opinion already condemns their acts, -we agree that here they must be given a presumption of innocence, -and we accept the burden of proving criminal acts and the -responsibility of these defendants for their commission.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>When I say that we do not ask for convictions unless we prove -crime, I do not mean mere technical or incidental transgression -of international conventions. We charge guilt on planned and intended -conduct that involves moral as well as legal wrong. And we -do not mean conduct that is a natural and human, even if illegal, -cutting of corners, such as many of us might well have committed -had we been in the defendants’ positions. It is not because they -yielded to the normal frailties of human beings that we accuse -them. It is their abnormal and inhuman conduct which brings them -to this bar.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>We will not ask you to convict these men on the testimony of -their foes. There is no count in the Indictment that cannot be -proved by books and records. The Germans were always meticulous -record keepers, and these defendants had their share of the Teutonic -passion for thoroughness in putting things on paper. Nor -were they without vanity. They arranged frequently to be photographed -in action. We will show you their own films. You will see -their own conduct and hear their own voices as these defendants -re-enact for you, from the screen, some of the events in the course -of the conspiracy.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>We would also make clear that we have no purpose to incriminate -the whole German people. We know that the Nazi -Party was not put in power by a majority of the German vote. -<span class='pageno' title='103' id='Page_103'></span> -We know it came to power by an evil alliance between the most -extreme of the Nazi revolutionists, the most unrestrained of the -German reactionaries, and the most aggressive of the German -militarists. If the German populace had willingly accepted the Nazi -program, no Storm-troopers would have been needed in the early -days of the Party and there would have been no need for concentration -camps or the Gestapo, both of which institutions were inaugurated -as soon as the Nazis gained control of the German State. -Only after these lawless innovations proved successful at home -were they taken abroad.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The German people should know by now that the people of -the United States hold them in no fear, and in no hate. It is true -that the Germans have taught us the horrors of modern warfare, -but the ruin that lies from the Rhine to the Danube shows that -we, like our Allies, have not been dull pupils. If we are not awed -by German fortitude and proficiency in war, and if we are not -persuaded of their political maturity, we do respect their skill in -the arts of peace, their technical competence, and the sober, industrious, -and self-disciplined character of the masses of the German -people. In 1933 we saw the German people recovering -prestige in the commercial, industrial, and artistic world after the -set-back of the last war. We beheld their progress neither with -envy nor malice. The Nazi regime interrupted this advance. The -recoil of the Nazi aggression has left Germany in ruins. The Nazi -readiness to pledge the German word without hesitation and to -break it without shame has fastened upon German diplomacy a -reputation for duplicity that will handicap it for years. Nazi arrogance -has made the boast of the “master race” a taunt that will -be thrown at Germans the world over for generations. The Nazi -nightmare has given the German name a new and sinister significance -throughout the world which will retard Germany a century. -The German, no less than the non-German world, has accounts -to settle with these defendants.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The fact of the war and the course of the war, which is the -central theme of our case, is history. From September 1st, 1939, -when the German armies crossed the Polish frontier, until September -1942, when they met epic resistance at Stalingrad, German -arms seemed invincible. Denmark and Norway, the Netherlands -and France, Belgium and Luxembourg, the Balkans and Africa, -Poland and the Baltic States, and parts of Russia, all had been -overrun and conquered by swift, powerful, well-aimed blows. That -attack on the peace of the world is the crime against international -society which brings into international cognizance crimes in its aid -and preparation which otherwise might be only internal concerns. -<span class='pageno' title='104' id='Page_104'></span> -It was aggressive war, which the nations of the world had renounced. -It was war in violation of treaties, by which the peace -of the world was sought to be safe-guarded.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>This war did not just happen—it was planned and prepared -for over a long period of time and with no small skill and cunning. -The world has perhaps never seen such a concentration -and stimulation of the energies of any people as that which -enabled Germany 20 years after it was defeated, disarmed, and -dismembered to come so near carrying out its plan to dominate -Europe. Whatever else we may say of those who were the authors -of this war, they did achieve a stupendous work in organization, -and our first task is to examine the means by which these defendants -and their fellow conspirators prepared and incited Germany -to go to war.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In general, our case will disclose these defendants all uniting -at some time with the Nazi Party in a plan which they well knew -could be accomplished only by an outbreak of war in Europe. Their -seizure of the German State, their subjugation of the German -people, their terrorism and extermination of dissident elements, -their planning and waging of war, their calculated and planned -ruthlessness in the conduct of warfare, their deliberate and -planned criminality toward conquered peoples,—all these are ends -for which they acted in concert; and all these are phases of the -conspiracy, a conspiracy which reached one goal only to set out -for another and more ambitious one. We shall also trace for you -the intricate web of organizations which these men formed and -utilized to accomplish these ends. We will show how the entire -structure of offices and officials was dedicated to the criminal -purposes and committed to the use of the criminal methods planned -by these defendants and their co-conspirators, many of whom war -and suicide have put beyond reach.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>It is my purpose to open the case, particularly under Count -One of the Indictment, and to deal with the Common Plan or Conspiracy -to achieve ends possible only by resort to Crimes against -Peace, War Crimes, and Crimes against Humanity. My emphasis -will not be on individual barbarities and perversions which may -have occurred independently of any central plan. One of the dangers -ever present is that this Trial may be protracted by details of particular -wrongs and that we will become lost in a “wilderness of -single instances”. Nor will I now dwell on the activity of individual -defendants except as it may contribute to exposition of the common -plan.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The case as presented by the United States will be concerned -with the brains and authority back of all the crimes. These defendants -<span class='pageno' title='105' id='Page_105'></span> -were men of a station and rank which does not soil its -own hands with blood. They were men who knew how to use -lesser folk as tools. We want to reach the planners and designers, -the inciters and leaders without whose evil architecture the world -would not have been for so long scourged with the violence and -lawlessness, and wracked with the agonies and convulsions, of this -terrible war.</p> - -<p class='line'> </p> - -<p class='pindent'><span class='it'>The Lawless Road to Power</span>:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The chief instrumentality of cohesion in plan and action was the -National Socialist German Workers Party, known as the Nazi Party. -Some of the defendants were with it from the beginning. Others -joined only after success seemed to have validated its lawlessness -or power had invested it with immunity from the processes of the -law. Adolf Hitler became its supreme leader or “Führer” in 1921.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>On the 24th of February 1920, at Munich, it publicly had -proclaimed its program (1708-PS). Some of its purposes would commend -themselves to many good citizens, such as the demands for -“profit-sharing in the great industries,” “generous development of -provision for old age,” “creation and maintenance of a healthy -middle class,” “a land reform suitable to our national requirements,” -and “raising the standard of health.” It also made a strong -appeal to that sort of nationalism which in ourselves we call -patriotism and in our rivals chauvinism. It demanded “equality -of rights for the German people in its dealing with other nations, -and the abolition of the peace treaties of Versailles and St. Germain.” -It demanded the “union of all Germans on the basis of the -right of self-determination of peoples to form a Great Germany.” -It demanded “land and territory (colonies) for the enrichment of -our people and the settlement of our surplus population.” All of -these, of course, were legitimate objectives if they were to be -attained without resort to aggressive warfare.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The Nazi Party from its inception, however, contemplated war. -It demanded the “abolition of mercenary troops and the formation -of a national army.” It proclaimed that:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“In view of the enormous sacrifice of life and property -demanded of a nation by every war, personal enrichment -through war must be regarded as a crime against the nation. -We demand, therefore, ruthless confiscation of all war profits.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>I do not criticize this policy. Indeed, I wish it were universal. -I merely wish to point out that in a time of peace, war was a preoccupation -of the Party, and it started the work of making war -less offensive to the masses of the people. With this it combined -a program of physical training and sports for youth that became, -as we shall see, the cloak for a secret program of military training. -<span class='pageno' title='106' id='Page_106'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>The Nazi Party declaration also committed its members to an -anti-Semitic program. It declared that no Jew or any person of non-German -blood could be a member of the nation. Such persons were -to be disfranchised, disqualified for office, subject to the alien laws, -and entitled to nourishment only after the German population had -first been provided for. All who had entered Germany after -August 2, 1914 were to be required forthwith to depart, and all -non-German immigration was to be prohibited.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The Party also avowed, even in those early days, an authoritarian -and totalitarian program for Germany. It demanded creation -of a strong central power with unconditional authority, nationalization -of all businesses which had been “amalgamated,” and a -“reconstruction” of the national system of education which “must -aim at teaching the pupil to understand the idea of the State (state -sociology).” Its hostility to civil liberties and freedom of the press -was distinctly announced in these words:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“It must be forbidden to publish newspapers which do not -conduce to the national welfare. We demand the legal prosecution -of all tendencies in art or literature of a kind likely -to disintegrate our life as a nation and the suppression of -institutions which might militate against the above requirements.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>The forecast of religious persecution was clothed in the language -of religious liberty, for the Nazi program stated, “We demand -liberty for all religious denominations in the State.” But, it continues -with the limitation, “so far as they are not a danger to it and do -not militate against the morality and moral sense of the German -race.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The Party program foreshadowed the campaign of terrorism. It -announced, “We demand ruthless war upon those whose activities -are injurious to the common interests”, and it demanded that such -offenses be punished with death.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>It is significant that the leaders of this Party interpreted this -program as a belligerent one, certain to precipitate conflict. The -Party platform concluded, “The leaders of the Party swear to -proceed regardless of consequences—if necessary, at the sacrifice -of their lives—toward the fulfillment of the foregoing points.” It is -this Leadership Corps of the Party, not its entire membership, that -stands accused before you as a criminal organization.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Let us now see how the leaders of the Party fulfilled their -pledge to proceed regardless of consequences. Obviously, their -foreign objectives, which were nothing less than to undo international -treaties and to wrest territory from foreign control, as well -as most of their internal program, could be accomplished only by -<span class='pageno' title='107' id='Page_107'></span> -possession of the machinery of the German State. The first effort, -accordingly, was to subvert the Weimar Republic by violent revolution. -An abortive putsch at Munich in 1923 landed many of them in -jail. A period of meditation which followed produced <span class='it'>Mein Kampf</span>, -henceforth the source of law for the Party workers and a source of -considerable revenue to its supreme leader. The Nazi plans for the -violent overthrow of the feeble Republic then turned to plans for -its capture.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>No greater mistake could be made than to think of the Nazi -Party in terms of the loose organizations which we of the western -world call “political parties”. In discipline, structure, and method -the Nazi Party was not adapted to the democratic process of persuasion. -It was an instrument of conspiracy and of coercion. The -Party was not organized to take over power in the German State -by winning support of a majority of the German people; it was -organized to seize power in defiance of the will of the people.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The Nazi Party, under the “Führerprinzip,” was bound by an -iron discipline into a pyramid, with the Führer, Adolf Hitler, at -the top and broadening into a numerous Leadership Corps, composed -of overlords of a very extensive Party membership at the -base. By no means all of those who may have supported the movement -in one way or another were actual Party members. The -membership took the Party oath which in effect amounted to an -abdication of personal intelligence and moral responsibility. This -was the oath: “I vow inviolable fidelity to Adolf Hitler; I vow -absolute obedience to him and to the leaders he designates for me.” -The membership in daily practice followed its leaders with an -idolatry and self-surrender more Oriental than Western.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>We will not be obliged to guess as to the motives or goal of the -Nazi Party. The immediate aim was to undermine the Weimar -Republic. The order to all Party members to work to that end was -given in a letter from Hitler of August 24, 1931 to Rosenberg, of -which we will produce the original. Hitler wrote:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“I am just reading in the <span class='it'>Völkischer Beobachter</span>, edition -235/236, page 1, an article entitled “Does Wirth Intend To -Come over?” The tendency of the article is to prevent on our -part a crumbling away from the present form of government. -I myself am travelling all over Germany to achieve exactly -the opposite. May I therefore ask that my own paper will -not stab me in the back with tactically unwise articles. . . .” -(047-PS)</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Captured film enables us to present the Defendant Alfred Rosenberg, -who from the screen will himself tell you the story. The SA -practiced violent interference with elections. We have the reports -<span class='pageno' title='108' id='Page_108'></span> -of the SD describing in detail how its members later violated the -secrecy of elections in order to identify those who opposed them. -One of the reports makes this explanation:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“. . . . The control was effected in the following way: some -members of the election committee marked all the ballot -papers with numbers. During the ballot itself, a voters’ list -was made up. The ballot-papers were handed out in numerical -order, therefore it was possible afterwards with the aid of -this list to find out the persons who cast ‘No’—votes or invalid -votes. One sample of these marked ballot-papers is enclosed. -The marking was done on the back of the ballot-papers with -skimmed milk. . . .” (R-142)</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>The Party activity, in addition to all the familiar forms of political -contest, took on the aspect of a rehearsal for warfare. It utilized -a Party formation, “Die Sturmabteilungen”, commonly known as -the SA. This was a voluntary organization of youthful and fanatical -Nazis trained for the use of violence under semi-military discipline. -Its members began by acting as bodyguards for the Nazi leaders -and rapidly expanded from defensive to offensive tactics. They -became disciplined ruffians for the breaking up of opposition -meetings and the terrorization of adversaries. They boasted that -their task was to make the Nazi Party “master of the streets”. The -SA was the parent organization of a number of others. Its offspring -include “Die Schutzstaffeln”, commonly known as the SS, formed -in 1925 and distinguished for the fanaticism and cruelty of its members; -“Der Sicherheitsdienst”, known as the SD; and “Die Geheime -Staatspolizei”, the Secret State Police, the infamous Gestapo formed -in 1934 after Nazi accession to power.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>A glance at a chart of the Party organization is enough to show -how completely it differed from the political parties we know. It -had its own source of law in the Führer and sub-Führer. It had -its own courts and its own police. The conspirators set up a government -within the Party to exercise outside the law every sanction -that any legitimate state could exercise and many that it could not. -Its chain of command was military, and its formations were martial -in name as well as in function. They were composed of battalions -set up to bear arms under military discipline, motorized corps, -flying corps, and the infamous “Death Head Corps”, which was not -misnamed. The Party had its own secret police, its security units, -its intelligence and espionage division, its raiding forces, and its -youth forces. It established elaborate administrative mechanisms to -identify and liquidate spies and informers, to manage concentration -camps, to operate death vans, and to finance the whole movement. -Through concentric circles of authority, the Nazi Party, as its leadership -<span class='pageno' title='109' id='Page_109'></span> -later boasted, eventually organized and dominated every phase -of German life—but not until they had waged a bitter internal -struggle characterized by brutal criminality we charge here. In -preparation for this phase of their struggle, they created a Party -police system. This became the pattern and the instrument of the -police state, which was the first goal in their plan.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The Party formations, including the Leadership Corps of the -Party, the SD, the SS, the SA, and the infamous Secret State Police, -or Gestapo,—all these stand accused before you as criminal organizations; -organizations which, as we will prove from their own documents, -were recruited only from recklessly devoted Nazis, ready in -conviction and temperament to do the most violent of deeds to -advance the common program. They terrorized and silenced -democratic opposition and were able at length to combine with -political opportunists, militarists, industrialists, monarchists, and -political reactionaries.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>On January 30, 1933 Adolf Hitler became Chancellor of the German -Republic. An evil combination, represented in the prisoners’ -dock by its most eminent survivors, had succeeded in possessing -itself of the machinery of the German Government, a facade behind -which they thenceforth would operate to make a reality of the war -of conquest they so long had plotted. The conspiracy had passed -into its second phase.</p> - -<p class='line'> </p> - -<p class='pindent'><span class='it'>The Consolidation of Nazi Power</span>:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>We shall now consider the steps, which embraced the most -hideous of Crimes against Humanity, to which the conspirators -resorted in perfecting control of the German State and in preparing -Germany for the aggressive war indispensable to their ends.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The Germans of the 1920’s were a frustrated and baffled people -as a result of defeat and the disintegration of their traditional government. -The democratic elements, which were trying to govern -Germany through the new and feeble machinery of the Weimar -Republic, got inadequate support from the democratic forces of -the rest of the world, including my country. It is not to be denied -that Germany, when worldwide depression was added to her other -problems, was faced with urgent and intricate pressures in her -economic and political life which necessitated bold measures.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The internal measures by which a nation attempts to solve its -problems are ordinarily of no concern to other nations. But the -Nazi program from the first was recognized as a desperate program -for a people still suffering the effects of an unsuccessful war. The -Nazi policy embraced ends recognized as attainable only by a -renewal and a more successful outcome of war, in Europe. The -conspirators’ answer to Germany’s problems was nothing less than -<span class='pageno' title='110' id='Page_110'></span> -to plot the regaining of territories lost in the First World War and -the acquisition of other fertile lands of Central Europe by dispossessing -or exterminating those who inhabited them. They also -contemplated destroying or permanently weakening all other neighboring -peoples so as to win virtual domination over Europe and -probably of the world. The precise limits of their ambition we -need not define for it was and is as illegal to wage aggressive war -for small stakes as for large ones.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>We find at this period two governments in Germany—the real -and the ostensible. The forms of the German Republic were maintained -for a time, and it was the outward and visible government. -But the real authority in the State was outside and above the law -and rested in the Leadership Corps of the Nazi Party.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>On February 27, 1933, less than a month after Hitler became -Chancellor, the Reichstag building was set on fire. The burning -of this symbol of free parliamentary government was so providential -for the Nazis that it was believed they staged the fire themselves. -Certainly when we contemplate their known crimes, we cannot -believe they would shrink from mere arson. It is not necessary, -however, to resolve the controversy as to who set the fire. The -significant point is in the use that was made of the fire and of the -state of public mind it produced. The Nazis immediately accused -the Communist Party of instigating and committing the crime, and -turned every effort to portray this single act of arson as the -beginning of a communist revolution. Then, taking advantage of -the hysteria, the Nazis met this phantom revolution with a real one. -In the following December the German Supreme Court with commendable -courage and independence acquitted the accused Communists, -but it was too late to influence the tragic course of events -which the Nazi conspirators had set rushing forward.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Hitler, on the morning after the fire, obtained from the aged -and ailing President Von Hindenburg a presidential decree suspending -the extensive guarantees of individual liberty contained in the -constitution of the Weimar Republic. The decree provided that:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“Sections 114, 115, 117, 118, 123, 124, and 153 of the Constitution -of the German Reich are suspended until further -notice. Thus, restrictions on personal liberty, on the right of -free expression of opinion, including freedom of the press, -on the right of assembly and the right of association, and -violations of the privacy of postal, telegraphic, and telephonic -communications, and warrants for house-searches, orders for -confiscations as well as restrictions on property, are also permissible -beyond the legal limits otherwise prescribed.” -(1390-PS)</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'><span class='pageno' title='111' id='Page_111'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>The extent of the restriction on personal liberty under the decree -of February 28, 1933 may be understood by reference to the rights -under the Weimar constitution which were suspended:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“<span class='it'>Article 114.</span> The freedom of the person is inviolable. Curtailment -or deprivation of personal freedom by a public authority -is only permissible on a legal basis.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“Persons who have been deprived of their freedom must be -informed at the latest on the following day by whose authority -and for what reasons the deprivation of freedom was -ordered; opportunity shall be afforded them without delay -of submitting objections to their deprivation of freedom.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“<span class='it'>Article 115.</span> Every German’s home is his sanctuary and is -inviolable. Exceptions may only be made as provided by law.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“<span class='it'>Article 117.</span> The secrecy of letters and all postal, telegraphic, -and telephone communications is inviolable. Exceptions are -inadmissible except by Reich law.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“<span class='it'>Article 118.</span> Every German has the right, within the limits -of the general laws, to express his opinions freely in speech, -in writing, in print, in picture form, or in any other way. -No conditions of work or employment may detract from this -right and no disadvantage may accrue to him from any person -for making use of this right. . . .</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“<span class='it'>Article 123.</span> All Germans have the right to assemble peacefully -and unarmed without giving notice and without special -permission.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“A Reich law may make previous notification obligatory for -assemblies in the open air, and may prohibit them in case of -immediate danger to the public safety.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“<span class='it'>Article 124.</span> All the Germans have the right to form associations -or societies for purposes not contrary to criminal -law. This right may not be curtailed by preventive -measures. The same provisions apply to religious associations -and societies.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“Every association may become incorporated (Erwerb der -Rechtsfähigkeit) according to the provisions of the civil law. -The right may not be refused to any association on the -grounds that its aims are political, social-political, or religious.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“<span class='it'>Article 153.</span> Property is guaranteed by the Constitution. -Its content and limits are defined by the laws.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“Expropriation can only take place for the public benefit and -on a legal basis. Adequate compensation shall be granted, -unless a Reich law orders otherwise. In the case of dispute -concerning the amount of compensation, it shall be possible -<span class='pageno' title='112' id='Page_112'></span> -to submit the matter to the ordinary civil courts, unless Reich -laws determine otherwise. Compensation must be paid if the -Reich expropriates property belonging to the Lands, Communes, -or public utility associations.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“Property carries obligations. Its use shall also serve the -common good.” (2050-PS)</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>It must be said in fairness to Von Hindenburg that the constitution -itself authorized him temporarily to suspend these fundamental -rights “if the public safety and order in the German Reich -are considerably disturbed or endangered.” It must also be acknowledged -that President Ebert previously had invoked this power.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>But the National Socialist coup was made possible because the -terms of the Hitler-Hindenburg decree departed from all previous -ones in which the power of suspension had been invoked. -Whenever Ebert had suspended constitutional guarantees of individual -rights, his decree had expressly revived the Protective -Custody Act adopted by the Reichstag in 1916 during the previous -war. This act guaranteed a judicial hearing within 24 hours of -arrest, gave a right to have counsel and to inspect all relevant -records, provided for appeal, and authorized compensation from -Treasury funds for erroneous arrests.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The Hitler-Hindenburg decree of February 28, 1933 contained -no such safeguards. The omission may not have been noted by -Von Hindenburg. Certainly he did not appreciate its effect. It left -the Nazi police and party formations, already existing and functioning -under Hitler, completely unrestrained and irresponsible. -Secret arrest and indefinite detention, without charges, without -evidence, without hearing, without counsel, became the method of -inflicting inhuman punishment on any whom the Nazi police -suspected or disliked. No court could issue an injunction, or writ -of <span class='it'>habeas corpus</span>, or <span class='it'>certiorari</span>. The German people were in the -hands of the police, the police were in the hands of the Nazi Party, -and the Party was in the hands of a ring of evil men, of whom the -defendants here before you are surviving and representative -leaders.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The Nazi conspiracy, as we shall show, always contemplated -not merely overcoming current opposition but exterminating elements -which could not be reconciled with its philosophy of the -state. It not only sought to establish the Nazi “new order” but to -secure its sway, as Hitler predicted, “for a thousand years.” Nazis -were never in doubt or disagreement as to what these dissident -elements were. They were concisely described by one of them, -Colonel General Von Fritsch, on December 11, 1938 in these words: -<span class='pageno' title='113' id='Page_113'></span></p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“Shortly after the first war I came to the conclusion that we -should have to be victorious in three battles if Germany were -to become powerful again: 1. The battle against the working -class—Hitler has won this. 2. Against the Catholic Church, -perhaps better expressed against Ultramontanism. 3. Against -the Jews.” (1947-PS)</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>The warfare against these elements was continuous. The battle -in Germany was but a practice skirmish for the worldwide drive -against them. We have in point of geography and of time two -groups of Crimes against Humanity—one within Germany before -and during the war, the other in occupied territory during the -war. But the two are not separated in Nazi planning. They are a -continuous unfolding of the Nazi plan to exterminate peoples and -institutions which might serve as a focus or instrument for overturning -their “new world order” at any time. We consider these -crimes against humanity in this address as manifestations of the -one Nazi plan and discuss them according to General Von Fritsch’s -classification.</p> - -<p class='line'> </p> - -<p class='pindent'><span class='it'>1. The Battle against the Working Class</span>:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>When Hitler came to power, there were in Germany three -groups of trade unions. The General German Trade Union Confederation -(ADGB) with 28 affiliated unions, and the General -Independent Employees Confederation (AFA) with 13 federated -unions together numbered more than 4,500,000 members. The -Christian Trade Union had over 1,250,000 members.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The working people of Germany, like the working people of -other nations, had little to gain personally by war. While labor -is usually brought around to the support of the nation at war, -labor by and large is a pacific, though by no means a pacifist force -in the world. The working people of Germany had not forgotten -in 1933 how heavy the yoke of the war lord can be. It was the -workingmen who had joined the sailors and soldiers in the revolt -of 1918 to end the first World War. The Nazis had neither forgiven -nor forgotten. The Nazi program required that this part of the -German population not only be stripped of power to resist diversion -of its scanty comforts to armament, but also be wheedled or -whipped into new and unheard of sacrifices as a part of the Nazi -war preparation. Labor must be cowed, and that meant its organizations -and means of cohesion and defense must be destroyed.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The purpose to regiment labor for the Nazi Party was avowed -by Ley in a speech to workers on May 2, 1933 as follows:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“You may say what else do you want, you have the absolute -power. True we have the power, but we do not have the -whole people, we do not have you workers 100 per cent, and -<span class='pageno' title='114' id='Page_114'></span> -it is you whom we want; we will not let you be until you -stand with us in complete, genuine acknowledgment.” (614-PS)</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>The first Nazi attack was upon the two larger unions. On April -21, 1933 an order not even in the name of the Government, but of -the Nazi Party was issued by the conspirator Robert Ley as -“Chief of Staff of the political organization of the NSDAP,” applicable -to the Trade Union Confederation and the Independent -Employees Confederation. It directed seizure of their properties -and arrest of their principal leaders. The Party order directed -Party organs which we here denounce as criminal associations, the -SA and SS “to be employed for the occupation of the trade union -properties, and for the taking into custody of personalities who -come into question.” And it directed the taking into “protective -custody” of all chairmen and district secretaries of such unions -and branch directors of the labor bank. (392-PS)</p> - -<p class='pindent'>These orders were carried out on May 2, 1933. All funds of the -labor unions, including pension and benefit funds, were seized. -Union leaders were sent to concentration camps. A few days later, -on May 10, 1933, Hitler appointed Ley leader of the German Labor -Front (Deutsche Arbeitsfront) which succeeded to the confiscated -union funds. The German Labor Front, a Nazi controlled labor -bureau, was set up under Ley to teach the Nazi philosophy to -German workers and to weed out from industrial employment all -who were backward in their lessons. (1940-PS) “Factory troops” -were organized as an “ideological shock squad within the factory” -(1817-PS). The Party order provided that “outside of the German -Labor Front, no other organization (whether of workers or of -employees) is to exist.” On June 24, 1933 the remaining Christian -Trade Unions were seized, pursuant to an order of the Nazi Party -signed by Ley.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>On May 19, 1933, this time by a government decree, it was -provided that “trustees” of labor appointed by Hitler, should -regulate the conditions of all labor contracts, replacing the former -process of collective bargaining (405-PS). On November 30, 1934 -a decree “regulating national labor” introduced the Führer Principle -into industrial relations. It provided that the owners of enterprises -should be the “Führer” and the workers should be the followers. -The “enterprise-Führer” should “make decisions for -employees and laborers in all matters concerning the enterprise” -(1861-PS). It was by such bait that the great German industrialists -were induced to support the Nazi cause, to their own ultimate -ruin.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Not only did the Nazis dominate and regiment German labor, -but they forced the youth into the ranks of the laboring people -<span class='pageno' title='115' id='Page_115'></span> -they had thus led into chains. Under a compulsory labor service -decree on 26 June 1935 young men and women between the ages -of 18 and 25 were conscripted for labor (1654-PS). Thus was the -purpose to subjugate German labor accomplished. In the words of -Ley, this accomplishment consisted “in eliminating the association -character of the trade union and employees’ associations, and in its -place we have substituted the conception ‘soldiers of work’.” The -productive manpower of the German nation was in Nazi control. -By these steps the defendants won the battle to liquidate labor -unions as potential opposition and were enabled to impose upon the -working class the burdens of preparing for aggressive warfare.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Robert Ley, the field marshal of the battle against labor, answered -our Indictment with suicide. Apparently he knew no better -answer.</p> - -<p class='line'> </p> - -<p class='pindent'><span class='it'>2. The Battle against the Churches</span>:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The Nazi Party always was predominantly anti-Christian in its -ideology. But we who believe in freedom of conscience and of religion -base no charge of criminality on anybody’s ideology. It is not -because the Nazi themselves were irreligious or pagan, but because -they persecuted others of the Christian faith that they become -guilty of crime, and it is because the persecution was a step in the -preparation for aggressive warfare that the offense becomes one -of international consequence. To remove every moderating influence -among the German people and to put its population on a -total war footing, the conspirators devised and carried out a -systematic and relentless repression of all Christian sects and -churches.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>We will ask you to convict the Nazis on their own evidence. -Martin Bormann, in June 1941, issued a secret decree on the -relation of Christianity and National Socialism. The decree provided:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“For the first time in German history the Führer consciously -and completely has the leadership of the people in his own -hand. With the Party, its components, and attached units -the Führer has created for himself and thereby the German -Reich leadership an instrument which makes him independent -of the church. All influences which might impair -or damage the leadership of the people exercised by the -Führer with help of the NSDAP, must be eliminated. More -and more the people must be separated from the churches -and their organs, the pastors. Of course, the churches must -and will, seen from their viewpoint, defend themselves -against this loss of power. But never again must an influence -on leadership of the people be yielded to the -<span class='pageno' title='116' id='Page_116'></span> -churches. This (influence) must be broken completely and -finally.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“Only the Reich Government and by its direction the Party, -its components, and attached units have a right to leadership -of the people. Just as the deleterious influences of -astrologers, seers, and other fakers are eliminated and suppressed -by the State, so must the possibility of church -influence also be totally removed. Not until this has happened, -does the State leadership have influence on the individual -citizens. Not until then are people and Reich secure -in their existence for all the future.” (D-75)</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>And how the Party had been securing the Reich from Christian -influence, will be proved by such items as this teletype from the -Gestapo, Berlin, to the Gestapo, Nuremberg, on July 24, 1938. Let -us hear their own account of events in Rottenburg.</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“The Party on 23 July 1939 from 2100 on carried out the -third demonstration against Bishop Sproll. Participants -about 2500-3000 were brought in from outside by bus, etc. -The Rottenburg populace again did not participate in the -demonstration. This town took rather a hostile attitude to -the demonstrations. The action got completely out of hand -of the Party member responsible for it. The demonstrators -stormed the palace, beat in the gates and doors. About 150 -to 200 people forced their way into the palace, searched the -rooms, threw files out of the windows and rummaged -through the beds in the rooms of the palace. One bed was -ignited. Before the fire got to the other objects of equipment -in the rooms and the palace, the flaming bed could be -thrown from the window and the fire extinguished. The Bishop -was with Archbishop Groeber of Freiburg and the ladies -and gentlemen of his menage in the chapel at prayer. About -25 to 30 people pressed into this chapel and molested those -present. Bishop Groeber was taken for Bishop Sproll. He -was grabbed by the robe and dragged back and forth. -Finally the intruders realized that Bishop Groeber is not the -one they are seeking. They could then be persuaded to -leave the building. After the evacuation of the palace by -the demonstrators I had an interview with Archbishop -Groeber who left Rottenburg in the night. Groeber wants to -turn to the Führer and Reich Minister of the Interior, Dr. -Frick, anew. On the course of the action, the damage done -as well as the homage of the Rottenburg populace beginning -today for the Bishop I shall immediately hand in a full -<span class='pageno' title='117' id='Page_117'></span> -report, after I am in the act of suppressing counter mass -meetings. . . .</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“In case the Führer has instructions to give in this matter, -I request that these be transmitted most quickly. . . .” -(848-PS)</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Later, Defendant Rosenberg wrote to Bormann reviewing the -proposal of Kerrl as Church Minister to place the Protestant -Church under State tutelage and proclaim Hitler its supreme head. -Rosenberg was opposed, hinting that nazism was to suppress the -Christian Church completely after the war (See also 098-PS).</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The persecution of all pacifist and dissenting sects, such as -Jehovah’s Witnesses and the Pentecostal Association, was peculiarly -relentless and cruel. The policy toward the Evangelical -Churches, however, was to use their influence for the Nazis’ own -purposes. In September 1933 Mueller was appointed the Führer’s -representative with power to deal with the “affairs of the Evangelical -Church” in its relations to the State. Eventually, steps were -taken to create a Reich Bishop vested with power to control this -Church. A long conflict followed, Pastor Niemöller was sent to -concentration camp, and extended interference with the internal -discipline and administration of the churches occurred.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>A most intense drive was directed against the Roman Catholic -Church. After a strategic concordat with the Holy See, signed in -July 1933 in Rome, which never was observed by the Nazi Party, -a long and persistent persecution of the Catholic Church, its -priesthood, and its members, was carried out. Church schools and -educational institutions were suppressed or subjected to requirements -of Nazi teaching inconsistent with the Christian faith. The -property of the Church was confiscated and inspired vandalism -directed against Church property was left unpunished. Religious -instruction was impeded and the exercise of religion made difficult. -Priests and bishops were laid upon, riots were stimulated to -harass them, and many were sent to concentration camps.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>After occupation of foreign soil, these persecutions went on -with greater vigor than ever. We will present to you from the -files of the Vatican the earnest protests made by the Vatican to -Ribbentrop summarizing the persecutions to which the priesthood -and the Church had been subjected in this twentieth century under -the Nazi regime. Ribbentrop never answered them. He could not -deny. He dared not justify.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I now come to “Crimes against the Jews.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: We shall now take our noon recess.</p> - -<p class='line' style='text-align:center;margin-top:2em;margin-bottom:2em;'>[<span class='it'>A recess was taken until 1400 hours.</span>]</p> - -<hr class='pbk'/> - -<h2 class='nobreak'><span class='pageno' title='118' id='Page_118'></span><span class='it'>Afternoon Session</span></h2> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn for 15 minutes at -half past 3 and will then continue until half past 4.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I was about to take up the “Crimes -Committed against the Jews.”</p> - -<p class='line'> </p> - -<p class='pindent'><span class='it'>3. Crimes against the Jews</span>:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The most savage and numerous crimes planned and committed -by the Nazis were those against the Jews. Those in Germany in -1933 numbered about 500,000. In the aggregate, they had made for -themselves positions which excited envy, and had accumulated properties -which excited the avarice of the Nazis. They were few -enough to be helpless and numerous enough to be held up as a -menace.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Let there be no misunderstanding about the charge of persecuting -Jews. What we charge against these defendants is not those -arrogances and pretensions which frequently accompany the intermingling -of different peoples and which are likely, despite the honest -efforts of government, to produce regrettable crimes and convulsions. -It is my purpose to show a plan and design, to which all -Nazis were fanatically committed, to annihilate all Jewish people. -These crimes were organized and promoted by the Party leadership, -executed and protected by the Nazi officials, as we shall convince -you by written orders of the Secret State Police itself.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The persecution of the Jews was a continuous and deliberate -policy. It was a policy directed against other nations as well as -against the Jews themselves. Anti-Semitism was promoted to divide -and embitter the democratic peoples and to soften their resistance -to the Nazi aggression. As Robert Ley declared in <span class='it'>Der Angriff</span> on -14 May 1944: “The second German secret weapon is Anti-Semitism -because if it is constantly pursued by Germany, it will become a -universal problem which all nations will be forced to consider.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Anti-Semitism also has been aptly credited with being a “spearhead -of terror.” The ghetto was the laboratory for testing repressive -measures. Jewish property was the first to be expropriated, -but the custom grew and included similar measures against anti-Nazi -Germans, Poles, Czechs, Frenchmen, and Belgians. Extermination -of the Jews enabled the Nazis to bring a practiced hand -to similar measures against Poles, Serbs, and Greeks. The plight -of the Jew was a constant threat to opposition or discontent among -other elements of Europe’s population—pacifists, conservatives, -Communists, Catholics, Protestants, Socialists. It was in fact, a -threat to every dissenting opinion and to every non-Nazi’s life. -<span class='pageno' title='119' id='Page_119'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>The persecution policy against the Jews commenced with non-violent -measures, such as disfranchisement and discriminations -against their religion, and the placing of impediments in the way -of success in economic life. It moved rapidly to organized mass -violence against them, physical isolation in ghettos, deportation, -forced labor, mass starvation, and extermination. The Government, -the Party formations indicted before you as criminal organizations, -the Secret State Police, the Army, private and semi-public associations, -and “spontaneous” mobs that were carefully inspired from -official sources, were all agencies that were concerned in this persecution. -Nor was it directed against individual Jews for personal -bad citizenship or unpopularity. The avowed purpose was the -destruction of the Jewish people as a whole, as an end in itself, -as a measure of preparation for war, and as a discipline of conquered -peoples.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The conspiracy or common plan to exterminate the Jew was so -methodically and thoroughly pursued, that despite the German -defeat and Nazi prostration this Nazi aim largely has succeeded. -Only remnants of the European Jewish population remain in Germany, -in the countries which Germany occupied, and in those which -were her satellites or collaborators. Of the 9,600,000 Jews who lived -in Nazi-dominated Europe, 60 percent are authoritatively estimated -to have perished. Five million seven hundred thousand Jews are -missing from the countries in which they formerly lived, and over -4,500,000 cannot be accounted for by the normal death rate nor by -immigration; nor are they included among displaced persons. History -does not record a crime ever perpetrated against so many victims -or one ever carried out with such calculated cruelty.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>You will have difficulty, as I have, to look into the faces of these -defendants and believe that in this twentieth century human beings -could inflict such sufferings as will be proved here on their own -countrymen as well as upon their so-called “inferior” enemies. Particular -crimes, and the responsibility of defendants for them, are to -be dealt with by the Soviet Government’s counsel, when committed -in the East, and by counsel for the Republic of France when committed -in the West. I advert to them only to show their magnitude -as evidence of a purpose and a knowledge common to all defendants, -of an official plan rather than of a capricious policy of some -individual commander, and to show such a continuity of Jewish -persecution from the rise of the Nazi conspiracy to its collapse as -forbids us to believe that any person could be identified with any -part of Nazi action without approving this most conspicuous item -in their program.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The Indictment itself recites many evidences of the anti-Semitic -persecutions. The Defendant Streicher led the Nazis in anti-Semitic -<span class='pageno' title='120' id='Page_120'></span> -bitterness and extremism. In an article appearing in <span class='it'>Der Stürmer</span> -on 19 March 1942 he complained that Christian teachings have stood -in the way of “racial solution of the Jewish question in Europe”, -and quoted enthusiastically as the twentieth century solution the -Führer’s proclamation of February 24, 1942 that “the Jew will be -exterminated.” And on November 4, 1943 Streicher declared in <span class='it'>Der -Stürmer</span> that the Jews “have disappeared from Europe and that the -Jewish ‘Reservoir of the East’ from which the Jewish plague has -for centuries beset the people of Europe, has ceased to exist.” Streicher -now has the effrontery to tell us he is “only a Zionist”—he -says he wants only to return the Jews to Palestine. But on May 7, -1942 his newspaper, <span class='it'>Der Stürmer</span>, had this to say:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='pindent'>“It is also not only a European problem! <span class='it'>The Jewish -question is a world question!</span> Not only is Germany not safe -in the face of the Jews as long as one Jew lives in Europe, -but also the Jewish question is hardly solved in Europe so -long as Jews live in the rest of the world.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>And the Defendant Hans Frank, a lawyer by profession, I say -with shame, summarized in his diary in 1944 the Nazi policy thus: -“The Jews are a race which has to be eliminated; whenever we -catch one, it is his end” (2233-PS, 4 March 1944, P. 26). And earlier, -speaking of his function as Governor General of Poland, he confided -to his diary this sentiment: “Of course I cannot eliminate all lice -and Jews in only a year’s time” (2233-PS, Vol. IV, 1940, P. 1158). -I could multiply endlessly this kind of Nazi ranting but I will leave -it to the evidence and turn to the fruit of this perverted thinking.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The most serious of the actions against Jews were outside of -any law, but the law itself was employed to some extent. There -were the infamous Nuremberg decrees of September 15, 1935 (<span class='it'>Reichsgesetzblatt</span> -1935, Part. I, P. 1146). The Jews were segregated into -ghettos and put into forced labor; they were expelled from their -professions; their property was expropriated; all cultural life, the -press, the theater, and schools were prohibited them; and the SD -was made responsible for them (212-PS, 069-PS). This was an ominous, -guardianship, as the following order for “The Handling of the -Jewish Question” shows:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“The competency of the Chief of the Security Police and -Security Service, who is charged with the mission of solving -the European Jewish question, extends even to the Occupied -Eastern Provinces. . . .</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“An eventual act by the civilian population against the Jews -is not to be prevented as long as this is compatible with the -maintenance of order and security in the rear of the fighting -troops. . . . -<span class='pageno' title='121' id='Page_121'></span></p> - -<p class='noindent'>“The first main goal of the German measures must be strict -segregation of Jewry from the rest of the population. In the -execution of this, first of all is the seizing of the Jewish populace -by the introduction of a registration order and similar -appropriate measures. . . .</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“Then immediately, the wearing of the recognition sign consisting -of a yellow Jewish star is to be brought about and all -rights of freedom for Jews are to be withdrawn. They are to -be placed in ghettos and at the same time are to be separated -according to sexes. The presence of many more or less closed -Jewish settlements in White Ruthenia and in the Ukraine -makes this mission easier. Moreover, places are to be chosen -which make possible the full use of the Jewish manpower in -case labor needs are present. . . .</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“The entire Jewish property is to be seized and confiscated -with exception of that which is necessary for a bare existence. -As far as the economical situation permits, the power of disposal -of their property is to be taken from the Jews as soon -as possible through orders and other measures given by the -commissariat, so that the moving of property will quickly -cease.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“Any cultural activity will be completely forbidden, to the -Jew. This includes the outlawing of the Jewish press, the -Jewish theaters, and schools.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“The slaughtering of animals according to Jewish rites is also -to be prohibited. . . .” (212-PS)</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>The anti-Jewish campaign became furious in Germany following -the assassination in Paris of the German Legation Councillor Von -Rath. Heydrich, Gestapo head, sent a teletype to all Gestapo and -SD offices with directions for handling “spontaneous” uprising anticipated -for the nights of November 9 and 10, 1938 so as to aid in -destruction of Jewish-owned property and protect only that of Germans. -No more cynical document ever came into evidence. Then -there is a report by an SS brigade leader, Dr. Stahlecker, to Himmler, -which recites that:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“. . . Similarly, native anti-Semitic forces were induced to -start pogroms against Jews during the first hours after capture, -though this inducement proved to be very difficult. Following -out orders, the Security Police was determined to solve the -Jewish question with all possible means and most decisively. -But it was desirable that the Security Police should not put -in an immediate appearance, at least in the beginning, since -the extraordinarily harsh measures were apt to stir even German -circles. It had to be shown to the world that the native -<span class='pageno' title='122' id='Page_122'></span> -population itself took the first action by way of natural reaction -against the suppression by Jews during several decades -and against the terror exercised by the Communists during -the preceding period. . . .”</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“. . . In view of the extension of the area of operations and -the great number of duties which had to be performed by the -Security Police, it was intended from the very beginning to -obtain the co-operation of the reliable population for the fight -against vermin—that is mainly the Jews and Communists. -Beyond our directing of the first spontaneous actions of self-cleansing, -which will be reported elsewhere, care had to be -taken that reliable people should be put to the cleansing job -and that they were appointed auxiliary members of the Security -Police. . . .”</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“. . . Kovno. To our surprise it was not easy at first to set in -motion an extensive pogrom against Jews. Klimatis, the leader -of the partisan unit, mentioned above, who was used for -this purpose primarily, succeeded in starting a pogrom on -the basis of advice given to him by a small advanced detachment -acting in Kovno, and in such a way that no German -order or German instigation was noticed from the outside. -During the first pogrom in the night from 25 to 26 June the -Lithuanian partisans did away with more than 1,500 Jews, set -fire to several synagogues or destroyed them by other means -and burned down a Jewish dwelling district consisting of -about 60 houses. During the following nights about 2,300 Jews -were made harmless in a similar way. In other parts of Lithuania -similar actions followed the example of Kovno, though -smaller and extending to the Communists who had been left -behind.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“These self-cleansing actions went smoothly because the Army -authorities who had been informed showed understanding for -this procedure. From the beginning it was obvious that only -the first days after the occupation would offer the opportunity -for carrying out pogroms. After the disarmament of the partisans -the self-cleansing actions ceased necessarily.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“It proved much more difficult to set in motion similar cleansing -actions in Latvia. . . .” (L-180)</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Of course, it is self-evident that these “uprisings” were managed -by the Government and the Nazi Party. If we were in doubt, we -could resort to Streicher’s memorandum of April 14, 1939 which -says:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“The anti-Jewish action of November 1938 did not arise spontaneously -from the people. . . . Part of the Party formation -<span class='pageno' title='123' id='Page_123'></span> -have been charged with the execution of the anti-Jewish -action.” (406-PS)</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Jews as a whole were fined a billion Reichsmarks. They were -excluded from all businesses, and claims against insurance companies -for their burned properties were confiscated, all by decree -of the Defendant Göring. (<span class='it'>Reichsgesetzblatt</span>, 1938, Part I, Pp. -1579-82)</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Synagogues were the objects of a special vengeance. On November -10, 1938 the following order was given:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“By order of the Group Commander:</p> - -<p class='noindent'>All Jewish synagogues in the area of Brigade 50 have to be -blown up or set afire. . . . The operation will be carried out -in civilian clothing. . . . Execution of the order will be reported. -. . .” (1721-PS)</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Some 40 teletype messages from various police headquarters will -tell the fury with which all Jews were pursued in Germany on those -awful November nights. The SS troops were turned loose and the -Gestapo supervised. Jewish-owned property was authorized to be -destroyed. The Gestapo ordered twenty to thirty thousand “well-to-do-Jews” -to be arrested. Concentration camps were to receive -them. Healthy Jews, fit for labor, were to be taken. (3051-PS)</p> - -<p class='pindent'>As the German frontiers were expanded by war, so the campaign -against the Jews expanded. The Nazi plan never was limited to -extermination in Germany; always it contemplated extinguishing -the Jew in Europe and often in the world. In the West, the Jews -were killed and their property taken over. But the campaign -achieved its zenith of savagery in the East. The eastern Jew has -suffered as no people ever suffered. Their sufferings were carefully -reported to the Nazi authorities to show faithful adherence to the -Nazi design. I shall refer only to enough of the evidence of these -to show the extent of the Nazi design for killing Jews.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>If I should recite these horrors in words of my own, you would -think me intemperate and unreliable. Fortunately, we need not -take the word of any witness but the Germans themselves. I invite -you now to look at a few of the vast number of captured German -orders and reports that will be offered in evidence, to see what a -Nazi invasion meant. We will present such evidence as the report -of “Einsatzgruppe (Action Group) A” of October 15, 1941 which -boasts that in overrunning the Baltic States, “Native anti-Semitic -forces were induced to start pogroms against the Jews during the -first hours after occupation. . . .” The report continues:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“From the beginning it was to be expected that the Jewish -problem in the East could not be solved by pogroms alone. -In accordance with the basic orders received, however, the -<span class='pageno' title='124' id='Page_124'></span> -cleansing activities of the Security Police had to aim at a -complete annihilation of the Jews. Special detachments reinforced -by selected units—in Lithuania partisan detachments, -in Latvia units of the Latvian auxiliary police—therefore performed -extensive executions both in the towns and in rural -areas. The actions of the execution detachments were performed -smoothly.”</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“The sum total of the Jews liquidated in Lithuania amounts -to 71,105. During the pogroms in Kovno 3,800 Jews were -eliminated, in the smaller towns about 1,200 Jews.”</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“In Latvia, up to now a total of 30,000 Jews were executed. -Five hundred were eliminated by pogroms in Riga.” (L-180)</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>This is a captured report from the Commissioner of Sluzk on -October 30, 1941 which describes the scene in more detail. It says:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“. . . The first lieutenant explained that the police battalion -had received the assignment to effect the liquidation -of all Jews here in the town of Sluzk, within two days. . . . -Then I requested him to postpone the action one day. However, -he rejected this with the remark that he had to carry -out this action everywhere and in all towns and that only -two days were allotted for Sluzk. Within these two days, the -town of Sluzk had to be cleared of Jews by all means. . . . -All Jews without exception were taken out of the factories -and shops and deported in spite of our agreement. It is true -that part of the Jews was moved by way of the ghetto where -many of them were processed and still segregated by me, but -a large part was loaded directly on trucks and liquidated without -further delay outside of the town. . . . For the rest, as -regards the execution of the action, I must point out to my -deepest regret that the latter bordered already on sadism. -The town itself offered a picture of horror during the action. -With indescribable brutality on the part of both the German -police officers and particularly the Lithuanian partisans, the -Jewish people, but also among them White Ruthenians, were -taken out of their dwellings and herded together. Everywhere -in the town shots were to be heard and in different -streets the corpses of shot Jews accumulated. The White -Ruthenians were in greatest distress to free themselves from -the encirclement. Regardless of the fact that the Jewish -people, among whom were also tradesmen, were mistreated -in a terribly barbarous way in the face of the White Ruthenian -people, the White Ruthenians themselves were also -worked over with rubber clubs and rifle butts. There was no -<span class='pageno' title='125' id='Page_125'></span> -question of an action against the Jews any more. It rather -looked like a revolution. . . .”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>There are reports which merely tabulate the numbers slaughtered. -An example is an account of the work of Einsatzgruppen of -SIPO and SD in the East, which relates that:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In Estonia, all Jews were arrested immediately upon the arrival -of the Wehrmacht. Jewish men and women above the age of 16 -and capable of work were drafted for forced labor. Jews were subjected -to all sorts of restrictions and all Jewish property was confiscated. -All Jewish males above the age of 16 were executed, with -the exception of doctors and elders. Only 500 of an original 4,500 -Jews remained. Thirty-seven thousand, one hundred eighty persons -have been liquidated by the SIPO and SD in White Ruthenia during -October. In one town, 337 Jewish women were executed for demonstrating -a ‘provocative attitude.’ In another, 380 Jews were shot for -spreading vicious propaganda.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>And so the report continues, listing town after town, where -hundreds of Jews were murdered:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In Vitebsk 3,000 Jews were liquidated because of the danger of -epidemics. In Kiev 33,771 Jews were executed on September 29 and -30 in retaliation for some fires which were set off there. In Shitomir -3,145 Jews ‘had to be shot’ because, judging from experience -they had to be considered as the carriers of Bolshevik propaganda. -In Cherson 410 Jews were executed in reprisal against acts of sabotage. -In the territory east of the Dnieper, the Jewish problem was -’solved’ by the liquidation of 4,891 Jews and by putting the remainder -into labor battalions of up to 1,000 persons. (R-102)</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Other accounts tell not of the slaughter so much as of the depths -of degradation to which the tormentors stooped. For example, we -will show the report made to Defendant Rosenberg about the army -and the SS in the area under Rosenberg’s jurisdiction, which recited -the following:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>“Details: In presence of SS man, a Jewish dentist has to break -all gold teeth and fillings out of mouth of German and Russian -Jews <span class='it'>before</span> they are executed.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Men, women and children are locked into barns and burned -alive.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Peasants, women and children are shot on the pretext that they -are suspected of belonging to bands. (R-135)</p> - -<p class='pindent'>We of the Western World heard of gas wagons in which Jews -and political opponents were asphyxiated. We could not believe it. -But here we have the report of May 16, 1942 from the German -SS Officer Becker to his supervisor in Berlin which tells this story: -<span class='pageno' title='126' id='Page_126'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>Gas vans in C group can be driven to execution spot, which is -generally stationed 10 to 15 kms. from main road, only in dry -weather. Since those to be executed become frantic if conducted to -this place, such vans become immobilized in wet weather.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Gas vans in D group were camouflaged as cabin trailers, but -vehicles well known to authorities and civilian population which -calls them ‘death vans’.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Writer of letter (Becker) ordered all men to keep as far away -as possible during gassing. Unloading van has ‘atrocious spiritual -and physical effect’ on men and they should be ordered not to participate -in such work. (501-PS)</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I shall not dwell on this subject longer than to quote one more -sickening document which evidences the planned and systematic -character of the Jewish persecutions. I hold a report written with -Teutonic devotion to detail, illustrated with photographs to authenticate -its almost incredible text, and beautifully bound in leather -with the loving care bestowed on a proud work. It is the original -report of the SS Brigadier General Stroop in charge of the destruction -of the Warsaw Ghetto, and its title page carries the inscription, -“The Jewish ghetto in Warsaw no longer exists.” It is characteristic -that one of the captions explains that the photograph concerned -shows the driving out of Jewish “bandits”; those whom the photograph -shows being driven out are almost entirely women and little -children. It contains a day-by-day account of the killings mainly -carried out by the SS organization, too long to relate, but let me -quote General Stroop’s summary:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“The resistance put up by the Jews and bandits could only -be suppressed by energetic actions of our troops day and -night. <span class='it'>The Reichsführer SS ordered, therefore, on 23 April -1943, the cleaning out of the ghetto with utter ruthlessness -and merciless tenacity.</span> I, therefore, decided to destroy and -burn down the entire ghetto without regard to the armament -factories. These factories were systematically dismantled and -then burned. Jews usually left their hideouts, but frequently -remained in the burning buildings and jumped out of the windows -only when the heat became unbearable. They then -tried to crawl with broken bones across the street into buildings -which were not afire. Sometimes they changed their -hideouts during the night into the ruins of burned buildings. -Life in the sewers was not pleasant after the first week. Many -times we could hear loud voices in the sewers. SS men or -policemen climbed bravely through the manholes to capture -these Jews. Sometimes they stumbled over Jewish corpses; -sometimes they were shot at. Tear gas bombs were thrown -<span class='pageno' title='127' id='Page_127'></span> -into the manholes and the Jews driven out of the sewers and -captured. Countless numbers of Jews were liquidated in -sewers and bunkers through blasting. The longer the resistance -continued the tougher became the members of the -Waffen SS, Police and Wehrmacht who always discharged -their duties in an exemplary manner. Frequently Jews who -tried to replenish their food supplies during the night or to -communicate with neighboring groups were exterminated.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“This action eliminated,” says the SS commander, “a proved -total of 56,065. To that, we have to add the number killed -through blasting, fire, etc., which cannot be counted.” -(1061-PS)</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>We charge that all atrocities against Jews were the manifestation -and culmination of the Nazi plan to which every defendant here -was a party. I know very well that some of these men did take -steps to spare some particular Jew for some personal reason from -the horrors that awaited the unrescued Jew. Some protested that -particular atrocities were excessive, and discredited the general -policy. While a few defendants may show efforts to make specific -exceptions to the policy of Jewish extermination, I have found no -instance in which any defendant opposed the policy itself or sought -to revoke or even modify it.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Determination to destroy the Jews was a binding force which at -all times cemented the elements of this conspiracy. On many internal -policies there were differences among the defendants. But there -is not one of them who has not echoed the rallying cry of nazism: -“Deutschland erwache, Juda verrecke!” (Germany awake, Jewry -perish!).</p> - -<p class='line'> </p> - -<p class='pindent'><span class='it'>Terrorism and Preparation for War</span>:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>How a government treats its own inhabitants generally is thought -to be no concern of other governments or of international society. -Certainly few oppressions or cruelties would warrant the intervention -of foreign powers. But the German mistreatment of Germans -is now known to pass in magnitude and savagery any limits -of what is tolerable by modern civilization. Other nations, by -silence, would take a consenting part in such crimes. These Nazi -persecutions, moreover, take character as international crimes because -of the purpose for which they were undertaken.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The purpose, as we have seen, of getting rid of the influence of -free labor, the churches, and the Jews was to clear their obstruction -to the precipitation of aggressive war. If aggressive warfare in -violation of treaty obligation is a matter of international cognizance -the preparations for it must also be of concern to the international -community. Terrorism was the chief instrument for securing the -<span class='pageno' title='128' id='Page_128'></span> -cohesion of the German people in war purposes. Moreover, these -cruelties in Germany served as atrocity practice to discipline the -membership of the criminal organization to follow the pattern later -in occupied countries.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Through the police formations that are before you accused as -criminal organizations, the Nazi Party leaders, aided at some point -in their basic and notorious purpose by each of the individual -defendants, instituted a reign of terror. These espionage and police -organizations were utilized to hunt down every form of opposition -and to penalize every nonconformity. These organizations early -founded and administered concentration camps—Buchenwald in 1933, -Dachau in 1934. But these notorious names were not alone. Concentration -camps came to dot the German map and to number -scores. At first they met with resistance from some Germans. We -have a captured letter from Minister of Justice Gürtner to Hitler -which is revealing. A Gestapo official had been prosecuted for -crimes committed in the camp at Hohnstein, and the Nazi Governor -of Saxony had promptly asked that the proceeding be quashed. The -Minister of Justice in June of 1935 protested because, as he said:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“In this camp unusually grave mistreatments of prisoners -have occurred at least since summer 1933. The prisoners not -only were beaten with whips without cause, similarly as in -the Concentration Camp Bredow near Stettin till they lost -consciousness, but they were also tortured in other manners, -e.g. with the help of a dripping apparatus constructed exclusively -for this purpose, under which prisoners had to stand -until they were suffering from serious purulent wounds of -the scalp. . . .” (787-PS)</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>I shall not take time to detail the ghastly proceedings in these -concentration camps. Beatings, starvings, tortures, and killings -were routine—so routine that the tormentors became blasé and -careless. We have a report of discovery that in Plötzensee one -night, 186 persons were executed while there were orders for only -180. Another report describes how the family of one victim -received two urns of ashes by mistake.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Inmates were compelled to execute each other. In 1942 they -were paid five Reichsmarks per execution, but on June 27, 1942 -SS General Glücks ordered commandants of all concentration -camps to reduce this honorarium to three cigarettes. In 1943 the -Reich leader of the SS and Chief of German Police ordered the -corporal punishments on Russian women to be applied by Polish -women and vice versa, but the price was not frozen. He said that -as reward, a few cigarettes was authorized. Under the Nazis, -human life had been progressively devalued, until it finally became -<span class='pageno' title='129' id='Page_129'></span> -worth less than a handful of tobacco—ersatz tobacco. There were, -however, some traces of the milk of human kindness. On August -11, 1942 an order went from Himmler to the commanders of 14 -concentration camps that only German prisoners are allowed to -beat other German prisoners (2189-PS).</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Mystery and suspense was added to cruelty in order to spread -torture from the inmate to his family and friends. Men and -women disappeared from their homes or business or from the -streets, and no word came of them. The omission of notice was not -due to overworked staff; it was due to policy. The Chief of the -SD and SIPO reported that in accordance with orders from the -Führer anxiety should be created in the minds of the family of the -arrested person. (668-PS) Deportations and secret arrests were -labeled, with a Nazi wit which seems a little ghoulish, “Nacht und -Nebel” (Night and Fog) (L-90, 833-PS). One of the many orders for -these actions gave this explanation:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“The decree carries a basic innovation. The Führer and -Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces commands that -crimes of the specified sort committed by civilians of the -occupied territories are to be punished by the pertinent -courts-martial in the occupied territories <span class='it'>only</span> when (a) the -sentence calls for the death penalty, and (b) the sentence is -pronounced within eight days after the arrest.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“Only when both conditions are met does the Führer and -Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces hope for the -desired deterrent effect from the conduct of punitive proceedings -in the occupied territories.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“In other cases, in the future, the accused are to be secretly -brought to Germany, and the further conduct of the trial -carried on here. The deterrent effect of these measures lies -(a) in allowing the disappearance of the accused without a -trace, (b) therein that no information whatsoever may be -given about their whereabouts and their fate.” (833-PS)</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>To clumsy cruelty, scientific skill was added. “Undesirables” -were exterminated by injection of drugs into the bloodstream, by -asphyxiation in gas chambers. They were shot with poison bullets, -to study the effects. (L-103)</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Then, to cruel experiments the Nazi added obscene ones. These -were not the work of underling-degenerates but of master-minds -high in the Nazi conspiracy. On May 20, 1942 General Field Marshal -Milch authorized SS General Wolff to go ahead at Dachau -Camp with so-called “cold experiments”; and four female gypsies -were supplied for the purpose. Himmler gave permission to carry -on these “experiments” also in other camps. (1617-PS) At Dachau, -<span class='pageno' title='130' id='Page_130'></span> -the reports of the “doctor” in charge show that victims were -immersed in cold water until their body temperature was reduced -to 28 degrees centigrade (82.4 degrees Farenheit), when they all -died immediately (1618-PS). This was in August 1942. But the -“doctor’s” technique improved. By February 1943 he was able to -report that 30 persons were chilled to 27 to 29 degrees, their hands -and feet frozen white, and their bodies “rewarmed” by a hot bath. -But the Nazi scientific triumph was “rewarming with animal -heat.” The victim, all but frozen to death, was surrounded with -bodies of living women until he revived and responded to his -environment by having sexual intercourse. (1616-PS) Here Nazi -degeneracy reached its nadir.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I dislike to encumber the record with such morbid tales, but we -are in the grim business of trying men as criminals, and these are -the things that their own agents say happened. We will show you -these concentration camps in motion pictures, just as the Allied -armies found them when they arrived, and the measures General -Eisenhower had to take to clean them up. Our proof will be disgusting -and you will say I have robbed you of your sleep. But -these are the things which have turned the stomach of the world -and set every civilized hand against Nazi Germany.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Germany became one vast torture chamber. Cries of its victims -were heard round the world and brought shudders to civilized -people everywhere. I am one who received during this war most -atrocity tales with suspicion and scepticism. But the proof here -will be so overwhelming that I venture to predict not one word I -have spoken will be denied. These defendants will only deny -personal responsibility or knowledge.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Under the clutch of the most intricate web of espionage and -intrigue that any modern state has endured, and persecution and -torture of a kind that has not been visited upon the world in many -centuries, the elements of the German population which were both -decent and courageous were annihilated. Those which were decent -but weak were intimidated. Open resistance, which had never been -more than feeble and irresolute, disappeared. But resistance, I am -happy to say, always remained, although it was manifest in only -such events as the abortive effort to assassinate Hitler on July -20, 1944. With resistance driven underground, the Nazi had the -German State in his own hands.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>But the Nazis not only silenced discordant voices. They created -positive controls as effective as their negative ones. Propaganda -organs, on a scale never before known, stimulated the Party and -Party formations with a permanent enthusiasm and abandon such -as we, democratic people, can work up only for a few days before -<span class='pageno' title='131' id='Page_131'></span> -a general election. They inculcated and practiced the Führerprinzip -which centralized control of the Party and of the Party-controlled -State over the lives and thought of the German people, -who are accustomed to look upon the German State, by whomever -controlled, with a mysticism that is incomprehensible to my people.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>All these controls from their inception were exerted with unparalleled -energy and single-mindedness to put Germany on a war -footing. We will show from the Nazis’ own documents their secret -training of military personnel, their secret creation of a military -air force. Finally, a conscript army was brought into being. -Financiers, economists, industrialists joined in the plan and -promoted elaborate alterations in industry and finance to support -an unprecedented concentration of resources and energies upon -preparations for war. Germany’s rearmament so outstripped the -strength of her neighbors that in about a year she was able to -crush the whole military force of continental Europe, exclusive of -that of Soviet Russia, and then to push the Russian armies back -to the Volga. These preparations were of a magnitude which -surpassed all need of defense, and every defendant, and every -intelligent German, well understood them to be for aggressive -purposes.</p> - -<p class='line'> </p> - -<p class='pindent'><span class='it'>Experiments in Aggression</span>:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Before resorting to open aggressive warfare, the Nazis undertook -some rather cautious experiments to test the spirit of resistance -of those who lay across their path. They advanced, but only as -others yielded, and kept in a position to draw back if they found -a temperament that made persistence dangerous.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>On 7 March 1936 the Nazis reoccupied the Rhineland and then -proceeded to fortify it in violation of the Treaty of Versailles and -the Pact of Locarno. They encountered no substantial resistance -and were emboldened to take the next step, which was the acquisition -of Austria. Despite repeated assurances that Germany had -no designs on Austria, invasion was perfected. Threat of attack -forced Schuschnigg to resign as Chancellor of Austria and put the -Nazi Defendant Seyss-Inquart in his place. The latter immediately -opened the frontier and invited Hitler to invade Austria “to preserve -order”. On March 12th invasion began. The next day, Hitler -proclaimed himself Chief of the Austrian State, took command of -its armed forces, and a law was enacted annexing Austria to Germany.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Threats of aggression had succeeded without arousing resistance. -Fears nevertheless had been stirred. They were lulled by an assurance -to the Czechoslovak Government that there would be no -attack on that country. We will show that the Nazi Government -<span class='pageno' title='132' id='Page_132'></span> -already had detailed plans for the attack. We will lay before you -the documents in which these conspirators planned to create an -incident to justify their attack. They even gave consideration to -assassinating their own Ambassador at Prague in order to create -a sufficiently dramatic incident. They did precipitate a diplomatic -crisis which endured throughout the summer. Hitler set September -30th as the day when troops should be ready for action. Under the -threat of immediate war, the United Kingdom and France concluded -a pact with Germany and Italy at Munich on September 29, 1938, -which required Czechoslovakia to acquiesce in the cession of the -Sudetenland to Germany. It was consummated by German occupation -on October 1, 1938.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The Munich Pact pledged no further aggression against Czechoslovakia, -but the Nazi pledge was lightly given and quickly broken. -On the 15th of March 1939, in defiance of the treaty of Munich -itself, the Nazis seized and occupied Bohemia and Moravia, which -constituted the major part of Czechoslovakia not already ceded to -Germany. Once again the West stood aghast, but it dreaded war, -it saw no remedy except war, and it hoped against hope that the -Nazi fever for expansion had run its course. But the Nazi world -was intoxicated by these unresisted successes in open alliance with -Mussolini and in covert alliance with Franco. Then, having made -a deceitful, delaying peace with Russia, the conspirators entered -upon the final phase of the plan to renew war.</p> - -<p class='line'> </p> - -<p class='pindent'><span class='it'>War of Aggression</span>:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I will not prolong this address by detailing the steps leading to -the war of aggression which began with the invasion of Poland on -September 1, 1939. The further story will be unfolded to you from -documents including those of the German High Command itself. -The plans had been laid long in advance. As early as 1935 Hitler -appointed the Defendant Schacht to the position of General Deputy -for the War Economy (2261-PS). We have the diary of General Jodl -(1780-PS); the “Plan Otto,” Hitler’s own order for attack on Austria -in case trickery failed (C-102); the “Plan Green” which was the -blueprint for attack on Czechoslovakia (388-PS); plans for the war -in the West (375-PS, 376-PS); Funk’s letter to Hitler dated August -25, 1939 detailing the long course of economic preparation (699-PS); -Keitel’s top-secret mobilization order for 1939-40 prescribing secret -steps to be taken during a “period of tension” during which no -“ ‘state of war’ will be publicly declared even if open war measures -against the foreign enemy will be taken.” This letter order -(1639A-PS) is in our possession despite a secret order issued on -March 16, 1945, when Allied troops were advancing into the heart -of Germany, to burn these plans. We have also Hitler’s directive, -<span class='pageno' title='133' id='Page_133'></span> -dated December 18, 1940, for the “Barbarossa Contingency” outlining -the strategy of the attack upon Russia (446-PS). That plan -in the original bears the initials of the Defendants Keitel and Jodl. -They were planning the attack and planning it long in advance of -the declaration of war. We have detailed information concerning -“Case White,” the plan for attack on Poland (C-120). That attack -began the war. The plan was issued by Keitel on April 3rd, 1939. -The attack did not come until September. Steps in preparation for -the attack were taken by subordinate commanders, one of whom -issued an order on June 14, providing that:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“The Commander-in-Chief of the Army has ordered the -working out of a <span class='it'>plan of deployment against Poland</span> which -takes in account the demands of the political leadership <span class='it'>for -the opening of war by surprise and for quick success</span>. . . .</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“I declare it the duty of the commanding generals, the -divisional commanders, and the commandants to limit as -much as possible the number of persons who will be informed, -and to limit the extent of the information, and ask -that all suitable measures be taken to prevent persons not -concerned from getting information. . . .</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“The operation, in order to forestall an orderly Polish mobilization -and concentration, is to be opened by surprise with -forces which are for the most part armored and motorized, -placed on alert in the neighborhood of the border. The initial -superiority over the Polish frontier guards and surprise that -can be expected with certainty are to be maintained by -quickly bringing up other parts of the Army as well to -counteract the marching up of the Polish Army. . . .</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“If the development of the political situation should show -that a surprise at the beginning of the war is out of question, -because of well-advanced defense preparations on the part -of the Polish Army, the Commander-in-Chief of the Army -will order the opening of the hostilities only after the -assembling of sufficient additional forces. The basis of all -preparations will be to surprise the enemy. . . .” (2327-PS)</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>We have also the order for the invasion of England, signed by -Hitler and initialed by Keitel and Jodl. It is interesting that it -commences with a recognition that although the British military -position is “hopeless,” they show not the slightest sign of giving -in. (442-PS)</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Not the least incriminating are the minutes of Hitler’s meeting -with his high advisers. As early as November 5, 1937 Hitler told -Defendants Göring, Raeder, and Neurath, among others, that German -rearmament was practically accomplished and that he had -<span class='pageno' title='134' id='Page_134'></span> -decided to secure by force, starting with a lightning attack on -Czechoslovakia and Austria, greater living space for Germans in -Europe no later than 1943-45 and perhaps as early as 1938 (386-PS). -On the 23rd of May, 1939 the Führer advised his staff that:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“It is a question of expanding our living space in the East -and of securing our food supplies. . . . Over and above the -natural fertility, thorough-going German exploitation will -enormously increase the surplus.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“There is therefore no question of sparing Poland, and we -are left with the decision: <span class='it'>To attack Poland at the first -suitable opportunity</span>. We cannot expect a repetition of the -Czech affair. There will be war.” (L-79)</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>On August 22nd, 1939 Hitler again addressed members of the -High Command, telling them when the start of military operations -would be ordered. He disclosed that for propaganda purposes, he -would provocate a good reason. “It will make no difference,” he -announced, “whether this reason will sound convincing or not. -After all, the victor will not be asked whether he talked the truth -or not. We have to proceed brutally. The stronger is always -right.” (1014-PS) On 23 November 1939, after the Germans had -invaded Poland, Hitler made this explanation:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“. . . For the first time in history we have to fight on only -one front, the other front is at present free. But no one can -know how long that will remain so. I have doubted for a -long time whether I should strike in the East and then in the -West. Basically I did not organize the armed forces in order -not to strike. The decision to strike was always in me. Earlier -or later I wanted to solve the problem. Under pressure it -was decided that the East was to be attacked first. . . .” -(789-PS)</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>We know the bloody sequel. Frontier incidents were staged. -Demands were made for cession of territory. When Poland refused, -the German forces invaded on September 1st, 1939. Warsaw was -destroyed; Poland fell. The Nazis, in accordance with plan, moved -swiftly to extend their aggression throughout Europe and to gain the -advantage of surprise over their unprepared neighbors. Despite -repeated and solemn assurances of peaceful intentions, they invaded -Denmark and Norway on 9th April 1940; Belgium, The Netherlands, -and Luxembourg on 10th May 1940; Yugoslavia and Greece on -6th April 1941.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>As part of the Nazi preparation for aggression against Poland -and her allies, Germany, on 23rd August 1939, had entered into a -non-aggression pact with Soviet Russia. It was only a delaying -treaty intended to be kept no longer than necessary to prepare for -<span class='pageno' title='135' id='Page_135'></span> -its violation. On June 22, 1941, pursuant to long-matured plans, the -Nazis hurled troops into Soviet territory without any declaration -of war. The entire European world was aflame.</p> - -<p class='line'> </p> - -<p class='pindent'><span class='it'>Conspiracy with Japan</span>:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The Nazi plans of aggression called for use of Asiatic allies -and they found among the Japanese men of kindred mind and purpose. -They were brothers, under the skin.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Himmler records a conversation he had on January 31, 1939 -with General Oshima, Japanese Ambassador at Berlin. He wrote:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“Furthermore, he (Oshima) had succeeded up to now to send -10 Russians with bombs across the Caucasian frontier. These -Russians had the mission to kill Stalin. A number of -additional Russians, whom he had also sent across, had been -shot at the frontier.” (2195-PS)</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>On September 27th, 1940 the Nazis concluded a German-Italian-Japanese -10-year military and economic alliance by which those -powers agreed “to stand by and cooperate with one another in -regard to their efforts in Greater East Asia and regions of -Europe respectively wherein it is their prime purpose to establish -and maintain a new order of things.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>On March 5, 1941 a top-secret directive was issued by Defendant -Keitel. It stated that the Führer had ordered instigation of -Japan’s active participation in the war and directed that Japan’s -military power has to be strengthened by the disclosure of German -war experiences and support of a military, economic, and technical -nature has to be given. The aim was stated to be to crush England -quickly thereby keeping the United States out of the war. (C-75)</p> - -<p class='pindent'>On March 29, 1941 Ribbentrop told Matsuoka, the Japanese Foreign -Minister, that the German Army was ready to strike against -Russia. Matsuoka reassured Ribbentrop about the Far East. Japan, -he reported, was acting at the moment as though she had no interest -whatever in Singapore, but intends to strike when the right -moment comes. (1877-PS)</p> - -<p class='pindent'>On April 5, 1941 Ribbentrop urged Matsuoka that entry of -Japan into the war would “hasten the victory” and would be -more in the interest of Japan than of Germany since it would give -Japan a unique chance to fulfill her national aims and to play a -leading part in Eastern Asia (1882-PS).</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The proofs in this case will also show that the leaders of Germany -were planning war against the United States from its Atlantic -as well as instigating it from its Pacific approaches. A captured -memorandum from the Führer’s headquarters, dated October -29, 1940, asks certain information as to air bases and supply -and reports further that: -<span class='pageno' title='136' id='Page_136'></span></p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“The Führer is at present occupied with the question of -the occupation of the Atlantic islands with a view to the -prosecution of war against America at a later date. Deliberations -on this subject are being embarked upon here.” -(376-PS)</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>On December 7th, 1941, a day which the late President Roosevelt -declared “will live in infamy,” victory for German aggression -seemed certain. The Wehrmacht was at the gates of Moscow. -Taking advantage of the situation, and while her plenipotentiaries -were creating a diplomatic diversion in Washington, Japan without -declaration of war treacherously attacked the United States -at Pearl Harbor and the Philippines. Attacks followed swiftly on -the British Commonwealth, and The Netherlands in the Southwest -Pacific. These aggressions were met in the only way that they -could be met, with instant declarations of war and with armed -resistance which mounted slowly through many long months of -reverse until finally the Axis was crushed to earth and deliverance -for its victims was won.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Your Honor, I am about to take up “Crimes in the Conduct of -War”, which is quite a separate subject. We are within 5 minutes -of the recessing time. It will be very convenient for me if it will be -agreeable to you.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: We will sit again in 15 minutes’ time.</p> - -<p class='line' style='text-align:center;margin-top:2em;margin-bottom:2em;'>[<span class='it'>The Tribunal recessed until 1550 hours.</span>]</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal must request that if it adjourns -for 15 minutes members of the bar and others are back in their seats -after an interval of 15 minutes. Mr. Justice Jackson, I understand -that you wish to continue to 5:15, when you may be able to -conclude your speech?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I think that would be the most -orderly way.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes, the Tribunal will be glad to do so.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: May it please your Honor, I will now -take up the subject of “Crimes in the Conduct of War”.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Even the most warlike of peoples have recognized in the name -of humanity some limitations on the savagery of warfare. Rules to -that end have been embodied in international conventions to which -Germany became a party. This code had prescribed certain -restraints as to the treatment of belligerents. The enemy was -entitled to surrender and to receive quarter and good treatment as -a prisoner of war. We will show by German documents that these -<span class='pageno' title='137' id='Page_137'></span> -rights were denied, that prisoners of war were given brutal treatment -and often murdered. This was particularly true in the case of -captured airmen, often my countrymen.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>It was ordered that captured English and American airmen -should no longer be granted the status of prisoners of war. They -were to be treated as criminals and the Army was ordered to -refrain from protecting them against lynching by the populace. -(R-118) The Nazi Government, through its police and propaganda -agencies, took pains to incite the civilian population to attack and -kill airmen who crash-landed. The order, given by the Reichsführer -SS Himmler on 10 August 1943, directed that: “It is not the task of -the police to interfere in clashes between German and English and -American flyers who have bailed out”. This order was transmitted on -the same day by SS Obersturmbannführer Brand of Himmler’s personal -staff to all senior executive SS and Police officers, with these -directions:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“I am sending you the inclosed order with the request that -the Chief of the Regular Police and of the Security Police -be informed. They are to make this instruction known to -their subordinate officers verbally.” (R-110)</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Similarly, we will show Hitler’s top secret order, dated -18 October 1942, that Commandos, regardless of condition, were “to -be slaughtered to the last man” after capture (498-PS). We will -show the circulation of secret orders, one of which was signed by -Hess, to be passed orally to civilians, that enemy fliers or parachutists -were to be arrested or liquidated (062-PS). By such means were -murders incited and directed.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>This Nazi campaign of ruthless treatment of enemy forces -assumed its greatest proportions in the fight against Russia. Eventually -all prisoners of war were taken out of control of the Army and -put in the hands of Himmler and the SS (058-PS). In the East, the -German fury spent itself. Russian prisoners were ordered to be -branded. They were starved. I shall quote passages from a letter -written February 28, 1942 by Defendant Rosenberg to Defendant -Keitel:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“The fate of the Soviet prisoners of war in Germany is on -the contrary a tragedy of the greatest extent. Of 3,600,000 -prisoners of war, only several hundred thousand are still able -to work fully. A large part of them has starved, or died, -because of the hazards of the weather. Thousands also died -from spotted fever. . . .</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“The camp commanders have forbidden the civilian population -to put food at the disposal of the prisoners, and they have -rather let them starve to death. . . . -<span class='pageno' title='138' id='Page_138'></span></p> - -<p class='noindent'>“In many cases, when prisoners of war could no longer keep -up on the march because of hunger and exhaustion, they -were shot before the eyes of the horrified population, and -the corpses were left.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“In numerous camps, no shelter for the prisoners of war was -provided at all. They lay under the open sky during rain -or snow. Even tools were not made available to dig holes -or caves. . . .</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“Finally, the shooting of prisoners of war must be mentioned; -for instance, in various camps, all the ‘Asiatics’ were shot”. -(081-PS)</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Civilized usage and conventions to which Germany was a party -had prescribed certain immunities for civilian populations unfortunate -enough to dwell in lands overrun by hostile armies. The -German occupation forces, controlled or commanded by men on -trial before you, committed a long series of outrages against the -inhabitants of occupied territory that would be incredible except -for captured orders and captured reports which show the fidelity -with which those orders were executed.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>We deal here with a phase of common criminality designed by -the conspirators as part of the common plan. We can appreciate -why these crimes against their European enemies were not of a -casual character but were planned and disciplined crimes when we -get at the reason for them. Hitler told his officers on August 22, -1939 that: “The main objective in Poland is the destruction of the -enemy and not the reaching of a certain geographical line” (1014-PS). -The project of deporting promising youth from occupied territories -was approved by Rosenberg on the theory that “a desired weakening -of the biological force” of the conquered people is being -achieved (031-PS). To Germanize or to destroy was the program. -Himmler announced, “Either we win over any good blood that we -can use for ourselves and give it a place in our people or, gentlemen—you -may call this cruel, but nature is cruel,—we destroy this -blood.” As to “racially good types” Himmler further advised, -“Therefore, I think that it is our duty to take their children with -us, to remove them from their environment, if necessary by robbing -or stealing them” (L-70). He urged deportation of Slavic children -to deprive potential enemies of future soldiers.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The Nazi purpose was to leave Germany’s neighbors so weakened -that even if she should eventually lose the war, she would still be the -most powerful nation in Europe. Against this background, we must -view the plan for ruthless warfare, which means a plan for the -commission of War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity. -<span class='pageno' title='139' id='Page_139'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>Hostages in large numbers were demanded and killed. Mass -punishments were inflicted, so savage that whole communities were -extinguished. Rosenberg was advised of the annihilation of three -unidentified villages in Slovakia. (970-PS) In May of 1943 another -village of about 40 farms and 220 inhabitants was ordered wiped -out. The entire population was ordered shot, the cattle and property -impounded, and the order required that “the village will be -destroyed totally by fire.” (163-PS) A secret report from Rosenberg’s -Reich Ministry of Eastern Territory reveals that:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“Food rations allowed the Russian population are so low that -they fail to secure their existence and provide only for -minimum subsistence of limited duration. The population does -not know if they will still live tomorrow. They are faced -with death by starvation. . . .</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“The roads are clogged by hundreds of thousands of people, -sometimes as many as one million according to the estimate -of experts, who wander around in search of nourishment. . . .</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“Sauckel’s action has caused unrest among the civilians. . . . -Russian girls were deloused by men, nude photos in forced -positions were taken, women doctors were locked into freight -cars for the pleasure of the transport commanders, women -in night shirts were fettered and forced through the Russian -towns to the railroad station, etc. All this material has been -sent to the OKH.” (1381-PS)</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Perhaps the deportation to slave labor was the most horrible -and extensive slaving operation in history. On few other subjects -is our evidence so abundant or so damaging. In a speech made -on January 25, 1944 the Defendant Frank, Governor General of -Poland, boasted, “I have sent 1,300,000 Polish workers into the -Reich” (059-PS, P. 2). The Defendant Sauckel reported that “out of -the 5 million foreign workers who arrived in Germany not even -200,000 came voluntarily.” This fact was reported to the Führer and -Defendants Speer, Göring, and Keitel. (R-24) Children of 10 to -14 years were impressed into service by telegraphic order of Rosenberg’s -Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“The Command is further charged with the transferring of -worthwhile Russian youth between 10-14 years of age, to the -Reich. The authority is not affected by the changes connected -with the evacuation and transportation to the reception camps -of Bialystok, Krajewo, and Olitei. The Führer wishes that -this activity be increased even more.” (200-PS)</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>When enough labor was not forthcoming, prisoners of war were -forced into war work in flagrant violation of international conventions -(016-PS). Slave labor came from France, Belgium, Holland, -<span class='pageno' title='140' id='Page_140'></span> -Italy, and the East. Methods of recruitment were violent (R-124, -018-PS, 204-PS). The treatment of these slave laborers was stated in -general terms, not difficult to translate into concrete deprivations, -in a letter to the Defendant Rosenberg from the Defendant Sauckel, -which stated:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“All <span class='it'>prisoners of war</span>, from the <span class='it'>territories</span> of the West as -well as of the East, actually in Germany, must be completely -incorporated into the German armament and munition industries. -Their production must be brought to the highest -possible level. . . .</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“The complete employment of all prisoners of war as well -as the use of a gigantic number of new foreign civilian -workers, men and women, has become an indisputable -necessity for the solution of the mobilization of labor program -in this war.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“All the men must be fed, sheltered, and treated in such a -way as to exploit them to the highest possible extent at the -lowest conceivable degrees of expenditure. . . .” (016-PS)</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>In pursuance of the Nazi plan permanently to reduce the living -standards of their neighbors and to weaken them physically and -economically, a long series of crimes were committed. There was -extensive destruction, serving no military purpose, of the property -of civilians. Dikes were thrown open in Holland almost at the close -of the war not to achieve military ends but to destroy the resources -and retard the economy of the thrifty Netherlanders.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>There was carefully planned economic syphoning off of the assets -of occupied countries. An example of the planning is shown by a -report on France dated December 7, 1942 made by the Economic -Research Department of the Reichsbank. The question arose whether -French occupation costs should be increased from 15 million Reichsmarks -per day to 25 million Reichsmarks per day. The Reichsbank -analyzed French economy to determine whether it could bear the -burden. It pointed out that the armistice had burdened France to -that date to the extent of 18½ billion Reichsmarks, equalling -370 billion francs. It pointed out that the burden of these payments -within 2½ years equalled the aggregate French national income in -the year 1940, and that the amount of payments handed over to -Germany in the first 6 months of 1942 corresponded to the estimate -for the total French revenue for that whole year. The report concluded:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“In any case, the conclusion is inescapable that relatively -heavier tributes have been imposed on France since the -armistice in June 1940 than upon Germany after the World -War. In this connection, it must be noted that the economic -<span class='pageno' title='141' id='Page_141'></span> -powers of France never equalled those of the German Reich -and that the vanquished France could not draw on foreign -economic and financial resources in the same degree as Germany -after the last World War.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>The Defendant Funk was the Reich Minister of Economics -and President of the Reichsbank; the Defendant Ribbentrop -was Foreign Minister; the Defendant Göring was Plenipotentiary of -the Four Year Plan; and all of them participated in the exchange -of views of which this captured document is a part. (2149-PS) Notwithstanding -this analysis by the Reichsbank, they proceeded to -increase the imposition on France from 15 million Reichsmarks -daily to 25 million per day.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>It is small wonder that the bottom has been knocked out of -French economy. The plan and purpose of the thing appears in a -letter from General Stülpnagel, head of the German Armistice Commission, -to the Defendant Jodl as early as 14 September 1940 when -he wrote, “The slogan ‘Systematic weakening of France’ has already -been surpassed by far in reality” (1756-PS).</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Not only was there a purpose to debilitate and demoralize the -economy of Germany’s neighbors for the purpose of destroying their -competitive position, but there was looting and pilfering on an unprecedented -scale. We need not be hypocritical about this business -of looting. I recognize that no army moves through occupied territory -without some pilfering as it goes. Usually the amount of pilfering -increases as discipline wanes. If the evidence in this case showed no -looting except of that sort, I certainly would ask no conviction of -these defendants for it.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>But we will show you that looting was not due to the lack of -discipline or to the ordinary weaknesses of human nature. The -German organized plundering, planned it, disciplined it, and made -it official just as he organized everything else, and then he compiled -the most meticulous records to show that he had done the best job -of looting that was possible under the circumstances. And we have -those records.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The Defendant Rosenberg was put in charge of a systematic -plundering of the art objects of Europe by direct order of Hitler -dated 29 January 1940 (136-PS). On the 16th of April 1943 Rosenberg -reported that up to the 7th of April, 92 railway cars with 2,775 cases -containing art objects had been sent to Germany; and that 53 pieces -of art had been shipped to Hitler direct, and 594 to the Defendant -Göring. The report mentioned something like 20,000 pieces of seized -art and the main locations where they were stored. (015-PS)</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Moreover this looting was glorified by Rosenberg. Here we have -39 leather-bound tabulated volumes of his inventory, which in due -<span class='pageno' title='142' id='Page_142'></span> -time we will offer in evidence. One cannot but admire the artistry -of this Rosenberg report. The Nazi taste was cosmopolitan. Of the -9,455 articles inventoried, there were included 5,255 paintings, -297 sculptures, 1,372 pieces of antique furniture, 307 textiles, and -2,224 small objects of art. Rosenberg observed that there were -approximately 10,000 more objects still to be inventoried. (015-PS) -Rosenberg himself estimated that the values involved would come -close to a billion dollars (090-PS).</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I shall not go into further details of the War Crimes and Crimes -against Humanity committed by the gangster ring whose leaders -are before you. It is not the purpose in my part of this case to -deal with the individual crimes. I am dealing with the Common -Plan or design for crime and will not dwell upon individual offenses. -My task is to show the scale on which these crimes occurred, -and to show that these are the men who were in the responsible -positions and who conceived the plan and design which renders -them answerable, regardless of the fact that the plan was actually -executed by others.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>At length, this reckless and lawless course outraged the world. -It recovered from the demoralization of surprise attack, assembled -its forces and stopped these men in their tracks. Once success -deserted their banners, one by one the Nazi satellites fell away. -Sawdust Caesar collapsed. Resistance forces in every occupied -country arose to harry the invader. Even at home, Germans saw -that Germany was being led to ruin by these mad men, and the -attempt on July 20, 1944 to assassinate Hitler, an attempt fostered -by men of highest station, was a desperate effort by internal -forces in Germany to stop short of ruin. Quarrels broke out among -the failing conspirators, and the decline of the Nazi power was -more swift than its ascendancy. German Armed Forces surrendered, -its Government disintegrated, its leaders committed suicide -by the dozen, and by the fortunes of war these defendants fell -into our hands. Although they are not, by any means, all the -guilty ones, they are survivors among the most responsible. Their -names appear over and over in the documents and their faces -grace the photographic evidence. We have here the surviving -top politicians, militarists, financiers, diplomats, administrators, and -propagandists, of the Nazi movement. Who was responsible for -these crimes if they were not?</p> - -<p class='line'> </p> - -<p class='pindent'><span class='it'>The Law of the Case</span>:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The end of the war and capture of these prisoners presented -the victorious Allies with the question whether there is any legal -responsibility on high-ranking men for acts which I have described. -Must such wrongs either be ignored or redressed in hot -<span class='pageno' title='143' id='Page_143'></span> -blood? Is there no standard in the law for a deliberate and reasoned -judgment on such conduct?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The Charter of this Tribunal evidences a faith that the law is -not only to govern the conduct of little men, but that even rulers -are, as Lord Chief Justice Coke put it to King James, “under -God and the law.” The United States believed that the law long -has afforded standards by which a juridical hearing could be conducted -to make sure that we punish only the right men and for -the right reasons. Following the instructions of the late President -Roosevelt and the decision of the Yalta conference President Truman -directed representatives of the United States to formulate -a proposed International Agreement, which was submitted during -the San Francisco Conference to Foreign Ministers of the United -Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and the Provisional Government of -France. With many modifications, that proposal has become the -Charter of this Tribunal.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>But the Agreement which sets up the standards by which these -prisoners are to be judged does not express the views of the signatory -nations alone. Other nations with diverse but highly respected -systems of jurisprudence also have signified adherence to it. These -are Belgium, The Netherlands, Denmark, Norway, Czechoslovakia, -Luxembourg, Poland, Greece, Yugoslavia, Ethiopia, Australia, Haiti, -Honduras, Panama, New Zealand, Venezuela, and India. You judge, -therefore, under an organic act which represents the wisdom, the -sense of justice, and the will of 21 governments, representing an -overwhelming majority of all civilized people.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The Charter by which this Tribunal has its being, embodies -certain legal concepts which are inseparable from its jurisdiction -and which must govern its decision. These, as I have said, also -are conditions attached to the grant of any hearing to defendants. -The validity of the provisions of the Charter is conclusive upon us -all, whether we have accepted the duty of judging or of prosecuting -under it, as well as upon the defendants, who can point -to no other law which gives them a right to be heard at all. My -able and experienced colleagues believe, as do I, that it will contribute -to the expedition and clarity of this Trial if I expound -briefly the application of the legal philosophy of the Charter -to the facts I have recited.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>While this declaration of the law by the Charter is final, it may -be contended that the prisoners on trial are entitled to have it -applied to their conduct only most charitably if at all. It may be -said that this is new law, not authoritatively declared at the time -they did the acts it condemns, and that this declaration of the law -has taken them by surprise. -<span class='pageno' title='144' id='Page_144'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>I cannot, of course, deny that these men are surprised that this -is the law; they really are surprised that there is any such thing -as law. These defendants did not rely on any law at all. Their -program ignored and defied all law. That this is so will appear from -many acts and statements, of which I cite but a few.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In the Führer’s speech to all military commanders on November 23, -1939 he reminded them that at the moment Germany had a pact -with Russia, but declared: “Agreements are to be kept only as long -as they serve a certain purpose.” Later in the same speech he -announced: “A violation of the neutrality of Holland and Belgium -will be of no importance” (789-PS). A top secret document, entitled -“Warfare as a Problem of Organization,” dispatched by the Chief -of the High Command to all commanders on April 19, 1938 declared -that “the normal rules of war towards neutrals may be considered -to apply on the basis whether operation of rules will create greater -advantages or disadvantages for the belligerents” (L-211). And from -the files of the German Navy Staff, we have a “Memorandum on -Intensified Naval War,” dated October 15, 1939, which begins by -stating a desire to comply with International Law. “However,” it -continues, “if decisive successes are expected from any measure -considered as a war necessity, it must be carried through even if -it is not in agreement with international law.” (L-184) International -law, natural law, German law, any law at all was to these men -simply a propaganda device to be invoked when it helped and to be -ignored when it would condemn what they wanted to do. That men -may be protected in relying upon the law at the time they act is -the reason we find laws of retrospective operations unjust. But -these men cannot bring themselves within the reason of the rule -which in some systems of jurisprudence prohibits <span class='it'>ex post facto</span> laws. -They cannot show that they ever relied upon international law in -any state or paid it the slightest regard.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The third Count of the Indictment is based on the definition of -War Crimes contained in the Charter. I have outlined to you the -systematic course of conduct toward civilian populations and combat -forces which violates international conventions to which Germany -was a party. Of the criminal nature of these acts at least, the -defendants had, as we shall show, clear knowledge. Accordingly, -they took pains to conceal their violations. It will appear that the -Defendants Keitel and Jodl were informed by official legal advisors -that the orders to brand Russian prisoners of war, to shackle British -prisoners of war, and to execute commando prisoners were clear -violations of international law. Nevertheless, these orders were put -into effect. The same is true of orders issued for the assassination of -General Giraud and General Weygand, which failed to be executed -<span class='pageno' title='145' id='Page_145'></span> -only because of a ruse on the part of Admiral Canaris, who was -himself later executed for his part in the plot to take Hitler’s life -on July 20, 1944.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The fourth Count of the Indictment is based on Crimes against -Humanity. Chief among these are mass killings of countless human -beings in cold blood. Does it take these men by surprise that murder -is treated as a crime?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The first and second Counts of the Indictment add to these -crimes the crime of plotting and waging wars of aggression and -wars in violation of nine treaties to which Germany was a party. -There was a time, in fact, I think the time of the first World War, -when it could not have been said that war-inciting or war making -was a crime in law, however reprehensible in morals.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Of course, it was, under the law of all civilized peoples, a crime -for one man with his bare knuckles to assault another. How did it -come that multiplying this crime by a million, and adding fire arms -to bare knuckles, made it a legally innocent act? The doctrine was -that one could not be regarded as criminal for committing the usual -violent acts in the conduct of legitimate warfare. The age of -imperialistic expansion during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries -added the foul doctrine, contrary to the teachings of early -Christian and international law scholars such as Grotius, that all -wars are to be regarded as legitimate wars. The sum of these two -doctrines was to give war-making a complete immunity from accountability -to law.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>This was intolerable for an age that called itself civilized. Plain -people with their earthy common sense, revolted at such fictions -and legalisms so contrary to ethical principles and demanded -checks on war immunities. Statesmen and international lawyers at -first cautiously responded by adopting rules of warfare designed -to make the conduct of war more civilized. The effort was to set -legal limits to the violence that could be done to civilian populations -and to combatants as well.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The common sense of men after the first World War demanded, -however, that the law’s condemnation of war reach deeper, and -that the law condemn not merely uncivilized ways of waging war, -but also the waging in any way of uncivilized wars—wars of -aggression. The world’s statesmen again went only as far as they -were forced to go. Their efforts were timid and cautious and often -less explicit than we might have hoped. But the 1920’s did outlaw -aggressive war.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The re-establishment of the principle that there are unjust wars -and that unjust wars are illegal is traceable in many steps. One -of the most significant is the Briand-Kellogg Pact of 1928, by which -<span class='pageno' title='146' id='Page_146'></span> -Germany, Italy, and Japan, in common with practically all nations -of the world, renounced war as an instrument of national policy, -bound themselves to seek the settlement of disputes only by pacific -means, and condemned recourse to war for the solution of international -controversies. This pact altered the legal status of a war -of aggression. As Mr. Stimson, the United States Secretary of State -put it in 1932, such a war:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“. . . is no longer to be the source and subject of rights. It -is no longer to be the principle around which the duties, the -conduct, and the rights of nations revolve. It is an illegal -thing. . . . By that very act, we have made obsolete many -legal precedents and have given the legal profession the task -of re-examining many of its codes and treaties.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>The Geneva Protocol of 1924 for the Pacific Settlement of International -Disputes, signed by the representatives of 48 governments, -declared that “a war of aggression constitutes . . . an international -crime.” The Eighth Assembly of the League of Nations in 1927, on -unanimous resolution of the representatives of 48 member nations, -including Germany, declared that a war of aggression constitutes an -international crime. At the Sixth Pan-American Conference of 1928, -the 21 American Republics unanimously adopted a resolution stating -that “war of aggression constitutes an international crime against -the human species.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>A failure of these Nazis to heed, or to understand the force and -meaning of this evolution in the legal thought of the world, is not a -defense or a mitigation. If anything, it aggravates their offense and -makes it the more mandatory that the law they have flouted be -vindicated by juridical application to their lawless conduct. Indeed, -by their own law—had they heeded any law—these principles -were binding on these defendants. Article 4 of the Weimar constitution -provided that: “The generally accepted rules of international -law are to be considered as binding integral parts of the -law of the German Reich” (2050-PS). Can there be any doubt that -the outlawry of aggressive war was one of the “generally accepted -rules of international law” in 1939?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Any resort to war—to any kind of a war—is a resort to means -that are inherently criminal. War inevitably is a course of killings, -assaults, deprivations of liberty, and destruction of property. An -honestly defensive war is, of course, legal and saves those lawfully -conducting it from criminality. But inherently criminal acts cannot -be defended by showing that those who committed them were -engaged in a war, when war itself is illegal. The very minimum -legal consequence of the treaties making aggressive wars illegal is -to strip those who incite or wage them of every defense the law -<span class='pageno' title='147' id='Page_147'></span> -ever gave, and to leave war-makers subject to judgment by the -usually accepted principles of the law of crimes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>But if it be thought that the Charter, whose declarations concededly -bind us all, does contain new law I still do not shrink from -demanding its strict application by this Tribunal. The rule of law -in the world, flouted by the lawlessness incited by these defendants, -had to be restored at the cost to my country of over a million -casualties, not to mention those of other nations. I cannot subscribe -to the perverted reasoning that society may advance and strengthen -the rule of law by the expenditure of morally innocent lives but -that progress in the law may never be made at the price of morally -guilty lives.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>It is true of course, that we have no judicial precedent for the -Charter. But international law is more than a scholarly collection -of abstract and immutable principles. It is an outgrowth of treaties -and agreements between nations and of accepted customs. Yet every -custom has its origin in some single act, and every agreement has -to be initiated by the action of some state. Unless we are prepared -to abandon every principle of growth for international law, we -cannot deny that our own day has the right to institute customs and -to conclude agreements that will themselves become sources of a -newer and strengthened international law. International law is not -capable of development by the normal processes of legislation, for -there is no continuing international legislative authority. Innovations -and revisions in international law are brought about by the -action of governments such as those I have cited, designed to meet -a change in circumstances. It grows, as did the common law, -through decisions reached from time to time in adapting settled -principles to new situations. The fact is that when the law evolves -by the case method, as did the common law and as international law -must do if it is to advance at all, it advances at the expense of those -who wrongly guessed the law and learned too late their error. The -law, so far as international law can be decreed, had been clearly -pronounced when these acts took place. Hence, I am not disturbed -by the lack of judicial precedent for the inquiry it is proposed to -conduct.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The events I have earlier recited clearly fall within the standards -of crimes, set out in the Charter, whose perpetrators this Tribunal -is convened to judge and punish fittingly. The standards for War -Crimes and Crimes against Humanity are too familiar to need -comment. There are, however, certain novel problems in applying -other precepts of the Charter which I should call to your attention.</p> - -<p class='line'> </p> - -<p class='pindent'><span class='it'>The Crime against Peace</span>:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>A basic provision of the Charter is that to plan, prepare, initiate, -or wage a war of aggression, or a war in violation of international -<span class='pageno' title='148' id='Page_148'></span> -treaties, agreements, and assurances, or to conspire or participate in -a common plan to do so, is a crime.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>It is perhaps a weakness in this Charter that it fails itself to -define a war of aggression. Abstractly, the subject is full of difficulty -and all kinds of troublesome hypothetical cases can be conjured up. -It is a subject which, if the defense should be permitted to go afield -beyond the very narrow charge in the Indictment, would prolong -the Trial and involve the Tribunal in insoluble political issues. But -so far as the question can properly be involved in this case, the -issue is one of no novelty and is one on which legal opinion has -well crystallized.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>One of the most authoritative sources of international law on this -subject is the Convention for the Definition of Aggression signed -at London on July 3, 1933 by Romania, Estonia, Latvia, Poland, -Turkey, the Soviet Union, Persia, and Afghanistan. The subject has -also been considered by international committees and by commentators -whose views are entitled to the greatest respect. It had -been little discussed prior to the first World War but has received -much attention as international law has evolved its outlawry of -aggressive war. In the light of these materials of international law, -and so far as relevant to the evidence in this case, I suggest that -an “aggressor” is generally held to be that state which is the first -to commit any of the following actions:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>(1) Declaration of war upon another state;</p> - -<p class='pindent'>(2) Invasion by its armed forces, with or without a declaration -of war, of the territory of another state;</p> - -<p class='pindent'>(3) Attack by its land, naval, or air forces, with or without a -declaration of war, on the territory, vessels or aircraft of another -state; and</p> - -<p class='pindent'>(4) Provision of support to armed bands formed in the territory -of another state, or refusal, notwithstanding the request of the -invaded state, to take in its own territory, all the measures in its -power to deprive those bands of all assistance or protection.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>And I further suggest that it is the general view that no political, -military, economic, or other considerations shall serve as an excuse -or justification for such actions; but exercise of the right of legitimate -self-defense, that is to say, resistance to an act of aggression, -or action to assist a state which has been subjected to aggression, -shall not constitute a war of aggression.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>It is upon such an understanding of the law that our evidence -of a conspiracy to provoke and wage an aggressive war is prepared -and presented. By this test each of the series of wars begun by -these Nazi leaders was unambiguously aggressive. -<span class='pageno' title='149' id='Page_149'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>It is important to the duration and scope of this Trial that we -bear in mind the difference between our charge that this war was -one of aggression and a position that Germany had no grievances. -We are not inquiring into the conditions which contributed to -causing this war. They are for history to unravel. It is no part -of our task to vindicate the European <span class='it'>status quo</span> as of 1933, or as of -any other date. The United States does not desire to enter into -discussion of the complicated pre-war currents of European politics, -and it hopes this trial will not be protracted by their consideration. -The remote causations avowed are too insincere and inconsistent, -too complicated and doctrinaire to be the subject of profitable -inquiry in this trial. A familiar example is to be found in the -“Lebensraum” slogan, which summarized the contention that Germany -needed more living space as a justification for expansion. At -the same time that the Nazis were demanding more space for the -German people, they were demanding more German people to -occupy space. Every known means to increase the birth rate, legitimate -and illegitimate, was utilized. “Lebensraum” represented a -vicious circle of demand—from neighbors more space, and from -Germans more progeny. We do not need to investigate the verity -of doctrines which led to constantly expanding circles of aggression. -It is the plot and the act of aggression which we charge to -be crimes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Our position is that whatever grievances a nation may have, -however objectionable it finds the <span class='it'>status quo</span>, aggressive warfare -is an illegal means for settling those grievances or for altering those -conditions. It may be that the Germany of the 1920’s and 1930’s -faced desperate problems, problems that would have warranted -the boldest measures short of war. All other methods—persuasion, -propaganda, economic competition, diplomacy—were open to an -aggrieved country, but aggressive warfare was outlawed. These -defendants did make aggressive war, a war in violation of treaties. -They did attack and invade their neighbors in order to effectuate -a foreign policy which they knew could not be accomplished by -measures short of war. And that is as far as we accuse or propose -to inquire.</p> - -<p class='line'> </p> - -<p class='pindent'><span class='it'>The Law of Individual Responsibility</span>:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The Charter also recognizes individual responsibility on the -part of those who commit acts defined as crimes, or who incite -others to do so, or who join a common plan with other persons, -groups or organizations to bring about their commission. The principle -of individual responsibility for piracy and brigandage, which -have long been recognized as crimes punishable under international -law, is old and well established. That is what illegal warfare is. -<span class='pageno' title='150' id='Page_150'></span> -This principle of personal liability is a necessary as well as logical -one if international law is to render real help to the maintenance -of peace. An international law which operates only on states can -be enforced only by war because the most practicable method of -coercing a state is warfare. Those familiar with American history -know that one of the compelling reasons for adoption of our constitution -was that the laws of the Confederation, which operated -only on constituent states, were found ineffective to maintain -order among them. The only answer to recalcitrance was impotence -or war. Only sanctions which reach individuals can peacefully and -effectively be enforced. Hence, the principle of the criminality of -aggressive war is implemented by the Charter with the principle -of personal responsibility.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Of course, the idea that a state, any more than a corporation, -commits crimes, is a fiction. Crimes always are committed only -by persons. While it is quite proper to employ the fiction of responsibility -of a state or corporation for the purpose of imposing a -collective liability, it is quite intolerable to let such a legalism -become the basis of personal immunity.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The Charter recognizes that one who has committed criminal -acts may not take refuge in superior orders nor in the doctrine -that his crimes were acts of states. These twin principles working -together have heretofore resulted in immunity for practically -everyone concerned in the really great crimes against peace and -mankind. Those in lower ranks were protected against liability by -the orders of their superiors. The superiors were protected because -their orders were called acts of state. Under the Charter, no -defense based on either of these doctrines can be entertained. -Modern civilization puts unlimited weapons of destruction in the -hands of men. It cannot tolerate so vast an area of legal irresponsibility.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Even the German Military Code provides that:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“If the execution of a military order in the course of duty -violates the criminal law, then the superior officer giving -the order will bear the sole responsibility therefor. However, -the obeying subordinate will share the punishment of the -participant: (1) if he has exceeded the order given to him, -or (2) if it was within his knowledge that the order of his -superior officer concerned an act by which it was intended -to commit a civil or military crime or transgression.” (<span class='it'>Reichsgesetzblatt</span>, -1926 No. 37, P. 278, Art. 47)</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Of course, we do not argue that the circumstances under which -one commits an act should be disregarded in judging its legal -effect. A conscripted private on a firing squad cannot expect to -<span class='pageno' title='151' id='Page_151'></span> -hold an inquest on the validity of the execution. The Charter -implies common sense limits to liability just as it places common -sense limits upon immunity. But none of these men before you -acted in minor parts. Each of them was entrusted with broad discretion -and exercised great power. Their responsibility is correspondingly -great and may not be shifted to that fictional being, -“the State”, which cannot be produced for trial, cannot testify, -and cannot be sentenced.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The Charter also recognizes a vicarious liability, which responsibility -is recognized by most modern systems of law, for acts committed -by others in carrying out a common plan or conspiracy to -which a defendant has become a party. I need not discuss the -familiar principles of such liability. Every day in the courts of -countries associated in this prosecution, men are convicted for acts -that they did not personally commit, but for which they were held -responsible because of membership in illegal combinations or plans -or conspiracies.</p> - -<p class='line'> </p> - -<p class='pindent'><span class='it'>The Political, Police, and Military Organizations</span>:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Accused before this Tribunal as criminal organizations are certain -political and police organizations which the evidence will show -to have been instruments of cohesion in planning and executing -the crimes I have detailed. Perhaps the worst of the movement -were the Leadership Corps of the NSDAP, the Schutzstaffeln or -“SS”, and the Sturmabteilungen or “SA”, and the subsidiary formations -which these include. These were the Nazi Party leadership, -espionage, and policing groups. They were the real government, -above and outside of any law. Also accused as organizations -are the Reich Cabinet and the Secret Police, or Gestapo, -which were fixtures of the Government but animated solely by -the Party.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Except for a late period when some compulsory recruiting was -done in the SS, membership in all these militarized organizations -was voluntary. The police organizations were recruited from -ardent partisans who enlisted blindly to do the dirty work the -leaders planned. The Reich Cabinet was the governmental facade -for Nazi Party Government and in its members legal, as well as -actual responsibility was vested for the entire program. Collectively -they were responsible for the program in general, individually -they were especially responsible for segments of it. The finding -which we ask you to make, that these are criminal organizations, -will subject members to punishment to be hereafter determined by -appropriate tribunals, unless some personal defense—such as -becoming a member under threat to person, to family, or inducement -by false representation, or the like—be established. -<span class='pageno' title='152' id='Page_152'></span> -Every member will have a chance to be heard in the subsequent -forum on his personal relation to the organization, but your finding -in this trial will conclusively establish the criminal character of the -organization as a whole.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>We have also accused as criminal organizations the High Command -and the General Staff of the German Armed Forces. We -recognize that to plan warfare is the business of professional -soldiers in all countries. But it is one thing to plan strategic moves -in the event war comes, and it is another thing to plot and intrigue -to bring on that war. We will prove the leaders of the German -General Staff and of the High Command to have been guilty of -just that. Military men are not before you because they served -their country. They are here because they mastered it, along with -these others, and drove it to war. They are not here because they lost -the war, but because they started it. Politicians may have thought -of them as soldiers, but soldiers know they were politicians. We -ask that the General Staff and the High Command, as defined in -the Indictment, be condemned as a criminal group whose existence -and tradition constitute a standing menace to the peace of the -world.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>These individual defendants did not stand alone in crime and -will not stand alone in punishment. Your verdict of “guilty” -against these organizations will render <span class='it'>prima facie</span> guilty, as -nearly as we can learn, thousands upon thousands of members now -in custody of United States forces and of other armies.</p> - -<p class='line'> </p> - -<p class='pindent'><span class='it'>The responsibility of this Tribunal</span>:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>To apply the sanctions of the law to those whose conduct is -found criminal by the standards I have outlined, is the responsibility -committed to this Tribunal. It is the first court ever to -undertake the difficult task of overcoming the confusion of many -tongues and the conflicting concepts of just procedure among -divers systems of law, so as to reach a common judgment. The -tasks of all of us are such as to make heavy demands on patience -and good will. Although the need for prompt action has admittedly -resulted in imperfect work on the part of the Prosecution, four -great nations bring you their hurriedly assembled contributions of -evidence. What remains undiscovered we can only guess. We -could, with witnesses’ testimony, prolong the recitals of crime for -years—but to what avail. We shall rest the case when we have -offered what seems convincing and adequate proof of the crimes -charged without unnecessary cumulation of evidence. We doubt -very much whether it will be seriously denied that the crimes I -have outlined took place. The effort will undoubtedly be to -mitigate or escape personal responsibility. -<span class='pageno' title='153' id='Page_153'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>Among the nations which unite in accusing these defendants the -United States is perhaps in a position to be the most dispassionate, -for, having sustained the least injury, it is perhaps the least -animated by vengeance. Our American cities have not been -bombed by day and by night, by humans, and by robots. It is not our -temples that had been laid in ruins. Our countrymen have not had -their homes destroyed over their heads. The menace of Nazi aggression, -except to those in actual service, has seemed less personal and -immediate to us than to European peoples. But while the United -States is not first in rancor, it is not second in determination that -the forces of law and order be made equal to the task of dealing -with such international lawlessness as I have recited here.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Twice in my lifetime, the United States has sent its young manhood -across the Atlantic, drained its resources, and burdened itself -with debt to help defeat Germany. But the real hope and faith that -has sustained the American people in these great efforts was that -victory for ourselves and our Allies would lay the basis for an -ordered international relationship in Europe and would end the -centuries of strife on this embattled continent.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Twice we have held back in the early stages of European conflict -in the belief that it might be confined to a purely European -affair. In the United States, we have tried to build an economy -without armament, a system of government without militarism, -and a society where men are not regimented for war. This -purpose, we know now, can never be realized if the world periodically -is to be embroiled in war. The United States cannot, generation -after generation, throw its youth or its resources on to the -battlefields of Europe to redress the lack of balance between Germany’s -strength and that of her enemies, and to keep the battles -from our shores.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The American dream of a peace-and-plenty economy, as well -as the hopes of other nations, can never be fulfilled if those nations -are involved in a war every generation so vast and devastating as -to crush the generation that fights and burden the generation that -follows. But experience has shown that wars are no longer local. -All modern wars become world wars eventually. And none of the -big nations at least can stay out. If we cannot stay out of wars, -our only hope is to prevent wars.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I am too well aware of the weaknesses of juridical action alone -to contend that in itself your decision under this Charter can -prevent future wars. Judicial action always comes after the event. -Wars are started only on the theory and in the confidence that they -can be won. Personal punishment, to be suffered only in the event -the war is lost, will probably not be a sufficient deterrent to -<span class='pageno' title='154' id='Page_154'></span> -prevent a war where the warmakers feel the chances of defeat to -be negligible.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>But the ultimate step in avoiding periodic wars, which are -inevitable in a system of international lawlessness, is to make -statesmen responsible to law. And let me make clear that while -this law is first applied against German aggressors, the law -includes, and if it is to serve a useful purpose it must condemn -aggression by any other nations, including those which sit here now -in judgment. We are able to do away with domestic tyranny and -violence and aggression by those in power against the rights of -their own people only when we make all men answerable to the -law. This trial represents mankind’s desperate effort to apply the -discipline of the law to statesmen who have used their powers of -state to attack the foundations of the world’s peace and to commit -aggressions against the rights of their neighbors.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The usefulness of this effort to do justice is not to be measured -by considering the law or your judgment in isolation. This trial is -part of the great effort to make the peace more secure. One step -in this direction is the United Nations organization, which may take -joint political action to prevent war if possible, and joint military -action to insure that any nation which starts a war will lose it. -This Charter and this Trial, implementing the Kellogg-Briand Pact, -constitute another step in the same direction—juridical action of -a kind to ensure that those who start a war will pay for it personally.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>While the defendants and the prosecutors stand before you as -individuals, it is not the triumph of either group alone that is committed -to your judgment. Above all personalities there are -anonymous and impersonal forces whose conflict makes up much -of human history. It is yours to throw the strength of the law back -of either the one or the other of these forces for at least another -generation. What are the real forces that are contending before -you?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>No charity can disguise the fact that the forces which these -defendants represent, the forces that would advantage and delight -in their acquittal, are the darkest and most sinister forces in -society—dictatorship and oppression, malevolence and passion, -militarism and lawlessness. By their fruits we best know them. -Their acts have bathed the world in blood and set civilization back -a century. They have subjected their European neighbors to every -outrage and torture, every spoliation and deprivation that insolence, -cruelty, and greed could inflict. They have brought the -German people to the lowest pitch of wretchedness, from which -they can entertain no hope of early deliverance. They have stirred -<span class='pageno' title='155' id='Page_155'></span> -hatreds and incited domestic violence on every continent. These -are the things that stand in the dock shoulder to shoulder with -these prisoners.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The real complaining party at your bar is Civilization. In all -our countries it is still a struggling and imperfect thing. It does -not plead that the United States, or any other country, has been -blameless of the conditions which made the German people easy -victims to the blandishments and intimidations of the Nazi -conspirators.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>But it points to the dreadful sequence of aggressions and crimes -I have recited, it points to the weariness of flesh, the exhaustion of -resources, and the destruction of all that was beautiful or useful -in so much of the world, and to greater potentialities for destruction -in the days to come. It is not necessary among the ruins of this -ancient and beautiful city with untold members of its civilian -inhabitants still buried in its rubble, to argue the proposition that -to start or wage an aggressive war has the moral qualities of the -worst of crimes. The refuge of the defendants can be only their -hope that international law will lag so far behind the moral sense -of mankind that conduct which is crime in the moral sense must be -regarded as innocent in law.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Civilization asks whether law is so laggard as to be utterly -helpless to deal with crimes of this magnitude by criminals of this -order of importance. It does not expect that you can make war -impossible. It does expect that your juridical action will put the -forces of international law, its precepts, its prohibitions and, most -of all, its sanctions, on the side of peace, so that men and women -of good will, in all countries, may have “leave to live by no man’s -leave, underneath the law.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will now adjourn until -10 o’clock tomorrow morning.</p> - -<p class='line' style='text-align:center;margin-top:2em;margin-bottom:2em;'>[<span class='it'>The Tribunal adjourned until 22 November 1945 at 1000 hours.</span>]</p> - -<hr class='pbk'/> - -<div><span class='pageno' title='156' id='Page_156'></span><h1>THIRD DAY<br/> <span style='font-size:smaller'>Thursday, 22 November 1945</span></h1></div> - -<h2 class='nobreak'><span class='it'>Morning Session</span></h2> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Before the Chief Prosecutor for the United -States proceeds to present the evidence on Count One, the Tribunal -wishes me to announce the decision on the application made on -behalf of the Defendant Julius Streicher by his counsel that his -condition should be examined. It has been examined by three medical -experts on behalf of the Tribunal and their report has been -submitted to and considered by the Tribunal; and it is as follows:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“1. The Defendant Julius Streicher is sane.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“2. The Defendant Julius Streicher is fit to appear before the -Tribunal, and to present his defense.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“3. It being the unanimous conclusion of the examiners that -Julius Streicher is sane, he is for that reason capable of -understanding the nature and policy of his acts during the -period of time covered by the Indictment.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>The Tribunal accepts the report of the medical experts and the -trial against Julius Streicher will, therefore, proceed.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The other matter to which I have to refer is a motion on behalf -of counsel for Bormann, whom the Tribunal have decided to try -in his absence in pursuance of Article 12 of the Charter. Counsel -for Bormann has made a motion that the trial against him should -be postponed, but, in view of the fact that the provisions of the -Charter and the Tribunal’s rules of procedure have been strictly -carried out in the notices which have been given, and the fact that -counsel for Bormann will have ample time before he is called -upon to present defense on his behalf, the motion is denied.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I will now call upon counsel for the United States to present the -evidence on Count One.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. STOREY: May it please the Tribunal, as the first order -of business concerning the evidence, it shall be my purpose to outline -the method of capturing, assembling, processing, and authenticating -documents to be presented in evidence by the United States. -I shall also describe and illustrate the plan of presenting documents -and briefs relating to the United States’ case-in-chief.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>As the United States Army advanced into German territory, -there were attached to each Army and subordinate organization -specialized military personnel whose duties were to capture and -<span class='pageno' title='157' id='Page_157'></span> -preserve enemy information in the form of documents, records, reports, -and other files. The Germans kept accurate and voluminous -records. They were found in Army headquarters, Government buildings, -and elsewhere. During the later stages of the war, particularly, -such documents were found in salt mines, buried in the -ground, behind false walls, and many other places believed secure -by the Germans. For example, the personal correspondence and -diaries of the Defendant Rosenberg, including his Nazi correspondence, -were found behind a false wall in an old castle in eastern -Bavaria. The records of the OKL, or Luftwaffe, of which the Defendant -Göring was Commander-in-Chief—equivalent to the records -of the Headquarters of the Air Staff of the United States -Army Air Forces—were found in various places in the Bavarian -Alps. Most of such Luftwaffe records were assembled and processed -by the Army at Berchtesgaden.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>When the Army first captured documents and records, they -immediately placed the materials under guard and later assembled -them in temporary document centers. Many times the records were -so voluminous that they were hauled by fleets of Army trucks to -document centers. Finally, as the territory seized was made secure, -Army zones were established and each Army established a fixed -document center to which were transported the assembled documents -and records. Later this material was indexed and cataloged, -which was a slow process.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Beginning last June, Mr. Justice Jackson requested me to direct -the assembling of documentary evidence on the continent for the -United States case. Field teams from our office were organized -under the direction of Major William H. Coogan, who established -United States liaison officers at the main Army document centers. -Such officers were directed to screen and analyze the mass of captured -documents, and select those having evidentiary value for our -case. Literally hundreds of tons of enemy documents and records -were screened and examined and those selected were forwarded to -Nuremberg for processing. I now offer in evidence an affidavit by -Major Coogan, dated November 19, 1945, attached hereto, describing -the method of procedure, capture, screening and delivery of such -documents to Nuremberg. (Document Number 001 A-PS, Exhibit -USA-1)</p> - -<p class='pindent'>At this time, if Your Honors please, and in order to present this -matter to the Tribunal, I believe it wise to read at least substantial -portions of this affidavit. It is dated November 19, 1945.</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“I, Major William H. Coogan, 0-455814, Q.M.C., a commissioned -officer of the United States of America, do hereby certify -as follows: -<span class='pageno' title='158' id='Page_158'></span></p> - -<p class='noindent'>“1. The United States Chief of Counsel in July 1945 charged -the Field Branch of the Documentation Division with the -responsibility of collecting, evaluating, and assembling documentary -evidence in the European Theater for use in the -prosecution of the major Axis War Criminals before the International -Military Tribunal. I was appointed Chief of the Field -Branch on 20 July 1945. I am now the Chief of the Documentation -Division, Office of United States Chief of Counsel.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“2. I have served in the United States Army for more than -4 years and am a practicing attorney by profession. Based -upon my experience as an attorney and as a United States -Army officer, I am familiar with the operation of the United -States Army in connection with seizing and processing captured -enemy documents. In my capacity as Chief of the Documentation -Division, Office of the United States Chief of Counsel, -I am familiar with and have supervised the processing, filing, -translating, and photostating of all documentary evidence for -the United States Chief of Counsel.”</p> - -<p class='noindent'>I skip to paragraph 4.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“4. The Field Branch of the Documentation Division was -staffed by personnel thoroughly conversant with the German -language. Their task was to search for and select captured -enemy documents in the European Theater which disclosed -information relating to the prosecution of the major Axis -war criminals. Officers under my command were placed on -duty at various document centers and also dispatched on -individual missions to obtain original documents. When the -documents were located, my representatives made a record -of the circumstances under which they were found and all -information available concerning their authenticity was -recorded. Such documents were further identified by Field -Branch pre-trial serial numbers, assigned by my representatives -who would then periodically dispatch the original -documents by courier to the Office of the United States Chief -of Counsel.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“5. Upon receipt of these documents they were duly recorded -and indexed. After this operation, they were delivered to the -Screening and Analysis Branch of the Documentation Division -of the Office of United States Chief of Counsel, which -Branch re-examined the documents in order to finally determine -whether or not they should be retained as evidence for -the prosecutors. This final screening was done by German-speaking -analysts on the staff of the United States Chief of -Counsel. When the document passed the screeners, it was -<span class='pageno' title='159' id='Page_159'></span> -then transmitted to the Document Room of the Office of United -States Chief of Counsel, with a covering sheet prepared -by the screeners showing the title or nature of the document, -the personalities involved, and its importance. In the Document -Room, a trial identification number was given to each -document and to each group of documents, in cases where it -was desirable for the sake of clarity to file several documents -together.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“6. United States documents were given trial identification -numbers in one of five series designated by the letters: “PS”, -“L”, “R”, “C”, and “EC”, indicating the means of acquisition -of the documents. Within each series documents were listed -numerically.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“7. After a document was so numbered, it was then sent to -a German-speaking analyst who prepared a summary of the -document with appropriate references to personalities involved, -index headings, information as to the source of the document -as indicated by the Field Branch, and the importance of -the document to a particular phase of the case. Next, the original -document was returned to the Document Room and then -checked out to the Photostating Department, where photostatic -copies were made. Upon return from photostating, it -was placed in an envelope in one of the several fireproof -safes in the rear of the Document Room. One of the photostatic -copies of the document was sent to the translators, -thereafter leaving the original itself in the safe. A commissioned -officer has been, and is, responsible for the documents -in the safe. At all times when he is not present the safe is -locked and a military guard is on duty outside the only door. -If the officers preparing the certified translation, or one of -the officers working on the briefs, found it necessary to examine -the original document, this was done within the Document -Room in the section set aside for that purpose. The -only exception to this strict rule has been where it has been -occasionally necessary to present the original document to -Defense Counsel for examination. In this case, the document -was entrusted to a responsible officer of the Prosecution staff.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“8. All original documents are now located in safes in the -Document Room, where they will be secured until they are -presented by the Prosecution to the court during the progress -of this Trial.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“9. Some of the documents which will be offered in evidence -by the United States were seized and processed by the British -Army. Also, personnel from the Office of the United -<span class='pageno' title='160' id='Page_160'></span> -States Chief of Counsel and the British War Crimes Executive -have acted jointly in locating, seizing and processing such -documents.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“10. Substantially the same system of acquiring documentary -evidence was utilized by the British Army and the British -War Crimes Executive as above set forth with respect to the -United States Army and the Office of the United States Chief -of Counsel.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“11. Therefore, I certify in my official capacity as hereinabove -stated, to the best of my knowledge and belief, that the documents -captured in the British Zone of Operations and Occupation, -which will be offered in evidence by the United States -Chief of Counsel, have been authenticated, translated, and -processed in substantially the same manner as hereinabove -set forth with respect to the operations of the United States -Chief of Counsel.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“12. Finally, I certify that all documentary evidence offered -by the United States Chief of Counsel, including those documents -from British Army sources, are in the same condition -as captured by the United States and British Armies; that -they have been translated by competent and qualified translators; -that all photostatic copies are true and correct copies -of the originals and that they have been correctly filed, numbered, -and processed as above outlined.”</p> - -<p class='noindent'>Signed by: “William H. Coogan, Major, QMC, 0-455814.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>After the documents selected by the screening process outlined -reached our office, they were again examined, re-screened, and -translated by expert U.S. Army personnel, as outlined by Major -Coogan.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Finally, more than 2,500 documents were selected and filed here -in this Court House. At least several hundred will be offered in -evidence. They have been photographed, translated into English, -filed, indexed, and processed. The same general procedure was -followed by the British War Crimes Executive with regard to documents -captured by the British Army, and there has been complete -integration and cooperation of activities with the British in that -regard.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In order to present our case and to assist the Tribunal, we have -prepared written briefs on each phase of our case which cite the -documents by appropriate numbers. Legal propositions of the -United States will also be presented in such briefs. The briefs and -documents will cover each allegation of the Indictment which is -the United States’ responsibility. I hold in my hand one of the -trial briefs entitled “Reshaping of Education, Training of Youth,” -<span class='pageno' title='161' id='Page_161'></span> -which will be offered later on this day. Accompanying each brief -is a document book containing true copies in English of all documents -referred to in the brief. I hold in my hand the document -book that will be submitted to this Tribunal in support of the brief -which I have just exhibited to your Honors. Likewise, copies in -German have been, or will be, furnished to Defense counsel at the -time such documents are offered in evidence. Upon conclusion of -the presentation of each phase or section of our case by counsel, -the entire book of documents will be offered in evidence, such as -this book. At the same time, Lieutenant Barrett who will sit right -here all during the Trial and who is on our staff, will hand to the -clerk of this Tribunal the original documents that may be offered -in evidence in this form. It will have the seal of the Tribunal, will -be Exhibit USA, 2836-PS, and in turn Lieutenant Barrett will hand -that original document to the Tribunal. In the same manner, the -document book will be passed by Lieutenant Barrett to the clerk -of the Court, and these trial briefs for the assistance of the Tribunal -will be made available to the Court and to Defense Counsel. -Likewise, copies of documents actually introduced in evidence will -be made available to the press. Thus, may Your Honors please, it -is hoped that by this procedure the usual laborious and tedious -method of introducing documentary evidence may be expedited.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>May I, therefore, respectfully inquire of the Tribunal and of -Defense counsel if there is any objection to the procedure outlined? -If not, the United States will proceed with the presentation of the -documentary and trial briefs as outlined herein.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal has no objection to the course -that you propose.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. STOREY: If Your Honors please, may I now announce -what will be presented immediately following by the United -States?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I think perhaps that I ought to say to counsel -for the defendants that their silence will be taken as their -assent to the course proposed. In the absence of any objection by -them to the course proposed by Colonel Storey on behalf of the -Chief Prosecutor for the United States, the Tribunal will take it -that they agree that the course is convenient.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Thank you, gentlemen.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. STOREY: If Your Honors please, the next presentation -will be the briefs and documents on the Common Plan or Conspiracy -up to 1939. We will open by presentation of charts of the -Nazi Party and Reich Government with exhibits and explanation -by Mr. Albrecht. That will be followed by a presentation of the -<span class='pageno' title='162' id='Page_162'></span> -trial briefs and documents on the other phases of the Common -Plan or Conspiracy up to 1939.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RALPH G. ALBRECHT (Associate Trial Counsel for the United -States): May it please the Tribunal, the Prosecution will now allude -briefly to certain facts, which may well be considered to be within -judicial purview, the consideration of which the Prosecution has -found useful in understanding and evaluating the evidence that -will be presented in the course of the Trial, in support of the -allegations of the Indictment.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In the opinion of the Prosecution, some preliminary references -must be made to the National Socialist German Labor Party, the -NSDAP, which in itself is not one of the defendant organizations -in this proceeding, but which is represented among the defendant -organizations by its most important formations, namely the Leadership -Corps of the NSDAP, which you will hear referred to as Das -Korps der Politischen Leiter der NSDAP, the SS (Die Schutzstaffeln -der NSDAP), and the SA (Die Sturmabteilungen) of the Party.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>With the permission of the Tribunal the Prosecution will offer -at this point, as its first exhibit, a chart showing the structure and -organization of the NSDAP, substantially as it existed at the peak -of its development in March 1945. This chart has been prepared -by the Prosecution on the basis of information contained in important -and well-known official publications of the National Socialist -Party with which the defendants must be presumed to have -been well acquainted. We refer particularly to the <span class='it'>Organization -Book of the Party</span>, (<span class='it'>Das Organisationsbuch der NSDAP</span>), and to the -<span class='it'>National Socialist Year Book</span>, (<span class='it'>Nationalsozialistisches Jahrbuch</span>), of -both of which, be it noted, the late Defendant Robert Ley was the -chief editor or publisher. Both books appeared, in the course of -time, in many editions and in hundreds of thousands of copies, -throughout the period when the National Socialist Party was in -control of the German Reich and of the German people. The chart, -furthermore, which we are offering has been certified on its face -as correct by a high official of the Nazi Party, namely Franz Xaver -Schwarz, its treasurer (Reichsschatzmeister der NSDAP) and its -official in charge of Party administration; and his affidavit is being -submitted with the chart, and I now wish to offer this chart in -evidence. (Document Number 2903-PS, Exhibit USA-2.)</p> - -<p class='pindent'>We have been able to have this chart duplicated, and, with the -permission of the Tribunal, we are making it available to all -concerned.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Before I offer some remarks of explanation concerning the organization -of the National Socialist German Labor Party, which, we -believe, will be found useful in connection with the Prosecution’s -<span class='pageno' title='163' id='Page_163'></span> -case, I would just like to call the attention of the Tribunal to the -fact that the larger chart which now appears is a simplification of -the duplicated chart which Your Honors have been furnished. For -if it had been reproduced in the same detail, I am afraid many of -the boxes would not have appeared intelligible from this point.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I would like to call your attention first of all to an organization -with which we will have to become very familiar: the Leadership -Corps of the NSDAP, (the Reichsleiter), which has been named as -a defendant organization and which comprises the sum of the -officials and leaders of the Nazi Party. If Your Honors will be -good enough to follow me down the center line of the chart, we -come to the main horizontal line of division where the word -“Reichsleiter” appears. That is the first category of the Leadership -Corps, I should say, the main category, perhaps, of the Leadership -Corps.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The Führer, of course, stands above it. As we follow the vertical -line of division to the lower part of the chart, we reach five -additional boxes, which may be referred to collectively as the -Hoheitsträger, the bearers of the sovereignty of the Party, and those, -are the Gauleiter, the Kreisleiter, the Ortsgruppenleiter, the Zellenleiter, -and the Blockleiter.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The Führer at the top of our chart is the supreme and the -only leader in the Nazi hierarchy. His successor-designate was -first the Defendant Hess and subsequently the Defendant Göring.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The Reichsleiter, of whom 16 are shown on this chart, comprise -collectively the Party Directorate (Reichsleitung). Through them, -coordination of the Party and State machinery was achieved. A -number of these Reichsleiter, each of whom, at some time, was in -charge of at least one office within the Party Directorate, were -also the heads of other Party formations and affiliated and supervised -organizations of the Party and also of agencies of the State, -and they even held ministerial positions. The Reichsleitung may -be said to represent the horizontal organization of the Party according -to functions, within which all threads controlling the varied -life of the German people met. Each office within the Reichsleitung -of the NSDAP executed definite tasks assigned to it by -the Führer, or by the leader of the Party Chancellery (Chef der -Parteikanzlei), who on the chart before you appears directly under -the Führer.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In 1945 the chief of the Party Chancellery was Martin Bormann, -the defendant in this proceeding, and before him, and until -his flight to England in 1941, the Defendant Rudolf Hess. It was -the duty of the Reichsleitung to make certain that these tasks -assigned to it by the Führer were carried out with expedition and -<span class='pageno' title='164' id='Page_164'></span> -without interruption, in order that the will of the Führer quickly -and rapidly was communicated to the lowest Party echelon, the -lowliest Zelle or Block. The individual offices of the Reichsleitung had -the mission to remain in constant and closest contact with the life -of the people through the agency of the subdivisions of the component -Party organizations in the Gaue, within the Kreis, or the -Ort or the lower group. These leaders had been taught that the -right to organize human beings accrued through the appreciation -of the fact that a people must be educated ideologically; “weltanschaulich”, -the Germans call it, that is to say, according to the -philosophy of National Socialism.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Among the Reichsleiter, on trial in this cause, may be included -the following defendants:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>If Your Honors will follow me to this broad, horizontal line, we -start at the extreme left at the box marked with the Defendant -Frank’s name. At one time, although not in March 1945, he was -the head of the Legal Office of the Party. He was the Reichsleiter -des Reichsrechtsamtes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In the third square appears the Defendant Rosenberg, the delegate -of the Führer for Ideological Training and Education of the -Party. He was called “Der Beauftragte des Führers für die Überwachung -der gesamten geistigen und weltanschaulichen Schulung -der NSDAP.” Next to him, to the right, is the Defendant Von -Schirach, leader of youth education, (Leiter für die Jugenderziehung). -Next to him, appears the late Defendant Robert Ley, at one -time head of the Party Organization (Reichsorganisationsleiter der -NSDAP) and also the leader of the German Labor Front, the DAF -(Leiter der Deutschen Arbeitsfront).</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Then, if we cross the vertical line, and proceed to the right—in -passing I might allude to the box marked with the name of -Schwarz. He was the Party official and Reichsleiter, who certified -to the chart before the Tribunal.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>As we proceed further to the right, next to the last box, we -find the name of the Defendant Frick, who was the leader of the -Reichstag fraction (Leiter der NS Reichstagsfraktion).</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The next categories to be considered are the Hoheitsträger, at -the bottom of the vertical line, in the center of the chart. The -National Socialists called them the bearers of sovereignty. To them -was assigned the political sovereignty over specially designated -subdivisions of the State, of which they were the appointed leaders. -The Hoheitsträger may be said to represent the vertical organization -of the Party.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>These leaders, these Hoheitsträger included all Gauleiter, of -whom there were 42 within the Reich in 1945. A Gauleiter was a -<span class='pageno' title='165' id='Page_165'></span> -political leader of the largest subdivision of the State. He was -charged by the Führer with the political, cultural, and economic -control over all forms and manifestations of the life of the people -and the coordination of the same with National Socialist philosophy -and ideology.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>A number of the defendants before the bar of this Tribunal -were former Gauleiter of the NSDAP. I mention, in this connection, -the Defendant Streicher, Gauleiter of Franconia, “Franken-Führer” -they called him, whose seat was in the city of Nuremberg. -Von Schirach was Gauleiter of Vienna and the Defendant -Sauckel was Gauleiter of Thuringia.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The next lower category on the chart were the Kreisleiter, the -political leaders of the largest subdivision within a Gau. Then -follow the Ortsgruppenleiter, the political leaders of the largest -subdivision within the Kreis. And a Kreis consisted perhaps of -several towns or villages or, in the case of a larger city, anywhere -from 1,500 to 3,000 households.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The next Hoheitsträger were the Zellenleiter, the political -leaders of a group from four to eight city blocks, or of a corresponding -group within country districts, and then follow the -Blockleiter, the political leaders of from 40 to 60 households.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Now, each of these political leaders, of these Hoheitsträger, or -bearers of sovereignty, was directly responsible to the next highest -leader in the Nazi hierarchy. The Gauleiter was directly responsible -to the Führer himself; the Kreisleiter was directly responsible to -the Gauleiter, the Ortsgruppenleiter to the Kreisleiter, and so on.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The Führer himself reserved to himself, in accordance with the -philosophy that runs through the Party, the right to name all -Führer. It was he, personally, that named the Reichsleiter, all -members of the Party Directorate. It was he that appointed all -Gauleiter and Kreisleiter and all political leaders, down to the -grade of Gauamtsleiter, which was a lower classification of political -leader within the Party organization of the Gau.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>These Hoheitsträger, together with the Reichsleitung, constituted -the all-powerful group of leaders by means of which the Nazi Party -reached right down into the lives of the people, consolidated its -control of them and compelled them to conform to the National -Socialist pattern. For this purpose broad powers were given to -them, including the right to call upon all Party formations to -effectuate their plans. They could requisition the services of the -SA and of the SS, as well as of the HJ and of the NSKK. If I -may direct your attention, for the moment, to the Party organizations -that appear at the extreme left of the chart, I would just like -to say that structurally these organizations were organized regionally -<span class='pageno' title='166' id='Page_166'></span> -to accord with the offices and regions controlled by the Hoheitsträger. -If I might be more explicit, let us take the SA. The subsidiary -formations of the SA came down and corresponded, in its -lower organizations, to the Gau, so that we have a Gauleitung in -the SA, and further down, to the Kreis, so that we have a Kreisleitung -in the SA, so that the Gauleiter and the Kreisleiter, to cite -two examples, charged with a particular duty by the Führer, could -call on these organizations for assistance in carrying out their tasks.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>These sinister implications of the use of this power will become -more apparent as the Prosecution’s case develops, and as the wealth -of evidentiary material is introduced into evidence to prove the -criminality of the defendant organizations.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The component Party-organizations, called “Gliederungen” -within the Party, are shown at the extreme left of the chart, and -are the organizations to which I directed the attention of Your -Honors a moment ago. These organizations actually constitute the -Party itself, and substantially the entire Party-membership is -contained within these organizations. The four principal organizations -are sometimes referred to as “para-military” organizations. -They were uniformed organizations and they were armed. These -organizations were the notorious SA and SS, which are named as -party-defendants in this case, the HJ (Hitler Youth), and the NSKK—the -Motor Corps of the Party (Kraftfahrkorps). Then there were -also the National Socialist Women’s Organization, the National -Socialist German Students’ Bund (Nationalsozialistischer Deutscher -Studentenbund), and the National Socialist University Teachers’ -Organization (Nationalsozialistischer Dozentenbund).</p> - -<p class='pindent'>There are additional organizations that were officially designated -within the Party, as affiliated organizations, not Gliederungen or -controlled organizations, but affiliated organizations (Angeschlossene -Verbände der NSDAP). Among those organizations we have the -German Labor Front (Deutsche Arbeitsfront)—the DAF; we have -an organization that controlled the civil service (Reichsbund der -Deutschen Beamten). There were the physicians within the National -Socialist Deutscher Ärztebund; there were the teachers in the -National Socialist Lehrerbund; there were the lawyers within the -National Socialist Rechtswahrerbund, of which, at one time, the -Defendant Frank was the head.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>There is another group of organizations which was officially -known as supervised organizations (Betreute Organisationen der -NSDAP), organizations that included certain specialized women’s -organizations (Deutsches Frauenwerk), certain student societies -(Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Studentenschaft), former university -students (Altherrenbund der Deutschen Studenten). There was a -<span class='pageno' title='167' id='Page_167'></span> -group that had reference to the German communes (Nationalsozialistischer -Deutscher Gemeindetag), and there was a Reichsbund -für Leibesübungen that interested itself in controlling all those -interested in physical exercise.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>According to the official Party designations applicable to the -various organizations and associations that controlled German life -there was a fourth category, which is the last organization that -appears to the right on the chart before Your Honors, which is -sometimes simply called “Weitere Nationalsozialistische Organisationen”, -and here, in some respects, we are in “No man’s land”, -because the Party was not static, it was dynamic and our latest -information is now to the effect that the organizations that ordinarily -came within this category, well-known organizations like the -RAD (Reich Labor Service) and the NSFK (the National Socialist -Fliegerkorps) or Flying Corps may no longer be included there. -At least that was the opinion of the Party treasurer, who certified -to this chart.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I think with these few remarks, I have given some general -impression of the structure of the Party, with which we are dealing -in this proceeding before Your Honors.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Before leaving the chart, perhaps I would just like to point out -several other instances where some of the defendants appear in this -set-up.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>At the very top, to the left of the Führer, as marked on the -chart before Your Honors, are the successors-designate of the -Führer. First is the Defendant Hess, until 1941, and followed by the -Defendant Göring. Under the Führer appears the chief of the Party -Chancellery, the Defendant Martin Bormann, and then, if we come -to the level of the Reichsleiter, and go to the left, opposite Rosenberg’s -name, we find that somewhat below that his name is repeated -as the head of an office on a lower level, namely, the Foreign -Relations Office of the Party, which played such a sinister influence -in the early work of the Party, as will later appear in the documentary -evidence to be presented to Your Honors.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>We then come to the late Defendant Ley’s name, on the main -horizontal division, and follow the dotted line to a lower level, and -we will find he was the chief of the German Labor Front, and if -we come closer to the vertical line, to a lower level, below the -Reichsleitung, we find the Defendant Speer in the Hauptamt für -Technik (the Office of Technical Affairs), and below that as the -chief of the Bund Deutscher Technik (German Technological League).</p> - -<p class='pindent'>With the permission of the Tribunal, the Prosecution will now -pass to the consideration of the governmental machinery of the -German State, which, like the organization of the Nazi Party, -<span class='pageno' title='168' id='Page_168'></span> -requires some brief observations before the Prosecution proceeds -with the submission of proof on the Common Plan of Conspiracy, -with which the defendants have been charged.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>If the Tribunal will allow, the Prosecution will offer as its -second exhibit, another chart, delineating substantially the governmental -structure of the Reich Government as it existed in March -1945, and also the chief Leadership Corps of the Reich Government -and the Reich Administration during those years. (Document -Number 2905-PS, Exhibit USA-3)</p> - -<p class='pindent'>This chart has been prepared by the Prosecution on the basis -of information contained in two official publications, <span class='it'>Das Taschenbuch -für Verwaltungsbeamte</span>, (<span class='it'>the Manual for Administrative -Officers</span>) and the <span class='it'>National Sozialistisches Jahrbuch</span>, to which I have -already alluded, edited by the Defendant Ley.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>This chart has been examined, corrected, and certified by the -Defendant Wilhelm Frick, whose affidavit is submitted with the -chart. In fact, it is reproduced directly on the copies of the charts -before Your Honors.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>It seems plain that the Defendant Frick, a former Minister of -Interior of the Reich from January 1933 to August 1943, was well -qualified, by reason of his position and long service in public office -during the National Socialist regime, to certify to the substantial -accuracy of the facts disclosed in this chart.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Now, with the permission of the Tribunal, I would like to make -some brief comments on this chart.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>First of all, we refer to the Reichsregierung, which is the big -box in the center of the chart on the vertical line, directly below -Hitler. The Reichsregierung is a word that may not be translated -literally as “government of the Reich.” The word “Reichsregierung” -is a word of art and is applied collectively to the ministers who -composed the German Cabinet.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The Reichsregierung has been named as a defendant in this -proceeding, and as used in the Indictment the expression “Reichsregierung” -identifies a group which, we will urge, should be -declared to have been a criminal organization.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>This group includes all the men named in that center box, who -were members of the Cabinet after 30 January 1933, that is, Reich -ministers with and without portfolio, and all other officials entitled -to participate in the deliberations of the Cabinet.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Secondly, it includes members of the Counsel of Ministers for -the Defense of the Reich. It is called “Ministerrat für die Reichsverteidigung”, -which is the large box to the right of the vertical line.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Then, it includes the members of the Secret Cabinet Council, -which is the small box to the left of the vertical line, the Geheimer -<span class='pageno' title='169' id='Page_169'></span> -Kabinettsrat, of which the Defendant Von Neurath was the President.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Unlike the Cabinets and Ministerial Councils in countries that -were not within the orbit of the Axis, the Reichsregierung, after -30 January, 1933 when Adolf Hitler became Chancellor of the German -Reich, did not remain merely the executive branch of the -Government. In short order it also came to be possessed, and it -exercised legislative, and other functions as well, in the governmental -system into which the German Government developed while -under the domination of the National Socialist Party.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>It is proper to observe here that unlike such Party organizations -as the SA and SS, the Reichsregierung, before 1933, certainly, was -not a body created exclusively or even predominantly for the purpose -of committing illegal acts. The Reichsregierung was an instrument -of government provided for by the Weimar constitution. -Under the Nazi regime, however, the Reichsregierung gradually -became a primary agent of the Party, with functions formulated in -accordance with the objectives and methods of the Party itself. -The Party to all intents and purposes, was intended to be a Führerorden, -an order of Führer, a pool of political leaders. And while -the Party was, in the words of a German law, “the bearer of the -concept of the German State,” it was not identical with the State.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Thus, in order to realize its ideological and political objectives -and to reach the German people, the Party had to avail itself of -official state channels.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The Reichsregierung, and such agencies and offices established -by it, were the chosen instruments, by means of which the Party -policies were converted into legislative and administrative acts, -binding upon the German people as a whole.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In order to accomplish this result, the Reichsregierung was -thoroughly remodelled by the Party. Some of the steps may be here -recorded, by which the coordination of Party and State machinery -was assured in order to impose the will of the Führer on the German -people.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>On January 30, 1933, the date that the Führer became Reich -Chancellor, there were few National Socialists that were Cabinet -members. But, as the power of the Party in the Reich grew, the -Cabinet came to include an ever increasing number of Nazis, until -by January 1937 no non-Party member remained in the Reichsregierung. -New cabinet-posts were created and Nazis appointed to -them. Many of these cabinet members were also in the Reichsleitung -of the Party.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>To give but a few examples: -<span class='pageno' title='170' id='Page_170'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>The Defendant Rosenberg, whose name Your Honors will find -in that central box on the vertical line, the delegate of the Führer -for Ideological Training and Education of the Party, was a member -of the Reichsregierung in his capacity as Minister for the Occupied -Eastern Areas, the Reichsminister für die besetzten Ostgebiete.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>And if Your Honors will follow me on the vertical line to the -main horizontal line and proceed to the very end, you will find a -box marked “Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories”, of -which the head was the Defendant Rosenberg.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The Defendant Frick, the leader of the National Socialist fraction -in the Reichstag, was also Minister of the Interior.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>If Your Honors will follow me down to the main horizontal line -and two boxes over you will find the Ministry presided over by the -Defendant Frick. Goebbels, the Reichsleiter für Propaganda, also -sat in the Cabinet as Minister for Public Enlightenment and Propaganda -(Reichsminister für Volksaufklärung und Propaganda). He -is in the next box to the right from the Ministry of the Interior.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>After the 25th of July 1934 Party participation in the work of -the Cabinet was at all times achieved through the person of the -Defendant Rudolf Hess, the deputy of the Führer. By a decree of -Hitler the Defendant Hess was invested with the power to take -part in the editing of legislative bills with all the departments of -the Reich. Later this power of the Führer’s deputy was expanded -to include all executive decisions and orders that were published -in the <span class='it'>Reichsgesetzblatt</span>, the official volume in which are contained -the decrees of the State. After Hess’s flight to England in 1941, the -Defendant Martin Bormann, as his successor, took over the same -functions, and in addition he was given the authority of a Reichsminister -so that he could sit in the Cabinet.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Now, another item of importance:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>On the 30th of January 1937, four years after Hitler became -Chancellor, the Führer executed the acceptances into the Party of -those last few Cabinet members who still remained out of the -Party. Only one Cabinet member had the strength of character to -reject membership in the Party. That was the Minister of Transportation -and Minister of Posts, Mr. Eltz-Rübenach. His example -was not followed by the Defendant Von Neurath. His example -was not followed by the Defendant Raeder. And if the Defendant -Schacht was not yet at that time a member of the Party, I might -say that his example was not followed by the Defendant Schacht.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The chart shows many other instances where Party members on -the highest, as well as subordinate levels, occupied corresponding -or other positions in the organization of the State. Take Hitler himself. -The Führer of the NSDAP was also the Chancellor of the -<span class='pageno' title='171' id='Page_171'></span> -Reich, with which office, furthermore, the office of President of the -Reich was joined and merged after the death of President Von -Hindenburg in 1934.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Take the Defendant Göring, the successor-designate of Hitler. -As Führer of the SA, he sat in the Cabinet as Air Minister (Luftfahrtminister) -and he also held many other important positions, -including that of Commander-in-Chief of the Luftwaffe (the German -Air Force) and that of Delegate for the Four Year Plan.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Himmler, the notorious head of the SS, the Reichsführer SS, was -also the chief of the German Police, reporting to the Defendant -Frick. He himself later became Minister of the Interior after the -attempted assassination of Hitler on June 20, 1944, which event also -catapulted him into the position of Commander-in-Chief of the German -Reserve Army.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Now, at the extreme upper left of the chart is a small box that -is labeled “Reichstag” (the former German parliament).</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn for 10 minutes, -and 10 minutes only.</p> - -<p class='line' style='text-align:center;margin-top:1em;margin-bottom:2em;'>[<span class='it'>A recess was taken.</span>]</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. ALBRECHT: The Reichstag presents an anomaly in this -picture. Under the republic it had been the supreme law-making -body of the Reich, subject only to a limited check by the Reichsrat -(the Council of the Reich), by the President, and by the people -themselves by way of initiative and referendum.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Putting their opposition to all forms of Parliamentarianism into -effect at once, the Nazis proceeded to curtail the powers of the -Reichstag, to eliminate the Reichsrat, and to merge the Presidency -with the Office of Chancellor occupied by the Führer. By the Act -of 24th of March 1933 the Cabinet was given unlimited legislative -powers, including the right to deviate from the constitution. Subsequently, -as I stated, the Reichsrat was abolished, and with that -act the residuum of the power to legislate in the Reichstag was -reduced to a minimum. I say the power was reduced to a minimum -because the actual power to legislate was never taken away from -the Reichstag, but certainly after the advent of the Party to power -it was never permitted to exercise as a legislature.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The Reichsregierung retained its legislative powers throughout, -even though from time to time other agencies of the Reichsregierung, -such as the Plenipotentiary for Administration, in the -upper right of the chart, (the Generalbevollmächtigter für die -Reichsverwaltung), the Plenipotentiary for Economy, also in the -right-hand corner of the chart, (the Generalbevollmächtigter für die -Wirtschaft), and the Council of Ministers for the Defense of the -<span class='pageno' title='172' id='Page_172'></span> -Reich, were created. That is the big box to the right of the vertical -line. And these agencies of the Reichsregierung received certain -concurrent legislative powers.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The development of the Reichstag into an emasculated legislative -body was, however, only an intermediate step on the road -to rule by Führer decrees. That was the ultimate goal of the Party, -and a goal which they achieved.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The Nazis then proceeded to delegate some of the powers of the -Reich Cabinet to all sorts of newly created agencies, some of which -I have already mentioned. Cabinet functions were delegated first -of all to the Reich Defense Council, the Reichsverteidigungsrat, -possibly as early as the 4th of April 1933, but we believe certainly -not later than 1935. I might say in this connection that with respect -to a number of these agencies of the Reichsregierung which received -delegated powers, we are moving in a somewhat shadowy land, -because in developing this organization we are dealing—to some -extent, at least—with decrees and actions that were secret, or -secretive, in character.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>A number of these decrees were never definitely fixed in time. -A number of them were never published and the German people -themselves never became acquainted with them. And that is why -I say that the Reich Defense Council may possibly have been created -as early as two and one-half months after the advent of Hitler to -power but we believe that we will be able to show to the satisfaction -of the Tribunal that that important body in the Government -of the Reich was created certainly not later than May 1935.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I say it is an important body. This was the war-planning group, -of which Hitler himself was chairman and the Defendant Göring -the alternate. It was a large war-planning body, as Your Honors -will note, that included many Cabinet members, and there was also -a working committee—the true numerical size of which does not -appear from the chart—which was presided over by the Defendant -Keitel. That also was composed of Cabinet members and of Reich -defense officials, the majority of whom were appointed by Cabinet -officers and subject to their control. Other powers were delegated -to the Plenipotentiary, whom I have named before, for Administration, -appearing at the extreme right of the chart. That was the -Defendant Frick, and later the notorious Himmler.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Subordinate to Frick in his capacity as Plenipotentiary for -Administration were complete ministries, the Ministry of the -Interior (Frick’s old ministry), Ministry of Justice, Education, Church -Affairs, and Raumordnung (the Ministry for Special Planning).</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Other powers went to the delegate for the Four Year Plan, again -the Defendant Göring, whose box appears to the left of the median -line, half way to the edge. -<span class='pageno' title='173' id='Page_173'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>There were certain other powers that went to an organization -within the shadow-land I mentioned, and which, unfortunately, does -not have its name appear on this chart, the Dreierkollegium (the -College of Three), which title should really be imposed over the -last three boxes in the upper right hand corner; because the Dreierkollegium -consisted not alone of the Plenipotentiary for Administration, -but also the Plenipotentiary for War Economy, and the chairman -of that group who, I believe, was the Defendant Keitel, as the -head of the OKW, the Wehrmacht, all the armed forces. The duties -of the Dreierkollegium would seem to have included the drafting -of decrees in preparation of and for use during war. To the Secret -Cabinet Council, the Geheimer Kabinettsrat, of which the Defendant -Von Neurath was chairman,—or President, I believe was his title, -went other powers. That Secret Cabinet Council was created by a -decree of the Führer in 1938.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Certain other delegation of power took place to the Ministerrat -für die Reichsverteidigung (the Ministerial Council for the Defense -of the Realm), which is the smallest box appearing under the large -box of the Reich Defense Council, to the right of the vertical line.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The Council of Ministers for the Defense of the Reich was -responsible to the Führer alone. Its membership, as would seem to -be indicated on the chart, was taken from the Reich Defense -Council. It had broad powers to issue decrees with the force of law -in so far as the Reichsregierung itself had not legislated on the -subject.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>It should be stressed that this delegation of Cabinet functions to -various groups, composed largely of its own members, helped to -conceal some of the important policies of the Reichsregierung, -namely, those relating to the preparation of war, which delegated -the necessary authority to secret and semi-secret agencies. Thus in -a general way, as I have outlined, did the National Socialist Party -succeed in putting Nazi policies into effect through its dummy, -through the machinery of the State, the Reichsregierung, in its -revised form.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I think it might be helpful if Your Honors will permit me to -point out on this chart the large number of instances in which the -defendants’ names reappear in connection with the functions of the -Government of the Reich.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Now, first of all, the Reichsregierung itself—I am sorry to say -in that connection that there is one omission, a very important -omission. It is the name of the Vice Chancellor under Hitler, -Von Papen, who was Vice Chancellor from the seizure of power -until some time around the purge in June 1934.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Your Honors will see a grouping of Reich Ministers with portfolio, -and under it of Ministers without portfolio, in which mostly -<span class='pageno' title='174' id='Page_174'></span> -the names of the defendants in court are listed. There are State -Ministers listed acting as Reich Ministers, and you will note the -name of the Defendant Frank. There are other participants in -Cabinet meetings, among which you will notice the name of the -Defendant Von Schirach.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Now, this whole line on which the Cabinet hangs is the level -of the Reich Cabinet, and as I have stated, organizations that grew -out of this maternal organism, the Reichsregierung.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>To the left the Secret Cabinet Council includes the names of -the defendants. Still further to the left is the delegate for the Four -Year Plan. And over to the very end is the Reichstag, of which -the President was the Defendant Göring, and the leader of the -Reichstagsfraktion, the Defendant Frick.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>If we proceed to the right of the median line, we have the Reich -Defense Council, with Hitler himself as chairman, the Reich -Defense Committee under it, and the Ministerial Council for the -Defense of the Realm, which grew out of the Reich Defense Council. -And we see mostly the names of Cabinet ministers, including, -if I may advert to that fact, particularly the names of purely military -leaders, such as the Defendant Raeder and the Defendant -Keitel.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>And farther to the right, all names mentioned as defendants -in these proceedings, Schacht, the first Plenipotentiary for War -Economy, later succeeded by Funk; Field Marshal Keitel as the -Chief of the OKW, and the Defendant Frick again as Plenipotentiary -for Administration, in the triangle which became known as -the “Dreierkollegium.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>If we descend the vertical line to the horizontal line in the -middle, we have the various ministries over which these Cabinet -ministers, this Reichsregierung, presided. We have also at the -extreme left and the extreme right, very important and special -offices that were set up at the instigation of the Party, and those -offices reported directly to the Führer himself.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>If I may start at the extreme left, I will point out that as the -civil government moved after the military machine into the lowlands, -the Defendant Seyss-Inquart became the Reichskommissar -for the Netherlands.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>A few names below that of Seyss-Inquart is the name of the -Defendant Von Neurath, the Reichsprotektor for Bohemia and -Moravia, who was later succeeded by the Defendant Frick; and -under those names, the name of the Defendant Frank, the General-gouverneur -of Poland.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Adjoining the box of these administrators who reported directly -to the Reich Chancellor and President was the Foreign Office, -<span class='pageno' title='175' id='Page_175'></span> -presided over first by the Defendant Von Neurath, and subsequently -by the Defendant Von Ribbentrop.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>If we proceed down below the elongation under the smaller -box dealing with German legations, there should, of course, in -any itemized, detailed treatment of that box appear the name of -the Defendant Von Papen, the representative of the Reich in -Austria for a time, and later in Turkey.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The next box on the horizontal line is the Ministry of Economics, -(the Reichswirtschaftsministerium). First is the name of the -Defendant Schacht, followed by the name of the Defendant Göring, -and by the name of the Defendant Funk.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The next box, the Ministry for Armament and War Production -(the Reichsministerium für Rüstung und Kriegsproduktion), was -presided over by the Defendant Speer. And out of this organization, -and subordinate to it, in the box devoted to the Organization -Todt, again the name of the Defendant Speer, who succeeded Todt -to the leadership of that organization upon the death of Todt.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Two boxes over, the Ministry of Justice, if Your Honors will -follow me, down close to the bottom of the page to the last left-hand -box, appearing under the Ministry of Justice, is the Reichsrechtsanwaltskammer—I -am sorry, the box next to the bottom at -the left which is devoted to the Academy for German Law (Die -Akademie für deutsches Recht), over which the Defendant Frank -presided for a time.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Almost at the vertical line, the Air Ministry, of which the -Defendant Göring was Oberkommandant; and next to it again the -Ministry of the Interior, presided over by the Defendant Frick.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>If Your Honors will follow me again to the bottom of all the -squares to the small horizontal line at the bottom of the Ministry -of the Interior, we come to certain state officials, called “Reich -Governors” (Reichsstatthalter). And if those boxes were sufficiently -detailed there would appear thereon the names, among others, of -the Defendant Sauckel, who besides being the Gauleiter of Thuringia, -was also the Reichsstatthalter or Governor there. There -would also appear the name of the Defendant Von Schirach, who -was not only the Gauleiter of Vienna, but also the State representative -there—the Governor—the Reichsstatthalter of Vienna.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>And springing out of the Ministry of the Interior is the box or -boxes devoted to the German police, and in the first sub-division -appearing to the right, the Chief of the Security Police and SD, the -name of the Defendant Kaltenbrunner.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In the Ministry of Propaganda, about midway down in this box, -appears the name of the Defendant Fritzsche, who, although as the -chart is drawn, would not appear in the position of one of the -<span class='pageno' title='176' id='Page_176'></span> -chief directing heads of the Ministry, actually was very much -more important than his position there will indicate; and proof -will be submitted to Your Honors in support of that contention.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>At the end of the horizontal line is the Ministry for the Occupied -Eastern Territories (the Reichsministerium für die Besetzten -Ostgebiete) of which the Defendant Rosenberg was the head.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>And to the right of that box, among the agencies immediately -subordinate to Hitler as Reichskanzler and President, there is the -office of General Inspector for Highways, with the name of the -Defendant Speer associated with it; the General Inspector for -Water and Energy, again with the name of the Defendant Speer -associated with it.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>There follows the Reich Office for Forestry (the Reichsforstamt) -under the Defendant Göring; the Reichsjugendführer (the leader of -the Reich Youth), the Defendant Von Schirach; the Reich Housing -Commissioner (Reichswohnungskommissar), the late Defendant -Robert Ley; and among the subsequent agencies, that of the important -Reichsbank, over which the Defendant Schacht presided, -to be succeeded subsequently by the Defendant Funk; the General -Inspector for the Reich Capital (Generalbauinspekteur für die -Reichshauptstadt), the Defendant Speer.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I think I have named all of the defendants as they appear on -this chart, and of those now before Your Honors in this cause I think -they all appear on this chart in one capacity or another, in one or -more capacities,—all, I might add, except the Defendant Jodl. Jodl -was the Chief of Staff of all the Armed Forces. He was the head -of the Wehrmacht Führungsstab, and in the chart as evidential -material which will be subsequently brought before Your Honors, -the name Jodl will figure prominently in connection with the -organization of the Armed Forces.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>If I may make one correction at this point, a slip of the tongue -that was called to my attention, in discussing the chart of the Party, -in the small box to the left containing the designates of the Führer -to succeed him to the Party leadership, I made the statement that -Göring succeeded Hess as Führer-designate. Actually, when the -designations were announced by the Führer, Göring was always the -first designate, and the Defendant Hess the second.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In Annex A of the Indictment the various offices, Party functions, -and State offices which these defendants held in the course of -the period under discussion, these various offices are mentioned. -And we would like to submit at this time and offer into evidence -as exhibits proof of the offices that were occupied by these defendants. -This proof consists of 17 statements, more or less, signed by -<span class='pageno' title='177' id='Page_177'></span> -the defendants themselves and/or their counsel, certifying to the -Party and State offices that they have held from time to time. Some -of these statements were not as complete as we desired to have -them, and we have appended thereto a statement showing such -additional offices or proof of Party membership as was available -to us. I would like to offer those into evidence.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. ALBRECHT: And now, if Your Honors please, I offer into -evidence the two charts to which my remarks have been addressed -in the course of the morning.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Will counsel for the United States continue -the evidence until half past 12?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. STOREY: If Your Honor please, it lacks 2 minutes until -half past 12. Mr. Albrecht has finished, and will it be convenient -for Your Honors for Major Wallis to start at 2 o’clock?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Very well.</p> - -<p class='line' style='text-align:center;margin-top:2em;margin-bottom:2em;'>[<span class='it'>The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours.</span>]</p> - -<hr class='pbk'/> - -<h2><span class='pageno' title='178' id='Page_178'></span><span class='it'>Afternoon Session</span></h2> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. STOREY: If the Tribunal please, Major Frank Wallis will -now present the briefs and documents supporting the briefs in -behalf of the phase of the case known as the Common Plan or -Conspiracy, up through 1939.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Major Wallis.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MAJOR FRANK B. WALLIS (Assistant Trial Counsel for the -United States): Mr. President, members of the Tribunal:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>It will be my purpose to establish most of the material allegations -of the Indictment running from Paragraph IV on Page 3, to -Subparagraph E on Page 6. The subjects involved are:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The aims of the Nazi Party, their doctrinal techniques, their rise -to power, and the consolidation of control over Germany between -1933 and 1939 in preparation for aggressive war.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>This story has already been sketched by the American Chief -Prosecutor. Moreover, it is history, beyond challenge by the defendants. -For the most part, we rely upon the Tribunal to take judicial -notice of it. What we offer is merely illustrative material—including -statements by the defendants and other Nazi leaders—laws, decrees, -and the like. We do not need to rest upon captured documents or -other special sources, although some have been used.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>For the convenience of the court and Defense counsel, the -illustrative material has been put together in document books, and -the arguments derived from them have been set out in trial briefs.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I intend only to comment briefly on some of the materials and -to summarize the main lines of the briefs.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>What is the charge in Count One?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The charge in Count One is that the defendants, with divers -other persons, participated in the formulation or execution of a -Common Plan or Conspiracy to commit, or which involved the -commission of Crimes against Humanity (both within and without -Germany), War Crimes, and Crimes against Peace.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The charge is, further, that the instrument of cohesion among -the defendants, as well as an instrument for the execution of the -purposes of the conspiracy, was the Nazi Party, of which each -defendant was a member or to which he became an adherent.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The scope of the proof which I shall offer is:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>First, that the Nazi Party set for itself certain aims and objectives, -involving basically the acquisition of “Lebensraum”, or -living space, for all “racial” Germans.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Second, that it was committed to the use of any methods, -whether or not legal, in attaining these objectives, and that it did -in fact use illegal methods. -<span class='pageno' title='179' id='Page_179'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>Third, that it put forward and disseminated various lines of -propaganda, and used various propaganda techniques to assist it in -its unprincipled rise to power.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Fourth, that it ultimately did seize all governmental power in -Germany.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Fifth, that it used this power to complete the political conquest -of the State, to crush all opposition, and to prepare the nation -psychologically and otherwise for the foreign aggression upon -which it was bent from the outset.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In general we undertake to outline, so far as relevant to the -charge, what happened in Germany during the pre-war period, -leaving it to others to carry the story and proof through the war -years.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The aims of this conspiracy were open and notorious. It was -far different from any other conspiracy ever unfolded before a -court of justice, not only because of the gigantic number of people -involved, the period of time covered, the magnitude and audacity -of it, but because, unlike other criminal conspirators, these -conspirators often boastfully proclaimed to the world what they -planned to do, before they did it.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>As an illustration, Hitler, in his speech of 30 January 1941, -said:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“My program was to abolish the Versailles Treaty. It is -futile nonsense for the rest of the world to pretend today -that I did not reveal this program until 1933 or 1935 or 1937. -Instead of listening to the foolish chatter of emigres, these -gentlemen would have been wiser to read what I have -written thousands of times. No human being has declared or -recorded what he wanted more than I. Again and again I -wrote these words, ‘The abolition of the Treaty of Versailles’.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>First, a brief reference to the history of the Nazi Party.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The Court will no doubt recollect that the National Socialist -Party had its origin in the German Labor Party, which was -founded on 5 January 1919 in Munich. It was this organization -which Hitler joined as seventh member on 12 September 1919. At -a meeting of the German Labor Party held on 24 February 1920, -Hitler announced to the world the “25 Theses” that subsequently -became known as the “unalterable” program of the National -Socialist German Workers Party.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>A few days later, on 4 March 1920, the name of the German -Labor Party was changed to the “National Socialist German -Workers Party,” frequently referred to as the NSDAP, or Nazi -Party. It is under that name that the Nazi Party continued to -<span class='pageno' title='180' id='Page_180'></span> -exist until its dissolution after the collapse and unconditional surrender -of Germany in 1945.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The disagreements and intrigues within the Party between Hitler’s -followers and those who opposed him were finally resolved -on 29 July 1921, when Hitler became “First Chairman” and was -invested with extraordinary powers. Hitler immediately reorganized -the Party and imposed upon it the Führerprinzip—the -leadership principle—of which you will hear more later. Thereafter -Hitler, the Führer, determined all questions and made all -decisions for the Party.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The main objectives of the Party, which are fastened upon the -defendants and their co-conspirators by reason of their membership -in, or knowing adherence to the Party, were openly and -notoriously avowed. They were set out in the Party program of -1920, were publicized in <span class='it'>Mein Kampf</span> and in Nazi literature generally, -and were obvious from the continuous pattern of public action -of the Party from the date of its founding.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Now two consequences, of importance in the Trial of this case, -derive from the fact that the major objectives of the Party were -publicly and repeatedly proclaimed:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>First, the Court may take judicial notice of them.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Second, the defendants and their co-conspirators cannot be -heard to deny them or to assert that they were ignorant of them.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The Prosecution offers proof of the major objectives of the -Party—and hence of the objectives of the conspiracy—only to -refresh or implement judicial recollection. The main objectives -were:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>First, to overthrow the Treaty of Versailles and its restrictions -on military armament and activity in Germany;</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Second, to acquire territories lost by Germany in World War I;</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Third, to acquire other territories inhabited by so-called “racial -Germans”;</p> - -<p class='noindent'>and</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Fourth, to acquire still further territories said to be needed as -living space by the racial Germans so incorporated—all at the -expense of neighboring and other countries.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In speaking of the first aim, Hitler made an admission which -applied equally to the other aims, namely, that he had stated and -written a thousand times or more that he demanded the abolition -of the Versailles Treaty.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>These aims are fully documented in the evidence offered by the -Prosecution on this phase of the case, and it is not my purpose at -this time to recite to the Court numerous declarations made by the -defendants and others with respect to these aims. -<span class='pageno' title='181' id='Page_181'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>Moreover, these conspirators again and again publicly announced -to the still unbelieving world that they proposed to accomplish these -objectives by any means found opportune, including illegal means -and resort to threat of force, force, and aggressive war. The use -of force was distinctly sanctioned, in fact guaranteed, by official -statements and directives of the conspirators which made activism -and aggressiveness a political quality obligatory for Party -members. As Hitler stated in <span class='it'>Mein Kampf</span>:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“What we needed and still need are not a hundred or two -hundred reckless conspirators, but a hundred thousand and -a second hundred thousand fighters for our philosophy of -life.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>In 1929 Hitler stated:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“We confess further that we will tear anyone to pieces who -would dare hinder us in this undertaking. Our rights will -be protected only when the German Reich is again supported -by the point of the German dagger.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Hitler, in 1934, addressing the Party Congress at Nuremberg, -stated the duties of Party members in the following terms:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“Only a part of the people will consist of really active fighters. -It is they who were fighters of the National Socialist -revolution. Of them, more is demanded than of the millions -among the rest of the population. For them it is not sufficient -to confess, ‘I believe’, but to swear, ‘I fight’.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>In proof of the fact that the Party was committed to the use -of any means, whether or not legal or honorable, it is only necessary -to remind the Court that the Party virtually opened its public -career by staging a revolution—the Munich Putsch of 1923.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Now let us consider for a moment the doctrinal techniques of -the Common Plan or Conspiracy which are alleged in the Indictment.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>To incite others to join in the Common Plan, or Conspiracy and -as a means of securing for the Nazi conspirators the highest degree -of control over the German community, they disseminated and -exploited certain doctrines.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The first of these was the “master race” doctrine—that persons -of so-called “German blood” were a master race. This doctrine -of racial supremacy was incorporated as Point 4 in the Party -program, which provided:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“Only a member of the race can be a citizen. A member of -the race can only be one who is of German blood without -consideration of confession. Consequently, no Jew can be a -member of the race.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'><span class='pageno' title='182' id='Page_182'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>They outlined this master race doctrine as a new religion—the -faith of the blood—superseding in individual allegiance all -other religions and institutions. The Defendant Rosenberg and the -Defendant Streicher were particularly prominent in disseminating -this doctrine. Much of the evidence to be offered in this case will -illustrate the Nazi conspirators’ continued espousal and exploitation -of this master race doctrine.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>This doctrine had an eliminatory purpose. Call anything “non-German” -or Jewish, and you have a clear right, indeed a duty, to -cast it out. In fact purges did not stop at so-called racial lines, but -went far beyond.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The second important doctrine which permeates the entire -conspiracy and is one of the important links in establishing the -guilt of each of these defendants is the doctrine or concept of the -Führerprinzip, or leadership principle.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>This doctrine permeated the Nazi Party and all its formations -and allied organizations and eventually permeated the Nazi State -and all institutions, and is of such importance that I would like to -dwell upon it for a few moments and attempt to explain the concepts -which it embraces.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The Führerprinzip embodies two major political concepts:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>1. Authoritarianism;</p> - -<p class='pindent'>2. Totalitarianism.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Authoritarianism implies the following: All authority is concentrated -at the top and is vested in one person only, the Führer. -It further implies that the Führer is infallible as well as omnipotent. -The Party manual states:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>“Under the Commandments of the National Socialists: The -Führer is always right. . . .”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Also, there are no legal or political limits to the authority of -the Führer. Whatever authority is wielded by others is derived -from the authority of the Führer. Moreover, within the sphere of -jurisdiction allotted to him, each appointee of the Führer manipulates -his power in equally unrestricted fashion, subordinate only -to the command of those above him. Each appointee owes unconditional -obedience to the Führer and to the superior Party -leaders in the hierarchy.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Each Political Leader was sworn in yearly. According to the -Party manual, which will be introduced in evidence, the wording -of the oath was as follows:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“I pledge eternal allegiance to Adolf Hitler. I pledge unconditional -obedience to him and the Führer appointed by -him.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'><span class='pageno' title='183' id='Page_183'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>The Party manual also provides that:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“The Political Leader is inseparably tied to the ideology and -the organization of the NSDAP. His oath only ends with his -death or with his expulsion from the National Socialist Community.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>As the Defendant Hans Frank stated in one of his publications:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“Leadership principle in the administration means:</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“Always to replace decision by majority, by decision on the -part of a specific person with clear jurisdiction and with sole -responsibility to those above, and to entrust to his authority -the realization of the decision to those below.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>And finally the concept of authoritarianism contained in the -Führerprinzip implies: The authority of the Führer extends into -all spheres of public and private life.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The second main concept of the Führerprinzip is totalitarianism -which implies the following:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The authority of the Führer, his appointees, and through them, -of the Party as a whole, extends into all spheres of public and -private life.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The Party dominates the State.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The Party dominates the Armed Forces.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The Party dominates all individuals within the State.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The Party eliminates all institutions, groups, and individuals -unwilling to accept the leadership of its Führer.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>As the Party manual states:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“Only those organizations can lay claim to the institution of -the leadership principle and to the National Socialist meaning -of the State and people in the National Socialist meaning -of the term, which . . . have been integrated into, supervised -and formed by the Party and which, in the future, -will continue to do so.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>The manual goes on to state:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“All others which conduct an organizational life of their own -are to be rejected as outsiders and will either have to adjust -themselves or disappear from public life.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Illustrations of the Führerprinzip and its application to the -Party, the State and allied organizations are fully set forth in the -brief and accompanying documents, which will be offered in -evidence.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The third doctrine or technique employed by the Nazi conspirators -to make the German people amenable to their will and -aims was the doctrine that war was a noble and necessary activity -of Germans. The purpose of this doctrine was well expressed by -Hitler in <span class='it'>Mein Kampf</span> when he said: -<span class='pageno' title='184' id='Page_184'></span></p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“The question of restoration of German power is not a -question of how to fabricate arms, but a question of how to -create the spirit which makes a people capable of bearing -arms. If this spirit dominates a people, the will finds a -thousand ways to secure weapons.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Hitler’s writings and public utterances are replete with declarations -rationalizing the use of force and glorifying war. The following -is typical, when he said:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“Always before God and the world, the stronger has the -right to carry through his will. History proves it! He who -has no might has no use for right.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>As will be shown in subsequent proof, this doctrine of the glorification -of war played a major part in the education of the German -youth of the pre-war era.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I now offer the documents which establish the aims of the Nazi -Party and their doctrinal techniques. I also have for the assistance -of the Court and Defense Counsel, briefs which make the argument -from these documents.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I now direct your attention to the rise to power of the Nazi -Party.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The first attempt to acquire political control was by force. In -fact at no time during this period did the Party participate in any -electoral campaigns, nor did it see fit to collaborate with other -political. . . .</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Major Wallis, have you got copies of these -for defendants’ counsel?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MAJOR WALLIS: In Room 54, Sir.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Well, they will be wanting to follow them -now.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MAJOR WALLIS: Mr. President, my remarks, which I am -proceeding toward, will cover an entirely different subject than in -the briefs before you. The briefs cover what I have already said, -Sir.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Are you depositing a copy of these briefs -for each of the defendants’ counsel?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MAJOR WALLIS: I am informed, if Your Honor pleases, that -the same procedure has been followed with respect to these briefs -as has been followed with respect to the documents, namely, a -total of six has been made available to the defendants in Room 54. -If Your Honor does not deem that number sufficient, I feel sure that -I can give assurance, on behalf of the Chief Prosecutor of the -United States, that before the close of the day an ample supply -of copies will be there for use. -<span class='pageno' title='185' id='Page_185'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal thinks that the Defense -Counsel should each have a copy of these briefs.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MAJOR WALLIS: That will be done, Sir.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Members of the Defense Counsel: You will -understand that I have directed on behalf of the Tribunal that you -should each have a copy of this brief.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: We are very grateful for this directive, but none of -us has seen any of these documents so far. I assume and hope that -these documents will be given to the Defense in the German -translation.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes, Major Wallis.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MAJOR WALLIS: I now direct your attention to the rise to -power of the Nazi Party.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The 9th of November 1923 warranted the end as well as the -beginning of an era. On the 9th of November occurred the -historical fact popularly known as the Hitler Putsch. During the -night of November 8th to 9th Hitler, supported by the SA under -the Defendant Göring, at a meeting in Munich, proclaimed the -National Revolution and his dictatorship of Germany, and announced -himself as the Chancellor of the Reich. On the following -morning the duly constituted authorities of the State, after some -bloodshed in Munich, put an end to this illegal attempt to seize the -Government. Hitler and some of his followers were arrested and -tried, and sentenced to imprisonment.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The new era in the National Socialist movement commences -with Hitler’s parole from prison in December 1924. With the -return of its leader, the Party took up its fight for power once -again. The prohibitions invoked by the Government against the -Nazi Party at the time of the Munich Putsch gradually were -removed and Hitler the Führer of the Party, formally announced -that in seeking to achieve its aims to overthrow the Weimar -Government, the Party would resort only to “legal” means. A -valid inference from these facts may well be suggested, namely -that the Party’s resort to “legality” was in reality only a condition -on which it was permitted to carry on its activities in a democratically -organized state. But consistent with its professed resort to -“legality”, the Party now participated in the popular elections of -the German people and generally took part in political activity. -At the same time it engaged in feverish activity to expand the -Party membership, its organizational structure and activities. The -SA and the SS recruited numerous new members. Hitler’s <span class='it'>Mein -Kampf</span> appeared in 1925. The Hitler Youth was founded. Newspapers -were published, among them the <span class='it'>Völkischer Beobachter</span> of -<span class='pageno' title='186' id='Page_186'></span> -which the Defendant Rosenberg was editor, and <span class='it'>Der Angriff</span> -published by Goebbels, later the notorious Minister of Propaganda -and Public Enlightenment. Meetings of other political parties were -interfered with and broken up, and there was much street brawling.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The results of the Party’s attempt to win political power made -little headway for a number of years, despite the strenuous efforts -exerted to that end. In 30 elections in which the National Socialists -participated from 1925 to 1930 for seats in the Reichstag and in the -Landtage or Provincial Diets of the various German states, the -Nazis received mandates in but 16 and gained no seats at all in 14 -elections. The National Socialist vote in the 1927 elections did not -exceed 4 per cent of the total number of votes cast. The year 1929 -marks the first modest success at the polls in the State of Thuringia. -The Nazi received over 11 per cent of the popular vote, -elected 6 representatives out of the total of 53 to the Diet, and the -Defendant Frick became Minister of Interior of Thuringia, the first -National Socialist chosen to ministerial rank.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>With such encouragement and proof of the success of its -methods to win support, the Nazi Party redoubled its traditional -efforts (by means of terror and coercion). These met with some -rebuff on the part of the Reich and various German states. Prussia -required its civil servants to terminate their membership in the -Party and forbade the wearing of brown shirts, which were worn -by the SA of the Party. Baden likewise ruled against the wearing -of brown shirts, and Bavaria prohibited the wearing of uniforms -by political organizations. New National Socialist writings appeared -in Germany. The new <span class='it'>National Socialist Monthly</span> appeared under -the editorship of the Defendant Rosenberg, and shortly thereafter, -in June 1930, Rosenberg’s <span class='it'>Myth of the 20th Century</span> was published.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Against this background—President Von Hindenburg having -meanwhile dissolved the Reichstag when Chancellor Brüning -failed to obtain a vote of confidence—Germany moved to the polls -once more on the 14th September 1930. By this election their -representation in the Reichstag was increased from 12 seats to 107 -seats out of a total of 577.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The new Reichstag met and 107 Nazis marched into the session -dressed in brown shirts. Rowdy opposition at once developed, intent -on causing the fall of the Brüning Cabinet. Taking advantage -of the issues caused by the then prevailing general economic distress, -the Nazis sought a vote of non-confidence and dissolution of -the Reichstag. Failing in these obstructionary tactics, the Nazis -walked out on the Reichstag. -<span class='pageno' title='187' id='Page_187'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>With 107 members in the Reichstag the Nazi propaganda increased -in violence. The obstruction by the Nazi deputies of the Reichstag -continued with the same pattern of conduct. Repeatedly motions -of non-confidence in Brüning and for dissolution of the Reichstag -were offered and were lost. And after every failure the Nazi members -stalked out of the chamber anew.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>By spring of 1932, Brüning’s position became untenable and the -Defendant Von Papen was appointed Chancellor. The Reichstag was -dissolved and new elections held in which the Nazis increased the -number of their seats to 230 out of a total of 608. The Nazi Party -was becoming a strong party in Germany, but it had failed to -become the majority party. The obstructive tactics of the Nazi -deputies in the Reichstag continued, and by the fall of 1932 -Von Papen’s Government was no longer able to continue. President -Von Hindenburg again dissolved the Reichstag, and in the new elections -of November the Nazi representation in the Reichstag actually -decreased to 196 seats. The short-lived Von Schleicher Government -then came into being—it was the 3rd December 1932—and by -the end of January 1933 it went out of existence. With the support -of the Nationalist Party under Hugenberg and other political assistance, -Hitler became Chancellor of Germany by designation of -Von Hindenburg.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>That is the end of the prologue, as it were, to the dramatic and -sinister story that will be developed by the Prosecution in the course -of this Trial. Let it be noted here, however, and remembered, as -the story of the misdeeds and crimes of these defendants and their -fellow conspirators are exposed, that at no time in the course of -their alleged “legal” efforts to gain possession of the State, did the -conspirators represent a majority of the people.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Now it is commonly said that the Nazi conspirators “seized control” -when Hitler became Chancellor of the German Republic on -30 January 1933. It may be more truly said that they seized control -upon securing the passage of the Law for the Protection of the -People and the State on 24 March 1933. The steps leading to this -actual seizure of power are worthy of recital. The Nazi conspirators -were fully cognizant of their lack of control over the legislative -powers of the republic. They needed, if they were to carry out the -first steps of their grand conspiracy under the cloak of law, an -enabling act which, would vest supreme legislative power in Hitler’s -Cabinet, free from all restraints of the Weimar constitution. Such -an enabling act however required a change in the constitution -which, in turn, required two-thirds of the regular members of the -Reichstag to be present, and at least two-thirds of the votes of those -present. -<span class='pageno' title='188' id='Page_188'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>The time-table of events leading up to the passage of this enabling -act, known as the Law for the Protection of the People and -the State, is as follows:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>1. On January 30th, 1933 Hitler held his first Cabinet meeting -and we have the original minutes of that meeting, which will be -offered in evidence. The Defendants Von Papen, Von Neurath, Frick, -Göring, and Funk were present. According to the minutes of this -meeting, Hitler pointed out that the adjournment of the Reichstag -would be impossible without the collaboration of the Center Party. -He went on to say:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“We might, however, consider suppressing the Communist -Party to eliminate its votes in the Reichstag and by this -measure achieve a majority in the Reichstag.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>He expressed the fear, however, that this might result in a general -strike. The Reich Minister of Economy, according to these -official minutes, stated that in his opinion, it was impossible to avoid -the suppression of the Communist Party of Germany, for, if that -were not done they could not achieve a majority in the Reichstag, -certainly not a majority of two-thirds; that, after the suppression -of the Communist Party, the passage of an enabling act through -the Reichstag would be possible. The Defendant Frick suggested -that it would be best initially to request an enabling law from the -Reichstag. At this meeting Hitler agreed to contact representatives -of the Center Party the next morning to see what could be done -by way of making a deal with them.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>2. The next event in this time-table was the Reichstag fire on -the 28th of February 1933.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>3. Taking advantage of the uncertainty and unrest created by -the Reichstag fire, and the disturbances being created by the SA, -the provisions of the Weimar constitution guaranteeing personal -freedom, and other personal liberties were suspended by a decree -of the Reich President on February 28, 1933.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Then on 5th of March 1933, elections to the Reichstag were held. -The Nazis acquired 288 seats out of a total of 647.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>On the 15th of March 1933, another meeting of the Reich Cabinet -was held, and we also have the original official minutes of that -meeting which bears the initials, opposite their names, of the defendants -who were present at that meeting, signifying that they -have read—I contend that it is a reasonable inference to state that -it signifies that they read these minutes and approved them. The -following defendants were present at this meeting: Von Papen, -Von Neurath, Frick, Göring, and Funk. At this meeting, according -to these official minutes Hitler stated that the putting over of the -enabling act in the Reichstag by a two-thirds vote would, in his -<span class='pageno' title='189' id='Page_189'></span> -opinion, meet with no opposition. The Defendant Frick pointed out -that the Reichstag had to ratify the enabling act with a constitutional -majority within three days, and that the Center Party had -not expressed itself negatively. He went on to say that the enabling -act would have to be broadly conceived in a manner to allow for -deviation from the provisions of the Constitution of the Reich. He -further stated that as far as the constitutional requirements of a -two-thirds majority was concerned, a total of 432 delegates would -have to be present for the ratification of the enabling act. The Defendant -Göring expressed his conviction at this meeting that the -enabling act would be ratified with the required two-thirds vote for, -if necessary, the majority could be obtained by refusing admittance -to the Reichstag of some Social Democrats.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Now on the 20th of March another Cabinet meeting was held, -and we also have the official, original records of this meeting which -will be offered in evidence. The Defendants Frick, Von Papen, -Von Neurath, Göring, and Funk were present. The proposed enabling -act was again the subject of a discussion. Hitler reported -on the conference he had completed with the representatives of the -Center Party. The Defendant Neurath proposed a note concerning -the arrangement to be agreed to by the representatives of the Center -Party. The Defendant Frick expounded to the meeting the contents -of the draft of the proposed law, and further stated that -changes in the standing orders or rules of the Reichstag were also -necessary, that an explicit rule must be made that unexcused absent -delegates be considered present, and if that was done it would -probably be possible to ratify the enabling act on the following -Thursday in all three readings.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>It is interesting to note that among the things recorded in the -official minutes of this Cabinet meeting was the Defendant Göring’s -announcement that he had ordered SA troops on the Polish border -to be cautious and not to show themselves in uniform, and that the -Defendant Neurath recommended also that the SA be cautious, -especially in Danzig. In addition, the Defendant Neurath pointed -out that Communists in SA uniforms were being caught continuously. -These stool pigeons had to be hanged. Justice had to find -means and ways to make possible such punishment for Communist -stool pigeons, according to the Defendant Neurath.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>On 14th March 1933 the Defendant Frick announced:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“When the Reichstag meets the 21st of March, the Communists -will be prevented by urgent labor elsewhere from participation -in the session. In concentration camps they will be -re-educated for productive work. We will know how to render -<span class='pageno' title='190' id='Page_190'></span> -harmless permanently, sub-humans who don’t want to be -re-educated.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>During this period, taking advantage of the decree suspending -constitutional guarantees of freedom, a large number of Communists, -including Party officials and Reichstag deputies, and a smaller -number of Social Democrat officials and deputies, were placed in -protective custody. On 23 March 1933, in urging the passage of the -enabling act, Hitler stated before the Reichstag:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“It is up to you gentlemen, to make the decision now. It will -be for peace or war.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>On 24 March 1933 only 535 out of the regular 747 deputies of -the Reichstag were present. The absence of some was unexcused; -they were in protective custody in concentration camps. Subject to -the full weight of the Nazi pressure and terror, the Reichstag passed -an enabling act known as the “Law for the Protection of the People -and State,” with a vote of 441 in favor. This law marks the real -seizure of political control by the conspirators. Article 1 provided: -that the Reich laws can be enacted by the Reich Cabinet. Article 2 -provided: the National laws enacted by the Reich Cabinet may deviate -from the constitution. Article 3 provided: National Laws enacted -by the Reich Cabinet are prepared by the Chancellor and -published in the Reichsgesetzblatt. Article 4 provided: Treaties of -the Reich with foreign states, which concern matters of national -legislation, do not require the consent of the parties participating in -legislation. The Reich Cabinet is empowered to issue the necessary -provisions for the execution of these treaties.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Thus the Nazis acquired full political control, completely unrestrained -by any provision of the Weimar constitution.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I now offer the documents which establish the facts which I have -just stated, and I also present, for the assistance of the Court and -the Defense Counsel, the briefs covering this portion of the case.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I wish to speak to Major Wallis. Would it -be possible for the Prosecution to let defendants’ counsel have at -least one copy between each two of them here in court? If not -today, then tomorrow?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. STOREY: If the Tribunal please, there has been some misunderstanding -and the briefs were delivered to the Defendants’ -Document Room. We have sent for some of them and they should -be here shortly. However, Sir, in all fairness the briefs themselves -are not in the German language, because we had intended to take -the trial brief and the lawyers follow it over the translating system -and thus, when it was finished, it would be translated into all languages. -<span class='pageno' title='191' id='Page_191'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>However, in order to shorten the proceeding, Major Wallis has -made a summary, and he is giving the summary and will offer the -documents in evidence and later the briefs, as needed, to the Tribunal, -and to Defense Counsel, and unfortunately, in the rush of -time, they have been put down in the Defendants’ Document Room -and we have sent for some of them. We understand, also, if the -Tribunal please, that Dr. Kempner approached some of the distinguished -counsel for the Defense, and learned that a great many -of them not only speak English, but understand it when they read -it, and to save the tremendous physical burden on facilities, the -briefs have not, as yet, been translated into German. If there is -objection, the only thing we can do is to withhold them at this -time, but we understood it would be agreeable to pass them to them -in English, and that is what we propose to do at the present moment, -and have German speaking officers in the Document Room -who will translate for any of them who may not be able to read -German—pardon me, to read English.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: I have one request. We are here, as German Defense -Counsel, and in face of great difficulties. These proceedings are conducted -according to Anglo-American customs. We are doing our -best to make our way through these principles, and would be very -grateful if the President would take into consideration our difficult -situation.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I have heard—I am not quite sure if it was right—that according -to these Anglo-American principles, it is necessary to prepare -objections immediately, if one has any objections to the contents -of a document, and that this is not possible unless one does -it at once. This is a point on which I would like to make my request. -I am convinced that both the trial brief and the documents will be -made available to us, and we will see if we can have a German -translation of one or the other. If this trouble can be spared, if the -Defense Counsel needs a translation, we shall have it, but I should -like—I have one request—that we have leisure to raise an objection -later when we have had a chance to discuss it. I think in -that way we shall easily overcome the difficulties raised by the -present situation, and we are trying to cooperate in order to overcome -any difficulties.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal is glad that defendants’ counsel -are making efforts to cooperate in the Trial. After the adjournment, -the Tribunal will consider the best method of providing defendants’ -counsel with as many translations as possible, and you are right in -thinking that you will be able to make objections to any document -after you have had time to consider it.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Thank you, Sir. -<span class='pageno' title='192' id='Page_192'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>MAJOR WALLIS: Having acquired full political control, the -Nazi conspirators now proceeded to consolidate their power, and at -this point I would like to impress upon the Tribunal once again -that with the exception of a very few documents, the subject matter -of my remarks is within the purview of judicial notice of the Court, -a matter of history well known to these defendants and their counsel. -Their first step in the consolidation of power was ruthlessly to -purge their political opponents by confining them to concentration -camps or by murder. Concentration camps made their first appearance -in 1933 and were first used as means of putting political -opponents out of circulation by confining them to a so-called “protective -custody.” This system of concentration camps grew and -expanded within Germany. At a subsequent stage in these proceedings -full and complete evidence of the concentration camp -system and the atrocities committed therein will be presented to the -Court, both by documents and films.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Illustrative documentary evidence of the arrest, mistreatment, -and murder by the Nazi conspirators of their political opponents -is contained in the documentary evidence offered by the United -States.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>As an illustration, affidavit of Raymond H. Geist, former American -Consul and First Secretary of the Embassy in Berlin from 1929 -to 1938, states (which will be offered):</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“Immediately in 1933, the concentration camps were established -and put under charge of the Gestapo. Only political -prisoners were held in concentration camps.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“The first wave of terroristic acts began in March 1933, more -particularly from March 6 to 13, 1933, accompanied by unusual -mob violence. When the Nazi Party won the elections -in March 1933, the accumulated passion blew off in wholesale -attacks on the Communists, Jews, and others suspected of -being either. Mobs of SA men roamed the streets, beating up, -looting and even killing persons.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“For Germans taken into custody by the Gestapo there was -a regular pattern of brutality and terror. All over Germany -victims were numbered by the hundred thousand.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>On the 30th of June and 1 and 2 July 1934 the conspirators -proceeded to destroy opposition within their own ranks by wholesale -murder. In discussing this purge, the Defendant Frick stated, -in an affidavit under oath, signed on the 19th day of November -1945, in the presence of his Defense Counsel, as follows. This is -document number 2950-PS. It has not yet been introduced in evidence, -Sir: -<span class='pageno' title='193' id='Page_193'></span></p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“Himmler, in June of 1934, was able to convince Hitler that -Röhm wanted to start a Putsch. The Führer ordered Himmler -to suppress the Putsch which was supposed to take place at -the Tegernsee, where all of the SA leaders were coming together. -For northern Germany, the Führer gave the order to -suppress the Putsch to Göring.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Frick goes on to say:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“Pursuant to this order, a great many people were arrested -and something like a hundred, and possibly more, were even -put to death, accused of high treason; all this was done without -judicial process.” They were just killed on the spot. -Many people were killed—I don’t know how many—who -actually did not have anything to do with the Putsch. People -who just weren’t liked very well as, for instance, Schleicher, -the former Reich Chancellor, were killed. Schleicher’s wife -was also killed. Also Gregor Strasser, who had been the Reich -Organization Leader and second man in the Party after Hitler. -Strasser, at the time he was murdered, was not active in -political affairs any more; he had however separated himself -from the Führer in November or December of 1932”.</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Frick goes on to say:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“The SS was used by Himmler for the execution of these -orders to suppress the Putsch.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>During this period the conspirators created, by a series of decrees -of the Reich Cabinet, a number of new political crimes. Any act or -statement contrary to the Nazi Party was deemed to be treason and -punished accordingly. The formations of the Party, the SA, SS, as -well as the SD and the Gestapo, were the vicious tools used in the -extermination of all opposition, real or potential. As the Defendant -Göring said on July 24th, 1933—I refer to Document Number -2494-PS, which will be introduced in evidence:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“Whoever in the future raises a hand against a representative -of the National Socialist movement or of the State, must -know that he will lose his life in a very short while. Furthermore, -it will be entirely sufficient, if he is proven to have -intended the act, or, if the act results not in a death, but -only in an injury.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>The Defendant Frank stated, in a magazine of the Academy for -German Law, 1936, which will be introduced as Document Number -2533-PS, as follows:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“By the world we are blamed again and again because of the -concentration camps. We are asked, ‘Why do you arrest without -a warrant of arrest?’ I say, ‘Put yourself into the position -of our nation.’ Don’t forget that the very great and still untouched -<span class='pageno' title='194' id='Page_194'></span> -world of Bolshevism cannot forget that we have -made final victory for them impossible in Europe, right here -on German soil.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>And Raymond Geist, whose affidavit I previously referred to, -being Document Number 1759-PS, states:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“The German people were well-acquainted with what was -happening in concentration camps, and it was well known -that the fate of anyone too actively opposed to any part of -the Nazi program was liable to be one of great suffering. Indeed, -before the Hitler regime was many months old, almost -every family in Germany had received first-hand accounts of -the brutalities inflicted in the concentration camps from someone, -either in the family circle or in the circle of friends who -had served a sentence, and consequently the fear of such -camps was a very effective brake on any possible opposition.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>And as the Defendant Göring said in 1934,—and I refer to -Document Number 2344-PS, which will be offered in evidence:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“Against the enemies of the State, we must proceed ruthlessly -. . . therefore the concentration camps have been created, -where we have first confined thousands of Communist -and Socialist Democrat functionaries.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>In addition to ruthlessly purging all political opponents, the Nazi -conspirators further consolidated their position by promptly proceeding -to eliminate all other political parties. On 21 March 1933, -the Defendant Frick announced that the Communists would be prevented -from taking part in the Reichstag proceedings. This was -accomplished, as has been pointed out, by placing them in “protective -custody in concentration camps.” On the 26th May 1933 a -Reich Cabinet decree, signed by Hitler and the Defendant Frick, provided -for the confiscation of the Communist property. On 22 June -1933 the Social Democratic Party was suppressed in Prussia, it previously -having been seriously weakened by placing a number of -its members in concentration camps. On the 7th of July 1933 a -Reich decree eliminated Social Democrats from the Reichstag and -from the governing bodies of the provinces and municipalities. On -the 14 of July 1933, by a decree of the Reich Cabinet, the property -of the Social Democrats was confiscated, and the Nazi Party was -constituted as the sole political party in Germany, and thereupon -it became illegal to maintain or to form any other political party. -Thus, Hitler was able to say within hardly more than 5 months -after becoming Chancellor, I quote: “The Party has become the -State.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The Nazi conspirators immediately proceeded to make that statement -a recorded fact, for on the 1st of December 1933 the Reich -<span class='pageno' title='195' id='Page_195'></span> -Cabinet issued a law for “Securing the Unity of Party and State.” -This law was signed by Hitler and the Defendant Frick.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Article 1 provided that the Nazi Party:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“. . . is the bearer of the concept of the State and is inseparably -the State. It will be a part of the public law. Its organization -will be determined by the Führer.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Article 2 provided:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“The Deputy of the Führer and the Chief of Staff of the SA -will become members of the Reich Cabinet in order to insure -close cooperation of the offices of the Party and SA with -public authorities.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Article 3 provided:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“The members of the National Socialist German Workers -Party and the SA (including their subordinate organizations) -as the leading and driving force of the National Socialist State -will bear greater responsibility toward Führer, People, and -State.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='line' style='text-align:center;margin-top:2em;margin-bottom:2em;'>[<span class='it'>A recess was taken.</span>]</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. STOREY: During the recess defendants’ counsel and the -Prosecution arrived at an agreement for the furnishing of briefs to -the defendants, which I understand to be this:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Copies of the documents offered in evidence in German will be -delivered in the Defendants’ Information Center, with the understanding -that if any Defense Counsel needs to show the German -photostatic copy to his client he may do so in the defendants’ counsel -room adjacent thereto; that the briefs which we are passing to -the Tribunal as an aid will likewise be passed to defendants’ counsel -in English, and that if any of them have trouble in the translation -of any portion of the briefs, we have German-speaking officers in -the Defendants’ Information Center who will assist counsel. I understand -that all of these defendants’ counsel have so agreed.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Thank you. Now, Major Wallis.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MAJOR WALLIS: May it please the Court, at the moment of -recess I was referring to the law which was passed on 1 December -1933, for securing the unity of Party and State.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Article 6 of that law provided:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“The public authorities have to grant legal and administrative -assistance to the offices of the Party and the SA which are -entrusted with the execution of the jurisdiction of the Party -and SA.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Article 8 provided:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“The Reich Chancellor as Führer of the National Socialistic -German Workers Party and, as the supreme commander of -<span class='pageno' title='196' id='Page_196'></span> -the SA, will issue the regulations necessary for the execution -and augmentation of this law, particularly with respect to the -organization and procedure of the jurisdiction of the Party -and SA.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='noindent'>Thus by this law the Nazi Party became a para-governmental -organization in Germany.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The further merger of the Party and State occurred on the death -of Hindenburg. Instead of holding an election to fill the office of -President, the merger of the offices of President and Chancellor, in -the person of Hitler, was accomplished by the law of 1 August 1934, -signed by the entire Reich Cabinet. One of the significant consequences -of this law was to give to Hitler the supreme command of -the German Armed Forces, always a prerequisite of the presidency, -and every soldier was immediately required to take an oath of -loyalty and unconditional obedience to Hitler. On 4 February 1938 -Hitler issued a decree which stated in part—and I quote from -Document Number 1915-PS, which will be offered in the document -book at the close of my remarks—as follows: “From now on, I take -over directly the command of the whole Armed Forces.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>As a further step in the consolidation of their political control, -the Nazi conspirators reduced national elections to mere formalities -devoid of the element of freedom of choice. Elections, properly -speaking, could not take place under the Nazi system. In the first -place, the basic doctrine of the Führerprinzip dictated that all subordinates -must be appointed by their superiors in the Government -hierarchy. Although it had already become the practice, in 1938 it -was specifically provided by law that only one list of candidates -was to be submitted to the people. By the end of this pre-war -period little of substance remained in the election law. The majority -of the substantive provisions had become obsolete.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>By a series of laws and decrees the Nazi conspirators reduced -the powers of regional and local governments and substantially -transformed them into territorial subdivisions of the Reich Government. -With the abolition of representative assemblies and elective -officials in the Länder and the municipalities, regional and local -elections ceased to exist. On 31 January 1934 the last vestiges of -Land independence was destroyed by the Law for the Reconstruction -of the Reich. The Defendant Frick, Minister of the Interior -throughout this period, has written of this Law for the Reconstruction -of the Reich as follows:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“The reconstruction law abolished the sovereign rights and -executive powers of the Länder and made the Reich the sole -bearer of the rights of sovereignty. The supreme powers of -the Länder do not exist any longer. The natural result of this -<span class='pageno' title='197' id='Page_197'></span> -was the subordination of the Land government to the Reich -Government and the Land ministers to the corresponding -Reich ministers. On 30 January, 1934 the German Reich became -one state.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Another step taken by the Nazi conspirators in consolidating -their political power was the purge of civil servants on racial and -political grounds and their replacement by Party members and -supporters. This purge was accomplished through a series of Nazi -laws and decrees. The first was on 7 April 1933, entitled: “Law for -the Restoration of the Professional Civil Service.” Article 3 of the -law applied the Nazi blood and master race theories in providing -that officials who were not of Aryan descent were to be retired. -The political purge provision of the law is contained in Article 4, -and I quote:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“Officials who, because of their previous political activities, -do not offer security that they will assert themselves for the -National State without reservations may be dismissed.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='noindent'>The effect of this law and the decrees and regulations issued -thereunder was to fill every responsible position in the Government -with a Nazi and to prevent the appointment of any applicant opposed, -or suspected of being opposed, to the Nazi program and -policy.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Even the judiciary did not escape the purge of the Nazi conspirators. -All judges who failed to fulfill the racial and political -requirements of the conspirators were quickly removed. In addition, -the Nazis set up a new system of special criminal courts independent -of the regular judiciary and directly subservient to the Party program. -Moreover, the Nazis controlled all judges through special directives -and orders from the central Government, their aim being, as -expressed by one Gerland, one of the leading Nazi lawyers of that -time: “. . . to make the word ‘terrorization’ in the penal law respectable -again.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>As their control was consolidated, the conspirators greatly enlarged -existing State and Party organizations and established an -elaborate network of new formations and agencies. The Party spread -octopus-like throughout all of Germany. This process of growth was -summed up late in 1937 in an official statement of the Party Chancellery, -as follows:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“In order to control the whole German nation in all spheres -of life”—and I repeat, in order to control the whole German -nation in all spheres of life—“the NSDAP, after assuming -power, set up under its leadership, the new Party formations -and affiliated organizations.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'><span class='pageno' title='198' id='Page_198'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>At this point I would like to offer to the Court the document -book which contains the laws and conditions which I have referred -to in this part of my presentation together with the briefs covering -this part of it.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Labor unions:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I would like to direct the Tribunal’s attention to some case -histories in the consolidation of control by the conspirators.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The first case history in the consolidation of the Nazi conspirators’ -control of Germany is the destruction of the free trade -unions and the obtaining of control over the productive labor capacity -of the German nation.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The position of organized labor in Germany, at the time of the -Nazi seizure of power, the obstacles they afforded to the Nazi plans, -the speed with which they were destroyed, the terror and maltreatment -ranging from assault to murder of union leaders, were fully -outlined in the opening address of the Chief Prosecutor of the United -States, and are fully set forth in the document book which I will -present to the Court on this phase of the case.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The result achieved by the Nazi conspirators is best expressed in -the Words of Robert Ley. Ley’s confidence in the Nazis’ effective -control over the productive labor capacity of Germany in peace or -in war was declared as early as 1936 to the Nuremberg Party Congress. -I refer to Document 2283-PS which is included in the document -book which will be presented on this phase of the case. He -stated:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“The idea of the factory troops is making good progress in -the plants, and I am able to report to you, my Führer, that -security and peace in the factories has been guaranteed, not -only in normal times, but also in times of the most serious -crisis. Disturbances, such as the munitions strikes of the traitor -Ebert and confederates, are out of the question. National -Socialism has conquered the factories. Factory troops are the -National Socialist shock troops within the factory, and their -motto is: The Führer is always right.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>At this time I would like to offer to the Court the document book -containing the documents on this phase of the case, namely, “The -destruction of labor unions and the gaining of control of all productive -labor in Germany,” together with the brief on that subject. -At the same time, if it please the Court, I would like to offer the -document book concerning the consolidation of control with respect -to the utilization and molding of political machinery, which is, in -law, a decree which I referred to just prior to my discussion of the -destruction of labor unions. -<span class='pageno' title='199' id='Page_199'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>I would now direct your attention to the second case history in -the consolidation of control.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The Nazi conspirators early realized that the influence of the -Christian churches in Germany was an obstacle to their complete -domination of the German people and contrary to their master race -dogma. As the Defendant Martin Bormann stated in a secret decree -of the Party Chancellery signed by him and distributed to all Gauleiter -on 7 June 1941—it is identified as Document Number D-75 -and will be included in the document book which will be presented -to the Court—he stated as follows:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“More and more must the people be separated from the churches -and their organizations and pastors .... Not until this has -happened does the State leadership have influence on the -individual citizens.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Accordingly, the Nazi conspirators, seeking to subvert the influence -of the churches over the people of Germany, proceeded to -attempt to eliminate these churches:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>1. By promoting beliefs and practices incompatible with Christian -teachings.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>2. By persecuting priests, clergy, and members of monastic -orders. This persecution, as the documentary evidence will show, -ran the gauntlet of insults and indignities, physical assault, confinement -in concentration camps, and murder.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>3. By the confiscation of church properties.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>4. By suppressing religious publications.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>5. By the suppression of religious organizations. In addition, -they also suppressed religious education. This is illustrated by the -secret decree of the Party Chancellery which I just referred to in -Document D-75, when the Defendant Bormann stated:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“No human being would know anything of Christianity if it -had not been drilled into him in his childhood by his pastors. -The so-called “dear God” in no wise gives knowledge of His -existence to young people in advance, but in an astonishing -manner, in spite of His omnipotence, leaves this to the efforts -of the pastors. If, therefore, in the future our youth learns -nothing more of this Christianity, whose doctrines are far -below ours, Christianity will disappear by itself.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>At a subsequent stage in these proceedings, additional documentary -evidence of the acts of the conspirators in their attempt to -subvert the influence of the Christian churches will be offered. At -this time I offer the document book in support of this phase of the -case together with the accompanying brief. -<span class='pageno' title='200' id='Page_200'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>We now come to what might be called the third case history, -the persecution of the Jews. The Nazi conspirators adopted and -publicized a program of ruthless persecution of Jews.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>It is not our purpose at this time to present to the Court a full -and complete story, in all its sickening details, of the Nazi -conspirators’ plans and acts for the elimination and liquidation of -the Jewish population of Europe. This will be done in due course, -at a subsequent stage of these proceedings, but it is our purpose at -this time to bring before you, as one of the elements in the Nazi -scheme for the consolidation of their control of Germany, the action -which was planned and taken with respect to the Jews within -Germany during the pre-war period.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>As a means of implementing their master race policy and as a -means of rallying otherwise discordant elements behind the Nazi -banner, the conspirators adopted and publicized a program of -relentless persecution of Jews. This program was contained in the -official, unalterable 25 points of the Nazi Party, of which 6 were -devoted to the master race doctrine. The Defendants Göring, Hess, -Rosenberg, Frank, Frick, Streicher, Funk, Schirach, Bormann, and -others, all took prominent parts in publicizing this program. Upon -the Nazis coming into power, this Party program became the official -State program.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The first organized act was the boycott of Jewish enterprises on -1 April 1933. The Defendant Streicher, in a signed statement, -admits that he was in charge of this program only for one day. -We, of course, reserve the right to show additional evidence with -respect to that fact. The Nazi conspirators then embarked upon a -legislative program which was gradual and which dates from -7 April 1933 until September 1935. During this period a series of laws -was passed removing the Jews from civil service, from the professions -and from the schools and military service.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>It was clear, however, that the Nazi conspirators had a far -more ambitious program for the Jewish problem and only put off -its realization for reasons of expediency. After the usual propaganda -barrage, in which the speeches and writings of the Defendant -Streicher were most prominent, the Nazi conspirators initiated the -second period of anti-Jewish legislation, namely, from 15 September -1935 to September 1938. In this period the infamous Nuremberg -Laws were passed, depriving the Jews of their rights as -citizens, forbidding them to marry Aryans, and eliminating them -from additional professions. In the autumn of 1938 the Nazi -conspirators began to put into effect a program of complete elimination -of the Jews from German life. The measures taken were -partly presented as a retaliation against world Jewry in connection -<span class='pageno' title='201' id='Page_201'></span> -with the killing of a German embassy official in Paris. Unlike the -boycott action in April 1933, when care was taken to avoid -extensive violence, an allegedly spontaneous pogrom was staged -and carried out all over Germany. The legislative measures which -followed were discussed and approved in their final form at a -meeting on 12 November 1938 under the chairmanship of the -Defendant Göring, with the participation of the Defendants Frick -and Funk and others. I refer to Document 1816-PS, which will -appear in the document book. The meeting was called following -Hitler’s orders “requesting that the Jewish question be now, once -and for all, coordinated and solved one way or the other.” The -participants agreed on measures to be taken for the elimination of -the Jew from German economy. The laws issued in this period -were signed mostly by the Defendant Göring in his capacity as -Deputy of the Four Year Plan, and were thus strictly connected -with the consolidation of control of the German economy and -preparation for aggressive war. These laws obliged all German -Jews to pay a collective fine of 1 billion Reichsmarks; barred the -Jews from trades and crafts; limited movement of Jews to certain -localities and hours; limited the time for the sale or liquidation of -Jewish enterprises; forced Jews to deposit shares and securities -held by them; forbade the sale or acquisition of gold or precious -stones by a Jew; granted landlords the right to give notice to -Jewish tenants before legal expiration of the leases; and forced all -Jews over 6 years of age to wear the Star of David.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In the final period of the anti-Jewish crusade of the Nazi -conspirators within Germany, very few legislative measures were -passed. The Jews were just delivered to the SS, Gestapo, and the -various extermination staffs. The last law dealing with Jews in -Germany put them entirely outside the law and ordered the confiscation -by the State of the property of dead Jews. This law was -a weak reflection of a factual situation already in existence. As -Dr. Stuckart, assistant to the Defendant Frick, stated, at the time:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“The aim of the racial legislation may be regarded as already -achieved and consequently the racial legislation as essentially -closed. It led to the temporary solution of the Jewish problem -and at the same time essentially prepared for the final -solution. Many regulations will lose their practical importance -as Germany approaches the achievement of the final goal on -the Jewish problem.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Hitler, on January 30, 1939, in a speech before the Reichstag, -made the following prophesy: “The result (of a war) will be the -annihilation of the Jewish race in Europe.” -<span class='pageno' title='202' id='Page_202'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>I will leave to others in this case the task of presenting to the -Court the evidence as to how well that prophesy was fulfilled.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I would now offer to the Court the document book which -contains the laws referred to, with respect to the persecution of the -Jews, and the brief outlining that subject.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will now adjourn until -10 o’clock tomorrow morning.</p> - -<p class='line' style='text-align:center;margin-top:2em;margin-bottom:2em;'>[<span class='it'>The Tribunal adjourned until 23 November 1945 at 1000 hours.</span>]</p> - -<hr class='pbk'/> - -<div><span class='pageno' title='203' id='Page_203'></span><h1>FOURTH DAY<br/> <span style='font-size:smaller'>Friday, 23 November 1945</span></h1></div> - -<h2 class='nobreak'><span class='it'>Morning Session</span></h2> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. OTTO NELTE (Counsel for Defendant Keitel): Mr. President, -you advised the Defense in yesterday’s session that the Defense -should already at this stage of the Trial raise objections if they -believe they have any against the documentary evidence introduced -by the Prosecution.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The Chief Prosecutor introduced in Court yesterday a graphic -presentation concerning the Reich Ministries and other bureaus and -offices at the highest level of the German Government. My client -is of the opinion that this presentation is erroneous in the following -respects which concern his own person:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>1. A Reich Defense Council has never existed. The Reich Defense -Law, which provided for a Reich Defense Council in the event of -war, has never been published; a session of a Reich Defense Council -has never taken place. For this reason, the Defendant Keitel was -never a member of a Reich Defense Council.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>2. The Secret Cabinet Council which was to be created in accordance -with the law of February 4, 1938, never came into existence. -It was never constituted; it never held a session.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>3. The Defendant Keitel never was Reich Minister. Like the -Commanders-in-Chief of the Army and the Navy, he merely had the -rank of a Reich Minister. Consequently, he never was a Minister -without portfolio either. He did not participate in any advisory -Cabinet session.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I should like to ask the Court for its opinion as to whether these -objections may be made the object of an examination at this stage -of the Trial or whether they are to be reserved for a later stage?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal rules that the documents are -admissible, but the defendants can prove at a later stage any matters -which are relevant to the documents. It is not necessary for -the defendants to make objections at this stage. At a later stage -they can prove any matters which are relevant to the weight of -the documents.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: May I ask the Tribunal a question?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>We have now been able to see, in part, the briefs and documents -which were introduced in court yesterday. In that connection we -<span class='pageno' title='204' id='Page_204'></span> -have established that some of the documents submitted by the -Prosecution yesterday were not quoted in their entirety, nor were -they presented in substance. My question now is: Shall the contents, -the entire contents, of all the documents which were presented -to Court form the basis for the Court’s decision, even in cases where -the Prosecutor who presented the documents did not refer to their -contents?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In other words, must we consider all of the documents presented -in Court—including those the contents of which were not verbally -referred to—as a basis for the judgment and, consequently, should -they be examined with a view to determining whether the defendants -wish to raise any objections?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Finally I wish to ask the Tribunal whether the entire contents -of all the documents which were submitted to the Court yesterday, -and which may possibly be submitted in the future, are to be understood -by us as a basis for judgment even if the Prosecution does -not present them word for word or in substance or refer to them -in any other way.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Every document, when it is put in, becomes -a part of the record and is in evidence before the Tribunal, but it -is open to the defendants to criticize and comment upon any part -of the document when their case is presented.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Thank you. The question is clarified herewith.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: There are three announcements which I have -to make on behalf of the Tribunal; and the first is this:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>That we propose that the Tribunal shall not sit on Saturday -morning in this week, in order that defendants’ counsel may have -more time for the consideration of the documents and arguments, -which have been made up to that time. That is the first matter.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The second matter is that the Tribunal desires that all motions -and applications shall, as far as practicable, be made in writing, -both by the Prosecution and by the Defense. There are occasions, -of course, such as this morning when motions and applications for -the purposes of explanation, are more conveniently made orally, but -as far as practicable, it is the desire of the Tribunal that they shall -be made in writing, both by the Prosecution and by the Defense.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>And the other matter is an observation, which the Tribunal -desires me to make to the Prosecution, and to suggest to them that -it would be more convenient to the Tribunal and possibly also to -the Defense, that their briefs and volumes of documents should be -presented to the Tribunal before Counsel speaking begins that -branch of the case, so that the brief and volume of documents -should be before the Tribunal whilst Counsel is addressing the Tribunal -<span class='pageno' title='205' id='Page_205'></span> -upon that branch of the case; and also that it would be -convenient to the Tribunal—if it is convenient to Counsel for the -Prosecution—that he should give a short explanation—not a -prolonged explanation—of the documents, which he is presenting -to the Court, drawing their attention to any passages in the documents, -which he particularly wishes to draw attention to.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I will call upon the Chief Prosecutor for the United States to -continue his address.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. STOREY: May it please the Tribunal, yesterday afternoon -it appeared that there was some question about the identification -of documents formally offered in evidence yesterday. -Therefore, with the Tribunal’s permission I should like to offer -them by number, formally, so that the Clerk can get them on his -record and may be identified, with Your Honors’ permission.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The United States—and may I say, Sir, that we offer each one -of these exhibits in evidence, requesting that they be received and -filed as evidence for the United States of America, with the understanding -that Defense Council may later interpose objections. If -that is agreeable, Sir, the first is United States Exhibit Number 1, -the affidavit of Major William H. Coogan, concerning the capture, -processing and authentication of documents, together with Robert -G. Storey’s accompanying statement:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>United States Exhibit Number 2, being 2903-PS, being the Nazi -Party chart, together with authentication certificates;</p> - -<p class='pindent'>United States Exhibit Number 3, 2905-PS, the Nazi State chart, -together with authentication certificates;</p> - -<p class='pindent'>United States Exhibit Number 4, 2836-PS, the original statement -of Defendant Göring as to positions held;</p> - -<p class='pindent'>United States Exhibit Number 5, Document 2829-PS, the same, -concerning Defendant Ribbentrop. . . .</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Could not all this be done by the General -Secretary . . . the numbering of these documents?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. STOREY: Yes, Sir, that is correct. That is agreeable with -us, Sir, but the General Secretary raised the question that it was -not in the record. We have the complete tabulation describing each -document by number, and if it is agreeable with Your Honors, I -will offer the description on this page, correctly describing, by -exhibit number, each one that was offered in evidence yesterday.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: We will authorize the General Secretary to -accept the documents so numbered.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. STOREY: Thank you, Sir. The tabulation referred to is -set forth in the following words and figures: -<span class='pageno' title='206' id='Page_206'></span></p> - -<table id='tab7' summary='' class='center'> -<colgroup> -<col span='1' style='width: 35em;'/> -</colgroup> -<tr><td class='tab7c1 tdStyle2'>USA-1, Major Coogan’s affidavit with Colonel Storey’s statement;</td></tr> -<tr><td class='tab7c1 tdStyle2'>USA-2, 2903-PS, Nazi Party chart and authenticating papers;</td></tr> -<tr><td class='tab7c1 tdStyle2'>USA-3, 2905-PS, Nazi State chart and authenticating papers;</td></tr> -<tr><td class='tab7c1 tdStyle2'>USA-4, 2836-PS, original statement of Göring’s positions;</td></tr> -<tr><td class='tab7c1 tdStyle2'>USA-5, 2829-PS, original statement of Ribbentrop’s positions;</td></tr> -<tr><td class='tab7c1 tdStyle2'>USA-6, 2851-PS, original statement of Rosenberg’s positions;</td></tr> -<tr><td class='tab7c1 tdStyle2'>USA-7, 2979-PS, original statement of Frank’s positions;</td></tr> -<tr><td class='tab7c1 tdStyle2'>USA-8, 2978-PS, original statement of Frick’s positions;</td></tr> -<tr><td class='tab7c1 tdStyle2'>USA-9, 2975-PS, original statement of Streicher’s positions;</td></tr> -<tr><td class='tab7c1 tdStyle2'>USA-10, 2977-PS, original statement of Funk’s positions;</td></tr> -<tr><td class='tab7c1 tdStyle2'>USA-11, 3021-PS, original statement of Schacht’s positions;</td></tr> -<tr><td class='tab7c1 tdStyle2'>USA-12, 2887-PS, original statement of Dönitz’s positions;</td></tr> -<tr><td class='tab7c1 tdStyle2'>USA-13, 2888-PS, original statement of Raeder’s positions;</td></tr> -<tr><td class='tab7c1 tdStyle2'>USA-14, 2973-PS, original statement of Von Schirach’s positions;</td></tr> -<tr><td class='tab7c1 tdStyle2'>USA-15, 2974-PS, original statement of Sauckel’s positions;</td></tr> -<tr><td class='tab7c1 tdStyle2'>USA-16, 2965-PS, original statement of Jodl’s positions;</td></tr> -<tr><td class='tab7c1 tdStyle2'>USA-17, 2910-PS, original statement of Seyss-Inquart’s positions;</td></tr> -<tr><td class='tab7c1 tdStyle2'>USA-18, 2980-PS, original statement of Speer’s positions;</td></tr> -<tr><td class='tab7c1 tdStyle2'>USA-19, 2972-PS, original statement of Von Neurath’s positions;</td></tr> -<tr><td class='tab7c1 tdStyle2'>USA-20, 2976-PS, original statement of Fritzsche’s positions.</td></tr> -</table> - -<p class='pindent'>Document books:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>USA-A, Common Objectives, Methods, and Doctrines of Conspiracy;</p> - -<p class='pindent'>USA-B, The Acquiring of Totalitarian Control over Germany; -Political; First Steps; Control Acquired;</p> - -<p class='pindent'>USA-C, Consolidation of Control; (Utilization and Molding of -Political Machinery);</p> - -<p class='pindent'>USA-F, Purge of Political Opponents; Terrorization;</p> - -<p class='pindent'>USA-G, Destruction of Trade Unions and Acquisition of Control -over Productive Labor Capacity in Germany;</p> - -<p class='pindent'>USA-H, Suppression of the Christian Churches in Germany;</p> - -<p class='pindent'>USA-I, Adoption and Publication of the Program for Persecution -of the Jews.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>May it please the Tribunal, Mr. Justice Jackson called my attention—while -we are offering all of these on behalf of the United -States, naturally they are for the benefit and on the behalf of all -the other nations who are cooperating in this case.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: That is understood.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MAJOR WALLIS: May it please the Court, when we adjourned -yesterday afternoon, I was in the process of developing the various -means by which these conspirators acquired a totalitarian control -of Germany. I wish to continue on that subject this morning, and -I will first discuss the reshaping of education and the training of -youth; and in accordance with Your Honors’ suggestion, I offer -<span class='pageno' title='207' id='Page_207'></span> -the document book, United States Exhibit D, and would call to the -Court’s attention that this book contains translations of the documents -which we rely upon with respect to this portion of the case. -These documents consist of German writings, German speeches -of the defendants and other Nazi leaders, and are matters that we -suggest are clearly within the purview of judicial notice of the -Court. And in the brief which is offered for the assistance of the -Court in connection with this subject, the exact portions of the -documents which are desired to be brought to the attention of the -Tribunal are set forth either by quotation from the documents, or -by reference to the specific page number of the documents.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Meanwhile, during this entire pre-war period, the nation was -being prepared psychologically for war, and one of the most -important steps was the reshaping of the educational system so as -to educate the German youth to be amenable to their will. Hitler -publicly announced this purpose in November 1933, and I am quoting -from Document 2455-PS. He said:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“When an opponent declares, ‘I will not come over to your -side, and you will not get me on your side’, I calmly say, -‘Your child belongs to me already. A people lives forever. -What are you? You will pass on. Your descendants, however, -now stand in the new camps. In a short time they will know -nothing else but this new community’.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>He further said in May 1937, and I refer to Document Number -2454-PS:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“This new Reich will give its youth to no one, but will itself -take youth and give to youth its education and its own -upbringing.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>The first steps taken in making the German schools the tools -of the Nazi educational system were two decrees in May 1934, -whereby the Reich Ministry of Education was established and the -control of education by local authorities was replaced by the -absolute authority of the Reich in all educational matters. These -decrees are set out in Documents 2078-PS, 2088-PS, 2392-PS. Thereafter, -the curricula and organization of the German schools and -universities were modified by a series of decrees in order to make -these schools effective instruments for the teaching of Nazi -doctrines.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The Civil Service Law of 1933, which was presented in evidence -yesterday, made it possible for the Nazi conspirators to re-examine -thoroughly all German teachers and to remove all “harmful and -unworthy elements”, harmful and unworthy in the Nazi opinion. -Many teachers and professors, mostly Jews, were dismissed and were -replaced with State-spirited teachers. All teachers were required -<span class='pageno' title='208' id='Page_208'></span> -to belong to the National Socialist Teachers’ League, which organization -was charged with the training of all teachers in the theories -and doctrines of the NSDAP. This is set forth in Document 2452-PS. -The Führerprinzip was introduced into the schools and universities. -I refer to Document 2393-PS.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In addition, the Nazi conspirators supplemented the school -system by training the youth through the Hitler Jugend. The law -of the Hitler Jugend, which is set forth in Document 1392-PS, states:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“The German youth, besides being reared within the family -and school, shall be educated physically, intellectually, and -morally in the spirit of National Socialism to serve the people -and community through the Hitler Youth.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>In 1925 the Hitler Youth was officially recognized by the Nazi -Party and became a junior branch of the SA. In 1931 the Defendant -Schirach was appointed Reich Youth Leader of the NSDAP with -the rank of SA Gruppenführer. I refer to Document 1458-PS. In -June 1933 the Defendant Schirach was appointed Youth Leader of -the German Reich. I refer to the same document, 1458-PS. In that -same month, on orders of the Defendant Schirach, the Nazi conspirators -destroyed or took over all other youth organizations. This -was accomplished by force in the first instance. The Defendant -Schirach, by decree dated 22 June, 1933—I refer to Document -2229-PS—dissolved the Reich Committee of the German Youth -Associations and took over their property. By similar decrees, all -of which are set forth in the document book, all the youth organizations -of Germany were destroyed. Then the Nazi conspirators -made membership in the Hitler Jugend compulsory. I refer to -Document 1392-PS.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The Hitler Jugend from its inception had been a formation of -the Nazi Party. By virtue of the 1936 Youth Law, making membership -compulsory, it became an agency of the Reich Government -while still retaining its position as a formation of the Nazi Party. -This is set forth in Document 1392-PS. By 1940 membership in the -Hitler Jugend was over seven million. I refer you to Document -2435-PS. Through the Hitler Jugend the Nazi conspirators imbued -the youth with Nazi ideology. The master race doctrine and anti-Semitism, -including physical attack on the Jews, were systematically -taught in the training program. I refer you to Document 2436-PS. -The Hitler Jugend indoctrinated the youth with the idea that war -is a noble activity. I refer to Document 1458-PS. One of the most -important functions of the Hitler Jugend was to prepare the youth -for membership in the Party and its formations. The Hitler Jugend -was the agency used for extensive pre-military and military training -of youth. I refer to Document 1850-PS. In addition to general -<span class='pageno' title='209' id='Page_209'></span> -military training, special training was given in special formations. -These included flying units, naval units, motorized units, signal -units, et cetera.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The full details with the accompanying documents of the methods -used by the Nazi conspirators in reshaping the educational system -and supplementing it with the Hitler Jugend so as to educate the -German youth to be amenable to the Nazi will and prepare youth -for war are set forth in the document book which has been offered, -and in the accompanying briefs.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Now I would like to direct your attention to the weapon of -propaganda that was used during this period, and for this purpose -I offer United States Exhibit Number E with the accompanying -brief. This document book and the briefs which accompany it. . . .</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Have any copies of these documents been -provided for the Defense Counsel?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. STOREY: I understand, Sir, they have been sent to the -Defendants’ Information Center. I may say, Sir, that with tomorrow -we will have them in advance to everybody, including the Court -and the Defense Counsel.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Very well.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MAJOR WALLIS: This document book and the accompanying -brief is entitled “Propaganda Censorship and Supervision of Cultural -Activities.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>During this period one of the strongest weapons of the conspirators -was propaganda. From the outset they appreciated the -urgency of the task of inculcating the German masses with the -National Socialist principles and ideology. The early utterances of -Hitler and his fellow conspirators evidenced full recognition of the -fact that their power could endure only if it rested on general -acceptance of their political and social views.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Immediately following their accession to power, the Nazi conspirators -instituted a determined program for wholesale organization -of the masses by seizing control of all vehicles of public -expression. The wide-spread use of propaganda by the powerful -machine thus created became a key device in establishing control -over all phases of the German economy, public and private. They -conceived that the proper function of propaganda was to prepare -the ground psychologically for political action and military aggression -and to guarantee popular support of a system which was based -on a permanent and steadily intensified application of terror and -aggression both in the sphere of domestic politics and foreign -relations.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>To attain these objectives, propaganda was used to create -specific thought patterns designed to make the people amenable to -<span class='pageno' title='210' id='Page_210'></span> -the aims and program of the Nazis and to foster their active participation -therein to the greatest extent possible. The nature of this -propaganda is within the judicial purview of the Court. As Goebbels -put it, it was aimed at “the conquest of the masses.” Its intended -effect was the elimination of all serious resistance in the masses. -To achieve this result, as will be shown later in the evidence, the -Nazi conspirators were utterly unscrupulous in their choice of -means, a total disregard of veracity that presented their case purely -from the standpoint of political expediency and their conception of -national self-interest. Inasmuch as propaganda was the means to an -end, “the conquest of the masses,” it required different strategy -at different times, depending on the objectives issued and pursued -by the Nazi conspirators at any given moment. According to Hitler: -“the first task of propaganda is the gaining of people for the future -organization.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The recruiting of people for enlistment in the Party and supervised -organizations was the primary objective in the years preceding -and immediately following the seizure of power. After the -rise to power, this task was broadened to include the enlistment -of the people as a whole for the active support of the regime and -its policies. As the Reich Propaganda Leader of the Party and -Reich Minister for Propaganda, Goebbels stated:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>“Propaganda, the strongest weapon in the conquest of the State, -remains the strongest weapon in the consolidation and building up -of the State.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The methods which they used to control this strongest weapon -in the power of the State are set forth in a chart which I would -like to call to the Court’s attention at this time, and would like to -introduce in evidence as USA Exhibit Number 21.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>As you will note from the chart, there were three separate levels -of control within the German Reich. The first level was the Party -controls, which are represented on the chart by the top block. And -you will see that the Party through its Examining Commission -controlled the books and magazines, and issued books and magazines -setting forth the ideology of the Party.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The second block, the Press Leader Division, supervised all -publishers, headed Party newspapers and book publishers.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The third block, Press Chief,—this office controlled the Press -Political Office, the Press Personnel Office, and supervised Party -treatment of the press and treatment of Party affairs in the press.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The center block, the Office of Propaganda Leader, had under -its control not only the press, but exhibits and fairs, speakers’ -bureaus, films, radio, culture, and other means of expression and -dissemination of the ideology of the Party and its purposes. -<span class='pageno' title='211' id='Page_211'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>The next block, Ideology, was devoted exclusively to the -ideology of the Party headed by the Defendant Rosenberg. It -supplied all the training materials, prepared the curricula for the -schools, and the indoctrination of the people into the ideology of the -Party. On that same level is Youth Education, presided over by -the Defendant Schirach, who had under his control the Hitler Jugend; -and then there were the University Students and Teachers Division -of the Party controls.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>On the next level you have the controls that were exercised -by the State, and reading from left to right you have the Propaganda -Coordination, Foreign Coordination and Cooperation, the -radio, which was under the control of the Defendant Fritzsche, film, -literature, the German press, periodicals, theater, arts, other cultural -things, and the Ministry for Education.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Then, in the last tier, what is known as the corporate controls. -These were under a semi-official control of both the Party and the -State. These are the so-called cultural chambers. Their purpose -was to have full control over the personnel engaged in the -various arts and cultures, and engaged in the preparation -and dissemination of news. First was the press—all reporters -and writers belonged to that section. The next section is the fine -arts, music, theater, film, literature, radio,—then going over into -the Educational Branch the organization which the University -teachers, the students and former corps members of the universities -had to belong to.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>By means of this vast network of propaganda machinery, the -Nazi conspirators had full control over the expression and dissemination -of all thought, cultural activities, and dissemination of -news within the Reich. Nothing was or could be published in Germany -that did not have the approval, express or implied, of the -Party and State. The Defendant Schacht in his personal notes -explains the effect of the killing of a piece of news in a totalitarian -dictatorship. As he states it, it has never become publicly known -that there have been thousands of martyrs in the Hitler regime. -They have all disappeared in the cells or graves of the concentration -camps, without ever having been heard of again; and he goes -on to say, “what is the use of martyrdom in the fight against -terror if it has no chance of becoming known and thus serving as -an example for others.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Before you pass from this subject, there is -a docket on the documents which shows that certain documents -are missing. What does that mean? 1708, 2030.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MAJOR WALLIS: Those documents are in the process of being -reproduced and will be furnished to the Court, I hope, before the -<span class='pageno' title='212' id='Page_212'></span> -close of the day, Sir. They have been added to that book and, as -yet, have not been completed in their process of reproduction.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Thank you. Have they been translated?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MAJOR WALLIS: Yes, Sir, they have been translated, and the -translations are in the process of being reproduced.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Are the documents in their original form in -German?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MAJOR WALLIS: Yes, I believe they are, Sir.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Very well.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MAJOR WALLIS: I would now like to direct the Court’s attention -to the militarization of Nazi-dominated organizations during -this pre-war period and for that purpose I offer United States -Exhibit Number J, which consists of a document book with English -translations, and I present to the Court also a brief which accompanies -this portion of the case.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Throughout this pre-war period, and while the Nazi conspirators -were achieving and consolidating their totalitarian control of Germany, -they did not lose sight of their main objective—aggressive -war. Accordingly, they placed a considerable number of their -dominated organizations on a progressively militarized footing, with -a view to the rapid transformation of these organizations whenever -necessary, as instruments of war. These organizations were the SS, -the SA, the Hitler Jugend, the NSKK (or National Socialist Motor -Corps), the NSFK (which is the National Socialist Aviation Corps), -the RAD (which is the Reich Labor Service), and the OT (which is -the Todt Organization).</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The manner in which the militarization was accomplished is -detailed in part in the documents, which have been presented to -the Court and will be detailed further when the particular organizations -are taken up and discussed and their criminality established -at subsequent stages in the case. At this time, I would like to call -the Court’s attention to a chart, and while the chart is physically -being placed on the board, I would offer United States Exhibit -Number 22, which is Document 2833-PS and is a reproduction of -Page 15 of the book entitled, <span class='it'>History of the Nazi Party</span>. You will note -that on the left lower corner of the chart placed on the board, there -are some papers attached. The top paper is an affidavit which reads -as follows: “I certify that the above enlargement is a true and -correct copy prepared under my direct supervision, of Document -Number 2833-PS, Page 15 of the book entitled <span class='it'>History of the Party</span>,” -and you will note that underneath is a second paper and this -affidavit states it is a correct photographic copy, which appears in -the left-hand corner of the panel. This affidavit is signed by David -Zablodowsky, sworn to and subscribed the 23rd day of November -<span class='pageno' title='213' id='Page_213'></span> -1945 at Nuremberg, Germany, before James H. Johnson, First -Lieutenant, Office of the United States Chief of Counsel.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>This chart visualizes, as vividly as possible, just how this militarization -took place in Germany. The chart is entitled, “The -Organic Incorporation of German Nationals into the National -Socialist System, and the Way to Political Leadership.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Starting at the bottom of the chart, you see the young folk, -between the ages of 10 and 14. The arrows point both right and -left. The arrow to the right is the Adolf Hitler School, for youth -between the ages of 12 and 18. Both from the school and from the -young folk, they proceed to the Hitler Jugend. At 18 years of age, -they graduate from the Hitler Jugend into the various Party -formations, the SA, the SS, the NSKK, the NSFK. At the age of 20, -they continue from these Party formations into the Labor Front, and -from the Labor Front, after they have served their period of time -there, back again to the Party formations, of the SA, the SS, NSKK, -NSFK, until they reach the age of 21. Then they proceed into the -Army, serve in the Army from the ages of 21 to 23, and then -back again into the Party formations of SA, SS, et cetera.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>And then from that group, the select move up to be Political -Leaders (Leiter) of the Nazi Party, and from that group are selected -the cream of the crop who go to the Nazi Party Special Schools and -from these schools, as is represented on the top of the chart, -graduate the political Führer of the people.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I would emphasize again to the Court that this chart is not -anything that was prepared by Counsel in this case. It was prepared -by the Nazi Party people and it comes from their own history.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Thus, by the end of the pre-war period, the Nazi conspirators -had achieved one of the first major steps in their grand conspiracy. -All phases of German life were dominated by Nazi doctrine and -practice and mobilized for the accomplishment of their militant -aims. The extent to which this was accomplished can be no better -expressed than in the words of Hitler when he spoke to the Reichstag -on 20 February 1938. I refer to Document 2715-PS. He said:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“Only now have we succeeded in setting before us the great -tasks and in possessing the material things which are the -prerequisites for the realization of great creative plans in -all fields of our national existence. Thus, National Socialism -has made up with a few years for what centuries before it -had omitted. . . . National Socialism has given the German -people that leadership which as Party not only mobilizes the -nation but also organizes it, so that on the basis of the natural -principle of selection, the continuance of a stable political -leadership is safeguarded forever. . . . National Socialism -<span class='pageno' title='214' id='Page_214'></span> -possesses Germany entirely and completely since the day -when, 5 years ago, I left the house in Wilhelmsplatz as Reich -Chancellor. There is no institution in this state which is -not National Socialist. Above all, however, the National -Socialist Party in these 5 years not only has made the nation -National Socialist, but also has given itself the perfect organizational -structure which guarantees its permanence for -all future. The greatest guarantee of the National Socialist -revolution lies in the complete domination of the Reich and -all its institutions and organizations, internally and externally, -by the National Socialist Party. Its protection against -the world abroad, however, lies in its new National Socialist -armed forces. . . .</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“In this Reich, anybody who has a responsible position is a -National Socialist. . . . Every institution of this Reich is under -the orders of the supreme political leadership. . . . The Party -leads the Reich politically, the Armed Forces defend it militarily. -. . . There is nobody in any responsible position in this -state who doubts that I am the authorized leader of the -Reich.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Thus spoke Adolf Hitler at the end of this period on the 20th -of February 1938.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. STOREY: If the Tribunal please. . . .</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. ALFRED SEIDL (Counsel for Defendant Frank): Mr. -President, may I make a few short remarks in this connection? The -defendants were given, along with the Indictment, a list of the -documents. This list contains the following preamble:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“Each of the defendants is hereby informed that the Prosecution -will use some or all of the documents listed in the -appendix in order to corroborate the points enumerated in -the Indictment.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Now, the Chief Prosecutor introduced in court this morning -about 12 documents and a scrutiny of that list revealed that not -a single one of the documents is mentioned. Thus, already now, -at the very beginning of the Trial, we are confronted with the -fact that not only are documents presented to the Court without -the defendant being acquainted with their contents, but that documents -are being used as documentary evidence which are not even -listed.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Not a single one of these documents is mentioned in the list -and I must confess that an adequate defense is altogether impossible -under these circumstances. I therefore move: -<span class='pageno' title='215' id='Page_215'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>1. That the Tribunal direct the Prosecution to submit a list of -all documents which will be placed before the Court during examination;</p> - -<p class='pindent'>2. To instruct the Prosecution to make available to the defendants -and their counsel—at the latest on the day when documents -are being presented to the Court—a copy of the German text; and</p> - -<p class='pindent'>3. That the main proceedings be suspended until the Prosecution -is in a position to comply with these requests. Otherwise, I, at -least, will not be able to proceed with the defense.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Storey, or Counsel for the Prosecution, -will you say what answer you have to make to this objection?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. STOREY: If the Tribunal please, in the first place practically -every document referred to by Major Wallis is a document -of which the Court would take judicial knowledge. In the second place, -a list of documents was filed in the Defense Information Center on -November 1st. I am not sure as to whether all of these or a part -of them were included. In the third place each attorney presenting -each segment of the case sends down to the Defense Information -Center a list of the documents which he proposes to offer in evidence -upon his presentation. In the fourth place, I wonder if the -Tribunal and Defense Counsel realize the physical problems that -are imposed? I am informed that copies of these documents in -English, as well as copies of the briefs, were delivered either last -night or this morning in defendants’ Information Center. Lastly, -other presentations that follow—we will abide by the Tribunal’s -request: namely, that prior to the presentation the Court will be -furnished with these document books, with these briefs, and -Defense Counsel will also be furnished with them in advance. -The weekend will permit us to do that.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal thinks that the Trial must -now continue without any adjournment, but that in future as soon -as possible the Defendants’ Counsel will be furnished with copies -of the documents which are to be put in evidence.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. ROBERT SERVATIUS (Counsel for Defendant Sauckel): I -should like to present the following: The documents are presented -to the Court also in an English translation. An examination of -these translations should be made available to the Defense. I -point out particularly that the translation of technical terms could -possibly lead to misunderstandings. Moreover, the documents are -provided with an introductory remark and a table of contents. -The Defense should also have opportunity to read through this -table of contents and examine it.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I make the motion that these English translations and their -preliminary remarks be made available to the Defense. -<span class='pageno' title='216' id='Page_216'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Storey, I understood from you that -you proposed to make available to the defendants the trial briefs -which contain certain observations upon the documents put in.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. STOREY: That is right, Sir. They have been, are now, -and will be completed during the weekend, and, as I understood -Defense Counsel were willing for the briefs to be furnished in -English, and if they want a translation, there will be German -speaking officers in defendants’ Information Center at their service. -I understood that was agreeable yesterday.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. STOREY: Now sir, while I am on my feet, and in order -to obviate some misapprehension, for the benefit of Defense Counsel, -when we refer to document numbers as, say, 1850-PS, in many -instances that is a document which is a copy of a citation or a -decree in the <span class='it'>Reichsgesetzblatt</span>, and, therefore, is not a separate -document of ours, and we have placed in the defendants’ Information -Center ample copies and sets of the <span class='it'>Reichsgesetzblatt</span>, and -I dare say that one-half of the documents referred to in Major -Wallis’ presentation will be found in the <span class='it'>Reichsgesetzblatt</span>, and -I assure Your Honors that over the weekend we will do the utmost -to explain to Defense Counsel and to make available to them all -information that we have and will do so in the future in advance.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Thank you, Colonel Storey. The Tribunal -will now adjourn for 10 minutes.</p> - -<p class='line' style='text-align:center;margin-top:2em;margin-bottom:2em;'>[<span class='it'>A recess was taken.</span>]</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. STOREY: If Your Honors please, the next subject to be -presented is the economic preparation for aggressive war, by Mr. -Dodd.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. THOMAS J. DODD (Executive Trial Counsel for the United -States): May it please the Tribunal, Mr. President and Members -of the Tribunal:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In view of the discussions which took place just before the -recess period, I believe it proper for me to inform the Tribunal -that the documents to which I shall make reference,—a list of those -documents has been lodged in the defendants’ Information Center, -and, as well, photostatic copies of the originals have been placed -there this morning.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>It is my responsibility on behalf of the Chief Prosecutor for the -United States of America to present the proof with reference to the -allegations of the Indictment under Section IV (E), on <a id='rA'/><a href='#fA' style='text-decoration:none'><sup><span style='font-size:0.9em'>[A]</span></sup></a>Page 6 of -the English version of the Indictment, and particularly beginning -<span class='pageno' title='217' id='Page_217'></span> -with the second paragraph under (E), which is entitled, “The -Acquiring of Totalitarian Control in Germany, Economic, and the -Economic Planning and Mobilization for Aggressive War.”</p> - -<hr class='footnotemark'/> - -<div class='footnote'> -<table summary='footnote_A'> -<colgroup> -<col span='1' style='width: 3em;'/> -<col span='1'/> -</colgroup> -<tr><td style='vertical-align:top;'> -<div id='fA'><a href='#rA'>[A]</a></div> -</td><td> - -<p class='pindent'>Page numbers used in references throughout the Proceedings are to the original documents -and do not apply to pagination used in the present volumes.</p> - -</td></tr> -</table> -</div> - -<hr class='footnotemark'/> - -<p class='pindent'>The second paragraph:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“2. They used organizations of German business as instruments -of economic mobilization for war.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“3. They directed Germany’s economy towards preparation -and equipment of the military machine. To this end they -directed finance, capital investment, and foreign trade.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“4. The Nazi conspirators, and in particular the industrialists -among them, embarked upon a huge rearmament program, -and set out to produce and develop huge quantities of -materials of war and to create a powerful military potential.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>The fifth paragraph under that same heading (E), and the -final one in so far as my responsibility goes this morning, is -that which reads:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“With the object of carrying through the preparation for war -the Nazi conspirators set up a series of administrative -agencies and authorities. For example, in 1936 they established -for this purpose the office of the Four Year Plan with -the Defendant Göring as Plenipotentiary, vesting it with -overriding control over Germany’s economy. Furthermore, on -the 28th of August 1939, immediately before launching their -aggression against Poland, they appointed the Defendant -Funk Plenipotentiary for Economics; and on the 30th of -August 1939 they set up the Ministerial Council for the -Defense of the Reich to act as a War Cabinet.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>I will not take the time of this Tribunal to prove what the world -already knows: that the Nazi conspirators rearmed Germany on a -vast scale. I propose to place in evidence the secret records of the -plans and deliberations of the inner councils of the Nazis, which -prove that the reorganization of the German Government, the -financial wizardry of the Defendant Schacht, and the total mobilization -of the German economy largely under the Defendant Schacht, -Göring, and Funk, were directed at a single goal: aggressive war.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I should like to hand to the Court at this point the so-called -document book, which contains the English translation of the -original German document. I do not make an offer at this time of -these documents in evidence, but hand them to the Court for the -purpose of easing the task of the Court in following the discussion -concerning these documents. I might say at this point also that I -should like to submit at a little later date a brief for the assistance -of the Court after I have concluded my remarks before it this -morning. -<span class='pageno' title='218' id='Page_218'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>The significance of the economic measures adopted and applied -by the conspirators can, of course, be properly appraised only if -they are placed in the larger social and political context of Nazi -Germany. The economic measures were adopted while the conspirators -were, as has already been shown, directing their vast -propaganda apparatus to the glorification of war. They were adopted -while the conspirators were perverting physical training into training -for war. They were adopted while, as my colleagues will show, these -conspirators were threatening to use force and were planning to use -force to achieve their territorial and political objects. In short, if -Your Honors please, these measures constitute in the field of -economics and government administration the same preparation for -aggressive war which dominated every aspect of the Nazi State.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In 1939 and 1940 after the Nazi aggression upon Poland, Holland, -Belgium, and France it became perfectly clear to the world that the -Nazi conspirators had created probably the greatest instrument of -aggression in history.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>That machine was built up almost in its entirety in a period -of less than one decade. In May of 1939 Major General George -Thomas, former Chief of the Military-Economic Staff in the Reich -War Ministry, reported that the German Army had grown from -seven Infantry divisions in 1933 to thirty-nine Infantry divisions, -among them four fully motorized and three mountain divisions, -eighteen Corps Headquarters, five Panzer divisions, twenty-two -machine gun battalions. Moreover, General Thomas stated that the -German Navy had greatly expanded by the launching, among other -vessels, of two battleships of 35,000 tons, four heavy cruisers of -10,000 tons, and other warships; further, that the Luftwaffe had -grown to a point where it had a strength of 260,000 men, 21 squadrons, -consisting of 240 echelons, and 33 anti-aircraft batteries.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>He likewise reported that out of the few factories permitted by -the Versailles Treaty there had arisen, and I am quoting, if Your -Honors please, from the document bearing our number EC-28, -which consists of a lecture delivered by Major General Thomas on -the 24th of May 1939 in the Nazi Foreign Office. General Thomas -said in part—or rather he reported—that out of the few factories -permitted by the Versailles Treaty there had arisen:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“. . . the mightiest armament industry now existing in the -world. It has attained the performances which in part equal -the German wartime performances and in part even surpass -them. Germany’s crude steel production is today the largest -in the world after America’s. The aluminum production -exceeds that of America and of the other countries of the -world very considerably. The output of our rifle, machine -<span class='pageno' title='219' id='Page_219'></span> -gun, and artillery factories is at present larger than that of -any other state.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>That quotation, I repeat, was from a document bearing the -lettering “EC” and the number after the dash “28”. It is United -States of America Exhibit 23.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>These results—the results which General Thomas spoke about in -his lecture in May of 1939—were achieved only by making preparation -for war the dominating objective of German economy. And, -to quote General Thomas again, he stated:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“History will know only a few examples of cases where a -country has directed, even in peace time, all its economic -forces so deliberately and systematically towards the requirements -of war, as Germany was compelled to do in the period -between the two World Wars.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>That quotation from General Thomas will be found in the -document bearing our Number 2353-PS. It is another quotation -from General Thomas, but from another writing of his.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The task of mobilizing the German economy for aggressive war -began promptly after the Nazi conspirators’ seizure of power. It -was entrusted principally to the Defendants Schacht, Göring, and -Funk.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The Defendant Schacht, as is well known, was appointed President -of the Reichsbank in March of 1933 and Minister of Economics -in August of 1934. The world did not know, however, that the -responsibility for the execution of this program was entrusted to -the office of the Four Year Plan under the Defendant Göring.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I should now like to call to Your Honors’ attention a document -bearing the number EC-408, and I should also like to refer at this -time to another document for Your Honors’ attention while I discuss -the material—Number 2261-PS.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>And I continue to say that the world did not know, as well, -that the Defendant Schacht was designated Plenipotentiary for the -War Economy on May 21, 1935, with complete control over the -German civilian economy for war production in the Reich Defense -Council, established by a top-secret Hitler decree.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I invite Your Honors’ attention to the Document 2261-PS, -which I referred to a few minutes ago.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The Defendant Schacht recognized that the preparation for war -came before all else for, in a memorandum concerning the problems -of financing rearmament, written on the 3rd of May 1935, he -stated that his comments were based on the assumption that the -accomplishment of the armament program. . . .</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT [Interposing]: Pardon me, but you referred -us to Document 2261. -<span class='pageno' title='220' id='Page_220'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Yes, Your Honor.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: But you haven’t read anything from it.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: I did not; I merely referred the Court to it -since it. . . .</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT [Interposing]: It would help us, I think, if, -when you refer to a document, you refer to some particular -passage in it.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Very well.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I think it must be the middle paragraph in -the document: “The Führer has nominated the President of the -Directorate of the Reichsbank, Dr. Schacht. . . .”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Yes, that is the paragraph to which I wish to make -reference. If Your Honors please, I refer to the second paragraph, -or the middle paragraph, which states, in a letter dated June 24, -1935 at Berlin:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“The Führer and Reich Chancellor has nominated the President -of the Directorate of the Reichsbank, Dr. Schacht, to be -Plenipotentiary General for the War Economy.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>I might point out, in addition to the second paragraph, the last -paragraph of that letter or the last sentence of the letter, which -reads: “I point out the necessity of strictest secrecy once more”—the -letter being signed, “Von Blomberg.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Through Schacht’s financial genius monetary measures were -devised to restore German industry to full production; and through -the control of imports and exports, which he devised under -his plan of 1934, German production was channeled in accordance -with the requirements of the German war machine.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I shall, with the Court’s permission, later discuss the details -of documentary proof of this assertion.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In 1936, with an eye to the experience in the first World War, -the Nazi conspirators embarked on an ambitious plan to make Germany -completely self-sufficient in strategic war materials such as -rubber, gasoline, and steel, in a period of 4 years, so that the -Nazi conspirators would be fully prepared for aggressive war. The -responsibility for the execution of this program was entrusted to -the office of the Four Year Plan under the Defendant Göring—and -at this point I should like to refer to the document bearing the -number and the lettering EC-408. It is dated the 30th day of December -1936, marked “Secret Command Matter”, and entitled the -“Report Memorandum on the Four Year Plan and Preparation of -the War Economy.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>It sets out that the Führer and Reich Chancellor has conferred -powers in regard to mobilization preparations in the economic field -<span class='pageno' title='221' id='Page_221'></span> -that need further definition, and in the third paragraph it refers -specifically to Minister President, Generaloberst Göring as Commissioner -of the Four Year Plan, by authority of the Führer and Reich -Chancellor granted the 18th day of October 1936. The existence of -this program involved the reorganization and control of the whole -German economy for war.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Again referring to Major General Thomas—and specifically to -our document marked EC-27—General Thomas, in a lecture on -the 28th of February 1939, made at the Staff instructor’s course, -stated:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“The National Socialist State, soon after taking over power, -reorganized the German economy in all sections and directed -it towards a military viewpoint, which had been requested by -the Army for years. Due to the reorganization, agriculture, -commerce and professions become those powerful instruments -the Führer needs for his extensive plans, and we can say -today that Hitler’s mobile politics, as well as the powerful -efforts of the Army and economy, would not have been possible -without the necessary reorganization by the National -Socialist Government. We can now say that the economic -organization as a whole corresponds with the needs, although -slight adjustments will have to be made yet. Those reorganizations -made a new system of economics possible which was -necessary in view of our internal and foreign political situation -as well as our financial problems. The directed economy, -as we have it today concerning agriculture, commerce, and -industry, is not only the expression of the present State principles, -but at the same time also the economy of the country’s -defense.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>If Your Honors please, this program was not undertaken in a -vacuum; it was deliberately designed and executed to provide the -necessary instrument of the Nazi conspirators’ plans for aggressive -war.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In September of 1934 the Defendant Schacht frankly acknowledged -to the American Ambassador in Berlin that the Hitler Party -was absolutely committed to war, and the people too were ready -and willing; and that quotation is found in Ambassador Dodd’s diary -and is document bearing our Number 2832-PS and United States -Exhibit Number 29, particularly on page 176 of Ambassador Dodd’s -diary.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>At the same time, the Defendant Schacht promulgated his new -plan for the control of imports and exports in the interest of -rearmament. A year later he was appointed Plenipotentiary for -the War Economy by the top-secret decree referred to a few minutes -ago. -<span class='pageno' title='222' id='Page_222'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>In September 1936 the Defendant Göring announced—at a -meeting attended by the Defendant Schacht and others—that Hitler -had issued instructions to the Reich War Minister on the basis -that the show-down with Russia is inevitable, and added that “all -measures have to be taken just as if we were actually in the stage -of imminent danger of war.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I refer the Court to the document bearing the letters EC-416 and -particularly. . . . Before I discuss the quotation I might indicate that -this document is also marked a secret Reich matter in the minutes -of the Cabinet meeting of the 4th of September 1936, at 12 o’clock -noon. It tells who was present: the Defendant Göring, Von Blomberg, -the Defendant Schacht, and others.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>And on the second page of that document, in the second paragraph, -is found the quotation by the Defendant Göring. It starts -from the basic thought that:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“The show-down with Russia is inevitable. What Russia has -done in the field of reconstruction we too can do.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>On the third page of that document, in the second paragraph, the -Defendant Göring stated: “All measures have to be taken just as if -we were actually in the stage of imminent danger of war.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In the same month the office of the Four Year Plan was created -with the mission of making Germany self-sufficient for war in -4 years. I refer back, at this point, to the Document Number EC-408, -and particularly refer Your Honors to the third paragraph, again, of -that document, where the statement is made as regards the war -economy:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“Minister President Generaloberst Göring sees it as his task, -within 4 years, to put the entire economy in a state of readiness -for war.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>The Nazi Government officials provided the leadership in preparing -Germany for war. They received, however, the enthusiastic -cooperation of the German industrialists, and the role played by -industrialists in converting Germany to a war economy is an important -one, and I turn briefly to that aspect of the economic picture.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>On the invitation of the Defendant Göring, approximately 25 of -the leading industrialists of Germany, and the Defendant Schacht, -attended a meeting in Berlin on the 20th day of February, 1933. This -was shortly before the election of March 5, 1933 in Germany. At -this meeting Hitler announced the conspirators’ aim to seize totalitarian -control over Germany, to destroy the parliamentary system, -to crush all opposition by force, and to restore the power of the -Wehrmacht. -<span class='pageno' title='223' id='Page_223'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>Among those present on that day, in February of 1933 in Berlin, -were Gustav Krupp, head of the huge munitions firm Friedrich -Krupp, A.G.; four leading officials of the I.G. Farben, one of the -world’s largest chemical concerns; present, I repeat, was also the -Defendant Schacht, and Albert Vögler was also there, the head of -the huge steel trusts, the United Steel Works of Germany, and -there were other leading industrialists there.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In support of the assertion with respect to that meeting at that -time and in that place, I refer Your Honors to the document bearing -the number EC-439, it being an affidavit of George von Schnitzler, -and it reads as follows:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“I George von Schnitzler, a member of the Vorstand of I.G. -Farben, make the following deposition under oath:</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“At the end of February 1933 four members of the Vorstand -of I.G. Farben, including Dr. Bosch, the head of the Vorstand, -and myself, were asked by the office of the President of the -Reichstag to attend a meeting in his house, the purpose of -which was not given. I do not remember the two other colleagues -of mine who were also invited. I believe the invitation -reached me during one of my business trips to Berlin. I went -to the meeting which was attended by about twenty persons, -who I believe were mostly leading industrialists from the -Ruhr.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“Among those present I remember:</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“Dr. Schacht, who at that time was not yet head of the Reichsbank -again and not yet Minister of Economics;</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“Krupp von Bohlen, who in the beginning of 1933 presided -the Reichsverband der Deutschen Industrie, which later on -was changed in the semi-official organization ‘Reichsgruppe -Industrie’;</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“Dr. Albert Vögler, the leading man of the Vereinigte Stahlwerke;</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“Von Loewenfeld from an industrial work in Essen;</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“Dr. Stein, head of the Gewerkschaft Auguste Victoria, a mine -which belongs to the I.G. Dr. Stein was an active member of -the Deutsche Volkspartei.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“I remember that Dr. Schacht acted as a kind of host.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“While I had expected the appearance of Göring, Hitler entered -the room, shook hands with everybody and took a seat -at the table. In a long speech he talked mainly about the -danger of communism over which he pretended that he just -had won a decisive victory.</p> - -<p class='pindent'><span class='pageno' title='224' id='Page_224'></span></p> - -<p class='noindent'>“He then talked about the Bündnis (alliance) into which his -party and the Deutschnationale Volkspartei had entered. This -latter party, in the meantime, had been reorganized by Herr -Von Papen. At the end he came to the point which seemed -to me the purpose of the meeting. Hitler stressed the importance -that the two aforementioned parties should gain the -majority in the coming Reichstag election. Krupp von Bohlen -thanked Hitler for his speech. After Hitler had left the -room, Dr. Schacht proposed to the meeting the raising of an -election fund of, as far as I remember, RM 3 million. The -fund should be distributed between the two ‘allies’ according -to their relative strength at the time being. Dr. Stein suggested -that the Deutsche Volkspartei should be included. . . .”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT [Interposing]: Mr. Dodd, it seems to me that -really all that that document shows is that there was a meeting at -which Mr. Schacht was present, and at which it was determined to -subscribe an election fund in 1933.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: That is quite so, Your Honor. I will not labor the -Court by reading all of it. There were some other references, but -not of major importance, in the last paragraph, to a division of the -election fund. I just call Your Honors’ attention to it in passing.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I should like, at this point, to call Your Honors’ attention to the -document bearing the Number D-203. It is three-page document: -D-203.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: I wish to read only excerpts from it very briefly. -It is the speech delivered to the industrialists by Hitler, and I refer -particularly to the second paragraph of that document: “Private -enterprise cannot be maintained in the age of democracy. . . .”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT [Interposing]: What is the date of that?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: It is the speech made at the meeting on the 20th of -February 1933 at Berlin.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“Private enterprise cannot be maintained in the age of democracy; -it is conceivable only if the people have a sound idea -of authority and personality.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>I refer to Page 2 of the document, and I should like to read an -excerpt from that first paragraph on Page 2, about 13 sentences -down, beginning with the words:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“I recognized even while in the hospital that one had to search -for new ideas conducive to reconstruction. I found them in -<span class='pageno' title='225' id='Page_225'></span> -Nationalism, in the value of . . . strength and power of individual -personality.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>And, a little further down, the next to the last and the last -sentence of that same paragraph, Hitler said:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“If one rejects pacifism, one must put a new idea in its place -immediately. Everything must be pushed aside, must be replaced -by something better.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>And, in the third paragraph, the last sentence beginning:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“We must not forget that all the benefits of culture must be -introduced more or less with an iron fist, just as once upon -a time the farmers were forced to plant potatoes.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Then finally, on that page, in the fourth paragraph—nearly -at the end of it:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“With the very same courage with which we go to work to -make up for what had been sinned during the last 14 years, -we have withstood all attempts to move us off the right way.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Then, on the top of the next page, the second paragraph, these -words:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“Now we stand before the last election. Regardless of the -outcome there will be no retreat, even if the coming election -does not bring about a decision.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Why did you not read the last line on Page 2?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Beginning with the words “while still gaining -power”?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The sentence before:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“We must first gain complete power if we want to crush the -other side completely. While still gaining power, one should -not start the struggle against the opponent. Only when one -knows that one has readied the pinnacle of power, that there -is no further possible development, shall one strike.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: I was going to refer to that, if Your Honor pleases, -in a minute. However, I think it is quite proper to have it inserted -here.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Before starting to read this last paragraph, I suggest that it is -nearly the accustomed recess time, as I understand it, and it is a -rather lengthy paragraph. . . .</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT [Interposing]: Yes, we will adjourn until -2 o’clock.</p> - -<p class='line' style='text-align:center;margin-top:2em;margin-bottom:2em;'>[<span class='it'>The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours.</span>]</p> - -<hr class='pbk'/> - -<h2><span class='pageno' title='226' id='Page_226'></span><span class='it'>Afternoon Session</span></h2> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: If Your Honor pleases, if I may go back for just a -very little bit to take up the train of thought where I left off at -the noon recess.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>We were discussing the document, bearing the number D-203, -and I had referred particularly to the third page of that document, -and even more particularly to the second paragraph on that page; -and I wish to read from a sentence approximately 8 or 10 lines -down in that second paragraph, which reads as follows:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“The question of restoration of the Wehrmacht will not be -decided at Geneva but in Germany, when we have gained -internal strength through internal peace.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>I wish to refer again to the same page of the same document, -and to the last paragraph and the last sentence, with reference to -the Defendant Göring, who was present at that same meeting to -which this document refers, the meeting of February 20, 1933 in -Berlin. Göring said that the sacrifices asked for surely would be -so much easier for industry to bear if it realized that the election -of March 5th will surely be the last one for the next 10 years, -probably even for the next 100 years.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In a memorandum dated the 22d day of February 1933, and for -the information of the Court, in the document book bearing the -number D-204, Gustav Krupp described this meeting briefly, and in -the memorandum wrote that he had expressed to Hitler the gratitude -of the 25 industrialists present at the meeting on February 20, 1933.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>There are other expressions in that memorandum, which we do -not deem to be particularly pertinent to the allegations of the Indictment -with which we are now concerned. It is also to establish -the corroboration of the affidavit of Puhl that the meeting was -held.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I might point out to the Court that this memorandum, together -with the report of the speech of Hitler, were found by the British -and the United States armies in the personal files of the Defendant -Krupp.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I am aware, if Your Honors please, that the method I am pursuing -here is a little tedious, because I am trying to refer specifically -to the documents, and particularly to the excerpts referred to -in my remarks, and therefore this presentation differs very considerably -from that which has gone before. I trust, however, that -you will bear with me, because this part of the case requires some -rather careful and detailed explanations.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In April of 1933, after Hitler had entrenched himself in power, -Gustav Krupp, as chairman of the Reich Association of German -<span class='pageno' title='227' id='Page_227'></span> -Industry, which was the largest association of German industrialists, -submitted to Hitler the plan of that Association for the reorganization -of German industry, and in connection therewith, undertook to -bring the Association into line with the aims of the conspirators, -and to make it an effective instrument for the execution of their -policies.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In a letter of transmittal, Krupp stated that the plan of reorganization -which he submitted on behalf of the Association of industrialists, -was characterized by the desire to coordinate economic -measures and political necessity, adopting the Führer conception of -the new German State. A copy of that letter of transmittal is set -out in the document book under the Number D-157.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In the plan of reorganization itself, Krupp stated:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“The turn of political events is in line with the wishes which -I myself and the board of directors have cherished for a long -time. . . . In reorganizing the Reich Association of German -Industry, I shall be guided by the idea of bringing the new -organization into agreement with the political aims of the -Reich Government.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>The ideas expressed by Krupp on behalf of the members of the -Reich Association of German Industry for introducing the Leadership -Principle into industry, were subsequently adopted.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I respectfully refer the Court to the <span class='it'>Reichsgesetzblatt</span> of 1934, -Part I, Page 1194, Sections 11, 12, and 16.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Under the decree introducing the Leadership Principle into industry, -each group of industry was required to have a leader who -was to serve without compensation. The leaders were to be appointed -and could be removed at the discretion of the Minister of Economics. -The charter of each group was to be decreed by the leader, -who was obligated to lead his group in accordance with the principles -of the National Socialist State.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I think it is fair to argue that the introduction of the Leadership -Principle into the organizations of business permitted the centralization -of authority, and guaranteed the efficient execution of -orders, which the Government issued to business, in the interest of -a promotion of a war economy. And the overwhelming support -given by German industrialists to the Nazi war program is very -vividly described in a speech prepared by Gustav Krupp in January -of 1944, for delivery at the University of Berlin; and I must -again respectfully refer Your Honors to the document in your book -bearing the identification Number D-317.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I shall not, of course, bore this court with a reading of that -whole document, but I should like to quote from it without wrenching -any of the material from its true context. -<span class='pageno' title='228' id='Page_228'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>And this statement is found beginning in the third and the -fourth paragraphs, being the first large paragraph on the first page:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“War material is lifesaving for one’s own people, and whoever -works and performs in those spheres can be proud of it. -Here, enterprise as a whole finds its highest justification of -existence. This justification, I may inject this here, crystallized -especially during the time of interregnum between 1919 and -1933, when Germany was dying down disarmed. . . .”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='noindent'>And further on:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“It is the one great merit of the entire German war economy -that it did not remain idle during those bad years, even though -its activity could not be brought to light for obvious reasons. -Through years of secret work, scientific and basic groundwork -was laid in order to be ready again to work for the German -Armed Forces at the appointed hour without loss of time or -experience.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>And further quoting from that same speech, and the last paragraph, -particularly on the first page:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“Only through this secret activity of German enterprise, together -with the experience gained meanwhile through production -of peacetime goods, was it possible, after 1933, to fall -into step with the new tasks arrived at, restoring Germany’s -military power. Only through all that could the entirely new -and various problems, brought up by the Führer’s Four Year -Plan for German enterprise, be mastered. It was necessary -to exploit new raw materials, to explore and experiment, to -invest capital in order to make German economy independent -and strong—in short, to make it war-worthy.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Quoting even further from this same speech:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“I think I may state here that the German enterprises followed -the new ways enthusiastically, that they made the great intentions -of the Führer their own, by fair competition and -conscious gratitude, and became his faithful followers. How -else could the tasks between 1933 and 1939, and especially -those after 1939, have been overcome?”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>It must be emphasized that this secret rearmament program was -launched immediately upon the seizure of power by the Nazi conspirators. -On April 4, 1933 the Reich Cabinet passed a resolution -establishing a Reich Defense Council. The function of this Council -was secretly to mobilize for war; and at the second meeting of the -working committee of the Councillors for Reich Defense, which was, -by the way, the predecessor of the Reich Defense Council,—at that -second meeting which was held on May 22nd of 1933, the chairman -was the Defendant Keitel, then Colonel Keitel; and he stated that -<span class='pageno' title='229' id='Page_229'></span> -the Reich Defense Council would immediately undertake to prepare -for war emergency. He stressed the urgency of the task of organizing -a war economy, and announced that the Council stood ready to -brush aside all of their obstacles. Fully aware of the fact that their -action was in flagrant violation of the Treaty of Versailles, the Defendant -Keitel emphasized the extreme importance of absolute -secrecy when he said, and I quote from the document bearing the -number EC-177, on Page 5 of that document. Colonel Keitel is -speaking, and he said:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“No document ought to be lost, since otherwise it may fall -into the hands of the enemies’ intelligence service. Orally -transmitted matters are not provable; they can be denied by -us in Geneva.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>The singleness of purpose with which the Nazi conspirators -geared the German economy to the forging of a war machine is even -further shown by the secret minutes of the sixth meeting of the -working committee of the so-called Reich Defense Council, held on -the 7th of February 1934, as shown in the document bearing the -number EC-404, marked “Secret Command Matter”, and dated the -7th of February 1934. At this meeting, Lieutenant General Beck -pointed out that: “The actual state of preparation is the purpose of -this session.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Parenthetically, I might say that on the first page of that document -it appears that besides Lieutenant General Beck, the Defendant -Jodl was present, then Lieutenant Colonel Jodl. There was a -Captain Schmundt; and there was a Colonel Guderian there; and -there was a Major General Von Reichenau; there was a Major -Warlimont; and these are names that Your Honors will hear more -of in the course of the presentation of this case.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Detailed measures of financing a future war were discussed and -it was pointed out that the financial aspects of the war economy -would be regulated by the Reich Finance Ministry and the Reichsbank, -which was headed by the Defendant Schacht.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>On May 31st of 1935—as stated earlier in this morning’s discussion—the -Defendant Schacht was secretly appointed plenipotentiary-general -of the war economy, and he had the express -function of placing all economic forces of the nation in the services -of the Nazi war machine.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>By the secret defense law of May 21, 1935, under which Schacht -received this secret appointment, he was in effect, given charge of -the entire war economy. In case of war, he was to be virtual economic -dictator of Germany. His task was to place all economic -forces into the service for the conduct of the war and to secure -economically the life of the German people. The Ministers of -<span class='pageno' title='230' id='Page_230'></span> -Economy, of Food, Agriculture, Labor, Forestry, as well as all Reich -agencies directly under the Führer, were subordinated to him. He -was to be responsible for the financing as well as for the conduct -of the war; and he was even authorized to issue ordinances within -his sphere of responsibility, even if these deviated from the existing -laws.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The rearmament of Germany proceeded at an amazingly rapid -pace. By the summer of 1935, the Nazi conspirators were emboldened -to make plans for the reoccupation of the Rhineland; and at -the tenth meeting of this same working committee of the Council, the -question of measures to be taken in connection with the proposed -reoccupation of the Rhineland were discussed.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I refer to the document bearing the number EC-405.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>At that meeting, held on the 26th day of June 1935, it was said -that the Rhineland required special treatment, because of the assurances -given by Hitler to the French that no military action was -being undertaken in the de-militarized zone. Among the matters -requiring special treatment was the preparation of economic mobilization, -a task specifically entrusted to the Defendant Schacht, as -secret Plenipotentiary for the War Economy.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Are you reading from this document?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: I am quoting in part from it, Your Honor, and it is -upon the document that I base my statements which can be found -therein on Pages 4 and 5. I dislike annoying the Court with constant -references to these documents, but I thought it would be the -best way to proceed so as fully to inform the Court.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Well if you tell us where it is in the document -we can follow it in the document.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: On Page 4, the middle of the page, the fifth paragraph, -the first sentence: “The de-militarized zone requires special -treatment.” And on Page 5, (j), under “the preparations,” “Preparation -of economic mobilization.” On Page 4, the last paragraph -just before the setting-out of the (a), (b), (c), and (d), it is said. . . .</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I think you ought to read on Page 4, the last -paragraph but one: “Since political entanglements. . . .”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“Since political entanglements abroad must be avoided at -present under all circumstances . . . only those preparatory -measures that are urgently necessary may be carried out. The -existence of such preparations, or the intention of them must -be kept in strictest secrecy in the zone itself as well as in the -rest of the Reich.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'><span class='pageno' title='231' id='Page_231'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>The preparations are then set out, and they include, as I have -indicated a few minutes ago, as the last one in the list, the preparations -for economic mobilization.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>There are many others, of course. The preliminary mustering of -horse-drawn and motor vehicles, preparation for evacuation measures, -and so forth. We say—passing now from that document—we -say the rapid success of the German re-armament is attributable -to the greatest extent to the work of the Defendant Schacht. In the -fall of 1934, the Nazi conspirators announced the so-called “New -Plan,” aiming at the control of imports and exports in order to -obtain the raw materials which were needed for armaments and -the foreign currency which was required to sustain the armament -program. This new plan was the creation of the Defendant Schacht, -and under the plan, the Defendant Schacht controlled imports by -extending the system of supervisory boards for import control, -which was previously limited to the main groups of raw materials, -to all goods imported into Germany, whether raw materials, semi-manufactured -goods, or finished products. The requirement of licenses -for imports enabled the Nazi conspirators to restrict imports -to those commodities which served their war aims.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Subsequently, in February of 1935, the “Devisen” Law was -passed which can be found by reference in the <span class='it'>Reichsgesetzblatt</span> -of 1935, Part I, Page 105; and under it, all transactions involving -foreign exchange were subject to the approval of Devisenstellen -(the Foreign Exchange Control Offices). By thus controlling the -disposition of foreign exchange, the conspirators were able to manipulate -foreign trade so as to serve their needs and desires.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Thus every aspect of the German economy was being geared to -war under the guidance particularly of the Defendant Schacht. In -a study of the economic mobilization for war as of 30 September -1934, it was stated that steps had already been taken to build up -stock piles, to construct new facilities for the production of scarce -goods, and to redeploy industry, to secure areas and to control fiscal -and trade policies. References were made to the fact that the task -of stock piling had been hampered by the requirement of secrecy -and camouflage. Reserves of automobile fuels and stocks of coal -were being accumulated and the production of synthetic oil was -accelerated. Civilian supply was purposely organized so that most -plants would be working for the German Armed Forces. Studies -were made of the possibility of barter trade with supposedly neutral -countries in case of war.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The matter of financing the armament program presented a difficult -problem for the conspirators. In 1934 and 1935 the German -economy could by no possibility have raised funds for their extensive -<span class='pageno' title='232' id='Page_232'></span> -rearmament program through taxes and public loans. From -the outset, the armament program involved “the engagement of the -last reserves.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Apart from the problem of raising the huge sums required to -sustain this program, the Nazi conspirators were exceedingly anxious, -in the early stages, to conceal the extent of their feverish -armament activities.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>After considering various techniques of financing the armament -program, the Defendant Schacht proposed the use of so-called -“mefo” bills. One of the primary advantages of this method was -the fact that figures indicating the extent of rearmament that would -have become public through the use of other methods could be kept -secret through the use of mefo bills, and mefo bills were used -exclusively for armament financing.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Transactions in mefo bills worked as follows:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Mefo bills were drawn by armament contractors and accepted by -a limited liability company, [<span class='it'>The Metallurgische Forschungsgesellschaft -m. b. H.</span>], the initials of which spell mefo from whence the -transaction takes its name. This company had a nominal capital of -1 million Reichsmarks and was therefore merely a dummy organization. -The bills were received by all German banks for possible -rediscounting with the Reichsbank, and the bills were guaranteed -by the Reich. Their secrecy was assured by the fact that they -appeared neither in the published statements of the Reichsbank nor -in the budget figures.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The mefo bill system continued to be used until April 1 of 1938. -To that date, 12 billion Reichsmarks of mefo bills for the financing -of rearmament had been issued. Since it was no longer deemed -necessary in April of 1938 to conceal the vast progress of German -rearmament, mefo financing was discontinued at that time.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>A further source of funds which the Defendant Schacht drew -upon to finance the Secret Armament Program were the funds of -political opponents of the Nazi regime, and marks of foreigners on -deposit in the Reichsbank. As Schacht stated—and I am quoting: -“Our armaments are also financed partly with the credits of our -political opponents.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>That statement may be found in a memorandum from the Defendant -Schacht to Hitler, dated 3 May 1935, and it bears the number -in the document book of 1168-PS, and the specific sentence is -found in the second paragraph.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The outstanding mefo bills at all times represented a threat -to the stability of the currency because they could be tendered to -the Reichsbank for discount, in which case the currency circulation -would automatically have to be increased. Thus, there was an ever-present -threat of inflation. The Defendant Schacht continued on his -<span class='pageno' title='233' id='Page_233'></span> -course, because he stands, he said, “with unswerving loyalty to the -Führer because he fully recognizes the basic ideas of National Socialism -and because at the end, the disturbances, compared to the -great task, can be considered irrelevant.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>High-ranking military officers paid tribute to the Defendant -Schacht’s contrivances on behalf of the Nazi war machine. In an -article written for the <span class='it'>Military Weekly Gazette</span> in January of 1937, -it is said:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“The German Defense Force commemorates Dr. Schacht today -as one of the men who have done imperishable things for it -and its development in accordance with the directions from -the Führer and Reich Chancellor. The Defense Force owes it -to Schacht’s skill and great ability that, in defiance of all -currency difficulties, it, according to plan, has been able to -grow up to its present strength from an army of 100,000 -men.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>After the reoccupation of the Rhineland, the Nazi conspirators -re-doubled their efforts to prepare Germany for a major war. The -Four Year Plan, as we have indicated earlier, was proclaimed by -Hitler in his address at the Nuremberg Party convention on the -9th day of September in 1936, and it was given a statutory foundation -by the decree concerning the execution of the Four Year Plan -dated the 18th day of October, 1936, which is found in the <span class='it'>Reichsgesetzblatt</span> -of 1936, in the first part, on Page 887. By this decree -the Defendant Göring was put in charge of the plan. He was -authorized to enact any legal and administrative measures deemed -necessary by him for the accomplishment of his task, and to issue -orders and instructions to all Government agencies, including the -highest Reich authorities.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The purpose of the plan was to enable Nazi Germany to attain -complete self-sufficiency in essential raw materials, notably motor -fuel, rubber, textile fiber, and non-ferrous metals, and to intensify -preparations for war. The development of synthetic products was -greatly accelerated despite their high costs.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Apart from the self-sufficiency program, however, the Nazi conspirators -required foreign exchange to finance propaganda and -espionage activities abroad; Thus, in a speech on November 1 of -1937, before the Wehrmachtakademie, General Thomas stated:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“If you consider that one will need during the war considerable -means in order to organize the necessary propaganda -in order to pay for the espionage service and for similar purposes, -then one should be clear that our internal mark would -be of no use therefore, and that foreign exchange will be -needed.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'><span class='pageno' title='234' id='Page_234'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>This particular need for foreign exchange was reduced in part -by the virtue of the espionage and propaganda services rendered -free of charge to the Nazi State by some leading German industrial -concerns.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I hold in my hand a document bearing the number D-206. It -is dated at Essen the 12th day of October 1935. It was found in -the files of the Krupp Company by representatives of the United -States and the British armies. I shall not read all of it unless Your -Honors require it, but I’ll start at the beginning by way of establishing -its purpose and the information contained therein. It is entitled -“Memorandum.” There is a subheading: “Concerns: Distribution of -official propaganda literature abroad with the help of our foreign -connections.” It goes on to say that:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“On the morning of October 11 the district representative of -Ribbentrop’s private foreign office (Dienststelle Ribbentrop) -made an appointment for a conference by telephone.”—and -that—“A Mr. Lackmann arrived at the appointed time. . . . -“In answer to my question with whom I was dealing, and -which official bureau he represented, he informed me that he -was not himself the district representative of Ribbentrop’s -private foreign office, that a Mr. Landrat Bollmann was such, -and that he himself had come at Mr. Bollmann’s order.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>The next paragraph states:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“. . . that there exists a great mixup in the field of foreign -propaganda, and that Ribbentrop’s private foreign office wants -to create a tighter organization for foreign propaganda. For -this purpose the support of our firm and above all an index -of addresses . . . were needed.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>In the next sentence, of the third paragraph, I would like to -read:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“I informed Mr. L that our firm had put itself years ago at -the disposal of official bureaus for purposes of foreign propaganda, -and that we had supported all requests addressed to us -to the utmost.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>I now hold in my hand the document bearing the number D-167, -which is also a copy of a document found in the files of the Krupp -Company by representatives of the American and the British Armies. -It is dated the 14th day of October 1937, and states that it is -a memorandum of Herr Sonnenberg on the meeting at Essen on the -12th day of October 1937 and it indicates that one Menzel representing -the intelligence of the Combined Services Ministry, his department -coming under the Defense Office, asked for intelligence on -foreign armaments, but not including matters published in newspapers, -intelligence received by Krupp from their agents abroad -<span class='pageno' title='235' id='Page_235'></span> -and through other channels to be passed on to the Combined Services -Intelligence.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Finally, the third paragraph states that: “On our part we undertook -to supply information to the Combined Services Ministry . . . -as required.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I have concluded reading from that document, and I pass now -to discuss the conspirators’ program, which proceeded, as I have -said so many times here today, with amazing—really amazing -speed. The production of steel, for example, as shown in official -German publications, rose as follows:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In the year of 1933, 74,000 tons were produced; in 1934, 105,000 -tons; 1935, 145,000 tons; 1936, 186,000 tons; 1937, 217,000 tons; and -in 1938, 477,000 tons. The production of gasoline increased at even -a greater tempo: from 370,000 tons in 1934 to 1,494,000 tons in 1938.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The Nazi conspirators pressed the completion of the armament -program with a sense of urgency which clearly indicated their -awareness of the imminence of war. At a 4th of September meeting -in 1936 Göring pointed out that “all measures have to be taken -just as if we were actually in the state of imminent danger of -war.” He pointed out that “if war should break out tomorrow -we would be forced to take measures from which we might . . . shy -away at the present moment. They are therefore to be taken.” The -extreme urgency was manifested by Göring’s remark that “Existing -reserves will have to be touched for the purpose of carrying us -over this difficulty until the goal ordered by the Führer has been -reached . . . in case of war,” he added, “they are not a reliable -backing in any case.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>By a letter marked “Top Secret”, on the 21 of August of 1936, -the Defendant Schacht was advised that Hitler had ordered that all -formations of the Air Force be ready by April 1 of 1937. This -served to accentuate the urgent sense of immediacy that had -pervaded the Nazi war economy from the outset. Flushed with -their successes in the Rhineland, the Nazi conspirators were laying -the groundwork for further aggressive action.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Insofar as I understand you, you have not -referred us to any document since Document 167.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: No, Your Honor, the figures on the production of -steel and of oil are from the statistical year book for the German -Reich of 1939 and 1940 and the statistical year book for the German -Reich of 1941 and ’42—that is, with respect to the steel figures. -And the figures which I quoted with respect to the production of -gasoline are from the statistical year book for the German Reich -in 1941 and 1942. The statements of the Defendant Göring are -based upon the document marked EC-416, in the document book. -<span class='pageno' title='236' id='Page_236'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: That is the document you have already -referred to, isn’t it?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Yes, it has been referred to heretofore, I believe. -Some of these documents contain references to more than one part -of the presentation, and I have to refer to them at different times -in the presentation. . . .</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: All right. Go on, if you want to refer to it.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: The sixth paragraph on the first page:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“Existing reserves will have to be touched for the purpose -of carrying us over this difficulty until the goal ordered by -the Führer has been reached, and then in case of war, they -are not a reliable backing in any case.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>And on the second page, the eighth paragraph down:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“If war should break out tomorrow, we would be forced to -take measures from which we might possibly still shy away -at the present moment. They are therefore to be taken.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>With reference to the assertion that the Defendant Schacht was -advised that Hitler had ordered that all formations of the Air Force -be ready by April 1, 1937, I respectfully refer to Document 1301-PS, -dated 31 August 1936. I am advised that that document should -bear an additional number. It should read 1301-PS-7. On the first -page, if Your Honor pleases, the third paragraph, or the paragraph -marked “3” and after the words “air force” . . . states that according -to an order of the Führer, the setting up of all Air Force units had -to be completed on April 1, 1937; and if Your Honors will turn the -page to Page 20, about midway in the page, you will observe that -a copy of this document was sent to the president of the Reichsbank, -Dr. Schacht.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>After their successes in Austria and in the Sudetenland, the -Nazi conspirators redoubled their efforts to equip themselves for a -war of aggression, and in a conference on October 14, 1938, shortly -before the Nazi conspirators made their first demands on Poland, -the Defendant Göring stated that the Führer had instructed him -to carry out a gigantic program, by comparison with which the -performances thus far were insignificant. This faced difficulties -which he would overcome with the greatest energy and ruthlessness. -And that statement may be found in the Document 1301-PS, -on Page 25 of that document, and particularly the second sentence -of the opening paragraph:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“Everybody knows from the press what the world situation -looks like, and therefore the Führer has issued an order to -him to carry out a gigantic program compared to which -previous achievements are insignificant. There are difficulties -<span class='pageno' title='237' id='Page_237'></span> -in the way which he will overcome with the utmost energy -and ruthlessness.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>The supply of foreign currency had shrunk because of preparations -for the invasion of Czechoslovakia, and it was considered -necessary to replenish it. “These”—and I am now referring to the -third paragraph of that same Page 25 of Document 1301-PS:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“These gains made through the export are to be used for an -increased armament. The armament should not be curtailed -by the export activities. He received the order from the -Führer to increase the armament to an abnormal extent, the -Air Force having first priority. Within the shortest time, the -Air Force is to be increased fivefold; also the Navy should -get on more rapidly, and the Army should procure large -amounts of offensive weapons at a faster rate, particularly -heavy artillery pieces and heavy tanks. Along with this -manufactured armaments must go, especially fuel, powder -and explosives are to be moved into the foreground. It should -be coupled with the accelerated construction of highways, -canals, and particularly of the railroads.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>In the course of these preparations for war, a clash of wills -ensued between two men, the Defendant Göring and the Defendant -Schacht, as a result of which the Defendant Schacht resigned his -position as head of the Ministry of Economics and plenipotentiary -for the war economy in November of 1937 and was removed from -the presidency of the Reichsbank in January of 1939. I do not -propose, at this moment, to go into the details of this controversy. -There will be more said on that subject at a later stage in these -proceedings, but for the present, I should like to have it noted that -it is our contention that Schacht’s departure in no way implied any -disagreement with the major war aims of the Nazis. The Defendant -Schacht took particular pride in his vast attainments in the financial -and economic fields in aid of the Nazi war machine. And in the -document bearing the number EC-257, which is a copy of a letter -from the Defendant Schacht to General Thomas, in the first paragraph -of the letter:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“I think back with much satisfaction to the work in the -Ministry of Economics which afforded me the opportunity to -assist in the rearmament of the German people in the most -critical period, not only in the financial but also in the -economic sphere. I have always considered a rearmament of -the German people as <span class='it'>conditio sine qua non</span> of the establishment -of a new German nation.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='noindent'>The second paragraph is of a more personal nature and has no real -bearing on the issues before us at this time. -<span class='pageno' title='238' id='Page_238'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>In the document labeled EC-252, a letter written to General Von -Blomberg, dated the 8th day of July 1937, the Defendant Schacht -wrote:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“The direction of the war economy by the plenipotentiary -would in that event never take place entirely independent -from the rest of the war mechanism, but would be aimed at -accomplishment of the political war purpose with the assistance -of all economic forces. I am entirely willing, therefore, -to participate in this way in the preparation of the -forthcoming order giving effect to the Defense Act.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>In the spring of 1937, the Defendant Schacht participated with -representatives of the three branches of the Armed Forces in war -games in war economy which was something new by way of military -exercises. The war games in war economy were held at -Godesberg, Germany. And I refer to the document bearing the -label EC-174. It has as a heading, or subheading, under the summary: -“War economy trip to Godesberg undertaken by General -Staff between the 25th of May and the 2d of June,” and it goes on -to outline in some slight detail that there was a welcome to the -General Staff war economy trip. It tells something in a rather -vague and not altogether clear way of just how a war game in war -economy was conducted but it leaves no doubt in the mind that -such a war game in war economy had been conducted at Godesberg -at that time. And on the second page of this document, the last -paragraph is the translation of Part 1 of the speech welcoming Dr. -Schacht. It says:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“Before I start with the discussion of the war game in war -economy, I have to express how grateful we all are that you, -President Dr. Schacht, have gone to the trouble to personally -participate in our final discussion today despite all your other -activities. This proves to us your deep interest in war -economy tasks shown at all times and your presence here is -renewed proof that you are willing to facilitate for us soldiers -the difficult war-economic preparations and to strengthen a -harmonious cooperation with your offices.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>I should also like to call the Court’s attention to the next to the -last paragraph on the first page. It is a one-sentence paragraph, -and it simply says, “I want to point out, however, that all material -and all information received has to be kept in strict secrecy,” and -it refers to the preceding paragraph concerning the war games in -war economy.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>It appears that the annexation of Austria was a goal which the -Defendant Schacht had long sought, for in a speech to the employees -of the former Austrian National Bank, as set out in the document -<span class='pageno' title='239' id='Page_239'></span> -bearing the label EC-297, and particularly the second paragraph of -the first page of that document, nearly at the end, four or five lines -from the end of that paragraph, we find these words immediately -after “large applause”:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“Austria has certainly a great mission, namely, to be the -bearer of German culture, to insure respect and regard for -the German name, especially in the direction of the southeast. -Such a mission can only be performed within the -Great German Reich and based on the power of a nation of -75 millions, which, regardless of the wish of the opponents, -forms the heart and the soul of Europe.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Dr. Schacht goes on to say:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“We have read a lot in the foreign press during the last few -days that this aim, the union of both countries, is to a certain -degree justified, but that the method of effecting this union -was terrible. . . . This method, which certainly did not suit -one or another foreigner, is nothing but the consequence of -countless perfidies and brutal acts of violence which foreign -countries have practiced against us.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>And I refer now to Page 3 of this same document and to the -fourth paragraph, about the center of the page, and reading from -it:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“I am known for sometimes expressing thoughts which give -offense and there I would not like to depart from this custom. -I know that there are even here, in this country a few people—I -believe they are not too numerous—who find fault with -the events of the last few days; but nobody, I believe, doubts -the goal, and it should be said to all grumblers that you can’t -satisfy everybody. One person says he would have done it -maybe in one way, but the remarkable thing is that they did -not do it, and that it was only done by our Adolf Hitler; and -if there is still something left to be improved, then those -grumblers should try to bring about these improvements -from the German Reich, and within the German community, -but not to disturb it from without.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>In the memorandum of the 7th of January 1939, written by the -Defendant Schacht and other directors of the Reichsbank to Hitler, -urging a balancing of the budget in view of the threatening danger -of inflation, it was stated—and I now refer to the document bearing -the label EC-369 and particularly to the paragraph at the bottom -of the first page of that document:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“From the beginning the Reichsbank has been aware of the -fact that a successful foreign policy can be attained only by -the reconstruction of the German Armed Forces. It (the -<span class='pageno' title='240' id='Page_240'></span> -Reichsbank) therefore assumed to a very great extent the -responsibility to finance the rearmament in spite of the inherent -dangers to the currency. The justification thereof was -the necessity, which pushed all other considerations into the -background, to carry through the armament at once, out of -nothing, and furthermore under camouflage, which made a -respect-commanding foreign policy possible.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>The Reichsbank directors, as experts on money, believed that a -point had been reached where greater production of armaments -was no longer possible. We say that was merely a judgment on -the situation and not a moral principle, for there was no opposition -to Hitler’s policy of aggression. Doubts were ascertained only as -to whether he could finance that policy. Hitler’s letter to Schacht -on the occasion of Schacht’s departure from the Reichsbank, as contained -in Document EC-397, pays high tribute to Schacht’s great -efforts in furthering the program of the Nazi conspirators. The -Armed Forces by now had enabled Hitler to take Austria and the -Sudetenland. We say Schacht’s task up to that point had been well -done. And to quote from Document EC-397 in the words of Hitler, -in a letter which he wrote to the Defendant Schacht, “Your name, -above all, will always be connected with the first epoch of the -national rearmament.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Even though dismissed from the presidency of the Reichsbank, -Schacht was retained as a Minister without portfolio and special -confidential adviser to Hitler. The Defendant Funk stepped into -Schacht’s position as President of the Reichsbank. And I ask at this -point that the Court might take judicial notice of the <span class='it'>Völkischer -Beobachter</span> of January 21, 1939. The Defendant Funk was completely -uninhibited by fears of inflation, for like Göring, under whom -he had served in the Four Year Plan, he recognized no obstacles -to the plan to attack Poland.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In Document 699-PS, in a letter from the Defendant Funk to -Hitler, written on August 25 of 1939, only a few days before the -attack on Poland, the Defendant Funk reported to Hitler that the -Reichsbank was prepared to withstand any disturbances of the -international currency and credit system occasioned by a large-scale -war. He said that he had secretly transferred all available -funds of the Reichsbank abroad into gold, and that Germany stood -ready to meet the financial and economic tasks which lay ahead.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>And so it seems plain and clear from the writings, from the -acts, from the speeches of the Nazi conspirators themselves, that -they did in fact direct the whole of the German economy toward -preparation for aggressive war. To paraphrase the words that the -Defendant Göring once used, these conspirators gave the German -<span class='pageno' title='241' id='Page_241'></span> -people “guns instead of butter,” and we say they also gave history -its most striking example of a nation gearing itself in time of peace -to the single purpose of aggressive war. Their economic preparations, -formulated and applied with the ruthless energy of the -Defendant Göring, with the cynical financial wizardry of the -Defendant Schacht, and the willing complicity of Funk, among -others, were the indispensable first act in the heart-breaking -tragedy which their aggression inflicted upon the world.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I should like to offer, if I may at this time, Your Honor, those -documents which I have referred to in the course of this discussion. -We have here the original documents in the folders, and they -compare with the translations which have been submitted to the -Court.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Have the defendants had the opportunity -of inspecting these documents?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: I doubt that they have had full opportunity to -inspect them, Your Honor. The photostats are there, but I don’t -think they have had time to inspect them because they haven’t -been there long enough for that.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I think that they should have full -opportunity of inspecting them and comparing with the copies -which have been submitted to us before the originals are put in.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Very well, Your Honor. We may offer them at a -later date, as I understand, Your Honor?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Certainly. The Tribunal will adjourn for -10 minutes.</p> - -<p class='line' style='text-align:center;margin-top:2em;margin-bottom:2em;'>[<span class='it'>A recess was taken.</span>]</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COLONEL STOREY: May it please the Tribunal: The U. S. -Prosecution now passes into the aggressive war phase of the case -and it will be presented by Mr. Alderman.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. ALDERMAN: May it please the Tribunal: I rise to present -on behalf of the United States Chief of Counsel, evidence to support -the allegation of Count One of the Indictment relating to the -planning, preparation, initiation, and waging of illegal and aggressive -war, and relating to the conspiracy to commit that crime.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The aggressive war phase of the case, the aggressive war phase -of the conspiracy case under Count One, and the aggressive war -phase of the entire case is really, we think, the heart of the case. -If we did not reach it in our presentation we would not reach the -heart of the case. If we did not present it to the Tribunal in the -necessary detail, we would fail to present what is necessary to the -heart of the case. -<span class='pageno' title='242' id='Page_242'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>After all, everything else in this case, however dramatic, -however sordid, however shocking and revolting to the common -instincts of civilized peoples, is incidental to, or subordinate to, the -aggressive war aspect of the case.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>All the dramatic story of what went on in Germany in the early -phases of the conspiracy—the ideologies used, the techniques of -terror used, the suppressions of human freedom employed in the -seizure of power, and even the concentration camps and the Crimes -against Humanity, the persecutions, tortures, and murders committed—all -these things would have little juridical international -significance except for the fact that they were the preparation for -the commission of aggressions against peaceful neighboring peoples.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Even the aspects of the case involving War Crimes in the strict -sense are aspects which are merely the inevitable, proximate result -of the wars of aggression launched and waged by these conspirators, -and of the kind of warfare they waged—that is—total -war, the natural result of the totalitarian party-dominated state -that waged it, and atrocious war, the natural result of the atrocious -doctrines, designs, and purposes of these war-makers.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>For these reasons, I repeat that in our view the phases of the -case dealing with territorial gains acquired by threats of force and -with actual aggressions and aggressive wars constitute the real -heart of the case. Accordingly, we ask the indulgence of the Tribunal -if for these reasons we make the presentation of this part of -the case as detailed as seems to us necessary in view of the outstanding -importance of the subject matter.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The general scope of the case to be presented by the American -Prosecution has been stated in the opening address by Mr. Justice -Jackson. That address indicated to the Tribunal the general nature -and character of the evidence to be offered by the American Prosecution -in support of the allegations with which I shall deal. -However, before approaching the actual presentation of that -evidence, it seems to us that it would be helpful to an orderly -presentation of the case, to address the Tribunal in an introductory -way concerning this specific segment of the Prosecution’s case. In -doing so, I shall not attempt to retrace the ground so ably covered -by Mr. Justice Jackson. On the contrary, I shall confine my introductory -remarks to matters specifically and peculiarly applicable -to that part of the American case relating to the crime of illegal -warfare, and the Common Plan or Conspiracy to commit that crime.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The substantive rule of law which must guide the considerations -of the Tribunal on this aspect of the case, and the rule of law which -must be controlling in the final judgment of the Tribunal on this -part of the case, is stated in Article 6 of the Charter of the International -<span class='pageno' title='243' id='Page_243'></span> -Military Tribunal. Article 6, so far as pertinent here, -reads as follows:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“<span class='it'>Article</span> 6. The Tribunal established by the Agreement referred -to in Article 1 hereof for the trial and punishment of the -major war criminals of the European Axis countries shall -have the power to try and punish persons who, acting in the -interests of the European Axis countries, whether as individuals -or as members of organizations, committed any of the -following crimes.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“The following acts, or any of them, are crimes coming -within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal for which there shall -be individual responsibility:</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“(a) <span class='it'>CRIMES AGAINST PEACE</span>: namely, planning, preparation, -initiation or waging of a war of aggression, or a war -in violation of international treaties, agreements or assurances, -or participation in a Common Plan or Conspiracy -for the accomplishment of any of the foregoing. . . .”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Subparagraphs (b) and (c) of Article 6 are not pertinent to this -aspect of the case. However, the unnumbered final paragraph of -Article 6 is of controlling importance on this aspect of the case. -That paragraph reads:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“Leaders, organizers, instigators, and accomplices participating -in the formulation or execution of a Common Plan -or Conspiracy to commit any of the foregoing crimes are -responsible for all acts performed by any persons in execution -of such plan.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>In receiving evidence on this aspect of the case I would request -the Tribunal to have in mind five principles derived from the -portions of the Charter I have just read:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>(1) The Charter imposes “individual responsibility” for acts -constituting “Crimes against Peace”;</p> - -<p class='pindent'>(2) The term “Crimes against Peace” embraces planning, preparation, -initiation, or waging of illegal war;</p> - -<p class='pindent'>(3) The term “Crimes against Peace” also embraces participation -in a Common Plan or Conspiracy to commit illegal war;</p> - -<p class='pindent'>(4) An illegal war consists of either a war of aggression, or a -war in violation of international treaties, agreements, or assurances. -These two kinds of illegal war might not necessarily be the same. -It will be sufficient for the Prosecution to show that the war was -aggressive irrespective of breach of international treaties, agreements, -or assurances. On the other hand it would be sufficient for -the Prosecution to show that the war was in violation of international -treaties, agreements, or assurances irrespective of whether -<span class='pageno' title='244' id='Page_244'></span> -or not it was a war of aggression. We think the evidence in this -case will establish conclusively that the wars planned, prepared, -initiated, and waged by these defendants, and the wars which were -the object of their common plan and conspiracy, were illegal for -both reasons.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The fifth principle which I ask you to bear in mind, is that -individual criminal responsibility of a defendant is imposed by the -Charter not merely by reason of direct, immediate participation in -the crime. It is sufficient for the Prosecution to show that a -defendant was a leader, an organizer, instigator, or accomplice who -participated either in the formulation or in the execution of a -Common Plan or Conspiracy to commit Crimes against Peace. In -the case of many of the defendants the evidence will show direct -and immediate personal participation in the substantive crime -itself. In the case of some of the defendants the evidence goes to -their participation in the formulation and execution of a Common -Plan or Conspiracy. In the case of each defendant, we think, the -evidence will establish full individual responsibility for Crimes -against Peace, as defined in the Charter of this Tribunal. In this -connection I wish to emphasize that the Charter declares that the -responsibility of conspirators extends not only to their own acts, -but also to all acts performed by any persons in execution of the -conspiracy.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>It is familiar law in my country that if two or more persons set -out to rob a bank, in accordance with a criminal scheme to that -end, and in the course of carrying out their scheme one of the -conspirators commits the crime of murder, all of the participants -in the planning and execution of the bank robbery are guilty of -murder, whether or not they had any other personal participation -in the killing. This is a simple rule of law declared in the Charter. -All the parties to a Common Plan or Conspiracy are the agents -of each other and each is responsible as principal for the acts of all -the others as his agents.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>So much for the terms of the Charter having a bearing on this -aspect of the case.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I invite the attention of the Tribunal to the portions of the Indictment -lodged against the defendants on trial which relate to the -crimes of illegal war or war of aggression. Particularly I ask the -Tribunal to advert to the statements of offense under Count One -and Count Two of the Indictment in this case.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The statement of offense under Count One of the Indictment -is contained in Paragraph III. The offense there stated, so far as -pertinent to the present discussion, is: -<span class='pageno' title='245' id='Page_245'></span></p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“All the defendants, with divers other persons, during a -period of years preceding 8th May 1945, participated as -leaders, organizers, instigators, or accomplices in the formulation -or execution of a Common Plan or Conspiracy to commit, -or which involved the commission of, Crimes against -Peace, as defined in the Charter of this Tribunal. . . . The -Common Plan or Conspiracy embraced the commission of -Crimes against Peace, in that the defendants planned, prepared, -initiated, and waged wars of aggression, which were -also wars in violation of international treaties, agreements, -or assurances.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>The statement of offense under Count Two of the Indictment is -also relevant at this point. It must be obvious that essentially -Counts One and Two interlock in this Indictment. The substance -of the offense stated under Count Two, Paragraph V of the Indictment -is this:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“All the defendants with divers other persons, during a -period of years preceding 8 May 1945, participated in the planning, -preparation, incitation, and waging of wars of aggression -which were also wars in violation of international -treaties, agreements, and assurances.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>The emphasis in the statement of offense under Count One of -the Indictment is on the Common Plan or Conspiracy. The -emphasis under Count Two of the Indictment is on the substantive -crimes to which the conspiracy related and which were committed -in the course of and pursuant to that conspiracy.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I should hasten to add at this point that in the division of the -case as between the Chief Prosecutors of the four Prosecuting -Governments, primary responsibility for the presentation of -evidence supporting Count One has been placed on the American -prosecutor, and primary responsibility for the presentation of the -evidence supporting Count Two of the Indictment has been placed -on the British prosecutor.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>But as we shall show somewhat later, there will to some extent -be a cooperative effort as between the two prosecutors to present -certain phases of both counts together. In addition to the statement -of offense relating to illegal war in Paragraph III under -Count One of the Indictment, Count One also contains what -amounts to a bill of particulars of that offense. In so far as those -particulars relate to illegal war, they are contained in Paragraph -IV (F) of the Indictment which is set out in the English text -on Page 7 through the top of Page 10 under the general heading -“Utilization of Nazi Control for Foreign Aggression.” The allegations -of this bill of particulars have been read in open court, -<span class='pageno' title='246' id='Page_246'></span> -in the presence of the defendants, and the Tribunal, as well as the -defendants, are certainly familiar with the contents of those allegations. -I call attention to them now, however, in order to focus -attention on the parts of the Indictment which are relevant in -consideration of the evidence which I intend to bring before the -Tribunal.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>My introduction to the presentation of evidence in this matter -would be faulty if I did not invite the Tribunal to consider with me -the relationship between history and the evidence in this case. -Neither counsel nor Tribunal can orient themselves to the problem -at hand—neither counsel nor Tribunal can present or consider the -evidence in this case in its proper context, neither can argue or -evaluate the staggering implications of the evidence to be -presented—without reading that history, reading that evidence -against the background of recorded history. And by recorded -history, I mean the history merely of the last 12 years.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, of the U. S. Supreme Court, -found in his judicial experience that “a page of history is worth -a volume of logic.” My recollection is that he stated it perhaps -better, earlier in the preface to his book on the common law where -he said, I think, “The life of the law has been not logic but -experience.” I submit that in the present case a page of history is -worth a hundred tons of evidence. As lawyers and judges we -cannot blind ourselves to what we know as men. The history of the -past 12 years is a burning, living thing in our immediate memory. -The facts of history crowd themselves upon us and demand our -attention.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>It is common ground among all systems of jurisprudence that -matters of common knowledge need not be proved, but may receive -the judicial notice of courts without other evidence. The Charter -of this Tribunal, drawing on this uniformly recognized principle, -declares in Article 21:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“The Tribunal shall not require proof of facts of common -knowledge but shall take judicial notice thereof.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>The facts of recorded history are the prime example of facts of -common knowledge which require no proof. No court would -require evidence to prove that the Battle of Hastings occurred in -the year 1066, or that the Bastille fell on the 14th of July 1789, or -that Czar Alexander I freed the serfs in 1863, or that George -Washington was the first President of the United States or that -George III was the reigning King of England at that time.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>If I may be allowed to interpolate, an old law professor of mine -used to present the curiosity of the law: that a judge is held to -responsibility for no knowledge of the law whatsoever, that a -<span class='pageno' title='247' id='Page_247'></span> -lawyer is held to a reasonable knowledge of the law, and a layman -is held to an absolute knowledge of all the laws. It works inversely -as to facts, or facts of common knowledge. There, the judge is -imputed to know all of those facts, however many of them he may -have forgotten as an individual man. So one of the purposes of -this presentation will be to implement the judicial knowledge which -by hypothesis exists, and which probably actually exists.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>It is not our purpose however, to convert the record of these -proceedings into a history book. The evidence which we offer in -this case is evidence which for the moment has been concealed -from historians. It will fill in recorded history, but it must be read -against the background which common knowledge provides. The -evidence in this case consists primarily of captured documents. -These documents fill in the inside story underlying the historical -record which we all already knew. This evidence which we will -offer constitutes an illustrative spot check on history—on the -history of the recent times as the world knows it. The evidence -to be offered is not a substitute for history. We hope the Tribunal -will find it to be an authentication of history. The evidence which -we have drawn from captured documents establishes the validity -of the recent history of the past 12 years—a history of many -aggressions by the Nazi conspirators accused in this case.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>As I offer to the Tribunal document after document, I ask the -Court to see in those documents definite additions to history, the -addition of new elements long suspected and now proved. The -elements which the captured documents on this particular aspect -of the case will add to recorded history are the following:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>(1) The conspiratorial nature of the planning and preparation -which underlay the Nazi aggressions already known to history;</p> - -<p class='pindent'>(2) The deliberate premeditation which preceded those acts of -aggression;</p> - -<p class='pindent'>(3) The evil motives which led to the crimes;</p> - -<p class='pindent'>(4) The individual participation of named persons in the Nazi -conspiracy for aggression;</p> - -<p class='pindent'>(5) The deliberate falsification of the pretexts claimed by the -Nazi aggressors as the reasons for their criminal activities.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>These elements the captured documents will demonstrate beyond -possible doubt, and these elements, in the context of historical facts, -we think are all that need to be shown.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The critical period between the Nazi seizure of power and the -initiation of the first war of aggression was a very short period. -This critical period of a lawless preparation and illegal scheming -which ultimately set the whole world aflame was unbelievably -short. It covered only 6 years, 1933 to 1939. The speed with which -<span class='pageno' title='248' id='Page_248'></span> -all this was accomplished evidences at once the fanatical intensity -of the conspirators and their diabolical efficiency. Crowded into -these 6 short years is the making of the greatest tragedy that has -ever befallen mankind.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>A full understanding of these 6 years, and of the vibrant -6 years of war that followed, demands that we see this period of -time divided into rather definite phases, phases that reflect the development -and execution of the Nazi master plan. I suggest that the -Tribunal as it receives evidence, fit it into five phases. The first -was primarily preparatory, although it did involve overt acts. That -phase covers roughly the period from 1933 to 1936. In that period -the Nazi conspirators, having acquired governmental control of -Germany by the middle of 1933, turned their attention toward -utilization of that control for foreign aggression. Their plan at this -stage was to acquire military strength and political bargaining -power to be used against other nations. In this they succeeded. -The second phase of their aggression was shorter. It is rather -interesting to see that as the conspiracy gained strength it gained -speed. During each phase the conspirators succeeded in accomplishing -more and more in less and less time until, toward the end of -the period, the rate of acceleration of their conspiratorial movement -was enormous. The second phase of their utilization of control for -foreign aggression involved the actual seizure and absorption of -Austria and Czechoslovakia in that order. By March, the third -month of 1939, they had succeeded in that phase. The third phase -may be measured in months rather than years: from March 1939 -to September 1939. The previous aggression being successful, having -been consummated without the necessity of resorting to actual war, -the conspirators had obtained much desired resources and bases and -were ready to undertake further aggressions, by means of war if -necessary. By September 1939 war was upon the world. The fourth -phase of the aggression consisted of expanding the war into a -general European war of aggression. By April 1941 the war which -had theretofore involved Poland, the United Kingdom, and France, -had been expanded by invasions into Scandinavia and into the Low -Countries and into the Balkans. In the next phase the Nazi -conspirators carried the war eastward by invasion of the territory -of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and finally, through -their Pacific ally, Japan, precipitated the attack on the United -States at Pearl Harbor.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The final result of these aggressions is fresh in the minds of all -of us.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I turn now to certain outstanding evidence at hand. While on -this phase of the case we shall not rest exclusively on them alone; -<span class='pageno' title='249' id='Page_249'></span> -the essential elements of the crime which I have already pointed -out can be made out by a mere handful of captured documents. My -order of presentation of these will be first to present one by one -this handful of documents, documents which prove the essential -elements of the case on aggressive war up to the hilt. These documents -will leave no reasonable doubt concerning the aggressive -character of the Nazi war or concerning the conspiratorial premeditation -of that war. Some of this group of documents are the specific -basis for particular allegations in the Indictment. As I reach -those documents, I shall invite the attention of the Tribunal to the -allegations of the Indictment which are specifically supported by -them. Having proved the corpus of the crime in this way, I will -follow the presentation of this evidence with a more or less chronological -presentation of the details of the case on aggressive war -producing more detailed evidence of the relevant activities of the -conspirators from 1933 to 1941.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The documents which we have selected for single presentation -at this point, before developing the case in detail, are 10 in number. -The documents have been selected to establish the basic facts concerning -each phase of the development of the Nazi conspiracy for -aggression. Each document is conspiratorial in nature. Each document -is one, I believe, heretofore unknown to history and each -document is self-contained and tells its own story. Those are the -three standards of selection which we have sought to apply.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I turn to the period of 1933 to 1936, a period characterized by -an orderly, planned sequence of preparations for war. This is the -period covered by Paragraphs 1 and 2 of Section IV (F) of the -Indictment, to be found at Page 7 of the printed English text. The -essential character of this period was the formulation and execution -of the plan to re-arm and to re-occupy and fortify the Rhineland, -in violation of the Treaty of Versailles and other treaties, in order -to acquire military strength and political bargaining power to be -used against other nations.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>If the Tribunal please, we have what have been referred to as -document books. They are English translations of German documents, -in some cases German versions. I shall ask that they be -handed up and we will hand one copy at the moment to counsel -for the defendants. It has been physically impossible to prepare -21 sets of them. If possible we shall try to furnish further copies -to the defendants, the original German documents. . . .</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: I would be very much obliged. In order that there -should be no misunderstanding we have arranged that tomorrow -we will discuss with the Prosecution in what way the whole of -the evidence may be made available to all the Defense Counsel. -<span class='pageno' title='250' id='Page_250'></span> -It is, of course, necessary that no one should have the advantage -over the other. For this reason, while I appreciate the good will -of the Prosecution to overcome the difficulties, I must refuse their -kind offer of a copy of the book, because I feel that in so doing I -would have an unfair advantage over the others. I am not in a -position during the proceedings to hand the evidentiary document -to my colleagues. I ask you therefore to appreciate the reasons -why I have refused this document. I am convinced that tomorrow -we shall be able to agree about the way in which we can receive -evidence, and I suggest that today we try to continue as we have -done up to now.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Alderman, can you inform the Tribunal -how many copies of these documents you will be able to furnish -to the Tribunal by Monday?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. ALDERMAN: I cannot at the moment. If Your Honor -pleases: may I make this suggestion in connection with it, which -I think may be of help to all concerned? I think many of us have -underestimated the contribution of this interpreting system to this -Trial. We all see how it has speeded the proceeding, but in so -far as my presentation of German documents is concerned, I shall -let the documents speak. I expect to read the pertinent parts of -the documents into the system so that they will go into the transcript -of record. Counsel for the German defendants will get their -transcripts in German; our French and Russian Allies will get their -transcripts in their language, and it seems to me that that is the -most helpful way to overcome this language barrier. I can recognize -that for Dr. Dix to receive a volume of documents which are English -translations of German documents might not seem very helpful -to him. Further, as an aid, we will have original German -documents in court—one copy; and if the Court will allow, I would -ask that the original German document, from which I shall read, -would be passed to the German interpreter under Colonel Dostert, -so that instead of undertaking to translate an English translation -back into perhaps a bad German, he will have the original German -document before him and in that way, the exact German text -will be delivered in the daily transcript to all of the counsel for -the defendants. I hope that may be a helpful suggestion.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: That to some extent depends, does it not, -upon how much of the document you omit?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. ALDERMAN: That is quite true, Sir. As to these 10 documents -with which I propose to deal immediately, I expect to read -into the transcript practically the whole of the documents, because -the whole of them is significant, much more significant than anything -<span class='pageno' title='251' id='Page_251'></span> -I could say. Also all of these 10 documents were listed in the -list of documents which we furnished counsel for the defendants, -I believe, the 1st of November.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: You say that they were. . . .</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. ALDERMAN: In the list. But of course I recognize that -a list of documents is very different from the documents themselves.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Are the documents very long?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. ALDERMAN: Some of them are very long and some of -them are very short; you can’t generalize. Whenever it is a speech -of Adolf Hitler you can count it is fairly long.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Can you not by Monday have in the hands -of every member of the Defense Counsel copies of these 10 documents? -It is suggested to me that photostating could be done -quite easily.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. ALDERMAN: I understand that both our photostatic facilities -and our mimeographing facilities are right up to the hilt -with work. It is a very difficult mechanical problem.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. STOREY: If the Tribunal please: In further explanation, -the documents which Mr. Alderman intends to offer were on the -defendants’ list filed in the Document Center on the 1st day of -November 1945. Lieutenant Barrett had 23 copies of each one -photostated as far as he could on that list. Six copies went into -the defendants’ Information Center. Now, we can’t say at this -time whether six copies—that, is photostatic copies of each one—have -been furnished to the defendants, but whenever they wanted -copies of any particular one, either the original was exhibited to -them or photostatic copies were made.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Again, Sir, I call attention to the physical problems that are -almost insurmountable: to make 23 photostatic copies which are -required of every document. Now then, Sir. . . .</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: If I may interrupt you, I imagine that the -list which was deposited on the 1st of November didn’t contain -only these 10 documents but contained a great number of other -documents.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. STOREY: That is correct, Sir.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: So that the defendants’ counsel wouldn’t -know which out of that list of documents were going to be relied -upon.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. STOREY: Except, Sir, they were notified that the Prosecution -would use all or some of those documents if necessary, -<span class='pageno' title='252' id='Page_252'></span> -and if the copies were not furnished upon request, they have been -made and delivered to them.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>May I say, Sir, that working 24 hours a day, we are trying to -furnish 10 sets of all of these to defendants’ counsel, and they will -be. . . . One complete set was delivered to defendants’ counsel here -now as a convenience to follow. The other sets, I feel certain, will -be in their hands sometime Sunday, but one complete list we now -turn over to them—not a list, complete copies.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. WALTER SIEMERS (Counsel for Defendant Raeder): I -should like to point out one fact. The Prosecution declared this -morning that the documents that will be put before us today are -contained in the list which was submitted on the 1st of November, -that is—in the list which was submitted this morning. This morning -a list was made available to us in room 54. I have it in my -hand. This morning nine documents were named. Of these nine -documents, only one, contrary to what the Prosecution said, was -found in the old list; the other eight documents were neither in -the old list nor in the new list. The eight other documents are, -as I ascertained at lunch time today, not in the document room. -Neither are they available in photostatic copies, so they could not -be made available to me. I think, gentlemen, that it will not be -possible for us to work on this basis. I therefore request that we -should be allowed to wait until we know the result of the discussion -which we are told will take place tomorrow with the -Prosecution, so that we may then. . . .</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal proposes to adjourn now and -to give Defense Counsel the opportunity of meeting Counsel for -the Prosecution tomorrow morning. Both Counsel for the Prosecution -and Defense Counsel appear to be perfectly ready to make -every possible effort to deal with the case in the most reasonable -way, and at that meeting you will be able to discuss these documents -which you say have been omitted and the Counsel for the -Prosecution will try to satisfy you with reference to the other -documents.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Yes, I have one more request. The Prosecution -has just said that it will hardly be possible to make 23 photostatic -copies. I believe, gentlemen, that if these documents are as important -as the Prosecution said today, it is a <span class='it'>conditio sine qua non</span> -that every defense counsel and every defendant should have a -photostatic copy of these documents.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>As we all know it is easy to produce a photostat in a few -hours. With the excellent apparatus here available to the Prosecution -<span class='pageno' title='253' id='Page_253'></span> -it should, in my opinion, be easy to produce 20 or 40 photostats -of these 10 documents in 48 hours.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Well, you will meet the Counsel for the Prosecution -tomorrow and attempt to come to some satisfactory arrangement -with them then; and now the Tribunal will adjourn.</p> - -<p class='line' style='text-align:center;margin-top:2em;margin-bottom:2em;'>[<span class='it'>The Tribunal adjourned until 26 November 1945 at 1000 hours.</span>]</p> - -<hr class='pbk'/> - -<div><span class='pageno' title='254' id='Page_254'></span><h1>FIFTH DAY<br/> <span style='font-size:smaller'>Monday, 26 November 1945</span></h1></div> - -<h2 class='nobreak'><span class='it'>Morning Session</span></h2> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. FRITZ SAUTER (Counsel for Defendant Von Ribbentrop): -May it please the Court, I should like to make an application. I -am Dr. Sauter, counsel for the Defendant Von Ribbentrop. On -30 October the Defendant Von Ribbentrop requested that his former -secretary, Margareta Blank, at that time in the Remand Prison in -Nuremberg, be placed at his disposal in order that he might dictate -his reply to the Indictment, as well as a description of the manner -in which he performed his official duties in the last 7 or 8 years.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>On 11 November 1945 the Tribunal allowed this request. The -Defendant Von Ribbentrop was therefore able to dictate for a few -hours, but this was stopped for reasons unknown to him. Neither -has the Defendant Von Ribbentrop had returned to him the shorthand -notes or the typed transcript. He has not been able to dictate -any more to Fräulein Blank.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>On 15 November Ribbentrop repeated his request regarding the -witness Blank, but up to the present she has not been placed again -at his disposal. The Defendant Ribbentrop therefore requests the -President to give instructions that his former secretary, Margareta -Blank, again be placed at his disposal in order to take down the -necessary notes from dictation. Such permission appears to be -absolutely essential to enable the Defendant Ribbentrop properly -to prepare his own testimony and the testimony of the defense -witnesses.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Particularly in the case of Von Ribbentrop, the material to be -treated is so voluminous, that no other way of treating it appears -feasible to us. The Defendant Von Ribbentrop has a further request -to make. He has repeatedly asked that some of his former colleagues, -in particular Ambassador Gauss, Ambassador Von Rintelen, Minister -Von Sonnleitner, Professor Fritz Berber, and Under State -Secretary Henke, be brought to Nuremberg as witnesses, and that -he be permitted to speak to these witnesses in the presence of his -counsel. This request had in part been refused by the Court on -10 November. The remaining part has not yet been decided.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>It is quite impossible for the Defendant Von Ribbentrop to give -a clear and exhaustive account of the entire foreign policy for the -last 7 or 8 years if nothing is placed at his disposal except a pencil -<span class='pageno' title='255' id='Page_255'></span> -and a block of writing paper. Even the White Books of the Foreign -Office, for which he has asked, could not be placed at his disposal. -In view of the fact that the data concerning Germany’s foreign -policy during the last 7 or 8 years is so extensive, the Defendant -Von Ribbentrop cannot possibly recall every single date, every -event, every document, <span class='it'>et cetera</span>, unless his memory is refreshed -by his being able to speak with his former colleagues.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Apart from this the Defendant Von Ribbentrop has been in the -habit of taking a great many soporifics during the last 4 years, -especially bromides, and his memory has suffered in consequence. -It would not be very helpful to the investigation of historical truth -in a field which interests not only this Court, but also, to an even -greater extent, the outside world, if Von Ribbentrop during his -examination, might have to state at every turn that he could no -longer recollect these details.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Defendant Von Ribbentrop therefore applies to the Court and -begs that his above-mentioned colleagues be brought here and that -he receive permission to discuss with them matters pertaining to -the Trial, in order that he may prepare for further proceedings.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal has already intimated to -defendant’s counsel that all applications should, as far as practicable, -be made in writing, and they consider that the applications which -have how been made orally should have been made in writing. -They will consider the facts with reference to the applications in -respect of the Defendant Von Ribbentrop’s secretary. The other -applications as to witnesses and documents, which have been made -in writing, have been considered, or will be considered by the -Tribunal.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Mr. President, may I say in this connection that -the applications which I have today submitted have been repeatedly -lodged with the Court in writing, but my client is anxious lest he -experience difficulties in preparing for his own hearing and the -hearing of the defense witnesses.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: As was announced at the sitting on Friday, -Counsel for the Prosecution were to try to arrange with defendants’ -counsel some satisfactory arrangement with reference to the -production of documents in the German language. In accordance -with that announcement, Counsel for the Prosecution saw Counsel -for the Defense, and representatives of the Prosecution and the -Defense appeared before the Tribunal and the Tribunal has provisionally -made the following arrangement:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>1. That in the future, only such parts of documents as are read -in court by the Prosecution shall in the first instance be part of -<span class='pageno' title='256' id='Page_256'></span> -the record. In that way those parts of the documents will be conveyed -to defendants’ counsel through the earphones in German.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>2. In order that defendants and their counsel may have an -opportunity of inspecting such documents in their entirety in German, -a photostatic copy of the original and one copy thereof shall -be deposited in the defendants’ counsel room at the same time that -they are produced in court.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>3. The defendants’ counsel may at any time refer to any other -part of such documents.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>4. Prosecuting counsel will furnish defendants’ counsel with -10 copies of their trial briefs in English and five copies of their -books of documents in English, at the time such briefs and books -are furnished to the Tribunal.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>5. Defendants’ counsel will be furnished with one copy of each -of the transcripts of the proceedings.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>That is all. I call upon the prosecuting counsel for the United -States.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. ALDERMAN: If it pleases the Tribunal, may I make, Mr. -President, one inquiry with regard to your reference to trial briefs? -On my section of the case I shall not expect to hand up trial briefs -to the Court. Whatever I have in the nature of trial briefs will be -put over the microphone. I wonder if that is satisfactory?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I think what I said meets that case.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. ALDERMAN: I thought so, yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Because what I said was that the defendants’ -counsel would be furnished with 10 copies of the trial briefs in -English at the same time that they are furnished to the Tribunal. -Therefore, if you don’t furnish the trial briefs to the Tribunal, none -will be furnished to the defendants’ counsel.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. ALDERMAN: Yes. When the Tribunal rose on Friday last, -I had just completed an introductory statement preliminary to the -presentation of evidence on the aggressive war aspect of the case. -In that introductory statement I had invited attention to the parts -of the Charter and to the parts of the Indictment which are pertinent -to this aspect of the case. I had also discussed the relationship -between recorded history and the evidence to be presented, indicating -what sort of additions to recorded history would be made by -the evidence contained in the captured documents.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I then indicated to the Court that I would first proceed by -presenting singly a handful of captured documents, which, in our -opinion, prove the corpus of the crime of aggressive war, leaving -no reasonable doubt concerning the aggressive character of the Nazi -war, or concerning the conspiratorial premeditation of that war. -<span class='pageno' title='257' id='Page_257'></span> -I indicated to the Tribunal that after proving the corpus of the -crime in this way I would follow the presentation of this evidence -with a more or less chronological presentation of the case on aggressive -war, producing evidence in greater detail of the relevant -activities of the conspirators from 1933 to 1941.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>As the members of the Tribunal may understand, it is easier to -make plans about presentation than to keep them. There have been, -by necessity, some changes in our plans. I indicated on Friday that -to a certain extent the American case under Count One and the -British case under Count Two would interlock. The British Chief -Prosecutor, Sir Hartley Shawcross, is by force of circumstances, -required to be in London this week. He expects to be back next -week. The intention now is that when he returns Monday he will -make his opening statement covering Count Two of the Indictment -and such interrelated parts of Count One of the Indictment as have -not by then been presented. So that what is at the moment planned, -if it meets with the Court’s views, is that I shall continue, as far as -I may within 2 days of this week, on the detailed story as to aggressive -war; that thereupon we shall alter the presentation and present -some other matters coming under Count One. Then, following the -British Chief Prosecutor’s opening statement on Monday of next -week, we shall continue jointly with the chapters on Poland, Russia, -and Japan, as parts of both Count One and Two. While that may -not be strictly logical, it seems to us the best method with which to -proceed under the circumstances.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I turn now to the period of 1933 to 1936, a period characterized -by an orderly, planned sequence of preparations for war. This is -the period covered by Paragraphs 1 and 2 of IV (F) of the Indictment. -This may be found at Page 7 of the printed English text -of the Indictment.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The essential character of this period was the formulation and -execution of the plan to rearm and to reoccupy and fortify the -Rhineland in violation of the Treaty of Versailles and other treaties, -in order to acquire military strength and political bargaining power -to be used against other nations.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Hitler’s own eloquence in a secret speech delivered to all Supreme -Commanders on 23 November 1939, at 1200 hours, is sufficient -to characterize this phase of the Nazi conspiracy. This document -comes to hand as a captured document found in the OKW -files—OKW is Ober Kommando der Wehrmacht (the High Command -of the Army, Chief of the High Command of the Armed -Forces)—and was captured at Flensburg. The document is numbered -789-PS in our numbered series of documents. -<span class='pageno' title='258' id='Page_258'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>I have in my hand, if the Court please, the German original -of this document in the condition in which it was captured, and -I wish to offer the document in evidence and have it given the -proper serial number as the United States prosecutor’s exhibit. The -serial number, I understand, is United States Exhibit 23. I would -ask that the German text of the original be handed to the German -interpreters.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>If the Court please, understanding the ruling just made by the -presiding justice, although I have offered the entire document, as it is -a very long speech, I shall not read into the record the entire -speech. Of course the presiding judge said defense counsel may -insert any other parts of it as they wish.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I shall begin reading at the beginning, and read a little more -than half of the first page in the English text. I am advised that -the German original is marked with a blue pencil at the point -where I shall stop reading. I will read the English translation:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“November 23, 1939, 1200 hours. Conference with the -Führer, to which all Supreme Commanders are ordered. -The Führer gives the following speech:</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“The purpose of this conference is to give you an idea of -the world of my thoughts, which takes charge of me, in the -face of future events, and to tell you my decisions. The -building up of our Armed Forces was only possible in connection -with the ideological”—the German word is “weltanschaulich”—“education -of the German people by the -Party.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>If I may interpolate just to comment on that interesting German -word “weltanschaulich”, I take it that ideological is about as -close a translation as we can get, but the word means more than -that. It means a whole attitude towards the world, a way of looking -on the world.</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“When I started my political task”—I am quoting again—“in -1919, my strong belief in final success was based on a -thorough observation of the events of the day and the study -of the reasons for their occurrence. Therefore, I never lost -my belief in the midst of setbacks which were not spared -me during my period of struggle. Providence has had the -last word and brought me success. Moreover, I had a clear -recognition of the probable course of historical events and -the firm will to make brutal decisions. The first decision -was in 1919 when I, after long internal conflict, became -a politician and took up the struggle against my enemies. -That was the hardest of all decisions. I had, however, the -firm belief that I would arrive at my goal. First of all, I -<span class='pageno' title='259' id='Page_259'></span> -desired a new system of selection. I wanted to educate a -minority which would take over the leadership. After 15 -years I arrived at my goal, after strenuous struggles and -many setbacks. When I came to power in 1933, a period of -the most difficult struggle lay behind me. Everything existing -before that had collapsed. I had to reorganize everything, -beginning with the mass of the people and extending -it to the Armed Forces. First, reorganization of the interior, -abolishment of appearances of decay and defeatist ideas, -education to heroism. While reorganizing the interior, I -undertook the second task: To release Germany from its -international ties. Two particular characteristics are to be -pointed out: Secession from the League of Nations and denunciation -of the Disarmament Conference. It was a hard -decision. The number of prophets who predicted that it -would lead to the occupation of the Rhineland was large, -the number of believers was very small. I was supported -by the nation, which stood firmly behind me, when I carried -out my intentions. After that the order for rearmament. Here -again there were numerous prophets who predicted misfortunes, -and only a few believers. In 1935 the introduction -of compulsory armed service. After that, militarization of -the Rhineland, again a process believed to be impossible at -that time. The number of people who put trust in me was -very small. Then, beginning of the fortification of the whole -country, especially in the west.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“One year later, Austria came.”—I suppose he meant Austria -went.—“This step also was considered doubtful. It brought -about a considerable reinforcement of the Reich. The next -step was Bohemia, Moravia, and Poland. This step also was -not possible to accomplish in one campaign. First of all, -the western fortification had to be finished. It was not -possible to reach the goal in one effort. It was clear to me -from the first moment that I could not be satisfied with the -Sudeten-German territory. That was only a partial solution. -The decision to march into Bohemia was made. Then followed -the erection of the Protectorate, and with that the basis -for the action against Poland was laid, but I wasn’t quite -clear at that time whether I should start first against the -East and then in the West, or vice versa.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>There are some curious antitheses of thought in that speech, -as in most of Adolf Hitler’s speeches. In one sentence he combines -guidance by Providence with the making of brutal decisions. He -constantly speaks of how very few people were with him, and -<span class='pageno' title='260' id='Page_260'></span> -yet the mass of the German people were with him. But he does -give a brief summary of the gist of what is contained in the allegations -of the Indictment, to which I have invited your attention:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The organization of the mass of the people, then extending -to the Armed Forces, and the various brutal decisions that he did -make, about which history knows.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>That long document contains other material of great interest. -It may be that we shall advert to other portions of it later. At -this point, however, I have simply asked the Court to focus attention -on the matter I have just read and its bearing on the development -of the conspiracy during the period 1933 to 1936.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Another captured document is sufficient to demonstrate the -preparations for war in which the Nazi conspirators were engaged -during this period. I refer to a top-secret letter dated 24 June -1935 from General Von Brauchitsch to the Supreme Commanders -of the Army, Navy, and Air Forces. Attached to that letter is a -copy of a secret Reich Defense Law of 21 May 1935 and a copy of -a decision of the Reich Cabinet of 21 May 1935 on the Council -for the Defense of the Reich.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>These documents were captured in the OKW files at Fechenheim. -This group of documents is numbered 2261-PS in our numbered -series of documents. It seems to us one of the most significant -evidences of secret and direct preparations for aggressive war.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I gave expression to a typographical error. That was General -Von Blomberg instead of Brauchitsch.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I have the original of these documents. I ask that they be -admitted into evidence as Exhibit USA-24.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The top page of that document, which I shall read in full, is -the letter signed “Von Blomberg, Berlin, 21 June 1935, Top Secret”; -headed “The Reich Minister of War and Supreme Commander of -the Armed Forces, No. 1820/35 Top Secret L II a.”</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“To: The Supreme Commander of the Army, the Supreme -Commander of the Navy, the Supreme Commander of the -Air Forces.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“In the appendix I transmit one copy each of the law for -the defense of the Reich of 21 May 1935, and of a decision -of the Reich Cabinet of 21 May 1935 concerning the Reich -Defense Council. The publication of the Reich Defense Law -is temporarily suspended by order of the Führer and Reich -Chancellor.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“The Führer and Reich Chancellor has nominated the President -of the Directorate of the Reichsbank, Dr. Schacht, to -be ‘Plenipotentiary-General for War Economy.’ -<span class='pageno' title='261' id='Page_261'></span></p> - -<p class='noindent'>“I request that the copies of the Reich Defense Law needed -within the units of the Armed Forces, be ordered before -1 July 1935 at Armed Forces Office (L) where it is to be -established with the request that the law should only be -distributed down to corps headquarters outside of the Reich -Ministry of War.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“I point out the necessity of strictest secrecy once more.”</p> - -<p class='noindent'>Signed by “Von Blomberg.” Underneath that is an indorsement:</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“Berlin, 3 September 1935; No. 1820/35 L Top Secret II a. -To Defense-Economic Group G-3, copy transmitted (signed) -Jodl.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>“There is attached thereto, if the Tribunal please, the statute -referred to as the Reich Defense Law of 21 May 1935, or rather -it was enacted by the Reich Cabinet, and it starts with the statement: -“The Reich Cabinet has enacted the following law that is -hereby made public.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>There follows a law in detail covering preparations for state -of defense, mobilization, appointment of this Plenipotentiary-General -for War Economy, with plenipotentiary authority for the -economic preparation of the war, and a Part III providing for -setting of penalties.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The law is signed:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>“The Führer and Reich Chancellor, Adolf Hitler; the Reich -Minister of War, Von Blomberg; the Reich Minister of the Interior, -Frick,” one of the defendants. And at the bottom of it there is this -note—that is on Sheet 4 of the original German, I think:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“Note on the Law for the Defense of the Reich of 21 May -1935. The publication of the Law for the Defense of the Reich -of 21 May 1935 will be suspended. The law became effective -21 May 1935. The Führer and Reich Chancellor, Adolf Hitler.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>So that although the law itself stated that it was made public, -the publication was suspended by Adolf Hitler; although the law -became immediately effective.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>There is further attached a copy of the decision of the Reich -Cabinet of 21 May 1935 on the council for the defense of the realm -which deals largely with organization for economic preparation for -the war and which I think was discussed by my colleague, Mr. -Dodd, last week.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>There can be no question that this law of May 21, 1935 was the -cornerstone of war preparations of the Nazi conspirators. The -relationship of the Defendant Schacht to this preparation is made -transparently clear by this captured document.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>So much, for the time being, on the preparatory phase of the -conspiracy, 1933 to 1936. -<span class='pageno' title='262' id='Page_262'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>As indicated earlier, the next phase of aggression was the -formulation and execution of plans to attack Austria and Czechoslovakia, -in that order.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>This is the phase of the aggression covered by Paragraphs 3 (a), -(b), and (c) of Section IV (F) of the Indictment, appearing at Pages 7 -to 8 of the printed English text.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>One of the most striking and revealing of all the captured documents -which have come to hand is a document which we have come -to know as the Hossbach notes of a conference in the Reich Chancellery -on 5 November 1937 from 1615 to 2030 hours, in the course -of which Hitler outlined to those present the possibilities and -necessities of expanding their foreign policy, and requested—I -quote: “That his statements be looked upon in the case of his death -as his last will and testament.” And so with this document we shall -present to the Tribunal and to the public the last will and testament -of Adolf Hitler as he contemplated that last will and testament on -5 November 1937. The document comes to hand through the United -States Department of State and it is authenticated by the seal of -the Secretary of State of the United States. It is Document Number -386-PS in our series of numbered documents. I offer it in -evidence as Exhibit USA-25.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Before reading it, I note at the start that the recorder of the -minutes of this meeting, then Colonel Hossbach, was the Führer’s -adjutant. I note also the presence at this conspiratorial meeting of -the Defendant Erich Raeder. The Defendant Constantin von Neurath -was present. The Defendant Hermann Wilhelm Göring was present. -The minutes of this meeting reveal a crystalization towards the end -of 1937 in the policy of the Nazi regime. Austria and Czechoslovakia -were to be acquired by force. They would provide Lebensraum -(living space) and improve Germany’s military position for -further operations. While it is true that actual events unfolded -themselves in a somewhat different manner than that outlined at -this meeting, in essence the purposes stated at the meeting were -carried out. The document destroys any possible doubt concerning -the Nazis’ premeditation of their Crimes against Peace. This document -is of such tremendous importance that I feel obliged to read -it in full into the record:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“Berlin, 10 November 1937. Notes on the conference in the -Reichskanzlei on 5 November 1937 from 1615 to 2030 hours.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“Present: The Führer and Reich Chancellor; the Reich Minister -for War, Generalfeldmarschall Von Blomberg; the -C-in-C Army, Generaloberst Freiherr Von Fritsch; the C-in-C -Navy, Generaladmiral Dr. H. C. Raeder; the C-in-C Luftwaffe, -Generaloberst Göring; the Reichsminister for Foreign -<span class='pageno' title='263' id='Page_263'></span> -Affairs, Freiherr Von Neurath; Oberst Hossbach” (the adjutant -who took the minutes).</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“The Führer stated initially that the subject matter of today’s -conference was of such high importance that its detailed -discussion would certainly in other states take place before -the Cabinet in full session. However, he, the Führer, had -decided not to discuss this matter in the larger circle of the -Reich Cabinet, because of its importance. His subsequent -statements were the result of detailed deliberations and of -the experiences of his 4½ years in government; he desired to -explain to those present his fundamental ideas on the possibilities -and necessities of expanding our foreign policy, and -in the interests of a far-sighted policy he requested that his -statements be looked upon, in the case of his death, as his -last will and testament.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“The Führer then stated: The aim of German policy is the -security and the preservation of the nation and its propagation. -This is consequently a problem of space. The German -nation comprises 85 million people, which, because of the -number of individuals and the compactness of habitation, -form a homogeneous European racial body, the like of which -cannot be found in any other country. On the other hand -it justifies the demand for larger living space more than for -any other nation. If there have been no political consequences -to meet the demands of this racial body for living space, -then that is the result of historical development spread over -several centuries and should this political condition continue -to exist, it will represent the greatest danger to the preservation -of the German nation”—The German word used there, -is not “nation”; it is “Volkstum”—“at its present high level. -An arrest of the decrease of the German element in Austria -and in Czechoslovakia is just as little possible as the preservation -of the present state in Germany itself.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>I interpolate that I can but think that this is not a good translation -of the German because to me the sentence seems meaningless.</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“Instead of growth, sterility will be introduced, and as a -consequence, tensions of a social nature will appear after a -number, of years, because political and philosophical ideas are -of a permanent nature only as long as they are able to produce -the basis for the realization of the actual claim of the -existence of a nation. The German future is therefore -dependent exclusively on the solution of the need for living -space. Such a solution can be sought naturally only for a -limited period, about one to three generations. -<span class='pageno' title='264' id='Page_264'></span></p> - -<p class='noindent'>“Before touching upon the question of solving the need for -living space, it must be decided whether a solution of the -German position with a good future can be attained, either -by way of an autarchy or by way of an increased share in -universal commerce and industry.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“Autarchy: Execution will be possible only with strict National -Socialist State policy, which is the basis”—that is the basis -of autarchy—“Assuming this can be achieved the results are -as follows:</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“A. In the sphere of raw materials, only limited, but not total -autarchy can be attained:</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“1. Wherever coal can be used for the extraction of raw -materials, autarchy is feasible.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“2. In the case of ores the position is much more difficult. -Requirements in iron and light metals can be covered by -ourselves. Copper and tin, however, cannot.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“3. Cellular materials can be covered by ourselves as long as -sufficient wood supplies exist. A permanent solution is not -possible.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“4. Edible fats—possible.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“B. In the case of foods, the question of an autarchy must be -answered with a definite capital NO.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“The general increase of living standards, compared with 30 -to 40 years ago, brought about a simultaneous increase of the -demand and an increase of personal consumption among the -producers, the farmers themselves. The proceeds from the -production increase in agriculture have been used for covering -the increased demand, therefore they represent no actual -increase in production. A further increase in production by -making greater demands on the soil is not possible because it -already shows signs of deterioration due to the use of artificial -fertilizers, and it is therefore certain that, even with the -greatest possible increase in production, participation in the -world market could not be avoided.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>I interpolate, that if I understand him he means by that, “no -autarchy; we must participate in world trade and commerce.”</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“The considerable expenditure of foreign currency to secure -food by import, even in periods when harvests are good, -increases catastrophically when the harvest is really poor. -The possibility of this catastrophe increases correspondingly -to the increase in population, and the annual 560,000 excess -in births would bring about an increased consumption in -bread, because the child is a greater bread eater than the -adult. -<span class='pageno' title='265' id='Page_265'></span></p> - -<p class='noindent'>“Permanently to counter the difficulties of food supplies by -lowering the standard of living and by rationalization is -impossible in a continent which has developed an approximately -equivalent standard of living. As the solving of the -unemployment problem has brought into effect the complete -power of consumption, some small corrections in our agricultural -home production will be possible, but not a wholesale -alteration of the standard of food consumption. Consequently -autarchy becomes impossible, specifically in the sphere of -food supplies, as well as generally.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“Participation in world economy: There are limits to this -which we are unable to transgress. The market fluctuation -would be an obstacle to a secure foundation of the German -position; international commercial agreements do not offer -any guarantee for practical execution. It must be considered -on principle that since the World War (1914-18) an industrialization -has taken place in countries which formerly exported -food. We live in a period of economic empires, in which the -tendency to colonies, again approaches the condition which -originally motivated colonization; in Japan and Italy economic -motives are the basis of their will to expand, and economic -need will also drive Germany to it. Countries outside the -great economic empires have special difficulties in expanding -economically.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“The upward tendency, which has been caused in world -economy, due to armament competition, can never form a -permanent basis for an economic settlement, and this latter -is also hampered by the economic disruption caused by -Bolshevism. There is a pronounced military weakness in those -states which base their existence on export. As our exports -and imports are carried out over those sea lanes which are -dominated by Britain, it is more a question of security of transport -rather than one of foreign currency and this explains the -great weakness of our food situation in wartime. The only -way out, and one which may appear imaginary, is the securing -of greater living space, an endeavor which at all times -has been the cause of the formation of states and of movements -of nations. It is explicable that this tendency finds no -interest in Geneva and in satisfied states. Should the security -of our food situation be our foremost thought, then the space -required for this can only be sought in Europe, but we will -not copy liberal capitalistic policies which rely on exploiting -colonies. It is not a case of conquering people, but of conquering -agriculturally useful space. It would also be more -<span class='pageno' title='266' id='Page_266'></span> -to the purpose to seek raw material-producing territory in -Europe directly adjoining the Reich and not overseas, and -this solution would have to be brought into effect for one or -two generations. What would be required at a later date -over and above this must be left to subsequent generations. -The development of great world-wide national bodies is -naturally a slow process and the German people, with its -strong racial root”—I interpolate, there is that German word -“Rassekern” again (the racial root)—“has for this purpose the -most favorable foundations in the heart of the European continent. -The history of all times—Roman Empire, British -Empire—has proved that, every space, expansion can only be -effected by breaking resistance and taking risks. Even setbacks -are unavoidable; neither formerly nor today has space -been found without an owner; the attacker always comes up -against the proprietor.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='line' style='text-align:center;margin-top:2em;margin-bottom:2em;'>[<span class='it'>A recess was taken.</span>]</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. ALDERMAN: May it please the Tribunal, after the somewhat -jumbled discussion which I have just read of geopolitical -economic theory and of the need for expansion and Lebensraum, -Adolf Hitler, in these Hossbach notes, posed this question—and I -quote:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“The question for Germany is where the greatest possible -conquest could be made at lowest cost.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“German politics must reckon with its two hateful enemies, -England and France, to whom a strong German colossus in -the center of Europe would be intolerable. Both these states -would oppose a further reinforcement of Germany, both in -Europe and overseas, and in this opposition they would have -the support of all parties. Both countries would view the -building of German military strong points overseas as a -threat to their overseas communications, as a security -measure for German commerce, and retroactively a -strengthening of the German position in Europe.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“England is not in a position to cede any of her colonial -possessions to us, owing to the resistance which she experiences -in the Dominions. After the loss of prestige which -England has suffered owing to the transfer of Abyssinia to -Italian ownership, a return of East Africa can no longer -be expected. Any resistance on England’s part would at best -consist in the readiness to satisfy our colonial claims by -taking away colonies which at the present moment are not in -<span class='pageno' title='267' id='Page_267'></span> -British hands, for example, Angola. French favors would -probably be of the same nature.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“A serious discussion regarding the return of colonies to us -could be considered only at a time when England is in a -state of emergency and the German Reich is strong and -well armed. The Führer does not share the opinion that -the Empire is unshakeable.”—Meaning, I take it, the British -Empire.—</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“Resistance against the Empire is to be found less in conquered -territories than amongst its competitors. The British -Empire and the Roman Empire cannot be compared with one -another in regard to durability; after the Punic Wars the -latter did not have a serious political enemy. Only the dissolving -effects which originated in Christendom, and the -signs of age which creep into all states, made it possible for -the ancient Germans to subjugate ancient Rome.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“Alongside the British Empire today a number of states -exist which are stronger than it. The British mother country -is able to defend its colonial possession only allied with -other states and not by its own power. How could England -alone, for example, defend Canada against attack by America, -or its Far Eastern interests against an attack by Japan?</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“The singling out of the British Crown as the bearer of Empire -unity is in itself an admission that the universal empire -cannot be maintained permanently by power politics. The -following are significant pointers in this respect:</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“(a) Ireland’s struggle for independence.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“(b) Constitutional disputes in India where England, by her -half measures, left the door open for Indians, at a later -date, to utilize the non-fulfilment of constitutional promises -as a weapon against Britain.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“(c) The weakening of the British position in the Far East -by Japan.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“(d) The opposition in the Mediterranean to Italy which—by -virtue of its history, driven by necessity and led by -a genius—expands its power position and must consequently -infringe British interests to an increasing extent. The outcome -of the Abyssinian war is a loss of prestige for Britain -which Italy is endeavoring to increase by stirring up discontent -in the Mohammedan world.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“It must be established in conclusion that the Empire cannot -be held permanently by power politics by 45 million Britons, -in spite of all the solidity of their ideals. The proportion -of the populations in the Empire, compared with that of -<span class='pageno' title='268' id='Page_268'></span> -the motherland, is nine to one, and it should act as a warning -to us that if we expand in space, we must not allow -the level of our population to become too low.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>I take it he meant by that: “Keep the population of occupied -territories low in comparison with ours.”</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“France’s position is more favorable than that of England. -The French Empire is better placed geographically; the population -of its colonial possessions represents a potential military -increase. But France is faced with difficulties of internal -politics. In the life of the nations, parliamentary governments -ruled only 10 per cent of the time, approximately; -whereas, totalitarian governments ruled 90 per cent of the -time. Nevertheless, we have to take the following into our -political consideration as power factors:</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“Britain, France, Russia, and the adjoining smaller states.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“The German question can be solved only by way of force, -and this is never without risk. The battles of Frederick the -Great for Silesia, and Bismarck’s wars against Austria and -France had been a tremendous risk and the speed of Prussian -action in 1870 had prevented Austria from participating -in the war. If we place the decision to apply force with -risk at the head of the following expositions, then we are -left to reply to the questions ‘when’ and ‘how’. In this regard -we have to decide upon three different cases.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>I interpolate: The Tribunal will recall the specific allegation -in the Indictment that at this meeting there emerged three different -plans, any of which might be utilized.</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“Case 1. Period 1943-45: After this we can only expect a -change for the worse. The rearming of the Army, the -Navy, and the Air Force, as well as the formation of the -Officers’ Corps, are practically concluded.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>I remind the Tribunal that this meeting was on 5 November -1937, but he is contemplating the period 1943-45.</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“Our material equipment and armaments are modern; with -further delay the danger of their becoming out-of-date will -increase. In particular, the secrecy of ‘special weapons’ -cannot always be safeguarded. Enlistment of reserves would -be limited to the current recruiting age groups and an addition -from older untrained groups would be no longer available.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“In comparison with the rearmament, which will have been -carried out at that time by other nations, we shall decrease -in relative power. Should we not act until 1943-45, then, -dependent on the absence of reserves, any year could bring -<span class='pageno' title='269' id='Page_269'></span> -about the food crisis, for the countering of which we do not -possess the necessary foreign currency. This must be considered -a point of weakness in the regime. Over and above -that, the world will anticipate our action and will increase -counter-measures yearly. Whilst other nations isolate themselves, -we should be forced on the offensive.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“What the actual position would be in the years 1943-45, -no one knows today. It is certain, however, that we can -wait no longer.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“On the one side the large armed forces, with the necessity -for securing their upkeep, the aging of the Nazi movement -and of its leaders, and on the other side the prospect of a -lowering of the standard of living and a drop in the birth -rate, leaves us no other choice but to act. If the Führer is -still living, then it will be his irrevocable decision to solve -the German space problem no later than 1943-45. The -necessity for action before 1943-45 will come under consideration -in cases 2 and 3.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“Case 2. Should the social tensions in France lead to an -internal political crisis of such dimensions that it absorbs -the French Army and thus renders it incapable for employment -in war against Germany, then the time for action -against Czechoslovakia has come.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“Case 3. It would be equally possible to act against Czechoslovakia -if France should be so tied up by a war against -another state that it cannot proceed against Germany.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“For the improvement of our military political position it -must be our first aim, in every case of entanglement by war, -to conquer Czechoslovakia and Austria, simultaneously, in -order to remove any threat from the flanks in case of a -possible advance westwards. In the case of a conflict with -France it would hardly be necessary to assume that Czechoslovakia -would declare war on the same day as France. -However, Czechoslovakia’s desire to participate in the war -will increase proportionally to the degree to which we are -being weakened. Its actual participation could make itself -felt by an attack on Silesia, either towards the north or the -west.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“Once Czechoslovakia is conquered—and a mutual frontier, -Germany-Hungary is obtained—then a neutral attitude by -Poland in a German-French conflict could more easily be -relied upon. Our agreements with Poland remain valid only -as long as Germany’s strength remains unshakable; should -Germany have any setbacks then an attack by Poland against -<span class='pageno' title='270' id='Page_270'></span> -East Prussia, perhaps also against Pomerania, and Silesia, -must be taken into account.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“Assuming a development of the situation, which would lead -to a planned attack on our part in the years 1943-45, then -the behavior of France, England, Poland, and Russia would -probably have to be judged in the following manner:</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“The Führer believes personally, that in all probability England -and perhaps also France, have already silently written -off Czechoslovakia, and that they have got used to the idea -that this question would one day be cleaned up by Germany. -The difficulties in the British Empire and the prospect of -being entangled in another long, drawn-out European war, -would be decisive factors in the non-participation of England in -a war against Germany. The British attitude would certainly -not remain without influence on France’s attitude. An attack -by France, without British support, is hardly probable, -assuming that its offensive would stagnate along our western -fortifications. Without England’s support it would also not -be necessary to take into consideration a march by France -through Belgium and Holland, and this would also not have -to be reckoned with by us in case of a conflict with France, -as in every case it would have, as a consequence, the enmity -of Great Britain. Naturally, we should in every case have to -bar our frontier during the operation of our attacks against -Czechoslovakia and Austria. It must be taken into consideration -here that Czechoslovakia’s defense measures will increase -in strength from year to year and that a consolidation of the -inside values of the Austrian Army will also be effected in -the course of years. Although the population of Czechoslovakia -in the first place is not a thin one, the embodiment of -Czechoslovakia and Austria would nevertheless constitute the -conquest of food for 5 to 6 million people, on the basis that -a compulsory emigration of 2 million from Czechoslovakia, -and of 1 million from Austria could be carried out. The -annexation of the two States to Germany, militarily and -politically, would constitute a considerable relief, owing to -shorter and better frontiers, the freeing of fighting personnel -for other purposes, and the possibility of reconstituting new -armies up to a strength of about 12 divisions, representing a -new division per 1 million population.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“No opposition to the removal of Czechoslovakia is expected -on the part of Italy; however, it cannot be judged today what -would be her attitude in the Austrian question, since it would -<span class='pageno' title='271' id='Page_271'></span> -depend largely on whether the Duce were alive at the time -or not.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“The measure and speed of our action would decide Poland’s -attitude. Poland will have little inclination to enter the war -against a victorious Germany, with Russia in the rear.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“Military participation by Russia must be countered by the -speed of our operations; it is a question whether this needs -to be taken into consideration at all, in view of Japan’s -attitude.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“Should case 2 occur—paralyzation of France by a civil war—then -the situation should be utilized at any time for -operations against Czechoslovakia, as Germany’s most dangerous -enemy would be eliminated.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“The Führer sees case 3 looming nearer; it could develop -from the existing tensions in the Mediterranean, and should -it occur, he has firmly decided to make use of it any time, -perhaps even as early as 1938.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“Following recent experiences in the course of the events of -the war in Spain, the Führer does not see an early end to -hostilities there.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“Taking into consideration the time required for past offensives -by Franco,”—the English text says “France”; it means -“Franco”—“a further 3 years’ duration of war is within the -bounds of possibility. On the other hand, from the German -point of view, a 100 per cent victory by Franco is not -desirable; we are more interested in a continuation of the -war and preservation of the tensions in the Mediterranean. -Should Franco be in sole possession of the Spanish peninsula, -it would mean the end of Italian intervention and of the -presence of Italy in the Balearic Isles. As our interests are -directed towards continuing the war in Spain, it must be the -task of our future policy to strengthen Italy in her fight to -hold on to the Balearic Isles. However, a solidification of -Italian positions in the Balearic Isles cannot be tolerated -either by France or by England and could lead to a war by -France and England against Italy, in which case Spain, if -entirely in White (that is, Franco’s) hands, could participate -on the side of Italy’s enemies. A subjugation of Italy in such -a war appears very unlikely. Additional raw materials could -be brought to Italy via Germany. The Führer believes that -Italy’s military strategy would be to remain on the defensive -against France on the western frontier and carry out -operations against France from Libya, against the North -African French colonial possessions. -<span class='pageno' title='272' id='Page_272'></span></p> - -<p class='noindent'>“As a landing of French and British troops on the Italian -coast can be discounted, and as a French offensive via the -Alps to upper Italy would be extremely difficult, and would -probably stagnate before the strong Italian fortifications, -French lines of communication by the Italian fleet will, to a -great extent, paralyze the transport of fighting personnel from -North Africa to France, so that at its frontiers with Italy and -Germany, France will have at its disposal solely the metropolitan -fighting forces.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>There again I think that must be a defective English translation. -“French lines of communication by the Italian fleet,” must mean -“fresh lines,” or something in that connection.</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“If Germany profits from this war by disposing of the -Czechoslovakian and the Austrian questions, the probability -must be assumed that England, being at war with Italy, -would not decide to commence operations against Germany. -Without British support, a warlike action by France against -Germany is not to be anticipated.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“The date of our attack on Czechoslovakia and Austria must -be made depending upon the course of the Italian-French-English -war and would not be simultaneous with the commencement -of military operations by these three States. The -Führer was also not thinking of military agreements with -Italy, but in complete independence and by exploiting this -unique favorable opportunity, he wishes to begin to carry out -operations against Czechoslovakia. The attack on Czechoslovakia -would have to take place with the speed of lightning.”—The -German words are “blitzartig schnell.”</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“Feldmarschall Von Blomberg and Generaloberst Von Fritsch, -in giving their estimate on the situation, repeatedly pointed -out that we should not run the risk that England and France -become our enemies:</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“They stated that the war with Italy would not bind the -French Army to such an extent that it would not be in a -position to commence operations on our western frontier with -superior forces. Generaloberst Von Fritsch estimated the -French forces which would presumably be employed on the -Alpine frontier against Italy to be in the region of 20 divisions, -so that a strong French superiority would still remain -on our western frontier. The French would, according to -German reasoning, attempt to advance into the Rhineland. -We should consider the lead which France has in mobilization -and, quite apart from the very small value of our then-existing -fortifications, which was pointed out particularly by -<span class='pageno' title='273' id='Page_273'></span> -General Feldmarschall Von Blomberg; the four motorized -divisions which had been laid down for the West would be -more or less incapable of movement.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“With regard to our offensive in a southeasterly direction, -Feldmarschall Von Blomberg drew special attention to the -strength of the Czechoslovakian fortifications, the building of -which had assumed the character of a Maginot Line and which -would present extreme difficulties to our attack.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“Generaloberst Von Fritsch mentioned that it was the -purpose of a study which he had laid on for this winter to -investigate the possibilities of carrying out operations against -Czechoslovakia, with special consideration of the conquest of -the Czechoslovakian system of fortifications; the Generaloberst -also stated that, owing to the prevailing conditions, -he would have to relinquish his leave abroad, which was to -begin on 10 November. This intention was countermanded -by the Führer, who gave as a reason that the possibility of -the conflict was not to be regarded as being so imminent. -In reply to statements by General Feldmarschall Von Blomberg -and Generaloberst Von Fritsch regarding England and -France’s attitude, the Führer repeated his previous statements -and said that he was convinced of Britain’s non-participation -and that consequently he did not believe in military action -by France against Germany. Should the Mediterranean -conflict, already mentioned, lead to a general mobilization in -Europe, then we should have to commence operations against -Czechoslovakia immediately. If, however, the powers who -are not participating in the war should declare their disinterestedness, -then Germany would, for the time being, have -to side with this attitude.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“In view of the information given by the Führer, Generaloberst -Göring considered it imperative to think of a reduction -of our military undertaking in Spain. The Führer agreed to -this, insofar as he believed this decision should be postponed -for a suitable date.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“The second part of the discussion concerned material -armament questions. (Signed) Hossbach.”—There are other -notations.</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>In this connection I invite the Court’s attention to the allegation -in Paragraph 3 (a) of Section IV (F) of the Indictment; Page 7 of -the printed English text, relating to a meeting of an influential -group of Nazi conspirators on 5 November 1937. The document just -introduced and read in evidence gives the specific evidentiary support -for that allegation. -<span class='pageno' title='274' id='Page_274'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>The record of what happened thereafter is well known to -history. The Anschluss with Austria, under military pressure from -the Nazis, occurred in March 1938. We shall give you detailed -evidence concerning that in due course. So will we as to details of -the aggression against Czechoslovakia, including the pressure on -Czechoslovakia that resulted in the Munich Pact of September -1938, and the violation of that Pact itself by Germany, on 15 March -1939. There is much of interest in the secret documents relating to -those aggressions.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>At this point, however, I desire to bring to the attention of the -Tribunal one more captured document, which reveals in all its -nakedness the truth concerning the deliberateness of the aggression -against Czechoslovakia. This document consists of a file, a file kept -by Colonel Schmundt, Hitler’s adjutant. The file was found by one -of the units of the 327th Glider Infantry, in a cellar of the Platterhof, -Obersalzberg, near Berchtesgaden. The file represents a work-file -of originals and duplicates, incidental to the preparations for -the annexation of Czechoslovakia. I should like to ask the Tribunal -to examine particularly the photostat of the original German of -this file. We have copies of those photostats. Something in physical -form is lost in transcribing a translation. The picture of the -original file, including photographs of the telegrams, gives a sense -of the reality of the evidence that is lost in the transcribed translation. -The file is Document Number 388-PS, in our numbered -series of documents. I have here the original file, as found.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I thought perhaps I might read the German title. It is “Chefsache -Fall Grün,” that is the main plan for “Case Green,” “Green” -being a code word for the aggression against Czechoslovakia.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I offer the entire file in evidence as Exhibit USA-26 and will -ask that photostats be passed to the Court. I offer the file, if the -Tribunal please, with, of course, the understanding and realization -that only such parts of it as I read will immediately go into -evidence; but we shall refer to other parts from time to time -later, in the presentation of the case. The material in this file will -be dealt with in greater detail at a later point in my presentation. -However, at this point, I desire to call attention to item number 2 -in the file.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Item number 2 is dated 22 April 1938. It is the second sheet of -the English translation. It is a summary, prepared by Schmundt, -the adjutant, of a discussion on 21 April 1938 between Hitler and -the Defendant Wilhelm Keitel. This item, like the other items in -the file, relates to Fall Grün, or Case Green. As I said, Case Green -was a secret code word for the planned operations against Czechoslovakia. -This meeting occurred within approximately 1 month -<span class='pageno' title='275' id='Page_275'></span> -following the successful annexation of Austria. In the carrying out -of the conspiracy, it became necessary to revise the Plan Grün to -take into account the changed attitude, as a result of the bloodless -success against Austria. I shall now read item number 2 of this -file:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“Berlin, 22 April 1938. Bases of the Dissertation on ‘Grün.’</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“Summary of discussion between Führer and General Keitel -of 21 April:</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“A. Political aspect.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“1. Strategic surprise attack, out of a clear sky without any -cause or possibility of justification, has been turned down. As -result would be: hostile world opinion which can lead to a -critical situation. Such a measure is justified only for the -elimination of the last opponent on the mainland.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“2. Action after a time of diplomatic clashes, which gradually -come to a crisis and lead to war.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“3. Lightning-swift action as the result of an incident (for -example, the assassination of German Ambassador in connection -with an anti-German demonstration.)</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“B. Military conclusions.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“1. The preparations are to be made for the political possibilities -(2 and 3). Case 2 is the undesired one since Grün -will have taken security measures.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“2. The loss of time caused by transporting the bulk of the -divisions by rail—which is unavoidable, but should be cut -down as far as possible—must not impede a lightning-swift -blow at the time of the action.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“3. ‘Separate thrusts’ are to be carried out immediately with -a view to penetrating the enemy fortification lines at numerous -points and in a strategically favorable direction. The -thrusts are to be worked out to the smallest detail (knowledge -of roads, of targets, composition of the columns according -to their individual tasks). Simultaneous attacks by the -Army and Air Force.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“The Air Force is to support the individual columns (for -example dive-bombers; sealing of installations at penetration -points, hampering the bringing up of reserves, destroying -signal communications traffic, thereby isolating the garrisons).</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“4. Politically, the first 4 days of military action are the -decisive ones. If there are no effective military successes, a -European crisis will certainly arise. Accomplished facts must -prove the senselessness of foreign military intervention, draw -<span class='pageno' title='276' id='Page_276'></span> -Allies into the scheme (division of spoils) and demoralize -‘Grün.’</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“Therefore: bridging the time gap between first penetration -and employment of the forces to be brought up, by a determined -and ruthless thrust by a motorized army (for example -via Pilsen, Prague).</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“5. If possible, separation of transport movement ‘Rot’ from -‘Grün’.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='noindent'>‘Rot’ was the code name for their then plan against the West.</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“A simultaneous strategic concentration ‘Rot’ can lead ‘Rot’ -to undesired measures. On the other hand, it must be possible -to put ‘Fall Rot’ (Case Red) into operation at any time.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“C. Propaganda.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“1. Leaflets on the conduct of Germans in Czechoslovakia -(Grünland).</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“2. Leaflets with threats for intimidation of the Czechs -(Grünen).”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='noindent'>This is initialled by Schmundt.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In the reading of this document, the Tribunal doubtless noted -particularly Paragraph 3, under the heading “Political Aspect,” -which reads as follows: “Lightning-swift action as the result of an -incident (example: Assassination of German Ambassador as an upshot -of an anti-German demonstration).” The document as a whole, -establishes that the conspirators were planning the creation of an -incident to justify to the world their own aggression against -Czechoslovakia. It establishes, I submit, that consideration was being -given to assassinating the German Ambassador at Prague to create -the requisite incident. This is alleged in Paragraph 3 (c) of Section -IV (F) of the Indictment, appearing at Page 8 of the printed -English text.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>As the Indictment was being read, at the opening of the case, -when this particular allegation was reached, the Defendant Göring -shook his head slowly and solemnly in the negative. I can well -understand that he would have shaken his head, if he believed the -allegation of the Indictments to be untrue. In the course of Mr. Justice -Jackson’s opening address, when this same matter was referred -to, the Defendant Göring again solemnly shook his head. -On this allegation the Prosecution stands on the evidence just submitted, -the denials of the Defendant Göring, notwithstanding.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>If the Court please, would this be a convenient time to recess?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn now until 2 o’clock.</p> - -<p class='line' style='text-align:center;margin-top:2em;margin-bottom:2em;'>[<span class='it'>The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours.</span>]</p> - -<hr class='pbk'/> - -<h2><span class='pageno' title='277' id='Page_277'></span><span class='it'>Afternoon Session</span></h2> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Alderman.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. ALDERMAN: May it please the Tribunal, as I suggested -earlier, the next phase of the aggression was the formulation and -execution of the plan to attack Poland and with it the resulting -initiation of aggressive war in Poland in September 1939. This is -covered by Paragraphs 4 (a) and (b) of Section IV (F) of the Indictment -appearing on Page 9 of the printed English text.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Here again the careful and meticulous record-keeping of the -Adjutant Schmundt has provided us with a document in his own -handwriting, which lets the cat out of the bag. That may be a -troublesome colloquialism to translate. I do not know. The document -consists of minutes of a conference held on 23 May 1939. The -place of the conference was the Führer’s study in the New Reich -Chancellery. The Defendant Göring was present.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>The Defendant Frick interrupted at this point and said: “This -year is surely not correct.” This statement in German was not -translated.</span>]</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. ALDERMAN: I think one of the defendants indicated I had -referred to the wrong year. My notes show 23 May 1939. That is -shown by the original document.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Which is the document to which you are -referring?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. ALDERMAN: That is Document. L-79. As I said, the Defendant -Göring was present. The Defendant Raeder was present. -The Defendant Keitel was present. The subject of the meeting was, -I quote: “Indoctrination on the Political Situation and Future -Aims.” This document is of historical importance, second not even -to the political will and testament of the Führer, recorded by Adjutant -Hossbach.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The original of this document when captured, found its way -through the complicated channels across the Atlantic to the United -States. There, it was found by members of the staff of the American -Prosecution, by them taken to London, and thence to Nuremberg. -The “L” on the identifying number indicates that it is one -of the documents which was assembled in London and brought here -from there. We think the document is of unquestioned validity. -Its authenticity and its accuracy, as a record of what transpired -at the meeting of 23 May 1939, stands admitted by the Defendant -Keitel in one of his interrogations. As I say, the number is Document -L-79 in our numbered series. I offer it in evidence as Exhibit -USA-27. -<span class='pageno' title='278' id='Page_278'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>This document also is of such great importance historically and -as bearing on the issues now presented to the Tribunal, that I feel -obliged to read most of it. At the top:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“Top Secret (Geheime Reichssache). To be transmitted by -officer only.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“Minutes of a conference on 23 May 1939. Place: The Führer’s -study, New Reich Chancellery. Adjutant on duty: -Lieutenant Colonel (G. S.) Schmundt.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“Present: The Führer, Field Marshal Göring, Grand Admiral -Raeder, Colonel General Von Brauchitsch, Colonel General -Keitel, Colonel General Milch, General (of Artillery) Halder, -General Bodenschatz, Rear Admiral Schniewindt, Colonel -(G. S.) Jeschonnek, Colonel (G. S.) Warlimont, Lieutenant Colonel -(G. S.) Schmundt, Captain Engel (Army), Lieutenant Commander -Albrecht, Captain V. Below (Army).</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“Subject: Indoctrination on the Political Situation and Future -Aims.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“The Führer defined as the purpose of the conference:</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“1. Analysis of the situation;</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“2. Definition of the tasks for the Armed Forces arising from -that situation;</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“3. Exposition of the consequences of those tasks;</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“4. Ensuring the secrecy of all decisions and work resulting -from those consequences. Secrecy is the first essential for -success.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“The Führer’s observations are given in accordance with -their meaning. Our present situation must be considered -from two points of view: 1) The actual development of events -between 1933 and 1939; 2) the permanent and unchanging -situation in which Germany lies.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“In the period 1933-39, progress was made in all fields. Our -military situation improved enormously.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“Our situation with regard to the rest of the world has remained -the same.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“Germany had dropped from the circle of Great Powers. The -balance of power had been effected without the participation -of Germany.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“This equilibrium is disturbed when Germany’s demands for -the necessities of life make themselves felt, and Germany -re-emerges as a Great Power. All demands are regarded as -‘encroachments’. The English are more afraid of dangers in -the economic sphere than of the simple threat of force. -<span class='pageno' title='279' id='Page_279'></span></p> - -<p class='noindent'>“A mass of 80 million people has solved the problems of -ideals. So, too, must the economic problems be solved. No -German can evade the creation of the necessary economic -conditions for this. The solution of the problems demands -courage. The principle by which one evades solving the -problem by adapting oneself to circumstances is inadmissible. -Circumstances must rather be adapted to aims. This is impossible -without invasion of foreign states or attacks upon -foreign property.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“Living space, in proportion to the magnitude of the state, -is the basis of all power. One may refuse for a time to face -the problem, but finally it is solved one way or the other. -The choice is between advancement or decline. In 15 or 20 -years’ time we shall be compelled to find a solution. No German -statesman can evade the question longer than that.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“We are at present in a state of patriotic fervor, which is -shared by two other nations: Italy and Japan.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“The period which lies behind us has indeed been put to good -use. All measures have been taken in the correct sequence -and in harmony with our aims.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“After 6 years, the situation is today as follows:</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“The national political unity of the Germans has been achieved, -apart from minor exceptions.”—I suppose they were those -in the concentration camps.—“Further successes cannot be -attained without the shedding of blood.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“The demarcation of frontiers is of military importance.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“The Pole is no ‘supplementary enemy’. Poland will always -be on the side of our adversaries. In spite of treaties of -friendship, Poland has always had the secret intention of -exploiting every opportunity to do us harm.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“Danzig is not the subject of the dispute at all. It is a question -of expanding our living space in the East and of securing -our food supplies, of the settlement of the Baltic problem. -Food supplies can be expected only from thinly populated -areas. Over and above the natural fertility, thoroughgoing -German exploitation will enormously increase the surplus.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“There is no other possibility for Europe.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“Colonies: Beware of gifts of colonial territory. This does not -solve the food problem. Remember: blockade.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“If fate brings us into conflict with the West, the possession -of extensive areas in the East will be advantageous. We shall -be able to rely upon record harvests even less in time of -war than in peace. -<span class='pageno' title='280' id='Page_280'></span></p> - -<p class='noindent'>“The population of non-German areas will perform no military -service, and will be available as a source of labor.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“The Polish problem is inseparable from conflict with the -West.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“Poland’s internal power of resistance to Bolshevism is doubtful. -Thus Poland is of doubtful value as a barrier against -Russia.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“It is questionable whether military success in the West can -be achieved by a quick decision; questionable too is the attitude -of Poland.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“The Polish Government will not resist pressure from Russia. -Poland sees danger in a German victory in the West, and -will attempt to rob us of the victory.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“There is therefore no question of sparing Poland, and we -are left with the decision: <span class='it'>To attack Poland at the first suitable -opportunity</span>”.—That, if the Court please, is underscored -in the original German text.—</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“We cannot expect a repetition of the Czech affair. There -will be fighting. Our task is to isolate Poland. The success -of the isolation will be decisive.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“Therefore, the Führer must reserve the right to give the -final order to attack. There must be no simultaneous conflict -with the Western Powers (France and England).</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“If it is not certain that a German-Polish conflict will not -lead to war in the West, then the fight must be primarily -against England and France.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“Fundamentally, therefore: Conflict with Poland, beginning -with an attack on Poland, will only be successful if the -Western Powers keep out of it. If this is impossible, then it -will be better to attack in the West and to settle Poland at -the same time.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“The isolation of Poland is a matter of skillful politics.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“Japan is a weighty problem. Even if at first, for various -reasons, her collaboration with us appears to be somewhat -cool and restricted, it is nevertheless in Japan’s own interest -to take the initiative in attacking Russia in good time.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“Economic relations with Russia are possible only if political -relations have improved. A cautious trend is apparent in -press comment. It is not impossible that Russia will show -herself to be disinterested in the destruction of Poland. -Should Russia take steps to oppose us, our relations with -Japan may become closer. -<span class='pageno' title='281' id='Page_281'></span></p> - -<p class='noindent'>“If there were an alliance of France, England, and Russia -against Germany, Italy, and Japan, I would be constrained -to attack England and France with a few annihilating blows. -The Führer doubts the possibility of a peaceful settlement -with England. We must prepare ourselves for the conflict. -England sees in our development the foundation of a hegemony -which would weaken England. England is therefore -our enemy, and the conflict with England will be a life-and-death -struggle.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“<span class='it'>What will this struggle be like?</span>”—Underscored in the German -original.—</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“England cannot deal with Germany and subjugate us with -a few powerful blows. It is imperative for England that the -war should be brought as near to the Ruhr Basin as possible. -French blood will not be spared (West Wall). The possession -of the Ruhr Basin will determine the duration of our resistance.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“The Dutch and Belgian air bases must be occupied by armed -forces. Declarations of neutrality cannot be relied upon. If -England and France intend the war between Germany and -Poland to lead to a conflict, they will support Holland and -Belgium in their neutrality and make them build fortifications -in order finally to force them into cooperation.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“Albeit under protest, Belgium and Holland will yield to -pressure.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“Therefore, if England intends to intervene in the Polish war, -we must occupy Holland with lightning speed. We must aim -at securing a new defense line on Dutch soil up to the Zuider -Zee.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“The war with England and France will be a life-and-death -struggle.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“The idea that we can get off cheaply is dangerous; there is -no such possibility. We must burn our boats, and it is no -longer a question of justice or injustice, but of life or death -for 80 million human beings.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“Question: Short or long war?</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“Every country’s armed forces or government must aim at -a short war. The government, however, must also be prepared -for a war of 10 to 15 years’ duration.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“History has always shown that people have believed that -wars would be short. In 1914 the opinion still prevailed that -it was impossible to finance a long war. Even today this idea -still persists in many minds. But on the contrary, every -<span class='pageno' title='282' id='Page_282'></span> -state will hold out as long as possible, unless it immediately -suffers some grave weakening (for example Ruhr Basin). England -has similar weaknesses.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“England knows that to lose a war will mean the end of her -world power.</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>“England is the driving force against Germany.”—which translated -literally means: “England is the motor driving against Germany.” -I suppose that is the French “force motrice.”</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“Her strength lies in the following:</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“1. The British themselves are proud, courageous, tenacious, -firm in resistance, and gifted as organizers. They know how to -exploit every new development. They have the love of adventure -and the bravery of the Nordic race. Quality is -lowered by dispersal. The German average is higher.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“2. World power in itself. It has been constant for 300 years. -Extended by the acquisition of allies, this power is not merely -something concrete, but must also be considered as a psychological -force embracing the entire world. Add to this immeasurable -wealth, with consequential financial credit.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“3. Geopolitical safety and protection by strong sea power -and a courageous air force.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“England’s weakness:</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“If in the World War I we had had two battleships and two -cruisers more, and if the battle of Jutland had been begun in -the morning, the British Fleet would have been defeated and -England brought to her knees. It would have meant the end -of this war.”—that war, I take it—“It was formerly not sufficient -to defeat the Fleet. Landings had to be made in order -to defeat England. England could provide her own food -supplies. Today that is no longer possible.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“The moment England’s food supply routes are cut, she is -forced to capitulate. The import of food and oil depends on -the Fleet’s protection.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“If the German Air Force attacks English territory, England -will not be forced to capitulate in one day. But if the Fleet -is destroyed, immediate capitulation will be the result.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“There is no doubt that a surprise attack can lead to a quick -decision. It would be criminal, however, for the Government -to rely entirely on the element of surprise.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“Experience has shown that surprise may be nullified by:</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“1. Disclosure coming from a large circle of military experts -concerned; -<span class='pageno' title='283' id='Page_283'></span></p> - -<p class='noindent'>“2. Mere chance, which may cause the collapse of the whole -enterprise;</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“3. Human failings;</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“4. Weather conditions.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“The final date for striking must be fixed well in advance. -Beyond that time the tension cannot be endured for long. -It must be borne in mind that weather conditions can render -any surprise intervention by Navy and Air Force impossible.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“This must be regarded as a most unfavorable basis of action.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“1. An effort must be made to deal the enemy a significant or -the final decisive blow. Considerations of right and wrong or -treaties do not enter into the matter. This will only be possible -if we are not involved in a war with England on account -of Poland.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“2. In addition to the surprise attack, preparations for a long -war must be made, while opportunities on the continent for -England are eliminated.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“The Army will have to hold positions essential to the Navy -and Air Force. If Holland and Belgium are successfully occupied -and held, and if France is also defeated, the fundamental -conditions for a successful war against England will have -been secured.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“England can then be blockaded from western France at close -quarters by the Air Force, while the Navy with its submarines -can extend the range of the blockade.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“Consequences:</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“England will not be able to fight on the continent; daily -attacks by the Air Force and Navy will cut all her life-lines; -time will not be on England’s side; Germany will not bleed -to death on land.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“Such strategy has been shown to be necessary by World -War I and subsequent military operations. World War I is -responsible for the following strategic considerations which -are imperative:</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“1. With a more powerful Navy at the outbreak of the War, -or a wheeling movement by the Army towards the Channel -ports, the end would have been different.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“2. A country cannot be brought to defeat by an air force. -It is impossible to attack all objectives simultaneously, and -the lapse of time of a few minutes would evoke defense -counter measures.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“3. The unrestricted use of all resources is essential. -<span class='pageno' title='284' id='Page_284'></span></p> - -<p class='noindent'>“4. Once the Army, in cooperation with the Air Force and -Navy, has taken the most important positions, industrial -production will cease to flow into the bottomless pit of the -Army’s battles, and can be diverted to benefit the Air Force -and Navy.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“The Army must, therefore, be capable of taking these positions. -Systematic preparation must be made for the attack.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“Study to this end is of the utmost importance.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“The aim will always be to force England to her knees.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“A weapon will only be of decisive importance in winning -battles, so long as the enemy does not possess it.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“This applies to gas, submarines, and air force. It would be -true of the latter, for instance, as long as the English Fleet -had no available countermeasures; it will no longer be the -case in 1940 and 1941. Against Poland, for example, tanks -will be effective, as the Polish Army possesses no countermeasures.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“Where straightforward pressure is no longer considered to -be decisive, its place must be taken by the elements of -surprise and by masterly handling.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>The rest of the document, if the Tribunal please, deals more -in detail with military plans and preparations. I think it unnecessary -to read further.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The document just read is the evidence which specifically supports -the allegations in Paragraph 4 (a) of Section IV (F) of the -Indictment, appearing on Page 9 of the printed English text, relating -to the meeting of 23 May 1939. We think it leaves nothing unproved -in those allegations.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Alderman, perhaps you ought to read -the last page and the last five lines, because they refer in terms -to one of the defendants.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. ALDERMAN: I didn’t read these, Mr. President, simply -because I am convinced that they are mistranslated in the English. -I will be glad to have them read in the original German.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Very well, if you are of that opinion.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. ALDERMAN: We could get it from the original German.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: You mean that the English translation is -wrong?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. ALDERMAN: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: You had better inform us then if it is -wrong. -<span class='pageno' title='285' id='Page_285'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. ALDERMAN: Did you have reference to the last paragraph -headed “Working principles”?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes, the one after that.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. ALDERMAN: Yes. Might I ask that the German interpreter -read that, as it can be translated into the other languages. -It is on Page 16 of the original.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>BY THE INTERPRETER: “Page 16. Purpose:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“1. Study of the entire problem;</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“2. Study of the events;</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“3. Study of the means needed;</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“4. Study of the necessary training.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“Men with great powers of imagination and high technical -training must belong to the staff, as well as officers with -sober sceptic powers of understanding.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“Working principles:</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“1. No one is to take part in this, who does not have to -know of it.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“2. No one can find out more than he must know.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“3. When must the person in question know it at the very -latest? No one may know anything before it is necessary -that he know it.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“On Göring’s question, the Führer decided that:</p> - -<p class='noindent'>a) The armed forces determine what shall be built;</p> - -<p class='noindent'>b) In the shipbuilding program nothing is to be changed;</p> - -<p class='noindent'>c) The armament programs are to be modeled on the years -1943 or 1944.”—Schmundt certified this text.</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. ALDERMAN: Mr. President, the translation was closer -than I had anticipated.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. ALDERMAN: We think, as I have just said, that this document -leaves nothing unproved in those allegations in the Indictment. -It demonstrates that the Nazi conspirators were proceeding -in accordance with a plan. It demonstrates the cold-blooded premeditation -of the assault on Poland. It demonstrates that the -questions concerning Danzig, which the Nazis had agitated with -Poland as a political pretext, were not true questions, but were -false issues, issues agitated to conceal their motive of aggressive -expansion for food and “Lebensraum.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In this presentation of condemning documents, concerning the -initiation of war in September 1939, I must bring to the attention -of the Tribunal a group of documents concerning an address by -Hitler to his chief military commanders, at Obersalzberg on -<span class='pageno' title='286' id='Page_286'></span> -22 August 1939, just one week prior to the launching of the attack -on Poland.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>We have three of these documents, related and constituting -a single group. The first one I do not intend to offer as evidence. -The other two I shall offer.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The reason for that is this: The first of the three documents -came into our possession through the medium of an American -newspaperman and purported to be original minutes of this meeting -at Obersalzberg, transmitted to this American newspaperman -by some other person; and we had no proof of the actual delivery -to the intermediary by the person who took the notes. That document, -therefore, merely served to alert our Prosecution to see if -it could find something better. Fortunately, we did get the other -two documents, which indicate that Hitler on that day made two -speeches, perhaps one in the morning, one in the afternoon, as -indicated by the original minutes, which we captured. By comparison -of those two documents with the first document, we concluded -that the first document was a slightly garbled merger of the -two speeches.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>On 22 August 1939 Hitler had called together at Obersalzberg -the three Supreme Commanders of the three branches of the -Armed Forces, as well as the commanding generals bearing the title -Commanders-in-Chief (Oberbefehlshaber).</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I have indicated how, upon discovering this first document, the -Prosecution set out to find better evidence of what happened on -this day. In this the Prosecution succeeded. In the files of the -OKW at Flensburg, the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (Chief of -the High Command of the Armed Forces), there were uncovered -two speeches delivered by Hitler at Obersalzberg, on 22 August -1939. These are Documents Numbers 798-PS and 1014-PS, in our -series of documents.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In order to keep serial numbers consecutive, if the Tribunal -please, we have had the first document, which I do not intend to -offer, marked for identification Exhibit USA-28. Accordingly, -I offer the second document, 798-PS, in evidence as Exhibit -USA-29, and the third document, 1014-PS, as Exhibit USA-30.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>These are again, especially the first one, rather lengthy speeches, -and I shall not necessarily read the entire speech.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Reading from 798-PS, which is Exhibit USA-29, the Führer -speaks to the Commanders-in-Chief on 22 August 1939: “I have -called you together. . . .”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Is there anything to show where the speech -took place?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. ALDERMAN: Obersalzberg. -<span class='pageno' title='287' id='Page_287'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: How do you show that?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. ALDERMAN: You mean on the document?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. ALDERMAN: I am afraid the indication “Obersalzberg” -came from the first document which I have not offered in evidence. -I have no doubt that the defendants will admit that Obersalzberg -was the place of this speech.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The place is not very significant; it is the time.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Very well.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. ALDERMAN [Reading]:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“I have called you together to give you a picture of the -political situation, in order that you may have insight into -the individual element on which I base my decision to act, -and in order to strengthen your confidence. After this, we -will discuss military details.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“It was clear to me that a conflict with Poland had to come -sooner or later. I had already made this decision in the -spring.”—I interpolate, I think he is there referring to the -May document, which I have already read, L-79.—“But I -thought I would first turn against the West in a few years, -and only afterwards against the East. But the sequence -cannot be fixed. One cannot close one’s eyes even before a -threatening situation. I wanted to establish an acceptable -relationship with Poland, in order to fight first against the -West, but this plan, which was agreeable to me, could not -be executed, since the essential points have changed.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“It became clear to me that Poland would attack us, in case -of a conflict with the West.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“Poland wants access to the sea.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“The further development became obvious after the occupation -of the Memel region, and it became clear to me that -under the circumstances a conflict with Poland could arise -at an inopportune moment.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“I enumerate as reasons for this reflection, first of all, two -personal constitutions”—I suppose he means “personalities”; -that probably is an inapt translation—“my own personality, -and that of Mussolini. Essentially, it depends on me, my -existence, because of my political ability.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>I interpolate to comment on the tremendous significance of the -fact of a war, which engulfed almost the whole world, depending -upon one man’s personality.</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“Furthermore, the fact that probably no one will ever again -have the confidence of the whole German people as I do. -<span class='pageno' title='288' id='Page_288'></span> -There will probably never again be a man in the future with -more authority than I have. My existence is, therefore, a -factor of great value. But I can be eliminated at any time -by a criminal or an idiot.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“The second personal factor is Il Duce. His existence is also -decisive. If something happens to him, Italy’s loyalty to the -Alliance will no longer be certain. The basic attitude of the -Italian Court is against the Duce. Above all, the Court sees -in the expansion of the empire a burden. The Duce is the -man with the strongest nerves in Italy.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“The third factor favorable for us is Franco. We can ask -only benevolent neutrality from Spain, but this depends on -Franco’s personality. He guarantees a certain uniformity and -steadiness of the present system in Spain. We must take -into account the fact that Spain does not as yet have a Fascist -Party of our internal unity.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“On the other side, a negative picture, as far as decisive -personalities are concerned: There is no outstanding personality -in England or France.”—I interpolate: I think Adolf -Hitler must have overlooked one in England, perhaps -many.—</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“For us it is easy to make decisions. We have nothing to -lose—we can only gain. Our economic situation is such, -because of our restrictions, that we cannot hold out more -than a few years. Göring can confirm this. We have no -other choice; we must act. Our opponents risk much and can -gain only a little. England’s stake in a war is unimaginably -great. Our enemies have men who are below average. No -personalities, no masters, no men of action.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>I interpolate again. Perhaps that last sentence explains what he -meant by no personalities—no masters having the authority that -he had over his nation.</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“Besides the personal factor, the political situation is favorable -for us; in the Mediterranean rivalry between Italy, -France, and England; in the Orient tension, which leads to -the alarming of the Mohammedan world.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“The English empire did not emerge from the last war -strengthened. From a maritime point of view, nothing was -achieved; conflict between England and Ireland, the South -African Union became more independent, concessions had -to be made to India, England is in great danger, unhealthy -industries. A British statesman can look into the future only -with concern. -<span class='pageno' title='289' id='Page_289'></span></p> - -<p class='noindent'>“France’s position has also deteriorated, particularly in the -Mediterranean.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“Further favorable factors for us are these:</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“Since Albania, there is an equilibrium of power in the -Balkans. Yugoslavia carries the germ of collapse because -of her internal situation.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“Rumania did not grow stronger. She is liable to attack and -vulnerable. She is threatened by Hungary and Bulgaria. -Since Kemal’s death Turkey has been ruled by small minds, -unsteady weak men.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“All these fortunate circumstances will no longer prevail in -2 or 3 years. No one knows how long I shall live. Therefore -conflict better now.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“The creation of Greater Germany was a great achievement -politically, but militarily it was questionable, since it was -achieved through a bluff of the political leaders. It is necessary -to test the military, if at all possible, not by general -settlement, but by solving individual tasks.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“The relation to Poland has become unbearable. My Polish -policy hitherto was in contrast to the ideas of the people. -My propositions to Poland, the Danzig corridor, were disturbed -by England’s intervention. Poland changed her tune -towards us. The initiative cannot be allowed to pass to the -others. This moment is more favorable than in 2 to 3 years. -An attempt on my life or Mussolini’s would change the -situation to our disadvantage. One cannot eternally stand -opposite one another with cocked rifle. A suggested compromise -would have demanded that we change our convictions -and make agreeable gestures. They talked to us -again in the language of Versailles. There was danger of -losing prestige. Now the probability is still great that the -West will not interfere. We must accept the risk with reckless -resolution. A politician must accept a risk as much -as a military leader. We are facing the alternative to strike -or be destroyed with certainty sooner or later.”—We skip -two paragraphs.—</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“Now it is also a great risk. Iron nerves, iron resolution. . . .”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>A long discussion follows which I think it is unnecessary to -read, and then towards the end, four paragraphs from the bottom, -I resume:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“We need not be afraid of a blockade. The East will supply -us with grain, cattle, coal, lead, and zinc. It is a big aim, -which demands great efforts. I am only afraid that at the -<span class='pageno' title='290' id='Page_290'></span> -last minute some ‘Schweinehund’ will make a proposal for -mediation.”—And then the last paragraph of one sentence—“Göring -answers with thanks to the Führer and the assurance -that the Armed Forces will do their duty.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>I believe I have already offered Exhibit 30, which is a shorter -note entitled: “Second Speech of the Führer on 22 August 1939.” -Reading then from United States Exhibit 30, headed “Second Speech -by the Führer on 22 August 1939:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“It may also turn out differently regarding England and -France. One cannot predict it with certainty. I figure on a -trade barrier, not on blockade, and with severance of relations. -Most iron determination on our side. Retreat before -nothing. Everybody shall have to make a point of it, that -we were determined from the beginning to fight the Western -Powers. A struggle for life or death. Germany has won every -war as long as she was united. Iron, unflinching attitude of -all superiors, greatest confidence, faith in victory, overcoming -of the past by getting used to the heaviest strain. A long -period of peace would not do us any good. Therefore it is -necessary to expect everything. Manly bearing. It is not -machines that fight each other, but men. We have the -better quality of men. Mental factors are decisive. The -opposite camp has weaker people. In 1918 the Nation fell -down because the mental pre-requisites were not sufficient. -Frederick the Great secured final success only through his -mental power.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“Destruction of Poland in the foreground. The aim is the -elimination of living forces, not the arrival at a certain line. -Even if war should break out in the West, the destruction -of Poland shall be the primary objective. Quick decision -because of the season.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“I shall give a propagandistic cause for starting the war, -never mind whether it be plausible or not. The victor shall -not be asked, later on, whether we told the truth or not. -In starting and making a war, not the Right is what matters, -but Victory.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“Have no pity. Brutal attitude. Eighty million people shall -get what is their right. Their existence has to be secured. -The strongest has the right. Greatest severity.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“Quick decision necessary. Unshakeable faith in the German -soldier. A crisis may happen only if the nerves of the leaders -give way.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“First aim: Advance to the Vistula and Narew. Our technical -superiority will break the nerves of the Poles. Every newly -<span class='pageno' title='291' id='Page_291'></span> -created Polish force shall again be broken at once. Constant -war of attrition.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“New German frontier according to healthy principle. Possibly -a protectorate as a buffer. Military operations shall not -be influenced by these reflections. Complete destruction of -Poland is the military aim. To be fast is the main thing. -Pursuit until complete elimination.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“Conviction that the German Wehrmacht is up to the requirements. -The start shall be ordered, probably by Saturday -morning.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>That ends the quotation. The Tribunal will recall that in fact -the start was actually postponed until September 1.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. OTTO STAHMER (Counsel for Defendant Göring): Mr. -President, may I make a short statement on the two documents -which have just been read. Both the documents which were read -and also the third which was not read but to which reference was -made, are not recognized by the Defense. I do not wish this -objection to appear unjustified; may I therefore give this explanation:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Both the documents which were read contain a number of -factual errors. They are not signed. Moreover, only one meeting -took place, and that is the cause for the inaccuracy of these documents. -No one present at that meeting was charged with taking -down the events in the meeting stenographically, and since there -are no signatures, it cannot be determined who wrote the documents -and who is responsible for their reliability. The third -document which was not read is, according to the photostatic copy -in the Defense’s document room, simply typewritten. There is no -indication of place or time of execution.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Well, we have got nothing to do with the -third document, because it has not been read.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. STAHMER: Mr. President, this document has nevertheless -been published in the press and was apparently given to the -press by the Prosecution. Consequently both the Defense and the -defendants have a lively interest in giving a short explanation of -the facts concerning these documents.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal is trying this case in accordance -with the evidence and not in accordance with what is in the press, -and the third document is not in evidence before us.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. ALDERMAN: May it please the Tribunal, I recognize that -counsel wonder how these two documents which I have just read -are in our hands. They come to us from an authentic source. They -are German documents. They were found in the OKW files. If they -<span class='pageno' title='292' id='Page_292'></span> -aren’t correct records of what occurred, it surprises us that with -the great thoroughness with which the Germans kept accurate -records, they would have had these records that didn’t represent -the truth in their OKW files.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Alderman, the Tribunal will of course -hear what evidence the defendants choose to give with reference -to the documents.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. ALDERMAN: It has occurred to me in that connection that -if any of these defendants have in their possession what is a more -correct transcription of the Führer’s words on this occasion, the -Court should consider that. On the other question referred to by -counsel, I feel somewhat guilty. It is quite true that, by a -mechanical slip, the press got the first document, which we never -at all intended them to have. I feel somewhat responsible. It -happened to be included in the document books that were handed -up to the Court on Friday, because we had only intended to refer -to it and give it an identification mark and not to offer it. I had -thought that no documents would be released to the press until -they were actually offered in evidence. With as large an organization -as we have, it is very difficult to police all those matters.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Alderman, the Tribunal would like to -know how many of these documents are given to the press.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. ALDERMAN: I can’t answer that.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. STOREY: May it please the Tribunal, it is my understanding -that as and when documents are introduced in evidence, -then they are made available to the press.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: In what numbers?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. STOREY: I think about 250 copies of each one, about 200 -or 250 mimeographed copies.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal think that the defendants’ -counsel should have copies of these documents before any of them -are handed to the press. I mean to say that in preference to gentlemen -of the press the defendants’ counsel should have the documents.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. STOREY: Your Honor, if it please the Court, I understand -that these gentlemen had the 10 documents on Saturday morning or -Sunday morning. They had them for 24 hours, copies of the -originals of these documents that have been read today, down in -the Information Center.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I stated, in accordance with the provisional -arrangement which was made, and which was made upon your -representations, that 10 copies of the trial briefs and five copies -<span class='pageno' title='293' id='Page_293'></span> -of the volumes of documents should be given to the defendants’ -counsel.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. STOREY: Sir, I had the receipts that they were deposited -in the room.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes, but what I am pointing out to you, -Colonel Storey, is that if 250 copies of the documents can be given -to the press, then the defendants’ counsel should not be limited -to five copies.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. STOREY: If Your Honor pleases, the 250 copies are the -mimeographed copies in English when they are introduced in -evidence. I hold in my hands, or in my briefcase here, a receipt -that the document books and the briefs were delivered 24 hours -in advance.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: You don’t seem to understand what I am -putting to you, which is this: That if you can afford to give -250 copies of the documents in English to the press, you can afford -to give more than five copies to the defendants’ counsel—one each. -Well, we do not need to discuss it further. In the future that will -be done.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: May I say, then, that of every document in evidence -each defense counsel will receive one copy; it will not be just one -for several members of the Defense.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Go on, Mr. Alderman.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. ALDERMAN: The aggressive war having been initiated in -September 1939, and Poland having been totally defeated shortly -after the initial assaults, the Nazi aggressors converted the war -into a general war of aggression extending into Scandinavia, into -the Low Countries, and into the Balkans. Under the division of -the case between the Four Chief Prosecutors, this aspect of the -matter is left to presentation by the British Chief Prosecutor.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Another change that we have made in our plan, which I perhaps -should mention, is that following the opening statement by -the British Chief Prosecutor on Count Two, we expect to resume -the detailed handling of the later phases of the aggressive war -phase of the case. The British, instead of the Americans, will deal -with the details of aggression against Poland. Then with this -expansion of the war in Europe and then, as a joint part of the -American case under Count One and the British case under -Count Two, I shall take up the aggression against Russia and the -Japanese aggression in detail. So that the remaining two subjects, -with which I shall ultimately deal in more detail, and now by -presentation of specifically significant documents, are the case of -the attack on the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the 22nd -<span class='pageno' title='294' id='Page_294'></span> -of June 1941 and the case on collaboration between Italy and -Japan and Germany and the resulting attack on the United States -on the 7th of December 1941.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>As to the case on aggression against the Soviet Union, I shall -at this point present two documents. The first of these two documents -establishes the premeditation and deliberation which preceded -the attack. Just as, in the case of aggression against Czechoslovakia, -the Nazis had a code name for the secret operation “Case -Green”, so in the case of aggression against the Soviet Union, they -had a code name “Case Barbarossa.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: How do you spell that?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. ALDERMAN: B-a-r-b-a-r-o-s-s-a, after Barbarossa of Kaiser -Friederich. From the files of the OKW at Flensburg we have -a secret directive, Number 21, issued from the Führer’s headquarters -on 18 December 1940, relating to Case Barbarossa. This directive -is more than six months in advance of the attack. Other -evidence will show that the planning occurred even earlier. The -document is signed by Hitler and is initialled by the Defendant -Jodl and the Defendant Keitel. This secret order was issued in -nine copies. The captured document is the fourth of these nine -copies. It is Document Number 446-PS in our numbered series.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I offer it in evidence as Exhibit USA-31.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>If the Tribunal please, I think it will be sufficient for me to -read the first page of that directive, the first page of the English -translation. The paging may differ in the German original.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>It is headed “The Führer and Commander-in-Chief of the German -Armed Forces,” with a number of initials, the meaning of -which I don’t know, except OKW. It seems to be indicated to go -to GK chiefs, which I suppose to be General Kommando chiefs:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“The Führer’s headquarters, 18 December 1940. Secret. Only -through officer. Nine copies. 4th copy. Directive Number 21, -Case Barbarossa.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“The German Armed Forces must be prepared to crush -Soviet Russia in a quick campaign before the end of the war -against England. (Case Barbarossa.)</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“For this purpose the Army will have to employ all available -units with the reservation that the occupied territories -will have to be safeguarded against surprise attacks.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“For the Eastern campaign the Air Force will have to free -such strong forces for the support of the Army that a quick -completion of the ground operations may be expected and -that damage of the eastern German territories will be -avoided as much as possible. This concentration of the main -<span class='pageno' title='295' id='Page_295'></span> -effort in the East is limited by the following reservation: -That the entire battle and armament area dominated by us -must remain sufficiently protected against enemy air attacks -and that the attacks on England, and especially the supply -for them, must not be permitted to break down.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“Concentration of the main effort of the Navy remains unequivocally -against England also during an Eastern campaign.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“If occasion arises I will order the concentration of troops -for action against Soviet Russia eight weeks before the intended -beginning of operations.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“Preparations requiring more time to start are—if this has -not yet been done—to begin presently and are to be completed -by 15 May 1941.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“Great caution has to be exercised that the intention of an -attack will not be recognized.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“The preparations of the High Command are to be made on -the following basis:</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“1. General Purpose:</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“The mass of the Russian Army in western Russia is to be -destroyed in daring operations by driving forward deep -wedges with tanks, and the retreat of intact battle-ready -troops into the wide spaces of Russia is to be prevented.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“In quick pursuit, a line is to be reached from where the -Russian Air Force will no longer be able to attack German -Reich territory. The first goal of operations is the protection -from Asiatic Russia from the general line Volga-Archangel. -In case of necessity, the last industrial area in the Urals left -to Russia could be eliminated by the Luftwaffe.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“In the course of these operations the Russian Baltic Sea -Fleet will quickly erase its bases and will no longer be ready -to fight.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“Effective intervention by the Russian Air Force is to be -prevented through powerful blows at the beginning of the -operations.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Another secret document, captured from the OKW files. . . .</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Alderman, perhaps that would be a -convenient time to adjourn for 10 minutes.</p> - -<p class='line' style='text-align:center;margin-top:2em;margin-bottom:2em;'>[<span class='it'>A recess was taken.</span>]</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. ALDERMAN: If it pleases the Tribunal, another secret -document captured from the OKW files, we think establishes the -motive for the attack on the Soviet Union. It also establishes the -<span class='pageno' title='296' id='Page_296'></span> -full awareness of the Nazi conspirators of the Crimes against -Humanity which would result from their attack. The document is -a memorandum of 2 May 1941, concerning the result of a discussion -on that day with the state secretaries concerning the Case Barbarossa. -The document is initialled by a Major Von Gusovius, a -member of the staff of General Thomas set up to handle the -economic exploitations of the territory occupied by the Germans -during the course of the aggression against Russia. The document -is numbered 2718-PS in our numbered series of documents. I offer -it in evidence as Exhibit USA-32.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I shall simply read the first two paragraphs of this document, -including the introductory matter:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“Matter for Chief; 2 copies; first copy to files 1a. Second -copy to General Schubert, May 2, 1941.”</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“Memorandum about the result of today’s discussion with -the state secretaries about Barbarossa.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“1. The War can only be continued if all Armed Forces are -fed by Russia in the third year of war.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“2. There is no doubt that as a result many millions of people -will be starved to death if we take out of the country the -things necessary for us.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>That document has already been commented on and quoted from -in Mr. Justice Jackson’s opening statement. The staggering implications -of that document are hard to realize. In the words of the -document, the motive for the attack was that the war which the -Nazi conspirators had launched in September 1939 “can only be -continued if all Armed Forces are fed by Russia in the third year -of the war.” Perhaps, there never was a more sinister sentence -written than the sentence in this document which reads:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“There is no doubt that as a result many millions of people -will be starved to death if we take out of the country the -things necessary for us.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>The result is known to all of us.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I turn now to the Nazi collaboration with Italy and Japan and -the resulting attack on the United States on 7 December 1941. With -the unleashing of the German aggressive war against the Soviet -Union in June 1941, the Nazi conspirators, and in particular, the -Defendant Ribbentrop, called upon the eastern co-architect of the -New Order, Japan, to attack in the rear. Our evidence will show -that they incited and kept in motion a force reasonably calculated -to result in an attack on the United States. For a time, they maintained -their preference that the United States not be involved in -<span class='pageno' title='297' id='Page_297'></span> -the conflict, realizing the military implication of an entry of the -United States into the war. However, their incitement did result -in the attack on Pearl Harbor, and long prior to that attack, they -had assured the Japanese that they would declare war on the -United States should a United States-Japanese conflict break -out. It was in reliance on those assurances that the Japanese struck -at Pearl Harbor.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>On the present discussion of this phase of the case, I shall offer -only one document to prove this point. The document was captured -from the files of the German Foreign Office. It consists of notes -dated 4 April 1941, signed by “Schmidt,” regarding discussions -between the Führer and the Japanese Foreign Minister Matsuoka, -in the presence of the Defendant Ribbentrop. The document is -numbered 1881-PS in our numbered series, and I offer it in -evidence as Exhibit USA-33. In the original, it is in very large, -typewritten form in German. I shall read what I deem to be the -pertinent parts of this document, beginning with the four paragraphs; -first reading the heading, the heading being:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“Notes regarding the discussion between the Führer and the -Japanese Foreign Minister Matsuoka, in the presence of the -Reich Foreign Minister and the Reich Minister of State -Meissner, in Berlin, on 4 April 1941.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“Matsuoka then also expressed the request that the Führer -should instruct the proper authorities in Germany to meet -as broad-mindedly as possible the wishes of the Japanese -Military Commission. Japan was in need of German help -particularly concerning the U-boat warfare, which could be -given by making available to them the latest experiences -of the war as well as the latest technical improvements and -inventions.”—For the record, I am reading on what is page 6 -of the German original.—</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“Japan would do her utmost to avoid a war with the United -States. In case that country should decide to attack Singapore, -the Japanese Navy, of course, had to be prepared for -a fight with the United States, because in that case America -probably would side with Great Britain. He (Matsuoka) personally -believed that the United States could be restrained, -by diplomatic exertions, from entering the war at the side of -Great Britain. Army and Navy had, however, to count on -the worst situation,—that is, with war against America. -They were of the opinion that such a war would extend -for 5 years or longer, and would take the form of guerilla -warfare in the Pacific, and would be fought out in the South -<span class='pageno' title='298' id='Page_298'></span> -Sea. For this reason the German experiences in her guerilla -warfare are of the greatest value to Japan. It was a question -how such a war would best be conducted and how all the -technical improvements of submarines, in all details such as -periscopes and such like, could best be exploited by Japan.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“To sum up, Matsuoka requested that the Führer should see -to it that the proper German authorities would place at the -disposal of the Japanese those developments and inventions -concerning navy and army which were needed by the -Japanese.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“The Führer promised this and pointed out that Germany, -too, considered a conflict with the United States undesirable, -but that it had already made allowances for such a contingency. -In Germany one was of the opinion that America’s -contributions depended upon the possibilities of transportation, -and that this again is conditioned by the available -tonnage. Germany’s war against tonnage, however, -means a decisive weakening, not merely against England, -but also against America. Germany has made her preparations -so that no American could land in Europe. She would -conduct a most energetic fight against America with her -U-boats and her Luftwaffe, and due to her superior experience, -which would still have to be acquired by the United -States, she would be vastly superior, and that quite apart -from the fact that the German soldiers naturally rank high -above the Americans.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“In the further course of the discussion, the Führer pointed -out that Germany, on her part, would immediately take the -consequences if Japan would get involved with the United -States. It did not matter with whom the United States would -first get involved, whether with Germany or with Japan. -They would always try to eliminate one country at a time, -not to come to an understanding with the other country subsequently, -but to liquidate this one just the same. Therefore -Germany would strike, as already mentioned, without delay -in case of a conflict between Japan and America, because -the strength of the tripartite powers lies in their joint action; -their weakness would be if they would let themselves be -beaten individually.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“Matsuoka once more repeated his request that the Führer -might give the necessary instructions, in order that the -proper German authorities would place at the disposal of -the Japanese the latest improvements and inventions, which -<span class='pageno' title='299' id='Page_299'></span> -are of interest to them because the Japanese Navy had to -prepare immediately for a conflict with the United States.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“As regards Japanese-American relationship, Matsuoka -explained further that he has always declared in his country -that sooner or later a war with the United States would be -unavoidable, if Japan continued to drift along as at present. -In his opinion this conflict would happen rather sooner than -later. His argumentation went on, why should Japan, therefore, -not decisively strike at the right moment and take the -risk upon herself of a fight against America? Just thus would -she perhaps avoid a war for generations, particularly if she -gained predominance in the South Seas. There are, to be -sure, in Japan, many who hesitate to follow those trends of -thought. Matsuoka was considered in those circles a dangerous -man with dangerous thoughts. He, however, stated that if -Japan continued to walk along her present path, one day she -would have to fight anyway and that this would then be -under less favorable circumstances than at present.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“The Führer replied that he could well understand the -situation of Matsuoka, because he himself had been in similar -situations (the clearing of the Rhineland, declaration of -sovereignty of Armed Forces). He too was of the opinion -that he had to exploit favorable conditions and accept the -risk of an anyhow unavoidable fight, at a time when he -himself was still young and full of vigor. How right he was -in his attitude was proven by events. Europe now was free. -He would not hesitate a moment to reply instantly to any -widening of the war, be it by Russia, be it by America. -Providence favored those who will not let dangers come to -them, but who will bravely face them.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“Matsuoka replied that the United States, or rather their -ruling politicians, had recently still attempted a last -maneuver towards Japan, by declaring that America would -not fight Japan on account of China or the South Seas, -provided that Japan gave free passage to the consignment -of rubber and tin to America to their place of destination. -However, America would war against Japan the moment -she felt that Japan entered the war with the intention to -assist in the destruction of Great Britain. Such an argumentation -naturally did not miss its effect upon the Japanese, -because of the education oriented on English lines which -many had received.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“The Führer commented on this, that this attitude of America -did not mean anything, but that the United States had the -<span class='pageno' title='300' id='Page_300'></span> -hope that, as long as the British World Empire existed, one -day they could advance against Japan together with Great -Britain, whereas, in case of the collapse of the World Empire, -they would be totally isolated and could not do anything -against Japan.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“The Reich Foreign Minister interjected that the Americans -precisely under all circumstances wanted to maintain the -powerful position of England in East Asia, but that on the -other hand it is proved by this attitude, to what extent she -fears a joint action of Japan and Germany.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“Matsuoka continued that it seemed to him of importance -to give to the Führer an absolutely clear picture of the real -attitude inside Japan. For this reason he also had to inform -him regretfully of the fact that he, Matsuoka, in his capacity -as Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs, could not utter in -Japan a single word of all that he had expounded before the -Führer and the Reich Foreign Minister regarding his plans. -This would cause him serious damage in political and financial -circles. Once before, he had committed the mistake, before he -became Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs, to tell a close -friend something about his intentions. It seems that the latter -had spread these things, and thus brought about all sorts of -rumors, which he, as Foreign Minister, had to oppose energetically, -though as a rule he always tells the truth. Under -these circumstances he also could not indicate how soon he -could report on the questions discussed to the Japanese -Premier or to the Emperor. He would have to study exactly -and carefully, in the first place, the development in Japan, -so as to make his decision at a favorable moment, to make -a clear breast of his proper plans towards the Prince Konoye -and the Emperor. Then the decision would have to be made -within a few days, because the plans would otherwise be -spoiled by talk.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“Should he, Matsuoka, fail to carry out his intentions, that -would be proof that he is lacking in influence, in power of -conviction, and in tactical capabilities. However, should he -succeed, it would prove that he had great influence in Japan. -He himself felt confident that he would succeed.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“On his return, being questioned, he would indeed admit to -the Emperor, the Premier and the Ministers for the Navy and -the Army, that Singapore had been discussed; he would, -however, state that it was only on a hypothetical basis.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“Besides this, Matsuoka made the express request not to -cable in the matter of Singapore, because he had reason to -<span class='pageno' title='301' id='Page_301'></span> -fear that by cabling, something might leak out. If necessary, -he would send a courier.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“The Führer agreed and assured, after all, that he could rest -entirely assured of German reticence.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“Matsuoka replied he believed indeed in German reticence, -but unfortunately could not say the same for Japan.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“The discussion was terminated after the exchange of some -personal parting words.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“Berlin, the 4th of April 1941. (Signed) Schmidt.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>This completes the presentation of what I have called the -“handful of selected documents,” offered not as a detailed treatment -of any of these wars of aggression, but merely to prove the deliberate -planning, the deliberate premeditation with which each -of these aggressions was carried out.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I turn to a more detailed and more or less chronological presentation -of the various stages of the aggression.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will now adjourn until -10 o’clock tomorrow.</p> - -<p class='line' style='text-align:center;margin-top:2em;margin-bottom:2em;'>[<span class='it'>The Tribunal adjourned until 27 November 1945 at 1000 hours.</span>]</p> - -<hr class='pbk'/> - -<div><span class='pageno' title='302' id='Page_302'></span><h1>SIXTH DAY<br/> <span style='font-size:smaller'>Tuesday, 27 November 1945</span></h1></div> - -<h2 class='nobreak'><span class='it'>Morning Session</span></h2> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I call on the counsel for the United States. -Mr. Alderman, before you begin, I think it would be better, for the -purpose of the Tribunal, when citing documents, if you would refer -to them not only by the United States exhibit number and the -PS document number, but also by the document book identification. -Each document book, as I understand it, has either a letter or a -number. They are numbered alphabetically, I think. If that is not -done, when we have got a great number of document books before -us, it is very difficult to find where the particular exhibit is.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. ALDERMAN: I can see that, yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>May it please the Tribunal, the handful of selected documents -which I presented yesterday constitute a cross section of the aggressive -war case, as a whole. They do not purport to cover the details -of any of the phases of the aggressive war case. In effect they do -amount to a running account of the entire matter.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Before moving ahead with more detailed evidence, I think it -might be helpful to pause at this point, to present to the Tribunal -a chart. This chart presents visually some of the key points in the -development of the Nazi aggression. The Tribunal may find it helpful -as a kind of visual summary of some of the evidence received -yesterday and also as a background for some of the evidence which -remains to be introduced. I am quite certain that, as your minds -go back to those days, you remember the maps that appeared from -time to time in the public press, as these tremendous movements -developed in Europe. I am quite certain that you must have formed -the concept, as I did in those days, of the gradually developing -head of a wolf.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In that first chart you only have an incipient wolf. He lacks -a lower jaw, the part shown in red, but when that wolf moved -forward and took over Austria—the Anschluss—that red portion -became solid black. It became the jaw of the wolf, and when that -lower jaw was acquired, Czechoslovakia was already, with its head -and the main part of its body, in the mouth of the wolf.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Then on chart two you see the mountainous portions, the fortified -portions of Czechoslovakia. In red, you see the Sudetenland -<span class='pageno' title='303' id='Page_303'></span> -territories which were first taken over by the Pact of Munich, -whereupon Czechoslovakia’s head became diminutive in the mouth -of the wolf.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>And in chart three you see the diminishing head in red, with -its neck practically broken, and all that was necessary was the -taking over of Bohemia and Moravia and the wolf’s head became -a solid, black blot on the map of Europe, with arrows indicating -incipient further aggressions, which, of course, occurred.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>That is the visual picture that I have never been able to wipe -out of my mind, because it seems to demonstrate the inevitability -of everything that went along after the taking over of Austria.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The detailed more or less chronological presentation of the aggressive -war case will be divided into seven distinct sections. The -first section is that concerning preparation for aggression during -the period of 1933 to 1936, roughly. The second section deals with -aggression against Austria. The third section deals with aggression -against Czechoslovakia. The fourth section deals with aggression -against Poland and the initiation of actual war. For reasons -of convenience, the details of the Polish section will be -presented after the British Chief Prosecutor presents his opening -statement to the Tribunal. The fifth section deals with the expansion -of the war into a general war of aggression, by invasions -into Scandinavia, the Lowlands, and the Balkans. The details on -this section of the case will be presented by the British Chief Prosecutor. -The sixth section deals with aggression against the Soviet -Union, which I shall expect to present. For reasons of convenience -again, the details on this section, like the details on aggression -against Poland, will be presented after the British Prosecutor has -made his opening statement to the Tribunal. The seventh section -will deal with collaboration with Italy and Japan and the aggression -against the United States.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I turn now to the first of these sections, the part of the case -concerning preparation for aggression during the period 1933 to -1936. The particular section of the Indictment to which this discussion -addresses itself is paragraph IV (F) and sub-paragraph 2 -(a), (b), (c), (d), (e), and (f), which I need not read at a glance, as -the Tribunal will recall the allegation. It will be necessary, as I -proceed, to make reference to certain provisions of the Charter, -and to certain provisions of the Treaty of Versailles, and the Treaty -between the United States and Germany restoring friendly relations, -25 August 1921, which incorporates certain provisions of the -Treaty of Versailles and certain provisions of the Rhine Treaty of -Locarno of 16 October 1925. -<span class='pageno' title='304' id='Page_304'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Alderman, is it not intended that this -document book should have some identifying letter or number?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. ALDERMAN: “M”, I am informed. I do not offer those -treaties in evidence at this time, because the British will offer all -the pertinent treaties in their aspect of the case.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The Nazi plans for aggressive war started very soon after World -War I. Their modest origin and rather fantastic nature, and the -fact that they could have been interrupted at numerous points, do -not detract from the continuity of the planning. The focus of this -part of the Indictment on the period from 1933 to 1945, does not -disassociate these events from what occurred in the entire preceding -period. Thus, the ascendancy of Hitler and the Nazis to political -power in 1933, was already a well-advanced milestone on the German -road to progress.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>By 1933 the Nazi Party, the NSDAP, had reached very substantial -proportions. At that time, their plans called for the acquisition -of political control of Germany. This was indispensable for the -consolidation within the country of all the internal resources and -potentialities.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>As soon as there was sufficient indication of successful progress -along this line of internal consolidation, the next step was to become -disengaged from some of the external disadvantages of existing -international limitations and obligations. The restrictions of the -Versailles Treaty were a bar to the development of strength in all -the fields necessary, if one were to make war. Although there had -been an increasing amount of circumvention and violation from -the very time that Versailles came into effect, such operations under -disguise and subterfuge could not attain proportions adequate for -the objectives of the Nazis. To get the Treaty of Versailles out of -the way was indispensable to the development of the extensive -military power which they had to have for their purposes. Similarly, -as part of the same plan and for the same reasons, Germany -withdrew from the Disarmament Conference and from the League -of Nations. It was impossible to carry out their plans on the basis -of existing international obligations or of the orthodox kind of future -commitments.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The points mentioned in this Paragraph IV (F) 2 of the indictment -are now historical facts of which we expect the Tribunal to -take judicial notice.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>It goes without saying that every military and diplomatic operation -was preceded by a plan of action and a careful coordination of -all participating forces. At the same time each point was part of -a long-prepared plan of aggression. Each represents a necessary -<span class='pageno' title='305' id='Page_305'></span> -step in the direction of the specific aggression which was subsequently -committed.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>To develop an extensive argument would, perhaps, be the unnecessary -laboring of the obvious. What I intend to say is largely -the bringing to light of information disclosed in illustrative documents -which were hitherto unavailable.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The three things of immediate international significance referred -to in this Paragraph IV (F) 2 of the Indictment are:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>First, the withdrawal from the Disarmament Conference and the -League of Nations; second, the institution of compulsory military -service; and, third, the reoccupation of the demilitarized zone of -the Rhineland. Each of these steps was progressively more serious -than the matter of international relations. In each of these steps -Germany anticipated the possibility of sanction being applied by -other countries and, in particular, a strong military action from -France, with the possible assistance of England. However, the conspirators -were determined that nothing less than a preventive war -would stop them, and they also estimated correctly, that no one -or combination of Big Powers would undertake the responsibility -of such a war. The withdrawal from the Disarmament Conference -and from the League of Nations was, of course, action that did not -violate any international obligation. The League Covenant provided -the procedure for withdrawal. However, in this case and as part -of the bigger plan, the significance of these actions cannot be disassociated -from the general conspiracy and the plans for aggression. -The announcement of the institution of universal military service -was a more daring action with a more overt significance. It was -a violation of Versailles, but they got away with it. Then, came the -outright military defiance, the occupation of the demilitarized zone -of the Rhineland.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Still on the Indictment, Paragraph IV (F) 2, which alleges the -determination of the Nazi conspirators to remove the restrictions -of Versailles, the fact that the Nazi plans in this respect started -very early is not only confirmed by their own statements, but they -boasted about their long planning and careful execution.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I read to you yesterday at length from our Exhibit 789-PS, -Exhibit USA-23, Hitler’s speech to all Supreme Commanders, 23 November -1939. I need not read it again. He stated there that his -primary goal was to wipe out Versailles. After 4 years of actual -war, the Defendant Jodl, as Chief of the General Staff of the Armed -Forces, delivered an address to the Reich and to the Gauleiter in -which he traced the development of German strength. The seizure -of power to him meant the restoration of fighting sovereignty, including -<span class='pageno' title='306' id='Page_306'></span> -conscription, occupation of the Rhineland, and rearmament, -with special emphasis on modern armor and air forces.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I have, if the Tribunal please, our Document Number L-172. It -is a photostat of a microfilm of a speech by General Jodl, and I -offer that photostat as Exhibit USA-34. I shall read, if the Tribunal -please, only a part of that, but starting at the beginning.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The speech is entitled “The Strategic Position at the Beginning -of the Fifth Year of War.” It is a kind of retrospective summary -by the Defendant General Jodl. “A lecture by the Chief of the -General Staff of the Armed Forces to the Reich- and Gauleiter, -delivered in Munich on 7 November 1943.” I am reading from the -English translation:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“Introduction: Reichsleiter Bormann has requested me to -give you a review today of the strategic position at the beginning -of the fifth year of war.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“I must admit that it was not without hesitation that I undertook -this none-too-easy task. It is not possible to do it justice -with a few generalities. It is not necessary to talk about -what will come but one must say frankly what the situation -is. No one, the Führer has ordered, may know more or be -told more than he needs for his own immediate task, but -I have no doubt at all in my mind, gentlemen, but that you -need a great deal, in order to be able to cope with your tasks. -It is in your Gaue, after all, and among their inhabitants that -all the widespread enemy propaganda, defeatism, and malicious -rumors are concentrated. Up and down the country the devil -of subversion strides. All the cowards are seeking a way out, -or—as they call it—a political solution. They say we must -negotiate while there is still something in hand, and all these -slogans are made use of to attack the natural feeling of the -people, that in this war there can only be a fight to the end. -Capitulation is the end of the nation; the end of Germany. -Against this wave of enemy propaganda and cowardice you -need more than force. You need to know the true situation, -and for this reason I believe that I am justified in giving you -a perfectly open and unvarnished account of the present state -of affairs. This is no forbidden disclosure of secrets, but a -weapon which may perhaps help you to fortify the morale of -the people. For this war will not only be decided by force -of arms, but by the will to resist of the entire people. Germany -was broken in 1918 not at the front but at home. Italy -suffered not military defeat but moral defeat. She broke -down internally. The result has been not the peace she expected -but—through the cowardice of these criminal traitors—a -<span class='pageno' title='307' id='Page_307'></span> -fate a thousand times harder than continuation of the -war at our side would have brought to the Italian people. -I can rely on you, gentlemen, that since I give concrete -figures and data concerning our own strength, you will treat -these details as your secret; all the rest is at your disposal, -without restriction, for application in your activities as leaders -of the people.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“The necessity and objectives of this war were clear to all and -everyone at the moment when we entered upon the War of -Liberation of Greater Germany and, by attacking, parried the -danger which menaced us . . . both from Poland and from the -Western Powers. Our further incursions into Scandinavia, in -the direction of the Mediterranean and into Russia—these -also aroused no doubts concerning the general conduct of the -war, so long as we were successful. It was not until more -serious set-backs were encountered and our general situation -began to become increasingly acute, that the German people -began to ask themselves whether, perhaps, we had not undertaken -more than we could do and set our aims too high. To -provide an answer to this questioning and to furnish you -with certain points of view for use in your own work of enlightenment, -is one of the main points of my present lecture. -I shall divide it into three parts:</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“I. A review of the most important questions of past developments;</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“II. Consideration of the present situation;</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“III. The foundations of our confidence in victory.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“In view of my position as Military Advisor to the Führer, -I shall confine myself in my remarks to the problems of my -own personal sphere of action, fully appreciating at the same -time, that in view of the Protean nature of this war, I shall -in this way, be giving expression to only one aspect of the -events.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“I. The review:</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“1. The fact that the National Socialist movement and its -struggle for internal power were the preparatory stage of -the outer liberation from the bonds of the dictate of Versailles, -is not one on which I need expatiate, in this circle. I -should like, however, to mention at this point how clearly -all thoughtful professional soldiers realize what an important -part has been played by the National Socialist movement in -reawakening the military spirit (the Wehrwille), in nurturing -fighting strength (the Wehrkraft), and in rearming -<span class='pageno' title='308' id='Page_308'></span> -the German people. In spite of all the virtue inherent in it, -the numerically small Reichswehr would never have been -able to cope with this task, if only because of its own restricted -radius of action. Indeed, what the Führer aimed -at—and has so happily been successful in bringing about—was -the fusion of these two forces.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“2. The seizure of power . . .”—I invite the Tribunal’s attention -to the frequency with which that expression occurs in -all of these documents.—“The seizure of power by the Nazi -Party in its turn had meant, in the first place, the restoration -of military sovereignty.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>That is the German word “Wehrhoheit”—a kind of euphemism -there—“the highness of defense.” I think it really means “fighting -sovereignty.” Wehrhoheit also meant conscription, occupation of -the Rhineland and rearmament, with special emphasis being laid -on the creation of a modern armored and air arm.</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“3. The Austrian Anschluss . . .”—Anschluss means “locking -on to,” I think. They latched on to Austria and—“The -Austrian Anschluss, in its turn, brought with it not only -the fulfillment of an old national aim, but also had the effect -both of reinforcing our fighting strength and of materially -improving our strategic position. Whereas, up until then, the -territory of Czechoslovakia had projected in a most menacing -way right into Germany (a wasp waist in the direction of -France and an air base for the Allies, in particular Russia), -Czechoslovakia herself was now enclosed by pincers.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>I wish the Tribunal would contemplate the chart a moment -and see that worm-like form of Czechoslovakia, which General -Jodl calls a “wasp waist in the direction of France,” and then he -very accurately described what happened when Austria was taken -by the Anschluss, that the “wasp waist” was “enclosed in the pincers.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I resume reading:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“Her own strategic position had now become so unfavorable -that she was bound to fall a victim to any attack pressed -home with vigor before effective aid from the West could be -expected to arrive.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“This possibility of aid was furthermore made more difficult -by the construction of the West Wall, which, in contradistinction -to the Maginot Line, was not a measure based on debility -and resignation but one intended to afford rear coverage -for an active policy in the East. -<span class='pageno' title='309' id='Page_309'></span></p> - -<p class='noindent'>“4. The bloodless solution of the Czech conflict in the autumn -of 1938 and spring of 1939”—that is—the two phases in -Czechoslovakia—“and the annexation of Slovakia rounded -off the territory of Greater Germany in such a way that it -now became possible to consider the Polish problem on the -basis of more or less favorable strategic premises.”—I think -it needs nothing more than a glance at the progressive chart -to see what those favorable strategic premises were.—</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“5. This brings me to the actual outbreak of the present war, -and the question which next arises is whether the moment -for the struggle with Poland, in itself unavoidable, was favorably -selected or not. The answer to this question is all the -less in doubt, because the relatively strong opponent collapsed -more quickly than expected, and the Western Powers who -were Poland’s friends, although they did declare war on us -and form a second front, nevertheless made no use of the -possibilities open to them of wresting the initiative from our -hands. Concerning the course taken by the Polish campaign, -nothing further need be said but that it proved to an extent -which surprised the whole world a fact which until then had -not been certain by any means, namely, the high state of -efficiency of the young armed forces of Greater Germany.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>If the Court please, there is a long review by General Jodl in -this document. I could read on with interest and some enthusiasm, -but I believe I have read enough to show that General Jodl by this -document identifies himself fully with the Nazi movement. This -document shows that he was not a mere soldier. Insofar as he is -concerned, it identifies the military with the political, and the immediate -point on which I had offered the document was to show -the deliberation with which the Treaty of Versailles was abrogated -by Germany and the demilitarized zone of the Rhineland was militarized -and fortified.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In one of Adolf Hitler’s reviews of the 6-year period between -his ascendancy to power and the outbreak of hostilities, he not only -admitted but boasted about the orderly and coordinated long-range -planning. I bring up again, if the Tribunal please, the Document -L-79, which was offered in evidence yesterday as Exhibit USA-27. -That is the minutes of a conference of the Führer by Schmundt, his -adjutant. In as large a staff as ours we inevitably fall into a kind -of patois or lingo, as Americans say. We also refer to this as “Little -Schmundt.” The large file that I offered yesterday, we call “Big -Schmundt.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>At this point, I merely wish to read two sentences from Page 1 -of that document which we call “Little Schmundt.” -<span class='pageno' title='310' id='Page_310'></span></p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“In the period 1933 to 1939 progress was made in all fields. -Our military system improved enormously.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>And then, just above the middle of the second page of the English -translation:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“The period which lies behind us has indeed been put to -good use. All measures have been taken in the correct -sequence and in harmony with our aims.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>One of the most significant direct preparations for aggressive war -is found in the secret Reich Defense Law of 21 May 1935, which -I offered in evidence yesterday as Exhibit USA-24 and commented -on then. I need not repeat that comment. The law went into effect -upon its passage. It stated at the outset that it was to be made -public instantly, but at the end of it Adolf Hitler signed the decree -ordering that it be kept secret. I commented on that sufficiently -yesterday.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>General Thomas, Thomas, as we call him, who was in charge of -War and Armament Economy and for some time a high ranking -member of the German High Council, refers to this law as “the -cornerstone of war preparations.” He points out that, although the -law was not made public until the outbreak of war, it was put -into immediate execution as a program of preparation.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of General Thomas’ -work, <span class='it'>A History of the German War- and Armament-Economy, -1923-1944</span>, Page 25. We have the volume here, in German, so that -anyone who wishes may examine it. I don’t care to offer the entire -volume in evidence unless the Court think I should. We do give it -an exhibit number, Exhibit USA-35, but I simply should like to -place it in the files as a reference work implementing judicial notice, -if that is practicable.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: You want it simply for the purpose of -showing that General Thomas said that that law was the cornerstone -of war? That has already been passed into the record.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. ALDERMAN: I want to say to counsel for the defendants -that it is here if they care to consult it at any time.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Very well.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. ALDERMAN: I should have identified it by our number, -2353-PS.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>This secret law remained in effect until 4 September 1938, at -which time it was replaced by another secret Defense Law, revising -the system of defense organization and directing more detailed preparations -for the approaching status of mobilization, which I think -was the euphemism for war. -<span class='pageno' title='311' id='Page_311'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>These laws will be discussed more extensively in connection -with other sections of our presentation. They have been discussed -by Mr. Dodd in connection with the economic preparations for the -war.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The second secret Defense Law I offer in evidence, as our serial -number 2194-PS. I offer it as Exhibit USA-36.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>As to that document I only intend to read the two covering -letters:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“Reich Defense Law; the Ministry for Economy and Labor, -Saxony; Dresden 6; 4 September 1939; Telephone: 52.151, -long distance; Top Secret.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“Transportation Section, attention of Construction Chief -Counsellor Hirche or representative in the office; stamp of -receipt of the Reich Protector in Bohemia and Moravia; received -Prague, 5 September 1939, No. 274.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“Enclosed please find a copy of the Reich Defense Law of -4 September 1938 and a copy each of the decrees of the Reich -Minister of Transportation, dated 7 October 1938, RL/W/ -10.2212/38, Top Secret, and 17 July 1939, RL/LV 1.2173/39, -Top Secret, for your information and observance.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“By order, signed Kretschmar. 3 inclosures. Stamp: complete -to Dresden, 4 September 1939, signed Schneider.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“Receipt for the letter of 4 September 1939, with 3 inclosures, -signed 5 September 1939, and returned to Construction Counsellor -Kretschmar.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>The whole point being that it was enclosing a second secret -Reich Defense Law under top-secret cover.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Now, next I refer to Indictment, Paragraph IV (F) 2 (a). That -paragraph of the Indictment refers to four points:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>(1) Secret rearmament from 1933 to March 1935; (2) the training -of military personnel (that includes secret or camouflage training); -(3) production of munitions of war; and, (4) the building of an air -force.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>All four of these points are included in the general plan for the -breach of the Treaty of Versailles and for the ensuing aggressions. -The facts of rearmament and of its secrecy are self-evident from -the events that followed. The significant phase of this activity insofar -as the Indictment is concerned, lies in the fact that all this -was necessary in order to break the barriers of the Versailles -Treaty and of the Locarno Pact, and necessary to the aggressive -wars which were to follow. The extent and nature of those activities -could only have been for aggressive purposes, and the highest -importance which the Government attached to the secrecy of the -<span class='pageno' title='312' id='Page_312'></span> -program is emphasized by the disguised financing, both before and -after the announcement of conscription and the rebuilding of the -Army, 16 March 1935.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I have, if the Court please, an unsigned memorandum by the -Defendant Schacht dated 3 May 1935 entitled “The Financing of the -Armament Program” (Finanzierung der Rüstung). As I say, it is -not signed by the Defendant Schacht, but he identified it as being -his memorandum in an interrogation on the 16th of October 1945. -I would assume that he would still admit that it is his memorandum. -That memorandum has been referred to but I believe not -introduced or accepted in evidence. I identify it by our Number -1168-PS, and I offer it in evidence as Exhibit USA-37.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I think it is quite significant, and with the permission of the -Court I shall read the entire memorandum, reminding you that the -German interpreter has the original German before him to read -into the transcript. “Memorandum from Schacht to Hitler” identified -by Schacht as Exhibit A, interrogation 16 October 1945, Page 40. -May 3, 1935 is the date of the memorandum.</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“Financing of Armament. The following explanations are -based upon the thought that the accomplishment of the armament -program with speed and in quantity is the problem of -German politics; that everything else therefore should be -subordinated to this purpose as long as the main purpose is -not imperiled by neglecting all other questions. Even after -March 16, 1935 the difficulty remains that one cannot undertake -the open propagandistic treatment of the German people -for support of armament without endangering our position -internationally (without loss to our foreign trade). The -already nearly impossible financing of the armament program -is rendered hereby exceptionally difficult.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“Another supposition must also be emphasized. The printing -press can be used only for the financing of armament to such -a degree as permitted by maintaining of the money value. -Every inflation increases the prices of foreign raw materials -and increases the domestic prices and is therefore like a -snake biting its own tail. The circumstance that our armament -had to be camouflaged completely till 16 March 1935, -and since this date the camouflage had to be continued to an -even larger extent, made it necessary to use the printing -press (bank note press) already at the beginning of the whole -armament program, while it would have been natural to -start it (i.e., the printing press) at the final point of finance. -In the portfolio of the Reichsbank are segregated bills of -exchange for this purpose (that is, armament) of 3,775 millions -<span class='pageno' title='313' id='Page_313'></span> -and 866 millions, altogether 4,641 millions, out of which -bills of exchange for armament amount to 2,374 million -Reichsmark, that is of April 30, 1935. The Reichsbank has -invested the amount of marks under its jurisdiction, but -belonging to foreigners, in bank notes of armament.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“Our armaments are also financed partly with the credits of -our political opponents. Furthermore, 500 million Reichsmark -were used for financing of armaments which originated out -of the federal loans which were invested in the saving banks -in the year 1935. In the regular budget the following amounts -were provided for the Armed Forces:</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“For the budget period 1933 to 1934—750 million Reichsmark; -for the budget period 1934 to 1935—1,100 million Reichsmark; -and for the budget period 1935 to 1936—2,500 million Reichsmark.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“The amount of deficits of the budget since 1928 increases -after the budget 1935 to 1936 to 5 to 6 billion Reichsmark. -This total deficit is already financed at the present time by -short-term credits of the money market. It therefore reduces -in advance the possibilities of utilization of the public market -for the armament. The Reichsfinanzminister”—Minister of -Finance—“correctly points out at the defense of the budget:</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“ ‘As a permanent yearly deficit is an impossibility, as we -cannot figure with security increased tax revenues in an -amount balancing the deficit and any other previous debits, -as on the other hand a balanced budget is the only secure -basis for the impending great task of military policy,’ ”—I -interpolate that evidently the Defendant Schacht knew about -the impending great military task to be faced by Germany.—“ ‘for -all these reasons we have to put in motion a fundamental -and conscious budget policy, which solves the problem -of armament financing by organic and planned reduction of -other expenditures, not only from the point of receipt, but -also from the point of expenditure, that is, by saving.’</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“How urgent this question is, can be deduced from the -following, that very many tasks have been undertaken by the -State and Party”—it isn’t ever just the State; it is the State -and the Party—“and are now in process, all of which -are not covered by the budget, but from contributions and -credits, which have to be raised by industry in addition to -the regular taxes. The existence of various budgets side by -side, which serve more or less public tasks, is the greatest -impediment for gaining a clear view of the possibilities of -financing the armaments. A large number of ministries and -<span class='pageno' title='314' id='Page_314'></span> -various branches of the Party have their own budgets, and -for this reason have possibilities of incomes and expenses, -though based on the sovereignty of finance of the State, but -not subject to the control of the Finanzminister”—Minister -of Finance—“and therefore also not subject to the control of -the Cabinet. Just as in the sphere of politics the much too -far-reaching delegation of legislative powers to individuals -brought about various states within the State, exactly in the -same way the condition of various branches of State and -Party, working side by side and against each other, has a -devastating effect on the possibility of finance. If, in this -territory, concentration and unified control is not introduced -very soon, the solution of the already impossible task of -armament finance is endangered.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“We have the following tasks:</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“(1) A deputy is entrusted with, I suppose, finding all sources -and revenues, which have origin in contributions to the -Federal Government, to the State and Party, and in profits -of public and Party enterprises.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“(2) Furthermore experts entrusted by the Führer have to -examine how these amounts were used and which of these -amounts in the future can be withdrawn from their previous -purpose.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“(3) The same experts have to examine the investments of -all public and Party organizations, to what extent this -property can be used for the purpose of armament financing.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“(4) The federal Ministry of Finances is to be entrusted to -examine the possibilities of increased revenues by way of -new taxes or the increasing of existing taxes.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“The up-to-date financing of armaments by the Reichsbank, -under existing political conditions, was a necessity, and the -political success proved the correctness of this action. The -other possibilities of armament financing have to be started -now under any circumstance. For this purpose all absolutely -nonessential expenditures for other purposes must not take -place, and the total financial strength of Germany, limited -as it is, has to be concentrated for the one purpose of armament -financing. Whether the problem of financing as outlined -in this program succeeds remains to be seen, but without -such concentration it will fail with absolute certainty.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Being sort of a hand in finance myself, I can feel some sympathy -with the Defendant Schacht as he was wrestling with these -problems. -<span class='pageno' title='315' id='Page_315'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Would that be a convenient time to adjourn -for 10 minutes?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. ALDERMAN: Yes.</p> - -<p class='line' style='text-align:center;margin-top:2em;margin-bottom:2em;'>[<span class='it'>A recess was taken.</span>]</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. ALDERMAN: 21 May 1935 was a very important date in -the Nazi calendar. As I have already indicated, it was on that date -that they passed the secret Reich Defense Law, which is our Document -2261-PS. The secrecy of their armament operations had -already reached the point beyond which they could no longer maintain -successful camouflage and, since their program called for still -further expansion, they made a unilateral renunciation of the -armament provisions of the Versailles Treaty on the same date, -21 May 1935.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I refer to Hitler’s speech to the Reichstag on 21 May 1935; our -Document Number 2288-PS. We have here the original volume of -the <span class='it'>Völkische Beobachter</span> (the “Popular Observer”, I suppose, is the -correct translation), Volume 48, 1935, 122-151, May, and the date -22 May 1935, which gave his speech under the heading (if I may -translate, perhaps): “The Führer Notifies the World of the Way to -Real Peace.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I offer that part of that volume identified as our Number 2288-PS, -as Exhibit USA-38, and from that I shall read, beginning with -the fifth paragraph in the English translation. I am sorry, I said -the fifth paragraph—this indicates on Page 3. It is after he discusses -some general conclusions and then there is a paragraph -numbered 1, that says:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“1. The German Reich Government refuses to adhere to the -Geneva Resolution of 17 March. . . .</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“The Treaty of Versailles was not broken by Germany -unilaterally, but the well-known paragraphs of the Dictate -of Versailles were violated, and consequently invalidated by -those powers who could not make up their minds to follow -the disarmament requested of Germany with their own disarmament -as agreed upon by the Treaty.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“2. Because the other powers did not live up to their obligations -under the disarmament program, the Government of -the German Reich no longer considers itself bound to those -articles, which are nothing but a discrimination of the German -nation”—I suppose “against the German nation”—“for -an unlimited period of time, since through them, Germany -is being nailed down in a unilateral manner, contrary to the -spirit of the agreement.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'><span class='pageno' title='316' id='Page_316'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>If the Tribunal please, needless to say, when I cite Adolf Hitler, -I don’t necessarily vouch for the absolute truth of everything that -he presents. This is a public speech he made before the world, and -it is for the Tribunal to judge whether he is presenting a pretext -or whether he is presenting the truth.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In conjunction with other phases of planning and preparation -for aggressive war, there were various programs for direct and indirect -training of a military nature. This included not only the -training of military personnel, but also the establishment and -training of other para-military organizations, such as the police -force, which could be, and were absorbed by, the Army.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>These are shown in other parts of the case presented by the -Prosecution. However, the extent of this program for military -training is indicated by Hitler’s boast of the expenditure of 90 billion -Reichsmark during the period of 1933 to 1939 in the building -up of the Armed Forces.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I have another volume of the <span class='it'>Völkischer Beobachter</span>, Volume -52, 1939—I think the issue of 2 and 3 September 1939—which -I offer in evidence as Exhibit USA-39; and there appears a speech -by Adolf Hitler, with his picture, under the heading which, if I -may be permitted to try to translate, reads: “The Führer Announces -the Battle for the Justice and Security of the Reich.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>That is a speech, if the Court please, by Adolf Hitler, on 1 September -1939, the date of the attack on Poland, identified by our -number 2322-PS, and I read from the bottom of Page 3, the last -paragraph starting on the page:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“For more than 6 years now, I have been engaged in building -up the German Armed Forces. During this period more than -90 billion Reichsmark were spent building up the Wehrmacht. -Today, ours are the best-equipped armed forces in the -world, and they are superior to those of 1914. My confidence -in them can never be shaken.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>The secret nature of this training program and the fact of its -early development is illustrated by a reference to the secret training -of flying personnel, back in 1932, as well as the early plans to -build a military air force. A report was sent to the Defendant Hess -in a letter from one Schickedantz to the Defendant Rosenberg for -delivery to Hess. I suppose that Schickedantz was very anxious -that no one but Hess should get this letter, and therefore sent it to -Rosenberg for personal delivery.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>This document points out that the civilian pilots should be so -organized as to enable their transfer into the military air force -organization. -<span class='pageno' title='317' id='Page_317'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>This letter is our Document 1143-PS, dated 20 October 1932, and -I now offer it in evidence as U. S. Exhibit 40. It starts: “Lieber -Alfred” (referring to Alfred Rosenberg), and is signed: “Mit bestem -Gruss, Dein Amo.” Amo, I think, was the first name of Schickedantz.</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“Dear Alfred: I am sending you enclosed a communication -from the RWM forwarded to me by our confidential man”—Vertrauensmann—“which -indeed is very interesting. I -believe we will have to take some steps so that the matter -will not be procured secretly for the Stahlhelm. This report -is not known to anybody else. I intentionally did not inform -even our long friend.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>I suppose that means “our tall friend.” I may interpolate that -the Defendant Rosenberg, in an interrogation on 5 October 1945, -identified this “big friend” or “tall friend” as being one Von -Alvensleben.</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“I am enclosing an additional copy for Hess, and ask you to -transmit the letter to Hess by messenger, as I do not want to -write a letter to Hess for fear that it might be read somewhere. -Mit bestem Gruss, Dein Amo.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Then enclosed with that is “Air Force Organization”:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“Purpose: Preparation of material and training of personnel -to provide for the case of the armament of the Air Force.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“Entire management as a civilian organization will be transferred -to Colonel Von Willberg, at present Commander of -Breslau, who, retaining his position in the Reichswehr, is -going on leave of absence.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“(a) Organizing the pilots of civilian air-lines in such a way -as to enable their transfer to the air force organization.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“(b) Prospects to train crews for military flying. Training to -be done within the organization for military flying of the -Stahlhelm”—I believe that means the “steel helmet”—“which -is being turned over to Colonel Hänel, retired.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“All existing organizations for sport-flying are to be used for -military flying. Directions on kinds and tasks of military -flying will be issued by this Stahlhelm directorate. The -Stahlhelm organization will pay the military pilots 50 marks -per hour flight. These are due to the owner of the plane in -case he himself carries out the flight. They are to be divided -in case of non-owners of the plane, between flight organization, -proprietor, and crew, in the proportion of 10-20-20. . . . -Military flying is now paid better than flying for advertisement -(40). We therefore have to expect that most proprietors -<span class='pageno' title='318' id='Page_318'></span> -of planes or flying associations will go over to the Stahlhelm -organization. It must be achieved that equal conditions will -be granted by the RWM, also the NSDAP organization.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>The program of rearmament and the objectives of circumventing -and breaching the Versailles Treaty are forcefully shown by a -number of Navy documents, showing the participation and -cooperation of the German Navy in this rearmament program, -secret at first.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>When they deemed it safe to say so, they openly acknowledged -that it had always been their objective to break Versailles.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In 1937 the Navy High Command published a secret book -entitled <span class='it'>The Fight of the Navy Against Versailles, 1919 to 1935</span>. -The preface refers to the fight of the Navy against the unbearable -regulations of the Peace Treaty of Versailles. The table of contents -includes a variety of Navy activities, such as saving of coastal guns -from destruction as required by Versailles; independent armament -measures behind the back of the Government and behind the back -of the legislative bodies; resurrection of the U-boat arm; economic -rearmament and camouflage rearmament from 1933 to the freedom -from the restrictions in 1935.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>This document points out the significant effect of the seizure of -power by the Nazis in 1933 on increasing the size and determining -the nature of the rearmament program. It also refers to the far-reaching -independence in the building and development of the -Navy, which was only hampered in so far as concealment of rearmament -had to be considered in compliance with the Versailles -Treaty.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>With the restoration of what was called the military sovereignty -of the Reich in 1935 and the reoccupation of the demilitarized zone -of the Rhineland, the external camouflage of rearmament was -eliminated.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>We have, if the Court please, a photostat of the German printed -book to which I have referred, entitled <span class='it'>Der Kampf der Marine gegen -Versailles</span> (The Fight of the Navy against Versailles) <span class='it'>1919 to 1935</span>, -written by Sea Captain Schüssler. It has the symbol of the Nazi -Party with the swastika in the spread eagle on the cover sheet, and -it is headed “<span class='it'>Secret</span>”, underscored. It is our Document C-156. It -is a book of 76 pages of text, followed by index lists and charts. I -offer it in evidence as Exhibit USA-41. I may say that the -Defendant Raeder identified this book in a recent interrogation and -explained that the Navy tried to fulfill the letter of the Versailles -Treaty and at the same time to make progress in naval development. -I should like to read from this book, if the Court please, the -preface and one or two other portions of the book: -<span class='pageno' title='319' id='Page_319'></span></p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“The object and aim of this memorandum, under the heading -‘Preface’, is to draw a technically reliable picture based on -documentary records and the evidence of those who took part -in the fight of the Navy against the unbearable regulations of -the Peace Treaty of Versailles. It shows that the Reich Navy, -after the liberating activities of the Free Corps and of Scapa -Flow, did not rest but found ways and means to lay with -unquenchable enthusiasm, in addition to the building up of -the 15,000-man Navy, the basis for a greater development in -the future, and so create, by the work of soldiers and technicians, -the primary condition for a later rearmament. It -must also distinguish more clearly the services of these -men, who, without being known in wide circles, applied -themselves with extraordinary zeal and responsibility in the -service of the fight against the Peace Treaty. Thereby -stimulated by the highest feeling of duty, they risked, particularly -in the early days of their fight, themselves and their -positions unrestrainedly in the partially self-ordained tasks. -This compilation makes it clearer, however, that even such -ideal and ambitious plans can be realized only to a small -degree if the concentrated and united strength of the whole -people is not behind the courageous activity of the soldier. -Only when the Führer had created the second and even more -important condition for an effective rearmament in the -coordination of the whole nation and in the fusion of the -political, financial, and spiritual power, could the work of -the soldier find its fulfillment. The framework of this Peace -Treaty, the most shameful known in world history, collapsed -under the driving power of this united will.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“Signed, the Compiler.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Now I wish to invite the Court’s attention merely to the summary -of contents because the chapter titles are sufficiently significant -for my present purpose.</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“I. Defensive actions against the execution of the Treaty of -Versailles (from the end of the war to the occupation of the -Ruhr, 1923).</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“1. Saving of coastal guns from destruction.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“2. Removal of artillery equipment and ammunition, hand -and machine weapons.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“3. Limitation of destruction in Helgoland.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“II. Independent armament measures behind the back of the -Reich Government and of the legislative body (from 1923 to -the Lohmann case in 1927). -<span class='pageno' title='320' id='Page_320'></span></p> - -<p class='noindent'>“1. Attempt to increase the personnel strength of the Reich -Navy.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“2. Contribution to the strengthening of patriotism among -the people.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“3. Activities of Captain Lohmann.</p> - -</div> - -<p class='noindent'>I am ashamed to say, if the Court please, that I am not familiar -with the story about Captain Lohmann.</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“4. Preparation for the resurrection of the German U-boat -arm.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“5. Building up of the Air Force.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“6. Attempt to strengthen our mine arm.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“7. Economic rearmament.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“8. Miscellaneous measures: a. The N. V. Aerogeodetic; -b. Secret reconnaissance.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“III. Planned armament works countenanced by the Reich -Government but behind the back of the legislative body from -1928 to the seizure of power in 1933.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“IV. Rearmament under the leadership of the Reich Government -in camouflaged form (from 1933 to the freedom from -restrictions, 1935).”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Now if the interpreter who has the original German volume -will turn to Chapter IV, Page 75—“Aufrüstung”—Concealed -rearmament under the leadership of the Government of the Reich -(from 1933 until military freedom in 1935):</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“The unification of the whole nation which was combined -with the taking over of power on 30 January 1933 was of -decisive influence on the size and shape of further rearmament.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“While the Reichsrat approached its dissolution and withdrew -as a legislative body, the Reichstag assumed a composition -which could only take a decisive attitude toward the -rearmament of the Armed Forces. The Government took -over the management of the rearmament program upon this -foundation. . . .”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Then a heading—“Development of the Armed Forces”:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“This taking over of the management by the Reich Government -developed for the Armed Forces in such a manner that -the War Minister, General Von Blomberg, and through him -the three branches of the Armed Forces, received far-reaching -powers from the Reich Cabinet for the development -of the Armed Forces. The whole organization of the Reich -was included in this work. In view of these powers, the -collaboration of the former inspecting body in the management -<span class='pageno' title='321' id='Page_321'></span> -of the secret expenditure was from then on dispensed -with. There remained only the inspecting duties of the -accounting office of the German Reich.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Another heading—“Independence of the Commander-in-Chief -of the Navy”:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“The Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, Admiral Raeder, -honorary doctor, had received thereby a far-reaching independence -in the building and development of the Navy. This -was only hampered in so far as the previous concealment of -rearmament had to be continued in consideration of the Versailles -Treaty. Besides the ordinary budget there remained -the previous special budget, which was greatly increased in -view of the considerable credit for the provision of labor, -which was made available by the Reich. Wide powers in the -handling of these credits were given to the Director of the -Budget Department of the Navy, up to 1934 Commodore -Schüssler, afterwards Commodore Foerste. These took into -consideration the increased responsibility of the Chief of the -Budget.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Another heading—“Declaration of Military Freedom”:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“When the Führer, relying upon the strengthening of the -Armed Forces, executed in the meanwhile, announced the -restoration of the military sovereignty of the German Reich, -the last-mentioned limitation on rearmament works, namely, -the external camouflage, was eliminated. Freed from all the -shackles which have hampered our ability to move freely on -and under water, on land, and in the air, for one and a half -decades, and carried by the newly-awakened fighting spirit of -the whole nation, the Armed Forces, and as a part of it, the -Navy, can lead with full strength towards its completion, the -rearmament already under way with the goal of securing for -the Reich its rightful position in the world.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>If the Tribunal please, at this moment I have a new problem -about proof which I believe we have not discussed. I have in my -hand an English translation of an interrogation of the Defendant -Erich Raeder. Of course he knows he was interrogated; he knows -what he said. I don’t believe we have furnished copies of this interrogation -to defendants’ counsel. I don’t know whether under the -circumstances I am at liberty to read from it or not. If I do read -from it I suggest that the defendants’ counsel will all get the -complete text of it—I mean of what I read into the transcript.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Has the counsel for the Defendant Raeder -any objection to this interrogation being read? -<span class='pageno' title='322' id='Page_322'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: As far as I have understood the proceedings to -date, I believe that it is a question of a procedure in which either -proof by way of documents or proof by way of witnesses will be -furnished. I am surprised that the Prosecution wishes to furnish -proof by way of records of interrogations, taken at a time when -the Defense was not present. I should be obliged to the Court if I -could be told whether, in principle, I, as a defense counsel, may -resort to producing evidence in this form, i.e. present documents -of the interrogation of witnesses; that is to say, documents in which -I myself interrogated witnesses the same as the Prosecution without -putting witnesses on the stand.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal thinks that if interrogations -of defendants are to be used, copies of such interrogations should -be furnished to defendant’s counsel beforehand. The question which -the Tribunal wished to ask you was whether on this occasion you -objected to this interrogation being used without such a copy -having been furnished to you. With regard to your observation as -to your own rights with reference to interrogating your defendants, -the Tribunal considers that you must call them as witnesses upon -the witness stand and cannot interrogate them and put in the interrogations. -The question for you now is whether you object to this -interrogation being laid before the Tribunal at this stage.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I should like first of all to have an opportunity -of seeing every record before it is submitted in Court. Only then -shall I be able to decide whether interrogations can be read, the -contents of which I as a defense counsel am not familiar with.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Very well, the Tribunal will adjourn now -and it anticipates that the interrogation can be handed to you -during the adjournment and then can be used afterwards.</p> - -<p class='line' style='text-align:center;margin-top:2em;margin-bottom:2em;'>[<span class='it'>The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours.</span>]</p> - -<hr class='pbk'/> - -<h2><span class='pageno' title='323' id='Page_323'></span><span class='it'>Afternoon Session</span></h2> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: May it please the Tribunal. I should -like to ask the Tribunal to note the presence and appearance, on -behalf of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, of Mr. A. I. Vishinsky -of the Foreign Office, and General K. P. Gorshenin, Chief -Prosecutor of the Soviet Republic who has been able to join us in -the Prosecution only now.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal notes what Mr. Justice Jackson -has said, and observes that Mr. Vishinsky has taken his seat with -the Soviet Delegation of Chief Prosecutors.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: In the meanwhile during the lunch hour I have -seen the minutes. I should like to observe that I don’t think it is -very agreeable that the Prosecution should not depart from their -point that the Defense should only receive the documents during -the proceedings, or just before the proceedings, or at times, even -after the proceedings. I should be grateful if the Prosecution could -see to it in the future that we are informed in good time.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Yesterday a list of the documents which were to be presented -today was made in our room, number 54. I find that the documents -presented today are not included in yesterday’s list. You will understand -that the task of the Defense is thereby rendered comparatively -difficult. On principle, I cannot in my statement of today, -give my agreement to the reading of minutes of interrogations. -In order to facilitate matters, I should like to follow the Court’s -suggestion, and declare that I am agreeable to the minutes presented -here being read. I request, however—and I believe I have -already been assured by the Prosecution to that effect—that only -the part be read which refers to Document C-156, as I had no time -to discuss the remaining points with the defendants.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>As to the remaining points, five other documents are cited. -Moreover I request that the part which refers to the book by -Kapitän zur See Schüssler, should be read in full, and I believe that -the prosecutor agrees with this.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I understood from the counsel for Raeder -that you were substantially in agreement as to what parts of this -interrogation you should read. Is that right, Mr. Alderman?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. ALDERMAN: If I understood the counsel correctly, he -asked that I read the entire part of the interrogation which deals -with Document C-156, but I understood that he did not agree for -me to read other parts that referred to other documents. I handed -counsel the original of my copy of the interrogation before the -lunch hour, and when he returned it to me after the lunch hour, -<span class='pageno' title='324' id='Page_324'></span> -I substituted in his hands a carbon copy. I didn’t quite understand -his statement about documents being introduced which hadn’t been -furnished to the defendant. We did file the document book.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Is this document in the document book?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. ALDERMAN: My understanding is that the document book -contains all the documents except these interrogations. They did -not contain the interrogation.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Then he is right in saying that.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. ALDERMAN: He is right as to the interrogation, yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Are you in agreement with him then, that -you can read what you want to read now, and that it is not necessary -for you to read the parts to which he objects.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. ALDERMAN: I think so. I understand he objects to my -reading anything other than the part concerned with C-156. I would -anticipate that he might be willing for me to read the other parts -tomorrow.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>This deals with the book which I offered in evidence this morning, -Document C-156, Exhibit USA-41. The Defendant Raeder -identified that book, and explained that the Navy tried to fulfill -the letter of the Versailles Treaty and at the same time make progress -in naval development. I refer to the interrogation of the Defendant -Raeder at the part we had under discussion:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“Q. I have here a Document C-156, which is a photostatic -copy of a work prepared by the High Command of the Navy -and covers the struggle of the Navy against the Versailles -Treaty from 1919 to 1935. I ask you initially whether you -are familiar with the work.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“A. I know this book. I read it once when it was edited.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“Q. Was that an official publication of the German Navy?</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“A. This Captain Schüssler (indicating the author) was a -commander in the Admiralty. Published by the OKM, it -was an idea of this officer to put all these things together.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“Q. Do you recall the circumstances under which the authorization -to prepare such a work was given to him?</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“A. I think he told me that he would write such a book as -he tells here in the foreword.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“Q. And in the preparation of this work he had access to the -official Navy files and based his work on the items contained -therein?</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“A. Yes, I think so. He would have spoken with other persons, -and he would have had the files which were necessary. -<span class='pageno' title='325' id='Page_325'></span></p> - -<p class='noindent'>“Q. Do you know whether, before the work was published, -a draft of it was circulated among the officers in the Admiralty -for comment?</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“A. No, I don’t think so. Not before it was published. I saw -it only when it was published.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“Q. Was it circulated freely after its publication?</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“A. It was a secret object. I think all upper commands in -the Navy had knowledge of it.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“Q. It was not circulated outside of Navy circles?</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“A. No.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“Q. What then is your opinion concerning the comments contained -in the work, regarding the circumventing of the provisions -of Versailles?</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“A. I don’t remember very exactly what is in here. I can -only remember that the Navy had always the object to fulfill -the word of the Versailles Treaty, but in order to have -some advantages. But the flying men were exercised 1 year -before they went into the Navy. Quite young men. So that -the word of the Treaty of Versailles was filled. They did not -belong to the Navy, as long as they were exercised in flying, -and the submarines were developed, but not in Germany and -not in the Navy, but in Holland. There was a civil bureau, -and in Spain there was an industrialist; in Finland, too, and -they were built only much later, when we began to act with -the English Government about the Treaty of 35 to 100, because -we could see that then the Treaty of Versailles would -be destroyed by such a treaty with England, and so, in order -to keep the word of Versailles, we tried to fulfill the word -of Versailles, but we tried to have advantages.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“Q. Would a fair statement be that the Navy High Command -was interested in avoiding the limiting provisions of the -Treaty of Versailles regarding personnel and the limits of -armaments, but would attempt to fulfill the letter of the -Treaty, although actually avoiding it?</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“A. That was our endeavor.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. ALDERMAN: Now the rest of this is the portion that -counsel for the defendant asked me to read:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“Q. Why was such a policy adopted?</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“A. We were much menaced in the first years after the first -war by the danger that the Poles would attack East Prussia, -and so we tried to strengthen a little our very, very weak -forces in this way; and so all our efforts were directed to -<span class='pageno' title='326' id='Page_326'></span> -the aim of having a little more strength against the Poles -should they attack us. It was nonsense to think of attacking -Poland in this stage by the Navy. A second aim was to have -some defense against the entering of French forces into the -Ostsee (East Sea), because we knew that the French had the -intention to sustain the Poles. Their ships came into the Ostsee, -Gdynia, and so the Navy was a defense against an attack -of Poland and against the entrance of French ships into the -East Sea; quite defensive aims.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“Q. When did this fear of an attack from Poland first show -itself in official circles in Germany, would you say?</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“A. In all the first years. They took Vilna; in the same -minute we thought they would come to East Prussia. I don’t -know exactly the year, because those judgments were the -judgments of the German Government Ministers, the Army -and Navy Ministers—Gröner and Noske.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“Q. Then those views, in your opinion, were generally held -and existed perhaps as early as 1919-1920, after the end of -the first World War?</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“A. Oh, but the whole situation was very, very uncertain, -and about those years in the beginning I cannot give you a -very exact picture, because I was then 2 years in the Navy -Archives to write a book about the War and the fighting capacity -of cruisers. For 2 years I was not with those things.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. ALDERMAN: Likewise the same kind of planning and purposes -are reflected in the table of contents of a history of the German -Navy, 1919 to 1939, found in captured official files of the German -Navy. Although a copy of the book has not been found by us, -the project was to have been written by Oberst Scherff, Hitler’s -personal military historian. We have found the table of contents; -it refers by numbers to groups of documents and notes of documents, -which evidently were intended as the working materials -for the basis of chapters, to be written in accordance with the table -of contents. The titles in this table of contents clearly establish the -Navy planning and preparation to get the Versailles Treaty out of -the way and to rebuild the naval strength necessary for aggressive -war.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>We have here the original captured document which is, as I say, -the German typewritten table of contents of this projected work, -with a German cover, typewritten, entitled <span class='it'>Geschichte der Deutschen -Marine, 1919-1939</span> (<span class='it'>History of the German Navy, 1919-1939</span>). -We identify it as our series C-17 and I offer it in evidence as Exhibit -<span class='pageno' title='327' id='Page_327'></span> -USA-42. This table of contents includes such general headings—perhaps -I had better read some of the actual headings:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“Part A, 1919—The Year of Transition. Chapter VII: First -efforts to circumvent the Versailles Treaty and to limit its -effects.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“(a) Demilitarization of the Administration, incorporation of -naval offices in Civil Ministries <span class='it'>et cetera</span>. (For example: Incorporation -of greater sections of the German maritime observation -station and the sea-mark system in Helgoland and -Kiel, of the Ems-Jade Canal <span class='it'>et cetera</span> into the Reich Transport -Ministry up to 1934: Noske’s proposal of 11. 8. 1919 to incorporate -the Naval Construction Department in the Technical -High School, Berlin; formation of the Naval Arsenal Kiel.)”—With -a reference to a group of documents numbered 75.—”</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“(b) The saving from destruction of coastal fortifications and -guns.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“(1) North Sea (strengthening of fortifications with new batteries -and modern guns between the signing and the taking -effect of the Versailles Treaty; dealings with the Control -Commission—information, drawings, visits of inspection, result -of efforts.)”—referring to the group of documents numbered -85.—</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“(2) Baltic (taking over by the Navy of fortresses Pillau and -Swinemünde; salvage for the Army of 185 movable guns and -mortars there.)”—I may interpolate that when the British -offer in evidence the Treaty of Versailles, you will see the -detailed limitations which this document indicates an effort -to avoid.—</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“(3) The beginnings of coastal air defense.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“Part B, 1920-1924—The Organizational New Order. Chapter -V: The Navy. Fulfillment and avoidance of the Versailles -Treaty. Foreign countries.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“(a) The Interallied Control Commissions.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“(b) Defense measures against the fulfillment of the Versailles -Treaty and independent arming behind the back of -the Reich Government and the legislative bodies.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“(1) Dispersal of artillery gear and munitions, of hand and -automatic weapons.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“(2) Limitation of demolition work in Helgoland.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“(3) Attempt to strengthen personnel of the Navy, from 1923.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“(4) The activities of Captain Lohmann (founding of numerous -associations at home and abroad, participations, formation -<span class='pageno' title='328' id='Page_328'></span> -of ‘sports’ unions and clubs, interesting the film industry -in naval recruitment).</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“(5) Preparation for re-establishing the German U-boat arm -since 1920 (projects and deliveries for Japan, Holland, Turkey, -Argentina, and Finland; torpedo testing).</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“(6) Participation in the preparation for building of the Luftwaffe -(preservation of airdromes, aircraft construction, -teaching of courses, instruction of midshipmen in anti-air-raid -defense, training of pilots).</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“(7) Attempt to strengthen the mining branch.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“Part C (1925-1932—Replacement of tonnage). Chapter IV: -The Navy, the Versailles Treaty, foreign countries.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“(a) The activities of the Interallied Control Commission (up -to 31. 1. 27; discontinuance of the activity of the Naval Peace -Commission).</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“(b) Independent armament measures behind the back of the -Reich Government and legislative bodies up to the Lohmann -case.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“(1) The activities of Captain Lohmann (continuation) their -significance as a foundation for the rapid reconstruction work -from 1935.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“(2) Preparation for the restrengthening of the German U-boat -arm from 1925 (continuation), the merit of Lohmann in connection -with the preparation for rapid construction in 1925, -relationship to Spain, Argentina, Turkey; the first post-war -U-boat construction of the German Navy in Spain since -1927 . . . 250-ton specimen in Finland, preparation for rapid -assembly; electric torpedo; training of U-boat personnel -abroad in Spain and Finland. Formation of U-boat school in -1932 disguised as an anti-U-boat school.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“(3) Participation in the preparation for the reconstruction of -the Luftwaffe (continuation). Preparation for a Naval Air -Arm, Finance Aircraft Company Severa, later Luftdienst”—or -Air Service—“GMBH; Naval Flying School Warnemünde; -air station list, training of sea cadet candidates, military -tactical questions ‘Air Defense Journeys,’ technical -development, experimental station planning, trials, flying boat -development Do X <span class='it'>et cetera</span>, catapult aircraft, arming, engines, -ground organization, aircraft torpedoes, the Deutschland -flight 1925, and the seaplane race 1926.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“(4) Economic rearmament (‘The Tebeg’—Technical Advice -and Supply Company as a disguised naval office abroad for -<span class='pageno' title='329' id='Page_329'></span> -investigating the position of raw materials for industrial -capacity and other war economic questions).</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“(5) Various measures (the NV Aerogeodetic Company—secret -investigations).</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“(c) Planned armament work with the tacit approval of the -Reich Government, but behind the backs of the legislative -bodies (1928 to the taking over of power).</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“(1) The effect of the Lohmann case on the secret preparations; -winding up of works which could not be advocated; resumption -and carrying on of other work.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“(2) Finance question (‘Black Funds’ and the ‘Special Budget’).</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“(3) The Labor Committee and its objectives.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“(d) The question of Marine attachés (the continuation under -disguise; open reappointment 1932-1933).</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“(e) The question of disarmament of the fleet abroad and in -Germany (the Geneva Disarmament Conference 1927; the -London Naval Treaty of 1930; the Anglo-French-Italian -Agreement 1931; the League of Nations Disarmament Conference -1932).</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“Part D (1933-1939—The German Navy during the military -freedom period).”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='noindent'>—which goes beyond the period with which I am at the moment -dealing. A glance at the chapter headings following that will indicate -the scope of this proposed work. Whether the history was -ever actually written by Scherff, I do not know.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I would like to call attention just to the first two or three -headings, under this “Part D—The German Navy during the military -freedom period”:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“I. National Socialism and the question of the fleet and of -prestige at sea.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“II. Incorporation of the Navy in the National Socialist State.”—The -main heading III in the middle of the page—“The -Rearmament of the Navy under the direction of the Reich -Government in a disguised way.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>The policy development of the Navy is also reflected from the -financial side. The planned organization of the Navy budget for -armament measures was based on a co-ordination of military developments -and political objectives. Military political development -was accelerated after the withdrawal from the League of Nations.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I have here, if the Court please, a captured document, in German, -headed “Der Chef der Marineleitung, Berlin, 12 May 1934,” -and marked in large blue printing “Geheime Kommandosache” -<span class='pageno' title='330' id='Page_330'></span> -(Secret Commando Matter), which is identified as our C-153. It has -the facsimile signature of Raeder at the end. I assume it is the -facsimile; it may have been written with a stylus on a stencil; I -can’t tell. I offer it in evidence as Exhibit USA-43. It is headed -with the title: “Armament Plan (R. P.) for the 3rd Armament -Phase.” This document of 12 May 1934 speaks of war tasks, war -and operational plans, armament targets, <span class='it'>et cetera</span>, and shows that -it was distributed to many of the High Command of the Navy. It -shows that a primary objective was readiness for a war without -any alert period.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I quote from the third numbered paragraph:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“The planned organization of armament measures is necessary -for the realization of this target; this again requires a -co-ordinated and planned expenditure in peace time. This -organization of financial measures over a number of years, -according to the military viewpoint, is found in the armament -program and provides: (a) for the military leader a sound -basis for his operational considerations, and (b) for the political -leader a clear picture of what may be achieved with the -military means available at a given time.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>One other sentence from Paragraph 7 of that document:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“All theoretical and practical R-preparations”—I assume that -means armament preparations—“are to be drawn up with a -primary view to readiness for a war <span class='it'>without any alert -period</span>.”—And “without any alert period” is underscored in -the original.</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>The conspiratorial nature of these Nazi plans and preparations -long before the outbreak of hostilities is illustrated in many other -ways. Thus, in 1934, Hitler instructed Raeder to keep secret the -U-boat construction program; also the actual displacement and -speed of certain ships. Work on U-boats had been going on, as -already indicated, in Holland and Spain.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The Nazi theory was rather clever on that. The Versailles -Treaty forbade rearming by the Germans in Germany, but they -said it didn’t forbid them to rearm in Holland, Spain, and Finland.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Secrecy was equally important then because of the pending naval -negotiations with England. We have a captured document, which is -a manuscript in German script, of a conversation between the -Defendant Raeder and Adolf Hitler in June 1934. It is not signed -by the Defendant Raeder. I might ask his counsel if he objects to -my stating that the Defendant Raeder, in an interrogation on 8 November -1945, admitted that this was a record of this conversation -and that it was in his handwriting, though he did not sign his name -at the end. -<span class='pageno' title='331' id='Page_331'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>That document is identified in our series as C-189, and I offer -it in evidence as Exhibit USA-44.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>It is headed: “Conversation with the Führer in June 1934 on the -occasion of the resignation of the Commanding Officer of the ‘Karlsruhe.’ ”</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“1. Report by the C-in-C Navy concerning increased displacement -of D. and E. (defensive weapons).</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“Führer’s instructions: No mention must be made of a displacement -of 25-26,000 tons, but only of improved 10,000-ton ships. -Also, the speed over 26 nautical miles may not be stated.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“2. C-in-C Navy expresses the opinion that later on, the Fleet -must anyhow be developed to oppose England, that therefore -from 1936 onwards, the large ships must be armed with -35-centimeter guns (like the King George class.)</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“3. The Führer demands to keep the construction of the -U-boats secret, in consideration of the Saar plebiscite.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>In order to continue the vital increase of the Navy, as planned, -the Navy needed more funds than it had available; so Hitler proposed -to put funds of the Labor Front at the disposal of the Navy.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>We have another Raeder memorandum of a conversation between -Raeder and Hitler on 2 November 1934. Of this I have a -photostatic copy of the German typed memorandum, identified as -our C-190. This one, again, is not signed, but it was found in Raeder’s -personal file and I think he will not deny that it is his -memorandum. I offer it in evidence as Exhibit USA-45.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>It is headed: “Conversation with the Führer on 2. 11. 34 at the -time of the announcement by the Commanding Officer of the -‘Emden’.</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“1. When I mentioned that the total funds to be made available -for the Armed Forces for 1935 would presumably represent -only a fraction of the required sum, and that therefore -it was possible that the Navy might be hindered in its plans, -he replied that he did not think the funds would be greatly -decreased. He considered it necessary that the Navy be speedily -increased by 1938 with the deadlines mentioned. In case -of need he will get Dr. Ley to put 120 to 150 million from -the Labor Front at the disposal of the Navy, as the money -would still benefit the workers. Later, in a conversation with -Minister Göring and myself, he went on to say that he considered -it vital that the Navy be increased as planned, as no -war could be carried on if the Navy was not able to safeguard -the ore imports from Scandinavia.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“2. Then, when I mentioned that it would be desirable to -have six U-boats assembled at the time of the critical political -<span class='pageno' title='332' id='Page_332'></span> -situation in the first quarter of 1935,”—that’s the -following year, foreseeing—“he stated that he would keep -this point in mind, and tell me when the situation demanded -that the assembling should commence.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Then, there is an apostrophe and a note at the bottom:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“The order was not sent out. The first boats were launched -in the middle of June ’35 according to plan.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>The development of the armament industry by the use of foreign -markets was a program encouraged by the Navy, so that this -industry would be able to supply the requirements of the Navy in -case of need.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>We have an original German document, again headed “Geheime -Kommandosache” (secret commando matter)—a directive of 31 January -1933 by the Defendant Raeder for the German industry to -support the armament of the Navy.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>It is identified in our series as C-29. I offer it in evidence as -Exhibit USA-46:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“Top Secret.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“General directions for support given by the German Navy -to the German armament industry.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“The effects of the present economic depression have led here -and there to the conclusion that there are no prospects of an -active participation of the German armament industry abroad, -even if the Versailles terms are no longer kept. There is no -profit in it and it is therefore not worth promoting. Furthermore, -the view has been taken that the increasing ‘self-sufficiency’ -would in any case make such participation superfluous.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“However obvious these opinions may seem, formed because -of the situation as it is today, I am nevertheless forced to -make the following contradictory corrective points:</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“a) The economic crisis and its present effects must perforce -be overcome sooner or later. Though equality of rights in -war politics is not fully recognized today, it will, by the assimilation -of weapons, be achieved at some period, at least to -a certain extent.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“b) The consequent estimation of the duties of the German -armament industry lies mainly in the military-political sphere. -It is impossible for this industry to satisfy, militarily and -economically, the growing demands made of it by limiting -the deliveries to our Armed Forces. Its capacity must therefore -be increased by the delivery of supplies to foreign countries -over and above our own requirements. -<span class='pageno' title='333' id='Page_333'></span></p> - -<p class='noindent'>“c) Almost every country is working to the same end today, -even those which, unlike Germany, are not tied down by -restrictions. Britain, France, North America, Japan, and -especially Italy, are making supreme efforts to ensure markets -for their armament industries. The use of their diplomatic -representations, of the propaganda voyages of their -most modern ships and vessels, of sending missions and also -of the guaranteeing of loans and insurance against deficits, -are not merely to gain commercially advantageous orders for -their armament industries, but first and foremost, to expand -their output from the point of view of military policy.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“d) It is just when the efforts to do away with the restrictions -imposed on us have succeeded, that the German Navy -has an ever increasing and really vital interest in furthering -the German armament industry and preparing the way for it -in every direction in the competitive battle against the rest -of the world.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“e) If, however, the German armament industry is to be able -to compete in foreign countries, it must inspire the confidence -of its purchasers. The condition for this is that secrecy for -our own ends be not carried too far. The amount of material -to be kept secret under all circumstances, in the interest of -the defense of the country, is comparatively small. I would -like to issue a warning against the assumption that at the -present stage of technical development in foreign industrial -states, a problem of vital military importance which we perhaps -have solved, has not been solved there. Solutions arrived -at today, which may become known, if divulged to a -third person by naturally always possible indiscretion, have -often been already superseded by new better solutions on our -part, even at that time or at any rate after the copy has been -made. It is of greater importance that we should be technically -well to the fore in any really fundamental matters, -than that less important points should be kept secret unnecessarily -and excessively.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“f) To conclude: I attach particular importance to guaranteeing -the continuous support of the industry concerned by the -Navy, even after the present restrictions have been relaxed. -If the purchasers are not made confident that something better -is being offered them, the industry will not be able to -stand up to the competitive battle and therefore will not be -able to supply the requirements of the German Navy in case -of need.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'><span class='pageno' title='334' id='Page_334'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>This Navy program of surreptitious rearmament, in violation of -the Treaty obligations, starting even before the Nazis came into -power, is illustrated by a 1932 order of the Defendant Raeder, Chief -of the Naval Command, addressed to the main Naval Command, -regarding the concealed construction of torpedo-tubes for S-boats. -He ordered that torpedo-tubes be removed and stored in the Naval -Arsenal, but be kept ready for immediate refitting. By using only -the permitted number—that is, permitted under the Treaty—at a -given time, and storing them after satisfactory testing, the actual -number of operationally effective S-boats was constantly increased.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>We have this German order, with the facsimile signature of -Raeder, with the heading: “Der Chef der Marine Leitung, Berlin, -10 February 1932.” Our series number is C-141. I offer it in evidence -as Exhibit USA-47, the order for concealed armament of -S-boats. That is C-141. I read from the first paragraph of the text:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“In view of our Treaty obligations and the Disarmament -Conference, steps must be taken to prevent the first S-boat -half-flotilla, which in a few months will consist of exactly -similar, newly built S-boats, from appearing openly as a formation -of torpedo-carrying boats”—the German word being -“Torpedoträger”—“and it is not intended to count these -S-boats against the number of torpedo-carrying boats allowed -to us.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“I therefore order:</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“1. S2-S5 will be commissioned in the shipyard Lürssen, -Vegesack, without armament and will be fitted with easily -removable cover-sheetmetal on the spaces necessary for torpedo-tubes. -The same will be arranged by T.M.I.”—a translator’s -note at the bottom says with reference to T.M.I. (Inspectorate -of Torpedoes and Mining)—“In agreement with the -Naval Arsenal, for the Boat S-1 which will dismantle its torpedo-tubes -on completion of the practice shooting, for fitting -on another boat.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“2. The torpedo-tubes of all S-boats will be stored in the -Naval Arsenal ready for immediate fitting. During the trial -runs the torpedo-tubes will be taken on board one after the -other for a short time to be fitted and for practice shooting, -so that only one boat at a time carries torpedo armament. -For public consumption this boat will be in service for the -purpose of temporary trials by the T.V.A.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='noindent'>—I suppose that is not the Tennessee Valley Authority; the -translator’s note calls it the Technical Research Establishment.— -<span class='pageno' title='335' id='Page_335'></span></p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“It should not anchor together with the other unarmed boats -of the half-flotilla because of the obvious similarity of the -type. The duration of firing, and consequently the length of -time the torpedo-tubes are aboard, is to be as short as -possible.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“3. Fitting the torpedo-tubes on all S-boats is intended as -soon as the situation of the political control allows it.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Interestingly enough, that memorandum by the Defendant Raeder, -written in 1932, was talking about “as soon as the situation -of the political control allows it.” The seizure of power was the -following year.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Along similar lines the Navy was also carrying on the concealed -preparation of auxiliary cruisers, under the disguised designation -of ‘Transport Ships 0’. The preparations under this order were to -be completed by 1 April 1935. At the very time of construction of -these ships as commercial ships, plans were made for their conversion.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>We have the original German document, again top secret, identified -by our Number C-166, order from the Command Office of -the Navy, dated 12 March 1934, and signed in draft by Groos. It -has the seal of the Reichswehrministerium, Marineleitung, over the -draft signature. I offer it in evidence as Exhibit USA-48. I think -the Defendant Raeder will admit, or at least will not deny, that -this is an official document.</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“Subject: Preparation of auxiliary cruisers.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“It is intended to include in the Establishment Organization -35 (AG Aufstellungsgliederung) a certain number of auxiliary -cruisers which are intended for use in operations in foreign -waters.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“In order to disguise the intention and all the preparations, -the ships will be referred to as ‘Transport Ships 0’. It is -requested that in future this designation only be used.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>The short paragraph says: “The preparations are to be arranged, -so that they can be completed by 1. 4. 35.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Among official Navy files, OKM files, which we have, there are -notes kept year by year, from 1927 to 1940, on the reconstruction -of the German Navy, and in these notes are numerous examples -of the Navy’s activities and policies of which I should like to -point out some illustrations.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>One of these documents discloses that the displacement -of the battleships “Scharnhorst-Gneisenau” and “F/G”—whatever -that is—was actually greater than the tonnages which had -been notified to the British under the Treaty. This document, our -<span class='pageno' title='336' id='Page_336'></span> -C-23, I offer in evidence as Exhibit USA-49. That is a set really -of three separate documents joined together. I read from that -document:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“The true displacement of the battleships ‘Scharnhorst-Gneisenau’ -and the ‘F/G’ exceeds by 20 percent, in both cases, -the displacement reported to the British.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>And then there is a table with reference to different ships, and -two columns headed “Displacement by Type”: one column “Actual -Displacement” and the other column “Notified Displacement.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>On the “Scharnhorst” the actual was 31,300 tons; the notified -was 26,000 tons. On the “F”—actual 41,700 tons, the notified 35,000. -On the “HI”—actual 56,200 tons, notified 46,850, and so down the -list. I need not read them all.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>On the second document in that group towards the end, Page 2 -on the English version, is the statement:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“In a clear cut program for the construction, the Führer and -Reich Chancellor has set the Navy the task of carrying out -the aims of his foreign policy.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>The German Navy constantly planned and committed violations -of armament limitation and with characteristic German thoroughness -had prepared superficial explanations or pretexts to explain -away these violations.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Following a conference with the chief of “A” section, an elaborate -survey list was prepared and compiled, giving a careful list -of the quantity and type of German naval armament and ammunition -on hand under manufacture or construction, and in many -instances proposed together with a statement of the justification or -defense that might be used in those instances where the Versailles -Treaty was violated or its allotment has been exceeded.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The list contained 30 items under “Material Measures” and 14 -items under “Measures of Organization.” The variety of details -covered necessarily involved several sources within the Navy, which -must have realized their significance. As I understand it, the -“A” section was the military department of the Navy.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>We have this very interesting document among the captured -documents identified by our Number C-32. I offer it in evidence -as Exhibit USA-50. It again is Geheime Kommandosache and it -is headed “A Survey Report of German Naval Armament after Conference -with Chief of ‘A’ Section”, dated 9 September 1933, and -captured among official German Navy files.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>This is a long document, if the Tribunal please, but I should -like to call attention to a few of the more interesting items. -<span class='pageno' title='337' id='Page_337'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>There are three columns, one headed “Measure”, one headed -“Material Measures, Details,” and the most interesting one is headed -“Remarks.” The remarks contain the pretext or justification for -explaining away the violations of the Treaty. They are numbered, -so I can conveniently refer to the numbers:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“Number 1. Exceeding the permitted number of mines.”—Then -figures are given. Remarks—“Further mines are in part -ordered, in part being delivered.”</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“Number 2. Continuous storing of guns from the North Sea -area for Baltic artillery batteries.”—In the remarks column—“Justification: -Necessity for overhauling. Cheaper repairs.”</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“Number 6. Laying gun-platforms in the Kiel area.” Remarks: -“The offense over and above that in Serial Number 3 -lies in the fact that all fortifications are forbidden in the Kiel -area. This justification will make it less severe; pure defense -measures.”</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“Number 7. Exceeding the caliber permitted for coastal batteries.” -The explanation: “Possible justification is that, though -the caliber is larger, the number of guns is less.”</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“Number 8. Arming of minesweepers. The reply to any -remonstrance against this breach: the guns are taken from -the Fleet reserve stores, have been temporarily installed only -for training purposes. All nations arm their mine sweeping -forces (equality of rights).”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='noindent'>—Here is one that is rather amusing—“Number 13. Exceeding -the number of machine guns <span class='it'>et cetera</span>, permitted.” -Remarks: “Can be made light of.”</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“Number 18. Construction of U-boat parts.” This remark is -quite characteristic: “Difficult to detect. If necessary can be -denied.”</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“Number 20. Arming of fishing vessels.” Remarks: “For -warning shots. Make little of it.”—And so on throughout the -list.</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>I think quite obviously that must have been used as a guide -for negotiators who were attending the Disarmament Conference -as to the position that they might take.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Now to Paragraph IV (F) 2 (b) of the Indictment: the allegation -that “On 14 October 1933 they led Germany to leave the International -Disarmament Conference and the League of Nations.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>That is an historical fact of which I ask the Tribunal to take -judicial notice. The Nazis took this opportunity to break away -from the international negotiations and to take an aggressive position -on an issue which would not be serious enough to provoke -<span class='pageno' title='338' id='Page_338'></span> -reprisal from other countries. At the same time Germany attached -so much importance to this action, that they considered the possibility -of the application of sanctions by other countries. Anticipating -the probable nature of such sanctions and the countries which might -apply them, plans were made for military preparations for armed -resistance on land, at sea, and in the air, in a directive from the -Reichsminister for Defense Blomberg, to the Head of the Army -High Command Fritsch, the Head of the Navy High Command Raeder, -and the Reichsminister of Air Göring.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>We have this captured document in our series C-140, which I -offer in evidence as Exhibit USA-151. It is a directive dated 25 October -1933, 11 days after the withdrawal from the Disarmament -Conference and the League of Nations.</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“1) The enclosed directive gives the basis for preparations of -the Armed Forces in the case of sanctions being applied -against Germany.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“2) I request the Chiefs of the Army and Navy High Commands -and the Reichsminister for Air to carry out the -preparations in accordance with the following points:</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“(a) Strictest secrecy. It is of the utmost importance that no -facts become known to the outside world from which -preparation for resistance against sanctions can be inferred -or which is incompatible with Germany’s existing obligations -in the sphere of foreign policy regarding the demilitarized -zone. If necessary, the preparations must take second place -to this necessity.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>I think that makes the point without further reading. One of -the immediate consequences of the action was that following the -withdrawal from the League of Nations, Germany’s armament -program was still further increased.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I introduced this morning document C-153, as Exhibit USA-43, -so that is already in. From that, at this point, I wish to read Paragraph -5. That, as you recall, was a document dated 12 May 1934.</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“5) Owing to the speed of military political development, -since Germany quitted Geneva, and based on the progress of -the Army, the new R-plan will only be drawn up for a period -of 2 years. The third ‘A’ phase lasts accordingly from 1. 4. 34 -to 31. 3. 36.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Then the next allegation of the Indictment, if the Tribunal -please: “On 10 March 1935 the Defendant Göring announced that -Germany was building a military air force.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>That is an historical fact of which I ask the Court to take judicial -notice, and I am quite certain that the Defendant Göring would not -dispute it. -<span class='pageno' title='339' id='Page_339'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>We have a copy of the German publication known as <span class='it'>Das Archiv</span>—the -number of March 1935; and it is Page 1830 to which I -refer, and I would offer that in evidence, identifying it as our number -2292-PS; I offer it as Exhibit USA-52. It is an announcement -concerning the German Air Force:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“The Reich Minister for Aviation, General of the Airmen, -Göring, in his talk with the special correspondent of the -<span class='it'>Daily Mail</span>, Ward Price, expressed himself on the subject of -the German Air Force.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“General Göring said:</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“ ‘In the extension of our national defenses’ ”—Sicherheit—“ ‘it -was necessary, as we repeatedly told the world, to take -care of defense in the air. As far as that is concerned, I -restricted myself to those measures absolutely necessary. -The guiding line of my actions was, not the creation of an -aggressive force which would threaten other nations, but -merely the completion of a military aviation which would -be strong enough to repel, at any time, attacks on Germany.’ ”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Then, at the end of that section of the article in <span class='it'>Das Archiv</span>:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“In conclusion, the correspondent asks whether the German -Air Force will be capable of repelling attacks on Germany.</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>General Göring replied to that exactly as follows:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“ ‘The German Air Force is just as passionately permeated -with the will to defend the Fatherland to the last as it is -convinced, on the other hand, that it will never be employed -to threaten the peace of other nations.’ ”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>As I said; I believe, this morning, when we cite assurances of -that kind from Nazi leaders, we take it that we are not foreclosed -from showing that they had different intentions from those announced.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The next allegation of the Indictment is the promulgating of the -law for compulsory military service, universal military service.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Having gone as far as they could on rearmament and the secret -training of personnel, the next step necessary to the program for -aggressive war was a large-scale increase in military strength. -This could no longer be done under disguise and camouflage, and -would have to be known to the world. Accordingly, on 16 March -1935, there was promulgated a law for universal military service, -in violation of Article 173 of the Versailles Treaty.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I ask the Court to take judicial notice of that law as it appears -in the <span class='it'>Reichsgesetzblatt</span>, which is the official compilation of laws, -in the Title I of Volume I, yearly volume 1935, or Jahrgang, at -<span class='pageno' title='340' id='Page_340'></span> -Page 369 and I think I need not offer the book or the law in -evidence.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The text of the law itself is very brief and I might read that. -It is right at the end of the article. I should refer to that as our -Document Number 1654-PS, so as to identify it:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“In this spirit the German Reich Cabinet has today passed -the following law:</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“Law for the Organization of the Armed Forces of March 16, -1935.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“The Reich Cabinet has passed the following law which is -herewith promulgated:</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“Paragraph 1. Service in the Armed Forces is based upon -compulsory military duty.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“Paragraph 2. In peace time, the German Army, including -the police troops transferred to it, is organized into 12 corps -and 36 divisions.”—There is a typographical error in the -English version of that. It says “16 divisions”, but the original -German says 36 divisions.—</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“Paragraph 3. The Reich Minister of War is charged with -the duty of submitting immediately to the Reich Ministry -detailed laws on compulsory military duty.”</p> - -<p class='noindent'>Signed: “Berlin, 16 March 1935.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='noindent'>It is signed first by the Führer and Reich Chancellor Adolf Hitler, -and then many other officials, including the following defendants -in this case:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Von Neurath, Frick, Schacht, Göring, Hess, Frank.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Does the Court contemplate a short recess?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn for 10 minutes.</p> - -<p class='line' style='text-align:center;margin-top:2em;margin-bottom:2em;'>[<span class='it'>A recess was taken.</span>]</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. STOREY: If the Tribunal please, the Prosecution expects, -on tomorrow, to offer in evidence some captured enemy moving -pictures and in order to give Defense Counsel an opportunity to -see them before they are offered in evidence—and in response to -their request made to the Tribunal some time ago—the showing -of these films for Defense Counsel will be held in this court room -this evening at 8 o’clock, for the Defense Counsel.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Very well, Colonel Storey.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. ALDERMAN: May it please the Tribunal, I have reached -now Paragraph IV, F, 2 (e) of the Indictment, which alleges: -<span class='pageno' title='341' id='Page_341'></span></p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“On 21 May 1935 they falsely announced to the world, with -intent to deceive and allay fears of aggressive intentions, -that they would respect the territorial limitations of the Versailles -Treaty and comply with the Locarno Pact.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>As a part of their program to weaken resistance in possible -enemy states, the Nazis followed a policy of making false -assurances, thereby tending to create confusion and a false sense of -security. Thus on the same date on which Germany renounced the -armament provisions of the Versailles Treaty, Hitler announced the -intent of the German Government to respect the territorial limitations -of Versailles and Locarno.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I offered in evidence this morning, as Exhibit USA-38, our -Document 2288-PS, the pertinent volume of the issue of the <span class='it'>Völkischer -Beobachter</span> of 21 May 1935, containing Hitler’s speech in the -Reichstag on that date. In that speech he said:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“Therefore, the Government of the German Reich shall absolutely -respect all other articles pertaining to the cooperation”—Zusammenleben, -really meaning the living together in -harmony—“of the various nations, including territorial agreements. -Revisions which will be unavoidable as time goes by -it will carry out by way of a friendly understanding only.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“The Government of the German Reich has the intention not -to sign any treaty which it believes not to be able to fulfill. -However, it will live up to every treaty signed voluntarily -even if it was composed before this Government took over. -Therefore, it will in particular adhere to all the obligations -under the Locarno Pact, as long as the other partners of the -Pact also adhere to it.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>For convenient reference, the territorial limitations in the -Locarno and Versailles Treaties include the following: The Rhine -Pact of Locarno, 16 October 1925, Article 1:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“The High Contracting Parties, collectively and severally, -guarantee, in the manner provided in the following Articles: -the maintenance of the territorial <span class='it'>status quo</span>, resulting -from the frontiers between Germany and Belgium, and -between Germany and France, and the inviolability of the -said frontiers, as fixed by, or in pursuance of the Treaty -of Peace, signed at Versailles, on June 28, 1919, and also -the observance of the stipulations of Articles 42 and 43 of -the said Treaty, concerning the demilitarized zone.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>That has reference, of course, to the demilitarized zone of the -Rhineland. -<span class='pageno' title='342' id='Page_342'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>Then from the Versailles Treaty, 28 June 1919, Article 42:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“Germany is forbidden to maintain or construct any fortifications, -either on the left bank of the Rhine or on the right -bank, to the West of the line drawn 50 kilometers to the -East of the Rhine.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“Article 43: In the area defined above, the maintenance and -the assembly of armed forces, either permanently or temporarily -and military maneuvers of any kind, as well as -the upkeep of all permanent works for mobilization, are in -the same way forbidden.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>The next allegation of the Indictment (f):</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“On 7 March 1936, they reoccupied and fortified the Rhineland, -in violation of the Treaty of Versailles and the Rhine -Pact of Locarno of 16 October 1925, and falsely announced -to the world that ‘we have no territorial demands to make -in Europe.’ ”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>The demilitarized zone of the Rhineland obviously was a sore -wound with the Nazis ever since its establishment, after World -War I. Not only was this a blow to their increasing pride, but -it was a bar to any effective strong position which Germany might -want to take on any vital issues. In the event of any sanctions -against Germany, in the form of military action, the French and -other powers would get well into Germany, east of the Rhine, -before any German resistance could even be put up. Therefore, -any German plans to threaten or breach international obligations -or for any kind of aggression, required the preliminary reoccupation -and refortification of this open Rhineland territory. Plans -and preparations for the reoccupation of the Rhineland started -very early.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>We have a document, a German captured document, in German -script, which we identify as C-139, and which appears to be -signed by the handwriting of Blomberg. I offer it in evidence as -Exhibit USA-53.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The document deals with what is called “Operation Schulung”, -which means schooling, or training. It is dated 2 May 1935 and -even refers to prior Staff discussions on the subject dealt with. It -is addressed to the Chief of the Army Command, who at that -time, I believe, was Fritsch, the Chief of the Navy High Command, -Raeder, and the Reich Minister for Air, Göring.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>It does not use the name “Rhineland” and does not, in terms, -refer to it. It is our view that it was a military plan for the -military reoccupation of the Rhineland, in violation of the Treaty -of Versailles and the Rhine Pact of Locarno. -<span class='pageno' title='343' id='Page_343'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>I read from the first part of the document which is headed -“top secret”:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“For the operation suggested in the last Staff talks of the -Armed Forces, I lay down the code name ‘Schulung’ ”—training.—</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“The supreme direction of Operation Schulung rests with the -Reich Minister of Defense as this is a joint undertaking of -the three services.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“Preparations for the operation will begin forthwith according -to the following directives:</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“1. General.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“(1) The operation must, on issue of the code words ‘Carry -out Schulung’, be executed by a surprise blow at lightning -speed. Strictest secrecy is necessary in the preparations and -only the very smallest number of officers should be informed -and employed in the drafting of reports, drawings, <span class='it'>et cetera</span>, -and these officers only in person.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“(2) There is no time for mobilization of the forces taking -part. These will be employed in their peacetime strength -and with their peacetime equipment.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“(3) The preparation for the operation will be made without -regard to the present inadequate state of our armaments. -Every improvement of the state of our armaments will make -possible a greater measure of preparedness and thus result -in better prospects of success.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>The rest of the order deals with military details and I think -it is unnecessary to read it.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>There are certain points, in the face of this order, which are -inconsistent with any theory that it was merely a training order, -or that it might have been defensive in nature. The operation -was to be carried out as a surprise blow at lightning speed (Schlagartig -als Überfall).</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The air forces were to provide support for the attack. There -was to be reinforcement by the East Prussian division. Furthermore, -this document is dated 2 May 1935, which is about 6 weeks -after the promulgation of the Conscription Law on 16 March 1935, -and so it could hardly have been planned as a defensive measure -against any expected sanctions which might have been applied by -reason of the passage of the Conscription Law.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Of course the actual reoccupation of the Rhineland did not -take place until 7 March 1936, so that this early plan would necessarily -have been totally revised to suit the existing conditions and -specific objectives. As I say, although the plan does not mention -<span class='pageno' title='344' id='Page_344'></span> -the Rhineland, it has all of the indications of a Rhineland operation -plan. That the details of this particular plan were not ultimately -the ones that were carried out in reoccupying the Rhineland does -not at all detract from the vital fact that as early as 2 May 1935 -the Germans had already planned that operation, not merely as a -Staff plan but as a definite operation. It was evidently not on -their timetable to carry out the operation so soon if it could be -avoided. But they were prepared to do so, if necessary, to resist -French sanctions against their Conscription Law.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>It is significant to note the date of this document is the same -as the date of the signature of the Franco-Russian Pact, which the -Nazis later asserted as their excuse for the Rhineland reoccupation.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The military orders on the basis of which the Rhineland reoccupation -was actually carried into execution, on 7 March 1936, -were issued on 2 March 1936 by the War Minister and Commander-in-Chief -of the Armed Forces Blomberg, and addressed to the Commander-in-Chief -of the Army Fritsch, the Commander-in-Chief of -the Navy Raeder, and Air Minister and Commander-in-Chief of the -Air Force Göring. We have that order signed by Blomberg, headed, -as usual, “top secret,” identified by us as C-159. I offer it in -evidence as Exhibit USA-54.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The German copy of that document bears the Defendant -Raeder’s initial in green pencil, with a red pencil note: “To be -submitted to the C-in-C of the Navy.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The first part of the order reads:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“Supreme Command of the Navy:</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“1. The Führer and Reich Chancellor has made the following -decision:</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“By reason of the Franco-Russian Mutual Assistance Pact, -the obligations accepted by Germany in the Locarno Treaty, -as far as they apply to Articles 42 and 43, of the Treaty of -Versailles which referred to the demilitarized zone, are to -be regarded as obsolete.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“2. Sections of the Army and Air Force will therefore be -transferred simultaneously in a surprise move to garrisons -of the demilitarized zone. In this connection, I issue the -following orders. . . .”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>There follow the detailed orders for the military operation.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>We also have the orders for naval cooperation. The original -German document, which we identify as C-194, was issued on -6 March 1936, in the form of an order on behalf of the Reich -Minister for War, Blomberg, signed by Keitel, and addressed to -the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy Raeder, setting out detailed -<span class='pageno' title='345' id='Page_345'></span> -instructions for the Commander-in-Chief of the fleet and the -admirals commanding the Baltic and North Sea. I offer the document -in evidence as Exhibit USA-55.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The short covering letter is as follows:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“To: C-in-C Navy.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“The Minister has decided the following after the meeting:</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“1. The inconspicuous air reconnaissance in the German bay, -not over the line Texel-Doggerbank, from midday on Z-Day -onward, has been approved. C-in-C Air Force will instruct -the Air Command VI from midday 7 March to hold in -readiness single reconnaissance aircraft to be at the disposal -of the C-in-C fleet.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“2. The Minister will reserve the decision to set up a U-boat -reconnaissance line until the evening of 7 March. The immediate -transfer of U-boats from Kiel to Wilhelmshafen has -been approved.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“3. The proposed advance measures for the most part exceed -Degree of Emergency A and therefore are out of the question -as the first countermeasures to be taken against military -preparations of neighboring states. It is far more essential to -examine the advance measures included in Degree of -Emergency A, to see whether one or other of the especially -conspicuous measures could not be omitted.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>That is signed “Keitel”.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The rest of the documents are detailed naval orders—operational -orders—and I think I need not read further.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>For the historical emphasis of this occasion, Hitler made a -momentous speech on 7 March 1936. I have the volume of the -<span class='it'>Völkischer Beobachter</span>, Berlin, Sunday, 8 March 1936, our Document -2289-PS, which I offer in evidence as Exhibit USA-56.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>This is a long speech which the world remembers and of which -I shall only read a short portion:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“Men of the German Reichstag! France has replied to the -repeated friendly offers and peaceful assurances made by -Germany by infringing the Rhine Pact through a military -alliance with the Soviet Union exclusively directed against -Germany. In this manner, however, the Locarno Rhine Pact -has lost its inner meaning and ceased in practice to exist. -Consequently, Germany regards herself, for her part, as no -longer bound by this dissolved treaty. The German Government -is now constrained to face the new situation created -by this alliance, a situation which is rendered more acute by -the fact that the Franco-Soviet treaty has been supplemented -<span class='pageno' title='346' id='Page_346'></span> -by a Treaty of Alliance between Czechoslovakia and the -Soviet Union exactly parallel in form. In accordance with -the fundamental right of a nation to secure its frontiers and -ensure its possibilities of defense, the German Government -has today restored the full and unrestricted sovereignty of -Germany in the demilitarized zone of the Rhineland.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>The whole matter of the German reoccupation of the demilitarized -zone of the Rhineland caused extensive international -repercussions and study. As a result of the protests lodged with the -League of Nations, the Council of the League made an investigation -and announced the following finding, of which I ask the Tribunal -to take judicial notice, as being carried in the <span class='it'>League of Nations -Monthly Summary</span>, March 1936, Volume 16, Page 78; and it is also -quoted in an article by Quincy Wright, in the <span class='it'>American Journal -of International Law</span>, Page 487, 1936.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The finding is this:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“That the German Government has committed a breach of -Article 43 of the Treaty of Versailles by causing, on March 7, -1936, military forces to enter and establish themselves in the -demilitarized zone referred to, in Article 42 and the following -articles of that Treaty, and in the Treaty of Locarno.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>At the same time, on 7 March 1936, as the Germans reoccupied -the Rhineland in flagrant violation of the Versailles and Locarno -Treaties, they again tried to allay the fears of other European -powers and lead them into a false sense of security by announcing -to the world: “We have no territorial demands to make in Europe.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>That appears in this same speech of Hitler’s, which I have -offered in evidence as Exhibit USA-56, which is Document 2289-PS. -The language will be found on Page 6, Column 1:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“We have no territorial claims to make in Europe. We know -above all that all the tensions resulting either from false territorial -settlements or from the disproportion of the numbers -of inhabitants to their living spaces cannot, in Europe, be -solved by war.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Most of the acts set forth in the paragraph of the Indictment -which I have been discussing, I think do not need judicial proof -because they are historical facts. We have been able to bring you -a number of interesting documents illuminating that history. The -existence of prior plans and preparations is indisputable from the -very nature of things. The method and sequence of these plans -and their accomplishment are clearly indicative of the progressing -and increasingly aggressive character of the Nazi objectives, international -<span class='pageno' title='347' id='Page_347'></span> -obligations and considerations of humanity notwithstanding.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The detailed presentation of the violations of treaties and international -law will be presented by our British colleagues, in support -of Count Two of the Indictment.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In clear relief, there is shown the determination of the Nazi -conspirators to use whatever means were necessary to abrogate -and overthrow the Treaty of Versailles and its restrictions upon the -military armament and activity of Germany. In this process, they -conspired and engaged in secret rearmament and training, the -secret production of munitions of war, and they built up an air -force. They withdrew from the International Disarmament Conference -and the League of Nations on October 14, 1933. They -instituted universal military service on March 16, 1935. On May 21, -1935 they falsely announced that they would respect the territorial -limitations of Versailles and Locarno. On March 7, 1936 they reoccupied -and fortified the Rhineland and at the same time, falsely -announced that they had no territorial demands in Europe.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The objectives of the conspirators were vast and mighty, -requiring long and extensive preparations. The process involved the -evasion, circumvention, and violation of international obligations -and treaties. They stopped at nothing.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The accomplishment of all those things, together with getting -Versailles out of the way, constituted an opening of the gates toward -the specific aggressions which followed.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I pass next, if the Tribunal please, to the presentation of the -story of the aggression against Austria. I do not know whether -Your Honor desires me to start on that or not. I am perfectly -willing to do so.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Are you going to use this volume of documents -marked “M” tomorrow?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. ALDERMAN: There will be a new one marked “N”.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn until 10 o’clock -tomorrow morning.</p> - -<p class='line' style='text-align:center;margin-top:2em;margin-bottom:2em;'>[<span class='it'>The Tribunal adjourned until 28 November 1945 at 1000 hours.</span>]</p> - -<hr class='pbk'/> - -<div><span class='pageno' title='348' id='Page_348'></span><h1>SEVENTH DAY<br/> <span style='font-size:smaller'>Wednesday, 28 November 1945</span></h1></div> - -<h2 class='nobreak'><span class='it'>Morning Session</span></h2> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I call upon counsel for the United States.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. ALDERMAN: May it please the Tribunal, at this point we -distribute document book lettered “N”, which will cover the next -phase of the case, as I will now undertake to present it. Of the -five large phases of aggressive warfare, which I undertake to -present to the Tribunal, I have now completed the presentation of -the documents on the first phase, the phase lasting from 1933 to -1936, consisting of the preparation for aggression.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The second large phase of the program of the conspirators for -aggression lasted from approximately 1936 to March 1939, when -they had completed the absorption of Austria and the occupation -of all of Czechoslovakia. I again invite the Court’s attention to the -chart on the wall. You may be interested in glancing at it from -time to time as the presentation progresses.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The relevant portions of the Indictment to the present subject -are set forth in Subsection 3, under Section IV (F), appearing on -Pages 7 and 8 of the printed English text. This portion of the Indictment -is divided into three parts: First, the 1936 to 1938 phase of -the plan, planning for the assault on Austria and Czechoslovakia; -second, the execution of the plan to invade Austria, November 1937 -to March 1938; third, the execution of the plan to invade Czechoslovakia, -April 1938 to March 1939.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>As I previously indicated to the Tribunal, the portion of the -Indictment headed “(a) Planning for the assault on Austria and -Czechoslovakia” is proved for the most part by Document -Number 386-PS, which I introduced on Monday. That is Exhibit -USA-25. That was one of the handful of documents with which I -began my presentation of this part of the case. The minutes taken -by Colonel Hossbach of the meeting in the Reich Chancellery on -5 November 1937, when Hitler developed his political last will and -testament, reviewed the desire of Nazi Germany for more room -in central Europe, and made preparations for the conquest of -Austria and Czechoslovakia as a means of strengthening Germany -for the general pattern of the Nazi conspiracy for aggression.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I shall present the material on this second, or Austrian phase -of aggression, in two separate parts. I shall first present the -<span class='pageno' title='349' id='Page_349'></span> -materials and documents relating to the aggression against Austria. -They have been gathered together in the document book which has -just been distributed. Later I shall present the material relating -to the aggression against Czechoslovakia. They will be gathered in -a separate document book.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>First, we have the events leading up to the autumn of 1937, and -the strategic position of the National Socialists in Austria. I -suggest at this point, if the Tribunal please, that in this phase we -see the first full flowering of what has come to be known as Fifth -Column infiltration techniques in another country, and first under -that, the National Socialist aim of absorption of Austria.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In order to understand more clearly how the Nazi conspirators -proceeded, after the meeting of 5 November 1937, covered by the -Hossbach minutes, it is advisable to review the steps which had -already been taken in Austria by the Nazi Socialists of both Germany -and Austria. The position which the Nazis had reached by -the fall of 1937 made it possible for them to complete their absorption -of Austria much sooner and with much less cost than had been -contemplated at the time of the meeting covered by the Hossbach -minutes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The acquisition of Austria had long been a central aim of the -German National Socialists. On the first page of <span class='it'>Mein Kampf</span> -Hitler said: “German Austria must return to the Great German -Motherland.” He continued by stating that this purpose of having -common blood in a common Reich could not be satisfied by a mere -economic union. Moreover, this aim of absorption of Austria was -an aim from 1933 on and was regarded as a serious program which -the Nazis were determined to carry out.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>At this point, I should like to offer in evidence our Document -Number 1760-PS, which, if admitted, would be Exhibit USA-57. -This document is an affidavit executed in Mexico City on 28 August -of this year by George S. Messersmith, United States Ambassador, -now in Mexico City. Before I quote from Mr. Messersmith’s -affidavit, I should like to point out briefly that Mr. Messersmith -was Consul General of the United States of America in Berlin -from 1930 to late spring of 1934. He was then made American -Minister in Vienna where he stayed until 1937.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In this affidavit he states that the nature of his work brought -him into frequent contact with German Government officials, and -he reports in this affidavit that the Nazi Government officials, with -whom he had contact, were on most occasions amazingly frank -in their conversation and concealed none of their aims.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>If the Court please, this affidavit, which is quite long, presents -a somewhat novel problem of treatment in the presentation of this -case. In lieu of reading this entire affidavit into the record, I -<span class='pageno' title='350' id='Page_350'></span> -should like, if it might be done in that way, to offer in evidence, -not merely the English original of the affidavit, but also a translation -into German, which has been mimeographed. This translation -of the affidavit into German has been distributed to counsel for -the defendants.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. EGON KUBUSCHOK (Counsel for Defendant Von Papen): -An affidavit of a witness who is obtainable has just been turned -over to the Court. The content of the affidavit offers so many -subjective opinions of the witness, that it is imperative we hear -the witness personally in this matter.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I should like to take this occasion to ask that it be decided as -a matter of principle, whether that which a witness can testify -from his own knowledge may, without further ado, be presented -in the form of an affidavit; or whether if a witness is living and -can be reached the principle of oral proceedings should be applied, -that is, the witness should be heard directly.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. ALDERMAN: If the Tribunal please, I should like to be -heard briefly on the matter.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: You have finished what you had to say, I -understand?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. KUBUSCHOK: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Very well, we will hear Mr. Alderman.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. ALDERMAN: May it please the Tribunal, I recognize, of -course, the inherent weakness of an affidavit as evidence where -the witness is not present and subject to cross-examination. Mr. -Messersmith is an elderly gentleman. He is not in good health. -It was entirely impracticable to try to bring him here; otherwise, -we should have done so.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I remind the Court of Article 19 of the Charter:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“The Tribunal shall not be bound by technical rules of -evidence. It shall adopt and apply to the greatest possible -extent expeditious and non-technical procedure, and shall -admit any evidence, which it deems to have probative value.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Of course, the Court would not treat anything in an affidavit -such as this as having probative value unless the Court deemed -it to have probative value; and if the defendants have countering -evidence, which is strong enough to overcome whatever is probative -in this affidavit, of course the Court will treat the probative value -of all the evidence in accordance with this provision of the Charter.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>By and large, this affidavit and another affidavit by Mr. Messersmith -which we shall undertake to present cover background -material which is a matter of historical knowledge, of which the -Court could take judicial notice. Where he does quote these -<span class='pageno' title='351' id='Page_351'></span> -amazingly frank expressions by Nazi leaders, it is entirely open -to any of them, who may be quoted, to challenge what is said, or -to tell Your Honors what they believe was said. In any event, it -seems to me that the Court can accept an affidavit of this character, -made by a well-known American diplomat, and give it whatever -probative value the Court thinks it has.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>As to the question of reading the entire affidavit, I understand -the ruling of the Court to be that only those parts of documents, -which are quoted in the record, will be considered to be in the -record. It will be based upon the necessity of giving the German -counsel knowledge of what was being used. As to these affidavits, -we have furnished them complete German translations. It seems -to us that a different rule might obtain where that has been done.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Alderman, have you finished what you -had to say?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. ALDERMAN: Yes, sir.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. KUBUSCHOK: The representative of the Prosecution takes -the point of view that the age and state of health of the witness -makes it impossible to summon him as a witness. I do not know -the witness personally. Consequently, I am not in a position to state -to what extent he is actually incapacitated. Nevertheless, I have -profound doubts regarding the presentation of evidence of such an old -and incapacitated person. I am not speaking specifically now about -Mr. Messersmith. I do not think the Court can judge to what extent -old age and infirmity can possibly influence memory and reasoning -powers; so, personal presence would seem absolutely indispensable.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Furthermore, it is important to know what questions, <span class='it'>in toto</span>, -were put to the witness. An affidavit only reiterates the answers to -questions which were put to the person. Very often conclusions -can be drawn from unanswered questions. It is here a question of -evidence solely on the basis of an affidavit. For that reason we -are not in a position to assume, with absolute certainty, that the -evidence of the witness is complete.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I cannot sanction the intention of the Prosecution in this case -to introduce two methods of giving evidence of different value; -namely, a fully valid one through direct evidence of a witness, and -a less complete one through evidence laid down in an affidavit. -The situation is this: Either the evidence is sufficient, or it is not. -I think the Tribunal should confine itself to complete and fully -valid evidence.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Alderman, did you wish to add anything?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. ALDERMAN: I wish to make this correction, perhaps of -what I said. I did not mean to leave the implication that Mr. -Messersmith is in any way incapacitated. He is an elderly man, -<span class='pageno' title='352' id='Page_352'></span> -about 70 years old. He is on active duty in Mexico City; the main -difficulty is that we did not feel we could take him away from his -duties in that post, combined with a long trip and his age.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: That is all, is it?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. ALDERMAN: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal has considered the objection -which has been raised. In view of the powers which the Tribunal -has under Article 19 of the Charter, which provides that the -Tribunal shall not be bound by technical rules of evidence, but -shall adopt and apply to the greatest possible extent expeditious -and nontechnical procedure and shall admit any evidence which -it deems to have probative value, the Tribunal holds that affidavits -can be presented, and that in the present case it is a proper course.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The question of the probative value of an affidavit as compared -with a witness who has been cross-examined would, of course, be -considered by the Tribunal. If, at a later stage, the Tribunal thinks -the presence of a witness is of extreme importance, the matter can -be reconsidered. I add this: If the defense wish to put interrogatories -to the witness, they will be at liberty to do so.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. ALDERMAN: Thank you, Your Honor. I offer then our -Document 1760-PS as Exhibit USA-57, affidavit by George S. -Messersmith. Rather than reading the entire affidavit, unless the -Court wishes me to do so, I intend to paraphrase and state the -substance of what is covered in various parts of the affidavit.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal think it would be better to -adhere to the rule which we have laid down: That only what is -read in the court will form part of the record.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. ALDERMAN: I shall read then, if the Tribunal please, -from the fourth paragraph on the third page of the English copy, -the following list of names, headed by President Miklas of Austria -and Chancellor Dollfuss:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“From the very beginnings of the Nazi Government, I was -told by both high and secondary government officials in -Germany that incorporation of Austria into Germany was a -political and economic necessity and that this incorporation -was going to be accomplished ‘by whatever means were -necessary.’ Although I cannot assign definite times and -places, I am sure that at various times and places, every -one of the German officials whom I have listed earlier in this -statement told me this, with the exception of Schacht, Von -Krosigk and Krupp von Bohlen. I can assert that it was fully -understood by everyone in Germany who had any knowledge -whatever of what was going on that Hitler and the Nazi -Government were irrevocably committed to this end, and -<span class='pageno' title='353' id='Page_353'></span> -the only doubt which ever existed in conversations or statements -to me was how and when.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>In connection with that paragraph, I invite your attention to -the list of German officials to whom he refers on Page 2 of the -affidavit. They are listed as Hermann Göring, General Milch, -Hjalmar Schacht, Hans Frank, Wilhelm Frick, Count Schwerin von -Krosigk, Joseph Goebbels, Richard Walter Darré, Robert Ley, Hans -Heinrich Lammers, Otto Meissner, Franz von Papen, Walter Funk, -General Wilhelm Keitel, Admiral Erich von Raeder, Admiral Karl -Dönitz, Dr. Bohle, Dr. Stuckert, Dr. Krupp von Bohlen, and Dr. -Davidson. The affiant states he was sure that at various times and -places, everyone of those listed German officials had made these -statements to him, with the exception of Schacht, Von Krosigk, and -Krupp von Bohlen. I shall continue with the next paragraph:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“At the beginning of the Nazi regime in 1933, Germany was, -of course, far too weak to permit any open threats of force -against any country, such as the threats which the Nazis -made in 1938. Instead it was the avowed and declared policy -of the Nazi Government to accomplish the same results which -they later accomplished through force, through the methods -which had proved so successful for them in Germany: Obtain -a foothold in the Cabinet, particularly in the Ministry of the -Interior, which controlled the police, and then quickly eliminate -opposition elements. During my stay in Austria, I was -told on any number of occasions by Chancellor Dollfuss, -Chancellor Schuschnigg, President Miklas, and other high -officials of the Austrian Government that the German Government -kept up constant and unceasing pressure upon the -Austrian Government to agree to the inclusion of a number -of ministers with Nazi orientation. The English and French -ministers in Vienna, with whom I was in constant and close -contact, confirmed this information through statements which -they made to me of conversations which they had with high -Austrian officials.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>I shall read other portions of the affidavit as the presentation -proceeds, on the question of pressure used against Austria, including -terror and intimidation, culminating in the unsuccessful Putsch of -July 26, 1934. To achieve their ends the Nazis used various kinds -of pressure. In the first place, they used economic pressure. A law -of 24 March 1933, a German law, imposed a prohibitive 1,000 Reichsmark -penalty on trips to Austria. It brought great hardship to this -country which relied very heavily on its tourist trade. For that -I cite the <span class='it'>Reichsgesetzblatt</span>, 1933, Part I, Page 311, and ask the -Court to take judicial notice of that German law. -<span class='pageno' title='354' id='Page_354'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>The Nazis used propaganda and they used terroristic acts, -primarily bombings. Mr. Messersmith’s affidavit, Document 1760-PS, -from which I have already read, goes into some detail with respect -to these outrages. I read again from Page 4 of the affidavit, the -English version:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“The outrages were an almost constant occurrence, but there -were three distinct periods during which they rose to a peak. -During the first two of these periods, in mid-1933 and in early -1934, I was still in Berlin. However, during that period I was -told by high Nazi officials in conversation with them, that -these waves of terror were being instigated and directed by -them. I found no concealment in my conversations with high -Nazi officials of the fact that they were responsible for these -activities in Austria. These admissions were entirely consistent -with the Nazi thesis that terror is necessary and must -be used to impose the will of the Party not only in Germany -but in other countries. I recall specifically that General Milch -was one of those who spoke frankly that these outrages in -Austria were being directed by the Nazi Party, and expressed -his concern with respect thereto and his disagreement with -this definite policy of the Party.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“During the wave of terroristic acts in May and June 1934, -I had already assumed my duties as American Minister in -Vienna. The bomb outrages during this period were directed -primarily at railways, tourist centers, and the Catholic -Church, which latter, in the eyes of the Nazis, was one of the -strongest organizations opposing them. I recall, however, that -these outrages diminished markedly for a few days during -the meeting of Hitler and Mussolini in Venice in mid-June -1934. At that time Mussolini was strongly supporting the -Austrian Government and was strongly and deeply interested -in maintaining Austrian independence and sovereignty, and -in keeping down Nazi influence and activity in Austria. At -that time also Hitler could not afford an open break with -Mussolini and undoubtedly agreed to the short cessation of -these bomb outrages on the insistence of Mussolini because -he, Hitler, wished to achieve as favorable an atmosphere for -the meeting between him and Mussolini as possible. The -cessation of the bomb outrages during the Hitler-Mussolini -conversations was considered by me and by the Austrian -authorities and by all observers at that time as an open admission -on the part of Hitler and the German Government -that the outrages were systematically and completely -instigated and controlled from Germany.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'><span class='pageno' title='355' id='Page_355'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>Turning to Page 7 of the English version, following the line -which reads, “Official dispatch from Vienna” dated July 26, 1934, -I quote the following paragraph:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='pindent'>“In addition to these outrages, the Nazis attempted to bring -pressure upon Austria by means of the ‘Austrian Legion’. -This organization, a para-military force of several thousand -men, was stationed near the Austrian border in Germany -as a constant and direct threat of violent action against Austria. -It was without any question sanctioned by the Nazi Government -of Germany, as it could otherwise not have existed, and -it was armed by them. It was made up of Austrian Nazis -who had fled from Austria after committing various crimes -in Austria, and by Austrians in Germany who were attracted -by the idle life and pay given by the German authorities.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>These terroristic activities of the Nazis in Austria continued until -July 25, 1934. It is a well-known historical fact of which I ask the -Court to take judicial notice that on that day members of the -NSDAP, the Nazi Party, attempted a revolutionary Putsch in -Austria and killed Chancellor Dollfuss.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>At this point I should like to invite your attention to the fact -that the Indictment alleges in Count Four, Crimes against Humanity, -Paragraph B on Page 26 of the English printed text, that the Nazis -murdered amongst others Chancellor Dollfuss. I do not have -available an official authenticated account of the details of that -Putsch but I think that it will suffice if I briefly recall to the Court -what is, after all, a well-known matter of history.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>On July 25, 1934, about noon, 100 men dressed in the uniform -of the Austrian Army seized the Federal Chancellery. Chancellor -Dollfuss was wounded trying to escape, being shot twice at close -quarters. The radio building in the center of the town was overwhelmed, -and the announcer was compelled to broadcast the news -that Dollfuss had resigned and that Dr. Rintelen had taken his -place as Chancellor. Although the Putsch failed, the insurgents -kept control of the Chancellery building, and agreed to give it up -only after they had a safe conduct to the German border. The -insurgents contacted the German Minister Dr. Rieth by telephone -and subsequently had private negotiations with him in the building. -At about 7 p.m. they yielded the building, but Chancellor Dollfuss -breathed his last about 6 p.m., not having had the services of a -doctor.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>It is also a well-known historical fact that the German Government -denied all complicity in this Putsch and in this assassination. -Hitler removed Dr. Rieth as Minister on the ground that he had -offered a safe conduct to the rebels without making inquiry of the -<span class='pageno' title='356' id='Page_356'></span> -German Government, and had thus without reason dragged the -German Reich into an internal Austrian affair in public sight.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>This statement appears in a letter which Hitler sent to Defendant -Papen on July 26, 1934. I shall offer that letter a little later.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Although the German Government denied any knowledge or -complicity in this Putsch, we think there is ample basis for the -conclusion that the German Nazis bear responsibility for these -events. It is not my purpose, with respect to this somewhat minor -consideration, to review the extensive record in the trial of the -Austrian Nazi Planetta and others who were convicted for the -murder of Dollfuss. Similarly I have no intention of presenting to -the Court the contents of the Austrian <span class='it'>Braunbuch</span>, issued after -July 25. The Court will, I think, take judicial notice.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I should like, instead, to mention a few brief items which -seem to us sufficient for the purpose. I quote again from our -Exhibit Number 1760-PS, from the Messersmith affidavit, USA-57, -on Page 7, the paragraph in the middle of the page:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“The events of the Putsch of July 25, 1934, are too well -known for me to repeat them in this statement. I need say -here only that there can be no doubt that the Putsch was -ordered and organized by the Nazi officials from Germany -through their organization in Austria made up of German -Nazis and Austrian Nazis. Dr. Rieth, the German Minister -in Vienna, was fully familiar with all that was going to -happen and that was being planned. The German Legation -was located directly across the street from the British -Legation, and the Austrian secret police kept close watch -on the persons who entered the German Legation.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“The British had their own secret service in Vienna at the -time, and they also kept a discreet surveillance over the -people entering the German Legation. I was told by both -British and Austrian officials that a number of men who -were later found guilty by the Austrian courts of having -been implicated in the Putsch had frequented the German -Legation. In addition, I personally followed very closely the -activities of Dr. Rieth, and I never doubted, on the basis -of all my information, that Dr. Rieth was in close touch -and constant touch with the Nazi agents in Austria, these -agents being both German and Austrian. Dr. Rieth could -not have been unfamiliar with the Putsch and the details -in connection therewith. I recall, too, very definitely from -my conversations with the highest officials of the Austrian -Government after the Putsch their informing me that Dr. -Rieth had been in touch with Von Rintelen, who, it had -<span class='pageno' title='357' id='Page_357'></span> -been planned by the Nazis, was to succeed Chancellor Dollfuss, -had the Putsch been successful.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“It may be that Dr. Rieth was himself not personally sympathetic -with the plans for the Putsch, but there is no -question that he was fully familiar with all these plans -and must have given his assent thereto and connived therein.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“As this Putsch was so important and was a definite attempt -to overthrow the Austrian Government and resulted in the -murder of the Chancellor of Austria, I took occasion to -verify at the time for myself various other items of evidence -indicating that the Putsch was not only made with the -knowledge of the German Government but engineered by -it. I found and verified that almost a month before the -Putsch Goebbels told Signor Cerruti, the Italian Ambassador -in Berlin, that there would be a Nazi government in Vienna -in a month.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>I should also like to offer in evidence Ambassador Dodd’s diary, -1933-38, a book published in 1941, our Document 2832-PS, and -particularly the entry for July 26, 1934. We have the book with -the two pages to which I have reference. I should like to offer that -portion of the book in evidence as Exhibit USA-58, further identified -as our Document 2832-PS.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Mr. Dodd, then Ambassador to Berlin, made the following -observations in that entry. First he noted that in February 1934 -Ernst Hanfstaengl advised Mr. Dodd that he brought what was -virtually an order from Mussolini to Hitler to leave Austria alone -and to dismiss and silence Theodor Habicht, the German agent -in Munich, who had been agitating for annexation of Austria. On -June 18 in Venice, Hitler was reported to have promised Mussolini -to leave Austria alone. Mr. Dodd further states, and I -quote from his entry of July 26, 1934:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“On Monday, July 23, after repeated bombings in Austria -by Nazis, a boat loaded with explosives was seized on Lake -Constance by the Swiss police. It was a shipment of German -bombs and shells to Austria from some arms plant. -That looked ominous to me, but events of that kind had -been so common that I did not report it to Washington.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“Today evidence came to my desk that last night, as late -as 11 o’clock, the Government issued formal statements to -the newspapers rejoicing at the fall of Dollfuss and proclaiming -the Greater Germany that must follow. The German -Minister in Vienna had actually helped to form the new -cabinet. He had, as we now know, exacted a promise that -the gang of Austrian Nazi murderers should be allowed to go -<span class='pageno' title='358' id='Page_358'></span> -into Germany undisturbed, but it was realized about 12 -o’clock that although Dollfuss was dead the Loyal Austrians -had surrounded the Government Palace and prevented the -organization of a new Nazi regime. They held the murderers -prisoners. The German Propaganda Ministry therefore -forbade publication of the news sent out an hour before -and tried to collect all the releases that had been distributed. -A copy was brought to me today by a friend.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“All the German papers this morning lamented the cruel -murder and declared that it was simply an attack of discontented -Austrians, not Nazis. News from Bavaria shows -that thousands of Austrian Nazis living for a year in Bavaria -on German support had been active for 10 days before, some -getting across the border contrary to law, all drilling and -making ready to return to Austria. The German propagandist -Habicht was still making radio speeches about the -necessity of annexing the ancient realm of the Hapsburgs to -the Third Reich, in spite of all the promises of Hitler to -silence him. But now that the drive has failed and the -assassins are in prison in Vienna, the German Government -denounces all who say there was any support from Berlin.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“I think it will be clear one day that millions of dollars and -many arms have been pouring into Austria since the spring -of 1933. Once more, the whole world is condemning the -Hitler regime. No people in all modern history has been -quite so unpopular as Nazi Germany. This stroke completes -the picture. I expect to read a series of bitter denunciations -in the American papers when they arrive about 10 days -from now.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>As I stated before, the German Government denied any connection -with the Putsch and the murder of Dollfuss. In this connection, -I should like to invite attention to the letter of appointment -which Hitler wrote to the Defendant Von Papen on 26 July -1934. This letter appears in a standard German reference work -<span class='it'>Dokumente der Deutschen Politik</span>, Volume 2, Page 83. For convenience -we have identified it as Document 2799-PS, and a copy -translated into English is included in the document book. The -defendants may examine the German text in the <span class='it'>Dokumente der -Deutschen Politik</span>, a copy of which is present in my hand, Page 83 -of Volume 2.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I ask the Court if it will take judicial notice of this original -German typing.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I should like to read this letter which Chancellor Hitler sent -to Vice Chancellor Von Papen. I think it will provide us with a -<span class='pageno' title='359' id='Page_359'></span> -little historical perspective and perhaps freshen our recollection -of the ways in which the Nazi conspirators worked. In considering -Hitler’s letter to the Defendant Von Papen on July 26, we might -bear in mind as an interesting sidelight, the widespread report -at that time, and I mention this only as a widespread report, that -the Defendant Von Papen narrowly missed being purged on June 30, -1934, along with the Nazi Ernst Roehm and others. The letter from -Hitler to Von Papen is as follows:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“Dear Herr Von Papen:</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“As a result of the events in Vienna, I am compelled to -suggest to the Reich President the removal of the German -Minister to Vienna, Dr. Rieth, from his post, because he, -at the suggestion of Austrian Federal Ministers and the -Austrian rebels, respectively consented to an agreement made -by both these parties concerning the safe conduct and retreat -of the rebels to Germany without making inquiry of the -German Reich Government. Thus, the Minister has dragged -the German Reich into an internal Austrian affair without -any reason.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“The assassination of the Austrian Federal Chancellor which -was strictly condemned and regretted by the German Government -has made the situation in Europe, already fluid, -more acute, without any fault of ours. Therefore, it is my -desire to bring about, if possible, an easing of the general -situation, and especially to direct the relations with the German -Austrian State, which have been so strained for a long -time, again into normal and friendly channels.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“For this reason, I request you, dear Herr Von Papen, to -take over this important task, just because you have possessed, -and continue to possess, my most complete and unlimited -confidence ever since we have worked together in -the Cabinet.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“Therefore, I have suggested to the Reich President that you, -upon leaving the Reich Cabinet and upon release from the -office of Commissioner for the Saar, be called on a special -mission to the post of the German Minister in Vienna for -a limited period of time. In this position you will be directly -subordinated to me.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“Thanking once more for all that you have at one time done -for the co-ordination of the Government of the National -Revolution, and since then together with us for Germany, -I remain, yours very sincerely, Adolf Hitler.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Now let us look at the situation 4 years later, on July 25, 1938, -after the Anschluss with Austria. At that time the German officials -<span class='pageno' title='360' id='Page_360'></span> -no longer expressed regrets over the death of Dollfuss. They were -eager and willing to reveal what the world already knew, that -they were identified with and sponsors of the murder of the former -Chancellor.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I offer in evidence at this point Document L-273, which I offer -as Exhibit USA-59. That document is a dispatch from the American -Consul General, Vienna, to the Secretary of State, dated -July 26, 1938. Unfortunately, through a mechanical slip, this document -which is in English in the original, was not mimeographed -in English and is not in your document book. However, it was -translated into German, and is in the document book which counsel -for the defendants have. I read from a photostatic copy of the -dispatch:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“The two high points of the celebration”—here was a celebration—“were -the memorial assembly on the 24th at Klagenfurt, -capital of the Province of Carinthia, where in 1934 -the Vienna Nazi revolt found its widest response and the -march on the 25th to the former Federal Chancellery in -Vienna by the surviving members of the SS Standarte 89, -which made the attack on the Chancellery in 1934.”—a reconstitution -of the crime, so to say.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“The assembled thousands at Klagenfurt were addressed by -the Führer’s deputy, Rudolf Hess, in the presence of the -families of the 13 National Socialists who were hanged for -their part in the July Putsch. The Klagenfurt memorial -celebration was also made the occasion for the solemn swearing -in of the seven recently appointed Gauleiter of the Ostmark. -From the point of view of the outside world, this -speech of Reich Minister Hess was chiefly remarkable for the -fact that after devoting the first half of his speech to the expected -praise of the sacrifices of the men, women, and youths -of Austria in the struggle for Greater Germany, he then -launched into a defense of the occupation of Austria, an attack -on the ‘lying foreign press’ and on those who spread the idea -of a new war. The world was fortunate, declared Hess, that -Germany’s leader was a man who would not allow himself -to be provoked. The Führer does what is necessary for his -people in sovereign calm and labors for the peace of Europe, -even though provocators ‘completely ignoring the deliberate -threat of the peace of certain small states,’ deceitfully claim -that he is a menace to the peace of Europe.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“The march on the former Federal Chancellery,”—referring -back to the Putsch of 4 years before—“now the Reichsstatthalterei, -followed the exact route and time schedule of -<span class='pageno' title='361' id='Page_361'></span> -the original attack. The marchers were met at the Chancellery -by Reichsstatthalter Seyss-Inquart, who addressed them -and unveiled a memorial tablet. From the Reichsstatthalterei -the Standarte”—that is the SS organization which made the -original attack and which marched on this occasion 4 years -later—“marched from the old Ravag broadcasting center, -from which false news of the resignation of Dollfuss had -been broadcast, and there unveiled a second memorial tablet. -Steinhaeusel, the present Police President of Vienna, is a -member of the SS Standarte 89.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Today that original memorial plaque, if the Court please, is -rubble, like so much of Nuremberg; but we found a photograph -of it in the National Library in Vienna. I should like to offer this -photograph in evidence. It was taken on this occasion 4 years later. -The Nazi wreath encircles the memorial tablet. A large wreath -of flowers with a very distinct swastika Nazi symbol was laid -before the wreath. I offer that photograph identified as 2968-PS -in evidence. I offer it as Exhibit USA-60. You will find that in -the document book. I know of no more interesting or shocking -document at which you could look. We call celebrating a murder -4 years later, “Murder by ratification.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>As that photograph shows, this plaque which was erected to -celebrate this sinister occasion reads: “One hundred and fifty-four -German men of the 89th SS Standarte stood up here for Germany on -July 25, 1934. Seven found death in the hands of the hangman.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The Tribunal may notice that the number “154” at the top of -the plaque is concealed in the photograph by the Nazi wreath surrounding -the plaque. I must confess that I find myself curiously -interested in this tablet and in the photograph which was taken -and carefully filed. The words chosen for this marble tablet, and -surely we can presume that they were words chosen carefully, -tell us clearly that the men involved were not mere malcontent -Austrian revolutionaries, but were regarded as German men, were -members of a para-military organization, and stood up here for -Germany.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In 1934 Hitler repudiated Doctor Rieth because he dragged the -German Reich into an internal Austrian affair without any reason. -In 1938 Nazi Germany proudly identified itself with this murder, -took credit for it, and took responsibility for it. Further proof in -the conventional sense, it seems to us, is hardly necessary.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Next we refer to the program culminating in the Pact of -July 11, 1936. In considering the activities of the Nazi conspirators -in Austria between July 25, 1934 and November 1937 there is a -distinct intermediate point, the Pact of July 11, 1936. Accordingly, -<span class='pageno' title='362' id='Page_362'></span> -I shall first review developments in the 2-year period, July -1934-36.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>First, we must consider the continued aim of eliminating Austria’s -independence, with particular relation to the Defendant Von -Papen’s conversation and activity. The first point that should -be mentioned is this: The Nazi conspirators pretended to respect -the independence and sovereignty of Austria, notwithstanding the -aim of Anschluss stated in <span class='it'>Mein Kampf</span>. But in truth and in fact -they were working from the very beginning to destroy the Austrian -State.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>A dramatic recital of the position of Defendant Von Papen in -this regard is provided in Mr. Messersmith’s affidavit, from which -I have already quoted. I quote now from Page 9 of the English -copy, the second paragraph, 1760-PS, Exhibit USA-57:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“That the policy of Anschluss remained wholly unchanged -was confirmed to me by Franz von Papen when he arrived -in Vienna as German Minister. It will be recalled that he -accepted this assignment as German Minister even though -he knew that he had been marked for execution in the St. -Bartholomew’s massacre of 30 June 1934. When, in accordance -with protocol, he paid me a visit shortly after his arrival -in Vienna, I determined that during this call there would be -no reference to anything of importance, and I limited the -conversation strictly to platitudes which I was able to do as -he was calling on me in my office. I deemed it expedient to -delay my return call for several weeks in order to make it -clear to Von Papen that I had no sympathy with, and on the -other hand was familiar with the objectives of his mission in -Austria. When I did call on Von Papen in the German -Legation, he greeted me with ‘Now you are in my Legation -and I can control the conversation.’</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“In the boldest and most cynical manner he then proceeded -to tell me that all of southeastern Europe, to the borders -of Turkey, was Germany’s natural hinterland, and that he -had been charged with the mission of facilitating German -economic and political control over all this region for Germany. -He blandly and directly said that getting control of -Austria was to be the first step. He definitely stated that he -was in Austria to undermine and weaken the Austrian Government -and from Vienna to work towards the weakening -of the Governments in the other states to the south and -southeast. He said that he intended to use his reputation -as a good Catholic to gain influence with certain Austrians, -such as Cardinal Innitzer, towards that end. He said that -<span class='pageno' title='363' id='Page_363'></span> -he was telling me this because the German Government was -bound on this objective of getting this control of southeastern -Europe and that there was nothing which could stop -it, and that our own policy and that of France and England -was not realistic.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“The circumstances were such, as I was calling on him in -the German Legation, that I had to listen to what he had to -say and of course, I was prepared to hear what he had to -say although I already knew what his instructions were. I -was nevertheless shocked to have him speak so boldly to me, -and when he finished I got up and told him how shocked I -was to hear the accredited representative of a supposedly -friendly state to Austria admit that he was proposing to -engage in activities to undermine and destroy that Government -to which he was accredited. He merely smiled and said -of course this conversation was between us, and that he -would of course not be talking to others so clearly about -his objectives. I have gone into this detail with regard to -this conversation, as it is characteristic of the absolute frankness -and directness with which high Nazi officials spoke of -their objectives.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>And again, reading from the same document on Page 10, beginning -at the last paragraph at the bottom of the page:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“On the surface, however, German activities consisted principally -of efforts to win the support of prominent and influential -men through insidious efforts of all kinds, including -the use of the German diplomatic mission in Vienna and -its facilities and personnel.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“Von Papen as German Minister entertained frequently and -on a lavish scale. He approached almost every member of -the Austrian Cabinet, telling them, as several of them later -informed me, that Germany was bound to prevail in the -long run, and that they should join the winning side if they -wished to enjoy positions of power and influence under German -control. Of course, openly and outwardly he gave -solemn assurance that Germany would respect Austrian -independence and that all that she wished to do was to get -rid of elements in the Austrian Government like the Chancellor -Schuschnigg and Starhemberg as head of the Heimwehr, -and others, and replace them by a few ‘nationally-minded’ -Austrians, which of course meant the Nazis. The -whole basic effort of Von Papen was to bring about the Anschluss. -<span class='pageno' title='364' id='Page_364'></span></p> - -<p class='noindent'>“In early 1935 the Austrian Foreign Minister, Berger-Waldenegg, -informed me that in the course of a conversation -with Von Papen, the latter had remarked, ‘Yes, you have -your French and English friends now, and you can have -your independence a little longer.’ The Foreign Minister, of -course, told me this remark in German, but the foregoing -is an accurate translation. The Foreign Minister told me -that he had replied to Von Papen, ‘I am glad to have from -your own lips your own opinion which agrees with what your -Chief has just said in the Saar and which you have taken -such pains to deny.’ Von Papen appeared to be terribly upset -when he realized just what he had said and tried to cover -his statements, but according to Berger-Waldenegg, kept -constantly getting into deeper water.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“Von Papen undoubtedly achieved some success, particularly -with men like Glaise-Horstenau and others who had long -favored the Grossdeutschtum idea, but who nevertheless had -been greatly disturbed by the fate of the Catholic Church. -Without conscience or scruple, Von Papen exploited his reputation -and that of his wife as ardent and devout Catholics -to overcome the fears of these Austrians in this respect.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>May I inquire if the Court expect to take a short recess?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes. We will adjourn now for 10 minutes.</p> - -<p class='line' style='text-align:center;margin-top:2em;margin-bottom:2em;'>[<span class='it'>A recess was taken.</span>]</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal wishes to make it clear, if I -did not make it clear when I spoke before, that if Defense Counsel -wish to put interrogatories to Mr. Messersmith upon his affidavit -they may submit such interrogatories to the Tribunal in writing -for them to be sent to Mr. Messersmith to answer.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FLOTTENRICHTER OTTO KRANZBÜHLER (Counsel for Defendant -Dönitz): I do not know whether my question has yet been -answered, or by what it has been made known by the President -of the Court.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In the testimony of Mr. Messersmith, Dönitz’ name was mentioned. -It appears on Page 4 of the German version. I should like -to read the whole paragraph:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“Admiral Karl Dönitz was not always in an amicable frame -of mind. He was not a National Socialist when the National -Socialists came to power”. . . .</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: This passage was not read in evidence, -was it? -<span class='pageno' title='365' id='Page_365'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. KRANZBÜHLER: No, only the name was mentioned.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I don’t think the name was mentioned, -because this part of the affidavit was not read.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. KRANZBÜHLER: The name was read, Mr. President.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Very well, go on.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. KRANZBÜHLER: [<span class='it'>Continuing.</span>]</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“Nevertheless, he became one of the first high officers in -the Army and fleet and was in complete agreement with the -concepts and aims of National Socialism.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>As an introduction to this paragraph, Mr. Messersmith said, in -Document Number 1760, on Page 2, the last sentence before the -Number 1:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“Among those whom I saw frequently and to whom I have -reference in many of my statements were the following. . . .”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Then after Number 16 Dönitz’ name appears. My client has -informed me that he has heard the name “Messersmith” today for -the first time; that he does not know the witness Messersmith, -has never seen him, nor has he ever spoken to him.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I therefore request that the witness Messersmith be brought -before the Court to state when and where he spoke to the Defendant -Dönitz.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal has already ruled that the -affidavit is admissible; that its probative value will of course be -considered by the Tribunal, and the defendants’ counsel have the -right, if they wish, to submit interrogatories for the examination -of Messersmith. Of course defendants will have the opportunity -of giving evidence when their turn comes, then Admiral Dönitz, -if he thinks it right, will be able to deny the statements of the -affidavit.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. KRANZBÜHLER: Thank you.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. ALDERMAN: I want to call the Court’s attention to a slight -mistranslation into German of one sentence of the Messersmith -affidavit. In the German translation the word “nicht” crept in -when the negative was not in the English.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The English statement was:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“I deemed it expedient to delay my return call for several -weeks in order to make it clear to Von Papen that I had -no sympathy with and on the other hand was familiar with -the objectives of his mission in Austria.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>The German text contains the negative: “Und dass ich anderseits -nicht mit den Zielen seiner Berufung in Österreich vertraut -war.” The “nicht” should not be in the German text. -<span class='pageno' title='366' id='Page_366'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>The continued existence of Nazi organizations was a program -of armed preparedness. The wiles of the Defendant Von Papen -represented only one part of the total program of Nazi conspiracy. -At the same time Nazi activities in Austria, forced underground -during this period, were carried on.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Mr. Messersmith’s affidavit on Pages 9 and 10, the English text, -discloses the following. Reading from the last main paragraph on -Page 9:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“Nazi activities, forced underground in this period, were by -no means neglected. The Party was greatly weakened for a -time as a result of the energetic measures taken against the -Putsch and as a result of public indignation. Reorganization -work was soon begun. In October 1934 the Austrian Foreign -Minister, Berger-Waldenegg, furnished me the following -memorandum, which he told me had been supplied to the -Austrian Government by a person who participated in the -meeting under reference.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>I quote the first paragraph of the memorandum:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“A meeting of the chiefs of the Austrian National Socialist -Party was held on 29 and 30 September 1934, at Bad Aibling -in Bavaria.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Then, skipping four paragraphs and resuming on the fifth one:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“The Agents of the Party Direction in Germany have received -orders in every Austrian district to prepare lists of all those -persons who are known to support actively the present Government -and who are prepared closely to cooperate with it.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“When the next action against the Government takes place those -persons are to be proceeded against just as brutally as against -all those other persons, without distinction of party, who are -known to be adversaries of National Socialism.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“In a report of the Party leaders for Austria the following -principles have been emphasized:</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“A. The taking over of the power in Austria remains the -principal duty of the Austrian National Socialist Party. -Austria has for the German Reich a much greater significance -and value than the Saar. The Austrian problem is the -problem. All combat methods are consecrated by the end -which they are to serve.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“B. We must, on every occasion which presents itself, appear -to be disposed to negotiate, but arm at the same time for -the struggle. The new phase of the struggle will be particularly -serious and there will be this time two centers of -terror, one along the German frontier and the other along -the Yugoslav frontier.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'><span class='pageno' title='367' id='Page_367'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>That ends the quotation from the memorandum. I proceed with -the next paragraph of the affidavit:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“The Austrian Legion was kept in readiness in Germany. -Although it was taken back some miles further from the -Austrian frontier, it remained undissolved in spite of the -engagement which had been taken to dissolve it. The -Austrian Government received positive information to this -effect from time to time which it passed on to me and I had -direct information to the same effect from reliable persons -coming from Germany to Vienna who actually saw the -Legion.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>The fact of the reorganization of the Nazi Party in Austria is -corroborated by a report of one of the Austrian Nazis.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I offer in evidence our Document Number 812-PS, as Exhibit -USA-61. It contains three parts. First, there is a letter dated -August 22, 1939 from Mr. Rainer, then Gauleiter at Salzburg, to -the Defendant Seyss-Inquart, then Austrian Reich Minister. That -letter encloses a letter dated July 6, 1939 written by Rainer to -Reich Commissioner and Gauleiter Josef Bürckel.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. HANS LATERNSER: (Co-counsel for Defendant Seyss-Inquart): -I object to the presentation of the letters contained in -Document Number 812. Of course, I cannot object to the presentation -of this evidence to the extent that this evidence is to prove -that these letters were actually written. However, if these letters -are to serve as proof for the correctness of their contents, then -I must object to the use of these letters, for the following reason: -Particularly, the third document: It is a letter which, as is manifest -from its contents, has a certain bias, for this reason, that in this -letter it is explained to what extent the Austrian Nazi Party -participated in the Anschluss.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>It purports, further, to expose the leading role played by the -Party group Rainer-Klausner.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>From the bias that is manifest in the contents of this letter, -this letter cannot serve as proof for the facts brought forth in it, -particularly since the witness Rainer, who wrote this letter, is -available as a witness. I have discovered he is at present in -Nuremberg.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I object to the use of this letter to the extent that it is to be -used to prove the correctness of its contents, because the witness -who can testify to that is at our disposal in Nuremberg.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will hear Mr. Alderman in -answer to what has been said. The Tribunal has not yet read the -letter. -<span class='pageno' title='368' id='Page_368'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. ALDERMAN: I think perhaps it would be better to read -the letter before we argue about the significance of its contents.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Are you relying upon the letter as evidence -of the facts stated in it?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. ALDERMAN: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: From whom is the letter, and to whom is -it addressed?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. ALDERMAN: The first letter is from Mr. Rainer who was -at that time Gauleiter at Salzburg, to the Defendant Seyss-Inquart, -then Reich Minister of Austria.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>That letter encloses a letter dated July 6, 1939, written by -Rainer to Reich Commissioner and Gauleiter Josef Bürckel. In -that letter, in turn, Rainer enclosed a report on the events in the -NSDAP of Austria from 1933 to March 11, 1938, the day before -the invasion of Austria.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I had some other matters in connection with this that I did want -to bring to the attention of the Tribunal before it passes upon the -admissibility.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I don’t think that the defendant’s counsel -is really challenging the admissibility of the document; he challenges -the contents of the document.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. ALDERMAN: Yes. On that, in the first place, we are -advised by defendant’s counsel that this man Rainer is in Nuremberg. -I would assume he is there.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>We have also an affidavit by Rainer stating that what is stated -in these communications is the truth. However, it seems to us -that the communications themselves, as contemporaneous reports by -a Party officer at the time, are much more probative evidence than -anything that he might testify to before you today.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: I have already said that this letter has these -characteristics, that it is biased, that it tends to emphasize and -exaggerate the participation of the Austrian Nazi Party on the -Anschluss. Therefore, I must object to the use of this letter as -objective evidence. It was not written with the thought in mind -that the letter would be used as evidence before a court. If the -writer had known that, the letter undoubtedly would have been -formulated differently, considering his political activity.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I believe, although I am not sure, that the witness is in Nuremberg. -In that case, according to a principle which is basic for all -trial procedure, the witness should be presented to the Court personally, -particularly since, in this case, the difficulties inherent in -the question of Messersmith do not here pertain. -<span class='pageno' title='369' id='Page_369'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal is of the opinion that the -letters are admissible. They were written to and received by the -Defendant Seyss-Inquart. The defendant can challenge the contents -of the letters by his evidence.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>If it is true that Rainer is in Nuremberg, it is open to the -defendant to apply to the Tribunal for leave to call Rainer in due -course. He can then challenge the contents of these letters, both -by the Defendant Seyss-Inquart’s evidence and by Rainer’s evidence. -The letters themselves are admitted.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. ALDERMAN: May it please the Tribunal, I agree quite -fully with the statement that if it had been known that these -letters were to be offered in evidence in a court of justice, they -very probably would have been differently written. That applies -to a great part of the evidence that we shall offer in this case. -And I would say that if the photographer who took the photograph -of the Memorial Plaque had known that his photographs would -be introduced in evidence in a conspiracy case, he probably never -would have snapped the shutter.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The letter from Rainer to Bürckel indicates that he was asked -to prepare a short history of the role of the Party. Perhaps I had -better read the covering letter, addressed to the Defendant Seyss-Inquart:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“Dear Dr. Seyss:</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“I have received your letter of 19 August 1939, in which you -asked me to inform you what I know of those matters which, -among others, are the subject of your correspondence with -Bürckel.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“I do not wish to discuss sundry talks and all that which -has been brought to my notice in the course of time by -different people. I wish to clarify essentially my own attitude.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“On 5 July 1939 I was asked by telephone by the Reich -Commissioner Gauleiter Bürckel if I was in possession of the -memorandum of Globus regarding the events of March. I told -him that I did not have this memorandum, that I never possessed -a single part of it; that I, furthermore, did not then -participate in the matter and do not know its content. Because -of official requests by Bürckel, I have entrusted him with a -report accompanied by a letter written on 6 July.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“If Bürckel now writes to you that certain statements were -confirmed by me, I feel obliged to entrust you with a copy -each of my copies of those two documents, which were only -written in single originals. I shall specially inform Bürckel -of this, adding that I have given—apart from, those written -explanations—no confirmations, declarations, or criticisms -<span class='pageno' title='370' id='Page_370'></span> -whatsoever regarding you and your attitude and that I have -authorized nobody to refer to any statements of mine.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“Since the beginning of our collaboration, I have always -expressed and represented forcefully my ideas regarding -yourself and my opinion of your personality. This conception -of mine was the very basis of our collaboration. The events -of February and March have not changed this, especially -since I considered the political success of 11 March merely as -a confirmation of the intentions and convictions which have -equally induced both of us to collaborate.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“As far as Globus is concerned, you are fully, aware of his -nature, which I judged always and in every situation only -by its good side. I believe that you have already talked to -Globus about the occurrences between the 11 March 1938 and -today, and I am convinced that he will tell you everything -that is bothering him, if you will speak to him about this -matter, as is your intention.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“With best regards and Heil Hitler!</p> - -<p class='line' style='text-align:right;margin-right:1em;'>Yours, Friedl Rainer.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>And so Rainer writes his report, which is enclosed with this -letter, to show that the Party as a whole is entitled to the glory -which was excessively ascribed to one person, Dr. Seyss-Inquart.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I refer to the third paragraph of the first enclosure, the report -to Reich Commissioner Gauleiter Josef Bürckel:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“We saw in March and April how a false picture about the -actual leadership conditions developed from this fact which -could not be corrected in spite of our attempts to that effect. -This was an important factor for the varying moods of -Globocnik who hoped especially from you that you would -emphasize for Hitler, and also for the public, the role of the -Party during the events preceding 12 March 1938. I limited -myself to address this verbal and written declaration to Party -member Hess, and furthermore to secure the documents from -the March days. In addition, I spoke at every available -opportunity about the fight of the Party. I did not undertake -steps to give just credit to other persons for the glory which -was excessively ascribed to one person, Dr. Seyss-Inquart, -and I would not do that, primarily because I appear as a -beneficiary, and furthermore, because I believe that I would -not gladden Hitler by doing so.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“I am also convinced that Dr. Seyss-Inquart did not act -crookedly, and furthermore, that Hitler does not want to -commit an act of historical justice by special preference of -his person, but rather that he is attracted to him personally. -It really is of no great account to Hitler if this or that person -<span class='pageno' title='371' id='Page_371'></span> -were more or less meritorious in this sector of the great fight -of the movement. Because, in the last analysis, by far the -greatest part is to be ascribed only to him; he alone will be -considered by history as the liberator of Austria. I, therefore, -considered it best to accept existing conditions and look for -new fertile fields of endeavor in the Party.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“If I should be asked to describe—without personal interest—the -role of the Party according to my best conviction, I am -ready to do so at any time. For this reason I promised -yesterday to submit to you again a short summary, and to -make it available for your confidential use. Of this letter and -of this abbreviated description I retain the sole copy.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“Heil Hitler! Rainer.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Now, of course, all of these enclosures went to the Defendant -Seyss-Inquart, and he had knowledge of the contents of all of them.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>It is an historical fact of which the Court will take judicial -notice, that Seyss-Inquart was the original Quisling. It so happened -that the Norwegian Seyss-Inquart gave his name to posterity as -a meaningful name, but all Quislings are alike.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The Tribunal will observe from this that the Rainer report is -hardly likely to be tendentious, as counsel says, or to be prejudiced -in favor of Defendant Seyss-Inquart’s contribution to the Anschluss. -It tends, on the contrary, to show that Seyss-Inquart was -not quite so important as he might have thought he was. Even so, -Rainer gives Seyss-Inquart credit enough.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The Rainer report further tells of the disorganization of the -Nazi Party in Austria and of its reconstitution. I now quote the -second and third paragraphs of the report, appearing on Pages 3 -and 4 of the English text of 812-PS, which is Exhibit USA-61; and -I believe it is on Pages 1 and 2 of the original German of the report -or Bericht, which is the third part of the document:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“Thus the first stage of battle commenced which ended with -the July rising of 1934. The decision for the July rising was -right, the execution of it was faulty. The result was a complete -destruction of the organization; the loss of entire groups -of fighters through imprisonment or flight into the Alt-Reich, -and with regard to the political relationship of Germany to -Austria, a formal acknowledgment of the existence of the -Austrian State by the German Government. With the telegram -to Papen, instructing him to reinstitute normal relationships -between the two States, the Führer had liquidated -the first stage of the battle, and a new method of political -penetration was to begin. By order of the Führer the Landesleitung -<span class='pageno' title='372' id='Page_372'></span> -Munich was dissolved, and the Party in Austria was -left to its own resources.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“There was no acknowledged leader for the entire Party in -Austria. New leaderships were forming in the new Gaue. -The process was again and again interrupted by the interference -of the police; there was no liaison between the formations, -and frequently there were two, three, or more rival -leaderships. The first evident, acknowledged speaker of -almost all the Gaue in Autumn 1934 was Engineer Reinthaler -(already appointed Landesbauernführer, leader of the country’s -farmers, by Hess). He endeavored to bring about a political -appeasement by negotiations with the Government with the -purpose of giving the NSDAP legal status again, thus permitting -its political activities. Simultaneously, Reinthaler -started the reconstruction of the illegal political organization -at the head of which he had placed Engineer Neubacher.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Next we have secret contacts between German officials, including -the Defendant Von Papen, and the Austrian Nazis; the use -by the Austrian Nazis of front personalities.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>There are two cardinal factors concerning the Nazi organization -in Austria which should be borne in mind.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>First, although the Führer had, on the surface, cast the Austrian -Nazis adrift—as indicated in the document I have just read—in -fact, as we shall show, German officials, including Von Papen, -maintained secret contact with the Austrian Nazis in line with -Hitler’s desires. German officials consulted and gave advice and -support to the organization of the Austrian Nazis.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In the second place, the Austrian Nazis remained an illegal -organization in Austria, organizing for the eventual use of force -in a so-called emergency. But in the meantime they deemed it -expedient to act behind front personalities, such as the Defendant -Seyss-Inquart, who had no apparent taint of illegality in his -status in Austria.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Mr. Messersmith relates, in his affidavit, that he got hold of a -copy of a document outlining this Nazi program. I quote from -Page 8 of Document 1760-PS, USA-57, the following:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“For 2 years following the failure of the July 25 Putsch, the -Nazis remained relatively quiet in Austria. Very few terroristic -acts occurred during the remainder of 1934 and, as I -recall, in 1935 and most of 1936, this inactivity was in accordance -with directives from Berlin, as direct evidence to that -effect which came to my knowledge at that time, proved. -Early in January the Austrian Foreign Minister Berger-Waldenegg, -<span class='pageno' title='373' id='Page_373'></span> -furnished me a document which I considered -accurate in all respects, and which stated:</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“ ‘The German Minister here, Von Papen, on the occasion of -his last visit to Berlin, was received three times by Chancellor -Hitler for fairly long conversations and he also took -this opportunity to call on Schacht and Von Neurath. In -these conversations the following instructions were given -to him:</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“ ‘During the next 2 years nothing can be undertaken which -will give Germany external political difficulties. On this -ground, everything must be avoided which could awaken -the appearance of Germany interfering in the internal -affairs of Austria. Chancellor Hitler will, therefore, also -for this reason, not endeavor to intervene in the present -prevailing difficult crisis in the National Socialist Party in -Austria, although he is convinced that order could be -brought into the Party at once through a word from him. -This word, however, he will not give for foreign political -reasons, being convinced that ends desired by him may be -reached also in another way. Naturally, Chancellor Hitler -declared to the German Minister here, this does not indicate -any disinterestedness in Austria’s independence. Also, before -everything, Germany cannot for the present withdraw -Party members in Austria, and must therefore, in spite of -the very real exchange difficulties, make every effort to -bring help to the persecuted National Socialist sufferers in -Austria.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“ ‘As a result, Minister of Commerce Schacht finally gave the -authorization that from then on, 200,000 marks a month were -to be set aside for this end (support of National Socialists -in Austria). The control and supervision of this monthly sum -was to be entrusted to Engineer Reinthaler, who, through -the fact that he alone had control over the money, would have -a definite influence on the Party followers. In this way it -would be possible to end most quickly and most easily the -prevailing difficulties and divisions in the Austrian National -Socialist Party.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“ ‘The hope was also expressed to Herr Von Papen that the -recently authorized foundation of German Ortsgruppen of -the National Socialist Party in Austria, made up of German -citizens in Austria, would be so arranged as not to give the -appearance that Germany is planning to interfere in Austrian -internal affairs.’ ”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'><span class='pageno' title='374' id='Page_374'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>The report of Gauleiter Rainer to Reich Commissar Bürckel in -July 1939 outlines the further history of the Party and the leadership -squabbles following the retirement of Reinthaler.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Do you think this would be a convenient -time to break off until 2 o’clock?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. ALDERMAN: Yes, sir.</p> - -<p class='line' style='text-align:center;margin-top:2em;margin-bottom:2em;'>[<span class='it'>The Tribunal adjourned until 1400 hours.</span>]</p> - -<hr class='pbk'/> - -<h2><span class='pageno' title='375' id='Page_375'></span><span class='it'>Afternoon Session</span></h2> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. ALDERMAN: May it please the Tribunal, I had just referred -again to the report of Gauleiter Rainer to Reich Commissioner -Bürckel in July 1939, which outlines the further history of -the Party and the leadership problem following the retirement of -Reinthaler.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In referring to the situation in 1935, he mentioned some of the -contacts with the Reich Government, that is, the German Government, -in the following terms. I quote from Page 4 of the English -text of that report, and I believe from Page 4 of the German text -of the Rainer report, which is 812-PS, that is Exhibit USA-61:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“In August some further arrests took place, the victims of -which were, apart from the Gauleiter”—Gau leaders—“also -Globocnik and Rainer. Schattenfroh then claimed, because of -an instruction received from the imprisoned Leopold, to have -been made deputy country leader. A group led by engineer -Raffelsberger had at this time also established connection -with departments of the Alt-Reich (Ministry of Propaganda, -German racial agency, <span class='it'>et cetera</span>), and made an attempt to -formulate a political motto in the form of a program for the -fighting movement of Austria.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>And, again, the Rainer report sets forth the situation a little -later in 1936. I quote from Page 6 of the English text, and I think -Page 5 of the German text:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“The principles of the construction were:</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“The organization is the bearer of the illegal fight and the -trustee of the idea to create a secret organization, in a simple -manner and without compromise, according to the principle -of organizing an elite to be available to the illegal Land -Party Council upon any emergency. Besides this, all political -opportunities should be taken and all legal people and legal -chances should be used without revealing any ties with the -illegal organization. Therefore, cooperation between the illegal -Party organization and the legal political aides was -anchored at the top of the Party leadership. All connections -with the Party in Germany were kept secret in accordance -with the orders of the Führer. These said that the German -State should officially be omitted from the creation of an -Austrian NSDAP and that auxiliary centers for propaganda, -press, refugees, welfare, <span class='it'>et cetera</span>, should be established in -the foreign countries bordering Austria.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“Hinterleitner already contacted the lawyer Seyss-Inquart, -who had connection with Dr. Waechter which originated from -<span class='pageno' title='376' id='Page_376'></span> -Seyss-Inquart’s support of the July uprising. On the other -side, Seyss-Inquart had a good position in the legal field and -especially well-established relations with Christian Social -politicians. Dr. Seyss-Inquart came from the ranks of the -Styrian Heimatschutz”—home defense—“and became a Party -member when the entire Styrian Heimatschutz was incorporated -into the NSDAP. Another personality who had a -good position in the legal field was Colonel Glaise-Horstenau -who had contacts with both sides. The agreement of 11 July -1936 was strongly influenced by the activities of these two -persons of whom Glaise-Horstenau was designed as trustee to -the Führer.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>The Rainer report thus discloses the dual tactics of the Austrian -Nazis during this period of keeping quiet and awaiting developments. -They were maintaining their secret contacts with Reich officials, -and using native personalities such as Glaise-Horstenau and -Seyss-Inquart. The Nazis made good use of such figures, who were -more discreet in their activities and could be referred to as nationalists. -They presented, supported, and obtained consideration of -demands which could not be negotiated by other Nazis like Captain -Leopold.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Seyss-Inquart did not hold any public office until January 1937, -when he was made Counsellor of State. But Rainer, describing him -as a trustworthy member of the Party through the ranks of this -Styrian Heimatschutz, points him out as one who strongly influenced -the agreement of July 11, 1936. The strategic importance of that -agreement will be considered a little later. Rainer’s report, as I -have said before, was hardly likely to over emphasize the significance -of Seyss-Inquart’s contribution.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>That the Nazis, but not the Austrian Government, did well to -trust Seyss-Inquart is indicated by the next document. I propose -to offer in evidence Document 2219-PS as Exhibit USA-62. This is -a letter dated 14 July 1939, addressed to Field Marshal Göring. -The document is a typed carbon of the letter. It ends with the -“Heil Hitler” termination, and it is not signed, but we think it -was undoubtedly written by Defendant Seyss-Inquart. It was the -carbon copy found among Seyss-Inquart’s personal files, and such -carbon copies kept by authors of letters usually are not signed. On -the first page of the letter there appears a note in ink, not indicated -in the partial English translation, reading, “Air Mail, 15 July, -1515 hours, Berlin, brought to Göring’s office.” The main text of -the letter consists of a plea for intercession on behalf of one Mühlmann, -whose name we shall meet later, and who, unfortunately, got -into Bürckel’s bad graces. I shall quote the extract part of the -<span class='pageno' title='377' id='Page_377'></span> -document which has been translated into English, and which starts, -I believe, on Page 7 of the German text:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“At present in Vienna, 14 July 1939;</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“To the General Field Marshal</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“Sir:</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“If I may add something about myself, it is the following: -I know that I am not of an active fighting nature, unless final -decisions are at stake. At this time of pronounced activism”—Aktivismus—“this -will certainly be regarded as a fault of -my personality. Yet I know that I cling with unconquerable -tenacity to the goal in which I believe, that is Greater Germany”—Grossdeutschland—“and -the Führer. And if some -people are already tired out from the struggle and some have -been killed in the fight, I am still around somewhere and -ready to go into action. This, after all, was also the development -until the year 1938. Until July 1934, I conducted myself -as a regular member of the Party. And if I had quietly, -in whatever form, paid my membership dues (the first one, -according to a receipt, I paid in December 1931) I probably -would have been an undisputed, comparatively old fighter -and Party member of Austria, but I would not have done any -more for the union. I told myself in July 1934 that we must -fight this clerical regime on its own ground in order to give -the Führer a chance to use whatever method he desired.”—I -would like to call particular attention to that sentence.—“I -told myself that this Austria was worth a mass. I have -stuck to this attitude with an iron determination because I and -my friends had to fight against the whole political church, -the Freemasonry, the Jewry, in short, against everything in -Austria. The slightest weakness which we might have displayed -would undoubtedly have led to our political annihilation; -it would have deprived the Führer of the means -and tools to carry out his ingenious political solution for -Austria, as became evident in the days of March 1938. I have -been fully conscious of the fact that I am following a path -which is not comprehensible to the masses and also not to -my Party comrades. I followed it calmly and would without -hesitation follow it again, because I am satisfied that at one -point I could serve the Führer as a tool in his work, even -though my former attitude even now gives occasion to very -worthy and honorable Party comrades to doubt my trustworthiness. -I have never paid attention to such things because -I am satisfied with the opinion which the Führer and -the men close to him have of me.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'><span class='pageno' title='378' id='Page_378'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>That letter was written to one of the men close to him—Field -Marshal Göring. I think that suffices to demonstrate Seyss-Inquart -as one whose loyalty to Hitler, a foreign dictator, and to the aims -of the Nazi conspiracy, led him to fight for the Anschluss with all -the means at his disposal.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>It is appropriate at this time to offer in evidence a document -from the Defendant Von Papen, and to see how he thought the -doctrines of National Socialism could be used to effect the aim of -the Anschluss. I offer Document 2248-PS as Exhibit USA-63. This -document is a letter from Von Papen to Hitler, dated July 27, 1935. -It consists of a report entitled, “Review and Outlook 1 Year after -the Death of Chancellor Dollfuss.” After reviewing the success that -the Austrian Government had had in establishing Dollfuss as a -martyr, and his principles as the patriotic principles of Austria, -Von Papen stated—and I quote the last paragraph of the letter, -beginning on Page 1 (Page 146 of the German text):</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“National Socialism must and will overpower the new -Austrian ideology. If today it is contended in Austria that -the NSDAP is only a centralized Reich German Party and -therefore unable to transfer the spirit of thought of National -Socialism to groups of people of a different political makeup, -the answer must rightly be that the national revolution -in Germany could not have been brought about in a different -way. But when the creation of the people’s community in -the Reich will be completed, National Socialism could, in a -much wider sense than this is possible through the present -Party organization—at least apparently—certainly become the -rallying point for all racially German units beyond the -borders. Spiritual progress in regard to Austria cannot be -achieved today with any centralized tendency. If this recognition -would once and for all be stated clearly from within -the Reich, then it would easily become possible to effect a -break-through into the front of the New Austria. A Nuremberg -Party Day designated as ‘The German Day’ as in old -times and the proclamation of a National Socialistic peoples’ -front would be a stirring event for all beyond the borders of -the Reich. Such attacks would win us also the particularistic -Austrian circles, whose spokesman, the legitimistic Count -Dubsky, wrote in his pamphlet about the Anschluss: ‘The -Third Reich will be with Austria, or it will not be at all. National -Socialism must win it or perish if it is unable to solve -this task.’ ”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>We have other reports from Von Papen to Hitler which I shall -offer in evidence presently, showing that he maintained covert -<span class='pageno' title='379' id='Page_379'></span> -contact with the National Socialist groups in Austria. It is certainly -interesting that from the very start of his mission, Defendant Von -Papen was thinking of ways and means of using the principle of -National Socialism for national Germans outside the border of Germany. -Papen was working for the Anschluss, although he preferred -to use the principles of National Socialism rather than rely on -the Party organization as a necessary means of establishing those -principles in the German Reich.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Next we have some assurance and reassurance to Austria. The -German Government did no more than keep up a pretense of non-interference -with Austrian groups. It employed the psychological -inducement of providing assurances that it had no designs on -Austrian independence. If Austria could find hope for the execution -of those assurances, she could find her way clear to the granting -of concessions and obtain relief from the economic and internal -pressure.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I offer Document 2247-PS in evidence as Exhibit USA-64. It is -a letter from Von Papen, while in Berlin, to Hitler, dated May 17, -1935.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Von Papen’s letter indicated to Hitler that a forthright credible -statement by Germany reassuring Austria, would be most useful -for German diplomatic purposes and for the improvement of -relationship between Austria and German groups in Austria.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>He had a scheme for pitting Schuschnigg and his Christian Social -forces against Starhemberg, the Vice Chancellor of Austria, who -was backed by Mussolini. Von Papen hoped to persuade Schuschnigg -to ally his forces with the NSDAP in order to emerge victorious -over Starhemberg. Von Papen indicates that he obtained this idea -from Captain Leopold, leader of the illegal National Socialists in -Austria.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I quote from his letter, starting at the second paragraph of the -second page. This is Von Papen writing to “Mein Führer” Hitler:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“I suggest that we take an active part in this game. The -fundamental idea should be to pit Schuschnigg and his -Christian Social forces, who are opposed to a home-front -dictatorship, against Starhemberg. The possibility of thwarting -the measures arranged between Mussolini and Starhemberg -should be afforded to him in such a way that he would -submit the offer to the Government of a definitive German-Austrian -compromise of interests. According to the convincing -opinion of the leader of the NSDAP in Austria, Captain -Leopold, the totalitarian principle of the NSDAP in Austria -must be replaced in the beginning by a combination of that -part of the Christian Social elements which favors the Greater -<span class='pageno' title='380' id='Page_380'></span> -Germany idea and the NSDAP. If Germany recognizes the -national independence of Austria and guarantees full freedom -to the Austrian national opposition, then, as a result of -such a compromise, the Austrian Government would be -formed in the beginning by a coalition of these forces. . . . -A further consequence of this step would be the possibility -of the participation of Germany in the Danube Pact, which -would take the sting out of its acuteness due to the settlement -of relations between Germany and Austria. Such a -measure would have a most beneficial influence on the European -situation, and especially on our relationship with England.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“One may object that Schuschnigg will hardly be determined -to follow such a pattern, that he will rather in all probability -immediately communicate our offer to our opponents.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“Of course, one should first of all explore the possibility of -setting Schuschnigg against Starhemberg through the use of -go-betweens. The possibility exists. If Herr Schuschnigg -finally says ‘no’ and makes our offer known in Rome, then -the situation would not be any worse, but on the contrary, -the efforts of the Reich Government to make peace with -Austria would be revealed, without prejudice to other interests. -Therefore, even in the case of refusal this last attempt -would be an asset. I consider it completely possible, that in -view of the farspread dislike in the Alpine countries of the -pro-Italian course, and in view of the sharp tensions between -the Federal Government”—Bundesregierung—“Herr Schuschnigg -will grasp this last straw, always under the supposition -that the offer could not be interpreted as a trap by the -opponents, but that it bears all the marks of an actually -honest compromise with Austria.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“Assuming success of this step we would again establish our -active intervention in central European politics, which, as -opposed to the French, Czech, and Russian political -maneuvers, would be a tremendous success, both morally and -practically.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“Since there are 2 weeks left to accomplish very much work -in the way of explorations and conferences, an immediate decision -is necessary.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“The Reich Army Minister”—Reichswehrminister—“shares -the opinion presented above, and the Reich Foreign Minister”—Reichsaussenminister—“wants -to discuss it with you, my -Führer.”—Signed—“Papen.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'><span class='pageno' title='381' id='Page_381'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>In other words, Von Papen wanted a strong assurance and a -credible assurance of the preservation of Austria’s independence. -As he put it, Germany had nothing to lose with what it could -always call a mere effort at peace, and she might be able to convince -Schuschnigg to establish an Austrian coalition government -with the NSDAP. If she did this, she would vastly strengthen her -position in Europe. Finally Von Papen urged haste.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Exactly 4 days later, in a Reichstag address, Hitler responded -to Von Papen’s suggestion, and asserted:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“Germany neither intends nor wishes, to interfere in the -internal affairs of Austria, to annex Austria or to conclude -an Anschluss.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>The British will present a document covering that speech. I -merely wanted to use one sentence at this point. It is a sentence -quite well known to history.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>It is appropriate to take notice of this assurance at this point, -and to note that for a complexity of reasons Von Papen suggested, -and Hitler announced, a policy completely at variance with their -intentions, which had been, and continued to be, to interfere in -Austria’s internal affairs and to conclude an Anschluss.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>There was then a temporary continuance of a quiet pressure -policy.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>On May 1, 1936, Hitler blandly in a public speech branded as -a lie any statement that “tomorrow or the day after” Germany -would fall upon Austria. I invite the Court’s attention to the version -of the speech appearing in the <span class='it'>Völkischer Beobachter</span>, SD—that is -South Germany—2 to 3 May 1936, Page 2, and translated in our -Document 2367-PS.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Without offering that document, I ask the Court to take judicial -notice of that statement in that well-known speech.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>If Hitler meant what he said, it was only in the most literal -and misleading sense, that is, that he would not actually fall upon -Austria “tomorrow or the day after tomorrow.” For the conspirators -well knew that the successful execution of their purpose required -for a little while longer the quiet policy they had been pursuing -in Austria.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I now offer in evidence our Document L-150, “Memorandum of -Conversation between Ambassador Bullitt and the Defendant Von -Neurath, on 18 May 1936” as Exhibit USA-65. This document unfortunately -again appears in your document books in German. Due -to an error, it has not been mimeographed in English. German -counsel have the German copies. -<span class='pageno' title='382' id='Page_382'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>I shall read from it and at the same time, hand to the interpreter -reading the German, a marked copy of a German translation. I -might read one sentence from the first paragraph:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“I called on Von Neurath, Minister of Foreign Affairs, on -May 18 and had a long talk on the general European situation.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“Von Neurath said that it was the policy of the German Government -to do nothing active in foreign affairs until the -Rhineland had been ‘digested.’</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“He explained that he meant until the German fortifications -had been constructed on the French and Belgian frontiers, -the German Government would do everything possible to -prevent, rather than encourage, an outbreak by the Nazis in -Austria and would pursue a quiet line with regard to Czechoslovakia. -‘As soon as our fortifications are constructed and -the countries of Central Europe realize that France cannot -enter German territory, all these countries will begin to feel -very differently about their foreign policies and a new constellation -will develop.’ ”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='noindent'>I skip then two paragraphs.</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“Von Neurath then stated that no understanding had been -reached between Germany and Italy, and admitted that the -demonstrations of friendship between Germany and Italy -were mere demonstrations without basis in reality. He went -on to say that at the present time he could see no way to -reconcile the conflicting interests of Germany and Italy in -Austria. He said that there were three chief reasons why -the German Government was urging the Austrian Nazis to -remain quiet at the present time:</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“The first was that Mussolini had today the greater part of -his army mobilized on the Austrian border, ready to strike, -and that he would certainly strike if he should have a good -excuse.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“The second reason for urging Austrian Nazis to remain quiet -for the present was that the Nazi movement was growing -stronger daily in Austria. The youth of Austria was turning -more and more towards the Nazis, and the dominance of the -Nazi Party in Austria was inevitable and only a question of -time.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>The third reason was that until the German fortifications had -been constructed on the French border, an involvement of Germany -in war with Italy might lead to a French attack on Germany.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>But if Germany was not yet ready for open conflict in Austria, -her diplomatic position was vastly improved over 1934, a fact -<span class='pageno' title='383' id='Page_383'></span> -which influenced Austria’s willingness to make concessions to Germany -and to come to terms.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I quote again from the Messersmith affidavit, Page 11 of the -English text. That is Document 1760-PS.</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“Developments in the fall of 1935 and the spring of 1936 gave -Germany an opportunity to take more positive steps in the -direction of the nazification of Austria. Italy, which had given -Austria assurance of support of the most definite character -against external German aggression and on one occasion, by -mobilizing her forces, had undoubtedly stopped German -aggressive action which had been planned against Austria, -embarked on her Abyssinian adventure. This and the re-occupation -of the Rhineland in 1936 completely upset the -balance in Europe. It is quite obvious that after Italy had -launched her Abyssinian adventure, she was no longer in any -position to counter German aggressive moves against -Austria.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>This weakening of Austria helped to pave the way for the pact -of July 11, 1936. On July 11, 1936 the Governments of Austria -and Germany concluded an accord. That will be offered in evidence -also by the British Delegation.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I merely ask at this point, that the Tribunal take judicial notice -of the fact that such an accord was entered into. The formal part -of the agreement of July 11, 1936 will also be proved by our British -colleagues. For convenient reference, it will be found in the Document -which the British will offer, TC-22, and the substance of it -is also contained on Pages 11 and 12 of Mr. Messersmith’s affidavit, -1760-PS.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Upon the basis of this fight alone, the agreement looked like a -great triumph for Austria. It contains a confusing provision to the -effect that Austria in her policy, especially with regard to Germany, -would regard herself as a German state, but the other two provisions -clearly state that Germany recognizes the full sovereignty of -Austria and regards the inner political order of Austria, including -the question of Austria and National Socialism, as an internal concern -of Austria upon which Germany will exercise neither direct -nor indirect influence. But there was much more substance to the -day’s events than appears in the text of the accord. I refer to Mr. -Messersmith’s summary as set forth on Page 12 of his affidavit, -1760-PS, as follows:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“Even more important than the terms of the agreement -published in the official communiqué, was the contemporaneous -informal understanding, the most important provisions -of which were that Austria would: -<span class='pageno' title='384' id='Page_384'></span></p> - -<p class='noindent'>“(1) Appoint a number of individuals enjoying the Chancellor’s -confidence but friendly to Germany, to positions in the -Cabinet; (2) with the devised means to give the national -opposition a role in the political life of Austria within the -framework of the Patriotic Front; and (3) with amnesty for -all Nazis, save those convicted of the most serious offenses.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>This amnesty was duly announced by the Austrian Government -and thousands of Nazis were released, and the first penetration of -Deutsch-National into the Austrian Government was accomplished -by the appointment of Dr. Guido Schmidt as Secretary of State for -Foreign Affairs and Dr. Edmund Glaise-Horstenau as Minister -without portfolio.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I now offer in evidence Document 2994-PS, which is an affidavit -by Kurt von Schuschnigg, Foreign Chancellor of Austria, executed -at Nuremberg, Germany, on 19 November 1945. I offer this as -Exhibit USA-66. The defendants have received German translations -of that evidence.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: In the name of the accused, Seyss-Inquart, -I wish to protest against the presentation of written evidence by -the witness Von Schuschnigg for the following reasons: Today, -when a resolution was announced, with respect to the use to be -made of the written evidence of Mr. Messersmith, the Court was -of the opinion that in a case of very great importance it might -possibly take a different view of the matter. With respect to the -Austrian conflict this is the case, since Schuschnigg is the most -important witness, the witness who was affected at the time in his -position as Federal Chancellor. In the case of such an important -witness, the principle of direct evidence must be adhered to, in -order that the Court be in a position to ascertain the actual truth -in this case. The accused and his defense counsel would feel prejudiced -in his rights granted by the Charter, should direct evidence -be circumvented. I must, therefore, uphold my viewpoint since it -can be assumed that the witness Von Schuschnigg will be able to -confirm certain facts which are in favor of the accused Seyss-Inquart.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I therefore make the motion to the Court that the written -evidence of the witness Von Schuschnigg be not admitted.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: If you have finished, the Tribunal will hear -Mr. Alderman.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. ALDERMAN: May it please the Tribunal, at this point I am -simply proposing to offer this affidavit for the purpose of showing -the terms of the secret understanding between the German and -Austrian Governments in connection with this accord. It is not for -<span class='pageno' title='385' id='Page_385'></span> -any purpose to incriminate the Defendant Seyss-Inquart that it is -being offered at this point.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: May I add to my motion that the witness, -Von Schuschnigg, on 19 November 1945, was questioned in Nuremberg, -and that if an interrogation on 19 November was possible, -then a short time later—that is now—it ought to be possible to call -him before the Court, especially as the interrogation before this -court is of special importance.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will recess now to consider this -question.</p> - -<p class='line' style='text-align:center;margin-top:2em;margin-bottom:2em;'>[<span class='it'>A recess was taken.</span>]</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal has considered the objection to -the affidavit of Von Schuschnigg and upholds the objection.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>If the Prosecution desires to call Von Schuschnigg as a witness, -it can apply to do so. Equally if the Defense wishes to call Von -Schuschnigg as a witness, it can apply to do so. In the event -Von Schuschnigg is not able to be produced, the question of -affidavit-evidence by Von Schuschnigg being given will be reconsidered.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. ALDERMAN: May it please the Tribunal, in view of the -strategy and tactics of the Nazis’ concessions as indicated in the -portion of the Messersmith affidavit that I read, substantial concessions -were made by Austria to obtain Germany’s diplomatic -formal assurance of Austrian independence and non-intervention in -Austrian internal affairs.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The release of imprisoned Nazis presented potential police problems, -and as Mr. Messersmith pointed out in a 1934 dispatch to the -United States State Department quoted on Pages 12 to 13 of his -affidavit:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“Any prospect that the National Socialists might come to -power would make it more difficult to obtain effective police -and judicial action against the Nazis for fear of reprisals by -the future Nazi Government against those taking action -against Nazis even in the line of duty. The preservation of -internal peace in Austria was less dependent upon Germany’s -living up to her obligations under the accord.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Next, Germany’s continuing program of weakening the Austrian -Government. In the pact of 11 July 1936 Germany agreed not to -influence directly or indirectly the internal affairs of Austria, including -the matter of Austrian National Socialism.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>On 16 July 1936, just 5 days later, Hitler violated that provision. -I quote from Document 812-PS, which is Exhibit USA-61, the -<span class='pageno' title='386' id='Page_386'></span> -reports of Gauleiter Rainer to Commissioner Bürckel, all of which -were forwarded to the Defendant Seyss-Inquart—Page 6 of the -English, and I believe, also Page 6 of the German version.</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“At that time the Führer wished to see the leaders of the -Party in Austria in order to tell them his opinion on what -Austrian National Socialists should do. Meanwhile Hinterleitner -was arrested, and Dr. Rainer became his successor and -leader of the Austrian Party. On 16 July 1936 Doctor Rainer -and Globocnik visited the Führer at the Obersalzberg where -they received a clear explanation of the situation and the -wishes of the Führer. On 17 July 1936 all illegal Gauleiter -met in Anif near Salzburg, where they received a complete -report from Rainer on the statement of the Führer and his -political instructions for carrying out the fight. At this same -conference the Gauleiter received organizational instructions -from Globocnik and Hiedler.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Then skipping a paragraph I quote further from this report—in -the English that paragraph which I am skipping is omitted, -so I am skipping a paragraph in the German version:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“Upon the proposal of Globocnik, the Führer named Lieutenant -General”—Gruppenführer—“Keppler as chief of the -mixed commission which was appointed, in accordance with -the State Treaty of 11 July 1936, to supervise the correct -execution of the agreement. At the same time Keppler was -given full authority by the Führer for the Party in Austria. -After Keppler was unsuccessful in his efforts to cooperate -with Leopold, he worked together with Doctor Rainer, -Globocnik, Reinthaler as leader of the peasants, Kaltenbrunner”—that -is the Defendant Kaltenbrunner in this case—“as -leader of the SS, and Doctor Jury as deputy leader of -the Austrian Party, as well as with Glaise-Horstenau and -Seyss-Inquart.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>A new strategy was developed for the Austrian Nazis. Mr. -Messersmith describes it briefly, and I quote from Page 13 of his -affidavit, 1760-PS:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“The sequel of the agreement was the only one which could -have been expected in view of all the facts and previous -recorded happenings. Active Nazi operations in Austria were -resumed under the leadership of a certain Captain Leopold -who, as was known definitely, was in frequent touch with -Hitler. The Nazi program was now to form an organization -through which the Nazis could carry on their operations -openly and with legal sanction in Austria. There were formed -in Austria several organizations which had a legal basis, but -<span class='pageno' title='387' id='Page_387'></span> -which were simply a device by which the Nazis in Austria -could organize and later seek inclusion as a unit in the -Patriotic Front. The most important of these was the Union -of the East Mark,”—Ostmärkische Verein—“the sponsor of -which was the Minister of the Interior Glaise-Horstenau. -Through the influence of Glaise-Horstenau and pro-Nazi -Neustädter-Stürmer, this organization was declared legal by -the courts. I made specific mention of the foregoing because -it shows the degree to which the situation in Austria had -disintegrated as a result of the underground and open Nazi -activities directed from Germany.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>At this point I offer in evidence Document 2246-PS as Exhibit -USA-67, a captured German document which is a report from Von -Papen to Hitler dated September 1, 1936. This document is most -interesting because it indicates Von Papen’s strategy after July 11, -1936 for destroying Austria’s independence. Von Papen had taken -a substantial step forward with the agreement of July 11. It should -be noted incidentally, that after that agreement he was promoted -from Minister to Ambassador. Now his tactics were developed in -the following terms—I quote the last three paragraphs of his letter -of September 1, 1936 to the Führer and Reich Chancellor. Those -three paragraphs are all joined as one paragraph in the English -text:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“The progress of normalizing relations with Germany at the -present time is obstructed by the continued persistence of the -Ministry of Security, occupied by the old anti National -Socialistic officials. Changes in personnel are therefore of -utmost importance. But they are definitely not to be expected -prior to the conference on the abolishing of the control of -finances at Geneva. The Chancellor of the League has informed -Minister Von Glaise-Horstenau of his intention to -offer him the portfolio of the Ministry of the Interior. As a -guiding principle”—Marschroute (a German word meaning -the route of march)—“I recommend on the tactical side, continued, -patient, psychological treatment, with slowly intensified -pressure directed at changing the regime. The proposed -conference on economic relations, taking place at the end of -October, will be a very useful tool for the realization of some -of our projects. In discussion with Government officials as -well as with leaders of the illegal Party (Leopold and Schattenfroh) -who conform completely with the agreement of -11 July I am trying to direct the next developments in such -a manner to aim at corporative representation of the movement -in the Fatherland Front, but nevertheless refraining -from putting National Socialists in important positions for -<span class='pageno' title='388' id='Page_388'></span> -the time being. However, such positions are to be occupied -only by personalities having the support and the confidence -of the movement. I have a willing collaborator in this respect -in Minister Glaise-Horstenau.”—Signature—“Papen.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>To recapitulate, this report by Von Papen to Hitler discloses the -following plan:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>(a) Obtaining a change in personnel in the Austrian Ministry -of Security in due course;</p> - -<p class='pindent'>(b) Obtaining corporative representation of the Nazi movement -in the Fatherland Front;</p> - -<p class='pindent'>(c) Not putting avowed National Socialists in important positions -yet, but using nationalist personalities;</p> - -<p class='pindent'>(d) Using economic pressure and patient psychological treatment -with slowly intensified pressure directed at changing the regime.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>My next subject is Germany’s diplomatic preparations for the -conquest of Austria.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The program of the Nazi conspiracy with respect to Austria -consisted of weakening that country externally and internally by -removing its support from without, as well as by penetrating within. -This program was of the utmost significance, especially since, -as the Court will remember, the events of 25 July 1934 inside -Austria were overshadowed in the news of the day by the fact -that Mussolini had brought his troops to the Brenner Pass and -posed there as a strong protector of his northern neighbor, Austria.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Accordingly, interference in the affairs of Austria and steady -increase in the pressure needed to acquire control over that country, -required removal of the possibility that Italy or any other -country would come to its aid. But the foreign policy program -of the conspiracy for the weakening and isolation of Austria was -integrated with their foreign policy program in Europe generally.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I should like, therefore, at this juncture, to digress for a moment -from the presentation of evidence bearing on Austria alone and to -consider with the Tribunal the general foreign policy program -of the Nazis. It is not my intention to examine this subject in any -detail. Historians and scholars exhausting the archives will have -many years of probing all the details and ramifications of European -diplomacy during this fateful decade.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>It is instead my purpose to mention very briefly the highlights -of the Nazis’ diplomatic preparation for war.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In this connection I should like to offer to the Tribunal Document -Number 2385-PS, a second affidavit of George S. Messersmith -<span class='pageno' title='389' id='Page_389'></span> -executed on 30 August 1945 at Mexico City. This has been -made available to the defendants in German, as well as in English.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>This is a different affidavit from Document Number 1760-PS -which was executed August 28. This second affidavit, which I -offer as Exhibit USA-68, consists of a presentation of the diplomatic -portion of the program of the Nazi Party. To a considerable -extent it merely states facts of common knowledge, facts that -many people who are generally well informed already know. It -also gives us facts which are common knowledge in the circle of -diplomats or of students of foreign affairs. It consists of some 11 -mimeographed pages, single-spaced. I read first from the third -paragraph in the affidavit:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“As early as 1933, while I served in Germany, the German -and Nazi contacts which I had in the highest and secondary -categories openly acknowledged Germany’s ambitions to -dominate southeastern Europe from Czechoslovakia down to -Turkey. As they freely stated, the objective was territorial -expansion in the case of Austria and Czechoslovakia. The -professed objectives in the earlier stages of the Nazi regime, -in the remainder of southeastern Europe, were political and -economic control and they did not, at that time, speak so -definitely of actual absorption and destruction of sovereignty. -Their ambitions, however, were not limited to southeastern -Europe. From the very beginnings of 1933, and even before -the Nazis came into power, important Nazis speaking of the -Ukraine freely said that ‘it must be our granary’ and that -‘even with southeastern Europe under our control, Germany -needs and must have the greater part of the Ukraine in order -to be able to feed the people of greater Germany.’ After I -left Germany in the middle of 1934 for my post in Austria, -I continued to receive information as to the German designs -in southeastern Europe. In a conversation with Von Papen -shortly after his appointment as German Minister to Austria -in 1934, Von Papen frankly stated to me that ‘southeastern -Europe to Turkey is Germany’s hinterland and I have been -designated to carry through the task of bringing it within -the fold. Austria is first on the program.’</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“As I learned through my diplomatic colleagues, Von Papen -in Vienna and his colleague Von Mackensen in Budapest -were openly propagating the idea of the dismemberment -and final absorption of Czechoslovakia as early as 1935.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Then, skipping a short paragraph, I resume:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“Immediately after the Nazis came into power, they started -a vast rearmament program. This was one of the primary -<span class='pageno' title='390' id='Page_390'></span> -immediate objectives of the Nazi regime. As a matter of -fact the two immediate objectives of the Nazi regime when -it came into power, had to be and were, according to their -own statements frequently made to me: First, to bring about -the complete and absolute establishment of their power over -Germany and the German people, so that they would become -in every respect willing and capable instruments of the -regime to carry through its ends; Second, the establishment -of a tremendous armed power within Germany in order that -the political and economic program in southeastern Europe -and in Europe could be carried through by force if necessary, -but probably by a threat of force. It was characteristic that -in carrying through this second aim, they emphasized from -the very outset the building of an overpowering air force. -Göring and Milch often said to me or in my presence that -the Nazis had decided to concentrate on air power as the -weapon of terror most likely to give Germany a dominant -position and the weapon which could be developed the most -rapidly and in the shortest time.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='noindent'>Skipping to the end of that paragraph, and resuming at the next:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“At the same time that this rearmament was in progress, -the Nazi regime took all possible measures to prepare the -German people for war in the psychological sense. Throughout -Germany, for example, one saw everywhere German -youth of all ages engaged in military exercises, drilling, field -maneuvers, practicing the throwing of hand grenades, et -cetera. In this connection I wrote in an official communication -in November 1933, from Berlin as follows:</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“ ‘ . . . Everything that is being done in the country today -has for its object to make the people believe that Germany -is being threatened vitally in every aspect of its life by outside -influences and by other countries. Everything is being -done to use this feeling to stimulate military training and -exercises, and innumerable measures are being taken to -develop the German people into a hardy, sturdy race which -will be able to meet all comers. The military spirit is constantly -growing. It cannot be otherwise. The leaders of Germany -today have no desire for peace unless it is a peace -which the world makes at the expense of complete compliance -with German desires and ambitions. Hitler and his -associates really and sincerely want peace for the moment, -but only to have a chance to get ready to use force if it -is found finally essential. They are preparing their way -so carefully that there is not in my mind any question but -<span class='pageno' title='391' id='Page_391'></span> -that the German people will be with them when they want -to use force and when they feel that they have the necessary -means to carry through their objects. . . .’ ”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>One further sentence following that I quote:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“Military preparation and psychological preparation were -coupled with diplomatic preparation designed so to disunite -and isolate their intended victims as to render them defenseless -against German aggression.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>In 1933 the difficulties facing Germany in the political and -diplomatic field loomed large. France was the dominant military -power on the continent. She had a system of mutual assistance -in the West and in the East.</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“The Locarno Pact of 1928, supplemented by the Franco-Belgian -Alliance, guaranteed the territorial <span class='it'>status quo</span> in -the West. Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, and Romania were -allied in the Little Entente and each, in turn, was united -with France by mutual assistance pacts. Since 1922 France -and Poland had likewise been allied against external aggression. -Italy had made plain her special interest in Austrian -independence.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Nazi Germany launched a vigorous diplomatic campaign to -break up the existing alliances and understandings, to create divisions -among the members of the Little Entente and the other -eastern European powers.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Specifically, Nazi Germany countered these alliances with promises -of economic gain for cooperating with Germany. To some of -these countries she offered extravagant promises of territorial and -economic rewards. She offered Carinthia in Austria to Yugoslavia. -She offered part of Czechoslovakia to Hungary and part to Poland. -She offered Yugoslav territory to Hungary at the same time that -she was offering land in Hungary to Yugoslavia.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>As Mr. Messersmith states in his affidavit—that is 2385-PS, on -Page 5:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“Austria and Czechoslovakia were the first on the German -program of aggression. As early as 1934, Germany began to -woo neighbors of these countries with the promises of a share -in the loot. To Yugoslavia in particular they offered Carinthia. -Concerning the Yugoslav reaction, I reported at the -time:</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“ ‘The major factor in the internal situation in the last week -has been the increase in tension with respect to the Austrian -Nazi refugees in Yugoslavia. . . . There is very little doubt -but that Göring, when he made his trip to various capitals in -<span class='pageno' title='392' id='Page_392'></span> -southeastern Europe about 6 months ago, told the Yugoslavs -that they would get a part of Carinthia when a National -Socialist Government came into power in Austria. . . . The -Nazi seed sown in Yugoslavia had been sufficient to cause -trouble and there are undoubtedly a good many people there -who look with a great deal of benevolence on those Nazi -refugees who went to Yugoslavia in the days following -July 25.’</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“Germany made like promises of territorial gains to Hungary -and to Poland in order to gain their cooperation or at least -their acquiescence in the proposed dismemberment of Czechoslovakia. -As I learned from my diplomatic colleagues in -Vienna, Von Papen and Von Mackensen in Vienna and in -Budapest in 1935 were spreading the idea of division of -Czechoslovakia, in which division Germany was to get -Bohemia, Hungary to get Slovakia, and Poland the rest. This -did not deceive any of these countries for they knew that the -intention of Nazi Germany was to take all.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“The Nazi German Government did not hesitate to make inconsistent -promises when it suited its immediate objective. -I recall the Yugoslav Minister in Vienna saying to me in 1934 -or 1935 that Germany had made promises to Hungary of -Yugoslav territory while at the same time promising to Yugoslavs -portions of Hungarian territory. The Hungarian Minister -in Vienna later gave me the same information.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“I should emphasize here in this statement that the men who -made these promises were not only the ‘dyed in the wool’ -Nazis but more conservative Germans who already had begun -willingly to lend themselves to the Nazi program. In an -official dispatch to the Department of State from Vienna -dated October 10, 1935, I wrote as follows:</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“ ‘Europe will not get away from the myth that Neurath, -Papen, and Mackensen are not dangerous people and that -they are “diplomats of the old school.” They are in fact -servile instruments of the regime and just because the outside -world looks upon them as harmless, they are able to -work more effectively. They are able to sow discord just -because they propagate the myth that they are not in sympathy -with the regime.’ ”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>I find that last paragraph very important and worthy of emphasis. -In other words, Nazi Germany was able to promote these -divisions and increase its own aggressive strength by using as its -agents in making these promises men who on outward appearances -were merely conservative diplomats. It is true that the Nazis -<span class='pageno' title='393' id='Page_393'></span> -openly scoffed at any notion of international obligations, as I shall -show in a moment. It is true that the real trump in Germany’s -hand was its rearmament and more than that, its willingness to -go to war. And yet the attitude of the various countries was not -influenced by those considerations alone.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>With all those countries, and I suppose with all persons, we are -not always completely rational, we tend to believe what we want -to believe, and if an apparently substantial and conservative person -like the Defendant Von Neurath, for example, is saying these -things, one might be apt to believe them, or at least to act upon -that hypothesis. And it would be the more impressive if one were -also under the impression that the person involved was not a Nazi -and would not stoop to go along with the designs of the Nazis.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Germany’s approach toward Great Britain and France was in -terms of limited expansion as the price of peace. They signed a -naval limitations treaty with England and discussed a Locarno air -pact. In the case of both France and England, they limited their -statement of intentions and harped on fears of communism and war.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In making these various promises, Germany was untroubled -by notions of the sanctity of international obligations. High ranking -Nazis, including Göring, Frick, and Frank, openly stated to -Mr. Messersmith that Germany would observe her international -undertakings only so long as it suited Germany’s interest to do so.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I quote from the affidavit, Document 2385-PS, Page 4, beginning -on the 10th line:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“High ranking Nazis with whom I had to maintain official -contact, particularly men such as Göring, Goebbels, Ley, Frick, -Frank, Darré, and others, repeatedly scoffed at my position -as to the binding character of treaties and openly stated to -me that Germany would observe her international undertakings -only so long as it suited Germany’s interest to do -so. Although these statements were openly made to me as -they were, I am sure, made to others, these Nazi leaders -were not really disclosing any secret, for on many occasions -they expressed the same idea publicly.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>France and Italy worked actively in southeastern Europe to -counter Germany’s moves.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Would that be a convenient time to adjourn?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. ALDERMAN: Yes, sir.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn until 10 o’clock tomorrow -morning.</p> - -<p class='line' style='text-align:center;margin-top:2em;margin-bottom:2em;'>[<span class='it'>The Tribunal adjourned until 29 November 1945 at 1000 hours.</span>]</p> - -<hr class='pbk'/> - -<div><span class='pageno' title='394' id='Page_394'></span><h1>EIGHTH DAY<br/> <span style='font-size:smaller'>Thursday, 29 November 1945</span></h1></div> - -<h2 class='nobreak'><span class='it'>Morning Session</span></h2> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. ALDERMAN: May it please the Tribunal. Before I resume -the consideration of Mr. Messersmith’s second affidavit, Document -2385-PS, Exhibit USA-68, I should like to consider briefly the status -of the proof before this Tribunal of the matter stated in the first -Messersmith affidavit, introduced by the United States, Document -1760-PS, Exhibit USA-57. You will recall that Mr. Messersmith in -that affidavit made the following general statements:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>First, that although Nazi Germany stated that she would respect -the independence of Austria, in fact she intended from the very -beginning to conclude an Anschluss, and that Defendant Von Papen -was working toward that end.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Second, that although Nazi Germany pretended, on the surface, -to have nothing to do with the Austrian Nazis, in fact she -kept up contact with them and gave them support and instruction.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Third, that while they were getting ready for their eventual -use of force in Austria, if necessary, the Nazis were using quiet -infiltrating tactics to weaken Austria internally, through the use -of Christian-front personalities who were not flagrantly Nazi and -could be called what they referred to as Nationalist Opposition, -and through the device of developing new names for Nazi organizations, -so that they could be brought into the Fatherland Front -of Austria corporatively—that is as an entire group.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Now let us see briefly what some of our German documents -proved, in support of these general statements in the Messersmith -affidavit. The excerpts I have already read out of the report from -Rainer to Bürckel, enclosed in the letter to Seyss-Inquart, Document -812-PS, Exhibit USA-61, showed:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>First, that the Austrian Nazi groups kept up contacts with the -Reich although they did it secretly in accordance with instructions -from the Führer.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Second, that they continued their organization on a secret basis -so as to be ready in what they referred to as an emergency.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Third, that they used persons like Seyss-Inquart and Glaise-Horstenau, -who had what they called good legal positions, but who -<span class='pageno' title='395' id='Page_395'></span> -could be trusted by the Nazis; and that 5 days after the Pact of -July 11, 1936 between Germany and Austria, a pact which specifically -pledged the German Government not to interfere either -directly or indirectly in the internal affairs of Austria, including -the question of Austrian National Socialism, the Austrian Nazis -met with Hitler at Obersalzberg and received new instructions; and -finally, that Hitler then used Keppler, whose name we shall again -meet in a short while in a significant manner as his “contact man” -with the Austrian Nazis, with full authority to act for the Führer -in Austria and to work with the leaders of the Austrian Nazis.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Then we offered Document 2247-PS, Exhibit USA-64, Von -Papen’s letter to Hitler of May 17, 1935 that showed that Von -Papen had been in contact with Captain Leopold and it showed -how Von Papen got Hitler to make a solemn promise of Austria’s -independence in order to further Papen’s internal political gain in -Austria.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Then we offered Document 2248-PS, Exhibit USA-63, Von -Papen’s letter of July 27, 1935, which reviewed the situation 1 year -after Dollfuss’ death, and pointed out how National Socialism could -be made the link for the Anschluss and how National Socialism -could overcome the Austrian ideologies, and in which he identified -himself completely with the National Socialist goal.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>We offered Document 2246-PS, Exhibit USA-67, Von Papen’s -letter to Hitler of September 1, 1936, which showed how Von Papen -advised using both economic and continuing psychological pressure; -that he had conferences with the leaders of the illegal Austrian -Party; that he was trying to direct the next developments -in such a way as to get corporative representation of the Nazi -movement in the Fatherland Front, and that meanwhile he was -not ready to urge that avowed National Socialists be put in prominent -positions, but was quite satisfied with collaborators like -Glaise-Horstenau.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I think that practically all of the statements in Mr. Messersmith’s -affidavits have been fully supported by these documents, -German documents, which we have introduced. Certain parts of -the affidavits cannot be corroborated by documents, in the very -nature of things, and I refer specifically to Mr. Messersmith’s conversation -with the Defendant Von Papen in 1934, which I read -to the Tribunal yesterday. But I think those matters are manifestly -just as true and just as clear of the defendant’s guilt and -complicity.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Yesterday I was reading to the Tribunal selected excerpts from -Mr. Messersmith’s second affidavit, 2385-PS, Exhibit USA-68, relating -to the diplomatic preparations for war. Prior to adjournment, -<span class='pageno' title='396' id='Page_396'></span> -I had read to the Tribunal excerpts which established the following -propositions:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>First, Nazi Germany undertook a vigorous campaign to break -up the diplomatic agreements existing in 1933; first—in the West -the Locarno Pact supplemented by the French-Belgium Agreement; -second—in the East the Little Entente, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, -and Poland, and their respective mutual assistance pacts -with France, and the French-Polish Pact; third—as for Austria, -the special concern of Italy for her independence, that is for -Austrian independence.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In the second place, Nazi Germany countered these alliances -with extravagant and sometimes inconsistent promises of territorial -gain to countries in southeastern Europe, Yugoslavia, Hungary, and -Poland.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In the third place, Mr. Messersmith wrote an official communication -to the State Department, pointing out that persons like Von -Neurath and Von Papen were able to work more effectively in -making these promises and in doing their other work, just because -they, and I quote: “propagated the myth that they are not in -sympathy with the regime.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In the fourth place, in fact, high-ranking Nazis openly stated -that Germany would honor her international obligations only so -long as it suited her to do so.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>There are two more excerpts which I wish to read from this -affidavit:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>France and Italy worked actively in southeastern Europe to -counter German moves, as I said yesterday. France made attempts -to promote an east Locarno pact and to foster an economic accord -between Austria and the other Danubian powers. Italy’s effort -was to organize an economic bloc of Austria, Hungary, and Italy. -But Germany foiled these efforts by redoubling her promises of -loot, by continuing her armament, and by another very significant -strategy, that is the Fifth-Column strategy; that the Nazis stirred -up internal dissensions within neighboring countries to disunite and -weaken their intended victims.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I read now from Page 7 of the English copy of the second Messersmith -affidavit, Document 2385-PS, Exhibit USA-68, the paragraph -beginning in the middle of the page:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“At the same time that Germany held out such promises of -reward for cooperation in her program, she stirred up internal -dissensions within these countries themselves, and in -Austria and Czechoslovakia in particular, all of which was -designed so to weaken all opposition and strengthen the pro-Nazi -<span class='pageno' title='397' id='Page_397'></span> -and Fascist groups as to insure peaceful acquiescence -in the German program. Her machinations in Austria I have -related in detail, as they came under my direct observation, -in a separate affidavit. In Czechoslovakia they followed the -same tactics with the Sudeten Germans. I was reliably informed -that the Nazi Party spent over 6,000,000 marks in -financing the Henlein Party in the elections in the spring -of 1935 alone. In Yugoslavia she played on the old differences -between the Croats and the Serbs and the fear of the restoration -of the Hapsburg in Austria. It may be remarked here -that this latter was one of the principal instruments, and a -most effective one, which Nazi Germany used, as the fear in -Yugoslavia in particular of a restoration of the Hapsburg was -very real. In Hungary she played upon the agrarian difficulties -and at the same time so openly encouraged the Nazi -German elements in Hungary as to provoke the Government -of Hungary to demand the recall of Von Mackensen in 1936. -In Hungary and in Poland she played on the fear of communism -and communist Russia. In Romania she aggravated -the existing anti-Semitism, emphasizing the important role of -the Jews in Romanian industry and the Jewish ancestry of -Lupescu. Germany undoubtedly also financed the fascist Iron -Guard through Codreanou.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“Such ‘diplomatic’ measures reinforced by Germany’s vast -rearmament program had a considerable effect, particularly -in Yugoslavia, Poland, and Hungary, and sufficient at least -to deter these countries from joining any combination opposed -to German designs, even if not enough to persuade them -actively to ally themselves with Nazi Germany.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“Important political leaders of Yugoslavia began to become -convinced that the Nazi regime would remain in power and -would gain its ends, and that the course of safety for Yugoslavia -was to play along with Germany.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>I shall not take the time of the Tribunal to read into evidence -the detailed official dispatches which Mr. Messersmith sent to the -American State Department, showing that Yugoslavia, Hungary, -and Poland were beginning to follow the German line.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>As for Italy, Germany’s initial objective was to sow discord -between Yugoslavia and Italy, by promising Yugoslavia Italian territory, -particularly Trieste. This was to prevent France from -reaching agreement with them and to block an east Locarno pact. -On that I quote again from Document 2385-PS, Exhibit USA-68, -the second Messersmith affidavit, in the middle of Page 21 of the -English version: -<span class='pageno' title='398' id='Page_398'></span></p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“While Italy openly opposed efforts at Anschluss with Austria -in 1934, Italian ambitions in Abyssinia provided Germany -with the opportunity to sow discord between Italy and France -and England, and to win Italy over to acceptance of Germany’s -program in exchange for German support of Italy’s -plans in Abyssinia.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>That, if the Tribunal please, paved the way for the Austro-German -Declaration or Pact of 11 July 1936; and in the fall of 1936 -Germany extended the hand of friendship and common purpose to -Italy, in an alliance which they called the “Rome-Berlin Axis.” -This, together with Germany’s alliance with Japan, put increasing -pressure on England and greatly increased the relative strength of -Germany.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>And so by means of careful preparation in the diplomatic field, -among others, the Nazi conspirators had woven a position for -themselves, so that they could seriously consider plans for war and -begin to outline time tables, not binding time tables and not specific -ones in terms of months and days, but still general time tables, in -terms of years, which were the necessary foundation for further -aggressive planning, and a spur to more specific planning. And -that time table was developed, as the Tribunal has already seen, -in the conference of 5 November 1937, contained in our Document -Number 386-PS, Exhibit USA-25, the Hossbach minutes of that -conference, which I adverted to in detail on Monday last.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In those minutes, we see the crystallization of the plan to wage -aggressive war in Europe, and to seize both Austria and Czechoslovakia, -and in that order.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In connection with the exposition of the aggression on Austria, -I have shown first the purpose of the Nazi conspiracy, with respect -to the absorption of Austria, and then the steps taken by them in -Austria up to this period, that is, November 1937.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I have also outlined for the Tribunal the general diplomatic -preparations of the Nazi conspirators, with respect to their program -in Europe generally, and with respect to Austria in -particular.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>It may now be profitable to reconsider the minutes of the meeting -of 5 November 1937, in the light of this more-detailed background. -It will be recalled that in that meeting, the Führer insisted -that Germany must have more space in Europe. He concluded that -the space required must be taken by force; and three different possible -cases were outlined for different eventualities but all reaching -the conclusion that the problem would certainly have to be solved -before 1943 to 1945. -<span class='pageno' title='399' id='Page_399'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>Then there was envisaged the nature of a war in the near -future, specifically against Austria and Czechoslovakia. Hitler said -that for the improvement of Germany’s military and political -positions, it must be the first aim of the Nazis, in every case of -entanglement by war, to conquer Czechoslovakia and Austria -simultaneously in order to remove any threat from the flanks in -case of a possible advance westward.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Hitler then considered that the embodiment into Germany of -Czechoslovakia and Austria would constitute the conquest of food -for from 5 to 6 million people, including the assumption that the -comprehensive forced emigration of 1 million people from Austria -could be carried out. And he further pointed out that the annexation -of the two States to Germany, both militarily and politically, -would constitute a considerable relief since they would provide -shorter and better frontiers, would free fighting personnel for other -purposes, and would make possible the reconstitution of large new -German armies.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Insofar as Austria is concerned, those minutes reveal a crystallization -in the policy of the Nazi conspirators. It had always been -their aim to acquire Austria. At the outset a revolutionary Putsch -was attempted, but that failed. The next period was one of surface -recognition of the independence of Austria and the use of devious -means to strengthen the position of Nazis internally in Austria.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Now, however, it became clear that the need, or the greed, for -Austria, in the light of the larger aggressive purpose of the Nazi -conspirators was sufficiently great to warrant the use of force in -order to obtain Austria with the speed that was designed. In fact, -as we shall see later, the Nazis were actually able to secure Austria, -after having weakened it internally and removed from it the -support of other nations, merely by setting the German military -machine into motion and making a threat of force.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The German armies were able to cross the border and secure the -country without the necessity of firing a shot. Their careful planning -for war and their readiness to use war as an instrument of -political action made it possible, in the end, for them to pluck this -plum without having to fight a blow for it.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The German High Command had, of course, previously considered -preparation against Austria.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I offer in evidence another German document, C-175, as Exhibit -USA-69. It, again, is “top secret”, with the added legend in German: -“Chefsache nur durch Offizier” (matter for the chief only to -be delivered through an officer).</p> - -<p class='pindent'>This was a top-secret directive of 24 June 1937 of the Reichsminister -for War and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, -<span class='pageno' title='400' id='Page_400'></span> -General Von Blomberg. The importance of this top-secret directive -is indicated by the fact that the carbon copy, received by the Commander-in-Chief -of the Navy, was one of only four copies establishing -the directive for a unified preparation for war of all the -Armed Forces.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>This directive from General Von Blomberg states that although -the political situation indicates that Germany need not consider an -attack from any side it also states that Germany does not intend to -unleash a European war. It then states in Part 1, and I quote from -Page 2 of the English text, which, I believe, is Page 4, third paragraph, -of the German text:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“The intention to unleash a European war is held just as little -by Germany. Nevertheless, the politically fluid world -situation, which does not preclude surprising incidents, -demands a continued preparedness for war by the German -Armed Forces: (a) To counter attacks at any time; (b) To -enable the military exploitation of politically favorable -opportunities, should they occur.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>The directive then indicates that there will be certain preparations -for war of a general nature. I quote the first two portions of -Paragraph 2, on Page 2 of the English text, and I think Page 5 of -the German text:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“(2) The preparations of a general nature include:</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“(a) The permanent preparedness for mobilization of the German -Armed Forces, even before the completion of rearmament, -and full preparedness for war.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“(b) The further working on ‘mobilization without public announcement’ -in order to put the Armed Forces in a position -to begin a war suddenly and by surprise, both as regards -strength and time.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>And the directive finally indicates that there might be special -preparations for war against Austria. I quote from Part 3, (1) -Special Case Otto, Page 4 of the English text, and Page 19 of the -German text. “Case Otto”, as you will repeatedly see, was the -standing code name for aggressive war against Austria. I quote:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“Armed intervention in Austria in the event of her restoring -the monarchy.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“The object of this operation will be to compel Austria by -armed force to give up a restoration.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“Making use of the domestic political divisions of the -Austrian people, the march in will be made in the general -direction of Vienna, and will break any resistance.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'><span class='pageno' title='401' id='Page_401'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>I should now like to call attention to two conversations, held by -United States Ambassador Bullitt with the Defendants Schacht and -Göring, in November 1937.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>PROFESSOR DR. FRANZ EXNER (Counsel for Defendant Jodl): -I should like to state my objection to the manner in which Document -C-175 has been treated. This document is a study made by -the General Staff, which was conceived to meet many different -eventualities of war. It even mentions the possibility that Germany -might have to go to war with Spain, and might have to carry out -a military attack on her.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Only part of this document was read, the part relating to -Austria; and thus the impression was given that a plan had been -made to march against Austria, whereas it actually says the German -Reich had no intention to attack at that time, but was merely -preparing for all eventualities.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I should like to request that the reading of this document be -supplemented by reading at least the headings of the paragraphs -of this document. If these paragraphs of the document are placed -before the Court, it will be seen that this was not a plan to march -against Austria, but simply a document preparing for all eventualities.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Exner, your objection does not appear -to be to the admissibility of the document, but to the weight of the -document. The Tribunal has already informed defendants’ counsel -that they will have an opportunity at the appropriate time, when -they come to prepare their defense, to refer to any documents, parts -of which have been put in by the Prosecution, and to read such -parts as they think necessary then, and to make what criticism -they think necessary then.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Your objection is therefore premature, because it does not go to -the admissibility of the document. It simply indicates a wish that -more of it should be read. You will have the opportunity later to -read any parts of the documents which you wish.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. ALDERMAN: I suppose, if the Tribunal please, that the -fundamental basis of the objection just stated by the distinguished -counsel, must have been his theory that Germany never made any -plans to invade Austria, and if so, it would seem to follow that -Germany never invaded Austria, and perhaps history is mistaken.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I had adverted to two conversations, held by United States -Ambassador Bullitt with the Defendant Schacht and the Defendant -Göring, in November 1937.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>For this purpose, I offer in evidence our Document L-151, offered -as Exhibit USA-70. It is a dispatch from Mr. Bullitt, American -<span class='pageno' title='402' id='Page_402'></span> -Ambassador in Paris, to the American Secretary of State on -23 November 1937.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Now, again, if the Tribunal please, we are embarrassed because -that document is not in the document book before the members of -the Tribunal. It has been furnished in German translation to the -Defense Counsel.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>If the Tribunal will permit, I will read from the original exhibit. -On top is a letter from Ambassador Bullitt to the Secretary of -State, November 23, 1937, stating that he visited Warsaw, stopped -in Berlin en route, where he had conversations with Schacht and -Göring, among others.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>On the conversation with Schacht, I read from Page 2 of the -report:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“Schacht said that in his opinion, the best way to begin to -deal with Hitler was not through political discussion but -through economic discussion. Hitler was not in the least -interested in economic matters. He regarded money as filth. -It was therefore possible to enter into negotiations with him -in the economic domain without arousing his emotional antipathy, -and it might be possible through the conversations -thus begun to lead him into arrangements in the political and -military field, in which he was intensely interested. Hitler -was determined to have Austria eventually attached to Germany, -and to obtain at least autonomy for the Germans of -Bohemia. At the present moment he was not vitally concerned -about the Polish Corridor and in his”—that is Schacht’s—“opinion, -it might be possible to maintain the Corridor, -provided Danzig were permitted to join East Prussia, and -provided some sort of a bridge could be built across the Corridor, -uniting Danzig and East Prussia with Germany.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>And for the Defendant Göring’s statements to Ambassador -Bullitt, I read from the second memorandum, “Memorandum of -Conversation between Ambassador Bullitt and General Hermann -Göring,” on Page 2 of that document, following a part of a sentence -which is underlined, just below the middle of the page:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“The sole source of friction between Germany and France -was the refusal of France to permit Germany to achieve -certain vital national necessities.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“If France, instead of accepting collaboration with Germany, -should continue to follow a policy of building up alliances in -Eastern Europe to prevent Germany from the achievement of -her legitimate aims, it was obvious that there would be -conflict between France and Germany. -<span class='pageno' title='403' id='Page_403'></span></p> - -<p class='noindent'>“I asked Göring what aims especially he had in mind. He -replied:</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“ ‘We are determined to join to the German Reich all Germans -who are contiguous to the Reich and are divided from -the great body of the German race merely by the artificial -barriers imposed by the Treaty of Versailles.’</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“I asked Göring if he meant that Germany was absolutely -determined to annex Austria to the Reich. He replied that -this was an absolute determination of the German Government. -The German Government, at the present time, was not -pressing this matter because of certain momentary political -considerations, especially in their relations with Italy. But -Germany would tolerate no solution of the Austrian question -other than the consolidation of Austria in the German Reich.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“He then added a statement which went further than any I -have heard on this subject. He said:</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“ ‘There are schemes being pushed now for a union of -Austria, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia, either with or without -a Hapsburg at the head of the union. Such a solution is -absolutely unacceptable to us, and for us the conclusion of -such an agreement would be an immediate <span class='it'>casus belli</span>.’ -Göring used the Latin expression <span class='it'>casus belli</span>; it is not a -translation from the German, in which that conversation was -carried on.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“I asked Göring if the German Government was as decided -in its views with regard to the Germans in Bohemia, as it -was with regard to Austria. He replied that there could be -only one final solution of this question. The Sudeten Germans -must enter the German Reich as all other Germans who -lived contiguous to the Reich.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>These, if the Tribunal please, are official reports made by the -accredited representative of the United States in the regular course -of business. They carry with them the guarantee of truthfulness -of a report made by a responsible official to his own government, -recording contemporaneous conversations and events.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>My next subject is pressure and threats resulting in further -concessions by Austria: a meeting at Berchtesgaden, 12 February -1938.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>As I have stated before, the Austrian Government was laboring -under great difficulties imposed by its neighbor. There was economic -pressure, including the curtailment of the important tourist -trade; and there was what the Defendant Von Papen called “slowly -intensified psychological pressure.” There were increasing demonstrations, -<span class='pageno' title='404' id='Page_404'></span> -plots, and conspiracies. Demands were being presented -by Captain Leopold and approval of the Nazis was being espoused -by the Defendant Seyss-Inquart, the new Councillor of the State of -Austria. In this situation, Chancellor Schuschnigg decided to visit -Hitler at Berchtesgaden.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The official communiqué of this conference is quite calm; I -invite the Tribunal to take judicial notice of it. It is Document -2461-PS, the official German communiqué of the meeting of Hitler -and Schuschnigg at Obersalzberg, 12 February 1938, taken from the -official <span class='it'>Dokumente der Deutschen Politik</span>, Volume 6, I, Page 124, -Number 21-a.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The communiqué states that the unofficial meeting was caused -by the mutual desire to clarify by personal conversation the -questions relating to the relationship between the German Reich -and Austria.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The communiqué lists among those present:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Schuschnigg and his Foreign Minister Schmidt, Hitler and his -Foreign Minister Ribbentrop, and the Defendant Von Papen.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The communiqué concludes on a rather bright note saying, and -I quote:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“Both statesmen are convinced that the measures taken by -them constitute at the same time an effective contribution -toward the peaceful development of the European situation.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>A similar communiqué was issued by the Austrian Government. -But in fact, and as I think history well knows, the conference was -a very unusual and a very harsh one. Great concessions were -obtained by the German Government from Austria. The principal -concessions are contained in the official Austrian communiqué of -the reorganization of the Cabinet and the general political amnesty, -dated 16 February 1938.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>That communiqué, as taken from the <span class='it'>Dokumente der Deutschen -Politik</span>, Volume 6, Page 125, Number 21-b, is translated in our -Document 2464-PS and I invite the Court’s judicial notice of that -communiqué.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>That communiqué announced a reorganization of the Austrian -Cabinet, including, most significantly, the appointment of the -Defendant Seyss-Inquart to the position of Minister of Security and -Interior, where he would have control of the police. In addition, -announcement was made of a general political amnesty to Nazis -convicted of crimes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Two days later another concession was divulged.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I invite the Court’s judicial notice to our Document 2469-PS, a -translation of the official German and Austrian communiqué concerning -<span class='pageno' title='405' id='Page_405'></span> -the so-called equal rights of Austrian National Socialists in -Austria, 18 February 1938, <span class='it'>Dokumente der Deutschen Politik</span>, -Volume 6, I, Page 128; Number 21-d.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>That communiqué announced that pursuant to the Berchtesgaden -conference, the Austrian National Socialists would be taken -into the Fatherland Front, the single legal political party of Austria.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Did you tell us what exhibit numbers those -two documents were?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. ALDERMAN: I am sorry, Sir; Document 2469-PS.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: We haven’t had that yet. We have had -2461-PS, which is exhibit what?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. ALDERMAN: Well, I hadn’t read it in. I was asking the -Tribunal to take judicial notice of this as an official communiqué.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: You are not going to give it an exhibit -number?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. ALDERMAN: No, Sir.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Nor 2469?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. ALDERMAN: No, Sir.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In actual fact, great pressure was put on Schuschnigg at Berchtesgaden. -The fact that pressure was exerted, and pressure of a -military nature involving the threat of the use of troops, can be -sufficiently established from captured German documents.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I have our Document 1544-PS, a captured German document, -which I offer in evidence as Exhibit USA-71.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>This document consists of the Defendant Von Papen’s own notes -on his last meeting with Schuschnigg, on February 26, 1938. I -quote the last two paragraphs of these notes. This is Von Papen -speaking, in his own notes:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“I then introduced into the conversation the widespread -opinion that he”—that is, Schuschnigg—“had acted under -‘brutal pressure’ in Berchtesgaden. I myself had been present -and been able to state that he had always and at every point -had complete freedom of decision. The Chancellor replied -that he had actually been under considerable moral pressure; -he could not deny that. He had made notes on the talk which, -bore that out. I reminded him that despite this talk he had -not seen his way clear to make any concessions, and I asked -him whether without the pressure he would have been ready -to make the concessions he made late in the evening. He -answered: ‘To be honest, no.’ ”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>And then Von Papen says:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“It appears to me of importance to record this statement. -<span class='pageno' title='406' id='Page_406'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>“In parting I asked the Chancellor never to deceive himself -that Austria could have maintained her status with the help -of non-German, European combinations. This question could -be decided only according to the interests of the German -people. He asserted that he held the same conviction and -would act accordingly.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Thus we have, through the words of Von Papen, Schuschnigg’s -contemporary statement to Papen of the pressure which had been -exerted upon him as recorded by Von Papen in an original, contemporaneous -entry.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>For diplomatic purposes, Papen, who had been at Berchtesgaden, -kept up the pretense that there had been no pressure applied.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>But the Defendant General Jodl, writing the account of current -events in his diary, was much more candid. We are fortunate in -having General Jodl’s handwritten diary in German script which I -can’t read. It is our Document 1780-PS, and I offer it in evidence -as Exhibit USA-72.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I may say that General Jodl, in interrogations, has admitted that -this is his genuine diary in his handwriting.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>This diary discloses not only the pressure at Berchtesgaden, but -also the fact that for some days thereafter Defendant Keitel and -Admiral Canaris worked out a scheme for shamming military pressure -in order, obviously, to coerce President Miklas of Austria into -ratifying the agreement. It started from Schuschnigg at Berchtesgaden. -It will be noted that the approval of President Miklas was -needed to ratify the Berchtesgaden agreement; that is, with respect -to naming Seyss-Inquart as Minister of the Interior and Security.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>And so the Nazi conspirators kept up the military pressure with -threats of invasion for some days after the Berchtesgaden conference -in order to produce the desired effect on President Miklas.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I quote from General Jodl’s diary, the entries for February 11, -February 13, and February 14, 1938. The entry of 11 February:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“In the evening and on 12 February General K.”—Keitel—“with -General Von Reichenau and Sperrle at the Obersalzberg. -Schuschnigg together with G. Schmidt are being put under -heaviest political and military pressure. At 2300 hours -Schuschnigg signs protocol.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“13 February: In the afternoon General K.”—Keitel—“asks -Admiral C.”—Canaris—“and myself to come to his apartment. -He tells us that the Führer’s order is to the effect that -military pressure, by shamming military action, should be -kept up until the 15th. Proposals for these deceptive -maneuvers are drafted and submitted to the Führer by telephone -for approval. -<span class='pageno' title='407' id='Page_407'></span></p> - -<p class='noindent'>“14 February: At 2:40 o’clock the agreement of the Führer -arrives. Canaris went to Munich to the Counter-Intelligence -Office VII and initiates the different measures.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“The effect is quick and strong. In Austria the impression is -created that Germany is undertaking serious military preparations.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>The proposal for deceptive maneuvers reported on by Defendant -Jodl are set forth in Document 1775-PS, a captured German document, -which I offer in evidence as Exhibit USA-73.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The proposals are signed by the Defendant Keitel. Underneath -his signature appears a note that the Führer approved the proposal. -In the original document that note is handwritten in pencil.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The rumors which Keitel proposed for the intimidation of -Austria make very interesting reading. I quote the first three paragraphs -of the suggested order:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“1. To take no real preparatory measures in the Army or -Luftwaffe. No troop movements or redeployments.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“2. Spread false but quite credible news which may lead to -the conclusion of military preparations against Austria:</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“(a) Through V-men”—V-Männer—“in Austria.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“(b) Through our customs personnel”—staff—“at the frontier.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“(c) Through travelling agents.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“3. Such news could be:</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“(a) Furloughs are supposed to have been barred in the sector -of the VII A.K.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“(b) Rolling stock is being assembled in Munich, Augsburg, -and Regensburg.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“(c) Major General Muff, the Military Attaché in Vienna, has -been called for a conference to Berlin. As a matter of fact, -this is the case.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>—That reminds me of a lawyer from my own home town who -used to argue a matter at great length, and then he would end up -by saying, “and, incidentally, it is the truth.”</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“(d) The police stations located at the frontier of Austria -have called up reinforcements.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“(e) Custom officials report about the imminent maneuvers of -the Mountain Brigade”—Gebirgsbrigade—“in the region of -Freilassing, Reichenhall, and Berchtesgaden.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>The total pattern of intimidation and rumor was effective, for in -due course, as, we have already seen from the communiqués referred -to, President Miklas verified the Berchtesgaden Agreement -<span class='pageno' title='408' id='Page_408'></span> -which foreshadowed National Socialist Austria and then the events -culminating in the actual German invasion on 12 March 1938.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Mr. President, would this be a convenient moment for a recess?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn for 10 minutes.</p> - -<p class='line' style='text-align:center;margin-top:2em;margin-bottom:2em;'>[<span class='it'>A recess was taken.</span>]</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. ALDERMAN: May it please the Tribunal, I had reached -the subject of the events culminating in the German invasion of -Austria on 12 March 1938, and first under that, the plebiscite and -the preparations for both German and Austrian National Socialists.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The day after his appointment as Minister of the Interior of -Austria, Seyss-Inquart flew to Berlin for a conference with Hitler. -I invite the Court to take judicial notice of the official German -communiqué covering that visit of Seyss-Inquart to Hitler, as it -appears in the <span class='it'>Dokumente der Deutschen Politik</span>, Volume 6, I, Page -128, Number 21-c, a copy of which will be found in our Document -2484-PS.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>On March 9, 1938, 3 weeks after Seyss-Inquart had been put in -charge of the police of Austria and was in a position to direct their -handling of the National Socialists in Austria—3 weeks after the -Nazis began to exploit their new prestige and position with their -quota of further victories—Schuschnigg made an important announcement.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>On March 9, 1938, Schuschnigg announced that he would hold a -plebiscite throughout Austria the following Sunday, March 13, 1938. -The question to be submitted in the plebiscite was: “Are you for -an independent and social, a Christian, German, and united -Austria?” A “yes” answer to this question was certainly compatible -with the agreement made by the German Government on 11 July -1936 and carried forward at Berchtesgaden on 12 February 1938. -Moreover, for a long while the Nazis had been demanding a plebiscite -on the question of Anschluss, but the Nazis apparently -appreciated the likelihood of a strong “yes” vote on the question -put by Schuschnigg in the plebiscite, and they could not tolerate the -possibility of such a vote of confidence in the Schuschnigg Government.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In any case, as events showed, they took this occasion to overturn -the Austrian Government. Although the plebiscite was not -announced until the evening of 9 March, the Nazi organization -received word about it earlier in that day. It was determined by -the Nazis that they had to ask Hitler what to do about the situation -(that is, the Austrian Nazis), and that they would prepare a letter -of protest against the plebiscite from Seyss-Inquart to Schuschnigg; -<span class='pageno' title='409' id='Page_409'></span> -and that, pending Hitler’s approval, Seyss-Inquart would pretend -to negotiate with Schuschnigg about details of the plebiscite.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>This information is all contained in the report of Gauleiter -Rainer to Reich Commissioner Bürckel, transmitted as I have already -pointed out to Seyss-Inquart, and which has already been -received in evidence—our Document 812-PS, Exhibit USA-61.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I quote briefly from Page 7 of the English text, the paragraph -beginning on Page 11 of the German original:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“The Landesleitung received word about the planned plebiscite -through illegal information services, on 9 March 1938 -at 10 a.m. At the session which was called immediately afterwards, -Seyss-Inquart explained that he had known about -this for only a few hours, but that he could not talk about it -because he had given his word to keep silent on this subject. -But during the talks he made us understand that the illegal information -we received was based on truth, and that in view -of the new situation, he had been cooperating with the Landesleitung -from the very first moment. Klausner, Jury, Rainer, -Globocnik, and Seyss-Inquart were present at the first -talks which were held at 10 a.m. There it was decided that:</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“First, the Führer had to be informed immediately; secondly, -the opportunity for the Führer to intervene must be given -to him by way of an official declaration made by Minister -Seyss-Inquart to Schuschnigg; and thirdly, Seyss-Inquart must -negotiate with the Government until clear instructions and -orders were received from the Führer. Seyss-Inquart and -Rainer together composed a letter to Schuschnigg, and only -one copy of it was brought to the Führer by Globocnik, who -flew to him on the afternoon of 9 March 1938.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“Negotiations with the Government were not successful. -Therefore, they were stopped by Seyss-Inquart in accordance -with the instructions he received from the Führer. . . . On -10 March all the preparations for future revolutionary actions -already had been made . . . and the necessary orders given -to all unit leaders . . . . During the night of the 10 to 11, -Globocnik returned from the Führer with the announcement -that the Führer gave the Party freedom of action . . . and -that he would back it in everything it did.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>—That means the Austrian Nazi Party.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Next, Germany’s actual preparations for the invasion and the -use of force.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>When news of the plebiscite reached Berlin, it started a tremendous -amount of activity. Hitler, as history knows, was determined -<span class='pageno' title='410' id='Page_410'></span> -not to tolerate the plebiscite. Accordingly, he called his military -advisers and ordered the preparation of the march into Austria.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>On the diplomatic side he started a letter to Mussolini indicating -why he was going to march into Austria, and in the absence of the -Defendant Ribbentrop (who was temporarily detained in London), -the Defendant Von Neurath took over the affairs of the Foreign -Office again.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The terse and somewhat disconnected notes in General Jodl’s -diary give a vivid account of the activities in Berlin. I quote from -the entry of 10 March:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“By surprise and without consulting his Ministers, Schuschnigg -ordered a plebiscite for Sunday, 13 March, which should bring -strong majority for the Legitimists in the absence of plan or -preparation. The Führer is determined not to tolerate it.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“This same night, March 9 to 10, he calls for Göring. General -Von Reichenau is called back from the Cairo Olympic Committee. -General Von Schobert is ordered to come as well as -Minister Glaise-Horstenau, who is with the district leader, -Gauleiter Bürckel, in the Palatinate. General Keitel communicates -the facts at 9:45. He drives to the Reichskanzlei -at 10 o’clock. I follow at 10:15, according to the wish of General -Von Viebahn, to give him all drafts. ‘Prepare Case Otto.’</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“1300 hours, General K.”—which I think plainly means Keitel—“informs -Chief of Operational Staff and Admiral Canaris, -Ribbentrop is being detained in London. Neurath takes over -the Foreign Office. Führer wants to transmit ultimatum to -the Austrian Cabinet. A personal letter is dispatched to Mussolini -and the reasons are developed which forced the Führer -to take action.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“1830 hours, mobilization order is given to the Commander of -the 8th Army (Corps Area 3), 7th and 13th Army Corps, without -Reserve Army.” (Document Number 1780-PS, Exhibit -USA-72).</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Now, it is to be noted that Defendant Von Neurath was at this -critical hour acting as Foreign Minister. The previous February the -Defendant Ribbentrop had become Foreign Minister, and Von Neurath -had become President of the Secret Cabinet Council. But in -this critical hour of foreign policy the Defendant Ribbentrop was -in London handling the diplomatic consequences of the Austrian -transaction. As Foreign Minister in this hour of aggression, involving -mobilization and movement of troops, use of force and threats -to eliminate the independence of a neighboring country, the Defendant -Von Neurath resumed his former position in the Nazi conspiracy. -<span class='pageno' title='411' id='Page_411'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>I now offer in evidence our Document C-102 as Exhibit USA-74, -a captured German document, top secret, the directive of the Supreme -High Command of the Armed Forces, 11 March 1938. This -directive by Hitler, initialed by the Defendants Jodl and Keitel, -stated Hitler’s mixed political and military intentions. I quote Paragraphs -1, 4, and 5 of the directive. First the caption, “The Supreme -Command of the Armed Forces” with some initials; “referring to -Operation Otto; 30 copies.” This is the 11th copy; top secret:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“1. If other measures prove unsuccessful I intend to invade -Austria with armed forces to establish constitutional conditions -and to prevent further outrages against the pro-German -population.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“4. The forces of the Army and Air Force detailed for this -operation must be ready for invasion and/or ready for action -on 12 March 1938 at the latest from 1200 hours. I reserve the -right to give permission for crossing and flying over the frontier -and to decide the actual moment for invasion.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“5. The behavior of the troops must give the impression that -we do not want to wage war against our Austrian brother; it -is in our interest that the whole operation shall be carried out -without any violence, but in the form of a peaceful entry welcomed -by the population. Therefore any provocation is to be -avoided. If, however, resistance is offered it must be broken -ruthlessly by force of arms.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>I also offer in evidence captured German Document C-103 as Exhibit -USA-75. This was an implementing directive issued by the -Defendant Jodl, and it provided as follows:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“Top secret; 11 March 1938; 40 copies, sixth copy.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“Special Instruction Number 1 to the Supreme Commander of -the Armed Forces Number 427/38,”—with some symbols.—</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“Directive for policy toward Czechoslovakian and Italian -troops or militia units on Austrian soil.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“1. If Czechoslovakian troops or militia units are encountered -in Austria they are to be regarded as hostile.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“2. The Italians are everywhere to be treated as friends, especially -as Mussolini has declared himself disinterested in the -solution of the Austrian question. The Chief of the Supreme -Command of the Armed Forces, by order, Jodl.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Next, the actual events of 11 March 1938 in Austria are available -to us in two separate accounts. Although these accounts differ in -some minor details, such as precise words used and precise times -when they were used, they afford each other almost complete corroboration. -We think it appropriate for this Tribunal to have before -<span class='pageno' title='412' id='Page_412'></span> -it a relatively full account of the way in which the German Government -on 11 March 1938 deprived Austria of her sovereignty. First -I shall give the report of the day’s events in Austria as given by -the Austrian Nazis. I refer to Document 812-PS, Exhibit USA-61, -a report from Gauleiter Rainer to Reich Commissioner Bürckel, and -I shall read from Page 8 of the English version. For the benefit of -the German interpreter I am starting following a tabulation: First -case, second case, third case, and following the sentence, “Dr. Seyss-Inquart -took part in these talks with the Gauleiter.”</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“On Friday, 11 March, the Minister Glaise-Horstenau arrived -in Vienna after a visit with the Führer. After talks with -Seyss-Inquart he went to see the Chancellor. At 11:30 a.m. -the Landesleitung had a meeting at which Klausner, Rainer, -Globocnik, Jury, Seyss-Inquart, Glaise-Horstenau, Fischböck, -and Mühlmann participated. Dr. Seyss-Inquart reported on -his talks with Dr. Schuschnigg which had ended in a rejection -of the proposal of the two ministers.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“In regard to Rainer’s proposal, Von Klausner ordered that -the Government be presented with an ultimatum, expiring at -1400 hours, signed by legal political ‘front’ men, including -both Ministers and also State Councillors Fishböck and Jury, -for the establishment of a voting date in 3 weeks and a free -and secret ballot in accordance with the constitution.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“On the basis of written evidence which Glaise-Horstenau had -brought with him, a leaflet, to be printed in millions of copies, -and a telegram to the Führer calling for help were prepared.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“Klausner placed the leadership of the final political actions -in the hands of Rainer and Globocnik. Schuschnigg called -a session of all ministers for 2 p.m. Rainer agreed with Seyss-Inquart -that Rainer would send the telegram to the Führer -and the statement to the population at 3 p.m. and at the same -time he would start all necessary actions to take over power -unless he received news from the session of the Ministers’ -Council before that time. During this time all measures had -been prepared. At 2:30 Seyss-Inquart telephoned Rainer and -informed him that Schuschnigg had been unable to take the -pressure and had recalled the plebiscite but that he refused -to call a new plebiscite and had ordered the strongest police -measures for maintaining order. Rainer asked whether the -two Ministers had resigned, and Seyss-Inquart answered, ‘No.’ -Rainer informed the Reichskanzlei through the German Embassy, -and received an answer from Göring through the same -channels, that the Führer will not consent to partial solutions -and that Schuschnigg must resign. Seyss-Inquart was informed -<span class='pageno' title='413' id='Page_413'></span> -of this by Globocnik and Mühlmann. Talks were held between -Seyss-Inquart and Schuschnigg. Schuschnigg resigned. Seyss-Inquart -asked Rainer what measures the Party wished taken. -Rainer’s answer: Reestablishment of the Government by Seyss-Inquart, -legalization of the Party, and calling up of the SS -and SA as auxiliaries to the police force. Seyss-Inquart promised -to have these measures carried out, but very soon the -announcement followed that everything might be threatened -by the resistance of Miklas, the President. Meanwhile word -arrived from the German Embassy that the Führer expected -the establishment of a government under Seyss-Inquart with -a national majority, the legalization of the Party, and permission -for the Legion”—that is the Austrian Legion in Germany—“to -return, all within the specified time of 7:30 p.m.; -otherwise German troops would cross the border at 8 p.m. -At 5 p.m. Rainer and Globocnik, accompanied by Mühlmann, -went to the Chancellor’s office to carry out this errand.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“Situation: Miklas negotiated with Ender for the creation of -a government which included Blacks, Reds, and National Socialists, -and proposed the post of Vice-Chancellor to Seyss-Inquart. -The latter rejected it and told Rainer that he was -not able to negotiate by himself because he was personally -involved, and therefore a weak and unfavorable political -situation for the cause might result. Rainer negotiated with -Zernatto. Director of the Cabinet Hüber, Guido Schmidt, -Glaise-Horstenau, Legation Councillor Stein, Military Attaché -General Muff, and the Gruppenführer Keppler,”—whose name -I told you would reappear significantly—“who had arrived in -the meantime, were already negotiating. At 7 p.m. Seyss-Inquart -entered the negotiations again. Situation at 7:30 p.m.: -Stubborn refusal of Miklas to appoint Seyss-Inquart as Chancellor; -appeal to the world in case of a German invasion.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“Gruppenführer Keppler explained that the Führer did not -yet have an urgent reason for the invasion. This reason must -first be created. The situation in Vienna and in the country -is most dangerous. It is feared that street fights will break -out any moment because Rainer ordered the entire Party to -demonstrate at 3 o’clock. Rainer proposed storming and seizing -the Chancellor’s palace in order to force the reconstruction of -the Government. The proposal was rejected by Keppler but -was carried out by Rainer after he discussed it with Globocnik. -After 8 p.m. the SA and the SS marched in and occupied -the Government buildings and all important positions in the -city of Vienna. At 8:30 p.m. Rainer, with the approval of -<span class='pageno' title='414' id='Page_414'></span> -Klausner, ordered all Gauleiter of Austria to take over power -in all eight gaue of Austria, with the help of the SS and SA -and with instructions that all Government representatives -who try to resist, should be told that this action was taken -on order of Chancellor Seyss-Inquart.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“With this the revolution broke out, and this resulted in the -complete occupation of Austria within 3 hours and the taking -over of all important posts by the Party.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“The seizure of power was the work of the Party supported -by the Führer’s threat of invasion and the legal standing of -Seyss-Inquart in the Government. The national result in the -form of the taking over of the Government by Seyss-Inquart -was due to the actual seizure of power by the Party on one -hand, and the political efficiency of Dr. Seyss-Inquart in his -territory on the other; but both factors may be considered -only in relation to the Führer’s decision on 9 March 1938 to -solve the Austrian problem under any circumstances and the -orders consequently issued by the Führer.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>We have at hand another document which permits us virtually -to live again through the events of March 11, 1938, and to live -through them in most lively and interesting fashion. Thanks to the -efficiency of the Defendant Göring and his Luftwaffe organization -we have a highly interesting document, obviously an official document -from the Luftwaffe headquarters headed as usual “Geheime -Reichssache” (top secret). The letterhead is stamped “Reichsluftfahrtministerium -Forschungsamt”. If I can get the significance of the -German, Forschungsamt means the Research Department of Göring’s -Air Ministry. The document is in a characteristic German -folder and on the back it says, “Gespräche Fall Österreich” (Conversations -about the Austria Case) and the paper cover on the inside -has German script writing, which in time, I will ask the interpreter -to read; but it looks to me as if it is “Privat, Geheime Archive,” -which is Secret Archive, Berlin, “Gespräche Fall Österreich” (Case -Austria). I offer that set of documents in the original file as they -were found in the Air Ministry, identified as our 2949-PS. I offer -them as Exhibit USA-76, and, offering them, I am reminded of Job’s -outcry, “Oh, that mine enemy would write a book!”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The covering letter in that file, signed by some member of this -research organization within the Air Ministry, and addressed to the -Defendant Göring, states in substance—well, I will read the English -translation. It starts; “To the General Field Marshal. Enclosed -I submit, as ordered, the copies of your telephone conversations.” -<span class='pageno' title='415' id='Page_415'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>Evidently the defendant wanted to keep a record of important -telephone conversations which he had with important persons regarding -the Case Austria, and had the transcriptions provided by -his Research Department. Most of the conversations transcribed and -recorded in the volume I have offered, were conducted by the Defendant -Göring, although at least one interesting one was conducted -by Hitler. For purposes of convenience our staff has marked these -telephone calls in pencil with an identifying letter running from -“A” through “Z” and then to “AA.” Eleven of these conversations -have been determined by a screening process to be relevant to the -evidence of this particular time. All the conversations which have -been translated have been mimeographed and are included in the -document books handed to the defendants. The original binder -contains, of course, the complete set of conversations. A very extensive -and interesting account of events with which we are much -concerned can be developed from quotations from these translated -conversations.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I turn now to copies of the telephone conversations. The first -group in Part A of the binder took place between Field Marshal -Göring, who was identified by the letter “F” for Field Marshal, and -Seyss-Inquart, who was identified as “S”. The transcript prepared -by the Research Institute of the Air Ministry is in part in the language -of these two persons and is in part a summary of the actual -conversations. I quote from Part A of this binder, and because -of the corroborated nature of this transcript and its obvious authenticity, -I propose to quote this conversation in full.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>“F”—hereafter I shall use Göring and Seyss-Inquart—</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“F: ‘How do you do, doctor? My brother-in-law, is he with you?’</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“Seyss-Inquart: ‘No.’ ”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Thereupon the conversation took approximately the following -turn:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“Göring: ‘How are things with you? Have you resigned or do -you have any news?’</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“Seyss-Inquart: ‘The Chancellor has cancelled the elections -for Sunday, and therefore he has put S’ ”—Seyss-Inquart—“ ‘and -the other gentlemen in a difficult situation. Besides -having called off the elections, extensive precautionary measures -are being ordered; among others, curfew at 8 p.m.’</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“Göring replied that in his opinion the measures taken by -Chancellor Schuschnigg were not satisfactory in any respect. -At this moment he could not commit himself officially. Göring -will take a clear stand very shortly. In calling off the -elections he could see a postponement only, not a change of -the present situation which had been brought about by the -<span class='pageno' title='416' id='Page_416'></span> -behavior of the Chancellor Schuschnigg in breaking the -Berchtesgaden agreement.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“Thereafter a conversation took place between Göring and the -Führer. Afterwards Göring again telephoned Seyss-Inquart. -This conversation was held at 15:05.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“Göring told Seyss-Inquart that Berlin did not agree whatsoever -with the decision made by Chancellor Schuschnigg since -he did not enjoy any more the confidence of our Government -because he had broken the Berchtesgaden Agreement, and -therefore further confidence in his future actions did not -exist. Consequently the national Ministers, Seyss-Inquart, -and the others are being requested immediately to hand in -their resignations to the Chancellor, and also to ask the -Chancellor to resign. Göring added that if after a period of -1 hour no report had come through, the assumption would be -made that Seyss-Inquart would no more be in a position to -telephone. That would mean that the gentlemen had handed -in their resignations. Seyss-Inquart was then told to send the -telegram to the Führer as agreed upon. As a matter of course, -an immediate commission by the Federal President for Seyss-Inquart -to form a new cabinet would follow Schuschnigg’s -resignation.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Thus you see that at 2:45 p.m. Göring told Seyss-Inquart over -the telephone that it was not enough for Schuschnigg to cancel the -elections; and 20 minutes later he telephoned Seyss-Inquart to state -that Schuschnigg must resign. That is your second ultimatum. -When informed about an hour later that Schuschnigg had resigned -he pointed out that in addition it was necessary to have Seyss-Inquart -at the head of the Cabinet. Shall I go into another one -of these?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I think we had better adjourn now until -2 o’clock.</p> - -<p class='line' style='text-align:center;margin-top:2em;margin-bottom:2em;'>[<span class='it'>The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours.</span>]</p> - -<hr class='pbk'/> - -<h2><span class='pageno' title='417' id='Page_417'></span><span class='it'>Afternoon Session</span></h2> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. ALDERMAN: May it please the Tribunal, an hour later, -following the conversation between Göring and Seyss-Inquart with -which I dealt this morning, the Defendant Göring telephoned to -Dombrowski in the German Legation in Vienna. I have reference -to the telephone conversation marked “TT” on Page 2, Part C, of -Document 2949-PS. In that conversation, in the first place, the -Defendant Göring showed concern that the Nazi Party and all of -its organizations should be definitely legalized promptly. I quote -from Page 2 of the transcript:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“Göring: ‘Now to go on, the Party has definitely been -legalized?’</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“Dombrowski: ‘But that is—it is not necessary even to discuss -that?’</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“Göring: ‘With all of its organizations.’</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“Dombrowski: ‘With all of its organizations within this -country.’</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“Göring: ‘In uniform?’</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“Dombrowski: ‘In uniform.’</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“Göring: ‘Good.’</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“Dombrowski calls attention to the fact that the SA and SS -have already been on duty for one-half hour, which means -everything is all right.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>In addition, Göring stated that the Cabinet—the Austrian -Cabinet—must be formed by 7:30 p.m. and he transmitted -instructions to be delivered to Seyss-Inquart as to who should be -appointed to the Cabinet. I quote from Page 3 of the English text -of the transcript of the conversation:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“Göring: ‘Yes, and by 7:30 he also must talk with the Führer, -and as to the Cabinet, Keppler will bring you the names. -One thing I have forgotten: Fischböck must have the Department -of Economy and Commerce.’</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“Dombrowski: ‘That is understood.’</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“Göring: ‘Kaltenbrunner is to have the Department of -Security and Bahr is to have the Armed Forces. The Austrian -Army is to be taken by Seyss-Inquart himself and you know -all about the Justice Department.’</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“Dombrowski: ‘Yes, yes.’</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“Göring: ‘Give me the name.’</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“Dombrowski: ‘Well, your brother-in-law, isn’t that right?’ ”</p> - -<p class='noindent'>—That is Hüber, the brother-in-law of the Defendant -Göring.— -<span class='pageno' title='418' id='Page_418'></span></p> - -<p class='noindent'>“Göring: ‘Yes.’</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“Dombrowski: ‘Yes.’</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“Göring: ‘That’s right, and then also Fischböck.’ ”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>And about 20 minutes later, at 5:26 p.m., Göring was faced with -the news that Miklas, the President, was refusing to appoint Seyss-Inquart -as Chancellor, and he issued instructions as to the ultimatum -that was to be delivered to Miklas. I quote from the telephone -conversation between Göring and Seyss-Inquart, in Part E -of the folder, the part marked with capital R, Pages 1 and 2:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“Göring: ‘Now remember the following: You go immediately, -together with Lieutenant General Muff, and tell the Federal -President that if the conditions which are known to you are -not accepted immediately, the troops who are already -stationed at and advancing to the frontier, will march in -tonight along the whole line, and Austria will cease to exist. -Lieutenant General Muff should go with you and demand to -be admitted for conference immediately. Please inform us -immediately about Miklas’ position. Tell him there is no time -now for any joke. Just through the false report we received -before, action was delayed, but now the situation is such that -tonight the invasion will begin from all the corners of -Austria. The invasion will be stopped and the troops will be -held at the border only if we are informed by 7:30 that Miklas -has entrusted you with the Federal Chancellorship.’ ”</p> - -<p class='noindent'>—There follows in the transcript a sentence which is broken -up.—“ ‘M.’ ”—I suppose that means Lieutenant General -Muff.—“ ‘does not matter whatever it might be, the immediate -restoration of the Party with all its organizations.’ ”</p> - -<p class='noindent'>—There is again an interruption in the transcript.—“ ‘And -then call out all the National Socialists all over the country. -They should now be in the streets; so remember, report must -be given by 7:30. Lieutenant General Muff is supposed to -come along with you. I shall inform him immediately. If -Miklas could not understand it in 4 hours, we shall make him -understand it now in 4 minutes.’ ”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>An hour later, at 6:28 p.m., Göring had an extensively interrupted -telephone conversation with Keppler and Muff and Seyss-Inquart. -When he told Keppler that Miklas had refused to appoint -Seyss-Inquart, Göring said—I read from Part H, about a third of -the way down on the page:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“Göring: ‘Well, then Seyss-Inquart has to dismiss him. Just -go upstairs again and just tell him plainly that S. I.’ ”—Seyss-Inquart—“ ‘shall -call on the National Socialist -<span class='pageno' title='419' id='Page_419'></span> -guard, and in 5 minutes the troops will march in by my -order.’ ”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>After an interruption, Seyss-Inquart came to the telephone and -informed the Defendant Göring that Miklas was still sticking to -his old viewpoint, although a new person had gone in to talk to -him, and there might be definite word in about 10 minutes. The -conversation proceeded as follows—I quote from Page 2 of Part H, -beginning about the middle of the page:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“Göring: ‘Listen, so I shall wait a few more minutes, till he -comes back; then you inform me via Blitz conversation in -the Reich Chancery as usual, but it has to be done fast. -I can hardly justify it as a matter of fact. I am not entitled -to do so; if it cannot be done, then you have to take over the -power. All right?’</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“Seyss-Inquart: ‘But if he threatens?’</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“Göring: ‘Yes.’</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“Seyss-Inquart: ‘Well, I see; then we shall be ready.’</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“Göring: ‘Call me via Blitz.’ ”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>In other words, Göring and Seyss-Inquart had agreed on a plan -for Seyss-Inquart to take over power if Miklas remained obdurate. -The plan which was already discussed involved the use of both the -National Socialist forces in Austria and the German troops who -had been crossing the borders. Later that night Göring and Seyss-Inquart -had another conversation at about 11 o’clock. This was -after the ultimatum had expired. Seyss-Inquart informed Göring -that Miklas was still refusing to name Seyss-Inquart as Chancellor. -The conversation then proceeded as follows, and I quote from -Part I of this folder:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“Göring: ‘OK’ ”—What’s the German word for OK? -Schön.—“ ‘I shall give the order to march in and then you -make sure that you get the power. Notify the leading people -about the following which I shall tell you now. Everyone -who offers resistance or organizes resistance will immediately -be subjected to our court martial, the court martial of our -invading troops. Is that clear?’</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“Seyss-Inquart: ‘Yes.’</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“Göring: ‘Including leading personalities; it does not make -any difference.’</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“Seyss-Inquart: ‘Yes, they have given the order not to offer -any resistance.’</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“Göring: ‘Yes, it does not matter; the Federal President did -not authorize you, and that also can be considered as -resistance.’ -<span class='pageno' title='420' id='Page_420'></span></p> - -<p class='noindent'>“Seyss-Inquart: ‘Yes.’</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“Göring: ‘Well, now you are officially authorized.’</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“Seyss-Inquart: ‘Yes.’</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“Göring: ‘Well, good luck, Heil Hitler.’ ”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>I am sorry; that conversation took place at 8 o’clock, instead of -11. I meant to say 8 o’clock. It is quite interesting to me that when -the Defendant Göring was planning to invade a peaceful neighboring -state, he planned to try what he referred to as major war -criminals before German court martial, the leading personalities.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>So much for the conversation with respect to the plan of action -for taking over power. Something else very significant was sent -on that subject over the telephone, at least so far as those transcripts -indicate. But there was another historical event which was -discussed over the telephone. I refer to the famous telegram which -Seyss-Inquart sent to the German Government requesting the German -Government to send troops into Austria to help Seyss-Inquart -put down disorder. A conversation held at 8:48 that night between -Göring and Keppler proceeded as follows—I read from Page 1 of -Part L:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“Göring: ‘Well, I do not know yet. Listen, the main thing -is that if Inquart takes over all powers of Government he -keeps the radio stations occupied.’</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“Keppler: ‘Well, we represent the Government now.’</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“Göring: ‘Yes, that’s it. You are the Government. Listen -carefully. The following telegram should be sent here by -Seyss-Inquart. Take the notes: The provisional Austrian -Government which, after the dismissal of the Schuschnigg -Government, considered it its task to establish peace and -order in Austria, sends to the German Government the -urgent request for support in its task of preventing bloodshed. -For this purpose, it asks the German Government to -send German troops as soon as possible.’</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“Keppler: ‘Well, SA and SS are marching through the streets -but everything is quiet. Everything has collapsed with the -professional groups.’ ”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Now let us talk about sending German troops to put down -disorder. The SA and the SS were marching in the streets, but -everything was quiet. And a few minutes later, the conversation -continued thus, reading from Page 2 of Part L:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“Göring: ‘Then our troops will cross the border today.’</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“Keppler: ‘Yes.’</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“Göring: ‘Well, and he should send the telegram as soon -as possible.’ -<span class='pageno' title='421' id='Page_421'></span></p> - -<p class='noindent'>“Keppler: ‘Well, send the telegram to Seyss-Inquart in the -office of the Federal Chancellor.’</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“Göring: ‘Please show him the text of the telegram and do -tell him that we are asking him—well, he does not even -need to send the telegram. All he needs to do is to say, -“Agreed.” ’</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“Keppler: ‘Yes.’</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“Göring: ‘He should call me at the Führer’s or at my place. -Well, good luck. Heil Hitler.’ ”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Well, of course, he did not need to send the telegram because -Göring wrote the telegram. He already had it. It must be recalled -that in the first conversation, Part A, held at 3:05 p.m., Göring had -requested Seyss-Inquart to send the telegram agreed upon, but now -the matter was so urgent that Göring dictated the exact wording -of the telegram over the telephone. And an hour later, at 9:54 p.m. -a conversation between Dr. Dietrich in Berlin and Keppler in -Vienna went on as follows, reading from Part M:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“Dietrich: ‘I need the telegram urgently.’</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“Keppler: ‘Tell the General Field Marshal that Seyss-Inquart -agrees.’</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“Dietrich: ‘This is marvelous. Thank you.’</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“Keppler: ‘Listen to the radio. News will be given.’</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“Dietrich: ‘Where?’</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“Keppler: ‘From Vienna.’</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“Dietrich: ‘So Seyss-Inquart agrees?’</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“Keppler: ‘Jawohl.’ ”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Next the actual order to invade Austria. Communications with -Austria were now suspended but the German military machine had -been set in motion. To demonstrate that, I now offer in evidence -captured Document C-182, offered as Exhibit USA-77, a directive -of 11 March 1938 at 2045 hours, from the Supreme Commander of -the Armed Forces. This directive, initialed by General Jodl and -signed by Hitler, orders the invasion of Austria in view of its -failure to comply with the German ultimatum. The directive reads:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“Top secret; Berlin, 11 March 1938, 2045 hours; Supreme -Commander of the Armed Forces, OKW,”—with other symbols—“35 -copies, 6th copy. C-in-C Navy”—pencil note—“has -been informed. Re: Operation Otto. Directive No. 2.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“1) The demands of the German ultimatum to the Austrian -Government have not been fulfilled.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“2) The Austrian Armed Forces have been ordered to withdraw -before the entry of German troops and to avoid fighting. -<span class='pageno' title='422' id='Page_422'></span> -The Austrian Government has ceased to function of its own -accord.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“3) To avoid further bloodshed in Austrian towns, the entry -of the German Armed Forces into Austria will commence, -according to Directive No. 1, at daybreak on 12.3.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“I expect the set objectives to be reached by exerting all -forces to the full as quickly as possible.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='noindent'>Signed Adolf Hitler; initialed by Jodl and by a name that looks -like Warlimont.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>And then some interesting communications with Rome to avoid -possibility of disaster from that source. At the very time that Hitler -and Göring had embarked on this military undertaking, they -still had a question mark in their minds, and that was Italy. Italy -had massed on the Italian border in 1934 on the occasion of July -25, 1934—the Putsch. Italy had traditionally been the political -protector of Austria.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>With what a sigh of relief did Hitler hear at 10:25 p.m. that -night from Prince Phillipp von Hessen, his Ambassador at Rome, -that he had just come back from the Palazzo Venezia, and Mussolini -had accepted the whole thing in a very friendly manner. The -situation can really be grasped by the rereading of the conversation. -The record of the conversation shows the excitement under -which Hitler was operating when he spoke over the telephone. It -is a short conversation, and I shall read the first half of it from -Part N of the transcript of 2949-PS. I am afraid your title Part N -may be blurred on the mimeographed copy. “H” is Hessen and “F” -is the Führer.</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“Hessen: ‘I have just come back from Palazzo Venezia. Il -Duce accepted the whole thing in a very friendly manner. -He sends you his regards. He had been informed from -Austria; Schuschnigg gave him the news. He had then said -it would be a complete impossibility; it would be a bluff; -such a thing could not be done. So he was told that it was -unfortunately arranged thus, and it could not be changed any -more. Then Mussolini said that Austria would be immaterial -to him.’</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“Hitler: ‘Then please tell Mussolini I will never forget him -for this.’</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“Hessen: ‘Yes.’</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“Hitler: ‘Never, never, never, whatever happens. I am still -ready to make a quite different agreement with him.’</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“Hessen: ‘Yes, I told him that, too.’ -<span class='pageno' title='423' id='Page_423'></span></p> - -<p class='noindent'>“Hitler: ‘As soon as the Austrian affair has been settled, I -shall be ready to go with him through thick and thin; nothing -matters.’</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“Hessen: ‘Yes, my Führer.’</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“Hitler: ‘Listen, I shall make any agreement, I am no longer -in fear of the terrible position which would have existed -militarily in case we had gotten into a conflict. You may tell -him that I do thank him ever so much, never, never shall I -forget that.’</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“Hessen: ‘Yes, my Führer.’</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“Hitler: ‘I will never forget it, whatever will happen. If he -should ever need any help or be in any danger, he can be -convinced that I shall stick to him whatever might happen, -even if the whole world were against him.’</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“Hessen: ‘Yes, my Führer.’</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>The Tribunal will recall the reference in Jodl’s diary to the -letter which Hitler had sent to Mussolini. It is dated March 11. It -may be found in the official publication <span class='it'>Dokumente der Deutschen -Politik</span>, Volume 6, I, Page 135, Number 24-a. I ask the Court to -take judicial notice of it, and you will find a translation of it appearing -in our Document 2510-PS. In this letter, after stating that -Austria had been declining into anarchy, Hitler wrote—and I quote:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“I have decided to re-establish order in my fatherland—order -and tranquility—and to give to the popular will the possibility -of settling its own fate in unmistakable fashion openly -and by its own decision.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>He stated that this was an act of self-defense; that he had no -hostile intentions towards Italy. And after the invasion, when Hitler -was at Linz, Austria, he communicated his gratitude to Mussolini -once more in the famous telegram which the world so well -remembers. I again cite <span class='it'>Dokumente der Deutschen Politik</span>, Volume -6, Page 156, Number 29, the translation of the telegram being in -our Document 2467-PS, and the document reads: “Mussolini, I will -never forget you for this.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>We now shift our scene from Vienna to Berlin. We have shifted -our scene, I meant, from Vienna to Berlin. It may now be appropriate -to come back to Vienna just long enough to recall that late -in the evening of March 11, President Miklas did appoint Defendant -Seyss-Inquart as Chancellor. The radio announcement of Seyss-Inquart’s -appointment was made at 11:15 p.m. This is noted in -<span class='it'>Dokumente der Deutschen Politik</span>, Volume 6, I, Page 137, Number -25-a, and a translation of the announcement is in our Document -2465-PS. -<span class='pageno' title='424' id='Page_424'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>Then something had to be done in London to smooth things over -there and, accordingly, one more act played on the international -scene is set down in the Air Ministry telephone transcript. On -Sunday, March 13, 1938, the day after the invasion, Defendant -Göring who had been left in Berlin in charge of the Reich by Hitler, -who had gone to his fatherland, phoned Defendant Ribbentrop -in London. I find this conversation very illuminating as to the way -in which these defendants operated, using, if I may employ American -vernacular, a kind of international “double talk” to soothe and -mislead other nations. I quote from Part 1 of item W of Document -2949-PS:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“Göring:”—speaking to Ribbentrop in London:—“ ‘As you -know, the Führer has entrusted me with the administration -of the current government procedures (Führung der Regierungsgeschäfte), -and therefore I wanted to inform you. There -is overwhelming joy in Austria, that you can hear over the -radio.’</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“Ribbentrop: ‘Yes, it is fantastic, is it not?’</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“Göring: ‘Yes, the last march into the Rhineland is completely -overshadowed. The Führer was deeply moved, when he talked -to me last night. You must remember it was the first time -that he saw his homeland again. Now, I mainly want to talk -about political things. Well, this story that we had given an -ultimatum is just foolish gossip. From the very beginning the -National Socialist Ministers and the representatives of the -people (Volksreferenten) have presented the ultimatum. Later -on more and more prominent people of the movement participated, -and as a natural result, the Austrian National Socialist -Ministers asked us to back them up so that they would -not be completely beaten up again and be subjected to terror -and civil war. Then we told them we would not allow -Schuschnigg to provoke a civil war, under any circumstances. -Whether by Schuschnigg’s direct order or with his consent, -the communists and the Reds had been armed and were -already making demonstrations, which were photographed -with “Heil Moskau” and so on. Naturally, all these facts -caused some danger for Wiener-Neustadt. Then you have to -consider that Schuschnigg made his speeches, telling them the -Vaterländische Front would fight to the last man. One could -not know that they would capitulate like that, and therefore -Seyss-Inquart, who already had taken over the Government, -asked us to march in immediately. We had already marched -up to the frontier before this, since we could not know -<span class='pageno' title='425' id='Page_425'></span> -whether or not there would be a civil war. These are the -actual facts which can be proved by documents.’ ”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>There the Defendant Göring was giving to the Defendant -Ribbentrop the proper line that he should take in London as to how -to explain what had happened in Austria. Of course, when the -Defendant Göring said that his story about this matter could be -proved by documents, I don’t think he had in mind that his own -telephone calls might constitute documents.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Another rather interesting item begins on Page 3 of the English -text of this Part W—still Göring talking to Ribbentrop in London. -This is at the bottom of the page:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“Göring: ‘No, no, I think so, too. Only, I did not know if you -had spoken already to these people. I want you once more,—but -no, not at all once more, but generally speaking—tell -the following to Halifax and Chamberlain: It is not correct -that Germany has given an ultimatum. This is a lie by -Schuschnigg, because the ultimatum was presented to him -by Seyss-Inquart, Glaise-Horstenau, and Jury. Furthermore, -it is not true that we have presented an ultimatum to the -Federal President, but that it also was given by the others, -and as far as I know, just a military attaché came along, -asked by Seyss-Inquart, because of a technical question.’ ”—you -will recall that he was a lieutenant general directed -by Göring to go along—“ ‘He was supposed to ask whether, -in case Seyss-Inquart would ask for the support of German -troops, Germany would grant this request. Furthermore, I -want to state that Seyss-Inquart asked us expressly, by phone -and by telegram, to send troops because he did not know -about the situation in Wiener-Neustadt, Vienna, and so on; -because arms had been distributed there. And then he could -not know how the Fatherland Front might react since they -always had had such a big mouth.’</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“Ribbentrop: ‘Herr Göring, tell me, how is the situation in -Vienna; is everything settled yet?’</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“Göring: ‘Yes. Yesterday I landed hundreds of airplanes -with some companies, in order to secure the airfields, and -they were received with joy. Today the advance unit of the -17th division marches in, together with the Austrian troops. -Also, I want to point out that the Austrian troops did not -withdraw, but that they got together and fraternized immediately -with the German troops, wherever they were -stationed.’ ”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>These are quite interesting explanations that the ultimatum -was by Seyss-Inquart alone and not by Göring; that Lieutenant -<span class='pageno' title='426' id='Page_426'></span> -General Muff, the military attaché, was along just to answer a -technical question, and that Seyss-Inquart asked expressly by telephone -and telegram for troops. But, perhaps to understand this -conversation, we must try to create again the actual physical scene -of the time and place as Göring talked over the phone. I quote -eight lines from Page 11 of the English text, about in the middle, -Part W:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“Göring: ‘Well, do come! I shall be delighted to see you.’</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“Ribbentrop: ‘I shall see you this afternoon.’</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“Göring: ‘The weather is wonderful here—blue sky. I am -sitting here on my balcony—all covered with blankets—in -the fresh air, drinking my coffee. Later on I have to drive -in. I have to make the speech. And the birds are twittering, -and here and there I can hear over the radio the enthusiasm, -which must be wonderful over there.’ ”—that is, Vienna.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“Ribbentrop: ‘That is marvelous.’ ”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>May it please the Tribunal, I have practically come to the end of -the material relating to the aggression against Austria. In a moment -I shall take up quite briefly the effects of the Anschluss, some of the -developments which took place after the German troops marched -across the border. What is to come after that is an epilogue, but -before developing the epilogue, it may be appropriate to pause -briefly for just a moment. I think that the facts which I have -related to the Tribunal today show plainly certain things about the -defendants involved in the conspiracy, and among the conspirators -who particularly took action in the Austrian matter were Von Papen, -Seyss-Inquart, Ribbentrop, Von Neurath, and Göring.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>First, I think it is plain that these men were dangerous men. -They used their power without a bridle. They used their power to -override the independence and freedom of others. And they were -more than bullies squeezing a smaller foe. They were very sly -bullies. They compounded their force with fraud. They coupled -threats with legal technicalities and devious maneuvers, wearing -a sanctimonious mask to cover their duplicity. I think they are -dangerous men.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In accordance with the directive of March 11, our Document -C-182, Exhibit USA-77, the German Army crossed the Austrian -border at daybreak, 12 March 1938. Hitler issued a proclamation to -the German people announcing the invasion, and purporting to -justify it. I refer again to <span class='it'>Dokumente der Deutschen Politik</span>, Volume -6, Page 140, Number 27, “Proclamation of Hitler.” The British -Government and the French Government filed protests. The German -Government and the Austrian National Socialists swiftly secured -their grip on Austria. Seyss-Inquart welcomed Hitler at Linz, -<span class='pageno' title='427' id='Page_427'></span> -and they both expressed their joy over the events of the day. Seyss-Inquart -in his speech declared Article 88 of the Treaty of St. Germain -inoperative. I refer to the speech of Seyss-Inquart at Linz on -12 March 1938, as contained in the <span class='it'>Dokumente der Deutschen Politik</span>, -Volume 6, I, Page 144, Number 28-a, of which I ask the Tribunal to -take judicial notice, and which you will find translated in our Document -2485-PS.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>For a view of what was happening in Vienna, I offer in evidence -our Document L-292, telegram 70, American Legation, Vienna, to -the American Secretary of State, 12 March 1938, and I offer it as -Exhibit USA-78. I quote it in full:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“Secretary of State, Washington; March 12, noon.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“Numerous German bombers flying over Vienna dropping -leaflets ‘National Socialist Germany greets its possession, -National Socialist Austria and her new Government in true -indivisible Union.’</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“Continual rumors small German troop movements into -Austria and impending arrival Austrian Legion. SS and SA -in undisputed control in Vienna. Police wear swastika arm -bands. Schuschnigg and Schmidt rumored arrested. Himmler -and Hess here.”—Signed—“Wiley.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>The law-making machine was put to work immediately on the -task of consolidation. For all of this material I shall merely refer -the Tribunal to the German sources and to the document number of -the English translation, but I think I need not offer these legislative -acts in evidence but shall merely invite the Court to take judicial -notice of them.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>First, Miklas was forced to resign as President. I refer to <span class='it'>Dokumente -der Deutschen Politik</span>, Volume 6, I, Page 147, Number 30-b. -Our translation is in our Document 2466-PS.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In this connection the Court will no doubt recall Göring’s telephone -conversation as shown in Document 2949-PS, that in view of -Miklas’ delay in appointing Seyss-Inquart, Miklas would be dismissed. -Seyss-Inquart became both Chancellor and President.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>He then signed a Federal Constitutional Law of March 13, 1938 -for the reunion of Austria with the German Reich, which in turn -was incorporated into the Reich Statute of Reunion, passed the same -day, German law. I cite for that the <span class='it'>Reichsgesetzblatt</span> 1938, Volume -1, Page 237, Number 21, a translation of which will be found -in our Document 2307-PS.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>This Federal Constitutional Law declared Austria to be a province -of the German Reich. By annexing Austria into the German -Reich, Germany violated Article 80 of the Treaty of Versailles, -<span class='pageno' title='428' id='Page_428'></span> -which provided (by the way, on the Constitutional Law to which -I just referred there appear as signatories the following names:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Adolf Hitler, Führer and Reich Chancellor; Göring, General Field -Marshal, Reich Minister of Aviation; Frick, Reich Minister of the -Interior; Von Ribbentrop, Reich Minister of Foreign Affairs; R. Hess, -Deputy Führer.)</p> - -<p class='pindent'>By annexing Austria into the German Reich, Germany violated -Article 80 of the Treaty of Versailles, which provides, and I quote:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“Germany acknowledges and will respect the independence of -Austria within the frontier, which may be fixed in a treaty -between that state and the principal Allied and Associated -Powers. She agrees that this independence shall be inalienable.” -(JN-2)</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Similarly, the Austrian action violated Article 88 of the Treaty -of St. Germain, which provides:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“The independence of Austria is inalienable, otherwise than -with the consent of the Council of the League of Nations. -Consequently, Austria undertakes, in the absence of the consent -of the said Council, to abstain from any act which might -directly or indirectly or by any means whatever compromise -her independence, particularly until her admission to membership -of the League of Nations, by participation in the -affairs of another power.” (JN-3)</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>This basic Constitutional Law provided for a plebiscite to be -held on 10 April 1938 on the question of reunion, but this was a -mere formality. The plebiscite could only confirm the union declared -in the law. It could not undo Germany’s union with, and -control over, Austria.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>To illustrate the way in which legal consolidation was swiftly -assured under conditions of occupation of Austria by troops, it is -not necessary to do more than review some of the acts passed -within the month.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Hitler placed the Austrian Federal Army under his own command -and required all members of the Army to take an oath of -allegiance to Hitler as their Supreme Commander. A translation of -the pertinent document will be found in our 2936-PS, and I refer -to the instruction of the Führer and Reich Chancellor, concerning -the Austrian Federal Army, March 13, 1938, <span class='it'>Dokumente der Deutschen -Politik</span>, Volume 6, I, Page 150.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Public officials of the Province of Austria were required to take -an oath of office swearing allegiance to Hitler, Führer of the German -Reich and people. Jewish officials as defined were not permitted -to take the oath. -<span class='pageno' title='429' id='Page_429'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>I refer to a decree of the Führer and Reich Chancellor concerning -the administration of oath to the officials of the Province of -Austria, March 15, 1938, <span class='it'>Reichsgesetzblatt</span> 1938, Volume 1, Page 245, -Number 24, the translation being in our Document 2311-PS.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Hitler and Frick signed a decree applying to Austria various -Reich Laws, including the law of 1933 against the formation of new -political parties, and the 1933 Law for the Preservation of Unity of -Party and State.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I refer to the first decree of the Führer and Reich Chancellor -concerning the introduction of German Reich Law into Austria, -15 March 1938, <span class='it'>Reichsgesetzblatt</span> 1938, Volume 1, Page 247, Number -25, the translation being in our Document 2310-PS.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Hitler, Frick, and Göring ordered that the Reich Minister of the -Interior be the central authority for carrying out the reunion of -Austria with the German Reich. I cite the order pursuant to the -law concerning the reunion of Austria with the German Reich, -March 16, 1938, <span class='it'>Reichsgesetzblatt</span> 1938, Volume 1, Page 249, Number -25, translated in our 1060-PS.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In connection with Germany’s extensive propaganda campaign -to insure acceptability of the German regime, it may be noted that -Goebbels established a Reich Propaganda Office in Vienna.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I cite the order concerning the establishment of a Reich Propaganda -Office in Vienna, March 31, 1938, <span class='it'>Reichsgesetzblatt</span> 1938, Volume -1, Page 350, Number 46, translated in our Document 2935-PS.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The ballot addressed to soldiers of the former Austrian Army -as “German soldiers” asked the voters whether they agreed with -the accomplishment and ratification on March 13, 1938 of the reuniting -of Austria with Germany.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I cite the second order concerning plebiscite and election for the -Greater German Reichstag of March 24, 1938, <span class='it'>Reichsgesetzblatt</span> 1938, -Volume 1, Page 303, translated in our Document 1659-PS.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The ground work was fully laid before the holding of the plebiscite -“for German men and women of Austria” promised in the -basic law of March 13.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Then, the importance of Austria in further aggression. Could we -run that screen up, or is the chart still behind it? Well, the Court -will remember the chart.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The seizure of Austria had now formed that lower jaw to the -head of the wolf around the head of Czechoslovakia. Germany’s -desire to consummate the Anschluss with Austria and her determination -to execute that aim in the way and at the time that she -did—that is, with threat of military force, quickly, and despite -political risk—was due to the importance of Austria in her further -plans of aggression. -<span class='pageno' title='430' id='Page_430'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>The conference held November 5, 1937, planning for aggressive -war in Europe, outlined as objectives in Austria the conquest of -food through expulsion of a million people and the effective increase -in fighting strength, in part through the improvement in the -frontier.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I cite again Document 386-PS, Exhibit USA-25. Austria was to -yield to Germany material resources, and moreover, she provided -ready cash taken from the Jews and from the Austrian Government.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>One of the first orders passed after the Anschluss was an order -signed by Hitler, Frick, Schwerin von Krosigk and Schacht for the -transfer to the Reich of the assets of the Austrian National Bank. -I refer to the order for the transfer of the Austrian National Bank -to the Reichsbank, March 17, 1938, <span class='it'>Reichsgesetzblatt</span> 1938, Volume 1, -Page 254, Number 27, translated in our 2313-PS.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Austria also yielded human resources. Three months after the -Anschluss there was enacted a decree requiring the 21-year-old men, -Austrian men, to report for active military service. I refer to the -decree regarding registration for active military service in Austria -during 1938, <span class='it'>Reichsgesetzblatt</span> 1938, Volume 1, Page 634, translated -in our 1660-PS.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>And the acquisition of Austria improved the military strategic -position of the German Army. I invite the Court’s attention to a -document which I introduced in the case on preparation for aggression, -L-172, Exhibit USA-34, which was a lecture delivered by General -Jodl, Chief of the German Staff of the Armed Forces, on 7 November -1943, at Munich, to the Gauleiter. Only one page of that -lecture appears in this particular document book, and I quote from -one paragraph on Page 5 of the English text, which is Page 7 of -Jodl’s lecture, which reviewed the situation in 1938:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“The Austrian Anschluss, in its turn, brought with it not only -the fulfillment of an old national aim but also had the effect -both of reinforcing our fighting strength and of materially -improving our strategic position. Whereas, until then the -territory of Czechoslovakia had projected in a most menacing -way right into Germany—a wasp waist in the direction of -France and an air base for the Allies, in particular Russia—Czechoslovakia -herself was now enclosed by pincers. Her -own strategic position had now become so unfavorable that -she was bound to fall a victim to any attack pressed home -with vigor before effective aid from the west could be expected -to arrive.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>The Nazi conspirators were now ready to carry out the second -part of this second phase of their aggression and to take over -Czechoslovakia. -<span class='pageno' title='431' id='Page_431'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>Logically, if the Tribunal please, we should proceed at this point -with the story about Czechoslovakia. For reasons that I explained -earlier in the week we have had to change our plans somewhat -from a strictly logical order, and the plan at present is that on -Monday I shall go forward with the Czechoslovakian part of the -aggressive war case.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>At this point it is planned by our staff to show a motion picture, -and it will take some few minutes to make the physical arrangements -in the courtroom, so that if the Court should feel like recessing, -those arrangements could be made.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Could you tell me how long the showing of -the picture will take?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. ALDERMAN: My understanding is about an hour.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn for 10 minutes then, shall we -now, or until the picture is ready?</p> - -<p class='line' style='text-align:center;margin-top:2em;margin-bottom:2em;'>[<span class='it'>A recess was taken.</span>]</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. STOREY: If the Tribunal please, Sir, supplementing what -Mr. Alderman has said, we have had to readjust our presentation -to some extent. Tomorrow morning, a witness will be offered for -interrogation. Then Mr. Alderman on Monday; and Sir Hartley -Shawcross will make the opening statement for the British Empire -on Tuesday morning.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The film this afternoon, at the request of defendants’ counsel, -made in writing to the Court, has been exhibited to defendants’ -counsel on day before yesterday evening in this courtroom. I personally -requested Dr. Dix to convey the invitation to Defense Counsel -to witness the film. Eight of them came. Dr. Dix advised me -kindly that he would not come unless he was forced to come.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I now present Mr. Dodd, who will have charge of the presentation.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: If it please the Tribunal, the Prosecution for the -United States will at this time present to the Tribunal, with its -permission, a documentary film on concentration camps. This is by -no means the entire proof which the prosecution will offer with -respect to the subject of concentration camps, but this film which -we offer represents in a brief and unforgettable form an explanation -of what the words “concentration camp” imply.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>This subject arises appropriately in the narrative of events -leading up to the actual outbreak of aggressive war, which, as -Mr. Alderman’s presentation shows, was planned and prepared by -the Nazi conspirators. We propose to show that concentration -<span class='pageno' title='432' id='Page_432'></span> -camps were not an end in themselves but rather they were an -integral part of the Nazi system of government. As we shall show, -the black-shirted guards of the SS and the Gestapo stood ranged -behind the official pages of the <span class='it'>Reichsgesetzblatt</span>.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>We intend to prove that each and every one of these defendants -knew of the existence of these concentration camps; that fear and -terror and nameless horror of the concentration camps were instruments -by which the defendants retained power and suppressed -opposition to any of their policies, including, of course, their plans -for aggressive war. By this means they enforced the controls imposed -upon the German people, as required to execute these plans, -and obliterated freedom in Germany and in the countries invaded -and occupied by the armies of the Third Reich.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Finally, we ask the Tribunal in viewing this film to bear in -mind the fact that the proof to be offered at a later stage of this -Trial will show that on some of the organizations charged in this -Indictment lies the responsibility for the origination, the control, -and the maintenance of the whole concentration camp system: -Upon the SS, the SD—a part of the SS which tracked down the -victims—upon the Gestapo, which committed the victims to the -camps, and upon other branches of the SS which were in charge -of the atrocities committed therein.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Commander James Donovan will introduce the film with a statement -explaining its source and its authenticity.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COMMANDER JAMES BRITT DONOVAN, USNR. (Prosecution -Counsel for the United States): May it please the Tribunal, I refer -to Document Number 2430-PS, concerning the motion picture entitled -“Nazi Concentration Camps” and to the affidavits of Commander -James B. Donovan, Lieutenant Colonel George C. Stevens, -Lieutenant E. R. Kellogg and Colonel Erik Tiebold contained -therein. The affidavits of Colonel Stevens and of Lieutenant Kellogg -are also contained in the motion picture, and thus will be in -the record of the Tribunal. With the permission of the Tribunal, -I shall now, however, read into the record those affidavits not -appearing in the film.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: In the absence of any objection by the Defense -Counsel, we don’t think it is necessary to read these formal -affidavits.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COMMANDER DONOVAN: Yes, Sir. The United States now -offers in evidence an official documentary motion picture report on -Nazi concentration camps. This report has been compiled from -motion pictures taken by Allied military photographers as the Allied -armies in the West liberated the areas in which these camps were -<span class='pageno' title='433' id='Page_433'></span> -located. The accompanying narration is taken directly from the -reports of the military photographers who filmed the camps.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>While these motion pictures speak for themselves in evidencing -life and death in Nazi concentration camps, proper authentication -of the films is contained in the affidavits of the United States Army -and Navy officers to which I have referred.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>As has been stated, this motion picture has been made available -to all defense counsel and they possess copies in their Information -Room of the supporting affidavits duly translated.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>If the Tribunal please, we shall proceed with the projection of -the film, Document 2430-PS, Exhibit USA-79.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Photographs were then projected on the screen showing the -following affidavits while at the same time the voices of the -respective affiants were reproduced reading them.</span>]</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“I, George C. Stevens, Lieutenant Colonel, Army of the United -States, hereby certify:</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“1. From 1 March 1945 to 8 May 1945 I was on active duty -with the United States Army Signal Corps attached to the -Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces, and -among my official duties was direction of the photographing -of the Nazi concentration camps and prison camps as liberated -by Allied Forces.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“2. The motion pictures which will be shown following this -affidavit were taken by official Allied photographic teams in -the course of their military duties, each team being composed -of military personnel under the direction of a commissioned -officer.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“3. To the best of my knowledge and belief, these motion -pictures constitute a true representation of the individuals -and scenes photographed. They have not been altered in any -respect since the exposures were made. The accompanying -narration is a true statement of the facts and circumstances -under which these pictures were made.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“(Signed) George C. Stevens, Lieutenant Colonel, AUS.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“Sworn to before me this 2nd day of October 1945.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“(Signed) James B. Donovan, Commander, United States Naval -Reserve.”</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“I, E. R. Kellogg, Lieutenant, United States Navy, hereby certify -that:</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“1. From 1929 to 1941 I was employed at the Twentieth Century -Fox Studios in Hollywood, California, as a director of -film effects, and am familiar with all photographic techniques. -Since 6 September 1941 to the present date of 27 August 1945, -I have been on active duty with the United States Navy. -<span class='pageno' title='434' id='Page_434'></span></p> - -<p class='noindent'>“2. I have carefully examined the motion picture film to be -shown following this affidavit and I certify that the images -of these excerpts from the original negative have not been -retouched, distorted or otherwise altered in any respect and -are true copies of the originals held in the vaults of the -United States Army Signal Corps. These excerpts comprise -6,000 feet of film selected from 80,000 feet, all of which I have -reviewed and all of which is similar in character to these -excerpts.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“(Signed) E. R. Kellogg, Lieutenant, United States Navy.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“Sworn to before me this 27 day of August 1945.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“(Signed) John Ford, Captain, United States Navy.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>The film was then shown.</span>]</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. STOREY: That concludes the presentation.</p> - -<p class='line' style='text-align:center;margin-top:2em;margin-bottom:1em;'>[<span class='it'>The Tribunal adjourned until 30 November 1945 at 1000 hours.</span>]</p> - -<hr class='pbk'/> - -<div><span class='pageno' title='435' id='Page_435'></span><h1>NINTH DAY<br/> <span style='font-size:smaller'>Friday, 30 November 1945</span></h1></div> - -<h2 class='nobreak'><span class='it'>Morning Session</span></h2> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I call on the Prosecutor for the United -States.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Colonel Amen will represent the -United States this morning.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COLONEL JOHN HARLAN AMEN (Associate Trial Counsel for -the United States): May it please the Tribunal, I propose to call as -the first witness for the Prosecution, Major General Erwin Lahousen.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal wish me to state that the -evidence of the witness whom you propose to call must be strictly -confined to the count with which the United States are dealing, -Count One.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: May I have a moment to discuss that with the -Chief Counsel of the United States?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes, certainly.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. OTTO NELTE (Counsel for Defendant Keitel): Mr. President, -so far as I know the Prosecution . . .</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Would you state for whom you appear? Do -you appear for the Defendant Keitel?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: Yes. As far as I know, an agreement was reached -between the Prosecution and the Defense, to the effect that -whenever possible, questions to be brought up in the proceedings -on the following day should be announced beforehand. The obvious -purpose of this very reasonable understanding was to enable -Defense Counsel to discuss forthcoming questions with their clients, -and thus to assure a rapid and even progress of the Trial.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I was not informed that the witness Lahousen was to be called -by the Prosecution today, nor was I told on what questions he was -to be heard.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>It was particularly important to know this, because today, I -believe, the witness Lahousen was not to be heard on questions -connected with the Prosecution’s case as presented during the past -days.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: That is the contrary of what I said. What -I said was that the witness was to be confined to evidence relating -<span class='pageno' title='436' id='Page_436'></span> -to Count One, which is the Count that has been solely discussed up -to the present date.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: Do you mean, Mr. President, that in order to -enable the Defense to cross-examine the witness, there will be a -recess after the interrogation by the Prosecution during which -Counsel may discuss the questions with their clients? The witness -Lahousen, as far as I recall, has never until now been mentioned by -the Prosecution.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Is that all you have to say?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I think the Tribunal would like to hear -Counsel for the United States upon the agreement which counsel -for the Defendant Keitel alleges, namely, an agreement that what -was to be discussed on the following day should be communicated -to defendants’ counsel beforehand.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I know of no agreement to inform -defendants’ counsel of any witness, nor of his testimony; nor would -I want to make such. There are security reasons involved in disclosing -to Defense Counsel the names of witnesses, which I don’t -need to enlarge upon, I am quite sure.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>We did advise them that they would be given information as to -the documentary matters, and I think that has been kept.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>As to witnesses, however, a matter of policy arises. These witnesses -are not always prisoners. They have to be treated in somewhat -different fashion than prisoners; and the protection of their -security is a very important consideration where we are trying this -case, in the very hotbed of the Nazi organization with which some -of Defense Counsel were identified.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I think, Mr. Justice Jackson, that that is -sufficient. If you tell the Tribunal that there was no such agreement, -the Tribunal will, of course, accept that.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I know of nothing of that character, -relating to witnesses. That does apply to documents.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>We find it very difficult to know just the meaning of the ruling -which the Court has just announced. Count One of the Indictment -is a conspiracy count, covering the entire substantive part of the -Indictment. There are problems, of course, of overlapping, which -I had supposed had been worked out between the prosecutors -until this morning. It is impossible, trying a conspiracy case, to -keep from mentioning the fact that the act, which was the object -of the conspiracy, was performed. In fact, that is a part of the -evidence of the conspiracy. -<span class='pageno' title='437' id='Page_437'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>I know I don’t need to enlarge upon the wide scope of evidence -in a conspiracy case. I think, perhaps, the best way to do is to -swear the witness, and that the other prosecutors, if they feel their -field is being trespassed upon, or the judges, if they feel that we -are exceeding, raise the objection specifically; because I don’t know -how we can separate, particularly on a moment’s notice, Count One -from the other Counts.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>We have tried our best to work out an arrangement that would -be fair, as between ourselves and the other prosecutors, but we find -it impossible always to please everybody.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>With the greatest deference to the ruling of the Court, I would -like to suggest that we proceed. I don’t know just what the bounds -of the ruling might be, but I think the only way we can find out -is to proceed, and have specific objections to the specific things -which anyone feels have been transgressed; and in doing that, I -want to say that we do it with the greatest respect to the ruling, -but that we may find ourselves in conflict with it, because of the -difficulty of any boundary on the subject.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Stahmer?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. STAHMER: Mr. President, I must return to the matter -raised by Doctor Nelte, namely his statement that before the beginning -of the Trial the Defense and the Prosecution reached an -agreement to the effect that the next day’s program should always -be made known to the Defense on the previous day. Such an -agreement was actually reached, and I cannot understand why the -Prosecution was not informed of it. We considered the possibility -and then reached this agreement in a conference with Doctor -Kempner, who was acting as our liaison man. I should like further -to point out the following:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The Prosecution stated that for security reasons the Defense -could not be furnished with the names of witnesses to be called -during the next day’s proceedings. The press however received, -as early as yesterday, information on the witnesses to be called -today. We heard of this through representatives of the press this -morning and, as far as I know, the information also appeared in -today’s papers. I cannot understand, therefore, why it was withheld -from us, and why we were told that for security reasons, it -could not be communicated to us. I think this amounts to a -mistrust of the Defense’s discretion that is quite unjustified. It is, -furthermore, incorrect that we are now receiving documents in good -time; they still reach us belatedly. For instance, a document which -is to be dealt with in court today was put on our desks only this -morning, moreover, in a language which many of the defending -<span class='pageno' title='438' id='Page_438'></span> -counsel cannot understand, since they do not have complete -mastery of English.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>As I have already submitted this complaint to the Prosecution -in writing, may I ask the Tribunal to reach a decision in this -matter as soon as possible.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Have you finished?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. STAHMER: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: It is quite correct that the name of -the witness who is to be used today was given to the press. The -question of our policy as to giving witnesses’ names was submitted -to me last night after Court recessed, because we had not been -using witnesses heretofore; and I then stated to Colonel Storey that -witnesses’ names must not be given to the Defense Counsel for -security reasons.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>He communicated that, I believe, to Doctor Dix. I found that -later it had been given to the press. They, of course, have had -adequate information therefore as to this witness. However, I am -speaking about the policy. We cannot be under an obligation to -inform these counsel of the names of witnesses who will be called, -who are here in Nuremberg, but not in prison; the situation does -not permit that. Neither can we furnish transcripts of testimony -or that sort of thing of witnesses in advance.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Now we want to give the Defense Counsel everything that, in -the fair conduct of the Trial, they ought to have. They are now -receiving much more than any citizen of the United States gets on -trial in the courts of the United States, in some respects, as to -advance information and copies and help and service, and I do -think that to ask us to disclose to them in advance either the names -or substance of testimony—oftentimes the substance would disclose -the witness—would not be proper. It was stated yesterday that we -would take up a witness today.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: We have already heard two of the counsel -on behalf of the Defense. Have you anything to add which is different -to what they have said?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: Yes, I believe I can explain a misunderstanding and -clarify the whole problem.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Mr. President, as far as I am informed—I do not know what -was discussed in my absence—the situation is this:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Though discussions took place, no agreement was reached between -the Prosecution and the Defense. There is, as Your Lordship -knows, only a decision of the Tribunal regarding documents; -that decision is known and I need not repeat. As far as witnesses -are concerned I think I may assume that we are all agreed that the -<span class='pageno' title='439' id='Page_439'></span> -desire of the Defense to know the names of witnesses ahead of -time is justified.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The Tribunal must decide to what extent security reasons interfere -with this desire, which is in itself justified. That is a matter -which the Defense cannot determine. I think I understand Mr. -Justice Jackson correctly in saying that if the press is being told -what witnesses will appear on the next day, then it is a matter of -course that the same information should be given to Defense -Counsel at the same time. This was only a series of unhappy -circumstances, which can be overcome by mutual understanding -and good will.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>As I said, I do not know what was agreed upon before I was -present here. I cannot therefore contradict my colleague, Dr. Stahmer, -in this matter. I think it possible, however, that the misunderstanding -arose as a result of the decision of the Court to have documents -submitted to us 48 hours in advance and to have the film -shown to us beforehand, a decision which led my colleague to the -conclusion—and I consider it a justified conclusion—that all matters -of this sort were to be submitted to us in advance. We do not, of -course, expect to be informed of the contents of the witness’ -testimony.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>After this elucidation I should like to state my request that in -the future we be informed as soon as possible which witness is to -be called; and I should also like to ask that the security considerations -be guided by the knowledge that the Defense as a body -is reliable, determined and capable of assisting the Court in -reaching its verdict by submitting to the discipline of the proceedings. -I ask, therefore, that the cases in which the security officer -believes that he should not communicate the name of the witness -beforehand, should be reduced to an absolute minimum.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will consider the submissions -which have been made to them on behalf of Defense Counsel with -reference to what shall or what shall not be communicated to -them. With reference to the witness whom the United States -desire to call, they will now be permitted to call him. With -reference to what I said about confining his evidence to the first -count, the Tribunal thinks that the best course would be for the -other prosecutors to have the opportunity now to ask any -questions which they think right, and that they may have the -opportunity, if they wish, of calling the witness later upon their -own counts.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>As to cross-examination by the defendants’ counsel, that will be -allowed to them in the most convenient way possible, so that if -they wish to have an opportunity of communicating with their -<span class='pageno' title='440' id='Page_440'></span> -clients before they cross-examine, they may have the opportunity -of doing so. Now we will continue.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: May we have General Lahousen brought before -the Tribunal? What is your name?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>ERWIN LAHOUSEN (Witness): Erwin Lahousen.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: Will you please spell it?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAHOUSEN: L-a-h-o-u-s-e-n.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: Will you say this oath after me: “I swear by God—the -Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and -will withhold and add nothing.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>The witness repeated the oath.</span>]</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Don’t you think the witness had better sit -down?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: I think he should be allowed to sit down, particularly -since he has a heart condition which may be aggravated.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Very well; you may sit down.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: Where were you born?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAHOUSEN: I was born in Vienna.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: On what date?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAHOUSEN: On 25 October 1897.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: What has been your occupation?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAHOUSEN: I was a professional soldier.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: Where were you trained?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAHOUSEN: I was trained in Austria, in the Military Academy -in Wiener-Neustadt.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: Were you immediately commissioned as an officer?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAHOUSEN: In 1915 I was commissioned as a second lieutenant -in the infantry.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: Did you serve in the first World War?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAHOUSEN: Yes, as second and first lieutenant in the infantry.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: Were you promoted from time to time thereafter?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAHOUSEN: Yes, I was promoted under the normal regulations -valid in Austria at the time.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: By 1930 what rank had you attained?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAHOUSEN: In 1930 I was a captain.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: And commencing in 1930 did you take any additional -training?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAHOUSEN: In 1930 I entered the Austrian War School, which -corresponds to the Military Academy in the German Army. There -I received the training of an officer of the General Staff. -<span class='pageno' title='441' id='Page_441'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: How long did this training last?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAHOUSEN: This training lasted 3 years.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: In 1933 to what regular army unit were you -assigned?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAHOUSEN: In 1933 I was serving in the Second Austrian -Division, that was the Vienna Division.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: What type of work did you do there?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAHOUSEN: I was an intelligence officer; that branch of the -service for which I was already destined at the end of my training.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: Did you then receive a further promotion?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAHOUSEN: I was promoted normally in accordance with the -regulations valid in Austria, and roughly at the end of 1933 I -became a major. About 1935 or the beginning of 1936 I was transferred -to the General Staff, and in June, or at any rate, in the -summer of 1936, I became a lieutenant colonel of the Austrian -General Staff.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: And were you assigned to the Intelligence Division -at or about that time?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAHOUSEN: I entered the Austrian Intelligence Division which -corresponds technically to the Abwehr in the German Army. I -must add that an Intelligence Division was only added to the -Austrian Army about this time, i.e. 1936; before that year it did -not exist. Since it was planned to re-establish within the framework -of the Austrian Federal Army the military Intelligence Division -which had ceased to exist after the collapse of the Austrian-Hungarian -Empire, I was trained to assist in organizing this -division within the framework of the Austrian Army.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: After being assigned to the Intelligence Division, -how were your activities principally directed?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAHOUSEN: My responsible chief, or more exactly, the responsible -chief at that time, was Colonel of the General Staff Böhme. -He was the division chief to whom I was subordinate, the Chief of -the Intelligence Division, the man to whom I was responsible, from -whom I received my orders and instructions; later on it was the -Chief of the Austrian General Staff.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Can’t you shorten this, Colonel Amen? We -really need not have all this detail.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: Very good, Sir. It is, however, I think important -for the Tribunal to understand more of this information than you -ordinarily would by virtue of the fact that he was taken over -subsequently to a corresponding position in the German Army, -which I did want the Tribunal to appreciate. -<span class='pageno' title='442' id='Page_442'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>Now, will you state to the Tribunal what your principal -activities were after being assigned to the Intelligence Division? -What information were you interested in and seeking to obtain?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAHOUSEN: May I repeat—I don’t know if I understood you -correctly—I was a member of the Austrian Intelligence Division, -and not of the German Abwehr.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: After the Anschluss, what position did you assume?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAHOUSEN: After the Anschluss I was automatically taken -into the High Command of the German Armed Forces, where I did -the same work. In that position I was then a member of the Abwehr -and my chief was Admiral Canaris.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: And what was the position of Admiral Canaris?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAHOUSEN: Canaris was at that time Chief of the German -Abwehr, the German Intelligence.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: And will you explain briefly the responsibility of -the principal departments of the Abwehr under Admiral Canaris?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAHOUSEN: When, after the Anschluss in 1938, I entered the -Amt Ausland-Abwehr there were three Abwehr divisions, and the -division called “Ausland,” and together they formed the organization -known as “Ausland-Abwehr.” That was the set-up of the -organization in my time. How it was composed before I became a -member of it, I cannot say exactly.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: And what were your duties?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAHOUSEN: First, I automatically came into Abwehr Division -I. That was the division concerned with collecting information. -It was also called the Secret Information Service. I worked under -a divisional chief, the then Colonel in the General Staff Pieckenbrock, -whom I knew already from my Austrian past. I also knew -Canaris from my time in Austria.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: Admiral Canaris was your immediate superior?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAHOUSEN: Admiral Canaris was my immediate superior.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: From time to time did you act as his personal -representative?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAHOUSEN: Yes, in all cases and on all occasions when his -actual deputy—namely, Colonel Pieckenbrock—was not present, or -when Canaris, for one reason or another, considered it necessary -or advisable to have me appear as his representative.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: And in this capacity did you have any contact -with Field Marshal Keitel?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAHOUSEN: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: Did you also have contact with Jodl?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAHOUSEN: Yes, occasionally, but to a much lesser extent. -<span class='pageno' title='443' id='Page_443'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: And did you occasionally attend conferences at -which Herr Hitler was also present?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAHOUSEN: Yes, I attended a few of the sessions or discussions -at which Hitler was present and which he conducted.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: Will you tell the Tribunal whether the leaders of -the Abwehr were in sympathy with Hitler’s war program?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAHOUSEN: I have to make clear in this connection that, at -that time, we chiefs in the Abwehr were deeply influenced and -captivated by the personality of Canaris, his inner bearing was -perfectly clear and unequivocal to a small group of us.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: And was there a particular group or groups in -the Abwehr who worked against the Nazis?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAHOUSEN: Within the Amt Ausland-Abwehr there were two -groups which in their aims and actions were closely connected, but -which, nevertheless, must somehow be kept apart.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: And what were those two groups?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAHOUSEN: Before I answer this question, I must briefly picture -the personality of Canaris, who was the spiritual leader and -focus of this group.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: Please make it as brief as you can.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAHOUSEN: Canaris was a pure intellect, an interesting, highly -individual, and complicated personality, who hated violence as such -and therefore hated and abominated war, Hitler, his system, and -particularly his methods. In whatever way one may look on him, -Canaris was a human being.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: Now, will you refer back to the two groups of -which you spoke and tell me about each of those two groups and -their respective memberships?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAHOUSEN: One might characterize the first of the groups as -Canaris’ circle. It included the heads of the Amt Ausland-Abwehr:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Canaris himself as its spiritual leader; General Oster, Chief of -the Central Division (the head of the Abwehr); my predecessor, -Lieutenant Colonel Grosscurth, who had introduced me into the -circle of Canaris in Vienna in 1938; the Chief of Abwehr Division I, -Colonel Pieckenbrock, who was a close friend of Canaris; Pieckenbrock’s -successor, Colonel Hansen, who was executed after July; -my successor, Colonel Von Freytag Loringhoven, who committed -suicide on 26 July 1944, before arrest; also, in a somewhat different -way, what applies to all these persons, the Chief of Abwehr -Division III, Colonel Von Bentivegni, and then various people in -all these divisions, most of whom were executed or imprisoned in -connection with the events of July 20, 1944. -<span class='pageno' title='444' id='Page_444'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>I must also name here a man who did not belong to this group -but who knew of the actions designed to prevent the execution or -issuing of orders for murder and other atrocities, namely, Admiral -Bürckner who was Chief of the Ausland Division at that time. -Those, in the main, are the leaders of the first group called the -Canaris circle.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The second and much smaller group was centered around -General Oster as its spiritual leader. This group included members -of the Ausland-Abwehr who, as early as 1938—I recognized this -clearly by 1939-40 and later on—were actively concerned with -schemes and plans designed to remove the originator of this catastrophe, -Hitler, by force.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: What was the purpose of the group to which you -belonged; that is, Canaris’ inner circle?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAHOUSEN: On its political motives or aims, I was not informed. -I can only reiterate the thoughts and considerations which -I, since I was one of Canaris’ most intimate confidants, knew well. -His inner attitude, which influenced and moulded not only my own -actions but also those of the other men whom I mentioned, can be -described as follows:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>We did not succeed in preventing this war of aggression. The -war implies the end of Germany and of ourselves, a misfortune and -a catastrophe of very great extent. However, a misfortune even -greater than this catastrophe would be a triumph of this system. -To prevent this by all possible means was the ultimate aim and -purpose of our struggle.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The sense of what I have just said was often expressed by -Canaris among the group of which I am speaking.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: Now, did this group of which you and Canaris -were members meet frequently?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAHOUSEN: I must explain that his group or circle was not -to be regarded as an organization in the technical sense, or as a -sort of conspirators’ club. That would have been quite contradictory -to Canaris’ nature. It was rather, a spiritual organization of -men holding the same convictions, of men who had vision and -knowledge—their official functions provided them with knowledge—of -men who understood each other and acted, but each in his own -way and in accordance with his own individuality.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>This is also the reason for the differentiation of which I spoke -earlier. The same demands were not made on each individual, but -Canaris always approached the person whose attitude he knew -from personal knowledge to be the most suitable to carry out a -certain task. -<span class='pageno' title='445' id='Page_445'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: Did you have conversations at these official -meetings, at which Canaris expressed his views with respect to the -use of force in Poland, for example?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAHOUSEN: These and similar methods were repeatedly, I -may say always, discussed in our circle and they were naturally -repudiated by all of us.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: Do you recall what Canaris said about the Polish -war at the time of its commencement?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAHOUSEN: I very clearly recall the hour at which Canaris -entered, completely shattered, to tell us that the situation had after -all become serious, although it had earlier appeared as if the matter -might still be postponed. He told us then: “This is the end.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: Did you have conversations with Canaris and the -other members of your group with respect to eliminating Nazis -from your staff?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAHOUSEN: While I was still in Vienna, before I took up my -post in the OKW, I received instructions from Canaris not to bring -any National Socialists with me to his department in Berlin. I was -also instructed, whenever possible not to employ Party members -or officers sympathizing with the Party in my division, especially -in high positions. Thus the actual organization. . . .</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: Did Canaris keep a diary?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAHOUSEN: Yes, Canaris kept a diary. He did so even before -the beginning of the war—a diary to which I personally had to -contribute and did contribute much.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: Was it a part of your duties to make entries in -that diary?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAHOUSEN: No, it was not a part of my actual duties, but it -naturally fell to me to write entries on the conferences which I -attended with Canaris or as his representative.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: And did you keep copies of the entries which you -made in Canaris’ diary?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAHOUSEN: Yes, I kept copies, with Canaris’ knowledge and -approval.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: Do you have the original of some of those copies -with you here today?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAHOUSEN: I do not have them on me, but they are available -here.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: And you have refreshed your recollection in reference -to those entries?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAHOUSEN: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: What was the purpose of Canaris in keeping such -a diary? -<span class='pageno' title='446' id='Page_446'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAHOUSEN: As a truthful answer to this question I must repeat -what Canaris himself said to me on this subject:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“The purpose and intention of this diary is to portray to the -German people and to the world, at some future date, the -leaders who are now guiding the fate of their nation.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: Now, do you recall attending conferences with -Canaris at the Führer’s headquarters, just prior to the fall of -Warsaw?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAHOUSEN: Canaris and I took part in discussions not in the -Führer’s headquarters, but in the Führer’s special train, shortly -before the fall of Warsaw.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: And having refreshed your recollection from -reference to the entries in Canaris’ diary, can you tell the Tribunal -the date of those conferences?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAHOUSEN: According to the notes and documents at my disposal -it was on September 12, 1939.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: Did each of these conferences take place on the -same day?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAHOUSEN: The discussions in the Führer’s train took place -on the same day: September 12, 1939.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: And was there more than one conference on that -day? Were they split into several conferences?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAHOUSEN: One cannot really call them conferences; they -were discussions, conversations, of varying duration.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: And who was present on this occasion?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAHOUSEN: Present, regardless of location and time, were the -following: Foreign Minister Von Ribbentrop; Keitel, the Chief of -the OKW; Jodl, head of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff; Canaris; -and myself.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: Do you see Ribbentrop in this courtroom?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAHOUSEN: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: Will you indicate for the record where he is -sitting?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAHOUSEN: Over there. [<span class='it'>Indicating.</span>] In the first row, third -from the left.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: Do you also see Keitel in the courtroom?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAHOUSEN: Yes; he is next to Ribbentrop.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: Do you also see Jodl in the courtroom?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAHOUSEN: Yes; he is in the second row, next to Herr Von -Papen.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: Now, to the best of your knowledge and recollection, -will you please explain, in as much detail as possible, to the -<span class='pageno' title='447' id='Page_447'></span> -Tribunal, exactly what was said and what took place at this conference -in the Führer’s train?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAHOUSEN: First of all, Canaris had a short talk with Ribbentrop, -in which the latter explained the general political aims with -regard to Poland and in connection with the Ukrainian question. -The Chief of the OKW took up the Ukrainian question in subsequent -discussions which took place in his private carriage. These -are recorded in the files which I immediately prepared on Canaris’ -order. While we were still in the carriage of the Chief of the OKW, -Canaris expressed his serious misgivings regarding the proposed -bombardment of Warsaw, of which he knew. Canaris stressed the -devastating repercussions which this bombardment would have in -the foreign political field. The Chief of the OKW, Keitel, replied -that these measures had been agreed upon directly by the Führer -and Göring, and that he, Keitel, had had no influence on these -decisions. I quote Keitel’s own words here—naturally only after -re-reading my notes. Keitel said: “The Führer and Göring are in -frequent telephone communication; sometimes I also hear something -of what was said, but not always.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Secondly, Canaris very urgently warned against the measures -which had come to his knowledge, namely the proposed shootings -and extermination measures directed particularly against the Polish -intelligentsia, the nobility, the clergy, and in fact all elements which -could be regarded as leaders of a national resistance. Canaris said -at that time—I am quoting his approximate words: “One day the -world will also hold the Wehrmacht, under whose eyes these events -occurred, responsible for such methods.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The Chief of the OKW replied—and this is also based on my -notes, which I re-read a few days ago—that these things had been -decided upon by the Führer, and that the Führer, the Commander-in-Chief -of the Army, had let it be known that, should the Armed -Forces be unwilling to carry through these measures, or should -they not agree with them, they would have to accept the presence -at their side of the SS, the SIPO and similar units who would carry -them through. A civilian official would then be appointed to function -with each military commander. This, in outlines, was our -discussion on the proposed shooting and extermination measures -in Poland.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: Was anything said about a so-called “political -housecleaning”?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAHOUSEN: Yes, the Chief of the OKW used an expression -which was certainly derived from Hitler and which characterized -these measures as “political housecleaning”. I recall this expression -very clearly, even without the aid of my notes. -<span class='pageno' title='448' id='Page_448'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: In order that the record may be perfectly clear, -exactly what measures did Keitel say had already been agreed -upon?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAHOUSEN: According to the Chief of the OKW, the bombardment -of Warsaw and the shooting of the categories of people -which I mentioned before had been agreed upon already.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: And what were they?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAHOUSEN: Mainly the Polish intelligentsia, the nobility, the -clergy, and, of course, the Jews.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: What, if anything, was said about possible cooperation -with a Ukrainian group?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAHOUSEN: Canaris was ordered by the Chief of the OKW, -who stated that he was transmitting a directive which he had -apparently received from Ribbentrop since he spoke of it in connection -with the political plans of the Foreign Minister, to instigate -in the Galician Ukraine an uprising aimed at the extermination -of Jews and Poles.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: At what point did Hitler and Jodl enter this -meeting?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAHOUSEN: Hitler and Jodl entered either after the discussions -I have just described or towards the conclusion of the whole -discussion of this subject, when Canaris had already begun his -report on the situation in the West; that is, on the news which had -meanwhile come in on the reaction of the French Army at the -West Wall.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: And what further discussions took place then?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAHOUSEN: After this discussion in the private carriage of -the Chief of the OKW, Canaris left the coach and had another short -talk with Ribbentrop, who, returning to the subject of the Ukraine, -told him once more that the uprising should be so staged that all -farms and dwellings of the Poles should go up in flames, and all -Jews be killed.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: Who said that?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAHOUSEN: The Foreign Minister of that time, Ribbentrop, -said that to Canaris. I was standing next to him.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: Is there any slightest doubt in your mind about -that?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAHOUSEN: No. I have not the slightest doubt about that. I -remember with particular clarity the somewhat new phrasing that -“all farms and dwellings should go up in flames”. Previously there -had only been talk of “liquidation” and “elimination.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: Was there any note in Canaris’ diary which -helped to refresh your recollection on that point also? -<span class='pageno' title='449' id='Page_449'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAHOUSEN: No.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: What, if anything, was said on the subject of -France?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAHOUSEN: On the subject of France a discussion took place -in the carriage of the Chief of the OKW, in which Canaris described -the situation in the West on the basis of Abwehr reports, and said -that in his opinion a great attack was being prepared by the French -in the sector of Saarbrücken. Hitler, who had entered the room in -the meantime, intervened, took charge of the discussion, rejected in -a lively manner the opinion which Canaris had just expressed, and -put forward arguments which, looking back now, I must recognize -as factually correct.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: Do you recall whether, in the course of this conference, -Ribbentrop said anything about the Jews?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAHOUSEN: During the conversation, which was taking place -in the private coach of the Chief of the OKW, Ribbentrop was not -present.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: Do you recall whether at any time in the course -of the conferences Ribbentrop said anything about the Jews?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAHOUSEN: I repeat, in this discussion, which took place in -the coach, no.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: For purposes of keeping the record straight, -whenever you have referred to the Chief of the OKW, you were -referring to Keitel?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAHOUSEN: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: Was the Wehrmacht ever asked to furnish any -assistance for the Polish campaign?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAHOUSEN: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: Did that undertaking have any special name?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAHOUSEN: As is recorded in the diary of my division the -name of this undertaking which took place just before the Polish -campaign, was “Undertaking Himmler”.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: Will you explain to the Tribunal the nature of the -assistance required?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAHOUSEN: The affair on which I am now giving testimony -is one of the most mysterious actions which took place within the -Amt Ausland-Abwehr. A few days, or sometime before—I believe -it was the middle of August—the precise date can be found in the -diary of the division—Abwehr Division I, as well as my division, -Abwehr Division II, were given the task of providing Polish uniforms -and equipment, such as identification cards and so on, for an -Undertaking Himmler. This request, according to an entry in the -<span class='pageno' title='450' id='Page_450'></span> -diary of the division which was kept not by me, but by my adjutant, -was received by Canaris from the Wehrmacht Operations -Staff or from the National Defense Department. I believe the name -of General Warlimont is mentioned.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: Do you know where this request originated?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAHOUSEN: Where the request originated I cannot say, I can -only say that it reached us in the form of an order. It was, to be -sure, an order on which we, the divisional chiefs concerned, already -had some misgivings without knowing what, in the last analysis, -it meant. The name Himmler, however, spoke for itself, and that -is also evident from entries of the diary which record my question -why Herr Himmler should come to receive uniforms from us.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: To whom was the Polish material to be furnished -by the Abwehr?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAHOUSEN: These articles of equipment had to be kept in -readiness, and one day some man from the SS or the SD—the name -is given in the official war diary of the division—collected them.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: At what time was the Abwehr informed as to how -this Polish material was to be used?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAHOUSEN: The real purpose was unknown to us then; we do -not know its details even today. All of us, however, had the -reasonable suspicion that something entirely crooked was being -planned; the name of the undertaking was sufficient guarantee for -that.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: Did you subsequently find out from Canaris what -in fact had happened?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAHOUSEN: The actual course of events was the following: -When the first Wehrmacht communiqué spoke of the attack of -Polish units on German territory, Pieckenbrock, holding the communiqué -in his hand, and reading it aloud, observed that now we -knew why our uniforms had been needed. On the same day or a -few days later, I cannot say exactly, Canaris informed us that -people from concentration camps had been disguised in these uniforms -and had been ordered to make a military attack on the radio -station at Gleiwitz. I cannot recall whether any other locality was -mentioned. Although we were extremely interested, particularly -General Oster, to know details of this action, that is, where it had -occurred and what had happened—actually we could well imagine -it, but we did not know how it was carried out—I cannot even -today say exactly what happened.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: Did you ever find out what happened to the men -from the concentration camps who wore the Polish uniforms and -created the incident? -<span class='pageno' title='451' id='Page_451'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAHOUSEN: It is strange. This matter has always held my -interest, and even after the capitulation I spoke about these matters -with an SS Hauptsturmführer—he was a Viennese—in the -hospital in which both of us were staying, and I asked him for -details on what had taken place. The man—his name was Birckel—told -me: “It is odd, that even our circles heard of this matter -only very much later, and then only by intimation.” He added: -“So far as I know, even all members of the SD who took part in -that action were put out of the way, that is, killed.” That was -the last I heard of this matter.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: Do you recall attending a meeting in 1940 at which -the name of Weygand was under discussion?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAHOUSEN: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: Do you happen to recall the particular month in -which this discussion took place?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAHOUSEN: The discussion took place in the winter of 1940, -either in November or December, as far as I recall. I have recorded -the precise date in my personal notes, with the knowledge and -desire of Canaris.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: To the best of your knowledge and recollection, -who was present?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAHOUSEN: The three divisional chiefs and the Chief of the -Ausland Division, Admiral Bürckner, were present nearly every -day during the daily conference on the situation.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: What were you told at this meeting by Canaris?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAHOUSEN: In this discussion Canaris revealed to us that -already for some considerable time Keitel had put pressure on -him to arrange for the elimination of the French Marshal, Weygand; -and that naturally I—that is my division—would be charged -with the execution of this task.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: When you say “elimination”, what do you mean?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAHOUSEN: Killing.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: What was Weygand doing at this time?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAHOUSEN: Weygand was, so far as I recall, in North Africa -at that time.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: What was the reason given for attempting to kill -Weygand?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAHOUSEN: The reason given was the fear that Weygand -together with the unconquered part of the French Army might form -a center of resistance in North Africa. That, in the main, was the -reason, as far as I remember today; it may be that there were -other contributing factors. -<span class='pageno' title='452' id='Page_452'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: After you were so informed by Canaris, what -else was said at this meeting?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAHOUSEN: This request which was first put to the military -Abwehr so openly and in such an undisguised form by a representative -of the Armed Forces, was decidedly and indignantly rejected -by all those present. I, myself, as the person most involved, since -my division was expected to carry out this task, indicated flatly -before all present that I had not the slightest intention of executing -this order. My division and my officers are prepared to fight -but they are neither a murderers’ organization nor murderers.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: What then did Canaris say?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAHOUSEN: Canaris said: “Calm down. We’ll have a word -together later,” or something to that effect.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: Did you then talk it over later with Canaris?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAHOUSEN: When the other gentlemen had left the room, -I spoke with Canaris alone and he told me immediately: “It is -quite obvious that this order will not only not be carried out, but -it will not even be communicated to anybody else,” and that, in -fact, happened.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: Were you subsequently questioned as to whether -you had carried out this order?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAHOUSEN: On one occasion when Canaris was reporting to -Keitel, and I was present, Keitel mentioned the subject to me, and -asked me what had happened or what had been done in this -matter up to now. The date of this incident was recorded in my -notes, on Canaris’ suggestion and with his knowledge.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: What reply did you make to Keitel?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAHOUSEN: I cannot, of course, recall my precise words, but -one thing is certain; I did not answer that I had no intention of -carrying out this order. That I could not tell him, and did not -tell him; otherwise, I would not be sitting here today. Probably, -as in many similar cases, I replied that it was very difficult but -everything possible would be done, or something of that sort. -Naturally, I cannot recall my precise words.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: Incidentally, are you the only one of this intimate -Canaris group who is still alive today?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAHOUSEN: I believe I am at least one of the very few. Possibly -Pieckenbrock is still alive; perhaps Bentivegni, who, however, -did not belong to the inner circle. Most of the others were -liquidated as a result of the events on July 20.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: I have another subject to take up now. In 1941 -did you attend a conference at which General Reinecke was present? -<span class='pageno' title='453' id='Page_453'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAHOUSEN: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: Who was General Reinecke?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAHOUSEN: General Reinecke was at that time Chief of the -General Wehrmacht Department, which was part of the OKW.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: Do you recall the approximate date of that -meeting?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAHOUSEN: It was roughly in the summer of 1941, shortly -after the beginning of the Russian campaign; approximately in July.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: To the best of your knowledge and recollection, -will you state exactly who was present at that conference?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAHOUSEN: At this conference, which is also recorded in the -notes taken for Canaris, and in which I participated as his representative, -the following were present:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>General Reinecke as the presiding officer, Obergruppenführer -Müller of the RSHA, Colonel Breuer representing the Prisoners of -War Department, and I, as the representative of Canaris, of Ausland-Abwehr.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: Will you explain who Müller was and why he -was at this meeting?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAHOUSEN: Müller was a division chief in the Reich Central -Office of Security (RSHA), and took part in the session because -he was responsible for putting into practice the measures for the -treatment of Russian prisoners of war, that is, responsible for -carrying out the executions.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: Will you explain who Colonel Breuer was and -why he was there?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAHOUSEN: Colonel Breuer was the representative of the -Prisoners of War Department. I do not know of which organization -this department was a part at that time. At any rate, he -was responsible in the OKW for questions relating to prisoners -of war.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: What was the purpose of this conference?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAHOUSEN: The purpose of this conference was to examine -the orders issued for the treatment of Russian prisoners of war, -to comment on them, to explain and account for them on reasonable -grounds.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: Did you learn from the conversation at this conference -what the substance of these orders under discussion was?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAHOUSEN: These orders dealt with two groups of measures -which were to be taken. Firstly, the killing of Russian commissars, -and secondly, the killing of all those elements among the Russian -prisoners of war who, under a special selection program of the -<span class='pageno' title='454' id='Page_454'></span> -SD, could be identified as thoroughly bolshevized or as active representatives -of the Bolshevist ideology.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: Did you also learn from the conversation what the -basis for these orders was?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAHOUSEN: The basis for these orders was explained by General -Reinecke in its outlines as follows:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The war between Germany and Russia is not a war between -two states or two armies, but between two ideologies—namely, -the National Socialist and the Bolshevist ideology. The Red Army -soldier must not be looked upon as a soldier in the sense of the -word applying to our western opponents, but as an ideological -enemy. He must be regarded as the archenemy of National Socialism, -and must be treated accordingly.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: Did Canaris tell you why he was selecting you -to go to this conference?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAHOUSEN: Canaris gave me two or perhaps three reasons -and motives for ordering me to this conference although he himself -was in Berlin. Firstly, he wanted to avoid a meeting with -Reinecke, for whom, as the prototype of the ever-compliant National -Socialist general, he possessed strong personal dislike. Secondly, -he told and directed me to attempt through factual argument—that -is, through appeals to reason—to have this brutal and completely -senseless order rescinded or at least mitigated in its effects -as far as possible. He also selected me for tactical reasons since -he, as department chief, could by no means be as outspoken as I, -who, thanks to my subordinate position, could use much stronger -language. Thirdly, he was well acquainted with my personal -attitude, especially in this question, an attitude which I manifested -wherever possible during my many journeys and trips to -the front where I witnessed ill-treatment of prisoners of war. This -is also clearly recorded in my notes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: Did Canaris and the other members of your group -have a particular name for Reinecke?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAHOUSEN: Not only among our group but also in other -circles, he was known as the “little Keitel” or the “other Keitel”.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: Prior to your going to this conference, did Canaris -make any other comment on these orders?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAHOUSEN: Even at the time when these orders were issued, -Canaris expressed strong opposition to them in our circles—when -I say our circles, I mean mainly the divisional chiefs—and had -a protest made through the Ausland Division, that is, through -Bürckner. I no longer remember whether it was made in writing -or whether Bürckner made it orally to Keitel directly; I think it -<span class='pageno' title='455' id='Page_455'></span> -was done in both ways. Bürckner should be well informed -about this.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: When you say “protested through Bürckner,” what -do you mean?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAHOUSEN: When I say Bürckner, I mean his division, or a -group, or perhaps even a representative in his office, where questions -of international law were dealt with by Count Moltke who, -incidentally, also among the circle. . . .</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: Will you repeat that?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAHOUSEN: This protest or this counter-argument on the -question of the treatment of Russian prisoners of war was forwarded -by Canaris through the Ausland Division, that is, through -Bürckner. The Ausland Division included a section which dealt -with questions of international law, and the competent authority -in that section was Count Moltke who was a member of Oster’s -inner circle, and who was executed after the 20th of July.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Would that be a convenient time to break off?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: Yes, Sir.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Until 2 o’clock.</p> - -<p class='line' style='text-align:center;margin-top:2em;margin-bottom:1em;'>[<span class='it'>A recess was taken until 1400 hours.</span>]</p> - -<hr class='pbk'/> - -<h2><span class='pageno' title='456' id='Page_456'></span><span class='it'>Afternoon Session</span></h2> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes, Colonel Amen.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Witness Lahousen resumed the stand.</span>]</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: Prior to the luncheon recess you were testifying -about a conference in 1941 with Reinecke and others. Prior to that -conference did Canaris tell you what kind of appeal to make to -those present at the meeting?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAHOUSEN: Before the discussion Canaris said, as I have already -pointed out, that I should use factual arguments in order to -have this order withdrawn or at least to weaken its effects, but that -otherwise I should not take it into my head to use arguments of -a humanitarian nature lest I make a fool of myself.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: And now will you explain to the Tribunal, to the -best of your recollection, exactly what happened and what was said -in the course of that conference?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAHOUSEN: The discussion was opened by General Reinecke, -and he explained these orders in the manner in which I described -them before the recess. He said that these measures were necessary -and that it was essential that this idea should also be made clear -to the Wehrmacht, and particularly to the officers’ corps, since they -apparently were still entertaining ideas which belonged to the Ice -Age and not to the present age of National Socialism.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: What views did you present at this conference?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAHOUSEN: According to instructions I held the view of the -Amt Ausland Abwehr—that is of Canaris—and in the main I pointed -out, first of all, the most unfavorable effect of such measures on the -troops, namely on the front troops, that they would never understand -such orders, particularly not the simple soldier. Besides, we -had reports that the executions were sometimes carried out before -their eyes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Secondly, I brought forward the objections of my office in regard -to activities of the office itself, the unfavorable effect of these -measures on the enemy, that is, the virtual hindering of Russians, -who were surrendering to the last man without resistance, from -deserting; and furthermore, the great difficulties which beset the -Abwehr Division in acquiring agents, that is, people who, for various -reasons, had voluntarily declared themselves ready to help -the Germans.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: In order that this may be clear on the record, because -I think there was quite a bit of confusion in the translation, -I want to point out one or two of those arguments again. What did -<span class='pageno' title='457' id='Page_457'></span> -you say at this conference about the effect of the execution of these -orders on Russian soldiers?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAHOUSEN: I pointed out, first of all, that through these orders -some elements among the Russian soldiers who were inclined to -surrender were prevented from doing so. Secondly, that people who -for any reason would have offered their services to the Abwehr -would also be hindered by these measures. And that, <span class='it'>in summa</span>, -an effect opposite to that which they had desired would result and -the resistance of the Red Army soldiers would be increased to the -utmost.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: And in order that we may be perfectly clear, what -did you say about the effect of the execution of these orders on -the German troops?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAHOUSEN: I said, that from several reports we had from the -front, the effect on the morale and on the discipline of the troops -was devastating.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: Was there any discussion about international law -at this conference?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAHOUSEN: No. In this connection there was no discussion of -international law. The manner of selection of the prisoners of war -was particularly stressed. It was completely arbitrary apart from -the general order in itself.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: We will get to that in a moment. Were your -views accepted at this conference?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAHOUSEN: My views which were the views of the Amt Abwehr, -which I was representing, were opposed in the sharpest possible -manner by Müller, who with the usual cliches rejected the -arguments that I had produced, and who made the sole concession -that the executions, out of consideration for the feelings of the -troops, should not take place before them but at a place some -distance apart. He also made a few concessions in the question of -the selection, which was completely arbitrary, and was just left to -the Kommando leaders or to the prejudice of the Kommando -leaders.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: And subsequent to this conference did you learn -whether an order was issued with respect to having these killings -take place outside the sight of the German troops?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAHOUSEN: Except for Müller’s promise, which I have just -mentioned, I heard no more about it at the time. I found a confirmation -of the results of this conference and the promises then -made to me in an order which was submitted to me only now. -<span class='pageno' title='458' id='Page_458'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: Was there a conversation at this conference about -the manner in which these orders for the killings were being -executed?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAHOUSEN: Yes. In the course of discussions the entire -problem was under discussion including the manner in which these -orders were carried out—according to my recollection—by the Einsatzkommandos -of the SD. These SD squads were in charge both of -singling out of persons in camps and in assembly centers for -prisoners of war, and of carrying out the executions.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Reinecke also discussed measures regarding the treatment of -Russian prisoners of war in the camps. Reinecke emphatically -accepted the arguments put forth, not by me but by Müller, and -voiced his conviction in very decisive and excessively sharp -manner.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: Now, will you explain to the Tribunal from what -you learned at this conference the exact manner in which the -sorting of these prisoners was made and in what way it was determined -which of the prisoners should be killed?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAHOUSEN: The prisoners were sorted out by Kommandos of -the SD and according to peculiar and utterly arbitrary ways of -procedure. Some of the leaders of these Einsatzkommandos were -guided by racial considerations; particularly, of course, if someone -were a Jew or of Jewish type or could otherwise be classified as -racially inferior, he was picked for execution. Other leaders of the -Einsatzkommando selected people according to their intelligence. -Some had views all of their own and usually most peculiar, so that -I felt compelled to ask Müller, “Tell me, according to what principles -does this selection take place? Do you determine it by the -height of a person or the size of his shoes?”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Müller was very emphatic in rejecting these and any other -objections, and Reinecke adopted rigidly the same point of view -as Müller, instead of accepting my opinions, that is, those of the -Amt Ausland Abwehr, which were offered him as a “golden -bridge” for his acceptance. That was essentially the contents of the -discussion in which I participated.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: And had you received knowledge about the manner -in which these orders were executed through official reports -which you received?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAHOUSEN: We were currently informed of all happenings by -our officials at the front or in the camps. Officers of the Abwehr -Division III were active in these camps, and in this way, that is, -through the normal service channels, we were informed by reports -and oral presentation of all these measures and of their effects. -<span class='pageno' title='459' id='Page_459'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: Was the information which you received secret -and confidential information not open to others?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAHOUSEN: The information was confidential in accordance -with the manner in which our offices were run. <span class='it'>De facto</span>, however, -the happenings in the camps and the occurrences taking place at -the selections were known to large groups of the Wehrmacht.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: Now, at this conference did you learn anything -from Reinecke with respect to the treatment of Russian prisoners -in prison camps?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAHOUSEN: In this discussion the treatment of Russian prisoners -in the camps was discussed by Reinecke, and Reinecke was -of the opinion that in the camps their treatment must not be the -same as the treatment of other allied prisoners of war, but that -here, too, appropriate and discriminating measures must be applied. -The camp guards, at all events, had to be furnished with whips, -and at the slightest sign of an attempted escape or other undesirable -act, the guards should have the right to resort to arms.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: Besides the whips, what other equipment were -the Stalag guards given?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAHOUSEN: Those are details which I do not remember for the -moment. I can only say what was mentioned in this discussion.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: What, if anything, did Reinecke say about the -whips?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAHOUSEN: Reinecke said that the guards, that is, the guard -details, should make use of their whips or sticks or whatever -instruments they had.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: Now, through official channels did you learn of an -order for the branding of Russian prisoners of war?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Amen, I think you should refer to -them as “Soviet”, not “Russian” prisoners.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: Yes, Your Honor.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Continuing the interrogation.</span>] Did you learn of such an order?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAHOUSEN: I have heard about it in one of the discussions at -which most of the previously mentioned divisional chiefs were -usually present. At least a majority of them must have been -present.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: Do you know whether any protests were made -with respect to that order?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAHOUSEN: When the intention of branding these Soviet -prisoners was made known, a very sharp protest was voiced at once -by Canaris through the Amt Ausland, that is, by Bürckner himself. -<span class='pageno' title='460' id='Page_460'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: What, if anything, did Canaris tell you with -regard to this order?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAHOUSEN: Canaris told us that the question had already -been expounded in a medical opinion by some physicians; and that -there were actually people to lend themselves to treating such a -mad subject in a written medical opinion. That was the main -topic of this discussion.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. Amen: What information, if any, did you receive through -official channels regarding plans to bring Soviet prisoners back to -German territory?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAHOUSEN: In the same context and in the same circle—I -must always repeat it—that is, in discussions between Canaris and -the chiefs of his divisions I learned that the General Staff had -prepared to bring Soviet prisoners into Germany, but that their -transportation was suddenly abandoned. I remember that this was -by direct order of Hitler—which resulted in the conditions -developing in camps in the theater of operations where prisoners -were crowded together, could not be fed, and could not be adequately -clothed or housed, so that epidemics and cannibalism -resulted in these camps.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: I am not sure but what we missed some of your -previous answer. Will you start again to tell us about the change -which was made in these orders?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAHOUSEN: Will you please repeat the question?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: You referred to a change in the plans to take the -Soviet prisoners back to German territory. Is that correct?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAHOUSEN: Yes, they were not brought back into Germany.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: And what was the result of this action, namely -of their not being brought back at the direct order of Hitler?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAHOUSEN: The result was as described just now.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: But I want you to repeat it because we lost some -of the answer in the interpreting process. Please just repeat it -again.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAHOUSEN: The enormous crowds of prisoners of war -remained in the theater of operation, without proper care—care in -the sense of prisoner of war conventions—with regard to housing, -food, medical care; and many of them died on the bare floor. -Epidemics broke out, and cannibalism—human beings driven by -hunger devouring one another—manifested itself.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: Were you personally at the front to observe -these conditions?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAHOUSEN: I made several trips with Canaris and I saw some -of these things which I have just described, with my own eyes. -<span class='pageno' title='461' id='Page_461'></span> -At the time I made notes of my impressions which were found -amongst my papers.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: Did you also obtain information as to these matters -through official channels of the Abwehr?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAHOUSEN: Yes, I received this information through the office -subordinate to me and through the Amt Ausland.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: From your official information, to what extent -was the Wehrmacht involved in the mistreatment of these prisoners?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAHOUSEN: According to my information, the Wehrmacht was -involved in all matters which referred to prisoners of war, except -the executions, which were the concern of the Kommandos of the -SD and the Reichssicherheitshauptamt.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: But is it not a fact that the prisoner-of-war camps -were entirely under the jurisdiction of the Wehrmacht?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAHOUSEN: Yes, prisoners of war were under the jurisdiction -of the Supreme Command of the Wehrmacht.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: But before they were placed in these camps, the -Special Purpose Kommandos of the SS were responsible primarily -for the executions and the selection of the people to be executed, -is that correct?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAHOUSEN: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: Did you receive through official channels information -regarding the existence of an order for the killing of British -Commandos?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAHOUSEN: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: What action, if any, did Canaris or yourself take -with respect to this order?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAHOUSEN: The order, and as far as I remember, even the -mere intention that such an order was to be issued, was discussed -in our circle, that is between Canaris and his section chiefs. We -all, of course, unanimously agreed on its rejection. The reasons, -apart from the aspects of international law, were that the Amt -Ausland had under its command a formation, which was attached -to our section named “Regiment Brandenburg” which had a task -similar to the Commandos. As the head of the section to which -this regiment was attached and for which I considered myself -responsible, I immediately and most emphatically protested against -it in view of the retaliation measures which were to be expected -as a result of this order.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: Did you personally assist in the drafting of these -protests?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAHOUSEN: I know that twice a protest was lodged against this -order by Canaris, and by Amt Ausland, through Bürckner. The -<span class='pageno' title='462' id='Page_462'></span> -first time orally, or in writing as soon as the order was issued, -and the second time after the first executions had been carried -out in pursuance of this order. I myself helped to draft one of -these written protests—I do not know whether the first or the -second—making a contribution in the interest of my section, and -the Regiment Brandenburg, whose functions were similar, very -similar, to those of the Commandos.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: To whom in the ordinary course did these protests -go?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAHOUSEN: The protests were addressed to Canaris’ superior -officer, that is to say, to the Chief of the OKW.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: Who was that?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAHOUSEN: It was Keitel, at that time.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: Did these protests in the ordinary course go also -to Jodl?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAHOUSEN: That I cannot say, but it is possible.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: Now, will you tell the Tribunal what were the -grounds of the protests which you made?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAHOUSEN: The grounds were above all, that it was contrary -to the interpretation of international law that soldiers, that is to -say, not agents or spies, but soldiers clearly recognizable as such, -should be killed after they had been taken prisoner. That was the -main point which was also of concern to my section since it also -comprised soldiers who had to carry out such or similar tasks in -their capacity as soldiers.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: Were there any other grounds urged in protest -against these orders?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAHOUSEN: Certainly. Other reasons were also mentioned in -accordance with the interests of the different sections affected by -these orders. For the Amt Ausland, it was the point of view of -international law. The Abwehr Division III was particularly interested -in the interrogation of soldiers captured in commando raids, -but never in seeing them killed.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: Were there any other chiefs of the Abwehr Department -who assisted in the preparation of these protests?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAHOUSEN: As far as I remember today, no.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: You mentioned Admiral Bürckner, did you not?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAHOUSEN: Yes, Bürckner was not the chief of the Amt Ausland -Abwehr, but only of the Amt Ausland.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: Now, have you ever heard of an operation -known as “Gustav”? -<span class='pageno' title='463' id='Page_463'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAHOUSEN: The name “Gustav” was applied not to an operation -but to an undertaking similar to the one which was demanded -for the elimination of Marshal Weygand.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: Will you tell the Tribunal what was the meaning -of “Gustav”?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAHOUSEN: “Gustav” was the expression used by the Chief -of the OKW as a cover name to be used in conversations on the -question of General Giraud.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: When you say the Chief of the OKW, are you -referring to Keitel?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAHOUSEN: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: And are you referring to General Giraud of the -French Army?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAHOUSEN: Yes, General Giraud of the French Army, who, -according to my recollection, fled from Königstein in 1942.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: Do you know of any order issued with respect -to General Giraud?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAHOUSEN: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: Who issued such an order?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAHOUSEN: The Chief of the OKW, Keitel, gave an order of -this kind to Canaris, not in writing but an oral order.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: How did you come to know about this order?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAHOUSEN: I knew of this order in the same way as certain -other chiefs of the sections, that is Bentivegni, Chief of Abwehr -Section I, Pieckenbrock and a few other officers. We all heard it -at a discussion with Canaris.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: What was the substance of the order?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAHOUSEN: The essential part of this order was to eliminate -Giraud, in a fashion similar to Weygand.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: When you say “eliminate” what do you mean?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAHOUSEN: I mean the same as in the case of Marshal Weygand, -that is, it was intended and ordered that he was to be killed.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: Do you recall the approximate date when this -order was given by Keitel to Canaris?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAHOUSEN: This order was given to Canaris several times. -I cannot say for certain when it was given for the first time as I -was not present in person. It was probably after the flight of -Giraud from Königstein and prior to the attempt on the life of -Heydrich, in Prague. According to my notes, this subject was discussed -with me by Keitel in July of the same year, in the presence -of Canaris. -<span class='pageno' title='464' id='Page_464'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: Well now, what did Keitel first say to you personally -about this affair?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAHOUSEN: I cannot repeat his exact words, but the meaning -was that he proclaimed the intention of having Giraud killed, -and asked me, as in the case of Weygand, how the matter was -progressing or had progressed so far.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: And what did you say to him on that occasion?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAHOUSEN: I cannot remember the exact words. I probably -gave some evasive answer, or one that would permit gaining time.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: Now, was this question later discussed by you at -any time?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAHOUSEN: According to my recollection, this question was -once more discussed in August. The exact date can be found in -my notes. Canaris telephoned me in my private apartment one -evening and said impatiently that Keitel was urging him again -about Giraud, and the section chiefs were to meet the next day -on this question.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The next day the conference was held and Canaris repeated -in this larger circle what he had said to me over the phone the -night before. That is, he was being continually pressed by Keitel -that something must at last be done in this matter. Our attitude -was the same as in the matter of Weygand. All those present -rejected flatly this new demand to initiate and to carry out a murder. -We mentioned our decision to Canaris, who also was of the -same opinion and Canaris thereupon went down to Keitel in order -to induce him to leave the Military Abwehr out of all such matters -and requested that, as agreed prior to this, such matters should -be left entirely to the SD.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In the meantime, while we were all there, I remember Pieckenbrock -spoke, and I remember every word he said. He said it was -about time that Keitel was told clearly that he should tell his Herr -Hitler that we, the Military Abwehr, were no murder organization -like the SD or the SS. After a short time, Canaris came back and -said it was now quite clear that he had convinced Keitel that we, -the Military Abwehr, were to be left out of such matters and -further measures were to be left to the SD.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I must observe here and recall that Canaris had said to me, -once this order had been given, that the execution must be prevented -at any cost. He would take care of that and I was to -support him.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: I don’t think you have yet told us just who was -present at this conference. -<span class='pageno' title='465' id='Page_465'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAHOUSEN: The three Abwehr chiefs were present, Colonel -Pieckenbrock, whom I have already mentioned, Colonel General -Bentivegni, and I. Probably, also General Oster, and possibly -Bürckner, but I cannot remember clearly. In my notes only those -three chiefs are mentioned who all strictly rejected the proposal.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: What was the next occasion when this matter -was again brought to your attention?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAHOUSEN: A little later, it must have been September, the -exact date has been recorded, Keitel, then chief of the OKW, -rang me up in my private apartment. He asked me, “What about -‘Gustav’? You know what I mean by ‘Gustav’?” I said, “Yes, I -know.” “How is the matter progressing? I must know, it is very -urgent.” I answered, “I have no information on the subject. -Canaris has reserved this matter for himself, and Canaris is not -here, he is in Paris.” Then came the order from Keitel, or rather, -before he gave the order, he put one more question: “You know -that the others are to carry out the order?” By “the others,” he -meant the SS and SD. I answered, “Yes, I know.” Then came -an order from Keitel to immediately inquire of Müller how the -whole matter was progressing. “I must know it immediately,” he -said. I said, “Yes,” but went at once to the office of the Ausland -Abwehr, General Oster, and informed him what had happened, -and asked for his advice as to what was to be done in this matter -which was so extremely critical and difficult for Canaris and me. -I told him—Oster already knew as it was—that Canaris so far -had not breathed a word to the SD concerning what it was to do, -that is, murder Giraud. General Oster advised me to fly to Paris -immediately and to inform Canaris and to warn him. I flew the -next day to Paris and met Canaris at a hotel at dinner in a small -circle, which included Admiral Bürckner, and I told Canaris what -had happened. Canaris was horrified and amazed, and for a moment -he saw no way out.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>During the dinner Canaris asked me in the presence of Bürckner -and two other officers, that is, Colonel Rudolph, and another -officer whose name I have forgotten, as to the date when Giraud -had fled from Königstein and when the Abwehr III conference had -been held in Prague and at what time the assassination of Heydrich -had taken place. I gave these dates, which I did not know by -memory, to Canaris. When he had the three dates, he was visibly -relieved, and his saddened countenance took on new life. He -was certainly relieved in every way. I must add that—at this -important conference of the Abwehr III Heydrich was present. It -was a meeting between Abwehr III and SD officials who were -<span class='pageno' title='466' id='Page_466'></span> -collaborating with it—officials who were also in the counter-intelligence.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Canaris then based his whole plan on these three dates. His -plan was to attempt to show that at this conference he had passed -on the order to Heydrich, to carry out the action. That is to say, -his plan was to exploit Heydrich’s death to wreck the whole -affair. The next day we flew to Berlin, and Canaris reported to -Keitel that the matter was taking its course, and that Canaris -had given Heydrich the necessary instructions at the Abwehr III -conference in Prague, and that Heydrich had prepared everything, -that is, a special purpose action had been started in order to have -Giraud murdered, and with that the matter was settled and brought -to ruin.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: There was a mistake I think in the translation -back a little way. So if you don’t mind, will you please go back -to where you first referred to Heydrich in the conversation with -Canaris, and repeat the story, because I think that the translation -was incorrect. In other words, go back to the point where Canaris -suddenly seemed relieved, and started to tell you what the apparent -solution might be.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAHOUSEN: All those present saw that Canaris was much -relieved, as he heard the three dates from me. His whole plan or -his maneuvering—and that was typical of his personality—was -a purely intellectual or spiritual combination, built up on these -three dates, essential being the date of the escape of Giraud, and -the Abwehr III conference, for if the Abwehr III conference had -taken place prior to Giraud’s escape, then this combination would -probably not have stood the test.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Amen, what is the reason for the -repetition?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: There was a mistake in the record. If it is the -wish of the Tribunal, I shall not have him repeat it any further.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: It seems clear to the Tribunal what was said.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: Very well.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: What, if anything, happened next insofar as the -affair Giraud was concerned?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAHOUSEN: Nothing more happened. Giraud fled to North -Africa, and much later only I heard that Hitler was very indignant -about this escape, and said that the SD had failed miserably—so -it is said to be written in shorthand notes in the records of the -Hauptquartier of the Führer. The man who told me this is in -the American zone. -<span class='pageno' title='467' id='Page_467'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: Were you acquainted with Colonel Rowehl?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAHOUSEN: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: Who was he?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAHOUSEN: He was an officer. He was a colonel of the Luftwaffe.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: What was the work of the special squadron to -which he was attached?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAHOUSEN: Rowehl had a special squadron for altitude flying -which operated together with the Ausland Abwehr for the reconnaissance -of certain territories or states.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: Were you ever present when he reported to -Canaris?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAHOUSEN: I was present occasionally.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: Do you recall what Rowehl told Canaris on those -occasions?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAHOUSEN: He reported on the results of the reconnaissance -flights and submitted his photographs, I believe, to Abwehr I, Section -Luft which, competent for this work, made some evaluation -of them.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: Did you know over what territories these reconnaissance -flights had been made?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAHOUSEN: They were taken over Poland, England and in -southeastern Europe; I cannot be more explicit as I do not know -the specific territories or countries of southeastern Europe. All -I know is that this squadron was stationed in Budapest for the purpose -of making such reconnoitering flights.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: Did you personally see some of these photographs?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAHOUSEN: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: Now will you tell the Tribunal the dates when -you know that these reconnaissance flights over London and Leningrad -were being made?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAHOUSEN: I cannot give the exact dates. I only remember, -being present at discussions between Rowehl and Canaris—sometimes -Pieckenbrock was there too—that these reconnaissance flights -did take place in the aforementioned areas, that photographic -material was furnished and that the squadron operated from Hungarian -air fields in the vicinity of Budapest. I know this because -once I myself flew back from Budapest to Berlin in such a plane, -and also from knowing some of the pilots and their activities.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: What I am going to ask you about now is the -year, or years we will say, when these reconnaissance flights were -being made. -<span class='pageno' title='468' id='Page_468'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAHOUSEN: They were undertaken in 1939 before the beginning -of the Polish campaign.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: Were these flights kept secret?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAHOUSEN: Yes, of course they were secret.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: And why were these flights being made from -Hungary, if you know?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAHOUSEN: A Luftwaffe expert would have to give this information.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: Do you have in your possession a report of the -treatment of the Jews in certain territories?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAHOUSEN: Yes, I have a report which probably came to us -through Abwehr Department III, and I made several copies for -Canaris and one for myself. This report deals with the shooting -of Jews in Borrisov.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: Is that an official report?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAHOUSEN: Yes, it is. The report came by way of the Abwehr. -The files would show from what office it came to us. In -connection with these shootings of Jews in Borrisov the name of a -counter-intelligence officer, whom I knew quite well and who was -an Austrian like me, was mentioned.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: Now, may it please the Tribunal, I should like to -offer in evidence a photostatic copy, or copies, of the entries made -by the witness in every detail, together with a photostatic copy of -the report. The originals are here in court, but cannot be lifted out -of the box in which they are contained. They are so much damaged -by a bomb explosion that if they were to be lifted out of the box, -they would be destroyed beyond use, but we have had them photostated, -and the photostatic copies are now available. That letter -would be Exhibit USA-80, 3047-PS.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Do I understand, Colonel Amen, that only -such portions of these documents as are read in Court will be in -evidence?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: Well, these have been used by the witness to -refresh his recollection.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I know they have.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: And none of them have been read in full in court, -but they may be so read at any time, Sir.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: If you want them to go into evidence as -documents, you must read them, of course. Colonel Amen, do you -want to use the documents any more than you already used them -for the purpose of refreshing the witness’ memory?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: I do not, Sir, except having used them in this -fashion, I now think it is only fair to offer them in evidence for -<span class='pageno' title='469' id='Page_469'></span> -the information and scrutiny of the Tribunal; as far as I’m concerned -they have served their purpose.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: If the Defense wants to see them for the -purpose of cross-examination, of course, they may do so.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: Oh, yes, Sir. I have offered them already Sir, to -be Exhibit USA-80, 3047-PS.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: But otherwise they may not be put in -evidence.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: Correct.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: From this damaged paper, it seems to contain -a report on the execution of Jews in Borrisov.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: That again will not be in evidence unless -you read it.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: Correct, Sir. We will include that in the offer -which I just made to you, that unless what we are offering is -desired by the Court I will not offer it in evidence or read it.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Very well, the Court does not desire it.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: Very well. [<span class='it'>Turning to witness.</span>] As a member of -the Abwehr, were you generally well informed on the plans of the -German Reich for the waging of war?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAHOUSEN: Insofar as the effects of the plans concerned the -preparatory activities or co-operation of the Amt Ausland Abwehr.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: Did any intelligence information ever come to your -attention which was not available to an ordinary person, or to an -ordinary officer in the Army?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAHOUSEN: Yes, certainly. That was in the nature of my -office.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: And, on the basis of the knowledge which you so -obtained, did you in your group come to any decisions as to whether -or not the attack on Poland, for example, was an unprovoked act -of aggression?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Well. . . .</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAHOUSEN: Would you be kind enough to repeat the question?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: That is one principal question which this -Court has to decide. You cannot produce evidence upon a question -which is within the province of the Court to decide.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. AMEN: Very well, Sir. The witness is now available for -cross-examination.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Is it the Soviet Prosecutor’s wish to ask any -questions of this witness? General Rudenko? -<span class='pageno' title='470' id='Page_470'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>GENERAL R. A. RUDENKO (Chief Prosecutor for the U.S.S.R.): -Witness Lahousen, you have made definite replies to questions by -Colonel Amen and I should like to have certain details. Am I to -understand you rightly that the insurgent units of the Ukrainian -nationalists were organized under the direction of the German -High Command?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAHOUSEN: They were Ukrainian immigrants from Galicia.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: And from these immigrants were formed -Commandos?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAHOUSEN: Yes. “Commando” perhaps is not quite the right -expression. They were people who were brought together in camps -and were given a military or a semi-military training.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: What was the function of these Commandos?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAHOUSEN: They were organizations of immigrants from the -Galicia Ukraine, as I already previously stated, who worked -together with the Amt Ausland Abwehr.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: What were these troops supposed actually to -accomplish?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAHOUSEN: Tasks were assigned to them before each combat -by the office in charge of the command, that is, in the case of -orders originating from the office to which I belonged, they were -determined by the OKW.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: What functions did these groups have?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAHOUSEN: These Commandos were to carry out sabotage of -all kinds behind the enemy’s front line.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: That is to say in what territory?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAHOUSEN: In those territories with which Germany had -entered into war, or speaking of the concrete case here in question, -with Poland, or to be more correct in Poland.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: Of course in Poland. Well, sabotage and what -else?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAHOUSEN: Sabotage, such as wrecking of bridges and other -objectives of military importance. The Wehrmacht operational staff -determined what was of military importance; details of that activity -I have just described, namely, destruction of militarily important -objectives or objectives important for a particular operation.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: But what about terroristic activities? I am -asking you about the terroristic activities of these units.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAHOUSEN: Political tasks were not assigned to them by us, -that is, by the Amt Ausland Abwehr. Political assignments were -made by the respective Reich offices responsible, where it should -be said, often as a result of erroneous. . . . -<span class='pageno' title='471' id='Page_471'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: You have misunderstood me. You are speaking -about sabotage and I was asking you concerning terroristic acts of -these organizations. Do you understand me? Was terror one of their -tasks? Let me repeat again, as well as the sabotage acts, were -there any terror acts assigned to them?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAHOUSEN: On our part never.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: You have told me that from your side there -was no question of terrorism; from whose side was the question -put, who worked on this aspect?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAHOUSEN: Well, that was the whole point all the time. Each -one of these military Abwehr units was asked again and again to -combine our purely military tasks which were determined by the -needs of the Wehrmacht leadership with political or terroristic -measures, as is clearly shown by the memorandum on our files -concerning preparation of the campaign against Poland.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: Answering the question of Colonel Amen as -to whether the Red Army man was looked upon as an ideological -enemy and was subjected to corresponding measures, what do you -mean by corresponding measures? I repeat the question. You have -said that the Red Army man was looked upon by you, I mean by -the German High Command as an ideological enemy and was to -be subjected to corresponding measures. What does it mean? What -do you mean by saying corresponding measures?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAHOUSEN: By special measures I mean quite clearly all those -brutal methods which were actually used and which I have already -mentioned and of which I am convinced there were many more, -more than I could possibly have seen in my restricted field and -more than was known to me.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: You already told the Tribunal that there were -special Commandos for the screening of prisoners of war. I understand -that they were screened in the following way: Into those -who were to be killed and the others who were to be interned in -camps, is that right?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAHOUSEN: Yes, these special Commandos of the SD were -concerned, however, solely with the execution of those selected -amongst the prisoners of war.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: That of course makes the chief of the Commandos -responsible and decisive for the question as to who was to -die and who was not to die.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAHOUSEN: Yes, in the course of a discussion with Reinecke, -the question was raised whether to give to the head of one such -Commando unit the right to decide who, in view of the order, was -to be looked upon as Bolshevistically tainted or not. -<span class='pageno' title='472' id='Page_472'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: And the chief of the Commando unit decided -upon his own authority, what to do with them.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAHOUSEN: Yes, at least up to the date of the discussion in -which I participated, upon an order from Canaris. This point was -one of the most important ones of this discussion.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: You have told us about your protest and the -protest of Canaris against these atrocities, killings, and so forth. -What were the results of these protests?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAHOUSEN: As I have already stated, there were some very -modest results, so modest that, you can hardly call them results at -all. For the fact that executions were not to take place in sight of -the troops but only at a distance of 500 meters can in no way be -called a good result.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: What conversation did you have with Müller -on this subject, concerning concessions he had made? You told us -when you were asked by General Alexandrov. . . .</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAHOUSEN: Who was Alexandrov?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: You were questioned by Colonel Rosenblith, -a representative of the Soviet Delegation. I am sorry I made a -mistake. Perhaps you will remember your communication to Colonel -Rosenblith regarding the conversation and the concessions that -Müller made. I shall ask you to tell us that part again.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAHOUSEN: The name of Alexandrov does not mean anything -to me. What has the name Alexandrov to do in this connection?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: Alexandrov was a mistake on my part. Forget -it. I am interested in the question of Müller, concerning the -shootings, torturings, and so forth.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAHOUSEN: I had a long conversation with Müller, especially -with regard to making the selections. I cited, to be concrete, as an -example of the methods used, the case of the Crimean Tartars, -Soviet Russian soldiers who, according to their nationality, originated -from the Crimea; and cases where, for certain reasons, Mohammedan -people were declared Jews, and were then executed. Thus, -aside from the brutality of these and all other similar measures, -this proved the entirely irrational point of view, incomprehensible -to any normal person, which characterized the handling of the -entire matter. To that, among other things, I made reference.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: You told us how these measures were carried -out.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: He doesn’t hear you, carry on but go a little -bit more slowly.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: Have you finished your report concerning the -conversation with Müller? -<span class='pageno' title='473' id='Page_473'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAHOUSEN: No, I didn’t quite finish, I had many discussions -with Müller on the subject—it was the central point of all these -conversations. All the subjects about which I have given evidence -were discussed first with Müller, who was the competent man, at -least in his sector. As for Reinecke, he then merely decided according -to his ideas, which were contrary to those held by me and my -office. I would be grateful if you would tell me what particular -points you would like to have me explain and I would gladly repeat -anything.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: Your usual topic of discussion was murders, -shootings, and so forth, especially shootings. I am interested in all -that. What did Müller say about it? How were shootings to take -place, especially in relation to your protests?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAHOUSEN: He told me in a rather cynical way, that if the -troops were so terribly disturbed by these shootings, as you claim, -and their morale is suffering therefrom the shootings would simply -take place at some distance, et cetera. That was the main meaning -of what he said.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: That was the result of your protests?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAHOUSEN: Yes, that was the very poor result of the protest, -and then still a certain concession. . . .</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: And one last question. The conditions of the -concentration camps where Soviet prisoners were taken and where -mass destruction of prisoners was committed was all this dependent -on directives of the German High Command?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAHOUSEN: In some sort of cooperation with the competent -authorities, the Reich Main Security Office. In addition to all I have -stated, I must point out that at the time, I myself did not read the -orders and that I learned of the collaboration, or the coordination -in this question mainly from the conversation with Reinecke, who -came to me as a representative of the OKW and with the aforementioned -Müller.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: Excuse me, did you get that information in -private or official sessions or conversations?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAHOUSEN: It was a strictly official meeting called by General -Reinecke as chairman. I was not there as “Lahousen,” but as a representative -of the Amt Ausland Abwehr.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: Did the orders which were passed on in these -sessions come to you directly from the German High Command?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAHOUSEN: They came from the German High Command and -from one of the highest offices of the RSHA according to what -Reinecke said. I have never seen or read them with my own eyes, -therefore this is all I can state. -<span class='pageno' title='474' id='Page_474'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: But you have heard during these meetings -where they were discussed and when they were discussed.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAHOUSEN: Yes, during the discussion, the course of which I -have already described, or at least its essential aspects, of course.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: And during these sessions which you mentioned -were the questions raised about murders and burning of -cities?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAHOUSEN: There was no talk at these discussions about setting -on fire, but mention was made of the orders which had been -issued with respect to the prisoners.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: About the murders only.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAHOUSEN: About the executions.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: That is all.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Does the French Prosecutor wish to ask any -questions?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DUBOST: One single question. Who gave the orders for the -liquidation of the Commandos?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAHOUSEN: What was it exactly that you meant? Presumably -the killing of members of the Commando troops?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DUBOST: Who gave the orders for the execution?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAHOUSEN: I did not read the order myself, but according to -what was said in our circles about this subject, the idea came from -Hitler himself; but who was responsible for transforming this idea -into an order, I do not know.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DUBOST: The Defendants Keitel, Jodl—what orders did they -handle; what orders did they give?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAHOUSEN: I cannot say that because I do not know it.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DUBOST: What were the reasons for these orders, as far as -you know?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAHOUSEN: Not merely was it my opinion, but it was common -knowledge, that the reasons for these orders were to cause an -intimidating effect and thus to prevent and paralyze the activity -of the Commandos.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DUBOST: Who gave the order to have General Giraud -executed or murdered?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAHOUSEN: I did not hear the first part of the question.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DUBOST: Who gave the order to kill Weygand and Giraud?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAHOUSEN: The order to liquidate, that is, to be explicit, to -murder Weygand and Giraud, was given to me by Canaris, who -received it from Keitel. This order and this intention regarding the -matter Weygand, were furthermore transmitted to me through -<span class='pageno' title='475' id='Page_475'></span> -direct speech with Keitel. Keitel asked me after Canaris had read -to him a report in my presence, on December 23, 1940, according -to my notes, about the progress in the case Weygand.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>As regards the second case, that is the case Giraud, I had it -from Canaris himself that the order was sent to him by Keitel—as -did also the other chiefs who were present. I further heard of it -a second time during a report from Canaris to Keitel, in my presence, -in July 1942, when this order was communicated to me in a -manner similar to that of the case Weygand, and, finally, I received -it in a direct manner from Keitel through telephone conversation -which I described here, and transmitted as urgent intelligence.</p> - -<p class='line' style='text-align:center;margin-top:1em;margin-bottom:1em;'>[<span class='it'>The British Prosecutor indicated that he had no questions.</span>]</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Do you want to ask any questions, Dr. Nelte?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: The witness, Lahousen, has given very important -evidence, particularly charging in a grave manner the Defendant -Keitel, represented by me. . . .</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Are you going to make a speech now?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: My client, the Defendant Keitel, would like to put -numerous questions to the witness after he has had a discussion -with me. I therefore ask the Tribunal to allow either that there -may be a considerable adjournment now or that at the next session -these questions may be discussed in cross-examination.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Very well. You shall have an opportunity to -cross-examine at 10 o’clock tomorrow. Does any member of the -Tribunal wish to ask any questions of the witness now?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): I should like to ask the witness -whether the orders to kill the Russians and in connection therewith -the treatment of the prisoners were in writing.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAHOUSEN: As far as I know, yes, but I did not see or read -these orders myself.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Were they official orders?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAHOUSEN: Yes, they were official orders, of course, though -the facts were brought out in a roundabout way. It was these -orders which Reinecke and the others discussed and this is how -I learned about the essential points of these orders. I did not read -them myself at that time. But I knew that they were not oral -agreements because they were commented upon; consequently I -knew that something existed in writing. Only I could not and -cannot say whether there were one or more orders, and who signed -them. This I did not claim to know. I submitted my knowledge -which is based solely on discussions and reports from which I quite -clearly could deduct the existence of orders. -<span class='pageno' title='476' id='Page_476'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Do you know to whom or to -what organizations such orders were usually addressed?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAHOUSEN: Orders of this kind, involving the question of -principle, went to the OKW, because things relating to prisoners -of war were and had to be the concern of the OKW, and in particular -of Reinecke, which also explains the discussions with -Reinecke.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): So usually the members or some -of the members of the General Staff would have known of such -orders, would they not?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAHOUSEN: Certainly, many members of the Wehrmacht knew -of the essential contents of this order, for the reaction of the Wehrmacht -against this order was tremendous. Apart from official discussions -which I have reported here, these orders were discussed a -great deal in casino clubs and elsewhere, because all these matters -became manifest in the most undesirable form and had a most -undesirable effect on the troops. As a matter of fact, officers, and -high-ranking officers at the front, either did not transmit these -orders or sought to evade them in some way and this was discussed -a great deal. I have named some of these officers; some are -listed in the notes, diary, <span class='it'>et cetera</span>. It was not an everyday occurrence, -and it was then the topic of the day.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): And were the orders known to -the leaders of the SA and SD?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAHOUSEN: They must have been known to them, for the -ordinary soldiers who watched all these proceedings knew and -spoke about them. To a certain extent they were even known to -the civilian populace; civilians learned far more details about these -matters from wounded soldiers returning from the front than I -could tell here.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: General Nikitchenko wants to ask a question.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE TRIBUNAL (Major General I. T. Nikitchenko): You have -told us that you received instructions about the murder of prisoners -of war and brutal treatment. You received these orders from -Reinecke?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAHOUSEN: Well, I must correct something that I said. It is -not I and not the Amt Ausland Abwehr who got the order, because -we had nothing to do with it, but I knew about it, as I was present -at this conference as a representative of the Amt Ausland Abwehr. -But we ourselves had nothing to do with the treatment of prisoners -of war, and certainly not in this negative sense.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): Apart from these meetings, -the meetings of the High Command, were such instructions -<span class='pageno' title='477' id='Page_477'></span> -ever given? Were there any meetings of the High Command headquarters -about killings and ill-treatment of prisoners of war?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAHOUSEN: There certainly must have been a number of -discussions on this subject, but I was present at only one of them, -which I have already described, so I cannot say anything more -about it.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): At headquarters?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAHOUSEN: In the OKW—at headquarters.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): At the headquarters of -the German Army?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAHOUSEN: Certainly in the OKW where Amt Ausland Abwehr -had sent a delegate in my person, if for no other reason than -to enter protest. As a matter of fact our Amt had nothing to do -with prisoners of war in this sense. But contrarywise we were, -because of technical and easily understandable reasons, interested -in proper treatment of the prisoners.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): The meetings were not -about good treatment of prisoners, but rather about ill-treatment -and killing them? Was Ribbentrop also present at these meetings?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAHOUSEN: No! On no account. This discussion—I mean the -one conference about which I have given testimony—took place -after the accomplished fact. Everything had already happened; -executions had taken place, and now effects began to make themselves -felt. Protests of all kinds, from the front and from other -places, such as, for example, our own office, Amt Ausland Abwehr, -followed. This conference was intended to show the necessity for -the orders which had already been given, and to justify measures -already taken. These discussions took place after the beginning of -the operations, after the orders which had been given had already -been carried out, and all that I have touched upon or stated had -already happened and produced its evil effects. The accomplished -fact had been thoroughly discussed with the idea of making one -more attempt, a last attempt on our part, to put to an end, and -break off, the matter.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): Did all these conversations -bring about results?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAHOUSEN: That is what I talked about, and that was the -subject of the discussions with Reinecke in which I took part. I did -not take part in the other discussions and therefore can say nothing -about them.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): At which other meetings -had orders been given about killings of Ukrainians and burning of -towns and villages in Galicia? -<span class='pageno' title='478' id='Page_478'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAHOUSEN: I would like to achieve clarity relative to what -the General has in mind. Am I being asked about the conference -in the Führer’s train in 1939 prior to the fall of Warsaw? According -to the entries in Canaris’ diary, it took place on 12 September 1939. -This order or directive which Ribbentrop issued and which Keitel -transmitted to Canaris, Ribbentrop also giving it to Canaris during -a brief discussion, was in reference to the organizations of National -Ukrainians with which Amt Abwehr cooperated along military -lines, and which were to bring about an uprising in Poland, an -uprising which aimed to exterminate the Poles and the Jews; that -is to say, above all, such elements as were always being discussed -in these conferences. When Poles are mentioned, the intelligentsia -especially are meant, and all those persons who embodied the -national will of resistance. This was the order given to Canaris in -the connection I have already described and as it has already been -noted in the memorandum. The idea was not to kill Ukrainians but, -on the contrary, to carry out this task of a purely political and -terroristic nature together with the Ukrainians. The cooperation -between Amt Ausland Abwehr and these people who numbered -only about 500 or 1000, and what actually occurred can be clearly -seen from the diary. This was simply a preparation for military -sabotage.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): These instructions were -received from Ribbentrop and Keitel?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAHOUSEN: They came from Ribbentrop. Such orders which -concerned political aims couldn’t possibly come from Amt Ausland -Abwehr because any. . . .</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): I am not asking you whether -they could or could not. I am asking you where they came from.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAHOUSEN: They came from Ribbentrop, as is seen from the -memorandum. This is the memorandum that I made for Canaris.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. DIX: I have three short questions. May I put them?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: It is now past 4, and we have to hear the -requests of the Defendant Hess, and the Court has to be cleared for -them. So I think you had better postpone them until tomorrow.</p> - -<p class='line' style='text-align:center;margin-top:2em;margin-bottom:2em;'>[<span class='it'>A recess was taken and all defendants except Hess were removed from the courtroom.</span>]</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I call upon counsel for the Defendant Hess.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. GÜNTHER VON ROHRSCHEIDT (Counsel for Defendant -Hess): May it please the Tribunal, I am speaking as counsel for the -Defendant Rudolf Hess. -<span class='pageno' title='479' id='Page_479'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>In the proceedings which have already been opened against -Hess, the Court is to decide solely the question whether the -defendant is fit or unfit to be heard, and further, whether he might -even be considered entirely irresponsible.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The Court itself has posed this question affecting the proceedings -against Hess by asking the experts to state their opinion, firstly, -on whether the defendant is in a position to plead on the charge; -secondly, on his state of mind, whether he is mentally sound or not.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>With regard to question 1 (Is the defendant in a position to -plead?) the Tribunal asked the experts specifically whether the -defendant is sufficiently in possession of his mental faculties to -understand the proceedings and to conduct his defense adequately—that -is, to repudiate a witness to whom he has objections and to -understand details of the evidence.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The experts to whom this task was entrusted have, in separate -groups, examined Hess for a few days and have stated their expert -opinion on these questions in writing. As the defendant’s counsel -I consider it my duty, after studying the reports of these experts, -which unfortunately, I could not do as carefully as I desired since -time was short, and in view of my knowledge of the defendant -and my experience in almost daily contact with him, to state my -opinion that the defendant Hess is not in a position to plead in -the case against him.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I am therefore obliged to file the following applications on -behalf of the Defendant Hess:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Firstly, I request a ruling to suspend the proceedings against -Hess temporarily. Secondly, if his inability to plead is recognized -by the Tribunal, I request that the proceedings against the -defendant be not conducted in his absence. Thirdly, if the Tribunal -rules that Hess is fit to plead, I request that in addition other -competent psychiatrists be consulted for an authoritative opinion.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Before I come to the reasons for my applications, I should like -to say, at the request of the defendant, that he himself considers he -is fit to plead and would himself like to inform the Court to that -effect.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>May I now state the reasons for my application:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In regard to my first application: If the defendant is not fit to -plead, I request that the proceedings against Hess be temporarily -suspended.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In this connection may I refer to the opinions already submitted -to the Tribunal.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>After examining the questions placed before them by the -Tribunal, the experts have come to the conclusion which is -embodied in what I may call the main report signed by a mixed -<span class='pageno' title='480' id='Page_480'></span> -delegation consisting as far as I could determine of English, Soviet, -and American experts, and dated 14 November 1945.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>This report states, I quote: “The ability of the Defendant Hess -is impaired”—that is—“the ability to defend himself, to face a -witness, and to understand details of the evidence.” I have cited -this part of the report because it is closest to the questions put to -the experts by the Tribunal.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Another opinion says that “. . . even if Hess’ amnesia does not -prevent the defendant from understanding what happens around -him and to follow the proceedings in Court. . . .”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT [<span class='it'>Interposing</span>]: Would you speak a little more -slowly? The interpreters are not able to interpret so fast.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Would you also refer us expressly to those parts of the medical -reports to which you wish to draw our attention?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Do you understand what I said?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. VON ROHRSCHEIDT: Yes. I am sorry I cannot refer to the -pages of the original or English text, as I only have the German -translation; so I can only say that the first quotation. . . .</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT [<span class='it'>Interposing</span>]: You can read the words in -German, and they will be translated into English.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Which report are you referring to?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. VON ROHRSCHEIDT: I was referring to the report of -14 November as far as I can see from my German translation. This -report seems to have been drawn up by a delegation of English, -Soviet, and American experts, and accompanied the report of -17 November 1945. What I quoted was the following—may I repeat:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“The ability of the Defendant Hess to defend himself, to face -a witness, and to understand details of the evidence is -impaired.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>I ask the Tribunal to tell me. . . .</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Can you say which of the doctors you are -quoting?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. VON ROHRSCHEIDT: It is the report which, in my copy, is -dated 14 November 1945, and, as I said, was presumably signed by -Soviet, American, and English doctors.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Unfortunately, when returning the material yesterday evening -after translation into German I could not get the original text, and -my attempt to obtain it now failed through lack of time.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Have the English prosecutors got a copy, and -can you tell us which it is?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I’m sorry, My Lord, I think I -am in the same difficulties as your Lordship. On the order that I -have, I have copies of four medical reports. Your Lordship will see -<span class='pageno' title='481' id='Page_481'></span> -at the end of the document headed “Order,” it says, “Copies of -four medical reports are attached.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The first one of these is signed by three English doctors on the -19th of November. The second is signed by three American doctors -and a French doctor, dated the 20th of November 1945. And then -there is a report signed by three Soviet doctors, dated the 17th of -November. And one is signed by three Soviet doctors and the -French doctor dated the 16th of November. These are the only ones -which I have with the Court’s order.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I don’t know what this report is that you are referring to.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Dr. Von Rohrscheidt seems to -have an unsigned report of the 14th.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Von Rohrscheidt, have you got the four -reports which are really before us? I will read them out to you.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The first one I have got in my hand is the 19th of November -1945, by Lord Moran, Dr. Rees, and Dr. Riddoch. Have you got that? -That is the English report.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. VON ROHRSCHEIDT: I only have this report in the German -translation and not in the original.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: But if you have got it in the German translation, -that is quite good enough.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Then the next one is dated the 20th of November 1945, by -Dr. Jean Delay, Dr. Nolan Lewis, Dr. Cameron, and Colonel Paul -Schroeder. Have you got that?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. VON ROHRSCHEIDT: Yes, I have that.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: That is two.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Then, the next one is dated the 16th of November, and is signed -by three Soviet doctors and one French doctor, Dr. Jean Delay, -dated the 16th of November. Have you got that?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. VON ROHRSCHEIDT: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Then there is another report of the 17th, -signed by the three Soviet doctors alone, without the French doctor.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. VON ROHRSCHEIDT: Yes, I have that one.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Now, will you refer us to the passages in -those reports upon which you rely?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>There is another report by two English doctors which is practically -the same. That is the one I have already referred to, that -does not contain the name of Lord Moran on it, dated the 19th of -November.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. VON ROHRSCHEIDT: Yes, I think I can shorten the proceedings -by saying that in my opinion all the reports surely agree—even -<span class='pageno' title='482' id='Page_482'></span> -if not in the same words—that the ability of the accused Hess -to defend himself, to face a witness, and to understand details of -the evidence is impaired. And under this assumption that all the -medical opinions agree on this point I, as the defendant’s counsel, -must come to the conclusion that the defendant is unable to plead. -The reduced capacity of the defendant to defend himself, which -is caused by his mental defect, recognized by all experts as amnesia -and described as a mental condition of a mixed character, but more -than mere mental abnormality, must be accepted as meaning that -he is unfit to plead.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I am of the opinion that the conclusion reached by the medical -experts implies that, in the way the question was formulated, the -Defendant Hess cannot adequately defend himself on account of -this mental defect, namely, amnesia. The medical reports also state -that the defendant is not insane. That is not the important point -at the moment because in my view it can already be convincingly -stated, on the basis of the reports as such that on account of his -reduced mental ability the defendant is not in a condition to understand -the entire proceedings.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I myself believe—and I think that my opinion on this agrees -with the medical opinion—that the defendant is completely incapable -of making himself understood in a manner expected from -a mentally normal defendant.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In view of my own experience with him I consider that the -defendant is incapable of grasping the charges which the Prosecution -will bring against him to the extent required for his defense, -since his memory is completely impaired. On account of his loss -of memory he neither remembers events of the past nor the persons -with whom he associated in the past. I am, therefore, of the opinion -that defendant’s own claim that he is fit to plead is irrelevant. And -since, as the medical report says, his condition cannot be rectified -within appreciable time, I think that the proceedings against him -should be suspended.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Whether the narco-synthesis treatment suggested by the medical -experts will bring about the desired effect is uncertain. It is also -uncertain within what period of time this treatment would result in -the complete recovery of the defendant’s health. The medical reports -accuse the defendant of deliberately refusing to undergo such -medical treatment. The defendant himself, however, tells me that, -on the contrary, he would readily undergo treatment but that he -refuses the suggested cure because firstly, he believes that he is -completely sound and fit to plead, that therefore this cure is unnecessary; -secondly, because he disapproves on principle of such -violent intervention, and finally because he thinks that such an -<span class='pageno' title='483' id='Page_483'></span> -intervention at this time might render him unfit to plead and to -take part in the proceedings—and that is the very thing he wishes -to avoid.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>If, however, the defendant is incapable of pleading, or of -defending himself, as is stated in the medical report, and if this -condition is likely to last for a long time, then in my opinion, a -basis exists for the temporary suspension of the proceedings against -him.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Coming now to my second application:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>If the Tribunal accepts my arguments and declares the Defendant -Hess unfit to plead, then, according to Article 12 of the -Charter, it would be possible to proceed against the defendant <span class='it'>in -absentia</span>. Article 12 provides that the Tribunal has the right to -proceed against a defendant in his absence if he cannot be found, -or if for other reasons the Tribunal deems it necessary in the -interests of justice. The question then is whether it is in the -interest of justice to proceed against the defendant <span class='it'>in absentia</span>. In -my opinion it is incompatible with real justice to proceed against -the defendant if he is prevented by his impaired condition—namely, -amnesia which is recognized by all the medical experts—from personally -safeguarding his rights by attending the proceedings.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In a trial in which charges being brought against the defendant -are so grave that they might entail the death penalty, it seems to -me incompatible with real justice that the defendant should on -account of his impaired condition, be deprived of the rights granted -him under Article 16 of the Charter. This Article of the Charter -makes provisions for the defendant’s own defense, for the opportunity -of giving evidence personally, and for the possibility of -cross-examining every witness called by the Prosecution. All this -is of such great importance for the Defense, that exclusion from -any of these rights would, in my opinion, constitute a grave injustice -to the defendant. A trial <span class='it'>in absentia</span> could therefore not be -regarded as a fair trial.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>If as I have stated the defendant’s capacity to defend himself -is reduced for the reasons agreed on and to the extent established -in the reports of the experts, then he is also not in a position to -give his counsel the information necessary for a defense conducted -in the defendant’s absence.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Since the Charter has clearly laid down these rights of the -defendant’s, it seems unjust to me as defense counsel, that the -defendant should be deprived of them because his illness prevents -him from personally safeguarding them by attending the proceedings. -<span class='pageno' title='484' id='Page_484'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>The provisions in Article 12 of the Charter for trying a defendant -in his absence must surely be looked upon as applying in an exceptional -case of a defendant who endeavors to evade the proceedings -although able to plead. But the Defendant Hess has told me, -and he will probably emphasize it to the Tribunal, that he wishes -to attend the proceedings; that he will therefore consider it particularly -unjust if the proceedings are conducted in his absence, -despite his good will, despite the fact that he wishes to attend them.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I therefore request the Tribunal, if it declares the defendant -unfit to plead, that it will not proceed against him in his absence.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>And now my third application:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>If the Tribunal considers the Defendant Hess fit to plead, thereby -overruling my opinion and what I think is also the conclusion of -the medical reports, I request that additional medical experts be -consulted to re-examine this question since as far as I saw from -the reports, each of the doctors examined and talked to the -defendant for only a few hours on one day, one of them on two -days. In a case of such outstanding importance as this one I think -it would be necessary to place the defendant into a suitable hospital -to obtain a reliable picture based on several weeks of examination -and observation. The experts themselves are, obviously, not quite -sure whether Defendant Hess beyond his inability to plead, is -insane or at least not of sound mind. That is clear from the fact -that all the medical statements end by emphasizing that if the -Tribunal does not consider the defendant unfit to plead, he should -again be subjected to a psychiatric examination.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I think therefore that this suggestion of the psychiatrists who -have already examined him should be followed, and I request, that -if the Tribunal considers the defendant fit to plead another exhaustive -medical examination be authorized.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I want to ask you one question: Is it not -consistent with all the medical opinions that the defendant is -capable of understanding the course of the proceedings, and that -the only defect from which he is suffering is forgetfulness about -what happened before he flew to England?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. VON ROHRSCHEIDT: Mr. President, it is true that the -experts consider the Defendant Hess capable of following the -proceedings. But, on the other hand, in answer to the questions put -to them, they emphasize that the defendant is not capable of -defending himself. The Tribunal asked the experts to give their -opinion on the question—may I read it again, under the second -point: “Is the defendant sane or not?” The question was answered -in the affirmative by all experts, but that does not exclude the fact -that the defendant might, at this moment, be incapable of pleading. -<span class='pageno' title='485' id='Page_485'></span> -The Tribunal’s question was this: “. . . the Tribunal wishes to be -advised whether the defendant is of sufficient intellect to comprehend -the course of the proceedings of the Trial so as to make -a proper defense, to challenge a witness, to whom he might wish to -object, and to understand the details of the evidence.” This is the -wording of the translation in my possession. In my view this -question is answered by the experts to the effect that the defendant -is incapable of adequately defending himself, of rejecting the -testimony of a witness and of comprehending evidence submitted. -That, as I see it, is the conclusion of all the experts’ reports with -the exception of the one signed by the Russians.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>May I refer to the report signed by the American Delegation, -dated 20 November 1945, it is stated there under Number 1:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“We find as a result of our examinations and investigations, -that Rudolf Hess is suffering from hysteria characterized in -part by loss of memory.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Now comes the passage to which I should like to draw the -Tribunal’s attention:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“The loss of memory is such that it will not interfere with -his comprehension of the proceedings, but it will interfere -with his response to questions relating to his past and will -interfere with his undertaking his defense.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>This report thus establishes that Hess’ defense will be impaired. -And I believe that if the experts go so far as to admit -that his memory is affected, then one may assume that to a great -degree he is not fit to plead. The report of the Soviet-French -representatives, signed by the Russian professors and by Professor -Jean Delay goes even further in stating that, although the defendant -is able to comprehend all that happens around him, the -amnesia affects his capacity to defend himself and to understand -details of the past and that it must be considered an impediment. -As I see it, the report clearly means that, although the defendant -is not insane, and although he can follow the proceedings as such, -he cannot defend himself as he is suffering from a form of amnesia -which is based on hysteria and which can be believed.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Do you accept the opinion of -the experts?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. VON ROHRSCHEIDT: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): I should like to draw the -attention of Defense Counsel to the fact that he has referred inaccurately -to the decision reached by the Soviet and French experts. -He has rendered this decision in a free translation which does not -correspond to the original contents. -<span class='pageno' title='486' id='Page_486'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. VON ROHRSCHEIDT: May I ask whether the report of -November 16 is meant? May I once more read what my translation -says? I can only refer to the translation of the English -text that was given to me; this translation was made in the Translation -Division of the Secretariat and handed to me.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>May I repeat that the translation in my possession refers to the -report of November 16, 1945 signed by members of the Soviet -Delegation and by Professor Delay of Paris.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Under point 3 of this report the following is stated:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“At present he is not insane in the strict sense of the word. -His amnesia does not prevent him completely from understanding -what is going on around him but it will interfere -with his ability to conduct his defense and to understand -details of the past which would appear as factual data.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='noindent'>That is the text which I have here before me in the authentic -German version.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: That is all we wish to ask you. Does the -Chief Prosecutor for the United States wish to address the Tribunal?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I think General Rudenko would like -to open discussion, if that is agreeable.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes. Are you going on?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: In connection with the statement made by -counsel for the defendant, on the results of the evidence of Hess’ -certified psychological condition, I consider it essential to make -the following declaration:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The defendant’s psychological condition was confirmed by -experts appointed by the Tribunal. These experts came to the -unanimous conclusion that he is sane and responsible for his -actions. The Chief Prosecutors, after discussing the results of the -decision and acting in accordance with the order of the Tribunal, -make the following reply to the inquiry of the Tribunal:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>First of all, we do not question or doubt the findings of the -commission. We consider that the Defendant, Rudolf Hess, is perfectly -able to stand his trial. This is the unanimous opinion of the -Chief Prosecutors. I consider that the findings of the examinations -by the experts are quite sufficient to declare Hess sane and able -to stand his trial. We therefore request the Tribunal to make the -requisite decision this very day.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In stating his reasons for the postponement of the proceedings -or for the settlement of the defendant’s case, defense counsel -referred to the decision of the experts. I must state, however, that -this decision—and I do not know on what principle it was reached—was -<span class='pageno' title='487' id='Page_487'></span> -quoted quite inaccurately. In the summary submitted by -defense counsel, it is pointed out that the mental condition of the -Defendant Hess does not permit him to defend himself, to reply -to the witnesses or to understand all the details of the evidence. -This is contrary to the decision submitted by the experts in their -statement. The final conclusion of the experts definitely states that -his loss of memory would not entirely prevent him from understanding -the trial; it would, however, make it impossible for him -to defend himself and to remember particulars of the past. I consider -that these particulars, which Hess is unable to remember, -would not unduly interest the Tribunal. The most important point -is that emphasized by the experts in their decision, a point which -they themselves never doubted and which, incidentally, was never -doubted by Hess’ defense counsel, namely—that Hess is sane; and -in that case Hess comes under the jurisdiction of the International -Tribunal. On the basis of these facts I consider that the application -of the Defense should be denied as being unsubstantiated.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: May it please the Tribunal, it -has been suggested that I might say just a word, and as shortly -as the Tribunal desires, as to the legal conceptions which govern -the position with which the Tribunal and this defendant are placed -at the present time.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The question before the Tribunal is whether this defendant is -able to plead to the Indictment and should be tried at the present -time.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>If I might very briefly refer the Tribunal to the short passages -in the report, which I submit are relevant, it might be useful -at the present time. According to the attachments to the order, -which I have, the first report is that signed by the British doctors -on the 19th November 1945. And in that report I beg the Tribunal -to refer to Paragraph 3, in which the signatories say that at the -moment he is not insane in the strict sense. His loss of memory -will not entirely interfere with his comprehension of the proceedings, -but it will interfere with his ability to make his defense and -to understand details of the past, which arise in evidence.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The next report is that signed by the American and French -doctors, and in Paragraph 1, the Tribunal will see:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“We find, as a result of our examinations and investigations, -that Rudolf Hess is suffering from hysteria characterized in -part by loss of memory. The nature of this loss of memory -is such that it will not interfere with his comprehension of -the proceedings, but it will interfere with his response to -questions relating to his past and will interfere with his -undertaking his defense.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'><span class='pageno' title='488' id='Page_488'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>If the Tribunal will proceed to the third report, signed by the -Soviet doctors, at the foot of Page 1 of the copy that I have there -is a paragraph beginning “Psychologically . . .” which I submit is -of importance:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“Psychologically, Hess is in a state of clear consciousness; -knows that he is in prison at Nuremberg, under indictment -as a war criminal; has read, and, according to his own words, -is acquainted with the charges against him. He answers -questions rapidly and to the point. His speech is coherent, -his thoughts formed with precision and correctness and they -are accompanied by sufficient emotionally expressive movements. -Also, there is no kind of evidence of paralogism.</p> - -<p class='noindent'>“It should also be noted here, that the present psychological -examination, which was conducted by Lieutenant Gilbert, -Ph. D., bears out the testimony, that the intelligence of Hess -is normal and in some instances, above the average. His -movements are natural and not forced.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Now, if I may come to the next report, I am sorry—the report -which is signed by the three Soviet doctors and Professor Delay -of Paris, dated the 16th, which is the last in my bundle, that says -in Paragraph 3:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“At present, he is not insane in the strict sense of the word. -His amnesia does not prevent him completely from understanding -what is going on around him, but it will interfere -with his ability to conduct his defense and to understand -details of the past, which would appear as factual data.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>I refer, without quoting, because I do not consider that they are -of such importance on this point, to the explanation of the kind -and reason of the amnesia which appeared in the Soviet report, -dated 17 November, under the numbers 1, 2, and 3 at the end of -the report. But I remind the Tribunal that all these reports unite -in saying that there is no form of insanity.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In these circumstances, the question in English law—and I -respectfully submit that to the consideration of the Tribunal as -being representative of natural justice in this regard—is, in deciding -whether the defendant is fit to plead, whether the defendant -be insane or not, and the time which is relevant for the deciding -of that issue is at the date of the arraignment and not at any -prior time.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Different views have been expressed as to the party on whom -the onus of proof lies in that issue, but the later, and logically the -better view, is that the onus is on the Defense, because it is -always presumed that a person is sane until the contrary is proved. -<span class='pageno' title='489' id='Page_489'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>Now, if I might refer the Court to one case which I suspect, -if I may so use my mind, has not been absent from the Court’s -mind, because of the wording of the notice which we are discussing -today, it is the case of Pritchard in 7 Carrington and Pike, which -is referred to in Archibolds’ <span class='it'>Criminal Pleading</span> in the 1943 edition, -at Page 147.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In Pritchard’s case, where a prisoner arraigned on an indictment -for felony appeared to be deaf, dumb, and also of non-sane mind, -Baron Alderson put three distinct issues to the jury, directing the -jury to be sworn separately on each: Whether the prisoner was -mute of malice, or by the visitation of God; (2) whether he was -able to plead; (3) whether he was sane or not. And on the last -issue they were directed to inquire whether the prisoner was of -sufficient intellect to comprehend the course of the proceedings -of the trial so as to make a proper defense, to challenge a juror, -that is, a member of the jury, to whom he might wish to object -and to understand the details of the evidence; and he directed the -jury that if there was no certain mode of communicating to the -prisoner the details of the evidence so that he could clearly understand -them, and be able properly to make his defense to the -charge against him, the jury ought to find that he was not of -sane mind.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I submit to the Tribunal that the words there quoted, “to comprehend -the course of the proceedings of the trial so as to make -a proper defense,” emphasize that the material time, the only -time which should be considered, is whether at the moment of plea -and of trial the defendant understands what is charged against -him and the evidence by which it is supported.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: And does not relate to his memory at that -time.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is, I respectfully agree -with Your Lordship, it does not relate to his memory. It has never, -in English jurisprudence, to my knowledge, been held to be a bar -either to trial or punishment, that a person who comprehends the -charge and the evidence has not got a memory as to what happened -at the time. That, of course, is entirely a different question -which does not arise either on these reports or on this application -as to what was the defendant’s state of mind when the acts were -committed. No one here suggests that the defendant’s state of mind -when the action charged was committed was abnormal, and it -does not come into this case.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: He will, it seems to me, be able to put forward -his amnesia as part of his defense.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Certainly, My Lord. -<span class='pageno' title='490' id='Page_490'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: And to say, “I should have been able to make -a better defense if I had been able to remember what took place -at the time.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, My Lord. If I might compare -a very simple case within my experience, and I am sure -within the experience of members of the Court where this has -arisen scores of times in English courts, after a motor accident -when a man is charged with manslaughter or doing grievous -bodily harm, he is often in the position of saying, “Because of the -accident my memory is not good or fails as to the acts charged.” -That should not, and no one has ever suggested that it could, be -a matter of relief from criminal responsibility. I hope that the -Tribunal will not think that I have occupied too much of their -time, but I thought it was useful just to present the matter on -the basis of the English law as I understand it.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Sir David, so I can understand -you, one of the tests under the Pritchard case is whether or not -the defendant can make a proper defense, is it not?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: With the greatest respect, you -have got to read that with the preceding words, which limit it. -They say, “Whether a prisoner was of sufficient intellect to comprehend -the course of the proceedings of the trial so as to make -a proper defense.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE TRIBUNAL: (Mr. Biddle): And would you interpret that -to mean that this defendant could make a proper defense under -the procedure of the trial if you also find as a fact, which you, -I think, do not dispute, and which you quoted in fact, that although -not insane—now I quote that he did not understand, or rather:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“His amnesia does not prevent him completely from understanding -what is going on around him, but it will interfere -with his ability to conduct his defense, and understand -details of the past. . . .”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>You don’t think that is inconsistent with that finding?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: No, I am submitting it is not. It -is part of his defense, and it may well be, “I don’t remember -anything about that at all.” And he could actually add to that, -“From my general behavior or from other acts which I undoubtedly -have done, it is extremely unlikely that I should do it.” That is the -defense which is left to him. And he must take that defense. That -is my submission.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): So even if we assume, for the -purpose of argument, that his amnesia is complete, and that he -remembers nothing that occurred before the indictment though -now understanding the proceedings, you think he should be tried? -<span class='pageno' title='491' id='Page_491'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I submit he should be tried. -That is my submission as to the legal position. I especially didn’t -discuss, of course, as the Tribunal will appreciate—I didn’t discuss -the quantum of amnesia here because I am putting that to the -Tribunal. I wanted to put before the Tribunal the legal basis on -which this application is opposed. Therefore I accept readily the -extreme case which the learned American judge has put to me.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: M. Donnedieu de Vabres would like to ask -a question.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE TRIBUNAL (M. De Vabres): I would like to know in what -period the real amnesia of Hess applies. He pretends to have forgotten -facts which occurred more than 15 days ago. It may be -simulation or, as they say in the report, it may be real simulation. -I would like to know if according to the reports Hess has really lost -his memory of facts which are referred to in the Indictment, facts -which pertain to the past covered by the Indictment.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: The facts which are included in -the Indictment, the explanation that the doctors give as to his -amnesia, is most clearly set out in these paragraphs of the Soviet -report. That is the third report dated the 17th of November 1945, -Page 2, and the numbered paragraphs 1 to 3. They say first:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“In the psychological personality of Hess there are no changes -typical of the progressive schizophrenic disease”—that is, -there are no changes typical of a progressive double personality -developing.—“and therefore, the delusions, from -which he suffered periodically while in England, cannot be -considered as manifestations of a schizophrenic paranoia, -and must be recognized as the expression of a psychogenic -paranoic reaction, that is, the psychologically comprehensible -reaction”—now I ask the learned French judge to note the -next sentence—“of an unstable personality to the situation -(the failure of his mission, arrest, and incarceration). Such -is the interpretation of the delirious statements of Hess in -England as is bespoken by their disappearance, appearance, -and repeated disappearance depending on external circumstances -which affected the mental state of Hess.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Paragraph 2:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“The loss of memory by Hess is not the result of some kind -of mental disease but represents hysterical amnesia, the basis -of which is a subconscious inclination towards self-defense”—now -I ask the learned French judge to note again the next -words—“as well as a deliberate and conscious tendency -towards it. Such behavior often terminates when the hysterical -<span class='pageno' title='492' id='Page_492'></span> -person is faced with an unavoidable necessity of conducting -himself correctly. Therefore the amnesia of Hess -may end upon his being brought to trial.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Paragraph 3:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p class='noindent'>“Rudolf Hess, prior to his flight to England, did not suffer -from any kind of insanity, nor is he now suffering from it. -At the present time he exhibits hysterical behavior with -signs of”—and again I ask the learned French judge to note -this point—“with signs of a conscious-intentional (simulated) -character, which does not exonerate him from his responsibility -under the Indictment.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>The last sentence is a matter for the Tribunal. But in these -circumstances it would be impossible to say that the amnesia may -continue to be complete or is entirely unconscious. That is deliberately -avoided by the learned doctors. Therefore the Prosecution -do not say that that is the case, but they do say that even if it -were complete, the legal basis which I have suggested to the Court -is a correct one for action in this matter.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Thank you, Sir David. Would Dr. Rohrscheidt -like to add anything by way of reply? One moment. Mr. Justice -Jackson, I gathered from what Sir David said that he was speaking -on behalf of you and of the French Prosecution, is that correct?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I intend to adopt all that he said. -I would only add a few more words, if I may.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Doctor Rohrscheidt, Mr. Justice Jackson has -something to say first of all.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I adopt all that has been said, and -will not repeat. We have three applications before the Tribunal. -One is for another examination. I will spend very little time on -that. I think that we have made, up to this point with this examination, -medical history in having seven psychiatrists from five -nations who are completely in agreement. An achievement of that -kind is not likely to be risked.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The only reason suggested here is that a relatively short time -has been devoted to the examination, but I suggest to Your Honors -that that is not the situation, because there have been available the -examinations and observations and medical history during the -incarceration of Hess in England, extending from 1941, and the -reports of the psychiatrists of the American forces since he was -brought to Nuremberg, and they all agree. So that there is a more -complete medical history in this case than in most cases.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The next application was as to trial in absentia. I shall spend -no time on that, for there seems to be no occasion for trying Hess -<span class='pageno' title='493' id='Page_493'></span> -<span class='it'>in absentia</span> if he shouldn’t be tried in his presence. If he is unable -to be tried, why, he simply shouldn’t be tried at all. That is -all I can see to it.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I would like to call your attention to the one thing in all this, -the one statement on which any case can be made here for postponement. -That is the statement with which we all agree: That -Hess’ condition will interfere with his response to questions relating -to his past and will interfere with his undertaking his defense. -Now, I think it will interfere with his defense if he persists in it, -and I am sure that counsel has a very difficult task. But Hess -has refused the treatment, and I have filed with the court the -report of Major Kelly, the American psychiatrist, in whose care -he was placed immediately after he was brought here.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>He has refused every simple treatment that has been suggested. -He has refused to submit to the ordinary things that we submit -to every day—blood tests, examinations—and says he will submit -to nothing until after the trial. The medication which was suggested -to bring him out of this hysterical situation—every psychiatrist -agrees that this is simply an hysterical situation if it is genuine at -all—was the use of intravenous drugs of the barbital series, either -sodium amytal or sodium phenotal, the ordinary sort of sedative -that you perhaps take on a sleepless night. We did not dare -administer that, to be perfectly candid, against his objection, because -we felt if that, however harmless—and in over a thousand -cases observed by Major Kelly there have been no ill effects although -some cases are reported where there have—we felt that if should -he be struck by lightning a month afterward it would still be -charged that something that we had done had caused his death; -and we did not desire to impose any such treatment upon him.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>But I respectfully suggest that a man cannot stand at the bar -of the Court and assert that his amnesia is a defense to his being -tried, and at the same time refuse the simple medical expedients -which all agree might be useful.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>He is in the volunteer class with his amnesia. When he was -in England, as the reports show, he is reported to have made the -statement that his earlier amnesia was simulated. He came out -of this state during a period in England, and went back into it. It -is now highly selective. That is to say, you can’t be sure what Hess -will remember and what he will not remember. His amnesia is not -of the type which is a complete blotting out of the personality, of -the type that would be fatal to his defense.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>So we feel that so long as Hess refuses the ordinary, simple -expedients, even if his amnesia is genuine, that he is not in a -position to continue to assert that he must not be brought to trial. -<span class='pageno' title='494' id='Page_494'></span> -We think he should be tried, not in absentia, but that this trial -should proceed.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Isn’t Hess asserting that he wants -to be tried?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, I don’t know about that. He -has been interrogated and interrogated by us, interrogated by his -co-defendants, and I wouldn’t attempt to say what he would now -say he wants. I haven’t observed that it is causing him any great -distress. Frankly, I doubt very much if he would like to be absent, -but I wouldn’t attempt to speak for him.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Does M. Dubost wish to add anything?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>M. Dubost indicated that he did not.</span>]</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. VON ROHRSCHEIDT: May I just say a few words to the -Tribunal to explain my point of view once more?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Firstly, it is a fact that the Defendant Hess, according to the -unanimous reports of the doctors, is not insane, that his mental -faculties are not impaired.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Secondly, as all reports agree, the Defendant Hess is suffering -from amnesia. The reports vary on whether this amnesia is founded -on a pathological, a psychogenic, or hysterical basis, but they agree -that it exists as an unsound mental condition. The defendant is -therefore, not insane, but has a mental defect. Legally, therefore, -he cannot claim that he is not to be held responsible for his actions; -for at the time when the actions with which he is charged were -committed, he was certainly not insane, and consequently can be -held responsible. It is a different question, however, at least -according to German law, whether the defendant is at this moment -in a position to follow the proceedings of a trial, that is, whether -he is fit to plead. And on the basis of the medical reports which I -quoted, I think this question should be answered negatively. He -is not fit to plead.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I admit that doubts are possible, that the Tribunal may have -doubts whether the answers of the experts are sufficient to establish -that the defendant’s ability to plead is actually impaired, that he -cannot, as the Tribunal perhaps deliberately phrased it, defend -himself adequately. I think that perhaps the emphasis should be -on this last point. It is my opinion that the amnesia—this loss -of memory confirmed by all experts—is such that the defendant is -unable to make an adequate defense. It may be, of course, that he -can defend himself on one point or another, that he can raise -objections on some points, and that he may be able to follow the -proceedings as such. But his defense could not be termed adequate -<span class='pageno' title='495' id='Page_495'></span> -in the sense in which the defense of a person in full possession -of his mental faculties would be adequate.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>May I add one word. I already mentioned that the defendant -told me that he would like to attend the proceedings, as he does -not consider himself unfit to plead, but that, in the opinion of the -Defense, is quite irrelevant. It is a question which the Tribunal -must examine, and in which the personal opinion of the defendant -is of no account.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>With regard to the conclusion which the American prosecutor -draws from the defendant’s refusal to undergo the narco-synthesis -treatment suggested by the doctors—that <span class='it'>is</span> not a question of -truculence. He refused it only because, as he assured me, he was -afraid that the intravenous injections at this particular moment -might incapacitate him in his weakened condition and make it -impossible for him to follow the proceedings; he wants, however, -to attend the trial. He refused also because, as I have already mentioned, -he himself thinks that he is sound and therefore says, “I -do not need any intravenous injections, I shall recover in the -course of time.” The defendant also told me that he has an abhorrence -of such treatments. I know that to be true, because in the -unhappy times of the National Socialist regime, he was always in -favor of natural remedies. He even founded the Rudolf Hess -Hospital in Dresden, which uses natural and not medical remedies.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: May I make one observation, Your -Honors?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: The argument illustrates the selectivity -of the memory of which I spoke to you. Hess apparently -can inform his counsel about his attitude toward this particular -matter during the National Socialist regime. His counsel is able to -tell us how he felt about medical things during the National Socialist -regime, but when we ask him about anything in which he participated -that might have a criminal aspect, the memory becomes -bad. I hope that the Court has not overlooked the statement of the -matters that he does well recollect.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. VON ROHRSCHEIDT: May I make a correction?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: It is unusual to hear counsel in a second -reply, but as Mr. Justice Jackson has spoken again we will hear -what you have to say.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. VON ROHRSCHEIDT: I merely want to say that I was -misunderstood. It was not the defendant who told me that he -always favored natural remedies; I said that from my own knowledge. -I said it from my own experience to show that he has an -<span class='pageno' title='496' id='Page_496'></span> -instinctive aversion for medical interference. My remark was not -based on the memory of the defendant, but on knowledge of -my own.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Rohrscheidt, the Tribunal would like, if -you consider it proper, that the Defendant Hess should state what -his views on this question are.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. VON ROHRSCHEIDT: As his defense counsel, I have certainly -no objection, and in my opinion it is the defendant’s own -wish to be heard. The Tribunal would then be able to gain a personal -impression of his condition.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: He can state whether he considers himself -fit to plead from where he is.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>HESS: Mr. President, I would like to say this. At the beginning -of the proceedings this afternoon I gave my defense counsel a -note saying that I thought the proceedings could be shortened if -I would be allowed to speak. I wish to say the following:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In order to forestall the possibility of my being pronounced -incapable of pleading, in spite of my willingness to take part in -the proceedings and to hear the verdict alongside my comrades, I -would like to make the following declaration before the Tribunal, -although, originally, I intended to make it during a later stage of -the trial:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Henceforth my memory will again respond to the outside world. -The reasons for simulating loss of memory were of a tactical nature. -Only my ability to concentrate is, in fact, somewhat reduced. But -my capacity to follow the trial, to defend myself, to put questions -to witnesses, or to answer questions myself is not affected thereby.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I emphasize that I bear full responsibility for everything that -I did, signed or co-signed. My fundamental attitude that the Tribunal -is not competent, is not affected by the statement I have just -made. I also simulated loss of memory in consultations with my -officially appointed defense counsel. He has, therefore, represented -it in good faith.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The trial is adjourned.</p> - -<p class='line' style='text-align:center;margin-top:2em;margin-bottom:1em;'>[<span class='it'>The Tribunal adjourned until 1 December 1945 at 1000 hours.</span>]</p> - -<hr class='pbk'/> - -<h2 class='nobreak'>TRANSCRIBER NOTES</h2> - -<p class='pindent'>Punctuation and spelling has been maintained except where obvious -printer errors have occurred such as missing periods or commas for -periods. English and American spellings occur throughout the document -depending on the author. Multiple occurrences of the following spellings -which differ and are found throughout this volume are as follows:</p> - -<table id='tab8' summary='' class='center'> -<colgroup> -<col span='1' style='width: 10em;'/> -<col span='1' style='width: 10em;'/> -</colgroup> -<tr><td class='tab8c1 tdStyle1'>cooperate</td><td class='tab8c2 tdStyle0'>co-operate</td></tr> -<tr><td class='tab8c1 tdStyle1'>coordidnated</td><td class='tab8c2 tdStyle0'>co-ordinated</td></tr> -<tr><td class='tab8c1 tdStyle1'>gas wagons</td><td class='tab8c2 tdStyle0'>gas-wagons</td></tr> -<tr><td class='tab8c1 tdStyle1'>peace time</td><td class='tab8c2 tdStyle0'>peacetime</td></tr> -<tr><td class='tab8c1 tdStyle1'>Ausland Abwehr</td><td class='tab8c2 tdStyle0'>Ausland-Abwehr</td></tr> -<tr><td class='tab8c1 tdStyle1'>Governor General</td><td class='tab8c2 tdStyle0'>Governor-General</td></tr> -</table> - -<p class='noindent'>Although some sentences may appear to have incorrect spellings or verb tenses, -the original text has been maintained as it represents what the tribunal -read into the record and reflects the actual translations between the -German, English, Russian and French documents presented in the trial(s).</p> - -<p class='pindent'>An attempt has been made to produce this ebook in a format as close as -possible to the original document's presentation and layout.</p> - -<p class='line'> </p> - -<p class='noindent'>[The end of <span class='it'>Trial of the Major War Criminals -Before the International Military Tribunal: Nuremberg 14 -November 1945-1 October 1946 (Vol. 2)</span>, -by Various.]</p> - - - - - - - - -<pre> - - - - - -End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of Trial of the Major War Criminals -Before the International Militar, by Various - -*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK TRIAL--MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS, VOL II *** - -***** This file should be named 51882-h.htm or 51882-h.zip ***** -This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: - http://www.gutenberg.org/5/1/8/8/51882/ - -Produced by Larry Harrison, Cindy Beyer and the online -Project Gutenberg team at -http://www.pgdpcanada.net with images provided by The -Internet Archives-US - -Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions will -be renamed. - -Creating the works from print editions not protected by U.S. copyright -law means that no one owns a United States copyright in these works, -so the Foundation (and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United -States without permission and without paying copyright -royalties. 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