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+This eBook, including all associated images, markup, improvements,
+metadata, and any other content or labor, has been confirmed to be
+in the PUBLIC DOMAIN IN THE UNITED STATES.
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+Project Gutenberg (https://www.gutenberg.org) public repository for
+eBook #51182 (https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/51182)
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-Project Gutenberg's History of Greece, Volume 9 (of 12), by George Grote
-
-This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and most
-other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions
-whatsoever.  You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms of
-the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online at
-www.gutenberg.org.  If you are not located in the United States, you'll have
-to check the laws of the country where you are located before using this ebook.
-
-Title: History of Greece, Volume 9 (of 12)
-
-Author: George Grote
-
-Release Date: February 11, 2016 [EBook #51182]
-
-Language: English
-
-Character set encoding: UTF-8
-
-*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK HISTORY OF GREECE, VOLUME 9 OF 12 ***
-
-
-
-
-Produced by Adrian Mastronardi, Mark C. Orton, Ramon Pajares
-Box and the Online Distributed Proofreading Team at
-http://www.pgdp.net (This file was produced from images
-generously made available by The Internet Archive/American
-Libraries.)
-
-
-
-
-
-
-TRANSCRIBER'S NOTE
-
-  * Italics are denoted by underscores as in _italics_.
-  * Small caps are represented in upper case as in SMALL CAPS.
-  * Gesperrt Greek text is enclosed in tildes as in ~καὶ τὰ λοιπά~.
-  * Original spelling, hyphenation and punctuation have been kept,
-    but variant spellings were made consistent when a predominant
-    usage was found.
-  * Obvious printer errors have been silently corrected, after
-    comparison with a later edition of this work. Greek text has
-    also been corrected after checking with this later edition and
-    with Perseus, when the reference was found.
-  * Both “Euagoras” and “Evagoras” are used to refer to the same
-    ruler.
-  * The following changes were also made, after checking with other
-    editions:
-
-  page  vi: “fractions” → “factions”   (they divide into three
-                                        factions).
-  page 216: “Odrysians” → “Bithynians” (who charged through
-                                        the Bithynians).
-  page 326:      “with” → “which”      (which his successor Teleutias
-                                        ... still farther completed)
-  note  30:    “Ἑγγαδα” → “Ἑλλάδα”     (Τοιοῦτοι οὔν ὄντες, ἐπόθουν εἰς
-                                        τὴν Ἑλλάδα σώζεσθαι).
-  note 626:       “494” → “394”        (before the autumn of 394 B.C.).
-
-
-
-
-  HISTORY OF GREECE
-
-  BY
-  GEORGE GROTE, ESQ.
-
-  VOL. IX.
-
-  REPRINTED FROM THE LONDON EDITION.
-
-  NEW YORK:
-  HARPER & BROTHERS, PUBLISHERS,
-  329 AND 331 PEARL STREET.
-  1880.
-
-
-
-
-CONTENTS.
-
-VOL. IX.
-
-
-PART II.
-
-CONTINUATION OF HISTORICAL GREECE.
-
-
-CHAPTER LXIX.
-
-CYRUS THE YOUNGER AND THE TEN THOUSAND GREEKS.
-
-  Spartan empire.—March of the Ten Thousand Greeks.—Persian
-  kings—Xerxes—Artaxerxes Longimanus.—Darius Nothus.—Cyrus the
-  younger in Ionia—his vigorous operations against Athens.—Youth
-  and education of Cyrus.—His esteem for the Greeks—his
-  hopes of the crown.—Death of Darius Nothus—succession of
-  Artaxerxes Mnemon.—Secret preparations of Cyrus for attacking
-  his brother.—Klearchus and other Greeks in the service of
-  Cyrus.—Strict administration, and prudent behavior, of
-  Cyrus.—Cyrus collects his army at Sardis.—The Ten Thousand
-  Greeks—their position and circumstances.—Xenophon.—How
-  Xenophon came to join the Cyreian army.—Cyrus marches
-  from Sardis—Kolossæ—Kelænæ.—Peltæ—Keramôn-Agora,
-  Käystru-Pedion.—Distress of Cyrus for money—Epyaxa
-  supplies him.—Thymbrium.—Tyriæum—Review of the Greeks by
-  Cyrus.—Ikonium—Lykaonia—Tyana.—Pass over Taurus into
-  Kilikia.—Syennesis of Kilikia—his duplicity—he assists Cyrus
-  with money.—Cyrus at Tarsus—mutiny of the Greeks—their
-  refusal to go farther.—Klearchus tries to suppress the
-  mutiny by severity—he fails.—He tries persuasion—his
-  discourse to the soldiers.—His refusal to march farther—well
-  received.—Deceitful manœuvres of Klearchus to bring the
-  soldiers round to Cyrus.—The soldiers agree to accompany
-  Cyrus farther—increase of pay.—March onward—from Tarsus to
-  Issus.—Flight of Abrokomas—abandonment of the passes.—Gates
-  of Kilikia and Syria.—Desertion of Xenias and Pasion—prudence
-  of Cyrus.—Cyrus marches from the sea to Thapsakus on the
-  Euphrates.—Partial reluctance of the army—they ford the
-  Euphrates.—Separate manœuvre of Menon.—Abrokomas abandons the
-  defence of the river—his double dealing.—Cyrus marches along
-  the left bank of the Euphrates—the Desert—privations of the
-  army.—Pylæ—Charmandê—dangerous dispute between the soldiers
-  of Klearchus and those of Menon.—Entry into Babylonia—treason
-  of Orontes—preparation for battle.—Discourse of Cyrus to his
-  officers and soldiers.—Conception formed by Cyrus of Grecian
-  superiority.—Present of Cyrus to the prophet Silanus.—Cyrus
-  passes the undefended trench—Kunaxa—sudden appearance of the
-  king’s army—preparation of Cyrus for battle.—Last orders of
-  Cyrus.—Battle of Kunaxa—easy victory of the Greeks on their
-  side.—Impetuous attack of Cyrus upon his brother—Cyrus is
-  slain.—Flight of Ariæus and the Asiatic force of Cyrus.—Plunder
-  of the Cyreian camp by Artaxerxes. Victorious attitude of the
-  Greeks.—Character of Cyrus.—If Cyrus had succeeded, he would
-  have been the most formidable enemy to Greece.                  1-51
-
-
-CHAPTER LXX.
-
-RETREAT OF THE TEN THOUSAND GREEKS.
-
-  Dismay of the Greeks on learning the death of Cyrus. Klearchus
-  offers the throne to Ariæus.—Artaxerxes summons the Greeks
-  to surrender—their reply—language of Phalinus.—Ariæus
-  refuses the throne, but invites the Greeks to join him
-  for retreat.—The Greeks rejoin Ariæus—interchange of
-  oaths—resolution to retreat together.—Position of the
-  Greeks—to all appearance hopeless.—Commencement of the
-  retreat, along with Ariæus—disorder of the army.—Heralds
-  from the Persians to treat about a truce.—The heralds
-  conduct the Greeks to villages furnished with provisions.
-  March over the canals.—Abundant supplies obtained in the
-  villages.—Visit of Tissaphernes—negotiations.—Convention
-  concluded with Tissaphernes, who engages to conduct the
-  Greeks home.—Motives of the Persians—favorable dispositions
-  of Parysatis towards Cyrus.—Long halt of the Greeks—their
-  quarrel with Ariæus.—Secret despair of Klearchus.—Retreating
-  march begun, under Tissaphernes—they enter within the Wall
-  of Media—march to Sittakê.—Alarm and suspicions of the
-  Greeks—they cross the Tigris.—Retreating march up the left bank
-  of the Tigris—to the Great Zab.—Suspicions between the Greeks
-  and Tissaphernes.—Klearchus converses with Tissaphernes—and
-  is talked over.—Klearchus, with the other Grecian generals,
-  visits Tissaphernes in his tent.—Tissaphernes seizes the
-  Greek generals. They are sent prisoners to the Persian court,
-  and there put to death.—Menon is reserved to perish in
-  torture—sentiments of queen Parysatis.—How Klearchus came
-  to be imposed upon.—Plans of Tissaphernes—impotence and
-  timidity of the Persians.—The Persians summon the Grecian army
-  to surrender.—Indignant refusal of the Greeks—distress and
-  despair prevalent among them.—First appearance of Xenophon—his
-  dream.—He stimulates the other captains to take the lead and
-  appoint new officers.—Address of Xenophon to the officers.
-  New generals are named, Xenophon being one.—The army is
-  convened in general assembly—speech of Xenophon.—Favorable
-  augury from a man sneezing.—Encouraging topics insisted on by
-  Xenophon.—Great impression produced by his speech—the army
-  confirm the new generals proposed.—Great ascendency acquired
-  over the army at once by Xenophon—qualities whereby he obtained
-  it.—Combination of eloquence and confidence, with soldier-like
-  resource and bravery.—Approach of the Persian Mithridates—the
-  Greeks refuse all parley.—The Greeks cross the Zab and resume
-  their march, harassed by the Persian cavalry.—Sufferings of
-  the Greeks from marching under the attacks of the cavalry.
-  Successful precautions taken.—Tissaphernes renews the attack,
-  with some effect.—Comfortable quarters of the Greeks. They
-  halt to repel the cavalry, and then march fast onward.—Victory
-  of the Greeks—prowess of Xenophon.—The Greeks embarrassed as
-  to their route—impossibility either of following the Tigris
-  farther, or of crossing it.—The strike into the mountains of the
-  Karduchians.—They burn much of their baggage—their sufferings
-  from the activity and energy of the Karduchians.—Extreme danger
-  of their situation.—Xenophon finds out another road to turn
-  the enemy’s position.—The Karduchians are defeated and the
-  road cleared.—Danger of Xenophon with the rear division and
-  baggage.—Anxiety of the Greeks to recover the bodies of the
-  slain.—They reach the river Kentritês, the northern boundary
-  of Karduchia.—Difficulties of passing the Kentritês—dream of
-  Xenophon.—They discover a ford and pass the river.—Xenophon
-  with the rear-guard repels the Karduchians and effects his
-  passage.—March through Armenia. Heavy snow and severe
-  cold.—They ford the Eastern Euphrates or Murad.—Distressing
-  marches—extreme misery from cold and hunger.—Rest in
-  good quarters—subterranean villages well stocked with
-  provisions.—After a week’s rest, they march onward—their
-  guide runs away.—They reach a difficult pass occupied by the
-  Chalybes—raillery exchanged between Xenophon and Cheirisophus
-  about stealing.—They turn the pass by a flank-march, and
-  force their way over the mountain.—March through the country
-  of the Taochi—exhaustion of provisions—capture of a
-  hill-fort.—Through the Chalybes, the bravest fighters whom
-  they had yet seen—the Skythini.—They reach the flourishing
-  city of Gymnias.—First sight of the sea from the mountain-top
-  Thêchê—extreme delight of the soldiers.—Passage through the
-  Makrônes.—Through the Kolchians—who oppose them and are
-  defeated.—Kolchian villages—unwholesome honey.—Arrival at
-  Trapezus on the Euxine (Trebizond).—Joy of the Greeks—their
-  discharge of vows to their gods—their festivals and
-  games.—Appendix.                                             52-120
-
-
-CHAPTER LXXI.
-
-PROCEEDINGS OF THE TEN THOUSAND GREEKS, FROM THE TIME THAT THEY
-REACHED TRAPEZUS, TO THEIR JUNCTION WITH THE LACEDÆMONIAN ARMY IN
-ASIA MINOR.
-
-  Greek cities on the Euxine—Sinôpê with her colonies Kerasus,
-  Kotyôra, and Trapezus.—Indigenous inhabitants—their relations
-  with the Greek colonists.—Feelings of the Greeks on the Euxine
-  when the Ten Thousand descended among them.—Uncertainty and
-  danger of what they might do.—Plans of the army—Cheirisophus
-  is sent to Byzantium to procure vessels for transporting
-  them.—Regulations for the army proposed by Xenophon during
-  his absence.—Adopted by the army—their intense repugnance
-  to farther marching.—Measures for procuring transports.
-  Marauding expeditions for supplies, against the Colchians and
-  the Drilæ.—The army leave Trapezus, and march westward along
-  the coast to Kerasus.—Acts of disorder and outrage committed by
-  various soldiers near Kerasus.—March to Kotyôra—hostilities
-  with the Mosynœki.—Long halt at Kotyôra—remonstrance from the
-  Sinopians.—Speech of Hekatonymus of Sinôpê to the army—reply
-  of Xenophon.—Success of the reply—good understanding
-  established with Sinôpê.—Consultation of the army with
-  Hekatonymus, who advises going home by sea.—Envoys sent by
-  the army to Sinôpê to procure vessels.—Poverty and increasing
-  disorganization or the army.—Ideas of Xenophon about founding
-  a new city in the Euxine, with the army.—Sacrifice of Xenophon
-  to ascertain the will of the gods—treachery of the prophet
-  Silanus.—Silanus, Timasion, and others raise calumnies
-  against Xenophon. General assembly of the army.—Accusations
-  against Xenophon—his speech in defence.—He carries the
-  soldiers with him—discontent and flight of Silanus.—Fresh
-  manœuvres of Timasion—fresh calumnies circulated against
-  Xenophon—renewed discontent of the army.—Xenophon convenes
-  the assembly again.—his address in defence of himself.—His
-  remonstrance against the disorders in the army.—Vote of the
-  army unanimously favorable to Xenophon—disapproving the
-  disorders, and directing trial.—Xenophon’s appeal to universal
-  suffrage, as the legitimate political authority. Success of
-  his appeal.—Xenophon recommends trial of the generals before
-  a tribunal formed of the lochages or captains. Satisfaction of
-  the army with Xenophon.—Manner in which discipline was upheld
-  by the officers.—Complete triumph of Xenophon. His influence
-  over the army, derived from his courage, his frankness, and
-  his oratory.—Improved feeling of the army—peace with the
-  Paphlagonian Korylas.—The army pass by sea to Sinôpê.—Return
-  of Cheirisophus—resolution of the army to elect a single
-  general—they wish to elect Xenophon, who declines—Cheirisophus
-  is chosen.—The army pass by sea to Herakleia—they wish to
-  extort money from the Herakleots—opposition of Cheirisophus
-  and Xenophon.—Dissatisfaction of the army—they divide into
-  three factions. 1. The Arcadians and Achæans. 2. A division
-  under Cheirisophus. 3. A division under Xenophon.—Arcadian
-  division start first and act for themselves—they get into
-  great danger, and are rescued by Xenophon—the army reünited at
-  Kalpê—old board of generals reëlected, with Neon in place of
-  Cheirisophus.—Distress for provisions at Kalpê—unwillingness
-  to move in the face of unfavorable sacrifices—ultimate victory
-  over the troops of the country.—Halt at Kalpê—comfortable
-  quarters—idea that they were about to settle there as a
-  colony.—Arrival of Kleander, the Spartan harmost, from
-  Byzantium, together with Dexippus.—Disorder in the army:
-  mutiny against Kleander, arising from the treachery of
-  Dexippus.—Indignation and threats of Kleander—Xenophon
-  persuades the army to submit—fear of Sparta.—Satisfaction
-  given to Kleander, by the voluntary surrender of Agasias with
-  the mutinous soldier.—Appeal to the mercy of Kleander, who is
-  completely soothed.—Kleander takes the command, expressing
-  the utmost friendship both towards the army and towards
-  Xenophon.—Unfavorable sacrifices make Kleander throw up the
-  command and sail away.—March of the army across the country
-  from Kalpê to Chalkêdon.—Pharnabazus bribes Anaxibius to carry
-  the army across the Bosphorus into Europe—false promises of
-  Anaxibius to the army.—Intention of Xenophon to leave the army
-  immediately and go home—first proposition addressed to him by
-  Seuthes of Thrace.—The army cross over to Byzantium—fraud
-  and harsh dealing of Anaxibius, who sends the army at once out
-  of the town.—Last orders of Anaxibius as the soldiers were
-  going out of the gates.—Wrath and mutiny of the soldiers, in
-  going away—they rush again into the gates, and muster within
-  the town.—Terror of Anaxibius and all within the town.—The
-  exasperated soldiers masters of Byzantium—danger of all within
-  it—conduct of Xenophon.—Xenophon musters the soldiers in
-  military order and harangues them.—Xenophon calms the army, and
-  persuades them to refrain from assaulting the town—message sent
-  by them to Anaxibius—they go out of Byzantium, and agree to
-  accept Kœratadas as their commander.—Remarkable effect produced
-  by Xenophon—evidence which it affords of the susceptibility of
-  the Greek mind to persuasive influences. Xenophon leaves the
-  army, and goes into Byzantium with the view of sailing home.
-  Kœratadas is dismissed from the command.—Dissension among the
-  commanders left.—Distress of the army—Aristarchus arrives from
-  Sparta to supersede Kleander—Polus on his way to supersede
-  Anaxibius.—Pharnabazus defrauds Anaxibius, who now employs
-  Xenophon to convey the Cyreians across back to Asia.—Aristarchus
-  hinders the crossing—his cruel dealing towards the sick Cyreians
-  left in Byzantium.—His treacherous scheme for entrapping
-  Xenophon.—Xenophon is again implicated in the conduct of
-  the army—he opens negotiations with Seuthes.—Position of
-  Seuthes—his liberal offers to the army.—Xenophon introduces
-  him to the army, who accept the offers.—Service of the army
-  with Seuthes, who cheats them of most of their pay.—The army
-  suspect the probity of Xenophon—unjust calumnies against
-  him—he exposes it in a public harangue, and regains their
-  confidence.—Change of interest in the Lacedæmonians, who
-  become anxious to convey the Cyreians across into Asia, in
-  order to make war against the satraps.—Xenophon crosses over
-  with the army to Asia—his poverty—he is advised to sacrifice
-  to Zeus Meilichios—beneficial effects.—He conducts the army
-  across Mount Ida to Pergamus.—His unsuccessful attempt to
-  surprise and capture the rich Persian Asidates.—In a second
-  attempt he captures Asidates—valuable booty secured.—General
-  sympathy expressed for Xenophon—large share personally
-  allotted to him.—The Cyreians are incorporated in the army of
-  the Lacedæmonian general Thimbron—Xenophon leaves the army,
-  depositing his money in the temple at Ephesus.—His subsequent
-  return to Asia, to take command of Cyreians as a part of the
-  Lacedæmonian army.—Xenophon in the Spartan service, with
-  Agesilaus against Athens—he is banished.—He settles at Skillus
-  near Olympia, on an estate consecrated to Artemis.—Charms of
-  the residence—good hunting—annual public sacrifice offered by
-  Xenophon.—Later life of Xenophon—expelled from Skillus after
-  the battle of Leuktra—afterwards restored at Athens.—Great
-  impression produced by the retreat of the Ten Thousand upon the
-  Greek mind.                                                  121-180
-
-
-CHAPTER LXXII.
-
-GREECE UNDER THE LACEDÆMONIAN EMPIRE.
-
-  Sequel of Grecian affairs generally—resumed.—Spartan
-  empire—how and when it commenced.—Oppression and suffering
-  of Athens under the Thirty.—Alteration of Grecian feeling
-  towards Athens—the Thirty are put down and the democracy
-  restored.—The Knights or Horsemen, the richest proprietors
-  at Athens, were the great supporters of the Thirty in their
-  tyranny.—The state of Athens, under the Thirty, is a sample of
-  that which occurred in a large number of other Grecian cities,
-  at the commencement of the Spartan empire.—Great power of
-  Lysander—he establishes in most of the cities Dekarchies, along
-  with a Spartan harmost.—Intimidation exercised everywhere by
-  Lysander in favor of his own partisans.—Oppressive action of
-  these Dekarchies.—In some points, probably worse than the
-  Thirty at Athens.—Bad conduct of the Spartan harmosts—harsh
-  as well as corrupt. No justice to be obtained against them
-  at Sparta.—Contrast of the actual empire of Sparta, with
-  the promises of freedom which she had previously held
-  out.—Numerous promises of general autonomy made by Sparta—by
-  the Spartan general Brasidas, especially.—Gradual change in
-  the language and plans of Sparta towards the close of the
-  Peloponnesian war.—Language of Brasidas contrasted with the
-  acts of Lysander.—Extreme suddenness and completeness of the
-  victory of Ægospotami left Lysander almost omnipotent.—The
-  dekarchies became partly modified by the jealousy at Sparta
-  against Lysander. The harmosts lasted much longer.—The Thirty
-  at Athens were put down by the Athenians themselves, not by any
-  reformatory interference of Sparta.—The empire of Sparta much
-  worse and more oppressive than that of Athens.—Imperial Athens
-  deprived her subject-allies of their autonomy, but was guilty
-  of little or no oppression.—Imperial Sparta did this, and much
-  worse—her harmosts and decemvirs are more complained of than the
-  fact of her empire.—This more to be regretted, as Sparta had
-  now an admirable opportunity for organizing a good and stable
-  confederacy throughout Greece.—Sparta might have reörganized
-  the confederacy of Delos, which might now have been made to work
-  well.—Insupportable arrogance of Lysander—bitter complaints
-  against him, as well as against the dekarchies.—Lysander
-  offends Pharnabazus, who procures his recall. His disgust and
-  temporary expatriation.—Surrender of the Asiatic Greeks to
-  Persia, according to the treaty concluded with Sparta.—Their
-  condition is affected by the position and ambitious schemes of
-  Cyrus, whose protection they seek against Tissaphernes.—After
-  the death of Cyrus, Tissaphernes returns as victor and satrap
-  to the coast of Asia Minor.—Alarm of the Asiatic Greeks,
-  who send to ask aid from Sparta. The Spartans send Thimbron
-  with an army to Asia. His ill-success and recall—he is
-  superseded by Derkyllidas.—Conduct of the Cyreians loose as
-  to pillage.—Derkyllidas makes a truce with Tissaphernes, and
-  attacks Pharnabazus in the Troad and Æolis.—Distribution of the
-  Persian empire; relation of king, satrap, sub-satrap.—Mania,
-  widow of Zênis, holds the subsatrapy of Æolis under Pharnabazus.
-  Her regular payment and vigorous government.—Military force,
-  personal conquests, and large treasures, of Mania.—Assassination
-  of Mania, and of her son, by her son-in-law Meidias, who
-  solicits the satrapy from Pharnabazus, but is indignantly
-  refused.—Invasion and conquest of Æolis by Derkyllidas, who
-  gets possession of the person of Meidias.—Derkyllidas acquires
-  and liberates Skêpsis and Gergis, deposing Meidias, and seizing
-  the treasures of Mania.—Derkyllidas concludes a truce with
-  Pharnabazus, and takes winter quarters in Bithynia.—Command of
-  Derkyllidas—satisfaction of Sparta with the improved conduct of
-  the Cyreians.—Derkyllidas crosses into Europe, and employs his
-  troops in fortifying the Chersonesus against the Thracians.—He
-  captures and garrisons Atarneus.—He makes war upon Tissaphernes
-  and Pharnabazus, upon the Mæander.—Timidity of Tissaphernes—he
-  concludes a truce with Derkyllidas.—Derkyllidas is superseded
-  by Agesilaus.—Alienation towards Sparta had grown up among her
-  allies in Central Greece.—Great energy imparted to Spartan
-  action by Lysander immediately after the victory of Ægospotami;
-  an energy very unusual with Sparta.—The Spartans had kept all
-  the advantages of victory to themselves—their allies were
-  allowed nothing.—Great power of the Spartans—they take revenge
-  upon those who had displeased them—their invasion of Elis.—The
-  Spartan king Agis invades the Eleian territory. He retires
-  from it immediately in consequence of an earthquake.—Second
-  invasion of Elis by Agis—he marches through Triphylia and
-  Olympia; victorious march, with much booty.—Insurrection of
-  the oligarchical party in Elis—they are put down.—The Eleians
-  are obliged to submit to hard terms of peace.—Sparta refuses
-  to restore the Pisatans to the Olympic presidency.—Triumphant
-  position of Sparta—she expels the Messenians from Peloponnesus
-  and its neighborhood.                                        181-229
-
-
-CHAPTER LXXIII.
-
-AGESILAUS KING OF SPARTA.—THE CORINTHIAN WAR.
-
-  Triumphant position of Sparta at the close of the
-  war—introduction of a large sum of gold and silver by
-  Lysander—opposed by some of the Ephors.—The introduction of money
-  was only one among a large train of corrupting circumstances
-  which then became operative on Sparta.—Contrast between
-  Sparta in 432 B.C., and Sparta after 404 B.C.—Increase of
-  peculation, inequality, and discontent at Sparta.—Testimonies
-  of Isokrates and Xenophon to the change of character and habits
-  at Sparta.—Power of Lysander—his arrogance and ambitious
-  projects—flattery lavished upon him by sophists and poets.—Real
-  position of the kings at Sparta.—His intrigues to make himself
-  king at Sparta—he tries in vain to move the oracles in his
-  favor—scheme laid for the production of sacred documents, as
-  yet lying hidden, by a son of Apollo.—His aim at the kingship
-  fails—nevertheless he still retains prodigious influence at
-  Sparta.—Death of Agis, king of Sparta—doubt as to the legitimacy
-  of his son Leotychides. Agesilaus, seconded by Lysander,
-  aspires to the throne.—Character of Agesilaus.—Conflicting
-  pretensions of Agesilaus and Leotychides.—Objection taken against
-  Agesilaus on the ground of his lameness,—oracle produced by
-  Diopeithes—eluded by the interpretation of Lysander.—Agesilaus
-  is preferred as king—suspicions which always remained attached
-  to Lysander’s interpretation.—Popular conduct of Agesilaus—he
-  conciliates the ephors—his great influence at Sparta—his energy,
-  combined with unscrupulous partisanship.—Dangerous conspiracy at
-  Sparta—terror-striking sacrifices.—Character and position of the
-  chief conspirator Kinadon—state of parties at Sparta—increasing
-  number of malcontents.—Police of the ephors—information
-  laid before them.—Wide-spread discontent reckoned upon by
-  the conspirators.—Alarm of the ephors—their manœuvres for
-  apprehending Kinadon privately.—Kinadon is seized, interrogated,
-  and executed—his accomplices are arrested, and the conspiracy
-  broken up.—Dangerous discontent indicated at Sparta.—Proceedings
-  of Derkyllidas and Pharnabazus in Asia.—Persian preparations
-  for reviving the maritime war against Sparta—renewed activity
-  of Konon.—Agesilaus is sent with a land-force to Asia,
-  accompanied by Lysander.—Large plans of Agesilaus, for
-  conquest in the interior of Asia.—General willingness of
-  the Spartan allies to serve in the expedition, but refusal
-  from Thebes, Corinth, and Athens.—Agesilaus compares himself
-  with Agamemnon—goes to sacrifice at Aulis—is contemptuously
-  hindered by the Thebans.—Arrival of Agesilaus at Ephesus—he
-  concludes a fresh armistice with Tissaphernes.—Arrogant
-  behavior and overweening ascendency of Lysander—offensive to
-  the army and to Agesilaus.—Agesilaus humbles and degrades
-  Lysander, who asks to be sent away.—Lysander is sent to command
-  at the Hellespont—his valuable service there.—Tissaphernes
-  breaks the truce with Agesilaus, who makes war upon him and
-  Pharnabazus—he retires for the purpose of organizing a force
-  of cavalry.—Agesilaus indifferent to money for himself, but
-  eager in enriching his friends.—His humanity towards captives
-  and deserted children.—Spartan side of his character—exposure
-  of naked prisoners—different practice of Asiatics and
-  Greeks.—Efforts of Agesilaus to train his army, and to procure
-  cavalry.—Agesilaus renews the war against Tissaphernes, and
-  gains a victory near Sardis.—Artaxerxes causes Tissaphernes to
-  be put to death and superseded by Tithraustes.—Negotiations
-  between the new satrap and Agesilaus—the satraps in Asia Minor
-  hostile to each other.—Commencement of action at sea against
-  Sparta—the Athenian Konon, assisted by Persian ships and money,
-  commands a fleet of eighty sail on the coast of Karia.—Rhodes
-  revolts from the Spartan empire—Konon captures an Egyptian
-  corn-fleet at Rhodes.—Anxiety of the Lacedæmonians—Agesilaus
-  is appointed to command at sea as well as on land.—Severity
-  of the Lacedæmonians towards the Rhodian Dorieus—contrast of
-  the former treatment of the same man by Athens.—Sentiment of a
-  multitude compared with that of individuals.—Efforts of Agesilaus
-  to augment the fleet—he names Peisander admiral.—Operations
-  of Agesilaus against Pharnabazus.—He lays waste the residence
-  of the satrap, and surprises his camp—offence given to
-  Spithridates.—Personal conference between Agesilaus and
-  Pharnabazus.—Friendship established between Agesilaus and the son
-  of Pharnabazus—character of Agesilaus.—Promising position and
-  large preparations for Asiatic land-warfare, of Agesilaus—he is
-  recalled with his army to Peloponnesus.—Efforts and proceedings
-  of Konon in command of the Persian fleet—his personal visit to
-  the Persian court.—Pharnabazus is named admiral jointly with
-  Konon.—Battle of Knidus—complete defeat of the Lacedæmonian
-  fleet—death of Peisander the admiral.                        230-283
-
-
-CHAPTER LXXIV.
-
-FROM THE BATTLE OF KNIDUS TO THE REBUILDING OF THE LONG WALLS OF
-ATHENS.
-
-  War in Central Greece against Sparta—called the Corinthian
-  war.—Relations of Sparta with the neighboring states and with
-  her allies after the accession of Agesilaus. Discontent among
-  the allies.—Great power of Sparta, stretching even to Northern
-  Greece—state of Herakleia.—Growing disposition in Greece
-  to hostility against Sparta, when she becomes engaged in the
-  war against Persia.—The satrap Tithraustes sends an envoy
-  with money into Greece, to light up war against Sparta—his
-  success at Thebes, Corinth, and Argos.—The Persian money did
-  not create hostility against Sparta, but merely brought out
-  hostile tendencies pre-existing. Philo-Laconian sentiment
-  of Xenophon.—War between Sparta and Thebes—the Bœotian
-  war.—Active operations of Sparta against Bœotia—Lysander
-  is sent to act from Herakleia on the northward—Pausanias
-  conducts an army from Peloponnesus.—The Thebans apply to
-  Athens for aid—remarkable proof of the altered sentiment in
-  Greece.—Speech of the Theban envoy at Athens.—Political feeling
-  at Athens—good effects of the amnesty after the expulsion of
-  the Thirty.—Unanimous vote of the Athenians to assist Thebes
-  against Sparta.—State of the Bœotian confederacy—Orchomenus
-  revolts and joins Lysander, who invades Bœotia with his army
-  and attacks Haliartus.—Lysander is repulsed and slain before
-  Haliartus.—Pausanias arrives in Bœotia after the death of
-  Lysander—Thrasybulus and an Athenian army come to the aid
-  of the Thebans.—Pausanias evacuates Bœotia, on receiving
-  the dead bodies of Lysander and the rest for burial.—Anger
-  against Pausanias at Sparta; he escapes into voluntary exile;
-  he is condemned in his absence.—Condemnation of Pausanias not
-  deserved.—Sparta not less unjust in condemning unsuccessful
-  generals than Athens.—Character of Lysander—his mischievous
-  influence, as well for Sparta as for Greece generally.—His
-  plans to make himself king at Sparta—discourse of the
-  sophist Kleon.—Encouragement to the enemies of Sparta, from
-  the death of Lysander—alliance against her between Thebes,
-  Athens, Corinth, and Argos—the Eubœans and others join the
-  alliance.—Increased importance of Thebes—she now rises to the
-  rank of a primary power—the Theban leader Ismenias.—Successful
-  operations of Ismenias to the north of Bœotia—capture of
-  Herakleia from Sparta.—Synod of anti-Spartan allies at
-  Corinth—their confident hopes—the Lacedæmonians send to recall
-  Agesilaus from Asia.—Large muster near Corinth of Spartans
-  and Peloponnesians on one side, of anti-Spartan allies on the
-  other.—Boldness of the language against Sparta—speech of
-  the Corinthian Timolaus.—The anti-Spartan allies take up a
-  defensive position near Corinth—advance of the Lacedæmonians to
-  attack them.—Battle of Corinth—victory of the Lacedæmonians
-  in their part of the battle; their allies in the other parts
-  being worsted.—Lacedæmonian ascendency within Peloponnesus
-  is secured, but no farther result gained.—Agesilaus—his
-  vexation on being recalled from Asia—his large plans of Asiatic
-  conquest.—Regret of the Asiatic allies when he quits Asia—he
-  leaves Euxenus in Asia with four thousand men.—Agesilaus crosses
-  the Hellespont and marches homeward through Thrace, Macedonia,
-  and Thessaly.—Agesilaus and his army on the northern frontier
-  of Bœotia—eclipse of the sun—news of the naval defeat at
-  Knidus.—Bœotians and their allies mustered at Korôneia.—Battle
-  of Korôneia—Agesilaus with most of his army is victorious; while
-  the Thebans on their side are also victorious.—Terrible combat
-  between the Thebans and Spartans; on the whole, the result is
-  favorable to the Thebans.—Victory of Agesilaus, not without
-  severe wounds—yet not very decisive—his conduct after the
-  battle.—Army of Agesilaus withdraws from Bœotia—he goes to the
-  Pythian games—sails homeward across the Corinthian Gulf—his
-  honorable reception at Sparta.—Results of the battles of Corinth
-  and Korôneia. Sparta had gained nothing by the former, and had
-  rather lost by the latter.—Reverses of Sparta after the defeat
-  of Knidus. Loss of the insular empire of Sparta. Nearly all her
-  maritime allies revolt to join Pharnabazus and Konon.—Abydos
-  holds faithfully to Sparta, under Derkyllidas.—Derkyllidas
-  holds both Abydos and the Chersonesus opposite, in spite of
-  Pharnabazus—anger of the latter.—Pharnabazus and Konon sail
-  with their fleet to Peloponnesus and Corinth.—Assistance
-  and encouragement given by Pharnabazus to the allies at
-  Corinth—Remarkable fact of the Persian satrap and fleet at
-  Corinth.—Pharnabazus leaves the fleet with Konon in the Saronic
-  Gulf, and aids him, with money, to rebuild the Long Walls of
-  Athens.—Konon rebuilds the Long Walls—hearty coöperation of
-  the allies.—Great importance of this restoration—how much
-  it depended upon accident—Maintenance of the lines of Corinth
-  against Sparta, was one essential condition to the power of
-  rebuilding the Long Walls. The lines were not maintained longer
-  than the ensuing year.                                       284-324
-
-
-CHAPTER LXXV.
-
-FROM THE REBUILDING OF THE LONG WALLS OF ATHENS TO THE PEACE OF
-ANTALKIDAS.
-
-  Large plans of Konon—organization of a mercenary force at
-  Corinth.—Naval conflicts of the Corinthians and Lacedæmonians,
-  in the Corinthian Gulf.—Land-warfare—the Lacedæmonians
-  established at Sikyon—the anti-Spartan allies occupying the
-  lines of Corinth from sea to sea.—Sufferings of the Corinthians
-  from the war being carried on in their territory. Many Corinthian
-  proprietors become averse to the war.—Growth and manifestation
-  of the philo-Laconian party in Corinth. Oligarchical form of
-  the government left open nothing but an appeal to force.—The
-  Corinthian government forestall the conspiracy by a _coup
-  d’état_.—Numerous persons of the philo-Laconian party are
-  banished; nevertheless Pasimêlus the leader is spared, and
-  remains at Corinth.—Intimate political union and consolidation
-  between Corinth and Argos.—Pasimêlus admits the Lacedæmonians
-  within the Long Walls of Corinth. Battle within those walls.—The
-  Lacedæmonians are victorious—severe loss of the Argeians.—The
-  Lacedæmonians pull down a portion of the Long Walls between
-  Corinth and Lechæum, so as to open a free passage across. They
-  capture Krommyon and Sidus.—Effective warfare carried on by
-  the light troops under Iphikrates at Corinth—Military genius
-  and improvements of Iphikrates.—The Athenians restore the Long
-  Walls between Corinth and Lechæum—expedition of the Spartan
-  king Agesilaus, who, in concert with Teleutias, retakes the Long
-  Walls and captures Lechæum.—Alarm of Athens and Thebes at the
-  capture of the Long Walls of Corinth. Propositions sent to Sparta
-  to solicit peace. The discussions come to no result.—Advantages
-  derived by the Corinthians from possession of Peiræum. At
-  the instigation of the exiles, Agesilaus marches forth with
-  an army to attack it.—Isthmian festival—Agesilaus disturbs
-  the celebration. The Corinthian exiles, under his protection,
-  celebrate it; then, when he is gone, the Corinthians from the
-  city perform the ceremony over again.—Agesilaus attacks Peiræum,
-  which he captures, together with the Heræum, many prisoners, and
-  much booty.—Triumphant position of Agesilaus. Danger of Corinth.
-  The Thebans send fresh envoys to solicit peace—contemptuously
-  treated by Agesilaus.—Sudden arrival of bad news, which spoils
-  the triumph.—Destruction of a Lacedæmonian mora by the light
-  troops under Iphikrates.—Daring and well-planned manœuvres
-  of Iphikrates.—Few of the mora escape to Lechæum.—The
-  Lacedæmonians bury the bodies of the slain, under truce
-  asked and obtained. Trophy erected by Iphikrates.—Great
-  effect produced upon the Grecian mind by this event.
-  Peculiar feelings of Spartans; pride of the relatives of the
-  slain.—Mortification of Agesilaus—he marches up to the walls
-  of Corinth and defies Iphikrates—he then goes back humiliated
-  to Sparta.—Success of Iphikrates—he retakes Krommyon,
-  Sidus, and Peiræum—Corinth remains pretty well undisturbed
-  by enemies. The Athenians recall Iphikrates.—Expedition of
-  Agesilaus against Akarnania—successful, after some delay—the
-  Akarnanians submit, and enrol themselves in the Lacedæmonian
-  confederacy.—The Lacedæmonians under Agesipolis invade
-  Argos.—Manœuvre of the Argeians respecting the season of the
-  holy truce. Agesipolis consults the oracles at Olympia and
-  Delphi.—Earthquake in Argos after the invasion of Agesipolis—he
-  disregards it.—He marches up near to Argos—much plunder
-  taken—he retires.—Transactions in Asia—efforts of Sparta to
-  detach the Great King from Athens.—The Spartan Antalkidas is
-  sent as envoy to Tiribazus. Konon and other envoys sent also,
-  from Athens and the anti-Spartan allies.—Antalkidas offers to
-  surrender the Asiatic Greeks, and demands universal autonomy
-  throughout the Grecian world—the anti-Spartan allies refuse
-  to accede to those terms.—Hostility of Sparta to all the
-  partial confederacies of Greece, now first proclaimed under
-  the name of universal autonomy.—Antalkidas gains the favor of
-  Tiribazus, who espouses privately the cause of Sparta, though
-  the propositions for peace fail. Tiribazus seizes Konon—Konon’s
-  career is now closed, either by death or imprisonment.—Tiribazus
-  cannot prevail with the Persian court, which still continues
-  hostile to Sparta. Struthas is sent down to act against the
-  Lacedæmonians in Ionia.—Victory of Struthas over Thimbron and
-  the Lacedæmonian army. Thimbron is slain.—Diphridas is sent
-  to succeed Thimbron.—Lacedæmonian fleet at Rhodes—intestine
-  disputes in the island.—The Athenians send aid to Evagoras
-  at Cyprus. Fidelity with which they adhered to him, though
-  his alliance had now become inconvenient.—Thrasybulus is
-  sent with a fleet from Athens to the Asiatic coast—his
-  acquisitions in the Hellespont and Bosphorus.—Victory of
-  Thrasybulus in Lesbos—he levies contributions along the
-  Asiatic coast—he is slain near Aspendus.—Character of
-  Thrasybulus.—Agyrrhius succeeds Thrasybulus—Rhodes still
-  holds out against the Lacedæmonians.—Anaxibius is sent to
-  command at the Hellespont in place of Derkyllidas—his vigorous
-  proceedings—he deprives Athens of the tolls of the strait.—The
-  Athenians send Iphikrates with his peltasts and a fleet to the
-  Hellespont. His stratagem to surprise Anaxibius.—Defeat and
-  death of Anaxibius.—The Athenians are again masters of the
-  Hellespont and the strait dues.—The island of Ægina—its past
-  history.—The Æginetans are constrained by Sparta into war
-  with Athens. The Lacedæmonian admiral Teleutias at Ægina. He
-  is superseded by Hierax. His remarkable popularity among the
-  seamen.—Hierax proceeds to Rhodes, leaving Gorgôpas at Ægina.
-  Passage of the Lacedæmonian Antalkidas to Asia.—Gorgôpas
-  is surprised in Ægina, defeated, and slain, by the Athenian
-  Chabrias; who goes to assist Evagoras in Cyprus.—The
-  Lacedæmonian seamen at Ægina unpaid and discontented.
-  Teleutias is sent thither to conciliate them.—Sudden and
-  successful attack of Teleutias upon the Peiræus.—Unprepared
-  and unguarded condition of Peiræus—Teleutias gains rich
-  plunder, and sails away in safety.—He is enabled to pay his
-  seamen—activity of the fleet—great loss inflicted upon Athenian
-  commerce.—Financial condition of Athens. The Theôrikon.—Direct
-  property-taxes.—Antalkidas goes up with Tiribazus to Susa—his
-  success at the Persian court—he brings down the terms of peace
-  asked for by Sparta, ratified by the Great King, to be enforced
-  by Sparta in his name.—Antalkidas in command of the Lacedæmonian
-  and Syracusan fleets in the Hellespont, with Persian aid. His
-  successes against the Athenians.—Distress and discouragement of
-  Athens—anxiety of the anti-Spartan allies for peace.—Tiribazus
-  summons them all to Sardis, to hear the convention which had
-  been sent down by the Great King.—Terms of the convention,
-  called the peace of Antalkidas.—Congress at Sparta for
-  acceptance or rejection. All parties accept. The Thebans at
-  first accept under reserve for the Bœotian cities.—Agesilaus
-  refuses to allow the Theban reserve, and requires unconditional
-  acceptance. His eagerness, from hatred of Thebes, to get into a
-  war with them single-handed. The Thebans are obliged to accept
-  unconditionally.—Agesilaus forces the Corinthians to send away
-  their Argeian auxiliaries. The philo-Argeian Corinthians go into
-  exile; the philo-Laconian Corinthians are restored.          326-388
-
-
-
-
-HISTORY OF GREECE.
-
-PART II.
-
-
-
-
-CHAPTER LXIX.
-
-CYRUS THE YOUNGER AND THE TEN THOUSAND GREEKS.
-
-
-In my last volume, I brought down the History of Grecian affairs to
-the close of the Peloponnesian war, including a description of the
-permanent loss of imperial power, the severe temporary oppression,
-the enfranchisement and renewed democracy, which marked the lot of
-defeated Athens. The defeat of that once powerful city, accomplished
-by the Spartan confederacy,—with large pecuniary aid from the young
-Persian prince Cyrus, satrap of most of the Ionian seaboard,—left
-Sparta mistress, for the time, of the Grecian world. Lysander, her
-victorious admiral, employed his vast temporary power for the purpose
-of setting up, in most of the cities, Dekarchies or ruling Councils
-of Ten, composed of his own partisans; with a Lacedæmonian Harmost
-and garrison to enforce their oligarchical rule. Before I proceed,
-however, to recount, as well as it can be made out, the unexpected
-calamities thus brought upon the Grecian world, with their eventual
-consequences,—it will be convenient to introduce here the narrative
-of the Ten Thousand Greeks, with their march into the heart of
-the Persian empire and their still more celebrated Retreat. This
-incident, lying apart from the main stream of Grecian affairs, would
-form an item, strictly speaking, in Persian history rather than in
-Grecian. But its effects on the Greek mind, and upon the future
-course of Grecian affairs, were numerous and important; while as an
-illustration of Hellenic character and competence measured against
-that of the contemporary Asiatics, it stands preeminent and full of
-instruction.
-
-This march from Sardis up to the neighborhood of Babylon, conducted
-by Cyrus the younger and undertaken for the purpose of placing him
-on the Persian throne in the room of his elder brother Artaxerxes
-Mnemon,—was commenced about March or April in the year 401 B.C. It
-was about six months afterwards, in the month of September or October
-of the same year, that the battle of Kunaxa was fought, in which,
-though the Greeks were victorious, Cyrus himself lost his life. They
-were then obliged to commence their retreat, which occupied about one
-year, and ultimately brought them across the Bosphorus of Thrace to
-Byzantium, in October or November, 400 B.C.
-
-The death of king Darius Nothus, father both of Artaxerxes and
-Cyrus, occurred about the beginning of 404 B.C., a short time after
-the entire ruin of the force of Athens at Ægospotami. His reign of
-nineteen years, with that of his father Artaxerxes Longimanus which
-lasted nearly forty years, fill up almost all the interval from
-the death of Xerxes in 465 B.C. The close of the reigns both of
-Xerxes and of his son Artaxerxes had indeed been marked by those
-phenomena of conspiracy, assassination, fratricide, and family
-tragedy, so common in the transmission of an Oriental sceptre.
-Xerxes was assassinated by the chief officer of the palace, named
-Artabanus,—who had received from him at a banquet the order to
-execute his eldest son Darius, but had not fulfilled it. Artabanus,
-laying the blame of the assassination upon Darius, prevailed upon
-Artaxerxes to avenge it by slaying the latter; he then attempted the
-life of Artaxerxes himself, but failed, and was himself killed, after
-carrying on the government a few months. Artaxerxes Longimanus, after
-reigning about forty years, left the sceptre to his son Xerxes the
-second, who was slain after a few months by his brother Sogdianus;
-who again was put to death after seven months, by a third brother
-Darius Nothus mentioned above.[1]
-
-  [1] See Diodor. xi, 69; xii, 64-71; Ktesias, Persica, c. 29-45;
-  Aristotel. Polit. v, 14, 8. This last passage of Aristotle is not
-  very clear. Compare Justin, x, 1.
-
-  For the chronology of these Persian kings, see a valuable
-  Appendix in Mr. Fynes Clinton’s Fasti Hellenici, App. 18, vol.
-  ii, p. 313-316.
-
-The wars between the Persian empire, and Athens as the head of the
-confederacy of Delos (477-449 B.C.), have been already related in
-one of my earlier volumes. But the internal history of the Persian
-empire during these reigns is scarcely at all known to us; except a
-formidable revolt of the satrap Megabyzus, obscurely noticed in the
-Fragments of Ktesias.[2] About 414 B.C. the Egyptians revolted.
-Their native prince Amyrtæus maintained his independence,—though
-probably in a part only, and not the whole, of that country,[3]—and
-was succeeded by a native Egyptian dynasty for the space of sixty
-years. A revolt of the Medes, which took place in 408 B.C.,
-was put down by Darius, and subsequently a like revolt of the
-Kadusians.[4] The peace concluded in 449 B.C., between Athens and
-the Persian empire, continued without open violation, until the
-ruinous catastrophe which befel the former near Syracuse, in 413
-B.C. Yet there had been various communications and envoys from
-Sparta to the Persian court, endeavoring to procure aid from the
-Great King during the early years of the war; communications so
-confused and contradictory, that Artaxerxes (in a letter addressed
-to the Spartans, in 425 B.C., and carried by his envoy Artaphernes
-who was captured by the Athenians), complained of being unable
-to understand what they meant,—no two Spartans telling the same
-story.[5] It appears that Pissuthnes, satrap of Sardis, revolted from
-the Persian king, shortly after this period, and that Tissaphernes
-was sent by the Great King to suppress this revolt; in which having
-succeeded, by bribing the Grecian commander of the satrap’s mercenary
-troops, he was rewarded by the possession of the satrapy.[6] We find
-Tissaphernes satrap in the year 413 B.C., commencing operations
-jointly with the Spartans, for detaching the Asiatic allies from
-Athens, after her reverses in Sicily; and employing the Spartans
-successfully against Amorges, the revolted son of Pissuthnes, who
-occupied the strong maritime town of Iasus.[7]
-
-  [2] Ktesias, Persica, c. 38-40.
-
-  [3] See the Appendix of Mr. Fynes Clinton, mentioned in the
-  preceding note, p. 317.
-
-  There were some Egyptian troops in the army of Artaxerxes at
-  the battle of Kunaxa; on the other hand, there were other
-  Egyptians in a state of pronounced revolt. Compare two passages
-  of Xenophon’s Anabasis, i, 8, 9; ii, 5, 13; Diodor. xiii, 46; and
-  the Dissertation of F. Ley, Fata et Conditio Ægypti sub imperio
-  Persarum, p. 20-56 (Cologne, 1830).
-
-  [4] Xen. Hellen. i, 2, 19; ii, 1, 13.
-
-  [5] Thucyd. iv, 50. πολλῶν γὰρ ἐλθόντων πρεσβέων οὐδένα ταὐτὰ
-  λέγειν.
-
-  This incompetence, or duplicity, on the part of the Spartan
-  envoys, helps to explain the facility with which Alkibiades duped
-  them at Athens (Thucyd. v, 45). See above, in this History, Vol.
-  VII. ch. lv, p. 47.
-
-  [6] Ktesias, Persic. c. 52.
-
-  [7] Thucyd. viii, 28. See Vol. VII, ch. lxi, p. 389 of this
-  History.
-
-The increased vigor of Persian operations against Athens, after
-Cyrus, the younger son of Darius Nothus, came down to the Ionic coast
-in 407 B.C., has been recounted in my preceding volume; together
-with the complete prostration of Athenian power, accomplished during
-the ensuing three years. Residing at Sardis and placed in active
-coöperation with Greeks, this ambitious and energetic young prince
-soon became penetrated with their superior military and political
-efficiency, as compared with the native Asiatics. For the abilities
-and character of Lysander, the Peloponnesian admiral, he contracted
-so much admiration, that, when summoned to court during the last
-illness of his father Darius in 405 B.C., he even confided to that
-officer the whole of his tribute and treasure, to be administered in
-furtherance of the war;[8] which during his absence was brought to a
-victorious close.
-
-  [8] Xen. Hellen. ii, 1, 14. Compare Xen. Œconom. iv, 20.
-
-Cyrus, born after the accession of his father to the throne, was
-not more than eighteen years of age when first sent down to Sardis
-(in 407 B.C.) as satrap of Lydia, Phrygia, and Kappadokia, and
-as commander of that Persian military division which mustered at
-the plain of Kastôlus; a command not including the Ionic Greeks on
-the seaboard, who were under the satrapy of Tissaphernes.[9] We
-cannot place much confidence in the account which Xenophon gives
-of his education; that he had been brought up with his brother
-and many noble Persian youths in the royal palace,—under the
-strictest discipline and restraint, enforcing modest habits, with
-the reciprocal duties of obedience and command, upon all of them,
-and upon him with peculiar success.[10] It is contradicted by all
-the realities which we read about the Persian court, and is a patch
-of Grecian rather than of Oriental sentiment, better suited to the
-romance of the Cyropædia that to the history of the Anabasis. But in
-the Persian accomplishments of horsemanship, mastery of the bow and
-of the javelin, bravery in the field, daring as well as endurance in
-hunting wild beasts, and power of drinking much wine without being
-intoxicated,—Cyrus stood preeminent; and especially so when compared
-with his elder brother Artaxerxes, who was at least unwarlike, if not
-lazy and timid.[11] And although the peculiar virtue of the Hellenic
-citizen,—competence for alternate command and obedience,—formed
-no part of the character of Cyrus, yet it appears that Hellenic
-affairs and ideas became early impressed upon his mind; insomuch that
-on first coming down to Sardis as satrap, he brought down with him
-strong interest for the Peloponnesian cause, and strenuous antipathy
-to that ancient enemy by whom the Persian arms had been so signally
-humbled and repressed. How zealously he coöperated with Lysander and
-the Peloponnesians in putting down Athens, has been shown in my last
-preceding volume.[12]
-
-  [9] Xen. Anab. i, 1, 2; i, 9, 7; Xen. Hellen. i, 4, 3.
-
-  [10] Xen. Anab. i, 9, 3-5. Compare Cyropædia, i, 2, 4-6; viii, 1,
-  16, etc.
-
-  [11] Plutarch, Artaxerx. c. 2-6; Xen. Anab. _ut sup._
-
-  [12] See Vol. VIII. ch. lxiv, p. 135.
-
-An energetic and ambitious youth like Cyrus, having once learnt
-from personal experience to appreciate the Greeks, was not slow in
-divining the value of such auxiliaries as instruments of power to
-himself. To coöperate effectively in the war, it was necessary that
-he should act to a certain extent upon Grecian ideas, and conciliate
-the good will of the Ionic Greeks; so that he came to combine the
-imperious and unsparing despotism of a Persian prince, with something
-of the regularity and system belonging to a Grecian administrator.
-Though younger than Artaxerxes, he seems to have calculated from
-the first upon succeeding to the Persian crown at the death of his
-father. So undetermined was the law of succession in the Persian
-royal family, and so constant the dispute and fratricide on each
-vacancy of the throne, that such ambitious schemes would appear
-feasible to a young man of much less ardor than Cyrus. Moreover he
-was the favorite son of queen Parysatis,[13] who greatly preferred
-him to his elder brother Artaxerxes. He was born after the accession
-of Darius to the throne, while Artaxerxes had been born prior to
-that event; and, as this latter consideration had been employed
-seventy years earlier by queen Atossa[14] in determining her husband
-Darius son of Hystaspes to declare (even during his lifetime) her
-son Xerxes as his intended successor, to the exclusion of an elder
-son by a different wife, and born before his accession,—so Cyrus,
-perhaps, anticipated the like effective preference to himself from
-the solicitations of Parysatis. Probably his hopes were farther
-inflamed by the fact that he bore the name of the great founder of
-the monarchy; whose memory every Persian reverenced. How completely
-he reckoned on becoming king, is shown by a cruel act performed about
-the early part of 405 B.C. It was required as a part of Persian
-etiquette that every man who came into the presence of the king
-should immerse his hands in certain pockets or large sleeves, which
-rendered them for the moment inapplicable to active use; but such
-deference was shown to no one except the king. Two first cousins of
-Cyrus,—sons of Hieramenês, (seemingly one of the satraps or high
-Persian dignitaries in Asia Minor), by a sister of Darius,—appeared
-in his presence without thus concealing their hands;[15] upon which
-Cyrus ordered them both to be put to death. The father and mother
-preferred bitter complaints of this atrocity to Darius; who was
-induced to send for Cyrus to visit him in Media, on the ground, not
-at all fictitious, that his own health was rapidly declining.
-
-  [13] Darius had had thirteen children by Parysatis; but all
-  except Artaxerxes and Cyrus died young. Ktesias asserts that he
-  heard this statement from Parysatis herself (Ktesias, Persica, c.
-  49).
-
-  [14] Herodot. vii, 4.
-
-  [15] Xen. Hellen. ii, 1, 8, 9; Thucyd. viii, 58.
-
-  Compare Xen. Cyropæd. viii, 3, 10; and Lucian, Navigium seu Vota,
-  c. 30. vol. iii, p. 267, ed. Hemsterhuys with Du Soul’s note.
-
-  It is remarkable that, in this passage of the Hellenica, either
-  Xenophon, or the copyist, makes the mistake of calling Xerxes
-  (instead of Artaxerxes) father of Darius. Some of the editors,
-  without any authority from MSS., wish to alter the text from
-  Ξέρξου to Ἀρταξέρξου.
-
-If Cyrus expected to succeed to the crown, it was important that he
-should be on the spot when his father died. He accordingly went up
-from Sardis to Media, along with his body guard of three hundred
-Greeks, under the Arcadian Xenias; who were so highly remunerated for
-this distant march, that the rate of pay was long celebrated.[16]
-He also took with him Tissaphernes as an ostensible friend; though
-there seems to have been a real enmity between them. Not long after
-his arrival, Darius died; but without complying with the request
-of Parysatis that he should declare in favor of Cyrus as his
-successor. Accordingly Artaxerxes, being proclaimed king, went to
-Pasargadæ, the religious capital of the Persians, to perform the
-customary solemnities. Thus disappointed, Cyrus was farther accused
-by Tissaphernes of conspiring the death of his brother; who caused
-him to be seized, and was even on the point of putting him to death,
-when the all-powerful intercession of Parysatis saved his life.[17]
-He was sent down to his former satrapy at Sardis, whither he returned
-with insupportable feelings of anger and wounded pride, and with a
-determined resolution to leave nothing untried for the purpose of
-dethroning his brother. This statement, given to us by Xenophon,
-represents doubtless the story of Cyrus and his friends, current
-among the Cyreian army. But if we look at the probabilities of the
-case, we shall be led to suspect that the charge of Tissaphernes may
-well have been true, and the conspiracy of the disappointed Cyrus
-against his brother, a reality instead of a fiction.[18]
-
-  [16] Xen. Anab. i, 4, 12.
-
-  [17] Xen. Anab. i, 1, 4.
-
-  [18] So it is presented by Justin, v, 11.
-
-The moment when Cyrus returned to Sardis was highly favorable to his
-plans and preparations. The long war had just been concluded by the
-capture of Athens and the extinction of her power. Many Greeks, after
-having acquired military tastes and habits, were now thrown out of
-employment; many others were driven into exile, by the establishment
-of the Lysandrian Dekarchies throughout all the cities at once.
-Hence competent recruits, for a well-paid service like that of
-Cyrus, were now unusually abundant. Having already a certain number
-of Greek mercenaries, distributed throughout the various garrisons
-in his satrapy, he directed the officers in command to strengthen
-their garrisons by as many additional Peloponnesian soldiers as they
-could obtain. His pretext was,—first, defence against Tissaphernes,
-with whom, since the denunciation by the latter, he was at open
-war,—next, protection of the Ionic cities on the seaboard, who had
-been hitherto comprised under the government of Tissaphernes, but
-had now revolted of their own accord, since the enmity of Cyrus
-against him had been declared. Miletus alone had been prevented from
-executing this resolution, for Tissaphernes, reinforcing his garrison
-in that place, had adopted violent measures of repression, killing
-or banishing several of the leading men. Cyrus, receiving these
-exiled Milesians with every demonstration of sympathy, immediately
-got together both an army and a fleet, under the Egyptian Tamos,[19]
-to besiege Miletus by land and sea. He at the same time transmitted
-to court the regular tribute due from these maritime cities, and
-attempted, through the interest of his mother Parysatis, to procure
-that they should be transferred from Tissaphernes to himself. Hence
-the Great King was deluded into a belief that the new levies of Cyrus
-were only intended for private war between him and Tissaphernes;
-an event not uncommon between two neighboring satraps. Nor was it
-displeasing to the court that a suspected prince should be thus
-occupied at a distance.[20]
-
-  [19] Xen. Anab. i, 1, 6; i, 4, 2.
-
-  [20] Xen. Anab. i, 1, 7, 8, ὥστε οὐδὲν ἤχθετο (the king) αὐτῶν
-  πολεμοῦντων.
-
-Besides the army thus collected around Miletus, Cyrus found means
-to keep other troops within his call, though at a distance and
-unsuspected. A Lacedæmonian officer named Klearchus, of considerable
-military ability and experience, presented himself as an exile at
-Sardis. He appears to have been banished, (as far as we can judge
-amidst contradictory statements,) for gross abuse of authority, and
-extreme tyranny, as Lacedæmonian Harmost at Byzantium, and even for
-having tried to maintain himself in that place after the Ephors had
-formally dismissed him. The known efficiency, and restless warlike
-appetite of Klearchus,[21] procured for him the confidence of Cyrus,
-who gave him the large sum of ten thousand Darics, (about £7600),
-which he employed in levying an army of mercenary Greeks for the
-defence of the Grecian cities in the Chersonese against the Thracian
-tribes in their neighborhood; thus maintaining the troops until they
-were required by Cyrus. Again, Aristippus and Menon,—Thessalians
-of the great family of the Aleuadæ at Larissa, who had maintained
-their tie of personal hospitality with the Persian royal family
-ever since the time of Xerxes, and were now in connection with
-Cyrus,[22]—received from him funds to maintain a force of two
-thousand mercenaries for their political purposes in Thessaly,
-subject to his call whenever he should require them. Other Greeks,
-too, who had probably contracted similar ties of hospitality with
-Cyrus by service during the late war,—Proxenus, a Bœotian; Agias
-and Sophænetus, Arcadians; Sokrates, an Achæan, etc.,—were also
-empowered by him to collect mercenary soldiers. His pretended objects
-were, partly the siege of Miletus; partly an ostensible expedition
-against the Pisidians,—warlike and predatory mountaineers who did
-much mischief from their fastnesses in the south-east of Asia Minor.
-
-  [21] Xen. Anab. i, 1, 9; ii, 6, 3. The statements here contained
-  do not agree with Diodor. xiv, 12; while both of them differ from
-  Isokrates (Orat. viii, De Pace, s. 121; Or. xii, Panath. s. 111),
-  and Plutarch, Artaxerxes, c. 6.
-
-  I follow partially the narrative of Diodorus, so far as to
-  suppose that the tyranny which he mentions was committed by
-  Klearchus as Harmost of Byzantium. We know that there was a
-  Lacedæmonian Harmost in that town, named as soon as the town was
-  taken, by Lysander, after the battle of Ægospotami (Xen. Hellen.
-  ii, 2, 2). This was towards the end of 405 B.C. We know farther,
-  from the Anabasis, that Kleander was Harmost there in 400 B.C.
-  Klearchus may have been Harmost there in 404 B.C.
-
-  [22] Xen. Anab. i, 1, 10; Herodot. vii, 6; ix, 1; Plato, Menon,
-  c. 1, p. 70; c. 11, p. 78 C.
-
-Besides these unavowed Grecian levies, Cyrus sent envoys to the
-Lacedæmonians to invoke their aid, in requital for the strenuous
-manner in which he had seconded their operations against Athens,—and
-received a favorable answer. He farther got together a considerable
-native force, taking great pains to conciliate friends as well
-as to inspire confidence. “He was straightforward and just, like
-a candidate for command,”—to use the expression of Herodotus
-respecting the Median Dëiokês;[23] maintaining order and security
-throughout his satrapy, and punishing evil doers in great numbers,
-with the utmost extremity of rigor; of which the public roads
-exhibited abundant living testimony, in the persons of mutilated men,
-deprived of their hands, feet, or eyesight.[24] But he was also exact
-in rewarding faithful service, both civil and military. He not only
-made various expeditions against the hostile Mysians and Pisidians,
-but was forward in exposing his own person, and munificent, rewarding
-the zeal of all soldiers who distinguished themselves. He attached
-men to his person both by a winning demeanor and by seasonable gifts.
-As it was the uniform custom, (and is still the custom in the East),
-for every one who approached Cyrus to come with a present in his
-hand,[25] so he usually gave away again these presents as marks of
-distinction to others. Hence he not only acquired the attachment of
-all in his own service, but also of those Persians whom Artaxerxes
-sent down on various pretences for the purpose of observing his
-motions. Of these emissaries from Susa, some were even sent to
-obstruct and enfeeble him. It was under such orders that a Persian
-named Orontes, governor of Sardis, acted, in levying open war against
-Cyrus; who twice subdued him, and twice pardoned him, on solemn
-assurance of fidelity for the future.[26] In all agreements, even
-with avowed enemies, Cyrus kept faith exactly; so that his word was
-trusted by every one.
-
-  [23] Herodot. i. 96. Ὁ δὲ (Dëiokês) οἷα μνώμενος ἀρχὴν, ἰθύς τε
-  καὶ δίκαιος ἦν.
-
-  Xenoph. Hellen. iii, 1, 1; Diodor. xiv, 19.
-
-  [24] Xen. Anab. 1, 9, 8. Πολλάκις δ᾽ ἰδεῖν ἦν ἀνὰ τὰς στειβομένας
-  ὁδοὺς, καὶ ποδῶν καὶ χειρῶν καὶ ὀφθαλμῶν στερουμένους ἀνθρώπους.
-
-  For other samples of mutilation inflicted by Persians, not
-  merely on malefactors, but on prisoners by wholesale, see
-  Quintus Curtius, v. 5, 6. Alexander the Great was approaching
-  near to Persepolis, “quum miserabile agmen, inter pauca
-  fortunæ exempla memorandum, regi occurrit. Captivi erant
-  Græci ad quatuor millia ferè, quos Persæ vario suppliciorum
-  modo affecerunt. Alios pedibus, quosdam manibus auribusque,
-  amputatis, inustisque barbararum literarum notis, in longum sui
-  ludibrium reservaverant,” etc. Compare Diodorus, xvii, 69; and
-  the prodigious tales of cruelty recounted in Herodot. ix, 112;
-  Ktesias, Persic. c. 54-59; Plutarch, Artaxerx. c. 14, 16, 17.
-
-  It is not unworthy of remark, that while there was nothing in
-  which the Persian rulers displayed greater invention than in
-  exaggerating bodily suffering upon a malefactor or an enemy,—at
-  Athens, whenever any man was put to death by public sentence, the
-  execution took place within the prison by administering a cup
-  of hemlock, without even public exposure. It was the minimum of
-  pain, as well as the minimum of indignity; as any one may see who
-  reads the account of the death of Sokrates, given by Plato at the
-  end of the Phædon.
-
-  It is certain, that, on the whole, the public sentiment in
-  England is more humane now than it was in that day at Athens.
-  Yet an Athenian public could not have borne the sight of a
-  citizen publicly hanged or beheaded in the market-place. Much
-  less could they have borne the sight of the prolonged tortures
-  inflicted on Damiens at Paris in 1757 (a fair parallel to the
-  Persian σκάφευσις described in Plutarch, Artaxerx. c. 16), in the
-  presence of an immense crowd of spectators, when every window
-  commanding a view of the Place de Grève was let at a high price,
-  and filled by the best company in Paris.
-
-  [25] Xen. Anab. i, 9, 13.
-
-  [26] Xen. Anab. i, 6, 6.
-
-Of such virtues, (rare in an Oriental ruler, either ancient or
-modern,)—and of such secret preparations,—Cyrus sought to reap the
-fruits at the beginning of 401 B.C. Xenias, his general at home,
-brought together all the garrisons, leaving a bare sufficiency for
-defence of the towns. Klearchus, Menon, and the other Greek generals
-were recalled, and the siege of Miletus was relinquished; so that
-there was concentrated at Sardis a body of seven thousand seven
-hundred Grecian hoplites, with five hundred light armed.[27] Others
-afterwards joined on the march, and there was, besides, a native
-army of about one hundred thousand men. With such means Cyrus set
-forth, (March or April, 401 B.C.), from Sardis. His real purpose was
-kept secret; his ostensible purpose, as proclaimed and understood by
-every one except himself and Klearchus, was to conquer and root out
-the Pisidian mountaineers. A joint Lacedæmonian and Persian fleet,
-under the Lacedæmonian admiral Samius, at the same time coasted
-round the south of Asia Minor, in order to lend coöperation from the
-sea-side.[28] This Lacedæmonian coöperation passed for a private levy
-effected by Cyrus himself; for the ephors would not formally avow
-hostility against the Great King.[29]
-
-  [27] Xen. Anab. i, 2, 2-3.
-
-  [28] Xen. Hellen. iii, 1, 1.
-
-  [29] Diodor. xiv, 21.
-
-The body of Greeks, immortalized under the name of the Ten
-Thousand, who were thus preparing to plunge into so many unexpected
-perils,—though embarking on a foreign mercenary service, were by
-no means outcasts, or even men of extreme poverty. They were for
-the most part persons of established position, and not a few even
-opulent. Half of them were Acadians or Achæans.
-
-Such was the reputation of Cyrus for honorable and munificent
-dealing, that many young men of good family had run away from their
-fathers and mothers; others of mature age had been tempted to leave
-their wives and children; and there were even some who had embarked
-their own money in advance of outfit for other poorer men, as well as
-for themselves.[30] All calculated on a year’s campaign in Pisidia;
-which might perhaps be hard, but would certainly be lucrative, and
-would enable them to return with a well-furnished purse. So the Greek
-commanders at Sardis all confidently assured them; extolling, with
-the emphasis and eloquence suitable to recruiting officers, both
-the liberality of Cyrus[31] and the abundant promise of all men of
-enterprise.
-
-  [30] Xen. Anab. vi, 4, 8. Τῶν γὰρ στρατιωτῶν οἱ πλεῖστοι ἦσαν οὐ
-  σπάνει βίου ἐκπεπλευκότες ἐπὶ ταύτην τὴν μισθοφορὰν, ἀλλὰ τὴν
-  Κύρου ἀρετὴν ἀκούοντες, οἱ μὲν καὶ ἄνδρας ἄγοντες, οἱ δὲ καὶ
-  προσανελωκότες χρήματα, καὶ τούτων ἕτεροι ἀποδεδρακότες πατέρας
-  καὶ μητέρας, οἱ δὲ καὶ τέκνα καταλιπόντες, ὡς χρήματα αὐτοῖς
-  κτησάμενοι ἥξοντες πάλιν, ἀκούοντες καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους τοὺς παρὰ
-  Κύρῳ πολλὰ καὶ ἀγαθὰ πράττειν. Τοιοῦτοι οὖν ὄντες, ἐπόθουν εἰς
-  τὴν Ἑλλάδα σώζεσθαι. Compare v. 10, 10.
-
-  [31] Compare similar praises of Ptolemy Philadelphus, in order to
-  attract Greek mercenaries from Sicily to Egypt (Theokrit. xiv,
-  50-59).
-
-Among others, the Bœotian Proxenus wrote to his friend Xenophon, at
-Athens, pressing him strongly to come to Sardis, and offering to
-present him to Cyrus, whom he, (Proxenus,) “considered as a better
-friend to him than his own country;[32]” a striking evidence of the
-manner in which such foreign mercenary service overlaid Grecian
-patriotism, which we shall recognize more and more as we advance
-forward. This able and accomplished Athenian,—entitled to respectful
-gratitude, not indeed from Athens his country, but from the Cyreian
-army and the intellectual world generally,—was one of the class of
-Knights or Horsemen, and is said to have served in that capacity at
-the battle of Delium.[33] Of his previous life we know little or
-nothing, except that he was an attached friend and diligent hearer of
-Sokrates; the memorials of whose conversation we chiefly derive from
-his pen, as we also derive the narrative of the Cyreian march. In
-my last preceding chapter on Sokrates, I have made ample use of the
-Memorabilia of Xenophon; and I am now about to draw from his Anabasis
-(a model of perspicuous and interesting narrative) the account of the
-adventures of the Cyreian army, which we are fortunate in knowing
-from so authentic a source.
-
-  [32] Xen. Anab. iii, 1, 4. Ὑπισχνεῖτο δὲ αὐτῷ (Proxenus to
-  Xenophon) εἰ ἔλθοι, φίλον Κύρῳ ποιήσειν· ὃν αὐτος ἔφη κρείττω
-  ἑαυτῷ νομίζειν τῆς πατρίδος.
-
-  [33] Strabo, ix, p. 403. The story that Sokrates carried off
-  Xenophon, wounded and thrown from his horse, on his shoulders,
-  and thus saved his life,—seems too doubtful to enter into the
-  narrative.
-
-  Among the proofs that Xenophon was among the Horsemen or Ἱππεῖς
-  of Athens, we may remark, not only his own strong interest, and
-  great skill in horsemanship, in the cavalry service and the
-  duties of its commander, and in all that relates to horses, as
-  manifested in his published works,—but also the fact, that his
-  son Gryllus served afterwards among the Athenian horsemen at the
-  combat of cavalry which preceded the great battle of Mantineia
-  (Diogen. Laërt. ii, 54).
-
-On receiving the invitation from Proxenus, Xenophon felt much
-inclined to comply. To a member of that class of Knights, which
-three years before had been the mainstay of the atrocities of the
-Thirty, (how far he was personally concerned, we cannot say,) it is
-probable that residence in Athens was in those times not peculiarly
-agreeable to him. He asked the opinion of Sokrates; who, apprehensive
-lest service under Cyrus, the bitter enemy of Athens, might expose
-him to unpopularity with his countrymen, recommended an application
-to the Delphian oracle. Thither Xenophon went; but in truth he had
-already made up his mind beforehand. So that instead of asking,
-“whether he ought to go or refuse,”—he simply put the question, “To
-which of the gods must I sacrifice, in order to obtain safety and
-success in a journey which I am now meditating?” The reply of the
-oracle,—indicating Zeus Basileus as the god to whom sacrifice was
-proper,—was brought back by Xenophon; upon which Sokrates, though
-displeased that the question had not been fairly put as to the
-whole project, nevertheless advised, since an answer had now been
-given, that it should be literally obeyed. Accordingly Xenophon,
-having offered the sacrifices prescribed, took his departure first
-to Ephesus and thence to Sardis, where he found the army about
-to set forth. Proxenus presented him to Cyrus, who entreated him
-earnestly to take service, promising to dismiss him as soon as the
-campaign against the Pisidians should be finished.[34] He was thus
-induced to stay, yet only as a volunteer or friend of Proxenus,
-without accepting any special post in the army, either as officer
-or soldier. There is no reason to believe that his service under
-Cyrus had actually the effect apprehended by Sokrates, of rendering
-him unpopular at Athens. For though he was afterwards banished,
-this sentence was not passed against him until after the battle
-of Korôneia in 394 B.C., where he was in arms as a conspicuous
-officer under Agesilaus, against his own countrymen and their Theban
-allies,—nor need we look farther back for the grounds of the
-sentence.
-
-  [34] Xen. Anab. iii, 1, 4-9; v. 9, 22-24.
-
-Though Artaxerxes, entertaining general suspicions of his brother’s
-ambitious views, had sent down various persons to watch him, yet
-Cyrus had contrived to gain or neutralize these spies, and had
-masked his preparations so skilfully, that no intimation was conveyed
-to Susa until the march was about to commence. It was only then that
-Tissaphernes, seeing the siege of Miletus relinquished, and the vast
-force mustering at Sardis, divined that something more was meant than
-the mere conquest of Pisidian freebooters, and went up in person
-to warn the king; who began his preparations forthwith.[35] That
-which Tissaphernes had divined was yet a secret to every man in the
-army, to Proxenus as well as the rest,—when Cyrus, having confided
-the provisional management of his satrapy to some Persian kinsmen,
-and to his admiral the Egyptian Tamos, commenced his march in a
-south-easterly direction from Sardis, through Lydia and Phrygia.[36]
-Three days’ march, a distance stated at twenty-two parasangs,[37]
-brought him to the Mæander; one additional march of eight parasangs,
-after crossing that river, forwarded him to Kolossæ, a flourishing
-city in Phrygia, where Menon overtook him with a reinforcement of
-one thousand hoplites, and five hundred peltasts,—Dolopes, Ænianes,
-and Olynthians. He then marched three days onward to Kelænæ, another
-Phrygian city, “great and flourishing,” with a citadel very strong
-both by nature and art. Here he halted no less than thirty days, in
-order to await the arrival of Klearchus, with his division of one
-thousand hoplites, eight hundred Thracian peltasts, and two hundred
-Kretan bowmen; at the same time Sophænetus arrived with one thousand
-farther hoplites, and Sosias with three hundred. This total of Greeks
-was reviewed by Cyrus in one united body at Kelænæ; eleven thousand
-hoplites and two thousand peltasts.[38]
-
-  [35] Xen. Anab. i, 2, 4; ii, 3, 19.
-
-  Diodorus (xiv, 11) citing from Ephorus affirms that the first
-  revelation to Artaxerxes was made by Pharnabazus, who had learnt
-  it from the acuteness of the Athenian exile Alkibiades. That the
-  latter should have had any concern in it, appears improbable. But
-  Diodorus on more than one occasion, confounds Pharnabazus and
-  Tissaphernes.
-
-  [36] Diodor. xiv, 19.
-
-  [37] The parasang was a Persian measurement of length, but
-  according to Strabo, not of uniform value in all parts of Asia;
-  in some parts, held equivalent to thirty stadia, in others to
-  forty, in others to sixty (Strabo, xi, p. 518; Forbiger, Handbuch
-  der Alten Geograph. vol. i, p. 555). This variability of meaning
-  is no way extraordinary, when we recollect the difference between
-  English, Irish, and German miles, etc.
-
-  Herodotus tells us distinctly what _he_ meant by a parasang, and
-  what the Persian government of his day recognized as such in
-  their measurement of the great road from Sardis to Susa, as well
-  as in their measurements of territory for purposes of tribute
-  (Herod. v, 53; vi, 43). It was thirty Greek stadia = nearly three
-  and a half English miles, or nearly three geographical miles.
-  The distance between every two successive stations, on the road
-  from Sardis to Susa, (which was “all inhabited and all secure,”
-  διὰ οἰκεομένης τε ἅπασα καὶ ἀσφολέος), would seem to have been
-  measured and marked in parasangs and fractions of a parasang. It
-  seems probable, from the account which Herodotus gives of the
-  march of Xerxes (vii, 26), that this road passed from Kappadokia
-  and across the river Halys, through Kelænæ and Kolossæ to Sardis;
-  and therefore that the road which Cyrus took for his march, from
-  Sardis at least as far as Kelænæ, must have been so measured and
-  marked.
-
-  Xenophon also in his summing up of the route, (ii, 2, 6; vii,
-  8, 26) implies the parasang as equivalent to thirty stadia,
-  while he gives for the most part, each day’s journey measured
-  in parasangs. Now even at the outset of the march, we have
-  no reason to believe that there was any official measurer of
-  road-progress accompanying the army, like Bæton, ὁ Βηματιστὴς
-  Ἀλεξάνδρου, in Alexander’s invasion; see Athenæus, x, p. 442, and
-  Geier, Alexandri Magni Histor. Scriptt. p. 357. Yet Xenophon,
-  throughout the whole march, even as far as Trebizond, states the
-  day’s march of the army in parasangs; not merely in Asia Minor,
-  where there were roads, but through the Arabian desert between
-  Thapsakus and Pylæ,—through the snows of Armenia,—and through
-  the territory of the barbarous Chalybes. He tells us that in the
-  desert of Arabia they marched ninety parasangs in thirteen days,
-  or very nearly seven parasangs per day,—and that too under the
-  extreme heat of summer. He tells us, farther, that in the deep
-  snows of Armenia, and in the extremity of winter, they marched
-  fifteen parasangs in three days; and through the territory (also
-  covered with snow) of the pugnacious Chalybes, fifty parasangs in
-  seven days, or more than seven parasangs per day. Such marches,
-  at thirty stadia for the parasang, are impossible. And how did
-  Xenophon measure the distance marched over?
-
-  The most intelligent modern investigators and travellers,—Major
-  Rennell, Mr. Ainsworth, Mr. Hamilton, Colonel Chesney, Professor
-  Koch, etc., offer no satisfactory solution of the difficulty.
-  Major Rennell reckons the parasangs as equal to 2.25 geogr.
-  miles; Mr. Ainsworth at three geogr. miles; Mr. Hamilton (travels
-  in Asia Minor, c. 42, p. 200), at something less than two and a
-  half geogr. miles; Colonel Chesney (Euphrat. and Tigris, ch. 8,
-  p. 207) at 2.608 geogr. miles between Sardis and Thapsakus—at
-  1.98 geogr. miles, between Thapsakus and Kunaxa,—at something
-  less than this, without specifying how much, during the retreat.
-  It is evident that there is no certain basis to proceed upon,
-  even for the earlier portion of the route; much more, for the
-  retreat. The distance between Ikonium and Dana (or Tyana), is one
-  of the quantities on which Mr. Hamilton rests his calculation;
-  but we are by no means certain that Cyrus took the direct route
-  of march; he rather seems to have turned out of his way, partly
-  to plunder Lykaonia, partly to conduct the Kilikian princess
-  homeward. The other item, insisted upon by Mr. Hamilton, is the
-  distance between Kelænæ and Kolossæ, two places the site of which
-  seems well ascertained, and which are by the best modern maps,
-  fifty-two geographical miles apart. Xenophon calls the distance
-  twenty parasangs. Assuming the road by which he marched to have
-  been the same with that now travelled, it would make the parasang
-  of Xenophon = 2.6 geographical miles. I have before remarked that
-  the road between Kolossæ and Kelænæ was probably measured and
-  numbered according to parasangs; so that Xenophon, in giving the
-  number of parasangs between these two places, would be speaking
-  upon official authority.
-
-  Even a century and a half afterwards, the geographer Eratosthenes
-  found it not possible to obtain accurate measurements, in much of
-  the country traversed by Cyrus (Strabo, ii, p. 73.)
-
-  Colonel Chesney remarks,—“From Sardis to Cunaxa, or the mounds
-  of Mohammed, cannot be much under or over twelve hundred and
-  sixty-five geographical miles; making 2.364 geographical miles
-  for each of the five hundred and thirty-five parasangs given by
-  Xenophon between those two places.”
-
-  As a measure of distance, the parasang of Xenophon is evidently
-  untrustworthy. Is it admissible to consider, in the description
-  of this march, that the parasangs and stadia of Xenophon are
-  measurements rather of time than of space? From Sardis to Kelænæ,
-  he had a measured road and numbered parasangs of distance; it is
-  probable that the same mensuration and numeration continued for
-  four days farther, as far as Keramôn-Agora, (since I imagine that
-  the road from Kelænæ to the Halys and Kappadokia must have gone
-  through these two places,)—and possibly it may have continued
-  even as far as Ikonium or Dana. Hence, by these early marches,
-  Xenophon had the opportunity of forming to himself roughly an
-  idea of the time (measured by the course of the sun) which it
-  took for the army to march one, two, or three parasangs; and when
-  he came to the ulterior portions of the road, he called _that
-  length of time_ by the name of one, two, or three parasangs. Five
-  parasangs seem to have meant with him a full day’s march; three
-  or four, a short day; six, seven, or eight, a long, or very long
-  day.
-
-  We must recollect that the Greeks in the time of Xenophon had no
-  portable means of measuring hours, and did not habitually divide
-  the day into hours, or into any other recognized fraction. The
-  Alexandrine astronomers, near two centuries afterwards, were
-  the first to use ὥρη in the sense of hour (Ideler, Handbuch der
-  Chronologie, vol. i, p. 239.)
-
-  This may perhaps help to explain Xenophon’s meaning, when he
-  talks about marching five or seven parasangs amidst the deep
-  snows of Armenia; I do not however suppose that he had this
-  meaning uniformly or steadily present to his mind. Sometimes, it
-  would seem, he must have used the word in its usual meaning of
-  distance.
-
-  [38] Xen. Anab. i, 2, 8, 9. About Kelænæ, Arrian, Exp. Al. i, 29,
-  2; Quint. Curt. iii, 1, 6.
-
-As far as Kelænæ, his march had been directed straight towards
-Pisidia, near the borders of which territory that city is situated.
-So far, therefore, the fiction with which he started was kept up.
-But on leaving Kelænæ, he turned his march away from Pisidia, in
-a direction nearly northward; first in two days, ten parasangs,
-to the town of Peltæ; next in two days farther, twelve parasangs,
-to Keramôn-Agora, the last city in the district adjoining Mysia.
-At Peltæ, in a halt of three days, the Arcadian general Xenias
-celebrated the great festival of his country, the Lykæa, with
-its usual games and matches, in the presence of Cyrus. From
-Keramôn-Agora, Cyrus marched in three days the unusual distance of
-thirty parasangs,[39] to a city called Käystru-Pedion, (the plain
-of Käystrus), where he halted for five days. Here his repose was
-disturbed by the murmurs of the Greek soldiers, who had received no
-pay for three months, (Xenophon had before told us that they were
-mostly men who had some means of their own), and who now flocked
-around his tent to press for their arrears. So impoverished was Cyrus
-by previous disbursements,—perhaps also by remissions of tribute for
-the purpose of popularizing himself,—that he was utterly without
-money, and was obliged to put them off again with promises. And
-his march might well have ended here, had he not been rescued from
-embarrassment by the arrival of Epyaxa, wife of the Kilikian prince
-Syennesis, who brought to him a large sum of money, and enabled him
-to give to the Greek soldiers four months’ pay at once. As to the
-Asiatic soldiers, it is probable that they received little beyond
-their maintenance.
-
-  [39] These three marches, each of ten parasangs, from
-  Keramôn-Agora to Käystru-Pedion,—are the longest recorded in
-  the Anabasis. It is rather surprising to find them so; for
-  there seems no motive for Cyrus to have hurried forward. When
-  he reached Käystru-Pedion, he halted five days. Koch (Zug der
-  Zehn Tausend, Leipsic, 1850, p. 19) remarks that the three days’
-  march, which seem to have dropped out of Xenophon’s calculation,
-  comparing the items with the total, might conveniently be let
-  in here; so that these thirty parasangs should have occupied
-  six days’ march instead of three; five parasangs per day. The
-  whole march which Cyrus had hitherto made from Sardis, including
-  the road from Keramôn-Agora to Käystru-Pedion, lay in the great
-  road from Sardis to the river Halys, Kappadokia, and Susa. That
-  road (as we see by the March of Xerxes, Herodot. vii, 26; v,
-  52) passed through both Kelænæ and Kolossæ; though this is a
-  prodigious departure from the straight line. At Käystru-Pedion,
-  Cyrus seems to have left this great road; taking a different
-  route, in a direction nearly south-east towards Ikonium. About
-  the point, somewhere near Synnada, where these different roads
-  crossed, see Mr. Ainsworth, Trav. in the Track, p. 28.
-
-  I do not share the doubts which have been raised about Xenophon’s
-  accuracy, in his description of the route from Sardis to Ikonium;
-  though the names of several of the places which he mentions are
-  not known to us, and their sites cannot be exactly identified.
-  There is a great departure from the straight line of bearing. But
-  we at the present day assign more weight to that circumstance
-  than is suited to the days of Xenophon. Straight roads,
-  stretching systematically over a large region of country, are
-  not of that age; the communications were probably all originally
-  made, between one neighboring town and another, without much
-  reference to saving of distance, and with no reference to any
-  promotion of traffic between distant places.
-
-  It was just about this time that King Archelaus began to “cut
-  straight roads” in Macedonia,—which Thucydides seems to note as
-  a remarkable thing (ii, 100).
-
-Two ensuing days of march, still through Phrygia, brought the army
-to Thymbrium; two more to Tyriæum. Each day’s march is called five
-parasangs[40]. It was here that Cyrus, halting three days, passed
-the army in review, to gratify the Kilikian princess Epyaxa, who
-was still accompanying the march. His Asiatic troops were first
-made to march in order before him, cavalry and infantry in their
-separate divisions; after which he himself in a chariot, and Epyaxa
-in a Harmamaxa, (a sort of carriage or litter covered with an awning
-which opened or shut at pleasure), passed all along the front of
-the Greek line, drawn up separately. The hoplites were marshalled
-four deep, all in their best trim; brazen helmets, purple tunics,
-greaves or leggings, and the shields rubbed bright, just taken out
-of the wrappers in which they were carried during a mere march.[41]
-Klearchus commanded on the left, and Menon on the right; the other
-generals being distributed in the centre. Having completed his review
-along the whole line, and taken a station with the Kilikian princess
-at a certain distance in front of it, Cyrus sent his interpreter to
-the generals, and desired that he might see them charge. Accordingly,
-the orders were given, the spears were protended, the trumpets
-sounded, and the whole Greek force moved forward in battle array with
-the usual shouts. As they advanced, the pace became accelerated, and
-they made straight against the victualling portion of the Asiatic
-encampment. Such was the terror occasioned by the sight, that all the
-Asiatics fled forthwith, abandoning their property,—Epyaxa herself
-among the first, quitting her palanquin. Though she had among her
-personal guards some Greeks from Aspendus, she had never before seen
-a Grecian army, and was amazed as well as terrified; much to the
-satisfaction of Cyrus, who saw in the scene an augury of his coming
-success.[42]
-
-  [40] Neither Thymbrium, nor Tyriæum, can be identified. But it
-  seems that both must have been situated on the line of road now
-  followed by the caravans from Smyrna to Konieh (Ikonium,) which
-  line of road follows a direction between the mountains called
-  Emir Dagh on the north-east, and those called Sultan Dagh on the
-  south-west (Koch, Der Zug der Zehn Tausend, p. 21, 22).
-
-  [41] Εἶχον δὲ πάντες κράνη χαλκᾶ, καὶ χιτῶνας φοινικοῦς, καὶ
-  κνημῖδας, καὶ ~τὰς ἀσπίδας ἐκκεκαθαρμένας~.
-
-  When the hoplite was on march, without expectation of an enemy,
-  the shield seems to have been carried behind him, with his
-  blanket attached to it (see Aristoph. Acharn. 1085, 1089-1149);
-  it was slung by the strap round his neck and shoulder. Sometimes
-  indeed he had an opportunity of relieving himself from the
-  burden, by putting the shield in a baggage-wagon (Xen. Anab. i,
-  7, 20). The officers generally, and doubtless some soldiers,
-  could command attendants to carry their shields for them (iv, 2,
-  20; Aristoph. 1, c.).
-
-  On occasion of this review, the shields were unpacked, rubbed,
-  and brightened, as before a battle (Xen. Hell. vii, 5, 20); then
-  fastened round the neck or shoulders, and held out upon the left
-  arm, which was passed through the rings or straps attached to its
-  concave or interior side.
-
-  Respecting the cases or wrappers of the shields, see a curious
-  stratagem of the Syracusan Agathokles (Diodor. xx, 11). The Roman
-  soldiers also carried their shields in leathern wrappers, when on
-  march (Plutarch, Lucull. c. 27).
-
-  It is to be remarked that Xenophon, in enumerating the arms of
-  the Cyreians, does not mention _breastplates_; which (though
-  sometimes worn, see Plutarch, Dion. c. 30) were not usually worn
-  by hoplites, who carried heavy shields. It is quite possible
-  that _some_ of the Cyreian infantry may have had breastplates as
-  well as shields, since every soldier provided his own arms; but
-  Xenophon states only what was common to all.
-
-  Grecian cavalry commonly wore a heavy breastplate, but had no
-  shield.
-
-  [42] Xen. Anab. i, 2, 16-19.
-
-Three days of farther march, (called twenty parasangs in all) brought
-the army to Ikonium, (now Konieh), the extreme city of Phrygia;
-where Cyrus halted three days. He then marched for five days (thirty
-parasangs) through Lykaonia; which country, as being out of his
-own satrapy, and even hostile, he allowed the Greeks to plunder.
-Lykaonia being immediately on the borders of Pisidia, its inhabitants
-were probably reckoned as Pisidians, since they were of the like
-predatory character:[43] so that Cyrus would be partially realizing
-the pretended purpose of his expedition. He thus, too, approached
-near to Mount Taurus, which separated him from Kilikia; and he here
-sent the Kilikian princess, together with Menon and his division,
-over the mountain, by a pass shorter and more direct, but seemingly
-little frequented, and too difficult for the whole army; in order
-that they might thus get straight into Kilikia,[44] in the rear of
-Syennesis, who was occupying the regular pass more to the northward.
-Intending to enter with his main body through this latter pass, Cyrus
-first proceeded through Kappadokia (four days’ march, twenty-five
-parasangs) to Dana or Tyana, a flourishing city of Kappadokia; where
-he halted three days, and where he put to death two Persian officers,
-on a charge of conspiring against him.[45]
-
-  [43] Xen. Anab. iii, 2, 25.
-
-  [44] This shorter and more direct pass crosses the Taurus by
-  Kizil-Chesmeh, Alan Buzuk, and Mizetli; it led directly to the
-  Kilikian seaport-town Soli, afterwards called Pompeiopolis. It
-  is laid down in the Peutinger Tables as the road from Iconium to
-  Pompeiopolis (Ainsworth, p. 40 _seq._; Chesney, Euph. and Tigr.
-  ii, p. 209).
-
-  [45] Xen. Anab. i, 2, 20.
-
-This regular pass over Taurus, the celebrated Tauri-Pylæ or Kilikian
-Gates, was occupied by Syennesis. Though a road fit for vehicles, it
-was yet three thousand six hundred feet above the level of the sea,
-narrow, steep, bordered by high ground on each side, and crossed by a
-wall with gates, so that it could not be forced if ever so moderately
-defended.[46] But the Kilikian prince, alarmed at the news that
-Menon had already crossed the mountains by the less frequented pass
-to his rear, and that the fleet of Cyrus was sailing along the coast,
-evacuated his own impregnable position, and fell back to Tarsus; from
-whence he again retired, accompanied by most of the inhabitants,
-to an inaccessible fastness on the mountains. Accordingly Cyrus,
-ascending without opposition the great pass thus abandoned, reached
-Tarsus after a march of four days, there rejoining Menon and Epyaxa.
-Two lochi or companies of the division of Menon, having dispersed on
-their march for pillage, had been cut off by the natives; for which
-the main body of Greeks now took their revenge, plundering both the
-city and the palace of Syennesis. That prince, though invited by
-Cyrus to come back to Tarsus, at first refused, but was at length
-prevailed upon by the persuasions of his wife, to return under a
-safe conduct. He was induced to contract an alliance, to exchange
-presents with Cyrus, and to give him a large sum of money towards
-his expedition, together with a contingent of troops; in return for
-which it was stipulated that Kilikia should be no farther plundered,
-and that the slaves taken away might be recovered wherever they were
-found.[47]
-
-  [46] Xen. Anab. i, 2, 21; Diodor. xiv, 20. See Mr. Kinneir,
-  Travels in Asia Minor, p. 116; Col. Chesney, Euphrates and
-  Tigris, vol. i, p. 293-354; and Mr. Ainsworth, Travels in the
-  Track of the Ten Thousand, p. 40 _seq._; also his other work,
-  Travels in Asia Minor, vol. ii. ch. 30, p. 70-77; and Koch,
-  Der Zug der Zehn Tausend, p. 26-172, for a description of this
-  memorable pass.
-
-  Alexander the Great, as well as Cyrus, was fortunate enough to
-  find this impregnable pass abandoned; as it appears, through
-  sheer stupidity or recklessness of the satrap who ought to have
-  defended it, and who had not even the same excuse for abandoning
-  it as Syennesis had on the approach of Cyrus (Arrian. E. A. ii.
-  4; Curtius, iii, 9, 10, 11).
-
-  [47] Xen. Anab. i, 2, 23-27.
-
-It seems evident, though Xenophon does not directly tell us so, that
-the resistance of Syennesis, (this was a standing name or title of
-the hereditary princes of Kilikia under the Persian crown), was a
-mere feint; that the visit of Epyaxa with a supply of money to Cyrus,
-and the admission of Menon and his division over Mount Taurus, were
-manœuvres in collusion with him; and that, thinking Cyrus would be
-successful, he was disposed to support his cause, yet careful at the
-same time to give himself the air of having been overpowered, in case
-Artaxerxes should prove victorious.[48]
-
-  [48] Diodorus (xiv, 20) represents Syennesis as playing a double
-  game, though reluctantly. He takes no notice of the proceeding of
-  Epyaxa.
-
-  So Livy says, about the conduct of the Macedonian courtiers in
-  regard to the enmity between Perseus and Demetrius, the two
-  sons of Philip II. of Macedon: “Crescente in dies Philippi
-  odio in Romanos, cui Perseus indulgeret, Demetrius summâ ope
-  adversaretur, prospicientes animo exitum incauti a fraude
-  fraternâ juvenis—_adjuvandum, quod futurum erat, rati,
-  fovendamque spem potentioris, Perseo se adjungunt_,” _etc._
-  (Livy, xl, 5).
-
-At first, however, it appeared as if the march of Cyrus was destined
-to finish at Tarsus, where he was obliged to remain twenty days. The
-army had already passed by Pisidia, the ostensible purpose of the
-expedition, for which the Grecian troops had been engaged; not one of
-them, either officer or soldier, suspecting anything to the contrary,
-except Klearchus, who was in the secret. But all now saw that they
-had been imposed upon, and found out that they were to be conducted
-against the Persian king. Besides the resentment at such delusion,
-they shrunk from the risk altogether; not from any fear of Persian
-armies, but from the terrors of a march of three months inward from
-the coast, and the impossibility of return, which had so powerfully
-affected the Spartan King Kleomenes,[49] a century before; most of
-them being (as I have before remarked) men of decent position and
-family in their respective cities. Accordingly they proclaimed their
-determination to advance no farther, as they had not been engaged to
-fight against the Great King.[50]
-
-  [49] See Herodot. v. 49.
-
-  [50] Xen. Anab. i, 3, 1.
-
-Among the Grecian officers, each (Klearchus, Proxenus, Menon, Xenias,
-etc.) commanded his own separate division, without any generalissimo
-except Cyrus himself. Each of them probably sympathized more or less
-in the resentment as well as in the repugnance of the soldiers. But
-Klearchus, an exile and a mercenary by profession, was doubtless
-prepared for this mutiny, and had assured Cyrus that it might be
-overcome. That such a man as Klearchus could be tolerated as a
-commander of free and non-professional soldiers, is a proof of the
-great susceptibility of the Greek hoplites for military discipline.
-For though he had great military merits, being brave, resolute, and
-full of resource in the hour of danger, provident for the subsistence
-of his soldiers, and unshrinking against fatigue and hardship,—yet
-his look and manner were harsh, his punishments were perpetual as
-well as cruel, and he neither tried nor cared to conciliate his
-soldiers; who accordingly stayed with him, and were remarkable
-for exactness of discipline, so long as political orders required
-them,—but preferred service under other commanders, when they
-could obtain it.[51] Finding his orders to march forward disobeyed,
-Klearchus proceeded at once in his usual manner to enforce and
-punish. But he found resistance universal; he himself with the cattle
-who carried his baggage, was pelted when he began to move forward,
-and narrowly escaped with his life. Thus disappointed in his attempt
-at coercion, he was compelled to convene the soldiers in a regular
-assembly, and to essay persuasion.
-
-  [51] Xen. Anab. ii, 6, 5-15.
-
-On first appearing before the assembled soldiers, this harsh and
-imperious officer stood for a long time silent, and even weeping;
-a remarkable point in Grecian manners,—and exceedingly impressive
-to the soldiers, who looked on him with surprise and in silence. At
-length he addressed them: “Be not astonished, soldiers, to see me
-deeply mortified. Cyrus has been my friend and benefactor. It was
-he who sheltered me as an exile, and gave me ten thousand Darics,
-which I expended not on my own profit or pleasure, but upon you, and
-in defence of Grecian interests in the Chersonese against Thracian
-depredators. When Cyrus invited me, I came to him along with you, in
-order to make him the best return in my power for his past kindness.
-But now, since you will no longer march along with me, I am under the
-necessity either of renouncing you or of breaking faith with him.
-Whether I am doing right or not, I cannot say; but I shall stand
-by you, and share your fate. No one shall say of me that, having
-conducted Greek troops into a foreign land, I betrayed the Greeks and
-chose the foreigner. You are to me country, friends, allies; while
-you are with me, I can help a friend, and repel an enemy. Understand
-me well; I shall go wherever you go, and partake your fortune.”[52]
-
-  [52] Xen. Anab. i, 3, 2-7. Here, as on other occasions, I
-  translate the sense rather than the words.
-
-This speech, and the distinct declaration of Klearchus that he
-would not march forward against the King, was heard by the soldiers
-with much delight; in which those of the other Greek divisions
-sympathized, especially as none of the other Greek commanders had yet
-announced a similar resolution. So strong was this feeling among the
-soldiers of Xenias and Pasion, that two thousand of them left their
-commanders, coming over forthwith, with arms and baggage, to the
-encampment of Klearchus.
-
-Meanwhile Cyrus himself, dismayed at the resistance encountered,
-sent to desire an interview with Klearchus. But the latter, knowing
-well the game that he was playing, refused to obey the summons. He,
-however, at the same time despatched a secret message to encourage
-Cyrus with the assurance that everything would come right at
-last,—and to desire farther that fresh invitations might be sent,
-in order that he (Klearchus) might answer by fresh refusals. He then
-again convened in assembly both his own soldiers and those who had
-recently deserted Xenias to join him. “Soldiers (said he), we must
-recollect that we have now broken with Cyrus. We are no longer his
-soldiers, nor he our paymaster; moreover, I know that he thinks we
-have wronged him,—so that I am both afraid and ashamed to go near
-him. He is a good friend,—but a formidable enemy; and has a powerful
-force of his own, which all of you see near at hand. This is no time
-for us to slumber. We must take careful counsel whether to stay or
-go; and if we go, how to get away in safety, as well as to obtain
-provisions. I shall be glad to hear what any man has to suggest.”
-
-Instead of the peremptory tone habitual with Klearchus, the troops
-found themselves now, for the first time, not merely released from
-his command, but deprived of his advice. Some soldiers addressed the
-assembly, proposing various measures suitable to the emergency; but
-their propositions were opposed by other speakers, who, privately
-instigated by Klearchus himself, set forth the difficulties either
-of staying or departing. One among these secret partisans of the
-commander even affected to take the opposite side, and to be
-impatient for immediate departure. “If Klearchus does not choose to
-conduct us back (said this speaker) let us immediately elect other
-generals, buy provisions, get ready to depart, and then send to
-ask Cyrus for merchant-vessels,—or at any rate for guides in our
-return march by land. If he refuses both these requests, we must
-put ourselves in marching order, to fight our way back; sending
-forward a detachment without delay to occupy the passes.” Klearchus
-here interposed to say, that as for himself, it was impossible for
-him to continue in command; but he would faithfully obey any other
-commander who might be elected. He was followed by another speaker,
-who demonstrated the absurdity of going and asking Cyrus, either for
-a guide, or for ships, at the very moment when they were frustrating
-his projects. How could he be expected to assist them in getting
-away? Who could trust either his ships or his guides? On the other
-hand, to depart without his knowledge or concurrence was impossible.
-The proper course would be to send a deputation to him, consisting
-of others along with Klearchus, to ask what it was that he really
-wanted; which no one yet knew. His answer to the question should
-be reported to the meeting, in order that they might take their
-resolution accordingly.
-
-To this proposition the soldiers acceded; for it was but too plain
-that retreat was no easy matter. The deputation went to put the
-question to Cyrus; who replied that his real purpose was to attack
-his enemy Abrokomas, who was on the river Euphrates, twelve days’
-march onward. If he found Abrokomas there, he would punish him as he
-deserved. If, on the other hand, Abrokomas had fled, they might again
-consult what step was fit to be taken.
-
-The soldiers, on hearing this, suspected it to be a deception, but
-nevertheless acquiesced, not knowing what else to do. They required
-only an increase of pay. Not a word was said about the Great King, or
-the expedition against him. Cyrus granted increased pay of fifty per
-cent. upon the previous rate. Instead of one daric per month to each
-soldier, he agreed to give a daric and a half.[53]
-
-  [53] Xen. Anab. i, 3, 16-21.
-
-This remarkable scene at Tarsus illustrates the character of the
-Greek citizen-soldier. What is chiefly to be noted, is, the appeal
-made to their reason and judgment,—the habit, established more
-or less throughout so large a portion of the Grecian world, and
-attaining its maximum at Athens, of hearing both sides and deciding
-afterwards. The soldiers are indignant, justly and naturally, at the
-fraud practised upon them. But instead of surrendering themselves to
-this impulse arising out of the past, they are brought to look at the
-actualities of the present, and take measure of what is best to be
-done for the future. To return back from the place where they stood,
-against the wish of Cyrus, was an enterprise so full of difficulty
-and danger, that the decision to which they came was recommended by
-the best considerations of reason. To go on was the least dangerous
-course of the two, besides its chances of unmeasured reward.
-
-As the remaining Greek officers and soldiers followed the example
-of Klearchus and his division, the whole army marched forward from
-Tarsus, and reached Issus, the extreme city of Kilikia, in five
-days’ march,—crossing the rivers Sarus[54] and Pyramus. At Issus, a
-flourishing and commercial port in the angle of the Gulf so called,
-Cyrus was joined by his fleet of fifty triremes,—thirty-five
-Lacedæmonian and twenty-five Persian triremes; bringing a
-reinforcement of seven hundred hoplites, under the command of the
-Lacedæmonian Cheirisophus, said to have been despatched by the
-Spartan Ephors.[55] He also received a farther reinforcement of four
-hundred Grecian soldiers; making the total of Greeks in his army
-fourteen thousand, from which are to be deducted the one hundred
-soldiers of Menon’s division, slain in Kilikia.
-
-  [54] The breadth of the river Sarus (Scihun) is given by Xenophon
-  at three hundred feet; which agrees nearly with the statements of
-  modern travellers (Koch, Der Zug der Zehn Tausend, p. 34).
-
-  Compare, for the description of this country, Kinneir’s Journey
-  through Asia Minor, p. 135; Col. Chesney, Euphrates and Tigris,
-  ii, p. 211; Mr. Ainsworth, Travels in the Track of the Ten
-  Thousand, p. 54.
-
-  Colonel Chesney affirms that neither the Sarus nor the Pyramus
-  is fordable. There must have been bridges; which, in the then
-  flourishing state of Kilikia, is by no means improbable. He and
-  Mr. Ainsworth, however, differ as to the route which they suppose
-  Cyrus to have taken between Tarsus and Issus.
-
-  Xenophon mentions nothing about the Amanian Gates, which
-  afterwards appear noticed both in Arrian (ii, 6; ii, 7) and in
-  Strabo (xiv, p. 676). The various data of ancient history and
-  geography about this region are by no means easy to reconcile;
-  see a valuable note of Mützel on Quintus Curtius, iii, 17, 7.
-  An inspection of the best recent maps, either Colonel Chesney’s
-  or Kiepert’s, clears up some of these better than any verbal
-  description. We see by these maps that Mount Amanus bifurcates
-  into two branches, one of them flanking the Gulf of Issus on
-  its western, the other on its eastern side. There are thus two
-  different passes, each called Pylæ Amanides or Amanian Gates; one
-  having reference to the Western Amanus, the other to the Eastern.
-  The former was crossed by Alexander, the latter by Darius, before
-  the battle of Issus; and Arrian (ii, 6; ii, 7) is equally correct
-  in saying of both of them that they passed the Amanian Gates;
-  though both did not pass the same gates.
-
-  [55] Diodor. xiv. 21.
-
-The arrival of this last body of four hundred men was a fact of some
-importance. They had hitherto been in the service of Abrokomas (the
-Persian general commanding a vast force, said to be three hundred
-thousand men, for the king, in Phœnicia and Syria), from whom they
-now deserted to Cyrus. Such desertion was at once the proof of their
-reluctance to fight against the great body of their countrymen
-marching upwards, and of the general discouragement reigning
-amidst the king’s army. So great, indeed, was that discouragement,
-that Abrokomas now fled from the Syrian coast into the interior;
-abandoning three defensible positions in succession—1. The Gates of
-Kilikia and Syria. 2. The pass of Beilan over Mount Amanus. 3. The
-passage of the Euphrates.—He appears to have been alarmed by the
-easy passage of Cyrus from Kappadokia into Kilikia, and still more,
-probably, by the evident collusion of Syennesis with the invader.[56]
-
-  [56] Xen. Anab. i, 4, 3-5. Ἀβροκόμας δ᾽ οὐ τοῦτο ἐποίησεν ἀλλ᾽
-  ἐπεὶ ἤκουσε Κῦρον ἐν Κιλικίᾳ ὄντα, αναστρέψας ἐκ Φοινίκης, παρὰ
-  βασιλέα ἀπήλαυνεν, etc.
-
-Cyrus had expected to find the gates of Kilikia and Syria stoutly
-defended, and had provided for this emergency by bringing up his
-fleet to Issus, in order that he might be able to transport a
-division by sea to the rear of the defenders. The pass was at one
-day’s march from Issus. It was a narrow road for the length of
-near half a mile, between the sea on one side and the steep cliffs
-terminating mount Amanus on the other. The two entrances, on the
-side of Kilikia as well as on that of Syria, were both closed by
-walls and gates; midway between the two the river Kersus broke out
-from the mountains and flowed into the sea. No army could force this
-pass against defenders; but the possession of the fleet doubtless
-enabled an assailant to turn it. Cyrus was overjoyed to find it
-undefended.[57] And here we cannot but notice the superior ability
-and forethought of Cyrus as compared with the other Persians opposed
-to him. He had looked at this as well as at the other difficulties
-of his march, beforehand, and had provided the means of meeting
-them; whereas, on the king’s side, all the numerous means and
-opportunities of defence are successively abandoned; the Persians
-have no confidence, except in vast numbers,—or when numbers fail, in
-treachery.
-
-  [57] Diodor. xiv.
-
-Five parasangs, or one day’s march from this pass, Cyrus reached the
-Phœnician maritime town of Myriandrus; a place of great commerce,
-with its harbor full of merchantmen. While he rested here seven days,
-his two generals Xenias and Pasion deserted him; privately engaging
-a merchant vessel to carry them away with their property. They could
-not brook the wrong which Cyrus had done them in permitting Klearchus
-to retain under his command those soldiers who had deserted them
-at Tarsus, at the time when the latter played off his deceitful
-manœuvre. Perhaps the men who had thus deserted may have been
-unwilling to return to their original commanders, after having taken
-so offensive a step. And this may partly account for the policy of
-Cyrus in sanctioning what Xenias and Pasion could not but feel as a
-great wrong, in which a large portion of the army sympathized. The
-general belief among the soldiers was, that Cyrus would immediately
-despatch some triremes to overtake and bring back the fugitives.
-But instead of this, he summoned the remaining generals, and after
-communicating to them the fact that Xenias and Pasion were gone,
-added,—“I have plenty of triremes to overtake their merchantmen
-if I chose, and to bring them back. But I will do no such thing.
-No one shall say of me, that I make use of a man while he is with
-me,—and afterwards seize, rob, or ill-use him, when he wishes
-to depart. Nay, I have their wives and children under guard as
-hostages, at Tralles;[58] but even these shall be given up to them,
-in consideration of their good behavior down to the present day. Let
-them go if they choose, with the full knowledge that they behave
-worse towards me than I towards them.” This behavior, alike judicious
-and conciliating, was universally admired, and produced the best
-possible effect upon the spirits of the army; imparting a confidence
-in Cyrus which did much to outweigh the prevailing discouragement,
-in the unknown march upon which they were entering.[59]
-
-  [58] Xen. Anab. i, 4, 6. To require the wives or children of
-  generals in service, as hostages for fidelity, appears to have
-  been not unfrequent with Persian kings. On the other hand, it
-  was remarked as a piece of gross obsequiousness in the Argeian
-  Nikostratus, who commanded the contingent of his countrymen
-  serving under Artaxerxes Ochus in Egypt, that he volunteered to
-  bring up his son to the king as a hostage, without being demanded
-  (Theopompus, Frag. 135 [ed. Wichers] ap. Athenæ. vi, p. 252).
-
-  [59] Xen. Anab. i, 4, 7-9.
-
-At Myriandrus Cyrus finally quitted the sea, sending back his
-fleet,[60] and striking with his land-force eastward into the
-interior. For this purpose it was necessary first to cross mount
-Amanus, by the pass of Beilan; an eminently difficult road, which he
-was fortunate enough to find open, though Abrokomas might easily have
-defended it, if he had chosen.[61] Four days’ march brought the army
-to the Chalus (perhaps the river of Aleppo), full of fish held sacred
-by the neighboring inhabitants; five more days, to the sources of the
-river Daradax, with the palace and park of the Syrian satrap Belesys;
-three days farther, to Thapsakus on the Euphrates. This was a great
-and flourishing town, a centre of commerce enriched by the important
-ford or transit of the river Euphrates close to it, in latitude
-about 35° 40′ N.[62] The river, when the Cyreians arrived, was four
-stadia, or somewhat less than half an English mile, in breadth.
-
-  [60] Diodor. xiv, 21.
-
-  [61] See the remarks of Mr. Ainsworth, Travels in the Track of
-  the Ten Thousand, p. 58-61; and other citations respecting the
-  difficult road through the pass of Beilan, in Mützel’s valuable
-  notes on Quintus Curtius, iii, 20, 13, p. 101.
-
-  [62] Neither the Chalus, nor the Daradax, nor indeed the
-  road followed by Cyrus in crossing Syria from the sea to the
-  Euphrates, can be satisfactorily made out (Koch, Zug der Zehn
-  Tausend, p. 36, 37).
-
-  Respecting the situation of Thapsakus,—placed erroneously by
-  Rennell lower down the river at Deir, where it stands marked even
-  in the map annexed to Col. Chesney’s Report on the Euphrates, and
-  by Reichard higher up the river, near Bir—see Ritter, Erdkunde,
-  part x, B. iii; West Asien, p. 14-17, with the elaborate
-  discussion, p. 972-978, in the same volume; also the work of
-  Mr. Ainsworth above cited, p. 70. The situation of Thapsakus is
-  correctly placed in Colonel Chesney’s last work (Euphr. and Tigr.
-  p. 213), and in the excellent map accompanying that work; though
-  I dissent from his view of the march of Cyrus between the pass of
-  Beilan and Thapsakus.
-
-  Thapsakus appears to have been the most frequented and
-  best-known passage over the Euphrates, throughout the duration
-  of the Seleukid kings, down to 100 B.C. It was selected as a
-  noted point, to which observations and calculations might be
-  conveniently referred, by Eratosthenes and other geographers
-  (see Strabo, ii, p. 79-87). After the time when the Roman empire
-  became extended to the Euphrates, the new Zeugma, higher up the
-  river near Bir or Bihrejik (about the 37th parallel of latitude)
-  became more used and better known, at least to the Roman writers.
-
-  The passage at Thapsakus was in the line of road from Palmyra
-  to Karrhæ in Northern Mesopotamia; also from Seleukeia (on the
-  Tigris below Bagdad) to the other cities founded in Northern
-  Syria by Seleukus Nikator and his successors, Antioch on the
-  Orontes, Seleukeia in Pieria, Laodikeia, Antioch ad Taurum, etc.
-
-  The ford at Thapsakus (says Mr. Ainsworth, p. 69, 70) “is
-  celebrated to this day as the ford of the Anezeh or Beduins. On
-  the right bank of the Euphrates there are the remains of a paved
-  causeway leading to the very banks of the river, and continued on
-  the opposite side.”
-
-Cyrus remained at Thapsakus five days. He was now compelled formally
-to make known to his soldiers the real object of the march, hitherto,
-in name at least, disguised. He accordingly sent for the Greek
-generals, and desired them to communicate publicly the fact, that
-he was on the advance to Babylon against his brother,—which to
-themselves, probably, had been for some time well known. Among the
-soldiers, however, the first announcement excited loud murmurs,
-accompanied by accusation against the generals, of having betrayed
-them, in privity with Cyrus. But this outburst was very different to
-the strenuous repugnance which they had before manifested at Tarsus.
-Evidently they suspected, and had almost made up their minds to, the
-real truth; so that their complaint was soon converted into a demand
-for a donation to each man, as soon as they should reach Babylon;
-as much as that which Cyrus had given to his Grecian detachment on
-going up thither before. Cyrus willingly promised them five minæ
-per head (about £19 5_s._), equal to more than a year’s pay, at the
-rate recently stipulated of a daric and a half per month. He engaged
-to give them, besides, the full rate of pay until they should have
-been sent back to the Ionian coast. Such ample offers satisfied the
-Greeks, and served to counterbalance at least, if not to efface, the
-terrors of that unknown region which they were about to tread.
-
-But before the general body of Greek soldiers had pronounced their
-formal acquiescence, Menon with his separate division was already
-in the water, crossing. For Menon had instigated his men to decide
-separately for themselves, and to execute their decision, before
-the others had given any answer. “By acting thus (said he) you will
-confer special obligation on Cyrus, and earn corresponding reward.
-If the others follow you across, he will suppose that they do so
-because you have set the example. If, on the contrary, the others
-should refuse, we shall all be obliged to retreat: but he will
-never forget that you, separately taken, have done all that you
-could for him.” Such breach of communion, and avidity for separate
-gain, at a time when it vitally concerned all the Greek soldiers to
-act in harmony with each other, was a step suitable to the selfish
-and treacherous character of Menon. He gained his point, however,
-completely; for Cyrus, on learning that the Greek troops had actually
-crossed, despatched Glus the interpreter to express to them his
-warmest thanks, and to assure them that he would never forget the
-obligation; while at the same time, he sent underhand large presents
-to Menon separately.[63] He passed with his whole army immediately
-afterwards; no man being wet above the breast.
-
-  [63] Xen. Anab. i, 4, 12-18.
-
-What had become of Abrokomas and his army, and why did he not defend
-this passage, where Cyrus might so easily have been arrested? We are
-told that he had been there a little before, and that he had thought
-it sufficient to burn all the vessels at Thapsakus, in the belief
-that the invaders could not cross the river on foot. And Xenophon
-informs us that the Thapsakenes affirmed the Euphrates to have been
-never before fordable,—always passed by means of boats; insomuch
-that they treated the actual low state of the water as a providential
-interposition of the gods in favor of Cyrus; “the river made way
-for him to come and take the sceptre.” When we find that Abrokomas
-came too late afterwards for the battle of Kunaxa, we shall be led
-to suspect that he too, like Syennesis in Kilikia, was playing a
-double game between the two royal brothers, and that he was content
-with destroying those vessels which formed the ordinary means of
-communication between the banks, without taking any means to inquire
-whether the passage was practicable without them. The assertion of
-the Thapsakenes, in so far as it was not a mere piece of flattery to
-Cyrus, could hardly have had any other foundation than the fact, that
-they had never seen the river crossed on foot (whether practicable or
-not), so long as there were regular ferry-boats.[64]
-
-  [64] Xen. Anab. i, 4, 18. Compare (Plutarch, Alexand. 17)
-  analogous expressions of flattery—from the historians of
-  Alexander, affirming that the sea near Pamphylia providentially
-  made way for him—from the inhabitants on the banks of the
-  Euphrates, when the river was passed by the Roman legions and
-  the Parthian prince Tiridates, in the reign of the Emperor
-  Tiberius (Tacitus, Annal. vi. 37); and by Lucullus still earlier
-  (Plutarch, Lucull. c. 24).
-
-  The time when Cyrus crossed the Euphrates, must probably have
-  been about the end of July or beginning of August. Now the period
-  of greatest height, in the waters of the Euphrates near this
-  part of its course, is from the 21st to the 28th of May; the
-  period when they are lowest, is about the middle of November
-  (see Colonel Chesney’s Report on the Euphrates, p. 5). Rennell
-  erroneously states that they are lowest in August and September
-  (Expedit, of Xenophon, p. 277). The waters would thus be at a
-  sort of mean height, when Cyrus passed.
-
-  Mr. Ainsworth states that there were only twenty inches of water
-  in the ford at Thapsakus, from October 1841 to February 1842; the
-  steamers Nimrod and Nitocris then struck upon it (p. 72), though
-  the steamers Euphrates and Tigris had passed over it without
-  difficulty in the month of May.
-
-After crossing the Euphrates, Cyrus proceeded, for nine days’
-march,[65] southward along its left bank, until he came to its
-affluent, the river Araxes or Chaboras, which divided Syria from
-Arabia. From the numerous and well-supplied villages there situated,
-he supplied himself with a large stock of provisions, to confront
-the desolate march through Arabia on which they were about to enter,
-following the banks of the Euphrates still further southward. It was
-now that he entered on what may be called the Desert,—an endless
-breadth or succession of undulations, “like the sea,” without any
-cultivation or even any tree; nothing but wormwood and various
-aromatic shrubs.[66] Here too the astonished Greeks saw, for the
-first time, wild asses, antelopes, ostriches, bustards, some of which
-afforded sport, and occasionally food, to the horsemen who amused
-themselves by chasing them; though the wild ass was swifter than
-any horse, and the ostrich altogether unapproachable. Five days’
-march brought them to Korsôtê, a town which had been abandoned by
-its inhabitants,—probably, however, leaving the provision dealers
-behind, as had before happened at Tarsus, in Kilikia;[67] since the
-army here increased their supplies for the onward march. All that
-they could obtain was required, and was indeed insufficient, for the
-trying journey which awaited them. For thirteen successive days, and
-ninety computed parasangs, did they march along the left bank of
-the Euphrates, without provisions, and even without herbage except
-in some few places. Their flour was exhausted, so that the soldiers
-lived for some days altogether upon meat, while many baggage-animals
-perished of hunger. Moreover the ground was often heavy and
-difficult, full of hills and narrow valleys, requiring the personal
-efforts of every man to push the cars and waggons at particular
-junctures; efforts in which the Persian courtiers of Cyrus, under
-his express orders, took zealous part, toiling in the dirt with
-their ornamented attire.[68] After these thirteen days of hardship,
-they reached Pylæ; near the entrance of the cultivated territory of
-Babylonia, where they seem to have halted five or six days to rest
-and refresh.[69] There was on the opposite side of the river, at or
-near this point, a flourishing city named Charmandê; to which many of
-the soldiers crossed over (by means of skins stuffed with hay), and
-procured plentiful supplies, especially of date-wine and millet.[70]
-
-  [65] Xenophon gives these nine days of march as covering fifty
-  parasangs (Anab. i, 4, 19). But Koch remarks that the distance
-  is not half so great as that from the sea to Thapsakus; which
-  latter Xenophon gives at sixty-five parasangs. There is here some
-  confusion; together with the usual difficulty in assigning any
-  given distance as the equivalent of the parasang (Koch, Zug der
-  Zehn Tausend, p. 38).
-
-  [66] See the remarkable testimony of Mr. Ainsworth, from personal
-  observation, to the accuracy of Xenophon’s description of the
-  country, even at the present day.
-
-  [67] Xen. Anab. i, 2, 24.
-
-  [68] Xen. Anab. i, 5, 4-8.
-
-  [69] I infer that the army halted here five or six days, from
-  the story afterwards told respecting the Ambrakiot Silanus, the
-  prophet of the army; who, on sacrificing, had told Cyrus that his
-  brother would not fight for ten days (i, 7, 16). This sacrifice
-  must have been offered, I imagine, during the halt—not during
-  the distressing march which preceded. The ten days named by
-  Silanus, expired on the fourth day after they left Pylæ.
-
-  It is in reference to this portion of the course of the
-  Euphrates, from the Chaboras southward down by Anah and Hit (the
-  ancient Is, noticed by Herodotus, and still celebrated from
-  its unexhausted supply of bitumen), between latitude 35½° and
-  34°—that Colonel Chesney, in his Report on the Navigation of the
-  Euphrates (p. 2), has the following remarks:—
-
-  “The scenery above Hit, in itself very picturesque, is greatly
-  heightened, as one is carried along the current, by the frequent
-  recurrence, at very short intervals, of ancient irrigating
-  aqueducts; these beautiful specimens of art and durability are
-  attributed by the Arabs to the times of the ignorant, meaning (as
-  is expressly understood) the Persians, when fire-worshippers,
-  and in possession of the world. They literally cover both banks,
-  and prove that the borders of the Euphrates were once thickly
-  inhabited by a people far advanced indeed in the application
-  of hydraulics to domestic purposes, of the first and greatest
-  utility—the transport of water. The greater portion is now more
-  or less in ruins, but some have been repaired, and kept up for
-  use either to grind corn or to irrigate. The aqueducts are of
-  stone, firmly cemented, narrowing to about two feet or twenty
-  inches at top, placed at right angles to the current, and carried
-  various distances towards the interior, from two hundred to one
-  thousand two hundred yards.
-
-  “But what most concerns the subject of this memoir is, the
-  existence of a parapet wall or stone rampart in the river, just
-  above the several aqueducts. In general, there is one of the
-  former attached to each of the latter. And almost invariably,
-  between two mills on the opposite banks, one of them crosses the
-  stream from side to side, with the exception of a passage left
-  in the centre for boats to pass up and down. The object of these
-  subaqueous walls would appear to be exclusively, to raise the
-  water sufficiently at low seasons, to give it impetus, as well as
-  a more abundant supply to the wheels. And their effect at those
-  times is, to create a fall in every part of the width, save the
-  opening left for commerce, through which the water rushes with
-  a moderately irregular surface. These dams were probably from
-  four to eight feet high originally; but they are now frequently a
-  bank of stones disturbing the evenness of the current, but always
-  affording a sufficient passage for large boats at low seasons.”
-
-  The marks which Colonel Chesney points out, of previous
-  population and industry on the banks of the Euphrates at this
-  part of its course, are extremely interesting and curious, when
-  contrasted with the desolation depicted by Xenophon; who mentions
-  that there were no other inhabitants than some who lived by
-  cutting millstones from the stone quarries near, and sending
-  them to Babylon in exchange for grain. It is plain that the
-  population, of which Colonel Chesney saw the remaining tokens,
-  either had already long ceased, or did not begin to exist, or to
-  construct their dams and aqueducts, until a period later than
-  Xenophon. They probably began during the period of the Seleukid
-  kings, after the year 300 B.C. For this line of road along the
-  Euphrates began then to acquire great importance as the means
-  of communication between the great city of Seleukeia (on the
-  Tigris, below Bagdad) and the other cities founded by Seleukus
-  Nikator and his successors in the North of Syria and Asia
-  Minor—Seleukeia in Pieria, Antioch, Laodikeia, Apameia, etc.
-  This route coincides mainly with the present route from Bagdad
-  to Aleppo, crossing the Euphrates at Thapsakus. It can hardly be
-  doubted that the course of the Euphrates was better protected
-  during the two centuries of the Seleukid kings (B.C. 300-100,
-  speaking in round numbers), than it came to be afterwards, when
-  that river became the boundary line between the Romans and the
-  Parthians. Even at the time of the Emperor Julian’s invasion,
-  however, Ammianus Marcellinus describes the left bank of the
-  Euphrates, north of Babylonia, as being in several parts well
-  cultivated, and furnishing ample subsistence, (Ammian. Marc.
-  xxiv, 1). At the time of Xenophon’s Anabasis, there was nothing
-  to give much importance to the banks of the Euphrates north of
-  Babylonia.
-
-  Mr. Ainsworth describes the country on the left bank of the
-  Euphrates, before reaching Pylæ, as being now in the same
-  condition as it was when Xenophon and his comrades marched
-  through it,—“full of hills and narrow valleys, and presenting
-  many difficulties to the movement of an army. The illustrator
-  was, by a curious accident, left by the Euphrates steamer on
-  this very portion of the river, and on the same side as the
-  Perso-Greek army, and he had to walk a day and a night across
-  these inhospitable regions; so that he can speak feelingly of the
-  difficulties which the Greeks had to encounter.” (Travels in the
-  Track, etc. p. 81.)
-
-  [70] I incline to think that Charmandê must have been nearly
-  opposite Pylæ, lower down than Hit. But Major Rennell (p. 107)
-  and Mr. Ainsworth (p. 84) suppose Charmandê to be the same place
-  as the modern Hit (the Is of Herodotus). There is no other known
-  town with which we can identify it.
-
-It was during this halt opposite Charmandê that a dispute occurred
-among the Greeks themselves, menacing to the safety of all. I have
-already mentioned that Klearchus, Menon, Proxenus, and each of the
-Greek chiefs, enjoyed a separate command over his own division,
-subject only to the superior control of Cyrus himself. Some of the
-soldiers of Menon becoming involved in a quarrel with those of
-Klearchus, the latter examined into the case, pronounced one of
-Menon’s soldiers to have misbehaved, and caused him to be flogged.
-The comrades of the man thus punished resented the proceeding to such
-a degree, that as Klearchus was riding away from the banks of the
-river to his own tent, attended by a few followers only through the
-encampment of Menon,—one of the soldiers who happened to be cutting
-wood, flung the hatchet at him, while others hooted and began to pelt
-him with stones. Klearchus, after escaping unhurt from this danger to
-his own division, immediately ordered his soldiers to take arms and
-put themselves in battle order. He himself advanced at the head of
-his Thracian peltasts, and his forty horsemen, in hostile attitude
-against Menon’s division; who on their side ran to arms, with Menon
-himself at their head, and placed themselves in order of defence. A
-slight accident might have now brought on irreparable disorder and
-bloodshed, had not Proxenus, coming up at the moment with a company
-of his hoplites, planted himself in military array between the two
-disputing parties, and entreated Klearchus to desist from farther
-assault. The latter at first refused. Indignant that his recent
-insult and narrow escape from death should be treated so lightly,
-he desired Proxenus to retire. His wrath was not appeased, until
-Cyrus himself, apprised of the gravity of the danger, came galloping
-up with his personal attendants and his two javelins in hand.
-“Klearchus, Proxenus, and all you Greeks (said he), you know not what
-you are doing. Be assured that if you now come to blows, it will be
-the hour of my destruction,—and of your own also, shortly after me.
-For if _your_ force be ruined, all these natives whom you see around,
-will become more hostile to us even than the men now serving with the
-King.” On hearing this (says Xenophon) Klearchus came to his senses,
-and the troops dispersed without any encounter.[71]
-
-  [71] Xen. Anab. i, 5, 11-17.
-
-After passing Pylæ, the territory called Babylonia began. The hills
-flanking the Euphrates, over which the army had hitherto been
-passing, soon ceased, and low alluvial plains commenced.[72] Traces
-were now discovered, the first throughout their long march, of a
-hostile force moving in their front, ravaging the country and burning
-the herbage. It was here that Cyrus detected the treason of a Persian
-nobleman named Orontes, whom he examined in his tent, in the presence
-of various Persians possessing his intimate confidence, as well as
-of Klearchus with a guard of three thousand hoplites. Orontes was
-examined, found guilty, and privately put to death.[73]
-
-  [72] The commentators agree in thinking that we are to understand
-  by Pylæ a sort of gate or pass, marking the spot where the desert
-  country north of Babylonia—with its undulations of land, and
-  its steep banks along the river—was exchanged for the flat and
-  fertile alluvium constituting Babylonia proper. Perhaps there was
-  a town near the pass, and named after it.
-
-  Now it appears from Col. Chesney’s survey that this alteration
-  in the nature of the country takes place a few miles below Hit.
-  He observes—(Euphrates and Tigris, vol. i, p. 54)—“Three miles
-  below Hit, the remains of aqueducts disappear, and the windings
-  become shorter and more frequent, as the river flows through
-  a tract of country almost level.” Thereabouts it is that I am
-  inclined to place Pylæ.
-
-  Colonel Chesney places it lower down, twenty-five miles from Hit.
-  Professor Koch (Zug der Zehn Tausend, p. 44), lower down still.
-  Mr. Ainsworth places it as much as seventy geographical miles
-  lower than Hit (Travels in the Track of the Ten Thousand, p. 81);
-  compare Ritter, Erdkunde, West Asien, x. p. 16; xi, pp. 755-763.
-
-  [73] The description given of this scene (known to the Greeks
-  through the communications of Klearchus) by Xenophon, is
-  extremely interesting (Anab. i, 6). I omit it from regard to
-  space.
-
-After three days’ march, estimated by Xenophon at twelve parasangs,
-Cyrus was induced by the evidences before him, or by the reports
-of deserters, to believe that the opposing army was close at hand,
-and that a battle was impending. Accordingly, in the middle of the
-night, he mustered his whole army, Greeks as well as barbarians;
-but the enemy did not appear as had been expected. His numbers
-were counted at this spot, and it was found that there were, of
-Greeks ten thousand four hundred hoplites, and two thousand five
-hundred peltasts; of the barbarian or Asiatic force of Cyrus, one
-hundred thousand men with twenty scythed chariots. The numbers of
-the Greeks had been somewhat diminished during the march, from
-sickness, desertion, or other causes. The reports of deserters
-described the army of Artaxerxes at one million two hundred thousand
-men, besides the six thousand horse-guards commanded by Artagerses,
-and two hundred scythed chariots, under the command of Abrokomas,
-Tissaphernes, and two others. It was ascertained afterwards, however,
-that the force of Abrokomas had not yet joined, and later accounts
-represented the numerical estimation as too great by one-fourth.
-
-In expectation of an action, Cyrus here convened the generals as
-well as the Lochages (or captains) of the Greeks; as well to consult
-about suitable arrangements, as to stimulate their zeal in his cause.
-Few points in this narrative are more striking than the language
-addressed by the Persian prince to the Greeks, on this as well as on
-other occasions.
-
-“It is not from want of native forces, men of Hellas, that I have
-brought you hither, but because I account you better and braver than
-any number of natives. Prove yourselves now worthy of the freedom
-which you enjoy; that freedom for which I envy you, and which I would
-choose, be assured, in preference to all my possessions a thousand
-times multiplied. Learn now from me, who know it well, all that you
-will have to encounter,—vast numbers and plenty of noise; but if
-you despise these, I am ashamed to tell you what worthless stuff
-you will find in these native men. Behave well,—like brave men,
-and trust me for sending you back in such condition as to make your
-friends at home envy you; though I hope to prevail on many of you to
-prefer my service to your own homes.”
-
-“Some of us are remarking, Cyrus, (said a Samian exile named
-Gaulitês), that you are full of promises at this hour of danger, but
-will forget them, or perhaps will be unable to perform them, when
-danger is over.... As to ability, (replied Cyrus), my father’s empire
-reaches northward to the region of intolerable cold, southward to
-that of intolerable heat. All in the middle is now apportioned in
-satrapies among my brother’s friends; all, if we are victorious,
-will come to be distributed among mine. I have no fear of not having
-enough to give away, but rather of not having friends enough to
-receive it from me. To each of you Greeks, moreover, I shall present
-a wreath of gold.”
-
-Declarations like these, repeated by Cyrus to many of the Greek
-soldiers, and circulated among the remainder, filled all of them with
-confidence and enthusiasm in his cause. Such was the sense of force
-and superiority inspired, that Klearchus asked him,—“Do you really
-think, Cyrus, that your brother will fight you?... Yes, by Zeus, (was
-the reply); assuredly, if he be the son of Darius and Parysatis, and
-my brother, I shall not win this prize without a battle.” All the
-Greeks were earnest with him at the same time not to expose his own
-person, but to take post in the rear of their body.[74] We shall see
-presently how this advice was followed.
-
-  [74] Xen. Anab. i, 7, 2-9.
-
-The declarations here reported, as well as the expressions employed
-before during the dispute between Klearchus and the soldiers of
-Menon near Charmandê—being, as they are, genuine and authentic, and
-not dramatic composition such as those of Æschylus in the Persæ,
-nor historic amplification like the speeches ascribed to Xerxes in
-Herodotus,—are among the most valuable evidences respecting the
-Hellenic character generally. It is not merely the superior courage
-and military discipline of the Greeks which Cyrus attests, compared
-with the cowardice of Asiatics,—but also their fidelity and sense
-of obligation which he contrasts with the time-serving treachery
-of the latter;[75] connecting these superior qualities with the
-political freedom which they enjoy. To hear this young prince
-expressing such strong admiration and envy for Grecian freedom, and
-such ardent personal preference for it above all the splendor of his
-own position,—was doubtless the most flattering of all compliments
-which he could pay to the listening citizen-soldiers. That a young
-Persian prince should be capable of conceiving such a sentiment, is
-no slight proof of his mental elevation above the level both of his
-family and of his nation. The natural Persian opinion is expressed
-by the conversation between Xerxes and Demaratus[76] in Herodotus.
-To Xerxes, the conception of free citizenship,—and of orderly,
-self-sufficing courage planted by a public discipline, patriotic as
-well as equalizing,—was not merely repugnant, but incomprehensible.
-He understood only a master issuing orders to obedient subjects, and
-stimulating soldiers to bravery by means of the whip. His descendant
-Cyrus, on the contrary, had learnt by personal observation to
-enter into the feeling of personal dignity prevalent in the Greeks
-around him, based as it was on the conviction that they governed
-themselves and that there was no man who had any rights of his
-own over them,—that the law was their only master, and that in
-rendering obedience to it they were working for no one else but for
-themselves.[77] Cyrus knew where to touch the sentiment of Hellenic
-honor, so fatally extinguished after the Greeks lost their political
-freedom by the hands of the Macedonians, and exchanged for that
-intellectual quickness, combined with moral degeneracy, which Cicero
-and his contemporaries remark as the characteristic of these once
-high-toned communities.
-
-  [75] Xen. Anab. i, 5, 16.
-
-  [76] See Herodot. vii, 102, 103, 209. Compare the observations of
-  the Persian Achæmenês, c. 236.
-
-  [77] Herod. vii, 104. Demaratus says to Xerxes, respecting the
-  Lacedæmonians—Ἐλεύθεροι γὰρ ἐόντες, οὐ πάντα ἐλεύθεροί εἰσι·
-  ἔπεστι γάρ σφι δεσπότης, νόμος, τὸν ὑποδειμαίνουσι πολλῷ μᾶλλον ἢ
-  οἱ σοὶ σέ.
-
-  Again, the historian observes about the Athenians, and their
-  extraordinary increase of prowess after having shaken off the
-  despotism of Hippias (v. 78)—Δηλοῖ δ᾽ οὐ καθ᾽ ἓν μόνον ἀλλὰ
-  πανταχοῦ, ἡ ἰσηγορίη ὥς ἐστι χρῆμα σπουδαῖον· εἰ καὶ Ἀθηναῖοι
-  τυραννευόμενοι μὲν, οὐδαμῶν τῶν σφέας περιοικεόντων ἦσαν τὰ
-  πολέμια ἀμείνους, ἀπαλλαχθέντες δὲ τυράννων, μακρῷ πρῶτοι
-  ἐγένοντο. Δηλοῖ ὦν ταῦτα, ὅτι κατεχόμενοι μὲν ἐθελοκακεέον, ὡς
-  δεσπότῃ ἐργαζόμενοι· ἐλευθερωθέντων δὲ, αὐτὸς ἕκαστος ἑωϋτῷ
-  προθυμέετο ἐργάζεσθαι.
-
-  Compare Menander, Fragm. Incert. CL. ap. Meineke, Fragm. Comm.
-  Græc. vol. iv. p. 268—
-
-    Ἐλεύθερος πᾶς ἑνὶ δεδούλωται, νόμῳ·
-    Δυσὶν δὲ δοῦλος, καὶ νόμῳ καὶ δεσπότῃ.
-
-Having concerted the order of battle with the generals, Cyrus
-marched forward in cautious array during the next day, anticipating
-the appearance of the king’s forces. Nothing of the kind was seen,
-however, though abundant marks of their retiring footsteps were
-evident. The day’s march, (called three parasangs) having been
-concluded without a battle, Cyrus called to him the Ambrakiotic
-prophet Silanus, and presented him with three thousand darics or
-ten Attic talents. Silanus had assured him, on the eleventh day
-preceding, that there would be no action in ten days from that time;
-upon which Cyrus had told him,—“If your prophecy comes true, I will
-give you three thousand darics. My brother will not fight at all, if
-he does not fight within ten days.”[78]
-
-  [78] Xen. Anab. i, 7, 14-17.
-
-In spite of the strong opinion which he had expressed in reply to
-Klearchus, Cyrus now really began to conceive that no battle would
-be hazarded by his enemies; especially as in the course of this last
-day’s march, he came to a broad and deep trench (thirty feet broad
-and eighteen feet deep), approaching so near to the Euphrates as to
-leave an interval of only twenty feet for passage. This trench had
-been dug by order of Artaxerxes across the plain, for a length said
-to be of twelve parasangs (about forty-two English miles, if the
-parasang be reckoned at thirty stadia), so as to touch at its other
-extremity what was called the walls of Media.[79] It had been dug
-as a special measure of defence against the approaching invaders.
-Yet we hear with surprise, and the invaders themselves found with
-equal surprise, that not a man was on the spot to defend it; so
-that the whole Cyreian army and baggage passed without resistance
-through the narrow breadth of twenty feet. This is the first notice
-of any defensive measures taken to repel the invasion,—except the
-precaution of Abrokomas in burning the boats at Thapsakus. Cyrus
-had been allowed to traverse all this immense space, and to pass
-through so many defensible positions, without having yet struck a
-blow. And now Artaxerxes, after having cut a prodigious extent of
-trench at the cost of so much labor,—provided a valuable means of
-resistance, especially against Grecian heavy-armed soldiers,—and
-occupied it seemingly until the very last moment,—throws it up from
-some unaccountable panic, and suffers a whole army to pass unopposed
-through this very narrow gut. Having surmounted unexpectedly so
-formidable an obstacle, Cyrus as well as the Greeks imagined that
-Artaxerxes would never think of fighting in the open plain. All began
-to relax in that careful array which had been observed since the
-midnight review, insomuch that he himself proceeded in his chariot
-instead of on horseback, while many of the Greek soldiers lodged
-their arms on the waggons or beasts of burden.[80]
-
-  [79] From Pylæ to the undefended trench, there intervened three
-  entire days of march, and one part of a day; for it occurred in
-  the fourth day’s march.
-
-  Xenophon calls the three entire days, twelve parasangs in all.
-  This argues short marches, not full marches. And it does not
-  seem that the space of ground traversed during any one of them
-  can have been considerable. For they were all undertaken with
-  visible evidences of an enemy immediately in front of them; which
-  circumstance was the occasion of the treason of Orontes, who
-  asked Cyrus for a body of cavalry, under pretence of attacking
-  the light troops of the enemy in front, and then wrote a letter
-  to inform Artaxerxes that he was about to desert with his
-  division. The letter was delivered to Cyrus, who thus discovered
-  the treason.
-
-  Marching with a known enemy not far off in front, Cyrus must
-  have kept his army in something like battle order, and therefore
-  must have moved slowly. Moreover the discovery of the treason of
-  Orontes must itself have been an alarming fact, well calculated
-  to render both Cyrus and Klearchus doubly cautious for the time.
-  And the very trial of Orontes appears to have been conducted
-  under such solemnities as must have occasioned a halt of the army.
-
-  Taking these circumstances, we can hardly suppose the Greeks
-  to have got over so much as thirty English miles of ground in
-  the three entire days of march. The fourth day they must have
-  got over very little ground indeed; not merely because Cyrus
-  was in momentary expectation of the King’s main army, and of
-  a general battle (i, 7, 14), but because of the great delay
-  necessary for passing the trench. His whole army (more than one
-  hundred thousand men), with baggage, chariots, etc., had to pass
-  through the narrow gut of twenty feet wide between the trench
-  and the Euphrates. He can hardly have made more than five miles
-  in this whole day’s march, getting at night so far as to encamp
-  two or three miles beyond the trench. We may therefore reckon
-  the distance marched over between Pylæ and the trench as about
-  thirty-two miles in all; and two or three miles farther to the
-  encampment of the next night. Probably Cyrus would keep near the
-  river, yet not following its bends with absolute precision; so
-  that in estimating distance, we ought to take a mean between the
-  straight line and the full windings of the river.
-
-  I conceive the trench to have cut the Wall of Media at a much
-  wider angle than appears in Col. Chesney’s map; so that the
-  triangular space included between the trench, the Wall, and the
-  river, was much more extensive. The reason, we may presume,
-  why the trench was cut, was, to defend that portion of the
-  well-cultivated and watered country of Babylonia which lay
-  outside of the Wall of Media—which portion (as we shall see
-  hereafter in the marches of the Greeks after the battle) was very
-  considerable.
-
-  [80] Xen. Anab. i, 7, 20. The account given by Xenophon of this
-  long line of trench, first dug by order of Artaxerxes, and then
-  left useless and undefended, differs from the narrative of
-  Diodorus (xiv, 22), which seems to be borrowed from Ephorus.
-  Diodorus says that the king caused a long trench to be dug, and
-  lined with carriages and waggons as a defence for his baggage;
-  and that he afterwards marched forth from this entrenchment, with
-  his soldiers free and unincumbered, to give battle to Cyrus. This
-  is a statement more plausible than that of Xenophon, in this
-  point of view, that it makes out the king to have acted upon a
-  rational scheme; whereas in Xenophon he appears at first to have
-  adopted a plan of defence, and then to have renounced it, after
-  immense labor and cost, without any reason, so far as we can see.
-  Yet I have no doubt that the account of Xenophon is the true one.
-  The narrow passage, and the undefended trench, were both facts of
-  the most obvious and impressive character to an observing soldier.
-
-On the next day but one after passing the undefended trench, they
-were surprised, at a spot called Kunaxa,[81] just when they were
-about to halt for the mid-day meal and repose, by the sudden
-intimation that the king’s army was approaching in order of battle
-on the open plain. Instantly Cyrus hastened to mount on horseback,
-to arm himself, and to put his forces in order, while the Greeks on
-their side halted and formed their line with all possible speed.[82]
-They were on the right wing of the army, adjoining the river
-Euphrates; Ariæus with the Asiatic forces being on the left, and
-Cyrus himself, surrounded by a body-guard of six hundred well-armed
-Persian horsemen, in the centre. Among the Greeks, Klearchus
-commanded the right division of hoplites, with Paphlagonian horsemen
-and the Grecian peltasts on the extreme right, close to the river;
-Proxenus with his division stood next; Menon commanded on the left.
-All the Persian horsemen around Cyrus had breastplates, helmets,
-short Grecian swords, and two javelins in their right hands; the
-horses also were defended by facings both over the breast and head.
-Cyrus himself, armed generally like the rest, stood distinguished
-by having an upright tiara instead of the helmet. Though the first
-news had come upon them by surprise, the Cyreians had ample time
-to put themselves in complete order; for the enemy did not appear
-until the afternoon was advanced. First, was seen dust, like a white
-cloud,—next, an undefined dark spot, gradually nearing, until the
-armor began to shine, and the component divisions of troops, arranged
-in dense masses, became discernible. Tissaphernes was on the left,
-opposite to the Greeks, at the head of the Persian horsemen, with
-white cuirasses; on his right, stood the Persian bowmen, with their
-gerrha, or wicker shields, spiked so as to be fastened in the ground
-while arrows were shot from behind them; next, the Egyptian infantry
-with long wooden shields covering the whole body and legs. In front
-of all was a row of chariots with scythes attached to the wheels,
-destined to begin the charge against the Grecian phalanx.[83]
-
-  [81] Xenophon does not mention the name Kunaxa, which comes to
-  us from Plutarch (Artaxerx. c. 8), who states that it was five
-  hundred stadia (about fifty-eight miles) from Babylon; while
-  Xenophon was informed that the field of battle was distant from
-  Babylon only three hundred and sixty stadia. Now, according to
-  Colonel Chesney (Euphrates and Tigris, vol. i, p. 57), Hillah
-  (Babylon) is distant ninety-one miles by the river, or sixty-one
-  and a half miles direct, from Felujah. Following therefore the
-  distance given by Plutarch (probably copied from Ktesias), we
-  should place Kunaxa a little lower down the river than Felujah.
-  This seems the most probable supposition.
-
-  Rennell and Mr. Baillie Fraser so place it (Mesopotamia and
-  Assyria, p. 186, Edin. 1842), I think rightly; moreover the
-  latter remarks, what most of the commentators overlook, that the
-  Greeks did not pass through the Wall of Media until long after
-  the battle. See a note a little below, near the beginning of my
-  next chapter, in reference to that Wall.
-
-  [82] The distance of the undefended trench from the battle-field
-  of Kunaxa would be about twenty-two miles. First, three miles
-  beyond the trench, to the first night-station; next, a full day’s
-  march, say twelve miles; thirdly, a half day’s march, to the time
-  of the mid-day halt, say seven miles.
-
-  The distance from Pylæ to the trench having before been stated at
-  thirty-two miles, the whole distance from Pylæ to Kunaxa will be
-  about fifty-four miles.
-
-  Now Colonel Chesney has stated the distance from Hit to Felujah
-  Castle (two known points) at forty-eight miles of straight line,
-  and seventy-seven miles, if following the line of the river.
-  Deduct four miles for the distance from Hit to Pylæ, and we shall
-  then have between Pylæ and Felujah, a rectilinear distance of
-  forty-four miles. The marching route of the Greeks (as explained
-  in the previous note, the Greeks following generally, but not
-  exactly, the windings of the river) will give fifty miles from
-  Pylæ to Felujah, and fifty-three or fifty-four from Pylæ to
-  Kunaxa.
-
-  [83] Xen. Anab. i, 8, 8-11.
-
-As the Greeks were completing their array, Cyrus rode to the front,
-and desired Klearchus to make his attack with the Greeks upon the
-centre of the enemy; since it was there that the king in person would
-be posted, and if that were once beaten, the victory was gained. But
-such was the superiority of Artaxerxes in numbers, that his centre
-extended beyond the left of Cyrus. Accordingly Klearchus, afraid of
-withdrawing his right from the river, lest he should be taken both in
-flank and rear, chose to keep his position on the right,—and merely
-replied to Cyrus, that he would manage everything for the best. I
-have before remarked[84] how often the fear of being attacked on the
-unshielded side and on the rear, led the Greek soldier into movements
-inconsistent with military expediency; and it will be seen presently
-that Klearchus, blindly obeying this habitual rule of precaution,
-was induced here to commit the capital mistake of keeping on the
-right flank, contrary to the more judicious direction of Cyrus.[85]
-The latter continued for a short time riding slowly in front of the
-lines, looking alternately at the two armies, when Xenophon, one of
-the small total of Grecian horsemen, and attached to the division of
-Proxenus, rode forth from the line to accost him, asking if he had
-any orders to give. Cyrus desired him to proclaim to every one that
-the sacrifices were favorable. Hearing a murmur going through the
-Grecian ranks, he inquired from Xenophon what it was; and received
-for answer, that the watchword was now being passed along for the
-second time. He asked, with some surprise, who gave the watchword?
-and what it was? Xenophon replied that it was “Zeus the Preserver,
-and Victory.”—“I accept it,” replied Cyrus; “let that be the word;”
-and immediately rode away to his own post in the centre, among the
-Asiatics.
-
-  [84] Thucyd. v. 70. See Vol. VII, ch. lvi, p. 84 of this History.
-
-  [85] Plutarch (Artaxerx. c. 8) makes this criticism upon
-  Klearchus; and it seems quite just.
-
-The vast host of Artaxerxes, advancing steadily and without noise,
-were now within less than half a mile of the Cyreians, when the
-Greek troops raised the pæan or usual war-cry, and began to move
-forward. As they advanced, the shout became more vehement, the pace
-accelerated, and at last the whole body got into a run.[86] This
-might have proved unfortunate, had their opponents been other than
-Grecian hoplites; but the Persians did not stand to await the charge.
-They turned and fled, when the assailants were yet hardly within
-bow-shot. Such was their panic, that even the drivers of the scythed
-chariots in front, deserting their teams, ran away along with the
-rest; while the horses, left to themselves, rushed apart in all
-directions, some turning round to follow the fugitives, others coming
-against the advancing Greeks, who made open order to let them pass.
-The left division of the king’s army was thus routed without a blow,
-and seemingly without a man killed on either side; one Greek only
-being wounded by an arrow, and another by not getting out of the way
-of one of the chariots.[87] Tissaphernes alone,—who, with the body
-of horse immediately around him, was at the extreme Persian left,
-close to the river,—formed an exception to this universal flight.
-He charged and penetrated through the Grecian peltasts, who stood
-opposite to him between the hoplites and the river. These peltasts,
-commanded by Episthenes of Amphipolis, opened their ranks to let him
-pass, darting at the men as they rode by, yet without losing any
-one themselves. Tissaphernes thus got into the rear of the Greeks,
-who continued, on their side, to pursue the flying Persians before
-them.[88]
-
-  [86] Xen. Anab. i, 8, 17; Diodor. xiv, 23.
-
-  [87] Xen. Anab. i, 8, 17-20.
-
-  [88] Xen. Anab i, 10, 4-8.
-
-Matters proceeded differently in the other parts of the field.
-Artaxerxes, though in the centre of his own army, yet from his
-superior numbers outflanked Ariæus, who commanded the extreme left of
-the Cyreians.[89] Finding no one directly opposed to him, he began to
-wheel round his right wing, to encompass his enemies; not noticing
-the flight of his left division. Cyrus, on the other hand, when he
-saw the easy victory of the Greeks on their side, was overjoyed;
-and received from every one around him salutations, as if he were
-already king. Nevertheless, he had self-command enough not yet to
-rush forward as if the victory was already gained,[90] but remained
-unmoved, with his regiment of six hundred horse around him, watching
-the movements of Artaxerxes. As soon as he saw the latter wheeling
-round his right division to get upon the rear of the Cyreians, he
-hastened to check this movement by an impetuous charge upon the
-centre, where Artaxerxes was in person, surrounded by the body-guard
-of six thousand horse, under Artagerses. So vigorous was the attack
-of Cyrus, that with his six hundred horse, he broke and dispersed
-this body-guard, killing Artagerses with his own hand. His own six
-hundred horse rushed forward in pursuit of the fugitives, leaving
-Cyrus himself nearly alone, with only the select few, called his
-“Table-Companions,” around him. It was under these circumstances
-that he first saw his brother Artaxerxes, whose person had been
-exposed to view by the flight of the body-guards. The sight filled
-him with such a paroxysm of rage and jealous ambition,[91] that
-he lost all thought of safety or prudence,—cried out, “I see the
-man,”—and rushed forward with his mere handful of companions to
-attack Artaxerxes, in spite of the numerous host behind him. Cyrus
-made directly at his brother, darting his javelin with so true an aim
-as to strike him in the breast, and wound him through the cuirass;
-though the wound (afterwards cured by the Greek surgeon Ktesias)
-could not have been very severe, since Artaxerxes did not quit the
-field, but, on the contrary, engaged in personal combat, he and those
-around him, against this handful of assailants. So unequal a combat
-did not last long. Cyrus, being severely wounded under the eye by the
-javelin of a Karian soldier, was cast from his horse and slain. The
-small number of faithful companions around him all perished in his
-defence. Artasyras, who stood first among them in his confidence and
-attachment, seeing him mortally wounded and fallen, cast himself down
-upon him, clasped him in his arms, and in this position either slew
-himself, or was slain by order of the king.[92]
-
-  [89] Xen. Anab. i, 8, 23; i, 9, 31.
-
-  [90] Xen. Anab. i, 8, 21.
-
-  Κῦρος δὲ, ὁρῶν τοὺς Ἕλληνας νικῶντας τὸ καθ᾽ αὑτοὺς καὶ
-  διώκοντας, ἡδόμενος καὶ προσκυνούμενος ἤδη ὡς βασιλεὺς ὑπὸ τῶν
-  ἀμφ᾽ αὐτὸν, ~οὐδ᾽ ὣς ἐξήχθη διώκειν~, etc.
-
-  The last words are remarkable, as indicating that no other
-  stimulus except that of ambitious rivalry and fraternal
-  antipathy, had force enough to overthrow the self-command of
-  Cyrus.
-
-  [91] Compare the account of the transport of rage which seized
-  the Theban Pelopidas, when he saw Alexander the despot of Pheræ
-  in the opposite army; which led to the same fatal consequences
-  (Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 32; Cornel. Nepos, Pelop. c. 5). See
-  also the reflections of Xenophon on the conduct of Teleutas
-  before Olynthus.—Hellenic. v. 3, 7.
-
-  [92] Xen. Anab. i, 8, 22-29. The account of this battle and of
-  the death of Cyrus by Ktesias (as far as we can make it out from
-  the brief abstract in Photius—Ktesias, Fragm. c. 58, 59, ed.
-  Bähr) does not differ materially from Xenophon. Ktesias mentions
-  the Karian soldier (not noticed by Xenophon) who hurled the
-  javelin; and adds that this soldier was afterwards tortured and
-  put to death by Queen Parysatis, in savage revenge for the death
-  of Cyrus. He also informs us that Bagapatês, the person who by
-  order of Artaxerxes cut off the head and hand of Cyrus, was
-  destroyed by her in the same way.
-
-  Diodorus (xiv, 23) dresses up a much fuller picture of the
-  conflict between Cyrus and his brother, which differs on many
-  points, partly direct and partly implied, from Xenophon.
-
-  Plutarch (Artaxerxes, c. 11, 12, 13) gives an account of the
-  battle, and of the death of Cyrus, which he professes to have
-  derived from Ktesias, but which differs still more materially
-  from the narrative in Xenophon. Compare also the few words of
-  Justin, v, 11.
-
-  Diodorus (xiv, 24) says that twelve thousand men were slain of
-  the king’s army at Kunaxa; the greater part of them by the Greeks
-  under Klearchus, who did not lose a single man. He estimates the
-  loss of Cyrus’s Asiatic army at three thousand men. But as the
-  Greeks did not lose a man, so they can hardly have killed many
-  in the pursuit; for they had scarcely any cavalry, and no great
-  number of peltasts,—while hoplites could not have overtaken the
-  flying Persians.
-
-The head and the right hand of the deceased prince were immediately
-cut off by order of Artaxerxes, and doubtless exhibited conspicuously
-to view. This was a proclamation to every one that the entire contest
-was at an end; and so it was understood by Ariæus, who, together
-with all the Asiatic troops of Cyrus, deserted the field and fled
-back to the camp. Not even there did they defend themselves, when
-the king and his forces pursued them; but fled yet farther back to
-the resting-place of the previous night. The troops of Artaxerxes
-got into the camp and began to plunder it without resistance. Even
-the harem of Cyrus fell into their power. It included two Grecian
-women,—of free condition, good family, and education,—one from
-Phokæa, the other from Miletus, brought to him, by force, from their
-parents to Sardis. The elder of these two, the Phokæan, named Milto,
-distinguished alike for beauty and accomplished intelligence,
-was made prisoner and transferred to the harem of Artaxerxes;
-the other, a younger person, found means to save herself, though
-without her upper garments,[93] and sought shelter among some
-Greeks who were left in the camp on guard of the Grecian baggage.
-These Greeks repelled the Persian assailants with considerable
-slaughter; preserving their own baggage, as well as the persons
-of all who fled to them for shelter. But the Asiatic camp of the
-Cyreians was completely pillaged, not excepting those reserved
-waggons of provisions which Cyrus had provided in order that his
-Grecian auxiliaries might be certain, under all circumstances, of a
-supply.[94]
-
-  [93] Xen. Anab. i, 10, 3. The accomplishments and fascinations
-  of this Phokæan lady, and the great esteem in which she was
-  held first by Cyrus and afterwards by Artaxerxes, have been
-  exaggerated into a romantic story, in which we cannot tell
-  what may be the proportion of truth (see Ælian, V. H. xii, 1;
-  Plutarch, Artaxerx. c. 26, 27; Justin, x, 2). Both Plutarch
-  and Justin state that the subsequent enmity between Artaxerxes
-  and his son Darius, which led to the conspiracy of the latter
-  against his father, and to his destruction when the conspiracy
-  was discovered, arose out of the passion of Darius for her. But
-  as that transaction certainly happened at the close of the long
-  life and reign of Artaxerxes, who reigned forty-six years—and
-  as she must have been then sixty years old, if not more—we may
-  fairly presume that the cause of the family tragedy must have
-  been something different.
-
-  Compare the description of the fate of Berenikê of Chios, and
-  Monimê of Miletus, wives of Mithridates king of Pontus, during
-  the last misfortunes of that prince (Plutarch, Lucullus, c. 18).
-
-  [94] Xen. Anab. i, 10, 17. This provision must probably have been
-  made during the recent halt at Pylæ.
-
-While Artaxerxes was thus stripping the Cyreian camp, he was
-joined by Tissaphernes and his division of horse, who had charged
-through between the Grecian division and the river. At this time,
-there was a distance of no less than thirty stadia or three and a
-half miles between him and Klearchus with the Grecian division;
-so far had the latter advanced forward in pursuit of the Persian
-fugitives. Apprised, after some time, that the king’s troops had
-been victorious on the left and centre, and were masters of the
-camp,—but not yet knowing of the death of Cyrus,—Klearchus
-marched back his troops, and met the enemy’s forces also returning.
-He was apprehensive of being surrounded by superior numbers, and
-therefore took post with his rear upon the river. In this position,
-Artaxerxes again marshalled his troops in front, as if to attack
-him, but the Greeks, anticipating his movement, were first in making
-the attack themselves, and forced the Persians to take flight even
-more terror-stricken than before. Klearchus, thus relieved from all
-enemies, waited awhile in hopes of hearing news of Cyrus. He then
-returned to the camp, which was found stripped of all its stores;
-so that the Greeks were compelled to pass the night without supper,
-while most of them also had had no dinner, from the early hour at
-which the battle had commenced.[95] It was only on the next morning
-that they learnt, through Proklês (descendant of the Spartan king
-Demaratus, formerly companion of Xerxes in the invasion of Greece),
-that Cyrus had been slain; news which converted their satisfaction at
-their own triumph into sorrow and dismay.[96]
-
-  [95] Xen. Anab. i, 10, 18, 19.
-
-  [96] Xen. Anab. ii. 1, 3, 4.
-
-Thus terminated the battle of Kunaxa, and along with it the ambitious
-hopes as well as the life of this young prince. His character and
-proceedings suggest instructive remarks. Both in the conduct of
-this expedition, and in the two or three years of administration
-in Asia Minor which preceded it, he displayed qualities such as
-are not seen in Cyrus called the Great, nor in any other member of
-the Persian regal family, nor indeed in any other Persian general
-throughout the history of the monarchy. We observe a large and
-long-sighted combination,—a power of foreseeing difficulties, and
-providing means beforehand for overcoming them,—a dexterity in
-meeting variable exigencies, and dealing with different parties,
-Greeks or Asiatics, officers or soldiers,—a conviction of the
-necessity, not merely of purchasing men’s service by lavish presents,
-but of acquiring their confidence by straightforward dealing and
-systematic good faith,—a power of repressing displeasure when policy
-commanded, as at the desertion of Xenias and Pasion, and the first
-conspiracies of Orontes; although usually the punishments which he
-inflicted were full of Oriental barbarity. How rare were the merits
-and accomplishments of Cyrus, as a Persian, will be best felt when
-we contrast this portrait, by Xenophon, with the description of
-the Persian satraps by Isokrates.[97] That many persons deserted
-from Artaxerxes to Cyrus,—none, except Orontes, from Cyrus to
-Artaxerxes,—has been remarked by Xenophon. Not merely throughout
-the march, but even as to the manner of fighting at Kunaxa, the
-judgment of Cyrus was sounder than that of Klearchus. The two matters
-of supreme importance to the Greeks, were, to take care of the
-person of Cyrus, and to strike straight at that of Artaxerxes with
-the central division around him. Now it was the fault of Klearchus,
-and not of Cyrus, that both these matters were omitted; and that
-the Greeks gained only a victory comparatively insignificant on
-the right. Yet in spite of such mistake, not his own, it appears
-that Cyrus would have been victorious, had he been able to repress
-that passionate burst of antipathy which drove him, like a madman,
-against his brother. The same insatiable ambition, and jealous
-fierceness when power was concerned, which had before led him to put
-to death two first cousins, because they omitted, in his presence,
-an act of deference never paid except to the king in person,—this
-same impulse, exasperated by the actual sight of his rival brother,
-and by that standing force of fraternal antipathy so frequent in
-regal families,[98] blinded him, for the moment, to all rational
-calculation.
-
-  [97] Isokrates, Orat. iv, (Panegyric.) s. 175-182; a striking
-  passage, as describing the way in which political institutions
-  work themselves into the individual character and habits.
-
-  [98] Diodorus (xiv, 23) notices the legendary pair of hostile
-  brothers, Eteokles and Polyneikes, as a parallel. Compare
-  Tacitus, Annal. iv, 60. “Atrox Drusi ingenium, super cupidinem
-  potentiæ, et _solita fratribus odia_, accendebatur invidia, quod
-  mater Agrippina promptior Neroni erat,” etc.; and Justin, xlii, 4.
-
-  Compare also the interesting narrative of M. Prosper Mérimée, in
-  his life of Don Pedro of Castile; a prince commonly known by the
-  name of Peter the Cruel. Don Pedro was dethroned, and slain in
-  personal conflict, by the hand of his bastard brother, Henri of
-  Transtamare.
-
-  At the battle of Navarrete, in 1367, says M. Mérimée, “Don Pèdre,
-  qui, pendant le combat, s’était jété au plus fort de la mêlée,
-  s’acharna long temps à la poursuite des fuyards. On le voyait
-  galoper dans la plaine, monté sur un cheval noir, sa bannière
-  armoriée de Castille devant lui, cherchant son frère partout où
-  l’on combattait encore, et criant, échauffé par le carnage—‘Où
-  est ce bâtard, qui se nomme roi de Castille?’” (Histoire de Don
-  Pèdre, p. 504.)
-
-  Ultimately Don Pedro, blocked up and almost starved out in the
-  castle of Montiel, was entrapped by simulated negotiations into
-  the power of his enemies. He was slain in personal conflict by
-  the dagger of his brother Henri, after a desperate struggle,
-  in which he seemed likely to prevail, if Henri had not been
-  partially aided by a bystander.
-
-  This tragical scene (on the night of the 23d of March, 1369) is
-  graphically described by M. Mérimée (p. 564-566).
-
-We may however remark that Hellas, as a whole, had no cause to regret
-the fall of Cyrus at Kunaxa. Had he dethroned his brother and become
-king, the Persian empire would have acquired under his hand such a
-degree of strength as might probably have enabled him to forestall
-the work afterwards performed by the Macedonian kings, and to make
-the Greeks in Europe as well as those in Asia his dependents. He
-would have employed Grecian military organization against Grecian
-independence, as Philip and Alexander did after him. His money
-would have enabled him to hire an overwhelming force of Grecian
-officers and soldiers, who would (to use the expression of Proxenus
-as recorded by Xenophon[99]) have thought him a better friend to
-them than their own country. It would have enabled him also to take
-advantage of dissension and venality in the interior of each Grecian
-city, and thus to weaken their means of defence while he strengthened
-his own means of attack. This was a policy which none of the Persian
-kings, from Darius son of Hystaspes down to Darius Codomanus, had
-ability or perseverance enough to follow out; none of them knew
-either the true value of Grecian instruments, or how to employ
-them with effect. The whole conduct of Cyrus, in reference to this
-memorable expedition, manifests a superior intelligence, competent
-to use the resources which victory would have put in his hands,—and
-an ambition likely to use them against the Greeks, in avenging the
-humiliations of Marathon, Salamis, and the peace of Kallias.
-
-  [99] Xen. Anab. iii, 1, 4. Ὑπισχνεῖτο δὲ αὐτῷ (Ξενοφῶντα
-  Πρόξενος) εἰ ἔλθοι, φίλον Κύρῳ ποιήσειν· ~ὃν αὐτός ἔφη κρείττω
-  ἑαυτῷ νομίζειν τῆς πατρίδος~.
-
-
-
-
-CHAPTER LXX.
-
-RETREAT OF THE TEN THOUSAND GREEKS.
-
-
-The first triumphant feeling of the Greek troops at Kunaxa was
-exchanged, as soon as they learnt the death of Cyrus, for dismay
-and sorrow; accompanied by unavailing repentance for the venture
-into which he and Klearchus had seduced them. Probably Klearchus
-himself too repented, and with good reason, of having displayed,
-in his manner of fighting the battle, so little foresight, and so
-little regard either to the injunctions or to the safety of Cyrus.
-Nevertheless he still maintained the tone of a victor in the field,
-and after expressions of grief for the fate of the young prince,
-desired Proklês and Glus to return to Ariæus, with the reply, that
-the Greeks on their side were conquerors without any enemy remaining;
-that they were about to march onward against Artaxerxes; and that if
-Ariæus would join them, they would place him on the throne which had
-been intended for Cyrus. While this reply was conveyed to Ariæus by
-his particular friend Menon along with the messengers, the Greeks
-procured a meal as well as they could, having no bread, by killing
-some of the baggage animals; and by kindling fire, to cook their
-meat, from the arrows, the wooden Egyptian shields which had been
-thrown away on the field, and the baggage carts.[100]
-
-  [100] Xen. Anab. ii, 1, 5-7.
-
-Before any answer could be received from Ariæus, heralds appeared
-coming from Artaxerxes; among them being Phalinus, a Greek from
-Zakynthus, and the Greek surgeon Ktesias of Knidus, who was in the
-service of the Persian king.[101] Phalinus, an officer of some
-military experience and in the confidence of Tissaphernes, addressed
-himself to the Greek commanders; requiring them on the part of the
-king, since he was now victor and had slain Cyrus, to surrender their
-arms and appeal to his mercy. To this summons, painful in the extreme
-to a Grecian ear, Klearchus replied that it was not the practice for
-victorious men to lay down their arms. Being then called away to
-examine the sacrifice which was going on, he left the interview to
-the other officers, who met the summons of Phalinus by an emphatic
-negative. “If the king thinks himself strong enough to ask for our
-arms unconditionally, let him come and try to seize them.” “The
-king (rejoined Phalinus) thinks that you are in his power, being
-in the midst of his territory, hemmed in by impassable rivers, and
-encompassed by his innumerable subjects.”—“Our arms and our valor
-are all that remain to us (replied a young Athenian); we shall not
-be fools enough to hand over to you our only remaining treasure, but
-shall employ them still to have a fight for your treasure.”[102] But
-though several spoke in this resolute tone, there were not wanting
-others disposed to encourage a negotiation; saying that they had been
-faithful to Cyrus as long as he lived, and would now be faithful to
-Artaxerxes, if he wanted their services in Egypt or anywhere else.
-In the midst of this parley Klearchus returned, and was requested
-by Phalinus to return a final answer on behalf of all. He at first
-asked the advice of Phalinus himself; appealing to the common
-feeling of Hellenic patriotism, and anticipating, with very little
-judgment, that the latter would encourage the Greeks in holding out.
-“If (replied Phalinus) I saw one chance out of ten thousand in your
-favor, in the event of a contest with the king, I should advise you
-to refuse the surrender of your arms. But as there is no chance
-of safety for you against the king’s consent, I recommend you to
-look out for safety in the only quarter where it presents itself.”
-Sensible of the mistake which he had made in asking the question,
-Klearchus rejoined,—“That is _your_ opinion; now report our
-answer: We think we shall be better friends to the king, if we are
-to be his friends,—or more effective enemies, if we are to be his
-enemies,—with our arms, than without them.” Phalinus, in retiring,
-said that the king proclaimed a truce so long as they remained in
-their present position,—but war, if they moved, either onward or
-backward. And to this Klearchus acceded, without declaring which he
-intended to do.[103]
-
-  [101] We know from Plutarch (Artaxer. c. 13) that Ktesias
-  distinctly asserted himself to have been present at this
-  interview, and I see no reason why we should not believe him.
-  Plutarch indeed rejects his testimony as false, affirming that
-  Xenophon would certainly have mentioned him, had he been there;
-  but such an objection seems to me insufficient. Nor is it
-  necessary to construe the words of Xenophon, ἦν δ᾽ αὐτῶν Φαλῖνος
-  ~εἶς Ἕλλην~, (ii, 1, 7) so strictly as to negative the presence
-  of one or two other Greeks. Phalinus is thus specified because he
-  was the spokesman of the party—a military man.
-
-  [102] Xen. Anab. ii, 1, 12 μὴ οὖν οἴου τὰ μόνα ἡμῖν ἀγαθὰ ὄντα
-  ὑμῖν παραδώσειν· ἀλλὰ σὺν τούτοις καὶ περὶ τῶν ὑμετέρων ἀγαθῶν
-  μαχούμεθα.
-
-  [103] Xen. Anab. ii, 1, 14-22. Diodorus (xiv, 25) is somewhat
-  copious in his account of the interview with Phalinus. But he
-  certainly followed other authorities besides Xenophon, if even it
-  be true that he had Xenophon before him. The allusion to the past
-  heroism of Leonidas seems rather in the style of Ephorus.
-
-Shortly after the departure of Phalinus, the envoys despatched to
-Ariæus returned; communicating his reply, that the Persian grandees
-would never tolerate any pretensions on his part to the crown, and
-that he intended to depart early the next morning on his return; if
-the Greeks wished to accompany him, they must join him during the
-night. In the evening, Klearchus, convening the generals and the
-lochages (or captains of lochi), acquainted them that the morning
-sacrifice had been of a nature to forbid their marching against
-the king,—a prohibition of which he now understood the reason,
-from having since learnt that the king was on the other side of
-the Tigris, and therefore out of their reach,—but that it was
-favorable for rejoining Ariæus. He gave directions accordingly for a
-night-march back along the Euphrates, to the station where they had
-passed the last night but one prior to the battle. The other Grecian
-generals, without any formal choice of Klearchus as chief, tacitly
-acquiesced in his orders, from a sense of his superior decision and
-experience, in an emergency when no one knew what to propose. The
-night-march was successfully accomplished, so that they joined Ariæus
-at the preceding station about midnight; not without the alarming
-symptom, however, that Miltokythês the Thracian deserted to the king,
-at the head of three hundred and forty of his countrymen, partly
-horse, partly foot.
-
-The first proceeding of the Grecian generals was to exchange solemn
-oaths of reciprocal fidelity and fraternity with Ariæus. According
-to an ancient and impressive practice, a bull, a wolf, a boar, and a
-ram, were all slain, and their blood allowed to run into the hollow
-of a shield; in which the Greek generals dipped a sword, and Ariæus,
-with his chief companions, a spear.[104] The latter, besides the
-promise of alliance, engaged also to guide the Greeks, in good faith,
-down to the Asiatic coast. Klearchus immediately began to ask what
-route he proposed to take; whether to return by that along which they
-had come up, or by any other. To this Ariæus replied, that the road
-along which they had marched was impracticable for retreat, from the
-utter want of provisions through seventeen days of desert; but that
-he intended to choose another road, which, though longer, would be
-sufficiently productive to furnish them with provisions. There was,
-however, a necessity (he added), that the first two or three days’
-marches should be of extreme length, in order that they might get
-out of the reach of the king’s forces, who would hardly be able to
-overtake them afterwards with any considerable numbers.
-
-  [104] Xen. Anab. ii, 2, 7-9. Koch remarks, however, with good
-  reason, that it is difficult to see how they could get a wolf in
-  Babylonia, for the sacrifice (Zug der Zehn Tausend, p. 51).
-
-They had now come ninety-three days’ march[105] from Ephesus, or
-ninety from Sardis.[106] The distance from Sardis to Kunaxa is,
-according to Colonel Chesney, about twelve hundred and sixty-five
-geographical miles, or fourteen hundred and sixty-four English miles.
-There had been at least ninety-six days of rest, enjoyed at various
-places, so that the total of time elapsed must have at least been one
-hundred and eighty-nine days, or a little more than half a year;[107]
-but it was probably greater, since some intervals of rest are not
-specified in number of days.
-
-  [105] Such is the sum total stated by Xenophon himself (Anab.
-  ii, 1, 6). It is greater, by nine days, than the sum total which
-  we should obtain by adding together the separate days’ march
-  specified by Xenophon from Sardis. But the distance from Sardis
-  to Ephesus, as we know from Herodotus, was three days’ journey
-  (Herod. v, 55); and therefore the discrepancy is really only to
-  the amount of six, not of nine. See Krüger ad Anabas. p. 556;
-  Koch, Zug der Z. p. 141.
-
-  [106] Colonel Chesney (Euphrates and Tigris, c. ii, p. 208)
-  calculates twelve hundred and sixty-five geographical miles from
-  Sardis to Kunaxa or the Mounds of Mohammed.
-
-  [107] For example, we are not told how long they rested at Pylæ,
-  or opposite to Charmandê. I have given some grounds (in the
-  preceding chapter) for believing that it cannot have been less
-  than five days. The army must have been in the utmost need of
-  repose, as well as of provisions.
-
-How to retrace their steps, was now the problem, apparently
-insoluble. As to the military force of Persia in the field,
-indeed, not merely the easy victory at Kunaxa, but still more the
-undisputed march throughout so long a space, left them no serious
-apprehensions.[108] In spite of this great extent, population, and
-riches, they had been allowed to pass through the most difficult
-and defensible country, and to ford the broad Euphrates, without a
-blow; nay, the king had shrunk from defending the long trench which
-he had specially caused to be dug for the protection of Babylonia.
-But the difficulties which stood between them and their homes were
-of a very different character. How were they to find their way back,
-or obtain provisions, in defiance of a numerous hostile cavalry,
-which, not without efficiency even in a pitched battle would be most
-formidable in opposing their retreat? The line of their upward march
-had all been planned, with supplies furnished, by Cyrus;—yet even
-under such advantages, supplies had been on the point of failing,
-in one part of the march. They were now, for the first time, called
-upon to think and provide for themselves; without knowledge of either
-roads or distances,—without trustworthy guides,—without any one
-to furnish or even to indicate supplies,—and with a territory all
-hostile, traversed by rivers which they had no means of crossing.
-Klearchus himself knew nothing of the country, nor of any other
-river except the Euphrates; nor does he indeed, in his heart, seem
-to have conceived retreat as practicable without the consent of
-the king.[109] The reader who casts his eye on a map of Asia, and
-imagines the situation of this Greek division on the left bank of
-the Euphrates, near the parallel of latitude 33° 30′—will hardly be
-surprised at any measure of despair, on the part either of general or
-soldiers. And we may add that Klearchus had not even the advantage of
-such a map, or probably of any map at all, to enable him to shape his
-course.
-
-  [108] Xen. Anab. i, 5, 9.
-
-  [109] Xen. Anab. ii, 4, 6, 7.
-
-In this dilemma, the first and most natural impulse was to consult
-Ariæus who (as has been already stated) pronounced, with good
-reason, that return by the same road was impracticable; and promised
-to conduct them home by another road,—longer indeed, yet better
-supplied. At daybreak on the ensuing morning, they began their march
-in an easterly direction, anticipating that before night they should
-reach some villages of the Babylonian territory, as in fact they
-did;[110] yet not before they had been alarmed in the afternoon by
-the supposed approach of some of the enemy’s horse, and by evidences
-that the enemy were not far off, which induced them to slacken
-their march for the purpose of more cautious array. Hence they did
-not reach the first villages before dark; and these too had been
-pillaged by the enemy while retreating before them, so that only
-the first-comers under Klearchus could obtain accommodation, while
-the succeeding troops, coming up in the dark, pitched as they could
-without any order. The whole camp was a scene of clamor, dispute, and
-even alarm, throughout the night. No provisions could be obtained.
-Early the next morning Klearchus ordered them under arms; and
-desiring to expose the groundless nature of the alarm, caused the
-herald to proclaim, that whoever would denounce the person who had
-let the ass into the camp on the preceding night, should be rewarded
-with a talent of silver.[111]
-
-  [110] Xen. Anab. ii, 2, 13. Ἐπεὶ γὰρ ἡμέρα ἐγένετο, ~ἐπορεύοντο
-  ἐν δεξιᾷ ἔχοντες τὸν ἥλιον~, λογιζόμενοι ἥξειν ἅμα ἡλίῳ δύνοντι
-  εἰς κώμας τῆς Βαβυλωνίας χώρας· καὶ τοῦτο μὲν οὐκ ἐψεύσθησαν.
-
-  Schneider, in his note on this passage, as well as Ritter,
-  (Erdkunde, part. x, 3, p. 17), Mr. Ainsworth (Travels in the
-  Track, p. 103) and Colonel Chesney (Euph. and Tigr. p. 219),
-  understand the words here used by Xenophon in a sense from
-  which I dissent. “When it was day, the army proceeded onward on
-  their march, having the sun on their right hand,”—these words
-  they understand as meaning that the army marched _northward_;
-  whereas, in my judgment, the words intimate that the army marched
-  _eastward_. _To have the sun on the right hand_, does not so
-  much refer either to the precise point where, or to the precise
-  instant when, the sun rises,—but to his diurnal path through the
-  heavens, and to the general direction of the day’s march. This
-  may be seen by comparing the remarkable passage in Herodotus,
-  iv, 42, in reference to the alleged circumnavigation of Africa,
-  from the Red Sea round the Cape of Good Hope to the Straits of
-  Gibraltar, by the Phœnicians under the order of Nekos. These
-  Phœnicians said, “that in sailing round Africa (from the Red Sea)
-  they had the sun on their right hand”—ὡς τὴν Λιβύην περιπλώοντες
-  ~τὸν ἠέλιον ἐπὶ δεξιᾷ~. Herodotus rejects this statement as
-  incredible. Not knowing the phenomena of a southern latitude
-  beyond the tropic of Capricorn, he could not imagine that men in
-  sailing from East to West could possibly have the sun on their
-  right hand; any man journeying from the Red Sea to the Straits
-  of Gibraltar must, in his judgment, have the sun on the _left_
-  hand, as he himself had always experienced in the north latitude
-  of the Mediterranean or the African coast. See Vol. III. of this
-  History, ch. xviii, p. 282.
-
-  In addition to this reason, we may remark, that Ariæus and the
-  Greeks, starting from their camp on the banks of the Euphrates
-  (the place where they had passed the last night but one before
-  the battle of Kunaxa) and marching _northward_, could not expect
-  to arrive, and could not really arrive, at villages of the
-  Babylonian territory. But they might naturally expect to do so,
-  if they marched _eastward_, towards the Tigris. Nor would they
-  have hit upon the enemy in a northerly march, which would in fact
-  have been something near to a return upon their own previous
-  steps. They would moreover have been stopped by the undefended
-  Trench, which could only be passed at the narrow opening close to
-  the Euphrates.
-
-  [111] Xen. Anab. ii, 2, 20. This seems to have been a standing
-  military jest, to make the soldiers laugh at their past panic.
-  See the references in Krüger and Schneider’s notes.
-
-What was the project of route entertained by Ariæus, we cannot
-ascertain;[112] since it was not farther pursued. For the effect of
-the unexpected arrival of the Greeks as if to attack the enemy,—and
-even the clamor and shouting of the camp during the night—so
-intimidated the Persian commanders, that they sent heralds the next
-morning to treat about a truce. The contrast between this message,
-and the haughty summons of the preceding day to lay down their arms,
-was sensibly felt by the Grecian officers, and taught them that the
-proper way of dealing with the Persians was by a bold and aggressive
-demeanor. When Klearchus was apprised of the arrival of the heralds,
-he desired them at first to wait at the outposts until he was at
-leisure; then, having put his troops into the best possible order,
-with a phalanx compact on every side to the eye, and the unarmed
-persons out of sight, he desired the heralds to be admitted. He
-marched out to meet them with the most showy and best-armed soldiers
-immediately around him, and when they informed him that they had
-come from the king with instructions to propose a truce, and to
-report on what conditions the Greeks would agree to it, Klearchus
-replied abruptly,—“Well then,—go and tell the king, that our first
-business must be to fight; for we have nothing to eat, nor will any
-man presume to talk to Greeks about a truce, without first providing
-dinner for them.” With this reply the heralds rode off, but returned
-very speedily; thus making it plain that the king, or the commanding
-officer, was near at hand. They brought word that the king thought
-their answer reasonable, and had sent guides to conduct them to a
-place where they would obtain provisions, if the truce should be
-concluded.
-
-  [112] Diodorus (xvi, 24) tells us that Ariæus intended to guide
-  them towards Paphlagonia; a very loose indication.
-
-After an affected delay and hesitation, in order to impose upon the
-Persians, Klearchus concluded the truce, and desired that the guides
-would conduct the army to those quarters where provisions could
-be had. He was most circumspect in maintaining exact order during
-the march, himself taking charge of the rear guard. The guides led
-them over many ditches and channels, full of water, and cut for the
-purpose of irrigation; some so broad and deep that they could not be
-crossed without bridges. The army had to put together bridges for
-the occasion, from palm trees either already fallen, or expressly
-cut down. This was a troublesome business, which Klearchus himself
-superintended with peculiar strictness. He carried his spear in the
-left hand, his stick in the right; employing the latter to chastise
-any soldier who seemed remiss,—and even plunging into the mud and
-lending his own hands in aid wherever it was necessary.[113] As it
-was not the usual season of irrigation for crops, he suspected that
-the canals had been filled on this occasion expressly to intimidate
-the Greeks, by impressing them with the difficulties of their
-prospective march; and he was anxious to demonstrate to the Persians
-that these difficulties were no more than Grecian energy could easily
-surmount.
-
-  [113] Xen. Anab. ii, 3, 7, 13.
-
-At length they reached certain villages indicated by their guides
-for quarters and provision; and here for the first time they had a
-sample of that unparalleled abundance of the Babylonian territory,
-which Herodotus is afraid to describe with numerical precision.
-Large quantities of corn,—dates not only in great numbers, but of
-such beauty, freshness, size and flavor, as no Greek had ever seen
-or tasted, insomuch that fruit like what was imported into Greece,
-was disregarded and left for the slaves,—wine and vinegar, both
-also made from the date-palm: these are the luxuries which Xenophon
-is eloquent in describing, after his recent period of scanty fare
-and anxious apprehension; not without also noticing the headaches
-which such new and luscious food, in unlimited quanity, brought upon
-himself and others.[114]
-
-  [114] Xen. Anab. ii, 3, 14, 17.
-
-After three days passed in these restorative quarters, they were
-visited by Tissaphernes, accompanied by four Persian grandees and
-a suite of slaves. The satrap began to open a negotiation with
-Klearchus and the other generals. Speaking through an interpreter,
-he stated to them that the vicinity of his satrapy to Greece
-impressed him with a strong interest in favor of the Cyreian Greeks,
-and made him anxious to rescue them out of their present desperate
-situation; that he had solicited the king’s permission to save them,
-as a personal recompense to himself for having been the first to
-forewarn him of the schemes of Cyrus, and for having been the only
-Persian who had not fled before the Greeks at Kunaxa; that the King
-had promised to consider this point, and had sent him in the meantime
-to ask the Greeks what their purpose was in coming up to attack
-him; and that he trusted the Greeks would give him a conciliatory
-answer to carry back, in order that he might have less difficulty
-in realizing what he desired for their benefit. To this Klearchus,
-after first deliberating apart with the other officers, replied,
-that the army had come together, and had even commenced their march,
-without any purpose of hostility to the King; that Cyrus had brought
-them up the country under false pretences, but that they had been
-ashamed to desert him in the midst of danger, since he had always
-treated them generously; that since Cyrus was now dead, they had
-no purpose of hostility against the King, but were only anxious
-to return home; that they were prepared to repel hostility from
-all quarters, but would be not less prompt in requiting favor or
-assistance. With this answer Tissaphernes departed, and returned
-on the next day but one, informing them that he had obtained the
-King’s permission to save the Grecian army,—though not without
-great opposition, since many Persian counsellors contended that it
-was unworthy of the King’s dignity, to suffer those who had assailed
-him to escape. “I am now ready (said he) to conclude a covenant and
-exchange oaths with you; engaging to conduct you safely back into
-Greece, with the country friendly, and with a regular market for you
-to purchase provisions. You must stipulate on your part always to
-pay for your provisions, and to do no damage to the country. If I do
-not furnish you with provisions to buy, you are then at liberty to
-take them where you can find them.” Well were the Greeks content to
-enter into such a covenant, which was sworn, with hands given upon
-it, by Klearchus, the other generals, and the lochages, on their
-side,—and by Tissaphernes with the King’s brother-in-law on the
-other. Tissaphernes then left them, saying that he would go back to
-the King, make preparations, and return to reconduct the Greeks home;
-going himself to his own satrapy.[115]
-
-  [115] Xen. Anab. ii, 3, 18-27.
-
-The statements of Ktesias, though known to us only indirectly and
-not to be received without caution, afford ground for believing that
-Queen Parysatis decidedly wished success to her son Cyrus in his
-contest for the throne,—that the first report conveyed to her of the
-battle of Kunaxa, announcing the victory of Cyrus, filled her with
-joy, which was exchanged for bitter sorrow when she was informed of
-his death,—that she caused to be slain with horrible tortures all
-those, who though acting in the Persian army and for the defence of
-Artaxerxes, had any participation in the death of Cyrus—and that
-she showed favorable dispositions towards the Cyreian Greeks.[116]
-It seems probable, farther, that her influence may have been exerted
-to procure for them an unimpeded retreat, without anticipating the
-use afterwards made by Tissaphernes (as will soon appear) of the
-present convention. And in one point of view, the Persian king had
-an interest in facilitating their retreat. For the very circumstance
-which rendered retreat difficult, also rendered the Greeks dangerous
-to him in their actual position. They were in the heart of the
-Persian empire, within seventy miles of Babylon; in a country
-not only teeming with fertility, but also extremely defensible;
-especially against cavalry, from the multiplicity of canals, as
-Herodotus observed respecting Lower Egypt.[117] And Klearchus might
-say to his Grecian soldiers,—what Xenophon was afterwards preparing
-to say to them at Kalpê on the Euxine Sea, and what Nikias also
-affirmed to the unhappy Athenian army whom he conducted away from
-Syracuse[118]—that wherever they sat down, they were sufficiently
-numerous and well-organized to become at once a city. A body of such
-troops might effectually assist, and would perhaps encourage, the
-Babylonian population to throw off the Persian yoke, and to exonerate
-themselves from the prodigious tribute which they now paid to the
-satrap. For these reasons, the advisers of Artaxerxes thought it
-advantageous to convey the Greeks across the Tigris out of Babylonia,
-beyond all possibility of returning thither. This was at any rate
-the primary object of the convention. And it was the more necessary
-to conciliate the good-will of the Greeks, because there seems to
-have been but one bridge over the Tigris; which bridge could only be
-reached by inviting them to advance considerably farther into the
-interior of Babylonia.
-
-  [116] Ktesiæ Persica, Fragm. c. 59, ed. Bähr; compared with the
-  remarkable Fragment. 18, preserved by the so-called Demetrius
-  Phalêreus: see also Plutarch, Artaxerx. c. 17.
-
-  [117] Herodot. i, 193; ii, 108; Strabo, xvii. p. 788.
-
-  [118] Xen. Anab. v, 6, 16; Thucyd. vii.
-
-Such was the state of fears and hopes on both sides, at the time when
-Tissaphernes left the Greeks, after concluding his convention. For
-twenty days did they await his return, without receiving from him
-any communication; the Cyreian Persians under Ariæus being encamped
-near them. Such prolonged and unexplained delay became, after a few
-days, the source of much uneasiness to the Greeks; the more so as
-Ariæus received during this interval several visits from his Persian
-kinsmen, and friendly messages from the king, promising amnesty for
-his recent services under Cyrus. Of these messages the effects were
-painfully felt in manifest coldness of demeanor on the part of his
-Persian troops towards the Greeks. Impatient and suspicious, the
-Greek soldiers impressed upon Klearchus their fears, that the king
-had concluded the recent convention only to arrest their movements,
-until he should have assembled a larger army and blocked up more
-effectually the roads against their return. To this Klearchus
-replied,—“I am aware of all that you say. Yet if we now strike our
-tents, it will be a breach of the convention and a declaration of
-war. No one will furnish us with provisions; we shall have no guides;
-Ariæus will desert us forthwith, so that we shall have his troops
-as enemies instead of friends. Whether there be any other river for
-us to cross, I know not; but we know that the Euphrates itself can
-never be crossed, if there be an enemy to resist us. Nor have we any
-cavalry,—while cavalry is the best and most numerous force of our
-enemies. If the king, having all these advantages, really wishes to
-destroy us, I do not know why he should falsely exchange all these
-oaths and solemnities, and thus make his own word worthless in the
-eyes both of Greeks and barbarians.”[119]
-
-  [119] Xen. Anab. ii, 4, 3-8.
-
-Such words from Klearchus are remarkable, as they testify his
-own complete despair of the situation,—certainly a very natural
-despair,—except by amicable dealing with the Persians; and also his
-ignorance of geography and the country to be traversed. This feeling
-helps to explain his imprudent confidence afterwards in Tissaphernes.
-
-That satrap, however, after twenty days, at last came back, with
-his army prepared to return to Ionia,—with the king’s daughter
-whom he had just received in marriage,—and with another grandee
-named Orontas. Tissaphernes took the conduct of the march, providing
-supplies for the Greek troops to purchase; while Ariæus and his
-division now separated themselves altogether from the Greeks, and
-became intermingled with the other Persians. Klearchus and the Greeks
-followed them, at the distance of about three miles in the rear, with
-a separate guide for themselves; not without jealousy and mistrust,
-sometimes shown in individual conflicts, while collecting wood or
-forage, between them and the Persians of Ariæus. After three days’
-march (that is, apparently, three days, calculated from the moment
-when they began their retreat with Ariæus) they came to the Wall of
-Media, and passed through it,[120] prosecuting their march onward
-through the country on its other or interior side. It was of bricks
-cemented with bitumen, one hundred feet high, and twenty feet broad;
-it was said to extend a length of twenty parasangs (or about seventy
-miles, if we reckon the parasang at thirty stadia), and to be not far
-distant from Babylon. Two days of farther march, computed as eight
-parasangs, brought them to the Tigris. During these two days they
-crossed two great ship canals, one of them over a permanent bridge,
-the other over a temporary bridge laid on seven boats. Canals of
-such magnitude must probably have been two among the four stated by
-Xenophon to be drawn from the river Tigris, each of them a parasang
-distant from the other. They were one hundred feet broad, and deep
-enough even for heavy vessels; they were distributed by means of
-numerous smaller channels and ditches for the irrigation of the soil;
-and they were said to fall into the Euphrates; or rather, perhaps,
-they terminated in one main larger canal cut directly from the
-Euphrates to the Tigris, each of them joining this larger canal at
-a different point of its course. Within less than two miles of the
-Tigris was a large and populous city named Sittakê, near which the
-Greeks pitched their camp, on the verge of a beautiful park or thick
-grove full of all kinds of trees; while the Persians all crossed the
-Tigris, at the neighboring bridge.
-
-  [120] Xen. Anab. ii, 4, 12. Διελθόντες δὲ ~τρεῖς σταθμοὺς~,
-  ἀφίκοντο πρὸς τὸ Μηδίας καλούμενον τεῖχος, καὶ ~παρῆλθον αὐτοῦ
-  εἴσω~. It appears to me that these three days’ march or σταθμοὶ
-  can hardly be computed from the moment when they commenced
-  their march under the conduct of Tissaphernes. On the other
-  hand, if we begin from the moment when the Greeks started under
-  conduct of Ariæus, we can plainly trace three distinct _resting
-  places_ (σταθμοὺς) before they reached the Wall of Media.
-  First, at the villages where the confusion and alarm arose (ii,
-  13-21). Secondly, at the villages of abundant supply, where
-  they concluded the truce with Tissaphernes, and waited twenty
-  days for his return (ii, 3, 14; ii, 4, 9). Thirdly, one night’s
-  halt under the conduct of Tissaphernes, before they reached the
-  Wall of Media. This makes three distinct stations or halting
-  places, between the station (the first station after passing
-  the undefended trench) from whence they started to begin their
-  retreat under the conduct of Ariæus,—and the point where they
-  traversed the Wall of Media.
-
-As Proxenus and Xenophon were here walking in front of the camp after
-supper, a man was brought up who had asked for the former at the
-advanced posts. This man said that he came with instructions from
-Ariæus. He advised the Greeks to be on their guard, as there were
-troops concealed in the adjoining grove, for the purpose of attacking
-them during the night,—and also to send and occupy the bridge
-over the Tigris, since Tissaphernes intended to break it down, in
-order that the Greeks might be caught without possibility of escape
-between the river and the canal. On discussing this information with
-Klearchus, who was much alarmed by it, a young Greek present remarked
-that the two matters stated by the informant contradicted each other;
-for that if Tissaphernes intended to attack the Greeks during the
-night, he would not break down the bridge, so as both to prevent his
-own troops on the other side from crossing to aid, and to deprive
-those on this side of all retreat if they were beaten,—while, if
-the Greeks were beaten, there was no escape open to them, whether
-the bridge continued or not. This remark induced Klearchus to ask
-the messenger, what was the extent of ground between the Tigris and
-the canal. The messenger replied, that it was a great extent of
-country, comprising many large cities and villages. Reflecting on
-this communication, the Greek officers came to the conclusion that
-the message was a stratagem on the part of Tissaphernes to frighten
-them and accelerate their passage across the Tigris; under the
-apprehension that they might conceive the plan of seizing or breaking
-the bridge and occupying a permanent position in the spot where they
-were; which was an island, fortified on one side by the Tigris,—on
-the other sides, by intersecting canals between the Euphrates and
-the Tigris.[121] Such an island was a defensible position, having
-a most productive territory with numerous cultivators, so as to
-furnish shelter and means of hostility for all the king’s enemies.
-Tissaphernes calculated that the message now delivered would induce
-the Greeks to become alarmed with their actual position and to cross
-the Tigris with as little delay as possible. At least this was the
-interpretation which the Greek officers put upon his proceeding;
-an interpretation highly plausible, since, in order to reach the
-bridge over the Tigris, he had been obliged to conduct the Greek
-troops into a position sufficiently tempting for them to hold,—and
-since he knew that his own purposes were purely treacherous. But the
-Greeks, officers as well as soldiers, were animated only by the wish
-of reaching home. They trusted, though not without misgivings, in
-the promise of Tissaphernes to conduct them; and never for a moment
-thought of taking permanent post in this fertile island. They did
-not, however, neglect the precaution of sending a guard during the
-night to the bridge over the Tigris, which no enemy came to assail.
-On the next morning they passed over it in a body, in cautious and
-mistrustful array, and found themselves on the eastern bank of the
-Tigris,—not only without attack, but even without sight of a single
-Persian, except Glus, the interpreter, and a few others watching
-their motions.
-
-  [121] I reserve for this place the consideration of that which
-  Xenophon states, in two or three passages, about the Wall
-  of Media and about different canals in connection with the
-  Tigris,—the result of which, as far as I can make it out, stands
-  in my text.
-
-  I have already stated, in the preceding chapter, that in the
-  march of the day next but one preceding the battle of Kunaxa,
-  the army came to a deep and broad trench dug for defence across
-  their line of way, with the exception of a narrow gut of twenty
-  feet broad close by the Euphrates; through which gut the whole
-  army passed. Xenophon says, “This trench had been carried upwards
-  across the plain as far as the Wall of Media, where indeed,
-  the canals are situated, flowing from the river Tigris; four
-  canals, one hundred feet in breadth, and extremely deep, so
-  that corn-bearing vessels sail along them. They strike into the
-  Euphrates, they are distant each from the other by one parasang,
-  and there are bridges over them—Παρετέτατο δ᾽ ἡ τάφρος ἄνω διὰ
-  τοῦ πεδίου ἐπὶ δώδεκα παράσαγγας, μέχρι τοῦ Μηδίας τείχους,
-  ἔνθα δὴ (the books print a full stop between τείχους and ἔνθα,
-  which appears to me incorrect, as the sense goes on without
-  interruption) εἰσιν αἱ διωρύχες, ἀπὸ τοῦ Τίγρητος ποταμοῦ
-  ῥέουσαι· εἰσὶ δὲ τέτταρες, τὸ μὲν εὖρος πλεθριαῖαι, βαθεῖαι
-  δὲ ἰσχυρῶς, καὶ πλοῖα πλεῖ ἐν αὐταῖς σιταγωγά· εἰσβάλλουσι δὲ
-  εἰς τὸν Εὐφράτην, διαλείπουσι δ᾽ ἑκάστη παρασάγγην, γέφυραι δ᾽
-  ἔπεισιν. The present tense—εἰσιν αἱ διώρυχες—seems to mark the
-  local reference of ἔνθα to the Wall of Media, and not to the
-  actual march of the army.
-
-  Major Rennell (Illustrations of the Expedition of Cyrus, pp.
-  79-87, etc.), Ritter, (Erdkunde, x, p. 16), Koch, (Zug der Zehn
-  Tausend, pp. 46, 47), and Mr. Ainsworth (Travels in the Track
-  of the Ten Thousand, p. 88) consider Xenophon to state that
-  the Cyreian army on this day’s march (the day but one before
-  the battle) passed through the Wall of Media and over the four
-  distinct canals reaching from the Tigris to the Euphrates. They
-  all, indeed, contest the accuracy of this latter statement;
-  Rennell remarking that the level of the Tigris, in this part
-  of its course, is lower than that of the Euphrates; and that
-  it could not supply water for so many broad canals so near to
-  each other. Col. Chesney also conceives the army to have passed
-  through the Wall of Media before the battle of Kunaxa.
-
-  It seems to me, however, that they do not correctly interpret the
-  words of Xenophon, who does not say that Cyrus ever passed either
-  the Wall of Media, or these four canals _before_ the battle of
-  Kunaxa, but who says (as Krüger, De Authentiâ Anabaseos, p. 12,
-  prefixed to his edition of the Anabasis, rightly explains him),
-  that these four canals flowing from the Tigris are at, or near,
-  the Wall of Media, which the Greeks did not pass through until
-  long _after_ the battle, when Tissaphernes was conducting them
-  towards the Tigris, two days’ march before they reached Sittakê
-  (Anab. ii, 4, 12).
-
-  It has been supposed, during the last few years, that the
-  direction of the Wall of Media could be verified by actual ruins
-  still subsisting on the spot. Dr. Ross and Captain Lynch (see
-  journal of the Geographical Society, vol. ix. pp. 447-473, with
-  Captain Lynch’s map annexed) discovered a line of embankment
-  which they considered to be the remnant of it. It begins on the
-  western bank of the Tigris, in latitude 34° 3′, and stretches
-  towards the Euphrates in a direction from N. N. E. to S. S. W.
-  “It is a solitary straight single mound, twenty-five long paces
-  thick, with a bastion on its western face at every fifty-five
-  paces; and on the same side it has a deep ditch, twenty-seven
-  paces broad. The wall is here built of the small pebbles of the
-  country, imbedded in cement of lime of great tenacity; it is from
-  thirty-five to forty feet in height, and runs in a straight line
-  as far as the eye can trace it. The Bedouins tell me that it goes
-  in the same straight line to two mounds called Ramelah on the
-  Euphrates, some hours above Felujah; that it is, in places far
-  inland, built of brick, and in some parts worn down to a level
-  with the desert.” (Dr. Ross, l. c. p. 446).
-
-  Upon the faith of these observations, the supposed wall (now
-  called Sidd Nimrud by the natives) has been laid down as the Wall
-  of Media reaching from the Tigris to the Euphrates, in the best
-  recent maps, especially that of Colonel Chesney; and accepted as
-  such by recent inquirers.
-
-  Nevertheless, subsequent observations, recently made known by
-  Colonel Rawlinson to the Geographical Society, have contradicted
-  the views of Dr. Ross as stated above, and shown that the Wall
-  of Media, in the line here assigned to it, has no evidence to
-  rest upon. Captain Jones, commander of the steamer at Bagdad,
-  undertook, at the request of Colonel Rawlinson a minute
-  examination of the locality, and ascertained that what had been
-  laid down as the Wall of Media was merely a line of mounds;
-  no wall at all, but a mere embankment, extending seven or
-  eight miles from the Tigris, and designed to arrest the winter
-  torrents and drain off the rain water of the desert into a large
-  reservoir, which served to irrigate an extensive valley between
-  the rivers.
-
-  From this important communication it results, that there is as
-  yet no evidence now remaining for determining what was the line
-  or position of the Wall of Media; which had been supposed to be
-  a datum positively established, serving as premises from whence
-  to deduce other positions mentioned by Xenophon. As our knowledge
-  now stands, there is not a single point mentioned by Xenophon
-  in Babylonia which can be positively verified, except Babylon
-  itself,—and Pylæ, which is known pretty nearly, as the spot
-  where Babylonia proper commences.
-
-  The description which Xenophon gives of the Wall of Media is very
-  plain and specific. I see no reason to doubt that he actually
-  saw it, passed through it, and correctly describes it in height
-  as well as breadth. Its entire length he of course only gives
-  from what he was told. His statement appears to me good evidence
-  that there was a Wall of Media, which reached from the Tigris to
-  the Euphrates, or perhaps to some canal cut from the Euphrates,
-  though there exists no mark to show what was the precise locality
-  and direction of the Wall. Ammianus Marcellinus (xxiv, 2), in
-  the expedition of the emperor Julian, saw near Macepracta, on
-  the left bank of the Euphrates, the ruins of a wall, “which in
-  ancient times had stretched to a great distance for the defence
-  of Assyria against foreign invasion.” It is fair to presume that
-  this was the Wall of Media; but the position of Macepracta cannot
-  be assigned.
-
-  It is important, however, to remember,—what I have already
-  stated in this note,—that Xenophon did not see, and did not
-  cross either the Wall of Media, or the two canals here mentioned,
-  until many days after the battle of Kunaxa.
-
-  We know from Herodotus that all the territory of Babylonia was
-  intersected by canals, and that there was one canal greater
-  than the rest and navigable, which flowed from the Euphrates to
-  the Tigris, in a direction to the south of east. This coincides
-  pretty well with the direction assigned in Colonel Chesney’s map
-  to the Nahr-Malcha or Regium Flumen, into which the four great
-  canals, described by Xenophon as drawn from the Tigris to the
-  Euphrates, might naturally discharge themselves, and still be
-  said to fall into the Euphrates, of which the Nahr-Malcha was as
-  it were a branch. How the level of the two rivers would adjust
-  itself, when the space between them was covered with a network of
-  canals great and small, and when a vast quantity of the water of
-  both was exhausted in fertilizing the earth, is difficult to say.
-
-  The _island_ wherein the Greeks stood, at their position near
-  Sittakê, before crossing the Tigris, would be a parallelogram
-  formed by the Tigris, the Nahr-Malcha, and the two parallel
-  canals joining them. It might well be called a large island,
-  containing many cities and villages, with a large population.
-
-After having crossed by a bridge laid upon thirty-seven pontoons,
-the Greeks continued their march to the northward upon the eastern
-side of the Tigris, for four days, to the river Physkus; said to
-be twenty parasangs.[122] The Physkus was one hundred feet wide,
-with a bridge, and the large city of Opis near it. Here, at the
-frontier of Assyria and Media, the road from the eastern regions to
-Babylon joined the road northerly on which the Greeks were marching.
-An illegitimate brother of Artaxerxes was seen at the head of a
-numerous force, which he was conducting from Susa and Ekbatana as a
-reinforcement to the royal army. This great host halted to see the
-Greeks pass by; and Klearchus ordered the march in column of two
-abreast, employing himself actively to maintain an excellent array,
-and halting more than once. The army thus occupied so long a time in
-passing by the Persian host, that their numbers appeared greater than
-the reality, even to themselves; while the effect upon the Persian
-spectators was very imposing.[123] Here Assyria ended and Media
-began. They marched, still in a northerly direction, for six days
-through a portion of Media almost unpeopled, until they came to some
-flourishing villages which formed a portion of the domain of queen
-Parysatis; probably these villages, forming so marked an exception to
-the desert character of the remaining march, were situated on the
-Lesser Zab, which flows into the Tigris, and which Xenophon must have
-crossed, though he makes no mention of it. According to the order
-of march stipulated between the Greeks and Tissaphernes, the latter
-only provided a supply of provisions for the former to purchase; but
-on the present halt, he allowed the Greeks to plunder the villages,
-which were rich and full of all sorts of subsistence,—yet without
-carrying off the slaves. The wish of the satrap to put an insult on
-Cyrus, as his personal enemy,[124] through Parysatis, thus proved a
-sentence of ruin to these unhappy villagers. Five more days’ march,
-called twenty parasangs, brought them to the banks of the river
-Zabatus, or the Greater Zab, which flows into the Tigris near a
-town now called Senn. During the first of these five days, they saw
-on the opposite side of the Tigris a large town called Kænæ, from
-whence they received supplies of provisions, brought across by the
-inhabitants upon rafts supported by inflated skins.[125]
-
-  [122] There seems reason to believe that in ancient times the
-  Tigris, above Bagdad, followed a course more to the westward, and
-  less winding, than it does now. The situation of Opis cannot be
-  verified. The ruins of a large city were seen by Captain Lynch
-  near the confluence of the river Adhem with the Tigris, which he
-  supposed to be Opis, in lat. 34°.
-
-  [123] Xen. Anab. ii, 4, 26.
-
-  [124] Ktesias, Fragm. 18, ed. Bähr.
-
-  [125] Xen. Anab. ii, 5, 26-28.
-
-  Mannert, Rennell, Mr. Ainsworth, and most modern commentators,
-  identify this town of Καιναὶ or Kænæ with the modern town Senn;
-  which latter place Mannert (Geogr. der Röm. v. p. 333) and
-  Rennell (Illustrations p. 129) represent to be near the Lesser
-  Zab instead of the Greater Zab.
-
-  To me it appears that the locality assigned by Xenophon to
-  Καιναὶ, does not at all suit the modern town of Senn. Nor is
-  there much real similarity of name between the two; although our
-  erroneous way of pronouncing the Latin name _Caenae_, creates a
-  delusive appearance of similarity. Mr. Ainsworth shows that some
-  modern writers have been misled in the same manner by identifying
-  the modern town of Sert with Tigrano-_certa_.
-
-  It is a perplexing circumstance in the geography of Xenophon’s
-  work, that he makes no mention of the Lesser Zab, which yet he
-  must have crossed. Herodotus notices them both, and remarks on
-  the fact that though distinct rivers, both bore the same name (v,
-  52). Perhaps in drawing up his narrative after the expedition,
-  Xenophon may have so far forgotten, as to fancy that two
-  synonymous rivers mentioned as distinct in his memoranda, were
-  only one.
-
-On the banks of the Great Zab they halted three days,—days of
-serious and tragical moment. Having been under feelings of mistrust,
-ever since the convention with Tissaphernes, they had followed
-throughout the whole march, with separate guides of their own, in the
-rear of his army, always maintaining their encampment apart. During
-their halt on the Zab, so many various manifestations occurred to
-aggravate the mistrust, that hostilities seemed on the point of
-breaking out between the two camps. To obviate this danger Klearchus
-demanded an interview with Tissaphernes, represented to him the
-threatening attitude of affairs, and insisted on the necessity of
-coming to a clear understanding. He impressed upon the satrap that,
-over and above the solemn oaths which had been interchanged, the
-Greeks on their side could have no conceivable motive to quarrel
-with him; that they had everything to hope from his friendship, and
-everything to fear, even to the loss of all chance of safe return,
-from his hostility; that Tissaphernes, also, could gain nothing by
-destroying them, but would find them, if he chose, the best and most
-faithful instruments for his own aggrandizement and for conquering
-the Mysians and the Pisidians,—as Cyrus had experienced while he was
-alive. Klearchus concluded his protest by requesting to be informed,
-what malicious reporter had been filling the mind of Tissaphernes
-with causeless suspicions against the Greeks.[126]
-
-  [126] Xen. Anab. ii, 5, 2-15.
-
-“Klearchus (replied the satrap), I rejoice to hear such excellent
-sense from your lips. You remark truly, that if you were to meditate
-evil against me, it would recoil upon yourselves. I shall prove to
-you, in my turn, that you have no cause to mistrust either the king
-or me. If we had wished to destroy you, nothing would be easier. We
-have superabundant forces for the purpose; there are wide plains
-in which you would be starved,—besides mountains and rivers which
-you would be unable to pass, without our help. Having thus the
-means of destroying you in our hands, and having nevertheless bound
-ourselves by solemn oaths to save you, we shall not be fools and
-knaves enough to attempt it now, when we should draw upon ourselves
-the just indignation of the gods. It is my peculiar affection for my
-neighbors, the Greeks,—and my wish to attach to my own person, by
-ties of gratitude, the Greek soldiers of Cyrus,—which have made me
-eager to conduct you to Ionia in safety. For I know that when you are
-in my service, though the king is the only man who can wear his tiara
-erect _upon his head_, I shall be able to wear mine erect upon _my
-heart_, in full pride and confidence.”[127]
-
-  [127] Xen. Anab. ii, 5, 17-23. This last comparison is curious,
-  and in all probability the genuine words of the satrap—τὴν μὲν
-  γὰρ ἐπὶ τῇ κεφαλῇ τιάραν βασιλεῖ μόνῳ ἔξεστιν ὀρθὴν ἔχειν, τὴν δ᾽
-  ἐπὶ τῇ καρδίᾳ ἴσως ἂν ὑμῶν παρόντων καὶ ἕτερος εὐπετῶς ἔχοι.
-
-So powerful was the impression made upon Klearchus by these
-assurances, that he exclaimed,—“Surely those informers deserve the
-severest punishment, who try to put us at enmity, when we are such
-good friends to each other, and have so much reason to be so.” “Yes
-(replied Tissaphernes), they deserve nothing less; and if you, with
-the other generals and lochages, will come into my tent to-morrow, I
-will tell you who the calumniators are.” “To-be-sure I will (rejoined
-Klearchus), and bring the other generals with me. I shall tell you at
-the same time, who are the parties that seek to prejudice us against
-you.” The conversation then ended, the satrap detaining Klearchus
-to dinner, and treating him in the most hospitable and confidential
-manner.
-
-On the next morning, Klearchus communicated what had passed to the
-Greeks, insisting on the necessity that all the generals should go
-to Tissaphernes pursuant to his invitation; in order to reëstablish
-that confidence which unworthy calumniators had shaken, and to punish
-such of the calumniators as might be Greeks. So emphatically did
-he pledge himself for the good faith and philhellenic dispositions
-of the satrap, that he overruled the opposition of many among the
-soldiers; who, still continuing to entertain their former suspicions,
-remonstrated especially against the extreme imprudence of putting
-all the generals at once into the power of Tissaphernes. The urgency
-of Klearchus prevailed. Himself with four other generals,—Proxenus,
-Menon, Agias, and Sokrates,—and twenty lochages or captains,—went
-to visit the satrap in his tent; about two hundred of the soldiers
-going along with them, to make purchases for their own account in the
-Persian camp-market.[128]
-
-  [128] Xen. Anab. ii, 5, 30.
-
-On reaching the quarters of Tissaphernes,—distant nearly three
-miles from the Grecian camp, according to habit,—the five generals
-were admitted into the interior, while the lochages remained at
-the entrance. A purple flag, hoisted from the top of the tent,
-betrayed too late the purpose for which they had been invited to
-come. The lochages and the Grecian soldiers who had accompanied them
-were surprised and cut down, while the generals in the interior
-were detained, put in chains, and carried up as prisoners to the
-Persian court. Here Klearchus, Proxenus, Agias, and Sokrates were
-beheaded after a short imprisonment. Queen Parysatis, indeed, from
-affection to Cyrus, not only furnished many comforts to Klearchus
-in the prison, by the hands of her surgeon, Ktesias, but used all
-her influence with her son Artaxerxes to save his life; though
-her efforts were counteracted, on this occasion, by the superior
-influence of queen Stateira, his wife. The rivalry between these
-two royal women, doubtless arising out of many other circumstances
-besides the death of Klearchus, became soon afterwards so furious,
-that Parysatis caused Stateira to be poisoned.[129]
-
-  [129] Xen. Anab. ii, 6, 1. Ktesiæ Frag. Persica, c. 60, ed. Bähr;
-  Plutarch, Artaxerx. c. 19, 20; Diodor. xiv, 27.
-
-Menon was not put to death along with the other generals. He appears
-to have taken credit at the Persian court for the treason of
-entrapping his colleagues into the hands of Tissaphernes. But his
-life was only prolonged to perish a year afterwards in disgrace and
-torture,—probably by the requisition of Parysatis, who thus avenged
-the death of Klearchus. The queen-mother had always power enough to
-perpetrate cruelties, though not always to avert them.[130] She had
-already brought to a miserable end every one, even faithful defenders
-of Artaxerxes, concerned in the death of her son Cyrus.
-
-  [130] Tacit. Histor. i, 45. “Othoni nondum auctoritas inerat ad
-  _prohibendum_ scelus; _jubere_ jam poterat. Ita, simulatione
-  iræ, vinciri jussum (Marium Celsum) et majores pœnas daturum,
-  affirmans, præsenti exitio subtraxit.”
-
-  Ktesias (Persica, c. 60; compare Plutarch and Diodorus as
-  referred to in the preceding note) attests the treason of Menon,
-  which he probably derived from the story of Menon himself.
-  Xenophon mentions the ignominious death of Menon, and he probably
-  derived his information from Ktesias (see Anabasis, ii, 6, 29).
-
-  The supposition that it was Parysatis who procured the death
-  of Menon, in itself highly probable, renders all the different
-  statements consistent and harmonious.
-
-Though Menon thought it convenient, when brought up to Babylon, to
-boast of having been the instrument through whom the generals were
-entrapped into the fatal tent, this boast is not to be treated as
-matter of fact. For not only does Xenophon explain the catastrophe
-differently, but in the delineation which he gives of Menon, dark
-and odious as it is in the extreme, he does not advance any such
-imputation; indirectly, indeed, he sets it aside.[131] Unfortunately
-for the reputation of Klearchus, no such reasonable excuse can be
-offered for his credulity, which brought himself as well as his
-colleagues to so melancholy an end, and his whole army to the brink
-of ruin. It appears that the general sentiment of the Grecian army,
-taking just measure of the character of Tissaphernes, was disposed
-to greater circumspection in dealing with him. Upon that system
-Klearchus himself had hitherto acted; and the necessity of it might
-have been especially present to _his_ mind, since he had served with
-the Lacedæmonian fleet at Miletus in 411 B.C., and had, therefore,
-had fuller experience than other men in the army, of the satrap’s
-real character.[132] On a sudden he now turns round, and on the faith
-of a few verbal declarations, puts all the military chiefs into the
-most defenceless posture and the most obvious peril, such as hardly
-the strongest grounds for confidence could have justified. Though
-the remark of Machiavel is justified by large experience,—that
-from the short-sightedness of men and their obedience to present
-impulse, the most notorious deceiver will always find new persons
-to trust him,—still such misjudgment on the part of an officer of
-age and experience is difficult to explain.[133] Polyænus intimates
-that beautiful women, exhibited by the satrap at his first banquet
-to Klearchus alone, served as a lure to attract him with all his
-colleagues to the second; while Xenophon imputes the error to
-continuance of a jealous rivalry with Menon. The latter,[134] it
-appears, having always been intimate with Ariæus, had been thus
-brought into previous communication with Tissaphernes, by whom he had
-been well received, and by whom he was also encouraged to lay plans
-for detaching the whole Grecian army from Klearchus, so as to bring
-it all under his (Menon’s) command, into the service of the satrap.
-Such at least was the suspicion of Klearchus; who, jealous in the
-extreme of his own military authority, tried to defeat the scheme by
-bidding still higher himself for the favor of Tissaphernes. Imagining
-that Menon was the unknown calumniator who prejudiced the satrap
-against him, he hoped to prevail on the satrap to disclose his name
-and dismiss him.[135] Such jealousy seems to have robbed Klearchus
-of his customary prudence. We must also allow for another impression
-deeply fixed in his mind; that the salvation of the army was hopeless
-without the consent of Tissaphernes, and, therefore, since the latter
-had conducted them thus far in safety, when he might have destroyed
-them before, that his designs at the bottom could not be hostile.[136]
-
-  [131] Xenophon seems to intimate that there were various stories
-  current, which he does not credit, to the disparagement of
-  Menon,—καὶ τὰ μὲν δὴ ἀφανῆ ἔξεστι περὶ αὐτοῦ ψεύδεσθαι, etc.
-  (Anab. ii, 6, 28).
-
-  Athenæus (xi, p. 505) erroneously states that Xenophon affirmed
-  Menon to be the person who caused the destruction of Klearchus by
-  Tissaphernes.
-
-  [132] Xenophon in the Cyropædia (viii, 8, 3) gives a strange
-  explanation of the imprudent confidence reposed by Klearchus in
-  the assurance of the Persian satrap. It arose (he says) from the
-  high reputation for good faith which the Persians had acquired
-  by the undeviating and scrupulous honor of the first Cyrus (or
-  Cyrus the Great), but which they had since ceased to deserve,
-  though the corruption of their character had not before publicly
-  manifested itself.
-
-  This is a curious perversion of history to serve the purpose of
-  his romance.
-
-  [133] Macciavelli, Principe, c. 18, p. 65.
-
-  [134] Polyæn. vii, 18.
-
-  [135] Xen. Anab. ii, 5, 27, 28.
-
-  [136] Compare Anab. ii, 4, 6, 7; ii, 5, 9.
-
-Notwithstanding these two great mistakes,—one on the present
-occasion, one previously, at the battle of Kunaxa, in keeping the
-Greeks on the right contrary to the order of Cyrus,—both committed
-by Klearchus, the loss of that officer was doubtless a great
-misfortune to the army; while, on the contrary, the removal of Menon
-was a signal benefit,—perhaps a condition of ultimate safety. A man
-so treacherous and unprincipled as Xenophon depicts Menon, would
-probably have ended by really committing towards the army that
-treason, for which he falsely took credit at the Persian court in
-reference to the seizure of the generals.
-
-The impression entertained by Klearchus, respecting the hopeless
-position of the Greeks in the heart of the Persian territory after
-the death of Cyrus, was perfectly natural in a military man who could
-appreciate all the means of attack and obstruction which the enemy
-had it in their power to employ. Nothing is so unaccountable in this
-expedition as the manner in which such means were thrown away,—the
-spectacle of Persian impotence. First, the whole line of upward
-march, including the passage of the Euphrates, left undefended; next,
-the long trench dug across the frontier of Babylonia, with only
-a passage of twenty feet wide left near the Euphrates, abandoned
-without a guard; lastly, the line of the Wall of Media and the canals
-which offered such favorable positions for keeping the Greeks out
-of the cultivated territory of Babylonia, neglected in like manner,
-and a convention concluded, whereby the Persians engaged to escort
-the invaders safe to the Ionian coast, beginning by conducting them
-through the heart of Babylonia, amidst canals affording inexpugnable
-defences if the Greeks had chosen to take up a position among them.
-The plan of Tissaphernes, as far as we can understand it, seems to
-have been, to draw the Greeks to some considerable distance from
-the heart of the Persian empire, and then to open his schemes of
-treasonable hostility, which the imprudence of Klearchus enabled
-him to do, on the banks of the Great Zab, with chances of success
-such as he could hardly have contemplated. We have here a fresh
-example of the wonderful impotence of the Persians. We should have
-expected that, after having committed so flagrant an act of perfidy,
-Tissaphernes would at least have tried to turn it to account; that
-he would have poured, with all his forces and all his vigor, on the
-Grecian camp, at the moment when it was unprepared, disorganized,
-and without commanders. Instead of which, when the generals (with
-those who accompanied them to the Persian camp) had been seized or
-slain, no attack whatever was made except by small detachments of
-Persian cavalry upon individual Greek stragglers in the plain. One
-of the companions of the generals, an Arcadian named Nikarchus, ran
-wounded into the Grecian camp, where the soldiers were looking from
-afar at the horsemen scouring the plain without knowing what they
-were about,—exclaiming that the Persians were massacring all the
-Greeks, officers as well as soldiers. Immediately the Greek soldiers
-hastened to put themselves in defence, expecting a general attack
-to be made upon their camp; but no more Persians came near than a
-body of about three hundred horse, under Ariæus and Mithridates
-(the confidential companions of the deceased Cyrus), accompanied by
-the brother of Tissaphernes. These men, approaching the Greek lines
-as friends, called for the Greek officers to come forth, as they
-had a message to deliver from the king. Accordingly, Kleanor and
-Sophænetus, with an adequate guard, came to the front, accompanied by
-Xenophon, who was anxious to hear news about Proxenus. Ariæus then
-acquainted them that Klearchus, having been detected in a breach of
-the convention to which he had sworn, had been put to death; that
-Proxenus and Menon, who had divulged his treason, were in high honor
-at the Persian quarters. He concluded by saying,—the king calls upon
-you to surrender your arms, which now (he says) belong to him, since
-they formerly belonged to his slave Cyrus.[137]
-
-  [137] Xen. Anab. ii, 5, 37, 38.
-
-The step here taken seems to testify a belief on the part of these
-Persians, that the generals being now in their power, the Grecian
-soldiers had become defenceless, and might be required to surrender
-their arms, even to men who had just been guilty of the most deadly
-fraud and injury towards them. If Ariæus entertained such an
-expectation, he was at once undeceived by the language of Kleanor and
-Xenophon, who breathed nothing but indignant reproach; so that he
-soon retired and left the Greeks to their own reflections.
-
-While their camp thus remained unmolested, every man within it was a
-prey to the most agonizing apprehensions. Ruin appeared impending and
-inevitable, though no one could tell in what precise form it would
-come. The Greeks were in the midst of a hostile country, ten thousand
-stadia from home, surrounded by enemies, blocked up by impassable
-mountains and rivers, without guides, without provisions, without
-cavalry to aid their retreat, without generals to give orders. A
-stupor of sorrow and conscious helplessness seized upon all. Few came
-to the evening muster; few lighted fires to cook their suppers; every
-man lay down to rest where he was; yet no man could sleep, for fear,
-anguish, and yearning after relatives whom he was never again to
-behold.[138]
-
-[138] Xen. Anab. iii, 1, 2, 3.
-
-Amidst the many causes of despondency which weighed down this forlorn
-army, there was none more serious than the fact, that not a single
-man among them had now either authority to command, or obligation
-to take the initiative. Nor was any ambitious candidate likely
-to volunteer his pretensions, at a moment when the post promised
-nothing but the maximum of difficulty as well as of hazard. A new,
-self-kindled, light—and self-originated stimulus—was required, to
-vivify the embers of suspended hope and action, in a mass paralyzed
-for the moment, but every way capable of effort. And the inspiration
-now fell, happily for the army, upon one in whom a full measure of
-soldierly strength and courage was combined with the education of an
-Athenian, a democrat, and a philosopher.
-
-It is in true Homeric vein, and in something like Homeric language,
-that Xenophon (to whom we owe the whole narrative of the expedition)
-describes his dream, or the intervention of Oneirus, sent by Zeus,
-from which this renovating impulse took its rise.[139] Lying mournful
-and restless, like his comrades, he caught a short repose; when
-he dreamt that he heard thunder, and saw the burning thunder-bolt
-fall upon his paternal house, which became forthwith encircled by
-flames. Awaking, full of terror, he instantly sprang up; upon which
-the dream began to fit on and blend itself with his waking thoughts,
-and with the cruel realities of his position. His pious and excited
-fancy generated a series of shadowy analogies. The dream was sent by
-Zeus[140] the King, since it was from him that thunder and lightning
-proceeded. In one respect, the sign was auspicious,—that a great
-light had appeared to him from Zeus, in the midst of peril and
-suffering. But on the other hand, it was alarming, that the house had
-appeared to be completely encircled by flames, preventing all egress,
-because this seemed to indicate that he would remain confined where
-he was in the Persian dominions, without being able to overcome the
-difficulties which hedged him in. Yet doubtful as the promise was,
-it was still the message of Zeus addressed to himself, serving as
-a stimulus to him to break through the common stupor and take the
-initiative movement.[141] “Why am I lying here? Night is advancing;
-at daybreak the enemy will be on us, and we shall be put to death
-with tortures. Not a man is stirring to take measures of defence.
-Why do I wait for any man older than myself, or for any man of a
-different city, to begin?”
-
-  [139] Xen. Anab. iii, 1, 4-11. Ἦν δέ τις ἐν τῇ στρατιᾷ Ξενοφῶν
-  Ἀθηναῖος, ὃς οὔτε στρατηγὸς, etc.
-
-  Homer, Iliad, v, 9—
-
-    Ἦν δέ τις ἐν Τρώεσσι Δάρης, ἀφνεῖος, ἀμύμων,
-    Ἱρεὺς Ἡφαίστοιο, etc.
-
-  Compare the description of Zeus sending Oneirus to the sleeping
-  Agamemnon, at the beginning of the second book of the Iliad.
-
-  [140] Respecting the value of a sign from Zeus Basileus, and the
-  necessity of conciliating him, compare various passages in the
-  Cyropædia, ii, 4, 19; iii, 3, 21; vii, 5, 57.
-
-  [141] Xen. Anab. iii, 1, 12, 13. Περίφοβος δ᾽ εὐθὺς ἀνηγέρθη, καὶ
-  τὸ ὄναρ τῆ μὲν ἔκρινεν ἀγαθόν, ὅτι ἐν πόνοις ὢν καὶ κινδύνοις
-  φῶς μέγα ἐκ Διὸς ἰδεῖν ἔδοξε, etc. ... Ὁποῖον τι μὲν δή ἐστι τὸ
-  τοιοῦτον ὄναρ ἰδεῖν, ἔξεστι σκοπεῖν ἐκ τῶν συμβάντων μετὰ τὸ
-  ὄναρ. Γίγνεται γὰρ τάδε. Εὐθὺς ἐπειδὴ ἀνηγέρθη, πρῶτον μὲν ἔννοια
-  αὐτῷ ἐμπίπτει· Τί κατάκειμαι; ἡ δὲ νὺξ προβαίνει· ἅμα δὲ τῇ ἡμέρᾳ
-  εἰκὸς τοὺς πολεμίους ἥξειν, etc.
-
-  The reader of Homer will readily recall various passages in the
-  Iliad and Odyssey, wherein the like mental talk is put into
-  language and expanded,—such as Iliad, xi, 403—and several other
-  passages cited or referred to in Colonel Mure’s History of the
-  Language and Literature of Greece, ch. xiv, vol. ii, p. 25 _seq._
-
-  A vision of light shining brightly out of a friendly house,
-  counts for a favorable sign (Plutarch, De Genio Socratis, p. 587
-  C.).
-
-With these reflections, interesting in themselves and given with
-Homeric vivacity, he instantly went to convene the lochagi or
-captains who had served under his late friend Proxenus; and impressed
-upon them emphatically the necessity of standing forward to put the
-army in a posture of defence. “I cannot sleep, gentlemen; neither, I
-presume, can you, under our present perils. The enemy will be upon
-us at daybreak,—prepared to kill us all with tortures, as his worst
-enemies. For my part, I rejoice that his flagitious perjury has put
-an end to a truce by which we were the great losers; a truce under
-which we, mindful of our oaths, have passed through all the rich
-possessions of the king, without touching anything except what we
-could purchase with our own scanty means. Now, we have our hands
-free; all these rich spoils stand between us and him, as prizes for
-the better man. The gods, who preside over the match, will assuredly
-be on the side of us, who have kept our oaths in spite of strong
-temptations, against these perjurers. Moreover, our bodies are more
-enduring, and our spirits more gallant, than theirs. They are easier
-to wound, and easier to kill, than we are, under the same favor of
-the gods as we experienced at Kunaxa.
-
-“Probably others also are feeling just as we feel. But let us not
-wait for any one else to come as monitors to us; let us take the
-lead, and communicate the stimulus of honor to others. Do you show
-yourselves now the best among the lochages,—more worthy of being
-generals than the generals themselves. Begin at once, and I desire
-only to follow you. But if you order me into the front rank, I shall
-obey without pleading my youth as an excuse,—accounting myself of
-complete maturity, when the purpose is to save myself from ruin.”[142]
-
-  [142] Xen. Anab. iii, 1, 16, 25.
-
-  “Vel imperatore, vel milite, me utemini.” (Sallust, Bellum
-  Catilinar. c. 20).
-
-All the captains who heard Xenophon cordially concurred in
-his suggestion, and desired him to take the lead in executing
-it. One captain alone,—Apollonides, speaking in the Bœotian
-dialect,—protested against it as insane; enlarging upon their
-desperate position, and insisting upon submission to the king, as the
-only chance of safety. “How (replied Xenophon)? Have you forgotten
-the courteous treatment which we received from the Persians in
-Babylonia, when we replied to their demand for the surrender of our
-arms by showing a bold front? Do not you see the miserable fate which
-has befallen Klearchus, when he trusted himself unarmed in their
-hands, in reliance on their oaths? And yet you scout our exhortations
-to resistance, again advising us to go and plead for indulgence! My
-friends, such a Greek as this man, disgraces not only his own city,
-but all Greece besides. Let us banish him from our counsels, cashier
-him, and make a slave of him to carry baggage.”—“Nay (observed
-Agasias of Stymphalus), the man has nothing to do with Greece; I
-myself have seen his ears bored, like a true Lydian.” Apollonides was
-degraded accordingly.[143]
-
-  [143] Xen. Anab. iii, 1, 26-30. It would appear from the words
-  of Xenophon, that Apollonides had been one of those who had held
-  faint-hearted language (ὑπομαλακιζόμενοι, ii, 1, 14) in the
-  conversation with Phalinus shortly after the death of Cyrus.
-  Hence Xenophon tells him, that this is the second time of his
-  offering such advice—Ἃ σὺ πάντα εἰδὼς, τοὺς μὲν ἀμύνασθαι
-  κελεύοντας φλυαρεῖν φῂς, ~πείθειν δὲ πάλιν κελεύεις ἰόντας~;
-
-  This helps to explain the contempt and rigor with which Xenophon
-  here treats him. Nothing indeed could be more deplorable, under
-  the actual circumstances, than for a man “to show his acuteness
-  by summing up the perils around.” See the remarkable speech of
-  Demosthenes at Pylos (Thucyd. iv, 10).
-
-Xenophon with the rest then distributed themselves in order to bring
-together the chief remaining officers in the army, who were presently
-convened, to the number of about one hundred. The senior captain of
-the earlier body next desired Xenophon to repeat to this larger body
-the topics upon which he had just before been insisting. Xenophon
-obeyed, enlarging yet more emphatically on the situation, perilous,
-yet not without hope,—on the proper measures to be taken,—and
-especially on the necessity that they, the chief officers remaining,
-should put themselves forward prominently, first fix upon effective
-commanders, then afterwards submit the names to be confirmed by the
-army, accompanied with suitable exhortations and encouragement. His
-speech was applauded and welcomed, especially by the Lacedæmonian
-general Cheirisophus, who had joined Cyrus with a body of seven
-hundred hoplites at Issus in Kilikia. Cheirisophus urged the captains
-to retire forthwith, and agree upon other commanders instead of the
-four who had been seized; after which the herald must be summoned,
-and the entire body of soldiers convened without delay. Accordingly
-Timasion of Dardanus was chosen instead of Klearchus; Xanthiklês in
-place of Sokrates; Kleanor in place of Agias; Philesius in place
-of Menon; and Xenophon instead of Proxenus.[144] The captains, who
-had served under each of the departed generals, separately chose a
-successor to the captain thus promoted. It is to be recollected that
-the five now chosen were not the only generals in the camp; thus for
-example, Cheirisophus had the command of his own separate division,
-and there may have been one or two others similarly placed. But it
-was now necessary for all the generals to form a Board and act in
-concert.
-
-  [144] Xen. Anab. iii, 1, 36-46.
-
-At daybreak the newly constituted Board of generals placed proper
-outposts in advance, and then convened the army in general assembly,
-in order that the new appointments might be submitted and confirmed.
-As soon as this had been done, probably on the proposition of
-Cheirisophus (who had been in command before), that general addressed
-a few words of exhortation and encouragement to the soldiers. He was
-followed by Kleanor, who delivered, with the like brevity, an earnest
-protest against the perfidy of Tissaphernes and Ariæus. Both of
-them left to Xenophon the task, alike important and arduous at this
-moment of despondency, of setting forth the case at length,—working
-up the feelings of the soldiers to that pitch of resolution which
-the emergency required,—and above all, extinguishing all those
-inclinations to acquiesce in new treacherous proposals from the
-enemy, which the perils of the situation would be likely to suggest.
-
-Xenophon had equipped himself in his finest military costume at this
-his first official appearance before the army, when the scales seemed
-to tremble between life and death. Taking up the protest of Kleanor
-against the treachery of the Persians, he insisted that any attempt
-to enter into convention or trust with such liars, would be utter
-ruin,—but that if energetic resolution were taken to deal with them
-only at the point of the sword, and punish their misdeeds, there was
-good hope of the favor of the gods and of ultimate preservation. As
-he pronounced this last word, one of the soldiers near him happened
-to sneeze. Immediately the whole army around shouted with one accord
-the accustomed invocation to Zeus the Preserver; and Xenophon, taking
-up the accident, continued,—“Since, gentlemen, this omen from Zeus
-the Preserver has appeared at the instant when we were talking about
-preservation, let us here vow to offer the preserving sacrifice to
-that god, and at the same time to sacrifice to the remaining gods as
-well as we can, in the first friendly country which we may reach. Let
-every man who agrees with me, hold up his hand.” All held up their
-hands; all then joined in the vow, and shouted the pæan.
-
-This accident, so dexterously turned to profit by the rhetorical
-skill of Xenophon, was eminently beneficial in raising the army out
-of the depression which weighed them down, and in disposing them to
-listen to his animating appeal. Repeating his assurances that the
-gods were on their side, and hostile to their perjured enemy, he
-recalled to their memory the great invasions of Greece by Darius
-and Xerxes,—how the vast hosts of Persia had been disgracefully
-repelled. The army had shown themselves on the field of Kunaxa worthy
-of such forefathers; and they would for the future be yet bolder,
-knowing by that battle of what stuff the Persians were made. As for
-Ariæus and his troops, alike traitors and cowards, their desertion
-was rather a gain than a loss. The enemy were superior in horsemen;
-but men on horseback were, after all, only men, half-occupied in the
-fear of losing their seats,—incapable of prevailing against infantry
-firm on the ground,—and only better able to run away. Now that the
-satrap refused to furnish them with provisions to buy, they on their
-side were released from their covenant, and would take provisions
-without buying. Then as to the rivers; those were indeed difficult
-to be crossed in the middle of their course; but the army would
-march up to their sources, and could then pass them without wetting
-the knee. Or indeed, the Greeks might renounce the idea of retreat,
-and establish themselves permanently in the king’s own country,
-defying all his force, like the Mysians and Pisidians. “If (said
-Xenophon) we plant ourselves here at our ease in a rich country, with
-these tall, stately, and beautiful Median and Persian women for our
-companions,[145]—we shall be only too ready, like the Lotophagi,
-to forget our way home. We ought first to go back to Greece, and
-tell our countrymen that if they remain poor, it is their own fault,
-when there are rich settlements in this country awaiting all who
-choose to come, and who have courage to seize them. Let us burn our
-baggage-waggons and tents, and carry with us nothing but what is of
-the strictest necessity. Above all things, let us maintain order,
-discipline, and obedience to the commanders, upon which our entire
-hope of safety depends. Let every man promise to lend his hand to
-the commanders in punishing any disobedient individuals; and let us
-thus show the enemy that we have ten thousand persons like Klearchus,
-instead of that one whom they have so perfidiously seized. Now is the
-time for action. If any man, however obscure, has anything better to
-suggest, let him come forward and state it; for we have all but one
-object,—the common safety.”
-
-  [145] Xen. Anab. iii, 2, 25.
-
-  Ἀλλὰ γὰρ δέδοικα μή ἂν ἅπαξ μάθωμεν ἀργοὶ ζῆν καὶ ἐν ἀφθόνοις
-  βιοτεύειν, καὶ Μήδων δὲ καὶ Περσῶν ~καλαῖς καὶ μεγάλαις γυναιξὶ
-  καὶ παρθένοις ὁμιλεῖν~, μὴ ὥσπερ οἱ λωτοφάγοι, ἐπιλαθώμεθα τῆς
-  οἴκαδε ὁδοῦ.
-
-  Hippokrates (De Aëre, Locis, et Aquis, c. 12) compares the
-  physical characteristics of Asiatics and Europeans, noticing the
-  ample, full-grown, rounded, voluptuous, but inactive forms of
-  the first,—as contrasted with the more compact, muscular, and
-  vigorous type of the second, trained for movement, action, and
-  endurance.
-
-  Dio Chrysostom has a curious passage, in reference to the Persian
-  preference for eunuchs as slaves, remarking that they admired
-  even in males an approach to the type of feminine beauty,—their
-  eyes and tastes being under the influence only of aphrodisiac
-  ideas; whereas the Greeks, accustomed to the constant training
-  and naked exercises of the palæstra, boys competing with boys and
-  youths with youths, had their associations of the male beauty
-  attracted towards active power and graceful motion.
-
-  Οὐ γὰρ φανερὸν, ὅτι οἱ Πέρσαι εὐνούχους ἐποίουν τοὺς καλοὺς, ὅπως
-  αὐτοῖς ὡς κάλλιστοι ὦσι; Τοσοῦτον διαφέρειν ᾤοντο πρὸς κάλλος τὸ
-  θῆλυ· σχεδὸν καὶ πάντες οἱ βάρβαροι, διὰ τὸ μόνον τὰ ἀφροδίσια
-  ἐννοεῖν. Κἀκεῖνοι γυναικός εἰδος περιτιθέασι τοῖς ἄῤῥεσιν, ἄλλως
-  δ᾽ οὐκ ἐπίστανται ἐρᾷν· ἴσως δὲ καὶ ἡ τροφὴ αἰτία τοῖς Πέρσαις,
-  τῷ μέχρι πολλοῦ τρέφεσθαι ὑπό τε γυναικῶν καὶ εὐνούχων τῶν
-  πρεσβυτέρων· παῖδας δὲ μετὰ παιδῶν, καὶ μειράκια μετὰ μειρακίων
-  μὴ πάνυ συνεῖναι, μηδὲ γυμνοῦσθαι ἐν παλαίστραις καὶ γυμνασίοις,
-  etc. (Orat. xxi, p. 270).
-
-  Compare Euripides, Bacchæ, 447 _seq._; and the Epigram of Strato
-  in the Anthologia, xxxiv, vol. ii, p. 367 Brunck.
-
-It appears that no one else desired to say a word, and that
-the speech of Xenophon gave unqualified satisfaction; for when
-Cheirisophus put the question, that the meeting should sanction his
-recommendations, and finally elect the new generals proposed,—every
-man held up his hand. Xenophon then moved that the army should break
-up immediately, and march to some well-stored villages, rather more
-than two miles distant; that the march should be in a hollow oblong,
-with the baggage in the centre; that Cheirisophus, as a Lacedæmonian,
-should lead the van; while Kleanor, and the other senior officers,
-would command on each flank,—and himself with Timasion, as the two
-youngest of the generals, would lead the rear-guard.
-
-This proposition was at once adopted, and the assembly broke up,
-proceeding forthwith to destroy, or distribute among one another,
-every man’s superfluous baggage,—and then to take their morning meal
-previous to the march.
-
-The scene just described is interesting and illustrative in more
-than one point of view.[146] It exhibits that susceptibility to the
-influence of persuasive discourse which formed so marked a feature
-in the Grecian character,—a resurrection of the collective body out
-of the depth of despair, under the exhortation of one who had no
-established ascendency, nor anything to recommend him, except his
-intelligence, his oratorical power, and his community of interest
-with themselves. Next, it manifests, still more strikingly, the
-superiority of Athenian training as compared with that of other parts
-of Greece. Cheirisophus had not only been before in office as one
-of the generals, but was also a native of Sparta, whose supremacy
-and name was at that moment all-powerful. Kleanor had been before,
-not indeed a general, but a lochage, or one in the second rank of
-officers;—he was an elderly man,—and he was an Arcadian, while
-more than the numerical half of the army consisted of Arcadians and
-Achæans. Either of these two, therefore, and various others besides,
-enjoyed a sort of prerogative, or established starting-point,
-for taking the initiative in reference to the dispirited army.
-But Xenophon was comparatively a young man, with little military
-experience;—he was not an officer at all, either in the first or
-second grade, but simply a volunteer, companion of Proxenus;—he was,
-moreover, a native of Athens, a city at that time unpopular among
-the great body of Greeks, and especially of Peloponnesians, with
-whom her recent long war had been carried on. Not only, therefore,
-he had no advantages compared with others, but he was under positive
-disadvantages. He had nothing to start with except his personal
-qualities and previous training; in spite of which we find him not
-merely the prime mover, but also the ascendent person for whom the
-others make way. In him are exemplified those peculiarities of
-Athens, attested not less by the denunciation of her enemies than
-by the panegyric of her own citizens,[147]—spontaneous and forward
-impulse, as well in conception as in execution,—confidence under
-circumstances which made others despair,—persuasive discourse and
-publicity of discussion, made subservient to practical business,
-so as at once to appeal to the intelligence, and stimulate the
-active zeal, of the multitude. Such peculiarities stood out more
-remarkably from being contrasted with the opposite qualities in
-Spartans,—mistrust in conception, slackness in execution, secrecy in
-counsel, silent and passive obedience. Though Spartans and Athenians
-formed the two extremities of the scale, other Greeks stood nearer on
-this point to the former than to the latter.
-
-  [146] A very meagre abstract is given by Diodorus, of that which
-  passed after the seizure of the generals (xiv, 27). He does
-  not mention the name of Xenophon on this occasion, nor indeed
-  throughout all his account of the march.
-
-  [147] Compare the hostile speech of the Corinthian envoy at
-  Sparta, prior to the Peloponnesian war, with the eulogistic
-  funeral oration of Perikles, in the second year of that war
-  (Thucyd. i, 70, 71; ii, 39, 40).
-
-  Οἱ μέν γε (εἰσὶ), νεωτεροποιοὶ (description of the Athenians by
-  the Corinthian speaker) ~καὶ ἐπινοῆσαι ὀξεῖς καὶ ἐπιτελέσαι ἔργῳ
-  ἃ ἂν γνῶσιν~· ὑμεῖς δὲ (Lacedæmonians), τὰ ὑπάρχοντά τε σώζειν
-  καὶ ἐπιγνῶναι μηδὲν, καὶ ἔργῳ οὐδὲ τἀναγκαῖα ἐξικέσθαι. Αὖθις δὲ,
-  οἱ μὲν, καὶ παρὰ δύναμιν τολμηταὶ καὶ παρὰ γνώμην κινδυνευταὶ καὶ
-  ἐπὶ τοῖς δεινοῖς εὐέλπιδες· τὸ δὲ ὑμέτερον, τῆς τεδυνάμεως ἐνδεᾶ
-  πρᾶξαι, τῆς τε γνώμης μηδὲ τοῖς βεβαίοις πιστεῦσαι, τῶν τε δεινῶν
-  μηδέποτε οἴεσθαι ἀπολυθήσεσθαι. Καὶ μὴν καὶ ἄοκνοι πρὸς ὑμᾶς
-  μελλήτας, καὶ ἀποδημηταὶ πρὸς ἐνδημοτάτους, etc.
-
-  Again, in the oration of Perikles—Καὶ αὐτοὶ ἤτοι κρίνομεν ἢ
-  ἐνθυμούμεθα ὀρθῶς τὰ πράγματα, οὐ τοὺς λόγους τοῖς ἔργοις βλάβην
-  ἡγούμενοι, ἀλλὰ μὴ προδιδαχθῆναι μᾶλλον λόγῳ, πρότερον ἢ ἐπὶ ἃ
-  δεῖ ἔργῳ ἐλθεῖν. Διαφερόντως μὲν δὴ καὶ τόδε ἔχομεν, ~ὥστε τολμᾷν
-  τε οἱ αὐτοὶ μάλιστα καὶ περὶ ὧν ἐπιχειρήσομεν ἐκλογίζεσθαι~· ὃ
-  τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀμαθία μὲν θράσος, λογισμὸς δὲ ὄκνον, φέρει.
-
-If, even in that encouraging autumn which followed immediately
-upon the great Athenian catastrophe before Syracuse, the inertia
-of Sparta could not be stirred into vigorous action without the
-vehemence of the Athenian Alkibiades,—much more was it necessary
-under the depressing circumstances which now overclouded the
-unofficered Grecian army, that an Athenian bosom should be found as
-the source of new life and impulse. Nor would any one, probably,
-except an Athenian, either have felt or obeyed the promptings to
-stand forward as a volunteer at that moment, when there was every
-motive to decline responsibility, and no special duty to impel him.
-But if by chance, a Spartan or an Arcadian had been found thus
-forward, he would have been destitute of such talents as would
-enable him to work on the minds of others[148]—of that flexibility,
-resource, familiarity with the temper and movements of an assembled
-crowd, power of enforcing the essential views and touching the
-opportune chords, which Athenian democratical training imparted.
-Even Brasidas and Gylippus, individual Spartans of splendid merit,
-and equal or superior to Xenophon in military resource, would not
-have combined with it that political and rhetorical accomplishment
-which the position of the latter demanded. Obvious as the wisdom
-of his propositions appears, each of them is left to him not only
-to imitate, but to enforce;—Cheirisophus and Kleanor, after a few
-words of introduction, consign to him the duty of working up the
-minds of the army to the proper pitch. How well he performed this,
-may be seen by his speech to the army, which bears in its general
-tenor a remarkable resemblance to that of Perikles addressed to the
-Athenian public in the second year of the war, at the moment when
-the miseries of the epidemic, combined with those of invasion, had
-driven them almost to despair. It breathes a strain of exaggerated
-confidence, and an undervaluing of real dangers, highly suitable
-for the occasion, but which neither Perikles nor Xenophon would
-have employed at any other moment.[149] Throughout the whole of his
-speech, and especially in regard to the accidental sneeze near at
-hand which interrupted the beginning of it, Xenophon displayed that
-skill and practice in dealing with a numerous audience and a given
-situation, which characterized more or less every educated Athenian.
-Other Greeks, Lacedæmonians or Arcadians, could act, with bravery
-and in concert; but the Athenian Xenophon was among the few who
-could think, speak, and act, with equal efficiency.[150] It was this
-tripartite accomplishment which an aspiring youth was compelled to
-set before himself as an aim, in the democracy of Athens, and which
-the sophists as well as the democratical institutions, both of them
-so hardly depreciated, helped and encouraged him to acquire. It was
-this tripartite accomplishment, the exclusive possession of which,
-in spite of constant jealousy on the part of Bœotian officers and
-comrades of Proxenus,[151] elevated Xenophon into the most ascendent
-person of the Cyreian army, from the present moment until the time
-when it broke up,—as will be seen in the subsequent history.
-
-  [148] Compare the observations of Perikles, in his last speech
-  to the Athenians about the inefficiency of the best thoughts, if
-  a man had not the power of setting them forth in an impressive
-  manner (Thucyd. ii, 60). Καίτοι ἐμοὶ τοιούτῳ ἀνδρὶ ὀργίζεσθε, ὃς
-  οὐδενὸς οἴομαι ἥσσων εἶναι ~γνῶναί τε τὰ δέοντα καὶ ἑρμηνεῦσαι
-  ταῦτα~, φιλόπολίς τε καὶ χρημάτων κρείττων· ὅ τε γὰρ γνοὺς καὶ μὴ
-  σαφῶς διδάξας, ἐν ἵσῳ καὶ εἰ μὴ ἐνεθυμήθη, etc.
-
-  The philosopher and the statesman at Athens here hold the same
-  language. It was the opinion of Sokrates—μόνους ἀξίους εἶναι
-  τιμῆς ~τοὺς εἰδότας τὰ δέοντα, καὶ ἑρμηνεῦσαι δυναμένους~
-  (Xenoph. Mem. i, 2, 52).
-
-  A striking passage in the funeral harangue of Lysias (Orat. ii,
-  Epitaph. s. 19) sets forth the prevalent idea of the Athenian
-  democracy—authoritative law, with persuasive and instructive
-  speech, as superseding mutual violence (νόμος and λόγος, as the
-  antithesis of βία). Compare a similar sentiment in Isokrates (Or.
-  iv, (Panegyr.) s. 53-56).
-
-  [149] See the speech of Perikles (Thuc. ii, 60-64). He justifies
-  the boastful tone of it, by the unwonted depression against which
-  he had to contend on the part of his hearers—Δελώσω δὲ καὶ
-  τόδε ὅ μοι δοκεῖτε οὔτ᾽ αὐτοὶ πώποτε ἐνθυμηθῆναι ὑπάρχον ὑμῖν
-  μεγέθους περὶ ἐς τὴν ἀρχὴν οὔτ᾽ ἐγὼ ἐν τοῖς πρὶν λόγοις, ~οὐδ᾽
-  ἂν νῦν ἐχρησάμην κομπωδεστέραν ἔχοντι τὴν προσποίησιν, εἰ μὴ
-  καταπεπληγμένους ὑμᾶς παρὰ τὸ εἰκὸς ἑώρων~.
-
-  This is also the proper explanation of Xenophon’s tone.
-
-  [150] In a passage of the Cyropædia (v. 5, 46), Xenophon sets
-  forth in a striking manner the combination of the λεκτικὸς καὶ
-  πρακτικός—Ὥσπερ καὶ ὅταν μάχεσθαι δέῃ, ὁ πλείστους χειρωσάμενος
-  ἀλκιμώτατος δοξάζεται εἶναι, οὕτω καὶ ὅταν πεῖσαι δέῃ, ὁ
-  πλέιστους ὁμογνώμονας ἡμῖν ποιήσας οὗτος δικαίως ἂν ~λεκτικώτατος
-  καὶ πρακτικώτατος~ κρίνοιτο ἂν εἶναι. Μὴ μέντοι ὡς ~λόγον
-  ἡμῖν ἐπιδειξόμενοι, οἷον ἂν εἴποιτε πρὸς ἕκαστον αὐτῶν, τοῦτο
-  μελετᾶτε—ἀλλ᾽ ὡς τοὺς πεπεισμένους ὑφ᾽ ἑκάστου δήλους ἐσομένους
-  οἷς ἂν πράττωσιν, ὅυτω παρασκευάζεσθε~.
-
-  In describing the duties of a Hipparch or commander of the
-  cavalry, Xenophon also insists upon the importance of persuasive
-  speech, as a means of keeping up the active obedience of the
-  soldiers—Εἴς γε μὴν τὸ εὐπειθεῖς εἶναι τοὺς ἀρχομένους, μέγα μὲν
-  καὶ τὸ λόγῳ διδάσκειν, ὅσα ἀγαθὰ ἔνι ἐν τῷ πειθαρχεῖν, etc. (Xen.
-  Mag. Eq. i, 24).
-
-  [151] See Xenoph. Anab. v, 6, 25.
-
-I think it the more necessary to notice this fact,—that the
-accomplishments whereby Xenophon leaped on a sudden into such
-extraordinary ascendency, and rendered such eminent service to
-his army, were accomplishments belonging in an especial manner to
-the Athenian democracy and education,—because Xenophon himself
-has throughout his writings treated Athens not merely without the
-attachment of a citizen, but with feelings more like the positive
-antipathy of an exile. His sympathies are all in favor of the
-perpetual drill, the mechanical obedience, the secret government
-proceedings, the narrow and prescribed range of ideas, the silent
-and deferential demeanor, the methodical, though tardy, action—of
-Sparta. Whatever may be the justice of his preference, certain it
-is, that the qualities whereby he was himself enabled to contribute
-so much both to the rescue of the Cyreian army, and to his own
-reputation,—were Athenian far more than Spartan.
-
-While the Grecian army, after sanctioning the propositions of
-Xenophon, were taking their morning meal before they commenced
-their march, Mithridates, one of the Persians previously attached
-to Cyrus, appeared with a few horsemen on a mission of pretended
-friendship. But it was soon found out that his purposes were
-treacherous, and that he came merely to seduce individual soldiers
-to desertion,—with a few of whom he succeeded. Accordingly, the
-resolution was taken to admit no more heralds or envoys.
-
-Disembarrassed of superfluous baggage, and refreshed, the army
-now crossed the Great Zab River, and pursued their march on the
-other side, having their baggage and attendants in the centre, and
-Cheirisophus leading the van, with a select body of three hundred
-hoplites.[152] As no mention is made of a bridge, we are to presume
-that they forded the river,—which furnishes a ford (according to Mr.
-Ainsworth), still commonly used, at a place between thirty and forty
-miles from its junction with the Tigris. When they had got a little
-way forward, Mithridates again appeared with a few hundred cavalry
-and bowmen. He approached them like a friend; but as soon as he was
-near enough, suddenly began to harass the rear with a shower of
-missiles. What surprises us most, is, that the Persians, with their
-very numerous force, made no attempt to hinder them from crossing so
-very considerable a river; for Xenophon estimates the Zab at four
-hundred feet broad,—and this seems below the statement of modern
-travellers, who inform us that it contains not much less water than
-the Tigris; and though usually deeper and narrower, cannot be much
-narrower at any fordable place.[153] It is to be recollected that
-the Persians, habitually marching in advance of the Greeks, must
-have reached the river first, and were, therefore, in possession
-of the crossing, whether bridge or ford. Though on the watch for
-every opportunity of perfidy, Tissaphernes did not dare to resist
-the Greeks even in the most advantageous position, and ventured only
-upon sending Mithridates to harass the rear; which he executed with
-considerable effect. The bowmen and darters of the Greeks, few in
-number, were at the same time inferior to those of the Persians;
-and when Xenophon employed his rear guard, hoplites and peltasts,
-to charge and repel them, he not only could never overtake any one,
-but suffered much in getting back to rejoin his own main body. Even
-when retiring, the Persian horseman could discharge his arrow or cast
-his javelin behind him with effect; a dexterity which the Parthians
-exhibited afterwards still more signally, and which the Persian
-horsemen of the present day parallel with their carbines. This was
-the first experience which the Greeks had of marching under the
-harassing attack of cavalry. Even the small detachment of Mithridates
-greatly delayed their progress; so that they accomplished little
-more than two miles, reaching the villages in the evening, with many
-wounded, and much discouragement.[154]
-
-  [152] Xen. Anab. iii, 3, 6; iii, 5, 43.
-
-  [153] Xen. Anab. ii, 5, 1. Ainsworth. Travels and Researches in
-  Asia Minor, etc. vol. ii, ch. 44, p. 327; also his Travels in the
-  Track of the Ten Thousand, p. 119-134.
-
-  Professor Koch, who speaks with personal knowledge both of
-  Armenia and of the region east of the Tigris, observes truly
-  that the Great Zab is the only point (east of the Tigris) which
-  Xenophon assigns in such a manner as to be capable of distinct
-  local identification. He also observes, here as elsewhere, that
-  the number of parasangs specified by Xenophon is essentially
-  delusive as a measure of distance (Zug der Zehn Tausend, p. 64).
-
-  [154] Xen. Anab. iii, 3, 9.
-
-“Thank Heaven,” (said Xenophon in the evening, when Cheirisophus
-reproached him for imprudence in quitting the main body to charge
-cavalry, whom yet he could not reach.) “Thank Heaven, that our
-enemies attacked us with a small detachment only, and not with their
-great numbers. They have given us a valuable lesson, without doing
-us any serious harm.” Profiting by the lesson, the Greek leaders
-organized during the night and during the halt of the next day, a
-small body of fifty cavalry; with two hundred Rhodian slingers,
-whose slings, furnished with leaden bullets, both carried farther
-and struck harder than those of the Persians hurling large stones.
-On the ensuing morning, they started before daybreak, since there
-lay in their way a ravine difficult to pass. They found the ravine
-undefended (according to the usual stupidity of Persian proceedings),
-but when they had got nearly a mile beyond it, Mithridates reappeared
-in pursuit with a body of four thousand horsemen and darters.
-Confident from his achievement of the preceding day, he had promised,
-with a body of that force, to deliver the Greeks into the hands
-of the satrap. But the latter were now better prepared. As soon
-as he began to attack them, the trumpet sounded,—and forthwith
-the horsemen, slingers, and darters, issued forth to charge the
-Persians, sustained by the hoplites in the rear. So effective was
-the charge, that the Persians fled in dismay, notwithstanding their
-superiority in number; while the ravine so impeded their flight
-that many of them were slain, and eighteen prisoners made. The
-Greek soldiers of their own accord mutilated the dead bodies, in
-order to strike terror into the enemy.[155] At the end of the day’s
-march they reached the Tigris, near the deserted city of Larissa,
-the vast, massive, and lofty brick walls of which (twenty-five feet
-in thickness, one hundred feet high, seven miles in circumference)
-attested its former grandeur. Near this place was a stone pyramid,
-one hundred feet in breadth, and two hundred feet high; the summit
-of which was crowded with fugitives out of the neighboring villages.
-Another day’s march up the course of the Tigris brought the army to
-a second deserted city called Mespila, nearly opposite to the modern
-city of Mosul. Although these two cities, which seem to have formed
-the continuation or the substitute of the once colossal Nineveh or
-Ninus, were completely deserted,—yet the country around them was so
-well furnished with villages and population, that the Greeks not only
-obtained provisions, but also strings for the making of new bows, and
-lead for bullets to be used for the slingers.[156]
-
-  [155] Xen. Anab. iii, 4, 1-5.
-
-  [156] Xen. Anab. iii, 4, 17, 18. It is here, on the site of the
-  ancient Nineveh, that the recent investigations of Mr. Layard
-  have brought to light so many curious and valuable Assyrian
-  remains. The legend which Xenophon heard on the spot, respecting
-  the way in which these cities were captured and ruined, is of a
-  truly Oriental character.
-
-During the next day’s march, in a course generally parallel with
-the Tigris, and ascending the stream, Tissaphernes, coming up along
-with some other grandees, and with a numerous army, enveloped the
-Greeks both in flanks and rear. In spite of his advantage of numbers,
-he did not venture upon any actual charge, but kept up a fire of
-arrows, darts, and stones. He was, however, so well answered by
-the newly-trained archers and slingers of the Greeks, that on the
-whole they had the advantage, in spite of the superior size of the
-Persian bows, many of which were taken and effectively employed on
-the Grecian side. Having passed the night in a well-stocked village,
-they halted there the next day in order to stock themselves with
-provisions, and then pursued their march for four successive days
-along a level country, until, on the fifth day, they reached hilly
-ground with the prospect of still higher hills beyond. All this
-march was made under unremitting annoyance from the enemy, insomuch
-that though the order of the Greeks was never broken, a considerable
-number of their men were wounded. Experience taught them, that it
-was inconvenient for the whole army to march in one inflexible,
-undivided, hollow square; and they accordingly constituted six lochi
-or regiments of one hundred men each, subdivided into companies
-of fifty, and enômoties or smaller companies of twenty-five, each
-with a special officer (conformably to the Spartan practice) to
-move separately on each flank, and either to fall back, or fall in,
-as might suit the fluctuations of the central mass, arising from
-impediments in the road or menaces of the enemy.[157] On reaching
-the hills, in sight of an elevated citadel or palace, with several
-villages around it, the Greeks anticipated some remission of the
-Persian attack. But after having passed over one hill, they were
-proceeding to ascend the second, when they found themselves assailed
-with unwonted vigor by the Persian cavalry from the summit of it,
-whose leaders were seen flogging on the men to the attack.[158]
-This charge was so efficacious, that the Greek light troops were
-driven in with loss, and forced to take shelter within the ranks of
-the hoplites. After a march both slow and full of suffering, they
-could only reach their night-quarters by sending a detachment to get
-possession of some ground above the Persians, who thus became afraid
-of a double attack.
-
-  [157] Xen. Anab. iii, 4, 19-23.
-
-  I incline to believe that there were six lochi upon _each_
-  flank—that is, twelve lochi in all; though the words of Xenophon
-  are not quite clear.
-
-  [158] Xen. Anab. iii, 4-25. Compare Herodot. vii, 21, 56, 103.
-
-The villages which they now reached (supposed by Mr. Ainsworth
-to have been in the fertile country under the modern town called
-Zakhu),[159] were unusually rich in provisions; magazines of flour,
-barley, and wine, having been collected there for the Persian
-satrap. They reposed here three days, chiefly in order to tend the
-numerous wounded, for whose necessities, eight of the most competent
-persons were singled out to act as surgeons. On the fourth day they
-resumed their march, descending into the plain. But experience had
-now satisfied them that it was imprudent to continue in march under
-the attack of cavalry, so that when Tissaphernes appeared and began
-to harass them, they halted at the first village, and when thus in
-station, easily repelled him. As the afternoon advanced, the Persian
-assailants began to retire; for they were always in the habit of
-taking up their night-post at a distance of near seven miles from
-the Grecian position; being very apprehensive of nocturnal attack in
-their camp, when their horses were tied by the leg and without either
-saddle or bridle.[160] As soon as they had departed, the Greeks
-resumed their march, and made so much advance during the night, that
-the Persians did not overtake them either on the next day or the day
-after.
-
-  [159] Professor Koch (Zug der Zehn Tausend, p. 68) is of the same
-  opinion.
-
-  [160] Xen. Anab. iii, 4, 35; see also Cyropædia, iii, 3, 37.
-
-  The Thracian prince Seuthes was so apprehensive of night attack,
-  that he and his troops kept their horses bridled all night (Xen.
-  Anab. vii, 2, 21.)
-
-  Mr. Kinneir (Travels in Asia Minor, etc., p. 481) states that the
-  horses of Oriental cavalry, and even of the English cavalry in
-  Hindostan, are still kept tied and shackled at night, in the same
-  way as Xenophon describes to have been practised by the Persians.
-
-On the ensuing day, however, the Persians, having made a forced
-march by night, were seen not only in advance of the Greeks, but
-in occupation of a spur of high and precipitous ground overhanging
-immediately the road whereby the Greeks were to descend into the
-plain. When Cheirisophus approached, he at once saw that descent
-was impracticable in the face of an enemy thus posted. He therefore
-halted, sent for Xenophon from the rear, and desired him to bring
-forward the peltasts to the van. But Xenophon, though he obeyed
-the summons in person and galloped his horse to the front, did not
-think it prudent to move the peltasts from the rear, because he saw
-Tissaphernes, with another portion of the army, just coming up; so
-that the Grecian army was at once impeded in front, and threatened by
-the enemy closing upon them behind. The Persians on the high ground
-in front could not be directly assailed. But Xenophon observed,
-that on the right of the Grecian army, there was an accessible
-mountain-summit yet higher, from whence a descent might be made for a
-flank attack upon the Persian position. Pointing out this summit to
-Cheirisophus, as affording the only means of dislodging the troops
-in front, he urged that one of them should immediately hasten with a
-detachment to take possession of it, and offered to Cheirisophus the
-choice either of going, or staying with the army. “Choose yourself,”
-said Cheirisophus. “Well, then, (said Xenophon), I will go; since I
-am the younger of the two.” Accordingly, at the head of a select
-detachment from the van and centre of the army, he immediately
-commenced his flank march up the steep ascent to this highest
-summit. So soon as the enemy saw their purpose, they also detached
-troops on their side, hoping to get to the summit first; and the two
-detachments were seen mounting at the same time, each struggling with
-the utmost efforts to get before the other,—each being encouraged by
-shouts and clamor from the two armies respectively.
-
-As Xenophon was riding by the side of his soldiers, cheering them
-on and reminding them that their chance of seeing their country and
-their families all depended upon success in the effort before them, a
-Sikyonian hoplite in the ranks, named Sotêridas, said to him,—“You
-and I are not on an equal footing, Xenophon. You are on horseback; I
-am painfully struggling up on foot, with my shield to carry.” Stung
-with this taunt, Xenophon sprang from his horse, pushed Sotêridas out
-of his place in the ranks, took his shield as well as his place, and
-began to march forward afoot along with the rest. Though thus weighed
-down at once by the shield belonging to an hoplite, and by the heavy
-cuirass of a horseman (who carried no shield), he nevertheless put
-forth all his strength to advance, under such double incumbrance,
-and to continue his incitement to the rest. But the soldiers around
-him were so indignant at the proceeding of Sotêridas, that they
-reproached and even struck him, until they compelled him to resume
-his shield as well as his place in the ranks. Xenophon then remounted
-and ascended the hill on horseback as far as the ground permitted;
-but was obliged again to dismount presently, in consequence of the
-steepness of the uppermost portion. Such energetic efforts enabled
-him and his detachment to reach the summit first. As soon as the
-enemy saw this, they desisted from their ascent, and dispersed in all
-directions; leaving the forward march open to the main Grecian army,
-which Cheirisophus accordingly conducted safely down into the plain.
-Here he was rejoined by Xenophon on descending from the summit. All
-found themselves in comfortable quarters, amidst several well-stocked
-villages on the banks of the Tigris. They acquired moreover an
-additional booty of large droves of cattle, intercepted when on the
-point of being transported across the river; where a considerable
-body of horse were seen assembled on the opposite bank.[161]
-
-  [161] Xen. Anab. iii, 4, 36-49; iii, 5, 3.
-
-Though here disturbed only by some desultory attacks on the part of
-the Persians, who burnt several of the villages which lay in their
-forward line of march, the Greeks became seriously embarrassed
-whither to direct their steps; for on their left flank was the
-Tigris, so deep that their spears found no bottom,—and on their
-right, mountains of exceeding height. As the generals and the
-lochages were taking counsel, a Rhodian soldier came to them with a
-proposition for transporting the whole army across to the other bank
-of the river by means of inflated skins, which could be furnished
-in abundance by the animals in their possession. But this ingenious
-scheme, in itself feasible, was put out of the question by the view
-of the Persian cavalry on the opposite bank; and as the villages in
-their front had been burnt, the army had no choice except to return
-back one day’s march to those in which they had before halted. Here
-the generals again deliberated, questioning all their prisoners as
-to the different bearings of the country. The road from the south
-was that in which they had already marched from Babylon and Media;
-that to the westward, going to Lydia and Ionia, was barred to them
-by the interposing Tigris; eastward (they were informed) was the way
-to Ekbatana and Susa; northward, lay the rugged and inhospitable
-mountains of the Karduchians,—fierce freemen who despised the
-Great King, and defied all his efforts to conquer them; having once
-destroyed a Persian invading army of one hundred and twenty thousand
-men. On the other side of Karduchia, however, lay the rich Persian
-satrapy of Armenia, wherein both the Euphrates and the Tigris could
-be crossed near their sources, and from whence could choose their
-farther course easily towards Greece. Like Mysia, Pisidia, and other
-mountainous regions, Karduchia was a free territory surrounded on all
-sides by the dominions of the Great King, who reigned only in the
-cities and on the plains.[162]
-
-  [162] Xen. Anab. iii, 5; iv, 1, 3. Probably the place where
-  the Greeks quitted the Tigris to strike into the Karduchian
-  mountains, was the neighborhood of Jezireh ibn Omar, the ancient
-  Bezabde. It is here that farther march, up the eastern side of
-  the Tigris, is rendered impracticable by the mountains closing
-  in. Here the modern road crosses the Tigris by a bridge, from the
-  eastern bank to the western (Koch, Zug der Zehn Tausend, p. 72).
-
-Determining to fight their way across these difficult mountains into
-Armenia, but refraining from any public announcement, for fear that
-the passes should be occupied beforehand,—the generals sacrificed
-forthwith, in order that they might be ready for breaking up at a
-moment’s notice. They then began their march a little after midnight,
-so that soon after daybreak they reached the first of the Karduchian
-mountain-passes, which they found undefended. Cheirisophus, with
-his front division and all the light troops, made haste to ascend
-the pass, and having got over the first mountain, descended on the
-other side to some villages in the valley or nooks beneath; while
-Xenophon with the heavy-armed and the baggage, followed at a slower
-pace,—not reaching the villages until dark, as the road was both
-steep and narrow. The Karduchians, taken completely by surprise,
-abandoned the villages as the Greeks approached, and took refuge
-on the mountains; leaving to the intruders plenty of provisions,
-comfortable houses, and especially, abundance of copper vessels. At
-first the Greeks were careful to do no damage, trying to invite the
-natives to amicable colloquy. But none of the latter would come near,
-and at length necessity drove the Greeks to take what was necessary
-for refreshment. It was just when Xenophon and the rear guard were
-coming in at night, that some few Karduchians first set upon them; by
-surprise and with considerable success,—so that if their numbers had
-been greater, serious mischief might have ensued.[163]
-
-  [163] Xen. Anab. iv, 1, 12.
-
-Many fires were discovered burning on the mountains,—an earnest
-of resistance during the next day; which satisfied the Greek
-generals that they must lighten the army, in order to ensure greater
-expedition as well as a fuller complement of available hands during
-the coming march. They therefore gave orders to burn all the baggage
-except what was indispensable, and to dismiss all the prisoners;
-planting themselves in a narrow strait, through which the army had
-to pass, in order to see that their directions were executed. The
-women, however, of whom there were many with the army, could not be
-abandoned; and it seems farther that a considerable stock of baggage
-was still retained;[164] nor could the army make more than slow
-advance, from the narrowness of the road and the harassing attack
-of the Karduchians, who were now assembled in considerable numbers.
-Their attack was renewed with double vigor on the ensuing day, when
-the Greeks were forced, from want of provisions, to hasten forward
-their march, though in the midst of a terrible snow-storm. Both
-Cheirisophus in the front and Xenophon in the rear, were hard pressed
-by the Karduchian slingers and bowmen; the latter, men of consummate
-skill, having bows three cubits in length, and arrows of more than
-two cubits, so strong that the Greeks when they took them could dart
-them as javelins. These archers, amidst the rugged ground and narrow
-paths, approached so near and drew the bow with such surprising
-force, resting one extremity of it on the ground, that several Greek
-warriors were mortally wounded even through both shield and corslet
-into the reins, and through the brazen helmet into their heads;
-among them especially, two distinguished men, a Lacedæmonian named
-Kleonymus, and an Arcadian named Basias.[165] The rear division,
-more roughly handled than the rest, was obliged continually to halt
-to repel the enemy, under all the difficulties of the ground, which
-made it scarcely possible to act against nimble mountaineers. On one
-occasion, however, a body of these latter were entrapped into an
-ambush, driven back with loss, and (what was still more fortunate)
-two of their number were made prisoners.
-
-  [164] Xen. Anab. iv, 3, 19-30.
-
-  [165] Xen. Anab. iv, 1, 18; iv, 2, 28.
-
-Thus impeded, Xenophon sent frequent messages entreating Cheirisophus
-to slacken the march of the van division; but instead of obeying,
-Cheirisophus only hastened the faster, urging Xenophon to follow
-him. The march of the army became little better than a rout, so that
-the rear division reached the halting-place in extreme confusion;
-upon which Xenophon proceeded to remonstrate with Cheirisophus for
-prematurely hurrying forward and neglecting his comrades behind. But
-the other,—pointing out to his attention the hill before them, and
-the steep path ascending it, forming their future line of march,
-which was beset with numerous Karduchians,—defended himself by
-saying that he had hastened forward in hopes of being able to reach
-this pass before the enemy, in which attempt however he had not
-succeeded.[166]
-
-  [166] Xen. Anab. iv, 1, 21.
-
-To advance farther on this road appeared hopeless; yet the guides
-declared that no other could be taken. Xenophon then bethought
-him of the two prisoners whom he had just captured, and proposed
-that these two should be questioned also. They were accordingly
-interrogated apart; and the first of them,—having persisted in
-denying, notwithstanding all menaces, that there was any road
-except that before them,—was put to death under the eyes of the
-second prisoner. This latter, on being then questioned, gave more
-comfortable intelligence; saying that he knew of a different road,
-more circuitous, but easier and practicable even for beasts of
-burden, whereby the pass before them and the occupying enemy might be
-turned; but that there was one particular high position commanding
-the road, which it was necessary to master beforehand by surprise,
-as the Karduchians were already on guard there. Two thousand Greeks,
-having the guide bound along with them, were accordingly despatched
-late in the afternoon, to surprise this post by a night-march; while
-Xenophon, in order to distract the attention of the Karduchians in
-front, made a feint of advancing as if about to force the direct
-pass. As soon as he was seen crossing the ravine which led to this
-mountain, the Karduchians on the top immediately began to roll down
-vast masses of rock, which bounded and dashed down the roadway, in
-such manner as to render it unapproachable. They continued to do this
-all night, and the Greeks heard the noise of the descending masses
-long after they had returned to their camp for supper and rest.[167]
-
-  [167] Xen. Anab. iv, 2, 4.
-
-Meanwhile the detachment of two thousand, marching by the circuitous
-road, and reaching in the night the elevated position, (though there
-was another above yet more commanding), held by the Karduchians,
-surprised and dispersed them, passing the night by their fires. At
-daybreak, and under favor of a mist, they stole silently towards
-the position occupied by the other Karduchians in front of the main
-Grecian army. On coming near they suddenly sounded their trumpets,
-shouted aloud, and commenced the attack, which proved completely
-successful. The defenders, taken unprepared, fled with little
-resistance, and scarcely any loss, from their activity and knowledge
-of the country; while Cheirisophus and the main Grecian force, on
-hearing the trumpet which had been previously concerted as the
-signal, rushed forward and stormed the height in front; some along
-the regular path, others climbing up as they could and pulling each
-other up by means of their spears. The two bodies of Greeks thus
-joined each other on the summit, so that the road became open for
-farther advance.
-
-Xenophon, however, with the rear guard, marched on the circuitous
-road taken by the two thousand, as the most practicable for the
-baggage animals, whom he placed in the centre of his division,—the
-whole array covering a great length of ground, since the road was
-very narrow. During this interval, the dispersed Karduchians had
-rallied, and reoccupied two or three high peaks, commanding the
-road,—from whence it was necessary to drive them. Xenophon’s
-troops stormed successively these three positions, the Karduchians
-not daring to affront close combat, yet making destructive use of
-their missiles. A Grecian guard was left on the hindermost of the
-three peaks, until all the baggage train should have passed by. But
-the Karduchians, by a sudden and well-timed movement, contrived
-to surprise this guard, slew two out of the three leaders, with
-several soldiers, and forced the rest to jump down the crags as they
-could, in order to join their comrades in the road. Encouraged by
-such success, the assailants pressed nearer to the marching army,
-occupying a crag over against that lofty summit on which Xenophon was
-posted. As it was within speaking distance, he endeavored to open a
-negotiation with them in order to get back the dead bodies of the
-slain. To this demand the Karduchians at first acceded, on condition
-that their villages should not be burnt; but finding their numbers
-every moment increasing, they resumed the offensive. When Xenophon
-with the army had begun his descent from the last summit, they
-hurried onward in crowds to occupy it; beginning again to roll down
-masses of rock, and renew their fire of missiles, upon the Greeks.
-Xenophon himself was here in some danger, having been deserted by
-his shield-bearer; but he was rescued by an Arcadian hoplite named
-Eurylochus, who ran to give him the benefit of his own shield as a
-protection for both in the retreat.[168]
-
-  [168] Xen. Anab. iv, 3, 17-21.
-
-After a march thus painful and perilous, the rear division at
-length found themselves in safety among their comrades in villages
-with well-stocked houses and abundance of corn and wine. So eager,
-however, were Xenophon and Cheirisophus to obtain the bodies of
-the slain for burial, that they consented to purchase them by
-surrendering the guide, and to march onward without any guide;—a
-heavy sacrifice in this unknown country, attesting their great
-anxiety about the burial.[169]
-
-  [169] Xen. Anab. iv, 3, 23.
-
-For three more days did they struggle and fight their way through
-the narrow and rugged paths of the Karduchian mountains, beset
-throughout by these formidable bowmen and slingers; whom they had to
-dislodge at every difficult turn, and against whom their own Kretan
-bowmen were found inferior, indeed, but still highly useful. Their
-seven days’ march through this country, with its free and warlike
-inhabitants, were days of the utmost fatigue, suffering and peril;
-far more intolerable than anything which they had experienced from
-Tissaphernes and the Persians. Right glad were they once more to
-see a plain, and to find themselves near the banks of the river
-Kentritês, which divided these mountains from the hillocks and plains
-of Armenia,—enjoying comfortable quarters in villages, with the
-satisfaction of talking over past miseries.[170]
-
-  [170] Xen. Anab. iv, 3, 2. His expressions have a simple emphasis
-  which marks how unfading was the recollection of what he had
-  suffered in Karduchia.
-
-  Καὶ οἱ Ἕλληνες ἐνταῦθα ἀνεπαύσαντο ἄσμενοι ἰδόντες πεδίον· ἀπεῖχε
-  δὲ τῶν ὀρέων ὁ ποταμὸς ἓξ ἢ ἕπτα στάδια τῶν Καρδούχων. Τότε μὲν
-  οὖν ηὐλίσθησαν μάλα ἡδέως, καὶ τὰ ἐπιτήδεια ἔχοντες καὶ πολλὰ
-  τῶν παρεληλυθότων πόνων μνημονεύοντες. Ἕπτα γὰρ ἡμέρας, ὅσασπερ
-  ἐπορεύθησαν διὰ τῶν Καρδούχων, πάσας μαχόμενοι διετέλεσαν, καὶ
-  ἔπαθον κακὰ ὅσα οὐδὲ τὰ σύμπαντα ὑπὸ βασιλέως καὶ Τισσαφέρνους.
-  Ὡς οὖν ἀπηλλαγμένοι τούτων ἡδέως ἐκοιμήθησαν.
-
-Such were the apprehensions of Karduchian invasion, that the Armenian
-side of the Kentritês, for a breadth of fifteen miles, was unpeopled
-and destitute of villages.[171] But the approach of the Greeks having
-become known to Tiribazus, satrap of Armenia, the banks of the river
-were lined with his cavalry and infantry to oppose their passage; a
-precaution, which if Tissaphernes had taken at the Great Zab at the
-moment when he perfidiously seized Klearchus and his colleagues, the
-Greeks would hardly have reached the northern bank of that river.
-In the face of such obstacles, the Greeks, nevertheless, attempted
-the passage of the Kentritês, seeing a regular road on the other
-side. But the river was two hundred feet in breadth (only half the
-breadth of the Zab), above their breasts in depth, extremely rapid,
-and with a bottom full of slippery stones; insomuch that they could
-not hold their shields in the proper position, from the force of the
-stream, while if they lifted the shields above their heads, they
-were exposed defenceless to the arrows of the satrap’s troops. After
-various trials, the passage was found impracticable, and they were
-obliged to resume their encampment on the left bank. To their great
-alarm they saw the Karduchians assembling on the hills in their
-rear, so that their situation, during this day and night, appeared
-nearly desperate. In the night, Xenophon had a dream,—the first,
-which he has told us, since his dream on the terrific night after
-the seizure of the generals,—but on this occasion, of augury more
-unequivocally good. He dreamed that he was bound in chains, but that
-his chains on a sudden dropped off spontaneously; on the faith of
-which, he told Cheirisophus at daybreak that he had good hopes of
-preservation; and when the generals offered sacrifice, the victims
-were at once favorable. As the army were taking their morning meal,
-two young Greeks ran to Xenophon with the auspicious news that they
-had accidentally found another ford near half a mile up the river,
-where the water was not even up to their middle, and where the rocks
-came so close on the right bank that the enemy’s horse could offer no
-opposition. Xenophon, starting from his meal in delight, immediately
-offered libations to those gods who had revealed both the dream to
-himself in the night, and the unexpected ford afterwards to these
-youths; two revelations which he ascribed to the same gods.[172]
-
-  [171] Xen. Anab. iv, 4, 1.
-
-  [172] Xen. Anab. iv, 3, 6-13.
-
-Presently they marched in their usual order, Cheirisophus
-commanding the van and Xenophon the rear, along the river to the
-newly-discovered ford; the enemy marching parallel with them on
-the opposite bank. Having reached the ford, halted, and grounded
-arms, Cheirisophus placed a wreath on his head, took it off again,
-and then resumed his arms, ordering all the rest to follow his
-example.[173] Each lochus (company of one hundred men) was then
-arranged in column or single file, with Cheirisophus himself in
-the centre. Meanwhile the prophets were offering sacrifice to the
-river. So soon as the signs were pronounced to be favorable, all
-the soldiers shouted the pæan, and all the women joined in chorus
-with their feminine yell. Cheirisophus then at the head of the army,
-entered the river and began to ford it; while Xenophon, with a large
-portion of the rear division, made a feint of hastening back to the
-original ford, as if he were about to attempt the passage there. This
-distracted the attention of the enemy’s horse; who became afraid of
-being attacked on both sides, galloped off to guard the passage at
-the other point, and opposed no serious resistance to Cheirisophus.
-As soon as the latter had reached the other side, and put his
-division into order, he marched up to attack the Armenian infantry,
-who were on the high banks a little way above; but this infantry,
-deserted by its cavalry, dispersed without awaiting his approach. The
-handful of Grecian cavalry, attached to the division of Cheirisophus,
-pursued and took some valuable spoils.[174]
-
-  [173] Xen. Anab. iv, 3, 17.
-
-  ... ἔθεντο τὰ ὅπλα, καὶ αὐτὸς πρῶτος Χειρίσοφος, στεφανωσάμενος
-  καὶ ἀποδὺς, ἐλάμβανε τὰ ὅπλα, καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις πᾶσι παρήγγελλε.
-
-  I apprehend that the words τὸν στέφανον are here to be understood
-  after ἀποδὺς—not the words τὰ ὅπλα, as Krüger in his note seems
-  to imagine. It is surely incredible, that in the actual situation
-  of the Grecian army, the soldiers should be ordered first to
-  disarm, and then to resume their arms. I conceive the matter
-  thus:—First, the order is given, to ground arms; so that the
-  shield is let down and drops upon the ground, sustained by the
-  left hand of the soldier upon its upper rim; while the spear,
-  also resting on the ground, is sustained by the shield and by the
-  same left hand. The right hand of the soldier being thus free, he
-  is ordered first to wreath himself (the costume usual in offering
-  sacrifice)—next, to take off his wreath—lastly, to resume his
-  arms.
-
-  Probably the operations of wreathing and unwreathing, must
-  here have been performed by the soldiers symbolically, or by
-  gesture, raising the hand to the head, as if to crown it. For it
-  seems impossible that they could have been provided generally
-  with actual wreaths, on the banks of the Kentritês, and just
-  after their painful march through the Karduchian mountains.
-  Cheirisophus himself, however, had doubtless a real wreath, which
-  he put on and took off; so probably had the prophets and certain
-  select officiating persons.
-
-  [174] Xen. Anab. iv, 3, 20-25.
-
-As soon as Xenophon saw his colleague successfully established on
-the opposite bank, he brought back his detachment to the ford over
-which the baggage and attendants were still passing, and proceeded to
-take precautions against the Karduchians on his own side, who were
-assembling in the rear. He found some difficulty in keeping his rear
-division together, for many of them, in spite of orders, quitted
-their ranks, and went to look after their mistresses or their baggage
-in the crossing of the water.[175] The peltasts and bowmen, who had
-gone over with Cheirisophus, but whom that general now no longer
-needed, were directed to hold themselves prepared on both flanks of
-the army crossing, and to advance a little way into the water, in
-the attitude of men just about to recross. When Xenophon was left
-with only the diminished rear-guard, the rest having got over,—the
-Karduchians rushed upon him, and began to shoot and sling. But on
-a sudden, the Grecian hoplites charged with their accustomed pæan,
-upon which the Karduchians took to flight,—having no arms for close
-combat on the plain. The trumpet now being heard to sound, they ran
-away so much the faster; while this was the signal, according to
-orders before given by Xenophon, for the Greeks to suspend their
-charge, to turn back, and to cross the river as speedily as possible.
-By favor of this able manœuvre, the passage was accomplished by the
-whole army, with little or no loss, about mid-day.[176]
-
-  [175] Xen. Anab. iv, 3, 30.
-
-  [176] Xen. Anab. iv, 3, 31-34; iv, 4, 1.
-
-They now found themselves in Armenia; a country of even, undulating
-surface, but very high above the level of the sea, and extremely cold
-at the season when they entered it,—December. Though the strip of
-land bordering on Karduchia furnished no supplies, one long march
-brought them to a village, containing abundance of provisions,
-together with a residence of the satrap Tiribazus; after which, in
-two farther marches, they reached the river Teleboas, with many
-villages on its banks. Here Tiribazus himself, appearing with a
-division of cavalry, sent forward his interpreter to request a
-conference with the leaders; which being held, it was agreed that the
-Greeks should proceed unmolested through his territory, taking such
-supplies as they required,—but should neither burn nor damage the
-villages. They accordingly advanced onward for three days, computed
-at fifteen parasangs, or three pretty full days’ march; without
-any hostility from the satrap, though he was hovering within less
-than two miles of them. They then found themselves amidst several
-villages, wherein were regal or satrapical residences, with a
-plentiful stock of bread, meat, wine, and all sorts of vegetables.
-Here, during their nightly bivouac, they were overtaken by so heavy
-a fall of snow, that the generals, on the next day, distributed
-the troops into separate quarters among the villages. No enemy
-appeared near, while the snow seemed to forbid any rapid surprise.
-Yet at night, the scouts reported that many fires were discernible,
-together with traces of military movements around; insomuch that the
-generals thought it prudent to put themselves on their guard, and
-again collected the army into one bivouac. Here, in the night, they
-were overwhelmed by a second fall of snow, still heavier than the
-preceding; sufficient to cover over the sleeping men and their arms,
-and to benumb the cattle. The men, however, lay warm under the snow
-and were unwilling to rise, until Xenophon himself set the example
-of rising, and employing himself, without his arms, in cutting
-wood and kindling a fire.[177] Others followed his example, and
-great comfort was found in rubbing themselves with pork-fat, oil of
-almonds, or of sesame, or turpentine. Having sent out a clever scout
-named Demokrates, who captured a native prisoner, they learned that
-Tiribazus was laying plans to intercept them in a lofty mountain-pass
-lying farther on in their route; upon which they immediately set
-forth, and by two days of forced march, surprising in their way the
-camp of Tiribazus, got over the difficult pass in safety. Three days
-of additional march brought them to the Euphrates river,[178]—that
-is, to the eastern branch, now called Murad. They found a ford and
-crossed it, without having the water higher than the navel; and they
-were informed that its sources were not far off.
-
-  [177] Xen. Anab. iv, 4, 11.
-
-  [178] Xen. Anab. iv, 5, 2.
-
-  The recent editors, Schneider and Krüger, on the authority of
-  various MSS., read here ἐπορεύθησαν—~ἐπὶ~ τὸν Εὐφράτην ποταμόν.
-  The old reading was, as it stands in Hutchinson’s edition, ~παρὰ~
-  τὸν Εὐφράτην ποταμόν.
-
-  This change may be right, but the geographical data are here too
-  vague to admit of any certainty. See my Appendix annexed to this
-  chapter.
-
-Their four days of march, next on the other side of the Euphrates,
-were toilsome and distressing in the extreme; through a plain covered
-with deep snow (in some places six feet deep), and at times in the
-face of a north wind so intolerably chilling and piercing, that at
-length one of the prophets urged the necessity of offering sacrifices
-to Boreas; upon which (says Xenophon[179]) the severity of the wind
-abated conspicuously, to the evident consciousness of all. Many of
-the slaves and beasts of burden, and a few even of the soldiers,
-perished; some had their feet frost-bitten, others became blinded by
-the snow, others again were exhausted by hunger. Several of these
-unhappy men were unavoidably left behind; others lay down to perish,
-near a warm spring which had melted the snow around, from extremity
-of fatigue and sheer wretchedness, though the enemy were close upon
-the rear. It was in vain that Xenophon, who commanded the rear-guard,
-employed his earnest exhortations, prayers, and threats, to induce
-them to move forward. The sufferers, miserable and motionless,
-answered only by entreating him to kill them at once. So greatly was
-the army disorganized by wretchedness, that we hear of one case in
-which a soldier, ordered to carry a disabled comrade, disobeyed the
-order, and was about to bury him alive.[180] Xenophon made a sally,
-with loud shouts and clatter of spear with shield, in which even the
-exhausted men joined,—against the pursuing enemy. He was fortunate
-enough to frighten them away, and drive them to take shelter in
-a neighboring wood. He then left the sufferers lying down, with
-assurance that relief should be sent to them on the next day,—and
-went forward, seeing all along the line of march the exhausted
-soldiers lying on the snow, without even the protection of a watch.
-He and his rear-guard, as well as the rest, were obliged thus to
-pass the night without either food or fire, distributing scouts in
-the best way the case admitted. Meanwhile, Cheirisophus with the van
-division had got into a village, which they reached so unexpectedly,
-that they found the women fetching water from a fountain outside
-the wall, and the headman of the village in his house within. This
-division here obtained rest and refreshment, and at daybreak some of
-their soldiers were sent to look after the rear. It was with delight
-that Xenophon saw them approach, and sent them back to bring up in
-their arms, into the neighboring village, those exhausted soldiers
-who had been left behind.[181]
-
-  [179] Xen. Anab. iv, 5, 4.
-
-  Ἔνθα δὴ τῶν μάντέων τις εἶπε σφαγιάσασθαι τῷ Ἀνέμῳ· καὶ πᾶσι δὴ
-  περιφανῶς ἔδοξε λῆξαι τὸ χαλεπὸν τοῦ πνεύματος.
-
-  The suffering of the army from the terrible snow and cold of
-  Armenia are set forth in Diodorus, xiv, 28.
-
-  [180] Xen. Anab. v, 8, 8-11.
-
-  [181] Xen. Anab. iv, 5, 8-22.
-
-Repose was now indispensable after the recent sufferings. There
-were several villages near at hand, and the generals, thinking it
-no longer dangerous to divide the army, quartered the different
-divisions among them according to lot. Polykrates, an Athenian, one
-of the captains in the division of Xenophon, requested his permission
-to go at once and take possession of the village assigned to him,
-before any of the inhabitants could escape. Accordingly, running
-at speed with a few of the swiftest soldiers, he came upon the
-village so suddenly as to seize the headman, with his newly-married
-daughter, and several young horses intended as a tribute for the
-king. This village, as well as the rest, was found to consist of
-houses excavated in the ground (as the Armenian villages are at
-the present day), spacious within, but with a narrow mouth like a
-well, entered by a descending ladder. A separate entrance was dug
-for conveniently admitting the cattle. All of them were found amply
-stocked with live cattle of every kind, wintered upon hay; as well as
-with wheat, barley, vegetables, and a sort of barley-wine or beer,
-in tubs, with the grains of barley on the surface. Reeds or straws,
-without any joint in them, were lying near, through which they
-sucked the liquid.[182] Xenophon did his utmost to conciliate the
-headman (who spoke Persian, and with whom he communicated through the
-Perso-Grecian interpreter of the army), promising him that not one
-of his relations should be maltreated, and that he should be fully
-remunerated if he would conduct the army safely out of the country,
-into that of the Chalybes which he described as being adjacent.
-By such treatment the headman was won over, promised his aid, and
-even revealed to the Greeks the subterranean cellars wherein the
-wine was deposited; while Xenophon, though he kept him constantly
-under watch, and placed his youthful son as a hostage under the care
-of Episthenes, yet continued to treat him with studied attention
-and kindness. For seven days did the fatigued soldiers remain in
-these comfortable quarters, refreshing themselves and regaining
-strength. They were waited upon by the native youths, with whom they
-communicated by means of signs. The uncommon happiness which all of
-them enjoyed after their recent sufferings, stands depicted in the
-lively details given by Xenophon; who left here his own exhausted
-horse, and took young horses in exchange, for himself and the other
-officers.[183]
-
-  [182] Xen. Anab. iv, 5, 26. Κάλαμοι γόνατα οὐκ ἔχοντες.
-
-  This Armenian practice of sucking the beer through a reed, to
-  which the observation of modern travellers supplies analogies
-  (see Krüger’s note), illustrates the Fragment of Archilochus (No.
-  28, ed. Schneidewin, Poetæ Græc. Minor).
-
-    ὥσπερ αὐλῷ βρύτον ἢ Θρῆιξ ἀνὴρ
-    ἢ Φρὺξ ἔβρυζε, etc.
-
-  The similarity of Armenian customs to those of the Thracians and
-  Phrygians, is not surprising.
-
-  [183] Xen. Anab. iv, 5, 26-36.
-
-After this week of repose, the army resumed its march through the
-snow. The headman, whose house they had replenished as well as they
-could, accompanied Cheirisophus in the van as guide, but was not
-put in chains or under guard; his son remained as an hostage with
-Episthenes, but his other relations were left unmolested at home. As
-they marched for three days without reaching a village, Cheirisophus
-began to suspect his fidelity, and even became so out of humor,
-though the man affirmed that there were no villages in the track, as
-to beat him,—yet without the precaution of putting him afterwards
-in fetters. The next night, accordingly, this headman made his
-escape; much to the displeasure of Xenophon, who severely reproached
-Cheirisophus, first for his harshness, and next for his neglect. This
-was the only point of difference between the two (says Xenophon),
-during the whole march; a fact very honorable to both, considering
-the numberless difficulties against which they had to contend.
-Episthenes retained the headman’s youthful son, carried him home in
-safety, and became much attached to him.[184]
-
-  [184] Xen. Anab. iv. 6, 1-3.
-
-Condemned thus to march without a guide, they could do no better than
-march up the course of a river; and thus, from the villages which
-had proved so cheering and restorative, they proceeded seven days’
-march all through snow, up the river Phasis; a river not verifiable,
-but certainly not the same as is commonly known under that name by
-Grecian geographers; it was one hundred feet in breadth.[185] Two
-more days’ march brought them from this river to the foot of a range
-of mountains; near a pass occupied by an armed body of Chalybes,
-Taochi, and Phasiani.
-
-  [185] Xen. Anab. iv, 6, 4.
-
-Observing the enemy in possession of this lofty ground, Cheirisophus
-halted until all the army came up; in order that the generals might
-take counsel. Here Kleanor began by advising that they should storm
-the pass with no greater delay than was necessary to refresh the
-soldiers. But Xenophon suggested that it was far better to avoid the
-loss of life which must thus be incurred, and to amuse the enemy by
-feigned attack, while a detachment should be sent by stealth, at
-night, to ascend the mountain at another point and turn the position.
-“However (continued he, turning to Cheirisophus), stealing a march
-upon the enemy is more your trade than mine. For I understand that
-you, the full citizens and peers at Sparta, practise stealing from
-your boyhood upward;[186] and that it is held no way base, but even
-honorable, to steal such things as the law does not distinctly
-forbid. And to the end that you may steal with the greatest effect,
-and take pains to do it in secret, the custom is, to flog you if you
-are found out. Here, then, you have an excellent opportunity for
-displaying your training. Take good care that we be not found out in
-stealing an occupation of the mountain now before us; for if we _are_
-found out, we shall be well beaten.
-
-  [186] Xen. Anab. iv, 6, 10-14.
-
-  Καὶ οὐκ αἰσχρὸν εἶναι, ἀλλὰ ~καλὸν~ κλέπτειν, etc. The reading
-  ~καλὸν~ is preferred by Schneider to ~ἀναγκαῖον~, which has been
-  the vulgar reading, and is still retained by Krüger. Both are
-  sanctioned by authority of MSS., and either would be admissible;
-  on the whole, I incline to side with Schneider.
-
-“Why, as for that (replied Cheirisophus), you Athenians, also, as I
-learn, are capital hands at stealing the public money, and that too
-in spite of prodigious peril to the thief; nay, your most powerful
-men steal most of all,—at least, if it be the most powerful men
-among you who are raised to official command. So that this is a time
-for _you_ to exhibit _your_ training as well as for me to exhibit
-mine.”[187]
-
-  [187] Xen. Anab. iv, 6, 16.
-
-  Ἀλλὰ μέντοι, ἔφη ὁ Χειρίσοφος, κἀγὼ ὑμᾶς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἀκούω
-  δεινοὺς εἶναι κλέπτειν τὰ δημόσια, καὶ μάλα ὄντος δεινοῦ τοῦ
-  κινδύνου τῷ κλέπτοντι, καὶ τοὺς κρατίστους μέντοι μάλιστα,
-  εἴπερ ὑμῖν οἱ κράτιστοι ἄρχειν ἀξιοῦνται· ὥστε ὥρα καὶ σοὶ
-  ἐπιδείκνυσθαι τὴν παίδειαν.
-
-We have here an interchange of raillery between the two Grecian
-officers, which is not an uninteresting feature in the history of
-the expedition. The remark of Cheirisophus, especially illustrates
-that which I noted in a former chapter as true both of Sparta and
-Athens[188],—the readiness to take bribes, so general in individuals
-clothed with official power; and the readiness, in official
-Athenians, to commit such peculation, in spite of serious risk of
-punishment. Now this chance of punishment proceeded altogether from
-those accusing orators commonly called demagogues, and from the
-popular judicature whom they addressed. The joint working of both
-greatly abated the evil, yet was incompetent to suppress it. But
-according to the pictures commonly drawn of Athens, we are instructed
-to believe that the crying public evil was,—too great a license of
-accusation, and too much judicial trial. Assuredly, such was not
-the conception of Cheirisophus; nor shall we find it borne out by
-any fair appreciation of the general evidence. When the peculation
-of official persons was thus notorious in spite of serious risks,
-what would it have become if the door had been barred to accusing
-demagogues, and if the numerous popular dikasts had been exchanged
-for a few select judges of the same stamp and class as the official
-men themselves?
-
-  [188] See Vol. VII, ch. lxi, p. 401 _seq._
-
-Enforcing his proposition, Xenophon now informed his colleagues
-that he had just captured a few guides by laying an ambush for
-certain native plunderers who beset the rear; and that these guides
-acquainted him that the mountain was not inaccessible, but pastured
-by goats and oxen. He farther offered himself to take command of
-the marching detachment. But this being overruled by Cheirisophus,
-some of the best among the captains, Aristonymus, Aristeas, and
-Nichomachus, volunteered their services and were accepted. After
-refreshing the soldiers, the generals marched with the main army near
-to the foot of the pass, and there took up their night-station,
-making demonstrations of a purpose to storm it the next morning. But
-as soon as it was dark, Aristonymus and his detachment started, and
-ascending the mountain at another point, obtained without resistance
-a high position on the flank of the enemy, who soon, however, saw
-them and despatched a force to keep guard on that side. At daybreak
-these two detachments came to a conflict on the heights, in which the
-Greeks were completely victorious, while Cheirisophus was marching
-up the pass to attack the main body. His light troops, encouraged
-by seeing this victory of their comrades, hastened on to the charge
-faster than their hoplites could follow. But the enemy was so
-dispirited by seeing themselves turned, that they fled with little or
-no resistance. Though only a few were slain, many threw away their
-light shields of wicker or wood-work, which became the prey of the
-conquerors.[189]
-
-  [189] Xen. Anab. iv, 6, 20-27.
-
-Thus masters of the pass, the Greeks descended to the level ground
-on the other side, where they found themselves in some villages
-well-stocked with provisions and comforts; the first in the country
-of the Taochi. Probably they halted here some days; for they had seen
-no villages, either for rest or for refreshment, during the last nine
-days’ march, since leaving those Armenian villages in which they had
-passed a week so eminently restorative, and which apparently had
-furnished them with a stock of provisions for the onward journey.
-Such halt gave time to the Taochi to carry up their families and
-provisions into inaccessible strongholds, so that the Greeks found
-no supplies, during five days’ march through the territory. Their
-provisions were completely exhausted, when they arrived before one
-of these strongholds, a rock on which were seen the families and
-the cattle of the Taochi; without houses or fortification, but
-nearly surrounded by a river, so as to leave only one narrow ascent,
-rendered unapproachable by vast rocks which the defenders hurled
-or rolled from the summit. By an ingenious combination of bravery
-and stratagem, in which some of the captains much distinguished
-themselves, the Greeks overcame this difficulty, and took the
-height. The scene which then ensued was awful. The Taochian women
-seized their children, flung them over the precipice, and then cast
-themselves headlong also, followed by the men. Almost every soul thus
-perished, very few surviving to become prisoners. An Arcadian captain
-named Æneas, seeing one of them in a fine dress about to precipitate
-himself with the rest, seized him with a view to prevent it. But the
-man in return grasped him firmly, dragged him to the edge of the
-rock, and leaped down to the destruction of both. Though scarcely any
-prisoners were taken, however, the Greeks obtained abundance of oxen,
-asses, and sheep, which fully supplied their wants.[190]
-
-  [190] Xen. Anab. iv, 7, 2-15.
-
-They now entered into the territory of the Chalybes, which they
-were seven days in passing through. These were the bravest warriors
-whom they had seen in Asia. Their equipment was a spear of fifteen
-cubits long, with only one end pointed,—a helmet, greaves, stuffed
-corselet, with a kilt or dependent flaps,—a short sword which they
-employed to cut off the head of a slain enemy, displaying the head
-in sight of their surviving enemies with triumphant dance and song.
-They carried no shield; perhaps because the excessive length of the
-spear required the constant employment of both hands,—yet they did
-not shrink from meeting the Greeks occasionally in regular, stand-up
-fight. As they had carried off all their provisions into hill-forts,
-the Greeks could obtain no supplies, but lived all the time upon
-the cattle which they had acquired from the Taochi. After seven
-days of march and combat,—the Chalybes perpetually attacking their
-rear,—they reached the river Harpasus (four hundred feet broad),
-where they passed into the territory of the Skythini. It rather seems
-that the territory of the Chalybes was mountainous; that of the
-Skythini was level, and containing villages, wherein they remained
-three days, refreshing themselves, and stocking themselves with
-provisions.[191]
-
-  [191] Xen. Anab. iv, 7, 18.
-
-Four days of additional march brought them to a sight, the like of
-which they had not seen since Opis and Sittakê on the Tigris in
-Babylonia,—a large and flourishing city called Gymnias; an earnest
-of the neighborhood of the sea, of commerce, and of civilization. The
-chief of this city received them in a friendly manner, and furnished
-them with a guide who engaged to conduct them, after five days’
-march, to a hill from whence they would have a view of the sea.
-This was by no means their nearest way to the sea, for the chief of
-Gymnias wished to send them through the territory of some neighbors
-to whom he was hostile; which territory, as soon as they reached it,
-the guide desired them to burn and destroy. However, the promise was
-kept, and on the fifth day, marching still apparently through the
-territory of the Skythini, they reached the summit of a mountain
-called Thêchê, from whence the Euxine Sea was visible.[192]
-
-  [192] Diodorus (xiv, 29) calls the mountain Χήνοιν—Chenium. He
-  seems to have had Xenophon before him in his brief description of
-  this interesting scene.
-
-An animated shout from the soldiers who formed the van-guard
-testified the impressive effect of this long-deferred spectacle,
-assuring as it seemed to do, their safety and their return home. To
-Xenophon and to the rear-guard,—engaged in repelling the attack
-of natives who had come forward to revenge the plunder of their
-territory,—the shout was unintelligible. They at first imagined that
-the natives had commenced attack in front as well as in the rear,
-and that the van-guard was engaged in battle. But every moment the
-shout became louder, as fresh men came to the summit and gave vent
-to their feelings; so that Xenophon grew anxious, and galloped up
-to the van with his handful of cavalry to see what had happened.
-As he approached, the voice of the overjoyed crowd was heard
-distinctly crying out, _Thalatta, Thalatta_ (The sea, the sea), and
-congratulating each other in ecstasy. The main body, the rear-guard,
-the baggage-soldiers driving up their horses and cattle before
-them, became all excited by the sound, and hurried up breathless
-to the summit. The whole army, officers and soldiers, were thus
-assembled, manifesting their joyous emotions by tears, embraces, and
-outpourings of enthusiastic sympathy. With spontaneous impulse they
-heaped up stones to decorate the spot by a monument and commemorative
-trophy; putting on the stones such homely offerings as their means
-afforded,—sticks, hides, and a few of the wicker shields just taken
-from the natives. To the guide, who had performed his engagement of
-bringing them in five days within sight of the sea, their gratitude
-was unbounded. They presented him with a horse, a silver bowl, a
-Persian costume, and ten darics in money; besides several of the
-soldiers’ rings, which he especially asked for. Thus loaded with
-presents, he left them, having first shown them a village wherein
-they could find quarters,—as well as the road which they were to
-take through the territory of the Makrônes.[193]
-
-  [193] Xen. Anab. iv, 7, 23-27.
-
-When they reached the river which divided the land of the Makrônes
-from that of the Skythini, they perceived the former assembled in
-arms on the opposite side to resist their passage. The river not
-being fordable, they cut down some neighboring trees to provide the
-means of crossing. While these Makrônes were shouting and encouraging
-each other aloud, a peltast in the Grecian army came to Xenophon,
-saying that he knew their language, and that he believed this to
-be his country. He had been a slave at Athens, exported from home
-during his boyhood,—he had then made his escape (probably during
-the Peloponnesian war, to the garrison of Dekeleia), and afterwards
-taken military service. By this fortunate accident, the generals
-were enabled to open negotiations with the Makrônes, and to assure
-them that the army would do them no harm, desiring nothing more than
-a free passage and a market to buy provisions. The Makrônes, on
-receiving such assurance in their own language from a countryman,
-exchanged pledges of friendship with the Greeks, assisted them to
-pass the river, and furnished the best market in their power during
-the three days’ march across their territory.[194]
-
-  [194] Xen. Anab. iv, 8, 4-7.
-
-The army now reached the borders of the Kolchians, who were found in
-hostile array, occupying the summit of a considerable mountain which
-formed their frontier. Here Xenophon, having marshalled the soldiers
-for attack, with each lochus (company of one hundred men) in single
-file, instead of marching up the hill in phalanx, or continuous front
-with only a scanty depth,—addressed to them the following pithy
-encouragement,—“Now, gentlemen, these enemies before us are the only
-impediment that keeps us away from reaching the point at which we
-have been so long aiming. We must even eat them raw, if in any way we
-can do so.”
-
-Eighty of these formidable companies of hoplites, each in single
-file, now began to ascend the hill; the peltasts and bowmen being
-partly distributed among them, partly placed on the flanks.
-Cheirisophus and Xenophon, each commanding on one wing, spread
-their peltasts in such a way as to outflank the Kolchians, who
-accordingly weakened their centre in order to strengthen their
-wings. Hence the Arcadian peltasts and hoplites in the Greek
-centre were enabled to attack and disperse the centre with little
-resistance; and all the Kolchians presently fled, leaving the Greeks
-in possession of their camp, as well as of several well-stocked
-villages in their rear. Amidst these villages the army remained to
-refresh themselves for several days. It was here that they tasted the
-grateful, but unwholesome honey, which this region still continues to
-produce,—unaware of its peculiar properties. Those soldiers who ate
-little of it were like men greatly intoxicated with wine; those who
-ate much, were seized with the most violent vomiting and diarrhœa,
-lying down like madmen in a state of delirium. From this terrible
-distemper some recovered on the ensuing day, others two or three days
-afterwards. It does not appear that any one actually died.[195]
-
-  [195] Xen. Anab. iv, 8, 15-22. Most modern travellers attest the
-  existence, in these regions, of honey intoxicating and poisonous,
-  such as Xenophon describes. They point out the _Azalea Pontica_,
-  as the flower from which the bees imbibe this peculiar quality.
-  Professor Koch, however, calls in question the existence of any
-  honey thus naturally unwholesome near the Black Sea. He states
-  (Zug der Zehn Tausend, p. 111) that after careful inquiries he
-  could find no trace of any such. Not contradicting Xenophon, he
-  thinks that the honey which the Greeks ate must have been stale
-  or tainted.
-
-Two more days’ march brought them to the sea, at the Greek maritime
-city of Trapezus or Trebizond, founded by the inhabitants of Sinôpê
-on the coast of the Kolchian territory. Here the Trapezuntines
-received them with kindness and hospitality, sending them presents
-of bullocks, barley-meal, and wine. Taking up their quarters in some
-Kolchian villages near the town, they now enjoyed, for the first
-time since leaving Tarsus, a safe and undisturbed repose during
-thirty days, and were enabled to recover in some degree from the
-severe hardships which they had undergone. While the Trapezuntines
-brought produce for sale into the camp, the Greeks provided the
-means of purchasing it by predatory incursions against the Kolchians
-on the hills. Those Kolchians who dwelt under the hills and on the
-plain were in a state of semi-dependence upon Trapezus; so that the
-Trapezuntines mediated on their behalf and prevailed on the Greeks
-to leave them unmolested, on condition of a contribution of bullocks.
-
-These bullocks enabled the Greeks to discharge the vow which they had
-made, on the proposition of Xenophon, to Zeus the Preserver, during
-that moment of dismay and despair which succeeded immediately on the
-massacre of their generals by Tissaphernes. To Zeus the Preserver,
-to Hêraklês the Conductor, and to various other gods, they offered
-an abundant sacrifice on their mountain camp overhanging the sea;
-and after the festival ensuing, the skins of the victims were given
-as prizes to competitors in running, wrestling, boxing, and the
-pankration. The superintendence of such festival games, so fully
-accordant with Grecian usage and highly interesting to the army,
-was committed to a Spartan named Drakontius; a man whose destiny
-recalls that of Patroklus and other Homeric heroes,—for he had been
-exiled as a boy, having unintentionally killed another boy with a
-short sword. Various departures from Grecian custom, however, were
-admitted. The matches took place on the steep and stony hill-side
-overhanging the sea, instead of on a smooth plain; and the numerous
-hard falls of the competitors afforded increased interest to the
-bystanders. The captive non-Hellenic boys were admitted to run for
-the prize, since otherwise a boy-race could not have been obtained.
-Lastly, the animation of the scene, as well as the ardor of the
-competitors, was much enhanced by the number of their mistresses
-present.[196]
-
-  [196] Xen. Anab. iv, 8, 23-27.
-
-  A curious and interesting anecdote in Plutarch’s Life of
-  Alexander, (c. 41) attests how much these Hetæræ accompanying
-  the soldiers (women for the most part free), were esteemed in
-  the Macedonian army, and by Alexander himself among the rest. A
-  Macedonian of Ægæ named Eurylochus, had got himself improperly
-  put on a list of veterans and invalids, who were on the point of
-  being sent back from Asia to Europe. The imposition was detected,
-  and on being questioned he informed Alexander that he had
-  practised it in order to be able to follow a free Hetæra named
-  Telesippa, who was about to accompany the departing division. “I
-  sympathize with your attachment, Eurylochus (replied Alexander);
-  let us see whether we cannot prevail upon Telesippa either by
-  persuasion or by presents, since she is of free condition, to
-  stay behind” (Ἡμᾶς μὲν, ὦ Εὐρύλοχε, συνερῶντας ἔχεις· ὅρα δὲ ὅπως
-  πείθωμεν ἢ λόγοις ἢ δώροις τὴν Τελεσίππαν, ἐπειδήπερ ἐξ ἐλευθέρας
-  ἐστί).
-
-
-
-
-APPENDIX TO CHAPTER LXX.
-
-ON THE GEOGRAPHY OF THE RETREAT OF THE TEN THOUSAND AFTER THEY
-QUITTED THE TIGRIS AND ENTERED THE KARDUCHIAN MOUNTAINS.
-
-
-It would be injustice to this gallant and long-suffering body of
-men not to present the reader with a minute description of the full
-length of their stupendous march. Up to the moment when the Greeks
-enter Karduchia, the line of march may be indicated upon evidence
-which, though not identifying special halting-places or localities,
-makes us certain that we cannot be far wrong on the whole. But after
-that moment, the evidence gradually disappears, and we are left with
-nothing more than a knowledge of the terminus, the general course,
-and a few negative conditions.
-
-Mr. Ainsworth has given, in his Book IV. (Travels in the Track of the
-Ten Thousand, p. 155 seq.) an interesting topographical comment on
-the march through Karduchia, and on the difficulties which the Greeks
-would have to surmount. He has farther shown what may have been their
-probable line of march through Karduchia; but the most important
-point which he has established here, seems to be the identity of
-the river Kentritês with the Buhtan-Chai, an eastern affluent of
-the Tigris—distinguishing it from the river of Bitlis on the west
-and the river Khabur on the south-east, with both of which it had
-been previously confounded (p. 167). The Buhtan-Chai falls into the
-Tigris at a village called Til, and “constitutes at the present day,
-a natural barrier between Kurdistan and Armenia” (p. 166). In this
-identification of the Kentritês with the Buhtan-Chai, Professor Koch
-agrees (Zug der Zehn Tausend, p. 78).
-
-If the Greeks crossed the Kentritês near its confluence with the
-Tigris, they would march up its right bank in one day to a situation
-near the modern town of Sert (Mr. Ainsworth thinks), though Xenophon
-takes no notice of the river of Bitlis, which nevertheless they must
-have passed. Their next two days of march, assuming a direction
-nearly north, would carry them (as Xenophon states, iv. 4, 2) beyond
-the sources of the Tigris; that is, “beyond the headwaters of the
-eastern tributaries to the Tigris.”
-
-Three days of additional march brought them to the river
-Teleboas—“of no great size, but beautiful” (iv. 4, 4). There appear
-sufficient reasons to identify this river with the Kara-Su or Black
-River, which flows through the valley or plain of Mush into the Murad
-or Eastern Euphrates (Ainsworth, p. 172; Ritter, Erdkunde, part
-x. s. 37. p. 682). Though Kinneir (Journey through Asia Minor and
-Kurdistan, 1818, p. 484), Rennell (Illustrations of the Expedition of
-Cyrus, p. 207) and Bell (System of Geography, iv. p. 140) identify it
-with the Ak-Su or river of Mush—this, according to Ainsworth, “is
-only a small tributary to the Kara-Su, which is the great river of
-the plain and district.”
-
-Professor Koch, whose personal researches in and around Armenia
-give to his opinion the highest authority, follows Mr. Ainsworth in
-identifying the Teleboas with the Kara-Su. He supposes, however, that
-the Greeks crossed the Kentritês, not near its confluence with the
-Tigris, but considerably higher up, near the town of Sert or Sort.
-From hence he supposes that they marched nearly north-east in the
-modern road from Sert to Bitlis, thus getting round the head or near
-the head of the river called Bitlis-Su, which is one of the eastern
-affluents to the Tigris (falling first into the Buhtan-Chai), and
-which Xenophon took for the Tigris itself. They then marched farther,
-in a line not far distant from the Lake of Van, over the saddle which
-separates that lake from the lofty mountain Ali-Dagh. This saddle is
-the water-shed which separates the affluents to the Tigris from those
-to the Eastern Euphrates, of which latter the Teleboas or Kara-Su is
-one (Koch, Zug der Zehn Tausend, p. 82-84).
-
-After the river Teleboas, there seems no one point in the march which
-can be identified with anything approaching to certainty. Nor have
-we any means even of determining the general line of route, apart
-from specific places, which they followed from the river Teleboas to
-Trebizond.
-
-Their first object was to reach and cross the Eastern Euphrates.
-They would of course cross at the nearest point where they could
-find a ford. But how low down its course does the river continue to
-be fordable, in mid-winter, with snow on the ground? Here professor
-Koch differs from Mr. Ainsworth and colonel Chesney. He affirms that
-the river would be fordable a little above its confluence with the
-Tscharbahur, about latitude 39° 3′. According to Mr. Ainsworth, it
-would not be fordable below the confluence with the river of Khanus
-(Khinnis). Koch’s authority, as the most recent and systematic
-investigator of these regions, seems preferable, especially as it
-puts the Greeks nearly in the road now travelled over from Mush to
-Erzerum, which is said to be the only pass over the mountains open
-throughout all the winter, passing by Khinnis and Koili; see Ritter,
-Erdkunde, x. p. 387. Xenophon mentions a warm spring, which the army
-passed by during the third or fourth day after crossing the Euphrates
-(Anab. iv, 5, 15). Professor Koch believes himself to have identified
-this warm spring—the only one, as he states (p. 90-93), south of
-the range of mountains called the Bingöldagh—in the district called
-Wardo, near the village of Bashkan.
-
-To lay down, with any certainty, the line which the Greeks followed
-from the Euphrates to Trebizond, appears altogether impossible. I
-cannot admit the hypothesis of Mr. Ainsworth, who conducts the army
-across the Araxes to its northern bank, carries them up northward
-to the latitude of Teflis in Georgia, then brings them back again
-across the Harpa Chai (a northern affluent of the Araxes, which he
-identifies with the Harpasus mentioned by Xenophon) and the Araxes
-itself, to Gymnias, which he places near the site of Erzerum.
-Professor Koch (p. 104-108), who dissents with good reason from Mr.
-Ainsworth, proposes (though with hesitation and uncertainty) a line
-of his own which appears to me open greatly to the same objection
-as that of Mr. Ainsworth. It carries the Greeks too much to the
-northward of Erzerum, more out of their line of march from the place
-where they crossed the Eastern Euphrates, than can be justified by
-any probability. The Greeks knew well that, in order to get home they
-must take a westerly direction (see Anab. iii. 5, 15).
-
-Their great and constant purpose would be to make way to the
-westward, as soon as they had crossed the Euphrates; and the road
-from that river, passing near the site of Erzerum to Trebizond, would
-thus coincide, in the main, with their spontaneous tendency. They
-had no motive to go northward of Erzerum, nor ought we to suppose it
-without some proof. I trace out, therefore, a line of march much less
-circuitous; not meaning it to be understood as the real road which
-the army can be proved to have taken, but simply because it seems a
-possible line, and because it serves as a sort of approximation to
-complete the reader’s idea of the entire ground travelled over by the
-Ten Thousand.
-
-Koch hardly makes sufficient account of the overwhelming hardships
-with which the Greeks had to contend, when he states (p. 96) that
-if they had taken a line as straight, or nearly as straight as was
-practicable, they might have marched from the Euphrates to Trebizond
-in sixteen or twenty days, even allowing for the bad time of year.
-Considering that it was mid-winter, in that very high and cold
-country, with deep snow throughout; that they had absolutely no
-advantages or assistance of any kind; that their sick and disabled
-men, together with their arms, were to be carried by the stronger;
-that there were a great many women accompanying them; that they had
-beasts to drive along, carrying baggage and plunder,—the prophet
-Silanus, for example, having preserved his three thousand darics
-in coin from the field of Kunaxa until his return; that there was
-much resistance from the Chalybes and Taochi; that they had to take
-provisions where provisions were discoverable; that even a small
-stream must have impeded them, and probably driven them out of their
-course to find a ford,—considering the intolerable accumulation
-of these and other hardships, we need not wonder at any degree of
-slowness in their progress. It rarely happens that modern travellers
-go over these regions in mid-winter; but we may see what travelling
-is at that season, by the dreadful description which Mr. Baillie
-Fraser gives of his journey from Tauris to Erzerum in the month of
-March (Travels in Koordhistan, Letter XV). Mr. Kinneir says (Travels,
-p. 353)—“The winters are so severe that all communication between
-Baiburt and the circumjacent villages is cut off for four months in
-the year, in consequence of the depth of the snow.”
-
-Now if we measure on Kiepert’s map the rectilinear distance,—the
-air-line—from Trebizond to the place where Koch represents the
-Greeks to have crossed the Eastern Euphrates,—we shall find
-it one hundred and seventy English miles. The number of days’
-journey-marches which Xenophon mentions are fifty-four; even if we
-include the five days of march undertaken from Gymnias (Anab. iv.
-7, 20), which, properly speaking, were directed against the enemies
-of the governor of Gymnias, more than for the promotion of their
-retreat. In each of those fifty-four days, therefore, they must
-have made 3.14 miles of rectilinear progress. This surely is not an
-unreasonably slow progress to suppose, under all the disadvantages of
-their situation; nor does it imply any very great actual departure
-from the straightest line practicable. Indeed Koch himself (in his
-Introduction, p. 4) suggests various embarrassments which must have
-occurred on the march, but which Xenophon has not distinctly stated.
-
-The river which Xenophon calls the Harpasus seems to be probably the
-Tchoruk-su, as colonel Chesney and Prof. Koch suppose. At least it is
-difficult to assign any other river with which the Harpasus can be
-identified.
-
-I cannot but think it probable that the city which Xenophon calls
-_Gymnias_ (Diodorus, xiv. 29, calls it Gymnasia) was the same as
-that which is now called Gumisch-Khana (Hamilton), Gumush-Kaneh
-(Ainsworth), Gemisch-Khaneh (Kinneir). “Gumisch-Khana (says Mr.
-Hamilton, Travels in Asia Minor, vol. i. ch. xi. p. 168; ch. xiv. p.
-234) is celebrated as the site of the most ancient and considerable
-silver-mines in the Ottoman dominions.” Both Mr. Kinneir and Mr.
-Hamilton passed through Gumisch-Khana on the road from Trebizond to
-Erzerum.
-
-Now here is not only great similarity of name, and likelihood of
-situation,—but the existence of the silver mines furnishes a
-plausible explanation of that which would otherwise be very strange;
-the existence of this “great, flourishing, inhabited, city,” inland,
-in the midst of such barbarians,—the Chalybes, the Skythini, the
-Makrônes, etc.
-
-Mr. Kinneir reached Gumisch-Khana at the end of the third day after
-quitting Trebizond; the two last days having been very long and
-fatiguing. Mr. Hamilton, who also passed through Gumisch-Khana,
-reached it at the end of two long days. Both these travellers
-represent the road near Gumisch-Khana as extremely difficult. Mr.
-Ainsworth, who did not himself pass through Gumisch-Khana, tells
-us (what is of some importance in this discussion) that it lies in
-the _winter-road_ from Erzerum to Trebizond (Travels in Asia Minor,
-vol. ii. p. 394). “The winter-road, which is the longest, passes by
-Gumisch-Khana, and takes the longer portion of valley; all the others
-cross over the mountain at various points, to the east of the road
-by the mines. But whether going by the mountains or the valley, the
-muleteers often go indifferently to the west as far as Ash Kaleh, and
-at other times turn off by the villages of Bey Mausour and Kodjah
-Bunar, where they take to the mountains.”
-
-Mr. Hamilton makes the distance from Trebizond to Gumisch-Khana
-eighteen hours, or fifty-four calculated post miles; that is, about
-forty English miles (Appendix to Travels in Asia Minor, vol. ii. p.
-389).
-
-Now we are not to suppose that the Greeks marched in any direct road
-from Gymnias to Trebizond. On the contrary, the five days’ march
-which they undertook immediately from Gymnias were conducted by a
-guide sent from that town, who led them over the territories of
-people hostile to Gymnias, in order that they might lay waste the
-lands (iv. 7, 20). What progress they made, during these marches,
-towards Trebizond, is altogether doubtful. The guide promised that on
-the fifth day he would bring them to a spot from whence they could
-view the sea, and he performed his promise by leading them to the top
-of the sacred mountain Thêchê.
-
-Thêchê was a summit (ἄκρον, iv. 7, 25), as might be expected. But
-unfortunately it seems impossible to verify the particular summit
-on which the interesting scene described by Xenophon took place.
-Mr. Ainsworth presumes it to be the mountain called Kop-Dagh; from
-whence, however, according to Koch, the sea cannot be discerned.
-D’Anville and some other geographers identify it with the ridge
-called Tekieh-Dagh, to the east of Gumisch-Khana; nearer to the sea
-than that place. This mountain, I think, would suit pretty well for
-the narrative in respect to position; but Koch and other modern
-travellers affirm that it is neither high enough, nor near enough to
-the sea, to permit any such view as that which Xenophon relates. It
-stands on Kiepert’s map at a distance of full thirty-five English
-miles from the sea, the view of which, moreover, seems intercepted
-by the still higher mountain-chain now called Kolath-Dagh, a portion
-of the ancient Paryadres, which runs along parallel to the coast. It
-is to be recollected that in the first half of February, the time of
-Xenophon’s visit, the highest peaks would certainly be all covered
-with snow, and therefore very difficult to ascend.
-
-There is a striking view obtained of the sea from the mountain called
-Karakaban. This mountain, more than four thousand feet high, lies
-rather above twenty miles from the sea, to the south of Trebizond,
-and immediately north of the still higher chain of Kolath-Dagh. From
-the Kolath-Dagh chain, which runs east and west, there strike out
-three or four parallel ridges to the northward, formed of primitive
-slate, and cut down precipitously so as to leave deep and narrow
-valleys between. On leaving Trebizond, the traveller ascends the hill
-immediately above the town, and then descends into the valley on
-the other side. His road to Karakaban lies partly along the valley,
-partly along the crest of one of the four ridges just mentioned. But
-throughout all this road, the sea is never seen; being hidden by the
-hills immediately above Trebizond. He does not again see the sea
-until he reaches Karakaban, which is sufficiently high to enable him
-to see over those hills. The guides (as I am informed by Dr. Holland,
-who twice went over the spot) point out with great animation this
-view of the sea, as particularly deserving of notice. It is enjoyed
-for a short space while the road winds round the mountain, and then
-again lost.
-
-Here is a view of the sea at once distant, sudden, impressive,
-and enjoyed from an eminence not too high to be accessible to the
-Cyreian army. In so far, it would be suitable to the description of
-Xenophon. Yet again it appears that a person coming to this point
-from the land-side (as Xenophon of course did), would find it in
-his descending route, not in his ascending; and this can hardly be
-reconciled with the description which we read in the Greek historian.
-Moreover, the subsequent marches which Xenophon mentions after
-quitting the mountain summit Thêchê, can hardly be reconciled with
-the supposition that it was the same as what is now called Karakaban.
-It is, indeed, quite possible, (as Mr. Hamilton suggests), that
-Thêchê may have been a peak apart from any road, and that the guide
-may have conducted the soldiers thither for the express purpose of
-showing the sea, guiding them back again into the road afterwards.
-This increases the difficulty of identifying the spot. However, the
-whole region is as yet very imperfectly known, and perhaps it is
-not impossible that there may be some particular locality even on
-Tekiah-Dagh, whence, through an accidental gap in the intervening
-mountains, the sea might become visible.
-
-
-
-
-CHAPTER LXXI.
-
-PROCEEDINGS OF THE TEN THOUSAND GREEKS, FROM THE TIME THAT THEY
-REACHED TRAPEZUS, TO THEIR JUNCTION WITH THE LACEDÆMONIAN ARMY IN
-ASIA MINOR.
-
-
-We now commence a third act in the history of this memorable
-body of men. After having followed them from Sardis to Kunaxa as
-mercenaries to procure the throne for Cyrus,—then from Kunaxa to
-Trapezus as men anxious only for escape, and purchasing their safety
-by marvellous bravery, endurance, and organization, we shall now
-track their proceedings among the Greek colonies on the Euxine and
-at the Bosphorus of Thrace, succeeded by their struggles against
-the meanness of the Thracian prince Seuthes, as well as against the
-treachery and arbitrary harshness of the Lacedæmonian commanders
-Anaxibius and Aristarchus.
-
-Trapezus, now Trebizond, where the army had recently found repose,
-was a colony from Sinôpê, as were also Kerasus and Kotyôra, farther
-westward; each of them receiving an harmost or governor from the
-mother-city, and paying to her an annual tribute. All these three
-cities were planted on the narrow strip of land dividing the Euxine
-from the elevated mountain range which so closely borders on its
-southern coast. At Sinôpê itself, the land stretches out into a
-defensible peninsula, with a secure harbor, and a large breadth of
-adjacent fertile soil. So tempting a site invited the Milesians,
-even before the year 600 B.C., to plant a colony there, and enabled
-Sinôpê to attain much prosperity and power. Farther westward, not
-more than a long day’s journey for a rowing vessel from Byzantium,
-was situated the Megarian colony of Herakleia, in the territory of
-the Mariandyni.
-
-The native tenants of this line of coast, upon whom the Greek
-settlers intruded themselves (reckoning from the westward), were the
-Bithynian Thracians, the Mariandyni, the Paphlagonians, the Tibarêni,
-Chalybes, Mosynœki, Drilæ, and Kolchians. Here, as elsewhere, these
-natives found the Greek seaports useful, in giving a new value to
-inland produce, and in furnishing the great men with ornaments
-and luxuries to which they would otherwise have had no access. The
-citizens of Herakleia had reduced into dependence a considerable
-portion of the neighboring Mariandyni, and held them in a relation
-resembling that of the natives of Esthonia and Livonia to the German
-colonies in the Baltic. Some of the Kolchian villages were also
-subject, in the same manner, to the Trapezuntines;[197] and Sinôpê
-doubtless possessed a similar inland dominion of greater or less
-extent. But the principal wealth of this important city arose from
-her navy and maritime commerce; from the rich thunny fishery attached
-to her promontory; from the olives in her immediate neighborhood,
-which was a cultivation not indigenous, but only naturalized by the
-Greeks on the seaboard; from the varied produce of the interior,
-comprising abundant herds of cattle, mines of silver, iron, and
-copper in the neighboring mountains, wood for ship-building, as well
-as for house furniture, and native slaves.[198] The case was similar
-with the three colonies of Sinôpê, more to the eastward,—Kotyôra,
-Kerasus, and Trapezus; except that the mountains which border on the
-Euxine, gradually approaching nearer and nearer to the shore, left
-to each of them a more confined strip of cultivable land. For these
-cities the time had not yet arrived, to be conquered and absorbed
-by the inland monarchies around them, as Miletus and the cities on
-the eastern coast of Asia Minor had been. The Paphlagonians were at
-this time the only indigenous people in those regions who formed
-a considerable aggregated force, under a prince named Korylas; a
-prince tributary to Persia, yet half independent,—since he had
-disobeyed the summons of Artaxerxes to come up and help in repelling
-Cyrus[199]—and now on terms of established alliance with Sinôpê,
-though not without secret designs, which he wanted only force to
-execute, against that city.[200] The other native tribes to the
-eastward were mountaineers both ruder and more divided; warlike on
-their own heights, but little capable of any aggressive combinations.
-
-  [197] Strabo, xii, p. 542; Xen. Anab. iv, 8, 24.
-
-  [198] Strabo. xii, p. 545, 546.
-
-  [199] Xen. Anab. v, 6, 8.
-
-  [200] Xen. Anab. v, 5, 23.
-
-Though we are told that Perikles had once despatched a detachment of
-Athenian colonists to Sinôpê,[201] and had expelled from thence the
-despot Timesilaus,—yet neither that city nor any of their neighbors
-appear to have taken a part in the Peloponnesian war, either for
-or against Athens; nor were they among the number of tributaries
-to Persia. They doubtless were acquainted with the upward march of
-Cyrus, which had disturbed all Asia; and probably were not ignorant
-of the perils and critical state of his Grecian army. But it was
-with a feeling of mingled surprise, admiration, and alarm, that they
-saw that army descend from the mountainous region, hitherto only
-recognized as the abode of Kolchians, Makrônes, and other analogous
-tribes, among whom was perched the mining city of Gymnias.
-
-  [201] Plutarch, Perikles, c. 20.
-
-Even after all the losses and extreme sufferings of the retreat, the
-Greeks still numbered, when mustered at Kerasus,[202] eight thousand
-six hundred hoplites, with peltasts or targeteers, bowmen, slingers,
-etc., making a total of above ten thousand military persons. Such a
-force had never before been seen in the Euxine. Considering both the
-numbers and the now-acquired discipline and self-confidence of the
-Cyreians, even Sinôpê herself could have raised no force capable of
-meeting them in the field. Yet they did not belong to any city, nor
-receive orders from any established government. They were like those
-mercenary armies which marched about in Italy during the fourteenth
-century, under the generals called Condottieri, taking service
-sometimes with one city, sometimes with another. No one could predict
-what schemes they might conceive, or in what manner they might deal
-with the established communities on the shores of the Euxine. If we
-imagine that such an army had suddenly appeared in Sicily, a little
-time before the Athenian expedition against Syracuse, it would have
-been probably enlisted by Leontini and Katana in their war against
-Syracuse. If the inhabitants of Trapezus had wished to throw off the
-dominion of Sinôpê,—or if Korylas, the Paphlagonian, were meditating
-war against that city,—here were formidable auxiliaries to second
-their wishes. Moreover there were various tempting sites, open to the
-formation of a new colony, which, with so numerous a body of original
-Greek settlers, would probably have overtopped Sinôpê herself. There
-was no restraining cause to reckon upon, except the general Hellenic
-sympathies and education of the Cyreian army; and what was of not
-less importance, the fact that they were not mercenary soldiers by
-permanent profession, such as became so formidably multiplied in
-Greece during the next generation,—but established citizens who had
-come out on a special service under Cyrus, with the full intention,
-after a year of lucrative enterprise, to return to their homes and
-families.[203] We shall find such gravitation towards home steadily
-operative throughout the future proceedings of the army. But at the
-moment when they first emerged from the mountains, no one could be
-sure that it would be so. There was ample ground for uneasiness among
-the Euxine Greeks, especially the Sinopians, whose supremacy had
-never before been endangered.
-
-  [202] Xen. Anab. v, 3, 3; v, 7, 9. The maximum of the Grecian
-  force, when mustered at Issus after the junction of those three
-  hundred men who deserted from Abrokomas, was thirteen thousand
-  nine hundred men. At the review in Babylonia, three days before
-  the battle of Kunaxa, there were mustered, however, only twelve
-  thousand nine hundred (Anab. i, 7, 10).
-
-  [203] Xen. Anab. vi, 2, 8.
-
-  Τῶν γὰρ στρατιωτῶν ὁι πλεῖστοι ἦσαν οὐ σπάνει βίου ἐκπεπλευκότες
-  ἐπὶ ταύτην τὴν μισθοφορὰν, ἀλλὰ τὴν Κύρου ἀρετὴν ἀκούοντες,
-  οἱ μὲν καὶ ἄνδρας ἄγοντες, οἱ δὲ καὶ προσανηλωκότες χρήματα,
-  καὶ τούτων ἕτεροι ἀποδεδρακότες πατέρας καὶ μητέρας, οἱ δὲ
-  καὶ τέκνα καταλιπόντες, ὡς χρήματα αὐτοῖς κτησάμενοι ἥξοντες
-  πάλιν, ἀκούοντες καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους τοὺς παρὰ Κύρῳ πολλὰ καὶ ἀγαθὰ
-  πράττειν. Τοιοῦτοι οὖν ὄντες ἐπόθουν εἶς τὴν Ἑλλάδα σώζεσθαι.
-
-  This statement respecting the position of most of the soldiers
-  is more authentic, as well as less disparaging, than that of
-  Isokrates (Orat. iv, Panegyr. s. 170).
-
-  In another oration, composed about fifty years after the
-  Cyreian expedition, Isokrates notices the large premiums which
-  it had been formerly necessary to give to those who brought
-  together mercenary soldiers, over and above the pay to the
-  soldiers themselves (Isokrates, Orat. v. ad Philipp. s. 112); as
-  contrasted with the over-multiplication of unemployed mercenaries
-  during his own later time (Ibid. s. 142 _seq._)
-
-An undisturbed repose of thirty days enabled the Cyreians to recover
-from their fatigues, to talk over their past dangers, and to take
-pride in the anticipated effect which their unparalleled achievement
-could not fail to produce in Greece. Having discharged their vows
-and celebrated their festival to the gods, they held an assembly
-to discuss their future proceedings; when a Thurian soldier, named
-Antileon, exclaimed,—“Comrades, I am already tired of packing up,
-marching, running, carrying arms, falling into line, keeping watch,
-and fighting. Now that we have the sea here before us, I desire to
-be relieved from all these toils, to sail the rest of the way, and
-to arrive in Greece outstretched and asleep, like Odysseus.” This
-pithy address being received with vehement acclamations, and warmly
-responded to by all,—Cheirisophus offered, if the army chose to
-empower him, to sail forthwith to Byzantium, where he thought he
-could obtain from his friend the Lacedæmonian admiral, Anaxibius,
-sufficient vessels for transport. His proposition was gladly
-accepted; and he departed to execute the project.
-
-Xenophon then urged upon the army various resolutions and
-measures, proper for the regulation of affairs during the absence
-of Cheirisophus. The army would be forced to maintain itself by
-marauding expeditions among the hostile tribes in the mountains.
-Such expeditions, accordingly, must be put under regulation; neither
-individual soldiers, nor small companies, must be allowed to go out
-at pleasure, without giving notice to the generals; moreover, the
-camp must be kept under constant guard and scouts, in the event of
-surprise from a retaliating enemy. It was prudent also to take the
-best measures in their power for procuring vessels; since, after all,
-Cheirisophus might possibly fail in bringing an adequate number.
-They ought to borrow a few ships of war from the Trapezuntines, and
-detain all the merchant ships which they saw; unshipping the rudders,
-placing the cargoes under guard, and maintaining the crew during all
-the time that the ships might be required for transport of the army.
-Many such merchant vessels were often sailing by;[204] so that they
-would thus acquire the means of transport, even though Cheirisophus
-should bring few or none from Byzantium. Lastly, Xenophon proposed to
-require the Grecian cities to repair and put in order the road along
-the coast, for a land-march; since, perhaps, with all their efforts,
-it would be found impossible to get together a sufficient stock of
-transports.
-
-  [204] Xen. Anab. v, 1, 3-13.
-
-  Ὁρῶ δ᾽ ἐγὼ πλοῖα πολλάκις παραπλέοντα, etc. This is a forcible
-  proof how extensive was the Grecian commerce with the town and
-  region of Phasis, at the eastern extremity of the Euxine.
-
-All the propositions of Xenophon were readily adopted by the army,
-except the last. But the mere mention of a renewed land-march excited
-such universal murmurs of repugnance, that he did not venture to put
-that question to the vote. He took upon himself, however, to send
-messages to the Grecian cities, on his own responsibility; urging
-them to repair the roads, in order that the departure of the army
-might be facilitated. And he found the cities ready enough to carry
-his wishes into effect, as far as Kotyôra.[205]
-
-  [205] Xen. Anab v. 1, 15.
-
-The wisdom of these precautionary suggestions of Xenophon soon
-appeared; for Cheirisophus not only failed in his object, but was
-compelled to stay away for a considerable time. A pentekonter (or
-armed ship with fifty oars) was borrowed from the Trapezuntines, and
-committed to the charge of a Lacedæmonian Periœkus, named Dexippus,
-for the purpose of detaining the merchant vessels passing by. This
-man having violated his trust, and employed the ship to make his own
-escape out of the Euxine, a second was obtained and confided to an
-Athenian, Polykrates; who brought in successively several merchant
-vessels. These the Greeks did not plunder, but secured the cargoes
-under adequate guard, and only reserved the vessels for transports.
-It became, however, gradually more and more difficult to supply the
-camp with provisions. Though the army was distributed into suitable
-detachments for plundering the Kolchian villages on the hills, and
-seizing cattle and prisoners for sale, yet these expeditions did
-not always succeed; indeed on one occasion, two Grecian lochi or
-companies got entangled in such difficult ground, that they were
-destroyed, to a man. The Kolchians united on the hills in increased
-and menacing numbers, insomuch that a larger guard became necessary
-for the camp; while the Trapezuntines,—tired of the protracted
-stay of the army, as well as desirous of exempting from pillage
-the natives in their own immediate neighborhood,—conducted the
-detachments only to villages alike remote and difficult of access.
-It was in this manner that a large force under Xenophon himself,
-attacked the lofty and rugged stronghold of the Drilæ,—the most
-warlike nation of mountaineers in the neighborhood of the Euxine;
-well armed, and troublesome to Trapezus by their incursions. After a
-difficult march and attack which Xenophon describes in interesting
-detail, and wherein the Greeks encountered no small hazard of ruinous
-defeat,—they returned in the end completely successful, and with a
-plentiful booty.[206]
-
-  [206] Xen. Anab. v. 2.
-
-At length, after long awaiting in vain the reappearance of
-Cheirisophus, increasing scarcity and weariness determined them to
-leave Trapezus. A sufficient number of vessels had been collected to
-serve for the transport of the women, of the sick and wounded, and of
-the baggage. All these were accordingly placed on board, under the
-command of Philesius and Sophænetus, the two oldest generals; while
-the remaining army marched by land, along a road which had been just
-made good under the representations of Xenophon. In three days they
-reached Kerasus, another maritime colony of the Sinopeans, still in
-the territory called Kolchian; there they halted ten days, mustered
-and numbered the army, and divided the money acquired by the sale of
-their prisoners. Eight thousand six hundred hoplites, out of a total
-probably greater than eleven thousand, were found still remaining;
-besides targeteers and various light troops.[207]
-
-  [207] Xen. Anab. v, 3, 3. Mr. Kinneir (Travels in Asia Minor, p.
-  327) and many other authors, have naturally presumed from the
-  analogy of name that the modern town Kerasoun (about long. 38°
-  40′) corresponds to the Kerasus of Xenophon; which Arrian in
-  his Periplus conceives to be identical with what was afterwards
-  called Pharnakia.
-
-  But it is remarked both by Dr. Cramer (Asia Minor, vol. i, p.
-  281) and by Mr. Hamilton (Travels in Asia Minor, ch. xv, p. 250),
-  that Kerasoun is too far from Trebizond to admit of Xenophon
-  having marched with the army from the one place to the other in
-  three days; or even in less than ten days, in the judgment of Mr.
-  Hamilton. Accordingly Mr. Hamilton places the site of the Kerasus
-  of Xenophon much nearer to Trebizond (about long. 39° 20′, as it
-  stands in Kiepert’s map of Asia Minor,) near a river now called
-  the Kerasoun Dere Sú.
-
-During the halt at Kerasus, the declining discipline of the army
-became manifest as they approached home. Various acts of outrage
-occurred, originating now, as afterwards, in the intrigues of
-treacherous officers. A captain named Klearetus persuaded his company
-to attempt the plunder of a Kolchian village near Kerasus, which had
-furnished a friendly market to the Greeks, and which rested secure on
-the faith of peaceful relations. He intended to make off separately
-with the booty in one of the vessels; but his attack was repelled,
-and he himself slain. The injured villagers despatched three elders,
-as heralds, to remonstrate with the Grecian authorities; but these
-heralds being seen in Kerasus by some of the repulsed plunderers,
-were slain. A partial tumult then ensued, in which even the
-magistrates of Kerasus were in great danger, and only escaped the
-pursuing soldiers by running into the sea. This enormity, though it
-occurred under the eyes of the generals, immediately before their
-departure from Kerasus, remained without inquiry or punishment, from
-the numbers concerned in it.
-
-Between Kerasus and Kotyôra, there was not then (nor is there now)
-any regular road.[208] This march cost the Cyreian army not less
-than ten days, by an inland track departing from the sea-shore, and
-through the mountains inhabited by the indigenous tribes Mosynœki
-and Chalybes. The latter, celebrated for their iron works, were
-under dependence to the former. As the Mosynœki refused to grant a
-friendly passage across their territory, the army were compelled to
-fight their way through it as enemies, with the aid of one section
-of these people themselves; which alliance was procured for them by
-the Trapezuntine Timesitheos, who was proxenus of the Mosynœki, and
-understood their language. The Greeks took the mountain fastnesses
-of this people, and plundered the wooden turrets which formed their
-abodes. Of their peculiar fashions Xenophon gives an interesting
-description, which I have not space to copy.[209] The territory of
-the Tibarêni was more easy and accessible. This people met the Greeks
-with presents, and tendered a friendly passage. But the generals at
-first declined the presents,—preferring to treat them as enemies
-and plunder them; which in fact they would have done, had they not
-been deterred by inauspicious sacrifices.[210]
-
-  [208] It was not without great difficulty that Mr. Kinneir
-  obtained horses to travel from Kotyôra to Kerasoun by land.
-  The aga of the place told him that it was madness to think of
-  travelling by land, and ordered a felucca for him; but was at
-  last prevailed on to furnish horses. There seems, indeed, to
-  have been no regular or trodden road at all; the hills approach
-  close to the sea, and Mr. Kinneir “travelled the whole of the way
-  along the shore alternately over a sandy beach and a high wooded
-  bank. The hills at intervals jutting out into the sea, form capes
-  and numerous little bays along the coast; but the nature of the
-  country was still the same, that is to say, studded with fine
-  timber, flowers, and groves of cherry trees” (Travels in Asia
-  Minor, p. 324).
-
-  Kerasus is the indigenous country of the cherry tree, and the
-  origin of its name.
-
-  Professor Koch thinks, that the number of days’ march given by
-  Xenophon (ten days) between Kerasus and Kotyôra, is more than
-  consists with the real distance, even if Kerasus be placed where
-  Mr. Hamilton supposes. If the number be correctly stated, he
-  supposes that the Greeks must have halted somewhere (Zug der Zehn
-  Tausend. p. 115. 116).
-
-  [209] Xen. Anab. v, 5, 3.
-
-  [210] Xen. Anab. v, 7, 18-25.
-
-Near Kotyôra, which was situated on the coast of the Tibarêni, yet
-on the borders of Paphlagonia, they remained forty-five days, still
-awaiting the appearance of Cheirisophus with the transports to carry
-them away by sea. The Sinopian harmost or governor, did not permit
-them to be welcomed in so friendly a manner as at Trapezus. No market
-was provided for them, nor were their sick admitted within the walls.
-But the fortifications of the town were not so constructed as to
-resist a Greek force, the like of which had never before been seen
-in those regions. The Greek generals found a weak point, made their
-way in, and took possession of a few houses for the accommodation
-of their sick; keeping a guard at the gate to secure free egress,
-but doing no farther violence to the citizens. They obtained their
-victuals partly from the Kotyôrite villages, partly from the
-neighboring territory of Paphlagonia, until at length envoys arrived
-from Sinôpê to remonstrate against their proceedings.
-
-These envoys presented themselves before the assembled soldiers in
-the camp, when Hekatonymus, the chief and the most eloquent among
-them, began by complimenting the army upon their gallant exploits
-and retreat. He then complained of the injury which Kotyôra and
-Sinôpê, as the mother city of Kotyôra, had suffered at their hands,
-in violation of common Hellenic kinship. If such proceedings were
-continued, he intimated that Sinôpê would be compelled in her own
-defence to seek alliance with the Paphlagonian prince Korylas, or
-any other barbaric auxiliary who would lend them aid against the
-Greeks.[211] Xenophon replied that if the Kotyôrites had sustained
-any damage, it was owing to their own ill-will and to the Sinopian
-harmost in the place; that the generals were under the necessity of
-procuring subsistence for the soldiers, with house-room for the sick,
-and that they had taken nothing more; that the sick men were lying
-within the town, but at their own cost, while the other soldiers were
-all encamped without; that they had maintained cordial friendship
-with the Trapezuntines, and requited all their good offices; that
-they sought no enemies except through necessity, being anxious
-only again to reach Greece; and that as for the threat respecting
-Korylas, they knew well enough that that prince was eager to become
-master of the wealthy city of Sinôpê, and would speedily attempt
-some such enterprise if he could obtain the Cyreian army as his
-auxiliaries.[212]
-
-  [211] Xen. Anab. v, 5, 7-12.
-
-  [212] Xen. Anab. v, 5, 13-22.
-
-This judicious reply shamed the colleagues of Hekatonymus so much,
-that they went the length of protesting against what he had said,
-and of affirming that they had come with propositions of sympathy
-and friendship to the army, as well as with promises to give them
-an hospitable reception at Sinôpê, if they should visit that town
-on their way home. Presents were at once sent to the army by the
-inhabitants of Kotyôra, and a good understanding established.
-
-Such an interchange of good will with the powerful city of Sinôpê was
-an unspeakable advantage to the army,—indeed, an essential condition
-to their power of reaching home. If they continued their march by
-land, it was only through Sinopian guidance and mediation that they
-could obtain or force a passage through Paphlagonia; while for a
-voyage by sea, there was no chance of procuring a sufficient number
-of vessels except from Sinôpê, since no news had been received of
-Cheirisophus. On the other hand, that city had also a strong interest
-in facilitating their transit homeward, and thus removing formidable
-neighbors for whose ulterior purposes there could be no guarantee.
-After some preliminary conversation with the Sinopian envoys, the
-generals convoked the army in assembly, and entreated Hekatonymus
-and his companions to advise them as to the best mode of proceeding
-westward to the Bosphorus. Hekatonymus, after apologizing for the
-menacing insinuations of his former speech, and protesting that
-he had no other object in view except to point out the safest and
-easiest plan of route for the army, began to unfold the insuperable
-difficulties of a march through Paphlagonia. The very entrance
-into the country must be achieved through a narrow aperture in the
-mountains, which it was impossible to force if occupied by the enemy.
-Even assuming this difficulty to be surmounted, there were spacious
-plains to be passed over, wherein the Paphlagonian horse, the most
-numerous and bravest in Asia, would be found almost irresistible.
-There were also three or four great rivers, which the army would
-be unable to pass,—the Thermodon and the Iris, each three hundred
-feet in breadth,—the Halys, two stadia or nearly a quarter of a mile
-in breadth,—the Parthenius, also very considerable. Such an array
-of obstacles (he affirmed) rendered the project of marching through
-Paphlagonia impracticable; whereas the voyage by sea from Kotyôra
-to Sinôpê, and from Sinôpê to Herakleia, was easy; and the transit
-from the latter place, either by sea to Byzantium, or by land across
-Thrace, yet easier.[213]
-
-  [213] Xen. Anab. v, 6, 4-11.
-
-Difficulties like these, apparently quite real, were more than
-sufficient to determine the vote of the army, already sick of
-marching and fighting, in favor of the sea-voyage; though there were
-not wanting suspicions of the sincerity of Hekatonymus. But Xenophon,
-in communicating to the latter the decision of the army, distinctly
-apprised him that they would on no account permit themselves to be
-divided; that they would either depart or remain all in a body,
-and that vessels must be provided sufficient for the transport of
-all. Hekatonymus desired them to send envoys of their own to Sinôpê
-to make the necessary arrangements. Three envoys were accordingly
-sent,—Ariston, an Athenian, Kalimachus, an Arcadian, and Samolas, an
-Achæan; the Athenian, probably, as possessing the talent of speaking
-in the Sinopian senate or assembly.[214]
-
-  [214] Xen. Anab. v, 6, 14.
-
-During the absence of these envoys, the army still continued near
-Kotyôra with a market provided by the town, and with traders from
-Sinôpê and Herakleia in the camp. Such soldiers as had no money
-wherewith to purchase, subsisted by pillaging the neighboring
-frontier of Paphlagonia.[215] But they were receiving no pay; every
-man was living on his own resources; and instead of carrying back a
-handsome purse to Greece, as each soldier had hoped when he first
-took service under Cyrus, there seemed every prospect of their
-returning poorer than when they left home.[216] Moreover, the army
-was now moving onward without any definite purpose, with increasing
-dissatisfaction and decreasing discipline; insomuch that Xenophon
-foresaw the difficulties which would beset the responsible commanders
-when they should come within the stricter restraints and obligations
-of the Grecian world.
-
-  [215] Xen. Anab. v, 6, 19; vi, 1, 2.
-
-  [216] Xen. Anab. vi, 4, 8; vi, 2, 4.
-
-It was these considerations which helped to suggest to him the
-idea of employing the army on some enterprise of conquest and
-colonization in the Euxine itself; an idea highly flattering to
-his personal ambition, especially as the army was of unrivalled
-efficiency against an enemy, and no such second force could ever
-be got together in those distant regions. His patriotism as a
-Greek was inflamed with the thoughts of procuring for Hellas a new
-autonomous city, occupied by a considerable Hellenic population,
-possessing a spacious territory, and exercising dominion over many
-indigenous neighbors. He seems to have thought first of attacking and
-conquering some established non-Hellenic city; an act which his ideas
-of international morality did not forbid, in a case where he had
-contracted no special convention with the inhabitants,—though he (as
-well as Cheirisophus) strenuously protested against doing wrong to
-any innocent Hellenic community.[217] He contemplated the employment
-of the entire force in capturing Phasis or some other native city;
-after which, when the establishment was once safely effected, those
-soldiers who preferred going home to remaining as settlers, might
-do so without emperiling those who stayed, and probably with their
-own purses filled by plunder and conquest in the neighborhood. To
-settle as one of the richest proprietors and chiefs,—perhaps even
-the recognized Œkist, like Agnon at Amphipolis,—of a new Hellenic
-city such as could hardly fail to become rich, powerful, and
-important,—was a tempting prospect for one who had now acquired the
-habits of command. Moreover, the sequel will prove, how correctly
-Xenophon appreciated the discomfort of leading the army back to
-Greece without pay and without certain employment.
-
-  [217] Xen. Anab. v, 6, 15-30; vi, 2, 6; vii, 1, 25, 29.
-
-  Haken and other commentators do injustice to Xenophon when they
-  ascribe to him the design of seizing the Greek city of Kotyôra.
-
-It was the practice of Xenophon, and the advice of his master
-Sokrates,[218] in grave and doubtful cases, where the most careful
-reflection was at fault, to recur to the inspired authority of an
-oracle or a prophet, and to offer sacrifice, in full confidence
-that the gods would vouchsafe to communicate a special revelation
-to any person whom they favored. Accordingly Xenophon, previous to
-any communication with the soldiers respecting his new project, was
-anxious to ascertain the will of the gods by a special sacrifice; for
-which he invoked the presence of the Ambrakiot Silanus, the chief
-prophet in the army. This prophet (as I have already mentioned),
-before the battle of Kunaxa, had assured Cyrus that Artaxerxes would
-not fight for ten days,—and the prophecy came to pass; which made
-such an impression on Cyrus that he rewarded him with the prodigious
-present of three thousand darics or ten Attic talents. While others
-were returning poor, Silanus, having contrived to preserve this sum
-throughout all the hardships of the retreat, was extremely rich,
-and anxious only to hasten home with his treasure in safety. He
-heard with strong repugnance the project of remaining in the Euxine,
-and determined to traverse it by intrigue. As far as concerned
-the sacrifices, indeed, which he offered apart with Xenophon, he
-was obliged to admit that the indications of the victims were
-favorable;[219] Xenophon himself being too familiar with the process
-to be imposed upon. But he at the same time tried to create alarm by
-declaring that a nice inspection disclosed evidence of treacherous
-snares laid for Xenophon; which latter indications he himself began
-to realize, by spreading reports among the army that the Athenian
-general was laying clandestine plans for keeping them away from
-Greece without their own concurrence.[220]
-
-  [218] Xen. Memorab. i, 1, 8, 9. Ἔφη δὲ (Sokrates) δεῖν, ἃ μὲν
-  μαθόντας ποιεῖν ἔδωκαν οἱ θεοὶ, μανθάνειν· ἃ δὲ μὴ δῆλα τοῖς
-  ἀνθρώποις ἐστὶ, πειρᾶσθαι διὰ μαντικῆς παρὰ τῶν θεῶν πυνθάνεσθαι·
-  τοὺς θεοὺς γὰρ, οἷς ἂν ὦσιν ἰλέω, σημαίνειν.
-
-  Compare passages in his Cyropædia, i, 6, 3; De Officio Magistr.
-  Equit. ix, 9.
-
-  “The gods (says Euripides, in the Sokratic vein) have given us
-  wisdom to understand and appropriate to ourselves the ordinary
-  comforts of life; in obscure or unintelligible cases, we are
-  enabled to inform ourselves by looking at the blaze of the fire,
-  or by consulting prophets who understand the livers of sacrificial
-  victims and the flight of birds. When they have thus furnished so
-  excellent a provision for life, who but spoilt children can be
-  discontented, and ask for more? Yet still human prudence, full of
-  self-conceit, will struggle to be more powerful, and will presume
-  itself to be wiser, than the gods.”
-
-    Ἃ δ᾽ ἔστ᾽ ἄσημα, κοὐ σαφῆ, γιγνώσκομεν
-    Εἰς πῦρ βλέποντες, καὶ κατὰ σπλάγχνων πτύχας
-    Μάντεις προσημαίνουσιν οἰωνῶν τ᾽ ἄπο.
-    Ἆρ᾽ οὐ τρυφῶμεν, θεοῦ κατασκευὴν βίου
-    Δόντος τοιαύτην, οἷσιν οὐκ ἀρκεῖ τάδε;
-    Ἀλλ᾽ ἡ φρόνησις τοῦ θεοῦ μεῖζον σθένειν
-    Ζητεῖ· τὸ γαῦρον δ᾽ ἐν χεροῖν κεκτημένοι
-    Δοκοῦμεν εἶναι δαιμόνων σοφώτεροι (Supplices, 211).
-
-  It will be observed that this constant outpouring of special
-  revelations, through prophets, omens, etc., was (in the view of
-  these Sokratic thinkers) an essential part of the divine
-  government; indispensable to satisfy their ideas of the
-  benevolence of the gods; since rational and scientific
-  prediction was so habitually at fault and unable to fathom the
-  phenomena of the future.
-
-  [219] Xen. Anab. v. 6, 29.
-
-  [220] Though Xenophon accounted sacrifice to be an essential
-  preliminary to any action of dubious result, and placed great
-  faith in the indications which the victims offered, as signs of
-  the future purposes of the gods,—he nevertheless had very little
-  confidence in the professional prophets. He thought them quite
-  capable of gross deceit (See Xen. Cyrop. i, 6, 2, 3; compare
-  Sophokles, Antigone, 1035, 1060; and Œdip. Tyrann. 387).
-
-Thus prematurely and insidiously divulged, the scheme found some
-supporters, but a far larger number of opponents; especially among
-those officers who were jealous of the ascendency of Xenophon.
-Timasion and Thorax employed it as a means of alarming the
-Herakleotic and Sinopian traders in the camp; telling them that
-unless they provided not merely transports, but also pay for the
-soldiers, Xenophon would find means to detain the army in the Euxine,
-and would employ the transports when they arrived, not for the
-homeward voyage, but for his own projects of acquisition This news
-spread so much terror both at Sinôpê and Herakleia, that large offers
-of money were made from both cities to Timasion, on condition that he
-would ensure the departure of the army, as soon as the vessels should
-be assembled at Kotyôra. Accordingly these officers, convening an
-assembly of the soldiers, protested against the duplicity of Xenophon
-in thus preparing momentous schemes without any public debate or
-decision. And Timasion, seconded by Thorax, not only strenuously
-urged the army to return, but went so far as to promise to them, on
-the faith of the assurances from Herakleia and Sinôpê, future pay
-on a liberal scale, to commence from the first new moon after their
-departure; together with a hospitable reception in his native city of
-Dardanus on the Hellespont, from whence they could make incursions on
-the rich neighboring satrapy of Pharnabazus.[221]
-
-  [221] Xen. Anab. v, 6, 19-26.
-
-It was not, however, until these attacks were repeated from more
-than one quarter,—until the Achæans Philesius and Lykon had loudly
-accused Xenophon of underhand manœuvring to cheat the army into
-remaining against their will,—that the latter rose to repel the
-imputation; saying, that all that he had done was, to consult the
-gods whether it would be better to lay his project before the army or
-to keep it in his own bosom. The encouraging answer of the gods, as
-conveyed through the victims and testified even by Silanus himself,
-proved that the scheme was not ill-conceived; nevertheless, (he
-remarked) Silanus had begun to lay snares for him, realizing by his
-own proceedings a collateral indication which he had announced to be
-visible in the victims. “If (added Xenophon) you had continued as
-destitute and unprovided as you were just now,—I should still have
-looked out for a resource in the capture of some city which would
-have enabled such of you as chose, to return at once; while the rest
-stay behind to enrich themselves. But now there is no longer any
-necessity; since Herakleia and Sinôpê are sending transports, and
-Timasion promises pay to you from the next new moon. Nothing can be
-better; you will go back safely to Greece, and will receive pay for
-going thither. I desist at once from my scheme, and call upon all who
-were favorable to it to desist also. Only let us all keep together
-until we are on safe ground; and let the man who lags behind or runs
-off, be condemned as a wrong-doer.”[222]
-
-  [222] Xen. Anab. v, 6, 30-33.
-
-Xenophon immediately put this question to the vote, and every hand
-was held up in its favor. There was no man more disconcerted with
-the vote than the prophet Silanus, who loudly exclaimed against the
-injustice of detaining any one desirous to depart. But the soldiers
-put him down with vehement disapprobation, threatening that they
-would assuredly punish him if they caught him running off. His
-intrigue against Xenophon thus recoiled upon himself, for the moment.
-But shortly afterwards, when the army reached Herakleia, he took his
-opportunity for clandestine flight, and found his way back to Greece
-with the three thousand darics.[223]
-
-  [223] Xen. Anab. v, 6, 34; vi, 4, 13.
-
-If Silanus gained little by his manœuvre, Timasion and his partners
-gained still less. For so soon as it became known that the army had
-taken a formal resolution to go back to Greece, and that Xenophon
-himself had made the proposition, the Sinopians and the Herakleots
-felt at their ease. They sent the transport vessels, but withheld the
-money which they had promised to Timasion and Thorax. Hence these
-officers were exposed to dishonor and peril; for, having positively
-engaged to find pay for the army, they were now unable to keep their
-word. So keen were their apprehensions, that they came to Xenophon
-and told him that they had altered their views, and that they now
-thought it best to employ the newly-arrived transports in conveying
-the army, not to Greece, but against the town and territory of Phasis
-at the eastern extremity of the Euxine.[224] Xenophon replied, that
-they might convene the soldiers and make the proposition, if they
-chose; but that he would have nothing to say to it. To make the
-very proposition themselves, for which they had so much inveighed
-against Xenophon, was impossible without some preparation; so that
-each of them began individually to sound his captains, and get
-the scheme suggested by them. During this interval, the soldiery
-obtained information of the manœuvre, much to their discontent
-and indignation; of which Neon (the lieutenant of the absent
-Cheirisophus) took advantage, to throw the whole blame upon Xenophon;
-alleging that it was he who had converted the other officers to his
-original project, and that he intended as soon as the soldiers were
-on shipboard, to convey them fraudulently to Phasis instead of to
-Greece. There was something so plausible in this glaring falsehood,
-which represented Xenophon as the author of the renewed project,
-once his own,—and something so improbable in the fact that the
-other officers should spontaneously have renounced their own strong
-opinions to take up his,—that we can hardly be surprised at the
-ready credence which Neon’s calumny found among the army. Their
-exasperation against Xenophon became so intense, that they collected
-in fierce groups; and there was even a fear that they would break
-out into mutinous violence, as they had before done against the
-magistrates of Kerasus.
-
-  [224] Xen. Anab. v, 6, 36.
-
-  I may here note that this _Phasis_ in the Euxine means the town
-  of that name, not the river.
-
-Well knowing the danger of such spontaneous and informal assemblages,
-and the importance of the habitual solemnities of convocation
-and arrangement, to ensure either discussion or legitimate
-defence,[225]—Xenophon immediately sent round the herald to summon
-the army into the regular agora, with customary method and ceremony.
-The summons was obeyed with unusual alacrity, and Xenophon then
-addressed them,—refraining, with equal generosity and prudence, from
-saying anything about the last proposition which Timasion and others
-had made to him. Had he mentioned it, the question would have become
-one of life and death between him and those other officers.
-
-  [225] Xen. Anab. v, 7, 1-3.
-
-  Ἐπεὶ δὲ ᾐσθάνετο ὁ Ξενοφῶν, ἔδοξεν αὐτῷ ὡς τάχιστα συναγαγεῖν
-  αὐτῶν ἀγορὰν, καὶ μὴ ἐᾶσαι συλλεγῆναι αὐτομάτους· καὶ ἐκέλευε τὸν
-  κήρυκα συλλέξαι ἀγοράν.
-
-  The prudence of Xenophon in convoking the assembly at once is
-  incontestable. He could not otherwise have hindered the soldiers
-  from getting together, and exciting one another to action,
-  without any formal summons.
-
-  The reader should contrast with this the scene at Athens
-  (described in Thucydides, ii, 22; and in Vol. VI, Ch. xlviii, p.
-  133 of this History) during the first year of the Peloponnesian
-  war, and the first invasion of Attica by the Peloponnesians;
-  when the invaders were at Acharnæ, within sight of the walls of
-  Athens, burning and destroying the country. In spite of the most
-  violent excitement among the Athenian people, and the strongest
-  impatience to go out and fight, Perikles steadily refused to call
-  an assembly, for fear that the people should take the resolution
-  of going out. And what was much more remarkable—the people
-  even in that state of excitement though all united within the
-  walls, did not meet in any informal assembly, nor come to any
-  resolution, or to any active proceeding; which the Cyreians would
-  certainly have done, had they not been convened in a regular
-  assembly.
-
-  The contrast with the Cyreian army here illustrates the
-  extraordinary empire exercised by constitutional forms over the
-  minds of the Athenian citizens.
-
-“Soldiers (said he), I understand that there are some men here
-calumniating me, as if I were intending to cheat you and carry you
-to Phasis. Hear me, then, in the name of the gods. If I am shown to
-be doing wrong, let me not go from hence unpunished; but if, on the
-contrary, my calumniators are proved to be the wrong-doers, deal
-with them as they deserve. You surely well know where the sun rises
-and where he sets; you know that if a man wishes to reach Greece,
-he must go westward,—if to the barbaric territories, he must go
-eastward. Can any one hope to deceive you on this point, and persuade
-you that the sun rises on _this_ side, and sets on _that_? Can any
-one cheat you into going on shipboard with a wind which blows you
-away from Greece? Suppose even that I put you aboard when there is
-no wind at all. How am I to force you to sail with me against your
-own consent,—I being only in one ship, you in a hundred and more?
-Imagine, however, that I could even succeed in deluding you to
-Phasis. When we land there, you will know at once that we are not
-in Greece; and what fate can I then expect,—a detected impostor in
-the midst of ten thousand men with arms in their hands? No,—these
-stories all proceed from foolish men, who are jealous of my influence
-with you; jealous, too, without reason,—for I neither hinder _them_
-from outstripping me in your favor, if they can render you greater
-service,—nor _you_ from electing them commanders, if you think fit.
-Enough of this, now; I challenge any one to come forward and say how
-it is possible either to cheat, or to be cheated, in the manner laid
-to my charge.”[226]
-
-  [226] Xen. Anab. v, 7, 7-11.
-
-Having thus grappled directly with the calumnies of his enemies, and
-dissipated them in such manner as doubtless to create a reaction in
-his own favor, Xenophon made use of the opportunity to denounce the
-growing disorders in the army; which he depicted as such that, if no
-corrective were applied, disgrace and contempt must fall upon all.
-As he paused after this general remonstrance, the soldiers loudly
-called upon him to go into particulars; upon which he proceeded to
-recall, with lucid and impressive simplicity, the outrages which had
-been committed at and near Kerasus,—the unauthorized and unprovoked
-attack made by Klearetus and his company on a neighboring village
-which was in friendly commerce with the army,—the murder of the
-three elders of the village, who had come as heralds to complain
-to the generals about such wrong,—the mutinous attack made by
-disorderly soldiers even upon the magistrates of Kerasus, at the
-very moment when they were remonstrating with the generals on what
-had occurred; exposing these magistrates to the utmost peril, and
-putting the generals themselves to ignominy.[227] “If such are to
-be our proceedings, (continued Xenophon), look you well into what
-condition the army will fall. You, the aggregate body,[228] will no
-longer be the sovereign authority to make war or peace with whom
-you please; each individual among you will conduct the army against
-any point which he may choose. And even if men should come to you as
-envoys, either for peace or for other purposes, they may be slain
-by any single enemy; so that you will be debarred from all public
-communications whatever. Next, those whom your universal suffrage
-shall have chosen commanders, will have no authority; while any
-self-elected general who chooses to give the word, Cast! Cast! (i.
-e. darts or stones), may put to death, without trial, either officer
-or soldier, as it suits him; that is, if he finds you ready to obey
-him, as it happened near Kerasus. Look, now, what these self-elected
-leaders have done for you. The magistrate of Kerasus, if he was
-really guilty of wrong towards you, has been enabled to escape with
-impunity; if he was innocent, he has been obliged to run away from
-you, as the only means of avoiding death without pretence or trial.
-Those who stoned the heralds to death, have brought matters to such
-a pass, that you alone, among all Greeks, cannot enter the town of
-Kerasus in safety, unless in commanding force; and that we cannot
-even send in a herald to take up our dead (Klearetus and those who
-were slain in the attack on the Kerasuntine village) for burial;
-though at first those who had slain them in self-defence were anxious
-to give up the bodies to us. For who will take the risk of going in
-as herald, from those who have set the example of putting heralds to
-death? We generals were obliged to entreat the Kerasuntines to bury
-the bodies for us.”[229]
-
-  [227] Xen. Anab. v, 7, 13-26.
-
-  [228] Xen. Anab. v, 7, 26-27. Εἰ οὖν ταῦτα τοιαῦτα ἔσται,
-  θεάσασθε οἵα ἡ κατάστασις ἡμῖν ἔσται τῆς στρατιᾶς. Ὑμεῖς μὲν οἱ
-  πάντες οὐκ ἔσεσθε κύριοι, οὔτ᾽ ἀνελέσθαι πόλεμον ᾧ ἂν βούλησθε,
-  οὔτε καταλῦσαι· ἰδίᾳ δὲ ὁ βουλόμενος ἄξει στράτευμα ἐφ᾽ ὅ,τι ἂν
-  ἐθέλῃ. Κἄν τινες πρὸς ὑμᾶς ἴωσι πρέσβεις, ἢ εἰρήνης δεόμενοι ἢ
-  ἄλλου τινός, κατακαίνοντες τούτους οἱ βουλόμενοι, ποιήσουσιν ὑμᾶς
-  τῶν λόγων μὴ ἀκοῦσαι τῶν πρὸς ὑμᾶς ἰόντων. Ἔπειτα δὲ, οὓς μὲν ἂν
-  ὑμεῖς ἅπαντες ἔλησθε ἄρχοντας, ἐν οὐδεμίᾳ χώρᾳ ἔσονται· ὅστις δ᾽
-  ἂν ἑαυτὸν ἕληται στρατηγὸν, καὶ ἐθέλῃ λέγειν, Βάλλε, Βάλλε, οὗτος
-  ἔσται ἱκανὸς καὶ ἄρχοντα κατακαίνειν καὶ ἰδιώτην ὃν ἂν ὑμῶν ἐθέλῃ
-  ἄκριτον—ἂν ὦσιν οἱ πεισόμενοι αὐτῷ, ὥσπερ καὶ νῦν ἐγένετο.
-
-  [229] Xen. Anab. v, 7, 27-30.
-
-Continuing in this emphatic protest against the recent disorders
-and outrages, Xenophon at length succeeded in impressing his own
-sentiment, heartily and unanimously, upon the soldiers. They passed
-a vote that the ringleaders of the mutiny at Kerasus should be
-punished; that if any one was guilty of similar outrages in future,
-he should be put upon his trial by the generals, before the lochages
-or captains as judges, and if condemned by them, put to death; and
-that trial should be had before the same persons, for any other wrong
-committed since the death of Cyrus. A suitable religious ceremony was
-also directed to be performed, at the instance of Xenophon and the
-prophets, to purify the army.[230]
-
-  [230] Xen. Anab. v, 7, 34, 35.
-
-This speech affords an interesting specimen of the political
-morality universal throughout the Grecian world, though deeper and
-more predominant among its better sections. In the miscellaneous
-aggregate, and temporary society, now mustered at Kotyôra, Xenophon
-insists on the universal suffrage of the whole body, as the
-legitimate sovereign authority for the guidance of every individual
-will; the decision of the majority, fairly and formally collected,
-as carrying a title to prevail over every dissentient minority;
-the generals chosen by the majority of votes, as the only persons
-entitled to obedience. This is the cardinal principle to which he
-appeals, as the anchorage of political obligation in the mind of
-each separate man or fraction; as the condition of all success, all
-safety, and all conjoint action; as the only condition either for
-punishing wrong or protecting right; as indispensable to keep up
-their sympathies with the Hellenic communities, and their dignity
-either as soldiers or as citizens. The complete success of his speech
-proves that he knew how to touch the right chord of Grecian feeling.
-No serious acts of individual insubordination occurred afterwards,
-though the army collectively went wrong on more than one occasion.
-And what is not less important to notice,—the influence of Xenophon
-himself, after his unreserved and courageous remonstrance, seems to
-have been sensibly augmented,—certainly no way diminished.
-
-The circumstances which immediately followed were indeed well
-calculated to augment it. For it was resolved, on the proposition of
-Xenophon himself[231] that the generals themselves should be tried
-before the newly-constituted tribunal of the lochages or captains,
-in case any one had complaint to make against them for past matters;
-agreeably to the Athenian habit of subjecting every magistrate to
-a trial of accountability on laying down his office. In the course
-of this investigation, Philesius and Xanthiklês were fined twenty
-minæ, to make good an assignable deficiency of that amount, in the
-cargoes of those merchantmen which had been detained at Trapezus
-for the transport of the army; Sophænetus, who had the general
-superintendence of this property, but had been negligent in that
-duty, was fined ten minæ. Next, the name of Xenophon was put up, when
-various persons stood forward to accuse him of having beaten and
-ill-used them. As commander of the rear-guard, his duty was by far
-the severest and most difficult, especially during the intense cold
-and deep snow; since the sick and wounded, as well as the laggards
-and plunderers, all fell under his inspection. One man especially
-was loud in complaints against him, and Xenophon questioned him, as
-to the details of his case, before the assembled army. It turned out
-that he had given him blows, because the man, having been intrusted
-with the task of carrying a sick soldier, was about to evade the duty
-by burying the dying man alive.[232] This interesting debate (given
-in the Anabasis at length) ended by full approbation, on the part of
-the army, of Xenophon’s conduct, accompanied with regret that he had
-not handled the man yet more severely.
-
-  [231] Xen. Anab. v, 7, 35.
-
-  Παραινοῦντος δὲ Ξενοφῶντος, καὶ τῶν μάντεων συμβουλευόντων, ἔδοξε
-  καὶ καθᾶραι τὸ στράτευμα· καὶ ἐγένετο καθαρμός· ἔδοξε δὲ καὶ τοὺς
-  στρατηγοὺς δίκην ὑποσχεῖν τοῦ παρεληλυθότος χρόνου.
-
-  In the distribution of chapters as made by the editors, chapter
-  the eighth is made to begin at the second ἔδοξε, which seems to
-  me not convenient for comprehending the full sense. I think that
-  the second ἔδοξε, as well as the first, is connected with the
-  words παραινοῦντος Ξενοφῶντος, and ought to be included not only
-  in the same chapter with them, but also in the same sentence,
-  without an intervening full stop.
-
-  [232] Xen. Anab. v, 8, 3-12.
-
-The statements of Xenophon himself give us a vivid idea of the
-internal discipline of the army, even as managed by a discreet and
-well-tempered officer. “I acknowledge (said he to the soldiers) to
-have struck many men for disorderly conduct; men who were content to
-owe their preservation to your orderly march and constant fighting,
-while they themselves ran about to plunder and enrich themselves at
-your cost. Had we all acted as they did, we should have perished to
-a man. Sometimes, too, I struck men who were lagging behind with
-cold and fatigue, or were stopping the way so as to hinder others
-from getting forward; I struck them with my fist,[233] in order to
-save them from the spear of the enemy. You yourselves stood by,
-and saw me; you had arms in your hands, yet none of you interfered
-to prevent me. I did it for their good as well as for yours, not
-from any insolence of disposition; for it was a time when we were
-all alike suffering from cold, hunger, and fatigue; whereas I now
-live comparatively well, drink more wine, and pass easy days,—and
-yet I strike no one. You will find that the men who failed most
-in those times of hardship, are now the most outrageous offenders
-in the army. There is Boïskus,[234] the Thessalian pugilist, who
-pretended sickness during the march, in order to evade the burthen
-of carrying his shield,—and now, as I am informed, he has stripped
-several citizens of Kotyôra of their clothes. If (he concluded) the
-blows which I have occasionally given, in cases of necessity, are
-now brought in evidence,—I call upon those among you also, to whom
-I have rendered aid and protection, to stand up and testify in my
-favor.”[235]
-
-  [233] Xen. Anab. v, 8, 16. ἔπαισα πὺξ, ὅπως μὴ λόγχῃ ὑπὸ τῶν
-  πολεμίων παίοιτο.
-
-  [234] The idea that great pugilists were not good soldiers in
-  battle, is as old among the Greeks as the Iliad. The unrivalled
-  pugilist of the Homeric Grecian army, Epeius, confesses his own
-  inferiority as a soldier (Iliad, xxiii 667).
-
-    Ἆσσον ἴτω, ὅστις δέπας οἴσεται ἀμφικύπελλον·
-    Ἡμίονον δ᾽ οὔ φημί τιν᾽ ἄξεμεν ἄλλον Ἀχαιῶν,
-    Πυγμῇ νικήσαντ᾽· ἐπεὶ εὔχομαι εἶναι ἄριστος.
-    ~Ἦ οὐχ ἅλις, ὅ,ττι μάχης ἐπιδεύομαι~; οὐδ᾽ ἄρα πως ἦν
-    Ἐν πάντεσσ᾽ ἔργοισι δαήμονα φῶτα γενέσθαι.
-
-  [235] Xen. Anab. v, 8, 13-25.
-
-Many individuals responded to this appeal, insomuch that Xenophon
-was not merely acquitted, but stood higher than before in the
-opinion of the army. We learn from his defence that for a commanding
-officer to strike a soldier with his fist, if wanting in duty,
-was not considered improper; at least under such circumstances as
-those of the retreat. But what deserves notice still more, is, the
-extraordinary influence which Xenophon’s powers of speaking gave him
-over the minds of the army. He stood distinguished from the other
-generals, Lacedæmonian, Arcadian, Achæan, etc., by having the power
-of working on the minds of the soldiers collectively; and we see
-that he had the good sense, as well as the spirit, not to shrink
-from telling them unpleasant truths. In spite of such frankness—or
-rather, partly by means of such frankness,—his ascendency as
-commander not only remained unabated, as compared with that of the
-others, but went on increasing. For whatever may be said about the
-flattery of orators as a means of influence over the people,—it
-will be found that though particular points may be gained in this
-way, yet wherever the influence of an orator has been steady and
-long-continued (like that of Perikles[236] or Demosthenes) it is
-owing in part to the fact that he has an opinion of his own, and is
-not willing to accommodate himself constantly to the prepossessions
-of his hearers. Without the oratory of Xenophon, there would have
-existed no engine for kindling or sustaining the _sensus communis_
-of the ten thousand Cyreians assembled at Kotyôra, or for keeping
-up the moral authority of the aggregate over the individual members
-and fractions. The other officers could doubtless speak well enough
-to address short encouragements, or give simple explanations, to
-the soldiers; without this faculty, no man was fit for military
-command over Greeks. But the oratory of Xenophon was something of
-a higher order. Whoever will study the discourse pronounced by him
-at Kotyôra, will perceive a dexterity in dealing with assembled
-multitudes,—a discriminating use sometimes of the plainest and
-most direct appeal, sometimes of indirect insinuation or circuitous
-transitions to work round the minds of the hearers,—a command of
-those fundamental political convictions which lay deep in the Grecian
-mind, but were often so overlaid by the fresh impulses arising out of
-each successive situation, as to require some positive friction to
-draw them out from their latent state—lastly, a power of expansion
-and varied repetition—such as would be naturally imparted both
-by the education and the practice of an intelligent Athenian, but
-would rarely be found in any other Grecian city. The energy and
-judgment displayed by Xenophon in the retreat were doubtless not less
-essential to his influence than his power of speaking; but in these
-points we may be sure that other officers were more nearly his equals.
-
-  [236] See the striking remarks of Thucydides (ii, 65) upon
-  Perikles.
-
-The important public proceedings above described not only restored
-the influence of Xenophon, but also cleared off a great amount of
-bad feeling, and sensibly abated the bad habits, which had grown up
-in the army. A scene which speedily followed was not without effect
-in promoting cheerful and amicable sympathies. The Paphlagonian
-prince Korylas, weary of the desultory warfare carried on between
-the Greeks and the border inhabitants, sent envoys to the Greek camp
-with presents of horses and fine robes,[237] and with expressions of
-a wish to conclude peace. The Greek generals accepted the presents,
-and promised to submit the proposition to the army. But first they
-entertained the envoys at a banquet, providing at the same time
-games and dances, with other recreations amusing not only to them
-but also to the soldiers generally. The various dances, warlike and
-pantomimic, of Thracians, Mysians, Ænianes, Magnêtes, etc., are
-described by Xenophon in a lively and interesting manner. They were
-followed on the next day by an amicable convention concluded between
-the army and the Paphlagonians.[238]
-
-  [237] Xen. Anab. vi, 1, 2. Πέμπει παρὰ τοὺς Ἕλληνας πρέσβεις,
-  ἔχοντας ἵππους καὶ στολὰς καλάς, etc.
-
-  The horses sent were doubtless native Paphlagonian; the robes
-  sent were probably the produce of the looms of Sinôpê and
-  Kotyôra; just as the Thracian princes used to receive fine woven
-  and metallic fabrics from Abdêra and the other Grecian colonies
-  on their coast—ὑφαντὰ καὶ λεῖα, καὶ ἡ ἄλλη κατασκευὴ, etc.
-  (Thucyd. ii, 96). From the like industry probably proceeded
-  the splendid “regia textilia” and abundance of gold and silver
-  vessels, captured by the Roman general Paulus Emilius along with
-  Perseus the last king of Macedonia (Livy, xlv, 33-35).
-
-  [238] Xen. Anab. vi, 1, 10-14.
-
-Not long afterwards,—a number of transports, sufficient for the
-whole army, having been assembled from Herakleia and Sinôpê,—all the
-soldiers were conveyed by sea to the latter place, passing by the
-mouth of the rivers Thermodon, Iris, and Halys, which they would have
-found impracticable to cross in a land-march through Paphlagonia.
-Having reached Sinôpê after a day and a night of sailing with a fair
-wind, they were hospitably received, and lodged in the neighboring
-seaport of Armênê, where the Sinopians sent to them a large present
-of barley-meal and wine, and where they remained for five days.
-
-It was here that they were joined by Cheirisophus, whose absence
-had been so unexpectedly prolonged. But he came with only a single
-trireme, bringing nothing except a message from Anaxibius, the
-Lacedæmonian admiral in the Bosphorus; who complimented the army,
-and promised that they should be taken into pay as soon as they
-were out of the Euxine. The soldiers, severely disappointed on
-seeing him arrive thus empty-handed, became the more strongly bent
-on striking some blow to fill their own purses before they reached
-Greece. Feeling that it was necessary to the success of any such
-project that it should be prepared not only skilfully, but secretly,
-they resolved to elect a single general in place of that board of
-six (or perhaps more) who were still in function. Such was now the
-ascendency of Xenophon, that the general sentiment of the army at
-once turned towards him; and the lochages or captains, communicating
-to him what was in contemplation, intimated to him their own anxious
-hopes that he would not decline the offer. Tempted by so flattering
-a proposition, he hesitated at first what answer he should give. But
-at length the uncertainty of being able to satisfy the exigencies
-of the army, and the fear of thus compromising the reputation which
-he had already realized, outweighed the opposite inducements. As
-in other cases of doubt, so in this,—he offered sacrifice to Zeus
-Basileus; and the answer returned by the victims was such as to
-determine him to refusal. Accordingly, when the army assembled, with
-predetermination to choose a single chief, and proceeded to nominate
-him,—he respectfully and thankfully declined, on the ground that
-Cheirisophus was a Lacedæmonian, and that he himself was not; adding
-that he should cheerfully serve under any one whom they might name.
-His excuse, however, was repudiated by the army; and especially by
-the lochages. Several of these latter were Arcadians; and one of
-them, Agasias, cried out, with full sympathy of the soldiers, that if
-that principle were admitted, he, as an Arcadian, ought to resign his
-command. Finding that his former reason was not approved, Xenophon
-acquainted the army that he had sacrificed to know whether he ought
-to accept the command, and that the gods had peremptorily forbidden
-him to do so.[239]
-
-  [239] Xen. Anab. vi, 1, 22-31.
-
-Cheirisophus was then elected sole commander, and undertook the
-duty; saying that he would have willingly served under Xenophon,
-if the latter had accepted the office, but that it was a good
-thing for Xenophon himself to have declined,—since Dexippus had
-already poisoned the mind of Anaxibius against him, although he
-(Cheirisophus) had emphatically contradicted the calumnies.[240]
-
-  [240] Xen. Anab. vi, 1, 32.
-
-On the next day, the army sailed forward, under the command of
-Cheirisophus, to Herakleia; near which town they were hospitably
-entertained, and gratified with a present of meal, wine, and
-bullocks, even greater than they had received at Sinôpê. It now
-appeared that Xenophon had acted wisely in declining the sole
-command; and also that Cheirisophus, though elected commander, yet
-having been very long absent, was not really of so much importance
-in the eyes of the soldiers as Xenophon. In the camp near Herakleia,
-the soldiers became impatient that their generals (for the habit
-of looking upon Xenophon as one of them still continued) took no
-measures to procure money for them. The Achæan Lykon proposed that
-they should extort a contribution of no less than three thousand
-staters of Kyzikus (about sixty thousand Attic drachmæ, or ten
-talents, equal to two thousand three hundred pounds) from the
-inhabitants of Herakleia; another man immediately outbid this
-proposition, and proposed that they should require ten thousand
-staters—a full month’s pay for the army. It was moved that
-Cheirisophus and Xenophon should go to the Herakleots as envoys with
-this demand. But both of them indignantly refused to be concerned in
-so unjust an extortion from a Grecian city which had just received
-the army kindly, and sent handsome presents. Accordingly, Lykon
-with two Arcadian officers undertook the mission, and intimated
-the demand, not without threats in case of non-compliance, to
-the Herakleots. The latter replied that they would take it into
-consideration. But they waited only for the departure of the envoys,
-and then immediately closed their gates, manned their walls, and
-brought in their outlying property.
-
-The project being thus baffled, Lykon and the rest turned their
-displeasure upon Cheirisophus and Xenophon, whom they accused of
-having occasioned its miscarriage. And they now began to exclaim,
-that it was disgraceful to the Arcadians and Achæans; who formed more
-than one numerical half of the army and endured all the toil—to obey
-as well as to enrich generals from other Hellenic cities; especially
-a single Athenian who furnished no contingent to the army. Here
-again it is remarkable that the personal importance of Xenophon
-caused him to be still regarded as a general, though the sole command
-had been vested, by formal vote, in Cheirisophus. So vehement was
-the dissatisfaction, that all the Arcadian and Achæan soldiers in
-the army, more than four thousand and five hundred hoplites in
-number, renounced the authority of Cheirisophus, formed themselves
-into a distinct division, and chose ten commanders from out of
-their own numbers. The whole army thus became divided into three
-portions—first, the Arcadians and Achæans; secondly, one thousand
-and four hundred hoplites and seven hundred peltasts, who adhered
-to Cheirisophus; lastly, one thousand seven hundred hoplites, three
-hundred peltasts, and forty horsemen, (all the horsemen in the army)
-attaching themselves to Xenophon; who however was taking measures to
-sail away individually from Herakleia and quit the army altogether,
-which he would have done had he not been restrained by unfavorable
-sacrifices.[241]
-
-  [241] Xen. Anab. vi, 2, 11-16.
-
-The Arcadian division, departing first, in vessels from Herakleia,
-landed at the harbor of Kalpê; an untenanted promontory of the
-Bithynian or Asiatic Thrace, midway between Herakleia and Byzantium.
-From thence they marched at once into the interior of Bithynia, with
-the view of surprising the villages, and acquiring plunder. But
-through rashness and bad management, they first sustained several
-partial losses, and ultimately became surrounded upon an eminence, by
-a large muster of the indigenous Bithynians from all the territory
-around. They were only rescued from destruction by the unexpected
-appearance of Xenophon with his division; who had left Herakleia
-somewhat later, but heard by accident, during their march, of the
-danger of their comrades. The whole army thus became re-assembled at
-Kalpê, where the Arcadians and Achæans, disgusted at the ill-success
-of their separate expedition, again established the old union
-and the old generals. They chose Neon in place of Cheirisophus,
-who,—afflicted by the humiliation put upon him, in having been
-first named sole commander and next deposed within a week,—had
-fallen sick of a fever and died. The elder Arcadian captains farther
-moved a resolution, that if any one henceforward should propose to
-separate the army into fractions, he should be put to death.[242]
-
-  [242] Xenoph. Anab. vi. 3, 10-25; vi, 4, 11.
-
-The locality of Kalpê was well suited for the foundation of a colony,
-which Xenophon evidently would have been glad to bring about, though
-he took no direct measures tending towards it; while the soldiers
-were so bent on returning to Greece, and so jealous lest Xenophon
-should entrap them into remaining, that they almost shunned the
-encampment. It so happened that they were detained there for some
-days without being able to march forth even in quest of provisions,
-because the sacrifices were not favorable. Xenophon refused to
-lead them out, against the warning of the sacrifices—although the
-army suspected him of a deliberate manœuvre for the purpose of
-detention. Neon, however, less scrupulous, led out a body of two
-thousand men who chose to follow him, under severe distress for want
-of provisions. But being surprised by the native Bithynians, with
-the aid of some troops of the Persian satrap Pharnabazus, he was
-defeated with the loss of no less than five hundred men; a misfortune
-which Xenophon regards as the natural retribution for contempt of
-the sacrificial warning. The dangerous position of Neon with the
-remainder of the detachment was rapidly made known at the camp; upon
-which Xenophon, unharnessing a waggon-bullock as the only animal near
-at hand, immediately offered sacrifice. On this occasion, the victim
-was at once favorable; so that he led out without delay the greater
-part of the force, to the rescue of the exposed detachment, which was
-brought back in safety to the camp. So bold had the enemy become,
-that in the night the camp was attacked. The Greeks were obliged on
-the next day to retreat into stronger ground, surrounding themselves
-with a ditch and palisade. Fortunately a vessel arrived from
-Herakleia, bringing to the camp at Kalpê a supply of barley-meal,
-cattle, and wine; which restored the spirits of the army, enabling
-them to go forth on the ensuing morning, and assume the aggressive
-against the Bithynians and the troops of Pharnabazus. These troops
-were completely defeated and dispersed, so that the Greeks returned
-to their camp at Kalpê in the evening, both safe and masters of the
-country.[243]
-
-  [243] Xen. Anab. vi, 5.
-
-At Kalpê they remained some time, awaiting the arrival of Kleander
-from Byzantium, who was said to be about to bring vessels for their
-transport. They were now abundantly provided with supplies, not
-merely from the undisturbed plunder of the neighboring villages, but
-also from the visits of traders who came with cargoes. Indeed the
-impression—that they were preparing, at the instance of Xenophon,
-to found a new city at Kalpê—became so strong, that several of the
-neighboring native villages sent envoys to ask on what terms alliance
-would be granted to them. At length Kleander came, but with two
-triremes only.[244]
-
-  [244] Xen. Anab. vi, 6, 1-5.
-
-Kleander was the Lacedæmonian harmost or governor of Byzantium. His
-appearance opens to us a new phase in the eventful history of this
-gallant army, as well as an insight into the state of the Grecian
-world under the Lacedæmonian empire. He came attended by Dexippus,
-who had served in the Cyreian army until their arrival at Trapezus,
-and who had there been entrusted with an armed vessel for the purpose
-of detaining transports to convey the troops home, but had abused the
-confidence reposed in him by running away with the ship to Byzantium.
-
-It so happened that at the moment when Kleander arrived, the whole
-army was out on a marauding excursion. Orders had been already
-promulgated, that whatever was captured by every one when the whole
-army was out, should be brought in and dealt with as public property;
-though on days when the army was collectively at rest, any soldier
-might go out individually and take to himself whatever he could
-pillage. On the day when Kleander arrived, and found the whole army
-out, some soldiers were just coming back with a lot of sheep which
-they had seized. By right, the sheep ought to have been handed into
-the public store. But these soldiers, desirous to appropriate them
-wrongfully, addressed themselves to Dexippus, and promised him a
-portion if he would enable them to retain the rest. Accordingly
-the latter interfered, drove away those who claimed the sheep as
-public property, and denounced them as thieves to Kleander; who
-desired him to bring them before him. Dexippus arrested one of them,
-a soldier belonging to the lochus or company of one of the best
-friends of Xenophon,—the Arcadian Agasias. The latter took the man
-under his protection; while the soldiers around, incensed not less
-at the past than at the present conduct of Dexippus, broke out into
-violent manifestations, called him a traitor and pelted him with
-stones. Such was their wrath that not Dexippus alone, but the crew
-of the triremes also, and even Kleander himself, fled in alarm; in
-spite of the intervention of Xenophon and the other generals, who
-on the one hand explained to Kleander, that it was an established
-army-order which these soldiers were seeking to enforce—and on the
-other hand controlled the mutineers. But the Lacedæmonian harmost
-was so incensed as well by his own fright as by the calumnies of
-Dexippus, that he threatened to sail away at once, and proclaim the
-Cyreian army enemies to Sparta, so that every Hellenic city should
-be interdicted from giving them reception.[245] It was in vain that
-the generals, well knowing the formidable consequences of such
-an interdict, entreated him to relent. He would consent only on
-condition that the soldier who had begun to throw stones, as well as
-Agasias the interfering officer, should be delivered up to him. This
-latter demand was especially insisted upon by Dexippus, who, hating
-Xenophon, had already tried to prejudice Anaxibius against him, and
-believed that Agasias had acted by his order.[246]
-
-  [245] Xen. Anab. vi, 6, 5-9.
-
-  [246] Xen. Anab. vi, 1, 32; vi, 4, 11-15.
-
-The situation became now extremely critical; since the soldiers
-would not easily be brought to surrender their comrades,—who had
-a perfectly righteous cause, though they had supported it by undue
-violence,—to the vengeance of a traitor like Dexippus. When the
-army was convened in assembly, several of them went so far as to
-treat the menace of Kleander with contempt. But Xenophon took pains
-to set them right upon this point. “Soldiers (said he), it will be
-no slight misfortune if Kleander shall depart as he threatens to
-do, in his present temper towards us. We are here close upon the
-cities of Greece; now the Lacedæmonians are the imperial power in
-Greece, and not merely their authorized officers, but even each one
-of their individual citizens, can accomplish what he pleases in the
-various cities. If then Kleander begins by shutting us out from
-Byzantium, and next enjoins the Lacedæmonian harmosts in the other
-cities to do the same, proclaiming us lawless and disobedient to
-Sparta,—if, besides, the same representation should be conveyed to
-the Lacedæmonian admiral of the fleet, Anaxibius,—we shall be hard
-pressed either to remain or to sail away; for the Lacedæmonians are
-at present masters, both on land and at sea.[247] We must not, for
-the sake of any one or two men, suffer the whole army to be excluded
-from Greece. We must obey whatever the Lacedæmonians command,
-especially as our cities, to which we respectively belong, now obey
-them. As to what concerns myself, I understand that Dexippus has told
-Kleander that Agasias would never have taken such a step except by my
-orders. Now, if Agasias himself states this, I am ready to exonerate
-both him and all of you, and to give myself up to any extremity
-of punishment. I maintain too, that any other man whom Kleander
-arraigns, ought in like manner to give himself up for trial, in order
-that you collectively may be discharged from the imputation. It will
-be hard indeed, if just as we are reaching Greece, we should not
-only be debarred from the praise and honor which we anticipated, but
-should be degraded even below the level of others, and shut out from
-the Grecian cities.”[248]
-
-  [247] Xen. Anab. vi, 6, 12, 13.
-
-  Εἰσὶ μὲν γὰρ ἤδη ἐγγὺς αἱ Ἑλληνίδες πόλεις· τῆς δ᾽ Ἑλλάδος
-  Λακεδαιμόνιοι προεστήκασιν· ~ἱκανοὶ δέ εἰσι καὶ εἶς ἕκαστος
-  Λακεδαιμονίων ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ὅ,τι βούλονται διαπράττεσθαι~.
-  Εἰ οὖν οὗτος πρῶτον μὲν ἡμᾶς Βυζαντίου ἀποκλείσει, ἔπειτα δὲ
-  τοῖς ἄλλοις ἁρμοσταῖς παραγγελεῖ εἰς τὰς πόλεις μὴ δέχεσθαι,
-  ὡς ἀπιστοῦντας Λακεδαιμονίοις καὶ ἀνόμους ὄντας—ἔτι δὲ πρὸς
-  Ἀναξίβιον τὸν ναύαρχον οὗτος ὁ λόγος περὶ ἡμῶν ἥξει—χαλεπὸν
-  ἔσται καὶ μένειν καὶ αποπλεῖν· ~καὶ γὰρ ἐν τῇ γῇ ἄρχουσι
-  Λακεδαιμόνιοι καὶ ἐν τῇ θαλάττῃ τὸν νῦν χρόνον~.
-
-  [248] Xen. Anab. vi, 6, 12-16.
-
-After this speech from the philo-Laconian Xenophon,—so significant
-a testimony of the unmeasured ascendency and interference of the
-Lacedæmonians throughout Greece,—Agasias rose and proclaimed, that
-what he had done was neither under the orders, nor with the privity,
-of Xenophon; that he had acted on a personal impulse of wrath, at
-seeing his own honest and innocent soldier dragged away by the
-traitor Dexippus; but that he now willingly gave himself up as a
-victim, to avert from the army the displeasure of the Lacedæmonians.
-This generous self-sacrifice, which at the moment promised nothing
-less than a fatal result to Agasias, was accepted by the army; and
-the generals conducted both him and the soldier whom he had rescued,
-as prisoners to Kleander. Presenting himself as the responsible
-party, Agasias at the same time explained to Kleander the infamous
-behavior of Dexippus to the army, and said that towards no one else
-would he have acted in the same manner; while the soldier whom he had
-rescued and who was given up at the same time, also affirmed that
-he had interfered merely to prevent Dexippus and some others from
-overruling, for their own individual benefit, a proclaimed order
-of the entire army. Kleander, having observed that if Dexippus had
-done what was affirmed, he would be the last to defend him, but that
-no one ought to have been stoned without trial,—desired that the
-persons surrendered might be left for his consideration, and at the
-same time retracted his expressions of displeasure as regarded all
-the others.[249]
-
-  [249] Xen. Anab. vi, 6, 22-28.
-
-The generals then retired, leaving Kleander in possession of the
-prisoners, and on the point of taking his dinner. But they retired
-with mournful feelings, and Xenophon presently convened the army
-to propose that a general deputation should be sent to Kleander to
-implore his lenity towards their two comrades. This being cordially
-adopted, Xenophon, at the head of a deputation comprising Drakontius,
-the Spartan, as well as the chief officers, addressed an earnest
-appeal to Kleander, representing that his honor had been satisfied
-with the unconditional surrender of the two persons required; that
-the army, deeply concerned for two meritorious comrades, entreated
-him now to show mercy and spare their lives; that they promised him
-in return the most implicit obedience, and entreated him to take the
-command of them, in order that he might have personal cognizance
-of their exact discipline, and compare their worth with that of
-Dexippus. Kleander was not merely soothed, but completely won over
-by this address; and said in reply that the conduct of the generals
-belied altogether the representations made to him, (doubtless by
-Dexippus) that they were seeking to alienate the army from the
-Lacedæmonians. He not only restored the two men in his power, but
-also accepted the command of the army, and promised to conduct them
-back into Greece.[250]
-
-  [250] Xen. Anab. vi, 6, 31-36.
-
-The prospects of the army appeared thus greatly improved; the
-more so, as Kleander, on entering upon his new functions as
-commander, found the soldiers so cheerful and orderly, that he was
-highly gratified, and exchanged personal tokens of friendship and
-hospitality with Xenophon. But when sacrifices came to be offered,
-for beginning the march homeward, the signs were so unpropitious,
-for three successive days, that Kleander could not bring himself to
-brave such auguries at the outset of his career. Accordingly, he told
-the generals, that the gods plainly forbade him, and reserved it
-for them, to conduct the army into Greece; that he should therefore
-sail back to Byzantium, and would receive the army in the best way
-he could, when they reached the Bosphorus. After an interchange
-of presents with the soldiers, he then departed with his two
-triremes.[251]
-
-  [251] Xen. Anab. vi, 6, 36, 37.
-
-The favorable sentiment now established in the bosom of Kleander will
-be found very serviceable hereafter to the Cyreians at Byzantium;
-but they had cause for deeply regretting the unpropitious sacrifices
-which had deterred him from assuming the actual command at Kalpê. In
-the request preferred to him by them that he would march as their
-commander to the Bosphorus, we may recognize a scheme, and a very
-well-contrived scheme, of Xenophon; who had before desired to leave
-the army at Herakleia, and who saw plainly that the difficulties of
-a commander, unless he were a Lacedæmonian of station and influence,
-would increase with every step of their approach to Greece. Had
-Kleander accepted the command, the soldiers would have been better
-treated, while Xenophon himself might either have remained as his
-adviser, or might have gone home. He probably would have chosen the
-latter course.
-
-Under the command of their own officers, the Cyreians now marched
-from Kalpê across Bithynia to Chrysopolis,[252] (in the territory of
-Chalkêdon on the Asiatic edge of the Bosphorus, immediately opposite
-to Byzantium, as Scutari now is to Constantinople), where they
-remained seven days, turning into money the slaves and plunder which
-they had collected. Unhappily for them, the Lacedæmonian admiral
-Anaxibius was now at Byzantium, so that their friend Kleander was
-under his superior command. And Pharnabazus, the Persian satrap
-of the north-western regions of Asia Minor, becoming much alarmed
-lest they should invade his satrapy, despatched a private message
-to Anaxibius; whom he prevailed upon, by promise of large presents,
-to transport the army forthwith across to the European side of the
-Bosphorus.[253] Accordingly, Anaxibius, sending for the generals and
-the lochages across to Byzantium, invited the army to cross, and gave
-them his assurance that as soon as the soldiers should be in Europe,
-he would provide pay for them. The other officers told him that they
-would return with this message and take the sense of the army; but
-Xenophon, on his own account, said that he should not return; that he
-should now retire from the army, and sail away from Byzantium. It was
-only on the pressing instance of Anaxibius that he was induced to go
-back to Chrysopolis and conduct the army across; on the understanding
-that he should depart immediately afterwards.
-
-  [252] Nearly the same cross march was made by the Athenian
-  general Lamachus, in the eighth year of the Peloponnesian war,
-  after he had lost his triremes by a sudden rise of the water
-  at the mouth of the river Kalex, in the territory of Herakleia
-  (Thucyd. iv, 75).
-
-  [253] Xen. Anab. vii, 1, 2. Πέμψας πρὸς Ἀναξίβιον τὸν ναύαρχον,
-  ἐδεῖτο διαβιβάσαι τὸ στράτευμα ἐκ τῆς Ἀσίας, καὶ ὑπισχνεῖτο πάντα
-  ποιήσειν αὐτῷ ὅσα δέοι.
-
-  Compare vii, 2, 7, when Anaxibius demanded in vain the fulfilment
-  of this promise.
-
-Here at Byzantium, he received his first communication from the
-Thracian prince Seuthes; who sent Medosadês to offer him a reward
-if he would bring the army across. Xenophon replied that the army
-would cross; that no reward from Seuthes was needful to bring about
-that movement; but that he himself was about to depart, leaving the
-command in other hands. In point of fact, the whole army crossed
-with little delay, landed in Europe, and found themselves within the
-walls of Byzantium.[254] Xenophon, who had come along with them, paid
-a visit shortly afterwards to his friend the harmost Kleander, and
-took leave of him as about to depart immediately. But Kleander told
-him that he must not think of departing until the army was out of
-the city, and that he would be held responsible if they stayed. In
-truth Kleander was very uneasy so long as the soldiers were within
-the walls, and was well aware that it might be no easy matter to
-induce them to go away. For Anaxibius had practised a gross fraud
-in promising them pay, which he had neither the ability nor the
-inclination to provide. Without handing to them either pay or even
-means of purchasing supplies, he issued orders that they must go
-forth with arms and baggage, and muster outside of the gates, there
-to be numbered for an immediate march; any one who stayed behind
-being held as punishable. This proclamation was alike unexpected
-and offensive to the soldiers, who felt that they had been deluded,
-and were very backward in obeying. Hence Kleander, while urgent
-with Xenophon to defer his departure until he had conducted the
-army outside of the walls, added—“Go forth as if you were about to
-march along with them; when you are once outside, you may depart as
-soon as you please.”[255] Xenophon replied that this matter must be
-settled with Anaxibius, to whom accordingly both of them went, and
-who repeated the same directions, in a manner yet more peremptory.
-Though it was plain to Xenophon that he was here making himself a
-sort of instrument to the fraud which Anaxibius had practised upon
-the army, yet he had no choice but to obey. Accordingly, he as well
-as the other generals put themselves at the head of the troops, who
-followed, however reluctantly, and arrived most of them outside
-of the gates. Eteonikus (a Lacedæmonian officer of consideration,
-noticed more than once in my last preceding volume) commanding at
-the gate, stood close to it in person; in order that when all the
-Cyreians had gone forth, he might immediately shut it and fasten it
-with the bar.[256]
-
-  [254] Xen. Anab. vii, 1, 5-7.
-
-  [255] Xen. Anab. vii, 1, 7-10. Ἀλλ᾽ ὁμῶς (ἔφη), ἐγώ σοι
-  συμβουλεύω ἐξελθεῖν ὡς πορευσόμενον· ἐπειδὰν δ᾽ ἔξω γένηται τὸ
-  στράτευμα, τότε ἀπαλλάττεσθαι.
-
-  [256] Xen. Anab. vii, 1, 12.
-
-Anaxibius knew well what he was doing. He fully anticipated that the
-communication of the final orders would occasion an outbreak among
-the Cyreians, and was anxious to defer it until they were outside.
-But when there remained only the rearmost companies still in the
-inside and on their march, all the rest having got out—he thought
-the danger was over, and summoned to him the generals and captains,
-all of whom were probably near the gates superintending the march
-through. It seems that Xenophon, having given notice that he intended
-to depart, did not answer to this summons as one of the generals, but
-remained outside among the soldiers. “Take what supplies you want
-(said Anaxibius) from the neighboring Thracian villages, which are
-well furnished with wheat, barley, and other necessaries. After thus
-providing yourselves, march forward to the Chersonesus, and there
-Kyniskus will give you pay.”[257]
-
-  [257] Xen. Anab. vii, 1, 13.
-
-This was the first distinct intimation given by Anaxibius that he did
-not intend to perform his promise of finding pay for the soldiers.
-Who Kyniskus was, we do not know, nor was he probably known to the
-Cyreians; but the march here enjoined was at least one hundred and
-fifty English miles, and might be much longer. The route was not
-indicated, and the generals had to inquire from Anaxibius whether
-they were to go by what was called the Holy Mountain (that is, by
-the shorter line, skirting the northern coast of the Propontis), or
-by a more inland and circuitous road through Thrace;—also whether
-they were to regard the Thracian prince, Seuthes, as a friend or an
-enemy.[258]
-
-  [258] Xen. Anab. vii, 1, 14.
-
-Instead of the pay which had been formally promised to them by
-Anaxibius if they would cross over from Asia to Byzantium, the
-Cyreians thus found themselves sent away empty-handed, to a long
-march,—through another barbarous country, with chance supplies to
-be ravished only by their own efforts,—and at the end of it a lot
-unknown and uncertain; while, had they remained in Asia, they would
-have had at any rate the rich satrapy of Pharnabazus within their
-reach. To perfidy of dealing was now added a brutal ejectment from
-Byzantium, without even the commonest manifestations of hospitality;
-contrasting pointedly with the treatment which the army had recently
-experienced at Trapezus, Sinôpê, and Herakleia; where they had been
-welcomed not only by compliments on their past achievements, but also
-by an ample present of flour, meat, and wine. Such behavior could
-not fail to provoke the most violent indignation in the bosoms of
-the soldiery; and Anaxibius had therefore delayed giving the order
-until the last soldiers were marching out, thinking that the army
-would hear nothing of it until the generals came out of the gates
-to inform them; so that the gates would be closed, and the walls
-manned to resist any assault from without. But his calculations were
-not realized. Either one of the soldiers passing by heard him give
-the order, or one of the captains forming his audience stole away
-from the rest, and hastened forward to acquaint his comrades on the
-outside. The bulk of the army, already irritated by the inhospitable
-way in which they had been thrust out, needed nothing farther to
-inflame them into spontaneous mutiny and aggression. While the
-generals within (who either took the communication more patiently, or
-at least, looking farther forward, felt that any attempt to resent
-or resist the ill usage of the Spartan admiral would only make their
-position worse) were discussing with Anaxibius the details of the
-march just enjoined, the soldiers without, bursting into spontaneous
-movement, with a simultaneous and fiery impulse, made a rush back to
-get possession of the gate. But Eteonikus, seeing their movement,
-closed it without a moment’s delay, and fastened the bar. The
-soldiers on reaching the gate and finding it barred, clamored loudly
-to get it opened, threatened to break it down, and even began to
-knock violently against it. Some ran down to the sea-coast, and made
-their way into the city round the line of stones at the base of the
-city wall, which protected it against the sea; while the rearmost
-soldiers who had not yet marched out, seeing what was passing, and
-fearful of being cut off from their comrades, assaulted the gate from
-the inside, severed the fastenings with axes, and threw it wide open
-to the army.[259] All the soldiers then rushed up, and were soon
-again in Byzantium.
-
-  [259] Xen. Anab. vii, 1, 15-17.
-
-Nothing could exceed the terror of the Lacedæmonians as well as of
-the native Byzantines, when they saw the excited Cyreians again
-within the walls. The town seemed already taken and on the point of
-being plundered. Neither Anaxibius nor Eteonikus took the smallest
-means of resistance, nor stayed to brave the approach of the
-soldiers, whose wrath they were fully conscious of having deserved.
-Both fled to the citadel—the former first running to the sea-shore,
-and jumping into a fishing-boat to go thither by sea. He even thought
-the citadel not tenable with its existing garrison, and sent over to
-Chalkêdon for a reinforcement. Still more terrified were the citizens
-of the town. Every man in the market-place instantly fled; some to
-their houses, others to the merchant vessels in the harbor, others to
-the triremes or ships of war, which they hauled down to the water,
-and thus put to sea.[260]
-
-  [260] Xen. Anab. vii, 1, 18, 19.
-
-To the deception and harshness of the Spartan admiral, there was
-thus added a want of precaution in the manner of execution, which
-threatened to prove the utter ruin of Byzantium. For it was but
-too probable that the Cyreian soldiers, under the keen sense of
-recent injury, would satiate their revenge, and reimburse themselves
-for the want of hospitality towards them, without distinguishing
-the Lacedæmonian garrison from the Byzantine citizens; and that
-too from mere impulse, not merely without orders, but in spite of
-prohibitions, from their generals. Such was the aspect of the case,
-when they became again assembled in a mass within the gates; and
-such would probably have been the reality, had Xenophon executed
-his design of retiring earlier, so as to leave the other generals
-acting without him. Being on the outside along with the soldiers,
-Xenophon felt at once, as soon as he saw the gates forced open and
-the army again within the town, the terrific emergency which was
-impending; first, the sack of Byzantium,—next, horror and antipathy,
-throughout all Greece, towards the Cyreian officers and soldiers
-indiscriminately,—lastly, unsparing retribution inflicted upon all
-by the power of Sparta. Overwhelmed with these anxieties, he rushed
-into the town along with the multitude, using every effort to pacify
-them and bring them into order. They on their parts, delighted to
-see him along with them, and conscious of their own force, were
-eager to excite him to the same pitch as themselves, and to prevail
-on him to second and methodize their present triumph. “Now is your
-time, Xenophon, (they exclaimed), to make yourself a man. You have
-here a city,—you have triremes,—you have money,—you have plenty
-of soldiers. Now then, if you choose, you can enrich us; and we in
-return can make you powerful.”—“You speak well (replied he); I
-shall do as you propose; but if you want to accomplish anything,
-you must fall into military array forthwith.” He knew that this was
-the first condition of returning to anything like tranquillity; and
-by great good fortune, the space called the Thrakion, immediately
-adjoining the gate inside, was level, open, and clear of houses;
-presenting an excellent place of arms or locality for a review. The
-whole army,—partly from their long military practice,—partly under
-the impression that Xenophon was really about to second their wishes
-and direct some aggressive operation,—threw themselves almost of
-their own accord into regular array on the Thrakion; the hoplites
-eight deep, the peltasts on each flank. It was in this position that
-Xenophon addressed them as follows:—
-
-“Soldiers! I am not surprised that you are incensed, and that you
-think yourselves scandalously cheated and ill-used. But if we give
-way to our wrath, if we punish these Lacedæmonians now before us for
-their treachery, and plunder this innocent city,—reflect what will
-be the consequence. We shall stand proclaimed forthwith as enemies to
-the Lacedæmonians and their allies; and what sort of a war that will
-be, those who have witnessed and who still recollect recent matters
-of history may easily fancy. We Athenians entered into the war
-against Sparta with a powerful army and fleet, an abundant revenue,
-and numerous tributary cities in Asia as well as Europe,—among them
-this very Byzantium in which we now stand. We have been vanquished
-in the way that all of you know. And what then will be the fate of
-us soldiers, when we shall have as united enemies, Sparta with all
-her old allies and Athens besides,—Tissaphernes and the barbaric
-forces on the coast,—and most of all, the Great King whom we marched
-up to dethrone and slay, if we were able? Is any man fool enough to
-think that we have a chance of making head against so many combined
-enemies? Let us not plunge madly into dishonor and ruin, nor incur
-the enmity of our own fathers and friends; who are in the cities
-which will take arms against us,—and will take arms justly, if we,
-who abstained from seizing any barbaric city, even when we were in
-force sufficient, shall nevertheless now plunder the first Grecian
-city into which we have been admitted. As far as I am concerned, may
-I be buried ten thousand fathoms deep in the earth, rather than see
-you do such things; and I exhort _you_, too, as Greeks, to obey the
-leaders of Greece. Endeavor, while thus obedient, to obtain your just
-rights; but if you should fail in this, rather submit to injustice
-than cut yourselves off from the Grecian world. Send to inform
-Anaxibius that we have entered the city, not with a view to commit
-any violence, but in the hope, if possible, of obtaining from him the
-advantages which he promised us. If we fail, we shall at least prove
-to him that we quit the city, not under his fraudulent manœuvres, but
-under our own sense of the duty of obedience.”[261]
-
-  [261] Xen. Anab. vii, 1, 30-31.
-
-This speech completely arrested the impetuous impulse of the army,
-brought them to a true sense of their situation, and induced them to
-adopt the proposition of Xenophon. They remained unmoved in their
-position on the Thrakion, while three of the captains were sent to
-communicate with Anaxibius. While they were thus waiting, a Theban
-named Kœratadas approached, who had once commanded in Byzantium under
-the Lacedæmonians, during the previous war. He had now become a sort
-of professional Condottiero or general, looking out for an army to
-command, wherever he could find one, and offering his services to any
-city which would engage him. He addressed the assembled Cyreians,
-and offered, if they would accept him for their general, to conduct
-them against the Delta of Thrace (the space included between the
-north-west corner of the Propontis and the south-west corner of the
-Euxine), which he asserted to be a rich territory presenting great
-opportunity to plunder; he farther promised to furnish them with
-ample subsistence during the march. Presently the envoys returned,
-bearing the reply of Anaxibius, who received the message favorably,
-promising that not only the army should have no cause to regret their
-obedience, but that he would both report their good conduct to the
-authorities at home, and do everything in his own power to promote
-their comfort.[262] He said nothing farther about taking them into
-pay; that delusion having now answered its purpose. The soldiers, on
-hearing his communication, adopted a resolution to accept Kœratadas
-as their future commander, and then marched out of the town. As soon
-as they were on the outside, Anaxibius, not content with closing the
-gates against them, made public proclamation that if any one of them
-were found in the town, he should be sold forthwith into slavery.
-
-  [262] Xen. Anab. viii, 1, 32-35.
-
-There are few cases throughout Grecian history in which an able
-discourse has been the means of averting so much evil, as was averted
-by this speech of Xenophon to the army in Byzantium. Nor did he
-ever, throughout the whole period of his command, render to them a
-more signal service. The miserable consequences, which would have
-ensued, had the army persisted in their aggressive impulse,—first,
-to the citizens of the town, ultimately to themselves, while
-Anaxibius, the only guilty person, had the means of escaping by
-sea, even under the worst circumstances,—are stated by Xenophon
-rather under than above the reality. At the same time no orator ever
-undertook a more difficult case, or achieved a fuller triumph over
-unpromising conditions. If we consider the feelings and position
-of the army at the instant of their breaking into the town, we
-shall be astonished that any commander could have arrested their
-movements. Though fresh from all the glory of their retreat, they
-had been first treacherously entrapped over from Asia, next roughly
-ejected, by Anaxibius; and although it may be said truly that the
-citizens of Byzantium had no concern either in the one or the other,
-yet little heed is commonly taken, in military operations, to the
-distinction between garrison and citizens in an assailed town.
-Having arms in their hands, with consciousness of force arising
-out of their exploits in Asia, the Cyreians were at the same time
-inflamed by the opportunity both of avenging a gross recent injury,
-and enriching themselves in the process of execution; to which we
-may add, the excitement of that rush whereby they had obtained the
-reëntry, and the farther fact, that without the gates they had
-nothing to expect except poor, hard, uninviting service in Thrace.
-With soldiers already possessed by an overpowering impulse of this
-nature, what chance was there that a retiring general, on the point
-of quitting the army, could so work upon their minds as to induce
-them to renounce the prey before them? Xenophon had nothing to
-invoke except distant considerations, partly of Hellenic reputation,
-chiefly of prudence; considerations indeed of unquestionable reality
-and prodigious magnitude, yet belonging all to a distant future,
-and therefore of little comparative force, except when set forth in
-magnified characters by the orator. How powerfully he worked upon
-the minds of his hearers, so as to draw forth these far-removed
-dangers from the cloud of present sentiment by which they were
-overlaid,—how skilfully he employed in illustration the example of
-his own native city,—will be seen by all who study his speech. Never
-did his Athenian accomplishments,—his talent for giving words to
-important thoughts,—his promptitude in seizing a present situation
-and managing the sentiments of an impetuous multitude,—appear to
-greater advantage than when he was thus suddenly called forth to
-meet a terrible emergency. His pre-established reputation and the
-habit of obeying his orders, were doubtless essential conditions of
-success. But none of his colleagues in command would have been able
-to accomplish the like memorable change on the minds of the soldiers,
-or to procure obedience for any simple authoritative restraint;
-nay, it is probable, that if Xenophon had not been at hand, the
-other generals would have followed the passionate movement, even
-though they had been reluctant,—from simple inability to repress
-it.[263] Again,—whatever might have been the accomplishments of
-Xenophon, it is certain that even _he_ would not have been able to
-work upon the minds of these excited soldiers, had they not been
-Greeks and citizens as well as soldiers,—bred in Hellenic sympathies
-and accustomed to Hellenic order, with authority operating in part
-through voice and persuasion, and not through the Persian whip and
-instruments of torture. The memorable discourse on the Thrakion
-at Byzantium illustrates the working of that persuasive agency
-which formed one of the permanent forces and conspicuous charms of
-Hellenism. It teaches us that if the orator could sometimes accuse
-innocent defendants and pervert well-disposed assemblies,—a part
-of the case which historians of Greece often present as if it were
-the whole,—he could also, and that in the most trying emergencies,
-combat the strongest force of present passion, and bring into vivid
-presence the half-obscured lineaments of long-sighted reason and duty.
-
-  [263] So Tacitus says about the Roman general Spurinna (governor
-  of Placentia for Otho against Vitellius), and his mutinous army
-  who marched out to fight the Vitellian generals against his
-  strenuous remonstrance—“Fit _temeritatis alienæ comes_ Spurinna,
-  primo coactus, mox _velle simulans_, quo plus auctoritatis
-  inesset consiliis, si seditio mitesceret” (Tacitus, Hist. ii, 18).
-
-After conducting the army out of the city, Xenophon sent, through
-Kleander, a message to Anaxibius, requesting that he himself might
-be allowed to come in again singly, in order to take his departure
-by sea. His request was granted, though not without much difficulty;
-upon which he took leave of the army, under the strongest expressions
-of affection and gratitude on their part,[264] and went into
-Byzantium along with Kleander; while on the next day Kœratadas came
-to assume the command according to agreement, bringing with him a
-prophet, and beasts to be offered in sacrifice. There followed in
-his train twenty men carrying sacks of barley-meal, twenty more with
-jars of wine, three bearing olives, and one man with a bundle of
-garlic and onions. All these provisions being laid down, Kœratadas
-proceeded to offer sacrifice, as a preliminary to the distribution
-of them among the soldiers. On the first day, the sacrifices being
-unfavorable, no distribution took place; on the second day, Kœratadas
-was standing with the wreath on his head at the altar, and with the
-victims beside him, about to renew his sacrifice,—when Timasion and
-the other officers interfered, desired him to abstain, and dismissed
-him from the command. Perhaps the first unfavorable sacrifices may
-have partly impelled them to this proceeding. But the main reason
-was, the scanty store, inadequate even to one day’s subsistence for
-the army, brought by Kœratadas,—and the obvious insufficiency of his
-means.[265]
-
-  [264] Xen. Anab. vii, 6, 33.
-
-  [265] Xen. Anab. vii, 1, 34-40.
-
-On the departure of Kœratadas, the army marched to take up its
-quarters in some Thracian villages not far from Byzantium, under
-its former officers; who however could not agree as to their future
-order of march. Kleanor and Phryniskus, who had received presents
-from Seuthes, urged the expediency of accepting the service of
-that Thracian prince; Neon insisted on going to the Chersonese
-under the Lacedæmonian officers in that peninsula (as Anaxibius had
-projected); in the idea that he, as a Lacedæmonian, would there
-obtain the command of the whole army; while Timasion, with the view
-of re-establishing himself in his native city of Dardanus, proposed
-returning to the Asiatic side of the strait.
-
-Though this last plan met with decided favor among the army, it
-could not be executed without vessels. These Timasion had little
-or no means of procuring; so that considerable delay took place,
-during which the soldiers, receiving no pay, fell into much distress.
-Many of them were even compelled to sell their arms in order to get
-subsistence; while others got permission to settle in some of the
-neighboring towns, on condition of being disarmed. The whole army was
-thus gradually melting away, much to the satisfaction of Anaxibius,
-who was anxious to see the purposes of Pharnabazus accomplished.
-By degrees, it would probably have been dissolved altogether, had
-not a change of interest on the part of Anaxibius induced him to
-promote its reorganization. He sailed from Byzantium to the Asiatic
-coast, to acquaint Pharnabazus that the Cyreians could no longer
-cause uneasiness, and to require his own promised reward. It seems
-moreover that Xenophon himself departed from Byzantium by the same
-opportunity. When they reached Kyzikus, they met the Lacedæmonian
-Aristarchus; who was coming out as newly-appointed harmost of
-Byzantium, to supersede Kleander, and who acquainted Anaxibius that
-Polus was on the point of arriving to supersede him as admiral.
-Anxious to meet Pharnabazus and make sure of his bribe, Anaxibius
-impressed his parting injunction upon Aristarchus to sell for slaves
-all the Cyreians whom he might find at Byzantium on his arrival, and
-then pursued his voyage along the southern coast of the Propontis
-to Parium. But Pharnabazus, having already received intimation of
-the change of admirals, knew that the friendship of Anaxibius was no
-longer of any value, and took no farther heed of him; while he at the
-same time sent to Byzantium to make the like compact with Aristarchus
-against the Cyreian army.[266]
-
-  [266] Xen. Anab. vii, 2, 7. Φαρνάβαζος δὲ, ἐπεὶ ᾔσθετο
-  Ἀρίσταρχόν τε ἥκοντα εἰς Βυζάντιον ἁρμοστὴν καὶ Ἀναξίβιον
-  οὐκέτι ναυαρχοῦντα, Ἀναξιβίου μὲν ἠμέλησε, πρὸς Ἀρίσταρχον δὲ
-  διεπράττετο τὰ αὐτὰ περὶ τοῦ Κυρείου στρατεύματος ἅπερ καὶ πρὸς
-  Ἀναξίβιον.
-
-Anaxibius was stung to the quick at this combination of
-disappointment and insult on the part of the satrap. To avenge it, he
-resolved to employ those very soldiers whom he had first corrupted
-and fraudulently brought across to Europe, next cast out from
-Byzantium, and lastly, ordered to be sold into slavery, so far as any
-might yet be found in that town; bringing them back into Asia for
-the purpose of acting against Pharnabazus. Accordingly he addressed
-himself to Xenophon, and ordered him without a moment’s delay to
-rejoin the army, for the purpose of keeping it together, of recalling
-the soldiers who had departed, and transporting the whole body across
-into Asia. He provided him with an armed vessel of thirty oars to
-cross over from Parium to Perinthus, sending over a peremptory
-order to the Perinthians to furnish him with horses in order that
-he might reach the army with the greatest speed.[267] Perhaps it
-would not have been safe for Xenophon to disobey this order, under
-any circumstances. But the idea of acting with the army in Asia
-against Pharnabazus, under Lacedæmonian sanction, was probably very
-acceptable to him. He hastened across to the army, who welcomed his
-return with joy, and gladly embraced the proposal of crossing to
-Asia, which was a great improvement upon their forlorn and destitute
-condition. He accordingly conducted them to Perinthus, and encamped
-under the walls of the town; refusing, in his way through Selymbria,
-a second proposition from Seuthes to engage the services of the army.
-
-  [267] Xen. Anab. vii, 2, 8-25.
-
-  Ἐκ τούτου δὴ ὁ Ἀναξίβιος, καλέσας Ξενοφῶντα, ~κελεύει πάσῃ τέχνῃ
-  καὶ μηχανῇ πλεῦσαι ἐπὶ τὸ στράτευμα ὡς τάχιστα~, καὶ συνέχειν τε
-  τὸ στράτευμα καὶ συναθροίζειν τῶν διεσπαρμένων ὡς ἂν πλείστους
-  δύνηται, καὶ παραγαγόντα εἰς τὴν Πέρινθον διαβιβάζειν εἰς τὴν
-  Ἀσίαν ~ὅτι τάχιστα~· καὶ δίδωσιν αὐτῷ τριακόντορον, καὶ ἐπιστολὴν
-  καὶ ἄνδρα συμπέμπει κελεύσοντα τοὺς Περινθίους ~ὡς τάχιστα~
-  Ξενοφῶντα προπέμψαι τοῖς ἵπποις ἐπὶ τὸ στράτευμα.
-
-  The vehement interest which Anaxibius took in this new project is
-  marked by the strength of Xenophon’s language; extreme celerity
-  is enjoined three several times.
-
-While Xenophon was exerting himself to procure transports for the
-passage of the army at Perinthus, Aristarchus the new harmost arrived
-there with two triremes from Byzantium. It seems that not only
-Byzantium, but also both Perinthus and Selymbria, were comprised in
-his government as harmost. On first reaching Byzantium to supersede
-Kleander, he found there no less than four hundred of the Cyreians,
-chiefly sick and wounded; whom Kleander, in spite of the ill-will
-of Anaxibius, had not only refused to sell into slavery, but had
-billeted upon the citizens, and tended with solicitude; so much did
-his good feeling towards Xenophon and towards the army now come
-into play. We read with indignation that Aristarchus, immediately
-on reaching Byzantium to supersede him, was not even contented
-with sending these four hundred men out of the town; but seized
-them,—Greeks, citizens, and soldiers as they were,—and sold them
-all into slavery.[268] Apprised of the movements of Xenophon
-with the army, he now came to Perinthus to prevent their transit
-into Asia; laying an embargo on the transports in the harbor, and
-presenting himself personally before the assembled army to prohibit
-the soldiers from crossing. When Xenophon informed him that Anaxibius
-had given them orders to cross, and had sent him expressly to conduct
-them,—Aristarchus replied, “Anaxibius is no longer in functions
-as admiral, and I am harmost in this town. If I catch any of you
-at sea, I will sink you.” On the next day, he sent to invite the
-generals and the captains (lochages) to a conference within the
-walls. They were just about to enter the gates, when Xenophon, who
-was among them, received a private warning, that if he went in,
-Aristarchus would seize him, and either put him to death or send
-him prisoner to Pharnabazus. Accordingly Xenophon sent forward the
-others, and remained himself with the army, alleging the obligation
-of sacrificing. The behavior of Aristarchus,—who, when he saw the
-others without Xenophon, sent them away, and desired that they
-would all come again in the afternoon,—confirmed the justice of
-his suspicions, as to the imminent danger from which he had been
-preserved by this accidental warning.[269] It need hardly be added
-that Xenophon disregarded the second invitation no less than the
-first; moreover a third invitation, which Aristarchus afterwards
-sent, was disregarded by all.
-
-  [268] Xen. Anab. vii, 2, 6. Καὶ ὁ Ἀναξίβιος τῷ μὲν Ἀριστάρχῳ
-  ἐπιστέλλει ὁπόσους ἂν εὕροι ἐν Βυζαντίῳ τῶν Κύρου στρατιωτῶν
-  ὑπολελειμμένους, ἀποδόσθαι· ὁ δὲ Κλέανδρος οὐδένα ἐπεπράκει,
-  ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς κάμνοντας ἐθεράπευεν οἰκτείρων, καὶ ἀναγκάζων
-  οἰκίᾳ δέχεσθαι. Ἀρίσταρχος δ᾽ ἐπεὶ ἦλθε τάχιστα, οὐκ ἐλάττους
-  τετρακοσίων ἀπέδοτο.
-
-  [269] Xen. Anab. vii, 2, 14-16.
-
-  Ἥδη δὲ ὄντων πρὸς τῷ τείχει, ἐξαγγέλλει τις τῷ Ξενοφῶντι ὅτι, εἰ
-  εἴσεισι, συλληφθήσεται· καὶ ἢ αὐτοῦ τι πείσεται, ἢ καὶ Φαρναβάζῳ,
-  παραδοθήσεται. Ὁ δὲ, ἀκούσας ταῦτα, τοὺς μὲν προπέμπεται, αὐτὸς
-  δ᾽ εἶπεν, ὅτι θῦσαί τι βούλοιτο.... Οἱ δὲ στρατηγοὶ καὶ οἱ
-  λοχαγοὶ ἥκοντες παρὰ τοῦ Ἀριστάρχου, ἀπήγγελλον ὅτι νῦν μὲν
-  ἀπιέναι σφᾶς κελεύει, τῆς δείλης δὲ ἥκειν· ἔνθα καὶ δήλη μᾶλλον
-  ἐδόκει [εἶναι] ἡ ἐπιβουλή. Compare vii, 3, 2.
-
-We have here a Lacedæmonian harmost, not scrupling to lay a snare of
-treachery as flagrant as that which Tissaphernes had practised on
-the banks of the Zab to entrap Klearchus and his colleagues,—and
-that too against a Greek, and an officer of the highest station
-and merit, who had just saved Byzantium from pillage, and was now
-actually in execution of orders received from the Lacedæmonian
-admiral Anaxibius. Had the accidental warning been withheld, Xenophon
-would assuredly have fallen into this snare, nor could we reasonably
-have charged him with imprudence,—so fully was he entitled to count
-upon straightforward conduct under the circumstances. But the same
-cannot be said of Klearchus, who undoubtedly manifested lamentable
-credulity, nefarious as was the fraud to which he fell a victim.
-
-At the second interview with the other officers, Aristarchus, while
-he forbade the army to cross the water, directed them to force their
-way by land through the Thracians who occupied the Holy mountain, and
-thus to arrive at the Chersonese; where (he said) they should receive
-pay. Neon the Lacedæmonian, with about eight hundred hoplites who
-adhered to his separate command, advocated this plan as the best. To
-be set against it, however, there was the proposition of Seuthes to
-take the army into pay; which Xenophon was inclined to prefer, uneasy
-at the thoughts of being cooped up in the narrow peninsula of the
-Chersonese, under the absolute command of the Lacedæmonian harmost,
-with great uncertainty both as to pay and as to provisions.[270]
-Moreover it was imperiously necessary for these disappointed troops
-to make some immediate movement; for they had been brought to the
-gates of Perinthus in hopes of passing immediately on shipboard; it
-was mid-winter,—they were encamped in the open field, under the
-severe cold of Thrace,—they had neither assured supplies, nor even
-money to purchase, if a market had been near.[271] Xenophon, who
-had brought them to the neighborhood of Perinthus, was now again
-responsible for extricating them from this untenable situation,
-and began to offer sacrifices, according to his wont, to ascertain
-whether the gods would encourage him to recommend a covenant with
-Seuthes. The sacrifices were so favorable, that he himself, together
-with a confidential officer from each of the generals, went by
-night and paid a visit to Seuthes, for the purpose of understanding
-distinctly his offers and purposes.
-
-  [270] Xen. Anab. vii, 2, 15; vii, 3, 3; vii, 6, 13.
-
-  [271] Xen. Anab. vii, 6, 24. μέσος δὲ χείμων ἦν, etc. Probably
-  the month of December.
-
-Mæsadês, the father of Seuthes, had been apparently a dependent
-prince under the great monarchy of the Odrysian Thracians; so
-formidable in the early years of the Peloponnesian war. But intestine
-commotions had robbed him of his principality over three Thracian
-tribes; which it was now the ambition of Seuthes to recover, by
-the aid of the Cyreian army. He offered to each soldier one stater
-of Kyzikus (about twenty Attic drachmæ, or nearly the same as that
-which they originally received from Cyrus) as pay per month; twice as
-much to each lochage or captain,—four times as much to each of the
-generals. In case they should incur the enmity of the Lacedæmonians
-by joining him, he guaranteed to them all the right of settlement and
-fraternal protection in his territory. To each of the generals, over
-and above pay, he engaged to assign a fort on the sea-coast, with a
-lot of land around it, and oxen for cultivation. And to Xenophon in
-particular, he offered the possession of Bisanthê, his best point on
-the coast. “I will also (he added, addressing Xenophon) give you my
-daughter in marriage; and if you have any daughter, I will buy her
-from you in marriage according to the custom of Thrace.”[272] Seuthes
-farther engaged never on any occasion to lead them more than seven
-days’ journey from the sea, at farthest.
-
-  [272] Xen. Anab. vii, 2, 17-38.
-
-These offers were as liberal as the army could possibly expect;
-and Xenophon himself, mistrusting the Lacedæmonians, as well as
-mistrusted by them, seems to have looked forward to the acquisition
-of a Thracian coast-fortress and territory (such as Miltiades,
-Alkibiades, and other Athenian leaders had obtained before him) as
-a valuable refuge in case of need.[273] But even if the promise had
-been less favorable, the Cyreians had no alternative; for they had
-not even present supplies,—still less any means of subsistence
-throughout the winter; while departure by sea was rendered impossible
-by the Lacedæmonians. On the next day, Seuthes was introduced by
-Xenophon and the other generals to the army, who accepted his offers
-and concluded the bargain.
-
-  [273] Xen. Anab. vii, 6, 34.
-
-They remained for two months in his service, engaged in warfare
-against various Thracian tribes, whom they enabled him to conquer
-and despoil; so that at the end of that period, he was in possession
-of an extensive dominion, a large native force, and a considerable
-tribute. Though the sufferings of the army from cold were extreme,
-during these two months of full winter and amidst the snowy
-mountains of Thrace, they were nevertheless enabled by their
-expeditions along with Seuthes to procure plentiful subsistence;
-which they could hardly have done in any other manner. But the pay
-which he had offered was never liquidated; at least, in requital
-of their two months of service, they received pay only for twenty
-days and a little more. And Xenophon himself, far from obtaining
-fulfilment of those splendid promises which Seuthes had made to
-him personally, seems not even to have received his pay as one
-of the generals. For him, the result was singularly unhappy;
-since he forfeited the good-will of Seuthes by importunate demand
-and complaint for the purpose of obtaining the pay due to the
-soldiers; while they on their side, imputing to his connivance the
-non-fulfilment of the promise, became thus in part alienated from
-him. Much of this mischief was brought about by the treacherous
-intrigues and calumny of a corrupt Greek from Maroneia, named
-Herakleides; who acted as minister and treasurer to Seuthes.
-
-Want of space compels me to omit the narrative given by Xenophon,
-both of the relations of the army with Seuthes, and of the warfare
-carried on against the hostile Thracian tribes,—interesting as it
-is from the juxtaposition of Greek and Thracian manners. It seems
-to have been composed by Xenophon under feelings of acute personal
-disappointment, and probably in refutation of calumnies against
-himself as if he had wronged the army. Hence we may trace in it a
-tone of exaggerated querulousness, and complaint that the soldiers
-were ungrateful to him. It is true that a portion of the army, under
-the belief that he had been richly rewarded by Seuthes while they had
-not obtained their stipulated pay, expressed virulent sentiments and
-falsehoods against him.[274] Until such suspicions were refuted, it
-is no wonder that the army were alienated; but they were perfectly
-willing to hear both sides,—and Xenophon triumphantly disproved the
-accusation. That in the end, their feelings towards him were those
-of esteem and favor, stands confessed in his own words,[275] proving
-that the ingratitude of which he complains was the feeling of some
-indeed, but not of all.
-
-  [274] Xen. Anab. vii, 6, 9, 10.
-
-  [275] Xen. Anab. vii, 7, 55-57.
-
-It is hard to say, however, what would have been the fate of this
-gallant army, when Seuthes, having obtained from their arms in two
-months all that he desired, had become only anxious to send them off
-without pay,—had they not been extricated by a change of interest
-and policy on the part of all-powerful Sparta. The Lacedæmonians had
-just declared war against Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus,—sending
-Thimbron into Asia to commence military operations. They then became
-extremely anxious to transport the Cyreians across to Asia, which
-their harmost, Aristarchus had hitherto prohibited,—and to take them
-into permanent pay; for which purpose two Lacedæmonians, Charmînus
-and Polynîkus were commissioned by Thimbron to offer to the army the
-same pay as had been promised, though not paid, by Seuthes; and as
-had been originally paid by Cyrus. Seuthes and Herakleides, eager
-to hasten the departure of the soldiers, endeavored to take credit
-with the Lacedæmonians for assisting their views.[276] Joyfully did
-the army accept this offer, though complaining loudly of the fraud
-practised upon them by Seuthes; which Charmînus, at the instance
-of Xenophon, vainly pressed the Thracian prince to redress.[277]
-He even sent Xenophon to demand the arrear of pay in the name of
-the Lacedæmonians, which afforded to the Athenian an opportunity
-of administering a severe lecture to Seuthes.[278] But the latter
-was found less accessible to the workings of eloquence than the
-Cyreian assembled soldiers; nor did Xenophon obtain anything beyond a
-miserable dividend upon the sum due;—together with civil expressions
-towards himself personally,—an invitation to remain in his service
-with one thousand hoplites instead of going to Asia with the
-army,—and renewed promises, not likely now to find much credit, of a
-fort and grant of lands.
-
-  [276] Xen. Anab. vii, 6, 1-7.
-
-  [277] Xen. Anab. vii, 7, 15.
-
-  [278] Xen. Anab. vii, 7, 21-47.
-
-  The lecture is of unsuitable prolixity, when we consider the
-  person to whom, and the circumstances under which, it purports to
-  have been spoken.
-
-When the army, now reduced by losses and dispersions to six thousand
-men,[279] was prepared to cross into Asia, Xenophon was desirous of
-going back to Athens, but was persuaded to remain with them until the
-junction with Thimbron. He was at this time so poor, having scarcely
-enough to pay for his journey home, that he was obliged to sell his
-horse at Lampsakus, the Asiatic town where the army landed. Here
-he found Eukleides, a Phliasian prophet with whom he had been wont
-to hold intercourse and offer sacrifice at Athens. This man, having
-asked Xenophon how much he had acquired in the expedition, could not
-believe him when he affirmed his poverty. But when they proceeded to
-offer sacrifice together, from some animals sent by the Lampsakenes
-as a present to Xenophon, Eukleides had no sooner inspected the
-entrails of the victims, than he told Xenophon that he fully credited
-the statement. “I see (he said) that even if money shall be ever on
-its way to come to you, you yourself will be a hindrance to it, even
-if there be no other (here Xenophon acquiesced); Zeus Meilichios (the
-Gracious)[280] is the real bar. Have you ever sacrificed to him, with
-entire burnt-offerings, as we used to do together at Athens?” “Never
-(replied Xenophon), throughout the whole march.” “Do so now, then
-(said Eukleides), and it will be for your advantage.” The next day,
-on reaching Ophrynium, Xenophon obeyed the injunction; sacrificing
-little pigs entire to Zeus Meilichios, as was the custom at Athens
-during the public festival called Diasia. And on the very same day he
-felt the beneficial effects of the proceeding; for Biton and another
-envoy came from the Lacedæmonians with an advance of pay to the army,
-and with dispositions so favorable to himself, that they bought back
-for him his horse, which he had just sold at Lampsakus for fifty
-darics. This was equivalent to giving him more than one year’s pay
-in hand (the pay which he would have received as general being four
-darics per month, or four times that of the soldier), at a time when
-he was known to be on the point of departure, and therefore would not
-stay to earn it. The short-comings of Seuthes were now made up with
-immense interest, so that Xenophon became better off than any man in
-the army; though he himself slurs over the magnitude of the present,
-by representing it as a delicate compliment to restore to him a
-favorite horse.
-
-  [279] Xen. Anab. vii, 7, 23.
-
-  [280] It appears that the epithet _Meilichios_ (the Gracious)
-  is here applied to Zeus in the same euphemistic sense as the
-  denomination _Eumenides_ to the avenging goddesses. Zeus
-  is conceived as having actually inflicted, or being in a
-  disposition to inflict, evil; the sacrifice to him under this
-  surname represents a sentiment of fear, and is one of atonement,
-  expiation or purification, destined to avert his displeasure; but
-  the surname itself is to be interpreted _proleptice_, to use the
-  word of the critics—it designates, not the actual disposition of
-  Zeus (or of other gods), but that disposition which the sacrifice
-  is intended to bring about in him.
-
-  See Pausan. i, 37, 3; ii, 20, 3. K. F. Herrmann, Gottesdienstl.
-  Alterthümer der Griechen, s. 58; Van Stegeren, De Græcorum Diebus
-  Festis, p. 5 (Utrecht, 1849).
-
-Thus gratefully and instantaneously did Zeus the Gracious respond
-to the sacrifice which Xenophon, after a long omission, had been
-admonished by Eukleides to offer. And doubtless Xenophon was more
-than ever confirmed in the belief, which manifests itself throughout
-all his writings, that sacrifice not only indicates, by the interior
-aspect of the immolated victims, the tenor of coming events,—but
-also, according as it is rendered to the right god and at the right
-season, determines his will, and therefore the course of events, for
-dispensations favorable or unfavorable.
-
-But the favors of Zeus the Gracious, though begun, were not yet
-ended. Xenophon conducted the army through the Troad, and across
-mount Ida, to Antandrus; from thence along the coast to Lydia,
-through the plain of Thêbê and the town of Adramyttium, leaving
-Atarneus on the right hand, to Pergamus in Mysia, a hill-town
-overhanging the river and plain of Käikus. This district was occupied
-by the descendants of the Eretrian Gongylus, who, having been
-banished for embracing the cause of the Persians when Xerxes invaded
-Greece, had been rewarded (like the Spartan king Demaratus) with
-this sort of principality under the Persian empire. His descendant,
-another Gongylus, now occupied Pergamus, with his wife Hellas and
-his sons Gorgion and Gongylus. Xenophon was here received with great
-hospitality. Hellas acquainted him that a powerful Persian, named
-Asidates, was now dwelling, with his wife, family, and property, in a
-tower not far off, on the plain; and that a sudden night-march, with
-three hundred men, would suffice for the capture of this valuable
-booty, to which her own cousin should guide him. Accordingly, having
-sacrificed and ascertained that the victims were favorable, Xenophon
-communicated his plan after the evening meal to those captains who
-had been most attached to him throughout the expedition, wishing to
-make them partners in the profit. As soon as it became known, many
-volunteers, to the number of six hundred, pressed to be allowed
-to join. But the captains repelled them, declining to take more
-than three hundred, in order that the booty might afford an ampler
-dividend to each partner.
-
-Beginning their march in the evening, Xenophon and his detachment of
-three hundred reached about midnight the tower of Asidates; it was
-large, lofty, thickly built, and contained a considerable garrison.
-It served for protection to his cattle and cultivating slaves around,
-like a baronial castle in the middle ages; but the assailants
-neglected this outlying plunder, in order to be more sure of taking
-the castle itself. Its walls however were found much stronger than
-was expected; and although a breach was made by force about daybreak,
-yet so vigorous was the defence of the garrison, that no entrance
-could be effected. Signals and shouts of every kind were made by
-Asidates to procure aid from the Persian forces in the neighborhood;
-numbers of whom soon began to arrive, so that Xenophon and his
-company were obliged to retreat. And their retreat was at last only
-accomplished, after severe suffering and wounds to nearly half of
-them, through the aid of Gongylus with his forces from Pergamus, and
-of Proklês (the descendant of Demaratus) from Halisarna, a little
-farther off seaward.[281]
-
-  [281] Xen. Anab. vii, 8, 10-19.
-
-Though his first enterprise thus miscarried, Xenophon soon laid plans
-for a second, employing the whole army; and succeeded in bringing
-Asidates prisoner to Pergamus, with his wife, children, horses, and
-all his personal property. Thus (says he, anxious above all things
-for the credit of sacrificial prophecy) the “previous sacrifices
-(those which had promised favorably before the first unsuccessful
-attempt) now came true.”[282] The persons of this family were
-doubtless redeemed by their Persian friends for a large ransom;[283]
-which, together with the booty brought in, made up a prodigious total
-to be divided.
-
-  [282] Xen. Anab. vii, 8, 22. Ἐνταῦθα οἱ περὶ Ξενοφῶντα
-  συμπεριτυγχάνουσιν αὐτῷ καὶ λαμβάνουσιν αὐτὸν (Ἀσιδάτην) καὶ
-  γυναῖκα καὶ παῖδας καὶ τοὺς ἵππους καὶ πάντα τὰ ὄντα· ~καὶ οὕτω
-  τὰ πρότερα ἱερὰ ἀπέβη~.
-
-  [283] Compare Plutarch, Kimon, c. 9; and Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 21.
-
-In making the division, a general tribute of sympathy and admiration
-was paid to Xenophon, to which all the army,—generals, captains, and
-soldiers,—and the Lacedæmonians besides,—unanimously concurred.
-Like Agamemnon at Troy, he was allowed to select for himself the
-picked lots of horses, mules, oxen, and other items of booty;
-insomuch that he became possessor of a share valuable enough to
-enrich him at once, in addition to the fifty darics which he had
-before received. “Here then Xenophon (to use his own language[284])
-had no reason to complain of the god” (Zeus Meilichios). We may
-add,—what he ought to have added, considering the accusations which
-he had before put forth,—that neither had he any reason to complain
-of the ingratitude of the army.
-
-  [284] Xen. Anab. vii, 8, 23.
-
-  Ἐνταῦθα τὸν θεὸν οὐκ ᾐτιάσατο ὁ Ξενοφῶν· συνέπραττον γὰρ καὶ οἱ
-  Λάκωνες καὶ οἱ λοχαγοὶ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι στρατηγοὶ καὶ οἱ στρατιῶται,
-  ὥστε ἐξαίρετα λαβεῖν καὶ ἵππους καὶ ζεύγη καὶ ἄλλα, ὥστε ἱκανὸν
-  εἶναι καὶ ἄλλον ἤδη εὖ ποιεῖν.
-
-As soon as Thimbron arrived with his own forces, and the Cyreians
-became a part of his army, Xenophon took his leave of them. Having
-deposited in the temple at Ephesus that portion which had been
-confided to him as general, of the tithe set apart by the army at
-Kerasus for the Ephesian Artemis,[285] he seems to have executed his
-intention of returning to Athens.[286] He must have arrived there,
-after an absence of about two years and a half, within a few weeks,
-at farthest, after the death of his friend and preceptor Sokrates,
-whose trial and condemnation have been recorded in my last volume.
-That melancholy event certainly occurred during his absence from
-Athens;[287] but whether it had come to his knowledge before he
-reached the city, we do not know. How much grief and indignation
-it excited in his mind, we may see by his collection of memoranda
-respecting the life and conversations of Sokrates, known by the name
-of Memorabilia, and probably put together shortly after his arrival.
-
-  [285] Xen. Anab. v, 3, 6. It seems plain that this deposit must
-  have been first made on the present occasion.
-
-  [286] Compare Anabasis, vii, 7, 57; vii, 8, 2.
-
-  [287] Xenoph. Memorab. iv, 8, 4—as well as the opening sentence
-  of the work.
-
-That he was again in Asia, three years afterwards, on military
-service under the Lacedæmonian king Agesilaus, is a fact attested by
-himself; but at what precise moment he quitted Athens for his second
-visit to Asia, we are left to conjecture. I incline to believe that
-he did not remain many months at home, but that he went out again
-in the next spring to rejoin the Cyreians in Asia,—became again
-their commander,—and served for two years under the Spartan general
-Derkyllidas before the arrival of Agesilaus. Such military service
-would doubtless be very much to his taste; while a residence at
-Athens, then subject and quiescent, would probably be distasteful to
-him; both from the habits of command which he had contracted during
-the previous two years, and from feelings arising out of the death of
-Sokrates. After a certain interval of repose, he would be disposed to
-enter again upon the war against his old enemy Tissaphernes; and his
-service went on when Agesilaus arrived to take the command.[288]
-
-  [288] See Xenoph. Hellen. iii, 2, 7—a passage which Morus
-  refers, I think with much probability, to Xenophon himself.
-
-  The very circumstantial details, which Xenophon gives (iii, 1,
-  11-28) about the proceedings of Derkyllidas against Meidias in
-  the Troad, seem also to indicate that he was serving there in
-  person.
-
-But during the two years after this latter event, Athens became a
-party to the war against Sparta, and entered into conjunction with
-the king of Persia as well as with the Thebans and others; while
-Xenophon, continuing his service as commander of the Cyreians, and
-accompanying Agesilaus from Asia back into Greece, became engaged
-against the Athenian troops and their Bœotian allies at the bloody
-battle of Korôneia. Under these circumstances, we cannot wonder that
-the Athenians passed sentence of banishment against him; not because
-he had originally taken part in aid of Cyrus against Artaxerxes,—nor
-because his political sentiments were unfriendly to democracy, as has
-been sometimes erroneously affirmed,—but because he was now openly
-in arms, and in conspicuous command, against his own country.[289]
-Having thus become an exile, Xenophon was allowed by the
-Lacedæmonians to settle at Skillus, one of the villages of Triphylia,
-near Olympia in Peloponnesus, which they had recently emancipated
-from the Eleians. At one of the ensuing Olympic festivals, Megabyzus,
-the superintendent of the temple of Artemis at Ephesus, came over as
-a spectator; bringing with him the money which Xenophon had dedicated
-therein to the Ephesian Artemis. This money Xenophon invested in the
-purchase of lands at Skillus, to be consecrated in permanence to the
-goddess; having previously consulted her by sacrifice to ascertain
-her approval of the site contemplated, which site was recommended
-to him by its resemblance in certain points to that of the Ephesian
-temple. Thus, there was near each of them a river called by the
-same name Selinus, having in it fish and a shelly bottom. Xenophon
-constructed a chapel, an altar, and a statue of the goddess made of
-cypress-wood: all exact copies, on a reduced scale, of the temple and
-golden statue at Ephesus. A column near them was inscribed with the
-following words,—“This spot is sacred to Artemis. Whoever possesses
-the property and gathers its fruits, must sacrifice to her the tithe
-every year, and keep the chapel in repair out of the remainder.
-Should any one omit this duty the goddess herself will take the
-omission in hand.”[290]
-
-  [289] That the sentence of banishment on Xenophon was not passed
-  by the Athenians until after the battle of Korôneia, appears
-  plainly from Anabasis, v. 3, 7. This battle took place in August
-  394 B.C.
-
-  Pausanias also will be found in harmony with this statement, as
-  to the time of the banishment. Ἐδιώχθη δὲ ὁ Ξενοφῶν ὑπὸ Ἀθηναίων,
-  ὡς ἐπὶ βασιλέα τῶν Περσῶν, ~σφίσιν εὔνουν ὄντα~, στρατείας
-  μετασχὼν Κύρῳ πολεμιωτάτῳ τοῦ δήμου (iv, 6, 4). Now it was not
-  until 396 or 395 B.C., that the Persian king began to manifest
-  the least symptoms of good-will towards Athens; and not until the
-  battle of Knidus (a little before the battle of Korôneia in the
-  same year), that he testified his good-will by conspicuous and
-  effective service. If, therefore, the motive of the Athenians
-  to banish Xenophon arose out of the good feeling on the part of
-  the king of Persia toward them, the banishment could not have
-  taken place before 395 B.C., and is not likely to have taken
-  place until after 394 B.C.; which is the intimation of Xenophon
-  himself as above.
-
-  Lastly, Diogenes Laërtius (ii, 52) states, what I believe to
-  be the main truth, that the sentence of banishment was passed
-  against Xenophon by the Athenians on the ground of his attachment
-  to the Lacedæmonians—ἐπὶ Λακωνισμῷ.
-
-  Krüger and others seem to think that Xenophon was banished
-  because he took service under Cyrus, who had been the bitter
-  enemy of Athens. It is true that Sokrates, when first consulted,
-  was apprehensive beforehand that this might bring upon him the
-  displeasure of Athens (Xen. Anab. iii, 1, 5). But it is to be
-  remembered that _at this time_, the king of Persia was just as
-  much the enemy of Athens as Cyrus was; and that Cyrus in fact
-  had made war upon her with the forces and treasures of the king.
-  Artaxerxes and Cyrus being thus, at that time, both enemies of
-  Athens, it was of little consequence to the Athenians whether
-  Cyrus succeeded or failed in his enterprise. But when Artaxerxes,
-  six years afterwards, became their friend, their feelings towards
-  his enemies were altered.
-
-  The passage of Pausanias as above cited, if understood as
-  asserting the main cause of Xenophon’s banishment, is in my
-  judgment inaccurate. Xenophon was banished _for Laconism_, or
-  attachment to Sparta against his country; the fact of his having
-  served under Cyrus against Artaxerxes counted at best only as a
-  secondary motive.
-
-  [290] Xen. Anab. v, 3, 13. Καὶ στήλη ἔστηκε παρὰ τὸν ναὸν,
-  γράμματα ἔχουσα—Ἱερὸς ὁ Χῶρος τῆς Αρτέμιδος· τὸν δὲ ἔχοντα καὶ
-  καρπούμενον τὴν μὲν δεκάτην καταθύειν ἑκάστου ἔτους, ἐκ δὲ τοῦ
-  περίττου τόν ναὸν ἐπισκευάζειν· ἐὰν δέ τις μὴ ποιῇ ταῦτα, τῇ θεῷ
-  μελήσει.
-
-Immediately near the chapel was an orchard of every description of
-fruit-trees, while the estate around comprised an extensive range
-of meadow, woodland, and mountain,—with the still loftier mountain
-called Pholoê adjoining. There was thus abundant pasture for horses,
-oxen, sheep, etc., and excellent hunting-ground near for deer and
-other game; advantages not to be found near the Artemision at
-Ephesus. Residing hard by on his own property, allotted to him by
-the Lacedæmonians, Xenophon superintended this estate as steward
-for the goddess; looking perhaps to the sanctity of her name for
-protection from disturbance by the Eleians, who viewed with a jealous
-eye the Lacedæmonian[291] settlers at Skillus, and protested against
-the peace and convention promoted by Athens after the battle of
-Leuktra, because it recognized that place, along with the townships
-of Triphylia, as autonomous. Every year he made a splendid sacrifice,
-from the tithe of all the fruits of the property; to which solemnity
-not only all the Skilluntines, but also all the neighboring villages,
-were invited. Booths were erected for the visitors, to whom the
-goddess furnished (this is the language of Xenophon) an ample dinner
-of barley-meal, wheaten loaves, meat, game, and sweetmeats;[292] the
-game being provided by a general hunt, which the sons of Xenophon
-conducted, and in which all the neighbors took part if they chose.
-The produce of the estate, saving this tithe and subject to the
-obligation of keeping the holy building in repair, was enjoyed
-by Xenophon himself. He had a keen relish for both hunting and
-horsemanship, and was among the first authors, so far as we know, who
-ever made these pursuits, with the management of horses and dogs, the
-subject of rational study and description.
-
-  [291] Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 2.
-
-  [292] Xen. Anab. v, 3, 9. Παρεῖχε δ᾽ ἡ θεὸς τοῖς σκηνοῦσιν ἄλφιτα
-  ἄρτους, οἶνον, τραγήματα, etc.
-
-Such was the use to which Xenophon applied the tithe voted by
-the army at Kerasus to the Ephesian Artemis; the other tithe,
-voted at the same time to Apollo, he dedicated at Delphi in the
-treasure-chamber of the Athenians, inscribing upon the offering his
-own name and that of Proxenus. His residence being only at a distance
-of twenty stadia from the great temple of Olympia, he was enabled to
-enjoy society with every variety of Greeks,—and to obtain copious
-information about Grecian politics, chiefly from philo-Laconian
-informants, and with the Lacedæmonian point of view predominant in
-his own mind; while he had also leisure for the composition of his
-various works. The interesting description which he himself gives of
-his residence at Skillus, implies a state of things not present and
-continuing,[293] but past and gone; other testimonies too, though
-confused and contradictory, seem to show that the Lacedæmonian
-settlement at Skillus lasted no longer than the power of Lacedæmon
-was adequate to maintain it. During the misfortunes which befel
-that city after the battle of Leuktra (371 B.C.), Xenophon, with
-his family and his fellow-settlers, was expelled by the Eleians,
-and is then said to have found shelter at Corinth. But as Athens
-soon came to be not only at peace, but in intimate alliance, with
-Sparta,—the sentence of banishment against Xenophon was revoked; so
-that the latter part of his life was again passed in the enjoyment
-of his birthright as an Athenian citizen and Knight.[294] Two of
-his sons, Gryllus and Diodorus, fought among the Athenian horsemen
-at the cavalry combat which preceded the battle of Mantineia, where
-the former was slain, after manifesting distinguished bravery; while
-his grandson Xenophon became in the next generation the subject of
-a pleading before the Athenian Dikastery, composed by the orator
-Deinarchus.[295]
-
-  [293] Xen. Anab. v. 3, 9.
-
-  [294] Diogen. Laërt. ii, 53, 54, 59. Pausanias (v, 6, 4) attests
-  the reconquest of Skillus by the Eleians, but adds (on the
-  authority of the Eleian ἐξηγηταὶ or show guides) that they
-  permitted Xenophon, after a judicial examination before the
-  Olympic Senate, to go on living there in peace. The latter point
-  I apprehend to be incorrect.
-
-  The latter works of Xenophon (De Vectigalibus, De Officio
-  Magistri Equitum, etc.), seem plainly to imply that he had been
-  restored to citizenship, and had come again to take cognizance of
-  politics at Athens.
-
-  [295] Diogen. Laërt. ut sup. Dionys. Halic. De Dinarcho, p. 664,
-  ed. Reiska. Dionysius mentions this oration under the title of
-  Ἀποστασίου ἀπολογία Αἰσχύλου πρὸς Ξενοφῶντα. And Diogenes also
-  alludes to it—ὥς φησι Δείναρχος ἐν τῷ πρὸς Ξενοφῶντα ἀποστασίου.
-
-  Schneider in his Epimetrum (ad calcem Anabaseos, p. 573),
-  respecting the exile of Xenophon, argues as if the person against
-  whom the oration of Deinarchus was directed, was Xenophon
-  himself, the Cyreian commander and author. But this, I think, is
-  chronologically all but impossible; for Deinarchus was not born
-  till 361 B.C., and composed his first oration in 336 B.C.
-
-  Yet Deinarchus, in his speech against Xenophon, undoubtedly
-  mentioned several facts respecting the Cyreian Xenophon, which
-  implies that the latter was a relative of the person against
-  whom the oration was directed. I venture to set him down as
-  grandson, on that evidence, combined with the identity of name
-  and the suitableness in point of time. He might well be the son
-  of Gryllus, who was slain fighting at the battle of Mantineia in
-  362 B.C.
-
-  Nothing is more likely than that an orator, composing an oration
-  against Xenophon the grandson, should touch upon the acts and
-  character of Xenophon the grandfather; see for analogy, the
-  oration of Isokrates, de Bigis; among others.
-
-On bringing this accomplished and eminent leader to the close of
-that arduous retreat which he had conducted with so much honor, I
-have thought it necessary to anticipate a little on the future,
-in order to take a glance at his subsequent destiny. To his exile
-(in this point of view not less useful than that of Thucydides) we
-probably owe many of those compositions from which so much of our
-knowledge of Grecian affairs is derived. But to the contemporary
-world, the retreat, which Xenophon so successfully conducted,
-afforded a far more impressive lesson than any of his literary
-compositions. It taught in the most striking manner the impotence
-of the Persian land-force, manifested not less in the generals than
-in the soldiers. It proved that the Persian leaders were unfit
-for any systematic operations, even under the greatest possible
-advantages, against a small number of disciplined warriors resolutely
-bent on resistance; that they were too stupid and reckless even
-to obstruct the passage of rivers, or destroy roads, or cut off
-supplies. It more than confirmed the contemptuous language applied
-to them by Cyrus himself, before the battle of Kunaxa; when he
-proclaimed that he envied the Greeks their freedom, and that he was
-ashamed of the worthlessness of his own countrymen.[296] Against
-such perfect weakness and disorganization, nothing prevented the
-success of the Greeks along with Cyrus, except his own paroxysm
-of fraternal antipathy.[297] And we shall perceive hereafter the
-military and political leaders of Greece,—Agesilaus, Jason of
-Pheræ,[298] and others down to Philip and Alexander[299]—firmly
-persuaded that with a tolerably numerous and well-appointed Grecian
-force, combined with exemption from Grecian enemies, they could
-succeed in overthrowing or dismembering the Persian empire. This
-conviction, so important in the subsequent history of Greece, takes
-its date from the retreat of the Ten Thousand. We shall indeed find
-Persia exercising an important influence, for two generations to
-come,—and at the peace of Antalkidas an influence stronger than
-ever,—over the destinies of Greece. But this will be seen to arise
-from the treason of Sparta, the chief of the Hellenic world, who
-abandons the Asiatic Greeks, and even arms herself with the name and
-the force of Persia, for purposes of aggrandizement and dominion
-to herself. Persia is strong by being enabled to employ Hellenic
-strength against the Hellenic cause; by lending money or a fleet
-to one side of the Grecian intestine parties, and thus becoming
-artificially strengthened against both. But the Xenophontic Anabasis
-betrays her real weakness against any vigorous attack; while it at
-the same time exemplifies the discipline, the endurance, the power
-of self-action and adaptation, the susceptibility of influence from
-speech and discussion, the combination of the reflecting obedience of
-citizens with the mechanical regularity of soldiers,—which confer
-such immortal distinction on the Hellenic character. The importance
-of this expedition and retreat, as an illustration of the Hellenic
-qualities and excellence, will justify the large space which has been
-devoted to it in this History.
-
-  [296] Xen. Anab. i, 7, 4. Compare Plutarch, Artaxerx. c. 20; and
-  Isokrates, Panegyr. Or. iv, s. 168, 169 _seq._
-
-  The last chapter of the Cyropædia of Xenophon (viii, 20, 21-26)
-  expresses strenuously the like conviction, of the military
-  feebleness and disorganization of the Persian empire, not
-  defensible without Grecian aid.
-
-  [297] Isokrates, Orat. v, (Philipp.) s. 104-106. ἤδη δ᾽
-  ἐγκρατεῖς δοκοῦντας εἶναι (_i. e._ the Greeks under Klearchus)
-  διὰ τὴν Κύρου ~προπέτειαν~ ἀτυχῆσαι, etc.
-
-  [298] Isokrates. Orat. v. (Philipp.) s. 141: Xen. Hellen. vi, 1,
-  12.
-
-  [299] See the stress laid by Alexander the Great upon the
-  adventures of the Ten Thousand, in his speech to encourage his
-  soldiers before the battle of Issus (Arrian, E. A. ii, 7, 8).
-
-
-
-
-CHAPTER LXXII.
-
-GREECE UNDER THE LACEDÆMONIAN EMPIRE
-
-
-The three preceding Chapters have been devoted exclusively to the
-narrative of the Expedition and Retreat, immortalized by Xenophon,
-occupying the two years intervening between about April 401 B.C.
-and June 399 B.C. That event, replete as it is with interest and
-pregnant with important consequences, stands apart from the general
-sequence of Grecian affairs,—which sequence I now resume.
-
-It will be recollected that as soon as Xenophon with his Ten Thousand
-warriors descended from the rugged mountains between Armenia and the
-Euxine to the hospitable shelter of Trapezus, and began to lay their
-plans for returning to Central Greece,—they found themselves within
-the Lacedæmonian empire, unable to advance a step without consulting
-Lacedæmonian dictation, and obliged, when they reached the Bosphorus,
-to endure without redress the harsh and treacherous usage of the
-Spartan officers, Anaxibius and Aristarchus.
-
-Of that empire the first origin has been set forth in my last
-preceding volume. It began with the decisive victory of Ægospotami
-in the Hellespont (September or October 405 B.C.), where the
-Lacedæmonian Lysander, without the loss of a man, got possession of
-the entire Athenian fleet and a large portion of their crews,—with
-the exception of eight or nine triremes with which the Athenian
-admiral Konon effected his escape to Euagoras at Cyprus. The whole
-power of Athens was thus annihilated, and nothing remained for
-the Lacedæmonians to master except the city itself and Peiræus; a
-consummation certain to happen, and actually brought to pass in
-April 404 B.C., when Lysander entered Athens in triumph, dismantled
-Peiræus, and demolished a large portion of the Long Walls. With the
-exception of Athens herself,—whose citizens deferred the moment of
-subjection by an heroic, though unavailing, struggle against the
-horrors of famine,—and of Samos,—no other Grecian city offered any
-resistance to Lysander after the battle of Ægospotami; which in fact
-not only took away from Athens her whole naval force, but transferred
-it all over to him, and rendered him admiral of a larger Grecian
-fleet than had ever been seen together since the battle of Salamis.
-
-I have recounted in my sixty-fifth chapter, the sixteen months
-of bitter suffering undergone by Athens immediately after her
-surrender. The loss of her fleet and power was aggravated by an
-extremity of internal oppression. Her oligarchical party and her
-exiles, returning after having served with the enemy against her,
-extorted from the public assembly, under the dictation of Lysander
-who attended it in person, the appointment of an omnipotent council
-of thirty for the ostensible purpose of framing a new constitution.
-These thirty rulers,—among whom Kritias was the most violent, and
-Theramenes (seemingly) the most moderate, or at least the soonest
-satiated,—perpetrated cruelty and spoliation on the largest scale,
-being protected against all resistance by a Lacedæmonian harmost and
-garrison established in the acropolis. Besides numbers of citizens
-put to death, so many others were driven into exile with the loss
-of their property, that Thebes and the neighboring cities became
-crowded with them. After about eight months of unopposed tyranny, the
-Thirty found themselves for the first time attacked by Thrasybulus
-at the head of a small party of these exiles coming out of Bœotia.
-His bravery and good conduct,—combined with the enormities of the
-Thirty, which became continually more nefarious, and to which even
-numerous oligarchical citizens, as well as Theramenes himself,
-successively became victims,—enabled him soon to strengthen himself,
-to seize the Peiræus, and to carry on a civil war which ultimately
-put down the tyrants.
-
-These latter were obliged to invoke the aid of a new Lacedæmonian
-force. And had that force still continued at the disposal of
-Lysander, all resistance on the part of Athens would have been
-unavailing. But fortunately for the Athenians, the last few months
-had wrought material change in the dispositions both of the allies
-of Sparta and of many among her leading men. The allies, especially
-Thebes and Corinth, not only relented in their hatred and fear of
-Athens, now that she had lost her power,—but even sympathized with
-her suffering exiles, and became disgusted with the self-willed
-encroachments of Sparta; while the Spartan king Pausanias, together
-with some of the ephors, were also jealous of the arbitrary
-and oppressive conduct of Lysander. Instead of conducting the
-Lacedæmonian force to uphold at all price the Lysandrian oligarchy,
-Pausanias appeared rather as an equitable mediator to terminate
-the civil war. He refused to concur in any measure for obstructing
-the natural tendency towards a revival of the democracy. It was in
-this manner that Athens, rescued from that sanguinary and rapacious
-_regime_ which has passed into history under the name of the Thirty
-Tyrants, was enabled to reappear as a humble and dependent member
-of the Spartan alliance,—with nothing but the recollection of her
-former power, yet with her democracy again in vigorous and tutelary
-action for internal government. The just and gentle bearing of her
-democratical citizens, and the absence of reactionary antipathies,
-after such cruel ill-treatment,—are among the most honorable
-features in her history.
-
-The reader will find in my last volume, what I can only rapidly
-glance at here, the details of that system of bloodshed, spoliation,
-extinction of free speech and even of intellectual teaching, efforts
-to implicate innocent citizens as agents in judicial assassination,
-etc.,—which stained the year of Anarchy (as it was termed in
-Athenian annals[300]) immediately following the surrender of the
-city. These details depend on evidence perfectly satisfactory; for
-they are conveyed to us chiefly by Xenophon, whose sympathies are
-decidedly oligarchical. From him too we learn another fact, not less
-pregnant with instruction; that the knights or horsemen, the body of
-richest proprietors at Athens, were the mainstay of the Thirty from
-first to last, notwithstanding all the enormities of their career.
-
-  [300] Xen. Hellen. ii, 3, 1.
-
-We learn from these dark, but well-attested details, to appreciate
-the auspices under which that period of history called the
-Lacedæmonian empire was inaugurated. Such phenomena were by no means
-confined within the walls of Athens. On the contrary, the year of
-Anarchy (using that term in the sense in which it was employed by the
-Athenians) arising out of the same combination of causes and agents,
-was common to a very large proportion of the cities throughout
-Greece. The Lacedæmonian admiral Lysander, during his first year of
-naval command, had organized in most of the allied cities factious
-combinations of some of the principal citizens, corresponding with
-himself personally; by whose efforts in their respective cities he
-was enabled to prosecute the war vigorously, and whom he repaid,
-partly by seconding as much as he could their injustices in their
-respective cities,—partly by promising to strengthen their hands
-still farther as soon as victory should be made sure.[301] This
-policy, while it served as a stimulus against the common enemy,
-contributed still more directly to aggrandize Lysander himself;
-creating for him an ascendency of his own, and imposing upon him
-personal obligations towards adherents, apart from what was required
-by the interests of Sparta.
-
-  [301] Plutarch, Lysand. c. 5.
-
-The victory of Ægospotami, complete and decisive beyond all
-expectations either of friend or foe, enabled him to discharge these
-obligations with interest. All Greece at once made submission to the
-Lacedæmonians,[302] except Athens and Samos,—and these two only held
-out a few months. It was now the first business of the victorious
-commander to remunerate his adherents, and to take permanent
-security for Spartan dominion as well as for his own. In the greater
-number of cities, he established an oligarchy of ten citizens, or a
-dekarchy,[303] composed of his own partisans; while he at the same
-time planted in each a Lacedæmonian harmost or governor, with a
-garrison to uphold the new oligarchy. The dekarchy of ten Lysandrian
-partisans, with the Lacedæmonian harmost to sustain them, became the
-general scheme of Hellenic government throughout the Ægean, from
-Eubœa to the Thracian coast-towns, and from Myletus to Byzantium.
-Lysander sailed round in person, with his victorious fleet, to
-Byzantium and Chalkêdon, to the cities of Lesbos, to Thasos, and
-other places,—while he sent Eteonikus to Thrace, for the purpose of
-thus recasting the governments everywhere. Not merely those cities
-which had hitherto been on the Athenian side, but also those which
-had acted as allies of Sparta, were subjected to the same intestine
-revolution and the same foreign constraint.[304] Everywhere the new
-Lysandrian dekarchy superseded the previous governments, whether
-oligarchical or democratical.
-
-  [302] Xen. Hellen. ii, 2, 6.
-
-  [303] These Councils of Ten, organized by Lysander, are sometimes
-  called _Dekarchies_—sometimes _Dekadarchies_. I use the former
-  word by preference; since the word _Dekadarch_ is also employed
-  by Xenophon in another and very different sense—as meaning an
-  officer who commands a _dekad_.
-
-  [304] Plutarch, Lysand. c. 13.
-
-  Καταλυών δὲ τοὺς δήμους καὶ τὰς ἄλλας πολιτείας, ἕνα μὲν ἁρμοστὴν
-  ἑκάστῃ Λακεδαιμόνιον κατέλιπε, δέκα δὲ ἄρχοντας ἐκ τῶν ὑπ᾽ αὐτοῦ
-  συγκεκροτημένων κατὰ πόλιν ἑταιρειῶν. Καὶ ταῦτα πράττων ~ὁμοίως
-  ἔν τε ταῖς πολεμίαις καὶ ταῖς συμμάχοις γεγενημέναις πόλεσι~,
-  παρέπλει σχολαίως τρόπον τινα κατασκευαζόμενος ἑαυτῷ τὴν τῆς
-  Ἑλλάδος ἡγεμονίαν. Compare Xen. Hellen. ii, 2, 2-5; Diodor. xiii,
-  3, 10, 13.
-
-At Thasus, as well as in other places, this revolution was not
-accomplished without much bloodshed as well as treacherous stratagem,
-nor did Lysander himself scruple to enforce, personally and by his
-own presence, the execution and expulsion of suspected citizens.[305]
-In many places, however, simple terrorism probably sufficed. The
-new Lysandrian Ten overawed resistance and procured recognition of
-their usurpation by the menace of inviting the victorious admiral
-with his fleet of two hundred sail, and by the simple arrival of
-the Lacedæmonian harmost. Not only was each town obliged to provide
-a fortified citadel and maintenance for this governor with his
-garrison, but a scheme of tribute, amounting to one thousand talents
-annually, was imposed for the future, and assessed ratably upon each
-city by Lysander.[306]
-
-  [305] Plutarch, Lysand. c. 13. πολλαῖς παραγινόμενος αὐτὸς
-  σφαγαῖς καὶ συνεκβάλλων τοὺς τῶν φίλων ἐχθροὺς, οὐκ ἐπιεικὲς
-  ἐδίδου τοῖς Ἕλλησι δεῖγμα τῆς Λακεδαιμονίων ἀρχῆς, etc.
-
-  Plutarch, Lysand. c. 14. Καὶ τῶν μὲν ἄλλων πόλεων ὁμαλῶς ἁπασῶν
-  κατέλυε τὰς πολιτείας καὶ καθίστη δεκαδαρχίας· πολλῶν μὲν ἐν
-  ἑκάστῃ σφαττομένων, πολλῶν δὲ φευγόντων, etc.
-
-  About the massacre at Thasus, see Cornelius Nepos, Lysand. c. 2;
-  Polyæn. i, 45, 4. Compare Plutarch, Lysand. c. 19; and see Vol.
-  VIII, Ch. lxv, p. 220 of this History.
-
-  [306] Diodor. xiv, 10. Compare Isokrates, Or. iv, (Panegyr.) s.
-  151; Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 1.
-
-In what spirit these new dekarchies would govern, consisting as they
-did of picked oligarchical partisans distinguished for audacity and
-ambition,[307]—who, to all the unscrupulous lust of power which
-characterized Lysander himself, added a thirst for personal gain,
-from which he was exempt, and were now about to reimburse themselves
-for services already rendered to him,—the general analogy of Grecian
-history would sufficiently teach us, though we are without special
-details. But in reference to this point, we have not merely general
-analogy to guide us; we have farther the parallel case of the Thirty
-at Athens, the particulars of whose rule are well known and have
-already been alluded to. These Thirty, with the exception of the
-difference of number, were to all intents and purposes a Lysandrian
-dekarchy; created by the same originating force, placed under the
-like circumstances, and animated by the like spirit and interests.
-Every subject town would produce its Kritias and Theramenes, and
-its body of wealthy citizens like the knights or horsemen at Athens
-to abet their oppressions, under Lacedæmonian patronage and the
-covering guard of the Lacedæmonian harmost. Moreover, Kritias,
-with all his vices, was likely to be better rather than worse, as
-compared with his oligarchical parallel in any other less cultivated
-city. He was a man of letters and philosophy, accustomed to the
-conversation of Sokrates, and to the discussion of ethical and
-social questions. We may say the same of the knights or horsemen
-at Athens. Undoubtedly they had been better educated, and had been
-exposed to more liberalizing and improving influences, than the
-corresponding class elsewhere. If, then, these knights at Athens
-had no shame in serving as accomplices to the Thirty throughout all
-their enormities, we need not fear to presume that other cities would
-furnish a body of wealthy men yet more unscrupulous, and a leader at
-least as sanguinary, rapacious, and full of antipathies, as Kritias.
-As at Athens, so elsewhere; the dekarchs would begin by putting to
-death notorious political opponents, under the name of “the wicked
-men;”[308] they would next proceed to deal in the same manner
-with men of known probity and courage, likely to take a lead in
-resisting oppression.[309] Their career of blood would continue,—in
-spite of remonstrances from more moderate persons among their own
-number, like Theramenes,—until they contrived some stratagem for
-disarming the citizens, which would enable them to gratify both their
-antipathies and their rapacity by victims still more numerous,—many
-of such victims being wealthy men, selected for purposes of pure
-spoliation.[310] They would next despatch by force any obtrusive
-monitor from their own number, like Theramenes; probably with far
-less ceremony than accompanied the perpetration of this crime at
-Athens, where we may trace the effect of those judicial forms and
-habits to which the Athenian public had been habituated,—overruled
-indeed, yet still not forgotten. There would hardly remain any fresh
-enormity still to commit, over and above the multiplied executions,
-except to banish from the city all but their own immediate partisans,
-and to reward these latter with choice estates confiscated from
-the victims.[311] If called upon to excuse such tyranny, the
-leader of a dekarchy would have sufficient invention to employ the
-plea of Kritias,—that all changes of government were unavoidably
-death-dealing, and that nothing less than such stringent measures
-would suffice to maintain his city in suitable dependence upon
-Sparta.[312]
-
-  [307] Plutarch, Lysand. c. 13. τοῦ Λυσάνδρου τῶν ὀλίγων τοῖς
-  θρασυτάτοις καὶ φιλονεικοτάτοις τὰς πόλεις ἐγχειρίζοντος.
-
-  [308] Xen. Hellen. ii, 3, 13.
-
-  ... ἔπεισαν Λύσανδρον φρουροὺς σφίσι ξυμπρᾶξαι ἐλθεῖν, ἕως δὴ
-  ~τοὺς πονηροὺς~ ἐκποδὼν ποιησάμενοι καταστήσαιντο τὴν πολιτείαν,
-  etc.
-
-  [309] Xen. Hellen. ii, 3, 14. Τῶν δὲ φρουρῶν τούτου (the harmost)
-  συμπέμποντος αὐτοῖς, οὓς ἐβούλοντο, συνελάμβανον οὐκέτι τοὺς
-  πονηροὺς καὶ ὀλίγου ἀξίους, ἀλλ᾽ ἤδη οὓς ἐνόμιζον ἥκιστα
-  μὲν παρωθουμένους ἀνέχεσθαι, ἀντιπράττειν δέ τι ἐπιχειροῦντας
-  πλείστους τοὺς συνεθέλοντας λαμβάνειν.
-
-  [310] Xen. Hellen. ii, 3, 21.
-
-  [311] Xen. Hellen. ii, 4, 1.
-
-  [312] Xen. Hellen. ii, 3, 24-32. Καὶ εἰσὶ μὲν δήπου πᾶσαι
-  μεταβολαὶ πολιτειῶν θανατήφοροι, etc.
-
-Of course, it is not my purpose to affirm that in any other city,
-precisely the same phenomena took place as those which occurred in
-Athens. But we are nevertheless perfectly warranted in regarding
-the history of the Athenian Thirty as a fair sample, from whence to
-derive our idea of those Lysandrian dekarchies which now overspread
-the Grecian world. Doubtless, each had its own peculiar march; some
-were less tyrannical; but, perhaps, some even more tyrannical,
-regard being had to the size of the city. And in point of fact,
-Isokrates, who speaks with indignant horror of these dekarchies,
-while he denounces those features which they had in common with the
-triakontarchy at Athens,—extrajudicial murders, spoliations, and
-banishments,—notices one enormity besides, which we do not find
-in the latter, violent outrages upon boys and women.[313] Nothing
-of this kind is ascribed to Kritias and his companions;[314] and
-it is a considerable proof of the restraining force of Athenian
-manners, that men who inflicted so much evil in gratification of
-other violent impulses, should have stopped short here. The decemvirs
-named by Lysander, like the decemvir Appius Claudius at Rome, would
-find themselves armed with power to satiate their lusts as well as
-their antipathies, and would not be more likely to set bounds to the
-former than to the latter. Lysander, in all the overweening insolence
-of victory, while rewarding his most devoted partisans with an
-exaltation comprising every sort of license and tyranny, stained the
-dependent cities with countless murders, perpetrated on private as
-well as on public grounds.[315] No individual Greek had ever before
-wielded so prodigious a power of enriching friends or destroying
-enemies, in this universal reorganization of Greece;[316] nor was
-there ever any power more deplorably abused.
-
-  [313] Isokrates Orat. iv, (Panegyr.) s. 127-132 (c. 32).
-
-  He has been speaking, at some length, and in terms of energetic
-  denunciation, against the enormities of the dekarchies. He
-  concludes by saying—Φυγὰς δὲ καὶ στάσεις καὶ νόμων συγχύσεις καὶ
-  πολιτειῶν μεταβολὰς, ~ἔτι δὲ παιδῶν ὕβρεις καὶ γυναικῶν αἰσχύνας
-  καὶ χρημάτων ἁρπαγὰς~, τίς ἂν δύναιτο διεξελθεῖν· πλὴν τοσοῦτον
-  εἰπεῖν ἔχω καθ᾽ ἁπάντων, ὅτι τὰ μὲν ἐφ᾽ ἡμῶν δεινὰ ῥᾳδίως ἄν τις
-  ἑνὶ ψηφίσματι διέλυσε, τὰς δὲ σφαγὰς καὶ τὰς ἀνομίας τὰς ἐπὶ
-  τούτων γενομένας οὐδεὶς ἂν ἰάσασθαι δύναιτο.
-
-  See also, of the same author, Isokrates, Orat. v, (Philipp.) s.
-  110; Orat. viii, (de Pace) s. 119-124; Or. xii, (Panath.) s. 58,
-  60, 106.
-
-  [314] We may infer that if Xenophon had heard anything of the
-  sort respecting Kritias, he would hardly have been averse to
-  mention it; when we read what he says (Memorab. i, 2, 29.)
-  Compare a curious passage about Kritias in Dion. Chrysostom. Or.
-  xxi, p. 270.
-
-  [315] Plutarch Lysand. c. 19. Ἦν δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι
-  δημοτικῶν φόνος οὐκ ἀριθμητὸς, ἅτε δὴ μὴ κατ᾽ ἰδίας μόνον
-  αἰτίας αὐτοῦ κτείνοντος, ἀλλὰ πολλαῖς μὲν ἔχθραις, πολλαῖς δὲ
-  πλεονεξίαις, τῶν ἑκασταχόθι φίλων χαριζομένου τὰ τοιαῦτα καὶ
-  συνεργοῦντος; also Pausanias, vii, 10, 1; ix, 32, 6.
-
-  [316] Plutarch, Agesilaus, c. 7.
-
-It was thus that the Lacedæmonian empire imposed upon each of the
-subject cities a double oppression;[317] the native decemvirs, and
-the foreign harmost; each abetting the other, and forming together an
-aggravated pressure upon the citizens, from which scarce any escape
-was left. The Thirty at Athens paid the greatest possible court to
-the harmost Kallibius,[318] and put to death individual Athenians
-offensive to him, in order to purchase his coöperation in their own
-violences. The few details which we possess respecting these harmosts
-(who continued throughout the insular and maritime cities for about
-ten years, until the battle of Knidus, or as long as the maritime
-empire of Sparta lasted,—but in various continental dependencies
-considerably longer, that is, until the defeat of Leuktra in 371
-B.C.), are all for the most part discreditable. We have seen in the
-last chapter the description given by the philo-Laconian Xenophon,
-of the harsh and treacherous manner in which they acted towards the
-returning Cyreian soldiers, combined with their corrupt subservience
-to Pharnabazus. We learn from him that it depended upon the fiat of
-a Lacedæmonian harmost whether these soldiers should be proclaimed
-enemies and excluded forever from their native cities; and Kleander,
-the harmost of Byzantium, who at first threatened them with this
-treatment, was only induced by the most unlimited submission,
-combined with very delicate management, to withdraw his menace. The
-cruel proceeding of Anaxibius and Aristarchus, who went so far as to
-sell four hundred of these soldiers into slavery, has been recounted
-a few pages above. Nothing can be more arbitrary or reckless than
-their proceedings. If they could behave thus towards a body of Greek
-soldiers full of acquired glory, effective either as friends or as
-enemies, and having generals capable of prosecuting their collective
-interests and making their complaints heard,—what protection would
-a private citizen of any subject city, Byzantium or Perinthus, be
-likely to enjoy against their oppression?
-
-  [317] See the speech of the Theban envoys at Athens, about eight
-  years after the surrender of Athens (Xen. Hellen. iii, 5, 13).
-
-  ... Οὐδὲ γὰρ φυγεῖν ἐξῆν (Plutarch, Lysand. c. 19).
-
-  [318] Xen. Hellen. ii, 3, 13.
-
-  τὸν μὲν Καλλίβιον ἐθεράπευον πάσῃ θεραπείᾳ, ὡς πάντα ἐπαινοίῃ, ἃ
-  πράττοιεν, etc. (Plutarch, Lysand. c. 15).
-
-  The Thirty seem to have outdone Lysander himself. A young
-  Athenian of rank, distinguished as a victor in the pankratium,
-  Autolykus,—having been insulted by Kallibius, resented it,
-  tripped him up, and threw him down. Lysander, on being appealed
-  to, justified Autolykus, and censured Kallibius, telling him
-  that he did not know how to govern freemen. The Thirty, however,
-  afterwards put Autolykus to death, as a means of courting
-  Kallibius (Plutarch, Lysand. c. 15). Pausanius mentions Eteonikus
-  (not Kallibius) as the person who struck Autolykus; but he
-  ascribes the same decision to Lysander (ix, 32, 3).
-
-The story of Aristodemus, the harmost of Oreus in Eubœa, evinces that
-no justice could be obtained against any of their enormities from
-the ephors of Sparta. That harmost, among many other acts of brutal
-violence, seized a beautiful youth, son of a free citizen at Oreus,
-out of the palæstra,—carried him off,—and after vainly endeavoring
-to overcome his resistance, put him to death. The father of the
-youth went to Sparta, made known the atrocities, and appealed to
-the ephors and Senate for redress. But a deaf ear was turned to his
-complaints, and in anguish of mind he slew himself. Indeed, we know
-that these Spartan authorities would grant no redress, not merely
-against harmosts, but even against private Spartan citizens, who
-had been guilty of gross crime out of their own country. A Bœotian
-near Leuktra, named Skedasus, preferred complaint that two Spartans,
-on their way from Delphi, after having been hospitably entertained
-in his house, had first violated, and afterwards killed, his two
-daughters; but even for so flagitious an outrage as this, no redress
-could be obtained.[319] Doubtless, when a powerful foreign ally, like
-the Persian satrap Pharnabazus,[320] complained to the ephors of the
-conduct of a Lacedæmonian harmost or admiral, his representations
-would receive attention; and we learn that the ephors were thus
-induced not merely to recall Lysander from the Hellespont, but to put
-to death another officer, Thorax, for corrupt appropriation of money.
-But for a private citizen in any subject city, the superintending
-authority of Sparta would be not merely remote but deaf and
-immovable, so as to afford him no protection whatever, and to leave
-him altogether at the mercy of the harmost. It seems, too, that
-the rigor of Spartan training, and peculiarity of habits, rendered
-individual Lacedæmonians on foreign service more self-willed, more
-incapable of entering into the customs or feelings of others, and
-more liable to degenerate when set free from the strict watch of
-home,—than other Greeks generally.[321]
-
-  [319] Plutarch, Amator. Narration, p. 773; Plutarch, Pelopidas,
-  c. 20. In Diodorus (xv, 54) and Pausanias, (ix, 13, 2), the
-  damsels thus outraged are stated to have slain themselves.
-  Compare another story in Xenoph. Hellen. v, 4, 56, 57.
-
-  [320] Plutarch, Lysand. c. 19.
-
-  [321] This seems to have been the impression not merely of
-  the enemies of Sparta, but even of the Spartan authorities
-  themselves. Compare two remarkable passages of Thucydides, i,
-  77, and i, 95. Ἄμικτα γὰρ (says the Athenian envoy at Sparta) τά
-  τε καθ᾽ ὑμᾶς αὐτοὺς νόμιμα τοῖς ἄλλοις ἔχετε, καὶ προσέτι εἷς
-  ἕκαστος ἐξιὼν οὔτε τούτοις χρῆται, οὐθ᾽ οἷς ἡ ἄλλη Ἑλλὰς νομίζει.
-
-  After the recall of the regent Pausanias and of Dorkis from the
-  Hellespont (in 477 B.C.), the Lacedæmonians refuse to send
-  out any successor, φοβούμενοι μὴ σφίσιν οἱ ἐξιόντες χείρους
-  γίγνωνται, ὅπερ καὶ ἐν τῷ Παυσανίᾳ ἐνεῖδον, etc. (i, 95.)
-
-  Compare Plutarch, Apophtheg. Laconic. p. 220 F.
-
-Taking all these causes of evil together,—the dekarchies, the
-harmosts, and the overwhelming dictatorship of Lysander,—and
-construing other parts of the Grecian world by the analogy of Athens
-under the Thirty,—we shall be warranted in affirming that the first
-years of the Spartan Empire, which followed upon the victory of
-Ægospotami, were years of all-pervading tyranny and multifarious
-intestine calamity, such as Greece had never before endured. The
-hardships of war, severe in many ways, were now at an end, but they
-were replaced by a state of suffering not the less difficult to bear
-because it was called peace. And what made the suffering yet more
-intolerable was, that it was a bitter disappointment, and a flagrant
-violation of promises proclaimed, repeatedly and explicitly, by the
-Lacedæmonians themselves.
-
-For more than thirty years preceding,—from times earlier than the
-commencement of the Peloponnesian war,—the Spartans had professed to
-interfere only for the purpose of liberating Greece, and of putting
-down the usurped ascendency of Athens. All the allies of Sparta
-had been invited into strenuous action,—all those of Athens had
-been urged to revolt,—under the soul-stirring cry of “Freedom to
-Greece.” The earliest incitements addressed by the Corinthians to
-Sparta in 432 B.C., immediately after the Korkyræan dispute, called
-upon her to stand forward in fulfilment of her recognized function
-as “Liberator of Greece,” and denounced her as guilty of connivance
-with Athens if she held back.[322] Athens was branded as the “despot
-city;” which had already absorbed the independence of many Greeks,
-and menaced that of all the rest. The last formal requisition borne
-by the Lacedæmonian envoys to Athens in the winter immediately
-preceding the war, ran thus,—“If you desire the continuance of
-peace with Sparta, restore to the Greeks their autonomy.”[323] When
-Archidamus, king of Sparta, approached at the head of his army to
-besiege Platæa, the Platæans laid claim to autonomy as having been
-solemnly guaranteed to them by King Pausanias after the great victory
-near their town. Upon which Archidamus replied,—“Your demand is
-just; we are prepared to confirm _your_ autonomy,—but we call upon
-you to aid us in securing the like for those other Greeks who have
-been enslaved by Athens. This is the sole purpose of our great
-present effort.”[324] And the banner of general enfranchisement,
-which the Lacedæmonians thus held up at the outset of the war,
-enlisted in their cause encouraging sympathy and good wishes
-throughout Greece.[325]
-
-  [322] Thucyd. i, 69. οὐ γὰρ ὁ δουλωσάμενος, ἀλλ᾽ ὁ δυνάμενος μὲν
-  παῦσαι, περιορῶν δὲ, ἀληθέστερον αὐτὸ δρᾷ, εἴπερ καὶ τὴν ἀξίωσιν
-  τῆς ἀρετῆς ὡς ἐλευθερῶν τὴν Ἑλλάδα φέρεται.
-
-  To the like purpose the second speech of the Corinthian envoys
-  at Sparta, c. 122-124—μὴ μέλλετε Ποτιδαιάταις τε ποιεῖσθαι
-  τιμωρίαν. ... καὶ τῶν ἄλλων μετελθεῖν τὴν ἐλευθερίαν, etc.
-
-  [323] Thucyd. i, 139. Compare Isokrates, Or. iv, Panegyr. c. 34,
-  s. 140; Or. v, (Philipp.) s. 121; Or. xiv, (Plataic.) s. 43.
-
-  [324] Thucyd. ii, 72. Παρασκευὴ δὲ τόσηδε καὶ πόλεμος γεγένηται
-  αὐτῶν ἕνεκα καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐλευθερώσεως.
-
-  Read also the speech of the Theban orator, in reply to the
-  Platæan, after the capture of the town by the Lacedæmonians (iii,
-  63).
-
-  [325] Thucyd. ii, 8. ἡ δὲ εὔνοια παρὰ πολὺ ἐποίει τῶν ἀνθρώπων
-  μᾶλλον ἐς τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους, ἄλλως τε καὶ προειπόντων ὅτι τὴν
-  Ἑλλάδα ἐλευθεροῦσιν.
-
-  See also iii, 13, 14—the speech of the envoys from the revolted
-  Mitylênê, to the Lacedæmonians.
-
-  The Lacedæmonian admiral Alkidas with his fleet, is announced as
-  crossing over the Ægean to Ionia for the purpose of “liberating
-  Greece;” accordingly, the Samian exiles remonstrate with him
-  for killing his prisoners, as in contradiction with that object
-  (iii, 32)—ἔλεγον οὐ καλῶς τὴν Ἑλλάδα ἐλευθεροῦν αὐτὸν, εἰ ἄνδρας
-  διέφθειρεν, etc.
-
-But the most striking illustration by far, of the seductive promises
-held out by the Lacedæmonians, was afforded by the conduct of
-Brasidas in Thrace, when he first came into the neighborhood of the
-Athenian allies during the eighth year of the war (424 B.C.). In his
-memorable discourse addressed to the public assembly at Akanthus, he
-takes the greatest pains to satisfy them that he came only for the
-purpose of realizing the promise of enfranchisement proclaimed by
-the Lacedæmonians at the beginning of the war.[326] Having expected,
-when acting in such a cause, nothing less than a hearty welcome,
-he is astonished to find their gates closed against him. “I am come
-(said he) not to injure, but to liberate the Greeks; after binding
-the Lacedæmonian authorities by the most solemn oaths, that all
-whom I may bring over shall be dealt with as autonomous allies.
-We do not wish to obtain you as allies either by force or fraud,
-but to act as your allies at a time when you are enslaved by the
-Athenians. You ought not to suspect my purposes, in the face of these
-solemn assurances; least of all ought any man to hold back through
-apprehension of private enmities, and through fear lest I should put
-the city into the hands of a few chosen partisans. I am not come to
-identify myself with local faction: I am not the man to offer you
-an unreal liberty by breaking down your established constitution,
-for the purpose of enslaving either the Many to the Few, or the
-Few to the Many. That would be more intolerable even than foreign
-dominion; and we Lacedæmonians should incur nothing but reproach,
-instead of reaping thanks and honor for our trouble. We should draw
-upon ourselves those very censures, upon the strength of which we
-are trying to put down Athens; and that, too, in aggravated measure,
-worse than those who have never made honorable professions; since to
-men in high position, specious trick is more disgraceful than open
-violence.[327]—If (continued Brasidas) in spite of my assurances,
-you still withhold from me your coöperation, I shall think myself
-authorized to constrain you by force. We should not be warranted in
-forcing freedom on any unwilling parties, except with a view to some
-common good. But as we seek not empire for ourselves,—as we struggle
-only to put down the empire of others,—as we offer autonomy to each
-and all,—so we should do wrong to the majority if we allowed you to
-persist in your opposition.”[328]
-
-  [326] Thucyd. iv, 85. Ἡ μὲν ἔκπεμψίς μου καὶ τῆς στρατιᾶς ὑπὸ
-  Λακεδαιμονίων, ὦ Ἀκάνθιοι, γεγένηται τὴν αἰτίαν ἐπαληθεύουσα ἣν
-  ἀρχόμενοι τοῦ πολέμου προείπομεν, ~Ἀθηναίοις ἐλευθεροῦντες τὴν
-  Ἑλλάδα πολεμήσειν~.
-
-  [327] Thucyd. iv, 85. Αὐτός τε οὐκ ἐπὶ κακῷ, ἐπ᾽ ἐλευθερώσει δὲ
-  τῶν Ἑλλήνων παρελήλυθα, ὅρκοις τε Λακεδαιμονίων καταλαβὼν τὰ τέλη
-  τοῖς μεγίστοις, ἦ μὴν οὓς ἂν ἔγωγε προσαγάγωμαι ξυμμάχους ἔσεσθαι
-  αὐτονόμους.... Καὶ εἴ τις ἰδίᾳ τινὰ δεδιὼς ἄρα, μὴ ἐγώ τισι
-  προσθῶ τὴν πόλιν, ἀπρόθυμός ἐστι, ~πάντων μάλιστα πιστευσάτω. Οὐ
-  γὰρ συστασιάσων ἥκω~, οὐδὲ ἀσαφῆ τὴν ἐλευθερίαν νομίζω ἐπιφέρειν,
-  εἰ, ~τὸ πάτριον παρεὶς, τὸ πλέον τοῖς ὀλίγοις~, ἢ τὸ ἔλασσον τοῖς
-  πᾶσι, δουλώσαιμι. ~Χαλεπώτερα γὰρ ἂν τῆς ἀλλοφύλου ἀρχῆς εἴη~,
-  καὶ ἡμῖν τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις οὐκ ἂν ἀντὶ πόνων χάρις καθίσταιτο,
-  ἀντὶ δὲ τιμῆς καὶ δόξης αἰτία μᾶλλον· ~οἷς τε τοὺς Ἀθηναίους
-  ἐγκλήμασι καταπολεμοῦμεν, αὐτοὶ ἂν φαινοίμεθα ἐχθίονα ἢ ὁ μὴ
-  ὑποδείξας ἀρετὴν κατακτώμενοι~.
-
-  [328] Thucyd. iv, 87. Οὐδὲ ὀφείλομεν οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι μὴ ~κοινοῦ
-  τινος αγαθοῦ αἰτίᾳ τοὺς μὴ βουλομένους ἐλευθεροῦν. Οὐδ᾽ αὖ ἀρχῆς
-  ἐφιέμεθα~, παῦσαι δὲ μᾶλλον ἑτέρους σπεύδοντες τοὺς πλείους
-  ἂν ἀδικοῖμεν, ~εἰ ξύμπασιν αὐτονομίαν ἐπιφέροντες~ ὑμᾶς τοὺς
-  ἐναντιουμένους περιΐδοιμεν. Compare Isokrates, Or. iv, (Panegyr.)
-  s. 140, 141.
-
-Like the allied sovereigns of Europe in 1813, who, requiring the
-most strenuous efforts on the part of the people to contend against
-the Emperor Napoleon, promised free constitutions and granted
-nothing after the victory had been assured,—the Lacedæmonians
-thus held out the most emphatic and repeated assurances of general
-autonomy in order to enlist allies against Athens; disavowing, even
-ostentatiously, any aim at empire for themselves. It is true, that
-after the great catastrophe before Syracuse, when the ruin of Athens
-appeared imminent, and when the alliance with the Persian satraps
-against her was first brought to pass, the Lacedæmonians began to
-think more of empire,[329] and less of Grecian freedom; which,
-indeed, so far as concerned the Greeks on the continent of Asia,
-was surrendered to Persia. Nevertheless the old watchword still
-continued. It was still currently believed, though less studiously
-professed, that the destruction of the Athenian empire was aimed at
-as a means to the liberation of Greece.[330]
-
-  [329] Feelings of the Lacedæmonians during the winter immediately
-  succeeding the great Syracusan catastrophe (Thuc. viii. 2)—καὶ
-  καθελόντες ἐκείνους (the Athenians) αὐτοὶ τῆς πάσης Ἑλλάδος ἤδη
-  ἀσφαλῶς ἡγήσεσθαι.
-
-  [330] Compare Thucyd. viii, 43, 3; viii, 46, 3.
-
-The victory of Ægospotami with its consequences cruelly undeceived
-every one. The language of Brasidas, sanctioned by the solemn oaths
-of the Lacedæmonian ephors, in 424 B.C.—and the proceedings
-of the Lacedæmonian Lysander in 405-404 B.C., the commencing
-hour of Spartan omnipotence,—stand in such literal and flagrant
-contradiction, that we might almost imagine the former to have
-foreseen the possibility of such a successor, and to have tried to
-disgrace and disarm him beforehand. The dekarchies of Lysander
-realized that precise ascendency of a few chosen partisans which
-Brasidas repudiates as an abomination worse than foreign dominion;
-while the harmosts and garrison, installed in the dependent cities
-along with the native decemvirs, planted the second variety of
-mischief as well as the first, each aggravating the other. Had the
-noble-minded Kallikratidas gained a victory at Arginusæ, and lived
-to close the war, he would probably have tried, with more or less of
-success, to make some approach to the promises of Brasidas. But it
-was the double misfortune of Greece, first that the closing victory
-was gained by such an admiral as Lysander, the most unscrupulous
-of all power-seekers, partly for his country, and still more for
-himself,—next, that the victory was so decisive, sudden and
-imposing, as to leave no enemy standing, or in a position to insist
-upon terms. The fiat of Lysander, acting in the name of Sparta,
-became omnipotent, not merely over enemies, but over allies; and
-to a certain degree even over the Spartan authorities themselves.
-There was no present necessity for conciliating allies,—still
-less for acting up to former engagements; so that nothing remained
-to oppose the naturally ambitious inspirations of the Spartan
-ephors, who allowed the admiral to carry out the details in his own
-way. But former assurances, though Sparta was in a condition to
-disregard them, were not forgotten by others; and the recollection
-of them imparted additional bitterness to the oppressions of the
-decemvirs and harmosts.[331] In perfect consistency with her misrule
-throughout Eastern Greece,[332] too, Sparta identified herself with
-the energetic tyranny of Dionysius at Syracuse, assisting both to
-erect and to uphold it; a contradiction to her former maxims of
-action which would have astounded the historian Herodotus.
-
-  [331] This is emphatically set forth in a fragment of Theopompus
-  the historian, preserved by Theodorus Metochita, and printed at
-  the end of the collection of the Fragments of Theopompus the
-  historian, both by Wichers and by M. Didot. Both these editors,
-  however, insert it only as Fragmentum Spurium, on the authority
-  of Plutarch (Lysander, c. 13), who quotes the same sentiment
-  from the comic writer Theopompus. But the passage of Theodorus
-  Metochita presents the express words Θεόπομπος ὁ ἱστορικός.
-  We have, therefore, his distinct affirmation against that of
-  Plutarch; and the question is, which of the two we are to believe.
-
-  Now if any one will read attentively the so-called Fragmentum
-  Spurium as it stands at the end of the collections above referred
-  to, he will see (I think) that it belongs much more naturally
-  to the historian than to the comic writer. It is a strictly
-  historical statement, illustrated by a telling, though coarse,
-  comparison. The Fragment is thus presented by Theodorus Metochita
-  (Fragm. Theopomp. 344, ed. Didot).
-
-  Θεόπομπος ὁ ἱστορικὸς ἀποσκώπτων εἰς τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους, εἴκαζεν
-  αὐτοὺς ταῖς φαύλαις καπηλίσιν, αἳ τοῖς χρωμένοις ἐγχέουσαι
-  τὴν ἀρχὴν οἶνον ἡδύν τε καὶ εὔχρηστον σοφιστικῶς ἐπὶ τῇ λήψει
-  τοῦ ἀργυρίου, μεθύστερον φαυλόν τινα καὶ ἐκτροπίαν καὶ ὀξίνην
-  κατακρινῶσι καὶ παρέχονται· καὶ τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους τοίνυν
-  ἔλεγε, τὸν αὐτὸν ἐκείναις τρόπον, ἐν τῷ κατὰ τῶν Ἀθηναίων
-  πολέμῳ, τὴν ἀρχὴν ἡδίστῳ πόματι τῆς ἀπ᾽ Ἀθηναίων ἐλευθερίας καὶ
-  προγράμματι καὶ κηρύγματι τοὺς Ἕλληνας δελεάσαντας, ὕστερον
-  πικρότατα σφίσιν ἐγχέαι καὶ ἀηδέστατα κράματα βιοτῆς ἐπωδύνου καὶ
-  χρήσεως πραγμάτων ἀλγεινῶν, πάνυ τοι κατατυραννοῦντας τὰς πόλεις
-  δεκαρχίαις καὶ ἁρμοσταῖς βαρυτάτοις, καὶ πραττομένους, ἃ δυσχερὲς
-  εἶναι σφόδρα καὶ ἀνύποιστον φέρειν, καὶ ἀποκτιννύναι.
-
-  Plutarch, ascribing the statement to the comic Theopompus,
-  affirms him to be silly (ἔοικε ληρεῖν) in saying that the
-  Lacedæmonian empire began by being sweet and pleasant, and
-  afterwards was corrupted and turned into bitterness and
-  oppression; whereas the fact was, that it was bitterness and
-  oppression from the very first.
-
-  Now if we read the above citation from Theodorus, we shall see
-  that Theopompus did not really put forth that assertion which
-  Plutarch contradicts as silly and untrue.
-
-  What Theopompus stated was, that the first Lacedæmonians, _during
-  the war against Athens_, tempted the Greeks with a most delicious
-  draught and _programme_ and _proclamation_ of freedom from the
-  rule of Athens,—and that they afterwards poured in the most
-  bitter and repulsive mixtures of hard oppression and tyranny, etc.
-
-  The sweet draught is asserted to consist—not, as Plutarch
-  supposes, in the first taste of the actual Lacedæmonian empire
-  after the war, but—in the seductive promises of freedom held
-  out by them to the allies _during the war_. Plutarch’s charge of
-  ἔοικε ληρεῖν has thus no foundation. I have written δελεάσαντας
-  instead of δελεάσοντας which stands in Didot’s Fragment, because
-  it struck me that this correction was required to construe the
-  passage.
-
-  [332] Isokrates, Or. iv, (Panegr.) s. 145; Or. viii, (de Pace) s.
-  122; Diodor. xiv, 10-44; xv, 23. Compare Herodot. v, 92; Thucyd.
-  i, 18; Isokrates, Or. iv, (Panegyr.) s. 144.
-
-The empire of Sparta thus constituted at the end of 405 B.C.,
-maintained itself in full grandeur for somewhat above ten years,
-until the naval battle of Knidus,[333] in 394 B.C. That defeat
-destroyed her fleet and maritime ascendency, yet left her in
-undiminished power on land, which she still maintained until her
-defeat by the Thebans[334] at Leuktra in 371 B.C. Throughout all
-this time, it was her established system to keep up Spartan harmosts
-and garrisons in the dependent cities on the continent as well as in
-the islands. Even the Chians, who had been her most active allies
-during the last eight years of the war, were compelled to submit
-to this hardship; besides having all their fleet taken away from
-them.[335] But the native dekarchies, though at first established
-by Lysander universally throughout the maritime dependencies, did
-not last as a system so long as the harmosts. Composed as they were
-to a great degree of the personal nominees and confederates of
-Lysander, they suffered in part by the reactionary jealousy which
-in time made itself felt against his overweening ascendency. After
-continuing for some time, they lost the countenance of the Spartan
-ephors, who proclaimed permission to the cities (we do not precisely
-know when) to resume their preëxisting governments.[336] Some of the
-dekarchies thus became dissolved, or modified in various ways, but
-several probably still continued to subsist, if they had force enough
-to maintain themselves; for it does not appear that the ephors ever
-systematically put them down, as Lysander had systematically set them
-up.
-
-  [333] Isokrates, Panathen. s. 61. Σπαρτιᾶται μὲν γὰρ ἔτη δέκα
-  μόλις ἐπεστάτησαν αὐτῶν, ἡμεῖς δὲ πέντε καὶ ἑξήκοντα συνεχῶς
-  κατέσχομεν τὴν ἀρχήν. I do not hold myself bound to make out the
-  exactness of the chronology of Isokrates. But here we may remark
-  that his “hardly ten years” is a term, though less than the truth
-  by some months, if we may take the battle of Ægospotami as the
-  beginning, is very near the truth if we take the surrender of
-  Athens as the beginning, down to the battle of Knidus.
-
-  [334] Pausanias, viii, 52, 2; ix, 6, 1.
-
-  [335] Diodor. xiv, 84; Isokrates, Orat. viii, (de Pace) s. 121.
-
-  [336] Xen. Hellen. iii, 4, 2.
-
-  Lysander accompanied King Agesilaus (when the latter was going
-  to his Asiatic command in 396 B.C.). His purpose was—ὅπως
-  τὰς δεκαρχίας τὰς κατασταθείσας ὑπ᾽ ἐκείνου ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν,
-  ἐκπεπτωκυίας δὲ διὰ τοὺς ἐφόρους, οἱ τὰς πατρίους πολιτείας
-  παρήγγειλαν, πάλιν καταστήσειε μετ᾽ Ἀγησιλάου.
-
-  It shows the careless construction of Xenophon’s Hellenica, or
-  perhaps his reluctance to set forth the discreditable points of
-  the Lacedæmonian rule, that this is the first mention which he
-  makes (and that too, indirectly) of the dekarchies, nine years
-  after they had been first set up by Lysander.
-
-The government of the Thirty at Athens would never have been
-overthrown if the oppressed Athenians had been obliged to rely
-on a tutelary interference of the Spartan ephors to help them in
-overthrowing it. My last volume has shown that this nefarious
-oligarchy came to its end by the unassisted efforts of Thrasybulus
-and the Athenian democrats themselves. It is true, indeed, that the
-arrogance and selfishness of Sparta and of Lysander had alienated
-the Thebans, Corinthians, Megarians, and other neighboring allies,
-and induced them to sympathize with the Athenian exiles against the
-atrocities of the Thirty,—but they never rendered any positive
-assistance of moment. The inordinate personal ambition of Lysander
-had also offended King Pausanias and the Spartan ephors, so that
-they too became indifferent to the Thirty, who were his creatures.
-But this merely deprived the Thirty of that foreign support which
-Lysander, had he still continued in the ascendent, would have
-extended to them in full measure. It was not the positive cause
-of their downfall. That crisis was brought about altogether by
-the energy of Thrasybulus and his companions, who manifested such
-force and determination as could not have been put down without
-an extraordinary display of Spartan military power; a display not
-entirely safe when the sympathies of the chief allies were with
-the other side,—and at any rate adverse to the inclinations of
-Pausanias. As it was with the Thirty at Athens, so it probably
-was also with the dekarchies in the dependent cities. The Spartan
-ephors took no steps to put them down; but where the resistance of
-the citizens was strenuous enough to overthrow them, no Spartan
-intervention came to prop them up, and the harmost perhaps received
-orders not to consider his authority as indissolubly linked with
-theirs. The native forces of each dependent city being thus left to
-find their own level, the decemvirs, once installed, would doubtless
-maintain themselves in a great number; while in other cases they
-would be overthrown,—or, perhaps, would contrive to perpetuate their
-dominion by compromise and alliance with other oligarchical sections.
-This confused and unsettled state of the dekarchies,—some still
-existing, others half-existing, others again defunct,—prevailed in
-396 B.C., when Lysander accompanied Agesilaus into Asia, in the
-full hope that he should have influence enough to reorganize them
-all.[337] We must recollect that no other dependent city would
-possess the same means of offering energetic resistance to its local
-decemvirs, as Athens offered to the Thirty; and that the insular
-Grecian cities were not only feeble individually, but naturally
-helpless against the lords of the sea.[338]
-
-  [337] Compare the two passages of Xenophon’s Hellenica, iii, 4,
-  7; iii, 5, 13.
-
-  Ἅτε συντεταραγμένων ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι τῶν πολιτειῶν, καὶ οὔτε
-  δημοκρατίας ἔτι οὔσης, ὥσπερ ἐπ᾽ Ἀθηναίων, οὔτε δεκαρχίας, ὥσπερ
-  ἐπὶ Λυσάνδρου.
-
-  But that some of these dekarchies still continued, we know from
-  the subsequent passage. The Theban envoys say to the public
-  assembly at Athens, respecting the Spartans:—
-
-  Ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ οὓς ὑμῶν ἀπέστησαν φανεροί εἰσιν ἐξηπατηκότες· ὑπό
-  τε γὰρ τῶν ἁρμοστῶν ~τυραννοῦνται~, καὶ ὑπὸ δέκα ἀνδρῶν, οὓς
-  Λύσανδρος κατέστησεν ἐν ἑκάστῃ πόλει—where the decemvirs are
-  noted as still subsisting, in 395 B.C. See also Xen. Agesilaus,
-  i, 37.
-
-  [338] Xen. Hellen. iii, 5, 15.
-
-Such then was the result throughout Greece, when that long war,
-which had been undertaken in the name of universal autonomy, was
-terminated by the battle of Ægospotami. In place of imperial Athens
-was substituted, not the promised autonomy, but yet more imperial
-Sparta. An awful picture is given by the philo-Laconian Xenophon,
-in 399 B.C., of the ascendency exercised throughout all the
-Grecian cities, not merely by the ephors and the public officers,
-but even by the private citizens, of Sparta. “The Lacedæmonians
-(says he in addressing the Cyreian army) are now the presidents of
-Greece; and even any single private Lacedæmonian can accomplish
-what he pleases.”[339] “All the cities (he says in another place)
-then obeyed whatever order they might receive from a Lacedæmonian
-citizen.”[340] Not merely was the general ascendency thus omnipresent
-and irresistible, but it was enforced with a stringency of detail,
-and darkened by a thousand accompaniments of tyranny and individual
-abuse, such as had never been known under the much-decried empire of
-Athens.
-
-  [339] Xen. Anab. vi, 6, 12. Εἰσὶ μὲν γὰρ ἤδη ἐγγὺς αἱ Ἑλληνίδες
-  πόλεις· (this was spoken at Kalpê in Bithynia) τῆς δὲ Ἑλλάδος
-  Λακεδαιμόνιοι προεστήκασιν· ~ἱκανοὶ δέ εἰσι καὶ εἷς ἕκαστος
-  Λακεδαιμονίων ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ὅ,τι βούλονται διαπράττεσθαι~.
-
-  [340] Xen. Hellen. iii, 1, 5. Πᾶσαι γὰρ τότε αἱ πόλεις ἐπείθοντο,
-  ὅ,τι Λακεδαιμόνιος ἀνὴρ ἐπιτάττοι.
-
-We have more than one picture of the Athenian empire, in speeches
-made by hostile orators who had every motive to work up the strongest
-antipathies in the bosoms of their audience against it. We have the
-addresses of the Corinthian envoys at Sparta when stimulating the
-Spartan allies to the Peloponnesian war,[341]—that of the envoys
-from Mitylênê delivered at Olympia to the Spartan confederates,
-when the city had revolted from Athens and stood in pressing need
-of support,—the discourse of Brasidas in the public assembly at
-Akanthus,—and more than one speech also from Hermokrates, impressing
-upon his Sicilian countrymen hatred as well as fear of Athens.[342]
-Whoever reads these discourses, will see that they dwell almost
-exclusively on the great political wrong inherent in the very fact of
-her empire, robbing so many Grecian communities of their legitimate
-autonomy, over and above the tribute imposed. That Athens had thus
-already enslaved many cities, and was only watching for opportunities
-to enslave many more, is the theme upon which they expatiate. But
-of practical grievances,—of cruelty, oppression, spoliation,
-multiplied exiles, etc., of high-handed wrong committed by individual
-Athenians,—not one word is spoken. Had there been the smallest
-pretext for introducing such inflammatory topics, how much more
-impressive would have been the appeal of Brasidas to the sympathies
-of the Akanthians! How vehement would have been the denunciations of
-the Mitylenæan envoys, in place of the tame and almost apologetic
-language which we now read in Thucydides! Athens extinguished the
-autonomy of her subject-allies, and punished revolters with severity,
-sometimes even with cruelty. But as to other points of wrong, the
-silence of accusers, such as those just noticed, counts as a powerful
-exculpation.
-
-  [341] Thucyd. i, 68-120.
-
-  [342] Thucyd. iii, 9; iv, 59-85; vi, 76.
-
-The case is altered when we come to the period succeeding the
-battle of Ægospotami. Here indeed also, we find the Spartan empire
-complained of (as the Athenian empire had been before), in contrast
-with that state of autonomy to which each city laid claim, and which
-Sparta had not merely promised to ensure, but set forth as her only
-ground of war. Yet this is not the prominent grievance,—other topics
-stand more emphatically forward. The decemvirs and the harmosts (some
-of the latter being Helots), the standing instruments of Spartan
-empire, are felt as more sorely painful than the empire itself;
-as the language held by Brasidas at Akanthus admits them to be
-beforehand. At the time when Athens was a subject-city under Sparta,
-governed by the Lysandrian Thirty and by the Lacedæmonian harmost
-in the acropolis,—the sense of indignity arising from the fact of
-subjection was absorbed in the still more terrible suffering arising
-from the enormities of those individual rulers whom the imperial
-state had set up. Now Athens set up no local rulers,—no native
-Ten or native Thirty,—no resident Athenian harmosts or garrisons.
-This was of itself an unspeakable exemption, when compared with
-the condition of cities subject, not only to the Spartan empire,
-but also under that empire to native decemvirs like Kritias, and
-Spartan harmosts like Aristarchus or Aristodemus. A city subject to
-Athens had to bear definite burdens enforced by its own government,
-which was liable in case of default or delinquency to be tried
-before the popular Athenian Dikastery. But this same dikastery (as
-I have shown in a former volume, and as is distinctly stated by
-Thucydides)[343] was the harbor of refuge to each subject-city; not
-less against individual Athenian wrong-doers than against misconduct
-from other cities. Those who complained of the hardship suffered by
-a subject-city, from the obligation of bringing causes to be tried
-in the dikastery of Athens,—even if we take the case as they state
-it, and overlook the unfairness of omitting those numerous instances
-wherein the city was thus enabled to avert or redress wrong done to
-its own citizens,—would have complained both more loudly and with
-greater justice of an ever-present Athenian harmost; especially
-if there were coexistent a native government of Ten oligarchs,
-exchanging with him guilty connivances, like the partnership of the
-Thirty at Athens with the Lacedæmonian harmost Kallibius.[344]
-
-  [343] See the remarkable speech of Phrynichus in Thucyd. viii,
-  48, 5, which I have before referred to.
-
-  [344] Xen. Hellen. ii, 3, 14. Compare the analogous case of
-  Thebes, after the Lacedæmonians had got possession of the Kadmeia
-  (v. 2, 34-36).
-
-In no one point can it be shown that the substitution of Spartan
-empire in place of Athenian was a gain, either for the subject-cities
-or for Greece generally; while in many points, it was a great and
-serious aggravation of suffering. And this abuse of power is the
-more deeply to be regretted, as Sparta enjoyed after the battle of
-Ægospotami a precious opportunity,—such as Athens had never had,
-and such as never again recurred,—of reorganizing the Grecian
-world on wise principles, and with a view to Pan-hellenic stability
-and harmony. It is not her greatest sin to have refused to grant
-universal autonomy. She had indeed promised it; but we might pardon a
-departure from specific performance, had she exchanged the boon for
-one far greater, which it was within her reasonable power, at the
-end of 405 B.C., to confer. That universal town autonomy, towards
-which the Grecian instinct tended, though immeasurably better than
-universal subjection, was yet accompanied by much internal discord,
-and by the still more formidable evil of helplessness against any
-efficient foreign enemy. To ensure to the Hellenic world external
-safety as well as internal concord, it was not a new empire which
-was wanted, but a new political combination on equitable and
-comprehensive principles; divesting each town of a portion of its
-autonomy, and creating a common authority, responsible to all, for
-certain definite controlling purposes. If ever a tolerable federative
-system would have been practicable in Greece, it was after the
-battle of Ægospotami. The Athenian empire,—which, with all its
-defects, I believe to have been much better for the subject-cities
-than universal autonomy would have been,—had already removed many
-difficulties, and shown that combined and systematic action of
-the maritime Grecian world was no impossibility. Sparta might now
-have substituted herself for Athens, not as heir to the imperial
-power, but as president and executive agent of a new Confederacy of
-Delos,—reviving the equal, comprehensive, and liberal principles, on
-which that confederacy had first been organized.
-
-It is true that sixty years before, the constituent members of the
-original synod at Delos had shown themselves insensible to its value.
-As soon as the pressing alarm from Persia had passed over, some had
-discontinued sending deputies, others had disobeyed requisitions,
-others again had bought off their obligations, and forfeited their
-rights as autonomous and voting members, by pecuniary bargain
-with Athens; who, being obliged by the duties of her presidency
-to enforce obedience to the Synod against all reluctant members,
-made successively many enemies, and was gradually converted, almost
-without her own seeking, from President into Emperor, as the only
-means of obviating the total dissolution of the Confederacy. But
-though such untoward circumstances had happened before, it does not
-follow that they would now have happened again, assuming the same
-experiment to have been retried by Sparta, with manifest sincerity
-of purpose and tolerable wisdom. The Grecian world, especially the
-maritime portion of it, had passed through trials not less painful
-than instructive, during this important interval. Nor does it seem
-rash to suppose, that the bulk of its members might now have been
-disposed to perform steady confederate duties, at the call and under
-the presidency of Sparta, had she really attempted to reorganize a
-liberal confederacy, treating every city as autonomous and equal,
-except in so far as each was bound to obey the resolutions of the
-general synod. However impracticable such a scheme may appear,
-we must recollect that even Utopian schemes have their transient
-moments, if not of certain success, at least of commencement
-not merely possible but promising. And my belief is, that had
-Kallikratidas, with his ardent Pan-hellenic sentiment and force of
-resolution, been the final victor over imperial Athens, he would
-not have let the moment of pride and omnipotence pass over without
-essaying some noble project like that sketched above. It is to be
-remembered that Athens had never had the power of organizing any
-such generous Pan-hellenic combination. She had become depopularized
-in the legitimate execution of her trust, as president of the
-Confederacy of Delos, against refractory members;[345] and had been
-obliged to choose between breaking up the Confederacy, and keeping
-it together under the strong compression of an imperial chief. But
-Sparta had not yet become depopularized. She now stood without
-competitor as leader of the Grecian world, and might at that moment
-have reasonably hoped to carry the members of it along with her to
-any liberal and Pan-hellenic organization, had she attempted it with
-proper earnestness. Unfortunately she took the opposite course, under
-the influence of Lysander; founding a new empire far more oppressive
-and odious than that of Athens, with few of the advantages, and none
-of the excuses, attached to the latter. As she soon became even
-more unpopular than Athens, her moment of high tide, for beneficent
-Pan-hellenic combination, passed away also,—never to return.
-
-  [345] Such is the justification offered by the Athenian envoy
-  at Sparta, immediately before the Peloponnesian war (Thucyd. i,
-  75, 76). And it is borne out in the main by the narrative of
-  Thucydides himself (i, 99).
-
-Having thus brought all the maritime Greeks under her empire, with
-a tribute of more than one thousand talents imposed upon them,—and
-continuing to be chief of her landed alliance in Central Greece,
-which now included Athens as a simple unit,—Sparta was the
-all-pervading imperial power in Greece.[346] Her new empire was
-organized by the victorious Lysander; but with so much arrogance, and
-so much personal ambition to govern all Greece by means of nominees
-of his own, decemvirs and harmosts,—that he raised numerous rivals
-and enemies, as well at Sparta itself as elsewhere. The jealousy
-entertained by king Pausanias, the offended feelings of Thebes and
-Corinth, and the manner in which these new phenomena brought about
-(in spite of the opposition of Lysander) the admission of Athens as
-a revived democracy into the Lacedæmonian confederacy,—has been
-already related.
-
-  [346] Xen. Hellen. iii, 1, 3. πάσης τὴς Ἑλλάδος προστάται, etc.
-
-In the early months of 403 B.C., Lysander was partly at home, partly
-in Attica, exerting himself to sustain the falling oligarchy of
-Athens against the increasing force of Thrasybulus and the Athenian
-exiles in Peiræus. In this purpose he was directly thwarted by
-the opposing views of king Pausanias, and three out of the five
-ephors.[347] But though the ephors thus checked Lysander in regard
-to Athens, they softened the humiliation by sending him abroad to
-a fresh command on the Asiatic coast and the Hellespont; a step
-which had the farther advantage of putting asunder two such marked
-rivals as he and Pausanias had now become. That which Lysander had
-tried in vain to do at Athens, he was doubtless better able to do
-in Asia, where he had neither Pausanias nor the ephors along with
-him. He could lend effective aid to the dekarchies and harmosts in
-the Asiatic cities, against any internal opposition with which they
-might be threatened. Bitter were the complaints which reached Sparta,
-both against him and against his ruling partisans. At length the
-ephors were prevailed upon to disavow the dekarchies; and to proclaim
-that they would not hinder the cities from resuming their former
-governments at pleasure.[348]
-
-  [347] Xen. Hellen. ii, 4, 28-30.
-
-  [348] Xen. Hellen. iii, 4, 2.
-
-But all the crying oppressions set forth in the complaints of the
-maritime cities would have been insufficient to procure the recall
-of Lysander from his command in the Hellespont, had not Pharnabazus
-joined his remonstrances to the rest. These last representations so
-strengthened the enemies of Lysander at Sparta, that a peremptory
-order was sent to recall him. Constrained to obey, he came back to
-Sparta; but the comparative disgrace, and the loss of that boundless
-power which he had enjoyed on his command was so insupportable
-to him, that he obtained permission to go on a pilgrimage to the
-temple of Zeus Ammon in Libya, under the plea that he had a vow
-to discharge.[349] He appears also to have visited the temples
-of Delphi and Dodona,[350] with secret ambitious projects which
-will be mentioned presently. This politic withdrawal softened the
-jealousy against him, so that we shall find him, after a year or
-two, reëstablished in great influence and ascendency. He was sent as
-Spartan envoy, at what precise moment we do not know, to Syracuse,
-where he lent countenance and aid to the recently established
-despotism of Dionysius.[351]
-
-  [349] Plutarch, Lysand. c. 19, 20, 21.
-
-  The facts, which Plutarch states respecting Lysander, cannot be
-  reconciled with the chronology which he adopts. He represents
-  the recall of Lysander at the instance of Pharnabazus, with all
-  the facts which preceded it, as having occurred prior to the
-  reconstitution of the Athenian democracy, which event we know to
-  have taken place in the summer of 403 B.C.
-
-  Lysander captured Samos in the latter half of 404 B.C., after the
-  surrender of Athens. After the capture of Samos, he came home in
-  triumph, in the autumn of 404 B.C. (Xen. Hellen. iii, 3, 9). He
-  was at home, or serving in Attica, in the beginning of 403 B.C.
-  (Xen. Hellen. ii, 4, 30).
-
-  Now when Lysander came home at the end of 404 B.C., it was his
-  triumphant return; it was not a recall provoked by complaints of
-  Pharnabazus. Yet there can have been no other return before the
-  restoration of the democracy at Athens.
-
-  The recall of Lysander must have been the termination, not of
-  this command, but of a subsequent command. Moreover, it seems
-  to me necessary, in order to make room for the facts stated
-  respecting Lysander as well as about the dekarchies, that we
-  should suppose him to have been again sent out (after his quarrel
-  with Pausanias in Attica) in 403 B.C., to command in Asia. This
-  is nowhere positively stated, but I find nothing to contradict
-  it, and I see no other way of making room for the facts stated
-  about Lysander.
-
-  It is to be noted that Diodorus has a decided error in chronology
-  as to the date of the restoration of the Athenian democracy. He
-  places it in 401 B.C. (Diod. xiv, 33), two years later than its
-  real date, which is 403 B.C.; thus lengthening by two years the
-  interval between the surrender of Athens and the reëstablishment
-  of the democracy. Plutarch also seems to have conceived that
-  interval as much longer than it really was.
-
-  [350] Plutarch, Lysand. c. 25.
-
-  [351] Plutarch, Lysander, c. 2.
-
-The position of the Asiatic Greeks, along the coast of Ionia, Æolis,
-and the Hellespont, became very peculiar after the triumph of Sparta
-at Ægospotami. I have already recounted how, immediately after the
-great Athenian catastrophe before Syracuse, the Persian king had
-renewed his grasp upon those cities, from which the vigorous hand of
-Athens had kept him excluded for more than fifty years; how Sparta,
-bidding for his aid, had consented by three formal conventions to
-surrender them to him, while her commissioner Lichas even reproved
-the Milesians for their aversion to this bargain; how Athens also,
-in the days of her weakness, competing for the same advantage, had
-expressed her willingness to pay the same price for it.[352] After
-the battle of Ægospotami, this convention was carried into effect;
-though seemingly not without disputes between the satrap Pharnabazus
-on one side, and Lysander and Derkyllidas on the other.[353] The
-latter was Lacedæmonian harmost at Abydos, which town, so important
-as a station on the Hellespont, the Lacedæmonians seem still to have
-retained. But Pharnabazus and his subordinates acquired more complete
-command of the Hellespontine Æolis and of the Troad, than ever they
-had enjoyed before, both along the coast and in the interior.[354]
-
-  [352] Thucyd. viii, 5, 18-37, 56-58, 84.
-
-  [353] Plutarch, Lysander, c. 19, 20; Xen. Hellen. iii, 1, 9.
-
-  [354] Xen. Hellen. iii, 1, 13.
-
-Another element, however, soon became operative. The condition of
-the Greek cities on the coast of Ionia, though according to Persian
-regulations they belonged to the satrapy of Tissaphernes, was now
-materially determined,—first, by the competing claims of Cyrus, who
-wished to take them away from him, and tried to get such transfer
-ordered at court,—next, by the aspirations of that young prince to
-the Persian throne. As Cyrus rested his hope of success on Grecian
-coöperation, it was highly important to him to render himself
-popular among the Greeks, especially on his own side of the Ægean.
-Partly his own manifestations of just and conciliatory temper,
-partly the bad name and known perfidy of Tissaphernes, induced the
-Grecian cities with one accord to revolt from the latter. All threw
-themselves into the arms of Cyrus, except Miletus, where Tissaphernes
-interposed in time, slew the leaders of the intended revolt, and
-banished many of their partisans. Cyrus, receiving the exiles with
-distinguished favor, levied an army to besiege Miletus and procure
-their restoration; while he at the same time threw strong Grecian
-garrisons into the other cities to protect them against attack.[355]
-
-  [355] Xen. Anab. i, 1, 8.
-
-This local quarrel was, however, soon merged in the more
-comprehensive dispute respecting the Persian succession. Both parties
-were found on the field of Kunaxa; Cyrus with the Greek soldiers
-and Milesian exiles on one side,—Tissaphernes on the other. How
-that attempt, upon which so much hinged in the future history both
-of Asia Minor and of Greece, terminated, I have already recounted.
-Probably the impression brought back by the Lacedæmonian fleet which
-left Cyrus on the coast of Syria, after he had surmounted the most
-difficult country without any resistance, was highly favorable to
-his success. So much the more painful would be the disappointment
-among the Ionian Greeks when the news of his death was afterwards
-brought; so much the greater their alarm, when Tissaphernes, having
-relinquished the pursuit of the Ten Thousand Greeks at the moment
-when they entered the mountains of Karduchia, came down as victor to
-the seaboard; more powerful than ever,—rewarded[356] by the Great
-King, for the services which he had rendered against Cyrus, with
-all the territory which had been governed by the latter, as well
-as with the title of commander-in-chief over all the neighboring
-satraps,—and prepared not only to reconquer, but to punish, the
-revolted maritime cities. He began by attacking Kymê;[357] ravaging
-the territory, with great loss to the citizens, and exacting from
-them a still larger contribution, when the approach of winter
-rendered it inconvenient to besiege their city.
-
-  [356] Xen. Anab. ii, 3, 19; ii, 4, 8; Xen. Hellen. iii, 1, 3;
-  iii, 3, 13.
-
-  [357] Diodor. xiv, 35.
-
-In such a state of apprehension, these cities sent to Sparta, as the
-great imperial power of Greece, to entreat her protection against
-the aggravated slavery impending over them.[358] The Lacedæmonians
-had nothing farther to expect from the king of Persia, with whom
-they had already broken the peace by lending aid to Cyrus. Moreover,
-the fame of the Ten Thousand Greeks, who were now coming home along
-the Euxine towards Byzantium, had become diffused throughout Greece,
-inspiring signal contempt for Persian military efficiency, and hopes
-of enrichment by war against the Asiatic satraps. Accordingly, the
-Spartan ephors were induced to comply with the petition of their
-Asiatic countrymen, and to send over to Asia Thimbron at the head
-of a considerable force: two thousand Neodamodes (or Helots who had
-been enfranchised) and four thousand Peloponnesians heavy-armed,
-accompanied by three hundred Athenian horsemen, out of the number of
-those who had been adherents of the Thirty, four years before; an
-aid granted by Athens at the special request of Thimbron. Arriving
-in Asia during the winter of 400-399 B.C., Thimbron was reinforced
-in the spring of 399 B.C. by the Cyreian army, who were brought
-across from Thrace as described in my last chapter, and taken into
-Lacedæmonian pay. With this large force he became more than a
-match for the satraps, even on the plains where they could employ
-their numerous cavalry. The petty Grecian princes of Pergamus and
-Teuthrania, holding that territory by ancient grants from Xerxes to
-their ancestors, joined their troops to his, contributing much to
-enrich Xenophon at the moment of his departure from the Cyreians.
-Yet Thimbron achieved nothing worthy of so large an army. He not
-only miscarried in the siege of Larissa, but was even unable to
-maintain order among his own soldiers, who pillaged indiscriminately
-both friends and foes.[359] Such loud complaints were transmitted to
-Sparta of his irregularities and inefficiency, that the ephors first
-sent him order to march into Karia, where Tissaphernes resided,—and
-next, before that order was executed, despatched Derkyllidas to
-supersede him; seemingly in the winter 399-398 B.C. Thimbron on
-returning to Sparta was fined and banished.[360]
-
-  [358] Diodor. _ut sup._
-
-  [359] Xen. Hellen. iii, 1, 5-8; Xen. Anab. vii, 8, 8-16.
-
-  [360] Xen. Hellen. iii, 1, 8; Diodor. xiv, 38.
-
-It is highly probable that the Cyreian soldiers, though excellent in
-the field, yet having been disappointed of reward for the prodigious
-toils which they had gone through in their long march, and having
-been kept on short allowance in Thrace, as well as cheated by
-Seuthes,—were greedy, unscrupulous, and hard to be restrained, in
-the matter of pillage; especially as Xenophon, their most influential
-general, had now left them. Their conduct greatly improved under
-Derkyllidas. And though such improvement was doubtless owing partly
-to the superiority of the latter over Thimbron, yet it seems also
-partly ascribable to the fact that Xenophon, after a few months of
-residence at Athens, accompanied him to Asia, and resumed the command
-of his old comrades.[361]
-
-  [361] There is no positive testimony to this; yet such is my
-  belief, as I have stated at the close of the last chapter. It
-  is certain that Xenophon was serving under Agesilaus in Asia
-  three years after this time; the only matter left for conjecture
-  is, at what precise moment he went out the second time. The
-  marked improvement in the Cyreian soldiers, is one reason for
-  the statement in the text; another reason is, the great detail
-  with which the military operations of Derkyllidas are described,
-  rendering it probable that the narrative is from an eye-witness.
-
-Derkyllidas was a man of so much resource and cunning, as to have
-acquired the surname of Sisyphus.[362] He had served throughout all
-the concluding years of the war, and had been harmost at Abydus
-during the naval command of Lysander, who condemned him, on the
-complaint of Pharnabazus, to the disgrace of public exposure with
-his shield on his arm;[363] this was (I presume) a disgrace, because
-an officer of rank always had his shield carried for him by an
-attendant, except in the actual encounter of battle. Having never
-forgiven Pharnabazus for thus dishonoring him, Derkyllidas now took
-advantage of a misunderstanding between that satrap and Tissaphernes,
-to make a truce with the latter, and conduct his army, eight thousand
-strong, into the territory of the former.[364] The mountainous region
-of Ida generally known as the Troad,—inhabited by a population
-of Æolic Greeks (who had gradually Hellenized the indigenous
-inhabitants), and therefore known as the Æolis of Pharnabazus,—was
-laid open to him by a recent event, important in itself as well as
-instructive to read.
-
-  [362] Xen. Hellen. iii, 1, 8; Ephorus, ap. Athenæ. xi, p. 500.
-
-  [363] Xen. Hellen. iii, 1, 9. ἐστάθη τὴν ἀσπίδα ἔχων.
-
-  [364] Xen. Hellen. iii, 1, 10; iii, 2, 28.
-
-The entire Persian empire was parcelled into so many satrapies;
-each satrap being bound to send a fixed amount of annual tribute,
-and to hold a certain amount of military force ready, for the court
-at Susa. Provided he was punctual in fulfilling these obligations,
-little inquiry was made as to his other proceedings, unless in the
-rare case of his maltreating some individual Persian of high rank. In
-like manner, it appears, each satrapy was divided into sub-satrapies
-or districts; each of these held by a deputy, who paid to the
-satrap a fixed tribute and maintained for him a certain military
-force,—having liberty to govern in other respects as he pleased.
-Besides the tribute, however, presents of undefined amount were of
-constant occurrence, both from the satrap to the king, and from the
-deputy to the satrap. Nevertheless, enough was extorted from the
-people (we need hardly add), to leave an ample profit both to the one
-and to the other.[365]
-
-  [365] See the description of the satrapy of Cyrus (Xenoph. Anab.
-  i, 9, 19, 21, 22). In the main, this division and subdivision of
-  the entire empire into revenue-districts, each held by a nominee
-  responsible for payment of the rent or tribute, to the government
-  or to some higher officer of the government—is the system
-  prevalent throughout a large portion of Asia to the present day.
-
-This region, called Æolis, had been entrusted by Pharnabazus to a
-native of Dardanus named Zênis, who, after holding the post for some
-time and giving full satisfaction, died of illness, leaving a widow
-with a son and daughter still minors. The satrap was on the point
-of giving the district to another person, when Mania, the widow of
-Zênis, herself a native of Dardanus, preferred her petition to be
-allowed to succeed her husband. Visiting Pharnabazus with money
-in hand, sufficient not only to satisfy himself, but also to gain
-over his mistresses and his ministers,[366]—she said to him,—“My
-husband was faithful to you, and paid his tribute so regularly as to
-obtain your thanks. If I serve you no worse than he, why should you
-name any other deputy? If I fail in giving you satisfaction, you can
-always remove me, and give the place to another.” Pharnabazus granted
-her petition, and had no cause to repent it. Mania was regular in
-her payment of tribute,—frequent in bringing him presents,—and
-splendid, beyond any of his other deputies, in her manner of
-receiving him whenever he visited the district.
-
-  [366] Xen. Hellen. iii, 1, 10. Ἀναζεύξασα τὸν στόλον, καὶ χρήματα
-  λαβοῦσα, ὥστε καὶ αὐτῷ Φαρναβάζῳ δοῦναι, καὶ ταῖς παλλακίσιν
-  αὐτοῦ χαρίσασθαι καὶ τοῖς δυναμένοις μάλιστα παρὰ Φαρναβάζῳ,
-  ἐπορεύετο.
-
-Her chief residence was at Skêpsis, Gergis, and Kebrên,—inland
-towns, strong both by position and by fortification, amidst the
-mountainous region once belonging to the Teukri Gergithes. It was
-here too that she kept her treasures, which, partly left by her
-husband, partly accumulated by herself, had gradually reached an
-enormous sum. But her district also reached down to the coast,
-comprising among other towns the classical name of Ilium, and
-probably her own native city, the neighboring Dardanus. She
-maintained, besides, a large military force of Grecian mercenaries
-in regular pay and excellent condition, which she employed both
-as garrison for each of her dependent towns, and as means for
-conquest in the neighborhood. She had thus reduced the maritime
-towns of Larissa, Hamaxitus, and Kolônæ, in the southern part of
-the Troad; commanding her troops in person, sitting in her chariot
-to witness the attack, and rewarding every one who distinguished
-himself. Moreover, when Pharnabazus undertook an expedition against
-the predatory Mysians or Pisidians, she accompanied him, and her
-military force formed so much the best part of his army, that he
-paid her the highest compliments, and sometimes condescended to ask
-her advice.[367] So, when Xerxes invaded Greece, Artemisia, queen of
-Halikarnassus, not only furnished ships among the best appointed in
-his fleet, and fought bravely at Salamis, but also, when he chose to
-call a council, stood alone, in daring to give him sound opinions
-contrary to his own leanings; opinions which, fortunately for the
-Grecian world, he could bring himself only to tolerate, not to
-follow.[368]
-
-  [367] Xen. Hellen. iii, 1, 15.
-
-  [368] Herod. viii, 69.
-
-Under an energetic woman like Mania, thus victorious and
-well-provided, Æolis was the most defensible part of the satrapy of
-Pharnabazus, and might probably have defied Derkyllidas, had not a
-domestic traitor put an end to her life. Her son-in-law, Meidias,
-a Greek of Skêpsis, with whom she lived on terms of intimate
-confidence—“though she was scrupulously mistrustful of every one
-else, as it is proper for a despot to be,”[369]—was so inflamed by
-his own ambition and by the suggestions of evil counsellors, who
-told him it was a shame that a woman should thus be ruler while
-he was only a private man, that he strangled her in her chamber.
-Following up his nefarious scheme, he also assassinated her son, a
-beautiful youth of seventeen. He succeeded in getting possession of
-the three strongest places in the district, Kebrên, Skêpsis, and
-Gergis, together with the accumulated treasure of Mania; but the
-commanders in the other towns refused obedience to his summons, until
-they should receive orders from Pharnabazus. To that satrap Meidias
-instantly sent envoys, bearing ample presents, with a petition that
-the satrap would grant to him the district which had been enjoyed by
-Mania. Pharnabazus, repudiating the presents, sent an indignant reply
-to Meidias,—“Keep them until I come to seize them, and seize you,
-too, along with them. I would not consent to live, if I were not to
-avenge the death of Mania.”[370]
-
-  [369] Such is the emphatic language of Xenophon (Hellen. iii, 1,
-  14)—Μειδίας, θυγατρὸς ἀνὴρ αὐτῆς ὢν, ἀναπτερωθεὶς ὑπό τινων, ὡς
-  αἰσχρὸν εἴη, γυναῖκα μὲν ἄρχειν, αὐτὸν δ᾽ ἰδιώτην εἶναι, ~τοὺς
-  μὲν ἄλλους μάλα φυλαττομένης αὐτῆς, ὥσπερ ἐν τυραννίδι προσήκει~,
-  ἐκείνῳ δὲ πιστευούσης καὶ ἀσπαζομένης, ὥσπερ ἂν γυνὴ γαμβρὸν
-  ἀσπάζοιτο,—εἰσελθὼν ἀποπνῖξαι αὐτὴν λέγεται.
-
-  For the illustration of this habitual insecurity in which the
-  Grecian despot lived, see the dialogue of Xenophon called
-  Hieron (i, 12; ii, 8-10; vii, 10). He particularly dwells upon
-  the multitude of family crimes which stained the houses of the
-  Grecian despots; murders by fathers, sons, brothers, wives, etc.
-  (iii, 8).
-
-  [370] Xen. Hellen. iii, 1, 13.
-
-At that critical moment, prior to the coming of the satrap,
-Derkyllidas presented himself with his army, and found Æolis
-almost defenceless. The three recent conquests of Mania,—Larissa,
-Hamaxitus, and Kolônæ, surrendered to him as soon as he appeared;
-while the garrisons of Ilium and some other places, who had taken
-special service under Mania, and found themselves worse off now
-that they had lost her, accepted his invitation to renounce Persian
-dependence, declare themselves allies of Sparta, and hold their
-cities for him. He thus became master of most part of the district,
-with the exception of Kebrên, Skêpsis, and Gergis, which he was
-anxious to secure before the arrival of Pharnabazus. On arriving
-before Kebrên, however, in spite of this necessity for haste, he
-remained inactive for four days,[371] because the sacrifices were
-unpropitious; while a rash, subordinate officer, hazarding an
-unwarranted attack during this interval, was repulsed and wounded.
-The sacrifices at length became favorable, and Derkyllidas was
-rewarded for his patience. The garrison, affected by the example
-of those at Ilium and the other towns, disobeyed their commander,
-who tried to earn the satrap’s favor by holding out and assuring to
-him this very strong place. Sending out heralds to proclaim that
-they would go with Greeks and not with Persians, they admitted the
-Lacedæmonians at once within the gates. Having thus fortunately
-captured, and duly secured this important town, Derkyllidas marched
-against Skêpsis and Gergis, the former of which was held by Meidias
-himself; who, dreading the arrival of Pharnabazus, and mistrusting
-the citizens within, thought it best to open negotiations with
-Derkyllidas. He sent to solicit a conference, demanding hostages
-for his safety. When he came forth from the town, and demanded from
-the Lacedæmonian commander on what terms alliance would be granted
-to him, the latter replied,—“On condition that the citizens shall
-be left free and autonomous;” at the same time marching on, without
-waiting either for acquiescence or refusal, straight up to the
-gates of the town. Meidias, taken by surprise, in the power of the
-assailants, and aware that the citizens were unfriendly to him, was
-obliged to give orders that the gates should be opened; so that
-Derkyllidas found himself by this manœuvre in possession of the
-strongest place in the district without either loss or delay,—to the
-great delight of the Skepsians themselves.[372]
-
-  [371] Xen. Hellen. iii, 1, 18; Diodor. xiv, 38.
-
-  The reader will remark here how Xenophon shapes the narrative
-  in such a manner as to inculcate the pious duty in a general of
-  obeying the warnings furnished by the sacrifice,—either for
-  action or for inaction. I have already noticed (in my preceding
-  chapters) how often he does this in the Anabasis.
-
-  Such an inference is never (I believe) to be found suggested in
-  Thucydides.
-
-  [372] Xen. Hellen. iii, 1, 20-23.
-
-Derkyllidas, having ascended the acropolis of Skêpsis to offer a
-sacrifice of thanks to Athênê, the great patron goddess of Ilium
-and most of the Teukrian towns,—caused the garrison of Meidias
-to evacuate the town forthwith, and consigned it to the citizens
-themselves, exhorting them to conduct their political affairs as
-became Greeks and freemen. This proceeding, which reminds us of
-Brasidas in contrast with Lysander, was not less politic than
-generous; since Derkyllidas could hardly hope to hold an inland
-town in the midst of the Persian satrapy except by the attachments
-of the citizens themselves. He then marched away to Gergis, still
-conducting along with him Meidias, who urgently entreated to be
-allowed to retain that town, the last of his remaining fortresses.
-Without giving any decided answer, Derkyllidas took him by his
-side, and marched with him at the head of his army, arrayed only in
-double file, so as to carry the appearance of peace, to the foot
-of the lofty towers of Gergis. The garrison on the walls, seeing
-Meidias along with him, allowed him to approach without discharging
-a single missile. “Now, Meidias (said he), order the gates to be
-opened, and show me the way in, to the temple of Athênê, in order
-that I may there offer sacrifice.” Again Meidias was forced, from
-fear of being at once seized as a prisoner, to give the order; and
-the Lacedæmonian forces found themselves in possession of the town.
-Derkyllidas, distributing his troops around the walls, in order to
-make sure of his conquest, ascended to the acropolis to offer his
-intended sacrifice; after which he proceeded to dictate the fate
-of Meidias, whom he divested of his character of prince and of his
-military force,—incorporating the latter in the Lacedæmonian army.
-He then called upon Meidias to specify all his paternal property,
-and restored to him the whole of what he claimed as such, though the
-bystanders protested against the statement given in as a flagrant
-exaggeration. But he laid hands on all the property, and all the
-treasures of Mania,—and caused her house, which Meidias had taken
-for himself, to be put under seal,—as lawful prey; since Mania had
-belonged to Pharnabazus,[373] against whom the Lacedæmonians were
-making war. On coming out after examining and verifying the contents
-of the house, he said to his officers, “Now, my friends, we have here
-already worked out pay for the whole army, eight thousand men, for
-nearly a year. Whatever we acquire besides, shall come to you also.”
-He well knew the favorable effect which this intelligence would
-produce upon the temper, as well as upon the discipline, of the
-army—especially upon the Cyreians, who had tasted the discomfort of
-irregular pay and poverty.
-
-  [373] Xen. Hellen. iii, 1, 26. Εἶπέ μοι, ἔφη, Μανία δὲ τίνος ἦν;
-  Οἱ δὲ πάντες εἶπον, ὅτι Φαρναβάζου. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τὰ ἐκείνης, ἔφη,
-  Φαρναβάζου; Μάλιστα, ἔφασαν. Ἡμέτερ᾽ ἂν εἴη, ἔφη, ἐπεὶ κρατοῦμεν·
-  πολέμιος γὰρ ἡμῖν Φαρνάβαζος.
-
-  Two points are remarkable here. 1. The manner in which Mania,
-  the administratrix of a large district, with a prodigious
-  treasure and a large army in pay, is treated as _belonging_ to
-  Pharnabazus—as the servant or slave of Pharnabazus. 2. The
-  distinction here taken between public property and private
-  property, in reference to the laws of war and the rights of the
-  conqueror. Derkyllidas lays claim to that which had belonged to
-  Mania (or to Pharnabazus); but _not_ to that which had belonged
-  to Meidias.
-
-  According to the modern rules of international law, this
-  distinction is one allowed and respected, everywhere except
-  at sea. But in the ancient world, it by no means stood out so
-  clearly or prominently; and the observance of it here deserves
-  notice.
-
-“And where am I to live?” asked Meidias, who found himself turned
-out of the house of Mania. “In your rightful place of abode, to be
-sure (replied Derkyllidas); in your native town Skêpsis, and in
-your paternal house.[374]” What became of the assassin afterwards,
-we do not hear. But it is satisfactory to find that he did not reap
-the anticipated reward of his crime; the fruits of which were an
-important advantage to Derkyllidas and his army,—and a still more
-important blessing to the Greek cities which had been governed by
-Mania,—enfranchisement and autonomy.
-
-  [374] Xen. Hellen. iii, 1, 28.
-
-  Thus finishes the interesting narrative about Mania, Meidias, and
-  Derkyllidas. The abundance of detail, and the dramatic manner, in
-  which Xenophon has worked it out, impress me with a belief that
-  he was actually present at the scene.
-
-This rapid, easy, and skilfully managed exploit,—the capture of nine
-towns in eight days,—is all which Xenophon mentions as achieved
-by Derkyllidas during the summer. Having acquired pay for so many
-months, perhaps the soldiers may have been disposed to rest until
-it was spent. But as winter approached, it became necessary to find
-winter quarters, without incurring the reproach which had fallen upon
-Thimbron of consuming the substance of allies. Fearing, however, that
-if he changed his position, Pharnabazus would employ the numerous
-Persian cavalry to harass the Grecian cities, he tendered a truce,
-which the latter willingly accepted. For the occupation of Æolis by
-the Lacedæmonian general was a sort of watch-post (like Dekeleia to
-Athens,) exposing the whole of Phrygia near the Propontis (in which
-was Daskylium the residence of Pharnabazus) to constant attack.[375]
-Derkyllidas accordingly only marched through Phrygia, to take up his
-winter quarters in Bithynia, the north-western corner of Asia Minor,
-between the Propontis and the Euxine; the same territory through
-which Xenophon and the Ten Thousand had marched, on their road from
-Kalpê to Chalkêdon. He procured abundant provisions and booty,
-slaves as well as cattle, by plundering the Bithynian villages; not
-without occasional losses on his own side, by the carelessness of
-marauding parties.[376]
-
-  [375] Xen. Hellen. iii, 2, 1. νομίζων τὴν Αἰολίδα ἐπιτετειχίσθαι
-  τῇ ἑαυτοῦ οἰκήσει Φρυγίᾳ.
-
-  The word ἐπιτειχίζειν is capital and significant, in Grecian
-  warfare.
-
-  [376] Xen. Hellen. iii, 2, 2-5.
-
-One of these losses was of considerable magnitude. Derkyllidas had
-obtained from Seuthes in European Thrace (the same prince of whom
-Xenophon had so much reason to complain) a reinforcement of three
-hundred cavalry and two hundred peltasts,—Odrysian Thracians. These
-Odrysians established themselves in a separate camp, nearly two miles
-and a half from Derkyllidas, which they surrounded with a palisade
-about man’s height. Being indefatigable plunderers, they prevailed
-upon Derkyllidas to send them a guard of two hundred hoplites,
-for the purpose of guarding their separate camp with the booty
-accumulated within it. Presently the camp became richly stocked,
-especially with Bithynian captives. The hostile Bithynians, however,
-watching their opportunity when the Odrysians were out marauding,
-suddenly attacked at daybreak the two hundred Grecian hoplites in
-the camp. Shooting at them over the palisade with darts and arrows,
-they killed and wounded some, while the Greeks with their spears
-were utterly helpless, and could only reach their enemies by pulling
-up the palisade and charging out upon them; but the light-armed
-assailants, easily evading the charge of warriors with shield and
-spear, turned round upon them when they began to retire, and slew
-several before they could get back. In each successive sally the same
-phenomena recurred, until at length all the Greeks were overpowered
-and slain, except fifteen of them, who charged through the Bithynians
-in the first sally, and marched onward to join Derkyllidas, instead
-of returning with their comrades to the palisade. Derkyllidas lost no
-time in sending a reinforcement, which, however, came too late, and
-found only the naked bodies of the slain. The victorious Bithynians
-carried away all their own captives.[377]
-
-  [377] Xen. Hellen. iii, 2, 4.
-
-At the beginning of spring the Spartan general returned to Lampsakus,
-where he found Arakus and two other Spartans, just arrived out as
-commissioners sent by the ephors. Arakus came with instructions to
-prolong the command of Derkyllidas for another year; as well as to
-communicate the satisfaction of the ephors with the Cyreian army,
-in consequence of the great improvement in their conduct, compared
-with the year of Thimbron. He accordingly assembled the soldiers,
-and addressed them in a mingled strain of praise and admonition;
-expressing his hope that they would continue the forbearance which
-they had now begun to practise towards all Asiatic allies. The
-commander of the Cyreians (probably Xenophon himself), in his reply,
-availed himself of the occasion to pay a compliment to Derkyllidas.
-“We (said he) are the same men now as we were in the previous year;
-but we are under a different general; you need not look farther
-for the explanation.[378]” Without denying the superiority of
-Derkyllidas over his predecessor, we may remark that the abundant
-wealth of Mania, thrown into his hands by accident (though he showed
-great ability in turning the accident to account), was an auxiliary
-circumstance, not less unexpected than weighty, for ensuring the good
-behavior of the soldiers.
-
-  [378] Xen. Hellen. iii, 2, 6, 7.
-
-  Morus supposes (I think, with much probability) that ὁ τῶν
-  Κυρείων προεστηκὼς here means Xenophon himself.
-
-  _He_ could not with propriety advert to the fact that he himself
-  had not been with the army during the year of Thimbron.
-
-It was among the farther instructions of Arakus to visit all the
-principal Asiatic Greeks, and report their condition at Sparta;
-and Derkyllidas was pleased to see them entering on this survey
-at a moment when they would find the cities in undisturbed peace
-and tranquillity.[379] So long as the truce continued both with
-Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus, these cities were secure from
-aggression, and paid no tribute; the land-force of Derkyllidas
-affording to them a protection[380] analogous to that which had
-been conferred by Athens and her powerful fleet, during the interval
-between the formation of the Confederacy of Delos and the Athenian
-catastrophe at Syracuse. At the same time, during the truce, the
-army had neither occupation nor subsistence. To keep it together and
-near at hand, yet without living at the cost of friends, was the
-problem. It was accordingly with great satisfaction that Derkyllidas
-noticed an intimation accidentally dropped by Arakus. Some envoys
-(the latter said) were now at Sparta from the Thracian Chersonesus
-(the long tongue of land bordering westward on the Hellespont),
-soliciting aid against their marauding Thracian neighbors. That
-fertile peninsula, first hellenized a century and a half before by
-the Athenian Miltiades, had been a favorite resort for Athenian
-citizens, many of whom had acquired property there during the naval
-power of Athens. The battle of Ægospotami dispossessed and drove
-home these proprietors, at the same time depriving the peninsula
-of its protection against the Thracians. It now contained eleven
-distinct cities, of which Sestos was the most important; and its
-inhabitants combined to send envoys to Sparta, entreating the ephors
-to send out a force for the purpose of building a wall across the
-isthmus from Kardia to Paktyê; in recompense for which (they said)
-there was fertile land enough open to as many settlers as chose to
-come, with coast and harbors for export close at hand. Miltiades, on
-first going out to the Chersonese, had secured it by constructing a
-cross-wall on the same spot, which had since become neglected during
-the period of Persian supremacy; Perikles had afterwards sent fresh
-colonists, and caused the wall to be repaired. But it seems to have
-been unnecessary while the Athenian empire was in full vigor,—since
-the Thracian princes had been generally either conciliated, or kept
-off, by Athens, even without any such bulwark.[381] Informed that
-the request of the Chersonesites had been favorably listened to at
-Sparta, Derkyllidas resolved to execute their project with his own
-army. Having prolonged his truce with Pharnabazus, he crossed the
-Hellespont into Europe, and employed his army during the whole summer
-in constructing this cross-wall, about four and a quarter miles in
-length. The work was distributed in portions to different sections of
-the army, competition being excited by rewards for the most rapid and
-workmanlike execution; while the Chersonesites were glad to provide
-pay and subsistence for the army, during an operation which provided
-security for all the eleven cities, and gave additional value to
-their lands and harbors. Numerous settlers seem to have now come in,
-under Lacedæmonian auspices,—who were again disturbed, wholly or
-partially, when the Lacedæmonian maritime empire was broken up a few
-years afterwards.[382]
-
-  [379] Xen. Hellen. iii, 2, 9. ἔπεμψεν αὐτοὺς ἀπ᾽ ~Ἐφέσου~ διὰ
-  τῶν Ἑλληνίδων πόλεων, ἡδόμενος ὅτι ἔμελλον ὄψεσθαι τὰς πόλεις ἐν
-  εἰρήνῃ εὐδαιμονικῶς διαγούσας. I cannot but think that we ought
-  here to read ἐπ᾽ Ἐφέσου, not ἀπ᾽ Ἐφέσου; or else ἀπὸ Λαμψάκου.
-
-  It was at Lampsakus that this interview and conversation between
-  Derkyllidas and the commissioners took place. The commissioners
-  were to be sent from Lampsakus to Ephesus through the Grecian
-  cities.
-
-  The expression ἐν εἰρήνῃ εὐδαιμονικῶς διαγούσας has reference to
-  the foreign relations of the cities, and to their exemption from
-  annoyance by Persian arms,—without implying any internal freedom
-  or good condition. There were Lacedæmonian harmosts in most of
-  them, and dekarchies half broken up or modified in many; see the
-  subsequent passages (iii, 2, 20; iii, 4, 7; iv, 8, 1)
-
-  [380] Compare Xen. Hellen. iv, 2, 5.
-
-  [381] Herodot. vi, 36; Plutarch, Perikles, c. 19; Isokrates, Or.
-  v, (Philipp.) s. 7.
-
-  [382] Xen. Hellen. iii, 2, 10; iv, 8, 5. Diodor. xiv, 38.
-
-On returning to Asia in the autumn, after the completion of this
-work, which had kept his army usefully employed and amply provided
-during six months, Derkyllidas undertook the siege of Artaneus, a
-strong post (on the continental coast eastward of Mitylênê) occupied
-by some Chian exiles, whom the Lacedæmonian admiral Kratesippidas
-had lent corrupt aid in expelling from their native island a few
-years before.[383] These men, living by predatory expeditions against
-Chios and Ionia, were so well supplied with provisions that it cost
-Derkyllidas a blockade of eight months before he could reduce it. He
-placed in it a strong garrison well supplied, that it might serve him
-as a retreat in case of need,—under an Achæan named Drako, whose
-name remained long terrible from his ravages on the neighboring plain
-of Mysia.[384]
-
-  [383] Diodor. xiii, 65.
-
-  [384] Xen. Hellen. iii, 2, 11; Isokrates, Or. iv. (Panegyr.) s.
-  167.
-
-Derkyllidas next proceeded to Ephesus, where orders presently reached
-him from the ephors, directing him to march into Karia and attack
-Tissaphernes. The temporary truce which had hitherto provisionally
-kept off Persian soldiers and tribute-gatherers from the Asiatic
-Greeks, was now renounced by mutual consent. These Greeks had sent
-envoys to Sparta, assuring the ephors that Tissaphernes would be
-constrained to renounce formally the sovereign rights of Persia,
-and grant to them full autonomy, if his residence in Karia were
-vigorously attacked. Accordingly Derkyllidas marched southward
-across the Mæander into Karia, while the Lacedæmonian fleet under
-Pharax coöperated along the shore. At the same time Tissaphernes,
-on his side, had received reinforcements from Susa, together with
-the appointment of generalissimo over all the Persian force in Asia
-Minor; upon which Pharnabazus (who had gone up to court in the
-interval to concert more vigorous means of prosecuting the war, but
-had now returned)[385] joined him in Karia, prepared to commence
-vigorous operations for the expulsion of Derkyllidas and his army.
-Having properly garrisoned the strong places, the two satraps crossed
-the Mæander at the head of a powerful Grecian and Karian force, with
-numerous Persian cavalry, to attack the Ionian cities. As soon as
-he heard this news, Derkyllidas came back with his army from Karia,
-to cover the towns menaced. Having recrossed the Mæander, he was
-marching with his army in disorder, not suspecting the enemy to be
-near, when on a sudden he came upon their scouts, planted on some
-sepulchral monuments in the road. He also sent some scouts up to
-the neighboring monuments and towers, who apprised him that the two
-satraps, with their joint force in good order, were planted here to
-intercept him. He immediately gave orders for his hoplites to form
-in battle array of eight deep, with the peltasts, and his handful
-of horsemen, on each flank. But such was the alarm caused among his
-troops by this surprise, that none could be relied upon except the
-Cyreians and the Peloponnesians. Of the insular and Ionian hoplites,
-from Priênê and other cities, some actually hid their arms in the
-thick standing corn, and fled; others, who took their places in
-the line, manifested dispositions which left little hope that they
-would stand a charge; so that the Persians had the opportunity of
-fighting a battle not merely with superiority of number, but also
-with advantage of position and circumstances. Pharnabazus was anxious
-to attack without delay. But Tissaphernes, who recollected well the
-valor of the Cyreian troops, and concluded that all the remaining
-Greeks were like them, forbade it; sending forward heralds to demand
-a conference. As they approached, Derkyllidas, surrounding himself
-with a body-guard of the finest and best-equipped soldiers,[386]
-advanced to the front of the line to meet them; saying that he,
-for his part, was prepared to fight,—but since a conference was
-demanded, he had no objection to grant it, provided hostages were
-exchanged. This having been assented to, and a place named for
-conference on the ensuing day, both armies were simultaneously
-withdrawn; the Persians to Tralles, the Greeks to Leukophrys,
-celebrated for its temple of Artemis Leukophryne.[387]
-
-  [385] Diodor. xiv, 39.
-
-  [386] Xen. Hellen. iii, 2, 18.
-
-  In the Anabasis (ii, 3, 3) Xenophon mentions the like care
-  on the part of Klearchus, to have the best armed and most
-  imposing soldiers around him, when he went to his interview with
-  Tissaphernes.
-
-  Xenophon gladly avails himself of the opportunity, to pay an
-  indirect compliment to the Cyreian army.
-
-  [387] Xen. Hellen. iii, 2, 19; Diodor. xiv, 39.
-
-This backwardness on the part of Tissaphernes even at a time when he
-was encouraged by a brother satrap braver than himself, occasioned
-to the Persians the loss of a very promising moment, and rescued the
-Grecian army out of a position of much peril. It helps to explain
-to us the escape of the Cyreians, and the manner in which they were
-allowed to cross rivers and pass over the most difficult ground
-without any serious opposition; while at the same time it tended to
-confirm in the Greek mind the same impressions of Persian imbecility
-as that escape so forcibly suggested.
-
-The conference, as might be expected, ended in nothing.
-Derkyllidas required on behalf of the Asiatic Greeks complete
-autonomy,—exemption from Persian interference and tribute; while the
-two satraps on their side insisted that the Lacedæmonian army should
-be withdrawn from Asia, and the Lacedæmonian harmosts from all the
-Greco-Asiatic cities. An armistice was concluded, to allow time for
-reference to the authorities at home; thus replacing matters in the
-condition in which they had been at the beginning of the year.[388]
-
-  [388] Xen. Hellen. iii, 2, 20.
-
-Shortly after the conclusion of this truce, Agesilaus, king of
-Sparta, arrived with a large force, and the war in all respects began
-to assume larger proportions,—of which more in the next chapter.
-
-But it was not in Asia alone that Sparta had been engaged in war. The
-prostration of the Athenian power had removed that common bond of
-hatred and alarm which attached the allies to her headship; while her
-subsequent conduct had given positive offence, and had even excited
-against herself the same fear of unmeasured imperial ambition which
-had before run so powerfully against Athens. She had appropriated
-to herself nearly the whole of the Athenian maritime empire, with
-a tribute scarcely inferior, if at all inferior, in amount. How
-far the total of one thousand talents was actually realised during
-each successive year, we are not in a condition to say; but such
-was the assessment imposed and the scheme laid down by Sparta for
-her maritime dependencies,—enforced too by omnipresent instruments
-of rapacity and oppression, decemvirs and harmosts, such as Athens
-had never paralleled. When we add to this great maritime empire
-the prodigious ascendency on land which Sparta had enjoyed before,
-we shall find a total of material power far superior to that which
-Athens had enjoyed, even in her day of greatest exaltation, prior to
-the truce of 445 B.C.
-
-This was not all. From the general dulness of character pervading
-Spartan citizens, the full resources of the state were hardly ever
-put forth. Her habitual short-comings at the moment of action are
-keenly criticised by her own friends, in contrast with the ardor and
-forwardness which animated her enemies. But at and after the battle
-of Ægospotami, the entire management of Spartan foreign affairs
-was found in the hands of Lysander; a man not only exempt from the
-inertia usual in his countrymen, but of the most unwearied activity
-and grasping ambition, as well for his country as for himself. Under
-his direction the immense advantages which Sparta enjoyed from her
-new position were at once systematized and turned to the fullest
-account. Now there was enough in the new ascendency of Sparta, had
-it been ever so modestly handled, to spread apprehension through the
-Grecian world. But apprehension became redoubled, when it was seen
-that her ascendency was organized and likely to be worked by her
-most aggressive leader for the purposes of an insatiable ambition.
-Fortunately for the Grecian world, indeed, the power of Sparta did
-not long continue to be thus absolutely wielded by Lysander, whose
-arrogance and overweening position raised enemies against him at
-home. Yet the first impressions received by the allies respecting
-Spartan empire, were derived from his proceedings and his plans
-of dominion, manifested with ostentatious insolence; and such
-impressions continued, even after the influence of Lysander himself
-had been much abated by the counterworking rivalry of Pausanias and
-others.
-
-While Sparta separately had thus gained so much by the close of the
-war, not one of her allies had received the smallest remuneration or
-compensation, except such as might be considered to be involved in
-the destruction of a formidable enemy. Even the pecuniary result
-or residue which Lysander had brought home with him (four hundred
-and seventy talents remaining out of the advances made by Cyrus),
-together with the booty acquired at Dekeleia, was all detained by
-the Lacedæmonians themselves. Thebes and Corinth indeed presented
-demands, in which the other allies did not (probably durst not) join,
-to be allowed to share. But though all the efforts and sufferings
-of the war had fallen upon these allies no less than upon Sparta,
-the demands were refused, and almost resented as insults.[389] Hence
-there arose among the allies not merely a fear of the grasping
-dominion, but a hatred of the monopolizing rapacity, of Sparta.
-Of this new feeling, an early manifestation, alike glaring and
-important, was made by the Thebans and Corinthians, when they refused
-to join Pausanias in his march against Thrasybulus and the Athenian
-exiles in Peiræus,[390]—less than a year after the surrender of
-Athens, the enemy whom these two cities had hated with such extreme
-bitterness down to the very moment of surrender. Even Arcadians and
-Achæans too, habitually obedient as they were to Lacedæmon, keenly
-felt the different way in which she treated them, as compared with
-the previous years of war, when she had been forced to keep alive
-their zeal against the common enemy.[391]
-
-  [389] Xenoph. Hellen. iii, 5, 5; Plutarch, Lysand. c. 27; Justin,
-  v, 10.
-
-  [390] Xen. Hellen. ii, 4, 30.
-
-  [391] Xen. Hellen. iii, 5, 12. Κορινθίους δὲ καὶ Ἄρκαδας καὶ
-  Ἀχαίους τί φῶμεν; οἱ ἐν μὲν τῷ πρὸς ὑμᾶς (it is the Theban
-  envoys who are addressing the public assembly at Athens) πολέμῳ
-  ~μάλα λιπαρούμενοι ὑπ᾽ ἐκείνων~ (the Lacedæmonians), πάντων καὶ
-  πόνων καὶ κινδύνων καὶ δαπανημάτων μετεῖχον· ἐπεὶ δ᾽ ἔπραξαν
-  ἃ ἐβούλοντο οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, ποίας ἢ ἀρχῆς ἢ τιμῆς ἢ ποίων
-  χρημάτων μεταδεδώκασιν αὐτοῖς; ἀλλὰ τοὺς μὲν εἱλώτας ἁρμοστὰς
-  καθιστάναι, τῶν δὲ ξυμμάχων ἐλευθέρων ὄντων, ἐπεὶ εὐτύχησαν,
-  δεσπόται ἀναπεφῄνασιν.
-
-The Lacedæmonians were however strong enough not merely to despise
-this growing alienation of their allies, but even to take revenge
-upon such of the Peloponnesians as had incurred their displeasure.
-Among these stood conspicuous the Eleians; now under a government
-called democratical, of which the leading man was Thrasydæus,—a
-man who had lent considerable aid in 404 B.C. to Thrasybulus and
-the Athenian exiles in Peiræus. The Eleians, in the year 420 B.C.,
-had been engaged in a controversy with Sparta,—had employed their
-privileges as administrators of the Olympic festival to exclude
-her from attendance on that occasion,—and had subsequently been in
-arms against her along with Argos and Mantineia. To these grounds of
-quarrel, now of rather ancient date, had been added afterwards, a
-refusal to furnish aid in the war against Athens since the resumption
-of hostilities in 414 B.C., and a recent exclusion of king Agis,
-who had come in person to offer sacrifice and consult the oracle
-of Zeus Olympius; such exclusion being grounded on the fact that
-he was about to pray for victory in the war then pending against
-Athens, contrary to the ancient canon of the Olympic temple, which
-admitted no sacrifice or consultation respecting hostilities of Greek
-against Greek.[392] These were considered by Sparta as affronts;
-and the season was now favorable for resenting them, as well as
-for chastising and humbling Elis.[393] Accordingly Sparta sent an
-embassy, requiring the Eleians to make good the unpaid arrears
-of the quota assessed upon them for the cost of the war against
-Athens; and farther,—to relinquish their authority over their
-dependent townships or Periœki, leaving the latter autonomous.[394]
-Of these dependencies there were several, no one very considerable
-individually, in the region called Triphylia, south of the river
-Alpheus, and north of the Neda. One of them was Lepreum, the autonomy
-of which the Lacedæmonians had vindicated against Elis in 420 B.C.,
-though during the subsequent period it had again become subject.
-
-  [392] Xen. Hellen. iii, 2, 22.
-
-  Τούτων δ᾽ ὕστερον, καὶ Ἄγιδος πεμφθέντος θῦσαι τῷ Διῒ κατὰ
-  μαντείαν τινὰ, ἐκώλυον οἱ Ἠλεῖοι μὴ προσεύχεσθαι νίκην πολέμου,
-  λέγοντες, ὡς καὶ τὸ ἀρχαῖον εἴη οὕτω νόμιμον, μὴ χρηστηριάζεσθαι
-  τοὺς Ἕλληνας ἐφ᾽ Ἑλλήνων πολέμῳ· ὥστε ἄθυτος ἀπῆλθεν.
-
-  This canon seems not unnatural, for one of the greatest
-  Pan-hellenic temples and establishments. Yet it was not
-  constantly observed at Olympia (compare another example—Xen.
-  Hellen. iv, 7, 2); nor yet at Delphi, which was not less
-  Pan-hellenic than Olympia (see Thucyd. i, 118). We are therefore
-  led to imagine that it was a canon which the Eleians invoked only
-  when they were prompted by some special sentiment or aversion.
-
-  [393] Xen. Hellen. iii, 2, 23. Ἐκ τούτων οὖν πάντων ὀργιζομένοις,
-  ἔδοξε τοῖς ἐφόροις καὶ τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ, ~σωφρονίσαι αὐτούς~.
-
-  [394] Diodorus (xiv, 17) mentions this demand for the arrears;
-  which appears very probable. It is not directly noticed by
-  Xenophon, who however mentions (see the passage cited in the note
-  of page preceding) the general assessment levied by Sparta upon
-  all her Peloponnesian allies during the war.
-
-The Eleians refused compliance with the demand thus sent, alleging
-that their dependent cities were held by the right of conquest.
-They even retorted upon the Lacedæmonians the charge of enslaving
-Greeks;[395] upon which Agis marched with an army to invade their
-territory, entering it from the north side where it joined Achaia.
-Hardly had he crossed the frontier river Larissus and begun his
-ravages, when an earthquake occurred. Such an event, usually
-construed in Greece as a divine warning, acted on this occasion so
-strongly on the religious susceptibilities of Agis, that he not only
-withdrew from the Eleian territory, but disbanded his army. His
-retreat gave so much additional courage to the Eleians, that they
-sent envoys and tried to establish alliances among those cities which
-they knew to be alienated from Sparta. Not even Thebes and Corinth,
-however, could be induced to assist them; nor did they obtain any
-other aid except one thousand men from Ætolia.
-
-  [395] Diodor. xiv, 17.
-
-  Diodorus introduces in these transactions King Pausanias, not
-  King Agis, as the acting person.
-
-  Pausanias states (iii, 8, 2) that the Eleians, in returning a
-  negative answer to the requisition of Sparta, added that they
-  would enfranchise their Periœki, when they saw Sparta enfranchise
-  her own. This answer appears to me highly improbable, under the
-  existing circumstances of Sparta and her relations to the other
-  Grecian states. Allusion to the relations between Sparta and her
-  Periœki was a novelty, even in 371 B.C., at the congress which
-  preceded the battle of Leuktra.
-
-In the next summer Agis undertook a second expedition, accompanied
-on this occasion by all the allies of Sparta; even by the Athenians,
-now enrolled upon the list. Thebes and Corinth alone stood aloof. On
-this occasion he approached from the opposite or southern side, that
-of the territory once called Messenia; passing through Aulon, and
-crossing the river Neda. He marched through Triphylia to the river
-Alpheius, which he crossed, and then proceeded to Olympia, where he
-consummated the sacrifice from which the Eleians had before excluded
-him. In his march he was joined by the inhabitants of Lepreum,
-Makistus, and other dependent towns, which now threw off their
-subjection to Elis. Thus reinforced, Agis proceeded onward towards
-the city of Elis, through a productive country under flourishing
-agriculture, enriched by the crowds and sacrifices at the neighboring
-Olympic temple, and for a long period unassailed. After attacking,
-not very vigorously, the half-fortified city,—and being repelled
-by the Ætolian auxiliaries,—he marched onward to the harbor called
-Kyllênê, still plundering the territory. So ample was the stock of
-slaves, cattle, and rural wealth generally, that his troops not only
-acquired riches for themselves by plunder, but were also joined by
-many Arcadian and Achæan volunteers, who crowded in to partake of the
-golden harvest.[396]
-
-  [396] Xen. Hellen. iii, 2, 23, 26; Diodor. xiv, 17.
-
-The opposition or wealthy oligarchical party in Elis availed
-themselves of this juncture to take arms against the government;
-hoping to get possession of the city, and to maintain themselves in
-power by the aid of Sparta. Xenias their leader, a man of immense
-wealth, with several of his adherents, rushed out armed, and assailed
-the government-house, in which it appears that Thrasydæus and his
-colleagues had been banqueting. They slew several persons, and among
-them one, whom, from great personal resemblance, they mistook for
-Thrasydæus. The latter was however at that moment intoxicated, and
-asleep in a separate chamber.[397] They then assembled in arms in the
-market-place, believing themselves to be masters of the city; while
-the people, under the like impression that Thrasydæus was dead, were
-too much dismayed to offer resistance. But presently it became known
-that he was yet alive; the people crowded to the government-house
-“like a swarm of bees,”[398] and arrayed themselves for his
-protection as well as under his guidance. Leading them forth at once
-to battle, he completely defeated the oligarchical insurgents, and
-forced them to flee for protection to the Lacedæmonian army.
-
-  [397] Xen. Hellen. iii, 2, 27; Pausanias, iii, 8, 2; v, 4, 5.
-
-  The words of Xenophon are not very clear—Βουλόμενοι δὲ οἱ περὶ
-  Ξενίαν τὸν λεγόμενον μεδίμνῳ ἀπομετρήσασθαι τὸ παρὰ τοῦ πατρὸς
-  ἀργύριον (τὴν πόλιν) δι᾽ αὐτῶν προσχωρῆσαι Λακεδαιμονίοις,
-  ἐκπεσόντες ἐξ οἰκίας ξίφη ἔχοντες σφαγὰς ποιοῦσι, καὶ ἄλλους τέ
-  τινας κτείνουσι, καὶ ὅμοιόν τινα Θρασυδαίῳ ἀποκτείναντες, τῷ τοῦ
-  δήμου προστάτῃ, ᾤοντο Θρασυδαῖον ἀπεκτονέναι.... Ὁ δὲ Θρασυδαῖος
-  ἔτι καθεύδων ἐτύγχανεν, οὗπερ ἐμεθύσθη.
-
-  Both the words and the narrative are here very obscure. It seems
-  as if a sentence had dropped out, when we come suddenly upon the
-  mention of the drunken state of Thrasydæus, without having before
-  been told of any circumstance either leading to or implying this
-  condition.
-
-  [398] Xen. Hellen. iii, 2, 28.
-
-Agis presently evacuated the Eleian territory, yet not without
-planting a Lacedæmonian harmost and a garrison, together with Xenias
-and the oligarchical exiles, at Epitalium, a little way south of
-the river Alpheius. Occupying this fort (analogous to Dekeleia in
-Attica), they spread ravage and ruin all around throughout the autumn
-and winter, to such a degree, that in the early spring, Thrasydæus
-and the Eleian government were compelled to send to Sparta and
-solicit peace. They consented to raze the imperfect fortifications of
-their city, so as to leave it quite open. They farther surrendered
-their harbor of Kyllênê with their ships of war, and relinquished
-all authority over the Triphylian townships, as well as over Lasion,
-which was claimed as an Arcadian town.[399] Though they pressed
-strenuously their claim to preserve the town of Epeium (between the
-Arcadian town of Heræa and the Triphylian town of Makistus), on the
-plea that they had bought it from its previous inhabitants at the
-price of thirty talents paid down,—the Lacedæmonians, pronouncing
-this to be a compulsory bargain imposed upon weaker parties by force,
-refused to recognize it. The town was taken away from them, seemingly
-without any reimbursement of the purchase money either in part or
-in whole. On these terms the Eleians were admitted to peace, and
-enrolled again among the members of the Lacedæmonian confederacy.[400]
-
-  [399] Xen. Hellen. iii, 2, 30. There is something perplexing in
-  Xenophon’s description of the Triphylian townships which the
-  Eleians surrendered. First, he does not name Lepreum or Makistus,
-  both of which nevertheless had joined Agis on his invasion,
-  and were the most important places in Triphylia (iii, 2, 25).
-  Next, he names Letrini, Amphidoli, and Marganeis, as Triphylian;
-  which yet were on the north of the Alpheius, and are elsewhere
-  distinguished from Triphylian. I incline to believe that the
-  words in his text, καὶ τὰς Τριφυλίδας πόλεις ἀφεῖναι, must be
-  taken to mean Lepreum and Makistus, perhaps with some other
-  places which we do not know; but that a καὶ after ἀφεῖναι, has
-  fallen out of the text, and that the cities, whose names follow,
-  are to be taken as _not_ Triphylian. Phrixa and Epitalium were
-  both south, but only just south, of the Alpheius; they were not
-  on the borders of Triphylia,—and it seems doubtful whether they
-  were properly Triphylian.
-
-  [400] Xen. Hellen. iii, 2, 30; Diodor. xiv, 34; Pausan. iii, 8, 2.
-
-  This war between Sparta and Elis reaches over three different
-  years; it began in the first, occupied the whole of the second,
-  and was finished in the third. Which years these three were (out
-  of the seven which separate B.C. 403-396), critics have not been
-  unanimous.
-
-  Following the chronology of Diodorus, who places the beginning of
-  the war in 402 B.C., I differ from Mr. Clinton, who places it in
-  401 B.C. (Fasti Hellen. ad ann.), and from Sievers (Geschichte
-  von Griechenland bis zur Schlacht von Mantinea, p. 382), who
-  places it in 398 B.C.
-
-  According to Mr. Clinton’s view, the principal year of the war
-  would have been 400 B.C., the year of the Olympic festival.
-  But surely, had such been the fact, the coincidence of war in
-  the country with the Olympic festival, must have raised so many
-  complications, and acted so powerfully on the sentiments of all
-  parties, as to be specifically mentioned. In my judgment, the war
-  was brought to a close in the early part of 400 B.C., before the
-  time of the Olympic festival arrived. Probably the Eleians were
-  anxious, on this very ground, to bring it to a close before the
-  festival did arrive.
-
-  Sievers, in his discussion of the point, admits that the date
-  assigned by Diodorus to the Eleian war, squares both with the
-  date which Diodorus gives for the death of Agis, and with
-  that which Plutarch states about the duration of the reign of
-  Agesilaus,—better than the chronology which he himself (Sievers)
-  prefers. He founds his conclusion on Xenophon, Hell. iii, 2, 21.
-  Τούτων δὲ πραττομένων ἐν τῇ Ἀσίᾳ ὑπὸ Δερκυλλίδα, Λακεδαιμόνιοι
-  κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον πάλαι ὀργιζόμενοι τοῖς Ἠλείοις, etc.
-
-  This passage is certainly of some weight; yet I think in the
-  present case it is not to be pressed with rigid accuracy as to
-  date. The whole third Book down to these very words, has been
-  occupied entirely with the course of Asiatic affairs. Not a
-  single proceeding of the Lacedæmonians in Peloponnesus, since
-  the amnesty at Athens, has yet been mentioned. The command
-  of Derkyllidas included only the last portion of the Asiatic
-  exploits, and Xenophon has here loosely referred to it as if it
-  comprehended the whole. Sievers moreover compresses the whole
-  Eleian war into one year and a fraction; an interval, shorter, I
-  think, than that which is implied in the statements of Xenophon.
-
-The time of the Olympic festival seems to have been now approaching,
-and the Eleians were probably the more anxious to obtain peace
-from Sparta, as they feared to be deprived of their privilege
-as superintendents. The Pisatans,—inhabitants of the district
-immediately around Olympia,—availed themselves of the Spartan
-invasion of Elis to petition for restoration of their original
-privilege, as administrators of the temple of Zeus at Olympia with
-its great periodical solemnity,—by the dispossession of the Eleians
-as usurpers of that privilege. But their request met with no success.
-It was true indeed that such right had belonged to the Pisatans in
-early days, before the Olympic festival had acquired its actual
-Pan-hellenic importance and grandeur; and that the Eleians had only
-appropriated it to themselves after conquering the territory of
-Pisa. But taking the festival as it then stood, the Pisatans, mere
-villagers without any considerable city, were incompetent to do
-justice to it, and would have lowered its dignity in the eyes of all
-Greece.
-
-Accordingly the Lacedæmonians, on this ground, dismissed the
-claimants, and left the superintendence of the Olympic games still in
-the hands of the Eleians.[401]
-
-  [401] Xen. Hellen. iii, 2, 31.
-
-This triumphant dictation of terms to Elis, placed the Lacedæmonians
-in a condition of overruling ascendency throughout Peloponnesus, such
-as they had never attained before. To complete their victory, they
-rooted out all the remnants of their ancient enemies the Messenians,
-some of whom had been planted by the Athenians at Naupaktus, others
-in the island of Kephallenia. All of this persecuted race were
-now expelled, in the hour of Lacedæmonian omnipotence, from the
-neighborhood of Peloponnesus, and forced to take shelter, some in
-Sicily, others at Kyrênê.[402] We shall in a future chapter have to
-commemorate the turn of fortune in their favor.
-
-  [402] Diodor. xiv, 34; Pausan. iv, 26, 2. 2
-
-
-
-
-CHAPTER LXXIII.
-
-AGESILAUS KING OF SPARTA.—THE CORINTHIAN WAR.
-
-
-The close of the Peloponnesian war, with the victorious organization
-of the Lacedæmonian empire by Lysander, has already been described as
-a period carrying with it increased sufferings to those towns which
-had formerly belonged to the Athenian empire, as compared with what
-they had endured under Athens,—and harder dependence, unaccompanied
-by any species of advantage, even to those Peloponnesians and inland
-cities which had always been dependent allies of Sparta. To complete
-the melancholy picture of the Grecian world during these years, we
-may add (what will be hereafter more fully detailed) that calamities
-of a still more deplorable character overtook the Sicilian Greeks;
-first, from the invasion of the Carthaginians, who sacked Himera,
-Selinus, Agrigentum, Gela, and Kamarina,—next from the overruling
-despotism of Dionysius at Syracuse.
-
-Sparta alone had been the gainer; and that to a prodigious
-extent, both in revenue and power. It is from this time, and from
-the proceedings of Lysander, that various ancient authors dated
-the commencement of her degeneracy, which they ascribe mainly
-to her departure from the institutions of Lykurgus by admitting
-gold and silver money. These metals had before been strictly
-prohibited; no money being tolerated except heavy pieces of iron,
-not portable except to a very trifling amount. That such was the
-ancient institution of Sparta, under which any Spartan having in
-his possession gold and silver money, was liable, if detected, to
-punishment, appears certain. How far the regulation may have been in
-practice evaded, we have no means of determining. Some of the ephors
-strenuously opposed the admission of the large sum brought home by
-Lysander as remnant of what he had received from Cyrus towards the
-prosecution of the war. They contended that the admission of so much
-gold and silver into the public treasury was a flagrant transgression
-of the Lykurgean ordinances. But their resistance was unavailing and
-the new acquisitions were received; though it still continued to be a
-penal offence (and was even made a capital offence, if we may trust
-Plutarch) for any individual to be found with gold and silver in his
-possession.[403] To enforce such a prohibition, however, even if
-practicable before, ceased to be practicable so soon as these metals
-were recognized and tolerated in the possession, and for the purposes
-of the government.
-
-  [403] Plutarch, Lysand. c. 17. Compare Xen. Rep. Laced. vii, 6.
-
-  Both Ephorus and Theopompus recounted the opposition to the
-  introduction of gold and silver into Sparta, each mentioning the
-  name of one of the ephors as taking the lead in it.
-
-  There was a considerable body of ancient sentiment, and that too
-  among high-minded and intelligent men, which regarded gold and
-  silver as a cause of mischief and corruption, and of which the
-  stanza of Horace (Od. iii, 3) is an echo:—
-
-    Aurum irrepertum, et sic melius situm
-    Cum terra celat, spernere fortior
-      Quam cogere humanos in usus,
-        Omne sacrum rapiente dextrâ.
-
-
-There can be no doubt that the introduction of a large sum of coined
-gold and silver into Sparta was in itself a striking and important
-phenomenon, when viewed in conjunction with the peculiar customs and
-discipline of the state. It was likely to raise strong antipathies in
-the bosom of an old fashioned Spartan, and probably king Archidamus,
-had he been alive, would have taken part with the opposing ephors.
-But Plutarch and others have criticised it too much as a phenomenon
-by itself; whereas, it was really one characteristic mark and
-portion of a new assemblage of circumstances, into which Sparta had
-been gradually arriving during the last years of the war, and which
-were brought into the most effective action by the decisive success
-at Ægospotami. The institutions of Lykurgus, though excluding all
-Spartan citizens, by an unremitting drill and public mess, from trade
-and industry, from ostentation, and from luxury,—did not by any
-means extinguish in their bosoms the love of money;[404] while it had
-a positive tendency to exaggerate, rather than to abate, the love
-of power. The Spartan kings, Leotychides and Pleistoanax, had both
-been guilty of receiving bribes; Tissaphernes had found means (during
-the twentieth year of the Peloponnesian war) to corrupt not merely
-the Spartan admiral Astyochus, but also nearly all the captains of
-the Peloponnesian fleet, except the Syracusan Hermokrates; Gylippus,
-as well as his father Kleandrides, had degraded himself by the like
-fraud; and Anaxibius at Byzantium was not at all purer. Lysander,
-enslaved only by his appetite for dominion, and himself a remarkable
-instance of superiority to pecuniary corruption, was thus not the
-first to engraft that vice on the minds of his countrymen. But though
-he found it already diffused among them, he did much to impart
-to it a still more decided predominance, by the immense increase
-of opportunities, and enlarged booty for peculation, which his
-newly-organized Spartan empire furnished. Not merely did he bring
-home a large residue in gold and silver, but there was a much larger
-annual tribute imposed by him on the dependent cities, combined
-with numerous appointments of harmosts to govern these cities. Such
-appointments presented abundant illicit profits, easy to acquire, and
-even difficult to avoid, since the decemvirs in each city were eager
-thus to purchase forbearance or connivance for their own misdeeds.
-So many new sources of corruption were sufficient to operate most
-unfavorably on the Spartan character, if not by implanting any fresh
-vices, at least by stimulating all its inherent bad tendencies.
-
-  [404] Aristotel. Politic. ii, 6, 23.
-
-  Ἀποβέβηκε δὲ τοὐνάντιον τῷ νομοθέτῃ τοῦ συμφέροντος· τὴν μὲν γὰρ
-  πόλιν πεποίηκεν ἀχρήματον, τοὺς δ᾽ ἰδιώτας φιλοχρημάτους.
-
-To understand the material change thus wrought in it, we have only
-to contrast the speeches of king Archidamus and of the Corinthians,
-made in 432 B.C. at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, with
-the state of facts at the end of the war,—during the eleven years
-between the victory of Ægospotami and the defeat of Knidus (405-394
-B.C.). At the former of the two epochs, Sparta had no tributary
-subjects, nor any funds in her treasury, while her citizens were
-very reluctant to pay imposts.[405] About 334 B.C., thirty-seven
-years after her defeat at Leuktra and her loss of Messenia, Aristotle
-remarks the like fact, which had then again become true;[406] but
-during the continuance of her empire between 405 and 394 B.C.,
-she possessed a large public revenue, derived from the tribute of
-the dependent cities. In 432 B.C., Sparta is not merely cautious
-but backward; especially averse to any action at a distance from
-home.[407] In 404 B.C., after the close of the war, she becomes
-aggressive, intermeddling, and ready for dealing with enemies, or
-making acquisitions remote as well as near.[408] In 432 B.C., her
-unsocial and exclusive manners, against the rest of Greece, with
-her constant expulsion of other Greeks from her own city, stand
-prominent among her attributes;[409] while at the end of the war, her
-foreign relations had acquired such great development as to become
-the principal matter of attention for her leading citizens as well
-as for her magistrates; so that the influx of strangers into Sparta,
-and the efflux of Spartans into other parts of Greece became constant
-and inevitable. Hence the strictness of the Lykurgean discipline gave
-way on many points, and the principal Spartans especially struggled
-by various shifts to evade its obligations. It was to these leading
-men that the great prizes fell, enabling them to enrich themselves
-at the expense either of foreign subjects or of the public treasury,
-and tending more and more to aggravate that inequality of wealth
-among the Spartans which Aristotle so emphatically notices in his
-time;[410] since the smaller citizens had no similar opportunities
-opened to them, nor any industry of their own, to guard their
-properties against gradual subdivision and absorption, and to keep
-them in a permanent state of ability to furnish that contribution
-to the mess-table, for themselves and their sons, which formed the
-groundwork of Spartan political franchise. Moreover, the spectacle
-of such newly-opened lucrative prizes,—accessible only to that
-particular section of influential Spartan families who gradually
-became known apart from the rest under the title of the Equals
-or Peers,—embittered the discontent of the energetic citizens
-beneath that privileged position, in such a manner as to menace the
-tranquillity of the state,—as will presently be seen. That sameness
-of life, habits, attainments, aptitudes, enjoyments, fatigues, and
-restraints, which the Lykurgean regulations had so long enforced,
-and still continued to prescribe,—divesting wealth of its principal
-advantages, and thus keeping up the sentiment of personal equality
-among the poorer citizens,—became more and more eluded by the
-richer, through the venality as well as the example of ephors and
-senators;[411] while for those who had no means of corruption, it
-continued unrelaxed, except in so far as many of them fell into a
-still more degraded condition by the loss of their citizenship.
-
-  [405] Thucyd. i, 80. ἀλλὰ πολλῷ ἔτι πλέον τούτου (χρημάτων)
-  ἐλλείπομεν, καὶ οὔτε ἐν κοινῷ ἔχομεν, οὔτε ἑτοίμως ἐκ τῶν ἰδίων
-  φέρομεν.
-
-  [406] Aristotel. Polit. ii, 6, 23. Φαύλως δ᾽ ἔχει καὶ περὶ τὰ
-  κοινὰ κρήματα τοῖς Σπαρτιάταις· οὔτε γὰρ ἐν τῷ κοινῷ τῆς πόλεώς
-  ἐστιν οὐδὲν, πολέμους μεγάλους ἀναγκαζομένους φέρειν· εἰσφέρουσί
-  τε κακῶς, etc.
-
-  Contrast what Plato says in his dialogue of Alkibiades, i, c.
-  39, p. 122 E. about the great quantity of gold and silver then
-  at Sparta. The dialogue must bear date at some period between
-  400-371 B.C.
-
-  [407] See the speeches of the Corinthian envoys and of King
-  Archidamus at Sparta (Thucyd. i, 70-84; compare also viii, 24-96).
-
-  [408] See the criticisms upon Sparta, about 395 B.C. and 372 B.C.
-  (Xenoph. Hellen. iii, 5, 11-15; vi, 3, 8-11).
-
-  [409] Thucyd. i, 77. Ἄμικτα γὰρ τά τε καθ᾽ ὑμᾶς αὐτοὺς νόμιμα
-  τοῖς ἄλλοις ἔχετε, etc. About the ξενηλασίαι of the Spartans—see
-  the speech of Perikles in Thucyd. i, 138.
-
-  [410] Aristotel. Politic. ii, 6, 10.
-
-  [411] Aristot. Politic. ii, 6, 16-18; ii, 7, 3.
-
-It is not merely Isokrates,[412] who attests the corruption wrought
-in the character of the Spartans by the possession of that foreign
-empire which followed the victory of Ægospotami,—but also their
-earnest panegyrist Xenophon. After having warmly extolled the laws
-of Lykurgus or the Spartan institutions, he is constrained to admit
-that his eulogies, though merited by the past, have become lamentably
-inapplicable to that present which he himself witnessed. “Formerly
-(says he,[413]) the Lacedæmonians used to prefer their own society
-and moderate way of life at home, to appointments as harmosts in
-foreign towns, with all the flattery and all the corruption attending
-them. Formerly, they were afraid to be seen with gold in their
-possession; now, there are some who make even an ostentatious display
-of it. Formerly, they enforced their (Xenêlasy or) expulsion of
-strangers, and forbade foreign travel, in order that their citizens
-might not be filled with relaxed habits of life from contact with
-foreigners; but now, those who stand first in point of influence
-among them, study above all things to be in perpetual employment as
-harmosts abroad. There was a time when they took pains to be worthy
-of headship; but now they strive much rather to get and keep the
-command, than to be properly qualified for it. Accordingly, the
-Greeks used in former days to come and solicit, that the Spartans
-would act as their leaders against wrong-doers; but now they are
-exhorting each other to concert measures for shutting out Sparta from
-renewed empire. Nor can we wonder that the Spartans have fallen into
-this discredit, when they have manifestly renounced obedience both to
-the Delphian god, and to the institutions of Lykurgus!”
-
-  [412] Isokrates, de Pace, s. 118-127.
-
-  [413] Xen. de Republ. Laced. c. 14.
-
-  Οἶδα γὰρ πρότερον μὲν Λακεδαιμονίους αἱρουμένους, οἴκοι τὰ
-  μέτρια ἔχοντας ἀλλήλοις συνεῖναι μᾶλλον, ἢ ἁρμόζοντας ἐν ταῖς
-  πόλεσι καὶ κολακευομένους διαφθείρεσθαι. Καὶ πρόσθεν μὲν οἶδα
-  αὐτοὺς φοβουμένους, χρύσιον ἔχοντας φαίνεσθαι· νῦν δ᾽ ἔστιν οὓς
-  καὶ καλλωπιζομένους ἐπὶ τῷ κεκτῆσθαι. Ἐπίσταμαι δὲ καὶ πρόσθεν
-  τούτου ἕνεκα ξενηλασίας γιγνομένας, καὶ ἀποδημεῖν οὐκ ἐξόν, ὅπως
-  μὴ ῥᾳδιουργίας οἱ πολῖται ἀπὸ τῶν ξένων ἐμπίμπλαιντο· νῦν δ᾽
-  ἐπίσταμαι τοὺς δοκοῦντας πρώτους εἶναι ἐσπουδακότας ὡς μηδεπότε
-  παύωνται ἁρμόζοντες ἐπὶ ξένης. Καὶ ἦν μὲν, ὅτε ἐπεμελοῦντο, ὅπως
-  ἄξιοι εἶεν ἡγεῖσθαι· νῦν δὲ πολὺ μᾶλλον πραγματεύονται, ὅπως
-  ἄρξουσιν, ἢ ὅπως ἄξιοι τούτου ἔσονται. Τοιγαροῦν οἱ Ἕλληνες
-  πρότερον μὲν ἰόντες εἰς Λακεδαίμονα ἐδέοντο αὐτῶν, ἡγεῖσθαι ἐπὶ
-  τοὺς δοκοῦντας ἀδικεῖν· νῦν δὲ πολλοὶ παρακαλοῦσιν ἀλλήλους ~ἐπὶ
-  τὸ διακωλύειν ἄρξαι πάλιν αὐτούς~. Οὐδὲν μέντοι δεῖ θαυμάζειν
-  τούτων τῶν ἐπιψόγων αὐτοῖς γιγνομένων, ἐπειδὴ φανεροί εἰσιν οὔτε
-  τῷ θεῷ πειθόμενοι οὔτε τοῖς Λυκούργου νόμοις.
-
-  The expression, “taking measures to hinder the Lacedæmonians
-  from again exercising empire,”—marks this treatise as probably
-  composed some time between their naval defeat at Knidus, and
-  their land-defeat at Leuktra. The former put an end to their
-  maritime empire,—the latter excluded them from all possibility
-  of recovering it; but during the interval between the two, such
-  recovery was by no means impossible.
-
-This criticism (written at some period between 394-371 B.C.) from
-the strenuous eulogist of Sparta is highly instructive. We know from
-other evidences how badly the Spartan empire worked for the subject
-cities; we here learn how badly it worked for the character of the
-Spartans themselves, and for those internal institutions which even
-an enemy of Sparta, who detested her foreign policy, still felt
-constrained to admire.[414] All the vices, here insisted upon by
-Xenophon, arise from various incidents connected with her empire.
-The moderate, home-keeping, old-fashioned, backward disposition,—of
-which the Corinthians complain,[415] but for which king Archidamus
-takes credit, at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war,—is found
-exchanged, at the close of the war, for a spirit of aggression
-and conquest, for ambition public as well as private, and for
-emancipation of the great men from the subduing[416] equality of the
-discipline enacted by Lykurgus.
-
-  [414] The Athenian envoy at Melos says,—Λακεδαιμόνιοι γὰρ πρὸς
-  μὲν σφᾶς αὐτοὺς καὶ τὰ ἐπιχώρια νόμιμα, πλεῖστα ἀρετῇ χρῶνται·
-  πρὸς δὲ τοὺς ἀλλους—ἐπιφανέστατα ὧν ἴσμεν τὰ μὲν ἡδέα καλὰ
-  νομίζουσι, τὰ δὲ ξυμφέροντα δίκαια (Thucyd. v. 105). A judgment
-  almost exactly the same, is pronounced by Polybius (vi, 48).
-
-  [415] Thucyd. i, 69, 70, 71, 84. ἀρχαιότροπα ὑμῶν τὰ
-  ἐπιτηδεύματα—ἄοκνοι πρὸς ὑμᾶς μελλητὰς καὶ ἀποδημηταὶ πρὸς
-  ἐνδημοτάτους: also viii, 24.
-
-  [416] Σπάρτην δαμασίμβροτον (Simonides ap. Plutarch. Agesilaum,
-  c. 1).
-
-Agis the son of Archidamus (426-399 B.C.), and Pausanias son of
-Pleistoanax (408-394 B.C.), were the two kings of Sparta at the end
-of the war. But Lysander, the admiral or commander of the fleet, was
-for the time[417] greater than either of the two kings, who had the
-right of commanding only the troops on land. I have already mentioned
-how his overweening dictation and insolence offended not only
-Pausanias, but also several of the ephors and leading men at Sparta,
-as well as Pharnabazus the Persian satrap; thus indirectly bringing
-about the emancipation of Athens from the Thirty, the partial
-discouragement of the dekarchies throughout Greece, and the recall
-of Lysander himself from his command. It was not without reluctance
-that the conqueror of Athens submitted to descend again to a private
-station. Amidst the crowd of flatterers who heaped incense on him
-at the moment of his omnipotence, there were not wanting those who
-suggested that he was much more worthy to reign than either Agis or
-Pausanias; that the kings ought to be taken, not from the first-born
-of the lineage of Eurysthenês and Proklês, but by selection out of
-all the Herakleids, of whom Lysander himself was one;[418] and that
-the person elected ought to be not merely a descendant of Hêraklês,
-but a worthy parallel of Hêraklês himself, while pæans were sung to
-the honor of Lysander at Samos,[419]—while Chœrilus and Antilochus
-composed poems in his praise,—while Antimachus (a poet highly
-esteemed by Plato) entered into a formal competition of recited epic
-verses called _Lysandria_, and was surpassed by Nikêratus, there was
-another warm admirer, a rhetor or sophist of Halikarnassus, named
-Kleon,[420] who wrote a discourse proving that Lysander had well
-earned the regal dignity,—that personal excellence ought to prevail
-over legitimate descent, and that the crown ought to be laid open
-to election from the most worthy among the Herakleids. Considering
-that rhetoric was neither employed nor esteemed at Sparta, we cannot
-reasonably believe that Lysander really ordered the composition
-of this discourse as an instrument of execution for projects
-preconceived by himself, in the same manner as an Athenian prosecutor
-or defendant before the dikastery used to arm himself with a speech
-from Lysias or Demosthenes. Kleon would make his court professionally
-through such a prose composition, whether the project were first
-recommended by himself, or currently discussed among a circle of
-admirers; while Lysander would probably requite the compliment by a
-reward not less munificent than that which he gave to the indifferent
-poet Antilochus.[421] And the composition would be put into the
-form of an harangue from the admiral to his countrymen, without any
-definite purpose that it should be ever so delivered. Such hypothesis
-of a speaker and an audience was frequent with the rhetors in their
-writings, as we may see in Isokrates,—especially in his sixth
-discourse, called Archidamus.
-
-  [417] See an expression of Aristotle (Polit. ii, 6, 22) about
-  the function of admiral among the Lacedæmonians,—ἐπὶ γὰρ τοῖς
-  βασιλεῦσιν, οὖσι στρατηγοῖς ἀϊδίοις, ἡ ναυαρχία σχεδόν ἑτέρα
-  βασιλεία καθέστηκε.
-
-  This reflection,—which Aristotle intimates that he has borrowed
-  from some one else, though without saying from whom,—must in
-  all probability have been founded upon the case of Lysander;
-  for never after Lysander, was there any Lacedæmonian admiral
-  enjoying a power which could by possibility be termed exorbitant
-  or dangerous. We know that during the later years of the
-  Peloponnesian war, much censure was cast upon the Lacedæmonian
-  practice of annually changing the admiral (Xen. Hellen. i, 6, 4).
-
-  The Lacedæmonians seem to have been impressed with these
-  criticisms, for in the year 395 B.C. (the year before the battle
-  of Knidus) they conferred upon King Agesilaus, who was then
-  commanding the land army in Asia Minor, the command of the fleet
-  also—in order to secure unity of operations. This had never been
-  done before (Xen. Hellen. iii, 4, 28).
-
-  [418] Plutarch, Lysand. c. 24. Perhaps he may have been simply
-  a member of the tribe called Hylleis, who, probably, called
-  themselves Herakleids. Some affirmed that Lysander wished to
-  cause the kings to be elected out of all the Spartans, not simply
-  out of the Herakleids. This is less probable.
-
-  [419] Duris ap. Athenæum, xv, p. 696.
-
-  [420] Plutarch, Lysand. c. 18; Plutarch, Agesil. c. 20.
-
-  [421] Plutarch, Lysand. c. 17.
-
-Either from his own ambition, or from the suggestions of others,
-Lysander came now to conceive the idea of breaking the succession
-of the two regal families, and opening for himself a door to reach
-the crown. His projects have been characterized as revolutionary;
-but there seems nothing in them which fairly merits the appellation,
-in the sense which that word now bears, if we consider accurately
-what the Spartan kings were in the year 400 B.C. In this view the
-associations connected with the title of king, are to a modern
-reader misleading. The Spartan kings were not kings at all, in any
-modern sense of the term; not only they were not absolute, but they
-were not even constitutional kings. They were not sovereigns, nor
-was any Spartan their subject; every Spartan was the member of a
-free Grecian community. The Spartan king did not govern; nor did he
-reign, in the sense of having government carried on in his name and
-by his delegates. The government of Sparta was carried on by the
-ephors, with frequent consultation of the senate, and occasional,
-though rare appeals, to the public assembly of citizens. The Spartan
-king was not legally inviolable. He might be, and occasionally was,
-arrested, tried, and punished for misbehavior in the discharge of
-his functions. He was a self-acting person, a great officer of
-state; enjoying certain definite privileges, and exercising certain
-military and judicial functions, which passed as an _universitas_ by
-hereditary transmission in his family; but subject to the control of
-the ephors as to the way in which he performed these duties.[422]
-Thus, for example, it was his privilege to command the army when
-sent on foreign service; yet a law was made, requiring him to take
-deputies along with him, as a council of war, without whom nothing
-was to be done. The ephors recalled Agesilaus when they thought fit;
-and they brought Pausanias to trial and punishment, for alleged
-misconduct in his command.[423] The only way in which the Spartan
-kings formed part of the sovereign power in the state, or shared in
-the exercise of government properly so called, was that they had
-votes _ex officio_ in the Senate, and could vote there by proxy
-when they were not present. In ancient times, very imperfectly
-known, the Spartan kings seem really to have been sovereigns; the
-government having then been really carried on by them, or by their
-orders. But in the year 400 B.C., Agis and Pausanias had become
-nothing more than great and dignified hereditary officers of state,
-still bearing the old title of their ancestors. To throw open these
-hereditary functions to all the members of the Herakleid Gens, by
-election from their number, might be a change better or worse; it
-was a startling novelty (just as it would have been to propose, that
-any of the various priesthoods, which were hereditary in particular
-families, should be made elective), because of the extreme attachment
-of the Spartans to old and sanctified customs; but it cannot
-properly be styled revolutionary. The ephors, the senate, and the
-public assembly, might have made such a change in full legal form,
-without any appeal to violence; the kings might vote against it,
-but they would have been outvoted. And if the change had been made,
-the Spartan government would have remained, in form as well as in
-principle, just what it was before; although the Eurystheneid and
-Prokleid families would have lost their privileges. It is not meant
-here to deny that the Spartan kings were men of great importance in
-the state, especially when (like Agesilaus) they combined with their
-official station a marked personal energy. But it is not the less
-true, that the associations, connected with the title of _king_ in
-the modern mind, do not properly apply to them.
-
-  [422] Aristotle (Polit. v, 1, 5) represents justly the schemes
-  of Lysander as going πρὸς τὸ μέρος τι κινῆσαι τῆς πολιτείας·
-  οἷον ἀρχήν τινα καταστῆσαι ἢ ἀνελεῖν. The Spartan kingship is
-  here regarded as ἀρχή τις—one office of state, among others.
-  But Aristotle regards Lysander as having intended to destroy the
-  kingship—καταλῦσαι τὴν βασιλείαν—which does not appear to have
-  been the fact. The plan of Lysander was to retain the kingship,
-  but to render it elective instead of hereditary. He wished to
-  place the Spartan kingship substantially on the same footing, as
-  that on which the office of the kings or suffetes of Carthage
-  stood; who were not hereditary, nor confined to members of the
-  same family or Gens, but chosen out of the principal families or
-  Gentes. Aristotle, while comparing the βασιλεῖς at Sparta with
-  those at Carthage, as being generally analogous, pronounces in
-  favor of the Carthaginian election as better than the Spartan
-  hereditary transmission. (Arist. Polit. ii, 8, 2.)
-
-  [423] Thucyd. v, 63; Xen. Hellen. iii, 5, 25; iv, 2, 1.
-
-To carry his point at Sparta, Lysander was well aware that agencies
-of an unusual character must be employed. Quitting Sparta soon after
-his recall, he visited the oracles of Delphi, Dodona, and Zeus Ammon
-in Libya,[424] in order to procure, by persuasion or corruption,
-injunctions to the Spartans, countenancing his projects. So great was
-the general effect of oracular injunctions on the Spartan mind, that
-Kleomenes had thus obtained the deposition of king Demaratus, and the
-exiled Pleistoanax, his own return;[425] bribery having been in both
-cases the moving impulse. But Lysander was not equally fortunate.
-None of these oracles could be induced, by any offers, to venture
-upon so grave a sentence as that of repealing the established law of
-succession to the Spartan throne. It is even said that the priests of
-Ammon, not content with refusing his offers, came over to Sparta to
-denounce his proceeding; upon which accusation Lysander was put on
-his trial, but acquitted. The statement that he was thus tried and
-acquitted, I think untrue. But his schemes so far miscarried,—and
-he was compelled to resort to another stratagem, yet still appealing
-to the religious susceptibilities of his countrymen. There had been
-born some time before, in one of the cities of the Euxine, a youth
-named Silenus, whose mother affirmed that he was the son of Apollo;
-an assertion which found extensive credence, notwithstanding various
-difficulties raised by the sceptics. While making at Sparta this new
-birth of a son to the god, the partisans of Lysander also spread
-abroad the news that there existed sacred manuscripts and inspired
-records, of great antiquity, hidden and yet unread, in the custody
-of the Delphian priests; not to be touched or consulted until some
-genuine son of Apollo should come forward to claim them. With the
-connivance of some among the priests, certain oracles were fabricated
-agreeable to the views of Lysander. The plan was concerted that
-Silenus should present himself at Delphi, tender the proofs of his
-divine parentage, and then claim the inspection of these hidden
-records; which the priests, after an apparently rigid scrutiny,
-were prepared to grant. Silenus would then read them aloud in the
-presence of all the spectators; and one would be found among them,
-recommending to the Spartans to choose their kings out of all the
-best citizens.[426]
-
-  [424] Diodor. xiv, 13; Cicero, de Divinat. i, 43, 96; Cornel.
-  Nepos, Lysand. c. 3.
-
-  [425] Plutarch, Lysand. c. 25, from Ephorus. Compare Herodot. vi,
-  66; Thucyd. v, 12.
-
-  [426] Plutarch, Lysand. c. 26.
-
-So nearly did this project approach to consummation, that Silenus
-actually presented himself at Delphi, and put in his claim. But one
-of the confederates either failed in his courage, or broke down,
-at the critical moment; so that the hidden records still remained
-hidden. Yet though Lysander was thus compelled to abandon his plan,
-nothing was made public about it until after his death. It might
-probably have succeeded, had he found temple-confederates of proper
-courage and cunning,—when we consider the profound and habitual
-deference of the Spartans to Delphi; upon the sanction of which
-oracle the Lykurgean institutions themselves were mainly understood
-to rest. And an occasion presently arose, on which the proposed
-change might have been tried with unusual facility and pertinence;
-though Lysander himself, having once miscarried, renounced his
-enterprise, and employed his influence, which continued unabated,
-in giving the sceptre to another instead of acquiring it for
-himself,[427]—like Mucian in reference to the emperor Vespasian.
-
-  [427] Tacit. Histor. i, 10. “Cui expeditius fuerit tradere
-  imperium, quam obtinere.”
-
-  The general fact of the conspiracy of Lysander to open for
-  himself a way to the throne, appears to rest on very sufficient
-  testimony,—that of Ephorus; to whom perhaps the words φασί τινες
-  in Aristotle may allude, where he mentions this conspiracy as
-  having been narrated (Polit. v, 1, 5). But Plutarch, as well as
-  K. O. Müller (Hist. of Dorians, iv, 9, 5) and others, erroneously
-  represent the intrigues with the oracle as being resorted to
-  after Lysander returned from accompanying Agesilaus to Asia;
-  which is certainly impossible, since Lysander accompanied
-  Agesilaus out, in the spring of 396 B.C.—did not return to
-  Greece until the spring of 395 B.C.—and was then employed,
-  with an interval not greater than four or five months, on that
-  expedition against Bœotia wherein he was slain.
-
-  The tampering of Lysander with the oracle must undoubtedly have
-  taken place prior to the death of Agis,—at some time between 403
-  B.C. and 399 B.C. The humiliation which he received in 396 B.C.
-  from Agesilaus might indeed have led him to revolve in his mind
-  the renewal of his former plans; but he can have had no time to
-  do anything towards them. Aristotle (Polit. v, 6, 2) alludes
-  to the humiliation of Lysander by the kings as an example of
-  incidents _tending_ to raise disturbance in an aristocratical
-  government; but this humiliation, probably, alludes to the manner
-  in which he was thwarted in Attica by Pausanias in 403 B.C.—which
-  proceeding is ascribed by Plutarch to both kings, as well as to
-  their jealousy of Lysander (see Plutarch, Lysand. c. 21)—not to
-  the treatment of Lysander by Agesilaus in 396 B.C. The mission of
-  Lysander to the despot Dionysius at Syracuse (Plutarch, Lysand.
-  c. 2) must also have taken place prior to the death of Agis in
-  399 B.C.; whether before or after the failure of the stratagem at
-  Delphi, is uncertain; perhaps after it.
-
-It was apparently about a year after the campaigns in Elis, that
-king Agis, now an old man, was taken ill at Heræa in Arcadia, and
-carried back to Sparta, where he shortly afterwards expired. His
-wife Mimæa had given birth to a son named Leotychides, now a youth
-about fifteen years of age.[428] But the legitimacy of this youth
-had always been suspected by Agis, who had pronounced, when the
-birth of the child was first made known to him, that it could not be
-his. He had been frightened out of his wife’s bed by the shock of an
-earthquake, which was construed as a warning from Poseidon, and was
-held to be a prohibition of intercourse for a certain time; during
-which interval Leotychides was born. This was one story; another was,
-that the young prince was the son of Alkibiades, born during the
-absence of Agis in his command at Dekeleia. On the other hand, it
-was alleged that Agis, though originally doubtful of the legitimacy
-of Leotychides, had afterwards retracted his suspicions, and fully
-recognized him; especially, and with peculiar solemnity, during
-his last illness.[429] As in the case of Demaratus about a century
-earlier,[430]—advantage was taken of these doubts by Agesilaus, the
-younger brother of Agis, powerfully seconded by Lysander, to exclude
-Leotychides, and occupy the throne himself.
-
-  [428] The age of Leotychides is approximately marked by the
-  date of the presence of Alkibiades at Sparta 414-413 B.C. The
-  mere rumor, true or false, that this young man was the son of
-  Alkibiades, may be held sufficient as chronological evidence to
-  certify his age.
-
-  [429] Xen. Hellen. iii, 3, 2; Pausanias, iii, 8, 4; Plutarch,
-  Agesilaus, c. 3.
-
-  [430] Herodot. v, 66.
-
-Agesilaus was the son of king Archidamus, not by Lampito the mother
-of Agis, but by a second wife named Eupolia. He was now at the
-mature age of forty,[431] and having been brought up without any
-prospect of becoming king,—at least until very recent times,—had
-passed through the unmitigated rigor of Spartan drill and training.
-He was distinguished for all Spartan virtues; exemplary obedience
-to authority, in the performance of his trying exercises, military
-as well as civil,—intense emulation, in trying to surpass every
-competitor,—extraordinary courage, unremitting energy, as well as
-facility in enduring hardship,—perfect simplicity and frugality
-in all his personal habits,—extreme sensibility to the opinion of
-his fellow-citizens. Towards his personal friends or adherents,
-he was remarkable for fervor of attachment, even for unscrupulous
-partisanship, with a readiness to use all his influence in screening
-their injustices or short-comings; while he was comparatively
-placable and generous in dealing with rivals at home, notwithstanding
-his eagerness to be first in every sort of competition.[432] His
-manners were cheerful and popular, and his physiognomy pleasing;
-though in stature he was not only small but mean, and though he
-labored under the additional defect of lameness on one leg,[433]
-which accounts for his constant refusal to suffer his statue to be
-taken.[434] He was indifferent to money, and exempt from excess of
-selfish feeling, except in his passion for superiority and power.
-
-  [431] I confess I do not understand how Xenophon can say, in
-  his Agesilaus, i, 6, Ἀγησίλαος τοίνυν ἔτι μὲν νέος ὢν ἔτυχε
-  τῆς βασιλείας. For he himself says (ii, 28), and it seems
-  well established, that Agesilaus died at the age of above 80
-  (Plutarch, Agesil. c. 40); and his death must have been about 360
-  B.C.
-
-  [432] Plutarch, Agesilaus, c. 2-5; Xenoph. Agesil. vii, 3;
-  Plutarch, Apophth. Laconic. p. 212 D.
-
-  [433] Plutarch, Agesil. c. 2; Xenoph. Agesil. viii, 1.
-
-  It appears that the mother of Agesilaus was a very small woman,
-  and that Archidamus had incurred the censure of the ephors, on
-  that especial ground, for marrying her.
-
-  [434] Xenoph. Agesil. xi, 7; Plutarch, Agesil. c. 2.
-
-In spite of his rank as brother of Agis, Agesilaus had never yet
-been tried in any military command, though he had probably served
-in the army either at Dekeleia or in Asia. Much of his character,
-therefore, lay as yet undisclosed. And his popularity may perhaps
-have been the greater at the moment when the throne became vacant,
-inasmuch as, having never been put in a position to excite jealousy,
-he stood distinguished only for accomplishments, efforts, endurances,
-and punctual obedience, wherein even the poorest citizens were his
-competitors on equal terms. Nay, so complete was the self-constraint,
-and the habit of smothering emotions, generated by a Spartan
-training, that even the cunning Lysander himself did not at this time
-know him. He and Agesilaus had been early and intimate friends,[435]
-both having been placed as boys in the same herd or troop for the
-purposes of discipline; a strong illustration of the equalizing
-character of this discipline, since we know that Lysander was of
-poor parents and condition.[436] He made the mistake of supposing
-Agesilaus to be of a disposition particularly gentle and manageable;
-and this was his main inducement for espousing the pretensions of the
-latter to the throne, after the decease of Agis. Lysander reckoned,
-if by his means Agesilaus became king, on a great increase of his own
-influence, and especially on a renewed mission to Asia, if not as
-ostensible general, at least as real chief under the tutelar headship
-of the new king.
-
-  [435] Plutarch, Agesil. c. 2.
-
-  [436] Plutarch, Lysand. c. 2.
-
-Accordingly, when the imposing solemnities which always marked the
-funeral of a king of Sparta were terminated,[437] and the day arrived
-for installation of a new king, Agesilaus, under the promptings of
-Lysander, stood forward to contest the legitimacy and the title of
-Leotychides, and to claim the sceptre for himself,—a true Herakleid,
-brother of the late king Agis. In the debate, which probably took
-place not merely before the ephors and the senate but before the
-assembled citizens besides, Lysander warmly seconded his pretensions.
-Of this debate unfortunately we are not permitted to know much.
-We cannot doubt that the mature age and excellent reputation of
-Agesilaus would count as a great recommendation, when set against
-an untried youth; and this was probably the real point (since the
-relationship of both was so near) upon which decision turned;[438]
-for the legitimacy of Leotychides was positively asseverated by his
-mother Timæa,[439] and we do not find that the question of paternity
-was referred to the Delphian oracle, as in the case of Demaratus.
-
-  [437] Xen. Hellen. iii, 3, 1.
-
-  [438] Plutarch, Lysand. c. 22; Plutarch, Agesil. c. 3;
-  Xen. Hellen. iii, 3, 2; Xen. Agesil. 1, 5—κρίνασα ἡ πόλις
-  ἀνεπικλητότερον εἶναι Ἀγησίλαον καὶ τῷ γένει καὶ τῇ ἀρετῇ, etc.
-
-  [439] Xen. Hellen. iii, 3, 2. This statement contradicts the talk
-  imputed to Timæa by Duris (Plutarch, Agesil. c. 3; Plutarch,
-  Alkibiad. c. 23).
-
-There was, however, one circumstance which stood much in the way
-of Agesilaus,—his personal deformity. A lame king of Sparta had
-never yet been known. And if we turn back more than a century
-to the occurrence of a similar deformity in one of the Battiad
-princes at Kyrênê,[440] we see the Kyrenians taking it so deeply to
-heart, that they sent to ask advice from Delphi, and invited over
-the Mantineian reformer Demônax. Over and above this sentiment of
-repugnance, too, the gods had specially forewarned Sparta to beware
-of “a lame reign.” Deiopeithes, a prophet and religious adviser of
-high reputation, advocated the cause of Leotychides. He produced an
-ancient oracle, telling Sparta, that “with all her pride she must
-not suffer a lame reign to impair her stable footing;[441] for if
-she did so, unexampled suffering and ruinous wars would long beset
-her.” This prophecy had already been once invoked, about eighty years
-earlier,[442] but with a very different interpretation. To Grecian
-leaders, like Themistokles or Lysander, it was an accomplishment of
-no small value to be able to elude inconvenient texts or intractable
-religious feelings, by expository ingenuity. And Lysander here raised
-his voice (as Themistokles had done on the momentous occasion before
-the battle of Salamis),[443] to combat the professional expositors;
-contending that by “a lame reign,” the god meant, not a bodily defect
-in the king,—which might not even be congenital, but might arise
-from some positive hurt,[444]—but the reign of any king who was not
-a genuine descendant of Hêraklês.
-
-  [440] Herodot. iv, 161. Διεδέξατο δὲ τὴν βασιληΐην τοῦ
-  Ἀρκεσίλεω ὁ παῖς Βάττος, χωλός τε ἐὼν καὶ οὐκ ἀρτίπους. Οἱ δὲ
-  Κυρηναῖοι ~πρὸς τὴν καταλαβοῦσαν συμφορὴν~ ἔπεμπον ἐς Δελφοὺς,
-  ἐπειρησομένους ὅντινα τρόπον καταστησάμενοι κάλλιστα ἂν οἰκέοιεν.
-
-  [441] Plutarch, Lysand. c. 22; Plutarch, Agesil. c. 3; Pausanias,
-  iii, 8, 5.
-
-  [442] Diodor. xi, 50.
-
-  [443] Herodot. vii, 143.
-
-  [444] Xen. Hellen. iii, 3, 3. ὡς οὐκ οἴοιτο τὸν θεὸν τοῦτο
-  κελεύειν φυλάξασθαι, ~μὴ προσπταίσας τις χωλεύσῃ~, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον,
-  μὴ οὐκ ὢν τοῦ γένους βασιλεύσῃ.
-
-  Congenital lameness would be regarded as a mark of divine
-  displeasure, and therefore a disqualification from the throne,
-  as in the case of Battus of Kyrênê above noticed. But the
-  words χωλὴ βασίλεια were general enough to cover both the
-  cases,—superinduced as well as congenital lameness. It is upon
-  this that Lysander founds his inference—that the god did not
-  mean to allude to bodily lameness at all.
-
-The influence of Lysander,[445] combined doubtless with a
-preponderance of sentiment already tending towards Agesilaus, caused
-this effort of interpretative subtlety to be welcomed as convincing,
-and led to the nomination of the lame candidate as king. There was,
-however, a considerable minority, to whom this decision appeared a
-sin against the gods and a mockery of the oracle. And though the
-murmurs of such dissentients were kept down by the ability and
-success of Agesilaus during the first years of his reign; yet when,
-in his ten last years, calamity and humiliation were poured thickly
-upon this proud city, the public sentiment came decidedly round to
-their view. Many a pious Spartan then exclaimed, with feelings of
-bitter repentance, that the divine word never failed to come true at
-last,[446] and that Sparta was justly punished for having wilfully
-shut her eyes to the distinct and merciful warning vouchsafed to her,
-about the mischiefs of a “lame reign.”[447]
-
-  [445] Pausanias, iii, 8, 5; Plutarch, Agesil. c. 3; Plutarch,
-  Lysand. c. 22; Justin, vi, 2.
-
-  [446]
-
-    Ἴδ᾽ οἷον, ὦ παῖδες, προσέμιξεν ἄφαρ
-    Τοὔπος τὸ θεοπρόπον ἡμῖν
-    Τῆς παλαιφάτου προνοίας,
-    Ὅ τ᾽ ἔλακεν, etc.
-
-  This is a splendid chorus of the Trachiniæ of Sophokles (822)
-  proclaiming their sentiments on the awful death of Hêraklês, in
-  the tunic of Nessus, which has just been announced as about to
-  happen.
-
-  [447] Plutarch, Agesil. c. 30; Plutarch, Compar. Agesil. and
-  Pomp. c. 1. Ἀγησίλαος δὲ τὴν βασιλείαν ἔδοξε λαβεῖν, οὔτε τὰ
-  πρὸς θεοὺς ἄμεμπτος, οὔτε τὰ πρὸς ἀνθρώπους, κρίνας νοθείας
-  Λεωτυχίδην, ὃν υἱὸν αὑτοῦ ἀπέδειξεν ὁ ἀδελφὸς γνήσιον, τὸν δὲ
-  χρησμὸν κατειρωνευσάμενος τὸν περὶ τῆς χωλότητος. Again, ib. c.
-  2. δι᾽ Ἀγησίλαον ἐπεσκότησε τῷ χρησμῷ Λύσανδρος.
-
-Besides the crown, Agesilaus at the same time acquired the large
-property left by the late king Agis; an acquisition which enabled
-him to display his generosity by transferring half of it at once
-to his maternal relatives,—for the most part poor persons.[448]
-The popularity acquired by this step was still farther increased
-by his manner of conducting himself towards the ephors and senate.
-Between these magistrates and the kings, there was generally a bad
-understanding. The kings, not having lost the tradition of the
-plenary power once enjoyed by their ancestors, displayed as much
-haughty reserve as they dared, towards an authority now become
-essentially superior to their own. But Agesilaus,—not less from
-his own preëstablished habits, than from anxiety to make up for the
-defects of his title,—adopted a line of conduct studiously opposite.
-He not only took pains to avoid collision with the ephors, but showed
-marked deference both to their orders and to their persons. He rose
-from his seat whenever they appeared; he conciliated both ephors and
-senators by timely presents.[449] By such judicious proceeding, as
-well as by his exact observance of the laws and customs,[450] he was
-himself the greatest gainer. Combined with that ability and energy
-in which he was never deficient, it ensured to him more real power
-than had ever fallen to the lot of any king of Sparta; power not
-merely over the military operations abroad which usually fell to
-the kings,—but also over the policy of the state at home. On the
-increase and maintenance of that real power, his chief thoughts were
-concentrated; new dispositions generated by kingship, which had never
-shown themselves in him before. Despising, like Lysander, both money,
-luxury, and all the outward show of power,—he exhibited, as a king,
-an ultra-Spartan simplicity, carried almost to affectation, in diet,
-clothing, and general habits. But like Lysander also, he delighted
-in the exercise of dominion through the medium of knots or factions
-of devoted partisans, whom he rarely scrupled to uphold in all their
-career of injustice and oppression. Though an amiable man, with
-no disposition to tyranny, and still less to plunder, for his own
-benefit,—Agesilaus thus made himself the willing instrument of both,
-for the benefit of his various coadjutors and friends, whose power
-and consequence he identified with his own.[451]
-
-  [448] Xen. Agesil. iv, 5; Plutarch, Ages. c. 4.
-
-  [449] Plutarch, Agesil. c. 4.
-
-  [450] Xen. Agesil. vii, 2.
-
-  [451] Isokrates, Orat. v, (Philipp.) s. 100; Plutarch, Agesilaus,
-  c. 3, 13-23; Plutarch, Apophthegm. Laconica, p. 209 F—212 D.
-
-  See the incident alluded to by Theopompus ap. Athenæum, xiii, p.
-  609.
-
-At the moment when Agesilaus became king, Sparta was at the maximum
-of her power, holding nearly all the Grecian towns as subject allies,
-with or without tribute. She was engaged in the task (as has already
-been mentioned) of protecting the Asiatic Greeks against the Persian
-satraps in their neighborhood. And the most interesting portion
-of the life of Agesilaus consists in the earnestness with which
-he espoused, and the vigor and ability with which he conducted,
-this great Pan-hellenic duty. It will be seen that success in his
-very promising career was intercepted[452] by his bad, factious
-subservience to partisans, at home and abroad,—by his unmeasured
-thirst for Spartan omnipotence,—and his indifference or aversion
-to any generous scheme of combination with the cities dependent on
-Sparta.
-
-  [452] Isokrates (Orat. v, _ut sup._) makes a remark in substance
-  the same.
-
-His attention, however, was first called to a dangerous internal
-conspiracy with which Sparta was threatened. The “lame reign” was
-as yet less than twelve months old, when Agesilaus, being engaged
-in sacrificing at one of the established state solemnities, was
-apprised by the officiating prophet, that the victims exhibited
-menacing symptoms, portending a conspiracy of the most formidable
-character. A second sacrifice gave yet worse promise; and on the
-third, the terrified prophet exclaimed, “Agesilaus, the revelation
-before us imports that we are actually in the midst of our enemies.”
-They still continued to sacrifice, but victims were now offered to
-the averting and preserving gods, with prayers that these latter,
-by tutelary interposition, would keep off the impending peril. At
-length, after much repetition, and great difficulty, favorable
-victims were obtained; the meaning of which was soon made clear. Five
-days afterwards, an informer came before the ephors, communicating
-the secret, that a dangerous conspiracy was preparing, organized by a
-citizen named Kinadon.[453]
-
-  [453] Xenoph. Hellen. iii, 3, 4.
-
-The conspirator thus named was a Spartan citizen, but not one of
-that select number called The Equals or The Peers. It has already
-been mentioned that inequalities had been gradually growing up
-among qualified citizens of Sparta, tending tacitly to set apart
-a certain number of them under the name of The Peers, and all the
-rest under the correlative name of The Inferiors. Besides this,
-since the qualification of every family lasted only so long as the
-citizen could furnish a given contribution for himself and his sons
-to the public mess-table, and since industry of every kind was
-inconsistent with the rigid personal drilling imposed upon all of
-them,—the natural consequence was, that in each generation a certain
-number of citizens became disfranchised and dropped off. But these
-disfranchised men did not become Periœki or Helots. They were still
-citizens, whose qualification, though in abeyance, might be at any
-time renewed by the munificence of a rich man;[454] so that they too,
-along with the lesser citizens, were known under the denomination of
-The Inferiors. It was to this class that Kinadon belonged. He was
-a young man of remarkable strength and courage, who had discharged
-with honor his duties in the Lykurgean discipline,[455] and had
-imbibed from it that sense of personal equality, and that contempt
-of privilege, which its theory as well as its practice suggested.
-Notwithstanding all exactness of duty performed, he found that the
-constitution, as practically worked, excluded him from the honors and
-distinctions of the state; reserving them for the select citizens
-known under the name of Peers. And this exclusion had become more
-marked and galling since the formation of the Spartan empire after
-the victory of Ægospotami; whereby the number of lucrative posts
-(harmosties and others) all monopolized by the Peers, had been so
-much multiplied. Debarred from the great political prizes, Kinadon
-was still employed by the ephors, in consequence of his high spirit
-and military sufficiency, in that standing force which they kept
-for maintaining order at home.[456] He had been the agent ordered
-on several of those arbitrary seizures which they never scrupled to
-employ towards persons whom they regarded as dangerous. But this
-was no satisfaction to his mind; nay, probably, by bringing him
-into close contact with the men in authority, it contributed to
-lessen his respect for them. He desired “to be inferior to no man
-in Sparta,”[457] and his conspiracy was undertaken to realize this
-object by breaking up the constitution.
-
-  [454] See Vol. II, Ch. vi, p. 359 of this History.
-
-  [455] Xen. Hellen. iii, 3, 5. Οὗτος (Kinadon) δ᾽ ἦν νεανίσκος καὶ
-  τὸ εἶδος καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν εὔρωστος, οὐ μέντοι τῶν ὁμοίων.
-
-  The meaning of the term Οἱ ὅμοιοι fluctuates in Xenophon;
-  it sometimes, as here, is used to signify the privileged
-  Peers—again De Repub. Laced. xiii, 1; and Anab. iv, 6, 14.
-  Sometimes again it is used agreeably to the Lykurgean theory;
-  whereby every citizen, who rigorously discharged his duty in the
-  public drill, belonged to the number (De Rep. Lac. x, 7).
-
-  There was a variance between the theory and the practice.
-
-  [456] Xen. Hellen. iii, 3, 9. Ὑπηρετήκει δὲ καὶ ἄλλ᾽ ἤδη ὁ
-  Κινάδων τοῖς Ἐφόροις τοιαῦτα. iii, 3, 7. Οἱ συντεταγμένοι ἡμῶν
-  (Kinadon says) αὐτοὶ ὅπλα κεκτήμεθα.
-
-  [457] Xen. Hellen. iii, 3, 11. μηδενὸς ἥττων εἶναι τῶν ἐν
-  Λακεδαίμονι—was the declaration of Kinadon when seized and
-  questioned by the ephors concerning his purposes. Substantially
-  it coincides with Aristotle (Polit. v, 6, 2)—ἢ ὅταν ἀνδρώδης τις
-  ὢν μὴ μετέχῃ τῶν τιμῶν, οἷον Κινάδων ὁ τὴν ἐπ᾽ Ἀγησιλάου συστήσας
-  ἐπίθεσιν ἐπὶ τοὺς Σπαρτιάτας.
-
-It has already been mentioned that amidst the general insecurity
-which pervaded the political society of Laconia, the ephors
-maintained a secret police and system of espionage which reached its
-height of unscrupulous efficiency under the title of the Krypteia.
-Such precautions were now more than ever requisite; for the changes
-in the practical working of Spartan politics tended to multiply the
-number of malcontents, and to throw the Inferiors as well as the
-Periœki and the Neodamodes (manumitted Helots), into one common
-antipathy with the Helots, against the exclusive partnership of the
-Peers. Informers were thus sure of encouragement and reward, and the
-man who now came to the ephors either was really an intimate friend
-of Kinadon, or had professed himself such in order to elicit the
-secret. “Kinadon (said he to the ephors) brought me to the extremity
-of the market-place, and bade me count how many Spartans there were
-therein. I reckoned up about forty, besides the king, the ephors and
-the senators. Upon my asking him why he desired me to count them,
-he replied,—Because these are the men, and the only men, whom you
-have to look upon as enemies;[458] all others in the market-place,
-more than four thousand in number, are friends and comrades. Kinadon
-also pointed out to me the one or two Spartans whom we met in the
-roads, or who were lords in the country districts, as our only
-enemies; every one else around them being friendly to our purpose.”
-“How many did he tell you were the accomplices actually privy to
-the scheme?”—asked the ephors. “Only a few (was the reply); but
-those thoroughly trustworthy; these confidants themselves, however,
-said that all around them were accomplices,—Inferiors, Periœki,
-Neodamodes, and Helots, all alike; for whenever any one among the
-classes talked about a Spartan, he could not disguise his intense
-antipathy,—he talked as if he could eat the Spartans raw.”[459]
-
-  [458] Xen. Hellen. iii, 3, 5.
-
-  [459] Xen. Hellen. iii, 3, 6. Αὐτοὶ μέντοι πᾶσιν ἔφασαν
-  συνειδέναι καὶ εἵλωσι καὶ νεοδαμώδεσι, καὶ τοῖς ὑπομείοσι καὶ
-  τοῖς περιοίκοις· ὅπου γὰρ ἐν τούτοις τις λόγος γένοιτο περὶ
-  Σπαρτιατῶν, οὐδένα δύνασθαι κρύπτειν τὸ μὴ οὐχ ἡδέως ἂν ~καὶ ὠμῶν
-  ἐσθίειν αὐτῶν~.
-
-  The expression is Homeric—ὠμὸν βεβρώθοις Πρίαμον, etc. (Iliad.
-  iv, 35). The Greeks did not think themselves obliged to restrain
-  the full expression of vindictive feeling. The poet Theognis
-  wishes, “that he may one day come to drink the blood of those who
-  had ill-used him” (v. 349 Gaisf.).
-
-“But how (continued the ephors) did Kinadon reckon upon getting
-arms?” “His language was (replied the witness)—We of the standing
-force have our own arms all ready; and here are plenty of knives,
-swords, spits, hatchets, axes and scythes—on sale in this
-market-place, to suit an insurgent multitude; besides, every man
-who tills the earth, or cuts wood and stone, has tools by him which
-will serve as weapons in case of need; especially in a struggle with
-enemies themselves unarmed.” On being asked what was the moment fixed
-for execution, the witness could not tell; he had been instructed
-only to remain on the spot, and be ready.[460]
-
-  [460] Xen. Hellen. iii, 3, 7. ὅτι ἐπιδημεῖν οἱ παρηγγελμένον εἴη.
-
-It does not appear that this man knew the name of any person
-concerned, except Kinadon himself. So deeply were the ephors alarmed,
-that they refrained from any formal convocation even of what was
-called the Lesser Assembly,—including the senate, of which the
-kings were members _ex officio_, and, perhaps, a few other principal
-persons besides. But the members of this assembly were privately
-brought together to deliberate on the emergency; Agesilaus, probably,
-among them. To arrest Kinadon at once in Sparta appeared imprudent;
-since his accomplices, of number as yet unknown, would be thus
-admonished either to break out in insurrection, or at least to make
-their escape. But an elaborate stratagem was laid for arresting him
-out of Sparta, without the knowledge of his accomplices. The ephors,
-calling him before them, professed to confide to him (as they had
-done occasionally before) a mission to go to Aulon (a Laconian town
-on the frontier towards Arcadia and Triphylia) and there to seize
-some parties designated by name in a formal skytalê or warrant;
-including some of the Aulonite Periœki,—some Helots,—and one
-other person by name, a woman of peculiar beauty, resident at the
-place, whose influence was understood to spread disaffection among
-all the Lacedæmonians who came thither, old as well as young.[461]
-When Kinadon inquired what force he was to take with him on the
-mission, the ephors, to obviate all suspicion that they were picking
-out companions with views hostile to him, desired him to go to the
-Hippagretês (or commander of the three hundred youthful guards called
-horsemen, though they were not really mounted) and ask for the first
-six or seven men of the guard[462] who might happen to be in the way.
-But they (the ephors) had already held secret communication with the
-Hippagretês, and had informed him both whom they wished to be sent,
-and what the persons sent were to do. They then despatched Kinadon
-on his pretended mission telling him that they should place at his
-disposal three carts, in order that he might more easily bring home
-the prisoners.
-
-  [461] Xen. Hellen. iii, 3, 8. Ἀγαγεῖν δὲ ἐκέλευον καὶ τὴν
-  γυναῖκα, ἣ καλλίστη μὲν ἐλέγετο αὐτόθι εἶναι, λυμαίνεσθαι
-  δ᾽ ἐῴκει τοὺς ἀφικνουμένους Λακεδαιμονίων καὶ πρεσβυτέρους καὶ
-  νεωτέρους.
-
-  [462] Xen. Hellen. iii, 3, 9, 10.
-
-  The persons called Hippeis at Sparta, were not mounted; they were
-  a select body of three hundred youthful citizens, employed either
-  on home police or on foreign service.
-
-  See Herodot. viii, 124; Strabo, x, p. 481; K. O. Müller, History
-  of the Dorians, B. iii, ch. 12, s. 5, 6.
-
-Kinadon began his journey to Aulon, without the smallest suspicion
-of the plot laid for him by the ephors; who, to make their purpose
-sure, sent an additional body of the guards after him, to quell any
-resistance which might possibly arise. But their stratagem succeeded
-as completely as they could desire. He was seized on the road, by
-those who accompanied him ostensibly for his pretended mission.
-These men interrogated him, put him to the torture,[463] and heard
-from his lips the names of his accomplices; the list of whom they
-wrote down, and forwarded by one of the guards to Sparta. The ephors,
-on receiving it, immediately arrested the parties principally
-concerned, especially the prophet Tisamenus; and examined them along
-with Kinadon, as soon as he was brought prisoner. They asked the
-latter, among other questions, what was his purpose in setting on
-foot the conspiracy; to which he replied,—“I wanted to be inferior
-to no man at Sparta.” His punishment was not long deferred. Having
-been manacled with a clog round his neck to which his hands were
-made fast,—he was in this condition conducted round the city, with
-men scourging and pricking him during the progress. His accomplices
-were treated in like manner, and at length all of them were put to
-death.[464]
-
-  [463] Xen. Hellen. iii, 3, 9.
-
-  Ἔμελλον δὲ οἱ συλλαβόντες αὐτὸν μὲν κατέχειν, τοὺς δὲ ξυνειδότας
-  ~πυθόμενοι αὐτοῦ γράψαντες ἀποπέμπειν~ τὴν ταχίστην τοῖς ἐφόροις.
-  Οὕτω δ᾽ εἶχον οἱ ἔφοροι πρὸς τὸ πρᾶγμα, ὥστε καὶ μορὰν ἱππέων
-  ἔπεμψαν τοῖς ἐπ᾽ Αὐλῶνος. Ἐπεὶ δ᾽ εἰλημμένου τοῦ ἀνδρὸς ἧκεν
-  ἱππεὺς, ~φέρων τὰ ὀνόματα ὧν Κινάδων ἀπέγραψε~, παραχρῆμα τόν τε
-  μάντιν Τισάμενον καὶ τοὺς ἐπικαιριωτάτους ξυνελάμβανον. Ὡς δ᾽
-  ἀνήχθη ὁ Κινάδων, καὶ ἠλέγχετο, καὶ ὡμολόγει πάντα, καὶ ~τοὺς
-  ξυνειδότας ἔλεγε~, τέλος αὐτὸν ἤροντο, τί καὶ βουλόμενος ταῦτα
-  πράττοι;
-
-  Polyænus (ii, 14, 1) in his account of this transaction,
-  expressly mentions that the Hippeis or guards who accompanied
-  Kinadon, put him to the torture (στρεβλώσαντες) when they seized
-  him, in order to extort the names of his accomplices. Even
-  without express testimony, we might pretty confidently have
-  assumed this. From a man of spirit like Kinadon, they were not
-  likely to obtain such betrayal without torture.
-
-  I had affirmed that in the description of this transaction given
-  by Xenophon, it did not appear whether Kinadon was able to write
-  or not. My assertion was controverted by Colonel Mure (in his
-  Reply to my Appendix), who cited the words φέρων τὰ ὀνόματα ὧν
-  Κινάδων ~ἀπέγραψε~, as containing an affirmation from Xenophon
-  that Kinadon could write.
-
-  In my judgment, these words, taken in conjunction with what
-  precedes, and with the probabilities of the fact described, do
-  not contain such an affirmation.
-
-  The guards were instructed to seize Kinadon, and after _having
-  heard from Kinadon who his accomplices were, to write the names
-  down and send them to the ephors_. It is to be presumed that they
-  executed these instructions as given; the more so, as what they
-  were commanded to do, was at once the safest and the most natural
-  proceeding. For Kinadon was a man distinguished for personal
-  _stature and courage_ (τὸ εἶδος καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν εὔρωστος, iii, 3,
-  5) so that those who seized him would find it an indispensable
-  precaution to pinion his arms. Assuming even that Kinadon could
-  write,—yet, if he were to write, he must have his right arm
-  free. And why should the guards take this risk, when all which
-  the ephors required was, that Kinadon should _pronounce_ the
-  names, to be written down by others? With a man of the qualities
-  of Kinadon, it probably required the most intense pressure to
-  force him to betray his comrades, even by word of mouth; it would
-  probably be more difficult still, to force him to betray them by
-  the more deliberate act of writing.
-
-  I conceive that ἧκεν ἱππεὺς, φέρων τὰ ὀνόματα ὧν ὁ Κινάδων
-  ἀπέγραψε is to be construed with reference to the preceding
-  sentence, and announces the carrying into effect of the
-  instructions then reported as given by the ephors. “A guard came,
-  bearing the names of those whom Kinadon had given in.” It is not
-  necessary to suppose that Kinadon had written down these names
-  with his own hand.
-
-  In the beginning of the Oration of Andokides (De Mysteriis),
-  Pythonikus gives information of a mock celebration of the
-  mysteries, committed by Alkibiades and others; citing as his
-  witness the slave Andromachus; who is accordingly produced, and
-  states to the assembly _vivâ voce_ what he had seen and who
-  were the persons present—Πρῶτος μὲν οὗτος (Andromachus) ταῦτα
-  εμήνυσε, καὶ ~ἀπέγραψε τούτους~ (s. 13). It is not here meant to
-  affirm that the slave Andromachus wrote down the names of these
-  persons, which he had the moment before publicly announced to the
-  assembly. It is by the words ἀπέγραψε τούτους that the orator
-  describes the public oral announcement made by Andromachus, which
-  was formally taken note of by a secretary, and which led to legal
-  consequences against the persons whose names were given in.
-
-  So again, in the old law quoted by Demosthenes (adv. Makast. p.
-  1068), Ἀπογραφέτω δὲ τὸν μὴ ποιοῦντα ταῦτα ὁ βουλόμενος πρὸς τὸν
-  ἄρχοντα; and in Demosthenes adv. Nikostrat. p. 1247. Ἃ ἐκ τῶν
-  νόμων τῷ ἰδιώτῃ τῷ ἀπογράφαντι γίγνεται, τῇ πόλει ἀφίημι: compare
-  also Lysias, De Bonis Aristophanis, Or. xix, s. 53; it is not
-  meant to affirm that ὁ ἀπογράφων was required to perform his
-  process in writing, or was necessarily able to write. A citizen
-  who could not write might do this, as well as one who could. He
-  _informed against_ a certain person as delinquent; he _informed
-  of_ certain articles of property, as belonging to the estate
-  of one whose property had been confiscated to the city. The
-  information, as well as the name of the informer, was taken down
-  by the official person,—whether the informer could himself write
-  or not.
-
-  It appears to me that Kinadon, having been interrogated,
-  _told_ to the guards who first seized him, the names of his
-  accomplices,—just as he _told_ these names afterwards to the
-  ephors (καὶ τοῦς ξυνειδότας ~ἔλεγε~); and this, whether he was,
-  or was not, able to write; a point, which the passage of Xenophon
-  noway determines.
-
-  [464] Xenoph. Hellen. iii, 3, 11.
-
-Such is the curious narrative, given by Xenophon, of this
-unsuccessful conspiracy. He probably derived his information from
-Agesilaus himself; since we cannot easily explain how he could have
-otherwise learnt so much about the most secret manœuvres of the
-ephors, in a government proverbial for constant secrecy, like that of
-Sparta. The narrative opens to us a glimpse, though sadly transient
-and imperfect, of the internal dangers of the Spartan government. We
-were aware, from earlier evidences, of great discontent prevailing
-among the Helots, and to a certain extent among the Periœki. But
-the incident here described presents to us the first manifestation
-of a body of malcontents among the Spartans themselves; malcontents
-formidable both from energy and position, like Kinadon and the
-prophet Tisamenus. Of the state of disaffected feeling in the
-provincial townships of Laconia, an impressive proof is afforded by
-the case of that beautiful woman who was alleged to be so active
-in political proselytism at Aulon; not less than by the passionate
-expressions of hatred revealed in the deposition of the informer
-himself. Though little is known about the details, yet it seems that
-the tendency of affairs at Sparta was to concentrate both power
-and property in the hands of an oligarchy ever narrowing among the
-citizens; thus aggravating the dangers at home, even at the time when
-the power of the state was greatest abroad, and preparing the way for
-that irreparable humiliation which began with the defeat of Leuktra.
-
-It can hardly be doubted that much more wide-spread discontent came
-to the knowledge of the ephors than that which is specially indicated
-in Xenophon. And such discovery may probably have been one of the
-motives (as had happened in 424 B.C. on occasion of the expedition
-of Brasidas into Thrace) which helped to bring about the Asiatic
-expedition of Agesilaus, as an outlet for brave malcontents on
-distant and lucrative military service.
-
-Derkyllidas had now been carrying on war in Asia Minor for near three
-years, against Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus, with so much efficiency
-and success, as both to protect the Asiatic Greeks on the coast, and
-to intercept all the revenues which those satraps either transmitted
-to court or enjoyed themselves. Pharnabazus had already gone up to
-Susa (during his truce with Derkyllidas in 397 B.C.), and besides
-obtaining a reinforcement which acted under himself and Tissaphernes
-in 396 B.C. against Derkyllidas in Lydia, had laid schemes for
-renewing the maritime war against Sparta.[465]
-
-  [465] Diodor. xiv, 39; Xen. Hellen. iii, 3, 13.
-
-It is now that we hear again mentioned the name of Konon, who, having
-saved himself with nine triremes from the defeat of Ægospotami,
-had remained for the last seven years under the protection of
-Evagoras, prince of Salamis, in Cyprus. Konon, having married at
-Salamis, and having a son[466] born to him there, indulged but faint
-hopes of ever returning to his native city, when, fortunately for
-him as well as for Athens, the Persians again became eager for an
-efficient admiral and fleet on the coast of Asia Minor. Through
-representations from Pharnabazus, as well as from Evagoras in
-Cyprus,—and through correspondence of the latter with the Greek
-physician Ktesias, who wished to become personally employed in the
-negotiation, and who seems to have had considerable influence with
-queen Parysatis,[467]—orders were obtained, and funds provided, to
-equip in Phœnicia and Kilikia a numerous fleet, under the command of
-Konon. While that officer began to show himself, and to act with such
-triremes as he found in readiness (about forty in number) along the
-southern coast of Asia Minor from Kilikia to Kaunus,[468]—further
-preparations were vigorously prosecuted in the Phœnician ports, in
-order to make up the fleet to three hundred sail.[469]
-
-  [466] Lysias, Orat. xix, (De Bonis Aristophanis) s. 38.
-
-  [467] See Ktesias, Fragmenta, Persica, c. 63, ed. Bähr; Plutarch,
-  Artax. c. 21.
-
-  We cannot make out these circumstances with any distinctness;
-  but the general fact is plainly testified, and is besides very
-  probable. Another Grecian surgeon (besides Ktesias) is mentioned
-  as concerned,—Polykritus of Mendê; and a Kretan dancer named
-  Zeno,—both established at the Persian court.
-
-  There is no part of the narrative of Ktesias, the loss of which
-  is so much to be regretted as this; relating transactions, in
-  which he was himself concerned, and seemingly giving original
-  letters.
-
-  [468] Diodor. xiv, 39-79.
-
-  [469] Xen. Hellen. iii, 4, 1.
-
-It was by a sort of accident that news of such equipment reached
-Sparta,—in an age of the world when diplomatic residents were as
-yet unknown. A Syracusan merchant named Herodas, having visited
-the Phœnician ports for trading purposes, brought back to Sparta
-intelligence of the preparations which he had seen, sufficient to
-excite much uneasiness. The Spartans were taking counsel among
-themselves, and communicating with their neighboring allies, when
-Agesilaus, at the instance of Lysander, stood forward as a volunteer
-to solicit the command of a land-force for the purpose of attacking
-the Persians in Asia. He proposed to take with him only thirty
-full Spartan citizens or peers, as a sort of Board or Council of
-Officers; two thousand Neodamodes or enfranchised Helots, whom the
-ephors were probably glad to send away, and who would be selected
-from the bravest and most formidable; and six thousand hoplites from
-the land-allies, to whom the prospect of a rich service against
-Asiatic enemies would be tempting. Of these thirty Spartans, Lysander
-intended to be the leader; and thus, reckoning on his preëstablished
-influence over Agesilaus, to exercise the real command himself,
-without the name. He had no serious fear of the Persian arms, either
-by land or sea. He looked upon the announcement of the Phœnician
-fleet to be an empty threat, as it had so often proved in the mouth
-of Tissaphernes during the late war; while the Cyreian expedition
-had inspired him further with ardent hopes of another successful
-Anabasis, or conquering invasion of Persia from the sea-coast
-inwards. But he had still more at heart to employ his newly-acquired
-ascendency in reëstablishing everywhere the dekarchies, which had
-excited such intolerable hatred and exercised so much oppression,
-that even the ephors had refused to lend positive aid in upholding
-them, so that they had been in several places broken up or
-modified.[470] If the ambition of Agesilaus was comparatively less
-stained by personal and factious antipathies, and more Pan-hellenic
-in its aim, than that of Lysander,—it was at the same time yet more
-unmeasured in respect to victory over the Great King, whom he dreamed
-of dethroning, or at least of expelling from Asia Minor and the
-coast.[471] So powerful was the influence exercised by the Cyreian
-expedition over the schemes and imagination of energetic Greeks: so
-sudden was the outburst of ambition in the mind of Agesilaus, for
-which no one before had given him credit.
-
-  [470] Xen. Hellen. iii, 4, 2.
-
-  [471] Xen. Hellen. iii, 5, 1. ἐλπίδας ἔχοντα μεγάλας αἱρήσειν
-  βασιλέα, etc. Compare iv, 2, 3.
-
-  Xen. Agesilaus, i, 36. ἐπινοῶν καὶ ἐλπίζων καταλύσειν τὴν ἐπὶ τὴν
-  Ἑλλάδα στρατεύσασαν πρότερον ἀρχήν, etc.
-
-Though this plan was laid by two of the ablest men in Greece, it
-turned out to be rash and improvident, so far as the stability of the
-Lacedæmonian empire was concerned. That empire ought to have been
-made sure by sea, where its real danger lay, before attempts were
-made to extend it by new inland acquisitions. And except for purposes
-of conquest, there was no need of farther reinforcements in Asia
-Minor; since Derkyllidas was already there with a force competent
-to make head against the satraps. Nevertheless, the Lacedæmonians
-embraced the plan eagerly; the more so, as envoys were sent from many
-of the subject cities, by the partisans of Lysander and in concert
-with him, to entreat that Agesilaus might be placed at the head of
-the expedition, with as large a force as he required.[472]
-
-  [472] Plutarch, Agesil. c. 5.
-
-No difficulty probably was found in levying the proposed number
-of men from the allies, since there was great promise of plunder
-for the soldiers in Asia. But the altered position of Sparta with
-respect to her most powerful allies was betrayed by the refusal of
-Thebes, Corinth, and Athens to take any part in the expedition. The
-refusal of Corinth, indeed, was excused professedly on the ground
-of a recent inauspicious conflagration of one of the temples in the
-city; and that of Athens, on the plea of weakness and exhaustion not
-yet repaired. But the latter, at least, had already begun to conceive
-some hope from the projects of Konon.[473]
-
-  [473] Xen. Hellen. iii, 5, 5; Pausan. iii, 9, 1.
-
-The mere fact that a king of Sparta was about to take the command
-and pass into Asia, lent peculiar importance to the enterprise. The
-Spartan kings, in their function of leaders of Greece, conceived
-themselves to have inherited the sceptre of Agamemnon and
-Orestes;[474] and Agesilaus, especially, assimilated his expedition
-to a new Trojan war,—an effort of united Greece, for the purpose of
-taking vengeance on the common Asiatic enemy of the Hellenic name.
-The sacrifices having been found favorable, Agesilaus took measures
-for the transit of the troops from various ports to Ephesus. But
-he himself, with one division, touched in his way at Geræstus, the
-southern point of Eubœa; wishing to cross from thence and sacrifice
-at Aulis, (the port of Bœotia nearly opposite to Geræstus on the
-other side of the strait) where Agamemnon had offered his memorable
-sacrifice immediately previous to departure for Troy. It appears
-that he both went to the spot, and began the sacrifice, without
-asking permission from the Thebans; moreover, he was accompanied
-by his own prophet, who conducted the solemnities in a manner not
-consistent with the habitual practice of the temple or chapel of
-Artemis at Aulis. On both these grounds, the Thebans, resenting the
-proceeding as an insult, sent a body of armed men, and compelled
-him to desist from the sacrifice.[475] Not taking part themselves
-in the expedition, they probably considered that the Spartan king
-was presumptuous in assuming to himself the Pan-hellenic character
-of a second Agamemnon; and they thus inflicted a humiliation which
-Agesilaus never forgave.
-
-  [474] Herodot. i, 68; vii, 159; Pausan. iii, 16, 6.
-
-  [475] Xen. Hellen. iii, 4, 3, 4; iii, 5, 5; Plutarch, Agesilaus,
-  c. 6; Pausan. iii, 9, 2.
-
-Agesilaus seems to have reached Asia about the time when Derkyllidas
-had recently concluded his last armistice with Tissaphernes and
-Pharnabazus; an armistice, intended to allow time for mutual
-communication both with Sparta and the Persian court. On being asked
-by the satrap what was his purpose in coming, Agesilaus merely
-renewed the demand which had before been made by Derkyllidas—of
-autonomy for the Asiatic Greeks. Tissaphernes replied by proposing a
-continuation of the same armistice, until he could communicate with
-the Persian court,—adding that he hoped to be empowered to grant the
-demand. A fresh armistice was accordingly sworn to on both sides,
-for three months; Derkyllidas (who with his army came now under the
-command of Agesilaus) and Herippidas being sent to the satrap to
-receive his oath, and take oaths to him in return.[476]
-
-  [476] Xen. Hellen. iii, 4, 5, 6; Xen. Agesilaus, i, 10.
-
-  The term of three months is specified only in the latter passage.
-  The former armistice of Derkyllidas had probably not expired when
-  Agesilaus first arrived.
-
-While the army was thus condemned to temporary inaction at Ephesus,
-the conduct and position of Lysander began to excite intolerable
-jealousy in the superior officers; and most of all Agesilaus. So
-great and established was the reputation of Lysander,—whose statue
-had been erected at Ephesus itself in the temple of Artemis,[477] as
-well as in many other cities,—that all the Asiatic Greeks looked
-upon him as the real chief of the expedition. That he should be
-real chief, under the nominal command of another, was nothing more
-than what had happened before, in the year wherein he gained the
-great victory of Ægospotami,—the Lacedæmonians having then also
-sent him out in the ostensible capacity of secretary to the admiral
-Arakus, in order to save the inviolability of their own rule, that
-the same man should not serve twice as admiral.[478] It was through
-the instigation of Lysander, and with a view to his presence,
-that the decemvirs and other partisans in the subject cities had
-sent to Sparta to petition for Agesilaus; a prince as yet untried
-and unknown. So that Lysander,—taking credit, with truth, for
-having ensured to Agesilaus first the crown, next this important
-appointment,—intended for himself, and was expected by others, to
-exercise a fresh turn of command, and to renovate in every town
-the discomfited or enfeebled dekarchies. Numbers of his partisans
-came to Ephesus to greet his arrival, and a crowd of petitioners
-were seen following his steps everywhere; while Agesilaus himself
-appeared comparatively neglected. Moreover, Lysander resumed all
-that insolence of manner which he had contracted during his former
-commands, and which on this occasion gave the greater offence, since
-the manner of Agesilaus was both courteous and simple in a peculiar
-degree.[479]
-
-  [477] Pausan. vi, 3, 6.
-
-  [478] Xen. Hellen. ii, 1, 7. This rule does not seem to have been
-  adhered to afterwards. Lysander was sent out again as commander
-  in 403 B.C. It is possible, indeed, that he may have been again
-  sent out as nominal secretary to some other person named as
-  commander.
-
-  [479] Plutarch, Agesilaus, c. 7.
-
-The thirty Spartan counsellors, over whom Lysander had been named
-to preside, finding themselves neither consulted by him, nor
-solicited by others, were deeply dissatisfied. Their complaints
-helped to encourage Agesilaus, who was still more keenly wounded
-in his own personal dignity, to put forth a resolute and imperious
-strength of will, such as he had not before been known to possess.
-He successively rejected every petition preferred to him by or
-through Lysander; a systematic purpose which, though never formally
-announced,[480] was presently discerned by the petitioners, by the
-Thirty, and by Lysander himself. The latter thus found himself not
-merely disappointed in all his calculations, but humiliated to
-excess, though without any tangible ground of complaint. He was
-forced to warn his partisans, that his intervention was an injury
-and not a benefit to them; that they must desist from obsequious
-attentions to him, and must address themselves directly to Agesilaus.
-With that prince he also remonstrated on his own account,—“Truly,
-Agesilaus, you know how to degrade your friends.”—“Ay, to be sure
-(was the reply), those among them who want to appear greater than I
-am; but such as seek to uphold me, I should be ashamed if I did not
-know how to repay with due honor.”—Lysander was constrained to admit
-the force of this reply, and to request, as the only means of escape
-from present and palpable humiliation, that he might be sent on some
-mission apart; engaging to serve faithfully in whatever duty he might
-be employed.[481]
-
-  [480] The sarcastic remarks which Plutarch ascribes to Agesilaus,
-  calling Lysander “my meat-distributor” (κρεοδαίτην), are not
-  warranted by Xenophon, and seem not to be probable under the
-  circumstances (Plutarch, Lysand. c. 23; Plutarch, Agesil. c. 8).
-
-  [481] Xen. Hellen. iii, 4, 7-10; Plutarch, Agesilaus, c. 7-8;
-  Plutarch, Lysand. c. 23.
-
-  It is remarkable that in the Opusculum of Xenophon, a special
-  Panegyric called _Agesilaus_, not a word is said about this
-  highly characteristic proceeding between Agesilaus and Lysander
-  at Ephesus; nor indeed is the name of Lysander once mentioned.
-
-This proposition, doubtless even more agreeable to Agesilaus than to
-himself, being readily assented to, he was despatched on a mission
-to the Hellespont. Faithful to his engagement of forgetting past
-offences and serving with zeal, he found means to gain over a Persian
-grandee named Spithridates, who had received some offence from
-Pharnabazus. Spithridates revolted openly, carrying a regiment of
-two hundred horse to join Agesilaus; who was thus enabled to inform
-himself fully about the satrapy of Pharnabazus, comprising the
-territory called Phrygia, in the neighborhood of the Propontis and
-the Hellespont.[482]
-
-  [482] Xen. Hellen. iii, 4, 10.
-
-The army under Tissaphernes had been already powerful at the moment
-when his timidity induced him to conclude the first armistice with
-Derkyllidas. But additional reinforcements, received since the
-conclusion of the second and more recent armistice, had raised him
-to such an excess of confidence, that even before the stipulated
-three months had expired, he sent to insist on the immediate
-departure of Agesilaus from Asia, and to proclaim war forthwith,
-if such departure were delayed. While this message, accompanied by
-formidable reports of the satrap’s force, filled the army at Ephesus
-with mingled alarm and indignation, Agesilaus accepted the challenge
-with cheerful readiness; sending word back that he thanked the satrap
-for perjuring himself in so flagrant a manner, as to set the gods
-against him and ensure their favor to the Greek side.[483] Orders
-were forthwith given, and contingents summoned from the Asiatic
-Greeks, for a forward movement southward, to cross the Mæander, and
-attack Tissaphernes in Karia, where he usually resided. The cities on
-the route were required to provide magazines, so that Tissaphernes,
-fully anticipating attack in this direction, caused his infantry to
-cross into Karia, for the purpose of acting on the defensive; while
-he kept his numerous cavalry in the plain of the Mæander, with a
-view to overwhelm Agesilaus, who had no cavalry, in his march over
-that level territory towards the Karian hills and rugged ground. But
-the Lacedæmonian king, having put the enemy on this false scent,
-suddenly turned his march northward towards Phrygia and the satrapy
-of Pharnabazus. Tissaphernes took no pains to aid his brother satrap,
-who on his side had made few preparations for defence. Accordingly
-Agesilaus, finding little or no resistance, took many towns and
-villages, and collected abundance of provisions, plunder, and slaves.
-Profiting by the guidance of the revolted Spithridates, and marching
-as little as possible over the plains, he carried on lucrative
-and unopposed incursions as far as the neighborhood of Daskylium,
-the residence of the satrap himself, near the Propontis. Near the
-satrapic residence, however, his small body of cavalry, ascending an
-eminence, came suddenly upon an equal detachment of Persian cavalry,
-under Rhathines and Bagæus; who attacked them vigorously, and drove
-them back with some loss, until they were protected by Agesilaus
-himself coming up with the hoplites. The effect of such a check (and
-there were probably others of the same kind, though Xenophon does
-not specify them) on the spirits of the army was discouraging. On
-the next morning, the sacrifices being found unfavorable for farther
-advance, Agesilaus gave orders for retreating towards the sea. He
-reached Ephesus about the close of autumn; resolved to employ the
-winter in organizing a more powerful cavalry, which experience proved
-to be indispensable.[484]
-
-  [483] Xen. Hellen. iii, 4, 11, 12; Xen. Agesil. i, 12-14;
-  Plutarch, Agesil. c. 9.
-
-  [484] Xen. Hellen. iii, 4, 13-15; Xen. Agesil. i, 23. Ἐπεὶ μέντοι
-  οὐδὲ ἐν τῇ Φρυγίᾳ ἀνὰ τὰ πεδία ἐδύνατο στρατεύεσθαι, διὰ τὴν
-  Φαρναβάζου ἱππείαν, etc.
-
-  Plutarch, Agesil. c. 9.
-
-  These military operations of Agesilaus are loosely adverted to in
-  the early part of c. 79 of the fourteenth Book of Diodorus.
-
-This autumnal march through Phrygia was more lucrative than glorious.
-Yet it enables Xenophon to bring to view different merits of his
-hero Agesilaus; in doing which he exhibits to us ancient warfare
-and Asiatic habits on a very painful side. In common both with
-Kallikratidas and Lysander, though not with the ordinary Spartan
-commanders, Agesilaus was indifferent to the acquisition of money for
-himself. But he was not the less anxious to enrich his friends, and
-would sometimes connive at unwarrantable modes of acquisition for
-their benefit. Deserters often came in to give information of rich
-prizes or valuable prisoners; which advantages, if he had chosen,
-he might have appropriated to himself. But he made it a practice
-to throw both the booty and the honor in the way of some favorite
-officer; just as we have seen (in a former chapter) that Xenophon
-himself was allowed by the army to capture Asidates and enjoy a large
-portion of his ransom.[485] Again, when the army in the course of
-its march was at a considerable distance from the sea, and appeared
-to be advancing farther inland, the authorized auctioneers, whose
-province it was to sell the booty, found the buyers extremely slack.
-It was difficult to keep or carry what was bought, and opportunity
-for resale did not seem at hand. Agesilaus, while he instructed
-the auctioneers to sell upon credit, without insisting on ready
-money,—at the same time gave private hints to a few friends that he
-was very shortly about to return to the sea. The friends thus warned,
-bidding for the plunder on credit and purchasing at low prices, were
-speedily enabled to dispose of it again at a seaport, with large
-profits.[486]
-
-  [485] Xen. Agesil. i, 19; Xen. Anabas. vii, 8, 20-23; Plutarch,
-  Reipub. Gerend. Præcept. p 809, B. See above, Chapter lxxii, of
-  this History.
-
-  [486] Xen. Agesil. i, 18. πάντες παμπλήθη χρήματα ἔλαβον.
-
-We are not surprised to hear that such lucrative graces procured for
-Agesilaus many warm admirers; though the eulogies of Xenophon ought
-to have been confined to another point in his conduct, now to be
-mentioned. Agesilaus, while securing for his army the plunder of the
-country over which he carried his victorious arms, took great pains
-to prevent both cruelty and destruction of property. When any town
-surrendered to him on terms, his exactions were neither ruinous nor
-grossly humiliating.[487] Amidst all the plunder realized, too, the
-most valuable portion was the adult natives of both sexes, hunted
-down and brought in by the predatory light troops of the army, to
-be sold as slaves. Agesilaus was vigilant in protecting these poor
-victims from ill-usage; inculcating upon his soldiers the duty, “not
-of punishing them like wrong-doers, but simply of keeping them under
-guard as men.[488]” It was the practice of the poorer part of the
-native population often to sell their little children for exportation
-to travelling slave-merchants, from inability to maintain them. The
-children thus purchased, if they promised to be handsome, were often
-mutilated, and fetched large prices as eunuchs, to supply the large
-demand for the harems and religious worship of many Asiatic towns.
-But in their haste to get out of the way of a plundering army, these
-slave-merchants were forced often to leave by the way-side the little
-children whom they had purchased, exposed to the wolves, the dogs, or
-starvation. In this wretched condition, they were found by Agesilaus
-on his march. His humane disposition prompted him to see them carried
-to a place of safety, where he gave them in charge of those old
-natives whom age and feebleness had caused to be left behind as
-not worth carrying off. By such active kindness, rare, indeed, in a
-Grecian general, towards the conquered, he earned the gratitude of
-the captives, and the sympathies of every one around.[489]
-
-  [487] Xen. Agesil. i, 20-22.
-
-  [488] Xen. Hellen. iii, 4, 19; Xen. Agesil. i, 28. τοὺς ὑπὸ τῶν
-  λῃστῶν ἁλισκομένους βαρβάρους.
-
-  So the word λῃστὴς, used in reference to the fleet, means the
-  commander of a predatory vessel or privateer (Xen. Hellen. ii, 1,
-  30).
-
-  [489] Xen. Agesil. i, 21. Καὶ πολλάκις μὲν προηγόρευε τοῖς
-  στρατιώταις ~τοὺς ἁλισκομένους μὴ ὡς ἀδίκους τιμωρεῖσθαι,
-  ἀλλ᾽ ὡς ἀνθρώπους ὄντας φυλάσσειν~. Πολλάκις δὲ, ὅποτε
-  μεταστρατοπεδεύοιτο, ~εἰ αἴσθοιτο καταλελειμμένα παιδάρια μικρὰ
-  ἐμπόρων, (ἃ πολλοὶ ἐπώλουν, διὰ τὸ νομίζειν μὴ δύνασθαι ἂν φέρειν
-  αὐτὰ καὶ τρέφειν)~ ἐπεμέλετο καὶ τούτων, ὅπως συγκομίζοιτό ποι·
-  τοῖς δ᾽ αὖ διὰ γῆρας καταλελειμμένοις αἰχμαλώτοις προσέταττεν
-  ἐπιμελεῖσθαι αὐτῶν, ὡς μήτε ὑπὸ κυνῶν, μήθ᾽ ὑπὸ λύκων,
-  διαφθείροιντο. Ὥστε οὐ μόνον οἱ πυνθανόμενοι ταῦτα, ἀλλὰ καὶ
-  αὐτοὶ οἱ ἁλισκόμενοι εὐμενεῖς αὐτῷ ἐγίγνοντο.
-
-  Herodotus affirms that the Thracians also sold their children for
-  exportation,—πωλεῦσι τὰ τέχνα ἐπ᾽ ἐξαγωγῇ (Herod. v, 6): compare
-  Philostratus, Vit. Apollon. viii, 7-12, p. 346; and Ch. xvi, Vol.
-  III, p. 216 of this History.
-
-  Herodotus mentions the Chian merchant Panionius (like the
-  “_Mitylenæus mango_” in Martial,—“Sed Mitylenæi roseus mangonis
-  ephebus” Martial, vii, 79)—as having conducted on a large scale
-  the trade of purchasing boys, looking out for such as were
-  handsome, to supply the great demand in the East for eunuchs,
-  who were supposed to make better and more attached servants.
-  Herodot. viii, 105. ὅκως γὰρ κτήσαιτο (Panionius) παῖδας εἴδεος
-  ἐπαμμένους, ἐκτάμνων ἀγινέων ἐπώλεε ἐς Σάρδις τε καὶ Ἔφεσον
-  χρημάτων μεγάλων· παρὰ γὰρ τοῖσι βαρβάροισι τιμιώτεροί εἰσι οἱ
-  εὐνοῦχοι, πίστιος εἵνεκα τῆς πάσης, τῶν ἐνορχίων. Boys were
-  necessary, as the operation was performed in childhood or
-  youth,—παῖδες ἐκτομίαι (Herodot. vi, 6-32: compare iii, 48).
-  The Babylonians, in addition to their large pecuniary tribute,
-  had to furnish to the Persian court annually five hundred παῖδας
-  ἐκτομίας (Herodot. iii, 92). For some farther remarks on the
-  preference of the Persians both for the persons and the services
-  of εὐνοῦχοι, see Dio Chrysostom, Orat. xxi, p. 270; Xenoph.
-  Cyropæd. vii, 5, 61-65. Hellanikus (Fr. 169, ed. Didot) affirmed
-  that the Persians had derived both the persons so employed, and
-  the habit of employing them, from the Babylonians.
-
-  When Mr. Hanway was travelling near the Caspian, among the
-  Kalmucks, little children of two or three vears of age, were
-  often tendered to him for sale, at two rubles per head (Hanway’s
-  Travels, ch. xvi, pp. 65, 66).
-
-This interesting anecdote, imparting a glimpse of the ancient world
-in reference to details which Grecian historians rarely condescend
-to unveil, demonstrates the compassionate disposition of Agesilaus.
-We find in conjunction with it another anecdote, illustrating the
-Spartan side of his character. The prisoners who had been captured
-during the expedition were brought to Ephesus, and sold during
-the winter as slaves for the profit of the army. Agesilaus,—being
-then busily employed in training his troops to military
-efficiency, especially for the cavalry service during the ensuing
-campaign,—thought it advisable to impress them with contempt for the
-bodily capacity and prowess of the natives. He therefore directed the
-heralds who conducted the auction, to put the prisoners up to sale
-in a state of perfect nudity. To have the body thus exposed, was a
-thing never done, and even held disgraceful by the native Asiatics;
-while among the Greeks the practice was universal for purposes of
-exercise,—or at least, had become universal during the last two or
-three centuries,—for we are told that originally the Asiatic feeling
-on this point had prevailed throughout Greece. It was one of the
-obvious differences between Grecian and Asiatic customs,[490]—that
-in the former, both the exercises of the palæstra, as well as the
-matches in the solemn games, required competitors of every rank
-to contend naked. Agesilaus himself stripped thus habitually;
-Alexander, prince of Macedon, had done so, when he ran at the Olympic
-stadium,[491]—also the combatants out of the great family of the
-Diagorids of Rhodes, when they gained their victories in the Olympic
-pankratium,—and all those other noble pugilists, wrestlers, and
-runners, descended from gods and heroes, upon whom Pindar pours forth
-his complimentary odes.
-
-  [490] Herodot. i, 10. παρὰ γὰρ τοῖσι Λυδοῖσι, σχεδὸν δὲ παρὰ
-  τοῖσι ἄλλοισι βαρβάροισι, καὶ ἄνδρα ὀφθῆναι γυμνόν, ἐς αἰσχύνην
-  μεγάλην φέρει. Compare Thucyd. i, 6; Plato, Republic, v, 3, p.
-  452, D.
-
-  [491] Herodot. v, 22.
-
-On this occasion at Ephesus, Agesilaus gave special orders to put up
-the Asiatic prisoners to auction naked; not at all by way of insult,
-but in order to exhibit to the eye of the Greek soldier, as he
-contemplated them, how much he gained by his own bodily training and
-frequent exposure, and how inferior was the condition of men whose
-bodies never felt the sun or wind. They displayed a white skin, plump
-and soft limbs, weak and undeveloped muscles, like men accustomed to
-be borne in carriages instead of walking or running; from whence we
-indirectly learn that many of them were men in wealthy circumstances.
-And the purpose of Agesilaus was completely answered; since his
-soldiers, when they witnessed such evidences of bodily incompetence,
-thought that “the enemies against whom they had to contend were not
-more formidable than women.”[492] Such a method of illustrating the
-difference between good and bad physical training, would hardly have
-occurred to any one except a Spartan, brought up under the Lykurgean
-rules.
-
-  [492] Xen. Hellen. iii, 4, 19. Ἡγούμενος δὲ, καὶ τὸ καταφρονεῖν
-  τῶν πολεμίων ῥώμην τινὰ ἐμβάλλειν πρὸς τὸ μάχεσθαι, προεῖπε
-  τοῖς κήρυξι, τοὺς ὑπὸ τῶν λῃστῶν ἁλισκομένους βαρβάρους γυμνοὺς
-  πωλεῖν. Ὁρῶντες οὖν οἱ στρατιῶται λευκοὺς μὲν, ~διὰ τὸ μηδέποτε
-  ἐκδύεσθαι~, μαλακοὺς δὲ καὶ ἀπόνους, διὰ τὸ ἀεὶ ἐπ᾽ ὀχημάτων
-  εἶναι, ἐνόμισαν, οὐδὲν διοίσειν τὸν πόλεμον ἢ εἰ γυναιξὶ δέοι
-  μάχεσθαι.
-
-  Xen. Agesil. i, 28—where he has it—πίονας δὲ καὶ ἀπόνους, διὰ
-  τὸ ἀεὶ ἐπ᾽ ὀχημάτων εἶναι (Polyænus, ii, 1, 5; Plutarch, Agesil.
-  c. 9).
-
-  Frontinus (i, 18) recounts a proceeding somewhat similar on the
-  part of Gelon, after his great victory over the Carthaginians
-  at Himera in Sicily:—“Gelo Syracusarum tyrannus, bello adversus
-  Pœnos suscepto, cum multos cepisset, infirmissimum quemque
-  præcipue ex auxiliaribus, qui nigerrimi erant, nudatum in
-  conspectu suorum produxit, ut persuaderet contemnendos.”
-
-While Agesilaus thus brought home to the vision of his soldiers the
-inefficiency of untrained bodies, he kept them throughout the winter
-under hard work and drill, as well in the palæstra as in arms. A
-force of cavalry was still wanting. To procure it, he enrolled all
-the richest Greeks in the various Asiatic towns, as conscripts to
-serve on horseback; giving each of them leave to exempt himself,
-however, by providing a competent substitute and equipment,—man,
-horse, and arms.[493] Before the commencement of spring, an adequate
-force of cavalry was thus assembled at Ephesus, and put into
-tolerable exercise. Throughout the whole winter, that city became a
-place of arms, consecrated to drilling and gymnastic exercises. On
-parade as well as in the palæstra, Agesilaus himself was foremost in
-setting the example of obedience and hard work. Prizes were given
-to the diligent and improving among hoplites, horsemen, and light
-troops; while the armorers, braziers, leather-cutters, etc.,—all
-the various artisans, whose trade lay in muniments of war, were in
-the fullest employment. “It was a sight full of encouragement (says
-Xenophon, who was doubtless present and took part in it), to see
-Agesilaus and the soldiers leaving the gymnasium, all with wreaths on
-their heads, and marching to the temple of Artemis to dedicate their
-wreaths to the goddess.”[494]
-
-  [493] Xen. Hellen. iii, 4, 15; Xen. Agesil. i, 23. Compare what
-  is related about Scipio Africanus—Livy, xxix, 1.
-
-  [494] Xen. Hellen. iii, 4, 17, 18; Xen. Agesil. i, 26, 27.
-
-Before Agesilaus was in condition to begin his military operations
-for the spring, the first year of his command had passed over.
-Thirty fresh counsellors reached Ephesus from Sparta, superseding
-the first thirty under Lysander, who forthwith returned home. The
-army was now not only more numerous, but better trained, and more
-systematically arranged than in the preceding campaign. Agesilaus
-distributed the various divisions under the command of different
-members of the new Thirty; the cavalry being assigned to Xenoklês,
-the Neodamode hoplites to Skythês, the Cyreians to Herippidas, the
-Asiatic contingents to Migdon. He then gave out that he should march
-straight against Sardis. Nevertheless, Tissaphernes, who was in
-that place, construing this proclamation as a feint, and believing
-that the real march would be directed against Karia, disposed his
-cavalry in the plain of the Mæander as he had done in the preceding
-campaign; while his infantry were sent still farther southward within
-the Karian frontier. On this occasion, however, Agesilaus marched
-as he had announced, in the direction of Sardis. For three days he
-plundered the country without seeing an enemy; nor was it until the
-fourth day that the cavalry of Tissaphernes could be summoned back to
-oppose him; the infantry being even yet at a distance. On reaching
-the banks of the river Paktôlus, this Persian cavalry found the Greek
-light troops dispersed for the purpose of plunder, attacked them
-by surprise, and drove them in with considerable loss. Presently,
-however, Agesilaus came up, and ordered his cavalry to charge,
-anxious to bring on a battle before the Persian infantry could arrive
-in the field. In efficiency, it appears, the Persian cavalry was a
-full match for his cavalry, and in number apparently superior. But
-when he brought up his infantry, and caused his peltasts and younger
-hoplites to join the cavalry in a vigorous attack,—victory soon
-declared on his side. The Persians were put to flight and many of
-them drowned in the Paktôlus. Their camp, too, was taken, with a
-valuable booty; including several camels, which Agesilaus afterwards
-took with him into Greece. This success ensured to him the unopposed
-mastery of all the territory around Sardis. He carried his ravages
-to the very gates of that city, plundering the gardens and ornamented
-ground, proclaiming liberty to those within, and defying Tissaphernes
-to come out and fight.[495]
-
-  [495] Xen. Hellen. iii, 4, 21-24; Xen. Agesil. i, 32, 33;
-  Plutarch, Agesil. c. 10.
-
-  Diodorus (xiv, 80) professes to describe this battle; but his
-  description is hardly to be reconciled with that of Xenophon,
-  which is better authority. Among other points of difference,
-  Diodorus affirms that the Persians had fifty thousand infantry;
-  and Pausanias also states (iii, 9, 3) that the number of Persian
-  infantry in this battle was greater than had ever been got
-  together since the times of Darius and Xerxes Whereas, Xenophon
-  expressly states that the Persian infantry had not come up, and
-  took no part in the battle.
-
-The career of that timid and treacherous satrap now approached its
-close. The Persians in or near Sardis loudly complained of him as
-leaving them undefended, from cowardice and anxiety for his own
-residence in Karia; while the court of Susa was now aware that
-the powerful reinforcement which had been sent to him last year,
-intended to drive Agesilaus out of Asia, had been made to achieve
-absolutely nothing. To these grounds of just dissatisfaction was
-added a court intrigue; to which, and to the agency of a person yet
-more worthless and cruel than himself, Tissaphernes fell a victim.
-The queen mother, Parysatis, had never forgiven him for having been
-one of the principal agents in the defeat and death of her son Cyrus.
-Her influence being now reëstablished over the mind of Artaxerxes,
-she took advantage of the existing discredit of the satrap to get an
-order sent down for his deposition and death. Tithraustes, the bearer
-of this order, seized him by stratagem at Kolossæ in Phrygia, while
-he was in the bath, and caused him to be beheaded.[496]
-
-  [496] Plutarch. Artaxerx. c. 23; Diodor. xiv, 80; Xen. Hellen.
-  iii, 4, 25.
-
-The mission of Tithraustes to Asia Minor was accompanied by increased
-efforts on the part of Persia for prosecuting the war against Sparta
-with vigor, by sea as well as by land; and also for fomenting
-the anti-Spartan movement which burst out into hostilities this
-year in Greece. At first, however, immediately after the death of
-Tissaphernes, Tithraustes endeavored to open negotiations with
-Agesilaus, who was in military possession of the country around
-Sardis, while that city itself appears to have been occupied by
-Ariæus, probably the same Persian who had formerly been general
-under Cyrus, and who had now again revolted from Artaxerxes.[497]
-Tithraustes took credit to the justice of the king for having
-punished the late satrap; out of whose perfidy (he affirmed) the
-war had arisen. He then summoned Agesilaus, in the king’s name, to
-evacuate Asia, leaving the Asiatic Greeks to pay their original
-tribute to Persia, but to enjoy complete autonomy, subject to that
-one condition. Had this proposition been accepted and executed,
-it would have secured these Greeks against Persian occupation or
-governors; a much milder fate for them than that to which the
-Lacedæmonians had consented in their conventions with Tissaphernes
-sixteen years before,[498] and analogous to the position in which
-the Chalkidians of Thrace had been placed with regard to Athens,
-under the peace of Nikias;[499] subject to a fixed tribute, yet
-autonomous,—with no other obligation or interference. Agesilaus
-replied that he had no power to entertain such a proposition without
-the authorities at home, whom he accordingly sent to consult. But
-in the interim he was prevailed upon by Tithraustes to conclude an
-armistice for six months, and to move out of his satrapy into that
-of Pharnabazus; receiving a contribution of thirty talents towards
-the temporary maintenance of the army.[500] These satraps generally
-acted more like independent or even hostile princes, than coöperating
-colleagues; one of the many causes of the weakness of the Persian
-empire.
-
-  [497] Xen. Hellen. iii, 14, 25; iv, 1, 27.
-
-  [498] Thucyd. viii, 18, 37, 58.
-
-  [499] Thucyd. v, 18, 5.
-
-  [500] Xen. Hellen. iii, 4, 26; Diodor. xiv, 80. ἑξαμηνιαίους
-  ἀνοχάς.
-
-When Agesilaus had reached the neighborhood of Kymê, on his march
-northward to the Hellespontine Phrygia, he received a despatch from
-home, placing the Spartan naval force in the Asiatic seas under
-his command, as well as the land-force, and empowering him to name
-whomsoever he chose as acting admiral.[501] For the first time
-since the battle of Ægospotami, the maritime empire of Sparta was
-beginning to be threatened, and increased efforts on her part were
-becoming requisite. Pharnabazus, going up in person to the court
-of Artaxerxes, had by pressing representations obtained a large
-subsidy for fitting out a fleet in Cyprus and Phœnicia, to act under
-the Athenian admiral Konon against the Lacedæmonians.[502] That
-officer,—with a fleet of forty triremes, before the equipment of
-the remainder was yet complete,—had advanced along the southern
-coast of Asia Minor to Kaunus, at the south-western corner of the
-peninsula, on the frontier of Karia and Lykia. In this port he was
-besieged by the Lacedæmonian fleet of one hundred and twenty triremes
-under Pharax. But a Persian reinforcement strengthened the fleet
-of Konon to eighty sail, and put the place out of danger; so that
-Pharax, desisting from the siege, retired to Rhodes.
-
-  [501] Xen. Hellen. iii, 4, 27.
-
-  [502] Diodor. xiv, 39, Justin, vi, 1.
-
-The neighborhood of Konon, however, who was now with his fleet of
-eighty sail near the Chersonesus of Knidus, emboldened the Rhodians
-to revolt from Sparta. It was at Rhodes that the general detestation
-of the Lacedæmonian empire, disgraced in so many different cities by
-the local dekarchies and by the Spartan harmosts, first manifested
-itself. And such was the ardor of the Rhodian population, that their
-revolt took place while the fleet of Pharax was (in part at least)
-actually in the harbor, and they drove him out of it.[503] Konon,
-whose secret encouragements had helped to excite this insurrection,
-presently sailed to Rhodes with his fleet, and made the island his
-main station. It threw into his hands an unexpected advantage;
-for a numerous fleet of vessels arrived there shortly afterwards,
-sent by Nephareus, the native king of Egypt (which was in revolt
-against the Persians), with marine stores and grain to the aid of
-the Lacedæmonians. Not having been apprized of the recent revolt,
-these vessels entered the harbor of Rhodes as if it were still a
-Lacedæmonian island; and their cargoes were thus appropriated by
-Konon and the Rhodians.[504]
-
-  [503] Diodor. xiv, 79. Ῥόδιοι δὲ ἐκβαλόντες τὸν τῶν Πελοποννησίων
-  στόλον, ἀπέστησαν ἀπὸ Λακεδαιμονίων, καὶ τὸν Κόνωνα προσεδέξαντο
-  μετὰ τοῦ στόλου παντὸς εἰς τὴν πόλιν.
-
-  Compare Androtion apud Pausaniam, vi, 7, 2.
-
-  [504] Diodor. xiv, 79; Justin (vi, 2) calls this native Egyptian
-  king _Hercynion_.
-
-  It seems to have been the uniform practice, for the corn-ships
-  coming from Egypt to Greece to halt at Rhodes (Demosthen. cont.
-  Dionysodor p. 1285: compare Herodot. ii, 182).
-
-In recounting the various revolts of the dependencies of Athens
-which took place during the Peloponnesian war, I had occasion to
-point out more than once that all of them took place not merely in
-the absence of any Athenian force, but even at the instigation (in
-most cases) of a present hostile force,—by the contrivance of a
-local party,—and without privity or previous consent of the bulk
-of the citizens. The present revolt of Rhodes, forming a remarkable
-contrast on all these points, occasioned the utmost surprise and
-indignation among the Lacedæmonians. They saw themselves about to
-enter upon a renewed maritime war, without that aid which they had
-reckoned on receiving from Egypt, and with aggravated uncertainty
-in respect to their dependencies and tribute. It was under this
-prospective anxiety that they took the step of nominating Agesilaus
-to the command of the fleet as well as of the army, in order to
-ensure unity of operations;[505] though a distinction of functions,
-which they had hitherto set great value upon maintaining, was thus
-broken down,—and, though the two commands had never been united in
-any king before Agesilaus.[506] Pharax, the previous admiral, was
-recalled.[507]
-
-  [505] Xen. Hellen. iii, 4, 27.
-
-  [506] Plutarch, Agesil. c. 10; Aristotel. Politic. ii, 6, 22.
-
-  [507] The Lacedæmonian named Pharax, mentioned by Theopompus
-  (Fragm. 218, ed. Didot: compare Athenæus, xii, p. 536) as a
-  profligate and extravagant person, is more probably an officer
-  who served under Dionysius in Sicily and Italy, about forty years
-  after the revolt of Rhodes. The difference of time appears so
-  great, that we must probably suppose two different men bearing
-  the same name.
-
-But the violent displeasure of the Lacedæmonians against the revolted
-Rhodians was still better attested by another proceeding. Among
-all the great families at Rhodes, none were more distinguished
-than the Diagoridæ. Its members were not only generals and high
-political functionaries in their native island, but had attained
-even Pan-hellenic celebrity by an unparalleled series of victories
-at the Olympic and other great solemnities. Dorieus, a member of
-this family, had gained the victory in the pankration at Olympia
-on three successive solemnities. He had obtained seven prizes in
-the Nemean, and eight in the Isthmian games. He had carried off the
-prize at one Pythian solemnity without a contest,—no one daring
-to stand up against him in the fearful struggle of the pankration.
-As a Rhodian, while Rhodes was a subject ally of Athens during the
-Peloponnesian war, he had been so pronounced in his attachment to
-Sparta as to draw on himself a sentence of banishment; upon which he
-had retired to Thurii, and had been active in hostility to Athens
-after the Syracusan catastrophe. Serving against her in ships
-fitted out at his own cost, he had been captured in 407 B.C. by the
-Athenians, and brought in as prisoner to Athens. By the received
-practice of war in that day, his life was forfeited; and over and
-above such practice, the name of Dorieus was peculiarly odious to the
-Athenians. But when they saw before the public assembly a captive
-enemy, of heroic lineage, as well as of unrivalled athletic majesty
-and renown, their previous hatred was so overpowered by sympathy and
-admiration, that they liberated him by public vote, and dismissed him
-unconditionally.[508]
-
-  [508] Xen. Hellen. i, 5, 19.
-
-  Compare a similar instance of merciful dealing, on the part
-  of the Syracusan assembly, towards the Sikel prince Duketius
-  (Diodor. xi, 92).
-
-This interesting anecdote, which has already been related in
-my eighth volume,[509] is here again noticed as a contrast to
-the treatment which the same Dorieus now underwent from the
-Lacedæmonians. What he had been doing since, we do not know; but
-at the time when Rhodes now revolted from Sparta, he was not only
-absent from the island, but actually in or near Peloponnesus.
-Such, however, was the wrath of the Lacedæmonians against Rhodians
-generally, that Dorieus was seized by their order, brought to Sparta,
-and there condemned and executed.[510] It seems hardly possible that
-he can have had any personal concern in the revolt. Had such been
-the fact, he would have been in the island,—or would at least have
-taken care not to be within the reach of the Lacedæmonians when the
-revolt happened. Perhaps, however, other members of the Diagoridæ,
-his family, once so much attached to Sparta, may have taken part in
-it; for we know, by the example of the Thirty at Athens, that the
-Lysandrian dekarchies and Spartan harmosts made themselves quite
-as formidable to oligarchical as to democratical politicians, and
-it is very conceivable that the Diagoridæ may have become less
-philo-Laconian in their politics.
-
-  [509] Hist. of Greece, Vol. VIII, Ch. lxiv, p. 159.
-
-  [510] Pausanias, vi, 7, 2.
-
-This extreme difference in the treatment of the same man by Athens
-and by Sparta raises instructive reflections. It exhibits the
-difference both between Athenian and Spartan sentiment, and between
-the sentiment of a multitude and that of a few. The grand and
-sacred personality of the Hieronike Dorieus, when exhibited to
-the senses of the Athenian multitude,—the spectacle of a man in
-chains before them, who had been proclaimed victor and crowned on
-so many solemn occasions before the largest assemblages of Greeks
-ever brought together,—produced an overwhelming effect upon their
-emotions; sufficient not only to efface a strong preëstablished
-antipathy founded on active past hostility, but to countervail
-a just cause of revenge, speaking in the language of that day.
-But the same appearance produced no effect at all on the Spartan
-ephors and senate; not sufficient even to hinder them from putting
-Dorieus to death, though he had given them no cause for antipathy
-or revenge, simply as a sort of retribution for the revolt of the
-island. Now this difference depended partly upon the difference
-between the sentiment of Athenians and Spartans, but partly also
-upon the difference between the sentiment of a multitude and that of
-a few. Had Dorieus been brought before a select judicial tribunal
-at Athens, instead of before the Athenian public assembly,—or, had
-the case been discussed before the assembly in his absence,—he
-would have been probably condemned, conformably to usage, under the
-circumstances; but the vehement emotion worked by his presence upon
-the multitudinous spectators of the assembly, rendered such a course
-intolerable to them. It has been common with historians of Athens
-to dwell upon the passions of the public assembly as if it were
-susceptible of excitement only in an angry or vindictive direction;
-whereas, the truth is, and the example before us illustrates, that
-they were open-minded in one direction as well as in another,
-and that the present emotion, whatever it might be, merciful or
-sympathetic as well as resentful, was intensified by the mere fact of
-multitude. And thus, where the established rule of procedure happened
-to be cruel, there was some chance of moving an Athenian assembly to
-mitigate it in a particular case, though the Spartan ephors or senate
-would be inexorable in carrying it out,—if, indeed, they did not, as
-seems probable in the case of Dorieus, actually go beyond it in rigor.
-
-While Konon and the Rhodians were thus raising hostilities against
-Sparta by sea, Agesilaus, on receiving at Kymê the news of his
-nomination to the double command, immediately despatched orders
-to the dependent maritime cities and islands, requiring the
-construction and equipment of new triremes. Such was the influence
-of Sparta, and so much did the local governments rest upon its
-continuance, that these requisitions were zealously obeyed. Many
-leading men incurred considerable expense, from desire to acquire
-his favor; so that a fleet of one hundred and twenty new triremes
-was ready by the ensuing year. Agesilaus, naming his brother-in-law,
-Peisander, to act as admiral, sent him to superintend the
-preparations; a brave young man, but destitute both of skill and
-experience.[511]
-
-  [511] Xen. Hellen. iii, 4, 28, 29; Plutarch, Agesil. c. 10.
-
-Meanwhile, he himself pursued his march (about the beginning of
-autumn) towards the satrapy of Pharnabazus,—Phrygia south and
-south-east of the Propontis. Under the active guidance of his new
-auxiliary, Spithridates, he plundered the country, capturing some
-towns, and reducing others to capitulate; with considerable advantage
-to his soldiers. Pharnabazus, having no sufficient army to hazard a
-battle in defence of his satrapy, concentrated all his force near
-his own residence at Daskylium, offering no opposition to the march
-of Agesilaus; who was induced by Spithridates to traverse Phrygia
-and enter Paphlagonia, in hopes of concluding an alliance with the
-Paphlagonian prince Otys. That prince, in nominal dependence on
-Persia, could muster the best cavalry in the Persian empire. But
-he had recently refused to obey an invitation from the court at
-Susa, and he now not only welcomed the appearance of Agesilaus, but
-concluded an alliance with him, strengthening him with an auxiliary
-body of cavalry and peltasts. Anxious to requite Spithridates for
-his services, and vehemently attached to his son, the beautiful
-youth Megabates,—Agesilaus persuaded Otys to marry the daughter
-of Spithridates. He even caused her to be conveyed by sea in a
-Lacedæmonian trireme,—probably from Abydos to Sinôpê.[512]
-
-  [512] Xen. Hellen. iv, 1, 1-15.
-
-  The negotiation of this marriage by Agesilaus is detailed in a
-  curious and interesting manner by Xenophon. His conversation
-  with Otys took place in the presence of the thirty Spartan
-  counsellors, and probably in the presence of Xenophon himself.
-
-  The attachment of Agesilaus to the youth Megabazus or Megabates,
-  is marked in the Hellenica (iv, 1, 6-28)—but is more strongly
-  brought out in the Agesilaus of Xenophon (v, 6), and in Plutarch,
-  Agesil. c. 11.
-
-  In the retreat of the Ten Thousand Greeks (five years before)
-  along the southern coast of the Euxine, a Paphlagonian prince
-  named Korylas is mentioned (Xen. Anab. v, 5, 22; v, 6, 8).
-  Whether there was more than one Paphlagonian prince—or whether
-  Otys was successor of Korylas—we cannot tell.
-
-Reinforced by the Paphlagonian auxiliaries, Agesilaus prosecuted
-the war with augmented vigor against the satrapy of Pharnabazus. He
-now approached the neighborhood of Daskylium, the residence of the
-satrap himself, inherited from his father Pharnakês, who had been
-satrap before him. This was a well-supplied country, full of rich
-villages, embellished with parks and gardens for the satrap’s hunting
-and gratification: the sporting tastes of Xenophon lead him also to
-remark that there were plenty of birds for the fowler, with rivers
-full of fish.[513] In this agreeable region Agesilaus passed the
-winter. His soldiers, abundantly supplied with provisions, became so
-careless, and straggled with so much contempt of their enemy, that
-Pharnabazus, with a body of four hundred cavalry and two scythed
-chariots, found an opportunity of attacking seven hundred of them by
-surprise; driving them back with considerable loss, until Agesilaus
-came up to protect them with the hoplites.
-
-  [513] Xen. Hellen. iv, 1, 16-33.
-
-This partial misfortune, however, was speedily avenged. Fearful of
-being surrounded and captured, Pharnabazus refrained from occupying
-any fixed position. He hovered about the country, carrying his
-valuable property along with him, and keeping his place of encampment
-as secret as he could. The watchful Spithridates, nevertheless,
-having obtained information that he was encamped for the night in
-the village of Kanê, about eighteen miles distant, Herippidas (one
-of the thirty Spartans) undertook a night-march with a detachment
-to surprise him. Two thousand Grecian hoplites, the like number of
-light-armed peltasts, and Spithridates with the Paphlagonian horse,
-were appointed to accompany him. Though many of these soldiers
-took advantage of the darkness to evade attendance, the enterprise
-proved completely successful. The camp of Pharnabazus was surprised
-at break of day; his Mysian advanced guards were put to the sword,
-and he himself, with all his troops, was compelled to take flight
-with scarcely any resistance. All his stores, plate, and personal
-furniture, together with a large baggage-train and abundance of
-prisoners, fell into the hands of the victors. As the Paphlagonians
-under Spithridates formed the cavalry of the victorious detachment,
-they naturally took more spoil and more prisoners than the infantry.
-They were proceeding to carry off their acquisitions, when Herippidas
-interfered and took everything away from them; placing the entire
-spoil of every description, under the charge of Grecian officers, to
-be sold by formal auction in a Grecian city; after which the proceeds
-were to be distributed or applied by public authority. The orders of
-Herippidas were conformable to the regular and systematic proceeding
-of Grecian officers; but Spithridates and the Paphlagonians were
-probably justified by Asiatic practice in appropriating that which
-they had themselves captured. Moreover, the order, disagreeable
-in itself, was enforced against them with Lacedæmonian harshness
-of manner,[514] unaccompanied by any guarantee that they would be
-allowed, even at last, a fair share of the proceeds. Resenting the
-conduct of Herippidas as combining injury with insult, they deserted
-in the night and fled to Sardis, where the Persian Ariæus was in
-actual revolt against the court of Susa. This was a serious loss, and
-still more serious chagrin, to Agesilaus. He was not only deprived of
-valuable auxiliary cavalry, and of an enterprizing Asiatic informant;
-but the report would be spread that he defrauded his Asiatic allies
-of their legitimate plunder, and others would thus be deterred from
-joining him. His personal sorrow too was aggravated by the departure
-of the youth Megabazus, who accompanied his father Spithridates to
-Sardis.[515]
-
-  [514] Plutarch, Agesil. c. 11. πικρὸς ὢν ἐξεταστὴς τῶν κλαπέντων,
-  etc.
-
-  [515] Xen. Hellen. iv, 1, 27; Plutarch, Agesil. c. 11.
-
-  Since the flight of Spithridates took place secretly by night,
-  the scene which Plutarch asserts to have taken place between
-  Agesilaus and Megabazus cannot have occurred on the departure of
-  the latter, but must belong to some other occasion; as, indeed,
-  it seems to be represented by Xenophon (Agesil. v, 4).
-
-It was towards the close of this winter that a personal conference
-took place between Agesilaus and Pharnabazus, managed by the
-intervention of a Greek of Kyzikus named Apollophanês; who was
-connected by ties of hospitality with both, and served to each as
-guarantee for the good faith of the other. We have from Xenophon,
-himself probably present, an interesting detail of this interview.
-Agesilaus, accompanied by his thirty Spartan counsellors, being the
-first to arrive at the place of appointment, all of them sat down
-upon the grass to wait. Presently came Pharnabazus, with splendid
-clothing and retinue. His attendants were beginning to spread fine
-carpets for him, when the satrap, observing how the Spartans were
-seated, felt ashamed of such a luxury for himself, and sat down
-on the grass by the side of Agesilaus. Having exchanged salutes,
-they next shook hands; after which Pharnabazus, who as the older
-of the two had been the first to tender his right hand, was also
-the first to open the conversation. Whether he spoke Greek well
-enough to dispense with the necessity of an interpreter, we are not
-informed. “Agesilaus (said he), I was the friend and ally of you
-Lacedæmonians while you were at war with Athens; I furnished you with
-money to strengthen your fleet, and fought with you myself ashore on
-horseback, chasing your enemies into the sea. You cannot charge me
-with having ever played you false, like Tissaphernes, either by word
-or deed. Yet, after this behavior, I am now reduced by you to such a
-condition, that I have not a dinner in my own territory, except by
-picking up your leavings, like the beasts of the field. I see the
-fine residences, parks, and hunting-grounds, bequeathed to me by my
-father, which formed the charm of my life, cut up or burnt down by
-you. Is this the conduct of men mindful of favors received, and eager
-to requite them? Pray answer me this question; for, perhaps, I have
-yet to learn what is holy and just.”
-
-The thirty Spartan counsellors were covered with shame by this
-emphatic appeal. They all held their peace; while Agesilaus, after
-a long pause, at length replied,—“You are aware, Pharnabazus, that
-in Grecian cities, individuals become private friends and guests of
-each other. Such guests, if the cities to which they belong go to
-war, fight with each other, and sometimes by accident even kill each
-other, each in behalf of his respective city. So then it is that we,
-being at war with your king, are compelled to hold all his dominions
-as enemy’s land. But in regard to you, we would pay any price to
-become your friends. I do not invite you to accept us as masters,
-in place of your present master; I ask you to become our ally, and
-to enjoy your own property as a freeman—bowing before no man and
-acknowledging no master. Now freedom is in itself a possession of the
-highest value. But this is not all. We do not call upon you to be a
-freeman, and yet poor. We offer you our alliance, to acquire fresh
-territory, not for the king, but for yourself; by reducing those who
-are now your fellow-slaves to become your subjects. Now tell me,—if
-you thus continue a freeman and become rich, what can you want
-farther to make you a thoroughly prosperous man?”
-
-“I will speak frankly to you in reply (said Pharnabazus). If the king
-shall send any other general, and put me under him, I shall willingly
-become your friend and ally. But if he imposes the duty of command on
-me, so strong is the point of honor, that I shall continue to make
-war upon you to the best of my power. Expect nothing else.”[516]
-
-  [516] Xen. Hellen. iv, 1, 38. Ἐὰν μέντοι μοι τὴν ἀρχὴν προστάττῃ,
-  τοιοῦτόν τι, ὡς ἔοικε, φιλοτιμία ἐστὶ, εὖ χρὴ εἰδέναι, ὅτι
-  πολεμήσω ὑμῖν ὡς ἂν δύνωμαι ἄριστα.
-
-  Compare about φιλοτιμία, Herodot. iii, 53.
-
-Agesilaus, struck with this answer, took his hand and said,—“Would
-that with such high-minded sentiments you _could_ become our friend!
-At any rate, let me assure you of this,—that I will immediately quit
-your territory; and for the future, even should the war continue, I
-will respect both you and all your property, as long as I can turn my
-arms against any other Persians.”
-
-Here the conversation closed; Pharnabazus mounted his horse, and
-rode away. His son by Parapita, however,—at that time still
-a handsome youth,—lingered behind, ran up to Agesilaus, and
-exclaimed,—“Agesilaus, I make you my guest.”—“I accept it with all
-my heart,”—was the answer. “Remember me by this,”—rejoined the
-young Persian,—putting into the hands of Agesilaus the fine javelin
-which he carried. The latter immediately took off the ornamental
-trappings from the horse of his secretary Idæus, and gave them as a
-return present; upon which the young man rode away with them, and
-rejoined his father.[517]
-
-  [517] Xen. Hellen. iv, 1, 29-41; Plutarch, Agesil. c. 13, 14;
-  Xen. Agesil. iii, 5.
-
-There is a touching interest and emphasis in this interview as
-described by Xenophon, who here breathes into his tame Hellenic
-chronicle something of the romantic spirit of the Cyropædia. The
-pledges exchanged between Agesilaus and the son of Pharnabazus
-were not forgotten by either. The latter,—being in after days
-impoverished and driven into exile by his brother, during the
-absence of Pharnabazus in Egypt,—was compelled to take refuge in
-Greece; where Agesilaus provided him with protection and a home,
-and even went so far as to employ influence in favor of an Athenian
-youth, to whom the son of Pharnabazus was attached. This Athenian
-youth had outgrown the age and size of the boy-runners in the Olympic
-stadium; nevertheless Agesilaus, by strenuous personal interference,
-overruled the reluctance of the Eleian judges, and prevailed upon
-them to admit him as a competitor with the other boys.[518] The
-stress laid by Xenophon upon this favor illustrates the tone of
-Grecian sentiment, and shows us the variety of objects which personal
-ascendency was used to compass. Disinterested in regard to himself,
-Agesilaus was unscrupulous both in promoting the encroachments, and
-screening the injustices, of his friends.[519] The unfair privilege
-which he procured for this youth, though a small thing in itself,
-could hardly fail to offend a crowd of spectators familiar with the
-established conditions of the stadium, and to expose the judges to
-severe censure.
-
-  [518] Xen. Hellen. iv, 1, 40. πάντ᾽ ἐποίησεν, ὅπως ἂν δι᾽ ἐκεῖνον
-  ἐγκριθείη εἰς τὸ στάδιον ἐν Ὀλυμπίᾳ, μέγιστος ὢν παίδων.
-
-  [519] Plutarch, Agesil. c. 5-13.
-
-Quitting the satrapy of Pharnabazus,—which was now pretty well
-exhausted, while the armistice concluded with Tithraustes must have
-expired,—Agesilaus took up his camp near the temple of Artemis, at
-Astyra in the plain of Thêbê (in the region commonly known as Æolis),
-near the Gulf of Elæus. He here employed himself in bringing together
-an increased number of troops, with a view to penetrate farther
-into the interior of Asia Minor during the summer. Recent events
-had greatly increased the belief entertained by the Asiatics in his
-superior strength; so that he received propositions from various
-districts in the interior, inviting his presence, and expressing
-anxiety to throw off the Persian yoke. He sought also to compose
-the dissensions and misrule which had arisen out of the Lysandrian
-dekarchies in the Greco-Asiatic cities, avoiding as much as possible
-sharp inflictions of death or exile. How much he achieved in this
-direction, we cannot tell,[520] nor can it have been possible,
-indeed, to achieve much, without dismissing the Spartan harmosts and
-lessening the political power of his own partisans; neither of which
-he did.
-
-  [520] Xen. Hellen. iv, 1, 41; Xen. Agesil. i, 35-38; Plutarch,
-  Agesil. c. 14, 15; Isokrates, Or. v, (Philipp.) s. 100.
-
-His plans were now all laid for penetrating farther than ever into
-the interior, and for permanent conquest, if possible, of the western
-portion of Persian Asia. What he would have permanently accomplished
-towards this scheme, cannot be determined; for his aggressive march
-was suspended by a summons home, the reason of which will appear in
-the next chapter.
-
-Meanwhile, Pharnabazus had been called from his satrapy to go and
-take the command of the Persian fleet in Kilikia and the south of
-Asia Minor, in conjunction with Konon. Since the revolt of Rhodes
-from the Lacedæmonians, (in the summer of the preceding year,
-395 B.C.) that active Athenian had achieved nothing. The burst
-of activity, produced by the first visit of Pharnabazus at the
-Persian court, had been paralyzed by the jealousies of the Persian
-commanders, reluctant to serve under a Greek,—by peculation of
-officers who embezzled the pay destined for the troops,—by mutiny
-in the fleet from absence of pay,—and by the many delays arising
-while the satraps, unwilling to spend their own revenues in the war,
-waited for orders and remittances from court.[521] Hence Konon had
-been unable to make any efficient use of his fleet, during those
-months when the Lacedæmonian fleet was increased to nearly double its
-former number. At length he resolved,—seemingly at the instigation
-of his countrymen at home[522] as well as of Euagoras prince of
-Salamis in Cyprus, and through the encouragement of Ktesias, one
-of the Grecian physicians resident at the Persian court,—on going
-himself into the interior to communicate personally with Artaxerxes.
-Landing on the Kilikian coast, he crossed by land to Thapsakus on
-the Euphrates (as the Cyreian army had marched), from whence he
-sailed down the river in a boat to Babylon. It appears that he did
-not see Artaxerxes, from repugnance to that ceremony of prostration
-which was required from all who approached the royal person. But his
-messages, transmitted through Ktesias and others,—with his confident
-engagement to put down the maritime empire of Sparta and counteract
-the projects of Agesilaus, if the Persian forces and money were put
-into efficient action,—produced a powerful effect on the mind of
-the monarch; who doubtless was not merely alarmed at the formidable
-position of Agesilaus in Asia Minor, but also hated the Lacedæmonians
-as main agents in the aggressive enterprise of Cyrus. Artaxerxes not
-only approved his views, but made to him a large grant of money, and
-transmitted peremptory orders to the coast that his officers should
-be active in prosecuting the maritime war.
-
-  [521] Compare Diodor. xv, 41 _ad fin._; and Thucyd. viii, 45.
-
-  [522] Isokrates (Or. viii, De Pace, s. 82) alludes to “many
-  embassies” as having been sent by Athens to the king of Persia,
-  to protest against the Lacedæmonian dominion. But this mission of
-  Konon is the only one which we can verify, prior to the battle of
-  Knidus.
-
-  Probably Dennis, the son of Pyrilampês, an eminent citizen and
-  trierarch of Athens, must have been one of the companions of
-  Konon in this mission. He is mentioned in an oration of Lysias
-  as having received from the Great King a present of a golden
-  drinking-bowl or φιάλη; and I do not know on what other occasion
-  he can have received it, except in this embassy (Lysias, Or. xix,
-  De Bonis Aristoph. s. 27).
-
-What was of still greater moment, Konon was permitted to name any
-person whom he chose, as admiral jointly with himself. It was by his
-choice that Pharnabazus was called from his satrapy, and ordered to
-act jointly as commander of the fleet. This satrap, the bravest and
-most straightforward among all the Persian grandees, and just now
-smarting with resentment at the devastation of his satrapy[523] by
-Agesilaus, coöperated heartily with Konon. A powerful fleet, partly
-Phœnician, partly Athenian or Grecian, was soon equipped, superior
-in number even to the newly-organized Lacedæmonian fleet under
-Peisander.[524] Euagoras, prince of Salamis in Cyprus,[525] not only
-provided many triremes, but served himself, personally, on board.
-
-  [523] Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 6.
-
-  [524] The measures of Konon and the transactions preceding the
-  battle of Knidus, are very imperfectly known to us; but we may
-  gather them generally from Diodorus, xiv, 81; Justin, vi, 3, 4;
-  Cornelius Nepos, Vit. Conon. c. 2, 3; Ktesiæ Fragment, c. 62, 63,
-  ed. Bähr.
-
-  Isokrates (Orat. iv, (Panegyr.) s. 165; compare Orat. ix,
-  (Euagor.) s. 77) speaks loosely as to the duration of time that
-  the Persian fleet remained blocked up by the Lacedæmonians before
-  Konon obtained his final and vigorous orders from Artaxerxes,
-  unless we are to understand his _three years_ as referring to
-  the first news of outfit of ships of war in Phœnicia, brought to
-  Sparta by Herodas, as Schneider understands them; and even then
-  the statement that the Persian fleet remained πολιορκούμενον
-  for all this time, would be much exaggerated. Allowing for
-  exaggeration, however, Isokrates coincides generally with the
-  authorities above noticed.
-
-  It would appear that Ktesias the physician obtained about this
-  time permission to quit the court of Persia and come back to
-  Greece. Perhaps he may have been induced (like Demokêdes of
-  Kroton, one hundred and twenty years before) to promote the views
-  of Konon in order to get for himself this permission.
-
-  In the meagre abstract of Ktesias given by Photius (c. 63)
-  mention is made of some Lacedæmonian envoys who were now going up
-  to the Persian court, and were watched or detained on the way.
-  This mission can hardly have taken place before the battle of
-  Knidus; for then Agesilaus was in the full tide of success, and
-  contemplating the largest plans of aggression against Persia. It
-  must have taken place, I presume, after the battle.
-
-  [525] Isokrates, Or. ix, (Euagoras) s. 67. Εὐαγόρου δὲ ~αὑτόν
-  τε παρασχόντος~, καὶ τῆς δυνάμεως τὴν πλείστην παρασκευάσαντος.
-  Compare s. 83 of the same oration. Compare Pausanias, i, 3, 1.
-
-It was about the month of July, 394 B.C., that Pharnabazus and
-Konon brought their united fleet to the south-western corner of Asia
-Minor; first, probably, to the friendly island of Rhodes, next,
-off Loryma[526] and the mountain called Dorion on the peninsula of
-Knidus.[527] Peisander, with the fleet of Sparta and her allies,
-sailed out from Knidus to meet them, and both parties prepared for
-a battle. The numbers of the Lacedæmonians are reported by Diodorus
-at eighty-five triremes; those of Konon and Pharnabazus at above
-ninety. But Xenophon, without particularizing the number on either
-side, seems to intimate the disparity as far greater; stating that
-the entire fleet of Peisander was considerably inferior even to the
-Grecian division under Konon, without reckoning the Phœnician ships
-under Pharnabazus.[528] In spite of such inferiority, Peisander did
-not shrink from the encounter. Though a young man without military
-skill, he possessed a full measure of Spartan courage and pride;
-moreover,—since the Spartan maritime empire was only maintained by
-the assumed superiority of his fleet,—had he confessed himself
-too weak to fight, his enemies would have gone unopposed around
-the islands to excite revolt. Accordingly, he sailed forth from
-the harbor of Knidus. But when the two fleets were ranged opposite
-to each other, and the battle was about to commence,—so manifest
-and alarming was the superiority of the Athenians and Persians,
-that his Asiatic allies on the left division, noway hearty in the
-cause, fled almost without striking a blow. Under such discouraging
-circumstances, he nevertheless led his fleet into action with the
-greatest valor. But his trireme was overwhelmed by numbers, broken
-in various places by the beaks of the enemy’s ships, and forced back
-upon the land, together with a large portion of his fleet. Many of
-the crews jumped out and got to land, abandoning their triremes to
-the conquerors. Peisander, too, might have escaped in the same way;
-but disdaining either to survive his defeat or to quit his ship, fell
-gallantly fighting aboard. The victory of Konon and Pharnabazus was
-complete. More than half of the Spartan ships were either captured
-or destroyed, though the neighborhood of the land enabled a large
-proportion of the crews to escape to Knidus, so that no great number
-of prisoners were taken.[529] Among the allies of Sparta, the chief
-loss of course fell upon those who were most attached to her cause;
-the disaffected or lukewarm were those who escaped by flight at the
-beginning.
-
-  [526] Diodor. xiv, 83. διέτριβον περὶ Λώρυμα τῆς Χερσονήσου.
-
-  It is hardly necessary to remark, that the word _Chersonesus_
-  here (and in xiv, 89) does not mean the peninsula of Thrace
-  commonly known by that name, forming the European side of the
-  Hellespont,—but the peninsula on which Knidus is situated.
-
-  [527] Pausan. vi, 3, 6. περὶ Κνίδον καὶ ὄρος τὸ Δώριον
-  ὀνομαζόμενον.
-
-  [528] Xen. Hellen. iv, 3, 12. Φαρνάβαζον, ναύαρχον ὄντα, ξὺν
-  ταῖς Φοινίσσαις εἶναι. Κόνωνα δὲ, τὸ Ἑλληνικὸν ἔχοντα, τετάχθαι
-  ἔμπροσθεν αὐτοῦ. Ἀντιπαραταξαμένου δὲ τοῦ Πεισάνδρου, καὶ ~πολὺ
-  ἐλαττόνων αὐτῷ τῶν νεῶν φανεισῶν τῶν αὑτοῦ τοῦ μετὰ Κόνωνος
-  Ἑλληνικοῦ~, etc.
-
-  [529] Xen. Hellen. iv, 3, 10-14; Diodor. xiv, 83; Cornelius
-  Nepos, Conon, c. 4; Justin, vi, 3.
-
-Such was the memorable triumph of Konon at Knidus; the reversal of
-that of Lysander at Ægospotami eleven years before. Its important
-effects will be recounted in the coming chapter.
-
-
-
-
-CHAPTER LXXIV.
-
-FROM THE BATTLE OF KNIDUS TO THE REBUILDING OF THE LONG WALLS OF
-ATHENS.
-
-
-Having in my last chapter carried the series of Asiatic events down
-to the battle of Knidus, in the beginning of August, B.C. 394, at
-which period war was already raging on the other side of the Ægean,
-in Greece Proper,—I now take up the thread of events from a period
-somewhat earlier, to show how this last-mentioned war, commonly
-called the Corinthian war, began.
-
-At the accession of Agesilaus to the throne, in 398 B.C., the power
-of Sparta throughout all Greece from Laconia to Thessaly, was greater
-than it had ever been, and greater than any Grecian state had ever
-enjoyed before. The burden of the long war against Athens she had
-borne in far less proportion than her allies; its fruits she had
-reaped exclusively for herself. There prevailed consequently among
-her allies a general discontent, which Thebes as well as Corinth
-manifested by refusing to take part in the recent expeditions;
-either of Pausanias against Thrasybulus and the Athenian exiles in
-Peiræus,—or of Agis against the Eleians,—or of Agesilaus against
-the Persians in Asia Minor. The Eleians were completely humbled
-by the invasions of Agis; all the other cities in Peloponnesus,
-from apprehension, from ancient habit, and from being governed by
-oligarchies who leaned on Sparta for support, were obedient to her
-authority,—with the single exception of Argos, which remained, as
-before, neutral and quiet, though in sentiment unfriendly. Athens
-was a simple unit in the catalogue of Spartan allies, furnishing
-her contingent, like the rest, to be commanded by the xenâgus,—or
-officer sent from Sparta for the special purpose of commanding such
-foreign contingents.
-
-In the northern regions of Greece, the advance of Spartan power
-is yet more remarkable. Looking back to the year 419 B.C. (about
-two years after the peace of Nikias), Sparta had been so unable to
-protect her colony of Herakleia, in Trachis on the Maliac Gulf,
-near the strait of Thermopylæ, that the Bœotians were obliged
-to send a garrison thither, in order to prevent it from falling
-into the hands of Athens. They even went so far as to dismiss the
-Lacedæmonian harmost.[530] In the winter of 409-408 B.C., another
-disaster had happened at Herakleia, in which the Lacedæmonian harmost
-was slain.[531] But about 399 B.C., we find Sparta exercising an
-energetic ascendency at Herakleia, and even making that place a
-central post for keeping down the people in the neighborhood of Mount
-Œta and a portion of Thessaly. Herippidas, the Lacedæmonian, was sent
-thither to repress some factious movements, with a force sufficient
-to enable him to overawe the public assembly, to seize the obnoxious
-party in the place, and to put them to death, five hundred in number,
-outside of the gates.[532] Carrying his arms farther against the
-Œtæans and Trachinians in the neighborhood, who had been long at
-variance with the Laconian colonists at Herakleia, he expelled them
-from their abodes, and forced them to migrate with their wives and
-children into Thessaly.[533] Hence, the Lacedæmonians were enabled
-to extend their influence into parts of Thessaly, and to place a
-harmost with a garrison in Pharsalus, resting upon Herakleia as a
-basis,—which thus became a position of extraordinary importance for
-their dominion over the northern regions.
-
-  [530] Thucyd. v, 52.
-
-  [531] Xen. Hellen. i, 2, 18.
-
-  [532] Diodor. xiv, 38; Polyæn. ii, 21.
-
-  [533] Diodorus, _ut sup._; compare xiv, 81. τοὺς Τραχινίους
-  φεύγοντας ἐκ τῶν πατρίδων ὑπὸ Λακεδαιμονίων, etc.
-
-With the real power of Sparta thus greatly augmented on land, in
-addition to her vast empire at sea, bringing its ample influx of
-tribute,—and among cities who had not merely long recognized her
-as leader, but had never recognized any one else,—it required an
-unusual stimulus to raise any formidable hostile combination against
-her, notwithstanding a large spread of disaffection and antipathy.
-The stimulus came from Persia, from whose treasures the means had
-been before furnished to Sparta herself for subduing Athens. The
-news that a formidable navy was fitting out in Phœnicia, which had
-prompted the expedition of Agesilaus in the spring of 396 B.C., was
-doubtless circulated and heard with satisfaction among the Grecian
-cities unfriendly to Sparta; and the refusal of Thebes, Corinth, and
-Athens, to take service under that prince,—aggravated in the case
-of the Thebans by a positive offence given to him on the occasion of
-his sacrifice at Aulis,—was enough to warn Sparta of the dangerous
-sentiments and tendencies by which she was surrounded near home.
-
-It was upon these tendencies that the positive instigation and
-promises of Persia were brought to bear, in the course of the
-following year; and not merely promises, but pecuniary supplies,
-with news of revived naval warfare threatening the insular dominion
-of Sparta. Tithraustes, the new satrap, who had put to death and
-succeeded Tissaphernes, had no sooner concluded the armistice
-mentioned above, and prevailed upon Agesilaus to remove his army
-into the satrapy of Pharnabazus, than he employed active measures
-for kindling war against Sparta in Greece, in order to create a
-necessity for the recall of Agesilaus out of Asia. He sent a Rhodian
-named Timokrates into Greece, as envoy to the cities most unfriendly
-to the Lacedæmonians, with a sum of fifty talents;[534] directing
-him to employ this money in gaining over the leading men in these
-cities, and to exchange solemn oaths of alliance and aid with
-Persia, for common hostility against Sparta. The island of Rhodes
-having just revolted from the Spartan dominion, had admitted Konon
-with the Persian fleet (as I have mentioned in the last chapter),
-so that probably the Rhodian envoy was on a mission to Tithraustes
-on behalf of his countrymen. He was an appropriate envoy on this
-occasion, as having an animated interest in raising up new enemies
-to Sparta, and as being hearty in stirring up among the Thebans and
-Corinthians the same spirit which had led to the revolt of Rhodes.
-The effect which that revolt produced in alarming and exasperating
-the Spartans, has been already noticed; and we may fairly presume
-that its effect on the other side, in encouraging their Grecian
-enemies, was considerable. Timokrates visited Thebes, Corinth, and
-Argos, distributing his funds. He concluded engagements on behalf
-of the satrap, with various leading men in each, putting them into
-communication with each other; Ismenias, Androkleidas, and others in
-Thebes,—Timolaus and Polyanthes at Corinth,—Kylon and others at
-Argos. It appears that he did not visit Athens; at least, Xenophon
-expressly says that none of his money went there. The working of this
-mission,—coupled, we must recollect, with the renewed naval warfare
-on the coast of Asia, and the promise of a Persian fleet against
-that of Sparta,—was soon felt in the more pronounced manifestation
-of anti-Laconian sentiments in these various cities, and in the
-commencement of attempts to establish alliance between them.[535]
-
-  [534] Xen. Hellen. iii, 5, 1. Πέμπει Τιμοκράτην Ῥόδιον εἰς τὴν
-  Ἑλλάδα, δοὺς χρυσίον ἐς πεντήκοντα τάλαντα ἀργυρίου, καὶ κελεύει
-  πειρᾶσθαι, πιστὰ τὰ μέγιστα λαμβάνοντα, διδόναι τοῖς προεστηκόσιν
-  ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν, ἐφ᾽ ᾧ τε πόλεμον ἐξοίσειν πρὸς Λακεδαιμονίους.
-
-  Timokrates is ordered to give the money; yet not absolutely, but
-  only on a certain condition, in case he should find that such
-  condition could be realized; that is, if by giving it he could
-  procure from various leading Greeks sufficient assurances and
-  guarantees that they would raise war against Sparta. As this was
-  a matter more or less doubtful, Timokrates is ordered to _try
-  to give the money for this purpose_. Though the construction of
-  πειρᾶσθαι couples it with διδόναι, the sense of the word more
-  properly belongs to ἐξοίσειν—which designates the purpose to be
-  accomplished.
-
-  [535] Xen. Hellen. iii, 5, 2; Pausan. iii, 9, 4; Plutarch,
-  Artaxerxes, c. 20.
-
-With that Laconian bias which pervades his Hellenica, Xenophon
-represents the coming war against Sparta, as if it had been brought
-about mainly by these bribes from Persia to the leading men in
-these various cities. I have stated on more than one occasion, that
-the average public morality of Grecian individual politicians in
-Sparta, Athens, and other cities, was not such as to exclude personal
-corruption; that it required a morality higher than the average, when
-such temptation was resisted,—and a morality considerably higher
-than the average, if it were systematically resisted, and for a long
-life, as by Perikles and Nikias. There would be nothing therefore
-surprising, if Ismenias and the rest had received bribes under the
-circumstances here mentioned. But it appears highly improbable that
-the money given by Timokrates could have been a bribe; that is,
-given privately, and for the separate use of these leaders. It was
-furnished for the promotion of a certain public object, which could
-not be accomplished without heavy disbursements; it was analogous
-to that sum of thirty talents which (as Xenophon himself tells us)
-Tithraustes had just given to Agesilaus, as an inducement to carry
-away his army into the satrapy of Pharnabazus (not as a present for
-the private purse of the Spartan king, but as a contribution to
-the wants of the army),[536] or to that which the satrap Tiribazus
-gave to Antalkidas afterwards,[537] also for public objects.
-Xenophon affirms, that Ismenias and the rest, having received these
-presents from Timokrates, accused the Lacedæmonians and rendered
-them odious,—each in his respective city.[538] But it is certain,
-from his own showing, that the hatred towards them existed in these
-cities, before the arrival of Timokrates. In Argos, such hatred was
-of old standing; in Corinth and Thebes, though kindled only since the
-close of the war, it was not the less pronounced. Moreover, Xenophon
-himself informs us, that the Athenians, though they received none of
-the money,[539] were quite as ready for war as the other cities. If
-we therefore admit his statement as a matter of fact, that Timokrates
-gave private presents to various leading politicians, which is by no
-means improbable,—we must dissent from the explanatory use which he
-makes of this fact by setting it out prominently as the cause of the
-war. What these leading men would find it difficult to raise was,
-not hatred to Sparta, but confidence and courage to brave the power
-of Sparta. And for this purpose the mission of Timokrates would be
-a valuable aid, by conveying assurances of Persian coöperation and
-support against Sparta. He must have been produced publicly either
-before the people, the senate, or at least the great body of the
-anti-Laconian party in each city. And the money which he brought with
-him, though a portion of it may have gone in private presents, would
-serve to this party as the best warrant for the sincerity of the
-satrap.
-
-  [536] Xen. Hellen. iii, 4, 26.
-
-  [537] Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 16.
-
-  [538] Xen. Hellen. iii, 5, 2. Οἱ μὲν δὴ δεξάμενοι τὰ χρήματα ἐς
-  τὰς οἰκείας πόλεις διέβαλλον τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους· ἐπεὶ δὲ ταύτας
-  ἐς μῖσος αὐτῶν προήγαγον, συνίστασαν καὶ τὰς μεγίστας πόλεις πρὸς
-  ἀλλήλας.
-
-  [539] Xenophon, _ut sup._
-
-  Pausanias (iii, 9, 4) names some Athenians as having received
-  part of the money. So Plutarch also, in general terms (Agesil. c.
-  15).
-
-  Diodorus mentions nothing respecting either the mission or the
-  presents of Timokrates.
-
-Whatever negotiations may have been in progress between the cities
-visited by Timokrates, no union had been brought about between them
-when the war, kindled by an accident, broke out as a “Bœotian
-war,”[540] between Thebes and Sparta separately. Between the Opuntian
-Lokrians and the Phokians, north of Bœotia, there was a strip of
-disputed border land; respecting which the Phokians, imputing
-wrongful encroachment to the Lokrians, invaded their territory. The
-Lokrians, allied with Thebes, entreated her protection; upon which
-a body of Bœotians invaded Phokis; while the Phokians on their
-side threw themselves upon Lacedæmon, invoking her aid against
-Thebes.[541] “The Lacedæmonians (says Xenophon) were delighted to
-get a pretence for making war against the Thebans,—having been long
-angry with them on several different grounds. They thought that the
-present was an excellent time for marching against them, and putting
-down their insolence; since Agesilaus was in full success in Asia,
-and there was no other war to embarrass them in Greece.”[542] The
-various grounds on which the Lacedæmonians rested their displeasure
-against Thebes, begin from a time immediately succeeding the close of
-the war against Athens, and the sentiment was now both established
-and vehement. It was they who now began the Bœotian war; not the
-Thebans, nor the bribes brought by Timokrates.
-
-  [540] Πόλεμος Βοιωτικός (Diodor. xiv, 81).
-
-  [541] Xenophon (Hellen. iii, 5, 3) says,—and Pausanias (iii, 9,
-  4) follows him,—That the Theban leaders, wishing to bring about
-  a war with Sparta, and knowing that Sparta would not begin it,
-  purposely incited the Lokrians to encroach upon this disputed
-  border, in order that the Phokians might resent it, and that thus
-  a war might be lighted up. I have little hesitation in rejecting
-  this version, which I conceive to have arisen from Xenophon’s
-  philo-Laconian and miso-Theban tendency, and in believing that
-  the fight between the Lokrians and Phokians, as well as that
-  between the Phokians and Thebans, arose without any design on the
-  part of the latter to provoke Sparta. So Diodorus recounts it, in
-  reference to the war between the Phokians and the Thebans; for
-  about the Lokrians he says nothing (xiv, 81).
-
-  The subsequent events, as recounted by Xenophon himself, show
-  that the Spartans were not only ready in point of force, but
-  eager in regard to will, to go to war with the Thebans; while the
-  latter were not at all ready to go to war with Sparta. They had
-  not a single ally; for their application to Athens, in itself
-  doubtful, was not made until after Sparta had declared war
-  against them.
-
-  [542] Xen. Hellen. iii, 5, 5. Οἱ μέντοι Λακεδαιμόνιοι ~ἄσμενοι
-  ἔλαβον πρόφασιν στρατεύειν ἐπὶ τοὺς Θηβαίους, πάλαι ὀργιζόμενοι~
-  αὐτοῖς, τῆς τε ἀντιλήψεως τῆς τοῦ Ἀπόλλωνος δεκάτης ἐν Δεκελείᾳ,
-  καὶ τοῦ ἐπὶ τὸν Πειραιᾶ μὴ ἐθελῆσαι ἀκολουθῆσαι· ᾐτιῶντο δ᾽
-  αὐτοὺς, καὶ Κορινθίους πεῖσαι μὴ συστρατεύειν. Ἀνεμιμνήσκοντο δὲ
-  καὶ, ὡς θύοντ᾽ ἐν Αὐλίδι τὸν Ἀγησίλαον οὐκ εἴων, καὶ τὰ τεθυμένα
-  ἱερὰ ὡς ἔῤῥιψαν ἀπὸ τοῦ βωμοῦ· καὶ ὅτι οὐδ᾽ εἰς τὴν Ἀσίαν
-  συνεστράτευον Ἀγησιλάῳ. Ἐλογίζοντο δὲ καὶ καλὸν εἶναι τοῦ ἐξάγειν
-  στρατιὰν ἐπ᾽ αὐτοὺς, καὶ παῦσαι τῆς ἐς αὐτοὺς ὕβρεως· τά τε γὰρ
-  ἐν τῇ Ἀσίᾳ καλῶς σφίσιν ἔχειν, κρατοῦντος Ἀγησιλάου, καὶ ἐν τῇ
-  Ἑλλάδι οὐδένα ἄλλον πόλεμον ἐμποδὼν σφίσιν εἶναι. Compare vii, 1,
-  34.
-
-  The description here given by Xenophon himself,—of the
-  past dealing and established sentiment between Sparta and
-  Thebes,—refutes his allegation, that it was the bribes brought
-  by Timokrates to the leading Thebans which first blew up the
-  hatred against Sparta; and shows farther, that Sparta did not
-  need any circuitous manœuvres of the Thebans, to furnish her with
-  a pretext for going to war.
-
-The energetic and ambitious Lysander, who had before instigated the
-expedition of Agesilaus across the Ægean, and who had long hated
-the Thebans,—was among the foremost advisers of the expedition now
-decreed by the ephors against Thebes,[543] as well as the chief
-commander appointed to carry it into execution. He was despatched
-with a small force to act on the north of Bœotia. He was directed
-to start from Herakleia, the centre of Lacedæmonian influence in
-those regions,—to muster the Herakleots, together with the various
-dependent populations in the neighborhood of Œta, Œtæans, Malians,
-Ænianes, etc.—to march towards Bœotia, taking up the Phokians
-in his way,—and to attack Haliartus. Under the walls of this
-town king Pausanias engaged to meet him on a given day, with the
-native Lacedæmonian force and the Peloponnesian allies. For this
-purpose, having obtained favorable border sacrifices, he marched
-forth to Tegea, and there employed himself in collecting the allied
-contingents from Peloponnesus.[544] But the allies generally were
-tardy and reluctant in the cause; while the Corinthians withheld
-all concurrence and support,[545]—though neither did they make any
-manifestation in favor of Thebes.
-
-  [543] Plutarch, Lysand. c. 28.
-
-  [544] Xen. Hellen. iii, 5, 6, 7.
-
-  [545] Xen. Hellen. iii, 5, 23.
-
-  The conduct of the Corinthians here contributes again to refute
-  the assertion of Xenophon about the effect of the bribes of
-  Timokrates.
-
-Finding themselves thus exposed to a formidable attack on two sides,
-from Sparta at the height of her power, and from a Spartan officer
-of known ability,—being, moreover, at the same time without a
-single ally,—the Thebans resolved to entreat succor from Athens. A
-Theban embassy to Athens for any purpose, and especially for this
-purpose, was itself among the strongest marks of the revolution which
-had taken place in Grecian politics. The antipathy between the
-two cities had been so long and virulent, that the Thebans, at the
-close of the war, had endeavored to induce Sparta to root out the
-Athenian population. Their conduct subsequently had been favorable
-and sympathizing towards Thrasybulus in his struggle against the
-Thirty, and that leader had testified his gratitude by dedicating
-statues in the Theban Herakleion.[546] But it was by no means clear
-that Athens would feel herself called upon, either by policy or by
-sentiment, to assist them in the present emergency; at a moment when
-she had no Long Walls, no fortifications at Peiræus, no ships, nor
-any protection against the Spartan maritime power.
-
-  [546] Pausanias, ix, 11, 4.
-
-It was not until Pausanias and Lysander were both actually engaged in
-mustering their forces, that the Thebans sent to address the Athenian
-assembly. The speech of the Theban envoy sets forth strikingly the
-case against Sparta as it then stood. Disclaiming all concurrence
-with that former Theban deputy, who, without any instructions, had
-taken on himself to propose, in the Spartan assembly of allies,
-extreme severity towards the conquered Athenians,—he reminded the
-Athenians that Thebes had by unanimous voice declined obeying the
-summons of the Spartans, to aid in the march against Thrasybulus
-and the Peiræus; and that this was the first cause of the anger
-of the Spartans against her. On that ground, then, he appealed to
-the gratitude of democratical Athens against the Lacedæmonians.
-But he likewise invoked against them, with yet greater confidence,
-the aid of oligarchical Athens,—or of those who at that time had
-stood opposed to Thrasybulus and the Peiræus; for it was Sparta who,
-having first set up the oligarchy at Athens, had afterwards refused
-to sustain it, and left its partisans to the generosity of their
-democratical opponents, by whom alone they were saved harmless.[547]
-Of course Athens was eager, if possible (so he presumed), to regain
-her lost empire; and in this enterprise he tendered the cordial
-aid of Thebes as an ally. He pointed out that it was by no means
-an impracticable enterprise; looking to the universal hatred which
-Sparta had now drawn upon herself, not less on the part of ancient
-allies than of prior enemies. The Athenians knew by experience that
-Thebes could be formidable as a foe; she would now show that she
-could be yet more effective as a friend, if the Athenians would
-interfere to rescue her. Moreover, she was now about to fight, not
-for Syracusans or Asiatics, but for her own preservation and dignity.
-“We hesitate not to affirm, men of Athens (concluded the Theban
-speaker), that what we are now invoking at your hands is a greater
-benefit to you than it is to ourselves.”[548]
-
-  [547] Xen. Hellen. iii, 5, 9.
-
-  Πολὺ δ᾽ ἔτι μᾶλλον ἀξιοῦμεν, ὅσοι τῶν ἐν ἄστει ἐγένεσθε, προθύμως
-  ἐπὶ τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους ἰέναι. Ἐκεῖνοι γὰρ, καταστήσαντες ὑμᾶς ἐς
-  ὀλιγαρχίαν καὶ ἐς ἔχθραν τῷ δήμῳ, ἀφικόμενοι πολλῇ δυνάμει, ὡς
-  ὑμῖν σύμμαχοι, παρέδοσαν ὑμᾶς τῷ πλήθει· ὥστε τὸ μὲν ἐπ᾽ ἐκείνοις
-  εἶναι, ἀπολώλατε, ὁ δὲ δῆμος οὑτοσὶ ὑμᾶς ἔσωσε.
-
-  [548] Xen. Hellen. iii, 5, 9, 16.
-
-Eight years had now elapsed since the archonship of Eukleides and
-the renovation of the democracy after the crushing visitation of
-the Thirty. Yet we may see, from the important and well-turned
-allusion of the Theban speaker to the oligarchical portion of the
-assembly, that the two parties still stood in a certain measure
-distinguished. Enfeebled as Athens had been left by the war, she
-had never since been called upon to take any decisive and emphatic
-vote on a question of foreign policy; and much now turned upon the
-temper of the oligarchical minority, which might well be conceived
-likely to play a party game and speculate upon Spartan countenance.
-But the comprehensive amnesty decreed on the reëstablishment of the
-democratical constitution,—and the wise and generous forbearance
-with which it had been carried out, in spite of the most torturing
-recollections,—were now found to have produced their fruits.
-Majority and minority,—democrats and oligarchs,—were seen
-confounded in one unanimous and hearty vote to lend assistance to
-Thebes, in spite of all risk from hostility with Sparta. We cannot
-indeed doubt that this vote was considerably influenced also by the
-revolt of Rhodes, by the reappearance of Konon with a fleet in the
-Asiatic seas, and by private communications from that commander
-intimating his hope of acting triumphantly against the maritime power
-of Sparta, through enlarged aid from Persia. The vote had thus a
-double meaning. It proclaimed not merely the restored harmony between
-democrats and oligarchs at Athens, but also their common resolution
-to break the chain by which they were held as mere satellites and
-units in the regiment of Spartan allies, and to work out anew the
-old traditions of Athens as a self-acting and primary power, at
-least,—if not once again an imperial power. The vote proclaimed
-a renovated life in Athens, and its boldness under the existing
-weakness of the city, is extolled two generations afterwards by
-Demosthenes.[549]
-
-  [549] Demosthen. de Coronâ, c. 28, p. 258; also Philipp. i, c. 7,
-  p. 44. Compare also Lysias, Orat. xvi, (pro Mantitheo, s. 15).
-
-After having heard the Theban orator (we are told even by the
-philo-Laconian Xenophon),[550] “very many Athenian citizens rose
-and spoke in support of his prayer, and the whole assembly with one
-accord voted to grant it.” Thrasybulus proposed the resolution, and
-communicated it to the Theban envoys.
-
-  [550] Xen. Hellen. iii, 5, 16. Τῶν δ᾽ Ἀθηναίων παμπολλοὶ μὲν
-  ξυνηγόρευον, πάντες δ᾽ ἐψηφίσαντο βοηθεῖν αὐτοῖς.
-
-He told them that Athens knew well the risk which she was incurring
-while Peiræus was undefended; but nevertheless she was prepared to
-show her gratitude by giving more in requital than she had received;
-for she was prepared to give the Thebans positive aid, in case they
-were attacked—while the Thebans had done nothing more for _her_ than
-to refuse to join in an aggressive march against her.[551]
-
-  [551] Xen. Hellen. _ut sup._
-
-  Pausanias (iii, 9, 6) says that the Athenians sent envoys to the
-  Spartans to entreat them not to act aggressively against Thebes,
-  but to submit their complaint to equitable adjustment. This seems
-  to me improbable. Diodorus (xiv, 81) briefly states the general
-  fact in conformity with Xenophon.
-
-Without such assurance of succor from Athens, it is highly probable
-that the Thebans might have been afraid to face, single-handed,
-Lysander and the full force of Sparta. But they now prepared for a
-strenuous defence. The first approach of Lysander with his army of
-Herakleots, Phokians, and others, from the north, was truly menacing;
-the more so, as Orchomenus, the second city next to Thebes in the
-Bœotian confederacy, broke off its allegiance and joined him. The
-supremacy of Thebes over the cities composing the Bœotian confederacy
-appears to have been often harsh and oppressive, though probably not
-equally oppressive towards all, and certainly not equally odious to
-all. To Platæa on the extreme south of Bœotia, it had been long
-intolerable, and the unhappy fate of that little town has saddened
-many pages of my preceding volumes; to Orchomenus, on the extreme
-north, it was also unpalatable,—partly because that town stood next
-in power and importance to Thebes,—partly because it had an imposing
-legendary antiquity, and claimed to have been once the ascendant city
-receiving tribute from Thebes. The Orchomenians now joined Lysander,
-threw open to him the way into Bœotia, and conducted him with his
-army, after first ravaging the fields of Lebadeia, into the district
-belonging to Haliartus.[552]
-
-  [552] Xen. Hellen. iii, 5, 17; Plutarch, Lysand. c. 28.
-
-Before Lysander quitted Sparta, the plan of operations concerted
-between him and Pausanias, was that they should meet on a given
-day in the territory of Haliartus. And in execution of this plan
-Pausanias had already advanced with his Peloponnesian army as far
-as Platæa in Bœotia. Whether the day fixed between them had yet
-arrived, when Lysander reached Haliartus, we cannot determine with
-certainty. In the imperfection of the Grecian calendar, a mistake on
-this point would be very conceivable,—as had happened between the
-Athenian generals Hippokrates and Demosthenes in those measures which
-preceded the battle of Delium in 424 B.C.[553] But the engagement
-must have been taken by both parties, subject to obstructions in the
-way,—since each would have to march through a hostile country to
-reach the place of meeting. The words of Xenophon, however, rather
-indicate that the day fixed had not arrived; nevertheless, Lysander
-resolved at once to act against Haliartus, without waiting for
-Pausanias. There were as yet only a few Thebans in the town, and he,
-probably, had good reasons for judging that he would better succeed
-by rapid measures, before any more Thebans could arrive, than by
-delaying until the other Spartan army should join him; not to mention
-anxiety that the conquest should belong to himself exclusively,
-and confidence arising from his previous success at Orchomenus.
-Accordingly, he sent in an invitation to the Haliartians to follow
-the example of the Orchomenians, to revolt from Thebes, and to stand
-upon their autonomy under Lacedæmonian protection. Perhaps there may
-have been a party in the town disposed to comply. But the majority,
-encouraged too by the Thebans within, refused the proposition; upon
-which Lysander marched up to the walls and assaulted the town. He was
-here engaged, close by the gates, in examining where he could best
-effect an entrance, when a fresh division of Thebans, apprised of
-his proceedings, was seen approaching from Thebes, at their fastest
-pace,—cavalry, as well as hoplites. They were probably seen from
-the watch-towers in the city earlier than they became visible to
-the assailants without; so that the Haliartians, encouraged by the
-sight, threw open their gates, and made a sudden sally. Lysander,
-seemingly taken by surprise, was himself slain among the first, with
-his prophet by his side, by a Haliartian hoplite named Neochôrus. His
-troops stood some time, against both the Haliartians from the town,
-and the fresh Thebans who now came up. But they were at length driven
-back with considerable loss, and compelled to retreat to rugged and
-difficult ground at some distance in their rear. Here, however, they
-made good their position, repelling their assailants with the loss of
-more than two hundred hoplites.[554]
-
-  [553] Thucyd. iv, 89. γενομένης διαμαρτίας τῶν ἡμερῶν, etc.
-
-  [554] Xen. Hellen. iii, 5, 18, 19, 20; Plutarch, Lysand. c. 28,
-  29; Pausan. iii, 5, 4.
-
-  The two last differ in various matters from Xenophon, whose
-  account, however, though brief, seems to me to deserve the
-  preference.
-
-The success here gained, though highly valuable as an encouragement
-to the Thebans, would have been counterbalanced by the speedy
-arrival of Pausanias, had not Lysander himself been among the
-slain. But the death of so eminent a man was an irreparable loss to
-Sparta. His army, composed of heterogeneous masses, both collected
-and held together by his personal ascendency, lost confidence and
-dispersed in the ensuing night.[555] When Pausanias arrived soon
-afterwards, he found no second army to join with him. Yet his own
-force was more than sufficient to impress terror on the Thebans,
-had not Thrasybulus, faithful to the recent promise, arrived with
-an imposing body of Athenian hoplites, together with cavalry under
-Orthobulus[556]—and imparted fresh courage as well as adequate
-strength to the Theban cause.
-
-  [555] Xen. Hellen. iii, 5, 21. ἀπεληλυθότας ἐν νυκτὶ τούς τε
-  Φωκέας καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ἅπαντας οἴκαδε ἑκάστους, etc.
-
-  [556] Lysias, Or. xvi, (pro Mantitheo) s. 15, 16.
-
-Pausanias had first to consider what steps he would take to recover
-the bodies of the slain,—that of Lysander among them; whether he
-would fight a battle and thus take his chance of becoming master
-of the field,—or send the usual petition for burial-truce, which
-always implied confession of inferiority. On submitting the point
-to a council of officers and Spartan elders, their decision as well
-as his own was against fighting; not, however, without an indignant
-protest from some of the Spartan elders. He considered that the whole
-original plan of operations was broken up, since not only the great
-name and genius of Lysander had perished, but his whole army had
-spontaneously disbanded; that the Peloponnesian allies were generally
-lukewarm and reluctant, not to be counted upon for energetic behavior
-in case of pressing danger; that he had little or no cavalry,[557]
-while the Theban cavalry was numerous and excellent; lastly, that
-the dead body of Lysander himself lay so close to the walls of
-Haliartus, that even if the Lacedæmonians were victorious, they could
-not carry it off without serious loss from the armed defenders in
-their towers.[558] Such were the reasons which determined Pausanias
-and the major part of the council to send and solicit a truce. But
-the Thebans refused to grant it except on condition that they should
-immediately evacuate Bœotia. Though such a requisition was contrary
-to the received practice of Greece,[559] which imposed on the victor
-the duty of granting the burial-truce unconditionally, whenever it
-was asked and inferiority thus publicly confessed,—nevertheless,
-such was the reluctant temper of the army, that they heard not merely
-with acquiescence, but with joy,[560] the proposition of departing.
-The bodies were duly buried,—that of Lysander in the territory of
-Panopê, immediately across the Phokian border, but not far from
-Haliartus. And no sooner were these solemnities completed, than the
-Lacedæmonian army was led back to Peloponnesus; their dejection
-forming a mournful contrast to the triumphant insolence of the
-Thebans, who watched their march and restrained them, not without
-occasional blows, from straggling out of the road into the cultivated
-fields.[561]
-
-  [557] Accordingly we learn from an oration of Lysias, that the
-  service of the Athenian horsemen in this expedition, who were
-  commanded by Orthobulus, was judged to be extremely safe and
-  easy; while that of the hoplites was dangerous (Lysias, Orat.
-  xvi, pro Mantith. s. 15).
-
-  [558] Xen. Hellen. iii, 5, 23. Κορίνθιοι μὲν παντάπασιν οὐκ
-  ἠκολούθουν αὐτοῖς, οἱ δὲ παρόντες οὐ προθύμως στρατεύοιντο, etc.
-
-  [559] See the conduct of the Thebans on this very point (of
-  giving up the slain at the solicitation of the conquered
-  Athenians for burial) after the battle of Delium, and the
-  discussion thereupon,—in this History, Vol. VI, ch. liii, p. 393
-  _seq._
-
-  [560] Xen. Hellen. iii, 5, 24. Οἱ δὲ ἄσμενοί τε ταῦτα ἤκουσαν,
-  etc.
-
-  [561] Xen. Hellen. iii, 5, 24.
-
-The death of Lysander produced the most profound sorrow and
-resentment at Sparta. On returning thither, Pausanias found himself
-the subject of such virulent accusation, that he thought it prudent
-to make his escape, and take sanctuary in the temple of Athênê Alea,
-at Tegea. He was impeached, and put on trial during his absence, on
-two counts; first, for having been behind the time covenanted, in
-meeting Lysander at Haliartus; next for having submitted to ask a
-truce from the Thebans, instead of fighting a battle for the purpose
-of obtaining the bodies of the slain.
-
-As far as there is evidence to form a judgment, it does not appear
-that Pausanias was guilty upon either of the two counts. The first
-is a question of fact; and it seems quite as likely that Lysander
-was before his time, as that Pausanias was behind his time, in
-arriving at Haliartus. Besides, Lysander, arriving there first,
-would have been quite safe, had he not resolved to attack without
-delay; in which the chances of war turned out against him; though
-the resolution in itself may have been well conceived. Next, as to
-the truce solicited for burying the dead bodies,—it does not appear
-that Pausanias could with any prudence have braved the chances of a
-battle. The facts of the case,—even as summed up by Xenophon, who
-always exaggerates everything in favor of the Spartans,—lead us to
-this conclusion. A few of the Spartan elders would doubtless prefer
-perishing on the field of battle, to the humiliation of sending in
-the herald to ask for a truce. But the mischief of fighting a battle
-under the influence of such a point of honor, to the exclusion of
-a rational estimate of consequences, will be seen when we come to
-the battle of Leuktra, where Kleombrotus, son of Pausanias was thus
-piqued into an imprudence (at least this is alleged as one of the
-motives) to which his own life and the dominion of Sparta became
-forfeit.[562] Moreover, the army of Pausanias, comprising very few
-Spartans, consisted chiefly of allies who had no heart in the cause,
-and who were glad to be required by the Thebans to depart. If he
-had fought a battle and lost it, the detriment to Sparta would have
-been most serious in every way; whereas, if he had gained a victory,
-no result would have followed except the acquisition of the bodies
-for burial; since the execution of the original plan had become
-impracticable through the dispersion of the army of Lysander.
-
-  [562] Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 5.
-
-Though a careful examination of the facts leads us (and seems also
-to have led Xenophon[563]) to the conclusion that Pausanias was
-innocent, he was nevertheless found guilty in his absence. He was in
-great part borne down by the grief felt at Sparta for the loss of
-Lysander, with whom he had been before in political rivalry, and for
-whose death he was made responsible. Moreover, the old accusation
-was now revived against him,[564]—for which he had been tried,
-and barely acquitted, eight years before,—of having tolerated the
-reëstablishment of the Athenian democracy at a time when he might
-have put it down. Without doubt this argument told prodigiously
-against him at the present juncture, when the Athenians had just
-now, for the first time since the surrender of their city, renounced
-their subjection to Sparta and sent an army to assist the Thebans in
-their defence. So violent was the sentiment against Pausanias, that
-he was condemned to death in his absence, and passed the remainder of
-his life as an exile in sanctuary at Tegea. His son, Agesipolis, was
-invested with the sceptre in his place.
-
-  [563] The traveller Pausanias justifies the prudence of his regal
-  namesake in avoiding a battle, by saying that the Athenians
-  were in his rear, and the Thebans in his front; and that he was
-  afraid of being assailed on both sides at once, like Leonidas at
-  Thermopylæ and like the troops enclosed in Sphakteria (Paus. iii,
-  5, 5).
-
-  But the matter of fact, on which this justification rests,
-  is contradicted by Xenophon, who says that the Athenians had
-  actually joined the Thebans, and were in the same ranks—ἐλθόντες
-  ξυμπαρετάξαντο (Hellen. iii, 5, 22).
-
-  [564] Xen. Hellen. iii, 5, 25. Καὶ ὅτι τὸν δῆμον τῶν Ἀθηναίων
-  λαβὼν ἐν τῷ Πειραιεῖ ἀνῆκε, etc. Compare Pausanias, iii, 5, 3.
-
-A brief remark will not be here misplaced. On no topic have Grecian
-historians been more profuse in their reproaches, than upon the
-violence and injustice of democracy, at Athens and elsewhere, in
-condemning unsuccessful, but innocent generals. Out of the many cases
-in which this reproach is advanced, there are very few wherein it
-has been made good; but even if we grant it to be valid against
-Athens and her democracy, the fate of Pausanias will show us that
-the ephors and senate of anti-democratical Sparta were capable of
-the like unjust misjudgment. Hardly a single instance of Athenian
-condemnation occurs, which we can so clearly prove to be undeserved,
-as this of a Spartan king.
-
-Turning from the banished king to Lysander,—the Spartans had indeed
-valid reasons for deploring the fall of the latter. He had procured
-for them their greatest and most decisive victories, and the time was
-coming when they needed his services to procure them more; for he
-left behind him no man of equal warlike resource, cunning, and power
-of command. But if he possessed those abilities which powerfully
-helped Sparta to triumph over her enemies, he at the same time did
-more than any man to bring her empire into dishonor, and to render
-its tenure precarious. His decemviral governments or dekarchies,
-diffused through the subject cities, and each sustained by a
-Lacedæmonian harmost and garrison, were aggravations of local tyranny
-such as the Grecian world had never before undergone. And though the
-Spartan authorities presently saw that he was abusing the imperial
-name of the city for unmeasured personal aggrandizement of his own,
-and partially withdrew their countenance from his dekarchies,—yet
-the general character of their empire still continued to retain the
-impress of partisanship and subjugation which he had originally
-stamped upon it. Instead of that autonomy which Sparta had so
-repeatedly promised, it became subjection every way embittered. Such
-an empire was pretty sure to be short-lived; but the loss to Sparta
-herself, when her empire fell away, is not the only fault which the
-historian of Greece has to impute to Lysander. His far deeper sin
-consists in his having thrown away an opportunity,—such as never
-occurred either before or afterwards,—for organizing some permanent,
-honorable, self-maintaining, Pan-hellenic combination under the
-headship of Sparta. This is (as I have before remarked) what a man
-like Kallikratidas would have attempted, if not with far-sighted
-wisdom, at least with generous sincerity, and by an appeal to the
-best veins of political sentiment in the chief city as well as in
-the subordinates. It is possible that with the best intentions even
-he might have failed; so strong was the centrifugal instinct in the
-Grecian political mind. But what we have to reproach in Lysander is,
-that he never tried; that he abused the critical moment of cure for
-the purpose of infusing new poison into the system; that he not only
-sacrificed the interests of Greece to the narrow gains of Sparta,
-but even the interests of Sparta to the still narrower monopoly of
-dominion in his own hands. That his measures worked mischievously not
-merely for Greece, but for Sparta herself, aggravating all her bad
-tendencies,—has been already remarked in the preceding pages.
-
-That Lysander, with unbounded opportunities of gain, both lived
-and died poor, exhibits the honorable side of his character. Yet
-his personal indifference to money seems only to have left the
-greater space in his bosom for that thirst of power which made him
-unscrupulous in satiating the rapacity, as well as in upholding
-the oppressions, of coadjutors like the Thirty at Athens and the
-decemvirs in other cities. In spite of his great success and ability
-in closing the Peloponnesian war, we shall agree with Pausanias[565]
-that he was more mischievous than profitable even to Sparta,—even
-if we take no thought of Greece generally. What would have been the
-effect produced by his projects in regard to the regal succession,
-had he been able to bring them to bear, we have no means of
-measuring. We are told that the discourse composed and addressed
-to him by the Halicarnassian rhetor Kleon, was found after his
-death among his papers by Agesilaus; who first learnt from it, with
-astonishment and alarm, the point to which the ambition of Lysander
-had tended, and was desirous of exposing his real character by
-making the discourse public,—but was deterred by dissuasive counsel
-of the ephor Lakratidas. But this story (attested by Ephorus[566])
-looks more like an anecdote of the rhetorical schools than like a
-reality. Agesilaus was not the man to set much value on sophists or
-their compositions; nor is it easy to believe that he remained so
-long ignorant of those projects which Lysander had once entertained
-but subsequently dropped. Moreover the probability is, that Kleon
-himself would make the discourse public as a sample of his own
-talents, even in the lifetime of Lysander; not only without shame,
-but as representing the feelings of a considerable section of readers
-throughout the Grecian world.
-
-  [565] Pausanias, ix, 32, 6.
-
-  [566] Ephorus, Fr. 127, ed. Didot; Plutarch, Lysander, c. 30.
-
-Most important were the consequences which ensued from the death of
-Lysander and the retreat of Pausanias out of Bœotia. Fresh hope and
-spirits were infused into all the enemies of Sparta. An alliance was
-immediately concluded against her by Thebes, Athens, Corinth, and
-Argos. Deputies from these four cities were appointed to meet at
-Corinth, and to take active measures for inviting the coöperation of
-fresh allies; so that the war which had begun as a Bœotian war, now
-acquired the larger denomination of Corinthian war, under which it
-lasted until the peace of Antalkidas. The alliance was immediately
-strengthened by the junction of the Eubœans,—the Akarnanians,—the
-Ozolian Lokrians,—Ambrakia and Leukas (both particularly attached to
-Corinth),—and the Chalkidians of Thrace.[567]
-
-  [567] Diodor. xiv, 81, 82; Xen. Hellen. iv, 2, 17.
-
-We now enter upon the period when, for the first time, Thebes begins
-to step out of the rank of secondary powers, and gradually raises
-herself into a primary and ascendant city in Grecian politics.
-Throughout the Peloponnesian war, the Thebans had shown themselves
-excellent soldiers, both on horseback and on foot, as auxiliaries
-to Sparta. But now the city begins to have a policy of its own, and
-individual citizens of ability become conspicuous. While waiting
-for Pelopidas and Epaminondas, with whom we shall presently become
-acquainted, we have at the present moment Ismenias; a wealthy Theban,
-a sympathizer with Thrasybulus and the Athenian exiles eight years
-before, and one of the great organizers of the present anti-Spartan
-movement; a man, too, honored by his political enemies,[568] when
-they put him to death fourteen years afterwards, with the title of “a
-great wicked man,”—the same combination of epithets which Clarendon
-applies to Oliver Cromwell.
-
-  [568] Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 36. Ὁ δ᾽ (Ismenias) ἀπελογεῖτο μὲν πρὸς
-  πάντα ταῦτα, οὐ μέντοι ἔπειθέ γε τὸ μὴ οὐ μεγαλοπράγμων τε καὶ
-  κακοπράγμων εἶναι.
-
-  It is difficult to make out anything from the two allusions
-  in Plato, except that Ismenias was a wealthy and powerful man
-  (Plato, Menon, p. 90 B; Republ. i. p. 336 A.).
-
-It was Ismenias, who, at the head of a body of Bœotians and Argeians,
-undertook an expedition to put down the Spartan influence in the
-regions north of Bœotia. At Pharsalus in Thessaly, the Lacedæmonians
-had an harmost and garrison; at Pheræ, Lykophron the despot was
-their ally; while Larissa, with Medius the despot, was their
-principal enemy. By the aid of the Bœotians, Medius was now enabled
-to capture Pharsalus; Larissa, with Krannon and Skotusa, was received
-into the Theban alliance,[569] and Ismenias obtained also the more
-important advantage of expelling the Lacedæmonians from Herakleia.
-Some malcontents, left after the violent interference of the Spartan
-Herippidas two years before, opened the gates of Herakleia by
-night to the Bœotians and Argeians. The Lacedæmonians in the town
-were put to the sword, but the other Peloponnesian colonists were
-permitted to retire in safety; while the old Trachinian inhabitants,
-whom the Lacedæmonians had expelled to make room for their new
-settlers, together with the Œtæans, whom they had driven out of the
-districts in the neighborhood,—were now called back to repossess
-their original homes.[570] The loss of Herakleia was a serious blow
-to the Spartans in those regions,—protecting Eubœa in its recent
-revolt from them, and enabling Ismenias to draw into his alliance the
-neighboring Malians, Ænianes, and Athamanes,—tribes stretching along
-the valley of the Spercheius westward to the vicinity of Pindus.
-Assembling additional troops from these districts (which, only a
-few months before, had supplied an army to Lysander[571]), Ismenias
-marched against the Phokians, among whom the Spartan Lakisthenes had
-been left as harmost in command. After a severe battle, this officer
-with his Phokians was defeated near the Lokrian town of Naryx; and
-Ismenias came back victorious to the synod at Corinth.[572]
-
-  [569] Diodor. xiv, 82; Xen. Hellen. iv, 3, 3; Xen. Agesil. ii, 2.
-
-  [570] Diodor. xiv, 38-82.
-
-  [571] Xenoph. Hellen. iii, 5, 6.
-
-  [572] Diodor. xiv, 82.
-
-By such important advantages, accomplished during the winter of
-395-394 B.C., the prospects of Grecian affairs as they stood in the
-ensuing spring became materially altered. The allies assembled at
-Corinth, full of hope, and resolved to levy a large combined force
-to act against Sparta; who on her side seemed to be threatened with
-the loss of all her extra-Peloponnesian land-empire. Accordingly,
-the ephors determined to recall without delay Agesilaus with his
-army from Asia, and sent Epikydidas with orders to that effect.
-But even before this reinforcement could arrive, they thought it
-expedient to muster their full Peloponnesian force and to act
-with vigor against the allies at Corinth, who were now assembling
-in considerable numbers. Aristodemus,—guardian of the youthful
-king Agesipolis son of Pausanias, and himself of the Eurystheneid
-race,—marched at the head of a body of six thousand Lacedæmonian
-hoplites;[573] the Spartan xenâgi (or officers sent on purpose to
-conduct the contingents from the outlying allies), successively
-brought in three thousand hoplites from Elis, Triphylia, Akroreia,
-and Lasion,—fifteen hundred from Sikyon,—three thousand from
-Epidaurus, Trœzen, Hermionê, and Halieis. None were sent from Phlias,
-on the plea (true or false[574]) that in that city the moment was one
-of solemnity and holy truce. There were also hoplites from Tegea,
-Mantineia, and the Achæan towns, but their number is not given; so
-that we do not know the full muster-roll on the Lacedæmonian side.
-The cavalry, six hundred in number, were all Lacedæmonian; there
-were, moreover, three hundred Kretan bowmen,—and four hundred
-slingers from different rural districts of Triphylia.[575]
-
-  [573] Xen. Hellen. iv, 2, 16. Xenophon gives this total of six
-  thousand as if it were of Lacedæmonians _alone_. But if we follow
-  his narrative, we shall see that there were unquestionably
-  in the army troops of Tegea, Mantineia, and the Achæan towns
-  (probably also some of other Arcadian towns,) present in the
-  battle (iv, 2, 13, 18, 20). Can we suppose that Xenophon meant
-  to include _these_ allies in the total of six thousand, along
-  with the Lacedæmonians,—which is doubtless a large total for
-  Lacedæmonians alone? Unless this supposition be admitted,
-  there is no resource except to assume an omission, either of
-  Xenophon himself, or of the copyist; which omission in fact Gail
-  and others do suppose. On the whole, I think they are right;
-  for the number of hoplites on both sides would otherwise be
-  prodigiously unequal; while Xenophon says nothing to imply that
-  the Lacedæmonian victory was gained in spite of great inferiority
-  of number, and something which even implies that it must have
-  been nearly equal (iv, 2, 13),—though he is always disposed to
-  compliment Sparta wherever he can.
-
-  [574] From a passage which occurs somewhat later (iv, 4, 15),
-  we may suspect that this was an excuse, and that the Phliasians
-  were not very well affected to Sparta. Compare a similar case of
-  excuse ascribed to the Mantineians (v, 2, 2).
-
-  [575] Diodorus (xiv, 83) gives a total of twenty-three thousand
-  foot and five hundred horse, on the Lacedæmonian side, but
-  without enumerating items. On the side of the confederacy he
-  states a total of more than fifteen thousand foot and five
-  hundred horse (c. 82).
-
-The allied force of the enemy was already mustered near Corinth;
-six thousand Athenian hoplites,—seven thousand Argeian,—five
-thousand Bœotian, those from Orchomenus being absent,—three thousand
-Corinthian,—three thousand from the different towns of Eubœa; making
-twenty-four thousand in all. The total of cavalry was fifteen hundred
-and fifty; composed of eight hundred Bœotian, six hundred Athenian,
-one hundred from Chalkis in Eubœa, and fifty from the Lokrians. The
-light troops also were numerous,—partly Corinthian, drawn probably
-from the serf-population which tilled the fields,[576]—partly
-Lokrians, Malians, and Akarnanians.
-
-  [576] Xen. Hellen. iv, 2, 17. Καὶ ψιλὸν δὲ, ξὺν τοῖς τῶν
-  Κορινθίων, πλέον ἦν, etc. Compare Hesychius, v, Κυνόφαλοι;
-  Welcker, Præfat. ad. Theognidem, p. xxxv; K. O. Müller, History
-  of the Dorians, iii, 4, 3.
-
-The allied leaders, holding a council of war to arrange their plans,
-came to a resolution that the hoplites should not be drawn up in
-deeper files than sixteen men,[577] in order that there might be no
-chance of their being surrounded; and that the right wing, carrying
-with it command for the time, should be alternated from day to day
-between the different cities. The confidence which the events of the
-last few months had infused into these leaders, now for the first
-time acting against their old leader Sparta, is surprising. “There
-is nothing like marching to Sparta (said the Corinthian Timolaus)
-and fighting the Lacedæmonians at or near their own home. We must
-burn out the wasps in their nest, without letting them come forth
-to sting us. The Lacedæmonian force is like that of a river; small
-at its source, and becoming formidable only by the affluents which
-it receives, in proportion to the length of its course.”[578] The
-wisdom of this advice was remarkable; but its boldness was yet more
-remarkable, when viewed in conjunction with the established feeling
-of awe towards Sparta. It was adopted by the general council of the
-allies; but unfortunately the time for executing it had already
-passed; for the Lacedæmonians were already in march and had crossed
-their own border. They took the line of road by Tegea and Mantineia
-(whose troops joined the march), and advanced as far as Sikyon,
-where probably all the Arcadian and Achæan contingents were ordered
-to rendezvous.
-
-  [577] Xen. Hellen. iv, 2, 13; compare iv, 2, 18,—where he says
-  of the Thebans—~ἀμελήσαντες~ τοῦ ἐς ἑκκαίδεκα, βαθεῖαν παντελῶς
-  ἐποιήσαντο τὴν φάλαγγα, etc., which implies and alludes to the
-  resolution previously taken.
-
-  [578] Xen. Hellen. iv, 2, 11, 12.
-
-The troops of the confederacy had advanced as far as Nemea when
-they learnt that the Lacedæmonian army was at Sikyon; but they then
-altered their plan, and confined themselves to the defensive. The
-Lacedæmonians on their side crossed over the mountainous post called
-Epieikia, under considerable annoyance from the enemy’s light troops,
-who poured missiles upon them from the high ground. But when they
-had reached the level country, on the other side, along the shore
-of the Saronic Gulf, where they probably received the contingents
-from Epidaurus, Trœzen, Hermionê, and Halieis,—the whole army thus
-reinforced marched forward without resistance, burning and ravaging
-the cultivated lands. The confederates retreated before them, and at
-length took up a position close to Corinth, amidst some rough ground
-with a ravine in their front.[579] The Lacedæmonians advanced forward
-until they were little more than a mile distant from this position,
-and there encamped.
-
-  [579] Xen. Hellen. iv, 2, 14, 15.
-
-  In the passage,—καὶ οἱ ἕτεροι μέντοι ~ἐλθόντες~
-  κατεστρατοπεδεύσαντο, ἔμπροσθεν ποιησάμενοι τὴν χαράδραν,—I
-  apprehend that ἀπελθόντες (which is sanctioned by four MSS.,
-  and preferred by Leunclavius) is the proper reading, in place
-  of ~ἐλθόντες~. For it seems certain that the march of the
-  confederates was one of retreat, and that the battle was fought
-  very near to the walls of Corinth; since the defeated troops
-  sought shelter within the town, and the Lacedæmonian pursuers
-  were so close upon them, that the Corinthians within were afraid
-  to keep open the gates. Hence we must reject the statement of
-  Diodorus,—that the battle was fought on the banks of the river
-  Nemea (xiv, 83) as erroneous.
-
-  There are some difficulties and obscurities in the description
-  which Xenophon gives of the Lacedæmonian march. His words
-  run—ἐν τούτῳ οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, καὶ δὴ Τεγεάτας παρειληφότες
-  καὶ Μαντινέας, ~ἐξῄεσαν τὴν ἀμφίαλον~. These last three words
-  are not satisfactorily explained. Weiske and Schneider construe
-  τὴν ἀμφίαλον (very justly) as indicating the region lying
-  immediately on the Peloponnesian side of the isthmus of Corinth
-  and having the Saronic Gulf on one side, and the Corinthian Gulf
-  on the other; in which was included Sikyon. But then it would
-  not be correct to say, that “the Lacedæmonians had gone out by
-  the bimarine way.” On the contrary, the truth is, that “they
-  had gone out into the bimarine road or region,—which meaning
-  however would require a preposition—ἐξῄεσαν ~εἰς~ τὴν ἀμφίαλον.
-  Sturz in his Lexicon (v. ἐξιέναι) renders τὴν ἀμφίαλον—_viam ad
-  mare_—which seems an extraordinary sense of the word, unless
-  instances were produced to support it; and even if instances were
-  produced, we do not see why the way from Sparta to Sikyon should
-  be called by that name; which would more properly belong to the
-  road from Sparta down the Eurotas to Helos.
-
-  Again, we do not know distinctly the situation of the point or
-  district called τὴν Ἐπιεικίαν (mentioned again, iv, 4, 13). But
-  it is certain from the map, that when the confederates were
-  at Nemea, and the Lacedæmonians at Sikyon,—the former must
-  have been exactly placed so as to intercept the junction of
-  the contingents from Epidaurus, Trœzen, and Hermionê, with the
-  Lacedæmonian army. To secure this junction, the Lacedæmonians
-  were obliged to force their way across that mountainous region
-  which lies near Kleônæ and Nemea, and to march in a line
-  pointing from Sikyon down to the Saronic Gulf. Having reached
-  the other side of these mountains near the sea, they would be in
-  communication with Epidaurus and the other towns of the Argolic
-  peninsula.
-
-  The line of march which the Lacedæmonians would naturally
-  take from Sparta to Sikyon and Lechæum, by Tegea, Mantineia,
-  Orchomenus, etc., is described two years afterwards in the case
-  of Agesilaus (iv, 5, 19).
-
-After an interval seemingly of a few days, the Bœotians, on the day
-when their turn came to occupy the right wing and to take the lead,
-gave the signal for battle.[580] The Lacedæmonians, prevented by
-the wooded ground from seeing clearly, were only made aware of the
-coming attack by hearing the hostile pæan. Taking order of battle
-immediately, they advanced forward to meet the assailants when within
-a furlong of their line. In each army, the right division took the
-lead,—slanting to the right, or keeping the left shoulder forward,
-according to the tendency habitual with Grecian hoplites, through
-anxiety to keep the right or unshielded side from being exposed
-to the enemy, and at the same time to be protected by the shield
-of a right-hand neighbor.[581] The Lacedæmonians in the one army,
-and the Thebans in the other, each inclined themselves, and caused
-their respective armies to incline also, in a direction slanting
-to the right, so that the Lacedæmonians on their side considerably
-outflanked the Athenians on the opposite left. Out of the ten tribes
-of Athenian hoplites, it was only the six on the extreme left who
-came into conflict with the Lacedæmonians; while the remaining four
-contended with the Tegeans who stood next to the Lacedæmonians on
-their own line. But the six extreme Athenian tribes were completely
-beaten, and severely handled, being taken in flank as well as in
-front by the Lacedæmonians. On the other hand, the remaining four
-Athenian tribes vanquished and drove before them the Tegeans; and
-generally, along all the rest of the line, the Thebans, Argeians, and
-Corinthians were victorious,—except where the troops of the Achæan
-Pellênê stood opposed to those of the Bœotian Thespiæ, where the
-battle was equal and the loss severe on both sides. The victorious
-confederates, however, were so ardent and incautious in pursuit, as
-to advance a considerable distance and return with disordered ranks;
-while the Lacedæmonians, who were habitually self-restraining in
-this particular, kept their order perfectly, attacking the Thebans,
-Argeians, and Corinthians to great advantage when returning to their
-camp. Several of the Athenian fugitives obtained shelter within the
-walls of Corinth; in spite of the opposition of the philo-Laconian
-Corinthians, who insisted upon shutting the gates against them, and
-opening negotiations with Sparta. The Lacedæmonians however came so
-near that it was at last thought impossible to keep the gates open
-longer. Many of the remaining confederates were therefore obliged to
-be satisfied with the protection of their ancient camp;[582] which
-seems, however, to have been situated in such defensible ground,[583]
-that the Lacedæmonians did not molest them in it.
-
-  [580] Xen. Hellen. iv, 2, 18. The coloring which Xenophon puts
-  upon this step is hardly fair to the Thebans, as is so constantly
-  the case throughout his history. He says that “they were in no
-  hurry to fight” (οὐδέν τι κατήπειγον τὴν μάχην ξυνάπτειν) so
-  long as they were on the left, opposed to the Lacedæmonians on
-  the opposite right; but that as soon as they were on the right
-  (opposed to the Achæans on the opposite left), they forthwith
-  gave the word. Now it does not appear that the Thebans had
-  any greater privilege on the day when they were on the right,
-  than the Argeians or Athenians had when each were on the right
-  respectively. The command had been determined to reside in the
-  right division, which post alternated from one to the other; why
-  the Athenians or Argeians did not make use of this post to order
-  the attack, we cannot explain.
-
-  So again, Xenophon says, that in spite of the resolution taken by
-  the Council of War to have files sixteen deep, and no more,—the
-  Thebans made their files much deeper. Yet it is plain, from his
-  own account, that no mischievous consequences turned upon this
-  greater depth.
-
-  [581] See the instructive description of the battle of
-  Mantineia—in Thucyd. v, 71.
-
-  [582] Xen. Hellen. iv, 2, 20-23.
-
-  The allusion to this incident in Demosthenes (adv. Leptinem, c.
-  13, p. 472) is interesting, though indistinct.
-
-  [583] Xen. Hellen. iv, 2, 19. καὶ γὰρ ἦν λάσιον τὸ χωρίον—which
-  illustrates the expression in Lysias, Orat. xvi, (pro Mantitheo)
-  s. 20. ἐν Κορίνθῳ χωρίων ἰσχυρῶν κατειλημμένων.
-
-So far as the Lacedæmonians separately were concerned, the battle
-of Corinth was an important victory, gained (as they affirmed) with
-the loss of only eight men, and inflicting heavy loss upon the
-Athenians in the battle, as well as upon the remaining confederates
-in their return from pursuit. Though the Athenian hoplites suffered
-thus severely, yet Thrasybulus their commander,[584] who kept the
-field until the last, with strenuous efforts to rally them, was
-not satisfied with their behavior. But on the other hand, all the
-allies of Sparta were worsted, and a considerable number of them
-slain. According to Diodorus, the total loss on the Lacedæmonian side
-was eleven hundred; on the side of the confederates twenty-eight
-hundred.[585] On the whole, the victory of the Lacedæmonians was
-not sufficiently decisive to lead to important results, though it
-completely secured their ascendency within Peloponnesus. We observe
-here, as we shall have occasion to observe elsewhere, that the
-Peloponnesian allies do not fight heartily in the cause of Sparta.
-They seem bound to her more by fear than by affection.
-
-  [584] Lysias, Orat. xvi, (pro Mantitheo) s. 19.
-
-  Plato in his panegyrical discourse (Menexenus, c. 17, p. 245
-  E.) ascribes the defeat and loss of the Athenians to “bad
-  ground”—χρησαμένων δυσχωρίᾳ.
-
-  [585] Diodor. xiv, 83.
-
-  The statement in Xenophon (Agesil. vii, 5) that near ten thousand
-  men were slain on the side of the confederates, is a manifest
-  exaggeration; if indeed the reading be correct.
-
-The battle of Corinth took place about July 394 B.C., seemingly
-about the same time as the naval battle near Knidus (or perhaps a
-little earlier), and while Agesilaus was on his homeward march after
-being recalled from Asia. Had the Lacedæmonians been able to defer
-the battle until Agesilaus had come up so as to threaten Bœotia on
-the northern side, their campaign would probably have been much more
-successful. As it is, their defeated allies doubtless went home in
-disgust from the field of Corinth, so that the confederates were now
-enabled to turn their whole attention to Agesilaus.
-
-That prince had received in Asia his summons of recall from the
-ephors with profound vexation and disappointment, yet at the same
-time with patriotic submission. He had augmented his army, and
-was contemplating more extensive schemes of operations against the
-Persian satrapies in Asia Minor. He had established such a reputation
-for military force and skill, that numerous messages reached him
-from different inland districts, expressing their anxiety to be
-emancipated from Persian dominion; and inviting him to come to their
-aid. His ascendency was also established over the Grecian cities
-on the coast, whom he still kept under the government of partisan
-oligarchies and Spartan harmosts,—yet seemingly with greater
-practical moderation, and less license of oppression, than had marked
-the conduct of these men when they could count upon so unprincipled
-a chief as Lysander. He was thus just now not only at a high pitch
-of actual glory and ascendency, but nourishing yet brighter hopes of
-farther conquests for the future. And what filled up the measure of
-his aspirations,—all the conquests were to be made at the expense,
-not of Greeks, but of the Persians. He was treading in the footsteps
-of Agamemnon, as Pan-hellenic leader against a Pan-hellenic enemy.
-
-All these glorious dreams were dissipated by Epikydidas, with his
-sad message, and peremptory summons, from the ephors. In the chagrin
-and disappointment of Agesilaus we can sincerely sympathize; but
-the panegyric which Xenophon and others pronounce upon him for his
-ready obedience is altogether unreasonable.[586] There was no merit
-in renouncing his projects of conquest at the bidding of the ephors;
-because, if any serious misfortune had befallen Sparta at home, none
-of those projects could have been executed. Nor is it out of place to
-remark, that even if Agesilaus had not been recalled, the extinction
-of the Lacedæmonian naval superiority by the defeat of Knidus, would
-have rendered all large plans of inland conquest impracticable. On
-receiving his orders of recall, he convened an assembly both of his
-allies and of his army, to make known the painful necessity of his
-departure; which was heard with open and sincere manifestations of
-sorrow. He assured them that as soon as he had dissipated the clouds
-which hung over Sparta at home, he should come back to Asia without
-delay, and resume his efforts against the Persian satraps; in the
-interim he left Euxenus, with a force of four thousand men for their
-protection. Such was the sympathy excited by his communication,
-combined with esteem for his character, that the cities passed a
-general vote to furnish him with contingents of troops for his march
-to Sparta. But this first burst of zeal abated, when they came to
-reflect that it was a service against Greeks; not merely unpopular
-in itself, but presenting a certainty of hard fighting with little
-plunder. Agesilaus tried every means to keep up their spirits, by
-proclaiming prizes both to the civic soldiers and to the mercenaries,
-to be distributed at Sestus in the Chersonesus, as soon as they
-should have crossed into Europe,—prizes for the best equipment, and
-best disciplined soldiers in every different arm.[587] By these means
-he prevailed upon the bravest and most effective soldiers in his
-army to undertake the march along with him; among them many of the
-Cyreians, with Xenophon himself at their head.
-
-  [586] Xen. Agesil. i, 37; Plutarch, Agesil. c. 15. Cornelius
-  Nepos (Agesilaus, c. 4) almost translates the Agesilaus of
-  Xenophon; but we can better feel the force of _his_ panegyric,
-  when we recollect that he had had personal cognizance of the
-  disobedience of Julius Cæsar in his province to the orders of the
-  Senate, and that the omnipotence of Sylla and Pompey in their
-  provinces were then matter of recent history. “Cujus exemplum
-  (says Cornelius Nepos about Agesilaus) utinam imperatores nostri
-  sequi voluissent!”
-
-  [587] Xen. Hellen. iv, 2, 2-5; Xen. Agesil. i, 38; Plutarch,
-  Agesil. c. 16.
-
-Though Agesilaus, in leaving Greece, had prided himself on hoisting
-the flag of Agamemnon, he was now destined against his will to tread
-in the footsteps of the Persian Xerxes in his march from the Thracian
-Chersonese through Thrace, Macedonia, and Thessaly, to Thermopylæ
-and Bœotia. Never, since the time of Xerxes, had any army undertaken
-this march; which now bore an Oriental impress, from the fact that
-Agesilaus brought with him some camels, taken in the battle of
-Sardis.[588] Overawing or defeating the various Thracian tribes, he
-reached Amphipolis on the Strymon where he was met by Derkyllidas,
-who had come fresh from the battle of Corinth and informed him of
-the victory. Full as his heart was of Pan-hellenic projects against
-Persia, he burst into exclamations of regret on hearing of the death
-of so many Greeks in battle, who could have sufficed, if united,
-to emancipate Asia Minor.[589] Sending Derkyllidas forward to Asia
-to make known the victory to the Grecian cities in his alliance,
-he pursued his march through Macedonia and Thessaly. In the latter
-country, Larissa, Krannon, and other cities in alliance with Thebes,
-raised opposition to bar his passage. But in the disunited condition
-of this country, no systematic resistance could be organized against
-him. Nothing more appeared than detached bodies of cavalry, whom he
-beat and dispersed, with the death of Polycharmus, their leader. As
-the Thessalian cavalry, however, was the best in Greece, he took
-great pride in having defeated them with cavalry disciplined by
-himself in Asia; backed, however, it must be observed, by skilful and
-effective support from his hoplites.[590] After having passed the
-Achæan mountains or the line of Mount Othrys, he marched the rest of
-the way without opposition, through the strait of Thermopylæ to the
-frontier of Phokis and Bœotia.
-
-  [588] Xen. Hellen. iii, 4, 24.
-
-  [589] Xenoph. Agesil. vii, 5; Plutarch, Agesil. c. 16.
-
-  [590] Xen. Hellen. iv, 2, 4-9; Diodor. xiv, 83.
-
-In this latter part of his march, Agesilaus was met by the ephor
-Diphridas in person, who urged him to hasten his march as much
-as possible, and attack the Bœotians. He was further joined by
-two Lacedæmonian regiments[591] from Corinth, and by fifty young
-Spartan volunteers as a body-guard, who crossed by sea from Sikyon.
-He was reinforced also by the Phokians and the Orchomenians,—in
-addition to the Peloponnesian troops who had accompanied him to
-Asia, the Asiatic hoplites, the Cyreians, the peltasts, and the
-cavalry, whom he had brought with him from the Hellespont, and some
-fresh troops collected in the march. His army was thus in imposing
-force when he reached the neighborhood of Chæroneia on the Bœotian
-border. It was here that they were alarmed by an eclipse of the
-sun, on the fourteenth of August, 394 B.C.; a fatal presage, the
-meaning of which was soon interpreted for them by the arrival of a
-messenger bearing news of the naval defeat of Knidus, with the death
-of Peisander, brother-in-law of Agesilaus. Deeply was the latter
-affected by this irreparable blow. He foresaw that, when known, it
-would spread dismay and dejection among his soldiers, most of whom
-would remain attached to him only so long as they believed the cause
-of Sparta to be ascendant and profitable.[592] Accordingly, he
-resolved, being now within a day’s march of his enemies, to hasten
-on a battle without making known the bad news. Proclaiming that
-intelligence had been received of a sea-fight having taken place, in
-which the Lacedæmonians had been victorious, though Peisander himself
-was slain,—he offered a sacrifice of thanksgiving and sent round
-presents of congratulation,—which produced an encouraging effect,
-and made the skirmishers especially both forward and victorious.
-
-  [591] Plutarch (Agesil. c. 17; compare also Plutarch, Apophth.
-  p. 795, as corrected by Morus ad Xen. Hellen. iv, 3, 15) states
-  two moræ or regiments as having joined Agesilaus from Corinth;
-  Xenophon alludes only to one, besides that mora which was in
-  garrison at Orchomenus (Hellen. iv, 3, 15; Agesil. ii, 6).
-
-  [592] Xen. Hellen. iv, 3, 13.
-
-  Ὁ μὲν οὖν Ἀγησίλαος πυθόμενος ταῦτα, τὸ μὲν πρῶτον χαλεπῶς
-  ἔφερεν· ἐπεὶ μέντοι ἐνεθυμήθη, ὅτι τοῦ στρατεύματος τὸ πλεῖστον
-  εἴη αὐτῷ, οἷον ἀγαθῶν μὲν γιγνομένων ἡδέως μετέχειν, εἰ δέ τι
-  χαλεπὸν ὁρῷεν, οὐκ ἀνάγκην εἶναι κοινωνεῖν αὐτοῖς, etc.
-
-  These indirect intimations of the real temper even of the
-  philo-Spartan allies towards Sparta are very valuable when coming
-  from Xenophon, as they contradict all his partialities, and are
-  dropped here almost reluctantly, from the necessity of justifying
-  the conduct of Agesilaus in publishing a false proclamation to
-  his army.
-
-To his enemies, now assembled in force on the plain of Korôneia,
-the real issue of the battle of Knidus was doubtless made known,
-spreading hope and cheerfulness through their ranks; though we are
-not informed what interpretation they put upon the solar eclipse.
-The army was composed of nearly the same contingents as those who
-had recently fought at Corinth, except that we hear of the Ænianes
-in place of the Malians; but probably each contingent was less
-numerous, since there was still a necessity for occupying and
-defending the camp near Corinth. Among the Athenian hoplites, who had
-just been so roughly handled in the preceding battle, and who were
-now drafted off by lot to march into Bœotia, against both a general
-and an army of high reputation,—there prevailed much apprehension
-and some reluctance; as we learn from one of them, Mantitheus, who
-stood forward to volunteer his services, and who afterwards makes
-just boast of it before an Athenian dikastery.[593] The Thebans and
-Bœotians were probably in full force, and more numerous than at
-Corinth, since it was their own country which was to be defended.
-The camp was established in the territory of Korôneia, not far from
-the great temple of Itonian Athênê, where the Pambœotia, or general
-Bœotian assemblies were held, and where there also stood the trophy
-erected for the great victory over Tolmides and the Athenians, about
-fifty years before.[594] Between the two armies there was no great
-difference of numbers, except as to the peltasts, who were more
-numerous in the army of Agesilaus, though they do not seem to have
-taken much part in the battle.
-
-  [593] Lysias, Orat. xvi, (pro Mantitheo) s. 20. φοβουμένων
-  ἁπάντων εἰκότως, etc.
-
-  [594] Plutarch, Agesil. c. 19.
-
-Having marched from Chæroneia, Agesilaus approached the plain of
-Korôneia from the river Kephissus, while the Thebans met him from
-the direction of Mount Helikon. He occupied the right wing of his
-army, the Orchomenians being on the left, and the Cyreians with the
-Asiatic allies in the centre. In the opposite line, the Thebans were
-on the right, and the Argeians on the left. Both armies approached
-slowly and in silence until they were separated only by an interval
-of a furlong, at which moment the Thebans on the right began the
-war-shout, and accelerated their march to a run,—the rest of the
-line following their example. When they got within half a furlong
-of the Lacedæmonians, the centre division of the latter, under
-the command of Herippidas (comprising the Cyreians, with Xenophon
-himself, and the Asiatic allies) started forward on their side, and
-advanced at a run to meet them; seemingly, getting beyond their
-own line,[595] and coming first to cross spears with the enemy’s
-centre. After a sharp struggle, the division of Herippidas was
-here victorious, and drove back its opponents. Agesilaus, on his
-right, was yet more victorious, for the Argeians opposed to him,
-fled without even crossing spears. These fugitives found safety
-on the high ground of Mount Helikon. But on the other hand, the
-Thebans on their own right completely beat back the Orchomenians,
-and pursued them so far as to get to the baggage in the rear of the
-army. Agesilaus, while his friends around were congratulating him
-as conqueror, immediately wheeled round to complete his victory by
-attacking the Thebans; who, on their side also faced about, and
-prepared to fight their way, in close and deep order, to rejoin their
-comrades on Helikon. Though Agesilaus might have let them pass, and
-assailed them in the rear with greater safety and equal effect, he
-preferred the more honorable victory of a conflict face to face.
-Such is the coloring which his panegyrist, Xenophon,[596] puts upon
-his manœuvre. Yet we may remark that if he had let the Thebans pass,
-he could not have pursued them far, seeing that their own comrades
-were at hand to sustain them,—and also that having never yet fought
-against the Thebans, he had probably no adequate appreciation of
-their prowess.
-
-  [595] Xen. Hellen. iv, 3, 17. ἀντεξέδραμον ἀπὸ τῆς Ἀγησιλάου
-  φάλαγγος, etc.
-
-  [596] Xen. Hellen. iv, 3, 19; Xen. Agesil. ii, 12.
-
-The crash which now took place was something terrific beyond all
-Grecian military experience,[597] leaving an indelible impression
-upon Xenophon, who was personally engaged in it. The hoplites on
-both sides came to the fiercest and closest bodily struggle, pushing
-shields against each other, with all the weight of the incumbent mass
-behind impelling forward the foremost ranks,—especially in the deep
-order of the Thebans. The shields of the foremost combatants were
-thus stove in, their spears broken, and each man was engaged in such
-close embrace with his enemy, that the dagger was the only weapon
-which he could use. There was no systematic shout, such as usually
-marked the charge of a Grecian army; the silence was only broken by a
-medley of furious exclamations and murmurs.[598] Agesilaus himself,
-who was among the front ranks, and whose size and strength were by
-no means on a level with his personal courage, had his body covered
-with wounds from different weapons,[599]—was trodden down,—and only
-escaped by the devoted courage of those fifty Spartan volunteers
-who formed his body-guard. Partly from his wounds, partly from the
-irresistible courage and stronger pressure of the Thebans, the
-Spartans were at length compelled to give way, so far as to afford a
-free passage to the former, who were thus enabled to march onward
-and rejoin their comrades; not without sustaining some loss by
-attacks on their rear.[600]
-
-  [597] Xen. Hellen. iv, 3, 16; Xen. Agesil. ii, 9.
-
-  Διηγήσομαι δὲ καὶ τὴν μάχην· καὶ γὰρ ἐγένετο οἵα οὐκ ἄλλη τῶν γ᾽
-  ἐφ᾽ ἡμῶν.
-
-  [598] Xen. Hellen. iv, 3, 19; Xen. Agesil. ii, 12.
-
-  Καὶ συμβαλόντες τὰς ἀσπίδας ἐωθοῦντο, ἐμάχοντο, ἀπέκτεινον,
-  ἀπέθνησκον. Καὶ κραυγὴ μὲν οὐδεμία παρῆν, οὐ μὴν οὐδὲ σιγή· φωνὴ
-  δέ τις ἦν τοιαύτη, οἵαν ὀργή τε καὶ μάχη παράσχοιτ᾽ ἄν.
-
-  [599] Xen. Agesil. ii, 13. Ὁ δὲ, καίπερ πολλὰ τραύματα ἔχων
-  πάντοσε καὶ παντοίοις ὅπλοις, etc.
-
-  Plutarch, Agesil. c. 18.
-
-  [600] Xen. Hellen. iv, 3, 19; Xen. Agesil. ii, 12.
-
-Agesilaus thus remained master of the field of battle, having gained
-a victory over his opponents taken collectively. But so far as
-concerns the Thebans separately, he had not only gained no victory,
-but had failed in his purpose of stopping their progress, and had
-had the worst of the combat. His wounds having been dressed, he was
-brought back on men’s shoulders to give his final orders, and was
-then informed that a detachment of eighty Theban hoplites, left
-behind by the rest, had taken refuge in the temple of Itonian Athênê
-as suppliants. From generosity mingled with respect to the sanctity
-of the spot, he commanded that they should be dismissed unhurt, and
-then proceeded to give directions for the night-watch, as it was
-already late. The field of battle presented a terrible spectacle;
-Spartan and Theban dead lying intermingled, some yet grasping their
-naked daggers, others pierced with the daggers of their enemies;
-around, on the blood-stained ground, were seen broken spears, smashed
-shields, swords and daggers scattered apart from their owners.[601]
-He directed the Spartan and Theban dead to be collected in separate
-heaps, and placed in safe custody for the night, in the interior
-of his phalanx; the troops then took their supper, and rested for
-the night. On the next morning, Gylis the Polemarch was ordered to
-draw up the army in battle-array, to erect a trophy, and to offer
-sacrifices of cheerfulness and thanksgiving, with the pipers solemnly
-playing, according to Spartan fashion. Agesilaus was anxious to make
-these demonstrations of victory as ostentatious as possible, because
-he really doubted whether he had gained a victory. It was very
-possible that the Thebans might feel confidence enough to renew the
-attack, and try to recover the field of battle, with their own dead
-upon it; which Agesilaus had, for that reason, caused to be collected
-in a separate heap and placed within the Lacedæmonian line.[602] He
-was, however, soon relieved from doubt by a herald coming from the
-Thebans to solicit the customary truce for the burial of their dead;
-the understood confession of defeat. The request was immediately
-granted; each party paid the last solemnities to its own dead, and
-the Spartan force was then withdrawn from Bœotia. Xenophon does not
-state the loss on either side, but Diodorus gives it at six hundred
-on the side of the confederates, three hundred and fifty on that of
-the Lacedæmonians.[603]
-
-  [601] Xen. Agesil. ii, 14. Ἐπεί γε μὴν ἔληξεν ἡ μάχη, παρῆν δὴ
-  θεάσασθαι ἔνθα συνέπεσον ἀλλήλοις, τὴν μὲν γῆν αἵματι πεφυρμένην,
-  νεκροὺς δὲ κειμένους φιλίους καὶ πολεμίους μετ᾽ ἀλλήλων, ἀσπίδας
-  δὲ διατεθρυμμένας, δόρατα συντεθραυσμένα, ἐγχειρίδια γυμνὰ κουλεῶν
-  τὰ μὲν χαμαί, τὰ δ᾽ ἐν σώμασι, τὰ δ᾽ ἔτι μετὰ χειρός.
-
-  [602] Xen. Agesil. ii, 15. Τότε μὲν οὖν (καὶ γὰρ ἦν ἤδη ὀψέ)
-  συνελκύσαντες ~τοὺς τῶν πολεμίων νεκροὺς~ εἴσω φάλαγγος,
-  ἐδειπνοποιήσαντο καὶ ἐκοιμήθησαν.
-
-  Schneider in his note on this passage, as well as ad. Xen.
-  Hellen. iv, 3, 21—condemns the expression τῶν πολεμίων as
-  spurious and unintelligible. But in my judgment, these words hear
-  a plain and appropriate meaning, which I have endeavored to give
-  in the text. Compare Plutarch, Agesil. c. 19.
-
-  [603] Diodor. xiv, 84.
-
-Disqualified as he was by his wounds for immediate action, Agesilaus
-caused himself to be carried to Delphi, where the Pythian games were
-at that moment going on. He here offered to Apollo the tithe of the
-booty acquired during his two years’ campaigns in Asia; a tithe
-equal to one hundred talents.[604] Meanwhile the polemarch Gylis
-conducted the army first into Phokis, next on a predatory excursion
-into the Lokrian territory, where the nimble attack of the Lokrian
-light troops, amidst hilly ground, inflicted upon his troops a severe
-check, and cost him his life. After this the contingents in the army
-were dismissed to their respective homes, and Agesilaus himself, when
-tolerably recovered, sailed with the Peloponnesians homeward from
-Delphi across the Corinthian Gulf.[605] He was received at Sparta
-with every demonstration of esteem and gratitude, which was still
-farther strengthened by his exemplary simplicity and exact observance
-of the public discipline; an exactness not diminished either by long
-absence or enjoyment of uncontrolled ascendency. From this time
-forward he was the effective leader of Spartan policy, enjoying an
-influence greater than had ever fallen to the lot of any king before.
-His colleague, Agesipolis, both young and of feeble character, was
-won over by his judicious and conciliatory behavior, into the most
-respectful deference.[606]
-
-  [604] Xen. Hellen. iv, 3, 21; Plutarch, Agesil. c. 19. The latter
-  says—εἰς Δελφοὺς ἀπεκομίσθη ~Πυθίων ἀγομένων~, etc. Manso, Dr.
-  Arnold, and others, contest the accuracy of Plutarch in this
-  assertion respecting the time of year at which the Pythian games
-  were celebrated, upon grounds which seem to me very insufficient.
-
-  [605] Xen. Hellen. iv, 3, 22, 23; iv. 4, 1.
-
-  [606] Plutarch, Agesil. c. 17, 20; Xen. Hellen. v, 3, 20.
-
-Three great battles had thus been fought in the space of little
-more than a month (July and August)—those of Corinth, Knidus,
-and Korôneia; the first and third on land, the second at sea, as
-described in my last chapter. In each of the two land-battles the
-Lacedæmonians had gained a victory; they remained masters of the
-field, and were solicited by the enemy to grant the burial-truce.
-But if we inquire what results these victories had produced, the
-answer must be that both were totally barren. The position of Sparta
-in Greece as against her enemies had undergone no improvement. In
-the battle of Corinth, her soldiers had indeed manifested signal
-superiority, and acquired much honor. But at the field of Korôneia,
-the honor of the day was rather on the side of the Thebans, who broke
-through the most strenuous opposition, and carried their point of
-joining their allies. And the purpose of Agesilaus (ordered by the
-ephor Diphridas) to invade Bœotia, completely failed.[607] Instead of
-advancing, he withdrew from Korôneia, and returned to Peloponnesus
-across the gulf from Delphi; which he might have done just as well
-without fighting this murderous and hardly contested battle. Even the
-narrative of Xenophon, deeply colored as it is both by his sympathies
-and his antipathies, indicates to us that the predominant impression
-carried off by every one from the field of Korôneia was that of the
-tremendous force and obstinacy of the Theban hoplites,—a foretaste
-of what was to come at Leuktra!
-
-  [607] Plutarch, Agesil. c. 17. Cornelius Nepos, Agesil. c. 4.
-  “Obsistere ei conati sunt Athenienses et Bœoti,” etc. They
-  _succeeded_ in barring his way, and compelling him to retreat.
-
-If the two land-victories of Sparta were barren of results, the case
-was far otherwise with her naval defeat at Knidus. That defeat was
-pregnant with consequences following in rapid succession, and of
-the most disastrous character. As with Athens at Ægospotami,—the
-loss of her fleet, serious as that was, served only as the
-signal for countless following losses. Pharnabazus and Konon,
-with their victorious fleet, sailed from island to island, and
-from one continental seaport to another, in the Ægean, to expel
-the Lacedæmonian harmosts, and terminate the empire of Sparta. So
-universal was the odium which it had inspired, that the task was
-found easy beyond expectation. Conscious of their unpopularity, the
-harmosts in almost all the towns, on both sides of the Hellespont,
-deserted their posts and fled, on the mere news of the battle of
-Knidus.[608] Everywhere Pharnabazus and Konon found themselves
-received as liberators, and welcomed with presents of hospitality.
-They pledged themselves not to introduce any foreign force or
-governor, nor to fortify any separate citadel, but to guarantee
-to each city its own genuine autonomy. This policy was adopted
-by Pharnabazus at the urgent representation of Konon, who warned
-him that if he manifested any design of reducing the cities to
-subjection, he would find them all his enemies; that each of them
-severally would cost him a long siege; and that a combination would
-ultimately be formed against him. Such liberal and judicious ideas,
-when seen to be sincerely acted upon, produced a strong feeling of
-friendship and even of gratitude, so that the Lacedæmonian maritime
-empire was dissolved without a blow, by the almost spontaneous
-movements of the cities themselves. Though the victorious fleet
-presented itself in many different places, it was nowhere called
-upon to put down resistance, or to undertake a single siege.
-Kos, Nisyra, Teos, Chios, Erythræ, Ephesus, Mitylênê, Samos, all
-declared themselves independent, under the protection of the new
-conquerors.[609] Pharnabazus presently disembarked at Ephesus and
-marched by land northward to his own satrapy; leaving a fleet of
-forty triremes under the command of Konon.
-
-  [608] Xenoph. Hellen. iv, 8, 1-5.
-
-  [609] Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 1-3; Diodor. xiv, 84. About Samos, xiv,
-  97.
-
-  Compare also the speech of Derkyllidas to the Abydenes (Xen.
-  Hellen. iv, 8, 4)—Ὅσῳ δὲ μᾶλλον αἱ ἄλλαι πόλεις ξὺν τῇ τύχῃ
-  ἀπεστράφησαν ἡμῶν, τοσούτῳ ὄντως ἡ ὑμετέρα πιστότης μείζων φανείη
-  ἄν, etc.
-
-To this general burst of anti-Spartan feeling, Abydos, on the Asiatic
-side of the Hellespont, formed the solitary exception. That town,
-steady in hostility to Athens,[610] had been the great military
-station of Sparta for her northern Asiatic warfare, during the last
-twenty years. It was in the satrapy of Pharnabazus, and had been
-made the chief place of arms by Derkyllidas and Agesilaus, for
-their warfare against that satrap as well as for the command of the
-strait. Accordingly, while it was a main object with Pharnabazus to
-acquire possession of Abydos,—there was nothing which the Abydenes
-dreaded so much as to become subject to him. In this view they
-were decidedly disposed to cling to Lacedæmonian protection; and
-it happened by a fortunate accident for Sparta, that the able and
-experienced Derkyllidas was harmost in the town at the moment of
-the battle of Knidus. Having fought in the battle of Corinth, he
-had been sent to announce the news to Agesilaus, whom he had met on
-his march at Amphipolis, and who had sent him forward into Asia to
-communicate the victory to the allied cities;[611] neither of them at
-that moment anticipating the great maritime defeat then impending.
-The presence in Abydos of such an officer, who had already acquired
-a high military reputation in that region, and was at marked enmity
-with Pharnabazus,—combined with the standing apprehensions of the
-Abydenes,—was now the means of saving a remnant at least of maritime
-ascendency to Sparta. During the general alarm which succeeded the
-battle of Knidus, when the harmosts were everywhere taking flight,
-and when anti-Spartan manifestations often combined with internal
-revolutions to overthrow the dekarchs or their substitutes, were
-spreading from city to city,—Derkyllidas assembled the Abydenes,
-heartened them up against the reigning contagion, and exhorted them
-to earn the gratitude of Sparta by remaining faithful to her while
-others were falling off; assuring them that she would still be found
-capable of giving them protection. His exhortations were listened
-to with favor. Abydos remained attached to Sparta, was put in a
-good state of defence, and became the only harbor of safety for the
-fugitive harmosts out of the other cities, Asiatic and European.
-
-  [610] Ἐκ γὰρ Ἀβύδου, τῆς τὸν ἅπαντα χρόνον ὑμῖν ἔχθρας—says
-  Demosthenes in the Athenian assembly (cont. Aristokrat. c. 39, p.
-  672; compare c. 52, p. 688).
-
-  [611] Xen. Hellen. iv, 3, 2.
-
-Having secured his hold upon Abydos, Derkyllidas crossed the strait
-to make sure also of the strong place of Sestos, on the European
-side, in the Thracian Chersonese.[612] In that fertile peninsula
-there had been many new settlers, who had come in and acquired land
-under the Lacedæmonian supremacy, especially since the building of
-the cross-wall by Derkyllidas to defend the isthmus against Thracian
-invasion. By means of these settlers, dependent on Sparta for the
-security of their tenures,—and of the refugees from various cities
-all concentrated under his protection,—Derkyllidas maintained his
-position effectively both at Abydos and at Sestos; defying the
-requisition of Pharnabazus that he should forthwith evacuate them.
-The satrap threatened war, and actually ravaged the lands around
-Abydos,—but without any result. His wrath against the Lacedæmonians,
-already considerable, was so aggravated by disappointment when he
-found that he could not yet expel them from his satrapy, that he
-resolved to act against them with increased energy, and even to
-strike a blow at them near their own home. For this purpose he
-transmitted orders to Konon to prepare a commanding naval force for
-the ensuing spring, and in the mean time to keep both Abydos and
-Sestos under blockade.[613]
-
-  [612] Lysander, after the victory of Ægospotami and the expulsion
-  of the Athenians from Sestos, had assigned the town and district
-  as a settlement for the pilots and Keleustæ aboard his fleet. But
-  the ephors are said to have reversed the assignment, and restored
-  the town to the Sestians (Plutarch, Lysand. c. 14). Probably,
-  however, the new settlers would remain in part upon the lands
-  vacated by the expelled Athenians.
-
-  [613] Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 4-6.
-
-As soon as spring arrived, Pharnabazus embarked on board a powerful
-fleet equipped by Konon; directing his course to Melos, to various
-islands among the Cyclades, and lastly to the coast of Peloponnesus.
-They here spent some time on the coast of Laconia and Messenia,
-disembarking at several points to ravage the country. They next
-landed on the island of Kythêra, which they captured, granting
-safe retirement to the Lacedæmonian garrison, and leaving in the
-island a garrison under the Athenian Nikophêmus. Quitting then the
-harborless, dangerous, and ill-provided coast of Laconia, they sailed
-up the Saronic gulf to the isthmus of Corinth. Here they found the
-confederates,—Corinthian, Bœotian, Athenian, etc., carrying on war
-with Corinth as their central post, against the Lacedæmonians at
-Sikyon. The line across the isthmus from Lechæum to Kenchreæ (the
-two ports of Corinth) was now made good by a defensive system of
-operations, so as to confine the Lacedæmonians within Peloponnesus;
-just as Athens, prior to her great losses in 446 B.C., while
-possessing both Megara and Pegæ, had been able to maintain the inland
-road midway between them, where it crosses the high and difficult
-crest of Mount Geraneia, thus occupying the only three roads by which
-a Lacedæmonian army could march from the isthmus of Corinth into
-Attica or Bœotia.[614] Pharnabazus communicated in the most friendly
-manner with the allies, assured them of his strenuous support against
-Sparta, and left with them a considerable sum of money.[615]
-
-  [614] See Sir William Gell’s Itinerary of Greece, p. 4. Ernst
-  Curtius—Peloponnesos—p. 25, 26, and Thucyd. i, 108.
-
-  [615] Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 7, 8; Diodor. xiv, 84.
-
-The appearance of a Persian satrap with a Persian fleet, as master
-of the Peloponnesian sea and the Saronic Gulf, was a phenomenon
-astounding to Grecian eyes. And if it was not equally offensive to
-Grecian sentiment, this was in itself a melancholy proof of the
-degree to which Pan-hellenic patriotism had been stifled by the
-Peloponnesian war and the Spartan empire. No Persian tiara had been
-seen near the Saronic Gulf since the battle of Salamis; nor could
-anything short of the intense personal wrath of Pharnabazus against
-the Lacedæmonians, and his desire to revenge upon them the damage
-inflicted by Derkyllidas and Agesilaus, have brought him now so far
-away from his own satrapy. It was this wrathful feeling of which
-Konon took advantage to procure from him a still more important boon.
-
-Since 404 B.C., a space of eleven years, Athens had continued
-without any walls around her seaport town Peiræus, and without any
-Long Walls to connect her city with Peiræus. To this state she had
-been condemned by the sentence of her enemies, in the full knowledge
-that she could have little trade,—few ships either armed or
-mercantile,—poor defence even against pirates, and no defence at all
-against aggression from the mistress of the sea. Konon now entreated
-Pharnabazus, who was about to go home, to leave the fleet under his
-command, and to permit him to use it in rebuilding the fortifications
-of Peiræus as well as the Long Walls of Athens. While he engaged to
-maintain the fleet by contributions from the islands, he assured the
-satrap that no blow could be inflicted upon Sparta so destructive
-or so mortifying, as the renovation of Athens and Peiræus with their
-complete and connected fortifications. Sparta would thus be deprived
-of the most important harvest which she had reaped from the long
-struggle of the Peloponnesian war. Indignant as he now was against
-the Lacedæmonians, Pharnabazus sympathized cordially with these
-plans, and on departing not only left the fleet under the command
-of Konon, but also furnished him with a considerable sum of money
-towards the expense of the fortifications.[616]
-
-  [616] Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 9, 10.
-
-Konon betook himself to the work energetically and without delay.
-He had quitted Athens in 407 B.C., as one of the joint admirals
-nominated after the disgrace of Alkibiades. He had parted with his
-countrymen finally at the catastrophe of Ægospotami in 405 B.C.,
-preserving the miserable fraction of eight or nine ships out of that
-noble fleet which otherwise would have passed entire into the hands
-of Lysander. He now returned, in 393 B.C., as a second Themistokles,
-the deliverer of his country, and the restorer of her lost strength
-and independence. All hands were set to work; carpenters and masons
-being hired with the funds furnished by Pharnabazus, to complete
-the fortifications as quickly as possible. The Bœotians and other
-neighbors lent their aid zealously as volunteers,[617]—the same who
-eleven years before had danced to the sound of joyful music when
-the former walls were demolished; so completely had the feelings
-of Greece altered since that period. By such hearty coöperation
-the work was finished during the course of the present summer and
-autumn without any opposition; and Athens enjoyed again her fortified
-Peiræus and harbor, with a pair of Long Walls, straight and parallel,
-joining it securely to the city. The third, or Phalêric Wall (a
-single wall stretching from Athens to Phalêrum), which had existed
-down to the capture of the city by Lysander, was not restored; nor
-was it indeed by any means necessary to the security either of the
-city or of the port. Having thus given renewed life and security
-to Peiræus, Konon commemorated his great naval victory by a golden
-wreath in the acropolis, as well as by the erection of a temple in
-Peiræus to the honor of the Knidian Aphroditê, who was worshipped
-at Knidus with peculiar devotion by the local population.[618]
-He farther celebrated the completion of the walls by a splendid
-sacrifice and festival banquet. And the Athenian people not only
-inscribed on a pillar a public vote gratefully recording the exploits
-of Konon, but also erected a statue to his honor.[619]
-
-  [617] Xen. Hellen. iv. 8, 10; Diodor. xiv. 85.
-
-  Cornelius Nepos (Conon, c. 4) mentions fifty talents as a sum
-  received by Konon from Pharnabazus as a present, and devoted by
-  him to this public work. This is not improbable; but the total
-  sum contributed by the satrap towards the fortifications must,
-  probably, have been much greater.
-
-  [618] Demosthen. cont. Androtion. p. 616. c. 21. Pausanias (i, 1,
-  3) still saw this temple in Peiræus—very near to the sea; five
-  hundred and fifty years afterwards.
-
-  [619] Demosthen. cont. Leptin. c. 16. p. 477, 478; Athenæus, i,
-  3; Cornelius Nepos, Conon, c. 4.
-
-The importance of this event in reference to the future history of
-Athens was unspeakable. Though it did not restore to her either
-her former navy, or her former empire, it reconstituted her as a
-city, not only self-determining, but even partially ascendant. It
-reanimated her, if not into the Athens of Perikles, at least into
-that of Isokrates and Demosthenes; it imparted to her a second
-fill of strength, dignity, and commercial importance, during the
-half century destined to elapse before she was finally overwhelmed
-by the superior military force of Macedon. Those who recollect
-the extraordinary stratagem whereby Themistokles had contrived
-(eighty-five years before) to accomplish the fortification of Athens,
-in spite of the base but formidable jealousy of Sparta and her
-Peloponnesian allies, will be aware how much the consummation of the
-Themistoklean project had depended upon accident. Now, also, Konon
-in his restoration was favored by unusual combinations, such as no
-one could have predicted. That Pharnabazus should conceive the idea
-of coming over himself to Peloponnesus with a fleet of the largest
-force, was a most unexpected contingency. He was influenced neither
-by attachment to Athens, nor seemingly by considerations of policy,
-though the proceeding was one really conducive to the interests
-of Persian power,—but simply by his own violent personal wrath
-against the Lacedæmonians. And this wrath probably would have been
-satisfied, if, after the battle of Knidus, he could have cleared his
-own satrapy of them completely. It was his vehement impatience, when
-he found himself unable to expel his old enemy, Derkyllidas, from the
-important position of Abydos, which chiefly spurred him on to take
-revenge on Sparta in her own waters. Nothing less than the satrap’s
-personal presence would have placed at the disposal of Konon either
-a sufficient naval force, or sufficient funds for the erection of
-the new walls, and the defiance of all impediment from Sparta. So
-strangely did events thus run, that the energy, by which Derkyllidas
-preserved Abydos, brought upon Sparta, indirectly, the greater
-mischief of the new Kononian walls. It would have been better for
-Sparta that Pharnabazus should at once have recovered Abydos as well
-as the rest of his satrapy; in which case he would have had no wrongs
-remaining unavenged to incense him, and would have kept on his own
-side of the Ægean; feeding Konon with a modest squadron sufficient
-to keep the Lacedæmonian navy from again becoming formidable on the
-Asiatic side, but leaving the walls of Peiræus (if we may borrow
-an expression of Plato) “to continue asleep in the bosom of the
-earth.”[620]
-
-  [620] Plato, Legg. vi, p. 778; καθεύδειν ἐᾷν ἐν τῇ γῇ κατακείμενα
-  τὰ τείχη, etc.
-
-But the presence of Konon with his powerful fleet was not the only
-condition indispensable to the accomplishment of this work. It
-was requisite further, that the interposition of Sparta should be
-kept off, not merely by sea, but by land, and that, too, during
-all the number of months that the walls were in progress. Now the
-barrier against her on land was constituted by the fact, that the
-confederate force held the cross line within the isthmus from Lechæum
-to Kenchreæ, with Corinth as a centre.[621] But they were unable
-to sustain this line even through the ensuing year,—during which
-Sparta, aided by dissensions at Corinth, broke through it, as will
-appear in the next chapter. Had she been able to break through it
-while the fortifications of Athens were yet incomplete, she would
-have deemed no effort too great to effect an entrance into Attica and
-interrupt the work, in which she might very probably have succeeded.
-Here, then, was the second condition, which was realized during
-the summer and autumn of 393 B.C., but which did not continue to
-be realized longer. So fortunate was it for Athens, that the two
-conditions were fulfilled both together during this particular year!
-
-  [621] The importance of maintaining these lines, as a protection
-  to Athens against invasion from Sparta, is illustrated in Xen.
-  Hellen. v, 4, 19, and Andokides, Or. iii, De Pace, s. 26.
-
-
-
-
-CHAPTER LXXV.
-
-FROM THE REBUILDING OF THE LONG WALLS OF ATHENS TO THE PEACE OF
-ANTALKIDAS.
-
-
-The presence of Pharnabazus and Konon with their commanding force in
-the Saronic Gulf, and the liberality with which the former furnished
-pecuniary aid to the latter for rebuilding the full fortifications
-of Athens, as well as to the Corinthians for the prosecution of the
-war,—seem to have given preponderance to the confederates over
-Sparta for that year. The plans of Konon[622] were extensive. He was
-the first to organize for the defence of Corinth, a mercenary force
-which was afterwards improved and conducted with greater efficiency
-by Iphikrates; and after he had finished the fortifications of
-Peiræus with the Long Walls, he employed himself in showing his
-force among the islands, for the purpose of laying the foundations
-of renewed maritime power for Athens. We even hear that he caused
-an Athenian envoy to be despatched to Dionysius at Syracuse, with
-the view of detaching that despot from Sparta, and bringing him
-into connection with Athens. Evagoras, despot of Salamis in Cyprus,
-the steady friend of Konon, was a party to this proposition, which
-he sought to strengthen by offering to Dionysius his sister in
-marriage.[623] There was a basis of sympathy between them arising
-from the fact that Evagoras was at variance with the Phœnicians both
-in Phœnicia and Cyprus, while Dionysius was in active hostilities
-with the Carthaginians (their kinsmen and Colonists) in Sicily.
-Nevertheless, the proposition met with little or no success. We find
-Dionysius afterwards still continuing to act as an ally of Sparta.
-
-  [622] Harpokration, v. ξενικὸν ἐν Κορίνθῳ. Philochorus, Fragm.
-  150, ed. Didot.
-
-  [623] Lysias, Orat. xix, (De Bonis Aristophanis) s. 21.
-
-Profiting by the aid received from Pharnabazus, the Corinthians
-strengthened their fleet at Lechæum (their harbor in the Corinthian
-Gulf) so considerably, as to become masters of the Gulf, and to
-occupy Rhium, one of the two opposite capes which bound its narrow
-entrance. To oppose them, the Lacedæmonians on their side were
-driven to greater maritime effort. More than one naval action seems
-to have taken place, in those waters where the prowess and skill
-of the Athenian admiral Phormion had been so signally displayed at
-the beginning of the Peloponnesian war. At length the Lacedæmonian
-admiral Herippidas, who succeeded to the command of the fleet after
-his predecessor Polemarchus had been slain in battle, compelled the
-Corinthians to abandon Rhium, and gradually recovered his ascendency
-in the Corinthian Gulf; which his successor Teleutias, brother of
-Agesilaus, still farther completed.[624]
-
-  [624] Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 11.
-
-While these transactions were going on (seemingly during the last
-half of 393 B.C. and the full year of 392 B.C.), so as to put an
-end to the temporary naval preponderance of the Corinthians,—the
-latter were at the same time bearing the brunt of a desultory, but
-continued, land-warfare against the garrison of Lacedæmonians and
-Peloponnesians established at Sikyon. Both Corinth and Lechæum were
-partly defended by the presence of confederate troops, Bœotians,
-Argeians, Athenians, or mercenaries paid by Athens. But this did not
-protect the Corinthians against suffering great damage, in their
-lands and outlying properties, from the incursions of the enemy.
-
-The plain between Corinth and Sikyon,—fertile and extensive
-(speaking by comparison with Peloponnesus generally), and
-constituting a large part of the landed property of both cities,
-was rendered uncultivable during 393 and 392 B.C.; so that the
-Corinthian proprietors were obliged to withdraw their servants and
-cattle to Peiræum[625] (a portion of the Corinthian territory without
-the Isthmus properly so called, north-east of the Akrokorinthus, in a
-line between that eminence and the Megarian harbor of Pegæ). Here the
-Sikyonian assailants could not reach them, because of the Long Walls
-of Corinth, which connected that city by a continuous fortification
-of twelve stadia (somewhat less than a mile and a half) with its
-harbor of Lechæum. Nevertheless, the loss to the proprietors of
-the deserted plain was still so great, that two successive seasons
-of it were quite enough to inspire them with a strong aversion
-to the war;[626] the more so, as the damage fell exclusively upon
-them—their allies in Bœotia, Athens, and Argos, having as yet
-suffered nothing. Constant military service for defence, with the
-conversion of the city into a sort of besieged post, aggravated
-their discomfort. There was another circumstance also, doubtless
-not without influence. The consequences of the battle of Knidus had
-been, first, to put down the maritime empire of Sparta, and thus to
-diminish the fear which she inspired to the Corinthians; next, to
-rebuild the fortifications, and renovate the shipping, commercial as
-well as warlike, of Athens;—a revival well calculated to bring back
-a portion of that anti-Athenian jealousy and apprehension which the
-Corinthians had felt so strongly a few years before. Perhaps some
-of the trade at Corinth may have been actually driven away by the
-disturbance of the war, to the renewed fortifications and greater
-security of Peiræus.
-
-  [625] Xen. Hellen. iv, 4, 1; iv, 5, 1.
-
-  [626] I dissent from Mr. Fynes Clinton as well as from M.
-  Rehdantz (Vitæ Iphicratis, etc., c. 4, who in the main agrees
-  with Dodwell’s Annales Xenophontei) in their chronological
-  arrangement of these events.
-
-  They place the battle fought by Praxitas within the Long Walls
-  of Corinth in 393 B.C., and the destruction of the Lacedæmonian
-  _mora_ or division by Iphikrates (the monthly date of which is
-  marked by its having immediately succeeded the Isthmian games),
-  in 392 B.C. I place the former event in 392 B.C.; the latter in
-  390 B.C., immediately after the Isthmian games of 390 B.C.
-
-  If we study the narrative of Xenophon, we shall find, that after
-  describing (iv, 3) the battle of Korôneia (August 394 B.C.) with
-  its immediate consequences, and the return of Agesilaus home,—he
-  goes on in the next chapter to narrate the land-war about or near
-  Corinth, which he carries down without interruption (through
-  Chapters 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, of Book iv.) to 389 B.C.
-
-  But in Chapter 8 of Book iv, he leaves the land-war, and takes up
-  the naval operations, from and after the battle of Knidus (Aug.
-  394 B.C.). He recounts how Pharnabazus and Konon came across the
-  Ægean with a powerful fleet in the spring of 393 B.C., and how
-  after various proceedings, they brought the fleet to the Saronic
-  Gulf and the Isthmus of Corinth, where they must have arrived at
-  or near midsummer 393 B.C.
-
-  Now it appears to me certain, that these proceedings of
-  Pharnabazus with the fleet, recounted in the eighth chapter,
-  come, in point of date, _before_ the seditious movements and
-  the _coup d’état_ at Corinth, which are recounted in the fourth
-  chapter. At the time when Pharnabazus was at Corinth in midsummer
-  393 B.C., the narrative of Xenophon (iv, 8, 8-10) leads us to
-  believe that the Corinthians were prosecuting the war zealously,
-  and without discontent: the money and encouragement which
-  Pharnabazus gave them was calculated to strengthen such ardor. It
-  was by aid of this money that the Corinthians fitted out their
-  fleet under Agathinus, and acquired for a time the maritime
-  command of the Gulf.
-
-  The discontents against the war (recounted in chap. 4 _seq._)
-  could not have commenced until a considerable time after the
-  departure of Pharnabazus. They arose out of causes which only
-  took effect after a long continuance,—the hardships of the
-  land-war, the losses of property and slaves, the jealousy towards
-  Attica and Bœotia as being undisturbed, etc. The Lacedæmonian
-  and Peloponnesian aggressive force at Sikyon cannot possibly
-  have been established before the autumn of 394 B.C., and was
-  most probably placed there early in the spring of 393 B.C.
-  Its effects were brought about, not by one great blow, but
-  by repetition of ravages and destructive annoyance; and all
-  the effects which it produced previous to midsummer 393 B.C.
-  would be more than compensated by the presence, the gifts,
-  and the encouragement of Pharnabazus with his powerful fleet.
-  Moreover, after his departure, too, the Corinthians were at first
-  successful at sea, and acquired the command of the Gulf, which,
-  however, they did not retain for more than a year, if so much.
-  Hence, it is not likely that any strong discontent against the
-  war began before the early part of 392 B.C.
-
-  Considering all these circumstances, I think it reasonable to
-  believe that the _coup d’état_ and massacre at Corinth took place
-  (not in 393 B.C., as Mr. Clinton and M. Rehdantz place it, but)
-  in 392 B.C.; and the battle within the Long Walls rather later
-  in the same year.
-
-  Next, the opinion of the same two authors, as well as of
-  Dodwell,—that the destruction of the Lacedæmonian _mora_ by
-  Iphicrates took place in the spring of 392 B.C.,—is also, in my
-  view, erroneous. If this were true, it would be necessary to pack
-  all the events mentioned in Xenophon, iv, 4, into the year 393
-  B.C.; which I hold to be impossible. If the destruction of the
-  mora did not occur in the spring of 393 B.C., we know that it
-  could not have occurred until the spring of 390 B.C.; that is,
-  the next ensuing Isthmian games, two years afterwards. And this
-  last will be found to be its true date; thus leaving full time,
-  but not too much time, for the antecedent occurrences.
-
-Fostered by this pressure of circumstances, the discontented
-philo-Laconian or peace-party which had always existed at Corinth,
-presently acquired sufficient strength, and manifested itself with
-sufficient publicity to give much alarm to the government. The
-Corinthian government had always been, and still was, oligarchical.
-In what manner the administrators or the council were renovated, or
-how long individuals continued in office, indeed, we do not know. But
-of democracy, with its legal, popular assemblies, open discussions
-and authoritative resolves, there was nothing.[627] Now the
-oligarchical persons actually in power were vehemently anti-Laconian,
-consisting of men who had partaken of the Persian funds and
-contracted alliance with Persia, besides compromising themselves
-irrevocably (like Timolaus) by the most bitter manifestations
-of hostile sentiment towards Sparta. These men found themselves
-menaced by a powerful opposition party, which had no constitutional
-means for making its sentiments predominant, and for accomplishing
-peaceably either a change of administrators or a change of public
-policy. It was only by an appeal to arms and violence that such
-a consummation could be brought about; a fact notorious to both
-parties,—so that the oligarchical administrators, informed of the
-meetings and conversations going on, knew well that they had to
-expect nothing less than the breaking out of a conspiracy. That such
-anticipations were well-founded, we gather even from the partial
-recital of Xenophon; who states that Pasimêlus, the philo-Laconian
-leader, was on his guard and in preparation,[628]—and counts it to
-him as a virtue that shortly afterwards he opened the gates to the
-Lacedæmonians.
-
-  [627] Plutarch, Dion. c. 53.
-
-  [628] Xen. Hellen. iv, 4, 2. Γνόντες δὲ οἱ Ἀργεῖοι καὶ Βοιωτοὶ
-  καὶ Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ Κορινθίων οἵ τε τῶν παρὰ βασιλέως χρημάτων
-  μετεσχηκότες, καὶ οἱ τοῦ πολέμου αἰτιώτατοι γεγενημένοι, ὡς,
-  εἰ μὴ ἐκποδὼν ποιήσαιντο τοὺς ἐπὶ τὴν εἰρήνην τετραμμένους,
-  κινδυνεύσει πάλιν ἡ πόλις λακωνίσαι—οὕτω δὴ καὶ σφαγὰς
-  ἐπεχείρουν ποιεῖσθαι.
-
-  iv, 4, 4. Οἱ δὲ νεώτεροι, ὑποπτεύσαντος Πασιμήλου τὸ μέλλον
-  ἔσεσθαι, ἡσυχίαν ἔσχον ἐν τῷ Κρανίῳ· ὡς δὲ τῆς κραυγῆς ἤσθοντο,
-  καὶ φεύγοντές τινες ἐκ τοῦ πράγματος ἀφίκοντο πρὸς αὐτούς, ἐκ
-  τούτου ἀναδραμόντες κατὰ τὸν Ἀκροκόρινθον, προσβαλόντας μὲν
-  Ἀργείους καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ἀπεκρούσαντο, etc.
-
-Anticipating such conspiracy, the government resolved to prevent
-it by a _coup d’état_. They threw themselves upon the assistance
-of their allies, invited in a body of Argeians, and made their
-blow the more sure by striking it on the last day of the festival
-called Eukleia, when it was least expected. Their proceeding, though
-dictated by precaution, was executed with the extreme of brutal
-ferocity aggravated by sacrilege; in a manner very different from the
-deep-laid artifices recently practised by the Spartan ephors when
-they were in like manner afraid of the conspiracy of Kinadon,—and
-more like the oligarchical conspirators at Korkyra (in the third year
-of the Peloponnesian war) when they broke into the assembled Senate,
-and massacred Peithias, with sixty others in the senate-house.[629]
-While the choice performers at Corinth were contending for the prize
-in the theatre, with judges formally named to decide,—and while
-the market-place around was crowded with festive spectators,—a
-number of armed men were introduced, probably Argeians, with leaders
-designating the victims whom they were to strike. Some of these
-select victims were massacred in the market-place, others in the
-theatre, and one even while sitting as a judge in the theatre.
-Others again fled in terror to embrace the altars or statues in the
-market-place,—which sanctuary, nevertheless, did not save their
-lives. Nor was such sacrilege arrested,—repugnant as it was to
-the feelings of the assembled spectators and to Grecian feelings
-generally,—until one hundred and twenty persons had perished.[630]
-But the persons slain were chiefly elderly men; for the younger
-portion of the philo-Laconian party, suspecting some mischief, had
-declined attending the festival, and kept themselves separately
-assembled under their leader Pasimêlus in the gymnasium and
-cyprus-grove called Kranium, just without the city-gates. We find,
-too, that they were not only assembled, but actually in arms. For the
-moment that they heard the clamor in the market-place, and learned
-from some fugitives what was going on, they rushed up at once to
-the Akrokorinthus (or eminence and acropolis overhanging the city)
-and got possession of the citadel,—which they maintained with such
-force and courage that the Argeians and the Corinthians, who took
-part with the government, were repulsed in the attempt to dislodge
-them. This circumstance, indirectly revealed in the one-sided
-narrative of Xenophon, lets us into the real state of the city, and
-affords good ground for believing that Pasimêlus and his friends were
-prepared beforehand for an armed outbreak, but waited to execute it,
-until the festival was over,—a scruple which the government, in
-their eagerness to forestall the plot, disregarded,—employing the
-hands and weapons of Argeians who were comparatively unimpressed by
-solemnities peculiar to Corinth.[631]
-
-  [629] Thucyd. iii, 70.
-
-  [630] Diodorus (xiv, 86) gives this number, which seems very
-  credible. Xenophon (iv, 4, 4) only says πολλοί.
-
-  [631] In recounting this alternation of violence projected,
-  violence perpetrated, recourse on the one side to a foreign
-  ally, treason on the other by admitting an avowed enemy,—which
-  formed the _modus operandi_ of opposing parties in the
-  oligarchical Corinth,—I invite the reader to contrast it with
-  the democratical Athens.
-
-  At Athens, in the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, there were
-  precisely the same causes at work, and precisely the same marked
-  antithesis of parties, as those which here disturbed Corinth.
-  There was first, a considerable Athenian minority who opposed
-  the war with Sparta from the first; next, when the war began,
-  the proprietors of Attica saw their lands ruined, and were
-  compelled either to carry away, or to lose, their servants and
-  cattle, so that they obtained no returns. The intense discontent,
-  the angry complaints, the bitter conflict of parties, which
-  these circumstances raised among the Athenian citizens,—not to
-  mention the aggravation of all these symptoms by the terrible
-  epidemic,—are marked out in Thucydides, and have been recorded
-  in the fifth volume of this history. Not only the positive loss
-  and suffering, but all other causes of exasperation, stood at a
-  higher pitch at Athens in the early part of the Peloponnesian
-  war, than at Corinth in 392 B.C.
-
-  Yet what were the effects which they produced? Did the minority
-  resort to a conspiracy,—or the majority to a _coup d’état_—or
-  either of them to invitation of foreign aid against the other?
-  Nothing of the kind. The minority had always open to them the
-  road of pacific opposition, and the chance of obtaining a
-  majority in the Senate or in the public assembly, which was
-  practically identical with the totality of the citizens. Their
-  opposition, though pacific as to acts, was sufficiently animated
-  and violent in words and propositions, to serve as a real
-  discharge for imprisoned angry passion. If they could not carry
-  the adoption of their general policy, they had the opportunity
-  of gaining partial victories which took off the edge of a fierce
-  discontent; witness the fine imposed upon Perikles (Thucyd.
-  ii, 65) in the year before his death, which both gratified and
-  mollified the antipathy against him, and brought about shortly
-  afterwards a strong reaction in his favor. The majority, on the
-  other hand, knew that the predominance of its policy depended
-  upon its maintaining its hold on a fluctuating public assembly,
-  against the utmost freedom of debate and attack, within certain
-  forms and rules prescribed by the constitution; attachment to
-  the latter being the cardinal principle of political morality in
-  both parties. It was this system which excluded on both sides the
-  thought of armed violence. It produced among the democratical
-  citizens of Athens that characteristic insisted upon by Kleon
-  in Thucydides,—“constant and fearless security and absence of
-  treacherous hostility among one another” (διὰ γὰρ τὸ καθ᾽ ἡμέραν
-  ἀδεὲς καὶ ἀνεπιβούλευτον πρὸς ἀλλήλους, καὶ ἐς τοὺς ξυμμάχους τὸ
-  αὐτὸ ἔχετε—Thuc. iii, 37), the entire absence of which stands
-  so prominently forward in these deplorable proceedings of the
-  oligarchical Corinth. Pasimêlus and his Corinthian minority had
-  no assemblies, dikasteries, annual Senate, or constant habit of
-  free debate and accusation, to appeal to; their only available
-  weapon was armed violence, or treacherous correspondence with a
-  foreign enemy. On the part of the Corinthian government, superior
-  or more skilfully used force, or superior alliance abroad, was
-  the only weapon of defence, in like manner.
-
-  I shall return to this subject in a future chapter, where I enter
-  more at large into the character of the Athenians.
-
-Though Pasimêlus and his friends were masters of the citadel, and had
-repulsed the assault of their enemies, yet the _coup d’état_ had
-been completely successful in overawing their party in the city, and
-depriving them of all means of communicating with the Lacedæmonians
-at Sikyon. Feeling unable to maintain themselves, they were besides
-frightened by menacing omens, when they came to offer sacrifice,
-in order that they might learn whether the gods encouraged them to
-fight or not. The victims were found so alarming, as to drive them
-to evacuate the post and prepare for voluntary exile. Many of them
-(according to Diodorus five hundred)[632] actually went into exile;
-while others, and among them Pasimêlus himself, were restrained by
-the entreaties of their friends and relatives, combined with solemn
-assurances of peace and security from the government; who now,
-probably, felt themselves victorious, and were anxious to mitigate
-the antipathies which their recent violence had inspired. These
-pacific assurances were faithfully kept, and no farther mischief was
-done to any citizen.
-
-  [632] Diodor. xiv, 86; Xen. Hellen. iv, 4, 5.
-
-But the political condition of Corinth was materially altered, by an
-extreme intimacy of alliance and communion now formed with Argos;
-perhaps combined with reciprocal rights of intermarriage, and of
-purchase and sale. The boundary pillars or hedges which separated the
-two territories, were pulled up, and the city was entitled _Argos_
-instead of _Corinth_ (says Xenophon); such was probably the invidious
-phrase in which the opposition party described the very close
-political union now formed between the two cities; upheld by a strong
-Argeian force in the city and acropolis, together with some Athenian
-mercenaries under Iphikrates, and some Bœotians as a garrison in
-the port of Lechæum. Most probably the government remained still
-Corinthian, and still oligarchical, as before. But it now rested upon
-Argeian aid, and was therefore dependent chiefly upon Argos, though
-partly also upon the other two allies.
-
-To Pasimêlus and his friends such a state of things was intolerable.
-Though personally they had no ill-usage to complain of, yet the
-complete predominance of their political enemies was quite sufficient
-to excite their most vehement antipathies. They entered into
-secret correspondence with Praxitas, the Lacedæmonian commander at
-Sikyon, engaging to betray to him one of the gates in the western
-Long Wall between Corinth and Lechæum. The scheme being concerted,
-Pasimêlus and his partisans got themselves placed,[633] partly by
-contrivance and partly by accident, on the night-watch at this gate;
-an imprudence, which shows that the government not only did not
-maltreat them, but even admitted them to trust. At the moment fixed,
-Praxitas,—presenting himself with a Lacedæmonian _mora_ or regiment,
-a Sikyonian force, and the Corinthian exiles,—found the treacherous
-sentinels prepared to open the gates. Having first sent in a trusty
-soldier to satisfy him that there was no deceit,[634] he then
-conducted all his force within the gates, into the mid-space between
-the two Long Walls. So broad was this space, and so inadequate did
-his numbers appear to maintain it, that he took the precaution of
-digging a cross-ditch with a palisade to defend himself on the side
-towards the city; which he was enabled to do undisturbed, since the
-enemy (we are not told why) did not attack him all the next day.
-On the ensuing day, however, Argeians, Corinthians, and Athenian
-mercenaries under Iphikrates, all came down from the city in full
-force; the latter stood on the right of the line, along the eastern
-wall, opposed to the Corinthian exiles on the Lacedæmonian left;
-while the Lacedæmonians themselves were on their own right, opposed
-to the Corinthians from the city; and the Argeians, opposed to the
-Sikyonians, in the centre.
-
-  [633] Xen. Hellen. iv, 4, 8. καὶ κατὰ τύχην καὶ κατ᾽ ἐπιμέλειαν,
-  etc.
-
-  [634] Xen. Hellen. iv, 4, 8. Nothing can show more forcibly the
-  Laconian bias of Xenophon, than the credit which he gives to
-  Pasimêlus for his good faith towards the Lacedæmonians whom he
-  was letting in; overlooking or approving his treacherous betrayal
-  towards his own countrymen, in thus opening a gate which he
-  had been trusted to watch. τὼ δ᾽ εἰσηγαγέτην, καὶ ~οὕτως ἁπλῶς
-  ἀπεδειξάτην~, ὥστε ὁ εἰσελθὼν ἐξήγγειλε, πάντα εἶναι ἀδόλως,
-  οἷάπερ ἐλεγέτην.
-
-It was here that the battle began; the Argeians, bold from superior
-numbers, attacked and broke the Sikyonians, tearing up the palisade,
-and pursuing them down to the sea with much slaughter;[635] upon
-which Pasimachus the Lacedæmonian commander of cavalry, coming to
-their aid, caused his small body of horsemen to dismount and tie
-their horses to trees, and then armed them with shields taken from
-the Sikyonians, inscribed on the outside with the letter Sigma
-(Σ). With these he approached on foot to attack the Argeians, who,
-mistaking them for Sikyonians, rushed to the charge with alacrity;
-upon which Pasimachus exclaimed,—“By the two gods, Argeians, these
-Sigmas which you see here will deceive you;” he then closed with
-them resolutely, but his number was so inferior that he was soon
-overpowered and slain. Meanwhile, the Corinthian exiles on the left
-had driven back Iphikrates with his mercenaries (doubtless chiefly
-light troops) and pursued them even to the city gates; while the
-Lacedæmonians, easily repelling the Corinthians opposed to them,
-came out of their palisade, and planted themselves with their faces
-towards the eastern wall, but at a little distance from it, to
-intercept the Argeians on their return. The latter were forced to
-run back as they could, huddling close along the eastern wall, with
-their right or unshielded side exposed, as they passed, to the spears
-of the Lacedæmonians. Before they could get to the walls of Corinth,
-they were met and roughly handled by the victorious Corinthian
-exiles. And even when they came to the walls, those within, unwilling
-to throw open the gates for fear of admitting the enemy, contented
-themselves with handing down ladders, over which the defeated
-Argeians clambered with distress and difficulty. Altogether, their
-loss in this disastrous retreat was frightful. Their dead (says
-Xenophon) lay piled up like heaps of stones or wood.[636]
-
-  [635] Xen. Hellen. iv, 4. 10. Καὶ τοὺς μὲν Σικυωνίους ἐκράτησαν
-  καὶ διασπάσαντες τὸ σταύρωμα ἐδίωκον ἐπὶ θάλασσαν, καὶ ἐκεῖ
-  πολλοὺς αὐτῶν ἀπέκτειναν.
-
-  It would appear from hence that there must have been an open
-  portion of Lechæum, or a space apart from (but adjoining to) the
-  wall which encircled Lechæum, yet still within the Long Walls.
-  Otherwise the fugitive Sikyonians could hardly have got down to
-  the sea.
-
-  [636] Xen. Hellen. iv, 4, 12. Οὕτως ἐν ὀλίγῳ πολλοὶ ἔπεσον, ὥστε
-  εἰθισμένοι ὁρᾷν οἱ ἄνθρωποι σωροὺς σίτου, ξύλων, λίθου, τότε
-  ἐθεάσαντο σωροὺς νεκρῶν.
-
-  A singular form of speech.
-
-This victory of Praxitas and the Lacedæmonians, though it did
-not yet make them masters of Lechæum,[637] was, nevertheless,
-of considerable importance. Shortly afterwards they received
-reinforcements which enabled them to turn it to still better account.
-The first measure of Praxitas was to pull down a considerable breadth
-of the two walls, leaving a breach which opened a free passage for
-any Lacedæmonian army from Sikyon to reach and pass the isthmus. He
-then marched his troops through the breach, forward on the road to
-Megara, capturing the two Corinthian dependencies of Krommyon and
-Sidus on the Saronic gulf, in which he placed garrisons. Returning
-back by the road south of Corinth, he occupied Epieikia on the
-frontier of Epidaurus, as a protection to the territory of the latter
-against incursions from Corinth,—and then disbanded his army.
-
-  [637] Diodorus (xiv, 87) represents that the Lacedæmonians on
-  this occasion surprised and held Lechæum, defeating the general
-  body of the confederates who came out from Corinth to retake it.
-  But his narrative of all these circumstances differs materially
-  from that of Xenophon; whom I here follow in preference, making
-  allowance for great partiality, and for much confusion and
-  obscurity.
-
-  Xenophon gives us plainly to understand, that Lechæum was <i>not</i>
-  captured by the Lacedæmonians until the following year, by
-  Agesilaus and Teleutias.
-
-  It is to be recollected that Xenophon had particular means of
-  knowing what was done by Agesilaus, and therefore deserves credit
-  on that head,—always allowing for partiality. Diodorus does not
-  mention Agesilaus in connection with the proceedings at Lechæum.
-
-A desultory warfare was carried on during the ensuing winter and
-spring between the opposite garrisons in Corinth and Sikyon. It
-was now that the Athenian Iphikrates, in the former place, began
-to distinguish himself at the head of his mercenary peltasts whom,
-after their first organization by Konon, he had trained to effective
-tactics under the strictest discipline, and whose movements he
-conducted with consummate skill. His genius introduced improvements
-both in their armor and in their clothing. He lengthened by one
-half both the light javelin and the short sword, which the Thracian
-peltasts habitually carried; he devised a species of leggings,
-known afterwards by the name of Iphikratides; and he thus combined,
-better than had ever been done before, rapid motion,—power of
-acting in difficult ground and open order,—effective attack, either
-by missiles or hand to hand, and dexterous retreat in case of
-need.[638] As yet, he was but a young officer, in the beginning
-of his military career.[639] We must therefore presume that these
-improvements were chiefly of later date, the suggestions of his
-personal experience; but even now, the successes of his light troops
-were remarkable. Attacking Phlius, he entrapped the Phliasians into
-an ambuscade, and inflicted on them a defeat so destructive that
-they were obliged to invoke the aid of a Lacedæmonian garrison for
-the protection of their city. He gained a victory near Sikyon,
-and carried his incursions over all Arcadia, to the very gates of
-the cities; damaging the Arcadian hoplites so severely, that they
-became afraid to meet him in the field. His own peltasts, however,
-though full of confidence against these Peloponnesian hoplites,
-still retained their awe and their reluctance to fight against
-Lacedæmonians;[640] who, on their side, despised them, but despised
-their own allies still more. “Our friends fear these peltasts, as
-children fear hobgoblins,”—said the Lacedæmonians, sarcastically,
-endeavoring to set the example of courage by ostentatious
-demonstrations of their own around the walls of Corinth.[641]
-
-  [638] Diodor. xv, 44; Cornelius Nepos, Vit. Iphicrat. c.
-  2; Polyæn. iii, 9, 10. Compare Rehdantz, Vitæ Iphicratis,
-  Chabriæ, et Timothei, c. 2, 7 (Berlin, 1845)—a very useful and
-  instructive publication.
-
-  In describing the improvements made by Iphikrates in the armature
-  of his peltasts, I have not exactly copied either Nepos or
-  Diodorus, who both appear to me confused in their statements.
-  You would imagine, in reading their account (and so it has been
-  stated by Weber, Prolegg. ad Demosth. cont. Aristokr. p. xxxv.),
-  that there were no peltasts in Greece prior to Iphikrates;
-  that he was the first to transform heavy-armed hoplites into
-  light-armed peltasts, and to introduce from Thrace the light
-  shield or _pelta_, not only smaller in size than the round ἀσπὶς
-  carried by the hoplite, but also without the ἴτυς (or surrounding
-  metallic rim of the ἀσπὶς) seemingly connected by outside bars
-  or spokes of metal with the exterior central knob or projection
-  (_umbo_) which the hoplite pushed before him in close combat. The
-  _pelta_, smaller and lighter than the ἀσπὶς, was seemingly square
-  or oblong and not round; though it had no ἴτυς, it often had thin
-  plates of brass, as we may see by Xenophon, Anab. v, 2, 29, so
-  that the explanation of it given in the Scholia ad Platon. Legg.
-  vii, p. 813 must be taken with reserve.
-
-  But Grecian peltasts existed before the time of Iphikrates (Xen.
-  Hellen. i, 2, 1 and elsewhere); he did not first introduce them;
-  he found them already there, and improved their armature. Both
-  Diodorus and Nepos affirm that he lengthened the _spears_ of
-  the peltasts to a measure half as long again as those of the
-  hoplites (or twice as long, if we believe Nepos), and the swords
-  in proportion—“ηὔξησε μὲν τὰ δόρατα ἡμιολίῳ μεγέθει—hastæ
-  modum duplicavit.” Now this I apprehend to be not exact; nor is
-  it true (as Nepos asserts) that the Grecian hoplites carried
-  “short spears”—“brevibus hastis.” The spear of the Grecian
-  hoplite was long (though not so long as that of the heavy and
-  compact Macedonian phalanx afterwards became), and it appears
-  to me incredible that Iphikrates should have given to his light
-  and active peltast a spear twice as long, or half as long again,
-  as that of the hoplite. Both Diodorus and Nepos have mistaken
-  by making their comparison with the arms _of the hoplite_, to
-  which the changes of Iphikrates had no reference. The peltast
-  both before and after Iphikrates did not carry a _spear_, but
-  a _javelin_, which he employed as a missile, to hurl, not to
-  thrust; he was essentially an ἀκοντιστὴς or javelin-shooter (See
-  Xenoph. Hellen. iv, 5, 14; vi, 1, 9). Of course the javelin
-  might, in case of need, serve to thrust, but this was not its
-  appropriate employment; _e converso_, the spear might be hurled
-  (under advantageous circumstances, from the higher ground against
-  an enemy below—Xen. Hellen. ii. 4, 15; v, 4, 52), but its proper
-  employment was, to be held and thrust forward.
-
-  What Iphikrates really did, was, to lengthen both the two
-  offensive weapons which the peltast carried, before his
-  time,—the javelin, and the sword. He made the javelin a longer
-  and heavier weapon, requiring a more practised hand to throw—but
-  also competent to inflict more serious wounds, and capable
-  of being used with more deadly effect if the peltasts saw an
-  opportunity of coming to close fight on advantageous terms.
-  Possibly Iphikrates not only lengthened the weapon, but also
-  improved its point and efficacy in other ways; making it more
-  analogous to the formidable Roman _pilum_. Whether he made any
-  alteration in the _pelta_ itself, we do not know.
-
-  The name _Iphikratides_, given to these new-fashioned leggings or
-  boots, proves to us that Wellington and Blucher are not the first
-  eminent generals who have lent an honorable denomination to boots
-  and shoes.
-
-  [639] Justin, vi, 5.
-
-  [640] Xen. Hellen. iv, 4, 16; Diodor. xiv, 91.
-
-  Τοὺς μέντοι Λακεδαιμονίους οὕτως αὖ οἱ πελτασταὶ ἐδέδισαν, ὡς
-  ἐντὸς ἀκοντίσματος οὐ προσῄεσαν τοῖς ὁπλίταις, etc.
-
-  Compare the sentiment of the light troops in the attack of
-  Sphakteria, when they were awe-struck and afraid at first to
-  approach the Lacedæmonian hoplites—τῇ γνώμῃ δεδουλωμένοι ὡς ἐπὶ
-  Λακεδαιμονίους, etc. (Thucyd. iv, 34).
-
-  [641] Xen. Hellen. iv, 4, 17. ὥστε οἱ μὲν Λακεδαιμόνιοι καὶ
-  ἐπισκώπτειν ἐτόλμων, ὡς οἱ σύμμαχοι φοβοῖντο τοὺς πελταστὰς,
-  ὥσπερ μορμῶνας παιδάρια, etc.
-
-  This is a camp-jest of the time, which we have to thank Xenophon
-  for preserving.
-
-The breach made in the Long Walls of Corinth by Praxitas had laid
-open the road for a Peloponnesian army to march either into Attica
-or Bœotia.[642] Fortunately for the Athenians, they had already
-completed the rebuilding of their own Long Walls; but they were
-so much alarmed by the new danger, that they marched with their
-full force, and with masons and carpenters accompanying,[643] to
-Corinth. Here, with that celerity of work for which they were
-distinguished,[644] they in a few days reëstablished completely the
-western wall; the more important of the two, since it formed the
-barrier against the incursions of the Lacedæmonians from Sikyon. They
-had then a secure position, and could finish the eastern wall at
-their leisure; which they accordingly did, and then retired, leaving
-it to the confederate troops in Corinth to defend.
-
-  [642] Xenoph. Agesil. ii, 17. ἀναπετάσας τῆς Πελοποννήσου τὰς
-  πύλας, etc.
-
-  Respecting the Long Walls of Corinth, as part of a line
-  of defence which barred ingress to, or egress from,
-  Peloponnesus,—Colonel Leake remarks,—“The narrative of Xenophon
-  shows the great importance of the Corinthian Long Walls in time
-  of war. They completed a line of fortification from the summit
-  of the Acro-Corinthus to the sea, and thus intercepted the most
-  direct and easy communication from the Isthmus into Peloponnesus.
-  For the rugged mountain, which borders the southern side of the
-  Isthmian plain, has only two passes,—one, by the opening on the
-  eastern side of Acro-Corinthus, which obliged an enemy to pass
-  under the eastern side of Corinth, and was, moreover, defended
-  by a particular kind of fortification, as some remains of walls
-  still testify,—the other, along the shore at Cenchreiæ, which
-  was also a fortified place in the hands of the Corinthians.
-  Hence the importance of the pass of Cenchreiæ, in all operations
-  between the Peloponnesians, and an enemy without the Isthmus.”
-  (Leake, Travels in Morea, vol. iii, ch. xxviii, p. 254).
-
-  Compare Plutarch, Aratus, c. 16; and the operations of
-  Epaminondas as described by Diodorus, xv, 68.
-
-  [643] Xen. Hellen. iv, 4, 18. ἐλθόντες ~πανδημεὶ~ μετὰ λιθολόγων
-  καὶ τεκτόνων, etc. The word πανδημεὶ shows how much they were
-  alarmed.
-
-  [644] Thucyd. vi, 98.
-
-This advantage, however,—a very material one,—was again overthrown
-by the expedition of the Lacedæmonian king, Agesilaus, during the
-same summer. At the head of a full Lacedæmonian and Peloponnesian
-force, he first marched into the territory of Argos, and there spent
-some time in ravaging all the cultivated plain. From hence he passed
-over the mountain-road, by Tenea,[645] into the plain of Corinth,
-to the foot of the newly-repaired Long Walls. Here his brother
-Teleutias, who had recently superseded Herippidas as admiral in the
-Corinthian Gulf, came to coöperate with him in a joint attack, by
-sea and land, on the new walls and on Lechæum.[646] The presence of
-this naval force rendered the Long Walls difficult to maintain, since
-troops could be disembarked in the interval between them, where the
-Sikyonians in the previous battle had been beaten and pursued down
-to the sea. Agesilaus and Teleutias were strong enough to defeat the
-joint force of the four confederated armies, and to master not only
-the Long Walls, but also the port of Lechæum,[647] with its docks,
-and the ships within them; thus breaking up the naval power of
-Corinth in the Krissæan Gulf. Lechæum now became a permanent post of
-hostility against Corinth, occupied by a Lacedæmonian garrison, and
-occasionally by the Corinthian exiles, while any second rebuilding of
-the Corinthian Long Walls by the Athenians became impossible. After
-this important success, Agesilaus returned to Sparta. Neither he
-nor his Lacedæmonian hoplites, especially the Amyklæans, were ever
-willingly absent from the festival of the Hyakinthia; nor did he now
-disdain to take his station in the chorus,[648] under the orders of
-the choric conductor, for the pæan in honor of Apollo.
-
-  [645] The words stand in the text of Xenophon,—εὐθὺς ἐκεῖθεν
-  ὑπερβαλὼν κατὰ ~Τεγέαν~ εἰς Κόρινθον. A straight march from the
-  Argeian territory to Corinth could not possibly carry Agesilaus
-  by _Tegea_; Kœppen proposes ~Τενέαν~, which I accept, as
-  geographically suitable. I am not certain, however, that it is
-  right; the _Agesilaus_ of Xenophon has the words κατὰ τὰ στενά.
-
-  About the probable situation of Tenea, see Colonel Leake, Travels
-  in Morea, vol. iii, p. 321; also his Peloponnesiaca, p. 400.
-
-  [646] Xen. Hellen. iv, 4, 19—iv, 8, 10, 11.
-
-  It was rather late in the autumn of 393 B.C. that the
-  Lacedæmonian maritime operations in the Corinthian Gulf began,
-  against the fleet recently equipped by the Corinthians out of the
-  funds lent by Pharnabazus. First, the Lacedæmonian Polemarchus
-  was named admiral; he was slain,—and his secretary Pollis, who
-  succeeded to his command, retired afterwards wounded. Next came
-  Herippidas to the command, who was succeeded by Teleutias. Now if
-  we allow to Herippidas a year of command (the ordinary duration
-  of a Lacedæmonian admiral’s appointment), and to the other two
-  something less than a year, since their time was brought to
-  an end by accidents,—we shall find that the appointment of
-  Teleutias will fall in the spring or early summer of 391 B.C.,
-  the year of this expedition of Agesilaus.
-
-  [647] Andokides de Pace, s. 18; Xen. Hellen. iv, 4, 19.
-  Παρεγένετο δὲ αὐτῷ (Ἀγησιλάῳ) καὶ ὁ ἁδελφὸς Τελευτίας κατὰ
-  θάλασσαν, ἔχων τριήρεις περὶ δώδεκα· ὥστε μακαρίζεσθαι αὐτῶν τὴν
-  μητέρα, ὅτι τῇ αὐτῇ ἡμέρᾳ ὧν ~ἔτεκεν ὁ μὲν κατὰ γῆν τὰ τείχη τῶν
-  πολεμίων, ὁ δὲ κατὰ θάλασσαν τὰς ναῦς καὶ τὰ νεώρια ᾕρηκε~.
-
-  This last passage indicates decidedly that Lechæum was not
-  taken until this joint attack by Agesilaus and Teleutias. And
-  the authority of Xenophon on the point is superior, in my
-  judgment, to that of Diodorus (xiv, 86), who represents Lechæum
-  to have been taken in the year before, on the occasion when the
-  Lacedæmonians were first admitted by treachery within the Long
-  Walls.
-
-  The passage from Aristeides the rhetor, referred to by Wesseling,
-  Mr. Clinton, and others, only mentions the _battle_ at
-  Lechæum—_not the capture_ of the port. Xenophon also mentions a
-  _battle_ as having taken place close to Lechæum, between the two
-  long walls, on the occasion when Diodorus talks of the _capture_
-  of Lechæum; so that Aristeides is more in harmony with Xenophon
-  than with Diodorus.
-
-  A few months prior to this joint attack of Agesilaus and
-  Teleutias, the Athenians had come with an army, and with masons
-  and carpenters, for the express purpose of rebuilding the Long
-  Walls which Praxitas had in part broken down. This step would
-  have been both impracticable and useless, if the Lacedæmonians
-  had stood then in possession of Lechæum.
-
-  There is one passage of Xenophon, indeed, which looks as if the
-  Lacedæmonians had been in possession of Lechæum _before_ this
-  expedition of the Athenians to reëstablish the Long Walls,—Αὐτοὶ
-  (the Lacedæmonians) ~δ᾽ ἐκ τοῦ Λεχαίου ὁρμώμενοι~ σὺν μόρᾳ
-  καὶ τοῖς Κορινθίων φυγάσι, κύκλῳ περὶ τὸ ἄστυ τῶν Κορινθίων
-  ἐστρατεύοντο (iv, 4, 17). But whoever reads attentively the
-  sections from 15 to 19 inclusive, will see (I think) that this
-  affirmation may well refer to a period after, and not before,
-  the capture of Lechæum by Agesilaus; for it has reference to the
-  general contempt shown by the Lacedæmonians for the peltasts
-  of Iphikrates, as contrasted with the terror displayed by the
-  Mantineians and others, of these same peltasts. Even if this
-  were otherwise, however, I should still say that the passages
-  which I have produced above from Xenophon show plainly that
-  _he_ represents Lechæum to have been captured by Agesilaus and
-  Teleutias; and that the other words, ἐκ τοῦ Λεχαίου ὁρμώμενοι,
-  if they really implied anything inconsistent with this, must be
-  regarded as an inaccuracy.
-
-  I will add that the chapter of Diodorus, xiv, 86, puts into one
-  year events which cannot all be supposed to have taken place in
-  that same year.
-
-  Had Lechæum been in possession and occupation by the
-  Lacedæmonians in the year preceding the joint attack by Agesilaus
-  and Teleutias, Xenophon would surely have mentioned it in iv,
-  4, 14; for it was a more important post than Sikyon, for acting
-  against Corinth.
-
-  [648] Xen. Agesilaus, ii, 17.
-
-It was thus that the Long Walls, though rebuilt by the Athenians in
-the preceding year, were again permanently overthrown, and the road
-for Lacedæmonian armies to march beyond the isthmus once more laid
-open. So much were the Athenians and the Bœotians alarmed at this
-new success, that both appear to have become desirous of peace, and
-to have sent envoys to Sparta. The Thebans are said to have offered
-to recognize Orchomenus (which was now occupied by a Lacedæmonian
-garrison) as autonomous and disconnected from the Bœotian federation;
-while the Athenian envoys seem to have been favorably received at
-Sparta, and to have found the Lacedæmonians disposed to make peace
-on better terms than those which had been proposed during the late
-discussions with Tiribazus (hereafter to be noticed;) recognizing
-the newly built Athenian walls, restoring Lemnos, Imbros, and Skyros
-to Athens, and guaranteeing autonomy to each separate city in the
-Grecian world. The Athenian envoys at Sparta having provisionally
-accepted these terms, forty days were allowed for reference to the
-people of Athens; to which place Lacedæmonian envoys were sent as
-formal bearers of the propositions. The Argeians and Corinthians,
-however, strenuously opposed the thoughts of peace, urging the
-Athenians to continue the war; besides which, it appears that many
-Athenian citizens thought that large restitution ought to have been
-made of Athenian property forfeited at the end of the late war,
-and that the Thracian Chersonese ought to have been given back as
-well as the three islands. On these and other grounds, the Athenian
-people refused to sanction the recommendation of their envoys;
-though Andokides, one of those envoys, in a discourse still extant,
-earnestly advised that they should accept the peace.[649]
-
-  [649] Our knowledge of the abortive negotiations adverted to in
-  the text, is derived, partly from the third Oration of Andokides
-  called de Pace,—partly from a statement contained in the
-  Argument of that Oration, and purporting to be borrowed from
-  Philochorus—Φιλόχορος μὲν οὖν λέγει καὶ ελθεῖν τοὺς πρέσβεις ἐκ
-  Λακεδαίμονος, καὶ ἀπράκτους ἀνελθεῖν, μὴ πείσαντος τοῦ Ἀνδοκίδου.
-
-  Whether Philochorus had any additional grounds to rest upon,
-  other than this very oration itself, may appear doubtful. But at
-  any rate, this important fragment (which I do not see noticed
-  among the fragments of Philochorus in M. Didot’s collection)
-  counts for some farther evidence as to the reality of the peace
-  proposed and discussed, but not concluded.
-
-  Neither Xenophon nor Diodorus make any mention of such mission to
-  Sparta, or discussion at Athens, as that which forms the subject
-  of the Andokidean oration. But on the other hand, neither of them
-  says anything which goes to contradict the reality of the event;
-  nor can we in this case found any strong negative inference
-  on the mere silence of Xenophon, in the case of a pacific
-  proposition which ultimately came to nothing.
-
-  If indeed we could be certain that the oration of Andokides was
-  genuine it would of itself be sufficient to establish the reality
-  of the mission to which it relates. It would be sufficient
-  evidence, not only without corroboration from Xenophon, but even
-  against any contradictory statement proceeding from Xenophon.
-  But unfortunately, the rhetor Dionysius pronounced this oration
-  to be spurious; which introduces a doubt and throws us upon
-  the investigation of collateral probabilities. I have myself a
-  decided opinion (already stated more than once), that another
-  out of the four orations ascribed to Andokides (I mean the
-  fourth oration, entitled against Alkibiades) is spurious; and I
-  was inclined to the same suspicion with respect to this present
-  oration De Pace; a suspicion which I expressed in a former
-  volume (Vol. V, Ch. xlv, p. 334). But on studying over again
-  with attention this oration De Pace, I find reason to retract my
-  suspicion, and to believe that the oration may be genuine. It has
-  plenty of erroneous allegations as to matter of fact, especially
-  in reference to times prior to the battle of Ægospotami; but not
-  one, so far as I can detect, which conflicts with _the situation_
-  to which the orator addresses himself,—nor which requires us to
-  pronounce it spurious.
-
-  Indeed, in considering _this situation_ (which is the most
-  important point to be studied when we are examining the
-  genuineness of an oration), we find a partial coincidence in
-  Xenophon, which goes to strengthen our affirmative confidence.
-  One point much insisted upon in the oration is, that the Bœotians
-  were anxious to make peace with Sparta, and were willing to
-  relinquish Orchomenus (s. 13-20). Now Xenophon also mentions,
-  three or four months afterwards, the Bœotians as being anxious
-  for peace, and as sending envoys to Agesilaus to ask on what
-  terms it would be granted to them (Xen. Hellen. iv, 5, 6). This
-  coincidence is of some value in reference to the authenticity of
-  the oration.
-
-  Assuming the oration to be genuine, its date is pretty clearly
-  marked, and is rightly placed by Mr. Fynes Clinton in 391 B.C.
-  It was in the autumn or winter of that year, four years after
-  the commencement of the war in Bœotia which began in 395 B.C.
-  (s. 20). It was _after_ the capture of Lechæum, which took
-  place in the summer of 391 B.C.—and _before_ the destruction
-  of the Lacedæmonian _mora_ by Iphikrates, which took place in
-  the spring of 390 _B.C._ For Andokides emphatically intimates,
-  that at the moment when he spoke, _not one military success_
-  had yet been obtained against the Lacedæmonians—καίτοι ποίας
-  τινος ἂν ἐκεῖνοι παρ᾽ ἡμῶν εἰρήνης ἔτυχον, ~εἰ μίαν μόνον μάχην
-  ἡττήθησαν~; (s. 19). This could never have been said _after_ the
-  destruction of the Lacedæmonian _mora_, which made so profound
-  a sensation throughout Greece, and so greatly altered the
-  temper of the contending parties. And it seems to me one proof
-  (among others) that Mr. Fynes Clinton has not placed correctly
-  the events subsequent to the battle of Corinth, when I observe
-  that he assigns the destruction of the _mora_ to the year 392
-  B.C., a year _before_ the date which he rightly allots to the
-  Andokidean oration. I have placed (though upon other grounds)
-  the destruction of the _mora_ in the spring of 390 _B.C._, which
-  receives additional confirmation from this passage of Andokides.
-
-  Both Valckenaer and Sluiter (Lect. Andocid. c. x,) consider the
-  oration of Andokides de Pace as genuine; Taylor and other critics
-  hold the contrary opinion.
-
-The war being thus continued, Corinth, though defended by a
-considerable confederate force, including Athenian hoplites under
-Kallias, and peltasts under Iphikrates, became much pressed by the
-hostile posts at Lechæum as well as at Krommyon and Sidus,—and by
-its own exiles as the most active of all enemies. Still, however,
-there remained the peninsula and the fortification of Peiræum as
-an undisturbed shelter for the Corinthian servants and cattle,
-and a source of subsistence for the city. Peiræum was an inland
-post north-east of Corinth, in the centre of that peninsula which
-separates the two innermost recesses of the Krissæan Gulf,—the
-bay of Lechæum on its south-west, the bay called Alkyonis, between
-Kreusis and Olmiæ (now Psatho Bay), on its north-east. Across
-this latter bay Corinth communicated easily, through Peiræum and
-the fortified port of Œnoê, with Kreusis the port of Thespiæ in
-Bœotia.[650] The Corinthian exiles now prevailed upon Agesilaus
-to repeat his invasion of the territory, partly in order that
-they might deprive the city of the benefits which it derived from
-Peiræum,—partly in order that they might also appropriate to
-themselves the honor of celebrating the Isthmian games, which were
-just approaching. The Spartan king accordingly marched forth, at the
-head of a force composed of Lacedæmonians and of the Peloponnesian
-allies, first to Lechæum, and thence to the Isthmus, specially so
-called; that is, the sacred precinct of Poseidon near Schœnus on the
-Saronic Gulf, at the narrowest breadth of the Isthmus, where the
-biennial Isthmian festival was celebrated.
-
-  [650] Xen. Agesil. ii, 18.
-
-It was the month of April, or beginning of May, and the festival had
-actually begun, under the presidency of the Corinthians from the city
-who were in alliance with Argos; a body of Argeians being present
-as guards.[651] But on the approach of Agesilaus, they immediately
-retired to the city by the road to Kenchreæ, leaving their sacrifices
-half-finished. Not thinking fit to disturb their retreat, Agesilaus
-proceeded first to offer sacrifice himself, and then took a position
-close at hand, in the sacred ground of Poseidon, while the Corinthian
-exiles went through the solemnities in due form, and distributed the
-parsley wreaths to the victors. After remaining three days, Agesilaus
-marched away to attack Peiræum. He had no sooner departed, than the
-Corinthians from the city came forth, celebrated the festival and
-distributed the wreaths a second time.
-
-  [651] Xen. Hellen. iv, 5, 1; Plutarch, Agesil. c. 21.
-
-  Xenophon, who writes his history in the style and language of
-  a partisan, says that “_the Argeians_ celebrated the festival,
-  Corinth having now become Argos.” But it seems plain that the
-  truth was as I have stated in the text,—and that the Argeians
-  stood by (with others of the confederates probably also) to
-  protect the Corinthians of the city in the exercise of their
-  usual privilege; just as Agesilaus, immediately afterwards, stood
-  by to protect the Corinthian exiles while they were doing the
-  same thing.
-
-  The Isthmian games were _trietêric_, that is, celebrated in every
-  alternate year; in one of the spring months, about April or
-  perhaps the beginning of May (the Greek months being lunar, no
-  one of them would coincide regularly with any one of our calendar
-  months, year after year); and in the _second_ and _fourth_
-  Olympic years. From Thucydides, viii, 9, 10, we know that this
-  festival was celebrated in April 412 B.C.; that is, towards
-  the end of the _fourth_ year of Olympiad 91, about two or three
-  months before the festival of Olympiad 92.
-
-  Dodwell (De Cyclis Diss. vi, 2, just cited), Corsini, (Diss.
-  Agonistic. iv, 3), and Schneider in his note to this passage of
-  Xenophon,—all state the Isthmian games to have been celebrated
-  in the _first_ and _third_ Olympic years; which is, in my
-  judgment, a mistake. Dodwell erroneously states the Isthmian
-  games mentioned in Thucydides, viii, 9, to have been celebrated
-  at the beginning of Olympiad 92, instead of the fourth quarter
-  of the fourth year of Olympiad 91; a mistake pointed out by
-  Krüger (_ad loc._) as well as by Poppo and Dr. Arnold; although
-  the argumentation of the latter, founded upon the time of the
-  Lacedæmonian festival of the Hyakinthia, is extremely uncertain.
-  It is a still more strange idea of Dodwell, that the Isthmian
-  games were celebrated at the same time as the Olympic games
-  (Annal. Xenoph. ad ann. 392).
-
-Peiræum was occupied by so numerous a guard, comprising Iphikrates
-and his peltasts, that Agesilaus, instead of directly attacking
-it, resorted to the stratagem of making a sudden retrograde march
-directly towards Corinth. Probably, many of the citizens were at that
-moment absent for the second celebration of the festival; so that
-those remaining within, on hearing of the approach of Agesilaus,
-apprehended a plot to betray the city to him, and sent in haste
-to Peiræum to summon back Iphikrates with his peltasts. Having
-learned that these troops had passed by in the night, Agesilaus
-forthwith again turned his course and marched back to Peiræum, which
-he himself approached by the ordinary road, coasting round along
-the bay of Lechæum, near the Therma, or warm springs, which are
-still discernible;[652] while he sent a mora or division of troops
-to get round the place by a mountain-road more in the interior,
-ascending some woody heights commanding the town, and crowned by
-a temple of Poseidon.[653] The movement was quite effectual. The
-garrison and inhabitants of Peiræum, seeing that the place had
-become indefensible, abandoned it the next day with all their cattle
-and property, to take refuge in the Heræum, or sacred ground of
-Hêrê Akræa near the western cape of the peninsula. While Agesilaus
-marched thither towards the coast in pursuit of them, the troops
-descending from the heights attacked and captured Œnoê,[654]—the
-Corinthian town of that name situated near the Alkyonian bay over
-against Kreusis in Bœotia. A large booty here fell into their hands,
-which was still farther augmented by the speedy surrender of all
-in the Heræum to Agesilaus, without conditions. Called upon to
-determine the fate of the prisoners, among whom were included men,
-women, and children,—freemen and slaves,—with cattle and other
-property,—Agesilaus ordered that all those who had taken part in
-the massacre at Corinth, in the market-place, should be handed over
-to the vengeance of the exiles; and that all the rest should be sold
-as slaves.[655] Though he did not here inflict any harder measure
-than was usual in Grecian warfare, the reader who reflects that this
-sentence, pronounced by one on the whole more generous than most
-contemporary commanders, condemned numbers of free Corinthian men and
-women to a life of degradation, if not of misery,—will understand by
-contrast the encomiums with which in my last volume I set forth the
-magnanimity of Kallikratidas after the capture of Methymna; when he
-refused, in spite of the importunity of his allies, to sell either
-the Methymnæan or the Athenian captives,—and when he proclaimed the
-exalted principle, that no free Greek should be sold into slavery by
-any permission of his.[656]
-
-  [652] See Ulrichs, Reisen und Forschungen in Griechenland, chap.
-  i, p. 3. The modern village and port of Lutráki derives its name
-  from these warm springs, which are quite close to it and close to
-  the sea, at the foot of the mountain of Perachora or Peiræum; on
-  the side of the bay opposite to Lechæum, but near the point where
-  the level ground constituting the Isthmus (properly so-called),
-  ends,—and where the rocky or mountainous region, forming the
-  westernmost portion of Geraneia (or the peninsula of Peiræum),
-  begins. The language of Xenophon, therefore, when he comes to
-  describe the back-march of Agesilaus is perfectly accurate,—ἤδη
-  δ᾽ ἐκπεπερακότος αὐτοῦ τὰ θερμὰ ἐς τὸ πλατὺ τοῦ Λεχαίου, etc.
-  (iv, 5, 8).
-
-  [653] Xen. Hellen. iv, 5, 4.
-
-  Xenophon here recounts how Agesilaus sent up ten men with fire
-  in pans, to enable those on the heights to make fires and warm
-  themselves; the night being very cold and rainy, the situation
-  very high, and the troops not having come out with blankets or
-  warm covering to protect them. They kindled large fires, and the
-  neighboring temple of Poseidon was accidentally burnt.
-
-  [654] Xen. Hellen. iv, 5, 5.
-
-  This Œnoê must not be confounded with the Athenian town of that
-  name, which lay on the frontiers of Attica towards Bœotia.
-
-  So also the town of Peiræum here noticed must not be confounded
-  with another Peiræum, which was also in the Corinthian territory,
-  but on the Saronic Gulf, and on the frontiers of Epidaurus
-  (Thucyd. viii, 10).
-
-  [655] Xen. Hellen. iv, 5, 5-8.
-
-  [656] Xen. Hellen. i, 5, 14. See Vol. VIII, Ch. lxiv, p. 165 of
-  this History.
-
-  The sale of prisoners here directed by Agesilaus belies the
-  encomiums of his biographers (Xen. Agesil. vii, 6; Cornel. Nep.
-  Agesil. c. 5).
-
-As the Lacedæmonians had been before masters of Lechæum, Krommyon,
-and Sidus, this last success shut up Corinth on its other side,
-and cut off its communication with Bœotia. The city not being in
-condition to hold out much longer, the exiles already began to lay
-their plans for surprising it by aid of friends within.[657] So
-triumphant was the position of Agesilaus, that his enemies were all
-in alarm, and the Thebans, as well as others, sent fresh envoys
-to him to solicit peace. His antipathy towards the Thebans was so
-vehement, that it was a great personal satisfaction to him to see
-them thus humiliated. He even treated their envoys with marked
-contempt, affecting not to notice them when they stood close by,
-though Pharax, the proxenus of Thebes at Sparta, was preparing to
-introduce them.
-
-  [657] Xen. Agesil. vii, 6; Cornelius Nepos, Ages. c. 5.
-
-  The story of Polyænus (iii, 9, 45) may perhaps refer to this
-  point of time. But it is rare that we can verify his anecdotes or
-  those of the other Tactic writers. M. Rehdantz strives in vain to
-  find proper places for the sixty-three different stratagems which
-  Polyænus ascribes to Iphikrates.
-
-Absorbed in this overweening pride and exultation over conquered
-enemies, Agesilaus was sitting in a round pavilion, on the banks
-of the lake adjoining the Heræum,[658]—with his eyes fixed on
-the long train of captives brought out under the guard of armed
-Lacedæmonian hoplites, themselves the object of admiration to a crowd
-of spectators,[659]—when news arrived, as if under the special
-intervention of retributive Nemesis, which changed unexpectedly the
-prospect of affairs.[660] A horseman was seen galloping up, his horse
-foaming with sweat. To the many inquiries addressed, he returned no
-answer, nor did he stop until he sprang from his horse at the feet
-of Agesilaus; to whom, with sorrowful tone and features, he made his
-communication. Immediately Agesilaus started up, seized his spear,
-and desired the herald to summon his principal officers. On their
-coming near, he directed them, together with the guards around, to
-accompany him without a moment’s delay; leaving orders with the
-general body of the troops to follow as soon as they should have
-snatched some rapid refreshment. He then immediately put himself in
-march; but he had not gone far when three fresh horsemen met and
-informed him, that the task which he was hastening to perform had
-already been accomplished. Upon this he ordered a halt and returned
-to the Heræum; where on the ensuing day, to countervail the bad news,
-he sold all his captives by auction.[661]
-
-  [658] This Lake is now called Lake Vuliasmeni. Considerable
-  ruins were noticed by M. Dutroyat, in the recent French survey,
-  near its western extremity; on which side it adjoins the temple
-  of Hêrê Akræa, or the Heræum. See M. Boblaye, Recherches
-  Géographiques sur les Ruines de la Morée, p. 36; and Colonel
-  Leake’s Peloponnesiaca, p. 399.
-
-  [659] Xen. Hellen. iv, 5, 6.
-
-  Τῶν δὲ Λακεδαιμονίων ἀπὸ τῶν ὅπλων σὺν τοῖς δόρασι παρηκολούθουν
-  φύλακες τῶν αἰχμαλώτων, μάλα ὑπὸ τῶν παρόντων θεωρούμενοι· οἱ γὰρ
-  εὐτυχοῦντες καὶ κρατοῦντες ἀεί πως ἀξιοθέατοι δοκοῦσιν εἶναι.
-  Ἔτι δὲ καθημένου τοῦ Ἀγησιλάου, καὶ ἐοικότος ἀγαλλομένῳ τοῖς
-  πεπραγμένοις, ἱππεύς τις προσήλαυνε, καὶ μάλα ἰσχυρῶς ἱδρῶντι τῷ
-  ἵππῳ· ὑπὸ πολλῶν δὲ ἐρωτώμενος ὅ,τι ἀγγέλλοι, οὐδενὶ ἀπεκρίνατο,
-  etc.
-
-  It is interesting to mark in Xenophon the mixture of
-  Philo-Laconian complacency,—of philosophical reflection,—and
-  of that care in bringing out the contrast of good fortune, with
-  sudden reverse instantly following upon it, which forms so
-  constant a point of effect with Grecian poets and historians.
-
-  [660] Plutarch, Agesil. c. 22. ἔπαθε δὲ πρᾶγμα νεμεσητὸν, etc.
-
-  [661] Xen. Hellen. iv, 5, 7-9.
-
-This bad news,—the arrival of which has been so graphically
-described by Xenophon, himself probably among the bystanders and
-companions of Agesilaus,—was nothing less than the defeat and
-destruction of a Lacedæmonian _mora_ or military division by the
-light troops under Iphikrates. As it was an understood privilege of
-the Amyklæan hoplites in the Lacedæmonian army always to go home,
-even when on actual service, to the festival of the Hyakinthia,
-Agesilaus had left all of them at Lechæum. The festival day being
-now at hand, they set off to return. But the road from Lechæum to
-Sikyon lay immediately under the walls of Corinth, so that their
-march was not safe without an escort. Accordingly the polemarch
-commanding at Lechæum, leaving that place for the time under watch by
-the Peloponnesian allies, put himself at the head of the Lacedæmonian
-_mora_ which formed the habitual garrison, consisting of six hundred
-hoplites, and of a _mora_ of cavalry (number unknown)—to protect the
-Amyklæans until they were out of danger from the enemy at Corinth.
-Having passed by Corinth, and reached a point within about three
-miles of the friendly town of Sikyon, he thought the danger over, and
-turned back with his _mora_ of hoplites to Lechæum; still, however,
-leaving the officer of cavalry with orders to accompany the Amyklæans
-as much farther as they might choose, and afterwards to follow him on
-the return march.[662]
-
-  [662] Xen. Hellen. iv, 5, 11, 12.
-
-Though the Amyklæans (probably not very numerous) were presumed to
-be in danger of attack from Corinth in their march, and though the
-force in that town was known to be considerable, it never occurred
-to the Lacedæmonian polemarch that there was any similar danger for
-his own _mora_ of six hundred hoplites; so contemptuous was his
-estimate of the peltasts, and so strong was the apprehension which
-these peltasts were known to entertain of the Lacedæmonians. But
-Iphikrates, who had let the whole body march by undisturbed, when he
-now saw from the walls of Corinth the six hundred hoplites returning
-separately, without either cavalry or light troops, conceived the
-idea,—perhaps, in the existing state of men’s minds, no one else
-would have conceived it,—of attacking them with his peltasts as they
-repassed near the town. Kallias, the general of the Athenian hoplites
-in Corinth, warmly seconding the project, marched out his troops,
-and arrayed them in battle order not far from the gates; while
-Iphikrates with his peltasts began his attack upon the Lacedæmonian
-_mora_ in flanks and rear. Approaching within missile distance,
-he poured upon them a shower of darts and arrows, which killed or
-wounded several, especially on the unshielded side. Upon this the
-polemarch ordered a halt, directed the youngest soldiers to drive off
-the assailants, and confided the wounded to the care of attendants to
-be carried forward to Lechæum.[663] But even the youngest soldiers,
-encumbered by their heavy shields, could not reach their nimbler
-enemies, who were trained to recede before them. And when, after an
-unavailing pursuit, they sought to resume their places in the ranks,
-the attack was renewed, so that nine or ten of them were slain before
-they could get back. Again did the polemarch give orders to march
-forward; again the peltasts renewed their attack, forcing him to
-halt; again he ordered the younger soldiers (this time, all those
-between eighteen and thirty-three years of age, whereas on the former
-occasion, it had been those between eighteen and twenty-eight) to
-rush out and drive them off.[664] But the result was just the same:
-the pursuers accomplished nothing, and only suffered increased loss
-of their bravest and most forward soldiers, when they tried to
-rejoin the main body. Whenever the Lacedæmonians attempted to make
-progress, these circumstances were again repeated, to their great
-loss and discouragement; while the peltasts became every moment more
-confident and vigorous.
-
-  [663] Xen. Hellen. iv, 5, 14. Τούτους μὲν ἐκέλευον τοὺς
-  ὑπασπιστὰς ἀραμένους ἀποφέρειν ἐς Λέχαιον· ~οὗτοι καὶ μόνοι τῆς
-  μόρας τῇ ἀληθείᾳ ἐσώθησαν~.
-
-  We have here a remarkable expression of Xenophon,—“These were
-  the only men in the mora who were _really and truly saved_.” He
-  means, I presume, that they were the only men who were saved
-  without the smallest loss of honor; being carried off wounded
-  from the field of battle, and not having fled or deserted their
-  posts. The others who survived, preserved themselves by flight;
-  and we know that the treatment of those Lacedæmonians who ran
-  away from the field (οἱ τρέσαντες), on their return to Sparta,
-  was insupportably humiliating. See Xenoph. Rep. Laced. ix, 4;
-  Plutarch, Agesil. c. 30. We may gather from these words of
-  Xenophon, that a distinction was really made at Sparta between
-  the treatment of these wounded men here carried off, and that of
-  the other survivors of the beaten mora.
-
-  The ὑπασπισταὶ, or shield-bearers, were, probably, a certain
-  number of attendants, who habitually carried the shields of the
-  officers (compare Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 39; Anab. iv, 2, 20),
-  persons of importance, and rich hoplites. It seems hardly to
-  be presumed that every hoplite had an ὑπασπιστὴς, in spite of
-  what we read about the attendant Helots at the battle of Platæa
-  (Herod. ix, 10-29) and in other places.
-
-  [664] Xen. Hellen. iv, 5,15, 16. τὰ δέκα ἀφ᾽ ἥβης—τὰ
-  πεντεκαίδεκα ἀφ᾽ ἥβης.
-
-Some relief was now afforded to the distressed _mora_ by the coming
-up of their cavalry, which had finished the escort of the Amyklæans.
-Had this cavalry been with them at the beginning, the result might
-have been different; but it was now insufficient to repress the
-animated assaults of the peltasts. Moreover, the Lacedæmonian
-horsemen were at no time very good, nor did they on this occasion
-venture to push their pursuit to a greater range than the younger
-hoplites could keep up with them. At length, after much loss in
-killed and wounded, and great distress to all, the polemarch
-contrived to get his detachment as far as an eminence about a quarter
-of a mile from the sea and about two miles from Lechæum. Here,
-while Iphikrates still continued to harass them with his peltasts,
-Kallias also was marching up with his hoplites to charge them hand
-to hand,—when the Lacedæmonians, enfeebled in numbers, exhausted in
-strength, and too much dispirited for close fight with a new enemy,
-broke and fled in all directions. Some took the road to Lechæum,
-which place a few of them reached, along with the cavalry; the rest
-ran towards the sea at the nearest point, and observing that some of
-their friends were rowing in boats from Lechæum along the shore to
-rescue them, threw themselves into the sea, to wade or swim towards
-this new succor. But the active peltasts, irresistible in the pursuit
-of broken hoplites, put the last hand to the destruction of the
-unfortunate _mora_. Out of its full muster of six hundred, a very
-small proportion survived to reënter Lechæum.[665]
-
-  [665] Xen. Hellen. iv, 5, 17.
-
-  Xenophon affirms the number of slain to have been about two
-  hundred and fifty—ἐν πάσαις δὲ ταῖς μάχαις καὶ τῇ φυγῇ ἀπέθανον
-  περὶ πεντήκοντα καὶ διακοσίους. But he had before distinctly
-  stated that the whole _mora_ marching back to Lechæum under the
-  polemarch, was six hundred in number—ὁ μὲν πολέμαρχος σὺν τοῖς
-  ὁπλίταις, οὖσιν ὡς ἑξακοσίοις, ἀπῄει πάλιν ἐπὶ τὸ Λέχαιον (iv, 5,
-  12). And it is plain, from several different expressions, that
-  all of them were slain, excepting a very few survivors.
-
-  I think it certain, therefore, that one or other of these two
-  numbers is erroneous; either the original aggregate of six
-  hundred is _above_ the truth,—or the total of slain, two hundred
-  and fifty, is _below_ the truth. Now the latter supposition
-  appears to me by far the more probable of the two. The
-  Lacedæmonians, habitually secret and misleading in their returns
-  of their own numbers (see Thucyd. v, 74), probably did not choose
-  to admit publicly a greater total of slain than two hundred and
-  fifty. Xenophon has inserted this in his history, forgetting that
-  his own details of the battle refuted the numerical statement.
-  The total of six hundred is more probable, than any smaller
-  number, for the entire mora; and it is impossible to assign any
-  reasons why Xenophon should overstate it.
-
-The horseman who first communicated the disaster to Agesilaus, had
-started off express immediately from Lechæum, even before the bodies
-of the slain had been picked up for burial. The hurried movement of
-Agesilaus had been dictated by the desire of reaching the field in
-time to contend for the possession of the bodies, and to escape the
-shame of soliciting the burial-truce. But the three horsemen who
-met him afterwards, arrested his course by informing him that the
-bodies had already been buried, under truce asked and obtained; which
-authorized Iphikrates to erect his well-earned trophy on the spot
-where he had first made the attack.[666]
-
-  [666] Xen. Hellen. iv, 5, 8-10.
-
-Such a destruction of an entire division of Lacedæmonian hoplites,
-by light troops who stood in awe of them and whom they despised, was
-an incident, not indeed of great political importance, but striking
-in respect of military effect and impression upon the Grecian mind.
-Nothing at all like it had occurred since the memorable capture of
-Sphakteria, thirty-five years before; a disaster less considerable
-in one respect, that the number of hoplites beaten was inferior by
-one-third,—but far more important in another respect, that half the
-division had surrendered as prisoners; whereas in the battle near
-Corinth, though the whole mora (except a few fugitives) perished, it
-does not seem that a single prisoner was taken. Upon the Corinthians,
-Bœotians, and other enemies of Sparta, the event operated as a joyous
-encouragement, reviving them out of all their previous despondency.
-Even by the allies of Sparta, jealous of her superiority and bound
-to her by fear more than by attachment, it was welcomed with
-ill-suppressed satisfaction. But upon the army of Agesilaus (and
-doubtless upon the Lacedæmonians at home) it fell like a sudden
-thunderbolt, causing the strongest manifestations of sorrow and
-sympathy. To these manifestations there was only one exception,—the
-fathers, brothers, or sons of the slain warriors; who not only showed
-no sorrow, but strutted about publicly with cheerful and triumphant
-countenances, like victorious athletes.[667] We shall find the like
-phenomenon at Sparta a few years subsequently, after the far more
-terrible defeat at Leuktra; the relatives of the slain were joyous
-and elate,—those of the survivors, downcast and mortified;[668] a
-fact strikingly characteristic both of the intense mental effect
-of the Spartan training, and of the peculiar associations which
-it generated. We may understand how terrible was the contempt
-which awaited a Spartan who survived defeat, when we find fathers
-positively rejoicing that their sons had escaped such treatment by
-death.
-
-  [667] Xen. Hellen. iv, 5, 10. Ἅτε δὲ ἀήθους τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις
-  γεγενημένης τῆς τοιαύτης συμφορᾶς, πολὺ πένθος ἦν κατὰ τὸ
-  Λακωνικὸν στράτευμα, πλὴν ὅσων ἐτέθνασαν ἐν χώρᾳ ἢ υἱοὶ ἢ πατέρες
-  ἢ ἀδελφοί· ~οὗτοι δὲ, ὥσπερ νικηφόροι, λαμπροὶ καὶ ἀγαλλόμενοι τῷ
-  οἰκείῳ πάθει περιῄεσαν~.
-
-  If any reader objects to the words which I have used in the text
-  I request him to compare them with the Greek of Xenophon.
-
-  [668] Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 16.
-
-Sorely was Agesilaus requited for his supercilious insult towards
-the Theban envoys. When he at last consented to see them, after the
-news of the battle, their tone was completely altered. They said
-not a word about peace, but merely asked permission to pass through
-and communicate with their countrymen in Corinth. “I understand
-your purpose (said Agesilaus, smiling),—you want to witness the
-triumph of your friends, and see what it is worth. Come along with
-me, and I will teach you.” Accordingly, on the next day, he caused
-them to accompany him while he marched his army up to the very gates
-of Corinth,—defying those within to come out and fight. The lands
-had been so ravaged, that there remained little to destroy. But
-wherever there were any fruit-trees yet standing, the Lacedæmonians
-now cut them down. Iphikrates was too prudent to compromise his
-recent advantage by hazarding a second battle; so that Agesilaus had
-only the satisfaction of showing that he was master of the field,
-and then retired to encamp at Lechæum; from whence he sent back the
-Theban envoys by sea to Kreusis. Having then left a fresh mora or
-division at Lechæum, in place of that which had been defeated, he
-marched back to Sparta. But the circumstances of the march betrayed
-his real feelings, thinly disguised by the recent bravado of marching
-up to the gates of Corinth. He feared to expose his Lacedæmonian
-troops even to the view of those allies through whose territory he
-was to pass; so well was he aware that the latter (especially the
-Mantineians) would manifest their satisfaction at the recent defeat.
-Accordingly, he commenced his day’s march before dawn, and did not
-halt for the night till after dark; at Mantineia, he not only did
-not halt at all, but passed by, outside of the walls, before day had
-broken.[669] There cannot be a more convincing proof of the real
-dispositions of the allies towards Sparta, and of the sentiment of
-compulsion which dictated their continued adherence; a fact which we
-shall see abundantly illustrated as we advance in the stream of the
-history.
-
-  [669] Xen. Hellen. iv, 5, 16.
-
-The retirement of Agesilaus was the signal for renewed enterprise
-on the part of Iphikrates; who retook Sidus and Krommyon, which had
-been garrisoned by Praxitas,—as well as Peiræum and Œnoê, which had
-been left under occupation by Agesilaus. Corinth was thus cleared
-of enemies on its eastern and north-eastern sides. And though the
-Lacedæmonians still carried on a desultory warfare from Lechæum,
-yet such was the terror impressed by the late destruction of their
-mora, that the Corinthian exiles at Sikyon did not venture to march
-by land from that place to Lechæum, under the walls of Corinth,—but
-communicated with Lechæum only by sea.[670] In truth, we hear of no
-farther serious military operations undertaken by Sparta against
-Corinth, before the peace of Antalkidas. And the place became so
-secure, that the Corinthian leaders and their Argeian allies were
-glad to dispense with the presence of Iphikrates. That officer had
-gained so much glory by his recent successes, which the Athenian
-orators[671] even in the next generation never ceased to extol,
-that his temper, naturally haughty, became domineering; and he
-tried to procure, either for Athens or for himself, the mastery of
-Corinth,—putting to death some of the philo-Argeian leaders. We
-know these circumstances only by brief and meagre allusion; but they
-caused the Athenians to recall Iphikrates with a large portion of
-his peltasts, and to send Chabrias to Corinth in his place.[672]
-
-  [670] Xen. Hellen. iv, 5, 19.
-
-  [671] Demosthenes—περὶ Συντάξεως—c. 8, p. 172.
-
-  [672] Diodor. xiv, 92; Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 34.
-
-  Aristeides (Panathen. p. 168) boasts that the Athenians were
-  masters of the Acro-Corinthus, and might have kept the city as
-  their own, but that they generously refused to do so.
-
-It was either in the ensuing summer,—or perhaps immediately
-afterwards during the same summer,—390 B.C., that Agesilaus
-undertook an expedition into Akarnania; at the instance of the
-Achæans, who threatened, if this were not done, to forsake the
-Lacedæmonian alliance. They had acquired possession of the Ætolian
-district of Kalydon, had brought the neighboring villagers into a
-city residence, and garrisoned it as a dependence of the Achæan
-confederacy. But the Akarnanians,—allies of Athens as well as
-Thebes, and aided by an Athenian squadron at Œniadæ,—attacked them
-there, probably at the invitation of a portion of the inhabitants,
-and pressed them so hard, that they employed the most urgent
-instances to obtain aid from Sparta. Agesilaus crossed the Gulf at
-Rhium with a considerable force of Spartans and allies, and the full
-muster of the Achæans. On his arrival the Akarnanians all took refuge
-in their cities, sending their cattle up into the interior highlands,
-to the borders of a remote lake. Agesilaus, having sent to Stratus to
-require them not merely to forbear hostilities against the Achæans,
-but to relinquish their alliance with Athens and Thebes, and to
-become allies of Sparta,—found his demands resisted, and began to
-lay waste the country. Two or three days of operations designedly
-slack, were employed to lull the Akarnanians into security; after
-which, by a rapid forced march, Agesilaus suddenly surprised the
-remote spot in which their cattle and slaves had been deposited
-for safety. He spent a day here to sell this booty; merchants,
-probably, accompanying his army. But he had considerable difficulty
-in his return march, from the narrow paths and high mountains
-through which he had to thread his way. By a series of brave and
-well-combined hill-movements,—which, probably, reminded Xenophon
-of his own operations against the Karduchians in the retreat of the
-Ten-Thousand,—he defeated and dispersed the Akarnanians, though
-not without suffering considerably from the excellence of their
-light troops. Yet he was not successful in his attack upon any
-one of their cities, nor would he consent to prolong the war until
-seed-time, notwithstanding earnest solicitation from the Achæans,
-whom he pacified by engaging to return the next spring. He was,
-indeed, in a difficult and dangerous country, had not his retreat
-been facilitated by the compliance of the Ætolians; who calculated
-(though vainly) on obtaining from him the recovery of Naupaktus,
-then held (as well as Kalydon) by the Achæans.[673] Partial as the
-success of this expedition had been, however, it inflicted sufficient
-damage on the Akarnanians to accomplish its purpose. On learning that
-it was about to be repeated in the ensuing spring, they sent envoys
-to Sparta to solicit peace; consenting to abstain from hostilities
-against the Achæans, and to enrol themselves as members of the
-Lacedæmonian confederacy.[674]
-
-  [673] Diodor. xv, 73.
-
-  [674] Xen. Hellen. iv, 6, 1-14; iv, 7, 1.
-
-It was in this same year that the Spartan authorities resolved on
-an expedition against Argos, of which Agesipolis, the other king,
-took the command. Having found the border sacrifices favorable, and
-crossed the frontier, he sent forward his army to Phlius, where the
-Peloponnesian allies were ordered to assemble; but he himself first
-turned aside to Olympia, to consult the oracle of Zeus.
-
-It had been the practice of the Argeians, seemingly on more than
-one previous occasion,[675] when an invading Lacedæmonian army was
-approaching their territory, to meet them by a solemn message,
-intimating that it was the time of some festival (the Karneian, or
-other) held sacred by both parties, and warning them not to violate
-the frontier during the holy truce. This was in point of fact nothing
-better than a fraud; for the notice was sent, not at the moment when
-the Karneian festival (or other, as the case might be) ought to come
-on according to the due course of seasons, but at any time when it
-might serve the purpose of arresting a Lacedæmonian invasion. But
-though the duplicity of the Argeians was thus manifest, so strong
-were the pious scruples of the Spartan king, that he could hardly
-make up his mind to disregard the warning. Moreover, in the existing
-confusion of the calendar, there was always room for some uncertainty
-as to the question, which was the true Karneian moon; no Dorian
-state having any right to fix it imperatively for the others, as the
-Eleians fixed the Olympic truce, and the Corinthians the Isthmian.
-It was with a view to satisfy his conscience on this subject that
-Agesipolis now went to Olympia, and put the question to the oracle
-of Zeus,—whether he might with a safe religious conscience refuse
-to accept the holy truce, if the Argeians should now tender it. The
-oracle, habitually dexterous in meeting a specific question with a
-general reply, informed him, that he might with a safe conscience
-decline a truce demanded wrongfully and for underhand purposes.[676]
-This was accepted by Agesipolis as a satisfactory affirmative.
-Nevertheless, to make assurance doubly sure, he went directly
-forward to Delphi, to put the same question to Apollo. As it would
-have been truly embarrassing, however, if the two holy replies had
-turned out such as to contradict each other, he availed himself of
-the _præjudicium_ which he had already received at Olympia, and
-submitted the question to Apollo at Delphi in this form: “Is thine
-opinion on the question of the holy truce, the same as that of thy
-father (Zeus)?” “Most decidedly the same,” replied the god. Such
-double warranty, though the appeal was so drawn up as scarcely to
-leave to Apollo freedom of speech,[677] enabled Agesipolis to return
-with full confidence to Phlius, where his army was already mustered;
-and to march immediately into the Argeian territory by the road of
-Nemea. Being met on the frontier by two heralds with wreaths and in
-solemn attire, who warned him that it was a season of holy truce,
-he informed them that the gods authorized his disobedience to their
-summons, and marched on into the Argeian plain.
-
-  [675] Xen. Hellen. iv, 7, 3. Οἱ δ᾽ Ἀργεῖοι, ἐπεὶ ἔγνωσαν οὐ
-  δυνησόμενοι κωλύειν, ἔπεμψαν, ~ὥσπερ εἰώθεσαν~, ἐστεφανωμένους
-  δύο κήρυκας, ὑποφέροντας σπονδάς.
-
-  [676] Xen. Hellen. iv, 7, 2. Ὁ δὲ Ἀγησίπολις—ἐλθὼν εἰς Ὀλυμπίαν
-  καὶ χρηστηριαζόμενος, ἐπηρώτα τὸν θεὸν, εἰ ὁσίως ἂν ἔχοι αὐτῷ,
-  μὴ δεχομένῳ τὰς σπονδὰς τῶν Ἀργείων· ~ὅτι οὐχ ὁπότε καθήκοι
-  ὁ χρόνος, ἀλλ᾽ ὁπότε ἐμβάλλειν μέλλοιεν Λακεδαιμόνιοι, τότε
-  ὑπέφερον τοὺς μῆνας~. Ὁ δὲ θεὸς ἐπεσήμαινεν αὐτῷ, ὅσιον εἶναι μὴ
-  δεχομένῳ σπονδὰς ἀδίκως ἐπιφερομένας. Ἐκεῖθεν δ᾽ εὐθὺς πορευθεὶς
-  εἰς Δελφοὺς, ἐπήρετο αὖ τὸν Ἀπόλλω, εἰ κἀκείνῳ δοκοίῃ περὶ τῶν
-  σπονδῶν, καθάπερ τῷ πατρί. Ὁ δ᾽ ἀπεκρίνατο, ~καὶ μάλα κατὰ ταὐτά~.
-
-  I have given in the text what I believe to be the meaning of
-  the words ὑποφέρειν τοὺς μῆνας,—upon which Schneider has a
-  long and not very instructive note, adopting an untenable
-  hypothesis of Dodwell, that the Argeians on this occasion
-  appealed to the sanctity of the Isthmian truce; which is not
-  countenanced by anything in Xenophon, and which it belonged to
-  the Corinthians to announce, not to the Argeians. The plural
-  τοὺς μῆνας indicates (as Weiske and Manso understand it) that
-  the Argeians sometimes put forward the name of one festival,
-  sometimes of another. We may be pretty sure that the Karneian
-  festival was one of them; but what the others were, we cannot
-  tell. It is very probable that there were several festivals
-  of common obligation either among all the Dorians, or between
-  Sparta and Argos—πατρῴους τινας σπονδὰς ἐκ παλαιοῦ καθεστώσας
-  τοῖς Δωριεῦσι πρὸς ἀλλήλους,—to use the language of Pausanias
-  (iii, 5, 6). The language of Xenophon implies that the demand
-  made by the Argeians, for observance of the Holy Truce, was in
-  itself rightful, or rather, that it would have been rightful at
-  a different season; but that they put themselves in the wrong by
-  making it at an improper season and for a fraudulent political
-  purpose.
-
-  For some remarks on other fraudulent manœuvres of the Argeians,
-  respecting the season of the Karneian truce, see Vol. VII. of
-  this History, Ch. lvi, p. 66. The compound verb ~ὑποφέρειν~
-  τοὺς μῆνας seems to imply the _underhand purpose_ with which
-  the Argeians preferred their demand of the truce. What were the
-  previous occasions on which they had preferred a similar demand,
-  we are not informed. Two years before, Agesilaus had invaded
-  and laid waste Argos; perhaps they may have tried, but without
-  success, to arrest his march by a similar pious fraud.
-
-  It is to this proceeding, perhaps, that Andokides alludes (Or.
-  iii, De Pace, s. 27), where he says that the Argeians, though
-  strenuous in insisting that Athens should help them to carry on
-  the war for the possession of Corinth against the Lacedæmonians,
-  had nevertheless made a separate peace with the latter, covering
-  their own Argeian territory from invasion—αὐτοὶ δ᾽ ἰδίᾳ εἰρήνην
-  ποιησάμενοι τὴν χώραν οὐ παρέχουσιν ἐμπολεμεῖν. Of this obscure
-  passage I can give no better explanation.
-
-  [677] Aristotel. Rhetoric, ii, 23. Ἡγήσιππος ἐν Δελφοῖς ἐπηρώτα
-  τὸν θεόν, κεχρημένος πρότερον Ὀλυμπιᾶσιν, εἰ αὐτῷ ταὐτὰ δοκεῖ,
-  ἅπερ τῷ πατρί, ~ὡς αἰσχρὸν ὂν τἀναντία εἰπεῖν~.
-
-  A similar story about the manner of putting the question to
-  Apollo at Delphi, after it had already been put to Zeus at
-  Dodona, is told about Agesilaus on another occasion (Plutarch,
-  Apophth. Lacon. p. 208 F.).
-
-It happened that on the first evening after he had crossed the
-border, the supper and the consequent libation having been just
-concluded, an earthquake occurred; or, to translate the Greek phrase,
-“the god (Poseidon) shook.” To all Greeks, and to Lacedæmonians
-especially, this was a solemn event, and the personal companions of
-Agesipolis immediately began to sing the pæan in honor of Poseidon;
-the general impression among the soldiers being, that he would give
-orders for quitting the territory immediately, as Agis had acted in
-the invasion of Elis a few years before. Perhaps Agesipolis would
-have done the same here, construing the earthquake as a warning that
-he had done wrong, in neglecting the summons of the heralds,—had
-he not been fortified by the recent oracles. He now replied, that
-if the earthquake had occurred before he crossed the frontier, he
-should have considered it as a prohibition; but as it came after his
-crossing, he looked upon it as an encouragement to go forward.
-
-So fully had the Argeians counted on the success of their warning
-transmitted by the heralds, that they had made little preparation
-for defence. Their dismay and confusion were very great; their
-property was still outlying, not yet removed into secure places, so
-that Agesipolis found much both to destroy and to appropriate. He
-carried his ravages even to the gates of the city, piquing himself on
-advancing a little farther than Agesilaus had gone in his invasion
-two years before. He was at last driven to retreat by the terror
-of a flash of lightning in his camp, which killed several persons.
-And a project which he had formed, of erecting a permanent fort on
-the Argeian frontier, was abandoned in consequence of unfavorable
-sacrifices.[678]
-
-  [678] Xen. Hellen. iv, 7, 7; Pausan. iii, 5, 6.
-
-  It rather seems, by the language of these two writers, that they
-  look upon the menacing signs, by which Agesipolis was induced
-  to depart, as marks of some displeasure of the gods against his
-  expedition.
-
-Besides these transactions in and near the isthmus of Corinth, the
-war between Sparta and her enemies was prosecuted during the same
-years both in the islands and on the coast of Asia Minor; though our
-information is so imperfect that we can scarcely trace the thread of
-events. The defeat near Knidus (394 B.C.),—the triumphant maritime
-force of Pharnabazus and Konon at the Isthmus of Corinth in the
-ensuing year (393 B.C.),—the restoration of the Athenian Long Walls
-and fortified port,—and the activity of Konon with the fleet among
-the islands,[679]—so alarmed the Spartans with the idea of a second
-Athenian maritime empire, that they made every effort to detach the
-Persian force from the side of their enemies.
-
-  [679] Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 12. Compare Isokrates, Or. vii,
-  (Areopag.) s. 13. ἁπάσης γὰρ τῆς Ἑλλάδος ὑπὸ τὴν πόλιν ἡμῶν
-  ὑποπεσούσης καὶ μετὰ τὴν Κόνωνος ναυμαχίαν καὶ μετὰ τὴν Τιμοθέου
-  στρατηγίαν, etc. This oration, however, was composed a long while
-  after the events (about B.C. 353—see Mr. Clinton’s Fast. H.,
-  in that year); and Isokrates exaggerates; mistaking the break-up
-  of the Lacedæmonian empire for a resumption of the Athenian.
-  Demosthenes also (cont. Leptin. c. 16, p. 477) confounds the
-  same two ideas, and even the Athenian vote of thanks to Konon,
-  perpetuated on a commemorative column, countenanced the same
-  impression,—ἐπειδὴ Κόνων ἠλευθέρωσε τοὺς Ἀθηναίων συμμάχους, etc.
-
-The Spartan Antalkidas, a dexterous, winning and artful man,[680]
-not unlike Lysander, was sent as envoy to Tiribazus (392 B.C.);
-whom we now find as satrap of Ionia in the room of Tithraustes,
-after having been satrap of Armenia during the retreat of the Ten
-Thousand. As Tiribazus was newly arrived in Asia Minor, he had not
-acquired that personal enmity against the Spartans, which the active
-hostilities of Derkyllidas and Agesilaus had inspired to Pharnabazus
-and other Persians. Moreover, jealousy between neighboring satraps
-was an ordinary feeling, which Antalkidas now hoped to turn to the
-advantage of Sparta. To counteract his projects, envoys were also
-sent to Tiribazus, by the confederate enemies of Sparta, Athens,
-Thebes, Corinth, and Argos; and Konon, as the envoy of Athens, was
-incautiously despatched among the number. On the part of Sparta,
-Antalkidas offered, first, to abandon to the king of Persia all
-the Greeks on the continent of Asia; next, as to all the other
-Greeks, insular as well as continental, he required nothing more
-than absolute autonomy for each separate city, great and small.[681]
-The Persian king (he said) could neither desire anything more for
-himself, nor have any motive for continuing the war against Sparta,
-when he should once be placed in possession of all the towns on
-the Asiatic coast, and when he should find both Sparta and Athens
-rendered incapable of annoying him, through the autonomy and disunion
-of the Hellenic world. But to neither of the two propositions of
-Antalkidas would Athens, Thebes, or Argos, accede. As to the first,
-they repudiated the disgrace of thus formally abandoning the Asiatic
-Greeks;[682] as to the second proposition, guaranteeing autonomy
-to every distinct city of Greece, they would admit it only under
-special reserves, which it did not suit the purpose of Antalkidas
-to grant. In truth the proposition went to break up (and was framed
-with that view) both the Bœotian confederacy under the presidency
-of Thebes, and the union between Argos and Corinth; while it also
-deprived Athens of the chance of recovering Lemnos, Imbros, and
-Skyros,[683]—islands which had been possessed and recognized by her
-since the first commencement of the confederacy of Delos; indeed the
-two former, even from the time of Miltiades the conqueror of Marathon.
-
-  [680] Plutarch, Artaxerx. c. 22.
-
-  [681] Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 12-14.
-
-  [682] Diodor. xiv, 110. He affirms that these cities strongly
-  objected to this concession, five years afterwards, when the
-  peace of Antalkidas was actually concluded; but that they were
-  forced to give up their scruples and accept the peace including
-  the concession, because they had not force to resist Persia and
-  Sparta acting in hearty alliance.
-
-  Hence we may infer with certainty, that they also objected to
-  it during the earlier discussions, when it was first broached
-  by Antalkidas; and that their objections to it were in part the
-  cause why the discussions reported in the text broke off without
-  result.
-
-  It is true that Athens, during her desperate struggles in the
-  last years of the Peloponnesian war, had consented to this
-  concession, and even to greater, without doing herself any good
-  (Thucyd. viii, 56). But she was not now placed in circumstances
-  so imperious as to force her to be equally yielding.
-
-  Plato, in the Menexenus (c. 17, p. 245), asserts that all the
-  allies of Athens—Bœotians, Corinthians, Argeians, etc., were
-  willing to surrender the Asiatic Greeks at the requisition of
-  Artaxerxes; but that the Athenians alone resolutely stood out,
-  and were in consequence left without any allies. The latter
-  part of this assertion, as to the isolation of Athens from her
-  allies, is certainly not true; nor do I believe that the allies
-  took essentially different views from Athens on the point.
-  The Menexenus, eloquent and complimentary to Athens, must be
-  followed cautiously as to matters of fact. Plato goes the length
-  of denying that the Athenians subscribed the convention of
-  Antalkidas. Aristeides (Panathen. p. 172) says that they were
-  forced to subscribe it, because all their allies abandoned them.
-
-  [683] Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 15.
-
-Here commences a new era in the policy of Sparta. That she should
-abnegate all pretension to maritime empire, is noway difficult to
-understand—seeing that it had already been irrevocably overthrown
-by the defeat of Knidus. Nor can we wonder that she should abandon
-the Greeks on the Asiatic continent to Persian sway; since this
-was nothing more than she had already consented to do in her
-conventions with Tissaphernes and Cyrus during the latter years of
-the Peloponnesian war,[684]—and consented, let us add, not under
-any of that stringent necessity which at the same time pressed upon
-Athens, but simply with a view to the maximum of victory over an
-enemy already enfeebled. The events which followed the close of that
-war (recounted in a former chapter) had indeed induced her to alter
-her determination, and again to espouse their cause. But the real
-novelty now first exhibited in her policy, is, the full development
-of what had before existed in manifest tendency,—hostility against
-all the partial land-confederacies of Greece, disguised under the
-plausible demand of universal autonomy for every town, great or
-small. How this autonomy was construed and carried into act, we
-shall see hereafter; at present, we have only to note the first
-proclamation of it by Antalkidas in the name of Sparta.
-
-  [684] See a striking passage in the Or. xii, (Panathen.) of
-  Isokrates, s. 110.
-
-On this occasion, indeed, his mission came to nothing, from the
-peremptory opposition of Athens and the others. But he was fortunate
-enough to gain the approbation and confidence of Tiribazus; who saw
-so clearly how much both propositions tended to promote the interests
-and power of Persia, that he resolved to go up in person to court,
-and prevail on Artaxerxes to act in concert with Sparta. Though not
-daring to support Antalkidas openly, Tiribazus secretly gave him
-money to reinforce the Spartan fleet. He at the same time rendered
-to Sparta the more signal service of arresting and detaining Konon,
-pretending that the latter was acting contrary to the interests of
-the king.[685] This arrest was a gross act of perfidy, since Konon
-not only commanded respect in his character of envoy,—but had been
-acting with the full confidence, and almost under the orders, of
-Pharnabazus. But the removal of an officer of so much ability,—the
-only man who possessed the confidence of Pharnabazus,—was the most
-fatal of all impediments to the naval renovation of Athens. It was
-fortunate that Konon had had time to rebuild the Long Walls, before
-his means of action were thus abruptly intercepted. Respecting his
-subsequent fate, there exist contradictory stories. According to
-one, he was put to death by the Persians in prison; according to
-another, he found means to escape and again took refuge with Evagoras
-in Cyprus, in which island he afterwards died of sickness.[686]
-The latter story appears undoubtedly to be the true one. But it is
-certain that he never afterwards had the means of performing any
-public service, and that his career was cut short by this treacherous
-detention, just at the moment when its promise was the most splendid
-for his country.
-
-  [685] Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 16; Diodor. xiv, 85.
-
-  [686] Lysias, Or. xix, (De Bon. Aristoph.) s. 41, 42, 44;
-  Cornelius Nepos, Conon, c. 5; Isokrates, Or. iv, (Panegyr.) s.
-  180.
-
-Tiribazus, on going up to the Persian court, teems to have been
-detained there for the purpose of concerting measures against
-Evagoras, prince of Salamis in Cyprus, whose revolt from Persia was
-now on the point of breaking out. But the Persian court could not
-yet be prevailed upon to show any countenance to the propositions
-of Sparta or of Antalkidas. On the contrary, Struthas, who was sent
-down to Ionia as temporary substitute for Tiribazus, full of anxiety
-to avenge the ravages of Agesilaus, acted with vigorous hostility
-against the Lacedæmonians, and manifested friendly dispositions
-towards Athens.
-
-Thimbron (of whom we have before heard as first taking the command
-of the Cyreian army in Asia Minor, after their return from Thrace)
-received orders again to act as head of the Lacedæmonian forces in
-Asia against Struthas. The new commander, with an army estimated
-by Diodorus at eight thousand men,[687] marched from Ephesus into
-the interior, and began his devastation of the territory dependent
-on Persia. But his previous command, though he was personally
-amiable,[688] had been irregular and disorderly, and it was soon
-observed that the same defects were now yet more prominent,
-aggravated by too liberal indulgence in convivial pleasures.
-Aware of his rash, contemptuous, and improvident mode of attack,
-Struthas laid a snare for him by sending a detachment of cavalry
-to menace the camp, just when Thimbron had concluded his morning
-meal in company with the flute-player Thersander,—the latter not
-merely an excellent musician, but possessed of a full measure of
-Spartan courage. Starting from his tent at the news, Thimbron,
-with Thersander, waited only to collect the few troops immediately
-at hand, without even leaving any orders for the remainder, and
-hastened to repel the assailants; who gave way easily, and seduced
-him into a pursuit. Presently Struthas himself, appearing with a
-numerous and well-arrayed body of cavalry, charged with vigor the
-disorderly detachment of Thimbron. Both that general and Thersander,
-bravely fighting, fell among the first; while the army, deprived
-of their commander as well as ill-prepared for a battle, made but
-an ineffective resistance. They were broken, warmly pursued, and
-the greater number slain. A few who contrived to escape the active
-Persian cavalry, found shelter in the neighboring cities.[689]
-
-  [687] Diodor. xiv. 99.
-
-  [688] Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 22. Ἦν δὲ οὗτος ἁνὴρ (Diphridas)
-  ~εὔχαρίς τε οὐχ ἧττον τοῦ Θίμβρωνος~, μᾶλλόν τε συντεταγμένος,
-  καὶ ἐγχειρητικώτερος, στρατηγός. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐκράτουν αὐτοῦ αἱ τοῦ
-  σώματος ἡδοναὶ, ἀλλ᾽ ἀεὶ, πρὸς ᾧ εἴη ἔργῳ, τοῦτο ἔπραττεν.
-
-  [689] Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 18, 19.
-
-This victory of Struthas, gained by the Persian cavalry, displays
-a degree of vigor and ability which, fortunately for the Greeks,
-was rarely seen in Persian operations. Our scanty information does
-not enable us to trace its consequences. We find Diphridas sent out
-soon after by the Lacedæmonians, along with the admiral Ekdikus, as
-successor of Thimbron to bring together the remnant of the defeated
-army, and to protect those cities which had contributed to form it.
-Diphridas,—a man with all the popular qualities of his predecessor,
-but a better and more careful officer,—is said to have succeeded to
-some extent in this difficult mission. Being fortunate enough to take
-captive the son-in-law of Struthas, with his wife, (as Xenophon had
-captured Asidates,) he obtained a sufficiently large ransom to enable
-him to pay his troops for some time.[690] But it is evident that his
-achievements were not considerable, and that the Ionian Greeks on
-the continent are now left to make good their position, as they can,
-against the satrap at Sardis.
-
-  [690] Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 21, 22.
-
-The forces of Sparta were much required at Rhodes; which island (as
-has been mentioned already) had revolted from Sparta about five years
-before (a few months anterior to the battle of Knidus), dispossessed
-the Lysandrian oligarchy, and established a democratical government.
-But since that period, an opposition-party in the island had
-gradually risen up, acquired strength, and come into correspondence
-with the oligarchical exiles; who on their side warmly solicited
-aid from Sparta, representing that Rhodes would otherwise become
-thoroughly dependent on Athens. Accordingly, the Lacedæmonians sent
-eight triremes across the Ægean under the command of Ekdikus; the
-first of their ships of war which had crossed since the defeat of
-Knidus.[691] Though the Perso-Athenian naval force in the Ægean had
-been either dismissed or paralyzed since the seizure of Konon, yet
-the Rhodian government possessed a fleet of about twenty triremes,
-besides considerable force of other kinds; so that Ekdikus could
-not even land on the island, but was compelled to halt at Knidus.
-Fortunately, Teleutias the Lacedæmonian was now in the Corinthian
-Gulf with a fleet of twelve triremes, which were no longer required
-there; since Agesilaus and he had captured Lechæum a few months
-before, and destroyed the maritime force of the Corinthians in those
-waters. He was now directed to sail with his squadron out of the
-Corinthian Gulf across to Asia, to supersede Ekdikus, and take the
-command of the whole fleet for operations off Rhodes. On passing by
-Samos, he persuaded the inhabitants to embrace the cause of Sparta,
-and to furnish him with a few ships; after which he went onward to
-Knidus, where, superseding Ekdikus, he found himself at the head
-of twenty-seven triremes.[692] In his way from Knidus to Rhodes,
-he accidentally fell in with the Athenian admiral Philokrates,
-conducting ten triremes to Cyprus to the aid of Evagoras in his
-struggle against the Persians. He was fortunate enough to carry
-them all as prisoners into Knidus, where he sold the whole booty,
-and then proceeded with his fleet, thus augmented to thirty-seven
-sail, to Rhodes. Here he established a fortified post, enabling
-the oligarchical party to carry on an active civil war. But he was
-defeated in a battle,—his enemies being decidedly the stronger force
-in the island, and masters of all the cities.[693]
-
-  [691] Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 21.
-
-  [692] Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 23.
-
-  Diodorus (xiv, 97) agrees in this number of twenty-seven
-  triremes, and in the fact of aid having been obtained from Samos,
-  which island was persuaded to detach itself from Athens. But
-  he recounts the circumstances in a very different manner. He
-  represents the oligarchical party in Rhodes as having risen in
-  insurrection, and become masters of the island; he does not name
-  Teleutias, but Eudokimus (Ekdikus?), Diphilus (Diphridas?), and
-  Philodikus, as commanders.
-
-  The statement of Xenophon deserves the greater credence, in my
-  judgment. His means of information, as well as his interest,
-  about Teleutias (the brother of Agesilaus) were considerable.
-
-  [693] Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 24-26.
-
-  Although the three ancient Rhodian cities (Lindus, Ialysus,
-  and Kameirus) had coalesced (see Diodor. xiii, 75) a few years
-  before into the great city of Rhodes, afterwards so powerful and
-  celebrated,—yet they still continued to exist, and apparently as
-  fortified places. For Xenophon speaks of the democrats in Rhodes
-  as ~τάς τε πόλεις~ ἔχοντας, etc.
-
-  Whether the Philokrates here named as _Philokrates son of
-  Ephialtes_, is the same person as the Philokrates accused in the
-  Thirtieth oration of Lysias—cannot be certainly made out. It is
-  possible enough that there might be two contemporary Athenians
-  bearing this name, which would explain the circumstance that
-  Xenophon here names the father Ephialtes—a practice occasional
-  with him, but not common.
-
-The alliance with Evagoras of Cyprus, in his contention against
-Artaxerxes, was at this moment an unfortunate and perplexing
-circumstance for Athens, since she was relying upon Persian aid
-against Sparta, and since Sparta was bidding against her for it.
-But the alliance was one which she could not lightly throw off.
-For Evagoras had not only harbored Konon with the remnant of the
-Athenian fleet after the disaster of Ægospotami, but had earned
-a grant of citizenship and the honor of a statue at Athens, as a
-strenuous auxiliary in procuring that Persian aid which gained
-the battle of Knidus, and as a personal combatant in that battle,
-before the commencement of his dissension with Artaxerxes.[694] It
-would have been every way advantageous to Athens at this moment to
-decline assisting Evagoras, since (not to mention the probability
-of offending the Persian court) she had more than enough to employ
-all her maritime force nearer home and for purposes more essential
-to herself. Yet in spite of these very serious considerations of
-prudence, the paramount feelings of prior obligation and gratitude,
-enforced by influential citizens who had formed connections in
-Cyprus, determined the Athenians to identify themselves with his
-gallant struggles[695] (of which I shall speak more fully presently).
-So little was fickleness, or instability, or the easy oblivion of
-past feelings, a part of their real nature,—though historians have
-commonly denounced it as among their prominent qualities.
-
-  [694] Isokrates, Or. ix, (Evagoras) s. 67, 68, 82; Epistola
-  Philippi ap. Demosthen. Orat. p. 161, c. 4.
-
-  [695] Lysias, Orat. xix, (De Bonis Aristoph.) s. 27-44.
-
-The capture of their squadron under Philokrates, however, and the
-consequent increase of the Lacedæmonian naval force at Rhodes,
-compelled the Athenians to postpone further aid to Evagoras, and
-to arm forty triremes under Thrasybulus for the Asiatic coast; no
-inconsiderable effort, when we recollect that four years before
-there was scarcely a single trireme in Peiræus, and not even a
-wall of defence around the place. Though sent immediately for the
-assistance of Rhodes, Thrasybulus judged it expedient to go first
-to the Hellespont; probably from extreme want of money to pay his
-men. Derkyllidas was still in occupation of Abydos, yet there was no
-Lacedæmonian fleet in the strait; so that Thrasybulus was enabled to
-extend the alliances of Athens both on the European and the Asiatic
-side,—the latter being under the friendly satrap, Pharnabazus.
-Reconciling the two Thracian princes, Seuthes and Amadokus, whom he
-found at war, he brought both of them into amicable relations with
-Athens, and then moved forward to Byzantium. That city was already in
-alliance with Athens; but on the arrival of Thrasybulus, the alliance
-was still further cemented by the change of its government into a
-democracy. Having established friendship with the opposite city of
-Chalkêdon, and being thus master of the Bosphorus, he sold the tithe
-of the commercial ships sailing out of the Euxine;[696] leaving
-doubtless an adequate force to exact it. This was a striking evidence
-of revived Athenian maritime power, which seems also to have been
-now extended more or less to Samothrace, Thasus, and the coast of
-Thrace.[697]
-
-  [696] Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 25-27.
-
-  Polybius (iv, 38-47) gives instructive remarks and information
-  about the importance of Byzantium and its very peculiar position,
-  in the ancient world,—as well as about the dues charged on the
-  merchant vessels going into, or coming out of, the Euxine,—and
-  the manner in which these dues pressed upon general trade.
-
-  [697] Xen. Hellen. v, 1, 7.
-
-From Byzantium, Thrasybulus sailed to Mitylênê, which was already
-in friendship with Athens,—though Methymna and the other cities in
-the island were still maintained by a force under the Lacedæmonian
-harmost, Therimachus. With the aid of the Mitylenæans, and of the
-exiles from other Lesbian cities, Thrasybulus marched to the borders
-of Methymna, where he was met by Therimachus; who had also brought
-together his utmost force, but was now completely defeated and slain.
-The Athenians thus became masters of Antissa and Eresus, where they
-were enabled to levy a valuable contribution, as well as to plunder
-the refractory territory of Methymna. Nevertheless, Thrasybulus, in
-spite of farther help from Chios and Mitylênê, still thought himself
-not in a situation to go to Rhodes with advantage. Perhaps he was
-not sure of pay in advance, and the presence of unpaid troops in an
-exhausted island might be a doubtful benefit. Accordingly, he sailed
-from Lesbos along the western and southern coast of Asia Minor,
-levying contributions at Halikarnassus[698] and other places, until
-he came to Aspendus in Pamphylia; where he also obtained money and
-was about to depart with it, when some misdeeds committed by his
-soldiers so exasperated the inhabitants, that they attacked him by
-night unprepared in his tent, and slew him.[699]
-
-  [698] Lysias, Or. xxviii, cont. Erg. s. 1-20.
-
-  [699] Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 28-30; Diodor. xiv, 94.
-
-  The latter states that Thrasybulus lost twenty-three triremes by
-  a storm near Lesbos,—which Xenophon does not notice, and which
-  seems improbable.
-
-Thus perished the citizen to whom, more than to any one else, Athens
-owed not only her renovated democracy, but its wise, generous, and
-harmonious working, after renovation. Even the philo-Laconian and
-oligarchical Xenophon bestows upon him a marked and unaffected
-eulogy.[700] His devoted patriotism in commencing and prosecuting the
-struggle against the Thirty, at a time when they not only were at
-the height of their power, but had plausible ground for calculating
-on the full auxiliary strength of Sparta, deserves high admiration.
-But the feature which stands yet more eminent in his character,—a
-feature infinitely rare in the Grecian character, generally,—is,
-that the energy of a successful leader was combined with complete
-absence both of vindictive antipathies for the past, and of
-overbearing ambition for himself. Content to live himself as a simple
-citizen under the restored democracy, he taught his countrymen to
-forgive an oligarchical party from whom they had suffered atrocious
-wrongs, and set the example himself of acquiescing, in the loss of
-his own large property. The generosity of such a proceeding ought
-not to count for less, because it was at the same time dictated by
-the highest political prudence. We find in an oration of Lysias
-against Ergokles (a citizen who served in the Athenian fleet on
-this last expedition), in which the latter is accused of gross
-peculation,—insinuations against Thrasybulus, of having countenanced
-the delinquency, though coupled with praise of his general character.
-Even the words as they now stand are so vague as to carry little
-evidence; but when we reflect that the oration was spoken after the
-death of Thrasybulus, they are entitled to no weight at all.[701]
-
-  [700] Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 31. Καὶ Θρασύβουλος μὲν δὴ, μάλα δοκῶν
-  ἀνὴρ ἀγαθὸς εἶναι, οὕτως ἐτελεύτησεν.
-
-  [701] Lysias, cont. Ergo. Or. xxviii, s. 9.
-
-  Ergokles is charged in this oration with gross abuse of power,
-  oppression towards allies and citizens of Athens, and peculation
-  for his own profit, during the course of the expedition of
-  Thrasybulus; who is indirectly accused of conniving at such
-  misconduct. It appears that the Athenians, as soon as they
-  were informed that Thrasybulus had established the toll in the
-  Bosphorus, passed a decree that an account should be sent home
-  of all moneys exacted from the various cities, and that the
-  colleagues of Thrasybulus should come home to go through the
-  audit (s. 5); implying (so far as we can understand what is thus
-  briefly noticed) that Thrasybulus himself should _not_ be obliged
-  to come home, but might stay on his Hellespontine or Asiatic
-  command. Ergokles, however, probably one of these colleagues,
-  resented this decree as an insult, and advised Thrasybulus to
-  seize Byzantium, to retain the fleet, and to marry the daughter
-  of the Thracian prince Seuthes. It is also affirmed in the
-  oration that the fleet had come home in very bad condition (s.
-  2-4), and that the money, levied with so much criminal abuse, had
-  been either squandered or fraudulently appropriated.
-
-  We learn from another oration that Ergokles was condemned to
-  death. His property was confiscated, and was said to amount to
-  thirty talents, though he had been poor before the expedition;
-  but nothing like that amount was discovered after the sentence of
-  confiscation (Lysias, Or. xxx, cont. Philokrat. s. 3).
-
-The Athenians sent Agyrrhius to succeed Thrasybulus. After the
-death of the latter, we may conclude that the fleet went to Rhodes,
-its original destination,—though Xenophon does not expressly say
-so,—the rather, as neither Teleutias nor any subsequent Lacedæmonian
-commander appears to have become master of the island, in spite of
-the considerable force which they had there assembled.[702] The
-Lacedæmonians, however, on their side, being also much in want of
-money, Teleutias was obliged (in the same manner as the Athenians),
-to move from island to island, levying contributions as he could.[703]
-
-  [702] Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 31.
-
-  [703] Xen. Hellen. v, 1, 2.
-
-When the news of the successful proceedings of Thrasybulus at
-Byzantium and the Hellespont, again establishing a toll for the
-profit of Athens, reached Sparta, it excited so much anxiety, that
-Anaxibius, having great influence with the ephors of the time,
-prevailed on them to send him out as harmost to Abydos, in the room
-of Derkyllidas, who had now been in that post for several years.
-Having been the officer originally employed to procure the revolt
-of the place from Athens (in 411 B.C.),[704] Derkyllidas had since
-rendered service not less essential in preserving it to Sparta,
-during the extensive desertion which followed the battle of Knidus.
-But it was supposed that he ought to have checked the aggressive
-plans of Thrasybulus; moreover, Anaxibius promised, if a small force
-were entrusted to him, to put down effectually the newly-revived
-Athenian influence. He was supposed to know well, those regions in
-which he had once already been admiral, at the moment when Xenophon
-and the Cyreian army first returned; the harshness, treachery, and
-corruption, which he displayed in his dealing with that gallant
-body of men, have been already recounted in a former chapter.[705]
-With three triremes, and funds for the pay of a thousand mercenary
-troops, Anaxibius accordingly went to Abydos. He began his operations
-with considerable vigor, both against Athens and Pharnabazus. While
-he armed a land-force, which he employed in making incursions on
-the neighboring cities in the territory of that satrap,—he at the
-same time reinforced his little squadron by three triremes out of
-the harbor of Abydos, so that he became strong enough to seize the
-merchant vessels passing along the Hellespont to Athens or to her
-allies.[706] The force which Thrasybulus had left at Byzantium to
-secure the strait revenues, was thus inadequate to its object without
-farther addition.
-
-  [704] Thucyd. viii, 61; compare Xenoph. Anab. v, 6, 24.
-
-  [705] See above, Chapter lxxi, p. 156 of the present volume.
-
-  [706] Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 32, 83.
-
-Fortunately, Iphikrates was at this moment disengaged at Athens,
-having recently returned from Corinth with his body of peltasts, for
-whom doubtless employment was wanted. He was accordingly sent with
-twelve hundred peltasts and eight triremes, to combat Anaxibius in
-the Hellespont; which now became again the scene of conflict, as it
-had been in the latter years of the Peloponnesian war; the Athenians
-from the European side, the Lacedæmonians from the Asiatic. At first
-the warfare consisted of desultory privateering, and money-levying
-excursions, on both sides.[707] But at length, the watchful genius
-of Iphikrates discovered opportunity for a successful stratagem.
-Anaxibius, having just drawn the town of Antandrus into his alliance,
-had marched thither for the purpose of leaving a garrison in it,
-with his Lacedæmonian and mercenary forces, as well as two hundred
-hoplites from Abydos itself. His way lay across the mountainous
-region of Ida, southward to the coast of the gulf of Adramyttium.
-Accordingly, Iphikrates, foreseeing that he would speedily return,
-crossed over in the night from the Chersonese, and planted himself
-in ambush on the line of return march; at a point where it traversed
-the desert and mountainous extremities of the Abydene territory, near
-the gold mines of Kremastê. The triremes which carried him across
-were ordered to sail up the strait on the next day, in order that
-Anaxibius must be apprised of it, and might suppose Iphikrates to be
-employed on his ordinary money-levying excursion.
-
-  [707] Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 35, 36. τὸ μὲν πρῶτον λῃστὰς
-  διαπέμποντες ἐπολέμουν ἀλλήλοις ... Ὅπως δοκοίη, ὥσπερ εἰώθει,
-  ἐπ᾽ ἀργυρολογίαν ἐπαναπεπλευκέναι.
-
-The stratagem was completely successful. Anaxibius returned on the
-next day, without the least suspicion of any enemy at hand, marching
-in careless order and with long-stretched files, as well from the
-narrowness of the mountain path as from the circumstance that he
-was in the friendly territory of Abydos. Not expecting to fight, he
-had unfortunately either omitted the morning sacrifice, or taken
-no pains to ascertain that the victims were favorable; so Xenophon
-informs us,[708] with that constant regard to the divine judgments
-and divine warnings which pervades both the Hellenica and the
-Anabasis. Iphikrates having suffered the Abydenes who were in the
-van to pass, suddenly sprang from his ambush, to assault Anaxibius
-with the Lacedæmonians and the mercenaries, as they descended the
-mountain-pass into the plain of Kremastê. His appearance struck
-terror and confusion into the whole army; unprepared in its
-disorderly array for stedfast resistance,—even if the minds of
-the soldiers had been ever so well strung,—against well-trained
-peltasts, who were sure to prevail over hoplites not in steady
-rank. To Anaxibius himself, the truth stood plain at once. Defeat
-was inevitable, and there remained no other resource for him except
-to die like a brave man. Accordingly, desiring his shield-bearer
-to hand to him his shield, he said to those around him,—“Friends,
-my honor commands me to die here; but do you hasten away, and save
-yourselves, before the enemy close with us.” Such order was hardly
-required to determine his panic-stricken troops, who fled with one
-accord towards Abydos; while Anaxibius himself awaited firmly the
-approach of the enemy, and fell gallantly fighting on the spot.
-No less than twelve Spartan harmosts, those who had been expelled
-from their various governments by the defeat of Knidus, and who had
-remained ever since under Derkyllidas at Abydos, stood with the like
-courage and shared his fate. Such disdain of life hardly surprises
-us in conspicuous Spartan citizens, to whom preservation by flight
-was “no true preservation” (in the language of Xenophon),[709] but
-simply prolongation of life under intolerable disgrace at home. But
-what deserves greater remark is, that the youth to whom Anaxibius
-was tenderly attached and who was his constant companion, could not
-endure to leave him, stayed fighting by his side, and perished by the
-same honorable death.[710] So strong was the mutual devotion which
-this relation between persons of the male sex inspired in the ancient
-Greek mind. With these exceptions, no one else made any attempt to
-stand. All fled, and were pursued by Iphikrates as far as the gates
-of Abydos, with the slaughter of fifty out of the two hundred Abydene
-hoplites, and two hundred of the remaining troops.
-
-  [708] Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 36. Ὁ Ἀναξίβιος ἀπεπορεύετο, ὡς μὲν
-  ἐλέγετο, ~οὐδὲ τῶν ἱερῶν γεγενημένων αὐτῷ ἐκείνῃ τῇ ἡμέρᾳ~, ἀλλὰ
-  καταφρονήσας, ὅτι διὰ φιλίας τε ἐπορεύετο καὶ ἐς πόλιν φιλίαν,
-  καὶ ὅτι ἤκουε τῶν ἀπαντώντων, τὸν Ἰφικράτην ἀναπεπλευκέναι τῆς
-  ἐπὶ Προικοννήσου, ἀμελέστερον ἐπορεύετο.
-
-  [709] See the remarks a few pages back, upon the defeat and
-  destruction of the Lacedæmonian mora by Iphikrates, near Lechæum,
-  page 350.
-
-  [710] Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 39. Καὶ τὰ παιδικὰ μέντοι αὐτῷ
-  παρέμεινε, καὶ τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων δὲ τῶν συνεληλυθότων ἐκ τῶν
-  πόλεων ἁρμοστήρων ὡς δώδεκα μαχόμενοι συναπέθανον· οἱ δ᾽ ἄλλοι
-  φεύγοντες ἔπιπτον.
-
-This well-planned and successful exploit, while it added to the
-reputation of Iphikrates, rendered the Athenians again masters of the
-Bosphorus and the Hellespont, ensuring both the levy of the dues and
-the transit of their trading vessels. But while the Athenians were
-thus carrying on naval war at Rhodes and the Hellespont, they began
-to experience annoyance nearer home, from Ægina.
-
-That island (within sight as the eyesore of Peiræus, as Perikles was
-wont to call it) had been occupied fifty years before by a population
-eminently hostile to Athens, afterwards conquered and expelled by
-her,—at last again captured in the new abode which they had obtained
-in Laconia,—and put to death by her order. During the Peloponnesian
-war, Ægina had been tenanted by Athenian citizens as outsettlers
-or kleruchs; all of whom had been driven in after the battle of
-Ægospotami. The island was then restored by Lysander to the remnant
-of the former population,—as many of them at least as he could find.
-
-These new Æginetans, though doubtless animated by associations highly
-unfavorable to Athens, had nevertheless remained not only at peace,
-but also in reciprocal commerce, with her, until a considerable time
-after the battle of Knidus and the rebuilding of her Long Walls. And
-so they would have continued, of their own accord,—since they could
-gain but little, and were likely to lose all the security of their
-traffic, by her hostility,—had they not been forced to commence
-the war by Eteonikus, the Lacedæmonian harmost in the island;[711]
-one amidst many examples of the manner in which the smaller Grecian
-states were dragged into war, without any motive of their own, by the
-ambition of the greater,—by Sparta as well as by Athens.[712] With
-the concurrence of the ephors, Eteonikus authorized and encouraged
-all Æginetans to fit out privateers for depredation on Attica; which
-aggression the Athenians resented, after suffering considerable
-inconvenience by sending a force of ten triremes to block up Ægina
-from the sea, with a body of hoplites under Pamphilus to construct
-and occupy a permanent fort in the island. This squadron, however,
-was soon driven off (though Pamphilus still continued to occupy the
-fort) by Teleutias, who came to Ægina on hearing of the blockade;
-having been engaged, with the fleet which he commanded at Rhodes,
-in an expedition among the Cyclades, for the purpose of levying
-contributions. He seems to have been now at the term of his year of
-command, and while he was at Ægina, his successor, Hierax, arrived
-from Sparta, on his way to Rhodes, to supersede him. The fleet was,
-accordingly, handed over to Hierax at Ægina, while Teleutias went
-directly home to Sparta. So remarkable was his popularity among the
-seamen, that numbers of them accompanied him down to the water-edge,
-testifying their regret and attachment by crowning him with wreaths,
-or pressing his hand. Some, who came down too late, when he was
-already under weigh, cast their wreaths on the sea, uttering prayers
-for his health and happiness.[713]
-
-  [711] Xen. Hellen. v, 1, 1. ὢν δὲ ~πάλιν~ ὁ Ἐτεόνικος ἐν τῇ
-  Αἰγίνῃ, καὶ ἐπιμιξίᾳ χρωμένων τὸν πρόσθεν χρόνον τῶν Αἰγινητῶν
-  πρὸς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους, ἐπεὶ φανερῶς κατὰ θάλατταν ἐπολεμεῖτο
-  ὁ πόλεμος, ξυνδόξαν καὶ τοῖς ἐφόροις, ἐφίησι ληΐζεσθαι τὸν
-  βουλόμενον ἐκ τῆς Ἀττικῆς.
-
-  The meaning of the word πάλιν here is not easy to determine, since
-  (as Schneider remarks) not a word had been said before about the
-  presence of Eteonikus at Ægina. Perhaps we may explain it by
-  supposing that Eteonikus found the Æginetans reluctant to engage in
-  the war, and that he did not like to involve them in it without
-  first going to Sparta to consult the ephors. It was on _coming
-  back_ to Ægina (πάλιν) from Sparta, after having obtained the
-  consent of the ephors (ξυνδόξαν καὶ τοῖς ἐφόροις), that he issued
-  the letters of marque.
-
-  Schneider’s note explains τὸν πρόσθεν χρόνον incorrectly, in my
-  judgment.
-
-  [712] Compare Xen. Hellen. vi, 3, 8; Thucyd. iii, 13. The old
-  Æginetan antipathy against Athens, when thus again instigated,
-  continued for a considerable time. A year or two afterwards, when
-  the philosopher Plato was taken to Ægina to be sold as a slave,
-  it was death to any Athenian to land in the island (Aristides,
-  Or. xlvi, p. 384; p. 306 Dindorf; Diogenes Laërt. iii, 19;
-  Plutarch. Dion. c. 5).
-
-  [713] Xen. Hellen. v, 1, 3. Ὁ δὲ Τελευτίας, μακαριώτατα δὴ
-  ἀπέπλευσεν οἴκαδε, etc.
-
-  This description of the scene at the departure of Teleutias (for
-  whom, as well as for his brother Agesilaus, Xenophon always
-  manifests a marked sympathy) is extremely interesting. The
-  reflection, too, with which Xenophon follows it up, deserves
-  notice,—“I know well that in these incidents I am not recounting
-  any outlay of money, or danger incurred, or memorable stratagem.
-  But by Zeus, it _does_ seem to me worth a man’s while to reflect,
-  by what sort of conduct Teleutias created such dispositions in
-  his soldiers. This is a true man’s achievement, more precious
-  than any outlay or any danger.”
-
-  What Xenophon here glances at in the case of Teleutias, is the
-  scheme worked out in detail in the romance of the Cyropædia (τὸ
-  ἐθελοντῶν ἄρχειν—the exercising command in such manner as to
-  have willing and obedient subjects)—and touched upon indirectly
-  in various of his other compositions,—the Hiero, the Œconomicus,
-  and portions of the Memorabilia. The _idéal_ of government, as
-  it presented itself to Xenophon, was the paternal despotism, or
-  something like it.
-
-Hierax, while carrying back to Rhodes the remaining fleet which
-Teleutias had brought from that island, left his subordinate Gorgôpas
-as harmost at Ægina with twelve triremes; a force which protected
-the island completely, and caused the fortified post occupied by
-the Athenians under Pamphilus to be itself blocked up, insomuch
-that after an interval of four months, a special decree was passed
-at Athens to send a numerous squadron and fetch away the garrison.
-As the Æginetan privateers, aided by the squadron of Gorgôpas, now
-recommenced their annoyances against Attica, thirteen Athenian
-triremes were put in equipment under Eunomus as a guard-squadron
-against Ægina. But Gorgôpas and his squadron were now for the time
-withdrawn, to escort Antalkidas, the new Lacedæmonian admiral sent
-to Asia chiefly for the purpose of again negotiating with Tiribazus.
-On returning back, after landing Antalkidas at Ephesus, Gorgôpas
-fell in with Eunomus, whose pursuit, however, he escaped, landing at
-Ægina just before sunset. The Athenian admiral, after watching for a
-short time until he saw the Lacedæmonian seamen out of their vessels
-and ashore, departed as it grew dark to Attica, carrying a light to
-prevent his ships from parting company. But Gorgôpas, causing his men
-to take a hasty meal, immediately reëmbarked and pursued; keeping
-on the track by means of the light, and taking care not to betray
-himself either by the noise of oars or by the chant of the Keleustês.
-Eunomus had no suspicion of the accompanying enemy. Just after he
-had touched land near cape Zostêr in Attica, when his men were in
-the act of disembarking, Gorgôpas gave signal by trumpet to attack.
-After a short action by moonlight, four of the Athenian squadrons
-were captured, and carried off to Ægina; with the remainder, Eunomus
-escaped to Peiræus.[714]
-
-  [714] Xen. Hellen. v, 1, 6-10.
-
-This victory, rendering both Gorgôpas and the Æginetans confident,
-laid them open to a stratagem skilfully planned by the Athenian
-Chabrias. That officer, who seems to have been dismissed from Corinth
-as Iphikrates had been before him, was now about to conduct a force
-of ten triremes and eight hundred peltasts to the aid of Evagoras;
-to whom the Athenians were thus paying their debt of gratitude,
-though they could ill-spare any of their forces from home. Chabrias,
-passing over from Peiræus at night, landed without being perceived
-in a desert place of the coast of Ægina, and planted himself in
-ambush with his peltasts at some little distance inland of the
-Herakleion or temple of Hêraklês, amidst hollow ground suitable for
-concealment. He had before made agreement with another squadron
-and a body of hoplites under Demænetus; who arrived at daybreak and
-landed at Ægina at a point called Tripyrgia, about two miles distant
-from the Herakleion, but farther removed from the city. As soon as
-their arrival became known, Gorgôpas hastened out of the city to
-repel them, with all the troops he could collect, Æginetans as well
-as marines out of the ships of war,—and eight Spartans who happened
-to be his companions in the island. In their march from the city to
-attack the new comers, they had to pass near the Herakleion, and
-therefore near the troops in ambush; who, as soon as Gorgôpas and
-those about him had gone by, rose up suddenly and attacked them in
-the rear. The stratagem succeeded not less completely than that of
-Iphikrates at Abydos against Anaxibius. Gorgôpas and the Spartans
-near him were slain, the rest were defeated, and compelled to flee
-with considerable loss back to the city.[715]
-
-  [715] Xen. Hellen. v, 1, 12, 13.
-
-After this brilliant success, Chabrias pursued his voyage to Cyprus,
-and matters appeared so secure on the side of Ægina, that Demænetus
-also was sent to the Hellespont to reinforce Iphikrates. For some
-time indeed, the Lacedæmonian ships at Ægina did nothing. Eteonikus,
-who was sent as successor to Gorgôpas,[716] could neither persuade
-nor constrain the seamen to go aboard, since he had no funds,
-while their pay was in arrears; so that Athens with her coast and
-her trading-vessels remained altogether unmolested. At length the
-Lacedæmonians were obliged to send again to Ægina Teleutias, the most
-popular and best-beloved of all their commanders, whom the seamen
-welcomed with the utmost delight. Addressing them under the influence
-of this first impression, immediately after he had offered sacrifice,
-he told them plainly that he had brought with him no money, but that
-he had come to put them in the way of procuring it; that he should
-himself touch nothing until they were amply provided, and should
-require of them to bear no more hardship or fatigue than he went
-through himself; that the power and prosperity of Sparta had all
-been purchased by willingly braving danger, as well as toil, in the
-cause of duty; that it became valiant men to seek their pay, not by
-cringing to any one, but by their own swords at the cost of enemies.
-And he engaged to find them the means of doing this, provided they
-would now again manifest the excellent qualities which he knew them
-by experience to possess.[717]
-
-  [716] So we may conclude from Xen. Hellen. v, 1, 13; Demænetus is
-  found at the Hellespont v, 1, 26.
-
-  [717] Xen. Hellen. v, 1, 14-17.
-
-This address completely won over the seamen, who received it with
-shouts of applause; desiring Teleutias to give his orders forthwith,
-and promising ready obedience. “Well, (said he), now go and get your
-suppers, as you were intending to do; and then come immediately on
-shipboard, bringing with you provisions for one day. Advance me thus
-much out of your own means, that we may, by the will of the gods,
-make an opportune voyage.”[718]
-
-  [718] Xen. Hellen. v, 1, 18. Ἄγετε, ὦ ἄνδρες, δειπνήσατε μὲν,
-  ἅπερ καὶ ὡς ἐμέλλετε· προπαράσχετε δέ μοι μιᾶς ἡμέρας σῖτον·
-  ἔπειτα δὲ ἥκετε ἐπὶ τὰς ναῦς αὔτικα μάλα, ὅπως πλεύσωμεν, ἔνθα
-  θεὸς ἐθέλει, ἐν καιρῷ ἀφιξόμενοι.
-
-  Schneider doubts whether the words προπαράσχετε δέ μοι are
-  correct. But they seem to me to bear a very pertinent meaning.
-  Teleutias had no money; yet it was necessary for his purpose
-  that the seamen should come furnished with one day’s provision
-  beforehand. Accordingly he is obliged to ask _them_ to get
-  provision for themselves, or to _lend it_, as it were, _to him_;
-  though they were already so dissatisfied from not having received
-  their pay.
-
-In spite of the eminent popularity of Teleutias, the men would
-probably have refused to go on board, had he told them beforehand
-his intention of sailing with his twelve triremes straight into the
-harbor of Peiræus. At first sight, the enterprise seemed insane,
-for there were triremes in it more than sufficient to overwhelm
-him. But he calculated on finding them all unprepared, with seamen
-as well as officers in their lodgings ashore, so that he could not
-only strike terror and do damage, but even realize half an hour’s
-plunder before preparations could be made to resist him. Such was
-the security which now reigned there, especially since the death of
-Gorgôpas, that no one dreamt of an attack. The harbor was open, as
-it had been forty years before, when Brasidas (in the third year of
-the Peloponnesian war) attempted the like enterprise from the port of
-Megara.[719] Even then, at the maximum of the Athenian naval power,
-it was an enterprise possible, simply because every one considered it
-to be impossible; and it only failed because the assailants became
-terrified, and flinched in the execution.
-
-A little after dark, Teleutias quitted the harbor of Ægina, without
-telling any one whither he was going. Rowing leisurely, and allowing
-his men alternate repose on their oars, he found himself before
-morning within half a mile of Peiræus, where he waited until day was
-just dawning, and then led his squadron straight into the harbor.
-Everything turned out as he expected; there was not the least idea
-of being attacked, nor the least preparation for defence. Not a
-single trireme was manned or in fighting condition, but several were
-moored without their crews, together with merchant-vessels, loaded
-as well as empty. Teleutias directed the captains of his squadron
-to drive against the triremes, and disable them; but by no means
-to damage the beaks of their own ships by trying to disable the
-merchant-ships. Even at that early hour, many Athenians were abroad,
-and the arrival of the unexpected assailants struck every one with
-surprise and consternation. Loud and vague cries transmitted the news
-through all Peiræus, and from Peiræus up to Athens, where it was
-believed that their harbor was actually taken. Every man having run
-home for his arms, the whole force of the city rushed impetuously
-down thither, with one accord,—hoplites as well as horsemen. But
-before such succors could arrive, Teleutias had full time to do
-considerable mischief. His seamen boarded the larger merchant-ships,
-seizing both the men and the portable goods which they found aboard.
-Some even jumped ashore on the quay (called the Deigma), laid hands
-on the tradesmen, ship-masters, and pilots, whom they saw near, and
-carried them away captive. Various smaller vessels with their entire
-cargoes were also towed away; and even three or four triremes. With
-all these Teleutias sailed safely out of Peiræus, sending some of
-his squadron to escort the prizes to Ægina, while he himself with
-the remainder sailed southward along the coast. As he was seen to
-come out of Peiræus, his triremes were mistaken for Athenian, and
-excited no alarm; so that he thus captured several fishing-boats,
-and passage-boats coming with passengers from the islands to
-Athens,—together with some merchantmen carrying corn and other
-goods, at Sunium. All were carried safely into Ægina.[720]
-
-  [719] Thucyd. ii, 94.
-
-  [720] Xen. Hellen. v, 1, 18-22.
-
-The enterprise of Teleutias, thus admirably concerted and executed
-without the loss of a man, procured for him a plentiful booty, of
-which, probably not the least valuable portion consisted in the men
-seized as captives. When sold at Ægina, it yielded so large a return
-that he was enabled to pay down at once a month’s pay to his seamen;
-who became more attached to him than ever, and kept the triremes
-in animated and active service under his orders.[721] Admonished
-by painful experience, indeed, the Athenians were now, doubtless,
-careful both in guarding and in closing Peiræus; as they had become
-forty years before after the unsuccessful attack of Brasidas. But in
-spite of the utmost vigilance, they suffered an extent of damage from
-the indefatigable Teleutias, and from the Æginetan privateers, quite
-sufficient to make them weary of the war.[722]
-
-  [721] Xen. Hellen. v, 1, 24.
-
-  [722] Xen. Hellen. v, 1, 29.
-
-  Even ten years after this, however, when the Lacedæmonian harmost
-  Sphodrias marched from Thespiæ by night to surprise Peiræus, it
-  was without gates on the land-side—ἀπύλωτος—or at least without
-  any such gates as would resist an assault (Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 20).
-
-We cannot doubt, indeed, that the prosecution of the war must have
-been a heavy financial burthen upon the Athenians, from 395 B.C.
-downward to 387 B.C. How they made good the cost, without any
-contributory allies, or any foreign support, except what Konon
-obtained during one year from Pharnabazus,—we are not informed.
-On the revival of the democracy in 403 B.C., the poverty of the
-city, both public and private, had been very great, owing to the
-long previous war, ending with the loss of all Athenian property
-abroad. At a period about three years afterwards, it seems that the
-Athenians were in arrears, not merely for the tribute-money which
-they then owed to Sparta as her subject allies, but also for debts
-due to the Bœotians on account of damage done; that they were too
-poor to perform in full the religious sacrifices prescribed for the
-year, and were obliged to omit some even of the more ancient; that
-the docks as well as the walls were in sad want of repair.[723] Even
-the pay to those citizens who attended the public assemblies and
-sat as dikasts in the dikasteries,—pay essential to the working of
-the democracy,—was restored only by degrees; beginning first at one
-obolus, and not restored to three oboli, at which it had stood before
-the capture, until after an interval of some years.[724] It was at
-this time too that the Theôric Board, or Paymasters for the general
-expenses of public worship and sacrifice, was first established; and
-when we read how much the Athenians were embarrassed for the means
-of celebrating the prescribed sacrifices, there was, probably, great
-necessity for the formation of some such office. The disbursements
-connected with this object had been effected, before 403 B.C., not
-by any special Board, but by the Hellenotamiæ, or treasurers of the
-tribute collected from the allies, who were not renewed after 403
-B.C. as the Athenian empire had ceased to exist.[725] A portion of
-the money disbursed by the Theôric Board for the religious festivals,
-was employed in the distribution of two oboli per head, called the
-diobely, to all present citizens, and actually received by all,—not
-merely by the poor, but by persons in easy circumstances also.[726]
-This distribution was made at several festivals, having originally
-begun at the Dionysia, for the purpose of enabling the citizens to
-obtain places at the theatrical representations in honor of Dionysus;
-but we do not know either the number of the festivals, or the amount
-of the total sum. It was, in principle, a natural corollary of the
-religious idea connected with the festival; not simply because the
-comfort and recreation of each citizen, individually taken, was
-promoted by his being enabled to attend the festival,—but because the
-collective effect of the ceremony, in honoring and propitiating the
-god, was believed to depend in part upon a multitudinous attendance
-and lively manifestations.[727] Gradually, however, this distribution
-of Theôric or festival-money came to be pushed to an abusive and
-mischievous excess, which is brought before our notice forty years
-afterwards, during the political career of Demosthenes. Until that
-time, we have no materials for speaking of it; and what I here notice
-is simply the first creation of the Theôric Board.
-
-  [723] Lysias, Orat. xxx, cont. Nikomachum, s. 21-30.
-
-  I trust this Oration so far as the matter of fact, that in the
-  preceding year, some ancient sacrifices had been omitted from
-  state-poverty; but the manner in which the speaker makes this
-  fact tell against Nikomachus, may or may not be just.
-
-  [724] Aristophan. Ecclesias. 300-310.
-
-  [725] See the Inscription No. 147, in Boeckh’s Corpus Inscriptt.
-  Græcor.—Boeckh, Public Economy of Athens, ii, 7, p. 179, 180,
-  Eng. transl.—and Schömann, Antiq. Jur. Publ. Græc. s. 77, p. 320.
-
-  [726] Demosthenes, Philippic. iv, p. 141, s. 43; Demosth. Orat.
-  xliv, cont. Leocharem, p. 1091, s. 48.
-
-  [727] It is common to represent the festivals at Athens as
-  if they were so many stratagems for feeding poor citizens at
-  the public expense. But the primitive idea and sentiment of
-  the Grecian religious festival—the satisfaction to the god
-  dependent upon multitudinous spectators sympathizing and enjoying
-  themselves together (ἄμμιγα πάντας)—is much anterior to the
-  development of democracy at Athens. See the old oracles in
-  Demosthen. cont. Meidiam, p. 531, s. 66; Homer, Hymn. Apollin.
-  147; K. F. Herrmann, Gottesdienstlich. Alterthümer der Griechen,
-  s. 8.
-
-The means of Athens for prosecuting the war, and for paying her
-troops sent as well to Bœotia as to Corinth, must have been derived
-mainly from direct assessments on property, called eisphoræ. And
-some such assessments we find alluded to generally as having taken
-place during these years; though we know no details either as to
-frequency or amount.[728] But the restitution of the Long Walls and
-of the fortifications of Peiræus by Konon, was an assistance not less
-valuable to the finances of Athens than to her political power. That
-excellent harbor, commodious as a mercantile centre, and now again
-safe for the residence of metics and the importations of merchants,
-became speedily a scene of animated commerce, as we have seen it
-when surprised by Teleutias. The number of metics, or free resident
-non-citizens, became also again large, as it had been before the time
-of her reverses, and including a number of miscellaneous non-Hellenic
-persons, from Lydia, Phrygia, and Syria.[729] Both the port-duties,
-and the value of fixed property at Athens, was thus augmented so as
-in part to countervail the costs of war. Nevertheless these costs,
-continued from year to year, and combined with the damage done by
-Æginetan privateers, were seriously felt, and contributed to dispose
-the Athenians to peace.
-
-  [728] See such direct assessments on property alluded to in
-  various speeches of Lysias, Orat. xix. De Bonis Aristoph. s. 31,
-  45, 63; Orat. xxvii. cont. Epikratem, s. 11; Orat. xxix. cont.
-  Philokrat. s. 14.
-
-  Boeckh (in his Public Econ. of Athens, iv, 4, p. 493, Engl.
-  transl., which passage stands unaltered in the second edition
-  of the German original recently published, p. 642) affirms that
-  a proposition for the assessment of a direct property-tax of
-  one-fortieth, or two and a half per cent., was made about this
-  time by a citizen named Euripides, who announced it as intended
-  to produce five hundred talents; that the proposition was at
-  first enthusiastically welcomed by the Athenians, and procured
-  for its author unbounded popularity; but that he was presently
-  cried down and disgraced, because on farther examination the
-  measure proved unsatisfactory and empty talk.
-
-  Sievers also (Geschichte von Griech. bis zur Schlacht von
-  Mantineia, pp. 100, 101) adopts the same view as Boeckh, that
-  this was a real proposition of a property tax of two and a half
-  per cent., made by Euripides. After having alleged that the
-  Athenians in these times supplied their treasury by the most
-  unscrupulous injustice in confiscating the property of rich
-  citizens,—referring as proof to passages in the orators, none of
-  which establishes his conclusion,—Sievers goes on to say,—“But
-  that these violences did not suffice, is shown by the fact that
-  the people caught with greedy impatience at other measures. Thus
-  a new scheme of finance, which however was presently discovered
-  to be insufficient or inapplicable, excited at first the most
-  extravagant joy.” He adds in a note: “The scheme proceeded from
-  Euripides; it was a property-tax of two and a half per cent. See
-  Aristoph. Ecclesiaz. 823; Boeckh, Staatshaush. ii, p. 27.”
-
-  In my judgment, the assertion here made by Boeckh and Sievers
-  rests upon no sufficient ground. The passage of Aristophanes does
-  not warrant us in concluding anything at all about a proposition
-  for a property-tax. It is as follows:—
-
-    Τὸ δ᾽ ἔναγχος οὐχ ἅπαντες ἡμεῖς ὤμνυμεν
-    Τάλαντ᾽ ἔσεσθαι πεντακόσια τῇ πόλει
-    Τῆς τεσσαρακοστῆς, ἣν ἐπόρισ᾽ Εὐριπίδης;
-    Κεὐθὺς κατεχρύσου πᾶς ἀνὴρ Εὐριπίδην·
-    Ὅτε δὴ δ᾽ ἀνασκοπουμένοις ἐφαίνετο
-    Ὁ Διὸς Κόρινθος, καὶ τὸ πρᾶγμ᾽ οὐκ ἤρκεσεν,
-    Πάλιν κατεπίττου πᾶς ἀνὴρ Εὐριπίδην.
-
-  What this “new financial scheme” (so Sievers properly calls
-  it) was, which the poet here alludes to,—we have no means of
-  determining. But I venture to express my decided conviction
-  that it cannot have been a property-tax. The terms in which it
-  is described forbid that supposition. It was a scheme which
-  seemed at first sight exceedingly promising and gainful to
-  the city, and procured for its author very great popularity;
-  but which, on farther examination, proved to be mere empty
-  boasting (ὁ Διὸς Κόρινθος) How can this be said about any
-  motion for a property-tax? That any financier should ever have
-  gained extraordinary popularity by proposing a property-tax, is
-  altogether inconceivable. And a proposition to raise the immense
-  sum of five hundred talents (which Schömann estimates as the
-  probable aggregate charge of the whole peace-establishment of
-  Athens, Antiq. Jur. Public. Græc. s. 73, p. 313) at one blow by
-  an assessment upon property! It would be as much as any financier
-  could do to bear up against the tremendous _unpopularity_ of such
-  a proposition; and to induce the assembly even to listen to him,
-  were the necessity ever so pressing. How odious are propositions
-  for direct taxation, we may know without recurring to the
-  specific evidence respecting Athens; but if any man requires such
-  specific evidence, he may find it abundantly in the Philippics
-  and Olynthiacs of Demosthenes. On one occasion (De Symmoriis,
-  Or. xiv. s. 33, p. 185) that orator alludes to a proposition for
-  raising five hundred talents by direct property-tax as something
-  extravagant, which the Athenians would not endure to hear
-  mentioned.
-
-  Moreover,—unpopularity apart,—the motion for a property-tax
-  could scarcely procure credit for a financier, because it is of
-  all ideas the most simple and obvious. Any man can suggest such a
-  scheme. But to pass for an acceptable financier, you must propose
-  some measure which promises gain to the state without such
-  undisguised pressure upon individuals.
-
-  Lastly, there is nothing _delusive_ in a property-tax,—nothing
-  which looks gainful at first sight, and then turns out on farther
-  examination (ἀνασκοπουμένοις) to be false or uncertain. It may,
-  indeed, be more or less evaded; but this can only be known after
-  it has been assessed, and when payment is actually called for.
-
-  Upon these grounds I maintain that the τεσσαρακοστὴ proposed by
-  Euripides was not a property-tax. What it was I do not pretend
-  to say; but τεσσαρακοστὴ may have many other meanings; it might
-  mean a duty of two and a half per cent. upon imports or exports,
-  or upon the produce of the mines of Laureion; or it might mean
-  a cheap coinage or base money, something in the nature of the
-  Chian τεσσαρακοσταί (Thucyd. viii, 100). All that the passage
-  really teaches us is, that some financial proposition was made by
-  Euripides which at first seemed likely to be lucrative, but would
-  not stand an attentive examination. It is not even certain that
-  Euripides promised a receipt of five hundred talents; this sum is
-  only given to us as a comic exaggeration of that which foolish
-  men at first fancied. Boeckh in more than one place reasons
-  (erroneously, in my judgment) as if this five hundred talents was
-  a real and trustworthy estimate, and equal to two and a half per
-  cent. upon the taxable property of the Athenians. He says (iv,
-  8, p. 520, Engl. transl.) that “Euripides assumed as the basis
-  of his proposal for levying a property-tax, a taxable capital
-  of twenty thousand talents,”—and that “his proposition of
-  one-fortieth was _calculated_ to produce five hundred talents.”
-  No such conclusion can be fairly drawn from Aristophanes.
-
-  Again, Boeckh infers from another passage in the same play
-  of the same author, that a small direct property-tax of one
-  five-hundredth part had been recently imposed. After a speech
-  from one of the old women, calling upon a young man to follow
-  her, he replies (v. 1006):—
-
-    Ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ ἀνάγκη μοὔστίν, εἰ μὴ τῶν ἐμῶν
-    Τὴν πεντακοσιόστην κατέθηκας τῇ πόλει.
-
-  Boeckh himself admits (iv, 8, p. 520) that this passage is
-  very obscure, and so I think every one will find it. Tyrwhitt
-  was so perplexed by it that he altered ἐμῶν into ἐτῶν. Without
-  presuming to assign the meaning of the passage, I merely contend
-  that it cannot be held to justify the affirmation, as a matter
-  of historical fact, that a property-tax of one-five-hundredth
-  had been levied at Athens, shortly before the representation of
-  Ekklesiazusæ.
-
-  I cannot refrain here from noticing another inference drawn by
-  Sievers from a third passage in this same play,—the Ekklesiazusæ
-  (Geschichte Griechenlands vom Ende des Pelop. Kriegs bis zur
-  Schlacht von Mantineia, p. 101.) He says,—“How melancholy is the
-  picture of Athenian popular life, which is presented to us by the
-  Ekklesiazusæ and the second Plutus, ten or twelve years after the
-  restoration of the democracy! What an _impressive seriousness_
-  (welch ein erschütternder Ernst) is expressed in the speech of
-  Praxagora!” (v. 174 _seqq._).
-
-  I confess that I find neither seriousness, nor genuine and
-  trustworthy coloring, in this speech of Praxagora. It was a
-  comic case made out for the purpose of showing that the women
-  were more fit to govern Athens than the men, and setting forth
-  the alleged follies of the men in terms of broad and general
-  disparagement. The whole play is, throughout, thorough farce
-  and full of Aristophanic humor. And it is surely preposterous
-  to treat what is put into the mouth of Praxagora, the leading
-  feminine character, as if it were historical evidence as to the
-  actual condition or management of Athens. Let any one follow the
-  speech of Praxagora into the proposition of reform which she is
-  made to submit, and he will then see the absurdity of citing
-  her discourse as if it were an harangue in Thucydides. History
-  is indeed strangely transformed by thus turning comic wit into
-  serious matter of evidence; and no history has suffered so much
-  from the proceeding as that of Athens.
-
-  [729] Xenoph. Hellen. v. 1, 19-24: compare vii, 1, 3, 4; Xenoph.
-  De Vectigalibus, chapters i, ii, iii, etc.; Xenoph. De Repub.
-  Athen. i, 17.
-
-In the Hellespont also, their prospects were not only on the decline,
-but had become seriously menacing. After going from Ægina to Ephesus
-in the preceding year, and sending back Gorgôpas with the Æginetan
-squadron, Antalkidas had placed the remainder of his fleet under his
-secretary, Nikolochus, with orders to proceed to the Hellespont for
-the relief of Abydos. He himself landed, and repaired to Tiribazus,
-by whom he was conducted up to the court of Susa. Here he renewed
-the propositions for the pacification of Greece,—on principles of
-universal autonomy, abandoning all the Asiatic Greeks as subject
-absolutely to the Persian king,—which he had tried in vain to carry
-through two years before. Though the Spartans generally were odious
-to Artaxerxes, Antalkidas behaved with so much dexterity[730] as to
-gain the royal favor personally, while all the influence of Tiribazus
-was employed to second his political views. At length they succeeded
-in prevailing upon the king formally to adopt the peace, and to
-proclaim war against any Greeks who should refuse to accede to it,
-empowering the Spartans to enforce it everywhere as his allies and
-under his sanction. In order to remove one who would have proved a
-great impediment to this measure, the king was farther induced to
-invite the satrap Pharnabazus up to court, and to honor him with his
-daughter in marriage; leaving the satrapy of Daskylium under the
-temporary administration of Ariobarzanes, a personal friend and guest
-of Antalkidas.[731] Thus armed against all contingencies, Antalkidas
-and Tiribazus returned from Susa to the coast of Asia Minor in the
-spring of 387 B.C., not only bearing the formal diploma ratified by
-the king’s seal, but commanding ample means to carry it into effect;
-since, in addition to the full forces of Persia, twenty additional
-triremes were on their way from Syracuse and the Greco-Italian towns,
-sent by the despot Dionysius to the aid of the Lacedæmonians.[732]
-
-  [730] Plutarch, Artaxerx. c. 22.
-
-  [731] Xen. Hellen. v, 1, 28.
-
-  [732] Xen. Hellen. v, 1, 25-27.
-
-On reaching the coast, Antalkidas found Nikolochus with his fleet
-of twenty-five sail blocked up in Abydos by the Athenians under
-Iphikrates; who with thirty-two sail were occupying the European side
-of the Hellespont. He immediately repaired to Abydos by land, and
-took an early opportunity of stealing out by night with his fleet
-up the strait towards the Propontis; spreading the rumor that he
-was about to attack Chalkêdon, in concert with a party in the town.
-But he stopped at Perkôtê, and lay hid in that harbor until he saw
-the Athenian fleet (which had gone in pursuit of him upon the false
-scent laid out) pass by towards Prokonnêsus. The strait being now
-clear, Antalkidas sailed down it again to meet the Syracusan and
-Italian ships, whom he safely joined. Such junction, with a view to
-which his recent manœuvre had been devised, rendered him more than a
-match for his enemies. He had further the good fortune to capture a
-detached Athenian squadron of eight triremes, which Thrasybulus (a
-second Athenian citizen of that name) was conducting from Thrace to
-join the main Athenian fleet in the Hellespont. Lastly, additional
-reinforcements also reached Antalkidas from the zealous aid of
-Tiribazus and Ariobarzanes, insomuch that he found himself at the
-head of no less than eighty triremes, besides a still greater number
-which were under preparation in the various ports of Ionia.[733]
-
-  [733] Diodor. xv, 2. These triremes were employed in the ensuing
-  year for the prosecution of the war against Evagoras.
-
-Such a fleet, the greatest which had been seen in the Hellespont
-since the battle of Ægospotami, was so much superior to anything
-which could be brought to meet it, and indicated so strongly the
-full force of Persia operating in the interests of Sparta,—that the
-Athenians began to fear a repetition of the same calamitous suffering
-which they had already undergone from Lysander. A portion of such
-hardship they at once began to taste. Not a single merchant-ship
-reached them from the Euxine, all being seized and detained by
-Antalkidas; so that their main supply of imported corn was thus cut
-off. Moreover, in the present encouraging state of affairs, the
-Æginetan privateers became doubly active in harassing the coasting
-trade of Attica; and this combination, of actual hardship with
-prospective alarm, created a paramount anxiety at Athens to terminate
-the war. Without Athens, the other allies would have no chance of
-success through their own forces; while the Argeians also, hitherto
-the most obstinate, had become on their own account desirous of
-peace, being afraid of repeated Lacedæmonian invasions of their
-territory. That Sparta should press for a peace, when the terms of it
-were suggested by herself, is not wonderful. Even to her, triumphant
-as her position now seemed, the war was a heavy burden.[734]
-
-  [734] Xen. Hellen. v, 1, 28, 29.
-
-Such was the general state of feeling in the Grecian world, when
-Tiribazus summoned the contending parties into his presence, probably
-at Sardis, to hear the terms of the convention which had just come
-down from Susa. He produced the original edict, and having first
-publicly exhibited the regal seal, read aloud as follows:—
-
-“King Artaxerxes thinks it just that the cities in Asia, and the
-islands of Klazomenæ and Cyprus, shall belong to him. He thinks it
-just also, to leave all the other Hellenic cities autonomous, both
-small and great,—except Lemnos, Imbros, and Skyros, which are to
-belong to Athens, as they did originally. Should any parties refuse
-to accept this peace, I will make war upon them, along with those who
-are of the same mind, by land as well as by sea, with ships and with
-money.”[735]
-
-  [735] Xen. Hellen. v, 1, 31.
-
-  In this document there is the same introduction of the first
-  person immediately following the third, as in the correspondence
-  between Pausanias and Xerxes (Thucyd. i, 128, 129).
-
-Instructions were given to all the deputies to report the terms of
-this edict to their respective cities, and to meet again at Sparta
-for acceptance or rejection. When the time of meeting arrived,[736]
-all the cities, in spite of their repugnance to the abandonment
-of the Asiatic Greeks, and partly also to the second condition,
-nevertheless felt themselves overruled by superior force, and gave
-a reluctant consent. On taking the oaths, however, the Thebans
-tried indirectly to make good an exception in their own case, by
-claiming to take the oath not only on behalf of themselves, but on
-behalf of the Bœotian cities generally; a demand which Agesilaus in
-the name of Sparta repudiated, as virtually cancelling that item
-in the pacification whereby the small cities were pronounced to be
-autonomous as well as the great. When the Theban deputy replied that
-he could not relinquish his claim without fresh instructions from
-home, Agesilaus desired him to go at once and consult his countrymen.
-“You may tell them (said he) that if they do not comply, they will be
-shut out from the treaty.”
-
-  [736] Diodor. xiv, 110.
-
-It was with much delight that Agesilaus pronounced this peremptory
-sentence, which placed Thebes in so humiliating a dilemma. Antipathy
-towards the Thebans was one of his strongest sentiments, and he
-exulted in the hope that they would persist in their refusal so
-that he would thus be enabled to bring an overwhelming force to
-crush their isolated city. So eagerly did he thirst for the expected
-triumph, that immediately on the departure of the Theban deputies,
-and before their answer could possibly have been obtained, he
-procured the consent of the ephors, offered the border-sacrifice,
-and led the Spartan force out as far as Tegea. From that city he not
-only despatched messengers in all directions to hasten the arrival of
-the Periœki, but also sent forth the officers called xenâgi to the
-cities of the Peloponnesian allies, to muster and bring together the
-respective contingents. But in spite of all injunctions to despatch,
-his wishes were disappointed. Before he started from Tegea, the
-Theban deputies returned with the intimation that they were prepared
-to take the oath for Thebes alone, recognizing the other Bœotian
-cities as autonomous. Agesilaus and the Spartans were thus obliged
-to be satisfied with the minor triumph, in itself very serious and
-considerable, of having degraded Thebes from her federal headship,
-and isolated her from the Bœotian cities.[737]
-
-  [737] Xen. Hellen. v, 1, 32, 33.
-
-The unmeasured and impatient miso-Theban bitterness of Agesilaus,
-attested here by his friend and panegyrist, deserves especial notice;
-for it will be found to explain much of the misconduct of Sparta and
-her officers during the ensuing years.
-
-There yet remained one compliance for Agesilaus to exact. The Argeian
-auxiliaries were not yet withdrawn from Corinth; and the Corinthian
-government might probably think that the terms of the peace, leaving
-their city autonomous, permitted them to retain or dismiss these
-auxiliaries at their own discretion. But it was not so that Agesilaus
-construed the peace; and his construction, right or wrong, was backed
-by the power of enforcement. He sent to inform both Argeians and
-Corinthians, that if the auxiliaries were not withdrawn, he would
-march his army forthwith into both territories. No resistance could
-be offered to his peremptory mandate. The Argeians retired from
-Corinth; and the vehement philo-Argeian Corinthians,—especially
-those who had been concerned in the massacre at the festival of the
-Eukleia,—retired at the same time into voluntary exile, thinking
-themselves no longer safe in the town. They found a home partly
-at Argos, partly at Athens,[738] where they were most hospitably
-received. Those Corinthians who had before been in exile, and who,
-in concert with the Lacedæmonian garrison at Lechæum and Sikyon,
-had been engaged in bitter hostility against their countrymen in
-Corinth,—were immediately readmitted into the city. According to
-Xenophon, their readmission was pronounced by the spontaneous voice
-of the Corinthian citizens.[739] But we shall be more correct in
-affirming, that it was procured by the same intimidating summons from
-Agesilaus which had extorted the dismissal of the Argeians.[740]
-The restoration of the exiles from Lechæum on the present occasion
-was no more voluntary than that of the Athenian exiles had been
-eighteen years before, at the Peloponnesian war,—or than that of the
-Phliasian exiles was, two or three years afterwards.[741]
-
-  [738] Xen. Hellen. v, 1, 34; Demosthen. adv. Leptin. c. 13, p.
-  473.
-
-  [739] Xen. Hellen. v, 1, 34. Οἱ δ᾽ ἄλλοι πολῖται ἕκοντες
-  κατεδέχοντο τοὺς πρόσθεν φεύγοντας.
-
-  [740] Such is in fact the version of the story in Xenophon’s
-  Encomium upon Agesilaus (ii, 21), where it is made a matter of
-  honor to the latter, that he would not consent to peace, except
-  with a compulsory clause (ἠνάγκασε) that the Corinthian and
-  Theban exiles should be restored. The Corinthian exiles had been
-  actively coöperating with Agesilaus against Corinth. Of Theban
-  exiles we have heard nothing; but it is very probable that there
-  were several serving with Agesilaus,—and also pretty certain
-  that he would insist upon their restoration.
-
-  [741] Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 8.
-
-
-
-
-
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-Project Gutenberg's History of Greece, Volume 9 (of 12), by George Grote
-
-This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and most
-other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions
-whatsoever.  You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms of
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-www.gutenberg.org.  If you are not located in the United States, you'll have
-to check the laws of the country where you are located before using this ebook.
-
-Title: History of Greece, Volume 9 (of 12)
-
-Author: George Grote
-
-Release Date: February 11, 2016 [EBook #51182]
-
-Language: English
-
-Character set encoding: UTF-8
-
-*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK HISTORY OF GREECE, VOLUME 9 OF 12 ***
-
-
-
-
-Produced by Adrian Mastronardi, Mark C. Orton, Ramon Pajares
-Box and the Online Distributed Proofreading Team at
-http://www.pgdp.net (This file was produced from images
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-</pre>
-
-
-<div class="front">
-  <p><a href="#tnote">Transcriber's note</a></p>
-  <p><a href="#ToC">Table of Contents</a></p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="screenonly">
-  <div class="figcenter">
-    <img src="images/cover.jpg"
-         alt="Book cover" />
-  </div>
-</div>
-
-<div class="tit">
-  <hr class="chap" />
-
-  <h1>HISTORY OF GREECE</h1>
-
-  <p class="xl p2"><small>BY</small><br />
-  GEORGE GROTE, <span class="smcap">Esq.</span></p>
-
-  <p class="large p2">VOL. IX.</p>
-
-  <p class="xs p4">REPRINTED FROM THE LONDON EDITION.</p>
-
-  <p class="medium p2">NEW YORK:<br />
-  HARPER &amp; BROTHERS, PUBLISHERS,<br />
-  <span class="small">329 <small>AND</small> 331 <small>PEARL STREET.</small></span><br />
-  1880.</p>
-
-  <hr class="chap" />
-</div>
-
-<div class="chapter" id="ToC">
-  <p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_iii">[p. iii]</a></span></p>
-  <h2>CONTENTS.<br />
-  <span class="large">VOL. IX.</span></h2>
-  <hr class="sep2" />
-  <p class="xl center">PART II.</p>
-  <p class="large center">CONTINUATION OF HISTORICAL GREECE.</p>
-  <hr class="sep2" />
-</div>
-
-<div class="contents">
-
-<p class="chap">CHAPTER LXIX.</p>
-<p class="small center">CYRUS THE YOUNGER AND THE TEN THOUSAND GREEKS.</p>
-
-<p class="p1">Spartan empire. — March of the Ten Thousand Greeks.
-— Persian kings — Xerxes — Artaxerxes Longimanus. — Darius Nothus.
-— Cyrus the younger in Ionia — his vigorous operations against
-Athens. — Youth and education of Cyrus. — His esteem for the Greeks
-— his hopes of the crown. — Death of Darius Nothus — succession of
-Artaxerxes Mnemon. — Secret preparations of Cyrus for attacking
-his brother. — Klearchus and other Greeks in the service of Cyrus.
-— Strict administration, and prudent behavior, of Cyrus. — Cyrus
-collects his army at Sardis. — The Ten Thousand Greeks — their
-position and circumstances. — Xenophon. — How Xenophon came to join
-the Cyreian army. — Cyrus marches from Sardis — Kolossæ — Kelænæ.
-— Peltæ — Keramôn-Agora, Käystru-Pedion. — Distress of Cyrus for
-money — Epyaxa supplies him. — Thymbrium. — Tyriæum — Review of the
-Greeks by Cyrus. — Ikonium — Lykaonia — Tyana. — Pass over Taurus
-into Kilikia. — Syennesis of Kilikia — his duplicity — he assists
-Cyrus with money. — Cyrus at Tarsus — mutiny of the Greeks — their
-refusal to go farther. — Klearchus tries to suppress the mutiny
-by severity — he fails. — He tries persuasion — his discourse to
-the soldiers. — His refusal to march farther — well received. —
-Deceitful manœuvres of Klearchus to bring the soldiers round to
-Cyrus. — The soldiers agree to accompany Cyrus farther — increase of
-pay. — March onward — from Tarsus to Issus. — Flight of Abrokomas —
-abandonment of the passes. — Gates of Kilikia and Syria. — Desertion
-of Xenias and Pasion — prudence of Cyrus. — Cyrus marches from the
-sea to Thapsakus on the Euphrates. — Partial reluctance of the
-army — they ford the Euphrates. — Separate manœuvre of Menon. —
-Abrokomas abandons the defence of the river — his double dealing.
-— Cyrus marches along the left bank of the Euphrates — the Desert
-— privations of the army. — Pylæ — Charmandê — dangerous dispute
-between the soldiers of Klearchus and those of Menon. — Entry into
-Babylonia — treason of Orontes — preparation for battle. — Discourse
-of Cyrus to his officers and soldiers. — Conception formed by
-Cyrus of Grecian superiority. — Present<span class="pagenum"><a
-id="Page_iv">[p. iv]</a></span> of Cyrus to the prophet Silanus. —
-Cyrus passes the undefended trench — Kunaxa — sudden appearance of
-the king’s army — preparation of Cyrus for battle. — Last orders
-of Cyrus. — Battle of Kunaxa — easy victory of the Greeks on their
-side. — Impetuous attack of Cyrus upon his brother — Cyrus is slain.
-— Flight of Ariæus and the Asiatic force of Cyrus. — Plunder of the
-Cyreian camp by Artaxerxes. Victorious attitude of the Greeks. —
-Character of Cyrus. — If Cyrus had succeeded, he would have been
-the most formidable enemy to Greece.</p>
-<p class="toright"><a href="#Chap_69">1-51</a></p>
-
-<p class="chap">CHAPTER LXX.</p>
-<p class="small center">RETREAT OF THE TEN THOUSAND GREEKS.</p>
-
-<p class="p1">Dismay of the Greeks on learning the death of Cyrus.
-Klearchus offers the throne to Ariæus. — Artaxerxes summons the
-Greeks to surrender — their reply — language of Phalinus. — Ariæus
-refuses the throne, but invites the Greeks to join him for retreat.
-— The Greeks rejoin Ariæus — interchange of oaths — resolution to
-retreat together. — Position of the Greeks — to all appearance
-hopeless. — Commencement of the retreat, along with Ariæus —
-disorder of the army. — Heralds from the Persians to treat about a
-truce. — The heralds conduct the Greeks to villages furnished with
-provisions. March over the canals. — Abundant supplies obtained in
-the villages. — Visit of Tissaphernes — negotiations. — Convention
-concluded with Tissaphernes, who engages to conduct the Greeks home.
-— Motives of the Persians — favorable dispositions of Parysatis
-towards Cyrus. — Long halt of the Greeks — their quarrel with
-Ariæus. — Secret despair of Klearchus. — Retreating march begun,
-under Tissaphernes — they enter within the Wall of Media — march
-to Sittakê. — Alarm and suspicions of the Greeks — they cross the
-Tigris. — Retreating march up the left bank of the Tigris — to
-the Great Zab. — Suspicions between the Greeks and Tissaphernes.
-— Klearchus converses with Tissaphernes — and is talked over. —
-Klearchus, with the other Grecian generals, visits Tissaphernes in
-his tent. — Tissaphernes seizes the Greek generals. They are sent
-prisoners to the Persian court, and there put to death. — Menon
-is reserved to perish in torture — sentiments of queen Parysatis.
-— How Klearchus came to be imposed upon. — Plans of Tissaphernes
-— impotence and timidity of the Persians. — The Persians summon
-the Grecian army to surrender. — Indignant refusal of the Greeks —
-distress and despair prevalent among them. — First appearance of
-Xenophon — his dream. — He stimulates the other captains to take
-the lead and appoint new officers. — Address of Xenophon to the
-officers. New generals are named, Xenophon being one. — The army
-is convened in general assembly — speech of Xenophon. — Favorable
-augury from a man sneezing. — Encouraging topics insisted on by
-Xenophon. — Great impression produced by his speech — the army
-confirm the new generals proposed. — Great ascendency acquired
-over the army at once by Xenophon — qualities whereby he obtained
-it. — Combination of eloquence and confidence, with soldier-like
-resource and bravery. — Approach of the Persian Mithridates — the
-Greeks refuse all parley. — The Greeks cross the Zab and resume
-their march, harassed by the Persian cavalry. — Sufferings of the
-Greeks from marching under the attacks of the cavalry. Successful
-precautions taken. — Tissaphernes renews the attack, with<span
-class="pagenum"><a id="Page_v">[p. v]</a></span> some effect. —
-Comfortable quarters of the Greeks. They halt to repel the cavalry,
-and then march fast onward. — Victory of the Greeks — prowess of
-Xenophon. — The Greeks embarrassed as to their route — impossibility
-either of following the Tigris farther, or of crossing it. — The
-strike into the mountains of the Karduchians. — They burn much of
-their baggage — their sufferings from the activity and energy of the
-Karduchians. — Extreme danger of their situation. — Xenophon finds
-out another road to turn the enemy’s position. — The Karduchians
-are defeated and the road cleared. — Danger of Xenophon with the
-rear division and baggage. — Anxiety of the Greeks to recover the
-bodies of the slain. — They reach the river Kentritês, the northern
-boundary of Karduchia. — Difficulties of passing the Kentritês —
-dream of Xenophon. — They discover a ford and pass the river. —
-Xenophon with the rear-guard repels the Karduchians and effects his
-passage. — March through Armenia. Heavy snow and severe cold. — They
-ford the Eastern Euphrates or Murad. — Distressing marches — extreme
-misery from cold and hunger. — Rest in good quarters — subterranean
-villages well stocked with provisions. — After a week’s rest, they
-march onward — their guide runs away. — They reach a difficult pass
-occupied by the Chalybes — raillery exchanged between Xenophon and
-Cheirisophus about stealing. — They turn the pass by a flank-march,
-and force their way over the mountain. — March through the country
-of the Taochi — exhaustion of provisions — capture of a hill-fort. —
-Through the Chalybes, the bravest fighters whom they had yet seen —
-the Skythini. — They reach the flourishing city of Gymnias. — First
-sight of the sea from the mountain-top Thêchê — extreme delight
-of the soldiers. — Passage through the Makrônes. — Through the
-Kolchians — who oppose them and are defeated. — Kolchian villages —
-unwholesome honey. — Arrival at Trapezus on the Euxine (Trebizond).
-— Joy of the Greeks — their discharge of vows to their gods —
-their festivals and games. — Appendix.</p>
-<p class="toright"><a href="#Chap_70">52-120</a></p>
-
-<p class="chap">CHAPTER LXXI.</p>
-<p class="small center">PROCEEDINGS OF THE TEN THOUSAND GREEKS, FROM THE TIME THAT
-THEY REACHED TRAPEZUS, TO THEIR JUNCTION WITH THE LACEDÆMONIAN
-ARMY IN ASIA MINOR.</p>
-
-<p class="p1">Greek cities on the Euxine — Sinôpê with her colonies
-Kerasus, Kotyôra, and Trapezus. — Indigenous inhabitants — their
-relations with the Greek colonists. — Feelings of the Greeks on the
-Euxine when the Ten Thousand descended among them. — Uncertainty and
-danger of what they might do. — Plans of the army — Cheirisophus
-is sent to Byzantium to procure vessels for transporting them. —
-Regulations for the army proposed by Xenophon during his absence.
-— Adopted by the army — their intense repugnance to farther
-marching. — Measures for procuring transports. Marauding expeditions
-for supplies, against the Colchians and the Drilæ. — The army
-leave Trapezus, and march westward along the coast to Kerasus. —
-Acts of disorder and outrage committed by various soldiers near
-Kerasus. — March to Kotyôra — hostilities with the Mosynœki. — Long
-halt at Kotyôra — remonstrance from the Sinopians. — Speech of
-Hekatonymus of Sinôpê to the army — reply of Xenophon. — Success of
-the reply — good understanding established with Sinôpê. — <span
-class="pagenum"><a id="Page_vi">[p. vi]</a></span>Consultation
-of the army with Hekatonymus, who advises going home by sea. —
-Envoys sent by the army to Sinôpê to procure vessels. — Poverty
-and increasing disorganization or the army. — Ideas of Xenophon
-about founding a new city in the Euxine, with the army. — Sacrifice
-of Xenophon to ascertain the will of the gods — treachery of the
-prophet Silanus. — Silanus, Timasion, and others raise calumnies
-against Xenophon. General assembly of the army. — Accusations against
-Xenophon — his speech in defence. — He carries the soldiers with him
-— discontent and flight of Silanus. — Fresh manœuvres of Timasion
-— fresh calumnies circulated against Xenophon — renewed discontent
-of the army. — Xenophon convenes the assembly again. — his address
-in defence of himself. — His remonstrance against the disorders in
-the army. — Vote of the army unanimously favorable to Xenophon —
-disapproving the disorders, and directing trial. — Xenophon’s appeal
-to universal suffrage, as the legitimate political authority. Success
-of his appeal. — Xenophon recommends trial of the generals before
-a tribunal formed of the lochages or captains. Satisfaction of the
-army with Xenophon. — Manner in which discipline was upheld by the
-officers. — Complete triumph of Xenophon. His influence over the
-army, derived from his courage, his frankness, and his oratory. —
-Improved feeling of the army — peace with the Paphlagonian Korylas.
-— The army pass by sea to Sinôpê. — Return of Cheirisophus —
-resolution of the army to elect a single general — they wish to elect
-Xenophon, who declines — Cheirisophus is chosen. — The army pass by
-sea to Herakleia — they wish to extort money from the Herakleots
-— opposition of Cheirisophus and Xenophon. — Dissatisfaction of
-the army — they divide into three <span class="replace" id="tn_1"
-title="In the printed book: fractions">factions</span>. 1. The
-Arcadians and Achæans. 2. A division under Cheirisophus. 3. A
-division under Xenophon. — Arcadian division start first and act for
-themselves — they get into great danger, and are rescued by Xenophon
-— the army reünited at Kalpê — old board of generals reëlected, with
-Neon in place of Cheirisophus. — Distress for provisions at Kalpê
-— unwillingness to move in the face of unfavorable sacrifices —
-ultimate victory over the troops of the country. — Halt at Kalpê —
-comfortable quarters — idea that they were about to settle there as a
-colony. — Arrival of Kleander, the Spartan harmost, from Byzantium,
-together with Dexippus. — Disorder in the army: mutiny against
-Kleander, arising from the treachery of Dexippus. — Indignation
-and threats of Kleander — Xenophon persuades the army to submit —
-fear of Sparta. — Satisfaction given to Kleander, by the voluntary
-surrender of Agasias with the mutinous soldier. — Appeal to the mercy
-of Kleander, who is completely soothed. — Kleander takes the command,
-expressing the utmost friendship both towards the army and towards
-Xenophon. — Unfavorable sacrifices make Kleander throw up the command
-and sail away. — March of the army across the country from Kalpê to
-Chalkêdon. — Pharnabazus bribes Anaxibius to carry the army across
-the Bosphorus into Europe — false promises of Anaxibius to the army.
-— Intention of Xenophon to leave the army immediately and go home —
-first proposition addressed to him by Seuthes of Thrace. — The army
-cross over to Byzantium — fraud and harsh dealing of Anaxibius, who
-sends the army at once out of the town. — Last orders of Anaxibius
-as the soldiers were going out of the gates. — Wrath and mutiny of
-the soldiers, in going away — they rush again into the gates, and
-muster within the town. — Terror of Anaxibius and all within the
-town. — The exasperated soldiers masters of Byzantium — danger of
-all within it — conduct of Xenophon. — Xenophon musters the soldiers
-in military order and harangues them. — Xenophon calms the army, and
-persuades them to refrain from assaulting the town — message sent by
-them to<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_vii">[p. vii]</a></span>
-Anaxibius — they go out of Byzantium, and agree to accept Kœratadas
-as their commander. — Remarkable effect produced by Xenophon —
-evidence which it affords of the susceptibility of the Greek mind
-to persuasive influences. Xenophon leaves the army, and goes into
-Byzantium with the view of sailing home. Kœratadas is dismissed from
-the command. — Dissension among the commanders left. — Distress of
-the army — Aristarchus arrives from Sparta to supersede Kleander
-— Polus on his way to supersede Anaxibius. — Pharnabazus defrauds
-Anaxibius, who now employs Xenophon to convey the Cyreians across
-back to Asia. — Aristarchus hinders the crossing — his cruel dealing
-towards the sick Cyreians left in Byzantium. — His treacherous scheme
-for entrapping Xenophon. — Xenophon is again implicated in the
-conduct of the army — he opens negotiations with Seuthes. — Position
-of Seuthes — his liberal offers to the army. — Xenophon introduces
-him to the army, who accept the offers. — Service of the army with
-Seuthes, who cheats them of most of their pay. — The army suspect
-the probity of Xenophon — unjust calumnies against him — he exposes
-it in a public harangue, and regains their confidence. — Change of
-interest in the Lacedæmonians, who become anxious to convey the
-Cyreians across into Asia, in order to make war against the satraps.
-— Xenophon crosses over with the army to Asia — his poverty — he is
-advised to sacrifice to Zeus Meilichios — beneficial effects. — He
-conducts the army across Mount Ida to Pergamus. — His unsuccessful
-attempt to surprise and capture the rich Persian Asidates. — In a
-second attempt he captures Asidates — valuable booty secured. —
-General sympathy expressed for Xenophon — large share personally
-allotted to him. — The Cyreians are incorporated in the army of the
-Lacedæmonian general Thimbron — Xenophon leaves the army, depositing
-his money in the temple at Ephesus. — His subsequent return to Asia,
-to take command of Cyreians as a part of the Lacedæmonian army. —
-Xenophon in the Spartan service, with Agesilaus against Athens —
-he is banished. — He settles at Skillus near Olympia, on an estate
-consecrated to Artemis. — Charms of the residence — good hunting —
-annual public sacrifice offered by Xenophon. — Later life of Xenophon
-— expelled from Skillus after the battle of Leuktra — afterwards
-restored at Athens. — Great impression produced by the retreat of
-the Ten Thousand upon the Greek mind.</p>
-<p class="toright"><a href="#Chap_71">121-180</a></p>
-
-<p class="chap">CHAPTER LXXII.</p>
-<p class="small center">GREECE UNDER THE LACEDÆMONIAN EMPIRE.</p>
-
-<p class="p1">Sequel of Grecian affairs generally — resumed. —
-Spartan empire — how and when it commenced. — Oppression and
-suffering of Athens under the Thirty. — Alteration of Grecian
-feeling towards Athens — the Thirty are put down and the democracy
-restored. — The Knights or Horsemen, the richest proprietors at
-Athens, were the great supporters of the Thirty in their tyranny.
-— The state of Athens, under the Thirty, is a sample of that
-which occurred in a large number of other Grecian cities, at the
-commencement of the Spartan empire. — Great power of Lysander — he
-establishes in most of the cities Dekarchies, along with a Spartan
-harmost. — Intimidation exercised everywhere by Lysander in favor
-of his own partisans. — Oppressive action of these Dekarchies. — In
-some<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_viii">[p. viii]</a></span>
-points, probably worse than the Thirty at Athens. — Bad conduct of
-the Spartan harmosts — harsh as well as corrupt. No justice to be
-obtained against them at Sparta. — Contrast of the actual empire of
-Sparta, with the promises of freedom which she had previously held
-out. — Numerous promises of general autonomy made by Sparta — by
-the Spartan general Brasidas, especially. — Gradual change in the
-language and plans of Sparta towards the close of the Peloponnesian
-war. — Language of Brasidas contrasted with the acts of Lysander. —
-Extreme suddenness and completeness of the victory of Ægospotami left
-Lysander almost omnipotent. — The dekarchies became partly modified
-by the jealousy at Sparta against Lysander. The harmosts lasted
-much longer. — The Thirty at Athens were put down by the Athenians
-themselves, not by any reformatory interference of Sparta. — The
-empire of Sparta much worse and more oppressive than that of Athens.
-— Imperial Athens deprived her subject-allies of their autonomy, but
-was guilty of little or no oppression. — Imperial Sparta did this,
-and much worse — her harmosts and decemvirs are more complained of
-than the fact of her empire. — This more to be regretted, as Sparta
-had now an admirable opportunity for organizing a good and stable
-confederacy throughout Greece. — Sparta might have reörganized the
-confederacy of Delos, which might now have been made to work well. —
-Insupportable arrogance of Lysander — bitter complaints against him,
-as well as against the dekarchies. — Lysander offends Pharnabazus,
-who procures his recall. His disgust and temporary expatriation. —
-Surrender of the Asiatic Greeks to Persia, according to the treaty
-concluded with Sparta. — Their condition is affected by the position
-and ambitious schemes of Cyrus, whose protection they seek against
-Tissaphernes. — After the death of Cyrus, Tissaphernes returns as
-victor and satrap to the coast of Asia Minor. — Alarm of the Asiatic
-Greeks, who send to ask aid from Sparta. The Spartans send Thimbron
-with an army to Asia. His ill-success and recall — he is superseded
-by Derkyllidas. — Conduct of the Cyreians loose as to pillage. —
-Derkyllidas makes a truce with Tissaphernes, and attacks Pharnabazus
-in the Troad and Æolis. — Distribution of the Persian empire;
-relation of king, satrap, sub-satrap. — Mania, widow of Zênis, holds
-the subsatrapy of Æolis under Pharnabazus. Her regular payment and
-vigorous government. — Military force, personal conquests, and large
-treasures, of Mania. — Assassination of Mania, and of her son, by her
-son-in-law Meidias, who solicits the satrapy from Pharnabazus, but is
-indignantly refused. — Invasion and conquest of Æolis by Derkyllidas,
-who gets possession of the person of Meidias. — Derkyllidas acquires
-and liberates Skêpsis and Gergis, deposing Meidias, and seizing
-the treasures of Mania. — Derkyllidas concludes a truce with
-Pharnabazus, and takes winter quarters in Bithynia. — Command of
-Derkyllidas — satisfaction of Sparta with the improved conduct of
-the Cyreians. — Derkyllidas crosses into Europe, and employs his
-troops in fortifying the Chersonesus against the Thracians. — He
-captures and garrisons Atarneus. — He makes war upon Tissaphernes
-and Pharnabazus, upon the Mæander. — Timidity of Tissaphernes — he
-concludes a truce with Derkyllidas. — Derkyllidas is superseded
-by Agesilaus. — Alienation towards Sparta had grown up among her
-allies in Central Greece. — Great energy imparted to Spartan action
-by Lysander immediately after the victory of Ægospotami; an energy
-very unusual with Sparta. — The Spartans had kept all the advantages
-of victory to themselves — their allies were allowed nothing. —
-Great power of the Spartans — they take revenge upon those who
-had displeased them — their invasion of Elis. — The Spartan king
-Agis invades the Eleian territory. He retires from it immediately
-in consequence of<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_ix">[p.
-ix]</a></span> an earthquake. — Second invasion of Elis by Agis — he
-marches through Triphylia and Olympia; victorious march, with much
-booty. — Insurrection of the oligarchical party in Elis — they are
-put down. — The Eleians are obliged to submit to hard terms of peace.
-— Sparta refuses to restore the Pisatans to the Olympic presidency.
-— Triumphant position of Sparta — she expels the Messenians from
-Peloponnesus and its neighborhood.</p>
-<p class="toright"><a href="#Chap_72">181-229</a></p>
-
-<p class="chap">CHAPTER LXXIII.</p>
-<p class="small center">AGESILAUS KING OF SPARTA. — THE CORINTHIAN WAR.</p>
-
-<p class="p1">Triumphant position of Sparta at the close of the war —
-introduction of a large sum of gold and silver by Lysander — opposed
-by some of the Ephors. — The introduction of money was only one among
-a large train of corrupting circumstances which then became operative
-on Sparta. — Contrast between Sparta in 432 <small>B.C.</small>,
-and Sparta after 404 <small>B.C.</small> — Increase of peculation,
-inequality, and discontent at Sparta. — Testimonies of Isokrates
-and Xenophon to the change of character and habits at Sparta. —
-Power of Lysander — his arrogance and ambitious projects — flattery
-lavished upon him by sophists and poets. — Real position of the
-kings at Sparta. — His intrigues to make himself king at Sparta —
-he tries in vain to move the oracles in his favor — scheme laid
-for the production of sacred documents, as yet lying hidden, by
-a son of Apollo. — His aim at the kingship fails — nevertheless
-he still retains prodigious influence at Sparta. — Death of Agis,
-king of Sparta — doubt as to the legitimacy of his son Leotychides.
-Agesilaus, seconded by Lysander, aspires to the throne. — Character
-of Agesilaus. — Conflicting pretensions of Agesilaus and Leotychides.
-— Objection taken against Agesilaus on the ground of his lameness,
-— oracle produced by Diopeithes — eluded by the interpretation of
-Lysander. — Agesilaus is preferred as king — suspicions which always
-remained attached to Lysander’s interpretation. — Popular conduct of
-Agesilaus — he conciliates the ephors — his great influence at Sparta
-— his energy, combined with unscrupulous partisanship. — Dangerous
-conspiracy at Sparta — terror-striking sacrifices. — Character and
-position of the chief conspirator Kinadon — state of parties at
-Sparta — increasing number of malcontents. — Police of the ephors —
-information laid before them. — Wide-spread discontent reckoned upon
-by the conspirators. — Alarm of the ephors — their manœuvres for
-apprehending Kinadon privately. — Kinadon is seized, interrogated,
-and executed — his accomplices are arrested, and the conspiracy
-broken up. — Dangerous discontent indicated at Sparta. — Proceedings
-of Derkyllidas and Pharnabazus in Asia. — Persian preparations for
-reviving the maritime war against Sparta — renewed activity of
-Konon. — Agesilaus is sent with a land-force to Asia, accompanied by
-Lysander. — Large plans of Agesilaus, for conquest in the interior
-of Asia. — General willingness of the Spartan allies to serve in the
-expedition, but refusal from Thebes, Corinth, and Athens. — Agesilaus
-compares himself with Agamemnon — goes to sacrifice at Aulis — is
-contemptuously hindered by the Thebans. — Arrival of Agesilaus
-at Ephesus — he concludes a fresh armistice with Tissaphernes.
-— Arrogant behavior and overweening ascendency of Lysander —
-offensive to the army and to Agesilaus. — Agesilaus hum<span
-class="pagenum"><a id="Page_x">[p. x]</a></span>bles and degrades
-Lysander, who asks to be sent away. — Lysander is sent to command at
-the Hellespont — his valuable service there. — Tissaphernes breaks
-the truce with Agesilaus, who makes war upon him and Pharnabazus — he
-retires for the purpose of organizing a force of cavalry. — Agesilaus
-indifferent to money for himself, but eager in enriching his friends.
-— His humanity towards captives and deserted children. — Spartan side
-of his character — exposure of naked prisoners — different practice
-of Asiatics and Greeks. — Efforts of Agesilaus to train his army, and
-to procure cavalry. — Agesilaus renews the war against Tissaphernes,
-and gains a victory near Sardis. — Artaxerxes causes Tissaphernes to
-be put to death and superseded by Tithraustes. — Negotiations between
-the new satrap and Agesilaus — the satraps in Asia Minor hostile to
-each other. — Commencement of action at sea against Sparta — the
-Athenian Konon, assisted by Persian ships and money, commands a fleet
-of eighty sail on the coast of Karia. — Rhodes revolts from the
-Spartan empire — Konon captures an Egyptian corn-fleet at Rhodes. —
-Anxiety of the Lacedæmonians — Agesilaus is appointed to command at
-sea as well as on land. — Severity of the Lacedæmonians towards the
-Rhodian Dorieus — contrast of the former treatment of the same man by
-Athens. — Sentiment of a multitude compared with that of individuals.
-— Efforts of Agesilaus to augment the fleet — he names Peisander
-admiral. — Operations of Agesilaus against Pharnabazus. — He lays
-waste the residence of the satrap, and surprises his camp — offence
-given to Spithridates. — Personal conference between Agesilaus and
-Pharnabazus. — Friendship established between Agesilaus and the son
-of Pharnabazus — character of Agesilaus. — Promising position and
-large preparations for Asiatic land-warfare, of Agesilaus — he is
-recalled with his army to Peloponnesus. — Efforts and proceedings
-of Konon in command of the Persian fleet — his personal visit to
-the Persian court. — Pharnabazus is named admiral jointly with
-Konon. — Battle of Knidus — complete defeat of the Lacedæmonian
-fleet — death of Peisander the admiral.</p>
-<p class="toright"><a href="#Chap_73">230-283</a></p>
-
-<p class="chap">CHAPTER LXXIV.</p>
-<p class="small center">FROM THE BATTLE OF KNIDUS TO THE REBUILDING OF THE LONG WALLS OF ATHENS.</p>
-
-<p class="p1">War in Central Greece against Sparta — called the
-Corinthian war. — Relations of Sparta with the neighboring states
-and with her allies after the accession of Agesilaus. Discontent
-among the allies. — Great power of Sparta, stretching even to
-Northern Greece — state of Herakleia. — Growing disposition in
-Greece to hostility against Sparta, when she becomes engaged in the
-war against Persia. — The satrap Tithraustes sends an envoy with
-money into Greece, to light up war against Sparta — his success
-at Thebes, Corinth, and Argos. — The Persian money did not create
-hostility against Sparta, but merely brought out hostile tendencies
-pre-existing. Philo-Laconian sentiment of Xenophon. — War between
-Sparta and Thebes — the Bœotian war. — Active operations of Sparta
-against Bœotia — Lysander is sent to act from Herakleia on the
-northward — Pausanias conducts an army from Peloponnesus. — The
-Thebans apply to Athens for aid — remarkable proof of the altered
-sentiment in<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_xi">[p. xi]</a></span>
-Greece. — Speech of the Theban envoy at Athens. — Political feeling
-at Athens — good effects of the amnesty after the expulsion of the
-Thirty. — Unanimous vote of the Athenians to assist Thebes against
-Sparta. — State of the Bœotian confederacy — Orchomenus revolts
-and joins Lysander, who invades Bœotia with his army and attacks
-Haliartus. — Lysander is repulsed and slain before Haliartus. —
-Pausanias arrives in Bœotia after the death of Lysander — Thrasybulus
-and an Athenian army come to the aid of the Thebans. — Pausanias
-evacuates Bœotia, on receiving the dead bodies of Lysander and the
-rest for burial. — Anger against Pausanias at Sparta; he escapes
-into voluntary exile; he is condemned in his absence. — Condemnation
-of Pausanias not deserved. — Sparta not less unjust in condemning
-unsuccessful generals than Athens. — Character of Lysander — his
-mischievous influence, as well for Sparta as for Greece generally. —
-His plans to make himself king at Sparta — discourse of the sophist
-Kleon. — Encouragement to the enemies of Sparta, from the death of
-Lysander — alliance against her between Thebes, Athens, Corinth,
-and Argos — the Eubœans and others join the alliance. — Increased
-importance of Thebes — she now rises to the rank of a primary power
-— the Theban leader Ismenias. — Successful operations of Ismenias
-to the north of Bœotia — capture of Herakleia from Sparta. — Synod
-of anti-Spartan allies at Corinth — their confident hopes — the
-Lacedæmonians send to recall Agesilaus from Asia. — Large muster near
-Corinth of Spartans and Peloponnesians on one side, of anti-Spartan
-allies on the other. — Boldness of the language against Sparta —
-speech of the Corinthian Timolaus. — The anti-Spartan allies take
-up a defensive position near Corinth — advance of the Lacedæmonians
-to attack them. — Battle of Corinth — victory of the Lacedæmonians
-in their part of the battle; their allies in the other parts being
-worsted. — Lacedæmonian ascendency within Peloponnesus is secured,
-but no farther result gained. — Agesilaus — his vexation on being
-recalled from Asia — his large plans of Asiatic conquest. — Regret
-of the Asiatic allies when he quits Asia — he leaves Euxenus in
-Asia with four thousand men. — Agesilaus crosses the Hellespont and
-marches homeward through Thrace, Macedonia, and Thessaly. — Agesilaus
-and his army on the northern frontier of Bœotia — eclipse of the sun
-— news of the naval defeat at Knidus. — Bœotians and their allies
-mustered at Korôneia. — Battle of Korôneia — Agesilaus with most of
-his army is victorious; while the Thebans on their side are also
-victorious. — Terrible combat between the Thebans and Spartans; on
-the whole, the result is favorable to the Thebans. — Victory of
-Agesilaus, not without severe wounds — yet not very decisive — his
-conduct after the battle. — Army of Agesilaus withdraws from Bœotia —
-he goes to the Pythian games — sails homeward across the Corinthian
-Gulf — his honorable reception at Sparta. — Results of the battles
-of Corinth and Korôneia. Sparta had gained nothing by the former,
-and had rather lost by the latter. — Reverses of Sparta after the
-defeat of Knidus. Loss of the insular empire of Sparta. Nearly all
-her maritime allies revolt to join Pharnabazus and Konon. — Abydos
-holds faithfully to Sparta, under Derkyllidas. — Derkyllidas holds
-both Abydos and the Chersonesus opposite, in spite of Pharnabazus
-— anger of the latter. — Pharnabazus and Konon sail with their
-fleet to Peloponnesus and Corinth. — Assistance and encouragement
-given by Pharnabazus to the allies at Corinth — Remarkable fact
-of the Persian satrap and fleet at Corinth. — Pharnabazus leaves
-the fleet with Konon in the Saronic Gulf, and aids him, with
-money, to rebuild the Long Walls of Athens. — Konon rebuilds the
-Long Walls — hearty coöperation of the allies. — Great<span
-class="pagenum"><a id="Page_xii">[p. xii]</a></span> importance of
-this restoration — how much it depended upon accident — Maintenance
-of the lines of Corinth against Sparta, was one essential condition
-to the power of rebuilding the Long Walls. The lines were not
-maintained longer than the ensuing year.</p>
-<p class="toright"><a href="#Chap_74">284-324</a></p>
-
-<p class="chap">CHAPTER LXXV.</p>
-<p class="small center">FROM THE REBUILDING OF THE LONG WALLS OF ATHENS TO THE PEACE OF ANTALKIDAS.</p>
-
-<p class="p1">Large plans of Konon — organization of a mercenary
-force at Corinth. — Naval conflicts of the Corinthians and
-Lacedæmonians, in the Corinthian Gulf. — Land-warfare — the
-Lacedæmonians established at Sikyon — the anti-Spartan allies
-occupying the lines of Corinth from sea to sea. — Sufferings of
-the Corinthians from the war being carried on in their territory.
-Many Corinthian proprietors become averse to the war. — Growth and
-manifestation of the philo-Laconian party in Corinth. Oligarchical
-form of the government left open nothing but an appeal to force.
-— The Corinthian government forestall the conspiracy by a <i>coup
-d’état</i>. — Numerous persons of the philo-Laconian party are banished;
-nevertheless Pasimêlus the leader is spared, and remains at Corinth.
-— Intimate political union and consolidation between Corinth and
-Argos. — Pasimêlus admits the Lacedæmonians within the Long Walls
-of Corinth. Battle within those walls. — The Lacedæmonians are
-victorious — severe loss of the Argeians. — The Lacedæmonians pull
-down a portion of the Long Walls between Corinth and Lechæum, so as
-to open a free passage across. They capture Krommyon and Sidus. —
-Effective warfare carried on by the light troops under Iphikrates
-at Corinth — Military genius and improvements of Iphikrates. —
-The Athenians restore the Long Walls between Corinth and Lechæum
-— expedition of the Spartan king Agesilaus, who, in concert with
-Teleutias, retakes the Long Walls and captures Lechæum. — Alarm
-of Athens and Thebes at the capture of the Long Walls of Corinth.
-Propositions sent to Sparta to solicit peace. The discussions come to
-no result. — Advantages derived by the Corinthians from possession of
-Peiræum. At the instigation of the exiles, Agesilaus marches forth
-with an army to attack it. — Isthmian festival — Agesilaus disturbs
-the celebration. The Corinthian exiles, under his protection,
-celebrate it; then, when he is gone, the Corinthians from the city
-perform the ceremony over again. — Agesilaus attacks Peiræum, which
-he captures, together with the Heræum, many prisoners, and much
-booty. — Triumphant position of Agesilaus. Danger of Corinth. The
-Thebans send fresh envoys to solicit peace — contemptuously treated
-by Agesilaus. — Sudden arrival of bad news, which spoils the triumph.
-— Destruction of a Lacedæmonian mora by the light troops under
-Iphikrates. — Daring and well-planned manœuvres of Iphikrates. — Few
-of the mora escape to Lechæum. — The Lacedæmonians bury the bodies
-of the slain, under truce asked and obtained. Trophy erected by
-Iphikrates. — Great effect produced upon the Grecian mind by this
-event. Peculiar feelings of Spartans; pride of the relatives of the
-slain. — Mortification of Agesilaus — he marches up to the walls
-of Corinth and defies Iphikrates — he then goes back humiliated to
-Sparta. — Success of Iphikrates — he retakes<span class="pagenum"><a
-id="Page_xiii">[p. xiii]</a></span> Krommyon, Sidus, and Peiræum —
-Corinth remains pretty well undisturbed by enemies. The Athenians
-recall Iphikrates. — Expedition of Agesilaus against Akarnania —
-successful, after some delay — the Akarnanians submit, and enrol
-themselves in the Lacedæmonian confederacy. — The Lacedæmonians under
-Agesipolis invade Argos. — Manœuvre of the Argeians respecting the
-season of the holy truce. Agesipolis consults the oracles at Olympia
-and Delphi. — Earthquake in Argos after the invasion of Agesipolis —
-he disregards it. — He marches up near to Argos — much plunder taken
-— he retires. — Transactions in Asia — efforts of Sparta to detach
-the Great King from Athens. — The Spartan Antalkidas is sent as envoy
-to Tiribazus. Konon and other envoys sent also, from Athens and the
-anti-Spartan allies. — Antalkidas offers to surrender the Asiatic
-Greeks, and demands universal autonomy throughout the Grecian world —
-the anti-Spartan allies refuse to accede to those terms. — Hostility
-of Sparta to all the partial confederacies of Greece, now first
-proclaimed under the name of universal autonomy. — Antalkidas gains
-the favor of Tiribazus, who espouses privately the cause of Sparta,
-though the propositions for peace fail. Tiribazus seizes Konon —
-Konon’s career is now closed, either by death or imprisonment.
-— Tiribazus cannot prevail with the Persian court, which still
-continues hostile to Sparta. Struthas is sent down to act against the
-Lacedæmonians in Ionia. — Victory of Struthas over Thimbron and the
-Lacedæmonian army. Thimbron is slain. — Diphridas is sent to succeed
-Thimbron. — Lacedæmonian fleet at Rhodes — intestine disputes in the
-island. — The Athenians send aid to Evagoras at Cyprus. Fidelity
-with which they adhered to him, though his alliance had now become
-inconvenient. — Thrasybulus is sent with a fleet from Athens to the
-Asiatic coast — his acquisitions in the Hellespont and Bosphorus.
-— Victory of Thrasybulus in Lesbos — he levies contributions along
-the Asiatic coast — he is slain near Aspendus. — Character of
-Thrasybulus. — Agyrrhius succeeds Thrasybulus — Rhodes still holds
-out against the Lacedæmonians. — Anaxibius is sent to command at
-the Hellespont in place of Derkyllidas — his vigorous proceedings
-— he deprives Athens of the tolls of the strait. — The Athenians
-send Iphikrates with his peltasts and a fleet to the Hellespont. His
-stratagem to surprise Anaxibius. — Defeat and death of Anaxibius.
-— The Athenians are again masters of the Hellespont and the strait
-dues. — The island of Ægina — its past history. — The Æginetans are
-constrained by Sparta into war with Athens. The Lacedæmonian admiral
-Teleutias at Ægina. He is superseded by Hierax. His remarkable
-popularity among the seamen. — Hierax proceeds to Rhodes, leaving
-Gorgôpas at Ægina. Passage of the Lacedæmonian Antalkidas to Asia. —
-Gorgôpas is surprised in Ægina, defeated, and slain, by the Athenian
-Chabrias; who goes to assist Evagoras in Cyprus. — The Lacedæmonian
-seamen at Ægina unpaid and discontented. Teleutias is sent thither to
-conciliate them. — Sudden and successful attack of Teleutias upon the
-Peiræus. — Unprepared and unguarded condition of Peiræus — Teleutias
-gains rich plunder, and sails away in safety. — He is enabled to
-pay his seamen — activity of the fleet — great loss inflicted upon
-Athenian commerce. — Financial condition of Athens. The Theôrikon. —
-Direct property-taxes. — Antalkidas goes up with Tiribazus to Susa —
-his success at the Persian court — he brings down the terms of peace
-asked for by Sparta, ratified by the Great King, to be enforced by
-Sparta in his name. — Antalkidas in command of the Lacedæmonian and
-Syracusan fleets in the Hellespont, with Persian aid. His successes
-against the Athenians. — Distress and discouragement of Athens —
-anxiety of the anti<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_xiv">[p.
-xiv]</a></span>-Spartan allies for peace. — Tiribazus summons them
-all to Sardis, to hear the convention which had been sent down by
-the Great King. — Terms of the convention, called the peace of
-Antalkidas. — Congress at Sparta for acceptance or rejection. All
-parties accept. The Thebans at first accept under reserve for the
-Bœotian cities. — Agesilaus refuses to allow the Theban reserve, and
-requires unconditional acceptance. His eagerness, from hatred of
-Thebes, to get into a war with them single-handed. The Thebans are
-obliged to accept unconditionally. — Agesilaus forces the Corinthians
-to send away their Argeian auxiliaries. The philo-Argeian Corinthians
-go into exile; the philo-Laconian Corinthians are restored.</p>
-<p class="toright"><a href="#Chap_75">326-388</a></p>
-
-</div>
-
-<hr class="chap" />
-
-
-<div class="chapter" id="Chap_69">
-  <p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_1">[p. 1]</a></span></p>
-  <p class="falseh1">HISTORY OF GREECE.</p>
-  <hr class="sep2" />
-  <p class="xl center">PART II.</p>
-  <hr class="sep2" />
-  <h2 class="nobreak">CHAPTER LXIX.<br />
-  CYRUS THE YOUNGER AND THE TEN THOUSAND GREEKS.</h2>
-</div>
-
-<p class="noindent"><span class="smcap">In</span> my last volume,
-I brought down the History of Grecian affairs to the close of the
-Peloponnesian war, including a description of the permanent loss of
-imperial power, the severe temporary oppression, the enfranchisement
-and renewed democracy, which marked the lot of defeated Athens.
-The defeat of that once powerful city, accomplished by the Spartan
-confederacy,—with large pecuniary aid from the young Persian
-prince Cyrus, satrap of most of the Ionian seaboard,—left
-Sparta mistress, for the time, of the Grecian world. Lysander, her
-victorious admiral, employed his vast temporary power for the purpose
-of setting up, in most of the cities, Dekarchies or ruling Councils
-of Ten, composed of his own partisans; with a Lacedæmonian Harmost
-and garrison to enforce their oligarchical rule. Before I proceed,
-however, to recount, as well as it can be made out, the unexpected
-calamities thus brought upon the Grecian world, with their eventual
-consequences,—it will be convenient to introduce here the
-narrative of the Ten Thousand Greeks, with their march into the
-heart of the Persian empire and their still more celebrated Retreat.
-This incident, lying apart from the main stream of Grecian affairs,
-would form an item, strictly speaking, in Persian history rather
-than in Grecian. But its effects on the Greek mind, and upon the
-future course of Grecian affairs, were numerous and important;<span
-class="pagenum"><a id="Page_2">[p. 2]</a></span> while as an
-illustration of Hellenic character and competence measured against
-that of the contemporary Asiatics, it stands preeminent and full of
-instruction.</p>
-
-<p>This march from Sardis up to the neighborhood of Babylon,
-conducted by Cyrus the younger and undertaken for the purpose of
-placing him on the Persian throne in the room of his elder brother
-Artaxerxes Mnemon,—was commenced about March or April in the
-year 401 <small>B.C.</small> It was about six months afterwards, in
-the month of September or October of the same year, that the battle
-of Kunaxa was fought, in which, though the Greeks were victorious,
-Cyrus himself lost his life. They were then obliged to commence their
-retreat, which occupied about one year, and ultimately brought them
-across the Bosphorus of Thrace to Byzantium, in October or November,
-400 <small>B.C.</small></p>
-
-<p>The death of king Darius Nothus, father both of Artaxerxes and
-Cyrus, occurred about the beginning of 404 <small>B.C.</small>,
-a short time after the entire ruin of the force of Athens at
-Ægospotami. His reign of nineteen years, with that of his father
-Artaxerxes Longimanus which lasted nearly forty years, fill up almost
-all the interval from the death of Xerxes in 465 <small>B.C.</small>
-The close of the reigns both of Xerxes and of his son Artaxerxes had
-indeed been marked by those phenomena of conspiracy, assassination,
-fratricide, and family tragedy, so common in the transmission of
-an Oriental sceptre. Xerxes was assassinated by the chief officer
-of the palace, named Artabanus,—who had received from him at a
-banquet the order to execute his eldest son Darius, but had not
-fulfilled it. Artabanus, laying the blame of the assassination
-upon Darius, prevailed upon Artaxerxes to avenge it by slaying
-the latter; he then attempted the life of Artaxerxes himself, but
-failed, and was himself killed, after carrying on the government
-a few months. Artaxerxes Longimanus, after reigning about forty
-years, left the sceptre to his son Xerxes the second, who was
-slain after a few months by his brother Sogdianus; who again was
-put to death after seven months, by a third brother Darius Nothus
-mentioned above.<a id="FNanchor_1"></a><a href="#Footnote_1"
-class="fnanchor">[1]</a></p> <p><span class="pagenum"><a
-id="Page_3">[p. 3]</a></span></p> <p>The wars between the Persian
-empire, and Athens as the head of the confederacy of Delos (477-449
-<small>B.C.</small>), have been already related in one of my
-earlier volumes. But the internal history of the Persian empire
-during these reigns is scarcely at all known to us; except a
-formidable revolt of the satrap Megabyzus, obscurely noticed in the
-Fragments of Ktesias.<a id="FNanchor_2"></a><a href="#Footnote_2"
-class="fnanchor">[2]</a> About 414 <small>B.C.</small> the
-Egyptians revolted. Their native prince Amyrtæus maintained his
-independence,—though probably in a part only, and not the whole,
-of that country,<a id="FNanchor_3"></a><a href="#Footnote_3"
-class="fnanchor">[3]</a>—and was succeeded by a native Egyptian
-dynasty for the space of sixty years. A revolt of the Medes, which
-took place in 408 <small>B.C.</small>, was put down by Darius, and
-subsequently a like revolt of the Kadusians.<a id="FNanchor_4"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_4" class="fnanchor">[4]</a> The peace concluded in
-449 <small>B.C.</small>, between Athens and the Persian empire,
-continued without open violation, until the ruinous catastrophe
-which befel the former near Syracuse, in 413 <small>B.C.</small>
-Yet there had been various communications and envoys from Sparta
-to the Persian court, endeavoring to procure aid from the Great
-King during the early years of the war; communications so confused
-and contradictory, that Artaxerxes (in a letter addressed to
-the Spartans, in 425 <small>B.C.</small>, and carried by his
-envoy Artaphernes who was captured by the Athenians), complained
-of being unable to understand what they meant,—no two Spartans
-telling the same story.<a id="FNanchor_5"></a><a href="#Footnote_5"
-class="fnanchor">[5]</a> It appears that Pissuthnes, satrap of
-Sardis, revolted from the Persian king, shortly after this period,
-and that Tissaphernes was sent by the Great King to suppress this
-revolt; in which having succeeded, by bribing the Grecian commander
-of the satrap’s mercenary troops, he was rewarded by the possession
-of the satrapy.<a id="FNanchor_6"></a><a href="#Footnote_6"
-class="fnanchor">[6]</a> We find <span class="pagenum"><a
-id="Page_4">[p. 4]</a></span>Tissaphernes satrap in the year 413
-<small>B.C.</small>, commencing operations jointly with the
-Spartans, for detaching the Asiatic allies from Athens, after her
-reverses in Sicily; and employing the Spartans successfully against
-Amorges, the revolted son of Pissuthnes, who occupied the strong
-maritime town of Iasus.<a id="FNanchor_7"></a><a href="#Footnote_7"
-class="fnanchor">[7]</a></p>
-
-<p>The increased vigor of Persian operations against Athens,
-after Cyrus, the younger son of Darius Nothus, came down to the
-Ionic coast in 407 <small>B.C.</small>, has been recounted in my
-preceding volume; together with the complete prostration of Athenian
-power, accomplished during the ensuing three years. Residing at
-Sardis and placed in active coöperation with Greeks, this ambitious
-and energetic young prince soon became penetrated with their
-superior military and political efficiency, as compared with the
-native Asiatics. For the abilities and character of Lysander, the
-Peloponnesian admiral, he contracted so much admiration, that, when
-summoned to court during the last illness of his father Darius
-in 405 <small>B.C.</small>, he even confided to that officer
-the whole of his tribute and treasure, to be administered in
-furtherance of the war;<a id="FNanchor_8"></a><a href="#Footnote_8"
-class="fnanchor">[8]</a> which during his absence was brought to a
-victorious close.</p>
-
-<p>Cyrus, born after the accession of his father to the throne, was
-not more than eighteen years of age when first sent down to Sardis
-(in 407 <small>B.C.</small>) as satrap of Lydia, Phrygia, and
-Kappadokia, and as commander of that Persian military division which
-mustered at the plain of Kastôlus; a command not including the Ionic
-Greeks on the seaboard, who were under the satrapy of Tissaphernes.<a
-id="FNanchor_9"></a><a href="#Footnote_9" class="fnanchor">[9]</a>
-We cannot place much confidence in the account which Xenophon gives
-of his education; that he had been brought up with his brother
-and many noble Persian youths in the royal palace,—under
-the strictest discipline and restraint, enforcing modest habits,
-with the reciprocal duties of obedience and command, upon all of
-them, and upon him with peculiar success.<a id="FNanchor_10"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_10" class="fnanchor">[10]</a> It is contradicted
-by all the realities which we read about the Persian court, and
-is a patch of Grecian rather than of Oriental sentiment, better
-suited to the romance of the Cyropædia that to the history of the
-Anabasis. But in the Persian accomplishments of horsemanship,<span
-class="pagenum"><a id="Page_5">[p. 5]</a></span> mastery of the bow
-and of the javelin, bravery in the field, daring as well as endurance
-in hunting wild beasts, and power of drinking much wine without
-being intoxicated,—Cyrus stood preeminent; and especially
-so when compared with his elder brother Artaxerxes, who was at
-least unwarlike, if not lazy and timid.<a id="FNanchor_11"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_11" class="fnanchor">[11]</a> And although the
-peculiar virtue of the Hellenic citizen,—competence for
-alternate command and obedience,—formed no part of the
-character of Cyrus, yet it appears that Hellenic affairs and ideas
-became early impressed upon his mind; insomuch that on first coming
-down to Sardis as satrap, he brought down with him strong interest
-for the Peloponnesian cause, and strenuous antipathy to that
-ancient enemy by whom the Persian arms had been so signally humbled
-and repressed. How zealously he coöperated with Lysander and the
-Peloponnesians in putting down Athens, has been shown in my last
-preceding volume.<a id="FNanchor_12"></a><a href="#Footnote_12"
-class="fnanchor">[12]</a></p>
-
-<p>An energetic and ambitious youth like Cyrus, having once learnt
-from personal experience to appreciate the Greeks, was not slow
-in divining the value of such auxiliaries as instruments of power
-to himself. To coöperate effectively in the war, it was necessary
-that he should act to a certain extent upon Grecian ideas, and
-conciliate the good will of the Ionic Greeks; so that he came
-to combine the imperious and unsparing despotism of a Persian
-prince, with something of the regularity and system belonging to
-a Grecian administrator. Though younger than Artaxerxes, he seems
-to have calculated from the first upon succeeding to the Persian
-crown at the death of his father. So undetermined was the law of
-succession in the Persian royal family, and so constant the dispute
-and fratricide on each vacancy of the throne, that such ambitious
-schemes would appear feasible to a young man of much less ardor
-than Cyrus. Moreover he was the favorite son of queen Parysatis,<a
-id="FNanchor_13"></a><a href="#Footnote_13" class="fnanchor">[13]</a>
-who greatly preferred him to his elder brother Artaxerxes. He was
-born after the accession of Darius to the throne, while Artaxerxes
-had been born prior to that event; and, as this latter consideration
-had been employed seventy years earlier by<span class="pagenum"><a
-id="Page_6">[p. 6]</a></span> queen Atossa<a id="FNanchor_14"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_14" class="fnanchor">[14]</a> in determining her
-husband Darius son of Hystaspes to declare (even during his lifetime)
-her son Xerxes as his intended successor, to the exclusion of an
-elder son by a different wife, and born before his accession,—so
-Cyrus, perhaps, anticipated the like effective preference to himself
-from the solicitations of Parysatis. Probably his hopes were farther
-inflamed by the fact that he bore the name of the great founder of
-the monarchy; whose memory every Persian reverenced. How completely
-he reckoned on becoming king, is shown by a cruel act performed about
-the early part of 405 <small>B.C.</small> It was required as a part
-of Persian etiquette that every man who came into the presence of the
-king should immerse his hands in certain pockets or large sleeves,
-which rendered them for the moment inapplicable to active use; but
-such deference was shown to no one except the king. Two first cousins
-of Cyrus,—sons of Hieramenês, (seemingly one of the satraps or high
-Persian dignitaries in Asia Minor), by a sister of Darius,—appeared
-in his presence without thus concealing their hands;<a
-id="FNanchor_15"></a><a href="#Footnote_15" class="fnanchor">[15]</a>
-upon which Cyrus ordered them both to be put to death. The father and
-mother preferred bitter complaints of this atrocity to Darius; who
-was induced to send for Cyrus to visit him in Media, on the ground,
-not at all fictitious, that his own health was rapidly declining.</p>
-
-<p>If Cyrus expected to succeed to the crown, it was important
-that he should be on the spot when his father died. He accordingly
-went up from Sardis to Media, along with his body guard of three
-hundred Greeks, under the Arcadian Xenias; who were so highly
-remunerated for this distant march, that the rate of pay was
-long celebrated.<a id="FNanchor_16"></a><a href="#Footnote_16"
-class="fnanchor">[16]</a> He also took with him Tissaphernes as an
-ostensible friend; though there seems to have been a real enmity
-between them. Not long after his arrival, Darius died; but without
-complying with the request of Parysatis that he should declare
-in<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_7">[p. 7]</a></span> favor of
-Cyrus as his successor. Accordingly Artaxerxes, being proclaimed
-king, went to Pasargadæ, the religious capital of the Persians, to
-perform the customary solemnities. Thus disappointed, Cyrus was
-farther accused by Tissaphernes of conspiring the death of his
-brother; who caused him to be seized, and was even on the point of
-putting him to death, when the all-powerful intercession of Parysatis
-saved his life.<a id="FNanchor_17"></a><a href="#Footnote_17"
-class="fnanchor">[17]</a> He was sent down to his former satrapy
-at Sardis, whither he returned with insupportable feelings of
-anger and wounded pride, and with a determined resolution to leave
-nothing untried for the purpose of dethroning his brother. This
-statement, given to us by Xenophon, represents doubtless the story
-of Cyrus and his friends, current among the Cyreian army. But if we
-look at the probabilities of the case, we shall be led to suspect
-that the charge of Tissaphernes may well have been true, and the
-conspiracy of the disappointed Cyrus against his brother, a reality
-instead of a fiction.<a id="FNanchor_18"></a><a href="#Footnote_18"
-class="fnanchor">[18]</a></p>
-
-<p>The moment when Cyrus returned to Sardis was highly favorable to
-his plans and preparations. The long war had just been concluded
-by the capture of Athens and the extinction of her power. Many
-Greeks, after having acquired military tastes and habits, were now
-thrown out of employment; many others were driven into exile, by
-the establishment of the Lysandrian Dekarchies throughout all the
-cities at once. Hence competent recruits, for a well-paid service
-like that of Cyrus, were now unusually abundant. Having already a
-certain number of Greek mercenaries, distributed throughout the
-various garrisons in his satrapy, he directed the officers in command
-to strengthen their garrisons by as many additional Peloponnesian
-soldiers as they could obtain. His pretext was,—first,
-defence against Tissaphernes, with whom, since the denunciation
-by the latter, he was at open war,—next, protection of the
-Ionic cities on the seaboard, who had been hitherto comprised under
-the government of Tissaphernes, but had now revolted of their own
-accord, since the enmity of Cyrus against him had been declared.
-Miletus alone had been prevented from executing this resolution,
-for Tissaphernes, reinforcing his garrison in that place, had
-adopted violent measures of repression, killing or banishing several
-of the leading men.<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_8">[p.
-8]</a></span> Cyrus, receiving these exiled Milesians with every
-demonstration of sympathy, immediately got together both an army
-and a fleet, under the Egyptian Tamos,<a id="FNanchor_19"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_19" class="fnanchor">[19]</a> to besiege Miletus
-by land and sea. He at the same time transmitted to court the
-regular tribute due from these maritime cities, and attempted,
-through the interest of his mother Parysatis, to procure that they
-should be transferred from Tissaphernes to himself. Hence the
-Great King was deluded into a belief that the new levies of Cyrus
-were only intended for private war between him and Tissaphernes;
-an event not uncommon between two neighboring satraps. Nor was it
-displeasing to the court that a suspected prince should be thus
-occupied at a distance.<a id="FNanchor_20"></a><a href="#Footnote_20"
-class="fnanchor">[20]</a></p>
-
-<p>Besides the army thus collected around Miletus, Cyrus found means
-to keep other troops within his call, though at a distance and
-unsuspected. A Lacedæmonian officer named Klearchus, of considerable
-military ability and experience, presented himself as an exile at
-Sardis. He appears to have been banished, (as far as we can judge
-amidst contradictory statements,) for gross abuse of authority, and
-extreme tyranny, as Lacedæmonian Harmost at Byzantium, and even for
-having tried to maintain himself in that place after the Ephors had
-formally dismissed him. The known efficiency, and restless warlike
-appetite of Klearchus,<a id="FNanchor_21"></a><a href="#Footnote_21"
-class="fnanchor">[21]</a> procured for him the confidence of Cyrus,
-who gave him the large sum of ten thousand Darics, (about £7600),
-which he employed in levying an army of mercenary Greeks for the
-defence of the Grecian cities in the Chersonese against the Thracian
-tribes in their neighborhood; thus maintaining the troops until<span
-class="pagenum"><a id="Page_9">[p. 9]</a></span> they were required
-by Cyrus. Again, Aristippus and Menon,—Thessalians of
-the great family of the Aleuadæ at Larissa, who had maintained
-their tie of personal hospitality with the Persian royal family
-ever since the time of Xerxes, and were now in connection
-with Cyrus,<a id="FNanchor_22"></a><a href="#Footnote_22"
-class="fnanchor">[22]</a>—received from him funds to maintain
-a force of two thousand mercenaries for their political purposes in
-Thessaly, subject to his call whenever he should require them. Other
-Greeks, too, who had probably contracted similar ties of hospitality
-with Cyrus by service during the late war,—Proxenus, a
-Bœotian; Agias and Sophænetus, Arcadians; Sokrates, an Achæan,
-etc.,—were also empowered by him to collect mercenary soldiers.
-His pretended objects were, partly the siege of Miletus; partly
-an ostensible expedition against the Pisidians,—warlike and
-predatory mountaineers who did much mischief from their fastnesses in
-the south-east of Asia Minor.</p>
-
-<p>Besides these unavowed Grecian levies, Cyrus sent envoys
-to the Lacedæmonians to invoke their aid, in requital for the
-strenuous manner in which he had seconded their operations against
-Athens,—and received a favorable answer. He farther got
-together a considerable native force, taking great pains to
-conciliate friends as well as to inspire confidence. “He was
-straightforward and just, like a candidate for command,”—to
-use the expression of Herodotus respecting the Median Dëiokês;<a
-id="FNanchor_23"></a><a href="#Footnote_23" class="fnanchor">[23]</a>
-maintaining order and security throughout his satrapy, and punishing
-evil doers in great numbers, with the utmost extremity of rigor;
-of which the public roads exhibited abundant living testimony,
-in the persons of mutilated men, deprived of their hands, feet,
-or eyesight.<a id="FNanchor_24"></a><a href="#Footnote_24"
-class="fnanchor">[24]</a> But he was also exact in rewarding faithful
-service,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_10">[p. 10]</a></span>
-both civil and military. He not only made various expeditions
-against the hostile Mysians and Pisidians, but was forward in
-exposing his own person, and munificent, rewarding the zeal of all
-soldiers who distinguished themselves. He attached men to his person
-both by a winning demeanor and by seasonable gifts. As it was the
-uniform custom, (and is still the custom in the East), for every
-one who approached Cyrus to come with a present in his hand,<a
-id="FNanchor_25"></a><a href="#Footnote_25" class="fnanchor">[25]</a>
-so he usually gave away again these presents as marks of distinction
-to others. Hence he not only acquired the attachment of all in his
-own service, but also of those Persians whom Artaxerxes sent down on
-various pretences for the purpose of observing his motions. Of these
-emissaries from Susa, some were even sent to obstruct and enfeeble
-him. It was under such orders that a Persian named Orontes, governor
-of Sardis, acted, in levying open war against Cyrus; who twice
-subdued him, and twice pardoned him, on solemn assurance of fidelity
-for the future.<a id="FNanchor_26"></a><a href="#Footnote_26"
-class="fnanchor">[26]</a> In all agreements, even with avowed
-enemies, Cyrus kept faith exactly; so that his word was trusted by
-every one.</p>
-
-<p>Of such virtues, (rare in an Oriental ruler, either ancient
-or<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_11">[p. 11]</a></span>
-modern,)—and of such secret preparations,—Cyrus sought to reap the
-fruits at the beginning of 401 <small>B.C.</small> Xenias, his
-general at home, brought together all the garrisons, leaving a
-bare sufficiency for defence of the towns. Klearchus, Menon, and
-the other Greek generals were recalled, and the siege of Miletus
-was relinquished; so that there was concentrated at Sardis a
-body of seven thousand seven hundred Grecian hoplites, with five
-hundred light armed.<a id="FNanchor_27"></a><a href="#Footnote_27"
-class="fnanchor">[27]</a> Others afterwards joined on the march,
-and there was, besides, a native army of about one hundred
-thousand men. With such means Cyrus set forth, (March or April,
-401 <small>B.C.</small>), from Sardis. His real purpose was kept
-secret; his ostensible purpose, as proclaimed and understood
-by every one except himself and Klearchus, was to conquer and
-root out the Pisidian mountaineers. A joint Lacedæmonian and
-Persian fleet, under the Lacedæmonian admiral Samius, at the
-same time coasted round the south of Asia Minor, in order to
-lend coöperation from the sea-side.<a id="FNanchor_28"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_28" class="fnanchor">[28]</a> This Lacedæmonian
-coöperation passed for a private levy effected by Cyrus himself;
-for the ephors would not formally avow hostility against the
-Great King.<a id="FNanchor_29"></a><a href="#Footnote_29"
-class="fnanchor">[29]</a></p>
-
-<p>The body of Greeks, immortalized under the name of the Ten
-Thousand, who were thus preparing to plunge into so many unexpected
-perils,—though embarking on a foreign mercenary service, were
-by no means outcasts, or even men of extreme poverty. They were for
-the most part persons of established position, and not a few even
-opulent. Half of them were Acadians or Achæans.</p>
-
-<p>Such was the reputation of Cyrus for honorable and munificent
-dealing, that many young men of good family had run away from
-their fathers and mothers; others of mature age had been tempted
-to leave their wives and children; and there were even some who
-had embarked their own money in advance of outfit for other
-poorer men, as well as for themselves.<a id="FNanchor_30"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_30" class="fnanchor">[30]</a> All calculated on a
-year’s<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_12">[p. 12]</a></span>
-campaign in Pisidia; which might perhaps be hard, but would
-certainly be lucrative, and would enable them to return with
-a well-furnished purse. So the Greek commanders at Sardis all
-confidently assured them; extolling, with the emphasis and eloquence
-suitable to recruiting officers, both the liberality of Cyrus<a
-id="FNanchor_31"></a><a href="#Footnote_31" class="fnanchor">[31]</a>
-and the abundant promise of all men of enterprise.</p>
-
-<p>Among others, the Bœotian Proxenus wrote to his friend Xenophon,
-at Athens, pressing him strongly to come to Sardis, and offering
-to present him to Cyrus, whom he, (Proxenus,) “considered as a
-better friend to him than his own country;<a id="FNanchor_32"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_32" class="fnanchor">[32]</a>” a striking evidence of
-the manner in which such foreign mercenary service overlaid Grecian
-patriotism, which we shall recognize more and more as we advance
-forward. This able and accomplished Athenian,—entitled to
-respectful gratitude, not indeed from Athens his country, but from
-the Cyreian army and the intellectual world generally,—was
-one of the class of Knights or Horsemen, and is said to have served
-in that capacity at the battle of Delium.<a id="FNanchor_33"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_33" class="fnanchor">[33]</a> Of his previous life
-we know little or nothing, except that he was an attached friend and
-diligent hearer of Sokrates; the memorials of whose conversation we
-chiefly derive from his pen, as we also derive the narrative of the
-Cyreian march. In my last preceding chapter on Sokrates, I have made
-ample use of the Memorabilia of Xenophon; and I am now about to draw
-from his Anabasis (a model of perspicuous and interesting narrative)
-the account of the adventures of the Cyreian army, which we are
-fortunate in knowing from so authentic a source.</p>
-
-<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_13">[p. 13]</a></span></p>
-
-<p>On receiving the invitation from Proxenus, Xenophon felt much
-inclined to comply. To a member of that class of Knights, which
-three years before had been the mainstay of the atrocities of the
-Thirty, (how far he was personally concerned, we cannot say,)
-it is probable that residence in Athens was in those times not
-peculiarly agreeable to him. He asked the opinion of Sokrates; who,
-apprehensive lest service under Cyrus, the bitter enemy of Athens,
-might expose him to unpopularity with his countrymen, recommended an
-application to the Delphian oracle. Thither Xenophon went; but in
-truth he had already made up his mind beforehand. So that instead
-of asking, “whether he ought to go or refuse,”—he simply put
-the question, “To which of the gods must I sacrifice, in order to
-obtain safety and success in a journey which I am now meditating?”
-The reply of the oracle,—indicating Zeus Basileus as the god
-to whom sacrifice was proper,—was brought back by Xenophon;
-upon which Sokrates, though displeased that the question had not
-been fairly put as to the whole project, nevertheless advised, since
-an answer had now been given, that it should be literally obeyed.
-Accordingly Xenophon, having offered the sacrifices prescribed, took
-his departure first to Ephesus and thence to Sardis, where he found
-the army about to set forth. Proxenus presented him to Cyrus, who
-entreated him earnestly to take service, promising to dismiss him
-as soon as the campaign against the Pisidians should be finished.<a
-id="FNanchor_34"></a><a href="#Footnote_34" class="fnanchor">[34]</a>
-He was thus induced to stay, yet only as a volunteer or friend of
-Proxenus, without accepting any special post in the army, either as
-officer or soldier. There is no reason to believe that his service
-under Cyrus had actually the effect apprehended by Sokrates, of
-rendering him unpopular at Athens. For though he was afterwards
-banished, this sentence was not passed against him until after the
-battle of Korôneia in 394 <small>B.C.</small>, where he was in arms
-as a conspicuous officer under Agesilaus, against his own countrymen
-and their Theban allies,—nor need we look farther back for the
-grounds of the sentence.</p>
-
-<p>Though Artaxerxes, entertaining general suspicions of his
-brother’s ambitious views, had sent down various persons to watch
-him, yet Cyrus had contrived to gain or neutralize these spies,
-and<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_14">[p. 14]</a></span>
-had masked his preparations so skilfully, that no intimation
-was conveyed to Susa until the march was about to commence. It
-was only then that Tissaphernes, seeing the siege of Miletus
-relinquished, and the vast force mustering at Sardis, divined
-that something more was meant than the mere conquest of Pisidian
-freebooters, and went up in person to warn the king; who began his
-preparations forthwith.<a id="FNanchor_35"></a><a href="#Footnote_35"
-class="fnanchor">[35]</a> That which Tissaphernes had divined was
-yet a secret to every man in the army, to Proxenus as well as the
-rest,—when Cyrus, having confided the provisional management
-of his satrapy to some Persian kinsmen, and to his admiral the
-Egyptian Tamos, commenced his march in a south-easterly direction
-from Sardis, through Lydia and Phrygia.<a id="FNanchor_36"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_36" class="fnanchor">[36]</a> Three days’ march, a
-distance stated at twenty-two parasangs,<a id="FNanchor_37"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_37" class="fnanchor">[37]</a> brought him to<span
-class="pagenum"><a id="Page_15">[p. 15]</a></span> the Mæander; one
-additional march of eight parasangs, after crossing that river,
-forwarded him to Kolossæ, a flourishing city<span class="pagenum"><a
-id="Page_16">[p. 16]</a></span> in Phrygia, where Menon overtook
-him with a reinforcement of one thousand hoplites, and five hundred
-peltasts,—Dolopes, Ænianes, and Olynthians. He then marched
-three days onward to Kelænæ, another Phrygian city, “great and
-flourishing,” with a citadel very strong both by nature and art.
-Here he halted no less than thirty days, in order to await the
-arrival of Klearchus, with his division of one thousand hoplites,
-eight hundred Thracian peltasts, and two hundred Kretan bowmen; at
-the same time Sophænetus arrived with one thousand farther hoplites,
-and Sosias with three hundred. This total of Greeks was reviewed
-by<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_17">[p. 17]</a></span> Cyrus
-in one united body at Kelænæ; eleven thousand hoplites and two
-thousand peltasts.<a id="FNanchor_38"></a><a href="#Footnote_38"
-class="fnanchor">[38]</a></p>
-
-<p>As far as Kelænæ, his march had been directed straight towards
-Pisidia, near the borders of which territory that city is situated.
-So far, therefore, the fiction with which he started was kept up.
-But on leaving Kelænæ, he turned his march away from Pisidia, in
-a direction nearly northward; first in two days, ten parasangs,
-to the town of Peltæ; next in two days farther, twelve parasangs,
-to Keramôn-Agora, the last city in the district adjoining Mysia.
-At Peltæ, in a halt of three days, the Arcadian general Xenias
-celebrated the great festival of his country, the Lykæa, with
-its usual games and matches, in the presence of Cyrus. From
-Keramôn-Agora, Cyrus marched in three days the unusual distance of
-thirty parasangs,<a id="FNanchor_39"></a><a href="#Footnote_39"
-class="fnanchor">[39]</a> to a city called Käystru-Pedion, (the
-plain<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_18">[p. 18]</a></span>
-of Käystrus), where he halted for five days. Here his repose was
-disturbed by the murmurs of the Greek soldiers, who had received no
-pay for three months, (Xenophon had before told us that they were
-mostly men who had some means of their own), and who now flocked
-around his tent to press for their arrears. So impoverished was
-Cyrus by previous disbursements,—perhaps also by remissions of
-tribute for the purpose of popularizing himself,—that he was
-utterly without money, and was obliged to put them off again with
-promises. And his march might well have ended here, had he not been
-rescued from embarrassment by the arrival of Epyaxa, wife of the
-Kilikian prince Syennesis, who brought to him a large sum of money,
-and enabled him to give to the Greek soldiers four months’ pay at
-once. As to the Asiatic soldiers, it is probable that they received
-little beyond their maintenance.</p>
-
-<p>Two ensuing days of march, still through Phrygia, brought the
-army to Thymbrium; two more to Tyriæum. Each day’s march is called
-five parasangs<a id="FNanchor_40"></a><a href="#Footnote_40"
-class="fnanchor">[40]</a>. It was here that Cyrus, halting three
-days, passed the army in review, to gratify the Kilikian princess
-Epyaxa, who was still accompanying the march. His Asiatic troops
-were first made to march in order before him, cavalry and infantry
-in their separate divisions; after which he himself in a chariot,
-and Epyaxa in a Harmamaxa, (a sort of carriage or litter covered
-with an awning which opened or shut at pleasure), passed all along
-the front of the Greek line, drawn up separately. The hoplites were
-marshalled four deep, all in their best trim; brazen helmets, purple
-tunics, greaves or leggings, and the shields rubbed bright, just
-taken out of the wrappers in which they were<span class="pagenum"><a
-id="Page_19">[p. 19]</a></span> carried during a mere march.<a
-id="FNanchor_41"></a><a href="#Footnote_41" class="fnanchor">[41]</a>
-Klearchus commanded on the left, and Menon on the right; the other
-generals being distributed in the centre. Having completed his review
-along the whole line, and taken a station with the Kilikian princess
-at a certain distance in front of it, Cyrus sent his interpreter to
-the generals, and desired that he might see them charge. Accordingly,
-the orders were given, the spears were protended, the trumpets
-sounded, and the whole Greek force moved forward in battle array with
-the usual shouts. As they advanced, the pace became accelerated, and
-they made straight against the victualling portion of the Asiatic
-encampment. Such was the terror occasioned by the sight, that all
-the Asiatics fled forthwith, abandoning their property,—Epyaxa
-herself among the first, quitting her palanquin. Though she had
-among her personal guards some Greeks from Aspendus, she had never
-before seen a Grecian army, and was amazed as well as terrified;
-much to the satisfaction of Cyrus, who saw in the scene an augury of
-his coming success.<a id="FNanchor_42"></a><a href="#Footnote_42"
-class="fnanchor">[42]</a></p>
-
-<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_20">[p. 20]</a></span></p>
-
-<p>Three days of farther march, (called twenty parasangs in all)
-brought the army to Ikonium, (now Konieh), the extreme city of
-Phrygia; where Cyrus halted three days. He then marched for five
-days (thirty parasangs) through Lykaonia; which country, as being
-out of his own satrapy, and even hostile, he allowed the Greeks
-to plunder. Lykaonia being immediately on the borders of Pisidia,
-its inhabitants were probably reckoned as Pisidians, since they
-were of the like predatory character:<a id="FNanchor_43"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_43" class="fnanchor">[43]</a> so that Cyrus would
-be partially realizing the pretended purpose of his expedition. He
-thus, too, approached near to Mount Taurus, which separated him
-from Kilikia; and he here sent the Kilikian princess, together with
-Menon and his division, over the mountain, by a pass shorter and
-more direct, but seemingly little frequented, and too difficult
-for the whole army; in order that they might thus get straight
-into Kilikia,<a id="FNanchor_44"></a><a href="#Footnote_44"
-class="fnanchor">[44]</a> in the rear of Syennesis, who was occupying
-the regular pass more to the northward. Intending to enter with his
-main body through this latter pass, Cyrus first proceeded through
-Kappadokia (four days’ march, twenty-five parasangs) to Dana or
-Tyana, a flourishing city of Kappadokia; where he halted three days,
-and where he put to death two Persian officers, on a charge of
-conspiring against him.<a id="FNanchor_45"></a><a href="#Footnote_45"
-class="fnanchor">[45]</a></p>
-
-<p>This regular pass over Taurus, the celebrated Tauri-Pylæ or
-Kilikian Gates, was occupied by Syennesis. Though a road fit for
-vehicles, it was yet three thousand six hundred feet above the level
-of the sea, narrow, steep, bordered by high ground on each side, and
-crossed by a wall with gates, so that it could not be forced if ever
-so moderately defended.<a id="FNanchor_46"></a><a href="#Footnote_46"
-class="fnanchor">[46]</a> But the Kilikian prince,<span
-class="pagenum"><a id="Page_21">[p. 21]</a></span> alarmed at the
-news that Menon had already crossed the mountains by the less
-frequented pass to his rear, and that the fleet of Cyrus was sailing
-along the coast, evacuated his own impregnable position, and fell
-back to Tarsus; from whence he again retired, accompanied by most
-of the inhabitants, to an inaccessible fastness on the mountains.
-Accordingly Cyrus, ascending without opposition the great pass thus
-abandoned, reached Tarsus after a march of four days, there rejoining
-Menon and Epyaxa. Two lochi or companies of the division of Menon,
-having dispersed on their march for pillage, had been cut off by the
-natives; for which the main body of Greeks now took their revenge,
-plundering both the city and the palace of Syennesis. That prince,
-though invited by Cyrus to come back to Tarsus, at first refused,
-but was at length prevailed upon by the persuasions of his wife, to
-return under a safe conduct. He was induced to contract an alliance,
-to exchange presents with Cyrus, and to give him a large sum of money
-towards his expedition, together with a contingent of troops; in
-return for which it was stipulated that Kilikia should be no farther
-plundered, and that the slaves taken away might be recovered wherever
-they were found.<a id="FNanchor_47"></a><a href="#Footnote_47"
-class="fnanchor">[47]</a></p>
-
-<p>It seems evident, though Xenophon does not directly tell us so,
-that the resistance of Syennesis, (this was a standing name or title
-of the hereditary princes of Kilikia under the Persian crown), was a
-mere feint; that the visit of Epyaxa with a supply of money to Cyrus,
-and the admission of Menon and his division over Mount Taurus, were
-manœuvres in collusion with him; and that, thinking Cyrus would be
-successful, he was disposed to support his cause, yet careful at the
-same time to give himself the air of having been overpowered, in
-case Artaxerxes should prove victorious.<a id="FNanchor_48"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_48" class="fnanchor">[48]</a></p> <p><span
-class="pagenum"><a id="Page_22">[p. 22]</a></span></p> <p>At
-first, however, it appeared as if the march of Cyrus was destined
-to finish at Tarsus, where he was obliged to remain twenty days.
-The army had already passed by Pisidia, the ostensible purpose of
-the expedition, for which the Grecian troops had been engaged; not
-one of them, either officer or soldier, suspecting anything to the
-contrary, except Klearchus, who was in the secret. But all now saw
-that they had been imposed upon, and found out that they were to
-be conducted against the Persian king. Besides the resentment at
-such delusion, they shrunk from the risk altogether; not from any
-fear of Persian armies, but from the terrors of a march of three
-months inward from the coast, and the impossibility of return,
-which had so powerfully affected the Spartan King Kleomenes,<a
-name="FNanchor_49" id="FNanchor_49"></a><a href="#Footnote_49"
-class="fnanchor">[49]</a> a century before; most of them being (as
-I have before remarked) men of decent position and family in their
-respective cities. Accordingly they proclaimed their determination
-to advance no farther, as they had not been engaged to fight against
-the Great King.<a id="FNanchor_50"></a><a href="#Footnote_50"
-class="fnanchor">[50]</a></p>
-
-<p>Among the Grecian officers, each (Klearchus, Proxenus, Menon,
-Xenias, etc.) commanded his own separate division, without any
-generalissimo except Cyrus himself. Each of them probably sympathized
-more or less in the resentment as well as in the repugnance of the
-soldiers. But Klearchus, an exile and a mercenary by profession, was
-doubtless prepared for this mutiny, and had assured Cyrus that it
-might be overcome. That such a man as Klearchus could be tolerated
-as a commander of free and non-professional soldiers, is a proof
-of the great susceptibility of the Greek hoplites for military
-discipline. For though he had great military merits, being brave,
-resolute, and full of resource in the hour of danger, provident for
-the subsistence of his soldiers, and unshrinking against fatigue and
-hardship,—yet his look and manner were harsh, his punishments
-were perpetual as well as cruel, and he neither tried nor cared to
-conciliate his soldiers; who accordingly stayed with him, and were
-remarkable for exactness of discipline, so long as political orders
-required them,—but<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_23">[p.
-23]</a></span> preferred service under other commanders, when they
-could obtain it.<a id="FNanchor_51"></a><a href="#Footnote_51"
-class="fnanchor">[51]</a> Finding his orders to march forward
-disobeyed, Klearchus proceeded at once in his usual manner to enforce
-and punish. But he found resistance universal; he himself with the
-cattle who carried his baggage, was pelted when he began to move
-forward, and narrowly escaped with his life. Thus disappointed in his
-attempt at coercion, he was compelled to convene the soldiers in a
-regular assembly, and to essay persuasion.</p>
-
-<p>On first appearing before the assembled soldiers, this harsh and
-imperious officer stood for a long time silent, and even weeping; a
-remarkable point in Grecian manners,—and exceedingly impressive
-to the soldiers, who looked on him with surprise and in silence. At
-length he addressed them: “Be not astonished, soldiers, to see me
-deeply mortified. Cyrus has been my friend and benefactor. It was
-he who sheltered me as an exile, and gave me ten thousand Darics,
-which I expended not on my own profit or pleasure, but upon you,
-and in defence of Grecian interests in the Chersonese against
-Thracian depredators. When Cyrus invited me, I came to him along
-with you, in order to make him the best return in my power for
-his past kindness. But now, since you will no longer march along
-with me, I am under the necessity either of renouncing you or of
-breaking faith with him. Whether I am doing right or not, I cannot
-say; but I shall stand by you, and share your fate. No one shall say
-of me that, having conducted Greek troops into a foreign land, I
-betrayed the Greeks and chose the foreigner. You are to me country,
-friends, allies; while you are with me, I can help a friend, and
-repel an enemy. Understand me well; I shall go wherever you go, and
-partake your fortune.”<a id="FNanchor_52"></a><a href="#Footnote_52"
-class="fnanchor">[52]</a></p>
-
-<p>This speech, and the distinct declaration of Klearchus that he
-would not march forward against the King, was heard by the soldiers
-with much delight; in which those of the other Greek divisions
-sympathized, especially as none of the other Greek commanders had
-yet announced a similar resolution. So strong was this feeling among
-the soldiers of Xenias and Pasion, that two<span class="pagenum"><a
-id="Page_24">[p. 24]</a></span> thousand of them left their
-commanders, coming over forthwith, with arms and baggage, to the
-encampment of Klearchus.</p>
-
-<p>Meanwhile Cyrus himself, dismayed at the resistance encountered,
-sent to desire an interview with Klearchus. But the latter, knowing
-well the game that he was playing, refused to obey the summons. He,
-however, at the same time despatched a secret message to encourage
-Cyrus with the assurance that everything would come right at
-last,—and to desire farther that fresh invitations might be
-sent, in order that he (Klearchus) might answer by fresh refusals.
-He then again convened in assembly both his own soldiers and those
-who had recently deserted Xenias to join him. “Soldiers (said he), we
-must recollect that we have now broken with Cyrus. We are no longer
-his soldiers, nor he our paymaster; moreover, I know that he thinks
-we have wronged him,—so that I am both afraid and ashamed to go
-near him. He is a good friend,—but a formidable enemy; and has
-a powerful force of his own, which all of you see near at hand. This
-is no time for us to slumber. We must take careful counsel whether
-to stay or go; and if we go, how to get away in safety, as well as
-to obtain provisions. I shall be glad to hear what any man has to
-suggest.”</p>
-
-<p>Instead of the peremptory tone habitual with Klearchus, the troops
-found themselves now, for the first time, not merely released from
-his command, but deprived of his advice. Some soldiers addressed the
-assembly, proposing various measures suitable to the emergency; but
-their propositions were opposed by other speakers, who, privately
-instigated by Klearchus himself, set forth the difficulties either
-of staying or departing. One among these secret partisans of the
-commander even affected to take the opposite side, and to be
-impatient for immediate departure. “If Klearchus does not choose to
-conduct us back (said this speaker) let us immediately elect other
-generals, buy provisions, get ready to depart, and then send to ask
-Cyrus for merchant-vessels,—or at any rate for guides in our
-return march by land. If he refuses both these requests, we must
-put ourselves in marching order, to fight our way back; sending
-forward a detachment without delay to occupy the passes.” Klearchus
-here interposed to say, that as for himself, it was impossible for
-him to continue in command; but he would faithfully obey any other
-commander<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_25">[p. 25]</a></span>
-who might be elected. He was followed by another speaker, who
-demonstrated the absurdity of going and asking Cyrus, either for a
-guide, or for ships, at the very moment when they were frustrating
-his projects. How could he be expected to assist them in getting
-away? Who could trust either his ships or his guides? On the other
-hand, to depart without his knowledge or concurrence was impossible.
-The proper course would be to send a deputation to him, consisting
-of others along with Klearchus, to ask what it was that he really
-wanted; which no one yet knew. His answer to the question should
-be reported to the meeting, in order that they might take their
-resolution accordingly.</p>
-
-<p>To this proposition the soldiers acceded; for it was but too plain
-that retreat was no easy matter. The deputation went to put the
-question to Cyrus; who replied that his real purpose was to attack
-his enemy Abrokomas, who was on the river Euphrates, twelve days’
-march onward. If he found Abrokomas there, he would punish him as he
-deserved. If, on the other hand, Abrokomas had fled, they might again
-consult what step was fit to be taken.</p>
-
-<p>The soldiers, on hearing this, suspected it to be a deception,
-but nevertheless acquiesced, not knowing what else to do. They
-required only an increase of pay. Not a word was said about
-the Great King, or the expedition against him. Cyrus granted
-increased pay of fifty per cent. upon the previous rate. Instead
-of one daric per month to each soldier, he agreed to give a
-daric and a half.<a id="FNanchor_53"></a><a href="#Footnote_53"
-class="fnanchor">[53]</a></p>
-
-<p>This remarkable scene at Tarsus illustrates the character of the
-Greek citizen-soldier. What is chiefly to be noted, is, the appeal
-made to their reason and judgment,—the habit, established more
-or less throughout so large a portion of the Grecian world, and
-attaining its maximum at Athens, of hearing both sides and deciding
-afterwards. The soldiers are indignant, justly and naturally, at the
-fraud practised upon them. But instead of surrendering themselves
-to this impulse arising out of the past, they are brought to look
-at the actualities of the present, and take measure of what is best
-to be done for the future. To return back from the place where they
-stood, against the wish of<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_26">[p.
-26]</a></span> Cyrus, was an enterprise so full of difficulty and
-danger, that the decision to which they came was recommended by the
-best considerations of reason. To go on was the least dangerous
-course of the two, besides its chances of unmeasured reward.</p>
-
-<p>As the remaining Greek officers and soldiers followed the example
-of Klearchus and his division, the whole army marched forward from
-Tarsus, and reached Issus, the extreme city of Kilikia, in five days’
-march,—crossing the rivers Sarus<a id="FNanchor_54"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_54" class="fnanchor">[54]</a> and Pyramus. At Issus,
-a flourishing and commercial port in the angle of the Gulf so called,
-Cyrus was joined by his fleet of fifty triremes,—thirty-five
-Lacedæmonian and twenty-five Persian triremes; bringing a
-reinforcement of seven hundred hoplites, under the command of the
-Lacedæmonian Cheirisophus, said to have been despatched by the
-Spartan Ephors.<a id="FNanchor_55"></a><a href="#Footnote_55"
-class="fnanchor">[55]</a> He also received a farther reinforcement
-of four hundred Grecian soldiers; making the total of Greeks in
-his army fourteen thousand, from which<span class="pagenum"><a
-id="Page_27">[p. 27]</a></span> are to be deducted the one hundred
-soldiers of Menon’s division, slain in Kilikia.</p>
-
-<p>The arrival of this last body of four hundred men was a fact of
-some importance. They had hitherto been in the service of Abrokomas
-(the Persian general commanding a vast force, said to be three
-hundred thousand men, for the king, in Phœnicia and Syria), from whom
-they now deserted to Cyrus. Such desertion was at once the proof of
-their reluctance to fight against the great body of their countrymen
-marching upwards, and of the general discouragement reigning
-amidst the king’s army. So great, indeed, was that discouragement,
-that Abrokomas now fled from the Syrian coast into the interior;
-abandoning three defensible positions in succession—1. The
-Gates of Kilikia and Syria. 2. The pass of Beilan over Mount Amanus.
-3. The passage of the Euphrates.—He appears to have been
-alarmed by the easy passage of Cyrus from Kappadokia into Kilikia,
-and still more, probably, by the evident collusion of Syennesis
-with the invader.<a id="FNanchor_56"></a><a href="#Footnote_56"
-class="fnanchor">[56]</a></p>
-
-<p>Cyrus had expected to find the gates of Kilikia and Syria
-stoutly defended, and had provided for this emergency by bringing
-up his fleet to Issus, in order that he might be able to transport
-a division by sea to the rear of the defenders. The pass was at
-one day’s march from Issus. It was a narrow road for the length of
-near half a mile, between the sea on one side and the steep cliffs
-terminating mount Amanus on the other. The two entrances, on the side
-of Kilikia as well as on that of Syria, were both closed by walls
-and gates; midway between the two the river Kersus broke out from
-the mountains and flowed into the sea. No army could force this pass
-against defenders; but the possession of the fleet doubtless enabled
-an assailant to turn it. Cyrus was overjoyed to find it undefended.<a
-id="FNanchor_57"></a><a href="#Footnote_57" class="fnanchor">[57]</a>
-And here we cannot but notice the superior ability and forethought
-of Cyrus as compared with the other Persians opposed to him. He had
-looked at this as well as at the other difficulties of his march,
-beforehand, and had provided the means of meeting them; whereas,
-on the king’s side, all the numerous means and opportunities of
-defence are successively<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_28">[p.
-28]</a></span> abandoned; the Persians have no confidence, except in
-vast numbers,—or when numbers fail, in treachery.</p>
-
-<p>Five parasangs, or one day’s march from this pass, Cyrus reached
-the Phœnician maritime town of Myriandrus; a place of great
-commerce, with its harbor full of merchantmen. While he rested
-here seven days, his two generals Xenias and Pasion deserted him;
-privately engaging a merchant vessel to carry them away with their
-property. They could not brook the wrong which Cyrus had done them
-in permitting Klearchus to retain under his command those soldiers
-who had deserted them at Tarsus, at the time when the latter played
-off his deceitful manœuvre. Perhaps the men who had thus deserted
-may have been unwilling to return to their original commanders,
-after having taken so offensive a step. And this may partly account
-for the policy of Cyrus in sanctioning what Xenias and Pasion could
-not but feel as a great wrong, in which a large portion of the army
-sympathized. The general belief among the soldiers was, that Cyrus
-would immediately despatch some triremes to overtake and bring
-back the fugitives. But instead of this, he summoned the remaining
-generals, and after communicating to them the fact that Xenias and
-Pasion were gone, added,—“I have plenty of triremes to overtake
-their merchantmen if I chose, and to bring them back. But I will
-do no such thing. No one shall say of me, that I make use of a man
-while he is with me,—and afterwards seize, rob, or ill-use
-him, when he wishes to depart. Nay, I have their wives and children
-under guard as hostages, at Tralles;<a id="FNanchor_58"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_58" class="fnanchor">[58]</a> but even these shall
-be given up to them, in consideration of their good behavior down
-to the present day. Let them go if they choose, with the full
-knowledge that they behave worse towards me than I towards them.”
-This behavior, alike judicious and conciliating, was universally
-admired, and produced the best possible effect upon the spirits
-of the army; imparting a confidence in Cyrus which did much to
-outweigh the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_29">[p. 29]</a></span>
-prevailing discouragement, in the unknown march upon which they
-were entering.<a id="FNanchor_59"></a><a href="#Footnote_59"
-class="fnanchor">[59]</a></p>
-
-<p>At Myriandrus Cyrus finally quitted the sea, sending back
-his fleet,<a id="FNanchor_60"></a><a href="#Footnote_60"
-class="fnanchor">[60]</a> and striking with his land-force eastward
-into the interior. For this purpose it was necessary first to cross
-mount Amanus, by the pass of Beilan; an eminently difficult road,
-which he was fortunate enough to find open, though Abrokomas might
-easily have defended it, if he had chosen.<a id="FNanchor_61"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_61" class="fnanchor">[61]</a> Four days’ march
-brought the army to the Chalus (perhaps the river of Aleppo),
-full of fish held sacred by the neighboring inhabitants; five
-more days, to the sources of the river Daradax, with the palace
-and park of the Syrian satrap Belesys; three days farther, to
-Thapsakus on the Euphrates. This was a great and flourishing town,
-a centre of commerce enriched by the important ford or transit of
-the river Euphrates close to it, in latitude about 35° 40′ N.<a
-id="FNanchor_62"></a><a href="#Footnote_62" class="fnanchor">[62]</a>
-The river,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_30">[p. 30]</a></span>
-when the Cyreians arrived, was four stadia, or somewhat less than
-half an English mile, in breadth.</p>
-
-<p>Cyrus remained at Thapsakus five days. He was now compelled
-formally to make known to his soldiers the real object of the
-march, hitherto, in name at least, disguised. He accordingly sent
-for the Greek generals, and desired them to communicate publicly
-the fact, that he was on the advance to Babylon against his
-brother,—which to themselves, probably, had been for some time
-well known. Among the soldiers, however, the first announcement
-excited loud murmurs, accompanied by accusation against the generals,
-of having betrayed them, in privity with Cyrus. But this outburst
-was very different to the strenuous repugnance which they had before
-manifested at Tarsus. Evidently they suspected, and had almost made
-up their minds to, the real truth; so that their complaint was soon
-converted into a demand for a donation to each man, as soon as they
-should reach Babylon; as much as that which Cyrus had given to his
-Grecian detachment on going up thither before. Cyrus willingly
-promised them five minæ per head (about £19 5<i>s.</i>), equal to more
-than a year’s pay, at the rate recently stipulated of a daric and a
-half per month. He engaged to give them, besides, the full rate of
-pay until they should have been sent back to the Ionian coast. Such
-ample offers satisfied the Greeks, and served to counterbalance at
-least, if not to efface, the terrors of that unknown region which
-they were about to tread.</p>
-
-<p>But before the general body of Greek soldiers had pronounced
-their formal acquiescence, Menon with his separate division was
-already in the water, crossing. For Menon had instigated his men to
-decide separately for themselves, and to execute their decision,
-before the others had given any answer. “By acting thus (said he)
-you will confer special obligation on Cyrus, and earn corresponding
-reward. If the others follow you across, he will suppose<span
-class="pagenum"><a id="Page_31">[p. 31]</a></span> that they do so
-because you have set the example. If, on the contrary, the others
-should refuse, we shall all be obliged to retreat: but he will
-never forget that you, separately taken, have done all that you
-could for him.” Such breach of communion, and avidity for separate
-gain, at a time when it vitally concerned all the Greek soldiers to
-act in harmony with each other, was a step suitable to the selfish
-and treacherous character of Menon. He gained his point, however,
-completely; for Cyrus, on learning that the Greek troops had actually
-crossed, despatched Glus the interpreter to express to them his
-warmest thanks, and to assure them that he would never forget the
-obligation; while at the same time, he sent underhand large presents
-to Menon separately.<a id="FNanchor_63"></a><a href="#Footnote_63"
-class="fnanchor">[63]</a> He passed with his whole army immediately
-afterwards; no man being wet above the breast.</p>
-
-<p>What had become of Abrokomas and his army, and why did he not
-defend this passage, where Cyrus might so easily have been arrested?
-We are told that he had been there a little before, and that he had
-thought it sufficient to burn all the vessels at Thapsakus, in the
-belief that the invaders could not cross the river on foot. And
-Xenophon informs us that the Thapsakenes affirmed the Euphrates to
-have been never before fordable,—always passed by means of
-boats; insomuch that they treated the actual low state of the water
-as a providential interposition of the gods in favor of Cyrus;
-“the river made way for him to come and take the sceptre.” When
-we find that Abrokomas came too late afterwards for the battle of
-Kunaxa, we shall be led to suspect that he too, like Syennesis in
-Kilikia, was playing a double game between the two royal brothers,
-and that he was content with destroying those vessels which formed
-the ordinary means of communication between the banks, without
-taking any means to inquire whether the passage was practicable
-without them. The assertion of the Thapsakenes, in so far as it was
-not a mere piece of flattery to Cyrus, could hardly have had any
-other foundation than the fact, that they had never seen the river
-crossed on foot (whether practicable or not), so long as there were
-regular ferry-boats.<a id="FNanchor_64"></a><a href="#Footnote_64"
-class="fnanchor">[64]</a></p> <p><span class="pagenum"><a
-id="Page_32">[p. 32]</a></span></p> <p>After crossing the Euphrates,
-Cyrus proceeded, for nine days’ march,<a id="FNanchor_65"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_65" class="fnanchor">[65]</a> southward along its
-left bank, until he came to its affluent, the river Araxes or
-Chaboras, which divided Syria from Arabia. From the numerous and
-well-supplied villages there situated, he supplied himself with a
-large stock of provisions, to confront the desolate march through
-Arabia on which they were about to enter, following the banks of
-the Euphrates still further southward. It was now that he entered
-on what may be called the Desert,—an endless breadth or
-succession of undulations, “like the sea,” without any cultivation or
-even any tree; nothing but wormwood and various aromatic shrubs.<a
-id="FNanchor_66"></a><a href="#Footnote_66" class="fnanchor">[66]</a>
-Here too the astonished Greeks saw, for the first time, wild asses,
-antelopes, ostriches, bustards, some of which afforded sport, and
-occasionally food, to the horsemen who amused themselves by chasing
-them; though the wild ass was swifter than any horse, and the ostrich
-altogether unapproachable. Five days’ march brought them to Korsôtê,
-a town which had been abandoned by its inhabitants,—probably,
-however, leaving<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_33">[p.
-33]</a></span> the provision dealers behind, as had before happened
-at Tarsus, in Kilikia;<a id="FNanchor_67"></a><a href="#Footnote_67"
-class="fnanchor">[67]</a> since the army here increased their
-supplies for the onward march. All that they could obtain was
-required, and was indeed insufficient, for the trying journey which
-awaited them. For thirteen successive days, and ninety computed
-parasangs, did they march along the left bank of the Euphrates,
-without provisions, and even without herbage except in some few
-places. Their flour was exhausted, so that the soldiers lived for
-some days altogether upon meat, while many baggage-animals perished
-of hunger. Moreover the ground was often heavy and difficult, full
-of hills and narrow valleys, requiring the personal efforts of every
-man to push the cars and waggons at particular junctures; efforts in
-which the Persian courtiers of Cyrus, under his express orders, took
-zealous part, toiling in the dirt with their ornamented attire.<a
-id="FNanchor_68"></a><a href="#Footnote_68" class="fnanchor">[68]</a>
-After these thirteen days of hardship, they reached Pylæ; near
-the entrance of the cultivated territory of Babylonia, where
-they seem to have halted five or six days to rest and refresh.<a
-id="FNanchor_69"></a><a href="#Footnote_69" class="fnanchor">[69]</a>
-There<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_34">[p. 34]</a></span>
-was on the opposite side of the river, at or near this point, a
-flourishing city named Charmandê; to which many of the soldiers<span
-class="pagenum"><a id="Page_35">[p. 35]</a></span> crossed over (by
-means of skins stuffed with hay), and procured plentiful supplies,
-especially of date-wine and millet.<a id="FNanchor_70"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_70" class="fnanchor">[70]</a></p>
-
-<p>It was during this halt opposite Charmandê that a dispute occurred
-among the Greeks themselves, menacing to the safety of all. I have
-already mentioned that Klearchus, Menon, Proxenus, and each of the
-Greek chiefs, enjoyed a separate command over his own division,
-subject only to the superior control of Cyrus himself. Some of the
-soldiers of Menon becoming involved in a quarrel with those of
-Klearchus, the latter examined into the case, pronounced one of
-Menon’s soldiers to have misbehaved, and caused him to be flogged.
-The comrades of the man thus punished resented the proceeding to
-such a degree, that as Klearchus was riding away from the banks of
-the river to his own tent, attended by a few followers only through
-the encampment of Menon,—one of the soldiers who happened to
-be cutting wood, flung the hatchet at him, while others hooted and
-began to pelt him with stones. Klearchus, after escaping unhurt from
-this danger to his own division, immediately ordered his soldiers to
-take arms and put themselves in battle order. He himself advanced at
-the head of his Thracian peltasts, and his forty horsemen, in hostile
-attitude against Menon’s division; who on their side ran to arms,
-with Menon himself at their head, and placed themselves in order of
-defence. A slight accident might have now brought on irreparable
-disorder and bloodshed, had not Proxenus, coming up at the moment
-with a company of his hoplites, planted himself in military array
-between the two disputing parties,<span class="pagenum"><a
-id="Page_36">[p. 36]</a></span> and entreated Klearchus to desist
-from farther assault. The latter at first refused. Indignant that
-his recent insult and narrow escape from death should be treated so
-lightly, he desired Proxenus to retire. His wrath was not appeased,
-until Cyrus himself, apprised of the gravity of the danger, came
-galloping up with his personal attendants and his two javelins
-in hand. “Klearchus, Proxenus, and all you Greeks (said he), you
-know not what you are doing. Be assured that if you now come to
-blows, it will be the hour of my destruction,—and of your own
-also, shortly after me. For if <i>your</i> force be ruined, all these
-natives whom you see around, will become more hostile to us even
-than the men now serving with the King.” On hearing this (says
-Xenophon) Klearchus came to his senses, and the troops dispersed
-without any encounter.<a id="FNanchor_71"></a><a href="#Footnote_71"
-class="fnanchor">[71]</a></p>
-
-<p>After passing Pylæ, the territory called Babylonia began. The
-hills flanking the Euphrates, over which the army had hitherto
-been passing, soon ceased, and low alluvial plains commenced.<a
-id="FNanchor_72"></a><a href="#Footnote_72" class="fnanchor">[72]</a>
-Traces were now discovered, the first throughout their long march,
-of a hostile force moving in their front, ravaging the country
-and burning the herbage. It was here that Cyrus detected the
-treason of a Persian nobleman named Orontes, whom he examined
-in his tent, in the presence of various Persians possessing his
-intimate confidence, as well as of Klearchus with a guard of
-three<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_37">[p. 37]</a></span>
-thousand hoplites. Orontes was examined, found guilty, and privately
-put to death.<a id="FNanchor_73"></a><a href="#Footnote_73"
-class="fnanchor">[73]</a></p>
-
-<p>After three days’ march, estimated by Xenophon at twelve
-parasangs, Cyrus was induced by the evidences before him, or by
-the reports of deserters, to believe that the opposing army was
-close at hand, and that a battle was impending. Accordingly, in the
-middle of the night, he mustered his whole army, Greeks as well
-as barbarians; but the enemy did not appear as had been expected.
-His numbers were counted at this spot, and it was found that there
-were, of Greeks ten thousand four hundred hoplites, and two thousand
-five hundred peltasts; of the barbarian or Asiatic force of Cyrus,
-one hundred thousand men with twenty scythed chariots. The numbers
-of the Greeks had been somewhat diminished during the march, from
-sickness, desertion, or other causes. The reports of deserters
-described the army of Artaxerxes at one million two hundred thousand
-men, besides the six thousand horse-guards commanded by Artagerses,
-and two hundred scythed chariots, under the command of Abrokomas,
-Tissaphernes, and two others. It was ascertained afterwards, however,
-that the force of Abrokomas had not yet joined, and later accounts
-represented the numerical estimation as too great by one-fourth.</p>
-
-<p>In expectation of an action, Cyrus here convened the generals as
-well as the Lochages (or captains) of the Greeks; as well to consult
-about suitable arrangements, as to stimulate their zeal in his cause.
-Few points in this narrative are more striking than the language
-addressed by the Persian prince to the Greeks, on this as well as on
-other occasions.</p>
-
-<p>“It is not from want of native forces, men of Hellas, that I have
-brought you hither, but because I account you better and braver than
-any number of natives. Prove yourselves now worthy of the freedom
-which you enjoy; that freedom for which I envy you, and which I would
-choose, be assured, in preference to all my possessions a thousand
-times multiplied. Learn now from me, who know it well, all that you
-will have to encounter,—vast numbers and plenty of noise; but
-if you despise these, I am<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_38">[p.
-38]</a></span> ashamed to tell you what worthless stuff you will find
-in these native men. Behave well,—like brave men, and trust me
-for sending you back in such condition as to make your friends at
-home envy you; though I hope to prevail on many of you to prefer my
-service to your own homes.”</p>
-
-<p>“Some of us are remarking, Cyrus, (said a Samian exile named
-Gaulitês), that you are full of promises at this hour of danger, but
-will forget them, or perhaps will be unable to perform them, when
-danger is over.... As to ability, (replied Cyrus), my father’s empire
-reaches northward to the region of intolerable cold, southward to
-that of intolerable heat. All in the middle is now apportioned in
-satrapies among my brother’s friends; all, if we are victorious,
-will come to be distributed among mine. I have no fear of not having
-enough to give away, but rather of not having friends enough to
-receive it from me. To each of you Greeks, moreover, I shall present
-a wreath of gold.”</p>
-
-<p>Declarations like these, repeated by Cyrus to many of the Greek
-soldiers, and circulated among the remainder, filled all of them
-with confidence and enthusiasm in his cause. Such was the sense of
-force and superiority inspired, that Klearchus asked him,—“Do
-you really think, Cyrus, that your brother will fight you?... Yes,
-by Zeus, (was the reply); assuredly, if he be the son of Darius and
-Parysatis, and my brother, I shall not win this prize without a
-battle.” All the Greeks were earnest with him at the same time not to
-expose his own person, but to take post in the rear of their body.<a
-id="FNanchor_74"></a><a href="#Footnote_74" class="fnanchor">[74]</a>
-We shall see presently how this advice was followed.</p>
-
-<p>The declarations here reported, as well as the expressions
-employed before during the dispute between Klearchus and the soldiers
-of Menon near Charmandê—being, as they are, genuine and
-authentic, and not dramatic composition such as those of Æschylus
-in the Persæ, nor historic amplification like the speeches ascribed
-to Xerxes in Herodotus,—are among the most valuable evidences
-respecting the Hellenic character generally. It is not merely the
-superior courage and military discipline of the Greeks which Cyrus
-attests, compared with the cowardice of Asiatics,—but also
-their fidelity and sense of obligation which he contrasts with the
-time-serving treachery of the latter;<a id="FNanchor_75"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_75" class="fnanchor">[75]</a> connecting<span
-class="pagenum"><a id="Page_39">[p. 39]</a></span> these superior
-qualities with the political freedom which they enjoy. To hear
-this young prince expressing such strong admiration and envy for
-Grecian freedom, and such ardent personal preference for it above
-all the splendor of his own position,—was doubtless the most
-flattering of all compliments which he could pay to the listening
-citizen-soldiers. That a young Persian prince should be capable
-of conceiving such a sentiment, is no slight proof of his mental
-elevation above the level both of his family and of his nation. The
-natural Persian opinion is expressed by the conversation between
-Xerxes and Demaratus<a id="FNanchor_76"></a><a href="#Footnote_76"
-class="fnanchor">[76]</a> in Herodotus. To Xerxes, the conception
-of free citizenship,—and of orderly, self-sufficing
-courage planted by a public discipline, patriotic as well as
-equalizing,—was not merely repugnant, but incomprehensible. He
-understood only a master issuing orders to obedient subjects, and
-stimulating soldiers to bravery by means of the whip. His descendant
-Cyrus, on the contrary, had learnt by personal observation to
-enter into the feeling of personal dignity prevalent in the Greeks
-around him, based as it was on the conviction that they governed
-themselves and that there was no man who had any rights of his
-own over them,—that the law was their only master, and that
-in rendering obedience to it they were working for no one else
-but for themselves.<a id="FNanchor_77"></a><a href="#Footnote_77"
-class="fnanchor">[77]</a> Cyrus knew where to touch the sentiment
-of Hellenic honor, so fatally extinguished after the Greeks lost
-their political freedom by the hands<span class="pagenum"><a
-id="Page_40">[p. 40]</a></span> of the Macedonians, and exchanged for
-that intellectual quickness, combined with moral degeneracy, which
-Cicero and his contemporaries remark as the characteristic of these
-once high-toned communities.</p>
-
-<p>Having concerted the order of battle with the generals, Cyrus
-marched forward in cautious array during the next day, anticipating
-the appearance of the king’s forces. Nothing of the kind was seen,
-however, though abundant marks of their retiring footsteps were
-evident. The day’s march, (called three parasangs) having been
-concluded without a battle, Cyrus called to him the Ambrakiotic
-prophet Silanus, and presented him with three thousand darics or
-ten Attic talents. Silanus had assured him, on the eleventh day
-preceding, that there would be no action in ten days from that time;
-upon which Cyrus had told him,—“If your prophecy comes true,
-I will give you three thousand darics. My brother will not fight at
-all, if he does not fight within ten days.”<a id="FNanchor_78"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_78" class="fnanchor">[78]</a></p>
-
-<p>In spite of the strong opinion which he had expressed in reply
-to Klearchus, Cyrus now really began to conceive that no battle
-would be hazarded by his enemies; especially as in the course
-of this last day’s march, he came to a broad and deep trench
-(thirty feet broad and eighteen feet deep), approaching so near
-to the Euphrates as to leave an interval of only twenty feet for
-passage. This trench had been dug by order of Artaxerxes across
-the plain, for a length said to be of twelve parasangs (about
-forty-two English miles, if the parasang be reckoned at thirty
-stadia), so as to touch at its other extremity what was called
-the walls of Media.<a id="FNanchor_79"></a><a href="#Footnote_79"
-class="fnanchor">[79]</a> It had been dug as a special measure<span
-class="pagenum"><a id="Page_41">[p. 41]</a></span> of defence
-against the approaching invaders. Yet we hear with surprise, and
-the invaders themselves found with equal surprise, that not a man
-was on the spot to defend it; so that the whole Cyreian army and
-baggage passed without resistance through the narrow breadth of
-twenty feet. This is the first notice of any defensive measures taken
-to repel the invasion,—except the precaution of Abrokomas in
-burning the boats at Thapsakus. Cyrus had been allowed to traverse
-all this immense space, and to pass through so many defensible
-positions, without having yet struck a blow. And now Artaxerxes,
-after having cut a prodigious extent of trench at the cost of so much
-labor,—provided a valuable means of resistance, especially
-against Grecian heavy-armed<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_42">[p.
-42]</a></span> soldiers,—and occupied it seemingly until the
-very last moment,—throws it up from some unaccountable panic,
-and suffers a whole army to pass unopposed through this very narrow
-gut. Having surmounted unexpectedly so formidable an obstacle, Cyrus
-as well as the Greeks imagined that Artaxerxes would never think
-of fighting in the open plain. All began to relax in that careful
-array which had been observed since the midnight review, insomuch
-that he himself proceeded in his chariot instead of on horseback,
-while many of the Greek soldiers lodged their arms on the waggons
-or beasts of burden.<a id="FNanchor_80"></a><a href="#Footnote_80"
-class="fnanchor">[80]</a></p>
-
-<p>On the next day but one after passing the undefended trench, they
-were surprised, at a spot called Kunaxa,<a id="FNanchor_81"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_81" class="fnanchor">[81]</a> just when they were
-about to halt for the mid-day meal and repose, by the sudden<span
-class="pagenum"><a id="Page_43">[p. 43]</a></span> intimation that
-the king’s army was approaching in order of battle on the open plain.
-Instantly Cyrus hastened to mount on horseback, to arm himself, and
-to put his forces in order, while the Greeks on their side halted and
-formed their line with all possible speed.<a id="FNanchor_82"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_82" class="fnanchor">[82]</a> They were on the right
-wing of the army, adjoining the river Euphrates; Ariæus with the
-Asiatic forces being on the left, and Cyrus himself, surrounded by a
-body-guard of six hundred well-armed Persian horsemen, in the centre.
-Among the Greeks, Klearchus commanded the right division of hoplites,
-with Paphlagonian horsemen and the Grecian peltasts on the extreme
-right, close to the river; Proxenus with his division stood next;
-Menon commanded on the left. All the Persian horsemen around Cyrus
-had breastplates, helmets, short Grecian swords, and two javelins
-in their right hands; the horses also were defended by facings both
-over the breast and head. Cyrus himself, armed generally like the
-rest, stood distinguished by having an upright tiara instead of the
-helmet. Though the first news had come upon them by surprise, the
-Cyreians had ample time to put themselves in complete order; for
-the enemy did not appear until the afternoon was advanced. First,
-was seen dust, like a white cloud,—next, an undefined dark
-spot, gradually nearing, until the armor began to shine, and the
-component divisions of troops, arranged in dense masses, became
-discernible. Tissaphernes was on the left, opposite to the Greeks,
-at the head of the Persian horsemen, with white cuirasses; on his
-right, stood the Persian bowmen, with their<span class="pagenum"><a
-id="Page_44">[p. 44]</a></span> gerrha, or wicker shields, spiked so
-as to be fastened in the ground while arrows were shot from behind
-them; next, the Egyptian infantry with long wooden shields covering
-the whole body and legs. In front of all was a row of chariots with
-scythes attached to the wheels, destined to begin the charge against
-the Grecian phalanx.<a id="FNanchor_83"></a><a href="#Footnote_83"
-class="fnanchor">[83]</a></p>
-
-<p>As the Greeks were completing their array, Cyrus rode to the
-front, and desired Klearchus to make his attack with the Greeks
-upon the centre of the enemy; since it was there that the king in
-person would be posted, and if that were once beaten, the victory
-was gained. But such was the superiority of Artaxerxes in numbers,
-that his centre extended beyond the left of Cyrus. Accordingly
-Klearchus, afraid of withdrawing his right from the river, lest
-he should be taken both in flank and rear, chose to keep his
-position on the right,—and merely replied to Cyrus, that he
-would manage everything for the best. I have before remarked<a
-id="FNanchor_84"></a><a href="#Footnote_84" class="fnanchor">[84]</a>
-how often the fear of being attacked on the unshielded side and on
-the rear, led the Greek soldier into movements inconsistent with
-military expediency; and it will be seen presently that Klearchus,
-blindly obeying this habitual rule of precaution, was induced here to
-commit the capital mistake of keeping on the right flank, contrary
-to the more judicious direction of Cyrus.<a id="FNanchor_85"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_85" class="fnanchor">[85]</a> The latter continued
-for a short time riding slowly in front of the lines, looking
-alternately at the two armies, when Xenophon, one of the small total
-of Grecian horsemen, and attached to the division of Proxenus, rode
-forth from the line to accost him, asking if he had any orders to
-give. Cyrus desired him to proclaim to every one that the sacrifices
-were favorable. Hearing a murmur going through the Grecian ranks, he
-inquired from Xenophon what it was; and received for answer, that the
-watchword was now being passed along for the second time. He asked,
-with some surprise, who gave the watchword? and what it was? Xenophon
-replied that it was “Zeus the Preserver, and Victory.”—“I
-accept it,” replied Cyrus; “let that be the word;” and immediately
-rode away to his own post in the centre, among the Asiatics.</p>
-
-<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_45">[p. 45]</a></span></p>
-
-<p>The vast host of Artaxerxes, advancing steadily and without
-noise, were now within less than half a mile of the Cyreians, when
-the Greek troops raised the pæan or usual war-cry, and began to
-move forward. As they advanced, the shout became more vehement,
-the pace accelerated, and at last the whole body got into a run.<a
-id="FNanchor_86"></a><a href="#Footnote_86" class="fnanchor">[86]</a>
-This might have proved unfortunate, had their opponents been other
-than Grecian hoplites; but the Persians did not stand to await the
-charge. They turned and fled, when the assailants were yet hardly
-within bow-shot. Such was their panic, that even the drivers of the
-scythed chariots in front, deserting their teams, ran away along with
-the rest; while the horses, left to themselves, rushed apart in all
-directions, some turning round to follow the fugitives, others coming
-against the advancing Greeks, who made open order to let them pass.
-The left division of the king’s army was thus routed without a blow,
-and seemingly without a man killed on either side; one Greek only
-being wounded by an arrow, and another by not getting out of the way
-of one of the chariots.<a id="FNanchor_87"></a><a href="#Footnote_87"
-class="fnanchor">[87]</a> Tissaphernes alone,—who, with the
-body of horse immediately around him, was at the extreme Persian
-left, close to the river,—formed an exception to this universal
-flight. He charged and penetrated through the Grecian peltasts, who
-stood opposite to him between the hoplites and the river. These
-peltasts, commanded by Episthenes of Amphipolis, opened their ranks
-to let him pass, darting at the men as they rode by, yet without
-losing any one themselves. Tissaphernes thus got into the rear of
-the Greeks, who continued, on their side, to pursue the flying
-Persians before them.<a id="FNanchor_88"></a><a href="#Footnote_88"
-class="fnanchor">[88]</a></p>
-
-<p>Matters proceeded differently in the other parts of the field.
-Artaxerxes, though in the centre of his own army, yet from his
-superior numbers outflanked Ariæus, who commanded the extreme left
-of the Cyreians.<a id="FNanchor_89"></a><a href="#Footnote_89"
-class="fnanchor">[89]</a> Finding no one directly opposed to him,
-he began to wheel round his right wing, to encompass his enemies;
-not noticing the flight of his left division. Cyrus, on the other
-hand, when he saw the easy victory of the Greeks on their side, was
-overjoyed; and received from every one around him salutations, as
-if he were already king. Nevertheless, he had self-command<span
-class="pagenum"><a id="Page_46">[p. 46]</a></span> enough not
-yet to rush forward as if the victory was already gained,<a
-id="FNanchor_90"></a><a href="#Footnote_90" class="fnanchor">[90]</a>
-but remained unmoved, with his regiment of six hundred horse around
-him, watching the movements of Artaxerxes. As soon as he saw the
-latter wheeling round his right division to get upon the rear of the
-Cyreians, he hastened to check this movement by an impetuous charge
-upon the centre, where Artaxerxes was in person, surrounded by the
-body-guard of six thousand horse, under Artagerses. So vigorous
-was the attack of Cyrus, that with his six hundred horse, he broke
-and dispersed this body-guard, killing Artagerses with his own
-hand. His own six hundred horse rushed forward in pursuit of the
-fugitives, leaving Cyrus himself nearly alone, with only the select
-few, called his “Table-Companions,” around him. It was under these
-circumstances that he first saw his brother Artaxerxes, whose person
-had been exposed to view by the flight of the body-guards. The sight
-filled him with such a paroxysm of rage and jealous ambition,<a
-id="FNanchor_91"></a><a href="#Footnote_91" class="fnanchor">[91]</a>
-that he lost all thought of safety or prudence,—cried out,
-“I see the man,”—and rushed forward with his mere handful
-of companions to attack Artaxerxes, in spite of the numerous host
-behind him. Cyrus made directly at his brother, darting his javelin
-with so true an aim as to strike him in the breast, and wound him
-through the cuirass; though the wound (afterwards cured by the
-Greek surgeon Ktesias) could not have been very severe, since
-Artaxerxes did not quit the field, but, on the contrary, engaged
-in personal combat, he and those around him, against this handful
-of assailants. So unequal a combat did not last long. Cyrus, being
-severely wounded under the eye by the javelin of a Karian soldier,
-was cast from his horse and slain. The small number of faithful
-companions<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_47">[p. 47]</a></span>
-around him all perished in his defence. Artasyras, who stood first
-among them in his confidence and attachment, seeing him mortally
-wounded and fallen, cast himself down upon him, clasped him in his
-arms, and in this position either slew himself, or was slain by
-order of the king.<a id="FNanchor_92"></a><a href="#Footnote_92"
-class="fnanchor">[92]</a></p>
-
-<p>The head and the right hand of the deceased prince were
-immediately cut off by order of Artaxerxes, and doubtless exhibited
-conspicuously to view. This was a proclamation to every one that the
-entire contest was at an end; and so it was understood by Ariæus,
-who, together with all the Asiatic troops of Cyrus, deserted the
-field and fled back to the camp. Not even there did they defend
-themselves, when the king and his forces pursued them; but fled
-yet farther back to the resting-place of the previous night. The
-troops of Artaxerxes got into the camp and began to plunder it
-without resistance. Even the harem of Cyrus fell into their power.
-It included two Grecian women,—of free condition, good family,
-and education,—one from Phokæa, the other from Miletus,
-brought to him, by force, from their parents to Sardis. The elder
-of these two, the Phokæan, named Milto, distinguished alike<span
-class="pagenum"><a id="Page_48">[p. 48]</a></span> for beauty and
-accomplished intelligence, was made prisoner and transferred to the
-harem of Artaxerxes; the other, a younger person, found means to save
-herself, though without her upper garments,<a id="FNanchor_93"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_93" class="fnanchor">[93]</a> and sought shelter
-among some Greeks who were left in the camp on guard of the
-Grecian baggage. These Greeks repelled the Persian assailants with
-considerable slaughter; preserving their own baggage, as well as
-the persons of all who fled to them for shelter. But the Asiatic
-camp of the Cyreians was completely pillaged, not excepting those
-reserved waggons of provisions which Cyrus had provided in order that
-his Grecian auxiliaries might be certain, under all circumstances,
-of a supply.<a id="FNanchor_94"></a><a href="#Footnote_94"
-class="fnanchor">[94]</a></p>
-
-<p>While Artaxerxes was thus stripping the Cyreian camp, he
-was joined by Tissaphernes and his division of horse, who had
-charged through between the Grecian division and the river. At
-this time, there was a distance of no less than thirty stadia or
-three and a half miles between him and Klearchus with the Grecian
-division; so far had the latter advanced forward in pursuit of
-the Persian fugitives. Apprised, after some time, that the king’s
-troops had been victorious on the left and centre, and were
-masters of the camp,—but not yet knowing of the death of
-Cyrus,—Klearchus marched back his troops, and met the enemy’s
-forces also returning. He was apprehensive of being surrounded
-by superior numbers, and therefore took post with his rear upon
-the river. In this position, Artaxerxes<span class="pagenum"><a
-id="Page_49">[p. 49]</a></span> again marshalled his troops in
-front, as if to attack him, but the Greeks, anticipating his
-movement, were first in making the attack themselves, and forced
-the Persians to take flight even more terror-stricken than before.
-Klearchus, thus relieved from all enemies, waited awhile in hopes
-of hearing news of Cyrus. He then returned to the camp, which was
-found stripped of all its stores; so that the Greeks were compelled
-to pass the night without supper, while most of them also had had
-no dinner, from the early hour at which the battle had commenced.<a
-id="FNanchor_95"></a><a href="#Footnote_95" class="fnanchor">[95]</a>
-It was only on the next morning that they learnt, through Proklês
-(descendant of the Spartan king Demaratus, formerly companion of
-Xerxes in the invasion of Greece), that Cyrus had been slain;
-news which converted their satisfaction at their own triumph into
-sorrow and dismay.<a id="FNanchor_96"></a><a href="#Footnote_96"
-class="fnanchor">[96]</a></p>
-
-<p>Thus terminated the battle of Kunaxa, and along with it the
-ambitious hopes as well as the life of this young prince. His
-character and proceedings suggest instructive remarks. Both in
-the conduct of this expedition, and in the two or three years
-of administration in Asia Minor which preceded it, he displayed
-qualities such as are not seen in Cyrus called the Great, nor in
-any other member of the Persian regal family, nor indeed in any
-other Persian general throughout the history of the monarchy.
-We observe a large and long-sighted combination,—a power
-of foreseeing difficulties, and providing means beforehand for
-overcoming them,—a dexterity in meeting variable exigencies,
-and dealing with different parties, Greeks or Asiatics, officers
-or soldiers,—a conviction of the necessity, not merely of
-purchasing men’s service by lavish presents, but of acquiring
-their confidence by straightforward dealing and systematic good
-faith,—a power of repressing displeasure when policy
-commanded, as at the desertion of Xenias and Pasion, and the first
-conspiracies of Orontes; although usually the punishments which
-he inflicted were full of Oriental barbarity. How rare were the
-merits and accomplishments of Cyrus, as a Persian, will be best felt
-when we contrast this portrait, by Xenophon, with the description
-of the Persian satraps by Isokrates.<a id="FNanchor_97"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_97" class="fnanchor">[97]</a> That many<span
-class="pagenum"><a id="Page_50">[p. 50]</a></span> persons deserted
-from Artaxerxes to Cyrus,—none, except Orontes, from Cyrus
-to Artaxerxes,—has been remarked by Xenophon. Not merely
-throughout the march, but even as to the manner of fighting at
-Kunaxa, the judgment of Cyrus was sounder than that of Klearchus.
-The two matters of supreme importance to the Greeks, were, to take
-care of the person of Cyrus, and to strike straight at that of
-Artaxerxes with the central division around him. Now it was the fault
-of Klearchus, and not of Cyrus, that both these matters were omitted;
-and that the Greeks gained only a victory comparatively insignificant
-on the right. Yet in spite of such mistake, not his own, it appears
-that Cyrus would have been victorious, had he been able to repress
-that passionate burst of antipathy which drove him, like a madman,
-against his brother. The same insatiable ambition, and jealous
-fierceness when power was concerned, which had before led him to put
-to death two first cousins, because they omitted, in his presence, an
-act of deference never paid except to the king in person,—this
-same impulse, exasperated by the actual sight of his rival brother,
-and by that standing force of fraternal antipathy so frequent in
-regal families,<a id="FNanchor_98"></a><a href="#Footnote_98"
-class="fnanchor">[98]</a> blinded him, for the moment, to all
-rational calculation.</p>
-
-<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_51">[p. 51]</a></span></p>
-
-<p>We may however remark that Hellas, as a whole, had no cause to
-regret the fall of Cyrus at Kunaxa. Had he dethroned his brother
-and become king, the Persian empire would have acquired under his
-hand such a degree of strength as might probably have enabled him to
-forestall the work afterwards performed by the Macedonian kings, and
-to make the Greeks in Europe as well as those in Asia his dependents.
-He would have employed Grecian military organization against Grecian
-independence, as Philip and Alexander did after him. His money would
-have enabled him to hire an overwhelming force of Grecian officers
-and soldiers, who would (to use the expression of Proxenus as
-recorded by Xenophon<a id="FNanchor_99"></a><a href="#Footnote_99"
-class="fnanchor">[99]</a>) have thought him a better friend to
-them than their own country. It would have enabled him also to
-take advantage of dissension and venality in the interior of each
-Grecian city, and thus to weaken their means of defence while he
-strengthened his own means of attack. This was a policy which none
-of the Persian kings, from Darius son of Hystaspes down to Darius
-Codomanus, had ability or perseverance enough to follow out; none of
-them knew either the true value of Grecian instruments, or how to
-employ them with effect. The whole conduct of Cyrus, in reference
-to this memorable expedition, manifests a superior intelligence,
-competent to use the resources which victory would have put in his
-hands,—and an ambition likely to use them against the Greeks,
-in avenging the humiliations of Marathon, Salamis, and the peace of
-Kallias.</p>
-
-<hr class="chap" />
-
-
-<div class="chapter" id="Chap_70">
-  <p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_52">[p. 52]</a></span></p>
-  <h2 class="nobreak">CHAPTER LXX.<br />
-  RETREAT OF THE TEN THOUSAND GREEKS.</h2>
-</div>
-
-<p class="noindent"><span class="smcap">The</span>
-first triumphant feeling of the Greek troops at Kunaxa was exchanged,
-as soon as they learnt the death of Cyrus, for dismay and sorrow;
-accompanied by unavailing repentance for the venture into which
-he and Klearchus had seduced them. Probably Klearchus himself too
-repented, and with good reason, of having displayed, in his manner of
-fighting the battle, so little foresight, and so little regard either
-to the injunctions or to the safety of Cyrus. Nevertheless he still
-maintained the tone of a victor in the field, and after expressions
-of grief for the fate of the young prince, desired Proklês and Glus
-to return to Ariæus, with the reply, that the Greeks on their side
-were conquerors without any enemy remaining; that they were about
-to march onward against Artaxerxes; and that if Ariæus would join
-them, they would place him on the throne which had been intended for
-Cyrus. While this reply was conveyed to Ariæus by his particular
-friend Menon along with the messengers, the Greeks procured a meal
-as well as they could, having no bread, by killing some of the
-baggage animals; and by kindling fire, to cook their meat, from
-the arrows, the wooden Egyptian shields which had been thrown away
-on the field, and the baggage carts.<a id="FNanchor_100"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_100" class="fnanchor">[100]</a></p>
-
-<p>Before any answer could be received from Ariæus, heralds
-appeared coming from Artaxerxes; among them being Phalinus, a Greek
-from Zakynthus, and the Greek surgeon Ktesias of Knidus, who was
-in the service of the Persian king.<a id="FNanchor_101"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_101" class="fnanchor">[101]</a> Phalinus, an
-officer<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_53">[p. 53]</a></span>
-of some military experience and in the confidence of Tissaphernes,
-addressed himself to the Greek commanders; requiring them on the
-part of the king, since he was now victor and had slain Cyrus, to
-surrender their arms and appeal to his mercy. To this summons,
-painful in the extreme to a Grecian ear, Klearchus replied that it
-was not the practice for victorious men to lay down their arms.
-Being then called away to examine the sacrifice which was going
-on, he left the interview to the other officers, who met the
-summons of Phalinus by an emphatic negative. “If the king thinks
-himself strong enough to ask for our arms unconditionally, let him
-come and try to seize them.” “The king (rejoined Phalinus) thinks
-that you are in his power, being in the midst of his territory,
-hemmed in by impassable rivers, and encompassed by his innumerable
-subjects.”—“Our arms and our valor are all that remain to us
-(replied a young Athenian); we shall not be fools enough to hand
-over to you our only remaining treasure, but shall employ them still
-to have a fight for your treasure.”<a id="FNanchor_102"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_102" class="fnanchor">[102]</a> But though several
-spoke in this resolute tone, there were not wanting others disposed
-to encourage a negotiation; saying that they had been faithful to
-Cyrus as long as he lived, and would now be faithful to Artaxerxes,
-if he wanted their services in Egypt or anywhere else. In the midst
-of this parley Klearchus returned, and was requested by Phalinus
-to return a final answer on behalf of all. He at first asked the
-advice of Phalinus himself; appealing to the common feeling of
-Hellenic patriotism, and anticipating, with very little judgment,
-that the latter would encourage the Greeks in holding out. “If
-(replied Phalinus) I saw one chance out of ten thousand in your
-favor, in the event of a contest with the king, I should advise you
-to refuse the surrender of your arms. But as there is no chance
-of safety for you against the king’s consent, I recommend you to
-look out for safety in the only quarter where it presents itself.”
-Sensible of the mistake which he had made in asking the question,
-Klearchus rejoined,—“That is <i>your</i> opinion; now report our
-answer: We think we shall be better friends to the king, if we
-are to be his friends,—or more effective enemies, if we are
-to be his enemies,—with our arms, than without them.<span
-class="pagenum"><a id="Page_54">[p. 54]</a></span>” Phalinus, in
-retiring, said that the king proclaimed a truce so long as they
-remained in their present position,—but war, if they moved,
-either onward or backward. And to this Klearchus acceded, without
-declaring which he intended to do.<a id="FNanchor_103"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_103" class="fnanchor">[103]</a></p>
-
-<p>Shortly after the departure of Phalinus, the envoys despatched to
-Ariæus returned; communicating his reply, that the Persian grandees
-would never tolerate any pretensions on his part to the crown, and
-that he intended to depart early the next morning on his return; if
-the Greeks wished to accompany him, they must join him during the
-night. In the evening, Klearchus, convening the generals and the
-lochages (or captains of lochi), acquainted them that the morning
-sacrifice had been of a nature to forbid their marching against the
-king,—a prohibition of which he now understood the reason,
-from having since learnt that the king was on the other side of the
-Tigris, and therefore out of their reach,—but that it was
-favorable for rejoining Ariæus. He gave directions accordingly for a
-night-march back along the Euphrates, to the station where they had
-passed the last night but one prior to the battle. The other Grecian
-generals, without any formal choice of Klearchus as chief, tacitly
-acquiesced in his orders, from a sense of his superior decision and
-experience, in an emergency when no one knew what to propose. The
-night-march was successfully accomplished, so that they joined Ariæus
-at the preceding station about midnight; not without the alarming
-symptom, however, that Miltokythês the Thracian deserted to the king,
-at the head of three hundred and forty of his countrymen, partly
-horse, partly foot.</p>
-
-<p>The first proceeding of the Grecian generals was to exchange
-solemn oaths of reciprocal fidelity and fraternity with Ariæus.
-According to an ancient and impressive practice, a bull, a
-wolf, a boar, and a ram, were all slain, and their blood
-allowed to run into the hollow of a shield; in which the Greek
-generals dipped a sword, and Ariæus, with his chief companions,
-a spear.<a id="FNanchor_104"></a><a href="#Footnote_104"
-class="fnanchor">[104]</a> The latter, besides the<span
-class="pagenum"><a id="Page_55">[p. 55]</a></span> promise of
-alliance, engaged also to guide the Greeks, in good faith, down to
-the Asiatic coast. Klearchus immediately began to ask what route he
-proposed to take; whether to return by that along which they had
-come up, or by any other. To this Ariæus replied, that the road
-along which they had marched was impracticable for retreat, from the
-utter want of provisions through seventeen days of desert; but that
-he intended to choose another road, which, though longer, would be
-sufficiently productive to furnish them with provisions. There was,
-however, a necessity (he added), that the first two or three days’
-marches should be of extreme length, in order that they might get
-out of the reach of the king’s forces, who would hardly be able to
-overtake them afterwards with any considerable numbers.</p>
-
-<p>They had now come ninety-three days’ march<a
-id="FNanchor_105"></a><a href="#Footnote_105"
-class="fnanchor">[105]</a> from Ephesus, or ninety from
-Sardis.<a id="FNanchor_106"></a><a href="#Footnote_106"
-class="fnanchor">[106]</a> The distance from Sardis to Kunaxa is,
-according to Colonel Chesney, about twelve hundred and sixty-five
-geographical miles, or fourteen hundred and sixty-four English
-miles. There had been at least ninety-six days of rest, enjoyed
-at various places, so that the total of time elapsed must have
-at least been one hundred and eighty-nine days, or a little more
-than half a year;<a id="FNanchor_107"></a><a href="#Footnote_107"
-class="fnanchor">[107]</a> but it was probably greater, since some
-intervals of rest are not specified in number of days.</p>
-
-<p>How to retrace their steps, was now the problem, apparently
-insoluble. As to the military force of Persia in the field,
-indeed, not merely the easy victory at Kunaxa, but still more
-the undisputed march throughout so long a space, left them no
-serious<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_56">[p. 56]</a></span>
-apprehensions.<a id="FNanchor_108"></a><a href="#Footnote_108"
-class="fnanchor">[108]</a> In spite of this great extent,
-population, and riches, they had been allowed to pass through
-the most difficult and defensible country, and to ford the broad
-Euphrates, without a blow; nay, the king had shrunk from defending
-the long trench which he had specially caused to be dug for the
-protection of Babylonia. But the difficulties which stood between
-them and their homes were of a very different character. How were
-they to find their way back, or obtain provisions, in defiance of
-a numerous hostile cavalry, which, not without efficiency even
-in a pitched battle would be most formidable in opposing their
-retreat? The line of their upward march had all been planned, with
-supplies furnished, by Cyrus;—yet even under such advantages,
-supplies had been on the point of failing, in one part of the
-march. They were now, for the first time, called upon to think
-and provide for themselves; without knowledge of either roads or
-distances,—without trustworthy guides,—without any
-one to furnish or even to indicate supplies,—and with a
-territory all hostile, traversed by rivers which they had no means
-of crossing. Klearchus himself knew nothing of the country, nor of
-any other river except the Euphrates; nor does he indeed, in his
-heart, seem to have conceived retreat as practicable without the
-consent of the king.<a id="FNanchor_109"></a><a href="#Footnote_109"
-class="fnanchor">[109]</a> The reader who casts his eye on a map
-of Asia, and imagines the situation of this Greek division on the
-left bank of the Euphrates, near the parallel of latitude 33°
-30′—will hardly be surprised at any measure of despair, on the
-part either of general or soldiers. And we may add that Klearchus had
-not even the advantage of such a map, or probably of any map at all,
-to enable him to shape his course.</p>
-
-<p>In this dilemma, the first and most natural impulse was to
-consult Ariæus who (as has been already stated) pronounced, with
-good reason, that return by the same road was impracticable; and
-promised to conduct them home by another road,—longer indeed,
-yet better supplied. At daybreak on the ensuing morning, they began
-their march in an easterly direction, anticipating that before night
-they should reach some villages of the Babylonian territory, as
-in fact they did;<a id="FNanchor_110"></a><a href="#Footnote_110"
-class="fnanchor">[110]</a> yet not before they had been alarmed
-in the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_57">[p. 57]</a></span>
-afternoon by the supposed approach of some of the enemy’s horse, and
-by evidences that the enemy were not far off, which induced them to
-slacken their march for the purpose of more cautious array. Hence
-they did not reach the first villages before dark; and these too had
-been pillaged by the enemy while retreating before them, so that
-only the first-comers under Klearchus could obtain accommodation,
-while the succeeding troops, coming up in the dark, pitched as they
-could without any order. The whole camp was a scene of clamor,
-dispute, and even alarm, throughout the night. No provisions could be
-obtained. Early the next morning Klearchus<span class="pagenum"><a
-id="Page_58">[p. 58]</a></span> ordered them under arms; and desiring
-to expose the groundless nature of the alarm, caused the herald to
-proclaim, that whoever would denounce the person who had let the
-ass into the camp on the preceding night, should be rewarded with a
-talent of silver.<a id="FNanchor_111"></a><a href="#Footnote_111"
-class="fnanchor">[111]</a></p>
-
-<p>What was the project of route entertained by Ariæus, we cannot
-ascertain;<a id="FNanchor_112"></a><a href="#Footnote_112"
-class="fnanchor">[112]</a> since it was not farther pursued. For the
-effect of the unexpected arrival of the Greeks as if to attack the
-enemy,—and even the clamor and shouting of the camp during
-the night—so intimidated the Persian commanders, that they
-sent heralds the next morning to treat about a truce. The contrast
-between this message, and the haughty summons of the preceding day
-to lay down their arms, was sensibly felt by the Grecian officers,
-and taught them that the proper way of dealing with the Persians was
-by a bold and aggressive demeanor. When Klearchus was apprised of
-the arrival of the heralds, he desired them at first to wait at the
-outposts until he was at leisure; then, having put his troops into
-the best possible order, with a phalanx compact on every side to the
-eye, and the unarmed persons out of sight, he desired the heralds
-to be admitted. He marched out to meet them with the most showy and
-best-armed soldiers immediately around him, and when they informed
-him that they had come from the king with instructions to propose a
-truce, and to report on what conditions the Greeks would agree to it,
-Klearchus replied abruptly,—“Well then,—go and tell the
-king, that our first business must be to fight; for we have nothing
-to eat, nor will any man presume to talk to Greeks about a truce,
-without first providing dinner for them.” With this reply the heralds
-rode off, but returned very speedily; thus making it plain that the
-king, or the commanding officer, was near at hand. They brought word
-that the king thought their answer reasonable, and had sent guides to
-conduct them to a place where they would obtain provisions, if the
-truce should be concluded.</p>
-
-<p>After an affected delay and hesitation, in order to impose upon
-the Persians, Klearchus concluded the truce, and desired that
-the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_59">[p. 59]</a></span> guides
-would conduct the army to those quarters where provisions could
-be had. He was most circumspect in maintaining exact order during
-the march, himself taking charge of the rear guard. The guides
-led them over many ditches and channels, full of water, and cut
-for the purpose of irrigation; some so broad and deep that they
-could not be crossed without bridges. The army had to put together
-bridges for the occasion, from palm trees either already fallen,
-or expressly cut down. This was a troublesome business, which
-Klearchus himself superintended with peculiar strictness. He carried
-his spear in the left hand, his stick in the right; employing the
-latter to chastise any soldier who seemed remiss,—and even
-plunging into the mud and lending his own hands in aid wherever
-it was necessary.<a id="FNanchor_113"></a><a href="#Footnote_113"
-class="fnanchor">[113]</a> As it was not the usual season of
-irrigation for crops, he suspected that the canals had been filled on
-this occasion expressly to intimidate the Greeks, by impressing them
-with the difficulties of their prospective march; and he was anxious
-to demonstrate to the Persians that these difficulties were no more
-than Grecian energy could easily surmount.</p>
-
-<p>At length they reached certain villages indicated by their guides
-for quarters and provision; and here for the first time they had a
-sample of that unparalleled abundance of the Babylonian territory,
-which Herodotus is afraid to describe with numerical precision. Large
-quantities of corn,—dates not only in great numbers, but of
-such beauty, freshness, size and flavor, as no Greek had ever seen
-or tasted, insomuch that fruit like what was imported into Greece,
-was disregarded and left for the slaves,—wine and vinegar, both
-also made from the date-palm: these are the luxuries which Xenophon
-is eloquent in describing, after his recent period of scanty fare
-and anxious apprehension; not without also noticing the headaches
-which such new and luscious food, in unlimited quanity, brought upon
-himself and others.<a id="FNanchor_114"></a><a href="#Footnote_114"
-class="fnanchor">[114]</a></p>
-
-<p>After three days passed in these restorative quarters, they
-were visited by Tissaphernes, accompanied by four Persian grandees
-and a suite of slaves. The satrap began to open a negotiation
-with Klearchus and the other generals. Speaking through an
-interpreter, he stated to them that the vicinity of his satrapy<span
-class="pagenum"><a id="Page_60">[p. 60]</a></span> to Greece
-impressed him with a strong interest in favor of the Cyreian Greeks,
-and made him anxious to rescue them out of their present desperate
-situation; that he had solicited the king’s permission to save them,
-as a personal recompense to himself for having been the first to
-forewarn him of the schemes of Cyrus, and for having been the only
-Persian who had not fled before the Greeks at Kunaxa; that the King
-had promised to consider this point, and had sent him in the meantime
-to ask the Greeks what their purpose was in coming up to attack
-him; and that he trusted the Greeks would give him a conciliatory
-answer to carry back, in order that he might have less difficulty
-in realizing what he desired for their benefit. To this Klearchus,
-after first deliberating apart with the other officers, replied,
-that the army had come together, and had even commenced their march,
-without any purpose of hostility to the King; that Cyrus had brought
-them up the country under false pretences, but that they had been
-ashamed to desert him in the midst of danger, since he had always
-treated them generously; that since Cyrus was now dead, they had
-no purpose of hostility against the King, but were only anxious
-to return home; that they were prepared to repel hostility from
-all quarters, but would be not less prompt in requiting favor or
-assistance. With this answer Tissaphernes departed, and returned on
-the next day but one, informing them that he had obtained the King’s
-permission to save the Grecian army,—though not without great
-opposition, since many Persian counsellors contended that it was
-unworthy of the King’s dignity, to suffer those who had assailed
-him to escape. “I am now ready (said he) to conclude a covenant and
-exchange oaths with you; engaging to conduct you safely back into
-Greece, with the country friendly, and with a regular market for you
-to purchase provisions. You must stipulate on your part always to
-pay for your provisions, and to do no damage to the country. If I do
-not furnish you with provisions to buy, you are then at liberty to
-take them where you can find them.” Well were the Greeks content to
-enter into such a covenant, which was sworn, with hands given upon
-it, by Klearchus, the other generals, and the lochages, on their
-side,—and by Tissaphernes with the King’s brother-in-law on
-the other. Tissaphernes then left them, saying that he would<span
-class="pagenum"><a id="Page_61">[p. 61]</a></span> go back to
-the King, make preparations, and return to reconduct the Greeks
-home; going himself to his own satrapy.<a id="FNanchor_115"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_115" class="fnanchor">[115]</a></p>
-
-<p>The statements of Ktesias, though known to us only indirectly
-and not to be received without caution, afford ground for believing
-that Queen Parysatis decidedly wished success to her son Cyrus in
-his contest for the throne,—that the first report conveyed
-to her of the battle of Kunaxa, announcing the victory of Cyrus,
-filled her with joy, which was exchanged for bitter sorrow when
-she was informed of his death,—that she caused to be slain
-with horrible tortures all those, who though acting in the Persian
-army and for the defence of Artaxerxes, had any participation
-in the death of Cyrus—and that she showed favorable
-dispositions towards the Cyreian Greeks.<a id="FNanchor_116"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_116" class="fnanchor">[116]</a> It seems probable,
-farther, that her influence may have been exerted to procure for them
-an unimpeded retreat, without anticipating the use afterwards made
-by Tissaphernes (as will soon appear) of the present convention.
-And in one point of view, the Persian king had an interest in
-facilitating their retreat. For the very circumstance which rendered
-retreat difficult, also rendered the Greeks dangerous to him in
-their actual position. They were in the heart of the Persian
-empire, within seventy miles of Babylon; in a country not only
-teeming with fertility, but also extremely defensible; especially
-against cavalry, from the multiplicity of canals, as Herodotus
-observed respecting Lower Egypt.<a id="FNanchor_117"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_117" class="fnanchor">[117]</a> And Klearchus might
-say to his Grecian soldiers,—what Xenophon was afterwards
-preparing to say to them at Kalpê on the Euxine Sea, and what
-Nikias also affirmed to the unhappy Athenian army whom he conducted
-away from Syracuse<a id="FNanchor_118"></a><a href="#Footnote_118"
-class="fnanchor">[118]</a>—that wherever they sat down,
-they were sufficiently numerous and well-organized to become at
-once a city. A body of such troops might effectually assist, and
-would perhaps encourage, the Babylonian population to throw off
-the Persian yoke, and to exonerate themselves from the prodigious
-tribute which they now paid to the satrap. For these reasons,<span
-class="pagenum"><a id="Page_62">[p. 62]</a></span> the advisers of
-Artaxerxes thought it advantageous to convey the Greeks across the
-Tigris out of Babylonia, beyond all possibility of returning thither.
-This was at any rate the primary object of the convention. And it was
-the more necessary to conciliate the good-will of the Greeks, because
-there seems to have been but one bridge over the Tigris; which bridge
-could only be reached by inviting them to advance considerably
-farther into the interior of Babylonia.</p>
-
-<p>Such was the state of fears and hopes on both sides, at the time
-when Tissaphernes left the Greeks, after concluding his convention.
-For twenty days did they await his return, without receiving from him
-any communication; the Cyreian Persians under Ariæus being encamped
-near them. Such prolonged and unexplained delay became, after a few
-days, the source of much uneasiness to the Greeks; the more so as
-Ariæus received during this interval several visits from his Persian
-kinsmen, and friendly messages from the king, promising amnesty for
-his recent services under Cyrus. Of these messages the effects were
-painfully felt in manifest coldness of demeanor on the part of his
-Persian troops towards the Greeks. Impatient and suspicious, the
-Greek soldiers impressed upon Klearchus their fears, that the king
-had concluded the recent convention only to arrest their movements,
-until he should have assembled a larger army and blocked up more
-effectually the roads against their return. To this Klearchus
-replied,—“I am aware of all that you say. Yet if we now strike
-our tents, it will be a breach of the convention and a declaration of
-war. No one will furnish us with provisions; we shall have no guides;
-Ariæus will desert us forthwith, so that we shall have his troops
-as enemies instead of friends. Whether there be any other river for
-us to cross, I know not; but we know that the Euphrates itself can
-never be crossed, if there be an enemy to resist us. Nor have we any
-cavalry,—while cavalry is the best and most numerous force of
-our enemies. If the king, having all these advantages, really wishes
-to destroy us, I do not know why he should falsely exchange all
-these oaths and solemnities, and thus make his own word worthless in
-the eyes both of Greeks and barbarians.”<a id="FNanchor_119"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_119" class="fnanchor">[119]</a></p> <p><span
-class="pagenum"><a id="Page_63">[p. 63]</a></span></p> <p>Such
-words from Klearchus are remarkable, as they testify his own
-complete despair of the situation,—certainly a very natural
-despair,—except by amicable dealing with the Persians; and
-also his ignorance of geography and the country to be traversed.
-This feeling helps to explain his imprudent confidence afterwards in
-Tissaphernes.</p>
-
-<p>That satrap, however, after twenty days, at last came back, with
-his army prepared to return to Ionia,—with the king’s daughter
-whom he had just received in marriage,—and with another
-grandee named Orontas. Tissaphernes took the conduct of the march,
-providing supplies for the Greek troops to purchase; while Ariæus and
-his division now separated themselves altogether from the Greeks,
-and became intermingled with the other Persians. Klearchus and the
-Greeks followed them, at the distance of about three miles in the
-rear, with a separate guide for themselves; not without jealousy and
-mistrust, sometimes shown in individual conflicts, while collecting
-wood or forage, between them and the Persians of Ariæus. After three
-days’ march (that is, apparently, three days, calculated from the
-moment when they began their retreat with Ariæus) they came to the
-Wall of Media, and passed through it,<a id="FNanchor_120"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_120" class="fnanchor">[120]</a> prosecuting their
-march onward through the country on its other or interior side. It
-was of bricks cemented with bitumen, one hundred feet high, and
-twenty feet broad; it was said to extend a length of twenty parasangs
-(or about seventy miles, if we reckon the parasang at thirty stadia),
-and to be not far distant<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_64">[p.
-64]</a></span> from Babylon. Two days of farther march, computed as
-eight parasangs, brought them to the Tigris. During these two days
-they crossed two great ship canals, one of them over a permanent
-bridge, the other over a temporary bridge laid on seven boats.
-Canals of such magnitude must probably have been two among the four
-stated by Xenophon to be drawn from the river Tigris, each of them a
-parasang distant from the other. They were one hundred feet broad,
-and deep enough even for heavy vessels; they were distributed by
-means of numerous smaller channels and ditches for the irrigation of
-the soil; and they were said to fall into the Euphrates; or rather,
-perhaps, they terminated in one main larger canal cut directly from
-the Euphrates to the Tigris, each of them joining this larger canal
-at a different point of its course. Within less than two miles of the
-Tigris was a large and populous city named Sittakê, near which the
-Greeks pitched their camp, on the verge of a beautiful park or thick
-grove full of all kinds of trees; while the Persians all crossed the
-Tigris, at the neighboring bridge.</p>
-
-<p>As Proxenus and Xenophon were here walking in front of the camp
-after supper, a man was brought up who had asked for the former at
-the advanced posts. This man said that he came with instructions
-from Ariæus. He advised the Greeks to be on their guard, as there
-were troops concealed in the adjoining grove, for the purpose of
-attacking them during the night,—and also to send and occupy
-the bridge over the Tigris, since Tissaphernes intended to break it
-down, in order that the Greeks might be caught without possibility
-of escape between the river and the canal. On discussing this
-information with Klearchus, who was much alarmed by it, a young
-Greek present remarked that the two matters stated by the informant
-contradicted each other; for that if Tissaphernes intended to
-attack the Greeks during the night, he would not break down the
-bridge, so as both to prevent his own troops on the other side from
-crossing to aid, and to deprive those on this side of all retreat
-if they were beaten,—while, if the Greeks were beaten, there
-was no escape open to them, whether the bridge continued or not.
-This remark induced Klearchus to ask the messenger, what was the
-extent of ground between the Tigris and the canal. The messenger
-replied, that it was a great extent of country, comprising many large
-cities and villages. Reflecting on this communication, the Greek
-officers came to the con<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_65">[p.
-65]</a></span>clusion that the message was a stratagem on the part
-of Tissaphernes to frighten them and accelerate their passage across
-the Tigris; under the apprehension that they might conceive the plan
-of seizing or breaking the bridge and occupying a permanent position
-in the spot where they were; which was an island, fortified on one
-side by the Tigris,—on the other sides, by intersecting canals
-between the Euphrates and the Tigris.<a id="FNanchor_121"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_121" class="fnanchor">[121]</a> Such an island
-was<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_66">[p. 66]</a></span> a
-defensible position, having a most productive territory with numerous
-cultivators, so as to furnish shelter and means of hostility for all
-the king’s enemies. Tissaphernes calculated that the message<span
-class="pagenum"><a id="Page_67">[p. 67]</a></span> now delivered
-would induce the Greeks to become alarmed with their actual
-position and to cross the Tigris with as little delay as possible.
-At least this was the interpretation which the Greek officers put
-upon his proceeding; an interpretation highly plausible, since,
-in order to reach the bridge over the Tigris, he had been obliged
-to conduct the Greek troops into a position sufficiently tempting
-for them to hold,—and since he knew that his own purposes
-were purely treacherous. But the Greeks, officers as well<span
-class="pagenum"><a id="Page_68">[p. 68]</a></span> as soldiers, were
-animated only by the wish of reaching home. They trusted, though not
-without misgivings, in the promise of Tissaphernes to conduct them;
-and never for a moment thought of taking permanent post in this
-fertile island. They did not, however, neglect the precaution of
-sending a guard during the night to the bridge over the Tigris, which
-no enemy came to assail. On the next morning they passed over it in a
-body, in cautious and mistrustful array, and found themselves on the
-eastern bank of the Tigris,—not only without attack, but even
-without sight of a single Persian, except Glus, the interpreter, and
-a few others watching their motions.</p>
-
-<p>After having crossed by a bridge laid upon thirty-seven pontoons,
-the Greeks continued their march to the northward upon the eastern
-side of the Tigris, for four days, to the river Physkus; said to be
-twenty parasangs.<a id="FNanchor_122"></a><a href="#Footnote_122"
-class="fnanchor">[122]</a> The Physkus was one hundred feet wide,
-with a bridge, and the large city of Opis near it. Here, at the
-frontier of Assyria and Media, the road from the eastern regions to
-Babylon joined the road northerly on which the Greeks were marching.
-An illegitimate brother of Artaxerxes was seen at the head of a
-numerous force, which he was conducting from Susa and Ekbatana as
-a reinforcement to the royal army. This great host halted to see
-the Greeks pass by; and Klearchus ordered the march in column of
-two abreast, employing himself actively to maintain an excellent
-array, and halting more than once. The army thus occupied so long
-a time in passing by the Persian host, that their numbers appeared
-greater than the reality, even to themselves; while the effect upon
-the Persian spectators was very imposing.<a id="FNanchor_123"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_123" class="fnanchor">[123]</a> Here Assyria ended
-and Media began. They marched, still in a northerly direction, for
-six days through a portion of Media almost unpeopled, until they came
-to some flourishing villages which formed a portion of the domain
-of queen Parysatis; probably these villages, forming so marked an
-exception to the desert character of the remaining march, were<span
-class="pagenum"><a id="Page_69">[p. 69]</a></span> situated on the
-Lesser Zab, which flows into the Tigris, and which Xenophon must have
-crossed, though he makes no mention of it. According to the order
-of march stipulated between the Greeks and Tissaphernes, the latter
-only provided a supply of provisions for the former to purchase; but
-on the present halt, he allowed the Greeks to plunder the villages,
-which were rich and full of all sorts of subsistence,—yet
-without carrying off the slaves. The wish of the satrap to put an
-insult on Cyrus, as his personal enemy,<a id="FNanchor_124"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_124" class="fnanchor">[124]</a> through Parysatis,
-thus proved a sentence of ruin to these unhappy villagers. Five
-more days’ march, called twenty parasangs, brought them to the
-banks of the river Zabatus, or the Greater Zab, which flows
-into the Tigris near a town now called Senn. During the first
-of these five days, they saw on the opposite side of the Tigris
-a large town called Kænæ, from whence they received supplies of
-provisions, brought across by the inhabitants upon rafts supported
-by inflated skins.<a id="FNanchor_125"></a><a href="#Footnote_125"
-class="fnanchor">[125]</a></p>
-
-<p>On the banks of the Great Zab they halted three days,—days
-of serious and tragical moment. Having been under feelings of
-mistrust, ever since the convention with Tissaphernes, they
-had followed throughout the whole march, with separate guides
-of their own, in the rear of his army, always maintaining
-their encampment apart. During their halt on the Zab, so many
-various manifestations<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_70">[p.
-70]</a></span> occurred to aggravate the mistrust, that hostilities
-seemed on the point of breaking out between the two camps. To obviate
-this danger Klearchus demanded an interview with Tissaphernes,
-represented to him the threatening attitude of affairs, and insisted
-on the necessity of coming to a clear understanding. He impressed
-upon the satrap that, over and above the solemn oaths which had been
-interchanged, the Greeks on their side could have no conceivable
-motive to quarrel with him; that they had everything to hope from his
-friendship, and everything to fear, even to the loss of all chance
-of safe return, from his hostility; that Tissaphernes, also, could
-gain nothing by destroying them, but would find them, if he chose,
-the best and most faithful instruments for his own aggrandizement
-and for conquering the Mysians and the Pisidians,—as Cyrus
-had experienced while he was alive. Klearchus concluded his
-protest by requesting to be informed, what malicious reporter had
-been filling the mind of Tissaphernes with causeless suspicions
-against the Greeks.<a id="FNanchor_126"></a><a href="#Footnote_126"
-class="fnanchor">[126]</a></p>
-
-<p>“Klearchus (replied the satrap), I rejoice to hear such excellent
-sense from your lips. You remark truly, that if you were to meditate
-evil against me, it would recoil upon yourselves. I shall prove
-to you, in my turn, that you have no cause to mistrust either the
-king or me. If we had wished to destroy you, nothing would be
-easier. We have superabundant forces for the purpose; there are
-wide plains in which you would be starved,—besides mountains
-and rivers which you would be unable to pass, without our help.
-Having thus the means of destroying you in our hands, and having
-nevertheless bound ourselves by solemn oaths to save you, we shall
-not be fools and knaves enough to attempt it now, when we should
-draw upon ourselves the just indignation of the gods. It is my
-peculiar affection for my neighbors, the Greeks,—and my
-wish to attach to my own person, by ties of gratitude, the Greek
-soldiers of Cyrus,—which have made me eager to conduct you
-to Ionia in safety. For I know that when you are in my service,
-though the king is the only man who can wear his tiara erect
-<i>upon his head</i>, I shall be able to wear mine erect upon <i>my
-heart</i>, in full pride and confidence.”<a id="FNanchor_127"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_127" class="fnanchor">[127]</a></p> <p><span
-class="pagenum"><a id="Page_71">[p. 71]</a></span></p> <p>So powerful
-was the impression made upon Klearchus by these assurances, that
-he exclaimed,—“Surely those informers deserve the severest
-punishment, who try to put us at enmity, when we are such good
-friends to each other, and have so much reason to be so.” “Yes
-(replied Tissaphernes), they deserve nothing less; and if you, with
-the other generals and lochages, will come into my tent to-morrow, I
-will tell you who the calumniators are.” “To-be-sure I will (rejoined
-Klearchus), and bring the other generals with me. I shall tell you at
-the same time, who are the parties that seek to prejudice us against
-you.” The conversation then ended, the satrap detaining Klearchus
-to dinner, and treating him in the most hospitable and confidential
-manner.</p>
-
-<p>On the next morning, Klearchus communicated what had passed
-to the Greeks, insisting on the necessity that all the generals
-should go to Tissaphernes pursuant to his invitation; in order
-to reëstablish that confidence which unworthy calumniators had
-shaken, and to punish such of the calumniators as might be Greeks.
-So emphatically did he pledge himself for the good faith and
-philhellenic dispositions of the satrap, that he overruled the
-opposition of many among the soldiers; who, still continuing to
-entertain their former suspicions, remonstrated especially against
-the extreme imprudence of putting all the generals at once into
-the power of Tissaphernes. The urgency of Klearchus prevailed.
-Himself with four other generals,—Proxenus, Menon, Agias, and
-Sokrates,—and twenty lochages or captains,—went to visit
-the satrap in his tent; about two hundred of the soldiers going
-along with them, to make purchases for their own account in the
-Persian camp-market.<a id="FNanchor_128"></a><a href="#Footnote_128"
-class="fnanchor">[128]</a></p>
-
-<p>On reaching the quarters of Tissaphernes,—distant nearly
-three miles from the Grecian camp, according to habit,—the five
-generals were admitted into the interior, while the lochages remained
-at the entrance. A purple flag, hoisted from the top of the tent,
-betrayed too late the purpose for which they had been invited to
-come. The lochages and the Grecian soldiers who had accompanied them
-were surprised and cut down, while the generals in the interior were
-detained, put in chains, and carried up as prisoners to the Persian
-court. Here Klearchus, Proxenus, Agias, and<span class="pagenum"><a
-id="Page_72">[p. 72]</a></span> Sokrates were beheaded after a short
-imprisonment. Queen Parysatis, indeed, from affection to Cyrus, not
-only furnished many comforts to Klearchus in the prison, by the hands
-of her surgeon, Ktesias, but used all her influence with her son
-Artaxerxes to save his life; though her efforts were counteracted,
-on this occasion, by the superior influence of queen Stateira, his
-wife. The rivalry between these two royal women, doubtless arising
-out of many other circumstances besides the death of Klearchus,
-became soon afterwards so furious, that Parysatis caused Stateira
-to be poisoned.<a id="FNanchor_129"></a><a href="#Footnote_129"
-class="fnanchor">[129]</a></p>
-
-<p>Menon was not put to death along with the other generals. He
-appears to have taken credit at the Persian court for the treason
-of entrapping his colleagues into the hands of Tissaphernes. But
-his life was only prolonged to perish a year afterwards in disgrace
-and torture,—probably by the requisition of Parysatis,
-who thus avenged the death of Klearchus. The queen-mother had
-always power enough to perpetrate cruelties, though not always
-to avert them.<a id="FNanchor_130"></a><a href="#Footnote_130"
-class="fnanchor">[130]</a> She had already brought to a miserable end
-every one, even faithful defenders of Artaxerxes, concerned in the
-death of her son Cyrus.</p>
-
-<p>Though Menon thought it convenient, when brought up to Babylon, to
-boast of having been the instrument through whom the generals were
-entrapped into the fatal tent, this boast is not to be treated as
-matter of fact. For not only does Xenophon explain the catastrophe
-differently, but in the delineation which he gives of Menon, dark
-and odious as it is in the extreme, he does not advance any such
-imputation; indirectly, indeed, he sets it<span class="pagenum"><a
-id="Page_73">[p. 73]</a></span> aside.<a id="FNanchor_131"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_131" class="fnanchor">[131]</a> Unfortunately for
-the reputation of Klearchus, no such reasonable excuse can be
-offered for his credulity, which brought himself as well as his
-colleagues to so melancholy an end, and his whole army to the brink
-of ruin. It appears that the general sentiment of the Grecian army,
-taking just measure of the character of Tissaphernes, was disposed
-to greater circumspection in dealing with him. Upon that system
-Klearchus himself had hitherto acted; and the necessity of it might
-have been especially present to <i>his</i> mind, since he had served
-with the Lacedæmonian fleet at Miletus in 411 <small>B.C.</small>,
-and had, therefore, had fuller experience than other men in the
-army, of the satrap’s real character.<a id="FNanchor_132"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_132" class="fnanchor">[132]</a> On a sudden he
-now turns round, and on the faith of a few verbal declarations,
-puts all the military chiefs into the most defenceless posture and
-the most obvious peril, such as hardly the strongest grounds for
-confidence could have justified. Though the remark of Machiavel is
-justified by large experience,—that from the short-sightedness
-of men and their obedience to present impulse, the most notorious
-deceiver will always find new persons to trust him,—still
-such misjudgment on the part of an officer of age and experience is
-difficult to explain.<a id="FNanchor_133"></a><a href="#Footnote_133"
-class="fnanchor">[133]</a> Polyænus intimates that beautiful
-women, exhibited by the satrap at his first banquet to Klearchus
-alone, served as a lure to attract him with all his colleagues to
-the second; while Xenophon imputes the error to continuance of a
-jealous rivalry with Menon. The latter,<a id="FNanchor_134"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_134" class="fnanchor">[134]</a> it appears, having
-always been intimate with Ariæus, had been<span class="pagenum"><a
-id="Page_74">[p. 74]</a></span> thus brought into previous
-communication with Tissaphernes, by whom he had been well received,
-and by whom he was also encouraged to lay plans for detaching the
-whole Grecian army from Klearchus, so as to bring it all under his
-(Menon’s) command, into the service of the satrap. Such at least
-was the suspicion of Klearchus; who, jealous in the extreme of
-his own military authority, tried to defeat the scheme by bidding
-still higher himself for the favor of Tissaphernes. Imagining
-that Menon was the unknown calumniator who prejudiced the satrap
-against him, he hoped to prevail on the satrap to disclose his name
-and dismiss him.<a id="FNanchor_135"></a><a href="#Footnote_135"
-class="fnanchor">[135]</a> Such jealousy seems to have robbed
-Klearchus of his customary prudence. We must also allow for another
-impression deeply fixed in his mind; that the salvation of the army
-was hopeless without the consent of Tissaphernes, and, therefore,
-since the latter had conducted them thus far in safety, when he might
-have destroyed them before, that his designs at the bottom could
-not be hostile.<a id="FNanchor_136"></a><a href="#Footnote_136"
-class="fnanchor">[136]</a></p>
-
-<p>Notwithstanding these two great mistakes,—one on the present
-occasion, one previously, at the battle of Kunaxa, in keeping the
-Greeks on the right contrary to the order of Cyrus,—both
-committed by Klearchus, the loss of that officer was doubtless a
-great misfortune to the army; while, on the contrary, the removal of
-Menon was a signal benefit,—perhaps a condition of ultimate
-safety. A man so treacherous and unprincipled as Xenophon depicts
-Menon, would probably have ended by really committing towards the
-army that treason, for which he falsely took credit at the Persian
-court in reference to the seizure of the generals.</p>
-
-<p>The impression entertained by Klearchus, respecting the hopeless
-position of the Greeks in the heart of the Persian territory after
-the death of Cyrus, was perfectly natural in a military man who
-could appreciate all the means of attack and obstruction which the
-enemy had it in their power to employ. Nothing is so unaccountable
-in this expedition as the manner in which such means were thrown
-away,—the spectacle of Persian impotence. First, the whole
-line of upward march, including the passage of the Euphrates,
-left undefended; next, the long trench dug across the<span
-class="pagenum"><a id="Page_75">[p. 75]</a></span> frontier of
-Babylonia, with only a passage of twenty feet wide left near the
-Euphrates, abandoned without a guard; lastly, the line of the Wall
-of Media and the canals which offered such favorable positions for
-keeping the Greeks out of the cultivated territory of Babylonia,
-neglected in like manner, and a convention concluded, whereby the
-Persians engaged to escort the invaders safe to the Ionian coast,
-beginning by conducting them through the heart of Babylonia, amidst
-canals affording inexpugnable defences if the Greeks had chosen to
-take up a position among them. The plan of Tissaphernes, as far as
-we can understand it, seems to have been, to draw the Greeks to some
-considerable distance from the heart of the Persian empire, and then
-to open his schemes of treasonable hostility, which the imprudence
-of Klearchus enabled him to do, on the banks of the Great Zab, with
-chances of success such as he could hardly have contemplated. We have
-here a fresh example of the wonderful impotence of the Persians. We
-should have expected that, after having committed so flagrant an act
-of perfidy, Tissaphernes would at least have tried to turn it to
-account; that he would have poured, with all his forces and all his
-vigor, on the Grecian camp, at the moment when it was unprepared,
-disorganized, and without commanders. Instead of which, when the
-generals (with those who accompanied them to the Persian camp) had
-been seized or slain, no attack whatever was made except by small
-detachments of Persian cavalry upon individual Greek stragglers in
-the plain. One of the companions of the generals, an Arcadian named
-Nikarchus, ran wounded into the Grecian camp, where the soldiers
-were looking from afar at the horsemen scouring the plain without
-knowing what they were about,—exclaiming that the Persians
-were massacring all the Greeks, officers as well as soldiers.
-Immediately the Greek soldiers hastened to put themselves in defence,
-expecting a general attack to be made upon their camp; but no
-more Persians came near than a body of about three hundred horse,
-under Ariæus and Mithridates (the confidential companions of the
-deceased Cyrus), accompanied by the brother of Tissaphernes. These
-men, approaching the Greek lines as friends, called for the Greek
-officers to come forth, as they had a message to deliver from the
-king. Accordingly, Kleanor and Sophænetus, with an adequate guard,
-came to the front, accompanied by Xenophon, who was anxious to hear
-news about Proxenus. Ariæus<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_76">[p.
-76]</a></span> then acquainted them that Klearchus, having been
-detected in a breach of the convention to which he had sworn, had
-been put to death; that Proxenus and Menon, who had divulged his
-treason, were in high honor at the Persian quarters. He concluded
-by saying,—the king calls upon you to surrender your arms,
-which now (he says) belong to him, since they formerly belonged to
-his slave Cyrus.<a id="FNanchor_137"></a><a href="#Footnote_137"
-class="fnanchor">[137]</a></p>
-
-<p>The step here taken seems to testify a belief on the part of
-these Persians, that the generals being now in their power, the
-Grecian soldiers had become defenceless, and might be required to
-surrender their arms, even to men who had just been guilty of the
-most deadly fraud and injury towards them. If Ariæus entertained such
-an expectation, he was at once undeceived by the language of Kleanor
-and Xenophon, who breathed nothing but indignant reproach; so that he
-soon retired and left the Greeks to their own reflections.</p>
-
-<p>While their camp thus remained unmolested, every man within it was
-a prey to the most agonizing apprehensions. Ruin appeared impending
-and inevitable, though no one could tell in what precise form it
-would come. The Greeks were in the midst of a hostile country, ten
-thousand stadia from home, surrounded by enemies, blocked up by
-impassable mountains and rivers, without guides, without provisions,
-without cavalry to aid their retreat, without generals to give
-orders. A stupor of sorrow and conscious helplessness seized upon
-all. Few came to the evening muster; few lighted fires to cook
-their suppers; every man lay down to rest where he was; yet no
-man could sleep, for fear, anguish, and yearning after relatives
-whom he was never again to behold.<a id="FNanchor_138"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_138" class="fnanchor">[138]</a></p>
-
-<p>Amidst the many causes of despondency which weighed down this
-forlorn army, there was none more serious than the fact, that
-not a single man among them had now either authority to command,
-or obligation to take the initiative. Nor was any ambitious
-candidate likely to volunteer his pretensions, at a moment when
-the post promised nothing but the maximum of difficulty as well as
-of hazard. A new, self-kindled, light—and self-originated
-stimulus—was required, to vivify the embers of suspended
-hope and action, in a mass paralyzed for the moment, but every way
-capable<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_77">[p. 77]</a></span> of
-effort. And the inspiration now fell, happily for the army, upon one
-in whom a full measure of soldierly strength and courage was combined
-with the education of an Athenian, a democrat, and a philosopher.</p>
-
-<p>It is in true Homeric vein, and in something like Homeric
-language, that Xenophon (to whom we owe the whole narrative
-of the expedition) describes his dream, or the intervention
-of Oneirus, sent by Zeus, from which this renovating impulse
-took its rise.<a id="FNanchor_139"></a><a href="#Footnote_139"
-class="fnanchor">[139]</a> Lying mournful and restless, like his
-comrades, he caught a short repose; when he dreamt that he heard
-thunder, and saw the burning thunder-bolt fall upon his paternal
-house, which became forthwith encircled by flames. Awaking,
-full of terror, he instantly sprang up; upon which the dream
-began to fit on and blend itself with his waking thoughts, and
-with the cruel realities of his position. His pious and excited
-fancy generated a series of shadowy analogies. The dream was
-sent by Zeus<a id="FNanchor_140"></a><a href="#Footnote_140"
-class="fnanchor">[140]</a> the King, since it was from him that
-thunder and lightning proceeded. In one respect, the sign was
-auspicious,—that a great light had appeared to him from
-Zeus, in the midst of peril and suffering. But on the other hand,
-it was alarming, that the house had appeared to be completely
-encircled by flames, preventing all egress, because this seemed
-to indicate that he would remain confined where he was in the
-Persian dominions, without being able to overcome the difficulties
-which hedged him in. Yet doubtful as the promise was, it was
-still the message of Zeus addressed to himself, serving as a
-stimulus to him to break through the common stupor and take the
-initiative movement.<a id="FNanchor_141"></a><a href="#Footnote_141"
-class="fnanchor">[141]</a> “Why am I lying here? Night is
-advancing;<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_78">[p. 78]</a></span>
-at daybreak the enemy will be on us, and we shall be put to death
-with tortures. Not a man is stirring to take measures of defence.
-Why do I wait for any man older than myself, or for any man of a
-different city, to begin?”</p>
-
-<p>With these reflections, interesting in themselves and given
-with Homeric vivacity, he instantly went to convene the lochagi or
-captains who had served under his late friend Proxenus; and impressed
-upon them emphatically the necessity of standing forward to put the
-army in a posture of defence. “I cannot sleep, gentlemen; neither, I
-presume, can you, under our present perils. The enemy will be upon
-us at daybreak,—prepared to kill us all with tortures, as his
-worst enemies. For my part, I rejoice that his flagitious perjury
-has put an end to a truce by which we were the great losers; a truce
-under which we, mindful of our oaths, have passed through all the
-rich possessions of the king, without touching anything except what
-we could purchase with our own scanty means. Now, we have our hands
-free; all these rich spoils stand between us and him, as prizes for
-the better man. The gods, who preside over the match, will assuredly
-be on the side of us, who have kept our oaths in spite of strong
-temptations, against these perjurers. Moreover, our bodies are more
-enduring, and our spirits more gallant, than theirs. They are easier
-to wound, and easier to kill, than we are, under the same favor of
-the gods as we experienced at Kunaxa.</p>
-
-<p>“Probably others also are feeling just as we feel. But let us not
-wait for any one else to come as monitors to us; let us take the
-lead, and communicate the stimulus of honor to others. Do you show
-yourselves now the best among the lochages,—more worthy of
-being generals than the generals themselves. Begin at once,<span
-class="pagenum"><a id="Page_79">[p. 79]</a></span> and I desire
-only to follow you. But if you order me into the front rank, I
-shall obey without pleading my youth as an excuse,—accounting
-myself of complete maturity, when the purpose is to save myself
-from ruin.”<a id="FNanchor_142"></a><a href="#Footnote_142"
-class="fnanchor">[142]</a></p>
-
-<p>All the captains who heard Xenophon cordially concurred in his
-suggestion, and desired him to take the lead in executing it.
-One captain alone,—Apollonides, speaking in the Bœotian
-dialect,—protested against it as insane; enlarging upon their
-desperate position, and insisting upon submission to the king, as the
-only chance of safety. “How (replied Xenophon)? Have you forgotten
-the courteous treatment which we received from the Persians in
-Babylonia, when we replied to their demand for the surrender of our
-arms by showing a bold front? Do not you see the miserable fate which
-has befallen Klearchus, when he trusted himself unarmed in their
-hands, in reliance on their oaths? And yet you scout our exhortations
-to resistance, again advising us to go and plead for indulgence! My
-friends, such a Greek as this man, disgraces not only his own city,
-but all Greece besides. Let us banish him from our counsels, cashier
-him, and make a slave of him to carry baggage.”—“Nay (observed
-Agasias of Stymphalus), the man has nothing to do with Greece; I
-myself have seen his ears bored, like a true Lydian.” Apollonides was
-degraded accordingly.<a id="FNanchor_143"></a><a href="#Footnote_143"
-class="fnanchor">[143]</a></p>
-
-<p>Xenophon with the rest then distributed themselves in order to
-bring together the chief remaining officers in the army, who were
-presently convened, to the number of about one hundred. The<span
-class="pagenum"><a id="Page_80">[p. 80]</a></span> senior captain
-of the earlier body next desired Xenophon to repeat to this larger
-body the topics upon which he had just before been insisting.
-Xenophon obeyed, enlarging yet more emphatically on the situation,
-perilous, yet not without hope,—on the proper measures to be
-taken,—and especially on the necessity that they, the chief
-officers remaining, should put themselves forward prominently,
-first fix upon effective commanders, then afterwards submit the
-names to be confirmed by the army, accompanied with suitable
-exhortations and encouragement. His speech was applauded and
-welcomed, especially by the Lacedæmonian general Cheirisophus, who
-had joined Cyrus with a body of seven hundred hoplites at Issus in
-Kilikia. Cheirisophus urged the captains to retire forthwith, and
-agree upon other commanders instead of the four who had been seized;
-after which the herald must be summoned, and the entire body of
-soldiers convened without delay. Accordingly Timasion of Dardanus
-was chosen instead of Klearchus; Xanthiklês in place of Sokrates;
-Kleanor in place of Agias; Philesius in place of Menon; and Xenophon
-instead of Proxenus.<a id="FNanchor_144"></a><a href="#Footnote_144"
-class="fnanchor">[144]</a> The captains, who had served under each of
-the departed generals, separately chose a successor to the captain
-thus promoted. It is to be recollected that the five now chosen were
-not the only generals in the camp; thus for example, Cheirisophus had
-the command of his own separate division, and there may have been one
-or two others similarly placed. But it was now necessary for all the
-generals to form a Board and act in concert.</p>
-
-<p>At daybreak the newly constituted Board of generals placed
-proper outposts in advance, and then convened the army in general
-assembly, in order that the new appointments might be submitted
-and confirmed. As soon as this had been done, probably on the
-proposition of Cheirisophus (who had been in command before), that
-general addressed a few words of exhortation and encouragement to
-the soldiers. He was followed by Kleanor, who delivered, with the
-like brevity, an earnest protest against the perfidy of Tissaphernes
-and Ariæus. Both of them left to Xenophon the task, alike important
-and arduous at this moment of despondency, of setting forth the case
-at length,—working up the feelings of the soldiers to that
-pitch of resolution which the emergency required,—and<span
-class="pagenum"><a id="Page_81">[p. 81]</a></span> above all,
-extinguishing all those inclinations to acquiesce in new treacherous
-proposals from the enemy, which the perils of the situation would be
-likely to suggest.</p>
-
-<p>Xenophon had equipped himself in his finest military costume at
-this his first official appearance before the army, when the scales
-seemed to tremble between life and death. Taking up the protest of
-Kleanor against the treachery of the Persians, he insisted that
-any attempt to enter into convention or trust with such liars,
-would be utter ruin,—but that if energetic resolution were
-taken to deal with them only at the point of the sword, and punish
-their misdeeds, there was good hope of the favor of the gods and
-of ultimate preservation. As he pronounced this last word, one of
-the soldiers near him happened to sneeze. Immediately the whole
-army around shouted with one accord the accustomed invocation
-to Zeus the Preserver; and Xenophon, taking up the accident,
-continued,—“Since, gentlemen, this omen from Zeus the Preserver
-has appeared at the instant when we were talking about preservation,
-let us here vow to offer the preserving sacrifice to that god, and at
-the same time to sacrifice to the remaining gods as well as we can,
-in the first friendly country which we may reach. Let every man who
-agrees with me, hold up his hand.” All held up their hands; all then
-joined in the vow, and shouted the pæan.</p>
-
-<p>This accident, so dexterously turned to profit by the rhetorical
-skill of Xenophon, was eminently beneficial in raising the army out
-of the depression which weighed them down, and in disposing them to
-listen to his animating appeal. Repeating his assurances that the
-gods were on their side, and hostile to their perjured enemy, he
-recalled to their memory the great invasions of Greece by Darius and
-Xerxes,—how the vast hosts of Persia had been disgracefully
-repelled. The army had shown themselves on the field of Kunaxa worthy
-of such forefathers; and they would for the future be yet bolder,
-knowing by that battle of what stuff the Persians were made. As for
-Ariæus and his troops, alike traitors and cowards, their desertion
-was rather a gain than a loss. The enemy were superior in horsemen;
-but men on horseback were, after all, only men, half-occupied in
-the fear of losing their seats,—incapable of prevailing
-against infantry firm on the ground,—and only better able
-to run away. Now that the satrap refused to furnish them with
-provisions to buy, they on their side were<span class="pagenum"><a
-id="Page_82">[p. 82]</a></span> released from their covenant, and
-would take provisions without buying. Then as to the rivers; those
-were indeed difficult to be crossed in the middle of their course;
-but the army would march up to their sources, and could then pass
-them without wetting the knee. Or indeed, the Greeks might renounce
-the idea of retreat, and establish themselves permanently in the
-king’s own country, defying all his force, like the Mysians and
-Pisidians. “If (said Xenophon) we plant ourselves here at our ease
-in a rich country, with these tall, stately, and beautiful Median
-and Persian women for our companions,<a id="FNanchor_145"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_145" class="fnanchor">[145]</a>—we shall be
-only too ready, like the Lotophagi, to forget our way home. We ought
-first to go back to Greece, and tell our countrymen that if they
-remain poor, it is their own fault, when there are rich settlements
-in this country awaiting all who choose to come, and who have courage
-to seize them. Let us burn our baggage-waggons and tents, and carry
-with us nothing but what is of the strictest necessity. Above all
-things,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_83">[p. 83]</a></span>
-let us maintain order, discipline, and obedience to the commanders,
-upon which our entire hope of safety depends. Let every man promise
-to lend his hand to the commanders in punishing any disobedient
-individuals; and let us thus show the enemy that we have ten
-thousand persons like Klearchus, instead of that one whom they have
-so perfidiously seized. Now is the time for action. If any man,
-however obscure, has anything better to suggest, let him come forward
-and state it; for we have all but one object,—the common
-safety.”</p>
-
-<p>It appears that no one else desired to say a word, and that
-the speech of Xenophon gave unqualified satisfaction; for
-when Cheirisophus put the question, that the meeting should
-sanction his recommendations, and finally elect the new generals
-proposed,—every man held up his hand. Xenophon then moved that
-the army should break up immediately, and march to some well-stored
-villages, rather more than two miles distant; that the march
-should be in a hollow oblong, with the baggage in the centre; that
-Cheirisophus, as a Lacedæmonian, should lead the van; while Kleanor,
-and the other senior officers, would command on each flank,—and
-himself with Timasion, as the two youngest of the generals, would
-lead the rear-guard.</p>
-
-<p>This proposition was at once adopted, and the assembly broke up,
-proceeding forthwith to destroy, or distribute among one another,
-every man’s superfluous baggage,—and then to take their morning
-meal previous to the march.</p>
-
-<p>The scene just described is interesting and illustrative
-in more than one point of view.<a id="FNanchor_146"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_146" class="fnanchor">[146]</a> It exhibits that
-susceptibility to the influence of persuasive discourse which formed
-so marked a feature in the Grecian character,—a resurrection
-of the collective body out of the depth of despair, under the
-exhortation of one who had no established ascendency, nor anything
-to recommend him, except his intelligence, his oratorical power, and
-his community of interest with themselves. Next, it manifests, still
-more strikingly, the superiority of Athenian training as compared
-with that of other parts of Greece. Cheirisophus had not only been
-before in<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_84">[p. 84]</a></span>
-office as one of the generals, but was also a native of Sparta,
-whose supremacy and name was at that moment all-powerful. Kleanor
-had been before, not indeed a general, but a lochage, or one in the
-second rank of officers;—he was an elderly man,—and he
-was an Arcadian, while more than the numerical half of the army
-consisted of Arcadians and Achæans. Either of these two, therefore,
-and various others besides, enjoyed a sort of prerogative, or
-established starting-point, for taking the initiative in reference
-to the dispirited army. But Xenophon was comparatively a young man,
-with little military experience;—he was not an officer at
-all, either in the first or second grade, but simply a volunteer,
-companion of Proxenus;—he was, moreover, a native of Athens,
-a city at that time unpopular among the great body of Greeks, and
-especially of Peloponnesians, with whom her recent long war had
-been carried on. Not only, therefore, he had no advantages compared
-with others, but he was under positive disadvantages. He had
-nothing to start with except his personal qualities and previous
-training; in spite of which we find him not merely the prime mover,
-but also the ascendent person for whom the others make way. In
-him are exemplified those peculiarities of Athens, attested not
-less by the denunciation of her enemies than by the panegyric of
-her own citizens,<a id="FNanchor_147"></a><a href="#Footnote_147"
-class="fnanchor">[147]</a>—spontaneous and forward impulse,
-as well in conception as in execution,—confidence under
-circumstances which made others despair,—persuasive<span
-class="pagenum"><a id="Page_85">[p. 85]</a></span> discourse and
-publicity of discussion, made subservient to practical business,
-so as at once to appeal to the intelligence, and stimulate the
-active zeal, of the multitude. Such peculiarities stood out more
-remarkably from being contrasted with the opposite qualities in
-Spartans,—mistrust in conception, slackness in execution,
-secrecy in counsel, silent and passive obedience. Though Spartans and
-Athenians formed the two extremities of the scale, other Greeks stood
-nearer on this point to the former than to the latter.</p>
-
-<p>If, even in that encouraging autumn which followed immediately
-upon the great Athenian catastrophe before Syracuse, the inertia
-of Sparta could not be stirred into vigorous action without the
-vehemence of the Athenian Alkibiades,—much more was it
-necessary under the depressing circumstances which now overclouded
-the unofficered Grecian army, that an Athenian bosom should be found
-as the source of new life and impulse. Nor would any one, probably,
-except an Athenian, either have felt or obeyed the promptings to
-stand forward as a volunteer at that moment, when there was every
-motive to decline responsibility, and no special duty to impel him.
-But if by chance, a Spartan or an Arcadian had been found thus
-forward, he would have been destitute of such talents as would
-enable him to work on the minds of others<a id="FNanchor_148"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_148" class="fnanchor">[148]</a>—of that
-flexibility, resource, familiarity with the temper and movements
-of an assembled crowd, power of enforcing the essential views and
-touching the opportune chords, which Athenian democratical<span
-class="pagenum"><a id="Page_86">[p. 86]</a></span> training imparted.
-Even Brasidas and Gylippus, individual Spartans of splendid
-merit, and equal or superior to Xenophon in military resource,
-would not have combined with it that political and rhetorical
-accomplishment which the position of the latter demanded. Obvious
-as the wisdom of his propositions appears, each of them is left
-to him not only to imitate, but to enforce;—Cheirisophus
-and Kleanor, after a few words of introduction, consign to him
-the duty of working up the minds of the army to the proper pitch.
-How well he performed this, may be seen by his speech to the
-army, which bears in its general tenor a remarkable resemblance
-to that of Perikles addressed to the Athenian public in the
-second year of the war, at the moment when the miseries of the
-epidemic, combined with those of invasion, had driven them almost
-to despair. It breathes a strain of exaggerated confidence, and an
-undervaluing of real dangers, highly suitable for the occasion,
-but which neither Perikles nor Xenophon would have employed at
-any other moment.<a id="FNanchor_149"></a><a href="#Footnote_149"
-class="fnanchor">[149]</a> Throughout the whole of his speech, and
-especially in regard to the accidental sneeze near at hand which
-interrupted the beginning of it, Xenophon displayed that skill and
-practice in dealing with a numerous audience and a given situation,
-which characterized more or less every educated Athenian. Other
-Greeks, Lacedæmonians or Arcadians, could act, with bravery and in
-concert; but the Athenian Xenophon was among the few who could think,
-speak, and act, with equal efficiency.<a id="FNanchor_150"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_150" class="fnanchor">[150]</a> It was this
-tripartite accomplishment<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_87">[p.
-87]</a></span> which an aspiring youth was compelled to set before
-himself as an aim, in the democracy of Athens, and which the
-sophists as well as the democratical institutions, both of them so
-hardly depreciated, helped and encouraged him to acquire. It was
-this tripartite accomplishment, the exclusive possession of which,
-in spite of constant jealousy on the part of Bœotian officers and
-comrades of Proxenus,<a id="FNanchor_151"></a><a href="#Footnote_151"
-class="fnanchor">[151]</a> elevated Xenophon into the most ascendent
-person of the Cyreian army, from the present moment until the time
-when it broke up,—as will be seen in the subsequent history.</p>
-
-<p>I think it the more necessary to notice this fact,—that
-the accomplishments whereby Xenophon leaped on a sudden into such
-extraordinary ascendency, and rendered such eminent service to his
-army, were accomplishments belonging in an especial manner to the
-Athenian democracy and education,—because Xenophon himself
-has throughout his writings treated Athens not merely without the
-attachment of a citizen, but with feelings more like the positive
-antipathy of an exile. His sympathies are all in favor of the
-perpetual drill, the mechanical obedience, the secret government
-proceedings, the narrow and prescribed range of ideas, the silent and
-deferential demeanor, the methodical, though tardy, action—of
-Sparta. Whatever may be the justice of his preference, certain it
-is, that the qualities whereby he was himself enabled to contribute
-so much both to the rescue of the Cyreian army, and to his own
-reputation,—were Athenian far more than Spartan.</p>
-
-<p>While the Grecian army, after sanctioning the propositions of
-Xenophon, were taking their morning meal before they commenced their
-march, Mithridates, one of the Persians previously attached to Cyrus,
-appeared with a few horsemen on a mission of pretended friendship.
-But it was soon found out that his purposes were treacherous, and
-that he came merely to seduce individual<span class="pagenum"><a
-id="Page_88">[p. 88]</a></span> soldiers to desertion,—with a
-few of whom he succeeded. Accordingly, the resolution was taken to
-admit no more heralds or envoys.</p>
-
-<p>Disembarrassed of superfluous baggage, and refreshed, the army
-now crossed the Great Zab River, and pursued their march on the
-other side, having their baggage and attendants in the centre,
-and Cheirisophus leading the van, with a select body of three
-hundred hoplites.<a id="FNanchor_152"></a><a href="#Footnote_152"
-class="fnanchor">[152]</a> As no mention is made of a bridge, we
-are to presume that they forded the river,—which furnishes a
-ford (according to Mr. Ainsworth), still commonly used, at a place
-between thirty and forty miles from its junction with the Tigris.
-When they had got a little way forward, Mithridates again appeared
-with a few hundred cavalry and bowmen. He approached them like a
-friend; but as soon as he was near enough, suddenly began to harass
-the rear with a shower of missiles. What surprises us most, is,
-that the Persians, with their very numerous force, made no attempt
-to hinder them from crossing so very considerable a river; for
-Xenophon estimates the Zab at four hundred feet broad,—and
-this seems below the statement of modern travellers, who inform
-us that it contains not much less water than the Tigris; and
-though usually deeper and narrower, cannot be much narrower at any
-fordable place.<a id="FNanchor_153"></a><a href="#Footnote_153"
-class="fnanchor">[153]</a> It is to be recollected that the Persians,
-habitually marching in advance of the Greeks, must have reached the
-river first, and were, therefore, in possession of the crossing,
-whether bridge or ford. Though on the watch for every opportunity
-of perfidy, Tissaphernes did not dare to resist the Greeks even
-in the most advantageous position, and ventured only upon sending
-Mithridates to harass the rear; which he executed with considerable
-effect. The bowmen and darters of the Greeks, few in number, were
-at the same time inferior to those of the Persians; and<span
-class="pagenum"><a id="Page_89">[p. 89]</a></span> when Xenophon
-employed his rear guard, hoplites and peltasts, to charge and repel
-them, he not only could never overtake any one, but suffered much in
-getting back to rejoin his own main body. Even when retiring, the
-Persian horseman could discharge his arrow or cast his javelin behind
-him with effect; a dexterity which the Parthians exhibited afterwards
-still more signally, and which the Persian horsemen of the present
-day parallel with their carbines. This was the first experience which
-the Greeks had of marching under the harassing attack of cavalry.
-Even the small detachment of Mithridates greatly delayed their
-progress; so that they accomplished little more than two miles,
-reaching the villages in the evening, with many wounded, and much
-discouragement.<a id="FNanchor_154"></a><a href="#Footnote_154"
-class="fnanchor">[154]</a></p>
-
-<p>“Thank Heaven,” (said Xenophon in the evening, when Cheirisophus
-reproached him for imprudence in quitting the main body to charge
-cavalry, whom yet he could not reach.) “Thank Heaven, that our
-enemies attacked us with a small detachment only, and not with their
-great numbers. They have given us a valuable lesson, without doing
-us any serious harm.” Profiting by the lesson, the Greek leaders
-organized during the night and during the halt of the next day, a
-small body of fifty cavalry; with two hundred Rhodian slingers,
-whose slings, furnished with leaden bullets, both carried farther
-and struck harder than those of the Persians hurling large stones.
-On the ensuing morning, they started before daybreak, since there
-lay in their way a ravine difficult to pass. They found the ravine
-undefended (according to the usual stupidity of Persian proceedings),
-but when they had got nearly a mile beyond it, Mithridates reappeared
-in pursuit with a body of four thousand horsemen and darters.
-Confident from his achievement of the preceding day, he had promised,
-with a body of that force, to deliver the Greeks into the hands of
-the satrap. But the latter were now better prepared. As soon as
-he began to attack them, the trumpet sounded,—and forthwith
-the horsemen, slingers, and darters, issued forth to charge the
-Persians, sustained by the hoplites in the rear. So effective was
-the charge, that the Persians fled in dismay, notwithstanding
-their superiority in number; while the ravine so impeded their
-flight that many of them were slain, and eighteen prisoners
-made. The Greek soldiers of their own<span class="pagenum"><a
-id="Page_90">[p. 90]</a></span> accord mutilated the dead bodies, in
-order to strike terror into the enemy.<a id="FNanchor_155"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_155" class="fnanchor">[155]</a> At the end of
-the day’s march they reached the Tigris, near the deserted city
-of Larissa, the vast, massive, and lofty brick walls of which
-(twenty-five feet in thickness, one hundred feet high, seven miles
-in circumference) attested its former grandeur. Near this place was
-a stone pyramid, one hundred feet in breadth, and two hundred feet
-high; the summit of which was crowded with fugitives out of the
-neighboring villages. Another day’s march up the course of the Tigris
-brought the army to a second deserted city called Mespila, nearly
-opposite to the modern city of Mosul. Although these two cities,
-which seem to have formed the continuation or the substitute of the
-once colossal Nineveh or Ninus, were completely deserted,—yet
-the country around them was so well furnished with villages and
-population, that the Greeks not only obtained provisions, but also
-strings for the making of new bows, and lead for bullets to be used
-for the slingers.<a id="FNanchor_156"></a><a href="#Footnote_156"
-class="fnanchor">[156]</a></p>
-
-<p>During the next day’s march, in a course generally parallel
-with the Tigris, and ascending the stream, Tissaphernes, coming
-up along with some other grandees, and with a numerous army,
-enveloped the Greeks both in flanks and rear. In spite of his
-advantage of numbers, he did not venture upon any actual charge,
-but kept up a fire of arrows, darts, and stones. He was, however,
-so well answered by the newly-trained archers and slingers of the
-Greeks, that on the whole they had the advantage, in spite of the
-superior size of the Persian bows, many of which were taken and
-effectively employed on the Grecian side. Having passed the night
-in a well-stocked village, they halted there the next day in order
-to stock themselves with provisions, and then pursued their march
-for four successive days along a level country, until, on the
-fifth day, they reached hilly ground with the prospect of still
-higher hills beyond. All this march was made under unremitting
-annoyance from the enemy, insomuch that though the order of the
-Greeks was never broken, a considerable number of their<span
-class="pagenum"><a id="Page_91">[p. 91]</a></span> men were wounded.
-Experience taught them, that it was inconvenient for the whole army
-to march in one inflexible, undivided, hollow square; and they
-accordingly constituted six lochi or regiments of one hundred men
-each, subdivided into companies of fifty, and enômoties or smaller
-companies of twenty-five, each with a special officer (conformably
-to the Spartan practice) to move separately on each flank, and
-either to fall back, or fall in, as might suit the fluctuations of
-the central mass, arising from impediments in the road or menaces
-of the enemy.<a id="FNanchor_157"></a><a href="#Footnote_157"
-class="fnanchor">[157]</a> On reaching the hills, in sight of an
-elevated citadel or palace, with several villages around it, the
-Greeks anticipated some remission of the Persian attack. But after
-having passed over one hill, they were proceeding to ascend the
-second, when they found themselves assailed with unwonted vigor
-by the Persian cavalry from the summit of it, whose leaders were
-seen flogging on the men to the attack.<a id="FNanchor_158"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_158" class="fnanchor">[158]</a> This charge was so
-efficacious, that the Greek light troops were driven in with loss,
-and forced to take shelter within the ranks of the hoplites. After
-a march both slow and full of suffering, they could only reach
-their night-quarters by sending a detachment to get possession of
-some ground above the Persians, who thus became afraid of a double
-attack.</p>
-
-<p>The villages which they now reached (supposed by Mr. Ainsworth
-to have been in the fertile country under the modern town
-called Zakhu),<a id="FNanchor_159"></a><a href="#Footnote_159"
-class="fnanchor">[159]</a> were unusually rich in provisions;
-magazines of flour, barley, and wine, having been collected there for
-the Persian satrap. They reposed here three days, chiefly in order
-to tend the numerous wounded, for whose necessities, eight of the
-most competent persons were singled out to act as surgeons. On the
-fourth day they resumed their march, descending into the plain. But
-experience had now satisfied them that it was imprudent to continue
-in march under the attack of cavalry, so that when Tissaphernes
-appeared and began to harass them, they halted at the first village,
-and when thus in station, easily repelled him. As the afternoon
-advanced, the Persian assailants began<span class="pagenum"><a
-id="Page_92">[p. 92]</a></span> to retire; for they were always
-in the habit of taking up their night-post at a distance of near
-seven miles from the Grecian position; being very apprehensive of
-nocturnal attack in their camp, when their horses were tied by the
-leg and without either saddle or bridle.<a id="FNanchor_160"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_160" class="fnanchor">[160]</a> As soon as they had
-departed, the Greeks resumed their march, and made so much advance
-during the night, that the Persians did not overtake them either on
-the next day or the day after.</p>
-
-<p>On the ensuing day, however, the Persians, having made a forced
-march by night, were seen not only in advance of the Greeks, but
-in occupation of a spur of high and precipitous ground overhanging
-immediately the road whereby the Greeks were to descend into the
-plain. When Cheirisophus approached, he at once saw that descent
-was impracticable in the face of an enemy thus posted. He therefore
-halted, sent for Xenophon from the rear, and desired him to bring
-forward the peltasts to the van. But Xenophon, though he obeyed
-the summons in person and galloped his horse to the front, did not
-think it prudent to move the peltasts from the rear, because he saw
-Tissaphernes, with another portion of the army, just coming up; so
-that the Grecian army was at once impeded in front, and threatened by
-the enemy closing upon them behind. The Persians on the high ground
-in front could not be directly assailed. But Xenophon observed,
-that on the right of the Grecian army, there was an accessible
-mountain-summit yet higher, from whence a descent might be made for a
-flank attack upon the Persian position. Pointing out this summit to
-Cheirisophus, as affording the only means of dislodging the troops
-in front, he urged that one of them should immediately hasten with a
-detachment to take possession of it, and offered to Cheirisophus the
-choice either of going, or staying with the army. “Choose yourself,”
-said Cheirisophus. “Well, then, (said Xenophon), I will go; since
-I am the younger of the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_93">[p.
-93]</a></span> two.” Accordingly, at the head of a select detachment
-from the van and centre of the army, he immediately commenced his
-flank march up the steep ascent to this highest summit. So soon as
-the enemy saw their purpose, they also detached troops on their side,
-hoping to get to the summit first; and the two detachments were seen
-mounting at the same time, each struggling with the utmost efforts
-to get before the other,—each being encouraged by shouts and
-clamor from the two armies respectively.</p>
-
-<p>As Xenophon was riding by the side of his soldiers, cheering them
-on and reminding them that their chance of seeing their country
-and their families all depended upon success in the effort before
-them, a Sikyonian hoplite in the ranks, named Sotêridas, said to
-him,—“You and I are not on an equal footing, Xenophon. You are
-on horseback; I am painfully struggling up on foot, with my shield
-to carry.” Stung with this taunt, Xenophon sprang from his horse,
-pushed Sotêridas out of his place in the ranks, took his shield as
-well as his place, and began to march forward afoot along with the
-rest. Though thus weighed down at once by the shield belonging to
-an hoplite, and by the heavy cuirass of a horseman (who carried no
-shield), he nevertheless put forth all his strength to advance, under
-such double incumbrance, and to continue his incitement to the rest.
-But the soldiers around him were so indignant at the proceeding of
-Sotêridas, that they reproached and even struck him, until they
-compelled him to resume his shield as well as his place in the ranks.
-Xenophon then remounted and ascended the hill on horseback as far as
-the ground permitted; but was obliged again to dismount presently, in
-consequence of the steepness of the uppermost portion. Such energetic
-efforts enabled him and his detachment to reach the summit first.
-As soon as the enemy saw this, they desisted from their ascent,
-and dispersed in all directions; leaving the forward march open to
-the main Grecian army, which Cheirisophus accordingly conducted
-safely down into the plain. Here he was rejoined by Xenophon on
-descending from the summit. All found themselves in comfortable
-quarters, amidst several well-stocked villages on the banks of the
-Tigris. They acquired moreover an additional booty of large droves
-of cattle, intercepted when on the point<span class="pagenum"><a
-id="Page_94">[p. 94]</a></span> of being transported across the
-river; where a considerable body of horse were seen assembled on
-the opposite bank.<a id="FNanchor_161"></a><a href="#Footnote_161"
-class="fnanchor">[161]</a></p>
-
-<p>Though here disturbed only by some desultory attacks on the part
-of the Persians, who burnt several of the villages which lay in
-their forward line of march, the Greeks became seriously embarrassed
-whither to direct their steps; for on their left flank was the
-Tigris, so deep that their spears found no bottom,—and on
-their right, mountains of exceeding height. As the generals and the
-lochages were taking counsel, a Rhodian soldier came to them with a
-proposition for transporting the whole army across to the other bank
-of the river by means of inflated skins, which could be furnished
-in abundance by the animals in their possession. But this ingenious
-scheme, in itself feasible, was put out of the question by the view
-of the Persian cavalry on the opposite bank; and as the villages in
-their front had been burnt, the army had no choice except to return
-back one day’s march to those in which they had before halted. Here
-the generals again deliberated, questioning all their prisoners as
-to the different bearings of the country. The road from the south
-was that in which they had already marched from Babylon and Media;
-that to the westward, going to Lydia and Ionia, was barred to them
-by the interposing Tigris; eastward (they were informed) was the way
-to Ekbatana and Susa; northward, lay the rugged and inhospitable
-mountains of the Karduchians,—fierce freemen who despised the
-Great King, and defied all his efforts to conquer them; having once
-destroyed a Persian invading army of one hundred and twenty thousand
-men. On the other side of Karduchia, however, lay the rich Persian
-satrapy of Armenia, wherein both the Euphrates and the Tigris could
-be crossed near their sources, and from whence could choose their
-farther course easily towards Greece. Like Mysia, Pisidia, and other
-mountainous regions, Karduchia was a free territory surrounded
-on all sides by the dominions of the Great King, who reigned
-only in the cities and on the plains.<a id="FNanchor_162"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_162" class="fnanchor">[162]</a></p> <p><span
-class="pagenum"><a id="Page_95">[p. 95]</a></span></p> <p>Determining
-to fight their way across these difficult mountains into Armenia,
-but refraining from any public announcement, for fear that the
-passes should be occupied beforehand,—the generals sacrificed
-forthwith, in order that they might be ready for breaking up at a
-moment’s notice. They then began their march a little after midnight,
-so that soon after daybreak they reached the first of the Karduchian
-mountain-passes, which they found undefended. Cheirisophus, with
-his front division and all the light troops, made haste to ascend
-the pass, and having got over the first mountain, descended on the
-other side to some villages in the valley or nooks beneath; while
-Xenophon with the heavy-armed and the baggage, followed at a slower
-pace,—not reaching the villages until dark, as the road was
-both steep and narrow. The Karduchians, taken completely by surprise,
-abandoned the villages as the Greeks approached, and took refuge
-on the mountains; leaving to the intruders plenty of provisions,
-comfortable houses, and especially, abundance of copper vessels.
-At first the Greeks were careful to do no damage, trying to invite
-the natives to amicable colloquy. But none of the latter would
-come near, and at length necessity drove the Greeks to take what
-was necessary for refreshment. It was just when Xenophon and the
-rear guard were coming in at night, that some few Karduchians first
-set upon them; by surprise and with considerable success,—so
-that if their numbers had been greater, serious mischief might
-have ensued.<a id="FNanchor_163"></a><a href="#Footnote_163"
-class="fnanchor">[163]</a></p>
-
-<p>Many fires were discovered burning on the mountains,—an
-earnest of resistance during the next day; which satisfied the
-Greek generals that they must lighten the army, in order to ensure
-greater expedition as well as a fuller complement of available hands
-during the coming march. They therefore gave orders to burn all
-the baggage except what was indispensable, and to dismiss all the
-prisoners; planting themselves in a narrow strait, through which
-the army had to pass, in order to see that their directions were
-executed. The women, however, of whom there<span class="pagenum"><a
-id="Page_96">[p. 96]</a></span> were many with the army, could not be
-abandoned; and it seems farther that a considerable stock of baggage
-was still retained;<a id="FNanchor_164"></a><a href="#Footnote_164"
-class="fnanchor">[164]</a> nor could the army make more than slow
-advance, from the narrowness of the road and the harassing attack
-of the Karduchians, who were now assembled in considerable numbers.
-Their attack was renewed with double vigor on the ensuing day, when
-the Greeks were forced, from want of provisions, to hasten forward
-their march, though in the midst of a terrible snow-storm. Both
-Cheirisophus in the front and Xenophon in the rear, were hard pressed
-by the Karduchian slingers and bowmen; the latter, men of consummate
-skill, having bows three cubits in length, and arrows of more than
-two cubits, so strong that the Greeks when they took them could dart
-them as javelins. These archers, amidst the rugged ground and narrow
-paths, approached so near and drew the bow with such surprising
-force, resting one extremity of it on the ground, that several Greek
-warriors were mortally wounded even through both shield and corslet
-into the reins, and through the brazen helmet into their heads;
-among them especially, two distinguished men, a Lacedæmonian named
-Kleonymus, and an Arcadian named Basias.<a id="FNanchor_165"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_165" class="fnanchor">[165]</a> The rear division,
-more roughly handled than the rest, was obliged continually to halt
-to repel the enemy, under all the difficulties of the ground, which
-made it scarcely possible to act against nimble mountaineers. On one
-occasion, however, a body of these latter were entrapped into an
-ambush, driven back with loss, and (what was still more fortunate)
-two of their number were made prisoners.</p>
-
-<p>Thus impeded, Xenophon sent frequent messages entreating
-Cheirisophus to slacken the march of the van division; but
-instead of obeying, Cheirisophus only hastened the faster,
-urging Xenophon to follow him. The march of the army became
-little better than a rout, so that the rear division reached
-the halting-place in extreme confusion; upon which Xenophon
-proceeded to remonstrate with Cheirisophus for prematurely
-hurrying forward and neglecting his comrades behind. But the
-other,—pointing out to his attention the hill before them,
-and the steep path ascending it, forming their future line of
-march, which was beset with numerous Karduchians,—defended
-himself by saying that<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_97">[p.
-97]</a></span> he had hastened forward in hopes of being able to
-reach this pass before the enemy, in which attempt however he had
-not succeeded.<a id="FNanchor_166"></a><a href="#Footnote_166"
-class="fnanchor">[166]</a></p>
-
-<p>To advance farther on this road appeared hopeless; yet the guides
-declared that no other could be taken. Xenophon then bethought
-him of the two prisoners whom he had just captured, and proposed
-that these two should be questioned also. They were accordingly
-interrogated apart; and the first of them,—having persisted
-in denying, notwithstanding all menaces, that there was any road
-except that before them,—was put to death under the eyes of
-the second prisoner. This latter, on being then questioned, gave
-more comfortable intelligence; saying that he knew of a different
-road, more circuitous, but easier and practicable even for beasts
-of burden, whereby the pass before them and the occupying enemy
-might be turned; but that there was one particular high position
-commanding the road, which it was necessary to master beforehand
-by surprise, as the Karduchians were already on guard there. Two
-thousand Greeks, having the guide bound along with them, were
-accordingly despatched late in the afternoon, to surprise this post
-by a night-march; while Xenophon, in order to distract the attention
-of the Karduchians in front, made a feint of advancing as if about
-to force the direct pass. As soon as he was seen crossing the ravine
-which led to this mountain, the Karduchians on the top immediately
-began to roll down vast masses of rock, which bounded and dashed
-down the roadway, in such manner as to render it unapproachable.
-They continued to do this all night, and the Greeks heard the noise
-of the descending masses long after they had returned to their camp
-for supper and rest.<a id="FNanchor_167"></a><a href="#Footnote_167"
-class="fnanchor">[167]</a></p>
-
-<p>Meanwhile the detachment of two thousand, marching by the
-circuitous road, and reaching in the night the elevated position,
-(though there was another above yet more commanding), held by the
-Karduchians, surprised and dispersed them, passing the night by
-their fires. At daybreak, and under favor of a mist, they stole
-silently towards the position occupied by the other Karduchians in
-front of the main Grecian army. On coming near they suddenly sounded
-their trumpets, shouted aloud, and commenced the attack, which
-proved completely successful. The defenders, taken unprepared,<span
-class="pagenum"><a id="Page_98">[p. 98]</a></span> fled with little
-resistance, and scarcely any loss, from their activity and knowledge
-of the country; while Cheirisophus and the main Grecian force, on
-hearing the trumpet which had been previously concerted as the
-signal, rushed forward and stormed the height in front; some along
-the regular path, others climbing up as they could and pulling each
-other up by means of their spears. The two bodies of Greeks thus
-joined each other on the summit, so that the road became open for
-farther advance.</p>
-
-<p>Xenophon, however, with the rear guard, marched on the
-circuitous road taken by the two thousand, as the most practicable
-for the baggage animals, whom he placed in the centre of his
-division,—the whole array covering a great length of ground,
-since the road was very narrow. During this interval, the dispersed
-Karduchians had rallied, and reoccupied two or three high peaks,
-commanding the road,—from whence it was necessary to drive
-them. Xenophon’s troops stormed successively these three positions,
-the Karduchians not daring to affront close combat, yet making
-destructive use of their missiles. A Grecian guard was left on the
-hindermost of the three peaks, until all the baggage train should
-have passed by. But the Karduchians, by a sudden and well-timed
-movement, contrived to surprise this guard, slew two out of the
-three leaders, with several soldiers, and forced the rest to jump
-down the crags as they could, in order to join their comrades in the
-road. Encouraged by such success, the assailants pressed nearer to
-the marching army, occupying a crag over against that lofty summit
-on which Xenophon was posted. As it was within speaking distance,
-he endeavored to open a negotiation with them in order to get
-back the dead bodies of the slain. To this demand the Karduchians
-at first acceded, on condition that their villages should not be
-burnt; but finding their numbers every moment increasing, they
-resumed the offensive. When Xenophon with the army had begun his
-descent from the last summit, they hurried onward in crowds to
-occupy it; beginning again to roll down masses of rock, and renew
-their fire of missiles, upon the Greeks. Xenophon himself was here
-in some danger, having been deserted by his shield-bearer; but he
-was rescued by an Arcadian hoplite named Eurylochus, who ran to
-give him the benefit of his own shield as a protection for both
-in the retreat.<a id="FNanchor_168"></a><a href="#Footnote_168"
-class="fnanchor">[168]</a></p> <p><span class="pagenum"><a
-id="Page_99">[p. 99]</a></span></p> <p>After a march thus painful
-and perilous, the rear division at length found themselves in
-safety among their comrades in villages with well-stocked houses
-and abundance of corn and wine. So eager, however, were Xenophon
-and Cheirisophus to obtain the bodies of the slain for burial,
-that they consented to purchase them by surrendering the guide,
-and to march onward without any guide;—a heavy sacrifice
-in this unknown country, attesting their great anxiety about
-the burial.<a id="FNanchor_169"></a><a href="#Footnote_169"
-class="fnanchor">[169]</a></p>
-
-<p>For three more days did they struggle and fight their way
-through the narrow and rugged paths of the Karduchian mountains,
-beset throughout by these formidable bowmen and slingers; whom
-they had to dislodge at every difficult turn, and against whom
-their own Kretan bowmen were found inferior, indeed, but still
-highly useful. Their seven days’ march through this country, with
-its free and warlike inhabitants, were days of the utmost fatigue,
-suffering and peril; far more intolerable than anything which they
-had experienced from Tissaphernes and the Persians. Right glad
-were they once more to see a plain, and to find themselves near
-the banks of the river Kentritês, which divided these mountains
-from the hillocks and plains of Armenia,—enjoying comfortable
-quarters in villages, with the satisfaction of talking over
-past miseries.<a id="FNanchor_170"></a><a href="#Footnote_170"
-class="fnanchor">[170]</a></p>
-
-<p>Such were the apprehensions of Karduchian invasion, that the
-Armenian side of the Kentritês, for a breadth of fifteen miles, was
-unpeopled and destitute of villages.<a id="FNanchor_171"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_171" class="fnanchor">[171]</a> But the approach
-of the Greeks having become known to Tiribazus, satrap of Armenia,
-the banks of the river were lined with his cavalry and infantry to
-oppose their passage; a precaution, which if Tissaphernes had<span
-class="pagenum"><a id="Page_100">[p. 100]</a></span> taken at the
-Great Zab at the moment when he perfidiously seized Klearchus and his
-colleagues, the Greeks would hardly have reached the northern bank of
-that river. In the face of such obstacles, the Greeks, nevertheless,
-attempted the passage of the Kentritês, seeing a regular road on the
-other side. But the river was two hundred feet in breadth (only half
-the breadth of the Zab), above their breasts in depth, extremely
-rapid, and with a bottom full of slippery stones; insomuch that they
-could not hold their shields in the proper position, from the force
-of the stream, while if they lifted the shields above their heads,
-they were exposed defenceless to the arrows of the satrap’s troops.
-After various trials, the passage was found impracticable, and they
-were obliged to resume their encampment on the left bank. To their
-great alarm they saw the Karduchians assembling on the hills in their
-rear, so that their situation, during this day and night, appeared
-nearly desperate. In the night, Xenophon had a dream,—the
-first, which he has told us, since his dream on the terrific night
-after the seizure of the generals,—but on this occasion, of
-augury more unequivocally good. He dreamed that he was bound in
-chains, but that his chains on a sudden dropped off spontaneously;
-on the faith of which, he told Cheirisophus at daybreak that he had
-good hopes of preservation; and when the generals offered sacrifice,
-the victims were at once favorable. As the army were taking their
-morning meal, two young Greeks ran to Xenophon with the auspicious
-news that they had accidentally found another ford near half a mile
-up the river, where the water was not even up to their middle, and
-where the rocks came so close on the right bank that the enemy’s
-horse could offer no opposition. Xenophon, starting from his meal
-in delight, immediately offered libations to those gods who had
-revealed both the dream to himself in the night, and the unexpected
-ford afterwards to these youths; two revelations which he ascribed
-to the same gods.<a id="FNanchor_172"></a><a href="#Footnote_172"
-class="fnanchor">[172]</a></p>
-
-<p>Presently they marched in their usual order, Cheirisophus
-commanding the van and Xenophon the rear, along the river to the
-newly-discovered ford; the enemy marching parallel with them on
-the opposite bank. Having reached the ford, halted, and grounded
-arms, Cheirisophus placed a wreath on his head, took it off
-again,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_101">[p. 101]</a></span>
-and then resumed his arms, ordering all the rest to follow
-his example.<a id="FNanchor_173"></a><a href="#Footnote_173"
-class="fnanchor">[173]</a> Each lochus (company of one hundred men)
-was then arranged in column or single file, with Cheirisophus himself
-in the centre. Meanwhile the prophets were offering sacrifice to the
-river. So soon as the signs were pronounced to be favorable, all
-the soldiers shouted the pæan, and all the women joined in chorus
-with their feminine yell. Cheirisophus then at the head of the army,
-entered the river and began to ford it; while Xenophon, with a large
-portion of the rear division, made a feint of hastening back to the
-original ford, as if he were about to attempt the passage there. This
-distracted the attention of the enemy’s horse; who became afraid of
-being attacked on both sides, galloped off to guard the passage at
-the other point, and opposed no serious resistance to Cheirisophus.
-As soon as the latter had reached the other side, and put his
-division into order, he marched up to attack the Armenian infantry,
-who were on the high banks a little way above; but this infantry,
-deserted by its cavalry, dispersed without awaiting his approach. The
-handful of Grecian cavalry, attached to the division of Cheirisophus,
-pursued and took some valuable spoils.<a id="FNanchor_174"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_174" class="fnanchor">[174]</a></p>
-
-<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_102">[p. 102]</a></span></p>
-
-<p>As soon as Xenophon saw his colleague successfully established on
-the opposite bank, he brought back his detachment to the ford over
-which the baggage and attendants were still passing, and proceeded
-to take precautions against the Karduchians on his own side, who
-were assembling in the rear. He found some difficulty in keeping
-his rear division together, for many of them, in spite of orders,
-quitted their ranks, and went to look after their mistresses or their
-baggage in the crossing of the water.<a id="FNanchor_175"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_175" class="fnanchor">[175]</a> The peltasts and
-bowmen, who had gone over with Cheirisophus, but whom that general
-now no longer needed, were directed to hold themselves prepared
-on both flanks of the army crossing, and to advance a little way
-into the water, in the attitude of men just about to recross. When
-Xenophon was left with only the diminished rear-guard, the rest
-having got over,—the Karduchians rushed upon him, and began
-to shoot and sling. But on a sudden, the Grecian hoplites charged
-with their accustomed pæan, upon which the Karduchians took to
-flight,—having no arms for close combat on the plain. The
-trumpet now being heard to sound, they ran away so much the faster;
-while this was the signal, according to orders before given by
-Xenophon, for the Greeks to suspend their charge, to turn back,
-and to cross the river as speedily as possible. By favor of this
-able manœuvre, the passage was accomplished by the whole army,
-with little or no loss, about mid-day.<a id="FNanchor_176"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_176" class="fnanchor">[176]</a></p>
-
-<p>They now found themselves in Armenia; a country of even,
-undulating surface, but very high above the level of the sea, and
-extremely cold at the season when they entered it,—December.
-Though the strip of land bordering on Karduchia furnished no
-supplies, one long march brought them to a village, containing
-abundance of provisions, together with a residence of the satrap
-Tiribazus; after which, in two farther marches, they reached the
-river Teleboas, with many villages on its banks. Here Tiribazus
-himself, appearing with a division of cavalry, sent forward his
-interpreter to request a conference with the leaders; which being
-held, it was agreed that the Greeks should proceed unmolested through
-his territory, taking such supplies as they required,—but
-should neither burn nor damage the villages. They accordingly
-advanced onward for three days, computed at fifteen parasangs,
-or<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_103">[p. 103]</a></span> three
-pretty full days’ march; without any hostility from the satrap,
-though he was hovering within less than two miles of them. They then
-found themselves amidst several villages, wherein were regal or
-satrapical residences, with a plentiful stock of bread, meat, wine,
-and all sorts of vegetables. Here, during their nightly bivouac, they
-were overtaken by so heavy a fall of snow, that the generals, on the
-next day, distributed the troops into separate quarters among the
-villages. No enemy appeared near, while the snow seemed to forbid any
-rapid surprise. Yet at night, the scouts reported that many fires
-were discernible, together with traces of military movements around;
-insomuch that the generals thought it prudent to put themselves on
-their guard, and again collected the army into one bivouac. Here,
-in the night, they were overwhelmed by a second fall of snow, still
-heavier than the preceding; sufficient to cover over the sleeping men
-and their arms, and to benumb the cattle. The men, however, lay warm
-under the snow and were unwilling to rise, until Xenophon himself
-set the example of rising, and employing himself, without his arms,
-in cutting wood and kindling a fire.<a id="FNanchor_177"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_177" class="fnanchor">[177]</a> Others followed
-his example, and great comfort was found in rubbing themselves
-with pork-fat, oil of almonds, or of sesame, or turpentine. Having
-sent out a clever scout named Demokrates, who captured a native
-prisoner, they learned that Tiribazus was laying plans to intercept
-them in a lofty mountain-pass lying farther on in their route; upon
-which they immediately set forth, and by two days of forced march,
-surprising in their way the camp of Tiribazus, got over the difficult
-pass in safety. Three days of additional march brought them to the
-Euphrates river,<a id="FNanchor_178"></a><a href="#Footnote_178"
-class="fnanchor">[178]</a>—that is, to the eastern branch, now
-called Murad. They found a ford and crossed it, without having the
-water higher than the navel; and they were informed that its sources
-were not far off.</p>
-
-<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_104">[p. 104]</a></span></p>
-
-<p>Their four days of march, next on the other side of the Euphrates,
-were toilsome and distressing in the extreme; through a plain covered
-with deep snow (in some places six feet deep), and at times in the
-face of a north wind so intolerably chilling and piercing, that at
-length one of the prophets urged the necessity of offering sacrifices
-to Boreas; upon which (says Xenophon<a id="FNanchor_179"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_179" class="fnanchor">[179]</a>) the severity of the
-wind abated conspicuously, to the evident consciousness of all. Many
-of the slaves and beasts of burden, and a few even of the soldiers,
-perished; some had their feet frost-bitten, others became blinded by
-the snow, others again were exhausted by hunger. Several of these
-unhappy men were unavoidably left behind; others lay down to perish,
-near a warm spring which had melted the snow around, from extremity
-of fatigue and sheer wretchedness, though the enemy were close upon
-the rear. It was in vain that Xenophon, who commanded the rear-guard,
-employed his earnest exhortations, prayers, and threats, to induce
-them to move forward. The sufferers, miserable and motionless,
-answered only by entreating him to kill them at once. So greatly was
-the army disorganized by wretchedness, that we hear of one case in
-which a soldier, ordered to carry a disabled comrade, disobeyed the
-order, and was about to bury him alive.<a id="FNanchor_180"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_180" class="fnanchor">[180]</a> Xenophon made a
-sally, with loud shouts and clatter of spear with shield, in which
-even the exhausted men joined,—against the pursuing enemy. He
-was fortunate enough to frighten them away, and drive them to take
-shelter in a neighboring wood. He then left the sufferers lying
-down, with assurance that relief should be sent to them on the next
-day,—and went forward, seeing all along the line of march the
-exhausted soldiers lying on the snow, without even the protection of
-a watch. He and his rear-guard, as well as the rest, were obliged
-thus to pass the night without either food or fire, distributing
-scouts in the best way the case admitted. Meanwhile, Cheirisophus
-with the van division had got into a village, which they reached so
-unexpectedly, that they found the women<span class="pagenum"><a
-id="Page_105">[p. 105]</a></span> fetching water from a fountain
-outside the wall, and the headman of the village in his house within.
-This division here obtained rest and refreshment, and at daybreak
-some of their soldiers were sent to look after the rear. It was with
-delight that Xenophon saw them approach, and sent them back to bring
-up in their arms, into the neighboring village, those exhausted
-soldiers who had been left behind.<a id="FNanchor_181"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_181" class="fnanchor">[181]</a></p>
-
-<p>Repose was now indispensable after the recent sufferings. There
-were several villages near at hand, and the generals, thinking it
-no longer dangerous to divide the army, quartered the different
-divisions among them according to lot. Polykrates, an Athenian, one
-of the captains in the division of Xenophon, requested his permission
-to go at once and take possession of the village assigned to him,
-before any of the inhabitants could escape. Accordingly, running
-at speed with a few of the swiftest soldiers, he came upon the
-village so suddenly as to seize the headman, with his newly-married
-daughter, and several young horses intended as a tribute for the
-king. This village, as well as the rest, was found to consist of
-houses excavated in the ground (as the Armenian villages are at
-the present day), spacious within, but with a narrow mouth like a
-well, entered by a descending ladder. A separate entrance was dug
-for conveniently admitting the cattle. All of them were found amply
-stocked with live cattle of every kind, wintered upon hay; as well as
-with wheat, barley, vegetables, and a sort of barley-wine or beer,
-in tubs, with the grains of barley on the surface. Reeds or straws,
-without any joint in them, were lying near, through which they
-sucked the liquid.<a id="FNanchor_182"></a><a href="#Footnote_182"
-class="fnanchor">[182]</a> Xenophon did his utmost to conciliate the
-headman (who spoke Persian, and with whom he communicated through
-the Perso-Grecian interpreter of the army),<span class="pagenum"><a
-id="Page_106">[p. 106]</a></span> promising him that not one of
-his relations should be maltreated, and that he should be fully
-remunerated if he would conduct the army safely out of the country,
-into that of the Chalybes which he described as being adjacent.
-By such treatment the headman was won over, promised his aid, and
-even revealed to the Greeks the subterranean cellars wherein the
-wine was deposited; while Xenophon, though he kept him constantly
-under watch, and placed his youthful son as a hostage under the care
-of Episthenes, yet continued to treat him with studied attention
-and kindness. For seven days did the fatigued soldiers remain in
-these comfortable quarters, refreshing themselves and regaining
-strength. They were waited upon by the native youths, with whom
-they communicated by means of signs. The uncommon happiness which
-all of them enjoyed after their recent sufferings, stands depicted
-in the lively details given by Xenophon; who left here his own
-exhausted horse, and took young horses in exchange, for himself and
-the other officers.<a id="FNanchor_183"></a><a href="#Footnote_183"
-class="fnanchor">[183]</a></p>
-
-<p>After this week of repose, the army resumed its march through
-the snow. The headman, whose house they had replenished as well as
-they could, accompanied Cheirisophus in the van as guide, but was
-not put in chains or under guard; his son remained as an hostage
-with Episthenes, but his other relations were left unmolested at
-home. As they marched for three days without reaching a village,
-Cheirisophus began to suspect his fidelity, and even became so
-out of humor, though the man affirmed that there were no villages
-in the track, as to beat him,—yet without the precaution of
-putting him afterwards in fetters. The next night, accordingly,
-this headman made his escape; much to the displeasure of Xenophon,
-who severely reproached Cheirisophus, first for his harshness,
-and next for his neglect. This was the only point of difference
-between the two (says Xenophon), during the whole march; a fact
-very honorable to both, considering the numberless difficulties
-against which they had to contend. Episthenes retained the
-headman’s youthful son, carried him home in safety, and became much
-attached to him.<a id="FNanchor_184"></a><a href="#Footnote_184"
-class="fnanchor">[184]</a></p>
-
-<p>Condemned thus to march without a guide, they could do no better
-than march up the course of a river; and thus, from the<span
-class="pagenum"><a id="Page_107">[p. 107]</a></span> villages
-which had proved so cheering and restorative, they proceeded
-seven days’ march all through snow, up the river Phasis; a river
-not verifiable, but certainly not the same as is commonly known
-under that name by Grecian geographers; it was one hundred feet
-in breadth.<a id="FNanchor_185"></a><a href="#Footnote_185"
-class="fnanchor">[185]</a> Two more days’ march brought them from
-this river to the foot of a range of mountains; near a pass occupied
-by an armed body of Chalybes, Taochi, and Phasiani.</p>
-
-<p>Observing the enemy in possession of this lofty ground,
-Cheirisophus halted until all the army came up; in order that the
-generals might take counsel. Here Kleanor began by advising that they
-should storm the pass with no greater delay than was necessary to
-refresh the soldiers. But Xenophon suggested that it was far better
-to avoid the loss of life which must thus be incurred, and to amuse
-the enemy by feigned attack, while a detachment should be sent by
-stealth, at night, to ascend the mountain at another point and turn
-the position. “However (continued he, turning to Cheirisophus),
-stealing a march upon the enemy is more your trade than mine. For I
-understand that you, the full citizens and peers at Sparta, practise
-stealing from your boyhood upward;<a id="FNanchor_186"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_186" class="fnanchor">[186]</a> and that it is held
-no way base, but even honorable, to steal such things as the law does
-not distinctly forbid. And to the end that you may steal with the
-greatest effect, and take pains to do it in secret, the custom is,
-to flog you if you are found out. Here, then, you have an excellent
-opportunity for displaying your training. Take good care that we be
-not found out in stealing an occupation of the mountain now before
-us; for if we <i>are</i> found out, we shall be well beaten.</p>
-
-<p>“Why, as for that (replied Cheirisophus), you Athenians, also,
-as I learn, are capital hands at stealing the public money, and
-that too in spite of prodigious peril to the thief; nay, your most
-powerful men steal most of all,—at least, if it be the most
-powerful men among you who are raised to official command. So that
-this<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_108">[p. 108]</a></span>
-is a time for <i>you</i> to exhibit <i>your</i> training as well as for me
-to exhibit mine.”<a id="FNanchor_187"></a><a href="#Footnote_187"
-class="fnanchor">[187]</a></p>
-
-<p>We have here an interchange of raillery between the two
-Grecian officers, which is not an uninteresting feature in the
-history of the expedition. The remark of Cheirisophus, especially
-illustrates that which I noted in a former chapter as true both of
-Sparta and Athens<a id="FNanchor_188"></a><a href="#Footnote_188"
-class="fnanchor">[188]</a>,—the readiness to take bribes,
-so general in individuals clothed with official power; and the
-readiness, in official Athenians, to commit such peculation, in
-spite of serious risk of punishment. Now this chance of punishment
-proceeded altogether from those accusing orators commonly called
-demagogues, and from the popular judicature whom they addressed. The
-joint working of both greatly abated the evil, yet was incompetent
-to suppress it. But according to the pictures commonly drawn of
-Athens, we are instructed to believe that the crying public evil
-was,—too great a license of accusation, and too much judicial
-trial. Assuredly, such was not the conception of Cheirisophus; nor
-shall we find it borne out by any fair appreciation of the general
-evidence. When the peculation of official persons was thus notorious
-in spite of serious risks, what would it have become if the door
-had been barred to accusing demagogues, and if the numerous popular
-dikasts had been exchanged for a few select judges of the same stamp
-and class as the official men themselves?</p>
-
-<p>Enforcing his proposition, Xenophon now informed his colleagues
-that he had just captured a few guides by laying an ambush for
-certain native plunderers who beset the rear; and that these guides
-acquainted him that the mountain was not inaccessible, but pastured
-by goats and oxen. He farther offered himself to take command of
-the marching detachment. But this being overruled by Cheirisophus,
-some of the best among the captains, Aristonymus, Aristeas, and
-Nichomachus, volunteered their services and were accepted. After
-refreshing the soldiers, the generals marched with the main army near
-to the foot of the pass,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_109">[p.
-109]</a></span> and there took up their night-station, making
-demonstrations of a purpose to storm it the next morning. But as
-soon as it was dark, Aristonymus and his detachment started, and
-ascending the mountain at another point, obtained without resistance
-a high position on the flank of the enemy, who soon, however, saw
-them and despatched a force to keep guard on that side. At daybreak
-these two detachments came to a conflict on the heights, in which the
-Greeks were completely victorious, while Cheirisophus was marching
-up the pass to attack the main body. His light troops, encouraged
-by seeing this victory of their comrades, hastened on to the charge
-faster than their hoplites could follow. But the enemy was so
-dispirited by seeing themselves turned, that they fled with little
-or no resistance. Though only a few were slain, many threw away
-their light shields of wicker or wood-work, which became the prey
-of the conquerors.<a id="FNanchor_189"></a><a href="#Footnote_189"
-class="fnanchor">[189]</a></p>
-
-<p>Thus masters of the pass, the Greeks descended to the level
-ground on the other side, where they found themselves in some
-villages well-stocked with provisions and comforts; the first in
-the country of the Taochi. Probably they halted here some days;
-for they had seen no villages, either for rest or for refreshment,
-during the last nine days’ march, since leaving those Armenian
-villages in which they had passed a week so eminently restorative,
-and which apparently had furnished them with a stock of provisions
-for the onward journey. Such halt gave time to the Taochi to carry
-up their families and provisions into inaccessible strongholds, so
-that the Greeks found no supplies, during five days’ march through
-the territory. Their provisions were completely exhausted, when
-they arrived before one of these strongholds, a rock on which
-were seen the families and the cattle of the Taochi; without
-houses or fortification, but nearly surrounded by a river, so as
-to leave only one narrow ascent, rendered unapproachable by vast
-rocks which the defenders hurled or rolled from the summit. By an
-ingenious combination of bravery and stratagem, in which some of the
-captains much distinguished themselves, the Greeks overcame this
-difficulty, and took the height. The scene which then ensued was
-awful. The Taochian women seized their children, flung them over the
-precipice, and then cast<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_110">[p.
-110]</a></span> themselves headlong also, followed by the men. Almost
-every soul thus perished, very few surviving to become prisoners.
-An Arcadian captain named Æneas, seeing one of them in a fine dress
-about to precipitate himself with the rest, seized him with a view
-to prevent it. But the man in return grasped him firmly, dragged
-him to the edge of the rock, and leaped down to the destruction
-of both. Though scarcely any prisoners were taken, however, the
-Greeks obtained abundance of oxen, asses, and sheep, which fully
-supplied their wants.<a id="FNanchor_190"></a><a href="#Footnote_190"
-class="fnanchor">[190]</a></p>
-
-<p>They now entered into the territory of the Chalybes, which
-they were seven days in passing through. These were the bravest
-warriors whom they had seen in Asia. Their equipment was a spear
-of fifteen cubits long, with only one end pointed,—a helmet,
-greaves, stuffed corselet, with a kilt or dependent flaps,—a
-short sword which they employed to cut off the head of a slain
-enemy, displaying the head in sight of their surviving enemies
-with triumphant dance and song. They carried no shield; perhaps
-because the excessive length of the spear required the constant
-employment of both hands,—yet they did not shrink from
-meeting the Greeks occasionally in regular, stand-up fight. As
-they had carried off all their provisions into hill-forts, the
-Greeks could obtain no supplies, but lived all the time upon the
-cattle which they had acquired from the Taochi. After seven days of
-march and combat,—the Chalybes perpetually attacking their
-rear,—they reached the river Harpasus (four hundred feet
-broad), where they passed into the territory of the Skythini. It
-rather seems that the territory of the Chalybes was mountainous; that
-of the Skythini was level, and containing villages, wherein they
-remained three days, refreshing themselves, and stocking themselves
-with provisions.<a id="FNanchor_191"></a><a href="#Footnote_191"
-class="fnanchor">[191]</a></p>
-
-<p>Four days of additional march brought them to a sight, the like
-of which they had not seen since Opis and Sittakê on the Tigris
-in Babylonia,—a large and flourishing city called Gymnias;
-an earnest of the neighborhood of the sea, of commerce, and of
-civilization. The chief of this city received them in a friendly
-manner, and furnished them with a guide who engaged to conduct them,
-after five days’ march, to a hill from whence they would<span
-class="pagenum"><a id="Page_111">[p. 111]</a></span> have a view
-of the sea. This was by no means their nearest way to the sea, for
-the chief of Gymnias wished to send them through the territory of
-some neighbors to whom he was hostile; which territory, as soon
-as they reached it, the guide desired them to burn and destroy.
-However, the promise was kept, and on the fifth day, marching still
-apparently through the territory of the Skythini, they reached
-the summit of a mountain called Thêchê, from whence the Euxine
-Sea was visible.<a id="FNanchor_192"></a><a href="#Footnote_192"
-class="fnanchor">[192]</a></p>
-
-<p>An animated shout from the soldiers who formed the van-guard
-testified the impressive effect of this long-deferred spectacle,
-assuring as it seemed to do, their safety and their return home.
-To Xenophon and to the rear-guard,—engaged in repelling the
-attack of natives who had come forward to revenge the plunder of
-their territory,—the shout was unintelligible. They at first
-imagined that the natives had commenced attack in front as well
-as in the rear, and that the van-guard was engaged in battle. But
-every moment the shout became louder, as fresh men came to the
-summit and gave vent to their feelings; so that Xenophon grew
-anxious, and galloped up to the van with his handful of cavalry to
-see what had happened. As he approached, the voice of the overjoyed
-crowd was heard distinctly crying out, <i>Thalatta, Thalatta</i> (The
-sea, the sea), and congratulating each other in ecstasy. The main
-body, the rear-guard, the baggage-soldiers driving up their horses
-and cattle before them, became all excited by the sound, and
-hurried up breathless to the summit. The whole army, officers and
-soldiers, were thus assembled, manifesting their joyous emotions
-by tears, embraces, and outpourings of enthusiastic sympathy. With
-spontaneous impulse they heaped up stones to decorate the spot by
-a monument and commemorative trophy; putting on the stones such
-homely offerings as their means afforded,—sticks, hides,
-and a few of the wicker shields just taken from the natives. To
-the guide, who had performed his engagement of bringing them in
-five days within sight of the sea, their gratitude was unbounded.
-They presented him with a horse, a silver bowl, a Persian costume,
-and ten darics in money; besides several<span class="pagenum"><a
-id="Page_112">[p. 112]</a></span> of the soldiers’ rings, which he
-especially asked for. Thus loaded with presents, he left them, having
-first shown them a village wherein they could find quarters,—as
-well as the road which they were to take through the territory
-of the Makrônes.<a id="FNanchor_193"></a><a href="#Footnote_193"
-class="fnanchor">[193]</a></p>
-
-<p>When they reached the river which divided the land of the
-Makrônes from that of the Skythini, they perceived the former
-assembled in arms on the opposite side to resist their passage. The
-river not being fordable, they cut down some neighboring trees to
-provide the means of crossing. While these Makrônes were shouting
-and encouraging each other aloud, a peltast in the Grecian army
-came to Xenophon, saying that he knew their language, and that he
-believed this to be his country. He had been a slave at Athens,
-exported from home during his boyhood,—he had then made his
-escape (probably during the Peloponnesian war, to the garrison of
-Dekeleia), and afterwards taken military service. By this fortunate
-accident, the generals were enabled to open negotiations with the
-Makrônes, and to assure them that the army would do them no harm,
-desiring nothing more than a free passage and a market to buy
-provisions. The Makrônes, on receiving such assurance in their
-own language from a countryman, exchanged pledges of friendship
-with the Greeks, assisted them to pass the river, and furnished
-the best market in their power during the three days’ march across
-their territory.<a id="FNanchor_194"></a><a href="#Footnote_194"
-class="fnanchor">[194]</a></p>
-
-<p>The army now reached the borders of the Kolchians, who were found
-in hostile array, occupying the summit of a considerable mountain
-which formed their frontier. Here Xenophon, having marshalled the
-soldiers for attack, with each lochus (company of one hundred men)
-in single file, instead of marching up the hill in phalanx, or
-continuous front with only a scanty depth,—addressed to them
-the following pithy encouragement,—“Now, gentlemen, these
-enemies before us are the only impediment that keeps us away from
-reaching the point at which we have been so long aiming. We must even
-eat them raw, if in any way we can do so.”</p>
-
-<p>Eighty of these formidable companies of hoplites, each in
-single file, now began to ascend the hill; the peltasts and bowmen
-being partly distributed among them, partly placed on the flanks.
-Cheirisophus and Xenophon, each commanding on one wing, spread<span
-class="pagenum"><a id="Page_113">[p. 113]</a></span> their peltasts
-in such a way as to outflank the Kolchians, who accordingly weakened
-their centre in order to strengthen their wings. Hence the Arcadian
-peltasts and hoplites in the Greek centre were enabled to attack and
-disperse the centre with little resistance; and all the Kolchians
-presently fled, leaving the Greeks in possession of their camp, as
-well as of several well-stocked villages in their rear. Amidst these
-villages the army remained to refresh themselves for several days. It
-was here that they tasted the grateful, but unwholesome honey, which
-this region still continues to produce,—unaware of its peculiar
-properties. Those soldiers who ate little of it were like men greatly
-intoxicated with wine; those who ate much, were seized with the most
-violent vomiting and diarrhœa, lying down like madmen in a state of
-delirium. From this terrible distemper some recovered on the ensuing
-day, others two or three days afterwards. It does not appear that any
-one actually died.<a id="FNanchor_195"></a><a href="#Footnote_195"
-class="fnanchor">[195]</a></p>
-
-<p>Two more days’ march brought them to the sea, at the Greek
-maritime city of Trapezus or Trebizond, founded by the inhabitants of
-Sinôpê on the coast of the Kolchian territory. Here the Trapezuntines
-received them with kindness and hospitality, sending them presents
-of bullocks, barley-meal, and wine. Taking up their quarters in some
-Kolchian villages near the town, they now enjoyed, for the first
-time since leaving Tarsus, a safe and undisturbed repose during
-thirty days, and were enabled to recover in some degree from the
-severe hardships which they had undergone. While the Trapezuntines
-brought produce for sale into the camp, the Greeks provided the
-means of purchasing it by predatory incursions against the Kolchians
-on the hills. Those Kolchians who dwelt under the hills and on the
-plain were in a state of semi-dependence upon Trapezus; so that the
-Trapezuntines mediated on their behalf and prevailed on the<span
-class="pagenum"><a id="Page_114">[p. 114]</a></span> Greeks to leave
-them unmolested, on condition of a contribution of bullocks.</p>
-
-<p>These bullocks enabled the Greeks to discharge the vow which they
-had made, on the proposition of Xenophon, to Zeus the Preserver,
-during that moment of dismay and despair which succeeded immediately
-on the massacre of their generals by Tissaphernes. To Zeus the
-Preserver, to Hêraklês the Conductor, and to various other gods, they
-offered an abundant sacrifice on their mountain camp overhanging the
-sea; and after the festival ensuing, the skins of the victims were
-given as prizes to competitors in running, wrestling, boxing, and
-the pankration. The superintendence of such festival games, so fully
-accordant with Grecian usage and highly interesting to the army,
-was committed to a Spartan named Drakontius; a man whose destiny
-recalls that of Patroklus and other Homeric heroes,—for he
-had been exiled as a boy, having unintentionally killed another
-boy with a short sword. Various departures from Grecian custom,
-however, were admitted. The matches took place on the steep and stony
-hill-side overhanging the sea, instead of on a smooth plain; and the
-numerous hard falls of the competitors afforded increased interest
-to the bystanders. The captive non-Hellenic boys were admitted
-to run for the prize, since otherwise a boy-race could not have
-been obtained. Lastly, the animation of the scene, as well as the
-ardor of the competitors, was much enhanced by the number of their
-mistresses present.<a id="FNanchor_196"></a><a href="#Footnote_196"
-class="fnanchor">[196]</a></p>
-
-<hr class="chap" />
-
-
-<div class="chapter" id="Chap_70app">
-  <p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_115">[p. 115]</a></span></p>
-  <h3>APPENDIX TO CHAPTER LXX.</h3>
-  <p class="center">ON THE GEOGRAPHY OF THE RETREAT OF THE TEN THOUSAND
-  AFTER THEY QUITTED THE TIGRIS AND ENTERED THE KARDUCHIAN
-  MOUNTAINS.</p>
-</div>
-
-<p class="noindent p1"><span class="smcap">It</span>
-would be injustice to this gallant and long-suffering body of men not
-to present the reader with a minute description of the full length
-of their stupendous march. Up to the moment when the Greeks enter
-Karduchia, the line of march may be indicated upon evidence which,
-though not identifying special halting-places or localities, makes
-us certain that we cannot be far wrong on the whole. But after that
-moment, the evidence gradually disappears, and we are left with
-nothing more than a knowledge of the terminus, the general course,
-and a few negative conditions.</p>
-
-<p>Mr. Ainsworth has given, in his Book IV. (Travels in the Track of
-the Ten Thousand, p. 155 seq.) an interesting topographical comment
-on the march through Karduchia, and on the difficulties which the
-Greeks would have to surmount. He has farther shown what may have
-been their probable line of march through Karduchia; but the most
-important point which he has established here, seems to be the
-identity of the river Kentritês with the Buhtan-Chai, an eastern
-affluent of the Tigris—distinguishing it from the river of
-Bitlis on the west and the river Khabur on the south-east, with both
-of which it had been previously confounded (p. 167). The Buhtan-Chai
-falls into the Tigris at a village called Til, and “constitutes at
-the present day, a natural barrier between Kurdistan and Armenia” (p.
-166). In this identification of the Kentritês with the Buhtan-Chai,
-Professor Koch agrees (Zug der Zehn Tausend, p. 78).</p>
-
-<p>If the Greeks crossed the Kentritês near its confluence with the
-Tigris, they would march up its right bank in one day to a situation
-near the modern town of Sert (Mr. Ainsworth thinks), though Xenophon
-takes no notice of the river of Bitlis, which nevertheless they must
-have passed. Their next two days of march, assuming a direction
-nearly north, would carry them (as Xenophon states, iv. 4, 2) beyond
-the sources of the Tigris; that is, “beyond the headwaters of the
-eastern tributaries to the Tigris.”</p>
-
-<p>Three days of additional march brought them to the river
-Teleboas—“of no great size, but beautiful” (iv. 4, 4). There
-appear sufficient reasons to identify this river with the Kara-Su or
-Black River, which flows through the valley or plain of Mush into
-the Murad or Eastern<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_116">[p.
-116]</a></span> Euphrates (Ainsworth, p. 172; Ritter, Erdkunde, part
-x. s. 37. p. 682). Though Kinneir (Journey through Asia Minor and
-Kurdistan, 1818, p. 484), Rennell (Illustrations of the Expedition of
-Cyrus, p. 207) and Bell (System of Geography, iv. p. 140) identify it
-with the Ak-Su or river of Mush—this, according to Ainsworth,
-“is only a small tributary to the Kara-Su, which is the great river
-of the plain and district.”</p>
-
-<p>Professor Koch, whose personal researches in and around Armenia
-give to his opinion the highest authority, follows Mr. Ainsworth in
-identifying the Teleboas with the Kara-Su. He supposes, however, that
-the Greeks crossed the Kentritês, not near its confluence with the
-Tigris, but considerably higher up, near the town of Sert or Sort.
-From hence he supposes that they marched nearly north-east in the
-modern road from Sert to Bitlis, thus getting round the head or near
-the head of the river called Bitlis-Su, which is one of the eastern
-affluents to the Tigris (falling first into the Buhtan-Chai), and
-which Xenophon took for the Tigris itself. They then marched farther,
-in a line not far distant from the Lake of Van, over the saddle which
-separates that lake from the lofty mountain Ali-Dagh. This saddle is
-the water-shed which separates the affluents to the Tigris from those
-to the Eastern Euphrates, of which latter the Teleboas or Kara-Su is
-one (Koch, Zug der Zehn Tausend, p. 82-84).</p>
-
-<p>After the river Teleboas, there seems no one point in the march
-which can be identified with anything approaching to certainty. Nor
-have we any means even of determining the general line of route,
-apart from specific places, which they followed from the river
-Teleboas to Trebizond.</p>
-
-<p>Their first object was to reach and cross the Eastern Euphrates.
-They would of course cross at the nearest point where they could
-find a ford. But how low down its course does the river continue to
-be fordable, in mid-winter, with snow on the ground? Here professor
-Koch differs from Mr. Ainsworth and colonel Chesney. He affirms that
-the river would be fordable a little above its confluence with the
-Tscharbahur, about latitude 39° 3′. According to Mr. Ainsworth, it
-would not be fordable below the confluence with the river of Khanus
-(Khinnis). Koch’s authority, as the most recent and systematic
-investigator of these regions, seems preferable, especially as it
-puts the Greeks nearly in the road now travelled over from Mush to
-Erzerum, which is said to be the only pass over the mountains open
-throughout all the winter, passing by Khinnis and Koili; see Ritter,
-Erdkunde, x. p. 387. Xenophon mentions a warm spring, which the army
-passed by during the third or fourth day after crossing the Euphrates
-(Anab. iv, 5, 15). Professor Koch believes himself to have identified
-this warm spring—the only one, as he states (p. 90-93), south
-of the range of mountains called the Bingöldagh—in the district
-called Wardo, near the village of Bashkan.</p>
-
-<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_117">[p. 117]</a></span></p>
-
-<p>To lay down, with any certainty, the line which the Greeks
-followed from the Euphrates to Trebizond, appears altogether
-impossible. I cannot admit the hypothesis of Mr. Ainsworth, who
-conducts the army across the Araxes to its northern bank, carries
-them up northward to the latitude of Teflis in Georgia, then brings
-them back again across the Harpa Chai (a northern affluent of the
-Araxes, which he identifies with the Harpasus mentioned by Xenophon)
-and the Araxes itself, to Gymnias, which he places near the site of
-Erzerum. Professor Koch (p. 104-108), who dissents with good reason
-from Mr. Ainsworth, proposes (though with hesitation and uncertainty)
-a line of his own which appears to me open greatly to the same
-objection as that of Mr. Ainsworth. It carries the Greeks too much to
-the northward of Erzerum, more out of their line of march from the
-place where they crossed the Eastern Euphrates, than can be justified
-by any probability. The Greeks knew well that, in order to get home
-they must take a westerly direction (see Anab. iii. 5, 15).</p>
-
-<p>Their great and constant purpose would be to make way to the
-westward, as soon as they had crossed the Euphrates; and the road
-from that river, passing near the site of Erzerum to Trebizond, would
-thus coincide, in the main, with their spontaneous tendency. They
-had no motive to go northward of Erzerum, nor ought we to suppose it
-without some proof. I trace out, therefore, a line of march much less
-circuitous; not meaning it to be understood as the real road which
-the army can be proved to have taken, but simply because it seems a
-possible line, and because it serves as a sort of approximation to
-complete the reader’s idea of the entire ground travelled over by the
-Ten Thousand.</p>
-
-<p>Koch hardly makes sufficient account of the overwhelming hardships
-with which the Greeks had to contend, when he states (p. 96) that
-if they had taken a line as straight, or nearly as straight as was
-practicable, they might have marched from the Euphrates to Trebizond
-in sixteen or twenty days, even allowing for the bad time of year.
-Considering that it was mid-winter, in that very high and cold
-country, with deep snow throughout; that they had absolutely no
-advantages or assistance of any kind; that their sick and disabled
-men, together with their arms, were to be carried by the stronger;
-that there were a great many women accompanying them; that they
-had beasts to drive along, carrying baggage and plunder,—the
-prophet Silanus, for example, having preserved his three thousand
-darics in coin from the field of Kunaxa until his return; that there
-was much resistance from the Chalybes and Taochi; that they had to
-take provisions where provisions were discoverable; that even a
-small stream must have impeded them, and probably driven them out
-of their course to find a ford,—considering the intolerable
-accumulation of these and other hardships, we need not wonder at any
-degree of slowness in their progress. It<span class="pagenum"><a
-id="Page_118">[p. 118]</a></span> rarely happens that modern
-travellers go over these regions in mid-winter; but we may see what
-travelling is at that season, by the dreadful description which Mr.
-Baillie Fraser gives of his journey from Tauris to Erzerum in the
-month of March (Travels in Koordhistan, Letter XV). Mr. Kinneir
-says (Travels, p. 353)—“The winters are so severe that all
-communication between Baiburt and the circumjacent villages is cut
-off for four months in the year, in consequence of the depth of the
-snow.”</p>
-
-<p>Now if we measure on Kiepert’s map the rectilinear
-distance,—the air-line—from Trebizond to the place
-where Koch represents the Greeks to have crossed the Eastern
-Euphrates,—we shall find it one hundred and seventy English
-miles. The number of days’ journey-marches which Xenophon mentions
-are fifty-four; even if we include the five days of march undertaken
-from Gymnias (Anab. iv. 7, 20), which, properly speaking, were
-directed against the enemies of the governor of Gymnias, more than
-for the promotion of their retreat. In each of those fifty-four days,
-therefore, they must have made 3.14 miles of rectilinear progress.
-This surely is not an unreasonably slow progress to suppose, under
-all the disadvantages of their situation; nor does it imply any
-very great actual departure from the straightest line practicable.
-Indeed Koch himself (in his Introduction, p. 4) suggests various
-embarrassments which must have occurred on the march, but which
-Xenophon has not distinctly stated.</p>
-
-<p>The river which Xenophon calls the Harpasus seems to be probably
-the Tchoruk-su, as colonel Chesney and Prof. Koch suppose. At least
-it is difficult to assign any other river with which the Harpasus can
-be identified.</p>
-
-<p>I cannot but think it probable that the city which Xenophon calls
-<i>Gymnias</i> (Diodorus, xiv. 29, calls it Gymnasia) was the same as
-that which is now called Gumisch-Khana (Hamilton), Gumush-Kaneh
-(Ainsworth), Gemisch-Khaneh (Kinneir). “Gumisch-Khana (says Mr.
-Hamilton, Travels in Asia Minor, vol. i. ch. xi. p. 168; ch. xiv. p.
-234) is celebrated as the site of the most ancient and considerable
-silver-mines in the Ottoman dominions.” Both Mr. Kinneir and Mr.
-Hamilton passed through Gumisch-Khana on the road from Trebizond to
-Erzerum.</p>
-
-<p>Now here is not only great similarity of name, and likelihood of
-situation,—but the existence of the silver mines furnishes a
-plausible explanation of that which would otherwise be very strange;
-the existence of this “great, flourishing, inhabited, city,” inland,
-in the midst of such barbarians,—the Chalybes, the Skythini,
-the Makrônes, etc.</p>
-
-<p>Mr. Kinneir reached Gumisch-Khana at the end of the third day
-after quitting Trebizond; the two last days having been very long
-and fatiguing. Mr. Hamilton, who also passed through Gumisch-Khana,
-reached it at the end of two long days. Both these travellers
-repre<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_119">[p. 119]</a></span>sent
-the road near Gumisch-Khana as extremely difficult. Mr. Ainsworth,
-who did not himself pass through Gumisch-Khana, tells us (what is of
-some importance in this discussion) that it lies in the <i>winter-road</i>
-from Erzerum to Trebizond (Travels in Asia Minor, vol. ii. p. 394).
-“The winter-road, which is the longest, passes by Gumisch-Khana, and
-takes the longer portion of valley; all the others cross over the
-mountain at various points, to the east of the road by the mines. But
-whether going by the mountains or the valley, the muleteers often go
-indifferently to the west as far as Ash Kaleh, and at other times
-turn off by the villages of Bey Mausour and Kodjah Bunar, where they
-take to the mountains.”</p>
-
-<p>Mr. Hamilton makes the distance from Trebizond to Gumisch-Khana
-eighteen hours, or fifty-four calculated post miles; that is, about
-forty English miles (Appendix to Travels in Asia Minor, vol. ii. p.
-389).</p>
-
-<p>Now we are not to suppose that the Greeks marched in any direct
-road from Gymnias to Trebizond. On the contrary, the five days’
-march which they undertook immediately from Gymnias were conducted
-by a guide sent from that town, who led them over the territories of
-people hostile to Gymnias, in order that they might lay waste the
-lands (iv. 7, 20). What progress they made, during these marches,
-towards Trebizond, is altogether doubtful. The guide promised that on
-the fifth day he would bring them to a spot from whence they could
-view the sea, and he performed his promise by leading them to the top
-of the sacred mountain Thêchê.</p>
-
-<p>Thêchê was a summit (ἄκρον, iv. 7, 25), as might be expected. But
-unfortunately it seems impossible to verify the particular summit
-on which the interesting scene described by Xenophon took place.
-Mr. Ainsworth presumes it to be the mountain called Kop-Dagh; from
-whence, however, according to Koch, the sea cannot be discerned.
-D’Anville and some other geographers identify it with the ridge
-called Tekieh-Dagh, to the east of Gumisch-Khana; nearer to the sea
-than that place. This mountain, I think, would suit pretty well for
-the narrative in respect to position; but Koch and other modern
-travellers affirm that it is neither high enough, nor near enough to
-the sea, to permit any such view as that which Xenophon relates. It
-stands on Kiepert’s map at a distance of full thirty-five English
-miles from the sea, the view of which, moreover, seems intercepted
-by the still higher mountain-chain now called Kolath-Dagh, a portion
-of the ancient Paryadres, which runs along parallel to the coast. It
-is to be recollected that in the first half of February, the time of
-Xenophon’s visit, the highest peaks would certainly be all covered
-with snow, and therefore very difficult to ascend.</p>
-
-<p>There is a striking view obtained of the sea from the mountain
-called Karakaban. This mountain, more than four thousand feet
-high, lies rather above twenty miles from the sea, to the south of
-Trebizond,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_120">[p. 120]</a></span>
-and immediately north of the still higher chain of Kolath-Dagh. From
-the Kolath-Dagh chain, which runs east and west, there strike out
-three or four parallel ridges to the northward, formed of primitive
-slate, and cut down precipitously so as to leave deep and narrow
-valleys between. On leaving Trebizond, the traveller ascends the hill
-immediately above the town, and then descends into the valley on
-the other side. His road to Karakaban lies partly along the valley,
-partly along the crest of one of the four ridges just mentioned. But
-throughout all this road, the sea is never seen; being hidden by the
-hills immediately above Trebizond. He does not again see the sea
-until he reaches Karakaban, which is sufficiently high to enable him
-to see over those hills. The guides (as I am informed by Dr. Holland,
-who twice went over the spot) point out with great animation this
-view of the sea, as particularly deserving of notice. It is enjoyed
-for a short space while the road winds round the mountain, and then
-again lost.</p>
-
-<p>Here is a view of the sea at once distant, sudden, impressive,
-and enjoyed from an eminence not too high to be accessible to the
-Cyreian army. In so far, it would be suitable to the description of
-Xenophon. Yet again it appears that a person coming to this point
-from the land-side (as Xenophon of course did), would find it in
-his descending route, not in his ascending; and this can hardly be
-reconciled with the description which we read in the Greek historian.
-Moreover, the subsequent marches which Xenophon mentions after
-quitting the mountain summit Thêchê, can hardly be reconciled with
-the supposition that it was the same as what is now called Karakaban.
-It is, indeed, quite possible, (as Mr. Hamilton suggests), that
-Thêchê may have been a peak apart from any road, and that the guide
-may have conducted the soldiers thither for the express purpose of
-showing the sea, guiding them back again into the road afterwards.
-This increases the difficulty of identifying the spot. However, the
-whole region is as yet very imperfectly known, and perhaps it is
-not impossible that there may be some particular locality even on
-Tekiah-Dagh, whence, through an accidental gap in the intervening
-mountains, the sea might become visible.</p>
-
-<hr class="chap" />
-
-
-<div class="chapter" id="Chap_71">
-  <p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_121">[p. 121]</a></span></p>
-  <h2 class="nobreak">CHAPTER LXXI.<br />
-  PROCEEDINGS OF THE TEN THOUSAND GREEKS, FROM THE TIME
-  THAT THEY REACHED TRAPEZUS, TO THEIR JUNCTION WITH
-  THE LACEDÆMONIAN ARMY IN ASIA MINOR.</h2>
-</div>
-
-<p class="noindent"><span class="smcap">We</span> now commence a
-third act in the history of this memorable body of men. After having
-followed them from Sardis to Kunaxa as mercenaries to procure the
-throne for Cyrus,—then from Kunaxa to Trapezus as men anxious
-only for escape, and purchasing their safety by marvellous bravery,
-endurance, and organization, we shall now track their proceedings
-among the Greek colonies on the Euxine and at the Bosphorus of
-Thrace, succeeded by their struggles against the meanness of the
-Thracian prince Seuthes, as well as against the treachery and
-arbitrary harshness of the Lacedæmonian commanders Anaxibius and
-Aristarchus.</p>
-
-<p>Trapezus, now Trebizond, where the army had recently found repose,
-was a colony from Sinôpê, as were also Kerasus and Kotyôra, farther
-westward; each of them receiving an harmost or governor from the
-mother-city, and paying to her an annual tribute. All these three
-cities were planted on the narrow strip of land dividing the Euxine
-from the elevated mountain range which so closely borders on its
-southern coast. At Sinôpê itself, the land stretches out into a
-defensible peninsula, with a secure harbor, and a large breadth of
-adjacent fertile soil. So tempting a site invited the Milesians, even
-before the year 600 <small>B.C.</small>, to plant a colony there,
-and enabled Sinôpê to attain much prosperity and power. Farther
-westward, not more than a long day’s journey for a rowing vessel from
-Byzantium, was situated the Megarian colony of Herakleia, in the
-territory of the Mariandyni.</p>
-
-<p>The native tenants of this line of coast, upon whom the Greek
-settlers intruded themselves (reckoning from the westward), were
-the Bithynian Thracians, the Mariandyni, the Paphlagonians, the
-Tibarêni, Chalybes, Mosynœki, Drilæ, and Kolchians. Here, as
-elsewhere, these natives found the Greek seaports useful, in
-giving a new value to inland produce, and in furnishing the great
-men<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_122">[p. 122]</a></span>
-with ornaments and luxuries to which they would otherwise have had
-no access. The citizens of Herakleia had reduced into dependence
-a considerable portion of the neighboring Mariandyni, and held
-them in a relation resembling that of the natives of Esthonia
-and Livonia to the German colonies in the Baltic. Some of the
-Kolchian villages were also subject, in the same manner, to the
-Trapezuntines;<a id="FNanchor_197"></a><a href="#Footnote_197"
-class="fnanchor">[197]</a> and Sinôpê doubtless possessed a similar
-inland dominion of greater or less extent. But the principal wealth
-of this important city arose from her navy and maritime commerce;
-from the rich thunny fishery attached to her promontory; from the
-olives in her immediate neighborhood, which was a cultivation not
-indigenous, but only naturalized by the Greeks on the seaboard;
-from the varied produce of the interior, comprising abundant herds
-of cattle, mines of silver, iron, and copper in the neighboring
-mountains, wood for ship-building, as well as for house furniture,
-and native slaves.<a id="FNanchor_198"></a><a href="#Footnote_198"
-class="fnanchor">[198]</a> The case was similar with the three
-colonies of Sinôpê, more to the eastward,—Kotyôra, Kerasus,
-and Trapezus; except that the mountains which border on the
-Euxine, gradually approaching nearer and nearer to the shore,
-left to each of them a more confined strip of cultivable land.
-For these cities the time had not yet arrived, to be conquered
-and absorbed by the inland monarchies around them, as Miletus
-and the cities on the eastern coast of Asia Minor had been. The
-Paphlagonians were at this time the only indigenous people in
-those regions who formed a considerable aggregated force, under
-a prince named Korylas; a prince tributary to Persia, yet half
-independent,—since he had disobeyed the summons of Artaxerxes
-to come up and help in repelling Cyrus<a id="FNanchor_199"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_199" class="fnanchor">[199]</a>—and now on
-terms of established alliance with Sinôpê, though not without
-secret designs, which he wanted only force to execute, against
-that city.<a id="FNanchor_200"></a><a href="#Footnote_200"
-class="fnanchor">[200]</a> The other native tribes to the eastward
-were mountaineers both ruder and more divided; warlike on their own
-heights, but little capable of any aggressive combinations.</p>
-
-<p>Though we are told that Perikles had once despatched a detachment
-of Athenian colonists to Sinôpê,<a id="FNanchor_201"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_201" class="fnanchor">[201]</a> and had expelled
-from thence the despot Timesilaus,—yet neither that city nor
-any of<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_123">[p. 123]</a></span>
-their neighbors appear to have taken a part in the Peloponnesian
-war, either for or against Athens; nor were they among the number of
-tributaries to Persia. They doubtless were acquainted with the upward
-march of Cyrus, which had disturbed all Asia; and probably were not
-ignorant of the perils and critical state of his Grecian army. But it
-was with a feeling of mingled surprise, admiration, and alarm, that
-they saw that army descend from the mountainous region, hitherto only
-recognized as the abode of Kolchians, Makrônes, and other analogous
-tribes, among whom was perched the mining city of Gymnias.</p>
-
-<p>Even after all the losses and extreme sufferings of
-the retreat, the Greeks still numbered, when mustered at
-Kerasus,<a id="FNanchor_202"></a><a href="#Footnote_202"
-class="fnanchor">[202]</a> eight thousand six hundred hoplites,
-with peltasts or targeteers, bowmen, slingers, etc., making a total
-of above ten thousand military persons. Such a force had never
-before been seen in the Euxine. Considering both the numbers and
-the now-acquired discipline and self-confidence of the Cyreians,
-even Sinôpê herself could have raised no force capable of meeting
-them in the field. Yet they did not belong to any city, nor
-receive orders from any established government. They were like
-those mercenary armies which marched about in Italy during the
-fourteenth century, under the generals called Condottieri, taking
-service sometimes with one city, sometimes with another. No one
-could predict what schemes they might conceive, or in what manner
-they might deal with the established communities on the shores of
-the Euxine. If we imagine that such an army had suddenly appeared
-in Sicily, a little time before the Athenian expedition against
-Syracuse, it would have been probably enlisted by Leontini and
-Katana in their war against Syracuse. If the inhabitants of
-Trapezus had wished to throw off the dominion of Sinôpê,—or
-if Korylas, the Paphlagonian, were meditating war against that
-city,—here were formidable auxiliaries to second their wishes.
-Moreover there were various tempting sites, open to the formation
-of a new colony, which, with so numerous a body of original
-Greek settlers, would<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_124">[p.
-124]</a></span> probably have overtopped Sinôpê herself. There was
-no restraining cause to reckon upon, except the general Hellenic
-sympathies and education of the Cyreian army; and what was of not
-less importance, the fact that they were not mercenary soldiers by
-permanent profession, such as became so formidably multiplied in
-Greece during the next generation,—but established citizens
-who had come out on a special service under Cyrus, with the full
-intention, after a year of lucrative enterprise, to return to their
-homes and families.<a id="FNanchor_203"></a><a href="#Footnote_203"
-class="fnanchor">[203]</a> We shall find such gravitation towards
-home steadily operative throughout the future proceedings of the
-army. But at the moment when they first emerged from the mountains,
-no one could be sure that it would be so. There was ample ground for
-uneasiness among the Euxine Greeks, especially the Sinopians, whose
-supremacy had never before been endangered.</p>
-
-<p>An undisturbed repose of thirty days enabled the Cyreians to
-recover from their fatigues, to talk over their past dangers, and
-to take pride in the anticipated effect which their unparalleled
-achievement could not fail to produce in Greece. Having discharged
-their vows and celebrated their festival to the gods, they held
-an assembly to discuss their future proceedings; when a Thurian
-soldier, named Antileon, exclaimed,—“Comrades, I am already
-tired of packing up, marching, running, carrying arms, falling into
-line, keeping watch, and fighting. Now that we have the sea here
-before us, I desire to be relieved from all these toils, to sail
-the rest of the way, and to arrive in Greece outstretched and<span
-class="pagenum"><a id="Page_125">[p. 125]</a></span> asleep,
-like Odysseus.” This pithy address being received with vehement
-acclamations, and warmly responded to by all,—Cheirisophus
-offered, if the army chose to empower him, to sail forthwith to
-Byzantium, where he thought he could obtain from his friend the
-Lacedæmonian admiral, Anaxibius, sufficient vessels for transport.
-His proposition was gladly accepted; and he departed to execute the
-project.</p>
-
-<p>Xenophon then urged upon the army various resolutions and
-measures, proper for the regulation of affairs during the absence
-of Cheirisophus. The army would be forced to maintain itself by
-marauding expeditions among the hostile tribes in the mountains.
-Such expeditions, accordingly, must be put under regulation; neither
-individual soldiers, nor small companies, must be allowed to go
-out at pleasure, without giving notice to the generals; moreover,
-the camp must be kept under constant guard and scouts, in the
-event of surprise from a retaliating enemy. It was prudent also
-to take the best measures in their power for procuring vessels;
-since, after all, Cheirisophus might possibly fail in bringing
-an adequate number. They ought to borrow a few ships of war from
-the Trapezuntines, and detain all the merchant ships which they
-saw; unshipping the rudders, placing the cargoes under guard, and
-maintaining the crew during all the time that the ships might be
-required for transport of the army. Many such merchant vessels were
-often sailing by;<a id="FNanchor_204"></a><a href="#Footnote_204"
-class="fnanchor">[204]</a> so that they would thus acquire the means
-of transport, even though Cheirisophus should bring few or none from
-Byzantium. Lastly, Xenophon proposed to require the Grecian cities to
-repair and put in order the road along the coast, for a land-march;
-since, perhaps, with all their efforts, it would be found impossible
-to get together a sufficient stock of transports.</p>
-
-<p>All the propositions of Xenophon were readily adopted by the army,
-except the last. But the mere mention of a renewed land-march excited
-such universal murmurs of repugnance, that he did not venture to put
-that question to the vote. He took upon himself, however, to send
-messages to the Grecian cities, on his own responsibility; urging
-them to repair the roads, in order that the<span class="pagenum"><a
-id="Page_126">[p. 126]</a></span> departure of the army might be
-facilitated. And he found the cities ready enough to carry his
-wishes into effect, as far as Kotyôra.<a id="FNanchor_205"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_205" class="fnanchor">[205]</a></p>
-
-<p>The wisdom of these precautionary suggestions of Xenophon soon
-appeared; for Cheirisophus not only failed in his object, but was
-compelled to stay away for a considerable time. A pentekonter (or
-armed ship with fifty oars) was borrowed from the Trapezuntines, and
-committed to the charge of a Lacedæmonian Periœkus, named Dexippus,
-for the purpose of detaining the merchant vessels passing by. This
-man having violated his trust, and employed the ship to make his own
-escape out of the Euxine, a second was obtained and confided to an
-Athenian, Polykrates; who brought in successively several merchant
-vessels. These the Greeks did not plunder, but secured the cargoes
-under adequate guard, and only reserved the vessels for transports.
-It became, however, gradually more and more difficult to supply the
-camp with provisions. Though the army was distributed into suitable
-detachments for plundering the Kolchian villages on the hills, and
-seizing cattle and prisoners for sale, yet these expeditions did
-not always succeed; indeed on one occasion, two Grecian lochi or
-companies got entangled in such difficult ground, that they were
-destroyed, to a man. The Kolchians united on the hills in increased
-and menacing numbers, insomuch that a larger guard became necessary
-for the camp; while the Trapezuntines,—tired of the protracted
-stay of the army, as well as desirous of exempting from pillage the
-natives in their own immediate neighborhood,—conducted the
-detachments only to villages alike remote and difficult of access.
-It was in this manner that a large force under Xenophon himself,
-attacked the lofty and rugged stronghold of the Drilæ,—the
-most warlike nation of mountaineers in the neighborhood of the
-Euxine; well armed, and troublesome to Trapezus by their incursions.
-After a difficult march and attack which Xenophon describes in
-interesting detail, and wherein the Greeks encountered no small
-hazard of ruinous defeat,—they returned in the end completely
-successful, and with a plentiful booty.<a id="FNanchor_206"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_206" class="fnanchor">[206]</a></p>
-
-<p>At length, after long awaiting in vain the reappearance of
-Cheirisophus, increasing scarcity and weariness determined them
-to<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_127">[p. 127]</a></span> leave
-Trapezus. A sufficient number of vessels had been collected to
-serve for the transport of the women, of the sick and wounded, and
-of the baggage. All these were accordingly placed on board, under
-the command of Philesius and Sophænetus, the two oldest generals;
-while the remaining army marched by land, along a road which had
-been just made good under the representations of Xenophon. In
-three days they reached Kerasus, another maritime colony of the
-Sinopeans, still in the territory called Kolchian; there they
-halted ten days, mustered and numbered the army, and divided the
-money acquired by the sale of their prisoners. Eight thousand six
-hundred hoplites, out of a total probably greater than eleven
-thousand, were found still remaining; besides targeteers and various
-light troops.<a id="FNanchor_207"></a><a href="#Footnote_207"
-class="fnanchor">[207]</a></p>
-
-<p>During the halt at Kerasus, the declining discipline of the
-army became manifest as they approached home. Various acts of
-outrage occurred, originating now, as afterwards, in the intrigues
-of treacherous officers. A captain named Klearetus persuaded his
-company to attempt the plunder of a Kolchian village near Kerasus,
-which had furnished a friendly market to the Greeks, and which
-rested secure on the faith of peaceful relations. He intended to
-make off separately with the booty in one of the vessels; but his
-attack was repelled, and he himself slain. The injured villagers
-despatched three elders, as heralds, to remonstrate with the Grecian
-authorities; but these heralds being seen in Kerasus by some of the
-repulsed plunderers, were slain. A partial tumult then ensued, in
-which even the magistrates of Kerasus were in great danger, and only
-escaped the pursuing soldiers by running<span class="pagenum"><a
-id="Page_128">[p. 128]</a></span> into the sea. This enormity, though
-it occurred under the eyes of the generals, immediately before their
-departure from Kerasus, remained without inquiry or punishment, from
-the numbers concerned in it.</p>
-
-<p>Between Kerasus and Kotyôra, there was not then (nor is there now)
-any regular road.<a id="FNanchor_208"></a><a href="#Footnote_208"
-class="fnanchor">[208]</a> This march cost the Cyreian army
-not less than ten days, by an inland track departing from the
-sea-shore, and through the mountains inhabited by the indigenous
-tribes Mosynœki and Chalybes. The latter, celebrated for their
-iron works, were under dependence to the former. As the Mosynœki
-refused to grant a friendly passage across their territory, the
-army were compelled to fight their way through it as enemies, with
-the aid of one section of these people themselves; which alliance
-was procured for them by the Trapezuntine Timesitheos, who was
-proxenus of the Mosynœki, and understood their language. The
-Greeks took the mountain fastnesses of this people, and plundered
-the wooden turrets which formed their abodes. Of their peculiar
-fashions Xenophon gives an interesting description, which I have
-not space to copy.<a id="FNanchor_209"></a><a href="#Footnote_209"
-class="fnanchor">[209]</a> The territory of the Tibarêni was more
-easy and accessible. This people met the Greeks with presents, and
-tendered a friendly passage. But the generals at first declined
-the presents,—preferring to treat them as enemies<span
-class="pagenum"><a id="Page_129">[p. 129]</a></span> and plunder
-them; which in fact they would have done, had they not been
-deterred by inauspicious sacrifices.<a id="FNanchor_210"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_210" class="fnanchor">[210]</a></p>
-
-<p>Near Kotyôra, which was situated on the coast of the Tibarêni, yet
-on the borders of Paphlagonia, they remained forty-five days, still
-awaiting the appearance of Cheirisophus with the transports to carry
-them away by sea. The Sinopian harmost or governor, did not permit
-them to be welcomed in so friendly a manner as at Trapezus. No market
-was provided for them, nor were their sick admitted within the walls.
-But the fortifications of the town were not so constructed as to
-resist a Greek force, the like of which had never before been seen
-in those regions. The Greek generals found a weak point, made their
-way in, and took possession of a few houses for the accommodation
-of their sick; keeping a guard at the gate to secure free egress,
-but doing no farther violence to the citizens. They obtained their
-victuals partly from the Kotyôrite villages, partly from the
-neighboring territory of Paphlagonia, until at length envoys arrived
-from Sinôpê to remonstrate against their proceedings.</p>
-
-<p>These envoys presented themselves before the assembled soldiers
-in the camp, when Hekatonymus, the chief and the most eloquent
-among them, began by complimenting the army upon their gallant
-exploits and retreat. He then complained of the injury which Kotyôra
-and Sinôpê, as the mother city of Kotyôra, had suffered at their
-hands, in violation of common Hellenic kinship. If such proceedings
-were continued, he intimated that Sinôpê would be compelled in
-her own defence to seek alliance with the Paphlagonian prince
-Korylas, or any other barbaric auxiliary who would lend them aid
-against the Greeks.<a id="FNanchor_211"></a><a href="#Footnote_211"
-class="fnanchor">[211]</a> Xenophon replied that if the Kotyôrites
-had sustained any damage, it was owing to their own ill-will and to
-the Sinopian harmost in the place; that the generals were under the
-necessity of procuring subsistence for the soldiers, with house-room
-for the sick, and that they had taken nothing more; that the sick men
-were lying within the town, but at their own cost, while the other
-soldiers were all encamped without; that they had maintained cordial
-friendship with the Trapezuntines, and requited all their good
-offices; that they sought no enemies except through necessity, being
-anxious<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_130">[p. 130]</a></span>
-only again to reach Greece; and that as for the threat respecting
-Korylas, they knew well enough that that prince was eager to become
-master of the wealthy city of Sinôpê, and would speedily attempt
-some such enterprise if he could obtain the Cyreian army as his
-auxiliaries.<a id="FNanchor_212"></a><a href="#Footnote_212"
-class="fnanchor">[212]</a></p>
-
-<p>This judicious reply shamed the colleagues of Hekatonymus so much,
-that they went the length of protesting against what he had said,
-and of affirming that they had come with propositions of sympathy
-and friendship to the army, as well as with promises to give them
-an hospitable reception at Sinôpê, if they should visit that town
-on their way home. Presents were at once sent to the army by the
-inhabitants of Kotyôra, and a good understanding established.</p>
-
-<p>Such an interchange of good will with the powerful city of Sinôpê
-was an unspeakable advantage to the army,—indeed, an essential
-condition to their power of reaching home. If they continued their
-march by land, it was only through Sinopian guidance and mediation
-that they could obtain or force a passage through Paphlagonia; while
-for a voyage by sea, there was no chance of procuring a sufficient
-number of vessels except from Sinôpê, since no news had been
-received of Cheirisophus. On the other hand, that city had also a
-strong interest in facilitating their transit homeward, and thus
-removing formidable neighbors for whose ulterior purposes there
-could be no guarantee. After some preliminary conversation with the
-Sinopian envoys, the generals convoked the army in assembly, and
-entreated Hekatonymus and his companions to advise them as to the
-best mode of proceeding westward to the Bosphorus. Hekatonymus,
-after apologizing for the menacing insinuations of his former
-speech, and protesting that he had no other object in view except
-to point out the safest and easiest plan of route for the army,
-began to unfold the insuperable difficulties of a march through
-Paphlagonia. The very entrance into the country must be achieved
-through a narrow aperture in the mountains, which it was impossible
-to force if occupied by the enemy. Even assuming this difficulty to
-be surmounted, there were spacious plains to be passed over, wherein
-the Paphlagonian horse, the most numerous and bravest in Asia,
-would be found almost irresistible. There were also three or four
-great rivers, which the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_131">[p.
-131]</a></span> army would be unable to pass,—the Thermodon
-and the Iris, each three hundred feet in breadth,—the Halys,
-two stadia or nearly a quarter of a mile in breadth,—the
-Parthenius, also very considerable. Such an array of obstacles (he
-affirmed) rendered the project of marching through Paphlagonia
-impracticable; whereas the voyage by sea from Kotyôra to Sinôpê,
-and from Sinôpê to Herakleia, was easy; and the transit from
-the latter place, either by sea to Byzantium, or by land across
-Thrace, yet easier.<a id="FNanchor_213"></a><a href="#Footnote_213"
-class="fnanchor">[213]</a></p>
-
-<p>Difficulties like these, apparently quite real, were more than
-sufficient to determine the vote of the army, already sick of
-marching and fighting, in favor of the sea-voyage; though there
-were not wanting suspicions of the sincerity of Hekatonymus. But
-Xenophon, in communicating to the latter the decision of the army,
-distinctly apprised him that they would on no account permit
-themselves to be divided; that they would either depart or remain
-all in a body, and that vessels must be provided sufficient for
-the transport of all. Hekatonymus desired them to send envoys
-of their own to Sinôpê to make the necessary arrangements.
-Three envoys were accordingly sent,—Ariston, an Athenian,
-Kalimachus, an Arcadian, and Samolas, an Achæan; the Athenian,
-probably, as possessing the talent of speaking in the Sinopian
-senate or assembly.<a id="FNanchor_214"></a><a href="#Footnote_214"
-class="fnanchor">[214]</a></p>
-
-<p>During the absence of these envoys, the army still continued
-near Kotyôra with a market provided by the town, and with
-traders from Sinôpê and Herakleia in the camp. Such soldiers as
-had no money wherewith to purchase, subsisted by pillaging the
-neighboring frontier of Paphlagonia.<a id="FNanchor_215"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_215" class="fnanchor">[215]</a> But they were
-receiving no pay; every man was living on his own resources;
-and instead of carrying back a handsome purse to Greece, as
-each soldier had hoped when he first took service under Cyrus,
-there seemed every prospect of their returning poorer than when
-they left home.<a id="FNanchor_216"></a><a href="#Footnote_216"
-class="fnanchor">[216]</a> Moreover, the army was now moving onward
-without any definite purpose, with increasing dissatisfaction
-and decreasing discipline; insomuch that Xenophon foresaw the
-difficulties which would beset the responsible commanders when they
-should come within the stricter restraints and obligations of the
-Grecian world.</p>
-
-<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_132">[p. 132]</a></span></p>
-
-<p>It was these considerations which helped to suggest to him the
-idea of employing the army on some enterprise of conquest and
-colonization in the Euxine itself; an idea highly flattering to
-his personal ambition, especially as the army was of unrivalled
-efficiency against an enemy, and no such second force could ever
-be got together in those distant regions. His patriotism as a
-Greek was inflamed with the thoughts of procuring for Hellas a new
-autonomous city, occupied by a considerable Hellenic population,
-possessing a spacious territory, and exercising dominion over many
-indigenous neighbors. He seems to have thought first of attacking and
-conquering some established non-Hellenic city; an act which his ideas
-of international morality did not forbid, in a case where he had
-contracted no special convention with the inhabitants,—though
-he (as well as Cheirisophus) strenuously protested against doing
-wrong to any innocent Hellenic community.<a id="FNanchor_217"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_217" class="fnanchor">[217]</a> He contemplated the
-employment of the entire force in capturing Phasis or some other
-native city; after which, when the establishment was once safely
-effected, those soldiers who preferred going home to remaining as
-settlers, might do so without emperiling those who stayed, and
-probably with their own purses filled by plunder and conquest in
-the neighborhood. To settle as one of the richest proprietors and
-chiefs,—perhaps even the recognized Œkist, like Agnon at
-Amphipolis,—of a new Hellenic city such as could hardly fail to
-become rich, powerful, and important,—was a tempting prospect
-for one who had now acquired the habits of command. Moreover, the
-sequel will prove, how correctly Xenophon appreciated the discomfort
-of leading the army back to Greece without pay and without certain
-employment.</p>
-
-<p>It was the practice of Xenophon, and the advice of his master
-Sokrates,<a id="FNanchor_218"></a><a href="#Footnote_218"
-class="fnanchor">[218]</a> in grave and doubtful cases, where the
-most careful reflection<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_133">[p.
-133]</a></span> was at fault, to recur to the inspired authority of
-an oracle or a prophet, and to offer sacrifice, in full confidence
-that the gods would vouchsafe to communicate a special revelation
-to any person whom they favored. Accordingly Xenophon, previous to
-any communication with the soldiers respecting his new project, was
-anxious to ascertain the will of the gods by a special sacrifice;
-for which he invoked the presence of the Ambrakiot Silanus,
-the chief prophet in the army. This prophet (as I have already
-mentioned), before the battle of Kunaxa, had assured Cyrus that
-Artaxerxes would not fight for ten days,—and the prophecy came
-to pass; which made such an impression on Cyrus that he rewarded
-him with the prodigious present of three thousand darics or ten
-Attic talents. While others were returning poor, Silanus, having
-contrived to preserve this sum throughout all the hardships of
-the retreat, was extremely rich, and anxious only to hasten home
-with his treasure in safety. He heard with strong repugnance the
-project of remaining in the Euxine, and determined to traverse it
-by intrigue. As far as concerned the sacrifices, indeed, which
-he offered apart with Xenophon, he was obliged to admit that the
-indications of the victims were favorable;<a id="FNanchor_219"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_219" class="fnanchor">[219]</a> Xenophon<span
-class="pagenum"><a id="Page_134">[p. 134]</a></span> himself being
-too familiar with the process to be imposed upon. But he at the
-same time tried to create alarm by declaring that a nice inspection
-disclosed evidence of treacherous snares laid for Xenophon; which
-latter indications he himself began to realize, by spreading
-reports among the army that the Athenian general was laying
-clandestine plans for keeping them away from Greece without their
-own concurrence.<a id="FNanchor_220"></a><a href="#Footnote_220"
-class="fnanchor">[220]</a></p>
-
-<p>Thus prematurely and insidiously divulged, the scheme found
-some supporters, but a far larger number of opponents; especially
-among those officers who were jealous of the ascendency of
-Xenophon. Timasion and Thorax employed it as a means of alarming
-the Herakleotic and Sinopian traders in the camp; telling them
-that unless they provided not merely transports, but also pay for
-the soldiers, Xenophon would find means to detain the army in the
-Euxine, and would employ the transports when they arrived, not
-for the homeward voyage, but for his own projects of acquisition
-This news spread so much terror both at Sinôpê and Herakleia, that
-large offers of money were made from both cities to Timasion, on
-condition that he would ensure the departure of the army, as soon
-as the vessels should be assembled at Kotyôra. Accordingly these
-officers, convening an assembly of the soldiers, protested against
-the duplicity of Xenophon in thus preparing momentous schemes without
-any public debate or decision. And Timasion, seconded by Thorax,
-not only strenuously urged the army to return, but went so far as
-to promise to them, on the faith of the assurances from Herakleia
-and Sinôpê, future pay on a liberal scale, to commence from the
-first new moon after their departure; together with a hospitable
-reception in his native city of Dardanus on the Hellespont, from
-whence they could make incursions on the rich neighboring satrapy
-of Pharnabazus.<a id="FNanchor_221"></a><a href="#Footnote_221"
-class="fnanchor">[221]</a></p>
-
-<p>It was not, however, until these attacks were repeated from
-more than one quarter,—until the Achæans Philesius and Lykon
-had<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_135">[p. 135]</a></span> loudly
-accused Xenophon of underhand manœuvring to cheat the army into
-remaining against their will,—that the latter rose to repel
-the imputation; saying, that all that he had done was, to consult
-the gods whether it would be better to lay his project before the
-army or to keep it in his own bosom. The encouraging answer of the
-gods, as conveyed through the victims and testified even by Silanus
-himself, proved that the scheme was not ill-conceived; nevertheless,
-(he remarked) Silanus had begun to lay snares for him, realizing by
-his own proceedings a collateral indication which he had announced to
-be visible in the victims. “If (added Xenophon) you had continued as
-destitute and unprovided as you were just now,—I should still
-have looked out for a resource in the capture of some city which
-would have enabled such of you as chose, to return at once; while the
-rest stay behind to enrich themselves. But now there is no longer any
-necessity; since Herakleia and Sinôpê are sending transports, and
-Timasion promises pay to you from the next new moon. Nothing can be
-better; you will go back safely to Greece, and will receive pay for
-going thither. I desist at once from my scheme, and call upon all who
-were favorable to it to desist also. Only let us all keep together
-until we are on safe ground; and let the man who lags behind or
-runs off, be condemned as a wrong-doer.”<a id="FNanchor_222"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_222" class="fnanchor">[222]</a></p>
-
-<p>Xenophon immediately put this question to the vote, and every
-hand was held up in its favor. There was no man more disconcerted
-with the vote than the prophet Silanus, who loudly exclaimed against
-the injustice of detaining any one desirous to depart. But the
-soldiers put him down with vehement disapprobation, threatening that
-they would assuredly punish him if they caught him running off. His
-intrigue against Xenophon thus recoiled upon himself, for the moment.
-But shortly afterwards, when the army reached Herakleia, he took
-his opportunity for clandestine flight, and found his way back to
-Greece with the three thousand darics.<a id="FNanchor_223"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_223" class="fnanchor">[223]</a></p>
-
-<p>If Silanus gained little by his manœuvre, Timasion and his
-partners gained still less. For so soon as it became known that
-the army had taken a formal resolution to go back to Greece, and
-that Xenophon himself had made the proposition, the Sinopians<span
-class="pagenum"><a id="Page_136">[p. 136]</a></span> and the
-Herakleots felt at their ease. They sent the transport vessels,
-but withheld the money which they had promised to Timasion and
-Thorax. Hence these officers were exposed to dishonor and peril;
-for, having positively engaged to find pay for the army, they were
-now unable to keep their word. So keen were their apprehensions,
-that they came to Xenophon and told him that they had altered
-their views, and that they now thought it best to employ the
-newly-arrived transports in conveying the army, not to Greece, but
-against the town and territory of Phasis at the eastern extremity
-of the Euxine.<a id="FNanchor_224"></a><a href="#Footnote_224"
-class="fnanchor">[224]</a> Xenophon replied, that they might convene
-the soldiers and make the proposition, if they chose; but that
-he would have nothing to say to it. To make the very proposition
-themselves, for which they had so much inveighed against Xenophon,
-was impossible without some preparation; so that each of them began
-individually to sound his captains, and get the scheme suggested by
-them. During this interval, the soldiery obtained information of
-the manœuvre, much to their discontent and indignation; of which
-Neon (the lieutenant of the absent Cheirisophus) took advantage, to
-throw the whole blame upon Xenophon; alleging that it was he who had
-converted the other officers to his original project, and that he
-intended as soon as the soldiers were on shipboard, to convey them
-fraudulently to Phasis instead of to Greece. There was something
-so plausible in this glaring falsehood, which represented Xenophon
-as the author of the renewed project, once his own,—and
-something so improbable in the fact that the other officers should
-spontaneously have renounced their own strong opinions to take up
-his,—that we can hardly be surprised at the ready credence
-which Neon’s calumny found among the army. Their exasperation
-against Xenophon became so intense, that they collected in fierce
-groups; and there was even a fear that they would break out into
-mutinous violence, as they had before done against the magistrates of
-Kerasus.</p>
-
-<p>Well knowing the danger of such spontaneous and informal
-assemblages, and the importance of the habitual solemnities of
-convocation and arrangement, to ensure either discussion or
-legitimate<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_137">[p. 137]</a></span>
-defence,<a id="FNanchor_225"></a><a href="#Footnote_225"
-class="fnanchor">[225]</a>—Xenophon immediately sent round the
-herald to summon the army into the regular agora, with customary
-method and ceremony. The summons was obeyed with unusual alacrity,
-and Xenophon then addressed them,—refraining, with equal
-generosity and prudence, from saying anything about the last
-proposition which Timasion and others had made to him. Had he
-mentioned it, the question would have become one of life and death
-between him and those other officers.</p>
-
-<p>“Soldiers (said he), I understand that there are some men here
-calumniating me, as if I were intending to cheat you and carry you
-to Phasis. Hear me, then, in the name of the gods. If I am shown to
-be doing wrong, let me not go from hence unpunished; but if, on the
-contrary, my calumniators are proved to be the wrong-doers, deal
-with them as they deserve. You surely well know where the sun rises
-and where he sets; you know that if a man wishes to reach Greece,
-he must go westward,—if to the barbaric territories, he must
-go eastward. Can any one hope to deceive you on this point, and
-persuade you that the sun rises on <i>this</i> side, and sets on<span
-class="pagenum"><a id="Page_138">[p. 138]</a></span> <i>that</i>? Can
-any one cheat you into going on shipboard with a wind which blows
-you away from Greece? Suppose even that I put you aboard when there
-is no wind at all. How am I to force you to sail with me against
-your own consent,—I being only in one ship, you in a hundred
-and more? Imagine, however, that I could even succeed in deluding
-you to Phasis. When we land there, you will know at once that
-we are not in Greece; and what fate can I then expect,—a
-detected impostor in the midst of ten thousand men with arms in
-their hands? No,—these stories all proceed from foolish men,
-who are jealous of my influence with you; jealous, too, without
-reason,—for I neither hinder <i>them</i> from outstripping me
-in your favor, if they can render you greater service,—nor
-<i>you</i> from electing them commanders, if you think fit. Enough of
-this, now; I challenge any one to come forward and say how it is
-possible either to cheat, or to be cheated, in the manner laid
-to my charge.”<a id="FNanchor_226"></a><a href="#Footnote_226"
-class="fnanchor">[226]</a></p>
-
-<p>Having thus grappled directly with the calumnies of his enemies,
-and dissipated them in such manner as doubtless to create a reaction
-in his own favor, Xenophon made use of the opportunity to denounce
-the growing disorders in the army; which he depicted as such
-that, if no corrective were applied, disgrace and contempt must
-fall upon all. As he paused after this general remonstrance, the
-soldiers loudly called upon him to go into particulars; upon which
-he proceeded to recall, with lucid and impressive simplicity, the
-outrages which had been committed at and near Kerasus,—the
-unauthorized and unprovoked attack made by Klearetus and his
-company on a neighboring village which was in friendly commerce
-with the army,—the murder of the three elders of the village,
-who had come as heralds to complain to the generals about such
-wrong,—the mutinous attack made by disorderly soldiers even
-upon the magistrates of Kerasus, at the very moment when they were
-remonstrating with the generals on what had occurred; exposing these
-magistrates to the utmost peril, and putting the generals themselves
-to ignominy.<a id="FNanchor_227"></a><a href="#Footnote_227"
-class="fnanchor">[227]</a> “If such are to be our proceedings,
-(continued Xenophon), look you well into what condition the army
-will fall. You, the aggregate body,<a id="FNanchor_228"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_228" class="fnanchor">[228]</a> will no longer
-be<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_139">[p. 139]</a></span> the
-sovereign authority to make war or peace with whom you please; each
-individual among you will conduct the army against any point which
-he may choose. And even if men should come to you as envoys, either
-for peace or for other purposes, they may be slain by any single
-enemy; so that you will be debarred from all public communications
-whatever. Next, those whom your universal suffrage shall have chosen
-commanders, will have no authority; while any self-elected general
-who chooses to give the word, Cast! Cast! (i. e. darts or stones),
-may put to death, without trial, either officer or soldier, as it
-suits him; that is, if he finds you ready to obey him, as it happened
-near Kerasus. Look, now, what these self-elected leaders have done
-for you. The magistrate of Kerasus, if he was really guilty of
-wrong towards you, has been enabled to escape with impunity; if
-he was innocent, he has been obliged to run away from you, as the
-only means of avoiding death without pretence or trial. Those who
-stoned the heralds to death, have brought matters to such a pass,
-that you alone, among all Greeks, cannot enter the town of Kerasus
-in safety, unless in commanding force; and that we cannot even
-send in a herald to take up our dead (Klearetus and those who were
-slain in the attack on the Kerasuntine village) for burial; though
-at first those who had slain them in self-defence were anxious to
-give up the bodies to us. For who will take the risk of going in as
-herald, from those who have set the example of putting heralds to
-death? We generals were obliged to entreat the Kerasuntines to bury
-the bodies for us.”<a id="FNanchor_229"></a><a href="#Footnote_229"
-class="fnanchor">[229]</a></p>
-
-<p>Continuing in this emphatic protest against the recent disorders
-and outrages, Xenophon at length succeeded in impressing his own
-sentiment, heartily and unanimously, upon the soldiers. They<span
-class="pagenum"><a id="Page_140">[p. 140]</a></span> passed a vote
-that the ringleaders of the mutiny at Kerasus should be punished;
-that if any one was guilty of similar outrages in future, he should
-be put upon his trial by the generals, before the lochages or
-captains as judges, and if condemned by them, put to death; and that
-trial should be had before the same persons, for any other wrong
-committed since the death of Cyrus. A suitable religious ceremony
-was also directed to be performed, at the instance of Xenophon
-and the prophets, to purify the army.<a id="FNanchor_230"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_230" class="fnanchor">[230]</a></p>
-
-<p>This speech affords an interesting specimen of the political
-morality universal throughout the Grecian world, though deeper and
-more predominant among its better sections. In the miscellaneous
-aggregate, and temporary society, now mustered at Kotyôra, Xenophon
-insists on the universal suffrage of the whole body, as the
-legitimate sovereign authority for the guidance of every individual
-will; the decision of the majority, fairly and formally collected,
-as carrying a title to prevail over every dissentient minority;
-the generals chosen by the majority of votes, as the only persons
-entitled to obedience. This is the cardinal principle to which he
-appeals, as the anchorage of political obligation in the mind of
-each separate man or fraction; as the condition of all success, all
-safety, and all conjoint action; as the only condition either for
-punishing wrong or protecting right; as indispensable to keep up
-their sympathies with the Hellenic communities, and their dignity
-either as soldiers or as citizens. The complete success of his speech
-proves that he knew how to touch the right chord of Grecian feeling.
-No serious acts of individual insubordination occurred afterwards,
-though the army collectively went wrong on more than one occasion.
-And what is not less important to notice,—the influence of
-Xenophon himself, after his unreserved and courageous remonstrance,
-seems to have been sensibly augmented,—certainly no way
-diminished.</p>
-
-<p>The circumstances which immediately followed were indeed well
-calculated to augment it. For it was resolved, on the proposition
-of Xenophon himself<a id="FNanchor_231"></a><a href="#Footnote_231"
-class="fnanchor">[231]</a> that the generals themselves should
-be<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_141">[p. 141]</a></span> tried
-before the newly-constituted tribunal of the lochages or captains,
-in case any one had complaint to make against them for past matters;
-agreeably to the Athenian habit of subjecting every magistrate to
-a trial of accountability on laying down his office. In the course
-of this investigation, Philesius and Xanthiklês were fined twenty
-minæ, to make good an assignable deficiency of that amount, in the
-cargoes of those merchantmen which had been detained at Trapezus
-for the transport of the army; Sophænetus, who had the general
-superintendence of this property, but had been negligent in that
-duty, was fined ten minæ. Next, the name of Xenophon was put up, when
-various persons stood forward to accuse him of having beaten and
-ill-used them. As commander of the rear-guard, his duty was by far
-the severest and most difficult, especially during the intense cold
-and deep snow; since the sick and wounded, as well as the laggards
-and plunderers, all fell under his inspection. One man especially
-was loud in complaints against him, and Xenophon questioned him, as
-to the details of his case, before the assembled army. It turned out
-that he had given him blows, because the man, having been intrusted
-with the task of carrying a sick soldier, was about to evade the
-duty by burying the dying man alive.<a id="FNanchor_232"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_232" class="fnanchor">[232]</a> This interesting
-debate (given in the Anabasis at length) ended by full approbation,
-on the part of the army, of Xenophon’s conduct, accompanied with
-regret that he had not handled the man yet more severely.</p>
-
-<p>The statements of Xenophon himself give us a vivid idea of the
-internal discipline of the army, even as managed by a discreet and
-well-tempered officer. “I acknowledge (said he to the soldiers)
-to have struck many men for disorderly conduct; men who were
-content to owe their preservation to your orderly march and
-constant fighting, while they themselves ran about to plunder and
-enrich themselves at your cost. Had we all acted as they did, we
-should have perished to a man. Sometimes, too, I struck<span
-class="pagenum"><a id="Page_142">[p. 142]</a></span> men who
-were lagging behind with cold and fatigue, or were stopping the
-way so as to hinder others from getting forward; I struck them
-with my fist,<a id="FNanchor_233"></a><a href="#Footnote_233"
-class="fnanchor">[233]</a> in order to save them from the spear
-of the enemy. You yourselves stood by, and saw me; you had arms
-in your hands, yet none of you interfered to prevent me. I did it
-for their good as well as for yours, not from any insolence of
-disposition; for it was a time when we were all alike suffering
-from cold, hunger, and fatigue; whereas I now live comparatively
-well, drink more wine, and pass easy days,—and yet I strike
-no one. You will find that the men who failed most in those times
-of hardship, are now the most outrageous offenders in the army.
-There is Boïskus,<a id="FNanchor_234"></a><a href="#Footnote_234"
-class="fnanchor">[234]</a> the Thessalian pugilist, who pretended
-sickness during the march, in order to evade the burthen of carrying
-his shield,—and now, as I am informed, he has stripped several
-citizens of Kotyôra of their clothes. If (he concluded) the blows
-which I have occasionally given, in cases of necessity, are now
-brought in evidence,—I call upon those among you also, to
-whom I have rendered aid and protection, to stand up and testify
-in my favor.”<a id="FNanchor_235"></a><a href="#Footnote_235"
-class="fnanchor">[235]</a></p>
-
-<p>Many individuals responded to this appeal, insomuch that Xenophon
-was not merely acquitted, but stood higher than before in the
-opinion of the army. We learn from his defence that for a commanding
-officer to strike a soldier with his fist, if wanting in duty,
-was not considered improper; at least under such circumstances as
-those of the retreat. But what deserves notice still more, is,
-the extraordinary influence which Xenophon’s powers of speaking
-gave him over the minds of the army. He stood distinguished from
-the other generals, Lacedæmonian, Arcadian, Achæan, etc.,<span
-class="pagenum"><a id="Page_143">[p. 143]</a></span> by having
-the power of working on the minds of the soldiers collectively;
-and we see that he had the good sense, as well as the spirit,
-not to shrink from telling them unpleasant truths. In spite
-of such frankness—or rather, partly by means of such
-frankness,—his ascendency as commander not only remained
-unabated, as compared with that of the others, but went on
-increasing. For whatever may be said about the flattery of orators
-as a means of influence over the people,—it will be found that
-though particular points may be gained in this way, yet wherever
-the influence of an orator has been steady and long-continued (like
-that of Perikles<a id="FNanchor_236"></a><a href="#Footnote_236"
-class="fnanchor">[236]</a> or Demosthenes) it is owing in part to
-the fact that he has an opinion of his own, and is not willing to
-accommodate himself constantly to the prepossessions of his hearers.
-Without the oratory of Xenophon, there would have existed no engine
-for kindling or sustaining the <i>sensus communis</i> of the ten thousand
-Cyreians assembled at Kotyôra, or for keeping up the moral authority
-of the aggregate over the individual members and fractions. The
-other officers could doubtless speak well enough to address short
-encouragements, or give simple explanations, to the soldiers;
-without this faculty, no man was fit for military command over
-Greeks. But the oratory of Xenophon was something of a higher order.
-Whoever will study the discourse pronounced by him at Kotyôra, will
-perceive a dexterity in dealing with assembled multitudes,—a
-discriminating use sometimes of the plainest and most direct appeal,
-sometimes of indirect insinuation or circuitous transitions to work
-round the minds of the hearers,—a command of those fundamental
-political convictions which lay deep in the Grecian mind, but
-were often so overlaid by the fresh impulses arising out of each
-successive situation, as to require some positive friction to draw
-them out from their latent state—lastly, a power of expansion
-and varied repetition—such as would be naturally imparted
-both by the education and the practice of an intelligent Athenian,
-but would rarely be found in any other Grecian city. The energy and
-judgment displayed by Xenophon in the retreat were doubtless not
-less essential to his influence than his power of speaking; but in
-these points we may be sure that other officers were more nearly
-his equals.</p> <p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_144">[p.
-144]</a></span></p> <p>The important public proceedings above
-described not only restored the influence of Xenophon, but also
-cleared off a great amount of bad feeling, and sensibly abated
-the bad habits, which had grown up in the army. A scene which
-speedily followed was not without effect in promoting cheerful and
-amicable sympathies. The Paphlagonian prince Korylas, weary of the
-desultory warfare carried on between the Greeks and the border
-inhabitants, sent envoys to the Greek camp with presents of horses
-and fine robes,<a id="FNanchor_237"></a><a href="#Footnote_237"
-class="fnanchor">[237]</a> and with expressions of a wish to conclude
-peace. The Greek generals accepted the presents, and promised to
-submit the proposition to the army. But first they entertained the
-envoys at a banquet, providing at the same time games and dances,
-with other recreations amusing not only to them but also to the
-soldiers generally. The various dances, warlike and pantomimic,
-of Thracians, Mysians, Ænianes, Magnêtes, etc., are described by
-Xenophon in a lively and interesting manner. They were followed on
-the next day by an amicable convention concluded between the army and
-the Paphlagonians.<a id="FNanchor_238"></a><a href="#Footnote_238"
-class="fnanchor">[238]</a></p>
-
-<p>Not long afterwards,—a number of transports, sufficient
-for the whole army, having been assembled from Herakleia and
-Sinôpê,—all the soldiers were conveyed by sea to the latter
-place, passing by the mouth of the rivers Thermodon, Iris, and Halys,
-which they would have found impracticable to cross in a land-march
-through Paphlagonia. Having reached Sinôpê after a day and a night of
-sailing with a fair wind, they were hospitably received, and lodged
-in the neighboring seaport of Armênê, where the Sinopians sent to
-them a large present of barley-meal and wine, and where they remained
-for five days.</p>
-
-<p>It was here that they were joined by Cheirisophus, whose
-absence<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_145">[p. 145]</a></span>
-had been so unexpectedly prolonged. But he came with only a single
-trireme, bringing nothing except a message from Anaxibius, the
-Lacedæmonian admiral in the Bosphorus; who complimented the army,
-and promised that they should be taken into pay as soon as they
-were out of the Euxine. The soldiers, severely disappointed on
-seeing him arrive thus empty-handed, became the more strongly bent
-on striking some blow to fill their own purses before they reached
-Greece. Feeling that it was necessary to the success of any such
-project that it should be prepared not only skilfully, but secretly,
-they resolved to elect a single general in place of that board of
-six (or perhaps more) who were still in function. Such was now the
-ascendency of Xenophon, that the general sentiment of the army at
-once turned towards him; and the lochages or captains, communicating
-to him what was in contemplation, intimated to him their own anxious
-hopes that he would not decline the offer. Tempted by so flattering
-a proposition, he hesitated at first what answer he should give. But
-at length the uncertainty of being able to satisfy the exigencies
-of the army, and the fear of thus compromising the reputation which
-he had already realized, outweighed the opposite inducements. As
-in other cases of doubt, so in this,—he offered sacrifice to
-Zeus Basileus; and the answer returned by the victims was such as to
-determine him to refusal. Accordingly, when the army assembled, with
-predetermination to choose a single chief, and proceeded to nominate
-him,—he respectfully and thankfully declined, on the ground
-that Cheirisophus was a Lacedæmonian, and that he himself was not;
-adding that he should cheerfully serve under any one whom they might
-name. His excuse, however, was repudiated by the army; and especially
-by the lochages. Several of these latter were Arcadians; and one of
-them, Agasias, cried out, with full sympathy of the soldiers, that if
-that principle were admitted, he, as an Arcadian, ought to resign his
-command. Finding that his former reason was not approved, Xenophon
-acquainted the army that he had sacrificed to know whether he ought
-to accept the command, and that the gods had peremptorily forbidden
-him to do so.<a id="FNanchor_239"></a><a href="#Footnote_239"
-class="fnanchor">[239]</a></p>
-
-<p>Cheirisophus was then elected sole commander, and undertook<span
-class="pagenum"><a id="Page_146">[p. 146]</a></span> the duty; saying
-that he would have willingly served under Xenophon, if the latter
-had accepted the office, but that it was a good thing for Xenophon
-himself to have declined,—since Dexippus had already poisoned
-the mind of Anaxibius against him, although he (Cheirisophus) had
-emphatically contradicted the calumnies.<a id="FNanchor_240"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_240" class="fnanchor">[240]</a></p>
-
-<p>On the next day, the army sailed forward, under the command of
-Cheirisophus, to Herakleia; near which town they were hospitably
-entertained, and gratified with a present of meal, wine, and
-bullocks, even greater than they had received at Sinôpê. It now
-appeared that Xenophon had acted wisely in declining the sole
-command; and also that Cheirisophus, though elected commander, yet
-having been very long absent, was not really of so much importance
-in the eyes of the soldiers as Xenophon. In the camp near Herakleia,
-the soldiers became impatient that their generals (for the habit
-of looking upon Xenophon as one of them still continued) took no
-measures to procure money for them. The Achæan Lykon proposed that
-they should extort a contribution of no less than three thousand
-staters of Kyzikus (about sixty thousand Attic drachmæ, or ten
-talents, equal to two thousand three hundred pounds) from the
-inhabitants of Herakleia; another man immediately outbid this
-proposition, and proposed that they should require ten thousand
-staters—a full month’s pay for the army. It was moved that
-Cheirisophus and Xenophon should go to the Herakleots as envoys with
-this demand. But both of them indignantly refused to be concerned in
-so unjust an extortion from a Grecian city which had just received
-the army kindly, and sent handsome presents. Accordingly, Lykon
-with two Arcadian officers undertook the mission, and intimated
-the demand, not without threats in case of non-compliance, to
-the Herakleots. The latter replied that they would take it into
-consideration. But they waited only for the departure of the envoys,
-and then immediately closed their gates, manned their walls, and
-brought in their outlying property.</p>
-
-<p>The project being thus baffled, Lykon and the rest turned their
-displeasure upon Cheirisophus and Xenophon, whom they accused of
-having occasioned its miscarriage. And they now began to<span
-class="pagenum"><a id="Page_147">[p. 147]</a></span> exclaim, that it
-was disgraceful to the Arcadians and Achæans; who formed more than
-one numerical half of the army and endured all the toil—to
-obey as well as to enrich generals from other Hellenic cities;
-especially a single Athenian who furnished no contingent to the
-army. Here again it is remarkable that the personal importance of
-Xenophon caused him to be still regarded as a general, though the
-sole command had been vested, by formal vote, in Cheirisophus. So
-vehement was the dissatisfaction, that all the Arcadian and Achæan
-soldiers in the army, more than four thousand and five hundred
-hoplites in number, renounced the authority of Cheirisophus, formed
-themselves into a distinct division, and chose ten commanders from
-out of their own numbers. The whole army thus became divided into
-three portions—first, the Arcadians and Achæans; secondly,
-one thousand and four hundred hoplites and seven hundred peltasts,
-who adhered to Cheirisophus; lastly, one thousand seven hundred
-hoplites, three hundred peltasts, and forty horsemen, (all the
-horsemen in the army) attaching themselves to Xenophon; who however
-was taking measures to sail away individually from Herakleia and
-quit the army altogether, which he would have done had he not been
-restrained by unfavorable sacrifices.<a id="FNanchor_241"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_241" class="fnanchor">[241]</a></p>
-
-<p>The Arcadian division, departing first, in vessels from Herakleia,
-landed at the harbor of Kalpê; an untenanted promontory of the
-Bithynian or Asiatic Thrace, midway between Herakleia and Byzantium.
-From thence they marched at once into the interior of Bithynia,
-with the view of surprising the villages, and acquiring plunder.
-But through rashness and bad management, they first sustained
-several partial losses, and ultimately became surrounded upon an
-eminence, by a large muster of the indigenous Bithynians from all
-the territory around. They were only rescued from destruction by
-the unexpected appearance of Xenophon with his division; who had
-left Herakleia somewhat later, but heard by accident, during their
-march, of the danger of their comrades. The whole army thus became
-re-assembled at Kalpê, where the Arcadians and Achæans, disgusted
-at the ill-success of their separate expedition, again established
-the old union and the old generals. They chose Neon in place of
-Cheirisophus, who,—afflicted by<span class="pagenum"><a
-id="Page_148">[p. 148]</a></span> the humiliation put upon him, in
-having been first named sole commander and next deposed within a
-week,—had fallen sick of a fever and died. The elder Arcadian
-captains farther moved a resolution, that if any one henceforward
-should propose to separate the army into fractions, he should be
-put to death.<a id="FNanchor_242"></a><a href="#Footnote_242"
-class="fnanchor">[242]</a></p>
-
-<p>The locality of Kalpê was well suited for the foundation of a
-colony, which Xenophon evidently would have been glad to bring about,
-though he took no direct measures tending towards it; while the
-soldiers were so bent on returning to Greece, and so jealous lest
-Xenophon should entrap them into remaining, that they almost shunned
-the encampment. It so happened that they were detained there for some
-days without being able to march forth even in quest of provisions,
-because the sacrifices were not favorable. Xenophon refused to lead
-them out, against the warning of the sacrifices—although the
-army suspected him of a deliberate manœuvre for the purpose of
-detention. Neon, however, less scrupulous, led out a body of two
-thousand men who chose to follow him, under severe distress for want
-of provisions. But being surprised by the native Bithynians, with
-the aid of some troops of the Persian satrap Pharnabazus, he was
-defeated with the loss of no less than five hundred men; a misfortune
-which Xenophon regards as the natural retribution for contempt of
-the sacrificial warning. The dangerous position of Neon with the
-remainder of the detachment was rapidly made known at the camp; upon
-which Xenophon, unharnessing a waggon-bullock as the only animal near
-at hand, immediately offered sacrifice. On this occasion, the victim
-was at once favorable; so that he led out without delay the greater
-part of the force, to the rescue of the exposed detachment, which was
-brought back in safety to the camp. So bold had the enemy become,
-that in the night the camp was attacked. The Greeks were obliged on
-the next day to retreat into stronger ground, surrounding themselves
-with a ditch and palisade. Fortunately a vessel arrived from
-Herakleia, bringing to the camp at Kalpê a supply of barley-meal,
-cattle, and wine; which restored the spirits of the army, enabling
-them to go forth on the ensuing morning, and assume the aggressive
-against the Bithynians and the troops of Pharnabazus. These troops
-were completely defeated and dispersed,<span class="pagenum"><a
-id="Page_149">[p. 149]</a></span> so that the Greeks returned
-to their camp at Kalpê in the evening, both safe and masters of
-the country.<a id="FNanchor_243"></a><a href="#Footnote_243"
-class="fnanchor">[243]</a></p>
-
-<p>At Kalpê they remained some time, awaiting the arrival of Kleander
-from Byzantium, who was said to be about to bring vessels for their
-transport. They were now abundantly provided with supplies, not
-merely from the undisturbed plunder of the neighboring villages,
-but also from the visits of traders who came with cargoes. Indeed
-the impression—that they were preparing, at the instance of
-Xenophon, to found a new city at Kalpê—became so strong, that
-several of the neighboring native villages sent envoys to ask on
-what terms alliance would be granted to them. At length Kleander
-came, but with two triremes only.<a id="FNanchor_244"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_244" class="fnanchor">[244]</a></p>
-
-<p>Kleander was the Lacedæmonian harmost or governor of Byzantium.
-His appearance opens to us a new phase in the eventful history of
-this gallant army, as well as an insight into the state of the
-Grecian world under the Lacedæmonian empire. He came attended by
-Dexippus, who had served in the Cyreian army until their arrival at
-Trapezus, and who had there been entrusted with an armed vessel for
-the purpose of detaining transports to convey the troops home, but
-had abused the confidence reposed in him by running away with the
-ship to Byzantium.</p>
-
-<p>It so happened that at the moment when Kleander arrived, the
-whole army was out on a marauding excursion. Orders had been already
-promulgated, that whatever was captured by every one when the
-whole army was out, should be brought in and dealt with as public
-property; though on days when the army was collectively at rest,
-any soldier might go out individually and take to himself whatever
-he could pillage. On the day when Kleander arrived, and found the
-whole army out, some soldiers were just coming back with a lot of
-sheep which they had seized. By right, the sheep ought to have
-been handed into the public store. But these soldiers, desirous to
-appropriate them wrongfully, addressed themselves to Dexippus, and
-promised him a portion if he would enable them to retain the rest.
-Accordingly the latter interfered, drove away those who claimed the
-sheep as public property, and denounced them as thieves to Kleander;
-who desired him to bring them before him. Dexippus arrested one of
-them, a soldier belonging<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_150">[p.
-150]</a></span> to the lochus or company of one of the best friends
-of Xenophon,—the Arcadian Agasias. The latter took the man
-under his protection; while the soldiers around, incensed not less
-at the past than at the present conduct of Dexippus, broke out into
-violent manifestations, called him a traitor and pelted him with
-stones. Such was their wrath that not Dexippus alone, but the crew
-of the triremes also, and even Kleander himself, fled in alarm; in
-spite of the intervention of Xenophon and the other generals, who
-on the one hand explained to Kleander, that it was an established
-army-order which these soldiers were seeking to enforce—and on
-the other hand controlled the mutineers. But the Lacedæmonian harmost
-was so incensed as well by his own fright as by the calumnies of
-Dexippus, that he threatened to sail away at once, and proclaim the
-Cyreian army enemies to Sparta, so that every Hellenic city should be
-interdicted from giving them reception.<a id="FNanchor_245"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_245" class="fnanchor">[245]</a> It was in vain
-that the generals, well knowing the formidable consequences of
-such an interdict, entreated him to relent. He would consent only
-on condition that the soldier who had begun to throw stones, as
-well as Agasias the interfering officer, should be delivered
-up to him. This latter demand was especially insisted upon by
-Dexippus, who, hating Xenophon, had already tried to prejudice
-Anaxibius against him, and believed that Agasias had acted by
-his order.<a id="FNanchor_246"></a><a href="#Footnote_246"
-class="fnanchor">[246]</a></p>
-
-<p>The situation became now extremely critical; since the soldiers
-would not easily be brought to surrender their comrades,—who
-had a perfectly righteous cause, though they had supported it by
-undue violence,—to the vengeance of a traitor like Dexippus.
-When the army was convened in assembly, several of them went so
-far as to treat the menace of Kleander with contempt. But Xenophon
-took pains to set them right upon this point. “Soldiers (said he),
-it will be no slight misfortune if Kleander shall depart as he
-threatens to do, in his present temper towards us. We are here close
-upon the cities of Greece; now the Lacedæmonians are the imperial
-power in Greece, and not merely their authorized officers, but
-even each one of their individual citizens, can accomplish what he
-pleases in the various cities. If then Kleander begins by shutting
-us out from Byzantium, and next enjoins the Lacedæmonian<span
-class="pagenum"><a id="Page_151">[p. 151]</a></span> harmosts
-in the other cities to do the same, proclaiming us lawless and
-disobedient to Sparta,—if, besides, the same representation
-should be conveyed to the Lacedæmonian admiral of the fleet,
-Anaxibius,—we shall be hard pressed either to remain or to
-sail away; for the Lacedæmonians are at present masters, both on
-land and at sea.<a id="FNanchor_247"></a><a href="#Footnote_247"
-class="fnanchor">[247]</a> We must not, for the sake of any one or
-two men, suffer the whole army to be excluded from Greece. We must
-obey whatever the Lacedæmonians command, especially as our cities,
-to which we respectively belong, now obey them. As to what concerns
-myself, I understand that Dexippus has told Kleander that Agasias
-would never have taken such a step except by my orders. Now, if
-Agasias himself states this, I am ready to exonerate both him and
-all of you, and to give myself up to any extremity of punishment.
-I maintain too, that any other man whom Kleander arraigns, ought
-in like manner to give himself up for trial, in order that you
-collectively may be discharged from the imputation. It will be hard
-indeed, if just as we are reaching Greece, we should not only be
-debarred from the praise and honor which we anticipated, but should
-be degraded even below the level of others, and shut out from the
-Grecian cities.”<a id="FNanchor_248"></a><a href="#Footnote_248"
-class="fnanchor">[248]</a></p>
-
-<p>After this speech from the philo-Laconian Xenophon,—so
-significant a testimony of the unmeasured ascendency and interference
-of the Lacedæmonians throughout Greece,—Agasias rose and
-proclaimed, that what he had done was neither under the orders,
-nor with the privity, of Xenophon; that he had acted on a personal
-impulse of wrath, at seeing his own honest and innocent soldier
-dragged away by the traitor Dexippus; but that he now willingly gave
-himself up as a victim, to avert from the army the displeasure of
-the Lacedæmonians. This generous self-sacrifice, which at the<span
-class="pagenum"><a id="Page_152">[p. 152]</a></span> moment promised
-nothing less than a fatal result to Agasias, was accepted by the
-army; and the generals conducted both him and the soldier whom he
-had rescued, as prisoners to Kleander. Presenting himself as the
-responsible party, Agasias at the same time explained to Kleander
-the infamous behavior of Dexippus to the army, and said that towards
-no one else would he have acted in the same manner; while the
-soldier whom he had rescued and who was given up at the same time,
-also affirmed that he had interfered merely to prevent Dexippus
-and some others from overruling, for their own individual benefit,
-a proclaimed order of the entire army. Kleander, having observed
-that if Dexippus had done what was affirmed, he would be the last
-to defend him, but that no one ought to have been stoned without
-trial,—desired that the persons surrendered might be left for
-his consideration, and at the same time retracted his expressions of
-displeasure as regarded all the others.<a id="FNanchor_249"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_249" class="fnanchor">[249]</a></p>
-
-<p>The generals then retired, leaving Kleander in possession of the
-prisoners, and on the point of taking his dinner. But they retired
-with mournful feelings, and Xenophon presently convened the army
-to propose that a general deputation should be sent to Kleander to
-implore his lenity towards their two comrades. This being cordially
-adopted, Xenophon, at the head of a deputation comprising Drakontius,
-the Spartan, as well as the chief officers, addressed an earnest
-appeal to Kleander, representing that his honor had been satisfied
-with the unconditional surrender of the two persons required; that
-the army, deeply concerned for two meritorious comrades, entreated
-him now to show mercy and spare their lives; that they promised him
-in return the most implicit obedience, and entreated him to take the
-command of them, in order that he might have personal cognizance
-of their exact discipline, and compare their worth with that of
-Dexippus. Kleander was not merely soothed, but completely won over
-by this address; and said in reply that the conduct of the generals
-belied altogether the representations made to him, (doubtless by
-Dexippus) that they were seeking to alienate the army from the
-Lacedæmonians. He not only restored the two men in his power, but
-also accepted the command of the army, and promised to conduct them
-back into Greece.<a id="FNanchor_250"></a><a href="#Footnote_250"
-class="fnanchor">[250]</a></p> <p><span class="pagenum"><a
-id="Page_153">[p. 153]</a></span></p> <p>The prospects of the
-army appeared thus greatly improved; the more so, as Kleander, on
-entering upon his new functions as commander, found the soldiers so
-cheerful and orderly, that he was highly gratified, and exchanged
-personal tokens of friendship and hospitality with Xenophon. But when
-sacrifices came to be offered, for beginning the march homeward,
-the signs were so unpropitious, for three successive days, that
-Kleander could not bring himself to brave such auguries at the outset
-of his career. Accordingly, he told the generals, that the gods
-plainly forbade him, and reserved it for them, to conduct the army
-into Greece; that he should therefore sail back to Byzantium, and
-would receive the army in the best way he could, when they reached
-the Bosphorus. After an interchange of presents with the soldiers,
-he then departed with his two triremes.<a id="FNanchor_251"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_251" class="fnanchor">[251]</a></p>
-
-<p>The favorable sentiment now established in the bosom of Kleander
-will be found very serviceable hereafter to the Cyreians at
-Byzantium; but they had cause for deeply regretting the unpropitious
-sacrifices which had deterred him from assuming the actual command at
-Kalpê. In the request preferred to him by them that he would march
-as their commander to the Bosphorus, we may recognize a scheme, and
-a very well-contrived scheme, of Xenophon; who had before desired
-to leave the army at Herakleia, and who saw plainly that the
-difficulties of a commander, unless he were a Lacedæmonian of station
-and influence, would increase with every step of their approach
-to Greece. Had Kleander accepted the command, the soldiers would
-have been better treated, while Xenophon himself might either have
-remained as his adviser, or might have gone home. He probably would
-have chosen the latter course.</p>
-
-<p>Under the command of their own officers, the Cyreians now marched
-from Kalpê across Bithynia to Chrysopolis,<a id="FNanchor_252"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_252" class="fnanchor">[252]</a> (in the territory
-of Chalkêdon on the Asiatic edge of the Bosphorus, immediately
-opposite to Byzantium, as Scutari now is to Constantinople), where
-they remained seven days, turning into money the slaves<span
-class="pagenum"><a id="Page_154">[p. 154]</a></span> and plunder
-which they had collected. Unhappily for them, the Lacedæmonian
-admiral Anaxibius was now at Byzantium, so that their friend Kleander
-was under his superior command. And Pharnabazus, the Persian satrap
-of the north-western regions of Asia Minor, becoming much alarmed
-lest they should invade his satrapy, despatched a private message
-to Anaxibius; whom he prevailed upon, by promise of large presents,
-to transport the army forthwith across to the European side of
-the Bosphorus.<a id="FNanchor_253"></a><a href="#Footnote_253"
-class="fnanchor">[253]</a> Accordingly, Anaxibius, sending for the
-generals and the lochages across to Byzantium, invited the army to
-cross, and gave them his assurance that as soon as the soldiers
-should be in Europe, he would provide pay for them. The other
-officers told him that they would return with this message and take
-the sense of the army; but Xenophon, on his own account, said that
-he should not return; that he should now retire from the army, and
-sail away from Byzantium. It was only on the pressing instance
-of Anaxibius that he was induced to go back to Chrysopolis and
-conduct the army across; on the understanding that he should depart
-immediately afterwards.</p>
-
-<p>Here at Byzantium, he received his first communication from the
-Thracian prince Seuthes; who sent Medosadês to offer him a reward
-if he would bring the army across. Xenophon replied that the army
-would cross; that no reward from Seuthes was needful to bring about
-that movement; but that he himself was about to depart, leaving the
-command in other hands. In point of fact, the whole army crossed
-with little delay, landed in Europe, and found themselves within the
-walls of Byzantium.<a id="FNanchor_254"></a><a href="#Footnote_254"
-class="fnanchor">[254]</a> Xenophon, who had come along with them,
-paid a visit shortly afterwards to his friend the harmost Kleander,
-and took leave of him as about to depart immediately. But Kleander
-told him that he must not think of departing until the army was
-out of the city, and that he would be held responsible if they
-stayed. In truth Kleander was very uneasy so long as the soldiers
-were within the walls, and was well aware that it might be no
-easy matter to induce them to go away.<span class="pagenum"><a
-id="Page_155">[p. 155]</a></span> For Anaxibius had practised a gross
-fraud in promising them pay, which he had neither the ability nor
-the inclination to provide. Without handing to them either pay or
-even means of purchasing supplies, he issued orders that they must go
-forth with arms and baggage, and muster outside of the gates, there
-to be numbered for an immediate march; any one who stayed behind
-being held as punishable. This proclamation was alike unexpected and
-offensive to the soldiers, who felt that they had been deluded, and
-were very backward in obeying. Hence Kleander, while urgent with
-Xenophon to defer his departure until he had conducted the army
-outside of the walls, added—“Go forth as if you were about to
-march along with them; when you are once outside, you may depart as
-soon as you please.”<a id="FNanchor_255"></a><a href="#Footnote_255"
-class="fnanchor">[255]</a> Xenophon replied that this matter must be
-settled with Anaxibius, to whom accordingly both of them went, and
-who repeated the same directions, in a manner yet more peremptory.
-Though it was plain to Xenophon that he was here making himself a
-sort of instrument to the fraud which Anaxibius had practised upon
-the army, yet he had no choice but to obey. Accordingly, he as well
-as the other generals put themselves at the head of the troops, who
-followed, however reluctantly, and arrived most of them outside
-of the gates. Eteonikus (a Lacedæmonian officer of consideration,
-noticed more than once in my last preceding volume) commanding at
-the gate, stood close to it in person; in order that when all the
-Cyreians had gone forth, he might immediately shut it and fasten
-it with the bar.<a id="FNanchor_256"></a><a href="#Footnote_256"
-class="fnanchor">[256]</a></p>
-
-<p>Anaxibius knew well what he was doing. He fully anticipated that
-the communication of the final orders would occasion an outbreak
-among the Cyreians, and was anxious to defer it until they were
-outside. But when there remained only the rearmost companies still in
-the inside and on their march, all the rest having got out—he
-thought the danger was over, and summoned to him the generals and
-captains, all of whom were probably near the gates superintending
-the march through. It seems that Xenophon, having given notice that
-he intended to depart, did not answer to this summons as one of
-the generals, but remained outside among<span class="pagenum"><a
-id="Page_156">[p. 156]</a></span> the soldiers. “Take what supplies
-you want (said Anaxibius) from the neighboring Thracian villages,
-which are well furnished with wheat, barley, and other necessaries.
-After thus providing yourselves, march forward to the Chersonesus,
-and there Kyniskus will give you pay.”<a id="FNanchor_257"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_257" class="fnanchor">[257]</a></p>
-
-<p>This was the first distinct intimation given by Anaxibius that
-he did not intend to perform his promise of finding pay for the
-soldiers. Who Kyniskus was, we do not know, nor was he probably known
-to the Cyreians; but the march here enjoined was at least one hundred
-and fifty English miles, and might be much longer. The route was not
-indicated, and the generals had to inquire from Anaxibius whether
-they were to go by what was called the Holy Mountain (that is, by
-the shorter line, skirting the northern coast of the Propontis),
-or by a more inland and circuitous road through Thrace;—also
-whether they were to regard the Thracian prince, Seuthes, as a
-friend or an enemy.<a id="FNanchor_258"></a><a href="#Footnote_258"
-class="fnanchor">[258]</a></p>
-
-<p>Instead of the pay which had been formally promised to them by
-Anaxibius if they would cross over from Asia to Byzantium, the
-Cyreians thus found themselves sent away empty-handed, to a long
-march,—through another barbarous country, with chance supplies
-to be ravished only by their own efforts,—and at the end of
-it a lot unknown and uncertain; while, had they remained in Asia,
-they would have had at any rate the rich satrapy of Pharnabazus
-within their reach. To perfidy of dealing was now added a brutal
-ejectment from Byzantium, without even the commonest manifestations
-of hospitality; contrasting pointedly with the treatment which the
-army had recently experienced at Trapezus, Sinôpê, and Herakleia;
-where they had been welcomed not only by compliments on their past
-achievements, but also by an ample present of flour, meat, and wine.
-Such behavior could not fail to provoke the most violent indignation
-in the bosoms of the soldiery; and Anaxibius had therefore delayed
-giving the order until the last soldiers were marching out, thinking
-that the army would hear nothing of it until the generals came out of
-the gates to inform them; so that the gates would be closed, and the
-walls manned to resist any assault from without. But his calculations
-were not realized. Either one of the soldiers passing by heard him
-give the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_157">[p. 157]</a></span>
-order, or one of the captains forming his audience stole away from
-the rest, and hastened forward to acquaint his comrades on the
-outside. The bulk of the army, already irritated by the inhospitable
-way in which they had been thrust out, needed nothing farther to
-inflame them into spontaneous mutiny and aggression. While the
-generals within (who either took the communication more patiently, or
-at least, looking farther forward, felt that any attempt to resent
-or resist the ill usage of the Spartan admiral would only make their
-position worse) were discussing with Anaxibius the details of the
-march just enjoined, the soldiers without, bursting into spontaneous
-movement, with a simultaneous and fiery impulse, made a rush back to
-get possession of the gate. But Eteonikus, seeing their movement,
-closed it without a moment’s delay, and fastened the bar. The
-soldiers on reaching the gate and finding it barred, clamored loudly
-to get it opened, threatened to break it down, and even began to
-knock violently against it. Some ran down to the sea-coast, and made
-their way into the city round the line of stones at the base of the
-city wall, which protected it against the sea; while the rearmost
-soldiers who had not yet marched out, seeing what was passing, and
-fearful of being cut off from their comrades, assaulted the gate
-from the inside, severed the fastenings with axes, and threw it wide
-open to the army.<a id="FNanchor_259"></a><a href="#Footnote_259"
-class="fnanchor">[259]</a> All the soldiers then rushed up, and were
-soon again in Byzantium.</p>
-
-<p>Nothing could exceed the terror of the Lacedæmonians as well
-as of the native Byzantines, when they saw the excited Cyreians
-again within the walls. The town seemed already taken and on the
-point of being plundered. Neither Anaxibius nor Eteonikus took the
-smallest means of resistance, nor stayed to brave the approach of the
-soldiers, whose wrath they were fully conscious of having deserved.
-Both fled to the citadel—the former first running to the
-sea-shore, and jumping into a fishing-boat to go thither by sea. He
-even thought the citadel not tenable with its existing garrison, and
-sent over to Chalkêdon for a reinforcement. Still more terrified were
-the citizens of the town. Every man in the market-place instantly
-fled; some to their houses, others to the merchant vessels in the
-harbor, others to the triremes or ships of war, which they hauled
-down to the water, and thus put to sea.<a id="FNanchor_260"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_260" class="fnanchor">[260]</a></p> <p><span
-class="pagenum"><a id="Page_158">[p. 158]</a></span></p> <p>To the
-deception and harshness of the Spartan admiral, there was thus added
-a want of precaution in the manner of execution, which threatened
-to prove the utter ruin of Byzantium. For it was but too probable
-that the Cyreian soldiers, under the keen sense of recent injury,
-would satiate their revenge, and reimburse themselves for the want
-of hospitality towards them, without distinguishing the Lacedæmonian
-garrison from the Byzantine citizens; and that too from mere
-impulse, not merely without orders, but in spite of prohibitions,
-from their generals. Such was the aspect of the case, when they
-became again assembled in a mass within the gates; and such would
-probably have been the reality, had Xenophon executed his design of
-retiring earlier, so as to leave the other generals acting without
-him. Being on the outside along with the soldiers, Xenophon felt
-at once, as soon as he saw the gates forced open and the army
-again within the town, the terrific emergency which was impending;
-first, the sack of Byzantium,—next, horror and antipathy,
-throughout all Greece, towards the Cyreian officers and soldiers
-indiscriminately,—lastly, unsparing retribution inflicted upon
-all by the power of Sparta. Overwhelmed with these anxieties, he
-rushed into the town along with the multitude, using every effort to
-pacify them and bring them into order. They on their parts, delighted
-to see him along with them, and conscious of their own force, were
-eager to excite him to the same pitch as themselves, and to prevail
-on him to second and methodize their present triumph. “Now is your
-time, Xenophon, (they exclaimed), to make yourself a man. You have
-here a city,—you have triremes,—you have money,—you
-have plenty of soldiers. Now then, if you choose, you can enrich
-us; and we in return can make you powerful.”—“You speak
-well (replied he); I shall do as you propose; but if you want to
-accomplish anything, you must fall into military array forthwith.”
-He knew that this was the first condition of returning to anything
-like tranquillity; and by great good fortune, the space called
-the Thrakion, immediately adjoining the gate inside, was level,
-open, and clear of houses; presenting an excellent place of arms
-or locality for a review. The whole army,—partly from their
-long military practice,—partly under the impression that
-Xenophon was really about to second their wishes and direct some
-aggressive operation,—threw themselves almost of their own
-accord into regular array on the Thrakion;<span class="pagenum"><a
-id="Page_159">[p. 159]</a></span> the hoplites eight deep, the
-peltasts on each flank. It was in this position that Xenophon
-addressed them as follows:—</p>
-
-<p>“Soldiers! I am not surprised that you are incensed, and that you
-think yourselves scandalously cheated and ill-used. But if we give
-way to our wrath, if we punish these Lacedæmonians now before us
-for their treachery, and plunder this innocent city,—reflect
-what will be the consequence. We shall stand proclaimed forthwith
-as enemies to the Lacedæmonians and their allies; and what sort
-of a war that will be, those who have witnessed and who still
-recollect recent matters of history may easily fancy. We Athenians
-entered into the war against Sparta with a powerful army and
-fleet, an abundant revenue, and numerous tributary cities in Asia
-as well as Europe,—among them this very Byzantium in which
-we now stand. We have been vanquished in the way that all of you
-know. And what then will be the fate of us soldiers, when we
-shall have as united enemies, Sparta with all her old allies and
-Athens besides,—Tissaphernes and the barbaric forces on the
-coast,—and most of all, the Great King whom we marched up
-to dethrone and slay, if we were able? Is any man fool enough to
-think that we have a chance of making head against so many combined
-enemies? Let us not plunge madly into dishonor and ruin, nor incur
-the enmity of our own fathers and friends; who are in the cities
-which will take arms against us,—and will take arms justly,
-if we, who abstained from seizing any barbaric city, even when
-we were in force sufficient, shall nevertheless now plunder the
-first Grecian city into which we have been admitted. As far as I
-am concerned, may I be buried ten thousand fathoms deep in the
-earth, rather than see you do such things; and I exhort <i>you</i>,
-too, as Greeks, to obey the leaders of Greece. Endeavor, while
-thus obedient, to obtain your just rights; but if you should fail
-in this, rather submit to injustice than cut yourselves off from
-the Grecian world. Send to inform Anaxibius that we have entered
-the city, not with a view to commit any violence, but in the
-hope, if possible, of obtaining from him the advantages which he
-promised us. If we fail, we shall at least prove to him that we
-quit the city, not under his fraudulent manœuvres, but under our
-own sense of the duty of obedience.”<a id="FNanchor_261"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_261" class="fnanchor">[261]</a></p> <p><span
-class="pagenum"><a id="Page_160">[p. 160]</a></span></p> <p>This
-speech completely arrested the impetuous impulse of the army,
-brought them to a true sense of their situation, and induced them to
-adopt the proposition of Xenophon. They remained unmoved in their
-position on the Thrakion, while three of the captains were sent to
-communicate with Anaxibius. While they were thus waiting, a Theban
-named Kœratadas approached, who had once commanded in Byzantium under
-the Lacedæmonians, during the previous war. He had now become a sort
-of professional Condottiero or general, looking out for an army to
-command, wherever he could find one, and offering his services to any
-city which would engage him. He addressed the assembled Cyreians,
-and offered, if they would accept him for their general, to conduct
-them against the Delta of Thrace (the space included between the
-north-west corner of the Propontis and the south-west corner of the
-Euxine), which he asserted to be a rich territory presenting great
-opportunity to plunder; he farther promised to furnish them with
-ample subsistence during the march. Presently the envoys returned,
-bearing the reply of Anaxibius, who received the message favorably,
-promising that not only the army should have no cause to regret their
-obedience, but that he would both report their good conduct to the
-authorities at home, and do everything in his own power to promote
-their comfort.<a id="FNanchor_262"></a><a href="#Footnote_262"
-class="fnanchor">[262]</a> He said nothing farther about taking
-them into pay; that delusion having now answered its purpose. The
-soldiers, on hearing his communication, adopted a resolution to
-accept Kœratadas as their future commander, and then marched out of
-the town. As soon as they were on the outside, Anaxibius, not content
-with closing the gates against them, made public proclamation that if
-any one of them were found in the town, he should be sold forthwith
-into slavery.</p>
-
-<p>There are few cases throughout Grecian history in which an able
-discourse has been the means of averting so much evil, as was
-averted by this speech of Xenophon to the army in Byzantium. Nor
-did he ever, throughout the whole period of his command, render
-to them a more signal service. The miserable consequences, which
-would have ensued, had the army persisted in their aggressive
-impulse,—first, to the citizens of the town, ultimately
-to themselves, while Anaxibius, the only guilty person,<span
-class="pagenum"><a id="Page_161">[p. 161]</a></span> had the means
-of escaping by sea, even under the worst circumstances,—are
-stated by Xenophon rather under than above the reality. At the same
-time no orator ever undertook a more difficult case, or achieved
-a fuller triumph over unpromising conditions. If we consider the
-feelings and position of the army at the instant of their breaking
-into the town, we shall be astonished that any commander could have
-arrested their movements. Though fresh from all the glory of their
-retreat, they had been first treacherously entrapped over from Asia,
-next roughly ejected, by Anaxibius; and although it may be said
-truly that the citizens of Byzantium had no concern either in the
-one or the other, yet little heed is commonly taken, in military
-operations, to the distinction between garrison and citizens in an
-assailed town. Having arms in their hands, with consciousness of
-force arising out of their exploits in Asia, the Cyreians were at
-the same time inflamed by the opportunity both of avenging a gross
-recent injury, and enriching themselves in the process of execution;
-to which we may add, the excitement of that rush whereby they had
-obtained the reëntry, and the farther fact, that without the gates
-they had nothing to expect except poor, hard, uninviting service in
-Thrace. With soldiers already possessed by an overpowering impulse
-of this nature, what chance was there that a retiring general, on
-the point of quitting the army, could so work upon their minds as to
-induce them to renounce the prey before them? Xenophon had nothing to
-invoke except distant considerations, partly of Hellenic reputation,
-chiefly of prudence; considerations indeed of unquestionable
-reality and prodigious magnitude, yet belonging all to a distant
-future, and therefore of little comparative force, except when set
-forth in magnified characters by the orator. How powerfully he
-worked upon the minds of his hearers, so as to draw forth these
-far-removed dangers from the cloud of present sentiment by which
-they were overlaid,—how skilfully he employed in illustration
-the example of his own native city,—will be seen by all who
-study his speech. Never did his Athenian accomplishments,—his
-talent for giving words to important thoughts,—his promptitude
-in seizing a present situation and managing the sentiments of an
-impetuous multitude,—appear to greater advantage than when he
-was thus suddenly called forth to meet a terrible emergency. His
-pre-established reputation and the habit of obeying his orders,
-were<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_162">[p. 162]</a></span>
-doubtless essential conditions of success. But none of his colleagues
-in command would have been able to accomplish the like memorable
-change on the minds of the soldiers, or to procure obedience for any
-simple authoritative restraint; nay, it is probable, that if Xenophon
-had not been at hand, the other generals would have followed the
-passionate movement, even though they had been reluctant,—from
-simple inability to repress it.<a id="FNanchor_263"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_263" class="fnanchor">[263]</a> Again,—whatever
-might have been the accomplishments of Xenophon, it is certain
-that even <i>he</i> would not have been able to work upon the minds of
-these excited soldiers, had they not been Greeks and citizens as
-well as soldiers,—bred in Hellenic sympathies and accustomed
-to Hellenic order, with authority operating in part through voice
-and persuasion, and not through the Persian whip and instruments
-of torture. The memorable discourse on the Thrakion at Byzantium
-illustrates the working of that persuasive agency which formed one of
-the permanent forces and conspicuous charms of Hellenism. It teaches
-us that if the orator could sometimes accuse innocent defendants and
-pervert well-disposed assemblies,—a part of the case which
-historians of Greece often present as if it were the whole,—he
-could also, and that in the most trying emergencies, combat the
-strongest force of present passion, and bring into vivid presence the
-half-obscured lineaments of long-sighted reason and duty.</p>
-
-<p>After conducting the army out of the city, Xenophon sent, through
-Kleander, a message to Anaxibius, requesting that he himself might
-be allowed to come in again singly, in order to take his departure
-by sea. His request was granted, though not without much difficulty;
-upon which he took leave of the army, under the strongest expressions
-of affection and gratitude on their part,<a id="FNanchor_264"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_264" class="fnanchor">[264]</a> and went into
-Byzantium along with Kleander; while on the next day Kœratadas came
-to assume the command according to agreement, bringing with him
-a prophet, and beasts to be offered in<span class="pagenum"><a
-id="Page_163">[p. 163]</a></span> sacrifice. There followed in his
-train twenty men carrying sacks of barley-meal, twenty more with
-jars of wine, three bearing olives, and one man with a bundle of
-garlic and onions. All these provisions being laid down, Kœratadas
-proceeded to offer sacrifice, as a preliminary to the distribution
-of them among the soldiers. On the first day, the sacrifices being
-unfavorable, no distribution took place; on the second day, Kœratadas
-was standing with the wreath on his head at the altar, and with
-the victims beside him, about to renew his sacrifice,—when
-Timasion and the other officers interfered, desired him to abstain,
-and dismissed him from the command. Perhaps the first unfavorable
-sacrifices may have partly impelled them to this proceeding. But
-the main reason was, the scanty store, inadequate even to one
-day’s subsistence for the army, brought by Kœratadas,—and
-the obvious insufficiency of his means.<a id="FNanchor_265"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_265" class="fnanchor">[265]</a></p>
-
-<p>On the departure of Kœratadas, the army marched to take up its
-quarters in some Thracian villages not far from Byzantium, under
-its former officers; who however could not agree as to their future
-order of march. Kleanor and Phryniskus, who had received presents
-from Seuthes, urged the expediency of accepting the service of
-that Thracian prince; Neon insisted on going to the Chersonese
-under the Lacedæmonian officers in that peninsula (as Anaxibius had
-projected); in the idea that he, as a Lacedæmonian, would there
-obtain the command of the whole army; while Timasion, with the view
-of re-establishing himself in his native city of Dardanus, proposed
-returning to the Asiatic side of the strait.</p>
-
-<p>Though this last plan met with decided favor among the army, it
-could not be executed without vessels. These Timasion had little
-or no means of procuring; so that considerable delay took place,
-during which the soldiers, receiving no pay, fell into much distress.
-Many of them were even compelled to sell their arms in order to get
-subsistence; while others got permission to settle in some of the
-neighboring towns, on condition of being disarmed. The whole army was
-thus gradually melting away, much to the satisfaction of Anaxibius,
-who was anxious to see the purposes of Pharnabazus accomplished.
-By degrees, it would probably have<span class="pagenum"><a
-id="Page_164">[p. 164]</a></span> been dissolved altogether, had
-not a change of interest on the part of Anaxibius induced him to
-promote its reorganization. He sailed from Byzantium to the Asiatic
-coast, to acquaint Pharnabazus that the Cyreians could no longer
-cause uneasiness, and to require his own promised reward. It seems
-moreover that Xenophon himself departed from Byzantium by the same
-opportunity. When they reached Kyzikus, they met the Lacedæmonian
-Aristarchus; who was coming out as newly-appointed harmost of
-Byzantium, to supersede Kleander, and who acquainted Anaxibius that
-Polus was on the point of arriving to supersede him as admiral.
-Anxious to meet Pharnabazus and make sure of his bribe, Anaxibius
-impressed his parting injunction upon Aristarchus to sell for slaves
-all the Cyreians whom he might find at Byzantium on his arrival, and
-then pursued his voyage along the southern coast of the Propontis
-to Parium. But Pharnabazus, having already received intimation of
-the change of admirals, knew that the friendship of Anaxibius was
-no longer of any value, and took no farther heed of him; while he
-at the same time sent to Byzantium to make the like compact with
-Aristarchus against the Cyreian army.<a id="FNanchor_266"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_266" class="fnanchor">[266]</a></p>
-
-<p>Anaxibius was stung to the quick at this combination of
-disappointment and insult on the part of the satrap. To avenge it, he
-resolved to employ those very soldiers whom he had first corrupted
-and fraudulently brought across to Europe, next cast out from
-Byzantium, and lastly, ordered to be sold into slavery, so far as any
-might yet be found in that town; bringing them back into Asia for
-the purpose of acting against Pharnabazus. Accordingly he addressed
-himself to Xenophon, and ordered him without a moment’s delay to
-rejoin the army, for the purpose of keeping it together, of recalling
-the soldiers who had departed, and transporting the whole body across
-into Asia. He provided him with an armed vessel of thirty oars to
-cross over from Parium to Perinthus, sending over a peremptory
-order to the Perinthians to furnish him with horses in order that
-he might reach the army<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_165">[p.
-165]</a></span> with the greatest speed.<a id="FNanchor_267"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_267" class="fnanchor">[267]</a> Perhaps it would
-not have been safe for Xenophon to disobey this order, under
-any circumstances. But the idea of acting with the army in Asia
-against Pharnabazus, under Lacedæmonian sanction, was probably very
-acceptable to him. He hastened across to the army, who welcomed his
-return with joy, and gladly embraced the proposal of crossing to
-Asia, which was a great improvement upon their forlorn and destitute
-condition. He accordingly conducted them to Perinthus, and encamped
-under the walls of the town; refusing, in his way through Selymbria,
-a second proposition from Seuthes to engage the services of the
-army.</p>
-
-<p>While Xenophon was exerting himself to procure transports for the
-passage of the army at Perinthus, Aristarchus the new harmost arrived
-there with two triremes from Byzantium. It seems that not only
-Byzantium, but also both Perinthus and Selymbria, were comprised in
-his government as harmost. On first reaching Byzantium to supersede
-Kleander, he found there no less than four hundred of the Cyreians,
-chiefly sick and wounded; whom Kleander, in spite of the ill-will
-of Anaxibius, had not only refused to sell into slavery, but had
-billeted upon the citizens, and tended with solicitude; so much did
-his good feeling towards Xenophon and towards the army now come
-into play. We read with indignation that Aristarchus, immediately
-on reaching Byzantium to supersede him, was not even contented
-with sending these four hundred men out of the town; but seized
-them,—Greeks, citizens, and soldiers as they were,—and
-sold them all into slavery.<a id="FNanchor_268"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_268" class="fnanchor">[268]</a><span
-class="pagenum"><a id="Page_166">[p. 166]</a></span> Apprised of
-the movements of Xenophon with the army, he now came to Perinthus
-to prevent their transit into Asia; laying an embargo on the
-transports in the harbor, and presenting himself personally before
-the assembled army to prohibit the soldiers from crossing. When
-Xenophon informed him that Anaxibius had given them orders to cross,
-and had sent him expressly to conduct them,—Aristarchus
-replied, “Anaxibius is no longer in functions as admiral, and I am
-harmost in this town. If I catch any of you at sea, I will sink you.”
-On the next day, he sent to invite the generals and the captains
-(lochages) to a conference within the walls. They were just about
-to enter the gates, when Xenophon, who was among them, received a
-private warning, that if he went in, Aristarchus would seize him,
-and either put him to death or send him prisoner to Pharnabazus.
-Accordingly Xenophon sent forward the others, and remained himself
-with the army, alleging the obligation of sacrificing. The behavior
-of Aristarchus,—who, when he saw the others without Xenophon,
-sent them away, and desired that they would all come again in
-the afternoon,—confirmed the justice of his suspicions, as
-to the imminent danger from which he had been preserved by this
-accidental warning.<a id="FNanchor_269"></a><a href="#Footnote_269"
-class="fnanchor">[269]</a> It need hardly be added that Xenophon
-disregarded the second invitation no less than the first; moreover a
-third invitation, which Aristarchus afterwards sent, was disregarded
-by all.</p>
-
-<p>We have here a Lacedæmonian harmost, not scrupling to lay a
-snare of treachery as flagrant as that which Tissaphernes had
-practised on the banks of the Zab to entrap Klearchus and his
-colleagues,—and that too against a Greek, and an officer of
-the highest station and merit, who had just saved Byzantium from
-pillage, and was now actually in execution of orders received<span
-class="pagenum"><a id="Page_167">[p. 167]</a></span> from the
-Lacedæmonian admiral Anaxibius. Had the accidental warning been
-withheld, Xenophon would assuredly have fallen into this snare,
-nor could we reasonably have charged him with imprudence,—so
-fully was he entitled to count upon straightforward conduct under
-the circumstances. But the same cannot be said of Klearchus, who
-undoubtedly manifested lamentable credulity, nefarious as was the
-fraud to which he fell a victim.</p>
-
-<p>At the second interview with the other officers, Aristarchus,
-while he forbade the army to cross the water, directed them to
-force their way by land through the Thracians who occupied the Holy
-mountain, and thus to arrive at the Chersonese; where (he said)
-they should receive pay. Neon the Lacedæmonian, with about eight
-hundred hoplites who adhered to his separate command, advocated
-this plan as the best. To be set against it, however, there was the
-proposition of Seuthes to take the army into pay; which Xenophon was
-inclined to prefer, uneasy at the thoughts of being cooped up in the
-narrow peninsula of the Chersonese, under the absolute command of
-the Lacedæmonian harmost, with great uncertainty both as to pay and
-as to provisions.<a id="FNanchor_270"></a><a href="#Footnote_270"
-class="fnanchor">[270]</a> Moreover it was imperiously necessary
-for these disappointed troops to make some immediate movement; for
-they had been brought to the gates of Perinthus in hopes of passing
-immediately on shipboard; it was mid-winter,—they were encamped
-in the open field, under the severe cold of Thrace,—they had
-neither assured supplies, nor even money to purchase, if a market
-had been near.<a id="FNanchor_271"></a><a href="#Footnote_271"
-class="fnanchor">[271]</a> Xenophon, who had brought them to the
-neighborhood of Perinthus, was now again responsible for extricating
-them from this untenable situation, and began to offer sacrifices,
-according to his wont, to ascertain whether the gods would encourage
-him to recommend a covenant with Seuthes. The sacrifices were so
-favorable, that he himself, together with a confidential officer from
-each of the generals, went by night and paid a visit to Seuthes, for
-the purpose of understanding distinctly his offers and purposes.</p>
-
-<p>Mæsadês, the father of Seuthes, had been apparently a dependent
-prince under the great monarchy of the Odrysian Thracians;<span
-class="pagenum"><a id="Page_168">[p. 168]</a></span> so formidable in
-the early years of the Peloponnesian war. But intestine commotions
-had robbed him of his principality over three Thracian tribes;
-which it was now the ambition of Seuthes to recover, by the aid of
-the Cyreian army. He offered to each soldier one stater of Kyzikus
-(about twenty Attic drachmæ, or nearly the same as that which they
-originally received from Cyrus) as pay per month; twice as much to
-each lochage or captain,—four times as much to each of the
-generals. In case they should incur the enmity of the Lacedæmonians
-by joining him, he guaranteed to them all the right of settlement
-and fraternal protection in his territory. To each of the generals,
-over and above pay, he engaged to assign a fort on the sea-coast,
-with a lot of land around it, and oxen for cultivation. And to
-Xenophon in particular, he offered the possession of Bisanthê,
-his best point on the coast. “I will also (he added, addressing
-Xenophon) give you my daughter in marriage; and if you have any
-daughter, I will buy her from you in marriage according to the
-custom of Thrace.”<a id="FNanchor_272"></a><a href="#Footnote_272"
-class="fnanchor">[272]</a> Seuthes farther engaged never on any
-occasion to lead them more than seven days’ journey from the sea, at
-farthest.</p>
-
-<p>These offers were as liberal as the army could possibly expect;
-and Xenophon himself, mistrusting the Lacedæmonians, as well as
-mistrusted by them, seems to have looked forward to the acquisition
-of a Thracian coast-fortress and territory (such as Miltiades,
-Alkibiades, and other Athenian leaders had obtained before him)
-as a valuable refuge in case of need.<a id="FNanchor_273"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_273" class="fnanchor">[273]</a> But even if the
-promise had been less favorable, the Cyreians had no alternative;
-for they had not even present supplies,—still less any means
-of subsistence throughout the winter; while departure by sea was
-rendered impossible by the Lacedæmonians. On the next day, Seuthes
-was introduced by Xenophon and the other generals to the army, who
-accepted his offers and concluded the bargain.</p>
-
-<p>They remained for two months in his service, engaged in
-warfare against various Thracian tribes, whom they enabled him to
-conquer and despoil; so that at the end of that period, he was in
-possession of an extensive dominion, a large native force, and
-a considerable tribute. Though the sufferings of the army from
-cold were extreme, during these two months of full winter and
-amidst<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_169">[p. 169]</a></span>
-the snowy mountains of Thrace, they were nevertheless enabled
-by their expeditions along with Seuthes to procure plentiful
-subsistence; which they could hardly have done in any other manner.
-But the pay which he had offered was never liquidated; at least,
-in requital of their two months of service, they received pay only
-for twenty days and a little more. And Xenophon himself, far from
-obtaining fulfilment of those splendid promises which Seuthes had
-made to him personally, seems not even to have received his pay as
-one of the generals. For him, the result was singularly unhappy;
-since he forfeited the good-will of Seuthes by importunate demand
-and complaint for the purpose of obtaining the pay due to the
-soldiers; while they on their side, imputing to his connivance the
-non-fulfilment of the promise, became thus in part alienated from
-him. Much of this mischief was brought about by the treacherous
-intrigues and calumny of a corrupt Greek from Maroneia, named
-Herakleides; who acted as minister and treasurer to Seuthes.</p>
-
-<p>Want of space compels me to omit the narrative given by Xenophon,
-both of the relations of the army with Seuthes, and of the warfare
-carried on against the hostile Thracian tribes,—interesting
-as it is from the juxtaposition of Greek and Thracian manners. It
-seems to have been composed by Xenophon under feelings of acute
-personal disappointment, and probably in refutation of calumnies
-against himself as if he had wronged the army. Hence we may trace
-in it a tone of exaggerated querulousness, and complaint that the
-soldiers were ungrateful to him. It is true that a portion of the
-army, under the belief that he had been richly rewarded by Seuthes
-while they had not obtained their stipulated pay, expressed virulent
-sentiments and falsehoods against him.<a id="FNanchor_274"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_274" class="fnanchor">[274]</a> Until such suspicions
-were refuted, it is no wonder that the army were alienated; but
-they were perfectly willing to hear both sides,—and Xenophon
-triumphantly disproved the accusation. That in the end, their
-feelings towards him were those of esteem and favor, stands confessed
-in his own words,<a id="FNanchor_275"></a><a href="#Footnote_275"
-class="fnanchor">[275]</a> proving that the ingratitude of which he
-complains was the feeling of some indeed, but not of all.</p>
-
-<p>It is hard to say, however, what would have been the fate of this
-gallant army, when Seuthes, having obtained from their arms in<span
-class="pagenum"><a id="Page_170">[p. 170]</a></span> two months all
-that he desired, had become only anxious to send them off without
-pay,—had they not been extricated by a change of interest and
-policy on the part of all-powerful Sparta. The Lacedæmonians had just
-declared war against Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus,—sending
-Thimbron into Asia to commence military operations. They then became
-extremely anxious to transport the Cyreians across to Asia, which
-their harmost, Aristarchus had hitherto prohibited,—and to
-take them into permanent pay; for which purpose two Lacedæmonians,
-Charmînus and Polynîkus were commissioned by Thimbron to offer
-to the army the same pay as had been promised, though not paid,
-by Seuthes; and as had been originally paid by Cyrus. Seuthes
-and Herakleides, eager to hasten the departure of the soldiers,
-endeavored to take credit with the Lacedæmonians for assisting
-their views.<a id="FNanchor_276"></a><a href="#Footnote_276"
-class="fnanchor">[276]</a> Joyfully did the army accept this
-offer, though complaining loudly of the fraud practised upon them
-by Seuthes; which Charmînus, at the instance of Xenophon, vainly
-pressed the Thracian prince to redress.<a id="FNanchor_277"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_277" class="fnanchor">[277]</a> He even sent Xenophon
-to demand the arrear of pay in the name of the Lacedæmonians, which
-afforded to the Athenian an opportunity of administering a severe
-lecture to Seuthes.<a id="FNanchor_278"></a><a href="#Footnote_278"
-class="fnanchor">[278]</a> But the latter was found less accessible
-to the workings of eloquence than the Cyreian assembled soldiers;
-nor did Xenophon obtain anything beyond a miserable dividend upon
-the sum due;—together with civil expressions towards himself
-personally,—an invitation to remain in his service with one
-thousand hoplites instead of going to Asia with the army,—and
-renewed promises, not likely now to find much credit, of a fort and
-grant of lands.</p>
-
-<p>When the army, now reduced by losses and dispersions to six
-thousand men,<a id="FNanchor_279"></a><a href="#Footnote_279"
-class="fnanchor">[279]</a> was prepared to cross into Asia, Xenophon
-was desirous of going back to Athens, but was persuaded to remain
-with them until the junction with Thimbron. He was at this time
-so poor, having scarcely enough to pay for his journey home,
-that he was obliged to sell his horse at Lampsakus, the Asiatic
-town<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_171">[p. 171]</a></span>
-where the army landed. Here he found Eukleides, a Phliasian
-prophet with whom he had been wont to hold intercourse and offer
-sacrifice at Athens. This man, having asked Xenophon how much he
-had acquired in the expedition, could not believe him when he
-affirmed his poverty. But when they proceeded to offer sacrifice
-together, from some animals sent by the Lampsakenes as a present
-to Xenophon, Eukleides had no sooner inspected the entrails of
-the victims, than he told Xenophon that he fully credited the
-statement. “I see (he said) that even if money shall be ever on its
-way to come to you, you yourself will be a hindrance to it, even
-if there be no other (here Xenophon acquiesced); Zeus Meilichios
-(the Gracious)<a id="FNanchor_280"></a><a href="#Footnote_280"
-class="fnanchor">[280]</a> is the real bar. Have you ever sacrificed
-to him, with entire burnt-offerings, as we used to do together at
-Athens?” “Never (replied Xenophon), throughout the whole march.” “Do
-so now, then (said Eukleides), and it will be for your advantage.”
-The next day, on reaching Ophrynium, Xenophon obeyed the injunction;
-sacrificing little pigs entire to Zeus Meilichios, as was the custom
-at Athens during the public festival called Diasia. And on the very
-same day he felt the beneficial effects of the proceeding; for Biton
-and another envoy came from the Lacedæmonians with an advance of pay
-to the army, and with dispositions so favorable to himself, that they
-bought back for him his horse, which he had just sold at Lampsakus
-for fifty darics. This was equivalent to giving him more than one
-year’s pay in hand (the pay which he would have received as general
-being four darics per month, or four times that of the soldier), at a
-time when he was known to be on the point of departure, and therefore
-would not stay to earn it. The short-comings of Seuthes were now
-made<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_172">[p. 172]</a></span> up
-with immense interest, so that Xenophon became better off than any
-man in the army; though he himself slurs over the magnitude of the
-present, by representing it as a delicate compliment to restore to
-him a favorite horse.</p>
-
-<p>Thus gratefully and instantaneously did Zeus the Gracious
-respond to the sacrifice which Xenophon, after a long omission,
-had been admonished by Eukleides to offer. And doubtless Xenophon
-was more than ever confirmed in the belief, which manifests itself
-throughout all his writings, that sacrifice not only indicates, by
-the interior aspect of the immolated victims, the tenor of coming
-events,—but also, according as it is rendered to the right
-god and at the right season, determines his will, and therefore the
-course of events, for dispensations favorable or unfavorable.</p>
-
-<p>But the favors of Zeus the Gracious, though begun, were not yet
-ended. Xenophon conducted the army through the Troad, and across
-mount Ida, to Antandrus; from thence along the coast to Lydia,
-through the plain of Thêbê and the town of Adramyttium, leaving
-Atarneus on the right hand, to Pergamus in Mysia, a hill-town
-overhanging the river and plain of Käikus. This district was occupied
-by the descendants of the Eretrian Gongylus, who, having been
-banished for embracing the cause of the Persians when Xerxes invaded
-Greece, had been rewarded (like the Spartan king Demaratus) with
-this sort of principality under the Persian empire. His descendant,
-another Gongylus, now occupied Pergamus, with his wife Hellas and
-his sons Gorgion and Gongylus. Xenophon was here received with great
-hospitality. Hellas acquainted him that a powerful Persian, named
-Asidates, was now dwelling, with his wife, family, and property, in a
-tower not far off, on the plain; and that a sudden night-march, with
-three hundred men, would suffice for the capture of this valuable
-booty, to which her own cousin should guide him. Accordingly, having
-sacrificed and ascertained that the victims were favorable, Xenophon
-communicated his plan after the evening meal to those captains who
-had been most attached to him throughout the expedition, wishing to
-make them partners in the profit. As soon as it became known, many
-volunteers, to the number of six hundred, pressed to be allowed
-to join. But the captains repelled them, declining to take more
-than three hundred, in order that the booty might afford an ampler
-dividend to each partner.</p>
-
-<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_173">[p. 173]</a></span></p>
-
-<p>Beginning their march in the evening, Xenophon and his detachment
-of three hundred reached about midnight the tower of Asidates; it was
-large, lofty, thickly built, and contained a considerable garrison.
-It served for protection to his cattle and cultivating slaves around,
-like a baronial castle in the middle ages; but the assailants
-neglected this outlying plunder, in order to be more sure of taking
-the castle itself. Its walls however were found much stronger than
-was expected; and although a breach was made by force about daybreak,
-yet so vigorous was the defence of the garrison, that no entrance
-could be effected. Signals and shouts of every kind were made by
-Asidates to procure aid from the Persian forces in the neighborhood;
-numbers of whom soon began to arrive, so that Xenophon and his
-company were obliged to retreat. And their retreat was at last only
-accomplished, after severe suffering and wounds to nearly half of
-them, through the aid of Gongylus with his forces from Pergamus, and
-of Proklês (the descendant of Demaratus) from Halisarna, a little
-farther off seaward.<a id="FNanchor_281"></a><a href="#Footnote_281"
-class="fnanchor">[281]</a></p>
-
-<p>Though his first enterprise thus miscarried, Xenophon soon laid
-plans for a second, employing the whole army; and succeeded in
-bringing Asidates prisoner to Pergamus, with his wife, children,
-horses, and all his personal property. Thus (says he, anxious above
-all things for the credit of sacrificial prophecy) the “previous
-sacrifices (those which had promised favorably before the first
-unsuccessful attempt) now came true.”<a id="FNanchor_282"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_282" class="fnanchor">[282]</a> The persons of
-this family were doubtless redeemed by their Persian friends for
-a large ransom;<a id="FNanchor_283"></a><a href="#Footnote_283"
-class="fnanchor">[283]</a> which, together with the booty brought in,
-made up a prodigious total to be divided.</p>
-
-<p>In making the division, a general tribute of sympathy
-and admiration was paid to Xenophon, to which all the
-army,—generals, captains, and soldiers,—and the
-Lacedæmonians besides,—unanimously concurred. Like Agamemnon
-at Troy, he was allowed to select for himself the picked lots of
-horses, mules, oxen, and other items of booty; insomuch that he
-became possessor of a<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_174">[p.
-174]</a></span> share valuable enough to enrich him at once, in
-addition to the fifty darics which he had before received. “Here
-then Xenophon (to use his own language<a id="FNanchor_284"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_284" class="fnanchor">[284]</a>) had no reason to
-complain of the god” (Zeus Meilichios). We may add,—what he
-ought to have added, considering the accusations which he had before
-put forth,—that neither had he any reason to complain of the
-ingratitude of the army.</p>
-
-<p>As soon as Thimbron arrived with his own forces, and
-the Cyreians became a part of his army, Xenophon took his
-leave of them. Having deposited in the temple at Ephesus
-that portion which had been confided to him as general, of
-the tithe set apart by the army at Kerasus for the Ephesian
-Artemis,<a id="FNanchor_285"></a><a href="#Footnote_285"
-class="fnanchor">[285]</a> he seems to have executed his intention of
-returning to Athens.<a id="FNanchor_286"></a><a href="#Footnote_286"
-class="fnanchor">[286]</a> He must have arrived there, after an
-absence of about two years and a half, within a few weeks, at
-farthest, after the death of his friend and preceptor Sokrates,
-whose trial and condemnation have been recorded in my last volume.
-That melancholy event certainly occurred during his absence
-from Athens;<a id="FNanchor_287"></a><a href="#Footnote_287"
-class="fnanchor">[287]</a> but whether it had come to his knowledge
-before he reached the city, we do not know. How much grief and
-indignation it excited in his mind, we may see by his collection of
-memoranda respecting the life and conversations of Sokrates, known by
-the name of Memorabilia, and probably put together shortly after his
-arrival.</p>
-
-<p>That he was again in Asia, three years afterwards, on military
-service under the Lacedæmonian king Agesilaus, is a fact attested by
-himself; but at what precise moment he quitted Athens for his second
-visit to Asia, we are left to conjecture. I incline to believe that
-he did not remain many months at home, but that he went out again
-in the next spring to rejoin the Cyreians in Asia,—became
-again their commander,—and served for two years under the
-Spartan general Derkyllidas before the arrival of Agesilaus.<span
-class="pagenum"><a id="Page_175">[p. 175]</a></span> Such military
-service would doubtless be very much to his taste; while a residence
-at Athens, then subject and quiescent, would probably be distasteful
-to him; both from the habits of command which he had contracted
-during the previous two years, and from feelings arising out of the
-death of Sokrates. After a certain interval of repose, he would
-be disposed to enter again upon the war against his old enemy
-Tissaphernes; and his service went on when Agesilaus arrived to
-take the command.<a id="FNanchor_288"></a><a href="#Footnote_288"
-class="fnanchor">[288]</a></p>
-
-<p>But during the two years after this latter event, Athens
-became a party to the war against Sparta, and entered into
-conjunction with the king of Persia as well as with the Thebans
-and others; while Xenophon, continuing his service as commander
-of the Cyreians, and accompanying Agesilaus from Asia back into
-Greece, became engaged against the Athenian troops and their
-Bœotian allies at the bloody battle of Korôneia. Under these
-circumstances, we cannot wonder that the Athenians passed sentence
-of banishment against him; not because he had originally taken
-part in aid of Cyrus against Artaxerxes,—nor because
-his political sentiments were unfriendly to democracy, as has
-been sometimes erroneously affirmed,—but because he was
-now openly in arms, and in conspicuous command, against his
-own country.<a id="FNanchor_289"></a><a href="#Footnote_289"
-class="fnanchor">[289]</a><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_176">[p.
-176]</a></span> Having thus become an exile, Xenophon was allowed
-by the Lacedæmonians to settle at Skillus, one of the villages of
-Triphylia, near Olympia in Peloponnesus, which they had recently
-emancipated from the Eleians. At one of the ensuing Olympic
-festivals, Megabyzus, the superintendent of the temple of Artemis
-at Ephesus, came over as a spectator; bringing with him the money
-which Xenophon had dedicated therein to the Ephesian Artemis. This
-money Xenophon invested in the purchase of lands at Skillus, to be
-consecrated in permanence to the goddess; having previously consulted
-her by sacrifice to ascertain her approval of the site contemplated,
-which site was recommended to him by its resemblance in certain
-points to that of the Ephesian temple. Thus, there was near each of
-them a river called by the same name Selinus, having in it fish and a
-shelly bottom. Xenophon constructed a chapel, an altar, and a statue
-of the goddess made of cypress-wood: all exact copies, on a reduced
-scale, of the temple and golden statue at Ephesus. A column near them
-was inscribed with the following words,—“This spot is sacred
-to Artemis. Whoever possesses the property and gathers its fruits,
-must sacrifice to her the tithe every year, and keep the chapel<span
-class="pagenum"><a id="Page_177">[p. 177]</a></span> in repair
-out of the remainder. Should any one omit this duty the goddess
-herself will take the omission in hand.”<a id="FNanchor_290"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_290" class="fnanchor">[290]</a></p>
-
-<p>Immediately near the chapel was an orchard of every description
-of fruit-trees, while the estate around comprised an extensive range
-of meadow, woodland, and mountain,—with the still loftier
-mountain called Pholoê adjoining. There was thus abundant pasture
-for horses, oxen, sheep, etc., and excellent hunting-ground near for
-deer and other game; advantages not to be found near the Artemision
-at Ephesus. Residing hard by on his own property, allotted to
-him by the Lacedæmonians, Xenophon superintended this estate as
-steward for the goddess; looking perhaps to the sanctity of her
-name for protection from disturbance by the Eleians, who viewed
-with a jealous eye the Lacedæmonian<a id="FNanchor_291"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_291" class="fnanchor">[291]</a> settlers at Skillus,
-and protested against the peace and convention promoted by Athens
-after the battle of Leuktra, because it recognized that place,
-along with the townships of Triphylia, as autonomous. Every year he
-made a splendid sacrifice, from the tithe of all the fruits of the
-property; to which solemnity not only all the Skilluntines, but also
-all the neighboring villages, were invited. Booths were erected for
-the visitors, to whom the goddess furnished (this is the language
-of Xenophon) an ample dinner of barley-meal, wheaten loaves, meat,
-game, and sweetmeats;<a id="FNanchor_292"></a><a href="#Footnote_292"
-class="fnanchor">[292]</a> the game being provided by a general hunt,
-which the sons of Xenophon conducted, and in which all the neighbors
-took part if they chose. The produce of the estate, saving this tithe
-and subject to the obligation of keeping the holy building in repair,
-was enjoyed by Xenophon himself. He had a keen relish for both
-hunting and horsemanship, and was among the first authors, so far as
-we know, who ever made these pursuits, with the management of horses
-and dogs, the subject of rational study and description.</p>
-
-<p>Such was the use to which Xenophon applied the tithe voted<span
-class="pagenum"><a id="Page_178">[p. 178]</a></span> by the army
-at Kerasus to the Ephesian Artemis; the other tithe, voted at the
-same time to Apollo, he dedicated at Delphi in the treasure-chamber
-of the Athenians, inscribing upon the offering his own name and
-that of Proxenus. His residence being only at a distance of
-twenty stadia from the great temple of Olympia, he was enabled to
-enjoy society with every variety of Greeks,—and to obtain copious
-information about Grecian politics, chiefly from philo-Laconian
-informants, and with the Lacedæmonian point of view predominant
-in his own mind; while he had also leisure for the composition
-of his various works. The interesting description which he
-himself gives of his residence at Skillus, implies a state of
-things not present and continuing,<a id="FNanchor_293"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_293" class="fnanchor">[293]</a> but past and gone;
-other testimonies too, though confused and contradictory, seem to
-show that the Lacedæmonian settlement at Skillus lasted no longer
-than the power of Lacedæmon was adequate to maintain it. During
-the misfortunes which befel that city after the battle of Leuktra
-(371 <small>B.C.</small>), Xenophon, with his family and his
-fellow-settlers, was expelled by the Eleians, and is then said to
-have found shelter at Corinth. But as Athens soon came to be not
-only at peace, but in intimate alliance, with Sparta,—the sentence
-of banishment against Xenophon was revoked; so that the latter part
-of his life was again passed in the enjoyment of his birthright
-as an Athenian citizen and Knight.<a id="FNanchor_294"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_294" class="fnanchor">[294]</a> Two of his sons,
-Gryllus and Diodorus, fought among the Athenian horsemen at the
-cavalry combat which preceded the battle of Mantineia, where the
-former was slain, after manifesting distinguished bravery; while
-his grandson Xenophon became in the next generation the subject
-of a pleading before the Athenian Dikastery, composed by the
-orator Deinarchus.<a id="FNanchor_295"></a><a href="#Footnote_295"
-class="fnanchor">[295]</a></p>
-
-<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_179">[p. 179]</a></span></p>
-
-<p>On bringing this accomplished and eminent leader to the close
-of that arduous retreat which he had conducted with so much honor,
-I have thought it necessary to anticipate a little on the future,
-in order to take a glance at his subsequent destiny. To his exile
-(in this point of view not less useful than that of Thucydides) we
-probably owe many of those compositions from which so much of our
-knowledge of Grecian affairs is derived. But to the contemporary
-world, the retreat, which Xenophon so successfully conducted,
-afforded a far more impressive lesson than any of his literary
-compositions. It taught in the most striking manner the impotence of
-the Persian land-force, manifested not less in the generals than in
-the soldiers. It proved that the Persian leaders were unfit for any
-systematic operations, even under the greatest possible advantages,
-against a small number of disciplined warriors resolutely bent on
-resistance; that they were too stupid and reckless even to obstruct
-the passage of rivers, or destroy roads, or cut off supplies. It
-more than confirmed the contemptuous language applied to them by
-Cyrus himself, before the battle of Kunaxa; when he proclaimed that
-he envied the Greeks their freedom, and that he was ashamed of the
-worthlessness of his own countrymen.<a id="FNanchor_296"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_296" class="fnanchor">[296]</a> Against such
-perfect weakness and disorganization,<span class="pagenum"><a
-id="Page_180">[p. 180]</a></span> nothing prevented the success of
-the Greeks along with Cyrus, except his own paroxysm of fraternal
-antipathy.<a id="FNanchor_297"></a><a href="#Footnote_297"
-class="fnanchor">[297]</a> And we shall perceive hereafter the
-military and political leaders of Greece,—Agesilaus,
-Jason of Pheræ,<a id="FNanchor_298"></a><a href="#Footnote_298"
-class="fnanchor">[298]</a> and others down to Philip and
-Alexander<a id="FNanchor_299"></a><a href="#Footnote_299"
-class="fnanchor">[299]</a>—firmly persuaded that with a
-tolerably numerous and well-appointed Grecian force, combined with
-exemption from Grecian enemies, they could succeed in overthrowing
-or dismembering the Persian empire. This conviction, so important in
-the subsequent history of Greece, takes its date from the retreat
-of the Ten Thousand. We shall indeed find Persia exercising an
-important influence, for two generations to come,—and at the
-peace of Antalkidas an influence stronger than ever,—over
-the destinies of Greece. But this will be seen to arise from the
-treason of Sparta, the chief of the Hellenic world, who abandons the
-Asiatic Greeks, and even arms herself with the name and the force
-of Persia, for purposes of aggrandizement and dominion to herself.
-Persia is strong by being enabled to employ Hellenic strength
-against the Hellenic cause; by lending money or a fleet to one side
-of the Grecian intestine parties, and thus becoming artificially
-strengthened against both. But the Xenophontic Anabasis betrays her
-real weakness against any vigorous attack; while it at the same time
-exemplifies the discipline, the endurance, the power of self-action
-and adaptation, the susceptibility of influence from speech and
-discussion, the combination of the reflecting obedience of citizens
-with the mechanical regularity of soldiers,—which confer such
-immortal distinction on the Hellenic character. The importance of
-this expedition and retreat, as an illustration of the Hellenic
-qualities and excellence, will justify the large space which has been
-devoted to it in this History.</p>
-
-<hr class="chap" />
-
-
-<div class="chapter" id="Chap_72">
-  <p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_181">[p. 181]</a></span></p>
-  <h2 class="nobreak">CHAPTER LXXII.<br />
-  GREECE UNDER THE LACEDÆMONIAN EMPIRE.</h2>
-</div>
-
-<p class="noindent"><span class="smcap">The</span> three preceding
-Chapters have been devoted exclusively to the narrative of the
-Expedition and Retreat, immortalized by Xenophon, occupying the two
-years intervening between about April 401 <small>B.C.</small> and
-June 399 <small>B.C.</small> That event, replete as it is with
-interest and pregnant with important consequences, stands apart from
-the general sequence of Grecian affairs,—which sequence I now
-resume.</p>
-
-<p>It will be recollected that as soon as Xenophon with his Ten
-Thousand warriors descended from the rugged mountains between
-Armenia and the Euxine to the hospitable shelter of Trapezus, and
-began to lay their plans for returning to Central Greece,—they
-found themselves within the Lacedæmonian empire, unable to advance
-a step without consulting Lacedæmonian dictation, and obliged,
-when they reached the Bosphorus, to endure without redress the
-harsh and treacherous usage of the Spartan officers, Anaxibius and
-Aristarchus.</p>
-
-<p>Of that empire the first origin has been set forth in my last
-preceding volume. It began with the decisive victory of Ægospotami
-in the Hellespont (September or October 405 <small>B.C.</small>),
-where the Lacedæmonian Lysander, without the loss of a man, got
-possession of the entire Athenian fleet and a large portion of their
-crews,—with the exception of eight or nine triremes with which
-the Athenian admiral Konon effected his escape to Euagoras at Cyprus.
-The whole power of Athens was thus annihilated, and nothing remained
-for the Lacedæmonians to master except the city itself and Peiræus; a
-consummation certain to happen, and actually brought to pass in April
-404 <small>B.C.</small>, when Lysander entered Athens in triumph,
-dismantled Peiræus, and demolished a large portion of the Long Walls.
-With the exception of Athens herself,—whose citizens deferred
-the moment of subjection by an heroic, though unavailing, struggle
-against the horrors of famine,—and<span class="pagenum"><a
-id="Page_182">[p. 182]</a></span> of Samos,—no other Grecian
-city offered any resistance to Lysander after the battle of
-Ægospotami; which in fact not only took away from Athens her whole
-naval force, but transferred it all over to him, and rendered him
-admiral of a larger Grecian fleet than had ever been seen together
-since the battle of Salamis.</p>
-
-<p>I have recounted in my sixty-fifth chapter, the sixteen months
-of bitter suffering undergone by Athens immediately after her
-surrender. The loss of her fleet and power was aggravated by an
-extremity of internal oppression. Her oligarchical party and her
-exiles, returning after having served with the enemy against her,
-extorted from the public assembly, under the dictation of Lysander
-who attended it in person, the appointment of an omnipotent council
-of thirty for the ostensible purpose of framing a new constitution.
-These thirty rulers,—among whom Kritias was the most violent,
-and Theramenes (seemingly) the most moderate, or at least the soonest
-satiated,—perpetrated cruelty and spoliation on the largest
-scale, being protected against all resistance by a Lacedæmonian
-harmost and garrison established in the acropolis. Besides numbers of
-citizens put to death, so many others were driven into exile with the
-loss of their property, that Thebes and the neighboring cities became
-crowded with them. After about eight months of unopposed tyranny, the
-Thirty found themselves for the first time attacked by Thrasybulus
-at the head of a small party of these exiles coming out of Bœotia.
-His bravery and good conduct,—combined with the enormities of
-the Thirty, which became continually more nefarious, and to which
-even numerous oligarchical citizens, as well as Theramenes himself,
-successively became victims,—enabled him soon to strengthen
-himself, to seize the Peiræus, and to carry on a civil war which
-ultimately put down the tyrants.</p>
-
-<p>These latter were obliged to invoke the aid of a new Lacedæmonian
-force. And had that force still continued at the disposal of
-Lysander, all resistance on the part of Athens would have been
-unavailing. But fortunately for the Athenians, the last few months
-had wrought material change in the dispositions both of the
-allies of Sparta and of many among her leading men. The allies,
-especially Thebes and Corinth, not only relented in their hatred
-and fear of Athens, now that she had lost her power,—but
-even sympathized<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_183">[p.
-183]</a></span> with her suffering exiles, and became disgusted
-with the self-willed encroachments of Sparta; while the Spartan
-king Pausanias, together with some of the ephors, were also jealous
-of the arbitrary and oppressive conduct of Lysander. Instead of
-conducting the Lacedæmonian force to uphold at all price the
-Lysandrian oligarchy, Pausanias appeared rather as an equitable
-mediator to terminate the civil war. He refused to concur in any
-measure for obstructing the natural tendency towards a revival of
-the democracy. It was in this manner that Athens, rescued from that
-sanguinary and rapacious <i>regime</i> which has passed into history under
-the name of the Thirty Tyrants, was enabled to reappear as a humble
-and dependent member of the Spartan alliance,—with nothing but
-the recollection of her former power, yet with her democracy again
-in vigorous and tutelary action for internal government. The just
-and gentle bearing of her democratical citizens, and the absence of
-reactionary antipathies, after such cruel ill-treatment,—are
-among the most honorable features in her history.</p>
-
-<p>The reader will find in my last volume, what I can only rapidly
-glance at here, the details of that system of bloodshed, spoliation,
-extinction of free speech and even of intellectual teaching, efforts
-to implicate innocent citizens as agents in judicial assassination,
-etc.,—which stained the year of Anarchy (as it was termed in
-Athenian annals<a id="FNanchor_300"></a><a href="#Footnote_300"
-class="fnanchor">[300]</a>) immediately following the surrender of
-the city. These details depend on evidence perfectly satisfactory;
-for they are conveyed to us chiefly by Xenophon, whose sympathies are
-decidedly oligarchical. From him too we learn another fact, not less
-pregnant with instruction; that the knights or horsemen, the body of
-richest proprietors at Athens, were the mainstay of the Thirty from
-first to last, notwithstanding all the enormities of their career.</p>
-
-<p>We learn from these dark, but well-attested details, to
-appreciate the auspices under which that period of history called
-the Lacedæmonian empire was inaugurated. Such phenomena were by
-no means confined within the walls of Athens. On the contrary,
-the year of Anarchy (using that term in the sense in which it was
-employed by the Athenians) arising out of the same combination<span
-class="pagenum"><a id="Page_184">[p. 184]</a></span> of causes
-and agents, was common to a very large proportion of the cities
-throughout Greece. The Lacedæmonian admiral Lysander, during his
-first year of naval command, had organized in most of the allied
-cities factious combinations of some of the principal citizens,
-corresponding with himself personally; by whose efforts in their
-respective cities he was enabled to prosecute the war vigorously,
-and whom he repaid, partly by seconding as much as he could their
-injustices in their respective cities,—partly by promising
-to strengthen their hands still farther as soon as victory should
-be made sure.<a id="FNanchor_301"></a><a href="#Footnote_301"
-class="fnanchor">[301]</a> This policy, while it served as a stimulus
-against the common enemy, contributed still more directly to
-aggrandize Lysander himself; creating for him an ascendency of his
-own, and imposing upon him personal obligations towards adherents,
-apart from what was required by the interests of Sparta.</p>
-
-<p>The victory of Ægospotami, complete and decisive beyond all
-expectations either of friend or foe, enabled him to discharge these
-obligations with interest. All Greece at once made submission to
-the Lacedæmonians,<a id="FNanchor_302"></a><a href="#Footnote_302"
-class="fnanchor">[302]</a> except Athens and Samos,—and these
-two only held out a few months. It was now the first business
-of the victorious commander to remunerate his adherents, and to
-take permanent security for Spartan dominion as well as for his
-own. In the greater number of cities, he established an oligarchy
-of ten citizens, or a dekarchy,<a id="FNanchor_303"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_303" class="fnanchor">[303]</a> composed of his own
-partisans; while he at the same time planted in each a Lacedæmonian
-harmost or governor, with a garrison to uphold the new oligarchy. The
-dekarchy of ten Lysandrian partisans, with the Lacedæmonian harmost
-to sustain them, became the general scheme of Hellenic government
-throughout the Ægean, from Eubœa to the Thracian coast-towns, and
-from Myletus to Byzantium. Lysander sailed round in person, with
-his victorious fleet, to Byzantium and Chalkêdon, to the cities of
-Lesbos, to Thasos, and other places,—while he sent Eteonikus
-to Thrace, for the purpose of thus recasting the governments
-everywhere. Not merely those cities which had hitherto been on
-the Athenian side, but also those which had acted as allies<span
-class="pagenum"><a id="Page_185">[p. 185]</a></span> of Sparta,
-were subjected to the same intestine revolution and the same
-foreign constraint.<a id="FNanchor_304"></a><a href="#Footnote_304"
-class="fnanchor">[304]</a> Everywhere the new Lysandrian dekarchy
-superseded the previous governments, whether oligarchical or
-democratical.</p>
-
-<p>At Thasus, as well as in other places, this revolution was
-not accomplished without much bloodshed as well as treacherous
-stratagem, nor did Lysander himself scruple to enforce, personally
-and by his own presence, the execution and expulsion of suspected
-citizens.<a id="FNanchor_305"></a><a href="#Footnote_305"
-class="fnanchor">[305]</a> In many places, however, simple terrorism
-probably sufficed. The new Lysandrian Ten overawed resistance and
-procured recognition of their usurpation by the menace of inviting
-the victorious admiral with his fleet of two hundred sail, and by
-the simple arrival of the Lacedæmonian harmost. Not only was each
-town obliged to provide a fortified citadel and maintenance for this
-governor with his garrison, but a scheme of tribute, amounting to one
-thousand talents annually, was imposed for the future, and assessed
-ratably upon each city by Lysander.<a id="FNanchor_306"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_306" class="fnanchor">[306]</a></p>
-
-<p>In what spirit these new dekarchies would govern, consisting as
-they did of picked oligarchical partisans distinguished for audacity
-and ambition,<a id="FNanchor_307"></a><a href="#Footnote_307"
-class="fnanchor">[307]</a>—who, to all the unscrupulous lust
-of power which characterized Lysander himself, added a thirst for
-personal gain, from which he was exempt, and were now about to
-reimburse<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_186">[p. 186]</a></span>
-themselves for services already rendered to him,—the general
-analogy of Grecian history would sufficiently teach us, though we
-are without special details. But in reference to this point, we
-have not merely general analogy to guide us; we have farther the
-parallel case of the Thirty at Athens, the particulars of whose
-rule are well known and have already been alluded to. These Thirty,
-with the exception of the difference of number, were to all intents
-and purposes a Lysandrian dekarchy; created by the same originating
-force, placed under the like circumstances, and animated by the like
-spirit and interests. Every subject town would produce its Kritias
-and Theramenes, and its body of wealthy citizens like the knights
-or horsemen at Athens to abet their oppressions, under Lacedæmonian
-patronage and the covering guard of the Lacedæmonian harmost.
-Moreover, Kritias, with all his vices, was likely to be better
-rather than worse, as compared with his oligarchical parallel in any
-other less cultivated city. He was a man of letters and philosophy,
-accustomed to the conversation of Sokrates, and to the discussion of
-ethical and social questions. We may say the same of the knights or
-horsemen at Athens. Undoubtedly they had been better educated, and
-had been exposed to more liberalizing and improving influences, than
-the corresponding class elsewhere. If, then, these knights at Athens
-had no shame in serving as accomplices to the Thirty throughout all
-their enormities, we need not fear to presume that other cities
-would furnish a body of wealthy men yet more unscrupulous, and a
-leader at least as sanguinary, rapacious, and full of antipathies,
-as Kritias. As at Athens, so elsewhere; the dekarchs would begin by
-putting to death notorious political opponents, under the name of
-“the wicked men;”<a id="FNanchor_308"></a><a href="#Footnote_308"
-class="fnanchor">[308]</a> they would next proceed to deal in
-the same manner with men of known probity and courage, likely to
-take a lead in resisting oppression.<a id="FNanchor_309"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_309" class="fnanchor">[309]</a> Their career of
-blood would continue,—in spite of remonstrances from more
-moderate persons among their own number,<span class="pagenum"><a
-id="Page_187">[p. 187]</a></span> like Theramenes,—until
-they contrived some stratagem for disarming the citizens,
-which would enable them to gratify both their antipathies and
-their rapacity by victims still more numerous,—many of
-such victims being wealthy men, selected for purposes of pure
-spoliation.<a id="FNanchor_310"></a><a href="#Footnote_310"
-class="fnanchor">[310]</a> They would next despatch by force
-any obtrusive monitor from their own number, like Theramenes;
-probably with far less ceremony than accompanied the perpetration
-of this crime at Athens, where we may trace the effect of
-those judicial forms and habits to which the Athenian public
-had been habituated,—overruled indeed, yet still not
-forgotten. There would hardly remain any fresh enormity still
-to commit, over and above the multiplied executions, except to
-banish from the city all but their own immediate partisans, and
-to reward these latter with choice estates confiscated from
-the victims.<a id="FNanchor_311"></a><a href="#Footnote_311"
-class="fnanchor">[311]</a> If called upon to excuse such tyranny,
-the leader of a dekarchy would have sufficient invention to employ
-the plea of Kritias,—that all changes of government were
-unavoidably death-dealing, and that nothing less than such stringent
-measures would suffice to maintain his city in suitable dependence
-upon Sparta.<a id="FNanchor_312"></a><a href="#Footnote_312"
-class="fnanchor">[312]</a></p>
-
-<p>Of course, it is not my purpose to affirm that in any other
-city, precisely the same phenomena took place as those which
-occurred in Athens. But we are nevertheless perfectly warranted
-in regarding the history of the Athenian Thirty as a fair sample,
-from whence to derive our idea of those Lysandrian dekarchies
-which now overspread the Grecian world. Doubtless, each had its
-own peculiar march; some were less tyrannical; but, perhaps, some
-even more tyrannical, regard being had to the size of the city.
-And in point of fact, Isokrates, who speaks with indignant horror
-of these dekarchies, while he denounces those features which they
-had in common with the triakontarchy at Athens,—extrajudicial
-murders, spoliations, and banishments,—notices one enormity
-besides, which we do not find in the latter, violent outrages upon
-boys and women.<a id="FNanchor_313"></a><a href="#Footnote_313"
-class="fnanchor">[313]</a> Nothing of this kind is ascribed
-to Kritias and his<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_188">[p.
-188]</a></span> companions;<a id="FNanchor_314"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_314" class="fnanchor">[314]</a> and it is a
-considerable proof of the restraining force of Athenian manners,
-that men who inflicted so much evil in gratification of other
-violent impulses, should have stopped short here. The decemvirs
-named by Lysander, like the decemvir Appius Claudius at Rome, would
-find themselves armed with power to satiate their lusts as well as
-their antipathies, and would not be more likely to set bounds to
-the former than to the latter. Lysander, in all the overweening
-insolence of victory, while rewarding his most devoted partisans
-with an exaltation comprising every sort of license and tyranny,
-stained the dependent cities with countless murders, perpetrated on
-private as well as on public grounds.<a id="FNanchor_315"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_315" class="fnanchor">[315]</a> No individual
-Greek had ever before wielded so prodigious a power of enriching
-friends or destroying enemies, in this universal reorganization
-of Greece;<a id="FNanchor_316"></a><a href="#Footnote_316"
-class="fnanchor">[316]</a> nor was there ever any power more
-deplorably abused.</p>
-
-<p>It was thus that the Lacedæmonian empire imposed upon each of
-the subject cities a double oppression;<a id="FNanchor_317"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_317" class="fnanchor">[317]</a> the native decemvirs,
-and the foreign harmost; each abetting the other, and forming
-together an aggravated pressure upon the citizens, from which
-scarce any escape was left. The Thirty at Athens paid the greatest
-possible court to the harmost Kallibius,<a id="FNanchor_318"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_318" class="fnanchor">[318]</a> and put to
-death<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_189">[p. 189]</a></span>
-individual Athenians offensive to him, in order to purchase his
-coöperation in their own violences. The few details which we possess
-respecting these harmosts (who continued throughout the insular and
-maritime cities for about ten years, until the battle of Knidus, or
-as long as the maritime empire of Sparta lasted,—but in various
-continental dependencies considerably longer, that is, until the
-defeat of Leuktra in 371 <small>B.C.</small>), are all for the most
-part discreditable. We have seen in the last chapter the description
-given by the philo-Laconian Xenophon, of the harsh and treacherous
-manner in which they acted towards the returning Cyreian soldiers,
-combined with their corrupt subservience to Pharnabazus. We learn
-from him that it depended upon the fiat of a Lacedæmonian harmost
-whether these soldiers should be proclaimed enemies and excluded
-forever from their native cities; and Kleander, the harmost of
-Byzantium, who at first threatened them with this treatment, was only
-induced by the most unlimited submission, combined with very delicate
-management, to withdraw his menace. The cruel proceeding of Anaxibius
-and Aristarchus, who went so far as to sell four hundred of these
-soldiers into slavery, has been recounted a few pages above. Nothing
-can be more arbitrary or reckless than their proceedings. If they
-could behave thus towards a body of Greek soldiers full of acquired
-glory, effective either as friends or as enemies, and having generals
-capable of prosecuting their collective interests and making their
-complaints heard,—what protection would a private citizen of
-any subject city, Byzantium or Perinthus, be likely to enjoy against
-their oppression?</p>
-
-<p>The story of Aristodemus, the harmost of Oreus in Eubœa, evinces
-that no justice could be obtained against any of their enor<span
-class="pagenum"><a id="Page_190">[p. 190]</a></span>mities from the
-ephors of Sparta. That harmost, among many other acts of brutal
-violence, seized a beautiful youth, son of a free citizen at Oreus,
-out of the palæstra,—carried him off,—and after vainly
-endeavoring to overcome his resistance, put him to death. The father
-of the youth went to Sparta, made known the atrocities, and appealed
-to the ephors and Senate for redress. But a deaf ear was turned to
-his complaints, and in anguish of mind he slew himself. Indeed, we
-know that these Spartan authorities would grant no redress, not
-merely against harmosts, but even against private Spartan citizens,
-who had been guilty of gross crime out of their own country. A
-Bœotian near Leuktra, named Skedasus, preferred complaint that two
-Spartans, on their way from Delphi, after having been hospitably
-entertained in his house, had first violated, and afterwards
-killed, his two daughters; but even for so flagitious an outrage
-as this, no redress could be obtained.<a id="FNanchor_319"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_319" class="fnanchor">[319]</a> Doubtless,
-when a powerful foreign ally, like the Persian satrap
-Pharnabazus,<a id="FNanchor_320"></a><a href="#Footnote_320"
-class="fnanchor">[320]</a> complained to the ephors of the conduct
-of a Lacedæmonian harmost or admiral, his representations would
-receive attention; and we learn that the ephors were thus induced
-not merely to recall Lysander from the Hellespont, but to put to
-death another officer, Thorax, for corrupt appropriation of money.
-But for a private citizen in any subject city, the superintending
-authority of Sparta would be not merely remote but deaf and
-immovable, so as to afford him no protection whatever, and to leave
-him altogether at the mercy of the harmost. It seems, too, that
-the rigor of Spartan training, and peculiarity of habits, rendered
-individual Lacedæmonians on foreign service more self-willed, more
-incapable of entering into the customs or feelings of others, and
-more liable to degenerate when set free from the strict watch of
-home,—than other Greeks generally.<a id="FNanchor_321"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_321" class="fnanchor">[321]</a></p>
-
-<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_191">[p. 191]</a></span></p>
-
-<p>Taking all these causes of evil together,—the
-dekarchies, the harmosts, and the overwhelming dictatorship of
-Lysander,—and construing other parts of the Grecian world by
-the analogy of Athens under the Thirty,—we shall be warranted
-in affirming that the first years of the Spartan Empire, which
-followed upon the victory of Ægospotami, were years of all-pervading
-tyranny and multifarious intestine calamity, such as Greece had
-never before endured. The hardships of war, severe in many ways,
-were now at an end, but they were replaced by a state of suffering
-not the less difficult to bear because it was called peace. And what
-made the suffering yet more intolerable was, that it was a bitter
-disappointment, and a flagrant violation of promises proclaimed,
-repeatedly and explicitly, by the Lacedæmonians themselves.</p>
-
-<p>For more than thirty years preceding,—from times earlier
-than the commencement of the Peloponnesian war,—the Spartans
-had professed to interfere only for the purpose of liberating Greece,
-and of putting down the usurped ascendency of Athens. All the allies
-of Sparta had been invited into strenuous action,—all those
-of Athens had been urged to revolt,—under the soul-stirring
-cry of “Freedom to Greece.” The earliest incitements addressed by
-the Corinthians to Sparta in 432 <small>B.C.</small>, immediately
-after the Korkyræan dispute, called upon her to stand forward in
-fulfilment of her recognized function as “Liberator of Greece,”
-and denounced her as guilty of connivance with Athens if she
-held back.<a id="FNanchor_322"></a><a href="#Footnote_322"
-class="fnanchor">[322]</a> Athens was branded as the “despot city;”
-which had already absorbed the independence of many Greeks, and<span
-class="pagenum"><a id="Page_192">[p. 192]</a></span> menaced that of
-all the rest. The last formal requisition borne by the Lacedæmonian
-envoys to Athens in the winter immediately preceding the war, ran
-thus,—“If you desire the continuance of peace with Sparta,
-restore to the Greeks their autonomy.”<a id="FNanchor_323"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_323" class="fnanchor">[323]</a> When Archidamus,
-king of Sparta, approached at the head of his army to besiege
-Platæa, the Platæans laid claim to autonomy as having been solemnly
-guaranteed to them by King Pausanias after the great victory near
-their town. Upon which Archidamus replied,—“Your demand is
-just; we are prepared to confirm <i>your</i> autonomy,—but we call
-upon you to aid us in securing the like for those other Greeks who
-have been enslaved by Athens. This is the sole purpose of our great
-present effort.”<a id="FNanchor_324"></a><a href="#Footnote_324"
-class="fnanchor">[324]</a> And the banner of general enfranchisement,
-which the Lacedæmonians thus held up at the outset of the war,
-enlisted in their cause encouraging sympathy and good wishes
-throughout Greece.<a id="FNanchor_325"></a><a href="#Footnote_325"
-class="fnanchor">[325]</a></p>
-
-<p>But the most striking illustration by far, of the seductive
-promises held out by the Lacedæmonians, was afforded by the conduct
-of Brasidas in Thrace, when he first came into the neighborhood
-of the Athenian allies during the eighth year of the war (424
-<small>B.C.</small>). In his memorable discourse addressed to
-the public assembly at Akanthus, he takes the greatest pains to
-satisfy them that he came only for the purpose of realizing the
-promise of enfranchisement proclaimed by the Lacedæmonians at the
-beginning of the war.<a id="FNanchor_326"></a><a href="#Footnote_326"
-class="fnanchor">[326]</a> Having expected, when acting in such
-a cause, nothing<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_193">[p.
-193]</a></span> less than a hearty welcome, he is astonished to
-find their gates closed against him. “I am come (said he) not to
-injure, but to liberate the Greeks; after binding the Lacedæmonian
-authorities by the most solemn oaths, that all whom I may bring
-over shall be dealt with as autonomous allies. We do not wish to
-obtain you as allies either by force or fraud, but to act as your
-allies at a time when you are enslaved by the Athenians. You ought
-not to suspect my purposes, in the face of these solemn assurances;
-least of all ought any man to hold back through apprehension of
-private enmities, and through fear lest I should put the city into
-the hands of a few chosen partisans. I am not come to identify
-myself with local faction: I am not the man to offer you an unreal
-liberty by breaking down your established constitution, for the
-purpose of enslaving either the Many to the Few, or the Few to the
-Many. That would be more intolerable even than foreign dominion;
-and we Lacedæmonians should incur nothing but reproach, instead
-of reaping thanks and honor for our trouble. We should draw upon
-ourselves those very censures, upon the strength of which we are
-trying to put down Athens; and that, too, in aggravated measure,
-worse than those who have never made honorable professions; since
-to men in high position, specious trick is more disgraceful than
-open violence.<a id="FNanchor_327"></a><a href="#Footnote_327"
-class="fnanchor">[327]</a>—If (continued Brasidas) in spite
-of my assurances, you still withhold from me your coöperation, I
-shall think myself authorized to constrain you by force. We should
-not be warranted in forcing freedom on any<span class="pagenum"><a
-id="Page_194">[p. 194]</a></span> unwilling parties, except
-with a view to some common good. But as we seek not empire for
-ourselves,—as we struggle only to put down the empire of
-others,—as we offer autonomy to each and all,—so we
-should do wrong to the majority if we allowed you to persist in
-your opposition.”<a id="FNanchor_328"></a><a href="#Footnote_328"
-class="fnanchor">[328]</a></p>
-
-<p>Like the allied sovereigns of Europe in 1813, who, requiring the
-most strenuous efforts on the part of the people to contend against
-the Emperor Napoleon, promised free constitutions and granted
-nothing after the victory had been assured,—the Lacedæmonians
-thus held out the most emphatic and repeated assurances of general
-autonomy in order to enlist allies against Athens; disavowing, even
-ostentatiously, any aim at empire for themselves. It is true, that
-after the great catastrophe before Syracuse, when the ruin of Athens
-appeared imminent, and when the alliance with the Persian satraps
-against her was first brought to pass, the Lacedæmonians began to
-think more of empire,<a id="FNanchor_329"></a><a href="#Footnote_329"
-class="fnanchor">[329]</a> and less of Grecian freedom; which,
-indeed, so far as concerned the Greeks on the continent of Asia,
-was surrendered to Persia. Nevertheless the old watchword still
-continued. It was still currently believed, though less studiously
-professed, that the destruction of the Athenian empire was aimed at
-as a means to the liberation of Greece.<a id="FNanchor_330"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_330" class="fnanchor">[330]</a></p>
-
-<p>The victory of Ægospotami with its consequences cruelly
-undeceived every one. The language of Brasidas, sanctioned
-by the solemn oaths of the Lacedæmonian ephors, in 424
-<small>B.C.</small>—and the proceedings of the Lacedæmonian Lysander
-in 405-404 <small>B.C.</small>, the commencing hour of Spartan
-omnipotence,—stand in such literal and flagrant contradiction, that
-we might almost imagine the former to have foreseen the possibility
-of such a successor, and to have tried to disgrace and disarm him
-beforehand. The dekarchies of Lysander<span class="pagenum"><a
-id="Page_195">[p. 195]</a></span> realized that precise ascendency of
-a few chosen partisans which Brasidas repudiates as an abomination
-worse than foreign dominion; while the harmosts and garrison,
-installed in the dependent cities along with the native decemvirs,
-planted the second variety of mischief as well as the first, each
-aggravating the other. Had the noble-minded Kallikratidas gained a
-victory at Arginusæ, and lived to close the war, he would probably
-have tried, with more or less of success, to make some approach to
-the promises of Brasidas. But it was the double misfortune of Greece,
-first that the closing victory was gained by such an admiral as
-Lysander, the most unscrupulous of all power-seekers, partly for his
-country, and still more for himself,—next, that the victory was so
-decisive, sudden and imposing, as to leave no enemy standing, or in
-a position to insist upon terms. The fiat of Lysander, acting in the
-name of Sparta, became omnipotent, not merely over enemies, but over
-allies; and to a certain degree even over the Spartan authorities
-themselves. There was no present necessity for conciliating
-allies,—still less for acting up to former engagements; so that
-nothing remained to oppose the naturally ambitious inspirations
-of the Spartan ephors, who allowed the admiral to carry out the
-details in his own way. But former assurances, though Sparta was
-in a condition to disregard them, were not forgotten by others;
-and the recollection of them imparted additional bitterness to the
-oppressions of the decemvirs and harmosts.<a id="FNanchor_331"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_331" class="fnanchor">[331]</a> In perfect
-consistency<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_196">[p.
-196]</a></span> with her misrule throughout Eastern
-Greece,<a id="FNanchor_332"></a><a href="#Footnote_332"
-class="fnanchor">[332]</a> too, Sparta identified herself with the
-energetic tyranny of Dionysius at Syracuse, assisting both to erect
-and to uphold it; a contradiction to her former maxims of action
-which would have astounded the historian Herodotus.</p>
-
-<p>The empire of Sparta thus constituted at the end of 405
-<small>B.C.</small>, maintained itself in full grandeur
-for somewhat above ten years, until the naval battle of
-Knidus,<a id="FNanchor_333"></a><a href="#Footnote_333"
-class="fnanchor">[333]</a> in 394 <small>B.C.</small> That defeat
-de<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_197">[p. 197]</a></span>stroyed
-her fleet and maritime ascendency, yet left her in undiminished
-power on land, which she still maintained until her defeat by
-the Thebans<a id="FNanchor_334"></a><a href="#Footnote_334"
-class="fnanchor">[334]</a> at Leuktra in 371 <small>B.C.</small>
-Throughout all this time, it was her established system to keep
-up Spartan harmosts and garrisons in the dependent cities on the
-continent as well as in the islands. Even the Chians, who had
-been her most active allies during the last eight years of the
-war, were compelled to submit to this hardship; besides having
-all their fleet taken away from them.<a id="FNanchor_335"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_335" class="fnanchor">[335]</a> But the native
-dekarchies, though at first established by Lysander universally
-throughout the maritime dependencies, did not last as a system so
-long as the harmosts. Composed as they were to a great degree of
-the personal nominees and confederates of Lysander, they suffered
-in part by the reactionary jealousy which in time made itself
-felt against his overweening ascendency. After continuing for
-some time, they lost the countenance of the Spartan ephors, who
-proclaimed permission to the cities (we do not precisely know when)
-to resume their preëxisting governments.<a id="FNanchor_336"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_336" class="fnanchor">[336]</a> Some of the
-dekarchies thus became dissolved, or modified in various ways, but
-several probably still continued to subsist, if they had force enough
-to maintain themselves; for it does not appear that the ephors ever
-systematically put them down, as Lysander had systematically set them
-up.</p>
-
-<p>The government of the Thirty at Athens would never have been
-overthrown if the oppressed Athenians had been obliged to rely
-on a tutelary interference of the Spartan ephors to help them in
-overthrowing it. My last volume has shown that this nefarious<span
-class="pagenum"><a id="Page_198">[p. 198]</a></span> oligarchy came
-to its end by the unassisted efforts of Thrasybulus and the Athenian
-democrats themselves. It is true, indeed, that the arrogance and
-selfishness of Sparta and of Lysander had alienated the Thebans,
-Corinthians, Megarians, and other neighboring allies, and induced
-them to sympathize with the Athenian exiles against the atrocities
-of the Thirty,—but they never rendered any positive assistance
-of moment. The inordinate personal ambition of Lysander had also
-offended King Pausanias and the Spartan ephors, so that they too
-became indifferent to the Thirty, who were his creatures. But this
-merely deprived the Thirty of that foreign support which Lysander,
-had he still continued in the ascendent, would have extended to them
-in full measure. It was not the positive cause of their downfall.
-That crisis was brought about altogether by the energy of Thrasybulus
-and his companions, who manifested such force and determination
-as could not have been put down without an extraordinary display
-of Spartan military power; a display not entirely safe when the
-sympathies of the chief allies were with the other side,—and
-at any rate adverse to the inclinations of Pausanias. As it was
-with the Thirty at Athens, so it probably was also with the
-dekarchies in the dependent cities. The Spartan ephors took no
-steps to put them down; but where the resistance of the citizens
-was strenuous enough to overthrow them, no Spartan intervention
-came to prop them up, and the harmost perhaps received orders not
-to consider his authority as indissolubly linked with theirs. The
-native forces of each dependent city being thus left to find their
-own level, the decemvirs, once installed, would doubtless maintain
-themselves in a great number; while in other cases they would be
-overthrown,—or, perhaps, would contrive to perpetuate their
-dominion by compromise and alliance with other oligarchical sections.
-This confused and unsettled state of the dekarchies,—some still
-existing, others half-existing, others again defunct,—prevailed
-in 396 <small>B.C.</small>, when Lysander accompanied Agesilaus
-into Asia, in the full hope that he should have influence enough to
-reorganize them all.<a id="FNanchor_337"></a><a href="#Footnote_337"
-class="fnanchor">[337]</a><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_199">[p.
-199]</a></span> We must recollect that no other dependent city would
-possess the same means of offering energetic resistance to its local
-decemvirs, as Athens offered to the Thirty; and that the insular
-Grecian cities were not only feeble individually, but naturally
-helpless against the lords of the sea.<a id="FNanchor_338"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_338" class="fnanchor">[338]</a></p>
-
-<p>Such then was the result throughout Greece, when that long war,
-which had been undertaken in the name of universal autonomy, was
-terminated by the battle of Ægospotami. In place of imperial Athens
-was substituted, not the promised autonomy, but yet more imperial
-Sparta. An awful picture is given by the philo-Laconian Xenophon, in
-399 <small>B.C.</small>, of the ascendency exercised throughout all
-the Grecian cities, not merely by the ephors and the public officers,
-but even by the private citizens, of Sparta. “The Lacedæmonians
-(says he in addressing the Cyreian army) are now the presidents of
-Greece; and even any single private Lacedæmonian can accomplish
-what he pleases.”<a id="FNanchor_339"></a><a href="#Footnote_339"
-class="fnanchor">[339]</a> “All the cities (he says in another place)
-then obeyed whatever order they might receive from a Lacedæmonian
-citizen.”<a id="FNanchor_340"></a><a href="#Footnote_340"
-class="fnanchor">[340]</a> Not merely was the general ascendency thus
-omnipresent and irresistible, but it was enforced with a stringency
-of detail, and darkened by a thousand accompaniments of tyranny and
-individual abuse, such as had never been known under the much-decried
-empire of Athens.</p>
-
-<p>We have more than one picture of the Athenian empire, in speeches
-made by hostile orators who had every motive to work up the strongest
-antipathies in the bosoms of their audience against it. We have the
-addresses of the Corinthian envoys at Sparta when stimulating the
-Spartan allies to the Peloponnesian war,<a id="FNanchor_341"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_341" class="fnanchor">[341]</a>—that<span
-class="pagenum"><a id="Page_200">[p. 200]</a></span> of the envoys
-from Mitylênê delivered at Olympia to the Spartan confederates,
-when the city had revolted from Athens and stood in pressing
-need of support,—the discourse of Brasidas in the public
-assembly at Akanthus,—and more than one speech also from
-Hermokrates, impressing upon his Sicilian countrymen hatred as well
-as fear of Athens.<a id="FNanchor_342"></a><a href="#Footnote_342"
-class="fnanchor">[342]</a> Whoever reads these discourses, will see
-that they dwell almost exclusively on the great political wrong
-inherent in the very fact of her empire, robbing so many Grecian
-communities of their legitimate autonomy, over and above the tribute
-imposed. That Athens had thus already enslaved many cities, and was
-only watching for opportunities to enslave many more, is the theme
-upon which they expatiate. But of practical grievances,—of
-cruelty, oppression, spoliation, multiplied exiles, etc., of
-high-handed wrong committed by individual Athenians,—not one
-word is spoken. Had there been the smallest pretext for introducing
-such inflammatory topics, how much more impressive would have
-been the appeal of Brasidas to the sympathies of the Akanthians!
-How vehement would have been the denunciations of the Mitylenæan
-envoys, in place of the tame and almost apologetic language which
-we now read in Thucydides! Athens extinguished the autonomy of her
-subject-allies, and punished revolters with severity, sometimes
-even with cruelty. But as to other points of wrong, the silence
-of accusers, such as those just noticed, counts as a powerful
-exculpation.</p>
-
-<p>The case is altered when we come to the period succeeding the
-battle of Ægospotami. Here indeed also, we find the Spartan empire
-complained of (as the Athenian empire had been before), in contrast
-with that state of autonomy to which each city laid claim, and which
-Sparta had not merely promised to ensure, but set forth as her only
-ground of war. Yet this is not the prominent grievance,—other
-topics stand more emphatically forward. The decemvirs and the
-harmosts (some of the latter being Helots), the standing instruments
-of Spartan empire, are felt as more sorely painful than the empire
-itself; as the language held by Brasidas at Akanthus admits them
-to be beforehand. At the time when Athens was a subject-city under
-Sparta, governed by the Lysandrian Thirty and by the Lacedæmonian
-harmost in the acropolis,—the<span class="pagenum"><a
-id="Page_201">[p. 201]</a></span> sense of indignity arising from
-the fact of subjection was absorbed in the still more terrible
-suffering arising from the enormities of those individual rulers
-whom the imperial state had set up. Now Athens set up no local
-rulers,—no native Ten or native Thirty,—no resident
-Athenian harmosts or garrisons. This was of itself an unspeakable
-exemption, when compared with the condition of cities subject, not
-only to the Spartan empire, but also under that empire to native
-decemvirs like Kritias, and Spartan harmosts like Aristarchus or
-Aristodemus. A city subject to Athens had to bear definite burdens
-enforced by its own government, which was liable in case of default
-or delinquency to be tried before the popular Athenian Dikastery.
-But this same dikastery (as I have shown in a former volume, and
-as is distinctly stated by Thucydides)<a id="FNanchor_343"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_343" class="fnanchor">[343]</a> was the harbor of
-refuge to each subject-city; not less against individual Athenian
-wrong-doers than against misconduct from other cities. Those
-who complained of the hardship suffered by a subject-city, from
-the obligation of bringing causes to be tried in the dikastery
-of Athens,—even if we take the case as they state it, and
-overlook the unfairness of omitting those numerous instances
-wherein the city was thus enabled to avert or redress wrong
-done to its own citizens,—would have complained both more
-loudly and with greater justice of an ever-present Athenian
-harmost; especially if there were coexistent a native government
-of Ten oligarchs, exchanging with him guilty connivances, like
-the partnership of the Thirty at Athens with the Lacedæmonian
-harmost Kallibius.<a id="FNanchor_344"></a><a href="#Footnote_344"
-class="fnanchor">[344]</a></p>
-
-<p>In no one point can it be shown that the substitution of Spartan
-empire in place of Athenian was a gain, either for the subject-cities
-or for Greece generally; while in many points, it was a great and
-serious aggravation of suffering. And this abuse of power is the
-more deeply to be regretted, as Sparta enjoyed after the battle of
-Ægospotami a precious opportunity,—such as Athens had never
-had, and such as never again recurred,—of reorganizing the
-Grecian world on wise principles, and with a view to Pan-hellenic
-stability and harmony. It is not her greatest sin to have
-refused<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_202">[p. 202]</a></span> to
-grant universal autonomy. She had indeed promised it; but we might
-pardon a departure from specific performance, had she exchanged the
-boon for one far greater, which it was within her reasonable power,
-at the end of 405 <small>B.C.</small>, to confer. That universal
-town autonomy, towards which the Grecian instinct tended, though
-immeasurably better than universal subjection, was yet accompanied
-by much internal discord, and by the still more formidable evil of
-helplessness against any efficient foreign enemy. To ensure to the
-Hellenic world external safety as well as internal concord, it was
-not a new empire which was wanted, but a new political combination
-on equitable and comprehensive principles; divesting each town of a
-portion of its autonomy, and creating a common authority, responsible
-to all, for certain definite controlling purposes. If ever a
-tolerable federative system would have been practicable in Greece, it
-was after the battle of Ægospotami. The Athenian empire,—which,
-with all its defects, I believe to have been much better for the
-subject-cities than universal autonomy would have been,—had
-already removed many difficulties, and shown that combined and
-systematic action of the maritime Grecian world was no impossibility.
-Sparta might now have substituted herself for Athens, not as heir
-to the imperial power, but as president and executive agent of a
-new Confederacy of Delos,—reviving the equal, comprehensive,
-and liberal principles, on which that confederacy had first been
-organized.</p>
-
-<p>It is true that sixty years before, the constituent members of
-the original synod at Delos had shown themselves insensible to
-its value. As soon as the pressing alarm from Persia had passed
-over, some had discontinued sending deputies, others had disobeyed
-requisitions, others again had bought off their obligations,
-and forfeited their rights as autonomous and voting members, by
-pecuniary bargain with Athens; who, being obliged by the duties
-of her presidency to enforce obedience to the Synod against all
-reluctant members, made successively many enemies, and was gradually
-converted, almost without her own seeking, from President into
-Emperor, as the only means of obviating the total dissolution
-of the Confederacy. But though such untoward circumstances had
-happened before, it does not follow that they would now have
-happened again, assuming the same experiment to have been retried
-by Sparta, with manifest sincerity of purpose and tolerable<span
-class="pagenum"><a id="Page_203">[p. 203]</a></span> wisdom. The
-Grecian world, especially the maritime portion of it, had passed
-through trials not less painful than instructive, during this
-important interval. Nor does it seem rash to suppose, that the
-bulk of its members might now have been disposed to perform steady
-confederate duties, at the call and under the presidency of Sparta,
-had she really attempted to reorganize a liberal confederacy,
-treating every city as autonomous and equal, except in so far
-as each was bound to obey the resolutions of the general synod.
-However impracticable such a scheme may appear, we must recollect
-that even Utopian schemes have their transient moments, if not of
-certain success, at least of commencement not merely possible but
-promising. And my belief is, that had Kallikratidas, with his ardent
-Pan-hellenic sentiment and force of resolution, been the final
-victor over imperial Athens, he would not have let the moment of
-pride and omnipotence pass over without essaying some noble project
-like that sketched above. It is to be remembered that Athens had
-never had the power of organizing any such generous Pan-hellenic
-combination. She had become depopularized in the legitimate execution
-of her trust, as president of the Confederacy of Delos, against
-refractory members;<a id="FNanchor_345"></a><a href="#Footnote_345"
-class="fnanchor">[345]</a> and had been obliged to choose between
-breaking up the Confederacy, and keeping it together under the
-strong compression of an imperial chief. But Sparta had not yet
-become depopularized. She now stood without competitor as leader
-of the Grecian world, and might at that moment have reasonably
-hoped to carry the members of it along with her to any liberal
-and Pan-hellenic organization, had she attempted it with proper
-earnestness. Unfortunately she took the opposite course, under the
-influence of Lysander; founding a new empire far more oppressive and
-odious than that of Athens, with few of the advantages, and none
-of the excuses, attached to the latter. As she soon became even
-more unpopular than Athens, her moment of high tide, for beneficent
-Pan-hellenic combination, passed away also,—never to return.</p>
-
-<p>Having thus brought all the maritime Greeks under her
-empire, with a tribute of more than one thousand talents
-imposed upon them,—and continuing to be chief of her
-landed alliance in<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_204">[p.
-204]</a></span> Central Greece, which now included Athens as a
-simple unit,—Sparta was the all-pervading imperial power
-in Greece.<a id="FNanchor_346"></a><a href="#Footnote_346"
-class="fnanchor">[346]</a> Her new empire was organized by the
-victorious Lysander; but with so much arrogance, and so much
-personal ambition to govern all Greece by means of nominees of his
-own, decemvirs and harmosts,—that he raised numerous rivals
-and enemies, as well at Sparta itself as elsewhere. The jealousy
-entertained by king Pausanias, the offended feelings of Thebes and
-Corinth, and the manner in which these new phenomena brought about
-(in spite of the opposition of Lysander) the admission of Athens as a
-revived democracy into the Lacedæmonian confederacy,—has been
-already related.</p>
-
-<p>In the early months of 403 <small>B.C.</small>, Lysander was
-partly at home, partly in Attica, exerting himself to sustain
-the falling oligarchy of Athens against the increasing force of
-Thrasybulus and the Athenian exiles in Peiræus. In this purpose
-he was directly thwarted by the opposing views of king Pausanias,
-and three out of the five ephors.<a id="FNanchor_347"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_347" class="fnanchor">[347]</a> But though the
-ephors thus checked Lysander in regard to Athens, they softened the
-humiliation by sending him abroad to a fresh command on the Asiatic
-coast and the Hellespont; a step which had the farther advantage
-of putting asunder two such marked rivals as he and Pausanias had
-now become. That which Lysander had tried in vain to do at Athens,
-he was doubtless better able to do in Asia, where he had neither
-Pausanias nor the ephors along with him. He could lend effective
-aid to the dekarchies and harmosts in the Asiatic cities, against
-any internal opposition with which they might be threatened. Bitter
-were the complaints which reached Sparta, both against him and
-against his ruling partisans. At length the ephors were prevailed
-upon to disavow the dekarchies; and to proclaim that they would
-not hinder the cities from resuming their former governments
-at pleasure.<a id="FNanchor_348"></a><a href="#Footnote_348"
-class="fnanchor">[348]</a></p>
-
-<p>But all the crying oppressions set forth in the complaints of the
-maritime cities would have been insufficient to procure the recall
-of Lysander from his command in the Hellespont, had not Pharnabazus
-joined his remonstrances to the rest. These last representations
-so strengthened the enemies of Lysander at Sparta, that a<span
-class="pagenum"><a id="Page_205">[p. 205]</a></span> peremptory
-order was sent to recall him. Constrained to obey, he came back to
-Sparta; but the comparative disgrace, and the loss of that boundless
-power which he had enjoyed on his command was so insupportable
-to him, that he obtained permission to go on a pilgrimage to the
-temple of Zeus Ammon in Libya, under the plea that he had a vow
-to discharge.<a id="FNanchor_349"></a><a href="#Footnote_349"
-class="fnanchor">[349]</a> He appears also to have visited
-the temples of Delphi and Dodona,<a id="FNanchor_350"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_350" class="fnanchor">[350]</a> with secret ambitious
-projects which will be mentioned presently. This politic withdrawal
-softened the jealousy against him, so that we shall find him, after
-a year or two, reëstablished in great influence and ascendency. He
-was sent as Spartan envoy, at what precise moment we do not know,
-to Syracuse, where he lent countenance and aid to the recently
-established despotism of Dionysius.<a id="FNanchor_351"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_351" class="fnanchor">[351]</a></p>
-
-<p>The position of the Asiatic Greeks, along the coast of Ionia,
-Æolis,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_206">[p. 206]</a></span>
-and the Hellespont, became very peculiar after the triumph of Sparta
-at Ægospotami. I have already recounted how, immediately after
-the great Athenian catastrophe before Syracuse, the Persian king
-had renewed his grasp upon those cities, from which the vigorous
-hand of Athens had kept him excluded for more than fifty years;
-how Sparta, bidding for his aid, had consented by three formal
-conventions to surrender them to him, while her commissioner Lichas
-even reproved the Milesians for their aversion to this bargain;
-how Athens also, in the days of her weakness, competing for the
-same advantage, had expressed her willingness to pay the same
-price for it.<a id="FNanchor_352"></a><a href="#Footnote_352"
-class="fnanchor">[352]</a> After the battle of Ægospotami,
-this convention was carried into effect; though seemingly not
-without disputes between the satrap Pharnabazus on one side, and
-Lysander and Derkyllidas on the other.<a id="FNanchor_353"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_353" class="fnanchor">[353]</a> The latter was
-Lacedæmonian harmost at Abydos, which town, so important as a
-station on the Hellespont, the Lacedæmonians seem still to have
-retained. But Pharnabazus and his subordinates acquired more
-complete command of the Hellespontine Æolis and of the Troad,
-than ever they had enjoyed before, both along the coast and in
-the interior.<a id="FNanchor_354"></a><a href="#Footnote_354"
-class="fnanchor">[354]</a></p>
-
-<p>Another element, however, soon became operative. The condition
-of the Greek cities on the coast of Ionia, though according to
-Persian regulations they belonged to the satrapy of Tissaphernes,
-was now materially determined,—first, by the competing claims
-of Cyrus, who wished to take them away from him, and tried to get
-such transfer ordered at court,—next, by the aspirations
-of that young prince to the Persian throne. As Cyrus rested his
-hope of success on Grecian coöperation, it was highly important
-to him to render himself popular among the Greeks, especially on
-his own side of the Ægean. Partly his own manifestations of just
-and conciliatory temper, partly the bad name and known perfidy of
-Tissaphernes, induced the Grecian cities with one accord to revolt
-from the latter. All threw themselves into the arms of Cyrus, except
-Miletus, where Tissaphernes interposed in time, slew the leaders
-of the intended revolt, and banished many of their partisans.
-Cyrus, receiving the exiles with distinguished favor, levied an
-army to besiege Miletus and procure their restoration; while<span
-class="pagenum"><a id="Page_207">[p. 207]</a></span> he at the same
-time threw strong Grecian garrisons into the other cities to protect
-them against attack.<a id="FNanchor_355"></a><a href="#Footnote_355"
-class="fnanchor">[355]</a></p>
-
-<p>This local quarrel was, however, soon merged in the more
-comprehensive dispute respecting the Persian succession. Both
-parties were found on the field of Kunaxa; Cyrus with the Greek
-soldiers and Milesian exiles on one side,—Tissaphernes on
-the other. How that attempt, upon which so much hinged in the
-future history both of Asia Minor and of Greece, terminated, I have
-already recounted. Probably the impression brought back by the
-Lacedæmonian fleet which left Cyrus on the coast of Syria, after he
-had surmounted the most difficult country without any resistance,
-was highly favorable to his success. So much the more painful would
-be the disappointment among the Ionian Greeks when the news of his
-death was afterwards brought; so much the greater their alarm,
-when Tissaphernes, having relinquished the pursuit of the Ten
-Thousand Greeks at the moment when they entered the mountains of
-Karduchia, came down as victor to the seaboard; more powerful than
-ever,—rewarded<a id="FNanchor_356"></a><a href="#Footnote_356"
-class="fnanchor">[356]</a> by the Great King, for the services
-which he had rendered against Cyrus, with all the territory which
-had been governed by the latter, as well as with the title of
-commander-in-chief over all the neighboring satraps,—and
-prepared not only to reconquer, but to punish, the revolted maritime
-cities. He began by attacking Kymê;<a id="FNanchor_357"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_357" class="fnanchor">[357]</a> ravaging the
-territory, with great loss to the citizens, and exacting from them a
-still larger contribution, when the approach of winter rendered it
-inconvenient to besiege their city.</p>
-
-<p>In such a state of apprehension, these cities sent to
-Sparta, as the great imperial power of Greece, to entreat
-her protection against the aggravated slavery impending
-over them.<a id="FNanchor_358"></a><a href="#Footnote_358"
-class="fnanchor">[358]</a> The Lacedæmonians had nothing farther to
-expect from the king of Persia, with whom they had already broken
-the peace by lending aid to Cyrus. Moreover, the fame of the Ten
-Thousand Greeks, who were now coming home along the Euxine towards
-Byzantium, had become diffused throughout Greece, inspiring signal
-contempt for Persian military efficiency, and hopes of enrichment by
-war against the Asiatic satraps. Accordingly, the Spartan ephors were
-induced<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_208">[p. 208]</a></span>
-to comply with the petition of their Asiatic countrymen, and to
-send over to Asia Thimbron at the head of a considerable force:
-two thousand Neodamodes (or Helots who had been enfranchised) and
-four thousand Peloponnesians heavy-armed, accompanied by three
-hundred Athenian horsemen, out of the number of those who had been
-adherents of the Thirty, four years before; an aid granted by Athens
-at the special request of Thimbron. Arriving in Asia during the
-winter of 400-399 <small>B.C.</small>, Thimbron was reinforced in
-the spring of 399 <small>B.C.</small> by the Cyreian army, who
-were brought across from Thrace as described in my last chapter,
-and taken into Lacedæmonian pay. With this large force he became
-more than a match for the satraps, even on the plains where they
-could employ their numerous cavalry. The petty Grecian princes
-of Pergamus and Teuthrania, holding that territory by ancient
-grants from Xerxes to their ancestors, joined their troops to his,
-contributing much to enrich Xenophon at the moment of his departure
-from the Cyreians. Yet Thimbron achieved nothing worthy of so large
-an army. He not only miscarried in the siege of Larissa, but was
-even unable to maintain order among his own soldiers, who pillaged
-indiscriminately both friends and foes.<a id="FNanchor_359"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_359" class="fnanchor">[359]</a> Such loud complaints
-were transmitted to Sparta of his irregularities and inefficiency,
-that the ephors first sent him order to march into Karia, where
-Tissaphernes resided,—and next, before that order was executed,
-despatched Derkyllidas to supersede him; seemingly in the winter
-399-398 <small>B.C.</small> Thimbron on returning to Sparta was
-fined and banished.<a id="FNanchor_360"></a><a href="#Footnote_360"
-class="fnanchor">[360]</a></p>
-
-<p>It is highly probable that the Cyreian soldiers, though excellent
-in the field, yet having been disappointed of reward for the
-prodigious toils which they had gone through in their long march,
-and having been kept on short allowance in Thrace, as well as
-cheated by Seuthes,—were greedy, unscrupulous, and hard to
-be restrained, in the matter of pillage; especially as Xenophon,
-their most influential general, had now left them. Their conduct
-greatly improved under Derkyllidas. And though such improvement
-was doubtless owing partly to the superiority of the latter over
-Thimbron, yet it seems also partly ascribable to the fact that<span
-class="pagenum"><a id="Page_209">[p. 209]</a></span> Xenophon, after
-a few months of residence at Athens, accompanied him to Asia, and
-resumed the command of his old comrades.<a id="FNanchor_361"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_361" class="fnanchor">[361]</a></p>
-
-<p>Derkyllidas was a man of so much resource and cunning, as to
-have acquired the surname of Sisyphus.<a id="FNanchor_362"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_362" class="fnanchor">[362]</a> He had served
-throughout all the concluding years of the war, and had been harmost
-at Abydus during the naval command of Lysander, who condemned
-him, on the complaint of Pharnabazus, to the disgrace of public
-exposure with his shield on his arm;<a id="FNanchor_363"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_363" class="fnanchor">[363]</a> this was (I presume)
-a disgrace, because an officer of rank always had his shield
-carried for him by an attendant, except in the actual encounter
-of battle. Having never forgiven Pharnabazus for thus dishonoring
-him, Derkyllidas now took advantage of a misunderstanding between
-that satrap and Tissaphernes, to make a truce with the latter,
-and conduct his army, eight thousand strong, into the territory
-of the former.<a id="FNanchor_364"></a><a href="#Footnote_364"
-class="fnanchor">[364]</a> The mountainous region of Ida generally
-known as the Troad,—inhabited by a population of Æolic Greeks
-(who had gradually Hellenized the indigenous inhabitants), and
-therefore known as the Æolis of Pharnabazus,—was laid open to
-him by a recent event, important in itself as well as instructive to
-read.</p>
-
-<p>The entire Persian empire was parcelled into so many satrapies;
-each satrap being bound to send a fixed amount of annual tribute,
-and to hold a certain amount of military force ready, for the court
-at Susa. Provided he was punctual in fulfilling these obligations,
-little inquiry was made as to his other proceedings, unless in the
-rare case of his maltreating some individual Persian of high rank. In
-like manner, it appears, each satrapy was divided into sub-satrapies
-or districts; each of these held by a deputy, who paid to the
-satrap a fixed tribute and maintained for him a certain military
-force,—having liberty to govern in other respects as he<span
-class="pagenum"><a id="Page_210">[p. 210]</a></span> pleased. Besides
-the tribute, however, presents of undefined amount were of constant
-occurrence, both from the satrap to the king, and from the deputy
-to the satrap. Nevertheless, enough was extorted from the people
-(we need hardly add), to leave an ample profit both to the one
-and to the other.<a id="FNanchor_365"></a><a href="#Footnote_365"
-class="fnanchor">[365]</a></p>
-
-<p>This region, called Æolis, had been entrusted by Pharnabazus to
-a native of Dardanus named Zênis, who, after holding the post for
-some time and giving full satisfaction, died of illness, leaving a
-widow with a son and daughter still minors. The satrap was on the
-point of giving the district to another person, when Mania, the widow
-of Zênis, herself a native of Dardanus, preferred her petition to
-be allowed to succeed her husband. Visiting Pharnabazus with money
-in hand, sufficient not only to satisfy himself, but also to gain
-over his mistresses and his ministers,<a id="FNanchor_366"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_366" class="fnanchor">[366]</a>—she said
-to him,—“My husband was faithful to you, and paid his
-tribute so regularly as to obtain your thanks. If I serve you no
-worse than he, why should you name any other deputy? If I fail
-in giving you satisfaction, you can always remove me, and give
-the place to another.” Pharnabazus granted her petition, and
-had no cause to repent it. Mania was regular in her payment of
-tribute,—frequent in bringing him presents,—and splendid,
-beyond any of his other deputies, in her manner of receiving him
-whenever he visited the district.</p>
-
-<p>Her chief residence was at Skêpsis, Gergis, and
-Kebrên,—inland towns, strong both by position and by
-fortification, amidst the mountainous region once belonging to the
-Teukri Gergithes. It was here too that she kept her treasures,
-which, partly left by her husband, partly accumulated by herself,
-had gradually reached an enormous sum. But her district also reached
-down to the coast, comprising among other towns the classical name
-of Ilium, and probably<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_211">[p.
-211]</a></span> her own native city, the neighboring Dardanus. She
-maintained, besides, a large military force of Grecian mercenaries
-in regular pay and excellent condition, which she employed both
-as garrison for each of her dependent towns, and as means for
-conquest in the neighborhood. She had thus reduced the maritime
-towns of Larissa, Hamaxitus, and Kolônæ, in the southern part of
-the Troad; commanding her troops in person, sitting in her chariot
-to witness the attack, and rewarding every one who distinguished
-himself. Moreover, when Pharnabazus undertook an expedition against
-the predatory Mysians or Pisidians, she accompanied him, and her
-military force formed so much the best part of his army, that he
-paid her the highest compliments, and sometimes condescended to
-ask her advice.<a id="FNanchor_367"></a><a href="#Footnote_367"
-class="fnanchor">[367]</a> So, when Xerxes invaded Greece, Artemisia,
-queen of Halikarnassus, not only furnished ships among the best
-appointed in his fleet, and fought bravely at Salamis, but also, when
-he chose to call a council, stood alone, in daring to give him sound
-opinions contrary to his own leanings; opinions which, fortunately
-for the Grecian world, he could bring himself only to tolerate,
-not to follow.<a id="FNanchor_368"></a><a href="#Footnote_368"
-class="fnanchor">[368]</a></p>
-
-<p>Under an energetic woman like Mania, thus victorious and
-well-provided, Æolis was the most defensible part of the satrapy
-of Pharnabazus, and might probably have defied Derkyllidas, had
-not a domestic traitor put an end to her life. Her son-in-law,
-Meidias, a Greek of Skêpsis, with whom she lived on terms
-of intimate confidence—“though she was scrupulously
-mistrustful of every one else, as it is proper for a despot
-to be,”<a id="FNanchor_369"></a><a href="#Footnote_369"
-class="fnanchor">[369]</a>—was so inflamed by his own
-ambition and by the suggestions of evil counsellors, who told
-him it was a shame that a woman should thus be ruler while<span
-class="pagenum"><a id="Page_212">[p. 212]</a></span> he was only
-a private man, that he strangled her in her chamber. Following up
-his nefarious scheme, he also assassinated her son, a beautiful
-youth of seventeen. He succeeded in getting possession of the three
-strongest places in the district, Kebrên, Skêpsis, and Gergis,
-together with the accumulated treasure of Mania; but the commanders
-in the other towns refused obedience to his summons, until they
-should receive orders from Pharnabazus. To that satrap Meidias
-instantly sent envoys, bearing ample presents, with a petition that
-the satrap would grant to him the district which had been enjoyed
-by Mania. Pharnabazus, repudiating the presents, sent an indignant
-reply to Meidias,—“Keep them until I come to seize them, and
-seize you, too, along with them. I would not consent to live, if I
-were not to avenge the death of Mania.”<a id="FNanchor_370"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_370" class="fnanchor">[370]</a></p>
-
-<p>At that critical moment, prior to the coming of the satrap,
-Derkyllidas presented himself with his army, and found Æolis almost
-defenceless. The three recent conquests of Mania,—Larissa,
-Hamaxitus, and Kolônæ, surrendered to him as soon as he appeared;
-while the garrisons of Ilium and some other places, who had taken
-special service under Mania, and found themselves worse off now
-that they had lost her, accepted his invitation to renounce Persian
-dependence, declare themselves allies of Sparta, and hold their
-cities for him. He thus became master of most part of the district,
-with the exception of Kebrên, Skêpsis, and Gergis, which he was
-anxious to secure before the arrival of Pharnabazus. On arriving
-before Kebrên, however, in spite of this necessity for haste,
-he remained inactive for four days,<a id="FNanchor_371"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_371" class="fnanchor">[371]</a> because the
-sacrifices were unpropitious; while a rash, subordinate officer,
-hazarding an unwarranted attack during this interval, was repulsed
-and wounded. The sacrifices at length became favorable, and
-Derkyllidas was rewarded for his patience. The garrison, affected by
-the example of those at Ilium and the other towns, disobeyed<span
-class="pagenum"><a id="Page_213">[p. 213]</a></span> their
-commander, who tried to earn the satrap’s favor by holding out
-and assuring to him this very strong place. Sending out heralds
-to proclaim that they would go with Greeks and not with Persians,
-they admitted the Lacedæmonians at once within the gates. Having
-thus fortunately captured, and duly secured this important town,
-Derkyllidas marched against Skêpsis and Gergis, the former of
-which was held by Meidias himself; who, dreading the arrival of
-Pharnabazus, and mistrusting the citizens within, thought it best to
-open negotiations with Derkyllidas. He sent to solicit a conference,
-demanding hostages for his safety. When he came forth from the
-town, and demanded from the Lacedæmonian commander on what terms
-alliance would be granted to him, the latter replied,—“On
-condition that the citizens shall be left free and autonomous;” at
-the same time marching on, without waiting either for acquiescence
-or refusal, straight up to the gates of the town. Meidias, taken
-by surprise, in the power of the assailants, and aware that the
-citizens were unfriendly to him, was obliged to give orders that
-the gates should be opened; so that Derkyllidas found himself by
-this manœuvre in possession of the strongest place in the district
-without either loss or delay,—to the great delight of the
-Skepsians themselves.<a id="FNanchor_372"></a><a href="#Footnote_372"
-class="fnanchor">[372]</a></p>
-
-<p>Derkyllidas, having ascended the acropolis of Skêpsis to offer
-a sacrifice of thanks to Athênê, the great patron goddess of Ilium
-and most of the Teukrian towns,—caused the garrison of Meidias
-to evacuate the town forthwith, and consigned it to the citizens
-themselves, exhorting them to conduct their political affairs as
-became Greeks and freemen. This proceeding, which reminds us of
-Brasidas in contrast with Lysander, was not less politic than
-generous; since Derkyllidas could hardly hope to hold an inland
-town in the midst of the Persian satrapy except by the attachments
-of the citizens themselves. He then marched away to Gergis, still
-conducting along with him Meidias, who urgently entreated to be
-allowed to retain that town, the last of his remaining fortresses.
-Without giving any decided answer, Derkyllidas took him by his side,
-and marched with him at the head of his army, arrayed only in double
-file, so as to carry the appearance of peace, to the foot of the
-lofty towers of Gergis. The garrison on the<span class="pagenum"><a
-id="Page_214">[p. 214]</a></span> walls, seeing Meidias along with
-him, allowed him to approach without discharging a single missile.
-“Now, Meidias (said he), order the gates to be opened, and show
-me the way in, to the temple of Athênê, in order that I may there
-offer sacrifice.” Again Meidias was forced, from fear of being at
-once seized as a prisoner, to give the order; and the Lacedæmonian
-forces found themselves in possession of the town. Derkyllidas,
-distributing his troops around the walls, in order to make sure
-of his conquest, ascended to the acropolis to offer his intended
-sacrifice; after which he proceeded to dictate the fate of Meidias,
-whom he divested of his character of prince and of his military
-force,—incorporating the latter in the Lacedæmonian army. He
-then called upon Meidias to specify all his paternal property, and
-restored to him the whole of what he claimed as such, though the
-bystanders protested against the statement given in as a flagrant
-exaggeration. But he laid hands on all the property, and all the
-treasures of Mania,—and caused her house, which Meidias had
-taken for himself, to be put under seal,—as lawful prey;
-since Mania had belonged to Pharnabazus,<a id="FNanchor_373"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_373" class="fnanchor">[373]</a> against whom the
-Lacedæmonians were making war. On coming out after examining and
-verifying the contents of the house, he said to his officers, “Now,
-my friends, we have here already worked out pay for the whole
-army, eight thousand men, for nearly a year. Whatever we acquire
-besides, shall come to you also.” He well knew the favorable effect
-which this intelligence would produce upon the temper, as well as
-upon the discipline,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_215">[p.
-215]</a></span> of the army—especially upon the Cyreians, who
-had tasted the discomfort of irregular pay and poverty.</p>
-
-<p>“And where am I to live?” asked Meidias, who found himself turned
-out of the house of Mania. “In your rightful place of abode, to be
-sure (replied Derkyllidas); in your native town Skêpsis, and in your
-paternal house.<a id="FNanchor_374"></a><a href="#Footnote_374"
-class="fnanchor">[374]</a>” What became of the assassin afterwards,
-we do not hear. But it is satisfactory to find that he did not reap
-the anticipated reward of his crime; the fruits of which were an
-important advantage to Derkyllidas and his army,—and a still
-more important blessing to the Greek cities which had been governed
-by Mania,—enfranchisement and autonomy.</p>
-
-<p>This rapid, easy, and skilfully managed exploit,—the capture
-of nine towns in eight days,—is all which Xenophon mentions
-as achieved by Derkyllidas during the summer. Having acquired pay
-for so many months, perhaps the soldiers may have been disposed
-to rest until it was spent. But as winter approached, it became
-necessary to find winter quarters, without incurring the reproach
-which had fallen upon Thimbron of consuming the substance of allies.
-Fearing, however, that if he changed his position, Pharnabazus
-would employ the numerous Persian cavalry to harass the Grecian
-cities, he tendered a truce, which the latter willingly accepted.
-For the occupation of Æolis by the Lacedæmonian general was a sort
-of watch-post (like Dekeleia to Athens,) exposing the whole of
-Phrygia near the Propontis (in which was Daskylium the residence
-of Pharnabazus) to constant attack.<a id="FNanchor_375"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_375" class="fnanchor">[375]</a> Derkyllidas
-accordingly only marched through Phrygia, to take up his winter
-quarters in Bithynia, the north-western corner of Asia Minor,
-between the Propontis and the Euxine; the same territory through
-which Xenophon and the Ten Thousand had marched, on their road
-from Kalpê to Chalkêdon. He procured<span class="pagenum"><a
-id="Page_216">[p. 216]</a></span> abundant provisions and booty,
-slaves as well as cattle, by plundering the Bithynian villages; not
-without occasional losses on his own side, by the carelessness of
-marauding parties.<a id="FNanchor_376"></a><a href="#Footnote_376"
-class="fnanchor">[376]</a></p>
-
-<p>One of these losses was of considerable magnitude. Derkyllidas
-had obtained from Seuthes in European Thrace (the same prince of
-whom Xenophon had so much reason to complain) a reinforcement of
-three hundred cavalry and two hundred peltasts,—Odrysian
-Thracians. These Odrysians established themselves in a separate
-camp, nearly two miles and a half from Derkyllidas, which they
-surrounded with a palisade about man’s height. Being indefatigable
-plunderers, they prevailed upon Derkyllidas to send them a guard of
-two hundred hoplites, for the purpose of guarding their separate
-camp with the booty accumulated within it. Presently the camp became
-richly stocked, especially with Bithynian captives. The hostile
-Bithynians, however, watching their opportunity when the Odrysians
-were out marauding, suddenly attacked at daybreak the two hundred
-Grecian hoplites in the camp. Shooting at them over the palisade
-with darts and arrows, they killed and wounded some, while the
-Greeks with their spears were utterly helpless, and could only reach
-their enemies by pulling up the palisade and charging out upon
-them; but the light-armed assailants, easily evading the charge of
-warriors with shield and spear, turned round upon them when they
-began to retire, and slew several before they could get back. In
-each successive sally the same phenomena recurred, until at length
-all the Greeks were overpowered and slain, except fifteen of them,
-who charged through the <span class="replace" id="tn_2" title="In
-the printed book: Odrysians">Bithynians</span> in the first sally,
-and marched onward to join Derkyllidas, instead of returning with
-their comrades to the palisade. Derkyllidas lost no time in sending
-a reinforcement, which, however, came too late, and found only the
-naked bodies of the slain. The victorious Bithynians carried away all
-their own captives.<a id="FNanchor_377"></a><a href="#Footnote_377"
-class="fnanchor">[377]</a></p>
-
-<p>At the beginning of spring the Spartan general returned to
-Lampsakus, where he found Arakus and two other Spartans, just
-arrived out as commissioners sent by the ephors. Arakus came with
-instructions to prolong the command of Derkyllidas for another
-year; as well as to communicate the satisfaction of the ephors with
-the Cyreian army, in consequence of the great improvement<span
-class="pagenum"><a id="Page_217">[p. 217]</a></span> in their
-conduct, compared with the year of Thimbron. He accordingly assembled
-the soldiers, and addressed them in a mingled strain of praise
-and admonition; expressing his hope that they would continue the
-forbearance which they had now begun to practise towards all Asiatic
-allies. The commander of the Cyreians (probably Xenophon himself),
-in his reply, availed himself of the occasion to pay a compliment
-to Derkyllidas. “We (said he) are the same men now as we were in
-the previous year; but we are under a different general; you need
-not look farther for the explanation.<a id="FNanchor_378"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_378" class="fnanchor">[378]</a>” Without denying
-the superiority of Derkyllidas over his predecessor, we may remark
-that the abundant wealth of Mania, thrown into his hands by accident
-(though he showed great ability in turning the accident to account),
-was an auxiliary circumstance, not less unexpected than weighty, for
-ensuring the good behavior of the soldiers.</p>
-
-<p>It was among the farther instructions of Arakus to visit all the
-principal Asiatic Greeks, and report their condition at Sparta;
-and Derkyllidas was pleased to see them entering on this survey
-at a moment when they would find the cities in undisturbed peace
-and tranquillity.<a id="FNanchor_379"></a><a href="#Footnote_379"
-class="fnanchor">[379]</a> So long as the truce continued both
-with Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus, these cities were secure from
-aggression, and paid no tribute; the land-force of Derkyllidas
-affording to<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_218">[p.
-218]</a></span> them a protection<a id="FNanchor_380"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_380" class="fnanchor">[380]</a> analogous to that
-which had been conferred by Athens and her powerful fleet, during the
-interval between the formation of the Confederacy of Delos and the
-Athenian catastrophe at Syracuse. At the same time, during the truce,
-the army had neither occupation nor subsistence. To keep it together
-and near at hand, yet without living at the cost of friends, was the
-problem. It was accordingly with great satisfaction that Derkyllidas
-noticed an intimation accidentally dropped by Arakus. Some envoys
-(the latter said) were now at Sparta from the Thracian Chersonesus
-(the long tongue of land bordering westward on the Hellespont),
-soliciting aid against their marauding Thracian neighbors. That
-fertile peninsula, first hellenized a century and a half before by
-the Athenian Miltiades, had been a favorite resort for Athenian
-citizens, many of whom had acquired property there during the naval
-power of Athens. The battle of Ægospotami dispossessed and drove home
-these proprietors, at the same time depriving the peninsula of its
-protection against the Thracians. It now contained eleven distinct
-cities, of which Sestos was the most important; and its inhabitants
-combined to send envoys to Sparta, entreating the ephors to send
-out a force for the purpose of building a wall across the isthmus
-from Kardia to Paktyê; in recompense for which (they said) there was
-fertile land enough open to as many settlers as chose to come, with
-coast and harbors for export close at hand. Miltiades, on first going
-out to the Chersonese, had secured it by constructing a cross-wall on
-the same spot, which had since become neglected during the period of
-Persian supremacy; Perikles had afterwards sent fresh colonists, and
-caused the wall to be repaired. But it seems to have been unnecessary
-while the Athenian empire was in full vigor,—since the Thracian
-princes had been generally either conciliated, or kept off, by
-Athens, even without any such bulwark.<a id="FNanchor_381"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_381" class="fnanchor">[381]</a> Informed that the
-request of the Chersonesites had been favorably listened to at
-Sparta, Derkyllidas resolved to execute their project with his own
-army. Having prolonged his truce with Pharnabazus, he crossed the
-Hellespont into Europe, and employed his army during the whole
-summer in constructing this cross-wall, about four and a<span
-class="pagenum"><a id="Page_219">[p. 219]</a></span> quarter miles in
-length. The work was distributed in portions to different sections of
-the army, competition being excited by rewards for the most rapid and
-workmanlike execution; while the Chersonesites were glad to provide
-pay and subsistence for the army, during an operation which provided
-security for all the eleven cities, and gave additional value to
-their lands and harbors. Numerous settlers seem to have now come in,
-under Lacedæmonian auspices,—who were again disturbed, wholly
-or partially, when the Lacedæmonian maritime empire was broken up a
-few years afterwards.<a id="FNanchor_382"></a><a href="#Footnote_382"
-class="fnanchor">[382]</a></p>
-
-<p>On returning to Asia in the autumn, after the completion of this
-work, which had kept his army usefully employed and amply provided
-during six months, Derkyllidas undertook the siege of Artaneus, a
-strong post (on the continental coast eastward of Mitylênê) occupied
-by some Chian exiles, whom the Lacedæmonian admiral Kratesippidas
-had lent corrupt aid in expelling from their native island a few
-years before.<a id="FNanchor_383"></a><a href="#Footnote_383"
-class="fnanchor">[383]</a> These men, living by predatory expeditions
-against Chios and Ionia, were so well supplied with provisions that
-it cost Derkyllidas a blockade of eight months before he could
-reduce it. He placed in it a strong garrison well supplied, that it
-might serve him as a retreat in case of need,—under an Achæan
-named Drako, whose name remained long terrible from his ravages
-on the neighboring plain of Mysia.<a id="FNanchor_384"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_384" class="fnanchor">[384]</a></p>
-
-<p>Derkyllidas next proceeded to Ephesus, where orders presently
-reached him from the ephors, directing him to march into Karia
-and attack Tissaphernes. The temporary truce which had hitherto
-provisionally kept off Persian soldiers and tribute-gatherers from
-the Asiatic Greeks, was now renounced by mutual consent. These Greeks
-had sent envoys to Sparta, assuring the ephors that Tissaphernes
-would be constrained to renounce formally the sovereign rights of
-Persia, and grant to them full autonomy, if his residence in Karia
-were vigorously attacked. Accordingly Derkyllidas marched southward
-across the Mæander into Karia, while the Lacedæmonian fleet under
-Pharax coöperated along the shore. At the same time Tissaphernes,
-on his side, had received reinforcements from Susa, together with
-the appointment of generalissimo over all the Persian force in
-Asia Minor; upon which<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_220">[p.
-220]</a></span> Pharnabazus (who had gone up to court in the
-interval to concert more vigorous means of prosecuting the war, but
-had now returned)<a id="FNanchor_385"></a><a href="#Footnote_385"
-class="fnanchor">[385]</a> joined him in Karia, prepared to commence
-vigorous operations for the expulsion of Derkyllidas and his army.
-Having properly garrisoned the strong places, the two satraps
-crossed the Mæander at the head of a powerful Grecian and Karian
-force, with numerous Persian cavalry, to attack the Ionian cities.
-As soon as he heard this news, Derkyllidas came back with his
-army from Karia, to cover the towns menaced. Having recrossed the
-Mæander, he was marching with his army in disorder, not suspecting
-the enemy to be near, when on a sudden he came upon their scouts,
-planted on some sepulchral monuments in the road. He also sent some
-scouts up to the neighboring monuments and towers, who apprised
-him that the two satraps, with their joint force in good order,
-were planted here to intercept him. He immediately gave orders
-for his hoplites to form in battle array of eight deep, with the
-peltasts, and his handful of horsemen, on each flank. But such
-was the alarm caused among his troops by this surprise, that none
-could be relied upon except the Cyreians and the Peloponnesians.
-Of the insular and Ionian hoplites, from Priênê and other cities,
-some actually hid their arms in the thick standing corn, and fled;
-others, who took their places in the line, manifested dispositions
-which left little hope that they would stand a charge; so that the
-Persians had the opportunity of fighting a battle not merely with
-superiority of number, but also with advantage of position and
-circumstances. Pharnabazus was anxious to attack without delay.
-But Tissaphernes, who recollected well the valor of the Cyreian
-troops, and concluded that all the remaining Greeks were like them,
-forbade it; sending forward heralds to demand a conference. As they
-approached, Derkyllidas, surrounding himself with a body-guard of
-the finest and best-equipped soldiers,<a id="FNanchor_386"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_386" class="fnanchor">[386]</a> advanced to the
-front of the line to meet them; saying that he, for his part, was
-prepared<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_221">[p. 221]</a></span>
-to fight,—but since a conference was demanded, he had no
-objection to grant it, provided hostages were exchanged. This having
-been assented to, and a place named for conference on the ensuing
-day, both armies were simultaneously withdrawn; the Persians to
-Tralles, the Greeks to Leukophrys, celebrated for its temple of
-Artemis Leukophryne.<a id="FNanchor_387"></a><a href="#Footnote_387"
-class="fnanchor">[387]</a></p>
-
-<p>This backwardness on the part of Tissaphernes even at a time when
-he was encouraged by a brother satrap braver than himself, occasioned
-to the Persians the loss of a very promising moment, and rescued the
-Grecian army out of a position of much peril. It helps to explain
-to us the escape of the Cyreians, and the manner in which they were
-allowed to cross rivers and pass over the most difficult ground
-without any serious opposition; while at the same time it tended to
-confirm in the Greek mind the same impressions of Persian imbecility
-as that escape so forcibly suggested.</p>
-
-<p>The conference, as might be expected, ended in nothing.
-Derkyllidas required on behalf of the Asiatic Greeks complete
-autonomy,—exemption from Persian interference and tribute;
-while the two satraps on their side insisted that the Lacedæmonian
-army should be withdrawn from Asia, and the Lacedæmonian harmosts
-from all the Greco-Asiatic cities. An armistice was concluded, to
-allow time for reference to the authorities at home; thus replacing
-matters in the condition in which they had been at the beginning
-of the year.<a id="FNanchor_388"></a><a href="#Footnote_388"
-class="fnanchor">[388]</a></p>
-
-<p>Shortly after the conclusion of this truce, Agesilaus, king of
-Sparta, arrived with a large force, and the war in all respects
-began to assume larger proportions,—of which more in the next
-chapter.</p>
-
-<p>But it was not in Asia alone that Sparta had been engaged in war.
-The prostration of the Athenian power had removed that common bond of
-hatred and alarm which attached the allies to her headship; while her
-subsequent conduct had given positive offence, and had even excited
-against herself the same fear of unmeasured imperial ambition which
-had before run so powerfully against Athens. She had appropriated
-to herself nearly the whole of the Athenian maritime empire, with
-a tribute scarcely inferior, if at all inferior, in amount. How
-far the total of one thousand talents was actually realised during
-each successive year, we are not in a<span class="pagenum"><a
-id="Page_222">[p. 222]</a></span> condition to say; but such was
-the assessment imposed and the scheme laid down by Sparta for her
-maritime dependencies,—enforced too by omnipresent instruments
-of rapacity and oppression, decemvirs and harmosts, such as Athens
-had never paralleled. When we add to this great maritime empire
-the prodigious ascendency on land which Sparta had enjoyed before,
-we shall find a total of material power far superior to that which
-Athens had enjoyed, even in her day of greatest exaltation, prior to
-the truce of 445 <small>B.C.</small></p>
-
-<p>This was not all. From the general dulness of character pervading
-Spartan citizens, the full resources of the state were hardly ever
-put forth. Her habitual short-comings at the moment of action are
-keenly criticised by her own friends, in contrast with the ardor and
-forwardness which animated her enemies. But at and after the battle
-of Ægospotami, the entire management of Spartan foreign affairs
-was found in the hands of Lysander; a man not only exempt from the
-inertia usual in his countrymen, but of the most unwearied activity
-and grasping ambition, as well for his country as for himself. Under
-his direction the immense advantages which Sparta enjoyed from her
-new position were at once systematized and turned to the fullest
-account. Now there was enough in the new ascendency of Sparta, had
-it been ever so modestly handled, to spread apprehension through the
-Grecian world. But apprehension became redoubled, when it was seen
-that her ascendency was organized and likely to be worked by her
-most aggressive leader for the purposes of an insatiable ambition.
-Fortunately for the Grecian world, indeed, the power of Sparta did
-not long continue to be thus absolutely wielded by Lysander, whose
-arrogance and overweening position raised enemies against him at
-home. Yet the first impressions received by the allies respecting
-Spartan empire, were derived from his proceedings and his plans
-of dominion, manifested with ostentatious insolence; and such
-impressions continued, even after the influence of Lysander himself
-had been much abated by the counterworking rivalry of Pausanias and
-others.</p>
-
-<p>While Sparta separately had thus gained so much by the close
-of the war, not one of her allies had received the smallest
-remuneration or compensation, except such as might be considered
-to be involved in the destruction of a formidable enemy. Even
-the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_223">[p. 223]</a></span>
-pecuniary result or residue which Lysander had brought home
-with him (four hundred and seventy talents remaining out of the
-advances made by Cyrus), together with the booty acquired at
-Dekeleia, was all detained by the Lacedæmonians themselves. Thebes
-and Corinth indeed presented demands, in which the other allies
-did not (probably durst not) join, to be allowed to share. But
-though all the efforts and sufferings of the war had fallen upon
-these allies no less than upon Sparta, the demands were refused,
-and almost resented as insults.<a id="FNanchor_389"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_389" class="fnanchor">[389]</a> Hence there
-arose among the allies not merely a fear of the grasping
-dominion, but a hatred of the monopolizing rapacity, of Sparta.
-Of this new feeling, an early manifestation, alike glaring and
-important, was made by the Thebans and Corinthians, when they
-refused to join Pausanias in his march against Thrasybulus and
-the Athenian exiles in Peiræus,<a id="FNanchor_390"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_390" class="fnanchor">[390]</a>—less than
-a year after the surrender of Athens, the enemy whom these two
-cities had hated with such extreme bitterness down to the very
-moment of surrender. Even Arcadians and Achæans too, habitually
-obedient as they were to Lacedæmon, keenly felt the different way
-in which she treated them, as compared with the previous years of
-war, when she had been forced to keep alive their zeal against
-the common enemy.<a id="FNanchor_391"></a><a href="#Footnote_391"
-class="fnanchor">[391]</a></p>
-
-<p>The Lacedæmonians were however strong enough not merely to despise
-this growing alienation of their allies, but even to take revenge
-upon such of the Peloponnesians as had incurred their displeasure.
-Among these stood conspicuous the Eleians; now under a government
-called democratical, of which the leading man was Thrasydæus,—a
-man who had lent considerable aid in 404 <small>B.C.</small> to
-Thrasybulus and the Athenian exiles in Peiræus. The Eleians, in the
-year 420 <small>B.C.</small>, had been engaged in a controversy with
-Sparta,—had employed their privileges as administrators<span
-class="pagenum"><a id="Page_224">[p. 224]</a></span> of the Olympic
-festival to exclude her from attendance on that occasion,—and
-had subsequently been in arms against her along with Argos and
-Mantineia. To these grounds of quarrel, now of rather ancient
-date, had been added afterwards, a refusal to furnish aid in the
-war against Athens since the resumption of hostilities in 414
-<small>B.C.</small>, and a recent exclusion of king Agis, who had
-come in person to offer sacrifice and consult the oracle of Zeus
-Olympius; such exclusion being grounded on the fact that he was
-about to pray for victory in the war then pending against Athens,
-contrary to the ancient canon of the Olympic temple, which admitted
-no sacrifice or consultation respecting hostilities of Greek
-against Greek.<a id="FNanchor_392"></a><a href="#Footnote_392"
-class="fnanchor">[392]</a> These were considered by Sparta as
-affronts; and the season was now favorable for resenting them, as
-well as for chastising and humbling Elis.<a id="FNanchor_393"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_393" class="fnanchor">[393]</a> Accordingly
-Sparta sent an embassy, requiring the Eleians to make good the
-unpaid arrears of the quota assessed upon them for the cost of
-the war against Athens; and farther,—to relinquish their
-authority over their dependent townships or Periœki, leaving the
-latter autonomous.<a id="FNanchor_394"></a><a href="#Footnote_394"
-class="fnanchor">[394]</a> Of these dependencies there were several,
-no one very considerable individually, in the region called
-Triphylia, south of the river Alpheus, and north of the Neda. One
-of them was Lepreum, the autonomy of which the Lacedæmonians had
-vindicated against Elis in 420 <small>B.C.</small>, though during
-the subsequent period it had again become subject.</p>
-
-<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_225">[p. 225]</a></span></p>
-
-<p>The Eleians refused compliance with the demand thus sent,
-alleging that their dependent cities were held by the right of
-conquest. They even retorted upon the Lacedæmonians the charge of
-enslaving Greeks;<a id="FNanchor_395"></a><a href="#Footnote_395"
-class="fnanchor">[395]</a> upon which Agis marched with an army to
-invade their territory, entering it from the north side where it
-joined Achaia. Hardly had he crossed the frontier river Larissus
-and begun his ravages, when an earthquake occurred. Such an event,
-usually construed in Greece as a divine warning, acted on this
-occasion so strongly on the religious susceptibilities of Agis, that
-he not only withdrew from the Eleian territory, but disbanded his
-army. His retreat gave so much additional courage to the Eleians,
-that they sent envoys and tried to establish alliances among those
-cities which they knew to be alienated from Sparta. Not even Thebes
-and Corinth, however, could be induced to assist them; nor did they
-obtain any other aid except one thousand men from Ætolia.</p>
-
-<p>In the next summer Agis undertook a second expedition, accompanied
-on this occasion by all the allies of Sparta; even by the Athenians,
-now enrolled upon the list. Thebes and Corinth alone stood aloof. On
-this occasion he approached from the opposite or southern side, that
-of the territory once called Messenia; passing through Aulon, and
-crossing the river Neda. He marched through Triphylia to the river
-Alpheius, which he crossed, and then proceeded to Olympia, where he
-consummated the sacrifice from which the Eleians had before excluded
-him. In his march he was joined by the inhabitants of Lepreum,
-Makistus, and other dependent towns, which now threw off their
-subjection to Elis. Thus reinforced, Agis proceeded onward towards
-the city of Elis, through a productive country under flourishing
-agriculture, enriched by the crowds and sacrifices at the neighboring
-Olympic temple, and for<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_226">[p.
-226]</a></span> a long period unassailed. After attacking, not very
-vigorously, the half-fortified city,—and being repelled by the
-Ætolian auxiliaries,—he marched onward to the harbor called
-Kyllênê, still plundering the territory. So ample was the stock of
-slaves, cattle, and rural wealth generally, that his troops not only
-acquired riches for themselves by plunder, but were also joined by
-many Arcadian and Achæan volunteers, who crowded in to partake of
-the golden harvest.<a id="FNanchor_396"></a><a href="#Footnote_396"
-class="fnanchor">[396]</a></p>
-
-<p>The opposition or wealthy oligarchical party in Elis availed
-themselves of this juncture to take arms against the government;
-hoping to get possession of the city, and to maintain themselves in
-power by the aid of Sparta. Xenias their leader, a man of immense
-wealth, with several of his adherents, rushed out armed, and assailed
-the government-house, in which it appears that Thrasydæus and his
-colleagues had been banqueting. They slew several persons, and
-among them one, whom, from great personal resemblance, they mistook
-for Thrasydæus. The latter was however at that moment intoxicated,
-and asleep in a separate chamber.<a id="FNanchor_397"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_397" class="fnanchor">[397]</a> They then assembled
-in arms in the market-place, believing themselves to be masters of
-the city; while the people, under the like impression that Thrasydæus
-was dead, were too much dismayed to offer resistance. But presently
-it became known that he was yet alive; the people crowded to the
-government-house “like a swarm of bees,”<a id="FNanchor_398"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_398" class="fnanchor">[398]</a> and arrayed
-themselves for his protection as well as under his guidance.
-Leading them forth at once to battle, he completely defeated the
-oligarchical insurgents, and forced them to flee for protection to
-the Lacedæmonian army.</p>
-
-<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_227">[p. 227]</a></span></p>
-
-<p>Agis presently evacuated the Eleian territory, yet not without
-planting a Lacedæmonian harmost and a garrison, together with Xenias
-and the oligarchical exiles, at Epitalium, a little way south of
-the river Alpheius. Occupying this fort (analogous to Dekeleia in
-Attica), they spread ravage and ruin all around throughout the autumn
-and winter, to such a degree, that in the early spring, Thrasydæus
-and the Eleian government were compelled to send to Sparta and
-solicit peace. They consented to raze the imperfect fortifications of
-their city, so as to leave it quite open. They farther surrendered
-their harbor of Kyllênê with their ships of war, and relinquished
-all authority over the Triphylian townships, as well as over Lasion,
-which was claimed as an Arcadian town.<a id="FNanchor_399"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_399" class="fnanchor">[399]</a> Though they pressed
-strenuously their claim to preserve the town of Epeium (between
-the Arcadian town of Heræa and the Triphylian town of Makistus),
-on the plea that they had bought it from its previous inhabitants
-at the price of thirty talents paid down,—the Lacedæmonians,
-pronouncing this to be a compulsory bargain imposed upon weaker
-parties by force, refused to recognize it. The town was taken away
-from them, seemingly without any reimbursement of the purchase money
-either in part or in whole. On these terms the Eleians were admitted
-to peace, and enrolled again among the members of the Lacedæmonian
-confederacy.<a id="FNanchor_400"></a><a href="#Footnote_400"
-class="fnanchor">[400]</a></p>
-
-<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_228">[p. 228]</a></span></p>
-
-<p>The time of the Olympic festival seems to have been now
-approaching, and the Eleians were probably the more anxious to obtain
-peace from Sparta, as they feared to be deprived of their privilege
-as superintendents. The Pisatans,—inhabitants of the district
-immediately around Olympia,—availed themselves of the Spartan
-invasion of Elis to petition for restoration of their original
-privilege, as administrators of the temple of Zeus at Olympia with
-its great periodical solemnity,—by the dispossession of the
-Eleians as usurpers of that privilege. But their request met with
-no success. It was true indeed that such right had belonged to the
-Pisatans in early days, before the Olympic festival had acquired its
-actual Pan-hellenic importance and grandeur; and that the Eleians
-had only appropriated it to themselves after conquering<span
-class="pagenum"><a id="Page_229">[p. 229]</a></span> the territory
-of Pisa. But taking the festival as it then stood, the Pisatans,
-mere villagers without any considerable city, were incompetent to do
-justice to it, and would have lowered its dignity in the eyes of all
-Greece.</p>
-
-<p>Accordingly the Lacedæmonians, on this ground, dismissed the
-claimants, and left the superintendence of the Olympic games
-still in the hands of the Eleians.<a id="FNanchor_401"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_401" class="fnanchor">[401]</a></p>
-
-<p>This triumphant dictation of terms to Elis, placed the
-Lacedæmonians in a condition of overruling ascendency throughout
-Peloponnesus, such as they had never attained before. To
-complete their victory, they rooted out all the remnants of
-their ancient enemies the Messenians, some of whom had been
-planted by the Athenians at Naupaktus, others in the island of
-Kephallenia. All of this persecuted race were now expelled, in
-the hour of Lacedæmonian omnipotence, from the neighborhood of
-Peloponnesus, and forced to take shelter, some in Sicily, others
-at Kyrênê.<a id="FNanchor_402"></a><a href="#Footnote_402"
-class="fnanchor">[402]</a> We shall in a future chapter have to
-commemorate the turn of fortune in their favor.</p>
-
-<hr class="chap" />
-
-
-<div class="chapter" id="Chap_73">
-  <p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_230">[p. 230]</a></span></p>
-  <h2 class="nobreak">CHAPTER LXXIII.<br />
-  AGESILAUS KING OF SPARTA. — THE CORINTHIAN WAR.</h2>
-</div>
-
-<p class="noindent"><span class="smcap">The</span> close of
-the Peloponnesian war, with the victorious organization of the
-Lacedæmonian empire by Lysander, has already been described as a
-period carrying with it increased sufferings to those towns which had
-formerly belonged to the Athenian empire, as compared with what they
-had endured under Athens,—and harder dependence, unaccompanied
-by any species of advantage, even to those Peloponnesians and
-inland cities which had always been dependent allies of Sparta. To
-complete the melancholy picture of the Grecian world during these
-years, we may add (what will be hereafter more fully detailed) that
-calamities of a still more deplorable character overtook the Sicilian
-Greeks; first, from the invasion of the Carthaginians, who sacked
-Himera, Selinus, Agrigentum, Gela, and Kamarina,—next from the
-overruling despotism of Dionysius at Syracuse.</p>
-
-<p>Sparta alone had been the gainer; and that to a prodigious
-extent, both in revenue and power. It is from this time, and from
-the proceedings of Lysander, that various ancient authors dated
-the commencement of her degeneracy, which they ascribe mainly
-to her departure from the institutions of Lykurgus by admitting
-gold and silver money. These metals had before been strictly
-prohibited; no money being tolerated except heavy pieces of iron,
-not portable except to a very trifling amount. That such was the
-ancient institution of Sparta, under which any Spartan having in
-his possession gold and silver money, was liable, if detected, to
-punishment, appears certain. How far the regulation may have been in
-practice evaded, we have no means of determining. Some of the ephors
-strenuously opposed the admission of the large sum brought home
-by Lysander as remnant of what he had received from Cyrus towards
-the prosecution of the war. They contended that the admission of
-so much gold and silver into the public treasury was a flagrant
-transgression of the Lykurgean ordinances. But their resistance was
-unavailing and the new ac<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_231">[p.
-231]</a></span>quisitions were received; though it still continued to
-be a penal offence (and was even made a capital offence, if we may
-trust Plutarch) for any individual to be found with gold and silver
-in his possession.<a id="FNanchor_403"></a><a href="#Footnote_403"
-class="fnanchor">[403]</a> To enforce such a prohibition, however,
-even if practicable before, ceased to be practicable so soon as these
-metals were recognized and tolerated in the possession, and for the
-purposes of the government.</p>
-
-<p>There can be no doubt that the introduction of a large sum of
-coined gold and silver into Sparta was in itself a striking and
-important phenomenon, when viewed in conjunction with the peculiar
-customs and discipline of the state. It was likely to raise strong
-antipathies in the bosom of an old fashioned Spartan, and probably
-king Archidamus, had he been alive, would have taken part with the
-opposing ephors. But Plutarch and others have criticised it too much
-as a phenomenon by itself; whereas, it was really one characteristic
-mark and portion of a new assemblage of circumstances, into which
-Sparta had been gradually arriving during the last years of the
-war, and which were brought into the most effective action by the
-decisive success at Ægospotami. The institutions of Lykurgus,
-though excluding all Spartan citizens, by an unremitting drill and
-public mess, from trade and industry, from ostentation, and from
-luxury,—did not by any means extinguish in their bosoms the
-love of money;<a id="FNanchor_404"></a><a href="#Footnote_404"
-class="fnanchor">[404]</a> while it had a positive tendency to
-exaggerate, rather than to abate, the love of power. The Spartan
-kings, Leotychides and Pleistoanax, had<span class="pagenum"><a
-id="Page_232">[p. 232]</a></span> both been guilty of receiving
-bribes; Tissaphernes had found means (during the twentieth year of
-the Peloponnesian war) to corrupt not merely the Spartan admiral
-Astyochus, but also nearly all the captains of the Peloponnesian
-fleet, except the Syracusan Hermokrates; Gylippus, as well as his
-father Kleandrides, had degraded himself by the like fraud; and
-Anaxibius at Byzantium was not at all purer. Lysander, enslaved only
-by his appetite for dominion, and himself a remarkable instance
-of superiority to pecuniary corruption, was thus not the first to
-engraft that vice on the minds of his countrymen. But though he found
-it already diffused among them, he did much to impart to it a still
-more decided predominance, by the immense increase of opportunities,
-and enlarged booty for peculation, which his newly-organized Spartan
-empire furnished. Not merely did he bring home a large residue in
-gold and silver, but there was a much larger annual tribute imposed
-by him on the dependent cities, combined with numerous appointments
-of harmosts to govern these cities. Such appointments presented
-abundant illicit profits, easy to acquire, and even difficult to
-avoid, since the decemvirs in each city were eager thus to purchase
-forbearance or connivance for their own misdeeds. So many new sources
-of corruption were sufficient to operate most unfavorably on the
-Spartan character, if not by implanting any fresh vices, at least by
-stimulating all its inherent bad tendencies.</p>
-
-<p>To understand the material change thus wrought in it, we have
-only to contrast the speeches of king Archidamus and of the
-Corinthians, made in 432 <small>B.C.</small> at the beginning of
-the Peloponnesian war, with the state of facts at the end of the
-war,—during the eleven years between the victory of Ægospotami
-and the defeat of Knidus (405-394 <small>B.C.</small>). At the
-former of the two epochs, Sparta had no tributary subjects, nor
-any funds in her treasury, while her citizens were very reluctant
-to pay imposts.<a id="FNanchor_405"></a><a href="#Footnote_405"
-class="fnanchor">[405]</a> About 334 <small>B.C.</small>,
-thirty-seven years after her defeat at Leuktra and her loss of
-Messenia, Aristotle remarks the like fact, which had then again
-become true;<a id="FNanchor_406"></a><a href="#Footnote_406"
-class="fnanchor">[406]</a> but during the continuance of her
-empire<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_233">[p. 233]</a></span>
-between 405 and 394 <small>B.C.</small>, she possessed a large
-public revenue, derived from the tribute of the dependent cities.
-In 432 <small>B.C.</small>, Sparta is not merely cautious
-but backward; especially averse to any action at a distance
-from home.<a id="FNanchor_407"></a><a href="#Footnote_407"
-class="fnanchor">[407]</a> In 404 <small>B.C.</small>, after
-the close of the war, she becomes aggressive, intermeddling, and
-ready for dealing with enemies, or making acquisitions remote as
-well as near.<a id="FNanchor_408"></a><a href="#Footnote_408"
-class="fnanchor">[408]</a> In 432 <small>B.C.</small>, her unsocial
-and exclusive manners, against the rest of Greece, with her constant
-expulsion of other Greeks from her own city, stand prominent among
-her attributes;<a id="FNanchor_409"></a><a href="#Footnote_409"
-class="fnanchor">[409]</a> while at the end of the war, her foreign
-relations had acquired such great development as to become the
-principal matter of attention for her leading citizens as well as for
-her magistrates; so that the influx of strangers into Sparta, and
-the efflux of Spartans into other parts of Greece became constant
-and inevitable. Hence the strictness of the Lykurgean discipline
-gave way on many points, and the principal Spartans especially
-struggled by various shifts to evade its obligations. It was to these
-leading men that the great prizes fell, enabling them to enrich
-themselves at the expense either of foreign subjects or of the public
-treasury, and tending more and more to aggravate that inequality of
-wealth among the Spartans which Aristotle so emphatically notices
-in his time;<a id="FNanchor_410"></a><a href="#Footnote_410"
-class="fnanchor">[410]</a> since the smaller citizens had no similar
-opportunities opened to them, nor any industry of their own, to
-guard their properties against gradual subdivision and absorption,
-and to keep them in a permanent state of ability to furnish that
-contribution to the mess-table, for themselves and their sons, which
-formed the groundwork of Spartan political franchise. Moreover, the
-spectacle<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_234">[p. 234]</a></span>
-of such newly-opened lucrative prizes,—accessible only to that
-particular section of influential Spartan families who gradually
-became known apart from the rest under the title of the Equals or
-Peers,—embittered the discontent of the energetic citizens
-beneath that privileged position, in such a manner as to menace
-the tranquillity of the state,—as will presently be seen.
-That sameness of life, habits, attainments, aptitudes, enjoyments,
-fatigues, and restraints, which the Lykurgean regulations had so
-long enforced, and still continued to prescribe,—divesting
-wealth of its principal advantages, and thus keeping up the sentiment
-of personal equality among the poorer citizens,—became more
-and more eluded by the richer, through the venality as well as
-the example of ephors and senators;<a id="FNanchor_411"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_411" class="fnanchor">[411]</a> while for those who
-had no means of corruption, it continued unrelaxed, except in so far
-as many of them fell into a still more degraded condition by the loss
-of their citizenship.</p>
-
-<p>It is not merely Isokrates,<a id="FNanchor_412"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_412" class="fnanchor">[412]</a> who attests
-the corruption wrought in the character of the Spartans by
-the possession of that foreign empire which followed the
-victory of Ægospotami,—but also their earnest panegyrist
-Xenophon. After having warmly extolled the laws of Lykurgus or
-the Spartan institutions, he is constrained to admit that his
-eulogies, though merited by the past, have become lamentably
-inapplicable to that present which he himself witnessed. “Formerly
-(says he,<a id="FNanchor_413"></a><a href="#Footnote_413"
-class="fnanchor">[413]</a>) the Lacedæmonians used to prefer
-their<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_235">[p. 235]</a></span>
-own society and moderate way of life at home, to appointments
-as harmosts in foreign towns, with all the flattery and all the
-corruption attending them. Formerly, they were afraid to be seen
-with gold in their possession; now, there are some who make even an
-ostentatious display of it. Formerly, they enforced their (Xenêlasy
-or) expulsion of strangers, and forbade foreign travel, in order that
-their citizens might not be filled with relaxed habits of life from
-contact with foreigners; but now, those who stand first in point
-of influence among them, study above all things to be in perpetual
-employment as harmosts abroad. There was a time when they took pains
-to be worthy of headship; but now they strive much rather to get and
-keep the command, than to be properly qualified for it. Accordingly,
-the Greeks used in former days to come and solicit, that the Spartans
-would act as their leaders against wrong-doers; but now they are
-exhorting each other to concert measures for shutting out Sparta from
-renewed empire. Nor can we wonder that the Spartans have fallen into
-this discredit, when they have manifestly renounced obedience both to
-the Delphian god, and to the institutions of Lykurgus!”</p>
-
-<p>This criticism (written at some period between 394-371
-<small>B.C.</small>) from the strenuous eulogist of Sparta is
-highly instructive. We know from other evidences how badly the
-Spartan empire worked for the subject cities; we here learn how
-badly it worked for the character of the Spartans themselves,
-and for those internal institutions which even an enemy of
-Sparta, who detested her foreign policy, still felt constrained
-to admire.<a id="FNanchor_414"></a><a href="#Footnote_414"
-class="fnanchor">[414]</a> All the vices, here insisted upon by
-Xenophon, arise from various incidents connected with her empire. The
-moderate, home-keeping, old-fashioned, backward disposition,—of
-which the Corinthians complain,<a id="FNanchor_415"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_415" class="fnanchor">[415]</a> but<span
-class="pagenum"><a id="Page_236">[p. 236]</a></span> for which king
-Archidamus takes credit, at the beginning of the Peloponnesian
-war,—is found exchanged, at the close of the war, for
-a spirit of aggression and conquest, for ambition public as
-well as private, and for emancipation of the great men from
-the subduing<a id="FNanchor_416"></a><a href="#Footnote_416"
-class="fnanchor">[416]</a> equality of the discipline enacted by
-Lykurgus.</p>
-
-<p>Agis the son of Archidamus (426-399 <small>B.C.</small>),
-and Pausanias son of Pleistoanax (408-394 <small>B.C.</small>),
-were the two kings of Sparta at the end of the war. But
-Lysander, the admiral or commander of the fleet, was for
-the time<a id="FNanchor_417"></a><a href="#Footnote_417"
-class="fnanchor">[417]</a> greater than either of the two kings,
-who had the right of commanding only the troops on land. I have
-already mentioned how his overweening dictation and insolence
-offended not only Pausanias, but also several of the ephors and
-leading men at Sparta, as well as Pharnabazus the Persian satrap;
-thus indirectly bringing about the emancipation of Athens from the
-Thirty, the partial discouragement of the dekarchies throughout
-Greece, and the recall of Lysander himself from his command. It was
-not without reluctance that the conqueror of Athens submitted to
-descend again to a private station. Amidst the crowd of flatterers
-who heaped incense on him at the moment of his omnipotence, there
-were not wanting those who suggested that he was much more worthy
-to reign than either Agis or Pausanias; that the kings ought to be
-taken, not from the first-born of the lineage of Eurysthenês and
-Proklês, but by selection out of all the Herakleids, of whom Lysander
-himself was one;<a id="FNanchor_418"></a><a href="#Footnote_418"
-class="fnanchor">[418]</a><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_237">[p.
-237]</a></span> and that the person elected ought to be not
-merely a descendant of Hêraklês, but a worthy parallel of
-Hêraklês himself, while pæans were sung to the honor of Lysander
-at Samos,<a id="FNanchor_419"></a><a href="#Footnote_419"
-class="fnanchor">[419]</a>—while Chœrilus and Antilochus
-composed poems in his praise,—while Antimachus (a poet highly
-esteemed by Plato) entered into a formal competition of recited epic
-verses called <i>Lysandria</i>, and was surpassed by Nikêratus, there
-was another warm admirer, a rhetor or sophist of Halikarnassus,
-named Kleon,<a id="FNanchor_420"></a><a href="#Footnote_420"
-class="fnanchor">[420]</a> who wrote a discourse proving that
-Lysander had well earned the regal dignity,—that personal
-excellence ought to prevail over legitimate descent, and that the
-crown ought to be laid open to election from the most worthy among
-the Herakleids. Considering that rhetoric was neither employed nor
-esteemed at Sparta, we cannot reasonably believe that Lysander
-really ordered the composition of this discourse as an instrument of
-execution for projects preconceived by himself, in the same manner as
-an Athenian prosecutor or defendant before the dikastery used to arm
-himself with a speech from Lysias or Demosthenes. Kleon would make
-his court professionally through such a prose composition, whether
-the project were first recommended by himself, or currently discussed
-among a circle of admirers; while Lysander would probably requite
-the compliment by a reward not less munificent than that which he
-gave to the indifferent poet Antilochus.<a id="FNanchor_421"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_421" class="fnanchor">[421]</a> And the composition
-would be put into the form of an harangue from the admiral to
-his countrymen, without any definite purpose that it should be
-ever so delivered. Such hypothesis of a speaker and an audience
-was frequent with the rhetors in their writings, as we may see
-in Isokrates,—especially in his sixth discourse, called
-Archidamus.</p>
-
-<p>Either from his own ambition, or from the suggestions of others,
-Lysander came now to conceive the idea of breaking the succession of
-the two regal families, and opening for himself a door to reach the
-crown. His projects have been characterized as revolutionary;<span
-class="pagenum"><a id="Page_238">[p. 238]</a></span> but there
-seems nothing in them which fairly merits the appellation, in the
-sense which that word now bears, if we consider accurately what the
-Spartan kings were in the year 400 <small>B.C.</small> In this view
-the associations connected with the title of king, are to a modern
-reader misleading. The Spartan kings were not kings at all, in any
-modern sense of the term; not only they were not absolute, but they
-were not even constitutional kings. They were not sovereigns, nor
-was any Spartan their subject; every Spartan was the member of a
-free Grecian community. The Spartan king did not govern; nor did he
-reign, in the sense of having government carried on in his name and
-by his delegates. The government of Sparta was carried on by the
-ephors, with frequent consultation of the senate, and occasional,
-though rare appeals, to the public assembly of citizens. The Spartan
-king was not legally inviolable. He might be, and occasionally was,
-arrested, tried, and punished for misbehavior in the discharge
-of his functions. He was a self-acting person, a great officer
-of state; enjoying certain definite privileges, and exercising
-certain military and judicial functions, which passed as an
-<i>universitas</i> by hereditary transmission in his family; but subject
-to the control of the ephors as to the way in which he performed
-these duties.<a id="FNanchor_422"></a><a href="#Footnote_422"
-class="fnanchor">[422]</a> Thus, for example, it was his privilege to
-command the army when sent on foreign service; yet a law was made,
-requiring him to take deputies along with him, as a council of war,
-without whom nothing was to be done. The ephors recalled Agesilaus
-when they thought fit; and they brought Pausanias to trial<span
-class="pagenum"><a id="Page_239">[p. 239]</a></span> and punishment,
-for alleged misconduct in his command.<a id="FNanchor_423"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_423" class="fnanchor">[423]</a> The only way in which
-the Spartan kings formed part of the sovereign power in the state,
-or shared in the exercise of government properly so called, was that
-they had votes <i>ex officio</i> in the Senate, and could vote there by
-proxy when they were not present. In ancient times, very imperfectly
-known, the Spartan kings seem really to have been sovereigns; the
-government having then been really carried on by them, or by their
-orders. But in the year 400 <small>B.C.</small>, Agis and Pausanias
-had become nothing more than great and dignified hereditary officers
-of state, still bearing the old title of their ancestors. To throw
-open these hereditary functions to all the members of the Herakleid
-Gens, by election from their number, might be a change better or
-worse; it was a startling novelty (just as it would have been to
-propose, that any of the various priesthoods, which were hereditary
-in particular families, should be made elective), because of the
-extreme attachment of the Spartans to old and sanctified customs; but
-it cannot properly be styled revolutionary. The ephors, the senate,
-and the public assembly, might have made such a change in full legal
-form, without any appeal to violence; the kings might vote against
-it, but they would have been outvoted. And if the change had been
-made, the Spartan government would have remained, in form as well as
-in principle, just what it was before; although the Eurystheneid and
-Prokleid families would have lost their privileges. It is not meant
-here to deny that the Spartan kings were men of great importance in
-the state, especially when (like Agesilaus) they combined with their
-official station a marked personal energy. But it is not the less
-true, that the associations, connected with the title of <i>king</i> in
-the modern mind, do not properly apply to them.</p>
-
-<p>To carry his point at Sparta, Lysander was well aware that
-agencies of an unusual character must be employed. Quitting Sparta
-soon after his recall, he visited the oracles of Delphi, Dodona, and
-Zeus Ammon in Libya,<a id="FNanchor_424"></a><a href="#Footnote_424"
-class="fnanchor">[424]</a> in order to procure, by persuasion
-or corruption, injunctions to the Spartans, countenancing his
-projects. So great was the general effect of oracular injunctions
-on the Spartan mind, that Kleomenes had thus obtained the
-deposition of king Demaratus, and the exiled Pleistoanax, his
-own<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_240">[p. 240]</a></span>
-return;<a id="FNanchor_425"></a><a href="#Footnote_425"
-class="fnanchor">[425]</a> bribery having been in both cases the
-moving impulse. But Lysander was not equally fortunate. None of these
-oracles could be induced, by any offers, to venture upon so grave a
-sentence as that of repealing the established law of succession to
-the Spartan throne. It is even said that the priests of Ammon, not
-content with refusing his offers, came over to Sparta to denounce
-his proceeding; upon which accusation Lysander was put on his trial,
-but acquitted. The statement that he was thus tried and acquitted,
-I think untrue. But his schemes so far miscarried,—and he was
-compelled to resort to another stratagem, yet still appealing to the
-religious susceptibilities of his countrymen. There had been born
-some time before, in one of the cities of the Euxine, a youth named
-Silenus, whose mother affirmed that he was the son of Apollo; an
-assertion which found extensive credence, notwithstanding various
-difficulties raised by the sceptics. While making at Sparta this new
-birth of a son to the god, the partisans of Lysander also spread
-abroad the news that there existed sacred manuscripts and inspired
-records, of great antiquity, hidden and yet unread, in the custody
-of the Delphian priests; not to be touched or consulted until some
-genuine son of Apollo should come forward to claim them. With the
-connivance of some among the priests, certain oracles were fabricated
-agreeable to the views of Lysander. The plan was concerted that
-Silenus should present himself at Delphi, tender the proofs of his
-divine parentage, and then claim the inspection of these hidden
-records; which the priests, after an apparently rigid scrutiny,
-were prepared to grant. Silenus would then read them aloud in the
-presence of all the spectators; and one would be found among them,
-recommending to the Spartans to choose their kings out of all the
-best citizens.<a id="FNanchor_426"></a><a href="#Footnote_426"
-class="fnanchor">[426]</a></p>
-
-<p>So nearly did this project approach to consummation, that Silenus
-actually presented himself at Delphi, and put in his claim. But
-one of the confederates either failed in his courage, or broke
-down, at the critical moment; so that the hidden records still
-remained hidden. Yet though Lysander was thus compelled to abandon
-his plan, nothing was made public about it until after his<span
-class="pagenum"><a id="Page_241">[p. 241]</a></span> death. It
-might probably have succeeded, had he found temple-confederates of
-proper courage and cunning,—when we consider the profound and
-habitual deference of the Spartans to Delphi; upon the sanction
-of which oracle the Lykurgean institutions themselves were mainly
-understood to rest. And an occasion presently arose, on which
-the proposed change might have been tried with unusual facility
-and pertinence; though Lysander himself, having once miscarried,
-renounced his enterprise, and employed his influence, which continued
-unabated, in giving the sceptre to another instead of acquiring
-it for himself,<a id="FNanchor_427"></a><a href="#Footnote_427"
-class="fnanchor">[427]</a>—like Mucian in reference to the
-emperor Vespasian.</p>
-
-<p>It was apparently about a year after the campaigns in Elis, that
-king Agis, now an old man, was taken ill at Heræa in Arcadia, and
-carried back to Sparta, where he shortly afterwards expired. His
-wife Mimæa had given birth to a son named Leotychides, now<span
-class="pagenum"><a id="Page_242">[p. 242]</a></span> a youth about
-fifteen years of age.<a id="FNanchor_428"></a><a href="#Footnote_428"
-class="fnanchor">[428]</a> But the legitimacy of this youth had
-always been suspected by Agis, who had pronounced, when the birth
-of the child was first made known to him, that it could not be his.
-He had been frightened out of his wife’s bed by the shock of an
-earthquake, which was construed as a warning from Poseidon, and was
-held to be a prohibition of intercourse for a certain time; during
-which interval Leotychides was born. This was one story; another was,
-that the young prince was the son of Alkibiades, born during the
-absence of Agis in his command at Dekeleia. On the other hand, it
-was alleged that Agis, though originally doubtful of the legitimacy
-of Leotychides, had afterwards retracted his suspicions, and fully
-recognized him; especially, and with peculiar solemnity, during
-his last illness.<a id="FNanchor_429"></a><a href="#Footnote_429"
-class="fnanchor">[429]</a> As in the case of Demaratus about a
-century earlier,<a id="FNanchor_430"></a><a href="#Footnote_430"
-class="fnanchor">[430]</a>—advantage was taken of these doubts
-by Agesilaus, the younger brother of Agis, powerfully seconded by
-Lysander, to exclude Leotychides, and occupy the throne himself.</p>
-
-<p>Agesilaus was the son of king Archidamus, not by Lampito
-the mother of Agis, but by a second wife named Eupolia. He was
-now at the mature age of forty,<a id="FNanchor_431"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_431" class="fnanchor">[431]</a> and having been
-brought up without any prospect of becoming king,—at least
-until very recent times,—had passed through the unmitigated
-rigor of Spartan drill and training. He was distinguished for
-all Spartan virtues; exemplary obedience to authority, in
-the performance of his trying exercises, military as well as
-civil,—intense emulation, in trying to surpass every
-competitor,—extraordinary courage, unremitting energy, as
-well as facility in enduring hardship,—perfect simplicity and
-frugality in all his personal habits,—extreme sensibility to
-the opinion of his fellow-citizens. Towards his personal friends
-or<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_243">[p. 243]</a></span>
-adherents, he was remarkable for fervor of attachment, even
-for unscrupulous partisanship, with a readiness to use all his
-influence in screening their injustices or short-comings; while
-he was comparatively placable and generous in dealing with rivals
-at home, notwithstanding his eagerness to be first in every sort
-of competition.<a id="FNanchor_432"></a><a href="#Footnote_432"
-class="fnanchor">[432]</a> His manners were cheerful and popular,
-and his physiognomy pleasing; though in stature he was not only
-small but mean, and though he labored under the additional defect of
-lameness on one leg,<a id="FNanchor_433"></a><a href="#Footnote_433"
-class="fnanchor">[433]</a> which accounts for his constant refusal
-to suffer his statue to be taken.<a id="FNanchor_434"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_434" class="fnanchor">[434]</a> He was indifferent
-to money, and exempt from excess of selfish feeling, except in his
-passion for superiority and power.</p>
-
-<p>In spite of his rank as brother of Agis, Agesilaus had never
-yet been tried in any military command, though he had probably
-served in the army either at Dekeleia or in Asia. Much of his
-character, therefore, lay as yet undisclosed. And his popularity
-may perhaps have been the greater at the moment when the throne
-became vacant, inasmuch as, having never been put in a position to
-excite jealousy, he stood distinguished only for accomplishments,
-efforts, endurances, and punctual obedience, wherein even the
-poorest citizens were his competitors on equal terms. Nay, so
-complete was the self-constraint, and the habit of smothering
-emotions, generated by a Spartan training, that even the cunning
-Lysander himself did not at this time know him. He and Agesilaus
-had been early and intimate friends,<a id="FNanchor_435"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_435" class="fnanchor">[435]</a> both having been
-placed as boys in the same herd or troop for the purposes of
-discipline; a strong illustration of the equalizing character of
-this discipline, since we know that Lysander was of poor parents
-and condition.<a id="FNanchor_436"></a><a href="#Footnote_436"
-class="fnanchor">[436]</a> He made the mistake of supposing Agesilaus
-to be of a disposition particularly gentle and manageable; and this
-was his main inducement for espousing the pretensions of the latter
-to the throne, after the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_244">[p.
-244]</a></span> decease of Agis. Lysander reckoned, if by his means
-Agesilaus became king, on a great increase of his own influence,
-and especially on a renewed mission to Asia, if not as ostensible
-general, at least as real chief under the tutelar headship of the new
-king.</p>
-
-<p>Accordingly, when the imposing solemnities which
-always marked the funeral of a king of Sparta were
-terminated,<a id="FNanchor_437"></a><a href="#Footnote_437"
-class="fnanchor">[437]</a> and the day arrived for installation
-of a new king, Agesilaus, under the promptings of Lysander, stood
-forward to contest the legitimacy and the title of Leotychides, and
-to claim the sceptre for himself,—a true Herakleid, brother
-of the late king Agis. In the debate, which probably took place not
-merely before the ephors and the senate but before the assembled
-citizens besides, Lysander warmly seconded his pretensions. Of this
-debate unfortunately we are not permitted to know much. We cannot
-doubt that the mature age and excellent reputation of Agesilaus would
-count as a great recommendation, when set against an untried youth;
-and this was probably the real point (since the relationship of both
-was so near) upon which decision turned;<a id="FNanchor_438"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_438" class="fnanchor">[438]</a> for the
-legitimacy of Leotychides was positively asseverated by his
-mother Timæa,<a id="FNanchor_439"></a><a href="#Footnote_439"
-class="fnanchor">[439]</a> and we do not find that the question of
-paternity was referred to the Delphian oracle, as in the case of
-Demaratus.</p>
-
-<p>There was, however, one circumstance which stood much in the
-way of Agesilaus,—his personal deformity. A lame king
-of Sparta had never yet been known. And if we turn back more
-than a century to the occurrence of a similar deformity in one
-of the Battiad princes at Kyrênê,<a id="FNanchor_440"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_440" class="fnanchor">[440]</a> we see the
-Kyrenians taking it so deeply to heart, that they sent to ask
-advice from Delphi, and invited over the Mantineian reformer
-Demônax. Over and above this sentiment of repugnance, too, the
-gods had specially forewarned Sparta to beware of “a lame reign.”
-Deiopeithes, a prophet and religious<span class="pagenum"><a
-id="Page_245">[p. 245]</a></span> adviser of high reputation,
-advocated the cause of Leotychides. He produced an ancient oracle,
-telling Sparta, that “with all her pride she must not suffer a lame
-reign to impair her stable footing;<a id="FNanchor_441"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_441" class="fnanchor">[441]</a> for if she did
-so, unexampled suffering and ruinous wars would long beset
-her.” This prophecy had already been once invoked, about eighty
-years earlier,<a id="FNanchor_442"></a><a href="#Footnote_442"
-class="fnanchor">[442]</a> but with a very different
-interpretation. To Grecian leaders, like Themistokles or
-Lysander, it was an accomplishment of no small value to be able
-to elude inconvenient texts or intractable religious feelings,
-by expository ingenuity. And Lysander here raised his voice (as
-Themistokles had done on the momentous occasion before the battle
-of Salamis),<a id="FNanchor_443"></a><a href="#Footnote_443"
-class="fnanchor">[443]</a> to combat the professional expositors;
-contending that by “a lame reign,” the god meant, not a bodily
-defect in the king,—which might not even be congenital, but
-might arise from some positive hurt,<a id="FNanchor_444"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_444" class="fnanchor">[444]</a>—but the reign
-of any king who was not a genuine descendant of Hêraklês.</p>
-
-<p>The influence of Lysander,<a id="FNanchor_445"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_445" class="fnanchor">[445]</a> combined doubtless
-with a preponderance of sentiment already tending towards Agesilaus,
-caused this effort of interpretative subtlety to be welcomed as
-convincing, and led to the nomination of the lame candidate as
-king. There was, however, a considerable minority, to whom this
-decision appeared a sin against the gods and a mockery of the
-oracle. And though the murmurs of such dissentients were kept
-down by the ability and success of Agesilaus during the first
-years of his reign; yet when, in his ten last years, calamity and
-humiliation were poured thickly upon this proud city, the public
-sentiment came decidedly round to their view. Many a pious Spartan
-then<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_246">[p. 246]</a></span>
-exclaimed, with feelings of bitter repentance, that the divine
-word never failed to come true at last,<a id="FNanchor_446"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_446" class="fnanchor">[446]</a> and that Sparta was
-justly punished for having wilfully shut her eyes to the distinct
-and merciful warning vouchsafed to her, about the mischiefs of
-a “lame reign.”<a id="FNanchor_447"></a><a href="#Footnote_447"
-class="fnanchor">[447]</a></p>
-
-<p>Besides the crown, Agesilaus at the same time acquired the
-large property left by the late king Agis; an acquisition which
-enabled him to display his generosity by transferring half of
-it at once to his maternal relatives,—for the most part
-poor persons.<a id="FNanchor_448"></a><a href="#Footnote_448"
-class="fnanchor">[448]</a> The popularity acquired by this step
-was still farther increased by his manner of conducting himself
-towards the ephors and senate. Between these magistrates and the
-kings, there was generally a bad understanding. The kings, not
-having lost the tradition of the plenary power once enjoyed by
-their ancestors, displayed as much haughty reserve as they dared,
-towards an authority now become essentially superior to their
-own. But Agesilaus,—not less from his own preëstablished
-habits, than from anxiety to make up for the defects of his
-title,—adopted a line of conduct studiously opposite. He not
-only took pains to avoid collision with the ephors, but showed
-marked deference both to their orders and to their persons. He
-rose from his seat whenever they appeared; he conciliated both
-ephors and senators by timely presents.<a id="FNanchor_449"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_449" class="fnanchor">[449]</a> By such judicious
-proceeding, as well as by his exact observance of the laws
-and customs,<a id="FNanchor_450"></a><a href="#Footnote_450"
-class="fnanchor">[450]</a> he was himself the greatest gainer.
-Combined with that ability and energy in which he was never
-deficient, it ensured to him more real power than had ever fallen to
-the lot of any king of Sparta; power not merely over the military
-operations abroad<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_247">[p.
-247]</a></span> which usually fell to the kings,—but also over
-the policy of the state at home. On the increase and maintenance
-of that real power, his chief thoughts were concentrated; new
-dispositions generated by kingship, which had never shown themselves
-in him before. Despising, like Lysander, both money, luxury, and
-all the outward show of power,—he exhibited, as a king,
-an ultra-Spartan simplicity, carried almost to affectation, in
-diet, clothing, and general habits. But like Lysander also, he
-delighted in the exercise of dominion through the medium of knots
-or factions of devoted partisans, whom he rarely scrupled to
-uphold in all their career of injustice and oppression. Though an
-amiable man, with no disposition to tyranny, and still less to
-plunder, for his own benefit,—Agesilaus thus made himself
-the willing instrument of both, for the benefit of his various
-coadjutors and friends, whose power and consequence he identified
-with his own.<a id="FNanchor_451"></a><a href="#Footnote_451"
-class="fnanchor">[451]</a></p>
-
-<p>At the moment when Agesilaus became king, Sparta was at the
-maximum of her power, holding nearly all the Grecian towns as subject
-allies, with or without tribute. She was engaged in the task (as has
-already been mentioned) of protecting the Asiatic Greeks against
-the Persian satraps in their neighborhood. And the most interesting
-portion of the life of Agesilaus consists in the earnestness with
-which he espoused, and the vigor and ability with which he conducted,
-this great Pan-hellenic duty. It will be seen that success in his
-very promising career was intercepted<a id="FNanchor_452"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_452" class="fnanchor">[452]</a> by his bad, factious
-subservience to partisans, at home and abroad,—by his
-unmeasured thirst for Spartan omnipotence,—and his indifference
-or aversion to any generous scheme of combination with the cities
-dependent on Sparta.</p>
-
-<p>His attention, however, was first called to a dangerous internal
-conspiracy with which Sparta was threatened. The “lame reign” was as
-yet less than twelve months old, when Agesilaus, being engaged in
-sacrificing at one of the established state solemnities, was apprised
-by the officiating prophet, that the victims exhibited menacing
-symptoms, portending a conspiracy of the most formidable<span
-class="pagenum"><a id="Page_248">[p. 248]</a></span> character.
-A second sacrifice gave yet worse promise; and on the third, the
-terrified prophet exclaimed, “Agesilaus, the revelation before
-us imports that we are actually in the midst of our enemies.”
-They still continued to sacrifice, but victims were now offered
-to the averting and preserving gods, with prayers that these
-latter, by tutelary interposition, would keep off the impending
-peril. At length, after much repetition, and great difficulty,
-favorable victims were obtained; the meaning of which was soon made
-clear. Five days afterwards, an informer came before the ephors,
-communicating the secret, that a dangerous conspiracy was preparing,
-organized by a citizen named Kinadon.<a id="FNanchor_453"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_453" class="fnanchor">[453]</a></p>
-
-<p>The conspirator thus named was a Spartan citizen, but not one of
-that select number called The Equals or The Peers. It has already
-been mentioned that inequalities had been gradually growing up
-among qualified citizens of Sparta, tending tacitly to set apart
-a certain number of them under the name of The Peers, and all the
-rest under the correlative name of The Inferiors. Besides this,
-since the qualification of every family lasted only so long as
-the citizen could furnish a given contribution for himself and
-his sons to the public mess-table, and since industry of every
-kind was inconsistent with the rigid personal drilling imposed
-upon all of them,—the natural consequence was, that in each
-generation a certain number of citizens became disfranchised and
-dropped off. But these disfranchised men did not become Periœki
-or Helots. They were still citizens, whose qualification, though
-in abeyance, might be at any time renewed by the munificence
-of a rich man;<a id="FNanchor_454"></a><a href="#Footnote_454"
-class="fnanchor">[454]</a> so that they too, along with the lesser
-citizens, were known under the denomination of The Inferiors. It
-was to this class that Kinadon belonged. He was a young man of
-remarkable strength and courage, who had discharged with honor his
-duties in the Lykurgean discipline,<a id="FNanchor_455"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_455" class="fnanchor">[455]</a> and had imbibed from
-it that sense of personal<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_249">[p.
-249]</a></span> equality, and that contempt of privilege, which
-its theory as well as its practice suggested. Notwithstanding all
-exactness of duty performed, he found that the constitution, as
-practically worked, excluded him from the honors and distinctions
-of the state; reserving them for the select citizens known under
-the name of Peers. And this exclusion had become more marked and
-galling since the formation of the Spartan empire after the victory
-of Ægospotami; whereby the number of lucrative posts (harmosties and
-others) all monopolized by the Peers, had been so much multiplied.
-Debarred from the great political prizes, Kinadon was still employed
-by the ephors, in consequence of his high spirit and military
-sufficiency, in that standing force which they kept for maintaining
-order at home.<a id="FNanchor_456"></a><a href="#Footnote_456"
-class="fnanchor">[456]</a> He had been the agent ordered on
-several of those arbitrary seizures which they never scrupled to
-employ towards persons whom they regarded as dangerous. But this
-was no satisfaction to his mind; nay, probably, by bringing him
-into close contact with the men in authority, it contributed to
-lessen his respect for them. He desired “to be inferior to no
-man in Sparta,”<a id="FNanchor_457"></a><a href="#Footnote_457"
-class="fnanchor">[457]</a> and his conspiracy was undertaken to
-realize this object by breaking up the constitution.</p>
-
-<p>It has already been mentioned that amidst the general insecurity
-which pervaded the political society of Laconia, the ephors
-maintained a secret police and system of espionage which reached its
-height of unscrupulous efficiency under the title of the Krypteia.
-Such precautions were now more than ever requisite; for the changes
-in the practical working of Spartan politics tended to multiply the
-number of malcontents, and to throw the Inferiors as well as the
-Periœki and the Neodamodes (manumitted Helots), into one common
-antipathy with the Helots, against the exclusive partnership of the
-Peers. Informers were thus sure of encouragement and reward, and
-the man who now came to the ephors either<span class="pagenum"><a
-id="Page_250">[p. 250]</a></span> was really an intimate friend
-of Kinadon, or had professed himself such in order to elicit the
-secret. “Kinadon (said he to the ephors) brought me to the extremity
-of the market-place, and bade me count how many Spartans there were
-therein. I reckoned up about forty, besides the king, the ephors
-and the senators. Upon my asking him why he desired me to count
-them, he replied,—Because these are the men, and the only men,
-whom you have to look upon as enemies;<a id="FNanchor_458"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_458" class="fnanchor">[458]</a> all others in the
-market-place, more than four thousand in number, are friends and
-comrades. Kinadon also pointed out to me the one or two Spartans whom
-we met in the roads, or who were lords in the country districts,
-as our only enemies; every one else around them being friendly
-to our purpose.” “How many did he tell you were the accomplices
-actually privy to the scheme?”—asked the ephors. “Only a
-few (was the reply); but those thoroughly trustworthy; these
-confidants themselves, however, said that all around them were
-accomplices,—Inferiors, Periœki, Neodamodes, and Helots,
-all alike; for whenever any one among the classes talked about a
-Spartan, he could not disguise his intense antipathy,—he talked
-as if he could eat the Spartans raw.”<a id="FNanchor_459"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_459" class="fnanchor">[459]</a></p>
-
-<p>“But how (continued the ephors) did Kinadon reckon upon getting
-arms?” “His language was (replied the witness)—We of the
-standing force have our own arms all ready; and here are plenty of
-knives, swords, spits, hatchets, axes and scythes—on sale in
-this market-place, to suit an insurgent multitude; besides, every man
-who tills the earth, or cuts wood and stone, has tools by him which
-will serve as weapons in case of need; especially in a struggle with
-enemies themselves unarmed.” On being asked what was the moment fixed
-for execution, the witness could not tell; he had been instructed
-only to remain on the spot, and be ready.<a id="FNanchor_460"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_460" class="fnanchor">[460]</a></p> <p><span
-class="pagenum"><a id="Page_251">[p. 251]</a></span></p> <p>It does
-not appear that this man knew the name of any person concerned,
-except Kinadon himself. So deeply were the ephors alarmed, that they
-refrained from any formal convocation even of what was called the
-Lesser Assembly,—including the senate, of which the kings were
-members <i>ex officio</i>, and, perhaps, a few other principal persons
-besides. But the members of this assembly were privately brought
-together to deliberate on the emergency; Agesilaus, probably, among
-them. To arrest Kinadon at once in Sparta appeared imprudent;
-since his accomplices, of number as yet unknown, would be thus
-admonished either to break out in insurrection, or at least to make
-their escape. But an elaborate stratagem was laid for arresting
-him out of Sparta, without the knowledge of his accomplices. The
-ephors, calling him before them, professed to confide to him (as
-they had done occasionally before) a mission to go to Aulon (a
-Laconian town on the frontier towards Arcadia and Triphylia) and
-there to seize some parties designated by name in a formal skytalê
-or warrant; including some of the Aulonite Periœki,—some
-Helots,—and one other person by name, a woman of peculiar
-beauty, resident at the place, whose influence was understood to
-spread disaffection among all the Lacedæmonians who came thither, old
-as well as young.<a id="FNanchor_461"></a><a href="#Footnote_461"
-class="fnanchor">[461]</a> When Kinadon inquired what force he
-was to take with him on the mission, the ephors, to obviate all
-suspicion that they were picking out companions with views hostile
-to him, desired him to go to the Hippagretês (or commander of
-the three hundred youthful guards called horsemen, though they
-were not really mounted) and ask for the first six or seven men
-of the guard<a id="FNanchor_462"></a><a href="#Footnote_462"
-class="fnanchor">[462]</a> who might happen to be in the way. But
-they (the ephors) had already held secret communication with the
-Hippagretês, and had informed him both whom they wished to be
-sent, and what the persons sent were to<span class="pagenum"><a
-id="Page_252">[p. 252]</a></span> do. They then despatched Kinadon
-on his pretended mission telling him that they should place at his
-disposal three carts, in order that he might more easily bring home
-the prisoners.</p>
-
-<p>Kinadon began his journey to Aulon, without the smallest
-suspicion of the plot laid for him by the ephors; who, to make
-their purpose sure, sent an additional body of the guards after
-him, to quell any resistance which might possibly arise. But
-their stratagem succeeded as completely as they could desire. He
-was seized on the road, by those who accompanied him ostensibly
-for his pretended mission. These men interrogated him, put him
-to the torture,<a id="FNanchor_463"></a><a href="#Footnote_463"
-class="fnanchor">[463]</a> and heard from his lips the names
-of his accomplices;<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_253">[p.
-253]</a></span> the list of whom they wrote down, and forwarded
-by one of the guards to Sparta. The ephors, on receiving it,
-immediately arrested the parties principally concerned, especially
-the prophet Tisamenus; and examined them along with Kinadon, as
-soon as<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_254">[p. 254]</a></span>
-he was brought prisoner. They asked the latter, among other
-questions, what was his purpose in setting on foot the conspiracy;
-to which he replied,—“I wanted to be inferior to no man
-at Sparta.” His punishment was not long deferred. Having been
-manacled with a clog round his neck to which his hands were made
-fast,—he was in this condition conducted round the city,
-with men scourging and pricking him during the progress. His
-accomplices were treated in like manner, and at length all of them
-were put to death.<a id="FNanchor_464"></a><a href="#Footnote_464"
-class="fnanchor">[464]</a></p>
-
-<p>Such is the curious narrative, given by Xenophon, of this
-unsuccessful conspiracy. He probably derived his information from
-Agesilaus himself; since we cannot easily explain how he could have
-otherwise learnt so much about the most secret manœuvres of the
-ephors, in a government proverbial for constant secrecy, like that of
-Sparta. The narrative opens to us a glimpse, though sadly transient
-and imperfect, of the internal dangers of the Spartan government. We
-were aware, from earlier evidences, of great discontent prevailing
-among the Helots, and to a certain extent among the Periœki. But
-the incident here described presents to us the first manifestation
-of a body of malcontents among the Spartans themselves; malcontents
-formidable both from energy and position, like Kinadon and the
-prophet Tisamenus. Of the state of disaffected feeling in the
-provincial townships of Laconia, an impressive proof is afforded by
-the case of that beautiful woman who was alleged to be so active
-in political proselytism at Aulon; not less than by the passionate
-expressions of hatred revealed in the deposition of the informer
-himself. Though little is known about the details, yet it seems that
-the tendency of affairs at Sparta was to concentrate both power
-and property in the hands of an oligarchy ever narrowing among the
-citizens; thus aggravating the dangers at home, even at the time
-when the power of the state was greatest abroad, and preparing the
-way for that irreparable humiliation which began with the defeat of
-Leuktra.</p>
-
-<p>It can hardly be doubted that much more wide-spread discontent
-came to the knowledge of the ephors than that which is specially
-indicated in Xenophon. And such discovery may probably have been
-one of the motives (as had happened in 424 <small>B.C.</small> on
-occasion<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_255">[p. 255]</a></span>
-of the expedition of Brasidas into Thrace) which helped to bring
-about the Asiatic expedition of Agesilaus, as an outlet for brave
-malcontents on distant and lucrative military service.</p>
-
-<p>Derkyllidas had now been carrying on war in Asia Minor for near
-three years, against Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus, with so much
-efficiency and success, as both to protect the Asiatic Greeks on
-the coast, and to intercept all the revenues which those satraps
-either transmitted to court or enjoyed themselves. Pharnabazus had
-already gone up to Susa (during his truce with Derkyllidas in 397
-<small>B.C.</small>), and besides obtaining a reinforcement which
-acted under himself and Tissaphernes in 396 <small>B.C.</small>
-against Derkyllidas in Lydia, had laid schemes for renewing
-the maritime war against Sparta.<a id="FNanchor_465"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_465" class="fnanchor">[465]</a></p>
-
-<p>It is now that we hear again mentioned the name of Konon,
-who, having saved himself with nine triremes from the defeat
-of Ægospotami, had remained for the last seven years under the
-protection of Evagoras, prince of Salamis, in Cyprus. Konon, having
-married at Salamis, and having a son<a id="FNanchor_466"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_466" class="fnanchor">[466]</a> born to him there,
-indulged but faint hopes of ever returning to his native city, when,
-fortunately for him as well as for Athens, the Persians again became
-eager for an efficient admiral and fleet on the coast of Asia Minor.
-Through representations from Pharnabazus, as well as from Evagoras
-in Cyprus,—and through correspondence of the latter with the
-Greek physician Ktesias, who wished to become personally employed in
-the negotiation, and who seems to have had considerable influence
-with queen Parysatis,<a id="FNanchor_467"></a><a href="#Footnote_467"
-class="fnanchor">[467]</a>—orders were obtained, and funds
-provided, to equip in Phœnicia and Kilikia a numerous fleet, under
-the command of Konon. While that officer began to show himself,
-and to act with such triremes as he<span class="pagenum"><a
-id="Page_256">[p. 256]</a></span> found in readiness (about forty
-in number) along the southern coast of Asia Minor from Kilikia
-to Kaunus,<a id="FNanchor_468"></a><a href="#Footnote_468"
-class="fnanchor">[468]</a>—further preparations were vigorously
-prosecuted in the Phœnician ports, in order to make up the fleet to
-three hundred sail.<a id="FNanchor_469"></a><a href="#Footnote_469"
-class="fnanchor">[469]</a></p>
-
-<p>It was by a sort of accident that news of such equipment reached
-Sparta,—in an age of the world when diplomatic residents were
-as yet unknown. A Syracusan merchant named Herodas, having visited
-the Phœnician ports for trading purposes, brought back to Sparta
-intelligence of the preparations which he had seen, sufficient to
-excite much uneasiness. The Spartans were taking counsel among
-themselves, and communicating with their neighboring allies,
-when Agesilaus, at the instance of Lysander, stood forward as a
-volunteer to solicit the command of a land-force for the purpose
-of attacking the Persians in Asia. He proposed to take with him
-only thirty full Spartan citizens or peers, as a sort of Board or
-Council of Officers; two thousand Neodamodes or enfranchised Helots,
-whom the ephors were probably glad to send away, and who would be
-selected from the bravest and most formidable; and six thousand
-hoplites from the land-allies, to whom the prospect of a rich
-service against Asiatic enemies would be tempting. Of these thirty
-Spartans, Lysander intended to be the leader; and thus, reckoning on
-his preëstablished influence over Agesilaus, to exercise the real
-command himself, without the name. He had no serious fear of the
-Persian arms, either by land or sea. He looked upon the announcement
-of the Phœnician fleet to be an empty threat, as it had so often
-proved in the mouth of Tissaphernes during the late war; while the
-Cyreian expedition had inspired him further with ardent hopes of
-another successful Anabasis, or conquering invasion of Persia from
-the sea-coast inwards. But he had still more at heart to employ
-his newly-acquired ascendency in reëstablishing everywhere the
-dekarchies, which had excited such intolerable hatred and exercised
-so much oppression, that even the ephors had refused to lend positive
-aid in upholding them, so that they had been in several places broken
-up or modified.<a id="FNanchor_470"></a><a href="#Footnote_470"
-class="fnanchor">[470]</a> If the ambition of Agesilaus was
-comparatively less stained by personal and factious antipathies,
-and more Pan-hellenic<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_257">[p.
-257]</a></span> in its aim, than that of Lysander,—it was
-at the same time yet more unmeasured in respect to victory over
-the Great King, whom he dreamed of dethroning, or at least of
-expelling from Asia Minor and the coast.<a id="FNanchor_471"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_471" class="fnanchor">[471]</a> So powerful was
-the influence exercised by the Cyreian expedition over the schemes
-and imagination of energetic Greeks: so sudden was the outburst of
-ambition in the mind of Agesilaus, for which no one before had given
-him credit.</p>
-
-<p>Though this plan was laid by two of the ablest men in Greece, it
-turned out to be rash and improvident, so far as the stability of
-the Lacedæmonian empire was concerned. That empire ought to have
-been made sure by sea, where its real danger lay, before attempts
-were made to extend it by new inland acquisitions. And except for
-purposes of conquest, there was no need of farther reinforcements
-in Asia Minor; since Derkyllidas was already there with a force
-competent to make head against the satraps. Nevertheless, the
-Lacedæmonians embraced the plan eagerly; the more so, as envoys
-were sent from many of the subject cities, by the partisans of
-Lysander and in concert with him, to entreat that Agesilaus might
-be placed at the head of the expedition, with as large a force
-as he required.<a id="FNanchor_472"></a><a href="#Footnote_472"
-class="fnanchor">[472]</a></p>
-
-<p>No difficulty probably was found in levying the proposed number
-of men from the allies, since there was great promise of plunder
-for the soldiers in Asia. But the altered position of Sparta with
-respect to her most powerful allies was betrayed by the refusal of
-Thebes, Corinth, and Athens to take any part in the expedition. The
-refusal of Corinth, indeed, was excused professedly on the ground
-of a recent inauspicious conflagration of one of the temples in the
-city; and that of Athens, on the plea of weakness and exhaustion not
-yet repaired. But the latter, at least, had already begun to conceive
-some hope from the projects of Konon.<a id="FNanchor_473"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_473" class="fnanchor">[473]</a></p>
-
-<p>The mere fact that a king of Sparta was about to take the
-command and pass into Asia, lent peculiar importance to the
-enterprise. The Spartan kings, in their function of leaders of
-Greece, conceived themselves to have inherited the sceptre of
-Agamemnon<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_258">[p. 258]</a></span>
-and Orestes;<a id="FNanchor_474"></a><a href="#Footnote_474"
-class="fnanchor">[474]</a> and Agesilaus, especially, assimilated
-his expedition to a new Trojan war,—an effort of united
-Greece, for the purpose of taking vengeance on the common Asiatic
-enemy of the Hellenic name. The sacrifices having been found
-favorable, Agesilaus took measures for the transit of the troops
-from various ports to Ephesus. But he himself, with one division,
-touched in his way at Geræstus, the southern point of Eubœa;
-wishing to cross from thence and sacrifice at Aulis, (the port of
-Bœotia nearly opposite to Geræstus on the other side of the strait)
-where Agamemnon had offered his memorable sacrifice immediately
-previous to departure for Troy. It appears that he both went to
-the spot, and began the sacrifice, without asking permission from
-the Thebans; moreover, he was accompanied by his own prophet, who
-conducted the solemnities in a manner not consistent with the
-habitual practice of the temple or chapel of Artemis at Aulis. On
-both these grounds, the Thebans, resenting the proceeding as an
-insult, sent a body of armed men, and compelled him to desist from
-the sacrifice.<a id="FNanchor_475"></a><a href="#Footnote_475"
-class="fnanchor">[475]</a> Not taking part themselves in the
-expedition, they probably considered that the Spartan king was
-presumptuous in assuming to himself the Pan-hellenic character of
-a second Agamemnon; and they thus inflicted a humiliation which
-Agesilaus never forgave.</p>
-
-<p>Agesilaus seems to have reached Asia about the time when
-Derkyllidas had recently concluded his last armistice with
-Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus; an armistice, intended to allow time
-for mutual communication both with Sparta and the Persian court.
-On being asked by the satrap what was his purpose in coming,
-Agesilaus merely renewed the demand which had before been made by
-Derkyllidas—of autonomy for the Asiatic Greeks. Tissaphernes
-replied by proposing a continuation of the same armistice, until
-he could communicate with the Persian court,—adding that he
-hoped to be empowered to grant the demand. A fresh armistice was
-accordingly sworn to on both sides, for three months; Derkyllidas
-(who with his army came now under the command of Agesilaus)
-and Herippidas being sent to the satrap to receive his oath,
-and take oaths to him in return.<a id="FNanchor_476"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_476" class="fnanchor">[476]</a></p> <p><span
-class="pagenum"><a id="Page_259">[p. 259]</a></span></p>
-<p>While the army was thus condemned to temporary inaction at
-Ephesus, the conduct and position of Lysander began to excite
-intolerable jealousy in the superior officers; and most of
-all Agesilaus. So great and established was the reputation
-of Lysander,—whose statue had been erected at Ephesus
-itself in the temple of Artemis,<a id="FNanchor_477"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_477" class="fnanchor">[477]</a> as well as in many
-other cities,—that all the Asiatic Greeks looked upon him as
-the real chief of the expedition. That he should be real chief,
-under the nominal command of another, was nothing more than what had
-happened before, in the year wherein he gained the great victory of
-Ægospotami,—the Lacedæmonians having then also sent him out
-in the ostensible capacity of secretary to the admiral Arakus, in
-order to save the inviolability of their own rule, that the same
-man should not serve twice as admiral.<a id="FNanchor_478"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_478" class="fnanchor">[478]</a> It was through the
-instigation of Lysander, and with a view to his presence, that
-the decemvirs and other partisans in the subject cities had sent
-to Sparta to petition for Agesilaus; a prince as yet untried and
-unknown. So that Lysander,—taking credit, with truth, for
-having ensured to Agesilaus first the crown, next this important
-appointment,—intended for himself, and was expected by others,
-to exercise a fresh turn of command, and to renovate in every town
-the discomfited or enfeebled dekarchies. Numbers of his partisans
-came to Ephesus to greet his arrival, and a crowd of petitioners
-were seen following his steps everywhere; while Agesilaus himself
-appeared comparatively neglected. Moreover, Lysander resumed all
-that insolence of manner which he had contracted during his former
-commands, and which on this occasion gave the greater offence,
-since the manner of Agesilaus was both courteous and simple in a
-peculiar degree.<a id="FNanchor_479"></a><a href="#Footnote_479"
-class="fnanchor">[479]</a></p>
-
-<p>The thirty Spartan counsellors, over whom Lysander had been
-named to preside, finding themselves neither consulted by him, nor
-solicited by others, were deeply dissatisfied. Their complaints<span
-class="pagenum"><a id="Page_260">[p. 260]</a></span> helped to
-encourage Agesilaus, who was still more keenly wounded in his
-own personal dignity, to put forth a resolute and imperious
-strength of will, such as he had not before been known to possess.
-He successively rejected every petition preferred to him by
-or through Lysander; a systematic purpose which, though never
-formally announced,<a id="FNanchor_480"></a><a href="#Footnote_480"
-class="fnanchor">[480]</a> was presently discerned by the
-petitioners, by the Thirty, and by Lysander himself. The latter
-thus found himself not merely disappointed in all his calculations,
-but humiliated to excess, though without any tangible ground of
-complaint. He was forced to warn his partisans, that his intervention
-was an injury and not a benefit to them; that they must desist
-from obsequious attentions to him, and must address themselves
-directly to Agesilaus. With that prince he also remonstrated on
-his own account,—“Truly, Agesilaus, you know how to degrade
-your friends.”—“Ay, to be sure (was the reply), those among
-them who want to appear greater than I am; but such as seek to
-uphold me, I should be ashamed if I did not know how to repay with
-due honor.”—Lysander was constrained to admit the force
-of this reply, and to request, as the only means of escape from
-present and palpable humiliation, that he might be sent on some
-mission apart; engaging to serve faithfully in whatever duty he
-might be employed.<a id="FNanchor_481"></a><a href="#Footnote_481"
-class="fnanchor">[481]</a></p>
-
-<p>This proposition, doubtless even more agreeable to Agesilaus
-than to himself, being readily assented to, he was despatched on a
-mission to the Hellespont. Faithful to his engagement of forgetting
-past offences and serving with zeal, he found means to gain over
-a Persian grandee named Spithridates, who had received some
-offence from Pharnabazus. Spithridates revolted openly, carrying
-a regiment of two hundred horse to join Agesilaus; who was thus
-enabled to inform himself fully about the<span class="pagenum"><a
-id="Page_261">[p. 261]</a></span> satrapy of Pharnabazus, comprising
-the territory called Phrygia, in the neighborhood of the Propontis
-and the Hellespont.<a id="FNanchor_482"></a><a href="#Footnote_482"
-class="fnanchor">[482]</a></p>
-
-<p>The army under Tissaphernes had been already powerful at the
-moment when his timidity induced him to conclude the first armistice
-with Derkyllidas. But additional reinforcements, received since the
-conclusion of the second and more recent armistice, had raised him to
-such an excess of confidence, that even before the stipulated three
-months had expired, he sent to insist on the immediate departure of
-Agesilaus from Asia, and to proclaim war forthwith, if such departure
-were delayed. While this message, accompanied by formidable reports
-of the satrap’s force, filled the army at Ephesus with mingled alarm
-and indignation, Agesilaus accepted the challenge with cheerful
-readiness; sending word back that he thanked the satrap for perjuring
-himself in so flagrant a manner, as to set the gods against him and
-ensure their favor to the Greek side.<a id="FNanchor_483"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_483" class="fnanchor">[483]</a> Orders were
-forthwith given, and contingents summoned from the Asiatic Greeks,
-for a forward movement southward, to cross the Mæander, and attack
-Tissaphernes in Karia, where he usually resided. The cities on the
-route were required to provide magazines, so that Tissaphernes,
-fully anticipating attack in this direction, caused his infantry to
-cross into Karia, for the purpose of acting on the defensive; while
-he kept his numerous cavalry in the plain of the Mæander, with a
-view to overwhelm Agesilaus, who had no cavalry, in his march over
-that level territory towards the Karian hills and rugged ground. But
-the Lacedæmonian king, having put the enemy on this false scent,
-suddenly turned his march northward towards Phrygia and the satrapy
-of Pharnabazus. Tissaphernes took no pains to aid his brother satrap,
-who on his side had made few preparations for defence. Accordingly
-Agesilaus, finding little or no resistance, took many towns and
-villages, and collected abundance of provisions, plunder, and slaves.
-Profiting by the guidance of the revolted Spithridates, and marching
-as little as possible over the plains, he carried on lucrative
-and unopposed incursions as far as the neighborhood of Daskylium,
-the residence of the satrap himself, near the Propontis. Near the
-satrapic residence, however, his small<span class="pagenum"><a
-id="Page_262">[p. 262]</a></span> body of cavalry, ascending an
-eminence, came suddenly upon an equal detachment of Persian cavalry,
-under Rhathines and Bagæus; who attacked them vigorously, and drove
-them back with some loss, until they were protected by Agesilaus
-himself coming up with the hoplites. The effect of such a check (and
-there were probably others of the same kind, though Xenophon does
-not specify them) on the spirits of the army was discouraging. On
-the next morning, the sacrifices being found unfavorable for farther
-advance, Agesilaus gave orders for retreating towards the sea. He
-reached Ephesus about the close of autumn; resolved to employ the
-winter in organizing a more powerful cavalry, which experience proved
-to be indispensable.<a id="FNanchor_484"></a><a href="#Footnote_484"
-class="fnanchor">[484]</a></p>
-
-<p>This autumnal march through Phrygia was more lucrative than
-glorious. Yet it enables Xenophon to bring to view different merits
-of his hero Agesilaus; in doing which he exhibits to us ancient
-warfare and Asiatic habits on a very painful side. In common both
-with Kallikratidas and Lysander, though not with the ordinary Spartan
-commanders, Agesilaus was indifferent to the acquisition of money
-for himself. But he was not the less anxious to enrich his friends,
-and would sometimes connive at unwarrantable modes of acquisition
-for their benefit. Deserters often came in to give information of
-rich prizes or valuable prisoners; which advantages, if he had
-chosen, he might have appropriated to himself. But he made it a
-practice to throw both the booty and the honor in the way of some
-favorite officer; just as we have seen (in a former chapter) that
-Xenophon himself was allowed by the army to capture Asidates and
-enjoy a large portion of his ransom.<a id="FNanchor_485"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_485" class="fnanchor">[485]</a> Again, when the army
-in the course of its march was at a considerable distance from the
-sea, and appeared to be advancing farther inland, the authorized
-auctioneers, whose province it was to sell the booty, found the
-buyers extremely slack. It was difficult to keep or carry what was
-bought, and opportunity for resale did not<span class="pagenum"><a
-id="Page_263">[p. 263]</a></span> seem at hand. Agesilaus, while he
-instructed the auctioneers to sell upon credit, without insisting
-on ready money,—at the same time gave private hints to a
-few friends that he was very shortly about to return to the sea.
-The friends thus warned, bidding for the plunder on credit and
-purchasing at low prices, were speedily enabled to dispose of it
-again at a seaport, with large profits.<a id="FNanchor_486"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_486" class="fnanchor">[486]</a></p>
-
-<p>We are not surprised to hear that such lucrative graces procured
-for Agesilaus many warm admirers; though the eulogies of Xenophon
-ought to have been confined to another point in his conduct, now to
-be mentioned. Agesilaus, while securing for his army the plunder
-of the country over which he carried his victorious arms, took
-great pains to prevent both cruelty and destruction of property.
-When any town surrendered to him on terms, his exactions were
-neither ruinous nor grossly humiliating.<a id="FNanchor_487"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_487" class="fnanchor">[487]</a> Amidst all
-the plunder realized, too, the most valuable portion was the
-adult natives of both sexes, hunted down and brought in by
-the predatory light troops of the army, to be sold as slaves.
-Agesilaus was vigilant in protecting these poor victims from
-ill-usage; inculcating upon his soldiers the duty, “not of
-punishing them like wrong-doers, but simply of keeping them under
-guard as men.<a id="FNanchor_488"></a><a href="#Footnote_488"
-class="fnanchor">[488]</a>” It was the practice of the poorer
-part of the native population often to sell their little children
-for exportation to travelling slave-merchants, from inability to
-maintain them. The children thus purchased, if they promised to be
-handsome, were often mutilated, and fetched large prices as eunuchs,
-to supply the large demand for the harems and religious worship of
-many Asiatic towns. But in their haste to get out of the way of a
-plundering army, these slave-merchants were forced often to leave by
-the way-side the little children whom they had purchased, exposed
-to the wolves, the dogs, or starvation. In this wretched condition,
-they were found by Agesilaus on his march. His humane disposition
-prompted him to see them carried to a place of safety, where he
-gave them in charge of those old natives whom age and feebleness
-had<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_264">[p. 264]</a></span>
-caused to be left behind as not worth carrying off. By such active
-kindness, rare, indeed, in a Grecian general, towards the conquered,
-he earned the gratitude of the captives, and the sympathies of
-every one around.<a id="FNanchor_489"></a><a href="#Footnote_489"
-class="fnanchor">[489]</a></p>
-
-<p>This interesting anecdote, imparting a glimpse of the ancient
-world in reference to details which Grecian historians rarely
-condescend to unveil, demonstrates the compassionate disposition
-of Agesilaus. We find in conjunction with it another anecdote,
-illustrating the Spartan side of his character. The prisoners who
-had been captured during the expedition were brought to Ephesus,
-and<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_265">[p. 265]</a></span>
-sold during the winter as slaves for the profit of the army.
-Agesilaus,—being then busily employed in training his troops
-to military efficiency, especially for the cavalry service during
-the ensuing campaign,—thought it advisable to impress them
-with contempt for the bodily capacity and prowess of the natives.
-He therefore directed the heralds who conducted the auction, to put
-the prisoners up to sale in a state of perfect nudity. To have the
-body thus exposed, was a thing never done, and even held disgraceful
-by the native Asiatics; while among the Greeks the practice was
-universal for purposes of exercise,—or at least, had become
-universal during the last two or three centuries,—for we
-are told that originally the Asiatic feeling on this point had
-prevailed throughout Greece. It was one of the obvious differences
-between Grecian and Asiatic customs,<a id="FNanchor_490"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_490" class="fnanchor">[490]</a>—that in
-the former, both the exercises of the palæstra, as well as the
-matches in the solemn games, required competitors of every rank
-to contend naked. Agesilaus himself stripped thus habitually;
-Alexander, prince of Macedon, had done so, when he ran at the
-Olympic stadium,<a id="FNanchor_491"></a><a href="#Footnote_491"
-class="fnanchor">[491]</a>—also the combatants out of the great
-family of the Diagorids of Rhodes, when they gained their victories
-in the Olympic pankratium,—and all those other noble pugilists,
-wrestlers, and runners, descended from gods and heroes, upon whom
-Pindar pours forth his complimentary odes.</p>
-
-<p>On this occasion at Ephesus, Agesilaus gave special orders
-to put up the Asiatic prisoners to auction naked; not at all by
-way of insult, but in order to exhibit to the eye of the Greek
-soldier, as he contemplated them, how much he gained by his own
-bodily training and frequent exposure, and how inferior was the
-condition of men whose bodies never felt the sun or wind. They
-displayed a white skin, plump and soft limbs, weak and undeveloped
-muscles, like men accustomed to be borne in carriages instead of
-walking or running; from whence we indirectly learn that many
-of them were men in wealthy circumstances. And the purpose of
-Agesilaus was completely answered; since his soldiers, when they
-witnessed such evidences of bodily incompetence, thought that
-“the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_266">[p. 266]</a></span>
-enemies against whom they had to contend were not more formidable
-than women.”<a id="FNanchor_492"></a><a href="#Footnote_492"
-class="fnanchor">[492]</a> Such a method of illustrating the
-difference between good and bad physical training, would hardly have
-occurred to any one except a Spartan, brought up under the Lykurgean
-rules.</p>
-
-<p>While Agesilaus thus brought home to the vision of his soldiers
-the inefficiency of untrained bodies, he kept them throughout
-the winter under hard work and drill, as well in the palæstra as
-in arms. A force of cavalry was still wanting. To procure it, he
-enrolled all the richest Greeks in the various Asiatic towns, as
-conscripts to serve on horseback; giving each of them leave to
-exempt himself, however, by providing a competent substitute and
-equipment,—man, horse, and arms.<a id="FNanchor_493"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_493" class="fnanchor">[493]</a> Before the
-commencement of spring, an adequate force of cavalry was thus
-assembled at Ephesus, and put into tolerable exercise. Throughout
-the whole winter, that city became a place of arms, consecrated
-to drilling and gymnastic exercises. On parade as well as in the
-palæstra, Agesilaus himself was foremost in setting the example
-of obedience and hard work. Prizes were given to the diligent and
-improving among hoplites, horsemen, and light troops; while the
-armorers, braziers, leather-cutters, etc.,—all the various
-artisans, whose trade lay in muniments of war, were in the fullest
-employment. “It was a sight full of encouragement (says Xenophon,
-who was doubtless present and took part in it), to see Agesilaus
-and the soldiers leaving the gymnasium, all with wreaths on their
-heads,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_267">[p. 267]</a></span>
-and marching to the temple of Artemis to dedicate their wreaths
-to the goddess.”<a id="FNanchor_494"></a><a href="#Footnote_494"
-class="fnanchor">[494]</a></p>
-
-<p>Before Agesilaus was in condition to begin his military operations
-for the spring, the first year of his command had passed over.
-Thirty fresh counsellors reached Ephesus from Sparta, superseding
-the first thirty under Lysander, who forthwith returned home. The
-army was now not only more numerous, but better trained, and more
-systematically arranged than in the preceding campaign. Agesilaus
-distributed the various divisions under the command of different
-members of the new Thirty; the cavalry being assigned to Xenoklês,
-the Neodamode hoplites to Skythês, the Cyreians to Herippidas, the
-Asiatic contingents to Migdon. He then gave out that he should march
-straight against Sardis. Nevertheless, Tissaphernes, who was in
-that place, construing this proclamation as a feint, and believing
-that the real march would be directed against Karia, disposed his
-cavalry in the plain of the Mæander as he had done in the preceding
-campaign; while his infantry were sent still farther southward within
-the Karian frontier. On this occasion, however, Agesilaus marched
-as he had announced, in the direction of Sardis. For three days he
-plundered the country without seeing an enemy; nor was it until the
-fourth day that the cavalry of Tissaphernes could be summoned back to
-oppose him; the infantry being even yet at a distance. On reaching
-the banks of the river Paktôlus, this Persian cavalry found the Greek
-light troops dispersed for the purpose of plunder, attacked them
-by surprise, and drove them in with considerable loss. Presently,
-however, Agesilaus came up, and ordered his cavalry to charge,
-anxious to bring on a battle before the Persian infantry could arrive
-in the field. In efficiency, it appears, the Persian cavalry was a
-full match for his cavalry, and in number apparently superior. But
-when he brought up his infantry, and caused his peltasts and younger
-hoplites to join the cavalry in a vigorous attack,—victory
-soon declared on his side. The Persians were put to flight and
-many of them drowned in the Paktôlus. Their camp, too, was taken,
-with a valuable booty; including several camels, which Agesilaus
-afterwards took with him into Greece. This success ensured to him
-the unopposed mastery of all the ter<span class="pagenum"><a
-id="Page_268">[p. 268]</a></span>ritory around Sardis. He carried his
-ravages to the very gates of that city, plundering the gardens and
-ornamented ground, proclaiming liberty to those within, and defying
-Tissaphernes to come out and fight.<a id="FNanchor_495"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_495" class="fnanchor">[495]</a></p>
-
-<p>The career of that timid and treacherous satrap now approached
-its close. The Persians in or near Sardis loudly complained of him
-as leaving them undefended, from cowardice and anxiety for his own
-residence in Karia; while the court of Susa was now aware that
-the powerful reinforcement which had been sent to him last year,
-intended to drive Agesilaus out of Asia, had been made to achieve
-absolutely nothing. To these grounds of just dissatisfaction was
-added a court intrigue; to which, and to the agency of a person
-yet more worthless and cruel than himself, Tissaphernes fell a
-victim. The queen mother, Parysatis, had never forgiven him for
-having been one of the principal agents in the defeat and death
-of her son Cyrus. Her influence being now reëstablished over the
-mind of Artaxerxes, she took advantage of the existing discredit of
-the satrap to get an order sent down for his deposition and death.
-Tithraustes, the bearer of this order, seized him by stratagem
-at Kolossæ in Phrygia, while he was in the bath, and caused him
-to be beheaded.<a id="FNanchor_496"></a><a href="#Footnote_496"
-class="fnanchor">[496]</a></p>
-
-<p>The mission of Tithraustes to Asia Minor was accompanied by
-increased efforts on the part of Persia for prosecuting the war
-against Sparta with vigor, by sea as well as by land; and also
-for fomenting the anti-Spartan movement which burst out into
-hostilities this year in Greece. At first, however, immediately
-after the death of Tissaphernes, Tithraustes endeavored to open
-negotiations with Agesilaus, who was in military possession of
-the country around Sardis, while that city itself appears to
-have been occupied by Ariæus, probably the same Persian who
-had formerly been<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_269">[p.
-269]</a></span> general under Cyrus, and who had now again revolted
-from Artaxerxes.<a id="FNanchor_497"></a><a href="#Footnote_497"
-class="fnanchor">[497]</a> Tithraustes took credit to the justice
-of the king for having punished the late satrap; out of whose
-perfidy (he affirmed) the war had arisen. He then summoned
-Agesilaus, in the king’s name, to evacuate Asia, leaving the
-Asiatic Greeks to pay their original tribute to Persia, but to
-enjoy complete autonomy, subject to that one condition. Had
-this proposition been accepted and executed, it would have
-secured these Greeks against Persian occupation or governors; a
-much milder fate for them than that to which the Lacedæmonians
-had consented in their conventions with Tissaphernes sixteen
-years before,<a id="FNanchor_498"></a><a href="#Footnote_498"
-class="fnanchor">[498]</a> and analogous to the position in which the
-Chalkidians of Thrace had been placed with regard to Athens, under
-the peace of Nikias;<a id="FNanchor_499"></a><a href="#Footnote_499"
-class="fnanchor">[499]</a> subject to a fixed tribute, yet
-autonomous,—with no other obligation or interference. Agesilaus
-replied that he had no power to entertain such a proposition without
-the authorities at home, whom he accordingly sent to consult. But
-in the interim he was prevailed upon by Tithraustes to conclude an
-armistice for six months, and to move out of his satrapy into that
-of Pharnabazus; receiving a contribution of thirty talents towards
-the temporary maintenance of the army.<a id="FNanchor_500"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_500" class="fnanchor">[500]</a> These satraps
-generally acted more like independent or even hostile princes, than
-coöperating colleagues; one of the many causes of the weakness of the
-Persian empire.</p>
-
-<p>When Agesilaus had reached the neighborhood of Kymê, on his march
-northward to the Hellespontine Phrygia, he received a despatch from
-home, placing the Spartan naval force in the Asiatic seas under
-his command, as well as the land-force, and empowering him to name
-whomsoever he chose as acting admiral.<a id="FNanchor_501"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_501" class="fnanchor">[501]</a> For the first
-time since the battle of Ægospotami, the maritime empire of
-Sparta was beginning to be threatened, and increased efforts on
-her part were becoming requisite. Pharnabazus, going up in person
-to the court of Artaxerxes, had by pressing representations
-obtained a large subsidy for fitting out a fleet in Cyprus and
-Phœnicia, to act under the Athenian admiral Konon against the
-Lacedæmonians.<a id="FNanchor_502"></a><a href="#Footnote_502"
-class="fnanchor">[502]</a> That officer,—with a fleet of
-forty triremes, before<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_270">[p.
-270]</a></span> the equipment of the remainder was yet
-complete,—had advanced along the southern coast of Asia Minor
-to Kaunus, at the south-western corner of the peninsula, on the
-frontier of Karia and Lykia. In this port he was besieged by the
-Lacedæmonian fleet of one hundred and twenty triremes under Pharax.
-But a Persian reinforcement strengthened the fleet of Konon to eighty
-sail, and put the place out of danger; so that Pharax, desisting from
-the siege, retired to Rhodes.</p>
-
-<p>The neighborhood of Konon, however, who was now with his
-fleet of eighty sail near the Chersonesus of Knidus, emboldened
-the Rhodians to revolt from Sparta. It was at Rhodes that the
-general detestation of the Lacedæmonian empire, disgraced in so
-many different cities by the local dekarchies and by the Spartan
-harmosts, first manifested itself. And such was the ardor of the
-Rhodian population, that their revolt took place while the fleet
-of Pharax was (in part at least) actually in the harbor, and they
-drove him out of it.<a id="FNanchor_503"></a><a href="#Footnote_503"
-class="fnanchor">[503]</a> Konon, whose secret encouragements had
-helped to excite this insurrection, presently sailed to Rhodes
-with his fleet, and made the island his main station. It threw
-into his hands an unexpected advantage; for a numerous fleet of
-vessels arrived there shortly afterwards, sent by Nephareus, the
-native king of Egypt (which was in revolt against the Persians),
-with marine stores and grain to the aid of the Lacedæmonians.
-Not having been apprized of the recent revolt, these vessels
-entered the harbor of Rhodes as if it were still a Lacedæmonian
-island; and their cargoes were thus appropriated by Konon and
-the Rhodians.<a id="FNanchor_504"></a><a href="#Footnote_504"
-class="fnanchor">[504]</a></p>
-
-<p>In recounting the various revolts of the dependencies of Athens
-which took place during the Peloponnesian war, I had occasion to
-point out more than once that all of them took place not merely in
-the absence of any Athenian force, but even at the instigation<span
-class="pagenum"><a id="Page_271">[p. 271]</a></span> (in most
-cases) of a present hostile force,—by the contrivance of
-a local party,—and without privity or previous consent of
-the bulk of the citizens. The present revolt of Rhodes, forming
-a remarkable contrast on all these points, occasioned the utmost
-surprise and indignation among the Lacedæmonians. They saw themselves
-about to enter upon a renewed maritime war, without that aid which
-they had reckoned on receiving from Egypt, and with aggravated
-uncertainty in respect to their dependencies and tribute. It was
-under this prospective anxiety that they took the step of nominating
-Agesilaus to the command of the fleet as well as of the army, in
-order to ensure unity of operations;<a id="FNanchor_505"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_505" class="fnanchor">[505]</a> though a
-distinction of functions, which they had hitherto set great
-value upon maintaining, was thus broken down,—and, though
-the two commands had never been united in any king before
-Agesilaus.<a id="FNanchor_506"></a><a href="#Footnote_506"
-class="fnanchor">[506]</a> Pharax, the previous admiral, was
-recalled.<a id="FNanchor_507"></a><a href="#Footnote_507"
-class="fnanchor">[507]</a></p>
-
-<p>But the violent displeasure of the Lacedæmonians against the
-revolted Rhodians was still better attested by another proceeding.
-Among all the great families at Rhodes, none were more distinguished
-than the Diagoridæ. Its members were not only generals and high
-political functionaries in their native island, but had attained
-even Pan-hellenic celebrity by an unparalleled series of victories
-at the Olympic and other great solemnities. Dorieus, a member of
-this family, had gained the victory in the pankration at Olympia
-on three successive solemnities. He had obtained seven prizes in
-the Nemean, and eight in the Isthmian games. He had carried off the
-prize at one Pythian solemnity without a contest,—no one daring
-to stand up against him in the fearful struggle of the pankration.
-As a Rhodian, while Rhodes was a subject ally of Athens during the
-Peloponnesian war, he had been so pronounced in his attachment to
-Sparta as to draw on himself a sentence of banishment; upon which he
-had retired to Thurii, and had been active in hostility to Athens
-after the Syracusan<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_272">[p.
-272]</a></span> catastrophe. Serving against her in ships fitted out
-at his own cost, he had been captured in 407 <small>B.C.</small> by
-the Athenians, and brought in as prisoner to Athens. By the received
-practice of war in that day, his life was forfeited; and over and
-above such practice, the name of Dorieus was peculiarly odious to the
-Athenians. But when they saw before the public assembly a captive
-enemy, of heroic lineage, as well as of unrivalled athletic majesty
-and renown, their previous hatred was so overpowered by sympathy and
-admiration, that they liberated him by public vote, and dismissed
-him unconditionally.<a id="FNanchor_508"></a><a href="#Footnote_508"
-class="fnanchor">[508]</a></p>
-
-<p>This interesting anecdote, which has already been related in
-my eighth volume,<a id="FNanchor_509"></a><a href="#Footnote_509"
-class="fnanchor">[509]</a> is here again noticed as a contrast
-to the treatment which the same Dorieus now underwent from the
-Lacedæmonians. What he had been doing since, we do not know; but
-at the time when Rhodes now revolted from Sparta, he was not only
-absent from the island, but actually in or near Peloponnesus.
-Such, however, was the wrath of the Lacedæmonians against Rhodians
-generally, that Dorieus was seized by their order, brought to
-Sparta, and there condemned and executed.<a id="FNanchor_510"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_510" class="fnanchor">[510]</a> It seems hardly
-possible that he can have had any personal concern in the revolt.
-Had such been the fact, he would have been in the island,—or
-would at least have taken care not to be within the reach of the
-Lacedæmonians when the revolt happened. Perhaps, however, other
-members of the Diagoridæ, his family, once so much attached to
-Sparta, may have taken part in it; for we know, by the example of
-the Thirty at Athens, that the Lysandrian dekarchies and Spartan
-harmosts made themselves quite as formidable to oligarchical as
-to democratical politicians, and it is very conceivable that the
-Diagoridæ may have become less philo-Laconian in their politics.</p>
-
-<p>This extreme difference in the treatment of the same man by
-Athens and by Sparta raises instructive reflections. It exhibits
-the difference both between Athenian and Spartan sentiment, and
-between the sentiment of a multitude and that of a few. The<span
-class="pagenum"><a id="Page_273">[p. 273]</a></span> grand and
-sacred personality of the Hieronike Dorieus, when exhibited to the
-senses of the Athenian multitude,—the spectacle of a man in
-chains before them, who had been proclaimed victor and crowned on
-so many solemn occasions before the largest assemblages of Greeks
-ever brought together,—produced an overwhelming effect upon
-their emotions; sufficient not only to efface a strong preëstablished
-antipathy founded on active past hostility, but to countervail a
-just cause of revenge, speaking in the language of that day. But the
-same appearance produced no effect at all on the Spartan ephors and
-senate; not sufficient even to hinder them from putting Dorieus to
-death, though he had given them no cause for antipathy or revenge,
-simply as a sort of retribution for the revolt of the island. Now
-this difference depended partly upon the difference between the
-sentiment of Athenians and Spartans, but partly also upon the
-difference between the sentiment of a multitude and that of a few.
-Had Dorieus been brought before a select judicial tribunal at Athens,
-instead of before the Athenian public assembly,—or, had the
-case been discussed before the assembly in his absence,—he
-would have been probably condemned, conformably to usage, under the
-circumstances; but the vehement emotion worked by his presence upon
-the multitudinous spectators of the assembly, rendered such a course
-intolerable to them. It has been common with historians of Athens
-to dwell upon the passions of the public assembly as if it were
-susceptible of excitement only in an angry or vindictive direction;
-whereas, the truth is, and the example before us illustrates, that
-they were open-minded in one direction as well as in another,
-and that the present emotion, whatever it might be, merciful or
-sympathetic as well as resentful, was intensified by the mere fact of
-multitude. And thus, where the established rule of procedure happened
-to be cruel, there was some chance of moving an Athenian assembly to
-mitigate it in a particular case, though the Spartan ephors or senate
-would be inexorable in carrying it out,—if, indeed, they did
-not, as seems probable in the case of Dorieus, actually go beyond it
-in rigor.</p>
-
-<p>While Konon and the Rhodians were thus raising hostilities
-against Sparta by sea, Agesilaus, on receiving at Kymê the news
-of his nomination to the double command, immediately despatched
-orders to the dependent maritime cities and islands, requiring
-the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_274">[p. 274]</a></span>
-construction and equipment of new triremes. Such was the influence
-of Sparta, and so much did the local governments rest upon its
-continuance, that these requisitions were zealously obeyed.
-Many leading men incurred considerable expense, from desire to
-acquire his favor; so that a fleet of one hundred and twenty new
-triremes was ready by the ensuing year. Agesilaus, naming his
-brother-in-law, Peisander, to act as admiral, sent him to superintend
-the preparations; a brave young man, but destitute both of skill
-and experience.<a id="FNanchor_511"></a><a href="#Footnote_511"
-class="fnanchor">[511]</a></p>
-
-<p>Meanwhile, he himself pursued his march (about the beginning of
-autumn) towards the satrapy of Pharnabazus,—Phrygia south
-and south-east of the Propontis. Under the active guidance of his
-new auxiliary, Spithridates, he plundered the country, capturing
-some towns, and reducing others to capitulate; with considerable
-advantage to his soldiers. Pharnabazus, having no sufficient army
-to hazard a battle in defence of his satrapy, concentrated all his
-force near his own residence at Daskylium, offering no opposition
-to the march of Agesilaus; who was induced by Spithridates to
-traverse Phrygia and enter Paphlagonia, in hopes of concluding an
-alliance with the Paphlagonian prince Otys. That prince, in nominal
-dependence on Persia, could muster the best cavalry in the Persian
-empire. But he had recently refused to obey an invitation from
-the court at Susa, and he now not only welcomed the appearance
-of Agesilaus, but concluded an alliance with him, strengthening
-him with an auxiliary body of cavalry and peltasts. Anxious to
-requite Spithridates for his services, and vehemently attached to
-his son, the beautiful youth Megabates,—Agesilaus persuaded
-Otys to marry the daughter of Spithridates. He even caused her to
-be conveyed by sea in a Lacedæmonian trireme,—probably from
-Abydos to Sinôpê.<a id="FNanchor_512"></a><a href="#Footnote_512"
-class="fnanchor">[512]</a></p> <p><span class="pagenum"><a
-id="Page_275">[p. 275]</a></span></p> <p>Reinforced by the
-Paphlagonian auxiliaries, Agesilaus prosecuted the war with augmented
-vigor against the satrapy of Pharnabazus. He now approached the
-neighborhood of Daskylium, the residence of the satrap himself,
-inherited from his father Pharnakês, who had been satrap before
-him. This was a well-supplied country, full of rich villages,
-embellished with parks and gardens for the satrap’s hunting and
-gratification: the sporting tastes of Xenophon lead him also to
-remark that there were plenty of birds for the fowler, with rivers
-full of fish.<a id="FNanchor_513"></a><a href="#Footnote_513"
-class="fnanchor">[513]</a> In this agreeable region Agesilaus passed
-the winter. His soldiers, abundantly supplied with provisions, became
-so careless, and straggled with so much contempt of their enemy, that
-Pharnabazus, with a body of four hundred cavalry and two scythed
-chariots, found an opportunity of attacking seven hundred of them by
-surprise; driving them back with considerable loss, until Agesilaus
-came up to protect them with the hoplites.</p>
-
-<p>This partial misfortune, however, was speedily avenged. Fearful of
-being surrounded and captured, Pharnabazus refrained from occupying
-any fixed position. He hovered about the country, carrying his
-valuable property along with him, and keeping his place of encampment
-as secret as he could. The watchful Spithridates, nevertheless,
-having obtained information that he was encamped for the night in
-the village of Kanê, about eighteen miles distant, Herippidas (one
-of the thirty Spartans) undertook a night-march with a detachment
-to surprise him. Two thousand Grecian hoplites, the like number
-of light-armed peltasts, and Spithridates with the Paphlagonian
-horse, were appointed to accompany him. Though many of these
-soldiers took advantage of the darkness to evade attendance, the
-enterprise proved completely successful. The camp of Pharnabazus
-was surprised at break of day; his Mysian advanced guards were put
-to the sword, and he himself, with all his troops, was compelled to
-take flight with scarcely any resistance. All his stores, plate,
-and personal furniture, together with a large baggage-train and
-abundance of prisoners, fell into the hands<span class="pagenum"><a
-id="Page_276">[p. 276]</a></span> of the victors. As the
-Paphlagonians under Spithridates formed the cavalry of the victorious
-detachment, they naturally took more spoil and more prisoners than
-the infantry. They were proceeding to carry off their acquisitions,
-when Herippidas interfered and took everything away from them;
-placing the entire spoil of every description, under the charge of
-Grecian officers, to be sold by formal auction in a Grecian city;
-after which the proceeds were to be distributed or applied by public
-authority. The orders of Herippidas were conformable to the regular
-and systematic proceeding of Grecian officers; but Spithridates and
-the Paphlagonians were probably justified by Asiatic practice in
-appropriating that which they had themselves captured. Moreover,
-the order, disagreeable in itself, was enforced against them with
-Lacedæmonian harshness of manner,<a id="FNanchor_514"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_514" class="fnanchor">[514]</a> unaccompanied by
-any guarantee that they would be allowed, even at last, a fair
-share of the proceeds. Resenting the conduct of Herippidas as
-combining injury with insult, they deserted in the night and fled
-to Sardis, where the Persian Ariæus was in actual revolt against
-the court of Susa. This was a serious loss, and still more serious
-chagrin, to Agesilaus. He was not only deprived of valuable
-auxiliary cavalry, and of an enterprizing Asiatic informant; but
-the report would be spread that he defrauded his Asiatic allies of
-their legitimate plunder, and others would thus be deterred from
-joining him. His personal sorrow too was aggravated by the departure
-of the youth Megabazus, who accompanied his father Spithridates
-to Sardis.<a id="FNanchor_515"></a><a href="#Footnote_515"
-class="fnanchor">[515]</a></p>
-
-<p>It was towards the close of this winter that a personal conference
-took place between Agesilaus and Pharnabazus, managed by the
-intervention of a Greek of Kyzikus named Apollophanês; who was
-connected by ties of hospitality with both, and served to each as
-guarantee for the good faith of the other. We have from Xenophon,
-himself probably present, an interesting detail of this interview.
-Agesilaus, accompanied by his thirty Spartan counsellors,<span
-class="pagenum"><a id="Page_277">[p. 277]</a></span> being the first
-to arrive at the place of appointment, all of them sat down upon the
-grass to wait. Presently came Pharnabazus, with splendid clothing
-and retinue. His attendants were beginning to spread fine carpets
-for him, when the satrap, observing how the Spartans were seated,
-felt ashamed of such a luxury for himself, and sat down on the grass
-by the side of Agesilaus. Having exchanged salutes, they next shook
-hands; after which Pharnabazus, who as the older of the two had been
-the first to tender his right hand, was also the first to open the
-conversation. Whether he spoke Greek well enough to dispense with the
-necessity of an interpreter, we are not informed. “Agesilaus (said
-he), I was the friend and ally of you Lacedæmonians while you were
-at war with Athens; I furnished you with money to strengthen your
-fleet, and fought with you myself ashore on horseback, chasing your
-enemies into the sea. You cannot charge me with having ever played
-you false, like Tissaphernes, either by word or deed. Yet, after this
-behavior, I am now reduced by you to such a condition, that I have
-not a dinner in my own territory, except by picking up your leavings,
-like the beasts of the field. I see the fine residences, parks, and
-hunting-grounds, bequeathed to me by my father, which formed the
-charm of my life, cut up or burnt down by you. Is this the conduct
-of men mindful of favors received, and eager to requite them? Pray
-answer me this question; for, perhaps, I have yet to learn what is
-holy and just.”</p>
-
-<p>The thirty Spartan counsellors were covered with shame by this
-emphatic appeal. They all held their peace; while Agesilaus, after
-a long pause, at length replied,—“You are aware, Pharnabazus,
-that in Grecian cities, individuals become private friends and guests
-of each other. Such guests, if the cities to which they belong go to
-war, fight with each other, and sometimes by accident even kill each
-other, each in behalf of his respective city. So then it is that we,
-being at war with your king, are compelled to hold all his dominions
-as enemy’s land. But in regard to you, we would pay any price to
-become your friends. I do not invite you to accept us as masters, in
-place of your present master; I ask you to become our ally, and to
-enjoy your own property as a freeman—bowing before no man and
-acknowledging no master. Now freedom is in itself a possession of the
-highest value. But this is not all. We do not call upon you to be a
-freeman, and yet poor.<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_278">[p.
-278]</a></span> We offer you our alliance, to acquire fresh
-territory, not for the king, but for yourself; by reducing those
-who are now your fellow-slaves to become your subjects. Now tell
-me,—if you thus continue a freeman and become rich, what can
-you want farther to make you a thoroughly prosperous man?”</p>
-
-<p>“I will speak frankly to you in reply (said Pharnabazus). If the
-king shall send any other general, and put me under him, I shall
-willingly become your friend and ally. But if he imposes the duty
-of command on me, so strong is the point of honor, that I shall
-continue to make war upon you to the best of my power. Expect
-nothing else.”<a id="FNanchor_516"></a><a href="#Footnote_516"
-class="fnanchor">[516]</a></p>
-
-<p>Agesilaus, struck with this answer, took his hand and
-said,—“Would that with such high-minded sentiments you
-<i>could</i> become our friend! At any rate, let me assure you of
-this,—that I will immediately quit your territory; and for the
-future, even should the war continue, I will respect both you and
-all your property, as long as I can turn my arms against any other
-Persians.”</p>
-
-<p>Here the conversation closed; Pharnabazus mounted his horse,
-and rode away. His son by Parapita, however,—at that time
-still a handsome youth,—lingered behind, ran up to Agesilaus,
-and exclaimed,—“Agesilaus, I make you my guest.”—“I
-accept it with all my heart,”—was the answer. “Remember me
-by this,”—rejoined the young Persian,—putting into
-the hands of Agesilaus the fine javelin which he carried. The
-latter immediately took off the ornamental trappings from the
-horse of his secretary Idæus, and gave them as a return present;
-upon which the young man rode away with them, and rejoined
-his father.<a id="FNanchor_517"></a><a href="#Footnote_517"
-class="fnanchor">[517]</a></p>
-
-<p>There is a touching interest and emphasis in this interview as
-described by Xenophon, who here breathes into his tame Hellenic
-chronicle something of the romantic spirit of the Cyropædia. The
-pledges exchanged between Agesilaus and the son of Pharnabazus were
-not forgotten by either. The latter,—being in after days
-impoverished and driven into exile by his brother, during the<span
-class="pagenum"><a id="Page_279">[p. 279]</a></span> absence of
-Pharnabazus in Egypt,—was compelled to take refuge in Greece;
-where Agesilaus provided him with protection and a home, and even
-went so far as to employ influence in favor of an Athenian youth, to
-whom the son of Pharnabazus was attached. This Athenian youth had
-outgrown the age and size of the boy-runners in the Olympic stadium;
-nevertheless Agesilaus, by strenuous personal interference, overruled
-the reluctance of the Eleian judges, and prevailed upon them to admit
-him as a competitor with the other boys.<a id="FNanchor_518"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_518" class="fnanchor">[518]</a> The stress laid by
-Xenophon upon this favor illustrates the tone of Grecian sentiment,
-and shows us the variety of objects which personal ascendency was
-used to compass. Disinterested in regard to himself, Agesilaus was
-unscrupulous both in promoting the encroachments, and screening
-the injustices, of his friends.<a id="FNanchor_519"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_519" class="fnanchor">[519]</a> The unfair privilege
-which he procured for this youth, though a small thing in itself,
-could hardly fail to offend a crowd of spectators familiar with the
-established conditions of the stadium, and to expose the judges to
-severe censure.</p>
-
-<p>Quitting the satrapy of Pharnabazus,—which was now pretty
-well exhausted, while the armistice concluded with Tithraustes must
-have expired,—Agesilaus took up his camp near the temple of
-Artemis, at Astyra in the plain of Thêbê (in the region commonly
-known as Æolis), near the Gulf of Elæus. He here employed himself
-in bringing together an increased number of troops, with a view to
-penetrate farther into the interior of Asia Minor during the summer.
-Recent events had greatly increased the belief entertained by the
-Asiatics in his superior strength; so that he received propositions
-from various districts in the interior, inviting his presence, and
-expressing anxiety to throw off the Persian yoke. He sought also
-to compose the dissensions and misrule which had arisen out of the
-Lysandrian dekarchies in the Greco-Asiatic cities, avoiding as much
-as possible sharp inflictions of death or exile. How much he achieved
-in this direction, we cannot tell,<a id="FNanchor_520"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_520" class="fnanchor">[520]</a> nor can it have
-been possible, indeed, to achieve<span class="pagenum"><a
-id="Page_280">[p. 280]</a></span> much, without dismissing the
-Spartan harmosts and lessening the political power of his own
-partisans; neither of which he did.</p>
-
-<p>His plans were now all laid for penetrating farther than ever into
-the interior, and for permanent conquest, if possible, of the western
-portion of Persian Asia. What he would have permanently accomplished
-towards this scheme, cannot be determined; for his aggressive march
-was suspended by a summons home, the reason of which will appear in
-the next chapter.</p>
-
-<p>Meanwhile, Pharnabazus had been called from his satrapy to go and
-take the command of the Persian fleet in Kilikia and the south of
-Asia Minor, in conjunction with Konon. Since the revolt of Rhodes
-from the Lacedæmonians, (in the summer of the preceding year, 395
-<small>B.C.</small>) that active Athenian had achieved nothing.
-The burst of activity, produced by the first visit of Pharnabazus
-at the Persian court, had been paralyzed by the jealousies of the
-Persian commanders, reluctant to serve under a Greek,—by
-peculation of officers who embezzled the pay destined for the
-troops,—by mutiny in the fleet from absence of pay,—and
-by the many delays arising while the satraps, unwilling to spend
-their own revenues in the war, waited for orders and remittances
-from court.<a id="FNanchor_521"></a><a href="#Footnote_521"
-class="fnanchor">[521]</a> Hence Konon had been unable to make
-any efficient use of his fleet, during those months when the
-Lacedæmonian fleet was increased to nearly double its former number.
-At length he resolved,—seemingly at the instigation of his
-countrymen at home<a id="FNanchor_522"></a><a href="#Footnote_522"
-class="fnanchor">[522]</a> as well as of Euagoras prince of Salamis
-in Cyprus, and through the encouragement of Ktesias, one of the
-Grecian physicians resident at the Persian court,—on going
-himself into the interior to communicate personally with Artaxerxes.
-Landing on the Kilikian coast, he crossed by land to Thapsakus on the
-Eu<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_281">[p. 281]</a></span>phrates
-(as the Cyreian army had marched), from whence he sailed down
-the river in a boat to Babylon. It appears that he did not see
-Artaxerxes, from repugnance to that ceremony of prostration which was
-required from all who approached the royal person. But his messages,
-transmitted through Ktesias and others,—with his confident
-engagement to put down the maritime empire of Sparta and counteract
-the projects of Agesilaus, if the Persian forces and money were
-put into efficient action,—produced a powerful effect on the
-mind of the monarch; who doubtless was not merely alarmed at the
-formidable position of Agesilaus in Asia Minor, but also hated the
-Lacedæmonians as main agents in the aggressive enterprise of Cyrus.
-Artaxerxes not only approved his views, but made to him a large grant
-of money, and transmitted peremptory orders to the coast that his
-officers should be active in prosecuting the maritime war.</p>
-
-<p>What was of still greater moment, Konon was permitted to
-name any person whom he chose, as admiral jointly with himself.
-It was by his choice that Pharnabazus was called from his
-satrapy, and ordered to act jointly as commander of the fleet.
-This satrap, the bravest and most straightforward among all
-the Persian grandees, and just now smarting with resentment
-at the devastation of his satrapy<a id="FNanchor_523"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_523" class="fnanchor">[523]</a> by Agesilaus,
-coöperated heartily with Konon. A powerful fleet, partly Phœnician,
-partly Athenian or Grecian, was soon equipped, superior in
-number even to the newly-organized Lacedæmonian fleet under
-Peisander.<a id="FNanchor_524"></a><a href="#Footnote_524"
-class="fnanchor">[524]</a> Euagoras, prince of Sa<span
-class="pagenum"><a id="Page_282">[p. 282]</a></span>lamis
-in Cyprus,<a id="FNanchor_525"></a><a href="#Footnote_525"
-class="fnanchor">[525]</a> not only provided many triremes, but
-served himself, personally, on board.</p>
-
-<p>It was about the month of July, 394 <small>B.C.</small>,
-that Pharnabazus and Konon brought their united fleet to the
-south-western corner of Asia Minor; first, probably, to the friendly
-island of Rhodes, next, off Loryma<a id="FNanchor_526"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_526" class="fnanchor">[526]</a> and the mountain
-called Dorion on the peninsula of Knidus.<a id="FNanchor_527"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_527" class="fnanchor">[527]</a> Peisander, with
-the fleet of Sparta and her allies, sailed out from Knidus to meet
-them, and both parties prepared for a battle. The numbers of the
-Lacedæmonians are reported by Diodorus at eighty-five triremes;
-those of Konon and Pharnabazus at above ninety. But Xenophon,
-without particularizing the number on either side, seems to
-intimate the disparity as far greater; stating that the entire
-fleet of Peisander was considerably inferior even to the Grecian
-division under Konon, without reckoning the Phœnician ships under
-Pharnabazus.<a id="FNanchor_528"></a><a href="#Footnote_528"
-class="fnanchor">[528]</a> In spite of such inferiority, Peisander
-did not shrink from the encounter. Though a young man without
-military skill, he possessed a full measure of Spartan courage
-and pride; moreover,—since the Spartan maritime empire was
-only maintained by the assumed superior<span class="pagenum"><a
-id="Page_283">[p. 283]</a></span>ity of his fleet,—had he
-confessed himself too weak to fight, his enemies would have gone
-unopposed around the islands to excite revolt. Accordingly, he
-sailed forth from the harbor of Knidus. But when the two fleets
-were ranged opposite to each other, and the battle was about to
-commence,—so manifest and alarming was the superiority of the
-Athenians and Persians, that his Asiatic allies on the left division,
-noway hearty in the cause, fled almost without striking a blow. Under
-such discouraging circumstances, he nevertheless led his fleet into
-action with the greatest valor. But his trireme was overwhelmed by
-numbers, broken in various places by the beaks of the enemy’s ships,
-and forced back upon the land, together with a large portion of his
-fleet. Many of the crews jumped out and got to land, abandoning their
-triremes to the conquerors. Peisander, too, might have escaped in
-the same way; but disdaining either to survive his defeat or to quit
-his ship, fell gallantly fighting aboard. The victory of Konon and
-Pharnabazus was complete. More than half of the Spartan ships were
-either captured or destroyed, though the neighborhood of the land
-enabled a large proportion of the crews to escape to Knidus, so that
-no great number of prisoners were taken.<a id="FNanchor_529"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_529" class="fnanchor">[529]</a> Among the allies
-of Sparta, the chief loss of course fell upon those who were most
-attached to her cause; the disaffected or lukewarm were those who
-escaped by flight at the beginning.</p>
-
-<p>Such was the memorable triumph of Konon at Knidus; the reversal
-of that of Lysander at Ægospotami eleven years before. Its important
-effects will be recounted in the coming chapter.</p>
-
-<hr class="chap" />
-
-
-<div class="chapter" id="Chap_74">
-  <p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_284">[p. 284]</a></span></p>
-  <h2 class="nobreak">CHAPTER LXXIV.<br />
-  FROM THE BATTLE OF KNIDUS TO THE REBUILDING OF THE LONG WALLS OF ATHENS.</h2>
-</div>
-
-<p class="noindent"><span class="smcap">Having</span> in my last
-chapter carried the series of Asiatic events down to the battle of
-Knidus, in the beginning of August, <small>B.C.</small> 394, at
-which period war was already raging on the other side of the Ægean,
-in Greece Proper,—I now take up the thread of events from a period
-somewhat earlier, to show how this last-mentioned war, commonly
-called the Corinthian war, began.</p>
-
-<p>At the accession of Agesilaus to the throne, in 398
-<small>B.C.</small>, the power of Sparta throughout all Greece from
-Laconia to Thessaly, was greater than it had ever been, and greater
-than any Grecian state had ever enjoyed before. The burden of the
-long war against Athens she had borne in far less proportion than
-her allies; its fruits she had reaped exclusively for herself. There
-prevailed consequently among her allies a general discontent, which
-Thebes as well as Corinth manifested by refusing to take part in
-the recent expeditions; either of Pausanias against Thrasybulus and
-the Athenian exiles in Peiræus,—or of Agis against the Eleians,—or
-of Agesilaus against the Persians in Asia Minor. The Eleians were
-completely humbled by the invasions of Agis; all the other cities
-in Peloponnesus, from apprehension, from ancient habit, and from
-being governed by oligarchies who leaned on Sparta for support,
-were obedient to her authority,—with the single exception of Argos,
-which remained, as before, neutral and quiet, though in sentiment
-unfriendly. Athens was a simple unit in the catalogue of Spartan
-allies, furnishing her contingent, like the rest, to be commanded by
-the xenâgus,—or officer sent from Sparta for the special purpose of
-commanding such foreign contingents.</p>
-
-<p>In the northern regions of Greece, the advance of Spartan power is
-yet more remarkable. Looking back to the year 419 <small>B.C.</small>
-(about two years after the peace of Nikias), Sparta had been so
-unable to protect her colony of Herakleia, in Trachis on the Maliac
-Gulf, near the strait of Thermopylæ, that the Bœotians were<span
-class="pagenum"><a id="Page_285">[p. 285]</a></span> obliged to
-send a garrison thither, in order to prevent it from falling into
-the hands of Athens. They even went so far as to dismiss the
-Lacedæmonian harmost.<a id="FNanchor_530"></a><a href="#Footnote_530"
-class="fnanchor">[530]</a> In the winter of 409-408
-<small>B.C.</small>, another disaster had happened at Herakleia, in
-which the Lacedæmonian harmost was slain.<a id="FNanchor_531"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_531" class="fnanchor">[531]</a> But about 399
-<small>B.C.</small>, we find Sparta exercising an energetic
-ascendency at Herakleia, and even making that place a central
-post for keeping down the people in the neighborhood of Mount
-Œta and a portion of Thessaly. Herippidas, the Lacedæmonian, was
-sent thither to repress some factious movements, with a force
-sufficient to enable him to overawe the public assembly, to seize
-the obnoxious party in the place, and to put them to death, five
-hundred in number, outside of the gates.<a id="FNanchor_532"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_532" class="fnanchor">[532]</a> Carrying his arms
-farther against the Œtæans and Trachinians in the neighborhood, who
-had been long at variance with the Laconian colonists at Herakleia,
-he expelled them from their abodes, and forced them to migrate with
-their wives and children into Thessaly.<a id="FNanchor_533"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_533" class="fnanchor">[533]</a> Hence, the
-Lacedæmonians were enabled to extend their influence into parts
-of Thessaly, and to place a harmost with a garrison in Pharsalus,
-resting upon Herakleia as a basis,—which thus became a position
-of extraordinary importance for their dominion over the northern
-regions.</p>
-
-<p>With the real power of Sparta thus greatly augmented on land,
-in addition to her vast empire at sea, bringing its ample influx
-of tribute,—and among cities who had not merely long recognized
-her as leader, but had never recognized any one else,—it required
-an unusual stimulus to raise any formidable hostile combination
-against her, notwithstanding a large spread of disaffection and
-antipathy. The stimulus came from Persia, from whose treasures the
-means had been before furnished to Sparta herself for subduing
-Athens. The news that a formidable navy was fitting out in Phœnicia,
-which had prompted the expedition of Agesilaus in the spring of
-396 <small>B.C.</small>, was doubtless circulated and heard with
-satisfaction among the Grecian cities unfriendly to Sparta; and
-the refusal of Thebes, Corinth, and Athens, to take service under
-that<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_286">[p. 286]</a></span>
-prince,—aggravated in the case of the Thebans by a positive offence
-given to him on the occasion of his sacrifice at Aulis,—was enough to
-warn Sparta of the dangerous sentiments and tendencies by which she
-was surrounded near home.</p>
-
-<p>It was upon these tendencies that the positive instigation
-and promises of Persia were brought to bear, in the course of
-the following year; and not merely promises, but pecuniary
-supplies, with news of revived naval warfare threatening the
-insular dominion of Sparta. Tithraustes, the new satrap, who had
-put to death and succeeded Tissaphernes, had no sooner concluded
-the armistice mentioned above, and prevailed upon Agesilaus to
-remove his army into the satrapy of Pharnabazus, than he employed
-active measures for kindling war against Sparta in Greece, in
-order to create a necessity for the recall of Agesilaus out of
-Asia. He sent a Rhodian named Timokrates into Greece, as envoy to
-the cities most unfriendly to the Lacedæmonians, with a sum of
-fifty talents;<a id="FNanchor_534"></a><a href="#Footnote_534"
-class="fnanchor">[534]</a> directing him to employ this money in
-gaining over the leading men in these cities, and to exchange
-solemn oaths of alliance and aid with Persia, for common hostility
-against Sparta. The island of Rhodes having just revolted from the
-Spartan dominion, had admitted Konon with the Persian fleet (as I
-have mentioned in the last chapter), so that probably the Rhodian
-envoy was on a mission to Tithraustes on behalf of his countrymen.
-He was an appropriate envoy on this occasion, as having an animated
-interest in raising up new enemies to Sparta, and as being hearty
-in stirring up among the Thebans and Corinthians the same spirit
-which had led to the revolt of Rhodes. The effect which that revolt
-produced in alarming and exasperating the Spartans, has been<span
-class="pagenum"><a id="Page_287">[p. 287]</a></span> already noticed;
-and we may fairly presume that its effect on the other side, in
-encouraging their Grecian enemies, was considerable. Timokrates
-visited Thebes, Corinth, and Argos, distributing his funds. He
-concluded engagements on behalf of the satrap, with various leading
-men in each, putting them into communication with each other;
-Ismenias, Androkleidas, and others in Thebes,—Timolaus and Polyanthes
-at Corinth,—Kylon and others at Argos. It appears that he did not
-visit Athens; at least, Xenophon expressly says that none of his
-money went there. The working of this mission,—coupled, we must
-recollect, with the renewed naval warfare on the coast of Asia, and
-the promise of a Persian fleet against that of Sparta,—was soon felt
-in the more pronounced manifestation of anti-Laconian sentiments
-in these various cities, and in the commencement of attempts
-to establish alliance between them.<a id="FNanchor_535"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_535" class="fnanchor">[535]</a></p>
-
-<p>With that Laconian bias which pervades his Hellenica, Xenophon
-represents the coming war against Sparta, as if it had been brought
-about mainly by these bribes from Persia to the leading men in
-these various cities. I have stated on more than one occasion, that
-the average public morality of Grecian individual politicians in
-Sparta, Athens, and other cities, was not such as to exclude personal
-corruption; that it required a morality higher than the average, when
-such temptation was resisted,—and a morality considerably higher
-than the average, if it were systematically resisted, and for a long
-life, as by Perikles and Nikias. There would be nothing therefore
-surprising, if Ismenias and the rest had received bribes under the
-circumstances here mentioned. But it appears highly improbable that
-the money given by Timokrates could have been a bribe; that is,
-given privately, and for the separate use of these leaders. It was
-furnished for the promotion of a certain public object, which could
-not be accomplished without heavy disbursements; it was analogous
-to that sum of thirty talents which (as Xenophon himself tells us)
-Tithraustes had just given to Agesilaus, as an inducement to carry
-away his army into the satrapy of Pharnabazus (not as a present
-for the private purse of the Spartan king, but as a contribution
-to the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_288">[p. 288]</a></span>
-wants of the army),<a id="FNanchor_536"></a><a href="#Footnote_536"
-class="fnanchor">[536]</a> or to that which the satrap Tiribazus
-gave to Antalkidas afterwards,<a id="FNanchor_537"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_537" class="fnanchor">[537]</a> also for
-public objects. Xenophon affirms, that Ismenias and the rest,
-having received these presents from Timokrates, accused the
-Lacedæmonians and rendered them odious,—each in his respective
-city.<a id="FNanchor_538"></a><a href="#Footnote_538"
-class="fnanchor">[538]</a> But it is certain, from his own showing,
-that the hatred towards them existed in these cities, before the
-arrival of Timokrates. In Argos, such hatred was of old standing;
-in Corinth and Thebes, though kindled only since the close of
-the war, it was not the less pronounced. Moreover, Xenophon
-himself informs us, that the Athenians, though they received none
-of the money,<a id="FNanchor_539"></a><a href="#Footnote_539"
-class="fnanchor">[539]</a> were quite as ready for war as the other
-cities. If we therefore admit his statement as a matter of fact, that
-Timokrates gave private presents to various leading politicians,
-which is by no means improbable,—we must dissent from the explanatory
-use which he makes of this fact by setting it out prominently as the
-cause of the war. What these leading men would find it difficult
-to raise was, not hatred to Sparta, but confidence and courage to
-brave the power of Sparta. And for this purpose the mission of
-Timokrates would be a valuable aid, by conveying assurances of
-Persian coöperation and support against Sparta. He must have been
-produced publicly either before the people, the senate, or at least
-the great body of the anti-Laconian party in each city. And the money
-which he brought with him, though a portion of it may have gone in
-private presents, would serve to this party as the best warrant for
-the sincerity of the satrap.</p>
-
-<p>Whatever negotiations may have been in progress between the
-cities visited by Timokrates, no union had been brought about
-between them when the war, kindled by an accident, broke out
-as<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_289">[p. 289]</a></span> a
-“Bœotian war,”<a id="FNanchor_540"></a><a href="#Footnote_540"
-class="fnanchor">[540]</a> between Thebes and Sparta separately.
-Between the Opuntian Lokrians and the Phokians, north of Bœotia,
-there was a strip of disputed border land; respecting which the
-Phokians, imputing wrongful encroachment to the Lokrians, invaded
-their territory. The Lokrians, allied with Thebes, entreated her
-protection; upon which a body of Bœotians invaded Phokis; while
-the Phokians on their side threw themselves upon Lacedæmon,
-invoking her aid against Thebes.<a id="FNanchor_541"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_541" class="fnanchor">[541]</a> “The Lacedæmonians
-(says Xenophon) were delighted to get a pretence for making war
-against the Thebans,—having been long angry with them on several
-different grounds. They thought that the present was an excellent
-time for marching against them, and putting down their insolence;
-since Agesilaus was in full success in Asia, and there was no
-other war to embarrass them in Greece.”<a id="FNanchor_542"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_542" class="fnanchor">[542]</a> The various<span
-class="pagenum"><a id="Page_290">[p. 290]</a></span> grounds on which
-the Lacedæmonians rested their displeasure against Thebes, begin from
-a time immediately succeeding the close of the war against Athens,
-and the sentiment was now both established and vehement. It was
-they who now began the Bœotian war; not the Thebans, nor the bribes
-brought by Timokrates.</p>
-
-<p>The energetic and ambitious Lysander, who had before instigated
-the expedition of Agesilaus across the Ægean, and who had long hated
-the Thebans,—was among the foremost advisers of the expedition now
-decreed by the ephors against Thebes,<a id="FNanchor_543"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_543" class="fnanchor">[543]</a> as well as the
-chief commander appointed to carry it into execution. He was
-despatched with a small force to act on the north of Bœotia. He
-was directed to start from Herakleia, the centre of Lacedæmonian
-influence in those regions,—to muster the Herakleots, together
-with the various dependent populations in the neighborhood of
-Œta, Œtæans, Malians, Ænianes, etc.—to march towards Bœotia,
-taking up the Phokians in his way,—and to attack Haliartus.
-Under the walls of this town king Pausanias engaged to meet
-him on a given day, with the native Lacedæmonian force and
-the Peloponnesian allies. For this purpose, having obtained
-favorable border sacrifices, he marched forth to Tegea, and
-there employed himself in collecting the allied contingents from
-Peloponnesus.<a id="FNanchor_544"></a><a href="#Footnote_544"
-class="fnanchor">[544]</a> But the allies generally were tardy
-and reluctant in the cause; while the Corinthians withheld
-all concurrence and support,<a id="FNanchor_545"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_545" class="fnanchor">[545]</a>—though neither did
-they make any manifestation in favor of Thebes.</p>
-
-<p>Finding themselves thus exposed to a formidable attack on two
-sides, from Sparta at the height of her power, and from a Spartan
-officer of known ability,—being, moreover, at the same time without
-a single ally,—the Thebans resolved to entreat succor from Athens.
-A Theban embassy to Athens for any purpose, and especially for this
-purpose, was itself among the strongest marks of the revolution
-which had taken place in Grecian politics.<span class="pagenum"><a
-id="Page_291">[p. 291]</a></span> The antipathy between the two
-cities had been so long and virulent, that the Thebans, at the
-close of the war, had endeavored to induce Sparta to root out the
-Athenian population. Their conduct subsequently had been favorable
-and sympathizing towards Thrasybulus in his struggle against the
-Thirty, and that leader had testified his gratitude by dedicating
-statues in the Theban Herakleion.<a id="FNanchor_546"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_546" class="fnanchor">[546]</a> But it was by no
-means clear that Athens would feel herself called upon, either by
-policy or by sentiment, to assist them in the present emergency; at a
-moment when she had no Long Walls, no fortifications at Peiræus, no
-ships, nor any protection against the Spartan maritime power.</p>
-
-<p>It was not until Pausanias and Lysander were both actually
-engaged in mustering their forces, that the Thebans sent to
-address the Athenian assembly. The speech of the Theban envoy
-sets forth strikingly the case against Sparta as it then stood.
-Disclaiming all concurrence with that former Theban deputy, who,
-without any instructions, had taken on himself to propose, in the
-Spartan assembly of allies, extreme severity towards the conquered
-Athenians,—he reminded the Athenians that Thebes had by unanimous
-voice declined obeying the summons of the Spartans, to aid in the
-march against Thrasybulus and the Peiræus; and that this was the
-first cause of the anger of the Spartans against her. On that
-ground, then, he appealed to the gratitude of democratical Athens
-against the Lacedæmonians. But he likewise invoked against them,
-with yet greater confidence, the aid of oligarchical Athens,—or of
-those who at that time had stood opposed to Thrasybulus and the
-Peiræus; for it was Sparta who, having first set up the oligarchy
-at Athens, had afterwards refused to sustain it, and left its
-partisans to the generosity of their democratical opponents, by
-whom alone they were saved harmless.<a id="FNanchor_547"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_547" class="fnanchor">[547]</a> Of course Athens
-was eager, if possible (so he presumed), to regain her lost
-empire; and in this enterprise he tendered the cordial aid<span
-class="pagenum"><a id="Page_292">[p. 292]</a></span> of Thebes as
-an ally. He pointed out that it was by no means an impracticable
-enterprise; looking to the universal hatred which Sparta had now
-drawn upon herself, not less on the part of ancient allies than of
-prior enemies. The Athenians knew by experience that Thebes could be
-formidable as a foe; she would now show that she could be yet more
-effective as a friend, if the Athenians would interfere to rescue
-her. Moreover, she was now about to fight, not for Syracusans or
-Asiatics, but for her own preservation and dignity. “We hesitate not
-to affirm, men of Athens (concluded the Theban speaker), that what
-we are now invoking at your hands is a greater benefit to you than
-it is to ourselves.”<a id="FNanchor_548"></a><a href="#Footnote_548"
-class="fnanchor">[548]</a></p>
-
-<p>Eight years had now elapsed since the archonship of Eukleides
-and the renovation of the democracy after the crushing visitation
-of the Thirty. Yet we may see, from the important and well-turned
-allusion of the Theban speaker to the oligarchical portion of the
-assembly, that the two parties still stood in a certain measure
-distinguished. Enfeebled as Athens had been left by the war, she
-had never since been called upon to take any decisive and emphatic
-vote on a question of foreign policy; and much now turned upon the
-temper of the oligarchical minority, which might well be conceived
-likely to play a party game and speculate upon Spartan countenance.
-But the comprehensive amnesty decreed on the reëstablishment of the
-democratical constitution,—and the wise and generous forbearance
-with which it had been carried out, in spite of the most torturing
-recollections,—were now found to have produced their fruits. Majority
-and minority,—democrats and oligarchs,—were seen confounded in one
-unanimous and hearty vote to lend assistance to Thebes, in spite
-of all risk from hostility with Sparta. We cannot indeed doubt
-that this vote was considerably influenced also by the revolt of
-Rhodes, by the reappearance of Konon with a fleet in the Asiatic
-seas, and by private communications from that commander intimating
-his hope of acting triumphantly against the maritime power of
-Sparta, through enlarged aid from Persia. The vote had thus a
-double meaning. It proclaimed not merely the restored harmony
-between democrats and oligarchs at Athens, but also their common
-resolution to break the chain by which they were held as mere
-satellites<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_293">[p. 293]</a></span>
-and units in the regiment of Spartan allies, and to work out anew
-the old traditions of Athens as a self-acting and primary power,
-at least,—if not once again an imperial power. The vote proclaimed
-a renovated life in Athens, and its boldness under the existing
-weakness of the city, is extolled two generations afterwards by
-Demosthenes.<a id="FNanchor_549"></a><a href="#Footnote_549"
-class="fnanchor">[549]</a></p>
-
-<p>After having heard the Theban orator (we are told even
-by the philo-Laconian Xenophon),<a id="FNanchor_550"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_550" class="fnanchor">[550]</a> “very many Athenian
-citizens rose and spoke in support of his prayer, and the whole
-assembly with one accord voted to grant it.” Thrasybulus proposed the
-resolution, and communicated it to the Theban envoys.</p>
-
-<p>He told them that Athens knew well the risk which she was
-incurring while Peiræus was undefended; but nevertheless she was
-prepared to show her gratitude by giving more in requital than she
-had received; for she was prepared to give the Thebans positive
-aid, in case they were attacked—while the Thebans had done nothing
-more for <i>her</i> than to refuse to join in an aggressive march
-against her.<a id="FNanchor_551"></a><a href="#Footnote_551"
-class="fnanchor">[551]</a></p>
-
-<p>Without such assurance of succor from Athens, it is highly
-probable that the Thebans might have been afraid to face,
-single-handed, Lysander and the full force of Sparta. But they now
-prepared for a strenuous defence. The first approach of Lysander
-with his army of Herakleots, Phokians, and others, from the north,
-was truly menacing; the more so, as Orchomenus, the second city next
-to Thebes in the Bœotian confederacy, broke off its allegiance and
-joined him. The supremacy of Thebes over the cities composing the
-Bœotian confederacy appears to have been often harsh and oppressive,
-though probably not equally oppressive towards all, and certainly
-not equally odious to all. To Platæa on the extreme south of
-Bœotia, it had been long<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_294">[p.
-294]</a></span> intolerable, and the unhappy fate of that little town
-has saddened many pages of my preceding volumes; to Orchomenus, on
-the extreme north, it was also unpalatable,—partly because that town
-stood next in power and importance to Thebes,—partly because it had
-an imposing legendary antiquity, and claimed to have been once the
-ascendant city receiving tribute from Thebes. The Orchomenians now
-joined Lysander, threw open to him the way into Bœotia, and conducted
-him with his army, after first ravaging the fields of Lebadeia, into
-the district belonging to Haliartus.<a id="FNanchor_552"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_552" class="fnanchor">[552]</a></p>
-
-<p>Before Lysander quitted Sparta, the plan of operations concerted
-between him and Pausanias, was that they should meet on a given
-day in the territory of Haliartus. And in execution of this plan
-Pausanias had already advanced with his Peloponnesian army as far
-as Platæa in Bœotia. Whether the day fixed between them had yet
-arrived, when Lysander reached Haliartus, we cannot determine
-with certainty. In the imperfection of the Grecian calendar, a
-mistake on this point would be very conceivable,—as had happened
-between the Athenian generals Hippokrates and Demosthenes in
-those measures which preceded the battle of Delium in 424
-<small>B.C.</small><a id="FNanchor_553"></a><a href="#Footnote_553"
-class="fnanchor">[553]</a> But the engagement must have been taken
-by both parties, subject to obstructions in the way,—since each
-would have to march through a hostile country to reach the place of
-meeting. The words of Xenophon, however, rather indicate that the
-day fixed had not arrived; nevertheless, Lysander resolved at once
-to act against Haliartus, without waiting for Pausanias. There were
-as yet only a few Thebans in the town, and he, probably, had good
-reasons for judging that he would better succeed by rapid measures,
-before any more Thebans could arrive, than by delaying until the
-other Spartan army should join him; not to mention anxiety that
-the conquest should belong to himself exclusively, and confidence
-arising from his previous success at Orchomenus. Accordingly, he
-sent in an invitation to the Haliartians to follow the example of
-the Orchomenians, to revolt from Thebes, and to stand upon their
-autonomy under Lacedæmonian protection. Perhaps there may have been
-a party in the town disposed to comply. But the majority, encouraged
-too by<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_295">[p. 295]</a></span> the
-Thebans within, refused the proposition; upon which Lysander marched
-up to the walls and assaulted the town. He was here engaged, close by
-the gates, in examining where he could best effect an entrance, when
-a fresh division of Thebans, apprised of his proceedings, was seen
-approaching from Thebes, at their fastest pace,—cavalry, as well as
-hoplites. They were probably seen from the watch-towers in the city
-earlier than they became visible to the assailants without; so that
-the Haliartians, encouraged by the sight, threw open their gates,
-and made a sudden sally. Lysander, seemingly taken by surprise, was
-himself slain among the first, with his prophet by his side, by a
-Haliartian hoplite named Neochôrus. His troops stood some time,
-against both the Haliartians from the town, and the fresh Thebans who
-now came up. But they were at length driven back with considerable
-loss, and compelled to retreat to rugged and difficult ground at
-some distance in their rear. Here, however, they made good their
-position, repelling their assailants with the loss of more than two
-hundred hoplites.<a id="FNanchor_554"></a><a href="#Footnote_554"
-class="fnanchor">[554]</a></p>
-
-<p>The success here gained, though highly valuable as an
-encouragement to the Thebans, would have been counterbalanced by the
-speedy arrival of Pausanias, had not Lysander himself been among the
-slain. But the death of so eminent a man was an irreparable loss to
-Sparta. His army, composed of heterogeneous masses, both collected
-and held together by his personal ascendency, lost confidence
-and dispersed in the ensuing night.<a id="FNanchor_555"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_555" class="fnanchor">[555]</a> When Pausanias
-arrived soon afterwards, he found no second army to join with him.
-Yet his own force was more than sufficient to impress terror on the
-Thebans, had not Thrasybulus, faithful to the recent promise, arrived
-with an imposing body of Athenian hoplites, together with cavalry
-under Orthobulus<a id="FNanchor_556"></a><a href="#Footnote_556"
-class="fnanchor">[556]</a>—and imparted fresh courage as well as
-adequate strength to the Theban cause.</p>
-
-<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_296">[p. 296]</a></span></p>
-
-<p>Pausanias had first to consider what steps he would take to
-recover the bodies of the slain,—that of Lysander among them; whether
-he would fight a battle and thus take his chance of becoming master
-of the field,—or send the usual petition for burial-truce, which
-always implied confession of inferiority. On submitting the point
-to a council of officers and Spartan elders, their decision as well
-as his own was against fighting; not, however, without an indignant
-protest from some of the Spartan elders. He considered that the
-whole original plan of operations was broken up, since not only
-the great name and genius of Lysander had perished, but his whole
-army had spontaneously disbanded; that the Peloponnesian allies
-were generally lukewarm and reluctant, not to be counted upon for
-energetic behavior in case of pressing danger; that he had little
-or no cavalry,<a id="FNanchor_557"></a><a href="#Footnote_557"
-class="fnanchor">[557]</a> while the Theban cavalry was numerous
-and excellent; lastly, that the dead body of Lysander himself lay
-so close to the walls of Haliartus, that even if the Lacedæmonians
-were victorious, they could not carry it off without serious loss
-from the armed defenders in their towers.<a id="FNanchor_558"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_558" class="fnanchor">[558]</a> Such were the
-reasons which determined Pausanias and the major part of the
-council to send and solicit a truce. But the Thebans refused to
-grant it except on condition that they should immediately evacuate
-Bœotia. Though such a requisition was contrary to the received
-practice of Greece,<a id="FNanchor_559"></a><a href="#Footnote_559"
-class="fnanchor">[559]</a> which imposed on the victor the duty
-of granting the burial-truce unconditionally, whenever it was
-asked and inferiority thus publicly confessed,—nevertheless,
-such was the reluctant temper of the army, that they heard not
-merely with acquiescence, but with joy,<a id="FNanchor_560"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_560" class="fnanchor">[560]</a> the proposition
-of departing. The bodies were duly buried,—that of Lysander in
-the territory of Panopê, immediately across the Phokian border,
-but<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_297">[p. 297]</a></span> not
-far from Haliartus. And no sooner were these solemnities completed,
-than the Lacedæmonian army was led back to Peloponnesus; their
-dejection forming a mournful contrast to the triumphant insolence
-of the Thebans, who watched their march and restrained them, not
-without occasional blows, from straggling out of the road into the
-cultivated fields.<a id="FNanchor_561"></a><a href="#Footnote_561"
-class="fnanchor">[561]</a></p>
-
-<p>The death of Lysander produced the most profound sorrow and
-resentment at Sparta. On returning thither, Pausanias found himself
-the subject of such virulent accusation, that he thought it prudent
-to make his escape, and take sanctuary in the temple of Athênê Alea,
-at Tegea. He was impeached, and put on trial during his absence, on
-two counts; first, for having been behind the time covenanted, in
-meeting Lysander at Haliartus; next for having submitted to ask a
-truce from the Thebans, instead of fighting a battle for the purpose
-of obtaining the bodies of the slain.</p>
-
-<p>As far as there is evidence to form a judgment, it does not
-appear that Pausanias was guilty upon either of the two counts.
-The first is a question of fact; and it seems quite as likely that
-Lysander was before his time, as that Pausanias was behind his time,
-in arriving at Haliartus. Besides, Lysander, arriving there first,
-would have been quite safe, had he not resolved to attack without
-delay; in which the chances of war turned out against him; though
-the resolution in itself may have been well conceived. Next, as to
-the truce solicited for burying the dead bodies,—it does not appear
-that Pausanias could with any prudence have braved the chances of
-a battle. The facts of the case,—even as summed up by Xenophon,
-who always exaggerates everything in favor of the Spartans,—lead
-us to this conclusion. A few of the Spartan elders would doubtless
-prefer perishing on the field of battle, to the humiliation of
-sending in the herald to ask for a truce. But the mischief of
-fighting a battle under the influence of such a point of honor,
-to the exclusion of a rational estimate of consequences, will be
-seen when we come to the battle of Leuktra, where Kleombrotus,
-son of Pausanias was thus piqued into an imprudence (at least
-this is alleged as one of the motives) to which his own life and
-the dominion of Sparta became forfeit.<a id="FNanchor_562"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_562" class="fnanchor">[562]</a> Moreover, the army of
-Pausanias, comprising very few Spartans, con<span class="pagenum"><a
-id="Page_298">[p. 298]</a></span>sisted chiefly of allies who had no
-heart in the cause, and who were glad to be required by the Thebans
-to depart. If he had fought a battle and lost it, the detriment
-to Sparta would have been most serious in every way; whereas, if
-he had gained a victory, no result would have followed except the
-acquisition of the bodies for burial; since the execution of the
-original plan had become impracticable through the dispersion of the
-army of Lysander.</p>
-
-<p>Though a careful examination of the facts leads us (and seems also
-to have led Xenophon<a id="FNanchor_563"></a><a href="#Footnote_563"
-class="fnanchor">[563]</a>) to the conclusion that Pausanias was
-innocent, he was nevertheless found guilty in his absence. He was
-in great part borne down by the grief felt at Sparta for the loss
-of Lysander, with whom he had been before in political rivalry,
-and for whose death he was made responsible. Moreover, the old
-accusation was now revived against him,<a id="FNanchor_564"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_564" class="fnanchor">[564]</a>—for which he had been
-tried, and barely acquitted, eight years before,—of having tolerated
-the reëstablishment of the Athenian democracy at a time when he might
-have put it down. Without doubt this argument told prodigiously
-against him at the present juncture, when the Athenians had just
-now, for the first time since the surrender of their city, renounced
-their subjection to Sparta and sent an army to assist the Thebans in
-their defence. So violent was the sentiment against Pausanias, that
-he was condemned to death in his absence, and passed the remainder of
-his life as an exile in sanctuary at Tegea. His son, Agesipolis, was
-invested with the sceptre in his place.</p>
-
-<p>A brief remark will not be here misplaced. On no topic have
-Grecian historians been more profuse in their reproaches, than upon
-the violence and injustice of democracy, at Athens and elsewhere,
-in condemning unsuccessful, but innocent generals. Out of the many
-cases in which this reproach is advanced, there are very few<span
-class="pagenum"><a id="Page_299">[p. 299]</a></span> wherein it has
-been made good; but even if we grant it to be valid against Athens
-and her democracy, the fate of Pausanias will show us that the ephors
-and senate of anti-democratical Sparta were capable of the like
-unjust misjudgment. Hardly a single instance of Athenian condemnation
-occurs, which we can so clearly prove to be undeserved, as this of a
-Spartan king.</p>
-
-<p>Turning from the banished king to Lysander,—the Spartans had
-indeed valid reasons for deploring the fall of the latter. He had
-procured for them their greatest and most decisive victories, and
-the time was coming when they needed his services to procure them
-more; for he left behind him no man of equal warlike resource,
-cunning, and power of command. But if he possessed those abilities
-which powerfully helped Sparta to triumph over her enemies, he at the
-same time did more than any man to bring her empire into dishonor,
-and to render its tenure precarious. His decemviral governments or
-dekarchies, diffused through the subject cities, and each sustained
-by a Lacedæmonian harmost and garrison, were aggravations of local
-tyranny such as the Grecian world had never before undergone. And
-though the Spartan authorities presently saw that he was abusing the
-imperial name of the city for unmeasured personal aggrandizement
-of his own, and partially withdrew their countenance from his
-dekarchies,—yet the general character of their empire still continued
-to retain the impress of partisanship and subjugation which he had
-originally stamped upon it. Instead of that autonomy which Sparta had
-so repeatedly promised, it became subjection every way embittered.
-Such an empire was pretty sure to be short-lived; but the loss to
-Sparta herself, when her empire fell away, is not the only fault
-which the historian of Greece has to impute to Lysander. His far
-deeper sin consists in his having thrown away an opportunity,—such
-as never occurred either before or afterwards,—for organizing some
-permanent, honorable, self-maintaining, Pan-hellenic combination
-under the headship of Sparta. This is (as I have before remarked)
-what a man like Kallikratidas would have attempted, if not with
-far-sighted wisdom, at least with generous sincerity, and by an
-appeal to the best veins of political sentiment in the chief
-city as well as in the subordinates. It is possible that with
-the best intentions even he might have failed; so strong was the
-centrifugal instinct in the Grecian political mind. But what<span
-class="pagenum"><a id="Page_300">[p. 300]</a></span> we have to
-reproach in Lysander is, that he never tried; that he abused the
-critical moment of cure for the purpose of infusing new poison into
-the system; that he not only sacrificed the interests of Greece
-to the narrow gains of Sparta, but even the interests of Sparta
-to the still narrower monopoly of dominion in his own hands. That
-his measures worked mischievously not merely for Greece, but for
-Sparta herself, aggravating all her bad tendencies,—has been already
-remarked in the preceding pages.</p>
-
-<p>That Lysander, with unbounded opportunities of gain, both lived
-and died poor, exhibits the honorable side of his character.
-Yet his personal indifference to money seems only to have left
-the greater space in his bosom for that thirst of power which
-made him unscrupulous in satiating the rapacity, as well as in
-upholding the oppressions, of coadjutors like the Thirty at Athens
-and the decemvirs in other cities. In spite of his great success
-and ability in closing the Peloponnesian war, we shall agree
-with Pausanias<a id="FNanchor_565"></a><a href="#Footnote_565"
-class="fnanchor">[565]</a> that he was more mischievous than
-profitable even to Sparta,—even if we take no thought of Greece
-generally. What would have been the effect produced by his projects
-in regard to the regal succession, had he been able to bring them to
-bear, we have no means of measuring. We are told that the discourse
-composed and addressed to him by the Halicarnassian rhetor Kleon,
-was found after his death among his papers by Agesilaus; who first
-learnt from it, with astonishment and alarm, the point to which the
-ambition of Lysander had tended, and was desirous of exposing his
-real character by making the discourse public,—but was deterred
-by dissuasive counsel of the ephor Lakratidas. But this story
-(attested by Ephorus<a id="FNanchor_566"></a><a href="#Footnote_566"
-class="fnanchor">[566]</a>) looks more like an anecdote of the
-rhetorical schools than like a reality. Agesilaus was not the man to
-set much value on sophists or their compositions; nor is it easy to
-believe that he remained so long ignorant of those projects which
-Lysander had once entertained but subsequently dropped. Moreover the
-probability is, that Kleon himself would make the discourse public
-as a sample of his own talents, even in the lifetime of Lysander;
-not only without shame, but as representing the feelings of a
-considerable section of readers throughout the Grecian world.</p>
-
-<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_301">[p. 301]</a></span></p>
-
-<p>Most important were the consequences which ensued from the death
-of Lysander and the retreat of Pausanias out of Bœotia. Fresh hope
-and spirits were infused into all the enemies of Sparta. An alliance
-was immediately concluded against her by Thebes, Athens, Corinth,
-and Argos. Deputies from these four cities were appointed to meet at
-Corinth, and to take active measures for inviting the coöperation of
-fresh allies; so that the war which had begun as a Bœotian war, now
-acquired the larger denomination of Corinthian war, under which it
-lasted until the peace of Antalkidas. The alliance was immediately
-strengthened by the junction of the Eubœans,—the Akarnanians,—the
-Ozolian Lokrians,—Ambrakia and Leukas (both particularly attached to
-Corinth),—and the Chalkidians of Thrace.<a id="FNanchor_567"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_567" class="fnanchor">[567]</a></p>
-
-<p>We now enter upon the period when, for the first time, Thebes
-begins to step out of the rank of secondary powers, and gradually
-raises herself into a primary and ascendant city in Grecian
-politics. Throughout the Peloponnesian war, the Thebans had shown
-themselves excellent soldiers, both on horseback and on foot, as
-auxiliaries to Sparta. But now the city begins to have a policy of
-its own, and individual citizens of ability become conspicuous.
-While waiting for Pelopidas and Epaminondas, with whom we shall
-presently become acquainted, we have at the present moment Ismenias;
-a wealthy Theban, a sympathizer with Thrasybulus and the Athenian
-exiles eight years before, and one of the great organizers of
-the present anti-Spartan movement; a man, too, honored by his
-political enemies,<a id="FNanchor_568"></a><a href="#Footnote_568"
-class="fnanchor">[568]</a> when they put him to death fourteen
-years afterwards, with the title of “a great wicked man,”—the
-same combination of epithets which Clarendon applies to Oliver
-Cromwell.</p>
-
-<p>It was Ismenias, who, at the head of a body of Bœotians and
-Argeians, undertook an expedition to put down the Spartan influence
-in the regions north of Bœotia. At Pharsalus in Thessaly, the
-Lacedæmonians had an harmost and garrison; at Pheræ,<span
-class="pagenum"><a id="Page_302">[p. 302]</a></span> Lykophron the
-despot was their ally; while Larissa, with Medius the despot, was
-their principal enemy. By the aid of the Bœotians, Medius was now
-enabled to capture Pharsalus; Larissa, with Krannon and Skotusa,
-was received into the Theban alliance,<a id="FNanchor_569"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_569" class="fnanchor">[569]</a> and Ismenias obtained
-also the more important advantage of expelling the Lacedæmonians from
-Herakleia. Some malcontents, left after the violent interference
-of the Spartan Herippidas two years before, opened the gates of
-Herakleia by night to the Bœotians and Argeians. The Lacedæmonians
-in the town were put to the sword, but the other Peloponnesian
-colonists were permitted to retire in safety; while the old
-Trachinian inhabitants, whom the Lacedæmonians had expelled to make
-room for their new settlers, together with the Œtæans, whom they had
-driven out of the districts in the neighborhood,—were now called
-back to repossess their original homes.<a id="FNanchor_570"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_570" class="fnanchor">[570]</a> The loss of Herakleia
-was a serious blow to the Spartans in those regions,—protecting
-Eubœa in its recent revolt from them, and enabling Ismenias to
-draw into his alliance the neighboring Malians, Ænianes, and
-Athamanes,—tribes stretching along the valley of the Spercheius
-westward to the vicinity of Pindus. Assembling additional troops
-from these districts (which, only a few months before, had supplied
-an army to Lysander<a id="FNanchor_571"></a><a href="#Footnote_571"
-class="fnanchor">[571]</a>), Ismenias marched against the Phokians,
-among whom the Spartan Lakisthenes had been left as harmost in
-command. After a severe battle, this officer with his Phokians was
-defeated near the Lokrian town of Naryx; and Ismenias came back
-victorious to the synod at Corinth.<a id="FNanchor_572"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_572" class="fnanchor">[572]</a></p>
-
-<p>By such important advantages, accomplished during the winter
-of 395-394 <small>B.C.</small>, the prospects of Grecian
-affairs as they stood in the ensuing spring became materially
-altered. The allies assembled at Corinth, full of hope, and
-resolved to levy a large combined force to act against Sparta;
-who on her side seemed to be threatened with the loss of all
-her extra-Peloponnesian land-empire. Accordingly, the ephors
-determined to recall without delay Agesilaus with his army from
-Asia, and sent Epikydidas with orders to that effect. But even
-before this reinforcement could arrive, they thought it expe<span
-class="pagenum"><a id="Page_303">[p. 303]</a></span>dient to
-muster their full Peloponnesian force and to act with vigor
-against the allies at Corinth, who were now assembling in
-considerable numbers. Aristodemus,—guardian of the youthful king
-Agesipolis son of Pausanias, and himself of the Eurystheneid
-race,—marched at the head of a body of six thousand Lacedæmonian
-hoplites;<a id="FNanchor_573"></a><a href="#Footnote_573"
-class="fnanchor">[573]</a> the Spartan xenâgi (or officers sent
-on purpose to conduct the contingents from the outlying allies),
-successively brought in three thousand hoplites from Elis, Triphylia,
-Akroreia, and Lasion,—fifteen hundred from Sikyon,—three thousand
-from Epidaurus, Trœzen, Hermionê, and Halieis. None were sent from
-Phlias, on the plea (true or false<a id="FNanchor_574"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_574" class="fnanchor">[574]</a>) that in that city
-the moment was one of solemnity and holy truce. There were also
-hoplites from Tegea, Mantineia, and the Achæan towns, but their
-number is not given; so that we do not know the full muster-roll
-on the Lacedæmonian side. The cavalry, six hundred in number,
-were all Lacedæmonian; there were, moreover, three hundred Kretan
-bowmen,—and four hundred slingers from different rural districts
-of Triphylia.<a id="FNanchor_575"></a><a href="#Footnote_575"
-class="fnanchor">[575]</a></p>
-
-<p>The allied force of the enemy was already mustered near
-Corinth;<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_304">[p. 304]</a></span>
-six thousand Athenian hoplites,—seven thousand Argeian,—five
-thousand Bœotian, those from Orchomenus being absent,—three
-thousand Corinthian,—three thousand from the different towns of
-Eubœa; making twenty-four thousand in all. The total of cavalry
-was fifteen hundred and fifty; composed of eight hundred Bœotian,
-six hundred Athenian, one hundred from Chalkis in Eubœa, and fifty
-from the Lokrians. The light troops also were numerous,—partly
-Corinthian, drawn probably from the serf-population which tilled
-the fields,<a id="FNanchor_576"></a><a href="#Footnote_576"
-class="fnanchor">[576]</a>—partly Lokrians, Malians, and
-Akarnanians.</p>
-
-<p>The allied leaders, holding a council of war to arrange their
-plans, came to a resolution that the hoplites should not be drawn
-up in deeper files than sixteen men,<a id="FNanchor_577"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_577" class="fnanchor">[577]</a> in order that there
-might be no chance of their being surrounded; and that the right
-wing, carrying with it command for the time, should be alternated
-from day to day between the different cities. The confidence which
-the events of the last few months had infused into these leaders,
-now for the first time acting against their old leader Sparta, is
-surprising. “There is nothing like marching to Sparta (said the
-Corinthian Timolaus) and fighting the Lacedæmonians at or near
-their own home. We must burn out the wasps in their nest, without
-letting them come forth to sting us. The Lacedæmonian force is like
-that of a river; small at its source, and becoming formidable only
-by the affluents which it receives, in proportion to the length
-of its course.”<a id="FNanchor_578"></a><a href="#Footnote_578"
-class="fnanchor">[578]</a> The wisdom of this advice was remarkable;
-but its boldness was yet more remarkable, when viewed in conjunction
-with the established feeling of awe towards Sparta. It was adopted
-by the general council of the allies; but unfortunately the time
-for executing it had already passed; for the Lacedæmonians were
-already in march and had crossed their own border. They took the
-line of road by Tegea and Mantineia (whose troops joined the<span
-class="pagenum"><a id="Page_305">[p. 305]</a></span> march), and
-advanced as far as Sikyon, where probably all the Arcadian and Achæan
-contingents were ordered to rendezvous.</p>
-
-<p>The troops of the confederacy had advanced as far as Nemea when
-they learnt that the Lacedæmonian army was at Sikyon; but they then
-altered their plan, and confined themselves to the defensive. The
-Lacedæmonians on their side crossed over the mountainous post called
-Epieikia, under considerable annoyance from the enemy’s light troops,
-who poured missiles upon them from the high ground. But when they
-had reached the level country, on the other side, along the shore
-of the Saronic Gulf, where they probably received the contingents
-from Epidaurus, Trœzen, Hermionê, and Halieis,—the whole army thus
-reinforced marched forward without resistance, burning and ravaging
-the cultivated lands. The confederates retreated before them, and
-at length took up a position close to Corinth, amidst some rough
-ground with a ravine in their front.<a id="FNanchor_579"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_579" class="fnanchor">[579]</a> The Lacedæmonians
-advanced forward until they were little more than a mile distant from
-this position, and there encamped.</p> <p><span class="pagenum"><a
-id="Page_306">[p. 306]</a></span></p> <p>After an interval
-seemingly of a few days, the Bœotians, on the day when their turn
-came to occupy the right wing and to take the lead, gave the
-signal for battle.<a id="FNanchor_580"></a><a href="#Footnote_580"
-class="fnanchor">[580]</a> The Lacedæmonians, prevented by the
-wooded ground from seeing clearly, were only made aware of the
-coming attack by hearing the hostile pæan. Taking order of battle
-immediately, they advanced forward to meet the assailants when
-within a furlong of their line. In each army, the right division
-took the lead,—slanting to the right, or keeping the left shoulder
-forward, according to the tendency habitual with Grecian hoplites,
-through anxiety to keep the right or unshielded side from<span
-class="pagenum"><a id="Page_307">[p. 307]</a></span> being exposed to
-the enemy, and at the same time to be protected by the shield of a
-right-hand neighbor.<a id="FNanchor_581"></a><a href="#Footnote_581"
-class="fnanchor">[581]</a> The Lacedæmonians in the one army, and
-the Thebans in the other, each inclined themselves, and caused
-their respective armies to incline also, in a direction slanting
-to the right, so that the Lacedæmonians on their side considerably
-outflanked the Athenians on the opposite left. Out of the ten tribes
-of Athenian hoplites, it was only the six on the extreme left who
-came into conflict with the Lacedæmonians; while the remaining four
-contended with the Tegeans who stood next to the Lacedæmonians on
-their own line. But the six extreme Athenian tribes were completely
-beaten, and severely handled, being taken in flank as well as in
-front by the Lacedæmonians. On the other hand, the remaining four
-Athenian tribes vanquished and drove before them the Tegeans; and
-generally, along all the rest of the line, the Thebans, Argeians, and
-Corinthians were victorious,—except where the troops of the Achæan
-Pellênê stood opposed to those of the Bœotian Thespiæ, where the
-battle was equal and the loss severe on both sides. The victorious
-confederates, however, were so ardent and incautious in pursuit, as
-to advance a considerable distance and return with disordered ranks;
-while the Lacedæmonians, who were habitually self-restraining in
-this particular, kept their order perfectly, attacking the Thebans,
-Argeians, and Corinthians to great advantage when returning to
-their camp. Several of the Athenian fugitives obtained shelter
-within the walls of Corinth; in spite of the opposition of the
-philo-Laconian Corinthians, who insisted upon shutting the gates
-against them, and opening negotiations with Sparta. The Lacedæmonians
-however came so near that it was at last thought impossible to keep
-the gates open longer. Many of the remaining confederates were
-therefore obliged to be satisfied with the protection of their
-ancient camp;<a id="FNanchor_582"></a><a href="#Footnote_582"
-class="fnanchor">[582]</a> which seems, however, to have been
-situated in such defensible ground,<a id="FNanchor_583"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_583" class="fnanchor">[583]</a> that the
-Lacedæmonians did not molest them in it.</p>
-
-<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_308">[p. 308]</a></span></p>
-
-<p>So far as the Lacedæmonians separately were concerned, the
-battle of Corinth was an important victory, gained (as they
-affirmed) with the loss of only eight men, and inflicting heavy
-loss upon the Athenians in the battle, as well as upon the
-remaining confederates in their return from pursuit. Though
-the Athenian hoplites suffered thus severely, yet Thrasybulus
-their commander,<a id="FNanchor_584"></a><a href="#Footnote_584"
-class="fnanchor">[584]</a> who kept the field until the last,
-with strenuous efforts to rally them, was not satisfied with
-their behavior. But on the other hand, all the allies of
-Sparta were worsted, and a considerable number of them slain.
-According to Diodorus, the total loss on the Lacedæmonian side
-was eleven hundred; on the side of the confederates twenty-eight
-hundred.<a id="FNanchor_585"></a><a href="#Footnote_585"
-class="fnanchor">[585]</a> On the whole, the victory of the
-Lacedæmonians was not sufficiently decisive to lead to important
-results, though it completely secured their ascendency within
-Peloponnesus. We observe here, as we shall have occasion to observe
-elsewhere, that the Peloponnesian allies do not fight heartily in
-the cause of Sparta. They seem bound to her more by fear than by
-affection.</p>
-
-<p>The battle of Corinth took place about July 394
-<small>B.C.</small>, seemingly about the same time as the naval
-battle near Knidus (or perhaps a little earlier), and while Agesilaus
-was on his homeward march after being recalled from Asia. Had the
-Lacedæmonians been able to defer the battle until Agesilaus had come
-up so as to threaten Bœotia on the northern side, their campaign
-would probably have been much more successful. As it is, their
-defeated allies doubtless went home in disgust from the field of
-Corinth, so that the confederates were now enabled to turn their
-whole attention to Agesilaus.</p>
-
-<p>That prince had received in Asia his summons of recall from the
-ephors with profound vexation and disappointment, yet at the same
-time with patriotic submission. He had augmented his army,<span
-class="pagenum"><a id="Page_309">[p. 309]</a></span> and was
-contemplating more extensive schemes of operations against the
-Persian satrapies in Asia Minor. He had established such a reputation
-for military force and skill, that numerous messages reached him
-from different inland districts, expressing their anxiety to be
-emancipated from Persian dominion; and inviting him to come to
-their aid. His ascendency was also established over the Grecian
-cities on the coast, whom he still kept under the government of
-partisan oligarchies and Spartan harmosts,—yet seemingly with greater
-practical moderation, and less license of oppression, than had marked
-the conduct of these men when they could count upon so unprincipled
-a chief as Lysander. He was thus just now not only at a high pitch
-of actual glory and ascendency, but nourishing yet brighter hopes of
-farther conquests for the future. And what filled up the measure of
-his aspirations,—all the conquests were to be made at the expense,
-not of Greeks, but of the Persians. He was treading in the footsteps
-of Agamemnon, as Pan-hellenic leader against a Pan-hellenic enemy.</p>
-
-<p>All these glorious dreams were dissipated by Epikydidas, with his
-sad message, and peremptory summons, from the ephors. In the chagrin
-and disappointment of Agesilaus we can sincerely sympathize; but the
-panegyric which Xenophon and others pronounce upon him for his ready
-obedience is altogether unreasonable.<a id="FNanchor_586"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_586" class="fnanchor">[586]</a> There was no merit
-in renouncing his projects of conquest at the bidding of the ephors;
-because, if any serious misfortune had befallen Sparta at home,
-none of those projects could have been executed. Nor is it out of
-place to remark, that even if Agesilaus had not been recalled, the
-extinction of the Lacedæmonian naval superiority by the defeat of
-Knidus, would have rendered all large plans of inland conquest
-impracticable. On receiving his orders of recall, he convened an
-assembly both of his allies and of his army, to make known the
-painful necessity of his departure; which was heard with open and
-sincere manifestations<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_310">[p.
-310]</a></span> of sorrow. He assured them that as soon as he had
-dissipated the clouds which hung over Sparta at home, he should
-come back to Asia without delay, and resume his efforts against the
-Persian satraps; in the interim he left Euxenus, with a force of four
-thousand men for their protection. Such was the sympathy excited
-by his communication, combined with esteem for his character, that
-the cities passed a general vote to furnish him with contingents
-of troops for his march to Sparta. But this first burst of zeal
-abated, when they came to reflect that it was a service against
-Greeks; not merely unpopular in itself, but presenting a certainty
-of hard fighting with little plunder. Agesilaus tried every means
-to keep up their spirits, by proclaiming prizes both to the civic
-soldiers and to the mercenaries, to be distributed at Sestus in the
-Chersonesus, as soon as they should have crossed into Europe,—prizes
-for the best equipment, and best disciplined soldiers in every
-different arm.<a id="FNanchor_587"></a><a href="#Footnote_587"
-class="fnanchor">[587]</a> By these means he prevailed upon the
-bravest and most effective soldiers in his army to undertake the
-march along with him; among them many of the Cyreians, with Xenophon
-himself at their head.</p>
-
-<p>Though Agesilaus, in leaving Greece, had prided himself on
-hoisting the flag of Agamemnon, he was now destined against his
-will to tread in the footsteps of the Persian Xerxes in his
-march from the Thracian Chersonese through Thrace, Macedonia,
-and Thessaly, to Thermopylæ and Bœotia. Never, since the time of
-Xerxes, had any army undertaken this march; which now bore an
-Oriental impress, from the fact that Agesilaus brought with him some
-camels, taken in the battle of Sardis.<a id="FNanchor_588"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_588" class="fnanchor">[588]</a> Overawing or
-defeating the various Thracian tribes, he reached Amphipolis on
-the Strymon where he was met by Derkyllidas, who had come fresh
-from the battle of Corinth and informed him of the victory. Full
-as his heart was of Pan-hellenic projects against Persia, he burst
-into exclamations of regret on hearing of the death of so many
-Greeks in battle, who could have sufficed, if united, to emancipate
-Asia Minor.<a id="FNanchor_589"></a><a href="#Footnote_589"
-class="fnanchor">[589]</a> Sending Derkyllidas forward to Asia to
-make known the victory to the Grecian cities in his alliance, he
-pursued his march through Macedonia and Thessaly. In the latter
-coun<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_311">[p. 311]</a></span>try,
-Larissa, Krannon, and other cities in alliance with Thebes, raised
-opposition to bar his passage. But in the disunited condition of
-this country, no systematic resistance could be organized against
-him. Nothing more appeared than detached bodies of cavalry, whom he
-beat and dispersed, with the death of Polycharmus, their leader. As
-the Thessalian cavalry, however, was the best in Greece, he took
-great pride in having defeated them with cavalry disciplined by
-himself in Asia; backed, however, it must be observed, by skilful
-and effective support from his hoplites.<a id="FNanchor_590"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_590" class="fnanchor">[590]</a> After having passed
-the Achæan mountains or the line of Mount Othrys, he marched the rest
-of the way without opposition, through the strait of Thermopylæ to
-the frontier of Phokis and Bœotia.</p>
-
-<p>In this latter part of his march, Agesilaus was met by the
-ephor Diphridas in person, who urged him to hasten his march
-as much as possible, and attack the Bœotians. He was further
-joined by two Lacedæmonian regiments<a id="FNanchor_591"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_591" class="fnanchor">[591]</a> from Corinth, and
-by fifty young Spartan volunteers as a body-guard, who crossed
-by sea from Sikyon. He was reinforced also by the Phokians and
-the Orchomenians,—in addition to the Peloponnesian troops who had
-accompanied him to Asia, the Asiatic hoplites, the Cyreians, the
-peltasts, and the cavalry, whom he had brought with him from the
-Hellespont, and some fresh troops collected in the march. His
-army was thus in imposing force when he reached the neighborhood
-of Chæroneia on the Bœotian border. It was here that they were
-alarmed by an eclipse of the sun, on the fourteenth of August, 394
-<small>B.C.</small>; a fatal presage, the meaning of which was
-soon interpreted for them by the arrival of a messenger bearing
-news of the naval defeat of Knidus, with the death of Peisander,
-brother-in-law of Agesilaus. Deeply was the latter affected by this
-irreparable blow. He foresaw that, when known, it would spread dismay
-and dejection among his soldiers, most of whom would remain attached
-to him only so long as they believed the cause of Sparta<span
-class="pagenum"><a id="Page_312">[p. 312]</a></span> to be ascendant
-and profitable.<a id="FNanchor_592"></a><a href="#Footnote_592"
-class="fnanchor">[592]</a> Accordingly, he resolved, being now within
-a day’s march of his enemies, to hasten on a battle without making
-known the bad news. Proclaiming that intelligence had been received
-of a sea-fight having taken place, in which the Lacedæmonians
-had been victorious, though Peisander himself was slain,—he
-offered a sacrifice of thanksgiving and sent round presents of
-congratulation,—which produced an encouraging effect, and made the
-skirmishers especially both forward and victorious.</p>
-
-<p>To his enemies, now assembled in force on the plain of Korôneia,
-the real issue of the battle of Knidus was doubtless made known,
-spreading hope and cheerfulness through their ranks; though we are
-not informed what interpretation they put upon the solar eclipse. The
-army was composed of nearly the same contingents as those who had
-recently fought at Corinth, except that we hear of the Ænianes in
-place of the Malians; but probably each contingent was less numerous,
-since there was still a necessity for occupying and defending the
-camp near Corinth. Among the Athenian hoplites, who had just been so
-roughly handled in the preceding battle, and who were now drafted
-off by lot to march into Bœotia, against both a general and an army
-of high reputation,—there prevailed much apprehension and some
-reluctance; as we learn from one of them, Mantitheus, who stood
-forward to volunteer his services, and who afterwards makes just
-boast of it before an Athenian dikastery.<a id="FNanchor_593"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_593" class="fnanchor">[593]</a> The Thebans and
-Bœotians were probably in full force, and more numerous than at
-Corinth, since it was their own country which was to be defended.
-The camp was established in the territory of Korôneia, not far from
-the great<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_313">[p. 313]</a></span>
-temple of Itonian Athênê, where the Pambœotia, or general Bœotian
-assemblies were held, and where there also stood the trophy erected
-for the great victory over Tolmides and the Athenians, about fifty
-years before.<a id="FNanchor_594"></a><a href="#Footnote_594"
-class="fnanchor">[594]</a> Between the two armies there was no great
-difference of numbers, except as to the peltasts, who were more
-numerous in the army of Agesilaus, though they do not seem to have
-taken much part in the battle.</p>
-
-<p>Having marched from Chæroneia, Agesilaus approached the plain
-of Korôneia from the river Kephissus, while the Thebans met him
-from the direction of Mount Helikon. He occupied the right wing
-of his army, the Orchomenians being on the left, and the Cyreians
-with the Asiatic allies in the centre. In the opposite line, the
-Thebans were on the right, and the Argeians on the left. Both armies
-approached slowly and in silence until they were separated only by
-an interval of a furlong, at which moment the Thebans on the right
-began the war-shout, and accelerated their march to a run,—the rest
-of the line following their example. When they got within half a
-furlong of the Lacedæmonians, the centre division of the latter,
-under the command of Herippidas (comprising the Cyreians, with
-Xenophon himself, and the Asiatic allies) started forward on their
-side, and advanced at a run to meet them; seemingly, getting beyond
-their own line,<a id="FNanchor_595"></a><a href="#Footnote_595"
-class="fnanchor">[595]</a> and coming first to cross spears with the
-enemy’s centre. After a sharp struggle, the division of Herippidas
-was here victorious, and drove back its opponents. Agesilaus, on his
-right, was yet more victorious, for the Argeians opposed to him,
-fled without even crossing spears. These fugitives found safety
-on the high ground of Mount Helikon. But on the other hand, the
-Thebans on their own right completely beat back the Orchomenians,
-and pursued them so far as to get to the baggage in the rear of the
-army. Agesilaus, while his friends around were congratulating him
-as conqueror, immediately wheeled round to complete his victory by
-attacking the Thebans; who, on their side also faced about, and
-prepared to fight their way, in close and deep order, to rejoin their
-comrades on Helikon. Though Agesilaus might have let them pass, and
-assailed them in the rear with greater safety and equal effect, he
-pre<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_314">[p. 314]</a></span>ferred
-the more honorable victory of a conflict face to face. Such is the
-coloring which his panegyrist, Xenophon,<a id="FNanchor_596"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_596" class="fnanchor">[596]</a> puts upon his
-manœuvre. Yet we may remark that if he had let the Thebans pass,
-he could not have pursued them far, seeing that their own comrades
-were at hand to sustain them,—and also that having never yet fought
-against the Thebans, he had probably no adequate appreciation of
-their prowess.</p>
-
-<p>The crash which now took place was something terrific beyond
-all Grecian military experience,<a id="FNanchor_597"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_597" class="fnanchor">[597]</a> leaving an
-indelible impression upon Xenophon, who was personally engaged in
-it. The hoplites on both sides came to the fiercest and closest
-bodily struggle, pushing shields against each other, with all the
-weight of the incumbent mass behind impelling forward the foremost
-ranks,—especially in the deep order of the Thebans. The shields of
-the foremost combatants were thus stove in, their spears broken,
-and each man was engaged in such close embrace with his enemy, that
-the dagger was the only weapon which he could use. There was no
-systematic shout, such as usually marked the charge of a Grecian
-army; the silence was only broken by a medley of furious exclamations
-and murmurs.<a id="FNanchor_598"></a><a href="#Footnote_598"
-class="fnanchor">[598]</a> Agesilaus himself, who was among the
-front ranks, and whose size and strength were by no means on a level
-with his personal courage, had his body covered with wounds from
-different weapons,<a id="FNanchor_599"></a><a href="#Footnote_599"
-class="fnanchor">[599]</a>—was trodden down,—and only escaped
-by the devoted courage of those fifty Spartan volunteers who
-formed his body-guard. Partly from his wounds, partly from the
-irresistible courage and stronger pressure of the Thebans, the
-Spartans were at length compelled to give way, so far as to afford
-a free passage to the former, who were thus enabled to<span
-class="pagenum"><a id="Page_315">[p. 315]</a></span> march onward and
-rejoin their comrades; not without sustaining some loss by attacks
-on their rear.<a id="FNanchor_600"></a><a href="#Footnote_600"
-class="fnanchor">[600]</a></p>
-
-<p>Agesilaus thus remained master of the field of battle, having
-gained a victory over his opponents taken collectively. But so
-far as concerns the Thebans separately, he had not only gained no
-victory, but had failed in his purpose of stopping their progress,
-and had had the worst of the combat. His wounds having been dressed,
-he was brought back on men’s shoulders to give his final orders,
-and was then informed that a detachment of eighty Theban hoplites,
-left behind by the rest, had taken refuge in the temple of Itonian
-Athênê as suppliants. From generosity mingled with respect to the
-sanctity of the spot, he commanded that they should be dismissed
-unhurt, and then proceeded to give directions for the night-watch,
-as it was already late. The field of battle presented a terrible
-spectacle; Spartan and Theban dead lying intermingled, some yet
-grasping their naked daggers, others pierced with the daggers of
-their enemies; around, on the blood-stained ground, were seen
-broken spears, smashed shields, swords and daggers scattered apart
-from their owners.<a id="FNanchor_601"></a><a href="#Footnote_601"
-class="fnanchor">[601]</a> He directed the Spartan and Theban dead to
-be collected in separate heaps, and placed in safe custody for the
-night, in the interior of his phalanx; the troops then took their
-supper, and rested for the night. On the next morning, Gylis the
-Polemarch was ordered to draw up the army in battle-array, to erect
-a trophy, and to offer sacrifices of cheerfulness and thanksgiving,
-with the pipers solemnly playing, according to Spartan fashion.
-Agesilaus was anxious to make these demonstrations of victory as
-ostentatious as possible, because he really doubted whether he
-had gained a victory. It was very possible that the Thebans might
-feel confidence enough to renew the attack, and try to recover
-the field of battle, with their own dead upon it; which Agesilaus
-had, for that reason, caused to be collected in a sepa<span
-class="pagenum"><a id="Page_316">[p. 316]</a></span>rate heap and
-placed within the Lacedæmonian line.<a id="FNanchor_602"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_602" class="fnanchor">[602]</a> He was, however, soon
-relieved from doubt by a herald coming from the Thebans to solicit
-the customary truce for the burial of their dead; the understood
-confession of defeat. The request was immediately granted; each
-party paid the last solemnities to its own dead, and the Spartan
-force was then withdrawn from Bœotia. Xenophon does not state the
-loss on either side, but Diodorus gives it at six hundred on the
-side of the confederates, three hundred and fifty on that of the
-Lacedæmonians.<a id="FNanchor_603"></a><a href="#Footnote_603"
-class="fnanchor">[603]</a></p>
-
-<p>Disqualified as he was by his wounds for immediate action,
-Agesilaus caused himself to be carried to Delphi, where the Pythian
-games were at that moment going on. He here offered to Apollo the
-tithe of the booty acquired during his two years’ campaigns in Asia;
-a tithe equal to one hundred talents.<a id="FNanchor_604"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_604" class="fnanchor">[604]</a> Meanwhile the
-polemarch Gylis conducted the army first into Phokis, next on
-a predatory excursion into the Lokrian territory, where the
-nimble attack of the Lokrian light troops, amidst hilly ground,
-inflicted upon his troops a severe check, and cost him his life.
-After this the contingents in the army were dismissed to their
-respective homes, and Agesilaus himself, when tolerably recovered,
-sailed with the Peloponnesians homeward from Delphi across the
-Corinthian Gulf.<a id="FNanchor_605"></a><a href="#Footnote_605"
-class="fnanchor">[605]</a> He was received at Sparta with every
-demonstration of esteem and gratitude, which was still farther
-strengthened by his exemplary simplicity and exact observance of
-the public discipline; an exactness not diminished either by long
-absence or<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_317">[p. 317]</a></span>
-enjoyment of uncontrolled ascendency. From this time forward he
-was the effective leader of Spartan policy, enjoying an influence
-greater than had ever fallen to the lot of any king before. His
-colleague, Agesipolis, both young and of feeble character, was won
-over by his judicious and conciliatory behavior, into the most
-respectful deference.<a id="FNanchor_606"></a><a href="#Footnote_606"
-class="fnanchor">[606]</a></p>
-
-<p>Three great battles had thus been fought in the space of little
-more than a month (July and August)—those of Corinth, Knidus,
-and Korôneia; the first and third on land, the second at sea, as
-described in my last chapter. In each of the two land-battles the
-Lacedæmonians had gained a victory; they remained masters of the
-field, and were solicited by the enemy to grant the burial-truce.
-But if we inquire what results these victories had produced,
-the answer must be that both were totally barren. The position
-of Sparta in Greece as against her enemies had undergone no
-improvement. In the battle of Corinth, her soldiers had indeed
-manifested signal superiority, and acquired much honor. But at the
-field of Korôneia, the honor of the day was rather on the side
-of the Thebans, who broke through the most strenuous opposition,
-and carried their point of joining their allies. And the purpose
-of Agesilaus (ordered by the ephor Diphridas) to invade Bœotia,
-completely failed.<a id="FNanchor_607"></a><a href="#Footnote_607"
-class="fnanchor">[607]</a> Instead of advancing, he withdrew from
-Korôneia, and returned to Peloponnesus across the gulf from Delphi;
-which he might have done just as well without fighting this murderous
-and hardly contested battle. Even the narrative of Xenophon, deeply
-colored as it is both by his sympathies and his antipathies,
-indicates to us that the predominant impression carried off by every
-one from the field of Korôneia was that of the tremendous force and
-obstinacy of the Theban hoplites,—a foretaste of what was to come at
-Leuktra!</p>
-
-<p>If the two land-victories of Sparta were barren of results,
-the case was far otherwise with her naval defeat at Knidus.
-That defeat was pregnant with consequences following in rapid
-succession, and of the most disastrous character. As with Athens at
-Ægospotami,—the loss of her fleet, serious as that was, served<span
-class="pagenum"><a id="Page_318">[p. 318]</a></span> only as the
-signal for countless following losses. Pharnabazus and Konon,
-with their victorious fleet, sailed from island to island, and
-from one continental seaport to another, in the Ægean, to expel
-the Lacedæmonian harmosts, and terminate the empire of Sparta. So
-universal was the odium which it had inspired, that the task was
-found easy beyond expectation. Conscious of their unpopularity,
-the harmosts in almost all the towns, on both sides of the
-Hellespont, deserted their posts and fled, on the mere news of the
-battle of Knidus.<a id="FNanchor_608"></a><a href="#Footnote_608"
-class="fnanchor">[608]</a> Everywhere Pharnabazus and Konon found
-themselves received as liberators, and welcomed with presents of
-hospitality. They pledged themselves not to introduce any foreign
-force or governor, nor to fortify any separate citadel, but to
-guarantee to each city its own genuine autonomy. This policy was
-adopted by Pharnabazus at the urgent representation of Konon,
-who warned him that if he manifested any design of reducing the
-cities to subjection, he would find them all his enemies; that
-each of them severally would cost him a long siege; and that a
-combination would ultimately be formed against him. Such liberal
-and judicious ideas, when seen to be sincerely acted upon, produced
-a strong feeling of friendship and even of gratitude, so that the
-Lacedæmonian maritime empire was dissolved without a blow, by the
-almost spontaneous movements of the cities themselves. Though the
-victorious fleet presented itself in many different places, it was
-nowhere called upon to put down resistance, or to undertake a single
-siege. Kos, Nisyra, Teos, Chios, Erythræ, Ephesus, Mitylênê, Samos,
-all declared themselves independent, under the protection of the
-new conquerors.<a id="FNanchor_609"></a><a href="#Footnote_609"
-class="fnanchor">[609]</a> Pharnabazus presently disembarked at
-Ephesus and marched by land northward to his own satrapy; leaving a
-fleet of forty triremes under the command of Konon.</p>
-
-<p>To this general burst of anti-Spartan feeling, Abydos, on the
-Asiatic side of the Hellespont, formed the solitary exception. That
-town, steady in hostility to Athens,<a id="FNanchor_610"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_610" class="fnanchor">[610]</a> had been the great
-military<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_319">[p. 319]</a></span>
-station of Sparta for her northern Asiatic warfare, during the last
-twenty years. It was in the satrapy of Pharnabazus, and had been
-made the chief place of arms by Derkyllidas and Agesilaus, for their
-warfare against that satrap as well as for the command of the strait.
-Accordingly, while it was a main object with Pharnabazus to acquire
-possession of Abydos,—there was nothing which the Abydenes dreaded so
-much as to become subject to him. In this view they were decidedly
-disposed to cling to Lacedæmonian protection; and it happened by
-a fortunate accident for Sparta, that the able and experienced
-Derkyllidas was harmost in the town at the moment of the battle of
-Knidus. Having fought in the battle of Corinth, he had been sent
-to announce the news to Agesilaus, whom he had met on his march at
-Amphipolis, and who had sent him forward into Asia to communicate
-the victory to the allied cities;<a id="FNanchor_611"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_611" class="fnanchor">[611]</a> neither of them at
-that moment anticipating the great maritime defeat then impending.
-The presence in Abydos of such an officer, who had already acquired
-a high military reputation in that region, and was at marked enmity
-with Pharnabazus,—combined with the standing apprehensions of the
-Abydenes,—was now the means of saving a remnant at least of maritime
-ascendency to Sparta. During the general alarm which succeeded the
-battle of Knidus, when the harmosts were everywhere taking flight,
-and when anti-Spartan manifestations often combined with internal
-revolutions to overthrow the dekarchs or their substitutes, were
-spreading from city to city,—Derkyllidas assembled the Abydenes,
-heartened them up against the reigning contagion, and exhorted them
-to earn the gratitude of Sparta by remaining faithful to her while
-others were falling off; assuring them that she would still be found
-capable of giving them protection. His exhortations were listened
-to with favor. Abydos remained attached to Sparta, was put in a
-good state of defence, and became the only harbor of safety for the
-fugitive harmosts out of the other cities, Asiatic and European.</p>
-
-<p>Having secured his hold upon Abydos, Derkyllidas crossed the
-strait to make sure also of the strong place of Sestos, on the
-Eu<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_320">[p. 320]</a></span>ropean
-side, in the Thracian Chersonese.<a id="FNanchor_612"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_612" class="fnanchor">[612]</a> In that fertile
-peninsula there had been many new settlers, who had come in and
-acquired land under the Lacedæmonian supremacy, especially since
-the building of the cross-wall by Derkyllidas to defend the isthmus
-against Thracian invasion. By means of these settlers, dependent on
-Sparta for the security of their tenures,—and of the refugees from
-various cities all concentrated under his protection,—Derkyllidas
-maintained his position effectively both at Abydos and at Sestos;
-defying the requisition of Pharnabazus that he should forthwith
-evacuate them. The satrap threatened war, and actually ravaged the
-lands around Abydos,—but without any result. His wrath against
-the Lacedæmonians, already considerable, was so aggravated by
-disappointment when he found that he could not yet expel them from
-his satrapy, that he resolved to act against them with increased
-energy, and even to strike a blow at them near their own home. For
-this purpose he transmitted orders to Konon to prepare a commanding
-naval force for the ensuing spring, and in the mean time to keep
-both Abydos and Sestos under blockade.<a id="FNanchor_613"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_613" class="fnanchor">[613]</a></p>
-
-<p>As soon as spring arrived, Pharnabazus embarked on board a
-powerful fleet equipped by Konon; directing his course to Melos,
-to various islands among the Cyclades, and lastly to the coast of
-Peloponnesus. They here spent some time on the coast of Laconia and
-Messenia, disembarking at several points to ravage the country.
-They next landed on the island of Kythêra, which they captured,
-granting safe retirement to the Lacedæmonian garrison, and leaving
-in the island a garrison under the Athenian Nikophêmus. Quitting
-then the harborless, dangerous, and ill-provided coast of Laconia,
-they sailed up the Saronic gulf to the isthmus of Corinth. Here
-they found the confederates,—Corinthian, Bœotian, Athenian, etc.,
-carrying on war with Corinth as their central post, against the
-Lacedæmonians at Sikyon. The line across the<span class="pagenum"><a
-id="Page_321">[p. 321]</a></span> isthmus from Lechæum to Kenchreæ
-(the two ports of Corinth) was now made good by a defensive system of
-operations, so as to confine the Lacedæmonians within Peloponnesus;
-just as Athens, prior to her great losses in 446 <small>B.C.</small>,
-while possessing both Megara and Pegæ, had been able to maintain
-the inland road midway between them, where it crosses the high and
-difficult crest of Mount Geraneia, thus occupying the only three
-roads by which a Lacedæmonian army could march from the isthmus
-of Corinth into Attica or Bœotia.<a id="FNanchor_614"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_614" class="fnanchor">[614]</a> Pharnabazus
-communicated in the most friendly manner with the allies, assured
-them of his strenuous support against Sparta, and left with
-them a considerable sum of money.<a id="FNanchor_615"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_615" class="fnanchor">[615]</a></p>
-
-<p>The appearance of a Persian satrap with a Persian fleet, as master
-of the Peloponnesian sea and the Saronic Gulf, was a phenomenon
-astounding to Grecian eyes. And if it was not equally offensive to
-Grecian sentiment, this was in itself a melancholy proof of the
-degree to which Pan-hellenic patriotism had been stifled by the
-Peloponnesian war and the Spartan empire. No Persian tiara had been
-seen near the Saronic Gulf since the battle of Salamis; nor could
-anything short of the intense personal wrath of Pharnabazus against
-the Lacedæmonians, and his desire to revenge upon them the damage
-inflicted by Derkyllidas and Agesilaus, have brought him now so far
-away from his own satrapy. It was this wrathful feeling of which
-Konon took advantage to procure from him a still more important
-boon.</p>
-
-<p>Since 404 <small>B.C.</small>, a space of eleven years, Athens
-had continued without any walls around her seaport town Peiræus,
-and without any Long Walls to connect her city with Peiræus. To
-this state she had been condemned by the sentence of her enemies,
-in the full knowledge that she could have little trade,—few ships
-either armed or mercantile,—poor defence even against pirates,
-and no defence at all against aggression from the mistress of the
-sea. Konon now entreated Pharnabazus, who was about to go home, to
-leave the fleet under his command, and to permit him to use it in
-rebuilding the fortifications of Peiræus as well as the Long Walls
-of Athens. While he engaged to maintain the fleet by contributions
-from the islands, he assured the satrap that no blow could be<span
-class="pagenum"><a id="Page_322">[p. 322]</a></span> inflicted
-upon Sparta so destructive or so mortifying, as the renovation of
-Athens and Peiræus with their complete and connected fortifications.
-Sparta would thus be deprived of the most important harvest which
-she had reaped from the long struggle of the Peloponnesian war.
-Indignant as he now was against the Lacedæmonians, Pharnabazus
-sympathized cordially with these plans, and on departing not only
-left the fleet under the command of Konon, but also furnished
-him with a considerable sum of money towards the expense of the
-fortifications.<a id="FNanchor_616"></a><a href="#Footnote_616"
-class="fnanchor">[616]</a></p>
-
-<p>Konon betook himself to the work energetically and without delay.
-He had quitted Athens in 407 <small>B.C.</small>, as one of the
-joint admirals nominated after the disgrace of Alkibiades. He had
-parted with his countrymen finally at the catastrophe of Ægospotami
-in 405 <small>B.C.</small>, preserving the miserable fraction of
-eight or nine ships out of that noble fleet which otherwise would
-have passed entire into the hands of Lysander. He now returned, in
-393 <small>B.C.</small>, as a second Themistokles, the deliverer of
-his country, and the restorer of her lost strength and independence.
-All hands were set to work; carpenters and masons being hired with
-the funds furnished by Pharnabazus, to complete the fortifications
-as quickly as possible. The Bœotians and other neighbors lent
-their aid zealously as volunteers,<a id="FNanchor_617"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_617" class="fnanchor">[617]</a>—the same who eleven
-years before had danced to the sound of joyful music when the former
-walls were demolished; so completely had the feelings of Greece
-altered since that period. By such hearty coöperation the work was
-finished during the course of the present summer and autumn without
-any opposition; and Athens enjoyed again her fortified Peiræus and
-harbor, with a pair of Long Walls, straight and parallel, joining
-it securely to the city. The third, or Phalêric Wall (a single wall
-stretching from Athens to Phalêrum), which had existed down to
-the capture of the city by Lysander, was not restored; nor was it
-indeed by any means necessary to the security either of the city
-or of the port. Having thus given renewed life and security<span
-class="pagenum"><a id="Page_323">[p. 323]</a></span> to Peiræus,
-Konon commemorated his great naval victory by a golden wreath in the
-acropolis, as well as by the erection of a temple in Peiræus to the
-honor of the Knidian Aphroditê, who was worshipped at Knidus with
-peculiar devotion by the local population.<a id="FNanchor_618"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_618" class="fnanchor">[618]</a> He farther celebrated
-the completion of the walls by a splendid sacrifice and festival
-banquet. And the Athenian people not only inscribed on a pillar
-a public vote gratefully recording the exploits of Konon, but
-also erected a statue to his honor.<a id="FNanchor_619"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_619" class="fnanchor">[619]</a></p>
-
-<p>The importance of this event in reference to the future history
-of Athens was unspeakable. Though it did not restore to her either
-her former navy, or her former empire, it reconstituted her as a
-city, not only self-determining, but even partially ascendant. It
-reanimated her, if not into the Athens of Perikles, at least into
-that of Isokrates and Demosthenes; it imparted to her a second
-fill of strength, dignity, and commercial importance, during the
-half century destined to elapse before she was finally overwhelmed
-by the superior military force of Macedon. Those who recollect
-the extraordinary stratagem whereby Themistokles had contrived
-(eighty-five years before) to accomplish the fortification of
-Athens, in spite of the base but formidable jealousy of Sparta and
-her Peloponnesian allies, will be aware how much the consummation
-of the Themistoklean project had depended upon accident. Now, also,
-Konon in his restoration was favored by unusual combinations, such
-as no one could have predicted. That Pharnabazus should conceive
-the idea of coming over himself to Peloponnesus with a fleet of the
-largest force, was a most unexpected contingency. He was influenced
-neither by attachment to Athens, nor seemingly by considerations
-of policy, though the proceeding was one really conducive to the
-interests of Persian power,—but simply by his own violent personal
-wrath against the Lacedæmonians. And this wrath probably would
-have been satisfied, if, after the battle of Knidus, he could have
-cleared his own satrapy of them completely. It was his vehement
-impatience, when he found himself unable to expel his old enemy,
-Derkyllidas, from the important position of<span class="pagenum"><a
-id="Page_324">[p. 324]</a></span> Abydos, which chiefly spurred him
-on to take revenge on Sparta in her own waters. Nothing less than
-the satrap’s personal presence would have placed at the disposal
-of Konon either a sufficient naval force, or sufficient funds for
-the erection of the new walls, and the defiance of all impediment
-from Sparta. So strangely did events thus run, that the energy, by
-which Derkyllidas preserved Abydos, brought upon Sparta, indirectly,
-the greater mischief of the new Kononian walls. It would have been
-better for Sparta that Pharnabazus should at once have recovered
-Abydos as well as the rest of his satrapy; in which case he would
-have had no wrongs remaining unavenged to incense him, and would
-have kept on his own side of the Ægean; feeding Konon with a modest
-squadron sufficient to keep the Lacedæmonian navy from again becoming
-formidable on the Asiatic side, but leaving the walls of Peiræus (if
-we may borrow an expression of Plato) “to continue asleep in the
-bosom of the earth.”<a id="FNanchor_620"></a><a href="#Footnote_620"
-class="fnanchor">[620]</a></p>
-
-<p>But the presence of Konon with his powerful fleet was not the
-only condition indispensable to the accomplishment of this work.
-It was requisite further, that the interposition of Sparta should
-be kept off, not merely by sea, but by land, and that, too, during
-all the number of months that the walls were in progress. Now the
-barrier against her on land was constituted by the fact, that the
-confederate force held the cross line within the isthmus from Lechæum
-to Kenchreæ, with Corinth as a centre.<a id="FNanchor_621"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_621" class="fnanchor">[621]</a> But they were unable
-to sustain this line even through the ensuing year,—during which
-Sparta, aided by dissensions at Corinth, broke through it, as will
-appear in the next chapter. Had she been able to break through it
-while the fortifications of Athens were yet incomplete, she would
-have deemed no effort too great to effect an entrance into Attica and
-interrupt the work, in which she might very probably have succeeded.
-Here, then, was the second condition, which was realized during the
-summer and autumn of 393 <small>B.C.</small>, but which did not
-continue to be realized longer. So fortunate was it for Athens,
-that the two conditions were fulfilled both together during this
-particular year!</p>
-
-<hr class="chap" />
-
-
-<div class="chapter" id="Chap_75">
-  <p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_325">[p. 325]</a></span></p>
-  <h2 class="nobreak">CHAPTER LXXV.<br />
-  FROM THE REBUILDING OF THE LONG WALLS OF ATHENS TO THE PEACE OF ANTALKIDAS.</h2>
-</div>
-
-<p class="noindent"><span class="smcap">The</span> presence of
-Pharnabazus and Konon with their commanding force in the Saronic
-Gulf, and the liberality with which the former furnished pecuniary
-aid to the latter for rebuilding the full fortifications of
-Athens, as well as to the Corinthians for the prosecution of the
-war,—seem to have given preponderance to the confederates over
-Sparta for that year. The plans of Konon<a id="FNanchor_622"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_622" class="fnanchor">[622]</a> were extensive.
-He was the first to organize for the defence of Corinth, a
-mercenary force which was afterwards improved and conducted with
-greater efficiency by Iphikrates; and after he had finished the
-fortifications of Peiræus with the Long Walls, he employed himself
-in showing his force among the islands, for the purpose of laying
-the foundations of renewed maritime power for Athens. We even hear
-that he caused an Athenian envoy to be despatched to Dionysius
-at Syracuse, with the view of detaching that despot from Sparta,
-and bringing him into connection with Athens. Evagoras, despot
-of Salamis in Cyprus, the steady friend of Konon, was a party
-to this proposition, which he sought to strengthen by offering
-to Dionysius his sister in marriage.<a id="FNanchor_623"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_623" class="fnanchor">[623]</a> There was a basis
-of sympathy between them arising from the fact that Evagoras was
-at variance with the Phœnicians both in Phœnicia and Cyprus, while
-Dionysius was in active hostilities with the Carthaginians (their
-kinsmen and Colonists) in Sicily. Nevertheless, the proposition
-met with little or no success. We find Dionysius afterwards still
-continuing to act as an ally of Sparta.</p>
-
-<p>Profiting by the aid received from Pharnabazus, the Corinthians
-strengthened their fleet at Lechæum (their harbor in the Corinthian
-Gulf) so considerably, as to become masters of the Gulf, and<span
-class="pagenum"><a id="Page_326">[p. 326]</a></span> to occupy Rhium,
-one of the two opposite capes which bound its narrow entrance. To
-oppose them, the Lacedæmonians on their side were driven to greater
-maritime effort. More than one naval action seems to have taken
-place, in those waters where the prowess and skill of the Athenian
-admiral Phormion had been so signally displayed at the beginning of
-the Peloponnesian war. At length the Lacedæmonian admiral Herippidas,
-who succeeded to the command of the fleet after his predecessor
-Polemarchus had been slain in battle, compelled the Corinthians
-to abandon Rhium, and gradually recovered his ascendency in the
-Corinthian Gulf; <span class="replace" id="tn_3" title="In the
-printed book: with">which</span> his successor Teleutias, brother
-of Agesilaus, still farther completed.<a id="FNanchor_624"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_624" class="fnanchor">[624]</a></p>
-
-<p>While these transactions were going on (seemingly during the
-last half of 393 <small>B.C.</small> and the full year of 392
-<small>B.C.</small>), so as to put an end to the temporary naval
-preponderance of the Corinthians,—the latter were at the same time
-bearing the brunt of a desultory, but continued, land-warfare against
-the garrison of Lacedæmonians and Peloponnesians established at
-Sikyon. Both Corinth and Lechæum were partly defended by the presence
-of confederate troops, Bœotians, Argeians, Athenians, or mercenaries
-paid by Athens. But this did not protect the Corinthians against
-suffering great damage, in their lands and outlying properties, from
-the incursions of the enemy.</p>
-
-<p>The plain between Corinth and Sikyon,—fertile and extensive
-(speaking by comparison with Peloponnesus generally), and
-constituting a large part of the landed property of both cities,
-was rendered uncultivable during 393 and 392 <small>B.C.</small>;
-so that the Corinthian proprietors were obliged to withdraw
-their servants and cattle to Peiræum<a id="FNanchor_625"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_625" class="fnanchor">[625]</a> (a portion of
-the Corinthian territory without the Isthmus properly so called,
-north-east of the Akrokorinthus, in a line between that eminence
-and the Megarian harbor of Pegæ). Here the Sikyonian assailants
-could not reach them, because of the Long Walls of Corinth, which
-connected that city by a continuous fortification of twelve
-stadia (somewhat less than a mile and a half) with its harbor
-of Lechæum. Nevertheless, the loss to the proprietors of the
-deserted plain was still so great, that two successive seasons
-of it were quite enough to inspire them<span class="pagenum"><a
-id="Page_327">[p. 327]</a></span> with a strong aversion to
-the war;<a id="FNanchor_626"></a><a href="#Footnote_626"
-class="fnanchor">[626]</a> the more so, as the damage fell
-exclusively upon them—their allies in Bœotia, Athens, and<span
-class="pagenum"><a id="Page_328">[p. 328]</a></span> Argos, having
-as yet suffered nothing. Constant military service for defence, with
-the conversion of the city into a sort of besieged post, aggravated
-their discomfort. There was another circumstance also, doubtless
-not without influence. The consequences of the battle of Knidus had
-been, first, to put down the maritime empire of Sparta, and thus to
-diminish the fear which she inspired to the Corinthians; next, to
-rebuild the fortifications, and renovate the shipping, commercial as
-well as warlike, of Athens;—a revival well calculated to bring back
-a portion of that anti-Athenian jealousy and apprehension which the
-Corinthians had felt so strongly a few years before. Perhaps some
-of the trade at Corinth may have been actually driven away by the
-disturbance of the war, to the renewed fortifications and greater
-security of Peiræus.</p>
-
-<p>Fostered by this pressure of circumstances, the discontented
-philo-Laconian or peace-party which had always existed at Corinth,
-presently acquired sufficient strength, and manifested itself with
-sufficient publicity to give much alarm to the government. The
-Corinthian government had always been, and still was, oligarchical.
-In what manner the administrators or the council were renovated, or
-how long individuals continued in office, indeed, we do not know. But
-of democracy, with its legal, popular assemblies, open discussions
-and authoritative resolves, there was<span class="pagenum"><a
-id="Page_329">[p. 329]</a></span> nothing.<a id="FNanchor_627"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_627" class="fnanchor">[627]</a> Now the oligarchical
-persons actually in power were vehemently anti-Laconian, consisting
-of men who had partaken of the Persian funds and contracted alliance
-with Persia, besides compromising themselves irrevocably (like
-Timolaus) by the most bitter manifestations of hostile sentiment
-towards Sparta. These men found themselves menaced by a powerful
-opposition party, which had no constitutional means for making its
-sentiments predominant, and for accomplishing peaceably either
-a change of administrators or a change of public policy. It was
-only by an appeal to arms and violence that such a consummation
-could be brought about; a fact notorious to both parties,—so that
-the oligarchical administrators, informed of the meetings and
-conversations going on, knew well that they had to expect nothing
-less than the breaking out of a conspiracy. That such anticipations
-were well-founded, we gather even from the partial recital of
-Xenophon; who states that Pasimêlus, the philo-Laconian leader,
-was on his guard and in preparation,<a id="FNanchor_628"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_628" class="fnanchor">[628]</a>—and counts it to
-him as a virtue that shortly afterwards he opened the gates to the
-Lacedæmonians.</p>
-
-<p>Anticipating such conspiracy, the government resolved to prevent
-it by a <i>coup d’état</i>. They threw themselves upon the assistance
-of their allies, invited in a body of Argeians, and made their
-blow the more sure by striking it on the last day of the festival
-called Eukleia, when it was least expected. Their proceeding,
-though dictated by precaution, was executed with the extreme of
-brutal ferocity aggravated by sacrilege; in a manner very different
-from the deep-laid artifices recently practised by the Spartan
-ephors when they were in like manner afraid of the conspiracy of
-Kinadon,—and more like the oligarchical conspirators at Korkyra
-(in the third year of the Peloponnesian war) when they broke into
-the assembled Senate, and massacred Peithias, with sixty<span
-class="pagenum"><a id="Page_330">[p. 330]</a></span> others in
-the senate-house.<a id="FNanchor_629"></a><a href="#Footnote_629"
-class="fnanchor">[629]</a> While the choice performers at Corinth
-were contending for the prize in the theatre, with judges formally
-named to decide,—and while the market-place around was crowded
-with festive spectators,—a number of armed men were introduced,
-probably Argeians, with leaders designating the victims whom they
-were to strike. Some of these select victims were massacred in the
-market-place, others in the theatre, and one even while sitting as
-a judge in the theatre. Others again fled in terror to embrace the
-altars or statues in the market-place,—which sanctuary, nevertheless,
-did not save their lives. Nor was such sacrilege arrested,—repugnant
-as it was to the feelings of the assembled spectators and to
-Grecian feelings generally,—until one hundred and twenty persons
-had perished.<a id="FNanchor_630"></a><a href="#Footnote_630"
-class="fnanchor">[630]</a> But the persons slain were chiefly
-elderly men; for the younger portion of the philo-Laconian party,
-suspecting some mischief, had declined attending the festival, and
-kept themselves separately assembled under their leader Pasimêlus
-in the gymnasium and cyprus-grove called Kranium, just without
-the city-gates. We find, too, that they were not only assembled,
-but actually in arms. For the moment that they heard the clamor
-in the market-place, and learned from some fugitives what was
-going on, they rushed up at once to the Akrokorinthus (or eminence
-and acropolis overhanging the city) and got possession of the
-citadel,—which they maintained with such force and courage that the
-Argeians and the Corinthians, who took part with the government,
-were repulsed in the attempt to dislodge them. This circumstance,
-indirectly revealed in the one-sided narrative of Xenophon, lets
-us into the real state of the city, and affords good ground for
-believing that Pasimêlus and his friends were prepared beforehand
-for an armed outbreak, but waited to execute it, until the festival
-was over,—a scruple which the government, in their eagerness to
-forestall the plot, disregarded,—employing the hands and weapons
-of Argeians who were comparatively unimpressed by solemnities
-peculiar to Corinth.<a id="FNanchor_631"></a><a href="#Footnote_631"
-class="fnanchor">[631]</a></p>
-
-<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_331">[p. 331]</a></span></p>
-
-<p>Though Pasimêlus and his friends were masters of the citadel,
-and had repulsed the assault of their enemies, yet the <i>coup
-d’état</i><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_332">[p. 332]</a></span>
-had been completely successful in overawing their party in the
-city, and depriving them of all means of communicating with the
-Lacedæmonians at Sikyon. Feeling unable to maintain themselves, they
-were besides frightened by menacing omens, when they came to offer
-sacrifice, in order that they might learn whether the gods encouraged
-them to fight or not. The victims were found so alarming, as to drive
-them to evacuate the post and prepare for voluntary exile. Many of
-them (according to Diodorus five hundred)<a id="FNanchor_632"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_632" class="fnanchor">[632]</a> actually went
-into exile; while others, and among them Pasimêlus himself, were
-restrained by the entreaties of their friends and relatives, combined
-with solemn assurances of peace and security from the government;
-who now, probably, felt themselves victorious, and were anxious to
-mitigate the antipathies which their recent violence had inspired.
-These pacific assurances were faithfully kept, and no farther
-mischief was done to any citizen.</p>
-
-<p>But the political condition of Corinth was materially altered, by
-an extreme intimacy of alliance and communion now formed with Argos;
-perhaps combined with reciprocal rights of intermarriage, and of
-purchase and sale. The boundary pillars or hedges which separated the
-two territories, were pulled up, and the city was entitled <i>Argos</i>
-instead of <i>Corinth</i> (says Xenophon); such was probably the invidious
-phrase in which the opposition party described the very close
-political union now formed between the two cities; upheld by a strong
-Argeian force in the city and acropolis, together with some Athenian
-mercenaries under Iphikrates, and some Bœotians as a garrison in
-the port of Lechæum. Most probably the government remained still
-Corinthian, and still oligarchical, as before. But it now rested upon
-Argeian aid, and was therefore dependent chiefly upon Argos, though
-partly also upon the other two allies.</p>
-
-<p>To Pasimêlus and his friends such a state of things
-was intol<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_333">[p.
-333]</a></span>erable. Though personally they had no ill-usage
-to complain of, yet the complete predominance of their political
-enemies was quite sufficient to excite their most vehement
-antipathies. They entered into secret correspondence with Praxitas,
-the Lacedæmonian commander at Sikyon, engaging to betray to him
-one of the gates in the western Long Wall between Corinth and
-Lechæum. The scheme being concerted, Pasimêlus and his partisans got
-themselves placed,<a id="FNanchor_633"></a><a href="#Footnote_633"
-class="fnanchor">[633]</a> partly by contrivance and partly by
-accident, on the night-watch at this gate; an imprudence, which shows
-that the government not only did not maltreat them, but even admitted
-them to trust. At the moment fixed, Praxitas,—presenting himself
-with a Lacedæmonian <i>mora</i> or regiment, a Sikyonian force, and the
-Corinthian exiles,—found the treacherous sentinels prepared to open
-the gates. Having first sent in a trusty soldier to satisfy him that
-there was no deceit,<a id="FNanchor_634"></a><a href="#Footnote_634"
-class="fnanchor">[634]</a> he then conducted all his force within the
-gates, into the mid-space between the two Long Walls. So broad was
-this space, and so inadequate did his numbers appear to maintain it,
-that he took the precaution of digging a cross-ditch with a palisade
-to defend himself on the side towards the city; which he was enabled
-to do undisturbed, since the enemy (we are not told why) did not
-attack him all the next day. On the ensuing day, however, Argeians,
-Corinthians, and Athenian mercenaries under Iphikrates, all came
-down from the city in full force; the latter stood on the right of
-the line, along the eastern wall, opposed to the Corinthian exiles
-on the Lacedæmonian left; while the Lacedæmonians themselves were on
-their own right, opposed to the Corinthians from the city; and the
-Argeians, opposed to the Sikyonians, in the centre.</p>
-
-<p>It was here that the battle began; the Argeians, bold
-from superior numbers, attacked and broke the Sikyonians,
-tearing up the palisade, and pursuing them down to the sea
-with much slaugh<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_334">[p.
-334]</a></span>ter;<a id="FNanchor_635"></a><a href="#Footnote_635"
-class="fnanchor">[635]</a> upon which Pasimachus the Lacedæmonian
-commander of cavalry, coming to their aid, caused his small body
-of horsemen to dismount and tie their horses to trees, and then
-armed them with shields taken from the Sikyonians, inscribed on the
-outside with the letter Sigma (Σ). With these he approached on foot
-to attack the Argeians, who, mistaking them for Sikyonians, rushed
-to the charge with alacrity; upon which Pasimachus exclaimed,—“By
-the two gods, Argeians, these Sigmas which you see here will
-deceive you;” he then closed with them resolutely, but his number
-was so inferior that he was soon overpowered and slain. Meanwhile,
-the Corinthian exiles on the left had driven back Iphikrates with
-his mercenaries (doubtless chiefly light troops) and pursued them
-even to the city gates; while the Lacedæmonians, easily repelling
-the Corinthians opposed to them, came out of their palisade, and
-planted themselves with their faces towards the eastern wall, but
-at a little distance from it, to intercept the Argeians on their
-return. The latter were forced to run back as they could, huddling
-close along the eastern wall, with their right or unshielded side
-exposed, as they passed, to the spears of the Lacedæmonians. Before
-they could get to the walls of Corinth, they were met and roughly
-handled by the victorious Corinthian exiles. And even when they came
-to the walls, those within, unwilling to throw open the gates for
-fear of admitting the enemy, contented themselves with handing down
-ladders, over which the defeated Argeians clambered with distress
-and difficulty. Altogether, their loss in this disastrous retreat
-was frightful. Their dead (says Xenophon) lay piled up like heaps
-of stones or wood.<a id="FNanchor_636"></a><a href="#Footnote_636"
-class="fnanchor">[636]</a></p>
-
-<p>This victory of Praxitas and the Lacedæmonians, though it did
-not yet make them masters of Lechæum,<a id="FNanchor_637"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_637" class="fnanchor">[637]</a> was, nevertheless,
-of<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_335">[p. 335]</a></span>
-considerable importance. Shortly afterwards they received
-reinforcements which enabled them to turn it to still better account.
-The first measure of Praxitas was to pull down a considerable breadth
-of the two walls, leaving a breach which opened a free passage for
-any Lacedæmonian army from Sikyon to reach and pass the isthmus. He
-then marched his troops through the breach, forward on the road to
-Megara, capturing the two Corinthian dependencies of Krommyon and
-Sidus on the Saronic gulf, in which he placed garrisons. Returning
-back by the road south of Corinth, he occupied Epieikia on the
-frontier of Epidaurus, as a protection to the territory of the latter
-against incursions from Corinth,—and then disbanded his army.</p>
-
-<p>A desultory warfare was carried on during the ensuing winter
-and spring between the opposite garrisons in Corinth and Sikyon.
-It was now that the Athenian Iphikrates, in the former place,
-began to distinguish himself at the head of his mercenary peltasts
-whom, after their first organization by Konon, he had trained
-to effective tactics under the strictest discipline, and whose
-movements he conducted with consummate skill. His genius introduced
-improvements both in their armor and in their clothing. He lengthened
-by one half both the light javelin and the short sword, which
-the Thracian peltasts habitually carried; he devised a species
-of leggings, known afterwards by the name of Iphikratides; and
-he thus combined, better than had ever been done before, rapid
-motion,—power of acting in difficult ground and open order,—effective
-attack, either by missiles or hand to hand, and dexterous retreat
-in case of need.<a id="FNanchor_638"></a><a href="#Footnote_638"
-class="fnanchor">[638]</a> As yet, he was but a young officer,
-in<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_337">[p. 337]</a></span>
-the beginning of his military career.<a id="FNanchor_639"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_639" class="fnanchor">[639]</a> We must therefore
-presume that these improvements were chiefly of later date,
-the suggestions of his personal experience; but even now, the
-successes of his light troops were remarkable. Attacking Phlius,
-he entrapped the Phliasians into an ambuscade, and inflicted on
-them a defeat so destructive that they were obliged to invoke the
-aid of a Lacedæmonian garrison for the protection of their city.
-He gained a victory near Sikyon, and carried his incursions over
-all Arcadia, to the very gates of the cities; damaging the Arcadian
-hoplites so severely, that they became afraid to meet him in the
-field. His own peltasts, however, though full of confidence against
-these Peloponnesian hoplites, still retained their awe and their
-reluctance to fight against Lacedæmonians;<a id="FNanchor_640"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_640" class="fnanchor">[640]</a> who, on their side,
-despised them, but despised their own allies still more. “Our
-friends fear these peltasts, as children fear hobgoblins,”—said
-the Lacedæmonians, sarcastically, endeavoring to set the example
-of courage by ostentatious demonstrations of their own around the
-walls of Corinth.<a id="FNanchor_641"></a><a href="#Footnote_641"
-class="fnanchor">[641]</a></p>
-
-<p>The breach made in the Long Walls of Corinth by Praxitas had
-laid open the road for a Peloponnesian army to march either into
-Attica or Bœotia.<a id="FNanchor_642"></a><a href="#Footnote_642"
-class="fnanchor">[642]</a> Fortunately for the Athenians, they
-had<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_338">[p. 338]</a></span>
-already completed the rebuilding of their own Long Walls;
-but they were so much alarmed by the new danger, that they
-marched with their full force, and with masons and carpenters
-accompanying,<a id="FNanchor_643"></a><a href="#Footnote_643"
-class="fnanchor">[643]</a> to Corinth. Here, with that celerity of
-work for which they were distinguished,<a id="FNanchor_644"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_644" class="fnanchor">[644]</a> they in a few days
-reëstablished completely the western wall; the more important of
-the two, since it formed the barrier against the incursions of the
-Lacedæmonians from Sikyon. They had then a secure position, and could
-finish the eastern wall at their leisure; which they accordingly did,
-and then retired, leaving it to the confederate troops in Corinth to
-defend.</p>
-
-<p>This advantage, however,—a very material one,—was again overthrown
-by the expedition of the Lacedæmonian king, Agesilaus, during the
-same summer. At the head of a full Lacedæmonian and Peloponnesian
-force, he first marched into the territory of Argos, and there
-spent some time in ravaging all the cultivated plain. From hence he
-passed over the mountain-road, by Tenea,<a id="FNanchor_645"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_645" class="fnanchor">[645]</a><span
-class="pagenum"><a id="Page_339">[p. 339]</a></span> into
-the plain of Corinth, to the foot of the newly-repaired Long
-Walls. Here his brother Teleutias, who had recently superseded
-Herippidas as admiral in the Corinthian Gulf, came to coöperate
-with him in a joint attack, by sea and land, on the new walls
-and on Lechæum.<a id="FNanchor_646"></a><a href="#Footnote_646"
-class="fnanchor">[646]</a> The presence of this naval force
-rendered the Long Walls difficult to maintain, since troops could
-be disembarked in the interval between them, where the Sikyonians
-in the previous battle had been beaten and pursued down to the sea.
-Agesilaus and Teleutias were strong enough to defeat the joint force
-of the four confederated armies, and to master not only the Long
-Walls, but also the port of Lechæum,<a id="FNanchor_647"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_647" class="fnanchor">[647]</a> with its docks, and
-the ships<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_340">[p. 340]</a></span>
-within them; thus breaking up the naval power of Corinth in the
-Krissæan Gulf. Lechæum now became a permanent post of hostility
-against Corinth, occupied by a Lacedæmonian garrison, and
-occasionally by the Corinthian exiles, while any second rebuilding of
-the Corinthian Long Walls by the Athenians became impossible. After
-this important success, Agesilaus returned to Sparta. Neither he
-nor his Lacedæmonian hoplites, especially the Amyklæans, were ever
-willingly absent from the festival of the Hyakinthia; nor did he now
-disdain to take his station in the chorus,<a id="FNanchor_648"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_648" class="fnanchor">[648]</a> under the orders of
-the choric conductor, for the pæan in honor of Apollo.</p>
-
-<p>It was thus that the Long Walls, though rebuilt by the Athenians
-in the preceding year, were again permanently overthrown, and the
-road for Lacedæmonian armies to march beyond the isthmus once more
-laid open. So much were the Athenians and the Bœotians alarmed at
-this new success, that both appear to have<span class="pagenum"><a
-id="Page_341">[p. 341]</a></span> become desirous of peace, and to
-have sent envoys to Sparta. The Thebans are said to have offered
-to recognize Orchomenus (which was now occupied by a Lacedæmonian
-garrison) as autonomous and disconnected from the Bœotian federation;
-while the Athenian envoys seem to have been favorably received
-at Sparta, and to have found the Lacedæmonians disposed to make
-peace on better terms than those which had been proposed during
-the late discussions with Tiribazus (hereafter to be noticed;)
-recognizing the newly built Athenian walls, restoring Lemnos,
-Imbros, and Skyros to Athens, and guaranteeing autonomy to each
-separate city in the Grecian world. The Athenian envoys at Sparta
-having provisionally accepted these terms, forty days were allowed
-for reference to the people of Athens; to which place Lacedæmonian
-envoys were sent as formal bearers of the propositions. The Argeians
-and Corinthians, however, strenuously opposed the thoughts of
-peace, urging the Athenians to continue the war; besides which, it
-appears that many Athenian citizens thought that large restitution
-ought to have been made of Athenian property forfeited at the end
-of the late war, and that the Thracian Chersonese ought to have
-been given back as well as the three islands. On these and other
-grounds, the Athenian people refused to sanction the recommendation
-of their envoys; though Andokides, one of those envoys, in a
-discourse still extant, earnestly advised that they should accept
-the peace.<a id="FNanchor_649"></a><a href="#Footnote_649"
-class="fnanchor">[649]</a></p> <p><span class="pagenum"><a
-id="Page_342">[p. 342]</a></span></p> <p>The war being thus
-continued, Corinth, though defended by a considerable confederate
-force, including Athenian hoplites under<span class="pagenum"><a
-id="Page_343">[p. 343]</a></span> Kallias, and peltasts under
-Iphikrates, became much pressed by the hostile posts at Lechæum as
-well as at Krommyon and Sidus,—and by its own exiles as the most
-active of all enemies. Still, however, there remained the peninsula
-and the fortification of Peiræum as an undisturbed shelter for the
-Corinthian servants and cattle, and a source of subsistence for
-the city. Peiræum was an inland post north-east of Corinth, in the
-centre of that peninsula which separates the two innermost recesses
-of the Krissæan Gulf,—the bay of Lechæum on its south-west, the bay
-called Alkyonis, between Kreusis and Olmiæ (now Psatho Bay), on its
-north-east. Across this latter bay Corinth communicated easily,
-through Peiræum and the fortified port of Œnoê, with Kreusis the port
-of Thespiæ in Bœotia.<a id="FNanchor_650"></a><a href="#Footnote_650"
-class="fnanchor">[650]</a> The Corinthian exiles now prevailed upon
-Agesilaus to repeat his invasion of the territory, partly in order
-that they might deprive the city of the benefits which it derived
-from Peiræum,—partly in order that they might also appropriate to
-themselves the honor of celebrating the Isthmian games, which were
-just approaching. The Spartan king accordingly marched forth, at the
-head of a force composed of Lacedæmonians and of the Peloponnesian
-allies, first to Lechæum, and thence to the Isthmus, specially so
-called; that is, the sacred precinct of Poseidon near Schœnus on the
-Saronic Gulf, at the narrowest breadth of the Isthmus, where the
-biennial Isthmian festival was celebrated.</p>
-
-<p>It was the month of April, or beginning of May, and the festival
-had actually begun, under the presidency of the Corinthians from
-the city who were in alliance with Argos; a body of Argeians being
-present as guards.<a id="FNanchor_651"></a><a href="#Footnote_651"
-class="fnanchor">[651]</a> But on the approach of Agesilaus,<span
-class="pagenum"><a id="Page_344">[p. 344]</a></span> they immediately
-retired to the city by the road to Kenchreæ, leaving their sacrifices
-half-finished. Not thinking fit to disturb their retreat, Agesilaus
-proceeded first to offer sacrifice himself, and then took a position
-close at hand, in the sacred ground of Poseidon, while the Corinthian
-exiles went through the solemnities in due form, and distributed the
-parsley wreaths to the victors. After remaining three days, Agesilaus
-marched away to attack Peiræum. He had no sooner departed, than the
-Corinthians from the city came forth, celebrated the festival and
-distributed the wreaths a second time.</p>
-
-<p>Peiræum was occupied by so numerous a guard, comprising
-Iphikrates and his peltasts, that Agesilaus, instead of directly
-attacking it, resorted to the stratagem of making a sudden
-retrograde march directly towards Corinth. Probably, many of the
-citizens were at that moment absent for the second celebration of
-the festival; so that those remaining within, on hearing of the
-approach of Agesilaus, apprehended a plot to betray the city to
-him, and sent in haste to Peiræum to summon back Iphikrates with
-his peltasts. Having learned that these troops had passed by in
-the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_345">[p. 345]</a></span>
-night, Agesilaus forthwith again turned his course and marched
-back to Peiræum, which he himself approached by the ordinary road,
-coasting round along the bay of Lechæum, near the Therma, or warm
-springs, which are still discernible;<a id="FNanchor_652"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_652" class="fnanchor">[652]</a> while he sent a mora
-or division of troops to get round the place by a mountain-road more
-in the interior, ascending some woody heights commanding the town,
-and crowned by a temple of Poseidon.<a id="FNanchor_653"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_653" class="fnanchor">[653]</a> The movement was
-quite effectual. The garrison and inhabitants of Peiræum, seeing
-that the place had become indefensible, abandoned it the next day
-with all their cattle and property, to take refuge in the Heræum,
-or sacred ground of Hêrê Akræa near the western cape of the
-peninsula. While Agesilaus marched thither towards the coast in
-pursuit of them, the troops descending from the heights attacked
-and captured Œnoê,<a id="FNanchor_654"></a><a href="#Footnote_654"
-class="fnanchor">[654]</a>—the Corinthian town of that name situated
-near the Alkyonian bay over against Kreusis in Bœotia. A large booty
-here fell into their hands, which was still farther augmented by
-the speedy surrender of all in the Heræum to Agesilaus, without
-conditions. Called upon to determine the fate of the prisoners, among
-whom were included men,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_346">[p.
-346]</a></span> women, and children,—freemen and slaves,—with
-cattle and other property,—Agesilaus ordered that all those who
-had taken part in the massacre at Corinth, in the market-place,
-should be handed over to the vengeance of the exiles; and that
-all the rest should be sold as slaves.<a id="FNanchor_655"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_655" class="fnanchor">[655]</a> Though he did not
-here inflict any harder measure than was usual in Grecian warfare,
-the reader who reflects that this sentence, pronounced by one
-on the whole more generous than most contemporary commanders,
-condemned numbers of free Corinthian men and women to a life of
-degradation, if not of misery,—will understand by contrast the
-encomiums with which in my last volume I set forth the magnanimity
-of Kallikratidas after the capture of Methymna; when he refused, in
-spite of the importunity of his allies, to sell either the Methymnæan
-or the Athenian captives,—and when he proclaimed the exalted
-principle, that no free Greek should be sold into slavery by any
-permission of his.<a id="FNanchor_656"></a><a href="#Footnote_656"
-class="fnanchor">[656]</a></p>
-
-<p>As the Lacedæmonians had been before masters of Lechæum,
-Krommyon, and Sidus, this last success shut up Corinth on its
-other side, and cut off its communication with Bœotia. The city
-not being in condition to hold out much longer, the exiles
-already began to lay their plans for surprising it by aid of
-friends within.<a id="FNanchor_657"></a><a href="#Footnote_657"
-class="fnanchor">[657]</a> So triumphant was the position of
-Agesilaus, that his enemies were all in alarm, and the Thebans,
-as well as others, sent fresh envoys to him to solicit peace. His
-antipathy towards the Thebans was so vehement, that it was a great
-personal satisfaction to him to see them thus humiliated. He even
-treated their envoys with marked contempt, affecting not to notice
-them when they stood close by, though Pharax, the proxenus of Thebes
-at Sparta, was preparing to introduce them.</p>
-
-<p>Absorbed in this overweening pride and exultation over
-conquered enemies, Agesilaus was sitting in a round pavilion, on
-the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_347">[p. 347]</a></span>
-banks of the lake adjoining the Heræum,<a id="FNanchor_658"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_658" class="fnanchor">[658]</a>—with his eyes fixed
-on the long train of captives brought out under the guard of armed
-Lacedæmonian hoplites, themselves the object of admiration to a
-crowd of spectators,<a id="FNanchor_659"></a><a href="#Footnote_659"
-class="fnanchor">[659]</a>—when news arrived, as if under the special
-intervention of retributive Nemesis, which changed unexpectedly the
-prospect of affairs.<a id="FNanchor_660"></a><a href="#Footnote_660"
-class="fnanchor">[660]</a> A horseman was seen galloping up, his
-horse foaming with sweat. To the many inquiries addressed, he
-returned no answer, nor did he stop until he sprang from his horse
-at the feet of Agesilaus; to whom, with sorrowful tone and features,
-he made his communication. Immediately Agesilaus started up, seized
-his spear, and desired the herald to summon his principal officers.
-On their coming near, he directed them, together with the guards
-around, to accompany him without a moment’s delay; leaving orders
-with the general body of the troops to follow as soon as they should
-have snatched some rapid refreshment. He then immediately put himself
-in march; but he had not gone far when three fresh horsemen met and
-informed him, that the task which he was hastening to perform had
-already been accomplished. Upon this he ordered a halt and returned
-to the Heræum; where on the ensuing day, to countervail the bad news,
-he sold all his captives by auction.<a id="FNanchor_661"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_661" class="fnanchor">[661]</a></p>
-
-<p>This bad news,—the arrival of which has been so graphically<span
-class="pagenum"><a id="Page_348">[p. 348]</a></span> described by
-Xenophon, himself probably among the bystanders and companions of
-Agesilaus,—was nothing less than the defeat and destruction of a
-Lacedæmonian <i>mora</i> or military division by the light troops under
-Iphikrates. As it was an understood privilege of the Amyklæan
-hoplites in the Lacedæmonian army always to go home, even when on
-actual service, to the festival of the Hyakinthia, Agesilaus had left
-all of them at Lechæum. The festival day being now at hand, they set
-off to return. But the road from Lechæum to Sikyon lay immediately
-under the walls of Corinth, so that their march was not safe without
-an escort. Accordingly the polemarch commanding at Lechæum, leaving
-that place for the time under watch by the Peloponnesian allies,
-put himself at the head of the Lacedæmonian <i>mora</i> which formed the
-habitual garrison, consisting of six hundred hoplites, and of a
-<i>mora</i> of cavalry (number unknown)—to protect the Amyklæans until
-they were out of danger from the enemy at Corinth. Having passed
-by Corinth, and reached a point within about three miles of the
-friendly town of Sikyon, he thought the danger over, and turned back
-with his <i>mora</i> of hoplites to Lechæum; still, however, leaving
-the officer of cavalry with orders to accompany the Amyklæans as
-much farther as they might choose, and afterwards to follow him on
-the return march.<a id="FNanchor_662"></a><a href="#Footnote_662"
-class="fnanchor">[662]</a></p>
-
-<p>Though the Amyklæans (probably not very numerous) were presumed to
-be in danger of attack from Corinth in their march, and though the
-force in that town was known to be considerable, it never occurred
-to the Lacedæmonian polemarch that there was any similar danger for
-his own <i>mora</i> of six hundred hoplites; so contemptuous was his
-estimate of the peltasts, and so strong was the apprehension which
-these peltasts were known to entertain of the Lacedæmonians. But
-Iphikrates, who had let the whole body march by undisturbed, when he
-now saw from the walls of Corinth the six hundred hoplites returning
-separately, without either cavalry or light troops, conceived the
-idea,—perhaps, in the existing state of men’s minds, no one else
-would have conceived it,—of attacking them with his peltasts as
-they repassed near the town. Kallias, the general of the Athenian
-hoplites in Corinth, warmly seconding the project, marched out his
-troops, and arrayed them<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_349">[p.
-349]</a></span> in battle order not far from the gates; while
-Iphikrates with his peltasts began his attack upon the Lacedæmonian
-<i>mora</i> in flanks and rear. Approaching within missile distance,
-he poured upon them a shower of darts and arrows, which killed or
-wounded several, especially on the unshielded side. Upon this the
-polemarch ordered a halt, directed the youngest soldiers to drive off
-the assailants, and confided the wounded to the care of attendants
-to be carried forward to Lechæum.<a id="FNanchor_663"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_663" class="fnanchor">[663]</a> But even the youngest
-soldiers, encumbered by their heavy shields, could not reach their
-nimbler enemies, who were trained to recede before them. And when,
-after an unavailing pursuit, they sought to resume their places in
-the ranks, the attack was renewed, so that nine or ten of them were
-slain before they could get back. Again did the polemarch give orders
-to march forward; again the peltasts renewed their attack, forcing
-him to halt; again he ordered the younger soldiers (this time, all
-those between eighteen and thirty-three years of age, whereas on the
-former occasion, it had been those between eighteen and twenty-eight)
-to rush out and drive them off.<a id="FNanchor_664"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_664" class="fnanchor">[664]</a> But the result
-was just the same: the pursuers accomplished nothing, and only
-suffered increased loss of their bravest and most forward<span
-class="pagenum"><a id="Page_350">[p. 350]</a></span> soldiers, when
-they tried to rejoin the main body. Whenever the Lacedæmonians
-attempted to make progress, these circumstances were again repeated,
-to their great loss and discouragement; while the peltasts became
-every moment more confident and vigorous.</p>
-
-<p>Some relief was now afforded to the distressed <i>mora</i> by the
-coming up of their cavalry, which had finished the escort of the
-Amyklæans. Had this cavalry been with them at the beginning, the
-result might have been different; but it was now insufficient
-to repress the animated assaults of the peltasts. Moreover, the
-Lacedæmonian horsemen were at no time very good, nor did they on
-this occasion venture to push their pursuit to a greater range than
-the younger hoplites could keep up with them. At length, after
-much loss in killed and wounded, and great distress to all, the
-polemarch contrived to get his detachment as far as an eminence
-about a quarter of a mile from the sea and about two miles from
-Lechæum. Here, while Iphikrates still continued to harass them
-with his peltasts, Kallias also was marching up with his hoplites
-to charge them hand to hand,—when the Lacedæmonians, enfeebled in
-numbers, exhausted in strength, and too much dispirited for close
-fight with a new enemy, broke and fled in all directions. Some took
-the road to Lechæum, which place a few of them reached, along with
-the cavalry; the rest ran towards the sea at the nearest point,
-and observing that some of their friends were rowing in boats from
-Lechæum along the shore to rescue them, threw themselves into
-the sea, to wade or swim towards this new succor. But the active
-peltasts, irresistible in the pursuit of broken hoplites, put the
-last hand to the destruction of the unfortunate <i>mora</i>. Out of its
-full muster of six hundred, a very small proportion survived to
-reënter Lechæum.<a id="FNanchor_665"></a><a href="#Footnote_665"
-class="fnanchor">[665]</a></p> <p><span class="pagenum"><a
-id="Page_351">[p. 351]</a></span></p> <p>The horseman who first
-communicated the disaster to Agesilaus, had started off express
-immediately from Lechæum, even before the bodies of the slain had
-been picked up for burial. The hurried movement of Agesilaus had been
-dictated by the desire of reaching the field in time to contend for
-the possession of the bodies, and to escape the shame of soliciting
-the burial-truce. But the three horsemen who met him afterwards,
-arrested his course by informing him that the bodies had already been
-buried, under truce asked and obtained; which authorized Iphikrates
-to erect his well-earned trophy on the spot where he had first
-made the attack.<a id="FNanchor_666"></a><a href="#Footnote_666"
-class="fnanchor">[666]</a></p>
-
-<p>Such a destruction of an entire division of Lacedæmonian hoplites,
-by light troops who stood in awe of them and whom they despised,
-was an incident, not indeed of great political importance, but
-striking in respect of military effect and impression upon the
-Grecian mind. Nothing at all like it had occurred since the memorable
-capture of Sphakteria, thirty-five years before; a disaster less
-considerable in one respect, that the number of hoplites beaten was
-inferior by one-third,—but far more important in another respect,
-that half the division had surrendered as prisoners; whereas in the
-battle near Corinth, though the whole mora (except a few fugitives)
-perished, it does not seem that a single prisoner was taken. Upon
-the Corinthians, Bœotians, and other enemies of Sparta, the event
-operated as a joyous encouragement, reviving them out of all their
-previous despondency. Even by the allies of Sparta, jealous of her
-superiority and bound to her by fear more than by attachment, it
-was welcomed with ill-suppressed satisfaction. But upon the army of
-Agesilaus (and doubtless upon the Lacedæmonians at home) it fell
-like a sudden thunderbolt, causing the strongest manifestations of
-sorrow and<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_352">[p. 352]</a></span>
-sympathy. To these manifestations there was only one exception,—the
-fathers, brothers, or sons of the slain warriors; who not only showed
-no sorrow, but strutted about publicly with cheerful and triumphant
-countenances, like victorious athletes.<a id="FNanchor_667"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_667" class="fnanchor">[667]</a> We shall find
-the like phenomenon at Sparta a few years subsequently, after
-the far more terrible defeat at Leuktra; the relatives of the
-slain were joyous and elate,—those of the survivors, downcast
-and mortified;<a id="FNanchor_668"></a><a href="#Footnote_668"
-class="fnanchor">[668]</a> a fact strikingly characteristic both
-of the intense mental effect of the Spartan training, and of the
-peculiar associations which it generated. We may understand how
-terrible was the contempt which awaited a Spartan who survived
-defeat, when we find fathers positively rejoicing that their sons had
-escaped such treatment by death.</p>
-
-<p>Sorely was Agesilaus requited for his supercilious insult towards
-the Theban envoys. When he at last consented to see them, after the
-news of the battle, their tone was completely altered. They said not
-a word about peace, but merely asked permission to pass through and
-communicate with their countrymen in Corinth. “I understand your
-purpose (said Agesilaus, smiling),—you want to witness the triumph
-of your friends, and see what it is worth. Come along with me, and
-I will teach you.” Accordingly, on the next day, he caused them to
-accompany him while he marched his army up to the very gates of
-Corinth,—defying those within to come out and fight. The lands had
-been so ravaged, that there remained little to destroy. But wherever
-there were any fruit-trees yet standing, the Lacedæmonians now cut
-them down. Iphikrates was too prudent to compromise his recent
-advantage by hazarding a second battle; so that Agesilaus had only
-the satisfaction of showing that he was master of the field, and
-then retired to encamp at Lechæum; from whence he sent back the
-Theban envoys by sea to Kreusis. Having then left a fresh mora or
-division at Lechæum, in place of that which had been defeated,<span
-class="pagenum"><a id="Page_353">[p. 353]</a></span> he marched
-back to Sparta. But the circumstances of the march betrayed his
-real feelings, thinly disguised by the recent bravado of marching
-up to the gates of Corinth. He feared to expose his Lacedæmonian
-troops even to the view of those allies through whose territory he
-was to pass; so well was he aware that the latter (especially the
-Mantineians) would manifest their satisfaction at the recent defeat.
-Accordingly, he commenced his day’s march before dawn, and did
-not halt for the night till after dark; at Mantineia, he not only
-did not halt at all, but passed by, outside of the walls, before
-day had broken.<a id="FNanchor_669"></a><a href="#Footnote_669"
-class="fnanchor">[669]</a> There cannot be a more convincing proof
-of the real dispositions of the allies towards Sparta, and of the
-sentiment of compulsion which dictated their continued adherence; a
-fact which we shall see abundantly illustrated as we advance in the
-stream of the history.</p>
-
-<p>The retirement of Agesilaus was the signal for renewed enterprise
-on the part of Iphikrates; who retook Sidus and Krommyon, which had
-been garrisoned by Praxitas,—as well as Peiræum and Œnoê, which had
-been left under occupation by Agesilaus. Corinth was thus cleared
-of enemies on its eastern and north-eastern sides. And though the
-Lacedæmonians still carried on a desultory warfare from Lechæum,
-yet such was the terror impressed by the late destruction of their
-mora, that the Corinthian exiles at Sikyon did not venture to march
-by land from that place to Lechæum, under the walls of Corinth,—but
-communicated with Lechæum only by sea.<a id="FNanchor_670"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_670" class="fnanchor">[670]</a> In truth, we hear
-of no farther serious military operations undertaken by Sparta
-against Corinth, before the peace of Antalkidas. And the place
-became so secure, that the Corinthian leaders and their Argeian
-allies were glad to dispense with the presence of Iphikrates. That
-officer had gained so much glory by his recent successes, which the
-Athenian orators<a id="FNanchor_671"></a><a href="#Footnote_671"
-class="fnanchor">[671]</a> even in the next generation never ceased
-to extol, that his temper, naturally haughty, became domineering;
-and he tried to procure, either for Athens or for himself, the
-mastery of Corinth,—putting to death some of the philo-Argeian
-leaders. We know these circumstances only by brief and meagre
-allusion; but they caused<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_354">[p.
-354]</a></span> the Athenians to recall Iphikrates with a large
-portion of his peltasts, and to send Chabrias to Corinth in
-his place.<a id="FNanchor_672"></a><a href="#Footnote_672"
-class="fnanchor">[672]</a></p>
-
-<p>It was either in the ensuing summer,—or perhaps immediately
-afterwards during the same summer,—390 <small>B.C.</small>, that
-Agesilaus undertook an expedition into Akarnania; at the instance of
-the Achæans, who threatened, if this were not done, to forsake the
-Lacedæmonian alliance. They had acquired possession of the Ætolian
-district of Kalydon, had brought the neighboring villagers into a
-city residence, and garrisoned it as a dependence of the Achæan
-confederacy. But the Akarnanians,—allies of Athens as well as Thebes,
-and aided by an Athenian squadron at Œniadæ,—attacked them there,
-probably at the invitation of a portion of the inhabitants, and
-pressed them so hard, that they employed the most urgent instances
-to obtain aid from Sparta. Agesilaus crossed the Gulf at Rhium with
-a considerable force of Spartans and allies, and the full muster of
-the Achæans. On his arrival the Akarnanians all took refuge in their
-cities, sending their cattle up into the interior highlands, to
-the borders of a remote lake. Agesilaus, having sent to Stratus to
-require them not merely to forbear hostilities against the Achæans,
-but to relinquish their alliance with Athens and Thebes, and to
-become allies of Sparta,—found his demands resisted, and began to
-lay waste the country. Two or three days of operations designedly
-slack, were employed to lull the Akarnanians into security; after
-which, by a rapid forced march, Agesilaus suddenly surprised the
-remote spot in which their cattle and slaves had been deposited
-for safety. He spent a day here to sell this booty; merchants,
-probably, accompanying his army. But he had considerable difficulty
-in his return march, from the narrow paths and high mountains
-through which he had to thread his way. By a series of brave and
-well-combined hill-movements,—which, probably, reminded Xenophon of
-his own operations against the Karduchians in the retreat of the
-Ten-Thousand,—he defeated and dispersed the Akarnanians, though not
-without suffering considerably from the excellence of their light
-troops. Yet he was not successful in his attack upon any<span
-class="pagenum"><a id="Page_355">[p. 355]</a></span> one of their
-cities, nor would he consent to prolong the war until seed-time,
-notwithstanding earnest solicitation from the Achæans, whom he
-pacified by engaging to return the next spring. He was, indeed,
-in a difficult and dangerous country, had not his retreat been
-facilitated by the compliance of the Ætolians; who calculated (though
-vainly) on obtaining from him the recovery of Naupaktus, then held
-(as well as Kalydon) by the Achæans.<a id="FNanchor_673"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_673" class="fnanchor">[673]</a> Partial as the
-success of this expedition had been, however, it inflicted
-sufficient damage on the Akarnanians to accomplish its purpose. On
-learning that it was about to be repeated in the ensuing spring,
-they sent envoys to Sparta to solicit peace; consenting to abstain
-from hostilities against the Achæans, and to enrol themselves as
-members of the Lacedæmonian confederacy.<a id="FNanchor_674"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_674" class="fnanchor">[674]</a></p>
-
-<p>It was in this same year that the Spartan authorities resolved on
-an expedition against Argos, of which Agesipolis, the other king,
-took the command. Having found the border sacrifices favorable, and
-crossed the frontier, he sent forward his army to Phlius, where the
-Peloponnesian allies were ordered to assemble; but he himself first
-turned aside to Olympia, to consult the oracle of Zeus.</p>
-
-<p>It had been the practice of the Argeians, seemingly on
-more than one previous occasion,<a id="FNanchor_675"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_675" class="fnanchor">[675]</a> when an invading
-Lacedæmonian army was approaching their territory, to meet them by
-a solemn message, intimating that it was the time of some festival
-(the Karneian, or other) held sacred by both parties, and warning
-them not to violate the frontier during the holy truce. This was
-in point of fact nothing better than a fraud; for the notice was
-sent, not at the moment when the Karneian festival (or other, as
-the case might be) ought to come on according to the due course
-of seasons, but at any time when it might serve the purpose of
-arresting a Lacedæmonian invasion. But though the duplicity of the
-Argeians was thus manifest, so strong were the pious scruples of the
-Spartan king, that he could hardly make up his mind to disregard
-the warning. Moreover, in the existing confusion of the calendar,
-there was always room for some uncertainty as to the question,<span
-class="pagenum"><a id="Page_356">[p. 356]</a></span> which was the
-true Karneian moon; no Dorian state having any right to fix it
-imperatively for the others, as the Eleians fixed the Olympic truce,
-and the Corinthians the Isthmian. It was with a view to satisfy his
-conscience on this subject that Agesipolis now went to Olympia, and
-put the question to the oracle of Zeus,—whether he might with a safe
-religious conscience refuse to accept the holy truce, if the Argeians
-should now tender it. The oracle, habitually dexterous in meeting a
-specific question with a general reply, informed him, that he might
-with a safe conscience decline a truce demanded wrongfully and for
-underhand purposes.<a id="FNanchor_676"></a><a href="#Footnote_676"
-class="fnanchor">[676]</a> This<span class="pagenum"><a
-id="Page_357">[p. 357]</a></span> was accepted by Agesipolis as a
-satisfactory affirmative. Nevertheless, to make assurance doubly
-sure, he went directly forward to Delphi, to put the same question
-to Apollo. As it would have been truly embarrassing, however, if the
-two holy replies had turned out such as to contradict each other, he
-availed himself of the <i>præjudicium</i> which he had already received at
-Olympia, and submitted the question to Apollo at Delphi in this form:
-“Is thine opinion on the question of the holy truce, the same as that
-of thy father (Zeus)?” “Most decidedly the same,” replied the god.
-Such double warranty, though the appeal was so drawn up as scarcely
-to leave to Apollo freedom of speech,<a id="FNanchor_677"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_677" class="fnanchor">[677]</a> enabled Agesipolis
-to return with full confidence to Phlius, where his army was already
-mustered; and to march immediately into the Argeian territory by the
-road of Nemea. Being met on the frontier by two heralds with wreaths
-and in solemn attire, who warned him that it was a season of holy
-truce, he informed them that the gods authorized his disobedience to
-their summons, and marched on into the Argeian plain.</p>
-
-<p>It happened that on the first evening after he had crossed the
-border, the supper and the consequent libation having been just
-concluded, an earthquake occurred; or, to translate the Greek phrase,
-“the god (Poseidon) shook.” To all Greeks, and to Lacedæmonians
-especially, this was a solemn event, and the personal companions of
-Agesipolis immediately began to sing the pæan in honor of Poseidon;
-the general impression among the soldiers being, that he would give
-orders for quitting the territory immediately, as Agis had acted
-in the invasion of Elis a few years be<span class="pagenum"><a
-id="Page_358">[p. 358]</a></span>fore. Perhaps Agesipolis would have
-done the same here, construing the earthquake as a warning that
-he had done wrong, in neglecting the summons of the heralds,—had
-he not been fortified by the recent oracles. He now replied, that
-if the earthquake had occurred before he crossed the frontier, he
-should have considered it as a prohibition; but as it came after his
-crossing, he looked upon it as an encouragement to go forward.</p>
-
-<p>So fully had the Argeians counted on the success of their warning
-transmitted by the heralds, that they had made little preparation
-for defence. Their dismay and confusion were very great; their
-property was still outlying, not yet removed into secure places, so
-that Agesipolis found much both to destroy and to appropriate. He
-carried his ravages even to the gates of the city, piquing himself on
-advancing a little farther than Agesilaus had gone in his invasion
-two years before. He was at last driven to retreat by the terror
-of a flash of lightning in his camp, which killed several persons.
-And a project which he had formed, of erecting a permanent fort on
-the Argeian frontier, was abandoned in consequence of unfavorable
-sacrifices.<a id="FNanchor_678"></a><a href="#Footnote_678"
-class="fnanchor">[678]</a></p>
-
-<p>Besides these transactions in and near the isthmus of
-Corinth, the war between Sparta and her enemies was prosecuted
-during the same years both in the islands and on the coast of
-Asia Minor; though our information is so imperfect that we can
-scarcely trace the thread of events. The defeat near Knidus (394
-<small>B.C.</small>),—the triumphant maritime force of Pharnabazus
-and Konon at the Isthmus of Corinth in the ensuing year (393
-<small>B.C.</small>),—the restoration of the Athenian Long Walls
-and fortified port,—and the activity of Konon with the fleet among
-the islands,<a id="FNanchor_679"></a><a href="#Footnote_679"
-class="fnanchor">[679]</a>—so alarmed the<span class="pagenum"><a
-id="Page_359">[p. 359]</a></span> Spartans with the idea of a second
-Athenian maritime empire, that they made every effort to detach the
-Persian force from the side of their enemies.</p>
-
-<p>The Spartan Antalkidas, a dexterous, winning and artful
-man,<a id="FNanchor_680"></a><a href="#Footnote_680"
-class="fnanchor">[680]</a> not unlike Lysander, was sent as envoy
-to Tiribazus (392 <small>B.C.</small>); whom we now find as satrap
-of Ionia in the room of Tithraustes, after having been satrap of
-Armenia during the retreat of the Ten Thousand. As Tiribazus was
-newly arrived in Asia Minor, he had not acquired that personal enmity
-against the Spartans, which the active hostilities of Derkyllidas and
-Agesilaus had inspired to Pharnabazus and other Persians. Moreover,
-jealousy between neighboring satraps was an ordinary feeling,
-which Antalkidas now hoped to turn to the advantage of Sparta. To
-counteract his projects, envoys were also sent to Tiribazus, by the
-confederate enemies of Sparta, Athens, Thebes, Corinth, and Argos;
-and Konon, as the envoy of Athens, was incautiously despatched
-among the number. On the part of Sparta, Antalkidas offered, first,
-to abandon to the king of Persia all the Greeks on the continent
-of Asia; next, as to all the other Greeks, insular as well as
-continental, he required nothing more than absolute autonomy for
-each separate city, great and small.<a id="FNanchor_681"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_681" class="fnanchor">[681]</a> The Persian king
-(he said) could neither desire anything more for himself, nor have
-any motive for continuing the war against Sparta, when he should
-once be placed in possession of all the towns on the Asiatic
-coast, and when he should find both Sparta and Athens rendered
-incapable of annoying him, through the autonomy and disunion of
-the Hellenic world. But to neither of the two propositions of
-Antalkidas would Athens, Thebes, or Argos, accede. As to the first,
-they repudiated the disgrace of thus formally abandoning the
-Asiatic Greeks;<a id="FNanchor_682"></a><a href="#Footnote_682"
-class="fnanchor">[682]</a><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_360">[p.
-360]</a></span> as to the second proposition, guaranteeing autonomy
-to every distinct city of Greece, they would admit it only under
-special reserves, which it did not suit the purpose of Antalkidas
-to grant. In truth the proposition went to break up (and was
-framed with that view) both the Bœotian confederacy under the
-presidency of Thebes, and the union between Argos and Corinth;
-while it also deprived Athens of the chance of recovering Lemnos,
-Imbros, and Skyros,<a id="FNanchor_683"></a><a href="#Footnote_683"
-class="fnanchor">[683]</a>—islands which had been possessed and
-recognized by her since the first commencement of the confederacy of
-Delos; indeed the two former, even from the time of Miltiades the
-conqueror of Marathon.</p>
-
-<p>Here commences a new era in the policy of Sparta. That she
-should abnegate all pretension to maritime empire, is noway
-difficult to understand—seeing that it had already been irrevocably
-overthrown by the defeat of Knidus. Nor can we wonder that she
-should abandon the Greeks on the Asiatic continent to Persian
-sway; since this was nothing more than she had already consented
-to do in her conventions with Tissaphernes and Cyrus during the
-latter years of the Peloponnesian war,<a id="FNanchor_684"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_684" class="fnanchor">[684]</a>—and consented, let
-us add, not under any of that stringent necessity which at the same
-time pressed upon Athens, but simply with a view to the maximum of
-victory over an enemy already enfeebled. The events which followed
-the close of that war (recounted in a former chapter) had indeed
-induced her to alter her determination, and again to espouse
-their<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_361">[p. 361]</a></span>
-cause. But the real novelty now first exhibited in her policy,
-is, the full development of what had before existed in manifest
-tendency,—hostility against all the partial land-confederacies of
-Greece, disguised under the plausible demand of universal autonomy
-for every town, great or small. How this autonomy was construed and
-carried into act, we shall see hereafter; at present, we have only
-to note the first proclamation of it by Antalkidas in the name of
-Sparta.</p>
-
-<p>On this occasion, indeed, his mission came to nothing, from
-the peremptory opposition of Athens and the others. But he was
-fortunate enough to gain the approbation and confidence of Tiribazus;
-who saw so clearly how much both propositions tended to promote
-the interests and power of Persia, that he resolved to go up in
-person to court, and prevail on Artaxerxes to act in concert with
-Sparta. Though not daring to support Antalkidas openly, Tiribazus
-secretly gave him money to reinforce the Spartan fleet. He at the
-same time rendered to Sparta the more signal service of arresting
-and detaining Konon, pretending that the latter was acting
-contrary to the interests of the king.<a id="FNanchor_685"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_685" class="fnanchor">[685]</a> This arrest was a
-gross act of perfidy, since Konon not only commanded respect in his
-character of envoy,—but had been acting with the full confidence,
-and almost under the orders, of Pharnabazus. But the removal of
-an officer of so much ability,—the only man who possessed the
-confidence of Pharnabazus,—was the most fatal of all impediments
-to the naval renovation of Athens. It was fortunate that Konon had
-had time to rebuild the Long Walls, before his means of action were
-thus abruptly intercepted. Respecting his subsequent fate, there
-exist contradictory stories. According to one, he was put to death
-by the Persians in prison; according to another, he found means
-to escape and again took refuge with Evagoras in Cyprus, in which
-island he afterwards died of sickness.<a id="FNanchor_686"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_686" class="fnanchor">[686]</a> The latter story
-appears undoubtedly to be the true one. But it is certain that he
-never afterwards had the means of performing any public service, and
-that his career was cut short by this treacherous detention, just at
-the moment when its promise was the most splendid for his country.</p>
-
-<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_362">[p. 362]</a></span></p>
-
-<p>Tiribazus, on going up to the Persian court, teems to have been
-detained there for the purpose of concerting measures against
-Evagoras, prince of Salamis in Cyprus, whose revolt from Persia was
-now on the point of breaking out. But the Persian court could not
-yet be prevailed upon to show any countenance to the propositions
-of Sparta or of Antalkidas. On the contrary, Struthas, who was sent
-down to Ionia as temporary substitute for Tiribazus, full of anxiety
-to avenge the ravages of Agesilaus, acted with vigorous hostility
-against the Lacedæmonians, and manifested friendly dispositions
-towards Athens.</p>
-
-<p>Thimbron (of whom we have before heard as first taking the command
-of the Cyreian army in Asia Minor, after their return from Thrace)
-received orders again to act as head of the Lacedæmonian forces in
-Asia against Struthas. The new commander, with an army estimated
-by Diodorus at eight thousand men,<a id="FNanchor_687"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_687" class="fnanchor">[687]</a> marched from Ephesus
-into the interior, and began his devastation of the territory
-dependent on Persia. But his previous command, though he was
-personally amiable,<a id="FNanchor_688"></a><a href="#Footnote_688"
-class="fnanchor">[688]</a> had been irregular and disorderly, and it
-was soon observed that the same defects were now yet more prominent,
-aggravated by too liberal indulgence in convivial pleasures.
-Aware of his rash, contemptuous, and improvident mode of attack,
-Struthas laid a snare for him by sending a detachment of cavalry
-to menace the camp, just when Thimbron had concluded his morning
-meal in company with the flute-player Thersander,—the latter not
-merely an excellent musician, but possessed of a full measure of
-Spartan courage. Starting from his tent at the news, Thimbron, with
-Thersander, waited only to collect the few troops immediately at
-hand, without even leaving any orders for the remainder, and hastened
-to repel the assailants; who gave way easily, and seduced him into
-a pursuit. Presently Struthas himself, appearing with a numerous
-and well-arrayed body of cavalry, charged with vigor the disorderly
-detachment of Thimbron. Both that general and Thersander, bravely
-fighting, fell among the first; while the army, deprived of their
-commander<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_363">[p. 363]</a></span>
-as well as ill-prepared for a battle, made but an ineffective
-resistance. They were broken, warmly pursued, and the greater number
-slain. A few who contrived to escape the active Persian cavalry,
-found shelter in the neighboring cities.<a id="FNanchor_689"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_689" class="fnanchor">[689]</a></p>
-
-<p>This victory of Struthas, gained by the Persian cavalry, displays
-a degree of vigor and ability which, fortunately for the Greeks,
-was rarely seen in Persian operations. Our scanty information does
-not enable us to trace its consequences. We find Diphridas sent out
-soon after by the Lacedæmonians, along with the admiral Ekdikus, as
-successor of Thimbron to bring together the remnant of the defeated
-army, and to protect those cities which had contributed to form it.
-Diphridas,—a man with all the popular qualities of his predecessor,
-but a better and more careful officer,—is said to have succeeded to
-some extent in this difficult mission. Being fortunate enough to take
-captive the son-in-law of Struthas, with his wife, (as Xenophon had
-captured Asidates,) he obtained a sufficiently large ransom to enable
-him to pay his troops for some time.<a id="FNanchor_690"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_690" class="fnanchor">[690]</a> But it is evident
-that his achievements were not considerable, and that the Ionian
-Greeks on the continent are now left to make good their position, as
-they can, against the satrap at Sardis.</p>
-
-<p>The forces of Sparta were much required at Rhodes; which
-island (as has been mentioned already) had revolted from Sparta
-about five years before (a few months anterior to the battle of
-Knidus), dispossessed the Lysandrian oligarchy, and established a
-democratical government. But since that period, an opposition-party
-in the island had gradually risen up, acquired strength, and come
-into correspondence with the oligarchical exiles; who on their side
-warmly solicited aid from Sparta, representing that Rhodes would
-otherwise become thoroughly dependent on Athens. Accordingly, the
-Lacedæmonians sent eight triremes across the Ægean under the command
-of Ekdikus; the first of their ships of war which had crossed since
-the defeat of Knidus.<a id="FNanchor_691"></a><a href="#Footnote_691"
-class="fnanchor">[691]</a> Though the Perso-Athenian naval force in
-the Ægean had been either dismissed or paralyzed since the seizure
-of Konon, yet the Rhodian government possessed a fleet of about
-twenty triremes, besides considerable force of other kinds; so
-that Ekdikus could not even land on the<span class="pagenum"><a
-id="Page_364">[p. 364]</a></span> island, but was compelled to halt
-at Knidus. Fortunately, Teleutias the Lacedæmonian was now in the
-Corinthian Gulf with a fleet of twelve triremes, which were no longer
-required there; since Agesilaus and he had captured Lechæum a few
-months before, and destroyed the maritime force of the Corinthians
-in those waters. He was now directed to sail with his squadron out
-of the Corinthian Gulf across to Asia, to supersede Ekdikus, and
-take the command of the whole fleet for operations off Rhodes. On
-passing by Samos, he persuaded the inhabitants to embrace the cause
-of Sparta, and to furnish him with a few ships; after which he went
-onward to Knidus, where, superseding Ekdikus, he found himself
-at the head of twenty-seven triremes.<a id="FNanchor_692"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_692" class="fnanchor">[692]</a> In his way from
-Knidus to Rhodes, he accidentally fell in with the Athenian
-admiral Philokrates, conducting ten triremes to Cyprus to the
-aid of Evagoras in his struggle against the Persians. He was
-fortunate enough to carry them all as prisoners into Knidus, where
-he sold the whole booty, and then proceeded with his fleet, thus
-augmented to thirty-seven sail, to Rhodes. Here he established a
-fortified post, enabling the oligarchical party to carry on an
-active civil war. But he was defeated in a battle,—his enemies
-being decidedly the stronger force in the island, and masters of
-all the cities.<a id="FNanchor_693"></a><a href="#Footnote_693"
-class="fnanchor">[693]</a></p>
-
-<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_365">[p. 365]</a></span></p>
-
-<p>The alliance with Evagoras of Cyprus, in his contention against
-Artaxerxes, was at this moment an unfortunate and perplexing
-circumstance for Athens, since she was relying upon Persian aid
-against Sparta, and since Sparta was bidding against her for
-it. But the alliance was one which she could not lightly throw
-off. For Evagoras had not only harbored Konon with the remnant
-of the Athenian fleet after the disaster of Ægospotami, but
-had earned a grant of citizenship and the honor of a statue at
-Athens, as a strenuous auxiliary in procuring that Persian aid
-which gained the battle of Knidus, and as a personal combatant
-in that battle, before the commencement of his dissension with
-Artaxerxes.<a id="FNanchor_694"></a><a href="#Footnote_694"
-class="fnanchor">[694]</a> It would have been every way advantageous
-to Athens at this moment to decline assisting Evagoras, since (not
-to mention the probability of offending the Persian court) she had
-more than enough to employ all her maritime force nearer home and
-for purposes more essential to herself. Yet in spite of these very
-serious considerations of prudence, the paramount feelings of prior
-obligation and gratitude, enforced by influential citizens who had
-formed connections in Cyprus, determined the Athenians to identify
-themselves with his gallant struggles<a id="FNanchor_695"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_695" class="fnanchor">[695]</a> (of which I
-shall speak more fully presently). So little was fickleness, or
-instability, or the easy oblivion of past feelings, a part of their
-real nature,—though historians have commonly denounced it as among
-their prominent qualities.</p>
-
-<p>The capture of their squadron under Philokrates, however, and
-the consequent increase of the Lacedæmonian naval force at Rhodes,
-compelled the Athenians to postpone further aid to Evagoras, and
-to arm forty triremes under Thrasybulus for the Asiatic coast; no
-inconsiderable effort, when we recollect that four years before
-there was scarcely a single trireme in Peiræus, and not even a
-wall of defence around the place. Though sent immediately for the
-assistance of Rhodes, Thrasybulus judged it expedient to go<span
-class="pagenum"><a id="Page_366">[p. 366]</a></span> first to
-the Hellespont; probably from extreme want of money to pay his
-men. Derkyllidas was still in occupation of Abydos, yet there
-was no Lacedæmonian fleet in the strait; so that Thrasybulus was
-enabled to extend the alliances of Athens both on the European
-and the Asiatic side,—the latter being under the friendly satrap,
-Pharnabazus. Reconciling the two Thracian princes, Seuthes and
-Amadokus, whom he found at war, he brought both of them into
-amicable relations with Athens, and then moved forward to Byzantium.
-That city was already in alliance with Athens; but on the arrival
-of Thrasybulus, the alliance was still further cemented by the
-change of its government into a democracy. Having established
-friendship with the opposite city of Chalkêdon, and being thus
-master of the Bosphorus, he sold the tithe of the commercial
-ships sailing out of the Euxine;<a id="FNanchor_696"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_696" class="fnanchor">[696]</a> leaving doubtless
-an adequate force to exact it. This was a striking evidence of
-revived Athenian maritime power, which seems also to have been
-now extended more or less to Samothrace, Thasus, and the coast
-of Thrace.<a id="FNanchor_697"></a><a href="#Footnote_697"
-class="fnanchor">[697]</a></p>
-
-<p>From Byzantium, Thrasybulus sailed to Mitylênê, which was already
-in friendship with Athens,—though Methymna and the other cities in
-the island were still maintained by a force under the Lacedæmonian
-harmost, Therimachus. With the aid of the Mitylenæans, and of the
-exiles from other Lesbian cities, Thrasybulus marched to the borders
-of Methymna, where he was met by Therimachus; who had also brought
-together his utmost force, but was now completely defeated and slain.
-The Athenians thus became masters of Antissa and Eresus, where they
-were enabled to levy a valuable contribution, as well as to plunder
-the refractory territory of Methymna. Nevertheless, Thrasybulus, in
-spite of farther help from Chios and Mitylênê, still thought himself
-not in a situation to go to Rhodes with advantage. Perhaps he was not
-sure of pay in advance, and the presence of unpaid troops in an<span
-class="pagenum"><a id="Page_367">[p. 367]</a></span> exhausted island
-might be a doubtful benefit. Accordingly, he sailed from Lesbos along
-the western and southern coast of Asia Minor, levying contributions
-at Halikarnassus<a id="FNanchor_698"></a><a href="#Footnote_698"
-class="fnanchor">[698]</a> and other places, until he came to
-Aspendus in Pamphylia; where he also obtained money and was about
-to depart with it, when some misdeeds committed by his soldiers
-so exasperated the inhabitants, that they attacked him by night
-unprepared in his tent, and slew him.<a id="FNanchor_699"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_699" class="fnanchor">[699]</a></p>
-
-<p>Thus perished the citizen to whom, more than to any one else,
-Athens owed not only her renovated democracy, but its wise, generous,
-and harmonious working, after renovation. Even the philo-Laconian
-and oligarchical Xenophon bestows upon him a marked and unaffected
-eulogy.<a id="FNanchor_700"></a><a href="#Footnote_700"
-class="fnanchor">[700]</a> His devoted patriotism in commencing
-and prosecuting the struggle against the Thirty, at a time when
-they not only were at the height of their power, but had plausible
-ground for calculating on the full auxiliary strength of Sparta,
-deserves high admiration. But the feature which stands yet more
-eminent in his character,—a feature infinitely rare in the Grecian
-character, generally,—is, that the energy of a successful leader
-was combined with complete absence both of vindictive antipathies
-for the past, and of overbearing ambition for himself. Content to
-live himself as a simple citizen under the restored democracy, he
-taught his countrymen to forgive an oligarchical party from whom
-they had suffered atrocious wrongs, and set the example himself of
-acquiescing, in the loss of his own large property. The generosity
-of such a proceeding ought not to count for less, because it was at
-the same time dictated by the highest political prudence. We find
-in an oration of Lysias against Ergokles (a citizen who served in
-the Athenian fleet on this last expedition), in which the latter is
-accused of gross peculation,—insinuations against Thrasybulus, of
-having countenanced the delinquency, though coupled with praise of
-his general character. Even the words as they now stand are so vague
-as to carry little evidence; but when we<span class="pagenum"><a
-id="Page_368">[p. 368]</a></span> reflect that the oration was
-spoken after the death of Thrasybulus, they are entitled to no
-weight at all.<a id="FNanchor_701"></a><a href="#Footnote_701"
-class="fnanchor">[701]</a></p>
-
-<p>The Athenians sent Agyrrhius to succeed Thrasybulus. After
-the death of the latter, we may conclude that the fleet went
-to Rhodes, its original destination,—though Xenophon does not
-expressly say so,—the rather, as neither Teleutias nor any
-subsequent Lacedæmonian commander appears to have become master
-of the island, in spite of the considerable force which they had
-there assembled.<a id="FNanchor_702"></a><a href="#Footnote_702"
-class="fnanchor">[702]</a> The Lacedæmonians, however, on their
-side, being also much in want of money, Teleutias was obliged (in
-the same manner as the Athenians), to move from island to island,
-levying contributions as he could.<a id="FNanchor_703"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_703" class="fnanchor">[703]</a></p>
-
-<p>When the news of the successful proceedings of Thrasybulus at
-Byzantium and the Hellespont, again establishing a toll for the
-profit of Athens, reached Sparta, it excited so much anxiety,
-that Anaxibius, having great influence with the ephors of the
-time, prevailed on them to send him out as harmost to Abydos,
-in the room of Derkyllidas, who had now been in that post for
-several years. Having been the officer originally employed
-to procure the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_369">[p.
-369]</a></span> revolt of the place from Athens (in 411
-<small>B.C.</small>),<a id="FNanchor_704"></a><a href="#Footnote_704"
-class="fnanchor">[704]</a> Derkyllidas had since rendered service
-not less essential in preserving it to Sparta, during the extensive
-desertion which followed the battle of Knidus. But it was supposed
-that he ought to have checked the aggressive plans of Thrasybulus;
-moreover, Anaxibius promised, if a small force were entrusted to
-him, to put down effectually the newly-revived Athenian influence.
-He was supposed to know well, those regions in which he had once
-already been admiral, at the moment when Xenophon and the Cyreian
-army first returned; the harshness, treachery, and corruption, which
-he displayed in his dealing with that gallant body of men, have been
-already recounted in a former chapter.<a id="FNanchor_705"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_705" class="fnanchor">[705]</a> With three
-triremes, and funds for the pay of a thousand mercenary troops,
-Anaxibius accordingly went to Abydos. He began his operations with
-considerable vigor, both against Athens and Pharnabazus. While
-he armed a land-force, which he employed in making incursions on
-the neighboring cities in the territory of that satrap,—he at the
-same time reinforced his little squadron by three triremes out of
-the harbor of Abydos, so that he became strong enough to seize
-the merchant vessels passing along the Hellespont to Athens or
-to her allies.<a id="FNanchor_706"></a><a href="#Footnote_706"
-class="fnanchor">[706]</a> The force which Thrasybulus had left at
-Byzantium to secure the strait revenues, was thus inadequate to its
-object without farther addition.</p>
-
-<p>Fortunately, Iphikrates was at this moment disengaged at Athens,
-having recently returned from Corinth with his body of peltasts,
-for whom doubtless employment was wanted. He was accordingly sent
-with twelve hundred peltasts and eight triremes, to combat Anaxibius
-in the Hellespont; which now became again the scene of conflict,
-as it had been in the latter years of the Peloponnesian war; the
-Athenians from the European side, the Lacedæmonians from the Asiatic.
-At first the warfare consisted of desultory privateering, and
-money-levying excursions, on both sides.<a id="FNanchor_707"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_707" class="fnanchor">[707]</a> But at length,
-the watchful genius of Iphikrates discov<span class="pagenum"><a
-id="Page_370">[p. 370]</a></span>ered opportunity for a successful
-stratagem. Anaxibius, having just drawn the town of Antandrus
-into his alliance, had marched thither for the purpose of leaving
-a garrison in it, with his Lacedæmonian and mercenary forces, as
-well as two hundred hoplites from Abydos itself. His way lay across
-the mountainous region of Ida, southward to the coast of the gulf
-of Adramyttium. Accordingly, Iphikrates, foreseeing that he would
-speedily return, crossed over in the night from the Chersonese, and
-planted himself in ambush on the line of return march; at a point
-where it traversed the desert and mountainous extremities of the
-Abydene territory, near the gold mines of Kremastê. The triremes
-which carried him across were ordered to sail up the strait on the
-next day, in order that Anaxibius must be apprised of it, and might
-suppose Iphikrates to be employed on his ordinary money-levying
-excursion.</p>
-
-<p>The stratagem was completely successful. Anaxibius returned on
-the next day, without the least suspicion of any enemy at hand,
-marching in careless order and with long-stretched files, as well
-from the narrowness of the mountain path as from the circumstance
-that he was in the friendly territory of Abydos. Not expecting to
-fight, he had unfortunately either omitted the morning sacrifice,
-or taken no pains to ascertain that the victims were favorable; so
-Xenophon informs us,<a id="FNanchor_708"></a><a href="#Footnote_708"
-class="fnanchor">[708]</a> with that constant regard to the divine
-judgments and divine warnings which pervades both the Hellenica
-and the Anabasis. Iphikrates having suffered the Abydenes who
-were in the van to pass, suddenly sprang from his ambush, to
-assault Anaxibius with the Lacedæmonians and the mercenaries,
-as they descended the mountain-pass into the plain of Kremastê.
-His appearance struck terror and confusion into the whole army;
-unprepared in its disorderly array for stedfast resistance,—even
-if the minds of the soldiers had been ever so well strung,—against
-well-trained peltasts, who were sure to prevail over hoplites not
-in steady rank. To Anaxibius himself, the truth stood plain at
-once. Defeat was inevitable, and there remained no other resource
-for him except to die like a brave man.<span class="pagenum"><a
-id="Page_371">[p. 371]</a></span> Accordingly, desiring his
-shield-bearer to hand to him his shield, he said to those around
-him,—“Friends, my honor commands me to die here; but do you hasten
-away, and save yourselves, before the enemy close with us.” Such
-order was hardly required to determine his panic-stricken troops,
-who fled with one accord towards Abydos; while Anaxibius himself
-awaited firmly the approach of the enemy, and fell gallantly fighting
-on the spot. No less than twelve Spartan harmosts, those who had
-been expelled from their various governments by the defeat of
-Knidus, and who had remained ever since under Derkyllidas at Abydos,
-stood with the like courage and shared his fate. Such disdain of
-life hardly surprises us in conspicuous Spartan citizens, to whom
-preservation by flight was “no true preservation” (in the language
-of Xenophon),<a id="FNanchor_709"></a><a href="#Footnote_709"
-class="fnanchor">[709]</a> but simply prolongation of life under
-intolerable disgrace at home. But what deserves greater remark
-is, that the youth to whom Anaxibius was tenderly attached
-and who was his constant companion, could not endure to leave
-him, stayed fighting by his side, and perished by the same
-honorable death.<a id="FNanchor_710"></a><a href="#Footnote_710"
-class="fnanchor">[710]</a> So strong was the mutual devotion which
-this relation between persons of the male sex inspired in the ancient
-Greek mind. With these exceptions, no one else made any attempt to
-stand. All fled, and were pursued by Iphikrates as far as the gates
-of Abydos, with the slaughter of fifty out of the two hundred Abydene
-hoplites, and two hundred of the remaining troops.</p>
-
-<p>This well-planned and successful exploit, while it added to the
-reputation of Iphikrates, rendered the Athenians again masters of the
-Bosphorus and the Hellespont, ensuring both the levy of the dues and
-the transit of their trading vessels. But while the Athenians were
-thus carrying on naval war at Rhodes and the Hellespont, they began
-to experience annoyance nearer home, from Ægina.</p>
-
-<p>That island (within sight as the eyesore of Peiræus, as Perikles
-was wont to call it) had been occupied fifty years before by a
-population eminently hostile to Athens, afterwards conquered
-and<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_372">[p. 372]</a></span>
-expelled by her,—at last again captured in the new abode which they
-had obtained in Laconia,—and put to death by her order. During the
-Peloponnesian war, Ægina had been tenanted by Athenian citizens as
-outsettlers or kleruchs; all of whom had been driven in after the
-battle of Ægospotami. The island was then restored by Lysander to
-the remnant of the former population,—as many of them at least as he
-could find.</p>
-
-<p>These new Æginetans, though doubtless animated by associations
-highly unfavorable to Athens, had nevertheless remained not only
-at peace, but also in reciprocal commerce, with her, until a
-considerable time after the battle of Knidus and the rebuilding
-of her Long Walls. And so they would have continued, of their own
-accord,—since they could gain but little, and were likely to lose all
-the security of their traffic, by her hostility,—had they not been
-forced to commence the war by Eteonikus, the Lacedæmonian harmost
-in the island;<a id="FNanchor_711"></a><a href="#Footnote_711"
-class="fnanchor">[711]</a> one amidst many examples of the manner in
-which the smaller Grecian states were dragged into war, without any
-motive of their own, by the ambition of the greater,—by Sparta as
-well as by Athens.<a id="FNanchor_712"></a><a href="#Footnote_712"
-class="fnanchor">[712]</a> With the concurrence of the ephors,
-Eteonikus authorized and encouraged all Æginetans to fit out
-privateers for depredation on Attica; which aggression the<span
-class="pagenum"><a id="Page_373">[p. 373]</a></span> Athenians
-resented, after suffering considerable inconvenience by sending a
-force of ten triremes to block up Ægina from the sea, with a body
-of hoplites under Pamphilus to construct and occupy a permanent
-fort in the island. This squadron, however, was soon driven off
-(though Pamphilus still continued to occupy the fort) by Teleutias,
-who came to Ægina on hearing of the blockade; having been engaged,
-with the fleet which he commanded at Rhodes, in an expedition among
-the Cyclades, for the purpose of levying contributions. He seems to
-have been now at the term of his year of command, and while he was
-at Ægina, his successor, Hierax, arrived from Sparta, on his way to
-Rhodes, to supersede him. The fleet was, accordingly, handed over
-to Hierax at Ægina, while Teleutias went directly home to Sparta.
-So remarkable was his popularity among the seamen, that numbers
-of them accompanied him down to the water-edge, testifying their
-regret and attachment by crowning him with wreaths, or pressing
-his hand. Some, who came down too late, when he was already under
-weigh, cast their wreaths on the sea, uttering prayers for his health
-and happiness.<a id="FNanchor_713"></a><a href="#Footnote_713"
-class="fnanchor">[713]</a></p>
-
-<p>Hierax, while carrying back to Rhodes the remaining fleet which
-Teleutias had brought from that island, left his subordinate Gorgôpas
-as harmost at Ægina with twelve triremes; a force which protected
-the island completely, and caused the fortified post occu<span
-class="pagenum"><a id="Page_374">[p. 374]</a></span>pied by the
-Athenians under Pamphilus to be itself blocked up, insomuch that
-after an interval of four months, a special decree was passed at
-Athens to send a numerous squadron and fetch away the garrison. As
-the Æginetan privateers, aided by the squadron of Gorgôpas, now
-recommenced their annoyances against Attica, thirteen Athenian
-triremes were put in equipment under Eunomus as a guard-squadron
-against Ægina. But Gorgôpas and his squadron were now for the time
-withdrawn, to escort Antalkidas, the new Lacedæmonian admiral sent
-to Asia chiefly for the purpose of again negotiating with Tiribazus.
-On returning back, after landing Antalkidas at Ephesus, Gorgôpas
-fell in with Eunomus, whose pursuit, however, he escaped, landing at
-Ægina just before sunset. The Athenian admiral, after watching for a
-short time until he saw the Lacedæmonian seamen out of their vessels
-and ashore, departed as it grew dark to Attica, carrying a light to
-prevent his ships from parting company. But Gorgôpas, causing his men
-to take a hasty meal, immediately reëmbarked and pursued; keeping
-on the track by means of the light, and taking care not to betray
-himself either by the noise of oars or by the chant of the Keleustês.
-Eunomus had no suspicion of the accompanying enemy. Just after he
-had touched land near cape Zostêr in Attica, when his men were in
-the act of disembarking, Gorgôpas gave signal by trumpet to attack.
-After a short action by moonlight, four of the Athenian squadrons
-were captured, and carried off to Ægina; with the remainder, Eunomus
-escaped to Peiræus.<a id="FNanchor_714"></a><a href="#Footnote_714"
-class="fnanchor">[714]</a></p>
-
-<p>This victory, rendering both Gorgôpas and the Æginetans confident,
-laid them open to a stratagem skilfully planned by the Athenian
-Chabrias. That officer, who seems to have been dismissed from Corinth
-as Iphikrates had been before him, was now about to conduct a force
-of ten triremes and eight hundred peltasts to the aid of Evagoras;
-to whom the Athenians were thus paying their debt of gratitude,
-though they could ill-spare any of their forces from home. Chabrias,
-passing over from Peiræus at night, landed without being perceived in
-a desert place of the coast of Ægina, and planted himself in ambush
-with his peltasts at some little distance inland of the Herakleion or
-temple of Hêraklês, amidst hollow ground suitable for concealment. He
-had before<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_375">[p. 375]</a></span>
-made agreement with another squadron and a body of hoplites under
-Demænetus; who arrived at daybreak and landed at Ægina at a point
-called Tripyrgia, about two miles distant from the Herakleion, but
-farther removed from the city. As soon as their arrival became known,
-Gorgôpas hastened out of the city to repel them, with all the troops
-he could collect, Æginetans as well as marines out of the ships
-of war,—and eight Spartans who happened to be his companions in
-the island. In their march from the city to attack the new comers,
-they had to pass near the Herakleion, and therefore near the troops
-in ambush; who, as soon as Gorgôpas and those about him had gone
-by, rose up suddenly and attacked them in the rear. The stratagem
-succeeded not less completely than that of Iphikrates at Abydos
-against Anaxibius. Gorgôpas and the Spartans near him were slain,
-the rest were defeated, and compelled to flee with considerable loss
-back to the city.<a id="FNanchor_715"></a><a href="#Footnote_715"
-class="fnanchor">[715]</a></p>
-
-<p>After this brilliant success, Chabrias pursued his voyage to
-Cyprus, and matters appeared so secure on the side of Ægina,
-that Demænetus also was sent to the Hellespont to reinforce
-Iphikrates. For some time indeed, the Lacedæmonian ships at
-Ægina did nothing. Eteonikus, who was sent as successor to
-Gorgôpas,<a id="FNanchor_716"></a><a href="#Footnote_716"
-class="fnanchor">[716]</a> could neither persuade nor constrain the
-seamen to go aboard, since he had no funds, while their pay was
-in arrears; so that Athens with her coast and her trading-vessels
-remained altogether unmolested. At length the Lacedæmonians were
-obliged to send again to Ægina Teleutias, the most popular and
-best-beloved of all their commanders, whom the seamen welcomed with
-the utmost delight. Addressing them under the influence of this
-first impression, immediately after he had offered sacrifice, he
-told them plainly that he had brought with him no money, but that
-he had come to put them in the way of procuring it; that he should
-himself touch nothing until they were amply provided, and should
-require of them to bear no more hardship or fatigue than he went
-through himself; that the power and prosperity of Sparta had all been
-purchased by willingly braving danger, as well as toil, in the cause
-of duty; that it became valiant men to seek their pay, not by<span
-class="pagenum"><a id="Page_376">[p. 376]</a></span> cringing to any
-one, but by their own swords at the cost of enemies. And he engaged
-to find them the means of doing this, provided they would now again
-manifest the excellent qualities which he knew them by experience
-to possess.<a id="FNanchor_717"></a><a href="#Footnote_717"
-class="fnanchor">[717]</a></p>
-
-<p>This address completely won over the seamen, who received it
-with shouts of applause; desiring Teleutias to give his orders
-forthwith, and promising ready obedience. “Well, (said he), now go
-and get your suppers, as you were intending to do; and then come
-immediately on shipboard, bringing with you provisions for one day.
-Advance me thus much out of your own means, that we may, by the will
-of the gods, make an opportune voyage.”<a id="FNanchor_718"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_718" class="fnanchor">[718]</a></p>
-
-<p>In spite of the eminent popularity of Teleutias, the men would
-probably have refused to go on board, had he told them beforehand
-his intention of sailing with his twelve triremes straight into the
-harbor of Peiræus. At first sight, the enterprise seemed insane,
-for there were triremes in it more than sufficient to overwhelm
-him. But he calculated on finding them all unprepared, with seamen
-as well as officers in their lodgings ashore, so that he could not
-only strike terror and do damage, but even realize half an hour’s
-plunder before preparations could be made to resist him. Such was
-the security which now reigned there, especially since the death of
-Gorgôpas, that no one dreamt of an attack. The harbor was open, as
-it had been forty years before, when Brasidas (in the third year
-of the Peloponnesian war) attempted the like enterprise from the
-port of Megara.<a id="FNanchor_719"></a><a href="#Footnote_719"
-class="fnanchor">[719]</a> Even then, at the maximum of the Athenian
-naval power, it was an enterprise possible, simply because every
-one considered it to be impossible; and it only failed because the
-assailants became terrified, and flinched in the execution.</p>
-
-<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_377">[p. 377]</a></span></p>
-
-<p>A little after dark, Teleutias quitted the harbor of Ægina,
-without telling any one whither he was going. Rowing leisurely, and
-allowing his men alternate repose on their oars, he found himself
-before morning within half a mile of Peiræus, where he waited until
-day was just dawning, and then led his squadron straight into the
-harbor. Everything turned out as he expected; there was not the least
-idea of being attacked, nor the least preparation for defence. Not
-a single trireme was manned or in fighting condition, but several
-were moored without their crews, together with merchant-vessels,
-loaded as well as empty. Teleutias directed the captains of his
-squadron to drive against the triremes, and disable them; but by no
-means to damage the beaks of their own ships by trying to disable
-the merchant-ships. Even at that early hour, many Athenians were
-abroad, and the arrival of the unexpected assailants struck every one
-with surprise and consternation. Loud and vague cries transmitted
-the news through all Peiræus, and from Peiræus up to Athens, where
-it was believed that their harbor was actually taken. Every man
-having run home for his arms, the whole force of the city rushed
-impetuously down thither, with one accord,—hoplites as well as
-horsemen. But before such succors could arrive, Teleutias had full
-time to do considerable mischief. His seamen boarded the larger
-merchant-ships, seizing both the men and the portable goods which
-they found aboard. Some even jumped ashore on the quay (called the
-Deigma), laid hands on the tradesmen, ship-masters, and pilots,
-whom they saw near, and carried them away captive. Various smaller
-vessels with their entire cargoes were also towed away; and even
-three or four triremes. With all these Teleutias sailed safely out
-of Peiræus, sending some of his squadron to escort the prizes to
-Ægina, while he himself with the remainder sailed southward along
-the coast. As he was seen to come out of Peiræus, his triremes
-were mistaken for Athenian, and excited no alarm; so that he thus
-captured several fishing-boats, and passage-boats coming with
-passengers from the islands to Athens,—together with some merchantmen
-carrying corn and other goods, at Sunium. All were carried safely
-into Ægina.<a id="FNanchor_720"></a><a href="#Footnote_720"
-class="fnanchor">[720]</a></p>
-
-<p>The enterprise of Teleutias, thus admirably concerted and<span
-class="pagenum"><a id="Page_378">[p. 378]</a></span> executed
-without the loss of a man, procured for him a plentiful booty,
-of which, probably not the least valuable portion consisted in
-the men seized as captives. When sold at Ægina, it yielded so
-large a return that he was enabled to pay down at once a month’s
-pay to his seamen; who became more attached to him than ever,
-and kept the triremes in animated and active service under
-his orders.<a id="FNanchor_721"></a><a href="#Footnote_721"
-class="fnanchor">[721]</a> Admonished by painful experience,
-indeed, the Athenians were now, doubtless, careful both in guarding
-and in closing Peiræus; as they had become forty years before
-after the unsuccessful attack of Brasidas. But in spite of the
-utmost vigilance, they suffered an extent of damage from the
-indefatigable Teleutias, and from the Æginetan privateers, quite
-sufficient to make them weary of the war.<a id="FNanchor_722"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_722" class="fnanchor">[722]</a></p>
-
-<p>We cannot doubt, indeed, that the prosecution of the war must
-have been a heavy financial burthen upon the Athenians, from 395
-<small>B.C.</small> downward to 387 <small>B.C.</small> How
-they made good the cost, without any contributory allies, or any
-foreign support, except what Konon obtained during one year from
-Pharnabazus,—we are not informed. On the revival of the democracy
-in 403 <small>B.C.</small>, the poverty of the city, both public
-and private, had been very great, owing to the long previous war,
-ending with the loss of all Athenian property abroad. At a period
-about three years afterwards, it seems that the Athenians were in
-arrears, not merely for the tribute-money which they then owed to
-Sparta as her subject allies, but also for debts due to the Bœotians
-on account of damage done; that they were too poor to perform in full
-the religious sacrifices prescribed for the year, and were obliged
-to omit some even of the more ancient; that the docks as well as
-the walls were in sad want of repair.<a id="FNanchor_723"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_723" class="fnanchor">[723]</a> Even the pay to
-those citizens who attended the pub<span class="pagenum"><a
-id="Page_379">[p. 379]</a></span>lic assemblies and sat as dikasts in
-the dikasteries,—pay essential to the working of the democracy,—was
-restored only by degrees; beginning first at one obolus, and not
-restored to three oboli, at which it had stood before the capture,
-until after an interval of some years.<a id="FNanchor_724"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_724" class="fnanchor">[724]</a> It was at this
-time too that the Theôric Board, or Paymasters for the general
-expenses of public worship and sacrifice, was first established;
-and when we read how much the Athenians were embarrassed for
-the means of celebrating the prescribed sacrifices, there was,
-probably, great necessity for the formation of some such office.
-The disbursements connected with this object had been effected,
-before 403 <small>B.C.</small>, not by any special Board, but by
-the Hellenotamiæ, or treasurers of the tribute collected from the
-allies, who were not renewed after 403 <small>B.C.</small> as the
-Athenian empire had ceased to exist.<a id="FNanchor_725"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_725" class="fnanchor">[725]</a> A portion of
-the money disbursed by the Theôric Board for the religious
-festivals, was employed in the distribution of two oboli per
-head, called the diobely, to all present citizens, and actually
-received by all,—not merely by the poor, but by persons in easy
-circumstances also.<a id="FNanchor_726"></a><a href="#Footnote_726"
-class="fnanchor">[726]</a> This distribution was made at several
-festivals, having originally begun at the Dionysia, for the purpose
-of enabling the citizens to obtain places at the theatrical
-representations in honor of Dionysus; but we do not know either the
-number of the festivals, or the amount of the total sum. It was,
-in principle, a natural corollary of the religious idea connected
-with the festival; not simply because the comfort and recreation
-of each citizen, individually taken, was promoted by his being
-enabled to attend the festival,—but because the collective effect
-of the ceremony, in honoring and propitiating the god, was believed
-to depend in part upon a multitudinous attendance and lively
-manifestations.<a id="FNanchor_727"></a><a href="#Footnote_727"
-class="fnanchor">[727]</a> Gradually, however, this distribution
-of<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_380">[p. 380]</a></span> Theôric
-or festival-money came to be pushed to an abusive and mischievous
-excess, which is brought before our notice forty years afterwards,
-during the political career of Demosthenes. Until that time, we have
-no materials for speaking of it; and what I here notice is simply the
-first creation of the Theôric Board.</p>
-
-<p>The means of Athens for prosecuting the war, and for paying
-her troops sent as well to Bœotia as to Corinth, must have been
-derived mainly from direct assessments on property, called
-eisphoræ. And some such assessments we find alluded to generally as
-having taken place during these years; though we know no details
-either as to frequency or amount.<a id="FNanchor_728"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_728" class="fnanchor">[728]</a> But the restitution
-of<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_381">[p. 381]</a></span> the
-Long Walls and of the fortifications of Peiræus by Konon, was an
-assistance not less valuable to the finances of Athens than<span
-class="pagenum"><a id="Page_382">[p. 382]</a></span> to her political
-power. That excellent harbor, commodious as a mercantile centre, and
-now again safe for the residence of metics<span class="pagenum"><a
-id="Page_383">[p. 383]</a></span> and the importations of merchants,
-became speedily a scene of animated commerce, as we have seen it
-when surprised by Teleutias. The number of metics, or free resident
-non-citizens, became also again large, as it had been before the time
-of her reverses, and including a number of miscellaneous non-Hellenic
-persons, from Lydia, Phrygia, and Syria.<a id="FNanchor_729"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_729" class="fnanchor">[729]</a> Both the port-duties,
-and the value of fixed property at Athens, was thus augmented so as
-in part to countervail the costs of war. Nevertheless these costs,
-continued from year to year, and combined with the damage done by
-Æginetan privateers, were seriously felt, and contributed to dispose
-the Athenians to peace.</p>
-
-<p>In the Hellespont also, their prospects were not only on the
-decline, but had become seriously menacing. After going from Ægina
-to Ephesus in the preceding year, and sending back Gorgôpas with
-the Æginetan squadron, Antalkidas had placed the remainder of his
-fleet under his secretary, Nikolochus, with orders to proceed to
-the Hellespont for the relief of Abydos. He himself landed, and
-repaired to Tiribazus, by whom he was conducted up to the court
-of Susa. Here he renewed the propositions for the pacification of
-Greece,—on principles of universal autonomy, abandoning all the
-Asiatic Greeks as subject absolutely to the Persian king,—which he
-had tried in vain to carry through two years before. Though the
-Spartans generally were odious to Artaxerxes, Antalkidas behaved with
-so much dexterity<a id="FNanchor_730"></a><a href="#Footnote_730"
-class="fnanchor">[730]</a> as to gain the royal favor personally,
-while all the influence of Tiribazus was employed to second his
-political views. At length they succeeded in prevailing upon the king
-formally to adopt the peace, and to proclaim war against any Greeks
-who should refuse to accede to it, empowering the Spartans to enforce
-it everywhere as his allies and under his sanction. In order to
-remove one who would have<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_384">[p.
-384]</a></span> proved a great impediment to this measure, the king
-was farther induced to invite the satrap Pharnabazus up to court,
-and to honor him with his daughter in marriage; leaving the satrapy
-of Daskylium under the temporary administration of Ariobarzanes, a
-personal friend and guest of Antalkidas.<a id="FNanchor_731"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_731" class="fnanchor">[731]</a> Thus armed against
-all contingencies, Antalkidas and Tiribazus returned from Susa to
-the coast of Asia Minor in the spring of 387 <small>B.C.</small>,
-not only bearing the formal diploma ratified by the king’s seal, but
-commanding ample means to carry it into effect; since, in addition to
-the full forces of Persia, twenty additional triremes were on their
-way from Syracuse and the Greco-Italian towns, sent by the despot
-Dionysius to the aid of the Lacedæmonians.<a id="FNanchor_732"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_732" class="fnanchor">[732]</a></p>
-
-<p>On reaching the coast, Antalkidas found Nikolochus with his fleet
-of twenty-five sail blocked up in Abydos by the Athenians under
-Iphikrates; who with thirty-two sail were occupying the European
-side of the Hellespont. He immediately repaired to Abydos by land,
-and took an early opportunity of stealing out by night with his
-fleet up the strait towards the Propontis; spreading the rumor that
-he was about to attack Chalkêdon, in concert with a party in the
-town. But he stopped at Perkôtê, and lay hid in that harbor until he
-saw the Athenian fleet (which had gone in pursuit of him upon the
-false scent laid out) pass by towards Prokonnêsus. The strait being
-now clear, Antalkidas sailed down it again to meet the Syracusan
-and Italian ships, whom he safely joined. Such junction, with a
-view to which his recent manœuvre had been devised, rendered him
-more than a match for his enemies. He had further the good fortune
-to capture a detached Athenian squadron of eight triremes, which
-Thrasybulus (a second Athenian citizen of that name) was conducting
-from Thrace to join the main Athenian fleet in the Hellespont.
-Lastly, additional reinforcements also reached Antalkidas from the
-zealous aid of Tiribazus and Ariobarzanes, insomuch that he found
-himself at the head of no less than eighty triremes, besides a
-still greater number which were under preparation in the various
-ports of Ionia.<a id="FNanchor_733"></a><a href="#Footnote_733"
-class="fnanchor">[733]</a></p>
-
-<p>Such a fleet, the greatest which had been seen in the
-Hellespont<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_385">[p. 385]</a></span>
-since the battle of Ægospotami, was so much superior to anything
-which could be brought to meet it, and indicated so strongly the
-full force of Persia operating in the interests of Sparta,—that the
-Athenians began to fear a repetition of the same calamitous suffering
-which they had already undergone from Lysander. A portion of such
-hardship they at once began to taste. Not a single merchant-ship
-reached them from the Euxine, all being seized and detained by
-Antalkidas; so that their main supply of imported corn was thus
-cut off. Moreover, in the present encouraging state of affairs,
-the Æginetan privateers became doubly active in harassing the
-coasting trade of Attica; and this combination, of actual hardship
-with prospective alarm, created a paramount anxiety at Athens to
-terminate the war. Without Athens, the other allies would have no
-chance of success through their own forces; while the Argeians
-also, hitherto the most obstinate, had become on their own account
-desirous of peace, being afraid of repeated Lacedæmonian invasions
-of their territory. That Sparta should press for a peace, when
-the terms of it were suggested by herself, is not wonderful.
-Even to her, triumphant as her position now seemed, the war was
-a heavy burden.<a id="FNanchor_734"></a><a href="#Footnote_734"
-class="fnanchor">[734]</a></p>
-
-<p>Such was the general state of feeling in the Grecian world, when
-Tiribazus summoned the contending parties into his presence, probably
-at Sardis, to hear the terms of the convention which had just come
-down from Susa. He produced the original edict, and having first
-publicly exhibited the regal seal, read aloud as follows:—</p>
-
-<p>“King Artaxerxes thinks it just that the cities in Asia, and the
-islands of Klazomenæ and Cyprus, shall belong to him. He thinks
-it just also, to leave all the other Hellenic cities autonomous,
-both small and great,—except Lemnos, Imbros, and Skyros, which
-are to belong to Athens, as they did originally. Should any
-parties refuse to accept this peace, I will make war upon them,
-along with those who are of the same mind, by land as well as
-by sea, with ships and with money.”<a id="FNanchor_735"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_735" class="fnanchor">[735]</a></p> <p><span
-class="pagenum"><a id="Page_386">[p. 386]</a></span></p>
-<p>Instructions were given to all the deputies to report the
-terms of this edict to their respective cities, and to meet
-again at Sparta for acceptance or rejection. When the time of
-meeting arrived,<a id="FNanchor_736"></a><a href="#Footnote_736"
-class="fnanchor">[736]</a> all the cities, in spite of their
-repugnance to the abandonment of the Asiatic Greeks, and partly also
-to the second condition, nevertheless felt themselves overruled by
-superior force, and gave a reluctant consent. On taking the oaths,
-however, the Thebans tried indirectly to make good an exception in
-their own case, by claiming to take the oath not only on behalf of
-themselves, but on behalf of the Bœotian cities generally; a demand
-which Agesilaus in the name of Sparta repudiated, as virtually
-cancelling that item in the pacification whereby the small cities
-were pronounced to be autonomous as well as the great. When the
-Theban deputy replied that he could not relinquish his claim without
-fresh instructions from home, Agesilaus desired him to go at once and
-consult his countrymen. “You may tell them (said he) that if they do
-not comply, they will be shut out from the treaty.”</p>
-
-<p>It was with much delight that Agesilaus pronounced this peremptory
-sentence, which placed Thebes in so humiliating a dilemma. Antipathy
-towards the Thebans was one of his strongest sentiments, and he
-exulted in the hope that they would persist in their refusal so
-that he would thus be enabled to bring an overwhelming force to
-crush their isolated city. So eagerly did he thirst for the expected
-triumph, that immediately on the departure of the Theban deputies,
-and before their answer could possibly have been obtained, he
-procured the consent of the ephors, offered the border-sacrifice,
-and led the Spartan force out as far as Tegea. From that city he not
-only despatched messengers in all directions to hasten the arrival
-of the Periœki, but also sent forth the officers called xenâgi to
-the cities of the Peloponnesian allies, to muster and bring together
-the respective contingents. But in spite of all injunctions to
-despatch, his wishes were disappointed. Before he started from
-Tegea, the Theban deputies returned with the intimation that they
-were prepared to take the oath for Thebes alone, recognizing the
-other Bœotian cities as autonomous. Agesilaus and the Spartans were
-thus obliged to be satisfied with the minor triumph, in itself very
-serious and considerable, of having degraded<span class="pagenum"><a
-id="Page_387">[p. 387]</a></span> Thebes from her federal headship,
-and isolated her from the Bœotian cities.<a id="FNanchor_737"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_737" class="fnanchor">[737]</a></p>
-
-<p>The unmeasured and impatient miso-Theban bitterness of Agesilaus,
-attested here by his friend and panegyrist, deserves especial notice;
-for it will be found to explain much of the misconduct of Sparta and
-her officers during the ensuing years.</p>
-
-<p>There yet remained one compliance for Agesilaus to exact. The
-Argeian auxiliaries were not yet withdrawn from Corinth; and the
-Corinthian government might probably think that the terms of the
-peace, leaving their city autonomous, permitted them to retain
-or dismiss these auxiliaries at their own discretion. But it was
-not so that Agesilaus construed the peace; and his construction,
-right or wrong, was backed by the power of enforcement. He sent
-to inform both Argeians and Corinthians, that if the auxiliaries
-were not withdrawn, he would march his army forthwith into both
-territories. No resistance could be offered to his peremptory
-mandate. The Argeians retired from Corinth; and the vehement
-philo-Argeian Corinthians,—especially those who had been concerned
-in the massacre at the festival of the Eukleia,—retired at the
-same time into voluntary exile, thinking themselves no longer
-safe in the town. They found a home partly at Argos, partly
-at Athens,<a id="FNanchor_738"></a><a href="#Footnote_738"
-class="fnanchor">[738]</a> where they were most hospitably
-received. Those Corinthians who had before been in exile, and who,
-in concert with the Lacedæmonian garrison at Lechæum and Sikyon,
-had been engaged in bitter hostility against their countrymen in
-Corinth,—were immediately readmitted into the city. According to
-Xenophon, their readmission was pronounced by the spontaneous
-voice of the Corinthian citizens.<a id="FNanchor_739"></a><a
-href="#Footnote_739" class="fnanchor">[739]</a> But we shall
-be more correct in affirming, that it was procured by the same
-intimidating summons from Agesilaus which had extorted the dismissal
-of the Argeians.<a id="FNanchor_740"></a><a href="#Footnote_740"
-class="fnanchor">[740]</a> The restoration of the exiles from Lechæum
-on the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_388">[p. 388]</a></span>
-present occasion was no more voluntary than that of the Athenian
-exiles had been eighteen years before, at the Peloponnesian
-war,—or than that of the Phliasian exiles was, two or three years
-afterwards.<a id="FNanchor_741"></a><a href="#Footnote_741"
-class="fnanchor">[741]</a></p>
-
-<hr class="chap" />
-
-
-<div class="footnotes">
-
-<h2 class="nobreak">FOOTNOTES</h2>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_1"></a><span class="label"><a
-href="#FNanchor_1">[1]</a></span> See Diodor. xi, 69; xii, 64-71;
-Ktesias, Persica, c. 29-45; Aristotel. Polit. v, 14, 8. This last
-passage of Aristotle is not very clear. Compare Justin, x, 1. </p>
-
-<p>For the chronology of these Persian kings, see a valuable Appendix in
-Mr. Fynes Clinton’s Fasti Hellenici, App. 18, vol. ii, p. 313-316.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_2"></a><span class="label"><a
-href="#FNanchor_2">[2]</a></span> Ktesias, Persica, c. 38-40.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_3"></a><span class="label"><a
-href="#FNanchor_3">[3]</a></span> See the Appendix of Mr. Fynes
-Clinton, mentioned in the preceding note, p. 317.</p>
-
-<p>There were some Egyptian troops in the army of Artaxerxes at the
-battle of Kunaxa; on the other hand, there were other Egyptians in
-a state of pronounced revolt. Compare two passages of Xenophon’s
-Anabasis, i, 8, 9; ii, 5, 13; Diodor. xiii, 46; and the Dissertation
-of F. Ley, Fata et Conditio Ægypti sub imperio Persarum, p. 20-56
-(Cologne, 1830).</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_4"></a><span class="label"><a
-href="#FNanchor_4">[4]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. i, 2, 19; ii, 1,
-13.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_5"></a><span class="label"><a
-href="#FNanchor_5">[5]</a></span> Thucyd. iv, 50. πολλῶν γὰρ ἐλθόντων
-πρεσβέων οὐδένα ταὐτὰ λέγειν.</p>
-
-<p>This incompetence, or duplicity, on the part of the Spartan
-envoys, helps to explain the facility with which Alkibiades duped
-them at Athens (Thucyd. v, 45). See above, in this History, Vol. VII.
-ch. lv, p. 47.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_6"></a><span class="label"><a
-href="#FNanchor_6">[6]</a></span> Ktesias, Persic. c. 52.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_7"></a><span class="label"><a
-href="#FNanchor_7">[7]</a></span> Thucyd. viii, 28. See Vol. VII, ch.
-lxi, p. 389 of this History.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_8"></a><span class="label"><a
-href="#FNanchor_8">[8]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. ii, 1, 14. Compare
-Xen. Œconom. iv, 20.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_9"></a><span class="label"><a
-href="#FNanchor_9">[9]</a></span> Xen. Anab. i, 1, 2; i, 9, 7; Xen.
-Hellen. i, 4, 3.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_10"></a><span class="label"><a
-href="#FNanchor_10">[10]</a></span> Xen. Anab. i, 9, 3-5. Compare
-Cyropædia, i, 2, 4-6; viii, 1, 16, etc.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_11"></a><span class="label"><a
-href="#FNanchor_11">[11]</a></span> Plutarch, Artaxerx. c. 2-6; Xen.
-Anab. <i>ut sup.</i></p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_12"></a><span class="label"><a
-href="#FNanchor_12">[12]</a></span> See Vol. VIII. ch. lxiv, p.
-135.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_13"></a><span class="label"><a
-href="#FNanchor_13">[13]</a></span> Darius had had thirteen children
-by Parysatis; but all except Artaxerxes and Cyrus died young. Ktesias
-asserts that he heard this statement from Parysatis herself (Ktesias,
-Persica, c. 49).</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_14"></a><span class="label"><a
-href="#FNanchor_14">[14]</a></span> Herodot. vii, 4.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_15"></a><span class="label"><a
-href="#FNanchor_15">[15]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. ii, 1, 8, 9; Thucyd.
-viii, 58.</p>
-
-<p>Compare Xen. Cyropæd. viii, 3, 10; and Lucian, Navigium seu Vota,
-c. 30. vol. iii, p. 267, ed. Hemsterhuys with Du Soul’s note.</p>
-
-<p>It is remarkable that, in this passage of the Hellenica, either
-Xenophon, or the copyist, makes the mistake of calling Xerxes
-(instead of Artaxerxes) father of Darius. Some of the editors,
-without any authority from MSS., wish to alter the text from Ξέρξου
-to Ἀρταξέρξου.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_16"></a><span class="label"><a
-href="#FNanchor_16">[16]</a></span> Xen. Anab. i, 4, 12.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_17"></a><span class="label"><a
-href="#FNanchor_17">[17]</a></span> Xen. Anab. i, 1, 4.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_18"></a><span class="label"><a
-href="#FNanchor_18">[18]</a></span> So it is presented by Justin, v,
-11.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_19"></a><span class="label"><a
-href="#FNanchor_19">[19]</a></span> Xen. Anab. i, 1, 6; i, 4, 2.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_20"></a><span class="label"><a
-href="#FNanchor_20">[20]</a></span> Xen. Anab. i, 1, 7, 8, ὥστε οὐδὲν
-ἤχθετο (the king) αὐτῶν πολεμοῦντων.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_21"></a><span class="label"><a
-href="#FNanchor_21">[21]</a></span> Xen. Anab. i, 1, 9; ii, 6, 3. The
-statements here contained do not agree with Diodor. xiv, 12; while
-both of them differ from Isokrates (Orat. viii, De Pace, s. 121; Or.
-xii, Panath. s. 111), and Plutarch, Artaxerxes, c. 6.</p>
-
-<p>I follow partially the narrative of Diodorus, so far as to suppose
-that the tyranny which he mentions was committed by Klearchus as
-Harmost of Byzantium. We know that there was a Lacedæmonian Harmost
-in that town, named as soon as the town was taken, by Lysander,
-after the battle of Ægospotami (Xen. Hellen. ii, 2, 2). This was
-towards the end of 405 <small>B.C.</small> We know farther, from the
-Anabasis, that Kleander was Harmost there in 400 <small>B.C.</small>
-Klearchus may have been Harmost there in 404 <small>B.C.</small></p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_22"></a><span class="label"><a
-href="#FNanchor_22">[22]</a></span> Xen. Anab. i, 1, 10; Herodot.
-vii, 6; ix, 1; Plato, Menon, c. 1, p. 70; c. 11, p. 78 C.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_23"></a><span class="label"><a
-href="#FNanchor_23">[23]</a></span> Herodot. i. 96. Ὁ δὲ (Dëiokês)
-οἷα μνώμενος ἀρχὴν, ἰθύς τε καὶ δίκαιος ἦν.</p>
-
-<p>Xenoph. Hellen. iii, 1, 1; Diodor. xiv, 19.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_24"></a><span class="label"><a
-href="#FNanchor_24">[24]</a></span> Xen. Anab. 1, 9, 8. Πολλάκις δ᾽
-ἰδεῖν ἦν ἀνὰ τὰς στειβομένας ὁδοὺς, καὶ ποδῶν καὶ χειρῶν καὶ ὀφθαλμῶν
-στερουμένους ἀνθρώπους.</p>
-
-<p>For other samples of mutilation inflicted by Persians, not merely
-on malefactors, but on prisoners by wholesale, see Quintus Curtius,
-v. 5, 6. Alexander the Great was approaching near to Persepolis,
-“quum miserabile agmen, inter pauca fortunæ exempla memorandum, regi
-occurrit. Captivi erant Græci ad quatuor millia ferè, quos Persæ
-vario suppliciorum modo affecerunt. Alios pedibus, quosdam manibus
-auribusque, amputatis, inustisque barbararum literarum notis, in
-longum sui ludibrium reservaverant,” etc. Compare Diodorus, xvii, 69;
-and the prodigious tales of cruelty recounted in Herodot. ix, 112;
-Ktesias, Persic. c. 54-59; Plutarch, Artaxerx. c. 14, 16, 17.</p>
-
-<p>It is not unworthy of remark, that while there was nothing
-in which the Persian rulers displayed greater invention than in
-exaggerating bodily suffering upon a malefactor or an enemy,—at
-Athens, whenever any man was put to death by public sentence, the
-execution took place within the prison by administering a cup of
-hemlock, without even public exposure. It was the minimum of pain, as
-well as the minimum of indignity; as any one may see who reads the
-account of the death of Sokrates, given by Plato at the end of the
-Phædon.</p>
-
-<p>It is certain, that, on the whole, the public sentiment in England
-is more humane now than it was in that day at Athens. Yet an Athenian
-public could not have borne the sight of a citizen publicly hanged
-or beheaded in the market-place. Much less could they have borne the
-sight of the prolonged tortures inflicted on Damiens at Paris in 1757
-(a fair parallel to the Persian σκάφευσις described in Plutarch,
-Artaxerx. c. 16), in the presence of an immense crowd of spectators,
-when every window commanding a view of the Place de Grève was let at
-a high price, and filled by the best company in Paris.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_25"></a><span class="label"><a
-href="#FNanchor_25">[25]</a></span> Xen. Anab. i, 9, 13.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_26"></a><span class="label"><a
-href="#FNanchor_26">[26]</a></span> Xen. Anab. i, 6, 6.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_27"></a><span class="label"><a
-href="#FNanchor_27">[27]</a></span> Xen. Anab. i, 2, 2-3.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_28"></a><span class="label"><a
-href="#FNanchor_28">[28]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iii, 1, 1.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_29"></a><span class="label"><a
-href="#FNanchor_29">[29]</a></span> Diodor. xiv, 21.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_30"></a><span class="label"><a
-href="#FNanchor_30">[30]</a></span> Xen. Anab. vi, 4, 8. Τῶν γὰρ
-στρατιωτῶν οἱ πλεῖστοι ἦσαν οὐ σπάνει βίου ἐκπεπλευκότες ἐπὶ ταύτην
-τὴν μισθοφορὰν, ἀλλὰ τὴν Κύρου ἀρετὴν ἀκούοντες, οἱ μὲν καὶ ἄνδρας
-ἄγοντες, οἱ δὲ καὶ προσανελωκότες χρήματα, καὶ τούτων ἕτεροι
-ἀποδεδρακότες πατέρας καὶ μητέρας, οἱ δὲ καὶ τέκνα καταλιπόντες, ὡς
-χρήματα αὐτοῖς κτησάμενοι ἥξοντες πάλιν, ἀκούοντες καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους
-τοὺς παρὰ Κύρῳ πολλὰ καὶ ἀγαθὰ πράττειν. Τοιοῦτοι οὖν ὄντες, ἐπόθουν
-εἰς τὴν <span class="replace" id="tn_4" title="In the printed book:
-Ἑγγαδα">Ἑλλάδα</span> σώζεσθαι. Compare v. 10, 10.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_31"></a><span class="label"><a
-href="#FNanchor_31">[31]</a></span> Compare similar praises of
-Ptolemy Philadelphus, in order to attract Greek mercenaries from
-Sicily to Egypt (Theokrit. xiv, 50-59).</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_32"></a><span class="label"><a
-href="#FNanchor_32">[32]</a></span> Xen. Anab. iii, 1, 4. Ὑπισχνεῖτο
-δὲ αὐτῷ (Proxenus to Xenophon) εἰ ἔλθοι, φίλον Κύρῳ ποιήσειν· ὃν
-αὐτος ἔφη κρείττω ἑαυτῷ νομίζειν τῆς πατρίδος.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_33"></a><span class="label"><a
-href="#FNanchor_33">[33]</a></span> Strabo, ix, p. 403. The story
-that Sokrates carried off Xenophon, wounded and thrown from his
-horse, on his shoulders, and thus saved his life,—seems too doubtful
-to enter into the narrative.</p>
-
-<p>Among the proofs that Xenophon was among the Horsemen or Ἱππεῖς of
-Athens, we may remark, not only his own strong interest, and great
-skill in horsemanship, in the cavalry service and the duties of its
-commander, and in all that relates to horses, as manifested in his
-published works,—but also the fact, that his son Gryllus served
-afterwards among the Athenian horsemen at the combat of cavalry which
-preceded the great battle of Mantineia (Diogen. Laërt. ii, 54).</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_34"></a><span class="label"><a
-href="#FNanchor_34">[34]</a></span> Xen. Anab. iii, 1, 4-9; v. 9,
-22-24.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_35"></a><span class="label"><a
-href="#FNanchor_35">[35]</a></span> Xen. Anab. i, 2, 4; ii, 3, 19.</p>
-
-<p>Diodorus (xiv, 11) citing from Ephorus affirms that the first
-revelation to Artaxerxes was made by Pharnabazus, who had learnt it
-from the acuteness of the Athenian exile Alkibiades. That the latter
-should have had any concern in it, appears improbable. But Diodorus
-on more than one occasion, confounds Pharnabazus and Tissaphernes.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_36"></a><span class="label"><a
-href="#FNanchor_36">[36]</a></span> Diodor. xiv, 19.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_37"></a><span class="label"><a
-href="#FNanchor_37">[37]</a></span> The parasang was a Persian
-measurement of length, but according to Strabo, not of uniform value
-in all parts of Asia; in some parts, held equivalent to thirty
-stadia, in others to forty, in others to sixty (Strabo, xi, p.
-518; Forbiger, Handbuch der Alten Geograph. vol. i, p. 555). This
-variability of meaning is no way extraordinary, when we recollect the
-difference between English, Irish, and German miles, etc.</p>
-
-<p>Herodotus tells us distinctly what <i>he</i> meant by a parasang, and
-what the Persian government of his day recognized as such in their
-measurement of the great road from Sardis to Susa, as well as in
-their measurements of territory for purposes of tribute (Herod. v,
-53; vi, 43). It was thirty Greek stadia = nearly three and a half
-English miles, or nearly three geographical miles. The distance
-between every two successive stations, on the road from Sardis to
-Susa, (which was “all inhabited and all secure,” διὰ οἰκεομένης τε
-ἅπασα καὶ ἀσφολέος), would seem to have been measured and marked in
-parasangs and fractions of a parasang. It seems probable, from the
-account which Herodotus gives of the march of Xerxes (vii, 26), that
-this road passed from Kappadokia and across the river Halys, through
-Kelænæ and Kolossæ to Sardis; and therefore that the road which Cyrus
-took for his march, from Sardis at least as far as Kelænæ, must have
-been so measured and marked.</p>
-
-<p>Xenophon also in his summing up of the route, (ii, 2, 6; vii, 8,
-26) implies the parasang as equivalent to thirty stadia, while he
-gives for the most part, each day’s journey measured in parasangs.
-Now even at the outset of the march, we have no reason to believe
-that there was any official measurer of road-progress accompanying
-the army, like Bæton, ὁ Βηματιστὴς Ἀλεξάνδρου, in Alexander’s
-invasion; see Athenæus, x, p. 442, and Geier, Alexandri Magni Histor.
-Scriptt. p. 357. Yet Xenophon, throughout the whole march, even as
-far as Trebizond, states the day’s march of the army in parasangs;
-not merely in Asia Minor, where there were roads, but through the
-Arabian desert between Thapsakus and Pylæ,—through the snows of
-Armenia,—and through the territory of the barbarous Chalybes. He
-tells us that in the desert of Arabia they marched ninety parasangs
-in thirteen days, or very nearly seven parasangs per day,—and that
-too under the extreme heat of summer. He tells us, farther, that
-in the deep snows of Armenia, and in the extremity of winter, they
-marched fifteen parasangs in three days; and through the territory
-(also covered with snow) of the pugnacious Chalybes, fifty parasangs
-in seven days, or more than seven parasangs per day. Such marches, at
-thirty stadia for the parasang, are impossible. And how did Xenophon
-measure the distance marched over?</p>
-
-<p>The most intelligent modern investigators and travellers,—Major
-Rennell, Mr. Ainsworth, Mr. Hamilton, Colonel Chesney, Professor
-Koch, etc., offer no satisfactory solution of the difficulty. Major
-Rennell reckons the parasangs as equal to 2.25 geogr. miles; Mr.
-Ainsworth at three geogr. miles; Mr. Hamilton (travels in Asia Minor,
-c. 42, p. 200), at something less than two and a half geogr. miles;
-Colonel Chesney (Euphrat. and Tigris, ch. 8, p. 207) at 2.608 geogr.
-miles between Sardis and Thapsakus—at 1.98 geogr. miles, between
-Thapsakus and Kunaxa,—at something less than this, without specifying
-how much, during the retreat. It is evident that there is no certain
-basis to proceed upon, even for the earlier portion of the route;
-much more, for the retreat. The distance between Ikonium and Dana
-(or Tyana), is one of the quantities on which Mr. Hamilton rests
-his calculation; but we are by no means certain that Cyrus took the
-direct route of march; he rather seems to have turned out of his
-way, partly to plunder Lykaonia, partly to conduct the Kilikian
-princess homeward. The other item, insisted upon by Mr. Hamilton,
-is the distance between Kelænæ and Kolossæ, two places the site of
-which seems well ascertained, and which are by the best modern maps,
-fifty-two geographical miles apart. Xenophon calls the distance
-twenty parasangs. Assuming the road by which he marched to have been
-the same with that now travelled, it would make the parasang of
-Xenophon = 2.6 geographical miles. I have before remarked that the
-road between Kolossæ and Kelænæ was probably measured and numbered
-according to parasangs; so that Xenophon, in giving the number of
-parasangs between these two places, would be speaking upon official
-authority.</p>
-
-<p>Even a century and a half afterwards, the geographer Eratosthenes
-found it not possible to obtain accurate measurements, in much of the
-country traversed by Cyrus (Strabo, ii, p. 73.)</p>
-
-<p>Colonel Chesney remarks,—“From Sardis to Cunaxa, or the mounds of
-Mohammed, cannot be much under or over twelve hundred and sixty-five
-geographical miles; making 2.364 geographical miles for each of the
-five hundred and thirty-five parasangs given by Xenophon between
-those two places.”</p>
-
-<p>As a measure of distance, the parasang of Xenophon is evidently
-untrustworthy. Is it admissible to consider, in the description
-of this march, that the parasangs and stadia of Xenophon are
-measurements rather of time than of space? From Sardis to Kelænæ,
-he had a measured road and numbered parasangs of distance; it is
-probable that the same mensuration and numeration continued for four
-days farther, as far as Keramôn-Agora, (since I imagine that the
-road from Kelænæ to the Halys and Kappadokia must have gone through
-these two places,)—and possibly it may have continued even as far
-as Ikonium or Dana. Hence, by these early marches, Xenophon had
-the opportunity of forming to himself roughly an idea of the time
-(measured by the course of the sun) which it took for the army to
-march one, two, or three parasangs; and when he came to the ulterior
-portions of the road, he called <i>that length of time</i> by the name of
-one, two, or three parasangs. Five parasangs seem to have meant with
-him a full day’s march; three or four, a short day; six, seven, or
-eight, a long, or very long day.</p>
-
-<p>We must recollect that the Greeks in the time of Xenophon had
-no portable means of measuring hours, and did not habitually
-divide the day into hours, or into any other recognized fraction.
-The Alexandrine astronomers, near two centuries afterwards, were
-the first to use ὥρη in the sense of hour (Ideler, Handbuch der
-Chronologie, vol. i, p. 239.)</p>
-
-<p>This may perhaps help to explain Xenophon’s meaning, when he talks
-about marching five or seven parasangs amidst the deep snows of
-Armenia; I do not however suppose that he had this meaning uniformly
-or steadily present to his mind. Sometimes, it would seem, he must
-have used the word in its usual meaning of distance.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_38"></a><span class="label"><a
-href="#FNanchor_38">[38]</a></span> Xen. Anab. i, 2, 8, 9. About
-Kelænæ, Arrian, Exp. Al. i, 29, 2; Quint. Curt. iii, 1, 6.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_39"></a><span class="label"><a
-href="#FNanchor_39">[39]</a></span> These three marches, each of ten
-parasangs, from Keramôn-Agora to Käystru-Pedion,—are the longest
-recorded in the Anabasis. It is rather surprising to find them so;
-for there seems no motive for Cyrus to have hurried forward. When
-he reached Käystru-Pedion, he halted five days. Koch (Zug der Zehn
-Tausend, Leipsic, 1850, p. 19) remarks that the three days’ march,
-which seem to have dropped out of Xenophon’s calculation, comparing
-the items with the total, might conveniently be let in here; so that
-these thirty parasangs should have occupied six days’ march instead
-of three; five parasangs per day. The whole march which Cyrus had
-hitherto made from Sardis, including the road from Keramôn-Agora to
-Käystru-Pedion, lay in the great road from Sardis to the river Halys,
-Kappadokia, and Susa. That road (as we see by the March of Xerxes,
-Herodot. vii, 26; v, 52) passed through both Kelænæ and Kolossæ;
-though this is a prodigious departure from the straight line. At
-Käystru-Pedion, Cyrus seems to have left this great road; taking a
-different route, in a direction nearly south-east towards Ikonium.
-About the point, somewhere near Synnada, where these different roads
-crossed, see Mr. Ainsworth, Trav. in the Track, p. 28.</p>
-
-<p>I do not share the doubts which have been raised about Xenophon’s
-accuracy, in his description of the route from Sardis to Ikonium;
-though the names of several of the places which he mentions are not
-known to us, and their sites cannot be exactly identified. There is
-a great departure from the straight line of bearing. But we at the
-present day assign more weight to that circumstance than is suited to
-the days of Xenophon. Straight roads, stretching systematically over
-a large region of country, are not of that age; the communications
-were probably all originally made, between one neighboring town and
-another, without much reference to saving of distance, and with no
-reference to any promotion of traffic between distant places.</p>
-
-<p>It was just about this time that King Archelaus began to “cut
-straight roads” in Macedonia,—which Thucydides seems to note as a
-remarkable thing (ii, 100).</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_40"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_40">[40]</a></span> Neither Thymbrium, nor Tyriæum, can be identified. But it seems
-that both must have been situated on the line of road now followed by the
-caravans from Smyrna to Konieh (Ikonium,) which line of road follows a
-direction between the mountains called Emir Dagh on the north-east, and
-those called Sultan Dagh on the south-west (Koch, Der Zug der Zehn
-Tausend, p. 21, 22).</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_41"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_41">[41]</a></span> Εἶχον δὲ πάντες κράνη χαλκᾶ, καὶ χιτῶνας φοινικοῦς, καὶ κνημῖδας, καὶ
-<em class="gesperrt">τὰς ἀσπίδας ἐκκεκαθαρμένας</em>.
-</p>
-<p>
-When the hoplite was on march, without expectation of an enemy, the
-shield seems to have been carried behind him, with his blanket attached to
-it (see Aristoph. Acharn. 1085, 1089-1149); it was slung by the strap round
-his neck and shoulder. Sometimes indeed he had an opportunity of relieving
-himself from the burden, by putting the shield in a baggage-wagon
-(Xen. Anab. i, 7, 20). The officers generally, and doubtless some soldiers,
-could command attendants to carry their shields for them (iv, 2, 20; Aristoph.
-1, c.).
-</p>
-<p>
-On occasion of this review, the shields were unpacked, rubbed, and brightened,
-as before a battle (Xen. Hell. vii, 5, 20); then fastened round the neck
-or shoulders, and held out upon the left arm, which was passed through the
-rings or straps attached to its concave or interior side.
-</p>
-<p>
-Respecting the cases or wrappers of the shields, see a curious stratagem
-of the Syracusan Agathokles (Diodor. xx, 11). The Roman soldiers also
-carried their shields in leathern wrappers, when on march (Plutarch, Lucull.
-c. 27).
-</p>
-<p>
-It is to be remarked that Xenophon, in enumerating the arms of the Cyreians,
-does not mention <i>breastplates</i>; which (though sometimes worn, see
-Plutarch, Dion. c. 30) were not usually worn by hoplites, who carried heavy
-shields. It is quite possible that <i>some</i> of the Cyreian infantry may have
-had breastplates as well as shields, since every soldier provided his own
-arms; but Xenophon states only what was common to all.
-</p>
-<p>
-Grecian cavalry commonly wore a heavy breastplate, but had no shield.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_42"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_42">[42]</a></span> Xen. Anab. i, 2, 16-19.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_43"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_43">[43]</a></span> Xen. Anab. iii, 2, 25.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_44"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_44">[44]</a></span> This shorter and more direct pass crosses the Taurus by Kizil-Chesmeh,
-Alan Buzuk, and Mizetli; it led directly to the Kilikian seaport-town
-Soli, afterwards called Pompeiopolis. It is laid down in the Peutinger
-Tables as the road from Iconium to Pompeiopolis (Ainsworth, p. 40 <i>seq.</i>;
-Chesney, Euph. and Tigr. ii, p. 209).</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_45"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_45">[45]</a></span> Xen. Anab. i, 2, 20.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_46"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_46">[46]</a></span> Xen. Anab. i, 2, 21; Diodor. xiv, 20. See Mr. Kinneir, Travels in
-Asia Minor, p. 116; Col. Chesney, Euphrates and Tigris, vol. i, p. 293-354;
-and Mr. Ainsworth, Travels in the Track of the Ten Thousand, p. 40 <i>seq.</i>;
-also his other work, Travels in Asia Minor, vol. ii. ch. 30, p. 70-77; and
-Koch, Der Zug der Zehn Tausend, p. 26-172, for a description of this memorable
-pass.
-</p>
-<p>
-Alexander the Great, as well as Cyrus, was fortunate enough to find this
-impregnable pass abandoned; as it appears, through sheer stupidity or recklessness
-of the satrap who ought to have defended it, and who had not even
-the same excuse for abandoning it as Syennesis had on the approach of
-Cyrus (Arrian. E. A. ii. 4; Curtius, iii, 9, 10, 11).</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_47"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_47">[47]</a></span> Xen. Anab. i, 2, 23-27.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_48"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_48">[48]</a></span> Diodorus (xiv, 20) represents Syennesis as playing a double game,
-though reluctantly. He takes no notice of the proceeding of Epyaxa.
-</p>
-<p>
-So Livy says, about the conduct of the Macedonian courtiers in regard
-to the enmity between Perseus and Demetrius, the two sons of Philip II. of
-Macedon: “Crescente in dies Philippi odio in Romanos, cui Perseus indulgeret,
-Demetrius summâ ope adversaretur, prospicientes animo exitum
-incauti a fraude fraternâ juvenis—<i>adjuvandum, quod futurum erat, rati, fovendamque
-spem potentioris, Perseo se adjungunt</i>,” <i>etc.</i> (Livy, xl, 5).</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_49"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_49">[49]</a></span> See Herodot. v. 49.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_50"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_50">[50]</a></span> Xen. Anab. i, 3, 1.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_51"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_51">[51]</a></span> Xen. Anab. ii, 6, 5-15.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_52"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_52">[52]</a></span> Xen. Anab. i, 3, 2-7. Here, as on other occasions, I translate the
-sense rather than the words.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_53"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_53">[53]</a></span> Xen. Anab. i, 3, 16-21.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_54"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_54">[54]</a></span> The breadth of the river Sarus (Scihun) is given by Xenophon at three
-hundred feet; which agrees nearly with the statements of modern travellers
-(Koch, Der Zug der Zehn Tausend, p. 34).
-</p>
-<p>
-Compare, for the description of this country, Kinneir’s Journey through
-Asia Minor, p. 135; Col. Chesney, Euphrates and Tigris, ii, p. 211; Mr.
-Ainsworth, Travels in the Track of the Ten Thousand, p. 54.
-</p>
-<p>
-Colonel Chesney affirms that neither the Sarus nor the Pyramus is fordable.
-There must have been bridges; which, in the then flourishing state
-of Kilikia, is by no means improbable. He and Mr. Ainsworth, however,
-differ as to the route which they suppose Cyrus to have taken between
-Tarsus and Issus.
-</p>
-<p>
-Xenophon mentions nothing about the Amanian Gates, which afterwards
-appear noticed both in Arrian (ii, 6; ii, 7) and in Strabo (xiv, p. 676). The
-various data of ancient history and geography about this region are by no
-means easy to reconcile; see a valuable note of Mützel on Quintus Curtius,
-iii, 17, 7. An inspection of the best recent maps, either Colonel Chesney’s
-or Kiepert’s, clears up some of these better than any verbal description.
-We see by these maps that Mount Amanus bifurcates into two branches,
-one of them flanking the Gulf of Issus on its western, the other on its eastern
-side. There are thus two different passes, each called Pylæ Amanides
-or Amanian Gates; one having reference to the Western Amanus, the
-other to the Eastern. The former was crossed by Alexander, the latter by
-Darius, before the battle of Issus; and Arrian (ii, 6; ii, 7) is equally correct
-in saying of both of them that they passed the Amanian Gates; though
-both did not pass the same gates.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_55"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_55">[55]</a></span> Diodor. xiv. 21.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_56"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_56">[56]</a></span> Xen. Anab. i, 4, 3-5. Ἀβροκόμας δ᾽ οὐ τοῦτο ἐποίησεν ἀλλ᾽ ἐπεὶ
-ἤκουσε Κῦρον ἐν Κιλικίᾳ ὄντα, αναστρέψας ἐκ Φοινίκης, παρὰ βασιλέα ἀπήλαυνεν,
-etc.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_57"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_57">[57]</a></span> Diodor. xiv.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_58"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_58">[58]</a></span> Xen. Anab. i, 4, 6. To require the wives or children of generals in
-service, as hostages for fidelity, appears to have been not unfrequent with
-Persian kings. On the other hand, it was remarked as a piece of gross
-obsequiousness in the Argeian Nikostratus, who commanded the contingent
-of his countrymen serving under Artaxerxes Ochus in Egypt, that he volunteered
-to bring up his son to the king as a hostage, without being demanded
-(Theopompus, Frag. 135 [ed. Wichers] ap. Athenæ. vi, p. 252).</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_59"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_59">[59]</a></span> Xen. Anab. i, 4, 7-9.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_60"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_60">[60]</a></span> Diodor. xiv, 21.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_61"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_61">[61]</a></span> See the remarks of Mr. Ainsworth, Travels in the Track of the Ten
-Thousand, p. 58-61; and other citations respecting the difficult road
-through the pass of Beilan, in Mützel’s valuable notes on Quintus Curtius,
-iii, 20, 13, p. 101.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_62"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_62">[62]</a></span> Neither the Chalus, nor the Daradax, nor indeed the road followed by
-Cyrus in crossing Syria from the sea to the Euphrates, can be satisfactorily
-made out (Koch, Zug der Zehn Tausend, p. 36, 37).
-</p>
-<p>
-Respecting the situation of Thapsakus,—placed erroneously by Rennell
-lower down the river at Deir, where it stands marked even in the map annexed
-to Col. Chesney’s Report on the Euphrates, and by Reichard higher
-up the river, near Bir—see Ritter, Erdkunde, part x, B. iii; West Asien, p.
-14-17, with the elaborate discussion, p. 972-978, in the same volume; also
-the work of Mr. Ainsworth above cited, p. 70. The situation of Thapsakus
-is correctly placed in Colonel Chesney’s last work (Euphr. and Tigr. p.
-213), and in the excellent map accompanying that work; though I dissent
-from his view of the march of Cyrus between the pass of Beilan and Thapsakus.
-</p>
-<p>
-Thapsakus appears to have been the most frequented and best-known
-passage over the Euphrates, throughout the duration of the Seleukid kings,
-down to 100 <small>B.C.</small> It was selected as a noted point, to which observations
-and calculations might be conveniently referred, by Eratosthenes and other
-geographers (see Strabo, ii, p. 79-87). After the time when the Roman
-empire became extended to the Euphrates, the new Zeugma, higher up the
-river near Bir or Bihrejik (about the 37th parallel of latitude) became more
-used and better known, at least to the Roman writers.
-</p>
-<p>
-The passage at Thapsakus was in the line of road from Palmyra to
-Karrhæ in Northern Mesopotamia; also from Seleukeia (on the Tigris
-below Bagdad) to the other cities founded in Northern Syria by Seleukus
-Nikator and his successors, Antioch on the Orontes, Seleukeia in Pieria,
-Laodikeia, Antioch ad Taurum, etc.
-</p>
-<p>
-The ford at Thapsakus (says Mr. Ainsworth, p. 69, 70) “is celebrated to
-this day as the ford of the Anezeh or Beduins. On the right bank of the
-Euphrates there are the remains of a paved causeway leading to the very
-banks of the river, and continued on the opposite side.”</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_63"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_63">[63]</a></span> Xen. Anab. i, 4, 12-18.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_64"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_64">[64]</a></span> Xen. Anab. i, 4, 18. Compare (Plutarch, Alexand. 17) analogous expressions
-of flattery—from the historians of Alexander, affirming that the sea near
-Pamphylia providentially made way for him—from the inhabitants on the
-banks of the Euphrates, when the river was passed by the Roman legions and
-the Parthian prince Tiridates, in the reign of the Emperor Tiberius (Tacitus,
-Annal. vi. 37); and by Lucullus still earlier (Plutarch, Lucull. c. 24).
-</p>
-<p>
-The time when Cyrus crossed the Euphrates, must probably have been
-about the end of July or beginning of August. Now the period of greatest
-height, in the waters of the Euphrates near this part of its course, is from
-the 21st to the 28th of May; the period when they are lowest, is about the
-middle of November (see Colonel Chesney’s Report on the Euphrates, p. 5).
-Rennell erroneously states that they are lowest in August and September
-(Expedit, of Xenophon, p. 277). The waters would thus be at a sort of
-mean height, when Cyrus passed.
-</p>
-<p>
-Mr. Ainsworth states that there were only twenty inches of water in the
-ford at Thapsakus, from October 1841 to February 1842; the steamers
-Nimrod and Nitocris then struck upon it (p. 72), though the steamers Euphrates
-and Tigris had passed over it without difficulty in the month of
-May.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_65"></a><a href="#FNanchor_65"><span class="label">[65]</span></a> Xenophon gives these nine days of march as covering fifty parasangs
-(Anab. i, 4, 19). But Koch remarks that the distance is not half so great
-as that from the sea to Thapsakus; which latter Xenophon gives at sixty-five
-parasangs. There is here some confusion; together with the usual difficulty
-in assigning any given distance as the equivalent of the parasang
-(Koch, Zug der Zehn Tausend, p. 38).</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_66"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_66">[66]</a></span> See the remarkable testimony of Mr. Ainsworth, from personal observation,
-to the accuracy of Xenophon’s description of the country, even at
-the present day.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_67"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_67">[67]</a></span> Xen. Anab. i, 2, 24.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_68"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_68">[68]</a></span> Xen. Anab. i, 5, 4-8.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_69"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_69">[69]</a></span> I infer that the army halted here five or six days, from the story afterwards
-told respecting the Ambrakiot Silanus, the prophet of the army;
-who, on sacrificing, had told Cyrus that his brother would not fight for ten
-days (i, 7, 16). This sacrifice must have been offered, I imagine, during
-the halt—not during the distressing march which preceded. The ten days
-named by Silanus, expired on the fourth day after they left Pylæ.
-</p>
-<p>
-It is in reference to this portion of the course of the Euphrates, from the
-Chaboras southward down by Anah and Hit (the ancient Is, noticed by
-Herodotus, and still celebrated from its unexhausted supply of bitumen),
-between latitude 35½° and 34°—that Colonel Chesney, in his Report on the
-Navigation of the Euphrates (p. 2), has the following remarks:—
-</p>
-<p>
-“The scenery above Hit, in itself very picturesque, is greatly heightened,
-as one is carried along the current, by the frequent recurrence, at very short
-intervals, of ancient irrigating aqueducts; these beautiful specimens of art
-and durability are attributed by the Arabs to the times of the ignorant,
-meaning (as is expressly understood) the Persians, when fire-worshippers,
-and in possession of the world. They literally cover both banks, and prove
-that the borders of the Euphrates were once thickly inhabited by a people
-far advanced indeed in the application of hydraulics to domestic purposes,
-of the first and greatest utility—the transport of water. The greater portion
-is now more or less in ruins, but some have been repaired, and kept up
-for use either to grind corn or to irrigate. The aqueducts are of stone, firmly
-cemented, narrowing to about two feet or twenty inches at top, placed at
-right angles to the current, and carried various distances towards the interior,
-from two hundred to one thousand two hundred yards.
-</p>
-<p>
-“But what most concerns the subject of this memoir is, the existence of
-a parapet wall or stone rampart in the river, just above the several aqueducts.
-In general, there is one of the former attached to each of the latter.
-And almost invariably, between two mills on the opposite banks, one of
-them crosses the stream from side to side, with the exception of a passage
-left in the centre for boats to pass up and down. The object of these subaqueous
-walls would appear to be exclusively, to raise the water sufficiently
-at low seasons, to give it impetus, as well as a more abundant supply to the
-wheels. And their effect at those times is, to create a fall in every part of
-the width, save the opening left for commerce, through which the water
-rushes with a moderately irregular surface. These dams were probably
-from four to eight feet high originally; but they are now frequently a bank
-of stones disturbing the evenness of the current, but always affording a sufficient
-passage for large boats at low seasons.”
-</p>
-<p>
-The marks which Colonel Chesney points out, of previous population
-and industry on the banks of the Euphrates at this part of its course, are
-extremely interesting and curious, when contrasted with the desolation
-depicted by Xenophon; who mentions that there were no other inhabitants
-than some who lived by cutting millstones from the stone quarries near, and
-sending them to Babylon in exchange for grain. It is plain that the population,
-of which Colonel Chesney saw the remaining tokens, either had already
-long ceased, or did not begin to exist, or to construct their dams and
-aqueducts, until a period later than Xenophon. They probably began
-during the period of the Seleukid kings, after the year 300 <small>B.C.</small> For this
-line of road along the Euphrates began then to acquire great importance
-as the means of communication between the great city of Seleukeia (on
-the Tigris, below Bagdad) and the other cities founded by Seleukus Nikator
-and his successors in the North of Syria and Asia Minor—Seleukeia in
-Pieria, Antioch, Laodikeia, Apameia, etc. This route coincides mainly
-with the present route from Bagdad to Aleppo, crossing the Euphrates at
-Thapsakus. It can hardly be doubted that the course of the Euphrates
-was better protected during the two centuries of the Seleukid kings (<small>B.C.</small>
-300-100, speaking in round numbers), than it came to be afterwards, when
-that river became the boundary line between the Romans and the Parthians.
-Even at the time of the Emperor Julian’s invasion, however, Ammianus
-Marcellinus describes the left bank of the Euphrates, north of Babylonia,
-as being in several parts well cultivated, and furnishing ample subsistence,
-(Ammian. Marc. xxiv, 1). At the time of Xenophon’s Anabasis, there was
-nothing to give much importance to the banks of the Euphrates north of
-Babylonia.
-</p>
-<p>
-Mr. Ainsworth describes the country on the left bank of the Euphrates,
-before reaching Pylæ, as being now in the same condition as it was when
-Xenophon and his comrades marched through it,—“full of hills and narrow
-valleys, and presenting many difficulties to the movement of an army.
-The illustrator was, by a curious accident, left by the Euphrates steamer on
-this very portion of the river, and on the same side as the Perso-Greek
-army, and he had to walk a day and a night across these inhospitable regions;
-so that he can speak feelingly of the difficulties which the Greeks
-had to encounter.” (Travels in the Track, etc. p. 81.)</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_70"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_70">[70]</a></span> I incline to think that Charmandê must have been nearly opposite
-Pylæ, lower down than Hit. But Major Rennell (p. 107) and Mr. Ainsworth
-(p. 84) suppose Charmandê to be the same place as the modern Hit
-(the Is of Herodotus). There is no other known town with which we can
-identify it.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_71"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_71">[71]</a></span> Xen. Anab. i, 5, 11-17.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_72"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_72">[72]</a></span> The commentators agree in thinking that we are to understand by Pylæ
-a sort of gate or pass, marking the spot where the desert country north of
-Babylonia—with its undulations of land, and its steep banks along the
-river—was exchanged for the flat and fertile alluvium constituting Babylonia
-proper. Perhaps there was a town near the pass, and named after it.
-</p>
-<p>
-Now it appears from Col. Chesney’s survey that this alteration in the
-nature of the country takes place a few miles below Hit. He observes—(Euphrates
-and Tigris, vol. i, p. 54)—“Three miles below Hit, the remains
-of aqueducts disappear, and the windings become shorter and more frequent,
-as the river flows through a tract of country almost level.” Thereabouts
-it is that I am inclined to place Pylæ.
-</p>
-<p>
-Colonel Chesney places it lower down, twenty-five miles from Hit. Professor
-Koch (Zug der Zehn Tausend, p. 44), lower down still. Mr. Ainsworth
-places it as much as seventy geographical miles lower than Hit
-(Travels in the Track of the Ten Thousand, p. 81); compare Ritter, Erdkunde,
-West Asien, x. p. 16; xi, pp. 755-763.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_73"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_73">[73]</a></span> The description given of this scene (known to the Greeks through the
-communications of Klearchus) by Xenophon, is extremely interesting
-(Anab. i, 6). I omit it from regard to space.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_74"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_74">[74]</a></span> Xen. Anab. i, 7, 2-9.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_75"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_75">[75]</a></span> Xen. Anab. i, 5, 16.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_76"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_76">[76]</a></span> See Herodot. vii, 102, 103, 209. Compare the observations of the Persian
-Achæmenês, c. 236.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_77"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_77">[77]</a></span> Herod. vii, 104. Demaratus says to Xerxes, respecting the
-Lacedæmonians—Ἐλεύθεροι γὰρ ἐόντες, οὐ πάντα ἐλεύθεροί εἰσι· ἔπεστι γάρ
-σφι δεσπότης, νόμος, τὸν ὑποδειμαίνουσι πολλῷ μᾶλλον ἢ οἱ σοὶ σέ.</p>
-
-<p>Again, the historian observes about the Athenians, and their extraordinary
-increase of prowess after having shaken off the despotism of Hippias
-(v. 78)—Δηλοῖ δ᾽ οὐ καθ᾽ ἓν μόνον ἀλλὰ πανταχοῦ, ἡ ἰσηγορίη ὥς ἐστι χρῆμα
-σπουδαῖον· εἰ καὶ Ἀθηναῖοι τυραννευόμενοι μὲν, οὐδαμῶν τῶν σφέας περιοικεόντων
-ἦσαν τὰ πολέμια ἀμείνους, ἀπαλλαχθέντες δὲ τυράννων, μακρῷ πρῶτοι ἐγένοντο. Δηλοῖ
-ὦν ταῦτα, ὅτι κατεχόμενοι μὲν ἐθελοκακεέον, ὡς δεσπότῃ ἐργαζόμενοι· ἐλευθερωθέντων
-δὲ, αὐτὸς ἕκαστος ἑωϋτῷ προθυμέετο ἐργάζεσθαι.</p>
-
-<p>Compare Menander, Fragm. Incert. CL. ap. Meineke, Fragm. Comm.
-Græc. vol. iv. p. 268—</p>
-
-<div class="poetry-container">
-  <div class="poetry">
-    <p>Ἐλεύθερος πᾶς ἑνὶ δεδούλωται, νόμῳ·</p>
-    <p>Δυσὶν δὲ δοῦλος, καὶ νόμῳ καὶ δεσπότῃ.</p>
-  </div>
-</div>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_78"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_78">[78]</a></span> Xen. Anab. i, 7, 14-17.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_79"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_79">[79]</a></span> From Pylæ to the undefended trench, there intervened three entire
-days of march, and one part of a day; for it occurred in the fourth day’s
-march.
-</p>
-<p>
-Xenophon calls the three entire days, twelve parasangs in all. This
-argues short marches, not full marches. And it does not seem that the
-space of ground traversed during any one of them can have been considerable.
-For they were all undertaken with visible evidences of an enemy
-immediately in front of them; which circumstance was the occasion of the
-treason of Orontes, who asked Cyrus for a body of cavalry, under pretence
-of attacking the light troops of the enemy in front, and then wrote a letter
-to inform Artaxerxes that he was about to desert with his division. The
-letter was delivered to Cyrus, who thus discovered the treason.
-</p>
-<p>
-Marching with a known enemy not far off in front, Cyrus must have
-kept his army in something like battle order, and therefore must have
-moved slowly. Moreover the discovery of the treason of Orontes must
-itself have been an alarming fact, well calculated to render both Cyrus and
-Klearchus doubly cautious for the time. And the very trial of Orontes
-appears to have been conducted under such solemnities as must have occasioned
-a halt of the army.
-</p>
-<p>
-Taking these circumstances, we can hardly suppose the Greeks to have
-got over so much as thirty English miles of ground in the three entire days
-of march. The fourth day they must have got over very little ground indeed;
-not merely because Cyrus was in momentary expectation of the
-King’s main army, and of a general battle (i, 7, 14), but because of the
-great delay necessary for passing the trench. His whole army (more than
-one hundred thousand men), with baggage, chariots, etc., had to pass
-through the narrow gut of twenty feet wide between the trench and the Euphrates.
-He can hardly have made more than five miles in this whole
-day’s march, getting at night so far as to encamp two or three miles beyond
-the trench. We may therefore reckon the distance marched over between
-Pylæ and the trench as about thirty-two miles in all; and two or three
-miles farther to the encampment of the next night. Probably Cyrus would
-keep near the river, yet not following its bends with absolute precision; so
-that in estimating distance, we ought to take a mean between the straight
-line and the full windings of the river.
-</p>
-<p>
-I conceive the trench to have cut the Wall of Media at a much wider
-angle than appears in Col. Chesney’s map; so that the triangular space
-included between the trench, the Wall, and the river, was much more extensive.
-The reason, we may presume, why the trench was cut, was, to
-defend that portion of the well-cultivated and watered country of Babylonia
-which lay outside of the Wall of Media—which portion (as we shall see
-hereafter in the marches of the Greeks after the battle) was very considerable.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_80"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_80">[80]</a></span> Xen. Anab. i, 7, 20. The account given by Xenophon of this long line
-of trench, first dug by order of Artaxerxes, and then left useless and undefended,
-differs from the narrative of Diodorus (xiv, 22), which seems to be
-borrowed from Ephorus. Diodorus says that the king caused a long trench
-to be dug, and lined with carriages and waggons as a defence for his baggage;
-and that he afterwards marched forth from this entrenchment, with
-his soldiers free and unincumbered, to give battle to Cyrus. This is a
-statement more plausible than that of Xenophon, in this point of view, that
-it makes out the king to have acted upon a rational scheme; whereas in
-Xenophon he appears at first to have adopted a plan of defence, and then
-to have renounced it, after immense labor and cost, without any reason, so
-far as we can see. Yet I have no doubt that the account of Xenophon is
-the true one. The narrow passage, and the undefended trench, were both
-facts of the most obvious and impressive character to an observing soldier.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_81"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_81">[81]</a></span> Xenophon does not mention the name Kunaxa, which comes to us from
-Plutarch (Artaxerx. c. 8), who states that it was five hundred stadia (about
-fifty-eight miles) from Babylon; while Xenophon was informed that the
-field of battle was distant from Babylon only three hundred and sixty
-stadia. Now, according to Colonel Chesney (Euphrates and Tigris, vol. i,
-p. 57), Hillah (Babylon) is distant ninety-one miles by the river, or sixty-one
-and a half miles direct, from Felujah. Following therefore the distance
-given by Plutarch (probably copied from Ktesias), we should place
-Kunaxa a little lower down the river than Felujah. This seems the most
-probable supposition.
-</p>
-<p>
-Rennell and Mr. Baillie Fraser so place it (Mesopotamia and Assyria, p.
-186, Edin. 1842), I think rightly; moreover the latter remarks, what most
-of the commentators overlook, that the Greeks did not pass through the
-Wall of Media until long after the battle. See a note a little below, near
-the beginning of my next chapter, in reference to that Wall.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_82"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_82">[82]</a></span> The distance of the undefended trench from the battle-field of Kunaxa
-would be about twenty-two miles. First, three miles beyond the trench, to
-the first night-station; next, a full day’s march, say twelve miles; thirdly,
-a half day’s march, to the time of the mid-day halt, say seven miles.
-</p>
-<p>
-The distance from Pylæ to the trench having before been stated at thirty-two
-miles, the whole distance from Pylæ to Kunaxa will be about fifty-four
-miles.
-</p>
-<p>
-Now Colonel Chesney has stated the distance from Hit to Felujah Castle
-(two known points) at forty-eight miles of straight line, and seventy-seven
-miles, if following the line of the river. Deduct four miles for the distance
-from Hit to Pylæ, and we shall then have between Pylæ and Felujah,
-a rectilinear distance of forty-four miles. The marching route of the
-Greeks (as explained in the previous note, the Greeks following generally,
-but not exactly, the windings of the river) will give fifty miles from Pylæ
-to Felujah, and fifty-three or fifty-four from Pylæ to Kunaxa.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_83"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_83">[83]</a></span> Xen. Anab. i, 8, 8-11.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_84"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_84">[84]</a></span> Thucyd. v. 70. See Vol. VII, ch. lvi, p. 84 of this History.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_85"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_85">[85]</a></span> Plutarch (Artaxerx. c. 8) makes this criticism upon Klearchus; and it
-seems quite just.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_86"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_86">[86]</a></span> Xen. Anab. i, 8, 17; Diodor. xiv, 23.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_87"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_87">[87]</a></span> Xen. Anab. i, 8, 17-20.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_88"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_88">[88]</a></span> Xen. Anab i, 10, 4-8.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_89"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_89">[89]</a></span> Xen. Anab. i, 8, 23; i, 9, 31.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_90"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_90">[90]</a></span> Xen. Anab. i, 8, 21.
-</p>
-<p>
-Κῦρος δὲ, ὁρῶν τοὺς Ἕλληνας νικῶντας τὸ καθ᾽ αὑτοὺς καὶ διώκοντας,
-ἡδόμενος καὶ προσκυνούμενος ἤδη ὡς βασιλεὺς ὑπὸ τῶν ἀμφ᾽ αὐτὸν,
-<em class="gesperrt">οὐδ᾽ ὣς ἐξήχθη διώκειν</em>, etc.
-</p>
-<p>
-The last words are remarkable, as indicating that no other stimulus except
-that of ambitious rivalry and fraternal antipathy, had force enough to
-overthrow the self-command of Cyrus.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_91"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_91">[91]</a></span> Compare the account of the transport of rage which seized the Theban
-Pelopidas, when he saw Alexander the despot of Pheræ in the opposite
-army; which led to the same fatal consequences (Plutarch, Pelopidas, c.
-32; Cornel. Nepos, Pelop. c. 5). See also the reflections of Xenophon on
-the conduct of Teleutas before Olynthus.—Hellenic. v. 3, 7.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_92"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_92">[92]</a></span> Xen. Anab. i, 8, 22-29. The account of this battle and of the death of
-Cyrus by Ktesias (as far as we can make it out from the brief abstract in
-Photius—Ktesias, Fragm. c. 58, 59, ed. Bähr) does not differ materially
-from Xenophon. Ktesias mentions the Karian soldier (not noticed by
-Xenophon) who hurled the javelin; and adds that this soldier was afterwards
-tortured and put to death by Queen Parysatis, in savage revenge for
-the death of Cyrus. He also informs us that Bagapatês, the person who
-by order of Artaxerxes cut off the head and hand of Cyrus, was destroyed
-by her in the same way.
-</p>
-<p>
-Diodorus (xiv, 23) dresses up a much fuller picture of the conflict between
-Cyrus and his brother, which differs on many points, partly direct
-and partly implied, from Xenophon.
-</p>
-<p>
-Plutarch (Artaxerxes, c. 11, 12, 13) gives an account of the battle, and
-of the death of Cyrus, which he professes to have derived from Ktesias, but
-which differs still more materially from the narrative in Xenophon. Compare
-also the few words of Justin, v, 11.
-</p>
-<p>
-Diodorus (xiv, 24) says that twelve thousand men were slain of the king’s
-army at Kunaxa; the greater part of them by the Greeks under Klearchus,
-who did not lose a single man. He estimates the loss of Cyrus’s Asiatic
-army at three thousand men. But as the Greeks did not lose a man, so
-they can hardly have killed many in the pursuit; for they had scarcely any
-cavalry, and no great number of peltasts,—while hoplites could not have
-overtaken the flying Persians.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_93"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_93">[93]</a></span> Xen. Anab. i, 10, 3. The accomplishments and fascinations of this
-Phokæan lady, and the great esteem in which she was held first by Cyrus
-and afterwards by Artaxerxes, have been exaggerated into a romantic story,
-in which we cannot tell what may be the proportion of truth (see Ælian,
-V. H. xii, 1; Plutarch, Artaxerx. c. 26, 27; Justin, x, 2). Both Plutarch
-and Justin state that the subsequent enmity between Artaxerxes and his
-son Darius, which led to the conspiracy of the latter against his father, and
-to his destruction when the conspiracy was discovered, arose out of the
-passion of Darius for her. But as that transaction certainly happened at
-the close of the long life and reign of Artaxerxes, who reigned forty-six
-years—and as she must have been then sixty years old, if not more—we
-may fairly presume that the cause of the family tragedy must have been
-something different.
-</p>
-<p>
-Compare the description of the fate of Berenikê of Chios, and Monimê
-of Miletus, wives of Mithridates king of Pontus, during the last misfortunes
-of that prince (Plutarch, Lucullus, c. 18).</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_94"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_94">[94]</a></span> Xen. Anab. i, 10, 17. This provision must probably have been made
-during the recent halt at Pylæ.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_95"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_95">[95]</a></span> Xen. Anab. i, 10, 18, 19.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_96"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_96">[96]</a></span> Xen. Anab. ii. 1, 3, 4.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_97"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_97">[97]</a></span> Isokrates, Orat. iv, (Panegyric.) s. 175-182; a striking passage, as describing
-the way in which political institutions work themselves into the
-individual character and habits.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_98"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_98">[98]</a></span> Diodorus (xiv, 23) notices the legendary pair of hostile brothers, Eteokles
-and Polyneikes, as a parallel. Compare Tacitus, Annal. iv, 60. “Atrox
-Drusi ingenium, super cupidinem potentiæ, et <i>solita fratribus odia</i>, accendebatur
-invidia, quod mater Agrippina promptior Neroni erat,” etc.; and Justin,
-xlii, 4.
-</p>
-<p>
-Compare also the interesting narrative of M. Prosper Mérimée, in his
-life of Don Pedro of Castile; a prince commonly known by the name of
-Peter the Cruel. Don Pedro was dethroned, and slain in personal conflict,
-by the hand of his bastard brother, Henri of Transtamare.
-</p>
-<p>
-At the battle of Navarrete, in 1367, says M. Mérimée, “Don Pèdre, qui,
-pendant le combat, s’était jété au plus fort de la mêlée, s’acharna long temps
-à la poursuite des fuyards. On le voyait galoper dans la plaine, monté sur
-un cheval noir, sa bannière armoriée de Castille devant lui, cherchant son
-frère partout où l’on combattait encore, et criant, échauffé par le carnage—‘Où
-est ce bâtard, qui se nomme roi de Castille?’” (Histoire de Don
-Pèdre, p. 504.)
-</p>
-<p>
-Ultimately Don Pedro, blocked up and almost starved out in the castle
-of Montiel, was entrapped by simulated negotiations into the power of his
-enemies. He was slain in personal conflict by the dagger of his brother
-Henri, after a desperate struggle, in which he seemed likely to prevail, if
-Henri had not been partially aided by a bystander.
-</p>
-<p>
-This tragical scene (on the night of the 23d of March, 1369) is graphically
-described by M. Mérimée (p. 564-566).</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_99"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_99">[99]</a></span> Xen. Anab. iii, 1, 4. Ὑπισχνεῖτο δὲ αὐτῷ (Ξενοφῶντα Πρόξενος) εἰ ἔλθοι,
-φίλον Κύρῳ ποιήσειν· <em class="gesperrt">ὃν αὐτός ἔφη κρείττω ἑαυτῷ νομίζειν τῆς πατρίδος</em>.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_100"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_100">[100]</a></span> Xen. Anab. ii, 1, 5-7.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_101"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_101">[101]</a></span> We know from Plutarch (Artaxer. c. 13) that Ktesias distinctly asserted
-himself to have been present at this interview, and I see no reason
-why we should not believe him. Plutarch indeed rejects his testimony as
-false, affirming that Xenophon would certainly have mentioned him, had
-he been there; but such an objection seems to me insufficient. Nor is it
-necessary to construe the words of Xenophon, ἦν δ᾽ αὐτῶν Φαλῖνος <em class="gesperrt">εἶς Ἕλλην,</em>
-(ii, 1, 7) so strictly as to negative the presence of one or two other
-Greeks. Phalinus is thus specified because he was the spokesman of the
-party—a military man.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_102"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_102">[102]</a></span> Xen. Anab. ii, 1, 12 μὴ οὖν οἴου τὰ μόνα ἡμῖν ἀγαθὰ ὄντα
-ὑμῖν παραδώσειν· ἀλλὰ σὺν τούτοις καὶ περὶ τῶν ὑμετέρων ἀγαθῶν μαχούμεθα.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_103"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_103">[103]</a></span> Xen. Anab. ii, 1, 14-22. Diodorus (xiv, 25) is somewhat copious in
-his account of the interview with Phalinus. But he certainly followed
-other authorities besides Xenophon, if even it be true that he had Xenophon
-before him. The allusion to the past heroism of Leonidas seems rather in
-the style of Ephorus.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_104"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_104">[104]</a></span> Xen. Anab. ii, 2, 7-9. Koch remarks, however, with good reason, that
-it is difficult to see how they could get a wolf in Babylonia, for the sacrifice
-(Zug der Zehn Tausend, p. 51).</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_105"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_105">[105]</a></span> Such is the sum total stated by Xenophon himself (Anab. ii, 1, 6). It
-is greater, by nine days, than the sum total which we should obtain by
-adding together the separate days’ march specified by Xenophon from Sardis.
-But the distance from Sardis to Ephesus, as we know from Herodotus, was
-three days’ journey (Herod. v, 55); and therefore the discrepancy is really
-only to the amount of six, not of nine. See Krüger ad Anabas. p. 556;
-Koch, Zug der Z. p. 141.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_106"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_106">[106]</a></span> Colonel Chesney (Euphrates and Tigris, c. ii, p. 208) calculates twelve
-hundred and sixty-five geographical miles from Sardis to Kunaxa or the
-Mounds of Mohammed.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_107"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_107">[107]</a></span> For example, we are not told how long they rested at Pylæ, or opposite
-to Charmandê. I have given some grounds (in the preceding chapter) for
-believing that it cannot have been less than five days. The army must
-have been in the utmost need of repose, as well as of provisions.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_108"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_108">[108]</a></span> Xen. Anab. i, 5, 9.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_109"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_109">[109]</a></span> Xen. Anab. ii, 4, 6, 7.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_110"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_110">[110]</a></span> Xen. Anab. ii, 2, 13. Ἐπεὶ γὰρ ἡμέρα ἐγένετο,
-<em class="gesperrt">ἐπορεύοντο ἐν δεξιᾷ ἔχοντες τὸν ἥλιον</em>, λογιζόμενοι ἥξειν ἅμα
-ἡλίῳ δύνοντι εἰς κώμας τῆς Βαβυλωνίας χώρας· καὶ τοῦτο μὲν οὐκ ἐψεύσθησαν.
-</p>
-<p>
-Schneider, in his note on this passage, as well as Ritter, (Erdkunde, part.
-x, 3, p. 17), Mr. Ainsworth (Travels in the Track, p. 103) and Colonel
-Chesney (Euph. and Tigr. p. 219), understand the words here used by Xenophon
-in a sense from which I dissent. “When it was day, the army proceeded
-onward on their march, having the sun on their right hand,”—these
-words they understand as meaning that the army marched <i>northward</i>;
-whereas, in my judgment, the words intimate that the army marched <i>eastward</i>.
-<i>To have the sun on the right hand</i>, does not so much refer either to the
-precise point where, or to the precise instant when, the sun rises,—but to
-his diurnal path through the heavens, and to the general direction of the
-day’s march. This may be seen by comparing the remarkable passage in
-Herodotus, iv, 42, in reference to the alleged circumnavigation of Africa,
-from the Red Sea round the Cape of Good Hope to the Straits of Gibraltar,
-by the Phœnicians under the order of Nekos. These Phœnicians said, “that
-in sailing round Africa (from the Red Sea) they had the sun on their right
-hand”—ὡς τὴν Λιβύην περιπλώοντες <em class="gesperrt">τὸν ἠέλιον ἐπὶ δεξιᾷ</em>. Herodotus
-rejects this statement as incredible. Not knowing the phenomena of
-a southern latitude beyond the tropic of Capricorn, he could not imagine
-that men in sailing from East to West could possibly have the sun on their
-right hand; any man journeying from the Red Sea to the Straits of Gibraltar
-must, in his judgment, have the sun on the <i>left</i> hand, as he himself had
-always experienced in the north latitude of the Mediterranean or the African
-coast. See Vol. III. of this History, ch. xviii, p. 282.
-</p>
-<p>
-In addition to this reason, we may remark, that Ariæus and the Greeks,
-starting from their camp on the banks of the Euphrates (the place where
-they had passed the last night but one before the battle of Kunaxa) and
-marching <i>northward</i>, could not expect to arrive, and could not really arrive,
-at villages of the Babylonian territory. But they might naturally expect to
-do so, if they marched <i>eastward</i>, towards the Tigris. Nor would they have
-hit upon the enemy in a northerly march, which would in fact have been
-something near to a return upon their own previous steps. They would
-moreover have been stopped by the undefended Trench, which could only
-be passed at the narrow opening close to the Euphrates.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_111"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_111">[111]</a></span> Xen. Anab. ii, 2, 20. This seems to have been a standing military jest,
-to make the soldiers laugh at their past panic. See the references in Krüger
-and Schneider’s notes.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_112"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_112">[112]</a></span> Diodorus (xvi, 24) tells us that Ariæus intended to guide them towards
-Paphlagonia; a very loose indication.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_113"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_113">[113]</a></span> Xen. Anab. ii, 3, 7, 13.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_114"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_114">[114]</a></span> Xen. Anab. ii, 3, 14, 17.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_115"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_115">[115]</a></span> Xen. Anab. ii, 3, 18-27.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_116"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_116">[116]</a></span> Ktesiæ Persica, Fragm. c. 59, ed. Bähr; compared with the remarkable
-Fragment. 18, preserved by the so-called Demetrius Phalêreus: see also
-Plutarch, Artaxerx. c. 17.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_117"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_117">[117]</a></span> Herodot. i, 193; ii, 108; Strabo, xvii. p. 788.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_118"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_118">[118]</a></span> Xen. Anab. v, 6, 16; Thucyd. vii.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_119"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_119">[119]</a></span> Xen. Anab. ii, 4, 3-8.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_120"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_120">[120]</a></span> Xen. Anab. ii, 4, 12. Διελθόντες δὲ <em class="gesperrt">τρεῖς σταθμοὺς</em>, ἀφίκοντο
-πρὸς τὸ Μηδίας καλούμενον τεῖχος, καὶ <em class="gesperrt">παρῆλθον αὐτοῦ εἴσω</em>. It appears
-to me that these three days’ march or σταθμοὶ can hardly be computed
-from the moment when they commenced their march under the conduct of
-Tissaphernes. On the other hand, if we begin from the moment when the
-Greeks started under conduct of Ariæus, we can plainly trace three distinct
-<i>resting places</i> (σταθμοὺς) before they reached the Wall of Media. First, at
-the villages where the confusion and alarm arose (ii, 13-21). Secondly, at
-the villages of abundant supply, where they concluded the truce with Tissaphernes,
-and waited twenty days for his return (ii, 3, 14; ii, 4, 9). Thirdly,
-one night’s halt under the conduct of Tissaphernes, before they reached
-the Wall of Media. This makes three distinct stations or halting places,
-between the station (the first station after passing the undefended trench)
-from whence they started to begin their retreat under the conduct of Ariæus,—and
-the point where they traversed the Wall of Media.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_121"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_121">[121]</a></span> I reserve for this place the consideration of that which Xenophon states,
-in two or three passages, about the Wall of Media and about different canals
-in connection with the Tigris,—the result of which, as far as I can
-make it out, stands in my text.
-</p>
-<p>
-I have already stated, in the preceding chapter, that in the march of the
-day next but one preceding the battle of Kunaxa, the army came to a deep
-and broad trench dug for defence across their line of way, with the exception
-of a narrow gut of twenty feet broad close by the Euphrates; through
-which gut the whole army passed. Xenophon says, “This trench had been
-carried upwards across the plain as far as the Wall of Media, where indeed,
-the canals are situated, flowing from the river Tigris; four canals, one hundred
-feet in breadth, and extremely deep, so that corn-bearing vessels sail
-along them. They strike into the Euphrates, they are distant each from the
-other by one parasang, and there are bridges over them—Παρετέτατο δ᾽ ἡ τάφρος ἄνω
-διὰ τοῦ πεδίου ἐπὶ δώδεκα παράσαγγας, μέχρι τοῦ Μηδίας τείχους, ἔνθα δὴ (the books
-print a full stop between τείχους and ἔνθα, which
-appears to me incorrect, as the sense goes on without interruption)
-εἰσιν αἱ διωρύχες, ἀπὸ τοῦ Τίγρητος ποταμοῦ ῥέουσαι· εἰσὶ δὲ τέτταρες, τὸ μὲν εὖρος
-πλεθριαῖαι, βαθεῖαι δὲ ἰσχυρῶς, καὶ πλοῖα πλεῖ ἐν αὐταῖς σιταγωγά· εἰσβάλλουσι δὲ εἰς
-τὸν Εὐφράτην, διαλείπουσι δ᾽ ἑκάστη παρασάγγην, γέφυραι δ᾽ ἔπεισιν. The present
-tense—εἰσιν αἱ διώρυχες—seems to mark the local reference of ἔνθα to the Wall of Media,
-and not to the actual march of the army.
-</p>
-<p>
-Major Rennell (Illustrations of the Expedition of Cyrus, pp. 79-87, etc.),
-Ritter, (Erdkunde, x, p. 16), Koch, (Zug der Zehn Tausend, pp. 46, 47), and
-Mr. Ainsworth (Travels in the Track of the Ten Thousand, p. 88) consider
-Xenophon to state that the Cyreian army on this day’s march (the day but
-one before the battle) passed through the Wall of Media and over the four
-distinct canals reaching from the Tigris to the Euphrates. They all, indeed,
-contest the accuracy of this latter statement; Rennell remarking that the
-level of the Tigris, in this part of its course, is lower than that of the Euphrates;
-and that it could not supply water for so many broad canals so
-near to each other. Col. Chesney also conceives the army to have passed
-through the Wall of Media before the battle of Kunaxa.
-</p>
-<p>
-It seems to me, however, that they do not correctly interpret the words
-of Xenophon, who does not say that Cyrus ever passed either the Wall of
-Media, or these four canals <i>before</i> the battle of Kunaxa, but who says (as
-Krüger, De Authentiâ Anabaseos, p. 12, prefixed to his edition of the Anabasis,
-rightly explains him), that these four canals flowing from the Tigris
-are at, or near, the Wall of Media, which the Greeks did not pass through
-until long <i>after</i> the battle, when Tissaphernes was conducting them towards
-the Tigris, two days’ march before they reached Sittakê (Anab. ii, 4, 12).
-</p>
-<p>
-It has been supposed, during the last few years, that the direction of the
-Wall of Media could be verified by actual ruins still subsisting on the spot.
-Dr. Ross and Captain Lynch (see journal of the Geographical Society, vol.
-ix. pp. 447-473, with Captain Lynch’s map annexed) discovered a line of
-embankment which they considered to be the remnant of it. It begins on
-the western bank of the Tigris, in latitude 34° 3′, and stretches towards the
-Euphrates in a direction from N. N. E. to S. S. W. “It is a solitary straight
-single mound, twenty-five long paces thick, with a bastion on its western
-face at every fifty-five paces; and on the same side it has a deep ditch,
-twenty-seven paces broad. The wall is here built of the small pebbles of
-the country, imbedded in cement of lime of great tenacity; it is from thirty-five
-to forty feet in height, and runs in a straight line as far as the eye can
-trace it. The Bedouins tell me that it goes in the same straight line to two
-mounds called Ramelah on the Euphrates, some hours above Felujah; that
-it is, in places far inland, built of brick, and in some parts worn down to a
-level with the desert.” (Dr. Ross, l. c. p. 446).
-</p>
-<p>
-Upon the faith of these observations, the supposed wall (now called Sidd
-Nimrud by the natives) has been laid down as the Wall of Media reaching
-from the Tigris to the Euphrates, in the best recent maps, especially that of
-Colonel Chesney; and accepted as such by recent inquirers.
-</p>
-<p>
-Nevertheless, subsequent observations, recently made known by Colonel
-Rawlinson to the Geographical Society, have contradicted the views of
-Dr. Ross as stated above, and shown that the Wall of Media, in the line
-here assigned to it, has no evidence to rest upon. Captain Jones, commander
-of the steamer at Bagdad, undertook, at the request of Colonel
-Rawlinson a minute examination of the locality, and ascertained that what
-had been laid down as the Wall of Media was merely a line of mounds; no
-wall at all, but a mere embankment, extending seven or eight miles from
-the Tigris, and designed to arrest the winter torrents and drain off the rain
-water of the desert into a large reservoir, which served to irrigate an extensive
-valley between the rivers.
-</p>
-<p>
-From this important communication it results, that there is as yet no
-evidence now remaining for determining what was the line or position of the
-Wall of Media; which had been supposed to be a datum positively established,
-serving as premises from whence to deduce other positions mentioned
-by Xenophon. As our knowledge now stands, there is not a single point
-mentioned by Xenophon in Babylonia which can be positively verified, except
-Babylon itself,—and Pylæ, which is known pretty nearly, as the spot
-where Babylonia proper commences.
-</p>
-<p>
-The description which Xenophon gives of the Wall of Media is very plain
-and specific. I see no reason to doubt that he actually saw it, passed through
-it, and correctly describes it in height as well as breadth. Its entire length
-he of course only gives from what he was told. His statement appears to
-me good evidence that there was a Wall of Media, which reached from the
-Tigris to the Euphrates, or perhaps to some canal cut from the Euphrates,
-though there exists no mark to show what was the precise locality and direction
-of the Wall. Ammianus Marcellinus (xxiv, 2), in the expedition
-of the emperor Julian, saw near Macepracta, on the left bank of the Euphrates,
-the ruins of a wall, “which in ancient times had stretched to a
-great distance for the defence of Assyria against foreign invasion.” It is
-fair to presume that this was the Wall of Media; but the position of Macepracta
-cannot be assigned.
-</p>
-<p>
-It is important, however, to remember,—what I have already stated in
-this note,—that Xenophon did not see, and did not cross either the Wall
-of Media, or the two canals here mentioned, until many days after the battle
-of Kunaxa.
-</p>
-<p>
-We know from Herodotus that all the territory of Babylonia was intersected
-by canals, and that there was one canal greater than the rest and
-navigable, which flowed from the Euphrates to the Tigris, in a direction to
-the south of east. This coincides pretty well with the direction assigned
-in Colonel Chesney’s map to the Nahr-Malcha or Regium Flumen, into
-which the four great canals, described by Xenophon as drawn from the Tigris
-to the Euphrates, might naturally discharge themselves, and still be
-said to fall into the Euphrates, of which the Nahr-Malcha was as it were a
-branch. How the level of the two rivers would adjust itself, when the space
-between them was covered with a network of canals great and small, and
-when a vast quantity of the water of both was exhausted in fertilizing the
-earth, is difficult to say.
-</p>
-<p>
-The <i>island</i> wherein the Greeks stood, at their position near Sittakê, before
-crossing the Tigris, would be a parallelogram formed by the Tigris, the
-Nahr-Malcha, and the two parallel canals joining them. It might well be
-called a large island, containing many cities and villages, with a large
-population.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_122"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_122">[122]</a></span> There seems reason to believe that in ancient times the Tigris, above
-Bagdad, followed a course more to the westward, and less winding, than it
-does now. The situation of Opis cannot be verified. The ruins of a large
-city were seen by Captain Lynch near the confluence of the river Adhem
-with the Tigris, which he supposed to be Opis, in lat. 34°.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_123"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_123">[123]</a></span> Xen. Anab. ii, 4, 26.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_124"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_124">[124]</a></span> Ktesias, Fragm. 18, ed. Bähr.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_125"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_125">[125]</a></span> Xen. Anab. ii, 5, 26-28.
-</p>
-<p>
-Mannert, Rennell, Mr. Ainsworth, and most modern commentators, identify
-this town of Καιναὶ or Kænæ with the modern town Senn; which latter
-place Mannert (Geogr. der Röm. v. p. 333) and Rennell (Illustrations
-p. 129) represent to be near the Lesser Zab instead of the Greater Zab.
-</p>
-<p>
-To me it appears that the locality assigned by Xenophon to Καιναὶ, does
-not at all suit the modern town of Senn. Nor is there much real similarity
-of name between the two; although our erroneous way of pronouncing the
-Latin name <i>Caenae</i>, creates a delusive appearance of similarity. Mr. Ainsworth
-shows that some modern writers have been misled in the same manner
-by identifying the modern town of Sert with Tigrano-<i>certa</i>.
-</p>
-<p>
-It is a perplexing circumstance in the geography of Xenophon’s work,
-that he makes no mention of the Lesser Zab, which yet he must have
-crossed. Herodotus notices them both, and remarks on the fact that though
-distinct rivers, both bore the same name (v, 52). Perhaps in drawing up
-his narrative after the expedition, Xenophon may have so far forgotten, as
-to fancy that two synonymous rivers mentioned as distinct in his memoranda,
-were only one.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_126"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_126">[126]</a></span> Xen. Anab. ii, 5, 2-15.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_127"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_127">[127]</a></span> Xen. Anab. ii, 5, 17-23. This last comparison is curious, and in all
-probability the genuine words of the satrap—τὴν μὲν γὰρ ἐπὶ τῇ κεφαλῇ τιάραν
-βασιλεῖ μόνῳ ἔξεστιν ὀρθὴν ἔχειν, τὴν δ᾽ ἐπὶ τῇ καρδίᾳ ἴσως ἂν ὑμῶν παρόντων
-καὶ ἕτερος εὐπετῶς ἔχοι.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_128"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_128">[128]</a></span> Xen. Anab. ii, 5, 30.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_129"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_129">[129]</a></span> Xen. Anab. ii, 6, 1. Ktesiæ Frag. Persica, c. 60, ed. Bähr; Plutarch,
-Artaxerx. c. 19, 20; Diodor. xiv, 27.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_130"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_130">[130]</a></span> Tacit. Histor. i, 45. “Othoni nondum auctoritas inerat ad <i>prohibendum</i>
-scelus; <i>jubere</i> jam poterat. Ita, simulatione iræ, vinciri jussum (Marium
-Celsum) et majores pœnas daturum, affirmans, præsenti exitio subtraxit.”
-</p>
-<p>
-Ktesias (Persica, c. 60; compare Plutarch and Diodorus as referred to in
-the preceding note) attests the treason of Menon, which he probably derived
-from the story of Menon himself. Xenophon mentions the ignominious
-death of Menon, and he probably derived his information from Ktesias (see
-Anabasis, ii, 6, 29).
-</p>
-<p>
-The supposition that it was Parysatis who procured the death of Menon,
-in itself highly probable, renders all the different statements consistent and
-harmonious.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_131"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_131">[131]</a></span> Xenophon seems to intimate that there were various stories current,
-which he does not credit, to the disparagement of Menon,—καὶ τὰ μὲν δὴ ἀφανῆ
-ἔξεστι περὶ αὐτοῦ ψεύδεσθαι, etc. (Anab. ii, 6, 28).
-</p>
-<p>
-Athenæus (xi, p. 505) erroneously states that Xenophon affirmed Menon
-to be the person who caused the destruction of Klearchus by Tissaphernes.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_132"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_132">[132]</a></span> Xenophon in the Cyropædia (viii, 8, 3) gives a strange explanation of
-the imprudent confidence reposed by Klearchus in the assurance of the
-Persian satrap. It arose (he says) from the high reputation for good faith
-which the Persians had acquired by the undeviating and scrupulous honor
-of the first Cyrus (or Cyrus the Great), but which they had since ceased to
-deserve, though the corruption of their character had not before publicly
-manifested itself.
-</p>
-<p>
-This is a curious perversion of history to serve the purpose of his romance.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_133"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_133">[133]</a></span> Macciavelli, Principe, c. 18, p. 65.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_134"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_134">[134]</a></span> Polyæn. vii, 18.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_135"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_135">[135]</a></span> Xen. Anab. ii, 5, 27, 28.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_136"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_136">[136]</a></span> Compare Anab. ii, 4, 6, 7; ii, 5, 9.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_137"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_137">[137]</a></span> Xen. Anab. ii, 5, 37, 38.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_138"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_138">[138]</a></span> Xen. Anab. iii, 1, 2, 3.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_139"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_139">[139]</a></span> Xen. Anab. iii, 1, 4-11. Ἦν δέ τις ἐν τῇ στρατιᾷ
-Ξενοφῶν Ἀθηναῖος, ὃς οὔτε στρατηγὸς, etc.
-</p>
-<p>
-Homer, Iliad, v, 9—
-</p>
-<div class="poetry-container">
-  <div class="poetry">
-    <p>Ἦν δέ τις ἐν Τρώεσσι Δάρης, ἀφνεῖος, ἀμύμων,</p>
-    <p>Ἱρεὺς Ἡφαίστοιο, etc.</p>
-  </div>
-</div>
-<p>
-Compare the description of Zeus sending Oneirus to the sleeping Agamemnon,
-at the beginning of the second book of the Iliad.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_140"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_140">[140]</a></span> Respecting the value of a sign from Zeus Basileus, and the necessity
-of conciliating him, compare various passages in the Cyropædia, ii, 4, 19;
-iii, 3, 21; vii, 5, 57.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_141"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_141">[141]</a></span> Xen. Anab. iii, 1, 12, 13. Περίφοβος δ᾽ εὐθὺς ἀνηγέρθη, καὶ τὸ ὄναρ
-τῆ μὲν ἔκρινεν ἀγαθόν, ὅτι ἐν πόνοις ὢν καὶ κινδύνοις φῶς μέγα ἐκ Διὸς ἰδεῖν
-ἔδοξε, etc. ... Ὁποῖον τι μὲν δή ἐστι τὸ τοιοῦτον ὄναρ ἰδεῖν, ἔξεστι σκοπεῖν ἐκ τῶν
-συμβάντων μετὰ τὸ ὄναρ. Γίγνεται γὰρ τάδε. Εὐθὺς ἐπειδὴ ἀνηγέρθη, πρῶτον μὲν
-ἔννοια αὐτῷ ἐμπίπτει· Τί κατάκειμαι; ἡ δὲ νὺξ προβαίνει· ἅμα δὲ τῇ ἡμέρᾳ εἰκὸς
-τοὺς πολεμίους ἥξειν, etc.
-</p>
-<p>
-The reader of Homer will readily recall various passages in the Iliad and
-Odyssey, wherein the like mental talk is put into language and expanded,—such
-as Iliad, xi, 403—and several other passages cited or referred to in
-Colonel Mure’s History of the Language and Literature of Greece, ch. xiv,
-vol. ii, p. 25 <i>seq.</i>
-</p>
-<p>
-A vision of light shining brightly out of a friendly house, counts for a
-favorable sign (Plutarch, De Genio Socratis, p. 587 C.).</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_142"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_142">[142]</a></span> Xen. Anab. iii, 1, 16, 25.
-</p>
-<p>
-“Vel imperatore, vel milite, me utemini.” (Sallust, Bellum Catilinar.
-c. 20).</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_143"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_143">[143]</a></span> Xen. Anab. iii, 1, 26-30. It would appear from the words of Xenophon,
-that Apollonides had been one of those who had held faint-hearted
-language (ὑπομαλακιζόμενοι, ii, 1, 14) in the conversation with Phalinus
-shortly after the death of Cyrus. Hence Xenophon tells him, that this is
-the second time of his offering such advice—Ἃ σὺ πάντα εἰδὼς, τοὺς μὲν ἀμύνασθαι
-κελεύοντας φλυαρεῖν φῂς, <em class="gesperrt">πείθειν δὲ πάλιν κελεύεις ἰόντας</em>;
-</p>
-<p>
-This helps to explain the contempt and rigor with which Xenophon here
-treats him. Nothing indeed could be more deplorable, under the actual
-circumstances, than for a man “to show his acuteness by summing up the
-perils around.” See the remarkable speech of Demosthenes at Pylos
-(Thucyd. iv, 10).</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_144"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_144">[144]</a></span> Xen. Anab. iii, 1, 36-46.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_145"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_145">[145]</a></span> Xen. Anab. iii, 2, 25.
-</p>
-<p>
-Ἀλλὰ γὰρ δέδοικα μή ἂν ἅπαξ μάθωμεν ἀργοὶ ζῆν καὶ ἐν ἀφθόνοις βιοτεύειν,
-καὶ Μήδων δὲ καὶ Περσῶν <em class="gesperrt">καλαῖς καὶ μεγάλαις γυναιξὶ καὶ παρθένοις
-ὁμιλεῖν</em>, μὴ ὥσπερ οἱ λωτοφάγοι, ἐπιλαθώμεθα τῆς οἴκαδε ὁδοῦ.
-</p>
-<p>
-Hippokrates (De Aëre, Locis, et Aquis, c. 12) compares the physical
-characteristics of Asiatics and Europeans, noticing the ample, full-grown,
-rounded, voluptuous, but inactive forms of the first,—as contrasted with
-the more compact, muscular, and vigorous type of the second, trained for
-movement, action, and endurance.
-</p>
-<p>
-Dio Chrysostom has a curious passage, in reference to the Persian preference
-for eunuchs as slaves, remarking that they admired even in males an
-approach to the type of feminine beauty,—their eyes and tastes being
-under the influence only of aphrodisiac ideas; whereas the Greeks, accustomed
-to the constant training and naked exercises of the palæstra,
-boys competing with boys and youths with youths, had their associations
-of the male beauty attracted towards active power and graceful motion.
-</p>
-<p>
-Οὐ γὰρ φανερὸν, ὅτι οἱ Πέρσαι εὐνούχους ἐποίουν τοὺς καλοὺς, ὅπως αὐτοῖς
-ὡς κάλλιστοι ὦσι; Τοσοῦτον διαφέρειν ᾤοντο πρὸς κάλλος τὸ θῆλυ· σχεδὸν καὶ
-πάντες οἱ βάρβαροι, διὰ τὸ μόνον τὰ ἀφροδίσια ἐννοεῖν. Κἀκεῖνοι γυναικός
-εἰδος περιτιθέασι τοῖς ἄῤῥεσιν, ἄλλως δ᾽ οὐκ ἐπίστανται ἐρᾷν· ἴσως δὲ καὶ
-ἡ τροφὴ αἰτία τοῖς Πέρσαις, τῷ μέχρι πολλοῦ τρέφεσθαι ὑπό τε γυναικῶν καὶ
-εὐνούχων τῶν πρεσβυτέρων· παῖδας δὲ μετὰ παιδῶν, καὶ μειράκια μετὰ μειρακίων
-μὴ πάνυ συνεῖναι, μηδὲ γυμνοῦσθαι ἐν παλαίστραις καὶ γυμνασίοις, etc.
-(Orat. xxi, p. 270).
-</p>
-<p>
-Compare Euripides, Bacchæ, 447 <i>seq.</i>; and the Epigram of Strato in the
-Anthologia, xxxiv, vol. ii, p. 367 Brunck.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_146"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_146">[146]</a></span> A very meagre abstract is given by Diodorus, of that which passed
-after the seizure of the generals (xiv, 27). He does not mention the name
-of Xenophon on this occasion, nor indeed throughout all his account of the
-march.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_147"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_147">[147]</a></span> Compare the hostile speech of the Corinthian envoy at Sparta, prior
-to the Peloponnesian war, with the eulogistic funeral oration of Perikles,
-in the second year of that war (Thucyd. i, 70, 71; ii, 39, 40).
-</p>
-<p>
-Οἱ μέν γε (εἰσὶ), νεωτεροποιοὶ (description of the Athenians by the Corinthian
-speaker) <em class="gesperrt">καὶ ἐπινοῆσαι ὀξεῖς καὶ ἐπιτελέσαι ἔργῳ ἃ ἂν γνῶσιν</em>· ὑμεῖς δὲ
-(Lacedæmonians), τὰ ὑπάρχοντά τε σώζειν καὶ ἐπιγνῶναι μηδὲν, καὶ ἔργῳ οὐδὲ
-τἀναγκαῖα ἐξικέσθαι. Αὖθις δὲ, οἱ μὲν, καὶ παρὰ δύναμιν τολμηταὶ καὶ παρὰ
-γνώμην κινδυνευταὶ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῖς δεινοῖς εὐέλπιδες· τὸ δὲ ὑμέτερον, τῆς
-τεδυνάμεως ἐνδεᾶ πρᾶξαι, τῆς τε γνώμης μηδὲ τοῖς βεβαίοις πιστεῦσαι,
-τῶν τε δεινῶν μηδέποτε οἴεσθαι ἀπολυθήσεσθαι. Καὶ μὴν καὶ ἄοκνοι πρὸς
-ὑμᾶς μελλήτας, καὶ ἀποδημηταὶ πρὸς ἐνδημοτάτους, etc.
-</p>
-<p>
-Again, in the oration of Perikles—Καὶ αὐτοὶ ἤτοι κρίνομεν ἢ ἐνθυμούμεθα
-ὀρθῶς τὰ πράγματα, οὐ τοὺς λόγους τοῖς ἔργοις βλάβην ἡγούμενοι, ἀλλὰ μὴ
-προδιδαχθῆναι μᾶλλον λόγῳ, πρότερον ἢ ἐπὶ ἃ δεῖ ἔργῳ ἐλθεῖν. Διαφερόντως
-μὲν δὴ καὶ τόδε ἔχομεν, <em class="gesperrt">ὥστε τολμᾷν τε οἱ αὐτοὶ μάλιστα καὶ περὶ ὧν
-ἐπιχειρήσομεν ἐκλογίζεσθαι</em>· ὃ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀμαθία μὲν θράσος, λογισμὸς
-δὲ ὄκνον, φέρει.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_148"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_148">[148]</a></span> Compare the observations of Perikles, in his last speech to the Athenians
-about the inefficiency of the best thoughts, if a man had not the
-power of setting them forth in an impressive manner (Thucyd. ii, 60).
-Καίτοι ἐμοὶ τοιούτῳ ἀνδρὶ ὀργίζεσθε, ὃς οὐδενὸς οἴομαι ἥσσων εἶναι
-<em class="gesperrt">γνῶναί τε τὰ δέοντα καὶ ἑρμηνεῦσαι ταῦτα</em>, φιλόπολίς τε καὶ
-χρημάτων κρείττων· ὅ τε γὰρ γνοὺς καὶ μὴ σαφῶς διδάξας, ἐν ἵσῳ καὶ
-εἰ μὴ ἐνεθυμήθη, etc.
-</p>
-<p>
-The philosopher and the statesman at Athens here hold the same language.
-It was the opinion of Sokrates—μόνους ἀξίους εἶναι τιμῆς <em class="gesperrt">τοὺς
-εἰδότας τὰ δέοντα, καὶ ἑρμηνεῦσαι δυναμένους</em> (Xenoph. Mem.
-i, 2, 52).
-</p>
-<p>
-A striking passage in the funeral harangue of Lysias (Orat. ii, Epitaph.
-s. 19) sets forth the prevalent idea of the Athenian democracy—authoritative
-law, with persuasive and instructive speech, as superseding mutual violence
-(νόμος and λόγος, as the antithesis of βία). Compare a similar sentiment
-in Isokrates (Or. iv, (Panegyr.) s. 53-56).</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_149"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_149">[149]</a></span> See the speech of Perikles (Thuc. ii, 60-64). He justifies the boastful
-tone of it, by the unwonted depression against which he had to contend on
-the part of his hearers—Δελώσω δὲ καὶ τόδε ὅ μοι δοκεῖτε οὔτ᾽ αὐτοὶ
-πώποτε ἐνθυμηθῆναι ὑπάρχον ὑμῖν μεγέθους περὶ ἐς τὴν ἀρχὴν οὔτ᾽ ἐγὼ
-ἐν τοῖς πρὶν λόγοις, <em class="gesperrt">οὐδ᾽ ἂν νῦν ἐχρησάμην κομπωδεστέραν ἔχοντι
-τὴν προσποίησιν, εἰ μὴ καταπεπληγμένους ὑμᾶς παρὰ τὸ εἰκὸς ἑώρων</em>.
-</p>
-<p>
-This is also the proper explanation of Xenophon’s tone.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_150"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_150">[150]</a></span> In a passage of the Cyropædia (v. 5, 46), Xenophon sets forth in a
-striking manner the combination of the λεκτικὸς καὶ πρακτικός—Ὥσπερ καὶ
-ὅταν μάχεσθαι δέῃ, ὁ πλείστους χειρωσάμενος ἀλκιμώτατος δοξάζεται εἶναι,
-οὕτω καὶ ὅταν πεῖσαι δέῃ, ὁ πλέιστους ὁμογνώμονας ἡμῖν ποιήσας οὗτος
-δικαίως ἂν <em class="gesperrt">λεκτικώτατος καὶ πρακτικώτατος</em> κρίνοιτο ἂν εἶναι.
-Μὴ μέντοι ὡς <em class="gesperrt">λόγον ἡμῖν ἐπιδειξόμενοι, οἷον ἂν εἴποιτε πρὸς ἕκαστον
-αὐτῶν, τοῦτο μελετᾶτε—ἀλλ᾽ ὡς τοὺς πεπεισμένους ὑφ᾽ ἑκάστου δήλους
-ἐσομένους οἷς ἂν πράττωσιν, ὅυτω παρασκευάζεσθε</em>.
-</p>
-<p>
-In describing the duties of a Hipparch or commander of the cavalry,
-Xenophon also insists upon the importance of persuasive speech, as a means
-of keeping up the active obedience of the soldiers—Εἴς γε μὴν τὸ εὐπειθεῖς
-εἶναι τοὺς ἀρχομένους, μέγα μὲν καὶ τὸ λόγῳ διδάσκειν, ὅσα ἀγαθὰ ἔνι ἐν
-τῷ πειθαρχεῖν, etc. (Xen. Mag. Eq. i, 24).</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_151"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_151">[151]</a></span> See Xenoph. Anab. v, 6, 25.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_152"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_152">[152]</a></span> Xen. Anab. iii, 3, 6; iii, 5, 43.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_153"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_153">[153]</a></span> Xen. Anab. ii, 5, 1. Ainsworth. Travels and Researches in Asia Minor,
-etc. vol. ii, ch. 44, p. 327; also his Travels in the Track of the Ten Thousand,
-p. 119-134.
-</p>
-<p>
-Professor Koch, who speaks with personal knowledge both of Armenia
-and of the region east of the Tigris, observes truly that the Great Zab is
-the only point (east of the Tigris) which Xenophon assigns in such a manner
-as to be capable of distinct local identification. He also observes, here
-as elsewhere, that the number of parasangs specified by Xenophon is essentially
-delusive as a measure of distance (Zug der Zehn Tausend, p. 64).</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_154"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_154">[154]</a></span> Xen. Anab. iii, 3, 9.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_155"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_155">[155]</a></span> Xen. Anab. iii, 4, 1-5.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_156"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_156">[156]</a></span> Xen. Anab. iii, 4, 17, 18. It is here, on the site of the ancient Nineveh,
-that the recent investigations of Mr. Layard have brought to light so many
-curious and valuable Assyrian remains. The legend which Xenophon
-heard on the spot, respecting the way in which these cities were captured
-and ruined, is of a truly Oriental character.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_157"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_157">[157]</a></span> Xen. Anab. iii, 4, 19-23.
-</p>
-<p>
-I incline to believe that there were six lochi upon <i>each</i> flank—that
-is, twelve lochi in all; though the words of Xenophon are not quite clear.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_158"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_158">[158]</a></span> Xen. Anab. iii, 4-25. Compare Herodot. vii, 21, 56, 103.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_159"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_159">[159]</a></span> Professor Koch (Zug der Zehn Tausend, p. 68) is of the same opinion.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_160"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_160">[160]</a></span> Xen. Anab. iii, 4, 35; see also Cyropædia, iii, 3, 37.
-</p>
-<p>
-The Thracian prince Seuthes was so apprehensive of night attack, that
-he and his troops kept their horses bridled all night (Xen. Anab. vii,
-2, 21.)
-</p>
-<p>
-Mr. Kinneir (Travels in Asia Minor, etc., p. 481) states that the horses
-of Oriental cavalry, and even of the English cavalry in Hindostan, are still
-kept tied and shackled at night, in the same way as Xenophon describes to
-have been practised by the Persians.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_161"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_161">[161]</a></span> Xen. Anab. iii, 4, 36-49; iii, 5, 3.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_162"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_162">[162]</a></span> Xen. Anab. iii, 5; iv, 1, 3. Probably the place where the Greeks quitted
-the Tigris to strike into the Karduchian mountains, was the neighborhood
-of Jezireh ibn Omar, the ancient Bezabde. It is here that farther
-march, up the eastern side of the Tigris, is rendered impracticable by the
-mountains closing in. Here the modern road crosses the Tigris by a bridge,
-from the eastern bank to the western (Koch, Zug der Zehn Tausend,
-p. 72).</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_163"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_163">[163]</a></span> Xen. Anab. iv, 1, 12.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_164"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_164">[164]</a></span> Xen. Anab. iv, 3, 19-30.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_165"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_165">[165]</a></span> Xen. Anab. iv, 1, 18; iv, 2, 28.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_166"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_166">[166]</a></span> Xen. Anab. iv, 1, 21.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_167"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_167">[167]</a></span> Xen. Anab. iv, 2, 4.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_168"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_168">[168]</a></span> Xen. Anab. iv, 3, 17-21.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_169"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_169">[169]</a></span> Xen. Anab. iv, 3, 23.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_170"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_170">[170]</a></span> Xen. Anab. iv, 3, 2. His expressions have a simple emphasis which
-marks how unfading was the recollection of what he had suffered in Karduchia.
-</p>
-<p>
-Καὶ οἱ Ἕλληνες ἐνταῦθα ἀνεπαύσαντο ἄσμενοι ἰδόντες πεδίον· ἀπεῖχε δὲ
-τῶν ὀρέων ὁ ποταμὸς ἓξ ἢ ἕπτα στάδια τῶν Καρδούχων. Τότε μὲν οὖν
-ηὐλίσθησαν μάλα ἡδέως, καὶ τὰ ἐπιτήδεια ἔχοντες καὶ πολλὰ τῶν
-παρεληλυθότων πόνων μνημονεύοντες. Ἕπτα γὰρ ἡμέρας, ὅσασπερ ἐπορεύθησαν
-διὰ τῶν Καρδούχων, πάσας μαχόμενοι διετέλεσαν, καὶ ἔπαθον κακὰ ὅσα οὐδὲ
-τὰ σύμπαντα ὑπὸ βασιλέως καὶ Τισσαφέρνους. Ὡς οὖν ἀπηλλαγμένοι τούτων
-ἡδέως ἐκοιμήθησαν.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_171"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_171">[171]</a></span> Xen. Anab. iv, 4, 1.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_172"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_172">[172]</a></span> Xen. Anab. iv, 3, 6-13.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_173"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_173">[173]</a></span> Xen. Anab. iv, 3, 17.
-</p>
-<p>
-... ἔθεντο τὰ ὅπλα, καὶ αὐτὸς πρῶτος Χειρίσοφος, στεφανωσάμενος καὶ
-ἀποδὺς, ἐλάμβανε τὰ ὅπλα, καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις πᾶσι παρήγγελλε.
-</p>
-<p>
-I apprehend that the words τὸν στέφανον are here to be understood after
-ἀποδὺς—not the words τὰ ὅπλα, as Krüger in his note seems to imagine.
-It is surely incredible, that in the actual situation of the Grecian army, the
-soldiers should be ordered first to disarm, and then to resume their arms.
-I conceive the matter thus:—First, the order is given, to ground arms; so
-that the shield is let down and drops upon the ground, sustained by the left
-hand of the soldier upon its upper rim; while the spear, also resting on the
-ground, is sustained by the shield and by the same left hand. The right
-hand of the soldier being thus free, he is ordered first to wreath himself
-(the costume usual in offering sacrifice)—next, to take off his wreath—lastly,
-to resume his arms.
-</p>
-<p>
-Probably the operations of wreathing and unwreathing, must here have
-been performed by the soldiers symbolically, or by gesture, raising the
-hand to the head, as if to crown it. For it seems impossible that they
-could have been provided generally with actual wreaths, on the banks of
-the Kentritês, and just after their painful march through the Karduchian
-mountains. Cheirisophus himself, however, had doubtless a real wreath,
-which he put on and took off; so probably had the prophets and certain
-select officiating persons.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_174"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_174">[174]</a></span> Xen. Anab. iv, 3, 20-25.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_175"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_175">[175]</a></span> Xen. Anab. iv, 3, 30.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_176"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_176">[176]</a></span> Xen. Anab. iv, 3, 31-34; iv, 4, 1.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_177"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_177">[177]</a></span> Xen. Anab. iv, 4, 11.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_178"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_178">[178]</a></span> Xen. Anab. iv, 5, 2.
-</p>
-<p>
-The recent editors, Schneider and Krüger, on the authority of various
-MSS., read here ἐπορεύθησαν—<em class="gesperrt">ἐπὶ</em> τὸν Εὐφράτην ποταμόν. The old
-reading was, as it stands in Hutchinson’s edition, <em class="gesperrt">παρὰ</em> τὸν
-Εὐφράτην ποταμόν.
-</p>
-<p>
-This change may be right, but the geographical data are here too vague
-to admit of any certainty. See my Appendix annexed to this chapter.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_179"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_179">[179]</a></span> Xen. Anab. iv, 5, 4.
-</p>
-<p>
-Ἔνθα δὴ τῶν μάντέων τις εἶπε σφαγιάσασθαι τῷ Ἀνέμῳ· καὶ πᾶσι δὴ
-περιφανῶς ἔδοξε λῆξαι τὸ χαλεπὸν τοῦ πνεύματος.
-</p>
-<p>
-The suffering of the army from the terrible snow and cold of Armenia
-are set forth in Diodorus, xiv, 28.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_180"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_180">[180]</a></span> Xen. Anab. v, 8, 8-11.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_181"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_181">[181]</a></span> Xen. Anab. iv, 5, 8-22.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_182"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_182">[182]</a></span> Xen. Anab. iv, 5, 26. Κάλαμοι γόνατα οὐκ ἔχοντες.
-</p>
-<p>
-This Armenian practice of sucking the beer through a reed, to which
-the observation of modern travellers supplies analogies (see Krüger’s note),
-illustrates the Fragment of Archilochus (No. 28, ed. Schneidewin, Poetæ
-Græc. Minor).
-</p>
-<div class="poetry-container">
-  <div class="poetry">
-    <p>ὥσπερ αὐλῷ βρύτον ἢ Θρῆιξ ἀνὴρ</p>
-    <p>ἢ Φρὺξ ἔβρυζε, etc.</p>
-  </div>
-</div>
-<p>
-The similarity of Armenian customs to those of the Thracians and
-Phrygians, is not surprising.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_183"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_183">[183]</a></span> Xen. Anab. iv, 5, 26-36.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_184"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_184">[184]</a></span> Xen. Anab. iv. 6, 1-3.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_185"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_185">[185]</a></span> Xen. Anab. iv, 6, 4.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_186"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_186">[186]</a></span> Xen. Anab. iv, 6, 10-14.
-</p>
-<p>
-Καὶ οὐκ αἰσχρὸν εἶναι, ἀλλὰ <em class="gesperrt">καλὸν</em> κλέπτειν, etc. The reading <em class="gesperrt">καλὸν</em>
-is preferred by Schneider to <em class="gesperrt">ἀναγκαῖον</em>, which has been the vulgar
-reading, and is still retained by Krüger. Both are sanctioned by
-authority of MSS., and either would be admissible; on the whole, I incline
-to side with Schneider.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_187"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_187">[187]</a></span> Xen. Anab. iv, 6, 16.
-</p>
-<p>
-Ἀλλὰ μέντοι, ἔφη ὁ Χειρίσοφος, κἀγὼ ὑμᾶς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἀκούω
-δεινοὺς εἶναι κλέπτειν τὰ δημόσια, καὶ μάλα ὄντος δεινοῦ τοῦ
-κινδύνου τῷ κλέπτοντι, καὶ τοὺς κρατίστους μέντοι μάλιστα,
-εἴπερ ὑμῖν οἱ κράτιστοι ἄρχειν ἀξιοῦνται· ὥστε ὥρα καὶ σοὶ
-ἐπιδείκνυσθαι τὴν παίδειαν.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_188"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_188">[188]</a></span> See Vol. VII, ch. lxi, p. 401 <i>seq.</i></p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_189"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_189">[189]</a></span> Xen. Anab. iv, 6, 20-27.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_190"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_190">[190]</a></span> Xen. Anab. iv, 7, 2-15.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_191"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_191">[191]</a></span> Xen. Anab. iv, 7, 18.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_192"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_192">[192]</a></span> Diodorus (xiv, 29) calls the mountain Χήνοιν—Chenium. He seems
-to have had Xenophon before him in his brief description of this interesting
-scene.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_193"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_193">[193]</a></span> Xen. Anab. iv, 7, 23-27.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_194"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_194">[194]</a></span> Xen. Anab. iv, 8, 4-7.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_195"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_195">[195]</a></span> Xen. Anab. iv, 8, 15-22. Most modern travellers attest the existence,
-in these regions, of honey intoxicating and poisonous, such as Xenophon
-describes. They point out the <i>Azalea Pontica</i>, as the flower from which
-the bees imbibe this peculiar quality. Professor Koch, however, calls in
-question the existence of any honey thus naturally unwholesome near the
-Black Sea. He states (Zug der Zehn Tausend, p. 111) that after careful
-inquiries he could find no trace of any such. Not contradicting Xenophon,
-he thinks that the honey which the Greeks ate must have been stale or
-tainted.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_196"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_196">[196]</a></span> Xen. Anab. iv, 8, 23-27.
-</p>
-<p>
-A curious and interesting anecdote in Plutarch’s Life of Alexander, (c.
-41) attests how much these Hetæræ accompanying the soldiers (women for
-the most part free), were esteemed in the Macedonian army, and by Alexander
-himself among the rest. A Macedonian of Ægæ named Eurylochus,
-had got himself improperly put on a list of veterans and invalids, who
-were on the point of being sent back from Asia to Europe. The imposition
-was detected, and on being questioned he informed Alexander that he had
-practised it in order to be able to follow a free Hetæra named Telesippa,
-who was about to accompany the departing division. “I sympathize with
-your attachment, Eurylochus (replied Alexander); let us see whether we
-cannot prevail upon Telesippa either by persuasion or by presents, since
-she is of free condition, to stay behind” (Ἡμᾶς μὲν, ὦ Εὐρύλοχε, συνερῶντας
-ἔχεις· ὅρα δὲ ὅπως πείθωμεν ἢ λόγοις ἢ δώροις τὴν Τελεσίππαν, ἐπειδήπερ
-ἐξ ἐλευθέρας ἐστί).</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_197"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_197">[197]</a></span> Strabo, xii, p. 542; Xen. Anab. iv, 8, 24.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_198"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_198">[198]</a></span> Strabo. xii, p. 545, 546.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_199"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_199">[199]</a></span> Xen. Anab. v, 6, 8.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_200"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_200">[200]</a></span> Xen. Anab. v, 5, 23.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_201"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_201">[201]</a></span> Plutarch, Perikles, c. 20.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_202"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_202">[202]</a></span> Xen. Anab. v, 3, 3; v, 7, 9. The maximum of the Grecian force, when
-mustered at Issus after the junction of those three hundred men who deserted
-from Abrokomas, was thirteen thousand nine hundred men. At the
-review in Babylonia, three days before the battle of Kunaxa, there were
-mustered, however, only twelve thousand nine hundred (Anab. i, 7, 10).</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_203"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_203">[203]</a></span> Xen. Anab. vi, 2, 8.
-</p>
-<p>
-Τῶν γὰρ στρατιωτῶν ὁι πλεῖστοι ἦσαν οὐ σπάνει βίου ἐκπεπλευκότες ἐπὶ
-ταύτην τὴν μισθοφορὰν, ἀλλὰ τὴν Κύρου ἀρετὴν ἀκούοντες, οἱ μὲν καὶ
-ἄνδρας ἄγοντες, οἱ δὲ καὶ προσανηλωκότες χρήματα, καὶ τούτων ἕτεροι
-ἀποδεδρακότες πατέρας καὶ μητέρας, οἱ δὲ καὶ τέκνα καταλιπόντες, ὡς
-χρήματα αὐτοῖς κτησάμενοι ἥξοντες πάλιν, ἀκούοντες καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους
-τοὺς παρὰ Κύρῳ πολλὰ καὶ ἀγαθὰ πράττειν. Τοιοῦτοι οὖν ὄντες ἐπόθουν
-εἶς τὴν Ἑλλάδα σώζεσθαι.
-</p>
-<p>
-This statement respecting the position of most of the soldiers is more
-authentic, as well as less disparaging, than that of Isokrates (Orat. iv, Panegyr.
-s. 170).
-</p>
-<p>
-In another oration, composed about fifty years after the Cyreian expedition,
-Isokrates notices the large premiums which it had been formerly
-necessary to give to those who brought together mercenary soldiers, over
-and above the pay to the soldiers themselves (Isokrates, Orat. v. ad Philipp.
-s. 112); as contrasted with the over-multiplication of unemployed mercenaries
-during his own later time (Ibid. s. 142 <i>seq.</i>)</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_204"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_204">[204]</a></span> Xen. Anab. v, 1, 3-13.
-</p>
-<p>
-Ὁρῶ δ᾽ ἐγὼ πλοῖα πολλάκις παραπλέοντα, etc. This is a forcible proof
-how extensive was the Grecian commerce with the town and region of Phasis,
-at the eastern extremity of the Euxine.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_205"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_205">[205]</a></span> Xen. Anab v. 1, 15.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_206"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_206">[206]</a></span> Xen. Anab. v. 2.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_207"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_207">[207]</a></span> Xen. Anab. v, 3, 3. Mr. Kinneir (Travels in Asia Minor, p. 327) and
-many other authors, have naturally presumed from the analogy of name
-that the modern town Kerasoun (about long. 38° 40′) corresponds to the
-Kerasus of Xenophon; which Arrian in his Periplus conceives to be identical
-with what was afterwards called Pharnakia.
-</p>
-<p>
-But it is remarked both by Dr. Cramer (Asia Minor, vol. i, p. 281) and
-by Mr. Hamilton (Travels in Asia Minor, ch. xv, p. 250), that Kerasoun is
-too far from Trebizond to admit of Xenophon having marched with the
-army from the one place to the other in three days; or even in less than
-ten days, in the judgment of Mr. Hamilton. Accordingly Mr. Hamilton
-places the site of the Kerasus of Xenophon much nearer to Trebizond
-(about long. 39° 20′, as it stands in Kiepert’s map of Asia Minor,) near a
-river now called the Kerasoun Dere Sú.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_208"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_208">[208]</a></span> It was not without great difficulty that Mr. Kinneir obtained horses to
-travel from Kotyôra to Kerasoun by land. The aga of the place told him
-that it was madness to think of travelling by land, and ordered a felucca for
-him; but was at last prevailed on to furnish horses. There seems, indeed,
-to have been no regular or trodden road at all; the hills approach close to
-the sea, and Mr. Kinneir “travelled the whole of the way along the shore
-alternately over a sandy beach and a high wooded bank. The hills at intervals
-jutting out into the sea, form capes and numerous little bays along
-the coast; but the nature of the country was still the same, that is to say,
-studded with fine timber, flowers, and groves of cherry trees” (Travels in
-Asia Minor, p. 324).
-</p>
-<p>
-Kerasus is the indigenous country of the cherry tree, and the origin of
-its name.
-</p>
-<p>
-Professor Koch thinks, that the number of days’ march given by Xenophon
-(ten days) between Kerasus and Kotyôra, is more than consists with
-the real distance, even if Kerasus be placed where Mr. Hamilton supposes.
-If the number be correctly stated, he supposes that the Greeks must have
-halted somewhere (Zug der Zehn Tausend. p. 115. 116).</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_209"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_209">[209]</a></span> Xen. Anab. v, 5, 3.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_210"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_210">[210]</a></span> Xen. Anab. v, 7, 18-25.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_211"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_211">[211]</a></span> Xen. Anab. v, 5, 7-12.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_212"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_212">[212]</a></span> Xen. Anab. v, 5, 13-22.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_213"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_213">[213]</a></span> Xen. Anab. v, 6, 4-11.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_214"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_214">[214]</a></span> Xen. Anab. v, 6, 14.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_215"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_215">[215]</a></span> Xen. Anab. v, 6, 19; vi, 1, 2.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_216"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_216">[216]</a></span> Xen. Anab. vi, 4, 8; vi, 2, 4.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_217"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_217">[217]</a></span> Xen. Anab. v, 6, 15-30; vi, 2, 6; vii, 1, 25, 29.
-</p>
-<p>
-Haken and other commentators do injustice to Xenophon when they ascribe
-to him the design of seizing the Greek city of Kotyôra.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_218"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_218">[218]</a></span> Xen. Memorab. i, 1, 8, 9. Ἔφη δὲ (Sokrates) δεῖν, ἃ μὲν
-μαθόντας ποιεῖν ἔδωκαν οἱ θεοὶ, μανθάνειν· ἃ δὲ μὴ δῆλα τοῖς ἀνθρώποις
-ἐστὶ, πειρᾶσθαι διὰ μαντικῆς παρὰ τῶν θεῶν πυνθάνεσθαι· τοὺς θεοὺς γὰρ,
-οἷς ἂν ὦσιν ἰλέω, σημαίνειν.
-</p>
-<p>
-Compare passages in his Cyropædia, i, 6, 3; De Officio Magistr. Equit.
-ix, 9.
-</p>
-<p>
-“The gods (says Euripides, in the Sokratic vein) have given us wisdom
-to understand and appropriate to ourselves the ordinary comforts of life;
-in obscure or unintelligible cases, we are enabled to inform ourselves by looking
-at the blaze of the fire, or by consulting prophets who understand the
-livers of sacrificial victims and the flight of birds. When they have thus
-furnished so excellent a provision for life, who but spoilt children can be
-discontented, and ask for more? Yet still human prudence, full of self-conceit,
-will struggle to be more powerful, and will presume itself to be
-wiser, than the gods.”
-</p>
-<div class="poetry-container">
-  <div class="poetry">
-    <p>Ἃ δ᾽ ἔστ᾽ ἄσημα, κοὐ σαφῆ, γιγνώσκομεν</p>
-    <p>Εἰς πῦρ βλέποντες, καὶ κατὰ σπλάγχνων πτύχας</p>
-    <p>Μάντεις προσημαίνουσιν οἰωνῶν τ᾽ ἄπο.</p>
-    <p>Ἆρ᾽ οὐ τρυφῶμεν, θεοῦ κατασκευὴν βίου</p>
-    <p>Δόντος τοιαύτην, οἷσιν οὐκ ἀρκεῖ τάδε;</p>
-    <p>Ἀλλ᾽ ἡ φρόνησις τοῦ θεοῦ μεῖζον σθένειν</p>
-    <p>Ζητεῖ· τὸ γαῦρον δ᾽ ἐν χεροῖν κεκτημένοι</p>
-    <p>Δοκοῦμεν εἶναι δαιμόνων σοφώτεροι (Supplices, 211).</p>
-  </div>
-</div>
-<p>
-It will be observed that this constant outpouring of special revelations,
-through prophets, omens, etc., was (in the view of these Sokratic thinkers)
-an essential part of the divine government; indispensable to satisfy their
-ideas of the benevolence of the gods; since rational and scientific prediction
-was so habitually at fault and unable to fathom the phenomena of the future.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_219"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_219">[219]</a></span> Xen. Anab. v. 6, 29.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_220"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_220">[220]</a></span> Though Xenophon accounted sacrifice to be an essential preliminary to
-any action of dubious result, and placed great faith in the indications which
-the victims offered, as signs of the future purposes of the gods,—he nevertheless
-had very little confidence in the professional prophets. He thought
-them quite capable of gross deceit (See Xen. Cyrop. i, 6, 2, 3; compare Sophokles,
-Antigone, 1035, 1060; and Œdip. Tyrann. 387).</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_221"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_221">[221]</a></span> Xen. Anab. v, 6, 19-26.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_222"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_222">[222]</a></span> Xen. Anab. v, 6, 30-33.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_223"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_223">[223]</a></span> Xen. Anab. v, 6, 34; vi, 4, 13.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_224"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_224">[224]</a></span> Xen. Anab. v, 6, 36.
-</p>
-<p>
-I may here note that this <i>Phasis</i> in the Euxine means the town of that
-name, not the river.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_225"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_225">[225]</a></span> Xen. Anab. v, 7, 1-3.
-</p>
-<p>
-Ἐπεὶ δὲ ᾐσθάνετο ὁ Ξενοφῶν, ἔδοξεν αὐτῷ ὡς τάχιστα συναγαγεῖν αὐτῶν ἀγορὰν,
-καὶ μὴ ἐᾶσαι συλλεγῆναι αὐτομάτους· καὶ ἐκέλευε τὸν κήρυκα συλλέξαι ἀγοράν.
-</p>
-<p>
-The prudence of Xenophon in convoking the assembly at once is incontestable.
-He could not otherwise have hindered the soldiers from getting
-together, and exciting one another to action, without any formal summons.
-</p>
-<p>
-The reader should contrast with this the scene at Athens (described in
-Thucydides, ii, 22; and in Vol. VI, Ch. xlviii, p. 133 of this History) during
-the first year of the Peloponnesian war, and the first invasion of Attica
-by the Peloponnesians; when the invaders were at Acharnæ, within sight
-of the walls of Athens, burning and destroying the country. In spite of
-the most violent excitement among the Athenian people, and the strongest
-impatience to go out and fight, Perikles steadily refused to call an assembly,
-for fear that the people should take the resolution of going out. And
-what was much more remarkable—the people even in that state of excitement
-though all united within the walls, did not meet in any informal
-assembly, nor come to any resolution, or to any active proceeding; which
-the Cyreians would certainly have done, had they not been convened in a
-regular assembly.
-</p>
-<p>
-The contrast with the Cyreian army here illustrates the extraordinary
-empire exercised by constitutional forms over the minds of the Athenian
-citizens.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_226"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_226">[226]</a></span> Xen. Anab. v, 7, 7-11.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_227"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_227">[227]</a></span> Xen. Anab. v, 7, 13-26.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_228"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_228">[228]</a></span> Xen. Anab. v, 7, 26-27. Εἰ οὖν ταῦτα τοιαῦτα ἔσται,
-θεάσασθε οἵα ἡ κατάστασις ἡμῖν ἔσται τῆς στρατιᾶς. Ὑμεῖς μὲν οἱ
-πάντες οὐκ ἔσεσθε κύριοι, οὔτ᾽ ἀνελέσθαι πόλεμον ᾧ ἂν βούλησθε,
-οὔτε καταλῦσαι· ἰδίᾳ δὲ ὁ βουλόμενος ἄξει στράτευμα ἐφ᾽ ὅ,τι ἂν
-ἐθέλῃ. Κἄν τινες πρὸς ὑμᾶς ἴωσι πρέσβεις, ἢ εἰρήνης δεόμενοι ἢ
-ἄλλου τινός, κατακαίνοντες τούτους οἱ βουλόμενοι, ποιήσουσιν ὑμᾶς
-τῶν λόγων μὴ ἀκοῦσαι τῶν πρὸς ὑμᾶς ἰόντων. Ἔπειτα δὲ, οὓς μὲν ἂν
-ὑμεῖς ἅπαντες ἔλησθε ἄρχοντας, ἐν οὐδεμίᾳ χώρᾳ ἔσονται· ὅστις δ᾽
-ἂν ἑαυτὸν ἕληται στρατηγὸν, καὶ ἐθέλῃ λέγειν, Βάλλε, Βάλλε, οὗτος
-ἔσται ἱκανὸς καὶ ἄρχοντα κατακαίνειν καὶ ἰδιώτην ὃν ἂν ὑμῶν ἐθέλῃ
-ἄκριτον—ἂν ὦσιν οἱ πεισόμενοι αὐτῷ, ὥσπερ καὶ νῦν ἐγένετο.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_229"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_229">[229]</a></span> Xen. Anab. v, 7, 27-30.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_230"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_230">[230]</a></span> Xen. Anab. v, 7, 34, 35.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_231"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_231">[231]</a></span> Xen. Anab. v, 7, 35.
-</p>
-<p>
-Παραινοῦντος δὲ Ξενοφῶντος, καὶ τῶν μάντεων συμβουλευόντων, ἔδοξε
-καὶ καθᾶραι τὸ στράτευμα· καὶ ἐγένετο καθαρμός· ἔδοξε δὲ καὶ τοὺς
-στρατηγοὺς δίκην ὑποσχεῖν τοῦ παρεληλυθότος χρόνου.
-</p>
-<p>
-In the distribution of chapters as made by the editors, chapter the eighth
-is made to begin at the second ἔδοξε, which seems to me not convenient for
-comprehending the full sense. I think that the second ἔδοξε, as well as the
-first, is connected with the words παραινοῦντος Ξενοφῶντος, and ought to
-be included not only in the same chapter with them, but also in the same
-sentence, without an intervening full stop.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_232"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_232">[232]</a></span> Xen. Anab. v, 8, 3-12.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_233"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_233">[233]</a></span> Xen. Anab. v, 8, 16. ἔπαισα πὺξ, ὅπως μὴ λόγχῃ ὑπὸ
-τῶν πολεμίων παίοιτο.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_234"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_234">[234]</a></span> The idea that great pugilists were not good soldiers in battle, is as old
-among the Greeks as the Iliad. The unrivalled pugilist of the Homeric
-Grecian army, Epeius, confesses his own inferiority as a soldier (Iliad, xxiii
-667).
-</p>
-<div class="poetry-container">
-  <div class="poetry">
-    <p>Ἆσσον ἴτω, ὅστις δέπας οἴσεται ἀμφικύπελλον·</p>
-    <p>Ἡμίονον δ᾽ οὔ φημί τιν᾽ ἄξεμεν ἄλλον Ἀχαιῶν,</p>
-    <p>Πυγμῇ νικήσαντ᾽· ἐπεὶ εὔχομαι εἶναι ἄριστος.</p>
-    <p><em class="gesperrt">Ἦ οὐχ ἅλις, ὅ,ττι μάχης ἐπιδεύομαι</em>; οὐδ᾽ ἄρα πως ἦν</p>
-    <p>Ἐν πάντεσσ᾽ ἔργοισι δαήμονα φῶτα γενέσθαι.</p>
-  </div>
-</div>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_235"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_235">[235]</a></span> Xen. Anab. v, 8, 13-25.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_236"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_236">[236]</a></span> See the striking remarks of Thucydides (ii, 65) upon Perikles.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_237"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_237">[237]</a></span> Xen. Anab. vi, 1, 2. Πέμπει παρὰ τοὺς Ἕλληνας πρέσβεις,
-ἔχοντας ἵππους καὶ στολὰς καλάς, etc.
-</p>
-<p>
-The horses sent were doubtless native Paphlagonian; the robes sent were
-probably the produce of the looms of Sinôpê and Kotyôra; just as the
-Thracian princes used to receive fine woven and metallic fabrics from Abdêra
-and the other Grecian colonies on their coast—ὑφαντὰ καὶ λεῖα,
-καὶ ἡ ἄλλη κατασκευὴ, etc. (Thucyd. ii, 96). From the like industry probably
-proceeded the splendid “regia textilia” and abundance of gold and silver
-vessels, captured by the Roman general Paulus Emilius along with Perseus
-the last king of Macedonia (Livy, xlv, 33-35).</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_238"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_238">[238]</a></span> Xen. Anab. vi, 1, 10-14.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_239"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_239">[239]</a></span> Xen. Anab. vi, 1, 22-31.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_240"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_240">[240]</a></span> Xen. Anab. vi, 1, 32.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_241"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_241">[241]</a></span> Xen. Anab. vi, 2, 11-16.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_242"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_242">[242]</a></span> Xenoph. Anab. vi. 3, 10-25; vi, 4, 11.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_243"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_243">[243]</a></span> Xen. Anab. vi, 5.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_244"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_244">[244]</a></span> Xen. Anab. vi, 6, 1-5.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_245"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_245">[245]</a></span> Xen. Anab. vi, 6, 5-9.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_246"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_246">[246]</a></span> Xen. Anab. vi, 1, 32; vi, 4, 11-15.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_247"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_247">[247]</a></span> Xen. Anab. vi, 6, 12, 13.
-</p>
-<p>
-Εἰσὶ μὲν γὰρ ἤδη ἐγγὺς αἱ Ἑλληνίδες πόλεις· τῆς δ᾽ Ἑλλάδος Λακεδαιμόνιοι
-προεστήκασιν· <em class="gesperrt">ἱκανοὶ δέ εἰσι καὶ εἶς ἕκαστος Λακεδαιμονίων ἐν ταῖς
-πόλεσιν ὅ,τι βούλονται διαπράττεσθαι</em>. Εἰ οὖν οὗτος πρῶτον μὲν ἡμᾶς
-Βυζαντίου ἀποκλείσει, ἔπειτα δὲ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἁρμοσταῖς παραγγελεῖ εἰς τὰς
-πόλεις μὴ δέχεσθαι, ὡς ἀπιστοῦντας Λακεδαιμονίοις καὶ ἀνόμους ὄντας—ἔτι
-δὲ πρὸς Ἀναξίβιον τὸν ναύαρχον οὗτος ὁ λόγος περὶ ἡμῶν ἥξει—χαλεπὸν ἔσται
-καὶ μένειν καὶ αποπλεῖν· <em class="gesperrt">καὶ γὰρ ἐν τῇ γῇ ἄρχουσι Λακεδαιμόνιοι καὶ ἐν
-τῇ θαλάττῃ τὸν νῦν χρόνον</em>.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_248"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_248">[248]</a></span> Xen. Anab. vi, 6, 12-16.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_249"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_249">[249]</a></span> Xen. Anab. vi, 6, 22-28.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_250"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_250">[250]</a></span> Xen. Anab. vi, 6, 31-36.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_251"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_251">[251]</a></span> Xen. Anab. vi, 6, 36, 37.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_252"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_252">[252]</a></span> Nearly the same cross march was made by the Athenian general Lamachus,
-in the eighth year of the Peloponnesian war, after he had lost his
-triremes by a sudden rise of the water at the mouth of the river Kalex, in
-the territory of Herakleia (Thucyd. iv, 75).</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_253"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_253">[253]</a></span> Xen. Anab. vii, 1, 2. Πέμψας πρὸς Ἀναξίβιον τὸν
-ναύαρχον, ἐδεῖτο διαβιβάσαι τὸ στράτευμα ἐκ τῆς Ἀσίας, καὶ
-ὑπισχνεῖτο πάντα ποιήσειν αὐτῷ ὅσα δέοι.
-</p>
-<p>
-Compare vii, 2, 7, when Anaxibius demanded in vain the fulfilment of
-this promise.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_254"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_254">[254]</a></span> Xen. Anab. vii, 1, 5-7.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_255"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_255">[255]</a></span> Xen. Anab. vii, 1, 7-10. Ἀλλ᾽ ὁμῶς (ἔφη), ἐγώ σοι
-συμβουλεύω ἐξελθεῖν ὡς πορευσόμενον· ἐπειδὰν δ᾽ ἔξω γένηται τὸ
-στράτευμα, τότε ἀπαλλάττεσθαι.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_256"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_256">[256]</a></span> Xen. Anab. vii, 1, 12.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_257"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_257">[257]</a></span> Xen. Anab. vii, 1, 13.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_258"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_258">[258]</a></span> Xen. Anab. vii, 1, 14.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_259"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_259">[259]</a></span> Xen. Anab. vii, 1, 15-17.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_260"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_260">[260]</a></span> Xen. Anab. vii, 1, 18, 19.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_261"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_261">[261]</a></span> Xen. Anab. vii, 1, 30-31.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_262"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_262">[262]</a></span> Xen. Anab. viii, 1, 32-35.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_263"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_263">[263]</a></span> So Tacitus says about the Roman general Spurinna (governor of Placentia
-for Otho against Vitellius), and his mutinous army who marched out
-to fight the Vitellian generals against his strenuous remonstrance—“Fit
-<i>temeritatis alienæ comes</i> Spurinna, primo coactus, mox <i>velle simulans</i>, quo
-plus auctoritatis inesset consiliis, si seditio mitesceret” (Tacitus, Hist. ii,
-18).</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_264"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_264">[264]</a></span> Xen. Anab. vii, 6, 33.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_265"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_265">[265]</a></span> Xen. Anab. vii, 1, 34-40.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_266"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_266">[266]</a></span> Xen. Anab. vii, 2, 7. Φαρνάβαζος δὲ, ἐπεὶ ᾔσθετο
-Ἀρίσταρχόν τε ἥκοντα εἰς Βυζάντιον ἁρμοστὴν καὶ Ἀναξίβιον οὐκέτι
-ναυαρχοῦντα, Ἀναξιβίου μὲν ἠμέλησε, πρὸς Ἀρίσταρχον δὲ διεπράττετο
-τὰ αὐτὰ περὶ τοῦ Κυρείου στρατεύματος ἅπερ καὶ πρὸς Ἀναξίβιον.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_267"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_267">[267]</a></span> Xen. Anab. vii, 2, 8-25.
-</p>
-<p>
-Ἐκ τούτου δὴ ὁ Ἀναξίβιος, καλέσας Ξενοφῶντα, <em class="gesperrt">κελεύει πάσῃ τέχνῃ
-καὶ μηχανῇ πλεῦσαι ἐπὶ τὸ στράτευμα ὡς τάχιστα</em>, καὶ συνέχειν
-τε τὸ στράτευμα καὶ συναθροίζειν τῶν διεσπαρμένων ὡς ἂν πλείστους
-δύνηται, καὶ παραγαγόντα εἰς τὴν Πέρινθον διαβιβάζειν εἰς τὴν Ἀσίαν
-<em class="gesperrt">ὅτι τάχιστα</em>· καὶ δίδωσιν αὐτῷ τριακόντορον, καὶ ἐπιστολὴν καὶ
-ἄνδρα συμπέμπει κελεύσοντα τοὺς Περινθίους <em class="gesperrt">ὡς τάχιστα</em>
-Ξενοφῶντα προπέμψαι τοῖς ἵπποις ἐπὶ τὸ στράτευμα.
-</p>
-<p>
-The vehement interest which Anaxibius took in this new project is marked
-by the strength of Xenophon’s language; extreme celerity is enjoined three
-several times.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_268"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_268">[268]</a></span> Xen. Anab. vii, 2, 6. Καὶ ὁ Ἀναξίβιος τῷ μὲν Ἀριστάρχῳ
-ἐπιστέλλει ὁπόσους ἂν εὕροι ἐν Βυζαντίῳ τῶν Κύρου στρατιωτῶν
-ὑπολελειμμένους, ἀποδόσθαι· ὁ δὲ Κλέανδρος οὐδένα ἐπεπράκει, ἀλλὰ
-καὶ τοὺς κάμνοντας ἐθεράπευεν οἰκτείρων, καὶ ἀναγκάζων οἰκίᾳ δέχεσθαι.
-Ἀρίσταρχος δ᾽ ἐπεὶ ἦλθε τάχιστα, οὐκ ἐλάττους τετρακοσίων ἀπέδοτο.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_269"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_269">[269]</a></span> Xen. Anab. vii, 2, 14-16.
-</p>
-<p>
-Ἥδη δὲ ὄντων πρὸς τῷ τείχει, ἐξαγγέλλει τις τῷ Ξενοφῶντι ὅτι,
-εἰ εἴσεισι, συλληφθήσεται· καὶ ἢ αὐτοῦ τι πείσεται, ἢ καὶ Φαρναβάζῳ,
-παραδοθήσεται. Ὁ δὲ, ἀκούσας ταῦτα, τοὺς μὲν προπέμπεται, αὐτὸς δ᾽
-εἶπεν, ὅτι θῦσαί τι βούλοιτο.... Οἱ δὲ στρατηγοὶ καὶ οἱ λοχαγοὶ
-ἥκοντες παρὰ τοῦ Ἀριστάρχου, ἀπήγγελλον ὅτι νῦν μὲν ἀπιέναι σφᾶς
-κελεύει, τῆς δείλης δὲ ἥκειν· ἔνθα καὶ δήλη μᾶλλον ἐδόκει [εἶναι]
-ἡ ἐπιβουλή. Compare vii, 3, 2.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_270"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_270">[270]</a></span> Xen. Anab. vii, 2, 15; vii, 3, 3; vii, 6, 13.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_271"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_271">[271]</a></span> Xen. Anab. vii, 6, 24. μέσος δὲ χείμων ἦν, etc. Probably the month
-of December.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_272"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_272">[272]</a></span> Xen. Anab. vii, 2, 17-38.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_273"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_273">[273]</a></span> Xen. Anab. vii, 6, 34.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_274"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_274">[274]</a></span> Xen. Anab. vii, 6, 9, 10.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_275"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_275">[275]</a></span> Xen. Anab. vii, 7, 55-57.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_276"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_276">[276]</a></span> Xen. Anab. vii, 6, 1-7.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_277"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_277">[277]</a></span> Xen. Anab. vii, 7, 15.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_278"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_278">[278]</a></span> Xen. Anab. vii, 7, 21-47.
-</p>
-<p>
-The lecture is of unsuitable prolixity, when we consider the person to
-whom, and the circumstances under which, it purports to have been spoken.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_279"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_279">[279]</a></span> Xen. Anab. vii, 7, 23.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_280"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_280">[280]</a></span> It appears that the epithet <i>Meilichios</i> (the Gracious) is here applied to
-Zeus in the same euphemistic sense as the denomination <i>Eumenides</i> to the
-avenging goddesses. Zeus is conceived as having actually inflicted, or being
-in a disposition to inflict, evil; the sacrifice to him under this surname represents
-a sentiment of fear, and is one of atonement, expiation or purification,
-destined to avert his displeasure; but the surname itself is to be
-interpreted <i>proleptice</i>, to use the word of the critics—it designates, not the
-actual disposition of Zeus (or of other gods), but that disposition which
-the sacrifice is intended to bring about in him.
-</p>
-<p>
-See Pausan. i, 37, 3; ii, 20, 3. K. F. Herrmann, Gottesdienstl. Alterthümer
-der Griechen, s. 58; Van Stegeren, De Græcorum Diebus Festis, p.
-5 (Utrecht, 1849).</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_281"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_281">[281]</a></span> Xen. Anab. vii, 8, 10-19.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_282"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_282">[282]</a></span> Xen. Anab. vii, 8, 22. Ἐνταῦθα οἱ περὶ Ξενοφῶντα
-συμπεριτυγχάνουσιν αὐτῷ καὶ λαμβάνουσιν αὐτὸν (Ἀσιδάτην) καὶ
-γυναῖκα καὶ παῖδας καὶ τοὺς ἵππους καὶ πάντα τὰ ὄντα· <em class="gesperrt">καὶ
-οὕτω τὰ πρότερα ἱερὰ ἀπέβη</em>.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_283"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_283">[283]</a></span> Compare Plutarch, Kimon, c. 9; and Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 21.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_284"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_284">[284]</a></span> Xen. Anab. vii, 8, 23.
-</p>
-<p>
-Ἐνταῦθα τὸν θεὸν οὐκ ᾐτιάσατο ὁ Ξενοφῶν· συνέπραττον γὰρ καὶ οἱ
-Λάκωνες καὶ οἱ λοχαγοὶ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι στρατηγοὶ καὶ οἱ στρατιῶται,
-ὥστε ἐξαίρετα λαβεῖν καὶ ἵππους καὶ ζεύγη καὶ ἄλλα, ὥστε ἱκανὸν
-εἶναι καὶ ἄλλον ἤδη εὖ ποιεῖν.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_285"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_285">[285]</a></span> Xen. Anab. v, 3, 6. It seems plain that this deposit must have been
-first made on the present occasion.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_286"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_286">[286]</a></span> Compare Anabasis, vii, 7, 57; vii, 8, 2.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_287"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_287">[287]</a></span> Xenoph. Memorab. iv, 8, 4—as well as the opening sentence of the
-work.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_288"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_288">[288]</a></span> See Xenoph. Hellen. iii, 2, 7—a passage which Morus refers, I think
-with much probability, to Xenophon himself.
-</p>
-<p>
-The very circumstantial details, which Xenophon gives (iii, 1, 11-28)
-about the proceedings of Derkyllidas against Meidias in the Troad, seem
-also to indicate that he was serving there in person.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_289"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_289">[289]</a></span> That the sentence of banishment on Xenophon was not passed by the
-Athenians until after the battle of Korôneia, appears plainly from Anabasis,
-v. 3, 7. This battle took place in August 394 <small>B.C.</small>
-</p>
-<p>
-Pausanias also will be found in harmony with this statement, as to the
-time of the banishment. Ἐδιώχθη δὲ ὁ Ξενοφῶν ὑπὸ Ἀθηναίων, ὡς ἐπὶ βασιλέα
-τῶν Περσῶν, <em class="gesperrt">σφίσιν εὔνουν ὄντα</em>, στρατείας μετασχὼν Κύρῳ πολεμιωτάτῳ
-τοῦ δήμου (iv, 6, 4). Now it was not until 396 or 395 <small>B.C.</small>,
-that the Persian king began to manifest the least symptoms of good-will
-towards Athens; and not until the battle of Knidus (a little before the
-battle of Korôneia in the same year), that he testified his good-will by conspicuous
-and effective service. If, therefore, the motive of the Athenians
-to banish Xenophon arose out of the good feeling on the part of the king
-of Persia toward them, the banishment could not have taken place before
-395 <small>B.C.</small>, and is not likely to have taken place until after 394 <small>B.C.</small>; which
-is the intimation of Xenophon himself as above.
-</p>
-<p>
-Lastly, Diogenes Laërtius (ii, 52) states, what I believe to be the main
-truth, that the sentence of banishment was passed against Xenophon by the
-Athenians on the ground of his attachment to the Lacedæmonians—ἐπὶ
-Λακωνισμῷ.
-</p>
-<p>
-Krüger and others seem to think that Xenophon was banished because
-he took service under Cyrus, who had been the bitter enemy of Athens. It
-is true that Sokrates, when first consulted, was apprehensive beforehand that
-this might bring upon him the displeasure of Athens (Xen. Anab. iii, 1, 5).
-But it is to be remembered that <i>at this time</i>, the king of Persia was just as
-much the enemy of Athens as Cyrus was; and that Cyrus in fact had made
-war upon her with the forces and treasures of the king. Artaxerxes and
-Cyrus being thus, at that time, both enemies of Athens, it was of little consequence
-to the Athenians whether Cyrus succeeded or failed in his enterprise.
-But when Artaxerxes, six years afterwards, became their friend,
-their feelings towards his enemies were altered.
-</p>
-<p>
-The passage of Pausanias as above cited, if understood as asserting the
-main cause of Xenophon’s banishment, is in my judgment inaccurate.
-Xenophon was banished <i>for Laconism</i>, or attachment to Sparta against his
-country; the fact of his having served under Cyrus against Artaxerxes
-counted at best only as a secondary motive.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_290"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_290">[290]</a></span> Xen. Anab. v, 3, 13. Καὶ στήλη ἔστηκε παρὰ τὸν ναὸν,
-γράμματα ἔχουσα—Ἱερὸς ὁ Χῶρος τῆς Αρτέμιδος· τὸν δὲ ἔχοντα καὶ
-καρπούμενον τὴν μὲν δεκάτην καταθύειν ἑκάστου ἔτους, ἐκ δὲ τοῦ
-περίττου τόν ναὸν ἐπισκευάζειν· ἐὰν δέ τις μὴ ποιῇ ταῦτα, τῇ
-θεῷ μελήσει.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_291"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_291">[291]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 2.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_292"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_292">[292]</a></span> Xen. Anab. v, 3, 9. Παρεῖχε δ᾽ ἡ θεὸς τοῖς σκηνοῦσιν
-ἄλφιτα ἄρτους, οἶνον, τραγήματα, etc.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_293"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_293">[293]</a></span> Xen. Anab. v. 3, 9.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_294"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_294">[294]</a></span> Diogen. Laërt. ii, 53, 54, 59. Pausanias (v, 6, 4) attests the reconquest
-of Skillus by the Eleians, but adds (on the authority of the Eleian ἐξηγηταὶ
-or show guides) that they permitted Xenophon, after a judicial examination
-before the Olympic Senate, to go on living there in peace. The latter point
-I apprehend to be incorrect.
-</p>
-<p>
-The latter works of Xenophon (De Vectigalibus, De Officio Magistri
-Equitum, etc.), seem plainly to imply that he had been restored to citizenship,
-and had come again to take cognizance of politics at Athens.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_295"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_295">[295]</a></span> Diogen. Laërt. ut sup. Dionys. Halic. De Dinarcho, p. 664, ed. Reiska.
-Dionysius mentions this oration under the title of Ἀποστασίου ἀπολογία Αἰσχύλου
-πρὸς Ξενοφῶντα. And Diogenes also alludes to it—ὥς φησι Δείναρχος ἐν τῷ πρὸς
-Ξενοφῶντα ἀποστασίου.
-</p>
-<p>
-Schneider in his Epimetrum (ad calcem Anabaseos, p. 573), respecting
-the exile of Xenophon, argues as if the person against whom the oration
-of Deinarchus was directed, was Xenophon himself, the Cyreian commander
-and author. But this, I think, is chronologically all but impossible;
-for Deinarchus was not born till 361 <small>B.C.</small>, and composed his first oration in
-336 <small>B.C.</small>
-</p>
-<p>
-Yet Deinarchus, in his speech against Xenophon, undoubtedly mentioned
-several facts respecting the Cyreian Xenophon, which implies that the latter
-was a relative of the person against whom the oration was directed. I
-venture to set him down as grandson, on that evidence, combined with the
-identity of name and the suitableness in point of time. He might well be
-the son of Gryllus, who was slain fighting at the battle of Mantineia in
-362 <small>B.C.</small>
-</p>
-<p>
-Nothing is more likely than that an orator, composing an oration against
-Xenophon the grandson, should touch upon the acts and character of Xenophon
-the grandfather; see for analogy, the oration of Isokrates, de Bigis;
-among others.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_296"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_296">[296]</a></span> Xen. Anab. i, 7, 4. Compare Plutarch, Artaxerx. c. 20; and Isokrates,
-Panegyr. Or. iv, s. 168, 169 <i>seq.</i>
-</p>
-<p>
-The last chapter of the Cyropædia of Xenophon (viii, 20, 21-26) expresses
-strenuously the like conviction, of the military feebleness and disorganization
-of the Persian empire, not defensible without Grecian aid.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_297"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_297">[297]</a></span> Isokrates, Orat. v, (Philipp.) s. 104-106. ἤδη δ᾽ ἐγκρατεῖς
-δοκοῦντας εἶναι (<i>i. e.</i> the Greeks under Klearchus) διὰ τὴν Κύρου
-<em class="gesperrt">προπέτειαν</em> ἀτυχῆσαι, etc.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_298"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_298">[298]</a></span> Isokrates. Orat. v. (Philipp.) s. 141: Xen. Hellen. vi, 1, 12.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_299"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_299">[299]</a></span> See the stress laid by Alexander the Great upon the adventures of the
-Ten Thousand, in his speech to encourage his soldiers before the battle of
-Issus (Arrian, E. A. ii, 7, 8).</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_300"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_300">[300]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. ii, 3, 1.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_301"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_301">[301]</a></span> Plutarch, Lysand. c. 5.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_302"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_302">[302]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. ii, 2, 6.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_303"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_303">[303]</a></span> These Councils of Ten, organized by Lysander, are sometimes called
-<i>Dekarchies</i>—sometimes <i>Dekadarchies</i>. I use the former word by preference;
-since the word <i>Dekadarch</i> is also employed by Xenophon in another and
-very different sense—as meaning an officer who commands a <i>dekad</i>.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_304"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_304">[304]</a></span> Plutarch, Lysand. c. 13.
-</p>
-<p>
-Καταλυών δὲ τοὺς δήμους καὶ τὰς ἄλλας πολιτείας, ἕνα μὲν ἁρμοστὴν
-ἑκάστῃ Λακεδαιμόνιον κατέλιπε, δέκα δὲ ἄρχοντας ἐκ τῶν ὑπ᾽ αὐτοῦ
-συγκεκροτημένων κατὰ πόλιν ἑταιρειῶν. Καὶ ταῦτα πράττων <em class="gesperrt">ὁμοίως
-ἔν τε ταῖς πολεμίαις καὶ ταῖς συμμάχοις γεγενημέναις πόλεσι</em>,
-παρέπλει σχολαίως τρόπον τινα κατασκευαζόμενος ἑαυτῷ τὴν τῆς
-Ἑλλάδος ἡγεμονίαν. Compare Xen. Hellen. ii, 2, 2-5; Diodor. xiii,
-3, 10, 13.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_305"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_305">[305]</a></span> Plutarch, Lysand. c. 13. πολλαῖς παραγινόμενος αὐτὸς
-σφαγαῖς καὶ συνεκβάλλων τοὺς τῶν φίλων ἐχθροὺς, οὐκ ἐπιεικὲς ἐδίδου
-τοῖς Ἕλλησι δεῖγμα τῆς Λακεδαιμονίων ἀρχῆς, etc.
-</p>
-<p>
-Plutarch, Lysand. c. 14. Καὶ τῶν μὲν ἄλλων πόλεων ὁμαλῶς ἁπασῶν
-κατέλυε τὰς πολιτείας καὶ καθίστη δεκαδαρχίας· πολλῶν μὲν ἐν
-ἑκάστῃ σφαττομένων, πολλῶν δὲ φευγόντων, etc.
-</p>
-<p>
-About the massacre at Thasus, see Cornelius Nepos, Lysand. c. 2; Polyæn.
-i, 45, 4. Compare Plutarch, Lysand. c. 19; and see Vol. VIII, Ch.
-lxv, p. 220 of this History.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_306"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_306">[306]</a></span> Diodor. xiv, 10. Compare Isokrates, Or. iv, (Panegyr.) s. 151; Xen.
-Hellen. iv, 8, 1.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_307"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_307">[307]</a></span> Plutarch, Lysand. c. 13. τοῦ Λυσάνδρου τῶν ὀλίγων
-τοῖς θρασυτάτοις καὶ φιλονεικοτάτοις τὰς πόλεις ἐγχειρίζοντος.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_308"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_308">[308]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. ii, 3, 13.
-</p>
-<p>
-... ἔπεισαν Λύσανδρον φρουροὺς σφίσι ξυμπρᾶξαι ἐλθεῖν, ἕως δὴ
-<em class="gesperrt">τοὺς πονηροὺς</em> ἐκποδὼν ποιησάμενοι καταστήσαιντο τὴν
-πολιτείαν, etc.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_309"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_309">[309]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. ii, 3, 14. Τῶν δὲ φρουρῶν τούτου (the harmost)
-συμπέμποντος αὐτοῖς οὓς ἐβούλοντο συνελάμβανον οὐκέτι τοὺς πονηροὺς
-καὶ ὀλίγου ἀξίους, ἀλλ᾽ ἤδη οὓς ἐνόμιζον ἥκιστα μὲν παρωθουμένους
-ἀνέχεσθαι, ἀντιπράττειν δέ τι ἐπιχειροῦντας πλείστους τοὺς
-συνεθέλοντας λαμβάνειν.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_310"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_310">[310]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. ii, 3, 21.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_311"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_311">[311]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. ii, 4, 1.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_312"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_312">[312]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. ii, 3, 24-32. Καὶ εἰσὶ μὲν δήπου πᾶσαι
-μεταβολαὶ πολιτειῶν θανατήφοροι, etc.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_313"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_313">[313]</a></span> Isokrates Orat. iv, (Panegyr.) s. 127-132 (c. 32).
-</p>
-<p>
-He has been speaking, at some length, and in terms of energetic denunciation,
-against the enormities of the dekarchies. He concludes by saying—Φυγὰς
-δὲ καὶ στάσεις καὶ νόμων συγχύσεις καὶ πολιτειῶν μεταβολὰς,
-<em class="gesperrt">ἔτι δὲ παιδῶν ὕβρεις καὶ γυναικῶν αἰσχύνας καὶ χρημάτων ἁρπαγὰς</em>,
-τίς ἂν δύναιτο διεξελθεῖν· πλὴν τοσοῦτον εἰπεῖν ἔχω καθ᾽ ἁπάντων, ὅτι
-τὰ μὲν ἐφ᾽ ἡμῶν δεινὰ ῥᾳδίως ἄν τις ἑνὶ ψηφίσματι διέλυσε, τὰς δὲ σφαγὰς
-καὶ τὰς ἀνομίας τὰς ἐπὶ τούτων γενομένας οὐδεὶς ἂν ἰάσασθαι δύναιτο.
-</p>
-<p>
-See also, of the same author, Isokrates, Orat. v, (Philipp.) s. 110; Orat.
-viii, (de Pace) s. 119-124; Or. xii, (Panath.) s. 58, 60, 106.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_314"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_314">[314]</a></span> We may infer that if Xenophon had heard anything of the sort respecting
-Kritias, he would hardly have been averse to mention it; when we
-read what he says (Memorab. i, 2, 29.) Compare a curious passage about
-Kritias in Dion. Chrysostom. Or. xxi, p. 270.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_315"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_315">[315]</a></span> Plutarch Lysand. c. 19. Ἦν δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι
-δημοτικῶν φόνος οὐκ ἀριθμητὸς, ἅτε δὴ μὴ κατ᾽ ἰδίας μόνον αἰτίας αὐτοῦ
-κτείνοντος, ἀλλὰ πολλαῖς μὲν ἔχθραις, πολλαῖς δὲ πλεονεξίαις, τῶν
-ἑκασταχόθι φίλων χαριζομένου τὰ τοιαῦτα καὶ συνεργοῦντος; also
-Pausanias, vii, 10, 1; ix, 32, 6.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_316"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_316">[316]</a></span> Plutarch, Agesilaus, c. 7.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_317"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_317">[317]</a></span> See the speech of the Theban envoys at Athens, about eight years after
-the surrender of Athens (Xen. Hellen. iii, 5, 13).
-</p>
-<p>
-... Οὐδὲ γὰρ φυγεῖν ἐξῆν (Plutarch, Lysand. c. 19).</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_318"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_318">[318]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. ii, 3, 13.
-</p>
-<p>
-τὸν μὲν Καλλίβιον ἐθεράπευον πάσῃ θεραπείᾳ, ὡς πάντα ἐπαινοίῃ, ἃ πράττοιεν,
-etc. (Plutarch, Lysand. c. 15).
-</p>
-<p>
-The Thirty seem to have outdone Lysander himself. A young Athenian
-of rank, distinguished as a victor in the pankratium, Autolykus,—having
-been insulted by Kallibius, resented it, tripped him up, and threw him down.
-Lysander, on being appealed to, justified Autolykus, and censured Kallibius,
-telling him that he did not know how to govern freemen. The Thirty,
-however, afterwards put Autolykus to death, as a means of courting Kallibius
-(Plutarch, Lysand. c. 15). Pausanius mentions Eteonikus (not Kallibius)
-as the person who struck Autolykus; but he ascribes the same decision to
-Lysander (ix, 32, 3).</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_319"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_319">[319]</a></span> Plutarch, Amator. Narration, p. 773; Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 20. In
-Diodorus (xv, 54) and Pausanias, (ix, 13, 2), the damsels thus outraged
-are stated to have slain themselves. Compare another story in Xenoph.
-Hellen. v, 4, 56, 57.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_320"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_320">[320]</a></span> Plutarch, Lysand. c. 19.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_321"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_321">[321]</a></span> This seems to have been the impression not merely of the enemies of
-Sparta, but even of the Spartan authorities themselves. Compare two
-remarkable passages of Thucydides, i, 77, and i, 95. Ἄμικτα γὰρ (says the
-Athenian envoy at Sparta) τά τε καθ᾽ ὑμᾶς αὐτοὺς νόμιμα τοῖς ἄλλοις ἔχετε,
-καὶ προσέτι εἷς ἕκαστος ἐξιὼν οὔτε τούτοις χρῆται, οὐθ᾽ οἷς ἡ ἄλλη Ἑλλὰς νομίζει.
-</p>
-<p>
-After the recall of the regent Pausanias and of Dorkis from the Hellespont
-(in 477 <small>B.C.</small>), the Lacedæmonians refuse to send out any successor,
-φοβούμενοι μὴ σφίσιν οἱ ἐξιόντες χείρους γίγνωνται, ὅπερ καὶ ἐν τῷ Παυσανίᾳ
-ἐνεῖδον, etc. (i, 95.)
-</p>
-<p>
-Compare Plutarch, Apophtheg. Laconic. p. 220 F.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_322"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_322">[322]</a></span> Thucyd. i, 69. οὐ γὰρ ὁ δουλωσάμενος, ἀλλ᾽ ὁ δυνάμενος
-μὲν παῦσαι, περιορῶν δὲ, ἀληθέστερον αὐτὸ δρᾷ, εἴπερ καὶ τὴν ἀξίωσιν
-τῆς ἀρετῆς ὡς ἐλευθερῶν τὴν Ἑλλάδα φέρεται.
-</p>
-<p>
-To the like purpose the second speech of the Corinthian envoys at
-Sparta, c. 122-124—μὴ μέλλετε Ποτιδαιάταις τε ποιεῖσθαι
-τιμωρίαν. ... καὶ τῶν ἄλλων μετελθεῖν τὴν ἐλευθερίαν, etc.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_323"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_323">[323]</a></span> Thucyd. i, 139. Compare Isokrates, Or. iv, Panegyr. c. 34, s. 140; Or.
-v, (Philipp.) s. 121; Or. xiv, (Plataic.) s. 43.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_324"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_324">[324]</a></span> Thucyd. ii, 72. Παρασκευὴ δὲ τόσηδε καὶ πόλεμος γεγένηται
-αὐτῶν ἕνεκα καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐλευθερώσεως.
-</p>
-<p>
-Read also the speech of the Theban orator, in reply to the Platæan, after
-the capture of the town by the Lacedæmonians (iii, 63).</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_325"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_325">[325]</a></span> Thucyd. ii, 8. ἡ δὲ εὔνοια παρὰ πολὺ ἐποίει τῶν ἀνθρώπων
-μᾶλλον ἐς τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους, ἄλλως τε καὶ προειπόντων ὅτι τὴν
-Ἑλλάδα ἐλευθεροῦσιν.
-</p>
-<p>
-See also iii, 13, 14—the speech of the envoys from the revolted Mitylênê,
-to the Lacedæmonians.
-</p>
-<p>
-The Lacedæmonian admiral Alkidas with his fleet, is announced as crossing
-over the Ægean to Ionia for the purpose of “liberating Greece;” accordingly,
-the Samian exiles remonstrate with him for killing his prisoners,
-as in contradiction with that object (iii, 32)—ἔλεγον οὐ καλῶς
-τὴν Ἑλλάδα ἐλευθεροῦν αὐτὸν, εἰ ἄνδρας διέφθειρεν, etc.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_326"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_326">[326]</a></span> Thucyd. iv, 85. Ἡ μὲν ἔκπεμψίς μου καὶ τῆς στρατιᾶς
-ὑπὸ Λακεδαιμονίων, ὦ Ἀκάνθιοι, γεγένηται τὴν αἰτίαν ἐπαληθεύουσα
-ἣν ἀρχόμενοι τοῦ πολέμου προείπομεν, <em class="gesperrt">Ἀθηναίοις ἐλευθεροῦντες
-τὴν Ἑλλάδα πολεμήσειν</em>.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_327"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_327">[327]</a></span> Thucyd. iv, 85. Αὐτός τε οὐκ ἐπὶ κακῷ, ἐπ᾽ ἐλευθερώσει
-δὲ τῶν Ἑλλήνων παρελήλυθα, ὅρκοις τε Λακεδαιμονίων καταλαβὼν τὰ τέλη
-τοῖς μεγίστοις, ἦ μὴν οὓς ἂν ἔγωγε προσαγάγωμαι ξυμμάχους ἔσεσθαι
-αὐτονόμους.... Καὶ εἴ τις ἰδίᾳ τινὰ δεδιὼς ἄρα, μὴ ἐγώ τισι προσθῶ
-τὴν πόλιν, ἀπρόθυμός ἐστι, <em class="gesperrt">πάντων μάλιστα πιστευσάτω. Οὐ γὰρ
-συστασιάσων ἥκω</em>, οὐδὲ ἀσαφῆ τὴν ἐλευθερίαν νομίζω ἐπιφέρειν, εἰ,
-<em class="gesperrt">τὸ πάτριον παρεὶς, τὸ πλέον τοῖς ὀλίγοις</em>, ἢ τὸ ἔλασσον τοῖς
-πᾶσι, δουλώσαιμι. <em class="gesperrt">Χαλεπώτερα γὰρ ἂν τῆς ἀλλοφύλου ἀρχῆς εἴη</em>,
-καὶ ἡμῖν τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις οὐκ ἂν ἀντὶ πόνων χάρις καθίσταιτο,
-ἀντὶ δὲ τιμῆς καὶ δόξης αἰτία μᾶλλον· <em class="gesperrt">οἷς τε τοὺς Ἀθηναίους
-ἐγκλήμασι καταπολεμοῦμεν, αὐτοὶ ἂν φαινοίμεθα ἐχθίονα ἢ ὁ μὴ
-ὑποδείξας ἀρετὴν κατακτώμενοι</em>.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_328"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_328">[328]</a></span> Thucyd. iv, 87. Οὐδὲ ὀφείλομεν οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι μὴ
-<em class="gesperrt">κοινοῦ τινος αγαθοῦ αἰτίᾳ τοὺς μὴ βουλομένους ἐλευθεροῦν. Οὐδ᾽ αὖ
-ἀρχῆς ἐφιέμεθα</em>, παῦσαι δὲ μᾶλλον ἑτέρους σπεύδοντες τοὺς πλείους
-ἂν ἀδικοῖμεν, <em class="gesperrt">εἰ ξύμπασιν αὐτονομίαν ἐπιφέροντες</em> ὑμᾶς τοὺς
-ἐναντιουμένους περιΐδοιμεν. Compare Isokrates, Or. iv, (Panegyr.) s. 140, 141.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_329"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_329">[329]</a></span> Feelings of the Lacedæmonians during the winter immediately succeeding
-the great Syracusan catastrophe (Thuc. viii. 2)—καὶ καθελόντες ἐκείνους
-(the Athenians) αὐτοὶ τῆς πάσης Ἑλλάδος ἤδη ἀσφαλῶς ἡγήσεσθαι.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_330"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_330">[330]</a></span> Compare Thucyd. viii, 43, 3; viii, 46, 3.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_331"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_331">[331]</a></span> This is emphatically set forth in a fragment of Theopompus the historian,
-preserved by Theodorus Metochita, and printed at the end of the
-collection of the Fragments of Theopompus the historian, both by Wichers
-and by M. Didot. Both these editors, however, insert it only as Fragmentum
-Spurium, on the authority of Plutarch (Lysander, c. 13), who
-quotes the same sentiment from the comic writer Theopompus. But the
-passage of Theodorus Metochita presents the express words Θεόπομπος
-ὁ ἱστορικός. We have, therefore, his distinct affirmation against that of Plutarch;
-and the question is, which of the two we are to believe.
-</p>
-<p>
-Now if any one will read attentively the so-called Fragmentum Spurium
-as it stands at the end of the collections above referred to, he will see (I
-think) that it belongs much more naturally to the historian than to the
-comic writer. It is a strictly historical statement, illustrated by a telling,
-though coarse, comparison. The Fragment is thus presented by Theodorus
-Metochita (Fragm. Theopomp. 344, ed. Didot).
-</p>
-<p>
-Θεόπομπος ὁ ἱστορικὸς ἀποσκώπτων εἰς τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους, εἴκαζεν αὐτοὺς
-ταῖς φαύλαις καπηλίσιν, αἳ τοῖς χρωμένοις ἐγχέουσαι τὴν ἀρχὴν οἶνον ἡδύν
-τε καὶ εὔχρηστον σοφιστικῶς ἐπὶ τῇ λήψει τοῦ ἀργυρίου, μεθύστερον φαυλόν
-τινα καὶ ἐκτροπίαν καὶ ὀξίνην κατακρινῶσι καὶ παρέχονται· καὶ τοὺς
-Λακεδαιμονίους τοίνυν ἔλεγε, τὸν αὐτὸν ἐκείναις τρόπον, ἐν τῷ κατὰ τῶν
-Ἀθηναίων πολέμῳ, τὴν ἀρχὴν ἡδίστῳ πόματι τῆς ἀπ᾽ Ἀθηναίων ἐλευθερίας καὶ
-προγράμματι καὶ κηρύγματι τοὺς Ἕλληνας δελεάσαντας, ὕστερον πικρότατα
-σφίσιν ἐγχέαι καὶ ἀηδέστατα κράματα βιοτῆς ἐπωδύνου καὶ χρήσεως πραγμάτων
-ἀλγεινῶν, πάνυ τοι κατατυραννοῦντας τὰς πόλεις δεκαρχίαις καὶ ἁρμοσταῖς
-βαρυτάτοις, καὶ πραττομένους, ἃ δυσχερὲς εἶναι σφόδρα καὶ ἀνύποιστον
-φέρειν, καὶ ἀποκτιννύναι.
-</p>
-<p>
-Plutarch, ascribing the statement to the comic Theopompus, affirms him
-to be silly (ἔοικε ληρεῖν) in saying that the Lacedæmonian empire began by
-being sweet and pleasant, and afterwards was corrupted and turned into
-bitterness and oppression; whereas the fact was, that it was bitterness and
-oppression from the very first.
-</p>
-<p>
-Now if we read the above citation from Theodorus, we shall see that
-Theopompus did not really put forth that assertion which Plutarch contradicts
-as silly and untrue.
-</p>
-<p>
-What Theopompus stated was, that the first Lacedæmonians, <i>during the
-war against Athens</i>, tempted the Greeks with a most delicious draught and
-<i>programme</i> and <i>proclamation</i> of freedom from the rule of Athens,—and that
-they afterwards poured in the most bitter and repulsive mixtures of hard
-oppression and tyranny, etc.
-</p>
-<p>
-The sweet draught is asserted to consist—not, as Plutarch supposes, in
-the first taste of the actual Lacedæmonian empire after the war, but—in
-the seductive promises of freedom held out by them to the allies <i>during the
-war</i>. Plutarch’s charge of ἔοικε ληρεῖν has thus no foundation. I have
-written δελεάσαντας instead of δελεάσοντας which stands in Didot’s Fragment,
-because it struck me that this correction was required to construe
-the passage.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_332"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_332">[332]</a></span> Isokrates, Or. iv, (Panegr.) s. 145; Or. viii, (de Pace) s. 122; Diodor.
-xiv, 10-44; xv, 23. Compare Herodot. v, 92; Thucyd. i, 18; Isokrates,
-Or. iv, (Panegyr.) s. 144.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_333"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_333">[333]</a></span> Isokrates, Panathen. s. 61. Σπαρτιᾶται μὲν γὰρ ἔτη δέκα
-μόλις ἐπεστάτησαν αὐτῶν, ἡμεῖς δὲ πέντε καὶ ἑξήκοντα συνεχῶς κατέσχομεν
-τὴν ἀρχήν. I do not hold myself bound to make out the exactness of the chronology
-of Isokrates. But here we may remark that his “hardly ten years” is a
-term, though less than the truth by some months, if we may take the battle
-of Ægospotami as the beginning, is very near the truth if we take the
-surrender of Athens as the beginning, down to the battle of Knidus.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_334"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_334">[334]</a></span> Pausanias, viii, 52, 2; ix, 6, 1.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_335"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_335">[335]</a></span> Diodor. xiv, 84; Isokrates, Orat. viii, (de Pace) s. 121.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_336"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_336">[336]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iii, 4, 2.
-</p>
-<p>
-Lysander accompanied King Agesilaus (when the latter was going to his
-Asiatic command in 396 <small>B.C.</small>). His purpose was—ὅπως τὰς
-δεκαρχίας τὰς κατασταθείσας ὑπ᾽ ἐκείνου ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν, ἐκπεπτωκυίας
-δὲ διὰ τοὺς ἐφόρους, οἱ τὰς πατρίους πολιτείας παρήγγειλαν, πάλιν
-καταστήσειε μετ᾽ Ἀγησιλάου.
-</p>
-<p>
-It shows the careless construction of Xenophon’s Hellenica, or perhaps
-his reluctance to set forth the discreditable points of the Lacedæmonian
-rule, that this is the first mention which he makes (and that too, indirectly)
-of the dekarchies, nine years after they had been first set up by Lysander.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_337"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_337">[337]</a></span> Compare the two passages of Xenophon’s Hellenica, iii, 4, 7; iii,
-5, 13.
-</p>
-<p>
-Ἅτε συντεταραγμένων ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι τῶν πολιτειῶν, καὶ οὔτε δημοκρατίας
-ἔτι οὔσης, ὥσπερ ἐπ᾽ Ἀθηναίων, οὔτε δεκαρχίας, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ Λυσάνδρου.
-</p>
-<p>
-But that some of these dekarchies still continued, we know from the
-subsequent passage. The Theban envoys say to the public assembly at
-Athens, respecting the Spartans:—
-</p>
-<p>
-Ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ οὓς ὑμῶν ἀπέστησαν φανεροί εἰσιν ἐξηπατηκότες· ὑπό τε
-γὰρ τῶν ἁρμοστῶν <em class="gesperrt">τυραννοῦνται</em>, καὶ ὑπὸ δέκα ἀνδρῶν, οὓς
-Λύσανδρος κατέστησεν ἐν ἑκάστῃ πόλει—where the decemvirs are noted as still subsisting,
-in 395 <small>B.C.</small> See also Xen. Agesilaus, i, 37.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_338"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_338">[338]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iii, 5, 15.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_339"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_339">[339]</a></span> Xen. Anab. vi, 6, 12. Εἰσὶ μὲν γὰρ ἤδη ἐγγὺς αἱ Ἑλληνίδες
-πόλεις· (this was spoken at Kalpê in Bithynia) τῆς δὲ Ἑλλάδος
-Λακεδαιμόνιοι προεστήκασιν· <em class="gesperrt">ἱκανοὶ δέ εἰσι καὶ εἷς ἕκαστος
-Λακεδαιμονίων ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ὅ,τι βούλονται διαπράττεσθαι</em>.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_340"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_340">[340]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iii, 1, 5. Πᾶσαι γὰρ τότε αἱ πόλεις
-ἐπείθοντο, ὅ,τι Λακεδαιμόνιος ἀνὴρ ἐπιτάττοι.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_341"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_341">[341]</a></span> Thucyd. i, 68-120.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_342"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_342">[342]</a></span> Thucyd. iii, 9; iv, 59-85; vi, 76.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_343"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_343">[343]</a></span> See the remarkable speech of Phrynichus in Thucyd. viii, 48, 5, which
-I have before referred to.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_344"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_344">[344]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. ii, 3, 14. Compare the analogous case of Thebes, after
-the Lacedæmonians had got possession of the Kadmeia (v. 2, 34-36).</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_345"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_345">[345]</a></span> Such is the justification offered by the Athenian envoy at Sparta, immediately
-before the Peloponnesian war (Thucyd. i, 75, 76). And it is
-borne out in the main by the narrative of Thucydides himself (i, 99).</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_346"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_346">[346]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iii, 1, 3. πάσης τὴς Ἑλλάδος προστάται, etc.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_347"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_347">[347]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. ii, 4, 28-30.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_348"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_348">[348]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iii, 4, 2.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_349"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_349">[349]</a></span> Plutarch, Lysand. c. 19, 20, 21.
-</p>
-<p>
-The facts, which Plutarch states respecting Lysander, cannot be reconciled
-with the chronology which he adopts. He represents the recall of
-Lysander at the instance of Pharnabazus, with all the facts which preceded
-it, as having occurred prior to the reconstitution of the Athenian democracy,
-which event we know to have taken place in the summer of 403 <small>B.C.</small>
-</p>
-<p>
-Lysander captured Samos in the latter half of 404 <small>B.C.</small>, after the surrender
-of Athens. After the capture of Samos, he came home in triumph, in
-the autumn of 404 <small>B.C.</small> (Xen. Hellen. iii, 3, 9). He was at home, or serving
-in Attica, in the beginning of 403 <small>B.C.</small> (Xen. Hellen. ii, 4, 30).
-</p>
-<p>
-Now when Lysander came home at the end of 404 <small>B.C.</small>, it was his triumphant
-return; it was not a recall provoked by complaints of Pharnabazus.
-Yet there can have been no other return before the restoration of the
-democracy at Athens.
-</p>
-<p>
-The recall of Lysander must have been the termination, not of this command,
-but of a subsequent command. Moreover, it seems to me necessary,
-in order to make room for the facts stated respecting Lysander as well as
-about the dekarchies, that we should suppose him to have been again sent
-out (after his quarrel with Pausanias in Attica) in 403 <small>B.C.</small>, to command
-in Asia. This is nowhere positively stated, but I find nothing to contradict
-it, and I see no other way of making room for the facts stated about Lysander.
-</p>
-<p>
-It is to be noted that Diodorus has a decided error in chronology as to
-the date of the restoration of the Athenian democracy. He places it in
-401 <small>B.C.</small> (Diod. xiv, 33), two years later than its real date, which is 403 <small>B.C.</small>;
-thus lengthening by two years the interval between the surrender of
-Athens and the reëstablishment of the democracy. Plutarch also seems to
-have conceived that interval as much longer than it really was.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_350"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_350">[350]</a></span> Plutarch, Lysand. c. 25.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_351"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_351">[351]</a></span> Plutarch, Lysander, c. 2.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_352"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_352">[352]</a></span> Thucyd. viii, 5, 18-37, 56-58, 84.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_353"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_353">[353]</a></span> Plutarch, Lysander, c. 19, 20; Xen. Hellen. iii, 1, 9.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_354"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_354">[354]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iii, 1, 13.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_355"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_355">[355]</a></span> Xen. Anab. i, 1, 8.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_356"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_356">[356]</a></span> Xen. Anab. ii, 3, 19; ii, 4, 8; Xen. Hellen. iii, 1, 3; iii, 3, 13.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_357"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_357">[357]</a></span> Diodor. xiv, 35.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_358"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_358">[358]</a></span> Diodor. <i>ut sup.</i></p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_359"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_359">[359]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iii, 1, 5-8; Xen. Anab. vii, 8, 8-16.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_360"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_360">[360]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iii, 1, 8; Diodor. xiv, 38.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_361"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_361">[361]</a></span> There is no positive testimony to this; yet such is my belief, as I have
-stated at the close of the last chapter. It is certain that Xenophon was
-serving under Agesilaus in Asia three years after this time; the only matter
-left for conjecture is, at what precise moment he went out the second
-time. The marked improvement in the Cyreian soldiers, is one reason for
-the statement in the text; another reason is, the great detail with which
-the military operations of Derkyllidas are described, rendering it probable
-that the narrative is from an eye-witness.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_362"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_362">[362]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iii, 1, 8; Ephorus, ap. Athenæ. xi, p. 500.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_363"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_363">[363]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iii, 1, 9. ἐστάθη τὴν ἀσπίδα ἔχων.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_364"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_364">[364]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iii, 1, 10; iii, 2, 28.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_365"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_365">[365]</a></span> See the description of the satrapy of Cyrus (Xenoph. Anab. i, 9, 19,
-21, 22). In the main, this division and subdivision of the entire empire
-into revenue-districts, each held by a nominee responsible for payment of
-the rent or tribute, to the government or to some higher officer of the government—is
-the system prevalent throughout a large portion of Asia to
-the present day.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_366"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_366">[366]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iii, 1, 10. Ἀναζεύξασα τὸν στόλον, καὶ
-χρήματα λαβοῦσα, ὥστε καὶ αὐτῷ Φαρναβάζῳ δοῦναι, καὶ ταῖς
-παλλακίσιν αὐτοῦ χαρίσασθαι καὶ τοῖς δυναμένοις μάλιστα παρὰ
-Φαρναβάζῳ, ἐπορεύετο.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_367"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_367">[367]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iii, 1, 15.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_368"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_368">[368]</a></span> Herod. viii, 69.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_369"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_369">[369]</a></span> Such is the emphatic language of Xenophon (Hellen. iii,
-1, 14)—Μειδίας, θυγατρὸς ἀνὴρ αὐτῆς ὢν, ἀναπτερωθεὶς ὑπό τινων, ὡς
-αἰσχρὸν εἴη, γυναῖκα μὲν ἄρχειν, αὐτὸν δ᾽ ἰδιώτην εἶναι, <em class="gesperrt">τοὺς
-μὲν ἄλλους μάλα φυλαττομένης αὐτῆς, ὥσπερ ἐν τυραννίδι προσήκει</em>,
-ἐκείνῳ δὲ πιστευούσης καὶ ἀσπαζομένης, ὥσπερ ἂν γυνὴ γαμβρὸν
-ἀσπάζοιτο,—εἰσελθὼν ἀποπνῖξαι αὐτὴν λέγεται.
-</p>
-<p>
-For the illustration of this habitual insecurity in which the Grecian despot
-lived, see the dialogue of Xenophon called Hieron (i, 12; ii, 8-10; vii,
-10). He particularly dwells upon the multitude of family crimes which
-stained the houses of the Grecian despots; murders by fathers, sons, brothers,
-wives, etc. (iii, 8).</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_370"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_370">[370]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iii, 1, 13.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_371"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_371">[371]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iii, 1, 18; Diodor. xiv, 38.
-</p>
-<p>
-The reader will remark here how Xenophon shapes the narrative in such
-a manner as to inculcate the pious duty in a general of obeying the warnings
-furnished by the sacrifice,—either for action or for inaction. I have
-already noticed (in my preceding chapters) how often he does this in the
-Anabasis.
-</p>
-<p>
-Such an inference is never (I believe) to be found suggested in Thucydides.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_372"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_372">[372]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iii, 1, 20-23.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_373"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_373">[373]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iii, 1, 26. Εἶπέ μοι, ἔφη, Μανία δὲ τίνος ἦν;
-Οἱ δὲ πάντες εἶπον, ὅτι Φαρναβάζου. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τὰ ἐκείνης, ἔφη,
-Φαρναβάζου; Μάλιστα, ἔφασαν. Ἡμέτερ᾽ ἂν εἴη, ἔφη, ἐπεὶ κρατοῦμεν·
-πολέμιος γὰρ ἡμῖν Φαρνάβαζος.
-</p>
-<p>
-Two points are remarkable here. 1. The manner in which Mania, the
-administratrix of a large district, with a prodigious treasure and a large
-army in pay, is treated as <i>belonging</i> to Pharnabazus—as the servant or
-slave of Pharnabazus. 2. The distinction here taken between public property
-and private property, in reference to the laws of war and the rights
-of the conqueror. Derkyllidas lays claim to that which had belonged to
-Mania (or to Pharnabazus); but <i>not</i> to that which had belonged to Meidias.
-</p>
-<p>
-According to the modern rules of international law, this distinction is
-one allowed and respected, everywhere except at sea. But in the ancient
-world, it by no means stood out so clearly or prominently; and the observance
-of it here deserves notice.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_374"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_374">[374]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iii, 1, 28.
-</p>
-<p>
-Thus finishes the interesting narrative about Mania, Meidias, and Derkyllidas.
-The abundance of detail, and the dramatic manner, in which
-Xenophon has worked it out, impress me with a belief that he was actually
-present at the scene.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_375"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_375">[375]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iii, 2, 1. νομίζων τὴν Αἰολίδα
-ἐπιτετειχίσθαι τῇ ἑαυτοῦ οἰκήσει Φρυγίᾳ.
-</p>
-<p>
-The word ἐπιτειχίζειν is capital and significant, in Grecian warfare.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_376"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_376">[376]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iii, 2, 2-5.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_377"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_377">[377]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iii, 2, 4.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_378"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_378">[378]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iii, 2, 6, 7.
-</p>
-<p>
-Morus supposes (I think, with much probability) that ὁ τῶν Κυρείων
-προεστηκὼς here means Xenophon himself.
-</p>
-<p>
-<i>He</i> could not with propriety advert to the fact that he himself had not
-been with the army during the year of Thimbron.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_379"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_379">[379]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iii, 2, 9. ἔπεμψεν αὐτοὺς ἀπ᾽ <em class="gesperrt">Ἐφέσου</em>
-διὰ τῶν Ἑλληνίδων πόλεων, ἡδόμενος ὅτι ἔμελλον ὄψεσθαι τὰς πόλεις ἐν
-εἰρήνῃ εὐδαιμονικῶς διαγούσας. I cannot but think that we ought here
-to read ἐπ᾽ Ἐφέσου, not ἀπ᾽ Ἐφέσου; or else ἀπὸ Λαμψάκου.
-</p>
-<p>
-It was at Lampsakus that this interview and conversation between Derkyllidas
-and the commissioners took place. The commissioners were to
-be sent from Lampsakus to Ephesus through the Grecian cities.
-</p>
-<p>
-The expression ἐν εἰρήνῃ εὐδαιμονικῶς διαγούσας has reference to the
-foreign relations of the cities, and to their exemption from annoyance by
-Persian arms,—without implying any internal freedom or good condition.
-There were Lacedæmonian harmosts in most of them, and dekarchies half
-broken up or modified in many; see the subsequent passages (iii, 2, 20; iii,
-4, 7; iv, 8, 1)</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_380"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_380">[380]</a></span> Compare Xen. Hellen. iv, 2, 5.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_381"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_381">[381]</a></span> Herodot. vi, 36; Plutarch, Perikles, c. 19; Isokrates, Or. v, (Philipp.)
-s. 7.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_382"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_382">[382]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iii, 2, 10; iv, 8, 5. Diodor. xiv, 38.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_383"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_383">[383]</a></span> Diodor. xiii, 65.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_384"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_384">[384]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iii, 2, 11; Isokrates, Or. iv. (Panegyr.) s. 167.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_385"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_385">[385]</a></span> Diodor. xiv, 39.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_386"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_386">[386]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iii, 2, 18.
-</p>
-<p>
-In the Anabasis (ii, 3, 3) Xenophon mentions the like care on the part
-of Klearchus, to have the best armed and most imposing soldiers around
-him, when he went to his interview with Tissaphernes.
-</p>
-<p>
-Xenophon gladly avails himself of the opportunity, to pay an indirect
-compliment to the Cyreian army.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_387"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_387">[387]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iii, 2, 19; Diodor. xiv, 39.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_388"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_388">[388]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iii, 2, 20.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_389"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_389">[389]</a></span> Xenoph. Hellen. iii, 5, 5; Plutarch, Lysand. c. 27; Justin, v, 10.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_390"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_390">[390]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. ii, 4, 30.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_391"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_391">[391]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iii, 5, 12. Κορινθίους δὲ καὶ Ἄρκαδας
-καὶ Ἀχαίους τί φῶμεν; οἱ ἐν μὲν τῷ πρὸς ὑμᾶς (it is the Theban
-envoys who are addressing the public assembly at Athens) πολέμῳ
-<em class="gesperrt">μάλα λιπαρούμενοι ὑπ᾽ ἐκείνων</em> (the Lacedæmonians), πάντων
-καὶ πόνων καὶ κινδύνων καὶ δαπανημάτων μετεῖχον· ἐπεὶ δ᾽ ἔπραξαν
-ἃ ἐβούλοντο οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, ποίας ἢ ἀρχῆς ἢ τιμῆς ἢ ποίων
-χρημάτων μεταδεδώκασιν αὐτοῖς; ἀλλὰ τοὺς μὲν εἱλώτας ἁρμοστὰς
-καθιστάναι, τῶν δὲ ξυμμάχων ἐλευθέρων ὄντων, ἐπεὶ εὐτύχησαν,
-δεσπόται ἀναπεφῄνασιν.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_392"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_392">[392]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iii, 2, 22.
-</p>
-<p>
-Τούτων δ᾽ ὕστερον, καὶ Ἄγιδος πεμφθέντος θῦσαι τῷ Διῒ κατὰ μαντείαν
-τινὰ, ἐκώλυον οἱ Ἠλεῖοι μὴ προσεύχεσθαι νίκην πολέμου, λέγοντες,
-ὡς καὶ τὸ ἀρχαῖον εἴη οὕτω νόμιμον, μὴ χρηστηριάζεσθαι τοὺς Ἕλληνας
-ἐφ᾽ Ἑλλήνων πολέμῳ· ὥστε ἄθυτος ἀπῆλθεν.
-</p>
-<p>
-This canon seems not unnatural, for one of the greatest Pan-hellenic
-temples and establishments. Yet it was not constantly observed at Olympia
-(compare another example—Xen. Hellen. iv, 7, 2); nor yet at Delphi,
-which was not less Pan-hellenic than Olympia (see Thucyd. i, 118). We
-are therefore led to imagine that it was a canon which the Eleians invoked
-only when they were prompted by some special sentiment or aversion.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_393"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_393">[393]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iii, 2, 23. Ἐκ τούτων οὖν πάντων ὀργιζομένοις,
-ἔδοξε τοῖς ἐφόροις καὶ τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ, <em class="gesperrt">σωφρονίσαι αὐτούς</em>.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_394"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_394">[394]</a></span> Diodorus (xiv, 17) mentions this demand for the arrears; which appears
-very probable. It is not directly noticed by Xenophon, who however
-mentions (see the passage cited in the note of page preceding) the general
-assessment levied by Sparta upon all her Peloponnesian allies during the
-war.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_395"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_395">[395]</a></span> Diodor. xiv, 17.
-</p>
-<p>
-Diodorus introduces in these transactions King Pausanias, not King Agis,
-as the acting person.
-</p>
-<p>
-Pausanias states (iii, 8, 2) that the Eleians, in returning a negative answer
-to the requisition of Sparta, added that they would enfranchise their Periœki,
-when they saw Sparta enfranchise her own. This answer appears to
-me highly improbable, under the existing circumstances of Sparta and her
-relations to the other Grecian states. Allusion to the relations between
-Sparta and her Periœki was a novelty, even in 371 <small>B.C.</small>, at the congress
-which preceded the battle of Leuktra.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_396"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_396">[396]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iii, 2, 23, 26; Diodor. xiv, 17.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_397"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_397">[397]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iii, 2, 27; Pausanias, iii, 8, 2; v, 4, 5.
-</p>
-<p>
-The words of Xenophon are not very clear—Βουλόμενοι δὲ οἱ περὶ
-Ξενίαν τὸν λεγόμενον μεδίμνῳ ἀπομετρήσασθαι τὸ παρὰ τοῦ πατρὸς
-ἀργύριον (τὴν πόλιν) δι᾽ αὐτῶν προσχωρῆσαι Λακεδαιμονίοις,
-ἐκπεσόντες ἐξ οἰκίας ξίφη ἔχοντες σφαγὰς ποιοῦσι, καὶ ἄλλους
-τέ τινας κτείνουσι, καὶ ὅμοιόν τινα Θρασυδαίῳ ἀποκτείναντες,
-τῷ τοῦ δήμου προστάτῃ, ᾤοντο Θρασυδαῖον ἀπεκτονέναι.... Ὁ δὲ
-Θρασυδαῖος ἔτι καθεύδων ἐτύγχανεν, οὗπερ ἐμεθύσθη.
-</p>
-<p>
-Both the words and the narrative are here very obscure. It seems as if a
-sentence had dropped out, when we come suddenly upon the mention of
-the drunken state of Thrasydæus, without having before been told of any
-circumstance either leading to or implying this condition.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_398"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_398">[398]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iii, 2, 28.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_399"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_399">[399]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iii, 2, 30. There is something perplexing in Xenophon’s
-description of the Triphylian townships which the Eleians surrendered.
-First, he does not name Lepreum or Makistus, both of which nevertheless
-had joined Agis on his invasion, and were the most important places in
-Triphylia (iii, 2, 25). Next, he names Letrini, Amphidoli, and Marganeis,
-as Triphylian; which yet were on the north of the Alpheius, and are
-elsewhere distinguished from Triphylian. I incline to believe that the
-words in his text, καὶ τὰς Τριφυλίδας πόλεις ἀφεῖναι, must be taken to mean
-Lepreum and Makistus, perhaps with some other places which we do not
-know; but that a καὶ after ἀφεῖναι, has fallen out of the text, and that the
-cities, whose names follow, are to be taken as <i>not</i> Triphylian. Phrixa and
-Epitalium were both south, but only just south, of the Alpheius; they were
-not on the borders of Triphylia,—and it seems doubtful whether they were
-properly Triphylian.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_400"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_400">[400]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iii, 2, 30; Diodor. xiv, 34; Pausan. iii, 8, 2.
-</p>
-<p>
-This war between Sparta and Elis reaches over three different years; it
-began in the first, occupied the whole of the second, and was finished in
-the third. Which years these three were (out of the seven which separate
-<small>B.C.</small> 403-396), critics have not been unanimous.
-</p>
-<p>
-Following the chronology of Diodorus, who places the beginning of the
-war in 402 <small>B.C.</small>, I differ from Mr. Clinton, who places it in 401 <small>B.C.</small> (Fasti
-Hellen. ad ann.), and from Sievers (Geschichte von Griechenland bis zur
-Schlacht von Mantinea, p. 382), who places it in 398 <small>B.C.</small>
-</p>
-<p>
-According to Mr. Clinton’s view, the principal year of the war would
-have been 400 <small>B.C.</small>, the year of the Olympic festival. But surely, had such
-been the fact, the coincidence of war in the country with the Olympic festival,
-must have raised so many complications, and acted so powerfully on
-the sentiments of all parties, as to be specifically mentioned. In my judgment,
-the war was brought to a close in the early part of 400 <small>B.C.</small>, before
-the time of the Olympic festival arrived. Probably the Eleians were anxious,
-on this very ground, to bring it to a close before the festival did arrive.
-</p>
-<p>
-Sievers, in his discussion of the point, admits that the date assigned by
-Diodorus to the Eleian war, squares both with the date which Diodorus
-gives for the death of Agis, and with that which Plutarch states about the
-duration of the reign of Agesilaus,—better than the chronology which he
-himself (Sievers) prefers. He founds his conclusion on Xenophon, Hell.
-iii, 2, 21. Τούτων δὲ πραττομένων ἐν τῇ Ἀσίᾳ ὑπὸ Δερκυλλίδα, Λακεδαιμόνιοι
-κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον πάλαι ὀργιζόμενοι τοῖς Ἠλείοις, etc.
-</p>
-<p>
-This passage is certainly of some weight; yet I think in the present case
-it is not to be pressed with rigid accuracy as to date. The whole third
-Book down to these very words, has been occupied entirely with the course
-of Asiatic affairs. Not a single proceeding of the Lacedæmonians in Peloponnesus,
-since the amnesty at Athens, has yet been mentioned. The command
-of Derkyllidas included only the last portion of the Asiatic exploits,
-and Xenophon has here loosely referred to it as if it comprehended the
-whole. Sievers moreover compresses the whole Eleian war into one year
-and a fraction; an interval, shorter, I think, than that which is implied in
-the statements of Xenophon.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_401"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_401">[401]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iii, 2, 31.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_402"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_402">[402]</a></span> Diodor. xiv, 34; Pausan. iv, 26, 2. 2.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_403"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_403">[403]</a></span> Plutarch, Lysand. c. 17. Compare Xen. Rep. Laced. vii, 6.
-</p>
-<p>
-Both Ephorus and Theopompus recounted the opposition to the introduction
-of gold and silver into Sparta, each mentioning the name of one of
-the ephors as taking the lead in it.
-</p>
-<p>
-There was a considerable body of ancient sentiment, and that too among
-high-minded and intelligent men, which regarded gold and silver as a cause
-of mischief and corruption, and of which the stanza of Horace (Od. iii, 3)
-is an echo:—
-</p>
-<div class="poetry-container">
-  <div class="poetry">
-    <p>Aurum irrepertum, et sic melius situm</p>
-    <p>Cum terra celat, spernere fortior</p>
-    <p class="i1">Quam cogere humanos in usus,</p>
-    <p class="i2">Omne sacrum rapiente dextrâ.</p>
-  </div>
-</div>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_404"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_404">[404]</a></span> Aristotel. Politic. ii, 6, 23.
-</p>
-<p>
-Ἀποβέβηκε δὲ τοὐνάντιον τῷ νομοθέτῃ τοῦ συμφέροντος· τὴν μὲν γὰρ
-πόλιν πεποίηκεν ἀχρήματον, τοὺς δ᾽ ἰδιώτας φιλοχρημάτους.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_405"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_405">[405]</a></span> Thucyd. i, 80. ἀλλὰ πολλῷ ἔτι πλέον τούτου (χρημάτων)
-ἐλλείπομεν, καὶ οὔτε ἐν κοινῷ ἔχομεν, οὔτε ἑτοίμως ἐκ τῶν ἰδίων φέρομεν.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_406"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_406">[406]</a></span> Aristotel. Polit. ii, 6, 23. Φαύλως δ᾽ ἔχει καὶ περὶ
-τὰ κοινὰ κρήματα τοῖς Σπαρτιάταις· οὔτε γὰρ ἐν τῷ κοινῷ τῆς πόλεώς
-ἐστιν οὐδὲν, πολέμους μεγάλους ἀναγκαζομένους φέρειν· εἰσφέρουσί
-τε κακῶς, etc.
-</p>
-<p>
-Contrast what Plato says in his dialogue of Alkibiades, i, c. 39, p. 122 E.
-about the great quantity of gold and silver then at Sparta. The dialogue
-must bear date at some period between 400-371 <small>B.C.</small></p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_407"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_407">[407]</a></span> See the speeches of the Corinthian envoys and of King Archidamus
-at Sparta (Thucyd. i, 70-84; compare also viii, 24-96).</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_408"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_408">[408]</a></span> See the criticisms upon Sparta, about 395 <small>B.C.</small> and 372 <small>B.C.</small> (Xenoph.
-Hellen. iii, 5, 11-15; vi, 3, 8-11).</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_409"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_409">[409]</a></span> Thucyd. i, 77. Ἄμικτα γὰρ τά τε καθ᾽ ὑμᾶς αὐτοὺς
-νόμιμα τοῖς ἄλλοις ἔχετε, etc. About the ξενηλασίαι of the
-Spartans—see the speech of Perikles in Thucyd. i, 138.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_410"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_410">[410]</a></span> Aristotel. Politic. ii, 6, 10.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_411"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_411">[411]</a></span> Aristot. Politic. ii, 6, 16-18; ii, 7, 3.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_412"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_412">[412]</a></span> Isokrates, de Pace, s. 118-127.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_413"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_413">[413]</a></span> Xen. de Republ. Laced. c. 14.
-</p>
-<p>
-Οἶδα γὰρ πρότερον μὲν Λακεδαιμονίους αἱρουμένους, οἴκοι τὰ μέτρια
-ἔχοντας ἀλλήλοις συνεῖναι μᾶλλον, ἢ ἁρμόζοντας ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι καὶ
-κολακευομένους διαφθείρεσθαι. Καὶ πρόσθεν μὲν οἶδα αὐτοὺς
-φοβουμένους, χρύσιον ἔχοντας φαίνεσθαι· νῦν δ᾽ ἔστιν οὓς καὶ
-καλλωπιζομένους ἐπὶ τῷ κεκτῆσθαι. Ἐπίσταμαι δὲ καὶ πρόσθεν τούτου
-ἕνεκα ξενηλασίας γιγνομένας, καὶ ἀποδημεῖν οὐκ ἐξόν, ὅπως μὴ
-ῥᾳδιουργίας οἱ πολῖται ἀπὸ τῶν ξένων ἐμπίμπλαιντο· νῦν δ᾽ ἐπίσταμαι
-τοὺς δοκοῦντας πρώτους εἶναι ἐσπουδακότας ὡς μηδεπότε παύωνται
-ἁρμόζοντες ἐπὶ ξένης. Καὶ ἦν μὲν, ὅτε ἐπεμελοῦντο, ὅπως ἄξιοι εἶεν
-ἡγεῖσθαι· νῦν δὲ πολὺ μᾶλλον πραγματεύονται, ὅπως ἄρξουσιν, ἢ ὅπως
-ἄξιοι τούτου ἔσονται. Τοιγαροῦν οἱ Ἕλληνες πρότερον μὲν ἰόντες εἰς
-Λακεδαίμονα ἐδέοντο αὐτῶν, ἡγεῖσθαι ἐπὶ τοὺς δοκοῦντας ἀδικεῖν· νῦν
-δὲ πολλοὶ παρακαλοῦσιν ἀλλήλους <em class="gesperrt">ἐπὶ τὸ διακωλύειν ἄρξαι πάλιν
-αὐτούς</em>. Οὐδὲν μέντοι δεῖ θαυμάζειν τούτων τῶν ἐπιψόγων αὐτοῖς
-γιγνομένων, ἐπειδὴ φανεροί εἰσιν οὔτε τῷ θεῷ πειθόμενοι οὔτε τοῖς
-Λυκούργου νόμοις.
-</p>
-<p>
-The expression, “taking measures to hinder the Lacedæmonians from
-again exercising empire,”—marks this treatise as probably composed some
-time between their naval defeat at Knidus, and their land-defeat at Leuktra.
-The former put an end to their maritime empire,—the latter excluded
-them from all possibility of recovering it; but during the interval between
-the two, such recovery was by no means impossible.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_414"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_414">[414]</a></span> The Athenian envoy at Melos says,—Λακεδαιμόνιοι γὰρ πρὸς
-μὲν σφᾶς αὐτοὺς καὶ τὰ ἐπιχώρια νόμιμα, πλεῖστα ἀρετῇ χρῶνται· πρὸς δὲ
-τοὺς ἀλλους—ἐπιφανέστατα ὧν ἴσμεν τὰ μὲν ἡδέα καλὰ νομίζουσι, τὰ δὲ
-ξυμφέροντα δίκαια (Thucyd. v. 105). A judgment almost exactly the
-same, is pronounced by Polybius (vi, 48).</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_415"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_415">[415]</a></span> Thucyd. i, 69, 70, 71, 84. ἀρχαιότροπα ὑμῶν τὰ
-ἐπιτηδεύματα—ἄοκνοι πρὸς ὑμᾶς μελλητὰς καὶ ἀποδημηταὶ πρὸς
-ἐνδημοτάτους: also viii, 24.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_416"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_416">[416]</a></span> Σπάρτην δαμασίμβροτον (Simonides ap. Plutarch. Agesilaum, c. 1).</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_417"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_417">[417]</a></span> See an expression of Aristotle (Polit. ii, 6, 22) about the function of
-admiral among the Lacedæmonians,—ἐπὶ γὰρ τοῖς βασιλεῦσιν, οὖσι
-στρατηγοῖς ἀϊδίοις, ἡ ναυαρχία σχεδόν ἑτέρα βασιλεία καθέστηκε.
-</p>
-<p>
-This reflection,—which Aristotle intimates that he has borrowed from
-some one else, though without saying from whom,—must in all probability
-have been founded upon the case of Lysander; for never after Lysander,
-was there any Lacedæmonian admiral enjoying a power which could by
-possibility be termed exorbitant or dangerous. We know that during the
-later years of the Peloponnesian war, much censure was cast upon the Lacedæmonian
-practice of annually changing the admiral (Xen. Hellen. i, 6, 4).
-</p>
-<p>
-The Lacedæmonians seem to have been impressed with these criticisms,
-for in the year 395 <small>B.C.</small> (the year before the battle of Knidus) they conferred
-upon King Agesilaus, who was then commanding the land army in Asia
-Minor, the command of the fleet also—in order to secure unity of operations.
-This had never been done before (Xen. Hellen. iii, 4, 28).</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_418"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_418">[418]</a></span> Plutarch, Lysand. c. 24. Perhaps he may have been simply a member
-of the tribe called Hylleis, who, probably, called themselves Herakleids.
-Some affirmed that Lysander wished to cause the kings to be elected out
-of all the Spartans, not simply out of the Herakleids. This is less probable.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_419"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_419">[419]</a></span> Duris ap. Athenæum, xv, p. 696.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_420"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_420">[420]</a></span> Plutarch, Lysand. c. 18; Plutarch, Agesil. c. 20.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_421"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_421">[421]</a></span> Plutarch, Lysand. c. 17.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_422"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_422">[422]</a></span> Aristotle (Polit. v, 1, 5) represents justly the schemes of Lysander as
-going πρὸς τὸ μέρος τι κινῆσαι τῆς πολιτείας· οἷον ἀρχήν τινα καταστῆσαι ἢ ἀνελεῖν.
-The Spartan kingship is here regarded as ἀρχή τις—one office
-of state, among others. But Aristotle regards Lysander as having intended
-to destroy the kingship—καταλῦσαι τὴν βασιλείαν—which does not appear
-to have been the fact. The plan of Lysander was to retain the kingship,
-but to render it elective instead of hereditary. He wished to place the
-Spartan kingship substantially on the same footing, as that on which the
-office of the kings or suffetes of Carthage stood; who were not hereditary,
-nor confined to members of the same family or Gens, but chosen out of the
-principal families or Gentes. Aristotle, while comparing the βασιλεῖς at
-Sparta with those at Carthage, as being generally analogous, pronounces in
-favor of the Carthaginian election as better than the Spartan hereditary
-transmission. (Arist. Polit. ii, 8, 2.)</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_423"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_423">[423]</a></span> Thucyd. v, 63; Xen. Hellen. iii, 5, 25; iv, 2, 1.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_424"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_424">[424]</a></span> Diodor. xiv, 13; Cicero, de Divinat. i, 43, 96; Cornel. Nepos, Lysand. c. 3.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_425"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_425">[425]</a></span> Plutarch, Lysand. c. 25, from Ephorus. Compare Herodot. vi, 66;
-Thucyd. v, 12.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_426"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_426">[426]</a></span> Plutarch, Lysand. c. 26.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_427"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_427">[427]</a></span> Tacit. Histor. i, 10. “Cui expeditius fuerit tradere imperium, quam
-obtinere.”
-</p>
-<p>
-The general fact of the conspiracy of Lysander to open for himself a
-way to the throne, appears to rest on very sufficient testimony,—that of
-Ephorus; to whom perhaps the words φασί τινες in Aristotle may allude,
-where he mentions this conspiracy as having been narrated (Polit. v, 1, 5).
-But Plutarch, as well as K. O. Müller (Hist. of Dorians, iv, 9, 5) and others,
-erroneously represent the intrigues with the oracle as being resorted to after
-Lysander returned from accompanying Agesilaus to Asia; which is certainly
-impossible, since Lysander accompanied Agesilaus out, in the spring
-of 396 <small>B.C.</small>—did not return to Greece until the spring of 395 <small>B.C.</small>—and
-was then employed, with an interval not greater than four or five months,
-on that expedition against Bœotia wherein he was slain.
-</p>
-<p>
-The tampering of Lysander with the oracle must undoubtedly have
-taken place prior to the death of Agis,—at some time between 403 <small>B.C.</small>
-and 399 <small>B.C.</small> The humiliation which he received in 396 <small>B.C.</small> from Agesilaus
-might indeed have led him to revolve in his mind the renewal of his
-former plans; but he can have had no time to do anything towards them.
-Aristotle (Polit. v, 6, 2) alludes to the humiliation of Lysander by the
-kings as an example of incidents <i>tending</i> to raise disturbance in an aristocratical
-government; but this humiliation, probably, alludes to the manner
-in which he was thwarted in Attica by Pausanias in 403 <small>B.C.</small>—which proceeding
-is ascribed by Plutarch to both kings, as well as to their jealousy of
-Lysander (see Plutarch, Lysand. c. 21)—not to the treatment of Lysander
-by Agesilaus in 396 <small>B.C.</small> The mission of Lysander to the despot Dionysius
-at Syracuse (Plutarch, Lysand. c. 2) must also have taken place prior
-to the death of Agis in 399 <small>B.C.</small>; whether before or after the failure of the
-stratagem at Delphi, is uncertain; perhaps after it.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_428"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_428">[428]</a></span> The age of Leotychides is approximately marked by the date of the
-presence of Alkibiades at Sparta 414-413 <small>B.C.</small> The mere rumor, true or
-false, that this young man was the son of Alkibiades, may be held sufficient
-as chronological evidence to certify his age.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_429"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_429">[429]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iii, 3, 2; Pausanias, iii, 8, 4; Plutarch, Agesilaus, c. 3.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_430"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_430">[430]</a></span> Herodot. v, 66.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_431"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_431">[431]</a></span> I confess I do not understand how Xenophon can say, in his Agesilaus,
-i, 6, Ἀγησίλαος τοίνυν ἔτι μὲν νέος ὢν ἔτυχε τῆς βασιλείας. For he himself
-says (ii, 28), and it seems well established, that Agesilaus died at the age of
-above 80 (Plutarch, Agesil. c. 40); and his death must have been about 360
-<small>B.C.</small></p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_432"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_432">[432]</a></span> Plutarch, Agesilaus, c. 2-5; Xenoph. Agesil. vii, 3; Plutarch, Apophth.
-Laconic. p. 212 D.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_433"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_433">[433]</a></span> Plutarch, Agesil. c. 2; Xenoph. Agesil. viii, 1.
-</p>
-<p>
-It appears that the mother of Agesilaus was a very small woman, and
-that Archidamus had incurred the censure of the ephors, on that especial
-ground, for marrying her.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_434"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_434">[434]</a></span> Xenoph. Agesil. xi, 7; Plutarch, Agesil. c. 2.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_435"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_435">[435]</a></span> Plutarch, Agesil. c. 2.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_436"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_436">[436]</a></span> Plutarch, Lysand. c. 2.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_437"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_437">[437]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iii, 3, 1.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_438"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_438">[438]</a></span> Plutarch, Lysand. c. 22; Plutarch, Agesil. c. 3; Xen. Hellen. iii, 3, 2;
-Xen. Agesil. 1, 5—κρίνασα ἡ πόλις ἀνεπικλητότερον εἶναι Ἀγησίλαον καὶ τῷ γένει καὶ τῇ ἀρετῇ, etc.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_439"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_439">[439]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iii, 3, 2. This statement contradicts the talk imputed to
-Timæa by Duris (Plutarch, Agesil. c. 3; Plutarch, Alkibiad. c. 23).</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_440"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_440">[440]</a></span> Herodot. iv, 161. Διεδέξατο δὲ τὴν βασιληΐην τοῦ Ἀρκεσίλεω
-ὁ παῖς Βάττος, χωλός τε ἐὼν καὶ οὐκ ἀρτίπους. Οἱ δὲ Κυρηναῖοι <em class="gesperrt">πρὸς
-τὴν καταλαβοῦσαν συμφορὴν</em> ἔπεμπον ἐς Δελφοὺς, ἐπειρησομένους ὅντινα
-τρόπον καταστησάμενοι κάλλιστα ἂν οἰκέοιεν.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_441"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_441">[441]</a></span> Plutarch, Lysand. c. 22; Plutarch, Agesil. c. 3; Pausanias, iii, 8, 5.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_442"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_442">[442]</a></span> Diodor. xi, 50.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_443"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_443">[443]</a></span> Herodot. vii, 143.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_444"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_444">[444]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iii, 3, 3. ὡς οὐκ οἴοιτο τὸν θεὸν τοῦτο κελεύειν
-φυλάξασθαι, <em class="gesperrt">μὴ προσπταίσας τις χωλεύσῃ</em>, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον, μὴ οὐκ ὢν τοῦ
-γένους βασιλεύσῃ.
-</p>
-<p>
-Congenital lameness would be regarded as a mark of divine displeasure,
-and therefore a disqualification from the throne, as in the case of Battus
-of Kyrênê above noticed. But the words χωλὴ βασίλεια were general
-enough to cover both the cases,—superinduced as well as congenital lameness.
-It is upon this that Lysander founds his inference—that the god
-did not mean to allude to bodily lameness at all.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_445"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_445">[445]</a></span> Pausanias, iii, 8, 5; Plutarch, Agesil. c. 3; Plutarch, Lysand. c. 22;
-Justin, vi, 2.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_446"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_446">[446]</a></span></p>
-<div class="poetry-container" style="margin-top: -2em;">
-  <div class="poetry">
-    <p>Ἴδ᾽ οἷον, ὦ παῖδες, προσέμιξεν ἄφαρ</p>
-    <p>Τοὔπος τὸ θεοπρόπον ἡμῖν</p>
-    <p>Τῆς παλαιφάτου προνοίας,</p>
-    <p>Ὅ τ᾽ ἔλακεν, etc.</p>
-  </div>
-</div>
-<p>
-This is a splendid chorus of the Trachiniæ of Sophokles (822) proclaiming
-their sentiments on the awful death of Hêraklês, in the tunic of Nessus,
-which has just been announced as about to happen.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_447"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_447">[447]</a></span> Plutarch, Agesil. c. 30; Plutarch, Compar. Agesil. and Pomp. c. 1.
-Ἀγησίλαος δὲ τὴν βασιλείαν ἔδοξε λαβεῖν, οὔτε τὰ πρὸς θεοὺς ἄμεμπτος,
-οὔτε τὰ πρὸς ἀνθρώπους, κρίνας νοθείας Λεωτυχίδην, ὃν υἱὸν αὑτοῦ ἀπέδειξεν
-ὁ ἀδελφὸς γνήσιον, τὸν δὲ χρησμὸν κατειρωνευσάμενος τὸν περὶ τῆς χωλότητος.
-Again, ib. c. 2. δι᾽ Ἀγησίλαον ἐπεσκότησε τῷ χρησμῷ Λύσανδρος.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_448"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_448">[448]</a></span> Xen. Agesil. iv, 5; Plutarch, Ages. c. 4.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_449"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_449">[449]</a></span> Plutarch, Agesil. c. 4.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_450"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_450">[450]</a></span> Xen. Agesil. vii, 2.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_451"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_451">[451]</a></span> Isokrates, Orat. v, (Philipp.) s. 100; Plutarch, Agesilaus, c. 3, 13-23;
-Plutarch, Apophthegm. Laconica, p. 209 F—212 D.
-</p>
-<p>
-See the incident alluded to by Theopompus ap. Athenæum, xiii, p.
-609.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_452"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_452">[452]</a></span> Isokrates (Orat. v, <i>ut sup.</i>) makes a remark in substance the same.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_453"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_453">[453]</a></span> Xenoph. Hellen. iii, 3, 4.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_454"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_454">[454]</a></span> See Vol. II, Ch. vi, p. 359 of this History.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_455"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_455">[455]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iii, 3, 5. Οὗτος (Kinadon) δ᾽ ἦν νεανίσκος
-καὶ τὸ εἶδος καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν εὔρωστος, οὐ μέντοι τῶν ὁμοίων.
-</p>
-<p>
-The meaning of the term Οἱ ὅμοιοι fluctuates in Xenophon; it sometimes,
-as here, is used to signify the privileged Peers—again De Repub.
-Laced. xiii, 1; and Anab. iv, 6, 14. Sometimes again it is used agreeably
-to the Lykurgean theory; whereby every citizen, who rigorously discharged
-his duty in the public drill, belonged to the number (De Rep. Lac. x, 7).
-</p>
-<p>
-There was a variance between the theory and the practice.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_456"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_456">[456]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iii, 3, 9. Ὑπηρετήκει δὲ καὶ ἄλλ᾽ ἤδη
-ὁ Κινάδων τοῖς Ἐφόροις τοιαῦτα. iii, 3, 7. Οἱ συντεταγμένοι ἡμῶν
-(Kinadon says) αὐτοὶ ὅπλα κεκτήμεθα.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_457"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_457">[457]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iii, 3, 11. μηδενὸς ἥττων εἶναι τῶν ἐν Λακεδαίμονι—was
-the declaration of Kinadon when seized and questioned by the ephors concerning
-his purposes. Substantially it coincides with Aristotle (Polit. v, 6,
-2)—ἢ ὅταν ἀνδρώδης τις ὢν μὴ μετέχῃ τῶν τιμῶν, οἷον Κινάδων ὁ τὴν ἐπ᾽ Ἀγησιλάου
-συστήσας ἐπίθεσιν ἐπὶ τοὺς Σπαρτιάτας.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_458"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_458">[458]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iii, 3, 5.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_459"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_459">[459]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iii, 3, 6. Αὐτοὶ μέντοι πᾶσιν ἔφασαν συνειδέναι
-καὶ εἵλωσι καὶ νεοδαμώδεσι, καὶ τοῖς ὑπομείοσι καὶ τοῖς περιοίκοις· ὅπου
-γὰρ ἐν τούτοις τις λόγος γένοιτο περὶ Σπαρτιατῶν, οὐδένα δύνασθαι κρύπτειν
-τὸ μὴ οὐχ ἡδέως ἂν <em class="gesperrt">καὶ ὠμῶν ἐσθίειν αὐτῶν</em>.
-</p>
-<p>
-The expression is Homeric—ὠμὸν βεβρώθοις Πρίαμον, etc. (Iliad. iv, 35).
-The Greeks did not think themselves obliged to restrain the full expression
-of vindictive feeling. The poet Theognis wishes, “that he may one day
-come to drink the blood of those who had ill-used him” (v. 349 Gaisf.).</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_460"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_460">[460]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iii, 3, 7. ὅτι ἐπιδημεῖν οἱ παρηγγελμένον εἴη.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_461"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_461">[461]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iii, 3, 8. Ἀγαγεῖν δὲ ἐκέλευον καὶ τὴν γυναῖκα,
-ἣ καλλίστη μὲν ἐλέγετο αὐτόθι εἶναι, λυμαίνεσθαι δ᾽ ἐῴκει τοὺς
-ἀφικνουμένους Λακεδαιμονίων καὶ πρεσβυτέρους καὶ νεωτέρους.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_462"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_462">[462]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iii, 3, 9, 10.
-</p>
-<p>
-The persons called Hippeis at Sparta, were not mounted; they were a
-select body of three hundred youthful citizens, employed either on home
-police or on foreign service.
-</p>
-<p>
-See Herodot. viii, 124; Strabo, x, p. 481; K. O. Müller, History of the
-Dorians, B. iii, ch. 12, s. 5, 6.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_463"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_463">[463]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iii, 3, 9.
-</p>
-<p>
-Ἔμελλον δὲ οἱ συλλαβόντες αὐτὸν μὲν κατέχειν, τοὺς δὲ ξυνειδότας <em class="gesperrt">πυθόμενοι
-αὐτοῦ γράψαντες ἀποπέμπειν</em> τὴν ταχίστην τοῖς ἐφόροις. Οὕτω δ᾽ εἶχον οἱ
-ἔφοροι πρὸς τὸ πρᾶγμα, ὥστε καὶ μορὰν ἱππέων ἔπεμψαν τοῖς ἐπ᾽ Αὐλῶνος. Ἐπεὶ
-δ᾽ εἰλημμένου τοῦ ἀνδρὸς ἧκεν ἱππεὺς, <em class="gesperrt">φέρων τὰ ὀνόματα ὧν Κινάδων
-ἀπέγραψε</em>, παραχρῆμα τόν τε μάντιν Τισάμενον καὶ τοὺς ἐπικαιριωτάτους
-ξυνελάμβανον. Ὡς δ᾽ ἀνήχθη ὁ Κινάδων, καὶ ἠλέγχετο, καὶ ὡμολόγει πάντα,
-καὶ <em class="gesperrt">τοὺς ξυνειδότας ἔλεγε</em>, τέλος αὐτὸν ἤροντο, τί καὶ βουλόμενος
-ταῦτα πράττοι;
-</p>
-<p>
-Polyænus (ii, 14, 1) in his account of this transaction, expressly mentions
-that the Hippeis or guards who accompanied Kinadon, put him to the torture
-(στρεβλώσαντες) when they seized him, in order to extort the names of
-his accomplices. Even without express testimony, we might pretty confidently
-have assumed this. From a man of spirit like Kinadon, they were
-not likely to obtain such betrayal without torture.
-</p>
-<p>
-I had affirmed that in the description of this transaction given by Xenophon,
-it did not appear whether Kinadon was able to write or not. My
-assertion was controverted by Colonel Mure (in his Reply to my Appendix),
-who cited the words φέρων τὰ ὀνόματα ὧν Κινάδων <em class="gesperrt">ἀπέγραψε</em>, as containing
-an affirmation from Xenophon that Kinadon could write.
-</p>
-<p>
-In my judgment, these words, taken in conjunction with what precedes,
-and with the probabilities of the fact described, do not contain such an affirmation.
-</p>
-<p>
-The guards were instructed to seize Kinadon, and after <i>having heard from
-Kinadon who his accomplices were, to write the names down and send them to the
-ephors</i>. It is to be presumed that they executed these instructions as given;
-the more so, as what they were commanded to do, was at once the safest
-and the most natural proceeding. For Kinadon was a man distinguished
-for personal <i>stature and courage</i> (τὸ εἶδος καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν εὔρωστος, iii, 3, 5)
-so that those who seized him would find it an indispensable precaution to
-pinion his arms. Assuming even that Kinadon could write,—yet, if he
-were to write, he must have his right arm free. And why should the guards
-take this risk, when all which the ephors required was, that Kinadon should
-<i>pronounce</i> the names, to be written down by others? With a man of the
-qualities of Kinadon, it probably required the most intense pressure to force
-him to betray his comrades, even by word of mouth; it would probably be
-more difficult still, to force him to betray them by the more deliberate act
-of writing.
-</p>
-<p>
-I conceive that ἧκεν ἱππεὺς, φέρων τὰ ὀνόματα ὧν ὁ Κινάδων ἀπέγραψε is
-to be construed with reference to the preceding sentence, and announces
-the carrying into effect of the instructions then reported as given by the
-ephors. “A guard came, bearing the names of those whom Kinadon had
-given in.” It is not necessary to suppose that Kinadon had written down
-these names with his own hand.
-</p>
-<p>
-In the beginning of the Oration of Andokides (De Mysteriis), Pythonikus
-gives information of a mock celebration of the mysteries, committed
-by Alkibiades and others; citing as his witness the slave Andromachus;
-who is accordingly produced, and states to the assembly <i>vivâ voce</i> what he
-had seen and who were the persons present—Πρῶτος μὲν οὗτος (Andromachus)
-ταῦτα εμήνυσε, καὶ <em class="gesperrt">ἀπέγραψε τούτους</em> (s. 13). It is not here
-meant to affirm that the slave Andromachus wrote down the names of these
-persons, which he had the moment before publicly announced to the assembly.
-It is by the words ἀπέγραψε τούτους that the orator describes the public
-oral announcement made by Andromachus, which was formally taken
-note of by a secretary, and which led to legal consequences against the
-persons whose names were given in.
-</p>
-<p>
-So again, in the old law quoted by Demosthenes (adv. Makast. p. 1068),
-Ἀπογραφέτω δὲ τὸν μὴ ποιοῦντα ταῦτα ὁ βουλόμενος πρὸς τὸν ἄρχοντα; and
-in Demosthenes adv. Nikostrat. p. 1247. Ἃ ἐκ τῶν νόμων τῷ ἰδιώτῃ τῷ
-ἀπογράφαντι γίγνεται, τῇ πόλει ἀφίημι: compare also Lysias, De Bonis
-Aristophanis, Or. xix, s. 53; it is not meant to affirm that ὁ ἀπογράφων was
-required to perform his process in writing, or was necessarily able to write.
-A citizen who could not write might do this, as well as one who could. He
-<i>informed against</i> a certain person as delinquent; he <i>informed of</i> certain articles
-of property, as belonging to the estate of one whose property had been
-confiscated to the city. The information, as well as the name of the informer,
-was taken down by the official person,—whether the informer
-could himself write or not.
-</p>
-<p>
-It appears to me that Kinadon, having been interrogated, <i>told</i> to the
-guards who first seized him, the names of his accomplices,—just as he
-<i>told</i> these names afterwards to the ephors (καὶ τοῦς ξυνειδότας <em class="gesperrt">ἔλεγε</em>);
-and this, whether he was, or was not, able to write; a point, which the
-passage of Xenophon noway determines.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_464"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_464">[464]</a></span> Xenoph. Hellen. iii, 3, 11.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_465"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_465">[465]</a></span> Diodor. xiv, 39; Xen. Hellen. iii, 3, 13.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_466"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_466">[466]</a></span> Lysias, Orat. xix, (De Bonis Aristophanis) s. 38.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_467"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_467">[467]</a></span> See Ktesias, Fragmenta, Persica, c. 63, ed. Bähr; Plutarch, Artax. c. 21.
-</p>
-<p>
-We cannot make out these circumstances with any distinctness; but the
-general fact is plainly testified, and is besides very probable. Another Grecian
-surgeon (besides Ktesias) is mentioned as concerned,—Polykritus of
-Mendê; and a Kretan dancer named Zeno,—both established at the Persian
-court.
-</p>
-<p>
-There is no part of the narrative of Ktesias, the loss of which is so
-much to be regretted as this; relating transactions, in which he was himself
-concerned, and seemingly giving original letters.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_468"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_468">[468]</a></span> Diodor. xiv, 39-79.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_469"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_469">[469]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iii, 4, 1.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_470"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_470">[470]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iii, 4, 2.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_471"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_471">[471]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iii, 5, 1. ἐλπίδας ἔχοντα μεγάλας αἱρήσειν βασιλέα, etc.
-Compare iv, 2, 3.
-</p>
-<p>
-Xen. Agesilaus, i, 36. ἐπινοῶν καὶ ἐλπίζων καταλύσειν τὴν ἐπὶ τὴν Ἑλλάδα
-στρατεύσασαν πρότερον ἀρχήν, etc.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_472"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_472">[472]</a></span> Plutarch, Agesil. c. 5.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_473"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_473">[473]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iii, 5, 5; Pausan. iii, 9, 1.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_474"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_474">[474]</a></span> Herodot. i, 68; vii, 159; Pausan. iii, 16, 6.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_475"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_475">[475]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iii, 4, 3, 4; iii, 5, 5; Plutarch, Agesilaus, c. 6; Pausan. iii, 9, 2.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_476"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_476">[476]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iii, 4, 5, 6; Xen. Agesilaus, i, 10.
-</p>
-<p>
-The term of three months is specified only in the latter passage. The
-former armistice of Derkyllidas had probably not expired when Agesilaus
-first arrived.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_477"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_477">[477]</a></span> Pausan. vi, 3, 6.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_478"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_478">[478]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. ii, 1, 7. This rule does not seem to have been adhered to
-afterwards. Lysander was sent out again as commander in 403 <small>B.C.</small> It is
-possible, indeed, that he may have been again sent out as nominal secretary
-to some other person named as commander.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_479"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_479">[479]</a></span> Plutarch, Agesilaus, c. 7.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_480"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_480">[480]</a></span> The sarcastic remarks which Plutarch ascribes to Agesilaus, calling
-Lysander “my meat-distributor” (κρεοδαίτην), are not warranted by Xenophon,
-and seem not to be probable under the circumstances (Plutarch,
-Lysand. c. 23; Plutarch, Agesil. c. 8).</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_481"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_481">[481]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iii, 4, 7-10; Plutarch, Agesilaus, c. 7-8; Plutarch, Lysand.
-c. 23.
-</p>
-<p>
-It is remarkable that in the Opusculum of Xenophon, a special Panegyric
-called <i>Agesilaus</i>, not a word is said about this highly characteristic
-proceeding between Agesilaus and Lysander at Ephesus; nor indeed is the
-name of Lysander once mentioned.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_482"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_482">[482]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iii, 4, 10.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_483"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_483">[483]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iii, 4, 11, 12; Xen. Agesil. i, 12-14; Plutarch, Agesil.
-c. 9.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_484"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_484">[484]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iii, 4, 13-15; Xen. Agesil. i, 23. Ἐπεὶ
-μέντοι οὐδὲ ἐν τῇ Φρυγίᾳ ἀνὰ τὰ πεδία ἐδύνατο στρατεύεσθαι, διὰ
-τὴν Φαρναβάζου ἱππείαν, etc.
-</p>
-<p>
-Plutarch, Agesil. c. 9.
-</p>
-<p>
-These military operations of Agesilaus are loosely adverted to in the
-early part of c. 79 of the fourteenth Book of Diodorus.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_485"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_485">[485]</a></span> Xen. Agesil. i, 19; Xen. Anabas. vii, 8, 20-23; Plutarch, Reipub. Gerend.
-Præcept. p 809, B. See above, <a href="#Chap_72">Chapter lxxii</a>, of this History.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_486"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_486">[486]</a></span> Xen. Agesil. i, 18. πάντες παμπλήθη χρήματα ἔλαβον.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_487"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_487">[487]</a></span> Xen. Agesil. i, 20-22.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_488"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_488">[488]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iii, 4, 19; Xen. Agesil. i, 28. τοὺς ὑπὸ τῶν λῃστῶν
-ἁλισκομένους βαρβάρους.
-</p>
-<p>
-So the word λῃστὴς, used in reference to the fleet, means the commander
-of a predatory vessel or privateer (Xen. Hellen. ii, 1, 30).</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_489"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_489">[489]</a></span> Xen. Agesil. i, 21. Καὶ πολλάκις μὲν προηγόρευε τοῖς στρατιώταις
-<em class="gesperrt">τοὺς ἁλισκομένους μὴ ὡς ἀδίκους τιμωρεῖσθαι, ἀλλ᾽ ὡς ἀνθρώπους ὄντας
-φυλάσσειν</em>. Πολλάκις δὲ, ὅποτε μεταστρατοπεδεύοιτο, <em class="gesperrt">εἰ αἴσθοιτο
-καταλελειμμένα παιδάρια μικρὰ ἐμπόρων, (ἃ πολλοὶ ἐπώλουν, διὰ τὸ νομίζειν
-μὴ δύνασθαι ἂν φέρειν αὐτὰ καὶ τρέφειν)</em> ἐπεμέλετο καὶ τούτων, ὅπως
-συγκομίζοιτό ποι· τοῖς δ᾽ αὖ διὰ γῆρας καταλελειμμένοις αἰχμαλώτοις
-προσέταττεν ἐπιμελεῖσθαι αὐτῶν, ὡς μήτε ὑπὸ κυνῶν, μήθ᾽ ὑπὸ λύκων,
-διαφθείροιντο. Ὥστε οὐ μόνον οἱ πυνθανόμενοι ταῦτα, ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτοὶ οἱ
-ἁλισκόμενοι εὐμενεῖς αὐτῷ ἐγίγνοντο.
-</p>
-<p>
-Herodotus affirms that the Thracians also sold their children for exportation,—πωλεῦσι
-τὰ τέχνα ἐπ᾽ ἐξαγωγῇ (Herod. v, 6): compare Philostratus,
-Vit. Apollon. viii, 7-12, p. 346; and Ch. xvi, Vol. III, p. 216 of this
-History.
-</p>
-<p>
-Herodotus mentions the Chian merchant Panionius (like the “<i>Mitylenæus
-mango</i>” in Martial,—“Sed Mitylenæi roseus mangonis ephebus” Martial,
-vii, 79)—as having conducted on a large scale the trade of purchasing
-boys, looking out for such as were handsome, to supply the great demand
-in the East for eunuchs, who were supposed to make better and more attached
-servants. Herodot. viii, 105. ὅκως γὰρ κτήσαιτο (Panionius) παῖδας εἴδεος ἐπαμμένους,
-ἐκτάμνων ἀγινέων ἐπώλεε ἐς Σάρδις τε καὶ Ἔφεσον χρημάτων μεγάλων· παρὰ γὰρ τοῖσι
-βαρβάροισι τιμιώτεροί εἰσι οἱ εὐνοῦχοι, πίστιος εἵνεκα τῆς πάσης, τῶν ἐνορχίων.
-Boys were necessary, as the operation
-was performed in childhood or youth,—παῖδες ἐκτομίαι (Herodot. vi, 6-32:
-compare iii, 48). The Babylonians, in addition to their large pecuniary
-tribute, had to furnish to the Persian court annually five hundred παῖδας
-ἐκτομίας (Herodot. iii, 92). For some farther remarks on the preference of
-the Persians both for the persons and the services of εὐνοῦχοι, see Dio
-Chrysostom, Orat. xxi, p. 270; Xenoph. Cyropæd. vii, 5, 61-65. Hellanikus
-(Fr. 169, ed. Didot) affirmed that the Persians had derived both the
-persons so employed, and the habit of employing them, from the Babylonians.
-</p>
-<p>
-When Mr. Hanway was travelling near the Caspian, among the Kalmucks,
-little children of two or three vears of age, were often tendered to
-him for sale, at two rubles per head (Hanway’s Travels, ch. xvi, pp. 65, 66).</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_490"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_490">[490]</a></span> Herodot. i, 10. παρὰ γὰρ τοῖσι Λυδοῖσι, σχεδὸν δὲ
-παρὰ τοῖσι ἄλλοισι βαρβάροισι, καὶ ἄνδρα ὀφθῆναι γυμνόν, ἐς
-αἰσχύνην μεγάλην φέρει. Compare Thucyd. i, 6; Plato, Republic,
-v, 3, p. 452, D.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_491"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_491">[491]</a></span> Herodot. v, 22.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_492"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_492">[492]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iii, 4, 19. Ἡγούμενος δὲ, καὶ τὸ καταφρονεῖν
-τῶν πολεμίων ῥώμην τινὰ ἐμβάλλειν πρὸς τὸ μάχεσθαι, προεῖπε τοῖς κήρυξι,
-τοὺς ὑπὸ τῶν λῃστῶν ἁλισκομένους βαρβάρους γυμνοὺς πωλεῖν. Ὁρῶντες οὖν
-οἱ στρατιῶται λευκοὺς μὲν, <em class="gesperrt">διὰ τὸ μηδέποτε ἐκδύεσθαι</em>, μαλακοὺς
-δὲ καὶ ἀπόνους, διὰ τὸ ἀεὶ ἐπ᾽ ὀχημάτων εἶναι, ἐνόμισαν, οὐδὲν διοίσειν
-τὸν πόλεμον ἢ εἰ γυναιξὶ δέοι μάχεσθαι.
-</p>
-<p>
-Xen. Agesil. i, 28—where he has it—πίονας δὲ καὶ ἀπόνους, διὰ τὸ ἀεὶ
-ἐπ᾽ ὀχημάτων εἶναι (Polyænus, ii, 1, 5; Plutarch, Agesil. c. 9).
-</p>
-<p>
-Frontinus (i, 18) recounts a proceeding somewhat similar on the part of
-Gelon, after his great victory over the Carthaginians at Himera in Sicily:—“Gelo
-Syracusarum tyrannus, bello adversus Pœnos suscepto, cum multos
-cepisset, infirmissimum quemque præcipue ex auxiliaribus, qui nigerrimi
-erant, nudatum in conspectu suorum produxit, ut persuaderet contemnendos.”</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_493"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_493">[493]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iii, 4, 15; Xen. Agesil. i, 23. Compare what is related
-about Scipio Africanus—Livy, xxix, 1.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_494"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_494">[494]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iii, 4, 17, 18; Xen. Agesil. i, 26, 27.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_495"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_495">[495]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iii, 4, 21-24; Xen. Agesil. i, 32, 33; Plutarch, Agesil. c. 10.
-</p>
-<p>
-Diodorus (xiv, 80) professes to describe this battle; but his description
-is hardly to be reconciled with that of Xenophon, which is better authority.
-Among other points of difference, Diodorus affirms that the Persians had
-fifty thousand infantry; and Pausanias also states (iii, 9, 3) that the number
-of Persian infantry in this battle was greater than had ever been got
-together since the times of Darius and Xerxes Whereas, Xenophon expressly
-states that the Persian infantry had not come up, and took no part
-in the battle.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_496"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_496">[496]</a></span> Plutarch. Artaxerx. c. 23; Diodor. xiv, 80; Xen. Hellen. iii, 4, 25.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_497"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_497">[497]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iii, 14, 25; iv, 1, 27.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_498"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_498">[498]</a></span> Thucyd. viii, 18, 37, 58.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_499"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_499">[499]</a></span> Thucyd. v, 18, 5.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_500"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_500">[500]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iii, 4, 26; Diodor. xiv, 80. ἑξαμηνιαίους ἀνοχάς.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_501"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_501">[501]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iii, 4, 27.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_502"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_502">[502]</a></span> Diodor. xiv, 39, Justin, vi, 1.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_503"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_503">[503]</a></span> Diodor. xiv, 79. Ῥόδιοι δὲ ἐκβαλόντες τὸν τῶν Πελοποννησίων
-στόλον, ἀπέστησαν ἀπὸ Λακεδαιμονίων, καὶ τὸν Κόνωνα προσεδέξαντο μετὰ
-τοῦ στόλου παντὸς εἰς τὴν πόλιν.
-</p>
-<p>
-Compare Androtion apud Pausaniam, vi, 7, 2.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_504"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_504">[504]</a></span> Diodor. xiv, 79; Justin (vi, 2) calls this native Egyptian king <i>Hercynion</i>.
-</p>
-<p>
-It seems to have been the uniform practice, for the corn-ships coming
-from Egypt to Greece to halt at Rhodes (Demosthen. cont. Dionysodor
-p. 1285: compare Herodot. ii, 182).</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_505"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_505">[505]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iii, 4, 27.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_506"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_506">[506]</a></span> Plutarch, Agesil. c. 10; Aristotel. Politic. ii, 6, 22.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_507"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_507">[507]</a></span> The Lacedæmonian named Pharax, mentioned by Theopompus
-(Fragm. 218, ed. Didot: compare Athenæus, xii, p. 536) as a profligate
-and extravagant person, is more probably an officer who served under Dionysius
-in Sicily and Italy, about forty years after the revolt of Rhodes.
-The difference of time appears so great, that we must probably suppose
-two different men bearing the same name.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_508"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_508">[508]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. i, 5, 19.
-</p>
-<p>
-Compare a similar instance of merciful dealing, on the part of the Syracusan
-assembly, towards the Sikel prince Duketius (Diodor. xi, 92).</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_509"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_509">[509]</a></span> Hist. of Greece, Vol. VIII, Ch. lxiv, p. 159.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_510"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_510">[510]</a></span> Pausanias, vi, 7, 2.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_511"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_511">[511]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iii, 4, 28, 29; Plutarch, Agesil. c. 10.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_512"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_512">[512]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iv, 1, 1-15.
-</p>
-<p>
-The negotiation of this marriage by Agesilaus is detailed in a curious
-and interesting manner by Xenophon. His conversation with Otys took
-place in the presence of the thirty Spartan counsellors, and probably in
-the presence of Xenophon himself.
-</p>
-<p>
-The attachment of Agesilaus to the youth Megabazus or Megabates, is
-marked in the Hellenica (iv, 1, 6-28)—but is more strongly brought out
-in the Agesilaus of Xenophon (v, 6), and in Plutarch, Agesil. c. 11.
-</p>
-<p>
-In the retreat of the Ten Thousand Greeks (five years before) along the
-southern coast of the Euxine, a Paphlagonian prince named Korylas is
-mentioned (Xen. Anab. v, 5, 22; v, 6, 8). Whether there was more than
-one Paphlagonian prince—or whether Otys was successor of Korylas—we
-cannot tell.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_513"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_513">[513]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iv, 1, 16-33.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_514"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_514">[514]</a></span> Plutarch, Agesil. c. 11. πικρὸς ὢν ἐξεταστὴς τῶν κλαπέντων, etc.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_515"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_515">[515]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iv, 1, 27; Plutarch, Agesil. c. 11.
-</p>
-<p>
-Since the flight of Spithridates took place secretly by night, the scene
-which Plutarch asserts to have taken place between Agesilaus and Megabazus
-cannot have occurred on the departure of the latter, but must belong
-to some other occasion; as, indeed, it seems to be represented by Xenophon
-(Agesil. v, 4).</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_516"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_516">[516]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iv, 1, 38. Ἐὰν μέντοι μοι τὴν ἀρχὴν προστάττῃ,
-τοιοῦτόν τι, ὡς ἔοικε, φιλοτιμία ἐστὶ, εὖ χρὴ εἰδέναι, ὅτι πολεμήσω ὑμῖν
-ὡς ἂν δύνωμαι ἄριστα.
-</p>
-<p>
-Compare about φιλοτιμία, Herodot. iii, 53.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_517"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_517">[517]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iv, 1, 29-41; Plutarch, Agesil. c. 13, 14; Xen. Agesil.
-iii, 5.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_518"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_518">[518]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iv, 1, 40. πάντ᾽ ἐποίησεν, ὅπως ἂν
-δι᾽ ἐκεῖνον ἐγκριθείη εἰς τὸ στάδιον ἐν Ὀλυμπίᾳ, μέγιστος ὢν παίδων.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_519"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_519">[519]</a></span> Plutarch, Agesil. c. 5-13.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_520"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_520">[520]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iv, 1, 41; Xen. Agesil. i, 35-38; Plutarch, Agesil. c. 14, 15;
-Isokrates, Or. v, (Philipp.) s. 100.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_521"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_521">[521]</a></span> Compare Diodor. xv, 41 <i>ad fin.</i>; and Thucyd. viii, 45.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_522"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_522">[522]</a></span> Isokrates (Or. viii, De Pace, s. 82) alludes to “many embassies” as having
-been sent by Athens to the king of Persia, to protest against the Lacedæmonian
-dominion. But this mission of Konon is the only one which
-we can verify, prior to the battle of Knidus.
-</p>
-<p>
-Probably Dennis, the son of Pyrilampês, an eminent citizen and trierarch
-of Athens, must have been one of the companions of Konon in this
-mission. He is mentioned in an oration of Lysias as having received from
-the Great King a present of a golden drinking-bowl or φιάλη; and I do
-not know on what other occasion he can have received it, except in this
-embassy (Lysias, Or. xix, De Bonis Aristoph. s. 27).</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_523"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_523">[523]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 6.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_524"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_524">[524]</a></span> The measures of Konon and the transactions preceding the battle of
-Knidus, are very imperfectly known to us; but we may gather them generally
-from Diodorus, xiv, 81; Justin, vi, 3, 4; Cornelius Nepos, Vit. Conon.
-c. 2, 3; Ktesiæ Fragment, c. 62, 63, ed. Bähr.
-</p>
-<p>
-Isokrates (Orat. iv, (Panegyr.) s. 165; compare Orat. ix, (Euagor.) s. 77)
-speaks loosely as to the duration of time that the Persian fleet remained
-blocked up by the Lacedæmonians before Konon obtained his final and
-vigorous orders from Artaxerxes, unless we are to understand his <i>three
-years</i> as referring to the first news of outfit of ships of war in Phœnicia,
-brought to Sparta by Herodas, as Schneider understands them; and even
-then the statement that the Persian fleet remained πολιορκούμενον for all
-this time, would be much exaggerated. Allowing for exaggeration, however,
-Isokrates coincides generally with the authorities above noticed.
-</p>
-<p>
-It would appear that Ktesias the physician obtained about this time permission
-to quit the court of Persia and come back to Greece. Perhaps he
-may have been induced (like Demokêdes of Kroton, one hundred and
-twenty years before) to promote the views of Konon in order to get for
-himself this permission.
-</p>
-<p>
-In the meagre abstract of Ktesias given by Photius (c. 63) mention is
-made of some Lacedæmonian envoys who were now going up to the Persian
-court, and were watched or detained on the way. This mission can hardly
-have taken place before the battle of Knidus; for then Agesilaus was in the
-full tide of success, and contemplating the largest plans of aggression
-against Persia. It must have taken place, I presume, after the battle.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_525"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_525">[525]</a></span> Isokrates, Or. ix, (Euagoras) s. 67. Εὐαγόρου δὲ
-<em class="gesperrt">αὑτόν τε παρασχόντος</em>, καὶ τῆς δυνάμεως τὴν πλείστην
-παρασκευάσαντος. Compare s.
-83 of the same oration. Compare Pausanias, i, 3, 1.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_526"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_526">[526]</a></span> Diodor. xiv, 83. διέτριβον περὶ Λώρυμα τῆς Χερσονήσου.
-</p>
-<p>
-It is hardly necessary to remark, that the word <i>Chersonesus</i> here (and in
-xiv, 89) does not mean the peninsula of Thrace commonly known by that
-name, forming the European side of the Hellespont,—but the peninsula
-on which Knidus is situated.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_527"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_527">[527]</a></span> Pausan. vi, 3, 6. περὶ Κνίδον καὶ ὄρος τὸ Δώριον ὀνομαζόμενον.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_528"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_528">[528]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iv, 3, 12. Φαρνάβαζον,
-ναύαρχον ὄντα, ξὺν ταῖς Φοινίσσαις εἶναι. Κόνωνα δὲ, τὸ Ἑλληνικὸν ἔχοντα, τετάχθαι ἔμπροσθεν αὐτοῦ.
-Ἀντιπαραταξαμένου δὲ τοῦ Πεισάνδρου, καὶ <em class="gesperrt">πολὺ ἐλαττόνων αὐτῷ τῶν νεῶν
-φανεισῶν τῶν αὑτοῦ τοῦ μετὰ Κόνωνος Ἑλληνικοῦ</em>,
-etc.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_529"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_529">[529]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iv, 3, 10-14; Diodor. xiv, 83; Cornelius Nepos, Conon, c.
-4; Justin, vi, 3.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_530"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_530">[530]</a></span> Thucyd. v, 52.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_531"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_531">[531]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. i, 2, 18.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_532"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_532">[532]</a></span> Diodor. xiv, 38; Polyæn. ii, 21.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_533"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_533">[533]</a></span> Diodorus, <i>ut sup.</i>; compare xiv, 81. τοὺς
-Τραχινίους φεύγοντας ἐκ τῶν πατρίδων ὑπὸ Λακεδαιμονίων, etc.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_534"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_534">[534]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iii, 5, 1. Πέμπει Τιμοκράτην Ῥόδιον εἰς
-τὴν Ἑλλάδα, δοὺς χρυσίον ἐς πεντήκοντα τάλαντα ἀργυρίου, καὶ κελεύει
-πειρᾶσθαι, πιστὰ τὰ μέγιστα λαμβάνοντα, διδόναι τοῖς προεστηκόσιν
-ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν, ἐφ᾽ ᾧ τε πόλεμον ἐξοίσειν πρὸς Λακεδαιμονίους.
-</p>
-<p>
-Timokrates is ordered to give the money; yet not absolutely, but only
-on a certain condition, in case he should find that such condition could be
-realized; that is, if by giving it he could procure from various leading
-Greeks sufficient assurances and guarantees that they would raise war
-against Sparta. As this was a matter more or less doubtful, Timokrates is
-ordered to <i>try to give the money for this purpose</i>. Though the construction
-of πειρᾶσθαι couples it with διδόναι, the sense of the word more properly
-belongs to ἐξοίσειν—which designates the purpose to be accomplished.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_535"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_535">[535]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iii, 5, 2; Pausan. iii, 9, 4; Plutarch, Artaxerxes, c. 20.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_536"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_536">[536]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iii, 4, 26.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_537"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_537">[537]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 16.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_538"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_538">[538]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iii, 5, 2. Οἱ μὲν δὴ δεξάμενοι
-τὰ χρήματα ἐς τὰς οἰκείας πόλεις διέβαλλον τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους·
-ἐπεὶ δὲ ταύτας ἐς μῖσος αὐτῶν προήγαγον, συνίστασαν καὶ τὰς μεγίστας
-πόλεις πρὸς ἀλλήλας.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_539"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_539">[539]</a></span> Xenophon, <i>ut sup.</i>
-</p>
-<p>
-Pausanias (iii, 9, 4) names some Athenians as having received part of the
-money. So Plutarch also, in general terms (Agesil. c. 15).
-</p>
-<p>
-Diodorus mentions nothing respecting either the mission or the presents
-of Timokrates.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_540"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_540">[540]</a></span> Πόλεμος Βοιωτικός (Diodor. xiv, 81).</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_541"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_541">[541]</a></span> Xenophon (Hellen. iii, 5, 3) says,—and Pausanias (iii, 9, 4) follows
-him,—That the Theban leaders, wishing to bring about a war with Sparta,
-and knowing that Sparta would not begin it, purposely incited the Lokrians
-to encroach upon this disputed border, in order that the Phokians might
-resent it, and that thus a war might be lighted up. I have little hesitation
-in rejecting this version, which I conceive to have arisen from Xenophon’s
-philo-Laconian and miso-Theban tendency, and in believing that the fight
-between the Lokrians and Phokians, as well as that between the Phokians
-and Thebans, arose without any design on the part of the latter to provoke
-Sparta. So Diodorus recounts it, in reference to the war between the Phokians
-and the Thebans; for about the Lokrians he says nothing (xiv, 81).
-</p>
-<p>
-The subsequent events, as recounted by Xenophon himself, show that the
-Spartans were not only ready in point of force, but eager in regard to will,
-to go to war with the Thebans; while the latter were not at all ready to go
-to war with Sparta. They had not a single ally; for their application to
-Athens, in itself doubtful, was not made until after Sparta had declared
-war against them.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_542"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_542">[542]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iii, 5, 5. Οἱ μέντοι Λακεδαιμόνιοι <em class="gesperrt">ἄσμενοι
-ἔλαβον πρόφασιν στρατεύειν ἐπὶ τοὺς Θηβαίους, πάλαι ὀργιζόμενοι</em> αὐτοῖς,
-τῆς τε ἀντιλήψεως τῆς τοῦ Ἀπόλλωνος δεκάτης ἐν Δεκελείᾳ, καὶ τοῦ ἐπὶ τὸν
-Πειραιᾶ μὴ ἐθελῆσαι ἀκολουθῆσαι· ᾐτιῶντο δ᾽ αὐτοὺς, καὶ Κορινθίους πεῖσαι
-μὴ συστρατεύειν. Ἀνεμιμνήσκοντο δὲ καὶ, ὡς θύοντ᾽ ἐν Αὐλίδι τὸν Ἀγησίλαον
-οὐκ εἴων, καὶ τὰ τεθυμένα ἱερὰ ὡς ἔῤῥιψαν ἀπὸ τοῦ βωμοῦ· καὶ ὅτι οὐδ᾽ εἰς
-τὴν Ἀσίαν συνεστράτευον Ἀγησιλάῳ. Ἐλογίζοντο δὲ καὶ καλὸν εἶναι τοῦ ἐξάγειν
-στρατιὰν ἐπ᾽ αὐτοὺς, καὶ παῦσαι τῆς ἐς αὐτοὺς ὕβρεως· τά τε γὰρ ἐν τῇ Ἀσίᾳ
-καλῶς σφίσιν ἔχειν, κρατοῦντος Ἀγησιλάου, καὶ ἐν τῇ Ἑλλάδι οὐδένα ἄλλον
-πόλεμον ἐμποδὼν σφίσιν εἶναι. Compare vii, 1, 34.
-</p>
-<p>
-The description here given by Xenophon himself,—of the past dealing
-and established sentiment between Sparta and Thebes,—refutes his allegation,
-that it was the bribes brought by Timokrates to the leading Thebans
-which first blew up the hatred against Sparta; and shows farther, that
-Sparta did not need any circuitous manœuvres of the Thebans, to furnish
-her with a pretext for going to war.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_543"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_543">[543]</a></span> Plutarch, Lysand. c. 28.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_544"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_544">[544]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iii, 5, 6, 7.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_545"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_545">[545]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iii, 5, 23.
-</p>
-<p>
-The conduct of the Corinthians here contributes again to refute the assertion
-of Xenophon about the effect of the bribes of Timokrates.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_546"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_546">[546]</a></span> Pausanias, ix, 11, 4.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_547"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_547">[547]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iii, 5, 9.
-</p>
-<p>
-Πολὺ δ᾽ ἔτι μᾶλλον ἀξιοῦμεν, ὅσοι τῶν ἐν ἄστει ἐγένεσθε, προθύμως
-ἐπὶ τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους ἰέναι. Ἐκεῖνοι γὰρ, καταστήσαντες ὑμᾶς ἐς
-ὀλιγαρχίαν καὶ ἐς ἔχθραν τῷ δήμῳ, ἀφικόμενοι πολλῇ δυνάμει, ὡς ὑμῖν
-σύμμαχοι, παρέδοσαν ὑμᾶς τῷ πλήθει· ὥστε τὸ μὲν ἐπ᾽ ἐκείνοις εἶναι,
-ἀπολώλατε, ὁ δὲ δῆμος οὑτοσὶ ὑμᾶς ἔσωσε.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_548"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_548">[548]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iii, 5, 9, 16.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_549"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_549">[549]</a></span> Demosthen. de Coronâ, c. 28, p. 258; also Philipp. i, c. 7, p. 44. Compare
-also Lysias, Orat. xvi, (pro Mantitheo, s. 15).</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_550"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_550">[550]</a></span>
-Xen. Hellen. iii, 5, 16. Τῶν δ᾽ Ἀθηναίων παμπολλοὶ
-μὲν ξυνηγόρευον, πάντες δ᾽ ἐψηφίσαντο βοηθεῖν αὐτοῖς.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_551"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_551">[551]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. <i>ut sup.</i></p>
-<p>Pausanias (iii, 9, 6) says that the Athenians sent envoys to the Spartans
-to entreat them not to act aggressively against Thebes, but to submit their
-complaint to equitable adjustment. This seems to me improbable. Diodorus
-(xiv, 81) briefly states the general fact in conformity with Xenophon.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_552"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_552">[552]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iii, 5, 17; Plutarch, Lysand. c. 28.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_553"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_553">[553]</a></span> Thucyd. iv, 89. γενομένης διαμαρτίας τῶν ἡμερῶν, etc.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_554"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_554">[554]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iii, 5, 18, 19, 20; Plutarch, Lysand. c. 28, 29; Pausan. iii,
-5, 4.
-</p>
-<p>
-The two last differ in various matters from Xenophon, whose account,
-however, though brief, seems to me to deserve the preference.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_555"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_555">[555]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iii, 5, 21. ἀπεληλυθότας ἐν νυκτὶ τούς
-τε Φωκέας καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ἅπαντας οἴκαδε ἑκάστους, etc.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_556"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_556">[556]</a></span> Lysias, Or. xvi, (pro Mantitheo) s. 15, 16.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_557"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_557">[557]</a></span> Accordingly we learn from an oration of Lysias, that the service of the
-Athenian horsemen in this expedition, who were commanded by Orthobulus,
-was judged to be extremely safe and easy; while that of the hoplites
-was dangerous (Lysias, Orat. xvi, pro Mantith. s. 15).</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_558"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_558">[558]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iii, 5, 23. Κορίνθιοι μὲν παντάπασιν οὐκ
-ἠκολούθουν αὐτοῖς, οἱ δὲ παρόντες οὐ προθύμως στρατεύοιντο, etc.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_559"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_559">[559]</a></span> See the conduct of the Thebans on this very point (of giving up the
-slain at the solicitation of the conquered Athenians for burial) after the
-battle of Delium, and the discussion thereupon,—in this History, Vol. VI,
-ch. liii, p. 393 <i>seq.</i></p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_560"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_560">[560]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iii, 5, 24. Οἱ δὲ ἄσμενοί τε ταῦτα ἤκουσαν, etc.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_561"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_561">[561]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iii, 5, 24.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_562"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_562">[562]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 5.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_563"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_563">[563]</a></span> The traveller Pausanias justifies the prudence of his regal namesake in
-avoiding a battle, by saying that the Athenians were in his rear, and the
-Thebans in his front; and that he was afraid of being assailed on both sides
-at once, like Leonidas at Thermopylæ and like the troops enclosed in
-Sphakteria (Paus. iii, 5, 5).
-</p>
-<p>
-But the matter of fact, on which this justification rests, is contradicted by
-Xenophon, who says that the Athenians had actually joined the Thebans,
-and were in the same ranks—ἐλθόντες ξυμπαρετάξαντο (Hellen. iii, 5, 22).</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_564"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_564">[564]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iii, 5, 25. Καὶ ὅτι τὸν δῆμον τῶν Ἀθηναίων
-λαβὼν ἐν τῷ Πειραιεῖ ἀνῆκε, etc. Compare Pausanias, iii, 5, 3.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_565"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_565">[565]</a></span> Pausanias, ix, 32, 6.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_566"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_566">[566]</a></span> Ephorus, Fr. 127, ed. Didot; Plutarch, Lysander, c. 30.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_567"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_567">[567]</a></span> Diodor. xiv, 81, 82; Xen. Hellen. iv, 2, 17.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_568"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_568">[568]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 36. Ὁ δ᾽ (Ismenias) ἀπελογεῖτο μὲν
-πρὸς πάντα ταῦτα, οὐ μέντοι ἔπειθέ γε τὸ μὴ οὐ μεγαλοπράγμων τε καὶ
-κακοπράγμων εἶναι.
-</p>
-<p>
-It is difficult to make out anything from the two allusions in Plato, except
-that Ismenias was a wealthy and powerful man (Plato, Menon, p. 90 B;
-Republ. i. p. 336 A.).</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_569"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_569">[569]</a></span> Diodor. xiv, 82; Xen. Hellen. iv, 3, 3; Xen. Agesil. ii, 2.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_570"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_570">[570]</a></span> Diodor. xiv, 38-82.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_571"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_571">[571]</a></span> Xenoph. Hellen. iii, 5, 6.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_572"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_572">[572]</a></span> Diodor. xiv, 82.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_573"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_573">[573]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iv, 2, 16. Xenophon gives this total of six thousand as if
-it were of Lacedæmonians <i>alone</i>. But if we follow his narrative, we shall
-see that there were unquestionably in the army troops of Tegea, Mantineia,
-and the Achæan towns (probably also some of other Arcadian towns,) present
-in the battle (iv, 2, 13, 18, 20). Can we suppose that Xenophon meant
-to include <i>these</i> allies in the total of six thousand, along with the Lacedæmonians,—which
-is doubtless a large total for Lacedæmonians alone?
-Unless this supposition be admitted, there is no resource except to assume
-an omission, either of Xenophon himself, or of the copyist; which omission
-in fact Gail and others do suppose. On the whole, I think they are right;
-for the number of hoplites on both sides would otherwise be prodigiously
-unequal; while Xenophon says nothing to imply that the Lacedæmonian
-victory was gained in spite of great inferiority of number, and something
-which even implies that it must have been nearly equal (iv, 2, 13),—though
-he is always disposed to compliment Sparta wherever he can.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_574"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_574">[574]</a></span> From a passage which occurs somewhat later (iv, 4, 15), we may suspect
-that this was an excuse, and that the Phliasians were not very well
-affected to Sparta. Compare a similar case of excuse ascribed to the Mantineians
-(v, 2, 2).</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_575"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_575">[575]</a></span> Diodorus (xiv, 83) gives a total of twenty-three thousand foot and five
-hundred horse, on the Lacedæmonian side, but without enumerating items.
-On the side of the confederacy he states a total of more than fifteen
-thousand foot and five hundred horse (c. 82).</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_576"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_576">[576]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iv, 2, 17. Καὶ ψιλὸν δὲ, ξὺν τοῖς τῶν Κορινθίων,
-πλέον ἦν, etc. Compare Hesychius, v, Κυνόφαλοι; Welcker, Præfat. ad. Theognidem,
-p. xxxv; K. O. Müller, History of the Dorians, iii, 4, 3.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_577"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_577">[577]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iv, 2, 13; compare iv, 2, 18,—where he says of the
-Thebans—<em class="gesperrt">ἀμελήσαντες</em> τοῦ ἐς ἑκκαίδεκα, βαθεῖαν παντελῶς ἐποιήσαντο τὴν
-φάλαγγα, etc., which implies and alludes to the resolution previously
-taken.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_578"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_578">[578]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iv, 2, 11, 12.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_579"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_579">[579]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iv, 2, 14, 15.
-</p>
-<p>
-In the passage,—καὶ οἱ ἕτεροι μέντοι <em class="gesperrt">ἐλθόντες</em> κατεστρατοπεδεύσαντο,
-ἔμπροσθεν ποιησάμενοι τὴν χαράδραν,—I apprehend that ἀπελθόντες
-(which is sanctioned by four MSS., and preferred by Leunclavius) is the
-proper reading, in place of <em class="gesperrt">ἐλθόντες</em>. For it seems certain that the
-march of the confederates was one of retreat, and that the battle was fought
-very near to the walls of Corinth; since the defeated troops sought shelter
-within the town, and the Lacedæmonian pursuers were so close upon them,
-that the Corinthians within were afraid to keep open the gates. Hence we
-must reject the statement of Diodorus,—that the battle was fought on the
-banks of the river Nemea (xiv, 83) as erroneous.
-</p>
-<p>
-There are some difficulties and obscurities in the description which Xenophon
-gives of the Lacedæmonian march. His words run—ἐν τούτῳ οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, καὶ
-δὴ Τεγεάτας παρειληφότες καὶ Μαντινέας, <em class="gesperrt">ἐξῄεσαν τὴν ἀμφίαλον</em>.
-These last three words are not satisfactorily explained.
-Weiske and Schneider construe τὴν ἀμφίαλον (very justly) as indicating
-the region lying immediately on the Peloponnesian side of the isthmus of
-Corinth and having the Saronic Gulf on one side, and the Corinthian Gulf
-on the other; in which was included Sikyon. But then it would not be
-correct to say, that “the Lacedæmonians had gone out by the bimarine
-way.” On the contrary, the truth is, that “they had gone out into the bimarine
-road or region,—which meaning however would require a preposition—ἐξῄεσαν
-<em class="gesperrt">εἰς</em> τὴν ἀμφίαλον. Sturz in his Lexicon (v. ἐξιέναι) renders
-τὴν ἀμφίαλον—<i>viam ad mare</i>—which seems an extraordinary sense of
-the word, unless instances were produced to support it; and even if instances
-were produced, we do not see why the way from Sparta to Sikyon
-should be called by that name; which would more properly belong to the
-road from Sparta down the Eurotas to Helos.
-</p>
-<p>
-Again, we do not know distinctly the situation of the point or district
-called τὴν Ἐπιεικίαν (mentioned again, iv, 4, 13). But it is certain from
-the map, that when the confederates were at Nemea, and the Lacedæmonians
-at Sikyon,—the former must have been exactly placed so as to intercept
-the junction of the contingents from Epidaurus, Trœzen, and Hermionê,
-with the Lacedæmonian army. To secure this junction, the Lacedæmonians
-were obliged to force their way across that mountainous region which
-lies near Kleônæ and Nemea, and to march in a line pointing from Sikyon
-down to the Saronic Gulf. Having reached the other side of these mountains
-near the sea, they would be in communication with Epidaurus and the
-other towns of the Argolic peninsula.
-</p>
-<p>
-The line of march which the Lacedæmonians would naturally take from
-Sparta to Sikyon and Lechæum, by Tegea, Mantineia, Orchomenus, etc., is
-described two years afterwards in the case of Agesilaus (iv, 5, 19).</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_580"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_580">[580]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iv, 2, 18. The coloring which Xenophon puts upon this
-step is hardly fair to the Thebans, as is so constantly the case throughout
-his history. He says that “they were in no hurry to fight” (οὐδέν τι κατήπειγον
-τὴν μάχην ξυνάπτειν) so long as they were on the left, opposed to the
-Lacedæmonians on the opposite right; but that as soon as they were on the
-right (opposed to the Achæans on the opposite left), they forthwith gave
-the word. Now it does not appear that the Thebans had any greater privilege
-on the day when they were on the right, than the Argeians or Athenians
-had when each were on the right respectively. The command had
-been determined to reside in the right division, which post alternated from
-one to the other; why the Athenians or Argeians did not make use of this
-post to order the attack, we cannot explain.
-</p>
-<p>
-So again, Xenophon says, that in spite of the resolution taken by the
-Council of War to have files sixteen deep, and no more,—the Thebans
-made their files much deeper. Yet it is plain, from his own account, that
-no mischievous consequences turned upon this greater depth.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_581"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_581">[581]</a></span> See the instructive description of the battle of Mantineia—in Thucyd.
-v, 71.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_582"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_582">[582]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iv, 2, 20-23.
-</p>
-<p>
-The allusion to this incident in Demosthenes (adv. Leptinem, c. 13, p.
-472) is interesting, though indistinct.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_583"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_583">[583]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iv, 2, 19. καὶ γὰρ ἦν λάσιον τὸ χωρίον—which illustrates
-the expression in Lysias, Orat. xvi, (pro Mantitheo) s. 20. ἐν Κορίνθῳ χωρίων
-ἰσχυρῶν κατειλημμένων.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_584"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_584">[584]</a></span> Lysias, Orat. xvi, (pro Mantitheo) s. 19.
-</p>
-<p>
-Plato in his panegyrical discourse (Menexenus, c. 17, p. 245 E.) ascribes
-the defeat and loss of the Athenians to “bad ground”—χρησαμένων δυσχωρίᾳ.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_585"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_585">[585]</a></span> Diodor. xiv, 83.
-</p>
-<p>
-The statement in Xenophon (Agesil. vii, 5) that near ten thousand men
-were slain on the side of the confederates, is a manifest exaggeration; if
-indeed the reading be correct.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_586"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_586">[586]</a></span> Xen. Agesil. i, 37; Plutarch, Agesil. c. 15. Cornelius Nepos (Agesilaus,
-c. 4) almost translates the Agesilaus of Xenophon; but we can better
-feel the force of <i>his</i> panegyric, when we recollect that he had had personal
-cognizance of the disobedience of Julius Cæsar in his province to the orders
-of the Senate, and that the omnipotence of Sylla and Pompey in their
-provinces were then matter of recent history. “Cujus exemplum (says
-Cornelius Nepos about Agesilaus) utinam imperatores nostri sequi voluissent!”</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_587"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_587">[587]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iv, 2, 2-5; Xen. Agesil. i, 38; Plutarch, Agesil. c. 16.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_588"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_588">[588]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iii, 4, 24.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_589"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_589">[589]</a></span> Xenoph. Agesil. vii, 5; Plutarch, Agesil. c. 16.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_590"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_590">[590]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iv, 2, 4-9; Diodor. xiv, 83.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_591"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_591">[591]</a></span> Plutarch (Agesil. c. 17; compare also Plutarch, Apophth. p. 795, as
-corrected by Morus ad Xen. Hellen. iv, 3, 15) states two moræ or regiments
-as having joined Agesilaus from Corinth; Xenophon alludes only to one,
-besides that mora which was in garrison at Orchomenus (Hellen. iv, 3, 15;
-Agesil. ii, 6).</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_592"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_592">[592]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iv, 3, 13.
-</p>
-<p>
-Ὁ μὲν οὖν Ἀγησίλαος πυθόμενος ταῦτα, τὸ μὲν πρῶτον χαλεπῶς ἔφερεν·
-ἐπεὶ μέντοι ἐνεθυμήθη, ὅτι τοῦ στρατεύματος τὸ πλεῖστον εἴη αὐτῷ,
-οἷον ἀγαθῶν μὲν γιγνομένων ἡδέως μετέχειν, εἰ δέ τι χαλεπὸν ὁρῷεν,
-οὐκ ἀνάγκην εἶναι κοινωνεῖν αὐτοῖς, etc.
-</p>
-<p>
-These indirect intimations of the real temper even of the philo-Spartan
-allies towards Sparta are very valuable when coming from Xenophon, as
-they contradict all his partialities, and are dropped here almost reluctantly,
-from the necessity of justifying the conduct of Agesilaus in publishing a
-false proclamation to his army.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_593"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_593">[593]</a></span> Lysias, Orat. xvi, (pro Mantitheo) s. 20. φοβουμένων ἁπάντων εἰκότως,
-etc.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_594"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_594">[594]</a></span> Plutarch, Agesil. c. 19.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_595"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_595">[595]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iv, 3, 17. ἀντεξέδραμον ἀπὸ τῆς Ἀγησιλάου φάλαγγος, etc.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_596"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_596">[596]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iv, 3, 19; Xen. Agesil. ii, 12.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_597"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_597">[597]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iv, 3, 16; Xen. Agesil. ii, 9.
-</p>
-<p>
-Διηγήσομαι δὲ καὶ τὴν μάχην· καὶ γὰρ ἐγένετο οἵα οὐκ ἄλλη τῶν γ᾽ ἐφ᾽ ἡμῶν.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_598"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_598">[598]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iv, 3, 19; Xen. Agesil. ii, 12.
-</p>
-<p>
-Καὶ συμβαλόντες τὰς ἀσπίδας ἐωθοῦντο, ἐμάχοντο, ἀπέκτεινον, ἀπέθνησκον.
-Καὶ κραυγὴ μὲν οὐδεμία παρῆν, οὐ μὴν οὐδὲ σιγή· φωνὴ δέ τις ἦν τοιαύτη,
-οἵαν ὀργή τε καὶ μάχη παράσχοιτ᾽ ἄν.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_599"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_599">[599]</a></span> Xen. Agesil. ii, 13. Ὁ δὲ, καίπερ πολλὰ τραύματα ἔχων πάντοσε
-καὶ παντοίοις ὅπλοις, etc.
-</p>
-<p>
-Plutarch, Agesil. c. 18.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_600"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_600">[600]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iv, 3, 19; Xen. Agesil. ii, 12.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_601"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_601">[601]</a></span> Xen. Agesil. ii, 14. Ἐπεί γε μὴν ἔληξεν ἡ μάχη,
-παρῆν δὴ θεάσασθαι ἔνθα συνέπεσον ἀλλήλοις, τὴν μὲν γῆν αἵματι
-πεφυρμένην, νεκροὺς δὲ κειμένους φιλίους καὶ πολεμίους μετ᾽ ἀλλήλων,
-ἀσπίδας δὲ διατεθρυμμένας, δόρατα συντεθραυσμένα, ἐγχειρίδια γυμνὰ
-κουλεῶν τὰ μὲν χαμαί, τὰ δ᾽ ἐν σώμασι, τὰ δ᾽ ἔτι μετὰ χειρός.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_602"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_602">[602]</a></span> Xen. Agesil. ii, 15. Τότε μὲν οὖν (καὶ γὰρ ἦν ἤδη ὀψέ)
-συνελκύσαντες <em class="gesperrt">τοὺς τῶν πολεμίων νεκροὺς</em> εἴσω φάλαγγος,
-ἐδειπνοποιήσαντο καὶ ἐκοιμήθησαν.
-</p>
-<p>
-Schneider in his note on this passage, as well as ad. Xen. Hellen. iv, 3,
-21—condemns the expression τῶν πολεμίων as spurious and unintelligible.
-But in my judgment, these words hear a plain and appropriate meaning,
-which I have endeavored to give in the text. Compare Plutarch, Agesil.
-c. 19.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_603"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_603">[603]</a></span> Diodor. xiv, 84.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_604"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_604">[604]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iv, 3, 21; Plutarch, Agesil. c. 19. The latter says—εἰς
-Δελφοὺς ἀπεκομίσθη <em class="gesperrt">Πυθίων ἀγομένων</em>, etc. Manso, Dr. Arnold, and
-others, contest the accuracy of Plutarch in this assertion respecting the time
-of year at which the Pythian games were celebrated, upon grounds which
-seem to me very insufficient.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_605"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_605">[605]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iv, 3, 22, 23; iv. 4, 1.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_606"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_606">[606]</a></span> Plutarch, Agesil. c. 17, 20; Xen. Hellen. v, 3, 20.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_607"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_607">[607]</a></span> Plutarch, Agesil. c. 17. Cornelius Nepos, Agesil. c. 4. “Obsistere ei
-conati sunt Athenienses et Bœoti,” etc. They <i>succeeded</i> in barring his way,
-and compelling him to retreat.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_608"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_608">[608]</a></span> Xenoph. Hellen. iv, 8, 1-5.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_609"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_609">[609]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 1-3; Diodor. xiv, 84. About Samos, xiv, 97.
-</p>
-<p>
-Compare also the speech of Derkyllidas to the Abydenes (Xen. Hellen.
-iv, 8, 4)—Ὅσῳ δὲ μᾶλλον αἱ ἄλλαι πόλεις ξὺν τῇ τύχῃ ἀπεστράφησαν ἡμῶν,
-τοσούτῳ ὄντως ἡ ὑμετέρα πιστότης μείζων φανείη ἄν, etc.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_610"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_610">[610]</a></span> Ἐκ γὰρ Ἀβύδου, τῆς τὸν ἅπαντα χρόνον ὑμῖν ἔχθρας—says Demosthenes
-in the Athenian assembly (cont. Aristokrat. c. 39, p. 672; compare
-c. 52, p. 688).</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_611"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_611">[611]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iv, 3, 2.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_612"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_612">[612]</a></span> Lysander, after the victory of Ægospotami and the expulsion of the
-Athenians from Sestos, had assigned the town and district as a settlement
-for the pilots and Keleustæ aboard his fleet. But the ephors are said to
-have reversed the assignment, and restored the town to the Sestians (Plutarch,
-Lysand. c. 14). Probably, however, the new settlers would remain
-in part upon the lands vacated by the expelled Athenians.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_613"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_613">[613]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 4-6.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_614"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_614">[614]</a></span> See Sir William Gell’s Itinerary of Greece, p. 4. Ernst Curtius—Peloponnesos—p.
-25, 26, and Thucyd. i, 108.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_615"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_615">[615]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 7, 8; Diodor. xiv, 84.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_616"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_616">[616]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 9, 10.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_617"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_617">[617]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iv. 8, 10; Diodor. xiv. 85.
-</p>
-<p>
-Cornelius Nepos (Conon, c. 4) mentions fifty talents as a sum received
-by Konon from Pharnabazus as a present, and devoted by him to this public
-work. This is not improbable; but the total sum contributed by the satrap
-towards the fortifications must, probably, have been much greater.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_618"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_618">[618]</a></span> Demosthen. cont. Androtion. p. 616. c. 21. Pausanias (i, 1, 3) still saw
-this temple in Peiræus—very near to the sea; five hundred and fifty years
-afterwards.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_619"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_619">[619]</a></span> Demosthen. cont. Leptin. c. 16. p. 477, 478; Athenæus, i, 3; Cornelius
-Nepos, Conon, c. 4.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_620"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_620">[620]</a></span> Plato, Legg. vi, p. 778; καθεύδειν ἐᾷν ἐν τῇ γῇ κατακείμενα τὰ τείχη, etc.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_621"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_621">[621]</a></span> The importance of maintaining these lines, as a protection to Athens
-against invasion from Sparta, is illustrated in Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 19, and
-Andokides, Or. iii, De Pace, s. 26.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_622"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_622">[622]</a></span> Harpokration, v. ξενικὸν ἐν Κορίνθῳ. Philochorus, Fragm. 150, ed. Didot.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_623"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_623">[623]</a></span> Lysias, Orat. xix, (De Bonis Aristophanis) s. 21.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_624"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_624">[624]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 11.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_625"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_625">[625]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iv, 4, 1; iv, 5, 1.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_626"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_626">[626]</a></span> I dissent from Mr. Fynes Clinton as well as from M. Rehdantz (Vitæ
-Iphicratis, etc., c. 4, who in the main agrees with Dodwell’s Annales Xenophontei)
-in their chronological arrangement of these events.
-</p>
-<p>
-They place the battle fought by Praxitas within the Long Walls of Corinth
-in 393 <small>B.C.</small>, and the destruction of the Lacedæmonian <i>mora</i> or division
-by Iphikrates (the monthly date of which is marked by its having immediately
-succeeded the Isthmian games), in 392 <small>B.C.</small> I place the former event
-in 392 <small>B.C.</small>; the latter in 390 <small>B.C.</small>, immediately after the Isthmian games
-of 390 <small>B.C.</small>
-</p>
-<p>
-If we study the narrative of Xenophon, we shall find, that after describing
-(iv, 3) the battle of Korôneia (August 394 <small>B.C.</small>) with its immediate consequences,
-and the return of Agesilaus home,—he goes on in the next chapter
-to narrate the land-war about or near Corinth, which he carries down
-without interruption (through Chapters 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, of Book iv.) to 389 <small>B.C.</small>
-</p>
-<p>
-But in Chapter 8 of Book iv, he leaves the land-war, and takes up the
-naval operations, from and after the battle of Knidus (Aug. 394 <small>B.C.</small>). He
-recounts how Pharnabazus and Konon came across the Ægean with a powerful
-fleet in the spring of 393 <small>B.C.</small>, and how after various proceedings, they
-brought the fleet to the Saronic Gulf and the Isthmus of Corinth, where
-they must have arrived at or near midsummer 393 <small>B.C.</small>
-</p>
-<p>
-Now it appears to me certain, that these proceedings of Pharnabazus with
-the fleet, recounted in the eighth chapter, come, in point of date, <i>before</i> the
-seditious movements and the <i>coup d’état</i> at Corinth, which are recounted
-in the fourth chapter. At the time when Pharnabazus was at Corinth in
-midsummer 393 <small>B.C.</small>, the narrative of Xenophon (iv, 8, 8-10) leads us to
-believe that the Corinthians were prosecuting the war zealously, and without
-discontent: the money and encouragement which Pharnabazus gave them
-was calculated to strengthen such ardor. It was by aid of this money that
-the Corinthians fitted out their fleet under Agathinus, and acquired for a
-time the maritime command of the Gulf.
-</p>
-<p>
-The discontents against the war (recounted in chap. 4 <i>seq.</i>) could not
-have commenced until a considerable time after the departure of Pharnabazus.
-They arose out of causes which only took effect after a long continuance,—the
-hardships of the land-war, the losses of property and slaves,
-the jealousy towards Attica and Bœotia as being undisturbed, etc. The
-Lacedæmonian and Peloponnesian aggressive force at Sikyon cannot possibly
-have been established before the autumn of
-<span class="replace" id="tn_5" title="In the printed book: 494 B.C.">394 <small>B.C.</small></span>,
-and was most
-probably placed there early in the spring of 393 <small>B.C.</small> Its effects were brought
-about, not by one great blow, but by repetition of ravages and destructive
-annoyance; and all the effects which it produced previous to midsummer
-393 <small>B.C.</small> would be more than compensated by the presence, the gifts, and
-the encouragement of Pharnabazus with his powerful fleet. Moreover, after
-his departure, too, the Corinthians were at first successful at sea, and
-acquired the command of the Gulf, which, however, they did not retain for
-more than a year, if so much. Hence, it is not likely that any strong discontent
-against the war began before the early part of 392 <small>B.C.</small>
-</p>
-<p>
-Considering all these circumstances, I think it reasonable to believe that
-the <i>coup d’état</i> and massacre at Corinth took place (not in 393 <small>B.C.</small>, as Mr.
-Clinton and M. Rehdantz place it, but) in 392 <small>B.C.</small>; and the battle within
-the Long Walls rather later in the same year.
-</p>
-<p>
-Next, the opinion of the same two authors, as well as of Dodwell,—that
-the destruction of the Lacedæmonian <i>mora</i> by Iphicrates took place in the
-spring of 392 <small>B.C.</small>,—is also, in my view, erroneous. If this were true, it
-would be necessary to pack all the events mentioned in Xenophon, iv, 4,
-into the year 393 <small>B.C.</small>; which I hold to be impossible. If the destruction
-of the mora did not occur in the spring of 393 <small>B.C.</small>, we know that it could
-not have occurred until the spring of 390 <small>B.C.</small>; that is, the next ensuing
-Isthmian games, two years afterwards. And this last will be found to be
-its true date; thus leaving full time, but not too much time, for the antecedent
-occurrences.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_627"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_627">[627]</a></span> Plutarch, Dion. c. 53.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_628"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_628">[628]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iv, 4, 2. Γνόντες δὲ οἱ Ἀργεῖοι καὶ Βοιωτοὶ
-καὶ Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ Κορινθίων οἵ τε τῶν παρὰ βασιλέως χρημάτων μετεσχηκότες,
-καὶ οἱ τοῦ πολέμου αἰτιώτατοι γεγενημένοι, ὡς, εἰ μὴ ἐκποδὼν ποιήσαιντο
-τοὺς ἐπὶ τὴν εἰρήνην τετραμμένους, κινδυνεύσει πάλιν ἡ πόλις
-λακωνίσαι—οὕτω δὴ καὶ σφαγὰς ἐπεχείρουν ποιεῖσθαι.
-</p>
-<p>
-iv, 4, 4. Οἱ δὲ νεώτεροι, ὑποπτεύσαντος Πασιμήλου τὸ μέλλον ἔσεσθαι,
-ἡσυχίαν ἔσχον ἐν τῷ Κρανίῳ· ὡς δὲ τῆς κραυγῆς ἤσθοντο, καὶ φεύγοντές
-τινες ἐκ τοῦ πράγματος ἀφίκοντο πρὸς αὐτούς, ἐκ τούτου ἀναδραμόντες
-κατὰ τὸν Ἀκροκόρινθον, προσβαλόντας μὲν Ἀργείους καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους
-ἀπεκρούσαντο, etc.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_629"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_629">[629]</a></span> Thucyd. iii, 70.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_630"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_630">[630]</a></span> Diodorus (xiv, 86) gives this number, which seems very credible. Xenophon
-(iv, 4, 4) only says πολλοί.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_631"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_631">[631]</a></span> In recounting this alternation of violence projected, violence perpetrated,
-recourse on the one side to a foreign ally, treason on the other by admitting
-an avowed enemy,—which formed the <i>modus operandi</i> of opposing
-parties in the oligarchical Corinth,—I invite the reader to contrast it with
-the democratical Athens.
-</p>
-<p>
-At Athens, in the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, there were precisely
-the same causes at work, and precisely the same marked antithesis of
-parties, as those which here disturbed Corinth. There was first, a considerable
-Athenian minority who opposed the war with Sparta from the first;
-next, when the war began, the proprietors of Attica saw their lands ruined,
-and were compelled either to carry away, or to lose, their servants and cattle,
-so that they obtained no returns. The intense discontent, the angry
-complaints, the bitter conflict of parties, which these circumstances raised
-among the Athenian citizens,—not to mention the aggravation of all these
-symptoms by the terrible epidemic,—are marked out in Thucydides, and
-have been recorded in the fifth volume of this history. Not only the positive
-loss and suffering, but all other causes of exasperation, stood at a higher
-pitch at Athens in the early part of the Peloponnesian war, than at Corinth
-in 392 <small>B.C.</small>
-</p>
-<p>
-Yet what were the effects which they produced? Did the minority resort
-to a conspiracy,—or the majority to a <i>coup d’état</i>—or either of them to
-invitation of foreign aid against the other? Nothing of the kind. The
-minority had always open to them the road of pacific opposition, and the
-chance of obtaining a majority in the Senate or in the public assembly,
-which was practically identical with the totality of the citizens. Their opposition,
-though pacific as to acts, was sufficiently animated and violent in
-words and propositions, to serve as a real discharge for imprisoned angry
-passion. If they could not carry the adoption of their general policy, they
-had the opportunity of gaining partial victories which took off the edge of
-a fierce discontent; witness the fine imposed upon Perikles (Thucyd. ii, 65)
-in the year before his death, which both gratified and mollified the antipathy
-against him, and brought about shortly afterwards a strong reaction in
-his favor. The majority, on the other hand, knew that the predominance
-of its policy depended upon its maintaining its hold on a fluctuating public
-assembly, against the utmost freedom of debate and attack, within certain
-forms and rules prescribed by the constitution; attachment to the
-latter being the cardinal principle of political morality in both parties. It
-was this system which excluded on both sides the thought of armed violence.
-It produced among the democratical citizens of Athens that characteristic
-insisted upon by Kleon in Thucydides,—“constant and fearless
-security and absence of treacherous hostility among one another” (διὰ γὰρ τὸ
-καθ᾽ ἡμέραν ἀδεὲς καὶ ἀνεπιβούλευτον πρὸς ἀλλήλους, καὶ ἐς τοὺς ξυμμάχους
-τὸ αὐτὸ ἔχετε—Thuc. iii, 37), the entire absence of which stands so
-prominently forward in these deplorable proceedings of the oligarchical
-Corinth. Pasimêlus and his Corinthian minority had no assemblies, dikasteries,
-annual Senate, or constant habit of free debate and accusation, to
-appeal to; their only available weapon was armed violence, or treacherous
-correspondence with a foreign enemy. On the part of the Corinthian government,
-superior or more skilfully used force, or superior alliance abroad,
-was the only weapon of defence, in like manner.
-</p>
-<p>
-I shall return to this subject in a future chapter, where I enter more at
-large into the character of the Athenians.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_632"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_632">[632]</a></span> Diodor. xiv, 86; Xen. Hellen. iv, 4, 5.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_633"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_633">[633]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iv, 4, 8. καὶ κατὰ τύχην καὶ κατ᾽ ἐπιμέλειαν, etc.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_634"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_634">[634]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iv, 4, 8. Nothing can show more forcibly the Laconian
-bias of Xenophon, than the credit which he gives to Pasimêlus for his good
-faith towards the Lacedæmonians whom he was letting in; overlooking or
-approving his treacherous betrayal towards his own countrymen, in thus
-opening a gate which he had been trusted to watch. τὼ δ᾽ εἰσηγαγέτην,
-καὶ <em class="gesperrt">οὕτως ἁπλῶς ἀπεδειξάτην</em>, ὥστε ὁ εἰσελθὼν ἐξήγγειλε, πάντα
-εἶναι ἀδόλως, οἷάπερ ἐλεγέτην.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_635"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_635">[635]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iv, 4. 10. Καὶ τοὺς μὲν Σικυωνίους ἐκράτησαν
-καὶ διασπάσαντες τὸ σταύρωμα ἐδίωκον ἐπὶ θάλασσαν, καὶ ἐκεῖ πολλοὺς
-αὐτῶν ἀπέκτειναν.
-</p>
-<p>
-It would appear from hence that there must have been an open portion
-of Lechæum, or a space apart from (but adjoining to) the wall which encircled
-Lechæum, yet still within the Long Walls. Otherwise the fugitive
-Sikyonians could hardly have got down to the sea.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_636"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_636">[636]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iv, 4, 12. Οὕτως ἐν ὀλίγῳ πολλοὶ ἔπεσον, ὥστε
-εἰθισμένοι ὁρᾷν οἱ ἄνθρωποι σωροὺς σίτου, ξύλων, λίθου, τότε ἐθεάσαντο
-σωροὺς νεκρῶν.
-</p>
-<p>
-A singular form of speech.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_637"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_637">[637]</a></span> Diodorus (xiv, 87) represents that the Lacedæmonians on this
-occasion surprised and held Lechæum, defeating the general body of
-the confederates who came out from Corinth to retake it. But his
-narrative of all these circumstances differs materially from that
-of Xenophon; whom I here follow in preference, making allowance for
-great partiality, and for much confusion and obscurity.
-</p>
-<p>
-Xenophon gives us plainly to understand, that Lechæum was <i>not</i>
-captured by the Lacedæmonians until the following year, by Agesilaus
-and Teleutias.
-</p>
-<p>
-It is to be recollected that Xenophon had particular means of knowing
-what was done by Agesilaus, and therefore deserves credit on that
-head,—always allowing for partiality. Diodorus does not mention
-Agesilaus in connection with the proceedings at Lechæum.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_638"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_638">[638]</a></span> Diodor. xv, 44; Cornelius Nepos, Vit. Iphicrat. c. 2; Polyæn. iii, 9, 10.
-Compare Rehdantz, Vitæ Iphicratis, Chabriæ, et Timothei, c. 2, 7 (Berlin,
-1845)—a very useful and instructive publication.
-</p>
-<p>
-In describing the improvements made by Iphikrates in the armature of
-his peltasts, I have not exactly copied either Nepos or Diodorus, who both
-appear to me confused in their statements. You would imagine, in reading
-their account (and so it has been stated by Weber, Prolegg. ad Demosth.
-cont. Aristokr. p. xxxv.), that there were no peltasts in Greece prior to Iphikrates;
-that he was the first to transform heavy-armed hoplites into light-armed
-peltasts, and to introduce from Thrace the light shield or <i>pelta</i>, not
-only smaller in size than the round ἀσπὶς carried by the hoplite, but also
-without the ἴτυς (or surrounding metallic rim of the ἀσπὶς) seemingly connected
-by outside bars or spokes of metal with the exterior central knob
-or projection (<i>umbo</i>) which the hoplite pushed before him in close combat.
-The <i>pelta</i>, smaller and lighter than the ἀσπὶς, was seemingly square or oblong
-and not round; though it had no ἴτυς, it often had thin plates of brass,
-as we may see by Xenophon, Anab. v, 2, 29, so that the explanation of it
-given in the Scholia ad Platon. Legg. vii, p. 813 must be taken with reserve.
-</p>
-<p>
-But Grecian peltasts existed before the time of Iphikrates (Xen. Hellen.
-i, 2, 1 and elsewhere); he did not first introduce them; he found them already
-there, and improved their armature. Both Diodorus and Nepos affirm
-that he lengthened the <i>spears</i> of the peltasts to a measure half as long again
-as those of the hoplites (or twice as long, if we believe Nepos), and the
-swords in proportion—“ηὔξησε μὲν τὰ δόρατα ἡμιολίῳ μεγέθει—hastæ
-modum duplicavit.” Now this I apprehend to be not exact; nor is it true
-(as Nepos asserts) that the Grecian hoplites carried “short spears”—“brevibus
-hastis.” The spear of the Grecian hoplite was long (though not
-so long as that of the heavy and compact Macedonian phalanx afterwards
-became), and it appears to me incredible that Iphikrates should have given
-to his light and active peltast a spear twice as long, or half as long again,
-as that of the hoplite. Both Diodorus and Nepos have mistaken by making
-their comparison with the arms <i>of the hoplite</i>, to which the changes of Iphikrates
-had no reference. The peltast both before and after Iphikrates did
-not carry a <i>spear</i>, but a <i>javelin</i>, which he employed as a missile, to hurl, not
-to thrust; he was essentially an ἀκοντιστὴς or javelin-shooter (See Xenoph.
-Hellen. iv, 5, 14; vi, 1, 9). Of course the javelin might, in case of need,
-serve to thrust, but this was not its appropriate employment; <i>e converso</i>, the
-spear might be hurled (under advantageous circumstances, from the higher
-ground against an enemy below—Xen. Hellen. ii. 4, 15; v, 4, 52), but its
-proper employment was, to be held and thrust forward.
-</p>
-<p>
-What Iphikrates really did, was, to lengthen both the two offensive
-weapons which the peltast carried, before his time,—the javelin, and the
-sword. He made the javelin a longer and heavier weapon, requiring a
-more practised hand to throw—but also competent to inflict more serious
-wounds, and capable of being used with more deadly effect if the peltasts
-saw an opportunity of coming to close fight on advantageous terms. Possibly
-Iphikrates not only lengthened the weapon, but also improved its
-point and efficacy in other ways; making it more analogous to the formidable
-Roman <i>pilum</i>. Whether he made any alteration in the <i>pelta</i> itself,
-we do not know.
-</p>
-<p>
-The name <i>Iphikratides</i>, given to these new-fashioned leggings or boots,
-proves to us that Wellington and Blucher are not the first eminent generals
-who have lent an honorable denomination to boots and shoes.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_639"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_639">[639]</a></span> Justin, vi, 5.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_640"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_640">[640]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iv, 4, 16; Diodor. xiv, 91.
-</p>
-<p>
-Τοὺς μέντοι Λακεδαιμονίους οὕτως αὖ οἱ πελτασταὶ ἐδέδισαν, ὡς ἐντὸς
-ἀκοντίσματος οὐ προσῄεσαν τοῖς ὁπλίταις, etc.
-</p>
-<p>
-Compare the sentiment of the light troops in the attack of Sphakteria,
-when they were awe-struck and afraid at first to approach the Lacedæmonian
-hoplites—τῇ γνώμῃ δεδουλωμένοι ὡς ἐπὶ Λακεδαιμονίους, etc. (Thucyd. iv,
-34).</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_641"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_641">[641]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iv, 4, 17. ὥστε οἱ μὲν Λακεδαιμόνιοι καὶ
-ἐπισκώπτειν ἐτόλμων, ὡς οἱ σύμμαχοι φοβοῖντο τοὺς πελταστὰς, ὥσπερ
-μορμῶνας παιδάρια, etc.
-</p>
-<p>
-This is a camp-jest of the time, which we have to thank Xenophon for
-preserving.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_642"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_642">[642]</a></span> Xenoph. Agesil. ii, 17. ἀναπετάσας τῆς Πελοποννήσου τὰς πύλας, etc.
-</p>
-<p>
-Respecting the Long Walls of Corinth, as part of a line of defence
-which barred ingress to, or egress from, Peloponnesus,—Colonel Leake remarks,—“The
-narrative of Xenophon shows the great importance of the
-Corinthian Long Walls in time of war. They completed a line of fortification
-from the summit of the Acro-Corinthus to the sea, and thus intercepted
-the most direct and easy communication from the Isthmus into
-Peloponnesus. For the rugged mountain, which borders the southern side
-of the Isthmian plain, has only two passes,—one, by the opening on the
-eastern side of Acro-Corinthus, which obliged an enemy to pass under the
-eastern side of Corinth, and was, moreover, defended by a particular kind
-of fortification, as some remains of walls still testify,—the other, along
-the shore at Cenchreiæ, which was also a fortified place in the hands of the
-Corinthians. Hence the importance of the pass of Cenchreiæ, in all operations
-between the Peloponnesians, and an enemy without the Isthmus.”
-(Leake, Travels in Morea, vol. iii, ch. xxviii, p. 254).
-</p>
-<p>
-Compare Plutarch, Aratus, c. 16; and the operations of Epaminondas as
-described by Diodorus, xv, 68.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_643"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_643">[643]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iv, 4, 18. ἐλθόντες <em class="gesperrt">πανδημεὶ</em> μετὰ λιθολόγων καὶ τεκτόνων,
-etc. The word πανδημεὶ shows how much they were alarmed.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_644"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_644">[644]</a></span> Thucyd. vi, 98.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_645"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_645">[645]</a></span> The words stand in the text of Xenophon,—εὐθὺς ἐκεῖθεν ὑπερβαλὼν κατὰ
-<em class="gesperrt">Τεγέαν</em> εἰς Κόρινθον. A straight march from the Argeian territory
-to Corinth could not possibly carry Agesilaus by <i>Tegea</i>; Kœppen proposes
-<em class="gesperrt">Τενέαν</em>, which I accept, as geographically suitable. I am not certain,
-however, that it is right; the <i>Agesilaus</i> of Xenophon has the words κατὰ τὰ στενά.
-</p>
-<p>
-About the probable situation of Tenea, see Colonel Leake, Travels in
-Morea, vol. iii, p. 321; also his Peloponnesiaca, p. 400.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_646"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_646">[646]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iv, 4, 19—iv, 8, 10, 11.
-</p>
-<p>
-It was rather late in the autumn of 393 <small>B.C.</small> that the Lacedæmonian
-maritime operations in the Corinthian Gulf began, against the fleet recently
-equipped by the Corinthians out of the funds lent by Pharnabazus. First,
-the Lacedæmonian Polemarchus was named admiral; he was slain,—and
-his secretary Pollis, who succeeded to his command, retired afterwards
-wounded. Next came Herippidas to the command, who was succeeded by
-Teleutias. Now if we allow to Herippidas a year of command (the ordinary
-duration of a Lacedæmonian admiral’s appointment), and to the other
-two something less than a year, since their time was brought to an end by
-accidents,—we shall find that the appointment of Teleutias will fall in the
-spring or early summer of 391 <small>B.C.</small>, the year of this expedition of Agesilaus.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_647"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_647">[647]</a></span> Andokides de Pace, s. 18; Xen. Hellen. iv, 4, 19. Παρεγένετο δὲ
-αὐτῷ (Ἀγησιλάῳ) καὶ ὁ ἁδελφὸς Τελευτίας κατὰ θάλασσαν, ἔχων τριήρεις περὶ
-δώδεκα· ὥστε μακαρίζεσθαι αὐτῶν τὴν μητέρα, ὅτι τῇ αὐτῇ ἡμέρᾳ ὧν <em class="gesperrt">ἔτεκεν
-ὁ μὲν κατὰ γῆν τὰ τείχη τῶν πολεμίων, ὁ δὲ κατὰ θάλασσαν τὰς ναῦς καὶ
-τὰ νεώρια ᾕρηκε</em>.
-</p>
-<p>
-This last passage indicates decidedly that Lechæum was not taken until
-this joint attack by Agesilaus and Teleutias. And the authority of Xenophon
-on the point is superior, in my judgment, to that of Diodorus (xiv,
-86), who represents Lechæum to have been taken in the year before, on the
-occasion when the Lacedæmonians were first admitted by treachery within
-the Long Walls.
-</p>
-<p>
-The passage from Aristeides the rhetor, referred to by Wesseling, Mr.
-Clinton, and others, only mentions the <i>battle</i> at Lechæum—<i>not the capture</i>
-of the port. Xenophon also mentions a <i>battle</i> as having taken place close
-to Lechæum, between the two long walls, on the occasion when Diodorus
-talks of the <i>capture</i> of Lechæum; so that Aristeides is more in harmony
-with Xenophon than with Diodorus.
-</p>
-<p>
-A few months prior to this joint attack of Agesilaus and Teleutias, the
-Athenians had come with an army, and with masons and carpenters, for the
-express purpose of rebuilding the Long Walls which Praxitas had in part
-broken down. This step would have been both impracticable and useless,
-if the Lacedæmonians had stood then in possession of Lechæum.
-</p>
-<p>
-There is one passage of Xenophon, indeed, which looks as if the Lacedæmonians
-had been in possession of Lechæum <i>before</i> this expedition of the
-Athenians to reëstablish the Long Walls,—Αὐτοὶ (the Lacedæmonians)
-<em class="gesperrt">δ᾽ ἐκ τοῦ Λεχαίου ὁρμώμενοι</em> σὺν μόρᾳ καὶ τοῖς τῶν Κορινθίων φυγάσι,
-κύκλῳ περὶ τὸ ἄστυ τῶν Κορινθίων ἐστρατεύοντο (iv, 4, 17). But
-whoever reads attentively the sections from 15 to 19 inclusive, will see (I
-think) that this affirmation may well refer to a period after, and not before,
-the capture of Lechæum by Agesilaus; for it has reference to the general
-contempt shown by the Lacedæmonians for the peltasts of Iphikrates, as
-contrasted with the terror displayed by the Mantineians and others, of these
-same peltasts. Even if this were otherwise, however, I should still say
-that the passages which I have produced above from Xenophon show plainly
-that <i>he</i> represents Lechæum to have been captured by Agesilaus and
-Teleutias; and that the other words, ἐκ τοῦ Λεχαίου ὁρμώμενοι, if they
-really implied anything inconsistent with this, must be regarded as an inaccuracy.
-</p>
-<p>
-I will add that the chapter of Diodorus, xiv, 86, puts into one year events
-which cannot all be supposed to have taken place in that same year.
-</p>
-<p>
-Had Lechæum been in possession and occupation by the Lacedæmonians
-in the year preceding the joint attack by Agesilaus and Teleutias, Xenophon
-would surely have mentioned it in iv, 4, 14; for it was a more important
-post than Sikyon, for acting against Corinth.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_648"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_648">[648]</a></span> Xen. Agesilaus, ii, 17.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_649"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_649">[649]</a></span> Our knowledge of the abortive negotiations adverted to in the text, is
-derived, partly from the third Oration of Andokides called de Pace,—partly
-from a statement contained in the Argument of that Oration, and
-purporting to be borrowed from Philochorus—Φιλόχορος μὲν οὖν λέγει καὶ ελθεῖν
-τοὺς πρέσβεις ἐκ Λακεδαίμονος, καὶ ἀπράκτους ἀνελθεῖν, μὴ πείσαντος
-τοῦ Ἀνδοκίδου.
-</p>
-<p>
-Whether Philochorus had any additional grounds to rest upon, other
-than this very oration itself, may appear doubtful. But at any rate, this
-important fragment (which I do not see noticed among the fragments of
-Philochorus in M. Didot’s collection) counts for some farther evidence as
-to the reality of the peace proposed and discussed, but not concluded.
-</p>
-<p>
-Neither Xenophon nor Diodorus make any mention of such mission to
-Sparta, or discussion at Athens, as that which forms the subject of the Andokidean
-oration. But on the other hand, neither of them says anything
-which goes to contradict the reality of the event; nor can we in this case
-found any strong negative inference on the mere silence of Xenophon, in
-the case of a pacific proposition which ultimately came to nothing.
-</p>
-<p>
-If indeed we could be certain that the oration of Andokides was genuine
-it would of itself be sufficient to establish the reality of the mission to
-which it relates. It would be sufficient evidence, not only without corroboration
-from Xenophon, but even against any contradictory statement proceeding
-from Xenophon. But unfortunately, the rhetor Dionysius pronounced
-this oration to be spurious; which introduces a doubt and throws
-us upon the investigation of collateral probabilities. I have myself a
-decided opinion (already stated more than once), that another out of the
-four orations ascribed to Andokides (I mean the fourth oration, entitled
-against Alkibiades) is spurious; and I was inclined to the same suspicion
-with respect to this present oration De Pace; a suspicion which I expressed
-in a former volume (Vol. V, Ch. xlv, p. 334). But on studying over again
-with attention this oration De Pace, I find reason to retract my suspicion,
-and to believe that the oration may be genuine. It has plenty of erroneous
-allegations as to matter of fact, especially in reference to times prior to the
-battle of Ægospotami; but not one, so far as I can detect, which conflicts
-with <i>the situation</i> to which the orator addresses himself,—nor which requires
-us to pronounce it spurious.
-</p>
-<p>
-Indeed, in considering <i>this situation</i> (which is the most important point
-to be studied when we are examining the genuineness of an oration), we
-find a partial coincidence in Xenophon, which goes to strengthen our affirmative
-confidence. One point much insisted upon in the oration is, that
-the Bœotians were anxious to make peace with Sparta, and were willing to
-relinquish Orchomenus (s. 13-20). Now Xenophon also mentions, three or
-four months afterwards, the Bœotians as being anxious for peace, and as
-sending envoys to Agesilaus to ask on what terms it would be granted to
-them (Xen. Hellen. iv, 5, 6). This coincidence is of some value in reference
-to the authenticity of the oration.
-</p>
-<p>
-Assuming the oration to be genuine, its date is pretty clearly marked,
-and is rightly placed by Mr. Fynes Clinton in 391 <small>B.C.</small> It was in the autumn
-or winter of that year, four years after the commencement of the war
-in Bœotia which began in 395 <small>B.C.</small> (s. 20). It was <i>after</i> the capture of
-Lechæum, which took place in the summer of 391 <small>B.C.</small>—and <i>before</i> the destruction
-of the Lacedæmonian <i>mora</i> by Iphikrates, which took place in the
-spring of 390 <i>B.C.</i> For Andokides emphatically intimates, that at the moment
-when he spoke, <i>not one military success</i> had yet been obtained against
-the Lacedæmonians—καίτοι ποίας τινος ἂν ἐκεῖνοι παρ᾽ ἡμῶν εἰρήνης ἔτυχον,
-<em class="gesperrt">εἰ μίαν μόνον μάχην ἡττήθησαν</em>; (s. 19). This could never have
-been said <i>after</i> the destruction of the Lacedæmonian <i>mora</i>, which made so
-profound a sensation throughout Greece, and so greatly altered the temper
-of the contending parties. And it seems to me one proof (among others)
-that Mr. Fynes Clinton has not placed correctly the events subsequent to
-the battle of Corinth, when I observe that he assigns the destruction of the
-<i>mora</i> to the year 392 <small>B.C.</small>, a year <i>before</i> the date which he rightly allots to
-the Andokidean oration. I have placed (though upon other grounds) the
-destruction of the <i>mora</i> in the spring of 390 <i>B.C.</i>, which receives additional
-confirmation from this passage of Andokides.
-</p>
-<p>
-Both Valckenaer and Sluiter (Lect. Andocid. c. x,) consider the oration
-of Andokides de Pace as genuine; Taylor and other critics hold the contrary
-opinion.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_650"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_650">[650]</a></span> Xen. Agesil. ii, 18.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_651"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_651">[651]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iv, 5, 1; Plutarch, Agesil. c. 21.
-</p>
-<p>
-Xenophon, who writes his history in the style and language of a partisan,
-says that “<i>the Argeians</i> celebrated the festival, Corinth having now become
-Argos.” But it seems plain that the truth was as I have stated in the text,—and
-that the Argeians stood by (with others of the confederates probably
-also) to protect the Corinthians of the city in the exercise of their usual
-privilege; just as Agesilaus, immediately afterwards, stood by to protect
-the Corinthian exiles while they were doing the same thing.
-</p>
-<p>
-The Isthmian games were <i>trietêric</i>, that is, celebrated in every alternate
-year; in one of the spring months, about April or perhaps the beginning of
-May (the Greek months being lunar, no one of them would coincide regularly
-with any one of our calendar months, year after year); and in the
-<i>second</i> and <i>fourth</i> Olympic years. From Thucydides, viii, 9, 10, we know
-that this festival was celebrated in April 412 <small>B.C.</small>; that is, towards the end
-of the <i>fourth</i> year of Olympiad 91, about two or three months before the
-festival of Olympiad 92.
-</p>
-<p>
-Dodwell (De Cyclis Diss. vi, 2, just cited), Corsini, (Diss. Agonistic. iv,
-3), and Schneider in his note to this passage of Xenophon,—all state the
-Isthmian games to have been celebrated in the <i>first</i> and <i>third</i> Olympic
-years; which is, in my judgment, a mistake. Dodwell erroneously states
-the Isthmian games mentioned in Thucydides, viii, 9, to have been celebrated
-at the beginning of Olympiad 92, instead of the fourth quarter of the fourth
-year of Olympiad 91; a mistake pointed out by Krüger (<i>ad loc.</i>) as well as
-by Poppo and Dr. Arnold; although the argumentation of the latter, founded
-upon the time of the Lacedæmonian festival of the Hyakinthia, is extremely
-uncertain. It is a still more strange idea of Dodwell, that the Isthmian
-games were celebrated at the same time as the Olympic games (Annal.
-Xenoph. ad ann. 392).</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_652"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_652">[652]</a></span> See Ulrichs, Reisen und Forschungen in Griechenland, chap. i, p. 3.
-The modern village and port of Lutráki derives its name from these warm
-springs, which are quite close to it and close to the sea, at the foot of the
-mountain of Perachora or Peiræum; on the side of the bay opposite to
-Lechæum, but near the point where the level ground constituting the Isthmus
-(properly so-called), ends,—and where the rocky or mountainous
-region, forming the westernmost portion of Geraneia (or the peninsula of
-Peiræum), begins. The language of Xenophon, therefore, when he comes
-to describe the back-march of Agesilaus is perfectly accurate,—ἤδη δ᾽
-ἐκπεπερακότος αὐτοῦ τὰ θερμὰ ἐς τὸ πλατὺ τοῦ Λεχαίου, etc. (iv, 5, 8).</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_653"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_653">[653]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iv, 5, 4.
-</p>
-<p>
-Xenophon here recounts how Agesilaus sent up ten men with fire in
-pans, to enable those on the heights to make fires and warm themselves;
-the night being very cold and rainy, the situation very high, and the troops
-not having come out with blankets or warm covering to protect them. They
-kindled large fires, and the neighboring temple of Poseidon was accidentally
-burnt.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_654"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_654">[654]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iv, 5, 5.
-</p>
-<p>
-This Œnoê must not be confounded with the Athenian town of that
-name, which lay on the frontiers of Attica towards Bœotia.
-</p>
-<p>
-So also the town of Peiræum here noticed must not be confounded with
-another Peiræum, which was also in the Corinthian territory, but on the
-Saronic Gulf, and on the frontiers of Epidaurus (Thucyd. viii, 10).</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_655"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_655">[655]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iv, 5, 5-8.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_656"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_656">[656]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. i, 5, 14. See Vol. VIII, Ch. lxiv, p. 165 of this History.
-</p>
-<p>
-The sale of prisoners here directed by Agesilaus belies the encomiums of
-his biographers (Xen. Agesil. vii, 6; Cornel. Nep. Agesil. c. 5).</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_657"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_657">[657]</a></span> Xen. Agesil. vii, 6; Cornelius Nepos, Ages. c. 5.
-</p>
-<p>
-The story of Polyænus (iii, 9, 45) may perhaps refer to this point of time.
-But it is rare that we can verify his anecdotes or those of the other Tactic
-writers. M. Rehdantz strives in vain to find proper places for the sixty-three
-different stratagems which Polyænus ascribes to Iphikrates.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_658"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_658">[658]</a></span> This Lake is now called Lake Vuliasmeni. Considerable ruins were
-noticed by M. Dutroyat, in the recent French survey, near its western extremity;
-on which side it adjoins the temple of Hêrê Akræa, or the Heræum.
-See M. Boblaye, Recherches Géographiques sur les Ruines de la
-Morée, p. 36; and Colonel Leake’s Peloponnesiaca, p. 399.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_659"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_659">[659]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iv, 5, 6.
-</p>
-<p>
-Τῶν δὲ Λακεδαιμονίων ἀπὸ τῶν ὅπλων σὺν τοῖς δόρασι παρηκολούθουν φύλακες
-τῶν αἰχμαλώτων, μάλα ὑπὸ τῶν παρόντων θεωρούμενοι· οἱ γὰρ εὐτυχοῦντες καὶ
-κρατοῦντες ἀεί πως ἀξιοθέατοι δοκοῦσιν εἶναι. Ἔτι δὲ καθημένου τοῦ Ἀγησιλάου,
-καὶ ἐοικότος ἀγαλλομένῳ τοῖς πεπραγμένοις, ἱππεύς τις προσήλαυνε, καὶ μάλα
-ἰσχυρῶς ἱδρῶντι τῷ ἵππῳ· ὑπὸ πολλῶν δὲ ἐρωτώμενος ὅ,τι ἀγγέλλοι, οὐδενὶ
-ἀπεκρίνατο, etc.
-</p>
-<p>
-It is interesting to mark in Xenophon the mixture of Philo-Laconian
-complacency,—of philosophical reflection,—and of that care in bringing
-out the contrast of good fortune, with sudden reverse instantly following
-upon it, which forms so constant a point of effect with Grecian poets and
-historians.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_660"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_660">[660]</a></span> Plutarch, Agesil. c. 22. ἔπαθε δὲ πρᾶγμα νεμεσητὸν, etc.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_661"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_661">[661]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iv, 5, 7-9.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_662"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_662">[662]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iv, 5, 11, 12.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_663"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_663">[663]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iv, 5, 14. Τούτους μὲν ἐκέλευον τοὺς
-ὑπασπιστὰς ἀραμένους ἀποφέρειν ἐς Λέχαιον· <em class="gesperrt">οὗτοι καὶ μόνοι
-τῆς μόρας τῇ ἀληθείᾳ ἐσώθησαν</em>.
-</p>
-<p>
-We have here a remarkable expression of Xenophon,—“These were the
-only men in the mora who were <i>really and truly saved</i>.” He means, I presume,
-that they were the only men who were saved without the smallest
-loss of honor; being carried off wounded from the field of battle, and not
-having fled or deserted their posts. The others who survived, preserved
-themselves by flight; and we know that the treatment of those Lacedæmonians
-who ran away from the field (οἱ τρέσαντες), on their return to Sparta,
-was insupportably humiliating. See Xenoph. Rep. Laced. ix, 4; Plutarch,
-Agesil. c. 30. We may gather from these words of Xenophon, that a distinction
-was really made at Sparta between the treatment of these wounded
-men here carried off, and that of the other survivors of the beaten mora.
-</p>
-<p>
-The ὑπασπισταὶ, or shield-bearers, were, probably, a certain number of
-attendants, who habitually carried the shields of the officers (compare Xen.
-Hellen. iv, 8, 39; Anab. iv, 2, 20), persons of importance, and rich hoplites.
-It seems hardly to be presumed that every hoplite had an ὑπασπιστὴς, in
-spite of what we read about the attendant Helots at the battle of Platæa
-(Herod. ix, 10-29) and in other places.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_664"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_664">[664]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iv, 5,15, 16. τὰ δέκα ἀφ᾽ ἥβης—τὰ πεντεκαίδεκα ἀφ᾽ ἥβης.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_665"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_665">[665]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iv, 5, 17.
-</p>
-<p>
-Xenophon affirms the number of slain to have been about two hundred
-and fifty—ἐν πάσαις δὲ ταῖς μάχαις καὶ τῇ φυγῇ ἀπέθανον περὶ πεντήκοντα
-καὶ διακοσίους. But he had before distinctly stated that the whole <i>mora</i>
-marching back to Lechæum under the polemarch, was six hundred in number—ὁ μὲν
-πολέμαρχος σὺν τοῖς ὁπλίταις, οὖσιν ὡς ἑξακοσίοις, ἀπῄει πάλιν ἐπὶ τὸ
-Λέχαιον (iv, 5, 12). And it is plain, from several different expressions,
-that all of them were slain, excepting a very few survivors.
-</p>
-<p>
-I think it certain, therefore, that one or other of these two numbers is erroneous;
-either the original aggregate of six hundred is <i>above</i> the truth,—or
-the total of slain, two hundred and fifty, is <i>below</i> the truth. Now the
-latter supposition appears to me by far the more probable of the two. The
-Lacedæmonians, habitually secret and misleading in their returns of their
-own numbers (see Thucyd. v, 74), probably did not choose to admit publicly
-a greater total of slain than two hundred and fifty. Xenophon has inserted
-this in his history, forgetting that his own details of the battle refuted the
-numerical statement. The total of six hundred is more probable, than any
-smaller number, for the entire mora; and it is impossible to assign any reasons
-why Xenophon should overstate it.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_666"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_666">[666]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iv, 5, 8-10.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_667"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_667">[667]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iv, 5, 10. Ἅτε δὲ ἀήθους τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις
-γεγενημένης τῆς τοιαύτης συμφορᾶς, πολὺ πένθος ἦν κατὰ τὸ Λακωνικὸν
-στράτευμα, πλὴν ὅσων ἐτέθνασαν ἐν χώρᾳ ἢ υἱοὶ ἢ πατέρες ἢ ἀδελφοί·
-<em class="gesperrt">οὗτοι δὲ, ὥσπερ νικηφόροι, λαμπροὶ καὶ ἀγαλλόμενοι τῷ οἰκείῳ πάθει
-περιῄεσαν</em>.
-</p>
-<p>
-If any reader objects to the words which I have used in the text I request
-him to compare them with the Greek of Xenophon.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_668"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_668">[668]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 16.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_669"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_669">[669]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iv, 5, 16.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_670"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_670">[670]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iv, 5, 19.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_671"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_671">[671]</a></span> Demosthenes—περὶ Συντάξεως—c. 8, p. 172.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_672"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_672">[672]</a></span> Diodor. xiv, 92; Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 34.
-</p>
-<p>
-Aristeides (Panathen. p. 168) boasts that the Athenians were masters of
-the Acro-Corinthus, and might have kept the city as their own, but that
-they generously refused to do so.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_673"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_673">[673]</a></span> Diodor. xv, 73.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_674"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_674">[674]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iv, 6, 1-14; iv, 7, 1.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_675"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_675">[675]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iv, 7, 3. Οἱ δ᾽ Ἀργεῖοι, ἐπεὶ ἔγνωσαν οὐ
-δυνησόμενοι κωλύειν, ἔπεμψαν, <em class="gesperrt">ὥσπερ εἰώθεσαν</em>, ἐστεφανωμένους
-δύο κήρυκας, ὑποφέροντας σπονδάς.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_676"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_676">[676]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iv, 7, 2. Ὁ δὲ Ἀγησίπολις—ἐλθὼν εἰς Ὀλυμπίαν
-καὶ χρηστηριαζόμενος, ἐπηρώτα τὸν θεὸν, εἰ ὁσίως ἂν ἔχοι αὐτῷ, μὴ δεχομένῳ
-τὰς σπονδὰς τῶν Ἀργείων· <em class="gesperrt">ὅτι οὐχ ὁπότε καθήκοι ὁ χρόνος, ἀλλ᾽ ὁπότε
-ἐμβάλλειν μέλλοιεν Λακεδαιμόνιοι, τότε ὑπέφερον τοὺς μῆνας</em>. Ὁ δὲ θεὸς
-ἐπεσήμαινεν αὐτῷ, ὅσιον εἶναι μὴ δεχομένῳ σπονδὰς ἀδίκως ἐπιφερομένας.
-Ἐκεῖθεν δ᾽ εὐθὺς πορευθεὶς εἰς Δελφοὺς, ἐπήρετο αὖ τὸν Ἀπόλλω, εἰ κἀκείνῳ
-δοκοίῃ περὶ τῶν σπονδῶν, καθάπερ τῷ πατρί. Ὁ δ᾽ ἀπεκρίνατο, <em class="gesperrt">καὶ μάλα
-κατὰ ταὐτά</em>.
-</p>
-<p>
-I have given in the text what I believe to be the meaning of the words
-ὑποφέρειν τοὺς μῆνας,—upon which Schneider has a long and not very instructive
-note, adopting an untenable hypothesis of Dodwell, that the Argeians
-on this occasion appealed to the sanctity of the Isthmian truce;
-which is not countenanced by anything in Xenophon, and which it belonged
-to the Corinthians to announce, not to the Argeians. The plural τοὺς μῆνας
-indicates (as Weiske and Manso understand it) that the Argeians sometimes
-put forward the name of one festival, sometimes of another. We
-may be pretty sure that the Karneian festival was one of them; but what
-the others were, we cannot tell. It is very probable that there were several
-festivals of common obligation either among all the Dorians, or between
-Sparta and Argos—πατρῴους τινας σπονδὰς ἐκ παλαιοῦ καθεστώσας τοῖς Δωριεῦσι
-πρὸς ἀλλήλους,—to use the language of Pausanias (iii, 5, 6).
-The language of Xenophon implies that the demand made by the Argeians,
-for observance of the Holy Truce, was in itself rightful, or rather, that it
-would have been rightful at a different season; but that they put themselves
-in the wrong by making it at an improper season and for a fraudulent political
-purpose.
-</p>
-<p>
-For some remarks on other fraudulent manœuvres of the Argeians, respecting
-the season of the Karneian truce, see Vol. VII. of this History,
-Ch. lvi, p. 66. The compound verb <em class="gesperrt">ὑποφέρειν</em> τοὺς μῆνας seems to imply
-the <i>underhand purpose</i> with which the Argeians preferred their demand
-of the truce. What were the previous occasions on which they had preferred
-a similar demand, we are not informed. Two years before, Agesilaus
-had invaded and laid waste Argos; perhaps they may have tried, but without
-success, to arrest his march by a similar pious fraud.
-</p>
-<p>
-It is to this proceeding, perhaps, that Andokides alludes (Or. iii, De Pace,
-s. 27), where he says that the Argeians, though strenuous in insisting that
-Athens should help them to carry on the war for the possession of Corinth
-against the Lacedæmonians, had nevertheless made a separate peace with
-the latter, covering their own Argeian territory from invasion—αὐτοὶ δ᾽ ἰδίᾳ
-εἰρήνην ποιησάμενοι τὴν χώραν οὐ παρέχουσιν ἐμπολεμεῖν. Of this obscure
-passage I can give no better explanation.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_677"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_677">[677]</a></span> Aristotel. Rhetoric, ii, 23. Ἡγήσιππος ἐν Δελφοῖς ἐπηρώτα τὸν θεόν,
-κεχρημένος πρότερον Ὀλυμπιᾶσιν, εἰ αὐτῷ ταὐτὰ δοκεῖ, ἅπερ τῷ πατρί, <em class="gesperrt">ὡς αἰσχρὸν
-ὂν τἀναντία εἰπεῖν</em>.
-</p>
-<p>
-A similar story about the manner of putting the question to Apollo at
-Delphi, after it had already been put to Zeus at Dodona, is told about Agesilaus
-on another occasion (Plutarch, Apophth. Lacon. p. 208 F.).</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_678"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_678">[678]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iv, 7, 7; Pausan. iii, 5, 6.
-</p>
-<p>
-It rather seems, by the language of these two writers, that they look upon
-the menacing signs, by which Agesipolis was induced to depart, as marks
-of some displeasure of the gods against his expedition.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_679"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_679">[679]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 12. Compare Isokrates, Or. vii, (Areopag.) s. 13. ἁπάσης
-γὰρ τῆς Ἑλλάδος ὑπὸ τὴν πόλιν ἡμῶν ὑποπεσούσης καὶ μετὰ τὴν Κόνωνος ναυμαχίαν καὶ μετὰ
-τὴν Τιμοθέου στρατηγίαν, etc. This oration, however,
-was composed a long while after the events (about <small>B.C.</small> 353—see Mr. Clinton’s
-Fast. H., in that year); and Isokrates exaggerates; mistaking the
-break-up of the Lacedæmonian empire for a resumption of the Athenian.
-Demosthenes also (cont. Leptin. c. 16, p. 477) confounds the same two ideas,
-and even the Athenian vote of thanks to Konon, perpetuated on a commemorative
-column, countenanced the same impression,—ἐπειδὴ Κόνων ἠλευθέρωσε τοὺς
-Ἀθηναίων συμμάχους, etc.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_680"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_680">[680]</a></span> Plutarch, Artaxerx. c. 22.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_681"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_681">[681]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 12-14.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_682"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_682">[682]</a></span> Diodor. xiv, 110. He affirms that these cities strongly objected to this
-concession, five years afterwards, when the peace of Antalkidas was actually
-concluded; but that they were forced to give up their scruples and accept
-the peace including the concession, because they had not force to resist
-Persia and Sparta acting in hearty alliance.
-</p>
-<p>
-Hence we may infer with certainty, that they also objected to it during
-the earlier discussions, when it was first broached by Antalkidas; and that
-their objections to it were in part the cause why the discussions reported in
-the text broke off without result.
-</p>
-<p>
-It is true that Athens, during her desperate struggles in the last years of
-the Peloponnesian war, had consented to this concession, and even to
-greater, without doing herself any good (Thucyd. viii, 56). But she was
-not now placed in circumstances so imperious as to force her to be equally
-yielding.
-</p>
-<p>
-Plato, in the Menexenus (c. 17, p. 245), asserts that all the allies of Athens—Bœotians,
-Corinthians, Argeians, etc., were willing to surrender the Asiatic
-Greeks at the requisition of Artaxerxes; but that the Athenians alone
-resolutely stood out, and were in consequence left without any allies. The
-latter part of this assertion, as to the isolation of Athens from her allies, is
-certainly not true; nor do I believe that the allies took essentially different
-views from Athens on the point. The Menexenus, eloquent and complimentary
-to Athens, must be followed cautiously as to matters of fact. Plato
-goes the length of denying that the Athenians subscribed the convention of
-Antalkidas. Aristeides (Panathen. p. 172) says that they were forced to
-subscribe it, because all their allies abandoned them.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_683"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_683">[683]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 15.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_684"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_684">[684]</a></span> See a striking passage in the Or. xii, (Panathen.) of Isokrates, s. 110.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_685"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_685">[685]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 16; Diodor. xiv, 85.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_686"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_686">[686]</a></span> Lysias, Or. xix, (De Bon. Aristoph.) s. 41, 42, 44; Cornelius Nepos,
-Conon, c. 5; Isokrates, Or. iv, (Panegyr.) s. 180.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_687"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_687">[687]</a></span> Diodor. xiv. 99.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_688"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_688">[688]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 22. Ἦν δὲ οὗτος ἁνὴρ (Diphridas)
-<em class="gesperrt">εὔχαρίς τε οὐχ ἧττον τοῦ Θίμβρωνος</em>, μᾶλλόν τε συντεταγμένος,
-καὶ ἐγχειρητικώτερος, στρατηγός. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐκράτουν αὐτοῦ αἱ τοῦ
-σώματος ἡδοναὶ, ἀλλ᾽ ἀεὶ, πρὸς ᾧ εἴη ἔργῳ, τοῦτο ἔπραττεν.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_689"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_689">[689]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 18, 19.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_690"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_690">[690]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 21, 22.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_691"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_691">[691]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 21.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_692"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_692">[692]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 23.
-</p>
-<p>
-Diodorus (xiv, 97) agrees in this number of twenty-seven triremes, and
-in the fact of aid having been obtained from Samos, which island was persuaded
-to detach itself from Athens. But he recounts the circumstances
-in a very different manner. He represents the oligarchical party in Rhodes
-as having risen in insurrection, and become masters of the island; he does
-not name Teleutias, but Eudokimus (Ekdikus?), Diphilus (Diphridas?),
-and Philodikus, as commanders.
-</p>
-<p>
-The statement of Xenophon deserves the greater credence, in my judgment.
-His means of information, as well as his interest, about Teleutias
-(the brother of Agesilaus) were considerable.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_693"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_693">[693]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 24-26.
-</p>
-<p>
-Although the three ancient Rhodian cities (Lindus, Ialysus, and Kameirus)
-had coalesced (see Diodor. xiii, 75) a few years before into the great
-city of Rhodes, afterwards so powerful and celebrated,—yet they still continued
-to exist, and apparently as fortified places. For Xenophon speaks
-of the democrats in Rhodes as <em class="gesperrt">τάς τε πόλεις</em> ἔχοντας, etc.
-</p>
-<p>
-Whether the Philokrates here named as <i>Philokrates son of Ephialtes</i>, is
-the same person as the Philokrates accused in the Thirtieth oration of
-Lysias—cannot be certainly made out. It is possible enough that there
-might be two contemporary Athenians bearing this name, which would explain
-the circumstance that Xenophon here names the father Ephialtes—a
-practice occasional with him, but not common.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_694"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_694">[694]</a></span> Isokrates, Or. ix, (Evagoras) s. 67, 68, 82; Epistola Philippi ap. Demosthen.
-Orat. p. 161, c. 4.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_695"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_695">[695]</a></span> Lysias, Orat. xix, (De Bonis Aristoph.) s. 27-44.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_696"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_696">[696]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 25-27.
-</p>
-<p>
-Polybius (iv, 38-47) gives instructive remarks and information about the
-importance of Byzantium and its very peculiar position, in the ancient
-world,—as well as about the dues charged on the merchant vessels going
-into, or coming out of, the Euxine,—and the manner in which these dues
-pressed upon general trade.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_697"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_697">[697]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. v, 1, 7.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_698"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_698">[698]</a></span> Lysias, Or. xxviii, cont. Erg. s. 1-20.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_699"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_699">[699]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 28-30; Diodor. xiv, 94.
-</p>
-<p>
-The latter states that Thrasybulus lost twenty-three triremes by a storm
-near Lesbos,—which Xenophon does not notice, and which seems improbable.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_700"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_700">[700]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 31. Καὶ Θρασύβουλος μὲν δὴ, μάλα δοκῶν
-ἀνὴρ ἀγαθὸς εἶναι, οὕτως ἐτελεύτησεν.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_701"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_701">[701]</a></span> Lysias, cont. Ergo. Or. xxviii, s. 9.
-</p>
-<p>
-Ergokles is charged in this oration with gross abuse of power, oppression
-towards allies and citizens of Athens, and peculation for his own profit,
-during the course of the expedition of Thrasybulus; who is indirectly accused
-of conniving at such misconduct. It appears that the Athenians, as
-soon as they were informed that Thrasybulus had established the toll in the
-Bosphorus, passed a decree that an account should be sent home of all
-moneys exacted from the various cities, and that the colleagues of Thrasybulus
-should come home to go through the audit (s. 5); implying (so far as
-we can understand what is thus briefly noticed) that Thrasybulus himself
-should <i>not</i> be obliged to come home, but might stay on his Hellespontine or
-Asiatic command. Ergokles, however, probably one of these colleagues,
-resented this decree as an insult, and advised Thrasybulus to seize Byzantium,
-to retain the fleet, and to marry the daughter of the Thracian prince
-Seuthes. It is also affirmed in the oration that the fleet had come home
-in very bad condition (s. 2-4), and that the money, levied with so much
-criminal abuse, had been either squandered or fraudulently appropriated.
-</p>
-<p>
-We learn from another oration that Ergokles was condemned to death.
-His property was confiscated, and was said to amount to thirty talents,
-though he had been poor before the expedition; but nothing like that
-amount was discovered after the sentence of confiscation (Lysias, Or. xxx,
-cont. Philokrat. s. 3).</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_702"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_702">[702]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 31.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_703"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_703">[703]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. v, 1, 2.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_704"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_704">[704]</a></span> Thucyd. viii, 61; compare Xenoph. Anab. v, 6, 24.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_705"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_705">[705]</a></span> See above, <a href="#Chap_71">Chapter lxxi</a>, p. 156 of the present volume.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_706"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_706">[706]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 32, 83.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_707"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_707">[707]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 35, 36. τὸ μὲν πρῶτον λῃστὰς
-διαπέμποντες ἐπολέμουν ἀλλήλοις ... Ὅπως δοκοίη, ὥσπερ εἰώθει,
-ἐπ᾽ ἀργυρολογίαν ἐπαναπεπλευκέναι.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_708"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_708">[708]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 36. Ὁ Ἀναξίβιος ἀπεπορεύετο,
-ὡς μὲν ἐλέγετο, <em class="gesperrt">οὐδὲ τῶν ἱερῶν γεγενημένων αὐτῷ ἐκείνῃ τῇ
-ἡμέρᾳ</em>, ἀλλὰ καταφρονήσας, ὅτι διὰ φιλίας τε ἐπορεύετο καὶ
-ἐς πόλιν φιλίαν, καὶ ὅτι ἤκουε τῶν ἀπαντώντων, τὸν Ἰφικράτην
-ἀναπεπλευκέναι τῆς ἐπὶ Προικοννήσου, ἀμελέστερον ἐπορεύετο.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_709"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_709">[709]</a></span> See the remarks a few pages back, upon the defeat and destruction of
-the Lacedæmonian mora by Iphikrates, near Lechæum, <a href="#Page_350">page 350</a>.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_710"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_710">[710]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 39. Καὶ τὰ παιδικὰ μέντοι αὐτῷ παρέμεινε,
-καὶ τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων δὲ τῶν συνεληλυθότων ἐκ τῶν πόλεων ἁρμοστήρων
-ὡς δώδεκα μαχόμενοι συναπέθανον· οἱ δ᾽ ἄλλοι φεύγοντες ἔπιπτον.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_711"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_711">[711]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. v, 1, 1. ὢν δὲ <em class="gesperrt">πάλιν</em> ὁ Ἐτεόνικος
-ἐν τῇ Αἰγίνῃ, καὶ ἐπιμιξίᾳ χρωμένων τὸν πρόσθεν χρόνον τῶν Αἰγινητῶν
-πρὸς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους, ἐπεὶ φανερῶς κατὰ θάλατταν ἐπολεμεῖτο ὁ πόλεμος,
-ξυνδόξαν καὶ τοῖς ἐφόροις, ἐφίησι ληΐζεσθαι τὸν βουλόμενον ἐκ τῆς Ἀττικῆς.
-</p>
-<p>
-The meaning of the word πάλιν here is not easy to determine, since (as
-Schneider remarks) not a word had been said before about the presence of
-Eteonikus at Ægina. Perhaps we may explain it by supposing that Eteonikus
-found the Æginetans reluctant to engage in the war, and that he did
-not like to involve them in it without first going to Sparta to consult the
-ephors. It was on <i>coming back</i> to Ægina (πάλιν) from Sparta, after having
-obtained the consent of the ephors (ξυνδόξαν καὶ τοῖς ἐφόροις), that he issued
-the letters of marque.
-</p>
-<p>
-Schneider’s note explains τὸν πρόσθεν χρόνον incorrectly, in my judgment.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_712"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_712">[712]</a></span> Compare Xen. Hellen. vi, 3, 8; Thucyd. iii, 13. The old Æginetan
-antipathy against Athens, when thus again instigated, continued for a considerable
-time. A year or two afterwards, when the philosopher Plato was
-taken to Ægina to be sold as a slave, it was death to any Athenian to land
-in the island (Aristides, Or. xlvi, p. 384; p. 306 Dindorf; Diogenes Laërt.
-iii, 19; Plutarch. Dion. c. 5).</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_713"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_713">[713]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. v, 1, 3. Ὁ δὲ Τελευτίας, μακαριώτατα δὴ ἀπέπλευσεν οἴκαδε,
-etc.
-</p>
-<p>
-This description of the scene at the departure of Teleutias (for whom,
-as well as for his brother Agesilaus, Xenophon always manifests a marked
-sympathy) is extremely interesting. The reflection, too, with which Xenophon
-follows it up, deserves notice,—“I know well that in these incidents
-I am not recounting any outlay of money, or danger incurred, or memorable
-stratagem. But by Zeus, it <i>does</i> seem to me worth a man’s while to reflect,
-by what sort of conduct Teleutias created such dispositions in his soldiers.
-This is a true man’s achievement, more precious than any outlay or any
-danger.”
-</p>
-<p>
-What Xenophon here glances at in the case of Teleutias, is the scheme
-worked out in detail in the romance of the Cyropædia (τὸ ἐθελοντῶν ἄρχειν—the
-exercising command in such manner as to have willing and obedient
-subjects)—and touched upon indirectly in various of his other compositions,—the
-Hiero, the Œconomicus, and portions of the Memorabilia.
-The <i>idéal</i> of government, as it presented itself to Xenophon, was the paternal
-despotism, or something like it.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_714"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_714">[714]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. v, 1, 6-10.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_715"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_715">[715]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. v, 1, 12, 13.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_716"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_716">[716]</a></span> So we may conclude from Xen. Hellen. v, 1, 13; Demænetus is found
-at the Hellespont v, 1, 26.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_717"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_717">[717]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. v, 1, 14-17.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_718"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_718">[718]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. v, 1, 18. Ἄγετε, ὦ ἄνδρες, δειπνήσατε μὲν,
-ἅπερ καὶ ὡς ἐμέλλετε· προπαράσχετε δέ μοι μιᾶς ἡμέρας σῖτον· ἔπειτα
-δὲ ἥκετε ἐπὶ τὰς ναῦς αὔτικα μάλα, ὅπως πλεύσωμεν, ἔνθα θεὸς ἐθέλει,
-ἐν καιρῷ ἀφιξόμενοι.
-</p>
-<p>
-Schneider doubts whether the words προπαράσχετε δέ μοι are correct.
-But they seem to me to bear a very pertinent meaning. Teleutias had no
-money; yet it was necessary for his purpose that the seamen should come
-furnished with one day’s provision beforehand. Accordingly he is obliged
-to ask <i>them</i> to get provision for themselves, or to <i>lend it</i>, as it were, <i>to him</i>;
-though they were already so dissatisfied from not having received their
-pay.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_719"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_719">[719]</a></span> Thucyd. ii, 94.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_720"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_720">[720]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. v, 1, 18-22.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_721"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_721">[721]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. v, 1, 24.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_722"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_722">[722]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. v, 1, 29.
-</p>
-<p>
-Even ten years after this, however, when the Lacedæmonian harmost
-Sphodrias marched from Thespiæ by night to surprise Peiræus, it was without
-gates on the land-side—ἀπύλωτος—or at least without any such gates
-as would resist an assault (Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 20).</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_723"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_723">[723]</a></span> Lysias, Orat. xxx, cont. Nikomachum, s. 21-30.
-</p>
-<p>
-I trust this Oration so far as the matter of fact, that in the preceding
-year, some ancient sacrifices had been omitted from state-poverty; but the
-manner in which the speaker makes this fact tell against Nikomachus, may
-or may not be just.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_724"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_724">[724]</a></span> Aristophan. Ecclesias. 300-310.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_725"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_725">[725]</a></span> See the Inscription No. 147, in Boeckh’s Corpus Inscriptt. Græcor.—Boeckh,
-Public Economy of Athens, ii, 7, p. 179, 180, Eng. transl.—and
-Schömann, Antiq. Jur. Publ. Græc. s. 77, p. 320.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_726"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_726">[726]</a></span> Demosthenes, Philippic. iv, p. 141, s. 43; Demosth. Orat. xliv, cont.
-Leocharem, p. 1091, s. 48.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_727"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_727">[727]</a></span> It is common to represent the festivals at Athens as if they were so
-many stratagems for feeding poor citizens at the public expense. But the
-primitive idea and sentiment of the Grecian religious festival—the satisfaction
-to the god dependent upon multitudinous spectators sympathizing
-and enjoying themselves together (ἄμμιγα πάντας)—is much anterior to
-the development of democracy at Athens. See the old oracles in Demosthen.
-cont. Meidiam, p. 531, s. 66; Homer, Hymn. Apollin. 147; K. F. Herrmann,
-Gottesdienstlich. Alterthümer der Griechen, s. 8.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_728"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_728">[728]</a></span> See such direct assessments on property alluded to in various speeches
-of Lysias, Orat. xix. De Bonis Aristoph. s. 31, 45, 63; Orat. xxvii. cont. Epikratem,
-s. 11; Orat. xxix. cont. Philokrat. s. 14.
-</p>
-<p>
-Boeckh (in his Public Econ. of Athens, iv, 4, p. 493, Engl. transl., which
-passage stands unaltered in the second edition of the German original recently
-published, p. 642) affirms that a proposition for the assessment of a
-direct property-tax of one-fortieth, or two and a half per cent., was made
-about this time by a citizen named Euripides, who announced it as intended
-to produce five hundred talents; that the proposition was at first enthusiastically
-welcomed by the Athenians, and procured for its author unbounded
-popularity; but that he was presently cried down and disgraced, because on
-farther examination the measure proved unsatisfactory and empty talk.
-</p>
-<p>
-Sievers also (Geschichte von Griech. bis zur Schlacht von Mantineia,
-pp. 100, 101) adopts the same view as Boeckh, that this was a real proposition
-of a property tax of two and a half per cent., made by Euripides. After
-having alleged that the Athenians in these times supplied their treasury
-by the most unscrupulous injustice in confiscating the property of rich citizens,—referring
-as proof to passages in the orators, none of which establishes
-his conclusion,—Sievers goes on to say,—“But that these violences
-did not suffice, is shown by the fact that the people caught with greedy impatience
-at other measures. Thus a new scheme of finance, which however
-was presently discovered to be insufficient or inapplicable, excited at first
-the most extravagant joy.” He adds in a note: “The scheme proceeded
-from Euripides; it was a property-tax of two and a half per cent. See
-Aristoph. Ecclesiaz. 823; Boeckh, Staatshaush. ii, p. 27.”
-</p>
-<p>
-In my judgment, the assertion here made by Boeckh and Sievers rests
-upon no sufficient ground. The passage of Aristophanes does not warrant
-us in concluding anything at all about a proposition for a property-tax. It
-is as follows:—
-</p>
-<div class="poetry-container">
-  <div class="poetry">
-    <p>Τὸ δ᾽ ἔναγχος οὐχ ἅπαντες ἡμεῖς ὤμνυμεν</p>
-    <p>Τάλαντ᾽ ἔσεσθαι πεντακόσια τῇ πόλει</p>
-    <p>Τῆς τεσσαρακοστῆς, ἣν ἐπόρισ᾽ Εὐριπίδης;</p>
-    <p>Κεὐθὺς κατεχρύσου πᾶς ἀνὴρ Εὐριπίδην·</p>
-    <p>Ὅτε δὴ δ᾽ ἀνασκοπουμένοις ἐφαίνετο</p>
-    <p>Ὁ Διὸς Κόρινθος, καὶ τὸ πρᾶγμ᾽ οὐκ ἤρκεσεν,</p>
-    <p>Πάλιν κατεπίττου πᾶς ἀνὴρ Εὐριπίδην.</p>
-  </div>
-</div>
-<p>
-What this “new financial scheme” (so Sievers properly calls it) was, which
-the poet here alludes to,—we have no means of determining. But I venture
-to express my decided conviction that it cannot have been a property-tax.
-The terms in which it is described forbid that supposition. It was a
-scheme which seemed at first sight exceedingly promising and gainful to
-the city, and procured for its author very great popularity; but which, on
-farther examination, proved to be mere empty boasting (ὁ Διὸς Κόρινθος)
-How can this be said about any motion for a property-tax? That any financier
-should ever have gained extraordinary popularity by proposing a
-property-tax, is altogether inconceivable. And a proposition to raise the
-immense sum of five hundred talents (which Schömann estimates as the
-probable aggregate charge of the whole peace-establishment of Athens,
-Antiq. Jur. Public. Græc. s. 73, p. 313) at one blow by an assessment upon
-property! It would be as much as any financier could do to bear up against
-the tremendous <i>unpopularity</i> of such a proposition; and to induce the assembly
-even to listen to him, were the necessity ever so pressing. How odious
-are propositions for direct taxation, we may know without recurring to the
-specific evidence respecting Athens; but if any man requires such specific
-evidence, he may find it abundantly in the Philippics and Olynthiacs of Demosthenes.
-On one occasion (De Symmoriis, Or. xiv. s. 33, p. 185) that
-orator alludes to a proposition for raising five hundred talents by direct
-property-tax as something extravagant, which the Athenians would not endure
-to hear mentioned.
-</p>
-<p>
-Moreover,—unpopularity apart,—the motion for a property-tax could
-scarcely procure credit for a financier, because it is of all ideas the most
-simple and obvious. Any man can suggest such a scheme. But to pass for
-an acceptable financier, you must propose some measure which promises
-gain to the state without such undisguised pressure upon individuals.
-</p>
-<p>
-Lastly, there is nothing <i>delusive</i> in a property-tax,—nothing which looks
-gainful at first sight, and then turns out on farther examination (ἀνασκοπουμένοις)
-to be false or uncertain. It may, indeed, be more or less evaded;
-but this can only be known after it has been assessed, and when payment is
-actually called for.
-</p>
-<p>
-Upon these grounds I maintain that the τεσσαρακοστὴ proposed by Euripides
-was not a property-tax. What it was I do not pretend to say; but τεσσαρακοστὴ
-may have many other meanings; it might mean a duty of two
-and a half per cent. upon imports or exports, or upon the produce of the
-mines of Laureion; or it might mean a cheap coinage or base money, something
-in the nature of the Chian τεσσαρακοσταί (Thucyd. viii, 100). All that
-the passage really teaches us is, that some financial proposition was made
-by Euripides which at first seemed likely to be lucrative, but would not stand
-an attentive examination. It is not even certain that Euripides promised a
-receipt of five hundred talents; this sum is only given to us as a comic
-exaggeration of that which foolish men at first fancied. Boeckh in more
-than one place reasons (erroneously, in my judgment) as if this five hundred
-talents was a real and trustworthy estimate, and equal to two and a half
-per cent. upon the taxable property of the Athenians. He says (iv, 8, p. 520,
-Engl. transl.) that “Euripides assumed as the basis of his proposal for levying
-a property-tax, a taxable capital of twenty thousand talents,”—and
-that “his proposition of one-fortieth was <i>calculated</i> to produce five hundred
-talents.” No such conclusion can be fairly drawn from Aristophanes.
-</p>
-<p>
-Again, Boeckh infers from another passage in the same play of the same
-author, that a small direct property-tax of one five-hundredth part had been
-recently imposed. After a speech from one of the old women, calling upon
-a young man to follow her, he replies (v. 1006):—
-</p>
-<div class="poetry-container">
-  <div class="poetry">
-    <p>Ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ ἀνάγκη μοὔστίν, εἰ μὴ τῶν ἐμῶν</p>
-    <p>Τὴν πεντακοσιόστην κατέθηκας τῇ πόλει.</p>
-  </div>
-</div>
-<p>
-Boeckh himself admits (iv, 8, p. 520) that this passage is very obscure, and
-so I think every one will find it. Tyrwhitt was so perplexed by it that he
-altered ἐμῶν into ἐτῶν. Without presuming to assign the meaning of the
-passage, I merely contend that it cannot be held to justify the affirmation,
-as a matter of historical fact, that a property-tax of one-five-hundredth had
-been levied at Athens, shortly before the representation of Ekklesiazusæ.
-</p>
-<p>
-I cannot refrain here from noticing another inference drawn by Sievers
-from a third passage in this same play,—the Ekklesiazusæ (Geschichte
-Griechenlands vom Ende des Pelop. Kriegs bis zur Schlacht von Mantineia,
-p. 101.) He says,—“How melancholy is the picture of Athenian popular
-life, which is presented to us by the Ekklesiazusæ and the second Plutus,
-ten or twelve years after the restoration of the democracy! What an <i>impressive
-seriousness</i> (welch ein erschütternder Ernst) is expressed in the speech
-of Praxagora!” (v. 174 <i>seqq.</i>).
-</p>
-<p>
-I confess that I find neither seriousness, nor genuine and trustworthy
-coloring, in this speech of Praxagora. It was a comic case made out for the
-purpose of showing that the women were more fit to govern Athens than
-the men, and setting forth the alleged follies of the men in terms of broad
-and general disparagement. The whole play is, throughout, thorough farce
-and full of Aristophanic humor. And it is surely preposterous to treat what
-is put into the mouth of Praxagora, the leading feminine character, as if it
-were historical evidence as to the actual condition or management of Athens.
-Let any one follow the speech of Praxagora into the proposition of
-reform which she is made to submit, and he will then see the absurdity of
-citing her discourse as if it were an harangue in Thucydides. History is
-indeed strangely transformed by thus turning comic wit into serious matter
-of evidence; and no history has suffered so much from the proceeding as
-that of Athens.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_729"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_729">[729]</a></span> Xenoph. Hellen. v. 1, 19-24: compare vii, 1, 3, 4; Xenoph. De Vectigalibus,
-chapters i, ii, iii, etc.; Xenoph. De Repub. Athen. i, 17.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_730"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_730">[730]</a></span> Plutarch, Artaxerx. c. 22.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_731"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_731">[731]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. v, 1, 28.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_732"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_732">[732]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. v, 1, 25-27.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_733"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_733">[733]</a></span> Diodor. xv, 2. These triremes were employed in the ensuing year for
-the prosecution of the war against Evagoras.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_734"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_734">[734]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. v, 1, 28, 29.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_735"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_735">[735]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. v, 1, 31.
-</p>
-<p>
-In this document there is the same introduction of the first person immediately
-following the third, as in the correspondence between Pausanias
-and Xerxes (Thucyd. i, 128, 129).</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_736"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_736">[736]</a></span> Diodor. xiv, 110.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_737"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_737">[737]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. v, 1, 32, 33.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_738"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_738">[738]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. v, 1, 34; Demosthen. adv. Leptin. c. 13, p. 473.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_739"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_739">[739]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. v, 1, 34. Οἱ δ᾽ ἄλλοι πολῖται ἕκοντες κατεδέχοντο
-τοὺς πρόσθεν φεύγοντας.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_740"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_740">[740]</a></span> Such is in fact the version of the story in Xenophon’s Encomium upon
-Agesilaus (ii, 21), where it is made a matter of honor to the latter, that he
-would not consent to peace, except with a compulsory clause (ἠνάγκασε)
-that the Corinthian and Theban exiles should be restored. The Corinthian
-exiles had been actively coöperating with Agesilaus against Corinth. Of
-Theban exiles we have heard nothing; but it is very probable that there
-were several serving with Agesilaus,—and also pretty certain that he
-would insist upon their restoration.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-<p><a id="Footnote_741"></a><span class="label"><a href="#FNanchor_741">[741]</a></span> Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 8.</p>
-</div>
-
-</div>
-
-<hr class="chap" />
-
-<div class="transnote" id="tnote">
-  <p class="tnotetit">Transcriber's note</p>
-  <ul>
-    <li>Original spelling, hyphenation and punctuation have been kept, but variant spellings were made
-    consistent when a predominant usage was found.</li>
-    <li>Footnotes have been renumbered and moved to the end of the book.</li>
-    <li>Blank pages have been skipped.</li>
-    <li>Obvious printer errors have been silently corrected, after comparison with a later edition of
-    this work. Greek text has also been corrected after checking with this later edition and with Perseus,
-    when the reference was found.</li>
-    <li>The following changes were also made, after checking with other editions:
-      <table summary="changes made">
-        <tr>
-          <td>page</td>
-          <td class="tdr">&#8199;<a href="#Page_vi">vi</a>:</td>
-          <td class="tdr">“fractions”</td>
-          <td>→</td>
-          <td>“<a href="#tn_1">factions</a>”</td>
-        </tr>
-        <tr>
-          <td>page</td>
-          <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_216">216</a>:</td>
-          <td class="tdr">“Odrysians”</td>
-          <td>→</td>
-          <td>“<a href="#tn_2">Bithynians</a>”</td>
-        </tr>
-        <tr>
-          <td>page</td>
-          <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_326">326</a>:</td>
-          <td class="tdr">“with”</td>
-          <td>→</td>
-          <td>“<a href="#tn_3">which</a>”</td>
-        </tr>
-        <tr>
-          <td>note</td>
-          <td class="tdr">&#8199;<a href="#Footnote_30">30</a>:</td>
-          <td class="tdr">“Ἑγγαδα”</td>
-          <td>→</td>
-          <td>“<a href="#tn_4">Ἑλλάδα</a>”</td>
-        </tr>
-        <tr>
-          <td>note</td>
-          <td class="tdr"><a href="#Footnote_626">626</a>:</td>
-          <td class="tdr">“494 <small>B.C.</small>”</td>
-          <td>→</td>
-          <td>“<a href="#tn_5">394 <small>B.C.</small></a>”</td>
-        </tr>
-      </table>
-    </li>
-    <li>Both “Euagoras” and “Evagoras” are used to refer to the same ruler.</li>
-    <li>The book cover image was created by the transcriber and is placed in the public domain.</li>
-  </ul>
-</div>
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-<pre>
-
-
-
-
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