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diff --git a/.gitattributes b/.gitattributes new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d7b82bc --- /dev/null +++ b/.gitattributes @@ -0,0 +1,4 @@ +*.txt text eol=lf +*.htm text eol=lf +*.html text eol=lf +*.md text eol=lf diff --git a/LICENSE.txt b/LICENSE.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6312041 --- /dev/null +++ b/LICENSE.txt @@ -0,0 +1,11 @@ +This eBook, including all associated images, markup, improvements, +metadata, and any other content or labor, has been confirmed to be +in the PUBLIC DOMAIN IN THE UNITED STATES. + +Procedures for determining public domain status are described in +the "Copyright How-To" at https://www.gutenberg.org. + +No investigation has been made concerning possible copyrights in +jurisdictions other than the United States. Anyone seeking to utilize +this eBook outside of the United States should confirm copyright +status under the laws that apply to them. diff --git a/README.md b/README.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4e7e3a3 --- /dev/null +++ b/README.md @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +Project Gutenberg (https://www.gutenberg.org) public repository for +eBook #50379 (https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/50379) diff --git a/old/50379-0.txt b/old/50379-0.txt deleted file mode 100644 index 9a7fda6..0000000 --- a/old/50379-0.txt +++ /dev/null @@ -1,11534 +0,0 @@ -The Project Gutenberg eBook, The 56th Division, by C. H. (Charles Humble) -Dudley Ward - - -This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and most -other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions -whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms of -the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online at -www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the United States, you'll have -to check the laws of the country where you are located before using this ebook. - - - - -Title: The 56th Division - 1st London Territorial Division - - -Author: C. H. (Charles Humble) Dudley Ward - - - -Release Date: November 4, 2015 [eBook #50379] - -Language: English - -Character set encoding: UTF-8 - - -***START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE 56TH DIVISION*** - - -E-text prepared by Brian Coe, Carol Brown, and the Online Distributed -Proofreading Team (http://www.pgdp.net) - - - -Note: Project Gutenberg also has an HTML version of this - file which includes the original illustrations. - See 50379-h.htm or 50379-h.zip: - (http://www.gutenberg.org/files/50379/50379-h/50379-h.htm) - or - (http://www.gutenberg.org/files/50379/50379-h.zip) - - -Transcriber's note: - - This text includes characters that require UTF-8 (Unicode) - file encoding. If the œ (oe ligature) or the apostrophes - and quotation marks appear as garbage, make sure your text - reader’s “character set” or “file encoding” is set to UTF-8 - (Unicode). You may also need to change the default font. - - Page numbers are displayed in the right margin. - - Additional notes are at the end of the book. - - - - -THE 56th DIVISION - - -[Illustration: - -_Photo, Elliott & Fry._ -MAJOR-GENERAL SIR AMYATT HULL, K.C.B. - [_Frontispiece_] - - -THE 56th DIVISION - -(1st London Territorial Division) - -by - -MAJOR C. H. DUDLEY WARD -D.S.O., M.C. - -With a Foreword by General Lord Horne of Stirkoke, -G.C.B., K.C.M.G. - - - - - - - -London -John Murray, Albemarle Street, W. -1921 - -All Rights Reserved - - - - - TO THE MEMORY - - OF - - MAJOR-GENERAL - SIR CHARLES PATRICK AMYATT HULL, - K.C.B. - - BORN JULY 3RD, 1865 - DIED JULY 24TH, 1920 - - - - - FOREWORD - - -When day broke on the 28th March, 1918, the 56th London Territorial -Division was in position on the southern portion of the Vimy Ridge. At -nightfall the division still held its ground, having beaten back three -separate assaults delivered in great strength by picked German troops -specially trained in the attack and inspired with confidence resulting -from the successes of the previous week. Truly a great achievement, -and important as great, for the Vimy Ridge covered the city of Arras -and the coalfields of Béthune. - -Important as this success was held to be at the time, a time of great -strain upon the forces of the Empire, it was not till later on, when -Ludendorff took us into his confidence, that we learned its full -significance. Ludendorff gives us to understand that the failure of -the German effort of 28th March constituted the turning-point of the -1918 campaign. That evening Ludendorff recognised the beginning of the -end; the German nation lost heart; the _moral_ of the German Army -deteriorated rapidly. - -I have selected the above--one of the many achievements of the 56th -London Territorial Division--to illustrate the stage of efficiency to -which the troops of our Territorial Army had attained in war. - -I saw much of our Territorial troops in France: I had seen something -of them in pre-war days, and I recall an absence of appreciation of -the devotion of those whose patriotic enthusiasm put life into the -great organisation evolved from the brain of a statesman to whom -history will give the credit hitherto unworthily begrudged to Lord -Haldane. - -I take this opportunity of paying my tribute of respect and admiration -to the Territorial Army as a whole, and the 56th London Division in -particular. - -This note would not be complete without reference to that fine -soldier, the late Major-Gen. Sir Amyatt Hull, whose professional -qualities and personal charm gained the respect and affection of all -ranks, and who imbued with his own unconquerable spirit the officers -and men of the division which he commanded so long, and of which he -was so justly proud. - - HORNE OF STIRKOKE, - _General_. - - - - - CONTENTS - - - FOREWORD BY GENERAL LORD HORNE OF STIRKOKE, - G.C.B., K.C.M.G. - - - CHAPTER I - - FORMATION AND THE ATTACK ON THE GOMMECOURT SALIENT - -The Assembly--The Grouping of Units--The Size of a Division--Perfecting -the Organisation--General Situation--Falkenhayn’s View--Haig’s -Summary--Preparations for the Somme--The Division at Hébuterne--The -First Task--Extent of the New Line--The German Positions--Note by Gen. -Hull--The Date of Attack--Operation Orders--Artillery and -Smoke--Patrol Reports--The Attack--Gen. Hull’s Conclusion--The Battle -of Albert, 1916 pp. 1-48 - - - CHAPTER II - - THE SOMME - -Tanks--Progress on the Somme--The Move to Battle Positions--In Contact -with the Enemy--The Battle of Ginchy--The Attack-Haig’s Dispatch-- -Battle of Flers-Courcelette--Orders to Tanks--The Attack--The -Quadrilateral--The Battle of Morval--Battle of the Transloy -Ridges--The Division Relieved--Lessons of the Somme--Lieut.-Col. -Bayliffe’s Paper--The Bad Conditions--Lord Cavan’s Appreciation-- -Falkenhayn on Verdun--Hindenburg and Ludendorff pp. 49-100 - - - CHAPTER III - - LAVENTIE-RICHBOURG - -Strength of the Division--Raids--Gen. Haking’s Appreciation-- -Revolution in Russia--Move to the Third Army pp. 101-113 - - - CHAPTER IV - - THE BATTLES OF ARRAS, 1917 - -The German Retreat, 1917--Plan of Attack--Artillery Control Signals-- -First Battle of the Scarpe--The Attack--Clearing the Hindenburg -Line--The Advance Checked--German Comments--Move to the VI Corps-- -Third Battle of the Scarpe--Result of the Battle--Minor Actions-- -British Gains--Q.W.R. Observation--The Artillery pp. 114-143 - - - CHAPTER V - - YPRES - -Gen. Sir C. P. A. Hull--General Situation--Opening of the Offensive-- -Gen. F. A. Dudgeon--Preliminary Difficulties--The Attack--German -Pill-box Defence--Result of Ypres Battles pp. 144-164 - - - CHAPTER VI - - CAMBRAI - -Organisation of Battalions--Patrol Encounters--The Plan of Attack-- -Preparations--The Attack--Tadpole Copse--The Attack Held--Warning of -a Counter-attack--The Counter-attack--The Story of a Great Fight--Gen. -Dudgeon’s Report--The French Troops pp. 165-208 - - - CHAPTER VII - - THE GERMAN OFFENSIVE - -American Action--The Enemy Strength--British Strength--German -Assembly--British Preparations--Frequent Change of Orders--Imminence -of Enemy Attack--Disposition of Troops--Enemy Attack Opens--The -Queen’s Westminsters--L.R.B. and 4th Londons--Kensingtons, London -Scottish--The Artillery--Enemy Failure--Reports on the Battle--The -Machine Gunners pp. 209-242 - - - CHAPTER VIII - - THE ADVANCE TO VICTORY - -Allied Defence--South of the Scarpe--Gen. Dudgeon--Raids--Division in -Rest Area--August the 8th--Haig’s Plan--Orders for the Advance--The -Position--The Battle of Albert--Croisilles--Battle of the Scarpe--Loss -of Direction--Bullecourt--The Artillery pp. 243-280 - - - CHAPTER IX - - THE ARMISTICE - -The New Position--Battle of the Canal du Nord--German Resistance -Broken--Aubigny-au-Bac--The Allied Advance--Reorganisation--Open -Fighting--Battle of the Sambre--Demolition of Roads-- -Intercommunication--The Grand Honnelle--Enemy Confusion--The -“Cease Fire” pp. 281-314 - - -APPENDIX pp. 315-326 - - -INDEX pp. 327-331 - - -Special thanks are due to Messrs. Hutchinson & Co., publishers of -_My War Memories 1914-1918_, by Gen. Ludendorff, and _General -Headquarters 1914-1916, and Its Critical Decisions_, by Gen. von -Falkenhayn; also to Messrs. Cassell & Co., publishers of _Out of My -Life_, by Field-Marshal von Hindenburg, for permission to print -extracts from these works. - - - - - LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS - - -MAJOR-GENERAL SIR AMYATT HULL, K.C.B. _Frontispiece_ - - FACING PAGE -GOMMECOURT, JULY 1916 46 - -INVERNESS COPSE AND GLENCORSE WOOD, AUGUST 1917 152 - -BATTERY POSITION, ZOUAVE WOOD, HOOGE, AUGUST 1917 164 - - - MAPS - -1. THE GOMMECOURT SALIENT 46 - -2. GINCHY AND MORVAL--THE BATTLES ON THE 9TH, 15TH, AND - 25TH SEPTEMBER 78 - -3. THE TRANSLOY RIDGE 86 - -4. THE BATTLES OF ARRAS, 1917 134 - -5. THE BATTLE OF LANGEMARCK, 1917 158 - -6. LOCAL MAP--FRONT OF THE DIVISION AT CAMBRAI, 1917 186 - -7. THE BATTLE OF CAMBRAI 196 - -8. THE FIRST BATTLE OF ARRAS, 1918 234 - -9. THE BATTLES OF ALBERT AND THE SCARPE, 1918 278 - -10. BATTLE OF THE CANAL DU NORD 296 - -11. GENERAL MAP 310 - - - - - THE FIFTY-SIXTH DIVISION 1 - - - - - CHAPTER I - - FORMATION AND THE ATTACK ON THE GOMMECOURT SALIENT - - -After the declaration of war, when the first news of the Expeditionary -Force began to trickle across the Channel, the people of England were -told that troops were marching to the lilting tune with the Cockney -refrain: - - Good-bye, Piccadilly, - Farewell, Leicester Square, - It’s a long, long way to Tipperary, - But my heart’s right there. - -Within a few months territorial battalions were marching in France and -singing the same absurd song. But the London, the Cockney spirit, -impudent, noisy, but good-tempered and friendly, always wide awake, -observant, and ready for a scrap, above all never down-hearted, led -the way from the very beginning of the war. It is with the -light-hearted crowd of Piccadilly and Leicester Square that we are -concerned, for the whole of London some time or other passes through -those thoroughfares. - - * * * * * - -There is something peculiarly fascinating in following the fortunes of -London troops, particularly Territorial troops. - -For some reason there has been a tendency of late years to look down 2 -on the men of London, to dismiss them as weaklings, as men of poor -physique, with maybe smart tongues and clothes, but without the -necessary stamina for hardy soldiers. It would be difficult to say on -what ground such an opinion was based. At least it has no historical -foundation. The Trained Bands of London have a very definite place in -the history of England. - -Although it is not the oldest corps, the Artillery Company of London, -formed to train men in the use of the long bow, cross bow, and hand -gun, dates back to the time of Henry VIII. Westminster and the County -of Middlesex were ever to the fore in raising Volunteers as distinct -from the Militia, though the distinction was not always too clear. St. -George’s, Hanover Square--Pimlico--Inns of Court--Bloomsbury--St. -James’s are names to be found in every record of effort to meet a -national danger. Enfield, Tottenham, Stoke Newington, Chelsea, -Kensington, Chiswick, Battersea, Clapham, Clerkenwell, Deptford, -Hungerford, Islington, Lambeth, and Wandsworth have all raised -companies for the defence of England in former times of stress. - -There is no need to labour the point. Every student of the history of -the British Army knows what the Service owes to London. The Londoner -has always proved himself a valiant soldier, and has not withheld from -enlistment. - -What England owes to the Territorial is above computation. As the -descendant of the old Volunteer he was enrolled to serve in England -alone. But when war with the Central Powers was declared he did not -hesitate--his response was immediate and unanimous. Territorials 3 -landed in France in 1914, and continued to arrive in that country in a -steady stream as they could be spared from Great Britain. - -When the 56th Division was assembled in France during the first days -of February 1916, it was not, therefore, a new unit, looking about -with wondering eyes at new scenes, and standing, as it were, on the -tiptoes of expectation as it paused on the outskirts of the great -adventure. The twelve battalions of infantry were veterans.[1] - -On the 5th February Major-Gen. C. P. A. Hull, to whom command of the -new division was given, arrived at Hallencourt, between Abbeville and -Amiens, where his staff was to meet. - - Lieut.-Col. J. E. S. Brind G.S.O.1. - Major A. E. G. Bayley G.S.O.2. - Capt. T. W. Bullock G.S.O.3. - Bt. Lieut.-Col. H. W. Grubb A.A. and Q.M.G. - Capt. W. M. Sutton D.A.A.G. - Major F. J. Lemon D.A.Q.M.G. - Lieut. H. C. B. Way A.D.C. - -The presence of these officers, however, did not constitute a -division. Brigade commanders and their staffs arrived--Brig.-Gen. F. -H. Burnell-Nugent, 167th Brigade, Brig.-Gen. G. G. Loch, 168th -Brigade, Brig.-Gen. E. S. Coke, 169th Brigade--and we find a wail of -despair going up from the 169th Brigade: “No rations, fuel, or -stationery yet available”--“No divisional organisation exists” (this -on the 8th), and a wealth of meaning in this note written on the 18th: -“The Brigade Interpreter (who should have been available at first) 4 -arrived at last. Rain whole day.” Could anything be more tragic? - -Our sympathies are entirely with the staff on these occasions, for -though the situation cannot be described as chaotic, it is -bewildering. Troops were arriving from all directions and at all times -of the day; the machinery was not in running order, and its creaking -wheels, which occasionally stopped, necessitated the most careful -watching and a great deal of work. When an organisation is being made, -no one can say “that is not my job,” for it seems as though all jobs -are his for the time being. The Interpreter would have been most -useful if only to arrange the billeting--and what is a staff officer -without stationery? - -The Brigades were as follows: - -The 167th Infantry Brigade; commanded by Brig.-Gen. F. H. -Burnell-Nugent, with Capt. G. Blewitt as his Brigade Major and Capt. -O. H. Tidbury as Staff Captain. The battalions of this brigade were -the 1/1st London Regt., the 1/3rd London Regt., the 1/8th Middlesex -Regt., and the 1/7th Middlesex Regt. - -The 168th Infantry Brigade; commanded by Brig.-Gen. G. G. Loch, with -Capt. P. Neame, V.C., as his Brigade Major, and Major L. L. Wheatley -as Staff Captain. The battalions of this brigade were the 1/4th London -Regt., the 1/12th London Regt. (Rangers), the 1/13th London Regt. -(Kensingtons), and the 1/14th London Regt. (London Scottish). - -The 169th Infantry Brigade; commanded by Brig.-Gen. E. S. Coke, with -Capt. L. A. Newnham as his Brigade Major, and Capt. E. R. Broadbent as -Staff Captain. The battalions were the 1/2nd London Regt. (Royal -Fusiliers), the 1/5th London Regt. (London Rifle Brigade), the 1/9th 5 -London Regt. (Queen Victoria’s Rifles), and the 1/16th London Regt. -(Queen’s Westminster Rifles). - -It is not easy to keep the brigade groupings in mind at this -stage--arrangements were recast and designations were changed. The -1/1st (London) Bde. R.F.A., the 2/1st (London) Field Coy. R.E., the -2/1st (London) Field Ambulance were posted to the 167th Brigade. The -1/2nd London Bde. R.F.A., the 2/2nd London Field Coy. R.E., and the -2/2nd London Field Ambulance were posted to the 168th Brigade. The -1/3rd London Bde. R.F.A. and the 2/3rd London Field Ambulance to the -169th Brigade. But we find that subsequent changes result in-- - - the 1/1st London Bde. R.F.A. becoming 280th Bde. R.F.A; - the 1/2nd London Bde. R.F.A. becoming 281st Bde. R.F.A.; - the 1/3rd London Bde. R.F.A. becoming 282nd Bde. R.F.A.; - -and a newly-formed 18-pounder brigade, the 283rd Bde. R.F.A. Also the -two field companies of the Royal Engineers become known as the 512th -and 513th Field Companies, and were joined by the 416th Edinburgh -Field Coy., which was posted to the 169th Infantry Brigade. - -And the Royal Army Service Corps, which appears at first as numbers 1, -2, 3, and 4 Companies, become the 213th, with the 214th, 215th, and -216th posted to the three infantry brigades in numerical order. - -The Stokes trench mortar batteries were numbered 167th, 168th, and -169th; the medium trench mortar batteries as X, Y, and Z. They were -posted in numerical or alphabetical order to the infantry brigades. 6 -There was also a heavy trench mortar battery designated V Battery, -which was formed in May 1916. - -The pioneer battalion was the 1/5th Battalion Cheshire Regt. The -veterinary unit was the 1/1st London Mobile Veterinary Section. - -These were the bits of machinery forming the 56th Division. - -The first divisional conference was held on the 11th February, when -most of the officers attending had their first introduction to Gen. -Hull. He was a tall, good-looking man with an abrupt manner, but of -singular charm. It did not take him long to win the complete -confidence of his division. - -In the midst of the work of getting the machine properly fitted -together, there were the usual rumours and warning orders which came -to nothing. The first information Gen. Hull received was that the VI -Corps, of which his division formed a part, would relieve the XVII -French Corps and would move to the area Domart-en-Ponthieu. The move -took place on the 27th February, in the midst of a heavy fall of snow, -which made the roads very heavy for transport. And a further move was -made on the 12th March to the Doullens area, between that town and St. -Pol. - -Whenever units were behind the line they trained. It did not matter -how long the individual soldier had been in France and Belgium, he was -never excused as a “fully trained soldier.” Even instructors were sent -from time to time to receive fresh instruction at Divisional, Corps, -or Army schools. And so, during the period of assembly, the units of -the 56th Division trained. Some were attached for ten days or a 7 -fortnight to the 14th Division for work in a “forward position” round -about Dainville--infantry, artillery, engineers, and field ambulance -took their turn at this work; others carried on the routine of -exercise on the training-grounds in the neighbourhood of their -billets. The Commander-in-Chief, Sir Douglas Haig, visited the -divisional area and the school at Givenchy on the 30th March. - -In studying the adventures of a division, whether it is holding the -line or whether it is in a reserve area, one must always visualise a -great deal more than the twelve battalions of infantry which make or -repel the final charge in any engagement. A division occupies and -works over a large area, and depends, of course, on a base of -supplies. When a person is told of the front taken up by a division, -he will look at the map and measure off the width of the front line. -“There,” he says, “is the division”! But the division covers quite a -big area in depth as well. Not only do the billets of troops not -actually employed in the front line go back a long way in successive -stages, but the wagons and lorries of the Royal Army Service Corps -work back many miles. The narrowest measurement of a divisional area -is usually the front line. - -Perhaps the following list, showing the dispositions of the division -in billets during March, will give those with no experience some idea -of what is meant by the word “division”: - - Divisional Headquarters Le Cauroy - Divisional Artillery Headquarters Le Cauroy - Divisional R.E. Headquarters Le Cauroy - 5th Cheshire Regt. Grand Rullecourt - B Squadron King Edward’s Horse Grand Rullecourt - Divisional Cyclists’ Coy. Grand Rullecourt - 1/4th London Howitzer Bde. Wamlin and Rozière 8 - Divisional Ammunition Column Etrée-Wamin - Headquarters Divisional Train Bruilly - No. 1 Coy. Divisional Train Wamin - 56th Sanitary Section Le Cauroy - Mobile Veterinary Section Bruilly - Salvage Company Le Cauroy - R.E. Ordnance Dump Le Cauroy - Divisional Canteen and Shops Le Cauroy - Divisional Schools Givenchy-le-Noble - - - 167TH INFANTRY BRIGADE - - Brigade Headquarters Rebreuve - 167/1st and X56th Trench Mortar Batteries Rebreuve - 1/1st London Regt. Ivergny - 1/3rd London Regt. Cannettemont - 1/7th Middlesex Regt. Beaudricourt - 1/8th Middlesex Regt. Rebreuviette - 1/1st London Bde. R.F.A. Rebreuve - 2/1st London Field Coy. R.E. Honval - No. 2 Coy. Train Rebreuviette - 2/1st London Field Ambulance Ivergny - - - 168TH INFANTRY BRIGADE - - Brigade Headquarters Manin - 168/1st Trench Mortar Battery Magnicourt - Y56th Trench Mortar Battery Berlencourt - 1/4th London Regt. Beaufort - 1/12th London Regt. Ambrines - 1/13th London Regt. Lignereuil - 1/14th London Regt. Villers-sire-Simon - 1/2nd London Bde. R.F.A. Berlencourt - 2/2nd London Field Coy. R.E. Sars-les-Bois - No. 3 Coy. Train Denier - 5th Entrenching Battalion Blavincourt - 2/2nd London Field Ambulance Liencourt - - - 169TH INFANTRY BRIGADE - - Brigade Headquarters Houvin-Houvigneul - 169/1st and Z56th Trench Mortar Batteries Houvin-Houvigneul - 1/2nd London Regt. Séricourt - 1/5th London Regt. Magnicourt - 1/9th London Regt. Houvigneul - 1/16th London Regt. Moncheaux 9 - 1/3rd London Bde. R.F.A. Bouret-sur-Canche - No. 4 Coy. Train Houvin-Houvigneul - 2/3rd London Field Ambulance Houvin-Houvigneul - Divisional Supply Column Liencourt - Divisional Ammunition Sub-Park Avesnes-le-Comte - -All these units contribute to an advance. Some designation, such as -“shops,” may strike the ear as strange, an unlikely unit to help much -in an advance; but a man cannot march without boots, a gun can neither -shoot nor advance with a broken spring, a motor lorry will not bring -up a single tin of “bully beef” if its axle breaks, and all these -things are put right by men who are labelled “shops.” Even the -Divisional Canteen plays its part, and has on occasions pushed well -forward to refresh wearied troops. - -We say these units contribute to an advance! They contribute to every -action, to every move--they are the division. - -As a further measure, which will give the importance of the unit -rather than the size of it, the maximum British effort was 99 -infantry, 6 cavalry, and 4 yeomanry divisions (the latter were more -often infantry than cavalry). - -The work of perfecting the organisation went on through the months of -February, March, and April. The problem of how to create from nothing -had sometimes to be faced as the Army usually faces such -conundrums--by cutting a bit from something else which did exist. -Capt. Newnham notes in the 169th Brigade diary under date 17th April: -“Brigade Machine Gun Coy. formed. Capt. J. R. Pyper, 4th London, to -command, and Capt. J. B. Baber, Queen’s Westminsters, second in -command. Company formed from existing personnel in battalions, each -battalion finding a section, and some from Headquarters. No M.G.C. 10 -gunners available, as per War Office letter. Already weak battalions -lose good men and reinforcements will have to come from them as well.” - -The health of the division was good except for an outbreak of measles -in the 169th Brigade. - -On the 3rd May the 167th Brigade moved to Souastre, under the VII -Corps, and the rest of the division followed on the 6th May, -Divisional Headquarters being established at Hénu. - -On the 9th May the C.R.A., Brig.-Gen. R. J. C. Elkington, took over -artillery positions from the C.R.A. 14th Division on the Hébuterne -front. - - * * * * * - -Three months had elapsed since the division had commenced to assemble -at Hallencourt. Troops were well rested and trained, and were now to -be launched in the big operations of 1916. It would be as well at this -point to note the general situation, as from now on the 56th Division -took a prominent part in the severe fighting which commenced on 1st -July. - -We will give the German point of view as expressed by Gen. von -Falkenhayn and published in his war book[2]: - - “France has been weakened almost to the limits of endurance, - both in a military and economic sense--the latter by the - permanent loss of the coalfields in the north-east of the - country. The Russian armies have not been completely - overthrown, but their offensive powers have been so - shattered that she can never revive in anything like her 11 - old strength. The armies of Serbia can be considered as - destroyed. Italy has no doubt realised that she cannot - reckon on the realisation of her brigand’s ambitions within - measurable time, and would therefore probably be only too - glad to be able to liquidate her adventure in any way that - would save her face. - - If no deductions can be drawn from these facts, the reasons - are to be sought in many circumstances ... the chief among - them cannot be passed over, for it is the enormous hold - which England still has on her allies.” - -He then goes on to discuss what can be done to break the will of -England. He says that the history of the English wars against the -Netherlands, Spain, France, and Napoleon is being repeated. That -England is “obviously staking everything on a war of exhaustion.” He -puts the winter of 1917 as the latest date when a food crisis and “the -social and political crisis that always follow them, among the members -of our alliance,” will occur, and asks, or rather states, that England -must be shown that her venture has no prospects. But “in this case, of -course, as in most others involving higher strategic decisions, it is -very much easier to say what has to be done than to find out how it -can and must be done.” - -How can one inflict a decisive defeat on England on land? Invasion is -impossible--the German Navy is convinced of that. - - “As far as our own Continent of Europe is concerned, we are - sure of our troops, and are working with known factors. For - that reason we must rule out enterprises in the East, where - England can only be struck at indirectly. Victories at 12 - Salonica, the Suez Canal, or in Mesopotamia can only help us - in so far as they intensify the doubts about England’s - invulnerability which have already been aroused among the - Mediterranean peoples and in the Mohammedan world. Defeats - in the East could do us palpable harm among our allies. We - can in no case expect to do anything of decisive effect on - the course of the war, as the protagonists of an Alexander - march to India or Egypt, or an overwhelming blow at - Salonica, are always hoping. Our allies have not the - necessary means at their disposal. We are not in a position - to supply them, owing to the bad communications, and - England, which has known how to swallow the humiliations of - Antwerp and Gallipoli, will survive defeats in those distant - theatres also. - - When we turn from them to the European theatre, where - England can be struck on land, we cannot close our eyes to - the fact that we are faced with an extraordinarily difficult - problem.” - -It would seem that England was giving poor von Falkenhayn a lot of -trouble. After looking vainly in the East for a vulnerable point in -her armour, he is forced to turn his eyes to the West. And in the West -he does not like the look of the British Army. He cannot collect more -than twenty-five or twenty-six divisions to attack with, and they are -not nearly enough! - - “Attempts at a mass break-through, even with an extreme - accumulation of men and material, cannot be regarded as - holding out prospects of success against a well-armed enemy - whose _moral_ is sound and who is not seriously inferior in - numbers. The defender has usually succeeded in closing the - gaps. The salients thus made, enormously exposed to the - effects of flanking fire, threaten to become a mere 13 - slaughterhouse. The technical difficulties of directing and - supplying the masses bottled up in them are so great as to - seem practically insurmountable.” - -He sweeps aside the idea of attacking the English Army with a final -complaint that, even if he drove it completely from the Continent, -“England may be trusted not to give up even then,” and France would -not have been very seriously damaged, so that a second operation would -have to be taken against her. It would be impossible to get sufficient -men. - -England’s allies are called her “tools,” and the only thing to do is -to smash up the “tools.” But no weapon is to be discarded, and so -unrestricted submarine warfare must be undertaken against this -arch-enemy. - - “If the definite promises of the Naval Authorities that the - unrestricted submarine war must force England to yield in - the course of the year 1916 are realised, we must face the - fact that the United States may take up a hostile attitude. - She cannot intervene decisively in the war in time to enable - her to make England fight on when that country sees the - spectre of hunger and many another famine rise up before her - island. There is only one shadow on this encouraging picture - of the future. We have to assume that the Naval Authorities - are not making a mistake.” - -As for the “tools,” Italy is ruled out as a possible one to be broken -as she is not of much account in Falkenhayn’s opinion, and he thinks -there will soon be internal troubles. Russia is also ruled out because -he does not see any gain in the capture of Petrograd or Moscow, and 14 -there are also “internal troubles.” There is France left. - - “As I have already insisted, the strain on France has almost - reached the breaking-point--though it is certainly borne - with the most remarkable devotion. If we succeed in opening - the eyes of her people to the fact that in a military sense - they have nothing more to hope for, that breaking-point - would be reached and England’s best sword knocked out of her - hand.... Within our reach behind the French sector of the - Western Front there are objectives for the retention of - which the French Staff would be compelled to throw in every - man they have. If they do so the forces of France will bleed - to death.... The objectives of which I am speaking now are - Belfort and Verdun.” - -Altogether this document, which was prepared for the Kaiser and must -have been read by that potentate with mixed feelings, was not the work -of an optimist. It reads more like despair, as though Falkenhayn was -saying, “I can still fight, I can still hurt, but I am bound to go -down in the end”! One cannot see any very shrewd reasoning in it, for -he not only underrated the valour of the French (as the Germans always -did), but he was placed in very serious difficulties by the successful -attack of Brussiloff on the Austrians in June, so that he also -undervalued the strength of Russia. For this misfortune, however, the -Germans blame the Austrians, condemning them for their offensive -against the Italians in May, which was undertaken against German -advice and made the Brussiloff adventure possible. But this document -shows the policy and plans of Germany for the year 1916--the great -German effort on Verdun, which was to bleed France to death, dominates -all other events. The attack was launched on the 21st February and 15 -coincides with the formation of the 56th Division, and the subsequent -movements of the division were connected with the wide-spreading -influence of the Verdun battle. - -In his dispatch dated the 29th May, Sir Douglas Haig sums up the early -situation very briefly. Since the 19th December, 1915, - - “the only offensive effort made by the enemy on a great - scale was directed against our French Allies near Verdun. - The fighting in that area has been prolonged and severe. The - results have been worthy of the highest traditions of the - French Army and of great service to the cause of the Allies. - The efforts made by the enemy have cost him heavy losses - both in men and in prestige, and he has made these - sacrifices without gaining any advantage to counterbalance - them. - - During the struggle my troops have been in readiness to - co-operate as they might be needed, but the only assistance - asked for by our Allies was of an indirect nature--viz., the - relief of the French troops on a portion of their defensive - front. This relief I was glad to be able to afford.” - -On the other hand, plans for a Franco-British offensive had been fully -discussed by Sir Douglas Haig and Marshal Joffre and complete -agreement arrived at. Vast preparations were in progress. Sir Douglas -Haig desired to postpone the attack as long as possible, because both -the British Army and the supply of ammunition were growing steadily, -and time would enable the newer troops to complete their training. But -though the original plans had no connection with Verdun, they were -bound to influence and be influenced by the great German attack. - -It may be said that the Entente Powers were not looking for a speedy 16 -termination of the war, but were bent on inflicting heavy blows on -Germany and her allies, while Germany was seeking, by a concentration -on France at Verdun, to gain a decision in the West. Falkenhayn’s -advice was being followed, although the unrestricted submarine warfare -was postponed for the time being. - -The plan for the British offensive was that the main attack should be -delivered by the Fourth Army, under Sir Henry Rawlinson, on a front -stretching from Maricourt, on the right, to Serre, on the left; while -farther north the Third Army, under Sir E. H. H. Allenby, would make -an attack on both sides of the Gommecourt salient. - -For an offensive on this scale enormous preparations were necessary. -There was no end to the amount of stores to be accumulated, from -ammunition to horseshoes. In the forward trench system many miles of -trenches had to be dug--assault trenches, assembly trenches, -communication trenches, trenches for telephone wires--dugouts had to -be constructed for sheltering troops, for dressing-stations, for -storing food, water, and engineering material, not forgetting -ammunition. We are bound to admit, however, that in those days, -although much work was done on dugouts, the infantry saw precious -little of them. Mining they saw, indeed, but dugouts were rare. - -Then there were dumps to be made at convenient points, and many miles -of railway line, both standard and narrow gauge, to bring the stores -within reach of the fighting troops. Roads had to be constructed, and -in some places causeways had to be built over marshy valleys. Wells -were sunk, over a hundred pumping stations were installed, and a 17 -hundred and twenty miles of water-mains laid. - -The whole country behind this vast front was teeming with men and -horses, with wagons and motor lorries. At night it was as though an -army of gigantic ants were at work, stretched out in long lines, -building and excavating, marching in solemn silent processions with -grim, determined purpose in the slowness of their gait, and bowed down -under loads of material. They passed and repassed in never-ending -streams; the roads were congested with motor and wagon traffic; paths -across the open country could be traced by the shadowy silhouettes of -men in single file. And the horizon flickered with the flash of guns -as with summer lightning, while shells passed overhead with a -long-drawn, ghostly wail, or fell with a sharp swish and a crash. The -line, that maze of foul mud-filled ditches constructed in a belt of -shell-pounded and festering earth, was indicated at night by floating -starlights rising irregularly as sparks, bursting into brilliancy, and -remaining for a moment, suspended in the blackness of the sky like arc -lamps, then dying once more to so many sparks before they fell to the -ground. - -Sometimes the nights would be quiet--that is to say, quiet except for -occasional crashes at intervals of several minutes--although the -constant flickering on the horizon would never cease; at others they -would be “lively,” one might almost say there would be a sensation of -hustle, so swift would be the wailing passage and so continuous the -crash of bursting shells. This might last all through the night as an -organised “shoot,” or would come suddenly, without warning, a swift -artillery attack on roads, working parties, or billets--what was 18 -afterwards known as “harassing fire” though it was in a more intense -form--and shifting from one point to another, from front line to -roads, from roads to billets, from billets to some spot where troops -were suspected to be working. Or there would be a raid with an angry -concentration of artillery from both sides. - -And night after night the preparation for the “Big Push” went on. - - * * * * * - -The 56th Division, now trained and “shaken together,” arrived in the -Hébuterne sector, on the right of the Gommecourt salient and towards -the left of the front under preparation for the British effort. The -167th Brigade took over the front-line system held by the 145th -Brigade, 48th Division, on the 4th May. The 168th Brigade marched from -their billets in the Doullens area on the 6th, and the 169th Brigade -followed on the 7th May. Divisional Headquarters were established at -Hénu. - -First blood was drawn for the division by the 167th Brigade on the -18th May. A German patrol attempted to bomb a sap held by the 3rd -London Regt., and was beaten off with the loss of one officer and one -N.C.O. killed. These proved to be of the 169th Infantry Regt., 52nd -Division, one of the divisions of the XIV German Corps and a normal -identification. - -The system of holding the line was one of “grouping.” On the 22nd May -Brig.-Gen. Coke, 169th Brigade, was in command of the line, which was -held by two battalions of the 169th Brigade and two battalions of the -168th Brigade. In support was Brig.-Gen. Nugent, with his headquarters -at Souastre, having under his command his own four battalions and one 19 -of the 169th Brigade. Brig.-Gen. Loch, 168th Brigade, with his -headquarters at Grenas, had two of his own battalions and one of the -169th Brigade. - -Plans were now in preparation for a very remarkable achievement. - -We have seen that the scheme for the big British offensive included an -attack on the Gommecourt salient. This was to be undertaken by the -Third Army, and the task fell to the VII Corps (Gen. Snow), holding -the front in question. For the moment we will confine ourselves to the -point that the 56th Division was to be one of the attacking divisions. - -When Gen. Hull was informed of what he was expected to do, he was at -once confronted with an obvious difficulty--the front line of his -sector was some seven hundred yards away from the enemy! It was not -impossible to shorten this distance, but, with one exception, the -several ways of doing it must result in heavy casualties; the enemy -would be bound to see what was afoot, and would try by every means in -his power to prevent and to hinder its execution, and render it as -costly as he could. It would also be a lengthy business unless it was -boldly tackled. Gen. Hull decided on the boldest of all courses. - -He traced out a new line which was, on an average, four hundred yards -in advance of the old one. This meant working, in some spots, within -two hundred and fifty yards of the enemy. _And he decided to dig it -in one night!_ It meant that at least three thousand yards of -trench must be constructed in a few hours, a task of appalling -magnitude; and it must be remembered that every effort was always made -to limit the number of men in any working party required for No Man’s 20 -Land. When he announced his intentions there was something like -consternation at Corps Headquarters. - -The task was allotted to Brig.-Gen. Nugent and the 167th Brigade. He -had at his disposal, over and above the five battalions of his -“group,” one company of the 5th Cheshire Regt. with a half of the -2/2nd London Field Coy. R.E. - -So that the men might know the lie of the land, the 167th Brigade was -sent on ahead of the rest of the division and straight into the line, -which it held for a fortnight. The Engineers, the company officers of -battalions concerned, and the brigade staff made most careful -reconnaissance, patrolling every night, noting landmarks, getting -acquainted with that silent, eerie tract separating the two lines of -combatants. Conversations throughout the day were punctuated with -references to “the strong point,” “the lonely tree,” the “May bush,” -“the Z hedge,” “the head of Sap 4,” as landmarks became familiar. -Sometimes German patrols were met, sometimes imagined. - -It was decided to divide the whole front into four sections--A, B, C, -and D. The only difficulty was the junction between B and C, but this -was eventually marked by a heap of white stones--a small heap. - -Four days before the date fixed for the operation, the brigade was -relieved, and during the following days the whole of the arrangements -were rehearsed--with the exception of the actual digging--first by day -and then by night. - -Meanwhile the artillery were warned that nothing was to be done by -them to rouse the enemy while the work was being carried out, but that 21 -all batteries must be manned and ready for instant action. All known -machine-gun emplacements were carefully registered, and arrangements -were made with the Brigadier-General commanding the Corps heavy -artillery to register on all German batteries whose zone of fire -included the area of the work. Two of the Divisional 4·5 howitzers -were to assist in the counter-battery work. - -Although the trench was dug in one night, the whole operation required -three nights to complete. On the first night, the 25-26th May, -covering parties crept out and took up positions in advance of the -selected line. Then engineers followed, quiet and certain in all that -they did, and marked out the line with string and pegs. On the left -they got to work speedily: the pegs were about nine inches long and -made from small round stakes from which the bark had not been removed; -the string was ordinary jute twine which had been prepared with loops -at the proper intervals to mark the angle of bays and traverses. They -were undisturbed, and C and D sections were marked out. - -But in A and B sections the night was one of excursions and alarms. -First of all there was great difficulty in getting the covering party -through our own wire, which suggests an unfortunate oversight; and -then German patrols were encountered. The latter occurrence was a -contingency which had always been reckoned with. A game of hide and -seek ensued, but meanwhile time passed. There was no question of -clearing No Man’s Land when other parties were working on the left, -and so the marking had to be abandoned. It did not, however, cause any -serious inconvenience. - -The next night each battalion marched from billets fully armed for 22 -digging. Ten per cent. carried picks, and the remainder carried -shovels which had been carefully sharpened. Each man had three -sandbags, one being wrapped round the shovel or pick to prevent noise, -and between them they also carried a quantity of white tape. - -In the line ten exits had been made by cutting through our wire and -constructing steps out of the trench--trench ladders had also been -provided by the engineers in case the steps should be impassable -through rain. White boards were hung on the wire to mark these gaps -for the withdrawal. - -The communication trenches to be used by the working battalions were -left quite clear by the troops holding the line, and, at the appointed -time, the head of each battalion was at the selected entrance and -advanced in the following order: covering parties, taping parties, -working parties. - -The covering parties, consisting of sixty officers and men in six -groups, had orders to use rifle fire as sparingly as possible, but to -make full use of the bayonet if enemy patrols were encountered. - -When the covering parties had been given time to get out, the two -other groups of parties followed at short intervals. And half an hour -after the digging parties had left the trench, wiring and carrying -parties, about a hundred men to each battalion, went out. There were -three thousand men in No Man’s Land! - -The boldness of Gen. Hull’s enterprise was amply justified. By 2.30 -a.m. the trench had been made and was held by posts, found from the -covering parties, reinforced with Lewis guns; they had rations, water, -and shovels to improve their positions, and were in telephonic 23 -communication with the old trench, and all the working parties had -filed away as silently as they had come. - -During the ensuing day the Royal Flying Corps successfully prevented -any enemy aeroplanes from approaching our lines, but our airmen -photographed the new line themselves, and at noon Gen. Hull was able -to see from a photograph what work had been done. - -On the night of 27-28th the same number of men were out working again, -improving the front-line trench and wire, digging support lines and -two other communication trenches. The new work had been pegged out the -previous night by the engineers. - -The 56th Division had then started its career with the astounding feat -of having in the space of forty-eight hours constructed and wired a -new system of trenches, comprising 2,900 yards of fire trench and -1,500 yards of communication trenches, in No Man’s Land and within 250 -yards of the enemy. Casualties were 8 killed and 55 wounded. A little -luck had waited on audacity, but the success of the whole operation -was undoubtedly due to the intelligence and keenness of the men. They -had nothing much to help them. Gen. Hull had, indeed, ordered two or -three wagons, loaded with empty shell-cases and biscuit tins, to drive -up and down the roads in rear of his lines, and the artillery fired an -occasional round from a howitzer as a means of distracting the -attention of the enemy, but it only required one foolish man to lose -his head and disaster would have descended on the whole brigade. - -It is interesting to note the dress. The covering parties were in full -fighting kit and carried one day’s ration; the taping, digging, and 24 -wiring men had no equipment, but carried a rifle, loaded with ten -rounds, and one bandolier; the wire-carrying party had no arms or -equipment. - -The first stage was over. There was, however, still an enormous lot of -work to be done--the trenches had to be improved, deepened, revetted, -emplacements had to be made for machine guns and trench mortars, -stores for ammunition of all sorts had to be constructed, cables had -to be buried--it is but a repetition of what was going on everywhere -on that front. - - * * * * * - -Gen. Hull and his G.S.O.1, Lieut.-Col. J. E. S. Brind, an -artilleryman, were considering the problem of attack. The main -features of it are noted by Gen. Hull as follows: - - (_a_) The village of Hébuterne, which affords concealment - from view to within a short distance of our present line and - good observation of the German positions between Gommecourt - and the spur north of the sunken road (K17a and b) on the - right of the divisional front. - - (_b_) The valleys west of Hébuterne, which afford good - artillery positions and cover from view, except from the - trees in Gommecourt Park. - - (_c_) The spur running eastward from Hébuterne just north of - the Hébuterne-Puisieux Road, which defilades the area, north - of the spur, from the German trenches, south of the spur. - - (_d_) Gommecourt Park and village, which, to a certain - extent, dominate the ground to the south. - - (_e_) The spur running from E29c (north-east of Gommecourt) - through K5a and b to the Rossignol Wood along the southern - portion of which spur runs the German fourth line. - - This spur commands the eastern edge of Gommecourt, dominates 25 - the German trench system south-east and south of - Gommecourt, and affords concealment, both for battery - positions in the valley to the east and for a covered means - of approach for a counter-attack against the captors of - Gommecourt. - - (_f_) The valley south-east of Nameless Farm, in which runs - the Puisieux-Gommecourt Road, a line of approach covered - from view from our present line. - -It was once asked after a severe action for the capture of some rising -ground, “What is the use of turning Fritz off a hill? There is always -another hill behind it.” Which was true enough. But it is as well to -remember that the high ground to the left as far as Blairville, held -at this date by the Germans, was in 1918 in our hands, and it enabled -Sir Douglas Haig to turn the whole of the old Somme position. - -Of the German line Gen. Hull says: - - “The German position south-east of Gommecourt Park and - village consists of three lines of trenches, of which the - first is heavily wired, the second lightly wired, the third - does not appear to be wired at all unless there is sunken - wire on the road. All three lines are visible from our - present position except the second and third lines behind - the strong point K11c and d. The northern flank of this - system of trenches rests on the southern edge of Gommecourt - Park, the trenches along which are organised to fire south. - The southern flank of the system rests on the strong point - K11c. - - In rear of this system is another consisting of two lines of - trenches running from the south-east corner of Gommecourt - along the ridge in 5Ka, b, and c, to Rossignol Wood. The - front trench of this system is heavily wired and visible.” - -In a most interesting paper on the proposed attack Gen. Hull says: 26 - - “The object of the VII Corps attack will be to establish - itself on the line 16 Poplars-Nameless Farm-Little Z-Tree at - E23a12. - - The 46th Division will attack from the north and the - question was discussed: - - (_a_) Should we endeavour to secure a footing on the - ridge E29c-K5a in the initial assault, or - - (_b_) Should the 56th Division first secure the German - third line from the south-east corner of Gommecourt - Wood and then, under Corps direction, launch a second - attack to secure the ridge? - - Whichever solution the Corps Commander considers it wisest - to adopt, there is one point which I wish to urge: that no - advance through the village or park of Gommecourt should be - attempted until the ridge E29c-K5a is secured. - - The clearing of the village and wood is bound to be a costly - enterprise if the enemy makes any attempt to fight it out. - It is to be hoped that the heavy bombardment will very - seriously affect the _moral_ of the garrison of the - village and park, and I consider that the knowledge that - they were cut off from escape and from reinforcements might - have so great an effect on the German troops as to make them - surrender and so save us valuable troops for further - operations. - - I was, and still am, in favour of the first solution, i.e. - to secure the Quadrilateral in the first assault. The - reasons which have been urged against this course are: - - (_a_) That at Loos no success was achieved after a - certain limited distance had been carried. - - (_b_) That in the event of either the 46th or the 56th - Divisions failing to achieve their objective, the - detachment of the other would be in an extremely - isolated position. - - I have carefully considered both these arguments, and do not 27 - think there is any reason to alter my opinion. - - At Loos the 47th Division was the only division to which a - definite objective was given. Its rôle was to form a - defensive flank on the right of the IV Corps. Its left flank - advanced nearly 2,500 yards behind the German front line - without serious loss or difficulty. In the present case I am - proposing an advance, at one point on each divisional front, - of only 800 yards, in the case of the 56th Division, and - less in the case of the 46th Division. In the present case, - too, we have the additional advantage of much heavier - artillery, more ammunition, and a salient to attack. - - As regards the second argument, that in the event of one or - other attack failing the detachment of the other division - would be isolated: - - In the event of my reaching my objective in K5a, and the - 46th Division failing to reach E29c, I should consider it my - duty to put in troops (if necessary from my reserve brigade) - to help the 46th Division. - - Troops at K5a would be within 500 yards of the unit at the - south-eastern edge of Gommecourt, and in direct - communication by visual signalling with my present trench - system, so that they can hardly be considered isolated, and - the risk, if any, is, I consider, worth running in order to - isolate completely the enemy troops in Gommecourt Park and - village. - - I do not like the idea of delay and a second attack to - capture the Quadrilateral in K5a. The second attack would - have to be launched from our front line trenches, as I do - not consider it would be feasible to organise and launch an - attack from the newly-captured trenches. Any delay would - enable the enemy to put his barrage in front of our - front-line system, as if there is a weak point in our - organisation, it is in the number of counter-batteries - available to deal with the enemy guns. If we delay we lose - the advantage surprise would give us.” - -While these problems were being discussed, Sir Douglas Haig had 28 -decided to hurry on his preparations. We have seen that his desire was -to delay as much as possible and perfect his machine, also that every -day meant to him added strength. But meanwhile the Entente Powers were -being pressed in another direction. The Austrians had attacked the -Italians with great initial success. By the end of May the situation -on that front was so serious that the Russian offensive was opened in -the early days of June in order to relieve the pressure. - -The Germans accuse the Austrians of having drained their front in -Galicia of artillery for their Italian offensive, and also of holding -the line with troops of poor quality. However that may be, Gen. -Brussiloff’s army, “after a relatively short artillery preparation ... -got up from their trenches and simply marched forward.” Falkenhayn has -a delightful observation on the whole business: “A ‘reconnaissance’ -like Brussiloff’s was only possible, of course, if the General had -decisive reason for holding a low opinion of his enemy’s power of -resistance. And on this point he made no miscalculation.” - -The immediate effect of the Russian success was the transfer of three -divisions from the Western Front, and later more followed; but the -Germans were still very strong in numbers, and there was no slacking -off of their efforts on Verdun. They were able to help the Austrians -to check the Russian advance and eventually to repulse it, but, on the -other hand, the Italian counter-attack met with success and drove the -Austrians back. - -Sir Douglas Haig says that - - “The heroic defence of our French Allies had already gained 29 - many weeks of inestimable value and had caused the enemy - very heavy losses; but the strain continued to increase. In - view, therefore, of the situation in the various theatres of - war, it was eventually agreed between Gen. Joffre and myself - that the combined French and British offensive should not be - postponed beyond the end of June. The object of that - offensive was threefold: - - (1) To relieve the pressure on Verdun. - - (2) To assist our Allies in the other theatres of war - by stopping any further transfer of German troops from - the Western Front. - - (3) To wear down the strength of the forces opposed to us.” - -We begin to see now the dominating influence of Verdun. In any case -the offensive could not have been postponed much longer, and if it was -an alteration of plan forced by the enemy, it was not to be compared -with the abandonment by the Germans of their offensive--which -Falkenhayn says he had prepared against the British with the object of -forestalling the Entente blow on the Western Front--due to the -uncomfortable situation of the Austrians. - -Probably, however, the date did influence the approaching action of -the 56th Division. The new front line was still a long way from the -enemy. The Queen’s Westminster Rifles succeeded in advancing a small -sector of the line by a hundred yards and, had there been time, the -whole division would have crept closer before jumping on the enemy. - -The weather, too, was very bad. - -In due course Gen. Hull issued his preliminary instructions, from -which it will be seen that the decision to attempt the capture of the -Quadrilateral in one operation had been taken: - - “The attack of the 56th Division will be carried out by the 30 - 168th and 169th Brigades, whose tasks will be as follows: - - (_a_) The objective of the 168th Brigade will be to - capture the German line from Fair Trench, about K11d13, - along Farm, Fame and Elbe, Felon, to a point in Fell - fifty yards north-west of the trench junction at K5c52, - and to establish itself in three strong points: - (1) About Farmyard, Farmer, Farm. - (2) About Elbe, between Et and Felon. - (3) About cross-trenches of Fell and Felon with Epte. - - 168th Brigade will be responsible for the construction of a - fire trench facing south-east to connect the right flank of - the captured line to our present line in W47. - - (_b_) The task of the 169th Brigade will be carried out - in three phases. The object of the 169th Brigade in the - first phase will be to capture the line of German - trenches from the left of the 168th Brigade along Fall, - Fellow, the Cemetery, Eck, the Maze, Eel, and Fir, and - to establish strong points: - - (1) From Feud through Ems to the Cemetery inclusive. - (2) About the Maze. - (3) About the south-east corner of Gommecourt Park. - - The second phase of the 169th Brigade attack will take place - immediately after the first phase. - - The objective of the second phase is the Quadrilateral of - the trenches in the south-east portion of K5a. The artillery - lifts will be timed on the assumption that the infantry will - reach Ems (between Etch and Fillet) twenty-five minutes - after zero; and Exe (between Etch and Fillet) twenty-seven - minutes after zero time. - - The third phase will take place directly after the - Quadrilateral is captured, and will consist of the securing 31 - of the cross-trenches at K5a78 (where Indus crosses Fill and - Fillet) and joining hands with the 46th Division along Fill. - Fillet will be consolidated facing east. - - The following will be carried on the man: - 200 rounds S.A.A.; - Waterproof sheet; - Haversack; - Iron ration and current day’s ration; - Two to three sand-bags; - Two tube helmets; - Proportion of wire-cutters, bill-hooks, tools.” - -The instructions for the 167th Brigade are practically embodied in the -following paragraphs: - - “One company 167th Brigade will be placed at the disposal of - the Brigadier-General commanding 169th Brigade, to hold - sectors Y49 and Y50. - - Seven officers and 200 men of the 167th Brigade will be - detailed for the control of smoke, and will be under the - orders of the Divisional Gas Officer. Approximately 1,200 - men will be required for work under the C.R.E. on - communication trenches across No Man’s Land and for carrying - parties.” - -Practice attacks, based on these instructions, were carried out by the -brigades in reserve. - -We have written of the constructive preparations which were going on -all along the line of proposed attack. These preparations were -continued until the last moment. But meanwhile another element was -introduced--that of destructive preparation. It is scarcely necessary -to point out that neither form of preparation could be concealed from -the enemy. The Germans knew as well as we did where we would attack. - -The Gommecourt sector to be attacked was held by the German 169th and 32 -170th Regiments, with about 1-1/2 battalions on the front line, 1 -battalion in support, 2 battalions in reserve in Bucquoy, and 2 -companies at Ablainzeville. Their artillery consisted of 5 batteries -of heavy artillery and 12 batteries of field artillery. These -batteries were divided into three groups at Quesnoy Farm, on the left -of the British position, Biez Wood and Puisieux. There was a further -group of guns near Adinfer Wood which could assist in the defence. - -The 56th Divisional Artillery, together with the heavy VII Corps guns, -had now to prepare for the infantry assault by smashing up not only -the wire and trench system, but billets and gun positions behind the -German lines as well. As regards villages, most attention was given to -Bucquoy, Essart, Ablainzeville, and Achiet-le-Grand. - -Three groups of artillery were formed--a northern group, under -Lieut.-Col. Southam, a southern group, under Lieut.-Col. Macdowell, -and a wire-cutting group under Lieut.-Col. Prechtel. The northern and -southern groups were under the orders of the Corps, and consisted of: - - NORTHERN GROUP - - 3 batteries of 18-pounders (until zero day, then 4 batteries). - 1 battery 4·5 howitzers. - Affiliated at zero to the 169th Brigade. - - SOUTHERN GROUP - - 4 batteries of 18-pounders. - 1 battery 4·5 howitzers. - Affiliated at zero to the 168th Brigade. - - WIRE-CUTTING GROUP 33 - - 5 batteries of 18-pounders until zero and then 4 batteries. - 1 battery 4·5 howitzers. - Two of the guns of the 4·5 battery will be at the call of the - counter-battery group. - -In the preliminary instructions it will be noticed that a party of -officers and men were detailed to act under the Divisional Gas -Officer. Their special duty was to cover the approach of the infantry -by the discharge of a smoke cloud. It was hoped to introduce some -element of surprise by occasional discharges of smoke during the -preparatory bombardment, and so the Corps ordered that the bombardment -should be carried out for a period of five days, and the attack would -take place on the sixth. These days would be known as U, V, W, X, Y, -and Z days. - - “Smoke discharges lasting for a period of ten minutes will - take place on the days and at the hours mentioned below. - They will coincide with the intense artillery bombardment of - the enemy trenches. These bombardments will commence thirty - minutes before the smoke, and will reach their maximum - intensity during the ten minutes that it is being discharged: - - U day, no discharge. - V day, no discharge. - W day from 10.15 a.m. to 10.25 a.m. - X day from 5.45 a.m. to 5.55 a.m. - Y day from 7.15 a.m. to 7.25 a.m. - - On Z day the smoke cloud will commence five minutes before - zero. On the 46th and 56th Divisional fronts its duration - will be as arranged by divisions. On the 37th Divisional 34 - front it will continue for one hour.” - -U day was the 24th June, but the whole of the great attack was -postponed for two days, so that, instead of having five days of the -preliminary bombardment, there were seven. - -Naturally the Germans did not sit still under this destructive fire, -but retaliated on our front line and trench system, and on our rear -organisation. The enemy artillery had been active during the month of -May, and the division had suffered in casualties to the extent of 402; -for the month of June casualties leapt up to 801. The end of June was -a prolonged crash of guns. Only for one half-hour, from 4 p.m., did -the guns cease so that aeroplanes might take photographs of the German -lines, and then the sky was speckled with the puffs of smoke from the -German anti-aircraft guns. - -The guns of the 56th Division fired altogether 115,594 rounds, of -which 31,000 were fired on Z day. To this total must be added the work -of the Corps heavy artillery. The 6-inch, 9·2-inch, and 15-inch fired -on V day 3,200 rounds, on W day 2,200 rounds, on X day 3,100 rounds, -and on Y day 5,300 rounds (which was repeated on the two extra days) -at the front-line trenches and strong points. 6-inch, 9·2-inch, -4·7-inch, 4·5-inch, and 60-pounder guns also dealt with the villages -of Bucquoy, Achiet-le-Grand, Essart, and Ablainzeville, but in nothing -like the same proportion of rounds. - -The first smoke cloud was discharged on the 26th June, and drew very -little hostile machine-gun fire. The enemy lines were reported to be -much damaged on that day. On the 27th the smoke discharge was somewhat 35 -spoilt by the premature bursting of a smoke shell an hour before the -appointed time. This misfortune caused the enemy to put down a barrage -on our front-line and communication trenches, which prevented the -smoke detachments getting to their appointed positions. When the cloud -was eventually discharged there was a large gap in the centre of it, -so it must have been obvious to the enemy that it was only a feint. - -The continual bombardment became more intense, and the enemy reply -more vigorous. On the 28th the enemy wire was reported as -satisfactorily cut in front of their first and second lines. Observers -also noted that there was considerable movement of troops behind the -German lines. - -Every night, the moment it was dark, although the artillery still -pounded trenches, roads, and tracks, patrols crept forward to -ascertain what progress had been made in the battering down of -defences. 2/Lieut. P. Henri, of the 3rd London Regt., raided the front -line. He found the Germans working feverishly to repair their trench, -and succeeded in capturing one prisoner, who proved to be of the -Labour Battalion of the 2nd Reserve Guards Division. He reported that -the wire in some places still formed a considerable obstacle. - -A patrol of the 1st London Regt. reported, on the 29th, that new -French wire and some strands of barbed wire had been put up. Up to the -last moment the Germans worked at their defences. Great activity was -seen on the morning of the 30th. - -The artillery grew more furious. A hail from heavy and field-gun -batteries descended on trenches and strong points. Lieut.-Col. 36 -Prechtel’s wire-cutting group pounded away at the wire. The trench -mortar batteries added their quota, though they were chased from -pillar to post by German retaliation. And as the evening shadows fell -on the last day, the usual night firing was taken up by the -never-wearying gunners. - - * * * * * - -The main object of this attack was to divert against the VII Corps -enemy artillery and infantry, which might otherwise have been used -against the left flank of the Fourth Army at Serre. To achieve this -result the two divisions, 46th and 56th, were given the task of -cutting off the Gommecourt salient. - -From the 24th to the 30th June the line of the 56th Division was held -by the 167th Brigade. The other two brigades then practised the -assault on a replica of the German defence system near Halloy. In the -early morning of the 1st July the 168th and 169th Brigades took over -the line, and the 167th withdrew to Hébuterne. - -The 5th Cheshire Regt. had a company with each of the assaulting -brigades; the Royal Engineers sent a section of the 2/1st London Field -Coy. with the 169th Brigade, and a section of the 2/2nd London Field -Coy. with the 168th Brigade. - -The London Scottish attacked on the right with the Kensingtons in -support; then came the Rangers with the 4th London Regt. in support. -The rôle of these battalions of the 168th Brigade may be briefly -described as a half-wheel to the right. They had to capture the strong -point round about Farm and Farmer trenches, and establish other strong -points at Elbe and Et, south-east of Nameless Farm, and the junction -of Felon and Epte. - -On the extreme left of the division was the London Rifle Brigade, and 37 -next to them the Queen Victoria’s Rifles. Again as a rough indication -of their task, they had to make a left wheel and hold the line of the -edge of Gommecourt Park, establishing strong points. The Queen’s -Westminster Rifles would then push straight on, carrying the attack -forward, as it were, between the right and left wheels, and capture -the strong point known as the Quadrilateral. - -At 6.25 a.m. every gun opened on the German lines, and for one hour -the enemy was pelted with shells of all sizes, the maximum speed of -fire being reached at 7.20 and lasting for ten minutes. At this moment -smoke was discharged from the left of our line near Z hedge, and in -five minutes the smoke was dense along the whole front. Then the -assaulting battalions climbed out of their trenches and advanced -steadily into the heavy fog. - -The German front line was reached with little loss--there was -machine-gun fire, but it was apparently high. Almost immediately, -however, the Germans gave an indication of their counter-measures--they -were reported by the London Scottish to be shelling their own line. -This gallant regiment succeeded in gaining practically the whole of -its objectives, but they were never very comfortable. Owing to the -smoke the two left companies lost direction, the flank company being -drawn off in the direction of Nameless Farm, and the inner company -failed to recognise its position and overran its objective. This was -in no way surprising, as it was extremely difficult, owing to the -heavy bombardment, to find, in some places, any trench at all. - -Next to the London Scottish the Rangers met with strong resistance, and 38 -probably strayed a bit to their left. They were soon in trouble, and -two companies of the 1/4th London Regt. were sent forward to reinforce -them. Together these two units succeeded in reaching the junction of -Epte with Felon and Fell, but there was a gap between them and the -London Scottish. - -On the left of the attack the London Rifle Brigade had swept up to the -edge of Gommecourt Park and commenced to consolidate their position. -The Queen Victoria’s Rifles, on the other hand, were meeting with -fierce resistance, and were short of the Cemetery. The Queen’s -Westminster Rifles, advancing in rear, soon became hopelessly mixed up -with the Queen Victoria’s Rifles. Within an hour it became clear that -the infantry were everywhere engaged in hand-to-hand fighting. - -The German counter-attack plans matured about an hour after the -assault was launched. Their barrage on No Man’s Land was increased to -fearful intensity, and from Gommecourt Park, which was apparently -packed with men in deep dugouts, came strong bombing attacks. The -London Rifle Brigade called for reinforcements, but platoons of the -reserve company failed to get through the barrage and across to the -German front line. - -The assaulting companies had been provided with boards bearing the -names of the trenches to be captured, and as they fought their way -forward, these boards were stuck up to mark the advance. At about 9.30 -a.m. the artillery observers, who did most useful and gallant work -during the whole action, could report that all objectives were gained -with the exception of the Quadrilateral. But the troops in the German 39 -lines were now held there firmly by the enemy barrage; they were cut -off from all communication by runners, and from all reinforcements. On -the right the Kensingtons had failed in an attempt to reinforce the -London Scottish. Captain Tagart, of the former regiment, had led his -company out, but was killed, and of the two remaining officers, one -was killed and the other wounded. A confused message having reached -headquarters, a fresh officer was sent down with orders to rally the -men and make another attempt to cross the inferno of No Man’s Land. He -found that there were only twenty men left, and that to cross with -them was impossible. - -The Royal Flying Corps contact machine, detailed to report on the -situation, sent constant messages that the Quadrilateral was empty of -troops of either side. The artillery observers, however, reported -seeing many parties of hostile bombers moving through the Park, and -enemy troops collecting behind the Cemetery. - -It seemed as though all battalions had at one time gained their -objectives except the Queen’s Westminster Rifles, but no blame falls -on this fine regiment. Lieut.-Col. Shoolbred says in his report, “As -no officer who got as far as this (first line) ever returned, it is -difficult to know in detail what happened.” The three captains, -Cockerill, Mott, and Swainson, were killed before reaching the second -German line. Apparently the wire on this section of the front was not -satisfactorily dealt with. The report says: - - “A great deal of the wire was not cut at all, so that both - the Victorias and ourselves had to file in, in close order, 40 - through gaps, and many were hit.... The losses were heavy - before reaching the bank at the Gommecourt-Nameless Farm - road. At this point our three companies and the two - Victorias were joined up and intermixed.... Only one runner - ever succeeded in getting through from the assaulting - companies.” - -There were a few brave young officers of the Queen’s Westminsters left -at this point--2/Lieuts. J. A. Horne, A. G. V. Yates, A. G. Negus, D. -F. Upton, E. H. Bovill. They proceeded to collect their men and lead -them forward, and while doing this 2/Lieuts. Yates and Negus were -killed. 2/Lieut. Upton, having then reorganised a bombing party, -bombed the enemy out of Fellow and reached the Cemetery. To do this -they had to run over the open and drop into Fellow. Another party -tried at the same time to bomb their way up Etch, but found it was too -strongly held by the enemy. Meanwhile, 2/Lieut. Upton had stuck up his -signboard, and more men doubled up over the open and dropped into -Fellow Trench. 2/Lieut. Horne then mounted a Lewis gun, under cover of -which a platoon of the Cheshire Regt. and some Royal Engineers blocked -Etch and also Fell (it would seem doubtful, from this statement, -whether Fell was ever held). - -Sergt. W. G. Nicholls had kept a party of bombers together and, led by -a young lieutenant of the Cheshire Regt., whose name unfortunately is -not mentioned [we believe it was 2/Lieut. G. S. Arthur], this party -forced its way from the Cemetery to the Quadrilateral. The names of -some of the men are given by Col. Shoolbred: - - “Cpl. R. T. Townsend, L/Cpl. W. C. Ide, Cpl. Hayward, - Rfn. F. H. Stow undoubtedly did reach the Quadrilateral, 41 - where strong enemy bombing parties met them, and the - Cheshire lieutenant ordered the party to retire, apparently - trying to cover their retirement himself, as he was not seen - again.” - -In any case this advance into the Quadrilateral was but a momentary -success, and it may be said that the attack never got beyond the -German third line. Signals were picked up by the artillery observers -calling for bombs. As early as 10 a.m. two parties of London Scottish, -each fifty strong, attempted to take bombs across to their comrades. -None got to the German first line, and only three ever got back to -ours. - -About midday the enemy was launching concerted counter-attacks from -all directions. He was coming down Epte, Ems, and Etch, he was coming -from Gommecourt Park, he was in Fall on the right. More desperate -attempts were made to reinforce the hard-pressed troops. Capt. P. A. -J. Handyside, of the 2nd London Regt., led his company out to try and -reach the left of the line. He was hit, but struggled on. He was hit -again and killed as he led a mere half-dozen men into the German first -line. - -Capt. J. R. Garland, also of the 2nd London Regt., attempted the same -feat with his company, and met with a like fate. All the officers of -both companies were casualties. - -At 2 p.m. the London Scottish still held firm on the right and the -London Rifle Brigade on the left--indeed, 2/Lieut. R. E. Petley, with -thirty men, hung on to Eck three hours after the rest of his battalion -had been ordered to fall back on Ferret, the German first line. But, -although the two flanks held, the troops in the centre were gradually 42 -forced back until isolated posts were held in the second German line. -By 4 p.m. nothing more was held than the German first line. - -By 9 p.m. everyone who could get there was back in our own lines. - -But we must not leave our account of the fighting with the story of -the 46th Division untold. It was not unreasonable for the men of the -56th Division to hope, while they were being hardly pressed, that the -46th Division might suddenly come to their aid. Perhaps luck would -favour that division! - -The attack from the north was launched between the Gommecourt road and -the Little Z. The 137th Brigade, with the 6th South Staffordshire -Regt. on the right and the 6th North Staffordshire Regt. on the left, -had Gommecourt Wood in front of them. The 139th Brigade, with the 5th -Sherwood Foresters on the right and the 7th Sherwood Foresters on the -left, carried the attack up to the Little Z. - -The account of this action is one long series of disasters. It seems -that the South Staffords on the right started by getting bogged in the -mud. A new front line had been dug, but they could not occupy it for -this reason. They filed out through gaps in their wire, and if any -succeeded in reaching the German front line it was for a period of -minutes only. The North Staffords fared no better, though a few more -men seem to have gained the enemy first line, but were, however, -quickly forced out. The utmost confusion reigned in that part of the -line, and the attack, from the very start, was futile. - -The 5th and 7th Sherwoods got away to time (7.30), but - - “there was a little delay in the fourth wave getting out, 43 - owing to the deep mud in the trenches, and still more delay - in the carrying parties moving up (due to a similar reason), - and also on account of the enemy barrage of artillery, - rifle, and machine-gun fire which became very heavy on our - old front line.... Of the 5th Sherwoods the first and second - waves reached the enemy first line fairly easily, but were - scattered by the time this occurred. The third and fourth - waves suffered severely in crossing from machine-gun fire. - The majority of the first and second waves passed over the - first-line trenches, but there is no evidence to show what - happened to them there, for not a man of the battalions that - reached the German second line has returned. The remaining - waves ... found that the enemy, who must have taken refuge - in deep dugouts, had now come up and manned the parapet in - parties. The Germans were noticed to be practically all - bombers.... The first three waves of the 7th Sherwoods (the - left of the attack) moved out to time and found the wire - well cut. So far as is known, only a small proportion of - these three waves reached the German second line, and after - a bomb fight on both flanks, the survivors fell back on the - German first line, where they found other men of the - battalion consolidating. After expending all their bombs in - repelling a German counter-attack, the survivors retired - over the parapet.” - -One can therefore say that, half an hour after the attack was -launched, the Germans in the Gommecourt salient had only the 56th -Division to deal with. We know that the Cemetery was seen to be -occupied by our troops about nine o’clock, and it was probably shortly -after this that the party of Queen’s Westminster Rifles, led by the -gallant lieutenant of the Cheshires, reached the Quadrilateral. But the 44 -Germans were then masters of the situation on the north of the salient -and, freed from all anxiety in that quarter, could turn their whole -attention to the 56th Division. Up to this time fighting had been -hard, but slow progress had been made, and with even moderate success -on the part of the 46th Division, depression and bewilderment might -have seized the enemy. But he turned with elation to the southern -attack, and shortly after 9.30 a.m. small parties of bombers were seen -moving through Gommecourt Park to attack the London Rifle Brigade, and -strong attacks were launched from the east of Gommecourt village. - -For the rest of the day no help came from the 46th Division, though a -new attack was ordered, postponed, and postponed again. The plan was -to reorganise assaulting waves from the carrying parties, and at 3.30 -in the afternoon it seemed probable that an attack would materialise, -but it did not. It was perhaps as well, for by that time the 56th -Division occupied the German front line only, and that in very weak -strength. - -As night fell all became quiet. The 167th Brigade relieved the 168th -on the right; the 169th reorganised. - -General Hull’s conclusions on this action are that - - “the primary reason for failing to retain the ground was a - shortage of grenades. This shortage was due to: - - (_a_) The enemy’s barrage, and in a lesser extent the - machine-gun fire from the flanks, which prevented - supplies being carried across No Man’s Land. - - (_b_) To the breadth of No Man’s Land. - - (_c_) Possibly to insufficient means of collecting - grenades and S.A.A. from men who had become 45 - casualties, and from German stores. - - I understand that our counter-battery groups engaged a very - large number of German batteries--the results were not - apparent, and I think this was due to the limited number of - guns available, and also to the small calibre of the - majority employed (60-pounders, 4·7 guns, and 4·5 - howitzers). I consider it would be better to employ the - heavy (9·2) and medium (6) howitzers, and even the - super-heavy. - - It was particularly noticeable that, once our attack was - launched, the Germans attempted practically no counter-work. - - The preliminary bombardment started on the 24th June, and - continued for seven days. During this period the enemy - seemed to have increased the number of his batteries.... The - effect of the bombardment on the German trenches was very - great ... on the dugouts the effect was negligible. On the - _moral_ of the enemy the effect was not so great as one - would have hoped.... - - I am doubtful of the value of these long bombardments, which - give the enemy time to recognise the points selected for the - attack, and possibly to relieve his troops, and to - concentrate guns, and to bring up ammunition. - - The intense bombardment prior to the attack lasted - sixty-five minutes, considerably longer than any of the - previous bombardments. I am in favour of having as many - false attacks and lifts of artillery fire as possible, but - consider there should be no difference.... - - The German attitude and _moral_ varied considerably--some of - the enemy showed fight, but other parties were quite ready - to surrender as soon as they came up from their dugouts. But - it cannot be said that their _moral_ was any more shattered - by the bombardment than were their dugouts. Later in the day 46 - German bombers advanced with great boldness, being assisted - by men who advanced over the open. Our men appear to have - had no difficulty in dealing with enemy bombers at first--it - was only when bombs were scarce that the enemy succeeded in - pushing us back. The counter-attacks on the right were never - made in great strength, but were prepared by artillery fire - which was followed up closely and boldly by bombers. On the - left the enemy appeared to be in greater strength, and came - out of Gommecourt village and through the Park in great - numbers.” - -The men of London had done well, although the salient remained in the -hands of the enemy. The effort of the infantry was valiant, and they -were supported with devotion by the artillery. The artillery observers -took great risks, and the conduct of one of Lieut.-Col. Prechtel’s -wire-cutting batteries is well worthy of note. It established itself -practically in our front line, about W48, and fired 1,200 rounds -during X, Y, Y1, Y2 days and on Z day fired a further 1,100 rounds. - -The German plan was, as has been shown, to prevent all reinforcements -from crossing No Man’s Land, and to deal with those troops who had -lodged themselves in their trench system by strong and well-organised -bombing attacks. - - [Illustration: 1. THE GOMMECOURT SALIENT. - _The dotted line is the old British line._] - - [Illustration: GOMMECOURT, JULY 1916] - -There is no doubt that the main object of the attack had been -fulfilled. Unpleasant as it may seem, the rôle of the 56th Division -was to induce the enemy to shoot at them with as many guns as could be -gathered together, and also to prevent him from moving troops. The -prisoners captured were 141 from units of the 52nd Reserve Division, -and 37 from the 2nd Guards Reserve Division, so that no movement of 47 -troops had occurred on that front, and we know that the number of -batteries had been increased. There were many more prisoners than -this, but they were caught in their own barrage as they crossed No -Man’s Land, and large numbers of dead Germans were afterwards found in -that much-battered belt. - -The main attack of the Fourth Army, launched on the same day, -succeeded on the right. North of the Ancre as far as Serre our losses -were severe, and the initial gains of the assaulting troops could not -be maintained. After five days’ fierce fighting, the enemy’s first -system of defence farther south had been penetrated to a depth of a -mile over a front of six miles. But north of the Ancre, after the -first day, operations were confined to maintaining a steady pressure -on the enemy. - -This battle, with the subsidiary attack on the Gommecourt Salient, is -known as the battle of Albert 1916. - - * * * * * - -The division was not relieved. It had suffered in casualties 182 -officers and 4,567 other ranks. The London Scottish had sent 24 -officers and 847 other ranks into battle, and 9 officers and 257 other -ranks had come out. The Rangers had sent in 23 officers and 780 other -ranks--6 officers and 280 other ranks came out. The Queen Victoria’s -Rifles came out with 22 officers and 160 other ranks; the London Rifle -Brigade, 18 officers and 300 other ranks; the Queen’s Westminster -Rifles, 19 officers and 160 other ranks. The supporting battalions -suffered only slightly less. - -When the fighting had abated the enemy seems to have initiated a truce 48 -to gather in the wounded. His own stretcher-bearers came out, on -seeing which ours also went out. This state of affairs lasted for an -hour, when our men were warned to get back to their lines. - -The state of the line was extraordinary. The front line, over which so -much labour had been expended, had ceased to exist, and could only be -held by means of patrols and a few small posts. Our main line was now -what was known as the R Line, the original line when the 56th Division -arrived in the sector. And the front held by the division was -gradually increased. From the 3rd July onwards the division took over -the line to the left until on the 8th the 169th Brigade was north of -Fonquevillers with its left opposite Little Z. Each brigade held its -front with two battalions in the line, one in brigade reserve and one -in divisional reserve. - -During the night of the 13th the artillery made a “demonstration” in -order to help the Fourth Army, which was again attacking in the south. -On this night a patrol of the Queen’s Westminster Rifles captured a -prisoner who proved to be of the 91st Regt.--a normal unit. - -On the 17th of the month all three brigades attempted raids, but the -enemy were found to be too alert, and no prisoners were obtained. - -The division remained on this front, keeping the enemy busy, until the -20th August, when it was relieved by the 17th Division, and marched -first to Doullens, then to Fromer-le-Grand, then to St. Riquier, where -it proceeded to refit and train under the orders of the X Corps. - - - [1] Appendix A. - - [2] _General Headquarters, 1914-1916, and its Critical - Decisions_--Gen. von Falkenhayn. - - - - - CHAPTER II 49 - - THE SOMME - - THE BATTLE OF GINCHY; THE BATTLE OF FLERS-COURCELETTE; - THE BATTLE OF MORVAL - - -The move to St. Riquier, in the neighbourhood of Abbeville, revealed -to some of the officers that their men were not very fit for marching. -This knowledge appears to come as a revelation to some people. Those -on active service very soon discovered that a long period of trench -duty, though it hardened the men to those particular conditions, made -them unfit for any strenuous marching. It was probably never -understood by people in England. They were, then, weary battalions -that arrived at St. Riquier. - -When it is said that a battalion or a division was “resting,” that -word must not be taken in too literal a sense. One might define it -with greater truth as being a change of location, sometimes a mere -matter of a mile or so, at others perhaps fifty miles. There were, it -is true, no trenches to man, no sentry groups by day and night, but -there was always work to be done. And the work, very naturally, had -always the one end in view--the defeat of the Germans. - -The training was almost exclusively of an aggressive nature. Unless -there was some special object in view, when trenches would be dug to -represent our own and those occupied by the enemy, the optimistic -nature of the Higher Command always leaned to open warfare training. 50 -Companies wandered about, as they do in England, attacking villages, -strong points, and woods, and indulged in vast schemes of pursuit -after phantom armies called Red or North or South Armies. But this -short period at St. Riquier gave the 56th Division a surprise in the -matter of training. - -Battalions had been reinforced since the Gommecourt action, and there -was some grumbling about the nature of the reinforcements. Batches of -men, from all sorts of units, were drafted to battalions, and General -Hull made great efforts to get this system altered. Battalions, -however, were of fair strength. - -We know that very early in the war the problem of barbed wire had been -exercising the minds of the Staff in general. Long after the Press -campaign for high explosives, when this form of shell was provided in -large quantities, wire-cutting was still ordered with quite a high -percentage of shrapnel. But whatever you did, however long the time -you gave to cutting the wire, it never disappeared entirely; vile, -treacherous strands stuck out of the earth like brambles, stakes -remained miraculously upright with waving lengths of wire to grab you -by the sleeve or the trousers; and when the cutting was well done, -there had been a mere substitution of obstacles--the state of the -ground, blasted into holes, pits, mounds, and mud made progress very -slow and difficult. - -How was wire to be removed? - -Mr. Winston Churchill let his mind wander round steam-rollers linked -up with chains. Other minds thought of tractors. At the same time, -inventors were considering the old question of moving forts. In August 51 -1916 there came from England a weird and fearful-looking machine known -as a Tank. - -On the 26th August the 7th Middlesex practised an attack in -conjunction with five Tanks. One can easily imagine the Middlesex men, -and everybody else who had wind of what was afoot, all agog at this -new form of field training! What were the criticisms of the London men -on this ... machine? - -The Tanks had only been landed in France on the 25th, and it is not -surprising that two of them broke down. But the practice was continued -on subsequent days until each brigade had acquired experience. Sir -Douglas Haig, Marshal Joffre, and H.R.H. the Prince of Wales were -interested spectators of these evolutions. - -The orders for this exercise were that the Tanks would cross our front -line at zero hour, and would be followed by the first infantry wave -one minute later. The second wave would start at zero plus three -minutes; the third wave at zero plus five minutes; the fourth wave at -zero plus six minutes. The infantry were instructed to advance in -short rushes up to, but not beyond, the Tanks--unless a Tank broke -down, when they were to proceed as if it was not there. - -Everyone seems to have been much impressed by the behaviour of the -Tanks. - -On the 31st August, General Hull received a warning order that his -division would move to Corbie and come under the XIV Corps (Cavan). -And on the following day the artillery was ordered forward. The 168th -and 169th Infantry Brigades left St. Riquier on the 3rd, and the 167th -Brigade on the 4th. Events came tumbling over one another. - -On the 4th September the leading troops of the division were at the 52 -Citadel and Happy Valley, near Carnoy; on the 5th at Maricourt Siding. -And on the 6th September the 56th Division was ordered to relieve the -5th Division that night in the front line. - -No one will ever be able to describe in adequate fashion the scene -behind the Somme battle front. Piccadilly in the height of the season, -with its slow-moving and ever-stopping traffic, may give some idea of -the state of the roads--only one must substitute army carts, limbers, -lorries, for smart limousine cars and buses, one must substitute a -loose stone road covered with six inches of mud, and holes three feet -deep filled with water, for the smooth wood paving of that -thoroughfare. And there were no pavements, no sidewalks. The infantry -threaded its way in single file through this mass of dirty carts, and -sweating men and horses, and overheated motor-lorries, halting -sometimes for hours; or broke away across-country where, although the -traffic was not so congested, obstacles such as cavalry lines, -transport lines, camps, and, as the forward area was penetrated, lines -of heavy guns and howitzers were met with. - -The whole country seemed pulsing with life and effort. Here was no -labour-saving device of peaceful civilisation, but a continual strain -of muscle and sinew. Difficulties were overcome by straining horses, -straining men, for where the greatest difficulty existed the engine -was of no use. And through the midst of all this, threading its way in -long files, passed the 56th Division. - - * * * * * - -We have said that the results of the first five days of fighting, -which started on the 1st July, was an advance of one mile on a front 53 -of six miles. This was followed by minor engagements to adjust the -line. - -The two northern Corps of the attacking Army were given to Sir Hubert -Gough, with instructions to keep the enemy busy while Sir Henry -Rawlinson battered his way through farther south. - -On the 14th July the Fourth Army was again launched on a front from -Longueval to Bazentin-le-Petit Wood. This battle was continued for -several days, and established the Army on a line from Maltz Horn Farm -(Montauban), where it joined on to the left of the French, along the -eastern edge of Trones Wood to Longueval, then westward past -Bazentin-le-Grand to the northern corner of Bazentin-le-Petit (and the -wood), and so to the north of Ovillers. Over 2,000 prisoners were -taken, which brought the total since the opening of the offensive to -more than 10,000, also in this battle we captured 4 heavy guns, 42 -field-guns, 30 trench mortars, and 52 machine guns. [Battle of -Bazentin Ridge.] - -But our line from Pozières to Delville Wood and Longueval, and then -south of Maltz Horn Farm, where it was carried still south by the -French to the village of Hem, made a most unpleasant salient. The -enemy had excellent observation from Guillemont, and could bring a -mass of surrounding artillery to bear on a comparatively small area -packed with troops, guns, and supplies. To relieve this most -uncomfortable position, it was arranged that the right of the British -Army should swing forward in conjunction with the French. To do this -the French would have to capture the strongly fortified villages of -Maurepas, Le Foret, Rancourt, and Frigicourt, while we would have to -take all the country up to Sailly-Saillisel and Morval, which included 54 -the capture of Flers, Gueudecourt, Ginchy, Guillemont, and Les Bœufs. -Before this could be done, the enemy, on the 18th July, launched a -strong counter-attack on Delville Wood-Longueval-Waterlot Farm. And -this was the prelude to much fierce and very confusing fighting. [The -battle of Delville Wood commenced on the 15th July and ended 3rd -September.] - -On the 30th July we attacked Guillemont and Falfemont Farm in -conjunction with our Allies, but without success; and on the 7th -August our troops again entered Guillemont and were again driven out. -Guillemont was the important point to be gained, but it was evident -that it could not be won in a small engagement, and as the only -objective, without heavy loss. So we and the French made a series of -attacks, advancing foot by foot on Maurepas, Falfemont, Guillemont, -Leuze Wood, and Ginchy. But no great progress was made. And so the -month of August passed. - -On the 3rd September a combined French and British attack was made on -a wide front extending on the left to the Ancre, so that both the -Fourth and Fifth Armies were engaged. The gain in front of Sir Hubert -Gough’s Army was small, but the Fourth Army managed to win the -much-disputed Guillemont, and after many assaults Falfemont Farm -(which was only completely captured on the 5th) and the greater part -of Leuze Wood. Ginchy and High Wood remained in the hands of the -Germans, but we had made a step in the right direction, and had -advanced our right to a depth of one mile on a front of nearly two -miles and captured over a thousand prisoners. [Battle of Guillemont, -3rd-6th September.] - -This was, briefly, the situation when the 56th Division marched 55 -forward to take over the line from the 5th Division. - - * * * * * - -Brig.-Gen. Loch was ordered to take over a portion of the line, and -accordingly the 168th Brigade moved from Maricourt Siding in the -direction of Falfemont Farm, and came under the orders of the 5th -Division. The local situation was always most difficult to grasp. The -Somme field of battle was the most hideous place and absolutely -bewildering. A guide was a treacherous person to trust, or perhaps we -should say he was a broken reed to lean on; for the poor fellow had no -treacherous intent in his heart, he was anxious enough to lead troops -in the right direction, but nine times out of ten was completely lost -a few minutes after he started. And there were, perhaps, more mistakes -made in attempting to trace the front line in that great battle than -in any other. - -Guillemont was held by us; Combles was strongly held by the Germans. -Between these two places was Leuze Wood. We held, with more or less -certainty, the line of the road between Leuze Wood and Guillemont, and -we also held the country between Leuze Wood and Falfemont Farm, and -had pushed troops into the wood itself; but the situation in the rest -of the square marked 27 was very vague (see map)--the only certain -thing was that there were many Germans there. Except for the wood and -the line of the road to Guillemont, the Germans held all of squares 20 -and 21. We had a nasty, elongated triangle pushed into enemy -territory, and it had a wobbly right side to it. - -The Kensingtons went into the front line not very far from Falfemont 56 -Farm, in the lower left corner of square 27. The London Scottish were -supposed to be in support to the Royal Irish Rifles, and got into a -two-foot scrape, unworthy of the name of “trench,” about -three-quarters of the way through Leuze Wood. The Royal Irish Rifles -were imagined to be holding the most southern end of Bouleaux Wood -across the road which separated it from Leuze Wood. - -The positions were, of course, taken over at night, and the next day -the French attacked Combles. In order to help our Allies our guns -started a bombardment, but unfortunately most of their shells fell -around Leuze Wood. It was one of the unavoidable accidents of war. -Close shooting has to be done, and there are many possible causes, -from faulty ammunition to wet ground, for guns shooting short. It is -none the less annoying to the infantry. Capt. A. H. Macgregor, of “C” -Company (London Scottish), made strong remarks in writing, but failed -to stop the energetic gunners. - -The Irish were having a much worse time than the London Scottish, as -they were also being heavily bombarded by the Germans. So they decided -to evacuate their trench. - -All this led to some confusion, and on top of it the enemy launched a -bombing attack, which was probably in support of their counter-attack -on the French. The London Scottish reserve companies, which were at -Wedge Wood, moved up, and the battalion prepared to defend Leuze Wood, -which they imagined would shortly be heavily attacked. But the Irish, -although they lost heavily, threw back the German bombers and were -relieved by two companies of the London Scottish. - -By midnight everything was re-established as it had been before, and, 57 -while probing about in the dark, the London Scottish gathered in two -enemy officers and fourteen other ranks of the 107th Infantry Regt. as -prisoners. - -The position they were in was on the south of the road, and it was -decided to try and dig a trench on the edge of Bouleaux Wood, that is, -on the other side of the road. A platoon was sent forward the -following morning to undertake this work. It was successfully carried -out, and the covering party managed to inflict a good many casualties -on the enemy--Sergt. Smith, of “B” Company, shot eight--and three -further prisoners were taken. - -This experience of the London Scottish will give some idea of the -conditions which ruled what was officially known as “holding the -line.” At any moment a post might be wrested from you and have to be -fought for again, and all the time you were described as “established” -in Leuze Wood. - -On the night of the 7th September the Queen Victoria’s Rifles took -over this bit of line, and the London Scottish went back to Maltz Horn -Farm. - -On the night of the 6/7th September, General Hull took over command of -the divisional front from the G.O.C. 5th Division. There was a slight -readjustment of line the next night, and it was then held by the 169th -Brigade on the right and in touch with the 1st French Division, and -the 168th Brigade on the left and in touch with the 16th Division on -the Combles-Guillemont road. - -There was to be a big attack on the 9th, but the position from which -the 56th Division had to start was not too satisfactory. A study of -the battle of the Somme will show that at some time or other every 58 -unit lost direction. It was exceedingly difficult to recognise an -objective; even the heaps of ruins which marked the sites of villages -were frequently mistaken. It is a rolling, featureless country. But -perhaps the chief cause of loss of direction was the shape of the -jumping-off line. The German defence was very obstinate and the -fighting severe. Troops, having made an advance, had to hang on -anywhere, facing the enemy where he opposed them most fiercely. The -result was a zigzag line, a crazy front, where troops frequently faced -east and west and were told to attack north. On an ordinary practice -field-day, a platoon commander can get his men out of a trench and -make them wheel in the desired direction, but in action attacking -troops will always be drawn towards the nearest firing. Men getting -out of a trench and hearing or seeing an enemy in front of them will -go towards him, no matter how much orders to the contrary have been -dinned into their heads. - -Consider the line of the 56th Division. The left along the -Guillemont-Leuze Wood road was facing due north; it then curled round -the wood and faced south-east; another curl made the extreme right of -the line face north-east. The attack on the 9th was to be in a -north-easterly direction. - -To get a better line and form a strong flank facing Combles, an -attempt was made to clear the enemy from the trenches south-east of -Leuze Wood. - -The London Rifle Brigade had relieved the Kensingtons on the right of -the line, and companies were somewhat puzzled by their position, which -is described as “most obscure.” On the night of the 8th they made a 59 -bombing attack to clear the trenches on the south-east of the wood. At -first this met with some success, but in the early morning of the 9th -the enemy came at them again in large numbers, and they were driven -back to their former position. It was not thought advisable to try to -regain the lost ground. - -The attack on the 9th September (the battle of Ginchy) was by the -whole of the XIV Corps in conjunction with the XV Corps on the left. -The XIV Corps held Guillemont; and Delville Wood was held by the XV -Corps. The object was to capture Ginchy and bring the line up to point -141·7, and from there down to Leuze Wood. Incidentally it meant -clearing the ground to the south-east of the wood, but in following -the actions from this date it must be remembered that the Higher -Command intended to work round Combles, and so the right of the -British Army was always working to form a defensive flank, until the -advance reached a point which would enable troops to join hands with -the French on the far side of Combles. - -The task of the 169th Brigade was the forming of a flank against -Combles by capturing the trenches south-east of the wood (the trenches -they had failed to take by bombing) and to advance their line a short -way through Bouleaux Wood. - -The 168th Brigade, who were on the line of the Guillemont-Leuze Wood -road, were to pivot on their right (the advance from the northern end -of the wood was very slight) and bring their left up to point 141·7. -This “right form” was to be done in two stages, the road to Ginchy -marking the halfway line. - -The artillery were ordered to put up a creeping and stationary -barrage. Fifty per cent. of guns were to fire on a known position as 60 -a stationary barrage; the other 50 per cent. were to start just ahead -of the infantry and creep forward at the rate of fifty yards a minute, -until the stationary barrage was reached, when the latter would be -jumped forward to the next stationary barrage line. - -It will be gathered from the foregoing account of how the 56th -Division took over the line that the conditions under which the -infantry waited for the resumption of attack were not dissimilar to -those at the end, though not the actual termination, of an -engagement--when nobody knows within a few hundred yards where any -unit really is. And, indeed, that was always the situation during the -battle of the Somme. There was perpetual unrest in the line. - -The battle on the 9th has always seemed like a wild rush in -fast-fading light. It was to open at 4.45 p.m., but on the left of the -Corps it seems to have been delayed. Nowhere was it entirely -successful in the assault. The situation remained obscure and fighting -continued for several days. - -The truth of the whole matter was that the enemy defended Combles with -desperation. The right of the 56th Division had as hard a task as was -ever set for any troops, and on their left was a German strong point -bearing the ominous name of “the Quadrilateral,” the strength of which -was only learned at bitter cost. We will follow the fortunes of the -division from the right of the line. - -The 169th Brigade was on the right with the London Rifle Brigade and -the Queen Victoria’s Rifles attacking. Leuze Wood, as we know, was -always a dangerous spot, and the task of the London Rifle Brigade was -to capture those trenches on the south-east of the wood and start the 61 -building up of the flank facing Combles. But the moment the men left -their jumping-off trenches, their attack was met and destroyed by a -hail of rifle and machine-gun fire. - -On the left of the London Rifle Brigade the Queen Victoria’s Rifles, -whose objective was the enemy trench on the far side of the Combles -road, met with more success and gained a precarious footing in a part -of that line. But no troops of the 169th Brigade could be said to be -established anywhere on their objective. - -Part of the 2nd London Regt. was given to the London Rifle Brigade, -and a second attack was launched on the trenches south-east of the -wood, almost simultaneously with a counter-attack by the enemy from -his Bouleaux Wood defences. The Queen Victoria’s Rifles held on to -their gains, but the second attack on the trenches south-east of the -wood failed. The Queen’s Westminster Rifles, who were in reserve, were -sent for. - -The 168th Brigade, on the left of the division, attacked with the 4th -London Regt. on the right and the Rangers on the left. The 4th -Londons, pivoting on the north end of Leuze Wood, gained their first -objective under close cover of our barrage and with little loss. But -the Rangers came under heavy machine-gun fire from their left. It was -ascertained from a prisoner, captured later, that a whole battalion of -his regiment, the 161st of the 185th Division, was in the centre of -the square marked 20. - -The left company of the Rangers, with the troops of the 16th Division -on their left, met a strong force of the enemy and were driven back to -their point of departure. The right company, however, after hard -fighting which lasted until 6 p.m., reached their first objective, the 62 -line of the road from Leuze Wood to Ginchy. - -Meanwhile the 4th London Regt., sticking close to the artillery -barrage, had again advanced at 5.25 p.m. and gained their final -objective. But their losses were severe. The machine-gun fire was -tremendous, and its effects can be gathered from the fact that a post, -which was left to construct a strong point in the first objective, was -entirely wiped out. - -The right company of the Rangers, having gained their first objective, -again advanced, though the opposition they had met with had caused -them to be late on the barrage. Again the murderous fire was poured on -them from the left, and they swerved so that they came up on the -centre of the 4th London troops. These two battalions were now on the -line of the trench leading to point 141·7, but exactly how near that -point was only determined later. On the right they were in touch with -the Queen Victoria’s Rifles. - -By this time it was quite dark; and the left of the 56th Division was -so much in the air that the enemy was on all but one side of it. The -16th Division had fared badly. - -The right brigade of the 16th Division had not been able to advance at -all, and were scattered about in front of Guillemont. The left brigade -had secured a footing in Ginchy, and the 3rd Brigade of the Guards -Division was already on its way to relieve the whole of the 16th -Division. But the situation was far from good. - -The Kensingtons, who were in support to the 168th Brigade, had moved -forward to occupy the departure trenches, and the commanding officer, 63 -seeing something of what had happened, promptly tried to strengthen -the flank of the 4th London Regt. and the Rangers. He disposed of his -battalion in forward positions with the object of protecting the left -flank. The London Scottish were sent for. - -Before 11 p.m. the two reserve battalions, the London Scottish and the -Queen’s Westminster Rifles, had arrived in the vicinity of Leuze Wood. -But the situation which faced General Hull at midnight was not a -comfortable one. His left was surrounded by Germans, and probably only -protected by the night, and his right was uncertain; there had been -reports of enemy snipers in Leuze Wood, and the enemy was certainly -pressing strongly with his bombers. - -Both brigades were ordered to attack again. - -Following events from the right of the line, the Queen’s Westminsters -were ordered to attack and capture the trenches south-east of the wood -before dawn. The night was pitch dark, and the Germans were pouring -shells into the wood. The exact bearing of the trench and its distance -from the wood were unknown to the battalion. It was impossible to -arrange an earlier hour than 7 a.m. for the attack. - -Patrols were sent out to get in touch with the enemy and reconnoitre -the ground, and while the battalion waited casualties mounted up. At -last came the dawn, but it brought no light; a thick mist had settled -over the country. At 7 a.m. the attack started. - -Two companies attacked. The right company went straight ahead, and the -left was told to swing to their left and take a trench beyond the -sunken road leading to Combles. The barrage was described as 64 -ineffective, which was, maybe, due to the fog. At any rate, neither -company reached its objective. The enemy was lining his defences in -force and poured in a hot fire with rifles and machine guns. - -Later in the day a further attack was launched, but met with no -success, and the situation during the whole of the morning, -complicated by the thick mist, remained extremely uncertain. - -On the 168th Brigade front the London Scottish had not waited till -dawn for their attack. They formed up in six waves, in trenches dug by -the 5th Cheshires on the extreme left of the original line of -departure, and were ordered to thrust through, moving due north, and -fill the gap between the 4th London Regt. and the troops of the 16th -Division in Ginchy. It was hoped that all the enemy troops in square -20 would be cut off. - -A quarter of an hour after midnight, in pitch darkness, the battalion -started to advance. The first three waves progressed some 600 yards, -and then, failing to see any landmarks or recognise where they were, -they halted and sent out patrols. The last three waves were nowhere in -sight; they had lost direction and joined the 4th London Regt. and -Rangers on their right. But while the leading waves waited for their -patrols to get in touch with either friend or foe, they were attacked -by about a hundred Germans from their rear. The London Scottish -whipped round and scattered them at the point of the bayonet. The -enemy vanished, but left a considerable number of dead on the ground. - -The London Scottish were now completely lost, and so marched south to -pick up their position again. - -The attempted attack, however, was not repeated, but two and a half 65 -companies were sent to the trench occupied by the 4th London Regt. and -the Rangers (Bully), where they attempted, by bombing, to reach point -141·7. Their efforts were not successful. - -Meanwhile the situation to the left of the 56th Division was no less -obscure. The 3rd Brigade of the Guards Division had been hurried up in -the dark to relieve the 16th Division. The guides of the left brigade -of the latter division led a relieving battalion into Ginchy, but had -only the haziest idea where their own troops were. Part of the 16th -Division on the east of the village was not relieved until midday on -the 10th. Ginchy was repeatedly attacked by the enemy, and no one knew -with any certainty what was happening. - -The right brigade of the 16th Division was not relieved for some time. -The guides to the relieving battalion lost themselves completely, and -a big gap existed between Ginchy and Guillemont. During the 10th this -gap was made good, but the whole of that day was occupied by repulsing -enemy attacks and trying to establish a definite line. - -On the 56th Division front there were repeated bombing attacks by the -enemy, and the S.O.S. was sent up several times. We may say that the -battalion reports of positions were only relatively accurate, and that -nothing was clear to Gen. Hull until the weather improved and air -reports could be made. - -Relief of the 168th Brigade by the 167th, and of the 169th by a -composite brigade of the 5th Division, took place, and it was then -ascertained that the London Scottish had, as related above, lost -direction in their attack and that no one was near the Ginchy--141·7 -road. The enemy still held the Quadrilateral in force, and the most 66 -advanced troops of the 56th Division were some way from it, though -they were strongly established in Bully Trench; and the enemy were -still in square 20. But the 56th and Guards Divisions were now in -touch and a firm line was held along the Guillemont--Leuze Wood road, -and from the cross-roads to Ginchy, which was also firmly held. - -The Quadrilateral was the danger-point, and it defied all attempts to -take it by bombing, and successfully withstood the Corps heavy -artillery. - - * * * * * - -Sir Douglas Haig sums up the situation at this point as follows: - - “... The French had made great progress on our right, - bringing their line forward to Louage Wood (just south of - Combles), Le Foret, Cléry-sur-Somme, all three inclusive. - The weak salient in the Allied line had therefore - disappeared, and we had gained the front required for - further operations. - - Still more importance, however, lay in the proof afforded in - the results described of the ability of our new armies not - only to rush the enemy’s strong defences--as had been - accomplished on the 1st and 14th July--but also to wear down - and break the power of resistance by a steady relentless - pressure, as had been done during the weeks of this fierce - and protracted struggle. As has already been recounted, the - preparations made for our assault on the 1st July had been - long and elaborate; but though the enemy knew that an attack - was coming, it would seem that he considered the troops - already on the spot, secure in their apparent impregnable - defences, would suffice to deal with it. The success of that - assault, combined with the vigour and determination with - which our troops pressed their advantage, and followed by the - successful attack on the night of 14th July, all served to 67 - awaken him to a fuller realisation of his danger. The great - depth of his system of fortifications, to which reference - has been made, gave him time to reorganise his defeated - troops, and to hurry up numerous fresh divisions and more - guns. Yet in spite of this he was still pushed back, - steadily and continuously. Trench after trench, and strong - point after strong point, were wrested from him. The great - majority of his repeated counter-attacks failed completely, - with heavy loss; while the few that achieved temporary - success purchased it dearly, and were soon thrown back from - the ground they had for the moment regained. - - The enemy had, it is true, delayed our advance considerably, - but the effort had cost him dear; and the comparative - collapse of his resistance during the last days of the - struggle justified the belief that in the long-run decisive - victory would lie with our troops, who had displayed such - fine fighting qualities and such indomitable endurance and - resolution. - - Practically the whole of the forward crest of the main - ridge, on a front of some 9,000 yards from Delville Wood to - the road above Mouquet Farm, was now in our hands, and with - it the advantage of observation over the slopes beyond. East - of Delville Wood, for a further 3,000 yards to Leuze Wood, - we were firmly established on the main ridge; while farther - east, across the Combles valley, the French were advancing - victoriously on our right. But though the centre of our line - was well placed, on our flanks there was still difficult - ground to be won. - - From Ginchy the crest of the high ground runs northwards for - 2,000 yards, and then eastward, in a long spur, for nearly - 4,000 yards. Near the eastern extremity of the spur stands - the village of Morval, commanding a wide field of view and - fire in every direction. At Leuze Wood my right was still - 2,000 yards from its objective at this village, and between 68 - lay a broad and deep branch of the main Combles valley, - completely commanded by the Morval spur, and flanked, not - only from its head north-east of Ginchy, but also from the - high ground east of the Combles valley, which looks directly - into it. - - Up this high ground beyond the Combles valley the French - were working their way towards the objective at - Sailly-Saillisel, situated due east of Morval, and standing - at the same level. Between these two villages the ground - falls away to the head of the Combles valley, which runs - thence in a south-westerly direction. In the bottom of this - valley lies the small town of Combles, then well fortified - and strongly held, though dominated by my right at Leuze - Wood, and by the French left on the opposite heights. It had - been agreed by the French and myself that an assault on - Combles would not be necessary, as the place could be - rendered untenable by pressing forward along the ridges - above it on either side. - - The capture of Morval from the south side presented a very - difficult problem, while the capture of Sailly-Saillisel, at - that time some 3,000 yards to the north of the French left, - was in some respects even more difficult. The line of the - French advance was narrowed almost to a defile by the - extensive and strongly fortified wood of St. Pierre Vaast on - the one side, and on the other by the Combles valley, which, - with the branches running out of it and the slopes on either - side, is completely commanded, as has been pointed out, by - the heights bounding the valley on the east and west.... - - The general plan of the combined Allied attack which was - opened on the 15th September was to pivot on the high ground - south of the Ancre and north of the Albert-Bapaume road, - while the Fourth Army devoted its whole effort to the - rearmost of the enemy’s original systems of defence between 69 - Morval and Le Sars. - - Should our success in this direction warrant it, I made - arrangements to enable me to extend the left of the attack - to embrace the villages of Martinpuich and Courcelette. As - soon as our advance on this front had reached the Morval - line, the time would have arrived to bring forward my left - across the Thiepval Ridge. Meanwhile our Allies arranged to - continue the line of advance in close co-operation with me - from the Somme to the slopes above Combles; but directed - their main effort northwards against the villages of - Rancourt and Frigicourt, so as to complete the isolation of - Combles and open the way for their attack on - Sailly-Saillisel.” - -That much was hoped from the big attack, to take place on the 15th, -there can be no doubt. Brigades resting in the rear of the divisional -area could see quantities of cavalry still farther back. It suggested -big results. - -The limits of the Fourth Army attack were Combles Ravine and -Martinpuich, and it was to capture Morval, Les Bœufs, Gueudecourt, and -Flers. The Cavalry Corps was to have its head on Carnoy at 10 a.m., -and as soon as the four villages had been captured it would advance -and seize the high ground round Rocquigny, Villers-au-Flos, -Riencourt-les-Bapaume, and Bapaume. - -And it was the first battle in which Tanks were employed! [The battle -of Flers-Courcelette.] - -Even in the midst of the struggle round about the Quadrilateral a -steady bombardment had been going on, in preparation of a further -attack, since the 12th September. Day firing commenced at 6 a.m. and -went on until 6.30 p.m., when night firing started. During the night 70 -bombardment lethal shells were used. - -On Z day the preliminary bombardment was to be the same as on former -days, with no increase until zero hour. When the intense fire, or -barrage, commenced, there were gaps left in it for the advance of -Tanks. - -For the XIV Corps there were, taking part in this attack, fifteen -Tanks. Nine were allotted to the Guards Division, three to the 6th -Division, and three to the 56th Division. - -The instructions given to Tanks were that they should start their -attack at a time which would enable them to reach the first objective -five minutes before the infantry. When they had cleared up the first -objective, a proportion of them was to push forward a short way, to -prearranged positions, and act as strong points. Departure from this -programme to assist any infantry held up by the enemy was left to the -discretion of the Tank Commander. - -On the second objective Tanks and infantry would advance together and -pace was to be regulated to “tank pace,” which was given as from 30 to -50 yards a minute. For the third and fourth objectives there would be -no creeping barrage, and Tanks would start in time to reach the -objectives before the infantry. In all cases their action was to be -arranged so as to crush wire and keep down hostile rifle and -machine-gun fire. - -Signals between Tank and infantry were arranged for by means of -coloured flags--a red flag meaning “out of action,” and a green flag -“am on objective.” - -The main task of the 56th Division was to clear Bouleaux Wood and form -a strong protective flank, covering all the lines of advance from 71 -Combles and the valleys running from the north-east of Combles. The -167th Brigade were ordered to advance as far as the bit of Beef Trench -running through Bouleaux Wood, and to Middle Copse on the left of the -wood; a flank was also to be formed to the south-east and clear of the -wood. The 168th Brigade were to pass through the 167th and carry on -the advance by further bounds. The 169th Brigade were to hold the line -through Leuze Wood and the left of square 27, and to capture the -well-known trench (Loop Trench) to the south-east of the wood which -runs into the sunken road to Combles. - -One Tank was to advance on the right of Leuze Wood and assist the -169th Brigade to drive the enemy beyond the sunken road; it would then -establish itself in the Orchard as a strong point. This Tank was -called the Right Tank. - -Two Tanks were to work from the north of Leuze Wood along the left of -Bouleaux Wood and assist the 167th and 168th Brigades. These were -known as the Centre and Left Tanks, and were eventually to proceed to -a railway cutting north-east of Bouleaux Wood, which promised to be a -point of some difficulty. - -The Right Tank, having seen the 169th Brigade safely in its -objectives, was to move along the south-east of Bouleaux Wood and take -up a position on the cutting in the top end of square 22. - -In the XIV Corps area the Tanks were by no means a success. It is only -right to say that this was not the fault of their crews. Every excuse -must be allowed, for the Tank was not only a new invention, and, like -most new inventions, somewhat clumsy in the first design, but the -ground was absolutely vile. We have not alluded to the weather, which, 72 -however, was a most important factor just now. The field of battle was -a field of mud; the resting area of the division was a field of mud; -the roads and tracks were rivers of mud; anyone can paint a picture of -the battle of the Somme provided he can paint miles of mud. And the -Army had simply blasted its way forward so that the shell-holes cut -one another in the mud. - -The scene round Leuze Wood, Guillemont, and Ginchy was a nightmare. -There had been little time to devote to the burial of the dead, and -corpses lay literally in heaps where the fighting had been severe. One -has only to imagine the results of repeated and obstinate attempts to -capture a position to realise what it must look like before it is -finally taken. An attack is launched and fails. Why does it fail? -Perhaps twenty men of a company get back to the trench from which they -attacked, and where are the others? On the ground. After five or six -attacks, each going out strong and coming back weak, each heralded by -a “barrage,” what will the place look like? - -We may mention here that the stretcher-bearers worked with eight men -to each stretcher, and each ambulance required six horses to drag it -through the mud. - -Just before 1 a.m. one of the Tanks allotted to the 56th Division -broke down on its way to the assembly position. This accident left the -division with one Tank working on either side of the Bouleaux Wood. - -The assault commenced at 6.20 a.m., and was followed by some of the -fiercest fighting in the history of the war. On the right of the -division the 2nd London Regt. succeeded, after some hours of gallant 73 -and determined effort, in driving the enemy from the greater part of -Loop Trench, the enemy clinging to the junction with the sunken road. -The Tank, which was some time before reaching the sunken road, gave -valuable assistance, but was set on fire by a direct hit from a field -gun. The fight then turned to the sunken road and the trench on the -far side of it; but the enemy was strong and no less determined than -the men of the 169th Brigade. No further advance was gained in this -direction. - -On the left of the division the 167th Brigade attacked, with the 1st -London Regt. in line and the 7th Middlesex in support in Leuze Wood. -The 1st London Regt. captured that portion of Beef Trench outside -Bouleaux Wood and, together with the 7th Middlesex--who were to -advance through them, but both units became mixed--occupied Middle -Copse. - -So far as the 56th Division was concerned, the result of the day’s -fighting remained with the advance on the south-east of Leuze Wood as -far as the Combles road, and on the north-west of Bouleaux Wood to -Beef Trench and Middle Copse. The enemy retained the whole of Bouleaux -Wood and the trenches to the north of the Combles road, and the road -itself. But the action, certainly of the 167th Brigade, was influenced -by the fortunes of the divisions on the left. - -The centre of the horseshoe which had been formed from the east of -Ginchy to the cross-roads east of Guillemont, and then to the north of -Leuze Wood and along Bully Trench, and which was prevented by the -Quadrilateral from being a complete circle, can scarcely have been an -enviable place for the Germans who were there. As fighters, these -Germans deserve the highest praise. They were of the 21st and 7th 74 -Bavarian Regts., of the 5th Bavarian Division. They were well wired -in, and had in the Quadrilateral deep dugouts in their front lines and -others in the ravine behind the position. But though we grant them a -perfect position and well-constructed defences, we must also admit -they performed a fine feat of arms. Those in the Quadrilateral had -resisted all efforts of the 56th and Guards Divisions to bomb them -out, and those in the horseshoe had repulsed the 16th Division and the -6th Division, which attacked them on the 13th. They had actually been -under severe artillery fire and subject to repeated assaults since the -9th September, and on the 15th, in spite of Tanks, of creeping -barrages, and of the heavy artillery, they remained immovable. - -The worst kind of luck had attended the Tanks of the 6th -Division--only one managed to reach the jumping-off line. This Tank -went on with the infantry for a short way, had all its periscopes shot -away, was pierced by most of the bullets which hit it (and a perfect -stream of fire was directed on it), and, the driver being badly -wounded, it retired through the ranks of the 6th Division. Had the -three Tanks attacked, something might have been done, anyhow with the -enemy to the south-west of the Quadrilateral; but with only one, the -barrage, arranged with gaps for three, became ineffective, and a -concentrated fire on the one Tank soon put it out of action--it also -drew attention to the infantry attack. Briefly, the 6th Division -failed. - -There was still a chance that the Guards would advance and render the -position of the Bavarians impossible. But this chance was not -realised. The Quadrilateral was a mass of machine guns, and, taking 75 -the Guards Division in flank, inflicted fearful casualties. The first -objective was taken and held--on the left the second objective was -reached--but already the assaulting troops were being shot in the back -by the Bavarians, and no further progress was made. Tanks do not seem -to have helped in that direction either. - -With this state of affairs on the left of the 56th Division, the -attacking brigades were not likely to progress very far in the -building up of a flank facing Combles. Until the Quadrilateral was -taken the 167th Brigade could not possibly move. The 7th Middlesex had -lost a lot of men from machine guns firing into their left rear as -they advanced behind the assault of the 1st London Regt. And finally -their Tank had broken down and was being attacked by the enemy. - -By 11 a.m. the two reserve battalions of the 169th Brigade were moved -forward to be used as reinforcements before the 168th Brigade was sent -into action. Gen. Hull was determined to clear Bouleaux Wood, which -had resisted so long. But at 1.30 p.m. the Corps Commander, Lord -Cavan, telephoned him that the Guards had not made as much progress as -he had thought, and that the operation against Bouleaux Wood would not -be practicable. But before this order could reach them the 8th -Middlesex made a further attempt to get into the wood and failed. All -attention was then centred on the Quadrilateral, which was holding up -the advance of no less than three divisions. - -The division was ordered to consolidate where it stood, but during the -night bombing attacks were carried out by the 169th Brigade on the -sunken road and end of Loop Trench, and by the 167th Brigade on the 76 -trench in Bouleaux Wood--neither met with success. - -On the 16th the 6th Division again attacked the Quadrilateral and -failed, but they were now well up to the stronghold. The Guards -Division had also crept in from the north. - -The 17th September was devoted to preparations for attacking on the -18th. The 169th Brigade made a trench parallel to the sunken road to -Combles, and also managed to occupy some 200 yards more frontage along -the road. Many dead Germans of the 26th Regiment were found. - -The attack on the 18th was in conjunction with the 6th Division. The -task of the 56th Division was to capture the trench on the north of -the sunken road to Combles, and the south-west face of Bouleaux Wood, -to a point beyond Beef Trench, and from there through the wood to -Middle Copse, where touch would be obtained with the 6th Division, who -were making another effort to clear the Quadrilateral. The attacking -brigades of the latter division declined the aid of Tanks on this -occasion. - -The weather was appalling. The state of the ground was rather worse -than what is so frequently called a quagmire--troops could not get -along. - -The 167th Brigade had lost heavily, and was not in sufficient strength -to attack, so the London Scottish were attached to that brigade. But -the battalion was unable to reach the assaulting line. - -Zero hour was 5.50 a.m., and on the right the 169th Brigade, with the -Queen’s Westminster Rifles and the London Rifle Brigade attacking, -failed to cross the fatal sunken road, which was not surprising, as 77 -the mud by itself was an almost perfect obstacle from the German point -of view. While on the left the London Scottish failure to reach the -assembly trench caused the attack to be abandoned. - -But the 6th Division was successful, and the Quadrilateral, which gave -such strong support to the enemy troops holding Bouleaux Wood, was -captured. The news was received by everyone with a sigh of relief. - -Of the fighting as a whole on the 15th September and subsequent days -Sir Douglas Haig reported: - - “The advance met with immediate success on almost the whole - of the front attacked. At 8.40 a.m. our Tanks were seen - entering Flers, followed by a large number of troops. - Fighting continued in Flers for some time, but by 10 a.m. - our troops had reached the north of the village, and by - midday had occupied the enemy’s trenches for some distance - beyond. On our right our line was advanced to within - assaulting distance of the strong line of defence running - before Morval, Les Bœufs, and Gueudecourt, and on our left - High Wood was at last carried after many hours of very - severe fighting, reflecting great credit on the attacking - battalions. Our success made it possible to carry out during - the afternoon that part of the plan which provided for the - capture of Martinpuich and Courcelette, and by the end of - the day both these villages were in our hands. On the 18th - September the work of this day was completed by the capture - of the Quadrilateral, an enemy stronghold which had hitherto - blocked our progress towards Morval. - - The result of the fighting on the 15th September and the - following days was a gain more considerable than any which - had attended our arms in the course of a single operation - since the commencement of the offensive. In the course of - one day’s fighting we had broken through two of the enemy’s 78 - main defensive systems, and had advanced on a front of over - six miles to an average depth of a mile. In the course of - this advance we had taken three villages, each powerfully - organised for prolonged resistance.... The total number of - prisoners taken by us in these operations amounted to over - 4,000, including 127 officers.” - -The 168th Brigade, on the left of the divisional front, was -responsible for holding Middle Copse. On the two nights of the 19th -and 20th September the London Scottish provided covering parties for -the 5th Cheshire Regt., who connected Beef Trench with Middle Copse, -and carried on two lines of trench in a north-easterly direction as -far as the rail or tram line; companies of these pioneers also -connected the Copse with the south-east side of the Quadrilateral. -This work resulted in a firm line some 900 yards in length facing -Bouleaux Wood, and gradually working round Combles. - -Prisoners captured by the London Scottish while covering the digging -parties were from the 2nd Battalion, 235th Regiment, Reserve 51st -Division. - -The right wing of the British Army had not yet reached the line -desired by Sir Douglas Haig. Morval, Les Bœufs, and Gueudecourt were -still in the hands of the enemy, and on the right Combles still held -out at the junction of the Allied Armies. An Allied attack from the -Somme to Martinpuich was arranged for the 23rd September, but the -weather was so bad that it had to be postponed until the 25th. [The -battle of Morval.] - - [Illustration: 2. GINCHY & MORVAL. - THE BATTLES ON THE 9TH, 15TH, & 25TH, SEPR.] - -The 168th Brigade were relieved by the 167th, and obtained a little -rest from the night of the 22nd to the night of the 24th. The battle 79 -front of the division was then the 169th Brigade on the right between -Leuze Wood and Combles, the 167th Brigade in Beef and Bully Trenches, -and the 168th Brigade in the new trenches ready to attack Bouleaux -Wood from the north-west, or rather to envelop it, as the wood was not -to be entered. - -The main task of the 56th Division was to continue building up the -flank, to neutralise the German detachments in Bouleaux Wood, and to -get touch with the 5th Division on the left. The actual objectives of -the 168th Brigade were some trenches between the north-east of the -wood and the tram-line, also the bank and cutting of the tram-line. -The 167th Brigade were to help by directing machine-gun and -trench-mortar fire on the wood, and the 169th Brigade by firing on the -north and north-east exits of Combles. - -The whole Corps attacked at 12.35 p.m., and the German resistance -crumbled away. - -The 4th London Regt. on the right and the London Scottish on the left -advanced under “a most efficient enfilade artillery barrage.” All -objectives were reached. The 4th London Regt. killed a large number of -Huns in shell-holes round the north end of the wood, and suffered -themselves somewhat from enemy snipers in the southern part of the -wood. The London Scottish had some trouble and quite a stiff fight to -clear the railway embankment, during which the left company suffered -severely. But four machine guns were captured there and eighty -prisoners. These two battalions overran their objectives and curled -round the end of Bouleaux Wood. - -The 5th, 6th, and Guards Divisions on the left swept through all their 80 -objectives--Morval and Les Bœufs were captured. - -For some time the London Scottish were out of touch with the 5th -Division, which had swerved too far to the right, but the complete -success of the operations enabled the 56th Division to improve the -position round Combles. By three o’clock in the afternoon the 4th -London Regt. had two companies in the north end of Bouleaux Wood, and -both the attacking battalions of the 168th Brigade had pushed out -patrols towards Combles. Artillery observation officers reported to -Gen. Hull that the enemy could be seen hurrying, in small parties, -from Combles in an easterly direction. - -A steady pressure was kept on the Germans in Bouleaux Wood. The centre -of resistance here was round the derelict Tank on the left edge of the -wood. The 1st London Regt. was on one side of the Tank and the enemy -on the other. On the right the London Rifle Brigade and the Queen -Victoria’s Rifles gave the enemy no rest in the sunken road and the -trench leading to Combles. - -By midnight the 168th Brigade had posts east of Combles, the 167th -Brigade had cleared the lower end of Bouleaux Wood and got behind the -Tank, and the 169th Brigade had captured all of the sunken road trench -and the Combles trench. And at dawn an officer’s patrol of the 168th -Brigade had met a French patrol on the east of Combles. The London -Rifle Brigade had already entered the town at 3.30 a.m. and secured -touch with the French there. - -The line desired by Sir Douglas Haig had been captured and there was a -momentary pause. The line held by the 56th Division at midday on the -26th was some 1,500 yards to the east of Combles. The 167th Brigade 81 -were in the front line and in touch with the 5th Division and the -French; the 168th Brigade were a short distance in rear, round about -the railway cuttings; and the 169th Brigade were half in Combles and -half to the west of it. The Germans were some distance away, holding -what was known as Mutton Trench in force, and it was arranged that the -168th Brigade should attack with the assistance of five Tanks. But the -Tanks failed to put in an appearance, and after waiting twenty-four -hours, the Rangers were told that the attack was cancelled. - -Meanwhile our Allies on the right had captured Frigicourt and had the -hard nut of Sailly-Saillisel to crack. To assist them in securing this -very important position, Sir Douglas Haig agreed to hand over the line -as far as Morval, so on the 28th the division was relieved and marched -for a few days’ rest to the neighbourhood of Ville-sur-Ancre and -Meaulte. - - * * * * * - -The battle, however, still raged. Sir Douglas Haig was pushing the -enemy hard: - - “The success of the Fourth Army had now brought our advance - to a stage at which I judged it advisable that Thiepval - should be taken, in order to bring our left flank into line - and establish it on the main ridge above that village, the - possession of which would be of considerable value in future - operations. - - Accordingly, at 12.25 p.m. on the 26th September, before the - enemy had been given time to recover from the blow struck by - the Fourth Army, a general attack was launched against - Thiepval and the Thiepval Ridge.... The attack was a - brilliant success. On the right our troops reached the - system of enemy trenches which formed their objective - without great difficulty. In Thiepval and the strong works 82 - to the north of it the enemy’s resistance was more - desperate.... On the left of the attack fierce fighting, in - which Tanks again gave valuable assistance to our troops, - continued in Thiepval during the day and the following - night, but by 8.30 a.m. on the 27th September the whole of - the village of Thiepval was in our hands.” - -The rest for the division, however, was not for very long. Reinforced, -though hardly refreshed, the brigades began to move back to the line. -On the 29th September the 167th Brigade was in Trones Wood, west of -Guillemont, and the 169th in a camp near by. On the last night of -September the latter brigade took over the line from the 6th Division, -with the right in touch with the French, while the 167th relieved the -2nd Guards Brigade on the left. - -The position taken over was outside Les Bœufs, in the trenches called -Foggy and Windy. Battalions in line from the right were the Queen’s -Westminsters, Queen Victoria’s, 1st Londons, and the 7th Middlesex. -The orders were that they should send out patrols and occupy a line of -posts over the crest of the ridge--the 169th Brigade posts A, B, C, D, -and the 167th Brigade E, F, G, H, and K. - -On October 2nd the 167th Brigade reported having joined up a line of -posts, but we cannot make the map-readings given agree with what is -known of positions in subsequent events. The country was more than -ever devoid of landmarks--it was just a wide expanse of shell-holes in -a dark brown, almost black, kind of earth--and no one knew either -their own position or those of the enemy within a few hundred yards; -and the few hundred yards were a matter of importance. Anyhow, the 83 -line was not the line of posts, but probably near the line we have -sketched on the left of 34. Touch was obtained with the 20th Division -on the left. - -Gen. Hull was now instructed that the Fourth Army would renew the -attack on the 5th October, and that the XIV Corps would establish -itself on a line from which the main Transloy defences could be -attacked at a later date. The 56th Division would capture Hazy, -Dewdrop, Spectrum, and part of Rainbow, and establish a line along the -west crest of the ridge; the Division would then, as a second phase of -the attack, establish a line on the forward slope of the ridge from -which Le Transloy could be seen. The General ordered that the 169th -Brigade should attack on the right, and the 167th Brigade on the left. -[The battle of the Transloy Ridges, 1st-18th October.] - -The weather became steadily worse and, though water is supposed to run -downhill and the division was on the slope of a hill, the troops might -just as well have been in the middle of a pond. No one could move, and -the operations were postponed for forty-eight hours. - -Assembly trenches were dug; and patrols reported the enemy some 200 -yards on the farther side of the ridge. The objectives for the attack -were well beyond the line of posts it had been hoped to occupy with -patrols, and the 2/1st London and 1/1st Edinburgh Field Companies -R.E., with two companies of the 5th Cheshire Regt., were given to the -two brigades to consolidate what was gained. - -The assault took place at 1.45 p.m. on the 7th October, and on the -left was fairly successful. The 7th Middlesex, on the extreme left, 84 -and the left company of the 1st London Regt. drove the enemy out of -the northern half of Spectrum and part of Rainbow, where they joined -with the 20th Division. The right company of the 1st Londons, however, -was held up by machine-gun fire from Dewdrop and failed to reach that -end of Spectrum. - -The 168th Brigade fared badly on the right. Three battalions attacked -in line--the London Scottish, the 4th London Regt., and the Rangers. -Two machine guns were in the front line, for covering fire, and four -others west of Les Bœufs, for indirect covering fire; there were also -six Stokes mortars in Burnaby to put a barrage on Dewdrop. In some -respects the attack was peculiar. As was so often the case, the -direction of the attack was at an angle to our front, and the London -Scottish, starting the assault from the right at 1.45 p.m., were -followed by the 4th London Regt. at 1.47 and the Rangers at 1.49 p.m.; -this was calculated to bring the three battalions into line by the -time Dewdrop and the gun-pits were reached. - -The leading company of the Rangers, on the left, was knocked out, -before it had gone fifty yards, by machine guns in the northern end of -Dewdrop, and the reserve companies of the battalion came under a very -heavy barrage and did not succeed in carrying forward the attack. The -remnants of this battalion lay out in shell-holes until dusk, when -they returned to the original line. - -The 4th London Regt., in the centre, met with much the same fate. The -left company was annihilated, and the right company, managing to reach -a patch of dead ground, lay down unable to move. The rear waves were -met with intense artillery fire, but advanced most gallantly to the 85 -line of the leading troops. From the dead ground attempts were made to -outflank the gun-pits, from which the hostile machine-gun fire was -directed, and small parties managed to work well round to the south. - -The London Scottish advanced well for about 400 yards, and occupied -the south gun-pits and the southern end of Hazy. The enemy at once -attempted a counter-attack from the northern end, but this was driven -off. But it was found that a wide gap existed between the right of the -battalion and the French, who had attacked east instead of north-east, -and small parties of the London Scottish were successively pushed out -to fill the gap and get touch. At six o’clock they had succeeded in -establishing a thin but continuous line in touch with our Allies. But -the situation was a very difficult one. The enemy had received -reinforcements in Hazy and the north gun-pits--from all appearances -fresh troops--and both flanks of the London Scottish were in the air -and exposed to the immediate presence of the enemy. - -At 8.30 p.m. the German counter-attack developed, and, though heavy -casualties were inflicted on the enemy, he succeeded in forcing the -London Scottish and the right of the 4th London Regt., which was -creeping round the gun-pits, to retire to our original line. - -The division, at nightfall, was left with a net gain of part of -Spectrum and Rainbow. Gen. Hull then ordered a renewal of the attack -on the next day, and sent up the London Rifle Brigade and the Queen -Victoria’s Rifles to the 168th Brigade, and the Queen’s Westminster -Rifles to the 167th Brigade. - -The assault took place at 3.30 p.m. on the 8th October, and almost at 86 -once Brig.-Gen. Freeth reported that the barrage was very feeble. - -On the 168th Brigade front the attack was arranged this time so that -it started simultaneously all along the line. The London Rifle Brigade -on the right advanced steadily for about 500 yards, and again gained a -foothold in Hazy. But the experience of the previous day was repeated. -The northern gun-pits, with their garrison of machine-gunners, was -held by the enemy, who poured a devastating fire into the left flank -of the four advancing waves, and on this occasion there was fire from -the right flank as well; the attack was in the main held up about -fifty yards from Hazy, where a shell-hole line was established. The -reserve company was sent forward to fill the gap which existed, as on -the first attack, between us and the French. - -The Queen Victoria’s Rifles and the 3rd London Regt., on the 167th -Brigade front, failed to make any appreciable advance. Both Dewdrop -and the south of Spectrum resting on the sunken road were strongly -garrisoned, and the machine-gun fire was withering. At 10.30 p.m. all -troops were withdrawn to the original line. - -The position on the morning of the 9th was that we held Spectrum to -the bend in the trench just south of the sunken road, and had a strong -party of the Queen’s Westminsters in the sunken road. On the remainder -of the front there had been no advance. - - [Illustration: 3. THE TRANSLOY RIDGE.] - -On these two days 84 prisoners of the 31st and 84th Reserve Infantry -Regts., 18th Division, and two machine guns were captured. The great -difficulty experienced was to know where troops were situated. The -weather was bad, and the effort of attacking was in itself a gigantic 87 -one, but that effort had been made, and seemed to hang on the brink of -success, and if the artillery could have helped a little more would -have been entirely satisfactory. The artillery, however, were greatly -handicapped. Maps could not tell them where the new enemy trenches -were, and aeroplanes were unable to take photographs. As to being -helped by roads, though these were clearly marked on the map, they had -been almost completely blown away by shell fire on the ground and were -by no means easy to distinguish. It was a vile country. - -The latter days of the Somme battle were even worse for the R.A.M.C. -Wounded men had to be carried to Ginchy and frequently from there to -Montauban. The medical branch of the division never experienced a -harder time than that on the Somme. - -On the night of the 9th October the 56th Division was relieved by the -4th Division. The battles of the Somme were practically over. Sir -Douglas Haig wanted to push on in the direction of Le Transloy: - - “On our eastern flank ... it was important to gain ground. - Here the enemy still possessed a strong system of trenches - covering the villages of Transloy and Beaulencourt and the - town of Bapaume; but although he was digging with feverish - haste, he had not been able to create any very formidable - defences behind this line. In this direction, in fact, we - had at last reached a stage at which a successful attack - might reasonably be expected to yield much greater results - than anything we had yet attained. The resistance of the - troops opposed to us had seriously weakened in the course of - our recent operations, and there was no reason to suppose - that the effort required would not be within our powers. - - This last completed system of defence, before Le Transloy, 88 - was flanked to the south by the enemy’s position at - Sailly-Saillisel and screened to the west by the spur lying - between Le Transloy and Les Bœufs. A necessary preliminary, - therefore, to an assault upon it was to secure the spur and - the Sailly-Saillisel heights. Possession of the high ground - at this latter village would at once give us far better - command over the ground to the north and the north-west, - secure the flank of our operations towards Transloy, and - deprive the enemy of observation over the Allied - communications in the Combles valley. In view of the enemy’s - efforts to construct new systems of defence behind the Le - Transloy line, it was desirable to lose no time in dealing - with the situation. - - Unfortunately, at this juncture very unfavourable weather - set in, and continued with scarcely a break during the - remainder of October and the early part of November. Poor - visibility seriously interfered with the work of our - artillery, and constant rain turned the mass of hastily-dug - trenches for which we were fighting into channels of deep - mud. The country roads, broken by countless shell craters, - that cross the deep stretch of ground we had lately won, - rapidly became almost impassable, making the supply of food, - stores, and ammunition a serious problem. These conditions - multiplied the difficulties of attack to such an extent that - it was found impossible to exploit the situation with the - rapidity necessary to enable us to reap the full benefits of - the advantages we had gained.” - -Two attacks were, indeed, made to assist the French in their -operations against the important village of Sailly-Saillisel, which -fell to them on the 18th of the month, but by that time the weather -had become so bad, and the delay had been so long, that the decisive -moment had passed. [The short and successful battle of the Ancre was 89 -fought on the 13-18th November, bringing the total number of 1916 -Somme battles up to twelve.] - - * * * * * - -Lieut.-Col. A. D. Bayliffe, who commanded the 168th Brigade through -this great battle, wrote at the time an interesting paper which he -heads: “Lessons to be deducted from the Operations on the Somme.” -Written with the incidents and conditions fresh on his mind, and for -future guidance, it is not a criticism of the actions fought, but from -his recommendations we may gather something of the difficulties which -had to be faced and overcome. We give only some striking extracts: - - “The results of the operations carried out by this brigade - bear out more than ever the necessity for an assault being - made direct at the objective. Failures, or partial failures, - are attributable to present-day troops being asked to - perform a complicated manœuvre such as a wheel or change of - direction during an assault. - - The objectives allotted should be as far as possible - definite, and should be chosen on the ground so that - well-defined landmarks may be included. With the heavy - casualties which occur among the officers, and considering - the partially-trained state of N.C.O.s and men, it is seldom - any use leaving the site of the objective to the judgment of - the assaulting troops. - - In order to comply with this suggestion, it is essential - that a proper scheme of assembly trenches should be thought - out, and proper time given for their construction even in - the rapid advances which have been taking place. - - In this connection it should be remembered that troops - engaged in holding the line cannot be expected to do much 90 - digging work. Also that, without further training, - reinforcement officers are incapable of finding their way - over unknown ground, even with good maps, and that they - cannot tape out trenches and extend working parties. It is - therefore necessary to use pioneers very largely for the - digging of assembly trenches if this essential work is to be - well done. - - Attacks delivered on too broad a front with too little - weight fail even against what appears to be inferior hostile - defences. The reason is that assaulting troops edge away - from the source of hostile fire, and when the lines of men - are too thin, they move forward through the gaps in the - hostile defences without dealing with them. - - It appears that assaults, to be successful, should never be - delivered with less than four waves even against near - objectives. One hostile machine gun may completely break up - the first wave or two; if there are two or more waves in - rear they may successfully carry on the assault. - - It is desirable to have Battalion Headquarters as far - forward as possible, right up in the front assembly trenches - if possible, before an attack. But it is no good placing - them there unless there is some suitable shelter (however - small), and unless time is available to lay communication - lines forward. Brigade Headquarters should also be right - forward, provided there is some accommodation. This - facilitates personal reconnaissance and liaison. - - If the efficiency of a brigade is to be maintained as a - fighting unit through a period of several weeks of active - operations, a far larger proportion of officers and men - should be left back than is customary. The average - reinforcement officer is quite useless when his first - appearance on service is in the middle of a modern battle. I - would suggest that a battalion should go into action with - from 12 to 16 officers only, and that 4 to 8 more should be - kept about the line of Brigade Headquarters, and the remainder 91 - to be at the transport lines. N.C.O.s should be dealt with - in the same proportion. - - It is well borne out through these operations that, if the - artillery barrage is good and the infantry advance close to - it, they will probably reach their objective without heavy - loss. Usually the standing barrage was put up behind the - objective, and it is thought that the standing barrage - should be on the objective until the creeping barrage - coincides with it and then both move together to their next - standing line. - - On one occasion (7th October) the three battalions of - infantry on this brigade front had to advance at different - times; the consequence was that the last to move had to face - a very heavy barrage in addition to machine-gun fire. It is - thought that the infantry should always move at zero, even - if they are not in line with each other, and that the - barrage line should be made to conform with the line of the - assaulting infantry. - - As usual there was a complete lack of touch throughout the - operations with the heavy artillery. It is thought that the - artillery group system should be extended so as to include - some heavy artillery. - - It is suggested that a large supply of signboards, painted - white or luminous, should be prepared for active operations, - and also a supply of trench bridges ... reliefs were often - much complicated and delayed by the lack of good tracks. - - The value of the Stokes mortars in the more open fighting we - have been having is very doubtful. The results achieved have - never been commensurate with the great labour involved in - getting the guns and ammunition forward. The trench mortar, - from an administrative point of view, is more trouble than - any other unit when frequent moves and reliefs occur, as it - is not self-contained, and much work and trouble is involved - at very busy moments in devising how its stores are to be - moved. - - The Tanks allotted to co-operate with this brigade were not 92 - found to be of any use at all. It is thought that Tanks - require select crews of great determination, and officers in - charge who have more experience and knowledge of the methods - of infantry and artillery in war. If the speed of the Tanks - could be increased, it would add very greatly to their - value.” - -The difficulties indicated in this paper were those which faced the -actual fighting men. We have already mentioned the zigzag line, and -the reader will readily appreciate how the attempt to form a front, -moving in a given direction after the men had left the trenches, -frequently led to confusion and loss of direction. Col. Bayliffe’s -statement that men will edge away from the source of fire does not -necessarily contravert our assertion that they are drawn towards the -sound of fire, which must be read in conjunction with the admitted -uncertainty of the exact position of an objective. During an attack no -officer or N.C.O. can control more than half a dozen men, and the more -usual number is two. On this basis the proportion of officers and -N.C.O.s is totally inadequate, and it follows that success depends -largely on the men themselves. The assaulting troops will fall -naturally under two heads: leaders and followers. The leaders are the -men of greater initiative, and in moments of uncertainty, when doubt -of their direction seizes them, when no trench is visible, they turn -towards the sound of the enemy--the place where the firing comes from. -It is one of the factors to be dealt with in keeping direction. A line -which has become thin through casualties will, no doubt, swerve from a -strongly-held post. - -And what a lot is covered by the paragraph on digging! The physical 93 -effort required to go through a battle like the Somme was colossal. -Relief meant only relief from the actual front line, not relief from -open trenches, from wet, from mud, from cold, or even from severe -casualties; it was merely a case of moving a short way back to other -trenches. After days of this sort of life an assault was a most -exhausting experience and, if successful, was not finished with the -written message, “We are on our objective.” Exhausted men were called -upon to dig new trenches at once, under fierce fire, and the trenches -dug, they waited for the counter-attack which, on the Somme, -inevitably followed. Perhaps the counter-attack succeeded and the men -were driven back to their original line--and still there was no rest. - -Imagine the condition of mind of the surviving officers and men of a -company when they were reinforced by troops straight from home, with -no experience of modern or indeed any other form of fighting. The -reinforcements came almost as an added anxiety to the old men. And how -could the new arrivals be expected to appreciate the advantage of -following close on our own barrage, in itself a doubt-provoking thing? -There was nothing easy for the regimental officer or for his men; they -fought the enemy, the earth, and the sky. - -We give the gallant colonel’s remarks on Tanks as an interesting light -on the early proceedings of the new engines of war. We are well aware -that they will provoke a smile from some readers, but they are none -the less justifiable. Tanks accomplished very little on this part of -the battle front. To the infantry they seemed only to attract the -attention of the enemy with the appalling noise they made and the very -definite target they afforded, and then they broke down! Col. 94 -Bayliffe’s opinion, which does not absolutely condemn the use of -Tanks, was shared by two Brigadier-Generals of the 16th Division, and -most of the infantry in less exalted positions. That they afterwards -accomplished the object of their inventors is beside the point. - -Heaven forbid that we should appear to offer excuses for the 56th -Division--none are needed. But we find it impossible to give a true -picture of the conditions under which men fought, and by placing a few -of the difficulties before the reader, hope to enable him to -appreciate the truly great fighting qualities of these London men. -Success conjures up to the mind a picture of swift movement, and such -successes were gained during the war--but not on the Somme. The enemy -was strong and determined, and fought to the last. Gen. Falkenhayn, -who was the instigator of the Verdun offensive, seems to rather -pooh-pooh the battle of the Somme, and give the impression that it had -little effect on the Central Powers; but as he was dismissed at the -end of August, one might deduce that other people did not share his -views. Hindenburg and Ludendorff, on the other hand, wag their heads -gravely over the whole business. The Germans were being badly -battered, and were fighting most desperately to arrest disaster. And -so, in recording the exploits of the 56th Division, we have to repeat -somewhat monotonously the account of attacks being continually -delivered on the same trench or point. - -The trouble in a battle of this sort is to reconcile the two points of -view: that of the Higher Command and that of the infantry. For the -infantry there was no break in the fighting--if they did not assault 95 -“over the top,” they were bombing the enemy out of a trench or being -bombed out themselves. And it is not too easy to decide what -particular trenches were held at any one moment. The position in Loop -Trench, for instance, was continually changing. Combles Trench, the -sunken road, and the southern end of Bouleaux Wood were points of -continual struggle. The enemy exerted his full pressure on the 56th -Division. But for the Higher Command this month of fighting divides -itself into five attacks! - -The plan on this part of the front was to surround Combles by joining -the French on the far side. The junction of two armies of different -nationalities might always be considered a point of weakness, and the -movement itself was one of which the enemy could take advantage. Lord -Cavan explains the position very clearly with a small rough sketch: - - “The plan to take Combles was like this: - - [Illustration] - - Therefore during the advance the protection of my flank from - a possible counter-stroke down the arrow was most important. 96 - This protection from Leuze Wood to Morval was splendidly and - gloriously afforded. Further, in the actual attack on Morval - and Les Bœufs this protecting flank had to be advanced to - keep pace with the attack. The key of this was the capture - of a trench about X-X. This was captured and held, and the - complete success of the battle was assured. I had every - confidence in Hull and his men, tired though they were, and - this confidence was more than justified.” - -This grim, determined, and desperate struggle reveals qualities in the -London troops which, though they existed, would not in a more -spectacular success have been so clearly demonstrated. It requires -good men to attack again and again until their object is gained, and -when these attacks are launched against such splendidly trained -soldiers as the Germans, one can only marvel that the thing was ever -done, and applaud the steadfast courage, the endurance of body and -spirit, which enabled the men to do it. - -True, the battles of the Somme ended with both sides being stuck in -the mud--an inglorious ending to so much heroism--and the final, and -perhaps fatal, stroke was snatched from our grasp by the weather; but -those who came through the battle may now consider dispassionately -what it was they had accomplished. - -The Central Powers (we must always remember that we fought more than -the strength of Germany) had decided, as we know, to bleed France -white on the field of Verdun. They were also pressing Italy hard and -had gained important successes. The Entente Powers replied first with -Brussiloff’s attack, and secondly with the Franco-British offensive on -the Somme. Falkenhayn declares that the most dangerous moment of 97 -the Russian offensive had been passed before the first shot of the -battle of the Somme had been fired. He also maintains that the -Austrian loss of the right bank of the Isonzo had no connection with -the Somme; that the Germans would not in any case have sent troops to -help their ally in Italy. As for Verdun, he deals with it in a -somewhat unsatisfactory paragraph: - - “The only tangible gain, then, of this battle to the enemy - remains in its effect on the situation on the Western Front. - As a matter of course, an expenditure of strength such as - the enemy favoured demanded the use of corresponding forces - for the defence. The operations in the Meuse area were not - yet, however, immediately affected. On the 11th July we were - still able, by a strong thrust, to advance our line on the - east bank.... After this it was the tension of the whole - situation, and especially the necessity to husband our - _matériel_ and ammunition, which necessitated the - abandonment of any big German offensive operations on the - Meuse. The headquarters of the Crown Prince’s Army Group - were instructed to carry on the offensive calmly and - according to plan, so as to give the enemy no good reason - for concluding that he could hope for its cessation. This, - too, was quite successful, for the French were unable to - bring up reinforcements from the Meuse to the Somme front - until September, when, following on the change of Chief of - the General Staff, the ‘Verdun-offensive’ had been - completely abandoned.” - -The last sentence is, of course, the bitter pill for Falkenhayn. It is -perhaps only natural that he would seek to justify his policy, and -persist that he was right and would have succeeded had he been left -alone. Hindenburg’s memoirs give one a somewhat different impression: 98 - - “Very soon after I took over my new post I found myself - compelled by the general situation to ask His Majesty the - Emperor to order the offensive at Verdun to be broken off. - The battles there exhausted our forces like an open wound. - Moreover, it was obvious in any case that the enterprise had - become hopeless, and that for us to persevere with it would - cost us greater losses than those we were able to inflict on - the enemy. The battlefield was a regular hell, and was - regarded as such by the troops.” - -And of the Somme he says: - - “The extent of the demands which were being made on the army - in the West was brought before my eyes quite vividly for the - first time during this visit to France. I will not hesitate - to admit that it was only now that I fully realised all that - the Western Armies had done hitherto.... I could now - understand how everyone, officers and men alike, longed to - get away from such an atmosphere.... Many of our best and - finest fighting men had to pour out their heart’s blood in - destroyed trenches.... - - It was only when the arrival of the wet season began to make - the ground impossible that things became quieter in the - battle area of the Somme. The million of shell-holes filled - with water became mere cemeteries.... Over everyone hovered - the fearful spectre of this battlefield, which for - desolation and horror seemed to be even worse than that of - Verdun.” - -General Ludendorff carries the impression still further[3]: - - “On the Somme the enemy’s powerful artillery, assisted by 99 - excellent aeroplane observation and fed with enormous - supplies of ammunition, had kept down our fire and destroyed - our artillery. The defence of our infantry had become so - flabby that the massed attacks of the enemy always - succeeded. Not only did our _moral_ suffer, but in - addition to fearful wastage in killed and wounded, we lost a - large number of prisoners and much material.... - - The 25th saw the beginning of the heaviest of the many heavy - engagements that made up the battle of the Somme. Great were - our losses. The enemy took Rancourt, Morval, Gueudecourt, - and the hotly-contested Combles. On the 26th the Thiepval - salient fell.... - - The fighting had made the most extraordinary demands both on - commanders and troops.... Divisions and other formations had - to be thrown in on the Somme front in quicker succession, - and had to stay in the line longer. The time for - recuperation and training on quiet sectors became shorter - and shorter. The troops were getting exhausted. Everything - was cut as fine as possible. The strain on our nerves in - Pless was terrible....” - -We may conclude, then, that the Somme, as the chief counter-stroke of -the Entente Powers, defeated the Central Powers; France was not bled -white; and although the Russians were driven back, and Roumania, who -had entered the war, was speedily defeated by the Central Powers, -Italy was relieved and delivered a successful counter-attack on the -Austrians. The situation, as a result of the Somme, although the -individual British soldier may not have thought it vastly improved, -was more than ever serious for the Central Powers, and one could not -at that stage hope for more. - -The total number of prisoners taken by the British Armies on the 100 -Somme, from 1st July to 18th November, was over 38,000. Also 29 heavy -guns, 96 field guns, 136 trench mortars, and 514 machine guns. - - - [3] _My War Memories, 1914-1918_, Ludendorff. - - - - - CHAPTER III 101 - - LAVENTIE-RICHBOURG - - -One might well imagine that the 56th Division was entitled to a rest, -but the days when armies retired into winter-quarters had -passed--unless a “quiet” bit of the line may be so called. There was a -rest for a few days in the neighbourhood of Belloy-sur-Somme, -north-west of Amiens. Battalions moved there, after a night at -Bernafay Wood, Mansell Camp, or the Citadel, by bus, and all moves -were complete by the 12th October. Then they rested and cleaned up. - -There was a slight rearrangement on the 20th, which brought Divisional -Headquarters to Hallencourt, and some of the units into other -villages, but the division was once more on the move almost -immediately, and on the 24th October was behind the 61st Division in -the country round Lestrem. Three days later brigades commenced the -relief of the 61st Division in the Richbourg l’Avoué-Laventie line. - -This bit of country was exceedingly flat, and in normal times was -drained by innumerable ditches. It was one of those bits of country -where trenches are an impossibility--soil and water seem to be -combined in equal proportions. Naturally war conditions did not -improve the draining, and at times large tracts of the country were -flooded. Our defences were breastworks, and the system of holding the 102 -line was by a combination of posts. There were certain advantages -about this line, matters of space and of easy approach, but they were -only apparent when the weather was fine; when it was cold and wet, -shelter was very difficult to find. - -At first all three brigades were in line, but on the 27th November the -5th Division was put in on the right and the front was shortened, so -that two brigades held the line and one was in reserve. - -The whole of the division, however, did not arrive in this sector at -once. The artillery had been left on the Somme battlefield covering -the left of the French. Of this time Brig.-Gen. Elkington writes: - - “During the whole of the month of October the heavy and - incessant rain had made the going so bad that it was almost - impossible to get vehicles up to the positions. Improvised - ammunition carriers were made out of the baskets from the - ammunition wagons, and for the last part of the operations - all ammunition, rations, and water went up on pack animals. - It was most difficult to get material for dugouts up to the - guns, and in consequence officers and men suffered a great - deal of discomfort. The horses also suffered very much from - the constant hard, heavy work. The 56th Divisional Artillery - were relieved on the 31st October by the 8th Divisional - Artillery. Owing to the heavy going, the withdrawal of the - guns was a difficult job, and one section of A/280, which - got stuck in deep mud, took two days to get out. The 56th - Divisional Artillery marched from the Somme on the 1st - November, badly in need of a rest and refit in the way of - clothes, etc., and on the 5th we arrived on the Neuville-St. - Vaast front, and went into the line, covering the 3rd - Canadian Division facing the Vimy Ridge, on the 6th. The - headquarters of the artillery was established at Aubigny, 103 - where the headquarters of the Canadian Division, under - Major-Gen. Lipsett, were. - - From the 7th November to the 1st December we remained - covering the Canadian Division. The sector was a very quiet - one, but the batteries were very extended, and it was a - matter of very long walks going round them, as cars were not - allowed forward. We were very well done by the Canadians, - and the men were able to get reclothed, and the horses - managed to pick up in the good stabling.... On the 1st - December the 56th Divisional Artillery was relieved by the - Canadian R.F.A., and we marched to the Neuve Chapelle area - to cover our own division.” - -Meanwhile the 56th Division was covered by the 6th Divisional -Artillery. - -Reinforcements for the shattered battalions were prompt, and all -monthly strength returns show a good average of a thousand men for -battalions. Horses remained steadily about 5,100, although the number -fell during the battle of the Somme. In actual numbers the division -was of average strength, but the quality had suffered. We find, for -instance, a record that a draft of over a thousand men arrived about -this period, and that they had not been instructed in musketry! With -all the will in the world such men were not of very great use. -Provision was made, however, for their instruction. - -Almost at once the reputation of this Neuve Chapelle front began to -change. It had been considered a quiet bit of line with nothing much -happening beyond mining and counter-mining. On the 28th October the -enemy opened a trench-mortar bombardment which Australian miners -declared to have been the heaviest they had experienced during their 104 -stay in that line. The system of holding the line by means of posts, -too, gave many opportunities for patrol work, as it was a system -adopted by both sides. The advantage of position, as was so often the -case, was with the Germans, who were on the Aubers Ridge, with better -observation and drier ground. - -The month of November was a quiet month, cold and wet. No Man’s Land -was flooded and patrols found it very difficult to move about, as they -could not avoid splashing and consequent betrayal of their presence. - -On the 30th November the enemy raided the 7th Middlesex, who occupied -as part of their line a mine-crater. Major Emery was on the spot, and -with two men drove them off. They failed to secure identification. The -next day, however, we secured identification in the shape of a Lieut. -Steinhardt, 19th Bavarian Regt., who was in charge of a patrol which -was dispersed by one of our Lewis-gun teams--an experience which the -lieutenant found so bewildering that he lost his way and entered our -lines, under the impression that they were his own. - -Two lance-corporals, Millar and Wodley, of the 2nd London Regt., also -secured identification by chasing a German patrol of five men, of whom -they killed one and the remaining four put up their hands. These men -were of the 7th Bavarian Regt., 5th Bavarian Division, III Bavarian -Corps. - -The policy of the XI Corps (Gen. Haking) was to annoy the enemy on all -occasions and keep him always uneasy. The month of December was -therefore devoted to most active patrolling, and the enemy lines were -entered again and again only to be found empty. There is only one 105 -record of finding the line occupied, when the Queen Victoria’s Rifles -captured two prisoners. The reason, of course, was the state of the -ground, and it affords an interesting sidelight on the endurance shown -by the men of the 56th Division, as the trenches, or rather defences, -they occupied were similar to those of the Hun. - -The operations of the winter are, in fact, only of interest as showing -the endurance, the determination, and the spirit of the 56th Division. -There was nothing in the nature of an attack or even a raid of any -magnitude--it was a matter of small parties of men resisting the -fearful conditions of climate, and penetrating with the greatest -boldness into the enemy lines. - -Having ascertained that the enemy was not occupying his line, but -merely patrolling it, a more aggressive attitude was adopted from the -1st January, 1917. On the first day of the year snipers, from the -battalions in line, established themselves in the German front line -and remained there all day. They had a few opportunities which they -did not miss. - -The operations until the 14th January were carried out by battalions -of the 167th Brigade; those between the 14th and 29th by the 169th -Brigade. Briefly they may be summarised. - -On the night of the 3rd/4th January 100 men of a new draft were taken -across No Man’s Land, in parties of six, to “visit” the enemy -trenches; this was no easy matter on account of the state of the -ground. On the same night two officers of the 3rd London Regt. -penetrated almost to the enemy support lines, when they were held up -by deep water. - -On the night 9/10th January four posts were established in the enemy 106 -front line, and on the next night two more. - -On the 14th a post known as Hampstead Heath was violently attacked by -the enemy in very superior numbers. This post was held by the 7th -Middlesex, and the men were so cold they could scarcely move; the -Queen’s Westminster Rifles were actually halfway across No Man’s Land -on the way to relieve them when the attack occurred. This relief was -apparently driven back by trench-mortar barrage and machine-gun fire. -The 7th Middlesex men put up a fight, but their Lewis gun was jammed -and useless, and they were forced out of the post. One man was found -to be missing. The record of this regiment is particularly fine, and -they felt very acutely the taking of this prisoner by the enemy. The -7th Middlesex is one of the two Imperial Service Battalions of the -Territorial Force which existed at the outbreak of war. It was the -first battalion to leave the country and was sent to hold Gibraltar. -In March 1915 it arrived in France and was attached to the 8th -Division at La Gorgue--in this same area. From the taking over of the -line immediately after the battle of Neuve Chapelle it went through -many engagements before joining the 56th Division, and up to this -time, in spite of all the attacks on the Somme, it had only lost six -men as prisoners. Its casualties in France, to date, were: 28 officers -and 338 other ranks killed, 35 officers and 763 other ranks wounded. - -On the morning of the 15th January another post called Bertha was -attacked under cover of a dense fog, and after four men out of eleven -had been killed, the post (of the 1st London Regt.) was driven -out--but two were taken prisoners. Almost immediately, however, a -patrol of the same regiment, composed of four men, left our front 107 -line and reoccupied the post, and by noon our troops had restored the -position. The enemy made another attack, but were driven off. This -post evidently caused the Germans great annoyance, as they attacked it -on the night of the 16/17th January and were again driven off. - -From the 17th to the 20th the posts were bombarded by artillery and -trench mortars, and on the 21st, under cover of an intense -bombardment, the enemy succeeded in occupying Bertha Post. A -counter-attack was at once organised, but it failed, owing to two -machine guns which the enemy had brought up with them. In the early -morning our patrols discovered the enemy leaving it, and it was again -occupied. - -During the night 22nd/23rd January the enemy made an organised attempt -to recapture all the posts. After repeated attacks the garrison of -Bertha Post was once more forced to retire, and again reoccupied the -spot in the early morning. - -The enemy shelled the posts all day on the 23rd and 24th, on the -latter with a large percentage of lachrymatory shells, which shelling -was followed by four separate attacks. After hand-to-hand and bombing -fights they were driven off. - -On the evening of the 27th the enemy concentrated his artillery fire -on Irma Post, which until then had only received general attention -from him, and succeeded in driving the garrison out. We then drove the -enemy out by artillery fire, and the post was reoccupied by us. - -On the 28th the Army Commander, Gen. Horne, directed that all the -posts should be vacated. - -One cannot consider these incidents only as small bickerings. The 108 -artillery fire which the men had to face was remarkably accurate and -very fierce, and there was also the weather. At first No Man’s Land -was a swamp, or a lake, and then a cold snap set in, which was -paralysing to all who had to live in the open. The men had no cover -either from shell fire or the weather--the “posts” were only a matter -of shell-holes on our side of the German breastworks, and improved -with the help of a shovel and a pick. In face of these hardships the -courage and determination of the troops of the 56th Division never -faltered, although at one time Capt. Newnham felt impelled to write -that, “although wiring has been much strengthened, actual -consolidation is impossible owing to the frozen ground. The garrison -feel they are occupying shell traps. Battalions are on the defensive -and not offensive, and the _moral_ of the men is suffering. At the -same time our existing defences are falling into disrepair.” In spite -of this dictum the men succeeded, after it was written, in driving off -four severe attacks, but it gives an indication of the desperate -conditions under which the 56th Division carried out an aggressive -policy. - -All this work drew from the Corps Commander a personal letter to Gen. -Hull: - - “I should be glad if you would convey, to the troops of the - division under your command, my appreciation of the - operations they have carried out so successfully during the - last month in establishing posts in the German front line, - and holding them in spite of heavy bombardments and hostile - infantry attacks. - - The effects of the operations are much greater than the - troops that took part in them are probably aware of. They 109 - have shown the enemy the offensive and enterprising spirit - displayed by our troops, and have encouraged other British - formations to adopt similar tactics which will have a - far-reaching effect. - - Brig.-Gens. Loch and Freeth, who conducted the operations at - different periods when you were acting in command of the - Corps, deserve credit for the determined manner in which - they continued the pressure against the enemy in spite of - serious opposition. The various counter-attacks by our - troops, immediately delivered without waiting for any - further orders and simply adhering to the plan laid down by - you, show a fine military spirit on the part of officers and - men of the battalions engaged. - - I was particularly pleased with the action of the scouts of - the 1st London Regt. who went across No Man’s Land in - daylight on the 14th January, and with the prompt action of - “B” Company, Queen Victoria’s Rifles, under Capt. Brand, on - the night of January 22nd/23rd, when the posts were - attacked. Also with “A” and “B” Companies of the London - Rifle Brigade, under Lieut. Prior and 2/Lieut. Rose, who - held Enfield and Barnet Posts in the enemy lines on the - night of January 24/25th, when their posts were shelled with - lachrymatory shells and our men had to wear respirators. - These posts were then heavily attacked, and the supporting - platoons quickly traversed No Man’s Land before the hostile - barrage was put down. I am also glad that the artillery - support on all occasions throughout these operations has - been prompt and effective. - - R. HAKING, Lieutenant-General, - Commanding XI Corps. - - _3rd February, 1917._” - -The division then settled down to more ordinary trench routine; but -the active season was approaching. - - * * * * * - -Although the first day of the new year seems to mark a definite break 110 -in time, no such break was obvious to the British troops in France and -Belgium. Sir Douglas Haig was determined to seize every favourable -opportunity to push the advantage that had been won at the battle of -the Somme. Between the Ancre and the Scarpe valleys the enemy was in a -very pronounced salient. A series of operations were undertaken -against the flank of this salient, commencing in November 1916. It -was, however, necessary to wait on the weather, and although some -valuable positions were captured, real advance was not made until -January, when actions were won and ground gained at Beaumont Hamel, -Grandcourt, Miraumont, Serre, Gommecourt, and Irles. These successes -opened the way for a big operation against the Le Transloy-Loupart -line. The enemy then made his celebrated retreat to the Hindenburg -Line. This line branched off from the original German defences near -Arras, ran south-east for twelve miles to Quéant, and then west of -Cambrai towards St. Quentin. - -The opening of the new year is a most interesting study. The Germans -were beginning to feel the lack of men. Their retreat was decided upon -for the purpose of shortening their line and avoiding a battle. They -knew it would require months of preparation before an army could -advance to the attack across the wide area which they had -systematically laid waste. Here at least they reckoned on a breathing -space. And in Germany itself the Hindenburg programme for production -was coming into operation--everywhere they were carefully going over -their resources and reorganising. - -England reached, in 1917, the height of her fighting power as regards 111 -the number of divisions, and this was known to the enemy. So he waited -with some anxiety for developments on the Western Front. - -The Germans had started their unrestricted submarine campaign, from -which they hoped to gain much benefit, but, on the other hand, they -were nervous of Russia--and Russia complicated the situation. - -Ludendorff writes: - - “How often had I not hoped for a revolution in Russia in - order that our military burden might be alleviated! But my - desire had been merely a castle in the air. Now it had come - true and as a surprise. It felt as though a weight had been - removed from my chest.” - -The revolution in Russia took place in March, and so, right at the -beginning of what promised to be an ominous year for the Germans, they -were able, by a stroke of fortune, to save ammunition in the East, and -to transfer fresh divisions from the East to the West, and let their -worn-out divisions deal with the Russians. - -The Entente Powers, however, had no reason to feel more than -disappointment, as they dealt the Central Powers a blow by the capture -of Baghdad; and although they had no immediate support from America, -that country declared war on Germany as a result of the submarine -policy adopted. - -The 56th Division opened the new year in very fair strength, as the -following return will show: - - Officers. Other Ranks. - Divisional Headquarters 22 103 - 167th Brigade Headquarters 2 3 - 1st London Regt. 34 1,028 - 3rd London Regt. 32 1,066 - 8th Middlesex Regt. 22 1,051 - 167th Machine Gun Coy. 11 171 112 - 168th Brigade Headquarters 7 25 - 4th London Regt. 40 1,003 - 12th London Regt. 47 1,073 - 13th London Regt. 38 1,043 - 14th London Regt. 37 963 - 168th Machine Gun Coy. 11 165 - 169th Brigade Headquarters 8 26 - 2nd London Regt. 41 1,012 - 5th London Regt. 35 1,052 - 9th London Regt. 34 1,030 - 16th London Regt. 39 975 - 169th Machine Gun Coy. 11 182 - 5th Cheshire Regt. 38 890 - 193rd Machine Gun Coy. 10 174 - 56th Divisional Artillery Headquarters 4 19 - 280th Brigade R.F.A. 29 756 - 281st Brigade R.F.A. 26 748 - 282nd Brigade R.F.A. 28 705 - D.A.C. 24 806 - 56th Divisional R.E. Headquarters 2 10 - 416th Edinburgh Field Coy. 10 210 - 512th London Field Coy. 10 212 - 513th London Field Coy. 10 218 - Divisional Signals 6 212 - Divisional Train 18 388 - Medical Units 26 573 - Mobile Veterinary 1 23 - -But soon after New Year’s Day the artillery was reorganised. The 56th -Divisional Artillery became two brigades (280th and 281st), each of -three (six-gun) 18-pounder batteries, and one (six-gun) howitzer -battery. For this purpose A/282 Howitzer Battery was split up, one -section going to D/280 and one to D/281. The 282nd Brigade, under the -new organisation, became an Army Field Artillery Brigade, and to bring -it up to strength it absorbed “B” Battery, 126th Brigade, and one -section of “D” Battery, 126th Brigade. This battery and section came -from the 37th Division. - -In the big operations which were soon to take place, Gen. Hull had 113 -Lieut.-Col. Packenham to help him as G.S.O.1. - - * * * * * - -Although we say the division went back to ordinary trench warfare -after January, it must not be thought that the policy of aggression -had been abandoned. The enemy lines were constantly visited and found -on most occasions to be empty. But the 13th London Regt., the -Kensingtons, secured five prisoners of the 13th Bavarian Regt., and -killed about forty on one occasion; and the London Rifle Brigade -obtained identification and killed three in a subsequent raid. The -enemy also made one attempt, and entered our line between two posts, -but the posts attacked him vigorously and drove him out, after killing -three of the party, who proved to be of the 13th Bavarian Regt. - -On the 6th March the line was handed over to the 49th Division, and -the 56th Division left the First Army and was transferred to the VII -Corps (Snow), Third Army. Brigades marched back to the Flers area, -Divisional Headquarters being at Le Cauroy, and battalions scattered -about the country between Frevent and St. Pol, in the villages of -Beauvois, Hernicourt, Croisette, Pronay, Siracourt, Blangermont, -Blangerol, Guinecourt, Héricourt, Framecourt, Petit Houvin, Nuncy, -Haute Côte, Sibiville, Séricourt, Honval, etc. - - - - - CHAPTER IV 114 - - THE BATTLES OF ARRAS, 1917 - - THE FIRST BATTLE OF THE SCARPE, 1917--THE THIRD BATTLE OF - THE SCARPE--MINOR ACTIONS - - -The Germans had commenced their retreat, and we know that the British -Higher Command had planned large movements. On the 14th March the -169th Brigade took over the front line between Achicourt and Agny, to -the south of Arras, with the 30th Division on the right and the 14th -Division on the left. Two days after a number of fires were seen in -the enemy lines to the south. The Hun was moving, but patrols found -him very alert on their immediate front. - -Brig.-Gen. Coke, 169th Brigade, went round his line on the 15th March, -and the diary notes that “trenches in a shocking condition, full of -mud and dirt”! It was a normal condition for trenches, and one might -well be excused for wondering if the Italians or the forces in -Salonica fared any better in this respect. Did they find mud on the -top of a real mountain? Maybe their position was always in the valley, -in the centre of a stream! - -As usual, patrols were out on the night of the 17th (the patrolling of -the 56th Division is worthy of great praise) and noticed nothing in -particular. But some scouts of the 2nd London Regt., lying close to -the enemy wire as dawn was breaking on the 18th, came to the -conclusion that the enemy line was not normal. They investigated and 115 -found it empty. This was promptly reported to the company commander, -who sent out strong fighting patrols and occupied the front line. - -Officers in the line acted with the greatest promptitude. Brigades on -either side were quick to follow the example of the 2nd London Regt., -and all Headquarters were buzzing with excitement, although the -situation, in view of what was happening farther south, was not -unexpected. - -By midday the 2nd London Regt. had occupied Beaurains. The whole Corps -was ordered to advance; the German second line was occupied, and on -the left the 14th Division were in the third line. The Corps order for -the advance, however, was cautious. It pointed out the probability of -the enemy withdrawing to a main line of defence, Telegraph Hill, and -the east half of Neuville Vitasse. The 169th Brigade were to keep -touch with the enemy, but Brig.-Gen. Coke must avoid becoming involved -in a serious engagement at present. - -By the early morning of the 19th March patrols had established the -fact that the enemy were indeed holding Neuville Vitasse, and on the -left he was found at Tilloy, the Harp, Telegraph Hill, and Nice -Trench. Troops remained in front of Neuville Vitasse and constructed -advance trenches. - -We have pointed out the salient, between the Ancre and the Scarpe, -which was the result of the battles of the Somme; and we have -mentioned the actions that had been fought on the right of this -salient in preparation to a bigger operation. It was the intention of -Sir Douglas Haig to attack the salient from both sides--the Fifth Army -in the south operating on the Ancre Front, and the Third Army about 116 -Arras. The plan included the pinching off of the whole area, and on -the north of the Scarpe the capture of the Vimy Ridge. This latter -operation was the task of the First Army. - -So far as the Fifth Army was concerned, the German retreat had avoided -a battle, but on the Third Army front their retirement must be -limited, as the enemy had no intention of giving up the Vimy Ridge on -our First Army front. Indeed, there was no retirement on the left of -the VII Corps, just south of Arras, which was the flank of the -Hindenburg Line. - -But adjustments and new orders were necessary to meet the situation. -It was most desirable to attract as many enemy troops to our front -before the French offensive was launched in the south, and so the -Fifth Army was ordered to follow the enemy closely to the Hindenburg -Line, where it would exert the greatest pressure, and the Third and -First Armies would, with slight modifications of detail, carry out the -original attack as planned on their front. - -The VII Corps was the most affected. The objectives of the Third Army -had been Mercatel, Hill 90, the German third-line system from Feuchy -Chapel, and the high ground about Monchy. The effect of the enemy -withdrawals on the VII Corps front was - - “to change our task from an attack in a south-easterly - direction from prepared positions, to an attack in an - easterly and north-easterly direction from improvised - positions. But the objects of the attack remain the same; - that is, to break through the enemy’s defensive line on the - right of the Third Army front, to overrun all his defences - as far as the Green Line (the far side of the Cojeul River), - and to clear and hold the southern side of the gap which the 117 - VI Corps, advancing simultaneously with us, will have made.” - -The VII Corps front was held by the 21st, 30th, 56th, and 14th -Divisions in line, with the 50th in reserve. On the right the 21st -Division had a very small rôle allotted to it. The first attack was to -be delivered by the 56th and 14th Divisions with the VI Corps on their -left (no German retreat had taken place here), and gradually the 30th -and then the 21st Divisions would take part in the advance. - -The first phase of the planned attack gave to the 56th Division the -task of capturing Neuville Vitasse (the 30th would conform on the -right, but even so would not approach the enemy main line), and to the -14th Division the piercing of the extreme left of the Hindenburg Line -and part of the Harp; the 3rd Division, VI Corps, on the left would -capture Tilloy. - -The second phase placed the right of the 30th Division on the south of -the Cojeul River and in possession of St. Martin-sur-Cojeul, and the -left through the Hindenburg (Cojeul Switch) Line, while the 56th and -14th would be in front of Wancourt. - -The 56th and 14th Divisions were not to go beyond Nepal Trench, as the -30th Division, pushing up from the south-west, would cross their front -and, passing entirely to the south bank of the Cojeul, would join -hands with the troops of the VI Corps east of Guemappe. The 21st -Division would contribute to the flank thus formed with its right -standing fast on Croisilles. - -After this Green Line, as it was called, there was the usual hopeful -reference to a distant objective, Cambrai, and some talk of cavalry, -no doubt a necessary provision, but one which, nevertheless, was 118 -greeted with hilarity. One thing, however, seems very certain: the -German retreat caused very little inconvenience to the Third Army, and -none at all to the First. - -Preparations for the attack on the Third Army front were carried on -swiftly. The enemy made no further move, but to the south, where he -had many miles to go before reaching the Hindenburg Line, he was still -being closely pursued by the Fifth Army. By the 2nd April the general -line was Sélency, Jeancourt, Epéhy, Royaulcourt, Doignies, Mercatel, -Beaurains. Between Sélency and Doignies the enemy still held positions -in advance of the Hindenburg Line, and minor engagements were -continually taking place on this section of the front. - -On the night of the 1st April the 167th and 168th Brigades relieved -the 169th Brigade in the front line. The bombardment of the enemy -positions commenced on the 4th, and was carried on for five days. -Meanwhile troops could study the country they were to attack. - -While the 169th Brigade had been in the line, training had been -carried on extensively by the other two brigades. Some of the -instructions and arrangements are worthy of note. For the men, open -fighting was the main practice. Regimental officers were told that - - “it must be realised that the maintenance of forward - movement depends on the determination and power of direction - of sections, platoons, companies, and battalions. The habit - of digging a trench and getting into it, or of waiting for - scientifically-arranged artillery barrages before advancing, - must be discarded. A slow advance will give time for the 119 - German reinforcements to arrive--the greater the rapidity of - an advance the more is resistance likely to lessen. A few - sticky company commanders may not only delay the whole - operation but, by giving the enemy time to reinforce, will - also cause unnecessary casualties.” - -We quote this for comparison with other instructions given at a later -date. There is nothing new in it, and nothing to criticise in it, but -man is a lover of precedent, and trench warfare, and failure to get -through to open fighting, was the precedent established for him. - -Very interesting instructions were issued on the subject of signals -between infantry and artillery. One of the most curious facts of the -war was the general lack of communication between attacking infantry -and artillery. True, the infantryman in the front line is not always -in the best position to direct artillery fire, but, on the other hand, -he is frequently the only man who knows anything at all. We learned, -to our cost, the excellence of the German control of artillery fire, -and though our artillery observation officers performed the most -gallant feats, our method never seemed as good as that of the enemy. -The instructions issued were in imitation of the German method. -Coloured lights were to be fired from any sort of pistol. Green lights -were to mean “open fire,” and white lights “increase the range.” These -were the only signals to be employed, either by the Forward -Observation Officer or by the infantry. The plan does not appear to -have answered very well. - -There were also definite instructions as to the strength of battalions -and the number of officers, non-commissioned officers, and men to be 120 -left out of the fight. We must deal with that in another place, merely -noting here that platoons were now made up of one rifle section, one -Lewis-gun section, one bombing section, and one rifle grenade section, -and that a Divisional Depot Battalion was formed at Bouquemaison, -where all details left out of the battle were sent. The Depot -Battalion ensured a number of trained reinforcements being available. - -We have left the 167th and 168th Brigades looking at Neuville Vitasse. -The way to that heap of ruins seemed clear, with the exception of a -strong point, Neuville Mill, situated on the right and in a position -to enfilade the attacking troops. On the 7th the 1st London Regt. -attempted to capture the place, but found it well defended with -machine guns, and failed. It was decided to deal with it by means of -Tanks. - -The attack launched by the Third and First Armies on the morning of -the 9th April was on a front of fifteen miles, from Croisilles to the -northern foot of the Vimy Ridge. It included between four and five -miles of the Hindenburg Line. - -The 56th Division attacked with the 167th Brigade on the right, having -the 3rd London Regt. and 8th Middlesex Regt. in line, with the 1st -London Regt. in support and the 7th Middlesex in reserve; the 168th -Brigade was on the left, with the 13th and 12th London Regts. in line, -the 14th in support, and the 4th in reserve. The Edinburgh Field Coy. -R.E. (less two sections) were with the right brigade, and the 513th -Field Coy. R.E. (less two sections), one company of the 5th Cheshires, -and two sections of the 193rd Divisional M.G. Coy. with the left -brigade. As the whole success of the operation depended on the 14th 121 -Division, the left brigade had to be prepared to make a defensive -flank--hence the machine guns and pioneers. - -The method of attack was what was sometimes called leap-frog. The two -battalions in line on each brigade front were to capture Pine Lane and -Neuville Vitasse, and then the supporting battalion would “go through” -them and capture the second defence, which was the Hindenburg, or -Cojeul Switch. In the case of the 167th Brigade, the reserve -battalion, the 7th Middlesex, were to carry on the game of leap-frog -and capture Nepal Trench. - -The weather up to this point had been fine, but on the morning of the -9th dark clouds rolled up, bringing heavy showers. The attack was -started by the Corps on the left. The 56th Division moved to the -assault at 7.45 a.m. - -The first phase of the attack was the capture of Neuville Vitasse. The -3rd London Regt., on the right, progressed well--two Tanks worked on -this battalion front and dealt with the strong point, Neuville -Mill--and at 10 a.m. had reached their first objective--that is to -say, they were in a position short of the Hindenburg Line. The 8th -Middlesex Regt. were delayed at first by uncut wire, but soon entered -the ruined village. Just before reaching the site of the church they -found themselves confronted by a “pocket” of determined Germans with -several machine guns. Working round the flanks of this “pocket,” -bombers and riflemen succeeded in enveloping the enemy, so that just -before eleven o’clock sixty-eight survivors surrendered with four -machine guns. The battalion then cleared the rest of Neuville Vitasse 122 -and were in touch with the 3rd London Regt. - -The Kensingtons swept through the enemy front line with little -opposition, and soon reached Moss Trench. Their reserve company, -seeing that all was well, moved south into the village and rendered -some assistance to the 8th Middlesex. - -On the extreme left of the divisional line the 12th London Regt., -after going through the first line, met some uncut wire which delayed -them, but soon after ten o’clock they were in touch with the -Kensingtons in Moss Trench, although their left was thrown back owing -to the right of the 14th Division being held up by uncut wire. - -Of the two Tanks on the 168th Brigade front, which were supposed to -work round the north of the village, only one ever started, and very -soon that one was on fire. - -Meanwhile the artillery, the 281st, 293rd, and “C” Battery of the -232nd Brigades, had moved across the old German line and taken -positions, about a thousand yards west of Neuville Vitasse, by ten -o’clock. (It will be noticed that the artillery was “grouped” again.) - -Everything was therefore ready for the assault on the northern -extremity of the Hindenburg Line, and an advance to Nepal Trench. -This, as we have said, was to be done by the 14th and 1st London -Regts., who were the supporting battalions to each brigade. - -The general plan at this point was that the 14th and 56th Divisions -should attack simultaneously, and the 30th Division, on the right, was -to follow in echelon. Not until the 7th Middlesex Regt.--which was in -reserve to the 167th Brigade, and was detailed to attack and capture 123 -Nepal Trench after the Hindenburg Line had been made secure--had -passed Neuville Vitasse was the 30th Division to move. As the fighting -on this right flank of the 56th Division was the most severe, we will -deal first with the left flank. - -The attack started at 12.10 p.m., and the London Scottish, passing -through the Kensingtons and 12th London Regt., were soon engaged in -some lively fighting which lasted about two hours. They killed a -number of the enemy, captured 100 of them and one machine gun, and -overran the mass of trenches by 1,000 yards. On their left they were -in touch with the 14th Division, but their right was in the air. As -the 167th Brigade had not progressed so well, the London Scottish -position was not too good. - -On the right of the 56th Division the situation was obscure. The 30th -Division--timed to advance after the 167th Brigade--had failed, and -this failure enabled the enemy in Egg and the adjacent trenches to -give their undivided attention to the flank of the 56th Division. The -attack was held up. - -Gen. Hull had foreseen strong opposition in this direction, and had -given Brig.-Gen. Freeth the 4th London Regt., the reserve battalion of -the 168th Brigade, and the Queen Victoria’s Rifles from the 169th -Brigade. So when it was seen that the 1st London Regt. had failed to -make progress, the 7th Middlesex and 4th London Regts. were launched. -Some progress was made, but casualties were heavy, and the position -remained uncertain and enveloped in a fog of rumour. - -In order to give more stability to the line, Brig.-Gen. Loch, 168th -Brigade, ordered the Kensingtons forward into that part of the -Hindenburg Line which the London Scottish had captured, and the latter 124 -battalion to withdraw from their forward position and reorganise. - -The situation at 6 p.m. is shown (_A_) on map. - -But the 14th Division, on the left, ordered an assault of the Wancourt -Line at 6.45 p.m., which attack, owing no doubt to the situation on -the 56th and 30th Divisional fronts, failed. - -Soon after ten o’clock that night (9th April) the Corps ordered the -assault of the Wancourt Line to take place at eight the following -morning, but Gen. Hull pointed out that fighting was still going on, -that the situation would not be clear until daylight, and that his -division would not be able to attack at that hour. The order was, -therefore, amended so that the attack should take place when the -situation on the 56th and 14th Divisional fronts was clear. - -In the darkness of the night the 167th Brigade troops bombed the -Germans out of all of the Hindenburg Line on their front, but they -were still giving much trouble from the 30th Division area. The London -Scottish were now able to advance again on the left and get in touch -with the 14th Division about 15. - -The position did not seem too favourable unless something was done on -the right, but at 10.45 a.m. the Corps issued a more ambitious order: -that the attack was to be carried on to the east of Guemappe. - -At midday the attack was launched, but now the whole direction was -altered. The left of the line, advancing on Wancourt, was held up, and -the right, in order to get elbow room, was forced to clear the -Hindenburg Line on the 30th Division front. In this maze of trenches -the 167th Brigade made steady progress towards the junction of the -Hindenburg and Wancourt Lines. This was good work, and the Corps 125 -ordered the occupation of Hill 90, on the far side of the Wancourt -Line. Gen. Hull, however, informed the Corps that it could not be done -that night. - -On the left the position was as uncertain as it had been the previous -day on the right. The 14th Division claimed to be in the Wancourt -Line, and eventually it was found that they had swerved to their left -and created a large gap between their right and the left of the London -Scottish, who were lying out in the open. - -So the situation (_B_) remained through the night. The next day, -the 11th, nothing was done on the left of the line, but the 167th -Brigade carried on their good work and the Queen Victoria’s Rifles -cleared the Hindenburg Line as far as the Cojeul River, and a long -length of Nepal Trench, which was part of the Wancourt Line. The -difficulty of the 30th Division was apparently uncut wire. They seemed -to be stuck facing the Hindenburg Line, while the Queen Victoria’s -Rifles cleared it. A Corps telegram to this division reads: - - “Not satisfied that the infantry are receiving sufficient - support from the artillery. The situation demands that as - many batteries as possible be pushed forward so that enemy - machine guns be dealt with at decisive range.” - -The 167th were relieved by the 169th Brigade late in the afternoon, -after three days of very severe and successful fighting. - -The 169th Brigade were ordered to consolidate Hill 90 and to push -patrols into Heninel, and later, when the 30th Division had occupied 126 -the Hindenburg Line, to cross the River Cojeul and make good the high -ground to the south. - -The attack ordered started at 5.15 a.m. on the 12th, and after stiff -bombing fights, the 2nd and 5th London Regts., working to the north -and south of Hill 90, joined hands on the other side of it. It was -found necessary, during this operation, to have a password, so that -converging parties should not bomb each other. To the great amusement -of the men the words “Rum jar” were chosen. The Germans, being bombed -from both sides, must have thought it an odd slogan. The enemy were -then seen withdrawing from Heninel, and the leading company of the 2nd -London Regt. immediately advanced and occupied the village. The 30th -Division then crossed to the south of the Cojeul River, and made -progress along the Hindenburg Line. Meanwhile the 2nd London Regt. had -pushed forward patrols and occupied the high ground to the east of -Heninel, where they got in touch with the 30th Division. - -The occupation of Hill 90, which had been made possible by the 167th -Brigade and the Queen Victoria’s Rifles (attached), also caused the -enemy to vacate the village of Wancourt, which was entered by patrols -of the London Rifle Brigade about eleven o’clock. The 14th Division -moved two battalions, one on either side of the village, with a view -to continuing the advance to the high ground east of the Cojeul River, -and at 1 p.m. the Corps ordered the advance to be continued to the -Sensée River; but these orders were modified and the 56th Division was -told to consolidate (_C_) and prepare for an advance on the 13th. - -On the 13th April nothing much was done. The 56th Division held the 127 -ridge from 35 to Wancourt Tower; on the right the 33rd Division, which -had relieved the 30th, failed to advance; on the left the 50th -Division, which had relieved the 14th on the preceding night, also -failed to advance, having been held up by machine-gun fire from -Guemappe. But the Corps ordered a general advance on the next day, the -objective being the line of the Sensée River. - -During the night the enemy blew up Wancourt Tower, which seemed to -suggest that he was contemplating retirement. At 5.30 a.m. our attack -was launched, but almost at once the 169th Brigade reported that the -Queen’s Westminster Rifles had gone forward with no one on their left. -About five hundred yards in front of them were some practice trenches -which the enemy had used for bombing. Capt. Newnham writes of the -attack dissolving about the line of these trenches. Apparently -Guemappe had not been taken on the left, and a perfect hail of -machine-gun fire enfiladed the advancing troops from this village. The -Queen Victoria’s Rifles, who attacked on the right, met with no better -fate, the leading waves being wiped out. From the diary of 169th -Brigade we learn that - - “the 151st Brigade attack on our left never developed, - leaving our flank exposed. Enemy met with in considerable - strength; they had just brought up fresh troops, and the - allotment of machine guns, according to prisoners, was two - per battalion. The 151st Brigade attack was ordered with - their left flank on Wancourt Tower, which was our left and - the dividing-line between brigades. Great confusion - consequently on our left front, where two battalions of - Durhams were mixed up with the Queen’s Westminster Rifles, - and the London Rifle Brigade, moving up in support, added to 128 - the congestion. Casualties were heavy--Queen’s Westminster - Rifles, 12 officers, 300 other ranks; Queen Victoria’s - Rifles, 15 officers and 400 other ranks.” - -The attack had not, however, dissolved at all points, as a thin line -of troops undoubtedly advanced a thousand yards, and more, beyond the -practice trenches. But these gallant fellows soon found themselves in -a very lonely position, and as the 30th and 50th Divisions failed to -make any ground at all, they had Germans practically on all sides of -them. They remained for some time and eventually withdrew. - -The next two days, the 15th and 16th, were occupied in consolidating -the ground gained. The division had alarms of counter-attack, but -nothing developed on their front. On the left, however, the enemy -attacked and recaptured Wancourt Tower from the 50th Division. This -point was not retaken by us until the next day, but the 56th Division -were not concerned. Further advance was postponed until the 22nd -April, and on the 18th the 30th Division took over the line from the -56th Division. - -This was the opening battle of the Arras series, and is known as the -First Battle of the Scarpe, 1917, and is linked up with the Battle of -Vimy Ridge. The student would do well to consider the two battles as -one. The capture of Vimy Ridge by the Canadians, and of Monchy by -troops of the Third Army, gave us positions of great importance and -improved the situation round Arras. The feeling of the 56th Division -was that it had been a great fight, and that they had proved -themselves undoubtedly better men than the Germans. The capture of -Neuville Vitasse and subsequent rolling up of the Hindenburg Line to 129 -the south of Heninel was a feat of which they felt proud. And they had -killed a lot of the enemy at close quarters. - -It is an interesting battle, as it undoubtedly inflicted a terrifying -defeat on the enemy. Ludendorff says of it[4]: - - “The 10th April and the following days were critical. The - consequences of a break through, of 12 to 15 kilometres wide - and 6 or more kilometres deep, are not easy to meet. In view - of the heavy losses in men, guns, and ammunition resulting - from such a break through, colossal efforts are needed to - make good the damage.... A day like 9th April threw all - calculations to the winds. Many days had to pass before a - line could really be formed and consolidated. The end of the - crisis, even if troops were available, depended very - largely, as it generally does in such cases, on whether the - enemy, after his first victory, would attack again, and by - further success aggravate the difficulty of forming a new - line. Our position having been weakened, such victories were - to be won only too easily....” - -Hindenburg also confesses to very anxious moments, and suggests that -“the English did not seem to have known how to exploit the success -they had gained to the full.” - -In his dispatch on this battle Sir Douglas Haig said that: - - “With the forces at my disposal, even combined with what the - French proposed to undertake in co-operation, I did not - consider that any great strategical results were likely to be 130 - gained by following up a success on the front about Arras, - and to the south of it, beyond the capture of the objectives - aimed at.... It was therefore my intention to transfer my - main offensive to another part of the front after these - objectives had been secured. - - The front selected for these operations was in Flanders. - They were to be commenced as soon as possible after the - Arras offensive, and continued throughout the summer, so far - as the forces at my disposal would permit.” - -It must be remembered that the plans for the year were drawn up in -consultation with our Allies, and the battles of Arras must be taken -as a part only of those plans. The First and Third Armies secured -positions which Sir Douglas Haig intended that they should secure; -they inflicted great loss on the enemy, more than 13,000 prisoners and -over 200 guns; they drew German reserves until at the end of the -operations there were twice as many enemy troops on that front as at -the beginning, which materially helped our Allies, who were on the -point of launching a big offensive on the Aisne and in Champagne. On -the whole, these battles fulfilled their object and may be viewed with -satisfaction. - -On the 16th April the French attacked the Chemin-des-Dames, north-west -of Rheims, and in the Champagne, south of Rheims. They met with very -heavy losses and most obstinate resistance. These were the -much-discussed operations under Gen. Nivelle, and, in order to assist, -Sir Douglas Haig agreed to continue the operations round Arras longer -than was his first intention. Plans, which had been made for a -rearrangement of artillery and troops for the operations at Ypres, 131 -were cancelled, and orders were issued for a continuance, with shallow -objectives, of the fighting at Arras. - -The First Battle of the Scarpe and the Battle of Vimy Ridge were, -therefore, the original scheme, and the subsequent battles should be -considered with this fact in mind. They were: the Second Battle of the -Scarpe, 1917, 23rd-24th April; the Battle of Arleux, 28th-29th April; -the Third Battle of the Scarpe, 1917, 3rd-4th May. The Battle of -Bullecourt, 3rd-17th May, and a number of actions must also be -included in the subsequent Arras offensive. - -A few days’ rest was granted to the 56th Division. The 167th Brigade -was round Pommier, the 168th round Couin, the 169th round Souastre. -Divisional Headquarters were first at Couin and then at Hauteville. On -the 25th Gen. Hull was ordered to hold himself in readiness to move -into either the VI or the VII Corps, and the next day was definitely -ordered into the VI Corps. On the 27th the 167th Brigade relieved the -15th Division in the front line, and Divisional Headquarters opened in -Rue de la Paix, Arras. - - * * * * * - -From the Harp, which it will be remembered was the original line, to -east of Monchy there runs a ridge of an average height of 100 metres; -at Monchy itself it rises above 110 metres. This ridge shoots out a -number of spurs towards the Cojeul River to the south. The position -taken over by the 167th Brigade was from a small copse south-east of -Monchy to the Arras-Cambrai road, about 500 yards from the Cojeul, and -on the reverse slope of one of these spurs. Observation for them was 132 -bad, and the enemy trenches were well sited and frequently over the -crest of the hill. - -On the 29th the 169th Brigade took over the right of the line from the -167th. The front line was then held by the London Rifle Brigade, the -2nd London Regt., the 1st London Regt., and the 7th Middlesex -Regiment. The Queen Victoria’s Rifles were in support of the Queen’s -Westminster Rifles in reserve to the right brigade, and the 3rd London -Regt. in support and the 8th Middlesex Regt. in reserve to the left -brigade. - -With a view to the important operations which the French were to carry -out on the 5th May, it was decided to attack on an extended front at -Arras on the 3rd. While the Third and First Armies attacked from -Fontaine-les-Croisilles to Fresnoy, the Fifth Army launched an attack -on the Hindenburg Line about Bullecourt. This gave a total front of -over sixteen miles. [The Third Battle of the Scarpe, 1917.] - -Zero hour was 3.45 a.m., and in the darkness, illumined by wavering -star-shells fired by a startled enemy, and with the crashing of the -barrage, the men of the 56th Division advanced from their assembly -trenches. As soon as the first waves topped the crest, they were met -with a withering machine-gun and rifle fire. The ground was confusing -and the darkness intense--officers, as was so often the case in night -attacks, found it impossible to direct their men. Exactly what -happened will never be known in detail. No reports came in for a -considerable time. - -With daylight the artillery observation officers began to communicate -with headquarters. Our men, they said, had advanced 1,000 yards on 133 -the right, and were digging in near a factory (Rohart) on the bank of -the Cojeul, and the 14th Division on their right seemed to have -reached its objectives. About 300 yards over the crest of the spur was -a trench known as Tool, and this seemed to be occupied by the enemy. - -Soon after this the 169th Brigade reported that the London Rifle -Brigade were holding a pit near the factory and a trench about the -same place; the 2nd London Regt. had a footing in Tool Trench. The -latter position is doubtful, but the 2nd Londons were well forward. - -Cavalry Farm, near and to the right of the original line, was still -held by the enemy, and about 10 o’clock the Queen Victoria’s Rifles, -after a short bombardment by the Stokes mortars, rushed and secured -the farm. They found a number of dugouts, which they bombed, and -secured 22 prisoners. The farm was connected with Tool Trench, and -they proceeded to bomb their way up it. It would appear, therefore, -that the 2nd London Regt. held a small section of this trench farther -to the north, if any at all. - -We must now follow the 167th Brigade on the left. The two attacking -battalions had been met with even worse machine-gun fire than the -169th Brigade. There was no news of them for a long time. It is clear -that neither the 1st London Regt. nor the 7th Middlesex ever held any -of Tool Trench, but a few gallant parties did undoubtedly overrun -Tool, and, crossing a sunken road known as Stirrup Lane, reached -Lanyard Trench, quite a short distance from the men of the London -Rifle Brigade, who had lodged themselves in the pit near Rohart -Factory. They were, however, not in sufficient numbers to join hands 134 -with the London Rifle Brigade, or some small groups of the 2nd London, -who were also in advanced shell-holes, and about 8 o’clock in the -evening were forced to surrender. (A small party was seen marching -east without arms.) The remaining 1st London and 7th Middlesex men lay -out in shell-holes in front of Tool Trench. - -Soon after the Queen Victoria’s Rifles had captured Cavalry Farm and -started to bomb up Tool Trench, with the forward artillery and trench -mortars helping them, the 3rd Division on the left of the 56th -declared that their men were in the northern end of Tool. They asked -that the artillery should be lifted off the trench, as they were going -to bomb down towards the Queen Victoria’s Rifles. But it appears that -they were very soon driven out, as by 3 p.m. the 3rd Division were -definitely reported to be in touch with the 7th Middlesex in the -original line. - -Meanwhile the 14th Division, on the right, which had made good -progress at the start, had been violently counter-attacked, and at -11.50 a.m. reported that they had been driven back to their original -line. - -Brig.-Gen. Coke, of the 169th Brigade, now found his men in a queer -position. The troops on either flank of his brigade were back in the -line they had started from; he ascertained that none of his brigade -were north of the Arras-Cambrai road, and so he held a long tongue in -the valley of the Cojeul open to attack from the high ground on either -side of it. - - [Illustration: _4. THE BATTLES OF ARRAS 1917._] - - [Illustration: _4. THE BATTLES OF ARRAS 1917._] - -Much movement by the enemy was observed during the afternoon; -reinforcements were assembling in Tool and the sunken road behind it. -About 10 o’clock in the evening the Germans started a fierce 135 -bombardment of the tongue of land held by the London Rifle Brigades -and 2nd London Regts., and, after an hour of ceaseless fire, -counter-attacked and drove the troops back to their original lines. - -Gen. Hull then ordered them to hold their original line and -reorganise, but before the orders could reach them these two fine -battalions had attacked again and reoccupied all the positions they -had gained in the morning with the exception of Cavalry Farm. But they -were in a bad situation. With the enemy holding the Cambrai road in -force, the only communication with the advanced troops was down the -bottom of the valley, a place of much water and mud. Brig.-Gen. Coke -therefore withdrew his men just before sunrise. They brought with -them, however, a German officer and 15 men who had surrendered in the -neighbourhood of Cavalry Farm. - -It had been a day of very hard fighting, and the gain on the whole of -the sixteen miles of front attacked was Fresnoy, which had been taken -by the Canadians, and a portion of the Hindenburg Line, east of -Bullecourt, captured by the Australians. The enemy had been terribly -frightened by the successful start of the battles of Arras. Hindenburg -and Ludendorff were putting into effect their new system of holding -the front in depth, but thin in the forward zones, with many machine -guns, and strong supports for immediate counter-attack. It seemed as -though their system had broken down at the first test, and, as the -Russians were no longer a menace to them, they poured reinforcements -across Germany. But, as we know, this continuation of the offensive -was with the object of helping our Allies by holding troops and guns 136 -which might otherwise have been used against them. - -The 167th and 169th Brigades held the line for one day more, and were -relieved by the 168th on the 5th May. The latter brigade also took -over a stretch of extra line to the north. - -The enemy was exceedingly quiet and our patrols very active. If any -indication is wanted of the high _moral_ of the 56th Division, it can -be found in this patrol work. After an action of this kind, when the -two brigades lost just on a thousand men, really audacious -reconnoitring deserves the highest praise. Again and again attempts -were made by patrols to enter Tool Trench, only to find the enemy -alert. Cavalry Farm, on the right, and the copse, on the left, were -both entered and found unoccupied; but the exact position of the enemy -in Tool Trench was ascertained. - -Meanwhile the heavy artillery kept up a steady fire on Tool Trench, -causing large numbers of Germans to run over the open and seek safer -ground. And troops worked hard on our trenches, which were greatly -improved. - -At 8.30 p.m. on the 11th May the 4th London Regt. on the right and the -London Scottish on the left attacked Cavalry Farm and the trench on -the far side of it, and Tool Trench. - -A practice barrage on the previous day had drawn heavy fire in a few -minutes, and it had been decided not to have a barrage, but to keep -the heavy artillery firing steadily to the last minute. The enemy, who -held the line in full strength, were taken by surprise. Only Cavalry -Farm was visible from our line, and the 4th London Regt. swept into -this place with no difficulty. But the right of the enemy line was 137 -able to put up a fight, and the left company of the London Scottish -suffered somewhat severely. Except for this one point, the trench was -vacated by its garrison in a wild scramble. They could not, however, -escape the Lewis gunners and brigade machine-gunners, who did some -good execution. Quite a lot of the enemy were killed in the trench and -a round dozen taken prisoner--they were of the 128th Infantry Regt. -and the 5th Grenadier Regt. Eight machine guns were also found. - -Tool Trench was only a part of the enemy line which ran up the hill on -the east of Monchy. To the south of the copse it was Tool and to the -north it was Hook. The very northern end of Tool and all of Hook -remained in the hands of the enemy. A block was made by filling in -about forty yards of the trench and the new line was consolidated. - -The new line had been much damaged by our fire, but it was soon -reconstructed, and two communication trenches were dug to the old -line. Meanwhile the trench mortars kept up a steady bombardment of -Hook Trench, and snipers picked off the enemy as he attempted to seek -the safer shell-holes in the open. - -During the next few days several deserters from the 5th Grenadier -Regt. came in, and they, in common with other prisoners, persisted in -stating that the enemy was contemplating a retirement. Patrols, -however, always found Lanyard Trench and Hook fully garrisoned. The -167th Brigade had taken over the line from the 168th, and the 8th -Middlesex attempted to rush both Lanyard and Hook; this was not done -in force, but was more in the nature of a surprise by strong patrols. -They found the enemy too alert. - -On the 19th something in the nature of an attack in force was carried 138 -out. The 8th Middlesex made a night attack, in conjunction with the -29th Division, on Hook Trench and the support line behind it. The -Middlesex men gained the junction of Hook and Tool, but were very -“bunched”; the 187th Brigade on the left made no progress at all. It -is probable that the Middlesex were more to the left than they -imagined, as they were heavily bombed from both flanks, and eventually -forced to withdraw. - -On the 20th May the weary troops of the 56th Division were relieved by -the 37th Division. - -In these actions and in the battle on the 3rd May the objectives were -shallow and the enemy fully prepared to resist, with large -reinforcements of men and guns in the field. The enemy barrage was -considered the heaviest that had, as yet, been encountered. The -positions attacked were well sited and frequently masked, and there -was also the complication of night assaults at short notice. -Brig.-Gen. Freeth, in an interesting report of the battle on the 3rd, -says: - - “... Owing to the darkness it was extremely difficult for - the assaulting troops to keep direction or the correct - distances between waves. The tendency was for rear waves to - push forward too fast for fear of losing touch with the wave - in front of them. Consequently, by the time the leading wave - was approaching Tool Trench, all the rear waves had - telescoped into it. Even if Tool Trench had been taken, much - delay would have been caused in extricating and moving - forward waves allotted to the further objectives.” - -Anyone who has taken part in a night attack will appreciate these -difficulties. If it goes well it is very well, but if not the -confusion is appalling. - -The casualties from the 29th April to 21st May were 79 officers and 139 -2,022 other ranks. - -The general situation was that on the 5th May the French had delivered -their attack on the Chemin-des-Dames and achieved their object, but on -the whole the French offensive was disappointing. On the British -front, however, 19,500 prisoners and 257 guns had been captured, and -the situation round Arras greatly improved. The spring offensive was -at an end. - -But fighting did not cease round Arras and over the width of the sixty -square miles of regained country. The Messines attack in the north was -in course of preparation, and the orders to the Fifth, Third, and -First Armies were to continue operations, with the forces left to -them, with the object of keeping the enemy in doubt as to whether the -offensive would be continued. Objectives, of a limited nature, were to -be selected, and importance given to such actions by combining with -them feint attacks. They were successful in their object, but there -was bitter with the sweet, as Sir Douglas Haig writes: - - “These measures seem to have had considerable success, if - any weight may be attached to the enemy’s reports concerning - them. They involved, however, the disadvantage that I - frequently found myself unable to deny the German accounts - of the bloody repulse of extensive British attacks which, in - fact, never took place.” - -The attack on Messines was launched on the 7th June, and was a -complete success. With the first crash of our concentrated artillery -nineteen mines were exploded, and our troops swept forward all along -the line. By the evening 7,200 prisoners, 67 guns, 94 trench mortars, 140 -and 294 machine-guns had been captured. - -The 56th Division indulged in a little well-earned rest. We read of -sports and horse shows in the vicinity of Habarcq, of concerts given -by the “Bow Bells” concert party (formed in 1916 at Souastre), and -diaries have the welcome entries “troops resting” as the only event of -the day. But this was not for long. Battalions were soon back in the -line, though much reduced in strength. For the first time we find, in -spite of reinforcements, that the average strength of battalions fell -to just over eight hundred. - -The 169th Brigade lost Capt. Newnham, who went to the New Zealand -Division as G.S.O.2. He instituted a form of official diary which is a -delight to read--concise, but with occasional reflections of a dry, -humorous nature. Capt. Carden Roe, from the 29th Division, took his -place as Brigade Major. - -During the 9th, 10th, and 11th of June the division relieved the 61st -Division in the line. The position was the same--Tool Trench from the -copse, on the left, to Cavalry Farm, but it was extended to Wancourt -Tower on the right. - -The front now held measured 2,700 yards. Wancourt Tower was on the -summit of the high spur which runs parallel to the Cojeul River on the -south bank. The line can, then, be visualised stretching across the -valley, with right and left flanks of the division on the high ground -on either side of the river. From the right good observation was -obtained over the enemy lines on the left of the divisional front, and -from the copse, on the left of the line, similar observation could be -had over the enemy on the right. - -The 3rd Division was on the left of the 56th, and on the 14th June, at 141 -7.30 a.m., the former launched an attack on Hook Trench. The attack -was a complete success; the division came level with the 56th and -captured 175 prisoners. - -The right of the 56th Division was held by the Queen’s Westminster -Rifles, and a few minutes after five o’clock in the evening sentries -noticed enemy movement behind a wood (Bois du Vert) which was opposite -the 3rd Division and on the left flank of the 56th. Careful watching -revealed the massing of troops. A warning was sent over the telephone. -The 76th Brigade, immediately on the left of the 56th Division, was -informed, as was the artillery. - -Killing human beings is not dear to the heart of Englishmen. Green -troops would stand violent shelling, merely looking a bit tense about -the face, but although they saw their comrades fall, shattered to -pieces, or badly wounded, they would sometimes show a great -disinclination to fire on Germans walking in the open behind the enemy -lines. It seemed as though the idea was that the particular German in -question was not trying to injure them--he might have been carrying a -plank or a bag of rations--and so they would watch him and no one -would attempt to shoot unless there was an old soldier with them. This -frame of mind, however, did not last long. - -But the evening of the 14th June was an occasion for glee. The Hun was -going to attack and all was ready for him. At 5.30 the grey waves left -the enemy trenches, and at once a storm of artillery, machine-gun, and -rifle fire met them. The Queen’s Westminster Rifles, of course, could -not fire, but they watched the action with great joy, and kept Brigade -and Divisional Headquarters informed of every enemy move. The attack 142 -was smashed up and, thanks to the Queen’s Westminster Rifles, the -enemy was chased out of sight by the artillery. - -After this costly lesson the Germans tried a night attack on the 16th -at 2.30 a.m. This time they succeeded in entering two posts, but the -3rd Division drove them out and the men of the 56th inflicted heavy -casualties from the flank. - -Nothing more was done in this line beyond some skirmishing round a -post. The division was relieved on the 4th July and moved to the Le -Cauroy area. - - * * * * * - -We have said very little about the Divisional Artillery, but to follow -them too closely in these engagements would lead to confusion. They -supported the 56th Division during the battle of Arras--in the -original scheme--and when the division moved on the 20th April the -artillery remained where it was. Brig.-Gen. Elkington writes: - - “The 56th Divisional Artillery remained in the line in this - sector, under different C.R.A.s and covering different - divisions, and were not under my command again until the end - of May, as I remained with the 56th Division and commanded - the artillery covering them. All the divisional artilleries - became much mixed up, and very few of the C.R.A.s had their - own artillery under their own command.... - - On the 24th May the division moved to the Habarcq area, and - remained there until the 9th June. I established the R.A. - Headquarters at Beaumetz, so as to keep in touch with our - artillery, who were still in the line. At the end of May I - got four days’ leave and went to Paris with Hawkes, - Jorgensen, and Robinson, and we were joined there by Cols. - Groves and Lemon. We all had an excellent time, and 143 - enjoyed it immensely.... On the 5th July the 56th Divisional - Artillery returned to my command, and we started to march to - the Ypres area, and arrived at Oudezeele on the 13th July - 1917. This was a very clean and comfortable village, and all - ranks were well billeted. We remained there until the 28th - July, a very pleasant and well-earned rest for both officers - and men, beautiful weather, and many sports were organised - for officers and men. Several fatigue parties had to be - furnished to assist the heavy artillery in the supply of - ammunition, and these had very hard work and some - casualties. During the later part our trench mortar - batteries, under Capt. Robinson, went into the line with the - Guards Division, and had rather a strenuous time doing - excellent work. On the 9th July I went home on ten days’ - leave, and I got married on the 12th July....” - -At one period of the war it was thought that the artillery had a -“soft” time, but as the war progressed it was seen that the zone which -included the lighter guns included also conditions which rendered the -comfort of artillerymen scarcely more enviable than that of the -infantry. We shall soon be able to throw a little more light on the -work of this very gallant arm of the Service. - - - [4] _My War Memories, 1914-1918._ - - - - - CHAPTER V 144 - - YPRES - - -On the 2nd July a rearrangement of the front had placed the 56th -Division in the VII Corps, and they remained at Le Cauroy under the -orders of that Corps until the 23rd July, when they moved to -Eperlecques, near St. Omer, and came under the Fifth Army. - -But the division lost Gen. Hull. It was absolutely necessary that he -should undergo a surgical operation, and the matter could not be -postponed any longer, so he went back to England. He was looked upon -as a friend as much as a commander, his striking personality had -impressed itself on all ranks, and his tall figure was recognised from -afar and welcomed whenever he visited the line or billets. The men saw -in him a fearless commander who knew his business. We are indebted to -Major Newnham for the following anecdote: - - “After the 1st July show (1916), the 169th Brigade held the - trenches in front of Fouquevillers. The trenches, though on - top of a hill, were dreadful. My diary records ‘all C.T.s - thigh-deep in mud.’ Gen. Hull doubted our statement, so on - Sunday, the 9th July, when he came to Brigade Headquarters, - I showed him the state of things. We went up the main C.T., - and gradually the slime rose, first ankle, then knee, then - thigh-deep. At length, where the C.T. ran in a hollow, I - said, ‘Now we get to a really deep bit, sir!’ He said, 145 - ‘Well, I’m damned if I’m going through it--I’m getting out!’ - And we went over the top, though in full view from a large - part of the Boche positions, and walked back in the open, - too!” - -And the General was enthusiastic in praise of his division. - -“We were a happy family,” he says. And “what pleased me as much as -their fighting qualities was their good temper and cheerfulness under -all circumstances,” and the circumstances were at times appallingly -severe. He was himself always cheerful, though his pet dog, an Irish -greyhound named Roy, has been described as “a miserable hound.” He -encouraged his staff to play “bridge” whenever their work permitted, -as a means of taking their minds off the war. All work and no play -would have made even a G.S.O.1 a dull boy, and relaxation was not easy -to find. He commanded the 4th Battalion Middlesex Regt. at Mons, and -was given command of the 10th Brigade on the 17th November 1914. When -he first entered the army in 1887, he joined the Royal Scots -Fusiliers, and was transferred to the Middlesex Regt. in 1912. We are -sorry to say that the “miserable hound,” Roy, who had been with the -General since January 1916, cut a tendon and had to be destroyed in -Belgium, although he survived the war. - -Gen. Hull was not, however, lost to the division, as he returned -later. Meanwhile Gen. W. Douglas Smith was given command. - -Troops were being massed for the big offensive at Ypres, and the Fifth -Army Staff, under Sir Hubert Gough, had been moved to take command of 146 -the greater part of the salient. Sir Herbert Plumer was still there, -but on the southern side, and with a reduced army. - - * * * * * - -In July 1917 England reached the summit of her military power in -France. There were 52 divisions from the Motherland, 4 from Canada, 5 -from Australia, 1 from New Zealand. One might, therefore, expect a -year of great results. And so it was, though not perhaps obviously -apparent. - -Writing of the year as a whole, Sir Douglas Haig says: - - “The general conditions of the struggle this year have been - very different from those contemplated at the conference of - the Allied Commanders held in November 1916. The great - general and simultaneous offensive then agreed on did not - materialise. Russia, though some of her leaders made a fine - effort at one period, not only failed to give the help - expected of her, but even failed to prevent the enemy from - transferring some forty divisions from her front in exchange - for tired ones used up in the Western theatre, or from - replacing losses in his divisions on this side by drafts of - fresh and well-trained men drawn from divisions in the East. - - The combined French and British offensive in the spring was - launched before Italy could be ready; and the splendid - effort made by Italy at a later period was, unfortunately, - followed by developments which resulted in a weakening of - the Allied forces in this theatre before the conclusion of - our offensive. - - In these circumstances the task of the British and French - armies has been a far heavier one throughout the year than - was originally anticipated, and the enemy’s means of meeting 147 - our attack have been far greater than either he or we could - have expected.” - -It was a year of disappointment, but was not a year without -achievement. We had failed against the Turk at Gaza, but had succeeded -at Baghdad; the French spring offensive had not succeeded, and our own -could only be described as a steadying blow at the Germans; Kerensky -came on the scene in Russia in May, and no doubt did his best, but -discipline had gone, and the offensive of Brussiloff and Korniloff, -though it succeeded at first, was well in hand, so far as the Central -Powers were concerned, in July. The East was the weak spot in our -calculations, with Russia going to ruin and dragging Rumania with her. -It was as well that Britain was at the crest of the power wave. - -After all, battles have a further object than the mere killing of men. -For quite a long while after the commencement of the war the Germans -talked boastfully of their “will.” The will to victory was going to -crush the _moral_ of their enemies. But although the Russian -revolution caused great rejoicing, although the German High Command -claimed a long list of victories, it seemed that German _moral_ -was somehow flagging, and their enemy’s will to victory was as -determined as ever. - -Ludendorff admits that in the summer of 1917 the position of the -Central Powers was better than that of the Entente, but that there -were other causes for “our spiritual decline.” He says that -Field-Marshal Hindenburg wrote to the Emperor on the 27th June that -“our greatest anxiety at this moment, however, is the decline of the -national spirit. It must be revived or we shall lose the war.” There -were speeches in the Reichstag containing the despairing cry that 148 -it was impossible to win the war. On the 7th July Hindenburg and -Ludendorff met members of the Reichstag to discuss “our defensive -attitude throughout the first half of 1917, the various failures near -Arras, in the Wytschæte salient, and in Galicia, where we had not as -yet attacked, the absence up to date of any decisive result from the -submarine war, and our serious situation as regards food and raw -materials....” And finally, on the 25th July, General Ludendorff wrote -that “it is certain that the Independent Social Democrats are carrying -on an agitation in the army which is in the highest degree detrimental -to discipline.” - -And the allies of Germany were giving her a great deal of trouble. - -One can only ask what created this frame of mind? Even a Social -Democrat must have the ground prepared before his doctrines can -germinate and flourish; it must be fertilised with dissatisfaction and -watered with despair. The German and Austrian nations were as one in -their desire for war in August 1914, and so strong that they had -little difficulty in winning the Turkish and Bulgarian nations to -their cause. Then surely we may answer the question by saying that it -was the guns of the Allied artillery and the rifles of the Allied -infantry that caused the “will” to falter, even when the position -seemed most favourable to the War Lord and his advisers. It was a slow -process, but a sure one. - -One must admit disappointment to France and Britain, as the leaders of -the countries allied against the Central Powers, but we cannot see the -justice of the German contention that their own position was good. 149 -In considering the events of this war, it is not easy to appreciate -the mind of a man who says “the military situation was good, but the -condition of the country behind the army was bad.” Country and army -surely hang together. The Germans never looked upon war as a clash of -armies alone, but sought by every means in their power, by oppression, -by slavery, by terror, to bend the non-combatant population to their -will. It is a logical view. This war, at least, was waged by country -against country, by nation against nation, and as a nation Germany was -cracking, and her allies with her. - -This was the state of affairs when the Battles of Ypres, 1917, after -an artillery preparation which had been growing in volume for a month, -opened with a stupendous crash on the 31st July--an official date. - -From the very first the Second and Fifth British Armies, and the First -French Army on the left, met with the fiercest resistance. The left of -the Fifth Army and the First French Army gained the greatest -success--the right of the Fifth Army and the Second Army did little -more than capture the enemy first line of defence. Whatever the -condition of the German people, the German Army seemed as strong as -ever. And yet it was being nursed. - -The system with which the Germans started the war was not one based on -consideration for lives. Verdun and the Somme had shaken the very -foundations of that system, and, if the German Army was still strong -and good, German Commanders had already expressed anxiety as to the -future conduct of their troops. Loss of lives and loss of _moral_ had -been responsible for a new method of defence. The front line was to be 150 -held by few men and many machine guns, and retirement before strong -enemy fire was advocated. The position was to be regained by means of -rapid counter-attack. Instead of holding a “line,” a zone was held. -Defence in depth was the policy. - -This loosened method of defence lessened the wastage of troops from -artillery fire, and in addition the system of “pill-boxes” was -instituted. These small reinforced concrete forts could withstand a -direct hit of all but the heaviest shell, and were admirably adapted -for the defence of a place like Flanders, where dugouts were almost an -impossibility. In fact, the new German pamphlet, “The Defensive -Battle,” was a distinct departure from the old “Cannon Fodder” point -of view. If the Reichstag was openly saying that the war could not be -won, the High Command of the Army was wondering if it would stand many -more blows. - -Men who fought at Ypres will say that they noticed no loss of -_moral_ in the enemy, and with this we agree; we only wish to insist -that there were indications which had not escaped the eyes of the -German Command. As to the hard, heart-breaking fighting of the Battles -of Ypres, 1917, it is only just to the gallant French and British -troops to point out once more the many advantages that lay with their -enemies. - -For over two years the Germans had held their semicircle round the -east of Ypres. The positions they occupied, though only the summits of -insignificant-looking “rises,” not even worthy of the name of “hills,” -overlooked the whole of the French and British assembly area. Not a -move escaped their observers, who knew every inch of the ground. What 151 -a place to prepare for an attack! - -Books of reference will give the 31st July as the opening date of the -1917 Battles of Ypres. It is false. The 31st is the date of the -assault--the battles started with the first indications of the British -intention to attack. Every new trench, every trace of new digging, -every new track taped out, every building, every hamlet, every wood -was bombarded by the enemy with guns and aeroplanes, which became -extremely active at this period. As the concentration of troops -increased, all attempts at concealment were abandoned, and camps were -pitched in the open. The whole area was a “target,” and was well -described by a gunner who remarked, “Every time a coconut!” -Observation, on the other hand, was denied to us. - -All this, bad in itself, the troops were able to face. But the enemy -had another advantage, being on the defensive, and that was the -condition of the ground over which the attackers had to advance. - -There is no place on the whole of the Western Front which can be -compared to this stretch of Flanders. If an infantryman or an -artilleryman attempted to give an adequate account of the conditions, -and the horrors which they occasioned, he would not be believed. We -will, therefore, give the words of the Higher Command, with the one -criticism that they are not strong enough. Sir Douglas Haig wrote: - - “The weather had been threatening throughout the day (31st - July) and had rendered the work of the aeroplanes very - difficult from the commencement of the battle. During the 152 - afternoon, while the fighting was still in progress, rain - fell, and fell steadily all night. Thereafter for four days - the rain continued without cessation, and for several days - after the weather remained stormy and unsettled. The - lowlying clayey soil, torn by shells and sodden with rain, - turned into a succession of vast muddy pools. The valleys of - the choked and overflowing streams were speedily transformed - into long stretches of bog, impassable except by a few - well-defined tracks, which became marks for the enemy’s - artillery. To leave these tracks was to risk death by - drowning, and in the course of the subsequent fighting, on - several occasions, both men and pack animals were lost in - this way.... As had been the case in the Arras battle, this - unavoidable delay in the development of our offensive was of - the greatest service to the enemy. Valuable time was lost, - the troops opposed to us were able to recover from the - disorganisation produced by our first attack, and the enemy - was given the opportunity to bring up reinforcements.” - -The enemy view of the conditions is given by Ludendorff: - - “Enormous masses of ammunition, such as the human mind had - never imagined before the war, was hurled upon the bodies of - men who passed a miserable existence scattered about in - mud-filled shell-holes. The horror of the shell-hole area of - Verdun was surpassed. It was no longer life at all. It was - mere unspeakable suffering. And through this world of mud - the attackers dragged themselves, slowly but steadily, and - in dense masses. Caught in the advance zone by our hail of - fire they often collapsed, and the lonely man in the - shell-hole breathed again. Then the mass came on again. - Rifle and machine gun jammed with the mud. Man fought - against man, and only too often the mass was successful.... 153 - And yet it must be admitted that certain units no longer - triumphed over the demoralising effects of the defensive - battle as they had done formerly.” - - [Illustration: INVERNESS COPSE AND GLENCORSE WOOD, AUGUST 1917] - -Very naturally Ludendorff claims that statues in bronze should be -erected to the German soldier for the suffering he experienced at -Ypres. But his own picture of the attackers seems somehow to be worse -than that of the defenders, if there are degrees of suffering. - -On the 31st July the assault of the Fifth Army met with complete -success on the left, where the crossing of the Steenbeke was secured. -But on the right the II Corps was only partially successful. After -overrunning the first system of defence about Hooge and Sanctuary -Wood, divisions were met with tremendous opposition, and eventually -checked at Inverness Copse and Glencorse Wood. - -On the 4th of August the 56th Division started to move from -Eperlecques, and on the 6th Divisional Headquarters were at -Reninghelst under the II Corps. Major-Gen. F. A. Dudgeon assumed -command of the division on the 10th; and on the 12th the division took -over the line from Surbiton Villas to Westhoek, facing Glencorse Wood -and Nonne Bosschen. But before this date the Divisional Artillery was -in action. - - * * * * * - -We cannot do better than quote from Brig.-Gen. Elkington’s most -interesting diary: - - “On the 2nd and 3rd of August the 56th Divisional Artillery - relieved the 8th Divisional Artillery in the line, taking over - their gun positions near Hooge. The artillery then experienced - what I think was their worst time during the war. All the 154 - battery positions were shelled day and night, more in the nature - of harassing fire with occasional counter-battery shoots. The - ground was so wet that digging was impossible, and the men lived - in holes in the ground covered with corrugated iron. The early - dawn was the only time it was safe to get supplies and ammunition - if casualties were to be avoided, and with all precautions most - batteries lost 100 per cent. of their gun line strength in killed - and wounded. The artillery supported operations on the 10th, - 12th, 16th, and 25th August, and answered S.O.S. calls on most - days; also a very heavy day on the 24th of August, when the enemy - counter-attacked in force. On the 16th and 17th the whole of the - guns of D/280 were put out of action; enemy shell fire and - exploding ammunition practically blew them to pieces, and except - for the actual tubes of the three howitzers, nothing was found - worth salving. On the 31st August the artillery came out of the - line, and entrained south on the 1st September to rejoin the 56th - Division, and all ranks hoped they had seen the last of the Ypres - salient.” - -We can only add to this that the selection of gun positions was a -matter of finding a place where the guns would not disappear in the -mud and which was not already occupied by another battery. - -The battle of the 16th is the one which concerns us. On that day the -Fifth Army attacked from the north-west corner of Inverness Copse to -the junction with the First French Army south of St. Janshoek [the -Battle of Langemarck, 1917]. The French always attacked on the left. - -The II Corps, on the right, attacked with the 56th and 8th Divisions. -The objective was the same as that of the 31st July, a line drawn to -include some 500 yards in depth of Polygon Wood, and so on to the 155 -north. But there is not much point in going over orders. Brig.-Gen. -Freeth reports (with some bitterness it seems to us): “Orders were -received and issued so hurriedly that it was impossible for brigade -and battalion staffs to keep pace with them. There was not time for -the scheme of operations to be thoroughly explained to regimental -officers, much less to the men.” Indeed, the mass of documents is -appalling, and, taken together with the facts, point to confusion of a -most distressing nature. - -It must be understood that Gen. Dudgeon was in no better case than -Brig.-Gen. Freeth. On the 11th August the division had been ordered to -take over the line from the 18th Division and portions of the 25th -Division. On that same day the General attended a conference at Corps -Headquarters and learnt that the 53rd Brigade of the 18th Division -would remain in the line and come under his orders for the battle. He -was called upon to attack on a front of 1,500 yards on a depth of -1,700 yards, with a defensive flank of 1,700 yards extending from the -south-eastern corner of Stirling Castle to Black Watch Corner. On the -12th the 169th Brigade was ordered to undertake a small operation with -the object of improving the line about Glencorse Wood, an undertaking -which the 18th Division had failed to carry out. But the 169th Brigade -met with strong opposition and also failed. On the 14th the enemy -attacked the 167th Brigade, on the left of the line, and drove in some -posts; they were re-established. Later on that day, at a conference, -the Brigadier-General commanding the 53rd Brigade represented that his -brigade was not in a state to carry out the attack ordered owing to -heavy casualties. The General then placed the 4th London Regt. under 156 -the orders of the 53rd Brigade and the trouble commenced--the -Commanding Officer was wounded on his way to interview the Brigadier. -The second in command had then to go and reconnoitre on the following -day, which left his battalion less than twenty-four hours in which to -make the necessary reconnaissance and preparation to get into -position. - -On the 15th instant, as the result of a conference with the Corps -Commander and the G.O.C. 8th Division, the starting line was altered. - -Owing to the date fixed for the attack, an inter-battalion relief was -necessary on the night 14/15th. In fact the ground was so bad that -there were reliefs, or remains of reliefs, going on every night. It -was not possible to undertake any patrolling to gain a knowledge of -the ground, and in daylight the shelling was so constant and accurate -that study of the country was most difficult. - -The General writes: - - “The darkness of the night, the boggy state of the ground, - heavy shelling of all approaches, and the fact that the - division was strange to the ground and had little - opportunity for reconnaissance and preparation presented - great difficulties in carrying out the assembly ... but the - difficulties were surmounted and the troops assembled in - time, though there is no doubt that the state of the ground - caused much fatigue.” - -So by 4 a.m. the 53rd Brigade, with the 7th Bedford, 6th Berkshire, -and 4th London Regts. in line, was on the right. In the centre was the -169th Brigade with the 5th and 2nd London Regts. in line. On the left -the 167th Brigade with the 8th Middlesex and 1st London Regts. in 157 -line. - -At 4.45 a.m. on the 16th August the barrage opened and the assaulting -troops clambered out of their mud holes. Red and green lights were -fired from the enemy rear lines, but his barrage did not answer to -these signals for some minutes. But the new enemy system of defence in -depth and by means of concrete forts was to be met for the first time -by the 56th Division. The barrage was good and, if anything, crept -forward too slowly, but the concrete fort was immune from damage by -shells from the lighter batteries, and the German machine-gunner was -able to fire through our barrage. - -The 7th Bedford Regt. was stopped at once by one of these forts on the -north-west of Inverness Copse. The failure to capture this point -reacted on the 4th London Regt., which suffered very heavy loss and -was brought to a standstill to the north of the western side of the -wood; they managed to work their way forward and form a defensive -flank along the southern edge of Glencorse Wood. - - * * * * * - -The 169th Brigade progressed well at first. The London Rifle Brigade -and the 2nd London Regt. disposed of isolated parties with machine -guns dotted about in shell holes on their front, but soon bumped into -a marsh. The 2nd London Regt. edged to the right, pushing the London -Rifle Brigade still farther away. And the same obstruction being met -by the 167th Brigade, the 8th Middlesex edged to the left, to avoid -the marsh, pushing the 1st London Regt. as they did so. There was then -a big gap between the two Brigades very soon after the start. - -The enemy resistance was found by the 169th Brigade beyond the marsh 158 -in the centre of Glencorse Wood. Here, along a sunken road, was a line -of concrete forts, or pill-boxes. Hard fighting and heavy casualties -followed. The artillery was no longer helpful, but Glencorse Wood was -finally cleared. The leading waves of the two battalions then went on -and reached Polygon Wood, but what happened to them is not known. The -second waves were checked at Polygon Wood by heavy fire from the front -and the flanks, and before they could steady themselves were thrown -back by a counter-attack which was only stopped by the Queen -Victoria’s Rifles, who were coming up in support. Later in the day a -second and heavier counter-attack from the east and south drove the -whole of the brigade back to the original front line. - - [Illustration: 5. THE BATTLE OF LANGEMARCK 1917.] - -The 167th Brigade, on the left, made better progress than any of the -others--for a time. The gap between the 169th and 167th Brigades was -never filled, so that when the 8th Middlesex came across a second lake -of mud, four feet deep, about the north end of Nonne Bosschen, their -right flank was exposed. And on the left the 1st London Regt. had been -heavily shelled before the start, so that when they did advance the -rear waves pressed on the leading wave until all became mixed, and no -one carried out the special task of clearing the ground as it was won; -the position was that, although the main weight of the attack was -carried forward to the left of the 8th Middlesex, many enemy snipers -were behind both battalions of the 167th Brigade. There is also, on -this flank, the mystery of a company that disappeared. Although it -seems pretty clear that the waves bunched up together, they must also 159 -have split; the third wave, composed of the larger part of a company, -was reported by its company commander, in writing sent by runner, to -be in a position north of Polygon Wood; and no doubt he got there, but -neither he nor his men were heard of again. A thin wave of the 8th -Division reached this same line, but were immediately driven back by a -massed and carefully timed counter-attack. - -But the attack of the 167th Brigade was completely held up. At 7 a.m. -the 8th Middlesex saw the troops of the 169th Brigade falling back -through Glencorse Wood; they then took up a position to their rear, -their southern flank being refused so as to gain touch with the 169th -Brigade. The situation remained unaltered through the afternoon. - -About 3 p.m. the enemy was reported to be massing opposite the 25th -Brigade on the left of the 56th Division, and shortly after to be -attacking all along the 167th Brigade front. In view of the barrier of -mud it is probable that he was only trying to reoccupy the ground from -which he had retired. But our artillery had direct observation and -heavy fire was opened on him, and his troops dispersed. - -About 5 p.m. the 167th Brigade again retired to a more favourable -position, which gave them a net gain of 400 yards beyond their -original line. They were then in touch with the 25th Brigade, 8th -Division. - -All attacking battalions were withdrawn and the line was held by the -Queen Victoria’s Rifles, the Queen’s Westminster Rifles, and the 7th -Middlesex Regt. The division was relieved the following night by the -14th Division, and moved to Steenvoorde E., Ouderdom, Wippenhoek, the -brigades being quartered in that numerical order. - -The total casualties from the 13th to the 17th August were 111 160 -officers and 2,794 other ranks. The loss in senior officers was -particularly heavy: Lieut.-Col. H. Campbell, Major V. A. Flower, Major -J. E. L. Higgins, and Major M. R. Harris, all of the 13th London Regt. -(Kensingtons); Lieut.-Col. R. R. Husey of the 5th London Regt.; -Lieut.-Col. J. P. Kellett of the 2nd London Regt.; Lieut.-Col. P. L. -Ingpen of the 8th Middlesex; and Lieut.-Col. F. W. D. Bendall of the -7th Middlesex Regt. were all wounded. - -Maybe the confusion was inevitable, but it makes a sorry story in -which the great gallantry of the London Territorials stands forth like -something clean and honest in the midst of slime and mud. Gen. Dudgeon -gives us some of the causes of the failure to reach the desired -objective. - - “Insufficient time for preparation and explanation of the - scheme of attack to those taking part, and insufficient time - to study the terrain. - - The portion of the 25th Division relieved by the 167th - Brigade had only been in the line twenty-four hours - previously, and could not assist much. - - Lack of previous preparation. No dumps of any kind were - taken over in the area, and there was insufficient time to - form all those that were necessary. - - Indifferent communications. Tracks east of Château Wood were - non-existent, and the tapes were soon obliterated by the - mud. - - Difficulty of maintaining signal communication. - - Fatigue of troops previous to the attack, owing to the bad - weather. - - The condition of the ground over which the attack took - place. The bog at the source of the Hanebeck made a gap - between the 169th and 167th Brigades, which laid their left 161 - and right flanks respectively open to counter-attack. It - also caused great fatigue to the troops. - - The nature of the hostile defences and new system of defence - in depth. The enemy’s counter-attacks were so timed as to - strike the leading waves about the same time as they reached - their objectives, when they were more or less disorganised, - and had been unable to consolidate the ground gained. - - The concentration of hostile guns opposite the front. The - heavy shelling prevented the moving up of reinforcements, - machine guns, and replenishment of ammunition.” - -It seems very certain that the British Staff was somewhat rattled by -the German tactics in defence. Questions--long lists of them--were -sent out, and reports asked for. The pill-box, it was agreed, -disorganised our assaulting waves, although it did not stop them. But -there is a limit to the possible advance of troops in a rush, and this -had been calculated by the enemy, who placed his main forces so as to -counter-attack the exhausted leading waves of attackers before they -had time to consolidate, or even mop up the ground behind them. How -was this to be overcome? - -All officers of the 56th Division seemed to agree on this question. -The answer was, “Do not try to penetrate too deeply.” Five hundred -yards was a distance which troops could cover without exhaustion, and -they would then be at such a distance from any troops assembled for -counter-attack as would give them time to consolidate, bring up -machine guns, and be ready for the counter-attack. Something of the -sort was eventually done, so the experience of the 56th Division was -of some service. - -The attack was not renewed on this sector of the front until the 20th 162 -September, when the Second Army (Sir Herbert Plumer’s command was -extended to his left) captured Glencorse and the half of Polygon Wood. - -The fighting in Flanders was carried on until November. The French -launched a big attack at Verdun on the 20th August, which met with -notable success. Ludendorff confesses to a feeling of despair. -Concrete had failed him, and as to his troops, “At some points they no -longer displayed the firmness which I, in common with the local -commanders, had hoped for.” By limiting the depth of penetration and -breaking up the German counter-attacks with artillery fire the British -troops were slowly eating their way through the defences in Flanders, -in spite of having to wade through mud. Many were the consultations at -German Headquarters. “Our defensive tactics had to be developed -further, somehow or other.” The wastage of troops had “exceeded all -expectations.” Seven divisions were sent to Italy. A countering blow -was the best defence. - -Sir Douglas Haig hoped that the phenomenal wet summer would be -followed by a normal autumn, and continued his attacks through -October. But the wet still continued, and important engagements, with -large numbers of troops and tremendous expenditure of ammunition, only -resulted in a “nibble” at the enemy territory. - -The German-Austrian attack on Italy started on the 24th October, and -resulted in the Italian Armies being driven back almost to the -outskirts of Venice. This misfortune had the immediate effect of -reducing the British Army on the Western Front by several divisions, 163 -which were sent under the command of Sir Herbert Plumer, and later of -Lord Cavan, to help our Italian Allies; it also determined Sir Douglas -Haig to continue his operations in Flanders. The fierce battle for -Passchendaele, in which the proud divisions from Canada added to their -immortal fame, was fought, and operations in Flanders reached their -final stages about the middle of November. - -For the effort expended, the gain in territory was small, the number -of prisoners was 24,065, the number of guns captured (74) was -insignificant. But the balancing of results is a very delicate affair. -During the three and a half months of the offensive the enemy had -employed 78 divisions (18 of them had been engaged a second or third -time after having rested and refitted). Deductions from such facts, -however, are a weak basis for argument. Sir Douglas Haig wrote: “It is -certain that the enemy’s losses considerably exceeded ours,” but, -apart from considerations of expediency, it is not clear how he -arrived at this startling conclusion. - -To compare the number of prisoners we captured with the number of -bayonets which the Germans could transfer from the Russian front is -absurd. What then have we left to show as a result for this costly -enterprise? Only damage to that highly important but very elusive -thing which we call “enemy _moral_.” The enemy charges us, -perhaps with some truth, with being clumsy soldiers with no -imagination, but he speaks with respect of the determination of the -British infantry, in a manner which suggests a growing conviction that -they could never be defeated. - - * * * * * - -An interesting figure was compiled by the II Corps giving the amount 164 -of ammunition fired by the artillery of that corps from the 23rd June -to 31st August--2,766,824 rounds with a total weight of 85,396 tons, -delivered by 230 trains of 37 trucks and one of 29 trucks. - -The battles of Ypres, 1917, are as follows: Battle of Pilckem Ridge, -31st July-2nd August; Battle of Langemarck, 16th-18th August; Battle -of the Menin Road Ridge, 20th-25th September; Battle of Polygon Wood, -26th September-3rd October; Battle of Broodseinde, 4th October; Battle -of Poelcappelle, 9th October; First Battle of Passchendaele, 12th -October; Second Battle of Passchendaele, 26th October-10th November. - - [Illustration: BATTERY POSITION, ZOUAVE WOOD, HOOGE, AUGUST 1917 - From a photograph taken by Lt. Wallis Muirhead, R.F.A.] - - - - - CHAPTER VI 165 - - CAMBRAI - - -The Divisional Headquarters opened at Reninghelst on the morning of -the 18th August; brigades were quartered at Steenvoorde and -Wippenhoek. These forward areas did not give uninterrupted rest; -frequent and close attention was paid to them by aeroplanes, and -during the following night two lorries were set on fire by bombs -dropped by the night birds. - -On the 22nd, 23rd, and 24th the division moved back, resting at -Busseboom, and eventually arrived at the peaceful area of Eperleques. -The 5th Cheshire Regt., however, remained in the battle area until the -29th. A further move started on the 30th, by train, to the ruined -villages to the east and south of Bapaume, with Divisional -Headquarters at Fremicourt. - -Sports, horse-shows, and the Divisional Band now played a more -prominent part in the life of the soldier, and we find the divisional -canteen being enlarged--a greengrocery, eggs, and butter department -being added, also a wholesale beer department. And, of course, there -was training! - -At the commencement of the war the British infantry were the greatest -riflemen in the world. Then came a period when everyone was mad on -throwing bombs, and the rifle was neglected. At the end of the war one 166 -sighed in vain for a half, even a quarter of the efficiency of the -pre-war rifleman. - -Training in 1917 was based on four weapons, and the platoon. The -platoon, we were told, was the smallest unit comprising all the -weapons with which the infantry was armed. Exclusive of Headquarters, -twenty-eight other ranks was the minimum strength, and when the -platoon was below that strength the necessary numbers would be -obtained by the _temporary amalgamation of companies, platoons, or -sections_. We draw attention to these words because the order was -afterwards reversed. - -The platoon was comprised of a rifle section, a Lewis-gun section, a -bomber section, and a rifle-grenade section. The principles governing -training were based on these various weapons. The rifle and bayonet -were for assault, for repelling attack, or for obtaining superiority -of fire, and the training of this section was considered of much -importance. Each man should be a marksman, first class with bayonet -and bomb, and a scout, in addition to being either a Lewis-gunner or -rifle grenadier. Bayonet fighting was recommended to all sections, as -it produced “lust for blood.” - -The bomb was called the second weapon of all N.C.O.s and men, and was -to be used for dislodging the enemy from behind cover or killing him -below ground. The section should study bombing attacks and the duties -of “moppers-up.” These last individuals should work in pairs. They -were to drop into their objectives and work laterally outwards. They -killed the enemy met with in the trenches, and they also guarded the -entrances to dug-outs and side trenches. They were not to penetrate -down dug-outs until the platoon they were working for arrived. 167 - -The rifle grenade was described as the howitzer of the infantry, and -was used to dislodge the enemy from behind cover and to drive him -below ground. The section was trained to a rifle-grenade barrage. - -The Lewis gun was the weapon of opportunity. Its mobility and the -small target it presented made it peculiarly suitable for working -round an enemy’s flank. - -In each section sufficient ammunition was carried for immediate -requirements. Every man (except bombers, signallers, scouts, runners, -and Lewis gunners who carried 50 rounds) carried at least 120 rounds -of rifle ammunition and 2 bombs. The Lewis-gun section carried 30 -“drums.” The bombers (with the exception of “throwers,” who carried 5) -carried at least 10 bombs each. - -The men of the rifle-grenade section each carried at least six -grenades. With this organisation training was carried out in -trench-to-trench warfare and the enveloping of strong points. - -In 1917 the strength of a platoon was not definitely laid down by the -Higher Command. It was suggested that a suitable number for each -section was nine--1 non-commissioned officer and 8 men. But there was -an order to leave 10 officers and 50 other ranks out of line for -“reconstruction.” They would not be available as reinforcements, but -were, generally, specialists and good instructors, on whom the -battalion could be rebuilt if casualties were heavy. Most units -carried out the suggestion of 9 to a section, and any extra men, -exclusive of the 50 for reconstruction, were used as reinforcements -during the battle. - -On arrival in the Third Army area (now under the command of General 168 -Byng, General Allenby having been given command in Egypt), the -strength of the 56th Division was very low. - -The four battalions of the 167th Brigade totalled altogether 63 -officers and 1,754 other ranks; the Machine Gun Company, 7 officers -and 150 other ranks; the Trench Mortar Battery, 5 officers and 50 -other ranks. - -The four battalions of the 168th Brigade totalled 94 officers and -2,802 other ranks; the Machine Gun Company, 7 officers and 160 other -ranks; the Trench Mortar Battery, 5 officers and 90 other ranks. - -The four battalions of the 169th Brigade totalled 61 officers and -1,921 other ranks; the Machine Gun Company, 10 officers and 145 other -ranks; the Trench Mortar Battery, 2 officers and 75 other ranks. - -It was therefore probable that when the period of rest was over the -division would go into a quiet bit of the line. - -All doubts as to the ultimate destination of the division were laid at -rest on the 4th September, when the 168th Brigade relieved the 9th -Brigade, 3rd Division, in the Lagnicourt section. The 169th Brigade -relieved the 8th Brigade in the Louverval section on the 5th; and the -167th Brigade relieved the 76th Brigade in the Morchies section on the -6th. The situation was quiet, and the weather fine and hot. - -Patrolling, of an active nature, commenced at once, and on the 10th -September the 167th Brigade secured a man of the 31st Reserve Infantry -Regt.; and on the same night the 168th Brigade secured two of the 86th -Reserve Infantry Regt. Various enemy posts were visited from time to -time, and occasionally entered, but the gem of these small enterprises 169 -was that of the Queen’s Westminster Rifles. On the 29th September -2/Lieut. W. H. Ormiston, with thirty men, lay in wait in the middle of -No Man’s Land and successfully ambushed a patrol of fifteen Germans. -Eleven were killed and two brought in; unfortunately, the remaining -two proved swift of foot and got away. It was not done without a -fight. Six of the Queen’s Westminsters were wounded. Both Corps and -Army Commanders sent their congratulations to this well-known and -gallant regiment, with the added message that the identification was -of great importance. The prisoners were of the 414th Infantry Regt. - -During this month six hundred gas projectors were dug into the 56th -Divisional Front. - -During the month of October raids were attempted by the London -Scottish and the Kensingtons, but the enemy were found alert and the -parties failed to enter the German line. The Kensingtons, however, -were successful in rescuing a British pilot whose machine was brought -down in No Man’s Land, but they had to fight for him. - -The only incident of importance in the month of October was a visit of -ten days of Major-Gen. Bloxom, U.S.A., with his chief of staff, with -the object of gaining experience. - -The strength of the division remained about the same. - -On the 2nd November a document headed “IV Corps, No. H.R.S. 17/48” was -received, into which we must enter at some length. - -The Third Army stretched from the little stream of l’Omignon, which -runs into the St. Quentin Canal a few miles above that town, to -Gavrelle, north of the Scarpe. It was composed of the VII, III, IV, 170 -VI, and XVII Corps from right to left (and later, the V Corps). The -III Corps had its right on 22 Ravine, between Villers-Guislain and -Gonnelieu, and its left to the east of Trescault. Then came the IV -Corps, with its left north of Lagnicourt, on a little stream called -the Hirondelle. These two corps were facing the Hindenburg Line, and -had in their immediate rear the battlefields of the Somme, and the -country which the Germans had laid to waste in their retreat in the -early spring. - -At the time when our pursuing troops were brought to a standstill in -front of this celebrated line, preparations were at once commenced for -attack. Several actions had been fought on this sector before it -settled down to a “quiet sector”; assembly trenches existed, and -adequate shelter for brigade and battalion headquarters had been -constructed. It was now chosen as a sector to be attacked. - -At this time our Italian Allies were in serious difficulties, and -seven German divisions were engaged in this theatre. And, although the -movement of whole divisions had started from Russia without exchange -from the Western Front, a mass of enemy troops were still pinned down -in Flanders. It seemed as though a sudden surprise attack might -benefit the Italian Armies and also improve the position on the -Western Front. But there was the obvious difficulty of a lack of -troops at Sir Douglas Haig’s disposal; the Flanders adventure had been -a most costly one for us, for practically the whole of the British -Army had passed through the salient inferno Ypres. Finally it was -decided that sufficient troops could be mustered to justify the -attack, and as the French not only promised to engage the enemy’s 171 -attention elsewhere, but actually set aside a large force of cavalry -and infantry to help in the attack (they started to move on the 20th -November), the order was given. - -The scheme, as set forth in this document, was for the infantry to -break through the German defensive system with the aid of Tanks on a -front from Gonnelieu to Hermies, seize the crossings of the Canal de -l’Escaut at Masnières and Marcoing, cut the last of the enemy’s -defences on the Beaurevoir-Masnières line, and pass the cavalry -through the break thus made. - -The cavalry were then to capture Cambrai and Bourlon Wood, cut all -railway communications into Cambrai, and to occupy the crossings of -the Sensée between Paillencourt and Palleul to the north of Cambrai. -They would come up from Gouzeaucourt and Metz-en-Couture. - -If this part of the plan was accomplished, the whole of the Third Army -would participate in further operations to complete the surrounding of -all the enemy forces in the Quéant salient. Presumably our Allies -would have been called upon as well. - -The III Corps, composed of the 20th, 6th, 12th, 29th Divisions, and -2nd and 3rd Brigades, Tank Corps (less three companies) would secure -the canal crossings at Marcoing and Masnières, and form a flank from -Gonnelieu through Bois Lateau, Creve-cœur, to a spot called la Belle -Etoile a few miles south-east of Cambrai. - -The IV Corps, composed of the 51st, 62nd, 36th, 56th Divisions, and -1st Brigade, Tank Corps, would attack with two divisions, on the left -of the III Corps, and the right of the Canal du Nord, towards 172 -Flesquières and Graincourt. - -The success of the whole plan depended on the capture of Masnières and -Marcoing, at which point the cavalry would be passed through the -break, and, as speed was the essence of the operation, in order to -obtain liberty of movement before the enemy could organise either -counter-attack or a fresh line of defence by bringing up fresh troops, -the leading cavalry divisions would have to pass through on the -afternoon or evening of zero day. - -Meanwhile, the IV Corps would be pushing forward on the left, with the -first object of establishing a line from Noyelles, along the Canal de -l’Escaut, through Fontaines, and relieve the cavalry on Bourlon, or -fight for that position, and join with the original front line in the -Louverval sector. - -Surprise was essential, so there would be no preliminary bombardment, -and these instructions insisted that the greatest care should be taken -not to divulge the presence of increased artillery to the enemy. -Registration and calibration was to be carried out by order of the -General Officer Commanding the Third Army Artillery. - -One of the first tasks was to erect camouflage over all positions -which would be occupied by the artillery. Then weatherproof cover for -ammunition would be constructed. But little more than this could be -done in the time at the disposal of the Army. In any case, the -accumulation of ammunition would have to be spread over as long a -period as possible, so as to minimise the increase of activity on the -railways. - -The action of the artillery would consist mainly in the formation of -smoke screens and barrages, on the front and flanks of the attack (to 173 -cover the advance of the Tanks), and the neutralisation of hostile -batteries, the bombardment of positions of assembly, rest billets, -telephone routes, and known centres of communication and command. But -the very nature of the operation precluded the careful registration of -all batteries. - -All the elaborate preparations of a trench-to-trench attack would be -reduced to a minimum, and in many items must be done away with. Cover -from weather would have to be provided for the full number of troops -when concentrated, but no extensive scheme of hutting or new camps -could be undertaken. In thick woods tents, suitably camouflaged, could -be erected, and in thin woods wire netting must be stretched -horizontally amongst the trees, about ten feet from the ground, and -have twigs scattered on the top of it, thus making a sort of roof -under which bivouacs could be pitched. - -As to concentration, the idea was to complete the move of the -artillery before the infantry was brought into the area, to have the -extra infantry in the area as short a time as possible, and to bring -up the Tanks at the very last moment. - -Finally, No. 15 Squadron R.F.C. was ordered to note particularly -whether any of the work being carried out was noticeable from the air. - -The rôle of the 56th Division in all this was to make a demonstration -on Z day and attract the attention of the enemy, and later on take -part in the operation of rolling up the Hindenburg Line. When Bourlon -Wood had been captured, the IV Corps would secure a line -Rumancourt-Buissy-Inchy, which would cut off the German divisions in -the Quéant salient and threaten with immediate capture their gun -positions. In this move two brigades of the 36th Division would 174 -take part on the east bank of the canal and one brigade on the west of -the canal, starting from the Spoil Heap near Hermies and moving in the -direction of Mœuvres and Inchy. - -The 169th Brigade, which would be on the right of the 56th Divisional -front, would be responsible for joining hands with the 109th Brigade, -36th Division, and with them attack in the direction of Tadpole Copse. -In this attack Tanks were to be employed, but the number was never -given. - -Nothing amuses troops more than to deceive the enemy--and we say -“amuse” advisedly, for though it is in the midst of a battle, with -death and destruction going on all round them, men will be as keen as -children in carrying out the scheme of make-believe, and if it -succeeds will roar with laughter. Such a scheme was on foot for the -56th Division. - -For the purpose of making the demonstration on the divisional front as -realistic as possible, a number of dummy Tanks were to be made by the -C.R.E., while brigades would amuse themselves by making dummy figures -of men to act as supporting infantry. The Tanks were to be put out in -No Man’s Land during the night, and would be half hidden by the smoke -barrage in the morning when the attack started; the figures would be -pushed above the trenches as though infantry were just emerging. A -motor-bicycle in the front-line trench was to imitate the noise of a -Tank. - -As might well be expected, excitement ran high in the division. The -construction of dummy figures and dummy Tanks was taken in hand at -once, and by the 19th November a dozen full-sized Tanks were ready, -together with some two hundred and fifty figures to each brigade 175 -front. - -On the 6th November wire-cutting was commenced by trench mortars in -the neighbourhood of Quéant--250 rounds a day being fired--the Germans -would probably think a raid was contemplated, which would account for -any suspicious movements! - -The time was short and, as preliminary preparation was to be cut down -to a minimum, fatigues were not very arduous. There was a certain -amount of work done on the roads near the front line, but the greatest -care had to be exercised not to make improvements of an apparent -nature. In the back areas, however, the strain was becoming -intolerable. There were troops in every hole and corner. Tents were -crammed full; huts, ruins, any place where men could find a little -shelter was used. And the weather was cold, and regulations about -lights and fires were very stringent. - -In the front line every precaution against accidents was taken. The -attacking divisions occupied their positions in line, but the old -troops remained in the outpost line in case the enemy should secure -identification; also patrols were ordered to avoid any possibility of -capture. - -On the 14th November the Corps ordered the 56th Division to hold the -line with two brigades instead of three, so as to have a concentrated -force ready to act in case of necessity. So on the night of the 18th -the 167th Brigade extended its left and took over the frontage of the -168th Brigade, which concentrated in Fremicourt and Beugny, to the -east of Bapaume. - -On the night of the 19th the dummy Tanks were put in position about -300 yards from the front line. At 2 a.m. on the 20th gas drums were 176 -projected into the German lines where the wire-cutting had taken place -(Quéant), and at 6.20 a.m. the whole of the artillery on the Third -Army front opened on the enemy lines with one stupendous crash. - -In the 56th Division front line all was activity. The parties with the -dummy figures moved them up and down in as lifelike a manner as they -could, and other parties hurled smoke grenades so that the enemy might -not see too clearly. - -The “make-believe” attack was a great success. The Germans opened -frantic and furious fire with machine-guns and artillery, and the -dummy Tanks were shelled until mid-day! - -By 9.15 a.m. the 36th Division (109th Brigade) had advanced along the -west bank of the canal from the Spoil Heap to the Bapaume-Cambrai -road, where the 169th Brigade joined up with it on the old German -outpost line. - -Meanwhile, great events had been taking place on the right. The III -Corps, on which so much depended, advanced through the Hindenburg Line -in grand style and, thanks to the rapid action of the 29th Division -(General de Lisle), which was to wait until news arrived of the -capture of the Hindenburg Support Line before advancing but attacked -instead on observer reports, seized Marcoing and Masnières. The first -bit of bad luck happened at Masnières, where the enemy had only -partially destroyed the iron bridge over the Escault Canal. It might -have been sufficiently strong for cavalry to cross over, or it might -have been repaired to enable them to do so, but a Tank attempted to -cross first and broke through it altogether. This unfortunate accident -did not stop a squadron of Canadian cavalry, who, with the dash usually 177 -associated with that arm, rode over a flimsy bridge across a lock on -the Marcoing side of the town and attacked the enemy on Rumilly Ridge. -It was probably troopers from this very gallant squadron who reached -the outskirts of Cambrai. - -Lieut.-Col. Johnston took the 2nd Hampshires across in a similar way -and secured the crossing. But in Marcoing other troops of the 29th -Division secured the bridge intact. - -The III Corps had therefore done its job, but the IV Corps was not so -fortunate. Havrincourt Wood had been of great service to the IV Corps -in the assembly. The 51st and 62nd Divisions, with a fringe of the -36th Division in front of them until the last moment, had completed -their concentration without a hitch. On the nights of the 16th, 17th, -and 18th all the Tanks were moved into Havrincourt Wood, and except -that a battery of 6-inch howitzers got into difficulties farther -north, and that a lorry “ran into a train carrying Tanks,” the whole -concentration was carried out as desired. But, although we do not -believe it made much difference, the enemy were aware of the attack. -Unfortunately, some men were captured in a raid on the 36th Divisional -front, and from the statements of prisoners they evidently divulged -the fact that an attack was contemplated. The time and the extent of -it, however, seems to have been a complete surprise to the Germans. - -At zero hour the Tanks advanced, followed by the 51st and 62nd -Divisions. There was in this sector some of the most formidable wire -on the whole of the western front, but the Tanks crushed wide lanes -through it and the troops advanced steadily. There was some obstinate 178 -fighting in Havrincourt village and park, where parties of the enemy -held out until the afternoon, but otherwise the Hindenburg front line -was captured by 8 o’clock. A pause of two hours was allowed here to -enable troops and Tanks to reorganise for the attack on the Hindenburg -Support. - -Once more the attack moved forward. The 62nd Division on the left met -with little opposition, and that portion of the support line allotted -to them was in their hands between 10 and 11 o’clock. But the 51st -Division on the right met with resistance at the village of -Flesquières. The infantry were prevented from advancing by machine -guns and uncut wire, and the Tanks, which came up on the ridge, were -at once put out of action by field guns, which had been pulled out of -their pits on to the slopes to the north of the village. Six Tanks -were to be seen here in a line, smashed to bits by a very gallant -German Battery Commander, who, it was said, served and fired the guns -himself, when his men had bolted. - -The 51st Division could make no progress, but on their left the 62nd -moved forward to Graincourt, and the 36th, still farther on the left, -had moved along the canal to the Cambrai road. And on the right troops -of the III Corps were well on towards Cantaign. The 51st Division made -a second attempt with Tanks and again failed. - -What follows is one of the mysteries of the Cambrai battle. A patrol -of King Edward’s Horse, operating with the 62nd Division, rode into -Flesquières soon after mid-day from the direction of Graincourt. They -reported only a few of the enemy there and do not appear to have -suffered any casualties themselves. But the 1st Cavalry Division, -which had been concentrated in the neighbourhood of Equancourt, had 179 -been ordered at 8.25 a.m. to move forward with their head on Metz, -ready to advance. This they did. About 11 o’clock they were ordered to -push forward through the Hindenburg Support Line, but found that -Flesquières was still in the hands of the enemy, and they were unable -to pass. About 2.30 p.m. they were ordered to pass at least two -regiments by Ribecourt and Premy Chapel and work round Flesquières -from the north-east and assist the 51st Division in their attack from -the south. But they found they were unable to carry out this -co-operation on account of the delay which had occurred, due to their -first effort, and also that Nine Wood was not clear of the enemy. At 4 -p.m. the Third Army ordered the cavalry to push forward in full -strength through Marcoing and carry out the original plan of a -break-through at that point; but darkness had come on and the order -was modified, one brigade being ordered to occupy Cantaign and cut off -the enemy retreating from Flesquières. Cantaign, however, was found to -be too strongly held for the cavalry to capture it, and therefore the -leading brigade remained at Noyelles for the night. It would seem that -the opportunity was missed. - -As dusk fell, the 62nd and 36th Divisions were well forward towards -the Bourlon Ridge, the former just short of Anneaux, and then forming -a long flank back east of Graincourt and to the west of Flesquières, -where they connected with the 51st Division. Farther to the right of -the IV Corps the III Corps had also pushed well forward and made a -similar flank facing west, the ground between the two points of -greatest advance about Orival Wood being occupied by the enemy’s -artillery. (Line C.) - -Immediately after the capture of the Hindenburg system the 180 -redistribution of the artillery and machine guns began. The machine -guns, which had been massed under corps control, reverted to their -divisions. Four brigades of Field Artillery, one 60-pounder battery, -and one, horsed, 6-inch Howitzer battery were placed under the orders -of each of the 36th, 62nd, and 51st Divisions. But a fortunate -circumstance arose: it was found difficult to get the heavy artillery -across No Man’s Land into the Flesquières salient, and the congestion -there was such that the supply of ammunition would have been -uncertain; so it was decided to move the bulk of the artillery to the -left, close to the old front line round about Demicourt, Hermies, and -Morchies. In this position they assisted very materially in breaking -up the great German attack on the 30th November. - -During this first day the Queen Victoria’s Rifles were on the right of -the 169th Brigade, and worked along the German outpost line in touch -with the 109th Brigade, who were clearing the Hindenburg Line, as far -as the Cambrai road. The 2nd London Regt. was on the left of the Queen -Victoria’s Rifles. - -It had been calculated that no large hostile reinforcements would be -likely to reach the scene of action for forty-eight hours after the -commencement of the attack, and Sir Douglas Haig had informed General -Byng that the advance would be stopped after that time, unless the -results then gained, and the general situation, justified its -continuance. Although, as we have said, the movements of the Canadian -Cavalry and King Edward’s Horse would seem to suggest that the -opportunity of passing other cavalry through had been missed, there -remained one day when, given success, they could still be employed. 181 -The 51st and 62nd Divisions were therefore ordered to capture the -Bourlon position, when the 1st Cavalry Division would follow up the -attack and seize the passages of the Canal du Nord between Palleul and -Sains-les-Marquion; and the 36th Division was to continue the advance -on the west of the canal, and hold the two brigades on the eastern -bank ready to push through and seize the canal, between -Sains-les-Marquion and Mœuvres, as soon as Bourlon was taken. The 56th -Division would be drawn farther into the operations on the left in the -direction of Tadpole Copse. - -When the day broke, Flesquières was found, by the 51st Division, to be -unoccupied by the enemy; they therefore pushed on to the -Marcoing-Graincourt road, capturing a number of guns in the valley -which the enemy had not been able to remove in the night. The 1st -Cavalry Division then advanced and took Cantaing, after some stiff -fighting in which some of the 51st Division took part. On the left the -62nd Division captured Anneaux and Anneaux Chapel, after heavy -fighting, and made more progress north of the Cambrai road, where they -established themselves on the ridge west of Bourlon Wood, and also -gained a further stretch of the Hindenburg Support Line. On the left -of the 62nd the 36th Division advanced along the west bank of the -canal, meeting increased opposition, and for a time held the south of -the village of Mœuvres. On their left again the Queen Victoria’s -Rifles worked along the outpost line and captured a machine gun with -its crew of seven. Resistance, however, was stiffening. The dividing -line between the 109th and the 169th Brigades was the grid line to the -west of Mœuvres, and any farther advance to the north would bring the 182 -56th Division in contact with the Hindenburg Line itself. - -Meanwhile, in the centre of the battlefield, progress was not what had -been hoped it would be. The 51st Division were to work round Bourlon -Wood from the east, and join hands with the 62nd Division; but they -met with such opposition as delayed their advance, and they did not -capture Fontaine until late in the afternoon. The capture of Bourlon -was not achieved. At nightfall the 51st Division was holding a line -north of Cantaing forward to Fontaine, making a dangerous salient, and -then in a westerly direction to the north of Anneaux, where, joining -with the 62nd, the line was carried north of the Cambrai road, forming -another salient north of the Sugar Factory. The 36th Division then -carried on the line, which bent back towards the road near the canal -bridge and then forward again to Mœuvres. Due west of Mœuvres the 56th -Division held the line to the old British trenches. The Tanks, in -diminished numbers, had assisted during the day, but no advance had -been made without a struggle. (Line D.) - -In the III Corps area there had been some heavy fighting during the -day, which resulted in some improvement of our positions. Heavy -counter-attacks were launched by the enemy, and much useful and -gallant work was done by dismounted cavalry beating off these attacks. -But the forty-eight hours had expired, and the high ground at Bourlon -Village and Wood, as well as certain tactical features to the east and -west of the wood, still remained in the enemy’s hands. It seemed -fairly clear that the surprise break-through and complete -disorganisation of the enemy’s back areas would not be accomplished. -Sir Douglas Haig had to decide whether to continue the offensive or 183 -take up a defensive attitude and rest content with what had been done. - - “It was not possible, however, to let matters stand as they - were. The positions captured by us north of Flesquières were - completely commanded by the Bourlon Ridge, and unless the - ridge were gained it would be impossible to hold them, - except at excessive cost. If I decided not to go on, a - withdrawal to the Flesquières ridge would be necessary, and - would have to be carried out at once. - - On the other hand, the enemy showed certain signs of an - intention to withdraw. Craters had been formed at road - junctions, and troops could be seen ready to move east. The - possession of Bourlon Ridge would enable our troops to - obtain observation over the ground to the north, which - sloped gently down to the Sensée River. The enemy’s - defensive lines south of the Scarpe and the Sensée Rivers - would thereby be turned, his communications exposed to the - observed fire of our artillery, and his positions in this - sector jeopardised. In short, so great was the importance of - the ridge to the enemy that its loss would probably cause - the abandonment by the Germans of their carefully prepared - defence systems for a considerable distance to the north of - it.... - - It was to be remembered, however, that the hostile - reinforcements coming up at this stage could at first be no - more than enough to replace the enemy’s losses; and although - the right of our advance had been definitely stayed, the - enemy had not yet developed such strength about Bourlon as - it seemed might not be overcome by the numbers at my - disposal. As has already been pointed out, on the Cambrai - side of the battlefield I had only aimed at securing a - defensive flank to enable the advance to be pushed northwards 184 - and north-westwards, and this part of my task had been to a - large extent achieved. - - An additional and very important argument in favour of - proceeding with my attack was supplied by the situation in - Italy, upon which a continuance of pressure on the Cambrai - front might reasonably be expected to exercise an important - effect, no matter what measures of success attended my - efforts. Moreover, two divisions previously under orders for - Italy had on this day been placed at my disposal, and with - this accession of strength the prospect of securing Bourlon - seemed good. - - After weighing these various considerations, therefore, I - decided to continue the operations to gain the Bourlon - position.” - -But in the morning, about 9.30 a.m., the enemy launched a heavy -counter-attack on the 62nd Division west of Bourlon Wood which, -although it did not succeed in driving them back, prevented any -advance. And about 10.30 they attacked Fontaine from the north-west -and east, and after heavy fighting drove the 51st Division out and -clear of the village. - -During the afternoon the Germans again attacked the 62nd Division, but -were again repulsed, as they had been in the morning. On the left of -the 62nd, the 36th were unable to gain ground on the east of the -canal, and on the west bank entered Mœuvres for the second time, but -after an hour or so were driven out. (Line E.) - -On this day, the 22nd November, the 56th Division played a more -important part. The 169th Brigade were still on the right of the -division. The Queen Victoria’s Rifles, in touch with the 109th -Brigade, were holding a line of posts across No Man’s Land and in the -old German outpost line. The Queen’s Westminster Rifles were ordered 185 -to concentrate, slightly to the north of the Cambrai road, and to -advance, in conjunction with the 109th Brigade, at 11 o’clock along -the front trench of the Hindenburg Line which runs to Tadpole Copse. -They would also work their way up the communication trenches to the -second line of the Hindenburg first system, and clear both lines as -far as Tadpole Copse. The London Rifle Brigade were ordered to -assemble in the captured Hindenburg Line south of the Cambrai road, -and follow the attack of the 109th Brigade to where the Hindenburg -system turned away from the canal at Mœuvres (see Map); they would -then follow the Queen’s Westminsters in two columns, one in the first -line and one in the second, and reinforce if necessary. The 5,000 -yards of British line up to the Hirondelle River were held by the -167th Brigade. - -The instructions were to carry out a determined advance. The idea, of -which this was the preliminary operation, was for the 36th Division to -move forward through Mœuvres and Inchy, while the 56th Division -captured the Hindenburg Line up to Quéant. - -It was entirely a bombing fight, and was supported by an artillery -barrage, which lifted off Swan Lane at 11.30 a.m. and moved forward at -the rate of fifty yards every five minutes. The division, until the -night 21st/22nd, had been covered by the 281st Brigade R.F.A. only--as -was usual in these battles, the artillery was switched about from one -command to another--but during the night the 280th Brigade R.F.A. had -moved to positions near Boursies and took part in this attack. - -It was hard and slow fighting, as is generally the case in bombing 186 -fights. Colonel Glazier, of the Queen’s Westminsters, writes: - - “The barrage got some way ahead of our men, but owing to the - uncertainty of the position of the troops it was impossible - to bring it back. At 12.30 p.m. a runner came with a request - for more bombs, and the news that our men had passed the - Boursies-Mœuvres road and were using German bombs.... Bombs - were sent forward; large quantities were taken forward by - the Queen Victoria’s Rifles.” - -News of progress was very slow in coming in, and the first definite -information indicating success was obtained from observers, who -reported at 2.40 p.m. that the enemy were shelling Tadpole Copse. Not -until 5.30 was it known for certain that the copse was occupied by -three companies of the Queen’s Westminsters. They captured 3 officers, -70 men, and 3 machine guns. - -The London Scottish had arrived at the old British front line about -Louverval at mid-day with the object of relieving the Queen’s -Westminsters and carrying on the attack. They were informed that the -attack would not be continued that day, and so formed a flank from the -south of Tadpole Copse to the old British line, although for the -moment they were unable to dislodge the enemy from a deep crater at -the road junctions some two hundred yards south-west of the copse. At -dawn they relieved the forward companies of the Queen’s Westminsters -and made ready for the morning attack. - - [Illustration: 6. LOCAL MAP. FRONT OF THE DIVISION AT CAMBRAI 1917.] - -Most useful work was also done during the night by the 416th Field -Coy. R.E., who constructed a bridge over the canal at the Cambrai -road, although the enemy kept up a persistent shelling of the road, 187 -and particularly of the point of intersection with the canal. The -512th Coy. R.E. at the same time made good the road from Boursies to -the canal. - -So the only progress made by the IV Corps on the 22nd was the capture -of Tadpole Copse by the Queen’s Westminsters, an important gain as it -occupies the high ground to the west of Mœuvres. But it became -apparent that the enemy was rapidly massing strong forces to stay our -farther advance. - -The 40th Division passed into the Corps command and was sent to -relieve the 62nd. The Corps orders that evening were for the advance -to continue on the 23rd, with the assistance of Tanks, the chief -objective being Bourlon village. The 51st Division was to attack it -from the east and the 40th from the south-west; but when it became -known that the 51st Division had been driven out of Fontaine, their -task was modified to the recapture of that village. The 36th and 56th -Divisions were to continue the advance up the canal, and roll up the -Hindenburg Support Line. - -All through the night there had been much shell fire on the 56th -Divisional front. Two counter-attacks had been successfully repulsed. -Owing to darkness and the congested state of the trenches, the London -Scottish were late in getting into their assembly positions, but as -they were not to move until an hour and a half after zero (6.30 a.m.), -which time was occupied by bombardment of the enemy positions, it did -not matter. - - “It was then found,” Colonel Jackson writes, “that the 169th - Brigade had not reached Tadpole Lane, but the communication - trench running from front to support trench on the north-west 188 - side of Tadpole Copse, and that a fairly deep valley existed - between this communication trench and the Inchy-Louverval - road. The Germans could thus directly enfilade the front and - support trenches with rifle and machine-gun fire from the - other side of the valley, where they had built strong blocks - and loopholes during the night. The battalion was thus held - up at this point until 2.30 p.m. By this time “D” Company - had, with the assistance of the Stokes Mortars (169th), been - able to cross the valley, face the block on the other side, - and cross the Inchy road, thus surrounding the enemy still - holding the block in the front line opposite “B” Company. - Ten officers, 69 other ranks, 6 machine guns, and 1 trench - mortar--all of the 20th German Division.” - -It would appear that the German counter-attacks during the night had -gained some ground. The valley alluded to by Colonel Jackson is not -shown clearly on the British maps and is only indicated by the very -unsatisfactory sign of “banks.” An imaginative person might have -traced the re-entrant starting in square 7 right up to these banks, -but it was not always wise to be too imaginative with the British map; -at any rate the shape of the ground seems to have been a surprise. - -By 4.30 p.m. the battalion had reached its objective, Adelaide street, -and was immediately strongly counter-attacked. The supply of bombs -failed--it is extraordinary how many bombs can be thrown on such -occasions--and the support line was lost as far as the Inchy road, but -the front line was held. In this counter-attack the London Scottish -were reinforced by two companies of the 4th London Regt. They were -ordered to consolidate. - -The operations on the rest of the Corps front during the day resulted 189 -in fierce fighting through Bourlon Wood, and the capture of Bourlon -village by the 40th Division, and a tremendous struggle for Fontaine -into which the 51st Division never really penetrated. Repeated and -heavy counter-attacks forced the 40th Division out of Bourlon village -to the north edge of Bourlon Wood. The 36th Division had captured and -again been forced out of Mœuvres, and had not been able to make much -progress on the east bank of the canal, a failure which caused the -position of the 40th Division to become a somewhat isolated one. The -gallant 51st Division, which had been used in such ruthless fashion, -was relieved by the Guards Division and went back to Albert (Line F). - -At 12.50 a.m. on the 24th the Corps issued orders for the ground -gained to be held at all costs. The 40th Division were to consolidate -their position and attack Bourlon village with the assistance of -twelve Tanks at noon. The Guards Division were to consolidate the line -taken over from the 51st, and the 36th and 56th Divisions to continue -their clearing of the Hindenburg Line. But, as we have said, the order -applying to the 56th Division was subsequently cancelled. - -The 168th Brigade, which was now in the centre of the division, took -over a stretch of the old British front line from the 167th on the -left; the forward position of the 169th was still in the Hindenburg -Line on the right. The main strength of the division was concentrated, -of course, about the Hindenburg Line to the west of Mœuvres, while in -the old British line it was strung out and thin. But the division as a -whole was strengthened on the 24th by the addition of one brigade of -Royal Horse Artillery. - -At three o’clock in the afternoon the enemy again attacked under a 190 -very severe barrage, and the London Scottish lost their hold on the -second line of the first German system, to the north of Tadpole Copse, -but not without a strong fight. The enemy came down all communication -trenches at once, while small parties of snipers advanced from -shell-hole to shell-hole over the open. The attack was pressed so -closely that the supply of bombs could not be maintained, and the -London Scottish men had eventually to retire across the open. The -front line, however, was still held to a point opposite Adelaide -Street. - -On the night of the 24th the division passed from the IV Corps to the -VI Corps. But although the 56th Division passed from the IV Corps we -must not lose sight of the doings of that corps, which continued to -press towards the north, with the 56th Division on its flank. During -the day many attacks and counter-attacks took place, and in the end -the 40th Division retook the village of Bourlon. - -By the morning of the 25th the London Scottish had been relieved by -the Rangers (12th London), in view of an attack to regain the stretch -of Hindenburg Line lost on the previous day. - -The 4th London Regt. were in position on the right and the Rangers -(12th) on the left. The 4th Londons, holding the bit of the Second -Line north of Tadpole Copse, were to bomb straight ahead while the -Rangers, who were in the First Line, would bomb up the communication -trenches to the Second Line and join hands with the 4th Londons. The -attack started at 1 p.m. and progressed very satisfactorily for a -while; but the fighting was very hard and the men very tired. The 4th -London at one time reached the Inchy road, but their arrival there 191 -seems to have coincided with a particularly violent effort of the -enemy which caused the Rangers to call for protective artillery fire; -the artillery responded and the 4th London, being in the zone of fire, -had to retire. The attack, which lasted until the evening, ended with -a small gain, but left the Germans in possession of the banks about -the valley north-west of the copse. - -On the 25th the 40th Division was driven out of Bourlon village, but -retained the ridge running through Bourlon Wood. They were relieved by -the 62nd during the night. Three dismounted battalions of the 2nd -Cavalry Division were placed at the disposal of the IV Corps, and did -good work during the next three days in Bourlon Wood. - -Bomb-fighting was carried on through the night about Tadpole Copse. We -have casually mentioned that the men were tired, and on the 26th Gen. -Dudgeon represented to the Corps that he considered his division was -too extended. It had captured and was holding about one mile of the -Hindenburg system, and, until Mœuvres was captured, his right flank -was in danger, while his left flank, on Tadpole Copse spur, was not -only exposed but being constantly attacked. Two brigades were involved -in the fighting about the Hindenburg system, and, in addition, were -holding a flank 2,000 yards long connecting up to the old British -front line. The remaining brigade was holding 5,500 yards of British -line, and had also to supply one battalion each night to work in the -captured position. There was therefore no divisional reserve, nor -could any reliefs be arranged for the troops who had been fighting. -The VI Corps placed one battalion of the 3rd Division (on the left) at -the disposal of the 167th Brigade, and this enabled the 8th Middlesex 192 -Regt. to be placed at the disposal of the 168th Brigade, which eased -the situation in the Hindenburg system. - -A heavy attack on the 27th was repulsed by the Rangers and the -Kensingtons, and on the following two days there is nothing more to -record than heavy shelling. - -The 26th had been a quiet day for the IV Corps. Certain reliefs were -carried out. The 36th Division was replaced by the 2nd Division; the -1st Cavalry Division, which had taken part in the fighting up to this -time, was ordered to return to its own corps; and the 47th Division -was ordered into the battle area east of the canal. - -On the 27th, after a night of storm and snow, the Guards and 62nd -Divisions attacked Fontaine and Bourlon villages. Though both -divisions entered their objectives, the positions were not held. The -resources of the Army were considered to be almost exhausted at this -stage, which was probably the reason for using only three battalions -of the Guards Division for this operation. - -The 59th Division was placed at the disposal of the IV Corps and -relieved the Guards on the next day, while the 47th Division relieved -the weary 62nd. And the Tanks were completely withdrawn. - -The battle had therefore petered out, leaving a most unsatisfactory -state of affairs about Bourlon Wood and village; the situation -opposite Fontaine was also not good. It will have been noticed that, -after the first rush, the fighting was done by the IV Corps against -the northern side of the salient which had been created, and the III -Corps held an extended flank which, at the junction with the VII Corps 193 -on their right, was somewhat thin. - -On the face of it it seems as though the mind of the Third Army Staff -was concentrated on the doings of the IV Corps and the enemy opposite -them. The Bourlon position had a mesmerising effect, and even though -the III Corps was suddenly warned by the Army to expect an attack on -the 29th, no very great preparation for such an event seems to have -been made. The divisions did all they could. The 12th Division on the -right of the Corps moved the two battalions in divisional reserve -nearer the line, and organised all reinforcements and the 10 per cent. -personnel, left out of the line, into a battalion about 850 strong. -Other divisions issued a warning to troops in the line. The 55th, on -the left of the VII Corps and next to the 12th, sent out a long order: - - “Certain indications during the day point to the possibility of - the enemy making an attack against our front. All troops will be - warned to be specially on the alert in trenches and all posts. - Special patrols will be sent out at 4 a.m. to watch for enemy - movement. Artillery will open fire on the enemy front line, - commencing at 5 a.m. The most likely places for concentration to - be selected by brigadier-generals commanding infantry brigades in - consultation with group commanders. In case of enemy attack all - posts and trenches will be held to the last at all costs, and - there will be no retirement from any line to another line. The - action of troops available for counter-attack will be considered - now. All machine guns will be warned to be specially on the - look-out for S.O.S. signals. From 5 a.m. 29th inst., 1/4th North - Lancs. will be ready to move at half-hour’s notice from receipt - of orders. Remainder of 164th Brigade will be ready to move 194 - at one hour’s notice from the same time.” - -On the other hand, the Guards and 62nd Divisions had already started -to move out of the salient. - -Nothing happened on the 29th, but on the 30th the enemy launched a big -attack on the III and IV Corps with the intention of pinching off the -salient and capturing all the troops in the area. - -The enemy broke through the III Corps, the weight of his attack being -directed at the junction of the 55th and 12th Divisions. General H. B. -Scott, commanding the 12th Division, says: - - “I do not consider that the troops in the front system were - in any way surprised. In fact, far from it, as on some - portions there was a heavy bombardment and the Divisional - Artillery had opened fire on S.O.S. lines at 6.30 a.m. Also - on the evening of the 29th November warning had been sent to - all infantry brigades and the C.R.A. that an attack was - possible on the eastern flank. - - In my opinion, the troops in the centre of the 12th Division - were pushed back by the force of numbers. The question of - the flanks being turned is another one for which I have no - evidence to show what actually happened to bring about those - situations. From all accounts the flanks of the division - were turned before the troops vacated the Banteaux Spur and - Lateau Wood. This is verified by those in the vicinity of - those places. - - The enemy had great facilities in assembling unknown to us - in Banteaux, in the factory, and in the wood. Undoubtedly - these were the places he used. The main attacks were, I - consider, made along the Banteaux Ravine, keeping south of - the Banteaux Spur; up the ravine from Banteaux to R23c (in 195 - the direction of la Vacquerie) and from the factory and wood - (in the valley north of Banteaux) towards the western edge - of Bonavis Ridge. - - I am confident that the enemy suffered heavy losses. - Undoubtedly he attacked in force, and some must have been - caught by the artillery and machine-gun barrage during the - assembly and the initial stages of his advance. Besides - this, there was much close fighting and many - counter-attacks.” - -The gallant 29th Division held on to Masnières like grim death, and -the enemy never moved them an inch, but he advanced as far as -Gouzeaucourt and was threatening Metz, through which lay the only good -road to the IV Corps. - -It is not quite clear whether this was the main German attack or not. -About six divisions seem to have been used, but, judging by the length -of the attack and its ferocity, the big effort is indicated on the -other side, the northern side of the salient. - -On the north side of the salient the divisions ran: the 59th, the 47th -(London Territorials), the 2nd, and the 56th. On the 56th Divisional -front the brigades holding the captured Hindenburg system were -disposed as follows: - -The Queen’s Westminster Rifles on the right and the 2nd London Regt. -on the left of the 169th Brigade front in the Hindenburg Line, the -London Rifle Brigade and Queen Victoria’s Rifles being in the old -British line behind them. - -The 168th Brigade, reinforced by one battalion, came next in the -Hindenburg Line, with the 8th Middlesex (attached) on the right and -the London Scottish on the left, and the 4th London Regt. holding the -defensive flank back to the old British front line. The Kensingtons 196 -were in support in the old British front line, and the Rangers were at -Beugny. - -The 167th Brigade had been relieved by the 3rd Division, and had -marched back to Fremicourt. - -At about 10 o’clock in the morning the 2nd Division, who were astride -the canal holding the ground won by the 36th Division, reported a -heavy concentration of the enemy on the east of Quarry Wood, between -the wood and the canal, and just behind Mœuvres, also a division -entering Mœuvres itself. But before this mass of troops was reported, -the London Scottish, 8th Middlesex, and Queen’s Westminster Rifles had -noticed unusual happenings in the enemy lines. - -The enemy had started registration by aeroplane, which caused other -observers than sentries to be on the watch. And then it was seen that -the Germans were wearing steel helmets instead of the usual soft caps. -The aerial activity increased, and soon heavy enemy fire was opened -between Mœuvres and Bourlon. The registration on the 56th Divisional -front was followed by slow, steady bombardment, which increased, until -about a quarter to ten a heavy barrage crashed down on the whole -front. It was obvious that an attack was impending, and the S.O.S. -rockets were sent up. - -The enemy barrage, which consisted of light howitzers, field guns, and -trench mortars, was particularly heavy on the blocks in the captured -communication trenches. Gradually the German guns lifted, and at 10.15 -a.m. the enemy swarmed forward to the attack. - - [Illustration: 7. THE BATTLE OF CAMBRAI.] - -A glance at the map will show the precarious position, not only of the -56th Division and neighbouring units, but of the whole of the Third 197 -Army troops engaged in the salient. South of the salient the Germans -were through our lines, and if they broke through in the north an -unparalleled disaster would be inflicted on the British Army. The -Germans tried hard. During the day no less than five set attacks were -launched, the heaviest with eleven lines of infantry advancing in -succession to the assault. We wish to emphasise the position of the IV -and III Corps and the general situation in the salient, for if the -56th Division failed to stand fast (and we know they could not be -called fresh troops) the fate of the two Corps was sealed. On no -portion of the front attacked could the Germans hope to gain a greater -success than on the part held by the 56th Division. - -The intricate nature of the Hindenburg Line, although it afforded the -attackers cover for assembly close up to the troops of the 56th -Division, had its disadvantages. Small bodies of defenders could -inflict incalculable loss and, though surrounded, could break up the -attack so that it only trickled through feebly; but, of course, they -must be good men. - -The 56th proved themselves once more to be good men. The German -storming parties were most cleverly supported by their trench mortars -and field artillery. A deluge of shells descended on the posts holding -the blocks in the communication trenches, and the enemy infantry -supplemented the bombardment with rifle grenades. The artillery lifted -slowly, and as it moved so the infantry, assembled at the other side -of the blocks, leapt out on the parapet and attempted to rush the -defending post. At the same time other infantry advanced over the open -from the main trenches. - -With such a short distance between opposing troops one might well 198 -suppose that this form of attack would succeed. It was sudden, it was -confusing, inasmuch as Germans appeared everywhere. But the men of the -56th Division showed the most astonishing, the most praiseworthy -calmness. The training of the division in the new organisation, with -platoons composed of rifle, bombing, rifle grenadier, and Lewis-gun -sections, combined with the coolness of the men now bore fruit. -Volleys from the rifle grenadier sections shook the Germans as they -emerged from their trenches; the riflemen picked off individuals who -were getting too close; Lewis guns, sited to sweep enemy avenues of -approach, sent streams of bullets into the mass of the enemy; and -where the Germans succeeded in reaching the trenches they had to deal -with the bombers. - -In the tremendous battle that followed, the Stokes mortar batteries -supported their comrades in exemplary fashion. The most striking -individual work of all that was done by these batteries was that -carried out by Corporal Macintosh, of the 168th Battery. This corporal -had done extraordinarily good work on the 24th, but on this occasion -he surpassed his previous record. Captain Crawford writes of his utter -disregard for his personal safety, of his standing exposed, not only -to the fire of artillery and trench mortars, but the more deadly -sniper, calmly directing the fire of his gun where it was most -urgently needed. And what of Private Woods? - - “Private Woods had been forced to withdraw his gun from its - original position, and in doing so he lost the stand. He - took up a new position with another gun, and carried on 199 - firing incessantly; and later, when the stand of his gun was - giving way through excessive firing, continued to use the - primary ammunition on the enemy whilst holding the barrel of - the gun between his legs.” - -The Germans attacked with the greatest determination, and pressed -forward with a multitude of men. Posts all along the front line were -gradually surrounded, but the grim, steadfast fierceness of the men of -the 56th Division was doing its work. The enemy losses were appalling. -The losses of the 56th Division were great, and where gaps occurred -the enemy slipped through. They appeared in the front line (the -support line of the Hindenburg front system), on the right, in the -centre, on the left. Hard fighting had reached the second line of the -Queen’s Westminsters and the 2nd Londons. Col. Pank, of the 8th -Middlesex, was in his headquarter dug-out, situated in the support -line (German front line), when he was told the enemy was in the front -line; he ordered his runners, signallers, everybody to man the trench -outside, and, leading the way himself, clambered out of one entrance -to the dug-out while the Germans threw bombs down the other. Col. Pank -slipped down the communication trench which ran to the old German -outpost line, and gathering together the first men he could find of -his support company, with a supply of bombs led them back to attack. - -The London Scottish were on the extreme left, holding the old German -front line through Tadpole Copse and across the Inchy road, and -therefore a continuation of the 8th Middlesex second line. Col. -Jackson was suddenly startled by finding the enemy in his line. But -the fierce attack led by Col. Pank shook the enemy, and though the 200 -London Scottish had their hands fairly full on their front and left -flank, they dealt with the party in their trench. Col. Pank then -cleared the whole of his section of the old German front line. This -was the point of deepest penetration by the enemy, and was reached -somewhere about one o’clock. - -We must point out that dug-outs in this line were far from comfortable -quarters. Their positions were naturally known to the Germans and they -were continually bombarded with enormous trench mortars, said to be -12-inch. In the expressive language of the Cockney, they were “bumped” -from morning to night. To get some idea of the effect of these engines -on those in the dug-outs, we need only say that each explosion -extinguished all the candles and left the occupants in darkness. - -The Kensingtons had been sent up to Barbican, the sunken road in No -Man’s Land, as reinforcements, but in view of the uncertainty of the -position they were ordered to remain there. - -One cannot hope to give a detailed account of attack and -counter-attack in this mass of trenches. Every hour brought a new -situation, now in our favour, now against us. The Queen’s Westminsters -and the 2nd Londons had suffered severe casualties. Everywhere the -line stood firm in the old German front line. Two companies of the -London Rifle Brigade had reinforced the Queen’s Westminsters, and -three companies of the Queen Victoria’s Rifles had gone to the 2nd -Londons. Practically the whole of the 169th Brigade was engaged, and -gradually they wore down the German attack. - -The message “Am holding on--hard pressed” came by pigeon and runner 201 -with distressing frequency. The Rangers were put under the orders of -the 169th Brigade. The remaining battalions of the 167th Brigade and -the 5th Cheshires were marching towards the battle. The S.O.S. was -signalled by the London Scottish at 4 p.m. At 6 p.m. fierce bombing -was still going on in all trenches forward. - -The position was that the 169th and 168th Brigades held the old German -front line with blocks in all the communication trenches running to -the second line. The Queen’s Westminsters (in touch with the 2nd -Division on the right), 2nd London, and 8th Middlesex, on whom the -greatest weight of the attack had fallen, had lost the old German -second line; the London Scottish, faced with the flank of the German -attack, but nevertheless a hotly pressed attack, had lost no ground. - -On this day the Divisional Artillery had fired on S.O.S. lines -continuously from soon after ten in the morning until six at night. A -number of fleeting targets and enemy batteries were also engaged with -good results. The Germans attempted to press forward with their -batteries; in fact, they believed they were going to break through, -and the batteries could be seen galloping into action. On one -occasion, about 1 p.m., a brigade of three German 77-mm. batteries -raced into the open, and were engaged so swiftly by the 280th Brigade -R.F.A. that only one battery was able to get off a round before being -knocked out. As usual the 56th Divisional Artillery supported the -gallantry of the infantry with equal gallantry and determination. - -The German counter-battery fire had increased rapidly every day from -the commencement of the operations, gas being used chiefly at night. 202 -But at no time did it reach anything like the same intensity as was -experienced on the Ypres front, or even on the Somme. Hostile aircraft -were very active, flying low over the front line and battery positions -during the latter part of the battle; and on two or three occasions -they hindered batteries in the open by machine-gunning their crews -when they were firing on S.O.S. lines. - -On the right of the 56th Division, and on the west side of the canal, -the 6th Brigade (2nd Division) stood firmly in line with the 56th. The -attack on the east of the canal fell on the 99th Brigade of the 2nd -Division and the 140th Brigade of the 47th Division, holding the crest -of the ridge running from Bourlon Wood to the Bapaume-Cambrai road. -The attack came on, time after time, only to be hurled back by the -fire of the guns and the machine guns, and the fine fighting of the -infantry. Full-strength attacks were delivered at 9.30 a.m., 11.25 -a.m., and at 2.30 p.m., but the enemy gained nothing more than a few -advanced posts, and an advance of about 300 yards near Bourlon Wood. - -The situation in the morning had been a precarious one, indeed the -greatest anxiety prevailed throughout the day. The Guards Division had -stopped the German rush on the south side of the salient during the -early afternoon, but if the 56th, 2nd, and 47th Divisions had not -stood firm on the northern side, the Third Army would have suffered a -heavy defeat. There were some frantic telegrams sent at times. At -10.30 a.m. the 2nd, 47th, 59th, and 62nd Artillery were ordered to be -prepared to move their guns from the Graincourt Valley, and to have -their teams up in readiness, but these same guns did fearful execution. 203 -The 47th Division reported at 11.35 a.m.: “Waves attacking over crest -F21 (Fontaine) held up by our barrage, which is very accurate. Our -guns have broken up concentration on E16 (west of Bourlon Wood). Dense -waves moving along crest E to W. Our guns apparently drawing them.” - -But the relief felt by the General Staff found expression in a booklet -entitled _The Story of a Great Fight. (Being an account of the -operations of the 47th, 2nd, and 56th Divisions in the neighbourhood -of Bourlon Wood and Mœuvres, on the 30th November, 1917.)_ We can -only give extracts which concern us: - - “The 56th Division had been in line prior to the British - attack of the 20th November, in which its right brigade had - taken part, and since that date had captured and held about - a mile of the Hindenburg Line west of Mœuvres, including - Tadpole Copse. Almost constant fighting had taken place in - this area since our attack, and the division, which at one - time had been holding a front of 11,000 yards, had already - been subjected to a very severe strain.... The story of the - subsequent fighting on the Bourlon-Mœuvres front is one so - brimful of heroism that it deserves to take its place in - English history for all time. The most determined attacks of - four German divisions, with three other German divisions in - support, were utterly crushed by the unconquerable - resistance of the three British divisions in line. The 30th - November, 1917, will be a proud day in the lives of all - those splendid British soldiers who, by their single-hearted - devotion to duty, prevented what would have become a serious - situation had they given way.... At 9.20 a.m. the enemy had - been seen advancing from the north towards the Canal du - Nord, and subsequently attack after attack was delivered by 204 - him on both sides of the canal against the 6th and 169th - Infantry Brigades. South of Mœuvres the enemy succeeded in - gaining an entry, but was driven back by a bombing attack - after heavy fighting.... From Mœuvres westward to Tadpole - Copse a desperate struggle was taking place for the - possession of the Hindenburg Line, in the course of which - the enemy at one time reached the Battalion Headquarters of - the 8th Middlesex Regt., attached to the 168th Brigade, 56th - Division. Here the German infantry were stopped by the - gallant defence of the officer commanding the battalion, - who, with the assistance of his headquarters staff, held off - the enemy with bombs until further help was organised and - the trench regained. Though much reduced in strength by the - fighting of the preceding days, and hard-pressed by superior - forces, the troops of the 168th and 169th Brigades beat off - all attacks. Queen’s Westminsters, London Scottish, and the - men of the 1/2nd Bn. London Regt. and 1/8th Bn. Middlesex - Regt. vied with one another in the valour of their - resistance.... At the end of this day of high courage and - glorious achievement, except for a few advanced positions, - some of which were afterwards regained, our line had been - maintained intact. The men who had come triumphantly through - this mighty contest felt, and rightly felt, that they had - won a great victory, in which the enemy had come against - them in full strength and had been defeated with losses at - which even the victors stood aghast.” - -The survivors will at least agree that when General Headquarters took -the trouble to print anything of this sort it had been well earned. - -During the night of the 30th November reliefs took place. On the 169th -Brigade front the London Rifle Brigade relieved the Queen’s -Westminsters and the 3rd London (attached) relieved the 2nd London. 205 -On the 168th Brigade front the Rangers relieved the London Scottish -and the 1st London the 8th Middlesex. The Queen’s Westminsters and the -2nd London, being the most worn troops, were sent into the divisional -reserve at Louverval, while the rest occupied the old British line. -The reliefs were not complete until 5 a.m. on the 1st December. - -At about 3.30 p.m. the enemy commenced a heavy bombardment of the -trenches held in the Hindenburg Line and the S.O.S. went up. From -movement noticed beforehand on the north-west of Tadpole Copse it -seemed likely that he would attack again, but the attempt, if it was -to be made, was crushed by the artillery. - -On the night of the 1st December the 51st Division started to relieve -the 56th, but, so as not to involve the 51st Division until the -following night, the front line was not relieved before the night of -the 2nd December. - -Gen. Dudgeon makes some interesting remarks on the battle: - - “Although up to Z day the rôle of the division was to attack - with Tanks over the open, the fighting which developed was - almost entirely trench fighting with bombs. No shortage of - bombs occurred, but the men employed at the divisional dump - (eleven men) worked day and night detonating, and at one - time the Divisional Artillery Column echélon had to be drawn - on. - - It was found that pigeon messages were very slow, probably - owing to the season of the year. Trench wireless sets were - used with success from positions within 200 yards of the - enemy, being erected only at night and dismantled by day. 206 - The reliable method of communication was by runner from the - captured trenches to our old line, viz. over about 2,300 - yards of No Man’s Land, and a series of relay posts was - arranged. - - The 168th Brigade, with the help of, on an average, two - companies 1/5th Cheshire Regt. and one battalion 167th - Brigade (occasional help), dug a communication trench ... - (about 1,500 yards). This trench, being rather in line with - the Inchy road, was somewhat subject to shell fire. 169th - Brigade also, with the help of one company of Pioneers and - one Field Company, dug a trench ... (1,300 yards), which was - less shelled. The Barbican and Houndsditch provided some - shelter, but in most cases reinforcements and supplies had - to go over the open in full view of Mœuvres, from which it - was impossible to obtain concealment.” - -During these operations the 56 machine guns in the division (two -companies of 16 guns and two companies of 12 guns) were used as -follows: With each infantry brigade, 8 guns; in Divisional Pool, 32 -guns. The 32 guns of the pool were employed on the 20th inst. in -barrage work outside the divisional area to cover the attack of the -36th and 62nd Divisions. They returned to divisional control on the -night of the 20th November. On the 21st and subsequent days the -headquarters of the Divisional Pool were in a central position in -Beaumetz.... On subsequent days the guns in the pool were used for -protection of the flank (a maximum of 10 guns were employed on this); -protective barrage on the Hindenburg Line and on the Hindenburg -Support; machine-gun defence behind the infantry. - -We have mentioned the word “mystery” with regard to the battle of 207 -Cambrai and the handling of the cavalry. Though they fought on foot -with the best at Bourlon Wood and Villers Guislan, there seems to have -been some hesitation on the first day of the battle. It is, however, -debatable whether they could have done much. Of the other mysteries -the success of the Germans on the southern side of the salient is one. -Early in the proceedings General Sir O’D. Snow, commanding the VII -Corps, is reported to have placed his fingers on a map at the point of -Twenty-two Ravine, and said, “If I were a German, I should attack -there”! No attempt was ever made to reinforce divisions before the -German counter-attack, although the Army was aware that one was -threatened. And this brings us to another mystery. Sir Douglas Haig -repeats several times in his dispatch a suggestion that he had a very -limited number of troops at his command. But we know that he had the -offer of French troops. He closes his account of the fighting on the -30th November by recording-- - - “my obligation to the Commander-in-Chief of the French - Armies for the prompt way in which he placed French troops - within reach for employment in case of need at the - unfettered discretion of the Third Army Commander. Part of - the artillery of this force actually came into action, - rendering valuable service; and though the remainder of the - troops were not called upon, the knowledge that they were - available should occasion arise was a great assistance.” - -One naturally asks the question: “What would have happened if French -troops had been used even as late as the 21st November?” If they were -still too far away, there were undoubtedly British divisions quite 208 -close up and quite fresh which could have been used to press the first -great advantage gained, and the French would still have been in hand -as a reserve. - -Casualties from the 20th November to the 3rd December were 9 officers -killed, 202 other ranks killed, 43 officers and 1,003 other ranks -wounded, 17 officers and 352 other ranks missing. - - - - - CHAPTER VII 209 - - THE GERMAN OFFENSIVE - - THE FIRST BATTLE OF ARRAS, 1918 - - -Telegrams of congratulation on the action at Cambrai came from Corps -and Army Headquarters; Sir Douglas Haig also sent a wire. But there -was no question of rest for the 56th Division. - -The strength of battalions on the 1st December was: - - Officers. Other ranks. - 7th Middlesex 41 760 - 8th “ 35 571 - 1st London 43 740 - 3rd “ 37 813 - 4th “ 32 622 - 12th “ 28 754 - 13th “ 36 850 - 14th “ 42 949 - 2nd “ 32 529 - 5th “ 40 730 - 9th “ 31 789 - 16th “ 30 592 - -On the 3rd the division, less artillery, moved by tactical trains to -the area behind Arras; Divisional Headquarters were at Fosseux; the -167th Brigade in the Montenescourt-Gouves-Wanquentin area; the 168th -in the Warlus-Simencourt area; the 169th in the Bernaville-Dainville -area. The next day the division moved into the XIII Corps area with -Divisional Headquarters in camp near Roclincourt. Gen. Dudgeon went 210 -to see the new line on the 6th, and on the 7th the relief of the 31st -Division started. - -The line taken over was between Gavrelle and Oppy: Gavrelle was held -by us and Oppy by the Germans. - -The enemy was very quiet and the weather not too bad for the time of -year. There was, of course, rain, and it was very cold; a short time -after the division took over the line it began to snow. Battalions had -about a week in the front line, a week in support, and then in camp -for a week. The great feature of this line was Arras, for at Arras -many comforts could be purchased to alleviate the life of the soldier. - -Identification was obtained by the 168th Brigade--a prisoner from the -7th Reserve Infantry Regt., 5th Reserve Division. There were one or -two bickerings between patrols, but nothing of importance. And so -Christmas Day was passed with the division still in line. - -On the 26th December General Swift, U.S.A., and his Chief of Staff -joined the division for a week, to study British methods. - -On the 9th January the 62nd Division took over the line from the 56th. - - * * * * * - -The outstanding events of the year 1917 must be carried in the mind so -that the new situation can be appreciated. In the month of February -the Germans had started an unrestricted U-boat campaign and America -had broken off diplomatic relations with her. War was not declared -between these two countries until April, and as an immediate -consequence it influenced the plans of the Entente and Central Powers -according to the time which, in the judgment of either, it would be 211 -possible for America to make her strength felt. - -The Entente Powers looked upon America as a reserve upon which they -could count in twelve months’ time, or slightly over. They were free -to undertake large operations with ambitious objects, provided they -did not either break their armies, or so reduce them in strength as to -render their resisting power unequal to any sudden German attack. - -On the other hand, the Central Powers had to do something before the -American troops arrived and gave the balance of power definitely to -the Entente. - -Although American action in the future was the deciding factor, the -formation of plans could not rest entirely on such a direct -calculation. At first it seemed that the Entente had no reason to -think that the abdication of the Tsar would mean the defection of -Russia; and the Central Powers could only hope to delay the American -Armies by their U-boats. But the Russian debacle began with her defeat -in Galicia in the latter part of July, and it soon became evident to -the Entente that they would, before the American forces could be used, -have to fight for their existence. They had, it is true, brought the -Central Powers’ offensive in Italy, which had threatened to cause a -disaster, to a standstill, but the Bolshevist _coup d’état_ in Russia -in November had brought visions of an overwhelming mass of German -troops moving to the west. December, January, and February were gloomy -months of speculation which culminated in a state of nervous -apprehension in March. - -During the first half of the year the Central Powers had not much to -congratulate themselves upon. Baghdad was captured in March. The 212 -battles of Arras in April and of Messines in June were sudden and -definite blows which shook them, and though the Ypres battles in 1917 -were a most costly affair to the British, the German losses had been -sufficiently heavy to create consternation. Well might Ludendorff -utter a cry of elation when events in Russia opened prospects of an -early release of the German armies on that front! He no longer -believed in the assurance of the German Navy that the U-boats would -neutralise American effort, but he saw a chance of victory before the -fatal date of effective American intervention. - -He and the Field-Marshal Hindenburg must have known that they would -have to make the last fatal throw and that there was barely time to -rattle the dice. Austria was done, worn out, exhausted. It was -doubtful whether she could stand against the Italians. Allenby, under -whom the 56th Division had fought in April, had gone to Egypt in June, -and by December had captured Jerusalem; and Turkey, at the end of her -tether, lay at his mercy: events in this theatre of war might move so -fast as to bring disaster from that direction on the Central Powers. -The Bulgarians were not trusted. And there were signs that the German -Army itself had lost its arrogant spirit. - -Hindenburg could count on a preponderance of numbers on the Western -Front, but desertions were appalling in number. Tens of thousands, we -are told, crossed the frontiers into neutral countries, and a great -many more stayed at home, “tacitly tolerated by their fellow-citizens -and completely unmolested by the authorities.” - -The movement of troops from east to west was carried out rapidly. By 213 -the New Year the Germans had a majority of thirty divisions over the -Entente on the Western Front. The plan was to attack with fifty to -sixty divisions under massed artillery, varying between twenty and -thirty batteries to each kilometre of front attacked, and a multitude -of trench mortars as well. - -Meanwhile American troops were arriving and training in the back -areas. - - * * * * * - -The 56th Divisional Artillery had remained in the Mœuvres sector. -Brig.-Gen. Elkington and his headquarters had, however, moved with the -infantry, and we quote from the Brigadier’s diary: - - “The headquarters of the division and the R.A. were - established in huts in Victory Camp, and I took over command - of the R.A. covering the division on the 8th [December]. On - the 17th and 18th the 56th Divisional Artillery returned to - the division and took over in the line. This part of the - front was at the time a very quiet one, but much harassing - fire was done and a certain amount of enemy counter-battery - work was done on the battery positions. Work was begun on - rear lines and rear battery positions. Very cold weather was - experienced in December. - - We remained in this sector with headquarters at Victory - Camp, which consisted of Nissen huts and was the coldest and - bleakest spot I encountered--it was a desperately cold - winter. From the 1st to the 3rd January an American General - and his staff officers were attached to the division and - went round battery positions and saw some shooting. On the - 5th January the 62nd Divisional Infantry relieved the 56th - Divisional Infantry, and on the 7th and 8th the R.A. of the - 62nd Division came and looked over the batteries in the line. - - On the 9th January the 62nd Divisional Artillery relieved 214 - the 56th Divisional Artillery and I handed over to the - C.R.A., our batteries going back to the area round Berles - for rest and training, the infantry having moved to the - Villers-Chatel area. The R.A. Headquarters was established - for the first four days at Bertincourt, and afterwards at - the château at Berles, a very comfortable billet owned by a - French Count who was very hospitable and glad to see us and - did everything he could to make us comfortable. Inspection - and training of batteries took place, but this was greatly - hampered by the bad and severe weather.” - -Training of the infantry was, owing to the weather, not very ardent -during the divisional rest from the 9th January to the 11th February. -But it was a welcome rest. - -British strength on the Western Front was now on the downward grade. -From January divisions were cut down to nine battalions, and from the -30th of that month we must say good-bye to the 1st Battalion of the -Rangers, the 1st Battalion of the Queen Victoria’s Rifles, and the -1/3rd London Regt. The headquarters and transport of these battalions -joined the 58th Division and were incorporated in the 2nd Battalions -of their respective regiments. The 56th Division retained a certain -number of the men, who were split up as follows: Queen Victoria’s -Rifles, 5 officers and 150 other ranks to the 13th London -(Kensingtons), 12 officers and 250 other ranks to the 16th London -(Queen’s Westminster Rifles), 4 officers and 76 other ranks to the 4th -London; the Rangers sent 8 officers and 300 other ranks to the London -Rifle Brigade; while the rest passed out of the Division (7 officers -and 230 other ranks to the 1/23rd London, and 12 officers and 200 215 -other ranks to the 2nd Battalion Rangers); the 1/3rd London sent 11 -officers and 250 other ranks to the 1/1st London, 11 officers and 250 -other ranks to the 1/2 London, and 2 officers and 34 other ranks to -the 1/4 London (12 officers and 214 other ranks out of the division to -their 2nd Battalion). - -So far as the infantry were concerned, the forty-seven divisions on -the Western Front in March 1918 were reduced by a quarter--this is -exclusive of the Canadian and Australian divisions, which retained -their original strength, and includes the 41st Division, which -returned from Italy on the 2nd March. - -The relief of the 62nd Division by the 56th started on the 8th -February, and on the 11th Gen. Dudgeon took over command of the line. - -Meanwhile “the wind was whistling through the châteaux of the Higher -Command!” The severe cold and the snow at Christmas and the -commencement of the New Year was followed by a thaw and a lot of rain. -The result was that most of the trenches fell in. A period of feverish -activity followed; engineers and pioneers were working every night, -and the infantry had to provide as many men as was possible. Gradually -the defences were reconstructed and new ones added. All this activity, -mingled with orders and provisions for retirement, was greeted by the -troops with characteristic jeers. - -We do not wish to contribute to the general abuse which was levelled -at the heads of the “Staff” or “Red Tabs”--the arrangements made on -this front at least were justified by the results--but we desire to -give as far as we can the feeling of the private soldier and -regimental officer. - -Arrangements for retreat shock the troops in much the same way as a 216 -coarse expression might shock a drawing-room full of ladies. They are -offended. They ask the question: “What’s the idea?” And although they -could not enumerate the difficulties of a gradual retirement, they -seem to “sense” the fearful responsibility that is being thrust upon -them. And the very nature of the situation caused orders to be given -which suggested uncertainty and indecision. The private soldier’s -point of view was simple: he wanted to be given orders to fight on a -certain spot, but to change the spot where he should fight annoyed -him. - -The system which was adopted to meet the onslaught of the Germans was -to spread the defence over a wide belt of country. The front-line -system was not to be held; it was to be occupied by outposts whose -duty was to watch the enemy and retire on the next line if he -attacked. The fight itself was to take place in what was called the -“battle zone”; and behind was yet another line through which the enemy -must pass before our defence was broken. If the Germans penetrated -these lines, they might be said to have broken our first system of -defence. - -Behind the 56th Division were other defences on which it might fall -back, but we are only concerned with the first system. - -As to the general distribution of forces to meet the German offensive, -one-half of the British strength was devoted to protecting the Channel -ports, and the rest was thinly dispersed over the remaining front. It -must be remembered that additional front amounting to 28 miles had -been taken over by the British in January, and that Sir Douglas Haig -was now responsible for 125 miles. In view of this length of line and 217 -the extreme importance of the Channel ports, the general disposition -of troops would seem to have been wise. - -The Germans claim to have effected a surprise in March 1918--a -contention which is scarcely justified. In his interesting, lengthy, -but somewhat vague account of the assembly of the great attacking -force, Ludendorff says that ammunition dumps had been increased all -along the British front, that movement of troops was carried out at -night, but that German aviators sent up to report could see signs of -concentration on the area chosen for attack which the blind English -were _unable to perceive_! This is not accurate, but one must -admit that the German concentration and preparation were superbly -done. - -We knew that a general movement of troops from east to west had been -started in November, and that roads and railways were being improved, -artillery increased, and ammunition accumulated all along the front -from Flanders to the Oise, and by the end of February indications -became apparent that the attack would be on the Third and Fifth -Armies. - -On the 19th March the Intelligence Department reported to Sir Douglas -Haig that the enemy preparations on the Arras-St. Quentin front were -complete and that the attack would probably be launched on the 20th or -21st. - -Ludendorff assumes that “nor did the enemy discover anything by other -means ... otherwise his defensive measures would have been more -effective and his reserves would have arrived more quickly.” In this -his claim of surprise might seem to be justified, although the charge -can be met by a statement of the considerations which influenced Sir -Douglas Haig through this anxious period; he could give up no ground 218 -in the northern portion of the British area where the Channel ports -were threatened, and he knew that the ground was exceptionally dry and -that preparations for an attack had been almost completed from the -direction of Menin; the same applied to the centre, behind which lay -the collieries of northern France, and important tactical features -covering his lateral communications; in the south, in the Somme area, -ground could be given up to a certain extent without serious -consequences. - -The dispositions of British troops according to the above -considerations had an effect on the Germans, for Ludendorff tells us -that when deciding on the front to be attacked he was faced with -strong forces about Ypres, that the condition of the centre (the Lys -Valley) would not admit an attack before April (which was late in view -of the Americans), that an attack in the direction of Verdun would -lead into very hilly country, and that in making his final decisions -he was influenced by the time factor and the “weakness of the enemy.” - -During the early part of 1918 the whole of the British force in -forward areas was concerned with the problem of defence. It was not a -cheerful period. Closely typewritten sheets of paper flew about in all -directions, giving instructions, making amendments to previous -instructions, calling for suggestions, and ever warning commanders -against attack. The Cheshire Regt. and the Engineers of the 56th -Division worked night and day at improving rear lines and constructing -alternative ones; fatigue parties were called for from battalions both -in and out of the line; machine gunners and trench-mortar experts moved -restlessly from point to point, selecting possible emplacements for 219 -their guns, and the artillery did the same farther back. - -The men in the line were always the coolest in the whole of the army, -but the officers were gradually being worked up to a state of feverish -anxiety and a certain amount of bewilderment. - -On the 9th March the Kensingtons carried out a smart and successful -raid, killing about 20 and capturing 4 Germans. The prisoners stated -that the German offensive was imminent. Orders were issued for battle -positions to be manned at 5 a.m. as from the 13th. - -Another raid by the London Rifle Brigade on the 16th was hung up in a -mass of uncut wire, but 2/Lieut. Kite Powell hacked his way through -and, followed by four men, managed to enter the German line and kill -half a dozen of them. They secured no prisoner; still, the information -that the enemy front line was strongly held and that they were very -alert was of value. - -Aeroplane activity was very great from the 18th onwards, and a great -deal of individual movement was seen behind the enemy lines. Harassing -fire by the 56th Divisional Artillery was increased, and with a good -percentage of gas shells. The enemy seemed to give a great deal of -attention to our wire with his trench mortars during the increasing -bursts of artillery fire. - -On the 21st March, with one tremendous crash, the great battle opened -on a front of 44 miles, the artillery bombardment including the front -held by the 56th Division. But the attack was launched farther south -between La Fère and Croiselles. - -No less than 68 German divisions took part in the battle on the first 220 -day, many more than the whole of the British Army contained. The -training, carried out in some cases behind the Russian front, had been -so complete as to include the practising of infantry behind an actual, -live barrage. The result was admirable. Swarms of men, followed -resolutely and closely by artillery, broke through the Fifth and the -right of the Third Armies, which were composed of a total force of 29 -infantry divisions and 3 cavalry divisions. - -The German 17th Army, composed of 24 divisions, attacked north of -Cambrai; the 2nd Army, of 17 divisions, immediately south of Cambrai; -and the 18th Army, of 27 divisions, carried the attack down to La -Fère. - -The 2nd and 18th German Armies made good progress against the British -Fifth Army, but the resistance of our Third Army limited the enemy’s -success, so that the 17th German Army was not able to cut off the -Flesquières salient, near Cambrai, as had been planned. But during the -night of 22nd/23rd March the Fifth Army was back at Peronne, and there -was a deep bulge in the Third Army towards Bapaume. On the 27th the -German line ran through Albert and Montdidier. But the right of the -German 17th Army was not too comfortable--Arras must be swept aside! - -Behind Arras the wildest excitement prevailed. The word “panic,” a -humiliating word, can be applied. But, as we have said before, there -was always a zone of calmness, and that zone was the forward zone. Had -the London men of the 56th Division been able to see the scurrying -motors and anxious faces of the “soft job” men behind them, they would 221 -have been amazed. But the 56th Division just went on with the -ordinary, somewhat strenuous routine which had been instituted at the -commencement of the year, strengthening the defences, putting out -wire, arranging “blocks,” constructing emplacements for machine guns -and trench mortars. Being, however, on the flank of the XIII Corps, -regimental officers were subjected to the annoyance of frequent -changes of orders and plans. - -On the 19th March an order was given for the 56th Division to alter -the method of holding the line from a three-brigade front to a -two-brigade front. Each of the two front-line brigades would have two -battalions in line and one in reserve, and the division would have an -entire brigade in reserve. The necessary moves were made on the night -of 21st/22nd March. - -An order was issued on the 20th that the division would be relieved by -the 62nd Division, but this was cancelled on the 21st. On the 22nd a -further warning order was given that the division would be relieved by -the 2nd Canadian Division, and this also was cancelled on the 23rd. - -The situation of the Third Army, on the right of the 56th Division, -brought a multitude of instructions. On the 22nd the XVII Corps had -been ordered to withdraw to its third system on the south of the -Scarpe, but to continue holding Monchy lightly. But north of the -Scarpe the 4th Division, on the right of the 56th, would not move -until Monchy had been captured by the enemy, in which case the 56th -Division would adjust their line to run through Beatty Post, Bailleul -Post, to le Point du Jour Post. General Matheson, commanding the 4th -Division, did not, however, intend to move unless definitely ordered 222 -to do so, and if attacked would fight in three successive lines, the -last bringing him to the Point du Jour Post. - -This last assurance of General Matheson was of a nature to simplify -the possible actions of officers of the 56th Division, and was -welcome. That the enemy was going to do something was becoming -evident. At 5.30 p.m. on the 23rd he exploded a land mine under the -wire in front of Towy Post, and appeared to be manning the line -opposite the divisional front thicker than usual. Harassing fire was -turned on the German trenches, and the reserve brigade was ordered to -stand to at 5 a.m. in future. - -In the south the Germans were now approaching Albert and Roye. All -sorts of rumours were flying about behind the lines. On the 24th the -169th Brigade captured a wounded German, and he was sent for -examination in the early morning of the 25th. He said that the 101st -Reserve and 102nd Reserve Regiments, belonging to the 219th and 23rd -(Reserve) Divisions, had occupied the Wotan Stellung, behind the front -line, on the night of the 24th. These divisions had come from Riga, -and would attack on the 26th together with the 240th and 5th Bavarian -Reserve Divisions. They were to advance to a depth of four kilometres -with the right flank on Oppy, and then swing round towards Vimy. The -battalion section of the 471st Regt. had already 60 trench mortars in -position, and 8 more trench mortar companies were to arrive on the -night of the 25th. The ammunition was already in the line. One may -imagine that Gen. Dudgeon’s conference at 6.30 p.m. was far from a -dull affair. - -The artillery were ordered to fire on chosen targets through the 223 -night, and patrolling was active. - -A great deal of movement had been seen throughout the day of men and -light railways. Troops were seen detraining at Vitry. - -And that night there was an inter-battalion relief on the right, the -Queen’s Westminsters relieving the 2nd London. The party sent to -relieve Gavrelle Post found it occupied by two dead men only--the -remainder of the garrison had entirely disappeared. Signs of a -struggle were there, but no one on either flank had reported the post -being attacked, and, apparently, nothing unusual had been seen. - -Gen. Dudgeon ordered both brigades to do their utmost to secure a -German prisoner. Every effort was made, but the enemy was found more -than ever on the alert, with parties lying out to catch patrols. It is -curious that one patrol reported the enemy repairing their wire--it is -probable that they were cutting it down. - -The attack was coming, and Divisional Headquarters strained every -nerve to direct, encourage, and advise for the struggle. Some of the -orders are not too easy to understand, and one is of interest as an -example of rumour being accepted as fact. - -The artillery, of course, was very busy, and we find an instruction to -cut German wire and to keep the gaps open! And the order we refer to -as being founded on rumour was as follows: “In view possible -appearance enemy agents warn all ranks against use of word -RETIRE. Any person using this word before or during an attack -to be shot.” This was, no doubt, based on a much-circulated statement -that the Fifth Army debacle was largely due to German agents, dressed 224 -as British officers, giving the order to retire. We cannot believe in -a swarm of disguised Germans. - -It must, however, have been a very weighty consideration which induced -the Higher Command to order an extension of divisional front on the -27th. General Sir H. de Lisle, better known as the commander of the -29th Division and now in command of the XIII Corps, was ordered to -take over the line to the Souchez River, on his left. This meant that -the 56th Division had to relieve the 3rd Canadian Division, on the -left, at Tommy and Arleux Posts during the night of 27th/28th March. -At the same time the division was again ordered to treat the front -line as an outpost line, and to fight on the line between Ditch Post -and Willerval South. But at the last moment the front line was ordered -to be held as such so as to conform with the 4th Division on the -right; the 56th Division was already so stretched out that this -curious eleventh-hour change did not make much difference. - -The Vimy Ridge lay behind the division, but the ground they fought on -was not level. The 4th Division, on the right, was on high ground, and -Gavrelle lay in a slight depression; the ground rose again towards -Bailleul East Post, and fell once more in the direction of Oppy. The -division was, however, on a forward slope which gave them good -observation from a somewhat exposed position (see map contours). - -The rearrangement of the line, which took place during the night, gave -the Queen’s Westminsters the right, holding Towy Post and Gavrelle -Post with one company, while the other three companies held posts -defending Naval Trench. The London Rifle Brigade held Mill, Bradford, -and Bird Posts with two companies and one platoon, the remainder of 225 -the battalion holding posts on the Marine Trench line. The third -battalion of the brigade, the 2nd London Regt., held the Ditch, -Bailleul, and Bailleul East line. Behind them, in the Farbus line, was -one company of the 5th Cheshire Regt., and in reserve the 169th -Brigade held two companies of the 1st London Regt., attached from the -167th Brigade, and a detachment of the 176th Tunnelling Company, who -were in the Point du Jour Post. - -The 168th Brigade, on the left, held Beatty, Wood, and Oppy Posts with -two companies of the 4th London Regt., and two in support on the line -Duke Street; and Tommy and Arleux Posts with the Kensingtons, two -companies in the front line and in support. - -The actual distribution of troops on the left is not very clear, as -the redistribution was not complete when, at 3 a.m. on the 28th March, -the enemy opened a furious bombardment. We find a note that the London -Rifle Brigade had not at that hour relieved Bailleul East Post, and -that one company of the 1st Canadian Rifles were still holding Sugar -Post. This latter company remained at Sugar Post throughout the -battle, being placed, with that complete disregard of all, except the -winning of the battle, which characterised the Canadians, under the -orders of the 168th Brigade. But the London Scottish were also in this -Sugar Post-Willerval line. In the Farbus line were two platoons of the -5th Cheshires, and behind them, in the Point du Jour-Ridge Post line, -two companies of the 1st London Regt. and one and a half companies of -the 5th Cheshires. - -The two remaining battalions of the 167th Brigade and three field 226 -companies of Royal Engineers were in Divisional Reserve. - -The opening of a modern battle is, with few exceptions, a matter of -artillery. Brig.-Gen. Elkington’s diary gives us some interesting -facts: - - “On the morning of the 28th March the 56th Division was - holding a line south of Gavrelle to Arleux, a front of about - 5,000 yards. To cover this front the field-guns under the - command of the division consisted of the 56th Divisional - Artillery and 9 guns of the 52nd Army (Field Artillery - Brigade), or 45 18-pounders and 12 4·5 howitzers. Six 6-inch - Newton mortars were in action in the first-line system, and - three were covering the Bailleul-Willerval line (that is our - main line of resistance). Of the former, only two were - manned, as all the ammunition at the other mortars had been - expended previously, in accordance with orders which, later - on, were cancelled, but not before the ammunition had been - expended. - - Between 3 a.m. and 3.20 a.m. the Germans put down a heavy - barrage of gas and H.E. shells of all calibres on the - Bailleul-Willerval line and the support line. At 4 a.m. the - barrage increased over the whole of the front-line system - and our posts were heavily bombarded with trench mortars. - From 6 a.m. the hostile barrage of all calibres was heavily - concentrated on the front line, and continued to be intense - on this area until 7.15 a.m. - - During the above periods, that is from 3 a.m. until 7.15 - a.m., our artillery was firing heavily on the enemy’s front - system of trenches, special concentrations being put down, - in co-operation with the heavy artillery, on lines of - organised shell-holes. It was considered at the time that - these shell-holes were temporary trench-mortar emplacements, - but from information given by prisoners after the attack, 227 - it appears likely that they were the assembly positions of - the assaulting troops. From 6.45 a.m. onwards “counter - preparation” was put into effect. At 7.15 a.m. the hostile - barrage lifted from the front line to our support line, and - the S.O.S. went up in the Gavrelle sector and was repeated - almost immediately in the Oppy sector. Our S.O.S. was put - down over the whole of the divisional front at the same - time.” - -As may be imagined, the effect of this bombardment was terrible. The -bulk of the forward posts were obliterated. But even such -concentration as the Germans directed against the front line was not -sufficient to destroy all life--it could not deal with the whole of -the line. Towy Post and Wood Post had, during the last few days, been -subjected to a great deal of enemy attention, and the posts had been -moved--but even so the casualties were severe. One survivor came out -of Mill Post and reported that the trenches had been “blotted out,” -and that the entrance to a big dug-out there was blown in and -destroyed. - -The Germans, advancing almost shoulder to shoulder, entered Gavrelle, -which, as we know, was in a hollow. Although there was no living soul -there to oppose them, the machine gunners had the place under indirect -fire from fourteen guns, and the enemy losses were severe. But the -first stages of the battle were centred round Towy and Wood Posts. - -Capt. G. A. N. Lowndes, of the Queen’s Westminsters, was in command of -Towy Post, and with the lifting of the enemy barrage and the -appearance of the first Germans there came from the post the crackling -sound of rifle fire, joined, almost at once, by the rattle sound of 228 -Lewis guns, until the whole developed into what might be described as -a roar. But the enemy was in Gavrelle and the undefended portions of -the front line on either side of Towy Post. Once in the trenches, the -storming troops could work slowly forward under some sort of cover. To -the rifle fire of the defenders was soon added the crash of bombs. The -enemy was confident; he worked slowly and surely round the post. - -The glorious little band of Queen’s Westminsters knew what was -happening, but kept cool. Gradually they were forced into a small and -cramped area; Lewis guns and rifles dealt with Germans in the open, -clearing the ground round about and forcing the enemy to seek the -safety of the battered trench; but the store of bombs was getting low. - -Capt. Lowndes, ably supported by 2/Lieuts. L. W. Friend and J. C. B. -Price, after hanging on to the last moment, directed his dwindling -company to fight through the Germans in rear, using the remaining -bombs, and swiftly, desperately, they broke through and reached Naval -Trench and joined the rest of the battalion round headquarters. - -But the Germans, coming through Mill Post, were already in Marine -Trench, and Lieut.-Col. Glazier, commanding the Queen’s Westminsters, -passed a portion of his force into Thames Alley to form a flank. - -Now trouble came from the right. The Lancashire Fusiliers, of the 4th -Division, fell back on to the Ditch Post line, and the enemy entered -Humid Trench. Col. Glazier swung back his right flank into Towy Alley, -and held the Germans firmly. And then for a moment the fortunes of war -turned against the Queen’s Westminsters. - -The 56th Divisional Artillery, aware that the enemy were in our lines, 229 -attempted to adjust their barrage in consultation with brigadiers. It -was a most difficult task, for, needless to say, communication was -almost non-existent. At the junction of Naval and Towy Trenches was a -block, and in front of it the enemy was held, but the artillery, -probably seeing the Germans in Humid and the end of Naval Trenches, -put down their barrage too close and blew in our block. The German -hordes quickly took advantage of this bit of luck and swarmed down -Naval Trench, either killing or capturing the garrison up to the -Gavrelle road. - -About the same time the block on the left of the line, near Thames -Valley, was forced by the enemy, and the whole of the Naval Line was -in his hands. But the Queen’s Westminsters, gallantly led by Col. -Glazier, were still in front of the Germans on the line Keiller, -Pelican, and Thames Posts. Every bit of the communication trenches -which gave a good fire position, every dump-hole, even the shell-holes -were manned, and, as the Germans advanced over the open, in -reorganised lines, from Naval Trench, they were met with a fresh -rattle and roar of rifle fire. The ground was covered with silent and -groaning figures in the field-grey uniform, and the enemy had to -resort once more to bombing. - -Again the Queen’s Westminsters gave up a little ground, but the -enemy’s effort was smashed. At 11 a.m. the position was: we held a -block in Towy Alley, about 300 yards east of the Ditch-Bailleul East -line, and Castleford Post, and the rest of the battalion had joined -the 2nd London Regt. in the Bailleul-Willerval line. - -The account given by the London Rifle Brigade on the left of the 230 -Queen’s Westminsters is short, but in it one can read the desperate -nature of the fighting and the gallant resistance which was put up. -The relief of Bradford and Bird Posts was not completed until 3.30 -a.m., when the bombardment which heralded the attack commenced. All -forward and lateral communication was at once cut. Wire and posts -defending the front line were wiped out. When the enemy infantry -advanced, they simply walked into the front line, rushed the few men -left at the blocks in Belvoir and Brough, and commenced bombing -towards Naval Trench. The battalion was almost annihilated, and what -was left joined the Queen’s Westminsters in Thames Valley and became -mixed up with them. The fighting strength of this battalion at the -commencement of the battle was 23 officers and 564 other ranks; it was -reduced to 8 officers and about 60 other ranks. - -The whole of the 169th Brigade now stood on the Bailleul-Willerval -line and the enemy was held. Twice he attacked over the open, with -aeroplanes flying low and pouring a hail of bullets on the defenders, -while field guns were dragged by plunging horses and straining men -across No Man’s Land as far as Naval Trench, but each time he was -defeated. The field guns fired no more than twenty rounds before being -silenced by the 56th Divisional Artillery; and though the enemy -infantry had a novel method of advancing--they stood up, threw their -rifles forward into a shell-hole, held up their hands, and advanced, -only to drop by the side of their arms, which they immediately -proceeded to use--they made no further progress. - -The right of the 56th Division was, at 11 a.m., in touch with the 4th 231 -Division. A battalion of the 167th Brigade was placed under the orders -of the 169th, and six machine guns were sent up to Point du Jour, and -two field companies of the Engineers to Tongue and Blanch Posts, so -that the right flank of the division seemed secure. - -The 4th Londons, on the right of the 168th Brigade, put up a most -gallant defence. Wood Post, held by 2 officers and 45 other ranks, had -been moved before the bombardment and so was untouched. The full -garrison was there to meet the enemy, who advanced in a solid line on -the left of the wood, but came through the wood in groups of about ten -men each, 40 yards or so apart, and followed by further groups of -about thirty men each some 200 yards in rear. - -The enemy was completely checked in the wood and on the left; but -Beatty Post, on the right, which had been badly battered about by -trench mortars, was occupied. The garrison, consisting at first of 3 -officers and 84 other ranks, though much depleted when the assault was -launched, was overwhelmed by sheer numbers, and only 1 officer and 6 -men ever returned. The enemy then started to work round to the rear of -Wood Post, but for over an hour this hard little band held out and -repulsed the enemy. - -Oppy Post was also smothered by artillery and trench mortars, and -eventually overwhelmed by the storming infantry. Of the 2 officers and -48 other ranks forming the garrison, 1 officer and 5 other ranks were -left. - -Fifteen minutes after the assault was launched, the enemy was in the -Earl Lane and Viscount Street, but were held for a time by the troops -in Ouse Alley. But so long as Wood Post held, the enemy did not make 232 -any great progress. - -Major F. A. Phillips was in command of the forward fighting, and moved -about encouraging his men, who were inflicting heavy casualties on the -enemy whenever an attempt was made to advance over the open. But Wood -Post fell back just before 9 o’clock, and soon after the enemy began -to force their way up Ouse Alley from Viscount Street, in rear of the -troops who were fighting so successfully in Marquis Trench. Major -Phillips promptly attacked over the open with about twenty details -from headquarters, and drove them back. - -The enemy had built up heavy rifle fire from Oppy Wood, although he -was suffering severely there from our artillery fire, and attacked the -left of the battalion many times over the open; but the Marquis line -held, and at 11 o’clock the position was extraordinary. The 169th -Brigade on the right was back in the Bailleul-Willerval line; and -while the advance companies of the 4th London were still holding the -Marquis line, the enemy was in Ouse Alley and bombing his way towards -the Bailleul line, also he was advancing over the open south of Ouse -Alley. The position then was very precarious, and the reserve company, -which Colonel Marchment had sent to get in touch with the forward -troops and form a flank, was unable to reach the forward troops. Major -Phillips decided to withdraw. - -The withdrawal was witnessed by Colonel Marchment from his -headquarters: - - “I watched it through my glasses. It was carried out in a - very steady and orderly way, the men leaving in groups of 233 - about a dozen. Although exposed to a heavy fire from front - and flanks, they made excellent use of the ground, and - suffered very few casualties.... The men of the reserve - company met the survivors returning and covered their - retirement.” - -The Kensingtons on the left of the division were not attacked. Some -fifty of the enemy approached Tommy Post, but were at once driven off -with casualties. But the battalion gave invaluable aid to the 4th -Londons, on the right, inflicting heavy losses by Lewis gun, rifle, -and rifle grenade fire on the German support troops as they came up to -the wood. About 11.30 a.m. the battalion was ordered to retire, in -conjunction with the right of the 3rd Canadian Division, on the left, -and so came into line with the rest of the division. - -The intense anxiety at Brigade and Divisional Headquarters can best be -imagined. For the first two hours of the battle little news could be -gained from Battalion Headquarters as to the progress of the fight. -The whole battlefield was enveloped in smoke, and interest was chiefly -centred on the fine stand which was being made by the Queen’s -Westminsters at Towy Post, where a power buzzer was installed, and -messages were received from the signallers even after the capture of -the post. At one time, while the 4th Londons were still holding the -front-line system, the enemy was attacking Bailleul East Post, held by -the London Scottish, and had captured two machine guns with crews just -in front of the post. A well-timed counter-attack from this gallant -regiment drove the enemy back and released the guns and crews. - -As the smoke cleared from the field, the Divisional Artillery took 234 -every advantage of their well-situated observation posts. But, though -the struggle was going on before them, observers found that both sides -were frequently so mixed up that they could give no help. Small bodies -of our infantry could be seen clearly, fighting with Germans on all -sides of them. - -On the right the situation of the 4th Division was very obscure. The -division was reported to have lost touch with its own brigades, while -the lateral line between the 169th and 12th Brigades was also cut. - -With the withdrawal of the 56th Division to the Bailleul-Willerval -line the situation cleared. They were then in touch with the 4th -Division, and the artillery was able to put down a protective barrage -in front of this line. The 3rd Canadian Division gave valuable -assistance with nine 18-pounders. - - [Illustration: 8. THE FIRST BATTLE OF ARRAS 1918.] - - “From this time till about 3 p.m.” (writes Brig.-Gen. - Elkington), “many excellent targets in the open were engaged - by both field and heavy artillery with great effect. - Unfortunately, owing to the limited number of guns - available, and that many had to be used for the immediate - protection of our infantry, only a few could be used for the - excellent targets in the open. At about 3.30 p.m. the enemy - made a heavy attack against the Bailleul line, particularly - on Bailleul East Post; this was completely shattered by a - concentrated barrage and by rifle and machine-gun fire. With - the exception of hostile bombing attacks up the - communication trenches leading to the Bailleul line, the - enemy made no further serious effort to attack. All battery - positions were heavily shelled throughout the day by all - calibres of ordnance, the shelling being more of the nature 235 - of area shoots than definite counter-battery work. As a - result, from dawn on the 28th to dawn on the 29th twelve - 18-pounders were destroyed or put out of action by enemy - shell-fire. In addition two 18-pounders in position as an - enfilade section near Arleux, facing south-east, had to be - destroyed and abandoned when our line was withdrawn to the - Bailleul line. This section engaged many targets with - observation from the vicinity of the guns, and was fought - until our infantry withdrew through it. The detachments then - retired after damaging the guns, burning the dug-outs, and - removing dial sights and breach blocks. All the six 6-inch - mortars in the front line were lost to the enemy, and no - news was available as to the fate of the officers and - detachments of the two that were manned (they were - afterwards found to have been made prisoners).... During the - night of the 28th/29th, with the exception of two batteries, - all the Divisional Artillery was withdrawn to positions at - an average of about 3,600 yards to our new front, this move - being carried out by single batteries in turns.... The - ammunition expended from the early morning of the 28th to - the early morning of the 29th by the 56th Divisional - Artillery alone was: 23,000 rounds of 18-pounder and 8,000 - rounds of 4·5 howitzer.... As a result of an urgent request - to the Corps on the afternoon of the 28th for new guns to - replace the damaged ones, six new ones were sent up--these - turned out to be 15-pounders, for which we had no - ammunition.... The Germans in their official communiqué - reported that the 56th Division had been annihilated!” - -The German attack was definitely crushed in the morning, but during -the afternoon a number of half-hearted and tentative attacks were -made. The situation, however, became more quiet about 6 p.m., and the 236 -169th Brigade was relieved by the 167th, with the 5th Canadian Mounted -Rifles in support at Point du Jour. - -During the night the engineers were employed in blocking and -filling-in the communication trenches in front of the new line, and -patrolling was actively carried out. The Kensingtons penetrated into -Arleux Loop South, Kent Road, and the junction of Tommy and Baron, -which seems to show that the enemy were dazed. - -On the 29th, except for some demonstrations at the bombing blocks, the -enemy made no move. There were many reports that he was massing for -further attacks, but it became evident that he was relieving his -storming troops. As night fell, the first platoons of the 4th Canadian -Division started to relieve, and during the night the 167th Brigade -moved back to Villers au Bois, the 168th to Mont St. Eloi, and the -169th to Ecoivres. - -On the 30th General Dudgeon visited the First Army Headquarters, where -he was congratulated by His Majesty the King. - -There is little doubt that the enemy hoped to achieve great results by -this new stroke, and that its failure was a serious set-back. Five -divisions attacked the 4th and 56th Divisions north of the Scarpe and, -according to captured documents, when the line Vimy-Bailleul-St. -Laurent-Blangy had been won, three special divisions were to attack -and capture the Vimy Ridge on the following day. South of the Scarpe -eleven divisions were launched, with the object of capturing Arras and -carrying the attack as far south as Bucquoy. The German official list -(published 1919) gives eleven divisions attacking north and south of 237 -the Scarpe, one division at Neuville Vitasse, and one at -Moyenneville--thirteen in all. It makes no mention of an attack south -of Moyenneville. But the eleven which attacked on the Scarpe were -beaten by the four British divisions which held that line--the 4th and -56th on the north, and the 3rd and 15th on the south. - -From this date onward the great German offensive began to decline, and -ended in the Somme area with a final effort to separate the French and -British Armies on the 4th and 5th April, by an attack on the north and -south of the Somme. “It was an established fact,” says Ludendorff, -“that the enemy’s resistance was beyond our strength.” Strategically -the Germans had not won what the events of the 23rd, 24th, and 25th -March had led them to hope for--the failure to take Amiens was a great -disappointment. - -The total casualties of the division were 55 officers and 1,433 other -ranks--not excessive, considering the weight of the attack and the -immortal triumph gained by the 56th Division. The importance of this -battle is so great that we give the comments of the two brigadiers. - -Brig.-Gen. Coke says that during the six weeks his brigade had been in -the line, the Cheshire Regt. had worked splendidly, and had put up -double apron belts of wire where they would be most effective--the -Naval-Marine line was protected by five belts of wire--and this stood -the bombardment well enough to be a serious obstacle. When the smoke, -which had enveloped the field at the commencement of the battle, had -cleared, excellent observation was obtainable, and the divisional -observers and artillery observers did splendid work. The enemy 238 -batteries, which came into action in the open during the afternoon, -were brought up under cover of smoke, and started to fire point-blank -at the Bailleul line, but the Divisional Artillery silenced them in a -few minutes. There was no shortage of ammunition or bombs. The system -of keeping a plentiful supply in deep dug-outs proved sound. - - “All concerned are convinced that the enemy losses were - extremely heavy in front of this brigade. The fullest use - was made of Lewis guns and rifles, and every attempt of the - enemy to advance on the Bailleul line over the open was - checked by these means. The fire-bays constructed along Towy - Alley proved specially valuable, and very considerable - losses were inflicted on the enemy from them during our - withdrawal to the Bailleul line. - - Many officers testify to the gallant way in which the - Machine Gun Battalion served its guns to the last and to the - good results of the machine-gun fire. - - Our artillery inflicted the maximum amount of damage - possible. The number of guns available for the brigade - section was quite inadequate to cover effectively such a - wide front. But the infantry testify to the heavy losses - inflicted on the enemy owing to the quick way in which the - group and battery commanders engaged each good target as - soon as it was observed. - - Gallant work was done by the 169th Light Trench Mortar - Battery during the day. Three of the teams disappeared with - the garrisons in the left sector. During the withdrawal, - mortars were placed to cover Pelican and Bailleul Posts.” - -It was widely noticed by the men of this brigade that the enemy -approached in a slow, dazed manner. The brigadier thinks that this may -have been due to the great weight carried by the German infantry, who 239 -seem, amongst other things, to have carried a week’s rations. The -enemy advanced in three or four lines and almost shoulder to shoulder. - -Brig.-Gen. Loch sent in a frank and interesting paper, in which he -points out: - - “(_a_) The uselessness of locking up large garrisons in the - front-line posts which are clearly known to the enemy and - are within effective trench-mortar range. Front-line posts - should be held lightly, and be used as observation posts and - to keep the enemy patrols from approaching our main line of - defence. They should be carefully concealed, need have no - regular communication trenches, and should be frequently - changed. The garrisons should be small and frequently - relieved. If rushed and captured from time to time, little - harm is done, provided the garrison have no identification - marks. Deep dug-outs in such posts are a positive danger and - should not be allowed; shelters against the weather are - ample. If heavily attacked, the rôle of such posts should be - to put up the S.O.S. and withdraw. The sole exception to - this rôle is in the case of posts whose whereabouts can be - properly hidden from the enemy. Such posts can be strongly - garrisoned and may have machine guns, as they will have to - break up and delay an attack. The losses in the forward - posts are sufficient commentary on the unsoundness of the - (present) system. - - (_b_) The value of changing the actual position of the - garrison in any post--_vide_ Wood Post. - - (_c_) The grave danger of altering carefully thought-out - dispositions at the eleventh hour. On the evening of the - 27th inst. my dispositions, which had been most minutely - worked out to meet the situation of an attack on my right - flank at the junction with the left of the 169th Brigade, - about Viscount Street, and covering Bradford and Mill Posts, 240 - had to be changed as the result of orders, and consequently - this portion of the line (always weak) was rendered - hopelessly incapable of withstanding a strong attack. It is - recognised that larger questions were involved, and no doubt - decided the redistribution, which was not complete before - the attack developed. - - (_d_) The uselessness of Stokes mortars in the actual front - line. Such weapons can only open on their S.O.S. lines, and - are very vulnerable from attacks on the flanks. The four - forward guns only fired about 50 rounds before being - surrounded. Had they been behind the main defensive line - covering the communication trenches, and themselves covered - by the infantry, they would have been far more valuable, and - would not possibly have been overrun. - - (_e_) The value of trench blocks was fully found out. Such - blocks should be prepared ready against penetration - laterally, so as to localise it. - - (_h_) Previous rehearsals and thorough knowledge of overland - routes are essential. To the fact that these points had - received proper attention is attributable the successful - delaying action of this brigade. - - (_i_) Defensive flanks prepared as such are invaluable. - - (_j_) Infantry and machine guns must establish closer - liaison.... It should be recognised once and for all that - all machine guns in a brigade sector must come under the - senior machine-gun officer in that sector.... Nothing herein - said, however, should be permitted to detract from the - principle that the battalion commander can and should issue - orders to the guns covering him if he considers the - situation demands it.... - - (_k_) Main forward communication trenches should never be - traced to lead into strong points.... Such communication - trenches are mere covering approaches to these strong points - and afford easy access to the enemy. Our main battle zone 241 - should not be covered by a single trench, e.g. the Red Line - (Bailleul), but should consist of at least three trenches - with strong points so constructed as not to be apparent and - obvious. As with garrisons of forward posts, so with - garrisons of battle trenches, they should be constantly - moved so as to avoid giving away the position actually held.” - -A captured German officer of the 152nd I.R., 41st Division, gave as -the main causes of the failure of the attack (_a_) the intensity of -the machine-gun barrage, which caused heavy casualties. His regiment -lost 12 officers and the 16th I.R. lost 24 officers; (_b_) watches did -not appear to have been correctly synchronised. We have mentioned the -service rendered by the Machine Gun Battalion, but, unfortunately, -there is no record of Lieut.-Col. E. C. S. Jervis’ dispositions. This -gallant and able officer says that the “tender spots” in his defence -were the low ridges running due east and west through Bradford Post, -and from Mill Post, south of Belvoir Alley, and then west. The former -could not be covered by machine-gun fire, the latter was. And we know -that the enemy, having exterminated the garrison, were mown down, in -and round Gavrelle, from the indirect fire of fourteen machine-guns. - -Apart from the heavy artillery fire, which, in itself, caused heavy -casualties, Colonel Jervis points out an interesting feature in this -battle: the complete mastery of the air which the enemy had throughout -the day, resulting in machine-guns being spotted and engaged by -low-flying aeroplanes, which also directed the fire of specially -detailed heavy artillery. Needless to say, machine-guns are very -vulnerable to this form of attack; and we must also point out, having 242 -mentioned the capture of guns, that when once the enemy has penetrated -the trench system machine-gunners have great difficulty in dealing -with bombing attacks from the flanks. The Machine Gun Battalion, -however, had a great opportunity in this battle, and took full -advantage of it. - -Brig.-Gen. Elkington expresses the opinion that this was the best -action fought by the 56th Division. We do not go quite so far as this. -It was more satisfactory to the troops, no doubt, but there is a great -difference between defence and attack. A successful defence is more -cheering to the infantry and artillery, inasmuch as they can more -easily estimate the damage they do to the enemy; but it would not be -fair to say that this was better than the hard fighting at Gommecourt -and south of Arras in April 1917, or indeed on the Somme in 1916 and -Ypres in 1917. The fact remains, however, that the 56th Division had, -by its stout defence, twice saved the situation, which had been -imperilled by enemy successes elsewhere. - - - - - CHAPTER VIII 243 - - THE ADVANCE TO VICTORY - - BATTLE OF ALBERT 1918--BATTLE OF THE SCARPE 1918 - - -It must not be thought that this first great German effort ended like -Act I at a theatre, with a curtain dropping for fifteen minutes while -the actors rested and changed their clothes, and the spectators found -solace in nicotine or alcohol. - -Troops in line, though they were not being attacked, probably worked -harder than ever before and the nervous tension was as great as ever. -All were conscious that the Germans might erupt again, and, as is -usual in such times of stress, the weak-hearted were always ready to -endow the enemy with miraculous powers of assembling, of covering -himself with a cloak of invisibility. The rush had been stopped, but -only by the sacrifice of a very considerable area of ground, and at -the expense of many reserves; but a mass of enemy divisions was still -concentrated on the Somme. - -It was certain that the enemy would attack again, and it seemed -probable that it would be about the centre of the British line, where -his preparations were already complete. Indeed, the situation was more -serious than it had ever been. - -The British Army had used up all its reserves in the fighting on the 244 -Somme, and in addition ten divisions had been withdrawn from the north -and replaced with worn-out divisions, reinforced from England. The -reasons for draining the north are given by Sir Douglas Haig as being -that he could, under urgent necessity, give ground there to a limited -extent, but a break-through in the centre, about Vimy, “would mean the -realisation of the enemy’s plans, which had been foiled by our defence -of Arras on the 28th March, namely, the capture of Amiens and the -separation of the bulk of the British Armies from the French and from -those British forces acting under the direction of the latter.” -Therefore, in view of the preparations which had been made on that -sector by the enemy, British forces could not be reduced. - -Certain preparations for an attack north of the La Bassée Canal had -been observed prior to the 21st March, and there were indications that -the enemy was completing these early in April; but the extent and -force of the possible attack could not be gauged. - -On the 7th April a heavy and prolonged bombardment with gas shell was -opened by the Germans from Lens to Armentières. And at 4 o’clock in -the morning of the 9th the bombardment was reopened with the greatest -intensity. At 7 o’clock, again helped by a thick fog, the enemy -attacked the left brigade of the Portuguese 2nd Division and broke -into their trenches; a few minutes later the attack spread to the -north and south. The attack included the left of the First Army and -the right of the Second Army. - -This great thrust in the direction of Hazebrouck was brought to a -standstill between Merville and the Forêt de Nieppe, but the enemy -penetrated beyond Bailleul, and in the north took Kemmel Hill and 245 -forced a retirement from the Passchendaele Ridge. - -This brings the general situation up to the end of April. But we must -note that on the 14th Marshal Foch became the Allied Generalissimo. - -The next German move was on the 27th May, north-west of Rheims, on the -Aisne front. The 19th, 21st, 25th, and 50th British Divisions, which -had taken part in both the Somme and the Lys Valley fighting, had been -sent down to a quiet part of the French front; they were joined by the -8th Division, which had been in some of the hardest fighting on the -Somme. These divisions constituted the IX Corps and were included in -the Sixth French Army. The German attack fell on the IX Corps and the -French Corps on their left, which was holding the Chemin des Dames; -they were forced from their positions, and by the 30th May the enemy -had reached the Marne. The attacks continued until the 6th June, when -they culminated in two attempts on the Montagne de Bligny, but here -they were held. - -By this time the Allied reserves were being used wherever they were -wanted. But it had been for the most part French reserves which had -come to the aid of the British. At the beginning of July, however, -Marshal Foch believed that the enemy was about to attack east and west -of Rheims, and he moved the whole of his French troops (eight -divisions) from Flanders, and in addition asked for four British -divisions to relieve French troops on the Somme. A further four -divisions were also sent down as a reserve behind the French front. - -As the Marshal had foreseen, the enemy attacked on the 15th July, and, -after making progress and crossing the Marne, was held by French, 246 -American, and Italian divisions. - -On the 18th July the Marshal launched his great counter-offensive on -the Château Thierry-Soissons front, and in this used the four British -divisions he had held in reserve, and which constituted the XXII -Corps. (The 56th Division entered this Corps later on.) - -In view of the defeats inflicted up to the moment of the -counter-offensive, it might well be supposed that the troops of the -Entente were despondent. The Germans were surprised at M. Clemenceau -stating that he would fight before Paris, that he would fight in -Paris, and that he would fight behind Paris, and this same spirit -certainly pervaded the 56th Division. With these great enemy successes -throughout the months of March, April, May, and July in mind, the -actions of the 56th Division during those months are perhaps the most -significant and, in our opinion, the most gallant work they performed. -There was no set battle. And a set battle is in some ways the easiest -kind of attack for the infantry. The operations through those months -were of a minor character, calling for a high level of courage and -determination from small parties of men, parties so small that the -success of the enterprise must depend on individual gallantry, as -there was no mass to drag them along. At any time minor operations -deserve more praise than is allotted to them, and at this time, in the -face of a series of German victories, they are worthy of the highest -admiration. - -Divisional Headquarters were at a place called Acq, to the north-west -of Arras, and the brigades in the neighbouring villages. Again the -division was not to know a lengthy period of rest, for on the 8th 247 -April the 56th Division had relieved the 1st Canadian Division and -Gen. Dudgeon took over command of the line. During the week of -so-called rest, brigades were called upon to provide anything between -1,200 and 1,500 men each night for fatigues, digging further lines of -defence. “Bow Bells” were active, and those who were not on fatigue -joined in many a chorus with a flavour and memory of London Town. - -The new front was south of the Scarpe and the Arras-Douai railway, -ground over which the division had fought in the same month of the -previous year. The high ground of Monchy and Orange Hill, on this side -of the Scarpe, had been lost on the 28th, and the line now ran through -Fampoux, on the north of the river, in front of Feuchy to Bois des -Bœufs, to the east of Tilloy, and so to Neuville Vitasse. Bois des -Bœufs was about the centre of the line held by the division, which was -thus astride of the Arras-Cambrai road. The Corps was the XVII -(Fergusson), and had been part of the Third Army, but on the 8th it -was transferred to the First Army. - -From the moment of taking over the line, patrols were pursuing an -aggressive policy. Many small encounters took place in No Man’s Land, -the 56th Division gradually gaining the ascendancy over the enemy. - -On the 19th, at 4.30 a.m., the 168th Brigade carried out a most -successful enterprise. The idea was to advance the outpost line on the -Tilloy-Wancourt road, and was undertaken by the London Scottish on the -right, with one company and a bombing section, and the 4th London -Regt. on the left, with one platoon and two bombing sections. The enemy 248 -were taken completely by surprise. One warrant officer and three other -ranks were captured, together with nine machine guns and a -Grenatenwerfer. The enemy line was held throughout the day, but the -hostile artillery fire became stronger, the position was not -particularly good, and towards the evening orders were given to -evacuate it. While this was being done at dusk, the Germans launched a -counter-attack and a lively scuffle ensued. The enemy was first beaten -off, and then the retirement was effected. - -A curious incident occurred during this brush with the enemy. The -Germans, as usual, sent up a multitude of lights, and a combination of -these appear to have presented to the artillery observers a cluster of -lights such as our S.O.S. rocket contained at that moment. The S.O.S. -barrage was accordingly put down, much to the surprise of the London -Scottish. - -The prisoners were of the 65th Infantry Regt., 185th Division. - -On the 23rd April the 56th Division took over from the 15th Division -the sector north of the Arras-Cambrai road, and held the whole of the -XVII Corps front. - -The enemy raided on the 24th, and occupied for a short period a -gun-pit post. He was ejected and gained no identification, but two of -his dead were found and proved to be of the 28th Infantry Regt., 185th -Division. But the next night two prisoners were captured by a patrol -on the extreme left of the line, near Broken Mill, belonging to the -14th Bavarian Regt., 16th Bavarian Division, which indicated a relief -of the 185th Division. - -Gen. Dudgeon, who had led the division through some very heavy 249 -fighting, fell ill on the 25th and was sent to hospital. His record -with the division is a fine one. At the third battle of Ypres he had -scarcely time to look round, knew no one in the division, and his -position might be described as most unenviable; at the battle of -Cambrai he was called upon to carry out a most difficult task; at -Arras he went through a most anxious and trying period. At none of -these places did he falter. The ordeals which were thrust upon him -were heavy, but he brought the division through them triumphantly. - -Brig.-Gen. Freeth assumed temporary command of the division, until -Gen. Hull arrived on the 4th May. - -No man had such power over the 56th Division as Gen. Hull. The -wonderful pugnacious spirit they had shown in the Laventie-Richebourg -line was roused to its highest pitch when, after a quiet ten days’ -study of the line, the General ordered a whole series of raids, which -at last caused the Germans to erect a board, in their line, on which -was chalked: “Please don’t raid us any more!” - -On the 21st May the 8th Middlesex raided near the Tilloy-Wancourt road -and captured four prisoners and a machine gun. They established the -important fact that the 16th Bavarian Division had been relieved by -the 214th, the prisoners being of the 50th Regt. - -On the 27th patrols ran into strong parties of the enemy covering a -large number of men engaged in wiring the enemy front. The next night -a somewhat ambitious raid was made on a wide front of either side of -the Tilloy-Wancourt road. On the left was the 7th Middlesex, in three 250 -parties (one company in all), on the right two platoons of the 1st -London Regt. - -The raid was a great success. Under an excellent barrage, of which -everyone spoke with the highest praise, the raiders entered the enemy -lines. They found it packed with men north of the road. The 1st -Londons claimed to have killed 40 south of the road, and the 7th -Middlesex appear to have spread terror and devastation in their area. - -The right party of Middlesex estimated that they had killed 32 of the -enemy and captured 1 machine gun. The centre party first met the enemy -in shell-holes outside their wire, and quickly disposed of them; they -claimed 35 Germans killed, 1 prisoner, and 1 machine gun. The left -party counted the damage they inflicted as no less than 60 killed. The -artillery had also done fearful execution. Although many of the enemy -were seen running away, the total casualties inflicted by this raid -were reckoned to be 200. Making every allowance for exaggeration--for -it is extremely difficult to count dead men during a raid--the facts -remain that the raid was a huge success and the casualties inflicted -exceedingly heavy. - -No attempt was made to advance our outpost line and our wounded were -taken safely back. The total casualties of the raiding parties were 2 -officers killed and 2 wounded, 2 other ranks killed and 49 -wounded--the wounds were mostly slight. The identification procured -was normal--50th Regt., 214th Division. - -On the 30th May the Kensingtons sent out an enterprising patrol which -rushed an enemy post and captured two more prisoners. Identification -normal. - -The month of June opened with a raid by the Kensingtons near the 251 -Cambrai road. Many of the enemy were killed and 27 taken prisoners. -The Germans did not show much fight on this occasion, but in most -cases emerged from dug-outs with no rifles or equipment. They were -again of the 50th Infantry Regt., 214th Division. The Kensingtons’ -casualties were 1 killed and 17 wounded. - -On the 10th June the 7th Middlesex raided on the left of the line, -near Broken Mill, and secured two prisoners of the 358th Infantry -Regt., 214th Division. - -One company of the London Rifle Brigade suddenly raided at 3 o’clock -in the afternoon on the 12th June south of the Cambrai road. They -advanced under cover of smoke and killed about 24 of the enemy and -captured 1 machine gun. Their casualties were only 3 killed and 11 -wounded, in spite of their daring. Identification normal. - -Soon after this raid the Germans were seen to be active in their -lines. Many officers were noticed examining our lines on the 24th -June, and the next night a platoon of the 1st Londons and a platoon of -the 8th Middlesex entered the enemy lines on the left and inflicted -casualties, but failed to obtain identification. This was soon -secured, however, by the London Rifle Brigade, who brought in a man of -the 50th Infantry Regt. on the 3rd July. - -The Queen’s Westminsters sent a company over into some fortified -gun-pits on the 8th July, and secured three prisoners of the 358th -Regiment, 214th Division. They took over with them some heavy charges -of ammonal, as it was known that a deep dug-out existed. As soon as -the raiders reached the gun-pits the garrison, led by an officer, -attempted to come out of the dug-out. The officer was promptly shot, 252 -though he missed the leading man of the Queen’s Westminsters by a -hair’s-breadth, and a charge of the explosive was thrown down the -dug-out. A terrific explosion completely destroyed that entrance. The -raiders then found the second entrance and treated it in the same -fashion. The prisoners stated that between fifty and sixty men were in -the dug-out with two officers. - -This ended the series of raids, and it would seem as though the 185th -and 214th German Divisions had good cause to remember the 56th -Division. But it is an exceedingly fine record, and speaks highly of -the _moral_ of the London men and the inspiring leadership of -their General. - -Gen. Hull handed over to the 2nd Canadian Division on the 15th July, -and the division moved through Roellecourt to Villers Châtel. - -Before leaving this period we must quote from Brig.-Gen. Elkington’s -diary: - - “In addition to the 56th Divisional Artillery I had several - other R.A. brigades under my command to assist in covering - the front, namely the 29th, 277th, and 311th R.A. Brigades. - During April and May Gen. Dudgeon suffered from severe - rheumatism and had to give up command of the division. - Major-Gen. Hull returned and took over command. - Reconnaissances and selection of several back lines, in case - of withdrawal being necessary on this front, were carried - out, and all battery positions carefully marked and their - observation posts selected, also their lines of retreat if - necessary. Continual training in moving warfare was also - carried out by means of skeleton drill with full staff. A - polo ground was used near Dainville and play went on twice a - week until the enemy elected to shell the ground, when it - had to be stopped. During this period the artillery 253 - supported many successful raids by our infantry and the - Canadians on our right.... The ‘Bow Bells’ established - themselves in a hut near our headquarters and gave many - excellent shows to crowded houses. Towards the end of May - Indian drivers were sent to us from the Divisional - Ammunition Column to release the European personnel. These - drivers did very well after they had been trained, but - suffered rather from the cold during the winter. On the 15th - July the 56th Divisional Infantry was relieved by the 2nd - Canadian Division, and I remained in the line commanding the - R.A. until the 21st July, when we were relieved.” - -Refitting and training were carried out, and after two weeks in the -back area, which was not free from enemy attention in the nature of -aeroplane bombs, the division started on the 31st July to relieve -portions of the 1st Canadian Division in the Tilloy and Vitasse -sections of the line. The Telegraph Sector was relieved during the -night of the following day, and on the 2nd August Gen. Hull took over -command of the line. - -The weather generally was very good and the line quiet. The 167th -Brigade obtained identification on the 4th showing that the 185th -German Division had been relieved by the 39th Division. On the 8th the -division projected gas on Neuville Vitasse, but otherwise everything -was quiet. - -On the 15th the 167th Brigade was relieved by the 44th Brigade, 15th -Division, and moved by rail to Izel-les-Hameau area. On the 18th the -168th Brigade was relieved by the 46th Brigade and moved to Mazières -area. And on the 18th the 169th Brigade went to Arras. - -At that date there was a proposal that the XVII Corps should attack 254 -Orange Hill and Chapel Hill, and the 56th Division was to take part in -this attack. Days, however, were spent in moving about. - -On the 20th Sir Douglas Haig visited Gen. Hull. The same day the 169th -Brigade moved to Avesne-le-Comte area, and the 168th to Lignereuil. At -mid-day on the 21st the 56th Division was transferred from the XVII -Corps to the VI Corps, and the whole division moved to the Bavincourt -area, when an entirely new scheme of attack came into being. - - * * * * * - -In his dispatch covering this period Sir Douglas Haig writes: - - “The definite collapse of the ambitious offensive launched - by the enemy on the 15th July, and the striking success of - the Allied counter-offensive south of the Aisne, effected a - complete change in the whole military situation.” - -This first big operation of Marshal Foch had inflicted heavy losses on -the enemy. Ten divisions were broken up and the remnants used as -reinforcements to others. The attempt to make the Entente Powers sue -for peace before the arrival of the Americans had failed--not only -were a million troops from the United States in France, but the -English divisions had been largely made up to strength. Between May -and June ten English divisions had been reduced to cadres--seven of -these were reconstituted during July and August. And German General -Headquarters had been forced to take momentous decisions. They had to -withdraw from the salient between Rheims and Soissons, and also abandon 255 -their idea of a new offensive in Flanders. “By the beginning of -August,” says Ludendorff, “we had suspended our attack and reverted to -the defensive on the whole front.” - -At a conference, held on the 23rd July, it was arranged by Marshal -Foch that the British, French, and American Armies should each prepare -plans for a local offensive. The objectives on the British front were -the disengagement of Amiens and the freeing of the Paris-Amiens -railway by an attack on the Albert-Montdidier front. The rôle of the -French and American Armies was to free other strategic railways -farther south and east. - -There seems a suggestion in his dispatches that the British -Commander-in-Chief was somewhat perturbed by this decision. He had the -safety of the Channel ports and the danger of a fresh German offensive -in that direction ever in his mind, and we know that it was -Ludendorff’s plan. There is an indication that Sir Douglas Haig was -urging a counter-stroke in the north. “These different operations,” he -says, “had already been the subject of correspondence between Marshal -Foch and myself.” Ultimately he came to the conclusion that the tasks -assigned to the British forces east of Amiens should take precedence -“as being the most important and the most likely to give large -results.” - -The attack opened on the 8th August on a front of over eleven miles -from just south of the Amiens-Roye road to Morlancourt. On the right -was the Canadian Corps, in the centre the Australian Corps, and on the -left the III Corps. The attack of the First French Army was timed to -take place an hour later between Moreuil and the British right. By the -12th August 22,000 prisoners and over 400 guns had been captured, and 256 -the line had been advanced to a depth of twelve miles, to the old -German positions in 1916. - -The 8th August was the black day of the German Army in the history of -this war, says Ludendorff.[5] - - “The Emperor told me later that, after the failure of the - July offensive and after the 8th August, he knew the war - could no longer be won. The official report of the evening - of the 8th announced briefly that the enemy had penetrated - our line south of the Somme on a wide front. Early the - following morning General von Cramon rang me up from Baden. - He informed me that my report had caused great alarm in - Vienna. I could not leave him in any doubt as to the serious - view I took of the situation. Nevertheless he begged me to - remember how detrimentally the blunt admission of defeat - must affect our allies, who had placed all their hopes in - Germany. This occurred again on the 2nd September. - - The impression made on our Allies by the failure on the - Western Front was great. The Emperor Charles announced his - intention of coming to Spa in the middle of August.” - -The great salient the Germans had created towards Amiens was -disappearing, and Sir Douglas Haig was faced with the old positions of -the opening of the battle of the Somme in 1916. But there was a -difference. The situation and his reasoning are succinctly related in -his dispatch: - - “In deciding to extend the attack northwards to the area 257 - between the Rivers Somme and Scarpe I was influenced by the - following considerations. - - The enemy did not seem prepared to meet an attack in this - direction, and, owing to the success of the Fourth Army, he - occupied a salient the left flank of which was already - threatened from the south. A further reason for my decision - was that the ground north of the Ancre River was not greatly - damaged by shell-fire, and was suitable for the use of - Tanks. A successful attack between Albert and Arras in a - south-easterly direction would turn the line of the Somme - south of Péronne, and give every promise of producing - far-reaching results. It would be a step towards the - strategic objective, St. Quentin-Cambrai. - - This attack, moreover, would be rendered easier by the fact - that we now held the commanding plateau south of Arras about - Bucquoy and Ablainzeville, which in the days of the old - Somme fighting had lain well behind the enemy’s lines. In - consequence we were here either astride or to the east of - the intricate system of trench lines which in 1916 we had no - choice but to attack frontally, and enjoyed advantages of - observation which at that date had been denied us. - - It was arranged that on the morning of the 21st August a - limited attack should be launched north of the Ancre to gain - the general line of the Arras-Albert railway, on which it - was correctly assumed that the enemy’s main line of - resistance was sited. The day of the 22nd August would then - be used to get troops and guns into position on this front, - and to bring forward the left of the Fourth Army between the - Somme and the Ancre. The principal attack would be delivered - on the 23rd August by the Third Army and the divisions of - the Fourth Army north of the Somme, the remainder of the - Fourth Army assisting by pushing forward south of the river - to cover the flank of the main operation. Thereafter, if - success attended our efforts, the whole of both armies were 258 - to press forward with the greatest vigour and exploit to the - full any advantage we might have gained.” - - * * * * * - -It will be seen, therefore, that as the attack from Amiens advanced, -it was being taken up by troops on the left. On the 21st August the IV -Corps was engaged, with the 42nd, New Zealand, and 37th Divisions, and -the VI Corps, with the 2nd and Guards Divisions. On the 23rd a series -of strong assaults were delivered on practically the whole front of -thirty-three miles from our junction with the French at Lihons. - -As the attack spread to the north, so activity in Corps, Division, and -Brigade Headquarters preceded actual movement of troops. A state of -brain and nerve tension prevailed. There was, too, a change of plan, -which is always one of the trials of the regimental soldier. It is as -well to recapitulate some of the movements. - -The relief in the line was completed on the 18th August, and on the -19th the 169th Brigade was sent to Arras to carry out preparations for -an attack on Orange and Chapel Hills. Owing to the change of plan this -brigade was sent back to the Avesnes-le-Comte area on the 21st, and on -the same day the 168th Brigade marched from the Mazières area to -Lignereuil. The 56th Division now came under the VI Corps (Haldane), -and Gen. Hull at once visited Corps Headquarters, but did not succeed -in gaining any exact information as to the rôle the division would -play in the forthcoming operations. During the night 21st/22nd the -division marched to the area Barly-St. Amand-Saulty-Bavincourt. - -Early in the morning of the 22nd Gen. Hull was called to a conference 259 -at Corps Headquarters, where the operations for the next day were -decided upon. He did not get back to Bavincourt until 10.30 a.m., when -he held a conference and explained the operations to all concerned. -Officers of all brigades were then sent off to reconnoitre; and the -168th Brigade marched at 3.30 p.m. to Blairville, a distance of seven -and a half miles. - -Time was now getting on and the Corps Operation order had not been -received. Gen. Hull, however, sent out his orders based on what had -been said at the conference in the morning, and at 9 p.m. the 168th -Brigade, with the 1st London Regt. attached, moved to the assembly -area, a march of another four and a half miles, ready to attack on the -left of the Guards Division. In the midst of all this movement and -with only a short time at their disposal, officers had no opportunity -of seeing the forward assembly areas or the objectives. They assembled -in the dark and attacked in the morning, never having seen the ground -before. - -The artillery was no better off than the infantry. - - “On the 21st August orders were received to join the VI - Corps, and I went off to see the Corps R.A., who were a long - way back, and also to see the 40th Division Artillery and - the Guards Artillery and to try to reconnoitre the new - front. On the evening of the 21st I received instructions - from the R.A. VI Corps that all arrangements were at once to - be made to put the 56th Artillery in action to cover the - attack of the 56th Division on the morning of the 23rd, the - divisional front being roughly from 500 yards north of - Hamelincourt to just north of Boiry Becquerelle. The 260 - Divisional Artillery, for purposes of the initial attack, - consisted of six brigades R.F.A., as follows: (_a_) Guards - Divisional Artillery, (_b_) 57th, (_c_) 56th. On the 21st - August these brigades were as follows: (_a_) in action on - the front, (_b_) in reserve near St. Pol, (_c_) in reserve - at Simencourt and Berneville. Reconnaissance was carried out - during the morning of the 22nd, and at 8 p.m. that evening - the brigades moved off to occupy the positions selected, and - ammunition to the extent of 400 rounds per gun had to be - dumped at the same time. This involved an immense amount of - work, but it was successfully carried out by the brigades of - the 56th Divisional Artillery by 2 a.m. on the 23rd; but the - brigades of the 57th Divisional Artillery, though all guns - were got into action, were delayed by heavy gas shelling, - and were as a result unable to complete the gun-dumps by the - opening of the barrage. At this time the artillery covering - the division was organised as follows: - - Right group: - - 74th and 75th Brigades R.F.A. Guards Divisional - Artillery, in action west of Boisleux-au-Mont. - - Centre group: - - 285th and 286th Brigades R.F.A. 57th Divisional - Artillery, in action south-east of Boisleux-au-Mont. - - Left group: - - 280th and 281st Brigades R.F.A. 56th Divisional - Artillery, in action south-west of Boisleux-au-Mont. - - As far as the field artillery was concerned, the strength of - the barrage was about one 18-pounder gun per 27 yards. - - Affiliated Heavy Artillery group--two brigades R.G.A.” [Gen. - Elkington.] - -The position from which the division attacked was a very strong one 261 -for defence. The Cojeul River has two branches. The northern branch, -running from the high ground by Adinfer Wood, passes to the north of -Boisleux-St. Marc and Boiry Becquerelle. The southern branch, running -across the front of the division, is underground between Hamelincourt -and Boyelles, where it comes to the surface and joins the main stream -south of Henin. - -The left flank of the division rested on Cojeul (north). There was, -therefore, a wide field of vision in front of them, with the one -exception of the spur which shoots out between the two branches of the -river to the north of Boyelles, and which afforded the enemy a -concealed position on that portion of the front. The general run of -the valley was across the direction of the 56th Division attack, and -Croisilles and St. Leger were over the ridge on the far side of the -valley. Beyond these villages the Hindenburg Line ran roughly from -Arras in a south-easterly direction, obliquely across the line of -attack. - -The first objective of the 168th Brigade, which was to make the -attack, was the blue line--that is, the two villages of Boyelles and -Boiry Becquerelle; and the brigade would then push out a fringe of -posts in front. Twenty-one Tanks (two companies, 11th Battalion Tank -Corps) were to help in this attack. - -As the battalions of the 168th Brigade marched to their positions, the -Germans used gas freely and respirators had to be worn. Fortunately -the night was light, but even so progress was slow, and such light as -there was did not help officers, when they had placed their men in -position, to see very much of what sort of a place it was they would -attack in the morning. It seemed that the enemy was very alert, as he 262 -fired a great deal with machine guns and light trench mortars during -the night. - -At 4.55 a.m. in the murky light of dawn the barrage, which had opened -at 4 a.m. at Gommecourt on the right of the VI Corps, crashed down in -front of the 56th Division. The Kensingtons, on the right, north of -Hamelincourt, the 4th Londons in the centre, and the London Scottish -on the left advanced to the assault twelve minutes later. The Tanks -cleared the way for the Kensingtons very effectively, only a few small -parties of the enemy showing much fight. The battalion, however, was -worried by machine-gun fire from the left, and it was seen that the -4th Londons were meeting with more determined opposition. Two platoons -of the Kensingtons were, therefore, sent to assist by attacking -Boyelles from the south. By 6 o’clock the Kensingtons had reached -their objective. - -The 4th Londons had the village of Boyelles and the curious circular -Marc system in front of them. The ruins of the village could be seen -from the right, but Marc system was blind. Actually the ground between -our front-line trench and the enemy line was level, but it dropped -suddenly from the German line and was helped by a sunken road, so that -there was plenty of shelter from the barrage. The left of the 4th -Londons was held up in front of this place. For some reason no Tank -attacked the forward Marc system, and until a platoon enfiladed the -sunken road from the south, and the London Scottish threatened from -the north, the garrison held up the advance and inflicted heavy -casualties. When the troops pressed in from the flanks, however, the 263 -Germans, 2 officers and 80 men, surrendered. - -Much the same thing happened to the right company of the 4th Londons -in the village of Boyelles. But here four Tanks came on the scene, and -again the garrison surrendered with eleven machine guns. Six light, -heavy, and medium trench mortars were captured in the banks on the -north of the stream. - -The London Scottish on the left met with opposition from Boiry -Becquerelle, but carried out a smart enveloping movement, closing on -the village from the flanks, and eventually getting behind it. Over -100 prisoners and 8 machine guns were taken by this well-known -battalion. - -All the first objective was then in our hands. - -At 9.15 a.m. the 168th Brigade was ordered to continue the advance so -as to conform with the 2nd Guards Brigade on the right. The brigade -was to gain touch with the Guards at Bank Copse on the east side of -the railway curve into St. Leger. But this order had to be transmitted -by runner and distances were great; it did not reach the centre -battalion until 11.15 a.m. - -The Kensingtons started their advance at 1.30 p.m., and almost at once -met with strong machine-gun and artillery fire. The advance was held -up on the Ervillers-Boyelles road, and much confused fighting ensued. -Two platoons managed to get round the opposition and joined the -Guards, with whom they attacked the railway bank to the west of Bank -Copse. The remainder of the battalion was apparently fighting in small -groups and was much scattered. The commanding officer, Lieut.-Col. R. -S. F. Shaw, went forward to try to clear up the situation and was -killed by a sniper. The position on this battalion front was not 264 -certain until 9.30 p.m., when it was ascertained that they were on the -line of the Ervillers-Boyelles road. - -The 4th Londons did not advance until 4.30 p.m. They attacked in -widely extended formation and casualties were very light. There was -opposition from five enemy machine guns, but these were outflanked and -overcome. The line of Boyelles Reserve was reached and patrols pushed -out 500 yards beyond without encountering any of the enemy. - -The London Scottish attacked at the same time as the 4th Londons and -encountered strong opposition at Boiry Work, at the northern end of -Boyelles Reserve. For one hour the London Scottish worked slowly to -get round this position, but before they closed in the garrison -surrendered--86 prisoners. They were then in line with the 4th Londons -and their posts pushed out some 500 yards in advance. - -In spite of the hurried orders it had been a successful day for the -56th Division. The Kensingtons had had the worst time, but they -captured in all 167 prisoners, while the 4th Londons had 243, and the -London Scottish 253. - -Commenting on the attack, Brig.-Gen. Loch says that the chief -difficulty was the short notice given, and the fact that the brigade -was billeted in a much scattered area made the rapid issue of orders -impossible. It was also impossible to reconnoitre the ground, and the -approach march was made in exceptionally hot weather. There had been -no preparation of the front prior to the attack, and signal -communications were poor. Visual signalling was of little value, owing -to the dust and the heavy state of the atmosphere, and reliance had 265 -to be placed, as it invariably was, on runners who worked well, but as -the distances were ever increasing it was a slow method. - - “The Tanks,” he says, “were most valuable, although through - various causes they, in some cases, arrived late in the - assembly areas. Their greater speed enabled them to catch up - the infantry, and by working forward and then to a flank - they evidently much demoralised the enemy and caused them to - surrender more freely than usual.” - -The machine guns, which since the beginning of March had been formed -into a battalion, were controlled by Lieut.-Col. Jervis, who was with -the Brigade Headquarters, and were echéloned in depth, the forward -line advancing with the assaulting infantry. - -The enemy was in considerable strength, as is shown by the number of -prisoners, 663, and the 59 machine guns and 18 trench mortars which -were captured. - -Other divisions of the VI and IV Corps were equally successful, and -the Germans holding the defences to the south, about Thiepval (which -had caused us such efforts to win in 1916), were in a precarious -position. The attack was pressed without giving the enemy -breathing-space, and he was becoming disorganised and showing signs of -confusion. - -But in writing of this great and last advance we are conscious that a -division, which until this moment had always appeared to be a large -and important unit in any operations, was being swamped by the numbers -set in motion. One of five or six is such a much bigger proportion -than one of fifty-seven or fifty-eight. And the French, American, and 266 -Belgian Armies were moving too. - -During the night the London Scottish were placed under the orders of -the 167th Brigade, which relieved the Kensingtons and 4th London -Regiment. The 169th Brigade moved to the Basseux area and, in the -morning of the 24th, to the Purple Line behind Boisleux-au-Mont. - -The 167th Brigade were ordered to attack the next day, the 24th, with -Summit Trench as their first objective, refusing their left flank so -as to join with the 52nd Division on the northern boundary. The second -objective was Fooley Reserve-Hill Switch-Cross Switch, with the object -of enveloping Croisilles from the north, while the Guards Division -carried out a similar operation from the south. Twelve Tanks and one -company of the Machine Gun Battalion were to assist. - -At 7 a.m. the barrage opened on the enemy frontline posts, and, after -ten minutes, crept forward, at the rate of 100 yards in four minutes, -followed by the infantry. The whole of the brigade, of course, -attacked--the 8th Middlesex being on the right, the 7th Middlesex in -the centre, and the 1st London Regiment on the left. The Guards -Division also attacked on the right, and the 52nd on the left. - -The 8th Middlesex reached their objective in Summit Trench and Ledger -Reserve about 10 o’clock. Opposition was not of a fierce nature and -took the form of “patchy” machine-gun fire and rifle fire. Small -parties of men kept working forward and could be seen, with Tanks, in -and about Summit Trench by 8.30 a.m. The 7th Middlesex and 1st Londons -advanced in a similar fashion and with the same opposition. 267 - -But news came from the Corps which, for the moment, checked the -advance. From prisoners’ statements it was learned that three fresh -divisions had arrived in Bullecourt and Hendicourt, and the 56th -Division was ordered to make preparations to meet a counter-attack. -The 169th Brigade was ordered forward behind Boyelles, and the 167th -Brigade was told to occupy Croisilles “by peaceful penetration.” -Meanwhile the right brigade of the 52nd Division, which was attacking -Henin Hill, had been compelled to withdraw and was echéloned on the -forward slopes to the left rear of the 56th Division. - -Patrols began to probe the country before them, and at 1.30 p.m. the -situation was: the 8th Middlesex had one company on the western side -of Croisilles with patrols on the outskirts of the village, two -companies in Summit Trench and that end of Leger Reserve, and one -company in Boyelles Reserve. The 7th Middlesex had two companies in -Summit Trench, with patrols in front, and support and reserve -companies in depth in rear. The 1st Londons had two companies in -Summit Trench, in touch with the 52nd Division, and support and -reserve companies in rear. - -Reports tended to show that Croisilles had been evacuated, and after a -consultation with Brig.-Gen. Freeth, Gen. Hull ordered the Brigade to -attack and establish itself in the Hindenburg Support Line between -Hump Lane and River Road (Sensée River). Six Tanks were to be used, -and the 52nd Division was to attack on the left. - -Attempts made by the 8th Middlesex to enter Croisilles were not 268 -successful, and at zero hour, 7.30 p.m., the village was still in the -hands of the enemy. - -The attack was met with determined and very heavy machine-gun and -artillery fire, and failed to gain any ground. Only one Tank came into -action, and that was met with gas which rendered it useless. -Croisilles Trench had been reached by troops, but found to be only 2 -feet deep at the most, and quite useless as a reorganising point for -further advance. This trench had unfortunately been shown as an -organised and deep defensive work. Brig.-Gen. Freeth, therefore, -ordered Summit Trench to be held as the line of resistance. - -The days’ fighting had resulted in an appreciable gain, but the -enemy’s resistance was increasing. The Corps ordered an attack on the -Hindenburg Support the following day, without the help of Tanks, and -Gen. Hull had to point out that the resistance was not only very -strong, as he had proved that day, but that the Hindenburg system was -very heavily wired. Tanks would have dealt with this wire had they -been available. The Corps then modified the order and instructed the -General to capture Croisilles and obtain a footing in Sensée Avenue, -to the north-east, so as to conform with the 52nd Division, who were -to attack on the left. - -During the night the front-line battalions were heavily shelled with -gas, which forced them to wear gas-masks, in one case for six hours. -Patrols, however, went out, and their reports coincided with that of -the Guards Division on the right, that Croisilles was full of machine -guns. Also the 52nd Division on the left reported that the Hindenburg 269 -Line was very strongly held. It was decided to bombard the village -while patrols would try to gain ground. - -But the 25th August was a negative day. Some posts were established in -front of the main line, but the village itself was too strongly held -and the bombardment, apparently, failed to dislodge the enemy. - -Meanwhile the 169th Brigade reconnoitred the position with a view of -attacking and enveloping Croisilles from the north and capturing the -Hindenburg Line. - -At 8 a.m. the 56th and 52nd Divisions had been moved from the command -of the VI Corps to that of the XVII Corps, and it was decided that the -167th Brigade should attack on the 26th and establish itself on the -line of the shallow Croisilles Trench and Fooley Reserve. Roughly the -XVII Corps faced the Hindenburg Line, which swung round the left flank -of the 56th Division, and on this flank the 52nd Division were to -advance on the Hindenburg Line in conjunction with the attack of the -167th Brigade. Farther north the Canadian Corps were to assault the -actual Hindenburg Line, and if they were successful the 52nd Division -would continue to push down the system and roll it up in a -south-easterly direction. - -The attack of the 167th Brigade took place at 3 a.m., and was nowhere -successful. The wire was still uncut (there were in some spots five -belts of it), and the machine guns in Croisilles poured a devastating -hail of bullets on the assaulting troops. But to the north the -Canadian Corps had been successful and had pierced the Hindenburg 270 -system. The 52nd Division had thrust one battalion into the celebrated -line, and was progressing towards Henin Hill. - -During the afternoon the 52nd Division reported the line from the -Cojeul River to Henin Hill clear of the enemy, and the 167th Brigade -was then relieved at 6 o’clock by the 169th. - -The battalions in line from the right were the Queen’s Westminsters, -the London Rifle Brigade, and the 2nd Londons. On taking over, the 2nd -Londons attempted to clear the situation on the left by a “stealth” -raid with two platoons. The experiment was bad, as the platoons were -almost wiped out by machine guns. - -The battle was continued the following day, the 27th, at 9.30 a.m. The -task was to keep in touch with the 52nd Division and sweep round the -north of the village. The Queen’s Westminsters, therefore, stood fast -while the London Rifle Brigade and the 2nd Londons executed a wheel to -the right. This was successful in reaching Farmers’ Avenue and Sensée -Avenue, while, on the left, the 52nd Division reached Fontaine -Croisilles and established themselves to the east of that village. A -glance at the map will show how the Hindenburg Line was being rolled -up, how desperate was the case of the Germans opposite the 56th -Division, and how necessary it was for them to concentrate their -fiercest resistance against the advance of the 56th Division. The day -was noteworthy for the good work done by the 2nd Londons in what was -the nearest approach to open warfare which had as yet been attempted. - -Croisilles was the obstacle which stood in our way. The Guards -Division attacked on the right of it, and after an initial success was 271 -counter-attacked so severely that they fell back on Leger Reserve, and -left a gap on the right of the Queen’s Westminsters, which was filled -by two platoons of the latter regiment. Farther to the south troops -were fighting on the Somme battlefield of the month of September -1916--still some way from the Hindenburg Line. But, as has been -pointed out, the whole of the old Somme positions were being turned -from the north. - -During the afternoon the 168th Brigade took over the frontage held by -the right and centre battalions of the 169th Brigade. These two -battalions were then able to enter the Hindenburg system which had -been captured by the 52nd Division, and move along it towards the -Sensée River, where they would start the attack. The 2nd Londons -meanwhile cleared their front of some small parties of the enemy and -crossed the Sensée to Nelly Avenue, part of an outpost line to the -main defences. The division then stood fast under orders to attack the -Bullecourt area the next day. - -During the night dispositions were altered. The 167th Brigade took -over the right of the Divisional front, with the 8th Middlesex, to the -west of Croisilles, and the 168th Brigade moved in position to support -the 169th in the attack along the Hindenburg Line. Also, the 168th -Brigade was to protect the flank of the 169th, if the village was not -taken, and “mop up” generally behind the attacking troops. - -The first objective for the 169th Brigade was given as Queen’s -Lane-Jove Lane; the second was the trenches south-east of Bullecourt. - -Patrols of the 8th Middlesex attempted to enter Croisilles several -times during the night, but were always met with machine-gun fire. In 272 -the morning of the 28th, however, an aeroplane reported the village -empty, but at 8.30 a.m. patrols of the 8th Middlesex found only the -western portion of the village clear. The whole battalion then -advanced, and after some lively fighting occupied the village. - -The 52nd Division, which had been relieved by the 57th Division, -passed through the troops in the line and joined in the general attack -of the 56th Division at 12.30 p.m. The action that followed is one of -the utmost confusion. The Queen’s Westminsters, who led the attack, -started from the line Nelly Avenue. The Germans on the right, in -Guardian Reserve, held out, and the 167th Brigade found sufficient of -the enemy to hold them up on the railway south-east of Croisilles. But -two companies of the Queen’s Westminsters and part of the 2nd Londons -lost direction, and seem to have become inextricably mixed with troops -of the 57th Division somewhere to the north of Hendicourt. - -Apparently trouble started on the previous day (27th), when the -Queen’s Westminsters and part of the London Rifle Brigade were -relieved by the London Scottish in front of Croisilles. The two former -battalions had to march to a flank to get into the Hindenburg Line, -and were severely shelled in doing so. On arriving at the Hindenburg -Line, progress to their positions of assembly was seriously impeded by -the 52nd Division, who, at that moment, were also assembling to attack -on the following day. Col. Savill, who was commanding the Queen’s -Westminsters, says that his men arrived “dead beat” at Nelly Avenue -and Burg Support, having been on the move all night. He gives as the -cause of the loss of direction the heavy machine-gun fire which his 273 -troops met from the right on emerging from the trenches, but a glance -at the map suggests another and more probable reason. He was unable to -assemble his battalion on a front conforming with the general line of -advance. The right of his leading companies was in Nelly Avenue, and -the left in Burg Support with orders “to swing round at right angles -to the Hindenburg system.” - -It was pointed out at the battle of the Somme that the complicated -manœuvre of changing direction at the commencement of an assault -should be avoided. It is probable that the commanding officer had no -other alternative, but the lesson is once more demonstrated. To the -difficult task imposed upon them must be added the further -embarrassment of never having seen the ground. True that the attack -did not start until 12.30 p.m., but it was extremely difficult to fix -landmarks owing to the country being so overgrown with long grass and -weeds, and in any case there was rising ground between Burg Support -and Bullecourt, so that the few hours from dawn to the attack were of -little benefit. - -The change of front by the left of the attacking force was further -complicated by the thick wire between the trenches of the Hindenburg -System. Before any manœuvre of the sort could be undertaken, these -belts of wire had to be passed, and by the time this had been -accomplished, all idea of direction had fled. - -The London Rifle Brigade, in close support to the Queen’s -Westminsters, had three companies in line, the fourth company being in -support on the right and Battalion Headquarters on the left. The left -and centre companies followed the Queen’s Westminsters--even in field 274 -practice this would probably occur. - -The 2nd London Regt. was already reduced to 11 officers and 193 other -ranks, and assembled in King’s Avenue. The two left companies followed -the Queen’s Westminsters, while the two right companies fought down -Tunnel Trench. - -Col. Savill, believing his battalion to be more or less on their way -to Bullecourt, moved with his headquarters down Burg Support and very -soon encountered the enemy. He was joined by the headquarters of the -London Rifle Brigade and the 2nd London Regt. It was thought that the -“mopping-up” had been badly done, and a message was sent for -reinforcements while the staff details tried to bomb their way -forward. - -Soon after the attack opened, therefore, the 169th Brigade was trying -to capture Bullecourt with two companies of the London Rifle Brigade -on the right, three battalion headquarter staffs and a few scattered -men of the Queen’s Westminsters in the centre, and two companies of -the 2nd London Regt. (not a hundred men) on the left. The right, which -was the strongest part of the total force, was definitely held up by a -strong enemy garrison in Guardian, and in other parts of the front the -enemy resistance was too strong to be overcome by so weak a force. - -Eventually a company of the 4th London Regt. was sent up Burg Support, -and by 5 p.m. progress had been made as far as the Hump. But on the -right the enemy, who were being continually reinforced by troops -falling back from the attack of the 167th Brigade through Croisilles, -still held Guardian Reserve. “Guardian Reserve,” writes Brig.-Gen. 275 -Coke, “was a thorn in the side of the brigade until 6 p.m.” Not only -was the advance severely harassed from this place, but no track for -carrying ammunition, etc., was available until it had been captured. -By 6 p.m., however, the London Rifle Brigade, reinforced by two -companies of the Kensingtons and the 168th Trench Mortar Battery, -drove the greater part of the remaining Germans to surrender. - -The advance continued on the right as far as Pelican Avenue, but in -the centre the Knuckle was not cleared until 5 a.m. on the 29th. The -situation all through the afternoon and night of the 28th August was -most complicated, the 2nd London, London Rifle Brigade, 4th London, -and Kensington Regts. being involved in a series of separate -operations dealing with scattered machine-gun nests, disposed in -trenches and in broken ground. - -During the afternoon the 168th Brigade had been ordered to move to Leg -Lane and get in touch with the 167th Brigade, also to be prepared to -move into Pelican Avenue with the object of attacking Bullecourt early -in the morning of the 29th. But, owing to the state of affairs in the -main Hindenburg System, this was impossible, and troops were moved -into position in daylight on the 29th. - -Meanwhile, all those troops who had gone careering about on the left -had become mixed up with the 172nd Brigade in the neighbourhood of -Cemetery Avenue to the north of Hendicourt. They had suffered a number -of casualties, and the remaining captain of the Queen’s Westminsters -had returned wounded during the afternoon, and had reported to the -169th Brigade that he and the force of which he assumed command had 276 -occupied Pelican Lane. This will give some idea of the difficulties -which confronted Brig.-Gen. Coke. - -The attack was resumed in strength at 1 p.m. on the 29th. The 168th -Brigade were in Pelican Avenue, with the Kensingtons on the right and -the London Scottish on the left, right and left support being the 4th -and 1st London Regts. - -Pelican Lane appears to have been held by small parties of the enemy, -and the 169th Brigade assembled in the trenches north-west of that -place. But the missing companies, with the exception of the 2nd London -Regt., had not returned. The London Rifle Brigade led the attack with -two companies, having in close support 40 men of the Queen’s -Westminsters (which were all that could be found), and behind them the -2nd Londons, with a total strength of 7 officers and 95 other ranks. - -The objective for the division was the trench system east of -Bullecourt and south of Riencourt. At the very start of the attack the -Kensingtons were held up at Station Redoubt; but the London Scottish -made good progress on the left, and by 2.15 p.m. were through -Bullecourt. The weak 169th Brigade made progress as far as Saddler -Lane and the sunken road on the left of the village. And the 57th -Division reported that they had captured Riencourt and were through -Hendicourt. - -Tank Avenue was strongly held by the enemy and successfully arrested -any further advance in the centre; and on the flanks the first check -was not overcome. And so the line remained with the London Scottish -bulged out round Bullecourt, and the Kensingtons bringing the right -flank back to Station Redoubt, and the 169th Brigade the left flank 277 -to Saddler Lane. The right of the division was in touch with the 3rd -Division, but the position of the 57th was obscure. - -The 167th Brigade then relieved the whole of the divisional front, and -the night passed in comparative quietness. - -At about 5 a.m. on the 30th the enemy counter-attacked the line -Hendicourt-Bullecourt-Ecoust in strength, and drove the 167th Brigade -out of Bullecourt to the line Pelican Lane and Pelican Avenue. At the -same time the 3rd Division on the right was driven out of Ecoust, and -on the left the 57th Division lost Riencourt and fell back on the -Bullecourt-Hendecourt road, the enemy securing the factory on that -road. - -The 167th Brigade at once attempted to regain Bullecourt; but the -enemy forces in Bullecourt received such strong support from the -Station Redoubt that all efforts failed. Gen. Hull arranged for a -bombardment of the Station Redoubt by the heavy artillery. - -Orders from the Corps fixed the 31st August for a renewal of the -attack in conjunction with the VI Corps on the left. And so the 168th -Brigade was once more ordered to take Bullecourt and the Station -Redoubt, relieving the 167th Brigade on that portion of the front. A -company of the latter brigade would then take up a position on the -left of the 168th Brigade and attack the factory. The objective was -Tank Support with the left flank thrown back to the factory. - -The relief took place, and all preparations were completed. At 5.15 -a.m. on the 31st the brigade advanced under a creeping barrage, with 278 -the London Scottish on the right, the 4th London Regt. in the centre, -and the 7th Middlesex on the left. - -The London Scottish carried the Station Redoubt, and attacked -Bullecourt Avenue at 8 o’clock, obtaining touch with the 4th Londons. -But the latter regiment was held up in front of Bullecourt; and on the -left the 7th Middlesex were unable to capture the factory. A company -of the Kensingtons was sent up on the left, and by 10.15 a.m. the -factory was captured, and touch obtained with the 171st Brigade of the -division on that flank. Meanwhile, the London Scottish had captured -Bullecourt Avenue. - -At 1 o’clock an artillery observer reported the enemy advancing over -the open and assembling in Tank Avenue and Support. All field guns and -the heavy artillery was concentrated on this target, and no -counter-attack developed. But the plans were modified to the capture -of the village only. - -Two companies of the Kensingtons were sent up as reinforcements, and -bombing from the flanks was carried on round the village. By the time -it was dark only the eastern portion was not cleared up; and the enemy -remained in Gordon Reserve. - -The 56th Division was then relieved by the 52nd, and marched out of -the line to rest about Boyelles. The captures during these operations -were: - - 29 officers, 1,047 other ranks. - 2 77-mm. guns and 1 8-inch howitzer. - 200 machine guns and over 50 trench mortars. - -The casualties of the division were: - - 123 officers and 2,381 other ranks. - - [Illustration: 9. THE BATTLES OF ALBERT & THE SCARPE 1918.] - -The hard-working but cheery artillery remained in the line. All -through the battle they had pushed forward close behind the infantry. 279 -On the 25th August the Guards Artillery had returned to their own -division, and as a consequence the 56th Divisional front had been -covered by the 57th Divisional Artillery on the right and their own -artillery on the left. At this time the 13th and 22nd Brigades of the -Royal Garrison Artillery had been affiliated with the 56th Divisional -Artillery. The enemy paid the closest attention to our artillery, -bombarding the battery positions incessantly with high-explosive and -gas shells. - -On the 29th, early in the morning, all brigades of artillery advanced -to the outskirts of Croisilles. In the previous fighting they had been -1,200 yards behind the infantry in Summit Trench. On this same day the -232nd Army Brigade R.F.A. was transferred to the 56th Division, and -formed an independent group with S.O.S. lines superimposed. After the -advance in the morning the 56th Divisional Artillery became the right -group and the 57th the left group. And the next day the 40th -Divisional Artillery replaced the 57th. - -The artillery passed under the command of the 40th and then the 63rd -Divisions, and eventually withdrew from the line on the 5th September, -all ranks and horses having suffered severely from gas. - -There was to be little rest. - -It is interesting to note that the official report of the Battles -Nomenclature Committee gives the Battle of Albert the dates 21st-23rd -August and boundaries Road Chaulnes--Lamotte--Corbie--Warloy--Acheux-- -Souastre--Berles-au-Bois--Brétencourt--Héninel; and the Battle of the -Scarpe 1918 the dates 26th-30th August and boundaries Noreuil -(exclusive)--St. Leger (exclusive)--Boisleux-au-Mont--Roclincourt-- 280 -Bailleul--Oppy. The ground from the right of Boyelles (about the -station) to Mercatel is therefore included in both battle fronts--the -Battle of the Scarpe opening with the 167th Brigade attack on -Croisilles Trench and Fooley Reserve--and places the 56th Division -operating on the flank in each battle. - - - [5] _My War Memories, 1914--1918._ - - - - - CHAPTER IX 281 - - THE ARMISTICE - - BATTLE OF THE CANAL DU NORD--BATTLE OF CAMBRAI, 1918--BATTLE - OF THE SAMBRE - - -When once the great offensive had started there was no pause in the -fighting. Divisions were relieved to reorganise. Sometimes they stood -their ground, so that supplies could be brought up, and so that they -might not shoot too far ahead of the base from which supplies were -drawn. The turmoil of the front line was assuredly no greater than the -turmoil in rear of the fighting troops. Activity, effort, unending -toil, went on behind the line as well as in the line. As the troops -drove the enemy in front of them, so engineers stood ready to rebuild -the shattered railways and reconstruct the shell-battered roads. But -the Army Service Corps could not stand still while the railways and -roads were in the hands of the engineers. They had to struggle forward -as best they could, and it is to their everlasting industry that the -troops in the fighting areas were fed, clothed, supplied with -ammunition, and, very frequently indeed, provided with water. - -When the infantry of the 56th Division returned to Boyelles, the place -was unrecognisable. The railway was through. Trains were in Boyelles, -and lines of lorries stood, being loaded by a swarm of men. It was a -cheering sight for the tired but happy division. - -Meanwhile the advance continued, fiercely opposed, but irresistible. 282 -On the right of Bullecourt the Fourth and Third Armies had, by the -night of the 30th, reached a line from Cléry-sur-Somme, past the -western edge of Marrières Wood to Combles, les Bœufs, Bancourt, -Fremicourt, and Vraucourt. And, south of Péronne, Allied infantry had -reached the left bank of the Somme from Nesle to the north. Farther -south still, the French held Noyon. On the 1st September the -Australians entered Péronne. - -On the left of Bullecourt the First Army had advanced (we have already -noted the advance of the Canadians) and were now on the high ground -east of Cherisy and Hautcourt, and had captured Eterpigny. On the -north of the Scarpe we had captured Plouvain. The Quéant-Drocourt line -was now within assaulting distance. - -This powerful line ran from the Hindenburg Line at Quéant to Drocourt, -in the neighbourhood of Lens, and was attacked by the Canadian Corps -and 4th Division, of the First Army, and the 52nd, 57th, and 63rd -Divisions, of the Third Army, on the 2nd September. It was one of the -greatest assaults of the war, and was completely successful. - -As the 56th Division knew very well, the Germans had been contesting -every inch of the ground. But now the enemy were in a most -unfavourable position, and started to fall back on the whole of the -Third Army front and on the right of the First Army. On the 3rd -September the enemy was on the line of the Canal du Nord; on the -following day he commenced to withdraw from the east bank of the -Somme, south of Péronne, and on the night of the 8th September was on -the line Vermand, Epehy, Havrincourt, and so along the east bank of -the canal. - -Meanwhile the division rested, bathed, and reorganised. Divisional 283 -Headquarters were at Boisleux St. Marc, and on the 3rd September Sir -Douglas Haig visited Gen. Hull and congratulated him on the good work -done for the division. - -On the 4th a warning order, followed by one of confirmation, was -received that the division would move to the Quéant-Pronville area in -readiness to relieve the 63rd Division in the line on the 5th. But at -mid-day on the 5th this order was cancelled. Meanwhile the 167th and -169th Brigades had already moved to the new area, and so had a useless -march back again. - -On the same day Gen. Hull was informed that his division would be -transferred to the XXII Corps and would relieve the 1st Division in -the line, command to pass on the 9th. - -Due north of Cambrai there is a very marshy tract of land. It was a -feature, it will be remembered, in the scheme of attack on Cambrai in -1917. These ponds are fed by the Sensée and Cojeul Rivers, and the -Canal du Nord is planned to run up, after passing Mœuvres, by -Inchy-en-Artois, Marquion to a place called Palleul, where it cuts -across this marsh and joins up with the Canal de l’Escaut and the -Canal de la Sensée. This water covers a stretch of ground running well -to the west, towards the Scarpe, and tails off near a village called -Etaing. When the Canadians made their gallant and successful attack on -the Quéant-Drocourt line, the left flank of the advance rested on the -ponds and marshes of the Sensée, and this was the front which the 56th -Division was to take over. - -The line was well up to the water and extended from a point about 500 284 -yards north of Eterpigny, south of Etaing, south of Lecleuse, and -joined with the Canadians 1,500 yards east of Récourt. - -The relief of the 1st Division took place on the 6th, 7th, and 8th, -command passing at 10 a.m. on the 9th September. The enemy was quiet, -but the weather was bad, cold and showery. - -On the 16th it was arranged that the 4th Division should relieve the -11th, on the left, and that the 56th would extend the front held to -their right, taking over from the 3rd Canadian Division. Battalions -then engaged in a series of side-stepping reliefs to the right until, -on the 25th, the right of the division was on the Arras-Cambrai road. -On this day the only incident of note occurred when the enemy twice -attempted to raid the London Scottish, and was, on each occasion, -driven off with loss. - -By this time preparations were complete for a further advance across -the Canal du Nord on the 27th September. The crossing of the canal was -to be forced by the Canadian Corps, when the 11th and 56th Divisions -would relieve the left of the Canadians and attack due north along the -eastern bank of the canal and towards the marshes of the Sensée. The -56th Division would be on the left--that is to say, they would advance -along the canal bank. The 169th Brigade was given the task of -attacking along the eastern bank, and the 168th was to clear up the -western bank. - -The great attack on the 27th September met with the fiercest -opposition. It was obviously of vital importance to the enemy to -maintain his front opposite St. Quentin and Cambrai. The advance of -the British Armies was striking directly at the all-important lateral 285 -communications running through Maubeuge to Hirson and Mezières, by -which alone the German forces on the Champagne front could be supplied -and maintained. It had been decided that the Americans were to attack -west of the Meuse in the direction of Mezières, the French west of the -Argonne with the same general objectives, and the Belgians in the -direction of Ghent. The British attack in the centre was where the -enemy’s defences were most highly organised, and if these were broken -the threat directed at his vital communications would react on his -defence elsewhere. - -The British attack was, too, largely on the field of a former attack -in 1917, but there was this difference: the Canadians had smashed -through the Quéant-Drocourt system on the left. This would make the -attack on the Bourlon Wood positions somewhat easier. But the whole -system of defence round and about the Hindenburg Line varied in depth -between 7,000 and 10,000 yards, and was a most formidable series of -fortifications. - -The First and Third Armies attacked with the IV, VI, XVII, and -Canadian Corps, the operation of the 56th Division being on the -extreme left and subsequent to the launching of the main attack. The -problem on the left, which the 56th Division helped to solve, was that -the northern portion of the canal was too formidable an obstacle to be -crossed in the face of the enemy, and it was therefore necessary to -force a passage on the narrow front about Mœuvres, and turn the line -of the canal farther north by a divergent attack developed fan-wise -from the point of crossing. - -The morning broke wet and misty. The wind was from the west, and 286 -carried the opening crash of the British barrage, at 5.30 a.m., well -behind the German lines. But they did not need this sort of warning. -For days they had watched the assembling of batteries, stores, a -gigantic army behind the infantry, who were ever keeping a steady -pressure on their advanced lines. Prepared as they were, however, -nothing could stop the assaulting lines of Canadians. News came in to -the 56th Division early that all was going well. - -Enemy retaliation on the 56th Division was slight, and practically -ceased by 5.40 a.m. But as the morning progressed it became apparent -that the Canadians were meeting with strong opposition on the extreme -left. They were timed to reach a line immediately south of Sauchy by -mid-day, and the 169th Brigade was to carry on the attack from there -at 2.48 p.m. - -Brig.-Gen. Coke ordered the London Rifle Brigade to send a company, as -soon as the barrage would permit, to establish posts on the east bank -of the canal, and cover the Royal Engineers, who were to build a -bridge about 1,000 yards north of the Arras-Cambrai road. A similar -bridge was to be made some 300 yards south of the road. The northern -bridge was to be complete by 11 a.m. and the southern one by mid-day. -But the village of Marquion was on the east of the canal, and on the -Arras-Cambrai road, and at 11.45 a.m. the village was still holding -out, which made it impossible for the 169th Brigade to keep to the -time-table and be in position for attack by 2.48 p.m. It was therefore -decided to postpone the attack until 3.28 p.m. - -Meanwhile, the Engineers (513th Coy. and 512th Coy.) and Pioneers had 287 -gone forward to construct their bridges, and had found themselves -opposed by hostile infantry. They, however, cleared the eastern bank -and commenced to build. - -At mid-day it was reported that Marquion was clear, and the 2nd London -Regt. started to cross about that time, followed by the Queen’s -Westminsters and the London Rifle Brigade. The advance of the 169th -Brigade to the assembly positions completed the clearing of the ground -behind the Canadians--the Queen’s Westminsters capturing no less than -50 prisoners from fighting groups they met with before forming up. - -At three o’clock the brigade was in position with the 2nd Londons on -the right and the Queen’s Westminsters on the left. The London Rifle -Brigade had one company between the two branches of the River Agache -clearing up the ground, and two companies in support of the 2nd -Londons; the fourth company was engaged in covering the Engineers, who -were making the northern bridge. - -The attack swiftly reached and captured all the small copses, Kamwezi, -Kiduna, and Cemetery, which yielded many prisoners, but the 2nd -Londons were checked by machine-gun nests on the railway embankment -south-west of Oisy. The 2nd Londons and the London Rifle Brigade -attacked four times without success, and on the fifth the surviving -enemy and their machine guns were captured. - -The Queen’s Westminsters met with the same sort of opposition. The -swampy ground in the triangle where the Agache joins the canal was an -effective obstacle behind which the enemy had placed machine guns, -which swept the line of advance. But the Queen’s Westminsters 288 -worked cunningly round by the banks of the Agache, and eventually -surrounded the Germans, capturing 1 officer and 22 other ranks (21 -dead bodies were counted in the post). By 7 p.m. the line of the -railway south-west of Oisy was held, and with the capture of a final -machine-gun nest defending the canal bridge east of Mill Copse, the -Queen’s Westminsters reached the final objective of the attack early -in the morning of the 28th. - -The task of advancing on the western bank of the canal was given to -the 168th Brigade, and was carried out by the Kensingtons. For some -way they advanced in line with the Queen’s Westminsters, but were then -held up by machine guns in Mill Copse. The country was extremely -difficult owing to water. Mill Copse could only be approached by a -narrow pavé lane, which was flooded and much blocked by fallen trees. -At 6.30 p.m. the leading company was about 500 yards south of the -copse, and it was decided not to attempt its capture by daylight, but -to wait for the moon. The advance was then continued at 2 a.m., and -reached the final objective without opposition. - -The following day the 169th Brigade pushed on to the marsh land east -of Palleul, meeting with no resistance, but securing a few prisoners. -Altogether this brigade captured over 400 prisoners and 34 machine -guns. - -The total captures of the division were: 12 officers, 501 other ranks, -45 machine guns, and 10 trench mortars. - -The 8th Middlesex (167th Brigade) then entered the village of Palleul, -after making a temporary bridge over the blown-up causeway, and -established a bridgehead at Arleux, a village on the north of the 289 -marshes. The enemy made a small attack in this direction on the 29th, -and drove in the bridgehead; they also shelled Palleul with mustard -gas. - -But the German resistance was broken. Gouzeaucourt, Marcoing, -Noyelles-sur-l’Escaut, Fontaine-Notre-Dame, and Sailly had been -captured, together with over 10,000 prisoners and 200 guns. -Consternation reigned at the headquarters of the Central Powers. The -Austrian Peace Note made its appearance on the 15th September; -Bulgaria surrendered on the 29th; and Damascus fell on the 20th. The -German troops on the Western Front fought desperately and well, but -they were being beaten, and frequently, on the British front, by -inferior numbers. - -The actual position held by the 56th Division was along the marshy -ground on both banks of the canal. It included Palleul and the Bois de -Quesnoy. But on the 30th the front was prolonged to the right, when -the 168th Brigade took over from the 11th Division, up to a point on -the eastern outskirts of Aubencheu. The enemy were very alert, and -opened heavy machine-gun fire on the approach of patrols. And on the -6th they set fire to Aubenchaul. When the fires had died down, patrols -established posts on the bank of the canal. - -This burning business was carried on extensively. Fires, accompanied -by explosions, were continually breaking out behind the enemy lines. -On the 9th October the division was ordered to take over a further -length of front and relieve the whole of the 11th Division, who had -their right flank on the village of Fressies. The object was to free -the 11th Division, so that they could follow the enemy, who were 290 -evacuating the area between the Canal de l’Escaut and the Sensée -Canal, as the result of the capture of Cambrai by the Canadian Corps. -(Battle of Cambrai 8th-9th October.) - -During the day it was found that the enemy were actually retiring on -the 11th Division front, and the 56th Division was ordered to -ascertain whether the villages of Arleux, Aubigny-au-Bac, and -Brunement were still occupied. Both the 167th Brigade on the left and -the 168th on the right sent out patrols, which were fired on and -engaged by the enemy the moment they crossed the canal. In Arleux -quite an exciting patrol action was fought, in which four of the enemy -were killed. - -The relief of the 11th Division was completed by six in the evening. -Patrols found that the enemy was still holding Fressies, and the 168th -Brigade was ordered to attack and capture that village. - -The operation was carried out by the Kensingtons, who stormed the -village most successfully at 7 a.m. on the 11th October. Two companies -only attacked, and the casualties were 1 killed and 9 wounded. On the -other hand, they captured 2 officers and 39 other ranks. A most -praiseworthy little action. - -The enemy was now cleared from the south bank of the canal along the -whole of the divisional front. The 11th Division, pressing forward, -was still on the right of the 56th, and on the left was the 1st -Canadian Division. Farther on the left was the VIII Corps, and, on -this same day, they captured Vitry-en-Artois and drove the enemy back -on Douai. On receipt of this news the 56th Divisional Artillery was -ordered to keep the crossings of the canal from Arleux northwards -under fire, and the 167th Brigade were instructed to push forward 291 -patrols and obtain a footing in Arleux if possible. This they were -unable to do, in face of the machine-gun fire, and a most unfavourable -approach. - -In the evening the division passed to the command of the Canadian -Corps. The 1st Canadian Division, on the left of the 56th, had been -pushing forward on the north of the ponds and marshes for some days, -and on the 12th they captured Arleux in the early hours of the -morning. The 167th Brigade co-operated in clearing up the southern -portion of the village and relieved all Canadian troops, so as to -include Arleux in the divisional front. - -Meanwhile, during the night 12th/13th October, the 169th Brigade -relieved the 168th on the right. A clever and daring enterprise to -capture Aubigny-au-Bac was then undertaken; in the words of Gen. Hull, -“initiated and carried out entirely under the orders of the -Brigadier-General commanding the 169th Infantry Brigade, who deserves -great credit for the successful exploit.” - -The 169th Brigade held the right sector, with the London Rifle Brigade -and the Queen’s Westminsters in line, and as the front was very -extended, Brig.-Gen. Coke decided to attempt the capture of the -village with two companies of the 2nd London Regt. - -The problem he had before him was to attack across the Canal de la -Sensée, which was 70 feet wide and had no bridges. Strong German posts -were stationed at two points, where bridges had formerly existed, -about 1,200 yards apart, and he decided to cross between these two -destroyed bridges. - -Absolute silence was essential for the success of the scheme. The 292 -416th Field Coy. R.E. was ordered to construct rafts to carry over an -officers’ patrol of the Queen’s Westminsters as soon as possible after -dark, and, after landing, the officers were to ascertain whether a -sufficiently large area, free of the enemy, existed for the assembly -of the attacking company. If it was found that there was room for a -company, the engineers were to construct a floating footbridge for -them to cross. - -The time for making reconnaissance and bringing up material was very -short. The men who were to attack had to carry up the material. It was -raining, and the approach was over marshy ground. All the men were wet -to the skin before even the bridge was started. - -Lieut. Arnold, of the 416th Field Coy., had silence and speed to -consider, and also the amount of material which could be brought up in -any given time. He decided he would not waste precious minutes over -rafts, but would proceed at once with the foot-bridge. By three -o’clock in the morning the bridge had been constructed, and the patrol -of Queen’s Westminsters went across. One cannot give higher praise to -the engineers than this: on landing, the patrol found that they could -not proceed more than ten paces in any direction without being -challenged by German sentries--there appeared to be three posts in the -immediate vicinity of the bridge. - -It seemed as though the enterprise must be abandoned. But as the enemy -had not opened fire, the brigadier ordered the patrol to try to rush -the posts without raising an alarm. - -The bridge was, from its very nature, an unstable affair, with no -hand-rail, and, owing to the rain which never ceased, a very slippery 293 -surface. The night, however, was very dark and the rain was perhaps a -great advantage. A platoon of the 2nd Londons crossed over stealthily -and quickly overpowered two Germans, which was all the enemy force -they found. The remaining platoons of the attacking company now -crossed over. - -The assembly area was far from a good one, being intersected by two -small streams, La Navie and La Petite Navie, of which nothing was -known. The artillery barrage was arranged against the flank of the -enemy position, creeping in a north-westerly direction. To follow it -in an ordinary way was out of the question, as the country was cut up -by many hedges and ditches. So platoons were directed to make their -own way to various points as soon as the barrage started. - -At 4.30 a.m. Capt. Sloan, who was in command of the company, had his -men assembled, as well as he was able, in the blackness of early -morning, when dawn is postponed by rain and thick, low-flying clouds. -In silence they waited for zero, which was at 5.15 a.m. - -The rest is a story of complete and absolute surprise. The attack came -from the least threatened side of the enemy position. Two machine-gun -teams tried to resist, but after several had been killed, the rest -threw up their hands. Altogether about 160 prisoners were taken in the -village. - -Posts were established on the outskirts of the village, but it was not -found possible to occupy the station, where the enemy was strong and -thoroughly roused, and so the momentary hope that Brunemont might also -be surprised, vanished. - -At 6 a.m. two platoons of the supporting company came up and were used 294 -to reinforce the posts already established. - -The enemy now began to show fight. Two machine guns worked up close -and gave Capt. Sloan a lot of trouble. They were engaged with rifle -grenades and rushed successfully. The remaining portion of the support -company was moved across the canal and into the village. - -As the morning advanced and the light grew better, the infantry -observation posts in Quesnoy Wood reported parties of the enemy moving -towards Aubigny. These were quickly dispersed, with many casualties, -by the artillery, who also put to flight the crews of several trench -mortars which were giving some trouble. - -About ten o’clock a heavy enemy barrage was put down on the village, -together with a concentration of machine-gun fire. This lasted for -half an hour, and was followed by a most determined attack, with a -force estimated at a battalion, from the north, and a smaller force -from Brunemont. In spite of heavy losses, the Germans pressed on and -slowly outflanked one post after another, greatly aided by trench -mortars. The 2nd Londons were pressed back to La Petite Navie stream, -where a stand was made and the enemy prevented from debauching from -the village. - -Being familiar with the ground, however, the enemy made full use of -the hedges, and although the four Stokes mortars of the brigade -battery, which supported the 2nd Londons, did exceedingly good work, -it became advisable to fall back farther to the canal bank. - -A bridgehead was maintained for some time, but at 5 p.m. all troops 295 -had returned to the southern bank. They brought with them three enemy -machine guns, and threw ten others into the canal. - -But in the early morning, when still dark, a patrol started to cross -over the bridge with the object of establishing a post on the north -bank. The enemy was so close that the end of the bridge was within -bombing distance. This caused the men to “bunch,” with the result that -the bridge broke. Cpl. McPhie and Sapper Cox, of the 416th Field Coy. -R.E., jumped into the water and held the cork floats, which supported -the structure, together, getting their fingers badly trodden on by the -patrol. But the patrol crossed before the two gallant men let go. Cpl. -McPhie, realising the serious position of the men who had crossed to -the north side, set about gathering material to repair and strengthen -the bridge. Daylight came on apace, but the corporal never wavered in -his intention. Having assembled what he wanted, in the nature of wood, -he led the way with the curt remark to his men: “We’ve got to make a -way for the patrol--it’s a death-or-glory job.” - -The patrol on the north bank helped him to the best of their power, -but they had the slenderest hold on that side of the canal. It was -daylight, and enemy snipers were concealed in every hedge. The -corporal started to work with bullets cracking like whips round his -ears. He was shot in the head and fell in the water. Sapper Cox tried -to pull him out, but Cpl. McPhie had sufficient strength to tell him -to leave go, as he himself “was done.” Sapper Cox persisted in his -efforts. The enemy fire increased: the corporal was hit again and -again; Sapper Cox had six bullets through him. The corporal was dead, 296 -and Cox let go of his body. - -Then Sapper Hawkins ran to the bank and threw a rope to Cox. This -wonderful man still had the strength to hold on to it while Hawkins -drew him ashore. - -Cox died two days later! - -McPhie was awarded the Victoria Cross. - - * * * * * - -In this very fine enterprise 3 officers and 87 other ranks formed the -attacking party. Altogether 6 officers and 165 other ranks passed over -the canal. But this small force captured 4 officers and 203 other -ranks. The casualties suffered by the whole of the 2nd Londons during -the day were 3 officers and 140 other ranks. - -Until the 169th Brigade handed over to the 10th Canadian Infantry -Brigade, on the 14th October, they held the bridgehead and patrolled -the north bank of the canal. But on the 15th the Germans succeeded in -rushing the bridgehead, although they failed to get any -identification. - -On relief the 169th Brigade moved back to Sauchy-Cauchy, and the -168th, who were in reserve, entrained for Arras. On the 15th the 167th -Brigade was relieved by the 11th Canadian Brigade and moved to -Rumancourt. On the 16th the whole division was in the outskirts of -Arras with headquarters at Etrun (except the artillery). - - [Illustration: 10. BATTLE OF THE CANAL DU NORD.] - -All through these weeks of fighting a great strain had been imposed on -the Royal Army Service Corps and the Divisional Ammunition Column. The -roads were bad and fearfully congested, and the distances were great 297 -and continually changing. When the great advance commenced railhead -was at a place called Tincques; on the 23rd August it changed to -Gouy-en-Artois; on the 27th to Beaumetz; on the 31st to -Boisleux-au-Mont. On the 8th September it was at Arras and on the 11th -October at Quéant. Not for one moment had supplies failed to be up to -time. The work of this branch of the organisation was excellent, and -the work of these units of supply should always be borne in mind in -every account of actions fought and big advances made. - -The artillery remained in the line until the 23rd October, and then -rested in the neighbourhood of Cambrai until the 31st October. - - * * * * * - -The whole of the Hindenburg Line passed into our possession during the -early part of October, and a wide gap was driven through such systems -of defence as existed behind it. The threat at the enemy’s -communications was now direct. There were no further prepared -positions between the First, Third, and Fourth Armies and Maubeuge. - -In Flanders the Second Army, the Belgian Army, and some French -divisions, the whole force under the King of the Belgians, had -attacked on the 28th September, and were advancing rapidly through -Belgium. - -Between the Second Army, the right of the Flanders force, and the -First Army, the left of the main British attacking force, was the -Fifth Army under Gen. Birdwood. This army was in front of the Lys -salient, which was thus left between the northern and southern attacks -with the perilous prospect of being cut off. On the 2nd October the 298 -enemy started an extensive withdrawal on the Fifth Army front. - -Meanwhile the Belgian coast was cleared. Ostend fell on the 17th -October, and a few days later the left flank of the Allied forces -rested on the Dutch frontier. The Fourth, Third, and First Armies -still pushed on towards Maubeuge, and by the end of the month the -Forêt de Mormal had been reached. - -The enemy was thoroughly beaten in the field. Though he blew up the -railways and roads as he fled, he was becoming embarrassed by his own -rearguards pressing on his heels as they were driven precipitately -before the Allied infantry; and the position of his armies revealed -certain and overwhelming disaster. - - * * * * * - -On the 27th October Austria sued for peace. - -On the 28th the Italians crossed the Piave. - -On the 29th the Serbians reached the Danube. - -On the 30th October Turkey was granted an armistice. - -The Central Powers lay gasping on the ground. - - * * * * * - -The 56th Division meanwhile led a quiet life, training and resting -round Etrun and Arras. Organisation of battalions was overhauled in -accordance with a pamphlet numbered O.B./1919 and issued by the -General Staff. It was designed to deal with the decreasing strength of -battalions, but, as it supposed a greater number of men than were in -many cases available, it was troublesome. - -The outstanding points were that platoons would now be composed of two -rifle and two Lewis-gun sections; that a platoon, so long as it 299 -contained two sections of three men each, was not to be amalgamated -with any other platoon; and that not more than six men and one -non-commissioned officer to each section should be taken into action. - - “The fighting efficiency of the section,” says the pamphlet, - “is of primary importance, and every endeavour must be made - to strengthen the sections, if necessary, by the recall of - employed men and men at courses, or even by withdrawing men - from the administrative portions of battalion and company - headquarters, which must in an emergency be temporarily - reduced. After the requirements of the fighting portion for - reconstruction have been met (50 other ranks), if the - battalion is up to its full establishment, a balance of 208 - men will remain for the administrative portion (90) and for - reinforcements. This balance will include men undergoing - courses of instruction, men on leave and in rest camps, men - sick but not evacuated, and men on army, corps, divisional, - or brigade employ. These latter must be reduced to the - lowest figure possible, and will in no case exceed 30 men - per battalion.” - -The order against the amalgamation of platoons applied also to -sections, but was not invariably carried out by company commanders. It -had become a universal practice to detail six men and one -non-commissioned officer to each post. With double sentries this gave -each man one hour on and two hours off--anything less than these -numbers threw a big strain on the men; and so long as the company -commander had sufficient men for an adequate number of sentry posts, -he made them up of that number. - -The details of a battalion as arranged by this pamphlet are 300 -interesting: - - [Header Key: - A - Fighting position. - B - Administrative position. - C - Reconstruction (not for reinforcement). - D - Supplies for reinforcement.] - --------------+---------+---------+---------+---------+--------- - | A | B | C | D | Total. - |Off.|O.R.|Off.|O.R.|Off.|O.R.|Off.|O.R.|Off.|O.R. - +----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+---- - Battalion | | | | | | | | | | - Headquarters | 5 | 70 | 2 | 66 | 2 | 8 | - | 27 | 9 | 171 - | | | | | | | | | | - 4 Company | | | | | | | | |} | - Headquarters | 4 | 74 | -- | 24 | 4 | 10 | -- | -- |} | - | | | | | | | | |} 8 | 110 - Attached from | | | | | | | | |} | - platoons | -- | 2 | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |} | - | | | | | | | | | | - 16 Platoon | | | | | | | | |} | - Headquarters | 12 | 38 | -- | 4 | 4 | 8 | -- | -- |} | - | | | | | | | | |} | - Section | | | | | | | | |} | - commanders | | | | | | | | |} | - acting as | | | | | | | | |} 16| 64 - platoon | | | | | | | | |} | - sergeants | -- | 10 | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |} | - | | | | | | | | |} | - N.C.O.s for | | | | | | | | |} | - reconstruction| -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | 8 | -- | -- |} | - | | | | | | | | | | - 64 sections | -- |448 | -- | -- | -- | 16 | -- | 91 | -- | 555 - +----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+---- - Total | 1 |642 | 2 | 90 | 10 | 50 | -- |118 | 33 | 900 - --------------+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+---- - -It will be seen that 732 other ranks were required to fill the -fighting and administrative minimum. The ration strength of battalions -from the 1st August and on the first of each month to the date of the -armistice was: - - ---------------+----------+----------+----------+---------- - | August. |September.| October. | November. - +----+-----+----+-----+----+-----+----+----- - |Off.| O.R.|Off.| O.R.|Off.|O.R. |Off.|O.R. - |----+-----+----+-----+----+-----+----+----- - 7th Middlesex | 39 | 950 | 35 | 678 | 43 | 865 | 43 | 863 - 8th “ | 40 | 948 | 38 | 787 | 41 | 864 | 39 | 813 - 1st Londons | 40 | 931 | 27 | 613 | 40 | 657 | 40 | 712 - 4th “ | 42 | 898 | 32 | 710 | 37 | 705 | 38 | 721 - 13th “ | 38 | 925 | 24 | 685 | 41 | 691 | 46 | 649 - 14th “ | 43 | 925 | 30 | 548 | 31 | 622 | 34 | 705 - 2nd “ | 37 | 891 | 27 | 599 | 31 | 717 | 35 | 601 - 5th “ | 35 | 989 | 25 | 669 | 32 | 603 | 33 | 631 - 16th “ | 42 | 959 | 27 | 577 | 31 | 560 | 29 | 612 - ---------------+----+-----+----+-----+----+-----+----+----- - -But these figures must be read with a reservation. In spite of all 301 -efforts, men always disappeared. No battalion or company commander -ever had the men who were on the ration strength. Guards, fatigue -parties, sudden demands for men from higher commands, dozens of -reasons could be given for the evaporation of strength. Probably -two-thirds only of these men were really available for fighting. In -those days a general when inspecting companies had no difficulty in -finding fault if he wished to do so. - -During the rest Gen. Hull discussed the subjects of organisation and -training with the officers of each of his brigades. - -But in the evening officers and men could be cheered by “Bow Bells,” -which were to be heard at the theatre in Arras and the cinema at Haut -Avesnes. - -On the 31st the division moved into XXII Corps Reserve with -headquarters at Basseville, and on the 1st November was ordered to -relieve the 49th Division during the night 2nd/3rd. - -On the 31st October the line immediately south of Valenciennes rested -on the 4th Canadian Division, from the Canal de l’Escaut to the -outskirts of the village of Famars, the 49th Division, on the high -ground west of the River Rondelle, the 4th Division, astride the river -and to the east of Artres, and then the 61st Division. - -The 4th and 49th Divisions of the XXII Corps attacked on the 2nd -November with the object of capturing the two villages of Preseau and -Saultain, but only the first was taken, and the 49th Division held the -Preseau-Valenciennes road. - -The 56th Division was now plunged into real open fighting. Their -objectives were no longer trench lines, but tactical features, such as 302 -spurs, rivers, woods, and villages. An examination of Gen. Hull’s -operation orders reveals the new nature of the fighting. - -The 169th Brigade was given the right and the 168th the left. The -objective of the XXII Corps, which was attacking with the 11th -Division on the right and the 56th on the left, was given as the -“general line of the Aunelle River left bank.” The Canadian Corps -would cover the left flank of the 56th Division by the capture of -Estreux. The division would be covered by six brigades of field -artillery. - -On attaining the high ground on the left of the Aunelle River, patrols -would be pushed out, “since if there is any sign of enemy retreat the -G.O.C. intends to push on mounted troops to secure the crossing of the -Petite Aunelle River and will order the leading brigades to support -them.” The mounted troops referred to were two squadrons of Australian -Light Horse. - -Each of the attacking brigades had at the disposal of the Brigadier a -battery of field artillery, also two sections (8 guns) of the M.G. -Battalion. - -As the front to be covered by the 56th Division was very extensive, -the 146th Brigade, of the 49th Division, remained in line on the left, -and was to advance until squeezed out by the converging advance of the -56th and Canadian Divisions. - -On the night 2nd/3rd November the 169th and 168th Brigades relieved -the right of the 49th Division on the Preseux-Valenciennes road -without incident. Soon after 8 a.m. on the 3rd, patrols reported that -the enemy had retired. The two brigades advanced and occupied -Saultain, which was full of civilians, before mid-day. The cavalry and -a company of New Zealand Cyclists were then ordered to push forward 303 -and secure the crossings of the River Aunelle. The line of the left -bank of the river was reached at 6 p.m., where machine-gun fire was -encountered. The brigades remained on that line for the night. - -The advance was resumed at dawn on the 4th, when the Queen’s -Westminster Rifles crossed the River Aunelle and captured the village -of Sebourg; there was some half-hearted opposition from about thirty -of the enemy who were rounded up, but when they attempted to advance -east of the village they came under intense machine-gun and rifle fire -from the high ground. Attempt to turn the enemy flank met with no -success, and as there was no artillery barrage arranged, Brig.-Gen. -Coke contented himself by holding the road to the east of the village. - -The 168th Brigade on the left were also held up by the enemy on the -high ground. The 4th London Regt. led the attack and took the hamlet -of Sebourtquiaux (slightly north of Sebourg), only to find that they -were not only faced with the enemy on the high ground to the east, but -that heavy enfilade fire was being directed on them from the village -of Rombies, on the western bank of the river, and on the Canadian -Corps front. The 4th London Regt. took up a position to the east of -Sebourtquiaux and astride the river, and so remained for the night. -(Battle of the Sambre.) - -This attack had been made without artillery preparation, but the -position of the artillery is well described by Brig.-Gen. Elkington in -a short report drawn up at the end of the operations. He says the -barrage put down on the 1st November had been a very heavy one, and -that the enemy never again waited for the full weight of the artillery 304 -to get into action. - - “The problem for the artillery then became a matter of - dealing with machine-gun nests, isolated guns, and small - parties of the enemy who were delaying our advance and - enabling the main body of the enemy to retire. The enemy - blew up bridges and roads, whenever possible, to delay the - advance of our guns. In these circumstances the following - points were emphasised: - - (1) The benefit of allotting artillery to each battalion - commander in the front line. The battery commander, by - remaining with the battalion commander and keeping good - communication with his battery, could bring fire to bear at - very short time on targets as they were encountered. In - practice it was generally found that a full battery was too - large a unit, and that four guns, or even a section, was of - more use. - - (2) When more than one artillery brigade was available for - an infantry brigade, the necessity of keeping them écheloned - in depth and maintaining all but one brigade on wheels. If - resistance was encountered, the brigade, or brigades, on - wheels in rear could be moved up to reinforce the artillery - in the line to put down a barrage for an attack, or, if no - resistance was encountered, a brigade in rear could advance - through the artillery in action, which in turn could get on - wheels as the advancing brigade came into action. This - procedure enabled brigades to get occasional days’ rests and - obviated the danger of getting roads choked with advancing - artillery. - - (3) The necessity of impressing on infantry commanders that - though at the commencement of an attack it is possible to - support them with a great weight of artillery, it is not - possible to push this mass of artillery forward when - movement becomes rapid, and that if they push forward 305 - rapidly, they are better served by a small mobile allotment - of guns.” - -The rapidity of the advance was little short of marvellous, for one -must remember that it did not depend on the ability of the infantry to -march forward, but on the engineers behind them, who were -reconstructing the roads and railways for the supply services. -Lieut.-Col. Sutton, who was controlling the Quartermasters’ Branch of -the division, has a note in his diary: - - “The enemy has done his demolition work most effectively. - Craters are blown at road junctions and render roads - impassable, especially in villages, where the rim of the - crater comes in many cases up to the walls of the houses. - Culverts are blown on main roads, and a particularly - effective blockage is caused in one place by blowing a - bridge across a road and stream, so that all the material - fell across the road and in the river.” - -This demolition was the great feature of the advance. The infantry -could always go across country, but guns and lorries were not always -able to use these short cuts. The weather was unfavourable, as it -rained practically every day. When craters were encountered, the -leading vehicles could perhaps get round, by going off the road, but -they had the effect of churning up the soft ground so that the crater -soon became surrounded by an impassable bog. The engineers and 5th -Cheshires worked like Trojans to fill up these terrific pits, or make -a firm surface round them. - -At this date railhead was at Aubigny-au-Bac, the scene of that great -exploit of the 2nd London Regt. And when one takes into account dates 306 -and distances, the achievement of those who were working behind the -infantry must be ranked as one of the finest in the war. One cannot -get a picture of the advance by considering the mere width of an army -front. The infantry were the spearhead, the supplies the shaft, but -the hand that grasped the whole weapon and drove it forward was that -of the engineer, the pioneer, the man of the Labour Battalion. The -effort of the army then must be considered in depth, from the scout to -the base. - -Under these circumstances communication between units became a matter -of vital importance. The ordinary administrative routine of trench -warfare required little modification, up to the point of the break -through the Hindenburg Line--after that it became impossible. Brigade -Headquarters were responsible for the distribution of rations, -engineer material, ordnance, mails, and billeting. In the orders for -advance the General Staff informed the Brigadier-General what units, -or portion of divisional troops, including Divisional Artillery, would -be under his tactical control, and these units, irrespective of their -arm of the service, constituted the Brigade Group. The supply of -ammunition, on the other hand, was worked by arms of the service and -not by Brigade Groups. The channel of supply being the ordinary -one--from the Divisional Ammunition Column to batteries, or Infantry -Brigade Reserve, or Machine-gun Battalion Reserve. - - * * * * * - -The administrative instructions for the division point out: - - “The outstanding difficulty in all the administrative - services will be that of intercommunication between the 307 - troops and the échelons in rear which supply them. The - system of interchange of orderlies between the forward and - rear échelons has been found unsatisfactory, as if the two - échelons both move at the same time, all touch is lost. - Prior to the advance, therefore, the administrative staff of - each brigade group will fix a ‘meeting-point’ or ‘rear - report centre’ as far forward as possible on the probable - line of advance. This point will serve as a rendezvous for - all maintenance service.... The principle of - intercommunication by means of a fixed report centre will - also be adopted by Divisional Artillery and the Machine Gun - Battalion for the purpose of ammunition supply.” - -This arrangement does not seem to have worked well for the artillery, -as we find Brig.-Gen. Elkington reporting: - - “For a time communication by orderly between units became - the only feasible plan. Owing to the rapid movement these - orderlies had the utmost difficulty in locating units. In - this Divisional Artillery the system of using village - churches as report centres was successfully tried, but, - owing to the cessation of hostilities, the trial was not as - exhaustive as could be wished. Notices showing change of - location were simply stuck on the church doors or railings, - and orderlies were instructed to at once proceed to the - church for information on entering a village.” - -This modification of the original scheme would seem to be a useful -one. - -In spite of all these difficulties, the 56th Division was advancing. -On the 5th November a barrage was arranged to cover troops attacking -the high ground to the east of the River Aunelle, as a preliminary 308 -to subsequent advance. The London Rifle Brigade led the attack of the -169th Brigade at 5.30 a.m., and by 7.30 a.m. had captured the village -of Angreau. Here they were checked by the enemy, who occupied the -woods on both banks of the Honnelle River. On their right the 11th -Division captured the village of Roisin, but on their left the 168th -Brigade had not made such good progress. - -Attacking, with the London Scottish on the right and the Kensingtons -on the left, the 168th Brigade were much hampered by flank fire from -Angre and the ground to their left, which was still held by the enemy. -The situation was somewhat eased by the capture of Rombies, by the 4th -Canadian Division, and at 3 p.m. the artillery put down a rolling -barrage, behind which the Kensingtons, and the London Scottish on -their right, advanced to the outskirts of Angre. The position for the -night was on the high ground west of the River Grande Honnelle. - -The enemy had determined to defend the crossing of the river, and had -an excellent position on the eastern bank, where they held the Bois de -Beaufort in strength. The advance was to be resumed at 5.30 a.m., but -just before that hour the German artillery put down a heavy barrage of -gas-shells. Undaunted, the 2nd Londons on the right and the London -Rifle Brigade on the left of the 169th Brigade attacked in gas-masks -and crossed the river. The 168th Brigade, attacking with the London -Scottish and Kensingtons in line, met at first with slight resistance, -but as soon as the river was reached they were faced with a heavy -barrage of artillery and machine-gun fire. In spite of very accurate -fire, they succeeded in crossing the river to the north and south of 309 -Angre. The position in front of them was of considerable natural -strength, but was turned by a clever move of the London Scottish from -the south, which established them firmly on the east bank. The -Kensingtons advanced to the high ground immediately east of the -village of Angre, and here met a heavy counter-attack which drove them -back to the west bank. - -Meanwhile the 169th Brigade was engaged in heavy fighting. Only the -northern portion of the Bois de Beaufort was included in the attack, -and the enemy were found to be strongly situated on ground which -dominated the western bank of the river. The attack was delivered with -spirit, and the enemy driven back. The 2nd Londons had the wood in -front of them, and the London Rifle Brigade shot ahead on the left, -outside the wood. The enemy rallied and counter-attacked the forward -troops, while at the same time a force of Germans debouched from the -wood on the right flank of the Rifle Brigade men, who were driven back -to the west of the river. Some of the 2nd Londons were involved in -this successful enemy counter-attack, but a party of forty--a large -party in those days--held on to the position they had reached in the -Bois de Beaufort until late in the afternoon, when, discovering what -had happened on the left, and being almost entirely surrounded, they -retired fighting to the western bank of the river. - -The right brigade, therefore, remained on the west bank. The -casualties had been heavy, amounting to 394. - -The London Scottish had retained their hold of the east bank, and -later in the afternoon the Kensingtons again succeeded in crossing 310 -the river, and definitely established themselves to the east and in -touch with the London Scottish. The casualties of the 168th Brigade -during these operations were 207. The prisoners captured by them were -111. The prisoners captured by the 169th Brigade were 43. - -The general destruction of roads, combined with the vile weather, now -began to cause anxiety. Horses were used as much as possible--a horse -can drag a cart through places which would be impossible for a motor -lorry--and civilian wagons were pressed into service, being used in -conjunction with spare army horses. This was all the more necessary as -the administrative branch of the division had the additional -responsibility of feeding civilians. - -All the villages captured or occupied by the troops were filled with -civilians. So great was their emotion on their release that they -pressed whatever they had in the nature of food and drink on the -troops. The coffee-pot of the French or Belgian housewife was -replenished with reckless disregard for “to-morrow.” And then as the -country was regained, so the villagers were cut off from the source -which had provided them with their limited supplies. With Germans in -retreat on one side and roads blown up on the other, they were more -isolated than they had ever been. On the 6th November the 56th -Division was rationing 16,000 civilians, and most of this work was -being done by the transport of the 168th and 169th Brigades. - - [Illustration: 11. GENERAL MAP.] - -The battle on the right of the division had progressed with almost -unfailing success. The 11th Division on their immediate right had met -with the same check on the River Honnelle, but farther south the Army -had forced their way through the great Forest of Mormal, and troops 311 -were well to the east of it. The German rearguards were only able, on -especially favourable positions, to check the advance of a few -divisions; on the whole the rearguards were being thrown back on the -main retreating force. The roads were packed with enemy troops and -transport, and the real modern cavalry, the low-flying aeroplanes, -swooped down on them, with bomb and machine gun spreading panic and -causing the utmost confusion. - -During the night 6th/7th November the 63rd Division was put into line -on the front of the 168th Brigade, and the 169th was relieved by the -167th Brigade. The 56th Division was then on a single brigade front, -with the 11th Division on the right and the 63rd on the left. - -At dawn on the 7th patrols found that the enemy was still in front of -them, and at 9 a.m. the brigade attacked with the 8th Middlesex on the -right and the 7th Middlesex on the left. They swept on through the -northern part of the wood, and by 10.30 a.m. the 7th Middlesex entered -the village of Onnezies. The Petite Honnelles River was crossed, and -the village of Montignies taken in the afternoon. But after the -Bavai-Hensies Road was crossed, opposition stiffened, and both -artillery and machine-gun fire became severe. A line of outposts held -the east of the road for the night. - -Explosions and fires, which were continually observed at night behind -the enemy lines, were more numerous on the night of 7th/8th, and when -the advance was continued at 8 a.m., the two Middlesex battalions -occupied the villages of Athis and Fayt-le-Franc with practically no -opposition. By nightfall outposts were covering Petit Moranfayt, Trieu 312 -Jean Sart, Ferlibray, and Richon. - -The road situation was worse than ever. Railhead was at -Aubigny-au-Bac, and supply lorries were unable to proceed any farther -than the Honnelle River owing to the destruction of the bridges. Rain -fell all the time, and cross-country tracts were impassable. All -traffic was thrown on the main roads, which, to the west of the river, -were now in such a state that all supplies were late. Arrangements -were made for aeroplanes to drop food to the advance troops, but -fortunately this was found unnecessary. - -The enemy was now in full retreat on the whole of the British front. -To the south the Guards Division entered Maubeuge, and to the north -the Canadians were approaching Mons. The 56th Division marched forward -through the villages of Coron, Rieu-de-Bury, Quevy-le-Grand, and -Quevy-le-Petit, and by the evening were on the line of the -Mons-Maubeuge road behind a line of outposts held by the 1st London -Regt. - -On the 10th November the 1st Londons continued the advance, preceded -by cavalry. No serious opposition was encountered until the infantry -had passed through Harvengt, when heavy machine-gun fire from both -flanks held up the advance. A squadron of 16th Lancers attempted to -get through, but failed. The infantry then attacked and cleared the -ground, entered Harmignies, and held a line to the east. - -Orders were received that night that the 63rd Division would carry on -the advance as advance guard to the XXII Corps, and the necessary -reliefs were carried out. The artillery of the 56th Division remained 313 -in action, and were just two miles south of the spot where Brig.-Gen. -Elkington was in action on the 23rd August 1914, at the battle of -Mons. Gen. Hull, on the other hand, had actually held an outpost line -before Harmignies with his battalion on the 22nd August, and had moved -to the north to hold a line from Obourg to Mons on the 23rd. After the -battle the celebrated retreat had taken him through the village of -Nouvelles due west of Harmignies, and so through Quevy to Bavai, -Caudray, Ham, and so on. What memories this second visit to Harmignies -must have brought back to him! From retreat to victory--from a -battalion to a division--Harmignies 1914, Harmignies 1918. - -Brig.-Gen. Coke also fought as company commander in August 1914 within -five miles of the spot where he finished in 1918. - -At 7.30 a.m. on the 11th November the XXII Corps issued orders that -hostilities would cease at 11 a.m. on that day, and that all troops -would stand fast. - -Just before 11 o’clock all batteries opened fire. Each gunner was -determined to be the last man to fire a shot at the Germans. And then, -in the midst of the rolling thunder of rapid fire, teams straining -every nerve to throw the last shell into the breach of their gun -before the “cease fire” sounded, 11 o’clock struck, the first blast of -the bugles pierced the air, and with the last note silence reigned. - -“There was no cheering or excitement amongst the men,” writes -Brig.-Gen. Elkington. “They seemed too tired, and no one seemed able -to realise that it was all over.” - - G.Q.G.A. 314 - _le 12 Novembre, 1918._ - - _Officiers, Sous-officiers, Soldats des Armées - Alliées_, - - Après avoir résolument arrêté l’enemi, vous l’avez pendant - des mois, avec une foi et une énergie inlassables, attaqué - sans répit. - - Vous avez gagné le plus grande bataille de l’Histoire et - sauvé la cause la plus sacrée: la Liberté du Monde. - - Soyez Fiers! - - D’une gloire immortelle vous avez paré vos drapeaux. - - La Postérité vous garde sa reconnaissance. - - Le Maréchal de France, - Commandant en Chef les Armées Alliées, - F. FOCH. - -The division did not move to the Rhine, but remained in this area, -with headquarters at Harvengt. They mended the roads, they drilled, -and they had sports. Towards the end of January 1919 demobilisation -had reached a point which rendered the division ineffective as a -fighting unit. - -The London Scottish were moved to the 9th Division, in Germany, on the -16th January, and the 7th Middlesex to the 41st Division on the 25th -February. On the 14th March Gen. Hull gave up command of the division. - -But their work was done. Officially the 56th Division returned the -first cadre on the 14th May, the last on the 10th June, 1919. - -The total casualties of this division were: - - Officers 1,470 - Other ranks 33,339 - ------ - Total 34,809 - - - - - APPENDIX 315 - - - GENERAL OFFICERS COMMANDING - - ------------+-------------------------+------------------------------- - Rank. | Name. | Remarks. - ------------+-------------------------+------------------------------- - Major-Gen. | C. P. A. Hull, C.B. | Joined Royal Scots Fusilier - | | Regt. 16/11/87. Middlesex - | | Regt. 24/2/12. - | | Brigade Major 11th Brigade - | | 10/11/03 to 9/11/07. - | | General Staff Officer, 2nd - | | Grade, Staff College, - | | 10/3/15 to 4/2/16. - | | Commanded the 4th Bn. - | | Middlesex Regt. at the - | | battle of Mons. Brigadier - | | commanding 10th Brigade - | | 17/11/14. - | | After his illness he commanded - | | the 16th Division - | | from the 23/2/18 until he - | | resumed command of the - | | 56th. - Major-Gen. | W. Douglas Smith, C.B. | Royal Scots Fusilier Regt. - | | Commanded 56th Division - | | 24/7/17 to 9/8/17. - T/Major-Gen.| F. A. Dudgeon, C.B. | The South Lancashire Regt. - - - G.S.O.s1 - - Lieut-Col. | J. E. S. Brind, C.M.G., | From Royal Artillery. - | D.S.O. | Joined the 56th Division - | | 6/2/16 and left 31/10/16. - Lieut.-Col. | A. Bryant, D.S.O. | The Gloucestershire Regt. - | | With the 56th Division - | | 30/10/16 to 23/12/16. - Lieut.-Col. | G. de la P. B. Pakenham,| The Border Regt. - | C.M.G., D.S.O. | - ------------+-------------------------+------------------------------- - - - G.S.O.s2 316 - - ------------+-------------------+--------+---------+------------------ - Rank. | Name. | From. | To. | Regt. - ------------+-------------------+--------+---------+------------------ - Major |A. E. G. Bayley, |5/2/16 |1/10/16 |Oxford and Bucks - | D.S.O. | | | Light Infantry. - Major |E. A. Beck, D.S.O. |28/9/16 |17/2/17 |The Royal Scots - | | | | Fusiliers. - Major |W. T. Brooks, |15/2/17 |3/9/17 |The D.C.L.I. - | M.C. | | | - Major |F. B. Hurndall, |4/9/17 |9/7/18 |The 20th Hussars. - | M.C. | | | - Captain, |T. O. M. Buchan, |9/7/18 |Demob. |The Queen’s R.W. - T/Major | M.C. | | | Surrey Regt. - - - G.S.O.s3 - - Captain. |T. W. Bullock |5/2/16 |20/4/16 |The Dorsetshire - | | | | Regt. - Captain. |M. G. N. Stopford, |10/6/16 |5/12/16 |The Rifle - | M.C. | | | Brigade. - Captain. |J. D. Crosthwaite, |7/12/16 |7/7/17 |The 1st London - | M.C. | | | Regt. - Captain. |E. L. Rabone, M.C. |11/7/17 |11/11/17 |The Worcestershire - | | | | Regt. - Captain. |C. W. Haydon, |11/11/17|11/5/18 |The Middlesex - | M.C. | | | Regt. - Captain. |T. L. C. Heald |14/5/18 |4/2/19 |The 5th Cheshire - | | | | Regt. - - - A.A. & Q.M.G.s - - Bt. Lieut.- |H. W. Grubb, |5/2/16 |4/12/17 |The Border Regt. - Col. D.S.O. | | | - Bt. Major |W. M. Sutton, |4/12/17 |Demob. |Somerset Light - T/Lieut.- | D.S.O., M.C. | | | Infantry. - Col. - - - D.A.A.G.s - - Captain. |W. M. Sutton, |5/2/16 |4/12/17 |Somerset Light - | D.S.O., M.C. | | | Infantry. - Major |A. C. Dundas |4/12/17 |10/12/18 |The Middlesex - | | | | Regt. - Major |A. Scott, D.S.O., |10/12/18|Demob. |A. & S. - | M.C. | | | Highlanders. - - - - D.A.Q.M.G.s 317 - - Major |F. J. Lemon, D.S.O.| 5/2/16 | 22/4/18 |The West Yorkshire - | | | | Regt. - Captain |T. F. Chipp, M.C. |23/4/18 | 2/2/19 |The Middlesex - T/Major | | | | Regt. - - - A.D.C.s - - [6]Lieut. |H. C. B. Way |10/2/16 | Demob. |The 2nd London - | | | | Regt. - 2/Lieut. |C. Burn-Callender | 4/3/16 | 2/2/17 |The - | | | | Montgomeryshire - | | | | Yeomanry. - Lieut. |H. M. Woodhouse |10/4/17 | 30/4/17 |The Notts - | | | | Yeomanry. - 2/Lieut. |C. Y. Jones |26/5/17 | 23/7/17 |The 13th London - | | | | Regt. - Captain |G. A. Greig |24/7/17 | 9/8/17 |The Royal Scots - | | | | Fusiliers. - Lieut. |R. W. Broatch |10/8/17 | Demob. |The 14th London - | | | | Regt. - - - 56TH DIVISIONAL ARTILLERY HEADQUARTERS - C.R.A. - - Col., |R. J. G. Elkington,| 6/2/16 | Demob. | - T/Brig.-Gen.| C.M.G., D.S.O. | | | - - - BRIGADE MAJORS - - Major |W. J. McLay | 6/2/16 | 4/6/16 | - Major |J. A. Don |28/6/16 | 27/9/16 | - Major |D. Thomson |27/7/16 | 21/1/18 | - Major |H. D. Gale, M.C. |21/1/18 | Demob. | - - - STAFF CAPTAINS - - Captain |B. Macmin | 6/2/16 | 22/1/17 | - Captain |N. C. Lockhart |22/1/17 | 12/2/19 | - Captain |J. D. Hendley Smith|12/2/19 | Demob. | - -------------+-------------------+--------+---------+----------------- - - - [6] NOTE.--Lieut. H. C. B. Way was away from 4/2/18 to - 4/4/18 as A.D.C. to G.O.C. 16th (Irish) Division. - - - ARTILLERY 318 - - - 1/1ST LONDON BRIGADE R.F.A. (280TH BRIGADE R.F.A.) - - Commanded by: - Lieut.-Col. L. A. C. Southam until March 1918. - Lieut.-Col. Batt. - 1916 - April 16th. 93rd Battery joined and designated D/280th Brigade - R.F.A. - May 6th. Designated 280th Brigade R.F.A. - “ 17th. B.A.C. posted to 56th D.A.C. - “ 28th. 93rd Battery ceased to be D/280th Bde. R.F.A., and was - transferred to 283rd Bde. R.F.A., and the original - 1/11th London Howitzer Battery became D/280. - Nov. 5th. Reorganised into four 6-gun batteries; “A,” 93rd, and - “C,” 18-pounders; “D,” howitzers. - 93rd Battery and one section “R” Battery transferred - from 283rd Bde. R.F.A. The original “B” Battery - split up: one section to “A,” and one section to “C.” - “D” Battery only had 4 howitzers until 25/1/17, when - one section 500th Howitzer Battery joined from 282nd - Bde. R.F.A. - - - 1/2ND LONDON BRIGADE R.F.A. (281ST BRIGADE R.F.A.) - - Commanded by Lieut.-Col. C. C. Macdowell. - 1916. - April 15th. 109th Battery joined. - May 12th. Designated 281st Bde. R.F.A. - “ 16th. B.A.C. posted to 56th D.A.C. - “ 28th. 10th (Howitzer) Battery transferred from 283rd Bde. - R.F.A. and designated D/281st Battery R.F.A. - 109th Battery transferred to 283rd Bde. R.F.A. - Nov. 5th. Reorganised into four 6-gun batteries. - “A,” 109th, and “C” 18-pounders; “D” howitzers. - 109th Battery and one section “R” Battery transferred - from 283rd Bde. R.F.A. - The original “C” Battery split up. One section to - “A” Battery. One section to “B” Battery. - “D” Battery only had 4 howitzers till 23/1/17, when - one section 500th Howitzer Battery joined from 282nd - Bde. R.F.A. - - - 1/3RD LONDON BRIGADE R.F.A. (282ND ARMY BRIGADE R.F.A.) - - Commanded by Lieut.-Col. A. F. Prechtel. - 1916 - April 16th. 109th Battery R.F.A. joined and designated “R” - Battery. (Duplicate--see 281st Bde.) - May 6th. Designated 282nd London Bde. R.F.A. - “ 7th, 8th, and 9th Batteries designated “A,” “B,” and - “C” Batteries. - May 17th. B.A.C. posted to 56th D.A.C. 319 - “ 28th. “R” Battery posted to 283rd Bde. R.F.A. - B/167th (Howitzer) Battery joined and designated - D/282nd Battery R.F.A. - Reorganised into four 6-gun batteries. “A,” “B,” and - Nov. 5th. “C,” 18-pounders; “D” howitzers. - to 500th How. Bty. R.F.A. joined 4/12/16. - 1917 One Section to D/280th Bde. R.F.A. One section to - D/281st Bde. R.F.A. - Jan. 25th. B/126th Battery R.F.A. joined and designated A/282nd - Battery. - The original “A” Battery having been split up, one - section each to “B” and “C.” - One section D/126th Battery R.F.A. joined 25/1/17. - Jan. 20th. Designated 282nd Army Bde. R.F.A. - “ 25th. One Section 56th D.A.C. joined and designated 282nd - B.A.C. - - - 1/4TH (LONDON) HOWITZER BRIGADE R.F.A. (283RD BRIGADE R.F.A.) - - Commanded by Lieut.-Col. Wainwright. - 1915 - Nov. 19th, Half of the B.A.C. left for Salonica to join 10th Division. - 1916 - May 6th. Designated 283rd (Howitzer) Bde. R.F.A. - “ 17th. B.A.C. transferred to 56th D.A.C. - “ 28th. “R” Battery joined from 282nd Bde. R.F.A. - 109th Battery joined from 281st Bde. R.F.A. - 93rd Battery joined from 280th Bde. R.F.A. (all - 18-pounders). - 10th (Howitzer) Battery transferred to 281st Bde. - R.F.A. - 11th (Howitzer) Battery transferred to 280th Bde. - R.F.A. - Nov. 5th. 93rd Battery and one section “R” Battery transferred - to 280th Bde. R.F.A. - 109th Battery and one section “R” Battery transferred - to 281st Bde. R.F.A. - Brigade ceased to exist, but the new organisation was - not completed until January 1917. - - - 56TH DIVISIONAL AMMUNITION COLUMN - - Commanded by Lieut.-Col. E. W. Griffith. - 1916 - May 17th. The B.A.C.s of 280th, 281st, 282nd, and 283rd Bdes. - R.F.A. absorbed, Then consisted of “A” Echelon - (H.Q., Nos. 1, 2, and 3 sections) and “B” Echelon. - 1917 - Jan. 25th. One Section (No. 2) became the 282nd Army Bde. Ammunition - Column. - Sept. “B” Echelon reorganised as S.A.A. Section. - Reorganised as H.Q., No. 1, 2, and S.A.A. Sections. - - - TRENCH MORTARS 320 - - 1916 - March 8th. “X” “Y,” and “Z” 2-inch Medium Batteries formed. - Four mortars each. - May. “V” Heavy Battery formed. - 1917 - Sept./Oct. Medium Batteries handed in 2-inch mortars and were - armed with four 6-inch mortars each. - 1918 - Feb. 13th. Medium batteries reorganised into two batteries (“X” - and “Y”) of 6-inch mortars each. - Heavy battery taken over by Corps. - 1919 - Feb. 6th. Reduced to Cadre. Surplus personnel to Brigades and - D.A.C. - - - ROYAL ENGINEERS - (See C.R.E.) - - 416th (Edinburgh) Field Coy. R.E. - 512th (London) Field Coy. R.E. - 513th (London) Field Coy. R.E. - 56th Divisional Signal Coy. - - - PIONEER BATTALION - - 1/5th Bn. Cheshire Regt. (Earl of Chester’s). - Commanded by: - Lieut.-Col. J. E. C. Groves, C.M.G., T.D., 14/2/15 to 21/2/18. - Major (T/Lieut.-Col.) W. A. V. Churton, D.S.O., T.D., 21/2/18 - to end. - - - MACHINE GUN CORPS - - 56th Bn. Machine Gun Corps formed on 1/3/18. - (See Divisional M.G. Officers.) - - - R.A.S.C. UNITS - - 213th Coy. R.A.S.C. - 214th “ “ - 215th “ “ - 216th “ “ - Divisional Train commanded by: - Lieut.-Col. A. G. Galloway, D.S.O., to Sept. 1917. - Lieut.-Col. E. P. Blencowe, D.S.O., to May 1918. - - - R.A.M.C. - - 2/1st London Field Ambulance. - 2/2nd “ “ “ - 2/3rd “ “ “ - - 1/1st London Mobile Vet. Section. - - 247th Divisional Employment Coy. formed in May 1917. - - - A.D.sM.S. 321 - - ------------+-----------------------+---------+---------+---------- - Rank. | Name. | From. | To. | Regt. - ------------+-----------------------+---------+---------+---------- - Colonel |E. G. Browne, C.B., |Feb. ’16 | Feb, ’17|R.A.M.C. - | A.M.S. | | | - Colonel |G. A. Moore, |Feb. ’17 | Feb. ’18|R.A.M.C. - | C.M.G., D.S.O. | | | - Colonel |E. C. Montgomery-Smith,|Feb. ’18 | Demob. |R.A.M.C. - | D.S.O., A.M.S. (T.F.)| | | - - - D.A.D.sM.S. - - Major |L. M. Purser, |Feb. ’16 |Sept. ’16|R.A.M.C. - | D.S.O. | | | - Captain |D. Jobson Scott, |Sept. ’16| Feb. ’18|R.A.M.C. - | M.C. | | | (T.F.) - Major |W. T. Hare, M.C. |Feb. ’18 | Demob. |R.A.M.C. - - - D.A.D.sV.S. - - Major |F. Hibbard | 5/2/16 | 30/9/16 | - Major |W. Ascott, O.B.E. | 1/10/16 | Demob. | - - - D.A.D.sO.S. - - Major |J. Bishop | 6/2/16 | 10/3/16 | - Captain |P. S. Tibbs | 11/3/16 | 23/7/16 | - Lieut. |V. C. Ward | 24/7/16 | 22/11/16| - Captain |W. D. Harbinson | 23/11/16| 27/5/17 | - Major |J. W. Burbidge | 28/5/17 | Demob. | - - - C.sR.E. - - Lieut.-Col. |H. W. Gordon, | 6/2/16 | Oct. ’17|Royal - | D.S.O. | | | Engineers. - Lieut.-Col. |E. N. Mozeley, | Oct. ’17| Demob. |Royal - | D.S.O. | | | Engineers. - - - DIVISIONAL MACHINE GUN OFFICERS - - Major |E. C. S. Jervis | Jan. ’17| May ’17 |R. of O. - | | | | 6th D.G.s. - Major |Roberts | May ’17 | Aug. ’17|M.G.C. - Lieut.-Col. |E. C. S. Jervis | Aug. ’17| Mar. ’18|R. of O. - | | | | 6th D.G.s. - - - 167TH INFANTRY BRIGADE - - BRIGADE COMMANDERS - - Major |F. H. Burnell-Nugent, | 6/2/16 | 26/7/16 | The Rifle - (T/Brig.- | D.S.O. | | | Brigade. - Gen.) | | | | - Bt. Col. |G. Freeth, C.M.G., | 7/7/16 | Demob. | Lancashire - (T/Brig.- | D.S.O. | | | Fusiliers. - Gen.) | | | | - - - BRIGADE MAJORS 322 - - Bt. Major |G. Blewitt, D.S.O., | 6/2/16 | 5/12/16 |The Oxford - | M.C. | | | and Bucks - | | | | Light - | | | | Infantry. - Captain |M. Stopford, M.C. | 5/12/16 | 25/3/18 |The Rifle - | | | | Brigade. - Captain |C. E. Clouting | 25/3/18 | 8/4/18 |General List. - Captain |C. W. Haydon, M.C. | 25/4/18 | Demob. |Middlesex - | | | | Regt. - - - STAFF CAPTAINS - - Captain |O. H. Tidbury, M.C. | 6/2/16 |27/12/16 |Middlesex - | | | | Regt. - Captain |T. F. Chipp, M.C. |27/12/16 | 23/4/18 |Middlesex - | | | | Regt. - Captain |H. F. Prynn, M.C. | 23/4/18 | Demob. |13th London - | | | | Regt. - | | | | (Kensingtons). - - - 168TH INFANTRY BRIGADE - - BRIGADE COMMANDERS - - Bt. Col. |G. G. Loch, C.M.G., | 5/2/16 | Demob. |The Royal - (T/Brig.- | D.S.O. | | | Scots. - Gen.) | | | | - - - BRIGADE MAJORS - - Major |P. Neame, V.C., D.S.O. | 5/2/16 | 28/11/16 |Royal - | | | | Engineers. - Captain |J. L. Willcocks, M.C. |28/11/16 | 3/7/18 |The Black - | | | | Watch. - Captain |A. R. Abercrombie, | 3/7/18 | 11/8/18 |The Queen’s - | D.S.O., M.C. | | | Regt. - Captain |R. C. Boyle | 11/8/18 | Demob. |West Somerset - | | | | Yeomanry. - - - STAFF CAPTAINS - - Major |L. L. Wheatley, | 5/2/16 | 7/3/16 |A. & S. - | D.S.O. | | | Highlanders. - Captain |R. E. Otter, M.C. | 7/4/16 | 20/4/17 |London Rifle - | | | | Brigade. - Captain |J. C. Andrews, M.C. | 26/4/17 | 7/3/18 | Q.V.R. - Captain |E. F. Coke, M.C. | 7/3/18 | Demob. |8th Canadian - | | | | Inantry - | | | | Battn. - - - 169TH INFANTRY BRIGADE - - BRIGADE COMMANDER - - Brig.-Gen. |E. S. D. E. Coke, | 5/2/16 | Demob. |K.O.S.B. - (Bt. Col.)| C.M.G., D.S.O. | | | - - - BRIGADE MAJORS 323 - - Captain |L. A. Newnham | 5/2/16 | 27/5/17 |Middlesex - | | | | Regt. - Captain |W. Carden Roe, | 27/5/17 | 24/3/18 |Royal Irish - | M.C. | | | Fusiliers. - Captain |Chute | 28/3/18 | 9/4/18 | - Captain |T. G. McCarthy | 1/4/18 | Demob. |2nd London - | | | | Regt. - - - STAFF CAPTAINS - - Captain |E. R. Broadbent, | 5/2/16 | 5/11/17 |8th Hussars. - | M.C. | | | - Captain |F. Bishop | 5/11/17 | Demob. |1/5th Bn. - | | | | Cheshire - | | | | Regt. ---------------+-----------------------+---------+---------+------------ - - - INFANTRY BATTALIONS, 167TH BRIGADE - - ---------------+-----------------------------+----------------------- - Battalion. | Commanding Officers. | Remarks. - ---------------+-----------------------------+----------------------- - 1/7th Middlesex|Lieut.-Col. E. J. King, |The Battalion went to - Regt. | C.M.G., to 2/11/16, and | Gibraltar Sept. 1914. - | from 4/2/17 to 14/5/17 | France to the 23rd - |Lieut-.Col. E. D. Jackson, | Brigade, 8th Division, - | D.S.O., from 2/11/16 to | in Feb. 1915. - | 4/2/17 | - |A/Lieut.-Col. F. W. D. | - | Bendall, from 15/5/17 | - | to 17/8/17 | - |A/Lieut.-Col. P. C. Kay, | - | D.S.O., M.C., from | - | 31/8/17 to 16/2/18. | - |A/Lieut.-Col. M. Beevor, | - | from 16/2/18. | - ---------------+-----------------------------+----------------------- - 1/8th Middlesex|T/Lieut.-Col. E. D. W. |This Battalion went to - Regt. | Gregory, from 31/5/15 to | Gibraltar in Sept. - | Sept. 1915. | 1914. To the 88th - |Lieut.-Col. P. L. Inkpen, | Brigade, 3rd during - | D.S.O., from Sept. 1915 | Division, in France - | to Oct. 1916, and Mar. | March 1915, and in - | 1917 to Aug. 1917. | April joined the 23rd - |Lieut.-Col. F. D. W. Bendall,| Brigade, when it was - | from Oct. 1916 to | amalgamated with the - | Mar. 1917. | 1/7th Middlesex. - |Lieut.-Col. C. H. Pank, | Resumed independence - | C.M.G., D.S.O., Sept. | on joining 56th - | 1917 to Mar. 1919. | Division. - |Lieut.-Col. M. B. Beevor, | - | from Mar. 1918. | - ---------------+-----------------------------+----------------------- 324 - 1/1st London |Lieut.-Col. E. G. Mercer, |Went to Malta in Sept. - Regt. (Royal | C.M.G., T.D., from Jan. | 1914. France Jan. - Fusiliers) | 1916 to June 1916. | 1915, joining the - |Lieut.-Col. D. V. Smith, | 25th Brigade, 8th - | D.S.O., V.D., from June | Division, in March. - | 1916 to Oct. 1916; from | To the 56th Division - | Feb. 1917 to April 1917. | April 1916. - |Lieut.-Col. Kennard, from | - | Oct. 1916 to Nov. 1916. | - |Lieut.-Col. W. R. Glover, | - | C.M.G., D.S.O., T.D., | - | from Nov. 1916 to Mar. | - | 1917; from April 1917. | - ---------------+-----------------------------+----------------------- - 1/3rd London |A/Lieut.-Col. A. E. Maitland,|To Malta in Sept. 1914. - Regt. (Royal | D.S.O., M.C., until | France Jan. 1915 with - Fusiliers) | Mar. 1917. | G.H.Q. troops. - |Lieut.-Col. F. D. Samuel, | Garhwal Brigade, - | D.S.O., T.D. | Meerut Division, on - | | 1/3/15. To 142nd - | | Brigade, 47th Division, - | | 1/1/16. Left 56th - | | Division and joined - | | 173rd Brigade, 58th - | | Division, 2/2/18. - ---------------+-----------------------------+----------------------- - - - INFANTRY BATTALIONS, 168TH BRIGADE - - ---------------+-----------------------------+----------------------- - Battalion. | Commanding Officers. | Remarks. - ---------------+-----------------------------+----------------------- - 1/4th London |Major W. J, Clark, until |To Malta Sept. 1914. - Regt. (Royal | 23/3/16. | France Jan. 1915 as - Fusiliers) |Lieut.-Col. L. L. Wheatley, | G.H.Q. troops. Joined - | 8/4/16 to 11/10/16. | Ferozepore Brigade, - |Lieut.-Col. H. J. Duncan | Lahore Division, on - | Teape, until 17/3/17. | 1/3/15. To 140th - |Lieut.-Col. A. E. Maitland, | Brigade, 47th - | 17/3/17 to 20/4/17. | Division, 1/1/16. - |Lieut.-Col. H. Campbell, | - | 20/4/17 to 14/8/17. | - |Lieut.-Col. A. F. Marchment, | - | 14/8/17 to the end. | - ----------------+-----------------------------+----------------------- 325 - 1/12th London |Colonel A. D. Bayliffe, |To France 4/1/15 as - Regt. | C.M.G., T.D. | G.H.Q. troops. Joined - (Rangers) | | 84th Brigade, 28th - | | Division, on 4/2/15. - | | Brigade moved to 5th - | | Division 19/2/15 and - | | rejoined 28th Division - | | 6/4/15. To G.H.Q. on - | | 19/5/15. Left 56th - | | Division 2/2/18, and - | | joined 58th Division. - ---------------+-----------------------------+----------------------- - 1/13th London |Lieut.-Col. H. Stafford |To France on 13/11/14, - Regt. | until 28/6/16. | and joined the 24th - (Kensingtons)|A/Lieut.-Col. W. W. Young | Brigade, 8th Division. - | until 27/10/16. | To G.H.Q. on 19/5/15. - |A/Lieut.-Col. J. C. R. | - | King, until 13/6/17. | - |A/Lieut.-Col. J. E. J. | - | Higgins, M.C., until | - | 5/8/17. | - |A/Lieut.-Col. V. Flower, | - | D.S.O., until 16/8/17. | - |A/Lieut.-Col. R. E. F. | - | Shaw, M.C., until 23/8/18. | - |A/Lieut.-Col. M. A. Prismall,| - | M.C., until 28/9/18. | - |A/Lieut.-Col. J. Forbes | - | Robertson, V.C., D.S.O., | - | M.C., until 13/10/18. | - |A/Lieut.-Col. F. S. B. | - | Johnson, D.S.O. | - ---------------+-----------------------------+----------------------- - 1/14th London |Lieut-.Col. B. C. Green, |To France on lines of - Regt. (London| C.M.G., T.D., until 2/8/16.| communication Sept. - Scottish) |Lieut.-Col. J. H. Lindsay, | 1914. Joined 1st - | D.S.O., until 6/10/16. | Brigade, 1st Division, - |Lieut.-Col. James Paterson, | on 7/11/14. - | M.C., until 6/3/17. | - |Lieut.-Col. E. D. Jackson, | - | D.S.O. | - ---------------+-----------------------------+----------------------- - - - INFANTRY BATTALIONS, 169TH BRIGADE 326 - - ---------------+-----------------------------+----------------------- - Battalion. | Commanding Officers. | Remarks. - ---------------+-----------------------------+----------------------- - 1/2nd London |Lieut.-Col. James |To Malta Sept. 1914. - Regt. (Royal | Attenborough, C.M.G., T.D.,| France Jan. 1915 as - Fusiliers) | until Nov. 1916, and | G.H.Q. troops. Joined - | Feb. 1917 to April 1917. | 17th Brigade, 6th - |A/Lieut.-Col. J. P. Kellett, | Division, 1/3/15. The - | D.S.O., M.C., Nov. 1916 | Brigade was transferred - | to Feb. 1917; May 1917 | to 24th Division - | to Aug. 1917; Jan. 1918 | 1/1/16. - | to Oct. 1918; Jan. 1919. | - |A/Lieut.-Col. R. E. F. | - | Sneath, M.C., Aug. 1917 | - | to Dec. 1917. | - |A/Lieut.-Col. S. H. Stevens, | - | M.C., Nov. 1918 to Jan. | - | 1919. | - ---------------+-----------------------------+----------------------- - 1/5th London |Lieut.-Col. Bates, D.S.O., |To France and joined - Regt. | until 13/8/16. | 11th Brigade, 4th - (London |Lieut.-Col. R. H. Husey, | Division, 24/11/14. - Rifle | D.S.O., 13/8/16 to 4/5/18. | To G.H.Q. 19/5/15. - Brigade) |Lieut.-Col. C. D. Burnell, | To 8th Brigade, 3rd - | D.S.O., 4/5/18 to end. | Division, 1/1/16. - | Also for one month, | - | 22/4/17 to 20/5/17, | - | during Lieut.-Col. | - | Husey’s absence. The | - | latter C.O. was also | - | absent from 26/3/17 to | - | 22/4/17, and 12/8/17 to | - | 3/12/17, when Major | - | F. H. Wallis took command. | - ---------------+-----------------------------+----------------------- - 1/9th London |Colonel J. W. F. Dickens, |To France 24/11/14 and - Regt. (Queen | D.S.O., V.D. | joined 13th Brigade, - Victoria’s |Lieut.-Col. F. B. Follett, | 5th Division. Brigade - Rifles) | D.S.O., M.C. | moved to 28th Division - |Lieut.-Col. M. Beevor, | on 19/2/15, and back to - | D.S.O. | 5th Division on 6/4/15. - |Lieut.-Col. E. G. H. Towell | Left 56th Division and - | | joined 58th 2/2/18. - ---------------+-----------------------------+----------------------- - 1/16th London |Lieut.-Col. R. Shoolbred, |To France and joined - Regt. | C.M.G., T.D. | 18th Brigade, 6th - (Queen’s |Lieut.-Col. E. P. Harding, | Division, 11/11/14. - Westminster | O.B.E., M.C. | - Rifles) |Lieut.-Col. P. M. Glazier, | - | D.S.O. | - | Lieut.-Col. S. R. Savill, | - | D.S.O., M.C. | - ---------------+-----------------------------+----------------------- - - - - - INDEX 327 - - - Ablainzeville, 32 - Achicourt, 114 - Achiet-le-Grand, 32 - Acq, 246 - Adinfer Wood, 32 - Agny, 114 - Albert, battle of, 258-268 - Ambrines, 8 - American power, 211 - Angreau, 308 - Arnold, Lt., 292 - Arras, battles of, 114-143, 208-242 - Arthur, G. S., 40 - Artillery Coy. of London (H.A.C.), 2 - Athis, 311 - Aubers Ridge, 104 - Aubigny-au-Bac, 290-297, 312 - Avesnes-le-Comte, 9, 254 - - Baghdad, 111, 145 - Bapaume, 69 - Barber, Capt. J. B., 9 - Basseux, 266 - Basseville, 301 - Bavincourt, 254, 259 - Bayley, Major A. E. G., 3 - Bayliffe, Lt.-Col. A. D., 89 - Bazentin, 53 - Bazentin Ridge, battle of, 53 - Beaudricourt, 8 - Beaufort, 8 - Beaumetz, 297 - Beauvois, 113 - Bedford Regt., 156 - Belfort, 14 - Bendall, Lt.-Col. F. W. D., 160 - Berkshire Regt., 156 - Berlencourt, 8 - Berles-au-Bois, 214 - Bernafay, 101 - Bertincourt, 214 - Beugny, 175 - Biez Wood, 32 - Blairville, 25, 259 - Blangermont, 113 - Blangerol, 113 - Blavincourt, 8 - Blewitt, Capt. G., 4 - Bloxam, Major-Gen. (U.S.A.), 169 - Boisleux-au-Mont, 297 - Boisleux St. Marc, 283 - Bouleaux Wood (_see_ Ginchy), 56 - Bouquemaison, 120 - Bouret-sur-Canche, 9 - Bourlon (_see_ Cambrai) - - Bovill, E. H., 40 - Bow Bells, 140 - Boyelles (_see_ Albert) - - Brand, Capt., 109 - Brigades: - 6th, 202 - 8th, 168 - 9th, 168 - 12th, 234 - 44th, 253 - 46th, 253 - 53rd, 155 - 76th, 168 - 99th, 202 - 109th, 174 - 137th, 42 - 139th, 42 - 140th, 202 - 145th, 18 - 171st, 278 - 172nd, 275 - Tank Brigades, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 171 - Brigades, composition of, 4, 5 - Brind, Lt.-Col. J. E. S., 3, 24 - Broadbent, Capt. E. R., 4 - Bruilly, 8 - Brussiloff, Gen., 14, 96, 147 - Bucquoy, 32 - Bullecourt, 135 (_see_ Scarpe, 269-280) - - Bullock, Capt. T. W., 3 - Busseboom, 165 - - Cambrai, battle of, 163-208, 290 - Campbell, Lt.-Col. H., 160 - Canadian Cavalry, 177 328 - Canadian Mounted Rifles, 236 - Canal du Nord (battle), 280-289 - Cannettemont, 8 - Canteen, 9, 165 - Carnoy, 69 - Cavan, Gen. Lord, 75, 95 - Chemin-des-Dames, 130 - Churchill, Rt. Hon. Winston, 50 - Citadel, 52, 101 - Cockerill, Capt., 39 - Coke, Brig.-Gen. E. S., 3, 18, 114, 134, 237, 275, 286, 291, 303, 313 - Combles (_see_ Ginchy) - Corbie, 51 - Coron, 312 - Corps: - II, 154, 163 - III, 170, 171 - IV, 27, 170, 171, 190, 258, 265, 285 - V, 170 - VI, 6, 117, 131, 170, 190, 254, 258, 265, 285 - VII, 10, 19, 113, 114, 170 - IX, 245 - X, 48 - XI, 104 - XIII, 209, 221 - XIV, 51, 59, 70 - XV, 59 - XVII, 170, 221, 247, 269, 285 - XXII, 246, 283, 301 - Canadian, 169, 282, 284, 291 - French XVII, 6 - German XIV, 18 - Couin, 131 - Cox (Sapper), 295 - Crawford, Capt., 198 - Croisette, 113 - Croisilles, 117, 268-275 - - Dainville, 7 - Delville Wood (_see_ Ginchy), 53 - Divisional Band, 164 - Divisional Depot Bn., 120 - Divisions: - Infantry: - 1st, 283 - 2nd, 193, 202, 258 - 3rd, 117, 140, 168, 191, 237, 277 - 4th, 87, 221, 234, 237, 284, 301 - 5th, 55, 65, 79, 102 - 6th, 70, 74, 79, 82, 103, 171 - 8th, 154, 245 - 11th, 284, 301, 308, 311 - 12th, 171, 193 - 13th, 114 - 14th, 10, 114, 117, 134 - 15th, 131, 237, 253 - 16th, 57, 62 - 18th, 86, 128, 155 - 19th, 245 - 20th, 171 - 21st, 117, 245 - 25th, 155, 160, 245 - 29th, 171, 176 - 30th, 117, 128 - 31st, 210 - 36th, 171, 177 - 37th, 112, 138, 258 - 40th, 259, 279 - 41st, 215 - 42nd, 258 - 46th, 26 - 47th, 27, 192, 202 - 48th, 18 - 49th, 113, 301 - 50th, 128, 245 - 51st, 171, 177 - 52nd, 266, 278, 282 - 55th, 193 - 57th, 260, 272, 282 - 58th, 214 - 59th, 192 - 61st, 101, 140, 301 - 62nd, 171, 177, 210 - 63rd, 279, 282, 311 - Cavalry: - 1st, 178, 181 - 2nd, 191 - Canadian: - 1st, 247, 253 - 2nd, 252 - 3rd, 102, 224, 234, 284 - 4th, 236, 301, 308 - New Zealand, 258 - Guards, 62, 70, 74, 79, 82, 189, 258, 263, 266, 312 - German: - Guards, 2nd R., 35, 47 - 5th Bav., 74, 104 - 5th Bav. R., 222 - 5th R., 210 - 16th Bav., 248 - 20th, 188 - 23rd R., 222 - 39th, 253 - 41st, 241 - 51st R., 78 - 52nd, 18, 46 329 - 185th, 61, 248 - 214th, 249, 250 - 219th R., 222 - 240th, 222 - Portuguese, 2nd, 244 - Domart-en-Ponthieu, 6 - Doullens, 6, 48 - Dudgeon, Gen. F. A., 153-249 - - Emery, Major, 104 - Eperlecques, 144, 153, 165 - Essart, 32, 36 - Etrun, 296 - - Falfemont Farm (_see_ Ginchy), 54 - Falkenhayn, Gen., 10, 29, 94, 97 - Fayt-le-Franc, 311 - Ferlibray, 312 - Flers, battle of, 54, 69 - Flower, Major V. A., 160 - Foch, Marshal, 245 - Fonquevillers, 48 - Fosseux, 209 - Freeth, Brig.-Gen., 86, 109, 123, 138, 155, 249, 268 - Fremicourt, 175 - Frevent, 113 - Friend, L. W., 228 - Frigicourt, 53 - Fromer-le-Grand, 48 - - Garland, Capt. J. R., 41 - Gavrelle (_see_ Arras) - Gaza, 147 - German prisoners (_see_ Regiments) - Ginchy, battle of, 55-66 - Givenchy-le-Noble, 8 - Glazier, Lt.-Col., 186, 228 - Glencorse (_see_ Ypres) - Gommecourt, action of, 18-47 - Gouy-en-Artois, 297 - Grand Rullecourt, 7 - Grenas, 19 - Grouping of units, 5 - Grubb, Lt.-Col. H. W., 3 - Guemappe (_see_ Arras, battles of), 117 - Guillemont, 55 - Guinecourt, 113 - - Haking, Gen. R., 109 - Hallencourt, 3, 10, 101 - Halloy, practice at, 36 - Hampshire Regt., 177 - Handyside, Capt. P. A. J., 41 - Happy Valley, 52 - Harbarcq, 140 - Harmignies, 312 - Harris, Major M. R., 160 - Harvengt, 312 - Hauteville, 131 - Hawkins (Sapper), 296 - Hayward, Cpl., 40 - Hébuterne, 10 - Heninel, 126 - Henri, P., 35 - Henu, 10, 18 - Héricourt, 113 - Hernicourt, 113 - Higgins, Major J. E., 160 - Hindenburg, Gen. von, 94, 98, 129, 147 - Honval, 8, 113 - Horne, J. A., 40 - Horses, 103 - Houvin, 8, 113 - Hull, Major-Gen. Sir C. P. A., 1-144, 249-314 - Husey, Col. R. R., 160 - - Ide, W. C., 40 - Identification (_see_ Regiments) - Indian drivers, 253 - Ingpen, Lt.-Col. P. L., 160 - Isonzo, 97 - Ivergny, 8 - Izel-les-Hameau, 253 - - Jackson, Lt.-Col., 188, 199 - Jervis, Lt.-Col. E. C. S., 241, 265 - Joffre, Marshal, 51 - - Kellet, Lt.-Col. J. P., 160 - Kerensky, 147 - King Edward’s Horse, 178 - Korniloff, 147 - - Lagnicourt, 168 - Lancashire Fusiliers, 228 - Laventie, 101-113 - Le Cauroy, 7, 117 - Lemon, Major F. J., 3 - Lestrem, 101 - Leuze Wood (_see_ Ginchy), 55 - Liencourt, 8 - Lignereuil, 8, 254 - Loch, Brig.-Gen., 3, 19, 55, 109, 123, 239, 264 - Louverval, 168 - Lowndes, G. A. N., 227 - Ludendorff, Gen. von, 94, 98, 111, 129, 147, 152 - - Macdowell, Lt.-Col., 23 330 - Macgregor, Capt. A. H., 56 - Macintosh, Cpl., 198 - McPhie, Cpl., 295 - Magnicourt, 8 - Maltzhorn Farm, 57 - Manin, 8 - Mansell Camp, 101 - Marchment, Lt.-Col., 232 - Marcoing (_see_ Cambrai) - Maricourt, 16, 52 - Masnières (_see_ Cambrai) - Maurepas, 53 - Mazières, 253 - Méaulte, 81 - Mercatel, 116 - Millar, Cpl., 104 - Moncheaux, 9 - Monchy, 116 - Mons, 313 - Montauban, 53, 87 - Montignies, 311 - Morchies, 168 - Mott, Capt., 39 - - Neame, Capt. P., 4 - Negus, A. G., 40 - Neuve Chapelle, 103 - Neuville Vitasse (_see_ Arras, battles of), 115 - Newnham, Capt. L. A., 4, 108, 140, 144 - Nicholls, W. G., 40 - Nonne Bosschen (_see_ Ypres) - North Staffordshire Regt., 42 - Nugent, Burnell-, Brig.-Gen., 3, 18, 20 - Nuncy, 113 - - Oburg, 313 - Onnezies, 311 - Oppy (_see_ Arras) - Organisation, 167, 298 - Ormiston, W. H., 169 - Ouderdom, 159 - Ovillers, 53 - - Packenham, Lt.-Col., 113 - Pank, Lt.-Col., 199 - Petit Moranfayt, 312 - Petley, R. E., 41 - Phillips, Major F. A., 232 - Pill-boxes, 150 - Pommier, 131 - Powell, Kite, 219 - Prechtel, Lt.-Col., 32, 36, 46 - Price, J. C. B., 228 - Prior, Lt., 109 - Proney, 113 - Pyper, Capt. J. R., 9 - - Quadrilateral, 26, 60, 74 - Quéant, 177, 297 - Quevy-le-Grand, 312 - - Raids, near Arras, 247-252 - Rancourt, 53 - Rebreuve, 8 - Regiments, German: - 5th Gren. Regt., 137 - 7th R.I.R., 210 - 7th Bav., 74, 104 - 13th Bav., 113 - 14th Bav., 248 - 16th I.R., 241 - 19th Bav., 104 - 21st Bav., 74 - 28th I.R., 248 - 31st R.I.R., 86, 168 - 50th I.R., 249, 251 - 65th I.R., 248 - 84th R.I.R., 86 - 86th R.I.R., 168 - 91st I.R., 48 - 101st R.I.R., 222 - 102nd R.I.R., 222 - 107th I.R., 57 - 128th I.R., 137 - 152nd I.R., 241 - 161st I.R., 61 - 169th I.R., 18, 32 - 170th I.R., 32 - 214th I.R., 250 - 235th I.R., 78 - 358th I.R., 251 - 414th I.R., 169 - 471st I.R., 222 - Reincourt-les-Bapaume, 69 - Reninghelst, 153, 165 - Richon, 312 - Rieu-de-Bury, 312 - Rocquingny, 69 - Roe, Cardon, 140 - Rose, 2/Lieut., 109 - Royal Flying Corps, 15th Squad., 173 - Royal Irish Rifles, 56 - Rumancourt, 296 - Rum jar, 126 - - St. Pol, 113 - St. Riquier, 49 - Sambre, battle of, 303 - Sars-les-Bois, 8 - Sauchy-Cauchy, 296 331 - Savill, Lt.-Col., 272 - Scarpe, 269-280 (_see_ Arras, battles of) - Sebourg, 303 - Séricourt, 8, 113 - Shaw, Lt.-Col. R. S. F., 263 - Sherwood Foresters, 42 - Shoolbred, Lt.-Col., 39 - Shops, 9 - Sibiville, 113 - Siracourt, 113 - Sloan, Capt., 293 - Smith, Gen. W. Douglas, 145 - Souastre, 10, 19, 131 - Southam, Lt.-Col., 39 - Steenvoorde, 159 - Stow, F. H., 41 - Sutton, Capt. W. M., 3 - Sutton, Lt.-Col., 305 - Swainson, Capt., 39 - Swift, Gen. (U.S.A.), 210 - - Tadpole Copse (_see_ Cambrai) - Tagart, Capt., 39 - Tanks, 51, 69, 70, 92, 171, 177, 261 - Tidbury, Capt. O. H., 4 - Tilloy (_see_ Arras, battles of), 115 - Tincques, 297 - Training, 166 - Transloy, battle of ridges, 83 - Trieu Jean Sart, 312 - Trones Wood, 53 - - Upton, D. F., 40 - - Verdun, reasons for battle, 4 - Victory Camp, 213 - Ville-sur-Ancre, 81 - Villers-au-Flos, 69 - Villers Châtel, 252 - Villers-sire-Simon, 8 - Vimy Ridge, 102, 116, 128 - - Wamin, 8 - Wamlin, 8 - Wancourt, 124 - Way, H. C. B., 3 - Wheatley, Major L. L., 4 - Wippenhoek, 159 - Wireless, 205 - Wodley, Cpl., 104 - Woods, Pte., 198 - - Yates, A. G. V., 40 - Ypres, battles of, 144-164 - - - - - PRINTED BY - HAZELL, WATSON AND VINEY, LD., - LONDON AND AYLESBURY, - ENGLAND. - - - - - * * * * * * - - - - -Transcriber's note: - -Unprinted punctuation was added where appropriate. - -Footnotes were renumbered sequentially and moved to the end of the -chapter in which the anchor occurs. - -On page 240, there are no subparagraphs (f) and (g); subparagraph (h) -follows subparagraph (e). - -A header key was added to the table on page 300 so that it would fit -on a standard computer screen. - -Other changes: - - “compaign” to “campaign” ... unrestricted submarine campaign ... - - “bebauching” to “debauching” ... prevented from debauching from the ... - - “277//16” to “27/7/16”, entry for D. Thomson. - in the table of 56th Divisional Artillery Headquarters, C.R.A. - - “5/2/6” to “5/2/16”, appendix entry for E. S. D. E. Coke, - 169th Infantry Brigade. - - “Marchmont” to “Marchment” in the index and twice in the text of - Chapter VII. - - “O.” to “Off.”, table header for Officers in September on page 340. - - - -***END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE 56TH DIVISION*** - - -******* This file should be named 50379-0.txt or 50379-0.zip ******* - - -This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: -http://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/5/0/3/7/50379 - - -Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions will -be renamed. - -Creating the works from print editions not protected by U.S. copyright -law means that no one owns a United States copyright in these works, -so the Foundation (and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United -States without permission and without paying copyright -royalties. 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- padding-left: 3em; - text-indent: -3em; - } - -/* remove bullets from index list */ -.none {list-style-type: none;} - -/* Transcriber notes */ -.tnote {border: dashed .1em; - margin-left: 5%; - margin-right: 5%; - padding-bottom: .5em; - padding-top: .5em; - padding-left: .5em; padding-right: .5em;} - - hr.full { width: 100%; - margin-top: 3em; - margin-bottom: 0em; - margin-left: auto; - margin-right: auto; - height: 4px; - border-width: 4px 0 0 0; /* remove all borders except the top one */ - border-style: solid; - border-color: #000000; - clear: both; } - </style> -</head> -<body> -<h1>The Project Gutenberg eBook, The 56th Division, by C. H. (Charles Humble) -Dudley Ward</h1> -<p>This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States -and most other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no -restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it -under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included with this -eBook or online at <a -href="http://www.gutenberg.org">www.gutenberg.org</a>. If you are not -located in the United States, you'll have to check the laws of the -country where you are located before using this ebook.</p> -<p>Title: The 56th Division</p> -<p> 1st London Territorial Division</p> -<p>Author: C. H. (Charles Humble) Dudley Ward</p> -<p>Release Date: November 4, 2015 [eBook #50379]</p> -<p>Language: English</p> -<p>Character set encoding: UTF-8</p> -<p>***START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE 56TH DIVISION***</p> -<p> </p> -<h3>E-text prepared by Brian Coe, Carol Brown,<br /> - and the Online Distributed Proofreading Team<br /> - (http://www.pgdp.net)</h3> -<p> </p> -<div class="p4 chapter tnote"> -<h4>Transcriber's Note:</h4> -<p>This text includes characters that require UTF-8 (Unicode) file -encoding. If the œ (oe ligature) or the apostrophes and quotation -marks appear as garbage, make sure your text reader’s “character set” -or “file encoding” is set to UTF-8 (Unicode). You may also need to -change the default font.</p> -<p>Additional notes are at the end of the book.</p> -</div><p> </p> -<hr class="full" /> -<p> </p> -<p> </p> - -<!--001.png--> - -<h1 class="p4 break">THE 56th DIVISION</h1> -<!--002.png--> -<!--003.png--> -<!--004.png--> - -<div class="p4 chapter"> -<div class="figcenter" style="width: 500px"> - <a name="frontis"></a> - <img src="images/frontis.jpg" - width="auto" height="100%" - alt="Illustration: Major General Hull" - /> - <p class="captionl"><i>Photo, Elliott & Fry.</i></p> -<p class="captionc">MAJOR-GENERAL SIR AMYATT HULL, K.C.B.</p> -<p class="captionr">[<i class="decoration">Frontispiece</i></p> -</div> -</div><!--end frontis page--> -<!--005.png--> -<div class="chapter"> -<p class="p4 center alth1"><strong>THE 56th DIVISION</strong></p> -<p class="center">(<span class="sc">1st</span> LONDON TERRITORIAL DIVISION)</p> - - -<h2 class="p4 no-break">BY MAJOR C. H. DUDLEY WARD</h2> -<p class="center larger">D.S.O., M.C.</p> - -<p class="p2 center"><span class="muchsmaller">WITH A FOREWORD BY</span><br /> -<span class="muchlarger">GENERAL LORD HORNE OF STIRKOKE,</span><br /> -G.C.B., K.C.M.G.</p> - - -<p class="p4 center">LONDON<br /> -JOHN MURRAY, ALBEMARLE STREET, W.<br /> -1921</p> -</div><!--end title page--> -<!--006.png--> - -<p class="p4 center break"><span class="sc">All Rights Reserved</span></p> -<!--007.png--> - -<p class="p4 center break">TO THE MEMORY</p> - -<p class="center">OF</p> - -<p class="center muchlarger">MAJOR-GENERAL<br /> -SIR CHARLES PATRICK AMYATT HULL,<br /> -K.C.B.</p> - -<p class="p2 center larger"><span class="sc">Born July 3rd, 1865</span><br /> -<span class="sc">Died July 24th, 1920</span></p> -<!--008.png--> -<!--009.png--> -<div class="chapter"> -<h3 class="p4 break"><a name="foreward"></a>FOREWORD</h3> - -<p class="p2">When day broke on the 28th March, 1918, the 56th London Territorial -Division was in position on the southern portion of the Vimy Ridge. At -nightfall the division still held its ground, having beaten back three -separate assaults delivered in great strength by picked German troops -specially trained in the attack and inspired with confidence resulting -from the successes of the previous week. Truly a great achievement, -and important as great, for the Vimy Ridge covered the city of Arras -and the coalfields of Béthune.</p> - -<p>Important as this success was held to be at the time, a time of great -strain upon the forces of the Empire, it was not till later on, when -Ludendorff took us into his confidence, that we learned its full -significance. Ludendorff gives us to understand that the failure of -the German effort of 28th March constituted the turning-point of the -1918 campaign. That evening Ludendorff recognised the beginning of the -end; the German nation lost heart; the <em>moral</em> of the German Army -deteriorated rapidly.</p> - -<p>I have selected the above—one of the many achievements of the 56th -London Territorial Division—to illustrate the stage of efficiency to -which the troops of our Territorial Army had attained in war.</p> - -<p>I saw much of our Territorial troops in France: -<!--010.png--> -I had seen something of them in pre-war days, and I recall an absence -of appreciation of the devotion of those whose patriotic enthusiasm -put life into the great organisation evolved from the brain of a -statesman to whom history will give the credit hitherto unworthily -begrudged to Lord Haldane.</p> - -<p>I take this opportunity of paying my tribute of respect and admiration -to the Territorial Army as a whole, and the 56th London Division in -particular.</p> - -<p>This note would not be complete without reference to that fine -soldier, the late Major-Gen. Sir Amyatt Hull, whose professional -qualities and personal charm gained the respect and affection of all -ranks, and who imbued with his own unconquerable spirit the officers -and men of the division which he commanded so long, and of which he -was so justly proud.</p> - -<p class="quotesign"><span class="sc">Horne of Stirkoke</span>,<br /> -  <i class="decoration">General</i>.</p> -</div><!--end Foreward--> -<!--011.png--> -<div class="chapter"> -<h3 class="p4">CONTENTS</h3> - -<p class="center"><a href="#foreward">FOREWORD</a> BY GENERAL LORD HORNE OF STIRKOKE,<br /> -G.C.B., K.C.M.G.</p> - - -<p class="p2 center muchlarger">CHAPTER <abbr title="one">I</abbr></p> - -<p class="center">FORMATION AND THE ATTACK ON THE GOMMECOURT -SALIENT</p> - -<p>The Assembly—The Grouping of Units—The Size of a -Division—Perfecting the Organisation—General Situation—Falkenhayn’s -View—Haig’s Summary—Preparations for the Somme—The Division at -Hébuterne—The First Task—Extent of the New Line—The German -Positions—Note by Gen. Hull—The Date of Attack—Operation -Orders—Artillery and Smoke—Patrol Reports—The Attack—Gen. Hull’s -Conclusion—The Battle of Albert, 1916</p> -<p class="tocright"> <abbr title="pages">pp.</abbr> <a href="#Page_1">1-48</a></p> - - -<p class="p2 center muchlarger">CHAPTER <abbr title="two">II</abbr></p> - -<p class="center">THE SOMME</p> - -<p>Tanks—Progress on the Somme—The Move to Battle Positions—In Contact -with the Enemy—The Battle of Ginchy—The Attack-Haig’s -Dispatch—Battle of Flers-Courcelette—Orders to Tanks—The -Attack—The Quadrilateral—The Battle of Morval—Battle of the -Transloy Ridges—The Division Relieved—Lessons of the -Somme—Lieut.-Col. Bayliffe’s Paper—The Bad Conditions—Lord Cavan’s -Appreciation—Falkenhayn on Verdun—Hindenburg and Ludendorff</p> -<p class="tocright"><abbr title="pages">pp.</abbr> <a href="#Page_49">49-100</a></p> - - -<p class="p2 center muchlarger">CHAPTER <abbr title="three">III</abbr></p> - -<p class="center">LAVENTIE-RICHBOURG</p> - -<p>Strength of the Division—Raids—Gen. Haking’s -Appreciation—Revolution in Russia—Move to the Third Army</p> - -<p class="tocright"><abbr title="pages">pp.</abbr> <a href="#Page_101">101-113</a></p> -<!--012.png--> - - -<p class="p2 center muchlarger">CHAPTER <abbr title="four">IV</abbr></p> - -<p class="center">THE BATTLES OF ARRAS, 1917</p> - -<p>The German Retreat, 1917—Plan of Attack—Artillery Control -Signals—First Battle of the Scarpe—The Attack—Clearing the -Hindenburg Line—The Advance Checked—German Comments—Move to the <abbr title="six">VI</abbr> -Corps—Third Battle of the Scarpe—Result of the Battle—Minor -Actions—British Gains—Q.W.R. Observation—The Artillery</p> -<p class="tocright"><abbr title="pages">pp.</abbr> <a href="#Page_114">114-143</a></p> - - -<p class="p2 center muchlarger">CHAPTER <abbr title="five">V</abbr></p> - -<p class="center">YPRES</p> - -<p>Gen. Sir C. P. A. Hull—General Situation—Opening of the -Offensive—Gen. F. A. Dudgeon—Preliminary Difficulties—The -Attack—German Pill-box Defence—Result of Ypres Battles</p> -<p class="tocright"><abbr title="pages">pp.</abbr> <a href="#Page_144">144-164</a></p> - - -<p class="p2 center muchlarger">CHAPTER <abbr title="six">VI</abbr></p> - -<p class="center">CAMBRAI</p> - -<p>Organisation of Battalions—Patrol Encounters—The Plan of -Attack—Preparations—The Attack—Tadpole Copse—The Attack -Held—Warning of a Counter-attack—The Counter-attack—The Story of a -Great Fight—Gen. Dudgeon’s Report—The French Troops</p> -<p class="tocright"><abbr title="pages">pp.</abbr> <a href="#Page_165">165-208</a></p> - - -<p class="p2 center muchlarger">CHAPTER <abbr title="seven">VII</abbr></p> - -<p class="center">THE GERMAN OFFENSIVE</p> - -<p>American Action—The Enemy Strength—British Strength—German -Assembly—British Preparations—Frequent Change of Orders—Imminence -of Enemy Attack—Disposition of Troops—Enemy Attack Opens—The -Queen’s Westminsters—L.R.B. and 4th Londons—Kensingtons, London -Scottish—The Artillery—Enemy Failure—Reports on the Battle—The -Machine Gunners</p> -<p class="tocright"><abbr title="pages">pp.</abbr> <a href="#Page_209">209-242</a></p> -<!--013.png--> - - -<p class="p2 center muchlarger">CHAPTER <abbr title="eight">VIII</abbr></p> - -<p class="center">THE ADVANCE TO VICTORY</p> - -<p>Allied Defence—South of the Scarpe—Gen. Dudgeon—Raids—Division in -Rest Area—August the 8th—Haig’s Plan—Orders for the Advance—The -Position—The Battle of Albert—Croisilles—Battle of the Scarpe—Loss -of Direction—Bullecourt—The Artillery</p> -<p class="tocright"><abbr title="pages">pp.</abbr> <a href="#Page_243">243-280</a></p> - - -<p class="p2 center muchlarger">CHAPTER <abbr title="nine">IX</abbr></p> - -<p class="center">THE ARMISTICE</p> - -<p>The New Position—Battle of the Canal du Nord—German Resistance -Broken—Aubigny-au-Bac—The Allied Advance—Reorganisation—Open -Fighting—Battle of the Sambre—Demolition of -Roads—Intercommunication—The Grand Honnelle—Enemy Confusion—The -“Cease Fire”</p> -<p class="tocright"><abbr title="pages">pp.</abbr> <a href="#Page_281">281-314</a></p> - - -<p class="p2"><span class="apxinx">APPENDIX</span><span class="toc_pages"><abbr title="pages">pp.</abbr> <a href="#Page_315">315-326</a></span></p> - - -<p class="p2"><span class="apxinx">INDEX</span><span class="toc_pages"><abbr title="pages">pp.</abbr> <a href="#Page_327">327-331</a></span></p> - -<p class="p4">Special thanks are due to Messrs. Hutchinson & Co., publishers of -<cite>My War Memories 1914-1918</cite>, by Gen. Ludendorff, and <cite>General -Headquarters 1914-1916, and Its Critical Decisions</cite>, by Gen. von -Falkenhayn; also to Messrs. Cassell & Co., publishers of <cite>Out of My -Life</cite>, by Field-Marshal von Hindenburg, for permission to print -extracts from these works.</p> -</div><!--end contents--> -<!--014.png--> -<div class="chapter"> -<h3 class="p4">LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS</h3> - -<table summary="list of illos"> - -<tr><td class="left"><span class="sc">Major-General Sir Amyatt Hull, K.C.B.</span></td><td class="right"><a href="#frontis"><i class="decoration">Frontispiece</i></a></td></tr> - -<tr><td class="right" colspan="2"><span class="muchsmaller">FACING PAGE</span></td></tr> - -<tr><td class="left"><span class="sc">Gommecourt, July 1916</span></td><td class="rightb"><a href="#gommecourt">46</a></td></tr> - -<tr><td class="left"><span class="sc">Inverness Copse and Glencorse Wood, August -1917</span></td><td class="rightb"><a href="#inverness">152</a></td></tr> - -<tr><td class="left"><span class="sc">Battery Position, Zouave Wood, Hooge, -August 1917</span></td><td class="rightb"><a href="#zouave">164</a></td></tr> -</table><!--end oflist of illos--> - -<h3 class="p2 no-break">MAPS</h3> -<table summary="list of maps"> -<tr><td class="right">1.</td><td class="left"><span class="sc">The Gommecourt Salient</span></td><td class="rightb"><a href="#illo1">46</a></td></tr> - -<tr><td class="right">2.</td><td class="left"><span class="sc">Ginchy and Morval—The Battles on the -9th, 15th, and 25th September</span></td><td class="rightb"><a href="#illo2">78</a></td></tr> - -<tr><td class="right">3.</td><td class="left"><span class="sc">The Transloy Ridge</span></td><td class="rightb"><a href="#illo3">86</a></td></tr> - -<tr><td class="right">4.</td><td class="left"><span class="sc">The Battles of Arras, 1917</span></td><td class="rightb"><a href="#illo4">134</a></td></tr> - -<tr><td class="right">5.</td><td class="left"><span class="sc">The Battle of Langemarck, 1917</span></td><td class="rightb"><a href="#illo5">158</a></td></tr> - -<tr><td class="right">6.</td><td class="left"><span class="sc">Local Map—Front of the Division at -Cambrai, 1917</span></td><td class="rightb"><a href="#illo6">186</a></td></tr> - -<tr><td class="right">7.</td><td class="left"><span class="sc">The Battle of Cambrai</span></td><td class="rightb"><a href="#illo7">196</a></td></tr> - -<tr><td class="right">8.</td><td class="left"><span class="sc">The First Battle of Arras, 1918</span></td><td class="rightb"><a href="#illo8">234</a></td></tr> - -<tr><td class="right">9.</td><td class="left"><span class="sc">The Battles of Albert and the Scarpe, 1918</span></td><td class="rightb"><a href="#illo9">278</a></td></tr> - -<tr><td class="right">10.</td><td class="left"><span class="sc">Battle of the Canal du Nord</span></td><td class="rightb"><a href="#illo10">296</a></td></tr> - -<tr><td class="right">11.</td><td class="left"><span class="sc">General Map</span></td><td class="rightb"><a href="#illo11">310</a></td></tr> -</table> -</div><!--end of list of maps and illos--> - -<p><!--015.png--><a name="Page_1" id="Page_1"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 1]</span></p> -<div class="chapter"> -<p class="p4 center alth1">THE FIFTY-SIXTH DIVISION</p> - -<h3 class="p4 break">CHAPTER <abbr title="one">I</abbr></h3> - -<h4>FORMATION AND THE ATTACK ON THE GOMMECOURT SALIENT</h4> - -<p class="p2">After the declaration of war, when the first news of the Expeditionary -Force began to trickle across the Channel, the people of England were -told that troops were marching to the lilting tune with the Cockney -refrain:</p> - -<div class="container"> -<div class="poem smaller no-break"> - <div class="i0">Good-bye, Piccadilly,</div> - <div class="i2">Farewell, Leicester Square,</div> - <div class="i0">It’s a long, long way to Tipperary,</div> - <div class="i2">But my heart’s right there.</div> -</div> -</div><!--end container--> - -<p>Within a few months territorial battalions were marching in France and -singing the same absurd song. But the London, the Cockney spirit, -impudent, noisy, but good-tempered and friendly, always wide awake, -observant, and ready for a scrap, above all never down-hearted, led -the way from the very beginning of the war. It is with the -light-hearted crowd of Piccadilly and Leicester Square that we are -concerned, for the whole of London some time or other passes through -those thoroughfares.</p> - -<p class="center">* * * * * * *</p> - -<p>There is something peculiarly fascinating in following the fortunes of -London troops, particularly Territorial troops.</p> - -<p><!--016.png--><a name="Page_2" id="Page_2"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 2]</span> -For some reason there has been a tendency of late years to look down -on the men of London, to dismiss them as weaklings, as men of poor -physique, with maybe smart tongues and clothes, but without the -necessary stamina for hardy soldiers. It would be difficult to say on -what ground such an opinion was based. At least it has no historical -foundation. The Trained Bands of London have a very definite place in -the history of England.</p> - -<p>Although it is not the oldest corps, the Artillery Company of London, -formed to train men in the use of the long bow, cross bow, and hand -gun, dates back to the time of Henry <abbr title="eight">VIII</abbr>. Westminster and the County -of Middlesex were ever to the fore in raising Volunteers as distinct -from the Militia, though the distinction was not always too clear. St. -George’s, Hanover Square—Pimlico—Inns of Court—Bloomsbury—St. -James’s are names to be found in every record of effort to meet a -national danger. Enfield, Tottenham, Stoke Newington, Chelsea, -Kensington, Chiswick, Battersea, Clapham, Clerkenwell, Deptford, -Hungerford, Islington, Lambeth, and Wandsworth have all raised -companies for the defence of England in former times of stress.</p> - -<p>There is no need to labour the point. Every student of the history of -the British Army knows what the Service owes to London. The Londoner -has always proved himself a valiant soldier, and has not withheld from -enlistment.</p> - -<p>What England owes to the Territorial is above computation. As the -descendant of the old Volunteer he was enrolled to serve in England -alone. But when war with the Central Powers was declared he did not -hesitate—his response was immediate and -<!--017.png--><a name="Page_3" id="Page_3"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 3]</span> -unanimous. Territorials -landed in France in 1914, and continued to arrive in that country in a -steady stream as they could be spared from Great Britain.</p> - -<p>When the 56th Division was assembled in France during the first days -of February 1916, it was not, therefore, a new unit, looking about -with wondering eyes at new scenes, and standing, as it were, on the -tiptoes of expectation as it paused on the outskirts of the great -adventure. The twelve battalions of infantry were veterans.<span class="lock"><a name="fnanchor_1" id="fnanchor_1"></a><a href="#footnote_1" class="fnanchor">[1]</a></span> -</p> - -<p>On the 5th February Major-Gen. C. P. A. Hull, to whom command of the -new division was given, arrived at Hallencourt, between Abbeville and -Amiens, where his staff was to meet.</p> - -<table summary="commanders"> -<tr><td class="lefta">Lieut.-Col. J. E. S. Brind</td><td class="lefta">G.S.O.1.</td></tr> -<tr><td class="lefta">Major A. E. G. Bayley</td><td class="lefta">G.S.O.2.</td></tr> -<tr><td class="lefta">Capt. T. W. Bullock</td><td class="lefta">G.S.O.3.</td></tr> -<tr><td class="lefta">Bt. Lieut.-Col. H. W. Grubb</td><td class="lefta">A.A. and Q.M.G.</td></tr> -<tr><td class="lefta">Capt. W. M. Sutton</td><td class="lefta">D.A.A.G.</td></tr> -<tr><td class="lefta">Major F. J. Lemon</td><td class="lefta">D.A.Q.M.G.</td></tr> -<tr><td class="lefta">Lieut. H. C. B. Way</td><td class="lefta">A.D.C.</td></tr> -</table> - -<p>The presence of these officers, however, did not constitute a -division. Brigade commanders and their staffs arrived—Brig.-Gen. F. -H. Burnell-Nugent, 167th Brigade, Brig.-Gen. G. G. Loch, 168th -Brigade, Brig.-Gen. E. S. Coke, 169th Brigade—and we find a wail of -despair going up from the 169th Brigade: “No rations, fuel, or -stationery yet available”—“No divisional organisation exists” (this -on the 8th), and a wealth of meaning in this note written on the 18th: -“The Brigade Interpreter (who should have -<!--018.png--><a name="Page_4" id="Page_4"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 4]</span> -been available at first) -arrived at last. Rain whole day.” Could anything be more tragic?</p> - -<p>Our sympathies are entirely with the staff on these occasions, for -though the situation cannot be described as chaotic, it is -bewildering. Troops were arriving from all directions and at all times -of the day; the machinery was not in running order, and its creaking -wheels, which occasionally stopped, necessitated the most careful -watching and a great deal of work. When an organisation is being made, -no one can say “that is not my job,” for it seems as though all jobs -are his for the time being. The Interpreter would have been most -useful if only to arrange the billeting—and what is a staff officer -without stationery?</p> - -<p>The Brigades were as follows:</p> - -<p>The 167th Infantry Brigade; commanded by Brig.-Gen. F. H. -Burnell-Nugent, with Capt. G. Blewitt as his Brigade Major and Capt. -O. H. Tidbury as Staff Captain. The battalions of this brigade were -the 1/1st London Regt., the 1/3rd London Regt., the 1/8th Middlesex -Regt., and the 1/7th Middlesex Regt.</p> - -<p>The 168th Infantry Brigade; commanded by Brig.-Gen. G. G. Loch, with -Capt. P. Neame, V.C., as his Brigade Major, and Major L. L. Wheatley -as Staff Captain. The battalions of this brigade were the 1/4th London -Regt., the 1/12th London Regt. (Rangers), the 1/13th London Regt. -(Kensingtons), and the 1/14th London Regt. (London Scottish).</p> - -<p>The 169th Infantry Brigade; commanded by Brig.-Gen. E. S. Coke, with -Capt. L. A. Newnham as his Brigade Major, and Capt. E. R. Broadbent as -Staff Captain. The battalions were the 1/2nd London Regt. (Royal -Fusiliers), the 1/5th London Regt. -<!--019.png--><a name="Page_5" id="Page_5"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 5]</span> -(London Rifle Brigade), the 1/9th -London Regt. (Queen Victoria’s Rifles), and the 1/16th London Regt. -(Queen’s Westminster Rifles).</p> - -<p>It is not easy to keep the brigade groupings in mind at this -stage—arrangements were recast and designations were changed. The -1/1st (London) Bde. R.F.A., the 2/1st (London) Field Coy. R.E., the -2/1st (London) Field Ambulance were posted to the 167th Brigade. The -1/2nd London Bde. R.F.A., the 2/2nd London Field Coy. R.E., and the -2/2nd London Field Ambulance were posted to the 168th Brigade. The -1/3rd London Bde. R.F.A. and the 2/3rd London Field Ambulance to the -169th Brigade. But we find that subsequent changes result in<span class="lock">—</span></p> - -<p class="indenthanging">the 1/1st London Bde. R.F.A. becoming 280th Bde. R.F.A;</p> - -<p class="indenthanging">the 1/2nd London Bde. R.F.A. becoming 281st Bde. R.F.A.;</p> - -<p class="indenthanging">the 1/3rd London Bde. R.F.A. becoming 282nd Bde. R.F.A.;</p> - -<p class="mt1">and a newly-formed 18-pounder brigade, the 283rd Bde. R.F.A. Also the -two field companies of the Royal Engineers become known as the 512th -and 513th Field Companies, and were joined by the 416th Edinburgh -Field Coy., which was posted to the 169th Infantry Brigade.</p> - -<p>And the Royal Army Service Corps, which appears at first as numbers 1, -2, 3, and 4 Companies, become the 213th, with the 214th, 215th, and -216th posted to the three infantry brigades in numerical order.</p> - -<p>The Stokes trench mortar batteries were numbered 167th, 168th, and -169th; the medium trench mortar batteries as X, Y, and Z. They were -posted in numerical or alphabetical order to the infantry -<!--020.png--><a name="Page_6" id="Page_6"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 6]</span> -brigades. -There was also a heavy trench mortar battery designated <abbr title="five">V</abbr> Battery, -which was formed in May 1916.</p> - -<p>The pioneer battalion was the 1/5th Battalion Cheshire Regt. The -veterinary unit was the 1/1st London Mobile Veterinary Section.</p> - -<p>These were the bits of machinery forming the 56th Division.</p> - -<p>The first divisional conference was held on the 11th February, when -most of the officers attending had their first introduction to Gen. -Hull. He was a tall, good-looking man with an abrupt manner, but of -singular charm. It did not take him long to win the complete -confidence of his division.</p> - -<p>In the midst of the work of getting the machine properly fitted -together, there were the usual rumours and warning orders which came -to nothing. The first information Gen. Hull received was that the <abbr title="six">VI</abbr> -Corps, of which his division formed a part, would relieve the <abbr title="seventeen">XVII</abbr> -French Corps and would move to the area Domart-en-Ponthieu. The move -took place on the 27th February, in the midst of a heavy fall of snow, -which made the roads very heavy for transport. And a further move was -made on the 12th March to the Doullens area, between that town and St. -Pol.</p> - -<p>Whenever units were behind the line they trained. It did not matter -how long the individual soldier had been in France and Belgium, he was -never excused as a “fully trained soldier.” Even instructors were sent -from time to time to receive fresh instruction at Divisional, Corps, -or Army schools. And so, during the period of assembly, the units of -the 56th Division trained. Some were attached for ten days or -<!--021.png--><a name="Page_7" id="Page_7"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 7]</span> -a -fortnight to the 14th Division for work in a “forward position” round -about Dainville—infantry, artillery, engineers, and field ambulance -took their turn at this work; others carried on the routine of -exercise on the training-grounds in the neighbourhood of their -billets. The Commander-in-Chief, Sir Douglas Haig, visited the -divisional area and the school at Givenchy on the 30th March.</p> - -<p>In studying the adventures of a division, whether it is holding the -line or whether it is in a reserve area, one must always visualise a -great deal more than the twelve battalions of infantry which make or -repel the final charge in any engagement. A division occupies and -works over a large area, and depends, of course, on a base of -supplies. When a person is told of the front taken up by a division, -he will look at the map and measure off the width of the front line. -“There,” he says, “is the division”! But the division covers quite a -big area in depth as well. Not only do the billets of troops not -actually employed in the front line go back a long way in successive -stages, but the wagons and lorries of the Royal Army Service Corps -work back many miles. The narrowest measurement of a divisional area -is usually the front line.</p> - -<p>Perhaps the following list, showing the dispositions of the division -in billets during March, will give those with no experience some idea -of what is meant by the word “division”:</p> - -<table summary="division definitions" class="smaller"> -<tr><td class="lefta">Divisional Headquarters</td><td class="lefta">Le Cauroy</td></tr> -<tr><td class="lefta">Divisional Artillery Headquarters</td><td class="lefta">Le Cauroy</td></tr> -<tr><td class="lefta">Divisional R.E. Headquarters</td><td class="lefta">Le Cauroy</td></tr> -<tr><td class="lefta">5th Cheshire Regt.</td><td class="lefta">Grand Rullecourt</td></tr> -<tr><td class="lefta">B Squadron King Edward’s Horse</td><td class="lefta">Grand Rullecourt</td></tr> -<tr><td class="lefta">Divisional Cyclists’ Coy.</td><td class="lefta">Grand Rullecourt</td></tr> -<tr><td class="lefta">1/4th London Howitzer Bde.</td><td class="lefta">Wamlin and Rozière<!--022.png--><a name="Page_8" id="Page_8"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 8]</span></td></tr> -<tr><td class="lefta">Divisional Ammunition Column</td><td class="lefta">Etrée-Wamin</td></tr> -<tr><td class="lefta">Headquarters Divisional Train</td><td class="lefta">Bruilly</td></tr> -<tr><td class="lefta">No. 1 Coy. Divisional Train</td><td class="lefta">Wamin</td></tr> -<tr><td class="lefta">56th Sanitary Section</td><td class="lefta">Le Cauroy</td></tr> -<tr><td class="lefta">Mobile Veterinary Section</td><td class="lefta">Bruilly</td></tr> -<tr><td class="lefta">Salvage Company</td><td class="lefta">Le Cauroy</td></tr> -<tr><td class="lefta">R.E. Ordnance Dump</td><td class="lefta">Le Cauroy</td></tr> -<tr><td class="lefta">Divisional Canteen and Shops</td><td class="lefta">Le Cauroy</td></tr> -<tr><td class="lefta">Divisional Schools</td><td class="lefta">Givenchy-le-Noble</td></tr> - -<tr><td class="center" colspan="2"><br /><span class="sc">167th Infantry Brigade</span></td></tr> - -<tr><td class="lefta">Brigade Headquarters</td><td class="lefta">Rebreuve</td></tr> -<tr><td class="lefta">167/1st and X56th Trench Mortar Batteries</td><td class="lefta">Rebreuve</td></tr> -<tr><td class="lefta">1/1st London Regt.</td><td class="lefta">Ivergny</td></tr> -<tr><td class="lefta">1/3rd London Regt.</td><td class="lefta">Cannettemont</td></tr> -<tr><td class="lefta">1/7th Middlesex Regt.</td><td class="lefta">Beaudricourt</td></tr> -<tr><td class="lefta">1/8th Middlesex Regt.</td><td class="lefta">Rebreuviette</td></tr> -<tr><td class="lefta">1/1st London Bde. R.F.A.</td><td class="lefta">Rebreuve</td></tr> -<tr><td class="lefta">2/1st London Field Coy. R.E.</td><td class="lefta">Honval</td></tr> -<tr><td class="lefta">No. 2 Coy. Train</td><td class="lefta">Rebreuviette</td></tr> -<tr><td class="lefta">2/1st London Field Ambulance</td><td class="lefta">Ivergny</td></tr> - -<tr><td class="center" colspan="2"><br /><span class="sc">168th Infantry Brigade</span></td></tr> - -<tr><td class="lefta">Brigade Headquarters</td><td class="lefta">Manin</td></tr> -<tr><td class="lefta">168/1st Trench Mortar Battery</td><td class="lefta">Magnicourt</td></tr> -<tr><td class="lefta">Y56th Trench Mortar Battery</td><td class="lefta">Berlencourt</td></tr> -<tr><td class="lefta">1/4th London Regt.</td><td class="lefta">Beaufort</td></tr> -<tr><td class="lefta">1/12th London Regt.</td><td class="lefta">Ambrines</td></tr> -<tr><td class="lefta">1/13th London Regt.</td><td class="lefta">Lignereuil</td></tr> -<tr><td class="lefta">1/14th London Regt.</td><td class="lefta">Villers-sire-Simon</td></tr> -<tr><td class="lefta">1/2nd London Bde. R.F.A.</td><td class="lefta">Berlencourt</td></tr> -<tr><td class="lefta">2/2nd London Field Coy. R.E.</td><td class="lefta">Sars-les-Bois</td></tr> -<tr><td class="lefta">No. 3 Coy. Train</td><td class="lefta">Denier</td></tr> -<tr><td class="lefta">5th Entrenching Battalion</td><td class="lefta">Blavincourt</td></tr> -<tr><td class="lefta">2/2nd London Field Ambulance</td><td class="lefta">Liencourt</td></tr> - -<tr><td class="center" colspan="2"><br /><span class="sc">169th Infantry Brigade</span></td></tr> - -<tr><td class="lefta">Brigade Headquarters</td><td class="lefta">Houvin-Houvigneul</td></tr> -<tr><td class="lefta">169/1st and Z56th Trench Mortar Batteries</td><td class="lefta">Houvin-Houvigneul</td></tr> -<tr><td class="lefta">1/2nd London Regt.</td><td class="lefta">Séricourt</td></tr> -<tr><td class="lefta">1/5th London Regt.</td><td class="lefta">Magnicourt</td></tr> -<tr><td class="lefta">1/9th London Regt.</td><td class="lefta">Houvigneul</td></tr> -<tr><td class="lefta">1/16th London Regt.</td><td class="lefta">Moncheaux<!--023.png--><a name="Page_9" id="Page_9"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 9]</span></td></tr> -<tr><td class="lefta">1/3rd London Bde. R.F.A.</td><td class="lefta">Bouret-sur-Canche</td></tr> -<tr><td class="lefta">No. 4 Coy. Train</td><td class="lefta">Houvin-Houvigneul</td></tr> -<tr><td class="lefta">2/3rd London Field Ambulance</td><td class="lefta">Houvin-Houvigneul</td></tr> -<tr><td class="lefta">Divisional Supply Column</td><td class="lefta">Liencourt</td></tr> -<tr><td class="lefta">Divisional Ammunition Sub-Park</td><td class="lefta">Avesnes-le-Comte</td></tr> -</table> - -<p>All these units contribute to an advance. Some designation, such as -“shops,” may strike the ear as strange, an unlikely unit to help much -in an advance; but a man cannot march without boots, a gun can neither -shoot nor advance with a broken spring, a motor lorry will not bring -up a single tin of “bully beef” if its axle breaks, and all these -things are put right by men who are labelled “shops.” Even the -Divisional Canteen plays its part, and has on occasions pushed well -forward to refresh wearied troops.</p> - -<p>We say these units contribute to an advance! They contribute to every -action, to every move—they are the division.</p> - -<p>As a further measure, which will give the importance of the unit -rather than the size of it, the maximum British effort was 99 -infantry, 6 cavalry, and 4 yeomanry divisions (the latter were more -often infantry than cavalry).</p> - -<p>The work of perfecting the organisation went on through the months of -February, March, and April. The problem of how to create from nothing -had sometimes to be faced as the Army usually faces such -conundrums—by cutting a bit from something else which did exist. -Capt. Newnham notes in the 169th Brigade diary under date 17th April: -“Brigade Machine Gun Coy. formed. Capt. J. R. Pyper, 4th London, to -command, and Capt. J. B. Baber, Queen’s Westminsters, second in -command. Company formed from existing personnel in battalions, each -<!--024.png--><a name="Page_10" id="Page_10"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 10]</span> -battalion finding a section, and some from Headquarters. No M.G.C. -gunners available, as per War Office letter. Already weak battalions -lose good men and reinforcements will have to come from them as well.”</p> - -<p>The health of the division was good except for an outbreak of measles -in the 169th Brigade.</p> - -<p>On the 3rd May the 167th Brigade moved to Souastre, under the <abbr title="seven">VII</abbr> -Corps, and the rest of the division followed on the 6th May, -Divisional Headquarters being established at Hénu.</p> - -<p>On the 9th May the C.R.A., Brig.-Gen. R. J. C. Elkington, took over -artillery positions from the C.R.A. 14th Division on the Hébuterne -front.</p> - -<p class="center">* * * * * * *</p> - -<p>Three months had elapsed since the division had commenced to assemble -at Hallencourt. Troops were well rested and trained, and were now to -be launched in the big operations of 1916. It would be as well at this -point to note the general situation, as from now on the 56th Division -took a prominent part in the severe fighting which commenced on 1st -July.</p> - -<p>We will give the German point of view as expressed by Gen. von -Falkenhayn and published in his war book<span class="lock"><a name="fnanchor_2" id="fnanchor_2"></a><a href="#footnote_2" class="fnanchor">[2]</a></span>:</p> - -<p class="blockquote">“France has been weakened almost to the limits of endurance, - both in a military and economic sense—the latter by the - permanent loss of the coalfields in the north-east of the - country. The Russian armies have not been completely - overthrown, but their offensive powers have been so - shattered that she can -<!--025.png--><a name="Page_11" id="Page_11"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 11]</span> - never revive in anything like - her old strength. The armies of Serbia can be considered as - destroyed. Italy has no doubt realised that she cannot - reckon on the realisation of her brigand’s ambitions within - measurable time, and would therefore probably be only too - glad to be able to liquidate her adventure in any way that - would save her face.</p> - -<p class="blockquote">If no deductions can be drawn from these facts, the reasons - are to be sought in many circumstances ... the chief among - them cannot be passed over, for it is the enormous hold - which England still has on her allies.”</p> - -<p>He then goes on to discuss what can be done to break the will of -England. He says that the history of the English wars against the -Netherlands, Spain, France, and Napoleon is being repeated. That -England is “obviously staking everything on a war of exhaustion.” He -puts the winter of 1917 as the latest date when a food crisis and “the -social and political crisis that always follow them, among the members -of our alliance,” will occur, and asks, or rather states, that England -must be shown that her venture has no prospects. But “in this case, of -course, as in most others involving higher strategic decisions, it is -very much easier to say what has to be done than to find out how it -can and must be done.”</p> - -<p>How can one inflict a decisive defeat on England on land? Invasion is -impossible—the German Navy is convinced of that.</p> - -<p class="blockquote">“As far as our own Continent of Europe is concerned, we are - sure of our troops, and are working with known factors. For - that reason we must rule out enterprises in the East, where - England can only be struck at -<!--026.png--><a name="Page_12" id="Page_12"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 12]</span> - indirectly. Victories at - Salonica, the Suez Canal, or in Mesopotamia can only help us - in so far as they intensify the doubts about England’s - invulnerability which have already been aroused among the - Mediterranean peoples and in the Mohammedan world. Defeats - in the East could do us palpable harm among our allies. We - can in no case expect to do anything of decisive effect on - the course of the war, as the protagonists of an Alexander - march to India or Egypt, or an overwhelming blow at - Salonica, are always hoping. Our allies have not the - necessary means at their disposal. We are not in a position - to supply them, owing to the bad communications, and - England, which has known how to swallow the humiliations of - Antwerp and Gallipoli, will survive defeats in those distant - theatres also.</p> - -<p class="blockquote">When we turn from them to the European theatre, where - England can be struck on land, we cannot close our eyes to - the fact that we are faced with an extraordinarily difficult - problem.”</p> - -<p>It would seem that England was giving poor von Falkenhayn a lot of -trouble. After looking vainly in the East for a vulnerable point in -her armour, he is forced to turn his eyes to the West. And in the West -he does not like the look of the British Army. He cannot collect more -than twenty-five or twenty-six divisions to attack with, and they are -not nearly enough!</p> - -<p class="blockquote">“Attempts at a mass break-through, even with an extreme - accumulation of men and material, cannot be regarded as - holding out prospects of success against a well-armed enemy - whose <em>moral</em> is sound and who is not seriously - inferior in numbers. The defender has usually succeeded in - closing the gaps. The salients thus made, enormously exposed - to the effects of -<!--027.png--><a name="Page_13" id="Page_13"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 13]</span> - flanking fire, threaten to - become a mere slaughterhouse. The technical difficulties of - directing and supplying the masses bottled up in them are so - great as to seem practically insurmountable.”</p> - -<p>He sweeps aside the idea of attacking the English Army with a final -complaint that, even if he drove it completely from the Continent, -“England may be trusted not to give up even then,” and France would -not have been very seriously damaged, so that a second operation would -have to be taken against her. It would be impossible to get sufficient -men.</p> - -<p>England’s allies are called her “tools,” and the only thing to do is -to smash up the “tools.” But no weapon is to be discarded, and so -unrestricted submarine warfare must be undertaken against this -arch-enemy.</p> - -<p class="blockquote">“If the definite promises of the Naval Authorities that the - unrestricted submarine war must force England to yield in - the course of the year 1916 are realised, we must face the - fact that the United States may take up a hostile attitude. - She cannot intervene decisively in the war in time to enable - her to make England fight on when that country sees the - spectre of hunger and many another famine rise up before her - island. There is only one shadow on this encouraging picture - of the future. We have to assume that the Naval Authorities - are not making a mistake.”</p> - -<p>As for the “tools,” Italy is ruled out as a possible one to be broken -as she is not of much account in Falkenhayn’s opinion, and he thinks -there will soon be internal troubles. Russia is also ruled out because -he does not see any gain in the capture of -<!--028.png--><a name="Page_14" id="Page_14"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 14]</span> -Petrograd or Moscow, and -there are also “internal troubles.” There is France left.</p> - -<p class="blockquote">“As I have already insisted, the strain on France has almost - reached the breaking-point—though it is certainly borne - with the most remarkable devotion. If we succeed in opening - the eyes of her people to the fact that in a military sense - they have nothing more to hope for, that breaking-point - would be reached and England’s best sword knocked out of her - hand.... Within our reach behind the French sector of the - Western Front there are objectives for the retention of - which the French Staff would be compelled to throw in every - man they have. If they do so the forces of France will bleed - to death.... The objectives of which I am speaking now are - Belfort and Verdun.”</p> - -<p>Altogether this document, which was prepared for the Kaiser and must -have been read by that potentate with mixed feelings, was not the work -of an optimist. It reads more like despair, as though Falkenhayn was -saying, “I can still fight, I can still hurt, but I am bound to go -down in the end”! One cannot see any very shrewd reasoning in it, for -he not only underrated the valour of the French (as the Germans always -did), but he was placed in very serious difficulties by the successful -attack of Brussiloff on the Austrians in June, so that he also -undervalued the strength of Russia. For this misfortune, however, the -Germans blame the Austrians, condemning them for their offensive -against the Italians in May, which was undertaken against German -advice and made the Brussiloff adventure possible. But this document -shows the policy and plans of Germany for the year 1916—the great -German effort on Verdun, which was to bleed France to death, dominates -all other events. The -<!--029.png--><a name="Page_15" id="Page_15"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 15]</span> -attack was launched on the 21st February and -coincides with the formation of the 56th Division, and the subsequent -movements of the division were connected with the wide-spreading -influence of the Verdun battle.</p> - -<p>In his dispatch dated the 29th May, Sir Douglas Haig sums up the early -situation very briefly. Since the 19th December, 1915,</p> - -<p class="blockquote">“the only offensive effort made by the enemy on a great - scale was directed against our French Allies near Verdun. - The fighting in that area has been prolonged and severe. The - results have been worthy of the highest traditions of the - French Army and of great service to the cause of the Allies. - The efforts made by the enemy have cost him heavy losses - both in men and in prestige, and he has made these - sacrifices without gaining any advantage to counterbalance - them.</p> - -<p class="blockquote">During the struggle my troops have been in readiness to - co-operate as they might be needed, but the only assistance - asked for by our Allies was of an indirect nature—viz., the - relief of the French troops on a portion of their defensive - front. This relief I was glad to be able to afford.”</p> - -<p>On the other hand, plans for a Franco-British offensive had been fully -discussed by Sir Douglas Haig and Marshal Joffre and complete -agreement arrived at. Vast preparations were in progress. Sir Douglas -Haig desired to postpone the attack as long as possible, because both -the British Army and the supply of ammunition were growing steadily, -and time would enable the newer troops to complete their training. But -though the original plans had no connection with Verdun, they were -bound to influence and be influenced by the great German attack.</p> - -<p><!--030.png--><a name="Page_16" id="Page_16"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 16]</span> -It may be said that the Entente Powers were not looking for a speedy -termination of the war, but were bent on inflicting heavy blows on -Germany and her allies, while Germany was seeking, by a concentration -on France at Verdun, to gain a decision in the West. Falkenhayn’s -advice was being followed, although the unrestricted submarine warfare -was postponed for the time being.</p> - -<p>The plan for the British offensive was that the main attack should be -delivered by the Fourth Army, under Sir Henry Rawlinson, on a front -stretching from Maricourt, on the right, to Serre, on the left; while -farther north the Third Army, under Sir E. H. H. Allenby, would make -an attack on both sides of the Gommecourt salient.</p> - -<p>For an offensive on this scale enormous preparations were necessary. -There was no end to the amount of stores to be accumulated, from -ammunition to horseshoes. In the forward trench system many miles of -trenches had to be dug—assault trenches, assembly trenches, -communication trenches, trenches for telephone wires—dugouts had to -be constructed for sheltering troops, for dressing-stations, for -storing food, water, and engineering material, not forgetting -ammunition. We are bound to admit, however, that in those days, -although much work was done on dugouts, the infantry saw precious -little of them. Mining they saw, indeed, but dugouts were rare.</p> - -<p>Then there were dumps to be made at convenient points, and many miles -of railway line, both standard and narrow gauge, to bring the stores -within reach of the fighting troops. Roads had to be constructed, and -in some places causeways had to be built over marshy valleys. Wells -were sunk, over a hundred -<!--031.png--><a name="Page_17" id="Page_17"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 17]</span> -pumping stations were installed, and a -hundred and twenty miles of water-mains laid.</p> - -<p>The whole country behind this vast front was teeming with men and -horses, with wagons and motor lorries. At night it was as though an -army of gigantic ants were at work, stretched out in long lines, -building and excavating, marching in solemn silent processions with -grim, determined purpose in the slowness of their gait, and bowed down -under loads of material. They passed and repassed in never-ending -streams; the roads were congested with motor and wagon traffic; paths -across the open country could be traced by the shadowy silhouettes of -men in single file. And the horizon flickered with the flash of guns -as with summer lightning, while shells passed overhead with a -long-drawn, ghostly wail, or fell with a sharp swish and a crash. The -line, that maze of foul mud-filled ditches constructed in a belt of -shell-pounded and festering earth, was indicated at night by floating -starlights rising irregularly as sparks, bursting into brilliancy, and -remaining for a moment, suspended in the blackness of the sky like arc -lamps, then dying once more to so many sparks before they fell to the -ground.</p> - -<p>Sometimes the nights would be quiet—that is to say, quiet except for -occasional crashes at intervals of several minutes—although the -constant flickering on the horizon would never cease; at others they -would be “lively,” one might almost say there would be a sensation of -hustle, so swift would be the wailing passage and so continuous the -crash of bursting shells. This might last all through the night as an -organised “shoot,” or would come suddenly, without warning, a swift -artillery attack on roads, working parties, or -<!--032.png--><a name="Page_18" id="Page_18"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 18]</span> -billets—what was -afterwards known as “harassing fire” though it was in a more intense -form—and shifting from one point to another, from front line to -roads, from roads to billets, from billets to some spot where troops -were suspected to be working. Or there would be a raid with an angry -concentration of artillery from both sides.</p> - -<p>And night after night the preparation for the “Big Push” went on.</p> - -<p class="center">* * * * * * *</p> - -<p>The 56th Division, now trained and “shaken together,” arrived in the -Hébuterne sector, on the right of the Gommecourt salient and towards -the left of the front under preparation for the British effort. The -167th Brigade took over the front-line system held by the 145th -Brigade, 48th Division, on the 4th May. The 168th Brigade marched from -their billets in the Doullens area on the 6th, and the 169th Brigade -followed on the 7th May. Divisional Headquarters were established at -Hénu.</p> - -<p>First blood was drawn for the division by the 167th Brigade on the -18th May. A German patrol attempted to bomb a sap held by the 3rd -London Regt., and was beaten off with the loss of one officer and one -N.C.O. killed. These proved to be of the 169th Infantry Regt., 52nd -Division, one of the divisions of the <abbr title="fourteen">XIV</abbr> German Corps and a normal -identification.</p> - -<p>The system of holding the line was one of “grouping.” On the 22nd May -Brig.-Gen. Coke, 169th Brigade, was in command of the line, which was -held by two battalions of the 169th Brigade and two battalions of the -168th Brigade. In support was Brig.-Gen. Nugent, with his headquarters -at -<!--033.png--><a name="Page_19" id="Page_19"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 19]</span> -Souastre, having under his command his own four battalions and one -of the 169th Brigade. Brig.-Gen. Loch, 168th Brigade, with his -headquarters at Grenas, had two of his own battalions and one of the -169th Brigade.</p> - -<p>Plans were now in preparation for a very remarkable achievement.</p> - -<p>We have seen that the scheme for the big British offensive included an -attack on the Gommecourt salient. This was to be undertaken by the -Third Army, and the task fell to the <abbr title="seven">VII</abbr> Corps (Gen. Snow), holding -the front in question. For the moment we will confine ourselves to the -point that the 56th Division was to be one of the attacking divisions.</p> - -<p>When Gen. Hull was informed of what he was expected to do, he was at -once confronted with an obvious difficulty—the front line of his -sector was some seven hundred yards away from the enemy! It was not -impossible to shorten this distance, but, with one exception, the -several ways of doing it must result in heavy casualties; the enemy -would be bound to see what was afoot, and would try by every means in -his power to prevent and to hinder its execution, and render it as -costly as he could. It would also be a lengthy business unless it was -boldly tackled. Gen. Hull decided on the boldest of all courses.</p> - -<p>He traced out a new line which was, on an average, four hundred yards -in advance of the old one. This meant working, in some spots, within -two hundred and fifty yards of the enemy. <em>And he decided to dig it -in one night!</em> It meant that at least three thousand yards of -trench must be constructed in a few hours, a task of appalling -magnitude; and it must be remembered that every effort was always made -to -<!--034.png--><a name="Page_20" id="Page_20"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 20]</span> -limit the number of men in any working party required for No Man’s -Land. When he announced his intentions there was something like -consternation at Corps Headquarters.</p> - -<p>The task was allotted to Brig.-Gen. Nugent and the 167th Brigade. He -had at his disposal, over and above the five battalions of his -“group,” one company of the 5th Cheshire Regt. with a half of the -2/2nd London Field Coy. R.E.</p> - -<p>So that the men might know the lie of the land, the 167th Brigade was -sent on ahead of the rest of the division and straight into the line, -which it held for a fortnight. The Engineers, the company officers of -battalions concerned, and the brigade staff made most careful -reconnaissance, patrolling every night, noting landmarks, getting -acquainted with that silent, eerie tract separating the two lines of -combatants. Conversations throughout the day were punctuated with -references to “the strong point,” “the lonely tree,” the “May bush,” -“the Z hedge,” “the head of Sap 4,” as landmarks became familiar. -Sometimes German patrols were met, sometimes imagined.</p> - -<p>It was decided to divide the whole front into four sections—A, B, C, -and D. The only difficulty was the junction between B and C, but this -was eventually marked by a heap of white stones—a small heap.</p> - -<p>Four days before the date fixed for the operation, the brigade was -relieved, and during the following days the whole of the arrangements -were rehearsed—with the exception of the actual digging—first by day -and then by night.</p> - -<p>Meanwhile the artillery were warned that nothing was to be done by -them to rouse the enemy while the -<!--035.png--><a name="Page_21" id="Page_21"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 21]</span> -work was being carried out, but that -all batteries must be manned and ready for instant action. All known -machine-gun emplacements were carefully registered, and arrangements -were made with the Brigadier-General commanding the Corps heavy -artillery to register on all German batteries whose zone of fire -included the area of the work. Two of the Divisional 4·5 howitzers -were to assist in the counter-battery work.</p> - -<p>Although the trench was dug in one night, the whole operation required -three nights to complete. On the first night, the 25-26th May, -covering parties crept out and took up positions in advance of the -selected line. Then engineers followed, quiet and certain in all that -they did, and marked out the line with string and pegs. On the left -they got to work speedily: the pegs were about nine inches long and -made from small round stakes from which the bark had not been removed; -the string was ordinary jute twine which had been prepared with loops -at the proper intervals to mark the angle of bays and traverses. They -were undisturbed, and C and D sections were marked out.</p> - -<p>But in A and B sections the night was one of excursions and alarms. -First of all there was great difficulty in getting the covering party -through our own wire, which suggests an unfortunate oversight; and -then German patrols were encountered. The latter occurrence was a -contingency which had always been reckoned with. A game of hide and -seek ensued, but meanwhile time passed. There was no question of -clearing No Man’s Land when other parties were working on the left, -and so the marking had to be abandoned. It did not, however, cause any -serious inconvenience.</p> - -<p>The next night each battalion marched from billets -<!--036.png--><a name="Page_22" id="Page_22"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 22]</span> -fully armed for -digging. Ten per cent. carried picks, and the remainder carried -shovels which had been carefully sharpened. Each man had three -sandbags, one being wrapped round the shovel or pick to prevent noise, -and between them they also carried a quantity of white tape.</p> - -<p>In the line ten exits had been made by cutting through our wire and -constructing steps out of the trench—trench ladders had also been -provided by the engineers in case the steps should be impassable -through rain. White boards were hung on the wire to mark these gaps -for the withdrawal.</p> - -<p>The communication trenches to be used by the working battalions were -left quite clear by the troops holding the line, and, at the appointed -time, the head of each battalion was at the selected entrance and -advanced in the following order: covering parties, taping parties, -working parties.</p> - -<p>The covering parties, consisting of sixty officers and men in six -groups, had orders to use rifle fire as sparingly as possible, but to -make full use of the bayonet if enemy patrols were encountered.</p> - -<p>When the covering parties had been given time to get out, the two -other groups of parties followed at short intervals. And half an hour -after the digging parties had left the trench, wiring and carrying -parties, about a hundred men to each battalion, went out. There were -three thousand men in No Man’s Land!</p> - -<p>The boldness of Gen. Hull’s enterprise was amply justified. By 2.30 -a.m. the trench had been made and was held by posts, found from the -covering parties, reinforced with Lewis guns; they had rations, water, -and shovels to improve their positions, and were -<!--037.png--><a name="Page_23" id="Page_23"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 23]</span> -in telephonic -communication with the old trench, and all the working parties had -filed away as silently as they had come.</p> - -<p>During the ensuing day the Royal Flying Corps successfully prevented -any enemy aeroplanes from approaching our lines, but our airmen -photographed the new line themselves, and at noon Gen. Hull was able -to see from a photograph what work had been done.</p> - -<p>On the night of 27-28th the same number of men were out working again, -improving the front-line trench and wire, digging support lines and -two other communication trenches. The new work had been pegged out the -previous night by the engineers.</p> - -<p>The 56th Division had then started its career with the astounding feat -of having in the space of forty-eight hours constructed and wired a -new system of trenches, comprising 2,900 yards of fire trench and -1,500 yards of communication trenches, in No Man’s Land and within 250 -yards of the enemy. Casualties were 8 killed and 55 wounded. A little -luck had waited on audacity, but the success of the whole operation -was undoubtedly due to the intelligence and keenness of the men. They -had nothing much to help them. Gen. Hull had, indeed, ordered two or -three wagons, loaded with empty shell-cases and biscuit tins, to drive -up and down the roads in rear of his lines, and the artillery fired an -occasional round from a howitzer as a means of distracting the -attention of the enemy, but it only required one foolish man to lose -his head and disaster would have descended on the whole brigade.</p> - -<p>It is interesting to note the dress. The covering parties were in full -fighting kit and carried one day’s -<!--038.png--><a name="Page_24" id="Page_24"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 24]</span> -ration; the taping, digging, and -wiring men had no equipment, but carried a rifle, loaded with ten -rounds, and one bandolier; the wire-carrying party had no arms or -equipment.</p> - -<p>The first stage was over. There was, however, still an enormous lot of -work to be done—the trenches had to be improved, deepened, revetted, -emplacements had to be made for machine guns and trench mortars, -stores for ammunition of all sorts had to be constructed, cables had -to be buried—it is but a repetition of what was going on everywhere -on that front.</p> - -<p class="center">* * * * * * *</p> - -<p>Gen. Hull and his G.S.O.1, Lieut.-Col. J. E. S. Brind, an -artilleryman, were considering the problem of attack. The main -features of it are noted by Gen. Hull as follows:</p> - -<p class="blockquote">(<i class="decoration">a</i>) The village of Hébuterne, which affords concealment from -view to within a short distance of our present line and good -observation of the German positions between Gommecourt and the spur -north of the sunken road (K17a and b) on the right of the divisional -front.</p> - -<p class="blockquote">(<i class="decoration">b</i>) The valleys west of Hébuterne, which afford good artillery -positions and cover from view, except from the trees in Gommecourt -Park.</p> - -<p class="blockquote">(<i class="decoration">c</i>) The spur running eastward from Hébuterne just north of the -Hébuterne-Puisieux Road, which defilades the area, north of the spur, -from the German trenches, south of the spur.</p> - -<p class="blockquote">(<i class="decoration">d</i>) Gommecourt Park and village, which, to a certain extent, -dominate the ground to the south.</p> - -<p class="blockquote">(<i class="decoration">e</i>) The spur running from E29c (north-east of Gommecourt) -through K5a and b to the Rossignol Wood along the southern portion of -which spur runs the German fourth line.</p> - -<p class="blockquote"><!--039.png--><a name="Page_25" id="Page_25"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 25]</span> -This spur commands the eastern edge of Gommecourt, dominates the -German trench system south-east and south of Gommecourt, and affords -concealment, both for battery positions in the valley to the east and -for a covered means of approach for a counter-attack against the -captors of Gommecourt.</p> - -<p class="blockquote">(<i class="decoration">f</i>) The valley south-east of Nameless Farm, in which runs the -Puisieux-Gommecourt Road, a line of approach covered from view from -our present line.</p> - -<p>It was once asked after a severe action for the capture of some rising -ground, “What is the use of turning Fritz off a hill? There is always -another hill behind it.” Which was true enough. But it is as well to -remember that the high ground to the left as far as Blairville, held -at this date by the Germans, was in 1918 in our hands, and it enabled -Sir Douglas Haig to turn the whole of the old Somme position.</p> - -<p>Of the German line Gen. Hull says:</p> - -<p class="blockquote">“The German position south-east of Gommecourt Park and - village consists of three lines of trenches, of which the - first is heavily wired, the second lightly wired, the third - does not appear to be wired at all unless there is sunken - wire on the road. All three lines are visible from our - present position except the second and third lines behind - the strong point K11c and d. The northern flank of this - system of trenches rests on the southern edge of Gommecourt - Park, the trenches along which are organised to fire south. - The southern flank of the system rests on the strong point - K11c.</p> - -<p class="blockquote">In rear of this system is another consisting of two lines of - trenches running from the south-east corner of Gommecourt - along the ridge in 5Ka, b, and c, to Rossignol Wood. The - front trench of this system is heavily wired and visible.”</p> - -<p><!--040.png--><a name="Page_26" id="Page_26"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 26]</span> -In a most interesting paper on the proposed attack Gen. Hull says:</p> - -<p class="blockquote">“The object of the <abbr title="seven">VII</abbr> Corps attack will be to establish - itself on the line 16 Poplars-Nameless Farm-Little Z-Tree at - E23a12.</p> - -<p class="blockquote">The 46th Division will attack from the north and the - question was discussed:</p> - -<p class="blockquote indenthanging smaller">(<i class="decoration">a</i>) Should we endeavour to secure a footing on the ridge - E29c-K5a in the initial assault, or</p> - -<p class="blockquote indenthanging smaller">(<i class="decoration">b</i>) Should the 56th Division first secure the German third - line from the south-east corner of Gommecourt Wood and - then, under Corps direction, launch a second attack to - secure the ridge?</p> - -<p class="blockquote">Whichever solution the Corps Commander considers it wisest - to adopt, there is one point which I wish to urge: that no - advance through the village or park of Gommecourt should be - attempted until the ridge E29c-K5a is secured.</p> - -<p class="blockquote">The clearing of the village and wood is bound to be a costly - enterprise if the enemy makes any attempt to fight it out. - It is to be hoped that the heavy bombardment will very - seriously affect the <em>moral</em> of the garrison of the - village and park, and I consider that the knowledge that - they were cut off from escape and from reinforcements might - have so great an effect on the German troops as to make them - surrender and so save us valuable troops for further - operations.</p> - -<p class="blockquote">I was, and still am, in favour of the first solution, i.e. - to secure the Quadrilateral in the first assault. The - reasons which have been urged against this course are:</p> - -<p class="blockquote indenthanging smaller">(<i class="decoration">a</i>) That at Loos no success was achieved after a certain - limited distance had been carried.</p> - -<p class="blockquote indenthanging smaller">(<i class="decoration">b</i>) That in the event of either the 46th or the 56th - Divisions failing to achieve their objective, the - detachment of the other would be in an extremely isolated - position.</p> - -<p class="blockquote"><!--041.png--><a name="Page_27" id="Page_27"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 27]</span> -I have carefully considered both these arguments, and do not - think there is any reason to alter my opinion.</p> - -<p class="blockquote">At Loos the 47th Division was the only division to which a - definite objective was given. Its rôle was to form a - defensive flank on the right of the <abbr title="four">IV</abbr> Corps. Its left flank - advanced nearly 2,500 yards behind the German front line - without serious loss or difficulty. In the present case I am - proposing an advance, at one point on each divisional front, - of only 800 yards, in the case of the 56th Division, and - less in the case of the 46th Division. In the present case, - too, we have the additional advantage of much heavier - artillery, more ammunition, and a salient to attack.</p> - -<p class="blockquote">As regards the second argument, that in the event of one or - other attack failing the detachment of the other division - would be isolated:</p> - -<p class="blockquote">In the event of my reaching my objective in K5a, and the - 46th Division failing to reach E29c, I should consider it my - duty to put in troops (if necessary from my reserve brigade) - to help the 46th Division.</p> - -<p class="blockquote">Troops at K5a would be within 500 yards of the unit at the - south-eastern edge of Gommecourt, and in direct - communication by visual signalling with my present trench - system, so that they can hardly be considered isolated, and - the risk, if any, is, I consider, worth running in order to - isolate completely the enemy troops in Gommecourt Park and - village.</p> - -<p class="blockquote">I do not like the idea of delay and a second attack to - capture the Quadrilateral in K5a. The second attack would - have to be launched from our front line trenches, as I do - not consider it would be feasible to organise and launch an - attack from the newly-captured trenches. Any delay would - enable the enemy to put his barrage in front of our - front-line system, as if there is a weak point in our - organisation, it is in the number of counter-batteries - available to deal with the enemy guns. If we delay we lose - the advantage surprise would give us.”</p> - -<p><!--042.png--><a name="Page_28" id="Page_28"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 28]</span> -While these problems were being discussed, Sir Douglas Haig had -decided to hurry on his preparations. We have seen that his desire was -to delay as much as possible and perfect his machine, also that every -day meant to him added strength. But meanwhile the Entente Powers were -being pressed in another direction. The Austrians had attacked the -Italians with great initial success. By the end of May the situation -on that front was so serious that the Russian offensive was opened in -the early days of June in order to relieve the pressure.</p> - -<p>The Germans accuse the Austrians of having drained their front in -Galicia of artillery for their Italian offensive, and also of holding -the line with troops of poor quality. However that may be, Gen. -Brussiloff’s army, “after a relatively short artillery preparation ... -got up from their trenches and simply marched forward.” Falkenhayn has -a delightful observation on the whole business: “A ‘reconnaissance’ -like Brussiloff’s was only possible, of course, if the General had -decisive reason for holding a low opinion of his enemy’s power of -resistance. And on this point he made no miscalculation.”</p> - -<p>The immediate effect of the Russian success was the transfer of three -divisions from the Western Front, and later more followed; but the -Germans were still very strong in numbers, and there was no slacking -off of their efforts on Verdun. They were able to help the Austrians -to check the Russian advance and eventually to repulse it, but, on the -other hand, the Italian counter-attack met with success and drove the -Austrians back.</p> - -<p>Sir Douglas Haig says that</p> - -<p class="blockquote">“The heroic defence of our French Allies had already -<!--043.png--><a name="Page_29" id="Page_29"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 29]</span> - gained - many weeks of inestimable value and had caused the enemy - very heavy losses; but the strain continued to increase. In - view, therefore, of the situation in the various theatres of - war, it was eventually agreed between Gen. Joffre and myself - that the combined French and British offensive should not be - postponed beyond the end of June. The object of that - offensive was threefold:</p> - -<p class="blockquote indenthanging smaller">(1) To relieve the pressure on Verdun.</p> - -<p class="blockquote indenthanging smaller">(2) To assist our Allies in the other theatres of war by - stopping any further transfer of German troops from the - Western Front.</p> - -<p class="blockquote indenthanging smaller">(3) To wear down the strength of the forces opposed to us.”</p> - -<p>We begin to see now the dominating influence of Verdun. In any case -the offensive could not have been postponed much longer, and if it was -an alteration of plan forced by the enemy, it was not to be compared -with the abandonment by the Germans of their offensive—which -Falkenhayn says he had prepared against the British with the object of -forestalling the Entente blow on the Western Front—due to the -uncomfortable situation of the Austrians.</p> - -<p>Probably, however, the date did influence the approaching action of -the 56th Division. The new front line was still a long way from the -enemy. The Queen’s Westminster Rifles succeeded in advancing a small -sector of the line by a hundred yards and, had there been time, the -whole division would have crept closer before jumping on the enemy.</p> - -<p>The weather, too, was very bad.</p> - -<p>In due course Gen. Hull issued his preliminary instructions, from -which it will be seen that the decision to attempt the capture of the -Quadrilateral in one operation had been taken:</p> - -<p class="blockquote"><!--044.png--><a name="Page_30" id="Page_30"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 30]</span> -“The attack of the 56th Division will be carried out by the - 168th and 169th Brigades, whose tasks will be as follows:</p> - -<p class="blockquote">(<i class="decoration">a</i>) The objective of the 168th Brigade will be to - capture the German line from Fair Trench, about K11d13, - along Farm, Fame and Elbe, Felon, to a point in Fell fifty - yards north-west of the trench junction at K5c52, and to - establish itself in three strong points:</p> - -<p class="blockquote indenthanging smaller">(1) About Farmyard, Farmer, Farm.</p> - -<p class="blockquote indenthanging smaller">(2) About Elbe, between Et and Felon.</p> - -<p class="blockquote indenthanging smaller">(3) About cross-trenches of Fell and Felon with Epte.</p> - -<p class="blockquote">168th Brigade will be responsible for the construction of a - fire trench facing south-east to connect the right flank of - the captured line to our present line in W47.</p> - -<p class="blockquote">(<i class="decoration">b</i>) The task of the 169th Brigade will be carried out in - three phases. The object of the 169th Brigade in the first - phase will be to capture the line of German trenches from - the left of the 168th Brigade along Fall, Fellow, the - Cemetery, Eck, the Maze, Eel, and Fir, and to establish - strong points:</p> - -<p class="blockquote indenthanging smaller">(1) From Feud through Ems to the Cemetery inclusive.</p> - -<p class="blockquote indenthanging smaller">(2) About the Maze.</p> - -<p class="blockquote indenthanging smaller">(3) About the south-east corner of Gommecourt Park.</p> - -<p class="blockquote">The second phase of the 169th Brigade attack will take place - immediately after the first phase.</p> - -<p class="blockquote">The objective of the second phase is the Quadrilateral of - the trenches in the south-east portion of K5a. The artillery - lifts will be timed on the assumption that the infantry will - reach Ems (between Etch and Fillet) twenty-five minutes - after zero; and Exe (between Etch and Fillet) twenty-seven - minutes after zero time.</p> - -<p class="blockquote">The third phase will take place directly after the - Quadrilateral is captured, and will consist of the -<!--045.png--><a name="Page_31" id="Page_31"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 31]</span> - securing - of the cross-trenches at K5a78 (where Indus crosses Fill and - Fillet) and joining hands with the 46th Division along Fill. - Fillet will be consolidated facing east.</p> - -<p class="blockquote">The following will be carried on the man:</p> - -<p class="smaller bigindent"> 200 rounds S.A.A.;</p> -<p class="smaller bigindent"> Waterproof sheet;</p> -<p class="smaller bigindent"> Haversack;</p> -<p class="smaller bigindent"> Iron ration and current day’s ration;</p> -<p class="smaller bigindent"> Two to three sand-bags;</p> -<p class="smaller bigindent"> Two tube helmets;</p> -<p class="smaller bigindent"> Proportion of wire-cutters, bill-hooks, tools.”</p> - -<p>The instructions for the 167th Brigade are practically embodied in the -following paragraphs:</p> - -<p class="blockquote">“One company 167th Brigade will be placed at the disposal of - the Brigadier-General commanding 169th Brigade, to hold - sectors Y49 and Y50.</p> - -<p class="blockquote">Seven officers and 200 men of the 167th Brigade will be - detailed for the control of smoke, and will be under the - orders of the Divisional Gas Officer. Approximately 1,200 - men will be required for work under the C.R.E. on - communication trenches across No Man’s Land and for carrying - parties.”</p> - -<p>Practice attacks, based on these instructions, were carried out by the -brigades in reserve.</p> - -<p>We have written of the constructive preparations which were going on -all along the line of proposed attack. These preparations were -continued until the last moment. But meanwhile another element was -introduced—that of destructive preparation. It is scarcely necessary -to point out that neither form of preparation could be concealed from -the enemy. The Germans knew as well as we did where we would attack.</p> - -<p><!--046.png--><a name="Page_32" id="Page_32"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 32]</span> -The Gommecourt sector to be attacked was held by the German 169th and -170th Regiments, with about 1-1/2 battalions on the front line, 1 -battalion in support, 2 battalions in reserve in Bucquoy, and 2 -companies at Ablainzeville. Their artillery consisted of 5 batteries -of heavy artillery and 12 batteries of field artillery. These -batteries were divided into three groups at Quesnoy Farm, on the left -of the British position, Biez Wood and Puisieux. There was a further -group of guns near Adinfer Wood which could assist in the defence.</p> - -<p>The 56th Divisional Artillery, together with the heavy <abbr title="seven">VII</abbr> Corps guns, -had now to prepare for the infantry assault by smashing up not only -the wire and trench system, but billets and gun positions behind the -German lines as well. As regards villages, most attention was given to -Bucquoy, Essart, Ablainzeville, and Achiet-le-Grand.</p> - -<p>Three groups of artillery were formed—a northern group, under -Lieut.-Col. Southam, a southern group, under Lieut.-Col. Macdowell, -and a wire-cutting group under Lieut.-Col. Prechtel. The northern and -southern groups were under the orders of the Corps, and consisted of:</p> - -<p class="center"><span class="sc">Northern Group</span></p> - -<p class="hanging mt1"> 3 batteries of 18-pounders (until zero day, then 4 batteries).</p> - -<p class="hanging mt1">1 battery 4·5 howitzers.</p> - -<p class="hanging mt1">Affiliated at zero to the 169th Brigade.</p> - -<p class="center"><span class="sc">Southern Group</span></p> - -<p class="hanging mt1">4 batteries of 18-pounders.</p> - -<p class="hanging mt1">1 battery 4·5 howitzers.</p> - -<p class="hanging mt1">Affiliated at zero to the 168th Brigade.</p> - -<p class="center"><!--047.png--><a name="Page_33" id="Page_33"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 33]</span> -<span class="sc">Wire-cutting Group</span></p> - -<p class="hanging mt1">5 batteries of 18-pounders until zero and then 4 batteries.</p> - -<p class="hanging mt1">1 battery 4·5 howitzers.</p> - -<p class="hanging mt1">Two of the guns of the 4·5 battery will be at the call of the -counter-battery group.</p> - -<p>In the preliminary instructions it will be noticed that a party of -officers and men were detailed to act under the Divisional Gas -Officer. Their special duty was to cover the approach of the infantry -by the discharge of a smoke cloud. It was hoped to introduce some -element of surprise by occasional discharges of smoke during the -preparatory bombardment, and so the Corps ordered that the bombardment -should be carried out for a period of five days, and the attack would -take place on the sixth. These days would be known as U, V, W, X, Y, -and Z days.</p> - -<p class="blockquote">“Smoke discharges lasting for a period of ten minutes will - take place on the days and at the hours mentioned below. - They will coincide with the intense artillery bombardment of - the enemy trenches. These bombardments will commence thirty - minutes before the smoke, and will reach their maximum - intensity during the ten minutes that it is being discharged:</p> - -<p class="smaller bigindent">U day, no discharge.</p> -<p class="smaller bigindent">V day, no discharge.</p> -<p class="smaller bigindent">W day from 10.15 a.m. to 10.25 a.m.</p> -<p class="smaller bigindent">X day from 5.45 a.m. to 5.55 a.m.</p> -<p class="smaller bigindent">Y day from 7.15 a.m. to 7.25 a.m.</p> - -<p class="blockquote">On Z day the smoke cloud will commence five minutes before - zero. On the 46th and 56th Divisional fronts its duration - will be as arranged by -<!--048.png--><a name="Page_34" id="Page_34"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 34]</span> - divisions. On the 37th Divisional - front it will continue for one hour.”</p> - -<p>U day was the 24th June, but the whole of the great attack was -postponed for two days, so that, instead of having five days of the -preliminary bombardment, there were seven.</p> - -<p>Naturally the Germans did not sit still under this destructive fire, -but retaliated on our front line and trench system, and on our rear -organisation. The enemy artillery had been active during the month of -May, and the division had suffered in casualties to the extent of 402; -for the month of June casualties leapt up to 801. The end of June was -a prolonged crash of guns. Only for one half-hour, from 4 p.m., did -the guns cease so that aeroplanes might take photographs of the German -lines, and then the sky was speckled with the puffs of smoke from the -German anti-aircraft guns.</p> - -<p>The guns of the 56th Division fired altogether 115,594 rounds, of -which 31,000 were fired on Z day. To this total must be added the work -of the Corps heavy artillery. The 6-inch, 9·2-inch, and 15-inch fired -on V day 3,200 rounds, on W day 2,200 rounds, on X day 3,100 rounds, -and on Y day 5,300 rounds (which was repeated on the two extra days) -at the front-line trenches and strong points. 6-inch, 9·2-inch, -4·7-inch, 4·5-inch, and 60-pounder guns also dealt with the villages -of Bucquoy, Achiet-le-Grand, Essart, and Ablainzeville, but in nothing -like the same proportion of rounds.</p> - -<p>The first smoke cloud was discharged on the 26th June, and drew very -little hostile machine-gun fire. The enemy lines were reported to be -much -<!--049.png--><a name="Page_35" id="Page_35"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 35]</span> -damaged on that day. On the 27th the smoke discharge was somewhat -spoilt by the premature bursting of a smoke shell an hour before the -appointed time. This misfortune caused the enemy to put down a barrage -on our front-line and communication trenches, which prevented the -smoke detachments getting to their appointed positions. When the cloud -was eventually discharged there was a large gap in the centre of it, -so it must have been obvious to the enemy that it was only a feint.</p> - -<p>The continual bombardment became more intense, and the enemy reply -more vigorous. On the 28th the enemy wire was reported as -satisfactorily cut in front of their first and second lines. Observers -also noted that there was considerable movement of troops behind the -German lines.</p> - -<p>Every night, the moment it was dark, although the artillery still -pounded trenches, roads, and tracks, patrols crept forward to -ascertain what progress had been made in the battering down of -defences. 2/Lieut. P. Henri, of the 3rd London Regt., raided the front -line. He found the Germans working feverishly to repair their trench, -and succeeded in capturing one prisoner, who proved to be of the -Labour Battalion of the 2nd Reserve Guards Division. He reported that -the wire in some places still formed a considerable obstacle.</p> - -<p>A patrol of the 1st London Regt. reported, on the 29th, that new -French wire and some strands of barbed wire had been put up. Up to the -last moment the Germans worked at their defences. Great activity was -seen on the morning of the 30th.</p> - -<p>The artillery grew more furious. A hail from heavy and field-gun -batteries descended on trenches -<!--050.png--><a name="Page_36" id="Page_36"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 36]</span> -and strong points. Lieut.-Col. -Prechtel’s wire-cutting group pounded away at the wire. The trench -mortar batteries added their quota, though they were chased from -pillar to post by German retaliation. And as the evening shadows fell -on the last day, the usual night firing was taken up by the -never-wearying gunners.</p> - -<p class="center">* * * * * * *</p> - -<p>The main object of this attack was to divert against the <abbr title="seven">VII</abbr> Corps -enemy artillery and infantry, which might otherwise have been used -against the left flank of the Fourth Army at Serre. To achieve this -result the two divisions, 46th and 56th, were given the task of -cutting off the Gommecourt salient.</p> - -<p>From the 24th to the 30th June the line of the 56th Division was held -by the 167th Brigade. The other two brigades then practised the -assault on a replica of the German defence system near Halloy. In the -early morning of the 1st July the 168th and 169th Brigades took over -the line, and the 167th withdrew to Hébuterne.</p> - -<p>The 5th Cheshire Regt. had a company with each of the assaulting -brigades; the Royal Engineers sent a section of the 2/1st London Field -Coy. with the 169th Brigade, and a section of the 2/2nd London Field -Coy. with the 168th Brigade.</p> - -<p>The London Scottish attacked on the right with the Kensingtons in -support; then came the Rangers with the 4th London Regt. in support. -The rôle of these battalions of the 168th Brigade may be briefly -described as a half-wheel to the right. They had to capture the strong -point round about Farm and Farmer trenches, and establish other strong -points at Elbe and Et, south-east of Nameless Farm, and the junction -of Felon and Epte.</p> - -<p><!--051.png--><a name="Page_37" id="Page_37"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 37]</span> -On the extreme left of the division was the London Rifle Brigade, and -next to them the Queen Victoria’s Rifles. Again as a rough indication -of their task, they had to make a left wheel and hold the line of the -edge of Gommecourt Park, establishing strong points. The Queen’s -Westminster Rifles would then push straight on, carrying the attack -forward, as it were, between the right and left wheels, and capture -the strong point known as the Quadrilateral.</p> - -<p>At 6.25 a.m. every gun opened on the German lines, and for one hour -the enemy was pelted with shells of all sizes, the maximum speed of -fire being reached at 7.20 and lasting for ten minutes. At this moment -smoke was discharged from the left of our line near Z hedge, and in -five minutes the smoke was dense along the whole front. Then the -assaulting battalions climbed out of their trenches and advanced -steadily into the heavy fog.</p> - -<p>The German front line was reached with little loss—there was -machine-gun fire, but it was apparently high. Almost immediately, -however, the Germans gave an indication of their -counter-measures—they were reported by the London Scottish to be -shelling their own line. This gallant regiment succeeded in gaining -practically the whole of its objectives, but they were never very -comfortable. Owing to the smoke the two left companies lost direction, -the flank company being drawn off in the direction of Nameless Farm, -and the inner company failed to recognise its position and overran its -objective. This was in no way surprising, as it was extremely -difficult, owing to the heavy bombardment, to find, in some places, -any trench at all.</p> - -<p>Next to the London Scottish the Rangers met with -<!--052.png--><a name="Page_38" id="Page_38"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 38]</span> -strong resistance, and -probably strayed a bit to their left. They were soon in trouble, and -two companies of the 1/4th London Regt. were sent forward to reinforce -them. Together these two units succeeded in reaching the junction of -Epte with Felon and Fell, but there was a gap between them and the -London Scottish.</p> - -<p>On the left of the attack the London Rifle Brigade had swept up to the -edge of Gommecourt Park and commenced to consolidate their position. -The Queen Victoria’s Rifles, on the other hand, were meeting with -fierce resistance, and were short of the Cemetery. The Queen’s -Westminster Rifles, advancing in rear, soon became hopelessly mixed up -with the Queen Victoria’s Rifles. Within an hour it became clear that -the infantry were everywhere engaged in hand-to-hand fighting.</p> - -<p>The German counter-attack plans matured about an hour after the -assault was launched. Their barrage on No Man’s Land was increased to -fearful intensity, and from Gommecourt Park, which was apparently -packed with men in deep dugouts, came strong bombing attacks. The -London Rifle Brigade called for reinforcements, but platoons of the -reserve company failed to get through the barrage and across to the -German front line.</p> - -<p>The assaulting companies had been provided with boards bearing the -names of the trenches to be captured, and as they fought their way -forward, these boards were stuck up to mark the advance. At about 9.30 -a.m. the artillery observers, who did most useful and gallant work -during the whole action, could report that all objectives were gained -with the exception of the Quadrilateral. But the troops in the -<!--053.png--><a name="Page_39" id="Page_39"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 39]</span> -German -lines were now held there firmly by the enemy barrage; they were cut -off from all communication by runners, and from all reinforcements. On -the right the Kensingtons had failed in an attempt to reinforce the -London Scottish. Captain Tagart, of the former regiment, had led his -company out, but was killed, and of the two remaining officers, one -was killed and the other wounded. A confused message having reached -headquarters, a fresh officer was sent down with orders to rally the -men and make another attempt to cross the inferno of No Man’s Land. He -found that there were only twenty men left, and that to cross with -them was impossible.</p> - -<p>The Royal Flying Corps contact machine, detailed to report on the -situation, sent constant messages that the Quadrilateral was empty of -troops of either side. The artillery observers, however, reported -seeing many parties of hostile bombers moving through the Park, and -enemy troops collecting behind the Cemetery.</p> - -<p>It seemed as though all battalions had at one time gained their -objectives except the Queen’s Westminster Rifles, but no blame falls -on this fine regiment. Lieut.-Col. Shoolbred says in his report, “As -no officer who got as far as this (first line) ever returned, it is -difficult to know in detail what happened.” The three captains, -Cockerill, Mott, and Swainson, were killed before reaching the second -German line. Apparently the wire on this section of the front was not -satisfactorily dealt with. The report says:</p> - -<p class="blockquote">“A great deal of the wire was not cut at all, so that both - the Victorias and ourselves had to file in, in -<!--054.png--><a name="Page_40" id="Page_40"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 40]</span> - close order, - through gaps, and many were hit.... The losses were heavy - before reaching the bank at the Gommecourt-Nameless Farm - road. At this point our three companies and the two - Victorias were joined up and intermixed.... Only one runner - ever succeeded in getting through from the assaulting - companies.”</p> - -<p>There were a few brave young officers of the Queen’s Westminsters left -at this point—2/Lieuts. J. A. Horne, A. G. V. Yates, A. G. Negus, D. -F. Upton, E. H. Bovill. They proceeded to collect their men and lead -them forward, and while doing this 2/Lieuts. Yates and Negus were -killed. 2/Lieut. Upton, having then reorganised a bombing party, -bombed the enemy out of Fellow and reached the Cemetery. To do this -they had to run over the open and drop into Fellow. Another party -tried at the same time to bomb their way up Etch, but found it was too -strongly held by the enemy. Meanwhile, 2/Lieut. Upton had stuck up his -signboard, and more men doubled up over the open and dropped into -Fellow Trench. 2/Lieut. Horne then mounted a Lewis gun, under cover of -which a platoon of the Cheshire Regt. and some Royal Engineers blocked -Etch and also Fell (it would seem doubtful, from this statement, -whether Fell was ever held).</p> - -<p>Sergt. W. G. Nicholls had kept a party of bombers together and, led by -a young lieutenant of the Cheshire Regt., whose name unfortunately is -not mentioned [we believe it was 2/Lieut. G. S. Arthur], this party -forced its way from the Cemetery to the Quadrilateral. The names of -some of the men are given by Col. Shoolbred:</p> - -<p class="blockquote">“Cpl. R. T. Townsend, L/Cpl. W. C. Ide, Cpl. Hayward, -<!--055.png--><a name="Page_41" id="Page_41"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 41]</span> - Rfn. F. H. Stow undoubtedly did reach the Quadrilateral, - where strong enemy bombing parties met them, and the - Cheshire lieutenant ordered the party to retire, apparently - trying to cover their retirement himself, as he was not seen - again.”</p> - -<p>In any case this advance into the Quadrilateral was but a momentary -success, and it may be said that the attack never got beyond the -German third line. Signals were picked up by the artillery observers -calling for bombs. As early as 10 a.m. two parties of London Scottish, -each fifty strong, attempted to take bombs across to their comrades. -None got to the German first line, and only three ever got back to -ours.</p> - -<p>About midday the enemy was launching concerted counter-attacks from -all directions. He was coming down Epte, Ems, and Etch, he was coming -from Gommecourt Park, he was in Fall on the right. More desperate -attempts were made to reinforce the hard-pressed troops. Capt. P. A. -J. Handyside, of the 2nd London Regt., led his company out to try and -reach the left of the line. He was hit, but struggled on. He was hit -again and killed as he led a mere half-dozen men into the German first -line.</p> - -<p>Capt. J. R. Garland, also of the 2nd London Regt., attempted the same -feat with his company, and met with a like fate. All the officers of -both companies were casualties.</p> - -<p>At 2 p.m. the London Scottish still held firm on the right and the -London Rifle Brigade on the left—indeed, 2/Lieut. R. E. Petley, with -thirty men, hung on to Eck three hours after the rest of his battalion -had been ordered to fall back on Ferret, the German first line. But, -although the two flanks held, the -<!--056.png--><a name="Page_42" id="Page_42"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 42]</span> -troops in the centre were gradually -forced back until isolated posts were held in the second German line. -By 4 p.m. nothing more was held than the German first line.</p> - -<p>By 9 p.m. everyone who could get there was back in our own lines.</p> - -<p>But we must not leave our account of the fighting with the story of -the 46th Division untold. It was not unreasonable for the men of the -56th Division to hope, while they were being hardly pressed, that the -46th Division might suddenly come to their aid. Perhaps luck would -favour that division!</p> - -<p>The attack from the north was launched between the Gommecourt road and -the Little Z. The 137th Brigade, with the 6th South Staffordshire -Regt. on the right and the 6th North Staffordshire Regt. on the left, -had Gommecourt Wood in front of them. The 139th Brigade, with the 5th -Sherwood Foresters on the right and the 7th Sherwood Foresters on the -left, carried the attack up to the Little Z.</p> - -<p>The account of this action is one long series of disasters. It seems -that the South Staffords on the right started by getting bogged in the -mud. A new front line had been dug, but they could not occupy it for -this reason. They filed out through gaps in their wire, and if any -succeeded in reaching the German front line it was for a period of -minutes only. The North Staffords fared no better, though a few more -men seem to have gained the enemy first line, but were, however, -quickly forced out. The utmost confusion reigned in that part of the -line, and the attack, from the very start, was futile.</p> - -<p>The 5th and 7th Sherwoods got away to time (7.30), but</p> - -<p class="blockquote"><!--057.png--><a name="Page_43" id="Page_43"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 43]</span> -“there was a little delay in the fourth wave getting out, - owing to the deep mud in the trenches, and still more delay - in the carrying parties moving up (due to a similar reason), - and also on account of the enemy barrage of artillery, - rifle, and machine-gun fire which became very heavy on our - old front line.... Of the 5th Sherwoods the first and second - waves reached the enemy first line fairly easily, but were - scattered by the time this occurred. The third and fourth - waves suffered severely in crossing from machine-gun fire. - The majority of the first and second waves passed over the - first-line trenches, but there is no evidence to show what - happened to them there, for not a man of the battalions that - reached the German second line has returned. The remaining - waves ... found that the enemy, who must have taken refuge - in deep dugouts, had now come up and manned the parapet in - parties. The Germans were noticed to be practically all - bombers.... The first three waves of the 7th Sherwoods (the - left of the attack) moved out to time and found the wire - well cut. So far as is known, only a small proportion of - these three waves reached the German second line, and after - a bomb fight on both flanks, the survivors fell back on the - German first line, where they found other men of the - battalion consolidating. After expending all their bombs in - repelling a German counter-attack, the survivors retired - over the parapet.”</p> - -<p>One can therefore say that, half an hour after the attack was -launched, the Germans in the Gommecourt salient had only the 56th -Division to deal with. We know that the Cemetery was seen to be -occupied by our troops about nine o’clock, and it was probably shortly -after this that the party of Queen’s Westminster Rifles, led by the -gallant lieutenant of the -<!--058.png--><a name="Page_44" id="Page_44"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 44]</span> -Cheshires, reached the Quadrilateral. But the -Germans were then masters of the situation on the north of the salient -and, freed from all anxiety in that quarter, could turn their whole -attention to the 56th Division. Up to this time fighting had been -hard, but slow progress had been made, and with even moderate success -on the part of the 46th Division, depression and bewilderment might -have seized the enemy. But he turned with elation to the southern -attack, and shortly after 9.30 a.m. small parties of bombers were seen -moving through Gommecourt Park to attack the London Rifle Brigade, and -strong attacks were launched from the east of Gommecourt village.</p> - -<p>For the rest of the day no help came from the 46th Division, though a -new attack was ordered, postponed, and postponed again. The plan was -to reorganise assaulting waves from the carrying parties, and at 3.30 -in the afternoon it seemed probable that an attack would materialise, -but it did not. It was perhaps as well, for by that time the 56th -Division occupied the German front line only, and that in very weak -strength.</p> - -<p>As night fell all became quiet. The 167th Brigade relieved the 168th -on the right; the 169th reorganised.</p> - -<p>General Hull’s conclusions on this action are that</p> - -<p class="blockquote">“the primary reason for failing to retain the ground -was a shortage of grenades. This shortage was due -to:</p> - -<p class="blockquote">(<i class="decoration">a</i>) The enemy’s barrage, and in a lesser extent the - machine-gun fire from the flanks, which prevented supplies - being carried across No Man’s Land.</p> - -<p class="blockquote">(<i class="decoration">b</i>) To the breadth of No Man’s Land.</p> - -<p class="blockquote">(<i class="decoration">c</i>) Possibly to insufficient means of collecting -<!--059.png--><a name="Page_45" id="Page_45"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 45]</span> - grenades and S.A.A. from men who had become casualties, - and from German stores.</p> - -<p class="blockquote">I understand that our counter-battery groups engaged a very - large number of German batteries—the results were not - apparent, and I think this was due to the limited number of - guns available, and also to the small calibre of the - majority employed (60-pounders, 4·7 guns, and 4·5 - howitzers). I consider it would be better to employ the - heavy (9·2) and medium (6) howitzers, and even the - super-heavy.</p> - -<p class="blockquote">It was particularly noticeable that, once our attack was - launched, the Germans attempted practically no counter-work.</p> - -<p class="blockquote">The preliminary bombardment started on the 24th June, and - continued for seven days. During this period the enemy - seemed to have increased the number of his batteries.... The - effect of the bombardment on the German trenches was very - great ... on the dugouts the effect was negligible. On the - <em>moral</em> of the enemy the effect was not so great as one - would have hoped....</p> - -<p class="blockquote">I am doubtful of the value of these long bombardments, which - give the enemy time to recognise the points selected for the - attack, and possibly to relieve his troops, and to - concentrate guns, and to bring up ammunition.</p> - -<p class="blockquote">The intense bombardment prior to the attack lasted - sixty-five minutes, considerably longer than any of the - previous bombardments. I am in favour of having as many - false attacks and lifts of artillery fire as possible, but - consider there should be no difference....</p> - -<p class="blockquote">The German attitude and <em>moral</em> varied - considerably—some of the enemy showed fight, but other - parties were quite ready to surrender as soon as they came - up from their dugouts. But it cannot be said that their - <em>moral</em> was any more shattered by the bombardment than - were their dugouts. Later -<!--060.png--><a name="Page_46" id="Page_46"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 46]</span> - in the day German bombers advanced - with great boldness, being assisted by men who advanced over - the open. Our men appear to have had no difficulty in - dealing with enemy bombers at first—it was only when bombs - were scarce that the enemy succeeded in pushing us back. The - counter-attacks on the right were never made in great - strength, but were prepared by artillery fire which was - followed up closely and boldly by bombers. On the left the - enemy appeared to be in greater strength, and came out of - Gommecourt village and through the Park in great numbers.”</p> - -<p>The men of London had done well, although the salient remained in the -hands of the enemy. The effort of the infantry was valiant, and they -were supported with devotion by the artillery. The artillery observers -took great risks, and the conduct of one of Lieut.-Col. Prechtel’s -wire-cutting batteries is well worthy of note. It established itself -practically in our front line, about W48, and fired 1,200 rounds -during X, Y, Y1, Y2 days and on Z day fired a further 1,100 rounds.</p> - -<p>The German plan was, as has been shown, to prevent all reinforcements -from crossing No Man’s Land, and to deal with those troops who had -lodged themselves in their trench system by strong and well-organised -bombing attacks.</p> - -<div class="figcenter" style="width: 500px"> - <a name="illo1"></a> - <img src="images/i_1gommecourt.jpg" - width="100%" height="auto" - alt="Illustration: Title or description" - /> - <p class="caption"><span class="sc u">1. The Gommecourt Salient.</span></p> -<p class="caption mt1"><i class="decoration">The dotted line is the old British line.</i></p> -</div> - -<div class="p4 figcenter" style="width: 500px"> - <a name="gommecourt"></a> - <img src="images/i_1bgommecourt.jpg" - width="100%" height="auto" - alt="Illustration: GOMMECOURT, JULY 1916" - /> - <p class="caption">GOMMECOURT, JULY 1916</p> -</div> - -<p>There is no doubt that the main object of the attack had been -fulfilled. Unpleasant as it may seem, the rôle of the 56th Division -was to induce the enemy to shoot at them with as many guns as could be -gathered together, and also to prevent him from moving troops. The -prisoners captured were 141 from units of the 52nd Reserve Division, -and 37 from -<!--061.png--> -<!--062.png--> -<!--063.png--> -<!--064.png--><a name="Page_47" id="Page_47"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 47]</span> -the 2nd Guards Reserve Division, so that no movement of -troops had occurred on that front, and we know that the number of -batteries had been increased. There were many more prisoners than -this, but they were caught in their own barrage as they crossed No -Man’s Land, and large numbers of dead Germans were afterwards found in -that much-battered belt.</p> - -<p>The main attack of the Fourth Army, launched on the same day, -succeeded on the right. North of the Ancre as far as Serre our losses -were severe, and the initial gains of the assaulting troops could not -be maintained. After five days’ fierce fighting, the enemy’s first -system of defence farther south had been penetrated to a depth of a -mile over a front of six miles. But north of the Ancre, after the -first day, operations were confined to maintaining a steady pressure -on the enemy.</p> - -<p>This battle, with the subsidiary attack on the Gommecourt Salient, is -known as the battle of Albert 1916.</p> - -<p class="center">* * * * * * *</p> - -<p>The division was not relieved. It had suffered in casualties 182 -officers and 4,567 other ranks. The London Scottish had sent 24 -officers and 847 other ranks into battle, and 9 officers and 257 other -ranks had come out. The Rangers had sent in 23 officers and 780 other -ranks—6 officers and 280 other ranks came out. The Queen Victoria’s -Rifles came out with 22 officers and 160 other ranks; the London Rifle -Brigade, 18 officers and 300 other ranks; the Queen’s Westminster -Rifles, 19 officers and 160 other ranks. The supporting battalions -suffered only slightly less.</p> - -<p>When the fighting had abated the enemy seems to -<!--065.png--><a name="Page_48" id="Page_48"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 48]</span> -have initiated a truce -to gather in the wounded. His own stretcher-bearers came out, on -seeing which ours also went out. This state of affairs lasted for an -hour, when our men were warned to get back to their lines.</p> - -<p>The state of the line was extraordinary. The front line, over which so -much labour had been expended, had ceased to exist, and could only be -held by means of patrols and a few small posts. Our main line was now -what was known as the R Line, the original line when the 56th Division -arrived in the sector. And the front held by the division was -gradually increased. From the 3rd July onwards the division took over -the line to the left until on the 8th the 169th Brigade was north of -Fonquevillers with its left opposite Little Z. Each brigade held its -front with two battalions in the line, one in brigade reserve and one -in divisional reserve.</p> - -<p>During the night of the 13th the artillery made a “demonstration” in -order to help the Fourth Army, which was again attacking in the south. -On this night a patrol of the Queen’s Westminster Rifles captured a -prisoner who proved to be of the 91st Regt.—a normal unit.</p> - -<p>On the 17th of the month all three brigades attempted raids, but the -enemy were found to be too alert, and no prisoners were obtained.</p> - -<p>The division remained on this front, keeping the enemy busy, until the -20th August, when it was relieved by the 17th Division, and marched -first to Doullens, then to Fromer-le-Grand, then to St. Riquier, where -it proceeded to refit and train under the orders of the <abbr title="ten">X</abbr> Corps.</p> - - -<p class="p2 footnote"> <a name="footnote_1" id="footnote_1"></a> -<a href="#fnanchor_1"><span class="muchsmaller">[1]</span></a> - Appendix A.</p> - -<p class="footnote"> <a name="footnote_2" id="footnote_2"></a> -<a href="#fnanchor_2"><span class="muchsmaller">[2]</span></a> - <cite>General Headquarters, 1914-1916, and its Critical - Decisions</cite>—Gen. von Falkenhayn.</p> -</div><!--end chapter one--> -<p><!--066.png--><a name="Page_49" id="Page_49"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 49]</span></p> -<div class="chapter"> -<h3 class="p4">CHAPTER <abbr title="two">II</abbr></h3> - -<h4>THE SOMME</h4> - -<h4 class="smaller">THE BATTLE OF GINCHY; THE BATTLE OF FLERS-COURCELETTE; -THE BATTLE OF MORVAL</h4> - -<p class="p2">The move to St. Riquier, in the neighbourhood of Abbeville, revealed -to some of the officers that their men were not very fit for marching. -This knowledge appears to come as a revelation to some people. Those -on active service very soon discovered that a long period of trench -duty, though it hardened the men to those particular conditions, made -them unfit for any strenuous marching. It was probably never -understood by people in England. They were, then, weary battalions -that arrived at St. Riquier.</p> - -<p>When it is said that a battalion or a division was “resting,” that -word must not be taken in too literal a sense. One might define it -with greater truth as being a change of location, sometimes a mere -matter of a mile or so, at others perhaps fifty miles. There were, it -is true, no trenches to man, no sentry groups by day and night, but -there was always work to be done. And the work, very naturally, had -always the one end in view—the defeat of the Germans.</p> - -<p>The training was almost exclusively of an aggressive nature. Unless -there was some special object in view, when trenches would be dug to -represent our own and those occupied by the enemy, the optimistic -<!--067.png--><a name="Page_50" id="Page_50"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 50]</span> -nature of the Higher Command always leaned to open warfare training. -Companies wandered about, as they do in England, attacking villages, -strong points, and woods, and indulged in vast schemes of pursuit -after phantom armies called Red or North or South Armies. But this -short period at St. Riquier gave the 56th Division a surprise in the -matter of training.</p> - -<p>Battalions had been reinforced since the Gommecourt action, and there -was some grumbling about the nature of the reinforcements. Batches of -men, from all sorts of units, were drafted to battalions, and General -Hull made great efforts to get this system altered. Battalions, -however, were of fair strength.</p> - -<p>We know that very early in the war the problem of barbed wire had been -exercising the minds of the Staff in general. Long after the Press -campaign for high explosives, when this form of shell was provided in -large quantities, wire-cutting was still ordered with quite a high -percentage of shrapnel. But whatever you did, however long the time -you gave to cutting the wire, it never disappeared entirely; vile, -treacherous strands stuck out of the earth like brambles, stakes -remained miraculously upright with waving lengths of wire to grab you -by the sleeve or the trousers; and when the cutting was well done, -there had been a mere substitution of obstacles—the state of the -ground, blasted into holes, pits, mounds, and mud made progress very -slow and difficult.</p> - -<p>How was wire to be removed?</p> - -<p>Mr. Winston Churchill let his mind wander round steam-rollers linked -up with chains. Other minds thought of tractors. At the same time, -inventors were considering the old question of moving forts. -<!--068.png--><a name="Page_51" id="Page_51"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 51]</span> -In August -1916 there came from England a weird and fearful-looking machine known -as a Tank.</p> - -<p>On the 26th August the 7th Middlesex practised an attack in -conjunction with five Tanks. One can easily imagine the Middlesex men, -and everybody else who had wind of what was afoot, all agog at this -new form of field training! What were the criticisms of the London men -on this ... machine?</p> - -<p>The Tanks had only been landed in France on the 25th, and it is not -surprising that two of them broke down. But the practice was continued -on subsequent days until each brigade had acquired experience. Sir -Douglas Haig, Marshal Joffre, and H.R.H. the Prince of Wales were -interested spectators of these evolutions.</p> - -<p>The orders for this exercise were that the Tanks would cross our front -line at zero hour, and would be followed by the first infantry wave -one minute later. The second wave would start at zero plus three -minutes; the third wave at zero plus five minutes; the fourth wave at -zero plus six minutes. The infantry were instructed to advance in -short rushes up to, but not beyond, the Tanks—unless a Tank broke -down, when they were to proceed as if it was not there.</p> - -<p>Everyone seems to have been much impressed by the behaviour of the -Tanks.</p> - -<p>On the 31st August, General Hull received a warning order that his -division would move to Corbie and come under the <abbr title="fourteen">XIV</abbr> Corps (Cavan). -And on the following day the artillery was ordered forward. The 168th -and 169th Infantry Brigades left St. Riquier on the 3rd, and the 167th -Brigade on the 4th. Events came tumbling over one another.</p> - -<p><!--069.png--><a name="Page_52" id="Page_52"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 52]</span> -On the 4th September the leading troops of the division were at the -Citadel and Happy Valley, near Carnoy; on the 5th at Maricourt Siding. -And on the 6th September the 56th Division was ordered to relieve the -5th Division that night in the front line.</p> - -<p>No one will ever be able to describe in adequate fashion the scene -behind the Somme battle front. Piccadilly in the height of the season, -with its slow-moving and ever-stopping traffic, may give some idea of -the state of the roads—only one must substitute army carts, limbers, -lorries, for smart limousine cars and buses, one must substitute a -loose stone road covered with six inches of mud, and holes three feet -deep filled with water, for the smooth wood paving of that -thoroughfare. And there were no pavements, no sidewalks. The infantry -threaded its way in single file through this mass of dirty carts, and -sweating men and horses, and overheated motor-lorries, halting -sometimes for hours; or broke away across-country where, although the -traffic was not so congested, obstacles such as cavalry lines, -transport lines, camps, and, as the forward area was penetrated, lines -of heavy guns and howitzers were met with.</p> - -<p>The whole country seemed pulsing with life and effort. Here was no -labour-saving device of peaceful civilisation, but a continual strain -of muscle and sinew. Difficulties were overcome by straining horses, -straining men, for where the greatest difficulty existed the engine -was of no use. And through the midst of all this, threading its way in -long files, passed the 56th Division.</p> - -<p class="center">* * * * * * *</p> - -<p>We have said that the results of the first five days of fighting, -which started on the 1st July, was an -<!--070.png--><a name="Page_53" id="Page_53"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 53]</span> -advance of one mile on a front -of six miles. This was followed by minor engagements to adjust the -line.</p> - -<p>The two northern Corps of the attacking Army were given to Sir Hubert -Gough, with instructions to keep the enemy busy while Sir Henry -Rawlinson battered his way through farther south.</p> - -<p>On the 14th July the Fourth Army was again launched on a front from -Longueval to Bazentin-le-Petit Wood. This battle was continued for -several days, and established the Army on a line from Maltz Horn Farm -(Montauban), where it joined on to the left of the French, along the -eastern edge of Trones Wood to Longueval, then westward past -Bazentin-le-Grand to the northern corner of Bazentin-le-Petit (and the -wood), and so to the north of Ovillers. Over 2,000 prisoners were -taken, which brought the total since the opening of the offensive to -more than 10,000, also in this battle we captured 4 heavy guns, 42 -field-guns, 30 trench mortars, and 52 machine guns. [Battle of -Bazentin Ridge.]</p> - -<p>But our line from Pozières to Delville Wood and Longueval, and then -south of Maltz Horn Farm, where it was carried still south by the -French to the village of Hem, made a most unpleasant salient. The -enemy had excellent observation from Guillemont, and could bring a -mass of surrounding artillery to bear on a comparatively small area -packed with troops, guns, and supplies. To relieve this most -uncomfortable position, it was arranged that the right of the British -Army should swing forward in conjunction with the French. To do this -the French would have to capture the strongly fortified villages of -Maurepas, Le Foret, Rancourt, and Frigicourt, while we would have to -take all the -<!--071.png--><a name="Page_54" id="Page_54"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 54]</span> -country up to Sailly-Saillisel and Morval, which included -the capture of Flers, Gueudecourt, Ginchy, Guillemont, and Les Bœufs. -Before this could be done, the enemy, on the 18th July, launched a -strong counter-attack on Delville Wood-Longueval-Waterlot Farm. And -this was the prelude to much fierce and very confusing fighting. [The -battle of Delville Wood commenced on the 15th July and ended 3rd -September.]</p> - -<p>On the 30th July we attacked Guillemont and Falfemont Farm in -conjunction with our Allies, but without success; and on the 7th -August our troops again entered Guillemont and were again driven out. -Guillemont was the important point to be gained, but it was evident -that it could not be won in a small engagement, and as the only -objective, without heavy loss. So we and the French made a series of -attacks, advancing foot by foot on Maurepas, Falfemont, Guillemont, -Leuze Wood, and Ginchy. But no great progress was made. And so the -month of August passed.</p> - -<p>On the 3rd September a combined French and British attack was made on -a wide front extending on the left to the Ancre, so that both the -Fourth and Fifth Armies were engaged. The gain in front of Sir Hubert -Gough’s Army was small, but the Fourth Army managed to win the -much-disputed Guillemont, and after many assaults Falfemont Farm -(which was only completely captured on the 5th) and the greater part -of Leuze Wood. Ginchy and High Wood remained in the hands of the -Germans, but we had made a step in the right direction, and had -advanced our right to a depth of one mile on a front of nearly two -miles and captured over a thousand prisoners. [Battle of Guillemont, -3rd-6th September.]</p> - -<p><!--072.png--><a name="Page_55" id="Page_55"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 55]</span> -This was, briefly, the situation when the 56th Division marched -forward to take over the line from the 5th Division.</p> - -<p class="center">* * * * * * *</p> - -<p>Brig.-Gen. Loch was ordered to take over a portion of the line, and -accordingly the 168th Brigade moved from Maricourt Siding in the -direction of Falfemont Farm, and came under the orders of the 5th -Division. The local situation was always most difficult to grasp. The -Somme field of battle was the most hideous place and absolutely -bewildering. A guide was a treacherous person to trust, or perhaps we -should say he was a broken reed to lean on; for the poor fellow had no -treacherous intent in his heart, he was anxious enough to lead troops -in the right direction, but nine times out of ten was completely lost -a few minutes after he started. And there were, perhaps, more mistakes -made in attempting to trace the front line in that great battle than -in any other.</p> - -<p>Guillemont was held by us; Combles was strongly held by the Germans. -Between these two places was Leuze Wood. We held, with more or less -certainty, the line of the road between Leuze Wood and Guillemont, and -we also held the country between Leuze Wood and Falfemont Farm, and -had pushed troops into the wood itself; but the situation in the rest -of the square marked 27 was very vague (see map)—the only certain -thing was that there were many Germans there. Except for the wood and -the line of the road to Guillemont, the Germans held all of squares 20 -and 21. We had a nasty, elongated triangle pushed into enemy -territory, and it had a wobbly right side to it.</p> - -<p>The Kensingtons went into the front line not very -<!--073.png--><a name="Page_56" id="Page_56"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 56]</span> -far from Falfemont -Farm, in the lower left corner of square 27. The London Scottish were -supposed to be in support to the Royal Irish Rifles, and got into a -two-foot scrape, unworthy of the name of “trench,” about -three-quarters of the way through Leuze Wood. The Royal Irish Rifles -were imagined to be holding the most southern end of Bouleaux Wood -across the road which separated it from Leuze Wood.</p> - -<p>The positions were, of course, taken over at night, and the next day -the French attacked Combles. In order to help our Allies our guns -started a bombardment, but unfortunately most of their shells fell -around Leuze Wood. It was one of the unavoidable accidents of war. -Close shooting has to be done, and there are many possible causes, -from faulty ammunition to wet ground, for guns shooting short. It is -none the less annoying to the infantry. Capt. A. H. Macgregor, of “C” -Company (London Scottish), made strong remarks in writing, but failed -to stop the energetic gunners.</p> - -<p>The Irish were having a much worse time than the London Scottish, as -they were also being heavily bombarded by the Germans. So they decided -to evacuate their trench.</p> - -<p>All this led to some confusion, and on top of it the enemy launched a -bombing attack, which was probably in support of their counter-attack -on the French. The London Scottish reserve companies, which were at -Wedge Wood, moved up, and the battalion prepared to defend Leuze Wood, -which they imagined would shortly be heavily attacked. But the Irish, -although they lost heavily, threw back the German bombers and were -relieved by two companies of the London Scottish.</p> - -<p><!--074.png--><a name="Page_57" id="Page_57"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 57]</span> -By midnight everything was re-established as it had been before, and, -while probing about in the dark, the London Scottish gathered in two -enemy officers and fourteen other ranks of the 107th Infantry Regt. as -prisoners.</p> - -<p>The position they were in was on the south of the road, and it was -decided to try and dig a trench on the edge of Bouleaux Wood, that is, -on the other side of the road. A platoon was sent forward the -following morning to undertake this work. It was successfully carried -out, and the covering party managed to inflict a good many casualties -on the enemy—Sergt. Smith, of “B” Company, shot eight—and three -further prisoners were taken.</p> - -<p>This experience of the London Scottish will give some idea of the -conditions which ruled what was officially known as “holding the -line.” At any moment a post might be wrested from you and have to be -fought for again, and all the time you were described as “established” -in Leuze Wood.</p> - -<p>On the night of the 7th September the Queen Victoria’s Rifles took -over this bit of line, and the London Scottish went back to Maltz Horn -Farm.</p> - -<p>On the night of the 6/7th September, General Hull took over command of -the divisional front from the G.O.C. 5th Division. There was a slight -readjustment of line the next night, and it was then held by the 169th -Brigade on the right and in touch with the 1st French Division, and -the 168th Brigade on the left and in touch with the 16th Division on -the Combles-Guillemont road.</p> - -<p>There was to be a big attack on the 9th, but the position from which -the 56th Division had to start was not too satisfactory. A study of -the battle of -<!--075.png--><a name="Page_58" id="Page_58"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 58]</span> -the Somme will show that at some time or other every -unit lost direction. It was exceedingly difficult to recognise an -objective; even the heaps of ruins which marked the sites of villages -were frequently mistaken. It is a rolling, featureless country. But -perhaps the chief cause of loss of direction was the shape of the -jumping-off line. The German defence was very obstinate and the -fighting severe. Troops, having made an advance, had to hang on -anywhere, facing the enemy where he opposed them most fiercely. The -result was a zigzag line, a crazy front, where troops frequently faced -east and west and were told to attack north. On an ordinary practice -field-day, a platoon commander can get his men out of a trench and -make them wheel in the desired direction, but in action attacking -troops will always be drawn towards the nearest firing. Men getting -out of a trench and hearing or seeing an enemy in front of them will -go towards him, no matter how much orders to the contrary have been -dinned into their heads.</p> - -<p>Consider the line of the 56th Division. The left along the -Guillemont-Leuze Wood road was facing due north; it then curled round -the wood and faced south-east; another curl made the extreme right of -the line face north-east. The attack on the 9th was to be in a -north-easterly direction.</p> - -<p>To get a better line and form a strong flank facing Combles, an -attempt was made to clear the enemy from the trenches south-east of -Leuze Wood.</p> - -<p>The London Rifle Brigade had relieved the Kensingtons on the right of -the line, and companies were somewhat puzzled by their position, which -is described as “most obscure.” On the night of the 8th they -<!--076.png--><a name="Page_59" id="Page_59"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 59]</span> -made a -bombing attack to clear the trenches on the south-east of the wood. At -first this met with some success, but in the early morning of the 9th -the enemy came at them again in large numbers, and they were driven -back to their former position. It was not thought advisable to try to -regain the lost ground.</p> - -<p>The attack on the 9th September (the battle of Ginchy) was by the -whole of the <abbr title="fourteen">XIV</abbr> Corps in conjunction with the <abbr title="fifteen">XV</abbr> Corps on the left. -The <abbr title="fourteen">XIV</abbr> Corps held Guillemont; and Delville Wood was held by the <abbr title="fifteen">XV</abbr> -Corps. The object was to capture Ginchy and bring the line up to point -141·7, and from there down to Leuze Wood. Incidentally it meant -clearing the ground to the south-east of the wood, but in following -the actions from this date it must be remembered that the Higher -Command intended to work round Combles, and so the right of the -British Army was always working to form a defensive flank, until the -advance reached a point which would enable troops to join hands with -the French on the far side of Combles.</p> - -<p>The task of the 169th Brigade was the forming of a flank against -Combles by capturing the trenches south-east of the wood (the trenches -they had failed to take by bombing) and to advance their line a short -way through Bouleaux Wood.</p> - -<p>The 168th Brigade, who were on the line of the Guillemont-Leuze Wood -road, were to pivot on their right (the advance from the northern end -of the wood was very slight) and bring their left up to point 141·7. -This “right form” was to be done in two stages, the road to Ginchy -marking the halfway line.</p> - -<p>The artillery were ordered to put up a creeping and stationary -barrage. Fifty per cent. of guns were -<!--077.png--><a name="Page_60" id="Page_60"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 60]</span> -to fire on a known position as -a stationary barrage; the other 50 per cent. were to start just ahead -of the infantry and creep forward at the rate of fifty yards a minute, -until the stationary barrage was reached, when the latter would be -jumped forward to the next stationary barrage line.</p> - -<p>It will be gathered from the foregoing account of how the 56th -Division took over the line that the conditions under which the -infantry waited for the resumption of attack were not dissimilar to -those at the end, though not the actual termination, of an -engagement—when nobody knows within a few hundred yards where any -unit really is. And, indeed, that was always the situation during the -battle of the Somme. There was perpetual unrest in the line.</p> - -<p>The battle on the 9th has always seemed like a wild rush in -fast-fading light. It was to open at 4.45 p.m., but on the left of the -Corps it seems to have been delayed. Nowhere was it entirely -successful in the assault. The situation remained obscure and fighting -continued for several days.</p> - -<p>The truth of the whole matter was that the enemy defended Combles with -desperation. The right of the 56th Division had as hard a task as was -ever set for any troops, and on their left was a German strong point -bearing the ominous name of “the Quadrilateral,” the strength of which -was only learned at bitter cost. We will follow the fortunes of the -division from the right of the line.</p> - -<p>The 169th Brigade was on the right with the London Rifle Brigade and -the Queen Victoria’s Rifles attacking. Leuze Wood, as we know, was -always a dangerous spot, and the task of the London Rifle Brigade was -to capture those trenches on the south-east -<!--078.png--><a name="Page_61" id="Page_61"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 61]</span> -of the wood and start the -building up of the flank facing Combles. But the moment the men left -their jumping-off trenches, their attack was met and destroyed by a -hail of rifle and machine-gun fire.</p> - -<p>On the left of the London Rifle Brigade the Queen Victoria’s Rifles, -whose objective was the enemy trench on the far side of the Combles -road, met with more success and gained a precarious footing in a part -of that line. But no troops of the 169th Brigade could be said to be -established anywhere on their objective.</p> - -<p>Part of the 2nd London Regt. was given to the London Rifle Brigade, -and a second attack was launched on the trenches south-east of the -wood, almost simultaneously with a counter-attack by the enemy from -his Bouleaux Wood defences. The Queen Victoria’s Rifles held on to -their gains, but the second attack on the trenches south-east of the -wood failed. The Queen’s Westminster Rifles, who were in reserve, were -sent for.</p> - -<p>The 168th Brigade, on the left of the division, attacked with the 4th -London Regt. on the right and the Rangers on the left. The 4th -Londons, pivoting on the north end of Leuze Wood, gained their first -objective under close cover of our barrage and with little loss. But -the Rangers came under heavy machine-gun fire from their left. It was -ascertained from a prisoner, captured later, that a whole battalion of -his regiment, the 161st of the 185th Division, was in the centre of -the square marked 20.</p> - -<p>The left company of the Rangers, with the troops of the 16th Division -on their left, met a strong force of the enemy and were driven back to -their point of departure. The right company, however, after hard -<!--079.png--><a name="Page_62" id="Page_62"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 62]</span> -fighting which lasted until 6 p.m., reached their first objective, the -line of the road from Leuze Wood to Ginchy.</p> - -<p>Meanwhile the 4th London Regt., sticking close to the artillery -barrage, had again advanced at 5.25 p.m. and gained their final -objective. But their losses were severe. The machine-gun fire was -tremendous, and its effects can be gathered from the fact that a post, -which was left to construct a strong point in the first objective, was -entirely wiped out.</p> - -<p>The right company of the Rangers, having gained their first objective, -again advanced, though the opposition they had met with had caused -them to be late on the barrage. Again the murderous fire was poured on -them from the left, and they swerved so that they came up on the -centre of the 4th London troops. These two battalions were now on the -line of the trench leading to point 141·7, but exactly how near that -point was only determined later. On the right they were in touch with -the Queen Victoria’s Rifles.</p> - -<p>By this time it was quite dark; and the left of the 56th Division was -so much in the air that the enemy was on all but one side of it. The -16th Division had fared badly.</p> - -<p>The right brigade of the 16th Division had not been able to advance at -all, and were scattered about in front of Guillemont. The left brigade -had secured a footing in Ginchy, and the 3rd Brigade of the Guards -Division was already on its way to relieve the whole of the 16th -Division. But the situation was far from good.</p> - -<p>The Kensingtons, who were in support to the 168th Brigade, had moved -forward to occupy the departure -<!--080.png--><a name="Page_63" id="Page_63"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 63]</span> -trenches, and the commanding officer, -seeing something of what had happened, promptly tried to strengthen -the flank of the 4th London Regt. and the Rangers. He disposed of his -battalion in forward positions with the object of protecting the left -flank. The London Scottish were sent for.</p> - -<p>Before 11 p.m. the two reserve battalions, the London Scottish and the -Queen’s Westminster Rifles, had arrived in the vicinity of Leuze Wood. -But the situation which faced General Hull at midnight was not a -comfortable one. His left was surrounded by Germans, and probably only -protected by the night, and his right was uncertain; there had been -reports of enemy snipers in Leuze Wood, and the enemy was certainly -pressing strongly with his bombers.</p> - -<p>Both brigades were ordered to attack again.</p> - -<p>Following events from the right of the line, the Queen’s Westminsters -were ordered to attack and capture the trenches south-east of the wood -before dawn. The night was pitch dark, and the Germans were pouring -shells into the wood. The exact bearing of the trench and its distance -from the wood were unknown to the battalion. It was impossible to -arrange an earlier hour than 7 a.m. for the attack.</p> - -<p>Patrols were sent out to get in touch with the enemy and reconnoitre -the ground, and while the battalion waited casualties mounted up. At -last came the dawn, but it brought no light; a thick mist had settled -over the country. At 7 a.m. the attack started.</p> - -<p>Two companies attacked. The right company went straight ahead, and the -left was told to swing to their left and take a trench beyond the -sunken road leading to Combles. The barrage was described -<!--081.png--><a name="Page_64" id="Page_64"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 64]</span> -as -ineffective, which was, maybe, due to the fog. At any rate, neither -company reached its objective. The enemy was lining his defences in -force and poured in a hot fire with rifles and machine guns.</p> - -<p>Later in the day a further attack was launched, but met with no -success, and the situation during the whole of the morning, -complicated by the thick mist, remained extremely uncertain.</p> - -<p>On the 168th Brigade front the London Scottish had not waited till -dawn for their attack. They formed up in six waves, in trenches dug by -the 5th Cheshires on the extreme left of the original line of -departure, and were ordered to thrust through, moving due north, and -fill the gap between the 4th London Regt. and the troops of the 16th -Division in Ginchy. It was hoped that all the enemy troops in square -20 would be cut off.</p> - -<p>A quarter of an hour after midnight, in pitch darkness, the battalion -started to advance. The first three waves progressed some 600 yards, -and then, failing to see any landmarks or recognise where they were, -they halted and sent out patrols. The last three waves were nowhere in -sight; they had lost direction and joined the 4th London Regt. and -Rangers on their right. But while the leading waves waited for their -patrols to get in touch with either friend or foe, they were attacked -by about a hundred Germans from their rear. The London Scottish -whipped round and scattered them at the point of the bayonet. The -enemy vanished, but left a considerable number of dead on the ground.</p> - -<p>The London Scottish were now completely lost, and so marched south to -pick up their position again.</p> - -<p>The attempted attack, however, was not repeated, -<!--082.png--><a name="Page_65" id="Page_65"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 65]</span> -but two and a half -companies were sent to the trench occupied by the 4th London Regt. and -the Rangers (Bully), where they attempted, by bombing, to reach point -141·7. Their efforts were not successful.</p> - -<p>Meanwhile the situation to the left of the 56th Division was no less -obscure. The 3rd Brigade of the Guards Division had been hurried up in -the dark to relieve the 16th Division. The guides of the left brigade -of the latter division led a relieving battalion into Ginchy, but had -only the haziest idea where their own troops were. Part of the 16th -Division on the east of the village was not relieved until midday on -the 10th. Ginchy was repeatedly attacked by the enemy, and no one knew -with any certainty what was happening.</p> - -<p>The right brigade of the 16th Division was not relieved for some time. -The guides to the relieving battalion lost themselves completely, and -a big gap existed between Ginchy and Guillemont. During the 10th this -gap was made good, but the whole of that day was occupied by repulsing -enemy attacks and trying to establish a definite line.</p> - -<p>On the 56th Division front there were repeated bombing attacks by the -enemy, and the S.O.S. was sent up several times. We may say that the -battalion reports of positions were only relatively accurate, and that -nothing was clear to Gen. Hull until the weather improved and air -reports could be made.</p> - -<p>Relief of the 168th Brigade by the 167th, and of the 169th by a -composite brigade of the 5th Division, took place, and it was then -ascertained that the London Scottish had, as related above, lost -direction in their attack and that no one was near the Ginchy—141·7 -road. The enemy still held the Quadrilateral -<!--083.png--><a name="Page_66" id="Page_66"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 66]</span> -in force, and the most -advanced troops of the 56th Division were some way from it, though -they were strongly established in Bully Trench; and the enemy were -still in square 20. But the 56th and Guards Divisions were now in -touch and a firm line was held along the Guillemont—Leuze Wood road, -and from the cross-roads to Ginchy, which was also firmly held.</p> - -<p>The Quadrilateral was the danger-point, and it defied all attempts to -take it by bombing, and successfully withstood the Corps heavy -artillery.</p> - -<p class="center">* * * * * * *</p> - -<p>Sir Douglas Haig sums up the situation at this point as follows:</p> - -<p class="blockquote">“... The French had made great progress on our right, - bringing their line forward to Louage Wood (just south of - Combles), Le Foret, Cléry-sur-Somme, all three inclusive. - The weak salient in the Allied line had therefore - disappeared, and we had gained the front required for - further operations.</p> - -<p class="blockquote">Still more importance, however, lay in the proof afforded in - the results described of the ability of our new armies not - only to rush the enemy’s strong defences—as had been - accomplished on the 1st and 14th July—but also to wear down - and break the power of resistance by a steady relentless - pressure, as had been done during the weeks of this fierce - and protracted struggle. As has already been recounted, the - preparations made for our assault on the 1st July had been - long and elaborate; but though the enemy knew that an attack - was coming, it would seem that he considered the troops - already on the spot, secure in their apparent impregnable - defences, would suffice to deal with it. The success of that - assault, combined with the vigour and determination with - which our troops pressed their advantage, and followed by the -<!--084.png--><a name="Page_67" id="Page_67"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 67]</span> - successful attack on the night of 14th July, all served to - awaken him to a fuller realisation of his danger. The great - depth of his system of fortifications, to which reference - has been made, gave him time to reorganise his defeated - troops, and to hurry up numerous fresh divisions and more - guns. Yet in spite of this he was still pushed back, - steadily and continuously. Trench after trench, and strong - point after strong point, were wrested from him. The great - majority of his repeated counter-attacks failed completely, - with heavy loss; while the few that achieved temporary - success purchased it dearly, and were soon thrown back from - the ground they had for the moment regained.</p> - -<p class="blockquote">The enemy had, it is true, delayed our advance considerably, - but the effort had cost him dear; and the comparative - collapse of his resistance during the last days of the - struggle justified the belief that in the long-run decisive - victory would lie with our troops, who had displayed such - fine fighting qualities and such indomitable endurance and - resolution.</p> - -<p class="blockquote">Practically the whole of the forward crest of the main - ridge, on a front of some 9,000 yards from Delville Wood to - the road above Mouquet Farm, was now in our hands, and with - it the advantage of observation over the slopes beyond. East - of Delville Wood, for a further 3,000 yards to Leuze Wood, - we were firmly established on the main ridge; while farther - east, across the Combles valley, the French were advancing - victoriously on our right. But though the centre of our line - was well placed, on our flanks there was still difficult - ground to be won.</p> - -<p class="blockquote">From Ginchy the crest of the high ground runs northwards for - 2,000 yards, and then eastward, in a long spur, for nearly - 4,000 yards. Near the eastern extremity of the spur stands - the village of Morval, commanding a wide field of view and - fire in every direction. At Leuze Wood my right was still - 2,000 -<!--085.png--><a name="Page_68" id="Page_68"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 68]</span> - yards from its objective at this village, and between - lay a broad and deep branch of the main Combles valley, - completely commanded by the Morval spur, and flanked, not - only from its head north-east of Ginchy, but also from the - high ground east of the Combles valley, which looks directly - into it.</p> - -<p class="blockquote">Up this high ground beyond the Combles valley the French - were working their way towards the objective at - Sailly-Saillisel, situated due east of Morval, and standing - at the same level. Between these two villages the ground - falls away to the head of the Combles valley, which runs - thence in a south-westerly direction. In the bottom of this - valley lies the small town of Combles, then well fortified - and strongly held, though dominated by my right at Leuze - Wood, and by the French left on the opposite heights. It had - been agreed by the French and myself that an assault on - Combles would not be necessary, as the place could be - rendered untenable by pressing forward along the ridges - above it on either side.</p> - -<p class="blockquote">The capture of Morval from the south side presented a very - difficult problem, while the capture of Sailly-Saillisel, at - that time some 3,000 yards to the north of the French left, - was in some respects even more difficult. The line of the - French advance was narrowed almost to a defile by the - extensive and strongly fortified wood of St. Pierre Vaast on - the one side, and on the other by the Combles valley, which, - with the branches running out of it and the slopes on either - side, is completely commanded, as has been pointed out, by - the heights bounding the valley on the east and west....</p> - -<p class="blockquote">The general plan of the combined Allied attack which was - opened on the 15th September was to pivot on the high ground - south of the Ancre and north of the Albert-Bapaume road, - while the Fourth Army devoted its whole effort to the - rearmost of the -<!--086.png--><a name="Page_69" id="Page_69"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 69]</span> - enemy’s original systems of defence between - Morval and Le Sars.</p> - -<p class="blockquote">Should our success in this direction warrant it, I made - arrangements to enable me to extend the left of the attack - to embrace the villages of Martinpuich and Courcelette. As - soon as our advance on this front had reached the Morval - line, the time would have arrived to bring forward my left - across the Thiepval Ridge. Meanwhile our Allies arranged to - continue the line of advance in close co-operation with me - from the Somme to the slopes above Combles; but directed - their main effort northwards against the villages of - Rancourt and Frigicourt, so as to complete the isolation of - Combles and open the way for their attack on - Sailly-Saillisel.”</p> - -<p>That much was hoped from the big attack, to take place on the 15th, -there can be no doubt. Brigades resting in the rear of the divisional -area could see quantities of cavalry still farther back. It suggested -big results.</p> - -<p>The limits of the Fourth Army attack were Combles Ravine and -Martinpuich, and it was to capture Morval, Les Bœufs, Gueudecourt, and -Flers. The Cavalry Corps was to have its head on Carnoy at 10 a.m., -and as soon as the four villages had been captured it would advance -and seize the high ground round Rocquigny, Villers-au-Flos, -Riencourt-les-Bapaume, and Bapaume.</p> - -<p>And it was the first battle in which Tanks were employed! [The battle -of Flers-Courcelette.]</p> - -<p>Even in the midst of the struggle round about the Quadrilateral a -steady bombardment had been going on, in preparation of a further -attack, since the 12th September. Day firing commenced at 6 a.m. and -went on until 6.30 p.m., when night firing started. -<!--087.png--><a name="Page_70" id="Page_70"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 70]</span> -During the night -bombardment lethal shells were used.</p> - -<p>On Z day the preliminary bombardment was to be the same as on former -days, with no increase until zero hour. When the intense fire, or -barrage, commenced, there were gaps left in it for the advance of -Tanks.</p> - -<p>For the <abbr title="fourteen">XIV</abbr> Corps there were, taking part in this attack, fifteen -Tanks. Nine were allotted to the Guards Division, three to the 6th -Division, and three to the 56th Division.</p> - -<p>The instructions given to Tanks were that they should start their -attack at a time which would enable them to reach the first objective -five minutes before the infantry. When they had cleared up the first -objective, a proportion of them was to push forward a short way, to -prearranged positions, and act as strong points. Departure from this -programme to assist any infantry held up by the enemy was left to the -discretion of the Tank Commander.</p> - -<p>On the second objective Tanks and infantry would advance together and -pace was to be regulated to “tank pace,” which was given as from 30 to -50 yards a minute. For the third and fourth objectives there would be -no creeping barrage, and Tanks would start in time to reach the -objectives before the infantry. In all cases their action was to be -arranged so as to crush wire and keep down hostile rifle and -machine-gun fire.</p> - -<p>Signals between Tank and infantry were arranged for by means of -coloured flags—a red flag meaning “out of action,” and a green flag -“am on objective.”</p> - -<p>The main task of the 56th Division was to clear Bouleaux Wood and form -a strong protective flank, -<!--088.png--><a name="Page_71" id="Page_71"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 71]</span> -covering all the lines of advance from -Combles and the valleys running from the north-east of Combles. The -167th Brigade were ordered to advance as far as the bit of Beef Trench -running through Bouleaux Wood, and to Middle Copse on the left of the -wood; a flank was also to be formed to the south-east and clear of the -wood. The 168th Brigade were to pass through the 167th and carry on -the advance by further bounds. The 169th Brigade were to hold the line -through Leuze Wood and the left of square 27, and to capture the -well-known trench (Loop Trench) to the south-east of the wood which -runs into the sunken road to Combles.</p> - -<p>One Tank was to advance on the right of Leuze Wood and assist the -169th Brigade to drive the enemy beyond the sunken road; it would then -establish itself in the Orchard as a strong point. This Tank was -called the Right Tank.</p> - -<p>Two Tanks were to work from the north of Leuze Wood along the left of -Bouleaux Wood and assist the 167th and 168th Brigades. These were -known as the Centre and Left Tanks, and were eventually to proceed to -a railway cutting north-east of Bouleaux Wood, which promised to be a -point of some difficulty.</p> - -<p>The Right Tank, having seen the 169th Brigade safely in its -objectives, was to move along the south-east of Bouleaux Wood and take -up a position on the cutting in the top end of square 22.</p> - -<p>In the <abbr title="fourteen">XIV</abbr> Corps area the Tanks were by no means a success. It is only -right to say that this was not the fault of their crews. Every excuse -must be allowed, for the Tank was not only a new invention, and, like -most new inventions, somewhat clumsy in the first design, but the -ground was absolutely vile. -<!--089.png--><a name="Page_72" id="Page_72"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 72]</span> -We have not alluded to the weather, which, -however, was a most important factor just now. The field of battle was -a field of mud; the resting area of the division was a field of mud; -the roads and tracks were rivers of mud; anyone can paint a picture of -the battle of the Somme provided he can paint miles of mud. And the -Army had simply blasted its way forward so that the shell-holes cut -one another in the mud.</p> - -<p>The scene round Leuze Wood, Guillemont, and Ginchy was a nightmare. -There had been little time to devote to the burial of the dead, and -corpses lay literally in heaps where the fighting had been severe. One -has only to imagine the results of repeated and obstinate attempts to -capture a position to realise what it must look like before it is -finally taken. An attack is launched and fails. Why does it fail? -Perhaps twenty men of a company get back to the trench from which they -attacked, and where are the others? On the ground. After five or six -attacks, each going out strong and coming back weak, each heralded by -a “barrage,” what will the place look like?</p> - -<p>We may mention here that the stretcher-bearers worked with eight men -to each stretcher, and each ambulance required six horses to drag it -through the mud.</p> - -<p>Just before 1 a.m. one of the Tanks allotted to the 56th Division -broke down on its way to the assembly position. This accident left the -division with one Tank working on either side of the Bouleaux Wood.</p> - -<p>The assault commenced at 6.20 a.m., and was followed by some of the -fiercest fighting in the history of the war. On the right of the -division the 2nd -<!--090.png--><a name="Page_73" id="Page_73"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 73]</span> -London Regt. succeeded, after some hours of gallant -and determined effort, in driving the enemy from the greater part of -Loop Trench, the enemy clinging to the junction with the sunken road. -The Tank, which was some time before reaching the sunken road, gave -valuable assistance, but was set on fire by a direct hit from a field -gun. The fight then turned to the sunken road and the trench on the -far side of it; but the enemy was strong and no less determined than -the men of the 169th Brigade. No further advance was gained in this -direction.</p> - -<p>On the left of the division the 167th Brigade attacked, with the 1st -London Regt. in line and the 7th Middlesex in support in Leuze Wood. -The 1st London Regt. captured that portion of Beef Trench outside -Bouleaux Wood and, together with the 7th Middlesex—who were to -advance through them, but both units became mixed—occupied Middle -Copse.</p> - -<p>So far as the 56th Division was concerned, the result of the day’s -fighting remained with the advance on the south-east of Leuze Wood as -far as the Combles road, and on the north-west of Bouleaux Wood to -Beef Trench and Middle Copse. The enemy retained the whole of Bouleaux -Wood and the trenches to the north of the Combles road, and the road -itself. But the action, certainly of the 167th Brigade, was influenced -by the fortunes of the divisions on the left.</p> - -<p>The centre of the horseshoe which had been formed from the east of -Ginchy to the cross-roads east of Guillemont, and then to the north of -Leuze Wood and along Bully Trench, and which was prevented by the -Quadrilateral from being a complete circle, can scarcely have been an -enviable place for the Germans who were there. As fighters, these -Germans deserve -<!--091.png--><a name="Page_74" id="Page_74"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 74]</span> -the highest praise. They were of the 21st and 7th -Bavarian Regts., of the 5th Bavarian Division. They were well wired -in, and had in the Quadrilateral deep dugouts in their front lines and -others in the ravine behind the position. But though we grant them a -perfect position and well-constructed defences, we must also admit -they performed a fine feat of arms. Those in the Quadrilateral had -resisted all efforts of the 56th and Guards Divisions to bomb them -out, and those in the horseshoe had repulsed the 16th Division and the -6th Division, which attacked them on the 13th. They had actually been -under severe artillery fire and subject to repeated assaults since the -9th September, and on the 15th, in spite of Tanks, of creeping -barrages, and of the heavy artillery, they remained immovable.</p> - -<p>The worst kind of luck had attended the Tanks of the 6th -Division—only one managed to reach the jumping-off line. This Tank -went on with the infantry for a short way, had all its periscopes shot -away, was pierced by most of the bullets which hit it (and a perfect -stream of fire was directed on it), and, the driver being badly -wounded, it retired through the ranks of the 6th Division. Had the -three Tanks attacked, something might have been done, anyhow with the -enemy to the south-west of the Quadrilateral; but with only one, the -barrage, arranged with gaps for three, became ineffective, and a -concentrated fire on the one Tank soon put it out of action—it also -drew attention to the infantry attack. Briefly, the 6th Division -failed.</p> - -<p>There was still a chance that the Guards would advance and render the -position of the Bavarians impossible. But this chance was not -realised. The -<!--092.png--><a name="Page_75" id="Page_75"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 75]</span> -Quadrilateral was a mass of machine guns, and, taking -the Guards Division in flank, inflicted fearful casualties. The first -objective was taken and held—on the left the second objective was -reached—but already the assaulting troops were being shot in the back -by the Bavarians, and no further progress was made. Tanks do not seem -to have helped in that direction either.</p> - -<p>With this state of affairs on the left of the 56th Division, the -attacking brigades were not likely to progress very far in the -building up of a flank facing Combles. Until the Quadrilateral was -taken the 167th Brigade could not possibly move. The 7th Middlesex had -lost a lot of men from machine guns firing into their left rear as -they advanced behind the assault of the 1st London Regt. And finally -their Tank had broken down and was being attacked by the enemy.</p> - -<p>By 11 a.m. the two reserve battalions of the 169th Brigade were moved -forward to be used as reinforcements before the 168th Brigade was sent -into action. Gen. Hull was determined to clear Bouleaux Wood, which -had resisted so long. But at 1.30 p.m. the Corps Commander, Lord -Cavan, telephoned him that the Guards had not made as much progress as -he had thought, and that the operation against Bouleaux Wood would not -be practicable. But before this order could reach them the 8th -Middlesex made a further attempt to get into the wood and failed. All -attention was then centred on the Quadrilateral, which was holding up -the advance of no less than three divisions.</p> - -<p>The division was ordered to consolidate where it stood, but during the -night bombing attacks were carried out by the 169th Brigade on the -sunken road -<!--093.png--><a name="Page_76" id="Page_76"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 76]</span> -and end of Loop Trench, and by the 167th Brigade on the -trench in Bouleaux Wood—neither met with success.</p> - -<p>On the 16th the 6th Division again attacked the Quadrilateral and -failed, but they were now well up to the stronghold. The Guards -Division had also crept in from the north.</p> - -<p>The 17th September was devoted to preparations for attacking on the -18th. The 169th Brigade made a trench parallel to the sunken road to -Combles, and also managed to occupy some 200 yards more frontage along -the road. Many dead Germans of the 26th Regiment were found.</p> - -<p>The attack on the 18th was in conjunction with the 6th Division. The -task of the 56th Division was to capture the trench on the north of -the sunken road to Combles, and the south-west face of Bouleaux Wood, -to a point beyond Beef Trench, and from there through the wood to -Middle Copse, where touch would be obtained with the 6th Division, who -were making another effort to clear the Quadrilateral. The attacking -brigades of the latter division declined the aid of Tanks on this -occasion.</p> - -<p>The weather was appalling. The state of the ground was rather worse -than what is so frequently called a quagmire—troops could not get -along.</p> - -<p>The 167th Brigade had lost heavily, and was not in sufficient strength -to attack, so the London Scottish were attached to that brigade. But -the battalion was unable to reach the assaulting line.</p> - -<p>Zero hour was 5.50 a.m., and on the right the 169th Brigade, with the -Queen’s Westminster Rifles and the London Rifle Brigade attacking, -failed to cross the fatal sunken road, which was not surprising, -<!--094.png--><a name="Page_77" id="Page_77"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 77]</span> -as -the mud by itself was an almost perfect obstacle from the German point -of view. While on the left the London Scottish failure to reach the -assembly trench caused the attack to be abandoned.</p> - -<p>But the 6th Division was successful, and the Quadrilateral, which gave -such strong support to the enemy troops holding Bouleaux Wood, was -captured. The news was received by everyone with a sigh of relief.</p> - -<p>Of the fighting as a whole on the 15th September and subsequent days -Sir Douglas Haig reported:</p> - -<p class="blockquote">“The advance met with immediate success on almost the whole - of the front attacked. At 8.40 a.m. our Tanks were seen - entering Flers, followed by a large number of troops. - Fighting continued in Flers for some time, but by 10 a.m. - our troops had reached the north of the village, and by - midday had occupied the enemy’s trenches for some distance - beyond. On our right our line was advanced to within - assaulting distance of the strong line of defence running - before Morval, Les Bœufs, and Gueudecourt, and on our left - High Wood was at last carried after many hours of very - severe fighting, reflecting great credit on the attacking - battalions. Our success made it possible to carry out during - the afternoon that part of the plan which provided for the - capture of Martinpuich and Courcelette, and by the end of - the day both these villages were in our hands. On the 18th - September the work of this day was completed by the capture - of the Quadrilateral, an enemy stronghold which had hitherto - blocked our progress towards Morval.</p> - -<p class="blockquote">The result of the fighting on the 15th September and the - following days was a gain more considerable than any which - had attended our arms in the course of a single operation - since the commencement of the offensive. In the course of - one day’s fighting we had -<!--095.png--><a name="Page_78" id="Page_78"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 78]</span> - broken through two of the - enemy’s main defensive systems, and had advanced on a front - of over six miles to an average depth of a mile. In the - course of this advance we had taken three villages, each - powerfully organised for prolonged resistance.... The total - number of prisoners taken by us in these operations amounted - to over 4,000, including 127 officers.”</p> - -<p>The 168th Brigade, on the left of the divisional front, was -responsible for holding Middle Copse. On the two nights of the 19th -and 20th September the London Scottish provided covering parties for -the 5th Cheshire Regt., who connected Beef Trench with Middle Copse, -and carried on two lines of trench in a north-easterly direction as -far as the rail or tram line; companies of these pioneers also -connected the Copse with the south-east side of the Quadrilateral. -This work resulted in a firm line some 900 yards in length facing -Bouleaux Wood, and gradually working round Combles.</p> - -<p>Prisoners captured by the London Scottish while covering the digging -parties were from the 2nd Battalion, 235th Regiment, Reserve 51st -Division.</p> - -<p>The right wing of the British Army had not yet reached the line -desired by Sir Douglas Haig. Morval, Les Bœufs, and Gueudecourt were -still in the hands of the enemy, and on the right Combles still held -out at the junction of the Allied Armies. An Allied attack from the -Somme to Martinpuich was arranged for the 23rd September, but the -weather was so bad that it had to be postponed until the 25th. [The -battle of Morval.]</p> - -<div class="figcenter" style="width: 500px"> - <a name="illo2"></a> - <img src="images/i_2ginchy.jpg" - width="100%" height="auto" - alt="Illustration: Ginchy and Morval" - /> - <p class="caption"><span class="sc u">2. Ginchy & Morval.</span></p> - <p class="caption mt1"><span class="sc u">The Battles on the 9<sup>th</sup>, 15<sup>th</sup>, & 25<sup>th</sup>, Sep<sup>r</sup>.</span></p> -</div> - -<p>The 168th Brigade were relieved by the 167th, and obtained a little -rest from the night of the 22nd to -<!--096.png--> -<!--097.png--> -<!--098.png--><a name="Page_79" id="Page_79"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 79]</span> -the night of the 24th. The battle -front of the division was then the 169th Brigade on the right between -Leuze Wood and Combles, the 167th Brigade in Beef and Bully Trenches, -and the 168th Brigade in the new trenches ready to attack Bouleaux -Wood from the north-west, or rather to envelop it, as the wood was not -to be entered.</p> - -<p>The main task of the 56th Division was to continue building up the -flank, to neutralise the German detachments in Bouleaux Wood, and to -get touch with the 5th Division on the left. The actual objectives of -the 168th Brigade were some trenches between the north-east of the -wood and the tram-line, also the bank and cutting of the tram-line. -The 167th Brigade were to help by directing machine-gun and -trench-mortar fire on the wood, and the 169th Brigade by firing on the -north and north-east exits of Combles.</p> - -<p>The whole Corps attacked at 12.35 p.m., and the German resistance -crumbled away.</p> - -<p>The 4th London Regt. on the right and the London Scottish on the left -advanced under “a most efficient enfilade artillery barrage.” All -objectives were reached. The 4th London Regt. killed a large number of -Huns in shell-holes round the north end of the wood, and suffered -themselves somewhat from enemy snipers in the southern part of the -wood. The London Scottish had some trouble and quite a stiff fight to -clear the railway embankment, during which the left company suffered -severely. But four machine guns were captured there and eighty -prisoners. These two battalions overran their objectives and curled -round the end of Bouleaux Wood.</p> - -<p>The 5th, 6th, and Guards Divisions on the left -<!--099.png--><a name="Page_80" id="Page_80"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 80]</span> -swept through all their -objectives—Morval and Les Bœufs were captured.</p> - -<p>For some time the London Scottish were out of touch with the 5th -Division, which had swerved too far to the right, but the complete -success of the operations enabled the 56th Division to improve the -position round Combles. By three o’clock in the afternoon the 4th -London Regt. had two companies in the north end of Bouleaux Wood, and -both the attacking battalions of the 168th Brigade had pushed out -patrols towards Combles. Artillery observation officers reported to -Gen. Hull that the enemy could be seen hurrying, in small parties, -from Combles in an easterly direction.</p> - -<p>A steady pressure was kept on the Germans in Bouleaux Wood. The centre -of resistance here was round the derelict Tank on the left edge of the -wood. The 1st London Regt. was on one side of the Tank and the enemy -on the other. On the right the London Rifle Brigade and the Queen -Victoria’s Rifles gave the enemy no rest in the sunken road and the -trench leading to Combles.</p> - -<p>By midnight the 168th Brigade had posts east of Combles, the 167th -Brigade had cleared the lower end of Bouleaux Wood and got behind the -Tank, and the 169th Brigade had captured all of the sunken road trench -and the Combles trench. And at dawn an officer’s patrol of the 168th -Brigade had met a French patrol on the east of Combles. The London -Rifle Brigade had already entered the town at 3.30 a.m. and secured -touch with the French there.</p> - -<p>The line desired by Sir Douglas Haig had been captured and there was a -momentary pause. The line held by the 56th Division at midday on the -26th -<!--100.png--><a name="Page_81" id="Page_81"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 81]</span> -was some 1,500 yards to the east of Combles. The 167th Brigade -were in the front line and in touch with the 5th Division and the -French; the 168th Brigade were a short distance in rear, round about -the railway cuttings; and the 169th Brigade were half in Combles and -half to the west of it. The Germans were some distance away, holding -what was known as Mutton Trench in force, and it was arranged that the -168th Brigade should attack with the assistance of five Tanks. But the -Tanks failed to put in an appearance, and after waiting twenty-four -hours, the Rangers were told that the attack was cancelled.</p> - -<p>Meanwhile our Allies on the right had captured Frigicourt and had the -hard nut of Sailly-Saillisel to crack. To assist them in securing this -very important position, Sir Douglas Haig agreed to hand over the line -as far as Morval, so on the 28th the division was relieved and marched -for a few days’ rest to the neighbourhood of Ville-sur-Ancre and -Meaulte.</p> - -<p class="center">* * * * * * *</p> - -<p>The battle, however, still raged. Sir Douglas Haig was pushing the -enemy hard:</p> - -<p class="blockquote">“The success of the Fourth Army had now brought our advance - to a stage at which I judged it advisable that Thiepval - should be taken, in order to bring our left flank into line - and establish it on the main ridge above that village, the - possession of which would be of considerable value in future - operations.</p> - -<p class="blockquote">Accordingly, at 12.25 p.m. on the 26th September, before the - enemy had been given time to recover from the blow struck by - the Fourth Army, a general attack was launched against - Thiepval and the Thiepval Ridge.... The attack was a - brilliant success. On the right our troops reached the - system of enemy trenches which formed their objective - without great -<!--101.png--><a name="Page_82" id="Page_82"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 82]</span> - difficulty. In Thiepval and the strong works - to the north of it the enemy’s resistance was more - desperate.... On the left of the attack fierce fighting, in - which Tanks again gave valuable assistance to our troops, - continued in Thiepval during the day and the following - night, but by 8.30 a.m. on the 27th September the whole of - the village of Thiepval was in our hands.”</p> - -<p>The rest for the division, however, was not for very long. Reinforced, -though hardly refreshed, the brigades began to move back to the line. -On the 29th September the 167th Brigade was in Trones Wood, west of -Guillemont, and the 169th in a camp near by. On the last night of -September the latter brigade took over the line from the 6th Division, -with the right in touch with the French, while the 167th relieved the -2nd Guards Brigade on the left.</p> - -<p>The position taken over was outside Les Bœufs, in the trenches called -Foggy and Windy. Battalions in line from the right were the Queen’s -Westminsters, Queen Victoria’s, 1st Londons, and the 7th Middlesex. -The orders were that they should send out patrols and occupy a line of -posts over the crest of the ridge—the 169th Brigade posts A, B, C, D, -and the 167th Brigade E, F, G, H, and K.</p> - -<p>On October 2nd the 167th Brigade reported having joined up a line of -posts, but we cannot make the map-readings given agree with what is -known of positions in subsequent events. The country was more than -ever devoid of landmarks—it was just a wide expanse of shell-holes in -a dark brown, almost black, kind of earth—and no one knew either -their own position or those of the enemy within a few hundred yards; -and the few hundred yards were -<!--102.png--><a name="Page_83" id="Page_83"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 83]</span> -a matter of importance. Anyhow, the -line was not the line of posts, but probably near the line we have -sketched on the left of 34. Touch was obtained with the 20th Division -on the left.</p> - -<p>Gen. Hull was now instructed that the Fourth Army would renew the -attack on the 5th October, and that the <abbr title="fourteen">XIV</abbr> Corps would establish -itself on a line from which the main Transloy defences could be -attacked at a later date. The 56th Division would capture Hazy, -Dewdrop, Spectrum, and part of Rainbow, and establish a line along the -west crest of the ridge; the Division would then, as a second phase of -the attack, establish a line on the forward slope of the ridge from -which Le Transloy could be seen. The General ordered that the 169th -Brigade should attack on the right, and the 167th Brigade on the left. -[The battle of the Transloy Ridges, 1st-18th October.]</p> - -<p>The weather became steadily worse and, though water is supposed to run -downhill and the division was on the slope of a hill, the troops might -just as well have been in the middle of a pond. No one could move, and -the operations were postponed for forty-eight hours.</p> - -<p>Assembly trenches were dug; and patrols reported the enemy some 200 -yards on the farther side of the ridge. The objectives for the attack -were well beyond the line of posts it had been hoped to occupy with -patrols, and the 2/1st London and 1/1st Edinburgh Field Companies -R.E., with two companies of the 5th Cheshire Regt., were given to the -two brigades to consolidate what was gained.</p> - -<p>The assault took place at 1.45 p.m. on the 7th October, and on the -left was fairly successful. The -<!--103.png--><a name="Page_84" id="Page_84"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 84]</span> -7th Middlesex, on the extreme left, -and the left company of the 1st London Regt. drove the enemy out of -the northern half of Spectrum and part of Rainbow, where they joined -with the 20th Division. The right company of the 1st Londons, however, -was held up by machine-gun fire from Dewdrop and failed to reach that -end of Spectrum.</p> - -<p>The 168th Brigade fared badly on the right. Three battalions attacked -in line—the London Scottish, the 4th London Regt., and the Rangers. -Two machine guns were in the front line, for covering fire, and four -others west of Les Bœufs, for indirect covering fire; there were also -six Stokes mortars in Burnaby to put a barrage on Dewdrop. In some -respects the attack was peculiar. As was so often the case, the -direction of the attack was at an angle to our front, and the London -Scottish, starting the assault from the right at 1.45 p.m., were -followed by the 4th London Regt. at 1.47 and the Rangers at 1.49 p.m.; -this was calculated to bring the three battalions into line by the -time Dewdrop and the gun-pits were reached.</p> - -<p>The leading company of the Rangers, on the left, was knocked out, -before it had gone fifty yards, by machine guns in the northern end of -Dewdrop, and the reserve companies of the battalion came under a very -heavy barrage and did not succeed in carrying forward the attack. The -remnants of this battalion lay out in shell-holes until dusk, when -they returned to the original line.</p> - -<p>The 4th London Regt., in the centre, met with much the same fate. The -left company was annihilated, and the right company, managing to reach -a patch of dead ground, lay down unable to move. The rear waves were -met with intense artillery fire, but -<!--104.png--><a name="Page_85" id="Page_85"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 85]</span> -advanced most gallantly to the -line of the leading troops. From the dead ground attempts were made to -outflank the gun-pits, from which the hostile machine-gun fire was -directed, and small parties managed to work well round to the south.</p> - -<p>The London Scottish advanced well for about 400 yards, and occupied -the south gun-pits and the southern end of Hazy. The enemy at once -attempted a counter-attack from the northern end, but this was driven -off. But it was found that a wide gap existed between the right of the -battalion and the French, who had attacked east instead of north-east, -and small parties of the London Scottish were successively pushed out -to fill the gap and get touch. At six o’clock they had succeeded in -establishing a thin but continuous line in touch with our Allies. But -the situation was a very difficult one. The enemy had received -reinforcements in Hazy and the north gun-pits—from all appearances -fresh troops—and both flanks of the London Scottish were in the air -and exposed to the immediate presence of the enemy.</p> - -<p>At 8.30 p.m. the German counter-attack developed, and, though heavy -casualties were inflicted on the enemy, he succeeded in forcing the -London Scottish and the right of the 4th London Regt., which was -creeping round the gun-pits, to retire to our original line.</p> - -<p>The division, at nightfall, was left with a net gain of part of -Spectrum and Rainbow. Gen. Hull then ordered a renewal of the attack -on the next day, and sent up the London Rifle Brigade and the Queen -Victoria’s Rifles to the 168th Brigade, and the Queen’s Westminster -Rifles to the 167th Brigade.</p> - -<p>The assault took place at 3.30 p.m. on the 8th -<!--105.png--><a name="Page_86" id="Page_86"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 86]</span> -October, and almost at -once Brig.-Gen. Freeth reported that the barrage was very feeble.</p> - -<p>On the 168th Brigade front the attack was arranged this time so that -it started simultaneously all along the line. The London Rifle Brigade -on the right advanced steadily for about 500 yards, and again gained a -foothold in Hazy. But the experience of the previous day was repeated. -The northern gun-pits, with their garrison of machine-gunners, was -held by the enemy, who poured a devastating fire into the left flank -of the four advancing waves, and on this occasion there was fire from -the right flank as well; the attack was in the main held up about -fifty yards from Hazy, where a shell-hole line was established. The -reserve company was sent forward to fill the gap which existed, as on -the first attack, between us and the French.</p> - -<p>The Queen Victoria’s Rifles and the 3rd London Regt., on the 167th -Brigade front, failed to make any appreciable advance. Both Dewdrop -and the south of Spectrum resting on the sunken road were strongly -garrisoned, and the machine-gun fire was withering. At 10.30 p.m. all -troops were withdrawn to the original line.</p> - -<p>The position on the morning of the 9th was that we held Spectrum to -the bend in the trench just south of the sunken road, and had a strong -party of the Queen’s Westminsters in the sunken road. On the remainder -of the front there had been no advance.</p> - -<div class="figcenter" style="width: 500px"> - <a name="illo3"></a> - <img src="images/i_3transloy.jpg" - width="100%" height="auto" - alt="Illustration: The Transloy Ridge" - /> - <p class="caption"><span class="sc u">3. The Transloy Ridge.</span></p> -</div> - -<p>On these two days 84 prisoners of the 31st and 84th Reserve Infantry -Regts., 18th Division, and two machine guns were captured. The great -difficulty experienced was to know where troops were situated. The -weather was bad, and the effort of -<!--106.png--> -<!--107.png--> -<!--108.png--><a name="Page_87" id="Page_87"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 87]</span> -attacking was in itself a gigantic -one, but that effort had been made, and seemed to hang on the brink of -success, and if the artillery could have helped a little more would -have been entirely satisfactory. The artillery, however, were greatly -handicapped. Maps could not tell them where the new enemy trenches -were, and aeroplanes were unable to take photographs. As to being -helped by roads, though these were clearly marked on the map, they had -been almost completely blown away by shell fire on the ground and were -by no means easy to distinguish. It was a vile country.</p> - -<p>The latter days of the Somme battle were even worse for the R.A.M.C. -Wounded men had to be carried to Ginchy and frequently from there to -Montauban. The medical branch of the division never experienced a -harder time than that on the Somme.</p> - -<p>On the night of the 9th October the 56th Division was relieved by the -4th Division. The battles of the Somme were practically over. Sir -Douglas Haig wanted to push on in the direction of Le Transloy:</p> - -<p class="blockquote">“On our eastern flank ... it was important to gain ground. - Here the enemy still possessed a strong system of trenches - covering the villages of Transloy and Beaulencourt and the - town of Bapaume; but although he was digging with feverish - haste, he had not been able to create any very formidable - defences behind this line. In this direction, in fact, we - had at last reached a stage at which a successful attack - might reasonably be expected to yield much greater results - than anything we had yet attained. The resistance of the - troops opposed to us had seriously weakened in the course of - our recent operations, and there was no reason to suppose - that the effort required would not be within our powers.</p> - -<p class="blockquote"><!--109.png--><a name="Page_88" id="Page_88"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 88]</span> - This last completed system of defence, before Le Transloy, - was flanked to the south by the enemy’s position at - Sailly-Saillisel and screened to the west by the spur lying - between Le Transloy and Les Bœufs. A necessary preliminary, - therefore, to an assault upon it was to secure the spur and - the Sailly-Saillisel heights. Possession of the high ground - at this latter village would at once give us far better - command over the ground to the north and the north-west, - secure the flank of our operations towards Transloy, and - deprive the enemy of observation over the Allied - communications in the Combles valley. In view of the enemy’s - efforts to construct new systems of defence behind the Le - Transloy line, it was desirable to lose no time in dealing - with the situation.</p> - -<p class="blockquote">Unfortunately, at this juncture very unfavourable weather - set in, and continued with scarcely a break during the - remainder of October and the early part of November. Poor - visibility seriously interfered with the work of our - artillery, and constant rain turned the mass of hastily-dug - trenches for which we were fighting into channels of deep - mud. The country roads, broken by countless shell craters, - that cross the deep stretch of ground we had lately won, - rapidly became almost impassable, making the supply of food, - stores, and ammunition a serious problem. These conditions - multiplied the difficulties of attack to such an extent that - it was found impossible to exploit the situation with the - rapidity necessary to enable us to reap the full benefits of - the advantages we had gained.”</p> - -<p>Two attacks were, indeed, made to assist the French in their -operations against the important village of Sailly-Saillisel, which -fell to them on the 18th of the month, but by that time the weather -had become so bad, and the delay had been so long, that the decisive -moment had passed. [The short -<!--110.png--><a name="Page_89" id="Page_89"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 89]</span> -and successful battle of the Ancre was -fought on the 13-18th November, bringing the total number of 1916 -Somme battles up to twelve.]</p> - -<p class="center">* * * * * * *</p> - -<p>Lieut.-Col. A. D. Bayliffe, who commanded the 168th Brigade through -this great battle, wrote at the time an interesting paper which he -heads: “Lessons to be deducted from the Operations on the Somme.” -Written with the incidents and conditions fresh on his mind, and for -future guidance, it is not a criticism of the actions fought, but from -his recommendations we may gather something of the difficulties which -had to be faced and overcome. We give only some striking extracts:</p> - -<p class="blockquote">“The results of the operations carried out by this brigade - bear out more than ever the necessity for an assault being - made direct at the objective. Failures, or partial failures, - are attributable to present-day troops being asked to - perform a complicated manœuvre such as a wheel or change of - direction during an assault.</p> - -<p class="blockquote">The objectives allotted should be as far as possible - definite, and should be chosen on the ground so that - well-defined landmarks may be included. With the heavy - casualties which occur among the officers, and considering - the partially-trained state of N.C.O.s and men, it is seldom - any use leaving the site of the objective to the judgment of - the assaulting troops.</p> - -<p class="blockquote">In order to comply with this suggestion, it is essential - that a proper scheme of assembly trenches should be thought - out, and proper time given for their construction even in - the rapid advances which have been taking place.</p> - -<p class="blockquote">In this connection it should be remembered that troops - engaged in holding the line cannot be expected -<!--111.png--><a name="Page_90" id="Page_90"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 90]</span> - to do much - digging work. Also that, without further training, - reinforcement officers are incapable of finding their way - over unknown ground, even with good maps, and that they - cannot tape out trenches and extend working parties. It is - therefore necessary to use pioneers very largely for the - digging of assembly trenches if this essential work is to be - well done.</p> - -<p class="blockquote">Attacks delivered on too broad a front with too little - weight fail even against what appears to be inferior hostile - defences. The reason is that assaulting troops edge away - from the source of hostile fire, and when the lines of men - are too thin, they move forward through the gaps in the - hostile defences without dealing with them.</p> - -<p class="blockquote">It appears that assaults, to be successful, should never be - delivered with less than four waves even against near - objectives. One hostile machine gun may completely break up - the first wave or two; if there are two or more waves in - rear they may successfully carry on the assault.</p> - -<p class="blockquote">It is desirable to have Battalion Headquarters as far - forward as possible, right up in the front assembly trenches - if possible, before an attack. But it is no good placing - them there unless there is some suitable shelter (however - small), and unless time is available to lay communication - lines forward. Brigade Headquarters should also be right - forward, provided there is some accommodation. This - facilitates personal reconnaissance and liaison.</p> - -<p class="blockquote">If the efficiency of a brigade is to be maintained as a - fighting unit through a period of several weeks of active - operations, a far larger proportion of officers and men - should be left back than is customary. The average - reinforcement officer is quite useless when his first - appearance on service is in the middle of a modern battle. I - would suggest that a battalion should go into action with - from 12 to 16 officers only, and that 4 to 8 more should be - kept about the line of Brigade -<!--112.png--><a name="Page_91" id="Page_91"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 91]</span> - Headquarters, and the remainder - to be at the transport lines. N.C.O.s should be dealt with - in the same proportion.</p> - -<p class="blockquote">It is well borne out through these operations that, if the - artillery barrage is good and the infantry advance close to - it, they will probably reach their objective without heavy - loss. Usually the standing barrage was put up behind the - objective, and it is thought that the standing barrage - should be on the objective until the creeping barrage - coincides with it and then both move together to their next - standing line.</p> - -<p class="blockquote">On one occasion (7th October) the three battalions of - infantry on this brigade front had to advance at different - times; the consequence was that the last to move had to face - a very heavy barrage in addition to machine-gun fire. It is - thought that the infantry should always move at zero, even - if they are not in line with each other, and that the - barrage line should be made to conform with the line of the - assaulting infantry.</p> - -<p class="blockquote">As usual there was a complete lack of touch throughout the - operations with the heavy artillery. It is thought that the - artillery group system should be extended so as to include - some heavy artillery.</p> - -<p class="blockquote">It is suggested that a large supply of signboards, painted - white or luminous, should be prepared for active operations, - and also a supply of trench bridges ... reliefs were often - much complicated and delayed by the lack of good tracks.</p> - -<p class="blockquote">The value of the Stokes mortars in the more open fighting we - have been having is very doubtful. The results achieved have - never been commensurate with the great labour involved in - getting the guns and ammunition forward. The trench mortar, - from an administrative point of view, is more trouble than - any other unit when frequent moves and reliefs occur, as it - is not self-contained, and much work and trouble is involved - at very busy moments in devising how its stores are to be - moved.</p> - -<p class="blockquote"><!--113.png--><a name="Page_92" id="Page_92"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 92]</span> - The Tanks allotted to co-operate with this brigade were not - found to be of any use at all. It is thought that Tanks - require select crews of great determination, and officers in - charge who have more experience and knowledge of the methods - of infantry and artillery in war. If the speed of the Tanks - could be increased, it would add very greatly to their - value.”</p> - -<p>The difficulties indicated in this paper were those which faced the -actual fighting men. We have already mentioned the zigzag line, and -the reader will readily appreciate how the attempt to form a front, -moving in a given direction after the men had left the trenches, -frequently led to confusion and loss of direction. Col. Bayliffe’s -statement that men will edge away from the source of fire does not -necessarily contravert our assertion that they are drawn towards the -sound of fire, which must be read in conjunction with the admitted -uncertainty of the exact position of an objective. During an attack no -officer or N.C.O. can control more than half a dozen men, and the more -usual number is two. On this basis the proportion of officers and -N.C.O.s is totally inadequate, and it follows that success depends -largely on the men themselves. The assaulting troops will fall -naturally under two heads: leaders and followers. The leaders are the -men of greater initiative, and in moments of uncertainty, when doubt -of their direction seizes them, when no trench is visible, they turn -towards the sound of the enemy—the place where the firing comes from. -It is one of the factors to be dealt with in keeping direction. A line -which has become thin through casualties will, no doubt, swerve from a -strongly-held post.</p> - -<p>And what a lot is covered by the paragraph on -<!--114.png--><a name="Page_93" id="Page_93"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 93]</span> -digging! The physical -effort required to go through a battle like the Somme was colossal. -Relief meant only relief from the actual front line, not relief from -open trenches, from wet, from mud, from cold, or even from severe -casualties; it was merely a case of moving a short way back to other -trenches. After days of this sort of life an assault was a most -exhausting experience and, if successful, was not finished with the -written message, “We are on our objective.” Exhausted men were called -upon to dig new trenches at once, under fierce fire, and the trenches -dug, they waited for the counter-attack which, on the Somme, -inevitably followed. Perhaps the counter-attack succeeded and the men -were driven back to their original line—and still there was no rest.</p> - -<p>Imagine the condition of mind of the surviving officers and men of a -company when they were reinforced by troops straight from home, with -no experience of modern or indeed any other form of fighting. The -reinforcements came almost as an added anxiety to the old men. And how -could the new arrivals be expected to appreciate the advantage of -following close on our own barrage, in itself a doubt-provoking thing? -There was nothing easy for the regimental officer or for his men; they -fought the enemy, the earth, and the sky.</p> - -<p>We give the gallant colonel’s remarks on Tanks as an interesting light -on the early proceedings of the new engines of war. We are well aware -that they will provoke a smile from some readers, but they are none -the less justifiable. Tanks accomplished very little on this part of -the battle front. To the infantry they seemed only to attract the -attention of the enemy with the appalling noise they made and the -<!--115.png--><a name="Page_94" id="Page_94"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 94]</span> -very definite target they afforded, and then they broke down! Col. -Bayliffe’s opinion, which does not absolutely condemn the use of -Tanks, was shared by two Brigadier-Generals of the 16th Division, and -most of the infantry in less exalted positions. That they afterwards -accomplished the object of their inventors is beside the point.</p> - -<p>Heaven forbid that we should appear to offer excuses for the 56th -Division—none are needed. But we find it impossible to give a true -picture of the conditions under which men fought, and by placing a few -of the difficulties before the reader, hope to enable him to -appreciate the truly great fighting qualities of these London men. -Success conjures up to the mind a picture of swift movement, and such -successes were gained during the war—but not on the Somme. The enemy -was strong and determined, and fought to the last. Gen. Falkenhayn, -who was the instigator of the Verdun offensive, seems to rather -pooh-pooh the battle of the Somme, and give the impression that it had -little effect on the Central Powers; but as he was dismissed at the -end of August, one might deduce that other people did not share his -views. Hindenburg and Ludendorff, on the other hand, wag their heads -gravely over the whole business. The Germans were being badly -battered, and were fighting most desperately to arrest disaster. And -so, in recording the exploits of the 56th Division, we have to repeat -somewhat monotonously the account of attacks being continually -delivered on the same trench or point.</p> - -<p>The trouble in a battle of this sort is to reconcile the two points of -view: that of the Higher Command and that of the infantry. For the -infantry there was -<!--116.png--><a name="Page_95" id="Page_95"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 95]</span> -no break in the fighting—if they did not assault -“over the top,” they were bombing the enemy out of a trench or being -bombed out themselves. And it is not too easy to decide what -particular trenches were held at any one moment. The position in Loop -Trench, for instance, was continually changing. Combles Trench, the -sunken road, and the southern end of Bouleaux Wood were points of -continual struggle. The enemy exerted his full pressure on the 56th -Division. But for the Higher Command this month of fighting divides -itself into five attacks!</p> - -<p>The plan on this part of the front was to surround Combles by joining -the French on the far side. The junction of two armies of different -nationalities might always be considered a point of weakness, and the -movement itself was one of which the enemy could take advantage. Lord -Cavan explains the position very clearly with a small rough sketch:</p> - -<p class="blockquote">“The plan to take Combles was like this:</p> - -<div class="figcenter" style="width: 500px"> - <img src="images/i_sketch.jpg" - width="50%" height="auto" - alt="Illustration: Sketch of plan to take Combles" - title="Sketch of plan to take Combles" - /> -</div> - -<p class="blockquote">Therefore during the advance the protection of my flank from - a possible counter-stroke down the -<!--117.png--><a name="Page_96" id="Page_96"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 96]</span> - arrow was most important. - This protection from Leuze Wood to Morval was splendidly and - gloriously afforded. Further, in the actual attack on Morval - and Les Bœufs this protecting flank had to be advanced to - keep pace with the attack. The key of this was the capture - of a trench about X-X. This was captured and held, and the - complete success of the battle was assured. I had every - confidence in Hull and his men, tired though they were, and - this confidence was more than justified.”</p> - -<p>This grim, determined, and desperate struggle reveals qualities in the -London troops which, though they existed, would not in a more -spectacular success have been so clearly demonstrated. It requires -good men to attack again and again until their object is gained, and -when these attacks are launched against such splendidly trained -soldiers as the Germans, one can only marvel that the thing was ever -done, and applaud the steadfast courage, the endurance of body and -spirit, which enabled the men to do it.</p> - -<p>True, the battles of the Somme ended with both sides being stuck in -the mud—an inglorious ending to so much heroism—and the final, and -perhaps fatal, stroke was snatched from our grasp by the weather; but -those who came through the battle may now consider dispassionately -what it was they had accomplished.</p> - -<p>The Central Powers (we must always remember that we fought more than -the strength of Germany) had decided, as we know, to bleed France -white on the field of Verdun. They were also pressing Italy hard and -had gained important successes. The Entente Powers replied first with -Brussiloff’s attack, and secondly with the Franco-British offensive on -the -<!--118.png--><a name="Page_97" id="Page_97"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 97]</span> -Somme. Falkenhayn declares that the most dangerous moment of -the Russian offensive had been passed before the first shot of the -battle of the Somme had been fired. He also maintains that the -Austrian loss of the right bank of the Isonzo had no connection with -the Somme; that the Germans would not in any case have sent troops to -help their ally in Italy. As for Verdun, he deals with it in a -somewhat unsatisfactory paragraph:</p> - -<p class="blockquote">“The only tangible gain, then, of this battle to the enemy - remains in its effect on the situation on the Western Front. - As a matter of course, an expenditure of strength such as - the enemy favoured demanded the use of corresponding forces - for the defence. The operations in the Meuse area were not - yet, however, immediately affected. On the 11th July we were - still able, by a strong thrust, to advance our line on the - east bank.... After this it was the tension of the whole - situation, and especially the necessity to husband our - <i lang="fr">matériel</i> and ammunition, which necessitated the - abandonment of any big German offensive operations on the - Meuse. The headquarters of the Crown Prince’s Army Group - were instructed to carry on the offensive calmly and - according to plan, so as to give the enemy no good reason - for concluding that he could hope for its cessation. This, - too, was quite successful, for the French were unable to - bring up reinforcements from the Meuse to the Somme front - until September, when, following on the change of Chief of - the General Staff, the ‘Verdun-offensive’ had been - completely abandoned.”</p> - -<p>The last sentence is, of course, the bitter pill for Falkenhayn. It is -perhaps only natural that he would seek to justify his policy, and -persist that he was right and would have succeeded had he been left -<!--119.png--><a name="Page_98" id="Page_98"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 98]</span> -alone. Hindenburg’s memoirs give one a somewhat different impression:</p> - -<p class="blockquote">“Very soon after I took over my new post I found myself - compelled by the general situation to ask His Majesty the - Emperor to order the offensive at Verdun to be broken off. - The battles there exhausted our forces like an open wound. - Moreover, it was obvious in any case that the enterprise had - become hopeless, and that for us to persevere with it would - cost us greater losses than those we were able to inflict on - the enemy. The battlefield was a regular hell, and was - regarded as such by the troops.”</p> - -<p>And of the Somme he says:</p> - -<p class="blockquote">“The extent of the demands which were being made on the army - in the West was brought before my eyes quite vividly for the - first time during this visit to France. I will not hesitate - to admit that it was only now that I fully realised all that - the Western Armies had done hitherto.... I could now - understand how everyone, officers and men alike, longed to - get away from such an atmosphere.... Many of our best and - finest fighting men had to pour out their heart’s blood in - destroyed trenches....</p> - -<p class="blockquote">It was only when the arrival of the wet season began to make - the ground impossible that things became quieter in the - battle area of the Somme. The million of shell-holes filled - with water became mere cemeteries.... Over everyone hovered - the fearful spectre of this battlefield, which for - desolation and horror seemed to be even worse than that of - Verdun.”</p> - -<p>General Ludendorff carries the impression still further<span class="lock"><a name="fnanchor_3" id="fnanchor_3"></a><a href="#footnote_3" class="fnanchor">[3]</a></span>:</p> - -<p class="blockquote"><!--120.png--><a name="Page_99" id="Page_99"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 99]</span> -“On the Somme the enemy’s powerful artillery, assisted by - excellent aeroplane observation and fed with enormous - supplies of ammunition, had kept down our fire and destroyed - our artillery. The defence of our infantry had become so - flabby that the massed attacks of the enemy always - succeeded. Not only did our <em>moral</em> suffer, but in - addition to fearful wastage in killed and wounded, we lost a - large number of prisoners and much material....</p> - -<p class="blockquote">The 25th saw the beginning of the heaviest of the many heavy - engagements that made up the battle of the Somme. Great were - our losses. The enemy took Rancourt, Morval, Gueudecourt, - and the hotly-contested Combles. On the 26th the Thiepval - salient fell....</p> - -<p class="blockquote">The fighting had made the most extraordinary demands both on - commanders and troops.... Divisions and other formations had - to be thrown in on the Somme front in quicker succession, - and had to stay in the line longer. The time for - recuperation and training on quiet sectors became shorter - and shorter. The troops were getting exhausted. Everything - was cut as fine as possible. The strain on our nerves in - Pless was terrible....”</p> - -<p>We may conclude, then, that the Somme, as the chief counter-stroke of -the Entente Powers, defeated the Central Powers; France was not bled -white; and although the Russians were driven back, and Roumania, who -had entered the war, was speedily defeated by the Central Powers, -Italy was relieved and delivered a successful counter-attack on the -Austrians. The situation, as a result of the Somme, although the -individual British soldier may not have thought it vastly improved, -was more than ever serious for the Central Powers, and one could not -at that stage hope for more.</p> - -<p><!--121.png--><a name="Page_100" id="Page_100"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 100]</span> -The total number of prisoners taken by the British Armies on the -Somme, from 1st July to 18th November, was over 38,000. Also 29 heavy -guns, 96 field guns, 136 trench mortars, and 514 machine guns.</p> - -<p class="p2 footnote"> <a name="footnote_3" id="footnote_3"></a> -<a href="#fnanchor_3"><span class="muchsmaller">[3]</span></a> - <cite>My War Memories, 1914-1918</cite>, Ludendorff.</p> -</div><!--end chapter two--> -<p><!--122.png--><a name="Page_101" id="Page_101"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 101]</span></p> -<div class="chapter"> -<h3 class="p4 break">CHAPTER <abbr title="three">III</abbr></h3> - -<h4>LAVENTIE-RICHBOURG</h4> - -<p class="p2">One might well imagine that the 56th Division was entitled to a rest, -but the days when armies retired into winter-quarters had -passed—unless a “quiet” bit of the line may be so called. There was a -rest for a few days in the neighbourhood of Belloy-sur-Somme, -north-west of Amiens. Battalions moved there, after a night at -Bernafay Wood, Mansell Camp, or the Citadel, by bus, and all moves -were complete by the 12th October. Then they rested and cleaned up.</p> - -<p>There was a slight rearrangement on the 20th, which brought Divisional -Headquarters to Hallencourt, and some of the units into other -villages, but the division was once more on the move almost -immediately, and on the 24th October was behind the 61st Division in -the country round Lestrem. Three days later brigades commenced the -relief of the 61st Division in the Richbourg l’Avoué-Laventie line.</p> - -<p>This bit of country was exceedingly flat, and in normal times was -drained by innumerable ditches. It was one of those bits of country -where trenches are an impossibility—soil and water seem to be -combined in equal proportions. Naturally war conditions did not -improve the draining, and at times large tracts of the country were -flooded. Our defences -<!--123.png--><a name="Page_102" id="Page_102"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 102]</span> -were breastworks, and the system of holding the -line was by a combination of posts. There were certain advantages -about this line, matters of space and of easy approach, but they were -only apparent when the weather was fine; when it was cold and wet, -shelter was very difficult to find.</p> - -<p>At first all three brigades were in line, but on the 27th November the -5th Division was put in on the right and the front was shortened, so -that two brigades held the line and one was in reserve.</p> - -<p>The whole of the division, however, did not arrive in this sector at -once. The artillery had been left on the Somme battlefield covering -the left of the French. Of this time Brig.-Gen. Elkington writes:</p> - -<p class="blockquote">“During the whole of the month of October the heavy and - incessant rain had made the going so bad that it was almost - impossible to get vehicles up to the positions. Improvised - ammunition carriers were made out of the baskets from the - ammunition wagons, and for the last part of the operations - all ammunition, rations, and water went up on pack animals. - It was most difficult to get material for dugouts up to the - guns, and in consequence officers and men suffered a great - deal of discomfort. The horses also suffered very much from - the constant hard, heavy work. The 56th Divisional Artillery - were relieved on the 31st October by the 8th Divisional - Artillery. Owing to the heavy going, the withdrawal of the - guns was a difficult job, and one section of A/280, which - got stuck in deep mud, took two days to get out. The 56th - Divisional Artillery marched from the Somme on the 1st - November, badly in need of a rest and refit in the way of - clothes, etc., and on the 5th we arrived on the Neuville-St. - Vaast front, and went into the line, covering the 3rd - Canadian Division facing the Vimy Ridge, on the 6th. The - headquarters -<!--124.png--><a name="Page_103" id="Page_103"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 103]</span> - of the artillery was established at Aubigny, - where the headquarters of the Canadian Division, under - Major-Gen. Lipsett, were.</p> - -<p class="blockquote">From the 7th November to the 1st December we remained - covering the Canadian Division. The sector was a very quiet - one, but the batteries were very extended, and it was a - matter of very long walks going round them, as cars were not - allowed forward. We were very well done by the Canadians, - and the men were able to get reclothed, and the horses - managed to pick up in the good stabling.... On the 1st - December the 56th Divisional Artillery was relieved by the - Canadian R.F.A., and we marched to the Neuve Chapelle area - to cover our own division.”</p> - -<p>Meanwhile the 56th Division was covered by the 6th Divisional -Artillery.</p> - -<p>Reinforcements for the shattered battalions were prompt, and all -monthly strength returns show a good average of a thousand men for -battalions. Horses remained steadily about 5,100, although the number -fell during the battle of the Somme. In actual numbers the division -was of average strength, but the quality had suffered. We find, for -instance, a record that a draft of over a thousand men arrived about -this period, and that they had not been instructed in musketry! With -all the will in the world such men were not of very great use. -Provision was made, however, for their instruction.</p> - -<p>Almost at once the reputation of this Neuve Chapelle front began to -change. It had been considered a quiet bit of line with nothing much -happening beyond mining and counter-mining. On the 28th October the -enemy opened a trench-mortar bombardment which Australian miners -declared to have been -<!--125.png--><a name="Page_104" id="Page_104"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 104]</span> -the heaviest they had experienced during their -stay in that line. The system of holding the line by means of posts, -too, gave many opportunities for patrol work, as it was a system -adopted by both sides. The advantage of position, as was so often the -case, was with the Germans, who were on the Aubers Ridge, with better -observation and drier ground.</p> - -<p>The month of November was a quiet month, cold and wet. No Man’s Land -was flooded and patrols found it very difficult to move about, as they -could not avoid splashing and consequent betrayal of their presence.</p> - -<p>On the 30th November the enemy raided the 7th Middlesex, who occupied -as part of their line a mine-crater. Major Emery was on the spot, and -with two men drove them off. They failed to secure identification. The -next day, however, we secured identification in the shape of a Lieut. -Steinhardt, 19th Bavarian Regt., who was in charge of a patrol which -was dispersed by one of our Lewis-gun teams—an experience which the -lieutenant found so bewildering that he lost his way and entered our -lines, under the impression that they were his own.</p> - -<p>Two lance-corporals, Millar and Wodley, of the 2nd London Regt., also -secured identification by chasing a German patrol of five men, of whom -they killed one and the remaining four put up their hands. These men -were of the 7th Bavarian Regt., 5th Bavarian Division, <abbr title="three">III</abbr> Bavarian -Corps.</p> - -<p>The policy of the <abbr title="eleven">XI</abbr> Corps (Gen. Haking) was to annoy the enemy on all -occasions and keep him always uneasy. The month of December was -therefore devoted to most active patrolling, and the enemy lines were -entered again and again only to be found -<!--126.png--><a name="Page_105" id="Page_105"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 105]</span> -empty. There is only one -record of finding the line occupied, when the Queen Victoria’s Rifles -captured two prisoners. The reason, of course, was the state of the -ground, and it affords an interesting sidelight on the endurance shown -by the men of the 56th Division, as the trenches, or rather defences, -they occupied were similar to those of the Hun.</p> - -<p>The operations of the winter are, in fact, only of interest as showing -the endurance, the determination, and the spirit of the 56th Division. -There was nothing in the nature of an attack or even a raid of any -magnitude—it was a matter of small parties of men resisting the -fearful conditions of climate, and penetrating with the greatest -boldness into the enemy lines.</p> - -<p>Having ascertained that the enemy was not occupying his line, but -merely patrolling it, a more aggressive attitude was adopted from the -1st January, 1917. On the first day of the year snipers, from the -battalions in line, established themselves in the German front line -and remained there all day. They had a few opportunities which they -did not miss.</p> - -<p>The operations until the 14th January were carried out by battalions -of the 167th Brigade; those between the 14th and 29th by the 169th -Brigade. Briefly they may be summarised.</p> - -<p>On the night of the 3rd/4th January 100 men of a new draft were taken -across No Man’s Land, in parties of six, to “visit” the enemy -trenches; this was no easy matter on account of the state of the -ground. On the same night two officers of the 3rd London Regt. -penetrated almost to the enemy support lines, when they were held up -by deep water.</p> - -<p>On the night 9/10th January four posts were -<!--127.png--><a name="Page_106" id="Page_106"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 106]</span> -established in the enemy -front line, and on the next night two more.</p> - -<p>On the 14th a post known as Hampstead Heath was violently attacked by -the enemy in very superior numbers. This post was held by the 7th -Middlesex, and the men were so cold they could scarcely move; the -Queen’s Westminster Rifles were actually halfway across No Man’s Land -on the way to relieve them when the attack occurred. This relief was -apparently driven back by trench-mortar barrage and machine-gun fire. -The 7th Middlesex men put up a fight, but their Lewis gun was jammed -and useless, and they were forced out of the post. One man was found -to be missing. The record of this regiment is particularly fine, and -they felt very acutely the taking of this prisoner by the enemy. The -7th Middlesex is one of the two Imperial Service Battalions of the -Territorial Force which existed at the outbreak of war. It was the -first battalion to leave the country and was sent to hold Gibraltar. -In March 1915 it arrived in France and was attached to the 8th -Division at La Gorgue—in this same area. From the taking over of the -line immediately after the battle of Neuve Chapelle it went through -many engagements before joining the 56th Division, and up to this -time, in spite of all the attacks on the Somme, it had only lost six -men as prisoners. Its casualties in France, to date, were: 28 officers -and 338 other ranks killed, 35 officers and 763 other ranks wounded.</p> - -<p>On the morning of the 15th January another post called Bertha was -attacked under cover of a dense fog, and after four men out of eleven -had been killed, the post (of the 1st London Regt.) was driven -out—but two were taken prisoners. Almost immediately, -<!--128.png--><a name="Page_107" id="Page_107"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 107]</span> -however, a patrol of the -same regiment, composed of four men, left our front line and -reoccupied the post, and by noon our troops had restored the position. -The enemy made another attack, but were driven off. This post -evidently caused the Germans great annoyance, as they attacked it on -the night of the 16/17th January and were again driven off.</p> - -<p>From the 17th to the 20th the posts were bombarded by artillery and -trench mortars, and on the 21st, under cover of an intense -bombardment, the enemy succeeded in occupying Bertha Post. A -counter-attack was at once organised, but it failed, owing to two -machine guns which the enemy had brought up with them. In the early -morning our patrols discovered the enemy leaving it, and it was again -occupied.</p> - -<p>During the night 22nd/23rd January the enemy made an organised attempt -to recapture all the posts. After repeated attacks the garrison of -Bertha Post was once more forced to retire, and again reoccupied the -spot in the early morning.</p> - -<p>The enemy shelled the posts all day on the 23rd and 24th, on the -latter with a large percentage of lachrymatory shells, which shelling -was followed by four separate attacks. After hand-to-hand and bombing -fights they were driven off.</p> - -<p>On the evening of the 27th the enemy concentrated his artillery fire -on Irma Post, which until then had only received general attention -from him, and succeeded in driving the garrison out. We then drove the -enemy out by artillery fire, and the post was reoccupied by us.</p> - -<p>On the 28th the Army Commander, Gen. Horne, directed that all the -posts should be vacated.</p> - -<p><!--129.png--><a name="Page_108" id="Page_108"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 108]</span> -One cannot consider these incidents only as -small bickerings. The artillery fire which the men had to face was -remarkably accurate and very fierce, and there was also the weather. -At first No Man’s Land was a swamp, or a lake, and then a cold snap -set in, which was paralysing to all who had to live in the open. The -men had no cover either from shell fire or the weather—the “posts” -were only a matter of shell-holes on our side of the German -breastworks, and improved with the help of a shovel and a pick. In -face of these hardships the courage and determination of the troops of -the 56th Division never faltered, although at one time Capt. Newnham -felt impelled to write that, “although wiring has been much -strengthened, actual consolidation is impossible owing to the frozen -ground. The garrison feel they are occupying shell traps. Battalions -are on the defensive and not offensive, and the <em>moral</em> of the -men is suffering. At the same time our existing defences are falling -into disrepair.” In spite of this dictum the men succeeded, after it -was written, in driving off four severe attacks, but it gives an -indication of the desperate conditions under which the 56th Division -carried out an aggressive policy.</p> - -<p>All this work drew from the Corps Commander a personal letter to Gen. -Hull:</p> - -<p class="blockquote">“I should be glad if you would convey, to the troops of the - division under your command, my appreciation of the - operations they have carried out so successfully during the - last month in establishing posts in the German front line, - and holding them in spite of heavy bombardments and hostile - infantry attacks.</p> - -<p class="blockquote">The effects of the operations are much greater than the - troops that took part in them are probably aware -<!--130.png--><a name="Page_109" id="Page_109"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 109]</span> - of. They - have shown the enemy the offensive and enterprising spirit - displayed by our troops, and have encouraged other British - formations to adopt similar tactics which will have a - far-reaching effect.</p> - -<p class="blockquote">Brig.-Gens. Loch and Freeth, who conducted the operations at - different periods when you were acting in command of the - Corps, deserve credit for the determined manner in which - they continued the pressure against the enemy in spite of - serious opposition. The various counter-attacks by our - troops, immediately delivered without waiting for any - further orders and simply adhering to the plan laid down by - you, show a fine military spirit on the part of officers and - men of the battalions engaged.</p> - -<p class="blockquote">I was particularly pleased with the action of the scouts of - the 1st London Regt. who went across No Man’s Land in - daylight on the 14th January, and with the prompt action of - “B” Company, Queen Victoria’s Rifles, under Capt. Brand, on - the night of January 22nd/23rd, when the posts were - attacked. Also with “A” and “B” Companies of the London - Rifle Brigade, under Lieut. Prior and 2/Lieut. Rose, who - held Enfield and Barnet Posts in the enemy lines on the - night of January 24/25th, when their posts were shelled with - lachrymatory shells and our men had to wear respirators. - These posts were then heavily attacked, and the supporting - platoons quickly traversed No Man’s Land before the hostile - barrage was put down. I am also glad that the artillery - support on all occasions throughout these operations has - been prompt and effective.</p> - -<p class="rightsign"><span class="sc">R. Haking</span>, Lieutenant-General, <br /> -Commanding <abbr title="eleven">XI</abbr> Corps.  </p> - -<p class="bigindent"><i class="decoration">3rd February, 1917.</i>”</p> - -<p>The division then settled down to more ordinary trench routine; but -the active season was approaching.</p> - -<p class="center">* * * * * * *</p> - -<p><!--131.png--><a name="Page_110" id="Page_110"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 110]</span> -Although the first day of the new year seems to mark a definite break -in time, no such break was obvious to the British troops in France and -Belgium. Sir Douglas Haig was determined to seize every favourable -opportunity to push the advantage that had been won at the battle of -the Somme. Between the Ancre and the Scarpe valleys the enemy was in a -very pronounced salient. A series of operations were undertaken -against the flank of this salient, commencing in November 1916. It -was, however, necessary to wait on the weather, and although some -valuable positions were captured, real advance was not made until -January, when actions were won and ground gained at Beaumont Hamel, -Grandcourt, Miraumont, Serre, Gommecourt, and Irles. These successes -opened the way for a big operation against the Le Transloy-Loupart -line. The enemy then made his celebrated retreat to the Hindenburg -Line. This line branched off from the original German defences near -Arras, ran south-east for twelve miles to Quéant, and then west of -Cambrai towards St. Quentin.</p> - -<p>The opening of the new year is a most interesting study. The Germans -were beginning to feel the lack of men. Their retreat was decided upon -for the purpose of shortening their line and avoiding a battle. They -knew it would require months of preparation before an army could -advance to the attack across the wide area which they had -systematically laid waste. Here at least they reckoned on a breathing -space. And in Germany itself the Hindenburg programme for production -was coming into operation—everywhere they were carefully going over -their resources and reorganising.</p> - -<p>England reached, in 1917, the height of her fighting -<!--132.png--><a name="Page_111" id="Page_111"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 111]</span> -power as regards -the number of divisions, and this was known to the enemy. So he waited -with some anxiety for developments on the Western Front.</p> - -<p>The Germans had started their unrestricted submarine <a -name="campaign"></a>campaign, from which they hoped to gain much -benefit, but, on the other hand, they were nervous of Russia—and -Russia complicated the situation.</p> - -<p>Ludendorff writes:</p> - -<p class="blockquote">“How often had I not hoped for a revolution in Russia in - order that our military burden might be alleviated! But my - desire had been merely a castle in the air. Now it had come - true and as a surprise. It felt as though a weight had been - removed from my chest.”</p> - -<p>The revolution in Russia took place in March, and so, right at the -beginning of what promised to be an ominous year for the Germans, they -were able, by a stroke of fortune, to save ammunition in the East, and -to transfer fresh divisions from the East to the West, and let their -worn-out divisions deal with the Russians.</p> - -<p>The Entente Powers, however, had no reason to feel more than -disappointment, as they dealt the Central Powers a blow by the capture -of Baghdad; and although they had no immediate support from America, -that country declared war on Germany as a result of the submarine -policy adopted.</p> - -<p>The 56th Division opened the new year in very fair strength, as the -following return will show:</p> - -<table summary="56th Division Strength" class="smaller"> -<tr><td></td><td class="center">Officers.</td><td class="center">Other Ranks.</td></tr> -<tr><td class="lefta">Divisional Headquarters</td><td class="righta">22</td><td class="righta">103</td></tr> -<tr><td class="lefta">167th Brigade Headquarters</td><td class="righta">2</td><td class="righta">3</td></tr> -<tr><td class="lefta">1st London Regt.</td><td class="righta">34 </td><td class="righta">1,028</td></tr> -<tr><td class="lefta">3rd London Regt.</td><td class="righta">32 </td><td class="righta">1,066</td></tr> -<tr><td class="lefta">8th Middlesex Regt.</td><td class="righta">22 </td><td class="righta">1,051</td></tr> -<tr><td class="lefta">167th Machine Gun Coy.</td><td class="righta">11</td><td class="righta">171 -<!--133.png--><a name="Page_112" id="Page_112"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 112]</span></td></tr> -<tr><td class="lefta">168th Brigade Headquarters</td><td class="righta">7</td><td class="righta">25</td></tr> -<tr><td class="lefta">4th London Regt.</td><td class="righta">40 </td><td class="righta">1,003</td></tr> -<tr><td class="lefta">12th London Regt.</td><td class="righta">47</td><td class="righta">1,073</td></tr> -<tr><td class="lefta">13th London Regt.</td><td class="righta">38</td><td class="righta">1,043</td></tr> -<tr><td class="lefta">14th London Regt.</td><td class="righta">37</td><td class="righta">963</td></tr> -<tr><td class="lefta">168th Machine Gun Coy.</td><td class="righta">11</td><td class="righta">165</td></tr> -<tr><td class="lefta">169th Brigade Headquarters</td><td class="righta">8</td><td class="righta">26</td></tr> -<tr><td class="lefta">2nd London Regt.</td><td class="righta">41</td><td class="righta">1,012</td></tr> -<tr><td class="lefta">5th London Regt.</td><td class="righta">35</td><td class="righta">1,052</td></tr> -<tr><td class="lefta">9th London Regt.</td><td class="righta">34</td><td class="righta">1,030</td></tr> -<tr><td class="lefta">16th London Regt.</td><td class="righta">39</td><td class="righta">975</td></tr> -<tr><td class="lefta">169th Machine Gun Coy.</td><td class="righta">11</td><td class="righta">182</td></tr> -<tr><td class="lefta">5th Cheshire Regt.</td><td class="righta">38</td><td class="righta">890</td></tr> -<tr><td class="lefta">193rd Machine Gun Coy.</td><td class="righta">10</td><td class="righta">174</td></tr> -<tr><td class="lefta">56th Divisional Artillery Headquarters</td><td class="righta">4</td><td class="righta">19</td></tr> -<tr><td class="lefta">280th Brigade R.F.A.</td><td class="righta">29</td><td class="righta">756</td></tr> -<tr><td class="lefta">281st Brigade R.F.A.</td><td class="righta">26</td><td class="righta">748</td></tr> -<tr><td class="lefta">282nd Brigade R.F.A.</td><td class="righta">28</td><td class="righta">705</td></tr> -<tr><td class="lefta">D.A.C.</td><td class="righta">24</td><td class="righta">806</td></tr> -<tr><td class="lefta">56th Divisional R.E. Headquarters</td><td class="righta">2</td><td class="righta">10</td></tr> -<tr><td class="lefta">416th Edinburgh Field Coy.</td><td class="righta">10</td><td class="righta">210</td></tr> -<tr><td class="lefta">512th London Field Coy.</td><td class="righta">10</td><td class="righta">212</td></tr> -<tr><td class="lefta">513th London Field Coy.</td><td class="righta">10</td><td class="righta">218</td></tr> -<tr><td class="lefta">Divisional Signals</td><td class="righta">6</td><td class="righta">212</td></tr> -<tr><td class="lefta">Divisional Train</td><td class="righta">18</td><td class="righta">388</td></tr> -<tr><td class="lefta">Medical Units</td><td class="righta">26</td><td class="righta">573</td></tr> -<tr><td class="lefta">Mobile Veterinary</td><td class="righta">1</td><td class="righta">23</td></tr> -</table> - -<p>But soon after New Year’s Day the artillery was reorganised. The 56th -Divisional Artillery became two brigades (280th and 281st), each of -three (six-gun) 18-pounder batteries, and one (six-gun) howitzer -battery. For this purpose A/282 Howitzer Battery was split up, one -section going to D/280 and one to D/281. The 282nd Brigade, under the -new organisation, became an Army Field Artillery Brigade, and to bring -it up to strength it absorbed “B” Battery, 126th Brigade, and one -section of “D” Battery, 126th Brigade. This battery and section came -from the 37th Division.</p> - -<p><!--134.png--><a name="Page_113" id="Page_113"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 113]</span> -In the big operations which were soon to take place, Gen. Hull had -Lieut.-Col. Packenham to help him as G.S.O.1.</p> - -<p class="center">* * * * * * *</p> - -<p>Although we say the division went back to ordinary trench warfare -after January, it must not be thought that the policy of aggression -had been abandoned. The enemy lines were constantly visited and found -on most occasions to be empty. But the 13th London Regt., the -Kensingtons, secured five prisoners of the 13th Bavarian Regt., and -killed about forty on one occasion; and the London Rifle Brigade -obtained identification and killed three in a subsequent raid. The -enemy also made one attempt, and entered our line between two posts, -but the posts attacked him vigorously and drove him out, after killing -three of the party, who proved to be of the 13th Bavarian Regt.</p> - -<p>On the 6th March the line was handed over to the 49th Division, and -the 56th Division left the First Army and was transferred to the <abbr title="seven">VII</abbr> -Corps (Snow), Third Army. Brigades marched back to the Flers area, -Divisional Headquarters being at Le Cauroy, and battalions scattered -about the country between Frevent and St. Pol, in the villages of -Beauvois, Hernicourt, Croisette, Pronay, Siracourt, Blangermont, -Blangerol, Guinecourt, Héricourt, Framecourt, Petit Houvin, Nuncy, -Haute Côte, Sibiville, Séricourt, Honval, etc.</p> -</div><!--end chapter three--> -<div class="chapter"> -<p><!--135.png--><a name="Page_114" id="Page_114"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 114]</span></p> -<h3 class="p4">CHAPTER <abbr title="four">IV</abbr></h3> - -<h4>THE BATTLES OF ARRAS, 1917</h4> - -<h4 class="smaller">THE FIRST BATTLE OF THE SCARPE, 1917—THE THIRD BATTLE OF THE -SCARPE—MINOR ACTIONS</h4> - -<p class="p2">The Germans had commenced their retreat, and we know that the British -Higher Command had planned large movements. On the 14th March the -169th Brigade took over the front line between Achicourt and Agny, to -the south of Arras, with the 30th Division on the right and the 14th -Division on the left. Two days after a number of fires were seen in -the enemy lines to the south. The Hun was moving, but patrols found -him very alert on their immediate front.</p> - -<p>Brig.-Gen. Coke, 169th Brigade, went round his line on the 15th March, -and the diary notes that “trenches in a shocking condition, full of -mud and dirt”! It was a normal condition for trenches, and one might -well be excused for wondering if the Italians or the forces in -Salonica fared any better in this respect. Did they find mud on the -top of a real mountain? Maybe their position was always in the valley, -in the centre of a stream!</p> - -<p>As usual, patrols were out on the night of the 17th (the patrolling of -the 56th Division is worthy of great praise) and noticed nothing in -particular. But some scouts of the 2nd London Regt., lying close to -the enemy wire as dawn was breaking on the 18th, came to the -conclusion that the enemy line was not normal. -<!--136.png--><a name="Page_115" id="Page_115"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 115]</span> -They investigated and -found it empty. This was promptly reported to the company commander, -who sent out strong fighting patrols and occupied the front line.</p> - -<p>Officers in the line acted with the greatest promptitude. Brigades on -either side were quick to follow the example of the 2nd London Regt., -and all Headquarters were buzzing with excitement, although the -situation, in view of what was happening farther south, was not -unexpected.</p> - -<p>By midday the 2nd London Regt. had occupied Beaurains. The whole Corps -was ordered to advance; the German second line was occupied, and on -the left the 14th Division were in the third line. The Corps order for -the advance, however, was cautious. It pointed out the probability of -the enemy withdrawing to a main line of defence, Telegraph Hill, and -the east half of Neuville Vitasse. The 169th Brigade were to keep -touch with the enemy, but Brig.-Gen. Coke must avoid becoming involved -in a serious engagement at present.</p> - -<p>By the early morning of the 19th March patrols had established the -fact that the enemy were indeed holding Neuville Vitasse, and on the -left he was found at Tilloy, the Harp, Telegraph Hill, and Nice -Trench. Troops remained in front of Neuville Vitasse and constructed -advance trenches.</p> - -<p>We have pointed out the salient, between the Ancre and the Scarpe, -which was the result of the battles of the Somme; and we have -mentioned the actions that had been fought on the right of this -salient in preparation to a bigger operation. It was the intention of -Sir Douglas Haig to attack the salient from both sides—the Fifth Army -in the south operating -<!--137.png--><a name="Page_116" id="Page_116"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 116]</span> -on the Ancre Front, and the Third Army about -Arras. The plan included the pinching off of the whole area, and on -the north of the Scarpe the capture of the Vimy Ridge. This latter -operation was the task of the First Army.</p> - -<p>So far as the Fifth Army was concerned, the German retreat had avoided -a battle, but on the Third Army front their retirement must be -limited, as the enemy had no intention of giving up the Vimy Ridge on -our First Army front. Indeed, there was no retirement on the left of -the <abbr title="seven">VII</abbr> Corps, just south of Arras, which was the flank of the -Hindenburg Line.</p> - -<p>But adjustments and new orders were necessary to meet the situation. -It was most desirable to attract as many enemy troops to our front -before the French offensive was launched in the south, and so the -Fifth Army was ordered to follow the enemy closely to the Hindenburg -Line, where it would exert the greatest pressure, and the Third and -First Armies would, with slight modifications of detail, carry out the -original attack as planned on their front.</p> - -<p>The <abbr title="seven">VII</abbr> Corps was the most affected. The objectives of the Third Army -had been Mercatel, Hill 90, the German third-line system from Feuchy -Chapel, and the high ground about Monchy. The effect of the enemy -withdrawals on the <abbr title="seven">VII</abbr> Corps front was</p> - -<p class="blockquote">“to change our task from an attack in a south-easterly - direction from prepared positions, to an attack in an - easterly and north-easterly direction from improvised - positions. But the objects of the attack remain the same; - that is, to break through the enemy’s defensive line on the - right of the Third Army front, to overrun all his defences - as far as the Green Line (the far side of the Cojeul River), - and to clear and hold -<!--138.png--><a name="Page_117" id="Page_117"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 117]</span> - the southern side of the gap which the - <abbr title="six">VI</abbr> Corps, advancing simultaneously with us, will have made.”</p> - -<p>The <abbr title="seven">VII</abbr> Corps front was held by the 21st, 30th, 56th, and 14th -Divisions in line, with the 50th in reserve. On the right the 21st -Division had a very small rôle allotted to it. The first attack was to -be delivered by the 56th and 14th Divisions with the <abbr title="six">VI</abbr> Corps on their -left (no German retreat had taken place here), and gradually the 30th -and then the 21st Divisions would take part in the advance.</p> - -<p>The first phase of the planned attack gave to the 56th Division the -task of capturing Neuville Vitasse (the 30th would conform on the -right, but even so would not approach the enemy main line), and to the -14th Division the piercing of the extreme left of the Hindenburg Line -and part of the Harp; the 3rd Division, <abbr title="six">VI</abbr> Corps, on the left would -capture Tilloy.</p> - -<p>The second phase placed the right of the 30th Division on the south of -the Cojeul River and in possession of St. Martin-sur-Cojeul, and the -left through the Hindenburg (Cojeul Switch) Line, while the 56th and -14th would be in front of Wancourt.</p> - -<p>The 56th and 14th Divisions were not to go beyond Nepal Trench, as the -30th Division, pushing up from the south-west, would cross their front -and, passing entirely to the south bank of the Cojeul, would join -hands with the troops of the <abbr title="six">VI</abbr> Corps east of Guemappe. The 21st -Division would contribute to the flank thus formed with its right -standing fast on Croisilles.</p> - -<p>After this Green Line, as it was called, there was the usual hopeful -reference to a distant objective, Cambrai, and some talk of cavalry, -no doubt a necessary -<!--139.png--><a name="Page_118" id="Page_118"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 118]</span> -provision, but one which, nevertheless, was -greeted with hilarity. One thing, however, seems very certain: the -German retreat caused very little inconvenience to the Third Army, and -none at all to the First.</p> - -<p>Preparations for the attack on the Third Army front were carried on -swiftly. The enemy made no further move, but to the south, where he -had many miles to go before reaching the Hindenburg Line, he was still -being closely pursued by the Fifth Army. By the 2nd April the general -line was Sélency, Jeancourt, Epéhy, Royaulcourt, Doignies, Mercatel, -Beaurains. Between Sélency and Doignies the enemy still held positions -in advance of the Hindenburg Line, and minor engagements were -continually taking place on this section of the front.</p> - -<p>On the night of the 1st April the 167th and 168th Brigades relieved -the 169th Brigade in the front line. The bombardment of the enemy -positions commenced on the 4th, and was carried on for five days. -Meanwhile troops could study the country they were to attack.</p> - -<p>While the 169th Brigade had been in the line, training had been -carried on extensively by the other two brigades. Some of the -instructions and arrangements are worthy of note. For the men, open -fighting was the main practice. Regimental officers were told that</p> - -<p class="blockquote">“it must be realised that the maintenance of forward - movement depends on the determination and power of direction - of sections, platoons, companies, and battalions. The habit - of digging a trench and getting into it, or of waiting for - scientifically-arranged artillery barrages before advancing, - must be discarded. -<!--140.png--><a name="Page_119" id="Page_119"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 119]</span> - A slow advance will give time for the - German reinforcements to arrive—the greater the rapidity of - an advance the more is resistance likely to lessen. A few - sticky company commanders may not only delay the whole - operation but, by giving the enemy time to reinforce, will - also cause unnecessary casualties.”</p> - -<p>We quote this for comparison with other instructions given at a later -date. There is nothing new in it, and nothing to criticise in it, but -man is a lover of precedent, and trench warfare, and failure to get -through to open fighting, was the precedent established for him.</p> - -<p>Very interesting instructions were issued on the subject of signals -between infantry and artillery. One of the most curious facts of the -war was the general lack of communication between attacking infantry -and artillery. True, the infantryman in the front line is not always -in the best position to direct artillery fire, but, on the other hand, -he is frequently the only man who knows anything at all. We learned, -to our cost, the excellence of the German control of artillery fire, -and though our artillery observation officers performed the most -gallant feats, our method never seemed as good as that of the enemy. -The instructions issued were in imitation of the German method. -Coloured lights were to be fired from any sort of pistol. Green lights -were to mean “open fire,” and white lights “increase the range.” These -were the only signals to be employed, either by the Forward -Observation Officer or by the infantry. The plan does not appear to -have answered very well.</p> - -<p>There were also definite instructions as to the strength of battalions -and the number of officers, -<!--141.png--><a name="Page_120" id="Page_120"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 120]</span> -non-commissioned officers, and men to be -left out of the fight. We must deal with that in another place, merely -noting here that platoons were now made up of one rifle section, one -Lewis-gun section, one bombing section, and one rifle grenade section, -and that a Divisional Depot Battalion was formed at Bouquemaison, -where all details left out of the battle were sent. The Depot -Battalion ensured a number of trained reinforcements being available.</p> - -<p>We have left the 167th and 168th Brigades looking at Neuville Vitasse. -The way to that heap of ruins seemed clear, with the exception of a -strong point, Neuville Mill, situated on the right and in a position -to enfilade the attacking troops. On the 7th the 1st London Regt. -attempted to capture the place, but found it well defended with -machine guns, and failed. It was decided to deal with it by means of -Tanks.</p> - -<p>The attack launched by the Third and First Armies on the morning of -the 9th April was on a front of fifteen miles, from Croisilles to the -northern foot of the Vimy Ridge. It included between four and five -miles of the Hindenburg Line.</p> - -<p>The 56th Division attacked with the 167th Brigade on the right, having -the 3rd London Regt. and 8th Middlesex Regt. in line, with the 1st -London Regt. in support and the 7th Middlesex in reserve; the 168th -Brigade was on the left, with the 13th and 12th London Regts. in line, -the 14th in support, and the 4th in reserve. The Edinburgh Field Coy. -R.E. (less two sections) were with the right brigade, and the 513th -Field Coy. R.E. (less two sections), one company of the 5th Cheshires, -and two sections of the 193rd Divisional M.G. Coy. with the left -<!--142.png--><a name="Page_121" id="Page_121"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 121]</span> -brigade. As the whole success of the operation depended on the 14th -Division, the left brigade had to be prepared to make a defensive -flank—hence the machine guns and pioneers.</p> - -<p>The method of attack was what was sometimes called leap-frog. The two -battalions in line on each brigade front were to capture Pine Lane and -Neuville Vitasse, and then the supporting battalion would “go through” -them and capture the second defence, which was the Hindenburg, or -Cojeul Switch. In the case of the 167th Brigade, the reserve -battalion, the 7th Middlesex, were to carry on the game of leap-frog -and capture Nepal Trench.</p> - -<p>The weather up to this point had been fine, but on the morning of the -9th dark clouds rolled up, bringing heavy showers. The attack was -started by the Corps on the left. The 56th Division moved to the -assault at 7.45 a.m.</p> - -<p>The first phase of the attack was the capture of Neuville Vitasse. The -3rd London Regt., on the right, progressed well—two Tanks worked on -this battalion front and dealt with the strong point, Neuville -Mill—and at 10 a.m. had reached their first objective—that is to -say, they were in a position short of the Hindenburg Line. The 8th -Middlesex Regt. were delayed at first by uncut wire, but soon entered -the ruined village. Just before reaching the site of the church they -found themselves confronted by a “pocket” of determined Germans with -several machine guns. Working round the flanks of this “pocket,” -bombers and riflemen succeeded in enveloping the enemy, so that just -before eleven o’clock sixty-eight survivors surrendered with four -machine guns. The battalion then cleared the rest -<!--143.png--><a name="Page_122" id="Page_122"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 122]</span> -of Neuville Vitasse -and were in touch with the 3rd London Regt.</p> - -<p>The Kensingtons swept through the enemy front line with little -opposition, and soon reached Moss Trench. Their reserve company, -seeing that all was well, moved south into the village and rendered -some assistance to the 8th Middlesex.</p> - -<p>On the extreme left of the divisional line the 12th London Regt., -after going through the first line, met some uncut wire which delayed -them, but soon after ten o’clock they were in touch with the -Kensingtons in Moss Trench, although their left was thrown back owing -to the right of the 14th Division being held up by uncut wire.</p> - -<p>Of the two Tanks on the 168th Brigade front, which were supposed to -work round the north of the village, only one ever started, and very -soon that one was on fire.</p> - -<p>Meanwhile the artillery, the 281st, 293rd, and “C” Battery of the -232nd Brigades, had moved across the old German line and taken -positions, about a thousand yards west of Neuville Vitasse, by ten -o’clock. (It will be noticed that the artillery was “grouped” again.)</p> - -<p>Everything was therefore ready for the assault on the northern -extremity of the Hindenburg Line, and an advance to Nepal Trench. -This, as we have said, was to be done by the 14th and 1st London -Regts., who were the supporting battalions to each brigade.</p> - -<p>The general plan at this point was that the 14th and 56th Divisions -should attack simultaneously, and the 30th Division, on the right, was -to follow in echelon. Not until the 7th Middlesex Regt.—which was in -reserve to the 167th Brigade, and was detailed -<!--144.png--><a name="Page_123" id="Page_123"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 123]</span> -to attack and capture -Nepal Trench after the Hindenburg Line had been made secure—had -passed Neuville Vitasse was the 30th Division to move. As the fighting -on this right flank of the 56th Division was the most severe, we will -deal first with the left flank.</p> - -<p>The attack started at 12.10 p.m., and the London Scottish, passing -through the Kensingtons and 12th London Regt., were soon engaged in -some lively fighting which lasted about two hours. They killed a -number of the enemy, captured 100 of them and one machine gun, and -overran the mass of trenches by 1,000 yards. On their left they were -in touch with the 14th Division, but their right was in the air. As -the 167th Brigade had not progressed so well, the London Scottish -position was not too good.</p> - -<p>On the right of the 56th Division the situation was obscure. The 30th -Division—timed to advance after the 167th Brigade—had failed, and -this failure enabled the enemy in Egg and the adjacent trenches to -give their undivided attention to the flank of the 56th Division. The -attack was held up.</p> - -<p>Gen. Hull had foreseen strong opposition in this direction, and had -given Brig.-Gen. Freeth the 4th London Regt., the reserve battalion of -the 168th Brigade, and the Queen Victoria’s Rifles from the 169th -Brigade. So when it was seen that the 1st London Regt. had failed to -make progress, the 7th Middlesex and 4th London Regts. were launched. -Some progress was made, but casualties were heavy, and the position -remained uncertain and enveloped in a fog of rumour.</p> - -<p>In order to give more stability to the line, Brig.-Gen. Loch, 168th -Brigade, ordered the Kensingtons forward into that part of the -Hindenburg Line which -<!--145.png--><a name="Page_124" id="Page_124"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 124]</span> -the London Scottish had captured, and the latter -battalion to withdraw from their forward position and reorganise.</p> - -<p>The situation at 6 p.m. is shown (<i class="decoration">A</i>) on map.</p> - -<p>But the 14th Division, on the left, ordered an assault of the Wancourt -Line at 6.45 p.m., which attack, owing no doubt to the situation on -the 56th and 30th Divisional fronts, failed.</p> - -<p>Soon after ten o’clock that night (9th April) the Corps ordered the -assault of the Wancourt Line to take place at eight the following -morning, but Gen. Hull pointed out that fighting was still going on, -that the situation would not be clear until daylight, and that his -division would not be able to attack at that hour. The order was, -therefore, amended so that the attack should take place when the -situation on the 56th and 14th Divisional fronts was clear.</p> - -<p>In the darkness of the night the 167th Brigade troops bombed the -Germans out of all of the Hindenburg Line on their front, but they -were still giving much trouble from the 30th Division area. The London -Scottish were now able to advance again on the left and get in touch -with the 14th Division about 15.</p> - -<p>The position did not seem too favourable unless something was done on -the right, but at 10.45 a.m. the Corps issued a more ambitious order: -that the attack was to be carried on to the east of Guemappe.</p> - -<p>At midday the attack was launched, but now the whole direction was -altered. The left of the line, advancing on Wancourt, was held up, and -the right, in order to get elbow room, was forced to clear the -Hindenburg Line on the 30th Division front. In this maze of trenches -the 167th Brigade made steady progress towards the junction of the -Hindenburg and -<!--146.png--><a name="Page_125" id="Page_125"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 125]</span> -Wancourt Lines. This was good work, and the Corps -ordered the occupation of Hill 90, on the far side of the Wancourt -Line. Gen. Hull, however, informed the Corps that it could not be done -that night.</p> - -<p>On the left the position was as uncertain as it had been the previous -day on the right. The 14th Division claimed to be in the Wancourt -Line, and eventually it was found that they had swerved to their left -and created a large gap between their right and the left of the London -Scottish, who were lying out in the open.</p> - -<p>So the situation (<i class="decoration">B</i>) remained through the night. The next day, -the 11th, nothing was done on the left of the line, but the 167th -Brigade carried on their good work and the Queen Victoria’s Rifles -cleared the Hindenburg Line as far as the Cojeul River, and a long -length of Nepal Trench, which was part of the Wancourt Line. The -difficulty of the 30th Division was apparently uncut wire. They seemed -to be stuck facing the Hindenburg Line, while the Queen Victoria’s -Rifles cleared it. A Corps telegram to this division reads:</p> - -<p class="blockquote">“Not satisfied that the infantry are receiving sufficient - support from the artillery. The situation demands that as - many batteries as possible be pushed forward so that enemy - machine guns be dealt with at decisive range.”</p> - -<p>The 167th were relieved by the 169th Brigade late in the afternoon, -after three days of very severe and successful fighting.</p> - -<p>The 169th Brigade were ordered to consolidate Hill 90 and to push -patrols into Heninel, and later, -<!--147.png--><a name="Page_126" id="Page_126"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 126]</span> -when the 30th Division had occupied -the Hindenburg Line, to cross the River Cojeul and make good the high -ground to the south.</p> - -<p>The attack ordered started at 5.15 a.m. on the 12th, and after stiff -bombing fights, the 2nd and 5th London Regts., working to the north -and south of Hill 90, joined hands on the other side of it. It was -found necessary, during this operation, to have a password, so that -converging parties should not bomb each other. To the great amusement -of the men the words “Rum jar” were chosen. The Germans, being bombed -from both sides, must have thought it an odd slogan. The enemy were -then seen withdrawing from Heninel, and the leading company of the 2nd -London Regt. immediately advanced and occupied the village. The 30th -Division then crossed to the south of the Cojeul River, and made -progress along the Hindenburg Line. Meanwhile the 2nd London Regt. had -pushed forward patrols and occupied the high ground to the east of -Heninel, where they got in touch with the 30th Division.</p> - -<p>The occupation of Hill 90, which had been made possible by the 167th -Brigade and the Queen Victoria’s Rifles (attached), also caused the -enemy to vacate the village of Wancourt, which was entered by patrols -of the London Rifle Brigade about eleven o’clock. The 14th Division -moved two battalions, one on either side of the village, with a view -to continuing the advance to the high ground east of the Cojeul River, -and at 1 p.m. the Corps ordered the advance to be continued to the -Sensée River; but these orders were modified and the 56th Division was -told to consolidate (<i class="decoration">C</i>) and prepare for an advance on the 13th.</p> - -<p>On the 13th April nothing much was done. The -<!--148.png--><a name="Page_127" id="Page_127"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 127]</span> -56th Division held the -ridge from 35 to Wancourt Tower; on the right the 33rd Division, which -had relieved the 30th, failed to advance; on the left the 50th -Division, which had relieved the 14th on the preceding night, also -failed to advance, having been held up by machine-gun fire from -Guemappe. But the Corps ordered a general advance on the next day, the -objective being the line of the Sensée River.</p> - -<p>During the night the enemy blew up Wancourt Tower, which seemed to -suggest that he was contemplating retirement. At 5.30 a.m. our attack -was launched, but almost at once the 169th Brigade reported that the -Queen’s Westminster Rifles had gone forward with no one on their left. -About five hundred yards in front of them were some practice trenches -which the enemy had used for bombing. Capt. Newnham writes of the -attack dissolving about the line of these trenches. Apparently -Guemappe had not been taken on the left, and a perfect hail of -machine-gun fire enfiladed the advancing troops from this village. The -Queen Victoria’s Rifles, who attacked on the right, met with no better -fate, the leading waves being wiped out. From the diary of 169th -Brigade we learn that</p> - -<p class="blockquote">“the 151st Brigade attack on our left never developed, - leaving our flank exposed. Enemy met with in considerable - strength; they had just brought up fresh troops, and the - allotment of machine guns, according to prisoners, was two - per battalion. The 151st Brigade attack was ordered with - their left flank on Wancourt Tower, which was our left and - the dividing-line between brigades. Great confusion - consequently on our left front, where two battalions of - Durhams were mixed up with the Queen’s Westminster Rifles, -<!--149.png--><a name="Page_128" id="Page_128"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 128]</span> - and the London Rifle Brigade, moving up in support, added to - the congestion. Casualties were heavy—Queen’s Westminster - Rifles, 12 officers, 300 other ranks; Queen Victoria’s - Rifles, 15 officers and 400 other ranks.”</p> - -<p>The attack had not, however, dissolved at all points, as a thin line -of troops undoubtedly advanced a thousand yards, and more, beyond the -practice trenches. But these gallant fellows soon found themselves in -a very lonely position, and as the 30th and 50th Divisions failed to -make any ground at all, they had Germans practically on all sides of -them. They remained for some time and eventually withdrew.</p> - -<p>The next two days, the 15th and 16th, were occupied in consolidating -the ground gained. The division had alarms of counter-attack, but -nothing developed on their front. On the left, however, the enemy -attacked and recaptured Wancourt Tower from the 50th Division. This -point was not retaken by us until the next day, but the 56th Division -were not concerned. Further advance was postponed until the 22nd -April, and on the 18th the 30th Division took over the line from the -56th Division.</p> - -<p>This was the opening battle of the Arras series, and is known as the -First Battle of the Scarpe, 1917, and is linked up with the Battle of -Vimy Ridge. The student would do well to consider the two battles as -one. The capture of Vimy Ridge by the Canadians, and of Monchy by -troops of the Third Army, gave us positions of great importance and -improved the situation round Arras. The feeling of the 56th Division -was that it had been a great fight, and that they had proved -themselves undoubtedly better men than the Germans. The capture of -<!--150.png--><a name="Page_129" id="Page_129"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 129]</span> -Neuville Vitasse and subsequent rolling up of the Hindenburg Line to -the south of Heninel was a feat of which they felt proud. And they had -killed a lot of the enemy at close quarters.</p> - -<p>It is an interesting battle, as it undoubtedly inflicted a terrifying -defeat on the enemy. Ludendorff says of it<span class="lock"><a name="fnanchor_4" id="fnanchor_4"></a><a href="#footnote_4" class="fnanchor">[4]</a></span>:</p> - -<p class="blockquote">“The 10th April and the following days were critical. The - consequences of a break through, of 12 to 15 kilometres wide - and 6 or more kilometres deep, are not easy to meet. In view - of the heavy losses in men, guns, and ammunition resulting - from such a break through, colossal efforts are needed to - make good the damage.... A day like 9th April threw all - calculations to the winds. Many days had to pass before a - line could really be formed and consolidated. The end of the - crisis, even if troops were available, depended very - largely, as it generally does in such cases, on whether the - enemy, after his first victory, would attack again, and by - further success aggravate the difficulty of forming a new - line. Our position having been weakened, such victories were - to be won only too easily....”</p> - -<p>Hindenburg also confesses to very anxious moments, and suggests that -“the English did not seem to have known how to exploit the success -they had gained to the full.”</p> - -<p>In his dispatch on this battle Sir Douglas Haig said that:</p> - -<p class="blockquote">“With the forces at my disposal, even combined with what the - French proposed to undertake in co-operation, I did not - consider that any great strategical -<!--151.png--><a name="Page_130" id="Page_130"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 130]</span> - results were likely to be - gained by following up a success on the front about Arras, - and to the south of it, beyond the capture of the objectives - aimed at.... It was therefore my intention to transfer my - main offensive to another part of the front after these - objectives had been secured.</p> - -<p class="blockquote">The front selected for these operations was in Flanders. - They were to be commenced as soon as possible after the - Arras offensive, and continued throughout the summer, so far - as the forces at my disposal would permit.”</p> - -<p>It must be remembered that the plans for the year were drawn up in -consultation with our Allies, and the battles of Arras must be taken -as a part only of those plans. The First and Third Armies secured -positions which Sir Douglas Haig intended that they should secure; -they inflicted great loss on the enemy, more than 13,000 prisoners and -over 200 guns; they drew German reserves until at the end of the -operations there were twice as many enemy troops on that front as at -the beginning, which materially helped our Allies, who were on the -point of launching a big offensive on the Aisne and in Champagne. On -the whole, these battles fulfilled their object and may be viewed with -satisfaction.</p> - -<p>On the 16th April the French attacked the Chemin-des-Dames, north-west -of Rheims, and in the Champagne, south of Rheims. They met with very -heavy losses and most obstinate resistance. These were the -much-discussed operations under Gen. Nivelle, and, in order to assist, -Sir Douglas Haig agreed to continue the operations round Arras longer -than was his first intention. Plans, which had been made for a -rearrangement of artillery and troops for the -<!--152.png--><a name="Page_131" id="Page_131"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 131]</span> -operations at Ypres, -were cancelled, and orders were issued for a continuance, with shallow -objectives, of the fighting at Arras.</p> - -<p>The First Battle of the Scarpe and the Battle of Vimy Ridge were, -therefore, the original scheme, and the subsequent battles should be -considered with this fact in mind. They were: the Second Battle of the -Scarpe, 1917, 23rd-24th April; the Battle of Arleux, 28th-29th April; -the Third Battle of the Scarpe, 1917, 3rd-4th May. The Battle of -Bullecourt, 3rd-17th May, and a number of actions must also be -included in the subsequent Arras offensive.</p> - -<p>A few days’ rest was granted to the 56th Division. The 167th Brigade -was round Pommier, the 168th round Couin, the 169th round Souastre. -Divisional Headquarters were first at Couin and then at Hauteville. On -the 25th Gen. Hull was ordered to hold himself in readiness to move -into either the <abbr title="six">VI</abbr> or the <abbr title="seven">VII</abbr> Corps, and the next day was definitely -ordered into the <abbr title="six">VI</abbr> Corps. On the 27th the 167th Brigade relieved the -15th Division in the front line, and Divisional Headquarters opened in -Rue de la Paix, Arras.</p> - -<p class="center">* * * * * * *</p> - -<p>From the Harp, which it will be remembered was the original line, to -east of Monchy there runs a ridge of an average height of 100 metres; -at Monchy itself it rises above 110 metres. This ridge shoots out a -number of spurs towards the Cojeul River to the south. The position -taken over by the 167th Brigade was from a small copse south-east of -Monchy to the Arras-Cambrai road, about 500 yards from the Cojeul, and -on the reverse slope of one of these spurs. -<!--153.png--><a name="Page_132" id="Page_132"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 132]</span> -Observation for them was -bad, and the enemy trenches were well sited and frequently over the -crest of the hill.</p> - -<p>On the 29th the 169th Brigade took over the right of the line from the -167th. The front line was then held by the London Rifle Brigade, the -2nd London Regt., the 1st London Regt., and the 7th Middlesex -Regiment. The Queen Victoria’s Rifles were in support of the Queen’s -Westminster Rifles in reserve to the right brigade, and the 3rd London -Regt. in support and the 8th Middlesex Regt. in reserve to the left -brigade.</p> - -<p>With a view to the important operations which the French were to carry -out on the 5th May, it was decided to attack on an extended front at -Arras on the 3rd. While the Third and First Armies attacked from -Fontaine-les-Croisilles to Fresnoy, the Fifth Army launched an attack -on the Hindenburg Line about Bullecourt. This gave a total front of -over sixteen miles. [The Third Battle of the Scarpe, 1917.]</p> - -<p>Zero hour was 3.45 a.m., and in the darkness, illumined by wavering -star-shells fired by a startled enemy, and with the crashing of the -barrage, the men of the 56th Division advanced from their assembly -trenches. As soon as the first waves topped the crest, they were met -with a withering machine-gun and rifle fire. The ground was confusing -and the darkness intense—officers, as was so often the case in night -attacks, found it impossible to direct their men. Exactly what -happened will never be known in detail. No reports came in for a -considerable time.</p> - -<p>With daylight the artillery observation officers began to communicate -with headquarters. Our men, -<!--154.png--><a name="Page_133" id="Page_133"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 133]</span> -they said, had advanced 1,000 yards on -the right, and were digging in near a factory (Rohart) on the bank of -the Cojeul, and the 14th Division on their right seemed to have -reached its objectives. About 300 yards over the crest of the spur was -a trench known as Tool, and this seemed to be occupied by the enemy.</p> - -<p>Soon after this the 169th Brigade reported that the London Rifle -Brigade were holding a pit near the factory and a trench about the -same place; the 2nd London Regt. had a footing in Tool Trench. The -latter position is doubtful, but the 2nd Londons were well forward.</p> - -<p>Cavalry Farm, near and to the right of the original line, was still -held by the enemy, and about 10 o’clock the Queen Victoria’s Rifles, -after a short bombardment by the Stokes mortars, rushed and secured -the farm. They found a number of dugouts, which they bombed, and -secured 22 prisoners. The farm was connected with Tool Trench, and -they proceeded to bomb their way up it. It would appear, therefore, -that the 2nd London Regt. held a small section of this trench farther -to the north, if any at all.</p> - -<p>We must now follow the 167th Brigade on the left. The two attacking -battalions had been met with even worse machine-gun fire than the -169th Brigade. There was no news of them for a long time. It is clear -that neither the 1st London Regt. nor the 7th Middlesex ever held any -of Tool Trench, but a few gallant parties did undoubtedly overrun -Tool, and, crossing a sunken road known as Stirrup Lane, reached -Lanyard Trench, quite a short distance from the men of the London -Rifle Brigade, who had lodged themselves in the pit near Rohart -Factory. -<!--155.png--><a name="Page_134" id="Page_134"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 134]</span> -They were, however, not in sufficient numbers to join hands -with the London Rifle Brigade, or some small groups of the 2nd London, -who were also in advanced shell-holes, and about 8 o’clock in the -evening were forced to surrender. (A small party was seen marching -east without arms.) The remaining 1st London and 7th Middlesex men lay -out in shell-holes in front of Tool Trench.</p> - -<p>Soon after the Queen Victoria’s Rifles had captured Cavalry Farm and -started to bomb up Tool Trench, with the forward artillery and trench -mortars helping them, the 3rd Division on the left of the 56th -declared that their men were in the northern end of Tool. They asked -that the artillery should be lifted off the trench, as they were going -to bomb down towards the Queen Victoria’s Rifles. But it appears that -they were very soon driven out, as by 3 p.m. the 3rd Division were -definitely reported to be in touch with the 7th Middlesex in the -original line.</p> - -<p>Meanwhile the 14th Division, on the right, which had made good -progress at the start, had been violently counter-attacked, and at -11.50 a.m. reported that they had been driven back to their original -line.</p> - -<p>Brig.-Gen. Coke, of the 169th Brigade, now found his men in a queer -position. The troops on either flank of his brigade were back in the -line they had started from; he ascertained that none of his brigade -were north of the Arras-Cambrai road, and so he held a long tongue in -the valley of the Cojeul open to attack from the high ground on either -side of it.</p> - -<div class="figcenter" style="width: 500px"> - <a name="illo4"></a> - <img src="images/i_4arras.jpg" - width="100%" height="auto" - alt="Illustration: The Battles of Arras 1917" - /> - <p class="caption"><span class="sc u">4. The Battles of Arras 1917.</span></p> -</div> - -<p>Much movement by the enemy was observed during the afternoon; -reinforcements were assembling in Tool and the sunken road behind it. -About 10 o’clock -<!--156.png--> -<!--157.png--> -<!--158.png--> -<!--159.png--><a name="Page_135" id="Page_135"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 135]</span> -in the evening the Germans started a fierce -bombardment of the tongue of land held by the London Rifle Brigades -and 2nd London Regts., and, after an hour of ceaseless fire, -counter-attacked and drove the troops back to their original lines.</p> - -<p>Gen. Hull then ordered them to hold their original line and -reorganise, but before the orders could reach them these two fine -battalions had attacked again and reoccupied all the positions they -had gained in the morning with the exception of Cavalry Farm. But they -were in a bad situation. With the enemy holding the Cambrai road in -force, the only communication with the advanced troops was down the -bottom of the valley, a place of much water and mud. Brig.-Gen. Coke -therefore withdrew his men just before sunrise. They brought with -them, however, a German officer and 15 men who had surrendered in the -neighbourhood of Cavalry Farm.</p> - -<p>It had been a day of very hard fighting, and the gain on the whole of -the sixteen miles of front attacked was Fresnoy, which had been taken -by the Canadians, and a portion of the Hindenburg Line, east of -Bullecourt, captured by the Australians. The enemy had been terribly -frightened by the successful start of the battles of Arras. Hindenburg -and Ludendorff were putting into effect their new system of holding -the front in depth, but thin in the forward zones, with many machine -guns, and strong supports for immediate counter-attack. It seemed as -though their system had broken down at the first test, and, as the -Russians were no longer a menace to them, they poured reinforcements -across Germany. But, as we know, this continuation of the offensive -was with the object of helping our Allies by holding troops -<!--160.png--><a name="Page_136" id="Page_136"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 136]</span> -and guns -which might otherwise have been used against them.</p> - -<p>The 167th and 169th Brigades held the line for one day more, and were -relieved by the 168th on the 5th May. The latter brigade also took -over a stretch of extra line to the north.</p> - -<p>The enemy was exceedingly quiet and our patrols very active. If any -indication is wanted of the high <em>moral</em> of the 56th Division, it can -be found in this patrol work. After an action of this kind, when the -two brigades lost just on a thousand men, really audacious -reconnoitring deserves the highest praise. Again and again attempts -were made by patrols to enter Tool Trench, only to find the enemy -alert. Cavalry Farm, on the right, and the copse, on the left, were -both entered and found unoccupied; but the exact position of the enemy -in Tool Trench was ascertained.</p> - -<p>Meanwhile the heavy artillery kept up a steady fire on Tool Trench, -causing large numbers of Germans to run over the open and seek safer -ground. And troops worked hard on our trenches, which were greatly -improved.</p> - -<p>At 8.30 p.m. on the 11th May the 4th London Regt. on the right and the -London Scottish on the left attacked Cavalry Farm and the trench on -the far side of it, and Tool Trench.</p> - -<p>A practice barrage on the previous day had drawn heavy fire in a few -minutes, and it had been decided not to have a barrage, but to keep -the heavy artillery firing steadily to the last minute. The enemy, who -held the line in full strength, were taken by surprise. Only Cavalry -Farm was visible from our line, and the 4th London Regt. swept into -this place with no difficulty. -<!--161.png--><a name="Page_137" id="Page_137"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 137]</span> -But the right of the enemy line was able -to put up a fight, and the left company of the London Scottish -suffered somewhat severely. Except for this one point, the trench was -vacated by its garrison in a wild scramble. They could not, however, -escape the Lewis gunners and brigade machine-gunners, who did some -good execution. Quite a lot of the enemy were killed in the trench and -a round dozen taken prisoner—they were of the 128th Infantry Regt. -and the 5th Grenadier Regt. Eight machine guns were also found.</p> - -<p>Tool Trench was only a part of the enemy line which ran up the hill on -the east of Monchy. To the south of the copse it was Tool and to the -north it was Hook. The very northern end of Tool and all of Hook -remained in the hands of the enemy. A block was made by filling in -about forty yards of the trench and the new line was consolidated.</p> - -<p>The new line had been much damaged by our fire, but it was soon -reconstructed, and two communication trenches were dug to the old -line. Meanwhile the trench mortars kept up a steady bombardment of -Hook Trench, and snipers picked off the enemy as he attempted to seek -the safer shell-holes in the open.</p> - -<p>During the next few days several deserters from the 5th Grenadier -Regt. came in, and they, in common with other prisoners, persisted in -stating that the enemy was contemplating a retirement. Patrols, -however, always found Lanyard Trench and Hook fully garrisoned. The -167th Brigade had taken over the line from the 168th, and the 8th -Middlesex attempted to rush both Lanyard and Hook; this was not done -in force, but was more in the nature of a surprise by strong patrols. -They found the enemy too alert.</p> - -<p>On the 19th something in the nature of an attack -<!--162.png--><a name="Page_138" id="Page_138"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 138]</span> -in force was carried -out. The 8th Middlesex made a night attack, in conjunction with the -29th Division, on Hook Trench and the support line behind it. The -Middlesex men gained the junction of Hook and Tool, but were very -“bunched”; the 187th Brigade on the left made no progress at all. It -is probable that the Middlesex were more to the left than they -imagined, as they were heavily bombed from both flanks, and eventually -forced to withdraw.</p> - -<p>On the 20th May the weary troops of the 56th Division were relieved by -the 37th Division.</p> - -<p>In these actions and in the battle on the 3rd May the objectives were -shallow and the enemy fully prepared to resist, with large -reinforcements of men and guns in the field. The enemy barrage was -considered the heaviest that had, as yet, been encountered. The -positions attacked were well sited and frequently masked, and there -was also the complication of night assaults at short notice. -Brig.-Gen. Freeth, in an interesting report of the battle on the 3rd, -says:</p> - -<p class="blockquote">“... Owing to the darkness it was extremely difficult for - the assaulting troops to keep direction or the correct - distances between waves. The tendency was for rear waves to - push forward too fast for fear of losing touch with the wave - in front of them. Consequently, by the time the leading wave - was approaching Tool Trench, all the rear waves had - telescoped into it. Even if Tool Trench had been taken, much - delay would have been caused in extricating and moving - forward waves allotted to the further objectives.”</p> - -<p>Anyone who has taken part in a night attack will appreciate these -difficulties. If it goes well it is very well, but if not the -confusion is appalling.</p> - -<p><!--163.png--><a name="Page_139" id="Page_139"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 139]</span> -The casualties from the 29th April to 21st May were 79 officers and -2,022 other ranks.</p> - -<p>The general situation was that on the 5th May the French had delivered -their attack on the Chemin-des-Dames and achieved their object, but on -the whole the French offensive was disappointing. On the British -front, however, 19,500 prisoners and 257 guns had been captured, and -the situation round Arras greatly improved. The spring offensive was -at an end.</p> - -<p>But fighting did not cease round Arras and over the width of the sixty -square miles of regained country. The Messines attack in the north was -in course of preparation, and the orders to the Fifth, Third, and -First Armies were to continue operations, with the forces left to -them, with the object of keeping the enemy in doubt as to whether the -offensive would be continued. Objectives, of a limited nature, were to -be selected, and importance given to such actions by combining with -them feint attacks. They were successful in their object, but there -was bitter with the sweet, as Sir Douglas Haig writes:</p> - -<p class="blockquote">“These measures seem to have had considerable success, if - any weight may be attached to the enemy’s reports concerning - them. They involved, however, the disadvantage that I - frequently found myself unable to deny the German accounts - of the bloody repulse of extensive British attacks which, in - fact, never took place.”</p> - -<p>The attack on Messines was launched on the 7th June, and was a -complete success. With the first crash of our concentrated artillery -nineteen mines were exploded, and our troops swept forward all along -the line. By the evening 7,200 prisoners, 67 guns, -<!--164.png--><a name="Page_140" id="Page_140"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 140]</span> -94 trench mortars, -and 294 machine-guns had been captured.</p> - -<p>The 56th Division indulged in a little well-earned rest. We read of -sports and horse shows in the vicinity of Habarcq, of concerts given -by the “Bow Bells” concert party (formed in 1916 at Souastre), and -diaries have the welcome entries “troops resting” as the only event of -the day. But this was not for long. Battalions were soon back in the -line, though much reduced in strength. For the first time we find, in -spite of reinforcements, that the average strength of battalions fell -to just over eight hundred.</p> - -<p>The 169th Brigade lost Capt. Newnham, who went to the New Zealand -Division as G.S.O.2. He instituted a form of official diary which is a -delight to read—concise, but with occasional reflections of a dry, -humorous nature. Capt. Carden Roe, from the 29th Division, took his -place as Brigade Major.</p> - -<p>During the 9th, 10th, and 11th of June the division relieved the 61st -Division in the line. The position was the same—Tool Trench from the -copse, on the left, to Cavalry Farm, but it was extended to Wancourt -Tower on the right.</p> - -<p>The front now held measured 2,700 yards. Wancourt Tower was on the -summit of the high spur which runs parallel to the Cojeul River on the -south bank. The line can, then, be visualised stretching across the -valley, with right and left flanks of the division on the high ground -on either side of the river. From the right good observation was -obtained over the enemy lines on the left of the divisional front, and -from the copse, on the left of the line, similar observation could be -had over the enemy on the right.</p> - -<p>The 3rd Division was on the left of the 56th, and -<!--165.png--><a name="Page_141" id="Page_141"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 141]</span> -on the 14th June, at -7.30 a.m., the former launched an attack on Hook Trench. The attack -was a complete success; the division came level with the 56th and -captured 175 prisoners.</p> - -<p>The right of the 56th Division was held by the Queen’s Westminster -Rifles, and a few minutes after five o’clock in the evening sentries -noticed enemy movement behind a wood (Bois du Vert) which was opposite -the 3rd Division and on the left flank of the 56th. Careful watching -revealed the massing of troops. A warning was sent over the telephone. -The 76th Brigade, immediately on the left of the 56th Division, was -informed, as was the artillery.</p> - -<p>Killing human beings is not dear to the heart of Englishmen. Green -troops would stand violent shelling, merely looking a bit tense about -the face, but although they saw their comrades fall, shattered to -pieces, or badly wounded, they would sometimes show a great -disinclination to fire on Germans walking in the open behind the enemy -lines. It seemed as though the idea was that the particular German in -question was not trying to injure them—he might have been carrying a -plank or a bag of rations—and so they would watch him and no one -would attempt to shoot unless there was an old soldier with them. This -frame of mind, however, did not last long.</p> - -<p>But the evening of the 14th June was an occasion for glee. The Hun was -going to attack and all was ready for him. At 5.30 the grey waves left -the enemy trenches, and at once a storm of artillery, machine-gun, and -rifle fire met them. The Queen’s Westminster Rifles, of course, could -not fire, but they watched the action with great joy, and kept Brigade -and Divisional Headquarters informed of every -<!--166.png--><a name="Page_142" id="Page_142"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 142]</span> -enemy move. The attack -was smashed up and, thanks to the Queen’s Westminster Rifles, the -enemy was chased out of sight by the artillery.</p> - -<p>After this costly lesson the Germans tried a night attack on the 16th -at 2.30 a.m. This time they succeeded in entering two posts, but the -3rd Division drove them out and the men of the 56th inflicted heavy -casualties from the flank.</p> - -<p>Nothing more was done in this line beyond some skirmishing round a -post. The division was relieved on the 4th July and moved to the Le -Cauroy area.</p> - -<p class="center">* * * * * * *</p> - -<p>We have said very little about the Divisional Artillery, but to follow -them too closely in these engagements would lead to confusion. They -supported the 56th Division during the battle of Arras—in the -original scheme—and when the division moved on the 20th April the -artillery remained where it was. Brig.-Gen. Elkington writes:</p> - -<p class="blockquote">“The 56th Divisional Artillery remained in the line in this - sector, under different C.R.A.s and covering different - divisions, and were not under my command again until the end - of May, as I remained with the 56th Division and commanded - the artillery covering them. All the divisional artilleries - became much mixed up, and very few of the C.R.A.s had their - own artillery under their own command....</p> - -<p class="blockquote">On the 24th May the division moved to the Habarcq area, and - remained there until the 9th June. I established the R.A. - Headquarters at Beaumetz, so as to keep in touch with our - artillery, who were still in the line. At the end of May I - got four days’ leave and went to Paris with Hawkes, - Jorgensen, and Robinson, and we were joined there by Cols. - Groves -<!--167.png--><a name="Page_143" id="Page_143"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 143]</span> - and Lemon. We all had an excellent time, and - enjoyed it immensely.... On the 5th July the 56th Divisional - Artillery returned to my command, and we started to march to - the Ypres area, and arrived at Oudezeele on the 13th July - 1917. This was a very clean and comfortable village, and all - ranks were well billeted. We remained there until the 28th - July, a very pleasant and well-earned rest for both officers - and men, beautiful weather, and many sports were organised - for officers and men. Several fatigue parties had to be - furnished to assist the heavy artillery in the supply of - ammunition, and these had very hard work and some - casualties. During the later part our trench mortar - batteries, under Capt. Robinson, went into the line with the - Guards Division, and had rather a strenuous time doing - excellent work. On the 9th July I went home on ten days’ - leave, and I got married on the 12th July....”</p> - -<p>At one period of the war it was thought that the artillery had a -“soft” time, but as the war progressed it was seen that the zone which -included the lighter guns included also conditions which rendered the -comfort of artillerymen scarcely more enviable than that of the -infantry. We shall soon be able to throw a little more light on the -work of this very gallant arm of the Service.</p> - - - <p class="p2 footnote"> <a name="footnote_4" id="footnote_4"></a> -<a href="#fnanchor_4"><span class="muchsmaller">[4]</span></a> - <cite>My War Memories, 1914-1918.</cite></p> -</div><!--end chapter four--> - -<div class="chapter"> -<p><!--168.png--><a name="Page_144" id="Page_144"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 144]</span></p> -<h3 class="p4">CHAPTER <abbr title="five">V</abbr></h3> - -<h4>YPRES</h4> - -<p class="p2">On the 2nd July a rearrangement of the front had placed the 56th -Division in the <abbr title="seven">VII</abbr> Corps, and they remained at Le Cauroy under the -orders of that Corps until the 23rd July, when they moved to -Eperlecques, near St. Omer, and came under the Fifth Army.</p> - -<p>But the division lost Gen. Hull. It was absolutely necessary that he -should undergo a surgical operation, and the matter could not be -postponed any longer, so he went back to England. He was looked upon -as a friend as much as a commander, his striking personality had -impressed itself on all ranks, and his tall figure was recognised from -afar and welcomed whenever he visited the line or billets. The men saw -in him a fearless commander who knew his business. We are indebted to -Major Newnham for the following anecdote:</p> - -<p class="blockquote">“After the 1st July show (1916), the 169th Brigade held the - trenches in front of Fouquevillers. The trenches, though on - top of a hill, were dreadful. My diary records ‘all C.T.s - thigh-deep in mud.’ Gen. Hull doubted our statement, so on - Sunday, the 9th July, when he came to Brigade Headquarters, - I showed him the state of things. We went up the main C.T., - and gradually the slime rose, first ankle, then knee, then - thigh-deep. At length, where the C.T. ran in a hollow, I - said, ‘Now we get to a really -<!--169.png--><a name="Page_145" id="Page_145"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 145]</span> - deep bit, sir!’ He said, - ‘Well, I’m damned if I’m going through it—I’m getting out!’ - And we went over the top, though in full view from a large - part of the Boche positions, and walked back in the open, - too!”</p> - -<p>And the General was enthusiastic in praise of his division.</p> - -<p>“We were a happy family,” he says. And “what pleased me as much as -their fighting qualities was their good temper and cheerfulness under -all circumstances,” and the circumstances were at times appallingly -severe. He was himself always cheerful, though his pet dog, an Irish -greyhound named Roy, has been described as “a miserable hound.” He -encouraged his staff to play “bridge” whenever their work permitted, -as a means of taking their minds off the war. All work and no play -would have made even a G.S.O.1 a dull boy, and relaxation was not easy -to find. He commanded the 4th Battalion Middlesex Regt. at Mons, and -was given command of the 10th Brigade on the 17th November 1914. When -he first entered the army in 1887, he joined the Royal Scots -Fusiliers, and was transferred to the Middlesex Regt. in 1912. We are -sorry to say that the “miserable hound,” Roy, who had been with the -General since January 1916, cut a tendon and had to be destroyed in -Belgium, although he survived the war.</p> - -<p>Gen. Hull was not, however, lost to the division, as he returned -later. Meanwhile Gen. W. Douglas Smith was given command.</p> - -<p>Troops were being massed for the big offensive at Ypres, and the Fifth -Army Staff, under Sir Hubert -<!--170.png--><a name="Page_146" id="Page_146"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 146]</span> -Gough, had been moved to take command of -the greater part of the salient. Sir Herbert Plumer was still there, -but on the southern side, and with a reduced army.</p> - -<p class="center">* * * * * * *</p> - -<p>In July 1917 England reached the summit of her military power in -France. There were 52 divisions from the Motherland, 4 from Canada, 5 -from Australia, 1 from New Zealand. One might, therefore, expect a -year of great results. And so it was, though not perhaps obviously -apparent.</p> - -<p>Writing of the year as a whole, Sir Douglas Haig says:</p> - -<p class="blockquote">“The general conditions of the struggle this year have been - very different from those contemplated at the conference of - the Allied Commanders held in November 1916. The great - general and simultaneous offensive then agreed on did not - materialise. Russia, though some of her leaders made a fine - effort at one period, not only failed to give the help - expected of her, but even failed to prevent the enemy from - transferring some forty divisions from her front in exchange - for tired ones used up in the Western theatre, or from - replacing losses in his divisions on this side by drafts of - fresh and well-trained men drawn from divisions in the East.</p> - -<p class="blockquote">The combined French and British offensive in the spring was - launched before Italy could be ready; and the splendid - effort made by Italy at a later period was, unfortunately, - followed by developments which resulted in a weakening of - the Allied forces in this theatre before the conclusion of - our offensive.</p> - -<p class="blockquote">In these circumstances the task of the British and French - armies has been a far heavier one throughout the year than - was originally anticipated, and the -<!--171.png--><a name="Page_147" id="Page_147"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 147]</span> - enemy’s means of meeting - our attack have been far greater than either he or we could - have expected.”</p> - -<p>It was a year of disappointment, but was not a year without -achievement. We had failed against the Turk at Gaza, but had succeeded -at Baghdad; the French spring offensive had not succeeded, and our own -could only be described as a steadying blow at the Germans; Kerensky -came on the scene in Russia in May, and no doubt did his best, but -discipline had gone, and the offensive of Brussiloff and Korniloff, -though it succeeded at first, was well in hand, so far as the Central -Powers were concerned, in July. The East was the weak spot in our -calculations, with Russia going to ruin and dragging Rumania with her. -It was as well that Britain was at the crest of the power wave.</p> - -<p>After all, battles have a further object than the mere killing of men. -For quite a long while after the commencement of the war the Germans -talked boastfully of their “will.” The will to victory was going to -crush the <em>moral</em> of their enemies. But although the Russian -revolution caused great rejoicing, although the German High Command -claimed a long list of victories, it seemed that German <em>moral</em> -was somehow flagging, and their enemy’s will to victory was as -determined as ever.</p> - -<p>Ludendorff admits that in the summer of 1917 the position of the -Central Powers was better than that of the Entente, but that there -were other causes for “our spiritual decline.” He says that -Field-Marshal Hindenburg wrote to the Emperor on the 27th June that -“our greatest anxiety at this moment, however, is the decline of the -national spirit. It must be -<!--172.png--><a name="Page_148" id="Page_148"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 148]</span> -revived or we shall lose the war.” There were speeches in the -Reichstag containing the despairing cry that it was impossible to win -the war. On the 7th July Hindenburg and Ludendorff met members of the -Reichstag to discuss “our defensive attitude throughout the first half -of 1917, the various failures near Arras, in the Wytschæte salient, -and in Galicia, where we had not as yet attacked, the absence up to -date of any decisive result from the submarine war, and our serious -situation as regards food and raw materials....” And finally, on the -25th July, General Ludendorff wrote that “it is certain that the -Independent Social Democrats are carrying on an agitation in the army -which is in the highest degree detrimental to discipline.”</p> - -<p>And the allies of Germany were giving her a great deal of trouble.</p> - -<p>One can only ask what created this frame of mind? Even a Social -Democrat must have the ground prepared before his doctrines can -germinate and flourish; it must be fertilised with dissatisfaction and -watered with despair. The German and Austrian nations were as one in -their desire for war in August 1914, and so strong that they had -little difficulty in winning the Turkish and Bulgarian nations to -their cause. Then surely we may answer the question by saying that it -was the guns of the Allied artillery and the rifles of the Allied -infantry that caused the “will” to falter, even when the position -seemed most favourable to the War Lord and his advisers. It was a slow -process, but a sure one.</p> - -<p>One must admit disappointment to France and Britain, as the leaders of -the countries allied against the Central Powers, but we cannot see the -justice of -<!--173.png--><a name="Page_149" id="Page_149"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 149]</span> -the German contention that their own position was good. -In considering the events of this war, it is not easy to appreciate -the mind of a man who says “the military situation was good, but the -condition of the country behind the army was bad.” Country and army -surely hang together. The Germans never looked upon war as a clash of -armies alone, but sought by every means in their power, by oppression, -by slavery, by terror, to bend the non-combatant population to their -will. It is a logical view. This war, at least, was waged by country -against country, by nation against nation, and as a nation Germany was -cracking, and her allies with her.</p> - -<p>This was the state of affairs when the Battles of Ypres, 1917, after -an artillery preparation which had been growing in volume for a month, -opened with a stupendous crash on the 31st July—an official date.</p> - -<p>From the very first the Second and Fifth British Armies, and the First -French Army on the left, met with the fiercest resistance. The left of -the Fifth Army and the First French Army gained the greatest -success—the right of the Fifth Army and the Second Army did little -more than capture the enemy first line of defence. Whatever the -condition of the German people, the German Army seemed as strong as -ever. And yet it was being nursed.</p> - -<p>The system with which the Germans started the war was not one based on -consideration for lives. Verdun and the Somme had shaken the very -foundations of that system, and, if the German Army was still strong -and good, German Commanders had already expressed anxiety as to the -future conduct of their troops. Loss of lives and loss of <em>moral</em> had -been responsible for a new method of defence. The -<!--174.png--><a name="Page_150" id="Page_150"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 150]</span> -front line was to be -held by few men and many machine guns, and retirement before strong -enemy fire was advocated. The position was to be regained by means of -rapid counter-attack. Instead of holding a “line,” a zone was held. -Defence in depth was the policy.</p> - -<p>This loosened method of defence lessened the wastage of troops from -artillery fire, and in addition the system of “pill-boxes” was -instituted. These small reinforced concrete forts could withstand a -direct hit of all but the heaviest shell, and were admirably adapted -for the defence of a place like Flanders, where dugouts were almost an -impossibility. In fact, the new German pamphlet, “The Defensive -Battle,” was a distinct departure from the old “Cannon Fodder” point -of view. If the Reichstag was openly saying that the war could not be -won, the High Command of the Army was wondering if it would stand many -more blows.</p> - -<p>Men who fought at Ypres will say that they noticed no loss of -<em>moral</em> in the enemy, and with this we agree; we only wish to insist -that there were indications which had not escaped the eyes of the -German Command. As to the hard, heart-breaking fighting of the Battles -of Ypres, 1917, it is only just to the gallant French and British -troops to point out once more the many advantages that lay with their -enemies.</p> - -<p>For over two years the Germans had held their semicircle round the -east of Ypres. The positions they occupied, though only the summits of -insignificant-looking “rises,” not even worthy of the name of “hills,” -overlooked the whole of the French and British assembly area. Not a -move escaped their -<!--175.png--><a name="Page_151" id="Page_151"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 151]</span> -observers, who knew every inch of the ground. What -a place to prepare for an attack!</p> - -<p>Books of reference will give the 31st July as the opening date of the -1917 Battles of Ypres. It is false. The 31st is the date of the -assault—the battles started with the first indications of the British -intention to attack. Every new trench, every trace of new digging, -every new track taped out, every building, every hamlet, every wood -was bombarded by the enemy with guns and aeroplanes, which became -extremely active at this period. As the concentration of troops -increased, all attempts at concealment were abandoned, and camps were -pitched in the open. The whole area was a “target,” and was well -described by a gunner who remarked, “Every time a coconut!” -Observation, on the other hand, was denied to us.</p> - -<p>All this, bad in itself, the troops were able to face. But the enemy -had another advantage, being on the defensive, and that was the -condition of the ground over which the attackers had to advance.</p> - -<p>There is no place on the whole of the Western Front which can be -compared to this stretch of Flanders. If an infantryman or an -artilleryman attempted to give an adequate account of the conditions, -and the horrors which they occasioned, he would not be believed. We -will, therefore, give the words of the Higher Command, with the one -criticism that they are not strong enough. Sir Douglas Haig wrote:</p> - -<p class="blockquote">“The weather had been threatening throughout the day (31st - July) and had rendered the work of the aeroplanes very - difficult from the commencement of -<!--176.png--><a name="Page_152" id="Page_152"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 152]</span> - the battle. During the - afternoon, while the fighting was still in progress, rain - fell, and fell steadily all night. Thereafter for four days - the rain continued without cessation, and for several days - after the weather remained stormy and unsettled. The - lowlying clayey soil, torn by shells and sodden with rain, - turned into a succession of vast muddy pools. The valleys of - the choked and overflowing streams were speedily transformed - into long stretches of bog, impassable except by a few - well-defined tracks, which became marks for the enemy’s - artillery. To leave these tracks was to risk death by - drowning, and in the course of the subsequent fighting, on - several occasions, both men and pack animals were lost in - this way.... As had been the case in the Arras battle, this - unavoidable delay in the development of our offensive was of - the greatest service to the enemy. Valuable time was lost, - the troops opposed to us were able to recover from the - disorganisation produced by our first attack, and the enemy - was given the opportunity to bring up reinforcements.”</p> - -<p>The enemy view of the conditions is given by Ludendorff:</p> - -<p class="blockquote">“Enormous masses of ammunition, such as the human mind had - never imagined before the war, was hurled upon the bodies of - men who passed a miserable existence scattered about in - mud-filled shell-holes. The horror of the shell-hole area of - Verdun was surpassed. It was no longer life at all. It was - mere unspeakable suffering. And through this world of mud - the attackers dragged themselves, slowly but steadily, and - in dense masses. Caught in the advance zone by our hail of - fire they often collapsed, and the lonely man in the - shell-hole breathed again. Then the mass came on again. - Rifle and machine gun jammed with the mud. Man fought - against man, -<!--177.png--> -<!--178.png--> -<!--179.png--><a name="Page_153" id="Page_153"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 153]</span> - and only too often the mass was successful.... - And yet it must be admitted that certain units no longer - triumphed over the demoralising effects of the defensive - battle as they had done formerly.”</p> - -<div class="figcenter" style="width: 500px"> - <a name="inverness"></a> - <img src="images/i_inverness.jpg" - width="100%" height="auto" - alt="Illustration: INVERNESS COPSE AND GLENCORSE WOOD, AUGUST 1917" - /> - <p class="caption">INVERNESS COPSE AND GLENCORSE WOOD, AUGUST 1917</p> -</div> - -<p>Very naturally Ludendorff claims that statues in bronze should be -erected to the German soldier for the suffering he experienced at -Ypres. But his own picture of the attackers seems somehow to be worse -than that of the defenders, if there are degrees of suffering.</p> - -<p>On the 31st July the assault of the Fifth Army met with complete -success on the left, where the crossing of the Steenbeke was secured. -But on the right the <abbr title="two">II</abbr> Corps was only partially successful. After -overrunning the first system of defence about Hooge and Sanctuary -Wood, divisions were met with tremendous opposition, and eventually -checked at Inverness Copse and Glencorse Wood.</p> - -<p>On the 4th of August the 56th Division started to move from -Eperlecques, and on the 6th Divisional Headquarters were at -Reninghelst under the <abbr title="two">II</abbr> Corps. Major-Gen. F. A. Dudgeon assumed -command of the division on the 10th; and on the 12th the division took -over the line from Surbiton Villas to Westhoek, facing Glencorse Wood -and Nonne Bosschen. But before this date the Divisional Artillery was -in action.</p> - -<p class="center">* * * * * * *</p> - -<p>We cannot do better than quote from Brig.-Gen. Elkington’s most -interesting diary:</p> - -<p class="blockquote">“On the 2nd and 3rd of August the 56th Divisional Artillery - relieved the 8th Divisional Artillery in the line, taking over - their gun positions near Hooge. The artillery then experienced - what I think was their -<!--180.png--><a name="Page_154" id="Page_154"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 154]</span> - worst time during the war. All the - battery positions were shelled day and night, more in the nature - of harassing fire with occasional counter-battery shoots. The - ground was so wet that digging was impossible, and the men lived - in holes in the ground covered with corrugated iron. The early - dawn was the only time it was safe to get supplies and ammunition - if casualties were to be avoided, and with all precautions most - batteries lost 100 per cent. of their gun line strength in killed - and wounded. The artillery supported operations on the 10th, - 12th, 16th, and 25th August, and answered S.O.S. calls on most - days; also a very heavy day on the 24th of August, when the enemy - counter-attacked in force. On the 16th and 17th the whole of the - guns of D/280 were put out of action; enemy shell fire and - exploding ammunition practically blew them to pieces, and except - for the actual tubes of the three howitzers, nothing was found - worth salving. On the 31st August the artillery came out of the - line, and entrained south on the 1st September to rejoin the 56th - Division, and all ranks hoped they had seen the last of the Ypres - salient.”</p> - -<p>We can only add to this that the selection of gun positions was a -matter of finding a place where the guns would not disappear in the -mud and which was not already occupied by another battery.</p> - -<p>The battle of the 16th is the one which concerns us. On that day the -Fifth Army attacked from the north-west corner of Inverness Copse to -the junction with the First French Army south of St. Janshoek [the -Battle of Langemarck, 1917]. The French always attacked on the left.</p> - -<p>The <abbr title="two">II</abbr> Corps, on the right, attacked with the 56th and 8th Divisions. -The objective was the same as that of the 31st July, a line drawn to -include some -<!--181.png--><a name="Page_155" id="Page_155"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 155]</span> -500 yards in depth of Polygon Wood, and so on to the -north. But there is not much point in going over orders. Brig.-Gen. -Freeth reports (with some bitterness it seems to us): “Orders were -received and issued so hurriedly that it was impossible for brigade -and battalion staffs to keep pace with them. There was not time for -the scheme of operations to be thoroughly explained to regimental -officers, much less to the men.” Indeed, the mass of documents is -appalling, and, taken together with the facts, point to confusion of a -most distressing nature.</p> - -<p>It must be understood that Gen. Dudgeon was in no better case than -Brig.-Gen. Freeth. On the 11th August the division had been ordered to -take over the line from the 18th Division and portions of the 25th -Division. On that same day the General attended a conference at Corps -Headquarters and learnt that the 53rd Brigade of the 18th Division -would remain in the line and come under his orders for the battle. He -was called upon to attack on a front of 1,500 yards on a depth of -1,700 yards, with a defensive flank of 1,700 yards extending from the -south-eastern corner of Stirling Castle to Black Watch Corner. On the -12th the 169th Brigade was ordered to undertake a small operation with -the object of improving the line about Glencorse Wood, an undertaking -which the 18th Division had failed to carry out. But the 169th Brigade -met with strong opposition and also failed. On the 14th the enemy -attacked the 167th Brigade, on the left of the line, and drove in some -posts; they were re-established. Later on that day, at a conference, -the Brigadier-General commanding the 53rd Brigade represented that his -brigade was not in a state to carry out the attack ordered owing to -<!--182.png--><a name="Page_156" id="Page_156"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 156]</span> -heavy casualties. The General then placed the 4th London Regt. under -the orders of the 53rd Brigade and the trouble commenced—the -Commanding Officer was wounded on his way to interview the Brigadier. -The second in command had then to go and reconnoitre on the following -day, which left his battalion less than twenty-four hours in which to -make the necessary reconnaissance and preparation to get into -position.</p> - -<p>On the 15th instant, as the result of a conference with the Corps -Commander and the G.O.C. 8th Division, the starting line was altered.</p> - -<p>Owing to the date fixed for the attack, an inter-battalion relief was -necessary on the night 14/15th. In fact the ground was so bad that -there were reliefs, or remains of reliefs, going on every night. It -was not possible to undertake any patrolling to gain a knowledge of -the ground, and in daylight the shelling was so constant and accurate -that study of the country was most difficult.</p> - -<p>The General writes:</p> - -<p class="blockquote">“The darkness of the night, the boggy state of the ground, - heavy shelling of all approaches, and the fact that the - division was strange to the ground and had little - opportunity for reconnaissance and preparation presented - great difficulties in carrying out the assembly ... but the - difficulties were surmounted and the troops assembled in - time, though there is no doubt that the state of the ground - caused much fatigue.”</p> - -<p>So by 4 a.m. the 53rd Brigade, with the 7th Bedford, 6th Berkshire, -and 4th London Regts. in line, was on the right. In the centre was the -169th Brigade with the 5th and 2nd London Regts. in line. On the left -<!--183.png--><a name="Page_157" id="Page_157"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 157]</span> -the 167th Brigade with the 8th Middlesex and 1st London Regts. in -line.</p> - -<p>At 4.45 a.m. on the 16th August the barrage opened and the assaulting -troops clambered out of their mud holes. Red and green lights were -fired from the enemy rear lines, but his barrage did not answer to -these signals for some minutes. But the new enemy system of defence in -depth and by means of concrete forts was to be met for the first time -by the 56th Division. The barrage was good and, if anything, crept -forward too slowly, but the concrete fort was immune from damage by -shells from the lighter batteries, and the German machine-gunner was -able to fire through our barrage.</p> - -<p>The 7th Bedford Regt. was stopped at once by one of these forts on the -north-west of Inverness Copse. The failure to capture this point -reacted on the 4th London Regt., which suffered very heavy loss and -was brought to a standstill to the north of the western side of the -wood; they managed to work their way forward and form a defensive -flank along the southern edge of Glencorse Wood.</p> - -<p class="center">* * * * * * *</p> - -<p>The 169th Brigade progressed well at first. The London Rifle Brigade -and the 2nd London Regt. disposed of isolated parties with machine -guns dotted about in shell holes on their front, but soon bumped into -a marsh. The 2nd London Regt. edged to the right, pushing the London -Rifle Brigade still farther away. And the same obstruction being met -by the 167th Brigade, the 8th Middlesex edged to the left, to avoid -the marsh, pushing the 1st London Regt. as they did so. There was then -a big gap between the two Brigades very soon after the start.</p> - -<p><!--184.png--><a name="Page_158" id="Page_158"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 158]</span> -The enemy resistance was found by the 169th Brigade beyond the marsh -in the centre of Glencorse Wood. Here, along a sunken road, was a line -of concrete forts, or pill-boxes. Hard fighting and heavy casualties -followed. The artillery was no longer helpful, but Glencorse Wood was -finally cleared. The leading waves of the two battalions then went on -and reached Polygon Wood, but what happened to them is not known. The -second waves were checked at Polygon Wood by heavy fire from the front -and the flanks, and before they could steady themselves were thrown -back by a counter-attack which was only stopped by the Queen -Victoria’s Rifles, who were coming up in support. Later in the day a -second and heavier counter-attack from the east and south drove the -whole of the brigade back to the original front line.</p> - -<div class="figcenter" style="width: 500px"> - <a name="illo5"></a> - <img src="images/i_5langemarck.jpg" - width="100%" height="auto" - alt="Illustration: The Battle of Langemarck 1917" - /> - <p class="caption"><span class="sc u">5. The Battle of Langemarck 1917.</span></p> -</div> - -<p >The 167th Brigade, on the left, made better progress than any of the -others—for a time. The gap between the 169th and 167th Brigades was -never filled, so that when the 8th Middlesex came across a second lake -of mud, four feet deep, about the north end of Nonne Bosschen, their -right flank was exposed. And on the left the 1st London Regt. had been -heavily shelled before the start, so that when they did advance the -rear waves pressed on the leading wave until all became mixed, and no -one carried out the special task of clearing the ground as it was won; -the position was that, although the main weight of the attack was -carried forward to the left of the 8th Middlesex, many enemy snipers -were behind both battalions of the 167th Brigade. There is also, on -this flank, the mystery of a company that disappeared. Although it -seems pretty clear that the waves bunched up -<!--185.png--> -<!--186.png--> -<!--187.png--><a name="Page_159" id="Page_159"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 159]</span> -together, they must also -have split; the third wave, composed of the larger part of a company, -was reported by its company commander, in writing sent by runner, to -be in a position north of Polygon Wood; and no doubt he got there, but -neither he nor his men were heard of again. A thin wave of the 8th -Division reached this same line, but were immediately driven back by a -massed and carefully timed counter-attack.</p> - -<p>But the attack of the 167th Brigade was completely held up. At 7 a.m. -the 8th Middlesex saw the troops of the 169th Brigade falling back -through Glencorse Wood; they then took up a position to their rear, -their southern flank being refused so as to gain touch with the 169th -Brigade. The situation remained unaltered through the afternoon.</p> - -<p>About 3 p.m. the enemy was reported to be massing opposite the 25th -Brigade on the left of the 56th Division, and shortly after to be -attacking all along the 167th Brigade front. In view of the barrier of -mud it is probable that he was only trying to reoccupy the ground from -which he had retired. But our artillery had direct observation and -heavy fire was opened on him, and his troops dispersed.</p> - -<p>About 5 p.m. the 167th Brigade again retired to a more favourable -position, which gave them a net gain of 400 yards beyond their -original line. They were then in touch with the 25th Brigade, 8th -Division.</p> - -<p>All attacking battalions were withdrawn and the line was held by the -Queen Victoria’s Rifles, the Queen’s Westminster Rifles, and the 7th -Middlesex Regt. The division was relieved the following night by the -14th Division, and moved to Steenvoorde E., Ouderdom, Wippenhoek, the -brigades being quartered in that numerical order.</p> - -<p><!--188.png--><a name="Page_160" id="Page_160"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 160]</span> -The total casualties from the 13th to the 17th August were 111 -officers and 2,794 other ranks. The loss in senior officers was -particularly heavy: Lieut.-Col. H. Campbell, Major V. A. Flower, Major -J. E. L. Higgins, and Major M. R. Harris, all of the 13th London Regt. -(Kensingtons); Lieut.-Col. R. R. Husey of the 5th London Regt.; -Lieut.-Col. J. P. Kellett of the 2nd London Regt.; Lieut.-Col. P. L. -Ingpen of the 8th Middlesex; and Lieut.-Col. F. W. D. Bendall of the -7th Middlesex Regt. were all wounded.</p> - -<p>Maybe the confusion was inevitable, but it makes a sorry story in -which the great gallantry of the London Territorials stands forth like -something clean and honest in the midst of slime and mud. Gen. Dudgeon -gives us some of the causes of the failure -to reach the desired objective.</p> - -<p class="blockquote">“Insufficient time for preparation and explanation of the - scheme of attack to those taking part, and insufficient time - to study the terrain.</p> - -<p class="blockquote">The portion of the 25th Division relieved by the 167th - Brigade had only been in the line twenty-four hours - previously, and could not assist much.</p> - -<p class="blockquote">Lack of previous preparation. No dumps of any kind were - taken over in the area, and there was insufficient time to - form all those that were necessary.</p> - -<p class="blockquote">Indifferent communications. Tracks east of Château Wood were - non-existent, and the tapes were soon obliterated by the - mud.</p> - -<p class="blockquote">Difficulty of maintaining signal communication.</p> - -<p class="blockquote">Fatigue of troops previous to the attack, owing to the bad - weather.</p> - -<p class="blockquote">The condition of the ground over which the attack took - place. The bog at the source of the Hanebeck made a gap - between the 169th and 167th Brigades, -<!--189.png--><a name="Page_161" id="Page_161"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 161]</span> - which laid their left - and right flanks respectively open to counter-attack. It - also caused great fatigue to the troops.</p> - -<p class="blockquote">The nature of the hostile defences and new system of defence - in depth. The enemy’s counter-attacks were so timed as to - strike the leading waves about the same time as they reached - their objectives, when they were more or less disorganised, - and had been unable to consolidate the ground gained.</p> - -<p class="blockquote">The concentration of hostile guns opposite the front. The - heavy shelling prevented the moving up of reinforcements, - machine guns, and replenishment of ammunition.”</p> - -<p>It seems very certain that the British Staff was somewhat rattled by -the German tactics in defence. Questions—long lists of them—were -sent out, and reports asked for. The pill-box, it was agreed, -disorganised our assaulting waves, although it did not stop them. But -there is a limit to the possible advance of troops in a rush, and this -had been calculated by the enemy, who placed his main forces so as to -counter-attack the exhausted leading waves of attackers before they -had time to consolidate, or even mop up the ground behind them. How -was this to be overcome?</p> - -<p>All officers of the 56th Division seemed to agree on this question. -The answer was, “Do not try to penetrate too deeply.” Five hundred -yards was a distance which troops could cover without exhaustion, and -they would then be at such a distance from any troops assembled for -counter-attack as would give them time to consolidate, bring up -machine guns, and be ready for the counter-attack. Something of the -sort was eventually done, so the experience of the 56th Division was -of some service.</p> - -<p><!--190.png--><a name="Page_162" id="Page_162"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 162]</span> -The attack was not renewed on this sector of the front until the 20th -September, when the Second Army (Sir Herbert Plumer’s command was -extended to his left) captured Glencorse and the half of Polygon Wood.</p> - -<p>The fighting in Flanders was carried on until November. The French -launched a big attack at Verdun on the 20th August, which met with -notable success. Ludendorff confesses to a feeling of despair. -Concrete had failed him, and as to his troops, “At some points they no -longer displayed the firmness which I, in common with the local -commanders, had hoped for.” By limiting the depth of penetration and -breaking up the German counter-attacks with artillery fire the British -troops were slowly eating their way through the defences in Flanders, -in spite of having to wade through mud. Many were the consultations at -German Headquarters. “Our defensive tactics had to be developed -further, somehow or other.” The wastage of troops had “exceeded all -expectations.” Seven divisions were sent to Italy. A countering blow -was the best defence.</p> - -<p>Sir Douglas Haig hoped that the phenomenal wet summer would be -followed by a normal autumn, and continued his attacks through -October. But the wet still continued, and important engagements, with -large numbers of troops and tremendous expenditure of ammunition, only -resulted in a “nibble” at the enemy territory.</p> - -<p>The German-Austrian attack on Italy started on the 24th October, and -resulted in the Italian Armies being driven back almost to the -outskirts of Venice. This misfortune had the immediate effect of -reducing the British Army on the Western Front by several -<!--191.png--><a name="Page_163" id="Page_163"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 163]</span> -divisions, -which were sent under the command of Sir Herbert Plumer, and later of -Lord Cavan, to help our Italian Allies; it also determined Sir Douglas -Haig to continue his operations in Flanders. The fierce battle for -Passchendaele, in which the proud divisions from Canada added to their -immortal fame, was fought, and operations in Flanders reached their -final stages about the middle of November.</p> - -<p>For the effort expended, the gain in territory was small, the number -of prisoners was 24,065, the number of guns captured (74) was -insignificant. But the balancing of results is a very delicate affair. -During the three and a half months of the offensive the enemy had -employed 78 divisions (18 of them had been engaged a second or third -time after having rested and refitted). Deductions from such facts, -however, are a weak basis for argument. Sir Douglas Haig wrote: “It is -certain that the enemy’s losses considerably exceeded ours,” but, -apart from considerations of expediency, it is not clear how he -arrived at this startling conclusion.</p> - -<p>To compare the number of prisoners we captured with the number of -bayonets which the Germans could transfer from the Russian front is -absurd. What then have we left to show as a result for this costly -enterprise? Only damage to that highly important but very elusive -thing which we call “enemy <em>moral</em>.” The enemy charges us, -perhaps with some truth, with being clumsy soldiers with no -imagination, but he speaks with respect of the determination of the -British infantry, in a manner which suggests a growing conviction that -they could never be defeated.</p> - -<p class="center">* * * * * * *</p> - -<p>An interesting figure was compiled by the <abbr title="two">II</abbr> Corps -<!--192.png--><a name="Page_164" id="Page_164"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 164]</span> -giving the amount -of ammunition fired by the artillery of that corps from the 23rd June -to 31st August—2,766,824 rounds with a total weight of 85,396 tons, -delivered by 230 trains of 37 trucks and one of 29 trucks.</p> - -<p>The battles of Ypres, 1917, are as follows: Battle of Pilckem Ridge, -31st July-2nd August; Battle of Langemarck, 16th-18th August; Battle -of the Menin Road Ridge, 20th-25th September; Battle of Polygon Wood, -26th September-3rd October; Battle of Broodseinde, 4th October; Battle -of Poelcappelle, 9th October; First Battle of Passchendaele, 12th -October; Second Battle of Passchendaele, 26th October-10th November.</p> -<!--193.png--> - -<div class="figcenter" style="width: 500px"> - <a name="zouave"></a> - <img src="images/i_zouavewood.jpg" - width="100%" height="auto" - alt="Illustration: Title or description" - /> - <p class="caption">BATTERY POSITION, ZOUAVE WOOD, HOOGE, AUGUST 1917</p> - <p class="captionr smaller">From a photograph taken by Lt. Wallis Muirhead, R.F.A.</p> -</div> - -</div><!--end chapter five--> -<p><!--194.png--> -<!--195.png--><a name="Page_165" id="Page_165"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 165]</span></p> -<div class="chapter"> -<h3 class="p4">CHAPTER <abbr title="six">VI</abbr></h3> - -<h4>CAMBRAI</h4> - -<p>The Divisional Headquarters opened at Reninghelst on the morning of -the 18th August; brigades were quartered at Steenvoorde and -Wippenhoek. These forward areas did not give uninterrupted rest; -frequent and close attention was paid to them by aeroplanes, and -during the following night two lorries were set on fire by bombs -dropped by the night birds.</p> - -<p>On the 22nd, 23rd, and 24th the division moved back, resting at -Busseboom, and eventually arrived at the peaceful area of Eperleques. -The 5th Cheshire Regt., however, remained in the battle area until the -29th. A further move started on the 30th, by train, to the ruined -villages to the east and south of Bapaume, with Divisional -Headquarters at Fremicourt.</p> - -<p>Sports, horse-shows, and the Divisional Band now played a more -prominent part in the life of the soldier, and we find the divisional -canteen being enlarged—a greengrocery, eggs, and butter department -being added, also a wholesale beer department. And, of course, there -was training!</p> - -<p>At the commencement of the war the British infantry were the greatest -riflemen in the world. Then came a period when everyone was mad on -throwing bombs, and the rifle was neglected. At the end of -<!--196.png--><a name="Page_166" id="Page_166"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 166]</span> -the war one -sighed in vain for a half, even a quarter of the efficiency of the -pre-war rifleman.</p> - -<p>Training in 1917 was based on four weapons, and the platoon. The -platoon, we were told, was the smallest unit comprising all the -weapons with which the infantry was armed. Exclusive of Headquarters, -twenty-eight other ranks was the minimum strength, and when the -platoon was below that strength the necessary numbers would be -obtained by the <em>temporary amalgamation of companies, platoons, or -sections</em>. We draw attention to these words because the order was -afterwards reversed.</p> - -<p>The platoon was comprised of a rifle section, a Lewis-gun section, a -bomber section, and a rifle-grenade section. The principles governing -training were based on these various weapons. The rifle and bayonet -were for assault, for repelling attack, or for obtaining superiority -of fire, and the training of this section was considered of much -importance. Each man should be a marksman, first class with bayonet -and bomb, and a scout, in addition to being either a Lewis-gunner or -rifle grenadier. Bayonet fighting was recommended to all sections, as -it produced “lust for blood.”</p> - -<p>The bomb was called the second weapon of all N.C.O.s and men, and was -to be used for dislodging the enemy from behind cover or killing him -below ground. The section should study bombing attacks and the duties -of “moppers-up.” These last individuals should work in pairs. They -were to drop into their objectives and work laterally outwards. They -killed the enemy met with in the trenches, and they also guarded the -entrances to dug-outs and side trenches. They were not to penetrate -down -<!--197.png--><a name="Page_167" id="Page_167"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 167]</span> -dug-outs until the platoon they were working for arrived.</p> - -<p>The rifle grenade was described as the howitzer of the infantry, and -was used to dislodge the enemy from behind cover and to drive him -below ground. The section was trained to a rifle-grenade barrage.</p> - -<p>The Lewis gun was the weapon of opportunity. Its mobility and the -small target it presented made it peculiarly suitable for working -round an enemy’s flank.</p> - -<p>In each section sufficient ammunition was carried for immediate -requirements. Every man (except bombers, signallers, scouts, runners, -and Lewis gunners who carried 50 rounds) carried at least 120 rounds -of rifle ammunition and 2 bombs. The Lewis-gun section carried 30 -“drums.” The bombers (with the exception of “throwers,” who carried 5) -carried at least 10 bombs each.</p> - -<p>The men of the rifle-grenade section each carried at least six -grenades. With this organisation training was carried out in -trench-to-trench warfare and the enveloping of strong points.</p> - -<p>In 1917 the strength of a platoon was not definitely laid down by the -Higher Command. It was suggested that a suitable number for each -section was nine—1 non-commissioned officer and 8 men. But there was -an order to leave 10 officers and 50 other ranks out of line for -“reconstruction.” They would not be available as reinforcements, but -were, generally, specialists and good instructors, on whom the -battalion could be rebuilt if casualties were heavy. Most units -carried out the suggestion of 9 to a section, and any extra men, -exclusive of the 50 for reconstruction, were used as reinforcements -during the battle.</p> - -<p><!--198.png--><a name="Page_168" id="Page_168"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 168]</span> -On arrival in the Third Army area (now under the command of General -Byng, General Allenby having been given command in Egypt), the -strength of the 56th Division was very low.</p> - -<p>The four battalions of the 167th Brigade totalled altogether 63 -officers and 1,754 other ranks; the Machine Gun Company, 7 officers -and 150 other ranks; the Trench Mortar Battery, 5 officers and 50 -other ranks.</p> - -<p>The four battalions of the 168th Brigade totalled 94 officers and -2,802 other ranks; the Machine Gun Company, 7 officers and 160 other -ranks; the Trench Mortar Battery, 5 officers and 90 other ranks.</p> - -<p>The four battalions of the 169th Brigade totalled 61 officers and -1,921 other ranks; the Machine Gun Company, 10 officers and 145 other -ranks; the Trench Mortar Battery, 2 officers and 75 other ranks.</p> - -<p>It was therefore probable that when the period of rest was over the -division would go into a quiet bit of the line.</p> - -<p>All doubts as to the ultimate destination of the division were laid at -rest on the 4th September, when the 168th Brigade relieved the 9th -Brigade, 3rd Division, in the Lagnicourt section. The 169th Brigade -relieved the 8th Brigade in the Louverval section on the 5th; and the -167th Brigade relieved the 76th Brigade in the Morchies section on the -6th. The situation was quiet, and the weather fine and hot.</p> - -<p>Patrolling, of an active nature, commenced at once, and on the 10th -September the 167th Brigade secured a man of the 31st Reserve Infantry -Regt.; and on the same night the 168th Brigade secured two of the 86th -Reserve Infantry Regt. Various enemy posts were visited from time to -time, and occasionally -<!--199.png--><a name="Page_169" id="Page_169"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 169]</span> -entered, but the gem of these small enterprises -was that of the Queen’s Westminster Rifles. On the 29th September -2/Lieut. W. H. Ormiston, with thirty men, lay in wait in the middle of -No Man’s Land and successfully ambushed a patrol of fifteen Germans. -Eleven were killed and two brought in; unfortunately, the remaining -two proved swift of foot and got away. It was not done without a -fight. Six of the Queen’s Westminsters were wounded. Both Corps and -Army Commanders sent their congratulations to this well-known and -gallant regiment, with the added message that the identification was -of great importance. The prisoners were of the 414th Infantry Regt.</p> - -<p>During this month six hundred gas projectors were dug into the 56th -Divisional Front.</p> - -<p>During the month of October raids were attempted by the London -Scottish and the Kensingtons, but the enemy were found alert and the -parties failed to enter the German line. The Kensingtons, however, -were successful in rescuing a British pilot whose machine was brought -down in No Man’s Land, but they had to fight for him.</p> - -<p>The only incident of importance in the month of October was a visit of -ten days of Major-Gen. Bloxom, U.S.A., with his chief of staff, with -the object of gaining experience.</p> - -<p>The strength of the division remained about the same.</p> - -<p>On the 2nd November a document headed “IV Corps, No. H.R.S. 17/48” was -received, into which we must enter at some length.</p> - -<p>The Third Army stretched from the little stream of l’Omignon, which -runs into the St. Quentin Canal a few miles above that town, to -Gavrelle, north of the -<!--200.png--><a name="Page_170" id="Page_170"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 170]</span> -Scarpe. It was composed of the VII, III, IV, -VI, and <abbr title="seventeen">XVII</abbr> Corps from right to left (and later, the <abbr title="five">V</abbr> Corps). The -<abbr title="three">III</abbr> Corps had its right on 22 Ravine, between Villers-Guislain and -Gonnelieu, and its left to the east of Trescault. Then came the <abbr title="four">IV</abbr> -Corps, with its left north of Lagnicourt, on a little stream called -the Hirondelle. These two corps were facing the Hindenburg Line, and -had in their immediate rear the battlefields of the Somme, and the -country which the Germans had laid to waste in their retreat in the -early spring.</p> - -<p>At the time when our pursuing troops were brought to a standstill in -front of this celebrated line, preparations were at once commenced for -attack. Several actions had been fought on this sector before it -settled down to a “quiet sector”; assembly trenches existed, and -adequate shelter for brigade and battalion headquarters had been -constructed. It was now chosen as a sector to be attacked.</p> - -<p>At this time our Italian Allies were in serious difficulties, and -seven German divisions were engaged in this theatre. And, although the -movement of whole divisions had started from Russia without exchange -from the Western Front, a mass of enemy troops were still pinned down -in Flanders. It seemed as though a sudden surprise attack might -benefit the Italian Armies and also improve the position on the -Western Front. But there was the obvious difficulty of a lack of -troops at Sir Douglas Haig’s disposal; the Flanders adventure had been -a most costly one for us, for practically the whole of the British -Army had passed through the salient inferno Ypres. Finally it was -decided that sufficient troops could be mustered to justify the -attack, and -<!--201.png--><a name="Page_171" id="Page_171"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 171]</span> -as the French not only promised to engage the enemy’s -attention elsewhere, but actually set aside a large force of cavalry -and infantry to help in the attack (they started to move on the 20th -November), the order was given.</p> - -<p>The scheme, as set forth in this document, was for the infantry to -break through the German defensive system with the aid of Tanks on a -front from Gonnelieu to Hermies, seize the crossings of the Canal de -l’Escaut at Masnières and Marcoing, cut the last of the enemy’s -defences on the Beaurevoir-Masnières line, and pass the cavalry -through the break thus made.</p> - -<p>The cavalry were then to capture Cambrai and Bourlon Wood, cut all -railway communications into Cambrai, and to occupy the crossings of -the Sensée between Paillencourt and Palleul to the north of Cambrai. -They would come up from Gouzeaucourt and Metz-en-Couture.</p> - -<p>If this part of the plan was accomplished, the whole of the Third Army -would participate in further operations to complete the surrounding of -all the enemy forces in the Quéant salient. Presumably our Allies -would have been called upon as well.</p> - -<p>The <abbr title="three">III</abbr> Corps, composed of the 20th, 6th, 12th, 29th Divisions, and -2nd and 3rd Brigades, Tank Corps (less three companies) would secure -the canal crossings at Marcoing and Masnières, and form a flank from -Gonnelieu through Bois Lateau, Creve-cœur, to a spot called la Belle -Etoile a few miles south-east of Cambrai.</p> - -<p>The <abbr title="four">IV</abbr> Corps, composed of the 51st, 62nd, 36th, 56th Divisions, and -1st Brigade, Tank Corps, would attack with two divisions, on the left -of the <abbr title="three">III</abbr> Corps, -<!--202.png--><a name="Page_172" id="Page_172"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 172]</span> -and the right of the Canal du Nord, towards -Flesquières and Graincourt.</p> - -<p>The success of the whole plan depended on the capture of Masnières and -Marcoing, at which point the cavalry would be passed through the -break, and, as speed was the essence of the operation, in order to -obtain liberty of movement before the enemy could organise either -counter-attack or a fresh line of defence by bringing up fresh troops, -the leading cavalry divisions would have to pass through on the -afternoon or evening of zero day.</p> - -<p>Meanwhile, the <abbr title="four">IV</abbr> Corps would be pushing forward on the left, with the -first object of establishing a line from Noyelles, along the Canal de -l’Escaut, through Fontaines, and relieve the cavalry on Bourlon, or -fight for that position, and join with the original front line in the -Louverval sector.</p> - -<p>Surprise was essential, so there would be no preliminary bombardment, -and these instructions insisted that the greatest care should be taken -not to divulge the presence of increased artillery to the enemy. -Registration and calibration was to be carried out by order of the -General Officer Commanding the Third Army Artillery.</p> - -<p>One of the first tasks was to erect camouflage over all positions -which would be occupied by the artillery. Then weatherproof cover for -ammunition would be constructed. But little more than this could be -done in the time at the disposal of the Army. In any case, the -accumulation of ammunition would have to be spread over as long a -period as possible, so as to minimise the increase of activity on the -railways.</p> - -<p>The action of the artillery would consist mainly in the formation of -smoke screens and barrages, on -<!--203.png--><a name="Page_173" id="Page_173"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 173]</span> -the front and flanks of the attack (to -cover the advance of the Tanks), and the neutralisation of hostile -batteries, the bombardment of positions of assembly, rest billets, -telephone routes, and known centres of communication and command. But -the very nature of the operation precluded the careful registration of -all batteries.</p> - -<p>All the elaborate preparations of a trench-to-trench attack would be -reduced to a minimum, and in many items must be done away with. Cover -from weather would have to be provided for the full number of troops -when concentrated, but no extensive scheme of hutting or new camps -could be undertaken. In thick woods tents, suitably camouflaged, could -be erected, and in thin woods wire netting must be stretched -horizontally amongst the trees, about ten feet from the ground, and -have twigs scattered on the top of it, thus making a sort of roof -under which bivouacs could be pitched.</p> - -<p>As to concentration, the idea was to complete the move of the -artillery before the infantry was brought into the area, to have the -extra infantry in the area as short a time as possible, and to bring -up the Tanks at the very last moment.</p> - -<p>Finally, No. 15 Squadron R.F.C. was ordered to note particularly -whether any of the work being carried out was noticeable from the air.</p> - -<p>The rôle of the 56th Division in all this was to make a demonstration -on Z day and attract the attention of the enemy, and later on take -part in the operation of rolling up the Hindenburg Line. When Bourlon -Wood had been captured, the <abbr title="four">IV</abbr> Corps would secure a line -Rumancourt-Buissy-Inchy, which would cut off the German divisions in -the Quéant salient and threaten with immediate capture their gun -positions. -<!--204.png--><a name="Page_174" id="Page_174"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 174]</span> -In this move two brigades of the 36th Division would -take part on the east bank of the canal and one brigade on the west of -the canal, starting from the Spoil Heap near Hermies and moving in the -direction of Mœuvres and Inchy.</p> - -<p>The 169th Brigade, which would be on the right of the 56th Divisional -front, would be responsible for joining hands with the 109th Brigade, -36th Division, and with them attack in the direction of Tadpole Copse. -In this attack Tanks were to be employed, but the number was never -given.</p> - -<p>Nothing amuses troops more than to deceive the enemy—and we say -“amuse” advisedly, for though it is in the midst of a battle, with -death and destruction going on all round them, men will be as keen as -children in carrying out the scheme of make-believe, and if it -succeeds will roar with laughter. Such a scheme was on foot for the -56th Division.</p> - -<p>For the purpose of making the demonstration on the divisional front as -realistic as possible, a number of dummy Tanks were to be made by the -C.R.E., while brigades would amuse themselves by making dummy figures -of men to act as supporting infantry. The Tanks were to be put out in -No Man’s Land during the night, and would be half hidden by the smoke -barrage in the morning when the attack started; the figures would be -pushed above the trenches as though infantry were just emerging. A -motor-bicycle in the front-line trench was to imitate the noise of a -Tank.</p> - -<p>As might well be expected, excitement ran high in the division. The -construction of dummy figures and dummy Tanks was taken in hand at -once, and by the 19th November a dozen full-sized Tanks were ready, -<!--205.png--><a name="Page_175" id="Page_175"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 175]</span> -together with some two hundred and fifty figures to each brigade -front.</p> - -<p>On the 6th November wire-cutting was commenced by trench mortars in -the neighbourhood of Quéant—250 rounds a day being fired—the Germans -would probably think a raid was contemplated, which would account for -any suspicious movements!</p> - -<p>The time was short and, as preliminary preparation was to be cut down -to a minimum, fatigues were not very arduous. There was a certain -amount of work done on the roads near the front line, but the greatest -care had to be exercised not to make improvements of an apparent -nature. In the back areas, however, the strain was becoming -intolerable. There were troops in every hole and corner. Tents were -crammed full; huts, ruins, any place where men could find a little -shelter was used. And the weather was cold, and regulations about -lights and fires were very stringent.</p> - -<p>In the front line every precaution against accidents was taken. The -attacking divisions occupied their positions in line, but the old -troops remained in the outpost line in case the enemy should secure -identification; also patrols were ordered to avoid any possibility of -capture.</p> - -<p>On the 14th November the Corps ordered the 56th Division to hold the -line with two brigades instead of three, so as to have a concentrated -force ready to act in case of necessity. So on the night of the 18th -the 167th Brigade extended its left and took over the frontage of the -168th Brigade, which concentrated in Fremicourt and Beugny, to the -east of Bapaume.</p> - -<p>On the night of the 19th the dummy Tanks were put in position about -300 yards from the front line. -<!--206.png--><a name="Page_176" id="Page_176"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 176]</span> -At 2 a.m. on the 20th gas drums were -projected into the German lines where the wire-cutting had taken place -(Quéant), and at 6.20 a.m. the whole of the artillery on the Third -Army front opened on the enemy lines with one stupendous crash.</p> - -<p>In the 56th Division front line all was activity. The parties with the -dummy figures moved them up and down in as lifelike a manner as they -could, and other parties hurled smoke grenades so that the enemy might -not see too clearly.</p> - -<p>The “make-believe” attack was a great success. The Germans opened -frantic and furious fire with machine-guns and artillery, and the -dummy Tanks were shelled until mid-day!</p> - -<p>By 9.15 a.m. the 36th Division (109th Brigade) had advanced along the -west bank of the canal from the Spoil Heap to the Bapaume-Cambrai -road, where the 169th Brigade joined up with it on the old German -outpost line.</p> - -<p>Meanwhile, great events had been taking place on the right. The <abbr title="three">III</abbr> -Corps, on which so much depended, advanced through the Hindenburg Line -in grand style and, thanks to the rapid action of the 29th Division -(General de Lisle), which was to wait until news arrived of the -capture of the Hindenburg Support Line before advancing but attacked -instead on observer reports, seized Marcoing and Masnières. The first -bit of bad luck happened at Masnières, where the enemy had only -partially destroyed the iron bridge over the Escault Canal. It might -have been sufficiently strong for cavalry to cross over, or it might -have been repaired to enable them to do so, but a Tank attempted to -cross first and broke through it altogether. This unfortunate accident -did not stop a squadron of -<!--207.png--><a name="Page_177" id="Page_177"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 177]</span> -Canadian cavalry, who, with the dash usually -associated with that arm, rode over a flimsy bridge across a lock on -the Marcoing side of the town and attacked the enemy on Rumilly Ridge. -It was probably troopers from this very gallant squadron who reached -the outskirts of Cambrai.</p> - -<p>Lieut.-Col. Johnston took the 2nd Hampshires across in a similar way -and secured the crossing. But in Marcoing other troops of the 29th -Division secured the bridge intact.</p> - -<p>The <abbr title="three">III</abbr> Corps had therefore done its job, but the <abbr title="four">IV</abbr> Corps was not so -fortunate. Havrincourt Wood had been of great service to the <abbr title="four">IV</abbr> Corps -in the assembly. The 51st and 62nd Divisions, with a fringe of the -36th Division in front of them until the last moment, had completed -their concentration without a hitch. On the nights of the 16th, 17th, -and 18th all the Tanks were moved into Havrincourt Wood, and except -that a battery of 6-inch howitzers got into difficulties farther -north, and that a lorry “ran into a train carrying Tanks,” the whole -concentration was carried out as desired. But, although we do not -believe it made much difference, the enemy were aware of the attack. -Unfortunately, some men were captured in a raid on the 36th Divisional -front, and from the statements of prisoners they evidently divulged -the fact that an attack was contemplated. The time and the extent of -it, however, seems to have been a complete surprise to the Germans.</p> - -<p>At zero hour the Tanks advanced, followed by the 51st and 62nd -Divisions. There was in this sector some of the most formidable wire -on the whole of the western front, but the Tanks crushed wide lanes -through it and the troops advanced steadily. There -<!--208.png--><a name="Page_178" id="Page_178"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 178]</span> -was some obstinate -fighting in Havrincourt village and park, where parties of the enemy -held out until the afternoon, but otherwise the Hindenburg front line -was captured by 8 o’clock. A pause of two hours was allowed here to -enable troops and Tanks to reorganise for the attack on the Hindenburg -Support.</p> - -<p>Once more the attack moved forward. The 62nd Division on the left met -with little opposition, and that portion of the support line allotted -to them was in their hands between 10 and 11 o’clock. But the 51st -Division on the right met with resistance at the village of -Flesquières. The infantry were prevented from advancing by machine -guns and uncut wire, and the Tanks, which came up on the ridge, were -at once put out of action by field guns, which had been pulled out of -their pits on to the slopes to the north of the village. Six Tanks -were to be seen here in a line, smashed to bits by a very gallant -German Battery Commander, who, it was said, served and fired the guns -himself, when his men had bolted.</p> - -<p>The 51st Division could make no progress, but on their left the 62nd -moved forward to Graincourt, and the 36th, still farther on the left, -had moved along the canal to the Cambrai road. And on the right troops -of the <abbr title="three">III</abbr> Corps were well on towards Cantaign. The 51st Division made -a second attempt with Tanks and again failed.</p> - -<p>What follows is one of the mysteries of the Cambrai battle. A patrol -of King Edward’s Horse, operating with the 62nd Division, rode into -Flesquières soon after mid-day from the direction of Graincourt. They -reported only a few of the enemy there and do not appear to have -suffered any casualties themselves. But the 1st Cavalry Division, -which had been concentrated -<!--209.png--><a name="Page_179" id="Page_179"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 179]</span> -in the neighbourhood of Equancourt, had -been ordered at 8.25 a.m. to move forward with their head on Metz, -ready to advance. This they did. About 11 o’clock they were ordered to -push forward through the Hindenburg Support Line, but found that -Flesquières was still in the hands of the enemy, and they were unable -to pass. About 2.30 p.m. they were ordered to pass at least two -regiments by Ribecourt and Premy Chapel and work round Flesquières -from the north-east and assist the 51st Division in their attack from -the south. But they found they were unable to carry out this -co-operation on account of the delay which had occurred, due to their -first effort, and also that Nine Wood was not clear of the enemy. At 4 -p.m. the Third Army ordered the cavalry to push forward in full -strength through Marcoing and carry out the original plan of a -break-through at that point; but darkness had come on and the order -was modified, one brigade being ordered to occupy Cantaign and cut off -the enemy retreating from Flesquières. Cantaign, however, was found to -be too strongly held for the cavalry to capture it, and therefore the -leading brigade remained at Noyelles for the night. It would seem that -the opportunity was missed.</p> - -<p>As dusk fell, the 62nd and 36th Divisions were well forward towards -the Bourlon Ridge, the former just short of Anneaux, and then forming -a long flank back east of Graincourt and to the west of Flesquières, -where they connected with the 51st Division. Farther to the right of -the <abbr title="four">IV</abbr> Corps the <abbr title="three">III</abbr> Corps had also pushed well forward and made a -similar flank facing west, the ground between the two points of -greatest advance about Orival Wood being occupied by the enemy’s -artillery. (Line C.)</p> - -<p><!--210.png--><a name="Page_180" id="Page_180"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 180]</span> -Immediately after the capture of the Hindenburg system the -redistribution of the artillery and machine guns began. The machine -guns, which had been massed under corps control, reverted to their -divisions. Four brigades of Field Artillery, one 60-pounder battery, -and one, horsed, 6-inch Howitzer battery were placed under the orders -of each of the 36th, 62nd, and 51st Divisions. But a fortunate -circumstance arose: it was found difficult to get the heavy artillery -across No Man’s Land into the Flesquières salient, and the congestion -there was such that the supply of ammunition would have been -uncertain; so it was decided to move the bulk of the artillery to the -left, close to the old front line round about Demicourt, Hermies, and -Morchies. In this position they assisted very materially in breaking -up the great German attack on the 30th November.</p> - -<p>During this first day the Queen Victoria’s Rifles were on the right of -the 169th Brigade, and worked along the German outpost line in touch -with the 109th Brigade, who were clearing the Hindenburg Line, as far -as the Cambrai road. The 2nd London Regt. was on the left of the Queen -Victoria’s Rifles.</p> - -<p>It had been calculated that no large hostile reinforcements would be -likely to reach the scene of action for forty-eight hours after the -commencement of the attack, and Sir Douglas Haig had informed General -Byng that the advance would be stopped after that time, unless the -results then gained, and the general situation, justified its -continuance. Although, as we have said, the movements of the Canadian -Cavalry and King Edward’s Horse would seem to suggest that the -opportunity of passing other cavalry through had been missed, there -remained one day when, given -<!--211.png--><a name="Page_181" id="Page_181"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 181]</span> -success, they could still be employed. -The 51st and 62nd Divisions were therefore ordered to capture the -Bourlon position, when the 1st Cavalry Division would follow up the -attack and seize the passages of the Canal du Nord between Palleul and -Sains-les-Marquion; and the 36th Division was to continue the advance -on the west of the canal, and hold the two brigades on the eastern -bank ready to push through and seize the canal, between -Sains-les-Marquion and Mœuvres, as soon as Bourlon was taken. The 56th -Division would be drawn farther into the operations on the left in the -direction of Tadpole Copse.</p> - -<p>When the day broke, Flesquières was found, by the 51st Division, to be -unoccupied by the enemy; they therefore pushed on to the -Marcoing-Graincourt road, capturing a number of guns in the valley -which the enemy had not been able to remove in the night. The 1st -Cavalry Division then advanced and took Cantaing, after some stiff -fighting in which some of the 51st Division took part. On the left the -62nd Division captured Anneaux and Anneaux Chapel, after heavy -fighting, and made more progress north of the Cambrai road, where they -established themselves on the ridge west of Bourlon Wood, and also -gained a further stretch of the Hindenburg Support Line. On the left -of the 62nd the 36th Division advanced along the west bank of the -canal, meeting increased opposition, and for a time held the south of -the village of Mœuvres. On their left again the Queen Victoria’s -Rifles worked along the outpost line and captured a machine gun with -its crew of seven. Resistance, however, was stiffening. The dividing -line between the 109th and the 169th Brigades was the grid line to the -west of Mœuvres, and any -<!--212.png--><a name="Page_182" id="Page_182"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 182]</span> -farther advance to the north would bring the -56th Division in contact with the Hindenburg Line itself.</p> - -<p>Meanwhile, in the centre of the battlefield, progress was not what had -been hoped it would be. The 51st Division were to work round Bourlon -Wood from the east, and join hands with the 62nd Division; but they -met with such opposition as delayed their advance, and they did not -capture Fontaine until late in the afternoon. The capture of Bourlon -was not achieved. At nightfall the 51st Division was holding a line -north of Cantaing forward to Fontaine, making a dangerous salient, and -then in a westerly direction to the north of Anneaux, where, joining -with the 62nd, the line was carried north of the Cambrai road, forming -another salient north of the Sugar Factory. The 36th Division then -carried on the line, which bent back towards the road near the canal -bridge and then forward again to Mœuvres. Due west of Mœuvres the 56th -Division held the line to the old British trenches. The Tanks, in -diminished numbers, had assisted during the day, but no advance had -been made without a struggle. (Line D.)</p> - -<p>In the <abbr title="three">III</abbr> Corps area there had been some heavy fighting during the -day, which resulted in some improvement of our positions. Heavy -counter-attacks were launched by the enemy, and much useful and -gallant work was done by dismounted cavalry beating off these attacks. -But the forty-eight hours had expired, and the high ground at Bourlon -Village and Wood, as well as certain tactical features to the east and -west of the wood, still remained in the enemy’s hands. It seemed -fairly clear that the surprise break-through and complete -disorganisation of the enemy’s back areas would not be accomplished. -<!--213.png--><a name="Page_183" id="Page_183"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 183]</span> -Sir Douglas Haig had to decide whether to continue the offensive or -take up a defensive attitude and rest content with what had been done.</p> - -<p class="blockquote">“It was not possible, however, to let matters stand as they - were. The positions captured by us north of Flesquières were - completely commanded by the Bourlon Ridge, and unless the - ridge were gained it would be impossible to hold them, - except at excessive cost. If I decided not to go on, a - withdrawal to the Flesquières ridge would be necessary, and - would have to be carried out at once.</p> - -<p class="blockquote">On the other hand, the enemy showed certain signs of an - intention to withdraw. Craters had been formed at road - junctions, and troops could be seen ready to move east. The - possession of Bourlon Ridge would enable our troops to - obtain observation over the ground to the north, which - sloped gently down to the Sensée River. The enemy’s - defensive lines south of the Scarpe and the Sensée Rivers - would thereby be turned, his communications exposed to the - observed fire of our artillery, and his positions in this - sector jeopardised. In short, so great was the importance of - the ridge to the enemy that its loss would probably cause - the abandonment by the Germans of their carefully prepared - defence systems for a considerable distance to the north of - it....</p> - -<p class="blockquote">It was to be remembered, however, that the hostile - reinforcements coming up at this stage could at first be no - more than enough to replace the enemy’s losses; and although - the right of our advance had been definitely stayed, the - enemy had not yet developed such strength about Bourlon as - it seemed might not be overcome by the numbers at my - disposal. As has already been pointed out, on the Cambrai - side of the battlefield I had only aimed at securing a - defensive flank to enable the advance to be pushed -<!--214.png--><a name="Page_184" id="Page_184"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 184]</span> - northwards - and north-westwards, and this part of my task had been to a - large extent achieved.</p> - -<p class="blockquote">An additional and very important argument in favour of - proceeding with my attack was supplied by the situation in - Italy, upon which a continuance of pressure on the Cambrai - front might reasonably be expected to exercise an important - effect, no matter what measures of success attended my - efforts. Moreover, two divisions previously under orders for - Italy had on this day been placed at my disposal, and with - this accession of strength the prospect of securing Bourlon - seemed good.</p> - -<p class="blockquote">After weighing these various considerations, therefore, I - decided to continue the operations to gain the Bourlon - position.”</p> - -<p>But in the morning, about 9.30 a.m., the enemy launched a heavy -counter-attack on the 62nd Division west of Bourlon Wood which, -although it did not succeed in driving them back, prevented any -advance. And about 10.30 they attacked Fontaine from the north-west -and east, and after heavy fighting drove the 51st Division out and -clear of the village.</p> - -<p>During the afternoon the Germans again attacked the 62nd Division, but -were again repulsed, as they had been in the morning. On the left of -the 62nd, the 36th were unable to gain ground on the east of the -canal, and on the west bank entered Mœuvres for the second time, but -after an hour or so were driven out. (Line E.)</p> - -<p>On this day, the 22nd November, the 56th Division played a more -important part. The 169th Brigade were still on the right of the -division. The Queen Victoria’s Rifles, in touch with the 109th -Brigade, were holding a line of posts across No Man’s Land and in the -old German outpost line. The Queen’s -<!--215.png--><a name="Page_185" id="Page_185"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 185]</span> -Westminster Rifles were ordered -to concentrate, slightly to the north of the Cambrai road, and to -advance, in conjunction with the 109th Brigade, at 11 o’clock along -the front trench of the Hindenburg Line which runs to Tadpole Copse. -They would also work their way up the communication trenches to the -second line of the Hindenburg first system, and clear both lines as -far as Tadpole Copse. The London Rifle Brigade were ordered to -assemble in the captured Hindenburg Line south of the Cambrai road, -and follow the attack of the 109th Brigade to where the Hindenburg -system turned away from the canal at Mœuvres (see Map); they would -then follow the Queen’s Westminsters in two columns, one in the first -line and one in the second, and reinforce if necessary. The 5,000 -yards of British line up to the Hirondelle River were held by the -167th Brigade.</p> - -<p>The instructions were to carry out a determined advance. The idea, of -which this was the preliminary operation, was for the 36th Division to -move forward through Mœuvres and Inchy, while the 56th Division -captured the Hindenburg Line up to Quéant.</p> - -<p>It was entirely a bombing fight, and was supported by an artillery -barrage, which lifted off Swan Lane at 11.30 a.m. and moved forward at -the rate of fifty yards every five minutes. The division, until the -night 21st/22nd, had been covered by the 281st Brigade R.F.A. only—as -was usual in these battles, the artillery was switched about from one -command to another—but during the night the 280th Brigade R.F.A. had -moved to positions near Boursies and took part in this attack.</p> - -<p>It was hard and slow fighting, as is generally the -<!--216.png--><a name="Page_186" id="Page_186"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 186]</span> -case in bombing -fights. Colonel Glazier, of the Queen’s Westminsters, writes:</p> - -<p class="blockquote">“The barrage got some way ahead of our men, but owing to the - uncertainty of the position of the troops it was impossible - to bring it back. At 12.30 p.m. a runner came with a request - for more bombs, and the news that our men had passed the - Boursies-Mœuvres road and were using German bombs.... Bombs - were sent forward; large quantities were taken forward by - the Queen Victoria’s Rifles.”</p> - -<p>News of progress was very slow in coming in, and the first definite -information indicating success was obtained from observers, who -reported at 2.40 p.m. that the enemy were shelling Tadpole Copse. Not -until 5.30 was it known for certain that the copse was occupied by -three companies of the Queen’s Westminsters. They captured 3 officers, -70 men, and 3 machine guns.</p> - -<p>The London Scottish had arrived at the old British front line about -Louverval at mid-day with the object of relieving the Queen’s -Westminsters and carrying on the attack. They were informed that the -attack would not be continued that day, and so formed a flank from the -south of Tadpole Copse to the old British line, although for the -moment they were unable to dislodge the enemy from a deep crater at -the road junctions some two hundred yards south-west of the copse. At -dawn they relieved the forward companies of the Queen’s Westminsters -and made ready for the morning attack.</p> - -<div class="figcenter" style="width: 500px"> - <a name="illo6"></a> - <img src="images/i_6local.jpg" - width="100%" height="auto" - alt="Illustration: Local Map Cambrai 1917." - /> - <p class="caption"><span class="sc u">6. Local Map. Front of the Division at -Cambrai 1917.</span></p> -</div> - -<p>Most useful work was also done during the night by the 416th Field -Coy. R.E., who constructed a bridge over the canal at the Cambrai -road, although the -<!--217.png--> -<!--218.png--> -<!--219.png--><a name="Page_187" id="Page_187"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 187]</span> -enemy kept up a persistent shelling of the road, -and particularly of the point of intersection with the canal. The -512th Coy. R.E. at the same time made good the road from Boursies to -the canal.</p> - -<p>So the only progress made by the <abbr title="four">IV</abbr> Corps on the 22nd was the capture -of Tadpole Copse by the Queen’s Westminsters, an important gain as it -occupies the high ground to the west of Mœuvres. But it became -apparent that the enemy was rapidly massing strong forces to stay our -farther advance.</p> - -<p>The 40th Division passed into the Corps command and was sent to -relieve the 62nd. The Corps orders that evening were for the advance -to continue on the 23rd, with the assistance of Tanks, the chief -objective being Bourlon village. The 51st Division was to attack it -from the east and the 40th from the south-west; but when it became -known that the 51st Division had been driven out of Fontaine, their -task was modified to the recapture of that village. The 36th and 56th -Divisions were to continue the advance up the canal, and roll up the -Hindenburg Support Line.</p> - -<p>All through the night there had been much shell fire on the 56th -Divisional front. Two counter-attacks had been successfully repulsed. -Owing to darkness and the congested state of the trenches, the London -Scottish were late in getting into their assembly positions, but as -they were not to move until an hour and a half after zero (6.30 a.m.), -which time was occupied by bombardment of the enemy positions, it did -not matter.</p> - -<p class="blockquote">“It was then found,” Colonel Jackson writes, “that the 169th - Brigade had not reached Tadpole Lane, but the communication - trench running from front to -<!--220.png--><a name="Page_188" id="Page_188"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 188]</span> - support trench on the north-west - side of Tadpole Copse, and that a fairly deep valley existed - between this communication trench and the Inchy-Louverval - road. The Germans could thus directly enfilade the front and - support trenches with rifle and machine-gun fire from the - other side of the valley, where they had built strong blocks - and loopholes during the night. The battalion was thus held - up at this point until 2.30 p.m. By this time “D” Company - had, with the assistance of the Stokes Mortars (169th), been - able to cross the valley, face the block on the other side, - and cross the Inchy road, thus surrounding the enemy still - holding the block in the front line opposite “B” Company. - Ten officers, 69 other ranks, 6 machine guns, and 1 trench - mortar—all of the 20th German Division.”</p> - -<p>It would appear that the German counter-attacks during the night had -gained some ground. The valley alluded to by Colonel Jackson is not -shown clearly on the British maps and is only indicated by the very -unsatisfactory sign of “banks.” An imaginative person might have -traced the re-entrant starting in square 7 right up to these banks, -but it was not always wise to be too imaginative with the British map; -at any rate the shape of the ground seems to have been a surprise.</p> - -<p>By 4.30 p.m. the battalion had reached its objective, Adelaide street, -and was immediately strongly counter-attacked. The supply of bombs -failed—it is extraordinary how many bombs can be thrown on such -occasions—and the support line was lost as far as the Inchy road, but -the front line was held. In this counter-attack the London Scottish -were reinforced by two companies of the 4th London Regt. They were -ordered to consolidate.</p> - -<p>The operations on the rest of the Corps front during -<!--221.png--><a name="Page_189" id="Page_189"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 189]</span> -the day resulted -in fierce fighting through Bourlon Wood, and the capture of Bourlon -village by the 40th Division, and a tremendous struggle for Fontaine -into which the 51st Division never really penetrated. Repeated and -heavy counter-attacks forced the 40th Division out of Bourlon village -to the north edge of Bourlon Wood. The 36th Division had captured and -again been forced out of Mœuvres, and had not been able to make much -progress on the east bank of the canal, a failure which caused the -position of the 40th Division to become a somewhat isolated one. The -gallant 51st Division, which had been used in such ruthless fashion, -was relieved by the Guards Division and went back to Albert (Line F).</p> - -<p>At 12.50 a.m. on the 24th the Corps issued orders for the ground -gained to be held at all costs. The 40th Division were to consolidate -their position and attack Bourlon village with the assistance of -twelve Tanks at noon. The Guards Division were to consolidate the line -taken over from the 51st, and the 36th and 56th Divisions to continue -their clearing of the Hindenburg Line. But, as we have said, the order -applying to the 56th Division was subsequently cancelled.</p> - -<p>The 168th Brigade, which was now in the centre of the division, took -over a stretch of the old British front line from the 167th on the -left; the forward position of the 169th was still in the Hindenburg -Line on the right. The main strength of the division was concentrated, -of course, about the Hindenburg Line to the west of Mœuvres, while in -the old British line it was strung out and thin. But the division as a -whole was strengthened on the 24th by the addition of one brigade of -Royal Horse Artillery.</p> - -<p><!--222.png--><a name="Page_190" id="Page_190"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 190]</span> -At three o’clock in the afternoon the enemy again attacked under a -very severe barrage, and the London Scottish lost their hold on the -second line of the first German system, to the north of Tadpole Copse, -but not without a strong fight. The enemy came down all communication -trenches at once, while small parties of snipers advanced from -shell-hole to shell-hole over the open. The attack was pressed so -closely that the supply of bombs could not be maintained, and the -London Scottish men had eventually to retire across the open. The -front line, however, was still held to a point opposite Adelaide -Street.</p> - -<p>On the night of the 24th the division passed from the <abbr title="four">IV</abbr> Corps to the -<abbr title="six">VI</abbr> Corps. But although the 56th Division passed from the <abbr title="four">IV</abbr> Corps we -must not lose sight of the doings of that corps, which continued to -press towards the north, with the 56th Division on its flank. During -the day many attacks and counter-attacks took place, and in the end -the 40th Division retook the village of Bourlon.</p> - -<p>By the morning of the 25th the London Scottish had been relieved by -the Rangers (12th London), in view of an attack to regain the stretch -of Hindenburg Line lost on the previous day.</p> - -<p>The 4th London Regt. were in position on the right and the Rangers -(12th) on the left. The 4th Londons, holding the bit of the Second -Line north of Tadpole Copse, were to bomb straight ahead while the -Rangers, who were in the First Line, would bomb up the communication -trenches to the Second Line and join hands with the 4th Londons. The -attack started at 1 p.m. and progressed very satisfactorily for a -while; but the fighting was very hard and the men very tired. The 4th -London at one time reached the -<!--223.png--><a name="Page_191" id="Page_191"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 191]</span> -Inchy road, but their arrival there -seems to have coincided with a particularly violent effort of the -enemy which caused the Rangers to call for protective artillery fire; -the artillery responded and the 4th London, being in the zone of fire, -had to retire. The attack, which lasted until the evening, ended with -a small gain, but left the Germans in possession of the banks about -the valley north-west of the copse.</p> - -<p>On the 25th the 40th Division was driven out of Bourlon village, but -retained the ridge running through Bourlon Wood. They were relieved by -the 62nd during the night. Three dismounted battalions of the 2nd -Cavalry Division were placed at the disposal of the <abbr title="four">IV</abbr> Corps, and did -good work during the next three days in Bourlon Wood.</p> - -<p>Bomb-fighting was carried on through the night about Tadpole Copse. We -have casually mentioned that the men were tired, and on the 26th Gen. -Dudgeon represented to the Corps that he considered his division was -too extended. It had captured and was holding about one mile of the -Hindenburg system, and, until Mœuvres was captured, his right flank -was in danger, while his left flank, on Tadpole Copse spur, was not -only exposed but being constantly attacked. Two brigades were involved -in the fighting about the Hindenburg system, and, in addition, were -holding a flank 2,000 yards long connecting up to the old British -front line. The remaining brigade was holding 5,500 yards of British -line, and had also to supply one battalion each night to work in the -captured position. There was therefore no divisional reserve, nor -could any reliefs be arranged for the troops who had been fighting. -The <abbr title="six">VI</abbr> Corps placed one battalion of the 3rd Division (on the left) at -the -<!--224.png--><a name="Page_192" id="Page_192"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 192]</span> -disposal of the 167th Brigade, and this enabled the 8th Middlesex -Regt. to be placed at the disposal of the 168th Brigade, which eased -the situation in the Hindenburg system.</p> - -<p>A heavy attack on the 27th was repulsed by the Rangers and the -Kensingtons, and on the following two days there is nothing more to -record than heavy shelling.</p> - -<p>The 26th had been a quiet day for the <abbr title="four">IV</abbr> Corps. Certain reliefs were -carried out. The 36th Division was replaced by the 2nd Division; the -1st Cavalry Division, which had taken part in the fighting up to this -time, was ordered to return to its own corps; and the 47th Division -was ordered into the battle area east of the canal.</p> - -<p>On the 27th, after a night of storm and snow, the Guards and 62nd -Divisions attacked Fontaine and Bourlon villages. Though both -divisions entered their objectives, the positions were not held. The -resources of the Army were considered to be almost exhausted at this -stage, which was probably the reason for using only three battalions -of the Guards Division for this operation.</p> - -<p>The 59th Division was placed at the disposal of the <abbr title="four">IV</abbr> Corps and -relieved the Guards on the next day, while the 47th Division relieved -the weary 62nd. And the Tanks were completely withdrawn.</p> - -<p>The battle had therefore petered out, leaving a most unsatisfactory -state of affairs about Bourlon Wood and village; the situation -opposite Fontaine was also not good. It will have been noticed that, -after the first rush, the fighting was done by the <abbr title="four">IV</abbr> Corps against -the northern side of the salient which had been created, and the <abbr title="three">III</abbr> -Corps held an extended -<!--225.png--><a name="Page_193" id="Page_193"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 193]</span> -flank which, at the junction with the <abbr title="seven">VII</abbr> Corps -on their right, was somewhat thin.</p> - -<p>On the face of it it seems as though the mind of the Third Army Staff -was concentrated on the doings of the <abbr title="four">IV</abbr> Corps and the enemy opposite -them. The Bourlon position had a mesmerising effect, and even though -the <abbr title="three">III</abbr> Corps was suddenly warned by the Army to expect an attack on -the 29th, no very great preparation for such an event seems to have -been made. The divisions did all they could. The 12th Division on the -right of the Corps moved the two battalions in divisional reserve -nearer the line, and organised all reinforcements and the 10 per cent. -personnel, left out of the line, into a battalion about 850 strong. -Other divisions issued a warning to troops in the line. The 55th, on -the left of the <abbr title="seven">VII</abbr> Corps and next to the 12th, sent out a long order:</p> - -<p class="blockquote">“Certain indications during the day point to the possibility of - the enemy making an attack against our front. All troops will be - warned to be specially on the alert in trenches and all posts. - Special patrols will be sent out at 4 a.m. to watch for enemy - movement. Artillery will open fire on the enemy front line, - commencing at 5 a.m. The most likely places for concentration to - be selected by brigadier-generals commanding infantry brigades in - consultation with group commanders. In case of enemy attack all - posts and trenches will be held to the last at all costs, and - there will be no retirement from any line to another line. The - action of troops available for counter-attack will be considered - now. All machine guns will be warned to be specially on the - look-out for S.O.S. signals. From 5 a.m. 29th inst., 1/4th North - Lancs. will be ready to move at half-hour’s notice from receipt - of orders. Remainder of 164th Brigade -<!--226.png--><a name="Page_194" id="Page_194"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 194]</span> - will be ready to move - at one hour’s notice from the same time.”</p> - -<p>On the other hand, the Guards and 62nd Divisions had already started -to move out of the salient.</p> - -<p>Nothing happened on the 29th, but on the 30th the enemy launched a big -attack on the <abbr title="three">III</abbr> and <abbr title="four">IV</abbr> Corps with the intention of pinching off the -salient and capturing all the troops in the area.</p> - -<p>The enemy broke through the <abbr title="three">III</abbr> Corps, the weight of his attack being -directed at the junction of the 55th and 12th Divisions. General H. B. -Scott, commanding the 12th Division, says:</p> - -<p class="blockquote">“I do not consider that the troops in the front system were - in any way surprised. In fact, far from it, as on some - portions there was a heavy bombardment and the Divisional - Artillery had opened fire on S.O.S. lines at 6.30 a.m. Also - on the evening of the 29th November warning had been sent to - all infantry brigades and the C.R.A. that an attack was - possible on the eastern flank.</p> - -<p class="blockquote">In my opinion, the troops in the centre of the 12th Division - were pushed back by the force of numbers. The question of - the flanks being turned is another one for which I have no - evidence to show what actually happened to bring about those - situations. From all accounts the flanks of the division - were turned before the troops vacated the Banteaux Spur and - Lateau Wood. This is verified by those in the vicinity of - those places.</p> - -<p class="blockquote">The enemy had great facilities in assembling unknown to us - in Banteaux, in the factory, and in the wood. Undoubtedly - these were the places he used. The main attacks were, I - consider, made along the Banteaux Ravine, keeping south of - the Banteaux Spur; up the ravine from Banteaux to -<!--227.png--><a name="Page_195" id="Page_195"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 195]</span> - R23c (in - the direction of la Vacquerie) and from the factory and wood - (in the valley north of Banteaux) towards the western edge - of Bonavis Ridge.</p> - -<p class="blockquote">I am confident that the enemy suffered heavy losses. - Undoubtedly he attacked in force, and some must have been - caught by the artillery and machine-gun barrage during the - assembly and the initial stages of his advance. Besides - this, there was much close fighting and many - counter-attacks.”</p> - -<p>The gallant 29th Division held on to Masnières like grim death, and -the enemy never moved them an inch, but he advanced as far as -Gouzeaucourt and was threatening Metz, through which lay the only good -road to the <abbr title="four">IV</abbr> Corps.</p> - -<p>It is not quite clear whether this was the main German attack or not. -About six divisions seem to have been used, but, judging by the length -of the attack and its ferocity, the big effort is indicated on the -other side, the northern side of the salient.</p> - -<p>On the north side of the salient the divisions ran: the 59th, the 47th -(London Territorials), the 2nd, and the 56th. On the 56th Divisional -front the brigades holding the captured Hindenburg system were -disposed as follows:</p> - -<p>The Queen’s Westminster Rifles on the right and the 2nd London Regt. -on the left of the 169th Brigade front in the Hindenburg Line, the -London Rifle Brigade and Queen Victoria’s Rifles being in the old -British line behind them.</p> - -<p>The 168th Brigade, reinforced by one battalion, came next in the -Hindenburg Line, with the 8th Middlesex (attached) on the right and -the London Scottish on the left, and the 4th London Regt. holding the -defensive flank back to the old British front line. -<!--228.png--><a name="Page_196" id="Page_196"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 196]</span> -The Kensingtons -were in support in the old British front line, and the Rangers were at -Beugny.</p> - -<p>The 167th Brigade had been relieved by the 3rd Division, and had -marched back to Fremicourt.</p> - -<p>At about 10 o’clock in the morning the 2nd Division, who were astride -the canal holding the ground won by the 36th Division, reported a -heavy concentration of the enemy on the east of Quarry Wood, between -the wood and the canal, and just behind Mœuvres, also a division -entering Mœuvres itself. But before this mass of troops was reported, -the London Scottish, 8th Middlesex, and Queen’s Westminster Rifles had -noticed unusual happenings in the enemy lines.</p> - -<p>The enemy had started registration by aeroplane, which caused other -observers than sentries to be on the watch. And then it was seen that -the Germans were wearing steel helmets instead of the usual soft caps. -The aerial activity increased, and soon heavy enemy fire was opened -between Mœuvres and Bourlon. The registration on the 56th Divisional -front was followed by slow, steady bombardment, which increased, until -about a quarter to ten a heavy barrage crashed down on the whole -front. It was obvious that an attack was impending, and the S.O.S. -rockets were sent up.</p> - -<p>The enemy barrage, which consisted of light howitzers, field guns, and -trench mortars, was particularly heavy on the blocks in the captured -communication trenches. Gradually the German guns lifted, and at 10.15 -a.m. the enemy swarmed forward to the attack.</p> - -<div class="figcenter" style="width: 500px"> - <a name="illo7"></a> - <img src="images/i_7cambrai.jpg" - width="100%" height="auto" - alt="Illustration: The Battle of Cambrai" - /> - <p class="caption"><span class="sc u">7. The Battle of Cambrai.</span></p> -</div> - -<p>A glance at the map will show the precarious position, not only of the -56th Division and neighbouring -<!--229.png--> -<!--230.png--> -<!--231.png--><a name="Page_197" id="Page_197"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 197]</span> -units, but of the whole of the Third -Army troops engaged in the salient. South of the salient the Germans -were through our lines, and if they broke through in the north an -unparalleled disaster would be inflicted on the British Army. The -Germans tried hard. During the day no less than five set attacks were -launched, the heaviest with eleven lines of infantry advancing in -succession to the assault. We wish to emphasise the position of the <abbr title="four">IV</abbr> -and <abbr title="three">III</abbr> Corps and the general situation in the salient, for if the -56th Division failed to stand fast (and we know they could not be -called fresh troops) the fate of the two Corps was sealed. On no -portion of the front attacked could the Germans hope to gain a greater -success than on the part held by the 56th Division.</p> - -<p>The intricate nature of the Hindenburg Line, although it afforded the -attackers cover for assembly close up to the troops of the 56th -Division, had its disadvantages. Small bodies of defenders could -inflict incalculable loss and, though surrounded, could break up the -attack so that it only trickled through feebly; but, of course, they -must be good men.</p> - -<p>The 56th proved themselves once more to be good men. The German -storming parties were most cleverly supported by their trench mortars -and field artillery. A deluge of shells descended on the posts holding -the blocks in the communication trenches, and the enemy infantry -supplemented the bombardment with rifle grenades. The artillery lifted -slowly, and as it moved so the infantry, assembled at the other side -of the blocks, leapt out on the parapet and attempted to rush the -defending post. At the same time other infantry advanced over the open -from the main trenches.</p> - -<p><!--232.png--><a name="Page_198" id="Page_198"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 198]</span> -With such a short distance between opposing troops one might well -suppose that this form of attack would succeed. It was sudden, it was -confusing, inasmuch as Germans appeared everywhere. But the men of the -56th Division showed the most astonishing, the most praiseworthy -calmness. The training of the division in the new organisation, with -platoons composed of rifle, bombing, rifle grenadier, and Lewis-gun -sections, combined with the coolness of the men now bore fruit. -Volleys from the rifle grenadier sections shook the Germans as they -emerged from their trenches; the riflemen picked off individuals who -were getting too close; Lewis guns, sited to sweep enemy avenues of -approach, sent streams of bullets into the mass of the enemy; and -where the Germans succeeded in reaching the trenches they had to deal -with the bombers.</p> - -<p>In the tremendous battle that followed, the Stokes mortar batteries -supported their comrades in exemplary fashion. The most striking -individual work of all that was done by these batteries was that -carried out by Corporal Macintosh, of the 168th Battery. This corporal -had done extraordinarily good work on the 24th, but on this occasion -he surpassed his previous record. Captain Crawford writes of his utter -disregard for his personal safety, of his standing exposed, not only -to the fire of artillery and trench mortars, but the more deadly -sniper, calmly directing the fire of his gun where it was most -urgently needed. And what of Private Woods?</p> - -<p class="blockquote">“Private Woods had been forced to withdraw his gun from its - original position, and in doing so he lost the stand. He - took up a new position with -<!--233.png--><a name="Page_199" id="Page_199"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 199]</span> - another gun, and carried on - firing incessantly; and later, when the stand of his gun was - giving way through excessive firing, continued to use the - primary ammunition on the enemy whilst holding the barrel of - the gun between his legs.”</p> - -<p>The Germans attacked with the greatest determination, and pressed -forward with a multitude of men. Posts all along the front line were -gradually surrounded, but the grim, steadfast fierceness of the men of -the 56th Division was doing its work. The enemy losses were appalling. -The losses of the 56th Division were great, and where gaps occurred -the enemy slipped through. They appeared in the front line (the -support line of the Hindenburg front system), on the right, in the -centre, on the left. Hard fighting had reached the second line of the -Queen’s Westminsters and the 2nd Londons. Col. Pank, of the 8th -Middlesex, was in his headquarter dug-out, situated in the support -line (German front line), when he was told the enemy was in the front -line; he ordered his runners, signallers, everybody to man the trench -outside, and, leading the way himself, clambered out of one entrance -to the dug-out while the Germans threw bombs down the other. Col. Pank -slipped down the communication trench which ran to the old German -outpost line, and gathering together the first men he could find of -his support company, with a supply of bombs led them back to attack.</p> - -<p>The London Scottish were on the extreme left, holding the old German -front line through Tadpole Copse and across the Inchy road, and -therefore a continuation of the 8th Middlesex second line. Col. -Jackson was suddenly startled by finding the enemy in his line. But -the fierce attack led -<!--234.png--><a name="Page_200" id="Page_200"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 200]</span> -by Col. Pank shook the enemy, and though the -London Scottish had their hands fairly full on their front and left -flank, they dealt with the party in their trench. Col. Pank then -cleared the whole of his section of the old German front line. This -was the point of deepest penetration by the enemy, and was reached -somewhere about one o’clock.</p> - -<p>We must point out that dug-outs in this line were far from comfortable -quarters. Their positions were naturally known to the Germans and they -were continually bombarded with enormous trench mortars, said to be -12-inch. In the expressive language of the Cockney, they were “bumped” -from morning to night. To get some idea of the effect of these engines -on those in the dug-outs, we need only say that each explosion -extinguished all the candles and left the occupants in darkness.</p> - -<p>The Kensingtons had been sent up to Barbican, the sunken road in No -Man’s Land, as reinforcements, but in view of the uncertainty of the -position they were ordered to remain there.</p> - -<p>One cannot hope to give a detailed account of attack and -counter-attack in this mass of trenches. Every hour brought a new -situation, now in our favour, now against us. The Queen’s Westminsters -and the 2nd Londons had suffered severe casualties. Everywhere the -line stood firm in the old German front line. Two companies of the -London Rifle Brigade had reinforced the Queen’s Westminsters, and -three companies of the Queen Victoria’s Rifles had gone to the 2nd -Londons. Practically the whole of the 169th Brigade was engaged, and -gradually they wore down the German attack.</p> - -<p>The message “Am holding on—hard pressed” came -<!--235.png--><a name="Page_201" id="Page_201"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 201]</span> -by pigeon and runner -with distressing frequency. The Rangers were put under the orders of -the 169th Brigade. The remaining battalions of the 167th Brigade and -the 5th Cheshires were marching towards the battle. The S.O.S. was -signalled by the London Scottish at 4 p.m. At 6 p.m. fierce bombing -was still going on in all trenches forward.</p> - -<p>The position was that the 169th and 168th Brigades held the old German -front line with blocks in all the communication trenches running to -the second line. The Queen’s Westminsters (in touch with the 2nd -Division on the right), 2nd London, and 8th Middlesex, on whom the -greatest weight of the attack had fallen, had lost the old German -second line; the London Scottish, faced with the flank of the German -attack, but nevertheless a hotly pressed attack, had lost no ground.</p> - -<p>On this day the Divisional Artillery had fired on S.O.S. lines -continuously from soon after ten in the morning until six at night. A -number of fleeting targets and enemy batteries were also engaged with -good results. The Germans attempted to press forward with their -batteries; in fact, they believed they were going to break through, -and the batteries could be seen galloping into action. On one -occasion, about 1 p.m., a brigade of three German 77-mm. batteries -raced into the open, and were engaged so swiftly by the 280th Brigade -R.F.A. that only one battery was able to get off a round before being -knocked out. As usual the 56th Divisional Artillery supported the -gallantry of the infantry with equal gallantry and determination.</p> - -<p>The German counter-battery fire had increased rapidly every day from -the commencement of the -<!--236.png--><a name="Page_202" id="Page_202"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 202]</span> -operations, gas being used chiefly at night. -But at no time did it reach anything like the same intensity as was -experienced on the Ypres front, or even on the Somme. Hostile aircraft -were very active, flying low over the front line and battery positions -during the latter part of the battle; and on two or three occasions -they hindered batteries in the open by machine-gunning their crews -when they were firing on S.O.S. lines.</p> - -<p>On the right of the 56th Division, and on the west side of the canal, -the 6th Brigade (2nd Division) stood firmly in line with the 56th. The -attack on the east of the canal fell on the 99th Brigade of the 2nd -Division and the 140th Brigade of the 47th Division, holding the crest -of the ridge running from Bourlon Wood to the Bapaume-Cambrai road. -The attack came on, time after time, only to be hurled back by the -fire of the guns and the machine guns, and the fine fighting of the -infantry. Full-strength attacks were delivered at 9.30 a.m., 11.25 -a.m., and at 2.30 p.m., but the enemy gained nothing more than a few -advanced posts, and an advance of about 300 yards near Bourlon Wood.</p> - -<p>The situation in the morning had been a precarious one, indeed the -greatest anxiety prevailed throughout the day. The Guards Division had -stopped the German rush on the south side of the salient during the -early afternoon, but if the 56th, 2nd, and 47th Divisions had not -stood firm on the northern side, the Third Army would have suffered a -heavy defeat. There were some frantic telegrams sent at times. At -10.30 a.m. the 2nd, 47th, 59th, and 62nd Artillery were ordered to be -prepared to move their guns from the Graincourt Valley, and to have -their teams up in -<!--237.png--><a name="Page_203" id="Page_203"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 203]</span> -readiness, but these same guns did fearful execution. -The 47th Division reported at 11.35 a.m.: “Waves attacking over crest -F21 (Fontaine) held up by our barrage, which is very accurate. Our -guns have broken up concentration on E16 (west of Bourlon Wood). Dense -waves moving along crest E to W. Our guns apparently drawing them.”</p> - -<p>But the relief felt by the General Staff found expression in a booklet -entitled <cite>The Story of a Great Fight. (Being an account of the -operations of the 47th, 2nd, and 56th Divisions in the neighbourhood -of Bourlon Wood and Mœuvres, on the 30th November, 1917.)</cite> We can -only give extracts which concern us:</p> - -<p class="blockquote">“The 56th Division had been in line prior to the British - attack of the 20th November, in which its right brigade had - taken part, and since that date had captured and held about - a mile of the Hindenburg Line west of Mœuvres, including - Tadpole Copse. Almost constant fighting had taken place in - this area since our attack, and the division, which at one - time had been holding a front of 11,000 yards, had already - been subjected to a very severe strain.... The story of the - subsequent fighting on the Bourlon-Mœuvres front is one so - brimful of heroism that it deserves to take its place in - English history for all time. The most determined attacks of - four German divisions, with three other German divisions in - support, were utterly crushed by the unconquerable - resistance of the three British divisions in line. The 30th - November, 1917, will be a proud day in the lives of all - those splendid British soldiers who, by their single-hearted - devotion to duty, prevented what would have become a serious - situation had they given way.... At 9.20 a.m. the enemy had - been seen advancing from the north towards the Canal du - Nord, and subsequently attack -<!--238.png--><a name="Page_204" id="Page_204"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 204]</span> - after attack was delivered by - him on both sides of the canal against the 6th and 169th - Infantry Brigades. South of Mœuvres the enemy succeeded in - gaining an entry, but was driven back by a bombing attack - after heavy fighting.... From Mœuvres westward to Tadpole - Copse a desperate struggle was taking place for the - possession of the Hindenburg Line, in the course of which - the enemy at one time reached the Battalion Headquarters of - the 8th Middlesex Regt., attached to the 168th Brigade, 56th - Division. Here the German infantry were stopped by the - gallant defence of the officer commanding the battalion, - who, with the assistance of his headquarters staff, held off - the enemy with bombs until further help was organised and - the trench regained. Though much reduced in strength by the - fighting of the preceding days, and hard-pressed by superior - forces, the troops of the 168th and 169th Brigades beat off - all attacks. Queen’s Westminsters, London Scottish, and the - men of the 1/2nd Bn. London Regt. and 1/8th Bn. Middlesex - Regt. vied with one another in the valour of their - resistance.... At the end of this day of high courage and - glorious achievement, except for a few advanced positions, - some of which were afterwards regained, our line had been - maintained intact. The men who had come triumphantly through - this mighty contest felt, and rightly felt, that they had - won a great victory, in which the enemy had come against - them in full strength and had been defeated with losses at - which even the victors stood aghast.”</p> - -<p>The survivors will at least agree that when General Headquarters took -the trouble to print anything of this sort it had been well earned.</p> - -<p>During the night of the 30th November reliefs took place. On the 169th -Brigade front the London Rifle Brigade relieved the Queen’s -Westminsters and -<!--239.png--><a name="Page_205" id="Page_205"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 205]</span> -the 3rd London (attached) relieved the 2nd London. -On the 168th Brigade front the Rangers relieved the London Scottish -and the 1st London the 8th Middlesex. The Queen’s Westminsters and the -2nd London, being the most worn troops, were sent into the divisional -reserve at Louverval, while the rest occupied the old British line. -The reliefs were not complete until 5 a.m. on the 1st December.</p> - -<p>At about 3.30 p.m. the enemy commenced a heavy bombardment of the -trenches held in the Hindenburg Line and the S.O.S. went up. From -movement noticed beforehand on the north-west of Tadpole Copse it -seemed likely that he would attack again, but the attempt, if it was -to be made, was crushed by the artillery.</p> - -<p>On the night of the 1st December the 51st Division started to relieve -the 56th, but, so as not to involve the 51st Division until the -following night, the front line was not relieved before the night of -the 2nd December.</p> - -<p>Gen. Dudgeon makes some interesting remarks on the battle:</p> - -<p class="blockquote">“Although up to Z day the rôle of the division was to attack - with Tanks over the open, the fighting which developed was - almost entirely trench fighting with bombs. No shortage of - bombs occurred, but the men employed at the divisional dump - (eleven men) worked day and night detonating, and at one - time the Divisional Artillery Column echélon had to be drawn - on.</p> - -<p class="blockquote">It was found that pigeon messages were very slow, probably - owing to the season of the year. Trench wireless sets were - used with success from positions within 200 yards of the - enemy, being erected only at -<!--240.png--><a name="Page_206" id="Page_206"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 206]</span> - night and dismantled by day. - The reliable method of communication was by runner from the - captured trenches to our old line, viz. over about 2,300 - yards of No Man’s Land, and a series of relay posts was - arranged.</p> - -<p class="blockquote">The 168th Brigade, with the help of, on an average, two - companies 1/5th Cheshire Regt. and one battalion 167th - Brigade (occasional help), dug a communication trench ... - (about 1,500 yards). This trench, being rather in line with - the Inchy road, was somewhat subject to shell fire. 169th - Brigade also, with the help of one company of Pioneers and - one Field Company, dug a trench ... (1,300 yards), which was - less shelled. The Barbican and Houndsditch provided some - shelter, but in most cases reinforcements and supplies had - to go over the open in full view of Mœuvres, from which it - was impossible to obtain concealment.”</p> - -<p>During these operations the 56 machine guns in the division (two -companies of 16 guns and two companies of 12 guns) were used as -follows: With each infantry brigade, 8 guns; in Divisional Pool, 32 -guns. The 32 guns of the pool were employed on the 20th inst. in -barrage work outside the divisional area to cover the attack of the -36th and 62nd Divisions. They returned to divisional control on the -night of the 20th November. On the 21st and subsequent days the -headquarters of the Divisional Pool were in a central position in -Beaumetz.... On subsequent days the guns in the pool were used for -protection of the flank (a maximum of 10 guns were employed on this); -protective barrage on the Hindenburg Line and on the Hindenburg -Support; machine-gun defence behind the infantry.</p> - -<p>We have mentioned the word “mystery” with -<!--241.png--><a name="Page_207" id="Page_207"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 207]</span> -regard to the battle of -Cambrai and the handling of the cavalry. Though they fought on foot -with the best at Bourlon Wood and Villers Guislan, there seems to have -been some hesitation on the first day of the battle. It is, however, -debatable whether they could have done much. Of the other mysteries -the success of the Germans on the southern side of the salient is one. -Early in the proceedings General Sir O’D. Snow, commanding the <abbr title="seven">VII</abbr> -Corps, is reported to have placed his fingers on a map at the point of -Twenty-two Ravine, and said, “If I were a German, I should attack -there”! No attempt was ever made to reinforce divisions before the -German counter-attack, although the Army was aware that one was -threatened. And this brings us to another mystery. Sir Douglas Haig -repeats several times in his dispatch a suggestion that he had a very -limited number of troops at his command. But we know that he had the -offer of French troops. He closes his account of the fighting on the -30th November by <span class="lock">recording—</span></p> - -<p class="blockquote">“my obligation to the Commander-in-Chief of the French - Armies for the prompt way in which he placed French troops - within reach for employment in case of need at the - unfettered discretion of the Third Army Commander. Part of - the artillery of this force actually came into action, - rendering valuable service; and though the remainder of the - troops were not called upon, the knowledge that they were - available should occasion arise was a great assistance.”</p> - -<p>One naturally asks the question: “What would have happened if French -troops had been used even as late as the 21st November?” If they were -still too far away, there were undoubtedly British divisions -<!--242.png--><a name="Page_208" id="Page_208"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 208]</span> -quite -close up and quite fresh which could have been used to press the first -great advantage gained, and the French would still have been in hand -as a reserve.</p> - -<p>Casualties from the 20th November to the 3rd December were 9 officers -killed, 202 other ranks killed, 43 officers and 1,003 other ranks -wounded, 17 officers and 352 other ranks missing.</p> -</div><!--end chapter six--> -<p><!--243.png--><a name="Page_209" id="Page_209"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 209]</span></p> -<div class="chapter"> -<h3 class="p4">CHAPTER <abbr title="seven">VII</abbr></h3> - -<h4>THE GERMAN OFFENSIVE</h4> - -<h4 class="smaller">THE FIRST BATTLE OF ARRAS, 1918</h4> - -<p class="p2">Telegrams of congratulation on the action at Cambrai came from Corps -and Army Headquarters; Sir Douglas Haig also sent a wire. But there -was no question of rest for the 56th Division.</p> - -<p>The strength of battalions on the 1st December was:</p> - -<table summary="strength of battalions"> -<tr><td></td><td class="center">Officers.</td><td class="center">Other ranks.</td></tr> -<tr><td class="lefta">7th Middlesex</td><td class="righta">41</td><td class="righta">760</td></tr> -<tr><td class="lefta">8th Middlesex</td><td class="righta">35</td><td class="righta">571</td></tr> -<tr><td class="lefta">1st London</td><td class="righta">43</td><td class="righta">740</td></tr> -<tr><td class="lefta">3rd London</td><td class="righta">37</td><td class="righta">813</td></tr> -<tr><td class="lefta">4th London</td><td class="righta">32</td><td class="righta">622</td></tr> -<tr><td class="lefta">12th London</td><td class="righta">28</td><td class="righta">754</td></tr> -<tr><td class="lefta">13th London</td><td class="righta">36</td><td class="righta">850</td></tr> -<tr><td class="lefta">14th London</td><td class="righta">42</td><td class="righta">949</td></tr> -<tr><td class="lefta">2nd London</td><td class="righta">32</td><td class="righta">529</td></tr> -<tr><td class="lefta">5th London</td><td class="righta">40</td><td class="righta">730</td></tr> -<tr><td class="lefta">9th London</td><td class="righta">31</td><td class="righta">789</td></tr> -<tr><td class="lefta">16th London</td><td class="righta">30</td><td class="righta">592</td></tr> -</table> - -<p>On the 3rd the division, less artillery, moved by tactical trains to -the area behind Arras; Divisional Headquarters were at Fosseux; the -167th Brigade in the Montenescourt-Gouves-Wanquentin area; the 168th -in the Warlus-Simencourt area; the 169th in the Bernaville-Dainville -area. The next day the division moved into the <abbr title="thirteen">XIII</abbr> Corps area with -Divisional -<!--244.png--><a name="Page_210" id="Page_210"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 210]</span> -Headquarters in camp near Roclincourt. Gen. Dudgeon went -to see the new line on the 6th, and on the 7th the relief of the 31st -Division started.</p> - -<p>The line taken over was between Gavrelle and Oppy: Gavrelle was held -by us and Oppy by the Germans.</p> - -<p>The enemy was very quiet and the weather not too bad for the time of -year. There was, of course, rain, and it was very cold; a short time -after the division took over the line it began to snow. Battalions had -about a week in the front line, a week in support, and then in camp -for a week. The great feature of this line was Arras, for at Arras -many comforts could be purchased to alleviate the life of the soldier.</p> - -<p>Identification was obtained by the 168th Brigade—a prisoner from the -7th Reserve Infantry Regt., 5th Reserve Division. There were one or -two bickerings between patrols, but nothing of importance. And so -Christmas Day was passed with the division still in line.</p> - -<p>On the 26th December General Swift, U.S.A., and his Chief of Staff -joined the division for a week, to study British methods.</p> - -<p>On the 9th January the 62nd Division took over the line from the 56th.</p> - -<p class="center">* * * * * * *</p> - -<p>The outstanding events of the year 1917 must be carried in the mind so -that the new situation can be appreciated. In the month of February -the Germans had started an unrestricted U-boat campaign and America -had broken off diplomatic relations with her. War was not declared -between these two countries until April, and as an immediate -consequence it influenced the plans of the Entente and Central -<!--245.png--><a name="Page_211" id="Page_211"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 211]</span> -Powers according to the time which, in the judgment of either, it -would be possible for America to make her strength felt.</p> - -<p>The Entente Powers looked upon America as a reserve upon which they -could count in twelve months’ time, or slightly over. They were free -to undertake large operations with ambitious objects, provided they -did not either break their armies, or so reduce them in strength as to -render their resisting power unequal to any sudden German attack.</p> - -<p>On the other hand, the Central Powers had to do something before the -American troops arrived and gave the balance of power definitely to -the Entente.</p> - -<p>Although American action in the future was the deciding factor, the -formation of plans could not rest entirely on such a direct -calculation. At first it seemed that the Entente had no reason to -think that the abdication of the Tsar would mean the defection of -Russia; and the Central Powers could only hope to delay the American -Armies by their U-boats. But the Russian debacle began with her defeat -in Galicia in the latter part of July, and it soon became evident to -the Entente that they would, before the American forces could be used, -have to fight for their existence. They had, it is true, brought the -Central Powers’ offensive in Italy, which had threatened to cause a -disaster, to a standstill, but the Bolshevist <i lang="fr">coup d’état</i> in Russia -in November had brought visions of an overwhelming mass of German -troops moving to the west. December, January, and February were gloomy -months of speculation which culminated in a state of nervous -apprehension in March.</p> - -<p>During the first half of the year the Central Powers had not much to -congratulate themselves upon. -<!--246.png--><a name="Page_212" id="Page_212"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 212]</span> -Baghdad was captured in March. The -battles of Arras in April and of Messines in June were sudden and -definite blows which shook them, and though the Ypres battles in 1917 -were a most costly affair to the British, the German losses had been -sufficiently heavy to create consternation. Well might Ludendorff -utter a cry of elation when events in Russia opened prospects of an -early release of the German armies on that front! He no longer -believed in the assurance of the German Navy that the U-boats would -neutralise American effort, but he saw a chance of victory before the -fatal date of effective American intervention.</p> - -<p>He and the Field-Marshal Hindenburg must have known that they would -have to make the last fatal throw and that there was barely time to -rattle the dice. Austria was done, worn out, exhausted. It was -doubtful whether she could stand against the Italians. Allenby, under -whom the 56th Division had fought in April, had gone to Egypt in June, -and by December had captured Jerusalem; and Turkey, at the end of her -tether, lay at his mercy: events in this theatre of war might move so -fast as to bring disaster from that direction on the Central Powers. -The Bulgarians were not trusted. And there were signs that the German -Army itself had lost its arrogant spirit.</p> - -<p>Hindenburg could count on a preponderance of numbers on the Western -Front, but desertions were appalling in number. Tens of thousands, we -are told, crossed the frontiers into neutral countries, and a great -many more stayed at home, “tacitly tolerated by their fellow-citizens -and completely unmolested by the authorities.”</p> - -<p>The movement of troops from east to west was -<!--247.png--><a name="Page_213" id="Page_213"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 213]</span> -carried out rapidly. By -the New Year the Germans had a majority of thirty divisions over the -Entente on the Western Front. The plan was to attack with fifty to -sixty divisions under massed artillery, varying between twenty and -thirty batteries to each kilometre of front attacked, and a multitude -of trench mortars as well.</p> - -<p>Meanwhile American troops were arriving and training in the back -areas.</p> - -<p class="center">* * * * * * *</p> - -<p>The 56th Divisional Artillery had remained in the Mœuvres sector. -Brig.-Gen. Elkington and his headquarters had, however, moved with the -infantry, and we quote from the Brigadier’s diary:</p> - -<p class="blockquote">“The headquarters of the division and the R.A. were - established in huts in Victory Camp, and I took over command - of the R.A. covering the division on the 8th [December]. On - the 17th and 18th the 56th Divisional Artillery returned to - the division and took over in the line. This part of the - front was at the time a very quiet one, but much harassing - fire was done and a certain amount of enemy counter-battery - work was done on the battery positions. Work was begun on - rear lines and rear battery positions. Very cold weather was - experienced in December.</p> - -<p class="blockquote">We remained in this sector with headquarters at Victory - Camp, which consisted of Nissen huts and was the coldest and - bleakest spot I encountered—it was a desperately cold - winter. From the 1st to the 3rd January an American General - and his staff officers were attached to the division and - went round battery positions and saw some shooting. On the - 5th January the 62nd Divisional Infantry relieved the 56th - Divisional Infantry, and on the 7th and 8th the R.A. of the - 62nd Division came and looked over the batteries in the line.</p> - -<p class="blockquote"><!--248.png--><a name="Page_214" id="Page_214"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 214]</span> - On the 9th January the 62nd Divisional Artillery relieved - the 56th Divisional Artillery and I handed over to the - C.R.A., our batteries going back to the area round Berles - for rest and training, the infantry having moved to the - Villers-Chatel area. The R.A. Headquarters was established - for the first four days at Bertincourt, and afterwards at - the château at Berles, a very comfortable billet owned by a - French Count who was very hospitable and glad to see us and - did everything he could to make us comfortable. Inspection - and training of batteries took place, but this was greatly - hampered by the bad and severe weather.”</p> - -<p>Training of the infantry was, owing to the weather, not very ardent -during the divisional rest from the 9th January to the 11th February. -But it was a welcome rest.</p> - -<p>British strength on the Western Front was now on the downward grade. -From January divisions were cut down to nine battalions, and from the -30th of that month we must say good-bye to the 1st Battalion of the -Rangers, the 1st Battalion of the Queen Victoria’s Rifles, and the -1/3rd London Regt. The headquarters and transport of these battalions -joined the 58th Division and were incorporated in the 2nd Battalions -of their respective regiments. The 56th Division retained a certain -number of the men, who were split up as follows: Queen Victoria’s -Rifles, 5 officers and 150 other ranks to the 13th London -(Kensingtons), 12 officers and 250 other ranks to the 16th London -(Queen’s Westminster Rifles), 4 officers and 76 other ranks to the 4th -London; the Rangers sent 8 officers and 300 other ranks to the London -Rifle Brigade; while the rest passed out of the Division (7 officers -and 230 other ranks to the 1/23rd London, and -<!--249.png--><a name="Page_215" id="Page_215"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 215]</span> -12 officers and 200 -other ranks to the 2nd Battalion Rangers); the 1/3rd London sent 11 -officers and 250 other ranks to the 1/1st London, 11 officers and 250 -other ranks to the 1/2 London, and 2 officers and 34 other ranks to -the 1/4 London (12 officers and 214 other ranks out of the division to -their 2nd Battalion).</p> - -<p>So far as the infantry were concerned, the forty-seven divisions on -the Western Front in March 1918 were reduced by a quarter—this is -exclusive of the Canadian and Australian divisions, which retained -their original strength, and includes the 41st Division, which -returned from Italy on the 2nd March.</p> - -<p>The relief of the 62nd Division by the 56th started on the 8th -February, and on the 11th Gen. Dudgeon took over command of the line.</p> - -<p>Meanwhile “the wind was whistling through the châteaux of the Higher -Command!” The severe cold and the snow at Christmas and the -commencement of the New Year was followed by a thaw and a lot of rain. -The result was that most of the trenches fell in. A period of feverish -activity followed; engineers and pioneers were working every night, -and the infantry had to provide as many men as was possible. Gradually -the defences were reconstructed and new ones added. All this activity, -mingled with orders and provisions for retirement, was greeted by the -troops with characteristic jeers.</p> - -<p>We do not wish to contribute to the general abuse which was levelled -at the heads of the “Staff” or “Red Tabs”—the arrangements made on -this front at least were justified by the results—but we desire to -give as far as we can the feeling of the private soldier and -regimental officer.</p> - -<p>Arrangements for retreat shock the troops in much -<!--250.png--><a name="Page_216" id="Page_216"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 216]</span> -the same way as a -coarse expression might shock a drawing-room full of ladies. They are -offended. They ask the question: “What’s the idea?” And although they -could not enumerate the difficulties of a gradual retirement, they -seem to “sense” the fearful responsibility that is being thrust upon -them. And the very nature of the situation caused orders to be given -which suggested uncertainty and indecision. The private soldier’s -point of view was simple: he wanted to be given orders to fight on a -certain spot, but to change the spot where he should fight annoyed -him.</p> - -<p>The system which was adopted to meet the onslaught of the Germans was -to spread the defence over a wide belt of country. The front-line -system was not to be held; it was to be occupied by outposts whose -duty was to watch the enemy and retire on the next line if he -attacked. The fight itself was to take place in what was called the -“battle zone”; and behind was yet another line through which the enemy -must pass before our defence was broken. If the Germans penetrated -these lines, they might be said to have broken our first system of -defence.</p> - -<p>Behind the 56th Division were other defences on which it might fall -back, but we are only concerned with the first system.</p> - -<p>As to the general distribution of forces to meet the German offensive, -one-half of the British strength was devoted to protecting the Channel -ports, and the rest was thinly dispersed over the remaining front. It -must be remembered that additional front amounting to 28 miles had -been taken over by the British in January, and that Sir Douglas Haig -was now responsible for 125 miles. In view of this length of -<!--251.png--><a name="Page_217" id="Page_217"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 217]</span> -line and -the extreme importance of the Channel ports, the general disposition -of troops would seem to have been wise.</p> - -<p>The Germans claim to have effected a surprise in March 1918—a -contention which is scarcely justified. In his interesting, lengthy, -but somewhat vague account of the assembly of the great attacking -force, Ludendorff says that ammunition dumps had been increased all -along the British front, that movement of troops was carried out at -night, but that German aviators sent up to report could see signs of -concentration on the area chosen for attack which the blind English -were <em>unable to perceive</em>! This is not accurate, but one must -admit that the German concentration and preparation were superbly -done.</p> - -<p>We knew that a general movement of troops from east to west had been -started in November, and that roads and railways were being improved, -artillery increased, and ammunition accumulated all along the front -from Flanders to the Oise, and by the end of February indications -became apparent that the attack would be on the Third and Fifth -Armies.</p> - -<p>On the 19th March the Intelligence Department reported to Sir Douglas -Haig that the enemy preparations on the Arras-St. Quentin front were -complete and that the attack would probably be launched on the 20th or -21st.</p> - -<p>Ludendorff assumes that “nor did the enemy discover anything by other -means ... otherwise his defensive measures would have been more -effective and his reserves would have arrived more quickly.” In this -his claim of surprise might seem to be justified, although the charge -can be met by a statement of the considerations which influenced Sir -Douglas Haig -<!--252.png--><a name="Page_218" id="Page_218"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 218]</span> -through this anxious period; he could give up no ground -in the northern portion of the British area where the Channel ports -were threatened, and he knew that the ground was exceptionally dry and -that preparations for an attack had been almost completed from the -direction of Menin; the same applied to the centre, behind which lay -the collieries of northern France, and important tactical features -covering his lateral communications; in the south, in the Somme area, -ground could be given up to a certain extent without serious -consequences.</p> - -<p>The dispositions of British troops according to the above -considerations had an effect on the Germans, for Ludendorff tells us -that when deciding on the front to be attacked he was faced with -strong forces about Ypres, that the condition of the centre (the Lys -Valley) would not admit an attack before April (which was late in view -of the Americans), that an attack in the direction of Verdun would -lead into very hilly country, and that in making his final decisions -he was influenced by the time factor and the “weakness of the enemy.”</p> - -<p>During the early part of 1918 the whole of the British force in -forward areas was concerned with the problem of defence. It was not a -cheerful period. Closely typewritten sheets of paper flew about in all -directions, giving instructions, making amendments to previous -instructions, calling for suggestions, and ever warning commanders -against attack. The Cheshire Regt. and the Engineers of the 56th -Division worked night and day at improving rear lines and constructing -alternative ones; fatigue parties were called for from battalions both -in and out of the line; machine gunners and trench-mortar experts moved -<!--253.png--><a name="Page_219" id="Page_219"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 219]</span> -restlessly from point to point, selecting possible emplacements for -their guns, and the artillery did the same farther back.</p> - -<p>The men in the line were always the coolest in the whole of the army, -but the officers were gradually being worked up to a state of feverish -anxiety and a certain amount of bewilderment.</p> - -<p>On the 9th March the Kensingtons carried out a smart and successful -raid, killing about 20 and capturing 4 Germans. The prisoners stated -that the German offensive was imminent. Orders were issued for battle -positions to be manned at 5 a.m. as from the 13th.</p> - -<p>Another raid by the London Rifle Brigade on the 16th was hung up in a -mass of uncut wire, but 2/Lieut. Kite Powell hacked his way through -and, followed by four men, managed to enter the German line and kill -half a dozen of them. They secured no prisoner; still, the information -that the enemy front line was strongly held and that they were very -alert was of value.</p> - -<p>Aeroplane activity was very great from the 18th onwards, and a great -deal of individual movement was seen behind the enemy lines. Harassing -fire by the 56th Divisional Artillery was increased, and with a good -percentage of gas shells. The enemy seemed to give a great deal of -attention to our wire with his trench mortars during the increasing -bursts of artillery fire.</p> - -<p>On the 21st March, with one tremendous crash, the great battle opened -on a front of 44 miles, the artillery bombardment including the front -held by the 56th Division. But the attack was launched farther south -between La Fère and Croiselles.</p> - -<p><!--254.png--><a name="Page_220" id="Page_220"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 220]</span> -No less than 68 German divisions took -part in the battle on the first day, many more than the whole of the -British Army contained. The training, carried out in some cases behind -the Russian front, had been so complete as to include the practising -of infantry behind an actual, live barrage. The result was admirable. -Swarms of men, followed resolutely and closely by artillery, broke -through the Fifth and the right of the Third Armies, which were -composed of a total force of 29 infantry divisions and 3 cavalry -divisions.</p> - -<p>The German 17th Army, composed of 24 divisions, attacked north of -Cambrai; the 2nd Army, of 17 divisions, immediately south of Cambrai; -and the 18th Army, of 27 divisions, carried the attack down to La -Fère.</p> - -<p>The 2nd and 18th German Armies made good progress against the British -Fifth Army, but the resistance of our Third Army limited the enemy’s -success, so that the 17th German Army was not able to cut off the -Flesquières salient, near Cambrai, as had been planned. But during the -night of 22nd/23rd March the Fifth Army was back at Peronne, and there -was a deep bulge in the Third Army towards Bapaume. On the 27th the -German line ran through Albert and Montdidier. But the right of the -German 17th Army was not too comfortable—Arras must be swept aside!</p> - -<p>Behind Arras the wildest excitement prevailed. The word “panic,” a -humiliating word, can be applied. But, as we have said before, there -was always a zone of calmness, and that zone was the forward zone. Had -the London men of the 56th Division been able to see the scurrying -motors and anxious faces of the -<!--255.png--><a name="Page_221" id="Page_221"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 221]</span> -“soft job” men behind them, they would -have been amazed. But the 56th Division just went on with the -ordinary, somewhat strenuous routine which had been instituted at the -commencement of the year, strengthening the defences, putting out -wire, arranging “blocks,” constructing emplacements for machine guns -and trench mortars. Being, however, on the flank of the <abbr title="thirteen">XIII</abbr> Corps, -regimental officers were subjected to the annoyance of frequent -changes of orders and plans.</p> - -<p>On the 19th March an order was given for the 56th Division to alter -the method of holding the line from a three-brigade front to a -two-brigade front. Each of the two front-line brigades would have two -battalions in line and one in reserve, and the division would have an -entire brigade in reserve. The necessary moves were made on the night -of 21st/22nd March.</p> - -<p>An order was issued on the 20th that the division would be relieved by -the 62nd Division, but this was cancelled on the 21st. On the 22nd a -further warning order was given that the division would be relieved by -the 2nd Canadian Division, and this also was cancelled on the 23rd.</p> - -<p>The situation of the Third Army, on the right of the 56th Division, -brought a multitude of instructions. On the 22nd the <abbr title="seventeen">XVII</abbr> Corps had -been ordered to withdraw to its third system on the south of the -Scarpe, but to continue holding Monchy lightly. But north of the -Scarpe the 4th Division, on the right of the 56th, would not move -until Monchy had been captured by the enemy, in which case the 56th -Division would adjust their line to run through Beatty Post, Bailleul -Post, to le Point du Jour Post. General Matheson, commanding the 4th -Division, did -<!--256.png--><a name="Page_222" id="Page_222"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 222]</span> -not, however, intend to move unless definitely ordered -to do so, and if attacked would fight in three successive lines, the -last bringing him to the Point du Jour Post.</p> - -<p>This last assurance of General Matheson was of a nature to simplify -the possible actions of officers of the 56th Division, and was -welcome. That the enemy was going to do something was becoming -evident. At 5.30 p.m. on the 23rd he exploded a land mine under the -wire in front of Towy Post, and appeared to be manning the line -opposite the divisional front thicker than usual. Harassing fire was -turned on the German trenches, and the reserve brigade was ordered to -stand to at 5 a.m. in future.</p> - -<p>In the south the Germans were now approaching Albert and Roye. All -sorts of rumours were flying about behind the lines. On the 24th the -169th Brigade captured a wounded German, and he was sent for -examination in the early morning of the 25th. He said that the 101st -Reserve and 102nd Reserve Regiments, belonging to the 219th and 23rd -(Reserve) Divisions, had occupied the Wotan Stellung, behind the front -line, on the night of the 24th. These divisions had come from Riga, -and would attack on the 26th together with the 240th and 5th Bavarian -Reserve Divisions. They were to advance to a depth of four kilometres -with the right flank on Oppy, and then swing round towards Vimy. The -battalion section of the 471st Regt. had already 60 trench mortars in -position, and 8 more trench mortar companies were to arrive on the -night of the 25th. The ammunition was already in the line. One may -imagine that Gen. Dudgeon’s conference at 6.30 p.m. was far from a -dull affair.</p> - -<p><!--257.png--><a name="Page_223" id="Page_223"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 223]</span> -The artillery were ordered to fire on chosen targets through the -night, and patrolling was active.</p> - -<p>A great deal of movement had been seen throughout the day of men and -light railways. Troops were seen detraining at Vitry.</p> - -<p>And that night there was an inter-battalion relief on the right, the -Queen’s Westminsters relieving the 2nd London. The party sent to -relieve Gavrelle Post found it occupied by two dead men only—the -remainder of the garrison had entirely disappeared. Signs of a -struggle were there, but no one on either flank had reported the post -being attacked, and, apparently, nothing unusual had been seen.</p> - -<p>Gen. Dudgeon ordered both brigades to do their utmost to secure a -German prisoner. Every effort was made, but the enemy was found more -than ever on the alert, with parties lying out to catch patrols. It is -curious that one patrol reported the enemy repairing their wire—it is -probable that they were cutting it down.</p> - -<p>The attack was coming, and Divisional Headquarters strained every -nerve to direct, encourage, and advise for the struggle. Some of the -orders are not too easy to understand, and one is of interest as an -example of rumour being accepted as fact.</p> - -<p>The artillery, of course, was very busy, and we find an instruction to -cut German wire and to keep the gaps open! And the order we refer to -as being founded on rumour was as follows: “In view possible -appearance enemy agents warn all ranks against use of word -<span class="sc">RETIRE</span>. Any person using this word before or during an attack -to be shot.” This was, no doubt, based on a much-circulated statement -that the Fifth Army debacle was largely due to German agents, -<!--258.png--><a name="Page_224" id="Page_224"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 224]</span> -dressed -as British officers, giving the order to retire. We cannot believe in -a swarm of disguised Germans.</p> - -<p>It must, however, have been a very weighty consideration which induced -the Higher Command to order an extension of divisional front on the -27th. General Sir H. de Lisle, better known as the commander of the -29th Division and now in command of the <abbr title="thirteen">XIII</abbr> Corps, was ordered to -take over the line to the Souchez River, on his left. This meant that -the 56th Division had to relieve the 3rd Canadian Division, on the -left, at Tommy and Arleux Posts during the night of 27th/28th March. -At the same time the division was again ordered to treat the front -line as an outpost line, and to fight on the line between Ditch Post -and Willerval South. But at the last moment the front line was ordered -to be held as such so as to conform with the 4th Division on the -right; the 56th Division was already so stretched out that this -curious eleventh-hour change did not make much difference.</p> - -<p>The Vimy Ridge lay behind the division, but the ground they fought on -was not level. The 4th Division, on the right, was on high ground, and -Gavrelle lay in a slight depression; the ground rose again towards -Bailleul East Post, and fell once more in the direction of Oppy. The -division was, however, on a forward slope which gave them good -observation from a somewhat exposed position (see map contours).</p> - -<p>The rearrangement of the line, which took place during the night, gave -the Queen’s Westminsters the right, holding Towy Post and Gavrelle -Post with one company, while the other three companies held posts -defending Naval Trench. The London Rifle Brigade held Mill, Bradford, -and Bird Posts with two companies -<!--259.png--><a name="Page_225" id="Page_225"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 225]</span> -and one platoon, the remainder of -the battalion holding posts on the Marine Trench line. The third -battalion of the brigade, the 2nd London Regt., held the Ditch, -Bailleul, and Bailleul East line. Behind them, in the Farbus line, was -one company of the 5th Cheshire Regt., and in reserve the 169th -Brigade held two companies of the 1st London Regt., attached from the -167th Brigade, and a detachment of the 176th Tunnelling Company, who -were in the Point du Jour Post.</p> - -<p>The 168th Brigade, on the left, held Beatty, Wood, and Oppy Posts with -two companies of the 4th London Regt., and two in support on the line -Duke Street; and Tommy and Arleux Posts with the Kensingtons, two -companies in the front line and in support.</p> - -<p>The actual distribution of troops on the left is not very clear, as -the redistribution was not complete when, at 3 a.m. on the 28th March, -the enemy opened a furious bombardment. We find a note that the London -Rifle Brigade had not at that hour relieved Bailleul East Post, and -that one company of the 1st Canadian Rifles were still holding Sugar -Post. This latter company remained at Sugar Post throughout the -battle, being placed, with that complete disregard of all, except the -winning of the battle, which characterised the Canadians, under the -orders of the 168th Brigade. But the London Scottish were also in this -Sugar Post-Willerval line. In the Farbus line were two platoons of the -5th Cheshires, and behind them, in the Point du Jour-Ridge Post line, -two companies of the 1st London Regt. and one and a half companies of -the 5th Cheshires.</p> - -<p><!--260.png--><a name="Page_226" id="Page_226"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 226]</span> -The two remaining battalions of the 167th Brigade and three field -companies of Royal Engineers were in Divisional Reserve.</p> - -<p>The opening of a modern battle is, with few exceptions, a matter of -artillery. Brig.-Gen. Elkington’s diary gives us some interesting -facts:</p> - -<p class="blockquote">“On the morning of the 28th March the 56th Division was - holding a line south of Gavrelle to Arleux, a front of about - 5,000 yards. To cover this front the field-guns under the - command of the division consisted of the 56th Divisional - Artillery and 9 guns of the 52nd Army (Field Artillery - Brigade), or 45 18-pounders and 12 4·5 howitzers. Six 6-inch - Newton mortars were in action in the first-line system, and - three were covering the Bailleul-Willerval line (that is our - main line of resistance). Of the former, only two were - manned, as all the ammunition at the other mortars had been - expended previously, in accordance with orders which, later - on, were cancelled, but not before the ammunition had been - expended.</p> - -<p class="blockquote">Between 3 a.m. and 3.20 a.m. the Germans put down a heavy - barrage of gas and H.E. shells of all calibres on the - Bailleul-Willerval line and the support line. At 4 a.m. the - barrage increased over the whole of the front-line system - and our posts were heavily bombarded with trench mortars. - From 6 a.m. the hostile barrage of all calibres was heavily - concentrated on the front line, and continued to be intense - on this area until 7.15 a.m.</p> - -<p class="blockquote">During the above periods, that is from 3 a.m. until 7.15 - a.m., our artillery was firing heavily on the enemy’s front - system of trenches, special concentrations being put down, - in co-operation with the heavy artillery, on lines of - organised shell-holes. It was considered at the time that - these shell-holes were temporary trench-mortar emplacements, - but from -<!--261.png--><a name="Page_227" id="Page_227"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 227]</span> - information given by prisoners after the attack, - it appears likely that they were the assembly positions of - the assaulting troops. From 6.45 a.m. onwards “counter - preparation” was put into effect. At 7.15 a.m. the hostile - barrage lifted from the front line to our support line, and - the S.O.S. went up in the Gavrelle sector and was repeated - almost immediately in the Oppy sector. Our S.O.S. was put - down over the whole of the divisional front at the same - time.”</p> - -<p>As may be imagined, the effect of this bombardment was terrible. The -bulk of the forward posts were obliterated. But even such -concentration as the Germans directed against the front line was not -sufficient to destroy all life—it could not deal with the whole of -the line. Towy Post and Wood Post had, during the last few days, been -subjected to a great deal of enemy attention, and the posts had been -moved—but even so the casualties were severe. One survivor came out -of Mill Post and reported that the trenches had been “blotted out,” -and that the entrance to a big dug-out there was blown in and -destroyed.</p> - -<p>The Germans, advancing almost shoulder to shoulder, entered Gavrelle, -which, as we know, was in a hollow. Although there was no living soul -there to oppose them, the machine gunners had the place under indirect -fire from fourteen guns, and the enemy losses were severe. But the -first stages of the battle were centred round Towy and Wood Posts.</p> - -<p>Capt. G. A. N. Lowndes, of the Queen’s Westminsters, was in command of -Towy Post, and with the lifting of the enemy barrage and the -appearance of the first Germans there came from the post the crackling -sound of rifle fire, joined, almost at once, -<!--262.png--><a name="Page_228" id="Page_228"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 228]</span> -by the rattle sound of -Lewis guns, until the whole developed into what might be described as -a roar. But the enemy was in Gavrelle and the undefended portions of -the front line on either side of Towy Post. Once in the trenches, the -storming troops could work slowly forward under some sort of cover. To -the rifle fire of the defenders was soon added the crash of bombs. The -enemy was confident; he worked slowly and surely round the post.</p> - -<p>The glorious little band of Queen’s Westminsters knew what was -happening, but kept cool. Gradually they were forced into a small and -cramped area; Lewis guns and rifles dealt with Germans in the open, -clearing the ground round about and forcing the enemy to seek the -safety of the battered trench; but the store of bombs was getting low.</p> - -<p>Capt. Lowndes, ably supported by 2/Lieuts. L. W. Friend and J. C. B. -Price, after hanging on to the last moment, directed his dwindling -company to fight through the Germans in rear, using the remaining -bombs, and swiftly, desperately, they broke through and reached Naval -Trench and joined the rest of the battalion round headquarters.</p> - -<p>But the Germans, coming through Mill Post, were already in Marine -Trench, and Lieut.-Col. Glazier, commanding the Queen’s Westminsters, -passed a portion of his force into Thames Alley to form a flank.</p> - -<p>Now trouble came from the right. The Lancashire Fusiliers, of the 4th -Division, fell back on to the Ditch Post line, and the enemy entered -Humid Trench. Col. Glazier swung back his right flank into Towy Alley, -and held the Germans firmly. And then for a moment the fortunes of war -turned against the Queen’s Westminsters.</p> - -<p><!--263.png--><a name="Page_229" id="Page_229"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 229]</span> -The 56th Divisional -Artillery, aware that the enemy were in our lines, attempted to adjust -their barrage in consultation with brigadiers. It was a most difficult -task, for, needless to say, communication was almost non-existent. At -the junction of Naval and Towy Trenches was a block, and in front of -it the enemy was held, but the artillery, probably seeing the Germans -in Humid and the end of Naval Trenches, put down their barrage too -close and blew in our block. The German hordes quickly took advantage -of this bit of luck and swarmed down Naval Trench, either killing or -capturing the garrison up to the Gavrelle road.</p> - -<p>About the same time the block on the left of the line, near Thames -Valley, was forced by the enemy, and the whole of the Naval Line was -in his hands. But the Queen’s Westminsters, gallantly led by Col. -Glazier, were still in front of the Germans on the line Keiller, -Pelican, and Thames Posts. Every bit of the communication trenches -which gave a good fire position, every dump-hole, even the shell-holes -were manned, and, as the Germans advanced over the open, in -reorganised lines, from Naval Trench, they were met with a fresh -rattle and roar of rifle fire. The ground was covered with silent and -groaning figures in the field-grey uniform, and the enemy had to -resort once more to bombing.</p> - -<p>Again the Queen’s Westminsters gave up a little ground, but the -enemy’s effort was smashed. At 11 a.m. the position was: we held a -block in Towy Alley, about 300 yards east of the Ditch-Bailleul East -line, and Castleford Post, and the rest of the battalion had joined -the 2nd London Regt. in the Bailleul-Willerval line.</p> - -<p><!--264.png--><a name="Page_230" id="Page_230"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 230]</span> -The account given by the London Rifle Brigade on the left of the -Queen’s Westminsters is short, but in it one can read the desperate -nature of the fighting and the gallant resistance which was put up. -The relief of Bradford and Bird Posts was not completed until 3.30 -a.m., when the bombardment which heralded the attack commenced. All -forward and lateral communication was at once cut. Wire and posts -defending the front line were wiped out. When the enemy infantry -advanced, they simply walked into the front line, rushed the few men -left at the blocks in Belvoir and Brough, and commenced bombing -towards Naval Trench. The battalion was almost annihilated, and what -was left joined the Queen’s Westminsters in Thames Valley and became -mixed up with them. The fighting strength of this battalion at the -commencement of the battle was 23 officers and 564 other ranks; it was -reduced to 8 officers and about 60 other ranks.</p> - -<p>The whole of the 169th Brigade now stood on the Bailleul-Willerval -line and the enemy was held. Twice he attacked over the open, with -aeroplanes flying low and pouring a hail of bullets on the defenders, -while field guns were dragged by plunging horses and straining men -across No Man’s Land as far as Naval Trench, but each time he was -defeated. The field guns fired no more than twenty rounds before being -silenced by the 56th Divisional Artillery; and though the enemy -infantry had a novel method of advancing—they stood up, threw their -rifles forward into a shell-hole, held up their hands, and advanced, -only to drop by the side of their arms, which they immediately -proceeded to use—they made no further progress.</p> - -<p><!--265.png--><a name="Page_231" id="Page_231"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 231]</span> -The right of the 56th Division was, at 11 a.m., in touch with the 4th -Division. A battalion of the 167th Brigade was placed under the orders -of the 169th, and six machine guns were sent up to Point du Jour, and -two field companies of the Engineers to Tongue and Blanch Posts, so -that the right flank of the division seemed secure.</p> - -<p>The 4th Londons, on the right of the 168th Brigade, put up a most -gallant defence. Wood Post, held by 2 officers and 45 other ranks, had -been moved before the bombardment and so was untouched. The full -garrison was there to meet the enemy, who advanced in a solid line on -the left of the wood, but came through the wood in groups of about ten -men each, 40 yards or so apart, and followed by further groups of -about thirty men each some 200 yards in rear.</p> - -<p>The enemy was completely checked in the wood and on the left; but -Beatty Post, on the right, which had been badly battered about by -trench mortars, was occupied. The garrison, consisting at first of 3 -officers and 84 other ranks, though much depleted when the assault was -launched, was overwhelmed by sheer numbers, and only 1 officer and 6 -men ever returned. The enemy then started to work round to the rear of -Wood Post, but for over an hour this hard little band held out and -repulsed the enemy.</p> - -<p>Oppy Post was also smothered by artillery and trench mortars, and -eventually overwhelmed by the storming infantry. Of the 2 officers and -48 other ranks forming the garrison, 1 officer and 5 other ranks were -left.</p> - -<p>Fifteen minutes after the assault was launched, the enemy was in the -Earl Lane and Viscount Street, but were held for a time by the troops -in Ouse Alley. -<!--266.png--><a name="Page_232" id="Page_232"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 232]</span> -But so long as Wood Post held, the enemy did not make -any great progress.</p> - -<p>Major F. A. Phillips was in command of the forward fighting, and moved -about encouraging his men, who were inflicting heavy casualties on the -enemy whenever an attempt was made to advance over the open. But Wood -Post fell back just before 9 o’clock, and soon after the enemy began -to force their way up Ouse Alley from Viscount Street, in rear of the -troops who were fighting so successfully in Marquis Trench. Major -Phillips promptly attacked over the open with about twenty details -from headquarters, and drove them back.</p> - -<p>The enemy had built up heavy rifle fire from Oppy Wood, although he -was suffering severely there from our artillery fire, and attacked the -left of the battalion many times over the open; but the Marquis line -held, and at 11 o’clock the position was extraordinary. The 169th -Brigade on the right was back in the Bailleul-Willerval line; and -while the advance companies of the 4th London were still holding the -Marquis line, the enemy was in Ouse Alley and bombing his way towards -the Bailleul line, also he was advancing over the open south of Ouse -Alley. The position then was very precarious, and the reserve company, -which <a name="Marchment"></a>Colonel Marchment had sent to get in touch with the forward -troops and form a flank, was unable to reach the forward troops. Major -Phillips decided to withdraw.</p> - -<p>The withdrawal was witnessed by Colonel Marchment from his -headquarters:</p> - -<p class="blockquote">“I watched it through my glasses. It was carried out in a - very steady and orderly way, the men -<!--267.png--><a name="Page_233" id="Page_233"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 233]</span> - leaving in groups of - about a dozen. Although exposed to a heavy fire from front - and flanks, they made excellent use of the ground, and - suffered very few casualties.... The men of the reserve - company met the survivors returning and covered their - retirement.”</p> - -<p>The Kensingtons on the left of the division were not attacked. Some -fifty of the enemy approached Tommy Post, but were at once driven off -with casualties. But the battalion gave invaluable aid to the 4th -Londons, on the right, inflicting heavy losses by Lewis gun, rifle, -and rifle grenade fire on the German support troops as they came up to -the wood. About 11.30 a.m. the battalion was ordered to retire, in -conjunction with the right of the 3rd Canadian Division, on the left, -and so came into line with the rest of the division.</p> - -<p>The intense anxiety at Brigade and Divisional Headquarters can best be -imagined. For the first two hours of the battle little news could be -gained from Battalion Headquarters as to the progress of the fight. -The whole battlefield was enveloped in smoke, and interest was chiefly -centred on the fine stand which was being made by the Queen’s -Westminsters at Towy Post, where a power buzzer was installed, and -messages were received from the signallers even after the capture of -the post. At one time, while the 4th Londons were still holding the -front-line system, the enemy was attacking Bailleul East Post, held by -the London Scottish, and had captured two machine guns with crews just -in front of the post. A well-timed counter-attack from this gallant -regiment drove the enemy back and released the guns and crews.</p> - -<p><!--268.png--><a name="Page_234" id="Page_234"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 234]</span> -As the smoke cleared from the field, the Divisional Artillery took -every advantage of their well-situated observation posts. But, though -the struggle was going on before them, observers found that both sides -were frequently so mixed up that they could give no help. Small bodies -of our infantry could be seen clearly, fighting with Germans on all -sides of them.</p> - -<p>On the right the situation of the 4th Division was very obscure. The -division was reported to have lost touch with its own brigades, while -the lateral line between the 169th and 12th Brigades was also cut.</p> - -<p>With the withdrawal of the 56th Division to the Bailleul-Willerval -line the situation cleared. They were then in touch with the 4th -Division, and the artillery was able to put down a protective barrage -in front of this line. The 3rd Canadian Division gave valuable -assistance with nine 18-pounders.</p> - -<div class="figcenter" style="width: 500px"> - <a name="illo8"></a> - <img src="images/i_8arras.jpg" - width="100%" height="auto" - alt="Illustration: The First Battle of Arras 1918" - /> - <p class="caption"><span class="sc u">8. The First Battle of Arras 1918.</span></p> -</div> - -<p class="blockquote">“From this time till about 3 p.m.” (writes Brig.-Gen. - Elkington), “many excellent targets in the open were engaged - by both field and heavy artillery with great effect. - Unfortunately, owing to the limited number of guns - available, and that many had to be used for the immediate - protection of our infantry, only a few could be used for the - excellent targets in the open. At about 3.30 p.m. the enemy - made a heavy attack against the Bailleul line, particularly - on Bailleul East Post; this was completely shattered by a - concentrated barrage and by rifle and machine-gun fire. With - the exception of hostile bombing attacks up the - communication trenches leading to the Bailleul line, the - enemy made no further serious effort to attack. All battery - positions were heavily shelled throughout the day by all - calibres of ordnance, the shelling being -<!--269.png--> -<!--270.png--> -<!--271.png--><a name="Page_235" id="Page_235"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 235]</span> - more of the nature - of area shoots than definite counter-battery work. As a - result, from dawn on the 28th to dawn on the 29th twelve - 18-pounders were destroyed or put out of action by enemy - shell-fire. In addition two 18-pounders in position as an - enfilade section near Arleux, facing south-east, had to be - destroyed and abandoned when our line was withdrawn to the - Bailleul line. This section engaged many targets with - observation from the vicinity of the guns, and was fought - until our infantry withdrew through it. The detachments then - retired after damaging the guns, burning the dug-outs, and - removing dial sights and breach blocks. All the six 6-inch - mortars in the front line were lost to the enemy, and no - news was available as to the fate of the officers and - detachments of the two that were manned (they were - afterwards found to have been made prisoners).... During the - night of the 28th/29th, with the exception of two batteries, - all the Divisional Artillery was withdrawn to positions at - an average of about 3,600 yards to our new front, this move - being carried out by single batteries in turns.... The - ammunition expended from the early morning of the 28th to - the early morning of the 29th by the 56th Divisional - Artillery alone was: 23,000 rounds of 18-pounder and 8,000 - rounds of 4·5 howitzer.... As a result of an urgent request - to the Corps on the afternoon of the 28th for new guns to - replace the damaged ones, six new ones were sent up—these - turned out to be 15-pounders, for which we had no - ammunition.... The Germans in their official communiqué - reported that the 56th Division had been annihilated!”</p> - -<p>The German attack was definitely crushed in the morning, but during -the afternoon a number of half-hearted and tentative attacks were -made. The situation, however, became more quiet about 6 p.m., -<!--272.png--><a name="Page_236" id="Page_236"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 236]</span> -and the -169th Brigade was relieved by the 167th, with the 5th Canadian Mounted -Rifles in support at Point du Jour.</p> - -<p>During the night the engineers were employed in blocking and -filling-in the communication trenches in front of the new line, and -patrolling was actively carried out. The Kensingtons penetrated into -Arleux Loop South, Kent Road, and the junction of Tommy and Baron, -which seems to show that the enemy were dazed.</p> - -<p>On the 29th, except for some demonstrations at the bombing blocks, the -enemy made no move. There were many reports that he was massing for -further attacks, but it became evident that he was relieving his -storming troops. As night fell, the first platoons of the 4th Canadian -Division started to relieve, and during the night the 167th Brigade -moved back to Villers au Bois, the 168th to Mont St. Eloi, and the -169th to Ecoivres.</p> - -<p>On the 30th General Dudgeon visited the First Army Headquarters, where -he was congratulated by His Majesty the King.</p> - -<p>There is little doubt that the enemy hoped to achieve great results by -this new stroke, and that its failure was a serious set-back. Five -divisions attacked the 4th and 56th Divisions north of the Scarpe and, -according to captured documents, when the line Vimy-Bailleul-St. -Laurent-Blangy had been won, three special divisions were to attack -and capture the Vimy Ridge on the following day. South of the Scarpe -eleven divisions were launched, with the object of capturing Arras and -carrying the attack as far south as Bucquoy. The German official list -(published 1919) gives eleven divisions attacking north -<!--273.png--><a name="Page_237" id="Page_237"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 237]</span> -and south of -the Scarpe, one division at Neuville Vitasse, and one at -Moyenneville—thirteen in all. It makes no mention of an attack south -of Moyenneville. But the eleven which attacked on the Scarpe were -beaten by the four British divisions which held that line—the 4th and -56th on the north, and the 3rd and 15th on the south.</p> - -<p>From this date onward the great German offensive began to decline, and -ended in the Somme area with a final effort to separate the French and -British Armies on the 4th and 5th April, by an attack on the north and -south of the Somme. “It was an established fact,” says Ludendorff, -“that the enemy’s resistance was beyond our strength.” Strategically -the Germans had not won what the events of the 23rd, 24th, and 25th -March had led them to hope for—the failure to take Amiens was a great -disappointment.</p> - -<p>The total casualties of the division were 55 officers and 1,433 other -ranks—not excessive, considering the weight of the attack and the -immortal triumph gained by the 56th Division. The importance of this -battle is so great that we give the comments of the two brigadiers.</p> - -<p>Brig.-Gen. Coke says that during the six weeks his brigade had been in -the line, the Cheshire Regt. had worked splendidly, and had put up -double apron belts of wire where they would be most effective—the -Naval-Marine line was protected by five belts of wire—and this stood -the bombardment well enough to be a serious obstacle. When the smoke, -which had enveloped the field at the commencement of the battle, had -cleared, excellent observation was obtainable, and the divisional -observers and artillery -<!--274.png--><a name="Page_238" id="Page_238"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 238]</span> -observers did splendid work. The enemy -batteries, which came into action in the open during the afternoon, -were brought up under cover of smoke, and started to fire point-blank -at the Bailleul line, but the Divisional Artillery silenced them in a -few minutes. There was no shortage of ammunition or bombs. The system -of keeping a plentiful supply in deep dug-outs proved sound.</p> - -<p class="blockquote">“All concerned are convinced that the enemy losses were - extremely heavy in front of this brigade. The fullest use - was made of Lewis guns and rifles, and every attempt of the - enemy to advance on the Bailleul line over the open was - checked by these means. The fire-bays constructed along Towy - Alley proved specially valuable, and very considerable - losses were inflicted on the enemy from them during our - withdrawal to the Bailleul line.</p> - -<p class="blockquote">Many officers testify to the gallant way in which the - Machine Gun Battalion served its guns to the last and to the - good results of the machine-gun fire.</p> - -<p class="blockquote">Our artillery inflicted the maximum amount of damage - possible. The number of guns available for the brigade - section was quite inadequate to cover effectively such a - wide front. But the infantry testify to the heavy losses - inflicted on the enemy owing to the quick way in which the - group and battery commanders engaged each good target as - soon as it was observed.</p> - -<p class="blockquote">Gallant work was done by the 169th Light Trench Mortar - Battery during the day. Three of the teams disappeared with - the garrisons in the left sector. During the withdrawal, - mortars were placed to cover Pelican and Bailleul Posts.”</p> - -<p>It was widely noticed by the men of this brigade that the enemy -approached in a slow, dazed manner. The brigadier thinks that this may -have been due -<!--275.png--><a name="Page_239" id="Page_239"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 239]</span> -to the great weight carried by the German infantry, who -seem, amongst other things, to have carried a week’s rations. The -enemy advanced in three or four lines and almost shoulder to shoulder.</p> - -<p>Brig.-Gen. Loch sent in a frank and interesting paper, in which he -points out:</p> - -<p class="blockquote">“(<i class="decoration">a</i>) The uselessness of locking up large garrisons in the - front-line posts which are clearly known to the enemy and - are within effective trench-mortar range. Front-line posts - should be held lightly, and be used as observation posts and - to keep the enemy patrols from approaching our main line of - defence. They should be carefully concealed, need have no - regular communication trenches, and should be frequently - changed. The garrisons should be small and frequently - relieved. If rushed and captured from time to time, little - harm is done, provided the garrison have no identification - marks. Deep dug-outs in such posts are a positive danger and - should not be allowed; shelters against the weather are - ample. If heavily attacked, the rôle of such posts should be - to put up the S.O.S. and withdraw. The sole exception to - this rôle is in the case of posts whose whereabouts can be - properly hidden from the enemy. Such posts can be strongly - garrisoned and may have machine guns, as they will have to - break up and delay an attack. The losses in the forward - posts are sufficient commentary on the unsoundness of the - (present) system.</p> - -<p class="blockquote">(<i class="decoration">b</i>) The value of changing the actual position of the - garrison in any post--<em>vide</em> Wood Post.</p> - -<p class="blockquote">(<i class="decoration">c</i>) The grave danger of altering carefully thought-out - dispositions at the eleventh hour. On the evening of the - 27th inst. my dispositions, which had been most minutely - worked out to meet the situation of an attack on my right - flank at the junction with the left of the 169th Brigade, - about Viscount Street, -<!--276.png--><a name="Page_240" id="Page_240"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 240]</span> - and covering Bradford and Mill Posts, - had to be changed as the result of orders, and consequently - this portion of the line (always weak) was rendered - hopelessly incapable of withstanding a strong attack. It is - recognised that larger questions were involved, and no doubt - decided the redistribution, which was not complete before - the attack developed.</p> - -<p class="blockquote">(<i class="decoration">d</i>) The uselessness of Stokes mortars in the actual front - line. Such weapons can only open on their S.O.S. lines, and - are very vulnerable from attacks on the flanks. The four - forward guns only fired about 50 rounds before being - surrounded. Had they been behind the main defensive line - covering the communication trenches, and themselves covered - by the infantry, they would have been far more valuable, and - would not possibly have been overrun.</p> - -<p class="blockquote">(<i class="decoration">e</i>) The value of trench blocks was fully found out. Such - blocks should be prepared ready against penetration - laterally, so as to localise it.</p> - -<p class="blockquote">(<i class="decoration">h</i>) Previous rehearsals and thorough knowledge of overland - routes are essential. To the fact that these points had - received proper attention is attributable the successful - delaying action of this brigade.</p> - -<p class="blockquote">(<i class="decoration">i</i>) Defensive flanks prepared as such are invaluable.</p> - -<p class="blockquote">(<i class="decoration">j</i>) Infantry and machine guns must establish closer - liaison.... It should be recognised once and for all that - all machine guns in a brigade sector must come under the - senior machine-gun officer in that sector.... Nothing herein - said, however, should be permitted to detract from the - principle that the battalion commander can and should issue - orders to the guns covering him if he considers the - situation demands it....</p> - -<p class="blockquote">(<i class="decoration">k</i>) Main forward communication trenches should never be - traced to lead into strong points.... Such communication - trenches are mere covering approaches to these strong points - and afford easy access to the -<!--277.png--><a name="Page_241" id="Page_241"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 241]</span> - enemy. Our main battle zone - should not be covered by a single trench, e.g. the Red Line - (Bailleul), but should consist of at least three trenches - with strong points so constructed as not to be apparent and - obvious. As with garrisons of forward posts, so with - garrisons of battle trenches, they should be constantly - moved so as to avoid giving away the position actually held.”</p> - -<p>A captured German officer of the 152nd I.R., 41st Division, gave as -the main causes of the failure of the attack (<i class="decoration">a</i>) the intensity of -the machine-gun barrage, which caused heavy casualties. His regiment -lost 12 officers and the 16th I.R. lost 24 officers; (<i class="decoration">b</i>) watches did -not appear to have been correctly synchronised. We have mentioned the -service rendered by the Machine Gun Battalion, but, unfortunately, -there is no record of Lieut.-Col. E. C. S. Jervis’ dispositions. This -gallant and able officer says that the “tender spots” in his defence -were the low ridges running due east and west through Bradford Post, -and from Mill Post, south of Belvoir Alley, and then west. The former -could not be covered by machine-gun fire, the latter was. And we know -that the enemy, having exterminated the garrison, were mown down, in -and round Gavrelle, from the indirect fire of fourteen machine-guns.</p> - -<p>Apart from the heavy artillery fire, which, in itself, caused heavy -casualties, Colonel Jervis points out an interesting feature in this -battle: the complete mastery of the air which the enemy had throughout -the day, resulting in machine-guns being spotted and engaged by -low-flying aeroplanes, which also directed the fire of specially -detailed heavy artillery. Needless to say, machine-guns are very -vulnerable -<!--278.png--><a name="Page_242" id="Page_242"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 242]</span> -to this form of attack; and we must also point out, having -mentioned the capture of guns, that when once the enemy has penetrated -the trench system machine-gunners have great difficulty in dealing -with bombing attacks from the flanks. The Machine Gun Battalion, -however, had a great opportunity in this battle, and took full -advantage of it.</p> - -<p>Brig.-Gen. Elkington expresses the opinion that this was the best -action fought by the 56th Division. We do not go quite so far as this. -It was more satisfactory to the troops, no doubt, but there is a great -difference between defence and attack. A successful defence is more -cheering to the infantry and artillery, inasmuch as they can more -easily estimate the damage they do to the enemy; but it would not be -fair to say that this was better than the hard fighting at Gommecourt -and south of Arras in April 1917, or indeed on the Somme in 1916 and -Ypres in 1917. The fact remains, however, that the 56th Division had, -by its stout defence, twice saved the situation, which had been -imperilled by enemy successes elsewhere.</p> -</div><!--end chapter seven--> -<p><!--279.png--><a name="Page_243" id="Page_243"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 243]</span></p> -<div class="chapter"> -<h3 class="p4">CHAPTER <abbr title="eight">VIII</abbr></h3> - -<h4>THE ADVANCE TO VICTORY</h4> - -<h4 class="smaller">BATTLE OF ALBERT 1918—BATTLE OF THE SCARPE 1918</h4> - -<p class="p2">It must not be thought that this first great German effort ended like -Act I at a theatre, with a curtain dropping for fifteen minutes while -the actors rested and changed their clothes, and the spectators found -solace in nicotine or alcohol.</p> - -<p>Troops in line, though they were not being attacked, probably worked -harder than ever before and the nervous tension was as great as ever. -All were conscious that the Germans might erupt again, and, as is -usual in such times of stress, the weak-hearted were always ready to -endow the enemy with miraculous powers of assembling, of covering -himself with a cloak of invisibility. The rush had been stopped, but -only by the sacrifice of a very considerable area of ground, and at -the expense of many reserves; but a mass of enemy divisions was still -concentrated on the Somme.</p> - -<p>It was certain that the enemy would attack again, and it seemed -probable that it would be about the centre of the British line, where -his preparations were already complete. Indeed, the situation was more -serious than it had ever been.</p> - -<p>The British Army had used up all its reserves -<!--280.png--><a name="Page_244" id="Page_244"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 244]</span> -in the fighting on the -Somme, and in addition ten divisions had been withdrawn from the north -and replaced with worn-out divisions, reinforced from England. The -reasons for draining the north are given by Sir Douglas Haig as being -that he could, under urgent necessity, give ground there to a limited -extent, but a break-through in the centre, about Vimy, “would mean the -realisation of the enemy’s plans, which had been foiled by our defence -of Arras on the 28th March, namely, the capture of Amiens and the -separation of the bulk of the British Armies from the French and from -those British forces acting under the direction of the latter.” -Therefore, in view of the preparations which had been made on that -sector by the enemy, British forces could not be reduced.</p> - -<p>Certain preparations for an attack north of the La Bassée Canal had -been observed prior to the 21st March, and there were indications that -the enemy was completing these early in April; but the extent and -force of the possible attack could not be gauged.</p> - -<p>On the 7th April a heavy and prolonged bombardment with gas shell was -opened by the Germans from Lens to Armentières. And at 4 o’clock in -the morning of the 9th the bombardment was reopened with the greatest -intensity. At 7 o’clock, again helped by a thick fog, the enemy -attacked the left brigade of the Portuguese 2nd Division and broke -into their trenches; a few minutes later the attack spread to the -north and south. The attack included the left of the First Army and -the right of the Second Army.</p> - -<p>This great thrust in the direction of Hazebrouck was brought to a -standstill between Merville and the Forêt de Nieppe, but the enemy -penetrated beyond -<!--281.png--><a name="Page_245" id="Page_245"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 245]</span> -Bailleul, and in the north took Kemmel Hill and -forced a retirement from the Passchendaele Ridge.</p> - -<p>This brings the general situation up to the end of April. But we must -note that on the 14th Marshal Foch became the Allied Generalissimo.</p> - -<p>The next German move was on the 27th May, north-west of Rheims, on the -Aisne front. The 19th, 21st, 25th, and 50th British Divisions, which -had taken part in both the Somme and the Lys Valley fighting, had been -sent down to a quiet part of the French front; they were joined by the -8th Division, which had been in some of the hardest fighting on the -Somme. These divisions constituted the <abbr title="nine">IX</abbr> Corps and were included in -the Sixth French Army. The German attack fell on the <abbr title="nine">IX</abbr> Corps and the -French Corps on their left, which was holding the Chemin des Dames; -they were forced from their positions, and by the 30th May the enemy -had reached the Marne. The attacks continued until the 6th June, when -they culminated in two attempts on the Montagne de Bligny, but here -they were held.</p> - -<p>By this time the Allied reserves were being used wherever they were -wanted. But it had been for the most part French reserves which had -come to the aid of the British. At the beginning of July, however, -Marshal Foch believed that the enemy was about to attack east and west -of Rheims, and he moved the whole of his French troops (eight -divisions) from Flanders, and in addition asked for four British -divisions to relieve French troops on the Somme. A further four -divisions were also sent down as a reserve behind the French front.</p> - -<p>As the Marshal had foreseen, the enemy attacked on the 15th July, and, -after making progress and -<!--282.png--><a name="Page_246" id="Page_246"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 246]</span> -crossing the Marne, was held by French, -American, and Italian divisions.</p> - -<p>On the 18th July the Marshal launched his great counter-offensive on -the Château Thierry-Soissons front, and in this used the four British -divisions he had held in reserve, and which constituted the XXII -Corps. (The 56th Division entered this Corps later on.)</p> - -<p>In view of the defeats inflicted up to the moment of the -counter-offensive, it might well be supposed that the troops of the -Entente were despondent. The Germans were surprised at M. Clemenceau -stating that he would fight before Paris, that he would fight in -Paris, and that he would fight behind Paris, and this same spirit -certainly pervaded the 56th Division. With these great enemy successes -throughout the months of March, April, May, and July in mind, the -actions of the 56th Division during those months are perhaps the most -significant and, in our opinion, the most gallant work they performed. -There was no set battle. And a set battle is in some ways the easiest -kind of attack for the infantry. The operations through those months -were of a minor character, calling for a high level of courage and -determination from small parties of men, parties so small that the -success of the enterprise must depend on individual gallantry, as -there was no mass to drag them along. At any time minor operations -deserve more praise than is allotted to them, and at this time, in the -face of a series of German victories, they are worthy of the highest -admiration.</p> - -<p>Divisional Headquarters were at a place called Acq, to the north-west -of Arras, and the brigades in the neighbouring villages. Again the -division was not -<!--283.png--><a name="Page_247" id="Page_247"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 247]</span> -to know a lengthy period of rest, for on the 8th -April the 56th Division had relieved the 1st Canadian Division and -Gen. Dudgeon took over command of the line. During the week of -so-called rest, brigades were called upon to provide anything between -1,200 and 1,500 men each night for fatigues, digging further lines of -defence. “Bow Bells” were active, and those who were not on fatigue -joined in many a chorus with a flavour and memory of London Town.</p> - -<p>The new front was south of the Scarpe and the Arras-Douai railway, -ground over which the division had fought in the same month of the -previous year. The high ground of Monchy and Orange Hill, on this side -of the Scarpe, had been lost on the 28th, and the line now ran through -Fampoux, on the north of the river, in front of Feuchy to Bois des -Bœufs, to the east of Tilloy, and so to Neuville Vitasse. Bois des -Bœufs was about the centre of the line held by the division, which was -thus astride of the Arras-Cambrai road. The Corps was the <abbr title="seventeen">XVII</abbr> -(Fergusson), and had been part of the Third Army, but on the 8th it -was transferred to the First Army.</p> - -<p>From the moment of taking over the line, patrols were pursuing an -aggressive policy. Many small encounters took place in No Man’s Land, -the 56th Division gradually gaining the ascendancy over the enemy.</p> - -<p>On the 19th, at 4.30 a.m., the 168th Brigade carried out a most -successful enterprise. The idea was to advance the outpost line on the -Tilloy-Wancourt road, and was undertaken by the London Scottish on the -right, with one company and a bombing section, and the 4th London -Regt. on the -<!--284.png--><a name="Page_248" id="Page_248"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 248]</span> -left, with one platoon and two bombing sections. The enemy -were taken completely by surprise. One warrant officer and three other -ranks were captured, together with nine machine guns and a -Grenatenwerfer. The enemy line was held throughout the day, but the -hostile artillery fire became stronger, the position was not -particularly good, and towards the evening orders were given to -evacuate it. While this was being done at dusk, the Germans launched a -counter-attack and a lively scuffle ensued. The enemy was first beaten -off, and then the retirement was effected.</p> - -<p>A curious incident occurred during this brush with the enemy. The -Germans, as usual, sent up a multitude of lights, and a combination of -these appear to have presented to the artillery observers a cluster of -lights such as our S.O.S. rocket contained at that moment. The S.O.S. -barrage was accordingly put down, much to the surprise of the London -Scottish.</p> - -<p>The prisoners were of the 65th Infantry Regt., 185th Division.</p> - -<p>On the 23rd April the 56th Division took over from the 15th Division -the sector north of the Arras-Cambrai road, and held the whole of the -<abbr title="seventeen">XVII</abbr> Corps front.</p> - -<p>The enemy raided on the 24th, and occupied for a short period a -gun-pit post. He was ejected and gained no identification, but two of -his dead were found and proved to be of the 28th Infantry Regt., 185th -Division. But the next night two prisoners were captured by a patrol -on the extreme left of the line, near Broken Mill, belonging to the -14th Bavarian Regt., 16th Bavarian Division, which indicated a relief -of the 185th Division.</p> - -<p><!--285.png--><a name="Page_249" id="Page_249"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 249]</span> -Gen. Dudgeon, who had led the division through some very heavy -fighting, fell ill on the 25th and was sent to hospital. His record -with the division is a fine one. At the third battle of Ypres he had -scarcely time to look round, knew no one in the division, and his -position might be described as most unenviable; at the battle of -Cambrai he was called upon to carry out a most difficult task; at -Arras he went through a most anxious and trying period. At none of -these places did he falter. The ordeals which were thrust upon him -were heavy, but he brought the division through them triumphantly.</p> - -<p>Brig.-Gen. Freeth assumed temporary command of the division, until -Gen. Hull arrived on the 4th May.</p> - -<p>No man had such power over the 56th Division as Gen. Hull. The -wonderful pugnacious spirit they had shown in the Laventie-Richebourg -line was roused to its highest pitch when, after a quiet ten days’ -study of the line, the General ordered a whole series of raids, which -at last caused the Germans to erect a board, in their line, on which -was chalked: “Please don’t raid us any more!”</p> - -<p>On the 21st May the 8th Middlesex raided near the Tilloy-Wancourt road -and captured four prisoners and a machine gun. They established the -important fact that the 16th Bavarian Division had been relieved by -the 214th, the prisoners being of the 50th Regt.</p> - -<p>On the 27th patrols ran into strong parties of the enemy covering a -large number of men engaged in wiring the enemy front. The next night -a somewhat ambitious raid was made on a wide front of either side of -the Tilloy-Wancourt road. On the left was -<!--286.png--><a name="Page_250" id="Page_250"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 250]</span> -the 7th Middlesex, in three -parties (one company in all), on the right two platoons of the 1st -London Regt.</p> - -<p>The raid was a great success. Under an excellent barrage, of which -everyone spoke with the highest praise, the raiders entered the enemy -lines. They found it packed with men north of the road. The 1st -Londons claimed to have killed 40 south of the road, and the 7th -Middlesex appear to have spread terror and devastation in their area.</p> - -<p>The right party of Middlesex estimated that they had killed 32 of the -enemy and captured 1 machine gun. The centre party first met the enemy -in shell-holes outside their wire, and quickly disposed of them; they -claimed 35 Germans killed, 1 prisoner, and 1 machine gun. The left -party counted the damage they inflicted as no less than 60 killed. The -artillery had also done fearful execution. Although many of the enemy -were seen running away, the total casualties inflicted by this raid -were reckoned to be 200. Making every allowance for exaggeration—for -it is extremely difficult to count dead men during a raid—the facts -remain that the raid was a huge success and the casualties inflicted -exceedingly heavy.</p> - -<p>No attempt was made to advance our outpost line and our wounded were -taken safely back. The total casualties of the raiding parties were 2 -officers killed and 2 wounded, 2 other ranks killed and 49 -wounded—the wounds were mostly slight. The identification procured -was normal—50th Regt., 214th Division.</p> - -<p>On the 30th May the Kensingtons sent out an enterprising patrol which -rushed an enemy post and captured two more prisoners. Identification -normal.</p> - -<p>The month of June opened with a raid by the -<!--287.png--><a name="Page_251" id="Page_251"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 251]</span> -Kensingtons near the -Cambrai road. Many of the enemy were killed and 27 taken prisoners. -The Germans did not show much fight on this occasion, but in most -cases emerged from dug-outs with no rifles or equipment. They were -again of the 50th Infantry Regt., 214th Division. The Kensingtons’ -casualties were 1 killed and 17 wounded.</p> - -<p>On the 10th June the 7th Middlesex raided on the left of the line, -near Broken Mill, and secured two prisoners of the 358th Infantry -Regt., 214th Division.</p> - -<p>One company of the London Rifle Brigade suddenly raided at 3 o’clock -in the afternoon on the 12th June south of the Cambrai road. They -advanced under cover of smoke and killed about 24 of the enemy and -captured 1 machine gun. Their casualties were only 3 killed and 11 -wounded, in spite of their daring. Identification normal.</p> - -<p>Soon after this raid the Germans were seen to be active in their -lines. Many officers were noticed examining our lines on the 24th -June, and the next night a platoon of the 1st Londons and a platoon of -the 8th Middlesex entered the enemy lines on the left and inflicted -casualties, but failed to obtain identification. This was soon -secured, however, by the London Rifle Brigade, who brought in a man of -the 50th Infantry Regt. on the 3rd July.</p> - -<p>The Queen’s Westminsters sent a company over into some fortified -gun-pits on the 8th July, and secured three prisoners of the 358th -Regiment, 214th Division. They took over with them some heavy charges -of ammonal, as it was known that a deep dug-out existed. As soon as -the raiders reached the gun-pits the garrison, led by an officer, -attempted to come out of the dug-out. The officer was promptly -<!--288.png--><a name="Page_252" id="Page_252"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 252]</span> -shot, -though he missed the leading man of the Queen’s Westminsters by a -hair’s-breadth, and a charge of the explosive was thrown down the -dug-out. A terrific explosion completely destroyed that entrance. The -raiders then found the second entrance and treated it in the same -fashion. The prisoners stated that between fifty and sixty men were in -the dug-out with two officers.</p> - -<p>This ended the series of raids, and it would seem as though the 185th -and 214th German Divisions had good cause to remember the 56th -Division. But it is an exceedingly fine record, and speaks highly of -the <em>moral</em> of the London men and the inspiring leadership of -their General.</p> - -<p>Gen. Hull handed over to the 2nd Canadian Division on the 15th July, -and the division moved through Roellecourt to Villers Châtel.</p> - -<p>Before leaving this period we must quote from Brig.-Gen. Elkington’s -diary:</p> - -<p class="blockquote">“In addition to the 56th Divisional Artillery I had several - other R.A. brigades under my command to assist in covering - the front, namely the 29th, 277th, and 311th R.A. Brigades. - During April and May Gen. Dudgeon suffered from severe - rheumatism and had to give up command of the division. - Major-Gen. Hull returned and took over command. - Reconnaissances and selection of several back lines, in case - of withdrawal being necessary on this front, were carried - out, and all battery positions carefully marked and their - observation posts selected, also their lines of retreat if - necessary. Continual training in moving warfare was also - carried out by means of skeleton drill with full staff. A - polo ground was used near Dainville and play went on twice a - week until the enemy elected to shell the ground, when it -<!--289.png--><a name="Page_253" id="Page_253"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 253]</span> - had to be stopped. During this period the artillery - supported many successful raids by our infantry and the - Canadians on our right.... The ‘Bow Bells’ established - themselves in a hut near our headquarters and gave many - excellent shows to crowded houses. Towards the end of May - Indian drivers were sent to us from the Divisional - Ammunition Column to release the European personnel. These - drivers did very well after they had been trained, but - suffered rather from the cold during the winter. On the 15th - July the 56th Divisional Infantry was relieved by the 2nd - Canadian Division, and I remained in the line commanding the - R.A. until the 21st July, when we were relieved.”</p> - -<p>Refitting and training were carried out, and after two weeks in the -back area, which was not free from enemy attention in the nature of -aeroplane bombs, the division started on the 31st July to relieve -portions of the 1st Canadian Division in the Tilloy and Vitasse -sections of the line. The Telegraph Sector was relieved during the -night of the following day, and on the 2nd August Gen. Hull took over -command of the line.</p> - -<p>The weather generally was very good and the line quiet. The 167th -Brigade obtained identification on the 4th showing that the 185th -German Division had been relieved by the 39th Division. On the 8th the -division projected gas on Neuville Vitasse, but otherwise everything -was quiet.</p> - -<p>On the 15th the 167th Brigade was relieved by the 44th Brigade, 15th -Division, and moved by rail to Izel-les-Hameau area. On the 18th the -168th Brigade was relieved by the 46th Brigade and moved to Mazières -area. And on the 18th the 169th Brigade went to Arras.</p> - -<p><!--290.png--><a name="Page_254" id="Page_254"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 254]</span> -At that date there was a proposal that the <abbr title="seventeen">XVII</abbr> Corps should attack -Orange Hill and Chapel Hill, and the 56th Division was to take part in -this attack. Days, however, were spent in moving about.</p> - -<p>On the 20th Sir Douglas Haig visited Gen. Hull. The same day the 169th -Brigade moved to Avesne-le-Comte area, and the 168th to Lignereuil. At -mid-day on the 21st the 56th Division was transferred from the <abbr title="seventeen">XVII</abbr> -Corps to the <abbr title="six">VI</abbr> Corps, and the whole division moved to the Bavincourt -area, when an entirely new scheme of attack came into being.</p> - -<p class="center">* * * * * * *</p> - -<p>In his dispatch covering this period Sir Douglas Haig writes:</p> - -<p class="blockquote">“The definite collapse of the ambitious offensive launched - by the enemy on the 15th July, and the striking success of - the Allied counter-offensive south of the Aisne, effected a - complete change in the whole military situation.”</p> - -<p>This first big operation of Marshal Foch had inflicted heavy losses on -the enemy. Ten divisions were broken up and the remnants used as -reinforcements to others. The attempt to make the Entente Powers sue -for peace before the arrival of the Americans had failed—not only -were a million troops from the United States in France, but the -English divisions had been largely made up to strength. Between May -and June ten English divisions had been reduced to cadres—seven of -these were reconstituted during July and August. And German General -Headquarters had been forced to take momentous decisions. They had to -withdraw from the salient between Rheims and Soissons, and -<!--291.png--><a name="Page_255" id="Page_255"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 255]</span> -also abandon -their idea of a new offensive in Flanders. “By the beginning of -August,” says Ludendorff, “we had suspended our attack and reverted to -the defensive on the whole front.”</p> - -<p>At a conference, held on the 23rd July, it was arranged by Marshal -Foch that the British, French, and American Armies should each prepare -plans for a local offensive. The objectives on the British front were -the disengagement of Amiens and the freeing of the Paris-Amiens -railway by an attack on the Albert-Montdidier front. The rôle of the -French and American Armies was to free other strategic railways -farther south and east.</p> - -<p>There seems a suggestion in his dispatches that the British -Commander-in-Chief was somewhat perturbed by this decision. He had the -safety of the Channel ports and the danger of a fresh German offensive -in that direction ever in his mind, and we know that it was -Ludendorff’s plan. There is an indication that Sir Douglas Haig was -urging a counter-stroke in the north. “These different operations,” he -says, “had already been the subject of correspondence between Marshal -Foch and myself.” Ultimately he came to the conclusion that the tasks -assigned to the British forces east of Amiens should take precedence -“as being the most important and the most likely to give large -results.”</p> - -<p>The attack opened on the 8th August on a front of over eleven miles -from just south of the Amiens-Roye road to Morlancourt. On the right -was the Canadian Corps, in the centre the Australian Corps, and on the -left the <abbr title="three">III</abbr> Corps. The attack of the First French Army was timed to -take place an hour later between Moreuil and the British right. By the -<!--292.png--><a name="Page_256" id="Page_256"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 256]</span> -12th August 22,000 prisoners and over 400 guns had been captured, and -the line had been advanced to a depth of twelve miles, to the old -German positions in 1916.</p> - -<p>The 8th August was the black day of the German Army in the history of -this war, says Ludendorff.<span class="lock"><a name="fnanchor_5" id="fnanchor_5"></a><a href="#footnote_5" class="fnanchor">[5]</a></span></p> - -<p class="blockquote">“The Emperor told me later that, after the failure of the - July offensive and after the 8th August, he knew the war - could no longer be won. The official report of the evening - of the 8th announced briefly that the enemy had penetrated - our line south of the Somme on a wide front. Early the - following morning General von Cramon rang me up from Baden. - He informed me that my report had caused great alarm in - Vienna. I could not leave him in any doubt as to the serious - view I took of the situation. Nevertheless he begged me to - remember how detrimentally the blunt admission of defeat - must affect our allies, who had placed all their hopes in - Germany. This occurred again on the 2nd September.</p> - -<p class="blockquote">The impression made on our Allies by the failure on the - Western Front was great. The Emperor Charles announced his - intention of coming to Spa in the middle of August.”</p> - -<p>The great salient the Germans had created towards Amiens was -disappearing, and Sir Douglas Haig was faced with the old positions of -the opening of the battle of the Somme in 1916. But there was a -difference. The situation and his reasoning are succinctly related in -his dispatch:</p> - -<p class="blockquote">“In deciding to extend the attack northwards to the -<!--293.png--><a name="Page_257" id="Page_257"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 257]</span> - area - between the Rivers Somme and Scarpe I was influenced by the - following considerations.</p> - -<p class="blockquote">The enemy did not seem prepared to meet an attack in this - direction, and, owing to the success of the Fourth Army, he - occupied a salient the left flank of which was already - threatened from the south. A further reason for my decision - was that the ground north of the Ancre River was not greatly - damaged by shell-fire, and was suitable for the use of - Tanks. A successful attack between Albert and Arras in a - south-easterly direction would turn the line of the Somme - south of Péronne, and give every promise of producing - far-reaching results. It would be a step towards the - strategic objective, St. Quentin-Cambrai.</p> - -<p class="blockquote">This attack, moreover, would be rendered easier by the fact - that we now held the commanding plateau south of Arras about - Bucquoy and Ablainzeville, which in the days of the old - Somme fighting had lain well behind the enemy’s lines. In - consequence we were here either astride or to the east of - the intricate system of trench lines which in 1916 we had no - choice but to attack frontally, and enjoyed advantages of - observation which at that date had been denied us.</p> - -<p class="blockquote">It was arranged that on the morning of the 21st August a - limited attack should be launched north of the Ancre to gain - the general line of the Arras-Albert railway, on which it - was correctly assumed that the enemy’s main line of - resistance was sited. The day of the 22nd August would then - be used to get troops and guns into position on this front, - and to bring forward the left of the Fourth Army between the - Somme and the Ancre. The principal attack would be delivered - on the 23rd August by the Third Army and the divisions of - the Fourth Army north of the Somme, the remainder of the - Fourth Army assisting by pushing forward south of the river - to cover the flank of the main operation. Thereafter, if - success attended our efforts, the whole of both - <!--294.png--><a name="Page_258" id="Page_258"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 258]</span> - armies were - to press forward with the greatest vigour and exploit to the - full any advantage we might have gained.”</p> - -<p class="center">* * * * * * *</p> - -<p>It will be seen, therefore, that as the attack from Amiens advanced, -it was being taken up by troops on the left. On the 21st August the <abbr title="four">IV</abbr> -Corps was engaged, with the 42nd, New Zealand, and 37th Divisions, and -the <abbr title="six">VI</abbr> Corps, with the 2nd and Guards Divisions. On the 23rd a series -of strong assaults were delivered on practically the whole front of -thirty-three miles from our junction with the French at Lihons.</p> - -<p>As the attack spread to the north, so activity in Corps, Division, and -Brigade Headquarters preceded actual movement of troops. A state of -brain and nerve tension prevailed. There was, too, a change of plan, -which is always one of the trials of the regimental soldier. It is as -well to recapitulate some of the movements.</p> - -<p>The relief in the line was completed on the 18th August, and on the -19th the 169th Brigade was sent to Arras to carry out preparations for -an attack on Orange and Chapel Hills. Owing to the change of plan this -brigade was sent back to the Avesnes-le-Comte area on the 21st, and on -the same day the 168th Brigade marched from the Mazières area to -Lignereuil. The 56th Division now came under the <abbr title="six">VI</abbr> Corps (Haldane), -and Gen. Hull at once visited Corps Headquarters, but did not succeed -in gaining any exact information as to the rôle the division would -play in the forthcoming operations. During the night 21st/22nd the -division marched to the area Barly-St. Amand-Saulty-Bavincourt.</p> - -<p><!--295.png--><a name="Page_259" id="Page_259"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 259]</span> -Early in the morning of the 22nd Gen. Hull was called to a conference -at Corps Headquarters, where the operations for the next day were -decided upon. He did not get back to Bavincourt until 10.30 a.m., when -he held a conference and explained the operations to all concerned. -Officers of all brigades were then sent off to reconnoitre; and the -168th Brigade marched at 3.30 p.m. to Blairville, a distance of seven -and a half miles.</p> - -<p>Time was now getting on and the Corps Operation order had not been -received. Gen. Hull, however, sent out his orders based on what had -been said at the conference in the morning, and at 9 p.m. the 168th -Brigade, with the 1st London Regt. attached, moved to the assembly -area, a march of another four and a half miles, ready to attack on the -left of the Guards Division. In the midst of all this movement and -with only a short time at their disposal, officers had no opportunity -of seeing the forward assembly areas or the objectives. They assembled -in the dark and attacked in the morning, never having seen the ground -before.</p> - -<p>The artillery was no better off than the infantry.</p> - -<p class="blockquote">“On the 21st August orders were received to join the <abbr title="six">VI</abbr> - Corps, and I went off to see the Corps R.A., who were a long - way back, and also to see the 40th Division Artillery and - the Guards Artillery and to try to reconnoitre the new - front. On the evening of the 21st I received instructions - from the R.A. <abbr title="six">VI</abbr> Corps that all arrangements were at once to - be made to put the 56th Artillery in action to cover the - attack of the 56th Division on the morning of the 23rd, the - divisional front being roughly from 500 yards north of - Hamelincourt to just north of Boiry -<!--296.png--><a name="Page_260" id="Page_260"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 260]</span> - Becquerelle. The - Divisional Artillery, for purposes of the initial attack, - consisted of six brigades R.F.A., as follows: (<i class="decoration">a</i>) Guards - Divisional Artillery, (<i class="decoration">b</i>) 57th, (<i class="decoration">c</i>) 56th. On the 21st - August these brigades were as follows: (<i class="decoration">a</i>) in action on - the front, (<i class="decoration">b</i>) in reserve near St. Pol, (<i class="decoration">c</i>) in reserve - at Simencourt and Berneville. Reconnaissance was carried out - during the morning of the 22nd, and at 8 p.m. that evening - the brigades moved off to occupy the positions selected, and - ammunition to the extent of 400 rounds per gun had to be - dumped at the same time. This involved an immense amount of - work, but it was successfully carried out by the brigades of - the 56th Divisional Artillery by 2 a.m. on the 23rd; but the - brigades of the 57th Divisional Artillery, though all guns - were got into action, were delayed by heavy gas shelling, - and were as a result unable to complete the gun-dumps by the - opening of the barrage. At this time the artillery covering - the division was organised as follows:</p> - -<p class="blockquote">Right group:</p> - -<p class="blockquote bigindent mt1">74th and 75th Brigades R.F.A. Guards Divisional - Artillery, in action west of Boisleux-au-Mont.</p> - -<p class="blockquote">Centre group:</p> - -<p class="blockquote bigindent mt1">285th and 286th Brigades R.F.A. 57th Divisional - Artillery, in action south-east of Boisleux-au-Mont.</p> - -<p class="blockquote">Left group:</p> - -<p class="blockquote bigindent mt1">280th and 281st Brigades R.F.A. 56th Divisional - Artillery, in action south-west of Boisleux-au-Mont.</p> - -<p class="blockquote">As far as the field artillery was concerned, the strength of - the barrage was about one 18-pounder gun per 27 yards.</p> - -<p class="blockquote">Affiliated Heavy Artillery group—two brigades R.G.A.” [Gen. - Elkington.]</p> - -<p><!--297.png--><a name="Page_261" id="Page_261"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 261]</span> -The position from which the division attacked was a very strong one -for defence. The Cojeul River has two branches. The northern branch, -running from the high ground by Adinfer Wood, passes to the north of -Boisleux-St. Marc and Boiry Becquerelle. The southern branch, running -across the front of the division, is underground between Hamelincourt -and Boyelles, where it comes to the surface and joins the main stream -south of Henin.</p> - -<p>The left flank of the division rested on Cojeul (north). There was, -therefore, a wide field of vision in front of them, with the one -exception of the spur which shoots out between the two branches of the -river to the north of Boyelles, and which afforded the enemy a -concealed position on that portion of the front. The general run of -the valley was across the direction of the 56th Division attack, and -Croisilles and St. Leger were over the ridge on the far side of the -valley. Beyond these villages the Hindenburg Line ran roughly from -Arras in a south-easterly direction, obliquely across the line of -attack.</p> - -<p>The first objective of the 168th Brigade, which was to make the -attack, was the blue line—that is, the two villages of Boyelles and -Boiry Becquerelle; and the brigade would then push out a fringe of -posts in front. Twenty-one Tanks (two companies, 11th Battalion Tank -Corps) were to help in this attack.</p> - -<p>As the battalions of the 168th Brigade marched to their positions, the -Germans used gas freely and respirators had to be worn. Fortunately -the night was light, but even so progress was slow, and such light as -there was did not help officers, when they had placed their men in -position, to see very much of what sort of a place it was they would -attack in the -<!--298.png--><a name="Page_262" id="Page_262"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 262]</span> -morning. It seemed that the enemy was very alert, as he -fired a great deal with machine guns and light trench mortars during -the night.</p> - -<p>At 4.55 a.m. in the murky light of dawn the barrage, which had opened -at 4 a.m. at Gommecourt on the right of the <abbr title="six">VI</abbr> Corps, crashed down in -front of the 56th Division. The Kensingtons, on the right, north of -Hamelincourt, the 4th Londons in the centre, and the London Scottish -on the left advanced to the assault twelve minutes later. The Tanks -cleared the way for the Kensingtons very effectively, only a few small -parties of the enemy showing much fight. The battalion, however, was -worried by machine-gun fire from the left, and it was seen that the -4th Londons were meeting with more determined opposition. Two platoons -of the Kensingtons were, therefore, sent to assist by attacking -Boyelles from the south. By 6 o’clock the Kensingtons had reached -their objective.</p> - -<p>The 4th Londons had the village of Boyelles and the curious circular -Marc system in front of them. The ruins of the village could be seen -from the right, but Marc system was blind. Actually the ground between -our front-line trench and the enemy line was level, but it dropped -suddenly from the German line and was helped by a sunken road, so that -there was plenty of shelter from the barrage. The left of the 4th -Londons was held up in front of this place. For some reason no Tank -attacked the forward Marc system, and until a platoon enfiladed the -sunken road from the south, and the London Scottish threatened from -the north, the garrison held up the advance and inflicted heavy -casualties. When the troops pressed in from the flanks, however, -<!--299.png--><a name="Page_263" id="Page_263"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 263]</span> -the -Germans, 2 officers and 80 men, surrendered.</p> - -<p>Much the same thing happened to the right company of the 4th Londons -in the village of Boyelles. But here four Tanks came on the scene, and -again the garrison surrendered with eleven machine guns. Six light, -heavy, and medium trench mortars were captured in the banks on the -north of the stream.</p> - -<p>The London Scottish on the left met with opposition from Boiry -Becquerelle, but carried out a smart enveloping movement, closing on -the village from the flanks, and eventually getting behind it. Over -100 prisoners and 8 machine guns were taken by this well-known -battalion.</p> - -<p>All the first objective was then in our hands.</p> - -<p>At 9.15 a.m. the 168th Brigade was ordered to continue the advance so -as to conform with the 2nd Guards Brigade on the right. The brigade -was to gain touch with the Guards at Bank Copse on the east side of -the railway curve into St. Leger. But this order had to be transmitted -by runner and distances were great; it did not reach the centre -battalion until 11.15 a.m.</p> - -<p>The Kensingtons started their advance at 1.30 p.m., and almost at once -met with strong machine-gun and artillery fire. The advance was held -up on the Ervillers-Boyelles road, and much confused fighting ensued. -Two platoons managed to get round the opposition and joined the -Guards, with whom they attacked the railway bank to the west of Bank -Copse. The remainder of the battalion was apparently fighting in small -groups and was much scattered. The commanding officer, Lieut.-Col. R. -S. F. Shaw, went forward to try to clear up the situation and was -<!--300.png--><a name="Page_264" id="Page_264"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 264]</span> -killed by a sniper. The position on this battalion front was not -certain until 9.30 p.m., when it was ascertained that they were on the -line of the Ervillers-Boyelles road.</p> - -<p>The 4th Londons did not advance until 4.30 p.m. They attacked in -widely extended formation and casualties were very light. There was -opposition from five enemy machine guns, but these were outflanked and -overcome. The line of Boyelles Reserve was reached and patrols pushed -out 500 yards beyond without encountering any of the enemy.</p> - -<p>The London Scottish attacked at the same time as the 4th Londons and -encountered strong opposition at Boiry Work, at the northern end of -Boyelles Reserve. For one hour the London Scottish worked slowly to -get round this position, but before they closed in the garrison -surrendered—86 prisoners. They were then in line with the 4th Londons -and their posts pushed out some 500 yards in advance.</p> - -<p>In spite of the hurried orders it had been a successful day for the -56th Division. The Kensingtons had had the worst time, but they -captured in all 167 prisoners, while the 4th Londons had 243, and the -London Scottish 253.</p> - -<p>Commenting on the attack, Brig.-Gen. Loch says that the chief -difficulty was the short notice given, and the fact that the brigade -was billeted in a much scattered area made the rapid issue of orders -impossible. It was also impossible to reconnoitre the ground, and the -approach march was made in exceptionally hot weather. There had been -no preparation of the front prior to the attack, and signal -communications were poor. Visual signalling was of little value, owing -to the dust and the heavy state -<!--301.png--><a name="Page_265" id="Page_265"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 265]</span> -of the atmosphere, and reliance had -to be placed, as it invariably was, on runners who worked well, but as -the distances were ever increasing it was a slow method.</p> - -<p class="blockquote">“The Tanks,” he says, “were most valuable, although through - various causes they, in some cases, arrived late in the - assembly areas. Their greater speed enabled them to catch up - the infantry, and by working forward and then to a flank - they evidently much demoralised the enemy and caused them to - surrender more freely than usual.”</p> - -<p>The machine guns, which since the beginning of March had been formed -into a battalion, were controlled by Lieut.-Col. Jervis, who was with -the Brigade Headquarters, and were echéloned in depth, the forward -line advancing with the assaulting infantry.</p> - -<p>The enemy was in considerable strength, as is shown by the number of -prisoners, 663, and the 59 machine guns and 18 trench mortars which -were captured.</p> - -<p>Other divisions of the <abbr title="six">VI</abbr> and <abbr title="four">IV</abbr> Corps were equally successful, and -the Germans holding the defences to the south, about Thiepval (which -had caused us such efforts to win in 1916), were in a precarious -position. The attack was pressed without giving the enemy -breathing-space, and he was becoming disorganised and showing signs of -confusion.</p> - -<p>But in writing of this great and last advance we are conscious that a -division, which until this moment had always appeared to be a large -and important unit in any operations, was being swamped by the numbers -set in motion. One of five or six is such a much bigger proportion -than one of fifty-seven -<!--302.png--><a name="Page_266" id="Page_266"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 266]</span> -or fifty-eight. And the French, American, and -Belgian Armies were moving too.</p> - -<p>During the night the London Scottish were placed under the orders of -the 167th Brigade, which relieved the Kensingtons and 4th London -Regiment. The 169th Brigade moved to the Basseux area and, in the -morning of the 24th, to the Purple Line behind Boisleux-au-Mont.</p> - -<p>The 167th Brigade were ordered to attack the next day, the 24th, with -Summit Trench as their first objective, refusing their left flank so -as to join with the 52nd Division on the northern boundary. The second -objective was Fooley Reserve-Hill Switch-Cross Switch, with the object -of enveloping Croisilles from the north, while the Guards Division -carried out a similar operation from the south. Twelve Tanks and one -company of the Machine Gun Battalion were to assist.</p> - -<p>At 7 a.m. the barrage opened on the enemy frontline posts, and, after -ten minutes, crept forward, at the rate of 100 yards in four minutes, -followed by the infantry. The whole of the brigade, of course, -attacked—the 8th Middlesex being on the right, the 7th Middlesex in -the centre, and the 1st London Regiment on the left. The Guards -Division also attacked on the right, and the 52nd on the left.</p> - -<p>The 8th Middlesex reached their objective in Summit Trench and Ledger -Reserve about 10 o’clock. Opposition was not of a fierce nature and -took the form of “patchy” machine-gun fire and rifle fire. Small -parties of men kept working forward and could be seen, with Tanks, in -and about Summit Trench by 8.30 a.m. The 7th Middlesex and 1st Londons -<!--303.png--><a name="Page_267" id="Page_267"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 267]</span> -advanced in a similar fashion and with the same opposition.</p> - -<p>But news came from the Corps which, for the moment, checked the -advance. From prisoners’ statements it was learned that three fresh -divisions had arrived in Bullecourt and Hendicourt, and the 56th -Division was ordered to make preparations to meet a counter-attack. -The 169th Brigade was ordered forward behind Boyelles, and the 167th -Brigade was told to occupy Croisilles “by peaceful penetration.” -Meanwhile the right brigade of the 52nd Division, which was attacking -Henin Hill, had been compelled to withdraw and was echéloned on the -forward slopes to the left rear of the 56th Division.</p> - -<p>Patrols began to probe the country before them, and at 1.30 p.m. the -situation was: the 8th Middlesex had one company on the western side -of Croisilles with patrols on the outskirts of the village, two -companies in Summit Trench and that end of Leger Reserve, and one -company in Boyelles Reserve. The 7th Middlesex had two companies in -Summit Trench, with patrols in front, and support and reserve -companies in depth in rear. The 1st Londons had two companies in -Summit Trench, in touch with the 52nd Division, and support and -reserve companies in rear.</p> - -<p>Reports tended to show that Croisilles had been evacuated, and after a -consultation with Brig.-Gen. Freeth, Gen. Hull ordered the Brigade to -attack and establish itself in the Hindenburg Support Line between -Hump Lane and River Road (Sensée River). Six Tanks were to be used, -and the 52nd Division was to attack on the left.</p> - -<p><!--304.png--><a name="Page_268" id="Page_268"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 268]</span> -Attempts made by the 8th Middlesex to enter Croisilles were not -successful, and at zero hour, 7.30 p.m., the village was still in the -hands of the enemy.</p> - -<p>The attack was met with determined and very heavy machine-gun and -artillery fire, and failed to gain any ground. Only one Tank came into -action, and that was met with gas which rendered it useless. -Croisilles Trench had been reached by troops, but found to be only 2 -feet deep at the most, and quite useless as a reorganising point for -further advance. This trench had unfortunately been shown as an -organised and deep defensive work. Brig.-Gen. Freeth, therefore, -ordered Summit Trench to be held as the line of resistance.</p> - -<p>The days’ fighting had resulted in an appreciable gain, but the -enemy’s resistance was increasing. The Corps ordered an attack on the -Hindenburg Support the following day, without the help of Tanks, and -Gen. Hull had to point out that the resistance was not only very -strong, as he had proved that day, but that the Hindenburg system was -very heavily wired. Tanks would have dealt with this wire had they -been available. The Corps then modified the order and instructed the -General to capture Croisilles and obtain a footing in Sensée Avenue, -to the north-east, so as to conform with the 52nd Division, who were -to attack on the left.</p> - -<p>During the night the front-line battalions were heavily shelled with -gas, which forced them to wear gas-masks, in one case for six hours. -Patrols, however, went out, and their reports coincided with that of -the Guards Division on the right, that Croisilles was full of machine -guns. Also the 52nd -<!--305.png--><a name="Page_269" id="Page_269"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 269]</span> -Division on the left reported that the Hindenburg -Line was very strongly held. It was decided to bombard the village -while patrols would try to gain ground.</p> - -<p>But the 25th August was a negative day. Some posts were established in -front of the main line, but the village itself was too strongly held -and the bombardment, apparently, failed to dislodge the enemy.</p> - -<p>Meanwhile the 169th Brigade reconnoitred the position with a view of -attacking and enveloping Croisilles from the north and capturing the -Hindenburg Line.</p> - -<p>At 8 a.m. the 56th and 52nd Divisions had been moved from the command -of the <abbr title="six">VI</abbr> Corps to that of the <abbr title="seventeen">XVII</abbr> Corps, and it was decided that the -167th Brigade should attack on the 26th and establish itself on the -line of the shallow Croisilles Trench and Fooley Reserve. Roughly the -<abbr title="seventeen">XVII</abbr> Corps faced the Hindenburg Line, which swung round the left flank -of the 56th Division, and on this flank the 52nd Division were to -advance on the Hindenburg Line in conjunction with the attack of the -167th Brigade. Farther north the Canadian Corps were to assault the -actual Hindenburg Line, and if they were successful the 52nd Division -would continue to push down the system and roll it up in a -south-easterly direction.</p> - -<p>The attack of the 167th Brigade took place at 3 a.m., and was nowhere -successful. The wire was still uncut (there were in some spots five -belts of it), and the machine guns in Croisilles poured a devastating -hail of bullets on the assaulting troops. But to the north the -Canadian Corps had been successful and had -<!--306.png--><a name="Page_270" id="Page_270"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 270]</span> -pierced the Hindenburg -system. The 52nd Division had thrust one battalion into the celebrated -line, and was progressing towards Henin Hill.</p> - -<p>During the afternoon the 52nd Division reported the line from the -Cojeul River to Henin Hill clear of the enemy, and the 167th Brigade -was then relieved at 6 o’clock by the 169th.</p> - -<p>The battalions in line from the right were the Queen’s Westminsters, -the London Rifle Brigade, and the 2nd Londons. On taking over, the 2nd -Londons attempted to clear the situation on the left by a “stealth” -raid with two platoons. The experiment was bad, as the platoons were -almost wiped out by machine guns.</p> - -<p>The battle was continued the following day, the 27th, at 9.30 a.m. The -task was to keep in touch with the 52nd Division and sweep round the -north of the village. The Queen’s Westminsters, therefore, stood fast -while the London Rifle Brigade and the 2nd Londons executed a wheel to -the right. This was successful in reaching Farmers’ Avenue and Sensée -Avenue, while, on the left, the 52nd Division reached Fontaine -Croisilles and established themselves to the east of that village. A -glance at the map will show how the Hindenburg Line was being rolled -up, how desperate was the case of the Germans opposite the 56th -Division, and how necessary it was for them to concentrate their -fiercest resistance against the advance of the 56th Division. The day -was noteworthy for the good work done by the 2nd Londons in what was -the nearest approach to open warfare which had as yet been attempted.</p> - -<p>Croisilles was the obstacle which stood in our way. The Guards -Division attacked on the right of it, and -<!--307.png--><a name="Page_271" id="Page_271"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 271]</span> -after an initial success was -counter-attacked so severely that they fell back on Leger Reserve, and -left a gap on the right of the Queen’s Westminsters, which was filled -by two platoons of the latter regiment. Farther to the south troops -were fighting on the Somme battlefield of the month of September -1916—still some way from the Hindenburg Line. But, as has been -pointed out, the whole of the old Somme positions were being turned -from the north.</p> - -<p>During the afternoon the 168th Brigade took over the frontage held by -the right and centre battalions of the 169th Brigade. These two -battalions were then able to enter the Hindenburg system which had -been captured by the 52nd Division, and move along it towards the -Sensée River, where they would start the attack. The 2nd Londons -meanwhile cleared their front of some small parties of the enemy and -crossed the Sensée to Nelly Avenue, part of an outpost line to the -main defences. The division then stood fast under orders to attack the -Bullecourt area the next day.</p> - -<p>During the night dispositions were altered. The 167th Brigade took -over the right of the Divisional front, with the 8th Middlesex, to the -west of Croisilles, and the 168th Brigade moved in position to support -the 169th in the attack along the Hindenburg Line. Also, the 168th -Brigade was to protect the flank of the 169th, if the village was not -taken, and “mop up” generally behind the attacking troops.</p> - -<p>The first objective for the 169th Brigade was given as Queen’s -Lane-Jove Lane; the second was the trenches south-east of Bullecourt.</p> - -<p>Patrols of the 8th Middlesex attempted to enter Croisilles several -times during the night, but were -<!--308.png--><a name="Page_272" id="Page_272"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 272]</span> -always met with machine-gun fire. In -the morning of the 28th, however, an aeroplane reported the village -empty, but at 8.30 a.m. patrols of the 8th Middlesex found only the -western portion of the village clear. The whole battalion then -advanced, and after some lively fighting occupied the village.</p> - -<p>The 52nd Division, which had been relieved by the 57th Division, -passed through the troops in the line and joined in the general attack -of the 56th Division at 12.30 p.m. The action that followed is one of -the utmost confusion. The Queen’s Westminsters, who led the attack, -started from the line Nelly Avenue. The Germans on the right, in -Guardian Reserve, held out, and the 167th Brigade found sufficient of -the enemy to hold them up on the railway south-east of Croisilles. But -two companies of the Queen’s Westminsters and part of the 2nd Londons -lost direction, and seem to have become inextricably mixed with troops -of the 57th Division somewhere to the north of Hendicourt.</p> - -<p>Apparently trouble started on the previous day (27th), when the -Queen’s Westminsters and part of the London Rifle Brigade were -relieved by the London Scottish in front of Croisilles. The two former -battalions had to march to a flank to get into the Hindenburg Line, -and were severely shelled in doing so. On arriving at the Hindenburg -Line, progress to their positions of assembly was seriously impeded by -the 52nd Division, who, at that moment, were also assembling to attack -on the following day. Col. Savill, who was commanding the Queen’s -Westminsters, says that his men arrived “dead beat” at Nelly Avenue -and Burg Support, having been on the move all night. He gives as the -cause of the loss -<!--309.png--><a name="Page_273" id="Page_273"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 273]</span> -of direction the heavy machine-gun fire which his -troops met from the right on emerging from the trenches, but a glance -at the map suggests another and more probable reason. He was unable to -assemble his battalion on a front conforming with the general line of -advance. The right of his leading companies was in Nelly Avenue, and -the left in Burg Support with orders “to swing round at right angles -to the Hindenburg system.”</p> - -<p>It was pointed out at the battle of the Somme that the complicated -manœuvre of changing direction at the commencement of an assault -should be avoided. It is probable that the commanding officer had no -other alternative, but the lesson is once more demonstrated. To the -difficult task imposed upon them must be added the further -embarrassment of never having seen the ground. True that the attack -did not start until 12.30 p.m., but it was extremely difficult to fix -landmarks owing to the country being so overgrown with long grass and -weeds, and in any case there was rising ground between Burg Support -and Bullecourt, so that the few hours from dawn to the attack were of -little benefit.</p> - -<p>The change of front by the left of the attacking force was further -complicated by the thick wire between the trenches of the Hindenburg -System. Before any manœuvre of the sort could be undertaken, these -belts of wire had to be passed, and by the time this had been -accomplished, all idea of direction had fled.</p> - -<p>The London Rifle Brigade, in close support to the Queen’s -Westminsters, had three companies in line, the fourth company being in -support on the right and Battalion Headquarters on the left. The left -<!--310.png--><a name="Page_274" id="Page_274"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 274]</span> -and centre companies followed the Queen’s Westminsters—even in field -practice this would probably occur.</p> - -<p>The 2nd London Regt. was already reduced to 11 officers and 193 other -ranks, and assembled in King’s Avenue. The two left companies followed -the Queen’s Westminsters, while the two right companies fought down -Tunnel Trench.</p> - -<p>Col. Savill, believing his battalion to be more or less on their way -to Bullecourt, moved with his headquarters down Burg Support and very -soon encountered the enemy. He was joined by the headquarters of the -London Rifle Brigade and the 2nd London Regt. It was thought that the -“mopping-up” had been badly done, and a message was sent for -reinforcements while the staff details tried to bomb their way -forward.</p> - -<p>Soon after the attack opened, therefore, the 169th Brigade was trying -to capture Bullecourt with two companies of the London Rifle Brigade -on the right, three battalion headquarter staffs and a few scattered -men of the Queen’s Westminsters in the centre, and two companies of -the 2nd London Regt. (not a hundred men) on the left. The right, which -was the strongest part of the total force, was definitely held up by a -strong enemy garrison in Guardian, and in other parts of the front the -enemy resistance was too strong to be overcome by so weak a force.</p> - -<p>Eventually a company of the 4th London Regt. was sent up Burg Support, -and by 5 p.m. progress had been made as far as the Hump. But on the -right the enemy, who were being continually reinforced by troops -falling back from the attack of the 167th Brigade through Croisilles, -still held Guardian -<!--311.png--><a name="Page_275" id="Page_275"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 275]</span> -Reserve. “Guardian Reserve,” writes Brig.-Gen. -Coke, “was a thorn in the side of the brigade until 6 p.m.” Not only -was the advance severely harassed from this place, but no track for -carrying ammunition, etc., was available until it had been captured. -By 6 p.m., however, the London Rifle Brigade, reinforced by two -companies of the Kensingtons and the 168th Trench Mortar Battery, -drove the greater part of the remaining Germans to surrender.</p> - -<p>The advance continued on the right as far as Pelican Avenue, but in -the centre the Knuckle was not cleared until 5 a.m. on the 29th. The -situation all through the afternoon and night of the 28th August was -most complicated, the 2nd London, London Rifle Brigade, 4th London, -and Kensington Regts. being involved in a series of separate -operations dealing with scattered machine-gun nests, disposed in -trenches and in broken ground.</p> - -<p>During the afternoon the 168th Brigade had been ordered to move to Leg -Lane and get in touch with the 167th Brigade, also to be prepared to -move into Pelican Avenue with the object of attacking Bullecourt early -in the morning of the 29th. But, owing to the state of affairs in the -main Hindenburg System, this was impossible, and troops were moved -into position in daylight on the 29th.</p> - -<p>Meanwhile, all those troops who had gone careering about on the left -had become mixed up with the 172nd Brigade in the neighbourhood of -Cemetery Avenue to the north of Hendicourt. They had suffered a number -of casualties, and the remaining captain of the Queen’s Westminsters -had returned wounded during the afternoon, and had reported to the -169th Brigade that he and the force of which he -<!--312.png--><a name="Page_276" id="Page_276"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 276]</span> -assumed command had -occupied Pelican Lane. This will give some idea of the difficulties -which confronted Brig.-Gen. Coke.</p> - -<p>The attack was resumed in strength at 1 p.m. on the 29th. The 168th -Brigade were in Pelican Avenue, with the Kensingtons on the right and -the London Scottish on the left, right and left support being the 4th -and 1st London Regts.</p> - -<p>Pelican Lane appears to have been held by small parties of the enemy, -and the 169th Brigade assembled in the trenches north-west of that -place. But the missing companies, with the exception of the 2nd London -Regt., had not returned. The London Rifle Brigade led the attack with -two companies, having in close support 40 men of the Queen’s -Westminsters (which were all that could be found), and behind them the -2nd Londons, with a total strength of 7 officers and 95 other ranks.</p> - -<p>The objective for the division was the trench system east of -Bullecourt and south of Riencourt. At the very start of the attack the -Kensingtons were held up at Station Redoubt; but the London Scottish -made good progress on the left, and by 2.15 p.m. were through -Bullecourt. The weak 169th Brigade made progress as far as Saddler -Lane and the sunken road on the left of the village. And the 57th -Division reported that they had captured Riencourt and were through -Hendicourt.</p> - -<p>Tank Avenue was strongly held by the enemy and successfully arrested -any further advance in the centre; and on the flanks the first check -was not overcome. And so the line remained with the London Scottish -bulged out round Bullecourt, and the Kensingtons bringing the right -flank back to -<!--313.png--><a name="Page_277" id="Page_277"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 277]</span> -Station Redoubt, and the 169th Brigade the left flank -to Saddler Lane. The right of the division was in touch with the 3rd -Division, but the position of the 57th was obscure.</p> - -<p>The 167th Brigade then relieved the whole of the divisional front, and -the night passed in comparative quietness.</p> - -<p>At about 5 a.m. on the 30th the enemy counter-attacked the line -Hendicourt-Bullecourt-Ecoust in strength, and drove the 167th Brigade -out of Bullecourt to the line Pelican Lane and Pelican Avenue. At the -same time the 3rd Division on the right was driven out of Ecoust, and -on the left the 57th Division lost Riencourt and fell back on the -Bullecourt-Hendecourt road, the enemy securing the factory on that -road.</p> - -<p>The 167th Brigade at once attempted to regain Bullecourt; but the -enemy forces in Bullecourt received such strong support from the -Station Redoubt that all efforts failed. Gen. Hull arranged for a -bombardment of the Station Redoubt by the heavy artillery.</p> - -<p>Orders from the Corps fixed the 31st August for a renewal of the -attack in conjunction with the <abbr title="six">VI</abbr> Corps on the left. And so the 168th -Brigade was once more ordered to take Bullecourt and the Station -Redoubt, relieving the 167th Brigade on that portion of the front. A -company of the latter brigade would then take up a position on the -left of the 168th Brigade and attack the factory. The objective was -Tank Support with the left flank thrown back to the factory.</p> - -<p>The relief took place, and all preparations were completed. At 5.15 -a.m. on the 31st the brigade -<!--314.png--><a name="Page_278" id="Page_278"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 278]</span> -advanced under a creeping barrage, with -the London Scottish on the right, the 4th London Regt. in the centre, -and the 7th Middlesex on the left.</p> - -<p>The London Scottish carried the Station Redoubt, and attacked -Bullecourt Avenue at 8 o’clock, obtaining touch with the 4th Londons. -But the latter regiment was held up in front of Bullecourt; and on the -left the 7th Middlesex were unable to capture the factory. A company -of the Kensingtons was sent up on the left, and by 10.15 a.m. the -factory was captured, and touch obtained with the 171st Brigade of the -division on that flank. Meanwhile, the London Scottish had captured -Bullecourt Avenue.</p> - -<p>At 1 o’clock an artillery observer reported the enemy advancing over -the open and assembling in Tank Avenue and Support. All field guns and -the heavy artillery was concentrated on this target, and no -counter-attack developed. But the plans were modified to the capture -of the village only.</p> - -<p>Two companies of the Kensingtons were sent up as reinforcements, and -bombing from the flanks was carried on round the village. By the time -it was dark only the eastern portion was not cleared up; and the enemy -remained in Gordon Reserve.</p> - -<p>The 56th Division was then relieved by the 52nd, and marched out of -the line to rest about Boyelles. The captures during these operations -were:</p> - -<p class="bigindent mt1">29 officers, 1,047 other ranks.</p> - -<p class="bigindent mt1">2 77-mm. guns and 1 8-inch howitzer.</p> - -<p class="bigindent mt1">200 machine guns and over 50 trench mortars</p> - -<p>The casualties of the division were:</p> - -<p class="bigindent mt1">123 officers and 2,381 other ranks.</p> - -<div class="figcenter" style="width: 500px"> - <a name="illo9"></a> - <img src="images/i_9albert.jpg" - width="100%" height="auto" - alt="Illustration: Battles of Albert and Scarpe 1918" - /> - <p class="caption"><span class="sc u">9. The Battles of Albert & the Scarpe 1918.</span></p> -</div> - -<p>The hard-working but cheery artillery remained in the line. All -through the battle they had pushed -<!--315.png--> -<!--316.png--> -<!--317.png--><a name="Page_279" id="Page_279"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 279]</span> -forward close behind the infantry. -On the 25th August the Guards Artillery had returned to their own -division, and as a consequence the 56th Divisional front had been -covered by the 57th Divisional Artillery on the right and their own -artillery on the left. At this time the 13th and 22nd Brigades of the -Royal Garrison Artillery had been affiliated with the 56th Divisional -Artillery. The enemy paid the closest attention to our artillery, -bombarding the battery positions incessantly with high-explosive and -gas shells.</p> - -<p>On the 29th, early in the morning, all brigades of artillery advanced -to the outskirts of Croisilles. In the previous fighting they had been -1,200 yards behind the infantry in Summit Trench. On this same day the -232nd Army Brigade R.F.A. was transferred to the 56th Division, and -formed an independent group with S.O.S. lines superimposed. After the -advance in the morning the 56th Divisional Artillery became the right -group and the 57th the left group. And the next day the 40th -Divisional Artillery replaced the 57th.</p> - -<p>The artillery passed under the command of the 40th and then the 63rd -Divisions, and eventually withdrew from the line on the 5th September, -all ranks and horses having suffered severely from gas.</p> - -<p>There was to be little rest.</p> - -<p>It is interesting to note that the official report of the Battles -Nomenclature Committee gives the Battle of Albert the dates 21st-23rd -August and boundaries Road -Chaulnes—Lamotte—Corbie—Warloy—Acheux—Souastre—Berles-au-Bois—Brétencourt—Héninel; -and the Battle of the Scarpe 1918 the dates -26th-30th August and boundaries Noreuil (exclusive)—St. Leger -<!--318.png--><a name="Page_280" id="Page_280"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 280]</span> -(exclusive)—Boisleux-au-Mont—Roclincourt—Bailleul—Oppy. The ground -from the right of Boyelles (about the station) to Mercatel is -therefore included in both battle fronts—the Battle of the Scarpe -opening with the 167th Brigade attack on Croisilles Trench and Fooley -Reserve—and places the 56th Division operating on the flank in each -battle.</p> - - -<p class="p2 footnote"> <a name="footnote_5" id="footnote_5"></a> -<a href="#fnanchor_5"><span class="muchsmaller">[5]</span></a> - <cite>My War Memories, 1914—1918.</cite></p> -</div><!--end chapter eight--> -<p><!--319.png--><a name="Page_281" id="Page_281"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 281]</span></p> -<div class="chapter"> -<h3 class="p4">CHAPTER <abbr title="nine">IX</abbr></h3> - -<h4>THE ARMISTICE</h4> - -<h4 class="smaller">BATTLE OF THE CANAL DU NORD—BATTLE OF CAMBRAI, 1918—BATTLE -OF THE SAMBRE</h4> - -<p class="p2">When once the great offensive had started there was no pause in the -fighting. Divisions were relieved to reorganise. Sometimes they stood -their ground, so that supplies could be brought up, and so that they -might not shoot too far ahead of the base from which supplies were -drawn. The turmoil of the front line was assuredly no greater than the -turmoil in rear of the fighting troops. Activity, effort, unending -toil, went on behind the line as well as in the line. As the troops -drove the enemy in front of them, so engineers stood ready to rebuild -the shattered railways and reconstruct the shell-battered roads. But -the Army Service Corps could not stand still while the railways and -roads were in the hands of the engineers. They had to struggle forward -as best they could, and it is to their everlasting industry that the -troops in the fighting areas were fed, clothed, supplied with -ammunition, and, very frequently indeed, provided with water.</p> - -<p>When the infantry of the 56th Division returned to Boyelles, the place -was unrecognisable. The railway was through. Trains were in Boyelles, -and lines of lorries stood, being loaded by a swarm of men. It was a -cheering sight for the tired but happy division.</p> - -<p>Meanwhile the advance continued, fiercely opposed, -<!--320.png--><a name="Page_282" id="Page_282"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 282]</span> -but irresistible. -On the right of Bullecourt the Fourth and Third Armies had, by the -night of the 30th, reached a line from Cléry-sur-Somme, past the -western edge of Marrières Wood to Combles, les Bœufs, Bancourt, -Fremicourt, and Vraucourt. And, south of Péronne, Allied infantry had -reached the left bank of the Somme from Nesle to the north. Farther -south still, the French held Noyon. On the 1st September the -Australians entered Péronne.</p> - -<p>On the left of Bullecourt the First Army had advanced (we have already -noted the advance of the Canadians) and were now on the high ground -east of Cherisy and Hautcourt, and had captured Eterpigny. On the -north of the Scarpe we had captured Plouvain. The Quéant-Drocourt line -was now within assaulting distance.</p> - -<p>This powerful line ran from the Hindenburg Line at Quéant to Drocourt, -in the neighbourhood of Lens, and was attacked by the Canadian Corps -and 4th Division, of the First Army, and the 52nd, 57th, and 63rd -Divisions, of the Third Army, on the 2nd September. It was one of the -greatest assaults of the war, and was completely successful.</p> - -<p>As the 56th Division knew very well, the Germans had been contesting -every inch of the ground. But now the enemy were in a most -unfavourable position, and started to fall back on the whole of the -Third Army front and on the right of the First Army. On the 3rd -September the enemy was on the line of the Canal du Nord; on the -following day he commenced to withdraw from the east bank of the -Somme, south of Péronne, and on the night of the 8th September was on -the line Vermand, Epehy, Havrincourt, and so along the east bank of -the canal.</p> - -<p><!--321.png--><a name="Page_283" id="Page_283"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 283]</span> -Meanwhile the division rested, bathed, and reorganised. Divisional -Headquarters were at Boisleux St. Marc, and on the 3rd September Sir -Douglas Haig visited Gen. Hull and congratulated him on the good work -done for the division.</p> - -<p>On the 4th a warning order, followed by one of confirmation, was -received that the division would move to the Quéant-Pronville area in -readiness to relieve the 63rd Division in the line on the 5th. But at -mid-day on the 5th this order was cancelled. Meanwhile the 167th and -169th Brigades had already moved to the new area, and so had a useless -march back again.</p> - -<p>On the same day Gen. Hull was informed that his division would be -transferred to the XXII Corps and would relieve the 1st Division in -the line, command to pass on the 9th.</p> - -<p>Due north of Cambrai there is a very marshy tract of land. It was a -feature, it will be remembered, in the scheme of attack on Cambrai in -1917. These ponds are fed by the Sensée and Cojeul Rivers, and the -Canal du Nord is planned to run up, after passing Mœuvres, by -Inchy-en-Artois, Marquion to a place called Palleul, where it cuts -across this marsh and joins up with the Canal de l’Escaut and the -Canal de la Sensée. This water covers a stretch of ground running well -to the west, towards the Scarpe, and tails off near a village called -Etaing. When the Canadians made their gallant and successful attack on -the Quéant-Drocourt line, the left flank of the advance rested on the -ponds and marshes of the Sensée, and this was the front which the 56th -Division was to take over.</p> - -<p>The line was well up to the water and extended -<!--322.png--><a name="Page_284" id="Page_284"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 284]</span> -from a point about 500 -yards north of Eterpigny, south of Etaing, south of Lecleuse, and -joined with the Canadians 1,500 yards east of Récourt.</p> - -<p>The relief of the 1st Division took place on the 6th, 7th, and 8th, -command passing at 10 a.m. on the 9th September. The enemy was quiet, -but the weather was bad, cold and showery.</p> - -<p>On the 16th it was arranged that the 4th Division should relieve the -11th, on the left, and that the 56th would extend the front held to -their right, taking over from the 3rd Canadian Division. Battalions -then engaged in a series of side-stepping reliefs to the right until, -on the 25th, the right of the division was on the Arras-Cambrai road. -On this day the only incident of note occurred when the enemy twice -attempted to raid the London Scottish, and was, on each occasion, -driven off with loss.</p> - -<p>By this time preparations were complete for a further advance across -the Canal du Nord on the 27th September. The crossing of the canal was -to be forced by the Canadian Corps, when the 11th and 56th Divisions -would relieve the left of the Canadians and attack due north along the -eastern bank of the canal and towards the marshes of the Sensée. The -56th Division would be on the left—that is to say, they would advance -along the canal bank. The 169th Brigade was given the task of -attacking along the eastern bank, and the 168th was to clear up the -western bank.</p> - -<p>The great attack on the 27th September met with the fiercest -opposition. It was obviously of vital importance to the enemy to -maintain his front opposite St. Quentin and Cambrai. The advance of -the British Armies was striking directly at the all-important -<!--323.png--><a name="Page_285" id="Page_285"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 285]</span> -lateral -communications running through Maubeuge to Hirson and Mezières, by -which alone the German forces on the Champagne front could be supplied -and maintained. It had been decided that the Americans were to attack -west of the Meuse in the direction of Mezières, the French west of the -Argonne with the same general objectives, and the Belgians in the -direction of Ghent. The British attack in the centre was where the -enemy’s defences were most highly organised, and if these were broken -the threat directed at his vital communications would react on his -defence elsewhere.</p> - -<p>The British attack was, too, largely on the field of a former attack -in 1917, but there was this difference: the Canadians had smashed -through the Quéant-Drocourt system on the left. This would make the -attack on the Bourlon Wood positions somewhat easier. But the whole -system of defence round and about the Hindenburg Line varied in depth -between 7,000 and 10,000 yards, and was a most formidable series of -fortifications.</p> - -<p>The First and Third Armies attacked with the IV, VI, XVII, and -Canadian Corps, the operation of the 56th Division being on the -extreme left and subsequent to the launching of the main attack. The -problem on the left, which the 56th Division helped to solve, was that -the northern portion of the canal was too formidable an obstacle to be -crossed in the face of the enemy, and it was therefore necessary to -force a passage on the narrow front about Mœuvres, and turn the line -of the canal farther north by a divergent attack developed fan-wise -from the point of crossing.</p> - -<p>The morning broke wet and misty. The wind was -<!--324.png--><a name="Page_286" id="Page_286"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 286]</span> -from the west, and -carried the opening crash of the British barrage, at 5.30 a.m., well -behind the German lines. But they did not need this sort of warning. -For days they had watched the assembling of batteries, stores, a -gigantic army behind the infantry, who were ever keeping a steady -pressure on their advanced lines. Prepared as they were, however, -nothing could stop the assaulting lines of Canadians. News came in to -the 56th Division early that all was going well.</p> - -<p>Enemy retaliation on the 56th Division was slight, and practically -ceased by 5.40 a.m. But as the morning progressed it became apparent -that the Canadians were meeting with strong opposition on the extreme -left. They were timed to reach a line immediately south of Sauchy by -mid-day, and the 169th Brigade was to carry on the attack from there -at 2.48 p.m.</p> - -<p>Brig.-Gen. Coke ordered the London Rifle Brigade to send a company, as -soon as the barrage would permit, to establish posts on the east bank -of the canal, and cover the Royal Engineers, who were to build a -bridge about 1,000 yards north of the Arras-Cambrai road. A similar -bridge was to be made some 300 yards south of the road. The northern -bridge was to be complete by 11 a.m. and the southern one by mid-day. -But the village of Marquion was on the east of the canal, and on the -Arras-Cambrai road, and at 11.45 a.m. the village was still holding -out, which made it impossible for the 169th Brigade to keep to the -time-table and be in position for attack by 2.48 p.m. It was therefore -decided to postpone the attack until 3.28 p.m.</p> - -<p>Meanwhile, the Engineers (513th Coy. and 512th -<!--325.png--><a name="Page_287" id="Page_287"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 287]</span> -Coy.) and Pioneers had -gone forward to construct their bridges, and had found themselves -opposed by hostile infantry. They, however, cleared the eastern bank -and commenced to build.</p> - -<p>At mid-day it was reported that Marquion was clear, and the 2nd London -Regt. started to cross about that time, followed by the Queen’s -Westminsters and the London Rifle Brigade. The advance of the 169th -Brigade to the assembly positions completed the clearing of the ground -behind the Canadians—the Queen’s Westminsters capturing no less than -50 prisoners from fighting groups they met with before forming up.</p> - -<p>At three o’clock the brigade was in position with the 2nd Londons on -the right and the Queen’s Westminsters on the left. The London Rifle -Brigade had one company between the two branches of the River Agache -clearing up the ground, and two companies in support of the 2nd -Londons; the fourth company was engaged in covering the Engineers, who -were making the northern bridge.</p> - -<p>The attack swiftly reached and captured all the small copses, Kamwezi, -Kiduna, and Cemetery, which yielded many prisoners, but the 2nd -Londons were checked by machine-gun nests on the railway embankment -south-west of Oisy. The 2nd Londons and the London Rifle Brigade -attacked four times without success, and on the fifth the surviving -enemy and their machine guns were captured.</p> - -<p>The Queen’s Westminsters met with the same sort of opposition. The -swampy ground in the triangle where the Agache joins the canal was an -effective obstacle behind which the enemy had placed machine guns, -which swept the line of advance. But the -<!--326.png--><a name="Page_288" id="Page_288"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 288]</span> -Queen’s Westminsters -worked cunningly round by the banks of the Agache, and eventually -surrounded the Germans, capturing 1 officer and 22 other ranks (21 -dead bodies were counted in the post). By 7 p.m. the line of the -railway south-west of Oisy was held, and with the capture of a final -machine-gun nest defending the canal bridge east of Mill Copse, the -Queen’s Westminsters reached the final objective of the attack early -in the morning of the 28th.</p> - -<p>The task of advancing on the western bank of the canal was given to -the 168th Brigade, and was carried out by the Kensingtons. For some -way they advanced in line with the Queen’s Westminsters, but were then -held up by machine guns in Mill Copse. The country was extremely -difficult owing to water. Mill Copse could only be approached by a -narrow pavé lane, which was flooded and much blocked by fallen trees. -At 6.30 p.m. the leading company was about 500 yards south of the -copse, and it was decided not to attempt its capture by daylight, but -to wait for the moon. The advance was then continued at 2 a.m., and -reached the final objective without opposition.</p> - -<p>The following day the 169th Brigade pushed on to the marsh land east -of Palleul, meeting with no resistance, but securing a few prisoners. -Altogether this brigade captured over 400 prisoners and 34 machine -guns.</p> - -<p>The total captures of the division were: 12 officers, 501 other ranks, -45 machine guns, and 10 trench mortars.</p> - -<p>The 8th Middlesex (167th Brigade) then entered the village of Palleul, -after making a temporary bridge over the blown-up causeway, and -established -<!--327.png--><a name="Page_289" id="Page_289"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 289]</span> -a bridgehead at Arleux, a village on the north of the -marshes. The enemy made a small attack in this direction on the 29th, -and drove in the bridgehead; they also shelled Palleul with mustard -gas.</p> - -<p>But the German resistance was broken. Gouzeaucourt, Marcoing, -Noyelles-sur-l’Escaut, Fontaine-Notre-Dame, and Sailly had been -captured, together with over 10,000 prisoners and 200 guns. -Consternation reigned at the headquarters of the Central Powers. The -Austrian Peace Note made its appearance on the 15th September; -Bulgaria surrendered on the 29th; and Damascus fell on the 20th. The -German troops on the Western Front fought desperately and well, but -they were being beaten, and frequently, on the British front, by -inferior numbers.</p> - -<p>The actual position held by the 56th Division was along the marshy -ground on both banks of the canal. It included Palleul and the Bois de -Quesnoy. But on the 30th the front was prolonged to the right, when -the 168th Brigade took over from the 11th Division, up to a point on -the eastern outskirts of Aubencheu. The enemy were very alert, and -opened heavy machine-gun fire on the approach of patrols. And on the -6th they set fire to Aubenchaul. When the fires had died down, patrols -established posts on the bank of the canal.</p> - -<p>This burning business was carried on extensively. Fires, accompanied -by explosions, were continually breaking out behind the enemy lines. -On the 9th October the division was ordered to take over a further -length of front and relieve the whole of the 11th Division, who had -their right flank on the village of Fressies. The object was to free -the 11th Division, so that they could follow the enemy, who -<!--328.png--><a name="Page_290" id="Page_290"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 290]</span> -were -evacuating the area between the Canal de l’Escaut and the Sensée -Canal, as the result of the capture of Cambrai by the Canadian Corps. -(Battle of Cambrai 8th-9th October.)</p> - -<p>During the day it was found that the enemy were actually retiring on -the 11th Division front, and the 56th Division was ordered to -ascertain whether the villages of Arleux, Aubigny-au-Bac, and -Brunement were still occupied. Both the 167th Brigade on the left and -the 168th on the right sent out patrols, which were fired on and -engaged by the enemy the moment they crossed the canal. In Arleux -quite an exciting patrol action was fought, in which four of the enemy -were killed.</p> - -<p>The relief of the 11th Division was completed by six in the evening. -Patrols found that the enemy was still holding Fressies, and the 168th -Brigade was ordered to attack and capture that village.</p> - -<p>The operation was carried out by the Kensingtons, who stormed the -village most successfully at 7 a.m. on the 11th October. Two companies -only attacked, and the casualties were 1 killed and 9 wounded. On the -other hand, they captured 2 officers and 39 other ranks. A most -praiseworthy little action.</p> - -<p>The enemy was now cleared from the south bank of the canal along the -whole of the divisional front. The 11th Division, pressing forward, -was still on the right of the 56th, and on the left was the 1st -Canadian Division. Farther on the left was the <abbr title="eight">VIII</abbr> Corps, and, on -this same day, they captured Vitry-en-Artois and drove the enemy back -on Douai. On receipt of this news the 56th Divisional Artillery was -ordered to keep the crossings of the canal from Arleux northwards -under fire, and the 167th Brigade were -<!--329.png--><a name="Page_291" id="Page_291"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 291]</span> -instructed to push forward -patrols and obtain a footing in Arleux if possible. This they were -unable to do, in face of the machine-gun fire, and a most unfavourable -approach.</p> - -<p>In the evening the division passed to the command of the Canadian -Corps. The 1st Canadian Division, on the left of the 56th, had been -pushing forward on the north of the ponds and marshes for some days, -and on the 12th they captured Arleux in the early hours of the -morning. The 167th Brigade co-operated in clearing up the southern -portion of the village and relieved all Canadian troops, so as to -include Arleux in the divisional front.</p> - -<p>Meanwhile, during the night 12th/13th October, the 169th Brigade -relieved the 168th on the right. A clever and daring enterprise to -capture Aubigny-au-Bac was then undertaken; in the words of Gen. Hull, -“initiated and carried out entirely under the orders of the -Brigadier-General commanding the 169th Infantry Brigade, who deserves -great credit for the successful exploit.”</p> - -<p>The 169th Brigade held the right sector, with the London Rifle Brigade -and the Queen’s Westminsters in line, and as the front was very -extended, Brig.-Gen. Coke decided to attempt the capture of the -village with two companies of the 2nd London Regt.</p> - -<p>The problem he had before him was to attack across the Canal de la -Sensée, which was 70 feet wide and had no bridges. Strong German posts -were stationed at two points, where bridges had formerly existed, -about 1,200 yards apart, and he decided to cross between these two -destroyed bridges.</p> - -<p>Absolute silence was essential for the success of the -<!--330.png--><a name="Page_292" id="Page_292"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 292]</span> -scheme. The -416th Field Coy. R.E. was ordered to construct rafts to carry over an -officers’ patrol of the Queen’s Westminsters as soon as possible after -dark, and, after landing, the officers were to ascertain whether a -sufficiently large area, free of the enemy, existed for the assembly -of the attacking company. If it was found that there was room for a -company, the engineers were to construct a floating footbridge for -them to cross.</p> - -<p>The time for making reconnaissance and bringing up material was very -short. The men who were to attack had to carry up the material. It was -raining, and the approach was over marshy ground. All the men were wet -to the skin before even the bridge was started.</p> - -<p>Lieut. Arnold, of the 416th Field Coy., had silence and speed to -consider, and also the amount of material which could be brought up in -any given time. He decided he would not waste precious minutes over -rafts, but would proceed at once with the foot-bridge. By three -o’clock in the morning the bridge had been constructed, and the patrol -of Queen’s Westminsters went across. One cannot give higher praise to -the engineers than this: on landing, the patrol found that they could -not proceed more than ten paces in any direction without being -challenged by German sentries—there appeared to be three posts in the -immediate vicinity of the bridge.</p> - -<p>It seemed as though the enterprise must be abandoned. But as the enemy -had not opened fire, the brigadier ordered the patrol to try to rush -the posts without raising an alarm.</p> - -<p>The bridge was, from its very nature, an unstable affair, with no -hand-rail, and, owing to the rain which -<!--331.png--><a name="Page_293" id="Page_293"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 293]</span> -never ceased, a very slippery -surface. The night, however, was very dark and the rain was perhaps a -great advantage. A platoon of the 2nd Londons crossed over stealthily -and quickly overpowered two Germans, which was all the enemy force -they found. The remaining platoons of the attacking company now -crossed over.</p> - -<p>The assembly area was far from a good one, being intersected by two -small streams, La Navie and La Petite Navie, of which nothing was -known. The artillery barrage was arranged against the flank of the -enemy position, creeping in a north-westerly direction. To follow it -in an ordinary way was out of the question, as the country was cut up -by many hedges and ditches. So platoons were directed to make their -own way to various points as soon as the barrage started.</p> - -<p>At 4.30 a.m. Capt. Sloan, who was in command of the company, had his -men assembled, as well as he was able, in the blackness of early -morning, when dawn is postponed by rain and thick, low-flying clouds. -In silence they waited for zero, which was at 5.15 a.m.</p> - -<p>The rest is a story of complete and absolute surprise. The attack came -from the least threatened side of the enemy position. Two machine-gun -teams tried to resist, but after several had been killed, the rest -threw up their hands. Altogether about 160 prisoners were taken in the -village.</p> - -<p>Posts were established on the outskirts of the village, but it was not -found possible to occupy the station, where the enemy was strong and -thoroughly roused, and so the momentary hope that Brunemont might also -be surprised, vanished.</p> - -<p><!--332.png--><a name="Page_294" id="Page_294"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 294]</span> -At 6 a.m. two platoons of the supporting company came up and were used -to reinforce the posts already established.</p> - -<p>The enemy now began to show fight. Two machine guns worked up close -and gave Capt. Sloan a lot of trouble. They were engaged with rifle -grenades and rushed successfully. The remaining portion of the support -company was moved across the canal and into the village.</p> - -<p>As the morning advanced and the light grew better, the infantry -observation posts in Quesnoy Wood reported parties of the enemy moving -towards Aubigny. These were quickly dispersed, with many casualties, -by the artillery, who also put to flight the crews of several trench -mortars which were giving some trouble.</p> - -<p>About ten o’clock a heavy enemy barrage was put down on the village, -together with a concentration of machine-gun fire. This lasted for -half an hour, and was followed by a most determined attack, with a -force estimated at a battalion, from the north, and a smaller force -from Brunemont. In spite of heavy losses, the Germans pressed on and -slowly outflanked one post after another, greatly aided by trench -mortars. The 2nd Londons were pressed back to La Petite Navie stream, -where a stand was made and the enemy prevented from <a name="debauch"></a>debauching from -the village.</p> - -<p>Being familiar with the ground, however, the enemy made full use of -the hedges, and although the four Stokes mortars of the brigade -battery, which supported the 2nd Londons, did exceedingly good work, -it became advisable to fall back farther to the canal bank.</p> - -<p><!--333.png--><a name="Page_295" id="Page_295"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 295]</span> -A bridgehead was maintained for some time, but at 5 p.m. all troops -had returned to the southern bank. They brought with them three enemy -machine guns, and threw ten others into the canal.</p> - -<p>But in the early morning, when still dark, a patrol started to cross -over the bridge with the object of establishing a post on the north -bank. The enemy was so close that the end of the bridge was within -bombing distance. This caused the men to “bunch,” with the result that -the bridge broke. Cpl. McPhie and Sapper Cox, of the 416th Field Coy. -R.E., jumped into the water and held the cork floats, which supported -the structure, together, getting their fingers badly trodden on by the -patrol. But the patrol crossed before the two gallant men let go. Cpl. -McPhie, realising the serious position of the men who had crossed to -the north side, set about gathering material to repair and strengthen -the bridge. Daylight came on apace, but the corporal never wavered in -his intention. Having assembled what he wanted, in the nature of wood, -he led the way with the curt remark to his men: “We’ve got to make a -way for the patrol—it’s a death-or-glory job.”</p> - -<p>The patrol on the north bank helped him to the best of their power, -but they had the slenderest hold on that side of the canal. It was -daylight, and enemy snipers were concealed in every hedge. The -corporal started to work with bullets cracking like whips round his -ears. He was shot in the head and fell in the water. Sapper Cox tried -to pull him out, but Cpl. McPhie had sufficient strength to tell him -to leave go, as he himself “was done.” Sapper Cox persisted in his -efforts. The enemy fire increased: the corporal was hit again and -again; Sapper Cox -<!--334.png--><a name="Page_296" id="Page_296"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 296]</span> -had six bullets through him. The corporal was dead, -and Cox let go of his body.</p> - -<p>Then Sapper Hawkins ran to the bank and threw a rope to Cox. This -wonderful man still had the strength to hold on to it while Hawkins -drew him ashore.</p> - -<p>Cox died two days later!</p> - -<p>McPhie was awarded the Victoria Cross.</p> - -<p class="center">* * * * * * *</p> - -<p>In this very fine enterprise 3 officers and 87 other ranks formed the -attacking party. Altogether 6 officers and 165 other ranks passed over -the canal. But this small force captured 4 officers and 203 other -ranks. The casualties suffered by the whole of the 2nd Londons during -the day were 3 officers and 140 other ranks.</p> - -<p>Until the 169th Brigade handed over to the 10th Canadian Infantry -Brigade, on the 14th October, they held the bridgehead and patrolled -the north bank of the canal. But on the 15th the Germans succeeded in -rushing the bridgehead, although they failed to get any -identification.</p> - -<p>On relief the 169th Brigade moved back to Sauchy-Cauchy, and the -168th, who were in reserve, entrained for Arras. On the 15th the 167th -Brigade was relieved by the 11th Canadian Brigade and moved to -Rumancourt. On the 16th the whole division was in the outskirts of -Arras with headquarters at Etrun (except the artillery).</p> - -<div class="figcenter" style="width: 500px"> - <a name="illo10"></a> - <img src="images/i_10canaldunord.jpg" - width="100%" height="auto" - alt="Illustration: Title or description" - /> - <p class="caption"><span class="sc u">10. Battle of the Canal du Nord.</span></p> -</div> - -<p>All through these weeks of fighting a great strain had been imposed on -the Royal Army Service Corps and the Divisional Ammunition Column. The -roads were bad and fearfully congested, and the distances -<!--335.png--> -<!--336.png--> -<!--337.png--><a name="Page_297" id="Page_297"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 297]</span> -were great -and continually changing. When the great advance commenced railhead -was at a place called Tincques; on the 23rd August it changed to -Gouy-en-Artois; on the 27th to Beaumetz; on the 31st to -Boisleux-au-Mont. On the 8th September it was at Arras and on the 11th -October at Quéant. Not for one moment had supplies failed to be up to -time. The work of this branch of the organisation was excellent, and -the work of these units of supply should always be borne in mind in -every account of actions fought and big advances made.</p> - -<p>The artillery remained in the line until the 23rd October, and then -rested in the neighbourhood of Cambrai until the 31st October.</p> - -<p class="center">* * * * * * *</p> - -<p>The whole of the Hindenburg Line passed into our possession during the -early part of October, and a wide gap was driven through such systems -of defence as existed behind it. The threat at the enemy’s -communications was now direct. There were no further prepared -positions between the First, Third, and Fourth Armies and Maubeuge.</p> - -<p>In Flanders the Second Army, the Belgian Army, and some French -divisions, the whole force under the King of the Belgians, had -attacked on the 28th September, and were advancing rapidly through -Belgium.</p> - -<p>Between the Second Army, the right of the Flanders force, and the -First Army, the left of the main British attacking force, was the -Fifth Army under Gen. Birdwood. This army was in front of the Lys -salient, which was thus left between the northern and southern attacks -with the perilous prospect of -<!--338.png--><a name="Page_298" id="Page_298"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 298]</span> -being cut off. On the 2nd October the -enemy started an extensive withdrawal on the Fifth Army front.</p> - -<p>Meanwhile the Belgian coast was cleared. Ostend fell on the 17th -October, and a few days later the left flank of the Allied forces -rested on the Dutch frontier. The Fourth, Third, and First Armies -still pushed on towards Maubeuge, and by the end of the month the -Forêt de Mormal had been reached.</p> - -<p>The enemy was thoroughly beaten in the field. Though he blew up the -railways and roads as he fled, he was becoming embarrassed by his own -rearguards pressing on his heels as they were driven precipitately -before the Allied infantry; and the position of his armies revealed -certain and overwhelming disaster.</p> - -<p class="center">* * * * * * *</p> - -<p>On the 27th October Austria sued for peace.</p> - -<p>On the 28th the Italians crossed the Piave.</p> - -<p>On the 29th the Serbians reached the Danube.</p> - -<p>On the 30th October Turkey was granted an armistice.</p> - -<p>The Central Powers lay gasping on the ground.</p> - -<p class="center">* * * * * * *</p> - -<p>The 56th Division meanwhile led a quiet life, training and resting -round Etrun and Arras. Organisation of battalions was overhauled in -accordance with a pamphlet numbered O.B./1919 and issued by the -General Staff. It was designed to deal with the decreasing strength of -battalions, but, as it supposed a greater number of men than were in -many cases available, it was troublesome.</p> - -<p>The outstanding points were that platoons would now be composed of two -rifle and two Lewis-gun -<!--339.png--><a name="Page_299" id="Page_299"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 299]</span> -sections; that a platoon, so long as it -contained two sections of three men each, was not to be amalgamated -with any other platoon; and that not more than six men and one -non-commissioned officer to each section should be taken into action.</p> - -<p class="blockquote">“The fighting efficiency of the section,” says the pamphlet, - “is of primary importance, and every endeavour must be made - to strengthen the sections, if necessary, by the recall of - employed men and men at courses, or even by withdrawing men - from the administrative portions of battalion and company - headquarters, which must in an emergency be temporarily - reduced. After the requirements of the fighting portion for - reconstruction have been met (50 other ranks), if the - battalion is up to its full establishment, a balance of 208 - men will remain for the administrative portion (90) and for - reinforcements. This balance will include men undergoing - courses of instruction, men on leave and in rest camps, men - sick but not evacuated, and men on army, corps, divisional, - or brigade employ. These latter must be reduced to the - lowest figure possible, and will in no case exceed 30 men - per battalion.”</p> - -<p>The order against the amalgamation of platoons applied also to -sections, but was not invariably carried out by company commanders. It -had become a universal practice to detail six men and one -non-commissioned officer to each post. With double sentries this gave -each man one hour on and two hours off—anything less than these -numbers threw a big strain on the men; and so long as the company -commander had sufficient men for an adequate number of sentry posts, -he made them up of that number.</p> - -<p><!--340.png--><a name="Page_300" id="Page_300"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 300]</span> -The details of a battalion as arranged by this pamphlet are -interesting:</p> - -<p class="bigindent smaller"><a name="header"></a>[Header Key:</p> -<p class="bigindent smaller mt1">A - Fighting position.</p> -<p class="bigindent smaller mt1">B - Administrative position.</p> -<p class="bigindent smaller mt1">C - Reconstruction (not for reinforcement).</p> -<p class="bigindent smaller mt1">D - Supplies for reinforcement.]</p> - -<table summary="battalion details" class="smaller"> - -<tr><td></td><td class="centerbox" colspan="2">A.</td> - <td class="centerbox" colspan="2">B</td> - <td class="centerbox" colspan="2">C</td> - <td class="centerbox" colspan="2">D</td> - <td class="centerbox" colspan="2">Total.</td> -</tr> - -<tr><td></td><td class="centerbox">Off.</td><td class="centerbox">O.R.</td> - <td class="centerbox">Off.</td><td class="centerbox">O.R.</td> - <td class="centerbox">Off.</td><td class="centerbox">O.R.</td> - <td class="centerbox">Off.</td><td class="centerbox">O.R.</td> - <td class="centerbox">Off.</td><td class="centerbox">O.R.</td> -</tr> - -<tr><td class="left">Battalion Headquarters</td><td class="rightb">5</td> - <td class="rightb">70</td><td class="rightb">2</td><td class="rightb">66</td> - <td class="rightb">2</td><td class="rightb">8</td><td class="rightb">—</td> - <td class="rightb">27</td><td class="rightb">9</td><td class="rightb">171</td> -</tr> - -<tr><td colspan="11"><hr /></td></tr> - -<tr><td class="left">4 Company Headquarters</td><td class="rightb">4</td><td class="rightb">74</td> - <td class="rightb">—</td><td class="rightb">24</td> - <td class="rightb">4</td><td class="rightb">10</td><td class="rightb">—</td> - <td class="rightb"> —</td><td class="rightm" rowspan="2">8</td> - <td class="rightm" rowspan="2">110</td> -</tr> - -<tr><td class="left">Attached from platoons</td><td class="rightb">—</td> - <td class="rightb">2</td><td class="rightb">—</td><td class="rightb">—</td> - <td class="rightb">—</td><td class="rightb">—</td> - <td class="rightb">—</td><td class="rightb">—</td> -</tr> - -<tr><td colspan="11"><hr /></td></tr> - -<tr><td class="left">16 Platoon Headquarters</td><td class="rightb">12</td> - <td class="rightb">38</td><td class="rightb">—</td> - <td class="rightb">4</td><td class="rightb">4</td><td class="rightb">8</td> - <td class="rightb">—</td><td class="rightb">—</td> - <td class="rightm" rowspan="3">16</td><td class="rightm" rowspan="3"> 64</td> -</tr> - -<tr><td class="left">Section commanders acting as platoon sergeants</td> - <td class="rightb">—</td><td class="rightb">10</td> - <td class="rightb">—</td><td class="rightb">—</td> - <td class="rightb">—</td><td class="rightb">—</td> - <td class="rightb">—</td><td class="rightb">—</td> -</tr> - -<tr><td class="left">N.C.O.s for reconstruction</td><td class="rightb">—</td> - <td class="rightb">—</td><td class="rightb">—</td> - <td class="rightb">—</td><td class="rightb">—</td> - <td class="rightb">8</td><td class="rightb">—</td><td class="rightb">—</td> -</tr> - -<tr><td colspan="11"><hr /></td></tr> - -<tr><td class="left">64 sections </td><td class="rightb">—</td> - <td class="rightb">448</td><td class="rightb">—</td> - <td class="rightb">—</td><td class="rightb">—</td> - <td class="rightb">16</td><td class="rightb">—</td> - <td class="rightb">91</td><td class="rightb">—</td><td class="rightb">555</td> -</tr> - -<tr><td class="left">Total</td><td class="rightbox">1</td> - <td class="rightbox">642</td><td class="rightbox">2</td> - <td class="rightbox">90</td><td class="rightbox">10</td> - <td class="rightbox">50</td><td class="centerbox">—</td> - <td class="rightbox">118</td><td class="rightbox">33</td> - <td class="rightbox">900</td> -</tr> -</table> - -<p>It will be seen that 732 other ranks were required to fill the -fighting and administrative minimum. The ration strength of battalions -from the 1st August and on the first of each month to the date of the -armistice was:</p> - -<table summary="ration strength of battalions" class="smaller"> -<tr><td></td><td class="centerbox" colspan="2">August.</td><td class="centerbox" colspan="2">September.</td> - <td class="centerbox" colspan="2">October.</td><td class="centerbox" colspan="2">November.</td> -</tr> -<tr><td></td><td class="centerbox">Off.</td><td class="centerbox">O.R.</td> - <td class="centerbox"><a name="officer"></a>Off.</td><td class="centerbox">O.R.</td> - <td class="centerbox">Off.</td><td class="centerbox">O.R.</td> - <td class="centerbox">Off.</td><td class="centerbox">O.R.</td> -</tr> -<tr><td class="lefta">7th Middlesex</td><td class="righta2">39</td><td class="righta2">950</td> - <td class="righta2">35</td><td class="righta2">678</td> - <td class="righta2">43</td><td class="righta2">865</td> - <td class="righta2">43</td><td class="righta2">863</td> -</tr> -<tr><td class="lefta">8th Middlesex</td><td class="righta2">40</td><td class="righta2">948</td> - <td class="righta2">38</td><td class="righta2">787</td> - <td class="righta2">41</td><td class="righta2">864</td> - <td class="righta2">39</td><td class="righta2">813</td> -</tr> -<tr><td class="lefta">1st Londons</td><td class="righta2">40</td><td class="righta2">931</td> - <td class="righta2">27</td><td class="righta2">613</td><td class="righta2">40</td> - <td class="righta2">657</td><td class="righta2">40</td><td class="righta2">712</td> -</tr> -<tr><td class="lefta">4th Londons</td><td class="righta2">42</td><td class="righta2">898</td> - <td class="righta2">32</td><td class="righta2">710</td> - <td class="righta2">37</td><td class="righta2">705</td> - <td class="righta2">38</td><td class="righta2">721</td> -</tr> -<tr><td class="lefta">13th Londons</td><td class="righta2">38</td><td class="righta2">925</td> - <td class="righta2">24</td><td class="righta2">685</td> - <td class="righta2">41</td><td class="righta2">691</td> - <td class="righta2">46</td><td class="righta2">649</td> -</tr> -<tr><td class="lefta">14th Londons</td><td class="righta2">43</td><td class="righta2">925</td> - <td class="righta2">30</td><td class="righta2">548</td> - <td class="righta2">31</td><td class="righta2">622</td> - <td class="righta2">34</td><td class="righta2">705</td> -</tr> -<tr><td class="lefta">2nd Londons</td><td class="righta2">37</td><td class="righta2">891</td> - <td class="righta2">27</td><td class="righta2">599</td> - <td class="righta2">31</td><td class="righta2">717</td> - <td class="righta2">35</td><td class="righta2">601</td> -</tr> -<tr><td class="lefta">5th Londons</td><td class="righta2">35</td><td class="righta2">989</td> - <td class="righta2">25</td><td class="righta2">669</td> - <td class="righta2">32</td><td class="righta2">603</td> - <td class="righta2">33</td><td class="righta2">631</td> -</tr> -<tr><td class="lefta">16th Londons</td><td class="righta2">42</td><td class="righta2">959</td> - <td class="righta2">27</td><td class="righta2">577</td> - <td class="righta2">31</td><td class="righta2">560</td> - <td class="righta2">29</td><td class="righta2">612</td> -</tr> -</table> - -<p><!--341.png--><a name="Page_301" id="Page_301"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 301]</span> -But these figures must be read with a reservation. In spite of all -efforts, men always disappeared. No battalion or company commander -ever had the men who were on the ration strength. Guards, fatigue -parties, sudden demands for men from higher commands, dozens of -reasons could be given for the evaporation of strength. Probably -two-thirds only of these men were really available for fighting. In -those days a general when inspecting companies had no difficulty in -finding fault if he wished to do so.</p> - -<p>During the rest Gen. Hull discussed the subjects of organisation and -training with the officers of each of his brigades.</p> - -<p>But in the evening officers and men could be cheered by “Bow Bells,” -which were to be heard at the theatre in Arras and the cinema at Haut -Avesnes.</p> - -<p>On the 31st the division moved into XXII Corps Reserve with -headquarters at Basseville, and on the 1st November was ordered to -relieve the 49th Division during the night 2nd/3rd.</p> - -<p>On the 31st October the line immediately south of Valenciennes rested -on the 4th Canadian Division, from the Canal de l’Escaut to the -outskirts of the village of Famars, the 49th Division, on the high -ground west of the River Rondelle, the 4th Division, astride the river -and to the east of Artres, and then the 61st Division.</p> - -<p>The 4th and 49th Divisions of the XXII Corps attacked on the 2nd -November with the object of capturing the two villages of Preseau and -Saultain, but only the first was taken, and the 49th Division held the -Preseau-Valenciennes road.</p> - -<p>The 56th Division was now plunged into real open fighting. Their -objectives were no longer trench -<!--342.png--><a name="Page_302" id="Page_302"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 302]</span> -lines, but tactical features, such as -spurs, rivers, woods, and villages. An examination of Gen. Hull’s -operation orders reveals the new nature of the fighting.</p> - -<p>The 169th Brigade was given the right and the 168th the left. The -objective of the XXII Corps, which was attacking with the 11th -Division on the right and the 56th on the left, was given as the -“general line of the Aunelle River left bank.” The Canadian Corps -would cover the left flank of the 56th Division by the capture of -Estreux. The division would be covered by six brigades of field -artillery.</p> - -<p>On attaining the high ground on the left of the Aunelle River, patrols -would be pushed out, “since if there is any sign of enemy retreat the -G.O.C. intends to push on mounted troops to secure the crossing of the -Petite Aunelle River and will order the leading brigades to support -them.” The mounted troops referred to were two squadrons of Australian -Light Horse.</p> - -<p>Each of the attacking brigades had at the disposal of the Brigadier a -battery of field artillery, also two sections (8 guns) of the M.G. -Battalion.</p> - -<p>As the front to be covered by the 56th Division was very extensive, -the 146th Brigade, of the 49th Division, remained in line on the left, -and was to advance until squeezed out by the converging advance of the -56th and Canadian Divisions.</p> - -<p>On the night 2nd/3rd November the 169th and 168th Brigades relieved -the right of the 49th Division on the Preseux-Valenciennes road -without incident. Soon after 8 a.m. on the 3rd, patrols reported that -the enemy had retired. The two brigades advanced and occupied -Saultain, which was full of civilians, before mid-day. The cavalry and -a company of -<!--343.png--><a name="Page_303" id="Page_303"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 303]</span> -New Zealand Cyclists were then ordered to push forward -and secure the crossings of the River Aunelle. The line of the left -bank of the river was reached at 6 p.m., where machine-gun fire was -encountered. The brigades remained on that line for the night.</p> - -<p>The advance was resumed at dawn on the 4th, when the Queen’s -Westminster Rifles crossed the River Aunelle and captured the village -of Sebourg; there was some half-hearted opposition from about thirty -of the enemy who were rounded up, but when they attempted to advance -east of the village they came under intense machine-gun and rifle fire -from the high ground. Attempt to turn the enemy flank met with no -success, and as there was no artillery barrage arranged, Brig.-Gen. -Coke contented himself by holding the road to the east of the village.</p> - -<p>The 168th Brigade on the left were also held up by the enemy on the -high ground. The 4th London Regt. led the attack and took the hamlet -of Sebourtquiaux (slightly north of Sebourg), only to find that they -were not only faced with the enemy on the high ground to the east, but -that heavy enfilade fire was being directed on them from the village -of Rombies, on the western bank of the river, and on the Canadian -Corps front. The 4th London Regt. took up a position to the east of -Sebourtquiaux and astride the river, and so remained for the night. -(Battle of the Sambre.)</p> - -<p>This attack had been made without artillery preparation, but the -position of the artillery is well described by Brig.-Gen. Elkington in -a short report drawn up at the end of the operations. He says the -barrage put down on the 1st November had been a very heavy one, and -that the enemy never again -<!--344.png--><a name="Page_304" id="Page_304"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 304]</span> -waited for the full weight of the artillery -to get into action.</p> - -<p class="blockquote">“The problem for the artillery then became a matter of - dealing with machine-gun nests, isolated guns, and small - parties of the enemy who were delaying our advance and - enabling the main body of the enemy to retire. The enemy - blew up bridges and roads, whenever possible, to delay the - advance of our guns. In these circumstances the following - points were emphasised:</p> - -<p class="blockquote">(1) The benefit of allotting artillery to each battalion - commander in the front line. The battery commander, by - remaining with the battalion commander and keeping good - communication with his battery, could bring fire to bear at - very short time on targets as they were encountered. In - practice it was generally found that a full battery was too - large a unit, and that four guns, or even a section, was of - more use.</p> - -<p class="blockquote">(2) When more than one artillery brigade was available for - an infantry brigade, the necessity of keeping them écheloned - in depth and maintaining all but one brigade on wheels. If - resistance was encountered, the brigade, or brigades, on - wheels in rear could be moved up to reinforce the artillery - in the line to put down a barrage for an attack, or, if no - resistance was encountered, a brigade in rear could advance - through the artillery in action, which in turn could get on - wheels as the advancing brigade came into action. This - procedure enabled brigades to get occasional days’ rests and - obviated the danger of getting roads choked with advancing - artillery.</p> - -<p class="blockquote">(3) The necessity of impressing on infantry commanders that - though at the commencement of an attack it is possible to - support them with a great weight of artillery, it is not - possible to push this mass of artillery forward when - movement becomes rapid, -<!--345.png--><a name="Page_305" id="Page_305"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 305]</span> - and that if they push forward - rapidly, they are better served by a small mobile allotment - of guns.”</p> - -<p>The rapidity of the advance was little short of marvellous, for one -must remember that it did not depend on the ability of the infantry to -march forward, but on the engineers behind them, who were -reconstructing the roads and railways for the supply services. -Lieut.-Col. Sutton, who was controlling the Quartermasters’ Branch of -the division, has a note in his diary:</p> - -<p class="blockquote">“The enemy has done his demolition work most effectively. - Craters are blown at road junctions and render roads - impassable, especially in villages, where the rim of the - crater comes in many cases up to the walls of the houses. - Culverts are blown on main roads, and a particularly - effective blockage is caused in one place by blowing a - bridge across a road and stream, so that all the material - fell across the road and in the river.”</p> - -<p>This demolition was the great feature of the advance. The infantry -could always go across country, but guns and lorries were not always -able to use these short cuts. The weather was unfavourable, as it -rained practically every day. When craters were encountered, the -leading vehicles could perhaps get round, by going off the road, but -they had the effect of churning up the soft ground so that the crater -soon became surrounded by an impassable bog. The engineers and 5th -Cheshires worked like Trojans to fill up these terrific pits, or make -a firm surface round them.</p> - -<p>At this date railhead was at Aubigny-au-Bac, the scene of that great -exploit of the 2nd London Regt. -<!--346.png--><a name="Page_306" id="Page_306"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 306]</span> -And when one takes into account dates -and distances, the achievement of those who were working behind the -infantry must be ranked as one of the finest in the war. One cannot -get a picture of the advance by considering the mere width of an army -front. The infantry were the spearhead, the supplies the shaft, but -the hand that grasped the whole weapon and drove it forward was that -of the engineer, the pioneer, the man of the Labour Battalion. The -effort of the army then must be considered in depth, from the scout to -the base.</p> - -<p>Under these circumstances communication between units became a matter -of vital importance. The ordinary administrative routine of trench -warfare required little modification, up to the point of the break -through the Hindenburg Line—after that it became impossible. Brigade -Headquarters were responsible for the distribution of rations, -engineer material, ordnance, mails, and billeting. In the orders for -advance the General Staff informed the Brigadier-General what units, -or portion of divisional troops, including Divisional Artillery, would -be under his tactical control, and these units, irrespective of their -arm of the service, constituted the Brigade Group. The supply of -ammunition, on the other hand, was worked by arms of the service and -not by Brigade Groups. The channel of supply being the ordinary -one—from the Divisional Ammunition Column to batteries, or Infantry -Brigade Reserve, or Machine-gun Battalion Reserve.</p> - -<p class="center">* * * * * * *</p> - -<p>The administrative instructions for the division point out:</p> - -<p class="blockquote">“The outstanding difficulty in all the administrative -<!--347.png--><a name="Page_307" id="Page_307"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 307]</span> - services will be that of intercommunication between the - troops and the échelons in rear which supply them. The - system of interchange of orderlies between the forward and - rear échelons has been found unsatisfactory, as if the two - échelons both move at the same time, all touch is lost. - Prior to the advance, therefore, the administrative staff of - each brigade group will fix a ‘meeting-point’ or ‘rear - report centre’ as far forward as possible on the probable - line of advance. This point will serve as a rendezvous for - all maintenance service.... The principle of - intercommunication by means of a fixed report centre will - also be adopted by Divisional Artillery and the Machine Gun - Battalion for the purpose of ammunition supply.”</p> - -<p>This arrangement does not seem to have worked well for the artillery, -as we find Brig.-Gen. Elkington reporting:</p> - -<p class="blockquote">“For a time communication by orderly between units became - the only feasible plan. Owing to the rapid movement these - orderlies had the utmost difficulty in locating units. In - this Divisional Artillery the system of using village - churches as report centres was successfully tried, but, - owing to the cessation of hostilities, the trial was not as - exhaustive as could be wished. Notices showing change of - location were simply stuck on the church doors or railings, - and orderlies were instructed to at once proceed to the - church for information on entering a village.”</p> - -<p>This modification of the original scheme would seem to be a useful -one.</p> - -<p>In spite of all these difficulties, the 56th Division was advancing. -On the 5th November a barrage was arranged to cover troops attacking -the high -<!--348.png--><a name="Page_308" id="Page_308"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 308]</span> -ground to the east of the River Aunelle, as a preliminary -to subsequent advance. The London Rifle Brigade led the attack of the -169th Brigade at 5.30 a.m., and by 7.30 a.m. had captured the village -of Angreau. Here they were checked by the enemy, who occupied the -woods on both banks of the Honnelle River. On their right the 11th -Division captured the village of Roisin, but on their left the 168th -Brigade had not made such good progress.</p> - -<p>Attacking, with the London Scottish on the right and the Kensingtons -on the left, the 168th Brigade were much hampered by flank fire from -Angre and the ground to their left, which was still held by the enemy. -The situation was somewhat eased by the capture of Rombies, by the 4th -Canadian Division, and at 3 p.m. the artillery put down a rolling -barrage, behind which the Kensingtons, and the London Scottish on -their right, advanced to the outskirts of Angre. The position for the -night was on the high ground west of the River Grande Honnelle.</p> - -<p>The enemy had determined to defend the crossing of the river, and had -an excellent position on the eastern bank, where they held the Bois de -Beaufort in strength. The advance was to be resumed at 5.30 a.m., but -just before that hour the German artillery put down a heavy barrage of -gas-shells. Undaunted, the 2nd Londons on the right and the London -Rifle Brigade on the left of the 169th Brigade attacked in gas-masks -and crossed the river. The 168th Brigade, attacking with the London -Scottish and Kensingtons in line, met at first with slight resistance, -but as soon as the river was reached they were faced with a heavy -barrage of artillery and machine-gun fire. In spite of very accurate -fire, they -<!--349.png--><a name="Page_309" id="Page_309"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 309]</span> -succeeded in crossing the river to the north and south of -Angre. The position in front of them was of considerable natural -strength, but was turned by a clever move of the London Scottish from -the south, which established them firmly on the east bank. The -Kensingtons advanced to the high ground immediately east of the -village of Angre, and here met a heavy counter-attack which drove them -back to the west bank.</p> - -<p>Meanwhile the 169th Brigade was engaged in heavy fighting. Only the -northern portion of the Bois de Beaufort was included in the attack, -and the enemy were found to be strongly situated on ground which -dominated the western bank of the river. The attack was delivered with -spirit, and the enemy driven back. The 2nd Londons had the wood in -front of them, and the London Rifle Brigade shot ahead on the left, -outside the wood. The enemy rallied and counter-attacked the forward -troops, while at the same time a force of Germans debouched from the -wood on the right flank of the Rifle Brigade men, who were driven back -to the west of the river. Some of the 2nd Londons were involved in -this successful enemy counter-attack, but a party of forty—a large -party in those days—held on to the position they had reached in the -Bois de Beaufort until late in the afternoon, when, discovering what -had happened on the left, and being almost entirely surrounded, they -retired fighting to the western bank of the river.</p> - -<p>The right brigade, therefore, remained on the west bank. The -casualties had been heavy, amounting to 394.</p> - -<p>The London Scottish had retained their hold of the east bank, and -later in the afternoon the Kensingtons -<!--350.png--><a name="Page_310" id="Page_310"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 310]</span> -again succeeded in crossing -the river, and definitely established themselves to the east and in -touch with the London Scottish. The casualties of the 168th Brigade -during these operations were 207. The prisoners captured by them were -111. The prisoners captured by the 169th Brigade were 43.</p> - -<p>The general destruction of roads, combined with the vile weather, now -began to cause anxiety. Horses were used as much as possible—a horse -can drag a cart through places which would be impossible for a motor -lorry—and civilian wagons were pressed into service, being used in -conjunction with spare army horses. This was all the more necessary as -the administrative branch of the division had the additional -responsibility of feeding civilians.</p> - -<p>All the villages captured or occupied by the troops were filled with -civilians. So great was their emotion on their release that they -pressed whatever they had in the nature of food and drink on the -troops. The coffee-pot of the French or Belgian housewife was -replenished with reckless disregard for “to-morrow.” And then as the -country was regained, so the villagers were cut off from the source -which had provided them with their limited supplies. With Germans in -retreat on one side and roads blown up on the other, they were more -isolated than they had ever been. On the 6th November the 56th -Division was rationing 16,000 civilians, and most of this work was -being done by the transport of the 168th and 169th Brigades.</p> - -<div class="figcenter" style="width: 500px"> - <a name="illo11"></a> - <img src="images/i_11generalmap.jpg" - width="100%" height="auto" - alt="Illustration: Title or description" - /> - <p class="caption"><span class="sc u">11. General Map.</span></p> -</div> - -<p>The battle on the right of the division had progressed with almost -unfailing success. The 11th Division on their immediate right had met -with the same check on the River Honnelle, but farther south the Army -had forced their way through the great -<!--351.png--> -<!--352.png--> -<!--353.png--><a name="Page_311" id="Page_311"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 311]</span> -Forest of Mormal, and troops -were well to the east of it. The German rearguards were only able, on -especially favourable positions, to check the advance of a few -divisions; on the whole the rearguards were being thrown back on the -main retreating force. The roads were packed with enemy troops and -transport, and the real modern cavalry, the low-flying aeroplanes, -swooped down on them, with bomb and machine gun spreading panic and -causing the utmost confusion.</p> - -<p>During the night 6th/7th November the 63rd Division was put into line -on the front of the 168th Brigade, and the 169th was relieved by the -167th Brigade. The 56th Division was then on a single brigade front, -with the 11th Division on the right and the 63rd on the left.</p> - -<p>At dawn on the 7th patrols found that the enemy was still in front of -them, and at 9 a.m. the brigade attacked with the 8th Middlesex on the -right and the 7th Middlesex on the left. They swept on through the -northern part of the wood, and by 10.30 a.m. the 7th Middlesex entered -the village of Onnezies. The Petite Honnelles River was crossed, and -the village of Montignies taken in the afternoon. But after the -Bavai-Hensies Road was crossed, opposition stiffened, and both -artillery and machine-gun fire became severe. A line of outposts held -the east of the road for the night.</p> - -<p>Explosions and fires, which were continually observed at night behind -the enemy lines, were more numerous on the night of 7th/8th, and when -the advance was continued at 8 a.m., the two Middlesex battalions -occupied the villages of Athis and Fayt-le-Franc with practically no -opposition. By nightfall -<!--354.png--><a name="Page_312" id="Page_312"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 312]</span> -outposts were covering Petit Moranfayt, Trieu -Jean Sart, Ferlibray, and Richon.</p> - -<p>The road situation was worse than ever. Railhead was at -Aubigny-au-Bac, and supply lorries were unable to proceed any farther -than the Honnelle River owing to the destruction of the bridges. Rain -fell all the time, and cross-country tracts were impassable. All -traffic was thrown on the main roads, which, to the west of the river, -were now in such a state that all supplies were late. Arrangements -were made for aeroplanes to drop food to the advance troops, but -fortunately this was found unnecessary.</p> - -<p>The enemy was now in full retreat on the whole of the British front. -To the south the Guards Division entered Maubeuge, and to the north -the Canadians were approaching Mons. The 56th Division marched forward -through the villages of Coron, Rieu-de-Bury, Quevy-le-Grand, and -Quevy-le-Petit, and by the evening were on the line of the -Mons-Maubeuge road behind a line of outposts held by the 1st London -Regt.</p> - -<p>On the 10th November the 1st Londons continued the advance, preceded -by cavalry. No serious opposition was encountered until the infantry -had passed through Harvengt, when heavy machine-gun fire from both -flanks held up the advance. A squadron of 16th Lancers attempted to -get through, but failed. The infantry then attacked and cleared the -ground, entered Harmignies, and held a line to the east.</p> - -<p>Orders were received that night that the 63rd Division would carry on -the advance as advance guard to the XXII Corps, and the necessary -reliefs were carried out. The artillery of the 56th Division -<!--355.png--><a name="Page_313" id="Page_313"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 313]</span> -remained -in action, and were just two miles south of the spot where Brig.-Gen. -Elkington was in action on the 23rd August 1914, at the battle of -Mons. Gen. Hull, on the other hand, had actually held an outpost line -before Harmignies with his battalion on the 22nd August, and had moved -to the north to hold a line from Obourg to Mons on the 23rd. After the -battle the celebrated retreat had taken him through the village of -Nouvelles due west of Harmignies, and so through Quevy to Bavai, -Caudray, Ham, and so on. What memories this second visit to Harmignies -must have brought back to him! From retreat to victory—from a -battalion to a division—Harmignies 1914, Harmignies 1918.</p> - -<p>Brig.-Gen. Coke also fought as company commander in August 1914 within -five miles of the spot where he finished in 1918.</p> - -<p>At 7.30 a.m. on the 11th November the XXII Corps issued orders that -hostilities would cease at 11 a.m. on that day, and that all troops -would stand fast.</p> - -<p>Just before 11 o’clock all batteries opened fire. Each gunner was -determined to be the last man to fire a shot at the Germans. And then, -in the midst of the rolling thunder of rapid fire, teams straining -every nerve to throw the last shell into the breach of their gun -before the “cease fire” sounded, 11 o’clock struck, the first blast of -the bugles pierced the air, and with the last note silence reigned.</p> - -<p>“There was no cheering or excitement amongst the men,” writes -Brig.-Gen. Elkington. “They seemed too tired, and no one seemed able -to realise that it was all over.”</p> - -<div lang="fr"><!--356.png--><a name="Page_314" id="Page_314"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 314]</span> -<p class="quotesign smaller">  G.Q.G.A.<br /> -<i class="decoration">le 12 Novembre, 1918.</i></p> - -<p class="blockquote"><i class="decoration">Officiers, Sous-officiers, Soldats des Armées - Alliées</i>,</p> - -<p class="blockquote">Après avoir résolument arrêté l’enemi, vous l’avez pendant - des mois, avec une foi et une énergie inlassables, attaqué - sans répit.</p> - -<p class="blockquote">Vous avez gagné le plus grande bataille de l’Histoire et - sauvé la cause la plus sacrée: la Liberté du Monde.</p> - -<p class="blockquote">Soyez Fiers!</p> - -<p class="blockquote">D’une gloire immortelle vous avez paré vos drapeaux.</p> - -<p class="blockquote">La Postérité vous garde sa reconnaissance.</p> - -<p class="center smaller">Le Maréchal de France,<br /> -Commandant en Chef les Armées Alliées,<br /> -<span class="sc">F. Foch</span>.</p> -</div><!--end of French section--> - -<p>The division did not move to the Rhine, but remained in this area, -with headquarters at Harvengt. They mended the roads, they drilled, -and they had sports. Towards the end of January 1919 demobilisation -had reached a point which rendered the division ineffective as a -fighting unit.</p> - -<p>The London Scottish were moved to the 9th Division, in Germany, on the -16th January, and the 7th Middlesex to the 41st Division on the 25th -February. On the 14th March Gen. Hull gave up command of the division.</p> - -<p>But their work was done. Officially the 56th Division returned the -first cadre on the 14th May, the last on the 10th June, 1919.</p> - -<p>The total casualties of this division were:</p> - -<table summary="casualties of 56 division"> -<tr><td class="lefta">Officers</td><td class="righta">1,470</td></tr> -<tr><td class="lefta">Other ranks</td><td class="righta">33,339</td></tr> -<tr><td></td><td class="righta"><hr /></td></tr> -<tr><td class="lefta">Total</td><td class="righta">34,809</td></tr> -</table> -</div><!--end chapter nine--> -<p class="p4"><!--357.png--><a name="Page_315" id="Page_315"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 315]</span></p> -<div class="chapter"> -<h3>APPENDIX</h3> - -<h4>GENERAL OFFICERS COMMANDING</h4> - -<table summary="general officers commanding" class="smaller"> -<tr><th>Rank.</th><th>Name.</th><th>Remarks.</th></tr> -<tr><td class="left">Major-Gen.</td><td class="lefth"><span class="lock">C. P. A. Hull,</span> C.B.</td> - <td class="lefth">Joined Royal Scots Fusilier Regt. 16/11/87. Middlesex Regt. 24/2/12.</td> -</tr> -<tr><td colspan="2"></td><td class="lefth">Brigade Major 11th Brigade - 10/11/03 to 9/11/07.</td> -</tr> -<tr><td colspan="2"></td><td class="lefth">General Staff Officer, 2nd - Grade, Staff College, 10/3/15 to 4/2/16.</td> -</tr> -<tr><td colspan="2"> </td><td class="lefth">Commanded the 4th Bn. - Middlesex Regt. at the battle of Mons. Brigadier - commanding 10th Brigade 17/11/14.</td> -</tr> -<tr><td colspan="2"></td><td class="lefth">After his illness he commanded the 16th Division - from the 23/2/18 until he resumed command of the 56th.</td> -</tr> -<tr><td class="left">Major-Gen.</td><td class="lefth">W. Douglas Smith, C.B.</td> - <td class="lefth">Royal Scots Fusilier Regt. Commanded 56th Division 24/7/17 to 9/8/17.</td> -</tr> -<tr><td class="left">T/Major-Gen.</td><td class="lefth"><span class="lock">F. A. Dudgeon,</span> C.B.</td><td class="lefth">The South Lancashire Regt.</td> -</tr> - -<tr><td class="center" colspan="3"><br />G.S.O.s1</td></tr> - -<tr><td class="left">Lieut-Col.</td><td class="lefth">J. E. S. Brind, C.M.G., D.S.O.</td> - <td class="lefth">From Royal Artillery. Joined the 56th Division 6/2/16 and left 31/10/16.</td> -</tr> -<tr><td class="left">Lieut.-Col.</td><td class="lefth">A. Bryant, D.S.O.</td> - <td class="lefth"> The Gloucestershire Regt. With the 56th Division 30/10/16 to 23/12/16.</td> -</tr> -<tr><td class="left">Lieut.-Col.</td><td class="lefth">G. de la P. B. Pakenham, C.M.G., D.S.O.</td> - <td class="lefth">The Border Regt.</td> -</tr> -</table> - - -<table summary="commanding officers continued" class="smaller"> - -<tr><td class="center" colspan="5"><br />G.S.O.s2 -<!--358.png--><a name="Page_316" id="Page_316"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 316]</span></td></tr> - -<tr><th>Rank.</th><th>Name.</th><th>From.</th><th>To.</th><th>Regt.</th></tr> - -<tr><td class="left">Major</td><td class="lefth"><span class="lock">A. E. G. Bayley,</span> D.S.O.</td> - <td class="center">5/2/16</td><td class="center">1/10/16</td><td class="lefth">Oxford and Bucks Light Infantry.</td></tr> -<tr><td class="left">Major</td><td class="lefth">E. A. Beck, D.S.O.</td><td class="center">28/9/16</td> - <td class="center">17/2/17</td><td class="lefth">The Royal Scots Fusiliers.</td></tr> -<tr><td class="left">Major</td><td class="lefth">W. T. Brooks,</td><td class="center">15/2/17</td> - <td class="center">3/9/17</td><td class="lefth">The D.C.L.I.</td></tr> -<tr><td class="left">Major</td><td class="lefth">F. B. Hurndall, M.C.</td><td class="center">4/9/17</td> - <td class="center">9/7/18</td><td class="lefth">The 20th Hussars.</td></tr> -<tr><td class="lefth">Captain, T/Major</td><td class="lefth">T. O. M. Buchan, M.C.</td> - <td class="center">9/7/18</td><td class="center">Demob.</td><td class="lefth">The Queen’s R.W. Surrey Regt.</td></tr> - -<tr><td class="center" colspan="5"><br />G.S.O.s3</td></tr> - -<tr><td class="left">Captain</td><td class="lefth">T. W. Bullock</td> - <td class="center">5/2/16</td><td class="center">20/4/16</td> - <td class="lefth">The Dorsetshire Regt.</td></tr> -<tr><td class="left">Captain</td><td class="lefth">M. G. N. Stopford, M.C.</td> - <td class="center">10/6/16</td><td class="center">5/12/16</td> - <td class="lefth">The Rifle Brigade.</td></tr> -<tr><td class="left">Captain</td><td class="lefth">J. D. Crosthwaite, M.C.</td> - <td class="center">7/12/16</td><td class="center">7/7/17</td> - <td class="lefth">The 1st London Regt.</td></tr> -<tr><td class="left">Captain</td><td class="lefth">E. L. Rabone, M.C.</td> - <td class="center">11/7/17</td><td class="center">11/11/17</td> - <td class="lefth">The Worcestershire Regt.</td></tr> -<tr><td class="left">Captain</td><td class="lefth">C. W. Haydon, M.C.</td> - <td class="center">11/11/17</td><td class="center">11/5/18</td> - <td class="lefth">The Middlesex Regt.</td></tr> -<tr><td class="left">Captain</td><td class="lefth">T. L. C. Heald</td> - <td class="center">14/5/18</td><td class="center">4/2/19</td> - <td class="lefth">The 5th Cheshire Regt.</td></tr> - -<tr><td class="center" colspan="5"><br />A.A. & Q.M.G.s</td></tr> - -<tr><td class="lefth">Bt. Lieut.-Col.</td><td class="lefth">H. W. Grubb, D.S.O.</td> - <td class="center">5/2/16</td><td class="center">4/12/17</td> - <td class="lefth">The Border Regt.</td></tr> -<tr><td class="lefth">Bt. Major T/Lieut.-Col.</td><td class="lefth">W. M. Sutton, D.S.O., M.C.</td> - <td class="center">4/12/17</td><td class="center">Demob.</td> - <td class="lefth">Somerset Light Infantry.</td></tr> - -<tr><td class="center" colspan="5"><br />D.A.A.G.s</td></tr> - -<tr><td class="left">Captain.</td><td class="lefth">W. M. Sutton, D.S.O., M.C.</td> - <td class="center">5/2/16</td><td class="center">4/12/17</td> - <td class="lefth">Somerset Light Infantry.</td></tr> -<tr><td class="left">Major</td><td class="lefth">A. C. Dundas </td> - <td class="center">4/12/17</td><td class="center">10/12/18</td> - <td class="lefth">The Middlesex Regt.</td></tr> -<tr><td class="left">Major</td><td class="lefth">A. Scott, D.S.O., M.C.</td> - <td class="center">0/12/18</td><td class="center">Demob.</td> - <td class="lefth">A. & S. Highlanders.</td></tr> - -<tr><td class="center" colspan="5"><br />D.A.Q.M.G.sa - -<!--359.png--><a name="Page_317" id="Page_317"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 317]</span> -</td></tr> - -<tr><td class="left">Major</td><td class="lefth">F. J. Lemon, D.S.O.</td> - <td class="center">5/2/16</td><td class="center">22/4/18</td> - <td class="lefth">The West Yorkshire Regt.</td></tr> -<tr><td class="left">Captain T/Major</td><td class="lefth">T. F. Chipp, M.C.</td> - <td class="center">23/4/18</td><td class="center">2/2/19</td> - <td class="lefth">The Middlesex Regt.</td></tr> - -<tr><td class="center" colspan="5"><br />A.D.C.s</td></tr> - -<tr><td class="left"> -<span class="lock"><a name="fnanchor_6" id="fnanchor_6"></a><a href="#footnote_6" class="fnanchor">[6]</a></span> -Lieut.</td><td class="lefth">H. C. B. Way</td> - <td class="center">10/2/16</td><td class="center">Demob.</td> - <td class="lefth">The 2nd London Regt.</td></tr> -<tr><td class="left">2/Lieut.</td><td class="lefth">C. Burn-Callender</td> - <td class="center">4/3/16</td><td class="center">2/2/17</td> - <td class="lefth">The Montgomeryshire Yeomanry.</td></tr> -<tr><td class="left">Lieut.</td><td class="lefth">H. M. Woodhouse</td> - <td class="center">10/4/17</td><td class="center">30/4/17</td> - <td class="lefth">The Notts Yeomanry.</td></tr> -<tr><td class="left">2/Lieut.</td><td class="lefth">C. Y. Jones</td> - <td class="center">26/5/17</td><td class="center">23/7/17</td> - <td class="lefth">The 13th London Regt.</td></tr> -<tr><td class="left">Captain</td><td class="lefth">G. A. Greig</td> - <td class="center">24/7/17</td><td class="center">9/8/17</td> - <td class="lefth">The Royal Scots Fusiliers.</td></tr> -<tr><td class="left">Lieut.</td><td class="lefth">R. W. Broatch</td> - <td class="center">10/8/17</td><td class="center">Demob.</td> - <td class="lefth">The 14th London Regt.</td></tr> - - -<tr><td></td><td colspan="3" class="p2 footnote"> <a name="footnote_6" id="footnote_6"></a> -<a href="#fnanchor_6"><span class="muchsmaller">[6]</span></a> - <span class="sc">Note.</span>—Lieut. H. C. B. Way was away from 4/2/18 to - 4/4/18 as A.D.C. to G.O.C. 16th (Irish) Division.</td></tr> - - -<tr><td class="center" colspan="5"><br />56TH DIVISIONAL ARTILLERY HEADQUARTERS<br /> -C.R.A.</td></tr> - -<tr><td class="lefth">Col., T/Brig.-Gen.</td><td class="lefth">R. J. G. Elkington, C.M.G., D.S.O.</td> - <td class="center">6/2/16</td><td class="center">Demob.</td></tr> - -<tr><td class="center" colspan="4"><br /><span class="sc">Brigade Majors</span></td></tr> - -<tr><td class="left">Major</td><td class="lefth">W. J. McLay</td> - <td class="center">6/2/16</td><td class="center">4/6/16</td></tr> -<tr><td class="left">Major</td><td class="lefth">J. A. Don</td> - <td class="center">28/6/16</td><td class="center">27/9/16</td></tr> -<tr><td class="left">Major</td><td class="lefth">D. Thomson</td> - <td class="center"><a name="date1"></a>27/7/16</td><td class="center">21/1/18</td></tr> -<tr><td class="left">Major</td><td class="lefth">H. D. Gale, M.C.</td> - <td class="center">21/1/18</td><td class="center">Demob.</td></tr> - -<tr><td class="center" colspan="4"><br /><span class="sc">Staff Captains</span></td></tr> - -<tr><td class="left">Captain</td><td class="lefth">B. Macmin</td> - <td class="center">6/2/16</td><td class="center">22/1/17</td></tr> -<tr><td class="left">Captain</td><td class="lefth">N. C. Lockhart</td> - <td class="center">22/1/17</td><td class="center">12/2/19</td></tr> -<tr><td class="left">Captain</td><td class="lefth">J. D. Hendley Smith</td> - <td class="center">12/2/19</td><td class="center">Demob.</td></tr> - -<tr><td colspan="5"><hr /></td></tr> -</table> - -<div class="chapter"> -<p><!--360.png--><a name="Page_318" id="Page_318"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 318]</span></p> - -<table summary="Artillery" class="smaller"> -<tr><td class="center" colspan="2">ARTILLERY</td></tr> -<tr><td class="center" colspan="2"><span class="sc">1/1st London Brigade R.F.A.</span> (<span class="sc">280th Brigade R.F.A.</span>)</td></tr> - -<tr><td class="left" colspan="2">Commanded by:</td></tr> -<tr><td class="left" colspan="2">  Lieut.-Col. L. A. C. Southam until March 1918.</td></tr> -<tr><td class="left" colspan="2">  Lieut.-Col. Batt.</td></tr> -<tr><td class="left">1916</td><td></td></tr> -<tr><td class="left"><span class="lock">April 16th.</span></td> - <td class="lefth">93rd Battery joined and designated D/280th Brigade R.F.A.</td></tr> -<tr><td class="left">May 6th.</td><td class="left">Designated 280th Brigade R.F.A.</td></tr> -<tr><td class="left">  “  17th.</td><td class="left">B.A.C. posted to 56th D.A.C.</td></tr> -<tr><td class="left">  “  28th.</td><td class="lefth">93rd Battery - ceased to be D/280th Bde. R.F.A., and was transferred to 283rd - Bde. R.F.A., and the original 1/11th London Howitzer Battery - became D/280.</td></tr> -<tr><td class="left">Nov. 5th.</td> - <td class="left"><p class="p0 hangingl">Reorganised into four - 6-gun batteries; “A,” 93rd, and “C,” 18-pounders; “D,” - howitzers.</p> - <p class="hangingl mt1">93rd Battery and one section “R” Battery - transferred from 283rd Bde. R.F.A. The original “B” Battery split - up: one section to “A,” and one section to “C.”</p> - <p class="hangingl mt1">“D” Battery only had 4 howitzers until - 25/1/17, when one section 500th Howitzer Battery joined from 282nd - Bde. R.F.A.</p></td></tr> - -<tr><td class="center" colspan="2"><br /><span class="sc">1/2nd London Brigade R.F.A.</span> (<span class="sc">281st Brigade R.F.A.</span>)</td></tr> - -<tr><td class="left" colspan="2">Commanded by Lieut.-Col. C. C. Macdowell.</td></tr> -<tr><td class="center">1916.</td></tr> -<tr><td class="center">April 15th.</td><td class="left">109th Battery joined.</td></tr> -<tr><td class="center">May 12th.</td><td class="left">Designated 281st Bde. R.F.A.</td></tr> -<tr><td class="center">  “  16th.</td><td class="left">B.A.C. posted to 56th D.A.C.</td></tr> -<tr><td class="center">  “  28th.</td> - <td class="left"><p class="p0 hangingl">10th (Howitzer) Battery transferred from 283rd Bde. - R.F.A. and designated D/281st Battery R.F.A.</p> - <p class="hangingl mt1">109th Battery transferred to 283rd Bde. R.F.A.</p></td></tr> -<tr><td class="center">Nov. 5th.</td> - <td class="left"><p class="p0 hangingl">Reorganised into four 6-gun batteries.</p> - <p class="hangingl mt1">“A,” 109th, and “C” 18-pounders; “D” howitzers.</p> - <p class="hangingl mt1">109th Battery and one section “R” Battery transferred - from 283rd Bde. R.F.A.</p> - <p class="hangingl mt1">The original “C” Battery split up. One section to - “A” Battery. One section to “B” Battery.</p> - <p class="hangingl mt1">“D” Battery only had 4 howitzers till 23/1/17, when - one section 500th Howitzer Battery joined from 282nd - Bde. R.F.A.</p></td></tr> - -<tr><td class="center" colspan="2"><br /><span class="sc">1/3rd London Brigade R.F.A.</span> (<span class="sc">282nd Army Brigade R.F.A.</span>)</td></tr> - -<tr><td class="left" colspan="2">Commanded by Lieut.-Col. A. F. Prechtel.</td></tr> -<tr><td class="center">1916</td></tr> -<tr><td class="left">April 16th.</td> - <td class="lefth">109th Battery R.F.A. joined and designated “R” Battery. (Duplicate--see 281st Bde.)</td></tr> -<tr><td class="left">May 6th.</td> - <td class="lefth">Designated 282nd London Bde. R.F.A.</td></tr> -<tr><td class="left">  “  </td> - <td class="lefth">7th, 8th, and 9th Batteries designated “A,” “B,” and - “C” Batteries.</td></tr> -<tr><td class="center">May 17th.</td> - <td class="left">B.A.C. posted to 56th D.A.C. -<!--361.png--><a name="Page_319" id="Page_319"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 319]</span> -</td></tr> -<tr><td class="center">  “  28th.</td> - <td class="left"><p class="p0 hangingl">“R” Battery posted to 283rd Bde. R.F.A.</p> - <p class="hangingl mt1">B/167th (Howitzer) Battery joined and - designated D/282nd Battery R.F.A.</p> - <p class="hangingl mt1">Reorganised into four 6-gun batteries. - “A,” “B,” and “C,” 18-pounders; “D” howitzers.</p></td></tr> -<tr><td class="center">Nov. 5th. to 1917</td> - <td class="left"><p class="p0 hangingl">500th How. Bty. R.F.A. joined 4/12/16.</p> - <p class="hangingl mt1">One Section to D/280th Bde. R.F.A. One - section to D/281st Bde. R.F.A.</p></td></tr> -<tr><td class="center">Jan. 25th.</td> - <td class="left"><p class="p0 hangingl">B/126th Battery R.F.A. - joined and designated A/282nd Battery.</p> - <p class="hangingl mt1">The original “A” Battery having been split - up, one section each to “B” and “C.”</p> - <p class="hangingl mt1">One section D/126th Battery R.F.A. joined 25/1/17.</p></td></tr> -<tr><td class="center">Jan. 20th.</td> - <td class="lefth">Designated 282nd Army Bde. R.F.A.</td></tr> -<tr><td class="center">  “   25th.</td> - <td class="lefth">One Section 56th D.A.C. joined and designated 282nd B.A.C.</td></tr> - -<tr><td colspan="2" class="center"><br /><span class="sc">1/4th (London) Howitzer Brigade R.F.A.</span> (<span class="sc">283rd Brigade R.F.A.</span>)</td></tr> - -<tr><td class="left" colspan="2">Commanded by Lieut.-Col. Wainwright.</td></tr> -<tr><td class="center">1915</td></tr> -<tr><td class="center">Nov. 19th,</td> - <td class="lefth">Half of the B.A.C. left for Salonica to join 10th Division.</td></tr> -<tr><td class="center">1916</td></tr> -<tr><td class="center">May 6th.</td> - <td class="lefth">Designated 283rd (Howitzer) Bde. R.F.A.</td></tr> -<tr><td class="center">  “  17th.</td> - <td class="lefth">B.A.C. transferred to 56th D.A.C.</td></tr> -<tr><td class="center">  “   28th.</td> - <td class="left"><p class="p0 hangingl">“R” Battery joined from 282nd Bde. R.F.A.</p> - <p class="hangingl mt1">109th Battery joined from 281st Bde. R.F.A.</p> - <p class="hangingl mt1">93rd Battery joined from 280th - Bde. R.F.A. (all 18-pounders).</p> - <p class="hangingl mt1">10th (Howitzer) Battery - transferred to 281st Bde. R.F.A.</p> - <p class="hangingl mt1">11th (Howitzer) Battery - transferred to 280th Bde. R.F.A.</p></td></tr> -<tr><td class="center">Nov. 5th.</td> - <td class="left"><p class="p0 hangingl">93rd Battery and one section “R” Battery transferred - to 280th Bde. R.F.A.</p> - <p class="hangingl mt1">109th Battery and one section “R” Battery transferred - to 281st Bde. R.F.A.</p> - <p class="hangingl mt1">Brigade ceased to exist, but the new organisation was - not completed until January 1917.</p></td></tr> - -<tr><td colspan="2" class="center"><br /><span class="sc">56th Divisional Ammunition Column</span></td></tr> - -<tr><td class="left" colspan="2">Commanded by Lieut.-Col. E. W. Griffith.</td></tr> -<tr><td class="center">1916</td></tr> -<tr><td class="center">May 17th.</td> - <td class="lefth">The B.A.C.s of 280th, 281st, 282nd, and 283rd Bdes. - R.F.A. absorbed, Then consisted of “A” Echelon - (H.Q., Nos. 1, 2, and 3 sections) and “B” Echelon.</td></tr> -<tr><td class="center">1917</td></tr> -<tr><td class="center">Jan. 25th.</td> - <td class="lefth">One Section (No. 2) became the 282nd Army Bde. Ammunition - Column.</td></tr> -<tr><td class="center">Sept.</td> - <td class="lefth">“B” Echelon reorganised as S.A.A. Section. - Reorganised as H.Q., No. 1, 2, and S.A.A. Sections.</td></tr> - -<tr><td colspan="2" class="center"><br /><span class="sc">Trench Mortars</span> -<!--362.png--><a name="Page_320" id="Page_320"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 320]</span> -</td></tr> - -<tr><td class="center">1916</td></tr> -<tr><td class="center">March 8th.</td> - <td class="lefth">“X” “Y,” and “Z” 2-inch Medium Batteries formed. - Four mortars each.</td></tr> -<tr><td class="center">May.</td> - <td class="lefth">“V” Heavy Battery formed.</td></tr> -<tr><td class="center">1917</td></tr> -<tr><td class="center">Sept./Oct</td> - <td class="lefth">Medium Batteries handed in 2-inch mortars and - were armed with four 6-inch mortars each.</td></tr> -<tr><td class="center">1918</td></tr> -<tr><td class="center">Feb. 13th.</td> - <td class="left"><p class="p0 hangingl">Medium batteries - reorganised into two batteries (“X” and “Y”) of 6-inch mortars - each.</p> - <p class="hangingl mt1">Heavy battery taken over by Corps.</p></td></tr> -<tr><td class="center">1919</td></tr> -<tr><td class="center">Feb. 6th.</td> - <td class="lefth">Reduced to Cadre. Surplus personnel to Brigades - and D.A.C.</td></tr> -</table> -</div><!--end of Artillery--> - -<div class="smaller"> -<p class="center">ROYAL ENGINEERS</p> - -<p class="center">(See C.R.E.)</p> - -<div class="container no-break mt2"> -<div class="poem"> -<div class="i0">416th (Edinburgh) Field Coy. R.E.</div> -<div class="i0">512th (London) Field Coy. R.E.</div> -<div class="i0">513th (London) Field Coy. R.E.</div> -<div class="i0">56th Divisional Signal Coy.</div> -</div></div> - -<p class="center">PIONEER BATTALION</p> - -<p class="center">1/5th Bn. Cheshire Regt. (Earl of Chester’s).</p> - -<p class="mt1">Commanded by:</p> -<p class="mt1"> Lieut.-Col. J. E. C. Groves, C.M.G., T.D., 14/2/15 to 21/2/18.</p> -<p class="mt1"> Major (T/Lieut.-Col.) W. A. V. Churton, D.S.O., T.D., 21/2/18 to end.</p> - -<p class="center">MACHINE GUN CORPS</p> - -<p class="center">56th Bn. Machine Gun Corps formed on 1/3/18.<br /> -(See Divisional M.G. Officers.)</p> - -<p class="center">R.A.S.C. UNITS</p> -<div class="container no-break mt2"> -<div class="poem"> -<div class="i0">213th Coy. R.A.S.C.</div> -<div class="i0">214th   “    “</div> -<div class="i0">215th   “    “</div> -<div class="i0">216th   “    “</div> -</div></div> - -<p class="mt1">Divisional Train commanded by:</p> -<p class="mt1"> Lieut.-Col. A. G. Galloway, D.S.O., to Sept. 1917.</p> -<p class="mt1"> Lieut.-Col. E. P. Blencowe, D.S.O., to May 1918.</p> - -<p class="center">R.A.M.C.</p> - -<div class="container no-break mt2"> -<div class="poem"> -<div class="i0">2/1st London Field Ambulance.</div> -<div class="i0">2/2nd  “     “     “</div> -<div class="i0">2/3rd   “     “     “</div> -</div></div> - -<p class="center">1/1st London Mobile Vet. Section.</p> - -<p class="center">247th Divisional Employment Coy. formed in May 1917.</p> -</div><!--end of Royal Engineers--> - -<table summary="officers continued" class="smaller"> -<tr><td class="center" colspan="5"><br />A.D.sM.S. -<!--363.png--><a name="Page_321" id="Page_321"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 321]</span> -</td></tr> - -<tr><th>Rank.</th><th>Name.</th><th>From.</th><th>To.</th><th>Regt.</th></tr> - -<tr><td class="left">Colonel</td><td class="lefth">E. G. Browne, C.B., A.M.S.</td> - <td class="center">Feb. ’16</td><td class="center">Feb, ’17</td> - <td class="lefth">R.A.M.C.</td></tr> -<tr><td class="left">Colonel</td><td class="lefth">G. A. Moore, C.M.G., D.S.O.</td> - <td class="center">Feb. ’17</td><td class="center">Feb. ’18</td> - <td class="lefth">R.A.M.C.</td></tr> -<tr><td class="left">Colonel</td><td class="lefth">E. C. Montgomery-Smith, D.S.O., A.M.S. (T.F.)</td> - <td class="center">Feb. ’18</td><td class="center">Demob.</td> - <td class="lefth">R.A.M.C.</td></tr> - -<tr><td class="center" colspan="5"><br />D.A.D.sM.S.</td></tr> - -<tr><td class="left">Major</td><td class="lefth">L. M. Purser, D.S.O.</td> - <td class="center">Feb. ’16</td><td class="center">Sept. ’16</td> - <td class="lefth">R.A.M.C.</td></tr> -<tr><td class="left">Captain</td><td class="lefth">D. Jobson Scott, M.C.</td> - <td class="center">Sept. ’16</td><td class="center">Feb. ’18</td> - <td class="lefth">R.A.M.C. (T.F.)</td></tr> -<tr><td class="left">Major</td><td class="lefth">W. T. Hare, M.C.</td> - <td class="center">Feb. ’18</td><td class="center">Demob.</td> - <td class="lefth">R.A.M.C.</td></tr> - -<tr><td class="center" colspan="5"><br />D.A.D.sV.S.</td></tr> - -<tr><td class="left">Major</td><td class="lefth">F. Hibbard</td> - <td class="center">5/2/16</td><td class="center">30/9/16</td></tr> -<tr><td class="left">Major</td><td class="lefth">W. Ascott, O.B.E.</td> - <td class="center">1/10/16</td><td class="center">Demob.</td></tr> - -<tr><td class="center" colspan="5"><br />D.A.D.sO.S.</td></tr> - -<tr><td class="left">Major</td><td class="lefth">J. Bishop</td> - <td class="center">6/2/16</td><td class="center">10/3/16</td></tr> -<tr><td class="left">Captain</td><td class="lefth">P. S. Tibbs</td> - <td class="center">11/3/16</td><td class="center">23/7/16</td></tr> -<tr><td class="left">Lieut.</td><td class="lefth">V. C. Ward</td> - <td class="center">24/7/16</td><td class="center">22/11/16</td></tr> -<tr><td class="left">Captain</td><td class="lefth">W. D. Harbinson</td> - <td class="center">23/11/16</td><td class="center">27/5/17</td></tr> -<tr><td class="left">Major</td><td class="lefth">J. W. Burbidge</td> - <td class="center">28/5/17</td><td class="center">Demob.</td></tr> - -<tr><td class="center" colspan="5"><br />C.sR.E.</td></tr> - -<tr><td class="lefth">Lieut.-Col.</td><td class="lefth">H. W. Gordon, D.S.O.</td> - <td class="center">6/2/16</td><td class="center">Oct. ’17</td> - <td class="lefth">Royal Engineers.</td></tr> -<tr><td class="lefth">Lieut.-Col.</td><td class="lefth">E. N. Mozeley, D.S.O.</td> - <td class="center">Oct. ’17</td><td class="center">Demob.</td> - <td class="lefth">Royal Engineers.</td></tr> - -<tr><td class="center" colspan="5"><br /><span class="sc">Divisional Machine Gun Officers</span></td></tr> - -<tr><td class="left">Major</td><td class="lefth">E. C. S. Jervis</td> - <td class="center">Jan. ’17</td><td class="center">May ’17</td> - <td class="lefth">R. of O. 6th D.G.s.</td></tr> -<tr><td class="left">Major</td><td class="lefth">Roberts</td> - <td class="center">May ’17</td><td class="center">Aug. ’17</td> - <td class="lefth">M.G.C.</td></tr> -<tr><td class="lefth">Lieut.-Col.</td><td class="lefth">E. C. S. Jervis</td> - <td class="center">Aug. ’17</td><td class="center">Mar. ’18</td> - <td class="lefth">R. of O. 6th D.G.s.</td></tr> - -<tr><td class="center" colspan="5"><br /><span class="sc">167th INFANTRY BRIGADE</span></td></tr> - -<tr><td class="center" colspan="5"><br /><span class="sc">Brigade Commanders</span></td></tr> - -<tr><td class="lefth">Major (T/Brig.-Gen.)</td><td class="lefth">F. H. Burnell-Nugent, D.S.O.</td> - <td class="center">6/2/16</td><td class="center">26/7/16</td> - <td class="lefth">The Rifle Brigade.</td></tr> -<tr><td class="lefth">Bt. Col. (T/Brig.-Gen.)</td><td class="lefth">G. Freeth, C.M.G., D.S.O.</td> - <td class="center">7/7/16</td><td class="center">Demob.</td> - <td class="lefth">Lancashire Fusiliers.</td></tr> - -<tr><td class="center" colspan="5"><br /><span class="sc">Brigade Majors</span> -<!--364.png--><a name="Page_322" id="Page_322"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 322]</span> -</td></tr> - -<tr><td class="left">Bt. Major</td><td class="lefth">G. Blewitt, D.S.O., M.C.</td> - <td class="center">6/2/16</td><td class="center">5/12/16</td> - <td class="lefth">The Oxford and Bucks Light Infantry.</td></tr> -<tr><td class="left">Captain</td><td class="lefth">M. Stopford, M.C.</td> - <td class="center">5/12/16</td><td class="center">25/3/18</td> - <td class="lefth">The Rifle Brigade.</td></tr> -<tr><td class="left">Captain</td><td class="lefth">C. E. Clouting</td> - <td class="center">25/3/18</td><td class="center">8/4/18</td> - <td class="lefth">General List.</td></tr> -<tr><td class="left">Captain</td><td class="lefth">C. W. Haydon, M.C.</td> - <td class="center">25/4/18</td><td class="center">Demob.</td> - <td class="lefth">Middlesex Regt.</td></tr> - -<tr><td class="center" colspan="5"><br /><span class="sc">Staff Captains</span></td></tr> - -<tr><td class="left">Captain</td><td class="lefth">O. H. Tidbury, M.C.</td> - <td class="center">6/2/16</td><td class="center">27/12/16</td> - <td class="lefth">Middlesex Regt.</td></tr> -<tr><td class="left">Captain</td><td class="lefth">T. F. Chipp, M.C.</td> - <td class="center">27/12/16</td><td class="center">23/4/18</td> - <td class="lefth">Middlesex Regt.</td></tr> -<tr><td class="left">Captain</td><td class="lefth">H. F. Prynn, M.C.</td> - <td class="center">23/4/18</td><td class="center">Demob.</td> - <td class="lefth">13th London Regt. (Kensingtons).</td></tr> - -<tr><td class="center" colspan="5"><br /><span class="sc">168th INFANTRY BRIGADE</span></td></tr> - -<tr><td class="center" colspan="5"><br /><span class="sc">Brigade Commanders</span></td></tr> - -<tr><td class="lefth">Bt. Col. (T/Brig.-Gen.)</td><td class="lefth">G. G. Loch, C.M.G., D.S.O.</td> - <td class="center">5/2/16</td><td class="center">Demob.</td> - <td class="lefth">The Royal Scots.</td></tr> - -<tr><td class="center" colspan="5"><br /><span class="sc">Brigade Majors</span></td></tr> - -<tr><td class="left">Major</td><td class="lefth">P. Neame, V.C., D.S.O.</td> - <td class="center">5/2/16</td><td class="center">28/11/16</td> - <td class="lefth">Royal Engineers.</td></tr> -<tr><td class="left">Captain</td><td class="lefth">J. L. Willcocks, M.C.</td> - <td class="center">28/11/16</td><td class="center">3/7/18</td> - <td class="lefth">The Black Watch.</td></tr> -<tr><td class="left">Captain</td><td class="lefth">A. R. Abercrombie, D.S.O., M.C.</td> - <td class="center">3/7/18</td><td class="center">11/8/18</td> - <td class="lefth">The Queen’s Regt.</td></tr> -<tr><td class="left">Captain</td><td class="lefth">R. C. Boyle</td> - <td class="center">11/8/18</td><td class="center">Demob.</td> - <td class="lefth">West Somerset Yeomanry.</td></tr> - -<tr><td class="center" colspan="5"><br /><span class="sc">Staff Captains</span></td></tr> - -<tr><td class="left">Major</td><td class="lefth">L. L. Wheatley, D.S.O.</td> - <td class="center">5/2/16</td><td class="center">7/3/16</td> - <td class="lefth">A. & S. Highlanders.</td></tr> -<tr><td class="left">Captain</td><td class="lefth">R. E. Otter, M.C.</td> - <td class="center">7/4/16</td><td class="center">20/4/17</td> - <td class="lefth">London Rifle Brigade.</td></tr> -<tr><td class="left">Captain</td><td class="lefth">J. C. Andrews, M.C.</td> - <td class="center">26/4/17</td><td class="center">7/3/18</td> - <td class="lefth">Q.V.R.</td></tr> -<tr><td class="left">Captain</td><td class="lefth">E. F. Coke, M.C.</td> - <td class="center">7/3/18</td><td class="center">Demob.</td> - <td class="lefth">8th Canadian Inantry Battn.</td></tr> - -<tr><td class="center" colspan="5"><br /><span class="sc">169th INFANTRY BRIGADE</span></td></tr> - -<tr><td class="center" colspan="5"><br /><span class="sc">Brigade Commander</span></td></tr> - -<tr><td class="lefth">Brig.-Gen. (Bt. Col.)</td><td class="lefth">E. S. D. E. Coke, C.M.G., D.S.O.</td> - <td class="center"><a name="date2"></a>5/2/16</td><td class="center">Demob.</td> - <td class="lefth">K.O.S.B.</td></tr> - -<tr><td class="center" colspan="5"><br /><span class="sc">Brigade Majors</span> -<!--365.png--><a name="Page_323" id="Page_323"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 323]</span> -</td></tr> - -<tr><td class="left">Captain</td><td class="lefth">L. A. Newnham</td> - <td class="center">5/2/16</td><td class="center">27/5/17</td> - <td class="lefth">Middlesex Regt.</td></tr> - -<tr><td class="left">Captain</td><td class="lefth">W. Carden Roe, M.C.</td> - <td class="center">27/5/17</td><td class="center">24/3/18</td> - <td class="lefth">Royal Irish Fusiliers.</td></tr> -<tr><td class="left">Captain</td><td class="lefth">Chute</td> - <td class="center">28/3/18</td><td class="center">9/4/18</td></tr> -<tr><td class="left">Captain</td><td class="lefth">T. G. McCarthy</td> - <td class="center">1/4/18</td><td class="center">Demob.</td> - <td class="lefth">2nd London Regt.</td></tr> - -<tr><td class="center" colspan="5"><br /><span class="sc">Staff Captains</span></td></tr> - -<tr><td class="left">Captain</td><td class="lefth">E. R. Broadbent, M.C.</td> - <td class="center">5/2/16</td><td class="center">5/11/17</td> - <td class="lefth">8th Hussars.</td></tr> -<tr><td class="left">Captain</td><td class="lefth">F. Bishop</td> - <td class="center">5/11/17</td><td class="center">Demob.</td> - <td class="lefth">1/5th Bn. Cheshire Regt.</td></tr> - -<tr><td colspan="5"><hr /></td></tr> -</table> - -<table summary="infantry battalions 167 168 and 169" class="smaller"> -<tr><td class="center" colspan="3"><br />INFANTRY BATTALIONS, <span class="sc">167th BRIGADE</span></td></tr> - -<tr><th>Battalion.</th><th>Commanding Officers.</th><th>Remarks.</th></tr> - -<tr><td class="lefth">1/7th Middlesex Regt.</td> - <td class="left"><p class="p0 hangingl">Lieut.-Col. E. J. King, C.M.G., to 2/11/16, and from 4/2/17 to 14/5/17</p> - <p class="hangingl mt1">Lieut-.Col. E. D. Jackson, D.S.O., from 2/11/16 to 4/2/17</p> - <p class="hangingl mt1">A/Lieut.-Col. F. W. D. Bendall, from 15/5/17 to 17/8/17</p> - <p class="hangingl mt1">A/Lieut.-Col. P. C. Kay, D.S.O., M.C., from 31/8/17 to 16/2/18.</p> - <p class="hangingl mt1">A/Lieut.-Col. M. Beevor, from 16/2/18.</p></td> - <td class="lefth">The Battalion went to Gibraltar Sept. 1914. - France to the 23rd Brigade, 8th Division, in Feb. - 1915.</td></tr> -<tr><td colspan="3"><hr /></td></tr> -<tr><td class="lefth">1/8th Middlesex Regt.</td> - <td class="left"><p class="p0 hangingl">T/Lieut.-Col. E. D. W. - Gregory, from 31/5/15 to Sept. 1915. </p> - <p class="hangingl mt1">Lieut.-Col. P. L. Inkpen, D.S.O., from - Sept. 1915 to Oct. 1916, and Mar. 1917 to Aug. 1917.</p> - <p class="hangingl mt1">Lieut.-Col. F. D. W. Bendall, from Oct. - 1916 to Mar. 1917.</p> - <p class="hangingl mt1">Lieut.-Col. C. H. Pank, C.M.G., D.S.O., - Sept. 1917 to Mar. 1919.</p> - <p class="hangingl mt1">Lieut.-Col. M. B. Beevor, from Mar. 1918.</p></td> - <td class="lefth">This Battalion went to Gibraltar in Sept. - 1914. To the 88th Brigade, 3rd Division, in France during - March 1915, and in April joined the 23rd Brigade, when it was - amalgamated with the 1/7th Middlesex. Resumed independence on - joining 56th Division.</td></tr> - -<tr><td colspan="3"><hr /></td></tr> -<tr><td class="lefth">1/1st London Regt. (Royal Fusiliers)</td> - <td class="left"><p class="p0 hangingl">Lieut.-Col. E. G. Mercer, - C.M.G., T.D., from Jan. 1916 to June 1916.</p> - <p class="hangingl mt1">Lieut.-Col. D. V. Smith, D.S.O., V.D., - from June 1916 to Oct. 1916; from Feb. 1917 to April 1917. </p> - <p class="hangingl mt1">Lieut.-Col. Kennard, from Oct. 1916 to Nov. 1916.</p> - <p class="hangingl mt1">Lieut.-Col. W. R. Glover, C.M.G., D.S.O., - T.D., from Nov. 1916 to Mar. 1917; from April 1917.</p></td> - <td class="lefth">Went to Malta in Sept. 1914. France Jan. - 1915, joining the 25th Brigade, 8th Division, in March. To - the 56th Division April 1916. -<!--366.png--><a name="Page_324" id="Page_324"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 324]</span> -</td></tr> - -<tr><td colspan="3"><hr /></td></tr> -<tr><td class="lefth">1/3rd London Regt. (Royal Fusiliers)</td> - <td class="left"><p class="p0 hangingl">A/Lieut.-Col. A. E. - Maitland, D.S.O., M.C., until Mar. 1917.</p> - <p class="hangingl mt1">Lieut.-Col. F. D. Samuel, D.S.O., T.D.</p></td> - <td class="lefth">To Malta in Sept. 1914. France Jan. 1915 with - G.H.Q. troops. Garhwal Brigade, Meerut Division, on 1/3/15. To - 142nd Brigade, 47th Division, 1/1/16. Left 56th Division and - joined 173rd Brigade, 58th Division, 2/2/18.</td></tr> - -<tr><td colspan="3"><hr /></td></tr> - -<tr><td colspan="3" class="center"><br /><span class="sc">INFANTRY BATTALIONS, 168th BRIGADE</span></td></tr> - -<tr><th>Battalion.</th><th>Commanding Officers.</th><th>Remarks.</th></tr> - -<tr><td class="lefth">1/4th London Regt. (Royal Fusiliers)</td> - <td class="left"><p class="p0 hangingl">Major W. J, Clark, until 23/3/16.</p> - <p class="hangingl mt1">Lieut.-Col. L. L. Wheatley, 8/4/16 to 11/10/16.</p> - <p class="hangingl mt1">Lieut.-Col. H. J. Duncan Teape, until 17/3/17. </p> - <p class="hangingl mt1">Lieut.-Col. A. E. Maitland, 17/3/17 to 20/4/17.</p> - <p class="hangingl mt1">Lieut.-Col. H. Campbell, 20/4/17 to 14/8/17. </p> - <p class="hangingl mt1">Lieut.-Col. A. F. Marchment, 14/8/17 to the end.</p></td> - <td class="lefth">To Malta Sept. 1914. France Jan. 1915 as G.H.Q. - troops. Joined Ferozepore Brigade, Lahore Division, on 1/3/15. To - 140th Brigade, 47th Division, 1/1/16.</td></tr> - -<tr><td colspan="3"><hr /></td></tr> -<tr><td class="lefth">1/12th London Regt. (Rangers) -<!--367.png--><a name="Page_325" id="Page_325"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 325]</span> - </td> - <td class="lefth">Colonel A. D. Bayliffe, C.M.G., T.D.</td> - <td class="lefth">To France 4/1/15 as G.H.Q. troops. Joined 84th - Brigade, 28th Division, on 4/2/15. Brigade moved to 5th Division - 19/2/15 and rejoined 28th Division 6/4/15. To G.H.Q. on 19/5/15. - Left56th Division 2/2/18, and joined 58th Division.</td></tr> - -<tr><td colspan="3"><hr /></td></tr> -<tr><td class="lefth">1/13th London Regt. (Kensingtons)</td> - <td class="left"><p class="p0 hangingl">Lieut.-Col. H. Stafford until 28/6/16.</p> - <p class="hangingl mt1">A/Lieut.-Col. W. W. Young until 27/10/16.</p> - <p class="hangingl mt1">A/Lieut.-Col. J. C. R. King, until 13/6/17.</p> - <p class="hangingl mt1">A/Lieut.-Col. J. E. J. Higgins, M.C., until 5/8/17.</p> - <p class="hangingl mt1">A/Lieut.-Col. V. Flower, D.S.O., until 16/8/17.</p> - <p class="hangingl mt1">A/Lieut.-Col. R. E. F. Shaw, M.C., until 23/8/18.</p> - <p class="hangingl mt1">A/Lieut.-Col. M. A. Prismall, M.C., until 28/9/18. </p> - <p class="hangingl mt1">A/Lieut.-Col. J. Forbes Robertson, V.C., D.S.O., M.C., until 13/10/18.</p> - <p class="hangingl mt1">A/Lieut.-Col. F. S. B. Johnson, D.S.O.</p></td> - <td class="lefth">To France on 13/11/14, and joined the 24th - Brigade, 8th Division. To G.H.Q. on 19/5/15.</td></tr> - -<tr><td colspan="3"><hr /></td></tr> -<tr><td class="lefth">1/14th London Regt. (London Scottish)</td> - <td class="left"><p class="p0 hangingl">Lieut-.Col. B. C. Green, C.M.G., T.D., until - 2/8/16.</p> - <p class="hangingl mt1">Lieut.-Col. J. H. Lindsay, D.S.O., until 6/10/16.</p> - <p class="hangingl mt1">Lieut.-Col. James Paterson, M.C., until 6/3/17.</p> - <p class="hangingl mt1">Lieut.-Col. E. D. Jackson, D.S.O.</p></td> - <td class="lefth">To France on lines of communication Sept. 1914. - Joined 1st Brigade, 1st Division, on 7/11/14.</td></tr> -<tr><td colspan="3"><hr /></td></tr> - -<tr><td class="center" colspan="3"><br /><span class="sc">INFANTRY BATTALIONS, 169th BRIGADE</span> -<!--368.png--><a name="Page_326" id="Page_326"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 326]</span> -</td></tr> - -<tr><th>Battalion.</th><th>Commanding Officers.</th><th>Remarks.</th></tr> - -<tr><td class="lefth">1/2nd London Regt. (Royal Fusiliers)</td> - <td class="left"><p class="p0 hangingl">Lieut.-Col. James Attenborough, C.M.G., T.D., - until Nov. 1916, and Feb. 1917 to April 1917.</p> - <p class="hangingl mt1">A/Lieut.-Col. J. P. Kellett, D.S.O., M.C., - Nov. 1916 to Feb. 1917; May 1917 to Aug. 1917; Jan. 1918 to Oct. - 1918; Jan. 1919.</p> - <p class="hangingl mt1">A/Lieut.-Col. R. E. F. Sneath, M.C., Aug. - 1917 to Dec. 1917.</p> - <p class="hangingl mt1">A/Lieut.-Col. S. H. Stevens, M.C., Nov. - 1918 to Jan. 1919.</p></td> - <td class="lefth">To Malta Sept. 1914. France Jan. 1915 as - G.H.Q. troops. Joined 17th Brigade, 6th Division, 1/3/15. The - Brigade was transferred to 24th Division 1/1/16.</td></tr> - -<tr><td colspan="3"><hr /></td></tr> -<tr><td class="lefth">1/5th London Regt. (London Rifle Brigade)</td> - <td class="left"><p class="p0 hangingl">Lieut.-Col. Bates, D.S.O., until 13/8/16.</p> - <p class="hangingl mt1">Lieut.-Col. R. H. Husey, D.S.O., 13/8/16 to 4/5/18.</p> - <p class="hangingl mt1">Lieut.-Col. C. D. Burnell, D.S.O., 4/5/18 - to end. Also for one month, 22/4/17 to 20/5/17, during Lieut.-Col. - Husey’s absence. The latter C.O. was also absent from 26/3/17 to - 22/4/17, and 12/8/17 to 3/12/17, when Major F. H. Wallis took - command.</p></td> - <td class="lefth">To France and joined 11th Brigade, 4th - Division, 24/11/14. To G.H.Q. 19/5/15. To 8th Brigade, 3rd - Division, 1/1/16.</td></tr> - -<tr><td colspan="3"><hr /></td></tr> -<tr><td class="lefth">1/9th London Regt. (Queen Victoria’s Rifles)</td> - <td class="left"><p class="p0 hangingl">Colonel J. W. F. Dickens, D.S.O., V.D.</p> - <p class="hangingl mt1">Lieut.-Col. F. B. Follett, D.S.O., M.C.</p> - <p class="hangingl mt1">Lieut.-Col. M. Beevor, D.S.O.</p> - <p class="hangingl mt1">Lieut.-Col. E. G. H. Towell</p></td> - <td class="lefth">To France 24/11/14 and joined 13th Brigade, - 5th Division. Brigade moved to 28th Division on 19/2/15, and - back to 5th Division on 6/4/15. Left 56th Division and joined - 58th 2/2/18.</td></tr> - -<tr><td colspan="3"><hr /></td></tr> -<tr><td class="lefth">1/16th London Regt. (Queen’s Westminster Rifles)</td> - <td class="left"><p class="p0 hangingl"><span class="lock">Lieut.-Col. R. Shoolbred,</span> C.M.G., T.D.</p> - <p class="hangingl mt1">Lieut.-Col. E. P. Harding, O.B.E., M.C.</p> - <p class="hangingl mt1">Lieut.-Col. P. M. Glazier, D.S.O.</p> - <p class="hangingl mt1">Lieut.-Col. S. R. Savill, D.S.O., M.C.</p></td> - <td class="lefth">To France and joined 18th Brigade, 6th - Division, 11/11/14.</td></tr> - -<tr><td colspan="3"><hr /></td></tr> -</table> -</div><!--end appendix--> - -<div class="chapter"> -<p><!--369.png--><a name="Page_327" id="Page_327"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 327]</span></p> -<h3 class="p4">INDEX</h3> - -<ul class="IX none"> -<li>Ablainzeville, <a href="#Page_32">32</a></li> -<li>Achicourt, <a href="#Page_114">114</a></li> -<li>Achiet-le-Grand, <a href="#Page_32">32</a></li> -<li>Acq, <a href="#Page_246">246</a></li> -<li>Adinfer Wood, <a href="#Page_32">32</a></li> -<li>Agny, <a href="#Page_114">114</a></li> -<li>Albert, battle of, <a href="#Page_258">258</a>-<a href="#Page_268">268</a></li> -<li>Ambrines, <a href="#Page_8">8</a></li> -<li>American power, <a href="#Page_211">211</a></li> -<li>Angreau, <a href="#Page_308">308</a></li> -<li>Arnold, Lt., <a href="#Page_292">292</a></li> -<li>Arras, battles of, <a href="#Page_114">114</a>-<a href="#Page_143">143</a>, <a href="#Page_208">208</a>-<a href="#Page_242">242</a></li> -<li>Arthur, G. S., <a href="#Page_40">40</a></li> -<li>Artillery Coy. of London (H.A.C.), <a href="#Page_2">2</a></li> -<li>Athis, <a href="#Page_311">311</a></li> -<li>Aubers Ridge, <a href="#Page_104">104</a></li> -<li>Aubigny-au-Bac, <a href="#Page_290">290</a>-<a href="#Page_297">297</a>, <a href="#Page_312">312</a></li> -<li>Avesnes-le-Comte, <a href="#Page_9">9</a>, <a href="#Page_254">254</a></li> -</ul> - -<ul class="IX none"> -<li>Baghdad, <a href="#Page_111">111</a>, <a href="#Page_145">145</a></li> -<li>Bapaume, <a href="#Page_69">69</a></li> -<li>Barber, Capt. J. B., <a href="#Page_9">9</a></li> -<li>Basseux, <a href="#Page_266">266</a></li> -<li>Basseville, <a href="#Page_301">301</a></li> -<li>Bavincourt, <a href="#Page_254">254</a>, <a href="#Page_259">259</a></li> -<li>Bayley, Major A. E. G., <a href="#Page_3">3</a></li> -<li>Bayliffe, Lt.-Col. A. D., <a href="#Page_89">89</a></li> -<li>Bazentin, <a href="#Page_53">53</a></li> -<li>Bazentin Ridge, battle of, <a href="#Page_53">53</a></li> -<li>Beaudricourt, <a href="#Page_8">8</a></li> -<li>Beaufort, <a href="#Page_8">8</a></li> -<li>Beaumetz, <a href="#Page_297">297</a></li> -<li>Beauvois, <a href="#Page_113">113</a></li> -<li>Bedford Regt., <a href="#Page_156">156</a></li> -<li>Belfort, <a href="#Page_14">14</a></li> -<li>Bendall, Lt.-Col. F. W. D., <a href="#Page_160">160</a></li> -<li>Berkshire Regt., <a href="#Page_156">156</a></li> -<li>Berlencourt, <a href="#Page_8">8</a></li> -<li>Berles-au-Bois, <a href="#Page_214">214</a></li> -<li>Bernafay, <a href="#Page_101">101</a></li> -<li>Bertincourt, <a href="#Page_214">214</a></li> -<li>Beugny, <a href="#Page_175">175</a></li> -<li>Biez Wood, <a href="#Page_32">32</a></li> -<li>Blairville, <a href="#Page_25">25</a>, <a href="#Page_259">259</a></li> -<li>Blangermont, <a href="#Page_113">113</a></li> -<li>Blangerol, <a href="#Page_113">113</a></li> -<li>Blavincourt, <a href="#Page_8">8</a></li> -<li>Blewitt, Capt. G., <a href="#Page_4">4</a></li> -<li>Bloxam, Major-Gen. (U.S.A.), <a href="#Page_169">169</a></li> -<li>Boisleux-au-Mont, <a href="#Page_297">297</a></li> -<li>Boisleux St. Marc, <a href="#Page_283">283</a></li> -<li>Bouleaux Wood (<i>see</i> Ginchy), <a href="#Page_56">56</a></li> -<li>Bouquemaison, <a href="#Page_120">120</a></li> -<li>Bouret-sur-Canche, <a href="#Page_9">9</a></li> -<li>Bourlon (<i>see</i> Cambrai)</li> -<li>Bovill, E. H., <a href="#Page_40">40</a></li> -<li>Bow Bells, <a href="#Page_140">140</a></li> -<li>Boyelles (<i>see</i> Albert)</li> -<li>Brand, Capt., <a href="#Page_109">109</a></li> -<li>Brigades: - <ul class="IX none"> - <li>6th, <a href="#Page_202">202</a></li> - <li>8th, <a href="#Page_168">168</a></li> - <li>9th, <a href="#Page_168">168</a></li> - <li>12th, <a href="#Page_234">234</a></li> - <li>44th, <a href="#Page_253">253</a></li> - <li>46th, <a href="#Page_253">253</a></li> - <li>53rd, <a href="#Page_155">155</a></li> - <li>76th, <a href="#Page_168">168</a></li> - <li>99th, <a href="#Page_202">202</a></li> - <li>109th, <a href="#Page_174">174</a></li> - <li>137th, <a href="#Page_42">42</a></li> - <li>139th, <a href="#Page_42">42</a></li> - <li>140th, <a href="#Page_202">202</a></li> - <li>145th, <a href="#Page_18">18</a></li> - <li>171st, <a href="#Page_278">278</a></li> - <li>172nd, <a href="#Page_275">275</a></li> - <li>Tank Brigades, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, <a href="#Page_171">171</a></li> - </ul></li> -<li>Brigades, composition of, <a href="#Page_4">4</a>, <a href="#Page_5">5</a></li> -<li>Brind, Lt.-Col. J. E. S., <a href="#Page_3">3</a>, <a href="#Page_24">24</a></li> -<li>Broadbent, Capt. E. R., <a href="#Page_4">4</a></li> -<li>Bruilly, <a href="#Page_8">8</a></li> -<li>Brussiloff, Gen., <a href="#Page_14">14</a>, <a href="#Page_96">96</a>, <a href="#Page_147">147</a></li> -<li>Bucquoy, <a href="#Page_32">32</a></li> -<li>Bullecourt, 135 (<i>see</i> Scarpe, <a href="#Page_269">269</a>-280)</li> -<li>Bullock, Capt. T. W., <a href="#Page_3">3</a></li> -<li>Busseboom, <a href="#Page_165">165</a></li> -</ul> - -<ul class="IX none"> -<li>Cambrai, battle of, <a href="#Page_163">163</a>-<a href="#Page_208">208</a>, <a href="#Page_290">290</a></li> -<li>Campbell, Lt.-Col. H., <a href="#Page_160">160</a></li> -<li>Canadian Cavalry, <a href="#Page_177">177</a> - -<!--370.png-->328<a name="Page_328" id="Page_328"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 328]</span></li> - -<li>Canadian Mounted Rifles, <a href="#Page_236">236</a></li> -<li>Canal du Nord (battle), <a href="#Page_280">280</a>-<a href="#Page_289">289</a></li> -<li>Cannettemont, <a href="#Page_8">8</a></li> -<li>Canteen, <a href="#Page_9">9</a>, <a href="#Page_165">165</a></li> -<li>Carnoy, <a href="#Page_69">69</a></li> -<li>Cavan, Gen. Lord, <a href="#Page_75">75</a>, <a href="#Page_95">95</a></li> -<li>Chemin-des-Dames, <a href="#Page_130">130</a></li> -<li>Churchill, Rt. Hon. Winston, <a href="#Page_50">50</a></li> -<li>Citadel, <a href="#Page_52">52</a>, <a href="#Page_101">101</a></li> -<li>Cockerill, Capt., <a href="#Page_39">39</a></li> -<li>Coke, Brig.-Gen. E. S., <a href="#Page_3">3</a>, <a href="#Page_18">18</a>, <a href="#Page_114">114</a>, <a href="#Page_134">134</a>, <a href="#Page_237">237</a>, <a href="#Page_275">275</a>, <a href="#Page_286">286</a>, <a href="#Page_291">291</a>, <a href="#Page_303">303</a>, <a href="#Page_313">313</a></li> -<li>Combles (<i>see</i> Ginchy)</li> -<li>Corbie, <a href="#Page_51">51</a></li> -<li>Coron, <a href="#Page_312">312</a></li> -<li>Corps: - <ul class="IX none"> - <li>II, <a href="#Page_154">154</a>, <a href="#Page_163">163</a></li> - <li>III, <a href="#Page_170">170</a>, <a href="#Page_171">171</a></li> - <li>IV, <a href="#Page_27">27</a>, <a href="#Page_170">170</a>, <a href="#Page_171">171</a>, <a href="#Page_190">190</a>, <a href="#Page_258">258</a>, <a href="#Page_265">265</a>, <a href="#Page_285">285</a></li> - <li>V, <a href="#Page_170">170</a></li> - <li>VI, <a href="#Page_6">6</a>, <a href="#Page_117">117</a>, <a href="#Page_131">131</a>, <a href="#Page_170">170</a>, <a href="#Page_190">190</a>, <a href="#Page_254">254</a>, <a href="#Page_258">258</a>, <a href="#Page_265">265</a>, <a href="#Page_285">285</a></li> - <li>VII, <a href="#Page_10">10</a>, <a href="#Page_19">19</a>, <a href="#Page_113">113</a>, <a href="#Page_114">114</a>, <a href="#Page_170">170</a></li> - <li>IX, <a href="#Page_245">245</a></li> - <li>X, <a href="#Page_48">48</a></li> - <li>XI, <a href="#Page_104">104</a></li> - <li>XIII, <a href="#Page_209">209</a>, <a href="#Page_221">221</a></li> - <li>XIV, <a href="#Page_51">51</a>, <a href="#Page_59">59</a>, <a href="#Page_70">70</a></li> - <li>XV, <a href="#Page_59">59</a></li> - <li>XVII, <a href="#Page_170">170</a>, <a href="#Page_221">221</a>, <a href="#Page_247">247</a>, <a href="#Page_269">269</a>, <a href="#Page_285">285</a></li> - <li>XXII, <a href="#Page_246">246</a>, <a href="#Page_283">283</a>, <a href="#Page_301">301</a></li> - <li>Canadian, <a href="#Page_169">169</a>, <a href="#Page_282">282</a>, <a href="#Page_284">284</a>, <a href="#Page_291">291</a></li> - <li>French XVII, <a href="#Page_6">6</a></li> - <li>German XIV, <a href="#Page_18">18</a></li> - </ul></li> -<li>Couin, <a href="#Page_131">131</a></li> -<li>Cox (Sapper), <a href="#Page_295">295</a></li> -<li>Crawford, Capt., <a href="#Page_198">198</a></li> -<li>Croisette, <a href="#Page_113">113</a></li> -<li>Croisilles, <a href="#Page_117">117</a>, <a href="#Page_268">268</a>-<a href="#Page_275">275</a></li> -</ul> - -<ul class="IX none"> -<li>Dainville, <a href="#Page_7">7</a></li> -<li>Delville Wood (<i>see</i> Ginchy), <a href="#Page_53">53</a></li> -<li>Divisional Band, <a href="#Page_164">164</a></li> -<li>Divisional Depot Bn., <a href="#Page_120">120</a></li> -<li>Divisions: - <ul class="IX none"> - <li>Infantry: - <ul class="IX none"> - <li>1st, <a href="#Page_283">283</a></li> - <li>2nd, <a href="#Page_193">193</a>, <a href="#Page_202">202</a>, <a href="#Page_258">258</a></li> - <li>3rd, <a href="#Page_117">117</a>, <a href="#Page_140">140</a>, <a href="#Page_168">168</a>, <a href="#Page_191">191</a>, <a href="#Page_237">237</a>, <a href="#Page_277">277</a></li> - <li>4th, <a href="#Page_87">87</a>, <a href="#Page_221">221</a>, <a href="#Page_234">234</a>, <a href="#Page_237">237</a>, <a href="#Page_284">284</a>, <a href="#Page_301">301</a></li> - <li>5th, <a href="#Page_55">55</a>, <a href="#Page_65">65</a>, <a href="#Page_79">79</a>, <a href="#Page_102">102</a></li> - <li>6th, <a href="#Page_70">70</a>, <a href="#Page_74">74</a>, <a href="#Page_79">79</a>, <a href="#Page_82">82</a>, <a href="#Page_103">103</a>, <a href="#Page_171">171</a></li> - <li>8th, <a href="#Page_154">154</a>, <a href="#Page_245">245</a></li> - <li>11th, <a href="#Page_284">284</a>, <a href="#Page_301">301</a>, <a href="#Page_308">308</a>, <a href="#Page_311">311</a></li> - <li>12th, <a href="#Page_171">171</a>, <a href="#Page_193">193</a></li> - <li>13th, <a href="#Page_114">114</a></li> - <li>14th, <a href="#Page_10">10</a>, <a href="#Page_114">114</a>, <a href="#Page_117">117</a>, <a href="#Page_134">134</a></li> - <li>15th, <a href="#Page_131">131</a>, <a href="#Page_237">237</a>, <a href="#Page_253">253</a></li> - <li>16th, <a href="#Page_57">57</a>, <a href="#Page_62">62</a></li> - <li>18th, <a href="#Page_86">86</a>, <a href="#Page_128">128</a>, <a href="#Page_155">155</a></li> - <li>19th, <a href="#Page_245">245</a></li> - <li>20th, <a href="#Page_171">171</a></li> - <li>21st, <a href="#Page_117">117</a>, <a href="#Page_245">245</a></li> - <li>25th, <a href="#Page_155">155</a>, <a href="#Page_160">160</a>, <a href="#Page_245">245</a></li> - <li>29th, <a href="#Page_171">171</a>, <a href="#Page_176">176</a></li> - <li>30th, <a href="#Page_117">117</a>, <a href="#Page_128">128</a></li> - <li>31st, <a href="#Page_210">210</a></li> - <li>36th, <a href="#Page_171">171</a>, <a href="#Page_177">177</a></li> - <li>37th, <a href="#Page_112">112</a>, <a href="#Page_138">138</a>, <a href="#Page_258">258</a></li> - <li>40th, <a href="#Page_259">259</a>, <a href="#Page_279">279</a></li> - <li>41st, <a href="#Page_215">215</a></li> - <li>42nd, <a href="#Page_258">258</a></li> - <li>46th, <a href="#Page_26">26</a></li> - <li>47th, <a href="#Page_27">27</a>, <a href="#Page_192">192</a>, <a href="#Page_202">202</a></li> - <li>48th, <a href="#Page_18">18</a></li> - <li>49th, <a href="#Page_113">113</a>, <a href="#Page_301">301</a></li> - <li>50th, <a href="#Page_128">128</a>, <a href="#Page_245">245</a></li> - <li>51st, <a href="#Page_171">171</a>, <a href="#Page_177">177</a></li> - <li>52nd, <a href="#Page_266">266</a>, <a href="#Page_278">278</a>, <a href="#Page_282">282</a></li> - <li>55th, <a href="#Page_193">193</a></li> - <li>57th, <a href="#Page_260">260</a>, <a href="#Page_272">272</a>, <a href="#Page_282">282</a></li> - <li>58th, <a href="#Page_214">214</a></li> - <li>59th, <a href="#Page_192">192</a></li> - <li>61st, <a href="#Page_101">101</a>, <a href="#Page_140">140</a>, <a href="#Page_301">301</a></li> - <li>62nd, <a href="#Page_171">171</a>, <a href="#Page_177">177</a>, <a href="#Page_210">210</a></li> - <li>63rd, <a href="#Page_279">279</a>, <a href="#Page_282">282</a>, <a href="#Page_311">311</a></li> - </ul></li> - <li>Cavalry: - <ul class="IX none"> - <li>1st, <a href="#Page_178">178</a>, <a href="#Page_181">181</a></li> - <li>2nd, <a href="#Page_191">191</a></li> - </ul></li> - <li>Canadian: - <ul class="IX none"> - <li>1st, <a href="#Page_247">247</a>, <a href="#Page_253">253</a></li> - <li>2nd, <a href="#Page_252">252</a></li> - <li>3rd, <a href="#Page_102">102</a>, <a href="#Page_224">224</a>, <a href="#Page_234">234</a>, <a href="#Page_284">284</a></li> - <li>4th, <a href="#Page_236">236</a>, <a href="#Page_301">301</a>, <a href="#Page_308">308</a></li> - </ul></li> - <li>New Zealand, <a href="#Page_258">258</a></li> - <li>Guards, <a href="#Page_62">62</a>, <a href="#Page_70">70</a>, <a href="#Page_74">74</a>, <a href="#Page_79">79</a>, <a href="#Page_82">82</a>, <a href="#Page_189">189</a>, <a href="#Page_258">258</a>, <a href="#Page_263">263</a>, <a href="#Page_266">266</a>, <a href="#Page_312">312</a></li> - <li>German: - <ul class="IX none"> - <li>Guards, 2nd R., <a href="#Page_35">35</a>, <a href="#Page_47">47</a></li> - <li>5th Bav., <a href="#Page_74">74</a>, <a href="#Page_104">104</a></li> - <li>5th Bav. R., <a href="#Page_222">222</a></li> - <li>5th R., <a href="#Page_210">210</a></li> - <li>16th Bav., <a href="#Page_248">248</a></li> - <li>20th, <a href="#Page_188">188</a></li> - <li>23rd R., <a href="#Page_222">222</a></li> - <li>39th, <a href="#Page_253">253</a></li> - <li>41st, <a href="#Page_241">241</a></li> - <li>51st R., <a href="#Page_78">78</a></li> - <li>52nd, <a href="#Page_18">18</a>, <a href="#Page_46">46</a> - -<!--371.png-->329<a name="Page_329" id="Page_329"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 329]</span></li> - - <li>185th, <a href="#Page_61">61</a>, <a href="#Page_248">248</a></li> - <li>214th, <a href="#Page_249">249</a>, <a href="#Page_250">250</a></li> - <li>219th R., <a href="#Page_222">222</a></li> - <li>240th, <a href="#Page_222">222</a></li> - </ul></li> - <li>Portuguese, 2nd, <a href="#Page_244">244</a></li> - </ul></li> -<li>Domart-en-Ponthieu, <a href="#Page_6">6</a></li> -<li>Doullens, <a href="#Page_6">6</a>, <a href="#Page_48">48</a></li> -<li>Dudgeon, Gen. F. A., <a href="#Page_153">153</a>-<a href="#Page_249">249</a></li> -</ul> - -<ul class="IX none"> -<li>Emery, Major, <a href="#Page_104">104</a></li> -<li>Eperlecques, <a href="#Page_144">144</a>, <a href="#Page_153">153</a>, <a href="#Page_165">165</a></li> -<li>Essart, <a href="#Page_32">32</a>, <a href="#Page_36">36</a></li> -<li>Etrun, <a href="#Page_296">296</a></li> -</ul> - -<ul class="IX none"> -<li>Falfemont Farm (<i>see</i> Ginchy), <a href="#Page_54">54</a></li> -<li>Falkenhayn, Gen., <a href="#Page_10">10</a>, <a href="#Page_29">29</a>, <a href="#Page_94">94</a>, <a href="#Page_97">97</a></li> -<li>Fayt-le-Franc, <a href="#Page_311">311</a></li> -<li>Ferlibray, <a href="#Page_312">312</a></li> -<li>Flers, battle of, <a href="#Page_54">54</a>, <a href="#Page_69">69</a></li> -<li>Flower, Major V. A., <a href="#Page_160">160</a></li> -<li>Foch, Marshal, <a href="#Page_245">245</a></li> -<li>Fonquevillers, <a href="#Page_48">48</a></li> -<li>Fosseux, <a href="#Page_209">209</a></li> -<li>Freeth, Brig.-Gen., <a href="#Page_86">86</a>, <a href="#Page_109">109</a>, <a href="#Page_123">123</a>, <a href="#Page_138">138</a>, <a href="#Page_155">155</a>, <a href="#Page_249">249</a>, <a href="#Page_268">268</a></li> -<li>Fremicourt, <a href="#Page_175">175</a></li> -<li>Frevent, <a href="#Page_113">113</a></li> -<li>Friend, L. W., <a href="#Page_228">228</a></li> -<li>Frigicourt, <a href="#Page_53">53</a></li> -<li>Fromer-le-Grand, <a href="#Page_48">48</a></li> -</ul> - -<ul class="IX none"> -<li>Garland, Capt. J. R., <a href="#Page_41">41</a></li> -<li>Gavrelle (<i>see</i> Arras)</li> -<li>Gaza, <a href="#Page_147">147</a></li> -<li>German prisoners (<i>see</i> Regiments)</li> -<li>Ginchy, battle of, <a href="#Page_55">55</a>-<a href="#Page_66">66</a></li> -<li>Givenchy-le-Noble, <a href="#Page_8">8</a></li> -<li>Glazier, Lt.-Col., <a href="#Page_186">186</a>, <a href="#Page_228">228</a></li> -<li>Glencorse (<i>see</i> Ypres)</li> -<li>Gommecourt, action of, <a href="#Page_18">18</a>-<a href="#Page_47">47</a></li> -<li>Gouy-en-Artois, <a href="#Page_297">297</a></li> -<li>Grand Rullecourt, <a href="#Page_7">7</a></li> -<li>Grenas, <a href="#Page_19">19</a></li> -<li>Grouping of units, <a href="#Page_5">5</a></li> -<li>Grubb, Lt.-Col. H. W., <a href="#Page_3">3</a></li> -<li>Guemappe (<i>see</i> Arras, battles of), <a href="#Page_117">117</a></li> -<li>Guillemont, <a href="#Page_55">55</a></li> -<li>Guinecourt, <a href="#Page_113">113</a></li> -</ul> - -<ul class="IX none"> -<li>Haking, Gen. R., <a href="#Page_109">109</a></li> -<li>Hallencourt, <a href="#Page_3">3</a>, <a href="#Page_10">10</a>, <a href="#Page_101">101</a></li> -<li>Halloy, practice at, <a href="#Page_36">36</a></li> -<li>Hampshire Regt., <a href="#Page_177">177</a></li> -<li>Handyside, Capt. P. A. J., <a href="#Page_41">41</a></li> -<li>Happy Valley, <a href="#Page_52">52</a></li> -<li>Harbarcq, <a href="#Page_140">140</a></li> -<li>Harmignies, <a href="#Page_312">312</a></li> -<li>Harris, Major M. R., <a href="#Page_160">160</a></li> -<li>Harvengt, <a href="#Page_312">312</a></li> -<li>Hauteville, <a href="#Page_131">131</a></li> -<li>Hawkins (Sapper), <a href="#Page_296">296</a></li> -<li>Hayward, Cpl., <a href="#Page_40">40</a></li> -<li>Hébuterne, <a href="#Page_10">10</a></li> -<li>Heninel, <a href="#Page_126">126</a></li> -<li>Henri, P., <a href="#Page_35">35</a></li> -<li>Henu, <a href="#Page_10">10</a>, <a href="#Page_18">18</a></li> -<li>Héricourt, <a href="#Page_113">113</a></li> -<li>Hernicourt, <a href="#Page_113">113</a></li> -<li>Higgins, Major J. E., <a href="#Page_160">160</a></li> -<li>Hindenburg, Gen. von, <a href="#Page_94">94</a>, <a href="#Page_98">98</a>, <a href="#Page_129">129</a>, <a href="#Page_147">147</a></li> -<li>Honval, <a href="#Page_8">8</a>, <a href="#Page_113">113</a></li> -<li>Horne, J. A., <a href="#Page_40">40</a></li> -<li>Horses, <a href="#Page_103">103</a></li> -<li>Houvin, <a href="#Page_8">8</a>, <a href="#Page_113">113</a></li> -<li>Hull, Major-Gen. Sir C. P. A., <a href="#Page_1">1</a>-<a href="#Page_144">144</a>, <a href="#Page_249">249</a>-<a href="#Page_314">314</a></li> -<li>Husey, Col. R. R., <a href="#Page_160">160</a></li> -</ul> - -<ul class="IX none"> -<li>Ide, W. C., <a href="#Page_40">40</a></li> -<li>Identification (<i>see</i> Regiments)</li> -<li>Indian drivers, <a href="#Page_253">253</a></li> -<li>Ingpen, Lt.-Col. P. L., <a href="#Page_160">160</a></li> -<li>Isonzo, <a href="#Page_97">97</a></li> -<li>Ivergny, <a href="#Page_8">8</a></li> -<li>Izel-les-Hameau, <a href="#Page_253">253</a></li> -</ul> - -<ul class="IX none"> -<li>Jackson, Lt.-Col., <a href="#Page_188">188</a>, <a href="#Page_199">199</a></li> -<li>Jervis, Lt.-Col. E. C. S., <a href="#Page_241">241</a>, <a href="#Page_265">265</a></li> -<li>Joffre, Marshal, <a href="#Page_51">51</a></li> -</ul> - -<ul class="IX none"> -<li>Kellet, Lt.-Col. J. P., <a href="#Page_160">160</a></li> -<li>Kerensky, <a href="#Page_147">147</a></li> -<li>King Edward’s Horse, <a href="#Page_178">178</a></li> -<li>Korniloff, <a href="#Page_147">147</a></li> -</ul> - -<ul class="IX none"> -<li>Lagnicourt, <a href="#Page_168">168</a></li> -<li>Lancashire Fusiliers, <a href="#Page_228">228</a></li> -<li>Laventie, <a href="#Page_101">101</a>-<a href="#Page_113">113</a></li> -<li>Le Cauroy, <a href="#Page_7">7</a>, <a href="#Page_117">117</a></li> -<li>Lemon, Major F. J., <a href="#Page_3">3</a></li> -<li>Lestrem, <a href="#Page_101">101</a></li> -<li>Leuze Wood (<i>see</i> Ginchy), <a href="#Page_55">55</a></li> -<li>Liencourt, <a href="#Page_8">8</a></li> -<li>Lignereuil, <a href="#Page_8">8</a>, <a href="#Page_254">254</a></li> -<li>Loch, Brig.-Gen., <a href="#Page_3">3</a>, <a href="#Page_19">19</a>, <a href="#Page_55">55</a>, <a href="#Page_109">109</a>, <a href="#Page_123">123</a>, <a href="#Page_239">239</a>, <a href="#Page_264">264</a></li> -<li>Louverval, <a href="#Page_168">168</a></li> -<li>Lowndes, G. A. N., <a href="#Page_227">227</a></li> -<li>Ludendorff, Gen. von, <a href="#Page_94">94</a>, <a href="#Page_98">98</a>, <a href="#Page_111">111</a>, <a href="#Page_129">129</a>, <a href="#Page_147">147</a>, <a href="#Page_152">152</a></li> -</ul> - -<ul class="IX none"> -<li>Macdowell, Lt.-Col., <a href="#Page_23">23</a> - -<!--372.png-->330<a name="Page_330" id="Page_330"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 330]</span></li> - -<li>Macgregor, Capt. A. H., <a href="#Page_56">56</a></li> -<li>Macintosh, Cpl., <a href="#Page_198">198</a></li> -<li>McPhie, Cpl., <a href="#Page_295">295</a></li> -<li>Magnicourt, <a href="#Page_8">8</a></li> -<li>Maltzhorn Farm, <a href="#Page_57">57</a></li> -<li>Manin, <a href="#Page_8">8</a></li> -<li>Mansell Camp, <a href="#Page_101">101</a></li> -<li>Marchment, Lt.-Col., <a href="#Page_232">232</a></li> -<li>Marcoing (<i>see</i> Cambrai)</li> -<li>Maricourt, <a href="#Page_16">16</a>, <a href="#Page_52">52</a></li> -<li>Masnières (<i>see</i> Cambrai)</li> -<li>Maurepas, <a href="#Page_53">53</a></li> -<li>Mazières, <a href="#Page_253">253</a></li> -<li>Méaulte, <a href="#Page_81">81</a></li> -<li>Mercatel, <a href="#Page_116">116</a></li> -<li>Millar, Cpl., <a href="#Page_104">104</a></li> -<li>Moncheaux, <a href="#Page_9">9</a></li> -<li>Monchy, <a href="#Page_116">116</a></li> -<li>Mons, <a href="#Page_313">313</a></li> -<li>Montauban, <a href="#Page_53">53</a>, <a href="#Page_87">87</a></li> -<li>Montignies, <a href="#Page_311">311</a></li> -<li>Morchies, <a href="#Page_168">168</a></li> -<li>Mott, Capt., <a href="#Page_39">39</a></li> -</ul> - -<ul class="IX none"> -<li>Neame, Capt. P., <a href="#Page_4">4</a></li> -<li>Negus, A. G., <a href="#Page_40">40</a></li> -<li>Neuve Chapelle, <a href="#Page_103">103</a></li> -<li>Neuville Vitasse (<i>see</i> Arras, battles of), <a href="#Page_115">115</a></li> -<li>Newnham, Capt. L. A., <a href="#Page_4">4</a>, <a href="#Page_108">108</a>, <a href="#Page_140">140</a>, <a href="#Page_144">144</a></li> -<li>Nicholls, W. G., <a href="#Page_40">40</a></li> -<li>Nonne Bosschen (<i>see</i> Ypres)</li> -<li>North Staffordshire Regt., <a href="#Page_42">42</a></li> -<li>Nugent, Burnell-, Brig.-Gen., <a href="#Page_3">3</a>, <a href="#Page_18">18</a>, <a href="#Page_20">20</a></li> -<li>Nuncy, <a href="#Page_113">113</a></li> -</ul> - -<ul class="IX none"> -<li>Oburg, <a href="#Page_313">313</a></li> -<li>Onnezies, <a href="#Page_311">311</a></li> -<li>Oppy (<i>see</i> Arras)</li> -<li>Organisation, <a href="#Page_167">167</a>, <a href="#Page_298">298</a></li> -<li>Ormiston, W. H., <a href="#Page_169">169</a></li> -<li>Ouderdom, <a href="#Page_159">159</a></li> -<li>Ovillers, <a href="#Page_53">53</a></li> -</ul> - -<ul class="IX none"> -<li>Packenham, Lt.-Col., <a href="#Page_113">113</a></li> -<li>Pank, Lt.-Col., <a href="#Page_199">199</a></li> -<li>Petit Moranfayt, <a href="#Page_312">312</a></li> -<li>Petley, R. E., <a href="#Page_41">41</a></li> -<li>Phillips, Major F. A., <a href="#Page_232">232</a></li> -<li>Pill-boxes, <a href="#Page_150">150</a></li> -<li>Pommier, <a href="#Page_131">131</a></li> -<li>Powell, Kite, <a href="#Page_219">219</a></li> -<li>Prechtel, Lt.-Col., <a href="#Page_32">32</a>, <a href="#Page_36">36</a>, <a href="#Page_46">46</a></li> -<li>Price, J. C. B., <a href="#Page_228">228</a></li> -<li>Prior, Lt., <a href="#Page_109">109</a></li> -<li>Proney, <a href="#Page_113">113</a></li> -<li>Pyper, Capt. J. R., <a href="#Page_9">9</a></li> -</ul> - -<ul class="IX none"> -<li>Quadrilateral, <a href="#Page_26">26</a>, <a href="#Page_60">60</a>, <a href="#Page_74">74</a></li> -<li>Quéant, <a href="#Page_177">177</a>, <a href="#Page_297">297</a></li> -<li>Quevy-le-Grand, <a href="#Page_312">312</a></li> -</ul> - -<ul class="IX none"> -<li>Raids, near Arras, <a href="#Page_247">247</a>-<a href="#Page_252">252</a></li> -<li>Rancourt, <a href="#Page_53">53</a></li> -<li>Rebreuve, <a href="#Page_8">8</a></li> -<li>Regiments, German: - <ul class="IX none"> - <li>5th Gren. Regt., <a href="#Page_137">137</a></li> - <li>7th R.I.R., <a href="#Page_210">210</a></li> - <li>7th Bav., <a href="#Page_74">74</a>, <a href="#Page_104">104</a></li> - <li>13th Bav., <a href="#Page_113">113</a></li> - <li>14th Bav., <a href="#Page_248">248</a></li> - <li>16th I.R., <a href="#Page_241">241</a></li> - <li>19th Bav., <a href="#Page_104">104</a></li> - <li>21st Bav., <a href="#Page_74">74</a></li> - <li>28th I.R., <a href="#Page_248">248</a></li> - <li>31st R.I.R., <a href="#Page_86">86</a>, <a href="#Page_168">168</a></li> - <li>50th I.R., <a href="#Page_249">249</a>, <a href="#Page_251">251</a></li> - <li>65th I.R., <a href="#Page_248">248</a></li> - <li>84th R.I.R., <a href="#Page_86">86</a></li> - <li>86th R.I.R., <a href="#Page_168">168</a></li> - <li>91st I.R., <a href="#Page_48">48</a></li> - <li>101st R.I.R., <a href="#Page_222">222</a></li> - <li>102nd R.I.R., <a href="#Page_222">222</a></li> - <li>107th I.R., <a href="#Page_57">57</a></li> - <li>128th I.R., <a href="#Page_137">137</a></li> - <li>152nd I.R., <a href="#Page_241">241</a></li> - <li>161st I.R., <a href="#Page_61">61</a></li> - <li>169th I.R., <a href="#Page_18">18</a>, <a href="#Page_32">32</a></li> - <li>170th I.R., <a href="#Page_32">32</a></li> - <li>214th I.R., <a href="#Page_250">250</a></li> - <li>235th I.R., <a href="#Page_78">78</a></li> - <li>358th I.R., <a href="#Page_251">251</a></li> - <li>414th I.R., <a href="#Page_169">169</a></li> - <li>471st I.R., <a href="#Page_222">222</a></li> - </ul></li> -<li>Reincourt-les-Bapaume, <a href="#Page_69">69</a></li> -<li>Reninghelst, <a href="#Page_153">153</a>, <a href="#Page_165">165</a></li> -<li>Richon, <a href="#Page_312">312</a></li> -<li>Rieu-de-Bury, <a href="#Page_312">312</a></li> -<li>Rocquingny, <a href="#Page_69">69</a></li> -<li>Roe, Cardon, <a href="#Page_140">140</a></li> -<li>Rose, 2/Lieut., <a href="#Page_109">109</a></li> -<li>Royal Flying Corps, 15th Squad., <a href="#Page_173">173</a></li> -<li>Royal Irish Rifles, <a href="#Page_56">56</a></li> -<li>Rumancourt, <a href="#Page_296">296</a></li> -<li>Rum jar, <a href="#Page_126">126</a></li> -</ul> - -<ul class="IX none"> -<li>St. Pol, <a href="#Page_113">113</a></li> -<li>St. Riquier, <a href="#Page_49">49</a></li> -<li>Sambre, battle of, <a href="#Page_303">303</a></li> -<li>Sars-les-Bois, <a href="#Page_8">8</a></li> -<li>Sauchy-Cauchy, <a href="#Page_296">296</a> - -<!--373.png-->331<a name="Page_331" id="Page_331"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 331]</span></li> - -<li>Savill, Lt.-Col., <a href="#Page_272">272</a></li> -<li>Scarpe, <a href="#Page_269">269</a>-280 (<i>see</i> Arras, battles of)</li> -<li>Sebourg, <a href="#Page_303">303</a></li> -<li>Séricourt, <a href="#Page_8">8</a>, <a href="#Page_113">113</a></li> -<li>Shaw, Lt.-Col. R. S. F., <a href="#Page_263">263</a></li> -<li>Sherwood Foresters, <a href="#Page_42">42</a></li> -<li>Shoolbred, Lt.-Col., <a href="#Page_39">39</a></li> -<li>Shops, <a href="#Page_9">9</a></li> -<li>Sibiville, <a href="#Page_113">113</a></li> -<li>Siracourt, <a href="#Page_113">113</a></li> -<li>Sloan, Capt., <a href="#Page_293">293</a></li> -<li>Smith, Gen. W. Douglas, <a href="#Page_145">145</a></li> -<li>Souastre, <a href="#Page_10">10</a>, <a href="#Page_19">19</a>, <a href="#Page_131">131</a></li> -<li>Southam, Lt.-Col., <a href="#Page_39">39</a></li> -<li>Steenvoorde, <a href="#Page_159">159</a></li> -<li>Stow, F. H., <a href="#Page_41">41</a></li> -<li>Sutton, Capt. W. M., <a href="#Page_3">3</a></li> -<li>Sutton, Lt.-Col., <a href="#Page_305">305</a></li> -<li>Swainson, Capt., <a href="#Page_39">39</a></li> -<li>Swift, Gen. (U.S.A.), <a href="#Page_210">210</a></li> -</ul> - -<ul class="IX none"> -<li>Tadpole Copse (<i>see</i> Cambrai)</li> -<li>Tagart, Capt., <a href="#Page_39">39</a></li> -<li>Tanks, <a href="#Page_51">51</a>, <a href="#Page_69">69</a>, <a href="#Page_70">70</a>, <a href="#Page_92">92</a>, <a href="#Page_171">171</a>, <a href="#Page_177">177</a>, <a href="#Page_261">261</a></li> -<li>Tidbury, Capt. O. H., <a href="#Page_4">4</a></li> -<li>Tilloy (<i>see</i> Arras, battles of), <a href="#Page_115">115</a></li> -<li>Tincques, <a href="#Page_297">297</a></li> -<li>Training, <a href="#Page_166">166</a></li> -<li>Transloy, battle of ridges, <a href="#Page_83">83</a></li> -<li>Trieu Jean Sart, <a href="#Page_312">312</a></li> -<li>Trones Wood, <a href="#Page_53">53</a></li> -</ul> - -<ul class="IX none"> -<li>Upton, D. F., <a href="#Page_40">40</a></li> -</ul> - -<ul class="IX none"> -<li>Verdun, reasons for battle, <a href="#Page_4">4</a></li> -<li>Victory Camp, <a href="#Page_213">213</a></li> -<li>Ville-sur-Ancre, <a href="#Page_81">81</a></li> -<li>Villers-au-Flos, <a href="#Page_69">69</a></li> -<li>Villers Châtel, <a href="#Page_252">252</a></li> -<li>Villers-sire-Simon, <a href="#Page_8">8</a></li> -<li>Vimy Ridge, <a href="#Page_102">102</a>, <a href="#Page_116">116</a>, <a href="#Page_128">128</a></li> -</ul> - -<ul class="IX none"> -<li>Wamin, <a href="#Page_8">8</a></li> -<li>Wamlin, <a href="#Page_8">8</a></li> -<li>Wancourt, <a href="#Page_124">124</a></li> -<li>Way, H. C. B., <a href="#Page_3">3</a></li> -<li>Wheatley, Major L. L., <a href="#Page_4">4</a></li> -<li>Wippenhoek, <a href="#Page_159">159</a></li> -<li>Wireless, <a href="#Page_205">205</a></li> -<li>Wodley, Cpl., <a href="#Page_104">104</a></li> -<li>Woods, Pte., <a href="#Page_198">198</a></li> -</ul> - -<ul class="IX none"> -<li>Yates, A. G. V., <a href="#Page_40">40</a></li> -<li>Ypres, battles of, <a href="#Page_144">144</a>-<a href="#Page_164">164</a></li> -</ul> -</div><!--end of index--> - -<p><!--374.png--><a name="Page_332" id="Page_332"></a><span class="pagenum">[Pg 332]</span></p> -<div class="p4 chapter"> - -<p class="center smaller">PRINTED BY<br /> -HAZELL, WATSON AND VINEY, LD.,<br /> -LONDON AND AYLESBURY,<br /> -ENGLAND.</p> -</div><!--end last page--> - -<div class="p4 chapter tnote"> - -<h4>Transcriber's Note:</h4> - -<p>Unprinted punctuation was added where appropriate.</p> - -<p>Footnotes were -renumbered sequentially and moved to the end of the chapter in which -the anchor occurs.</p> - -<p>Page numbers are displayed in the -right margin.</p> - -<p>In some e-book readers, text originally in small caps -will appear as <strong>bold</strong>.</p> - -<p>On page <a href="#Page_240">240</a>, there are no subparagraphs (f) -and (g); subparagraph (h) follows subparagraph (e).</p> - -<p>A <a href="#header">header key</a> was added to the table on page -300 so that the table would fit on a standard computer screen.</p> - -<p>Other changes:</p> -<ul> -<li>compaign to <a href="#campaign">campaign</a> ... unrestricted submarine campaign ...</li> -<li>bebauching to <a href="#debauch">debauching</a> ... prevented from debauching from the ...</li> -<li>277//16 to <a href="#date1">27/7/16</a>, entry for D. Thomson in the table of 56th Divisional Artillery Headquarters, C.R.A.</li> -<li>5/2/6 to <a href="#date2">5/2/16</a>, appendix entry for E. S. D. E. Coke, 169th Infantry Brigade</li> -<li>Marchmont to <a href="#Marchment">Marchment</a> in the index and twice in the text of Chapter VII.</li> -<li>table header for Officers in September was changed from O. to <a href="#officer">Off.</a></li> -</ul> -</div><!--end transcriber note--> - -<p> </p> -<p> </p> -<hr class="full" /> -<p>***END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE 56TH DIVISION***</p> -<p>******* This file should be named 50379-h.htm or 50379-h.zip *******</p> -<p>This and all associated files of various formats will be found in:<br /> -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/5/0/3/7/50379">http://www.gutenberg.org/5/0/3/7/50379</a></p> -<p> -Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions will -be renamed.</p> - -<p>Creating the works from print editions not protected by U.S. copyright -law means that no one owns a United States copyright in these works, -so the Foundation (and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United -States without permission and without paying copyright -royalties. 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