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| committer | nfenwick <nfenwick@pglaf.org> | 2025-02-04 22:48:28 -0800 |
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diff --git a/.gitattributes b/.gitattributes new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d7b82bc --- /dev/null +++ b/.gitattributes @@ -0,0 +1,4 @@ +*.txt text eol=lf +*.htm text eol=lf +*.html text eol=lf +*.md text eol=lf diff --git a/LICENSE.txt b/LICENSE.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6312041 --- /dev/null +++ b/LICENSE.txt @@ -0,0 +1,11 @@ +This eBook, including all associated images, markup, improvements, +metadata, and any other content or labor, has been confirmed to be +in the PUBLIC DOMAIN IN THE UNITED STATES. + +Procedures for determining public domain status are described in +the "Copyright How-To" at https://www.gutenberg.org. + +No investigation has been made concerning possible copyrights in +jurisdictions other than the United States. Anyone seeking to utilize +this eBook outside of the United States should confirm copyright +status under the laws that apply to them. diff --git a/README.md b/README.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ed4844d --- /dev/null +++ b/README.md @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +Project Gutenberg (https://www.gutenberg.org) public repository for +eBook #50098 (https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/50098) diff --git a/old/50098-0.txt b/old/50098-0.txt deleted file mode 100644 index f4b334d..0000000 --- a/old/50098-0.txt +++ /dev/null @@ -1,22516 +0,0 @@ -The Project Gutenberg EBook of The War History of the 4th Battalion The -London Regiment (Royal Fusiliers) 1914-1, by F. Clive Grimwade - -This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and most -other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions -whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms of -the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online at -www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the United States, you'll have -to check the laws of the country where you are located before using this ebook. - -Title: The War History of the 4th Battalion The London Regiment (Royal Fusiliers) 1914-1919 - -Author: F. Clive Grimwade - -Release Date: September 30, 2015 [EBook #50098] - -Language: English - -Character set encoding: UTF-8 - -*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK WAR HISTORY--4TH BATTALION 1914-1919 *** - - - - -Produced by Richard Tonsing, Brian Coe and the Online -Distributed Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net (This -file was produced from images generously made available -by University of California libraries) - - - - - - - THE WAR HISTORY - OF THE 4TH BATTALION - THE LONDON REGIMENT - (ROYAL FUSILIERS) - 1914-1919 - -[Illustration: _Frontispiece_ - -_Ypres Cathedral_] - - - - - THE WAR HISTORY - OF THE 4TH BATTALION - THE LONDON REGIMENT - (ROYAL FUSILIERS) - 1914-1919 - - - BY - CAPTAIN F. CLIVE GRIMWADE - 4TH BATTALION, THE LONDON REGIMENT (ROYAL FUSILIERS) - - LONDON - HEADQUARTERS OF THE 4TH LONDON REGIMENT - 112 SHAFTESBURY STREET, N.1 - 1922 - - * * * * * - - _Printed in Great Britain - by Turnbull & Spears, Edinburgh_ - - * * * * * - - THIS HISTORY IS DEDICATED - TO THE MEMORY OF - COLONEL E. T. RODNEY WILDE, V.D., - WHO COMMANDED THE BATTALION - FROM 23RD NOVEMBER 1890 TO 24TH JANUARY 1903 - AND COMPILED ITS HISTORICAL RECORDS - FROM 1643 TO 1908 - - - - -FOREWORD - - -It was considered by the past and present members of the 4th Battalion, -The London Regiment (Royal Fusiliers), that some permanent record of -the part taken by the Regiment in the European War should be compiled, -and a War History Committee was formed in February 1920 to consider the -preparation of such a record. - -At the unanimous request of the Committee Captain F. Clive Grimwade -undertook to write the Regiment's War History. - -The Committee desire to express their keen appreciation of the manner -in which he has overcome the difficulties of compiling such a History -and of his devotion in carrying out this long and arduous work. - -The Committee wish to express their thanks also to Lieut.-Col. -Marchment, to Captains Boutall, Garratt, Croll and Hetley, and to -other officers who have given Captain Grimwade valuable assistance; -to the author's mother, Mrs Grimwade, for her assistance in arranging -information as to officers' personal services and in correcting the -drafts of the book; and to the Regiment's Honorary Colonel, Lord -Marshall, for facilitating the publication of the book. - - THE WAR HISTORY COMMITTEE, - 4TH BATTALION, THE LONDON - REGIMENT (ROYAL FUSILIERS). - - LESLIE T. BURNETT, LIEUT.-COL. (_Chairman_). - G. H. M. VINE, MAJOR (_retired_). - H. J. DUNCAN-TEAPE, MAJOR. - S. J. ELLIOTT, MAJOR. - - _February 1922_ - - - - -CONTENTS - - - CHAP. PAGE - - I. MOBILISATION--DEPARTURE OVERSEAS 1 - - II. THE 1/4TH BATTALION IN MALTA--FORMATION - OF THE 2/4TH BATTALION 8 - - III. THE 1/4TH BATTALION IN FRANCE--OPERATIONS - AT NEUVE CHAPELLE 18 - - IV. THE 1/4TH BATTALION IN THE SECOND BATTLE - OF YPRES, 1915 40 - - V. OPERATIONS DURING THE SUMMER OF 1915 58 - - VI. THE 1/4TH BATTALION IN THE 47TH DIVISION 73 - - VII. THE 2/4TH BATTALION IN MALTA, GALLIPOLI - PENINSULA AND SOUTHERN EGYPT 86 - - VIII. THE 3/4TH AND 4/4TH BATTALIONS AT HOME 115 - - IX. THE FORMATION OF THE 56TH DIVISION 132 - - X. THE 1/4TH BATTALION IN THE BATTLES OF - THE SOMME, 1916--I. THE ATTACK ON - GOMMECOURT 139 - - XI. THE 1/4TH BATTALION IN THE BATTLES OF - THE SOMME, 1916--II. THE BATTLES OF - SEPTEMBER AND OCTOBER 177 - - XII. THE 1/4TH BATTALION DURING THE WINTER - 1916/17 217 - - XIII. THE 2/4TH BATTALION IN FRANCE--GERMAN - RETIREMENT FROM THE SOMME 236 - - XIV. THE 1/4TH BATTALION IN THE BATTLES OF - ARRAS, 1917 251 - - XV. THE 2/4TH BATTALION IN THE BATTLES FOR - BULLECOURT, 1917 273 - - XVI. THE THIRD BATTLE OF YPRES, 1917--I. THE - 1/4 BATTALION ON THE MENIN ROAD. 294 - - XVII. THE THIRD BATTLE OF YPRES, 1917--II. THE - 2/4 BATTALION ON THE NORTHERN RIDGES 306 - - XVIII. THE 1/4TH BATTALION IN THE BATTLE OF - CAMBRAI, 1917 325 - - XIX. THE 1/4TH BATTALION, WINTER 1917/18--THE - RESERVE BATTALION 1916/17 345 - - XX. THE 2/4TH BATTALION IN THE SECOND BATTLE - OF THE SOMME, 1918 359 - - XXI. THE 1/4TH BATTALION IN THE DEFENCE OF - ARRAS, 1918 392 - - XXII. THE 1/4TH AND 2/4TH BATTALIONS DURING THE - SUMMER MONTHS OF 1918--THE RESERVE - BATTALION, 1918 409 - - XXIII. THE FINAL ADVANCE--I. THE 2/4TH BATTALION - IN THE BATTLES OF AMIENS AND BAPAUME, - 1918 428 - - XXIV. THE FINAL ADVANCE--II. THE 1/4TH BATTALION - IN THE BATTLE OF BAPAUME, 1918 460 - - XXV. THE FINAL ADVANCE--III. THE 1/4TH - BATTALION IN THE BATTLES OF CAMBRAI - AND THE SAMBRE, 1918 478 - - - LIST OF APPENDICES - - I. MALTA 508 - - II. HONOURS AND DECORATIONS 510 - - III. THE RECONSTRUCTION OF THE 4TH LONDON - REGIMENT IN 1920 518 - - INDEX 521 - - - ILLUSTRATIONS - - YPRES CATHEDRAL _Frontispiece_ - - TO FACE PAGE - - GHAIN TUFFIEHA CAMP--MELLEHA CAMP--SELMUN - PALACE 8 - - MELLEHA--THE GRAND HARBOUR, VALETTA 16 - - ST JEAN VILLAGE IN APRIL 1920 56 - - ROUGE CROIX, LA BASSÉE ROAD--THE DOLL'S HOUSE - (FEROZEPORE BRIGADE HEADQUARTERS), LA BASSÉE - ROAD 64 - - SIGNPOST LANE, NEUVE CHAPELLE--RUINED FARMHOUSE, - NEUVE CHAPELLE 232 - - INVERNESS COPSE 304 - - PASSCHENDAELE RIDGE 320 - - ARRAS CATHEDRAL 416 - - - SKETCH MAPS - - BY CAPTAIN F. CLIVE GRIMWADE - - NO. - - 1. NEUVE CHAPELLE--RICHEBOURG L'AVOUÉ 32 - - 2. THE SECOND BATTLE OF YPRES, 1915 48 - - 3. GALLIPOLI PENINSULA--CAPE HELLES TRENCHES, - 1915 96 - - 4. THE ATTACK ON GOMMECOURT, 1ST JULY 1916 144 - - 5. THE BATTLE OF GINCHY, SEPTEMBER 1916 192 - - 6. THE BATTLE OF MORVAL, SEPTEMBER 1916 204 - - 7. THE BATTLE OF THE LE TRANSLOY RIDGES, OCTOBER - 1916 208 - - 8. LAVENTIE, WINTER 1916/17 224 - - 9. THE GERMAN RETIREMENT, FEBRUARY-MARCH 1917 240 - - 10. CAVALRY FARM, MAY 1917 266 - - 11. BULLECOURT, MAY-JUNE, 1917 288 - - 12. THE THIRD BATTLE OF YPRES, 1917 (1/4TH - BATTALION) 296 - - 13. THE THIRD BATTLE OF YPRES, 1917 (2/4TH - BATTALION) 312 - - 14. THE BATTLE OF CAMBRAI, 1917 336 - - 15. THE RETREAT FROM LA FÈRE, MARCH 1918 368 - - 16. THE DEFENCE OF ARRAS, MARCH 1918 400 - - 17. THE BATTLE OF AMIENS, 1918 (2/4TH BATTALION)--THE - ACTION AT CHIPILLY RIDGE, 8TH-10TH - AUGUST 432 - - 18. THE BATTLE OF BAPAUME, 1918 (2/4TH BATTALION) 448 - - 19. THE BATTLE OF BAPAUME, 1918 (1/4TH BATTALION) 472 - - 20. THE BATTLE OF CAMBRAI, 1918--THE CANAL DU - NORD 488 - - 21. THE BATTLE OF THE SAMBRE, 1918 496 - - - - -CHAPTER I - -MOBILISATION--DEPARTURE OVERSEAS - - -Of the London Volunteer Corps the unit now known as the 4th (City of -London) Battalion, The London Regiment (Royal Fusiliers) is one of -the most ancient. Called out as a Trained Band in 1643 to share in -repelling a threatened Royalist invasion of the City during the Civil -Wars, it has had a practically unbroken history for nearly three -hundred years. After the regular constitution of the Volunteer Forces -in the middle of last century it achieved some distinction as the 1st -Tower Hamlets Rifle Brigade, and despatched a machine-gun detachment -to the fighting in South Africa in 1900. In 1903 it became affiliated -to The Royal Fusiliers, as the 4th Volunteer Battalion of that -distinguished Regiment. On the reorganisation of the auxiliary forces -in 1908 by Lord Haldane, it acquired its present designation, which we -will abbreviate to the more convenient title by which it became known -in the Great War, namely, The 4th London Regiment. - -Prior to the War the training provided for the Territorial Force was -only such as to furnish the nucleus of a Second Line Army. Fourteen -days in camp each summer, an easy musketry course, and a few drills -at headquarters could not develop a soldier fit to meet fully trained -troops. That this was recognised by Lord Haldane is evidenced by the -fact that his scheme provided for a period of six months' training at -home for all Territorial soldiers should war break out, prior to their -despatch on active service. - -But they were none the less given a definite rôle in the defence of the -Motherland. Possibly this was not always realised to the full by all -the officers and non-commissioned officers of the Regiment; but it was -unmistakably brought home to them one evening in February 1914 when a -secret meeting of officers was convened at Headquarters in Hoxton for -the explanation of the scheme of mobilisation and of the task which the -Regiment would be called upon to execute should war occur. - -At that date the scheme of Mobilisation was already complete. Under it -the 1st London Infantry Brigade, of which the 4th London formed a part, -was entrusted with the supremely important task of guarding the London -and South Western Railway between London and Southampton during the -mobilisation and embarkation of the Expeditionary Force from the latter -port. The section allotted to the 4th Battalion was the main line from -Waterloo Station to Farnborough (inclusive); the Alton branch from its -junction with the main line near Brookwood to Bentley Station; and the -branch from the last-named station to Borden Camp. These dispositions -were worked out in the greatest detail, and arrangements were made -for the efficient guarding of all railway stations, signal boxes, -junctions, tunnels and bridges, and for a system of constant patrolling -of the line. - -The Infantry of the Territorial Force not being supplied during peace -time with war scale of transport, ammunition, etc., provision was made -for this necessary equipment to be drawn on mobilisation, and waggons -and horses in civilian employ were "earmarked" beforehand for this -purpose. - -The scheme having been explained, arrangements were made to detail all -guards, patrols, and requisitioning parties in readiness. - -When the war cloud over South-eastern Europe began to spread in July -1914 and threatened to envelop this country in the storm, the finishing -touches were put to the scheme at a memorable secret meeting at -Headquarters on the evening of Thursday, 31st July 1914. After that -meeting few who attended it had any doubt as to what was about to take -place. - -The annual camp in 1914 for the 1st London Division (Major-Gen. W. Fry, -C.B., C.V.O.) had been arranged for Sunday, 2nd August, and on that -date, this country still not having declared its intentions as to the -war, the 4th London Regiment entrained for Wareham, in Dorsetshire, -where the camp was to be held, with a strength of 23 officers and about -650 other ranks under Lieut.-Col. G. P. Botterill. - -Camp was reached shortly after noon, but scarcely had the Battalion -marched in when an order was received recalling it to London. By -2.30 p.m. it was once again entrained, quivering with excitement and -well-nourished on the journey to town with the most impossible rumours -of gigantic battles, most of which apocryphal happenings it swallowed -with gusto. At 2 a.m. on the 3rd August the 4th Londons marched into -Headquarters, and after a few hours' rest began to put the wheels -of the carefully assembled machine of mobilisation into motion. All -went without a hitch. Field dressings, identity discs and small books -were issued: separation allowance and next-of-kin rolls prepared. The -"earmarked" horses and vehicles were collected, and with the aid of -these, ammunition drawn from the Hyde Park Magazine. - -Blankets, lanterns and other stores sent up the River from Woolwich -were unloaded and conveyed direct to the platform at Waterloo Station, -ready for issue to the Battalion on its arrival there. The machine was -moving steadily. During the day the Regimental Colours were handed over -to the Lord Mayor of London for safe keeping. - -Shortly after midnight the 4th London Regiment entrained at Waterloo in -two trains, from which at each stop the allotted platoons detrained: so -that by the time the end of the sector was reached in the early hours -of the 4th August 1914, the railway was already guarded. Eighteen hours -before the declaration of war the Battalion was on its war station: a -good lead from Territorial troops to the rest of the country! - -The distribution of the Battalion was as follows: - - Battalion Headquarters, Lieut.-Col. G. P. Botterill, Surbiton. - - A and B Companies (forming No. 1 Double Company), Headquarters at - Clapham Junction, under Capt. H. J. Duncan-Teape. - - C and E Companies (forming No. 2 Double Company), Headquarters at - Woking, under Capt. G. H. M. Vine. - - D and F Companies (forming No. 3 Double Company), Headquarters at - North Camp, under Capt. R. J. Jackson. - - G and H Companies (forming No. 4 Double Company), Headquarters at - Bentley, under Capt. E. H. Stillwell. - -The Transport Section returned to Headquarters at Hoxton to complete -the formation of the Battalion transport on a war footing. - -Brigade Headquarters were at Waterloo Station under command of -Brigadier-General the Earl of Lucan. The Brigade Major was Major -R. F. Legge (Leinster Regiment); and the Staff Captain, Captain -Cornelius-Wheeler (3rd London Regiment, Royal Fusiliers). - -On the evening of the same day Lord Grey of Falloden (then Sir Edward -Grey), in the House of Commons, made his never-to-be-forgotten -indictment of the duplicity of Germany's action in the pre-war -negotiations and in her violation of Belgian neutrality, and the formal -declaration of war followed. - -The order for General Mobilisation, which was applicable to the -Territorial Force equally with the Regular Army, immediately ensued, -and orders to report forthwith were issued to all members of the -Battalion who had not paraded for the summer training two days -previously. It is to the credit of the Battalion that within twelve -hours no member had failed to reply. The N.C.O.'s and men thus -reporting for duty were as quickly as possible despatched from peace -headquarters and reported to their respective companies on the line. - -As the N.C.O.'s and men of the Battalion reported for duty they -were subjected to medical examination, and a certain number were -unfortunately unable to pass fit at the high standard required during -the early days of the war, so that the strength of the Battalion on the -6th August was 24 officers and 785 N.C.O.'s and men. - -The early days of August on the railway line afforded unmistakable -proof, if such were needed, of the extraordinary power of the London -soldier to adapt himself to circumstances. Men from offices, factories -and docks, suddenly taken from their occupations and their homes, -settled down to patrols and guards, to cooking their food and taking -responsibility, as to the manner born. All were swept forward on the -high flood of a great enthusiasm, and buoyed up amid minor discomforts -with intense pride that their country needed them and had given them -a job of work to carry out. This enthusiasm certainly bid fair at -times to show signs of excess of zeal. But the zeal was tempered with -an immense sense of the dignity of each and every one as a soldier -in the 4th Londons: the days on railway guard thus formed the basis -of the _esprit de corps_ which is essential to military success and -which in pre-war days it had been difficult, by the nature of things, -to develop. Scattered though the Battalion was over some 50 miles of -railway, disciplinary trouble of a serious nature was conspicuous by -its absence. - -By the middle of August the greater part of the Expeditionary Force had -been embarked to France, but the Brigade remained at its war station. -During the dark days which ensued, when telegram after telegram told -always of withdrawal before overwhelming forces of the German Army -after the glorious resistance at Mons, the Battalion continued to guard -the railway, and was busily occupied in recruiting to full strength -and in completing its equipment. The strength of the Battalion rose -steadily and rapidly, and by the end of August 941 N.C.O.'s and men -were at duty on the railway line. - -The duties on the railway were extremely heavy, and no training was -possible except the rudimentary instructions of the recruits who were -retained at peace headquarters. - -On the night of 31st August / 1st September orders were issued to the -Brigade to withdraw from the line and return to peace headquarters. -The move was satisfactorily completed by 12 noon on the 1st September, -the duties of the Brigade on the railway being taken over two days -later by the 3rd London Infantry Brigade. On return to headquarters the -Commanding Officer informed the Battalion that the whole Brigade would -be despatched on overseas garrison duty almost immediately, and called -for volunteers, a call which met with a favourable response from all -ranks. - -The two following days were actively occupied with medical inspections, -recruiting to fill the few remaining vacancies, etc. - -On the afternoon of the 3rd September the Battalion was paraded -for inspection by Major-Gen. W. Fry, C.B., C.V.O., commanding 1st -London Division, who, in an address to the troops, announced that the -destination of the Brigade was Malta; and conveyed to the Battalion, -to the great satisfaction of all ranks, the direct assurance of Earl -Kitchener that the Battalion would be retained in Malta only until it -should be passed fit to take the field. This announcement was received -with enthusiasm as it served to allay the disquieting rumours of the -possibility of the Malta station proving to be a "sidetrack" for the -period of the war. - -Shortly after midnight on the 3/4th September 1914, the Battalion -(strength 29 officers and 976 other ranks, fully armed and equipped) -paraded and marched to Waterloo amid scenes of enthusiasm and -excitement in Hoxton which will probably never be forgotten by those -who witnessed them, and entrained at 3.30 a.m. on the 4th September -for Southampton, embarking on arrival in H.T. _Galician_ (Union Castle -Line). - -The following officers proceeded overseas with the Battalion: - - Lieut.-Col. G. P. Botterill, in command. - Major L. T. Burnett, second in command. - Capt. G. B. Scott, Adjutant (2nd Battalion The Leinster Regiment). - Major R. J. J. Jackson, commanding F Company. - Capt. G. H. M. Vine, " E " - " H. J. T. Duncan-Teape, commanding A Company. - " R. N. Arthur, " H " - " H. P. L. Cart de Lafontaine, commanding D Company. - " W. Moore, commanding B Company. - " W. G. Clark, " C " - Lieut. C. R. Saunders, " G " - " S. Elliott (Machine Gun Officer). - " V. W. Edwards. - " F. C. Grimwade (Signalling Officer). - " P. B. K. Stedman (Transport Officer). - Lieut. H. W. Weathersbee. - 2/Lieut. A. L. Long. - " J. T. Sykes. - " R. L. Herring. - " R. V. Gery. - " E. W. Bottomley. - " T. I. Walker. - " A. B. Lucy. - " A. R. Moore. - " T. Moody. - " J. R. Pyper. - " E. Giles. - Hon. Lieut. and Q.M., E. S. Tomsett (Quartermaster). - Major J. F. F. Parr, R.A.M.C.T., Medical Officer attached. - -At 4 p.m. that afternoon anchor was weighed, and the transport convoy, -conveying the first Brigade of Territorial troops to leave this -country, dropped down Southampton water. - - - - -CHAPTER II - -THE 1/4TH BATTALION IN MALTA--FORMATION OF THE 2/4TH BATTALION - - -Under escort of H.M.S. _Amphitrite_, and accompanied by four other -transports conveying the remainder of the 1st London Infantry Brigade, -the _Galician_, carrying, in addition to the 1/4th Londons, two -companies of the 1/3rd Londons and a section of the 1/1st London Field -Ambulance, made a fair passage through the Bay and reached Gibraltar -without mishap. Here the convoy broke up, and the transports proceeded -independently to their destination. - -Nine days of the comparative peace of ship's routine formed a pleasant -interlude for the 1/4th Battalion after its recent trying duties on -the railway line. The passage to Malta was too short to allow the -monotony of ship's inspections, watches, and roll calls to pall, and -the interest of the troops was constantly quickened by the incidents of -a sea voyage--all so strange to Londoners whose horizon hitherto had -for the most part hardly extended beyond Hampstead Heath or Chingford. -Occasional fleeting glimpses of France and Spain, the gambols of a -school of whales, the brilliant hues of the African shore, and the -indescribable blue of the Mediterranean all contributed to render the -Battalion happy and indifferent to the discomforts of their quarters -'tween decks, where the heat was certainly trying after the Gates of -the Mediterranean had been passed. - -The first glimpse of Malta on the morning of the 13th September was -uninspiring. From the sea no vegetation can be seen owing to the system -whereby the scanty soil is walled up along the hillsides to prevent -it from being washed away; and the island presents to the passing -voyager an aspect of monotonous drab rock. No time was allowed for -despondency, however, for, with the pilot on board, the _Galician_ -steamed into the Marsamuscetto Harbour at Valetta where the Battalion -could feast on the riot of colour which unrolled before its eyes. - -[Illustration: _Ghain Tuffieha Camp_] - -[Illustration: _Melleha Camp_] - -[Illustration: _Selmun Palace_] - -The responsibilities of the 1st London Brigade for the defence of the -Fortress of Malta began immediately, for the day after its arrival the -infantry of the regular garrison left for the front. - -In the early hours of the 14th September the 1/4th Londons disembarked, -and being allotted quarters under canvas in Ghain Tuffieha Camp, was -introduced to the ardours of a sub-tropical summer by undertaking the -longest march it is possible to make in the island--a very trying -experience indeed. - -Ghain Tuffieha is a summer station on the west coast of the island -about eleven miles from Valetta, and is an important outpost of the -main defences of the Fortress. It lies in a broad, fertile valley -known as the Wied Tal Paules, which traverses the island from east -to west, its eastern limit being the coast at St Paul's Bay. To the -north of this valley lie the Melleha and the Marfa Ridges, two of the -northernmost barriers against invasion. The coast round these two -ranges of hills possesses a considerable number of sandy landing-places -in well-sheltered bays, which, as they face Sicily at about three -hours' passage from that island, required special guarding at this -period. - -The Battalion now settled down seriously to its training, and it was -found necessary to deal with some 250 men as recruits. These, however, -were passed through the Barrack Square stage of their training as -expeditiously as possible in view of the heavy duties which fell to the -Battalion in guarding the northern coast. - -The guards found from the main body of the Battalion at Ghain Tuffieha -were mostly night guards at the landing-places, at St Paul's Bay on -the east coast, and at Ghain Tuffieha Bay, Karraba Ridge, and Gneina -Bay on the west coast. In addition to these, G and H companies were -immediately despatched on detachment, the former to Selmun Palace -(which commands the promontory between the shores of Melleha and -St Paul's Bays), the latter to Melleha (which dominates the head of -Melleha Bay and the Marfa Ridge beyond it). The latter detachment was -subsequently moved down the ridge to the coast near the head of Melleha -Bay. The guards found by these detached companies were at Cala Mistra -Fort (at the foot of Kalkara Ravine), Ir Razzet tal Blata, L'Imgiebah, -and Ghain Zeituna by the Selmun force; and at Melleha Bay, Torri -L'Ahmar cross roads, and Marfa Palace by the Melleha force. - -The duties of the detached companies were found to be particularly -onerous, and the proportion of N.C.O.'s and men employed not only on -guards, but also on such necessary duties as signals, look-outs, and -water-carrying fatigues, continuously totalled rather more than a third -of the total strength of the detachments. Arrangements were therefore -made for the relief of the detachment companies every seven or eight -days, and this procedure was maintained throughout the Battalion's duty -on the island. - -The training of the Battalion proceeded smoothly but under conditions -of some difficulty, partly owing to the number of men constantly -engaged in coastal defence duties, and partly owing to the unfavourable -conditions of terrain. Every square yard of the rocky hillsides which -is covered with soil is devoted to some sort of cultivation by the -thrifty inhabitants, and the walling up of the soil on the hillsides, -which has already been alluded to, converts every hill into a series -of steps, over which manœuvres are both laborious and painful. In -spite of these obstacles, however, a good deal of useful work was -achieved, and the Battalion rapidly began to take shape as a useful -and well-disciplined unit. There can be no doubt that the experience -gained by all ranks in taking their share in ordinary garrison duties -at so early a stage in their embodied career proved of infinite value -later when the 1/4th Londons ultimately took their place in the -fighting line; and, moreover, the knowledge that they were subject to -the critical--and at that period not always sympathetic--surveillance -of the regular staff of the Fortress provided the strongest possible -incentive to all ranks to conduct themselves with credit to their -Regiment and to the Territorial Force. - -Early in October a very thorough course of musketry instruction -under Fortress arrangements was begun, firing taking place on the -Naval ranges of Ghain Tuffieha. The companies were thus employed as -follows:--2 on detachment, 2 on musketry course, 3 on company training, -and 1 finding all the duties at Battalion Headquarters, the whole being -worked on a roster so that each company was kept for training and -detachment purposes at its greatest possible strength. - -During the early days of the Battalion in Malta a few changes of -distribution took place among officers as follows: - -Major R. J. J. Jackson was evacuated to Cottonera Hospital sick. He -unfortunately remained in hospital until early in December 1914, -when he was invalided to England. Command of F Company was taken by -Lieut. F. C. Grimwade, and the Machine-Gun Section was taken over by -2/Lieut. T. I. Walker, Lieut. S. Elliott transferring to E Company. -The Battalion was also joined by 2/Lieut. R. C. Kelly who, however, -remained with the unit for a few weeks only, at the end of which time -he was appointed to the Secret Service, and with this he remained until -the end of the War. - -The middle of September, when the Battalion landed in Malta, found -the hot season waning, and although the temperature remained high -for some weeks the full intensity of the sub-tropical summer was not -experienced. In the early part of October, however, the scirocco, a -warm south-westerly wind which originates in the Sahara, followed, with -all its usual enervating effects, which were indeed quite as trying -as the intense heat of the sun had been. Towards the end of the same -month the wet season set in in earnest, and from that time until the -early part of December the camping ground at Ghain Tuffieha was swept -by tropical rains and sand storms of considerable violence, which from -time to time caused a certain amount of material damage and not a -little discomfort to the troops. The memory of suddenly having to turn -out and clear blocked drainage trenches and lay on to straining tent -ropes in the--sometimes--vain endeavour to prevent one's temporary home -from vanishing into thin air, and to rescue one's kit from a mud bath, -is now sufficiently remote to be contemplated without acute distress, -but the feelings which these encounters which the elements evoked at -the time were by no means so calm! - -During the worst phase of the Malta climate the Battalion remained -under canvas, and it is of some interest--though admittedly of little -consolation--to remark that no battalion had previously spent the -winter in Malta in other than permanent barracks. - -Thanks to the untiring efforts of the Battalion Medical Officer, Major -J. F. F. Parr, the bill of health during these marked variations of -climate remained extraordinarily clean, and in spite of its exposed -situation the Battalion suffered less from sickness than the others of -the Brigade which were accommodated in modern barracks. - -The month of December, however, saw the beginning of the most -delightful season in the island's year. The temperature was mild but -the evenings cool; vegetation began to spring up with almost startling -rapidity, and the prospect of the island, seen from the tops of the -hills, when looking down on to the terraced fields set in a sea of the -deepest azure, formed a most welcome and delightful contrast to the -sun-baked and drab view which had greeted the Battalion on its arrival -three months earlier. - -At the end of November the detachments were redistributed, the defence -duties on the northern coast being dealt with by one company only, half -at Selmun Palace, which formed its headquarters, the other half at -Melleha Bay. A fresh detachment was formed by the despatch of another -company to Verdala Barracks (in the Cottonera Lines, the Southern -Fortress of Valetta), for the duty of guarding prisoners of war, -notably the crew of the German raider _Emden_ who had just been landed -on the island. - -But for these changes the routine of training proceeded with little -variation, and it began to be thought by some that the Battalion would -be condemned to continue its duties in Malta until the end of the War; -but on the 22nd December 1914 a warning order was issued that the -Brigade would leave the island at an early date. - -On the 23rd the Battalion (less E and F Companies on detachment), -marched to Valetta to be reviewed by His Excellency the Governor on -the Marsa, a sports ground near the town. The review took place on the -following day and the Battalion returned the same evening, arriving in -camp at 6.30 p.m. - -The following Fortress Order was published on the 24th December: - - The Commander-in-Chief, after having inspected the units of - Lord Lucan's Brigade this morning, desires to place on record - his great satisfaction at the evident progress made by them to - become efficient soldiers of the King. His Excellency, who fully - appreciates the patriotic sentiments which have caused such a - magnificent body of men to respond to the call of the Empire in - this hour of national danger, has had much pleasure in telegraphing - to Lord Kitchener reporting the high state of efficiency and - fitness which the Brigade has reached. Such a result, which must - have been apparent to everyone who saw them on parade this morning, - could only have been obtained by the whole-hearted devotion to - their Country's cause of every officer, N.C.O., and man, and the - Commander-in-Chief wishes to congratulate the Earl of Lucan and the - whole of his Brigade on achieving such highly satisfactory results. - -No further preparations for departure were made until after the -Christmas festivities, which were rendered very enjoyable by the -arrival of many good things from home and by special gifts from the -Corporation of the City of London and the Regimental Association, -the latter organisation providing a gift of a pipe and tobacco-box -for every officer, N.C.O., and man. Christmastide over, however, the -Battalion concentrated on its preparations for leaving the island at -short notice. - -On the 28th December the detachment at Selmun was withdrawn, its place -being taken by a company of the Malta Militia; that at Verdala being -relieved by the 1st London Regiment, which for the time being was to -remain in the island. - - * * * * * - -On the departure of the 1/4th Battalion overseas the following officers -had been detailed to remain at headquarters to supervise the formation -of a Reserve Battalion: - - Captain E. H. Stillwell. - Captain W. H. Hamilton. - Lieutenant H. G. Stanham. - Lieutenant H. Parkhouse. - -These officers were assisted by a small number of N.C.O.'s and men -of the 1/4th Battalion who had been found medically unfit to proceed -overseas. The intention in raising the new battalion originally was to -provide a unit to supply reinforcements to the overseas battalion, but, -as will be seen, this intention was subsequently modified to a large -degree. - -Recruiting for the new battalion, which was at first designated the 4th -(1st Reserve) Battalion The London Regiment, and later was known as -the 2/4th London Regiment, proceeded (as indeed for all the formations -then being raised) with unprecedented rapidity, and within a fortnight -over 400 men had been enrolled, while the ranks continued to be swelled -daily by the advent of fresh recruits. - -Colonel Vickers Dunfee, V.D., was appointed with effect from 6th -September 1914 to command the new battalion with Hon. Lieut. E. V. -Wellby (late Lieut.-Col. 4th V.B. The Royal Fusiliers) as Captain and -Adjutant. - -The available accommodation proving utterly inadequate for the growing -numbers, the 2/4th Battalion moved on 23rd September, after inspection -by the Lord Mayor, Sir Vansittart Bowater, to quarters under canvas at -Folly Farm, New Barnet. The strength was now 6 officers and 480 other -ranks, and steadily increased from this time until the establishment -in all ranks was filled. Training now began in earnest--so far as the -wills of every officer, N.C.O., and man were concerned--but under the -most acute practical difficulties, such as were general among the newly -raised formations, owing to the lack of stores of all kinds, including -clothing, arms, and equipment. Gradually, however, "wooden equivalents" -gave place to rifles, and mufti made its final disappearance from the -parade ground. During the following month the Battalion moved into -winter quarters, occupying as barracks two vacant houses at Barnet, -namely, "Littlegrove" and "Beech Hill," and also some stabling and -out-buildings at "Oakhill." - -The Battalion owes a considerable debt of gratitude to the owners of -these houses and to other local residents, notably to W. H. Vernon, -Esq., and Sir Philip Sassoon, for their generosity in providing -accommodation and training facilities and for extending hospitality to -the Battalion in various ways, generosity which was also extended to -the 4/4th (Reserve) Battalion when it was formed in the following year. -Facilities for musketry training were also provided by the Enfield -Rifle Club, who very generously placed their range and the services -as instructors of several of their members at the disposal of the -Battalion. - -Training at Barnet continued until 14th December 1914, when, after -inspection by Lieut.-Gen. G. H. Moncrieff, Honorary Colonel of -the Regiment, the Battalion, which had now grown to a strength of -27 officers and 986 other ranks, joined the Brigade in billets at -Maidstone. Here the Brigade received on the 17th a warning order to -proceed on foreign service at short notice. The necessary preparation -of equipment, medical inspection, inoculation, etc., was at once put in -hand, and the Battalion was inspected by Major-General W. Fry, C.B., -C.V.O., commanding 1st London Division, who addressed the troops. - -It was fortunately possible to grant forty-eight hours' leave to all -ranks before departure, destined to be the last home leave for some -nineteen months, and on 23rd December the Battalion entrained at 10 -a.m. for Southampton, where it embarked on H.T. _Avon_ (Royal Mail -Steam Packet Company), the strength on embarkation being 27 officers -and 889 other ranks. - -The following officers proceeded overseas with the Battalion: - - Colonel Vickers Dunfee, V.D., in command. - Major V. H. Seyd, second in command. - Captain W. G. Hayward, Adjutant. - " G. H. Moore. - " H. Morris. - " F. C. Read. - " H. G. Stanham. - " H. Parkhouse. - Lieut. L. C. Coates. - " W. N. Towse. - " A. H. Simpson. - 2/Lieut. R. N. Keen. - " W. A. Stark. - " W. R. Botterill. - " V. S. Bowater. - " S. N. Davies. - " R. C. Dickins. - " W. H. Stevens. - " N. L. Thomas. - " J. R. Webster. - " L. A. Dickins. - " L. R. Chapman. - " H. W. Dennis. - " E. G. Lovell. - " H. W. Vernon. - - Hon. Lieut. and Quartermaster, J. E. W. Lambley (Quartermaster); - Lieut. Casey, R.A.M.C., Medical Officer attached. - -Just before departure the following telegram was received by Colonel -Dunfee from General Sir Ian Hamilton, G.C.B., D.S.O.: - - Had arranged to go down and see your Battalion. Unfortunately - situation renders imperative my presence at Headquarters. Can only, - therefore, wish you best of good luck and hope we may meet again. - -At about 5 p.m. on the 23rd December H.T. _Avon_ put to sea, and the -following day at daybreak the convoy assembled, consisting of:-- - - H.T. _Avon_--2/4th London Regiment and two Companies 2/3rd - London Regiment. - - H.T. _Euralia_--2/2nd London Regiment and 2/3rd London - Regiment, less two companies, under the escort of - H.M.S. _Eclipse_, which accompanied the transports as - far as Gibraltar. - -[Illustration: _Melleha_] - -[Illustration: _Grand Harbour, Valetta_] - -[Illustration: _Grand Harbour, Valetta_] - -The following appointments were made on H.T. _Avon_: Colonel Vickers -Dunfee to be O.C. Ship; Captain and Adjutant W. G. Hayward to be Ship's -Adjutant. - -Christmas was spent at sea with as much good cheer as circumstances -permitted, and after an uneventful voyage Malta was reached and H.T. -_Avon_ dropped anchor in the Grand Harbour at Valetta on 31st December -1914. - - * * * * * - -On the 30th December the 1/4th Battalion marched from Ghain Tuffieha to -St George's Barracks and handed over its arms and equipment, as it was -understood that these would be required for the relieving troops. - -The strength of the 1/4th Battalion on leaving the Island was 24 -officers and about 850 other ranks. Major J. F. F. Parr remained -on the Island and took over the duties of Medical Officer to the -2/4th Battalion, his duties in the 1/4th Battalion being assumed by -Lieutenant Casey, who had just arrived with the 2/4th Battalion. In -addition Captain R. N. Arthur and Lieut. V. W. Edwards transferred to -the 2/4th Battalion together with about 85 N.C.O.'s and men who were -found medically unfit for active service. These officers, N.C.O.'s, and -men reported on the 3rd January to the 2/4th Battalion which was thus -brought to about war strength. - -On the 2nd January the 2/4th Battalion disembarked and marched to -quarters at St Andrew's barracks, and the same day at 6.35 a.m. the -1/4th Battalion paraded for the last time at Ghain Tuffieha, marched -to Valetta and embarked on the _Avon_. That afternoon the _Avon_, -conveying in addition to the 1/4th Battalion the 1/3rd Londons, put -to sea under sealed orders, which were subsequently found to be for -Marseilles. - - - - -CHAPTER III - -THE 1/4TH BATTALION IN FRANCE--OPERATIONS AT NEUVE CHAPELLE - - -The Gulf of Lyons has an evil reputation and in January 1915 its -achievement did not belie its notoriety. The _Avon_ was a fine ship of -some 12,000 tons but being in ballast rolled unmercifully for three -days; and the smooth waters of Marseilles harbour, which were reached -early on the morning of the 5th January, were never more heartily -welcome than to the 1/4th Londons. - -Disembarkation took place the following afternoon at about 4 p.m. and -the Battalion, after forming up on the quay, marched straight to the -railway siding, where a train stood in readiness to carry it into the -war area. To British soldiers who have served in the French theatre -of war there is, we imagine, no recollection more vivid than that -conveyed by the words "40 Hommes--Chevaux en long!" The fourth class -French railway carriage, which is employed with fine impartiality for -the conveyance of men or horses as occasion demands, is now too well -known to call for lengthy comment; it is a subject over which we prefer -to pass hurriedly! Into these abominations on wheels the Battalion was -inserted at the standard rate of 40 men to each truck and rations for -two days were issued. After a delay, which seemed to the troops as -interminable as it was certainly inexplicable to them, the train at -about 9.30 p.m. rumbled sedately out of Marseilles in the leisurely -manner of all troop trains. - -Dawn next morning found the train at Avignon where a five minutes' halt -was made. The enthusiastic reception accorded to the Battalion all -along the line by the French civilians and also by the military was -most impressive; and the obvious satisfaction with which the arrival -of fresh British troops was hailed by one and all in the Rhone Valley -could not fail to impress the dullest sense with the strength of the -common cause which bound us to our gallant allies. - -A "Halte Repas," that is a halt just not long enough to enable the -troops to detrain and cook dinners, was made at Macon, after which -the journey, which resolved itself practically into a triumphal -progress, was resumed. At one wayside station, the name of which has, -unfortunately, passed from our recollection, a military guard of honour -saluted the arrival of the Battalion, while the ladies of the district -appeared with offerings of milk, coffee, and bouquets. So great, in -fact, was the enthusiasm that M. le Maire sent for a cask of wine in -which to assert his faith in the Entente Cordiale! Unhappily the French -railway authorities were not stirred by such intense emotion and the -train moved on before the wine arrived. - -By the morning of the 8th the train was skirting Paris, and that day -the first signs of war were reached. Near Chantilly (the famous French -racecourse) reserve lines of trenches forming the outer ring of the -Paris Defences were passed, while at Creil some buildings severely -damaged by shell fire stood as stern remembrances of the great retreat -three months earlier. - -This amusing though very tedious railway journey terminated at 9 p.m. -on the 7th January, when the Battalion detrained some ten miles south -of Boulogne at Etaples, at that date a small, muddy, and evil-smelling -fishing village. Etaples, which at a later stage of the war became such -an important base camp, with accommodation for some thirty thousand -men and many hospitals, was, in January 1915, not used as a British -military station, and the 1st London Brigade were the first troops -to be quartered there. Accommodation was provided under canvas in an -exposed situation, and the severity of the weather, which was intensely -cold and windy with occasional falls of snow, formed a contrast to the -sub-tropical climate in which the Battalion had been basking ten days -previously, which can only evoke surprise at the comparatively small -amount of sickness which ensued. - -The Battalion had, it will be remembered, left its rifles, equipment, -and transport in Malta, and the refitting and equipment of the troops -was taken in hand at once. The first step was the reorganisation of the -Battalion in four companies, as follows: - - New A Company--Old A and C Companies; - Captain H. J. Duncan-Teape in command. - Captain W. G. Clark second in command. - - New B Company--Old B and F Companies; - Captain W. Moore in command. - Captain F. C. Grimwade second in command. - - New C Company--Old D and E Companies; - Captain G. H. M. Vine in command. - 2/Lieut. W. H. Weathersbee second in command. - - New D Company--Old G and H Companies; - Captain C. R. Saunders in command. - Captain H. P. L. Cart de Lafontaine second in command. - - The Company Sergeant-Majors were respectively Edwards, Elsom, - Chennels, and Cornwall. - -In addition to this reorganisation the Battalion was issued with new -rifles of the long charger-loading type, with four Vickers guns, and -with new equipment of the 1914 pattern (webbing); and a refit of -clothing and necessaries was effected. Steps were also taken to dispose -of the surplus baggage and personal belongings acquired by all ranks -in Malta, and to reduce all to the scales of weight permissible in the -field. - -Command of the Regimental Transport was assumed by 2/Lieut. R. L. -Herring, who proceeded with his section to Abbeville, and returned by -road with the full war scale of 1st and 2nd Line Transport and the -Battalion chargers. - -These preparations which occupied the Battalion until the 25th January -were interspersed with such training as the state of the weather -permitted, the training being carried out on the sand dunes north of -Etaples. A warning order was received on the 25th to proceed to billets -near St Omer to join G.H.Q. Reserve. - -The following day the Battalion moved by train from Etaples to St -Omer, and thence by march route to the billeting area which had been -allotted to it in two small straggling villages called Helfaut and -Bilques, where it arrived about midnight. At this point the Battalions -of the 1st London Brigade parted company until once more reassembled by -the formation of the 56th Division a year later. - -Billeting in the early days of the war was not the simple matter -which it became at a later stage. For one thing, in most villages -neither wire beds, cook-houses, nor ablutions existed for the troops, -and the accommodation of barns and stables had not been tabulated by -Town-Majors ready for the use of billeting officers. All negotiations -for billets had therefore to be conducted by the billeting officer -direct with the communal authorities, through whom also straw and fuel -were drawn. - -After a few days in Helfaut and Bilques the Battalion was driven from -its billets by an epidemic of measles which attacked the civilian -inhabitants, and it found fresh quarters slightly nearer St Omer in a -more important village called Blendecques. - -The 1/4th Londons now embarked on a course of very severe training -under the immediate supervision of the Inspector of Infantry, -Brigadier-General Oxley. This was, indeed, a strenuous three weeks, -with breakfasts at 7.30 a.m. and dinners at 5 p.m., the hours between -being occupied in tactical exercises. Usually a march of five miles in -each direction to and from the training ground was involved and the -exercise itself was almost invariably the "Attack in Open Warfare." In -every conceivable formation, over every conceivable sort of ground, -did the Battalion attack every one of the villages within reach of -Blendecques, till at last it was entirely weary of the attack in any -shape or form! But the grounding in field work thus obtained was -excellent and so completely were the lessons rubbed into the mind -of every member of the Battalion that this wearisome training bore -excellent fruit as we shall see later. - -Once or twice a slight variation of training was obtained in work on -a new reserve line of trenches then being constructed east of St -Omer. This work was carried out under R.E. supervision. The design of -these trenches was strange. Their like was indeed never met with in -any sector of the line held by the Battalion in the whole of its war -service, and we can only be thankful that this reserve line never came -into active use. - -Throughout the training period the weather was continuously wet and -cold, and these adverse conditions, added to the long hours without -food, imposed a serious physical strain on all, and the news that the -Battalion had been passed fit to join a brigade was therefore received -by all ranks with extreme satisfaction. - -At Blendecques the Battalion was joined by Lieut. A. Hurd, R.A.M.C., -medical officer, vice Captain Casey to hospital. 2/Lieut. E. W. -Bottomley was also evacuated to hospital. - -On the 19th February the 1/4th Londons left the many good friends they -had made in Blendecques and marched through Wittes, where it halted for -the night, to Ham-en-Artois, arriving at 12.30 p.m. on the 20th, and -joined the Ferozepore Brigade of the Lahore Division. - -The Indian Corps (Lieut.-Gen. Sir James Willcocks, G.C.M.G., K.C.B., -K.C.S.I., D.S.O.) had arrived in France in the preceding October and -comprised the 3rd (Lahore) and 7th (Meerut) Divisions, the former -including the following units: - - LAHORE DIVISION - - Major General H. D'U. KEARY, C.B., D.S.O. - - DIVISIONAL CAVALRY - 15th Lancers. - - ENGINEERS - 20th and 21st Sappers and Miners. - 34th Sikh Pioneers. - - JULLUNDUR BRIGADE--Brig.-Gen. E. P. Strickland, C.M.G., D.S.O. - 1st Manchesters. - 1/4th Suffolks. - 40th Pathans. - 47th Sikhs. - 59th Scinde Rifles (F.F.). - - SIRHIND BRIGADE--Brig.-Gen. W. R. Walker, V.C. - 1st Highland Light Infantry. - 4th King's Liverpools. - 15th Ludhiana Sikhs. - 1/1st Gurkha Rifles. - 1/4th Gurkha Rifles. - - FEROZEPORE BRIGADE--Brig.-Gen. R. G. Egerton, C.B. - 1st Connaught Rangers. - 1/4th Londons. - 9th Bhopals. - 57th Wilde's Rifles (F.F.). - 129th Baluchis (Duke of Connaught's Own). - -During the months of December and January the Indian Corps had been -heavily engaged in a local operation which had raged with terrific -intensity between the small village of Givenchy and the extreme right -of our line; but our struggles to press forward along the canal to La -Bassée had been checked by a particularly vigorous defence on the part -of the enemy. The casualties suffered by the Brigades of the Indian -Corps in the fighting had been so severe that it was necessary to -withdraw some of them for a time from the line for the purpose of rest -and reorganisation. - -On joining its Brigade the strength of the 1/4th Londons was 25 -officers and 828 other ranks. The Battalion was fortunate in being -posted to the Division at this juncture as it had an opportunity -before going into action of becoming acquainted with its neighbouring -battalions with whom it was destined to share the fortunes of war -during the ensuing eleven months, and of gaining some insight into the -ancient, but at that date recently revived, sciences of bombing and -trench mortar work. And here let us remark for the benefit of those -members of the Battalion who joined the Service at a later stage and -found Mills Bombs and the Stokes Mortar ready for their use, that -in February 1915 the only bombs in use were those of the "jam-tin" -variety, that is to say, were roughly constructed out of old tins by -the troops who were to use them, filled with explosives, plugged with -clay, and fused with ordinary time fuse which had to be ignited before -the bomb was thrown; while the trench mortar of the day is perhaps best -described as a glorified rainwater pipe bound with copper wire, and -which threw a "jam-tin" bomb and was quite as dangerous to the team -which manned it as to the Germans. - -With their unfailing adaptability to circumstances the men of the -Battalion rapidly became friends with the Indian troops whom they -held in the greatest admiration. The Gurkhas in particular seemed -to exercise an irresistible attraction for the men of London, who -were especially impressed with the Gurkhas' playful way of throwing -their murderous Kukri knives. Indeed, to such lengths did this -admiration--which took the form of imitation--lead them that a -Battalion order was very quickly necessary to the effect that "the -game known as 'Gurkhas' played with unsheathed bayonets must cease -forthwith!" - -Throughout this period the weather was intensely cold and several falls -of snow occurred. The billets were passably good, however, and the -Battalion's bill of health remained clean. - -The Battalion was unfortunate at this period in losing Sergeant-Major -Dudley, who had done excellent work since mobilisation and now left for -a commission in the Royal Fusiliers. He was killed a fortnight after -joining his regiment. His duties were taken by Col.-Sergt. Instr. M. -Harris, who filled this important position with success for nearly -three years. - -On the 22nd February the undermentioned officers, being the first -reinforcement received by the Battalion, joined as follows: - - Lieuts. F. A. Coffin, H. M. Lorden, D. J. Leonard, and A. D. Coates. - -It is now necessary for a moment to look at the course which events -were taking on the wide field of the Western Theatre. - -At the period with which we are dealing, the Front held by the British -troops extended from the Béthune-La Bassée Road, on the right to just -north of the Ypres Salient on the left, and General Headquarters -(Field-Marshal Sir John French in command) were at St Omer. The -British troops were divided into two Armies, of which the First Army -under Sir Douglas Haig, consisting of the I Corps (Gough), IV Corps -(Rawlinson), and Indian Corps (Willcocks), held the right or southern -end of the line; the left being entrusted to the Second Army (Sir H. -Smith-Dorrien), which comprised the II Corps (Fergusson), the III Corps -(Pulteney), and the V Corps (Plumer). - -The moving warfare of the autumn of 1914, which had ended by the -opposing armies gradually extending their flanks until the sea -was reached and had culminated in the First Battle of Ypres in -October--November 1914, had given way to a siege warfare in which -the belligerents were confined in continuous lines of trenches which -were gradually being more heavily fortified. After the force of the -German drive toward Ypres had exhausted itself, a lull in active -operations ensued, hostilities flaring up here and there along the -line in the shape of minor operations of terrible intensity, in which -the possession of a few yards of ground was contested with ferocity by -both sides. In the intervals between these small struggles, however, -the battle line had been comparatively quiet during the winter months, -and not materially changed, the nett result being perhaps a slight gain -of ground to the British at the southern end of the line, which was -balanced by a tendency to lose ground in the north. - -Since the bitter struggle at Ypres in November 1914, the enemy had, in -the opinion of Sir John French, shown certain signs of weakening on the -Western Front, and this was attributed by him to the success which was -attending the Russian offensive in East Prussia, and to the consequent -withdrawal of German troops from the West. In order to assist our -Russian Allies as far as possible it was necessary to have resort to -active operations with the main object of holding as many of the German -reserves as possible in the West, and efforts to this end were already -being made by the French at Arras and in Champagne. - -The ravages caused during the winter trench warfare by sickness and -"trench-foot," which had had especially disastrous effects on those -regular divisions composed of troops withdrawn from tropical garrisons, -rendered necessary the early cultivation of a vigorous offensive -spirit, and these combined considerations led Sir John French to the -decision to take the offensive as soon as the condition of the ground -in Flanders should afford such an undertaking a reasonable prospect -of success. By the beginning of March the conditions were considered -sufficiently favourable, and the terrain selected for the proposed -offensive was the German positions opposed to the First Army and -defending the lower slopes of the Aubers Ridge. - -The objective of the First Army's attack was the advancement of our -line to the high ground about Illies and Hermies as a prelude to the -occupation of La Bassée, and this involved as a first local objective -the capture of the village of Neuve Chapelle. The Aubers Ridge is a -strongly marked hill feature, which runs in a south-westerly direction -from Lille until it loses itself in the marshlands in the neighbourhood -of La Bassée. Neuve Chapelle, which had already changed hands several -times in the fighting of the previous autumn, is a small village, the -immediate surroundings of which are much intersected with orchards and -fences, about 1000 yards from the lowest slopes of the Ridge, which, -immediately opposite to it, are covered by a considerable wood called -the Bois du Biez. - -The German defensive position skirted in front (or to the north-west) -of Neuve Chapelle and then making a sharp turn southwards, followed -the line of the Estaires-La Bassée Road, for some 600 yards, from its -junction with Foresters Lane (Rue des Berceaux) to its junction with -the Rue du Bois, where once more turning slightly to the west it left -the hamlet of Richebourg L'Avoué in the British lines, and finally made -a wide sweep once more to the south in the direction of Festubert (see -Map No. 1). The front of attack allotted to the Indian Corps was that -part which followed the alignment of the La Bassée road between Rue -du Bois and Foresters Lane, the actual capture of the greater part of -Neuve Chapelle being entrusted to the 8th Division. - -The attack was to be preceded by a heavy artillery bombardment, which -on the Corps front would be conducted by the divisional artillery of -both the Lahore and Meerut Divisions and the Corps heavy artillery, and -this was to be directed towards destroying the enemy's front trenches -and entanglements and certain strong posts, the searching of the -Bois du Biez, in order to disperse the concentration of the enemy's -counter-attack troops, and finally the building up of a "curtain of -fire" (subsequently though less descriptively termed a "barrage") east -of the captured positions, with the object of assisting the work of -consolidating them. - -The direction of the Indian Corps' attack being almost easterly -converged towards that of the IV Corps on their left (this being -south-easterly), and it was, therefore, necessary after the first -German positions had been carried and touch with the IV Corps secured, -to swing the direction of attack round more to the south, and to -establish a fire position facing south in order to guard against the -danger of a German flanking counter-attack from that quarter. The -position selected for this was a German sap, which had been thrown out -from the enemy lines towards the British strong point, Port Arthur, at -the corner of La Bassée Road and Rue du Bois. - -The troops holding the line of the Rue du Bois front, outside the limit -of the general attack, would thus be responsible for the defence of the -Indian right flank. It was hoped that the first bound would carry our -line forward to the old II Corps line first occupied by Smith-Dorrien's -troops in October 1914, east of Neuve Chapelle village. - -The assaulting troops detailed for this task were the Gharwal and Dehra -Dun Brigades of the Meerut Division, the Bareilly Brigade being in -close support; while the Lahore Division (less artillery) was placed in -Corps reserve, the Ferozepore Brigade being allotted to Army Reserve. - -In accordance with these orders the Ferozepore Brigade moved forward -from Ham-en-Artois to the Zelobes area on the 7th March, the 4th -Londons marching to Calonne-sur-Lys about eight miles north-west of -Neuve Chapelle, where it remained in billets in a constant state of -readiness to move. On the eve of the outbreak of our offensive the -order was relaxed to one of readiness to move at twelve hours' notice. - -On the 10th March Lieut.-Col. Botterill was granted seven days' leave -of absence on urgent private affairs, and command of the Battalion -devolved temporarily on Major L. T. Burnett, who remained in command -until after the termination of the Neuve Chapelle operations. - -In addition to the Brigades of the Meerut Division already mentioned, -on the right of the line, the troops detailed for the assault comprised -the 25th Brigade of the 8th Division opposite Neuve Chapelle village, -with the 23rd Brigade of the same Division on the extreme left. - -An enormous concentration of artillery had been quietly effected on -this front, including many of our newly arrived heavy batteries, and -at 7.30 a.m. on the 10th March, some 300 guns opened a devastating -bombardment on the German trenches along the frontage of attack. -The severity of this bombardment was unprecedented. Trenches were -obliterated, machine-guns and Germans were literally blown into the -air, and so dazed were the enemy by the appalling ordeal that our men -were able to stand on their parapets to watch the inferno in front -of them. At 8.5 a.m. the range of the guns was lengthened on to the -enemy's support trenches and our assaulting columns dashed forward. -The Indians and the 25th Brigade met with little resistance, but the -23rd Brigade on the left found itself faced with a practically unbroken -wire entanglement, from beyond which a deadly fire was poured into it -by the enemy machine-guns. By 8.35 a.m. the right and centre brigades -had effected a lodgment in the village, but the 23rd, being still held -up and suffering terrible losses, the 25th Brigade swung to its left -and turned the flank of the German troops who were opposing the 23rd. -By this means our left was able to advance and by 11 a.m. the village -of Neuve Chapelle was completely in our hands, and consolidation of -the ground won was begun under cover of our artillery barrage, which -effectually carried out its task of preventing the enemy bringing -forward reinforcements for a counter-attack. - -The street fighting, however, had resulted in considerable -disorganisation of units, so that valuable hours were lost in the -necessary reorganisation, and it was not until 3.30 p.m. that the -advance could be resumed. The attack so far had proved--as was -intended--a complete surprise, and the enemy's resistance seems to have -been paralysed except on the extreme left where our troops were still -under heavy fire. - -The only local counter-attack which developed during the morning of the -10th was on the extreme right of the attack, where the enemy succeeded -along the Rue du Bois in temporarily ejecting the Indian troops from -the captured trenches, and in effecting a strong lodgment in the -Orchard Trench in front of Richebourg L'Avoué. During the morning the -Jullundur and Sirhind Brigades moved forward to Richebourg St Vaast and -Vieille Chapelle respectively. - -The afternoon advance was made on the right by the Dehra Dun Brigade, -supported by the Jullundur Brigade of the Lahore Division, and the -objective assigned to it was the Bois du Biez. Between Neuve Chapelle -and the wood runs the little Rivière des Layes, and at a point where -this stream is spanned by a road bridge the enemy had established a -strong machine-gun post. The Indians made a gallant advance over 1000 -yards of open country, and succeeded in penetrating the wood, but their -line was enfiladed by the machine-guns on the bridge and they were -unable to hold the line of their furthest advance. On the left the -attack was renewed by the 25th and 24th Brigades, the hard-hit 23rd -being held back, their objective being the cluster of houses at Moulin -de Pietre, about a mile east of Neuve Chapelle; but their efforts also -were frustrated by the machine-guns on the bridge, which our artillery -was unable to dislodge. Further left still the front of attack had been -extended and the 21st Brigade (Watts) of the 7th Division was also -directed on Pietre; but in its advance encountered a line of undamaged -German trenches which effectually barred its efforts to progress. - -The position, therefore, when darkness intervened was that an average -advance of over a thousand yards had been gained and held, while -practically no effort had been made by the enemy to regain possession -of the lost ground. - -Preparations were made for a renewal of the advance on the following -day, but the 11th dawned misty and the day proved to be one of -equilibrium. A further advance was, attempted but the mist rendered -aircraft observation impossible and artillery co-operation with the -infantry extremely difficult owing to the constant breaking of our -forward lines of communication by the enemy shell fire. Our troops, -therefore, clung to their positions opposite the Bois du Biez and -Pietre under a murderous shell fire which caused many casualties; while -the enemy, by a stroke of ill fortune, was accorded a for him lucky -respite, in which he was able to prepare his counter-attack. - -On the evening of the 11th the exhaustion of the troops after two days' -fighting rendered a relief desirable, as it was hoped that weather -conditions would favour a prosecution of the offensive on the next day. -The Meerut Division consequently handed over its newly won positions -to the Lahore Division, the Dehra Dun Brigade being replaced by the -Sirhind Brigade, while arrangements were completed for relieving the -Gharwal Brigade on the night of the 12th/13th by the Ferozepore Brigade. - -The same evening the 4th London moved at 6 p.m. from Calonne to Lestrem -where it arrived at midnight and went into billets. Its stay there, -however, was short as within two hours it was turned out in order to -move further forward to Lacouture, about four miles west of Neuve -Chapelle, reaching there about 7.30 a.m. on the 12th March. Similar -forward moves were made by the remainder of the Brigade in view of its -impending occupation of the line. - -When the 4th Londons reached Lacouture the village was under shell fire -from the enemy's heavy guns and the behaviour of all ranks under fire -for the first time was highly commendable. But here also the hopes -of rest on which the thoughts of all had been centred far more than -on the German shells, were dashed, for almost immediately on arrival -the Battalion received fresh orders to move forward to Richebourg St -Vaast, in which village Brigade headquarters were then operating. The -exhaustion of all ranks on arrival was considerable as the Battalion -had been almost continuously on the move in full marching order for -about eighteen hours. Richebourg was a village of some importance and -a considerable number of our heavy batteries supporting the Neuve -Chapelle attack were stationed in its vicinity, with the result that it -received a generous share of the enemy's counter-battery bombardment -and also a good deal of attention due, apparently, to the prominence of -its church tower, to the existence of which the Germans objected. - -Here at last the Battalion was allotted billets in which it remained -until about 7 p.m., being under heavy shell fire the whole time and -sustaining its first battle casualties of seven men wounded. - -The mist continued during the 12th and our main operation could not -be pursued. The hostile shell fire increased in intensity, but the -Germans were equally with ourselves embarrassed by the difficulties of -accurate observation and their bombardments were not very disastrous -to us. Local advances were attempted by our troops in various parts -of the line and the houses at Pietre were actually reached by the -Guards of the 20th Brigade, but the ground gained was heavily swept by -hostile fire and could not be retained. All day counter-attacks in mass -formation were attempted by the Germans, and costly as the day was to -us, our casualties must have been far exceeded by theirs, their ranks -being literally mown down by our rifle, machine-gun and shrapnel fire. -By dusk the enemy's attempts had exhausted themselves and for the first -time in the war the Germans gave up attempts to recapture ground they -had lost. - -As it had been hoped that the 12th would witness the continuance of -our successes it had been impossible to arrange beforehand the details -of the relief of the Gharwal Brigade by the Ferozepore Brigade until -the result of the intended operations should be known, and it was not, -therefore, until late in the afternoon that the Brigade received orders -to move forward at once in order to take part in an attack that evening -on the Bois du Biez, which position it was proposed to carry at all -costs. For this operation the 41st Dogras of the Bareilly Brigade, then -in the trenches, were to be lent to the Brigade and relieved in their -position in line by the 4th Londons. This relief, however, could not -be effected in time to enable the 41st Dogras to join the Ferozepore -Brigade, which consequently advanced short of one battalion. - -The Brigade was not assembled in front of Neuve Chapelle until darkness -had fallen, and in order to allow time for the necessary dispositions -to be made, General Egerton, who for this operation commanded not only -the Ferozepore, but also the Jullundur and Sirhind Brigades, arranged -for the attack to commence at 10.30 p.m. At 9.30 p.m., however, orders -were received cancelling the attack and indicating that the offensive -had closed, and the Brigade returned to billets in Vieille Chapelle and -Lacouture. - -Meanwhile the 4th Londons proceeded with the relief of the 41st Dogras, -and although they occupied the line only for a few hours, perhaps we -may be pardoned for a rather more detailed record of the night's work -than the importance of the operation warrants in view of the fact that -this was the first tour of duty done by the Battalion in trenches. -The sector to be occupied lay at an interval of about 300 yards from -the right limit of the Neuve Chapelle attack as already described, -and consisted of a frontage of some 400 yards, in front of the Rue du -Bois. The line in this part did not consist of a continuous line of -trenches. In the first place, the ground here, as for miles in each -direction, was too waterlogged to admit of a trench being dug, and the -defences, therefore, consisted of a breastwork built up above ground -level, and in most parts of this sector the breastwork did not exceed -three feet in height and was entirely without parados. As a result, -moreover, of the recent fighting the defensive line consisted rather of -a series of short breastworks with gaps between them which could only -be crossed under cover of darkness. Communication trenches to the rear -were non-existent and the breastwork had to be approached from the Rue -du Bois, to which it ran parallel at a distance of about fifty yards, -"overland." It may be of interest to those who served in this area -with the regiment in the winter of 1916/17 to state that this feeble -breastwork was almost in the position of the support line subsequently -known as Guards' Trench. - -[Illustration: NEUVE CHAPELLE--RICHEBOURG L'AVOUÉ] - -This position perhaps was not an ideal one for the first introduction -of a raw Battalion to trench warfare, and the situation was not -improved by the exhaustion of the men or the fact that the Rue du -Bois was subject to a great deal of heavy shelling which had not died -down since the German counter-attacks of the day, but which continued -through the night. The Battalion moved forward by platoons past Windy -Corner, where it came under a heavy burst of shrapnel, and Edward Road, -skirting behind the ruined factory at the corner of the Rue du Bois, -and led by Indian guides, whose vague acquaintance with the language -of London did not assist matters to any appreciable extent. Be it -remembered also that no maps had been issued and no reconnaissance -of the line had been possible to any company officer. However, the -Battalion succeeded in occupying its breastwork and remained there -during the night, somewhat isolated as touch with the units on its -flanks was difficult to maintain owing to the breaks in the line, and -all ranks acquitted themselves in an exemplary manner. The shrapnel and -machine-gun fire maintained by the Germans during the night cost a few -casualties, amounting to 14 N.C.O.'s and men wounded. In addition to -these was 2/Lieut. A. R. Moore, who was hit in the leg on the way up to -the line. This officer, however, stuck to his duty and remained with -his platoon until after relief of the Battalion the next morning. He -was awarded the Military Cross for his gallant conduct. - -The Ferozepore Brigade attack not having materialised, the 41st Dogras -returned to the trenches, and before daybreak the 4th Londons were -relieved and withdrew to billets in Vieille Chapelle. - -With these incidents ended the battle of Neuve Chapelle in which, -although the gain of ground was much less than had been hoped for, -yet some solid success had been achieved. Our line had been carried -forward for about 1000 yards on a front of about two miles, and the -prisoners captured amounted to 1650 all ranks. The British casualties -had reached the serious total of 12,811, but the enemy's far exceeded -this number. The outstanding result of the action, however, was an -immense accession of moral strength to the British troops, for it had -been clearly established that where we could meet the Germans on terms -of equality in men and material, we were able to beat them, and the -confirmation of this, supplied by the battle of Neuve Chapelle, sent a -thrill of triumph in the hearts of our men all along the line. - -On the night 13/14 March, the Ferozepore Brigade relieved the Bareilly -Brigade on the Rue du Bois, the front line being occupied by the 57th -Rifles, 129th Baluchis and 1st Connaught Rangers, the 4th Londons -moving to Richebourg St Vaast in Brigade reserve. - -The sector now taken over extended from Chocolat Menier Corner on the -right to Port Arthur on the left, and during the tour proved to be -fairly quiet, except in the left subsection held by the Connaughts, -where two strong points, Port Arthur and the Orchard Redoubt, and also -the Crescent Trench, a circular trench connecting them, were daily -subjected to heavy bombardments. - -The 4th Londons in reserve provided garrisons for the forward area as -follows: - - D Company (Cart de Lafontaine) to the Orchard Redoubt, which it - held in company with a party of the Connaughts. - - One Platoon of each of A, B and C Companies to the left subsection, - under instruction in trench warfare by the Connaughts. - - Two Platoons each of B and C Companies (Moore and Vine) to Redoubts - D5 and D6 respectively. These redoubts were close to Windy - Corner on Forresters Lane, and were subsequently known as Dogs - and Edward Posts. - - Machine-Gun Detachment to Port Arthur Keep, and Trench Mortar - Section to the left subsection. - -The platoons under instruction were relieved every forty-eight hours -in order to ensure that during the tour of duty the companies were all -given a certain amount of trench experience. The remaining platoons, -not for the moment employed in garrison duty, were billeted with -Battalion Headquarters in Richebourg, and provided working and carrying -parties each night for the line. - -The line was still not fully organised after the battle, and the -Crescent Trench was not properly connected either to the Orchard on -its right or to Port Arthur on the farther side of the La Bassée Road -on its left; and as the construction of communication trenches in this -area had not yet been seriously undertaken, the various companies -holding those works were isolated during the hours of daylight, as were -also the detached listening posts pushed forward in front of them into -No Man's Land. There was thus a very considerable amount of trench work -required to bring the defences to a proper state of organisation and -also in the completion of the wire entanglements in front of the new -advanced line, and the 4th Londons were called upon for heavy duties in -this direction in conjunction with the Sappers and Miners. - -The tower of Richebourg church still proved a great attraction to the -enemy's heavy guns, and the village was daily subjected to severe shell -fire during daytime. On 21st March it became evident that the Germans -were determined to destroy the church tower, and a steady bombardment -with heavy shells began, which caused infinite damage to the church -itself and the surrounding houses. During this bombardment a direct -hit was obtained on a billet occupied by a platoon of Highland Light -Infantry, causing casualties of 12 killed and 30 wounded. Later three -direct hits were registered on the church tower, which fell about noon, -and this achievement was followed by a complete cessation of hostile -fire, which indicated sufficiently clearly what the intention of the -bombardment had been. - -All ranks of the Battalion were now settling down to their duties -in the trenches, showing great keenness to increase their value as -fighting troops and exhibiting the greatest steadiness under the -numerous heavy bombardments to which they had been exposed, and it was, -therefore, gratifying to receive a word of appreciation as to their -behaviour from the Divisional Commander during a visit which he paid to -Battalion Headquarters on the 17th. - -The Battalion was now again under command of Lieut.-Col. G. P. -Botterill, and Major L. T. Burnett resumed his duties as second in -command. - -On the 17th also a further reinforcement of officers was received as -follows: - - Major E. H. Stillwell and 2/Lieuts. E. P. M. Mosely and F. F. Hunt. - -The Machine-Gun and Trench Mortar Sections were now carrying out their -full duties in the front trenches, and did exceedingly good work during -this tour, which, for the latter section, was their first experience of -working their mortars in action. During the bombardment of the 19th, -2/Lieut. J. T. Sykes, in charge of the trench mortars, was wounded by -shrapnel while "spotting" for a mortar shoot, and evacuated to hospital. - -On the night of the 23/24 March the relief of the Ferozepore Brigade -by the 2nd Brigade began, and the forward garrisons of the 4th London -being withdrawn, the Battalion on the following evening marched back -to billets at Paradis, a small village near Merville. The Connaughts -were relieved in the line on the following night, and the Brigade being -concentrated in the Paradis area came into Army Reserve at two hours' -notice to move. - -The total casualties sustained by the Battalion during this tour of -trench duty were 17, a very small number having regard to the severity -of the bombardments to which it had been subjected. - -From the 26th March until the 2nd April, Lieut.-Col. Botterill was in -temporary command of the Brigade during the absence on leave of the -Brigadier; and command of the Battalion for this period was assumed by -Major G. H. M. Vine. - -The rest billets at Paradis were retained until the 30th March, the six -days being occupied in company training and route marches, and viewing -of arms by the Brigade Armourer-Sergeant. On the 28th a parade service -was held by Captain Cart de Lafontaine, this being the first Church -Service which the Battalion had had the opportunity of attending since -the middle of February. - -The Battalion was now firm friends with its Indian comrades whose -soldierly qualities it was learning to appreciate from actual -experience. Difficulties of language formed a barrier to close -intercourse, but a sort of war-cry was evolved which, being exchanged -between Indian and Cockney, formed a guarantee of friendship. A shout -of "Anglais-bon! Indian-bon! Allemand-NO BON!!" exchanged in passing -became a frequent form of greeting. - -On the night of the 31st March the Brigade returned to the trenches, -relieving the Sirhind Brigade in a sector north of Neuve Chapelle -village, the right boundary of which was Sign Post Lane, a road running -through the lines in the direction of the Bois du Biez. - -The 4th London was again in Brigade Reserve, and moved from Paradis -at 7 a.m. to Les Huit Maisons, where it remained in temporary billets -until dusk when it advanced to Croix Barbée, Battalion Headquarters -occupying a house at the corner of Loretto and Edward Roads. This house -will be in the recollection of those who served in this area in 1917 -as the site of St Vaast R.E. dump. Here the Battalion was again under -instruction in trench duties with the Connaughts, who were in the right -subsection of the new Brigade sector, but on this occasion companies -went into the line in turn as a whole, the companies not actually in -trenches occupying reserve posts at Loretto, Green Barn, and St Vaast. - -The right subsection was defended by breastworks and was immediately -facing Pietre, the hamlet which had stood between our troops and -success on the afternoon of the 10th March. It included the peculiar -feature of the Duck's Bill, in regard to which a word of description -may not be out of place. The name Duck's Bill brings to the minds of -most 4th London men the picture of a large defended mine crater quite -close to the German line, and approached by a defended sap which was -generally full of water. Such it was in the winter of 1916/17, but in -the spring of 1915 the Duck's Bill was a ruined farmhouse standing on -a knoll just in front of the cross-road connecting Sign Post Lane with -Sunken Road. This ruin was surrounded by a horseshoe trench, the points -of the horseshoe resting on the cross-road, which was barricaded and -connected with the front line by a rough breastwork. The defences -here were still in an unfinished condition as the farmhouse was the -extreme point of our advance in this sector in the battle, and the road -barricades were under the continual watch of German snipers in Pietre. -On the night of our entry into this sector the farmhouse had just -been demolished by German incendiary shells and the ruins were still -smouldering. - -"A Bosche had been buried," writes Captain Moore, "in the hastily -constructed parapet, face downward, and with his booted feet sticking -into our trench. They were Bosche boots, so presumably were on Bosche -feet, and every time one passed in the dark one knocked them--a truly -gruesome spot." - -The Duck's Bill farmhouse was finally disposed of when the mine crater -was blown in 1916. - -The reserve posts to which the companies in reserve were detailed were -defended keeps forming with others the Croix Barbée line of defence. -The aftermath of the battle, which had taken the form of such vigorous -shelling by the enemy, now exhausted itself and this tour proved -particularly quiet. The enemy's attention was paid principally to the -roads and communications in rear of our trenches, but his shelling was -sporadic and harmless. - -On the 11th April the Battalion moved out of Croix Barbée, marching -at 5 p.m. for Paradis, where it was joined the following day by the -remaining units of the Brigade, now in Divisional reserve. - -Of the rest in Paradis little need be said. The twelve days were spent -in training under company arrangements and in bathing, completing -issues of deficiencies in clothing, etc. On the 16th and 17th April, -however, practice attacks on trenches were carried out as a brigade -exercise, and although no definite information was, at the time, -conveyed to the units as regards the purpose of the practice, the -exercise was in preparation for the rôle which the Brigade would -be called upon to play during its next tour in the line. It was, -therefore, with the greater satisfaction that the 4th Londons carried -out the exercises in leading the assaulting columns beside the -Connaught Rangers. - -The novitiate of the Battalion was now over, and it was accepted as -being in every way able to do its full duty as a unit of the Ferozepore -Brigade, and the knowledge that it had "found itself" was in itself the -best possible incentive to all ranks to uphold worthily the honour of -their regiment. The weather was of the most perfect spring type, and -the ground and dykes were once more in their normal condition for the -time of year. Speculation was rife, therefore, as to the task which was -destined to be set the Brigade on its return to the line. - -A warning order was received that the Brigade would relieve the -Dehra Dun Brigade on Saturday, the 26th April, in a sector in front -of Neuve Chapelle village, extending from the La Bassée Road on the -right to Sign Post Lane on the left. The 4th Londons were to take over -the left centre subsection, the other front line battalions being -the Connaughts, the 9th Bhopals and the 57th Rifles, with the 129th -Baluchis in Brigade reserve. But this relief was destined not to take -place. - -During the day disquieting rumours went round--started as inexplicably -as such rumours always are--that things were not well in the north near -Ypres: rumours of heavy fighting, of defeat, and of dastardly crimes on -the part of the enemy. That the incredible brutality of the Germans was -indeed an accomplished fact all the world now knows, and we must now -review the tremendous happenings in the Ypres salient which caused the -outbreak of a storm destined to rage with ever-increasing fury for the -next three weeks. - - - - -CHAPTER IV - -THE 1/4TH BATTALION IN THE SECOND BATTLE OF YPRES, 1915 - - -Since the exhaustion of the enemy's drive towards Ypres in November -1914, the Ypres area had not been the scene of any important -operations, although from time to time fierce struggles had raged here -and there for the possession of points of minor tactical importance. -Early in April 1915 the British lines had been extended slightly -northward, and a sector had been taken over from the French troops on -the left. On the 22nd of that month the line from Steenstraate (near -the Yser Canal) as far as the Poelcapelle Road east of Langemarck was -held by a Moroccan Division of the French Army. Thence the line took -a south-easterly turn towards the Passchendaele-Becelaere Road and -was occupied by the Canadian Division. On the right of the Canadians, -British divisions held the trenches which ran east of Zonnebeeke in the -direction of Hooge. - -On the afternoon of the 22nd the French lines were subjected to a heavy -bombardment, following which at about 5 p.m. our aeroplanes reported -that they had seen thick clouds of yellow smoke issuing from the German -trenches between Langemarck and Bixschoote. These arose, as is now -well known, from poison gas, of which the effect was so terrible as to -render the troops exposed to it practically incapable of action. The -smoke and fumes at first hid everything from sight, and hundreds of -men were immediately incapacitated. Within an hour the whole position -had to be abandoned with the loss of fifty guns. This horrible and -unlooked-for attack was so overpowering in its moral effect that our -gallant allies were unable to combat it, and being totally unprovided -with means of defence against so diabolical a contrivance, were -forced--as indeed any troops would probably have been under the like -conditions--to abandon their position without offering resistance. The -confusion and moral effect were doubtless increased by the fact that -the trenches thus attacked were occupied by Africans whose firm belief -in the supernatural rendered it so much the more difficult for them to -withstand this assault. - -The immediate result of this gas attack was that the left flank of the -Canadian Division was in the air and was in imminent danger of being -entirely cut off. But the Canadians stuck to their positions with -magnificent tenacity and during the night repulsed numerous German -attacks. In the disorganisation following the gas attack the Germans -had succeeded in establishing themselves on the west side of the -Yser Canal at Lizerne, thus threatening to drive a wedge between the -Canadians on the right and the French and Belgian troops on the left. - -By 10 o'clock the next morning the position, though by no means -re-established, was slightly easier, touch being definitely ensured -between the Canadians' left and the French right, about 800 yards -east of the Canal; but in order to effect this junction so great an -extension of the British lines had been necessary that no reserves were -available for counter-attack. The enemy's artillery fire was severe all -day and the situation was rendered exceptionally difficult by the loss -of so many allied guns in the gas attack. - -It was arranged between Sir John French and General Foch, who was in -command of the French Army on our left, that the latter should make -immediate arrangements for the recapture of the original French Line, -and for this purpose it was necessary for the British to maintain their -present position without further retirement; but it was clear that -the British troops could not be allowed to remain in the precarious -position held by them during the last twenty-four hours unless the -French attack were delivered within a reasonable time. In the meantime -such reinforcements as were immediately available from neighbouring -Corps were being rushed up into Ypres to strengthen the temporary line -between ourselves and the French. - -On the 24th a heavy German attack breached our lines at St Julien. This -might have initiated an extremely critical situation but for a powerful -counter-attack organised and launched by Brig.-Gen. Hull (afterwards -G.O.C. 56th Division), who, with his own Brigade and parts of -battalions belonging to six different divisions all new to the ground, -was successful in stemming the tide of the enemy's advance, although -attempts to recapture St Julien were repulsed. - -Early in the morning of the 25th the left flank of the Canadian -division was driven back after two days' magnificent fighting, and by -the evening the allied line north of Ypres ran practically east and -west from the neighbourhood of Boesinghe on the Canal to the south -outskirts of St Julien. The general tendency of this line was to bow -inwards towards Ypres. The seriousness of the threat to the whole -British position east of Ypres is obvious. It was now possible for the -enemy to shell any point in our lines from both sides of the salient, -while his positions being about two miles farther to the south than -they had been prior to the gas attack of the 22nd, he was able to keep -the arterial road from Ypres to Zonnebeeke under continuous and heavy -shell fire from guns of all calibres. - -During the whole time considerable confusion was created by the -alteration of areas caused by the sudden relinquishment of the forward -positions; and by the fact that fresh troops on arrival in the Ypres -area had at once to be absorbed into the firing line to prevent -the enemy from exploiting his initial success. This confusion was -heightened by our lack of artillery, which was inadequate to keep -down the heavy German fire, and our casualties were in consequence -continuously heavy. Ypres was itself kept under very heavy shell fire -which vastly increased the difficulty of maintaining supplies of -munitions and food. - -The Lahore Division was ordered on the 23rd April to move to the Ypres -area, and on the morning of the 24th orders were received by the 1/4th -Londons that the contemplated relief of the Dehra Dun Brigade on the -La Bassée Road would not take place and that the Battalion would be -ready to move--possibly by train--at 1.30 p.m. By 2 p.m. the Battalion -had joined in the Ferozepore Brigade column followed by the first -line transport. In ignorance of its destination, and quite unaware of -the bitter struggle then going on at Ypres, the Battalion expected to -entrain at Merville, and a great many packs were filled with eatables -and comforts for a long train journey. - -However, when Merville, Indian Corps railhead, was passed it became -evident that whatever journey was before the column would be made -on foot. The march was an exceedingly trying one and was made under -"forced" conditions. The roads were in a bad state after the winter -rains, and a good deal of opening out in the column was inevitable, -so that the five-minute halts which took place each hour were mostly -spent in "closing up." Hour after hour the column moved on under the -burden of full marching order, now over uneven pavé, now in deep ruts -and thick mud. Merville, Vieux, Berquin, Strazeele, were passed in -succession. Daylight gave place to dusk and dusk to darkness but still -the column struggled forward. From all battalions stragglers now began -to line the sides of the road, unable after the physically weakening -experience of trench life to keep up the pace. At last about 10.30 -p.m. a long halt was made just outside Godewaersvelde, a small village -at the foot of the Mont des Cats. Here a rest of some forty minutes -was obtained on the roadside while double lines of guns, ammunition -columns, and transport blocked the road. - -Finally at about 10.45 p.m. the Battalion moved forward into -Godewaersvelde, but the village was packed with troops, and the -companies, therefore, had to content themselves with such shelter as -could be found beneath the parked lorries in the streets. - -But the end of the march was not yet. After a hasty breakfast the -Battalion was again on parade before 6 o'clock on the morning of the -25th, and once more joining the Brigade Column struggled up the steep -hill at Boescheppe, at the top of which another delay was caused -by a cross-current of vehicular traffic. The distress of the troops -was now so evident that orders were received to lighten packs, and -garments of all sorts, principally gifts of knitted garments sent out -from ladies in England, were left by the roadside. Through Westoutre -and Reninghelst the column marched on to Ouderdom, where it arrived at -about 2.30 p.m. with orders to billet in huts. Most of the huts were -already fully occupied and the greater part of the 1/4th Londons were -compelled to bivouac in the fields adjoining. Ouderdom is about seven -miles south-west of Ypres, and the object of the forced march was at -last clear. Some little idea of the storm raging in the salient could -be gathered from the bivouacs, as throughout the afternoon and night -the air vibrated with the continuous thunder of artillery in which the -rapid and sharp rafales of the French "seventy-fives" away to the north -were plainly distinguishable. - -Shortly after midnight orders were received that the Division would -be pushed into the firing line that day, the 26th April, and at dawn -the Battalion was once more formed up. Shovels and picks were issued -alternately to all the troops for the purpose of digging themselves -into such positions as they might be able to gain, and to each platoon -was issued a yellow flag for signalling its location to the artillery. -In these early days of the War no arrangements were made for the -formation of a "battle surplus," and consequently the whole available -strength of officers and men prepared to move forward. Packs were now -stacked to relieve the troops of superfluous weight, and at 4.30 a.m. -the companies began to move off at five minutes' intervals. - -The exhaustion of the men made progress inevitably slow. The roads -traversed were fortunately not receiving much attention from the -enemy's artillery, though a steady bombardment of Ypres with shells of -the heaviest calibre was proceeding. By about 9.30 a.m. the Battalion -was concentrated in a field adjoining Outskirt Farm at La Brique, where -it proceeded to dig itself into assembly trenches (see map No. 3). - -Meanwhile the Jullundur Brigade had concentrated farther to the east, -between St Jean and Wieltje, while the Sirhind Brigade in Divisional -Reserve had moved round the south of Ypres to a position north-west of -Potizje. - -The 1/4th Londons' position[1] during the hours of waiting in the -morning was behind the crest of the spur which runs westward from St -Jean, past La Brique towards the Canal, and though out of view from the -German trenches was undoubtedly located by the enemy's Taubes, whose -reconnaissances over our lines were entirely unmolested. This, combined -with the close proximity of the Battalion's position to several British -and French batteries, brought it a fair share of German shrapnel during -the morning, the shelling being from both the north and south sides of -the salient. Happily but few casualties were sustained. - -[1] It has been thought convenient in the account of this action to -designate buildings and other topographical features by the names by -which they afterwards became generally known, though they were not in -every case so named in April 1915. - -Below the hillside on which the Battalion lay concealed and distant -something more than half a mile the gaunt ruins of Ypres stood out -clearly in the morning sunlight, the fast-crumbling tower of its -wonderful Cloth Hall still erect, a silent witness of the tragedy -which was being enacted. All the morning shells were falling into the -town, a steady and merciless bombardment without the least cessation -or abatement. From the centre of the town dense columns of black smoke -rose continuously, and the crash of explosions and the clatter of -falling débris followed each other without respite. The cross-roads -at which the St Jean road left the town were in particular a target -for the German heavy guns. All the morning the 50th (Northumberland) -Division T.F. was moving from Ypres along this road to St Julien, and -as each platoon passed the fatal cross-road at the double a heavy shell -fell close by thinning the ranks. It seemed to every spectator of this -horrible yet fascinating sight that the German artillery fire must -surely be directed from some point within the British lines. - -At 12.40 p.m. the Brigade received orders to prepare to take part in -a divisional attack in conjunction with the French in a due northerly -direction, with the object of relieving the pressure on the left of St -Julien and of endeavouring to push the enemy back. With this attack the -50th Division would co-operate on the right of the Lahore Division in -an attempt to recapture St Julien itself. - -The Ferozepore Brigade's frontage was on the right of Boundary Road -(the Ypres-Langemarck Road) and extended as far as English Farm, beyond -which the Jullundur Brigade was responsible as far as Wieltje Farm on -the extreme right, and the general line of assembly was on the forward -slope of the spur some 600 yards north of La Brique. - -The Brigade's advance was led by the Connaught Rangers on the left, -the 57th Rifles in the centre, with the 129th Baluchis on the right. -The 1/4th Londons were to follow the Connaughts, while the 9th Bhopals -remained in reserve in La Brique. - -At 2 o'clock the attack was launched under a heavy bombardment from all -available British and French batteries, but such was the shortage of -ammunition that this support died down for lack of supplies in about -five minutes, after which the German batteries were free to search -intensively the whole area of the Brigade advance, causing a good many -casualties in the assaulting columns. - -From the line of assembly the ground subsided gently to a shallow -depression running across the direction of advance, beyond which, at a -distance of some 1000 yards from the crest on the La Brique side, the -hill swelled to a second skyline which impeded further view. Just below -the crest of the further spur an unfenced lane, Buffs Road, followed -the contour running eastwards from Boundary Road. None of this land was -intersected by trenches, the Allied trenches being several miles ahead -and to the rear of the German positions. - -The 1/4th Londons moved from their position of waiting at about 2.30 -p.m., and shaking out into four lines of platoons in file with B -Company (Moore) on the left, and A (Duncan-Teape) on the right of the -front line, followed by D (Saunders) and C (Clark). The German shrapnel -was now searching both slopes of the spur pretty severely and men -began to drop, but the Battalion steadily breasted the rise from which -it could overlook the shallow valley towards Buffs Road. The sight -which met their eyes defies description. The valley was covered with -a ragged crowd of agonised and nerve-racked men, both Moroccans and -Indians, who, having thrown down their arms and everything which could -impede them, were streaming back from the front trenches suffering -the tortures of poison gas. It was a revolting sight. The attack had -clearly failed and our leading troops were broken and in retirement. -But the men of the 1/4th Londons were splendid. Without wavering for -a single instant they trudged steadily forward, though indeed almost -completely exhausted, maintaining the intervals and distances between -platoons with the precision of the parade ground. Never was there a -more striking example of the results of training and discipline. The -"attack in open warfare" which had been so roundly cursed by one and -all in the days of training at Blendecques had indeed so sunk into the -minds of everyone that instinctively the troops remembering only their -orders to "follow the Connaughts at all costs" carried out under the -most trying ordeal the lessons which had been drilled into them. - -The Battalion continued to advance as far as Buffs Road, where a halt, -believed at first to be temporary, was called. No trench line existed -here but the ditch on the near side of the road had been widened. This -was already filled with the remains of the 2nd K.O.S.B. (who had been -fighting continuously since the action at Hill 60 on the 17th April, -and were now reduced to under 100 all ranks) and by the reserve company -of the Connaughts. The majority of the Battalion were, therefore, -unable to obtain shelter in the ditch, and the digging of a fresh line -some fifteen yards in rear was at once put in hand. - -Early in the advance Moore (B Coy.) was hit in the foot and his company -was taken over by Grimwade. Considering the severity of the enemy's -shrapnel fire the advance was made with surprisingly few casualties, -and although owing to the massing of the whole Battalion on one line -of narrow frontage some intermingling of platoons on halting was -inevitable, this was rapidly set to rights with little difficulty. The -enemy's bombardment soon died away considerably, though for a while he -maintained a steady machine-gun fire sweeping the crest of the ridge -ahead of Buffs Road. - -The troops leading the attack had moved forward steadily at zero hour -and had pushed over the crest line in front of Buffs Road descending -the further slope towards Turco Farm. The front German trench north -of the Farm was reached and occupied, but before the position was -properly established dense yellow clouds of poison gas issued from -the enemy lines and, being gently wafted by the breeze, bore down on -our defenceless troops. Under the horror of this ordeal the greater -part of the line broke and a general retirement ensued which affected -most severely the French and Indian Battalions, as already described. -About 100 of the Connaughts and the Manchesters (Sirhind Brigade), -however, managed to cling gallantly to their ground under Major -Deacon, though they were shortly afterwards ejected by a strong enemy -counter-attack which followed the gas cloud. They eventually succeeded -in consolidating a line in the immediate vicinity of Turco Farm. - -Shortly after the 1/4th Londons were established on Buffs Road -Lieut.-Col. Botterill became a casualty, and Major L. T. Burnett -assumed command of the Battalion. It was decided by Major Burnett that -the overcrowding of the Buffs Road alignment was so great and wasteful -of fire power, quite half the Battalion being unable to get into -position to use their rifles, that a redisposition of his forces was -desirable, and accordingly C and D companies withdrew to a position in -support some 300 yards in rear of Buffs Road, where they dug themselves -in. - -During this time the Regimental Aid Post under Lieut. Hurd, R.A.M.C., -was established at Irish Farm and the Battalion stretcher-bearers under -Corpl. Fulford worked with great coolness in evacuating the wounded -under heavy fire. - -[Illustration: THE SECOND BATTLE OF YPRES, 1915] - -At about 4.30 p.m. orders were received that the reserve company of -the Connaughts was to push forward and reinforce their two leading -companies, supported by the 1/4th Londons. But, after consultation -with Major Burnett, Major Hamilton of the Connaughts decided that the -severity of the enemy's fire was so great that there was no reasonable -probability of achieving a result commensurate with the inevitable -loss of life, and the orders for the projected advance were cancelled. -An attempt to reinforce the advanced troops was, however, actually -made at about 7.30 p.m. by the 15th Sikhs and the 1/4th Gurkhas of -the Sirhind Brigade, supported by the 9th Bhopals. This advance was -carried out in good order, the Indians passing through the 1/4th -Londons and disappearing over the ridge in front under a veritable hail -of fire; but although touch was obtained with the leading companies -of the Connaughts, the position of the German trenches could not be -ascertained in the gathering darkness, and Lieut.-Col. Hills, who was -in charge of the operation, decided to dig in on the position gained. - -In conjunction with Bhopals' attempt an attack was also delivered -by the Turcos of the French Brigade Moroccaine, who passed over the -1/4th Londons' trench in the gathering dusk. They were met in the -crest line by a frightful machine-gun fire under which they advanced -steadily, suffering heavy losses. A young French officer in charge of -these Africans filled all who saw him with the deepest admiration of -his coolness. Smoking a cigarette and lightly swinging a small rattan -cane, he stood up on the sky line with his loose blue cloak thrown -negligently over his shoulders, directing the advance of his men -with all the indifference to danger of which his wonderful nation is -capable. None of these gallant fellows were seen again. - -During the whole of the 26th very good work was done by 2/Lieut. A. -D. Coates, who was employed as _liaison_ officer between Brigade -Headquarters and the advanced troops. This gallant young officer -succeeded several times in passing through the enemy's barrage and was -the means of providing Headquarters with valuable information as to the -course of events at Turco Farm. - -Meanwhile the 1/4th Londons remained in readiness for action on Buffs -Road, which was shelled heavily at intervals, especially at about -6 p.m., when the German shrapnel caused a great many casualties. -The enemy's fire, however, died down after the evening advance by -the Indians had been checked. The night was particularly quiet, and -Sergt.-Major Harris at La Brique was able to get rations up to the -Battalion and issue them. - -The 27th April broke grey and cold and the morning was misty. During -the early hours the enemy's artillery was remarkably inactive and the -work of strengthening the Battalion's position was proceeded with -without molestation by the Germans. The signs of battle were few indeed -and it seemed almost impossible to realise the critical position of -the British troops. The sense of detachment from the serious events -of the preceding afternoon was enhanced by the unbroken state of the -countryside in the immediate neighbourhood and the presence of several -cows, which by some marvellous chance had escaped the enemy's shells -and continued to graze lazily in the field in rear of the Battalion's -position, as they had done during the battle on the previous afternoon. - -The lull, however, was only the calm which proverbially precedes the -storm, for about noon the enemy's guns opened with intense violence on -the British positions and the 1/4th Londons received their full share -of these hostile attentions. Fortunately, however, its position behind -the crest secured it from heavy loss. - -During this bombardment Major Burnett was ordered to report to Brigade -Headquarters, where he received orders for an attack to take place -in half an hour's time. When he got back to the Battalion under ten -minutes were left in which to explain the orders to his company -commanders and to make all preparations. The Battalion was to execute a -further advance in a north-easterly direction on to Oblong Farm, which -was given as the objective. In order to reach the assembly position, -it was necessary for the Battalion to move about 200 yards to the -right flank in order to come up on the right of the Sirhind Brigade, -who, in the early hours of the morning, had relieved the most advanced -troops of the Ferozepore Brigade. - -The hurried nature of the attack precluded any possibility of -reconnaissance of the ground by the officers and allowed no time for -the explanation of the work on hand to the rank and file. The position -of the German trenches was unknown and the difficulties and obstacles -which might be met with during the advance were entirely undisclosed. - -The movement of the Battalion toward its position of assembly for -this unpromising enterprise was carried out steadily although with -considerable loss. The British and Canadian artillery, which were -co-operating in giving support to the attack, were again lamentably -short of ammunition, so that an intense bombardment of some five -minutes left them unable to render further assistance. Thus as the -Battalion in moving to its flank came near the crest of the spur behind -which it had hitherto been concealed from direct observation by the -enemy, it became a very clear target for the hostile artillery, and the -German guns being no longer harassed by our artillery, were able to -pour a devastating fire upon the companies. - -The actual "jumping-off" position was the ditch on the south side of -Buffs Road which, at this point, was bordered by a hedge. The Battalion -advanced in two lines of two companies in open order, each company -formed in three waves, and the leading companies were C (Clark) on -the left and D (Saunders) on the right, followed respectively by B -(Grimwade) and A (Duncan-Teape). In order to ensure that the waves in -each company should move forward together, it was necessary to collect -the whole of each wave in the ditch before it moved; and this could -only be effected by "feeding" the men along the ditch in single file, -from the western end of the Battalion's frontage, the hedge in rear -being impenetrable. The result of this slow progress was that the -remainder of the Battalion waiting its turn to go into the ditch was -compelled to wait on the hill, under a high explosive and shrapnel fire -which was both intense and accurate. The result needs no description, -but under this very trying ordeal the Battalion was perfectly steady, -each platoon grouped together and waiting its order to move with the -greatest nonchalance. - -Before following the actual advance of the 1/4th Londons it will be -convenient to explain the object and scope of the operation of which it -formed part. - -During the morning arrangements had been made for the Lahore Division -to co-operate in an attack which was projected by the French Brigade -Moroccaine. The general direction of the French attack was to be along -the Ypres-Langemarck Road, as on the previous day, and the Lahore -Division was to take all possible advantage of the French advance -to gain ground, but without committing itself to the attack before -the French troops had secured its left flank. The Lahore Division's -attack was to conform to the French movement but on the east side of -the Langemarck Road; the Sirhind Brigade occupying the left of the -Divisional front next the French with the Ferozepore Brigade on its -right. - -The objective of the latter was, as already stated, Oblong Farm, a -moated farmstead some 1700 yards from starting-point, the attack being -led by the 1/4th Londons on the left and the 9th Bhopals on the right. -The Connaughts followed in support at a distance of 400 yards, while -the 57th Rifles and the 129th Baluchis, both of which regiments had -been seriously weakened in the action of the 26th, were in reserve. - -At 12.30 p.m. the leading waves of the two assaulting battalions moved -forward under a continued heavy shell and machine-gun fire. The ground -over which the advance was to be made was for the first 700 yards -an unenclosed plateau which afforded the enemy good observation of -our movements, and then sloping gently downwards to a somewhat more -enclosed depression rose beyond it once more towards the objective. The -objective itself was not visible from starting-point, and it appears -probable that in consequence of the very hurried preparations for the -attack, its position was not fully appreciated by all concerned and -thus it was not recognised. However this may be, it is certain that the -general direction of the attack after crossing Admirals Road became -diverted too much towards the north and thus some encroachment was -made on the frontage for which the Sirhind Brigade was responsible. -This was probably accentuated by the fact that the position selected -as starting-point lay at an acute angle to the direction of advance, -so that a change of direction was necessary during the advance -itself--always an operation of great difficulty. - -As far as Admirals Road cover was non-existent. On topping the crest -of the hill the Battalion came under an exceedingly severe rifle and -machine-gun fire, and losses were consequently heavy. The succeeding -waves, however, pushed on steadily as far as the near edge of the -depression described above, in the vicinity of Hampshire Farm, when it -became clearly impossible to get down the forward slope of the valley -under the raking fire of the enemy, without incurring frightful losses. -Half the leading companies were already hit, as were also Saunders, -fatally wounded, Grimwade, Stedman, Leonard, and Coates. It was, -therefore, decided by Major Burnett to hold the line gained and there -to reorganise the Battalion pending the arrival of reinforcements, when -it might be possible to carry the line forward. - -A small part of C Company under Clark and of B Company under Giles, -however, were successful in gaining the bottom of the valley, but -finding himself isolated and further advance impossible without -support, Clark, who assumed command of the composite party, took up a -position to the right of Canadian Farm, where the men dug themselves in -with their entrenching tools and hung on gallantly under a murderous -fire. Splendid service was rendered by two N.C.O.'s of this party, -Sergeant A. C. Ehren and Lance-Corporal C. Badham, both of B Company, -who passed through the barrage three times unscathed with messages -between Captain Clark and Battalion Headquarters. - -Excellent work was also done by the Machine-Gun Section under 2/Lieuts. -Walker and Pyper, who skilfully brought their guns into action on -the left of Hampshire Farm and assisted in no small measure to keep -down the hostile rifle fire from the enemy trenches on the further -side of the valley. Their position, however, was shortly afterwards -discovered, evidently by a Taube, which continued its reconnaissance -over our lines without let or hindrance, and the section came under -heavy shell fire and was forced to fall back on the main position, with -Walker dangerously wounded, Sergt. Phillips killed, and several other -casualties. - -At about 2.30 p.m. the enemy's artillery fire abated considerably, but -by that time the advance of the whole Division had been definitely -checked on an alignment generally corresponding with that occupied by -the 1/4th Londons, and reports were received that the French also had -failed to gain their objectives. - -Later in the evening the French attempted to renew their offensive, but -once more were met with clouds of poison gas which definitely broke -up their attack, and a report having been received from Col. Savy, -the French Commander, that his losses were so heavy as to preclude -all further attempts, orders were received that the Brigade would -consolidate its position. - -During the evening before dusk the Ferozepore Brigade was again -subjected to violent shelling, which inflicted considerable loss on all -battalions. During this later bombardment Lieut. Coffin was buried by a -high explosive shell. - -After darkness fell the 1/4th Londons were withdrawn from their -advanced line to Brigade Reserve in rear of Cross Roads Farm where -they set about digging fresh trenches. The Connaughts and the Bhopals -withdrew to the line of Admirals Road near Cross Roads Farm, in which -Brigade Headquarters were now established, while the Rifles and -Baluchis took up a position to the rear. - -The night passed without incident and with very little shelling, and -the opportunity was taken to collect the wounded whom it had been -impossible to evacuate under the heavy fire of the afternoon. 2/Lieut. -E. Giles, who from many volunteers was selected for this work, set a -splendid example of devotion to duty and worked hard throughout the -night in endeavouring to relieve the sufferings of his men. - -The day's losses had been heavy and the gain of ground nil, but the -bearing of the Battalion under somewhat disheartening circumstances had -been worthy of the highest traditions of regular troops. Something, -however, had been achieved as, in spite of his use of poison gas, the -enemy was no nearer Ypres and our line, though strained almost to -breaking point, was still holding. It appears indeed that the gallant -front shown by the Lahore Division was successful in deceiving the -Germans as to the extent of our resources, and deterred him from -pressing the advantages he had already gained. - -The casualties of the afternoon of the 27th April were in officers: - - Capt. C. R. Saunders and 2/Lieut. A. D. Coates, killed; Lieut. P. - B. K. Stedman, died of wounds; Capt. F. G. Grimwade, Lieuts. - F. A. Coffin and D. J. Leonard, and 2/Lieut. T. I. Walker, - wounded; and in N.C.O.'s and men, 32 killed (including C. S. M. - Chennels), 132 wounded, and 13 missing. - -During the 28th the 1/4th Londons remained in position in rear of Cross -Roads Farm, and beyond a good deal of shelling in which gas shell was -freely used by the enemy the day passed without important incident. -Luckily the bombardment this day was not very costly to the Battalion -or, indeed, to the Brigade as a whole. The Lahore Division was -transferred from V Corps to a special counter-attack force then formed -under command of Gen. Plumer, and it was arranged that the Sirhind and -Ferozepore Brigades should be prepared to co-operate with an attack -contemplated by the French who were still on our left flank, making -such advance as might be justified by the results achieved by our -Allies. The French attack, however, did not materialise in consequence -of the very heavy losses of the preceding two days and our Allies -confined themselves to artillery action. - -During the evening the enemy turned a large number of guns on to St -Jean and in a few hours the work of destruction, already far advanced, -was almost completed. In the darkness the church was clearly visible in -flames, the windows being lit up by the conflagration within: before -morning the tower had fallen, the roof had collapsed, and nothing but -smouldering ruins remained. - -The 29th April found the Ferozepore Brigade still holding its trenches -and orders were again issued to it to be prepared to co-operate with -the French. But during the morning definite orders were received that -the French attack was postponed, the assault of the enemy positions -being a more formidable proposition than could be tackled by the Allied -troops in their then exhausted and numerically weak condition. - -The German bombardment continued throughout the 29th, and the Battalion -remained inactive beyond the further strengthening of its trenches. -It did, however, have the satisfaction of seeing a Taube brought down -close to its lines by our anti-aircraft guns. - -Before daybreak on the 30th, the Ferozepore Brigade was relieved and -marched out of the salient, the 1/4th Londons proceeding by way of -Buffs Road and La Brique to hutments at Ouderdom. While passing through -La Brique the Battalion was met by a reinforcement of about fifty -N.C.O.'s and men from the 3/4th Battalion in England, conducted by -Major E. H. Stillwell. Accompanying this draft were 2/Lieuts. L. G. Rix -and B. Rivers Smith. - -The roads out of the salient were being very heavily shelled during the -relief, the cross roads at Vlamertinghe being in particular accurately -bombarded with heavy shrapnel. But Major Burnett was able to save a -great many casualties by varying the route of some platoons. - -At about 7.30 a.m. on the same morning the Ferozepore Brigade moved -from the hutments to bivouacs close by to avoid the effects of the -continuous shelling to which the concentration camp was subjected, -but returned to the huts at night. The day was spent in rest and -reorganisation. The Battalion was undoubtedly a little shaken after its -rough handling and very seriously reduced in strength. Over 600 rifles -had left Ouderdom on the morning of the 26th, but at the roll call -which took place on return on the 30th only 235 names were answered, -apart from the newly arrived draft which had not been in action. - -[Illustration: _St Jean Village in April 1920_] - -The following awards were made for services rendered: - - Capt. W. G. Clark, D.S.O.; Sergt. A. C. Ehren, D.C.M.; L/Corpl. - Colomb, D.C.M.; Corpl. Fulford, Médaille Militaire de France. - -In this, its first serious action, the 1/4th Battalion had firmly -established its reputation by its remarkable steadiness under -unprecedented circumstances, and, though the price paid was heavy, it -had the satisfaction of having contributed materially to the undying -glory of the British defence of Ypres. - -At 7.45 p.m. on the 1st May, the concentration of the Division being -now complete, the Ferozepore Brigade marched from Ouderdom _via_ -Reninghelst, Westoutre, to Meteren, arriving there at 12.30 a.m. on -the 2nd. A rest was made here until the afternoon when the route was -resumed, Doulieu being reached about 10 p.m. The march was completed -the following evening, when at about 7 p.m. the Brigade returned to its -former billets in the Paradis area. - - - - -CHAPTER V - -OPERATIONS DURING THE SUMMER OF 1915 - - -In spite of the severe tax placed on his resources by the -ever-increasing weight of the enemy's assaults at Ypres, and the -consequent difficulty of finding sufficient reserves of men and -material to embark on a new attack on a large scale, Sir John French -decided early in May to adopt the bold course of launching a fresh -offensive at the southern extremity of the British front. He was led -to this resolve partly by the hope of diverting the enemy's attention -towards the south and thereby easing the pressure against Ypres, -and partly by the desire to assist the French who were launching an -offensive south of the La Bassée Canal. - -The ultimate objective of this new undertaking was the opening of -the road to Lille, and the necessary preliminary to this was the -expulsion of the enemy from his defences on the Aubers Ridge and the -establishment of the British troops on the La Bassée-Lille Road. - -This attack was entrusted to the First Army, whose operations were -divided into two separate zones. In the north the assault was to be -made by the IV Corps at Rouges Bancs with the object of turning the -Aubers defences from that flank; while farther south the I and Indian -Corps were to secure the line Ligny-le-Grand--La Clicqueterie Farm. - -The Indian Corps attack was to be carried out by the Meerut -Division--the Lahore Division still being weak after its recent -fighting in the salient--on a front from the right of the Corps sector -near Chocolat Menier Corner to Oxford Road (on the left of La Bassée -Road). The rôle of the Lahore Division, which would occupy the line in -front of Neuve Chapelle with the Jullundur Brigade, was to support the -Meerut Division's attack with artillery, machine-gun and rifle fire, -and particularly to secure the left flank of the assaulting columns -during their advance by being prepared to operate as occasion might -arise against the Bois du Biez. - -The attack was launched on the 9th May at 5.40 a.m. after a forty -minutes' bombardment of the enemy lines by all available guns. - -The assaulting columns advanced with the greatest valour, but were -met by a murderous machine-gun and rifle fire, under which they were -literally mown down. The survivors struggled on in spite of the -frightful losses they were suffering, but practically none of the 1st -or Meerut Divisions reached the enemy's front trench. Farther north the -8th Division effected a lodgment in the enemy's trenches, but after -hanging on gallantly throughout the day were forced at night to return -to their original positions after suffering appalling casualties. From -all along the line came reports of what amounted to total failure. The -surprise effect which had proved so valuable at Neuve Chapelle in March -was wanting this day, and our artillery had been inadequately supplied -with high explosive shells to enable them to destroy the German -machine-gun emplacements. - -Meanwhile reports were received from the French of some considerable -degree of success. On the following day Sir John French decided not to -pursue his offensive in the north, but to limit his further efforts to -the area south of the La Bassée Road, and accordingly preparations were -made for the resumption of operations on the 12th. - -The Lahore Division had reached the Neuve Chapelle area after its march -back from Ypres on the evening of the 4th May, the Ferozepore Brigade -finding accommodation in its former billets at Paradis, which it left -the following day for Riez Bailleul. - -On the evening of the 8th the Brigade moved forward to take up its -prearranged position of assembly in support to the Jullundur Brigade. - -The position taken up by the 1/4th Londons and the 9th Bhopals was in -shallow assembly trenches in the orchards about the junction of Sign -Post Lane with Rue Tilleloy. These trenches were hastily dug and very -shallow, without either traverses or any sort of shelter; and it was -therefore fortunate that the weather was unusually warm and fine for -the time of year. The Connaughts and the 57th Rifles occupied the old -British front line (as it had been before the battle of Neuve Chapelle) -astride Sign Post Lane. - -During the whole of the 9th, 10th and 11th May the 1/4th London -remained in these trenches under continual heavy shell fire: though -owing to the lack of success with which the main operation had met it -was not called upon to advance. - -On the evening of the 11th it was withdrawn with the rest of the -Brigade to billets at Riez Bailleul. On return to billets great -discomfort was caused to all ranks by the discovery that the billet -in which the packs had been deposited during the three days spent in -trenches had been burnt to the ground, involving the total destruction -of its contents together with a mail from home. The following day the -Indian Corps Commander (Sir James Willcocks) visited the Battalion and -expressed his deep appreciation of its conduct at Ypres. - -The 12th May dawned dull and misty and artillery observation was -exceedingly difficult; and for this and other causes the renewal of -the attack was again postponed until the 15th. The Meerut Division was -again responsible for the Indian Corps attack. The Lahore Division -adopted a role similar to that which it had played on the 9th, and the -Ferozepore Brigade moved forward once more on the evening of the 15th -May to its former assembly positions about Sign Post Lane. - -In order to endeavour to secure the surprise effect which had been -lacking on the 9th it was decided this time to deliver the attack at -night, and after a preliminary bombardment the assaulting columns -dashed forward at 11.30 p.m. on the 15th. On the right of the attack -in the region of Festubert and La Quinque Rue considerable success was -achieved by the 7th Division, and some advance was also made by the 2nd -Division which was operating on the immediate right of the Indians. - -The Meerut Division, however, was again faced with a hail of lead from -the enemy lines under which it was impossible to live, and though the -troops did all that men could do, by 4 a.m. on the 16th, after two -gallant efforts, the attempts of the Indians to advance were definitely -checked and the remains of the assaulting columns were once more back -in their original trenches. - -From this date onwards operations were confined to the southern area -in the neighbourhood of Festubert, and though the battle continued to -rage until the 25th May, the Indian Corps was no longer concerned in -it beyond the preparations necessary to enable it to conform to the -advance on its right flank. - -During the early part of the month the 1/4th Londons received further -officer reinforcements as follows: - - Capt. A. A. N. Haine. - Lieut. S. G. Monk. - Lieut. D. C. Cooke. - 2/Lieut. J. S. B. Gathergood. - -The Battalion remained in its shallow trenches until the 18th May under -less favourable conditions of weather than previously, and the exposure -caused a large number of casualties through sickness, including Lieuts. -Rivers, Smith and Cooke, and 2/Lieut. Gathergood, who were evacuated to -hospital. - -On the evening of the 18th May the Ferozepore Brigade took over the -front line from the Jullundur Brigade, the 1/4th Londons relieving the -4th Suffolks on the right, between the La Bassée Road and Oxford Road, -the subsection including Port Arthur Keep where Battalion Headquarters -were established. This tour of duty was uneventful and the troops were -occupied principally in repairing the damage done to the entanglements -and defences by the enemy's shell fire during the days of the battle. -A certain amount of shell fire was, however, experienced causing a few -casualties, including Captain Haine, who was hit on the 22nd. The enemy -also paid a good deal of attention to the back areas and the regimental -transport now established at Rouge Croix was heavily shelled on the -25th, and again on the 26th, with such severity that it was compelled -to change position to Riez Bailleul. - -During this period also the issue of gas masks to all ranks was -completed. - -On the 30th the Sirhind Brigade, which had been in divisional reserve -during the battle, came forward and took over the line from the -Ferozepore Brigade, the 1/4th Londons handing over their trenches to -the 1st Manchesters and withdrawing to billets at Riez Bailleul. - -After the end of May no further attempt was made on the Indian Corps -front to conduct operations on a large scale. The difficulties -under which the Indian battalions were labouring in the supply -of reinforcements to replace casualties were extreme. The Indian -concentration camp at Marseilles was continually receiving -reinforcements from India, but of these an increasing proportion was -found to be unfit for despatch to the front, and as the summer wore -on the native regiments of the Corps gradually ebbed in numbers until -amalgamations began to be effected to maintain units at anything -approaching war strength. In these circumstances offensive operations -against so strongly defended a position as the Aubers Ridge were out -of the question, especially having regard to the continued shortage -in the supply of shells. At the same time the general situation did -not permit of the Indian Corps being entirely withdrawn from the line -for a prolonged rest and reorganisation. The story of the next three -months is, therefore, one of unceasing hard work in and out of the -line without any of those opportunities of distinction which are as -necessary to the well-being of a battalion--and especially a native -battalion--as a regular supply of rations. - -This increasing numerical weakness of the native battalions threw a -greater burden of work and responsibility on the British units, both -Regular and Territorial, though even they experienced the greatest -difficulty in obtaining the regular supplies from home of that fresh -blood which was so earnestly desired. The 1/4th London returned from -Ypres in May at a strength well under 300 all ranks, and at no period -during the remainder of its attachment to the Indian Corps did its -strength approach even 450; in other words, for months on end, in -sentry-go, working and carrying parties, and patrols, every man was -doing two men's work; and this with a very scanty proportion of rest -behind the line. Out of 126 days from the end of May to the beginning -of October the 1/4th Londons spent 92 days in trenches, and of the -remaining 34 in billets not one was spent beyond the reach of the -enemy's guns. - -With the exception of one tour of duty in the Min House Farm sector -the 1/4th Londons spent this summer on the right of the La Bassée Road -either in the trenches in front of the Rue du Bois, which included -the well-remembered positions of the Orchard Redoubt and Crescent -Trench, or in reserve, usually in Lansdowne Post, a large redoubt on -Forrester's Lane. The summer months saw very great improvements in the -Rue du Bois trenches. The isolated listening posts, like grouse-butts, -which had formed the advanced positions in March were now joined into -a continuous line of breastwork, connected with the Rue du Bois by -numerous communication trenches. Shelters for the trench garrisons -were also constructed, but these gave protection against nothing more -serious than rain--and not always that. In this waterlogged area the -sinking of a deep dugout was an impossibility, and the shelters were -in consequence mere "rabbit-hutches" built into the breastwork and -covered with corrugated iron and a few sandbags, which imbued the -occupants with an entirely unjustified sense of security. At the same -time the wire entanglements in No Man's Land were constantly extended -and strengthened. With all these defences steadily growing, the duties -of the Battalion on working parties, both when occupying the line and -when in reserve billets, were onerous and unceasing. Patrolling work by -night was vigorously prosecuted as being practically the only available -means of fostering the growth of the "offensive spirit." Trench routine -in 1915 was marked by a feature which in subsequent years almost -entirely vanished--the constant employment of rifle fire. At this -period the infantryman had not succumbed to the insensate craze for -bombs which later ruined his powers as a rifleman; and every night, in -one part of the trenches or another, saw something in the nature of an -organised shoot by the infantry, bursts of rapid fire being directed -on the enemy's parapet. These practices were of great value, not only -in keeping the men skilful with their rifles, but also in maintaining -their moral superiority over the enemy which might otherwise have -become seriously impaired through their knowledge of the inequality of -our strength in artillery. - -The enemy's activity during this summer was for the most part confined -to artillery fire which at times attained serious proportions and -inflicted severe loss; indeed throughout the period under review the -toll of casualties was steady and continuous. - -Out of the trenches the 1/4th Londons withdrew to reserve billets -either at Pont du Hem, L'Epinette, or La Fosse, and while in reserve -were invariably called upon for working parties in the forward area, -so that the opportunities available for training and repairing the -damage inevitably caused to parade discipline by long-continued -trench life were almost entirely wanting. At this period, moreover, -"back-of-the-line" organisation had not reached the high pitch attained -in later years. Baths were an infrequent luxury, concert parties--of -an organised type--unheard of, recreational training still without its -proper recognition. Such infrequent rests as were granted to the troops -were thus of comparatively small recuperative value. - -But in spite of these numerous difficulties the Battalion was steadily -increasing its military efficiency and its morale throughout the summer -was high. - -[Illustration: _Rouge Croix, La Bassée Road_] - -[Illustration: _The Doll's House, La Bassée Road_] - -One of the most unpleasant tours of duty was at Min House Farm, already -alluded to, a sector on the left of Neuve Chapelle, facing Mauquissart, -which the Battalion took over for a week in July as a temporary measure -during a readjustment of Brigade boundaries. The breastworks here were -especially weak and very much overlooked from the Aubers Ridge. Wire -was embryonic and communication trenches poor. Moreover, the area -appeared to be the subject of particular hatred on the part of the -Bosche, who shelled it frequently and heavily. Min House (or Moated -Grange) Farm, where Headquarters were established, was perched on the -crest of a little knoll which afforded the Headquarters staff a good -view over the sector, but, probably for this very reason, the Hun -objected to it. In fact before the tour of duty came to an end the farm -was totally destroyed by shell fire and Battalion Headquarters had been -forced to make a hasty exit to Ebenezer Farm, which, being outside the -sector and unprovided with signal communications, was not ideal for the -purpose of a Headquarters. - -An extraordinary incident occurred during the last week of June, which -seems worth recording. One night a patrol of the 129th Baluchis left -the British lines to investigate the condition of the enemy's wire. -On its return one man, Ayub Khan, was missing and all endeavours to -recover his body were fruitless. The following evening Ayub turned up -again, and being taken before his company commander related how he had -entered the German trenches and passed himself off as a deserter. As is -well known the Germans were always anxious to secure the defection of -the native troops, and Ayub Khan's arrival was therefore hailed with -enthusiasm. He was taken to the rear and examined carefully. Having -kept his eyes open and seen all he could, Ayub Khan persuaded the -Germans to let him return to our trenches in order to bring more of -his friends over. In a weak moment the Germans agreed to let him go; -but instead of greeting Ayub and his party of fellow-deserters, they -were faced a few days later with a notice board which was displayed on -our parapet commenting on the incident in suitable terms. Not being -a humourist, the Hun lost his temper, and it is at this point in the -story that the 1/4th Londons become concerned. The luckless notice -board was displayed on Crescent Trench then occupied by D Company. -At 8.30 a.m. on the 27th June the enemy opened on the board with 5.9 -howitzers, and almost the first shell hit Capt. Cart de Lafontaine's -Headquarters, causing him a severe attack of shell-shock and killing -his subaltern 2/Lieut. F. F. Hunt. All the morning the "hate" was -continued with great loss to D Company, and by midday the Crescent -Trench was practically obliterated. Company Sergt.-Major Risley showed -great coolness in controlling his men and withdrawing them as far as -was practicable out of the zone of fire, and set an excellent example -of steadiness under a most trying ordeal. He was subsequently awarded -the D.C.M. - -On the 16th June Major L. T. Burnett, who had been in temporary command -of the 1/4th Londons since the 26th April, was promoted Lieut.-Colonel -and appointed to command, Major G. H. M. Vine assuming the duties of -second in command. - -At the beginning of September, however, the Battalion was exceedingly -unfortunate in losing Major Vine, who was sent to hospital with eye -trouble, and Lieut.-Col. Burnett being on leave at the time the command -of the Battalion was assumed until his return by Lieut.-Col. Murray of -the 89th Punjabis. - -Early in August Capt. and Adjt. G. B. Scott also said farewell to -the Battalion on taking up an extra-regimental employment, and the -Adjutancy was given to Capt. W. G. Clark, D.S.O., and subsequently to -Capt. E. Giles. - -The following officers joined during August and September: - - Lieuts. R. V. Gery, D. J. Leonard, C. Gaskin. - - 2/Lieuts. S. E. Lyons, H. B. A. Balls, H. Jones, C. C. Spurr, A. G. - Sharp, R. Johnstone, W. J. Boutall, F. C. Fanhangel, S. E. H. - Walmisley, A. S. Ford, G. L. Goodes and H. J. M. Williams. - -In N.C.O.'s and men the Battalion was less fortunate, and up to the end -of September 3 N.C.O.'s and 14 men, all veterans of Neuve Chapelle or -Ypres, were the only reinforcements from home. - -The casualties in officers for the same period were: - - 2/Lieut. F. F. Hunt, killed. - - Capt. H. P. L. Cart de Lafontaine, wounded (shell-shock). - - Capts. H. W. Weathersbee and H. M. Lorden, and 2/Lieut. A. G. - Sharp, to hospital. - -Arrangements had now been completed for the launching of an offensive -on the high ground south of La Bassée Canal in the direction of Loos -and Hulluch. The opening day of the offensive had been fixed for the -25th September, and as the Indian Corps was not concerned with the main -action it will be needless for us here to review the course of events -south of the Canal. - -North of the Canal, however, a subsidiary operation of some magnitude -had been organised with the strategic object of increasing the pressure -on the German defences north of La Bassée to such an extent that he -would be compelled under the strain of our main offensive in the south -to relinquish the La Bassée line altogether and retire to the east of -the Aubers Ridge. - -To this end an ambitious programme had been drawn up for the Indian -Corps which temporarily included the newly arrived 19th Division. The -preliminary attack was to be made by the Meerut Division under cover -of a smoke and gas attack to the north of Neuve Chapelle, with the -object of establishing a new line in the first instance along the road -from the Ducks Bill to Mauquissart. The experience of previous actions -having clearly shown that initial success had frequently been converted -into subsequent failure by a delay in following up the first advance, -it was arranged that the Jullundur and Ferozepore Brigades and the 19th -Division should be prepared immediately to exploit whatever success -should be gained by the Meerut Division by pushing forward at once to -the line Moulin d'Eau--La Tourelle--east edge of Bois du Biez, while -the Sirhind Brigade "leap-frogged" through them to Lorgies. It was -hoped that considerable moral effect might be obtained by the use of -poison gas against the Germans, and to magnify this as much as possible -arrangements were made for the building up of smoke screens, one by the -Meerut Division to cover the left flank of its attack and one by the -Jullundur Brigade on the right of the attack; for the projection of a -heavy smoke cloud by the Ferozepore Brigade on the Rue du Bois and by -the 19th Division (holding the extreme Southern Section, south of the -Boar's Head salient); and for an attempt simultaneously to set fire to -the Bois du Biez by means of incendiary bombs. - -Systematic wire cutting on either side of the La Bassée Road was -begun on the 21st September, and a feint attack was conducted by the -Ferozepore Brigade late in the afternoon of the 22nd in conjunction -with the divisional artillery. This feint attack took the form of a -heavy bombardment of the enemy's front line by all available guns, -starting at about 5 p.m. After five minutes the guns lifted on to the -enemy's support line and the infantry in the line (Connaughts and 57th -Rifles) by means of rifle fire, lifting dummies on to the parapet and -flashing their bayonets, endeavoured to produce an impression among -the Germans that an attack was imminent. In the midst of the confusion -caused to the Germans by this demonstration our artillery once more -shortened its range, firing shrapnel on the enemy's front line. It was -believed that this feint attack had the desired effect: the fire of -our guns was certainly accurate and well distributed, and elicited but -little reply from the enemy. The hostile machine-gun fire, moreover, -betrayed some perturbation inasmuch as it was extremely erratic, the -bullets passing high over the Rue du Bois and doing no damage. The -1/4th Londons were at this period in Lansdowne Post. - -On the 23rd the weather changed, and the favourable dry season which -had given such promise of success for our schemes gave way to heavy -rains. The wind, too, veered round to the south-east so that it blew -towards our lines instead of towards the enemy's. This was particularly -disastrous as it would nullify the effect of the smoke screens and -render the use of gas impossible. It was determined, however, to do -all possible to carry the offensive through to success, and the Lahore -Division was ordered to be completely ready to move forward by 6 a.m. -on the 25th September. - -Once more, however, the attempt to advance on this front was foiled. -Possibly the feint attack on the 22nd had been somewhat too theatrical -to impress the enemy and had merely indicated our intentions to him. -Certain it was, however, that on the 25th he was holding his trenches -in particular strength and there remained stolidly throughout the day -in spite of our smoke screens and demonstrations, to which he replied -with vigorous machine-gun and shell fire. The attempt of the Meerut -Division to push forward proved abortive, and the Lahore Division was -unable to get forward, there being not the least sign of weakening on -the enemy's front opposite to them. There is no doubt that this failure -was in part at least due to the treachery of the elements. The smoke -screen was utterly ineffective; gas could not be used at all. - -The 26th saw the general situation unchanged and the enemy still -sitting in his front line and showing not the least disposition to -leave it. - -On the evening of the 26th the 1/4th Londons relieved the 57th Rifles -in a line of reserve posts on the Rue du Bois in the vicinity of -Chocolat Menier Corner (Dog, Cat, Pall Mall and "Z" Orchard Posts). - -The weather had now definitely broken and heavy rains fell, reducing -the trenches to veritable seas of mud. The Battalion continued to -occupy the Keeps until the evening of the 30th, the duty having passed -quietly with the exception of a small amount of enemy shell fire; but a -large proportion of the shells being "blind" no casualties were caused. -On relief on the 30th the 1/4th Londons once more withdrew to Lansdowne -Post. On the 2nd October the Ferozepore Brigade was relieved by the -19th Division and moved out to billets in the La Gorgue-Riez Bailleul -area. Here it remained resting and training for a week, throughout -which the weather remained vile in the extreme. - -On the 11th October the Ferozepore Brigade once more took over the -Neuve Chapelle sector from the Jullundur, the 1/4th Londons occupying -the right subsector with a detachment of the 89th Punjabis[2] in Hills -Redoubt and Battalion Headquarters in Sandbag Alley. On the left of the -1/4th Londons the Brigade sector was taken up as far as Château Road by -the 57th Rifles while the Connaughts were on the extreme left as far as -Sunken Road. - -[2] The 89th Punjabis reached France in June and replaced the 9th -Bhopals in the Ferozepore Brigade. - -Two days later the Ferozepore Brigade conducted a second feint attack -in conjunction with other operations which it is not necessary to -detail. On this occasion the feint was timed to take place shortly -after midday, the morning being occupied by our guns in a systematic -wire-cutting shoot, which was followed by a heavy bombardment of the -enemy trenches during the projection of the smoke screen. Following -the smoke screen, smoke barrages were formed on the flanks of the -feint attack at 1.45 p.m., and simultaneously with them the infantry -in the line operated with rifle fire and demonstrations similar to -those employed on the former occasion to give the illusion of a -pending attack. The wind again was unfavourable, this time blowing -the smoke along No Man's Land between the lines instead of over the -enemy's trenches; and owing to the strength of the wind the smoke -screen never became dense enough to conceal the bomb guns by which it -was delivered. During the whole period of the operation our front and -rear lines were subjected to a heavy fire from the enemy's artillery, -which caused very great damage to our breastworks and wire, guns as -heavy as 8-inch being employed with great intensity between 12.45 and -1.30 p.m. This bombardment caused large numbers of casualties in the -1/4th Londons, it being impossible to clear, even temporarily, the -bombarded trenches owing to the necessity of maintaining as intensely -as possible the bursts of rifle fire in accordance with the scheme. -It is a matter of grave doubt as to whether these demonstrations were -worth the casualties they cost; and it seems abundantly evident that no -useful purpose can have been served by carrying through a prearranged -scheme essentially dependent on the weather when the conditions on -the appointed day were unfavourable. Perhaps the best comment on the -undertaking is to be found in the orders for the operation, which -included a warning to the effect that "dummies must not be raised too -high so as to show the sticks, as they were before"! - -After the disturbance caused by this operation the sector relaxed to -a condition of remarkable calmness, which was maintained during the -remainder of the tour of duty. This came to an end on the night of the -27th October when the Ferozepore Brigade was relieved for the last time -in France by the Jullundur. The 1/4th Londons were relieved by the 4th -Suffolks and withdrew to billets on the Merville Road at Estaires, the -remainder of the Brigade concentrating in the same area. - -The casualties for the month of October included Lieuts. C. Gaskin and -D. J. Leonard, both wounded, the latter accidentally. During this rest -a reinforcement of about fifty N.C.O.'s and men joined the Battalion. - -Rumour had been active for some time as to the possible transference -of the Indian Corps to another theatre of operations, and on the 31st -notification was received that the Lahore Division would embark at -Marseilles early in November, but that the Territorial units would not -accompany it. The gradual withdrawal of the Division from the line -had in fact begun, and when the 1/4th Londons returned to the reserve -trenches in Loretto Road on the 4th November it had said good-bye to -its good friends of the Ferozepore Brigade and was temporarily attached -to the Jullundur. The following day its attachment was transferred -to the Sirhind Brigade, the Jullundur having also made its final -withdrawal from the line. - -On the 7th the Battalion relieved the 27th Punjabis (Sirhind) at -Ludhiana Lodge, and provided detachments to hold Church and Hills -Redoubts and Curzon Post, the front line being held by the 4th King's. -The three Territorial battalions of the Division, the 4th Londons, -4th King's, and 4th Suffolks were all now unattached and were handed -over to XI Corps, who were taking over the line from the Indians with -the Guards and 46th Divisions, and a few days of constant change of -positions ensued during the progress of the relief. - -On the 8th the 1/4th Londons withdrew to Loretto Road. This day the -long connection of the Battalion with the Indian Corps, with which -it had passed through pleasant and rough times alike on terms of the -closest friendship, was finally severed. Lieut.-Col. Burnett, Capt. W. -G. Clark, D.S.O., and a detachment of the Battalion marched to Croix -Barbée to bid good-bye to the divisional commander, Major-Gen. Keary. -In the course of an address to the detachment the General said that on -the occasion of the departure of the Indian Corps from France and the -consequent severance of the Battalion from the Division, he wished to -express his thanks to the regiment for the good work they had done. -Their loyalty and devotion to duty had been worthy of all praise, their -bearing in action left nothing to be desired, and their discipline had -been excellent throughout. On conclusion of this address the General -handed Lieut.-Col. Burnett a written Order of the Day. - -On the 10th the Battalion moved forward into Brigade reserve at Pont -Logy, and this day was attached to the 137th Brigade of the 46th -Division. The weather was still exceedingly wet, the trenches full of -water, and the conditions in the line owing to the lack of dugouts -were unusually uncomfortable. On the evening of the 14th the Battalion -finally left the Neuve Chapelle area, billeting at Croix Barbée for -the night and continuing its journey the following day by motor-bus -to Lillers, where it became attached to the 140th Brigade of the 47th -(London) Division. - -This concludes the first phase of the 4th London Regiment's service in -France. The year 1915 all along the line had been one of equilibrium -after the defensive battles of 1914. - -We have said enough of the Battalion's life in the Indian Corps to -indicate that the year 1915 was one of very hard work and continued -strain on all ranks. Out of 255 days spent in the Lahore Division the -Battalion was actually in trenches for 142 days, in reserve billets -providing working parties for 76 days, and at rest only for 37 days; -and although it was worn out and weak when it withdrew to Lillers in -November it was a thoroughly seasoned fighting battalion, every officer -and man of which was an experienced soldier. - - - - -CHAPTER VI - -THE 1/4TH BATTALION IN THE 47TH DIVISION - - -The 47th (London) Division to which the 1/4th Londons were now attached -had just withdrawn for a period of rest and reorganisation from the -trenches around Loos where they had seen a good deal of heavy fighting -in the battle of the 25th September. The Division had come out from -England in March 1915 and had first been engaged as the extreme right -Division of the British Army at Festubert in May. Although serious -losses had been suffered in the attacks on Hill 70 in September, -the battalions of the Division had subsequently received strong -reinforcements from home, and the majority of them were far larger -than the 1/4th Londons who, at the date of attachment to the Division, -numbered only 24 officers and 435 other ranks. - -The Division, which was under command of Major-Gen. C. St L. Barter, -K.C.B., K.C.V.O., comprised the following Infantry Brigades: - - 140TH INFANTRY BRIGADE--Brig.-Gen. G. Cuthbert, C.B. - - 1/4th London Regiment (Royal Fusiliers). - 1/6th " " (Rifles). - 1/7th " " - 1/8th " " (Post Office Rifles). - 1/15th " " (Civil Service Rifles). - - 141ST INFANTRY BRIGADE - - 1/17th London Regiment (Poplar and Stepney Rifles). - 1/18th " " (London Irish Rifles). - 1/19th " " (St Pancras). - 1/20th " " (Blackheath and Woolwich). - - 142ND INFANTRY BRIGADE - - 1/3rd London Regiment (Royal Fusiliers). - 1/21st " " (First Surrey Rifles). - 1/22nd " " (The Queen's), Kennington. - 1/23rd " " (East Surrey, Clapham Junction). - 1/24th " " (The Queen's), Bermondsey. - - PIONEER BATTALION - - 4th Royal Welsh Fusiliers. - -The Division was attached to the IV Corps (Rawlinson) of the First Army -(Haig). - -The first day after arrival at Lillers (16th November 1915) was -devoted by the Battalion to cleaning up uniforms and equipment which -had, through the prolonged duty in waterlogged trenches, become caked -with weeks of mud. The general discipline of the 47th Division and of -the 140th Brigade in particular was exceedingly good; and although -the battle discipline of the Lahore Division had been excellent, and -the training and experience which the 1/4th Londons had gained while -attached to it of the highest order, yet it cannot be gainsaid that -the parade discipline among the Indian Brigades had not been given -that amount of attention which the long years of war showed to be -necessary, even in the field, to ensure the best results in action. We -have already indicated that this weakness in the Indian Brigades arose -through their continual deficiency in numbers and the consequent long -periods of trench duty which had been imposed on them. - -The sudden change, therefore, from trench duty to a period of rest, in -which ceremonial mounting of guards and drill were prominent features, -created a totally new environment for the Battalion which was entirely -beneficial. - -The whole Battalion, from the Commanding Officer to the most recently -arrived draft, was determined to maintain the reputation of the -Battalion; and by dint of hard work on and off parade the 4th Londons -became rapidly second to none in the Brigade in all the duties they -were called upon to carry out--and they were the more impelled to this -effort by the realisation that they were the senior Battalion of the -Brigade, not only in precedence, but also in point of active service -experience. - -At Lillers the Brigade spent about a month, passed for the most part in -very cold and wet weather, in a thorough course of training, in which -particular attention was paid to drill and bombing. At this period -the question of the thorough organisation of bombing--or as they were -then called "grenadier"--sections with the proper quota of bayonet -men, throwers and carriers was attracting a great deal of thought, -and the time devoted to this particular branch of the art of war was -subsequently found, as will be seen later, to have been well spent. - -Each Battalion mounted daily a quarter guard and an inlying piquet -of one officer, two sergeants, and thirty rank and file, and the -ceremonial mounting of these duties was carried cut with all possible -pomp on the Grande Place at Retreat. - -In addition to this the peace-time system of "extra drills" as a minor -punishment was re-instituted--not perhaps an altogether pleasant -recollection for some--but in spite of the disadvantages such a system -must always have in the eyes of those for whose particular benefit it -is devised, there can be no question that this tightening of discipline -had in the end a beneficial effect on all ranks, the extent of which it -is impossible to overestimate. - -The training period was varied by inter-battalion sports and football -matches in which the 1/4th Londons achieved some success, beating the -7th Battalion 3-1, and the 6th Battalion 3-1. On the whole the month -passed smoothly with very little incident worthy of mention beyond a -two-day divisional route march which took place on the 1st and 2nd -December. - -On the 6th December the 1/4th Londons suffered a loss in the death -of Sergt. Bench, who had very efficiently carried out the duties of -Transport Sergeant since the Battalion's arrival in France, his death -being the result of injuries caused by a fall from his horse. - -During the training at Lillers a most gallant action was performed by -Lieut. H. Jones. While practising throwing with live bombs one of the -men dropped a bomb with the fuse burning. At great risk Lieut. Jones -picked up the bomb and threw it out of the trench, where it at once -exploded. His bravery undoubtedly saved several lives. - -In January, the Battalion was joined by Lieut. V. C. Donaldson. - - * * * * * - -The front of attack in the Battle of Loos had extended from the La -Bassée Canal on the left, where our lines were faced by the village of -Auchy, to the village of Loos on the extreme right. In this attack the -first objective was the line of the Lens-Hulluch-La Bassée Road, the -frontage being divided more or less equally by the Vermelles-Hulluch -Road, which ran directly out from our trenches towards the Germans. - -North of this dividing line were three very serious obstacles, namely, -Auchy itself defended by impassable wire entanglements; a work of large -area and enormous strength known as the Hohenzollern Redoubt; and a -group of Quarries close to the Lens-Hulluch Road. - -The 9th and 7th Divisions had met with great initial success on the -25th September 1915, the former overrunning the Hohenzollern Redoubt -and gaining a position beyond it on a large slag-heap known as Fosse -8, while elements of the 7th Division sweeping the enemy's defence of -the Quarries before them had gained the outskirts of Cité St Elie and -Hulluch beyond the Lens-Hulluch Road. The unfortunate check to the -advance of the 2nd Division at Auchy, however, had exposed the left -flank of the 9th Division, who were afterwards ejected from Fosse 8, -while the 7th on their right had been unable to retain their advanced -positions across the main road. - -Desperate fighting ensued for the possession of these strongholds -until the conclusion of the battle about 13th October. At that date -the Germans retained possession of the whole of the Quarries and the -greater part of the Hohenzollern Redoubt. Between the two the British -had driven a wedge so that the part of the Hohenzollern which remained -in the enemy's hands formed an abrupt salient, of which the west face -was formed by a trench irreverently named by the British "Little -Willie," and the south face by its obvious companion "Big Willie." -Connecting the eastern extremity of Big Willie with the north-west -corner of the Quarries the Germans remained in possession of Potsdam -Trench, while the Quarries themselves formed another but smaller -salient in the enemy's lines, well flanked on the south-east side by -our positions, which caused a second abrupt turn to the east in the -enemy lines. - -The whole area between these confused positions was a vast maze of -earthworks, for they were in the midst of what had, prior to the -battle, been a strong German third system of defence and No Man's -Land was traversed by innumerable short communication trenches and -saps, held by the opposing garrisons by means of barricades, for the -possession of which an unceasing and murderous struggle with bombs -and trench mortars was still proceeding. In addition to these deadly -conflicts a still more subtle warfare was being waged underground, -where our Tunnelling Companies were fighting a battle of wits with the -Germans by mining and counter-mining, and the blowing of mines followed -by fierce local infantry fights for possession of the craters thus -formed were of frequent recurrence. - -A reference to a large map will render clear the extreme importance to -the enemy of the possession of these two positions. Situate as they -were, one on each of the two lowest spurs of the Vermelles-Hulluch -Ridge, their capture by the British would have involved a very serious -threat to the German defences on the line Auchy-Haisnes, and might -easily have been a prelude to the outflanking of La Bassée itself. -The enemy was obviously alive to these possibilities, and the daily -intelligence reports gleaned from our patrols and observers made it -abundantly clear that he was strengthening his trenches and wire, and -was burrowing strenuously in opposition to our mining operations. - - * * * * * - -This severely contested part of the front was taken over by the 47th -Division from the 9th between the 13th and the 15th December, C Section -opposite the Quarries and D Section opposite the Hohenzollern Redoubt -being occupied by the 141st and 142nd Brigades, the 140th Brigade -remaining in reserve. - -For some time after the return to the line the 1/4th Londons did not -enter the trenches as a battalion, but on account of its small numbers -was retained in reserve, where it performed a great deal of heavy -labour in working and carrying parties for the rest of the Brigade. - -On the 15th the 1/4th Londons moved from Lillers at 8.30 a.m., -entraining for Nœux-les-Mines, whence it marched to billets at -Labourse, training being continued while the Brigade remained in -reserve. - -This move was followed by a further approach to the line which took -place on the 19th December, when the 140th Brigade relieved the 141st -in C 1 and C 2 Sections, opposite the Quarries, the 6th and 15th -Battalions occupying the front trenches with the 7th Battalion in -support at Le Philosophe and the 4th and 8th Battalions in Brigade -reserve at Noyelles-les-Vermelles. - -Here the 1/4th Londons' duties in carrying and trench working parties -in the forward areas were severe as the reserve billets were some three -miles from the front line trenches. - -The most active part of the Brigade's new front was C 2, the subsection -now garrisoned by the 15th Londons, where on the left of the Quarries -the continuous struggle already referred to in sapping, bombing and -mining was proceeding with particular violence. The centre of this -fighting was a work held by the British, known as the Hairpin, and -two saps, Essex Trench and Shipka Pass, which pushed forward from the -Hairpin towards the German lines. Essex Trench in particular was the -scene of much hard fighting, for the Germans were in occupation of the -further end of it and were separated from our garrison by a double -barricade. This trench and Shipka Pass were coveted by the Germans, -as it was through them that they hoped to obtain a lodgment in the -Hairpin, the possession of which would secure the right flank of their -salient at the Quarries and render their precarious tenure of that -feature much more secure. With this object they had on the night of the -17th launched a determined bombing attack along Essex Trench and Shipka -Pass, the enemy bombers being well supported by trench mortar and rifle -grenade fire. Our garrisons, however, were ready, and none of the enemy -reached our barricades, and their attack was finally dispersed by our -artillery. - -This attempt was renewed in the early hours of the 20th, when so -vigorous an attack was delivered that the 15th London bombers in Essex -Trench were forced back from their barricade for some 20 yards, and -were unable for the moment to organise a counter-attack as the Germans -had constructed "arrow head" trenches flanking his sap, so that he -was able to bring fire to bear on our garrison from three points -simultaneously. - -After a personal reconnaissance the Brigadier decided on making the -same evening a bid for the recovery of the lost trench. The 15th London -bombers having already suffered considerable loss, they were reinforced -during the day by the Battalion bombers of the 1/4th Londons, who -moved up to the Hairpin. The day passed quietly but for some accurate -shelling of our positions to the right of the Quarries, which was -stopped by our heavy guns. At 9.45 p.m. our attack was delivered by -three parties of bombers simultaneously--one in Essex Trench, one in a -neighbouring sap, and one moving over the open, flanking support being -given by machine-guns posted in Shipka Pass and west of the Quarries. - -The first attack failed, the Essex Trench party on reaching our -old barricade coming once more under a shower of bombs from three -directions, while the sap party found progress impossible owing to -the waterlogged condition of the sap, and the party in the open were -brought to a standstill by machine-gun fire. Second and third attempts -proved equally unsuccessful, and after the 23rd December attacks were -discontinued though the enemy portion of Essex Trench was kept under -constant trench mortar fire. - -Through all these days the 1/4th London bombers remained in line, -taking an active part in the unceasing battle of bombs which was -pursued between the barricades, practically without intermission, and -unhappily a large number of casualties was caused. - -On the 22nd December a special Order of the Day was received in which -Sir John French said farewell to the troops on the occasion of his -relinquishment of the Commander-in-Chief; and on the same day Sir Henry -Rawlinson handed over command of the IV Corps to General Wilson. - -Orders were received on the 23rd that in consequence of certain signs -of activity on the enemy's part, the line would be held in greater -strength for the ensuing forty-eight hours, and in accordance with the -prearranged defence scheme the 1/4th Londons occupied the old British -front line in front of Vermelles early on the morning of the 24th. At -8 a.m. a mine near the Hohenzollern Redoubt was blown by the British, -the crater being successfully occupied by troops of the 141st Brigade. -The Artillery activity caused by this operation dying down shortly -afterwards, the 1/4th Londons and other units in reserve returned to -their billets later in the day. - -During this tour of duty the Brigade Light Trench Mortar Battery, which -was in line in the Hairpin sector, was joined by 2/Lieut. Goodes. The -Battery did exceedingly good work during the fighting in the Hairpin. -When the 1/4th Londons left the 47th Division Goodes remained with 47/1 -L.T.M. Battery, and was killed at High Wood in September 1916, having -been decorated, for his consistently gallant service, with the Military -Cross and Bar. - -Christmas Day passed in the line without particular incident beyond the -daily "hates" of shells and bombs, and this year, in consequence of -special orders, no attempt was permitted to indulge in the remarkable -fraternisation with the enemy which had occurred during the first -Christmas of the war. - -On the 26th the relief of the 140th Brigade by the 142nd in C Section -commenced, and the following day the 1/4th Londons withdrew to new -billets at Sailly Labourse. - -In Divisional reserve the Brigade devoted a few days to the usual -routine of baths, cleaning, refitting and training, and on the last -day of the year once more entered the trenches, but on this occasion -in D Section, the left sector of the Divisional front, which it took -over from the 141st Brigade, the 6th and 15th Battalions once more -occupying the front system, the 8th Battalion in support to them, -while the 7th who joined the 4th at Sailly Labourse were with the 4th -in Brigade reserve. The new sector included the trenches opposed to -the Hohenzollern Redoubt, and extended to the left to the vicinity -of the Vermelles-Auchy railway. During the Brigade's short tenure of -the sector the usual shelling and trench mortar activity continued -but without incident of any particular interest. The 1/4th Londons -continued in the wearisome and unpicturesque task of supplying working -parties. - -During the 2nd, 3rd and 4th of January 1916, the relief of the 47th -Division by the Dismounted Division took place, the 140th being -relieved on the morning of the 3rd by the 1st Dismounted Brigade, -withdrawing on relief to a group of villages some seven miles behind -the line in the Béthune area, the 1/4th Londons billeting at Drouvin, -and the remainder of the Brigade being distributed between Verquin and -Mouchin. - -This relief was merely the first stage of a "side-step" which the -Division was making towards the south, and on the following day the -Brigade moved _via_ Nœux-les-Mines to Les Brebis and made arrangements -for the taking over of a sector of the line south of Loos from the -French. - -The 1/4th Londons' service in the Hulluch area had been arduous owing -to the long marches imposed on the working parties in addition to their -tasks, but it had fortunately, except among the bombers, not been a -costly one, and its strength had not very much decreased since the date -of its joining the Division. - -During December a few officer reinforcements were received as follows: -2/Lieuts. H. G. Beal, C. W. Cragg, J. Elliott and E. W. Monk, and -during January the Battalion was joined by 2/Lieut. C. F. P. de Pury -(to D Company). - -During December also the Quartermaster (Lieut. E. S. Tomsett) went on -leave during which he fell sick, not returning to the Battalion until -the 15th March 1916. In his absence his duties were carried out by -2/Lieut. S. E. H. Walmisley. - -In the New Year's Honours List the names of Lieut.-Col. L. T. Burnett, -Capt. W. G. Clark, D.S.O., and Capt. J. R. Pyper were mentioned in -despatches and a few weeks later the award of the Military Cross to -Captain Pyper was announced. - -The new sector taken over by the 47th Division involved relief of the -18th French Division, and a consequent extension southwards of the -British lines. This sector roughly comprised the lines in front of -the villages of Maroc and Loos, and had first been taken over from -the French in June 1915. The 47th Division had fought in this part -of the line in the battle of Loos, and carried the British positions -forward through Loos village up to the famous Double Crassier, and on -to the lower slopes of Hill 70. Subsequently the French had once more -taken the position over from them. This sector was divided into two -subsectors known respectively as Maroc and Loos, the Maroc subsector -on the right including some 1000 yards of trench extending from the -vicinity of the Grenay-Lens railway to the extreme southern limit of -the British advance in September 1915 and also about 1700 yards of the -new positions then gained; while the Loos sector comprised entirely new -positions gained in September and extended for some 1700 yards to the -left completely covering Loos village and the well-known "Tower Bridge." - -On the night of the 5/6 January the 140th Brigade entered the Maroc -sector, the 141st occupying the Loos sector with the 142nd in -Divisional reserve. The difficulties of the relief were somewhat -increased owing to the fact of taking over French troops, and the -difference of language was the inevitable cause of some delay, but -finally, however, matters were successfully adjusted and the 140th -Brigade was left in possession with the 1/4th Londons occupying the -right subsection, on a frontage of some 800 yards opposite the "Fosse -16 de Lens"; the 7th Londons in the right-centre subsection, the 15th -Londons in the left-centre subsection, which included the Double -Crassier, and the 6th Londons on the left. The 8th Battalion were in -reserve with two companies in South Maroc, and two in the old British -front line just in rear of the Double Crassier, which was the danger -point of the Brigade sector, not only on account of the observation of -our lines which it afforded the enemy but also because it lay at the -apex of an abrupt re-entrant in the British front line. - -In this sector the 1/4th Londons found their own supports which were -billeted in cellars in South Maroc, a mining village built on the -unattractive "square" plan of American cities, and consisting of -innumerable rows of artisans' dwellings, then unhappily in a state of -complete ruin. The cellars of these dwellings, however, still afforded -sufficient cover for the concentration unobserved by the Germans of a -considerable body of troops, and the Germans were evidently somewhat -disturbed at the prospect of this for their artillery, both light and -heavy, paid continual attention to the village both day and night. - -This sector having once more come into occupation by British troops -an enormous amount of work was immediately necessary to complete the -front line and company supplies of small arms ammunition, bombs, rifle -grenades and trench stores of all sorts; and this support and reserve -companies were kept busily engaged in this work throughout the tour of -duty. - -In this sector also the steel shrapnel helmet first made its -appearance, so far as the 1/4th Londons were concerned. It is amusing -to look back on the distrust with which its advent was first regarded -by all ranks alike--although afterwards, when once its efficiency and -protective qualities had been tested, it was as highly prized as it had -been previously shunned. The first issue was made at the rate of one -helmet per fire bay, the honour of wearing it falling to the man on -sentry duty for the time being, and most remarkably disinclined the men -were to assume this undesired badge of office. - -On the 9th the 140th Brigade was relieved in the line by the 142nd, -moving on the 13th into the Loos sector, where it took over the -trenches of the 141st Brigade. The 1/4th Londons did not take part in -this relief but remained in the right subsection, temporarily under -the orders of the 142nd Brigade, with the 22nd Londons on their left. -Here the Battalion remained until the 16th, when it was relieved by -the 17th Battalion, rejoining the 140th Brigade in rest billets at -Haillicourt. - -On the 19th January Lieut.-Col. L. T. Burnett left the Battalion on -short leave, and as it unfortunately proved, permanently, for he -fell seriously ill while on leave and was unable to return to duty -for nearly a year. The command was assumed during his absence by -Major W. G. Clark, D.S.O., while Major S. Elliott became temporarily -second in command. The loss of Lieut.-Col. Burnett was keenly felt. -His nine months' command had been marked by a striking advance in the -Battalion's efficiency and by the unswerving loyalty of all ranks under -his command. Later he joined the Reserve Battalion in England, being -subsequently transferred to employment in the War Office. - -At Haillicourt the Battalion spent a few days in rest and training -and returned to the trenches on the 24th January, occupying the same -subsector as on the previous occasion with the 7th Londons once more on -its left. - -This tour of duty was marked by particularly heavy artillery activity -on both sides, the Germans shelling our trenches and Maroc daily with -great accuracy and using a good deal of gas shell. A certain number of -casualties inevitably occurred, but, having regard to the continued -intensity of the bombardment, the number was remarkably small. - -On the 27th January the Kaiser's birthday was celebrated, and it was -somewhat confidently anticipated that, as in 1915, the Germans would -endeavour to score some success against the British. It had been known -for some time that enemy mining operations in this area had been -proceeding apace, and it therefore appeared not improbable that the -Germans would endeavour to time the firing of their mines for the 27th. -Preparations to meet this possibility were made. The Kaiser's birthday -did indeed prove to be a day of considerable activity, and though the -Germans delivered an abortive attack against the 15th Division on the -left no infantry movement occurred opposite the 140th Brigade; and -their activity was confined to shell fire, which assumed serious -proportions on the 27th and again on the 28th. Our artillery, however, -was ready with heavy retaliatory fire and by the evening of the 30th -conditions in the Maroc sector had reverted to something approaching -quietness. - -During this period the newly arrived 16th (Irish) Division of the -New Army was attached to the 47th Division for instruction in trench -warfare, the 1/4th Londons taking over the supervision of the 8th -Munsters, among whom unfortunately several casualties were caused by -hostile shell fire on the 30th. The 31st January was marked principally -by heavy British artillery fire, which elicited but little response -from the enemy and inflicted considerable damage on his wire and -defences generally. - -The following day the 140th Brigade handed over its trenches to the -142nd, the 1/4th Londons being relieved by the 21st Londons and -proceeding to rest billets in Haillicourt. - -This tour of duty really brought to a conclusion the Battalion's -service with the 47th Division, for though it did not part from the -Brigade until the 9th February, the intervening days were spent in -training, route-marching and cleaning. - -On the 8th Brig.-Gen. Cuthbert--then in temporary command of the -Division--inspected the 1/4th Londons prior to their departure, and -addressed the troops; and the following day the Battalion marched to -Béthune, entraining for Pont Remy (near Abbeville), and marched via -Hallencourt to Citerne, where it went into billets attached to the -168th Brigade of the newly formed 56th (London) Division, an attachment -which remained unbroken to the end of the War. - - - - -CHAPTER VII - -THE 2/4TH BATTALION IN MALTA, GALLIPOLI PENINSULA AND SOUTHERN EGYPT - - -On the departure from Malta of the 1st London Infantry Brigade on the -2nd January 1915, the 2/1st Brigade became responsible in its place for -the defence of the Fortress. - -The 2/4th Londons settled down at St George's Barracks to a vigorous -course of training. A musketry course under Fortress arrangements -was begun and also special classes for the Machine-Gun and Transport -sections, those for the latter being conducted by the A.S.C. at Musta -Fort. The Battalion also provided a detached company to continue the -duties of prisoner of war guard at Verdala Barracks, which had formerly -been carried out by a company of the 1/4th Battalion. - -Shortly after the relief of the garrison, Major J. F. F. Parr, -R.A.M.C.T., who had been medical officer of the 1/4th Londons, was -appointed to be M.O. in charge of Imtarfa Hospital. - -During the 2/4th Londons' duty in Malta they were frequently called -on to find the "public duties" consisting of an officer's guard at -the Governor's Palace in Valetta, and guards over various government -depôts, the first Palace Guard being found on the 9th February. - -The 10th February was celebrated as a festival on the island, being the -anniversary of St Paul's shipwreck, and the usual religious procession -took place. - -On the 11th February the Battalion moved from St George's Barracks to -Floriana Barracks, Valetta. - -The following day H.E. the Governor-General, General Sir Leslie Rundle, -G.C.B., G.C.V.O., K.C.M.G., D.S.O., and staff left Malta for England, -and on the 12th the new Governor-General (Field-Marshal Lord Methuen, -G.C.B., G.C.V.O., C.M.G.) arrived and took up his residence at the -Palace. - -At this period occurred two events of paramount importance which -materially affected the part which the Malta Station was destined to -play in the War. The first of these was the opening on the 25th April -1915 of combined military and naval operations against the Gallipoli -Peninsula; the second being the decision to throw in her lot with the -Allies of Italy, who declared war on Austria on the 22nd May 1915. - -The effect of the former of these events was to render British naval -supremacy in the Mediterranean, and consequently the security of the -Mediterranean Fleet Headquarters at Malta, of vital importance; and of -the second to ensure both desiderata not only by the relief from the -menace of a potential enemy at no great distance from the island, but -also by the accession to the Allied strength of the powerful Italian -Navy, which formed an additional protection to Malta against the -possibility of a surprise raid by Austria. - -From this date onwards, therefore, the function of Malta became one not -so much of a fortress as of a base of operations, and a highly useful -evacuating station for the casualties from Gallipoli who now began to -be drafted to the island in great numbers. The accommodation on the -island for hospitals being limited to the normal service requirements -of peace time, the congestion rapidly became serious, and the troops of -the garrison vacated their barracks, going under canvas in the barrack -squares in order to provide accommodation for the sick and wounded; the -2/4th Londons moving to the parade ground at Ghain Tuffieha Camp. - -On the 26th July a warning order was issued to the Battalion, which -was still regarded as a draft-finding unit to the 1/4th Battalion, to -prepare a draft of 400 other ranks to reinforce the 1/4th Battalion -in France. The resulting deficiency in the 2/4th Battalion was to -have been made up by a draft of equal size from the newly formed -4/4th Battalion in England, and although this latter draft actually -embarked at Southampton, the order was cancelled; and it appears that -the decision was made at this time, doubtless owing to the wastage -of personnel at Gallipoli, to treat the 2/4th Londons as a service -battalion and to leave the duty of provision of drafts for both the -1/4th and 2/4th Battalions to the 3/4th and 4/4th Battalions at home. - -The following officers were invalided home from Malta: Major J. F. F. -Parr, R.A.M.C.T., Capt. W. G. Hayward, 2/Lieuts. L. R. Chapman and N. -L. Thomas. The Battalion was joined on the 13th August by: 2/Lieuts. B. -F. L. Yeoman, H. G. Hicklenton, C. P. Darrington and N. W. Williams. -Capt. Hayward's duties as Adjutant were taken over by Capt. L. C. -Coates. - -On the 12th July Lieut. Simpson was ordered to join the 2nd Royal -Fusiliers, then attached to the 29th Division at the Dardanelles, and -was posted to the Machine-Gun Section of that Battalion. - -During this period training was proceeding to such extent as was -possible in view of the congested state of the island, and detachments -were supplied for fatigue duties at St Andrew's and St Patrick's Camps, -Imtarfa Hospital, and for coast defence at 9th Mile Stone (between St -Paul's and Salina Bays). - -On the 12th August three signallers of the Battalion, the first other -ranks to proceed on active service, left for the Dardanelles attached -for duty to H.M.S. _Euryalus_. Two days later a warning order was -issued for the Battalion to prepare for embarkation to Egypt. - -Before departure from Malta the 2/4th Londons were inspected on the -14th August by H.E. the Governor, who subsequently issued a Fortress -Order to the following effect: - - It is a pleasure to His Excellency to say with truth that it - has been a source of satisfaction to him to have had the four - Territorial battalions of the City of London Regiment under his - command. Their conduct has been excellent under trying conditions - lately on account of the heavy and unceasing fatigue work they have - had to perform. Their appearance in Valetta, the smart way in which - the men salute, the alacrity of the Main Guards in turning out, - all show the efficiency of the Battalions. His Excellency wishes - Officers, Non-Commissioned Officers and men "God Speed," and if - from Egypt they go to the Front he looks to them with confidence to - uphold the high reputation of the City of London Regiment. - -On August 19th camp at Ghain Tuffieha was struck and the Battalion -marched to Valetta, embarking next day on H.T. _Southlands_--which -sailed for Egypt on the 21st, arriving at Alexandria on the 25th. The -Battalion disembarked and marched to quarters under canvas at Sporting -Club Camp on the seashore, where it remained until October 6th. - -The strength on proceeding to Egypt was 30 officers and 765 other -ranks, the officers, N.C.O.'s and men who were not passed fit for -active service remaining under Lieut. V. W. Edwards in Malta for -garrison duty, until September 1916, when they returned to the Reserve -Battalion in England. - -At Alexandria the Battalion provided duties, including the Main and -Ras-el-tin Guards and town pickets; and also a detachment of 3 officers -and 100 other ranks at Keb-el-Dick Fort, from which further guards were -supplied for Chatty Cable Station, Supply Stores and other points of -importance. - -The Battalion was inspected by the Brigadier, the Earl of Lucan, on the -6th October, who in an address to the troops said: - - I have come here to-day to do something which is quite sad for me, - and that is to say good-bye to you. I wish you all every success, - good luck, and a safe return to England. I trust we shall all meet - again. - - I am proud that I have been in command of the 1st London Infantry - Brigade and am exceedingly sorry that I am not coming with you. I - had hoped that the four battalions of the London Regiment would - have gone to the Front as a Brigade. - - I much appreciate the hard work you all did at Malta and I send you - from here with every confidence that you will acquit yourselves in - the future as I know you have done in the past, and you will uphold - the great reputation you have gained. I feel sure you will do great - credit to yourselves and to the City of London Regiment wherever - you go. - -The commanding officer also received a letter from Major-Gen. Sir -A. Wallace, C.B., commanding the troops at Alexandria, expressing -his appreciation of the discipline and bearing of the Regiment and -affirming his conviction of the exemplary manner in which it would -carry out its duties on active service. - -The same day embarkation commenced on to H.T. _Karroo_ at Alexandria, -and on the 9th, under escort of two destroyers, the _Karroo_ sailed for -Mudros, arriving on the evening of 12th October. The following officers -did not accompany the Battalion to Mudros: - - Capts. G. H. Moore and H. Parkhouse (seconded for duty, in the - Censor's Office, Cairo). - - Lieut. H. W. Dennis (granted leave to England) and 2/Lieut. F. R. - C. Bradford (in hospital). - -For two days the Battalion remained on board in Mudros Harbour, but -on the 15th was transhipped to H.T. _Sarnia_, which put to sea about -3 p.m. At midnight the transport anchored off Cape Helles and the -Battalion disembarked on to the Gallipoli Peninsula at W. Beach and -bivouacked in dugouts in the early hours of the 16th October 1916. - -The Battalion was now attached to the Royal Naval Division, the -infantry of which consisted of the following units: - - ROYAL NAVAL DIVISION - Major-Gen. A. PARIS, C.B. - - 1ST BRIGADE--Brig.-Gen. David Mercer, C.B. - "Hawke" Battalion. - "Drake" " - "Hood" " - "Nelson" " - 2/3rd London Regiment. - 2/4th London Regiment. - - 2ND BRIGADE--Brig.-Gen. C. N. Trotman, C.B. - 1st Royal Marines. - 2nd Royal Marines. - "Anson" Battalion. - "Howe" " - 2/1st London Regiment. - 2/2nd London Regiment. - -The Division was attached with the 42nd (South Lancashire) and 52nd -(Lowland) Territorial Divisions to the VIII Corps (Lieut.-Gen. Sir -Francis Davies, K.C.B.). - - * * * * * - -The 2/4th Londons landed on the Peninsula at a critical period in the -fortunes of the expedition, and in order to render clear the position -of affairs in the middle of October, some reference is necessary to the -course which events had taken since the inception of the campaign. - -After witnessing the "amphibious battle" between British battleships -and the land forts of the Dardanelles, which took place on the 18th -March 1915, General Sir Ian Hamilton had formed the conclusion that -the Navy would be unable to open the way to Constantinople without the -fullest co-operation of all the military forces at his disposal. - -The Gallipoli Peninsula runs in a south-westerly direction from its -isthmus at Bulair, where it is spanned by fortified lines, for some -fifty-two miles to its extreme point, Cape Helles, attaining in its -centre a breadth of nearly twelve miles. - -The northern coast of the northern portion slopes abruptly towards -the Gulf of Zeros in a chain of hills extending as far as Cape Suvla, -the declivitous nature of the coastline precluding serious military -landings. In the southern half, which is more accessible from the -sea, the main features consist of Achi Baba, dominating the extreme -end of the Peninsula; Sari Bair Mountain, a succession of almost -perpendicular escarpments overlooking Suvla Bay; and the Kilid Bahr -plateau protecting the forts of the Narrows against attacks from the -north coast. - -As a result of a reconnaissance of this unpromising feature it became -abundantly evident to Sir Ian Hamilton that he could achieve success -and overcome the difficulties caused by the inadequacy of the landing -places and the improvements made by the Turks in their defences -since the 18th March, only by rapidly flinging ashore the largest -possible force at several landing places simultaneously. The glorious -achievement of the landings at Cape Helles and Anzac on the 25th April -are now matters of history, and lack of space makes it impossible to -repeat the epic here. We can only record the fact that in face of -innumerable difficulties and a murderous fire from the Turkish lines -and forts, landings were in fact effected. By the end of the month, -by dint of furious and practically continuous fighting, the French -and British were definitely though precariously established on the -south-west extremity of the Peninsula on a line running from sea to sea -about three miles north of Cape Helles. - -It was obviously essential to exploit the initial success as quickly as -possible in order to carry the Allied lines forward before the Turkish -reinforcements should arrive, and in spite of the exhaustion of the -troops, fighting of the most desperate character continued on both the -Helles and the Anzac fronts throughout May. But so enormously strong -were the Turkish entanglements and trenches, and so well placed their -machine-guns, that the Allied progress was slow and achieved only at -appalling cost. - -On the 6th-8th June a last attempt was made on the Helles front to -carry the village of Krithia and the slopes of Achi Baba, but this -attack met with a similar fate to its predecessors, and the nett result -after a severe struggle was an advance of some 200 yards; the line thus -gained representing the most advanced position ever occupied on this -front. - -As a result of strong representations by the Commander-in-Chief, fresh -forces were concentrated by the end of June consisting of the 10th, -11th and 13th Divisions of the New Armies, and the 52nd (Lowland), -53rd (Wessex) and 54th (East Anglian) Territorial Divisions, the two -last-named being represented by infantry only. - -The impossibility of attaining further success by frontal attacks at -Helles now being clear, Sir Ian Hamilton determined to employ his fresh -forces in endeavouring to strangle the Turkish defence by an attack -across the Peninsula from Anzac, in a south-easterly direction towards -Maidos; supported by a fresh landing farther up the coast at Suvla Bay. - -[Illustration: _V Beach, Cape Helles_] - -The new operation was launched on the 6th August. The main attack from -Anzac involved as a preliminary objective the occupation of the heights -of Sari Bair, the possession of which would enable us to bring rifle -fire to bear on the enemy communications with Helles and, moreover, -bring the Narrows within field-gun range. So nearly to success did -this attack attain that had it received the support which had been -anticipated from the Suvla Bay landing, with its consequent diversion -of Turkish reserves, there can be little doubt that the advance would -have developed into one of first-rate importance. New Zealand troops -did, in fact, scale the heights of the main ridge, but in subsequent -counter-attacks were forced to yield to the enemy, and the few hundred -yards of ground which stood between us and decisive victory were denied -to us. - -The actual landing at Suvla on the 8th was effected, as had been -hoped, as a complete surprise to the enemy, and met with little -resistance. But the exhaustion of the troops, caused by a failure -in the water supply arrangements, led to the waste of many valuable -hours of daylight in which no advance was possible and enabled the -enemy to prepare a stubborn resistance to our further attacks, and the -opportunity passed for ever. - -During August and September the supply of reinforcements and munitions -for the Dardanelles Army fell off seriously, and in the middle of -October the position had become stabilised. - -The general situation had indeed changed most unfavourably for our -chances of ultimate success. The wholesale retirement of our Russian -Allies during the summer had released large numbers of enemy reserves -for the Gallipoli theatre, and the recrudescence of enemy submarine -activity in the Ægean Sea increased the difficulties of supply and -transport from the bases at Mudros and Imbros, so that whereas the -Allied forces had indeed shot their bolt, the enemy's strength was -still increasing. - -Since the Suvla landing no further active operations had been -attempted, but constant pressure was maintained on the Turkish lines -by our trench garrisons in mining and bombing, while our artillery -continually harassed him in his advanced and rearward positions. - - * * * * * - -The 1st Brigade was out of the trenches on the arrival of the 2/4th -Londons and the first few days were therefore spent by the Battalion in -the rest camp at W. Beach (Cape Helles) in providing working parties -and unloading stores, while the senior officers of the Battalion -visited a sector of the trenches. The fact should not be overlooked -in connection with the 2/4th Battalion's record that owing to the -narrowness of our foothold on the Peninsula it was impossible to -withdraw troops, even when "at rest," beyond the shelled zone, and the -beaches were constantly under fire of heavy batteries on the Asiatic -side. - -On the 19th Oct. the Adjutant, Capt. L. C. Coates, was admitted to -hospital suffering from pleurisy and his duties were taken over by -Capt. J. R. Webster. - -The Allied lines on the Helles front stretched from sea to sea in a -direction from south-east to north-west about a thousand yards short of -Krithia village. The trench system was divided into two approximately -equal portions by the Krithia Road, which, connecting Krithia with the -village of Sedd-el-Bahr, near Cape Helles, traversed a ridge which -formed the backbone of this part of the Peninsula. On the right of the -road the lines were held by the French, their right flank (nearest -the Narrows) being drawn back slightly on the near side of a deep -gorge called Kereves Dere, the waters of which discharged into the -Dardanelles. On the left of the road the lines were in the occupation -of the VIII Corps, and were divided into three sections, of which at -this date the right was held by the 52nd, the centre by the Royal Naval -and the left, next the Ægean Sea, by the 42nd Division. - -The VIII Corps front was intersected by two deep ravines respectively -called Gully Ravine, near the Ægean coast, and Krithia Nullah on the -immediate left of the Krithia Road, and both of these, originating in -the slopes of Achi Baba, formed deep furrows through the British lines, -running towards the sea in a direction roughly parallel to the Krithia -Road. The high ground between the ravines formed a plateau covered -with scrub and gorse, and intersected in all directions by water -courses of less importance; the whole area being uncomfortably exposed -to direct observation from the Turkish defences on Achi Baba. All along -this front the British and Turkish lines were close together--in some -places only about 30 yards apart--and a continual and deadly warfare, -in which bombs played a prominent part, was being waged from sapheads -pushed out from the main defensive positions and held by barricades. - -The Royal Naval Division's subsector included several of such centres -of activity, notably at the Northern and Southern Barricades, on the -left, and at Worcester Barricade, a sap pushed forward from the Rue de -Paris, in the centre. - -The exposure of the whole British area to observation rendered -necessary the use of very long communication trenches, to afford cover -to the mule transport whereby the trench garrisons were supplied with -rations and trench stores. These wide mule tracks, doubled for upward -and downward traffic, were carried forward from the crest of the -plateau above the beaches at Cape Helles to within a few hundred yards -of the front trenches. - -On the 20th October the 1st R.N. Brigade relieved the 2nd Brigade in -the centre subsection, the forward system of trenches being occupied -by "Drake," "Nelson," "Hood" and "Hawke," the 2/4th Londons relieving -the 2/2nd Londons in the Eski line, a reserve line some 1500 yards in -rear of the most advanced trenches. The Battalion occupied this line -with two companies each side of the Eastern Mule Trench. The relief -was carried out without difficulty, but during the move forward from -bivouacs the Battalion incurred its first battle casualties, Capt. H. -Morris and Privates Housden and Maunder being wounded. - -At this time the Turkish Feast of Barram was proceeding, and when it -drew to a close on the evening of the 22nd it was anticipated with -some confidence that the enemy would attempt a demonstration against -the Allied positions. The only activity, however, was on our side and -our batteries both on land and sea gave the Turks a particularly hot -time during the evening. During this tour the weather began to break -and heavy rains fell, but apart from the wet condition of the trenches -and the consequent additional work in keeping them in repair the tour -of duty passed without incident of an unusual nature. On the 22nd half -the company officers and non-commissioned officers were attached for -instruction in the front line to the R.N. Battalions, their places -being taken after forty-eight hours by the other half. - -On the 27th the 2nd Brigade returned to the line relieving the 1st -Brigade, which withdrew on relief to the Rest Camp, the 2/4th Londons -handing over their positions in the Eski line to the 2/2nd Londons. - -This day General Sir Ian Hamilton handed over command-in-chief of the -Dardanelles Army to General Sir C. C. Monro, K.C.B. Sir Charles Monro's -duty on assuming command was in the first instance to report as to the -desirability, on purely military grounds, of evacuating the Peninsula, -and alternatively as to the force required to bring the campaign to -a successful issue. A reconnaissance of the position led him to the -conclusion that evacuation should be taken in hand, and the adoption -of this course received official approval, with results which will be -recorded in their place. - -In the Rest Camp the Battalion spent six days, which were occupied in -work on new winter quarters and dugouts, and which passed quietly but -for heavy shelling on the 29th October and the 1st November from enemy -batteries on the Asiatic shore; but fortunately no casualties were -suffered. - -The month of November was occupied in duty in and out of the line, -tours in the trenches being for seven days, followed by seven days in -the Rest Camp at Cape Helles. For both the tours in line the 2/4th -Londons were in reserve in the Eski lines though on each occasion -companies were sent in turn to the front trenches for instruction in -trench warfare. For this purpose they were attached to "Hawke," "Hood" -and "Drake" Battalions. - -[Illustration: GALLIPOLI PENINSULA--CAPE HELLES TRENCHES, 1915] - -The Turks at this period were comparatively quiet beyond a certain -amount of artillery fire, and for the companies in the Eski line the -time passed by no means unpleasantly. Engaged in strengthening and -improving the defences during working hours, they were allowed when -off duty to go in small parties down to Gully Beach on the Ægean -coast. These small excursions were the means of providing a change of -diet, for the men seldom returned without a good haul of fish, caught -by a stratagem in which, so rumour has it, the Mills Bomb figured -prominently. - -It was not long, however, before the Battalion discovered that their -worst enemy on the Peninsula was the elements. The summer heat had now -broken and the autumn rains were beginning with all their sub-tropical -violence. The Battalion's first introduction to these deluges occurred -on the 10th November, when, having just returned from the trenches to -the Rest Camp, it was treated to a violent rainstorm which flooded all -the dugouts and shelters. - -A week later when the 2/4th Londons had returned to the line a -thunderstorm burst over the lines and heavy rain fell for about two -hours, flooding many trenches and rendering them almost untenable. -This storm was followed by several days of rain and high wind which -inflicted considerable hardship on the troops, not only while they -were actually in the trenches but also by reason of the serious damage -caused to the Rest Camp, so that on coming out of the line when the -tour of duty was over the conditions of discomfort were unabated. - -This sort of incident, which recurred during the rainy season with -monotonous frequency, was far more productive of discomfort and ill -effects than it would have been on the Western front; since owing to -the restriction of space it was impossible to attain on the Peninsula -to anything approaching the degree of "back-of-the-line" organisation -which was reached in France. Wet clothes, therefore, remained wet -until the sun dried them, and the inevitable result was a constantly -high proportion of sickness, which during the last few months on the -Peninsula accounted for vastly more casualties than the enemy's -weapons. But under the most unpromising circumstances the British -soldier invariably manages to make himself as comfortable as possible -and to undergo severe privations with a sort of fatalistic and stoical -cheerfulness, which he vainly endeavours to conceal by much "grousing." -And so on the Peninsula, a locality scarcely associated as a rule with -ideas of amusement, a certain amount of recreation was obtained by -football matches, and by the efforts of the bands of the four London -battalions who played in different battalion areas each evening when -the Brigades were out of the trenches. The officers also were able to -obtain some exercise through the kindness of the officers of the 2nd -Royal Fusiliers (29th Division) who lent their horses, on which a few -pleasant 'longshore excursions' were made. - -The few days out of the trenches were occupied in supplying working -parties for the construction of the new winter quarters. - -On the 20th November the Battalion was issued with gas masks, and -received its first instruction in defensive measures against gas -attacks. It was believed at this time that steps were being taken -by the Turks to employ poison gas against the Allies, but none was -actually used against the 2/4th Londons. - -Hitherto the Battalion had fortunately suffered but few casualties at -the hands of the enemy, the total in all ranks amounting to 4 killed -and 5 wounded. Sickness, however, now began to take a heavy toll of all -units, and this became especially serious after the 26th November, on -which day a storm of unprecedented violence burst over the Peninsula, -accompanied by torrential rain, which rapidly filled the trenches and -forced the occupants on both sides on to the parapets, where they -crouched unable to move for fear of falling into the trenches and -being swept away by the torrents which poured down them and overflowed -on to the land adjoining. In the Rest Camps the dugouts were rapidly -flooded out and the troops spent a night of bitter exposure. In the -afternoon of the following day the wind suddenly shifted to the north, -and a biting frost ensued. The cold was agonising and the water froze -around the men's feet as they slept from sheer exhaustion. Greatcoats -which had been drenched by the rains were so stiffened by the frost -that they stood up by themselves. So severe was the cold that it was -only by keeping the men constantly at work with their shovels that -many were kept alive at all. On the 28th snow began to fall, and the -blizzard continued throughout the day and during the 29th. In the -meantime the sea had become very rough and the temporary quays and -breakwaters suffered great damage, both on the Peninsula and at Mudros -and Imbros, and this added seriously to the difficulties of the already -over-burdened transport services. - -During the first few days of December over 200 deaths occurred from -exposure and over 10,000 sick were evacuated from the Peninsula; -and from the statements of deserters it is probable that the Turks -suffered even more severely. A famous war correspondent who was at -Cape Helles at the time wrote: "Never probably since Crimean days have -British forces in the field had to endure such cold as the last days of -November brought to our men at the Dardanelles." - -On the 29th 2/Lieut. P. C. Darrington was evacuated to hospital.[3] - -[3] Darrington on recovery transferred to the 5th London Regiment -(L.R.B.) with whom he served till almost the end of the War, being -unhappily killed a few days before the Armistice. - -On the 1st December the 1st Brigade returned to the trenches and this -time the 2/4th Londons took over a sector of the front line between -"Drake" on the right, and "Hood" on the left. The sector included a -part of the front line known as Rue de Paris, from Sap B to Sap N, -which was occupied by A and C Companies, while D Company went into -support in Worcester Flats with B in reserve in Munster Terrace, the -machine-guns being in front line positions. This day the enemy's -artillery was more active than it had been for months, and for three -hours in the afternoon the British lines generally were subjected to a -violent bombardment by field guns and howitzers; but although an attack -was believed to be imminent no infantry movements developed, and in the -evening the situation became quieter. - -Although this tour of duty was not unusually active, there were -abundant signs of a considerable accession of strength behind the -Turkish lines, and daily his artillery became a little more active, -a good deal of shelling being caused by the registering of fresh -batteries on our lines. The Turkish snipers also became particularly -annoying, and their efficiency reflected itself in our casualty list -which, though not large, was somewhat longer than usual. On the -evenings of the 9th and the 11th the Turks employed a field searchlight -from behind Achi Baba, but the experiment was not repeated and led to -no incident of interest. - -Col. Dunfee was granted a month's leave of absence on urgent private -affairs, and left the Peninsula for England on the 5th, the command of -the Battalion devolving upon Major V. H. Seyd who continued in command, -with the acting rank of Lieut.-Col., until after the final evacuation -of the Peninsula, the duties of second in command being assumed by -Capt. R. N. Arthur. - -During this tour a draft of 49 N.C.O.'s and men under 2/Lieuts. J. -W. Price and S. Davis joined the 2/4th Londons from England, and was -posted to companies. 2/Lieuts. N. L. Thomas and F. R. C. Bradford -rejoined from hospital. - -The following is an extract from Battalion orders for the 12th December: - - The Commanding Officer would like to place on record that whilst - with the Grenade Section in the trenches last week No. 2827 Pte. - Hedger threw back a live grenade which had fallen into the trench, - thereby saving his comrades and himself from injury. - -On the 9th December a relief was effected, combined with a readjustment -of the boundaries of the Divisional sector on the arrival of the 29th -Division from the Suvla Bay front; and practically half the centre -subsection from Sap F (half-way along the 2/4th Londons' line) to the -left, occupied by two companies of the 2/4th Londons, "Hood" and -"Hawke," was handed over to the King's Own Scottish Borderers. On the -following morning A, B and C Companies and Battalion Headquarters -withdrew to the Rest Camp. D Company remained in line attached to -"Drake" until the 11th, when it rejoined the Battalion. - -This relief being, as already stated, carried out in the course of a -readjustment of the line, the Brigade spent only four days out of the -trenches, and on the 15th it took over a fresh sector facing Kereves -Dere on the right of Achi Baba Nullah. Of this new sector about 750 -yards were taken over from the 2nd R.N. Brigade while the French troops -were relieved in about 250 yards of trench adjoining on the right. The -sector was occupied with "Nelson" on the left, and "Drake" and A and -B Companies, 2/4th Londons, on the right. Battalion Headquarters and -C and D Companies occupied the Eski line in rear of the new sector, -in this part called the Tranchée d'Amade, with one company each side -of the junction with the main communication trench, the Avenue de -Constantinople. - -The days following the occupation of this sector were marked by -considerable activity on the part of the enemy's bombers. The hostile -trenches opposite the 2/4th Londons were on an overage about 70 yards -from the British front line and numerous saps had been pushed out -toward them, from the heads of which the struggle continued without -cessation, the Grenadiers on each side plying their objectionable trade -without abatement. - -On the 17th B Company relieved A Company in the front trenches. Capt. -F. C. J. Read this day was evacuated to hospital, being followed there -next day by Lieut. R. C. Dickins. - -On the 20th December the announcement was made in Corps orders of the -successful evacuation of the Suvla and Anzac positions which had taken -place during the night of the 19th. - -The details of the scheme for this evacuation had been carefully -worked out by Sir William Birdwood who had been appointed to command -of the Dardanelles Army on the formation of the Salonika Army (Sir C. -C. Monro assuming supreme command of the Mediterranean Forces). The -scheme provided for the completion of this difficult operation in three -stages, the first of which involved the embarkation of all troops, -animals and supplies not required for a prolonged campaign; this was -to be followed by the evacuation of troops, guns, stores, etc., not -immediately required for the defence of our positions, while the third -and final stage consisted of the embarkation of the rearguard troops -and the destruction of all guns, animals and stores which could not be -removed. - -The actual evacuation had been fixed for as early a date as possible -owing to the improbability of the long continuance of favourable -weather; and at both Suvla and Anzac the process was completed without -a hitch of any kind, only a small quantity of stores having to be -destroyed, and without any interference on the part of the enemy. - -Almost immediately after this operation a marked increase in the -Turkish activity on the Helles front took place, probably on account of -the release of large numbers of his batteries in the evacuated sectors. - -In announcing the completion of this operation, the special order of -the day affirmed that the Helles position was not to be abandoned, -but that on the contrary the VIII Corps was entrusted with the task -of holding to this theatre of operations as large as possible a force -of Turkish troops in order to prevent their employment elsewhere. To -this end the battalions holding the line were urged to maintain their -pressure against the enemy at all points while schemes were evolved for -the construction of deep dugouts, the improvement of reserve lines, -and other works, which would only be necessary in the event of a long -continued occupation of the Peninsula. - -Information was even disseminated that large reinforcements totalling -over 1600 all ranks were on the way, and were expected shortly. But -behind all these precautions against the leakage of information -among the Turks as to our intentions, and under cover of the various -fictions above described, preparations were being pressed forward for -the evacuation of the Helles front also; preparations which needed -particular care not only by reason of the greater activity of the -enemy than at Suvla and Anzac, but also because the enemy having been -successfully hoodwinked on the former occasion it hardly appeared -probable that we should be so successful a second time in masking our -intentions. - -Another very severe storm broke over Cape Helles on the 21st December, -accompanied by heavy rain, and one of the 2/4th London machine-guns -was struck by lightning in the trenches. It became evident that with -the likelihood of an early complete break up in the weather the final -evacuation must not be delayed; and accordingly it was fixed for the -8th January 1916, or the first fine night after that date. - -On the 21st Lieut. L. A. Dickins was seriously wounded and evacuated -from the Peninsula. This tour of duty indeed proved the most costly in -personnel which the Battalion had carried out, and among N.C.O.'s and -men 4 were killed and 13 wounded. - -On the 22nd the 1st R.N. Brigade made a further "side-step" to the -right in the trenches, and in the course of the readjustment A and -B Companies of the 2/4th Londons were relieved in the trenches and -withdrew to a fresh Rest Camp, called Cæsar's Camp. The rest of the -Battalion, however, remained in the Tranchée d'Amade until after -Christmas. - -On the 23rd December 2/Lieut. C. S. G. Blows joined the Battalion from -England. - -Owing to the kindness of Mrs Dunfee and other ladies interested in the -2/4th Londons, Christmas gifts and cards had been received for every -member of the Battalion, and these materially helped to infuse a little -cheerfulness into a somewhat depressing and comfortless Christmastide. -On Christmas Day the Battalion was practically complete in the Tranchée -d'Amade, B Company and two platoons of A Company having moved forward -once more from Cæsar's Camp. - -The general scheme for the evacuation of the Helles front was similar -to that employed at Anzac and Suvla, and in the course of the second -stage of the operation, detachments of the 2/4th Londons, consisting -of 63 other ranks under Lieut. S. N. Davies and 50 other ranks under -2/Lieut. S. Davis were embarked for Mudros on the night of the 31st -December. These were followed the next night by 5 officers and 147 -other ranks under Capt. R. N. Keen. - -On the 3rd January 1916, the machine-guns of the Battalion, now -increased to six, were evacuated in charge of a N.C.O. and two men, and -on the following day the last battle casualties occurred, three men -being slightly wounded in the Rest Camp. - -The preparations for final evacuation were now practically complete. -A strong embarkation staff had been formed to deal with the rapid -embarkation of the last troops as they should reach the beaches; -and new lines of defence guarding the beaches had been prepared for -occupation in case the enemy should become aware of the operation and -harass it. - -On the night of the 6th/7th January, a fourth detachment of 4 officers -and 118 other ranks of the Battalion under Capt. Arthur left the -Peninsula, and the next night Major Seyd in command of the remainder -of the Battalion (8 officers and 155 other ranks) embarked at V Beach. -This completed the safe evacuation of the whole Battalion with the -exception of four men who were left behind attached to the "Dumeszyl -Battery" under Commander Alan Campbell, R.N.D. (since killed), for -demolition work. After completion of their hazardous duties all the -members of this brave unit were also safely embarked. - -The total strength of the Battalion on evacuating the Peninsula -(including the transport and other details who had remained at Mudros -and Imbros) was 23 officers and about 560 other ranks. The total -casualties sustained at the hands of the enemy had been 2 officers -wounded, 16 N.C.O.'s and men killed and 38 wounded, the remaining -reduction of strength having been due to sickness and exposure. - -On the 7th January the enemy opened an intense bombardment, said to be -the heaviest since the original landing in April 1915, on our trenches; -the shelling lasting from noon till 3.30 p.m., at which time two -Turkish mines were sprung near Fusilier Bluff. No attack developed -except at this point, where a half-hearted advance of the enemy was -easily dispersed. - -The 8th January was calm and still, but at night the weather became -stormy, and a steady and increasing swell did not tend to facilitate -the task of rapid embarkation, and indeed rendered it very doubtful -whether it would be possible to get the last troops away at all. This -caused considerable anxiety to the Embarkation Staff whose task was -not lightened by the knowledge of the presence of an enemy submarine -which (unsuccessfully) torpedoed H.M.S. _Prince George_. Add to this -the possibility that the enemy might discover the retirement in time -to give trouble on the beaches; and it will be possible in at least a -small measure to appreciate the great skill with which this apparently -impracticable task was brought to a successful issue. By 3.30 a.m. the -evacuation was completed and at 4 a.m. two of our magazines were blown -up. The conflagration caused by these appears to have been the first -intimation of our departure received by the Turks who promptly shelled -our vacated lines heavily until 6.30 a.m. - -All material was removed except a few unserviceable guns, some 500 -animals and a large quantity of stores, all of which were destroyed. - -It is impossible to refrain from remarking on the excellent -organisation and discipline with which the evacuation was carried out, -and also on the extraordinary luck which was vouchsafed both at Anzac -and Suvla in the concealment of the moon. - -The Gallipoli expedition must live for ever in the annals of the -world's military history, as one of the most remarkable exploits ever -carried out. Although failure ensued, it was indeed a glorious failure, -and the wonder is rather that success was so nearly attained. The base -of operations at Alexandria was 800 miles distant, and the lines of -communication possessed only two inadequate and unprotected harbours -at Mudros and Imbros respectively. The whole occupied zone, and also -the sea in its vicinity, was all the time under hostile observation -and fire; there were no roads worthy of the name, no storehouses or -railways, and the activity of enemy submarines made it impossible to -send to the Peninsula any store-ship over 1500 tons. - -Yet in the face of all these obstacles not only was the landing -effected, but our position maintained for nearly nine months and the -whole force safely re-embarked; and the memory of it must live for ever -as one of the greatest pages of the history of the war. - -After the evacuation, an appreciative order was published in R.N. -Divisional Orders complimenting the troops on the discipline and -devotion which had sustained them during the hardships of the -campaign, and which alone had rendered the task of evacuation possible -of accomplishment. General Paris, commanding the Division, wrote -personally to the Commanding Officer a letter in which he said: "I must -thank you and your Battalion for the good work you did when with us on -the Peninsula, we all admired the cheerful spirit your men showed under -very trying circumstances." - -At Mudros the connection of the 2/4th Londons with the Royal Naval -Division was severed, and they became temporarily attached to the -29th Division. A few days were spent on the island in rest and -reorganisation, and during its stay there the Battalion was rejoined by -the Transport Section and other details who had been detached from it -during its duty at the Dardanelles; and a great deal of satisfaction -was caused by the distribution of mails from home, the delivery of -which had been delayed by the evacuation. - -On the 11th January Capt. R. N. Keen was admitted to hospital, and on -the 14th Sergt. F. W. Walker left the Battalion for England to take up -a commission. The record of this N.C.O. will be referred to again later -in connection with the 3/4th Battalion to which he was subsequently -attached. - -The Battalion embarked on H.T. _Ionian_ for Alexandria on the 18th, -arriving there three days later. Disembarkation took place on the -following day, and the Battalion entrained to Wardan, a camping ground -near Cairo, where it took up quarters under canvas and became attached -with the other three London Battalions to the 53rd Division, Major-Gen. -A. G. Dallas, C.B., in command. At Wardan company training was carried -out until the 16th February, when the 2/4th Londons, with two companies -of the 2/2nd Londons attached, moved by rail to Beni Mazar, where it -became part of the Minia Force. - - * * * * * - -At the period of the 2/4th Londons' return to Egypt the Eastern -frontier, on which the Turks had attempted to force the Suez Canal -defences about a year previously, had become quiet, and the principal -cause of anxiety centred in the Western Desert where the attitude of -the Senussi, a warlike tribe of Arabs, had created a situation of -some difficulty, which was rendered more complex by the possibility -of internal disorders and religious unrest in the Nile Valley and the -Delta district. - -On the outbreak of war between England and Turkey the Senussi had not -at first shown any disposition towards hostile action, but under the -influence of a Germanised Turk named Gaafer Pasha they had become more -truculent as the summer of 1915 wore on. Several breaches of the peace -which occurred in the autumn left no room for doubt that military -operations would be necessary to bring the Senussi to a due sense of -their proper behaviour. - -In November 1915 Lieut.-Gen. Sir John Maxwell, commanding in chief the -forces in Egypt, concentrated the Western Force at Mersa Matruh, a town -on the Mediterranean coast some 180 miles west of Alexandria. Under -Maj.-Gen. Wallace, C.B., to whom command of the Mersa Matruh troops was -given, several vigorous little operations were successfully carried out -against the tribesmen; but the lack of camel transport and water supply -arrangements restricted the scope of his activities. Preparations were -therefore made to remedy these defects and thus render possible the -despatch of a serious punitive expedition into the desert. - -On the 11th February a newly concentrated force of the Senussi -occupied the Baharia Oasis, and on the 27th of the same month they -also seized the Farafra and Dakhla Oases. To combat the serious menace -to the Nile Valley offered by these fresh signs of activity, Sir John -Maxwell formed a new command, known as the Southern Force, under -Maj.-Gen. J. Adye, C.B., with Headquarters at Beni Suef, a township -on the Nile some 175 miles south of Cairo. This Southern Force was -concentrated in four distinct areas for the protection of the Nile -Valley and the cultivated areas, the three northern areas respectively -concentrated at Wadi Natrun, Beni Salama and the Fayoum, being grouped -under command of Maj.-Gen. Dallas; the fourth and southernmost being -located in the Minia and Assiut provinces under Brig.-Gen. A. Stirling. - -General Stirling's Minia Force was being concentrated at the period -when the 2/4th Londons joined it, and comprised the following -formations: - - Highland Mounted Brigade (dismounted). - 1st Australian Light Horse Brigade. - One squadron of Cavalry (Egyptian Army). - Detachment of R.F.C. with two Aeroplanes. - Nos. 1 and 2 Armoured Trains. - 1/4th Glamorgan Battery R.F.A. - One section Hong-Kong Mountain Battery. - 2/1st Cheshire Field Company R.E. - 2/4th London Regiment. - Two Companies 2/2nd London Regiment, - -and was subsequently increased by the arrival of further units as -follows: - - One squadron Armoured Cars R.N. Division. - Half section Camel Transport Corps. - One Company Australian Camel Corps. - -In spite of the great strategic importance of the Oases it was found -impossible at the moment to undertake active operations, and the -activities of the Minia Force were therefore confined to defensive -measures. The whole Nile Valley at this time was infected by powerful -religious and political influences which were at work to endeavour to -induce the native population to co-operate with the enemy against the -British, and although these influences had not attained the success -hoped for by their instigators, they had taken a certain hold on all -classes of the civilian population. It was, therefore, extremely -important to counterbalance this smouldering agitation by the presence -of strong military forces in provincial stations, primarily to prevent -the occurrence of disturbances which might be fomented in the absence -of troops, and to safeguard points of military importance, such as -railway stations, bridges and canals. The natives of Egypt, though -not of warlike character, are capable of violent fanatical outbursts, -and the continued presence of the military, combined with frequent -displays of their force, was the best means of preventing altogether -disturbances which might assume very serious proportions. - - * * * * * - -Such was briefly the position of affairs at the period of the 2/4th -Londons' attachment to the Minia Force, but shortly after their arrival -a distinct improvement in the outlook was caused by the dispersal of -the Senussi forces in the battle of Agagia on the 26th February 1916. -This time it was possible to exploit the success, and the desert column -pushed forward to Sollum which was occupied on the 14th March. The -effect of this signal success on British prestige throughout Egypt was -marked, and this effect was enhanced by the continued failure of the -Turks to make any impression in the East on the Suez Canal defences. -The Senussi forces were now practically disposed of, only about 3000 -remaining in the field, and this remnant appeared to be disheartened, -while the reputation of their commander, Sayed Ahmed, both as a -temporal leader and a spiritual guide, had waned. - -The danger, however, was by no means past, and the occupation by the -Senussi of the Baharia Oasis, which followed soon after the battle of -Agagia, created a serious menace to the part of the Nile Valley for -which the Minia Force was responsible. - -The Minia District includes about 65 miles of a strip of cultivated -land running north and south along the left bank of the Nile, varying -in width from 7 to 14 miles. This area is intersected for irrigation -purposes by numerous canals of which the largest, Bahr Yusef, runs -roughly parallel to the Nile near the western edge of the cultivated -strip. Beyond it sand-dunes run for some two miles into the desert. -Minia itself is a town of some importance, containing about 35,000 -inhabitants. The loot to be obtained from its banks and merchants, -as well as the possibility of obtaining recruits from the Bedouin -population, and the certainty of creating a strong anti-British -influence, seemed to offer considerable inducements to raiding parties -from the Baharia Oasis, and it was against this danger that the -protective measures of the Minia Force were directed. - -The troops at Beni Mazar, which is on the main railway line 26 miles -north of Minia, comprised the following: - - 2/4th London Regiment. - Two Companies 2/2nd London Regiment. - One Camel Machine-Gun Section, Lovat's Scouts. - One Troop Australian Light Horse. - Detachment of Cheshire Field Company R.E. - No. 2 Armoured Train. - -A detached post of one company of infantry (supplied by 2/4th Londons) -was furnished from Beni Mazar to guard a bridge at Saqula over the Bahr -Yusef. The whole of the troops at Beni Mazar came under command of -A/Lieut.-Col. V. H. Seyd. - -At Beni Mazar the 2/4th Londons settled down quickly to their new -surroundings and carried out company training to the extent which the -circumstances permitted. The situation, however, placed a considerable -restriction on the activities of the Battalion in this direction, as it -was held at all times under instant readiness to move. A good deal of -attention was paid, nevertheless, to long distance route marching with -the deliberate intention of hardening the troops in preparation for the -possibility of an advance against the Baharia Oasis. - -On the 26th February a detachment of the 2/2nd Londons proceeded -to Nag Hamadi to guard the Nile bridgehead there. Col. Dunfee this -day returned from leave and took over once more the command of the -Battalion and of the forces at Beni Mazar, A/Lieut.-Col. Seyd reverting -to his former duties as second in command with the rank of Major. - -On the 28th and 29th trial runs were made on the armoured train from -Beni Mazar to Maghaga with the double object of giving the troops -practice in rapid entrainment and of reminding the inhabitants of the -presence of British forces. A demonstration march was made through -the streets of Maghaga, but the demeanour of the natives was found to -be quite satisfactory. The behaviour of the inhabitants of Beni Mazar -also was so peaceful at this time that it was found possible to relax -somewhat the strict orders as to permitting troops to walk out in the -town, and henceforth they were allowed to walk in pairs instead of -parties of six as had formerly been the case, though side arms were -still worn at all times. - -On the 1st March Capt. H. G. Stanham was appointed to command the -Saqula detachment. - -The working hours of the Battalion at this period were early in the -day, owing to the advance of the hot season, but in spite of the severe -change from the trying conditions to which it had been subjected at -Cape Helles two months earlier, the Battalion showed a remarkably good -bill of health. - -At the beginning of March the command in chief in Egypt was assumed by -Sir Archibald Murray, and in the rearrangement of the defensive forces -in the Nile Valley which ensued, the Beni Mazar troops ceased to form -part of the Minia Force, which was extended farther to the south, and -became attached to the Northern Force (Southern Area) under Maj.-Gen. -Dallas. - -On the 3rd and 5th of March practice alarms took place and the Beni -Mazar Force moved tactically to Tambu, taking up a position there for -the defence of the railway. The strength of the 2/4th Londons on parade -at the second alarm was 16 officers and 450 other ranks. - -Throughout the period of the 2/4th Londons' occupation of Beni Mazar -they received the greatest possible attention and kindness from the -local Egyptian residents, who overwhelmed them with presents of -eggs, fowls, turkeys, sheep, cigarettes, fruit and other "consumable -stores," which needless to say were gratefully received as a pleasant -alternative to rations. The officers of the Battalion were constantly -entertained by the local dignitaries, who extended to them all the -hospitality in their power, and among whom must be mentioned Mahomed -Marzouk, Mamur Markaz, Merza Mohed Ali F. Bey, Abdul Gawad, Mahomed -Zubi Abd el Razech, Ahmed H. el Keesz and H. Abd el Rezik. - -On the 6th April the Saqula detachment was withdrawn and on the 12th -the Battalion left Beni Mazar, handing over duties to the 2/5th -Devonshire Regiment. The Battalion strength, 23 officers and 586 other -ranks, proceeded by train _via_ Cairo and Alexandria, travelling all -night, and detrained the following day at Sidi Gaber, marching to -quarters under canvas at Sidi Bishr. Here the 2/1st London Infantry -Brigade came together again as a Brigade for the first time since its -occupation of Malta, under the command of Col. Dunfee. - -On the 17th April the Brigade embarked at Alexandria on H.T. -_Transylvania_ which carried in addition to the Brigade, detachments -of Colonial and Imperial troops, totalling together 130 officers and -about 3000 other ranks. The following appointments were made on H.T. -_Transylvania_: - - O.C. Ship--Col. Vickers Dunfee, V.D. } 2/4th London Regiment. - Ship's Adjutant--Capt. J. R. Webster } - -On the 18th the _Transylvania_ left Alexandria and during the passage -all possible precautions were taken against submarine attack. No -untoward incident however occurred, and on the 24th April the transport -arrived at Marseilles and disembarkation at once took place. - -The Battalion entrained immediately for Rouen, arriving on the 26th -April, and was accommodated in the Bruyères Camp. - -On arrival at Rouen the 2/1st London Infantry Brigade was finally -disbanded after having been in existence for about nineteen months. -Col. Dunfee, on the break-up of the Brigade, once more assumed command -of the Battalion, but its remaining life as a separate unit proved to -be short. - -The wastage which had inevitably taken place in the ranks of the 1/4th -Battalion (which had now been in France for over fifteen months) had -been far beyond the capacity of the Reserve Battalion at home to -replace; and with the certain prospect of being called on to fill -serious deficiencies to be caused by the large numbers of additional -casualties which were expected in the great battle destined to open on -1st July, it was decided by the War Office to disband finally all the -units formerly comprising the 2/1st London Infantry Brigade, and to use -these troops for the purpose of reinforcing their first line battalions. - -The dispersal of the 2/4th Battalion at Rouen is therefore the last -incident to be recorded in its separate history. - -Owing to the exigencies of the campaign it was impossible to grant -leave to more than a very small proportion of the Battalion in spite of -its prolonged absence from the United Kingdom, and drafts were quickly -sent up the line beginning on the 5th May. By the 20th June the whole -strength of the Battalion in officers, N.C.O.'s and men, with a few -exceptions, had been despatched to the 1/4th Londons, in the history -of which the arrival of these drafts will be noted in detail in their -place. - -The officers sent to other units were: - -Capts. W. H. S. Stevens and W. N. Towse, Lieut. R. C. Dickins, and -2/Lieuts. G. F. Bishop and H. W. Dennis to 1/21st London Regiment (47th -Division). - -Hon. Lieut. and Q.M. J. E. W. Lambley to XV Corps, A.C.C. - -A draft of 133 other ranks was sent to the Kensingtons (13th London), -but by the intervention of Lieut.-Col. Wheatley they were subsequently -secured for the 1/4th Londons. Col. Vickers Dunfee was attached to -1/22nd London Regiment (The Queens) for some two months, after which he -returned to England to command the 4th (Reserve) Battalion. - -Thus ends the separate record of the first reserve Battalion raised by -the 4th London Regiment during the war. Although the 2/4th Battalion -ceased to exist as a unit, the services rendered by its personnel -in the first line battalion were of a very high order, and the -reinforcements composed by it were particularly welcome inasmuch as -they afforded a large number of much needed non-commissioned officers, -who were quickly given an opportunity to prove their value in the -battles on the Somme later in the year. - - - - -CHAPTER VIII - -THE 3/4TH AND 4/4TH BATTALIONS AT HOME - - -At home 1915 and 1916 were two years of hard work in developing the -organisation of the Regiment to enable it to provide the reinforcements -necessary for the maintenance in the field of its overseas battalions. - -Prior to the war the 4th London Regiment--like all other Territorial -formations--had no reserve cadre which was capable of being expanded -into a reserve unit on mobilisation; and when therefore the 2/4th -Battalion followed the 1/4th Battalion overseas in December 1914 the -need of providing means of "feeding" the fighting battalions with fresh -personnel became pressing. The records of the home battalions are -necessarily lacking in the exciting incidents with which those of the -service battalions are crowded; but they represent an enormous amount -of labour carried out under conditions of great difficulty, and as a -rule with very little recognition of their vital importance to the -continued existence of the Regiment during the War. - -Reference has already been made in Chapter II to the steps taken -to raise a third line battalion under Major E. H. Stillwell on the -departure of the 2/4th Battalion for Malta. This new Battalion, -the 3/4th London Regiment, secured recruits rapidly, and, like its -predecessor, very quickly outgrew the limits of Headquarters at Hoxton. -It was therefore moved early in January to Littlegrove and Beech Hill, -the two houses at Barnet which had previously been occupied by the -battalion raised by Col. Dunfee. A slight stiffening of the ranks was -supplied by a few members of the overseas battalions who had received -a good deal of training with them but had been found medically unfit -to accompany them abroad; but the vast majority of the officers, -non-commissioned officers and men had but recently joined, most of -them without any previous experience of soldiering. No member of the -new Battalion, moreover, had seen service in the War, and the magnitude -of the task imposed on the officers and warrant officers of instilling -the rudiments of discipline into so unwieldy a mass of men was no light -one. The enthusiasm of the early days of the War, had, however, by no -means subsided, and all ranks worked with a will; and before long the -Battalion, now about 600 strong, began to find its feet. - -On the 8th February 1915 Capt. P. S. Cookson (late Royal Sussex -Regiment) was appointed to command the Battalion with the temporary -rank of Lieut.-Col. with Major W. H. Hamilton as second in command, and -Major E. V. Wellby as Adjutant. The company commanders were Capts. A. -A. N. Hayne, S. W. J. Limpenny, E. D. Wilson and A. E. Wood. - -The training facilities which had been extended to the 2/4th Battalion -by local residents at Barnet were accorded to the 3/4th Battalion also, -and the training of recruits under company arrangements proceeded as -rapidly as possible and as efficiently as the circumstances permitted. -No time indeed was to be lost for the 1/4th Londons were now in France, -and as already described began to suffer battle casualties early in -March 1915; so that it was clear that the 3/4th Battalion might at any -time be called upon to make up its deficiencies. Towards the end of -April it was in fact called on to supply the first reinforcement, and -accordingly despatched 2 officers and 50 other ranks who, as referred -to in Chapter IV, joined the 1/4th Londons in the Ypres Salient. - -Third line battalions had also been formed by the other regiments of -the 1st London Brigade, and hitherto these had been distributed over -a wide area on the outskirts of London; but in the last week of April -the four new battalions were concentrated under canvas at Tadworth -(Surrey) as the 3/1st London Brigade, under the command of Col. H. C. -Cholmondely, C.B. The 3/4th Battalion joined the Brigade on the 26th -April. - -On the 5th May the Adjutancy was taken over by Capt. E. E. Spicer with -Lieut S. H. Stedman as Assistant Adjutant, Major E. V. Wellby having -transferred to the 1st London Regiment. - -Early in June 1915 a general reconstruction was effected in the reserve -and training cadres at home; and a number of fresh battalions were -formed composed largely of personnel who were not medically fit to -serve overseas. To this end a composite Battalion, known as the 100th -Provisional Battalion, was formed of officers, N.C.O.'s and men of the -3/1st London Brigade. On the 2nd June Capt. A. E. Wood, and 2/Lieuts. -E. J. Bennet and J. S. B. Gathergood and about 100 N.C.O.'s and men -left the 3/4th Battalion at Tadworth to join the 100th Provisional -Battalion which was stationed at Aldeburgh. On the same day Major W. H. -Hamilton was appointed to raise, equip and train a new Battalion, to be -known as the 4/4th London Regiment. - -Concurrently with this development the 3/1st London Brigade moved from -Tadworth to billets at Bury St Edmunds. Here training was proceeded -with, and the battalions of the Brigade were again opened for -recruiting to make good the gaps in their ranks caused by the formation -of the Provisional Battalion. - -In the following month a further move took place, and the 3/1st London -Brigade took over billets in Ipswich. A further step was now made in -the organisation of the Home Forces and towards the end of August -all personnel of the Provisional Battalion except "home-service" men -were returned to their units. The 2/2nd and 2/3rd London Infantry -Brigades had also been concentrated in the Ipswich area, and a new -Division--the 58th--was now formed as a Service Division; and the duty -of "draft-finding" for the whole Regiment henceforth devolved solely on -the 4/4th Battalion under Major Hamilton. - -The composition of the 58th Division was as follows: - - 58TH (LONDON) DIVISION - Brig.-Gen. E. J. COOPER, C.B., M.V.O., D.S.O. - - DIVISIONAL CAVALRY. - Hampshire Yeomanry (Carabineers). - - ARTILLERY. - 290th, 291st, 292nd, 293rd Brigades, R.F.A. - 58th Division Ammunition Column. - - ROYAL ENGINEERS. - 2/1st Wessex} - 2/2nd " } Field Companies. - 1/5th London} - 58th Divisional Signal Company. - - 173RD INFANTRY BRIGADE. - 3/1st London Regiment} - 3/2nd " " } (Royal Fusiliers). - 3/3rd " " } - 3/4th " " } - - 174TH INFANTRY BRIGADE. - 2/5th London Regiment (London Rifle Brigade). - 2/6th " " (Rifles). - 2/7th " " - 2/8th " " (Post Office Rifles). - - 175TH INFANTRY BRIGADE. - 2/9th London Regiment (Queen Victoria Rifles). - 2/10th " " (Hackney). - 2/11th " " (Finsbury Rifles). - 2/12th " " (Rangers). - 1/1st Wessex Divisional Cyclists. - 509th, 510th, 511th, 512th S. and T. Companies, A.S.C. - -The duties of second in command were now taken by Major E. D. Wilson, -who continued to occupy this appointment for some months till he -was appointed to Brigade Staff and subsequently to Southern Command -Headquarters. He was succeeded as second in command by Capt. A. A. N. -Hayne. - -The constant changes of station to which the 3/4th Battalion had -been subjected during its short existence had, as will be readily -appreciated, a somewhat deleterious effect on its training and -general discipline. Prolonged life in billets is, moreover, highly -unsuitable for young troops under training, and the general effect -of the Division's stay in Ipswich was not altogether beneficial. All -units were similarly affected. The dispatch of the Division overseas -was in consequence delayed, and the troops began to become stale with -"over-training." Throughout 1915 and the early months of 1916 this -unsatisfactory state of affairs continued, and the routine of training, -now become wearying through its monotonous repetition, was broken only -by the occasional passing excitement of air raids, of which the eastern -counties saw a good deal. - -During February 1916, recruits called up under the "Derby" scheme to -the number of 359 were posted to the Battalion and their training -proceeded with all possible speed. Owing, however, to the need for -bringing them into line with the remainder of the Battalion in view -of the possibility of its being sent to the front during 1916, the -training of these men was expedited by temporarily attaching a part of -the Battalion to the 4/4th Battalion in order to ease the duties of the -training staff. - -In June the billets in Ipswich were vacated, and the Division removed -to quarters under canvas at Blackrock Camp outside the town, where the -former routine was resumed. - -In these somewhat unhappy circumstances we may leave the 3/4th -Battalion and return to trace the growth of the 4/4th Battalion which -had sprung from it at Tadworth a year previously. - -The following officers accompanied Major Hamilton to Headquarters and -were posted to the 4/4th Battalion: Capt. and Adjt. W. G. Hayward, -Lieut. H. E. Miller, and 2/Lieuts. W. H. Vernon and H. J. M. Williams. -Hon. Lieut. J. S. Fullalove (late Devonshire Regiment) was appointed -Quartermaster, and Coy. Sergt.-Major Potton (late 1/4th Londons) to -be Regimental Sergt.-Major. The Commanding Officer was fortunate in -enlisting into the Battalion as Warrant Officers and senior N.C.O.'s -several ex-Guardsmen and members of the City Police Force, including -Coy. Sergt.-Majors H. W. Dennis and J. Pearson, and C.Q.M.-Sergts. A. -Reed and F. Milne. These experienced soldiers formed the nucleus of -what afterwards became a very fine staff of instructors. - -The new Battalion shortly after its inception became the draft-finding -unit for the first and second line battalions in the field, and also -the unit by which wounded and invalided officers, N.C.O.'s and men -of the regiment from the front were re-equipped and passed through a -"refresher" course of training, pending their return to the front as -reinforcements. - -The Battalion was accordingly organised in three Companies, A and B -(respectively under Capts. W. Moore and F. C. Grimwade) being for the -reception and training of recruits; and C (under Lieut. D. C. Cooke) -being the "expeditionary" Company, the personnel being all N.C.O.'s and -men returned from the B.E.F. Lieut. F. A. Coffin succeeded Capt Hayward -as Adjutant, the latter taking over the duties of President of the -Regimental Institutes. - -Just previously to the formation of the Battalion the forces in the -field had suffered immense casualties at Ypres and on the Gallipoli -Peninsula; and the full weight of the German offensive on the Eastern -Front where the Russians were steadily giving ground was making itself -felt. Earl Kitchener had issued his second call for more men, and -recruiting was proceeding rapidly for all branches of the Service; and -within a month of its formation some 600 recruits had been posted to -the 4/4th Battalion, while the ranks of the Expeditionary Company were -rapidly swelling with returning casualties from Neuve Chapelle and -Ypres. - -It being obviously impossible to cope with the task of dealing with -such great numbers in the cramped accommodation at Headquarters -arrangements were made for taking over the billets at New Barnet, -previously occupied by the 2/4th and 3/4th Battalions; and the -Battalion moved to its new quarters on the 12th July, Headquarters and -A Company being billeted at Littlegrove and B and C Companies at Beech -Hill. - -A vigorous programme of training was at once put in hand, the work -being carried out at Folly Farm and, by the kindness of Sir Philip -Sassoon, in Trent Park. Through the generosity of the Club Committee -the full resources of the Enfield Rifle Club were again placed at the -disposal of the Battalion, and it is hard to overestimate the value of -the assistance rendered in the musketry training of the recruits by the -many public-spirited members of the Club who volunteered their services -as instructors. - -Owing to the continued influx of recruits, the training companies -having now each a strength of about 380, it was necessary to take over -additional billets at Oakhill which were allotted to the Expeditionary -Company. - -Early in August, almost before the recruit training was under way, -orders were received to prepare a draft of 400 other ranks to proceed, -at three days' notice, to Malta to join the 2/4th Battalion. After -considerable exertion the draft was equipped, fitted with khaki drill -uniforms and sun-helmets, and in due course proceeded to Southampton, -where it actually embarked on the transport. The orders for its -departure were, however, cancelled, and the draft returned to Barnet to -resume its training in the 4/4th Battalion, much to the disappointment -of the N.C.O.'s and men concerned. - -The supplies of webbing equipment having proved inadequate, the troops -were now being provided with leather equipment of the 1915 pattern; and -were armed with the long pattern charger-loading Lee-Enfield rifle. At -this date the training of recruits proceeded under no efficient system -such as was evolved at a later date. No set period was allowed for -the preparation of the drafts, and very few facilities were provided -for improving or speeding-up training beyond such as emanated from -the brains of the officers and N.C.O.'s immediately concerned, with -the inevitable result that a good deal of unnecessary delay and a -certain lack of uniformity in the training ensued. Thanks, however, to -the devoted efforts of the instructors, the recruits soon passed the -initial stages and were passed as "trained" men on a syllabus which -included drill, musketry, marching, physical training and bayonet -fighting, entrenching, field work and the rudiments of bomb-throwing. -The first draft of N.C.O.'s and men supplied by the Battalion -consisting of 40 other ranks under Lieut. N. L. Thomas and 2/Lieuts. S. -Davis, J. W. Price and C. S. G. Blows proceeded to the Dardanelles to -join the 2/4th Battalion at the beginning of November 1915. - -Recruiting had continued at a great speed during the months of -July, August and September, and the training companies had assumed -such unmanageable proportions that they were subdivided and a new -training company, C, under Major H. J. Duncan-Teape, was formed, the -Expeditionary Company being renamed D. - -On the 29th August 1915 the Battalion was visited by the following -ex-officers of the Regiment: - - Lieut.-Col. E. T. Rodney Wilde, V.D. - Lieut.-Col. Harry Dade, V.D. - Lieut.-Col. A. H. Lock, V.D. - Major P. Lynch, and - Major W. Stevens. - -On this occasion Church Parade was held at Folly Farm, after which -the Battalion marched past the ex-officers, the salute being taken by -Lieut.-Col. Dade. - -On the 13th November an inter-company relief took place, A Company -moving to Beech Hill, and its billets at Littlegrove being occupied by -B Company. - -At Christmas 48 hours' leave was granted to every member of the -Battalion, two leave parties being formed for the purpose. - -During this period the Reserve Battalions of the 1st London Division -were stationed in all parts of the Home Counties, and the supervision -of training by those responsible was naturally extremely difficult; and -it was consequently decided to bring together all these battalions into -one Divisional camp, the site selected being near Salisbury Plain. - -The move to Salisbury took place in January 1916, the 4/4th Battalion -proceeding on the 11th to No. 7 Camp, Hurdcott (between Salisbury and -Shaftesbury), where it found itself for the first time in company with -the 4/1st, 4/2nd, and 4/3rd Battalions, the remainder of the Division -being quartered at Hurdcott and Fovant. - -No troops of the 4th London Regiment were after this date quartered at -Barnet, but before finally saying farewell to this the first station -of so many hundreds of the members of the Regiment, we must once more -express the indebtedness of the Regiment not only to those gentlemen -who so generously afforded the Battalion the use of such excellent -training grounds, but also to Mr Kingwell and Mr W. H. Vernon, the -owners respectively of Beech Hill and Littlegrove, for the pains taken -by them to render these houses comfortable for the troops, and to -the many local residents who extended kindness and hospitality to the -Battalion, among whom Mr Eldred of Cockfosters must not be forgotten. - -About this time the designation of the Battalion was changed to the 4th -(Reserve) Battalion London Regiment, a corresponding alteration being -made in the titles of the other 4th and 3rd line battalions of the -Division. - -Major H. J. Duncan-Teape assumed the duties of second in command in -January 1916. - -The immediate result of the move to Salisbury Plain was an immense -strengthening of the _esprit-de-corps_ of the Battalion which now found -itself for the first time together in one camp, and a considerable -increase of efficiency and improvement in discipline followed. The -Hurdcott camps were arranged on suitably designed principles with well -ventilated sleeping huts and roomy messing and recreation rooms which -contributed in no small degree to the comfort and physical welfare of -the troops. The 4th (Reserve) Battalion was, moreover, exceptionally -fortunate in becoming the possessor of an excellent training and sports -ground some 5 acres in extent. Work was immediately set in hand to -construct a bayonet fighting assault course and a bombing ground, and -considerable improvements were made in the practice trenches which had -been left in a half-completed condition by the former occupants of the -camp. - -The 3rd line Division now came under the command of Col. Williams, C.B. -(late Somerset Light Infantry), who was succeeded in the command in May -by Col. S. H. Godman, D.S.O. (Scots Guards), whose kindly personality -will be held in grateful remembrance by all who came into personal -touch with him. - -Voluntary recruiting had come almost to a standstill during the -preceding December, and the training of all the N.C.O.'s and men who -had joined the Battalion previously was now practically completed. -Numerous drafts had been sent out to the 1/4th Battalion in France, and -the activities of the training staff of the Battalion were therefore -somewhat restricted. But in March the whole of the training reserve -camps in England became veritable hives of activity; for in that month -the first groups of men enlisted under the "Derby" scheme of recruiting -were called up, and were posted to their respective home training -battalions. - -The recruits allotted to the Regiment under this scheme were clothed -at Headquarters (though not equipped or armed) and drafted straight to -Hurdcott, and within the space of a week no fewer than 650 were posted -to the 4th (Reserve) Battalion. In the following week a party of 220 -N.C.O.'s and men of the 3/4th Battalion were sent to the 4th (Reserve) -Battalion for the completion of their training, which was found on -examination to be in a variety of stages of advancement. - -It will be readily appreciated that the sudden advent of so large a -body of totally untrained men strained the instructional facilities of -the Battalion to the utmost, and it was deemed advisable somewhat to -modify the system of training which had proved sufficient hitherto. -The recruits were posted to companies as usual, an extra company, E -(under Lieut. Miller), being now formed, but the company staffs assumed -responsibility only for clothing, equipment, messing, pay and other -administrative and disciplinary duties, the whole of the training -being entrusted to a specially selected staff of officers and N.C.O. -instructors, who were as far as possible relieved of company and -battalion duties. It is believed that the Battalions of the London -Reserve Division were among the first to adopt this system of coping -with the problem of draft-production which, in modified and improved -forms, gradually became recognised as the most efficient and was -generally adopted. - -It should be understood that the brief description which follows of the -work of the Reserve Battalion is somewhat anticipatory. The scheme of -training which was in force in the last year of the War was obviously -not evolved in a day, but was the fruit of three years' experience. But -it is thought that the present is perhaps the most suitable juncture -for the inclusion in this history of these notes, as the period now -under review saw the inception of the great training scheme whereby the -country produced its citizen soldiers who fought the great battles of -1916, 1917 and 1918. - -The system as originally evolved in the 4th Battalion was intended to -apply to "barrack-square" instruction in drill only, but as training -proceeded, it was found desirable not only to ensure uniformity of -instruction, but also for economy of instructors and the avoidance of -delay in the completion of training, to apply it to all branches of -training. "Specialist" officers and N.C.O.'s were therefore appointed -to take charge of each different subject of instruction, such as drill, -musketry, bombing, Lewis Gun, physical training and bayonet fighting, -entrenching and wiring, and "anti-gas" measures; the whole training -school being under the executive control of an "officer in charge of -training." - -This development was made the more desirable inasmuch as the War Office -now was tightening up the whole system of training, in view of the -continued heavy casualties at the front which rendered necessary not -only the fullest and quickest possible development of the untrained -man-power of the Empire, but also the regular and rapid filling up of -deficiencies in the ranks of the fighting troops. Under the War Office -scheme (the wisdom of which is demonstrated by the fact that in broad -principle it remained unaltered until the Armistice, modification only -being found desirable in matters of detail) the period allowed for the -conversion of the recruit into a trained soldier was fourteen weeks. -This period was subdivided with considerable skill and foresight, the -first two weeks being occupied in completing the equipment of the -recruit, coupled with light drill and physical training, together -with lectures on a few general subjects with the object of gradually -settling him into his new conditions of life, and to allow for his -complete recovery from the effects of "anti-typhoid" inoculation. The -serious training of the recruit therefore lasted twelve weeks, which -in the 1st London (Reserve) Brigade were subdivided into two distinct -periods. The first of these concerned the "individual" training of the -recruit in the subjects to which reference has been made above, and -which lasted for ten weeks. It was proceeded with in accordance with -War Office instructions, which laid down the number of hours to be -devoted weekly to each subject. During this period also the recruit was -put through a special table of musketry practices on the open range, -and it concluded with a series of tests of individual proficiency in -each subject, the passing of which decided the recruit's claim to be -classed as a trained soldier. - -Throughout these three months the training proceeded by platoons, each -platoon of recruits living, messing and working together, with the -object of impressing on them, from the earliest days of their service, -the importance of the platoon as a unit in action. The latter part of -the "individual" training period saw the sub-division of each platoon -into Lewis Gun and bombing sections, training being arranged for in -accordance with the particular requirements of each. The "individual" -training having been completed, the final fortnight was devoted to -platoon "combined training" in field work as a properly organised -platoon, the men working in full marching order, loaded to the weight -which they would be called upon to carry in the field. The physical -strain of the last fourteen days was undoubtedly considerable, but the -results attained by it were amply justified, not only from the point of -actual instruction imparted, but also from that of the highly important -question of selection of N.C.O.'s, for each section of the platoon in -"combined training" was in charge of a recruit N.C.O., the specialist -instructor being attached merely for the purpose of supervision. - -On completion of this final and most interesting period in the -recruit's training, he proceeded on "draft-leave" for four clear days, -on return from which he was reported as ready to proceed overseas, was -medically inspected and finally fitted out; and as a rule his departure -overseas ensued within a few days. - -Such was the course of life in a Reserve Battalion, and it will not -be disputed that the duties of an instructor were both multifarious -and exceedingly onerous, while the degree of personal application -and physical endurance which the recruit himself was called upon -to display was severe to a degree. Owing to the frequent changes of -personnel among the N.C.O. instructors, it is impossible to record -the names of all those who were in turn employed in this manner, but -it would be unjust not to acknowledge the splendid devotion of the -training staffs or to recognise with gratitude the extreme importance -of the rôle played by them in the War. Neither can we refrain from -remarking that, however complete the scheme of training, and however -efficient the instructors, it would have been nearly impossible to -carry it into effect in the short period allowed but for the intense -keenness and willingness to learn displayed by the vast majority of the -many thousands of recruits who were trained in accordance with it. - -The instructors themselves were drawn entirely from N.C.O.'s who had -served with the 1st or 2nd line battalions overseas, and had either -been invalided to the United Kingdom or were sent home for six months -"on exchange." In order to avoid staleness no instructor who was fit -for overseas service was permitted to retain his appointment for more -than one year, at the end of which period he himself returned to the -front as a reinforcement, his place on the training staff being taken -by one more recently returned to England. - -Officer instructors were selected and retained on a similar principle, -the period of appointment to the establishment of a training reserve -unit being (in the case of physical fitness for service overseas) a -maximum of six months. - -The officers of the first training staff appointed in the 4th (Reserve) -Battalion were: - - Capt. F. C. Grimwade, in charge of training. - 2/Lieut. E. G. Dew, Assistant to Training Officer. - 2/Lieut. A. G. Croll;} Musketry Instructors. - " G. H. Hetley} - 2/Lieut. R. K. Caparn, Physical Training Instructor. - 2/Lieut. L. A. Allen, Lewis Gun " - 2/Lieut. L. C. Haycraft, Bombing and Anti-gas " - -Signalling instruction was provided under Brigade arrangements, the -first Brigade Signalling Officer, 2/Lieut. R. C. Hunt, being supplied -by the 4th (Reserve) Battalion. - -Early in February 1916 the 4th (Reserve) Battalion received a very -welcome reinforcement in the shape of 50 men of the Second Trinidad -Contingent, and the honour done to the Regiment in selecting it for the -training of this draft, representative of one of the smallest and yet -most ancient and loyal outposts of the Empire, was much appreciated. -About the same time four Trinidad officers, 2/Lieuts. L. Farfan, H. -Dow, R. L. Fabien and J. MacDonald, were gazetted to the Battalion. It -was rapidly realised that the difference of climate between the West -Indies and the snow-laden winds of the "Plain" was too severe, and it -became evident that this keen and efficient platoon must be transferred -to a more suitable environment. After about six weeks with the 4th -(Reserve) Battalion, therefore, they were sent to complete their -training with the 7th Royal Fusiliers at Falmouth and later attached to -the 3/4th Devonshire Regiment in India. - -In April Major H. J. Duncan-Teape rejoined the 1/4th Battalion in -France, the duties of second in command being assumed by Major G. H. M. -Vine. - -During May the Battalion was inspected by Col. S. H. Godman, D.S.O., -commanding the Division, who presented C. S. M. Risley, D.C.M., with -his medal. The Battalion also received a visit from Lieut.-Col. E. -T. Rodney Wilde, V.D. At the end of May the Division was reviewed by -Field-Marshal Earl French, commanding the Home Forces. - -Although the whole of the Battalions at Hurdcott and Fovant Camps -existed for the training of recruits and were in no way formations -which were likely to be sent overseas as units, they were included in -the scheme which had been prepared for the defence of Great Britain in -the event of an attempt at landing by the Germans. - -This scheme provided for the maintenance of a permanent defence force -on the East Coast and at other points where it was deemed likely that -any attempt at invasion would be put into effect. In addition to this, -arrangements were made for the rapid concentration from other sources -of a mobile force for use, in the event of active operations taking -place, as a general reserve. To this general reserve the units of the -3rd line groups of the 1st London Division contributed a quota of -officers, N.C.O.'s and men varying from time to time with the numbers -of men who were sufficiently advanced in their course of training to -render their inclusion in the force useful. - -During the period at Hurdcott frequent test concentrations took place, -in several instances the parade being followed by a test route march. -These parades were always attended by the platoons of the 4th (Reserve) -Battalion detailed for the time being to this duty and passed off -satisfactorily. - -On the 2nd June 1916 Major W. H. Hamilton, who had commanded the -Battalion since its formation, was gazetted to the 4th Battalion Duke -of Cornwall's Light Infantry and almost immediately proceeded to join -his new Battalion at Meerut.[4] He was succeeded in temporary command -of the Battalion by Major G. H. M. Vine. On the occasion of Major -Hamilton's departure the troops testified to their appreciation of his -unfailing kindness and sympathy with all ranks throughout the period of -his command by lining the camp road and heartily cheering him as his -car passed down it. - -[4] Major Hamilton remained with the 4th D.C.L.I. until the following -year when he was attached to the 4th Hants Regiment. With this -Battalion he proceeded to Mesopotamia and took part in the victorious -advance which culminated in the occupation of Baghdad. He was later -appointed to command the detachment of the Hants Regiment which -accompanied the gallant little force led by General Dunsterville to -endeavour to secure the oilfield of Baku on the Caspian Sea. - -In the latter part of July command of the Battalion was assumed by Col. -Vickers Dunfee, Major Vine resuming the duties of second in command. - -On the 1st July 1916 began the great series of battles on the Somme, -the Regiment's part in which will be described, and almost immediately -calls were made for drafts of all ranks to fill the very serious -gaps caused by the heavy casualties sustained by the 1/4th Battalion -during the battle of Gommecourt; and between this date and the middle -of October when the 56th Division was finally withdrawn from the -Somme battles a total of some 30 officers and 400 other ranks were -despatched. These very heavy calls naturally depleted the ranks of the -home Battalion very seriously and took nearly all the "Derby" recruits -who had joined in the previous March. - -With the object, apparently, of effecting an ultimate economy in staff, -a reorganisation of considerable importance took place on the 1st -September 1916 among the whole of the 3rd line units of the Division. -So far as the Fusilier Brigade was concerned this took the form of -amalgamation of the four existing battalions into two, the 1st and -2nd Battalions becoming the 1st (Reserve) Battalion, and the 3rd and -4th Battalions becoming the 3rd (Reserve) Battalion. Each of these -new battalions for the time being retained a double establishment of -officers, warrant officers and N.C.O.'s and were organised in eight -companies till the despatch of personnel on draft permitted a reduction -to be made. The composite battalion was made responsible for the -provision of reinforcements and for the reception of ranks returned -from overseas for each of the two Regiments of which it was composed. - -These amalgamations of necessity involved extensive repostings of -officers, in particular among those of senior rank. Command of the -new 3rd (Reserve) Battalion was assumed by Lieut.-Col. T. Montgomerie -Webb, formerly commanding the old 3rd (Reserve) Battalion, Major G. -H. M. Vine being appointed second in command. The duties of Adjutant, -Quartermaster and Training Officer respectively were also assumed by -officers of the old 3rd (Reserve) Battalion (namely, Capt. McGlashan, -Capt. Coombe and Major H. Moore, M.C.), the officers who had previously -held the corresponding appointments in the old 4th (Reserve) Battalion -being posted as follows:-- - - Capt, F. A. Coffin (Adjt.) to Brigade Staff. - - Lieut. Fullalove (Q.M.) to new 6th (Reserve) Battalion. - - Capt. F. C. Grimwade (Training Officer) to command A Company new - 3rd (Reserve) Battalion. - -Col. Vickers Dunfee was appointed to command the new 1st (Reserve) -Battalion, an appointment which he retained until his demobilisation in -December 1918. - -It must be confessed that the immediate result of this amalgamation, -involving as it did the extinction as a separate entity of the 4th -(Reserve) Battalion, was a heavy blow to the _esprit de corps_ of all -ranks, which was in the circumstances at least comprehensible. The rank -and file at a critical stage of their training came under the command -of officers and N.C.O. instructors who were unknown to them, while the -instructors of the old 4th (Reserve) Battalion experienced a natural -and very keen disappointment at not being permitted to complete the -task to which they had applied themselves with such devotion for many -weeks past. - -A closer acquaintance with the new surroundings, however, resulted in -a gradual disappearance of these feelings of regret, and in due course -a new _esprit de corps_ and a closer bond of union between the two -Regiments concerned took their place. At the end of its existence in -November 1918 the 3rd (Reserve) Battalion had become an extremely happy -one, in which no sort of distinction existed between the 3rd and 4th -London Regiments, and each worked for the welfare of all. - - - - -CHAPTER IX - -THE FORMATION OF THE 56TH DIVISION - - -From May onwards during the remainder of 1916 the history of the -Regiment in France is that of the 1/4th Battalion, into which the -2/4th Battalion was merged; and we may therefore proceed to follow -its fortunes from the date of its attachment to the newly formed 56th -Division. - -At the date of the 1/4th Battalion's arrival in billets at Citerne on -the 9th February 1916, the 56th Division was just being concentrated. -The 47th Division, which comprised chiefly battalions of the 2nd London -Division of pre-war days and which the Battalion had just left, had -joined the British Armies in France as a Division; but the units of the -old 1st London Division, which had been among the first Territorial -units to leave England, had hitherto been scattered throughout the Army -attached to different regular divisions. The 56th, therefore, though -junior in precedence, owing to its comparatively late formation, to -many other Territorial Divisions which had left England as complete -organisations, consisted entirely of battalions which might fairly be -described as veteran, since all had seen a good deal of stiff work up -and down the lines. - -The infantry battalions were brigaded as follows: - - 56TH (LONDON) DIVISION--Major-Gen. Sir C. P. A. Hull, K.C.B. - - 167TH INFANTRY BRIGADE--Brig.-Gen. F. H. Burnell-Nugent, D.S.O. - 1/1st London (Royal Fusiliers). - 1/3rd London (Royal Fusiliers). - 1/7th Middlesex. - 1/8th Middlesex. - - 168TH INFANTRY BRIGADE--Brig.-Gen. G. G. Loch, C.M.G., D.S.O. - 1/4th London (Royal Fusiliers). - 1/12th London (Rangers). - 1/13th London (Kensingtons). - 1/14th London (London Scottish). - - 169TH INFANTRY BRIGADE--Brig.-Gen. E. S. D'Ewes Coke, C.M.G., D.S.O. - 1/2nd London (Royal Fusiliers). - 1/5th London (London Rifle Brigade). - 1/9th London (Queen Victoria Rifles). - 1/16th London (Queen's Westminster Rifles). - -The Division was attached to the VI Corps (Keir) of the Third Army -(Allenby). - -The record of the next three months may be passed over quickly as -they were devoted solely to organising and training the new Division -in areas well to the rear of the trenches, and it was not until the -early days of May 1916 that the various units came under fire as a -Division. This prolonged period of rest, which indeed was the longest -ever spent in this manner by the Battalion in the whole course of -its active service history, was of considerable importance in order -that staffs and units might become thoroughly acquainted with each -other, and that the individual battalions of each Brigade might have -a sufficient opportunity of creating the divisional _esprit de corps_ -which experience has shown to be so necessary in action. - -But the three months of routine work will provide us with a useful -respite in which to make some reference to one or two developments in -organisation which were carried out before the British forces plunged -into the dreary and protracted struggles of the Somme, and which -affected the 1/4th Londons equally with other units. - -One of the developments which took place about this period, and which -had an effect on the general efficiency of the Army so far-reaching -that its value can hardly be overestimated, was the formation of Army -and Divisional Schools, in which the lead was taken by the Third Army. -These schools, as is well known, were established under selected -bodies of instructors to achieve the double object of keeping the -fighting troops, through the medium of the regimental officers and -non-commissioned officers who attended them for short courses of -instruction, in touch with the progress made from time to time in the -art of war, and particularly in the more technical branches, such as -gas, bombing, Lewis gunnery, etc., and also of assisting battalions -to provide efficient courses of instruction and training for their own -personnel while out of the trenches for short periods. The success -which in general attended these efforts was great and their influence -on the action of our troops in the great battles of the latter part of -the War was undoubtedly far-reaching. - -The 56th Divisional Schools were first established under Major D. V. -Smith, D.S.O., 1/1st Londons, at Givenchy-le-Noble and Ambrines in -April 1916. - -Attention was also directed at this time towards training the -infantry to assume greater responsibility for the general maintenance -and strengthening of the forward trenches in their own occupation, -and thereby releasing the Royal Engineers for works requiring more -technical skill. To this end the early days of March saw the formation -in the Division of trench pioneer squads in each battalion consisting -of selected men under the supervision of a subaltern officer. These -squads were given special training in erecting wire entanglements, -constructing strong points and consolidation of newly captured -positions. The first trench pioneer officer of the 1/4th Londons was -2/Lieut. V. C. Donaldson, and under him the trench pioneers began to -shape well towards efficiency; but the need for the existence of such -squads was subsequently modified to some extent by the attachment to -each Division of a specially trained Pioneer Battalion, the 1/5th -Cheshire Regiment joining the 56th Division in this capacity. The -Pioneer Battalions were fighting units but, as their name implies, were -employed more particularly on constructional work rather beyond the -powers of the ordinary infantry officer to direct or of the troops to -execute, and in active operations their usefulness in consolidating -new trenches and similar duties was established beyond a doubt. The -advent of such highly trained units had a tendency somewhat, perhaps -not altogether rightly, to depreciate the value of battalion pioneer -squads, and ultimately these were done away with. The duty of trench -working parties, whether in active operations or in holding trenches, -afterwards fell equally on all the personnel of the companies, while -in the 56th Division if not in others, general direction was given to -the Battalion's activity in trench work by a "Works" officer attached -to Battalion Headquarters. This appointment established early in June -1916 was first filled in the 1/4th Londons by Capt. R. N. Arthur, and -remained in existence until the end of the War. The Works officer -became responsible for making arrangements between company commanders -and the Royal Engineers for the supply of the material required for the -trench work undertaken by the companies in the line, for detailing the -working parties supplied by the Battalion while out of the line, and in -general forming a link between the Commanding Officer and the company -commanders in the matter of trench work. - -A further development occurred in the formation of a Headquarters -Company, called in the 1/4th Londons for ease of distinction K -Company. The object of this change was to separate so far as was -reasonably possible the fighting personnel of the Battalion from the -administrative personnel, such as transport, headquarters clerks -and telephone operators; and to relieve the company commander of -responsibility as regards clothing, pay and accommodation, etc., of -such administrative personnel by bringing them under the direct control -of a Headquarters officer, usually the Assistant-Adjutant, to whom as a -rule such men were more accessible than to the company officers. This -left the companies more intact as fighting units and much reduced the -work of company quartermaster-sergeants in looking after large numbers -of men who in practice were seldom with the company. Upon the whole -the system worked exceedingly well; though, as was almost inevitable, -K Company showed from time to time a tendency to assume unreasonable -proportions and required a little "weeding out." - -At least a passing reference must be made to the 56th Division's -famous concert troop, the Bow Bells. The uniform excellence of its -entertainments from its inception till the end of the war was the means -of providing all ranks of the Division from time to time with hours of -intense pleasure and mental rest of inestimable value. - -Lastly, mention must be made of an institution which made its -appearance in the Battalion about this time and carried out exceedingly -useful work, namely, the Regimental Canteen. Thousands of 1/4th London -men have happy recollections of Sergt. Plumbley and his assistant Pte. -Blight, who, like the sutlers of former wars, followed the Battalion -in all its wanderings with their welcome stocks of tobacco, chocolate, -notepaper, newspapers and other useful articles, and, fair times or -foul, were always to be found with their little shop neatly set out in -a dugout or a ruined cottage not very far in rear of the most advanced -troops of the Battalion. - -The Battalion occupied its comfortable quarters at Citerne for about -a fortnight amid conditions which presented a total change from those -amidst which it had passed the previous year, and which brought a -corresponding benefit to the troops by way of mental as well as -physical recuperation. The Hallencourt area, lying as it does on the -broad rolling hills of Ponthieu on the west bank of the Somme, formed a -complete contrast to the dreary flats and marches of Flanders not only -in the pretty variation of the landscape but also because this part of -the country was unscarred by the ravages of war. At Citerne, moreover, -the Battalion for the first time since it joined the Ferozepore Brigade -in February 1915 was stationed beyond the range of heavy gun fire. -Citerne is but a small village, but its kindly and warm-hearted folk, -from M. le Maire downwards, will always be held in grateful remembrance -by those of the 1/4th Londons who had the good fortune to enjoy their -hospitality. - -The fortnight's sojourn here was devoted principally to training, but -the amusement of the Battalion was not overlooked and football matches -with other units and concerts in the tiny village theatre made a -welcome break in the routine of parades. - -At Citerne the 1/4th Londons became possessed for the first time in -France of a Chaplain, the Rev. R. Palmer, C.F., Brigade Chaplain, being -attached to the Battalion on the 19th February. The Battalion was also -rejoined at Citerne by Capt. W. Moore, who had been hit at Ypres the -previous April, and was further strengthened by the arrival of a draft -of 95 N.C.O.'s and men. - -On the 27th February the Division moved to a fresh training area on the -opposite bank of the Somme, Divisional Headquarters opening at Domart, -when the 168th Brigade Headquarters and the Battalion were billeted in -Vauchelles. Here the programme of training was continued until the 12th -March, on which day a second move was made, this time to the Doullens -area, all the battalions of the 168th Brigade occupying billets in the -town. - -On the 8th March a further reinforcement of 100 N.C.O.'s and men -arrived from the 4/4th Battalion and was posted to companies. At this -time also the bad news was received that Lieut.-Col. L. T. Burnett, who -had gone on leave in January, was unfit to return overseas, and Major -W. G. Clark, D.S.O., therefore continued in command of the Battalion, -with Major W. Moore as second in command. - -Doullens did not provide a refuge to the Brigade for long for the 15th -March saw the Division once more on the move to the Le Cauroy area -(east of Frevent), the 1/4th Londons taking over billets at Beaufort. -In this area the Division settled down steadily to a period of training -which continued without interruption and with very little incident -calling for notice for nearly seven weeks, during which the strength -of the Battalion, as of all other units, gradually crept up, if not to -war strength at least to such size that it became abundantly evident -that the Division was not destined to remain for long in billets -behind the line. Drafts joined the Battalion consisting of 2/Lieuts. -G. E. Stanbridge, G. H. Davis and A. G. Blunn, and also of 87 other -ranks on the 22nd March; of 12 other ranks on the 6th April; and a -final reinforcement of 33 other ranks arrived on the 20th April; these -additions bringing the Battalion to the respectable strength of nearly -600 all ranks. - -During the same period the Battalion suffered losses among officers -in Capt. J. R. Pyper, M.C., who was seconded to the 168th Brigade -Machine-Gun Company; Lieut. S. E. H. Walmisley, who after carrying out -the duties of Quartermaster for nearly four months during the absence -on sick leave of Lieut. E. S. Tomsett, was appointed to the Central -Training School, Rouen; and 2/Lieut. C. R. P. de Pury who was seconded -as R.T.O. - -On the 23rd March Major W. G. Clark, D.S.O., left the Battalion on -short leave and he also succumbed to a severe breakdown while at home -and was unable to return. Command of the Battalion was carried on -temporarily by Major W. Moore until the 8th April, when Lieut.-Col. L. -L. Wheatley, D.S.O., Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, Staff Captain -168th Infantry Brigade, took command. - -It would be but tiresome to follow the daily routine of the Battalion -during this prolonged period of rest where one day's work so much -resembles that which preceded it, and we may therefore be forgiven for -passing quickly over this part of the record. Enough has been said to -show how from the Battalion point of view the Division came into being -and was prepared for the work allotted to it, and it remains therefore -for us to pass on and endeavour to recount the manner in which the -1/4th Londons performed their task. - - - - -CHAPTER X - -THE 1/4TH BATTALION IN THE BATTLES OF THE SOMME, 1916 - - -I. _The Attack on Gommecourt_ - -The spring of 1916 was marked by two enemy offensives, at Verdun and -on the Italian front, both of which tried the resources of our Allies -severely. In order to draw off German troops to the East the Russian -offensive against the Austrians had been started in May, but in spite -of this the German pressure against Verdun continued to increase. - -Sir Douglas Haig had for some time intended to undertake an offensive -operation on a large scale during 1916 in conjunction with the French, -and in view of the continual increase in the strength of the British -Armies it was clearly desirable that the launching of the battle should -be delayed as long as possible consistent with the advance of the -summer. But in view of the great pressure at Verdun it was decided that -the British attacks should begin at the latest at the end of June, with -the objects of relieving our Allies and of pinning as many enemies as -possible to the front opposite the British Armies, in addition to the -tactical improvement of our positions. - -The part of the enemy's lines selected for attack was the right of the -British front, opposite which the Germans occupied high ground forming -the watershed between the River Somme and the rivers flowing north-east -into Belgium. The general direction of this watershed, which consists -of a chalk country of broad swelling downs and deep well-wooded -valleys, is roughly from east-south-east to west-north-west. The aspect -of this country bears a general resemblance to parts of Wiltshire, -and the gentle undulations of the higher slopes of the hills, which -descend with unexpected abruptness into waterless valleys lined with -banks whose declivitous sides seem to have been shaped by human agency, -cause the resemblance to be one also of detail. From this watershed -a series of long spurs runs south-westerly towards the Somme, and on -their lower slopes the German lines ran from Curlu near the river at -first north and then almost due west to Fricourt, a distance of some -10,000 yards. At Fricourt the lines took an abrupt turn northward for -a further 10,000 yards when they crossed the Ancre, a tributary of -the Somme, near Hamel. From this point they continued in a generally -northerly direction, passing through Beaumont Hamel, west of Serre -and between Hébuterne and Gommecourt. In the neighbourhood of the two -last-named villages the lines crossed the summit of the main watershed, -and thence descended gently in a north-easterly direction towards Arras. - -On the 20,000 yards between the Somme and the Ancre the enemy had -already prepared a strong second system of defence about two miles -in rear of the front system; and on the whole front from Gommecourt -to the Somme he had spared no effort in the nearly two years of his -uninterrupted occupation to render these positions impregnable. -The strengthening of woods and villages into fortresses, and the -skilful use of the ground in siting trenches and gun and machine-gun -emplacements, had in fact woven his successive lines of trenches -into one composite system. Yet further in rear he was still at work -improving existing defences and constructing new. - -The front of attack on which the British armies were to operate covered -the whole of the above described line from Gommecourt to Curlu--a total -of about 17 miles--while the French were to co-operate on a wide front -immediately south of the River Somme. - -The story of the struggle which, lasting from the beginning of July -until the early part of November, gave us possession, first of the -forward trench systems, then of the crest of the ridge, and finally -of the whole plateau and parts of the further slopes, divides itself -into phases, which can be dealt with in turn to such an extent as the -record of the 1/4th Battalion is concerned with them. For the present -we are concerned with the enormous preparations which preceded the -opening of the struggle and of the first phase of the battle which -began on the 1st July 1916. - -Dealing with the preparations for the battle generally, an enormous -amount of work was required in improving road and rail communications; -in digging assembly trenches and dugouts, for use not only as shelters -but also as aid posts and stores for ammunition for small arms and -trench mortars; and in constructing many additional machine-gun and gun -emplacements. The water supply for the assaulting troops presented a -serious problem, and Sir Douglas Haig records in his Despatches that in -this connection over a hundred pumping plants were installed and over -120 miles of water mains laid. - -During most of the period in which this preliminary labour proceeded -the troops were working under most trying weather conditions and -frequently were harassed by heavy enemy fire. - -The particular tasks for which the 168th Brigade, and in particular the -1/4th Londons, were called upon will be referred to in their places at -greater length. - - * * * * * - -After remaining in training in the Frevent area for the latter half of -March and the whole of April the 56th Division moved forward on the -3rd and 4th of May into the VII Corps area (D'Oyly Snow) and took over -from the 46th Division a sector of the line in front of the village of -Hébuterne and facing Gommecourt. - -The line was occupied by the 167th Brigade, the 168th moving in reserve -to Souastre, a small village some three miles west of the front -trenches. The Battalion moved by march route from Beaufort on the 6th -and arrived at Souastre after a ten mile march at 9 p.m. - -Two or three days were occupied in training, and on the 11th May the -Battalion began to supply working parties of considerable size. Of -these, one of 200 all ranks was despatched to Pas and employed in -felling and sawing trees to form props for gun pits and dugouts; and -another of 250 all ranks went to the chalk quarries of Hénu, where they -were given a task in digging road material. These working parties, the -first of many weary tasks, constituted so far as the Battalion was -concerned the first direct active preparations in the area of battle -for the Somme offensive. - -The Battalion's duty at Souastre lasted a fortnight. Work, however, -did not take up the whole of the Battalion's time, and opportunity was -found for a football match with the Kensingtons, which was played on -the 12th May and resulted in a draw at one all. A few days later the -Battalion entered representatives at the London Scottish sports at St. -Amand, securing second and third places in the "open" 200 yards. - -On the 15th Major H. J. Duncan-Teape rejoined the Battalion and was -appointed second in command. The works programme was now beginning -to be operated by Brigade Headquarters to the fullest extent and the -greatest possible working strength was daily employed, the chief tasks -being the digging of cable trenches for the signal services, the -construction of new dugouts and the deepening and strengthening of -existing communication and fire trenches. - -D Company and one platoon of B Company in fact were despatched on the -18th to Hébuterne, where they were billeted for night digging work; and -every available man of the remaining companies was detailed for work -of one sort or another. So insistent was the demand for more labour -that on the 20th May the band and every available man of the transport -section had to be put to work on digging parties. - -On the 20th and 21st May a series of Brigade reliefs took place, the -trenches being occupied by the 169th Brigade, who replaced the 167th; -while the 168th withdrew in Divisional reserve to Grenas, a hamlet near -the Doullens-Arras Road, where Brigade Headquarters opened on the 21st. -The Rangers and Scottish were billeted close by at Halloy; but the -1/4th Londons and the Kensingtons remained in the forward area attached -to the 169th Brigade, the latter battalion occupying W sector, on the -right of the Divisional front. The 1/4th Londons moved on the 21st -in Brigade reserve to Bayencourt, about a mile and a half south of -Souastre and slightly nearer the trenches. - -On the 22nd the detachments in Hébuterne were relieved by C Company, -who took over their tasks. Each night of the period of duty in -Bayencourt the Battalion continued to supply large numbers of men for -fatigues of various sorts, the parties being small and divided amongst -a large number of tasks. These working parties were equipped as lightly -as possible, the men carrying water-bottles and respirators over the -left shoulder; a bandolier of fifty rounds over the right shoulder; -and their rifles with bayonet in scabbard fixed. But although the -troops moved "light" the duties were onerous, partly from the long -hours of work and the strain induced by the short available time in -which to complete apparently impossible tasks; and not least by the bad -weather, the season from the middle of May onwards being for the most -part wet. Hitherto practically no casualties had been sustained, the -first recorded casualties at the enemy's hands during the Battalion's -attachment to the 56th Division occurring on the 24th May, when two men -were wounded at work in Hébuterne. - -On the afternoon of the 28th May the 1/4th Londons relieved the -Kensingtons in W subsector of the Divisional front, the Battalion still -being under the orders of the 169th Brigade. The Kensingtons took over -on relief the billets at Bayencourt. - -The Divisional sector as taken over from the 46th Division early in -May had consisted of the original line taken up by the French troops -in October 1914 during the extension of the battle line from the Aisne -to the sea. This line the French had continued to hold until they -were finally relieved of responsibility for it in June 1915, when the -British extended their lines southward to the Somme. The frontage of -the sector extended as shown on Map No. 4 from the Bucquoy Road on -the right to a point opposite the most westerly point of Gommecourt -Wood on the left, being divided into two subsectors, W and Y, by an -imaginary line running roughly parallel to, and 200 yards north of, the -Hébuterne-Bucquoy Road. Opposite the British lines the Germans held a -position of enormous strength bastioned by the enclosure of Gommecourt -Wood which marked an abrupt salient in their line. As was only too -frequently the case the enemy possessed considerable advantages of -observation over the British lines, the ground rising steadily in rear -of his front trenches to the Gommecourt-Bucquoy ridge, which, although -not a hill of outstanding pre-eminence, formed the summit of the Somme -watershed described earlier in this chapter. - -Except in the neighbourhood of villages such as Hébuterne, which are -surrounded by orchards and enclosed in a ring fence, the Somme country -is, like most of Picardy and Artois, devoid of hedges, and from road to -road the swell of the hillside is unbroken by fence or ditch. The roads -themselves, however, are in many cases "sunken," that is, contained in -a deep cutting, the cover afforded by the banks playing an important -part in the actions fought in this area. - -A glance at the map will help to make the position clear. The trench -line shown as a reserve position on the map and marked as the WR and YR -lines was at the date of the 56th Division's advent the most advanced -trench, so that No Man's Land varied in width from 800 to 600 yards. -This fact is most important and a full realisation of it is essential -to a correct understanding of the enormous task performed by the 56th -Division. - -In view of the impending attack the great width of No Man's Land was -clearly a great disadvantage, as the time which must necessarily be -occupied by assaulting columns in advancing an average of distance of -700 yards before reaching the German front line would expose them to -risk of very serious loss and possibly deprive the attack completely of -the weight necessary to enable it to be driven home. Nothing daunted -by this difficulty, however, the 56th Division at once proceeded to -make arrangements to push the lines forward and roughly to halve the -width of No Man's Land. This audacious scheme was put into operation, -and before the end of May the construction of the new front line--that -shown as the front line on the map--was begun. - -[Illustration: THE ATTACK ON GOMMECOURT, 1ST JULY 1916] - -The operation of digging a new front line at no great distance from the -enemy was one of considerable difficulty. It was clearly essential to -perform the work at night, and in view of the importance of the work it -was equally clearly a matter of necessity to have the task set out with -tapes as a mark for the troops to dig to. It was further reasonable to -anticipate that as soon as the enemy became aware of the existence of -the new line he would shell it violently, and therefore the new trench -must be sunk deeply enough in the first night's work to enable its -completion to be carried on from inside without the need for moving -troops about in the open. This aim postulated a working party of great -strength, for the front to be covered was nearly 2000 yards, and the -noise which must inevitably arise from over a mile of shovels and picks -hard at work was likely to bring down a hail of machine-gun bullets -and cause very severe casualties, and even, in the presence of an -enterprising enemy, the probability of a surprise attack in the middle -of the work. The attempt was clearly fraught with great risk, but with -characteristic boldness Gen. Hull determined to make the attempt. - -On the night of the 25/26th May the setting out of the work was safely -accomplished by the Royal Engineers under cover of a screen of scouts, -and the following night a working party of 3000 men got to work on the -digging, a line of outposts being established for their protection -within 200 yards of the German line. - -The Battalion responsible for W--the right or southern--sector of the -new line was the 1/4th Londons, the work being under the control of -Major Duncan-Teape, while the L.R.B. undertook the work in Y sector. -The night luckily passed quietly, and all ranks working with a will the -new trench, shown on map as W 47, W 48, W 49 and W 50, was opened and -sunk to a depth sufficient to provide cover. - -When the Battalion, therefore, took over W sector on the night of -the 28th May, the new front line was becoming fit to occupy and had, -moreover, reached the anticipated stage in which, the Bosche being -alive to what had been done, it was becoming a favourite target for his -shells and trench mortar bombs of all calibres. From this time onwards, -in fact until the battle, the Divisional sector and in particular the -new trenches were daily harassed by the enemy's fire, and constant -repair work on the part of our trench garrisons was called for in -addition to the continuance of new construction. - -The front line of W sector was taken up by A Company (A. R. Moore) on -the right with B Company (S. Elliott) on the left, supports to both -front line companies being found by D Company (Giles), while C Company -(Long) was in reserve at Hébuterne. Battalion Headquarters occupied -dugouts beneath a roller flour mill in Hébuterne. The move forward -from Bayencourt for this relief being made in daylight was carried out -across country along tracks, platoons moving separately at 300 yards -distance. - -After relief the Kensingtons in Bayencourt remained at the disposal -of the 1/4th Londons for working parties, for the construction of -the new front line was but a small beginning of the task which still -remained to be completed before the opening of the battle. In addition -to the first line there was to be dug a control trench immediately -in rear of it, and a new support line--the WS line--and all these -were to be connected up by the advancement from the old WR line of -Warrior, Welcome, Whisky, Woman and Wood Street communication trenches. -These defensive works completed, there was also the erection of the -necessary wire entanglements in front, the construction of dugouts -for shelters, company headquarters, ammunition stores, and signal -offices; the laying of armoured signal cable from all headquarters -dugouts back to battalion and brigade, the digging of cable trenches -for lines of particular importance, the collection of the necessary -supplies of small arms and trench mortar ammunition and bombs in dumps; -and other tasks of varying importance and interest. Enough has been -said, however, to indicate that with only a month in which to do all -this work it was clear that the Battalion was not likely to find time -hanging heavily on its hands while in the line,--and indeed it did not. - -The tour of duty proved somewhat unpleasant. The works programme was, -of course, the outstanding duty, and all ranks put their shoulders to -it with a will, but the heavy rains which fell each day made it hard to -keep pace with the time-table set for the work, while the remarkable -aggressiveness of the enemy's guns added to the digging scheme by -providing much undesired practice in trench repair work. - -During the night following the relief the Battalion's positions were -heavily bombarded by heavy guns and trench mortars, which caused much -damage and several casualties, especially in the left company front. -Capt. Elliott had to be dug out of the trench which was blown in on -him, and he was sent to hospital suffering from severe concussion; -and 3 N.C.O.'s and men were killed and 12 wounded. Capt. Elliott was -unhappily never able to return to France, and in him the Battalion lost -an officer of remarkably cool and sound judgment and of wide sympathy -with the welfare of his men. - -The 30th May opened with a heavy bombardment of our lines at 12.15 -a.m., which was repeated half an hour later. About 2.50 a.m., following -further bombardment, the S.O.S. signal was received from the Queen -Victoria's Rifles in Y subsector, who reported the enemy advancing. A -very quick response to the call was made by our artillery, which laid -down a barrage on S.O.S. lines; but no infantry movement developed on -our front. At about 5 p.m. the enemy turned his attention to Battalion -Headquarters in Hébuterne, which were heavily shelled and severely -damaged. The sentry on duty was badly wounded, as were also four other -men of the Headquarters staff and four of D Company billeted in an -adjoining dugout. The total casualties for the day amounted to 31, of -whom 16 in B Company were cases of severe shell shock following the -previous day's bombardment. - -This unpleasant degree of Bosche activity continued during the night, -when our working parties were harassed and seriously delayed; and the -31st May saw no abatement of the shelling. Battalion Headquarters again -received a "hate" at about 5 p.m., and the casualties for the day were -Lieut. H. B. A. Balls, wounded at duty, and in N.C.O.'s and men, 1 -killed and 3 wounded. - -Throughout this tour of duty the promptness with which the Divisional -artillery responded to calls for retaliatory fire against the enemy's -activity was excellent and did a great deal to inspire all ranks with -confidence in the gunners. - -Further heavy bombardments occurred on the 1st June, which caused -a very great deal of damage to the new trenches. On the afternoon -of the next day the 1/4th Londons were relieved by the London -Scottish, withdrawing on relief to Bayencourt, where tea was served -and valises picked up from the stores. In the evening the Battalion -was concentrated in huts at Souastre. The Kensingtons had also been -relieved by the Rangers, who with the Scottish now came under the -orders of the 169th Brigade. - -A day was spent in Souastre by the Battalion in cleaning trench mud -from uniforms and equipment, and in the evening it moved by march route -_via_ Hénu to Halloy, where it came once more under the orders of the -168th Brigade in Divisional reserve. - -During this period of preparations for the battle the strength of the -Battalion had been steadily creeping up with reinforcements from home -and from the disbanded 2/4th Battalion. The drafts from the 2/4th -Battalion were particularly valuable; they had all seen active service -and, moreover, they were rich in potential N.C.O.'s. Throughout the -hard fighting which followed the Battalion was fortunate in having -so great an internal reserve of strength in this respect. As already -recorded the 2/4th Battalion had been on overseas service for nearly -eighteen months without the grant of any home leave. Through the -special intervention of Lieut.-Col. Wheatley several large allotments -of leave were made to the 1/4th Londons, and these were used chiefly -for the benefit of the 2/4th Battalion reinforcements, but it was of -course inevitable that large numbers of men should be unable to obtain -leave before the 1st July. - -The drafts received were: - - 7th May--2/Lieuts. F. R. C. Bradford, C. S. G. Blows, J. W. - Price and S. Davis, and 214 other ranks from the 2/4th - Battalion. - - 14th May--44 other ranks from the Reserve Battalion. - - 24th May--130 other ranks from the 2/4th Battalion. - -When the last-noted draft joined, the Battalion was treated to the -annoying spectacle of watching a further 100 men of the 2/4th Battalion -marching by _en route_ for the Kensingtons. - -The day following arrival at Halloy being Sunday, a parade service was -held, the first since the 14th May; and later in the day a further -reinforcement, this time composed entirely of officers, reported to the -Battalion from the disbanded 2/4th Battalion, as follows: - - Capts. R. N. Arthur and H. G. Stanham, Lieuts. W. R. Botterill and - W. A. Stark, and 2/Lieuts. H. W. Vernon, B. F. L. Yeoman, H. G. - Hicklenton and N. W. Williams. - -The two first-named officers had been mobilised with the 1/4th -Battalion in August 1914, and were thus particularly welcome. The -officers of this draft were distributed among the companies, and Capt. -Arthur took over the duties of Works Officer as Major, an appointment -he continued to fill until the 27th June, when he was evacuated to -hospital seriously ill. - -The 5th, 6th and 7th June were spent in training, of which the -principal feature was a practice attack over trenches constructed to -represent those opposite the sector of line which the Battalion had -just left, in preparation, of course, for the coming battle. Following -the last day's practice the Battalion was inspected by the Third Army -commander, Sir Edmund Allenby, who was accompanied by Major-Gen. Hull -and Brig.-Gen. Loch, and expressed himself satisfied with all that he -had seen and also with what he had heard of the Battalion's behaviour -during its recent tour of duty. A report of this kind may read -curiously at first in view of the fact that the Battalion had been in -France for eighteen months and had proved its steadiness in the line on -many occasions: but remember that the 56th Division was brand new, and -commanders so far did not know how their troops would shape in action. -Praise from Allenby at this stage was therefore praise indeed. - -The same day the Battalion was once more sent adrift from its own -Brigade and became attached for duty to the 169th Brigade, though it -retained its billets at Halloy, and the 168th Brigade took over W and Y -sectors, Headquarters moving from Grenas to Sailly. - -The Battalion now became responsible for the various works duties in -the back area, relieving the L.R.B. in this monotonous task; and from -this date onwards remained hard at work on various tasks until almost -the eve of battle. B Company was despatched to Mondicourt, an important -and vast R.E. dump on the Doullens-Arras Road, for work under the -R.E.'s. The remaining companies were split up to supply parties for the -daily work, the total numbers found each day being 8 officers and 350 -other ranks, employed on such varied tasks as digging road material in -Halloy quarries; carrying logs at Pas for gun emplacements; shifting -and loading timber at Mondicourt; and working in the R.E. workshop at -Pas. This programme was pushed forward without a break until the 12th -June, the only intermission being an inspection on Sunday the 11th, -of such remnants of the Battalion as were available, by Sir Charles -Wakefield, then Lord Mayor of London, who was accompanied by Major-Gen. -Hull and Col. Evelyn Wood, and addressed the troops. - -On the 13th a further redistribution of Brigades took place, the 168th -remaining in line but retaining W sector only; Y sector was handed over -to the 169th Brigade; while the 167th moved back into reserve. This -move placed the Brigades in the positions they were destined to occupy -on the day of battle. The same day the 1/4th Londons moved forward, -leaving Halloy at 5 p.m., and marching _via_ Authie, St Leger and -Coigneux to Bayencourt, where it was joined in billets by B Company -from detachment at Mondicourt. A Company was pushed straight on to -Hébuterne, when in spite of its long march and late arrival in billets -it set to work on its share of the Brigade works programme at 5 a.m. on -the 14th June. - -The remaining companies were also set to work on the 14th in Hébuterne -on parts of the Brigade scheme, working hours being nightly from 9 -p.m. to 5 a.m. The parties were much split up, 280 being detailed to -the 2/2nd Field Company R.E., 140 to the 5th Cheshires and 140 to the -Brigade Signal Officer for digging cable trenches. The tasks were -various, but were all directed in one way or another to the completion -and repair of the new trench system and the necessary dugouts for -the impending offensive. Night after night, for fourteen nights in -succession, did the Battalion continue these stiff working parties. -Each night there was a march of nearly three miles in each direction -between billets and work, each night the Bosche was unpleasantly active -with machine-guns, and nearly every night it rained steadily. That the -Battalion carried out this depressing duty--for there is nothing with -which the average infantryman gets more quickly "fed up" than continual -working parties--with such efficiency and keenness is all the more to -its credit. Conditions were not comfortable and the men were beginning -to be tired; but they stuck to it well for they knew the urgency of the -work and how much remained to be done in an impossibly short time. - -On the 21st June the 167th Brigade took over the whole Divisional -sector for six days in order to give a final rest to the 168th and -169th and to keep them as fresh as possible for battle. The 168th -withdrew to its old rest billets at Halloy, but again the 1/4th Londons -were left behind as works battalion, remaining in Hébuterne attached to -the 167th Brigade and sticking to its works programme. - -On the 23rd June Lieut. W. J. Boutall rejoined the Battalion from home -and was posted to D Company, but almost immediately took up the duties -of Assistant Adjutant. - -A draft of the 2/4th Battalion arrived on the 24th, consisting of -Lieut. J. R. Webster and 40 other ranks. - -Affairs in the line had now begun to "tune up." Some days previously -the British 9·2 batteries in Bayencourt had begun to register, while -on the 24th the preliminary bombardment of the enemy's lines began -systematically, with occasional intense periods, alternating with -intervals of quiet. This continued daily--and nightly--much to the -discomfort of those who were lucky enough to occupy billets with more -or less sound ceilings, for their nights were continually disturbed by -large pieces of plaster falling on them at each concussion! The attack -had been originally projected for the 29th June, and in preparation for -this the 168th and 169th Brigades returned to the line in the afternoon -of the 27th, the 1/4th Londons advancing from Bayencourt, taking over -the whole of W sector from the 8th Middlesex. - -The sector was occupied on a three-company frontage as follows: - - D Company--(Giles) with two platoons in W 47 and 48, one - platoon in W 47 S and one in billets in Hébuterne. - - A Company--(A. R. Moore) with two platoons in W 49, one - in W 49 S and one in billets in Hébuterne. - - C Company--(Sykes) with two platoons in W 49 and 50, one - in W 50 S and one in Napier Trench. - - B Company--(W. Moore) with two platoons in reserve - dugouts in Cross Street. The two remaining platoons of - B were detailed for special duties as Brigade carrying - parties respectively under the Bombing and Machine-Gun - Officers. - -The Somme Battle was the first important offensive in which steps -were taken to reduce the number of officers actually taking part to -the smallest possible limits, and a "battle surplus" of officers and -also of warrant officers, N.C.O.'s and men was therefore left behind -in bivouacs near Souastre when the Battalion moved into the line. -This precaution, which was always afterwards adopted, was the means -of avoiding unnecessary casualties and of providing an immediate -reinforcement, as might be required, of fresh officers who would be -acquainted with the men. The officers left in "battle surplus" were -Capts. H. G. Stanham and A. L. Long, Lieuts. J. R. Webster and H. W. -Vernon, and 2/Lieuts. C. S. G. Blows and N. W. Williams; and these were -joined on the eve of battle by Major H. J. Duncan-Teape and Lieut. W -J. Boutall, both of whom remained in the line until the last possible -minute. Lieut. W. R. Botterill also left the line before the battle to -proceed to Woolwich R.M. College. - -During the day of relief the British bombardment of the German lines -was still proceeding, occasional intensive bursts being used. At -about 7.45 p.m. on the cessation of a burst the enemy put down a very -heavy retaliatory barrage on the W and WR lines, causing a good deal -of damage, especially to the latter. In the course of this shelling -D Company's headquarters were blown in and Capt. Giles was seriously -wounded, one of his company staff killed and another wounded. Poor -Giles, who had done magnificent work as platoon commander, adjutant and -company commander, and had never missed a day's duty since August 1914, -died in hospital from his injuries a few days later. He was a gallant -and unselfish officer. His place in command of D Company was taken by -Stanham, who came forward from surplus. - -During the evening two patrols were despatched from New Woman Street to -examine and report on the condition of the enemy's wire and front line -trenches. They returned at 12.30 a.m. on the 28th, bringing samples -of German wire, which was reported as too thick to admit of access to -the front line. About the same time a rocket signal was sent up from -the Bosche line, a red light followed by two more in quick succession, -and this was the prelude to a sharp bombardment of our lines for about -fifteen minutes. Somewhat later, about 3.45 a.m., a second barrage came -down, this time on Hébuterne, but the damage caused was not great. -As the day wore on the enemy's activity became less intense though -he exhibited great persistence all day in his efforts to locate our -batteries near Cross Street and our trench mortar emplacements in W 47. -At night working parties were set on to the almost final preparation of -cutting gaps in our own wire at intervals of about 50 to 70 yards to -allow egress to the assaulting columns. This work is naturally rather -tricky, and the gaps, the cutting of which was left till the last -minute, must be so concealed if possible as to avoid the risk of the -enemy marking them down and plastering them with shell fire. - -The day's casualties amounted to 2 officers, Lieut. W. A. Stark and J. -W. Price wounded, and 2 men killed and 11 wounded. - -During the evening patrols had again been despatched to investigate -the enemy's wire and trenches, and this night greater success was -achieved. The right patrol which approached the Bosche line in front of -Farm-Farmyard was under 2/Lieut. W. H. Webster, who on looking over the -enemy's parapet found he had selected a firebay containing a party of -Bosche hard at work. Unfortunately the alarm was given and the presence -of the patrol being disclosed by Véry lights it was forced to withdraw. - -Late on the evening of the 29th the warning was received that the -attack was postponed for forty-eight hours, until the 1st July. - -Throughout the 29th our preliminary bombardment continued with -gradually increasing intensity; but it was noticeable that in spite of -the damage it was clearly doing to the enemy's defences it was not by -any means successful in silencing his batteries. The German artillery -was in fact unpleasantly lively, and from 6.30 a.m. until about 4.30 -p.m. W sector was subjected to intermittent harassing fire from field -and machine-guns. This more or less desultory fire was followed at 6 -p.m. by a sharp enemy barrage. All the evening the enemy's activity -continued, and the remarkable number of Véry lights which he put up -indicated his growing nervousness. There was indeed now every reason to -believe that the Bosche expected our attack. The long-continued British -bombardment of trenches, dumps, cross roads and battery positions, the -systematic wire-cutting, and the activity of our air forces, could have -left no room for doubt in the enemy's mind that an important offensive -was being launched. In some parts of the battle front, indeed, the -Germans had displayed notice boards inviting the British to start their -attack; and though probably these emanated from individual bravado they -formed some indication that surprise effect was not to be expected, and -that there was good reason to believe that the Germans would with their -usual thoroughness have made preparations to offer the most stubborn -possible resistance to our projected advance. - -The 29th also demanded its toll of casualties from the Battalion, and -this day 28 N.C.O.'s and men were wounded. - -The 30th June opened with a heavy barrage on W sector and Hébuterne -at about midnight, but this subsided after a few minutes and little -further activity was displayed by the enemy during the early morning -hours. As dawn approached the enemy's nervousness evidently increased, -and he maintained an almost continuous discharge of Véry lights. -From 7 a.m. onwards, however, the enemy artillery once more began to -show signs of liveliness which increased as the day passed. The WR -line in the vicinity of Woman and Cross Streets was in particular -heavily shelled, and altogether a great amount of damage was done -to our trench system. This action of the enemy did not call for any -particular retaliatory measures from our artillery, which proceeded -with the preliminary bombardment according to its programme. The losses -sustained by the Battalion on this day amounted to 2 N.C.O.'s and men -killed and 21 wounded, making a total of 69 casualties during the three -days the Battalion had held the line. - -Little has been said of the actual occupation of the Battalion during -these three days; there is so much to relate of the battle day itself -that space does not permit us to dwell overmuch on the preceding -period. But be it understood that all the time the works programme was -being pushed on with feverish haste, though progress was slow owing -to the continued rain and the great delay caused in the projected new -work by having to divert from it a large proportion of the available -strength to repair the damage caused by the daily German bombardments. - -During the evening the Battalion formed up in its prearranged assembly -areas in readiness for the attack on the following morning. - - * * * * * - -The part which the 56th Division was called on to play in the offensive -was that of a combined operation on a comparatively small front in -conjunction with the 46th Division, which was in line opposite the -northern flank of the Gommecourt Salient and adjoining the 56th. These -Divisions which, with the 37th (not engaged), formed the VII Corps -and were the right flank of Allenby's Third Army, were the two most -northern divisions operating in the Somme offensive. - -Adjoining the 56th on the right lay Hunter-Weston's VIII Corps, -comprising from left to right the 31st, 4th and 29th Divisions in line, -with the 48th in support. One Brigade of this last-named Division--the -143rd--was in line between the 56th and the 31st, and its sector formed -a gap on which no forward move was attempted. The Gommecourt operation -was therefore entirely isolated, though forming an inherent part of the -one great offensive plan. - -South of the VIII Corps the British battle front was taken up by the X -Corps (Morland), III Corps (Pulteney), XV Corps (Horne) and XIII Corps -(Congreve), these forming with the VIII, Rawlinson's Fourth Army. - -The 56th Division's objectives, which will be easily followed from the -map, were to capture and consolidate a line running almost due north -from a strong point at the south end of Farm-Farmyard, through Fame, -Felon, Fell, Fellow, and the Quadrilateral to the junction of Fillet -and Indus. From this point the line was to be continued to the "little -Z" (a point about 2000 yards north of the apex of the Gommecourt -Salient) by the 46th Division, who were to clear Gommecourt village and -park. - -The 168th Brigade on the right of the Divisional sector attacked on a -two-battalion front from the strong point on the right to the junction -of Felon and Epte on the left. Strong points were to be consolidated -on the extreme right and also at the junctions of Felon with Elbe and -Epte. From this point the 169th Brigade was to continue the line to -the junction of Fir and Firm and also to the point of union with the -46th Division. - -The 167th Brigade was in Divisional reserve, and one battalion, the 1st -Londons, was detailed to supply 600 men to dig communication trenches -across No Man's Land after the attack. - -The 168th Brigade group was disposed as follows: - - HEADQUARTERS IN MARDI TRENCH - - ASSAULTING BATTALIONS-- - Right--London Scottish. - Left--Rangers. - - SUPPORTING BATTALIONS-- - Right--Kensingtons, with a special task of digging a - fire trench to form a defensive flank across - No Man's Land from the head of Welcome - Street. - Left--1/4th Londons. - 168th M.G. Company--In tunnelled emplacements in the - WR line for overhead covering fire. - 3-inch L.T.M. Battery (Stokes), (with half the 167th - Brigade Battery)--In emplacements in the - front line control trench. - -In addition the following troops were at the disposal of the Brigadier -for the operation: - - One Company 5th Cheshires (Pioneers). - One Section 2/2nd London Field Company, R.E. - Y 56--2-inch Mortar Battery. - -The artillery affiliated to the Brigade consisted of four 18-pr. -batteries and one 4·5-inch howitzer battery, comprising the southern -group. - -Similar attachments were made to the 167th Brigade, and over and above -these there remained at the disposal of the Divisional artillery, -a counter-battery group consisting of two 18-pr. and one 4·5-inch -howitzer batteries; and two 18-pr. batteries in reserve; while of -trench mortars there were one 2-inch battery (X 56) and two heavy -(9½-inch) mortars. - -During the evening of the 30th June the other battalions of the Brigade -began to move into W sector to take up their assembly positions. The -assembly areas are marked on the map in Roman numerals as follows: - - I. London Scottish (right front). - II. Rangers (left front). - III. Kensingtons (right support). - IV. 1/4th Londons (left support). - -As each battalion arrived and took over its area the various companies -of the 1/4th Londons withdrew to No. IV area in rear of the Rangers. -In order to avoid congestion and cross traffic in the communication -trenches several platoons of the 1/4th Londons had to withdraw to -assembly position over the open, and by 10 p.m. this operation was -completed. - -The 1st July was a glorious summer day, and the light haze which tells -of great heat hung over the rolling hills of this great plain which -was destined to become the scene of so great a struggle. With the -earliest grey of dawn the Germans opened an intense bombardment on all -our trenches, to which no reply was made by our artillery. This severe -shelling started at about 2.45 a.m. and lasted for nearly an hour: in -the course of it part of the Rangers were blown out of their assembly -trenches and compelled to make a temporary withdrawal to our area, -causing a good deal of congestion and confusion. - -At 6.25 a.m. our week old bombardment increased to "hurricane" -intensity and every gun, trench mortar and machine-gun on the British -front from Gommecourt to the Somme came into action, pouring a hail -of shot and shell into the enemy lines with merciless precision and -rapidity. Under such a colossal weight of metal it seemed that nothing -could live, and it was confidently hoped that the bombardment would go -far towards breaking down the enemy's morale and power of resistance to -our attack. - -At 7.25 a.m. a smoke barrage was raised along the whole front of the -attack by firing smoke bombs from the front trenches, and under this at -7.30 a.m. the British battalions moved to the assault under cover of a -creeping barrage, a moving curtain of fire. - -On the 168th Brigade front the attack was made by each assaulting -battalion on a four-company front, each company in column of platoons -in extended order. The attack as a whole, therefore, moved in four -"waves," and following as a fifth wave moved a trench-clearing party -consisting of two platoons of B Company of the 1/4th Londons. - -These platoons under 2/Lieuts. L. R. Chapman and H. G. Hicklenton had -the duty of completing the capture of each trench line by killing the -remaining garrison, clearing the dugouts, and collecting and sending -back the prisoners; thereby saving delay to the assaulting waves, who -would otherwise have had to perform these duties themselves to avoid -the risk of an attack from the rear after they had passed the first -objective. These platoons were made up to a strength of 1 officer, 3 -N.C.O.'s and 36 men organised in four sections (clearing, bombing, -blocking and communicating), but during the hours of waiting after -assembly had already lost 26 men hit. - -At the same time as the assaulting waves moved forward the Battalion, -less the two platoons of B Company above, advanced and occupied battle -positions in the area vacated by the Rangers, as follows: - - A Company--(A. R. Moore) two platoons in front line - trench and two platoons in Boyau de Service, Sector W - 49, between Whisky Street and Woman Street. - - C Company--(J. T. Sykes) two platoons in W 50 and two - platoons in the Boyau de Service, north and south of - Bucquoy Road. - - D Company--(H. G. Stanham) formed up in line in trench - W 49 S and W 50 S. - -The WS line occupied by D Company had been very severely damaged by the -German bombardment and communication was therefore extremely difficult. -The company was inevitably much split up under the two platoon -commanders, G. H. Davis and B. F. L. Yeoman, while Stanham took up a -central position where he hoped to keep in touch with both flanks. - -The two remaining platoons of B Company were employed as follows: - - 1 Platoon--Carrying party under Brigade Bombing Officer. - 1 Platoon--1 Section--Carrying party to 168th M.G. Company. - 3 Sections--In reserve in Napier Trench. - -Battalion Headquarters (K Company) were disposed as follows: - - Clerks, signallers, pioneers, In dugout and control trench - snipers, etc. (34 other ranks) of Woman Street. - - Company runners (16 other In a sap adjoining. - ranks) - - Battalion Bombers In a "crump" hole near the - Woman Street Battalion H.Q. - dugout. - - Battalion Trench Pioneers W 50 R. - - M.O. and Staff Aid Post (Junction of Wood - Street and Cross Street). - - Band Ditto. - - Reserve Lewis Gunners Divided between A and B - Companies. - - Regimental Police In control posts, chiefly at - intersection of fire trenches - with communication trenches - throughout the sector. - -A runner from the right company (A) reporting it in position arrived at -Headquarters at 8.15 a.m., but no report was received from any other -company, and from this time onwards throughout the day communication -was exceedingly difficult on account of the very heavy German barrage -which fell on all lines in W sector immediately after zero. It was -reported, however, by observers that all had successfully formed up on -their battle positions. - -We must now turn for a moment to the leading battalions. - -On the right the London Scottish advanced under the effective cover -of the smoke barrage, which was in fact so thick as to render the -maintenance of the correct direction a matter of difficulty, and -occupied Farm, Fell and Fate as far north as the Bucquoy Road, and -also the greater part of the strong point at the southern extremity of -attack. The blocking of the adjoining trenches and consolidation of -the captured lines was at once put in hand. The left companies appear -to have been drawn off somewhat towards Nameless Farm but seem to have -kept in touch with the Rangers on their left. - -Shortly after 8 o'clock the Scottish were joined by a company of -Kensingtons, who did good work in the consolidation of Farm-Farmyard. - -On the left four companies of the Rangers also crossed No Man's Land, -and although the position is obscure there can be no doubt that parties -of all companies succeeded in reaching the final objectives in Felon, -Elbe and Epte, and gained touch on Nameless Farm Road with the 169th -Brigade on the left. - -At these advanced points bomb fighting in the communication trenches -began and the struggle was pursued along the line with varying success. -Realising the pressure that was being brought to bear on his now -dangerously weak companies the O.C. Rangers asked for two companies of -the 1/4th Londons to lend the weight necessary to carry forward his -attack again. - -This order was received by Lieut.-Col. Wheatley at 8.45 a.m. and at -once he ordered A and C Companies to reinforce the Rangers in Fetter, -and D Company to move up to the W front line in their place. Telephone -communication having been cut by the enemy shell fire this order -was despatched by runner to the front companies; but of six runners -despatched by different routes, and two additional runners sent after -fifteen minutes' interval, only one returned after an unsuccessful -attempt to find the left company. The others were all killed. We must -pause here to offer a tribute to the bravery of runners, a class of -soldier whose gallantry was only too seldom adequately rewarded; their -duties compelled them to attempt to pass through impossible barrages -without the moral support of comradeship, and to face almost certain -death in the forlorn hope of getting through with a vital order. But -never once did they flinch from their duty. - -At 9.5 a.m. a report was received through the Rangers that Rangers -and 1/4th Londons were together in the German front line, and this -was followed at intervals by other reports indicating their further -progress, till at 10.25 a.m. a message from the Rangers reported -parties of both battalions in the second German trench. Following -the receipt of this information at 10.45 a.m. Lieut-Col. Wheatley -despatched the Battalion Trench Pioneers to help consolidate the -trenches gained. - -The above messages probably convey a substantially correct idea of -what occurred, but owing to the failure of all means of communication -on account of the intensity of the German shell fire, the movements -of A and C Companies will probably never be known in detail. At 11.50 -a.m. an untimed message was received from Capt. A. R. Moore (A Company) -reporting that he was still in W 49, his battle position, though at -9.5 a.m., as we have seen, he was reported to have crossed to the -German line; and probably this latter report is correct. The situation, -however, evidently required clearing up, and a patrol consisting of -L.-Corpl. Hyde and Pte. Lear despatched from Battalion Headquarters -succeeded in returning with the information that A Company had gone -forward. L.-Corpl. Hyde was awarded the Military Medal for his good -work, and subsequently recommended for a commission by Lieut.-Col. -Wheatley; he was unfortunately killed in action later in the Somme -Battle whilst completing his training with C Company. - -At 1 p.m. a message was received from Stanham (in reserve) that his -Company had suffered about fifty per cent. casualties and that his -position had become untenable. He was ordered to maintain his position. - -By this time the situation on the other side of No Man's Land was -becoming desperate. The work of consolidation was almost impossible -owing to the German barrage, and the sustained bomb fighting was -rapidly becoming an unequal struggle owing to the impossibility of -replenishing the dwindling supplies of bombs. Again and again with -unsurpassed devotion the carrying party endeavoured to pass through -the barrier of German shells with the coveted supplies of bombs to our -harassed troops--but passage was impossible and the gallant carriers -only added to the roll of casualties. - -At 1.30 p.m. a patrol returned from the German lines to Battalion -Headquarters. This had been despatched at 11 o'clock on a demand -from the Brigadier for information as to the left of the Brigade in -the German line, and Ptes. Whitehead and Buckingham had volunteered -for the duty. According to this patrol a party of the Rangers under -Lieut. Harper were holding on to the junction of Et and Felt, but was -urgently in need of bombs. Further, none of the 168th Brigade were then -in the German third line. This report was passed on to Brigade and to -the Rangers, and a special bomb carrying party from the Battalion was -ordered across to relieve Harper's need. But none reached the German -line, all being killed or wounded in No Man's Land. For their bravery -and devotion to duty Ptes. Whitehead and Buckingham were rewarded -with the Military Medal, and the former was subsequently granted a -commission. - -At 2.30 p.m. the front of the Battalion Headquarters dugout was blown -in by a shell, which killed seven and wounded seven men. At the time -the dugout was occupied by a large number of Headquarters staff, -including the Colonel, the Adjutant, the Signalling Officer and Major -Moore, but of these luckily none was hit. - -All this time the German shell fire continued without abatement, and at -3.30 p.m. further heavy casualties were reported by D Company. At 3.45 -p.m. Brigade Headquarters ordered D Company to withdraw to the WR line, -and a report was received from Stanham at 4.45 p.m. that his withdrawal -with 1 officer and 20 men was complete. - -Meanwhile the Brigade was gradually being compelled to give ground and, -owing to its lack of bombs, to loose its slender hold on the enemy's -positions. At about 2 p.m. the remnants of the Rangers, together with -a few 1/4th Londons and some Queen Victorias from the 169th Brigade -on the left, were driven into Fate, where they made a last determined -stand; but at 3.10 p.m. they were finally ejected from the German lines -and withdrew to the British trenches. - -On the right the Scottish and Kensingtons met with a similar fate. A -gallant fight was put up by the remains of the Battalion under Capt. H. -C. Sparks in Farm-Farmyard, but by 4 p.m., both his flanks being in the -air and his whole force being in imminent danger of extinction, Sparks -decided to withdraw, this operation being stubbornly and successfully -carried out after the removal of as many wounded as possible. - -At 6.30 p.m. the 1/4th Londons reformed in the WR line between Wood -Street and Woman Street, and later in the evening moved into the -trenches west of Hébuterne. - -The other battalions of the 168th were also withdrawn and the sector -was taken over by the 167th Brigade. - -The story of the 169th Brigade attack is, like that of the 168th, one -of initial success which could not be maintained. The line Fell-Feud -was carried in the early hours of the morning by the Queen Victorias -and London Rifle Brigade, but the intensity of the German shell fire -and the enfilading of the captured positions by machine-guns in -Gommecourt Park prevented the Queen's Westminsters from carrying the -Quadrilateral. Later in the day lack of bombs, as in the case of the -168th Brigade, proved the deciding factor, and resulted in a gradual -loss of the Brigade's grip on the enemy trenches, and after desperate -struggles the late afternoon hours found them also beaten back to their -original lines. - -So ended the first day on which the 56th Division had been in battle, a -day on which after the most stubborn fighting and unsurpassed devotion -the gain of ground was nil, and which dealt London the severest blow in -loss of personnel that it ever suffered on any single day throughout -the War. - -The losses in the Division during the period 24th June to 3rd July -amounted to 4749 all ranks, of whom 35 officers and 412 other ranks -were killed, 107 officers and 2632 other ranks wounded, and 40 officers -and 1532 other ranks missing. In the 1/4th Londons the losses for -the same period totalled the appalling number of 16 officers and 534 -other ranks. These dreadful losses were borne fairly equally by all -companies, for all had been exposed to the same deadly and unrelenting -shell fire throughout the day. - -Of A Company, gallantly led to the second German line by Capt. A. R. -Moore, M.C., but 18 returned. Moore himself and one of his subalterns, -F. C. Fanhangel, were killed, the other subaltern, A. G. Blunn, being -captured with 7 others. The rest of the company were killed. Moore's -end, like his life, was one of courageous devotion, and has been simply -told by one of his own sergeants: "Capt. Moore was wounded in the -wrist about thirty minutes before we went over. Nevertheless he led -the company, revolver in hand, and on the sunken road at the rear of -Nameless Farm I saw blood flowing from his back. He still pushed on, -and then I was shot through the leg and took shelter in a shell hole. -The last I saw of Capt. Moore he was still going ahead...." - -The two platoons of B Company which went forward as clearing party were -severely handled. Both the subalterns, Chapman and Hicklenton, were hit -and only 10 men got back from the German line. 2/Lieut. A. S. Ford on -carrying party duty was also hit. - -Of C Company only two platoons got forward as the order to advance -failed to reach Sykes, the company commander. But its casualties under -the terrific German barrage were as heavy as in any company, and after -Sykes had been wounded and both his subalterns, T. Moody and F. R. C. -Bradford, killed, the remnants of the company were brought steadily -out of action by Company Sergt.-Major Davis, who was rewarded with the -D.C.M. - -D Company, which remained in reserve all day, had perhaps the most -trying time of all. From 2.30 a.m. until withdrawn at 3.30 p.m. it -sat still under the most intense artillery bombardment, but was kept -splendidly in hand and ready to move by Stanham and his only remaining -subaltern, G. H. Davis. B. F. L. Yeoman became a casualty early in the -day. - -Of the Headquarters officers Major W. Moore and 2/Lieut. V. C. -Donaldson were wounded. - -Magnificent work was done throughout the day by the Medical Officer, -Capt. Hurd, and his staff, who, though the number of casualties far -out-measured the facilities for dealing with them, continued their -work without a break throughout the day and the night following. In -this work splendid help was rendered by the Padre, Rev. R. Palmer, who -organised and led search and carrying parties in No Man's Land and -brought in many wounded who were unable to move. - -The morning of the 2nd July was spent in the dreary duty of -ascertaining the casualties and reorganising the companies, and in the -afternoon the Battalion marched to billets at St Amand. - -With the results of the day's fighting on other parts of the front -we are hardly concerned here. From Fricourt to the Somme the day was -successful and the bulk of the objectives were captured and held. But -from Fricourt northward the tale throughout was one of complete check. -Everywhere our troops met with initial success which everywhere was -later changed into disaster with appalling losses. - -There is no doubt that in the northern half of attack the British -offensive was fully anticipated by the Germans. It would indeed have -been difficult to carry out such immense preparations over a period of -several weeks prior to the battle without permitting indications of the -impending attempt to become visible to hostile aerial scouts. But it -had been hoped that the weight and long continuance of the preliminary -bombardment, even though it disclosed its own purpose, would prove so -intense as to nullify all the German efforts to resist. - -We must here make some reference to the battle of the 46th Division on -the northern face of the Gommecourt salient. Against this ill-fated -Division the German fire was terrific. On the right the South Staffords -were completely shattered by the enemy's machine-guns before they could -cross No Man's Land; on the left the Sherwood Foresters succeeded in -gaining the German front line, and isolated parties appear even to -have struggled forward as far as the second trench, but were rapidly -ejected. Soon after zero the whole of the 46th Division's assaulting -troops were back in their own line after suffering appalling losses: -their attack was a complete failure. At the time, therefore, that the -56th Division was making headway into the German positions, instead of -the enemy feeling, as had been hoped, the pincers closing on him from -both sides of his salient, he was relieved from all menace on his right -flank facing the 46th Division, and free to throw the whole weight of -his artillery and infantry against the 56th Division. - -But the causes of the 56th Division's failure must be looked for deeper -than this. - -Primarily it may be said to have been due to the shortage of bombs. -The great distance which carrying parties had to traverse over No -Man's Land with fresh supplies and the intensity of the German barrage -through which they had to pass were both such that the facilities for -getting bombs forward were inadequate. It should be remembered that -the 168th and 169th Brigades captured three lines of German trenches -and held them against all attacks in spite of the gruelling enemy fire -for many hours. It was only when bomb supplies failed that they were -ejected. - -There are three other factors in this battle to which we may refer as -having contributed to the failure. - -First, the enormously strong deep dugouts in the German lines, which -were large enough to give shelter to the whole trench garrison except -the few necessary sentries, had proved too strong for all except the -heaviest guns; and those of the heaviest calibre had not been directed -against them. The German garrisons were therefore able to remain in -safety until the last moment when our barrage lifted off their front -lines and they were able to man their parapets. The strength of the -German defences was increased by the density and depth of their wire -entanglements, which had been most skilfully sited with the support of -machine-guns firing in enfilade. - -Secondly, the insufficient attention paid on our side to -counter-battery work. The batteries told off for counter-battery fire -were too few and of too light calibre. Throughout the day the cry arose -from all Headquarters to silence the German guns, but the few batteries -available, though served magnificently by splendid gunners, could not -cope with so gigantic a task. - -The third and most important cause lay in the cunning skill with which -the German barrage was used. We have referred above to the manning of -the German parapets by their garrisons after our barrage had passed -over; but not in every case did this happen. In many instances a -greater refinement of skill was exhibited. As the British barrage -lifted off the first objective and the leading waves of the assault -poured over it, down came the enemy barrage like a dense curtain, -cutting them off for ever from their supports and their supplies. The -barrage having thus trapped them, the front trench filled with Germans -swarming up from their subterranean shelters, and these poured a hail -of machine-gun fire into the backs of our waves which were pushing -forward to the next line. - -After the experience of two more years of organised trench to trench -attacks, it may be that failure for the reasons detailed above seems -a little obvious; but it would not be fair to pass them over without -pointing out that this was the first trench to trench attack of the -whole War which had been organised on so vast a scale, and it was -clearly impossible to provide against all eventualities when there -was no previous experience to act as a guide. It should be remembered -that in the south, where a greater degree of surprise was attained, -the arrangements for attack--which were substantially the same as in -the north--worked splendidly and resulted in marked success. And in -subsequent attacks attention was paid to the experience gained on this -great opening day of the First Somme Battle in increasing the strength -of counter-battery artillery and in making more efficient arrangements -for "mopping-up" captured lines. - -As regards the 168th Brigade attack, in addition to the above general -criticisms, it may be remarked that the event showed that on the left -of the Brigade at least there was insufficient weight in the attack. -The Scottish on the right had to advance 250 yards and were able to -carry their objectives; but on the left the depth to be penetrated -was about 450 yards, and this proved too great for the available -strength of the Rangers, who were organised in five waves, even when -strengthened by two additional waves supplied by the companies of the -1/4th Londons. - -A deal of congestion in the trenches and a great many casualties were -caused by the lack of those deep dugouts with which the Germans were -so well supplied, and in the case of the 1/4th Londons at any rate it -seems likely that they might have been of more use when called upon had -they been able to obtain efficient shelter during the hours of waiting. - -We have sufficiently elaborated the causes of failure. It must not -be forgotten that a very real and important result was achieved by -the Londoners this day. The strategic object of their attack was not -primarily the capture of ground but the holding of German troops and -guns from the area of our main attack. This was an unpleasant rôle, -but a highly important one, and there can be no manner of doubt that -it was to a very large degree fulfilled. The Division's achievement -is summarised concisely in the message of congratulation issued by -Lieut.-Gen. D'Oyly Snow on the 4th July: - - The Corps Commander wishes to congratulate all ranks of the 56th - Division on the way in which they took the German trenches and - held them by pure grit and pluck for so long in very adverse - circumstances. Although Gommecourt has not fallen into our hands, - the purpose of the attack, which was mainly to contain and kill - Germans, was accomplished, thanks to a great extent to the tenacity - of the 56th Division. - -A remarkable incident occurred on the Divisional front on the 2nd -July. At about 2.30 p.m. that day a number of German stretcher-bearers -were seen to issue from their trenches and begin collecting the many -British wounded who were still lying round about their first three -lines of trenches. Prompt measures of precaution were taken by the -Division, and all guns were made ready to open fire on barrage lines -should any intention be shown by the Germans to take advantage of the -temporary truce. As, however, the enemy stretcher-bearers continued -their humane work quietly, our own stretcher-bearers followed their -example and began collecting casualties from No Man's Land. During this -extraordinary armistice no attempt was made by the Germans to come -outside or by our men to go beyond the line which had formerly been the -German wire entanglements. After about two hours of this work, which -was the means of saving many lives, the stretcher-bearers returned by -mutual and tacit consent to their own lines and the War was resumed! - - * * * * * - -The casualties suffered by the 46th Division were exceedingly heavy, -and the treatment it had received was so severe that it was deemed -necessary to withdraw it from the line temporarily, and arrangements -were made for the 56th Division to assume responsibility at once for -the 46th sector as well as its own. - -This arrangement unfortunately deprived the 168th Brigade of its -well-earned rest. But though tired and in need of reorganisation after -the heavy losses it had sustained the Brigade's morale was good, for it -felt justifiably proud of its effort of the previous day. The relief -of the 46th Division began on the evening of the 2nd July when the -Scottish and the Kensingtons took over the line from the left of the -56th sector of the Fonquevillers-Gommecourt Road. - -The 1/4th Londons remained at St Amand during the 3rd July, busily -engaged in reorganising its platoons and making up as far as possible -deficiencies in equipment and ammunition. In the evening the 1/4th -Londons and Rangers took over from the 138th Brigade the remainder of -the 46th Divisional sector, the Battalion relieving the 5th Lincolns on -a front adjoining that occupied by the Kensingtons the previous night. - -The condition of the trenches was found to be shocking and the material -damage caused by shell and trench mortar fire was severe, but the -number of dead whose bodies had not yet been removed, and of wounded -who still were lying out in No Man's Land provided a great deal of work -of the utmost urgency. Fortunately the enemy did not interfere with -this work of clearing up the battlefield, and his lack of activity was -doubtless due to his being similarly employed. Reports were received -at night that enemy patrols were active in No Man's Land, but no -encounters took place and the Germans seen were probably covering -patrols for stretcher-bearing parties. - -The following day passed without unusual incident except for a certain -amount of enemy shelling during the afternoon, which did considerable -further damage to the Battalion's trenches. During the night a storm -of terrific intensity burst over Fonquevillers, adding to the general -discomfort by filling the trenches with water. - -The two remaining days spent by the Battalion in this sector were -occupied in continuing the work of removing the dead, baling out and -clearing blocked trenches, and generally attempting to reorganise the -broken-down defences as well as possible. - -On the evening of the 6th July the 168th Brigade was relieved in Z -sector, as the 46th Divisional line was called, by the 169th, and the -Battalion, handing over its trenches to the Queen's Westminsters, -moved by platoons into billets at St Amand, a welcome issue of dry -underclothing being issued to the troops on arrival. - -At this point the Battalion may be said finally to have finished its -share in the battle of the 1st July. Although not detailed as one of -the assaulting battalions in the attack, the strain to which it was -subjected both in actual hard work prior to the battle and by reason -of the enemy fire during the action, was as heavy as that borne by -any unit of the Division, while its casualties were among the most -severe. Starting at Bayencourt on the 13th June the Battalion had -supplied heavy working parties with long hours of work and with a -three-mile march in each direction to and from work for fourteen nights -in succession, always harassed by the enemy fire and frequently wet -through. For three nights of unusual enemy activity they had held the -line prior to the battle, and this duty was followed without respite -by the day of battle itself. After a brief interlude of two days in -billets it had once more returned to the trenches on the additional and -unexpected duty at Fonquevillers, and had there passed a further four -days in extreme discomfort--a record of which we think any battalion -might justly be proud. - -The extended front now held by the Division rendered a prolonged rest -for the Brigade out of the question, and the Battalion's sojourn at -St Amand was of only three days' duration. Of these days the first -two were occupied in refitting the troops as far as possible, and in -cleaning up and drying clothing after the days spent in the line. The -last day, Sunday 9th July, was occupied with Church Parade and, in -the afternoon, a Brigade Parade at Souastre for inspections by the -Corps and Army Commanders, both of whom addressed the Brigade in -congratulatory terms. - -On the afternoon of the 10th the 168th Brigade returned to the trenches -at Hébuterne, there relieving the 167th. An adjustment of sectors -was now effected as a result of which the 168th Brigade held the -right sector of the Divisional front, comprising the old W sector and -the part of Y sector south of the Hébuterne-Gommecourt Road; in the -centre was the 167th Brigade between the Hébuterne-Gommecourt and the -Fonquevillers-Gommecourt Roads; while the 169th Brigade held the left -of the Divisional front. - -The 168th front was occupied by the London Scottish in the right -subsector and the Kensingtons on the left. The 1/4th Londons took over -billets at Bayencourt, while the Rangers moved to Sailly. - -On the 17th the Battalion relieved the London Scottish in the right -subsector of the Brigade front, the relief being complete by 6 p.m. The -same day the Rangers took over the left subsector from the Kensingtons. - -The principal operation carried out by the Battalion during this tour -of duty was the filling in of the advanced front line. This had been so -seriously damaged during the battle as to become almost untenable, and -the labour which would be involved in its repair and maintenance did -not appear to be justifiable. Accordingly the task of filling it and -the communication trenches as far back as the WS line was carried out -on the night 18/19th July. The portion from Whisky Street southwards -was dealt with by 2 officers and 140 men of C Company, while the part -north of Whisky Street was filled in by 120 men of the Kensingtons. A -covering party in No Man's Land of 2 platoons' strength secured the -safety of the working party. - -This step clearly indicated that all ideas of an advance on this front -were--for the moment at any rate--given up, but the rôle played by -the Division during the remainder of its duty at Hébuterne was such -as to foster an offensive spirit in the troops by means of constant -patrolling activity and a general policy of aggression against the -enemy's defences and working parties. This rôle was the more important -on account of the striking developments which were occurring in the -British offensive operations nearer the Somme, where the pressure which -was being brought to bear on the Germans was severe and continually -increasing. Gradually the enemy was being compelled to push his -reserves into the fight and limit as far as possible his activities on -other parts of the front. Any action at Hébuterne, therefore, which -could prevent the withdrawal of the opposing garrison to the battle -area further south had a direct and important bearing on the fortunes -of the British arms. - -On the nights of the 20th, 21st and 22nd July strong patrols were sent -out from the Battalion under 2/Lieuts. W. E. Osborne, H. W. Vernon and -J. C. Graddon respectively, with the object of securing a live prisoner -captured from a German patrol. No success, however, was achieved. - -On the 23rd July an inter-battalion relief again took place and the -Battalion was relieved by the London Scottish withdrawing on relief to -Brigade support billets at Sailly, but leaving B Company in the Keep in -Hébuterne to furnish working parties. - -The Battalion remained in Sailly supplying working parties in the -forward area until the end of July. Advantage was taken of this -period out of the line to straighten out some "cross-postings" which -had occurred among drafts of N.C.O.'s and men recently sent up from -the Base, and drafts of Queen's Westminsters and 3rd London men were -despatched from the Battalion to rejoin their own units. At the same -time the Battalion received drafts of 4th London men from the Queen -Victorias and the Kensingtons, to whom they had been sent in error. - -On the last day of July the Battalion once more took over from the -London Scottish the right subsector of W sector, B and C Companies -occupying the WR line as the most advanced position with A Company in -support and D in reserve. - -During the ensuing tour of duty the work of trench repairing, wiring -and patrolling was actively prosecuted, but no incident worthy of -record occurred. The enemy's activity, both in artillery and trench -mortar fire, became rather more marked, and Hébuterne itself attracted -more attention than had been the case prior to the battle. The enemy's -shell fire produced, however, an ample measure of retaliation from our -guns, which bombarded his trenches with good results. - -On the 4th August the Battalion withdrew again to Brigade reserve at -Bayencourt, handing over its trenches to the London Scottish, and was -employed in furnishing working parties and in training. - -Since the 1st July the Battalion had received some very valuable -reinforcements of officers which repaired the deficiencies caused by -the battle, as follows: - - 13th July--Capt. F. C. J. Read from the 2/4th Battalion, - Lieut. A. G. Sharp, 2/Lieuts. P. F. Smalley, J. C. - Graddon, Y. R. Oldrey, W. H. Calnan, C. E. Lewis, W. - E. Osborne, J. W. Chapman, F. J. Foden, C. F. English - and J. T. Middleton from the Reserve Battalion. - - 16th July--2/Lieut. G. E. Stanbridge from the Reserve - Battalion. - - 6th August--2/Lieut. F. R. R. Burford from the 3/4th - Battalion, 2/Lieuts. C. J. Brodie, O. D. Garratt, C. - H. T. Heaver, A. Potton, W. Quennell and C. M. Taylor - from the Reserve Battalion. - - 7th August--2/Lieuts. C. W. Denning, M.M., S. J. - Barkworth, M.M., E. McD. McCormick, T. B. Cooper, - M.M., W. H. Davey, D.C.M., C. F. Mortleman - commissioned direct from the 1/20th Londons. - - 9th August--2/Lieuts. N. A. Ormiston, R. E. Grimsdell and - W. Richards from the Reserve Battalion. - - 10th August--2/Lieut. J. W. Price from Hospital and - 2/Lieut. L. W. Archer, commissioned from the ranks of - the Battalion. - -On the 5th July a draft of 60, of whom 58 were N.C.O.'s, arrived from -the 2/4th Battalion, a particularly welcome addition to the strength -in view of the losses which had been sustained. Early in July Lieut. -L. G. Rix, the Transport Officer, had been appointed Brigade Transport -Officer, and his place in the Battalion was filled by Lieut. G. V. -Lawrie, attached from the Scottish Rifles. - -2/Lieut. N. W. Williams was wounded at Fonquevillers on the 6th -July, and on the 18th the Battalion suffered a further great loss -in the Quartermaster, Lieut. E. S. Tomsett, who completely broke -down in health and was invalided to England. Tomsett had filled the -appointment of Quartermaster with great credit since November 1913, -and had served over thirteen years with the Battalion, his previous -service having been with the Rifle Brigade. On recovery from his -illness Tomsett was granted a combatant commission in recognition of -his services and appointed to command the depôt at Hoxton. His duties -as Quartermaster in the 1/4th Battalion were taken over by Lieut. H. B. -A. Balls. - -The 10th August found the Battalion once more--and for the last -time--resuming possession of W sector, the relief of the London -Scottish being completed by 4.45 p.m. During the progress of the relief -Hébuterne was intermittently shelled and a direct hit was scored -on Battalion Headquarters, though fortunately without inflicting -casualties. A six-day tour of duty produced but little of interest -beyond the usual trench routine. Patrolling in No Man's Land was -actively pursued, and resulted in establishing definitely the energy -being displayed by the Germans in repairing their defences, and also -their acquiescence in our possession of No Man's Land, which seemed -to be undisputed. The German artillery continued to shell Hébuterne -and the Orchard, near Cross Street, a good deal, while his constant -machine-gun fire at night interfered seriously with our work of wiring -in front of W 48. - -On the 12th Major-Gen. Hull presented ribands to those who had been -decorated for their work on the 1st July, the presentation being made -on the football field at Bayencourt. - -A warning order had now been received that the Division was to be -relieved by the 17th Division and to withdraw for training in rear of -the line, in the St Riquier area near Abbeville. - -The 168th Brigade was to concentrate at Halloy before proceeding to the -new area, and the first step in this concentration was the relief on -the 16th August of the 1/4th Londons and Rangers by the London Scottish -and Kensingtons respectively. On relief the 1/4th Londons moved to -billets in Sailly, leaving C Company at the Keep in Hébuterne for -working parties until the 18th, when the whole Battalion marched at -7 p.m. to Halloy, arriving in huts there at 11 p.m. By the 21st the -whole Brigade group was completely out of the line and the following -day moved to the new area, the Battalion entraining at Doullens at -11.40 a.m. and, detraining at St Riquier shortly before 6 p.m., marched -thence to billets at Le Plessiel. - - - - -CHAPTER XI - -THE 1/4TH BATTALION IN THE BATTLES OF THE SOMME, 1916 - - -II. _The Battles of September and October_ - -As we have pointed out in the preceding chapter, the 1st July was -a day of almost complete check to the British attack from Fricourt -northwards. Between Fricourt and the Somme, however, a certain measure -of success had been attained, while south of the river the French had -made a considerable advance. - -This limited success was exploited to the fullest extent during the -first half of July, and by the 14th, after very fierce fighting, in -which eleven British Divisions were engaged, our lines were pressed -forward through the series of fortresses forming the first German -system of defence. - -The Main Ridge of the Somme watershed runs east-south-east from -Thiepval, above the Ancre, across the Albert-Bapaume Road, towards the -Péronne-Bapaume Road. About a mile and a half west of the latter road -it is completely severed by a narrow and deep ravine in which lies -the small township of Combles; and about half way between Combles and -Thiepval it is deeply indented by a valley which separates the villages -of Bazentin-le-Grand and Bazentin-le-Petit, the head of this valley -being dominated by the high ground on which stands High Wood. The -ridge, therefore, divides itself into three sections, all on the same -general alignment, as follows: In the west, from Thiepval, astride the -Albert-Bapaume Road to High Wood; in the centre, from High Wood to the -Combles Valley; in the east, the high ground about Sailly Saillisel on -the Péronne-Albert Road. - -The German second system of defences followed roughly the near side -of the crest of this Main Ridge, including the villages (from east to -west) of Maurepas, Guillemont, Longueval (with Delville Wood), the -Bazentins and Pozières. The third system lay on the further slope of -the ridge and included the villages of Morval, Lesbœufs, Flers and -Gueudecourt. - -On the 14th July the British attacked the second system on a front from -Bazentin-le-Petit to Longueval. This attack, which was successful, -was pressed forward to High Wood, of which practically the whole -was captured, and thus secured for us a footing on the Main Ridge, -dividing the German forces on the west and centre portions of it. The -advance was consolidated and rounded off locally in the direction -of Guillemont; but the new positions formed an abrupt and narrow -salient in our line, and before a further advance to the German third -system could be contemplated it was necessary for the British hold on -the Main Ridge to be widened. It was considered by G.H.Q. that the -Pozières-Thiepval series of fortresses at the western extremity of the -ridge was too powerful to yield to frontal attack, and it was therefore -decided to extend the hold on the centre portion of the ridge. This -postulated the capture of Guillemont, Ginchy and Combles, and a -swinging-up of the British right flank which rested on the Combles -valley. The French were to co-operate on the right of the Combles -valley by the capture of Frégicourt and Rancourt. Combles itself, -immensely fortified and strongly garrisoned, was too formidable an -obstacle to be likely to fall into our hands by direct attack, except -at an appalling cost of life; and it was therefore to be enveloped, the -British advancing on the heights west of it and the French to its east. - -It is with this great outflanking movement for the capture of Combles -and the securing of the Main Ridge immediately west of it that the 56th -Division and the l/4th Londons are concerned. - -Guillemont was first attacked on the 23rd July, but it was not until -after repeated attempts that it finally fell into our hands on the 3rd -September. On that day the line was advanced to the outskirts of Ginchy -and to the Wedge Wood-Ginchy Road, Falfemont Farm falling to us on the -5th. - -Meanwhile local improvements had been made in our positions in various -parts of the line, and the bitter fighting of August, though productive -of no very deep advance was of the greatest value. It not only widened -our hold on the ridge, but also by a series of unrelenting sledgehammer -blows had a cumulative effect on the German morale and thus paved the -way for the greater successes of September. - - * * * * * - -The 168th Brigade continued training in the St Riquier area until -the end of August, the 1/4th Londons retaining their billets at Le -Plessiel. The training was rendered peculiarly interesting by reason of -the first appearance of the "Heavy Section Machine-Gun Corps," better -known as Tanks. These engines of war, which were regarded at first by -the troops with a good deal of wonderment and not a little misgiving, -only arrived in France on the 25th August. No time was lost in testing -them and giving infantry troops an opportunity to co-operate with them -in practice prior to their employment in action. - -The 56th Division received the compliment of being one of the units -selected by G.H.Q. to co-operate with Tanks on the occasion of their -first appearance in battle, and accordingly a series of practice -schemes was begun on the 26th August, the Brigades of the 56th Division -being employed in turn. Needless to say the interest aroused by the -strange appearance of these iron monsters was intense and speculation -was rife as to their potential value in action, not only among the -troops, but also among the many staff officers who were present at -the demonstrations. Unfortunately the time allowed for "tuning up" -the engines was inadequate, the result being that during the first -practices the Tanks showed a most undesirable predilection for breaking -down--a habit not calculated to inspire with confidence the infantry -who were expected to follow them. However, these difficulties were -largely overcome, and by the 2nd September, when the 168th Brigade's -turn for practising with them arrived, the Tanks were working well. - -In spite of the misgivings as to the tactical value of the Tanks which -presented themselves to the minds of those inclined to pessimism, -their arrival undoubtedly gave enormous encouragement to the troops -who were enabled at last to realise that the enemy were not always to -be first in the field with new inventions; and the anticipation of a -great surprise effect when the Tanks should first appear before the -enemy trenches brought all ranks to the tip-toe of expectation. The -strict injunction which was issued to avoid mention of the Tanks in -correspondence was most loyally obeyed. - -On the 2nd September a warning order was received that the Division -would move forward to the battle area, and the following day the 168th -and 169th Brigades moved to the Corbie area. The Battalion left Le -Plessiel in the afternoon of the 3rd, marching to St Riquier, where -it entrained for Corbie, a town of some size at the confluence of -the Ancre and the Somme. Here the Battalion detrained at 11.15 p.m., -marching, with the Rangers, to billets at Vaux-sur-Somme. The remainder -of the Brigade was accommodated a mile further forward at Sailly-le-Sec. - -The Division now came under the orders of the XIV Corps (Cavan), the -extreme right of the British Army, consisting of the 5th, 16th and 20th -Divisions, which had this day been operating on the Guillemont front in -the action already alluded to. - -On the morning of the 4th orders were received, without any previous -intimation that they might be coming, for the Battalion to move -forward at once. The whole Battalion, less personnel of the transport -and vehicles, marched out of Vaux-sur-Somme within one hour of the -receipt of these orders--a credit to the high state of organisation -to which the Battalion had been trained since leaving the Hébuterne -area. Boutall writes: "The march was a long and tedious one and I think -I am right in asserting that not a single man fell out on the way. I -distinctly remember Lieut.-Col. Wheatley congratulating himself on the -fact." - -This march terminated at a large concentration camp known as the -Citadel about two miles north of Bray. At the Citadel the Battalion -was able to form a vague idea for the first time of the enormous -effort being put forth by the British in this already long drawn-out -struggle. The concentration camp covered an enormous area on the -rolling hillsides above the Somme and presented an astounding spectacle -of numbers of units from every arm of the Service--gunners, infantry, -engineers--besides vast stores of materials of all kinds. The roar -of the guns in the inferno of the battle line seemed to speak to the -troops of the great and yet increasing power of the British Armies, -and filled every heart with hope and confidence. To many of those who -remembered the lean days of 1915 when the British battle line was -starved for men and shells, this first contact with the reality of the -Empire's strength was almost overpowering. - -On the 5th September the Division took the place in Corps Reserve of -the 20th Division, which had been withdrawn from the fighting line, and -in the evening of the same day the relief of the 5th Division in the -line began. - -The front taken over from the 5th Division was the extreme right of the -line from its junction with the French, overlooking the Combles valley -to the left of Leuze Wood. The 169th Brigade (relieving the 15th) -took over the right sector and the 168th Brigade (relieving the 95th) -assumed responsibility in the left sector. - -September had set in with steady rain which had already converted -all the roads, tracks and camping grounds into seas of liquid mud. -The Battalion, which since arrival at the Citadel had been held at -short notice to move, advanced during the afternoon of the 5th, in -full battle kit in the direction of the line. The state of the ground -made marching an impossibility, and after sliding along for some time -uncomfortably in the mud, orders were received for the Battalion to -return to the Citadel. The change of plan was, as usual, received with -philosophical resignation, and the men turned in to take advantage of -the short respite only to be roused again a few hours later the same -evening when the advance to the line began at 11.15 p.m. - -At this hour the Battalion, which with the Rangers was in Brigade -support, left the Citadel, arriving in its allotted position in -Casement Trench at 5.30 a.m. on the 6th September. This trench was now -reduced to a series of shell holes which the bad weather had rendered -most uncomfortable, and was a part of the original German system -opposite Maricourt. - -The departure from the Citadel was marked by a most unfortunate -accident. As the column began to move the explosion of a bomb which had -been left buried in the mud occurred at the head of D Company, and this -very seriously wounded Capt. A. L. Long, the company commander, and -2/Lieut. A. G. Sharp, and caused casualties to 19 N.C.O.'s and men. - -With the advent of daylight the Battalion first came face to face with -the ghastly desolation of the Somme battlefield. In all directions -every sort of landmark seemed to be obliterated. A few torn stumps -marked what had been Bernafay and Trones Woods, the village of -Guillemont was practically effaced, and the only signs of life in the -neighbourhood of the Battalion were numerous batteries of artillery -in action. Here the nucleus personnel left the Battalion and returned -to the Citadel, where the Q.M. stores were established. At 2 p.m. -the Battalion changed its position to Chimpanzee Trench in the -neighbourhood of the Brickfield, south of Bernafay Wood, and here it -received a foretaste of the German barrage. After dark the forward -move was resumed, and the Battalion entered the support trenches in -rear of Leuze Wood, on the Wedge Wood-Ginchy Road, relieving the 4th -Gloucesters. This trench formed a "switch" in the second German system -which had fallen into our hands on the 3rd September. - - -_The Battle of Ginchy, 5th-10th September_ - -The disposition of the Brigade was now as follows: - - In front line, Leuze Wood:--London Scottish. - In support, Wedge Wood-Ginchy Road:--1/4th Londons. - In reserve, Maltzhorn Farm:--Rangers. - - The Kensingtons were attached to the 169th Brigade, and were in - line to the south of Leuze Wood. - -During the night the enemy's bombardment of the front line and Wedge -Wood Valley increased in intensity and two platoons of the 1/4th -Londons, under Lieuts. Oldrey and Garratt, were ordered forward to -reinforce the Scottish in Leuze Wood. This advance was successfully -accomplished, the platoons managing to get through an unpleasantly -heavy barrage with only one casualty. No enemy attack materialised, and -towards dawn, the hostile bombardment having subsided, the two platoons -rejoined the Battalion. - -Throughout the 7th September and far into the night the enemy -shelled Wedge Wood Valley and the support line heavily, and the -Battalion suffered a good many casualties, chiefly among ration and -water-carrying parties, while communication with Battalion Headquarters -was exceedingly difficult. The Wedge Wood-Ginchy Road which ran -immediately in front of the trench was sunken at this point, and the -bank was honeycombed with German dugouts, among them one which had been -used as an aid-post, and which produced an ample supply of bandages, -lint and field-dressings, and also cigars and tobacco--trench stores -which were promptly taken on charge by the Battalion. - -The road itself was littered with German dead, the remnants of the -battle of the 3rd, who had apparently been caught by our barrage, -of the destructive nature of which evidences were everywhere to be -seen. "Unfortunately," writes an eyewitness, "the sunken road was an -attraction to countless flies in the daytime. So numerous were they -that from the road arose a continuous hum which was audible at a -considerable distance. They swarmed over into the trench and settled -on our food in such numbers that they often found their way into our -mouths at mealtimes." - -During the afternoon of the 7th orders were issued for the 56th -Division to extend its front to the left by taking over the sector held -by the right Brigade of the 16th Division. This consisted of a trench -following the Leuze Wood-Guillemont Road, from near the north corner -of Leuze Wood, for about 500 yards to the left. This relief was to be -effected by "side-stepping" the 168th Brigade to the left, its trenches -in Leuze Wood being handed over to the 169th Brigade. In pursuance -of this scheme the Battalion took over with A and D Companies the -advanced front line--about 200 yards' frontage on the immediate left -of Leuze Wood--from the 7th Inniskilling Fusiliers. Immediately after -relief these companies began to dig assembly trenches for the impending -continuance of the offensive, and this task was completed before dawn -on the 8th September. The Rangers meanwhile had come up in line on the -left of the 1/4th Londons, while the Scottish on relief in Leuze Wood -by the 169th Brigade had withdrawn into Brigade support, where they -were joined by the Kensingtons. - -The 8th September was occupied in improving the assembly trenches, and -in establishing an advanced report centre in a German dugout at the -south-west corner of Leuze Wood--by now corrupted by the ever-ready wit -of the Cockney into "Lousy" Wood--while under cover of darkness the -Cheshire Pioneers connected the Wood with Wedge Wood by a communication -trench. In addition a great deal of work was carried out in collecting -advanced dumps of tools, bombs, ammunition and water, in the west edge -of Leuze Wood. All this work was effected under very heavy shell fire -under which the Battalion sustained some loss. - -Orders had now been received for the resumption of the offensive on -the 9th, and during the night the 1/4th Londons and Rangers occupied -their newly dug assembly trenches, while the Kensingtons advanced to -the Wedge Wood support trench, the Scottish remaining at Maltzhorn -Farm. The advanced report centre in Leuze Wood was taken over by the -1/4th Londons and placed under charge of Capt. Houlder (17th Londons -attached). Capt. Houlder, who could speak German fluently, was -instrumental during the action in gaining from prisoners much useful -first-hand information which he was able to pass back to Battalion -and Brigade Headquarters. The terrifying aspect of this huge British -officer, coupled with the fact that he always had a loaded revolver -conspicuously displayed during his investigations, no doubt increased -the desire of his victims to respond to his enquiries! - -The battle of the 9th September was an attack on the whole front of the -Fourth Army, the French co-operating on our right. The object of the -XIV Corps, of which the 56th and 16th Divisions were in line, was to -advance the British positions from the Combles valley on the extreme -right well to the east of Leuze Wood on a line running from south-east -to north-west as far as the Ginchy-Morval Road, which formed the left -of the 56th Division front. From this point the 16th Division was to -reach a line which ran due west for some 800 yards along the road -towards Ginchy and then bent northwards to include the whole of the -village. - -Map No. 5 shows the objectives of the 56th Division, the 169th Brigade -on the right being responsible for forcing our lines forward of Leuze -Wood on its north and east sides; and the 168th Brigade continuing the -line as far as Point 141·7 on the Ginchy-Morval Road. The map also -indicates that nearly every battalion taking part in the assault would -have to make a change of direction from its starting point in order to -advance to its objective. - -So far as the 168th Brigade was concerned the advance was to be made -in two stages, the first objective being a line of German trenches, -running from the north corner of Leuze Wood towards Ginchy, and -the final objective being as above described. For this purpose the -dispositions of the Brigade remained as they had been on the eve of the -battle, that is: - - Right Assaulting Battalion--1/4th Londons. - Left do. --Rangers. - Support Battalion --Kensingtons. - Reserve do. --London Scottish. - -The 1/4th Londons were disposed for attack as follows: - - Right--B Company (Lieut. H. W. Vernon). - Centre--D Company (Lieut. G. H. Davis). - Left--A Company (Capt. J. R. Webster). - Support--C Company (2/Lieut. W. E. Osborne). - -Each company occupied a two-platoon frontage, so that the whole -Battalion was on a front of six platoons and in a depth of four waves. - -The morning of the 9th September dawned mistily, but by 10 o'clock -the sun's rays had dispersed the haze and disclosed to the enemy the -new earth thrown up in front of our hastily dug assembly trenches. A -heavy bombardment of the assembly areas on the whole Divisional front -followed, lasting all the morning and causing a good many casualties. -The assaulting companies having already formed up over night, the -trenches were crowded with troops waiting for the hour of attack, and -the experience of having quietly to endure this remarkably accurate and -heavy shoot was one of the most trying of the whole engagement. - -At 4 o'clock the enemy put down a heavy barrage on our lines. A quarter -of an hour later our preparatory bombardment, which had opened at 10 -a.m., increased to "hurricane" intensity, and for half an hour the -German positions were subjected to a frightful ordeal under which it -seemed that nothing could live. At 4.45 p.m. the British columns, on a -front of several miles, moved to the assault. - -The 1/4th Londons on getting out of their assembly trenches had to -make a change of direction, pivoting on their right flank, and this -accomplished, they moved forward steadily, keeping well up to their -barrage and suffering comparatively little loss. - -In consequence of the conflicting reports which were received during -the action, the heavy toll of casualties in all ranks, and the -resultant intermingling of companies in the positions gained, it has -been a matter of considerable difficulty to elucidate the position and -to extract from the mass of evidence a fair and impartial account of -what really occurred. - -It seems evident, however, that the position marked as the 1/4th -Londons' first objective was innocent of the trench which it was -expected to find there. At all events if a trench had ever existed on -the line of the Leuze Wood-Ginchy track it had been so battered by -shell fire as to be no longer recognisable as such; and it appears -that the greater part of the assaulting companies overshot the mark -and moved straight on to what was really the second objective, which -they occupied under the impression that it was the first objective. -It had been arranged that A Company on the left should consolidate -a strong point on the left of the real first objective at its point -of junction with the sector to be captured by the Rangers. Evidently -2/Lieut. Brodie, to whom was allotted this task, in making his change -of direction to the right took a somewhat wide sweep and struck the -east end of the Rangers' first objective, where a trench did actually -exist, and here he formed his block practically in the position where -it was intended to be. Subsequently Brodie, finding himself, no doubt, -out of touch with the remainder of the Battalion, who had gone too far, -came forward in the attempt to clear up the situation, but unhappily -was killed, together with all his men. - -The too rapid advance of the Battalion naturally brought them under the -fire of our own barrage, and during the forty minutes' pause which was -ordered after the capture of the first objective before the resumption -of the advance on to the second, a good many casualties did in fact -occur from our own shells which were dropping in and uncomfortably -close to the trench which was occupied. This trench--the real second -objective--was subsequently known as Bully Trench. We will therefore so -refer to it in order to avoid confusion. - -At 5.25 p.m. the Battalion, now including elements of all companies, -once more advanced in a commendably steady manner on to a trench just -topping the rise of the Main Ridge. This it occupied with very little -opposition. This advanced position--Beef Trench--was an isolated trench -about 150 yards ahead of Bully (the real second objective) with both -flanks in the air. It was shallow and evidently only in course of -construction. It afforded magnificent observation over the rearward -slopes of the Main Ridge on to the German third line system in front of -Morval, and in this position the work of consolidation was begun, two -Lewis gun posts being pushed forward overlooking the Morval-Lesbœufs -Road. Middle Copse, a small spinney about 200 yards to the front, was -seen to be teeming with Bosche who were effectively dealt with by our -Lewis guns. - -In the meantime the right platoon of B Company under 2/Lieut. Garratt, -which, in keeping touch with the Queen Victorias, had got ahead of the -rest of the Battalion, had evidently become deflected slightly to the -right during its advance and had dropped into the communication trench -connecting Leuze Wood with Bully Trench. Apparently somewhat confusing -his direction in the total absence of landmarks, Garratt moved along -this trench and turned the corner to the left along Bully Trench. -Here he came in contact with a Bosche bombing party, and attacking -them vigorously pushed them back for some considerable distance, and -eventually constructed a temporary block in the trench, probably about -the centre of the Battalion's sector, _i.e._ about 200 yards short of -the Quadrilateral. In this bomb fighting the men of B Company displayed -great courage and dash, and their accurate throwing contributed largely -to their success. Among these gallant men Corpl. Udall was conspicuous, -and for his devotion to duty he was awarded the Military Medal. - -During the advance of the assaulting companies of the Battalion from -Bully Trench to the advanced position in Beef, a somewhat determined -attack was delivered against B Company's block by a large party of the -enemy led by an officer. Fortunately the shallowness of the trench -exposed the enemy's advance and after a brisk exchange of bombs, -in the course of which some loss was inflicted on the attacking -party, including the officer who was shot by Garratt, the survivors -surrendered with the exception of a few who fled pursued by the fire of -our men and the Rangers. Garratt was subsequently awarded the Military -Cross for his good work. - -On the Battalion's left the Rangers, whose line of advance was -dominated by the Quadrilateral and a small spur running from it in a -south-westerly direction, had been faced with a withering machine-gun -fire under which advance was utterly impossible. Their left company was -unable to make progress, and by 8.30 p.m. was compelled to withdraw -to its assembly positions in conjunction with the right Brigade of -the 16th Division who had also been unable to overcome the German -resistance. The right company of the Rangers pushed gallantly forward -losing heavily, but was finally brought to a stand in the vicinity of -the temporary block which was being held in Bully by Garratt. Here they -were forced to take such cover as shell craters afforded them, and to -reply to the Bosche fire, in which they were assisted by the party of B -Company at the block. Under the gathering darkness a good many of the -Rangers were able to make their way into Bully trench. - -While all this was taking place two companies of the Kensingtons had -occupied the assembly trenches vacated by the 1/4th Londons, and the -commanders of these, appreciating the situation of the Rangers, at once -made a gallant attempt to fill the gap on the left. Their gallantry, -however, cost them dear, and the German barrage took a heavy toll of -casualties before they reached Bully Trench. The bravery of Major -Dickens was in particular remarkable. Mortally wounded some time before -he reached his objective, he continued to advance at the head of his -men, cheering and encouraging them until he collapsed into the trench. -Later in the evening the two remaining companies of the Kensingtons -were also thrown into the fight and became absorbed into the 1/4th -Londons' position in Bully Trench. - -Darkness had now fallen, and the position of the companies in the -advanced trench was far from happy. Both flanks were in the air and -heavy losses had been suffered; of the officers who had started -with these companies, only four--Cooper, McCormick, Quennell and -Burford--were still standing. News from Garratt showed that he was -doubtful as to whether he could hold out against another attack. - -Fearing to lose the advantage already gained, Cooper, who had assumed -command of the force in Beef Trench, decided to reoccupy Bully -temporarily, and finally clear it of the enemy. The withdrawal was -successfully accomplished in the dark, but the enemy was found to be -firmly established with an apparently ample supply of bombs on his -side of the block, which had now been completed with the help of the -Kensington and Ranger reinforcements; and further attempts to extend -our gains northward in Bully were abandoned. Communication being now -re-established with Battalion Headquarters, orders were received in -Bully for the reoccupation of the advanced positions in Beef; and the -Bully position being now much strengthened by Rangers and Kensingtons, -the 1/4th Londons moved forward alone to Beef Trench. - -During the remainder of the night a good deal of work was necessary in -reorganising the somewhat mixed force by which the forward position was -now occupied. One or two enemy patrols approached the position but were -fired on and dispersed, and apart from continued shell fire and sniping -the night passed comparatively peacefully. - -Captain Cooper gives the following account of a remarkable incident -which occurred during the night:-- - - A glow was seen in a shell hole some distance to the front and on - investigation this proved to be from the cigarette of a battalion - N.C.O., a corporal (Fergusson), who had formed part of one of the - forward posts. He had become separated from his men and wounded in - the back so that he was unable to walk. He stated that he had been - uncertain of his position and so had crawled into a shell hole. A - Bosche patrol had found him and removed his shoulder badges and - taken the contents of his pockets, but had propped him up in a - comfortable position and had left him his water-bottle, cigarettes - and matches. He was calmly and coolly enjoying a cigarette when - found. He was sent on a stretcher to the Aid Post. - -While these events were taking place on the Battalion's front, the -Queen Victorias, the left of the 169th Brigade, had occupied their -objective, and were in touch on the right of Bully. The enemy, however, -had hitherto successfully resisted all efforts of the London Rifle -Brigade to emerge from the east side of Leuze Wood. At about 7 p.m. the -Bosche at this part of the line had launched a vigorous bomb attack -along the sunken road leading from Combles, and the L.R.B. had been -forced back after a most stubborn resistance which cost them heavily. -During the night the Queen's Westminsters took over the extreme right -of the Division. - -The 16th Division on the left had also met with varied fortunes. The -47th Brigade on its left had successfully advanced through Ginchy -and established itself on its objective; but the right brigade, the -48th, whose objective lay along the Ginchy-Morval Road, met with most -stubborn resistance from the spur already referred to. In spite of -the most gallant efforts the Brigade was unable to make progress, and -eventually fell back with the left wing of the Rangers at about 8.30 -p.m. and reoccupied their original position on the Wedge Wood-Ginchy -Road. About this time the London Scottish were ordered into the fight -in order to endeavour to clear up the situation in this part of the -field. After the march forward from Maltzhorn their preparations were -completed at about midnight, and shortly after they attacked from -a position to the left of the Rangers' assembly trenches towards -the Quadrilateral. The enemy was still vigorous in his defence, and -after losing their direction in the intense darkness, the Scottish -were ultimately withdrawn, having first rendered a good account of -themselves in a lively little hand-to-hand fight with a party of the -Bosche. During the night the 16th Division was relieved by the 3rd -Guards Brigade. - -Shortly after dawn on the 10th 2/Lieut. McCormick, who had come back -to Battalion Headquarters with a report of the situation, returned to -Beef Trench with orders for the immediate evacuation of the advanced -position. Accordingly, after establishing two Lewis gun positions in -Beef Trench, the withdrawal was proceeded with as rapidly as possible, -the activity of the German snipers in the growing daylight making -movement difficult except in the smallest parties. The return of the -1/4th Londons to Bully Trench caused congestion which was subsequently -intensified by the arrival of a large reinforcement of London Scottish. -This Battalion made efforts during the day to prolong the line in the -direction of the Quadrilateral, while the Guards, working eastward -along the Ginchy-Morval Road, sought to join hands with them, but -the Germans were well supplied with bombs and put up a very gallant -resistance. The continued occupation of the spur--which on the previous -day had stopped the 16th Division--moreover forced an unpleasantly deep -re-entrant in the British line, leaving the left flank of the 1/4th -Londons dangerously exposed. An effort to rout out the pertinacious -defenders of this spur was made during the afternoon by the 168th -Stokes mortars, who fired 35 rounds with good effect into the enemy -trenches. - -The position on the right flank of the Battalion was still less -satisfactory than had been hoped for. At 7 a.m. and again at 3 p.m. the -Queen's Westminsters had made local attempts to gain the previous day's -objective, but each time without success. - -Throughout the day the Battalion's position was kept under heavy German -shell fire which caused the already heavy casualty roll to mount higher -and higher, and it was found necessary to relieve the congestion -in Bully by withdrawing the Rangers and Kensingtons to the rear. -Communication with Headquarters was rendered exceedingly difficult, -though, as always, there was no lack of brave volunteers to try to -pass through the German barrage, and these in some cases succeeded -in reaching the report centre in Leuze Wood. Moreover the trench, -only a shallow and half-finished work to start with, was becoming -badly shattered and was filled with wounded men, whom there was no -means of evacuating, for all the stretcher-bearers with companies had -themselves become casualties. Throughout this trying day all ranks -displayed magnificent spirit and clung to their hardly won gains with -grim determination. That night the 168th Brigade was relieved, the -1/4th Londons handing over their objective to the 8th Middlesex of the -167th Brigade. Following the relief, which was complete by midnight, -the Battalion moved by companies--by now sadly reduced in numbers--to -Casement Trench, whence the Battalion moved as a unit to Billon Farm, -near Carnoy, arriving in bivouacs there at 5.30 a.m. on the 11th -September. - -[Illustration: THE BATTLE OF GINCHY, SEPTEMBER 1916] - -The five days' duty just completed were perhaps the most strenuous -the Battalion had yet experienced. Almost all the time exposed to bad -weather conditions and to very heavy and accurate artillery fire, the -spirit of the men was magnificent; and their steadiness, after the loss -of 15 out of the 20 officers who led the companies into action, as well -as a large proportion of N.C.O.'s, was unsurpassed. Their fighting -qualities too were firmly established, for they had taken their -objectives up to time-table and handed them over intact twenty-four -hours later. The total casualties during the five days amounted to 22 -officers and about 250 other ranks. - -The officer casualties were as follows: - - 7th and 8th September--Capts. F. O. J. Read and H. G. Stanham, - 2/Lieuts. W. Richards, A. Potton, J. T. Middleton, C. H. T. - Heaver and L. W. Archer, wounded. - - 9th and 10th September--Capt. J. R. Webster, 2/Lieuts. C. J. - Brodie, F. J. Foden, W. E. Osborne, C. E. Lewis, C. S. G. Blows - and C. F. Mortleman, killed; Lieuts. H. W. Vernon and G. H. - Davis, 2/Lieuts. J. W. Price, V. R. Oldrey, C. F. English, N. - A. Ormiston and J. C. Graddon, wounded; and 2/Lieut. W. H. - Davey, D.C.M., missing, presumed killed. - -Throughout the 11th and 12th heavy fighting continued in which the -167th Brigade co-operated with the Guards on the left in numerous -efforts to clear out the re-entrant and reach the Ginchy Quadrilateral. -This magnificently defended position, however, held out against the -most gallant attempts of the attackers. During the night of the 11/12th -September the 167th Brigade was also relieved, the line being taken -over by the 16th Brigade of the 6th Division. - -The Battalion remained at Billon Farm for three most welcome days of -rest and reorganisation during which the weather, which now once more -became fine and warm, was of inestimable value in cheering the troops -after their somewhat trying experience. The relief to the men's spirits -on emerging even for a short spell from the ghastly featureless waste -of the battle area to surroundings where trees still bore their leaves, -roads still crossed the hillsides, and houses were not completely -effaced, was immense; and by the time the period of rest was over the -Battalion was once more braced up to continue the struggle. - -One or two changes occurred during this period among the officers of -the Battalion, of which the most important was the assumption of the -Adjutancy by Lieut. W. J. Boutall on the evacuation to hospital of -Capt. R. L. Herring, who had occupied this trying position practically -since the Battalion joined the 56th Division. 2/Lieut. Garratt assumed -the duties of Assistant Adjutant almost immediately afterwards. Capt. -J. T. Sykes left the Battalion for attachment to the Indian Army, and -the signalling officer, Lieut. E. W. Monk, to join the R.A.F. The -latter's duties were taken over by 2/Lieut. S. J. Barkworth, M.M. In -addition to these 2/Lieut. A. C. Knight was evacuated to hospital. - - -_The Battle of Flers-Courcelette 15th-18th September_ - -The renewal of the offensive was not long to be delayed. The object -of the High Command was to follow up the blows delivered against the -German positions as rapidly as possible, and to leave the enemy little -respite for reorganisation and rest. The constant hammering on his -defences had already had an appreciable effect on his morale, and it -was hoped that before long the strain on his resources would prove so -great that the situation would develop rapidly in favour of the Allies. - -The next general attack was arranged for the 15th September, the -assault being launched on the whole battle front from Morval to Le Sars -on the Albert-Bapaume Road. The great pivoting movement by which the -British right flank was to be swung forward in line with the left on -the Main Ridge had now reached an important stage, and the operations -of the XIV Corps were now more than ever bound up with the fortunes of -the French south of Combles. The French were aiming at establishing -themselves astride the Bapaume-Péronne Road at the village of Sailly -Saillisel, about two miles north-east of Combles; but the task -presented unusual difficulties owing to the restriction of the lines -of possible advance between the deep Combles ravine on the one flank, -and the extensive wood of St Pierre Vaast on the other. The evils of -this confinement were aggravated by the fact that the enemy position -about Morval at the extreme east end of the Main Ridge dominated the -whole of our Allies' line of advance. It was therefore essential to -the success, not only of the French in their ultimate object but also -of the combined "squeezing-out" process which was being applied to -Combles itself, that the British should at once possess themselves -of such portions of the Main Ridge as remained in the enemy's hands. -This entailed the breaking of the Third German system on the line -Morval-Lesbœufs-Flers, and this was the task of the XIV and XV Corps on -the 15th September. - -The positions held by the Division at the opening of the battle were as -follows: - - 167th Brigade--On the line north of Leuze Wood and - intersecting the south end of Bouleaux Wood - which had been captured on the 9th by the Queen - Victorias, and thence along the south-east edge - of Leuze Wood for about half its length. - - 169th Brigade--On the right of Leuze Wood, in a line - running due north and south, between the 167th - and the French. - - 168th Brigade--In reserve bivouacs in Angle Wood - Valley, the Battalion being at the head of the - Valley near Wedge Wood. - -The position which the Battalion had captured on the 9th September was -now held by the 6th Division, who formed the centre of the Corps while -the Guards were on the extreme left. - -The general idea of the attack was that the Guards and 6th Divisions -should attack positions in the German third line facing Lesbœufs, while -the 56th Division was to form a defensive flank facing the Combles -ravine. - -To establish this defensive flank the 169th Brigade on the right was -to push forward of Leuze Wood and occupy a position roughly north -and south with its left flank astride the sunken road from Combles, -about 300 yards east of the edge of Leuze Wood. The 167th was to clear -Bouleaux Wood in two stages and establish a line parallel to and about -100 yards in front of its east edge. The 1/4th Londons were to follow -up the advance of the 167th Brigade and then "leapfrog" through it on -to the German third line immediately in front of Morval whence they -would connect up between the left of the 167th Brigade and the right of -the 6th Division. - -The 15th September was on the greater part of the battle front a day -of big successes. At an early hour Flers fell before our assault, and -by the afternoon the British line had been pushed far beyond it; the -whole of High Wood was taken, and before nightfall Martinpuich and -Courcelette on the left had been added to the gains of the day. - -On the extreme right, however, the advance suffered a rather severe -check. The Guards, who occupied the left of the Corps front, were able -to make solid advances between Flers and Lesbœufs, but the 6th Division -adjoining them were held up by the Quadrilateral at Ginchy, whose brave -defenders still maintained their position most stubbornly; and this -failure naturally reacted on the 56th Division who occupied a narrow -wedge between the Quadrilateral and the Combles ravine. - -At 5.50 a.m. the three tanks which were to make their début with the -Division left their departure points for the first objective, and at -6.20 a.m. the infantry assault was launched. Almost three hours later, -at 9 a.m., the 1/4th Londons left their bivouacs in Angle Wood Valley -and moved forward in artillery formation towards the battle position -on the crest between the north edge of Leuze Wood and the west face -of Bouleaux Wood. Progress was not rapid owing to the heavy state of -the ground, and under the German shell fire a good many casualties -were sustained. The advance was made, however, in good order, and with -admirable steadiness. - -The 169th Brigade made very slight advances on the south of Leuze Wood; -while the 167th managed to secure the part of its first objective which -lay outside Bouleaux Wood. The 8th Middlesex of the latter Brigade -even made a heroic attempt to reach the second objective, but had to -be brought back. The enemy barrage was heavy and fell, as it so often -had in the Somme battles, between the assaulting columns and their -starting-point, thus cutting them off from supplies and reinforcement, -while the accurate intensity of their machine-gun fire from their -positions in the Quadrilateral made advance an utter impossibility. -After ten hours' fighting, during which the assaulting Brigades did all -that men could do, the Corps Commander telephoned to Gen. Hull that the -Division would make no further attempt against Bouleaux Wood that day. - -The 1/4th Londons luckily avoided the slaughter of the battle line this -day, for a few minutes prior to its advance from Angle Wood Valley -an order had been despatched to Brigade Headquarters to the effect -that in consequence of the check of the 6th Division in front of the -Quadrilateral the 168th Brigade would not occupy its battle position. -This order was transmitted by Brigade and reached the Battalion during -its advance. Upon receipt of it the Battalion was at once brought back -to its assembly area at Angle Wood Valley where, in common with the -remainder of the Brigade, it remained in bivouacs till the early hours -of the 18th September. This operation cost the Battalion a large number -of casualties among N.C.O.'s and men from the German shell fire, and -one officer, 2/Lieut. J. W. Chapman, wounded. - -During these days Angle Wood Valley was a distinctly unhealthy -locality. The German artillery maintained a searching fire over the -whole area, and exacted a fair toll of casualties. The weather, -which a few days previously had shown signs of mending, had once -more turned wet and the shell holes, which formed the only available -cover, became not the most desirable resting-place for the troops. The -strain was great, but the situation was as usual not only borne by all -in the Battalion with an almost stoical resignation, but enlivened -occasionally with those rare flashes of humour which have made the -London soldiers famous during the War in three continents. - -The story of the tanks on the 15th September is too well-known to -need elaboration here, and is, moreover, too much outside the actual -experience of the Battalion to allow of more than a passing reference. -The moral effect on the Germans was immense, and considering that their -employment had scarcely passed the experimental stage, the success -gained by them was conspicuous. As was anticipated, however, the tanks -promptly became a mark for a tremendous concentration of enemy fire -which made their room far more desirable than their company. Of the -three attached to the 56th Division one did useful work in the vicinity -of the Quadrilateral, and after trampling down a good deal of wire and -putting an enemy machine-gun team out of action returned to make a -personal report of its adventures. The careers of the other two were -sadly abbreviated, and the end of the day found them derelict--one -west of Bouleaux Wood, and one south-east of Leuze Wood--though not -before they had dealt out a certain amount of destruction to the German -defences. - -Orders were received while the Battalion remained in Angle Wood -Valley for the resumption of the offensive on the 18th September. The -objectives on the XIV Corps front were on this occasion very much more -modest than they had been three days earlier, and so far as the 56th -Division was concerned were as follows: - - 169th Brigade--The sunken road from Leuze Wood to - Combles, between the east edge of the wood and - the orchard west of Combles. - - 67th Brigade--The east edge of Bouleaux Wood for a - distance of 600 yards from its southern - extremity, and thence a line through the wood to - Middle Copse. From Middle Copse the objective was - continued in a northerly direction by the 6th - Division. - - The 168th Brigade remained in reserve in Angle Wood - Valley, but the 1/4th Londons and the London - Scottish were attached to the 167th. - -For this operation the Battalion was detailed as the left assaulting -battalion of the 167th Brigade, its objective being the portion between -Middle Copse (which was held by an advanced post of the 7th Middlesex) -and the east edge of Bouleaux Wood. For this purpose its assembly -position was the old German communication trench connecting Bully -Trench with the north corner of Leuze Wood. The right of the Brigade -frontage was taken up by the 3rd Londons. - -The hour of assault was fixed for 6.15 a.m. on the 18th, and to enable -it to reach its assembly position by 5.15 a.m. as ordered, the 1/4th -Londons moved from Angle Wood Valley at 3.30 a.m. But the ground was -impossible. All vestige of tracks had long since disappeared, and the -countryside in every direction was a vast slippery quagmire in which so -far from keeping any sort of march formation it was next to impossible -for the men, laden as they were with battle equipment, to stand upright -at all. - -Zero hour arrived, but the Battalion as well as the 3rd Londons was -still slipping and struggling a long way short of its assembly area. -The British barrage opened and was at once replied to by a withering -machine-gun fire by the enemy. Seldom has the Battalion been exposed to -so accurate and devastating a fire. The only alternative to complete -destruction was to take cover in the waterlogged shell holes, which -movement was carried out with alacrity by all ranks: in this unexpected -position an order reached the Battalion abandoning the attack and -recalling it to Angle Wood. - -On the right the much suffering 169th Brigade was able to achieve a -series of local bombing successes which carried their line appreciably -nearer Combles. From the 6th Division on the left, shortly after midday -came the cheering news that the Quadrilateral had at last fallen, -together with the trench to the north of it. - -This important success, which had so long eluded the grasp of the -successive Divisions who had sought it, paved the way for the -magnificent achievements of the 25th September, which will be recounted -later, its especial importance being that it was practically the last -heavily fortified stronghold on the central portion of the Main Ridge -to resist the British attacks. - -The abortive operation of the 18th cost the Battalion a good many -casualties in N.C.O.'s and men, and one officer, 2/Lieut. W. H. Calnan, -wounded. - -The same evening the 168th Brigade relieved the 167th in the Leuze -Wood trenches, the London Scottish occupying the front system, which -comprised Beef and Bully Trenches. The 1/4th Londons took over from -the 3rd Londons the support line, which ran diagonally through Leuze -Wood in a north and south direction. Leuze Wood was at all times -an unhealthy locality and formed an unfailing source of attraction -for every conceivable sort of German projectile. The 3rd Londons had -already suffered heavily here, and the night of the relief proved -to be no exception to the rule. Throughout the evening the wood was -plastered with high explosive shell, and even the inadequate shelter -of the trenches hastily dug, damaged and waterlogged as they were, was -exceedingly welcome. The position was, without exception, the muddiest -that had yet fallen to the lot of the Battalion. "To stand still," -writes a company commander, "was to sink gradually until the whole -of the legs to well above the knees were immersed and movement was -correspondingly difficult." Lewis guns and rifles had become choked -with mud so as to render the Battalion practically defenceless, but -with much labour they were cleaned, and some rations which were found -in the trench distributed. Dawn broke on a chilled but yet remarkably -cheerful Battalion. The continued strain of heavy shell fire and -conditions of physical misery were, however, beginning to have their -effect, and several men who in earlier actions had given ample proof -of their courage, collapsed. "One man of D Company who had previously -shown himself one of the stoutest-hearted, lost his mental balance and -suddenly became possessed of the idea of killing all the Germans in -the German Army, and had to be forcibly restrained from mounting the -parapet. 2/Lieut. Barkworth, who came up from Battalion Headquarters, -succeeded by sheer strength of personality in restraining him and -getting him back to H.Q." - -The 19th September was a day of comparative quiet on the battle front, -though shelling and sniping continued in a desultory fashion. Rain fell -steadily and the condition of the trenches, appallingly bad to start -with, became so wretched as to defy description. - -During the night of the 19th a large working party of the 5th Cheshire -Pioneers, under the supervision of the Brigade Major (Capt. R. E. -Neame, V.C., D.S.O., R.E.), and covered by a screen of one and a half -companies of the Scottish, dug a new trench 800 yards long. This new -work, Gropi Trench, ran forward from Beef Trench towards the German -line, parallel to the west edge of Bouleaux Wood, as far as the Morval -tram-line. The task was successfully completed before dawn, but with -the advent of daylight and the consequent exposure of the newly -turned-up earth, the whole brigade area was again subjected to a heavy -bombardment by the enemy's artillery. The German snipers again became -particularly active, and every rash movement was promptly punished. -Under this gruelling there was nothing for the Battalion to do but to -keep quietly in its trenches and make the best of an unpleasant state -of affairs. That night the Kensingtons came forward from Angle Wood -Valley and took over the support line from the Battalion, and also -Bully Trench in front of it. The relief was completed by 9.30 p.m., and -never was relief more welcome. The Rangers at the same time took over -the Beef and Gropi system from the London Scottish. On withdrawal from -the trenches the Battalion moved by companies to bivouacs at Falfemont -Farm, arriving there at 10.45 p.m. - -No further movement was made during the 21st and 22nd September, and -these two days were fairly quiet as the principal target for the German -guns was provided by the numerous British batteries in Angle Wood -Valley, which received heavy punishment. - -Between the 20th September and the 2nd October the following -reinforcements joined: - - Capt. R. N. Keen, Lieuts. W. H. Vernon and A. Bath, 2/Lieuts. C. A. - Speyer, C. Potter, W. R. Gifford, H. W. Spiers, L. C. Haycraft, - L. J. R. Atterbury, C. P. Russell, T. R. Fletcher and S. A. G. - Richardson. - - 2/Lieut. T. Siddall (25th Londons). - - 100 N.C.O.'s and men. - - A few days after joining Lieut. A. Bath and 2/Lieut. C. P. - Russell were evacuated, the former with a broken ankle, the - latter sick. - -The men of this draft represented so far as the 1/4th Battalion was -concerned the firstfruits of the "Derby" scheme, and it must always be -a matter for regret that the dreadful losses already incurred by the -Battalion made it inevitable to pitchfork this fine material straight -into the inferno of the Somme without any opportunity for it to become -previously assimilated into the ranks of the Battalion. The Somme -battles were a severe ordeal even to the most veteran soldiers; and the -bearing of these young and inexperienced troops in the trials of the -latter half of the Battalion's Somme fighting stands to their lasting -credit. - -As we have already remarked, the Cockney soldier, however wretched -his conditions, is never so depressed by his surroundings as to be -unable to find humour in the situation of the hour. The Battalion had -now spent seven consecutive days in the desolation of the battle area -practically without shelter from the pitiless torrents of rain which -combined with the German shells to churn the whole surface of the -ground into a disgusting glutinous mass; the troops were soaked to the -skin and plastered with mud from head to foot; but the unconquerable -spirit of cheerfulness held them together, dirty and dishevelled as -they were, a well-knit and disciplined fighting unit. The condition -of the ground, which added so vastly to the labours of the troops, is -illustrated by a story told by an officer who was present: - - A man attempted to cross the valley and started to plough his way - through the mud, but rashly omitted to lace up his boots, which he - had previously removed. His negligence was quickly visited upon - him, for scarcely had he begun his journey when the mud claimed one - of his boots, which became stuck fast. His powers of balance were - unequal to the task of putting his foot back in the boot, and he - toppled over, both his hands becoming firmly embedded. His efforts - to regain a standing position were prolonged and violent, but - after a time successful, and finally, boots in hand, he proceeded - on his way amid the cheers of the onlookers, who accepted his - performance as being arranged for their especial amusement, and - were particularly interested in the man's lurid observations on the - subject of boots, mud and war generally. - -There were a few occasions, however, when circumstances seemed too -strong even for the 1/4th Londons, and one of them occurred that night -when the rum jars which arrived with the rations were found, alas, to -contain--lime juice! - -On the evening of the 22nd September the 168th Brigade was relieved in -the left subsector by the 167th and the Battalion moved back to the -comparative peace of Casement Trench, where it occupied bivouacs until -the afternoon of the 24th, making preparations for the next bout in the -battle line. - - -_The Battle of Morval, 25th September_ - -The continuance of the offensive had been arranged for the 21st, -but the weather conditions placed such a handicap on the chances of -success that it was postponed, first until the 23rd and again till -the 25th September, when once more the battle broke out on a front -from the British right at Combles to a point half-way between Flers -and Martinpuich. The French were to co-operate in this attack on the -right of Combles ravine. The objectives of the XIV Corps included the -villages of Lesbœufs and Morval, and, as on the occasion of their -earlier attempt on the 15th, the 56th Division was to form a defensive -flank facing south-east over Combles. - -A series of local bombing operations was conducted on the 24th by the -169th Brigade on the extreme right in conjunction with the French, -which gave them an increased hold on Combles Trench immediately in -front of the village, and appreciably improved their jumping-off -positions for the following day. During the night also the two tanks -allotted to the Division moved forward to their rendezvous in the -quarry west of Leuze Wood. - -For the battle of the 25th the three Brigades of the Division were -all in line, the 169th on the right, with the 167th in the centre and -the 168th on the left. The 1/4th Londons were the right assaulting -Battalion of the 168th, their duty being to clear the northern end of -Bouleaux Wood and to establish a line of posts overlooking the ravine, -while the London Scottish on the left continued the defensive flank in -the direction of Morval (see Map No. 6). - -At 4.30 p.m. on the 24th the Battalion marched from Casement Trench -to occupy positions of assembly, relieving the 7th Middlesex in the -Gropi-Ranger system as follows: - - C Company--Left front, in Ranger Trench. - - B Company--Right front, in Gropi Trench, and the small - communication trench leading forward to Ranger Trench. - - D Company--Support, in Gropi Trench. - - A Company--Reserve, in the southern part of Gropi - Trench and Middle Copse. - - Battalion Headquarters were established in a dugout west of the - north part of Gropi Trench and the Aid Post in the quarry west of - Leuze Wood. - -The evening of relief was fortunately fairly quiet, but owing to the -complete obliteration of all landmarks some difficulty was experienced -by the guides provided for the companies in locating the positions to -be occupied. However, Middle Copse was eventually reached, and this -point being gained a little prospecting discovered Gropi Trench, after -which the relief proceeded smoothly and was completed without unusual -incident. Gropi Trench, which had been dug by the Cheshires, was found -to be very well constructed, and the excellent cover it afforded was -the means of sparing the Battalion a good many casualties from the -enemy snipers, who were active from the direction of Bouleaux Wood -during the morning of the 25th. - -After a preliminary bombardment by all available batteries the British -attack opened at 12.35 p.m. on the 25th, but the 168th Brigade's -positions being well in advance of those occupied by the 5th Division -on its left, its attack was deferred until seven minutes later in -order to allow the 5th Division to come up into line. The creeping -barrage, under which the Brigade's advance was made, was supplied by -batteries firing from Angle Wood Valley, and being thus in enfilade was -particularly efficient and accurate; and under its excellent protection -the 1/4th Londons and the London Scottish advanced steadily at 12.42 -p.m. - -[Illustration: THE BATTLE OF MORVAL, SEPTEMBER 1916] - -The advance of the Battalion was led by C Company (Grimsdell) in two -waves at 50 paces distance, followed by D Company (Cooper) in similar -formation. B Company's rôle was to conform to the advance and protect -the Brigade's right flank against any possible hostile action from -the southern half of Bouleaux Wood, while A Company in reserve moved -forward to occupy the positions vacated by the assaulting companies. - -The Battalion reached its objectives in the northern fringe of the Wood -with little opposition, and with slight loss, killing a large number -of Germans in the western edge of the Wood. A great many of the enemy -were also put to flight, and these were caught on the open hillside on -their way to Combles by the Lewis gunners of the Scottish advancing -on our left, who did great execution among them. The consolidation -of the strong posts allotted to the Battalion at once began, but was -considerably interfered with by German snipers, who were still clinging -to their posts farther south in the Wood. Under their fire Grimsdell -(in charge of C Company) fell, shot through the head. This harassing -fire rendered communication with Battalion Headquarters a matter of -some difficulty, and continued through the night, as the 167th Brigade -on the right had not been successful in pushing through the southern -extremity of Bouleaux Wood. By nightfall the new posts were completed -and occupied as follows: - - Post A--By 30 men and Lewis gun of C Company. - Post B1--By 25 men of D Company. - Post B2--By 30 men and 1 Lewis gun of D Company. - -These posts were improved and wired by parties from the Royal Engineers -and the Cheshire Pioneers, while A Company subsequently constructed an -additional post in the tram-line embankment north of the Wood. - -Meanwhile the London Scottish had been equally successful on our left, -and had taken possession of the German trench running north-east from -Bouleaux Wood in the direction of Morval; and farther still to the -north the Guards Division had captured Lesbœufs, while the 5th Division -were hammering at the western outskirts of Morval. - -The positions now occupied by the Brigade were of immense importance, -as they secured excellent observation over the northern exits of -Combles; and information received through the French from a German -officer prisoner being to the effect that the Combles garrison was -making preparations to fight its way out north-eastwards, the further -operations of the Brigade were directed towards working round the north -side of Combles and cutting off its communication with Morval. This -scheme naturally affected the left flank of the Brigade more than the -right flank, on which the Battalion was posted. - -Shortly after midnight the 167th Brigade gained a foothold in Bouleaux -Wood on the right of the Battalion, and a reconnaissance made by -Lieut.-Col. Wheatley soon after dawn on the 26th showed that the Wood -was finally cleared of the enemy. Touch was rapidly gained with the 1st -Londons and the line established in front of the east edge of the Wood. - -A few hours later definite information was received that the enemy had -evacuated Combles and that troops of the 56th Division had entered it -and had met in its deserted streets patrols of the 56th French Division. - -The remainder of the day passed quietly for the Battalion, and a -distinct lull occurred in the enemy's shell fire, while owing to the -clearance of Bouleaux Wood the ground west of it, which had been on the -previous afternoon so much swept by snipers, was now quite peaceful. - -Combles having fallen into our hands the most immediate need was to -improve touch with the French and carry the united line forward east -of the village. Early on the morning of the 26th Sept. the French -captured Frégicourt and succeeded in establishing themselves in touch -with the 169th Brigade south of Combles, thus securing the whole of -Combles Trench; while on the north of the village they managed to push -patrols forward towards the sunken road leading to Morval. The road was -occupied by the Rangers who had orders to occupy if possible the main -German third line between Morval and Frégicourt. This was found still -to be strongly held and the assistance of the Division's two tanks -were requisitioned. Unfortunately both these machines became badly -"ditched" before reaching their objective, and the Rangers' attack was -therefore abandoned. - -That evening the Battalion was relieved in Bouleaux Wood by the -Kensingtons, and withdrew to Bully and Beef Trenches with feelings of -immense elation at having contributed materially to this striking and -solid success. - -During the 27th September the trenches held by the Battalion were -heavily shelled, but no attempt was made by the enemy to launch a -counter-attack on the Brigade's front, and the Germans were evidently -content to accept the loss of Combles as irretrievable. In the evening -the 168th Brigade handed over its positions to the 2nd French Division, -and the Battalion, without relief in Bully and Beef Trenches, withdrew -to Casement Trench. - -The casualties sustained by the Battalion during this highly successful -operation were remarkably few, amounting to 2 officers (2/Lieuts. R. -E. Grimsdell, killed, and E. McD. McCormick, wounded), and about 30 -N.C.O.'s and men killed and wounded. - -During the evening of relief reports of the full success of the battle -of the 25th September reached the Battalion, including the splendid -news of the fall of the famous series of German redoubts on the -Thiepval Ridge. This welcome intelligence, combined with the knowledge -of the Combles success, put all ranks into the highest spirits, and -created the pardonable expectation that a "break-through" on a large -scale was imminent. How premature these high hopes were the Battalion -was to learn to its cost on the 7th October. - -Mention should be made here of the tasks performed by R. S. M. Harris -during the period the Battalion was operating in the Leuze Wood and -Bouleaux Wood area. He was responsible for organising all carrying -parties up to advanced Battalion Headquarters with water, rations and -munitions. These duties he carried out in a highly praiseworthy manner, -both he and his small band of carriers being continually called upon -day and night to tramp up the long Angle Wood Valley, often in the -rain, on practically impassable tracks and more often than not under -shell fire. "As Adjutant," writes Boutall, "I highly appreciated the -assistance he gave me in thus relieving me of a considerable amount of -additional work and anxiety. I do not remember a single instance during -this whole period when he failed us, in spite of the difficult and -heavy tasks we were obliged to impose on him." - - -_The Battle of the Le Transloy Ridges 1st-18th October_ - -Owing to the shortening of the line consequent upon the fall of -Combles, and the extension to their left of the French, the 56th -Division was now withdrawn and moved out of the battle area, the -Battalion marching at 2 p.m. on the 28th Sept. from Casement to -Ville-sur-Ancre, where rough but welcome billets were occupied. The -Division's rest was destined to be short-lived, for the following day a -warning order was received that it would take the place in the line of -the 6th and Guards Divisions, which had suffered considerably during a -prolonged period in action. - -The Battalion at this stage was unfortunate in losing Lieut.-Col. -Wheatley. The prolonged exposure had already undermined his health, and -at this period he was recommended a rest by the Medical Authorities. He -refused to go to hospital, and compromised by going to the Divisional -Rest Station, Major H. J. Duncan-Teape taking command, but so keen -was the Colonel to be with his unit, that without having sufficiently -recovered he returned on October 2nd. - -The sector to be occupied was about 2000 yards in frontage, running in -a north-west to south-east direction through the eastern outskirts of -Lesbœufs, and was taken over on the evening of the 30th September with -the 169th Brigade on the right, and the 167th on the left, the dividing -line being the Lesbœufs-Le Transloy Road. The left subsector (or -northern half of the line) lay just below the crest of the ridge above -Lesbœufs, and orders were issued for the advancement of this part of -the line to positions from which direct observation could be obtained -over the German positions in front of Le Transloy, in preparation for -an early renewal of the offensive. - -[Illustration: THE BATTLE OF THE LE TRANSLOY RIDGE, OCTOBER 1916] - -The 168th Brigade remained in Divisional reserve, and on the morning -of the 30th the Battalion, together with the London Scottish, moved -forward to their former bivouac area between Trones and Bernafay Woods, -the Kensingtons and Rangers remaining at the Citadel. - -The Battalion remained in the Trones Wood area during the 1st and 2nd -October, and a Brigade relief having been ordered for the following -day, moved forward at 4.30 p.m. to Lesbœufs, relieving the 2nd Londons. -The positions taken over by the Battalion formed the left subsector -of the Brigade front and extended from the Lesbœufs-Le Transloy Road, -which formed the left boundary, for some 800 yards southwards to the -junction with the London Scottish, who were in line on the right, -the latter battalion being the right flank of the British Army. The -Kensingtons moved into Brigade support in the old Morval-Flers line, -and the Rangers occupied bivouacs at Ginchy. - -The main position taken over by the Battalion was a roughly constructed -trench known as Shamrock, about 50 yards east of the sunken road -leading from Lesbœufs to Morval. In advance of this main position, -which was allotted to A and B Companies, were a number of embryo -trenches in varying stages of construction and quite isolated from -the main line. Of these isolated trenches the chief was Rainy, which -adjoined the Lesbœufs-Le Transloy Road, about 300 yards ahead of -Shamrock, and Foggy, some distance farther south and separated from -Rainy by a gap of probably 300 yards. C and D Companies and Battalion -Headquarters took up positions in the old Lesbœufs-Gueudecourt line -west of the village. - -The resumption of the offensive was imminent; and it was indeed first -fixed for the 5th October, though subsequently postponed till the 7th -owing to the continuance of adverse weather conditions. - -A great deal of constructional work was immediately necessary in -assembly and communication trenches, as well as in the completion -of the necessary advanced dumps of munitions and stores of all -kinds. Working parties from the Battalion, of the greatest available -strength, began work on part of these tasks on the night of the 4th, -the new trenches to be dug comprising communications to join Rainy -with Shamrock and with a small advanced position on the crest of the -ridge overlooking Le Transloy. In addition the road at Rainy was -barricaded. Large working parties were also provided by the Kensingtons -to provide an advanced assembly position for the attack by connecting -Rainy and Foggy, and by the Cheshire Pioneers and the R.E.'s on other -tasks. This latter task, however, could not be completed in one night -and was continued the following evening. The shocking state of the -ground prevented it from ever being finished, and on the day of the -attack only about 150 yards of trench had been added to Foggy. On the -night of the 6/7th also a fresh assembly trench for the use of the -centre battalion was taped out by the Brigade Major, and dug by the -Kensingtons. This work was called New Trench. - -Although the weather once again had embarked on a dry spell the -long continued rains had rendered working tasks immensely difficult -of accomplishment, and the tenacious character of the mud added -incalculably to the labour of digging and of reaching the site of the -work. The isolation of the various tasks in this appalling swamp, from -which every landmark had been swept out of existence, and the constant -harassing fire of the enemy's machine-gunners, caused great delays to -working parties in even locating their work, and all these factors -together tended to reduce the work actually carried out far below -expectations. - -The Battalion, not being originally detailed for the assault, was -relieved in the trenches on the evening of the 5th by the Rangers and -moved by companies on relief to bivouacs between Ginchy and Guillemont, -leaving A and C Companies in line for the completion of their tasks -begun the previous night. The following day, however, intimation was -received of a change of orders, and the Battalion returned to the -trenches that night as the centre assaulting battalion of the Brigade, -its place in brigade support being taken by the Kensingtons. - -So far as the 56th Division was concerned the attack of the 7th -October was for the purpose of advancing the line some 1400 yards -farther down the reverse slope of the Main Ridge, in order to provide -a suitable "jumping-off" line for a further offensive to be launched -later against the fourth German line in front of Le Transloy, which -guarded the Bapaume-Péronne Road. The advance was to be made under a -creeping barrage, in two stages, to objectives which were not marked -by enemy trenches, but on the farther of which the Division would -dig itself in. On the Division's right the French line would also be -advanced by the 56th French Division, with whom touch was to be gained -on the Frégicourt-Le Transloy Road. - -The 168th Brigade's assault was entrusted to the London Scottish -(right), 1/4th Londons (centre) and Rangers (left), the dispositions -for attack of the Battalion being as follows: - - D Company--(W. H. Vernon) two platoons in New Trench - and two platoons in 25 Trench; in touch with London - Scottish. - - C Company--(Speyer) in Foggy Extension; in touch with - Rangers. - - B Company--(Gifford) in Shamrock. - - A Company--(Keen) in support in the sunken road. - - Battalion Headquarters (Col. Wheatley) were in dugouts - south-west of Lesbœufs, and an advanced report centre (Major - Duncan-Teape) was established in the southern outskirts of - the village. - -The plan of attack was for D, C and B Companies to advance at two -minutes after zero to the first objective, the two platoons of D in -New Trench being especially detailed to the task of "mopping up" some -German gun pits some 150 yards to the front which were believed to be -held by a few enemy snipers. At the same time A Company was to occupy -Foggy Extension. After about fifteen minutes' pause on the first -objective, the assault on the second objective would be pursued by C -and B Companies only. - -Reference has already been made to the difficulty experienced prior -to the attack by working parties in locating their tasks, and similar -difficulty was met with by all troops throughout the operations. -The consistently bad atmospheric conditions had rendered aerial -photography almost impossible, and all through the action the doubt -which existed in the minds of commanders as to the exact position -of trenches, our own as well as the enemy's, was a fruitful source -of confusion and loss. The assembly of the companies for attack was -indeed only accomplished after serious delay owing to the extraordinary -but largely justifiable bewilderment of the guides detailed to the -Battalion. C Company only reached its position just before dawn -after having been led several hundred yards out of its way, to find -on arrival that its assembly trench was only knee deep and already -filled with wounded. Add to these obstacles to success, the fact that, -owing to the previous terrible losses in commissioned ranks, it was -impossible to avoid sending into the battle as many as nine officers -who had not been previously in action with the Battalion at all, -having only a few days earlier arrived from England, and it will be -appreciated that the probabilities of success were not great. Zero was -fixed for 1.45 p.m., and at that hour the barrage dropped. Two minutes -later the Battalion rose out of its trenches and made a gallant attempt -to advance. The story of the remainder of the day is a pitiful tragedy. - -The gun pits which had been allotted to the two platoons of D Company -in New Trench were found to be alive with bravely-manned machine-guns, -and under their withering fire D Company simply melted out of -existence. C Company, following slightly to its right, was able to -avoid total extinction by taking cover in shell holes in dead ground -close by, but 2/Lieut. C. M. Taylor fell under this fire at the head -of the leading wave of the Company. B Company, following on from -Shamrock, met the full blast of the enemy counter-barrage, and suffered -heavy losses, but pushed bravely on and eventually filtered into the -same general line as was already held by C Company and the remains of -D. Under the devastating fire from the gun pits further advance was -impossible, and the troops continued to suffer loss where they lay. The -afternoon wore on and the Battalion remained clinging to its position, -about 50 yards from its starting-point, until after dark. Sergt. H. F. -Page of D Company displayed magnificent coolness, and from his shell -hole passed a busy afternoon picking off the German gunners in the -pits with great deliberation. He was subsequently commissioned to the -King's Own Regiment (Royal Lancaster). All ranks alike were exposed to -the fire and all suffered proportionately. L. C. Haycraft, a promising -young subaltern of D Company who had already proved his worth with the -bombers of the Civil Service Rifles in the Hairpin at Hulluch, made -an attempt after dark to ascertain the enemy's position, but he never -returned from his reconnaissance. - -Gifford, in charge of B Company, also fell, as did his platoon -commanders, Fletcher and Richardson, the two last wounded; and C.S.M. -James, who received the Military Medal for his good work, took charge -of the Company and brought it out of action at the end of the day. - -On the left the Rangers had met with a similar fate at the hands of -the machine-gunners in Dewdrop Trench, before whose fire they had been -stopped dead with ghastly loss immediately they rose from the assembly -trench. - -The London Scottish, on the right, gained a little success, their right -flank achieving a maximum advance of about 400 yards, but their left -felt the blast of the deadly guns in the pits, and they were kept out -of all except the southern extremity of Hazy. - -At about 8.30 p.m. the enemy delivered a counter-attack from Hazy and -Dewdrop under heavy artillery support, which had the effect of forcing -the Brigade definitely back to its starting trenches. - -In the meantime a company of the Kensingtons had been brought up to -Burnaby with the idea of forcing the Dewdrop position by outflanking -it from the north, but the Germans being found still strongly in -possession of Spectrum, north of the road, the attack was cancelled. - -It having become obvious that the assaulting battalions were -dangerously weakened, immediate reliefs were arranged, and the -Battalion that night handed over its position to the Queen Victorias, -who were attached to the Brigade, and withdrew to the bivouacs at -Trones Wood. Here it was joined by the London Rifle Brigade. The -withdrawal of the Battalion was supervised by Major Duncan-Teape, -who managed by great efforts to get the whole of the remnants of the -companies back over the Ridge just before daylight broke. The roll call -at Trones Wood was a gloomy spectacle, for neither the 1/4th Londons -nor the London Scottish could muster more than the strength of about -one company. - -The total losses in all ranks sustained by the Battalion on this -unfortunate day amounted to about 300 all ranks, the casualties among -officers being: - - Killed--Lieut. W. H. Vernon, 2/Lieuts. C. M. Taylor, W. H. Gilford, - L. J. R. Atterbury and L. C. Haycraft. - - Wounded--Capt. R. N. Keen and 2/Lieuts. T. R. Fletcher, H. W. - Spiers and S. A. G. Richardson. - -Of this, the last of the Battalion's actions in the great Somme -battles, but little more need be said. The position which it had been -proposed to carry with three weak battalions was attempted again the -following day with equal lack of success; and subsequently other -Divisions suffered heavy casualties in the unsuccessful endeavour. -Indeed the position never did fall into our possession until the enemy -deliberately gave it up in his retirement of the succeeding February on -to the Hindenburg line. - -Lieut.-Col. L. L. Wheatley, D.S.O., had led the Battalion through many -trying ordeals with the unfailing confidence of all ranks who had the -honour to be under his command; but as already indicated, the strain of -the long-protracted struggle, especially of the last few days, combined -with continually wet clothes, had proved too much for him, and he now -contracted an acute attack of dysentery and was evacuated to hospital -on the 10th. He never returned to the Battalion which his compelling -personality had made essentially his own. - -On the 11th October the Battalion moved to the Citadel Camp, the -gateway through which thirty-five days earlier it had entered -the inferno of the battle; and the Division being concentrated -here after relief by the 4th Division, it marched the following -morning to Ville-sur-Ancre, moving thence by motor-buses to a rest -area north-west of Amiens, billets being provided for it at St -Vaast-en-Chaussée. - -Of all the great series of actions of the War the battles of the Somme -in 1916 stand out perhaps in the public memory as the most heroic, and -at the same time the most appalling, and we cannot leave the subject -finally without a few remarks generally reviewing the Battalion's -experiences. Of the thirty-five days spent in XIV Corps area only four -had been spent in rest bivouacs, and during the remaining thirty-one -the Battalion had taken part in active operations five times. The -losses incurred amounted to the enormous total of nearly 700 in all -ranks, of whom 40 were officers. - -It would be unfitting to close our account of the Somme battles without -paying some tribute to the magnificent work performed throughout by -Rear Headquarters under Major H. J. Duncan-Teape. The administrative -ranks of a battalion in action are invariably worked to the limits -of human endurance, but usually with inadequate recognition of their -importance; for it is no exaggeration to say that on the efficiency -with which they maintain the stream of supplies, whether of rations or -munitions, to the fighting ranks, depends not merely the success, but -the very existence of the troops in advanced positions. On the Somme -the consistently atrocious weather increased tenfold the fatigue and -strain of the administrative portion of the Battalion: the mud swamps -which had to be traversed, the severe shell fire which plastered all -back areas, the wretched misery of the whole struggle, and above all -the vast responsibility which rested on them, all combined to make -the work of Rear Headquarters an enormous strain both mental and -physical. But throughout the battles Major Duncan-Teape was constantly -alert and constantly at advanced Headquarters, ascertaining exactly -what was wanted, and getting it done. In Lieut. H. B. A. Balls, the -Acting Quartermaster, and in R.S.M. Harris he found able and devoted -lieutenants whose cool handling of all difficulties was invaluable. - -The transport sections of all battalions were brigaded under Capt. L. -G. Rix at the Citadel, and the 1/4th Londons' transport section under -Lieut. G. V. Lawrie worked throughout magnificently and never once -failed to deliver the day's supplies. Those who were present will fully -appreciate what this means. The work for horses and men was exhausting -and incessant; and oftentimes the limbers returned from the forward -area to the transport lines only just in time to load up once more for -the upward journey. The results that were obtained could only have been -achieved by the whole-hearted devotion of all ranks. - -Of the men in the companies on whom day after day fell the burden -of physical discomfort and mental strain it is impossible to speak -adequately. The record of their achievements speaks, and can be left to -speak, for itself. - -The decorations awarded for services rendered between the 1st July and -the 7th October were: - - M.C.--Lieut. W. J. Boutall, 2/Lieuts. O. D. Garratt, S. J. - Barkworth, M.M., E. McD. McCormick and Rev. R. Palmer, - C.F. - - D.C.M.--C.S.M. R. Davis, Sergt. T. Clark, Ptes. J. O'Brien and H. - S. Payne. - - M.M.--C.Q.M.-Sergt. R. Forbes, Sergts. H. C. Gearle, H. H. Merrell, - R. Hebberd, R. R. L. Hyde, C. James and T. Lock, Corpl. - J. Castle, L.-Corpls. H. Whitehead, A. Sergeant, A. J. - Moger and L. R. Webb, Ptes. H. E. Hyde, W. Buckingham, - A. E. Colvin, F. Hedger, W. Lawrence and C. F. Collins. - - - - -CHAPTER XII - -THE 1/4 BATTALION DURING THE WINTER 1916/17 - - -On arrival at St Vaast-en-Chaussée the 1/4th Londons were reduced -in strength to about 275 all ranks, and although the morale of the -troops was not impaired by their recent experiences, the Battalion was -seriously in need of rest, reorganisation and reinforcement. A few days -of light training, which occupied the mornings only, with games in the -afternoon, went far towards recreating the troops physically; but the -reorganisation of the Battalion was necessarily a more lengthy and -difficult matter. No company had more than two officers, and N.C.O.'s -were very few. Lewis gun teams and bombers were newly detailed to their -respective duties and untrained, and the building up once more of the -fine fighting battalion which had entered the trenches at Hébuterne -three and a half months earlier, added to the proper assimilating of -the reinforcements which were expected from England, presented a task -the completion of which was likely to occupy the greater part of the -winter months. - -After Lieut.-Col. Wheatley had succumbed to sickness the command of the -Battalion devolved on Major H. J. T. Duncan-Teape, who was appointed -acting Lieut.-Colonel. - -The few days' rest at St Vaast were enlivened by an entertainment given -by the Bow Bells, which had an excellent effect in cheering up the men. - -On the 20th October the Division moved to the Hallencourt area, where -it had originally been formed, the Battalion arriving in billets at -Citerne at about 5.30 p.m. after a march which, in the reduced physical -condition of the troops, proved to be exceedingly trying. Probably -never has the Battalion been accorded a kindlier welcome in billets -than from the good people of Citerne, who, having received it in -February and sent it out to battle, took a quite proprietary interest -in the laurels which it brought back to them. - -At St Vaast and Citerne the Battalion was joined by Capt. F. C. -Grimwade, who assumed the duties of second in command with the acting -rank of Major, 2/Lieuts. C. E. V. Richardson and P. Pyne. Capt. L. G. -Rix also returned to the Battalion from Brigade Transport Officer, and -2/Lieut. O. D. Garratt was appointed Assistant Adjutant. - -A course of light training was continued for a few days at Citerne -under weather conditions which continued bright and frosty until the -evening of the 24th October, when the Battalion marched at 8 p.m. in a -veritable deluge to Longpré Station to entrain for a fresh area. The -pitiless rain drenched all to the skin, but the men's spirits remained -completely undamped, for the rumour had gone forth that the new area -was far from the Somme, among the marshes of Flanders. The move from -Longpré was made by tactical train shortly after midnight, and about -midday on the 25th the Battalion detrained at Merville, whence it -marched straight to billets between Neuf Berquin and Estaires, being -now attached to the XI Corps (Haking) of the First Army (Horne). - -No prolonged rest was, however, in store, for although the Battalions -of the 56th Division were momentarily not prepared for active -operations, they were perfectly capable of holding trenches. No -surprise, therefore, was caused by the receipt the day following -arrival at Neuf Berquin of orders to relieve the 61st Division in the -Neuve Chapelle-Fauquissart area. - -A preliminary reconnaissance of the trenches by officers of Battalion -Headquarters and company commanders took place on the 26th, and on -the 27th the 1/4th Londons and London Scottish moved forward and -took over reserve billets in Laventie from the 2/7th and 2/8th Royal -Warwickshires. - -On the 28th October the 168th Brigade completed the relief of the 182nd -Brigade, the 1/4th Londons and Scottish moving into the right and left -subsections respectively of the Fauquissart sector, there relieving -the 2/6th and 2/5th Royal Warwickshires, while the reserve billets in -Laventie were taken over by the Kensingtons and Rangers. - -The new Divisional frontage covered some 7000 yards from the -neighbourhood of Richebourg l'Avoué on the right to a point opposite -Rouges Bancs on the left, all the Brigades being in line and each -finding its own supports and local reserves. The 168th Brigade held the -extreme left of the Divisional front, the 169th being on its right, -while the New Zealand Division was on its left. This extreme deployment -of a numerically weak Division was justified by the quiet character -of this area, and the fact that the German divisions opposed to it -were equally with ourselves somewhat exhausted by recent efforts in -the Somme battles and not anxious to venture on active operations. To -such an extent indeed had our continued pressure in the south drained -the enemy's resources that his lines opposite the 56th Division were -but feebly held, and at the moment not capable of being strongly -reinforced; and this area was therefore eminently suited to the -recuperation of a battle-worn Division and to the training in active -service conditions of the young troops from home who were shortly to -join it. - -The Fauquissart breastworks were in every way similar to those in -the Neuve Chapelle area already described in connection with the -Battalion's service in the Indian Corps, though being opposite the -village of Aubers, which is on the highest part of the Ridge, were even -more seriously subject to observation from the enemy lines than the -Richebourg breastworks. - -The village of Fauquissart, at this period in a condition of total -ruin, consisted of a scattered collection of houses extending for about -half a mile along each side of the Rue Tilleloy, which ran parallel -with the British front breastworks and about 200 yards in rear of them. -A thousand yards in rear of the Rue Tilleloy, and parallel to it, was -the Rue Bacquerot, these two roads forming good lateral communication -within the sector, though the former could only be used under cover of -darkness. The sector was also served by three communication trenches -starting from the Bacquerot, Elgin Street, Masselot Street and the -Strand, the last named during the winter months usually consisting of a -chain of unfordable lakes. - -This sector was held by the Battalion with three companies in line and -one in reserve, the reserve company holding three keeps on the line -of the Rue Bacquerot, called Road Bend, Wangerie and Masselot Posts. -Battalion Headquarters was accommodated in shelters near Temple Bar on -the Rue Bacquerot. - -The German lines opposite were heavily wired, and included two strongly -marked salients, the Devil's Jump and the Wick. But although the enemy -had the advantage in observation owing to his possession of the Ridge, -his front trenches were far from comfortable owing to the presence -behind his lines of the Rivière des Laies which, as the winter wore on, -became more and more swollen, finally bursting its banks and rendering -his forward defences completely untenable. - -Our wire entanglements were exceedingly poor, and immediate attention -was directed to the improvement of this important part of our defences; -the parapets also were thin, firebays sadly in need of revetment, and -the whole sector seriously lacking in shelter for the men. No time -was lost in evolving an extensive works programme, which was promptly -put into execution, the more important work being carried out under -Royal Engineer supervision. The urgency of the Brigade works programme -rendered the supply of large working parties necessary, and it was -therefore arranged that of the two battalions for the time being -in Laventie one would act as "Works Battalion" finding all working -parties, while the other would devote itself to training. - -The most peculiar feature of this sector lay in the immunity from shell -fire of Laventie behind the British lines and of Aubers in the German -territory. Each village layabout 2000 yards in rear of the respective -front trenches, and both were used as reserve billets for the troops -holding the line. By mutual and tacit consent the artillery on each -side refrained from bombarding the other's billets; any infringement -of this unwritten law on one side being met with immediate and severe -retaliation by the other. During the period therefore spent in -the Laventie area, the Battalion on coming out of the line had the -enjoyment of occupying tolerably wind-and water-tight billets without -molestation, although they were distant little more than a mile from -the enemy lines. A considerable number of civilians still clung to -their battered homes in Laventie, and it was strange to see French -soldiers, whose divisions were serving in Alsace or the Argonne, come -to Laventie "on leave from the front"! - -The 1/4th Londons now settled down to a regular routine of four days in -the right subsection breastworks followed by four days in billets in -Laventie, tours being later extended to six days, and as this routine -continued until the middle of December we need not follow it in detail. - -The sector had been particularly quiet prior to the 56th Division's -arrival, but almost from the day of its taking over the line conditions -began to change. Possibly a certain undesirable aggressiveness on -the part of the Londoners began to annoy an enemy who, but for -interference, was content to conduct a perfectly peaceful war; possibly -the change was due to the recovery of both sides from the fatigue and -over-strain of the Somme. Whatever the reason, certain it is that as -the winter wore on the whole Neuve Chapelle-Fauquissart area began -to become much more lively than it had been. On our side the most -vigorous system of patrolling, of daily organised shoots by guns of all -calibres, trench mortars and machine-guns, and of an intensive course -of sniping, quickly gave us the ascendancy and caused the Germans a -pardonable irritation under which they showed themselves less and less -disposed to take their punishment quietly. - -In the line the Battalion was busily occupied with its share of -the works programme and in patrolling in which the infrequency of -encounters with the enemy in No Man's Land gradually led to the belief -that his front breastwork was not occupied. This was probed further on -the last evening of November when a fighting patrol of twenty men under -2/Lieut. W. H. Webster (Intelligence Officer) entered the enemy lines -at the Wick Salient and found it untenanted, in a shocking condition of -flood and affording ample evidence that no attempt was being made to -repair the serious damage caused by our artillery fire. - -During the third week in November the Battalion's frontage was extended -to the right, involving the occupation by the right company of an extra -400 yards of breastwork and an additional supporting post, Erith, and -by the reserve company of a fourth keep on the Bacquerot line called -Lonely Post. This new piece of breastwork was usually subjected to a -good deal of enemy trench mortar fire, especially about the point at -which Erith Street communication trench joined the front line. This -was an unpleasant spot. Erith Street sunk into a slight depression so -that all traffic using it was plainly visible to the Germans; and as -it came to an abrupt end some fifteen yards short of the front line -an undesirable gap occurred which had to be traversed with more than -ordinary agility by those whose duty took them that way. A good deal -of extra trench repairing work was imposed on us in consequence of the -enemy's attentions at this point, and unfortunately some casualties -occurred. - -The enemy's activity was rather marked on the 26th November, during the -morning of which day over seventy 5·9-inch shells fell near the Convent -observation post but without a direct hit being obtained. The Convent, -together with two or three other posts along the line of the Rue -Tilleloy, used by the forward observation officers of our supporting -artillery, consisted of a substantial brick tower some 25 feet in -height, like an attenuated Martello Tower. These had been erected -behind the cover of the houses of Fauquissart before the village had -been destroyed. But the subsequent demolition of the houses had exposed -the towers, which consequently stood up naked and unashamed within 200 -yards of our front line, and their presence, possibly combined with -his evident inability to hit them, seemed to be a constant source of -annoyance to the enemy. - -All this time the Battalion strength was steadily increasing with -reinforcements from home and with the return of many who had been -wounded on the Somme, till by Christmas it mustered some 700 all ranks. -Officer reinforcements followed on each other's heels with surprising -rapidity, and the following joined during November: - - Captains V. S. Bowater and H. M. Lorden, Lieuts. H. Jones - (appointed Brigade Bombing Officer) and H. J. M. Williams, - 2/Lieuts. E. G. Dew, L. W. Wreford, S. P. Stotter, H. W. - Spiers, R. W. Chamberlain and W. A. Froy; 2/Lieuts. H. N. - Williams, L. W. N. Jones, H. D. Rees, Bradley (to 168th L.T.M. - Battery) and A. L. Harper (attached from 4th Royal Welsh - Fusiliers); 2/Lieuts. F. H. Hutchins, A. G. Davis and L. E. - Ballance (attached from 11th Londons); Captain H. Pentelow and - Lieuts. T. Coleman (Works Officer) and H. D. Beeby (attached - from Hunts Cyclist Battalion). - -Captain Pentelow was unluckily hit and sent to hospital two days after -his arrival. - -At the end of November the Rev. R. Palmer, M.C., left the Battalion to -take up the duties of Divisional Chaplain in the 24th Division, his -place being taken a few days later by Rev. S. F. Leighton Green, who -remained with the Battalion until after the Armistice. - -About this period a Divisional Musketry Camp was formed at Le Sart, -near Merville, and 2/Lieuts. Wreford and Pyne were appointed to it as -instructors. 2/Lieut. E. G. Dew was also appointed Battalion Bombing -Officer. - -On the 21st December a readjustment of the Battalion sector was -effected, and in the afternoon the sector as originally taken over -from the 182nd Brigade was handed over to the 1/3rd Londons, and the -Battalion marched to billets at Bout Deville. - -After three days occupied in cleaning up and training, Christmas Day -was celebrated as a holiday, and, the billets being beyond the range of -any but heavy guns, with which the Germans were not well supplied on -this front, the rest of the Battalion was quite undisturbed. But every -effort was made to render the Germans' Christmas as uncomfortable as -possible. At 6.30 p.m. on Christmas Eve a continuous steady bombardment -of his defences by all available batteries up to 6-inch guns began, and -lasted for forty-eight hours. This action was evidently much resented -by the enemy, and after Christmas the trench warfare in this area was -conducted with greater fierceness than it had been previously. - -The Bow Bells were now established in the theatre at La Gorgue, and -it was found possible to provide a free visit for every man in the -Battalion to its splendid Christmas pantomime "Aladdin," which was most -heartily appreciated. - -During the temporary absence of 2/Lieut. O. D. Garratt, the duties of -Intelligence Officer were taken by 2/Lieut. J. R. K. Paterson (Argyll -and Sutherland Highlanders, attached), who remained with the Battalion -for about a month. - -On New Year's Day 1917 the 168th Brigade relieved the 169th Brigade -in Moated Grange sector, the Rangers and Kensingtons occupying the -trenches, with the London Scottish in support, about Rouge Croix and -Pont du Hem on the La Bassée Road, while the 1/4th Londons remained in -Divisional reserve billets at Riez Bailleul. - -A week here was spent in supplying working parties, of which the labour -was considerable owing to the long distance--about four miles--which -had to be covered each night in each direction by parties going up the -line for work. The weather, moreover, had taken a marked change, and -a very severe frost had set in which increased tenfold the labour of -digging. Towards the end of the week snow fell adding further to the -fatigue of the long night marches. - -On the evening of the 9th January 1917 the Battalion took over from -the Kensingtons the right subsection of the Moated Grange sector. -This sector had seen a good many changes both as regards defences and -boundaries since the Battalion's previous occupation of it in the -summer of 1915, and the lines now taken over extended from Sign Post -Lane on the right for a frontage of some 1400 yards to a point opposite -the village of Mauquissart which lay just within the German lines. - -[Illustration: LAVENTIE, WINTER 1916-1917] - -The sector was held with three companies in the front breastworks -and supporting posts and one in reserve on Cardiff Road. Battalion -Headquarters occupied shelters at Ebenezer Farm. These positions were -far from ideal. The strength of the Battalion was much scattered -and difficult of control in emergency, owing to the exceedingly bad -communications within the area. The supporting platoons of the front -line companies, at Bristol House, Cornwall Siding and Pump House, -occupied the only remaining tenable portions of what had originally -been the German second line prior to the Battle of Neuve Chapelle, and -were separated from each other by about 100 yards of broken down and -almost impassably wet breastworks. For communication from front to rear -only one trench, Tilleloy South, was passable with any degree of safety -in daylight. Between Pump House and the front line, a distance of -about 250 yards, it was seriously overlooked from the German positions -in the Bois du Biez, with the result that traffic up and down it was -frequently sniped with trench mortar and 5·9 shells. - -Always an area of considerable activity, the Moated Grange possessed -several unpleasant features as a result of the active mining operations -which had begun in 1915, and were still proceeding with unabated -energy. The Duck's Bill Farm had given place to an enormous crater -of the same name, linked with the British lines by a defended sap -which left the front line at Sunken Road. The defence of this crater -and sap took a platoon, whose arduous duties of continual listening -and constant preparedness for an enemy raid were carried out under -exceedingly rough conditions, as both the crater and the sap were full -of water and shelters were conspicuous by their absence. - -On the front occupied by the left company the German lines were -invisible from the British breastworks owing to the lips thrown up -round the Colvin craters, a series of some thirty or more of immense -size which covered half the area of No Man's Land at this point. The -largest of this series, the Mauquissart crater, occupied the site of -what had once been our front line, and the breastwork now ran round -its nearer lip. This mined area was the most uncomfortable part of -the line, since the Germans were continually searching with trench -mortar fire for the heads of our mine shafts while the cover afforded -to enemy patrols by the crater lips themselves necessitated constant -vigilance and counter-patrolling activity on the part of our trench -garrison. Add to this the extreme hardship which the troops in this -part of the line inevitably had to undergo owing to the total lack of -dugouts and the perishing cold. The blowing of so many craters had, -moreover, cut off the ditches between fields which had formerly been -used for draining the trenches, with the result that there was no -means of getting rid of the water which in a large number of firebays -rose higher than the firestep. Under these conditions cooking in the -neighbourhood of the front line was out of the question, and all cooked -food had to be carried by permanent headquarter carrying parties from -the Battalion cook-house near Ebenezer Farm; in the case of rations -destined for the flank platoons this meant a trudge for the food -carriers of over a mile in each direction at each meal. - -The defences generally had suffered severely both from the enemy's -shell fire and the effects of the alternation of sharp frost and -heavy rain, and an immense amount of labour was called for in -working and carrying parties for the breastworks as well as for the -wire entanglements, which were in a very weak condition. The single -communication trench, therefore, became frequently congested with long -lines of troops "humping" material and food to the front line, and -altogether the Moated Grange was a hard sector to run efficiently and a -remarkably unpleasant one to live in. - -Two tours of six days each were spent in this sector, broken by -six days--not of rest, but of most exhausting working parties--in -Riez Bailleul. The days in line saw a good deal of shelling and the -Battalion suffered some loss, but in spite of this and of exposure -to intense cold the men were probably more happy in the line than in -billets. Further heavy falls of snow had occurred. The working parties -supplied from Riez Bailleul were largely engaged in drawing trench -stores and material at a dump on the La Bassée Road between Pont du -Hem and Rouge Croix, itself nearly two miles from billets; and thence -pushing it up to the front trenches on the tram-line dignified with the -title of Great Eastern Railway, a further distance of upwards of 3000 -yards. From railhead this material, consisting of trench boards, rolls -of barbed wire, revetting frames, hurdles and other heavy stuff had to -be distributed to companies in the line. These fatigues were obviously -exhausting, and seldom did a party leaving billets at 5.30 p.m. return -before midnight. - -The most difficult task of all, however, which may not yet have quite -faded from the memories of many, was connected with an ingenious scheme -for draining the craters with heavy cast-iron water mains each about 16 -feet long. With infinite labour these were brought to tram railhead, -but at this point the difficulty of carrying pipes, each weighing some -200 pounds, along 500 yards of quagmire proved too much even for the -stout hearts of Cockneys; and the high hopes which the author of the -scheme had entertained of draining the craters vanished as his pipes -sank in the mud. A change from this routine to the comparative peace of -trench mortaring in the line was not unwelcome. - -An act of gallantry occurred during the first tour which must be -recorded. During one of the enemy's midday bombardments a time-fuzed -medium trench mortar shell fell on the parapet of our breastwork on the -lip of Mauquissart crater, and lodged in the revetting hurdle at the -side of the trench. The firebay happened to be crowded with men working -on the defences, and heavy casualties must inevitably have been caused -but for the bravery of 2/Lieut. W. H. Webster, who rushed forward and, -seizing the shell, flung it over the parapet into the crater, where -it immediately exploded. For this gallant action 2/Lieut. Webster was -awarded the D.S.O. - -The enemy's artillery and trench mortars showed a marked increase of -activity during the second occupation of Moated Grange, the craters, -the Duck's Bill and Pump House, coming in for most of the punishment. -The 23rd January was perhaps the most trying to the troops. During the -morning "hate" a well-placed minenwerfer completely cut off the left -platoon in the craters, the only approach to them being by way of an -exposed and little used trench, Min Street, which involved a detour -of about 3200 yards from Headquarters. Shortly after midday a second -lucky German shell lighted on a dump of medium trench mortar shells -which were lying within a few yards of a shelter occupied by several -men of the right company. A terrific explosion took place and caused -a large crater which cut off the Battalion's right flank also, but, -strange to say, without inflicting so much as a scratch on any of the -men in the vicinity. These incidents are recounted merely as instances -of the constant annoyance caused to the troops in line by the enemy's -harassing tactics, as every bit of damage caused in this way involved -extra work to the already over-burdened troops in repairing it. - -On the last evening in the line, the 25th, an attempt was made by a -fighting patrol of the reserve company (C) under 2/Lieut. Ballance to -obtain an identification from the enemy. Wire-cutting shoots had taken -place for two days previously in preparation for this, and arrangements -were made to support the patrol with artillery fire as occasion -should arise. The enemy were found, however, to have made efficient -counter-preparations, and the surprise effect of the patrol having -failed, the project had to be abandoned with the loss of 1 man killed -and 2 wounded. - -During this tour the Battalion sustained 1 officer casualty, 2/Lieut. -W. Quennell, wounded. - -On the 26th January the Battalion was relieved by the 1/8th Middlesex -at 10.5 p.m. and withdrew to rest billets at La Gorgue, the 168th -Brigade having passed into Divisional reserve with Brigade Headquarters -at Merville. - -The 168th Brigade in rest in the Merville area settled down to such -training as was possible, the ground being covered with snow. One or -two useful instructional schemes with contact aeroplanes were carried -out, but the weather conditions prevented serious outdoor work, and -the training hours were, for the most part, devoted to repolishing the -parade discipline of the Brigade. According to the usual custom of the -Battalion when opportunity offered itself, the drums beat Retreat daily -and the Regimental Quarter Guard and inlying picket mounted in the -Grande Place at La Gorgue. - -Two further drafts of about 70 N.C.O.'s and men joined the Battalion in -January. - -It had been the intention that the 168th Brigade should pass fourteen -days in rest, but this idea had to be unexpectedly abandoned owing to a -concentration of troops near the frozen inundations of the Yser, where -it was feared that a sudden German advance over the ice might have -somewhat disturbing effects on the Allies' positions. This caused the -services of the 168th Brigade to be requisitioned once more, and on the -1st and 2nd February it relieved the 111th Brigade of the 37th Division -in the Neuve Chapelle sector, the Rangers and Kensingtons occupying the -line, while the Scottish moved as Works Battalion to billets at Croix -Barbée and the 1/4th Londons as Training Battalion to Fosse. - -On the 1st February 2/Lieut. C. E. V. Richardson was admitted to -hospital. - -After training at Fosse for six days the 1/4th Londons took over from -the Kensingtons the right subsector of Neuve Chapelle sector on the 8th -February. - -The Battalion now found itself after a lapse of over a year once more -in the area in which it had passed so many months with the Ferozepore -Brigade. The sector taken over comprised the old Rue du Bois (right, -centre and left) sections, and extended from a point opposite the -German Boar's Head Salient on the right to some 250 yards north of the -La Bassée Road on the left. Considerable changes had now taken place -in the method of holding the line; old well-known trenches had fallen -into disuse and fresh ones had taken their places. Those who looked for -the Crescent, Orchard Redoubt, and other well-remembered spots found -them broken down and no longer occupied. The front line breastwork was -now occupied in isolated posts at intervals of about 150 yards, each -garrisoned by a platoon. Each post was protected on its flanks as well -as in front by wire entanglements, while the intervening firebays had -been either filled in or choked with barbed wire. - -The communications within the sector were tolerably good, but the -breastwork was thin and in many places low, a natural result of leaving -long portions of it unoccupied for several months. - -The main line of resistance was now in the reserve or "B" line which, -on the right of the sector, was represented by Guards Trench in front -of the Rue du Bois, and on the left by the old British front line (as -it had been before the Battle of March 1915) in Edgware Road. Battalion -Headquarters in 1915 had occupied dugouts on the Rue du Bois, but were -now at Lansdowne Post, which formerly had housed a whole battalion. The -defence scheme provided for holding the "B" line at all costs in the -event of serious attack, so that the front line became virtually a line -of outposts. This method of holding the line in great depth was not -only far sounder than the former method of crowding the whole strength -into the front trench, but was also more economical, as the sector -which formerly had demanded a garrison of a whole brigade was held by -one battalion. - -The line was held with two companies in the front line posts and two in -support in the "B" line. - -On the right of the La Bassée Road the German trenches were about 100 -yards distant, and it was soon found that the enemy snipers had been -allowed to gain the ascendancy over the British, a state of affairs -which all battalions of the Brigade promptly set to work to correct. - -The first day's occupation of this sector passed without incident, but -on the evening of the 9th February, at about 7 p.m., the enemy opened -a heavy trench mortar and machine-gun bombardment on the front line -from Pioneer to Pope Posts, astride the La Bassée Road. The trench -mortar fire was well directed, and the breastwork on the right of Pope -Post was badly breached. At about 7.30 p.m. this preparatory shelling -was followed by a heavy "box" barrage, and an enemy raiding party -entered our lines between Pioneer and Pope Posts. An S.O.S. signal -was sent up from the left company Headquarters, and our artillery -responded promptly with a heavy barrage on the German front line and -communication trenches. - -The raiders, about twelve in number, divided into two groups, of which -one attacked Pope Post and the other Pioneer Post. The attack on Pope -Post was driven off by the garrison, three of the raiding party being -bayoneted by Sergt. Gardiner, whereupon the others turned and fled, -being followed back to the German lines by the second group. - -Capt. Rix, commanding B Company, accompanied by his Sergt.-Major -(Shelton) and his runner, gallantly endeavoured to pass through the -barrage on Hun Street in order to take control of affairs in the front -line; but all were unfortunately hit by the same shell, Shelton and -the runner being killed outright while Rix died in hospital a few days -later. The raiders were successful in capturing 2/Lieut. Webster, -D.S.O., who was with the Lewis gun post at Pioneer Post; he is believed -to have been mortally hit prior to his capture, and died in the enemy's -hands the following day. In addition to these regrettable casualties -about a dozen men were slightly wounded, the bulk of the loss on our -side being sustained by a carrying party from the Rangers who were -caught by the German barrage at Edgware Road tram railhead. 2/Lieut. -Stotter (B Company) was also slightly wounded. He remained at duty -for some days, but was admitted to hospital about ten days later. -The reorganisation of the line was promptly taken in hand by Capt. -Stanbridge (A Company) in support, who temporarily reinforced the front -line with one of his platoons under 2/Lieut. Harper, and subsequently -took over B Company vice Rix. The raiding party belonged, as was found -from the three enemy dead left in our hands, to the 2nd Battalion, -13th Bavarian Regiment. For his coolness and good work during the raid -Sergt. Gardiner was awarded the Military Medal. - -The remainder of the night passed without incident, and the bright -moonlight during the later hours enabled our working parties to make -considerable headway in repairing the breaches in our breastwork. - -On the morning of the following day an observed shoot--which caused -very great material damage--was carried out by our trench mortar -batteries on the enemy first and second lines. This shoot produced a -certain amount of trench mortar retaliation on Guards Trench, in the -course of which an unlucky shell destroyed a Stokes mortar section -under 2/Lieut. Bradley, and the whole of its team, causing a block in -our line at Mole Post. - -No further incident of importance occurred during the remainder of -this tour, though our lines were daily subjected to heavy bombardments -by the enemy medium trench mortars, especially in the neighbourhood -of Pioneer Post, where very considerable damage was caused to our -breastworks and wire. On the evenings of the 12th and 13th, however, -when this activity of the enemy began to assume somewhat serious -proportions, they were effectively silenced by prearranged retaliatory -shoots by our supporting artillery on the German front and support -lines. - -The following afternoon the Battalion handed over the right subsection -to the Kensingtons, and withdrew as Works Battalion to billets at Croix -Barbée. Here the Battalion supplied large working parties nightly, the -principal tasks being the raising and thickening of the weak portions -of the breastwork and the wiring of the new parts of the "B" line. - -Throughout this winter the prosecution of the works programme placed a -heavy strain on all ranks and totally deprived the periods spent out -of the line of any semblance of rest. Even on the night of relief the -working parties were carried out, and many times during these months -companies which had held front line trenches for six days marched back -to reserve billets and within an hour were paraded again for a working -party from which they were not dismissed till after midnight. The -necessity for this extreme pressure of work was doubtless real, but the -unceasing drudgery of it could not be conducive to good work while the -efficient recreation of the men by games out of the line received so -little attention. - -However, on this occasion it was found possible to make progress with -the Brigade boxing competition, a good ring being available at the -Brigade Lewis Gun School at Croix Barbée, and in this competition the -Battalion gained several successes. - -On the 20th February the Battalion returned to the trenches, taking -over the right subsection from the Kensingtons. - -[Illustration: _Sign Post Lane, Neuve Chapelle_] - -[Illustration: _Ruined Farmhouse near Neuve Chapelle_] - -This tour of duty was marked by an all round increase of activity both -in trench mortar and artillery fire on both sides, the points which -received the majority of the shelling being the front line about the -much battered Pope and Pioneer Posts, Port Arthur and the "B" line in -the neighbourhood of the Rue du Bois. The enemy was also active by day -with rifle grenades, and at night with machine-gun fire. - -Owing to the particular discomfort of living in Pope and Pioneer Posts -an inter-company relief between the two left companies was effected on -the 23rd February, A Company withdrawing into support in favour of C -Company, which took over Port Arthur sector. - -An attempt was made on the evening of the 26th by the 5th Division on -the right to raid in force the enemy's lines to the south of the Boar's -Head Salient. The enemy had exhibited numerous signs of nervousness, -and it was not altogether surprising to find him quite prepared for the -attempt by the 5th Division. The exact point against which the raiding -party was directed, however, did not coincide with his anticipations, -for the bulk of his rather sharp counter-barrage came down on the -sector held by this Battalion. This barrage lasted with intensity for -twenty minutes, and, trench mortars being freely employed, caused -a good deal of further damage to our already weak breastworks, but -inflicted practically no loss of personnel. - -The following morning the Kensingtons once more relieved the 1/4th -Londons, taking over the right subsection and extending it to the left -as far as the outskirts of Neuve Chapelle village, the adjusted line -being known as the left subsection of Ferme du Bois sector. - -On relief the Battalion occupied billets as training battalion at -Fosse, C Company being detached in hutments at Les Huit Maisons. -Training was proceeded with uninterruptedly though the weather remained -intensely cold and further falls of snow occurred. The opportunity -was taken to hold a Battalion cross-country run, which passed off as -satisfactorily as the arctic conditions permitted. The frost, which -had lasted for several weeks, was indeed now becoming a little serious -as it was utterly impossible, owing to the hardness of the soil, to -carry out repairs to the trenches which were daily being more knocked -about by the enemy's fire. The appalling destruction which must later -be caused by the inevitable thaw filled the hearts of those who would -form part of the subsequent working parties with feelings of misgiving, -mingled with resentment. - -On the 5th March the Battalion relieved the Kensingtons in the left -subsection of Ferme du Bois, the order of battle in the front line -being from the right, B, D and A Companies, with C in support in the -"B" line. The additional frontage between La Bassée Road and Neuve -Chapelle was also held in isolated posts. - -As before the "B" line was the main line of resistance; but the great -length of the "B" line sector--some 2300 yards--which had to be held in -eight separate posts, with three additional posts at night, presented -a difficult problem in defence to one weak company of about 120 -fighting ranks. The solution of the problem was not, however, actually -called for as the enemy remained unusually quiet for the whole of this -tour of duty, during which the snow fell thicker every day. After an -occupation of four uninteresting days the Battalion was relieved in -the left subsection on the afternoon of the 9th March by 1/6th Duke of -Wellington's Regiment (49th Division). On relief it withdrew to billets -at Bout Deville, marching the following morning at 8 a.m. to Merville, -where the Brigade entrained for the Le Cauroy area. Detrainment took -place at Doullens, and the Battalion marched some six miles to billets -at Le Souich, arriving shortly before midnight. - -The Battalion, which had left the Somme battlefields in an exhausted -condition in the previous October, had undergone a good schooling in -the Flanders breastworks. The strength had been increased to some 850 -all ranks, and all new drafts had become not only well assimilated, -but also well trained in a rather trying trench warfare. The physical -strain on the troops throughout the winter had been exceptionally -severe, owing to the terrible intensity of the winter weather, and -the very great amount of trench work for which the Battalion had -been called upon; and of this side of the incidents of the winter -sufficient has already been said for it to be realised without -difficulty that, although the Battalion still had a clean bill of -health, the prospect of a rest before embarking on active operations -was welcomed by all. - -The great retirement of the Germans was now in progress, and as the -1/4th Battalion was not actively concerned in this we may turn for the -moment to follow the fortunes of the 2/4th Battalion, who had recently -arrived in France with the 58th Division and were now in action in the -Arras sector. - - - - -CHAPTER XIII - -THE 2/4TH BATTALION IN FRANCE--GERMAN RETIREMENT FROM THE SOMME - - -The 58th Division, of which the 2/4th Londons formed a part, after -remaining at Ipswich for about a month, was transferred to the Southern -Command in hutted camps at Sutton Veny, near Warminster, on the 10th -July 1916. - -Here the Division, being concentrated in an area which provided -excellent training facilities, had a chance to become thoroughly -welded together and to show the material of which it was made in -a manner which had hitherto been impossible, for the influence of -scattered billets is invariably and inevitably unfavourable to strict -discipline. The fullest advantage was taken of this golden opportunity, -and the resultant tightening of discipline and advancement of all -ranks in technical efficiency rapidly justified the change of station. -A very great amount of work still lay before the whole Division -before it would be fit to take its place in the line overseas, and -much reorganisation in various directions was effected with entirely -beneficial results soon after its arrival at Warminster. - -Amidst all this work, which was carried out at fever-heat, the -amusement of the men was not overlooked. An excellent Divisional band -was formed, and their good services were added to early in December -by the creation of a Divisional concert troop "The Goods." Not to be -left behind in these achievements the 2/4th Londons formed their own -concert party, called for some not too obvious reason "The Tanks," -which afforded excellent entertainments under the able direction of -2/Lieuts. T. J. Bell and C. J. Graham, who were assisted by Pipe-Major -Ling, Corpl. Wilkinson, L./Corpls. Smith, Ringrose and Hardy, and Pte. -Rosenbloom. - -The 2/4th Londons had already attained a position which is believed -to be unique in the annals of the British Army inasmuch as they, a -Battalion affiliated to an English line regiment, had become the -possessors of a pipe band. This band had originally been formed for -recruiting purposes, but with the initiation of the "Derby Scheme" its -services were no longer necessary for the enticement of recruits, and -it had been secured for the Battalion. The pipers wore the Glengarry -cap and the Royal Stuart tartan. They were without doubt an exceedingly -good band and lightened many a weary mile of road both in England and -France with their stirring music. - -An attempt, which originated in the 2/4th Londons, was also made to -produce a Divisional magazine, and this appeared in September under the -title of _The Direct Hit_. It was well received and attained the age of -three months, but was then discontinued. - -Shortly after arrival at Sutton Veny the Division came under the -command of Major-Gen. H. D. Fanshawe, C.B., who ultimately took it to -France where he remained in command for some months. - -Various changes took place in the 2/4th Londons, and in November -1916 command of the Battalion was assumed by Lieut.-Col. W. R. H. -Dann (Bedfordshire Regiment), Capt. W. A. Nunneley becoming second -in command with the temporary rank of Major. The personnel was also -strengthened by the arrival of a large officer reinforcement from the -4th (Reserve) Battalion, the majority of whom had already seen service -in France in the ranks of various London Battalions. - -In the latter part of January 1917 the long awaited order arrived for -the 58th Division to proceed overseas. On the 23rd of that month the -2/4th Battalion left Sutton Veny with a strength of 32 officers and -976 other ranks and proceeded to Southampton, where it embarked on -the _Viper_, and crossed to Havre, arriving the following morning at -daybreak. Disembarkation took place at once and the Battalion, preceded -by its pipe band, marched to the Reinforcement Camp at Sanvic. The -following officers accompanied the Battalion overseas: - - Lieut.-Col. W. R. H. Dann, in command. - Major W. A. Nunneley, second in command. - Capt. E. E. Spicer, Adjutant. - " E. N. Cotton, cmdg. A Co. - " E. W. Bottomley, " B " - " G. E. A. Leake, " C " - " S. H. Stedman, " D " - " H. A. T. Hewlett. - " H. C. Long. - " W. H. Parker. - Lieut. B. Rivers Smith (Bde. L.G.O.). - 2/Lieut. R. K. Caparn. - " E. A. Monkman. - " L. J. Bassett (attd. L.T.M. Battery). - " T. Stoaling. - " A. M. Duthie (Bombing Officer). - " S. G. Askham. - " A. R. Muddell (attd. L.T.M. Battery). - " W. J. Stickney. - " A. G. Croll (Intelligence Officer). - " F. Stickney. - " H. W. Hallett (Signalling Officer). - " G. G. Hunt. - " T. J. Bell. - " R. McDowell. - " H. E. English. - " D. S. Boorman. - " H. S. Daw (Transport Officer). - " C. J. Graham. - " E. C. Pratt. - " S. P. Ferdinando. - Hon. Lt. & Qm. C. W. Cragg, (Quartermaster). - Capt. P. H. Burton, R.A.M.C., Medical Officer. - " Rev. O'Brien, Chaplain attached. - -The next day the Battalion entrained for Abbeville, but on arrival -found its orders to stay there countermanded and the journey was -therefore continued to Fortel, a small village about six miles -south-west of Frevent. - -The unusually hard frost which was general throughout northern -France in the winter of 1916/17 still held the country in its grip, -and the conditions for a raw battalion even in billets were far -from comfortable, but a ten days' stay at Fortel, which was devoted -to training and generally acclimatising the Battalion to its new -surroundings, prepared it at least in a small degree for the rigours of -a winter campaign. - -By the 5th February the concentration of the 58th Division was -complete, and the 173rd Brigade under Brig.-Gen. Hurst began to move by -easy stages to the line, the 2/4th Londons lying at Le Souich on the -6th, and at Sus-St Leger on the 7th and 8th. - -The following day the Brigade moved forward and became attached to -the 146th Brigade of the West Riding (Territorial) Division, for -instruction in trench warfare, the 2/4th Londons being divided up -between the battalions of the 146th Brigade for this purpose, with two -companies in reserve at Bailleulmont and Humbercamp. The 146th Brigade -was at this time holding a sector south-west of Arras facing Ransart. -Ransart lies at the base of a small spur between two watercourses, -both of which are usually dry, and the German trenches in front of the -village were dominated at an average distance of about 600 yards by our -own on the western side of the valley. - -This part of the front had the reputation of being exceedingly quiet -(and therefore suitable for the first tour of duty of inexperienced -troops), and was the defensive position taken up by the French in -October 1914 when, after the Battle of the Aisne, the battle front -had become stabilised by the continued extension of the flanks of the -opposing forces until they reached the sea. The British Army had taken -over the area from the French in July 1915. - -After five uneventful days in this sector the Battalion was relieved on -the 14th by the 2/12th Londons, and having rendezvoused at La Cauchie, -about three miles in rear of the line, embussed to Sus-St Leger where -it went into billets for a week's rest. - - * * * * * - -The important changes which were to take place in this area during the -next six weeks are so material to the development of the Campaign of -1917 that it is necessary to review briefly the operations which were -being conducted further south. The termination of the battles of the -Somme in November 1916 had left the enemy in possession of the whole -of the Ancre Valley from Le Transloy to Grandcourt and of excellent -positions on the high ground immediately north of Beaumont-Hamel; while -in rear of this position he had made great progress in the construction -of two more lines of defence running in a direction from north-west to -south-east about Bapaume. - -The advance of our troops over the Thiepval-Morval Ridge had, however, -left him confined in a marked salient, of which the apex was Gommecourt -Wood, between the Ancre on the south and the Scarpe where it passes -Arras on the north; and conditions appeared very favourable for -improving our situation in the neighbourhood of Beaumont-Hamel before -the conditions of winter should render active operations on a large -scale impossible. Accordingly operations which met with immediate -success were reopened on the 18th November on the left bank of the -Ancre between Grandcourt and Pys. These were renewed in January in the -Beaucourt valley on the opposite side of the river with such marked -success that the enemy was compelled to relinquish his hold on the high -ground north of Beaumont-Hamel while his position in Grandcourt became -precarious in the extreme. - -On the night of the 5th/6th February 1917 Grandcourt was evacuated and -the enemy fell back to the line Serre-Miraumont-Pys. Attacks with which -these initial successes were followed up on the 17th and 18th February -secured to the British complete command over the enemy's defences of -the upper Ancre and Miraumont village, while they accentuated his -salient west of Serre. The loss of this would lay open for us a further -advance on Puisieux-au-Mont and render the defence of the Gommecourt -Salient exceedingly hazardous. It was therefore to be expected that any -further withdrawal on the part of the enemy from in front of Miraumont -would entail a withdrawal on a large scale, and this actually occurred. - -By the 24th February British troops had occupied Serre and all the -enemy's defences on a line from that village to Gueudecourt, a frontage -of some nine miles. On the 27th February patrols entered Gommecourt -park and village, the prize so desperately fought for and withheld -from the 1/4th Battalion six months earlier, and the following morning -the whole of Puisieux fell into our hands. On the right the enemy's -resistance was more stubborn, but an assault on Irles on the 10th -March, which proved entirely successful, brought us face to face with -the first of the two lines of defence about Bapaume to which reference -has already been made. But even here the enemy made no determined -stand, and by the 13th our pursuing columns were making preparations to -assault the rear line. - -[Illustration: THE GERMAN RETIREMENT, FEBRUARY-MARCH, 1917] - - * * * * * - -The situation, therefore, when the 2/4th Battalion returned to the line -after its rest, the last two days of which were spent at Gaudiempré, -was that Corps and Divisional staffs were eagerly seeking information -as to any indication of the enemy's expected retirement between Arras -and Monchy-au-Bois, this being the only sector between Arras and the -Somme now left in his possession, which he had held at the end of the -Somme operations. This entailed a heavily increased burden of night -patrolling duties on all troops in the line. - -On the 24th February the 2/4th Battalion moved into Bellacourt, -relieving the 1/5th K.O.Y.L.I. in Brigade reserve, taking over the -front line from the 1/4th K.O.Y.L.I. on the following day. The sector -lay between Ransart and Blairville to the left of that previously -occupied, and was held with three companies in front trenches and one -in support. Battalion Headquarters were in Grosville. - -The German lines opposite this sector possessed two features of -particular interest in the Blockhouse, a strongly defended salient, and -the Talus, a machine-gun post pushed some 200 yards forward of their -main line in a hillside embankment. Two sunken roads and a watercourse -in No Man's Land added to the interest of life and provided our patrols -with some useful work. - -The advancing British troops in the south this day were beginning to -threaten Puisieux, the possession of which would lay open to attack the -Bucquoy Ridge to its north. It was clear that with British forces on -the Bucquoy Ridge the German reserve lines of defence and gun positions -about Adinfer Wood (which supported the lines now opposite the 173rd -Brigade) must either retreat precipitately or run a serious risk of -being cut off. Requests for information from Brigade consequently -became more and more insistent, and information was passed to the -Battalion that the lines opposite had actually been evacuated. -Officers' patrols under 2/Lieuts. A. G. Croll, A. M. Duthie, T. J. -Bell and D. S. Boorman, which covered No Man's Land, especially in the -vicinity of the Blockhouse and the Talus on the nights of the 24th and -28th, however, elicited unmistakable signs of occupation of the German -defences. But the desultory nature of the enemy's machine-gun fire, -and of his shell fire from the direction of Adinfer Wood, the marked -decrease in the number of Véry lights put up by him at night and the -constant sounds of transport moving on the roads in rear of his lines -all provided indications that his retirement could not long be delayed. -The patrols frequently heard working parties hard at work in rear of -the enemy's lines, and it afterwards transpired that these were busily -engaged in mining the roads over which our advancing troops must pursue -the German retreat. - -It had long been known that the enemy was hard at work on a highly -fortified defensive line which left his front defences at Arras and ran -in a south-easterly direction in front of Cambrai to near St Quentin. -This line, the famous "Hindenburg" line, was roughly parallel to that -now occupied by our advancing troops in the south and some eight miles -distant from it. Reports from British airmen showed that the Hindenburg -line was now the scene of feverish activity on the part of the enemy, -and this information seemed to confirm the probability indicated by the -results of our patrolling that the relinquishment of the Monchy-Arras -line was imminent. - -A most unfortunate incident occurred on the night of the 28th February, -when a strong patrol under 2/Lieut. R. K. Caparn returning to our lines -was fired upon by the sentries who apparently had failed to grasp the -prearranged signal, with the regrettable result that 2/Lieut. Caparn -was very seriously wounded and L./Corpl. Warren, Ptes. Anderson and -Vickery were killed. - -On the morning of the 2nd March the Battalion was relieved by the 2/2nd -Londons and withdrew to Divisional reserve in billets at Basseux and -Bailleulval. Three days' training ensued, followed by a move on the 6th -to Humbercamp. - -The 173rd Brigade had now "side-stepped" to the right, and on the 7th -March the 2/4th Londons once more entered the front line, relieving -the 1/6th North Staffords in a sector known as Z1 immediately opposite -Monchy-au-Bois. Battalion Headquarters opened in Bienvillers-au-Bois. - -This sector was about three miles south of that previously occupied, -and similar conditions prevailed both as regards ground and the German -retirement. No Man's Land, which was here about 300 yards wide, fell -gently from our lines to the village of Monchy-au-Bois, which had -been made a network of defences by the enemy, his first line passing -immediately in front of the village. In rear of the village the ground -again rose gently to the Adinfer Ridge. - -Bienvillers was almost daily given an unpleasantly copious allowance of -gas shells which caused numerous casualties, principally to carrying -parties from Battalion Headquarters. Among these was Major Nunneley, -who was gassed on the 10th; his duties of second in command were -assumed by Capt. Spicer, the Adjutancy being filled by Capt. A. Grover -(1st Bedfordshire Regiment), who had just been transferred to the 2/4th -Battalion at the request of Lieut.-Col. Dann. - -The long frost had now been succeeded by a remarkably sudden thaw which -created conditions of marked discomfort in the trenches. The water pent -up in the soil for so long filled all the trenches to a depth of about -two feet, and the trench walls everywhere began to fall in, throwing an -enormous amount of work on the occupying battalions in keeping them in -a defensible condition. - -By night our patrols continued their activities, but each night on -approaching the enemy's lines were met with brisk machine-gun fire, -which showed increasing activity each day. The Battalion observers also -reported daily columns of smoke in rear of the enemy's lines, arising, -as was found subsequently, from the systematic orgy of destruction -in which the Germans indulged prior to their retirement. There was, -moreover, during these few days a very marked increase of shelling -in our back areas, the villages of Pommier, Berles, Bretencourt and -Bailleulmont all receiving an unusually large amount of heavy fire. - -The 11th proved to be the most disturbed day of this tour of duty, the -enemy being exceedingly active in machine-gun and trench mortar fire. -About 100 light shells, of which many were gas, fell in Bienvillers, -fortunately without inflicting loss on the Battalion. On the 12th the -2/4th Londons were relieved by the 2/1st Londons and moved in Brigade -reserve to Pommier, where they continued training. The XVIII Corps -Commander inspected the Battalion on the 16th. - -The Battalion Orderly Room now began to be inundated by the Brigade -Intelligence Staff with plans, maps and all kinds of collated -information as to the villages which would lie in the line of the -Division's expected advance. All preparations were made for an -immediate move. Units in reserve were held in instant readiness to -advance, their first line transport wagons standing ready packed. - -The night of the 16th/17th March was unusually quiet, and patrols -pushed out by the 2/1st Londons about daybreak on the 17th returned -with the information that the German trenches about Monchy were -deserted. A patrol sent forward from the 2/4th Battalion under Capt. -Bottomley was able to penetrate into Monchy itself and returned about -midday with the definite assurance that the village was evacuated. - -The same day the order was given for a general advance of the whole of -the British forces from Arras to Roye. - -That afternoon the 173rd Brigade moved forward, the 2/1st Londons -occupying the German front line at Monchy and some high ground south -of the village, while the 2/4th Battalion was brought forward from -Brigade reserve, "leap-frogging" through the leading Battalion to the -German trenches east of the village. A Company pushed ahead and reached -a point about 300 yards west of Adinfer Wood. Here the Battalion was -in touch with the 6th South Staffords on the right. North of Monchy -village the 2/2nd Londons continued the line with the 174th Brigade on -their left. - -The withdrawal of the Germans from the Monchy Salient involved a -continual shortening of our lines as the salient became straightened -out, and in order to effect this the 2/1st Londons were withdrawn on -the night of the 17th to Pommier, while the 2/4th Battalion continued -its advance, "squeezing-out" the 2/2nd Londons as it pushed forward. By -5 p.m. the following day it had reached a position near Rabbit Wood, a -small copse on the North side of Adinfer Wood, its left being now in -touch with the 175th Brigade while the 46th Division kept pace with its -advance on the right. - -At midnight on the 18th/19th March the 2/4th Londons were withdrawn in -Brigade reserve to Ransart, which village was now occupied by Brigade -Headquarters. A few hours later, at 4.30 a.m. on the 19th, the 2/1st -Londons once more took up the advance towards Boiry-Becquerelle. - -The advance of the 19th March covered a depth of nearly 10,000 yards, -and as it was achieved with very little fighting it seems evident that -the Germans' preparations for withdrawal had been conducted with great -skill. From the time when they had left their original line at Monchy -they had almost entirely eluded close touch with our pursuing columns, -which were never able to harass their retirement to any useful extent. -Very little war material fell into our hands, and it seems possible -that valuable hours were lost on the 17th before the order to follow up -the retirement reached battalions in the line. - -The pursuit of the Germans was rendered exceedingly slow and arduous -by the unspeakable destruction which met our advancing columns at -every step. Cross roads had been mined and vast craters forced all -wheeled traffic to deviate on to the sodden fields adjoining. Trees -had been felled across the roads and added to the impediments to the -advance of our artillery. Everywhere the Germans had committed wanton -destruction--young fruit trees were ringed, crops were burnt wholesale, -and every sort of live stock had been driven before them in their -retreat. The aspect of the villages was most peculiar. At a distance -they appeared to be untouched, and the red roofs of the cottages showed -nothing unusual. On a closer approach, however, they were found to -be ruined and the walls knocked down so that the roofs had subsided -intact to the ground. Furniture, too heavy to be moved, had shared in -this destruction, and its débris was lying shattered among the heaps -of brick and stone. Yet further abominations had been invented, and -a series of ingenious "booby-traps" were discovered in the shape of -common articles such as shovels and helmets. These were left lying -about in places where they were likely to be picked up by our troops, -and being connected with bombs and even large mines caused explosions -when they were touched. - -By noon on the 19th March the 2/1st Londons had established themselves -after some opposition from machine-gun fire on the line between -Boiry-Becquerelle and Boyelles, in touch with the 46th Division in -Hamelincourt; but further efforts to advance from this position towards -St Leger, which was the objective for the day, were effectually stopped -by heavy enemy shell and machine-gun fire. - -Meanwhile the 2/4th Londons were once more moved forward, leaving -Ransart at about 3 p.m., and by 5.30 had advanced to the line of the -Boyelles-St Leger Railway on the right of the 2/1st Londons. - -The 173rd Brigade now occupied the whole of the 58th Divisional -front, being in touch with the Division on its right and its left -joining the 30th Division who were facing Henin-sur-Cojeul. The line -occupied by the 2/4th and 2/1st Londons formed a marked re-entrant -in the British line, overlooking a valley which runs in a northerly -direction from St Leger to Henin-sur-Cojeul. The enemy had apparently -deployed on the further side of this valley and was holding the line -of the Henin-Croisilles Road. Opposite the right flank of the 2/4th -Londons he had for the moment considerable advantage of ground over us, -as our line was dominated by a hill which protected Croisilles from -observation. The following day the Brigade consolidated itself in this -position, Brigade Headquarters moving forward to Boiry-St Rictrude, -which was also occupied by the 2/3rd Londons in Brigade reserve, while -the 2/2nd Londons moved into close support in Boisleux-au-Mont. - -The line held by the Brigade extended from Judas Farm near St Leger, -where it was in close touch with the Division on the right, in front of -Boyelles and Boiry-Becquerelle to the north branch of the Cojeul River. -North of the river the line was continued by the 30th Division, who -were endeavouring to force the villages of St Martin and Henin. - -The Battalion had pushed outposts beyond its main line on the railway -to the Boiry-St Leger Road, but all attempts to continue the general -advance beyond this line were frustrated by the heavy machine-gun and -shell fire with which the enemy sprayed the forward slopes of the ridge -down which the advance was to be made. At the same time signs were not -wanting that his withdrawal had not reached its limit, for fires were -observed in Henin and Croisilles which indicated that the systematic -destruction which hitherto had been the prelude to his retirement was -proceeding with unabated vigour. - -On the 21st the 2/4th Londons were relieved by the 2/3rd in the right -subsector and withdrew to Boiry-St Martin in reserve. For three days -the Battalion remained here under conditions of extreme discomfort. The -weather was exceptionally severe and the ground was covered with snow, -while the open and bare hillsides were swept by biting winds. Billets -were non-existent owing to the total destruction of the village, so -that the change from the front line to reserve brought very little of -rest or easier conditions. Indeed throughout this period of the advance -the terrible exposure proved a far more serious enemy than the Germans -themselves, and the casualties caused through it were five times more -numerous than those caused by wounds. - -The Hindenburg line was now within measurable distance, and the salient -previously held by the enemy being almost entirely flattened out -it was found possible to withdraw several divisions now in action. -This was the more desirable not only for the provision of as many -reserve divisions as possible for the impending offensive against -the Vimy Ridge, but also for the tasks of rendering the devastated -region covered by the advance habitable to our forces, of repairing -the ruined roads, and of bringing forward the supplies of material -necessary for further operations. One of the important gains of the -advance was the reopening of direct lateral communication between Arras -and Albert. With their usual thoroughness the Germans had completely -destroyed the railway connecting these two towns, the track being torn -up and the bridges demolished; and the complete reconstruction of it -presented one of the most pressing necessities in the organisation of -the new defences. - -The 58th Division, in accordance with this programme, was now -withdrawn, and on the 25th March the 173rd Brigade handed over its -sector to the 174th and withdrew to Pommier, the 2/4th Londons being -billeted at Monchy and put to work on repairing the roads. - -Each Brigade of the Division now became split up and battalions and -companies were scattered far afield on one or other of the necessary -works, of which a few have been enumerated above. - -On the 28th the 2/4th Londons moved further back from the line to -Grenas (on the Doullens-Arras Road) leaving behind it two companies, A -and C, which were attached to VII Corps troops (C Company joining the -56th Division) for road repairing at Wailly and Arras respectively. - -At the end of the month the Division, now attached to XIX Corps, was -concentrated, with the exception of the detachments referred to, in the -area of Frohen-le-Grand, between Doullens and Auxi-le-Château, and on -the 1st April the 2/4th Battalion, less A and C Companies, marched to -fresh billets in Bonnières, continuing their route the following day to -Vitz Villeroy, some four miles west of Auxi-le-Château. - -From the beginning of March the Battalion had experienced continual -rough handling, not only from enemy machine-gun and shell fire, but -also from the remarkable amount of marching and counter-marching and -exposure to the elements which the pursuit of the Germans had entailed. -It must also be borne in mind that they had a month previously been raw -troops of whom practically none had been under fire. The writer is, -therefore, with all the more pleasure able to testify to the excellent -bearing and strict march discipline of the Battalion as it swung -through Auxi-le-Château on the 2nd April. But if the 2/4th Battalion -expected rest after its labours it was soon to learn how illusive rest -can be in modern war, for the next day it returned to Auxi and embussed -to Beaumetz-les-Loges in the Arras area, when it once more took the -road and marched to Boiry-St Martin. Accommodation here was provided -for Headquarters and B Company in old German dugouts, while D Company -contented itself with temporary and hastily constructed shelters in the -village. - -A week of hard work in laying new track on the Arras-Albert Railway -followed, and on the 12th the Battalion, having been rejoined by A and -C Companies, moved to Pommier and thence to Achiet-le-Grand, where the -remainder of the 173rd, now under command of Brig.-Gen. Freyberg, V.C., -D.S.O., was concentrated. - -The Division was now in the Fifth Army area (Gough) and attached to the -V Corps. - -The remainder of April, with the exception of short spells of training, -was entirely devoted to working parties, the principal tasks entrusted -to the 2/4th Londons being the formation of a large R.E. dump at -Achiet-le-Grand, the construction of a light railway at Ervillers and -the repair of the Ervillers-St Leger Road. - -During the period under review the Battalion received one or two small -reinforcements of N.C.O.'s and men, and also the following officers: - - 18th March--2/Lieuts. G. H. Hetley, C. A. Clarke, S. M. - Williams and G. E. Lester, and 2/Lieut. Acason (18th - Londons). - - 27th April--2/Lieut. S. A. Seys (15th Londons). - -Casualties included Major W. A. Nunneley, gassed; 2/Lieut. R. K. -Caparn, wounded; 2/Lieuts. A. M. Duthie and S. P. Ferdinando, -accidentally wounded; 2/Lieuts. H. W. Hallett and G. G. Hunt, sick; and -in N.C.O.'s and men 10 killed, 25 wounded, and about 170 sick, chiefly -from exposure. - -The duties of signalling officer were taken by 2/Lieut. E. C. Pratt. - -In February the Battalion was unfortunate in losing 2/Lieut. C. J. -Graham, who joined Brigade Headquarters as Intelligence Officer. He -filled this appointment with great success until March 1918, when he -was appointed Brigade Major in the 47th Division. He was decorated with -the D.S.O. and the M.C. with Bar. - - - - -CHAPTER XIV - -THE 1/4TH BATTALION IN THE BATTLES OF ARRAS, 1917 - - -Reverting now to the 1/4th Battalion, we have the task of recording its -part in the great battles of April and May 1917 which developed after -the German retirement, some account of which has been attempted in the -preceding chapter. - -On transfer from the First Army area the 1/4th Battalion was billeted -at Le Souich late on the evening of the 10th March 1917. The following -day was Sunday and was observed as far as possible as a rest, and this -day the Battalion was joined by a reinforcement of officers, 2/Lieuts. -J. F. Elders, T. Caudwell, S. Minear, C. J. Reid and E. C. Hayes, all -attached from the Queen's Westminsters. On the 12th the Battalion -marched in drenching rain to Ivergny, the next village to Le Souich, -but on arrival the billets were found to be already occupied, and -orders were received to move a mile further on to Beaudricourt, which -village was reached about 4.30 p.m. - -At Beaudricourt the Battalion settled down to a steady course of -company training in preparation for active operations. According to -the Battalion custom, whenever possible, the day's work was started -by Commanding Officer's parade, and the strictest attention was paid -to all points of parade discipline; while the drums beat Retreat each -evening in the village street. The training included a good deal -of route marching to harden the troops after their long sojourn in -trenches, practice attacks from trench to trench, and "specialist" -training, in the course of which every man in the Battalion received -the rudiments of instruction in the Lewis gun. The opportunity was -also taken to reorganise the companies in accordance with the then -newly-evolved scheme, which had the object of rendering the platoon -a self-contained fighting unit comprising only fighting ranks. -The four sections of the platoon were definitely organised as one -of Lewis gunners, one of riflemen, one of rifle-grenadiers and one -of bombers; and all administrative details in the company, such as -cooks, stretcher-bearers and company runners, were collected into a -"headquarter" section under the immediate supervision of the company -second in command. - -The advantages of the new platoon organisation were evidenced by -practical demonstrations to the officers of the division of methods -of employing the various sections in co-operation with each other in -operations such as the capture of a strong point. These demonstrations -were given by a selected platoon of the Rangers, and Gen. Hull took the -opportunity of announcing to the assembled officers the rôle which it -was expected the Division would play in the coming attack. - -In the latter part of March the Battalion lost three officers, -2/Lieuts. S. P. Stotter and R. W. Chamberlain to hospital, and Capt. F. -C. Grimwade seconded to VII Corps School as Instructor. - - * * * * * - -The intention of G.H.Q. for the offensive of 1917 was to deliver a -heavy blow against the German positions in the Scarpe-Ancre Salient -(see Map No. 9); and in conjunction with this, and in order to secure -the left flank of the attack, to wrest from the enemy his commanding -positions on the Vimy Ridge, whence excellent observation could be -obtained over the Plains of Douai. This scheme underwent considerable -modifications before it was put into operation, firstly to secure -closer co-operation with the French offensive on the Aisne; and -secondly by reason of the German Retirement of March 1917, which -altered the rôle of the Fifth Army and compelled them to re-establish -themselves in fresh positions facing the Hindenburg line. - -The Hindenburg line in the vicinity of its junction with the original -German trench lines south-east of Arras being the centre of the -Battalion's operations in April and May, a reference to the map will be -of assistance to the reader in appreciating what follows. It will be -seen that the old trench systems (_i.e._ those held by the enemy until -March) crossed the valley of the Scarpe running southwards through the -eastern suburbs of Arras, as far as the Arras-Cambrai Road, and then -swinging south-westward followed the valley of the Crinchon River. -These trenches consisted of two main systems about 2000 yards apart, -the village of Beaurains being incorporated into the first system -and that of Tilloy-les-Mofflaines into the second, with Mercatel and -Neuville-Vitasse in rear of the second system. About three-quarters -of a mile south of Tilloy was Telegraph Hill, the line between being -strengthened by the enormously fortified redoubt known as The Harp. -From the southern extremity of The Harp the new Hindenburg line (or -rather system of trenches) struck off south-eastward, including -Neuville-Vitasse, crossing the valley of the Cojeul River between St -Martin and Heninel and passing thence between Croisilles and Fontaine. -Between the west side of the Cojeul valley and the Scarpe at Fampoux -was a "switch" line known as the Wancourt line, which crossed the -Cambrai Road just east of Feuchy Chapel. - -The task originally allotted to the 56th Division was the capture of -Beaurains and Telegraph Hill. - - * * * * * - -The 169th Brigade which had left the Neuve Chapelle area in advance -of the remainder of the Division had been placed in line at Agny, -opposite Beaurains, and to this point the commanding officers of the -168th Brigade proceeded on the 17th March to make the preliminary -reconnaissance for the attack. But the following day it was found that -Beaurains was clear of enemy and was already occupied by the 169th -Brigade who were following up energetically. The reconnaissance being -no longer required the party returned to billets pending further orders. - -On the 18th Lieut.-Col. A. E. Maitland, M.C. (Essex Regiment), was -appointed to command the Battalion, and on the 23rd the Division moved -forward into a concentration area in rear of Arras, the Battalion -marching from Beaudricourt at 9.30 a.m. and arriving in billets at -Beaumetz-les-Loges at 4.30 p.m. At Beaumetz the Battalion resumed its -training programme though the whole Brigade was held at short notice -to move in view of the possible further development of the enemy's -withdrawal. - -It is worth while pausing for a moment to consider the extraordinary -achievement of G.H.Q. in delivering the Arras-Vimy Ridge attack as it -did on the 9th April. The preparations were on similar lines to those -for the Somme offensive of the previous July, and were on an even -vaster scale owing to the increased number of the divisions which it -was proposed to employ and to the ever-growing strength and weight of -the British artillery. The preliminary work of forming reinforcement -and concentration camps, laying fresh and increasing the capacity of -existing railway lines, arranging for water supply, dumps of munitions -and _matériel_, establishment of hospitals and the hundred and one -other essential tasks had been steadily proceeding since the close of -the Somme offensive in November 1916. - -Imagine, then, the inevitable dislocation of the scheme when, a -comparatively few days before the attack was to be delivered, the -enemy suddenly withdrew on part of the front from the positions it -had been intended to assault and betook himself within fortified -lines of enormous strength to the rear. Dumps, railheads, hospitals, -water-supply, concentration areas, guns, heavy siege and light, all -had to be pushed forward to fresh and rapidly selected positions in an -area which had been laid waste with all the fiendish skill of which a -resourceful enemy was capable, and all the consequent modifications of -objectives and orders effected at the shortest possible notice. Not -only was this achieved, but it was achieved with such efficiency as to -produce on the 9th April the most striking single-day success which had -crowned the British Armies since the outbreak of the War. - -The Battalion was soon called on for its share in this "moving forward" -process of the preparations for battle, and on the 28th March it -marched with the remainder of the Brigade to positions in the old -British trench system opposite Beaurains, where for three days it -was engaged in supplying working parties. On the 1st April it was -withdrawn to Brigade reserve in Achicourt where it found comfortable -billets. A very large number of British heavy batteries were in action -here registering and wire-cutting for the coming battle, and the -continuous din of our own guns was trying. The shells of one battery of -60-pounders firing from just in rear of the Headquarters billet cleared -the roof of the house by about 18 inches. - -In the meantime the pursuit of the Germans had been maintained by the -56th Division, which with the 21st and 30th on its right and the 14th -on its left comprised the VII Corps (D'Oyly Snow). A relief had been -effected on the 1st April, the 168th and 167th Brigades taking over the -Divisional sector from the 169th which was withdrawn to reserve. By the -2nd April, the Germans having reached the Hindenburg system, the line -became stabilised, and no further important alteration occurred until -the day of battle. When the Battalion took over the advanced trenches -from the Rangers on the 3rd, therefore, the positions which they -occupied formed practically the "start-line" for the 9th April. - -The 56th Division occupied a salient of which the north-eastern face -was on the Beaurains-Neuville-Vitasse Road, and the south-eastern face -lay opposite the north-west corner of Neuville-Vitasse. On this side -the British positions had been pushed forward in the direction of -Neuville-Vitasse and posts were held in the old German communication -trenches leading back to the village. - -This sector was held by the Battalion with three companies in the -front line and one in reserve in a system known as the Circular Work -south-east of Beaurains. It will be readily appreciated that as the -advanced British positions were outposts in different communication -trenches it was necessary in order to provide a good jumping-off line -for the battle to connect these up by continuous trenches to form a -front line, to supply that front line with support lines and feed it -with fresh communication trenches. Clearly a good deal of digging was -necessary in a very short space of time, and the Battalion was heavily -engaged in this work during its tour of duty, which lasted until -the 7th April. The principal trenches dug were Deodar, Poplar, Lime, -Elm and Skin in the front system, and Gun, How and New Battery as -communication trenches. - -On the 4th April the British destructive bombardment began and -continued daily according to a prearranged programme until the day of -battle. This met with comparatively little retaliation. - -On the 7th an inter-battalion relief was effected, the Battalion -vacating the line in favour of the Kensingtons and Rangers who were -respectively detailed as right and left assaulting battalions. The -London Scottish moved to the old British line at Agny while the 1/4th -Londons returned to dugouts in the railway cutting at Achicourt. The -following day battle positions were occupied, the London Scottish -moving forward to close support in rear of the Kensingtons, and the -1/4th Londons to Brigade reserve in the Circular Work. - -The Division's objectives for the 9th April were as follows: - -The 168th (left) and 167th (right) Brigades were to advance through -Neuville-Vitasse to the first objective which was an arbitrary line -(the Blue line) skirting the east edge of the village and facing the -Hindenburg system. (_Note._--The Hindenburg line between Telegraph Hill -and the Cojeul River was known as the Cojeul Switch.) This first phase -was entrusted in the 168th to the Kensingtons and Rangers, the latter -battalion on the left being prepared to adopt special measures and form -a defensive flank facing north should the 14th Division be checked at -Telegraph Hill. - -After a pause on this objective of about four and a half hours the -London Scottish (168th) and 1st Londons (167th) were to "leapfrog" -through the leading troops and carry the Cojeul Switch, the Scottish -objectives being Back, Card and Telegraph Hill trenches (north of -the Neuville-Vitasse-Wancourt Road). Here a further pause was to be -made, after which the third phase of the battle would be taken up by -the 167th Brigade, who would advance, covering the whole Divisional -frontage on to the Wancourt line (Brown line). - -To return to the 1/4th Battalion. The day spent in Achicourt prior to -manning battle positions produced the first serious German retaliation -to our bombardment. As already remarked Achicourt was "stiff" with -batteries and also contained a very extensive and important ammunition -dump. Doubtless the Bosche decided that the quickest way to silence -our guns was to destroy their supplies of shell, and from 11.30 a.m. -until 5 p.m. he bombarded the village, causing a good many casualties -in the Battalion and firing several houses which formed part of the -dump. The village square, moreover, was packed with lorries loaded -with shell waiting to move forward with the batteries, and unluckily -the enemy obtained some direct hits on these. For some time the flying -fragments rendered the place remarkably unhealthy. Excellent work was -done in saving two lorries by Major H. Campbell of the Kensingtons. He -well earned his D.S.O. by driving two of the blazing lorries out of the -square into a place of safety. - -The battle positions occupied that night by the Battalion were as -follows: - - A Company (Lorden)--New Battery Trench. - C " (Bowater)--Southend and Margate Trenches. - D " (Spiers)--Astride the Neuville-Vitasse Road in - Battery and New Battery Trenches. - Battalion Headquarters--In North End (Circular Work). - B Company (Stanbridge)--Attached as "moppers-up" to the - Kensingtons. - -The role of the Battalion was laid down to provide for various -eventualities that might arise according to the degree of success -achieved by the assaulting battalions, and it was therefore held in -readiness either to assist the Rangers in forming a defensive flank in -case of failure by the division on the left, or to lend weight to the -Scottish attack on the Cojeul Switch. - -At 5.30 a.m. on the 9th April, after a hurricane bombardment of the -German lines, the British barrage lifted and the attack began. The -advance of the 56th Division was deferred until two hours later to -allow the 14th Division, whose start-line was less advanced, to come -into line, and accordingly at 7.30 a.m. the Rangers and Kensingtons -moved to the assault, followed by B Company of the 1/4th Londons who -were equipped with Stokes mortar shells for dealing with deep dugouts. - -B Company's job in mopping-up proved easier than had been expected, for -the German trench garrisons had been confined to their deep dugouts -for some days by the intensity of our bombardment, and the resultant -difficulties with which they had been faced in getting their rations -and water up from the rear made them on the whole not undisposed to -surrender; and in a short time the Battalion, in Brigade reserve, was -cheered by the sight of bodies of German prisoners marching in fours -down the road to Beaurains in a dazed and exhausted condition. - -By 9.30 a.m. the Blue line on the whole of the Brigade front was in our -hands, and its consolidation was at once put in hand by the assaulting -troops with assistance from the 512th Company R.E. and a company of the -Cheshire Pioneers. At 11.20 a.m. the Scottish moved forward on a three -company front to attack the Cojeul Switch. Their advance was met with -heavy machine-gun fire, and although one company succeeded in gaining -Back Trench, the furthest of the three lines forming the Cojeul Switch, -and in pushing patrols beyond it, the battalion was forced ultimately -to fall back to Telegraph Hill Trench, the front line of the Switch -System and that nearest to Neuville-Vitasse. - -At 12.30 p.m. the 1/4th Londons were ordered to advance to fresh -positions on the western edge of Neuville-Vitasse, where they came -under the orders of the 167th Brigade. The move was completed by 4 p.m. -with A Company in Tree, C in Leaf and D in Pine; B Company (still under -the orders of the Kensingtons) having by now withdrawn to reorganise in -Deodar Lane after their fight. - -As reports of the attack on the Cojeul Switch came in it became clear -that a gap existed between the London Scottish and the 7th Middlesex, -who had advanced to the assistance of the 1st Londons on their right, -and at 5 p.m. Brigade ordered the Battalion forward to fill this gap. -The three available companies moved forward at once, but on emerging -from Neuville-Vitasse it was found that touch had been regained by -the Scottish and the Middlesex, and the companies therefore took up a -position on the eastern edge of the village in support to the Middlesex. - -In the meantime the third phase of the attack, namely, the advance of -the 167th Brigade to the Wancourt line, had been definitely checked -by machine-gun fire, as had also that of the 14th Division on the -left; so that the day's fighting ended with the 14th Division in -possession of Telegraph Hill and The Harp, and the northern end of -the Cojeul Switch; the 56th occupying the Cojeul Switch astride the -Neuville-Vitasse-Wancourt Road; and the 30th on the right approaching -the Wancourt line in the vicinity of the Neuville-Vitasse-Henin Road--a -very substantial advance for the day. - -The 168th Brigade captures for the day amounted to 5 officers and -635 other ranks, all of the 163rd R. I. Regt., 9 machine-guns, 2 -granatenwerfer, 1 minenwerfer, and 2 heavy trench mortars, together -with large quantities of small arms and ammunition. - -In the evening the Battalion was rejoined by B Company, and Battalion -Headquarters advanced to a dugout in rear of the start-line for the -day. The night was marked by bombing operations in the Cojeul Switch -which had the wholesome effect of clearing out the few remaining -pockets of Bosche, and by 7.30 a.m. on the 10th touch had been gained -with the 14th Division on the left, while the 56th Division's right -had been extended further south and the London Scottish had possessed -themselves of the whole of the Back-Card-Telegraph Hill system. - -A remarkable instance of initiative on the part of a private soldier, -which occurred on the night of the 9th April, is worth recording. Pte. -Turner, a runner of D Company, lost his company and strayed into the -German line. Finding a dugout entrance he began to descend the stairs, -when he heard voices; and as the owners of the voices were evidently -Huns he announced his arrival by throwing a Mills bomb down the dugout. -The occupants apparently thought they were outnumbered and promptly -gave themselves up to the number of 1 officer and 16 other ranks. -Turner marshalled his bag in a shell hole outside, and the next morning -was found with them, all apparently quite content to be under the -leadership of one British private, outside Neuville-Vitasse. Turner's -coolness was rewarded with the Military Medal. - -Early on the 10th the weather, which had hitherto been cold and wet, -became yet worse and the landscape was soon white with snow, from which -trenches and shell holes gave no protection. - -Immediate arrangements were made by VII Corps to complete the previous -day's objectives, and an attack on the Wancourt line was delivered at -noon, the 56th Division attack being entrusted to the 167th Brigade. -During this attack the 1/4th Londons remained in support and withdrew -to their former position in the trenches on the western edge of -Neuville-Vitasse. - -The assault of the 10th April was only partly successful on the Corps -front, but the pressure was maintained on the 11th. By noon on that -day the 56th Division, whose advance had developed into a flank attack -along the Hindenburg line, had cleared the Cojeul Switch as far south -as the Cojeul River and occupied the villages of Wancourt and Heninel. - -While these successes had been gained south of the Scarpe an equally -striking victory had been gained north of the river where the XVII -Corps (Fergusson) of the Third Army and the Canadians (Byng) and 1 -Corps (Holland) of the First Army had swept the enemy from his long -established positions on the Vimy Ridge to the plain east of it, and -had sensibly tightened our grip on the mining area of Lens. - -Preparations were at once made to follow up this very striking success, -and VII Corps issued orders for the advance to be resumed on the 14th -over the watershed dividing the Cojeul valley from that of the Sensée. -The 13th was therefore devoted to preparations for this attack, in -forming advanced dumps and moving forward batteries, and the 168th -Brigade was placed under orders to advance at short notice, though no -actual move occurred during the day. - -On the 14th April the enemy barrage was much heavier than it had -been on the 9th, and under a murderous fire the 169th Brigade, -which attacked on the 56th Division's front, was forced after some -initial success back to its start-line. That night the 168th Brigade -was ordered forward to form a defensive flank in the Cojeul Switch -facing north-east, and accordingly the 1/4th Battalion moved after -dark from the Back-Card-Telegraph Hill area, which they had occupied -earlier in the day, to relieve the Queen's Westminsters on the right -of the advanced line, with the London Scottish on their left and the -Kensingtons and Rangers respectively in support and reserve. - -The relief was completed by 4 a.m. on the 15th with the exception of an -advanced post pushed well down the forward slope of the valley towards -Heninel. This was allotted to two platoons of B Company, but owing to -the complete devastation of the area, and the absence of landmarks, -the guides detailed to these platoons failed to find the post, and its -relief had to be postponed until the following evening. - -The Battalion now experienced another change of command, and -Lieut.-Col. Maitland having fallen sick it was taken over by Major H. -Campbell, D.S.O., attached from the Kensingtons to command with the -acting rank of Lieut.-Col. as from the 12th April. - -The 15th proved to be a day of inaction, though the enemy's artillery -was continuously active over the whole Battalion area. No further -advance was attempted on the 16th and no action occurred during the -early hours of the day, with the exception of a local counter-attack -by the enemy, directed against the 50th Division on our left, in the -course of which he managed to re-establish himself on the ridge in the -vicinity of Wancourt Tower. - -During the afternoon the hostile shelling slackened considerably, -but at about 4.30 p.m. warning was received that he was preparing a -counter-attack in force, and at 7.30 a barrage of terrific intensity -fell on the Battalion's trenches. The front line companies in -accordance with the prearranged scheme of defence at once cleared the -advanced trenches and pushed forward Lewis gun sections about 60 -yards into No Man's Land in order to smash up any attack that might be -delivered. By this time darkness was gathering and movement becoming -hard to detect. At about 8 o'clock, however, the enemy was observed -advancing in close formation to the attack. Our Lewis guns at once -opened fire and were magnificently supported by the artillery. The -attack was completely smashed and no German reached our lines. The -enemy barrage continued without abatement for about an hour, during -which the whole Battalion area was effectively searched and a great -many casualties caused. By 9 p.m., however, the bombardment slackened, -and after a few hours of desultory shelling died out altogether. - -During the evening the sector held by the London Scottish was also -subjected to severe shelling but no infantry action occurred, and it -was evident that the whole weight of the attack had fallen on the 1/4th -Londons' sector. The heaps of German dead which were visible in No -Man's Land on the following day bore striking testimony to the accuracy -of the Battalion's Lewis gun fire. - -During the attack excellent work was done under heavy fire by the -medical officer, Capt. Havard, R.A.M.C., and the medical orderlies. -The Aid Post was merely a corrugated iron shed built in the side of a -sunken road and afforded no cover from the shell splinters which were -flying in all directions. - -The 17th April passed without incident on the Battalion's front, though -on the left the 50th Division recaptured Wancourt Tower, the possession -of which gave us complete command of the high ground between the Cojeul -and the Sensée. That evening an inter-battalion relief took place, the -Rangers relieving the 1/4th Londons and the Kensingtons taking over -from the London Scottish. The relief of A Company had, however, to be -postponed until the following night owing to the approach of daylight. - -On relief the Battalion withdrew to deep dugouts in the Cojeul Switch -about 800 yards west of Heninel. These were large and well constructed, -and accommodated the whole Battalion underground without overcrowding. -The strength of the position was enormous, and it seemed a matter for -congratulation that the British attack had succeeded in dislodging the -former occupants with comparatively so little opposition. It pointed -to the fact that no well-defined earthwork defence is in the long-run -proof against an attack delivered by well-trained troops supported by -tanks and a sufficient weight of heavy artillery; and indeed, as will -be seen later, the capture of "pillboxes" and scattered shell hole -defences proved a greater obstacle in the third Battle of Ypres later -in the summer. - -The 56th Division was now withdrawn to Corps reserve; and after -spending a day in the dugouts the Battalion was relieved on the -afternoon of the 19th by the 16th Manchesters (30th Division), -withdrawing after relief to billets in Arras. - -Although the opening phases of the offensive involved the Battalion -in comparatively little fighting, it had been continuously engaged in -the general rough-and-tumble of shell holes and subjected to fairly -continuous shell fire since the opening of the battle. Its losses -during this period amounted in officers to: 2/Lieut. T. Siddall, -killed; 2/Lieuts. P. Pyne and L. W. N. Jones, wounded; Rev. S. F. -Leighton Green, C.F., wounded at duty. - -The battle had now completely achieved its object as originally -conceived by G.H.Q. The enemy was dislodged from the high ground on a -wide front, and the resultant change of positions afforded our troops -advantages of observation and drier foothold; and had Sir Douglas Haig -been a free agent he would at once have transferred his intentions to -the northern area, where he was desirous of launching his Messines and -Ypres offensives. In deference to the needs of our Allies, however, it -was necessary to keep the Germans active without respite on the Arras -front to which they had already drawn large reserves, and this was the -more important in view of the ghastly collapse of the Russian Empire -and the consequent liberation of enemy troops for the Western Front. -Active operations were, therefore, pursued for some time longer on the -Arras front, though perhaps they should not strictly be regarded as -part of the Battle of Arras. - -After the withdrawal of the 56th Division from the line, fighting broke -out again on a wide front both sides of the Scarpe on the 23rd April, -and continued with bitterness until the 26th though with comparatively -little success. Some progress was made on both sides of the Cojeul -River, and the village of Guémappe added to the British gains. - -The 19th April was the occasion of the Battalion's first visit to -Arras, with which town it became so intimately connected in the later -stages of the War. At this date the town was not seriously damaged -although it had lain a short two miles from the German lines for -over two years, and with the exception of the railway station and -its immediate vicinity was still quite healthy for reserve billets. -The Battalion was accommodated in the barracks of the Citadel, which -formed a welcome change from sixteen days of shell holes and dugouts. -On the 21st the Battalion embussed for Bayencourt where it encamped -in the Coigneux valley. Two days were occupied here in resting and -reorganising, and advantage was taken by all ranks during leisure hours -of the opportunity to revisit the Battalion's old haunts at Hébuterne -and to cross unmolested to Gommecourt Park. On the 24th the Battalion -moved at short notice to Gouy-en-Artois, arriving in billets there at 8 -p.m. While at Gouy the Battalion was inspected by the Brigadier-General. - -The 56th Division was now once more placed under orders for the line, -this time in the VI Corps area, the sector held by the 15th Division -being taken over by the 167th Brigade on the 29th April. The 168th -Brigade, being once again in Divisional reserve, moved from Gouy to -Simencourt on the 27th April, and on the following day into Arras, -where preparations for further active operations were made in billets. -The few days in Arras were much enlivened by the excellent show given -by the Bow Bells in Arras Theatre. - -The impending operation was to be an attempt to break through the -enemy's defences on a large scale, the Fifth, Third and First Armies -all being employed on a front from Fontaine-lez-Croisilles through -Chérisy and St Rohart Factory to a point north of Plouvain. The VI -Corps, consisting of the 3rd and 56th Divisions in line, took up the -frontage from the Scarpe to the Cojeul River, the 56th Division's -objective being on a line running north and south between St Rohart -Factory on the Arras-Cambrai Road and the Bois du Vert. - -The sector now held by the Division was about 1000 yards east of -Guémappe and Monchy-le-Preux and lay sidelong on the spurs and side -valleys descending to the Cojeul River. The enemy's defences were far -more difficult to cope with on this occasion than on the 9th April. -The Hindenburg and Wancourt lines had been passed; the Drocourt-Quéant -line was still far ahead; and the intervening area which was now -to be attacked was intersected in all directions by short isolated -trench lines in the siting of which the enemy had displayed his usual -skill in the use of ground. His defences, disposed in great depth, -were strengthened by large numbers of machine-guns cunningly placed -for mutual support in sunken roads and shell holes. It was known, -however, that the deep dugouts of the Hindenburg line did not exist in -this area, and it was hoped that a heavy and continuous bombardment -beforehand would sufficiently reduce his numbers and morale to give -success to the British infantry. - -The 56th Division attack was to be carried out by the 167th and 169th -Brigades, the 168th being relegated to reserve, though available for -the assistance of either assaulting brigade as occasion might arise. - -The Battalion remained in Arras until the 2nd May when, warning being -received that "zero" for the attack was fixed for 3.45 a.m., the -following day it moved at 4 p.m. to assembly in The Harp. In order to -secure close co-operation between the Brigades, 2/Lieut. O. D. Garratt -was attached to the 169th Headquarters as liaison officer. - -The night of the 2nd May was fine and cold, though the early hours -were misty, and at 3.40 a.m. on the 3rd when our bombardment increased -to hurricane intensity it was still almost dark. At this hour the -Battalion stood to, and the vivid flashes of the guns and the streams -of S.O.S. signals from the enemy lines showed that inferno had broken -loose, and the attack had begun. The British barrage was good, but the -enemy was evidently expecting the attack as his counter-barrage was -quick and his machine-gun fire devastating in volume and accuracy. - -The 3rd May was a day of great disappointment all along the line, and -comparatively little success was achieved. The 169th Brigade were -held up by a German strong post in Cavalry Farm and, after occupying -a precarious position between it and the river for some hours, were -forced back by a heavy counter-attack to their original line. The 167th -Brigade was also unable to progress. - -It seems clear that zero hour was too early. In the darkness it was -impossible for the troops to see visual signals of command, and the -delay caused by having to pass messages down the line owing to the din -of the bombardment resulted in the attacking waves moving off zig-zag -in shape with officers at the advanced points. In such a formation they -became an easy target for the enemy machine-guns. Some greater success -might, moreover, have been achieved had the creeping barrage moved -forward more quickly, which would have been quite possible in view of -the comparatively unbroken state of the ground. - -Early in the day the 1/4th Londons had moved forward to positions -in shell holes at Airy Corner, near Feuchy Chapel, and at 8.30 p.m. -the Battalion, now definitely at the disposal of the 169th Brigade, -received orders to advance to positions in the Wancourt line just -south of the Arras-Cambrai Road. This move was followed by another at -11 p.m., which brought the Battalion into close support of the front -line in Tank Trench, apparently in anticipation of a further German -counter-attack. The forward movement was made under a very heavy -gas shell bombardment, but gas helmets were worn and practically no -casualties were suffered. Shortly after arrival in the new position the -enemy shelling slackened, and as no further action appeared imminent -the Battalion was once more withdrawn to the Wancourt line, the move -again being made in gas helmets. A move of 8000 yards in the dark with -respirators is no easy matter to troops laden with battle equipment, -and the men were somewhat exhausted on regaining the reserve position. -A few hours' rest, however, put them to rights, and at 3 p.m. on the -4th the Battalion was again under orders to move forward. The losses -of the 167th and 169th Brigades on the previous day were so severe -that immediate relief was necessary for them, and the 168th Brigade -therefore took over the whole Divisional front; the Battalion relieving -the Queen Victorias and Queen's Westminsters in the subsector between -the Arras-Cambrai Road and the Cojeul River, with the London Scottish -on its left. - -[Illustration: CAVALRY FARM, MAY 1917] - -The sector was occupied with two companies (C and D) in the front -line and two (A and B) in support, Headquarters occupying a dugout on -the hillside between Guémappe and Wancourt. The relief was completed -without incident at 2.30 a.m. on the 5th May. The enemy evidently -anticipated a renewal of our attack for throughout the day the lines -were subjected to heavy shelling. Some doubt existed as to whether the -enemy still remained in occupation of Cavalry Farm and of Tool Trench -to the north of it, and as no movement was visible two daylight patrols -were sent out in the afternoon to investigate. These patrols managed -to gain the edge of Cavalry Farm, where they drew sharp rifle fire -from the enemy which caused some loss; and their object being gained -the patrols withdrew bringing their casualties with them. At about -10 p.m. the enemy's bombardment increased to a heavy barrage, which -was especially severe on the sector held by the 14th Division on the -right of the river, and it seemed likely that an enemy attack was in -preparation. The 14th Division indeed called for artillery support, and -this was promptly supplied by our artillery, which opened a terrific -barrage on the enemy lines. After an artillery duel of about two hours -the shelling on both sides slackened. The 6th and 7th May were both -marked by heavy shelling, which on the part of the enemy seemed mostly -to be directed towards searching for our battery positions in rear, -though some loss was caused to the Battalion, and 2/Lieuts. Reid and -Caudwell were killed, and 2/Lieut. Hutchins wounded, with several -N.C.O.'s and men killed and wounded by stray shells. - -On the night of the 7th May the Battalion handed over its sector to the -Rangers and withdrew to the old German trench system north of Wancourt, -Headquarters being accommodated in Marlière Caves. In this position the -Battalion remained a couple of days, during which the enemy's shell -fire continued at intervals but without causing serious damage. - -The attack of the 3rd May was the last general attack on the Arras -front, and subsequent operations were confined to local enterprises up -and down the line with the object of improving and rounding off the -positions gained. On the Divisional front a minor operation of this -sort was immediately necessary in clearing up the situation at Cavalry -Farm and Tool Trench, and the 1/4th Londons and London Scottish were -detailed to capture these positions. - -The Battalion moved into the line for this attack on the evening of the -10th May. - -The objectives allotted to it were Cavalry Farm and the trench -south-east of it, and Tool Trench for a frontage of 250 yards north of -the Cambrai Road; while the London Scottish were to extend the attack -on Tool Trench for a further 600 yards to the north and also capture -a small copse on the extreme left. The attack was to be made in each -battalion on a two company front, each company advancing in two waves -on a front of two platoons. One company of the Rangers was attached to -the 1/4th Londons and one of Kensingtons to the Scottish. - -For two days previous to the 11th, which was fixed for the operation, -the Divisional artillery had been carrying out destructive bombardments -with 4·5-inch howitzers on the objectives as well as on the -communication trenches leading to the rear and on the portion of Tool -Trench outside the limits of attack. On the evening of the 10th a -practice 18-pr. barrage was placed on the objectives, but the enemy -reply was so efficient that it was decided to conduct the assault -without any increase in our normal artillery activity and to endeavour -to carry the operation through as a surprise. - -At 8.30 p.m. on the 11th May the assaulting waves moved forward, the -1/4th Londons' attack led by D Company (H. N. Williams) on the right -of the road and A Company (Lorden) on the left, with B (Beeby) and C -(Rees) Companies in support. The surprise effect was excellent, and was -heightened by the fact that all the objectives except the Farm itself -were hidden from our trenches by a slight spur which here drops down to -the Cojeul River. The enemy had thus, in the absence of a barrage, no -warning of the attack, and in a few minutes the whole of the objectives -were captured. Few prisoners were taken, but a party of about fifty of -the enemy, fleeing from Cavalry Farm, were caught by our Lewis guns and -annihilated. Lewis gun posts were at once pushed forward into No Man's -Land, and the consolidation of the captured trench begun. So quickly -had all this happened that the enemy artillery opening in response -to an S.O.S. sent up from their lines was harmless to the leading -companies, though it inflicted some loss on the support companies which -were moving up to our vacated front line. - -The consolidation of the captured position was aided by the Cheshire -Pioneers, who completed before dawn a communication trench connecting -Cavalry Trench with the new front line. - -In the early hours of the 12th May the line was thinned out and only a -sufficient garrison left in the captured position to hold it against -counter-attack, the surplus platoons being withdrawn to the old -line. After some hours the German barrage subsided and we were left -in undisputed possession of our capture. This neat little operation -cost but few casualties considering the advantages gained, and the -completeness of the surprise is illustrated by an incident which -occurred early the following morning. One of our advanced Lewis gun -posts, hearing movement in front, challenged. A reply being received -in German, fire was opened. Two of the team went forward to collect -the bag and found a German officer shot dead and a Sergt.-Major badly -wounded. The maps which were taken from the officer's case showed some -of our battery positions accurately, and it appears that this luckless -pair were coming forward to Cavalry Farm to "spot" for a German -artillery shoot, ignorant of the fact that it was in our hands. - -The Battalion continued to occupy its new line until the evening of -the 13th May, when the 168th Brigade was relieved by the 167th. The -Battalion handed over its sector to the 1/3rd Londons and withdrew to a -reserve position on the Cambrai Road near Tilloy, arriving there in the -early hours of the 14th May. The following day a further move was made -to billets in Arras. - -After the Brigade's withdrawal from the line its gains were extended -on the 18th and 19th by successful local operations carried out by the -167th Brigade, who completed the captures of the north end of Tool -Trench and also parts of Hook and Long Trenches adjoining it. - -On the 19th May the 168th Brigade moved still further back to rest -billets in Berneville, and two days later the whole Division was -withdrawn, with Divisional Headquarters at Warlus. - -During May the Battalion received the following officer reinforcements: - - Lieuts. E. P. M. Mosely and A. S. Ford. - - 2/Lieuts. L. W. Archer and H. T. Hannay (commissioned from the - ranks of the Battalion). - - 2/Lieut. F. Barnes (20th Londons). - - 2/Lieuts. H. V. Coombes, N. Nunns, H. E. Jackman and W. G. Port - (21st Londons). - - 2/Lieut. S. A. Gray (23rd Londons). - - Capt. Maloney, R.A.M.C., vice Havard to London Field Ambulance. - -During the same period 2/Lieut. Wreford was wounded and Lieut. P. F. -Smalley evacuated to hospital. - -The Battalion remained in rest for about three weeks, which were -officially occupied in training and reorganisation. The actual training -was, however, reduced to the minimum, and the Battalion's really -serious duty became that of training for Battalion and Brigade sports, -and the relaxation which these provided combined with the determination -with which all ranks strove to gain physical fitness for the purpose -of the sports was undoubtedly quite as valuable as hours spent on the -parade ground. On the 23rd the Brigade was paraded for inspection by -Gen. Hull, who presented ribands to those who had been decorated in the -recent operations. - -The following day the Battalion moved from Berneville to fresh billets -in Simencourt, where the routine of training and recreation proceeded. -Early in June the 56th Division returned to the line, the 168th Brigade -moving to Montenescourt on the 11th and to Achicourt on the following -day. - -Eight days later the 168th Brigade relieved the 169th in the line, the -Battalion moving into left support positions at Wancourt, where it -relieved the 1/2nd Londons. Here the Battalion remained for five days -supplying working parties chiefly in connection with the construction -of new communication trenches to connect up the recently gained advance -posts with the front line, and in connecting up the posts themselves -to form a new front line. These days passed without incident beyond a -certain amount of enemy shelling and trench mortar fire, and on the -evening of the 26th June the Battalion moved forward to relieve the -Kensingtons in the front line system, its right flank resting on the -Cojeul River, where it joined the London Scottish, and its left flank -about 800 yards north of the Arras-Cambrai Road in Hook Trench. This -relief was completed by 1.30 a.m. on the 27th, and the sector was held -with three companies in front line and one in reserve. - -This tour of duty passed without important incident though the enemy's -artillery exhibited some activity, principally against the back areas -in the neighbourhood of Wancourt. On the 1st July hostile aircraft -were especially active, making many unsuccessful attempts to pass the -barrage of the British anti-aircraft batteries. This unusual anxiety of -the German airmen to cross our lines was possibly due to the presence -in the Arras area of H.M. the King, who was then visiting the troops in -France and staying at Bavencourt Château on the Arras-Doullens Road. - -That evening at 11 p.m. the 6th Queens of the 12th Division took over -the portion of the Battalion's sector lying to the north of the Cambrai -Road, and the following evening the remainder of the sector was handed -over to the 5th Borders of the 50th Division, the Battalion withdrawing -on relief to billets in Achicourt, which it reached at 5 a.m. on the -3rd July. - -The part of the 56th Division in the Arras fighting was now finished, -and the Division was withdrawn into Corps reserve for a welcome rest. -The fighting on the Hindenburg line was practically over, though we -shall have further reference to make to it in connection with the 2/4th -Battalion in another chapter. - -The weeks of battle had placed a great strain on the Battalion. Long -marches to and from the line, shell hole bivouacs, heavy working -parties, bad weather and severe shelling had all had their effect, and -a period of rest and reorganisation was needed. - -At 9.30 a.m. on the 4th July the 168th Brigade embussed for the Le -Cauroy area, in which it had trained a year previously prior to -occupying the Hébuterne trenches. The Battalion was allotted billets in -Denier where it entered on a short period of rest and reorganisation -in which the training was interspersed with the various rounds of the -Brigade boxing competition, the finals of which were held on the 15th -July. - -In June Lieut. H. Jones was seconded to VI Corps School as Instructor; -Capt. V. S. Bowater was evacuated to hospital; and 2/Lieut. C. W. -Denning joined the Battalion, being posted to the 168th L.T.M. Battery -early in July; 2/Lieuts. L. W. Wreford and A. C. Knight rejoined the -Battalion in July. - -The Division was now warned of an impending move to another theatre of -activity, and this move occurred on the 23rd, when the Division left -the VII Corps to join the Fifth Army in the Ypres Salient. - - - - -CHAPTER XV - -THE 2/4TH BATTALION IN THE BATTLES FOR BULLECOURT, 1917 - - -We must now follow the battles which had been fought during the latter -part of the German retirement south of the area covered by the battles -of Arras. - -All along the line the German retreat had been conducted steadily and -with marked success on to the Hindenburg line. Although on the whole -the retreat in the south had not been accompanied by heavy fighting, -the attempts of our troops to push forward and define rigidly the -Hindenburg system had met with resistance which had developed here and -there into fighting of the most desperate character. Nowhere had these -local conflagrations been more fierce than in the line of retreat to -Bullecourt. In this sector the retiring enemy was opposed by Australian -troops, who together with the 7th and 62nd (and later the 58th) -Divisions composed Gough's Fifth Army. - -A successful advance on 2nd April in this region was followed -by an attempt by the Australians on the 12th to carry the line -Bullecourt-Lagnicourt, but without success owing to the inadequacy -of the supporting artillery fire. Severe fighting ensued, and a -counter-attack of a serious nature by the Germans on the 15th was -ultimately held. - -On the 3rd May the Australians' efforts met with more success, and they -were able to penetrate the Hindenburg system on the immediate right of -Bullecourt. The 62nd Division on their left, however, were unable to -progress in the village itself, with the result that the ground held by -the Australians formed a salient badly enfiladed both from the village -and from the direction of Quéant. - -The position of Bullecourt in the Hindenburg system was peculiar. From -Heninel the line ran in a generally south-easterly direction towards -Bullecourt in front of the Fontaine-lez-Croisilles-Bullecourt Road. At -Bullecourt the line turned due east, passing some 500 yards in front of -Riencourt. Bullecourt itself was between the front and support trenches -of the first system, so that the front line formed a very pronounced -salient. East of Riencourt the line once more took an abrupt turn, this -time almost due south, passing in front (or to the west) of Quéant. - -Bullecourt lies on a spur which falls northward into the Hendecourt -valley, and its exits on all sides form a network of sunken roads. At -the period under review the majority of the houses were already in -ruins, and these, together with numerous fences enclosing orchards and -gardens, converted the space between the front and support Hindenburg -lines into a serious obstacle, of which the strength was increased by -an intermediate trench half-way through the village. The Germans had, -moreover, tunnelled the village in such a way that they could bring -reinforcements rapidly and safely to bear on any threatened point. -The small salient gained by the Australians straddling the Hindenburg -trenches on the immediate east of the village, uncomfortable as it -was for the occupants, was a serious menace to the enemy position; -and it was reasonable to anticipate that the Germans would not easily -acquiesce in this partial envelopment of their flank. - -During the early days of May the Australians in the salient were -subjected to numerous counter-attacks, while by dint of hand-to-hand -fighting the 62nd Division had gained a firm footing in the village. On -the 12th May the assault was renewed by the 7th Division, and fighting -of a desperately severe character developed in the village in which our -troops met with varying fortunes. In the eastern half of the village -the 2nd Queen's made some progress, but at the western end no advance -was possible. The situation at the sunken cross-roads at the north-east -corner of the village was obscure, and north of this point no part of -the enemy's support line was gained. Such was the position in "Bloody -Bullecourt" when the 58th Division began to take over the line. - -On the afternoon of the 12th May the Company Commanders and -Intelligence Officer of the 2/4th Battalion, together with their -Platoon Sergeants, were sent forward to reconnoitre the positions held -by the 15th Australian Infantry Brigade with a view to taking them -over. From Vaulx-Vraucourt to Noreuil the party followed the dried-up -bed of the Hirondelle River, the scene of many a desperate struggle -during the preceding month. The air was oppressive with the heat of a -premature burst of summer weather; the stench from hundreds of unburied -bodies and the ominous silence of the guns prior to the attack which -was to be renewed the following day caused the whole atmosphere to be -heavy with the presage of hard fighting to come. On arrival at the -Australian Headquarters the party was informed of the attack organised -for the following morning, so that further reconnaissance that day -was useless. After the barrage had died down, however, on the 13th a -fresh start was made up the communication trench, which was really the -Noreuil-Riencourt Road, a bank on the east side preventing observation -from Quéant. - -The Australian attack was successful, although the position was not -entirely cleared up, and they were now holding the first two lines of -the Hindenburg system, the support line being our front line, and the -former front line now forming our support. The intense artillery fire -to which this ground had many times been subjected had resulted in the -almost total obliteration of the trench lines as such, and the position -was really held in a line of shell craters. - -The arrangements for relief being completed, the 2/4th Battalion moved -up on the night of the 13th/14th May to take over the left sector of -the Brigade front, from the sunken cross-roads at the north-east corner -of Bullecourt to a small communication trench about 500 yards to the -east, C Company (Leake) and D Company (Parker) being in the front line -with A (Cotton) and B (Bottomley) in support. Battalion Headquarters -occupied a central position in the support line. A detached post under -2/Lieut. S. A. Seys was established in a shell hole west of the sunken -cross-roads in order to secure touch with the 7th Division in the -village. From the right of the 2/4th Battalion the Brigade sector as -far as the Noreuil-Riencourt Road was taken up by the 2/3rd Londons. - -The actual process of the relief, which was not completed until 1.30 -a.m. on the 14th May, was exceedingly trying owing to the heavy -shelling of the communication trench. Amongst the casualties caused -by this were 2/Lieut. F. Stickney (wounded) and Capt. P. H. Burton, -R.A.M.C. (killed). - -The Germans, having been ejected from their trench system in this -sector, were holding on in a system of unconnected shell holes on the -lower slopes of the spur, and their main line of resistance appeared -to be a sunken road running laterally across our front, and distant -about 300 yards. A new and evidently unfinished trench line crossed the -opposite hillside in front of Hendecourt. - -The heavy shelling which had interfered with the relief continued -throughout the night, our front and support lines being heavily -bombarded, while the back areas were subjected to incessant searching -with high explosive and shrapnel. - -Shortly after the Battalion had taken up its position a party of some -12 Germans with a machine-gun attempted to attack C Company's line. The -attack completely failed owing principally to the great gallantry of -Capt. Leake. 2/Lieut. S. G. Askham, who was in the trench with Leake at -the time, writes: - - We were inspecting the sentry posts and our attention was drawn - to considerable movement near our front line. Without a moment's - hesitation Capt. Leake leapt over the parapet and in a few seconds - we heard revolver shots being fired. He had single-handed attacked - a German machine-gun team who were on the point of establishing - a post in a position overlooking the whole of our front line. He - killed four of the team and the remainder were wounded by our rifle - fire. Leake returned with three prisoners and their machine-gun, - which he also secured.... Leake was a tower of strength to both - officers and men in the Company and we all felt that he richly - deserved the V.C., for which he was afterwards recommended. - -The continued bombardment now began to cause difficulty in controlling -the situation, for early in the morning a direct hit on the Brigade -signal depôt completely wrecked all the instruments and killed the -occupants of the dugout. Later, communication by power buzzer was also -cut, and for the remainder of the day all communication between the -Brigade and the battalions in the line had to be effected by runners. - -This intermittent shelling continued until shortly after midday on the -14th, when the enemy was observed from our lines to be massing for -attack in the neighbourhood of a ruined factory some 500 yards to our -front. A call was made on our artillery, which immediately put down a -heavy barrage under which the enemy's troops melted away. The hostile -bombardment now increased in intensity and a terrific barrage came down -on our lines, continuing with unabated violence all through the night. -This barrage was for the greater part in enfilade from the direction -of Quéant, and was therefore particularly accurate and deadly; under -the rain of shells our trenches, or what little remained of them, were -completely obliterated, the greater part of our front line supplies of -rifle ammunition and bombs were blown up and several Lewis guns with -their teams were buried. Through this appalling ordeal the Battalion -stuck to their posts grimly, though suffering severe losses. Shortly -before midnight the enemy launched an attack on the 7th Division in -Bullecourt village, in which by dint of fierce hand-to-hand conflicts -they wrested from the 7th Division some of its gains of the previous -two days. - -We have already pointed to the importance of the salient now occupied -by the 2/4th Londons, and, fully alive to the position, the Battalion -was not surprised by the attack which broke upon it at dawn the next -day. The importance to the Germans of the possession of this part of -the line may be gauged by the fact that the troops employed by them -were the 3rd Prussian Guard. - -At 4 a.m. on the 15th the enemy were seen to be massing for the attack. -Our artillery once more responded magnificently to the call made on -them, and their barrage caused severe disorganisation in the enemy's -ranks. The attack was stubbornly pushed home by the Germans, but their -barrage being lifted prematurely from our front line an opportunity was -afforded to our leading companies to prepare for the shock. Advantage -of this momentary respite was taken to reinforce the front line, three -platoons of B Company filling the gaps of D Company, and C Company -being strengthened by a party of A Company. These precautions cost the -enemy dearly, and his assaulting columns were met by a deadly rifle and -Lewis gun fire from the whole of our line, which completed the work -of the artillery. The German attack was broken and not a single enemy -reached our line. The remnants of the assaulting battalions turned and -fled down the hill, leaving an appalling number of dead and wounded. - -Beyond the right of the Brigade front a small party succeeded in -effecting a lodgment in a portion of the front line held by the -Australians, but these were shortly afterwards ejected with the -assistance of a platoon of the 2/2nd Londons. - -By six o'clock the enemy counter-attack was definitely and finally -broken and small parties could be seen doubling away from before -Bullecourt; and a further attempt to launch an attack on the -Australians about half an hour later was effectively stopped by our -artillery. - -After the attack had failed the enemy settled down to a slow but steady -shelling of our line for the remainder of the 15th, which was spent in -endeavouring to reorganise the battered remnants of the Battalion and -to put the lines once more in a defensible condition. Under cover of -darkness the 2/1st Londons took over the left subsector from the 2/4th -Londons, which withdrew to reserve dugouts in the sunken road in front -of Noreuil. - -The Battalion had found itself. In its first serious action it had -stood up to a frightful bombardment which had lasted without abatement -for nineteen hours, and at the end of it had seen the backs of the -Prussian Guard. It had paid, however, a severe price. The total -casualties during the two days in the line were, in officers, in -addition to the two already mentioned, 2/Lieuts. E. C. Pratt and T. -Stoaling (killed); Capts. G. E. A. Leake and H. C. Long (wounded); and -in N.C.O.'s and men 68 killed, 196 wounded and 2 missing. - -Capt. Leake had behaved with the utmost gallantry throughout the -attack. He was hit after the attack itself was over by a shell which -fell on his Company Headquarters, wounding also his second in command, -Capt. Long, and several of his Company staff. While being conveyed on -a stretcher to the Aid Post, Leake was again severely hit by a shell -which burst almost under the stretcher, killing two of the bearers. -After the shelling had subsided he was evacuated, but died in hospital -a fortnight later. For his magnificent behaviour he was recommended by -Lieut.-Col. Dann for the Victoria Cross, and eventually was awarded -the D.S.O. a few days before his death. This was conferred on him by -Gen. Gough, who visited for the express purpose the C.C.S. in which -Leake was lying. Lieut.-Col. Dann was awarded the D.S.O. for his -excellent work in this action. Awards of the Military Medal were made -to L./Corpls. Spencer and Selby, and Ptes. Grierson, Olinski and Spence. - -For three days the Battalion remained in the sunken road supplying -carrying parties to the front line. The destruction caused by the -hostile bombardment was such that all the necessary trench supplies in -munitions and material had to be completely renewed, and, moreover, the -battalion in the line was dependent on its supporting troops for their -water supply. This imposed a very heavy strain on the 2/4th Battalion -for the back areas were still continuously shelled, largely with gas -shell, and particularly during the hours of darkness when the carrying -parties were at work; and the relief of the 173rd Brigade by the 175th -which ensued on the night of the 18th/19th May was welcome. - -That night at 11 p.m. the Battalion handed over to the 2/12th Londons -(175th Brigade) and marched to rest billets in Bihucourt, where it -remained until the 29th, engaged in reorganisation and refitting -and training. During this period the gaps in the Battalion were -partly filled by reinforcements of two officers, 2/Lieuts. J. H. L. -Wheatley and E. P. Higgs, and a large draft of N.C.O.'s and men. The -2/4th Londons were visited on the 20th May by Lieut.-Gen. Birdwood, -commanding the Australians, who congratulated Lieut.-Col. Dann on the -Battalion's achievement. - -During the latter half of May the 58th Division extended its left -flank, taking over in succession from the 7th and 62nd Divisions both -of which had suffered severely. By the end of the month the Division -was occupying a front of 4000 yards with two brigades in line. The -173rd Brigade took over the left subsector with the 2/1st and 2/2nd -Londons in line, and the 2/3rd Londons in close support, while the -2/4th Londons moved on the 31st May in Brigade reserve to Mory, where -they continued training. - -Map No. 11 shows the position at this date. It will be seen that -north-west of Bullecourt the Hindenburg line on the Divisional front -was still not captured, though on its left the 21st Division was in -possession of the front trench as far as the Croisilles-Fontaine Road. -The 58th Division sector consisted for the greater part of isolated -shell hole defences. - -There thus remained in this area a length of about 2500 yards of -Hindenburg front and about 3500 yards of Hindenburg support trench -still to be captured from the enemy in order to complete the allotted -task. - -The first two days in the new sector passed without incident beyond -the usual artillery activity. Early on the morning of the 3rd June a -gas attack was carried out on the enemy's lines opposite our left by a -discharge of 197 gas projectors. The gas cloud formed appeared highly -satisfactory, and evidently caused the enemy some perturbation as his -artillery promptly put a barrage on our forward posts. This, however, -inflicted but little loss owing to the previous withdrawal of the -garrisons as a precautionary measure. - -Various signs of nervousness exhibited by the enemy about this time -suggested that he expected the continuance of our offensive, and indeed -in view of the successes already gained he might with reason anticipate -that he would not be left in unmolested possession of the remaining -sectors of the Hindenburg system. - -On the night of the 3rd/4th June the 2/4th Londons relieved the 2/2nd -Londons in the left subsector, A and B Companies (Cotton and Bottomley) -occupying the forward posts with C and D Companies (Hewlett and Parker) -in support. The line opposed to the Battalion was entirely in front of -the Heninel-Bullecourt Road, with a support line about 200 yards in -rear of it. For the greater part the line ran straight, but two small -salients, the Knuckle and the Hump, had been developed into strong -points of no mean order. The whole line was heavily wired, and although -the entanglements had suffered from our shell fire they still presented -a formidable obstacle, while the patrols sent forward nightly from -our posts obtained clear evidence that the line was held in unusual -strength. - -The most urgent work in this sector was the linking up of our scattered -shell hole posts to form a connected line, and this was pushed on with -all possible speed and completed by the night of the 10th. Throughout -this tour of duty the enemy continued a fairly vigorous bombardment of -our trenches and back areas, which was returned with interest by our -artillery. - -On the night of the 11th/12th June the 2/1st Londons took over from A, -B and D Companies, while C Company was relieved by the 2/7th Londons -(174th Brigade). On relief the Battalion withdrew in support to St -Leger, where Headquarters opened at the Château. - -During the days spent in support the Battalion was reinforced by a -large draft of N.C.O.'s and men, and by two officers, 2/Lieuts. C. -Potter and V. R. Oldrey. The latter officer was most unfortunately hit -by a stray bullet on the following day. - -The principal duty of the three days following relief was the -organisation and special training of A, B and D Companies to take part -in an assault of the Hindenburg system opposite the Brigade front. - -The front of attack extended from the sharp corner just south of the -Knuckle on the right to a point about 150 yards north of the Hump on -the left. As the proposed operation included the capture of two lines -of trench it was decided by Corps to divide it into two days' work in -order to simplify the question of the co-operation of the 21st Division -on the left. Accordingly the plan was that the first day the 173rd -Brigade should capture the allotted portion of the front line, while -the second day the area of operations should be extended and the 21st -Division on the left should join with the 173rd Brigade in the assault -of the support line. - -The troops detailed for the attack were in order from right to left, -1 company 2/3rd, 1 company 2/1st, 1½ companies 2/2nd and 1 company -2/4th Londons. For the purposes of the operation the companies of the -2/3rd and 2/4th Londons were respectively under command of the officers -commanding 2/1st and 2/2nd Londons. The attack was to be delivered -under a heavy barrage from a strong concentration of guns of the -7th, 58th and 62nd Divisions and the Corps Heavy Artillery, together -with the massed guns of the three Brigade Machine-Gun Companies. -Arrangements were also made for the provision of supporting rifle, -Lewis gun and machine-gun fire by the 21st Division. - -The 174th Brigade was to arrange for the establishment of a line of -posts along the sunken road in prolongation to the right of the 173rd -Brigade's objective. - -A Company (Cotton) was detailed for the first day's attack, and the -special task allotted to it by Lieut.-Col. Richardson, commanding the -2/2nd Battalion, was the capture of the sunken cross-roads to the left -of the Hump and of a German strong point in the front line about 100 -yards north of them. - -The assembly was successfully carried out during the night of 14th/15th -June, and completed by about 2.15 a.m. At 2.50 a.m. our barrage opened -and the assaulting waves moved forward to the attack in good order, -keeping well up to the barrage and suffering very little loss. - -The attack proved successful though it led to some hard fighting. The -actual advance was entrusted to two platoons under 2/Lieut. Wheatley -(right) and 2/Lieut. Bell (left). The objective at this point was -strengthened by two "pillbox" machine-gun posts and was in line with -the trench already held on our left by the 21st Division, from which it -was divided by a double barricade; and Lieut.-Col. Richardson took up -his Battle Headquarters in a dugout in their line, as did also Capt. -Cotton. A third platoon of A Company under 2/Lieut. Boorman assembled -in the 21st Division trench, and was formed as a bombing party with -others to rush the double barricade at zero hour and to bomb the enemy -out of their two pillboxes before our barrage had lifted off the enemy -trench in order to clear it before the arrival of Bell and Wheatley -with their platoons. A good many casualties were therefore inevitably -caused to Boorman's platoon by our own shell fire, and he reached the -traverse next to the first pillbox with only two corporals, Sherwood -and Whitworth. Here the two N.C.O.'s threw bombs, which landed neatly -outside the two doors of the pillbox, and directly they exploded -Boorman dashed round the traverse with a bomb in each hand. Sheltering -himself against the wall, he threw his bombs into each door of the -pillbox before the Germans inside had recovered from the effects of -Sherwood and Whitworth's attack. This neat piece of work secured the -pillbox to us, but before Boorman could reorganise his party for the -further advance to the second pillbox Bell's platoon had occupied the -trench. A few men of Wheatley's platoon were also found to be in line. -The greater number, including Wheatley himself, apparently overshot the -objective, not recognising it in its battered condition, and must all -have been killed or captured. - -According to the prearranged scheme, Bell's platoon was withdrawn -shortly before dawn, and Boorman was left in charge of the captured -position with the remains of his own and Wheatley's platoons. The 2/2nd -Londons were now in touch on our right, and by arrangement with them -the trench was divided between the two Battalions, the 2/4th Londons -being responsible from the 21st Division on the left as far as the -communication trench running back from the Hump to the German support -line. The shelling now resumed more moderate proportions, although it -continued sporadically all day, and casualties were continually being -caused in our ranks. The Battalion suffered a severe loss early in the -day in Sergt. Riley, who was acting C.S.M. for the attack. He had done -very good work indeed ever since the Battalion had been in France, -and had throughout shown complete indifference to danger. He was shot -through the chest while accompanying Boorman on a reconnaissance to -endeavour to trace Wheatley's missing platoon. - -In the meantime arrangements had been made for the further attack on -the support Hindenburg line on the following morning, and detailed -orders had been issued which provided for the assembly of the -assaulting troops in the front line--the first day's objective--by 2.10 -a.m. on the 16th June. This intention could not, however, be carried -out, for at about 10.30 p.m. on the 15th a heavy counter-attack was -launched against our new positions which caused severe fighting, in the -course of which the enemy once more gained a hold on the centre of his -old front line and also at two other points. - -On the front held by the 2/4th Londons the counter-offensive took the -form of a bombing attack, the approach of which along the communication -trench opposite the right of our sector was disclosed by the enemy's -own star shells, which rendered plainly visible the forms of the -attackers waist high above the battered sides of the trench. A shower -of Véry lights was at once put up, and with the assistance of these the -attack was driven off by Lewis gun and rifle grenade fire, arrangements -for which had been made most skilfully by Boorman earlier in the day. -None of the enemy succeeded in penetrating our position, but many of -his dead were left on the ground. - -It was, however, so essential to our purpose that the enemy should not -have the advantage of a day's respite before the attack on the support -line, that immediate arrangements were made for a counter-attack to -eject him once more from his old front line in order to leave this -clear as our jumping-off point. The recapture of the line was entrusted -to the 2/1st and 2/3rd Londons, who succeeded by surprise in completely -recovering the whole of the front line at the point of the bayonet by -2.45 a.m. on the 16th. - -At 3.10 a.m. the second day's attack opened. The order of battle was -the same as for the first day, but the forces employed were larger, -the 2/3rd Londons supplying three companies, the 2/1st Londons three -companies, the 2/2nd Londons two companies and the 2/4th Londons two -companies (B under Bottomley and D under Parker). - -The attack, as for the first day, was made under a creeping barrage -supplied by the Divisional artillery and the Brigade machine-gun -companies, and the assault was made in one wave with a "mopping-up" -wave in rear accompanied by a detachment of Royal Engineers for -consolidation work. - -This day again a good deal of difficulty seems to have been experienced -by the advancing troops in identifying their objectives, which had -become almost entirely obliterated by our long-continued bombardments, -while the dust raised by the barrage rendered the recognition of -surrounding physical features almost impossible. The resistance of the -enemy all along the line was most stubborn, and the unusual strength -in which he was holding the attacked position clearly indicated that -the attack was expected. The earliest reports which were received by -runner led to the belief that the objective on the two flanks had -been captured. No information from the centre was forthcoming, and it -gradually became evident that the direction of the flank companies was -at fault, with the result that they had swung outwards leaving in the -centre a gap still occupied by the Germans, who promptly began to bomb -along the line against our unprotected flanks. The attack of the 21st -Division on the left, moreover, failed throughout, and although a few -isolated parties succeeded in reaching a line of shell holes in front -of Tunnel Trench they were eventually forced to withdraw. - -The orders issued to the assaulting wave were to capture the Hindenburg -support line and hold on to it until supports should reach them, -but all the attempts of Lieut.-Col. Richardson to push forward his -supporting troops were frustrated by the intense rifle and machine-gun -fire with which the ground was continuously swept, and similar efforts -along the remainder of the front were stopped for the same reason. - -At 11 a.m. the obscurity of the position induced the Brigadier to -make a personal reconnaissance in order, if possible, to clear up the -situation, but he found it impossible to get along the captured German -front line, and therefore proceeded to the Battle Headquarters of -the 2/2nd Londons. The information obtained there led to the belief -that the 2/2nd and 2/4th Londons had carried their objectives without -difficulty and at comparatively little loss, but that their flanks -were in the air and in danger of being turned by the bombing attacks -of the enemy. The support line was now entirely cut off as runner -communication was utterly impossible under the enemy's devastating -fire, and it was clear that our isolated parties who were in the -objective must be suffering heavy losses. - -It has been difficult to establish what happened to the two companies -of the 2/4th Battalion owing to the heavy casualties sustained, but it -is evident that they also mistook the objective and pushed on some 200 -yards ahead of it, where they came under intense fire from front and -flanks. - -The most advanced party appears to have been a platoon of B Company -under McDowell, who although completely out of touch with the remainder -of their company held on most gallantly to the position they had gained -for some two hours, at the end of which time their ammunition was -exhausted and they were using a captured German machine-gun. No sign -of the promised supports being visible, and the enemy evidently being -about to surround his little party, now reduced to a mere half-dozen, -McDowell determined to fight his way back to his comrades, and began to -withdraw steadily. During his withdrawal he was hit, and on regaining -consciousness found himself alone. He continued his way back to our -lines, crawling from shell hole to shell hole, and managed to collect -four privates, all resolved to sell their lives dearly. By this time -he was completely surrounded, and his little band was destroyed by -rifle grenade fire; McDowell himself was hit again and captured. To the -eternal shame of the enemy let it be recorded that he lay for three -days in the enemy trench before being sent to their dressing-station, -and not until six days after his wounds were received were they dressed -at all. - -A similar fate appears to have overtaken the remainder of B and D -Companies, and the probability is that having overshot their objective -they were outflanked and cut off by parties of the enemy coming down -the sunken road from Fontaine-lez-Croisilles. Their mistake having -become evident to them, they endeavoured, like McDowell, to fight their -way back, but after making a gallant stand were eventually killed or -taken prisoners almost to a man. It is believed from aeroplane reports -subsequently received that this gallant little body actually succeeded -in maintaining themselves against all attacks for nearly two days. But -all efforts to relieve them meeting with failure, they at last fell -gloriously rather than surrender. - -A similar lack of success attended the efforts of the other battalions, -and as a result of the two days' fighting the Brigade held the front -Hindenburg line and the sunken road in rear of it, from the junction -with the 21st Division on the left to a point some 300 yards west of -the Crucifix cross-roads at Bullecourt. - -The casualties of the Brigade amounted to 48 officers and 955 other -ranks, those of the 2/4th Battalion for the two days' fighting being: - - Capts. E. W. Bottomley and W. H. Parker, 2/Lieuts. S. M. Williams - and J. H. L. Wheatley, killed; Capt. E. N. Cotton and 2/Lieut. - T. J. Bell, wounded; 2/Lieuts. E. A. Monkman and R. McDowell, - wounded and missing, and 2/Lieut. E. A. Stevenson, missing. - - In N.C.O.'s and men the losses totalled 7 killed, 53 wounded and - 139 missing, the majority being in B and D Companies. - -It became evident during the afternoon that the 173rd Brigade, who were -weak before they went into action, would need relief that night, and -arrangements were therefore made for the 174th Brigade to take over the -line. In accordance with this arrangement the whole Brigade front was -taken over on the night 16th/17th June by the 2/5th Londons, who pushed -forward strong patrols towards the Hindenburg support line. This, -however, was found to be held in strength by the enemy. - -With this somewhat disastrous day the idea of immediate further -offensive operations was postponed, and the 174th Brigade settled down -to consolidate itself in the Hindenburg front line. - -The fighting spirit displayed throughout the operation was splendid, -and it is only to be regretted that the two days' work had not been -arranged for a one day battle. As the event showed, the capture of the -Hindenburg front line on the 15th prepared the enemy for our attempt to -take the support line on the 16th, with the result that on the second -day severe casualties were inflicted on our troops to no purpose. - -During the second action at Bullecourt an incident occurred which is -surely one of the most remarkable of the whole War. We recount it in -the words of the official record, which appeared in the Battalion War -Diary on the 8th August: - - No. 282496 Pte. Taylor J., of A Company, admitted to 29th C.C.S. - This man had been missing since Bullecourt on the 15th June 1917, - had been wounded and crawled into a shell hole. He sustained a - compound fracture of the left thigh, and aided by Pte. Peters, - B Company, had lived on bully beef found on the bodies of dead - men. After being in the shell hole for over six weeks Pte. Peters - apparently was captured, for the following day three Germans - visited the shell hole and shook Pte. Taylor's leg, but he feigned - death. The following day, not being able to obtain any food, he - decided to crawl back to our lines. His position was some distance - behind the German line. He dragged himself to the parapet of the - trench, threw himself over, crawled through the wire across No - Man's Land into the sector held by the S. Staffords. Altogether he - spent seven weeks and four days behind the German lines. - -[Illustration: BULLECOURT, MAY-JUNE, 1917] - -Pte. Taylor's story was subjected to severe scrutiny by Lieut.-Col. -Dann and by the Brigadier, and their opinion of its truth is witnessed -by the fact that he was awarded the D.C. Medal. Pte. Peters' fate is -unknown, and it is regrettable that after his devotion to his comrade -it was not possible to make him a posthumous award for his gallantry. - -On relief by the 2/5th Londons the 2/4th Battalion marched to -Divisional reserve camp in Mory Copse, where it remained for four days -in reorganising and training. The month at Bullecourt had cost the -Battalion 597 casualties in all ranks, and a rest after the prolonged -operations was urgently needed. - -B and D Companies were for the moment practically effaced, and the -few remaining details were therefore attached respectively to A and C -Companies, these two composite companies being placed under command of -Capts. E. N. Cotton and H. A. T. Hewlett. - -On the 24th June the 58th Division was finally withdrawn from -Bullecourt, its place being taken by the 7th Division, and Divisional -Headquarters opened at Courcelles on that day. - -The 2/4th Londons with the remainder of the 173rd Brigade had moved on -the 21st to Camp at Logeast Wood, where a welcome fifteen days' rest -was spent in training and reorganising, working parties being supplied -daily to the R.E. dump at Achiet-le-Grand. - -During this period awards were made of the Military Cross to 2/Lieut. -D. S. Boorman, and of the Military Medal to L.-Corpl. Coates, for -their gallant conduct on the 15th/16th June. The Battalion was joined -on the 24th June by Capt. W. A. Stark and 2/Lieut. S. Davis, and by -drafts of 107 other ranks on the 21st June and of 28 N.C.O.'s on the -4th July. This welcome accession of strength, especially in N.C.O.'s, -who had become very few, rendered it possible once more to reorganise -the Battalion in four companies under Capts. E. N. Cotton (A), G. H. -Hetley (B), H. A. T. Hewlett (C), and A. G. Croll (D). The duties of -Intelligence Officer were taken over from Capt. Croll by 2/Lieut. S. A. -Seys, and on the 12th July, Cotton having been evacuated to hospital, -command of A Company was assumed by Capt. D. S. Boorman, M.C. - -The period of rest at Logeast Wood was brought to a close by a -Battalion sports meeting, one of those quite informal but very keenly -followed affairs which always have proved such an invaluable means -of recuperation for tired troops. The following day the reorganised -Battalion was inspected by the Colonel, and on the 8th July the -Battalion marched through the devastated region and the ruins of -Courcelles, Sapignies and Bapaume to Bancourt. Its route continued -the following day to Ytres, where six days in billets were occupied -in parading for inspection successively by the Divisional General -(Fanshawe), the Brigadier (Freyberg) and the IV Corps Commander. - -The Brigade was now in Divisional reserve, the Division having taken -over a sector of line in front of Gouzeaucourt and Havrincourt Wood. -The British trenches here were opposed once more to the Hindenburg -system, which had not been penetrated in this region. After severe -fighting in April round Epéhy our troops had established themselves on -high ground on the line Villers Plouich-Beaucamp-Trescault, whence a -series of spurs descend gradually in a north-easterly direction towards -Ribemont, Marcoing and the Scheldt Canal--all destined to witness -bitter fighting in the Cambrai battle five months later. - -The Gouzeaucourt-Havrincourt Wood sector was now exceedingly quiet. -This, to an extent, was of great advantage to the Battalion, since -nearly 40 per cent. of its strength at the moment consisted of drafts -newly arrived who had not yet been under fire. It was possible, -therefore, for the new material to become properly assimilated into the -Battalion before further casualties created deficiencies in the ranks. - -On the night 16th/17th July the 173rd Brigade took over from the 174th -Brigade the right of the Divisional front from the neighbourhood of -Villers Plouich to Queens Lane, a communication trench 500 yards west -of the Beaucamp-Ribemont Road. - -The 2/4th Battalion remained in Brigade reserve for a few days, -Battalion Headquarters and A Company being in huts in Dessart Wood, -C and D Companies in Gouzeaucourt Wood, and B Company attached to -the 2/1st Battalion in a support trench south of Beaucamp. Daily -working parties were supplied by the Battalion for trench repair and -improvement work, but very little incident worthy of record occurred. -The principal excitement was provided by the intelligence that a German -spy disguised as an officer of the R.F.A. was in hiding in one of the -numerous woods with which the countryside is dotted, but the Battalion -was not successful in tracking him down. - -The only portion of the line in which there was any degree of activity -was in front of the left of the Brigade sector, where an isolated -spinney in the middle of No Man's Land--here some 600 to 700 yards -wide--was always a target for the enemy's artillery. This spinney, -known as Boar Copse, was occupied by the Battalion in the line as an -advanced post, and it was decided to wire round the edge of the Copse -and connect it to our front line by a communication trench. The duty of -executing the work fell to the 2/4th Londons, and a working party of 4 -officers and 180 N.C.O.'s and men was supplied under Capt. A. G. Croll -on the night 20th/21st July. As ill luck would have it, the Germans -selected this same evening to endeavour to raid the outpost line -occupied by the 2/9th Londons farther to the left. The raid was carried -out under an intense barrage, but our artillery answered promptly to -the call made on it and the raiders were beaten off, leaving a prisoner -in our hands. Unfortunately the raid caused a certain amount of -shelling on the Boar Copse front resulting in a few casualties, among -whom was Capt. Croll. This was exceedingly bad luck and a loss to the -Battalion. Croll had done excellent work since the arrival in France -of the 2/4th Battalion and had just received his company. His wound, -though not dangerous, was sufficiently severe to keep him in England -for almost a year. His company was taken over by Capt. C. A. Clarke. - -The following night the Battalion relieved the 2/3rd Battalion in the -right subsector on a front of about 1500 yards, all the companies -being in line and each providing its own supports. - -The trenches were well sited and well dug, being very deep and heavily -traversed. Throughout this area the communication trenches were -of exceptional length, Lincoln Lane in particular, which ran from -Gouzeaucourt Wood to Beaucamp, being over two miles long. - -Very little incident occurred during this tour of duty. No Man's Land -was patrolled nightly and appeared to belong to us as no enemy were -encountered. - -On the evening of the 30th July the Battalion was relieved by the 11th -Royal Scots and marched to the light railway at Dessart Wood, whence it -entrained to Neuville-Borjonval, camping there for the night. - -The following day the Battalion moved by bus from Neuville to -Izel-les-Hameau, in the Arras area, the transport under Major Nunneley -moving by train from Bapaume to Saulty and then by march route to -Hameau. - -The whole Division was now put through a regular course of re-equipment -and training in preparation for the heavy work it was to be called -upon to do in the offensive at Ypres. In this training particular -attention was paid to musketry, the necessity for this having been -clearly demonstrated in all recent actions, in which troops had shown -a tendency to use bombs or rifle grenades to the exclusion of their -rifles. - -During this period drafts of officers were received as follows: - - 6th July--2/Lieut. F. A. Carlisle. - - 20th July--Lieut. F. S. Marsh (7th Londons); 2/Lieuts. - R. Michell (6th Londons); and H. N. Bundle, W. F. - Vines, E. R. Seabury and C. C. H. Clifford (13th - Londons). - - 25th July--Lieut. D. C. Cooke; 2/Lieuts. F. B. Burd - and A. J. Angel (13th Londons). - - 1st August--2/Lieuts. J. McDonald and F. W. Walker; - 2/Lieut. C. S. Pike (7th Londons). - - 9th August--2/Lieut. A. S. Cook (7th Londons). - -The Battalion changed its quarters on the 13th August, leaving Izel -for Denier, where it proceeded with its training. Not all the time was -devoted to work, but some excellent sports meetings were held--and -at the Brigade Sports on the 20th the Battalion was successful in -winning the Cup presented by Brig.-Gen. B. C. Freyberg, V.C., D.S.O. -The importance of achievements of this nature cannot be over-rated. -The longer the War continued the more obvious it became that if "rest" -periods were to do any good to the men at all they must be periods -of mental as well as physical rest, and games of all sorts provide -the required relaxation more than anything else. On coming out of the -trenches, weary, muddy, possibly hungry, and almost certainly wet -through, the men's first moments of freedom were spent in a game of -football. - -This was an aspect of the mentality of the British soldier which we -believe was never fathomed by the French villagers. Their hospitality -and devotion to "les braves Tommys" was unfailing and genuine; but -we feel there was a lingering notion among our kind hosts that this -remarkable devotion to football was really a confirmation of the -time-honoured tradition that the English are all at least a little mad. - -Reinforcements of N.C.O.'s and men were also being fed into the -Battalion during this period, and by the end of August the strength in -N.C.O.'s and men had increased by about 240. - - - - -CHAPTER XVI - -THE THIRD BATTLE OF YPRES - - -I. _The 1/4th Battalion on the Menin Road_ - -By the middle of May 1917 the British efforts on the Arras front had -achieved the success which had been aimed at; and the offensive having -been sufficiently prolonged to assist the French in their operations -on the Chemin des Dames, the Commander-in-Chief was free to turn his -attention to the northern area of the British lines. - -The first phase of the operation was opened on the 7th June, when a -brilliant attack by the Second Army (Plumer) carried the British line -forward over the Messines and Wytschaete Ridges, from which the Germans -had dominated our positions since October 1914. This operation, which -was one of the most completely successful of the whole War, resulted by -the 14th June in the advancement of practically the whole Second Army -front from the River Warnave to Klein Zillebeeke. - -One by one the points of vantage held by the enemy since the beginning -of siege warfare were being wrested from his grasp. In succession the -Thiepval Ridge, the Bucquoy Ridge, the Vimy Ridge and finally the -Messines-Wytschaete Ridge had fallen into our hands, and there remained -of this long series of heights only the series of ridges which from -Zillebeeke to Passchendaele dominate Ypres on the east and north sides. -It was towards these hills that the British offensive efforts were now -directed. - -The opening day of the offensive had originally been fixed for the -25th July 1917, but owing to the intensity of our bombardment the -enemy in anticipation of attack had withdrawn his guns, and the attack -was therefore postponed in order that the British guns might be -correspondingly advanced. Combined with the systematic bombardment of -the enemy's trenches, strong points and communications, a definite air -offensive which ensured our local supremacy in this respect, and also -severe gas shelling, were undertaken. - -The front of attack extended for some fifteen miles from Deulemont -on the right to Boesinghe on the Yser Canal--the main attack being -entrusted to the Fifth Army (Gough) on a front of about seven miles -from the Zillebeeke-Zandvoorde Road to Boesinghe. The Second Army on -the right was to make only a limited advance with the chief objects of -widening the front of attack and distributing the enemy's resistance. -At the same time the French on the extreme left (or north) would -co-operate in the marshes of the Yser. - -The offensive was finally launched on the 31st July 1917. The weather, -which for a fortnight previously had been fine and dry and had seemed -to predict success, broke on the day of the battle, and a merciless -rain which changed the whole area of operations to a sea of mud fell -without cessation for several days. The Corps in line on the 31st July -were from left to right the XIV (Cavan), the XVIII (Maxse), the XIX -(Watts), the II (Jacob) and the X (Morland). On the whole the day was -one of marked success, the deepest advance being made in the northern -sector of the attack. From Westhoek to St Julien the second German -line was carried, while north of the latter village the assaulting -troops passed the second line and gained the line of the Steenbeek as -far as the junction with the French, whose attack had also met with -complete success. South of Westhoek the enemy's resistance had been -more stubborn, and his positions in Inverness Copse and Glencorse Wood -which were strongly held by machine-gun posts proved an impassable -obstacle. In this region, however, the German first line was carried, -and our troops managed to maintain themselves far enough forward on -the Westhoek Ridge to deny the enemy observation over the Ypres plain; -the position gained running almost due south from Westhoek east of the -line Clapham Junction--Stirling Castle--Bodmin Copse, and thence to -Shrewsbury Forest, south of which the German second line was occupied -as far as the Ypres-Comines Canal. South of the Canal also the Second -Army achieved considerable success. - -The rain, which began to fall in the afternoon, had a most disastrous -effect on the British plan of attack. Movement over the shell-torn -ground, which was transformed into a series of bogs, rapidly became -impossible apart from a few well-defined tracks, and these naturally -became marks for the enemy's guns. The labour of moving forward -guns, relieving troops and completing the forward dumps and other -preparations for the next bound was increased tenfold. The inevitable -delay which ensued was of the greatest service to the enemy, who -thereby gained a valuable respite in which he was able to bring up -reinforcements. - -The fighting of the next few days was, therefore, local in character -and consisted in clearing up the situation and improving the -British positions at various points in the line, in the course of -which operations the capture of Westhoek was completed. Numerous -counter-attacks by the enemy were successfully resisted, and the line -gained on the 31st July was substantially held. - - * * * * * - -The 56th Division moved from the Third Army area on the 24th July to -the St Omer area. The 1/4th Londons entrained at Petit Houvin for St -Omer and marched to billets at Houlle, in the Eperlecques area, some -five miles north-west of St Omer. The Division was now attached to -the V Corps. Its training was continued during the opening phase of -the battle, after which the Division moved on the 6th August to the -II Corps area, the Battalion occupying billets at Steenvoorde, where -the routine was resumed. On the 8th Major-Gen. D. Smith, C.B. (who had -commanded the Division since 24th July, when Gen. Hull fell sick), left -to command the 20th Division and, two days later, command was assumed -by Major-Gen. F. A. Dudgeon, C.B. - -The same day a warning order was received that the Division would -shortly move into the line to take part in the second phase of the -battle, which was to be renewed as soon as weather conditions should -permit. - -[Illustration: THE THIRD BATTLE OF YPRES, 1917 (1/4TH BATTALION)] - -On the night of the 12th/13th August the Division moved forward into -the line opposite Glencorse Wood, which had been the centre of the -enemy's resistance on the first day of the battle, and took over from -portions of the 18th and 25th Divisions a sector between the Menin Road -at Clapham Junction and the cross-roads at Westhoek, the 169th Brigade -occupying the right of this front with the 167th Brigade on its left. -The 53rd Brigade of the 18th Division remained in line on the right of -the 169th Brigade, between Clapham Junction and Green Jacket Road, and -came under the orders of Gen. Dudgeon. - -On the morning of the 12th the 168th Brigade in Divisional reserve -embussed at Steenvoorde for Canal Reserve Camp, Dickebusch. - -The chain of machine-gun posts still held by the enemy in Inverness -Copse, Glencorse Wood and Nonne Boschen was of immense importance -to the Germans at this juncture; as they screened the long Spur -which, running north-east from the Menin Road Ridge between the -Polderhoek-Gheluvelt Ridge and the Zonnebeeke Road, formed an important -_point d'appui_ in the Langemarck-Gheluvelt line of defence. Their -capture by the British would, therefore, drive such a wedge towards the -enemy third line as to cause a serious menace to his communications -along the Menin and Zonnebeeke Roads. No one was more keenly alive to -the essential value of this position than the Germans, who spared no -efforts to frustrate attempts to launch a further attack in this area. -The continual severity of his shell and machine-gun fire against our -outpost line served his purpose well, as it not only inflicted severe -loss on the trench garrisons of the divisions in the line and seriously -impeded the task of advancing ammunition and other stores incidental -to an attack--a task already difficult enough by reason of the wet -state of the ground--but also precluded efficient reconnaissance of the -ground over which the attack was to be launched. - -The 56th Division was the extreme right of the attack. The advance -allotted to it was to be carried out by the 167th and 169th Brigades, -whose objective was a line beyond the third German line of defence, -and which may be roughly described as running north and south through -Polygon Wood. The southernmost point of this advance was to be Black -Watch Corner, and from this point it would be necessary to connect -the southern extremity of the final objective with the line on the -Division's right, on which no advance would be attempted. This meant -the formation of a defensive flank facing nearly south. - -This vital work of forming the flank was originally entrusted to the -53rd Brigade, and the importance of their rôle will be readily grasped, -since on the manner in which it was carried out would hang in large -measure the fortunes of the 169th and 167th and successive Brigades -on the left, for the German machine-guns in Inverness Copse, if not -silenced, would be free to enfilade the whole advance. The 53rd Brigade -which had been in the line since the opening of the battle on the 31st -July was, however, now exhausted, and so seriously reduced in strength -by the tireless activity of the German machine-gunners that it was not -in a condition to renew the offensive. Its task was therefore handed -over to the 1/4th Londons, on whom devolved the difficult operation -above described of covering the right flank of the whole attack. The -only troops of the 53rd Brigade who would be actively employed would -be a detachment of the 7th Bedfords, who were made responsible for -capturing the machine-gun nests which, from the north-west corner of -Inverness Copse, dominated the whole situation. - -The 1/4th Londons were detailed for this attack on the morning of the -14th August, and it is important in view of what subsequently occurred -to bear this date in mind. It must also be remembered that at this time -the Battalion was some seven miles from the field of battle and that no -officer, N.C.O. or man belonging to it had ever set eyes on the ground -over which the battle was to be fought. - -During the morning Lieut.-Col. Campbell, the Adjutant and the four -company officers went forward to reconnoitre the forward area, visiting -in turn 169th Brigade Headquarters at Dormy House, and Headquarters of -the Battalion in line of the 53rd Brigade at Stirling Castle. It had -been intended also to reconnoitre the ground over which the advance was -to be made, but such was the intensity of the enemy's artillery and -machine-gun fire that this was impossible, and the company commanders -were compelled to return to their companies in ignorance of what lay -before them. Later in the day Lieut.-Col. Campbell was ordered to -report to 53rd Brigade Headquarters, but was unluckily hit on his way -back, near Zillebeeke Lake. Although badly hit he made his way back -to the Battalion, but being unable to carry on was succeeded in the -command by Major A. F. Marchment, M.C. (1/1st Londons). - -At seven that night the Battalion moved forward from Dickebusch to -Château Segard, the move being completed by 11 p.m. Shortly after dawn -on the 15th the forward move was continued to Railway Dugouts, in the -cutting between Shrapnel Corner and Zillebeeke Lake, and here the -Battalion remained during the day. - -The 15th August was occupied in issuing battle equipment and rations -to the companies, while Lieut.-Col. Marchment took the opportunity of -conducting a reconnaissance of the forward area and communications, -and of issuing his operation orders. These were explained to company -commanders as adequately as time permitted, but it must be borne -in mind that when the Battalion moved forward to the assault the -following morning no company or platoon officer had been able to see -the ground over which he was to lead his men. At 6.30 p.m. the 1/4th -Londons left Railway Dugouts in battle order for the assembly area at -Clapham Junction with guides supplied from the 53rd Brigade. A great -deal of heavy shelling, in which four men of B Company were hit, was -experienced during the advance, and in breasting a ridge near Sanctuary -Wood the Battalion had to pass through a barrage put down by the -Germans. Aided by the excellent discipline of the troops, however, -company commanders were able to split up their companies within a -few seconds, and no loss was sustained. By ten o'clock the Battalion -was concentrated with A, B and C Companies in the tunnel under the -Menin Road, and D Company in the trench south of the road. Battalion -Headquarters and part of C Company were in the trench on the north side -of the tunnel. There was no defined line of trenches in this area, the -front being held by isolated shell hole posts, and the assembly was to -be made on tape lines laid down under staff arrangements. The lack of -shelter thus made it necessary to keep the Battalion under such cover -as was obtainable till the last possible moment. During the evening an -officer of each company reconnoitred the route from the concentration -area to the tape lines, assistance being rendered by the 6th Royal -Berkshires, and No Man's Land in front of the line of assembly was -patrolled until shortly before zero hour. - -The intention was to advance in a practically due east direction, while -at stated points in the line of advance platoons would halt one by one, -each establishing itself in a strong point, until finally, when the -last platoon reached its halting point, the whole Battalion would be -deployed in a line of outposts, all of which would turn to their right -and face south. This advance, being made on a front of two companies, -would result in a double line of posts of which the left flank would -rest on Black Watch Corner in touch with the 169th Brigade, while the -right flank would join hands with the 7th Bedfords in the corner of -Inverness Copse. - -At 3.15 a.m. on the 16th August companies began to form up on the tape -lines, the assembly being completed by 4.20 a.m., when the troops were -lying down in the open under a continuous and fairly heavy shell fire -and a galling machine-gun fire from the direction of Inverness Copse. -About 22 casualties occurred under this fire before zero hour at 5.45 -a.m. The order of battle was as follows: A. Company (Spiers) on the -right and B Company (Stanbridge) on the left in front; with D Company -(H. N. Williams) on the right and C Company (Rees) on the left in -support. - -The attack was to be delivered along the whole battle front at 5.45 -a.m. under cover of a creeping barrage, supported by machine-gun -barrage and heavy gun fire on the enemy back areas. At zero hour the -British barrage came down, well distributed and of terrific intensity. -It was hoped that the danger points in Inverness Copse would be put -out of action by our artillery, so that the task of the 7th Bedfords -would be an easy one, but calculations in this respect were soon found -to have been mistaken. The leading companies of the 1/4th Londons got -away from the mark at zero, in good order and well up to the barrage, -but almost immediately came under a hail of lead from Inverness Copse. -The attack of the 7th Bedfords, of such vital importance to the success -of the whole operation, had failed. The artillery fire had not produced -the expected effect on the enormously strong enemy posts over which the -barrage had passed harmlessly, and the 7th Bedfords were repulsed with -loss, thereby leaving the 1/4th Londons completely exposed to the full -force of the enemy's nest of machine-guns on their right flank. - -Within a few minutes 5 officers and 40 N.C.O.'s and men of A and B -Companies were casualties, but the survivors pushed forward steadily, -though a certain amount of delay caused by the gaps so suddenly torn in -their ranks was inevitable. The gallantry displayed by all ranks under -this devastating machine-gun fire, to which was added enemy shell fire -of great intensity, was unsurpassed, but under such a storm of bullets -at close range nothing could live, and the Battalion was brought to a -standstill about 200 yards from starting-point, in an old German trench -which skirted a ruined farmhouse about midway between Inverness Copse -and Glencorse Wood. - -A party of some 60 men of all companies managed to gain shelter in -Jap Avenue. Here they were organised by 2/Lieut. H. E. Jackman, -under whom a strong post was consolidated and an attempt made to -push forward along the trench. This proved unsuccessful owing to the -continued intensity of the enemy machine-gun fire and the accuracy of -his sniping. Further attempts by other companies to advance were also -fruitless, and the Battalion was forced to content itself with hanging -on to these small gains, from which at intervals it was able to engage -with Lewis gun and rifle fire small bodies of the enemy in the open -near the east end of Glencorse Wood. - -An attempt was made to re-establish the situation by an attack, for -which the 53rd Brigade was called upon, through Inverness Copse from -south to north, but so terribly reduced in numbers were its battalions -that Brigade reserve was limited to two weak platoons and further -action was found to be for the moment impossible. - -In the centre the leading waves of the 169th, after some resistance in -Glencorse Wood which they overcame, succeeded in penetrating Polygon -Wood, where they probably gained their objective. The second waves on -approaching the Wood were, however, met with intense fire from front -and flanks, and a few minutes later a heavy counter-attack developed -which drove back the assaulting troops to the middle of Glencorse Wood. -A further counter-attack in the evening forced the Brigade back to its -assembly line. - -On the left the 167th Brigade met with but little greater success. The -advance was steadily conducted as far as a line level with the eastern -edge of Nonne Boschen, where trouble was first encountered by a sea -of mud--an extensive bog caused by the springs in the source of the -Hanebeek--which forced the attacking battalions to edge away to their -left and thus lose touch with the 169th Brigade on their right. In -this position they came under heavy machine-gun fire, and the British -barrage having got far ahead, were forced to fall back. By 9 a.m. this -Brigade also was back in its assembly area. - -Early in the afternoon enemy artillery fire over the 1/4th Battalion's -front became very heavy, and retaliatory fire was directed by our -artillery into Inverness Copse. No infantry action developed, and -during the night the Battalion was relieved by the 12th Middlesex and -withdrew, in support, to the tunnel under Crab Crawl Trench in the old -British system south of Sanctuary Wood. - -Here the 1/4th Londons remained during the whole of the 17th August, -which passed uneventfully, and in the evening was relieved by the 8th -K.R.R.C. of the 14th Division, which took over the 56th Division -front. On relief, the Battalion withdrew to Mic Mac Camp, Ouderdom. - -Reviewing the Battalion's work on the 16th August it must be at once -admitted that it, and indeed the whole Division, failed completely to -perform its allotted task. That all ranks did all that was possible to -achieve it is reflected in the length of the casualty list, and it is -perhaps due to those who fell to comment briefly on what appear to be -the causes of failure. - -In the first place the operation itself was far from easy. The sea of -mud and ooze to which the line of advance had been reduced must in -any case have rendered the recognition by platoon commanders of the -spots at which they were in turn to halt and form their post a matter -of some difficulty. But the circumstances in which the Battalion -became responsible for the attack effectually precluded it from the -preparations for the operation which the difficulty of the task -warranted. The change of command was a further stroke of bad luck. -Lieut.-Col. Marchment was already known to the Battalion, but the -disadvantages under which he laboured in assuming command on the eve -of battle are obvious. The issue of orders was inevitably delayed as -Lieut.-Col. Campbell's reconnaissance had to be repeated by Lieut.-Col. -Marchment on the morning of the 15th, and it was not till the evening -of that day that the scheme could be explained to companies, and then -only by officers, who themselves had not seen the ground or even the -assembly position. In fact the operations of reconnaissance, issue -of orders and assembly of the Battalion had all to be disposed of in -twenty-two hours. In addition to these preliminary difficulties the -progress of the operation itself revealed further circumstances, to -which also a share of the responsibility for failure may be attributed. - -The extraordinary strength of the German machine-gun posts was such -that the most intense barrage which the excellent Corps and Divisional -artillery was capable of producing passed harmlessly over them, and -only a direct hit was sufficient to disturb the occupants. - -The very serious casualties at the outset of the attack--half an -hour after zero, three company commanders were the only officers left -standing--produced inevitably a certain degree of disorganisation, -though the fact that despite these heavy losses the Battalion was able -to establish and maintain itself throughout the day until relief, -speaks wonders for the discipline of the troops and the efficiency -and initiative of the N.C.O.'s. Further causes of failure lay in the -previous exhaustion of the men owing to the bad state of the ground, -which also made extremely difficult the preparation beforehand of -forward supply dumps, and the reinforcement of the attacking troops -during the battle. - -Defeat is not always inglorious, and we feel that the 16th August may -fairly be written down as a day on which the 1/4th Londons failed -without loss of reputation in any single particular. - -The casualties sustained were as follows: - - In officers--Lieut.-Col. H. Campbell, D.S.O., wounded; Lieuts. C. - A. Speyer, L. B. J. Elliott, L. W. Wreford and A. G. Davis, - killed; Capt. H. W. Spiers, Lieuts. A. S. Ford and E. G. Dew, - and 2/Lieuts. L. W. Archer, H. T, Hannay, N. Nunns and H. - E. Jackman, wounded; and in N.C.O.'s and men 182 killed and - wounded. - -2/Lieut. H. E. Jackman was awarded the M.C. for his excellent work and -devotion to duty this day. - -Throughout the Division casualties were heavy and 6 commanding officers -and nearly 4000 all ranks fell on this unfortunate day. - -On the remainder of the battle front varying success was obtained. In -the north a considerable advance was made and the German third line -was broken on a wide front. The French attack on the extreme left was -crowned with complete success. In the southern area, however, the enemy -resistance was everywhere more stubborn, and south of St Julien the -line remained unchanged as a result of the day's fighting. The Division -being concentrated in the Ouderdom area remained there training and -reorganising for several days. - -On the 22nd August its move to the Eperlecques area began, and on the -24th the 1/4th Londons entrained at Reninghelst siding for Watten, -where it detrained and marched to Houlle. - -[Illustration: _Inverness Copse_] - -The 56th Division had been so badly handled on the 16th August that -its return to the battle area without considerable reinforcement was -out of the question and it was, therefore, moved from the Ypres area -to Bapaume. The Battalion accordingly entrained at Arques in the early -hours of the 30th August and arrived in huts in the Beaulencourt area -at 8 p.m. the same day. - - - - -CHAPTER XVII - -THE THIRD BATTLE OF YPRES - - -II. _The 2/4th Battalion on the Northern Ridges_ - -After the restricted success of the 16th August, the renewal of -operations on a large scale was inevitably postponed for some time -through the continuance of adverse weather conditions; though in -the north minor operations had the effect of widening and deepening -the breach in the German defences in the neighbourhood of St -Julien, combined with the capture of a good many prisoners. These -local advances carried the British positions forward east of the -St Julien-Poelcapelle Road and gave them a firm footing in the -Gheluvelt-Langemarck line on both sides of the Ypres-Staden Railway. - -The withdrawal of some of the divisions which had been engaged in the -battle since the end of July being now necessary, the 58th Division was -among the fresh divisions which were sent north to take part in the -next large attack. - -On the 24th August the 2/4th Londons marched from Izel-les-Hameau -to Aubigny entraining for Hopoutre (Poperinghe), whence it marched -to quarters in Dirty Bucket Camp, one of a series of camps near -Vlamertinghe. The Division now became attached to the XVIII Corps -(Maxse). The Battalion continued its training in the new area, paying -a good deal of attention to intensive digging and musketry, and during -the days spent in Dirty Bucket the company commanders and seconds in -command attended a course of instruction at the XVIII Corps School at -Volckeringhove. - -On the night of the 28th/29th August the 58th Division entered the -trenches, taking over with the 174th and 175th Brigades, the sector -occupied by the 48th Division east of St Julien, the frontage extending -from the Hanebeek on the right to the vicinity of Keerselare on the -left. The sector was lightly held with one battalion of each brigade in -the outpost line, one battalion on the Canal Bank and two in camps west -of the Yser Canal. - -The 173rd Brigade remained in Divisional reserve and continued -training. The 2/4th Londons changed station on the last day of -the month, moving to Browne Camp, about four miles north-east of -Poperinghe. Here a further week's training was obtained, after which -the whole of B Company spent four days at the Fifth Army Musketry Camp -near St Omer. Nothing worthy of record occurred during this period -except on the 1st September, when the transport lines were heavily -shelled causing casualties to 26 N.C.O.'s and men, of whom 1 died of -wounds, and to 13 horses, 8 being killed. - -Reinforcements at this period included 2/Lieut. A. C. Knight (4th -Londons) and 2/Lieut. W. D. Warren (19th Londons), and about 110 -N.C.O.'s and men. - -On the 9th September the 2/4th Londons moved forward to Reigersburg -Camp, between Brielen and the Canal, and on the 11th-13th August the -173rd Brigade took over the whole Divisional sector. - -A warning order had now been issued as to the next attack which in -view of the markedly improved conditions of weather had been arranged -for the 20th September. The front of attack was more extended than on -the 16th August, the southern limit being the Ypres-Comines Canal near -Hollebeke, and the Ypres-Staden Railway north of Langemarck marking the -northern extremity. - -The success which had attended the enemy's resistance to our efforts -to advance in the Menin Road region had pointed to the necessity of -modifying the methods of attack. The successes obtained by the British -Army on the Somme, at Arras and at Messines, had caused the Germans to -alter their mode of defence, and instead of a strongly held trench line -they now presented to our attacks a system of concreted machine-gun -posts ("pillboxes" "or Mebus") disposed in great depth in front of -their main line of resistance. This system supplied their defence with -the elasticity which had hitherto been lacking, and the pillboxes, -being sited with remarkable skill to develop the employment of enfilade -fire to the fullest extent, proved a very serious obstacle to British -assaulting columns, which frequently suffered severe casualties at -their hands after making a deep advance into the enemy defensive -system. The pillboxes were, moreover, of such enormously strong -construction that nothing short of a direct hit by a heavy shell could -put them out of action. The effect of our severe artillery preparation -for attacks was therefore nullified, and the occupants of the pillboxes -could only be ejected as a rule by hand-to-hand fighting with bombs. - -This new feature in the fighting called for prompt measures on the -part of the British, and henceforward no attempt was made as a rule -to penetrate the enemy's pillbox system as long as any risk existed -of leaving any of these hornets' nests undisposed of in rear of the -advancing troops. In other words, the attacks were arranged with -objectives much more limited than formerly, while the artillery paid -more attention to the pillboxes, the ultimate capture of which formed -the task of special units detailed for the purpose. - -The assault arranged for the 20th September was prepared on these -revised lines, and all ranks were impressed beforehand with the -importance, not only of locating enemy strong points quickly and -rushing them before their occupants had recovered from the British -barrage, but also of methodical "mopping-up" and consolidation of all -ground gained. - -From the 9th September onwards the work of preparation for the -impending offensive was pushed forward with all possible speed, the -2/4th Londons bearing a heavy share of these necessary duties. For four -of the five nights spent at Reigersburg Camp a working party of the -strength of two companies was engaged in completing the advanced cable -line trench, while on the last night, the 13th, the whole Battalion -less B Company (still at the Musketry Camp) was detailed for carrying -various sorts of R.E. material forward to advanced dumps in readiness -for consolidation of the position it was hoped to gain. - -On the 14th the 2/4th Londons moved to a fresh position on the east -side of the Yser Canal, and for four nights following, the whole -Battalion was engaged in the desperate task of laying a duckboard track -of double width in front of St Julien, as far forward as possible in -the direction of the enemy positions, with the object of providing -a means of communication in the forward area, and of reinforcing or -relieving the advanced troops after the assault should have been -delivered. - -This week of continual working parties was most exhausting to all -concerned. The distance to be covered each night to and from the scene -of the work was about three and a half miles in each direction, and the -labour of the march was increased tenfold by the shocking condition of -the ground, which was still waterlogged, and, away from the defined -tracks, nothing but a series of lakes formed by shell craters full of -water. Heavy as the cable line duties were found, the laying of the -duckboard track during the latter half of the week proved still more -onerous. Not only had the troops to march to St Julien from the Canal -Bank, but the duckboards which were drawn from a dump at Alberta Farm -had to be carried on the men's shoulders for some five hundred yards to -the starting-point of the track. Progress was slow through the heavy -going and the continual delays caused by German Véry lights. Although -some two hundred and forty yards were laid during the four nights' -work, and the track was carried forty yards beyond our most advanced -positions, the task was never completed. The work was obviously fraught -with considerable risk of serious casualties owing to the large numbers -of men employed, and in the circumstances the losses incurred during -the week were light; 11 men being hit on the 11th, while on the 15th -2/Lieut. Carlisle was killed and 2/Lieut. Pike wounded, with 2 men -killed and 5 wounded. - -On the night of the 18th the 2/4th Londons relieved the 2/3rd Londons -in the line, which was still held by isolated posts, and the following -evening assembly for the attack began at about 9 p.m. - -The 58th Division front of attack was entirely north of the Hanebeek, -a small stream which runs almost due east from St Julien, the attack -south of the stream being undertaken by the 164th Brigade of the 55th -Division. The 58th Divisional front was taken up by the 173rd Brigade -on the right with the 174th on its left, the assaulting columns of -the 173rd Brigade consisting of four companies, each 100 strong, of -the 2/4th Londons. The 2/3rd Londons were in reserve to make a dummy -attack, with one company on the waterlogged portions of the front over -which no advance was possible. - -The 2/4th Londons' assembly position which was defined by tape lines -laid down by the adjutant, Capt. A. Grover, was on the line Janet -Farm-Springfield, and covered a front of some 800 yards. Almost in the -centre of this front and some 400 yards from starting-point, lay a -strongly fortified area around Winnipeg cross-roads. To the right of -the cross-roads the whole area as far as the Hanebeek was waterlogged -and impassable, while to the left a series of enemy strong points, -notably at the Cemetery and Spot Farm seemed likely to cause a good -deal of trouble to the attackers. The objective of the 2/4th Londons -lay on an undefined line running roughly north and south about 100 -yards beyond Winnipeg cross-roads. This marked the limit of the 173rd -Brigade's task, though the objective of the day lay about 500 yards -further east, its principal feature being a machine-gun nest in the -Schuler Galleries in the vicinity of the Hanebeek. The further advance -to this final objective was entrusted to the 164th and 174th Brigades, -who by a converging movement were to "squeeze out" the 2/4th Londons -leaving them in occupation of what would become a line of supporting -posts at the end of the day. - -Before the assembly a preliminary reconnaissance of the terrain was -carried out by the company commanders, and in connection with this -Capt. Hetley writes: - - I think all were impressed by the wonderful sight at Admirals Road. - This unsavoury road ran parallel to the front about 1500 yards or - more to the rear of St Julien and when passing over it on the - duckboard track, there could be seen guns in such large quantities - that there seemed to be very little greater interval than 150-200 - yards between them in any direction--a really wonderful contrast to - April 1915, when the Lahore Division was on exactly the same spot. - -On the evening of the 19th September Brigade Headquarters were -established at Cheddar Villa, while the 2/4th Londons' Battle -Headquarters opened in St Julien. The assembly was conducted by -Capt. Grover and Lieut. Seys (Intelligence Officer) who were solely -responsible for an operation which proved exceedingly difficult owing -to the still heavy state of the ground. So bad was the mud that men -constantly sank to their knees, and in some cases touch could only be -maintained by tying the men of each section together with tapes. In -spite of these difficulties the 400 men were in position by 3 a.m. -on the 20th without a hitch, and with practically no casualties, -although the most advanced platoons were within 150 yards of the enemy -positions. The assembly completed, the 2/3rd Londons who were holding -the line withdrew a short distance to the rear. - -The assault was delivered at 5.40 a.m. under cover of an intense -creeping barrage which proved to be excellent, and companies moved off -in good order in the half light close up to the barrage. The companies -were disposed as follows: on the right A Company (S. Davis) with two -platoons and Headquarters of D Company (Stark) attached; in the centre -B Company (Hetley); and on the left C Company (Hewlett) with two -platoons of D Company attached. - -The principal resistance, as had been anticipated, was encountered -in the neighbourhood of Winnipeg cross-roads, and at a pillbox which -lay between them and the cemetery. This was most gallantly captured -single-handed by Pte. Bolton, A Company, who bayonetted three of the -occupants and captured the remainder consisting of an officer and three -men. A slight check at the cross-roads produced a further small bag of -prisoners, sixteen in number, of whom one was an officer. On the left -the chief opposition was encountered at a pillbox some 300 yards east -of Springfield which was holding up the advance of C Company and of -the 174th Brigade on the left. 2/Lieut. F. W. Walker, quickly grasping -the situation, outflanked the position with six men, and succeeded in -rushing it, capturing two machine-guns and twenty men who were sent -back under escort, Walker and the rest of his party at once pushing on -to the objective where touch was gained with the 174th Brigade. Within -half an hour the 2/4th Londons were established on their objective, -the consolidation of which was promptly put in hand, while the flank -brigades after a pause of half an hour pressed forward to their final -objectives in accordance with the plan of attack. - -The complete success of this operation was undoubtedly due to the -careful provision which had been made in advance for the capture -of strong points by specially detailed units who thus ensured the -efficient "mopping-up" of all ground captured, while enabling the -remainder of the assaulting column to keep well up to the barrage. - -Owing to the known strength of Schuler Farm in the final objective, -special arrangements had been made for the attack of this point, -in conjunction with the 164th Brigade, by a strong platoon of D -Company 2/4th Londons with which two tanks were to co-operate in an -outflanking movement from the north. The earliest reports from this -region indicated that the attack had been successful, but subsequent -information made it clear that the first attack failed, partly owing -to the non-arrival of the tanks which stuck fast in the mud, and -partly owing to unexpected resistance met with at a machine-gun post -some 150 yards in advance of the farm. The capture of this post, -which produced 16 prisoners and 2 guns, cost the lives of 2/Lieut. -Warren and the whole platoon except Sergt. Watson and 6 men. The -delay caused, moreover, was serious, and by the time the survivors -of the platoon were able to continue their advance, the barrage had -passed beyond Schuler Farm. Sergt. Watson, being of opinion that the -strength of his party was insufficient to justify an attack on the main -position, sent back his prisoners and established himself with the -captured machine-guns at a point about 250 yards south-east of Winnipeg -cross-roads. - -[Illustration: THE THIRD BATTLE OF YPRES, 1917 (2/4TH BATTALION)] - -The shell fire of the enemy during the advance and subsequent to the -Battalion reaching its objective had been severe, and by this time -not more than 100 rifles of the 2/4th Londons remained effective. -Arrangements were therefore made to stiffen its line with one company -of the 2/3rd Londons. A further attack on Schuler Farm, to be -undertaken by the 2/3rd Londons, was organised for daybreak on the 21st. - -At about three o'clock in the afternoon the enemy was observed to be -advancing in fours against the brigade on our right, and the artillery -was immediately called into action. In spite of heavy losses, however, -the enemy continued to advance with praiseworthy courage until they -deployed, when their morale appeared to break and their ranks rapidly -melted under our shell fire. - -During the remainder of the day a good deal of annoyance was caused by -the continued sniping from Schuler Farm, of which the Germans remained -in possession, but no further counter-attack developed on our front, -and night fell with the 2/4th Londons' position intact. The casualties -already suffered had been heavy, and three company commanders, Hewlett, -Stark and Davis, had unluckily been hit, though the last was able to -remain with his company until after relief the following evening, when -having been wounded a second time he was evacuated. - -The attack of the platoon of the 2/3rd Londons under 2/Lieut. -Middlemiss on the 21st was postponed for further reconnaissance, in -the course of which Middlemiss observed the garrison of Schuler Farm -surrender to men of the 164th Brigade. Believing the situation to be -clear he proceeded along the road, but was hit by fire from a post -by the Hanebeek near that established by Sergt. Watson. Middlemiss' -report, which was the first information obtained of the fall of Schuler -Farm, caused the alteration of his platoon's objective to the pillbox -from which he had been hit, but in the evening this was found to have -been evacuated by its garrison, so that the whole position was now in -our hands. - -During the evening of the 21st violent counter-attacks under cover of -intense bombardments were delivered against the 164th and 174th Brigade -sectors, but these were dispersed, and the 2/4th Londons did not come -into action though their newly-dug trenches were almost obliterated by -the German shell fire and many more casualties occurred. - -At 9 p.m. on the 21st, the 2/4th Londons handed over their position, -intact at all points, to the 2/9th Londons, and withdrew across -the Yser Canal to Dambre Camp, where they remained training and -reorganising for some days. - -This was the most completely successful operation in which the 2/4th -Battalion had hitherto taken part, and indeed all along the line of the -Fifth Army attack the new methods which have been described met with -marked success. - -The outstanding achievements of the day were those of 2/Lieut. Walker, -Sergt. Watson and Pte. Bolton, of which some description has already -been given, but reference should also be made to the excellent work -of Capt. S. Davis, whose clear grasp of situations and the accurate -and complete information with which he kept Headquarters constantly -supplied, were of great value; of Pte. Austin, runner of A Company, -who passed backwards and forwards several times with important -messages through intense barrages; of Pte. Bull, the only surviving -stretcher-bearer of A Company, who displayed the greatest coolness and -devotion in tending wounded men under heavy fire; and Lieut. Altounyan, -the medical officer, whose services were of the utmost value and -carried out under exceedingly trying conditions. - -Mention should also be made of Pte. Anthony of the Battalion Signallers -who from an advanced point in the line established visual communication -with Brigade Headquarters, his station subsequently proving of great -value to the supporting artillery. - -On the evening of the 19th Brig.-Gen. Freyberg, V.C., D.S.O., was -seriously hit on his way to Battle Headquarters at Cheddar Villa; but -he insisted on remaining at duty, and directed operations from his -stretcher, though wounded in ten places, until after news of the -complete capture of the objective was received the next day, when his -removal was insisted upon by the A.D.M.S. who came forward to fetch -him. Command of the Brigade was taken temporarily by Lieut.-Col. Dann, -D.S.O. - -The following decorations were awarded after this action: 2/Lieut. F. -W. Walker, the D.S.O.; Capts. A. Grover and S. Davis, and Lieut. E. H. -R. Altounyan, the M.C.; Sergt. Watson, Ptes. Bolton, Austin, Anthony -and Bull, the D.C.M.; and Sergts. H. O. Wilderspin and F. W. Yandle, -Ptes. J. W. Ling and A. Westcott, the M.M. - -The casualties sustained during the action included: 2/Lieuts. H. N. -Bundle, E. R. Seabury and W. D. Warren, killed; 2/Lieut. F. B. Burd, -died of wounds; Capts. W. A. Stark, H. A. T. Hewlett and S. Davis, -M.C., 2/Lieuts. D. S. Boorman, M. C. (at duty), A. J. Angel, W. F. -Vines and A. C. Knight, wounded; and 60 N.C.O.'s and men killed, 176 -wounded and 29 missing. - -The 58th Division remained in line after this attack, and on the 26th -September took part in the third general attack which was delivered -by the Second and Fifth Armies on a front of some six miles, of which -the northern limit was the Divisional sector. The attack was delivered -by the 175th Brigade and a further considerable success gained, the -Divisional front having been carried forward in the operations since -the 19th a total distance of about 1600 yards. - -On the 27th September, the 2/4th Londons moved to Brake Camp, in the -Vlamertinghe area. Two days were occupied in training here, during -which the area in which the Battalion was located suffered on the -night of the 28th/29th September the most prolonged and serious -bombing by enemy aircraft it ever experienced, the bombardment lasting -without cessation from 9 p.m. to 2 a.m. Fortunately no casualties were -sustained. - -At Brake Camp the following joined the Battalion: - - Capt. R. C. Dickins. - - 2/Lieuts. C. C. Gibbs, D. G. Spring, F. J. Jones, E. G. Gardner and - A. W. Dodds (21st Londons); and 2/Lieut. S. J. Richardson - (7th Londons). - - 250 N.C.O.'s and men. - -Further casualties during September included Lieut., C. Potter and -2/Lieuts. O. H. Mattison and J. McDonald, to hospital. - -2/Lieut. Cook was appointed to the 173rd L.T.M. Battery. - -On the 30th September the 58th Division was withdrawn from the line and -concentrated as Corps reserve for rest in the Nordausques area (eight -miles north-west of St Omer), and the 2/4th Londons moved by rail from -Vlamertinghe to Zouafques where they went into billets on the 1st -October. The train was followed and bombed during the journey by German -airmen, 1 sergeant and 2 men being killed. - -During the period of the 58th Division's withdrawal from the line the -offensive was pressed forward under adverse conditions of weather. -The season was now becoming advanced and the condition of the ground -offered a far greater obstacle to our progress than the enemy's -resistance. Probably no series of battles of the whole war was waged -under such persistently adverse conditions, or imposed a greater -physical strain on the attacking troops. In every direction the -salient was by now a series of "shell hole lakes" the ground being -waterlogged and the mud more glutinous than ever. An increasing number -of casualties to men and beasts occurred through drowning in the shell -holes of this ghastly shell-battered inferno, but though the whole -forces of the elements seemed to be arrayed against us, advances of -enormous importance were achieved during the early part of October, -as a result of which the Allied positions were pushed forward to the -outskirts of Houthulst Forest, to the east of Poelcapelle and to within -2000 yards of Passchendaele. - -The prolonged continuance of active operations was obviously becoming -increasingly difficult, but G.H.Q. was impelled to pursue the course -of this dreary offensive partly by reason of the serious situation -caused on the Italian front by the defeat of Caporetto at the end of -October, and partly by the need of containing as many German divisions -as possible during the preparations for the Cambrai battle, which were -not yet complete. - -The 2/4th Londons remained at Zouafques training and reorganising for -over three weeks. Several drafts were received from the Base, which -together made the considerable addition of 244 N.C.O.'s and men to the -Battalion strength, thus bringing it above its numbers prior to the -action of the 20th September. - -On the 15th October the Battalion was joined by 2/Lieut. H. G. Langton; -and by 2/Lieuts. H. A. Snell, J. R. Naylor and R. J. Richards (1st -Londons). During this period also 2/Lieuts. H. E. English and C. C. H. -Clifford were evacuated sick. Capt. S. H. Stedman was posted to the -173rd Brigade Labour Company at Louches. - -On the 23rd October the 2/4th Londons returned by train to the -Vlamertinghe area and took over quarters in Siege Camp, moving the -following day to the concentration area on the canal bank, whence -the battle surplus under 2/Lieut. Askham left the Battalion for the -Divisional Depôt Battalion. - -On the 25th October, Major W. A. Nunneley, second in command of the -Battalion since July 1916, fell sick and was evacuated to hospital, his -duties being taken over by the adjutant, Capt. A. Grover, M.C. Major -Nunneley was subsequently appointed to command the German officers' -Prisoners of War Camp at Donington Hall. Capt. Grover, M.C., was -succeeded in the Adjutancy by Lieut. F. W. Walker, D.S.O. On the 22nd -2/Lieut D. G. Spring was seconded to the XX Corps School as Instructor. - -The operation in which the 173rd Brigade was detailed to take part -was arranged for the 26th October, and consisted of an attack on a -frontage from the Ypres-Roulers Railway (south of Passchendaele) to -beyond Poelcapelle. The task of the 173rd Brigade, who were flanked -on the right by the 63rd (Royal Naval) Division and on the left by -the 57th Division, was to carry forward the British line east of -Poelcapelle for some 700 yards in a due easterly direction astride the -Poelcapelle-Westroosebeeke Road. The Divisional frontage was some 1800 -yards in length, and bounded on the north by the Poelcapelle-Staden -Road and on the south by the Lekkerbotebeek. The assaulting troops -were provided by the 2/2nd, 2/3rd and 2/4th Londons, while the 2/1st -Londons were in Brigade reserve, with two battalions of the 174th -Brigade concentrated in the old German trench system near St Julien, -also at the disposal of the 173rd Brigade. - -The first objective, which was on the line Spider Crossroads-Moray -House, was to be taken by the 2/2nd and 2/3rd Battalions, while after a -pause of 45 minutes, the 2/4th Londons were to "leapfrog" through them -on to the second and final objective. - -As in the September action, particular preparation was made for the -assault of all known pillboxes by special parties, and the system of -posts to be established by each company was carefully and definitely -decided beforehand. The whole strength of the Battalion was necessary -to cover the wide frontage allotted to it, the order of battle from -the right being D Company (C. A. Clarke), C Company (Boorman), B -Company (Hetley) and A Company (Dickins). In addition to the stipulated -frontage the Battalion was also held responsible for some 200 yards of -waterlogged ground near the Lekkerbotebeek on its right, over which -touch with the 63rd Division could not be actively maintained. - -The attack was to be delivered under a creeping barrage supported by -heavy guns, machine-guns and smoke barrages, while look-out for enemy -counter-attacks was to be maintained by aeroplanes. - -On the morning of the 25th the 2/4th Londons left Siege Camp in battle -order and moved forward to positions in the original front German -system where they remained until the afternoon. At 3 p.m. the forward -move was resumed, and the Battalion was completely assembled in its -allotted area immediately east of Poelcapelle by 10.15 p.m., Battalion -Headquarters being established at Gloster Farm. - -The weather had for some days past shown a marked improvement, and -the ground over which the advance was to be made was reported to be -drying fast. But our much-tried troops could not escape their usual -fate in the matter of weather, for on the night of the 25th rain fell -pitilessly once more, filling up the shell holes, liquefying the mud -and drenching everyone to the skin. All movement was rendered a matter -of extraordinary difficulty, and when the time for the attack arrived -the assaulting columns could scarcely drag themselves forward. - -The British front line being composed of a line of unconnected posts, -the actual "jumping-off " line was defined by tapes which made it -essential to attack before daybreak. At 5.30 a.m. the British barrage -came down, and the 2/2nd and 2/3rd Battalions followed by the 2/4th -began their laborious advance. The barrage was disappointing, for not -only was it not as well distributed as on former occasions, but, having -regard to the state of the ground, it advanced far too quickly so that -the assaulting troops were soon left far behind. - -The 2/2nd Londons were successful in capturing four pillboxes of which -three were at Cameron Houses, about half-way to the first objective, -while the 2/3rd Londons on the left pushed forward to what was at -the time believed to be Spider cross-roads, but was probably a less -important road junction some 250 yards short of it. The line of this -cross-road and Cameron Houses was, however, the limit of the advance, -which was unsupported on the left owing to the adjoining division -on that flank having been held up. The only post taken by the 2/4th -Londons was Tracas Farm on the extreme right. - -The men were now thoroughly exhausted by their efforts, and were -practically defenceless as the mud had choked rifles and Lewis guns, -and rendered them temporarily useless. Indeed, for over half an hour -the Battalion possessed hardly a single rifle which could be fired. At -this juncture the enemy counter-attacked in great force both at Cameron -Houses and on the unsupported left flank, and his attack, as was to -be expected in the circumstances, was successful, and our troops were -driven back with severe loss to the assembly line where the enemy's -advance was finally held. - -After their rough handling of the morning it was clear that the -attacking battalions could not pursue the offensive or remain in the -line, and arrangements were accordingly made for their relief, on the -south of the Poelcapelle-Westroosebeeke Road by the 2/1st Londons and -on the north of it by the 2/7th Londons. The relief was completed by -10.15 p.m., and the 2/4th Londons returned to Siege Camp. - -In other parts of the line greater success was achieved this day, -notably in the vicinity of Passchendaele where the Canadians captured -all their objectives, and on the extreme left in the area held by the -French. - -The 26th October must be regarded as one of the most unfortunate days -ever experienced by the 2/4th Londons. The gallantry of officers, -N.C.O.'s and men alike left nothing to be desired, and their defeat -was at the hands of the elements far more than of the Germans. So bad -indeed was the state of the ground that not a few men, becoming stuck -in the mud and exhausted by their efforts to extricate themselves, met -their death by drowning in the flooded shell holes. - -For their good work on this day decorations were awarded to Capt. C. A. -Clarke (the M.C.) and Pte C. H. W. Roberts (the D.C.M.). - -The casualties sustained in this unfortunate affair were in officers: -2/Lieuts. F. J. Jones, H. G. Langton and J. R. Naylor, killed; 2/Lieut. -R. J. Richards, died of wounds; Capts. R. C. Dickins and D. S. Boorman, -M.C., 2/Lieuts. G. E. Lester, R. Michell, H. A. Snell and A. W. Dodds, -wounded; and in N.C.O.'s and men 25 killed, 214 wounded and 109 -missing--a total of 359 all ranks. This was the most costly single day -in the history of the 2/4th Battalion. - -The 2/4th Londons spent five days at Brake Camp cleaning up, resting -and reorganising, moving on the 1st November to Roads Camp, and on -the following day to St Jans-ter-biezen, about four miles west of -Poperinghe. The Battalion was now reduced to an organisation of -one company for fighting purposes, pending the arrival of further -reinforcements to fill the gaps created on the 26th October. - -On the 6th November a further move was made to P Camp near Peselhoek, -north of Poperinghe, and here the Battalion remained for eight days, -all of which were occupied in training except for three working parties -of 100 N.C.O.'s and men under Capt. Hetley who proceeded to Gwent Farm -for stretcher-bearing duties. - -[Illustration: _Passchendaele Ridge_] - -A further attempt was made by the 175th Brigade on the 30th October to -complete the unfulfilled task of the 26th, but again the state of the -ground rendered the operation abortive. On the higher ground, however, -Canadian troops again achieved some success, and by the 6th November -had captured Passchendaele. - -Thus was this stupendous offensive brought to a close. It had -been maintained for three and a half months under conditions of -unprecedented difficulty, and at enormous cost in personnel. Having -regard to the obstacles which were encountered at every step the -achievement was magnificent, and had served a definite purpose in the -War, not only by securing positions on the high ground for the winter, -but also by assisting our French and Italian Allies at a period when, -especially in the case of the latter, any operation which could relieve -the pressure on their front was of vital importance. - -On the 15th November the Division was concentrated in Corps reserve, -and the 2/4th Londons moved to Piccadilly Camp in the Proven area. - -The 2/4th Londons now spent a prolonged period out of the battle -area; occupying billets successively, after leaving Piccadilly Camp, -at Coulemby on the 26th November, at Bellebrune and Cremarest (about -twelve miles west of St Omer) from the 27th November to the 9th -December, and at Soult Camp near Brielen, to which the Battalion moved -on the last-mentioned date in anticipation of returning to the trenches. - -This period of training passed with the usual routine of -"back-of-the-line" training in drill, musketry, bombing, route marching -and games, interspersed with highly welcome entertainments given by -the Divisional concert troop "The Goods." Advantage was taken of the -time spent in rest to refill the gaps in the Battalion's ranks, and an -excellent opportunity was afforded of assimilating the newly-received -drafts as they arrived and before they were called upon to go into -action. These drafts totalled 213 N.C.O.'s and men, but even with this -accession of strength the 2/4th Londons still remained considerably -weaker than prior to the recent action. - -Officer reinforcements were more numerous in proportion, and included: - - Lieuts. H. J. M. Williams and G. E. Lester. - - 2/Lieuts. R. W. Chamberlain, E. P. Higgs and L. H. Sheppard. - - 2/Lieut. F. B. Johnson (13th Londons). - - Lieut. F. J. Griffiths, 2/Lieuts. F. E. Norrish, F. G. Williams, W. - H. G. Newman and W. Blair (20th Londons). - - 2/Lieuts. S. H. Jehu and J. R. Peryer (21st Londons). - - Lieut. C. A. Sampson (25th Londons). - - Lieuts. E. R. Howden and J. Cairns (A.S.C.). - -On the 16th/17th December the 173rd Brigade took over the whole -Divisional sector, which constituted the left of the II Corps front, -from the Lekkerbotebeeke on the right to the Broembeek, a small stream -close to the Ypres-Staden Railway on the left. The Corps line was in -practically the same position as on the occasion of the Battalion's -last visit to this area, and ran roughly north and south in front of -Poelcapelle, and about 500 yards east of the Poelcapelle-Houthulst -Road. The front line, which was occupied in a series of isolated shell -hole posts, which were being strengthened and linked up to each other -as opportunity offered, was held by two battalions, with support -battalions in the captured German trenches around Langemarck and -Pilckem. - -The 2/4th Battalion took over from the 2/10th Londons the left -support position in Eagle and Candle Trenches on the 16th December, -thus covering a depth of about 3500 yards. The ground between the -forward and rear companies was a quagmire of battered trenches, and -work was immediately necessary to attempt to reduce the chaos of the -defensive system to something approaching cohesion. After five quiet -days in these positions the Battalion moved forward to the left front -positions, relieving the 2/3rd Londons on the 20th December with three -companies in line and one in support. Headquarters were at Louis Farm. - -With the exception of an attack against our left company which was -attempted under a severe barrage on the afternoon of the 22nd, and -which was effectually dispersed, the tour passed quietly and the -Battalion was relieved on the 24th December by the 2/10th Londons, -and concentrated at Battle Siding (Brielen), entraining there for -Elverdinghe. Casualties were 2/Lieut. Jehu and 10 N.C.O.'s and men -wounded and shell-shocked. - -A week at Bridge No. 1 Camp, occupied for the most part in training and -bathing, was enlivened by the Christmas festivities, for which such -provision as was possible had been made, the outstanding feature being -the production by "The Goods" of their famous pantomime, "The Babes in -the Wood," which proved an immediate and enormous success. - -New Year's Day 1918 found the Battalion once more in left support -positions in Whitemill, Eagle, Bear and Candle Trenches, with -Headquarters in dugouts at Langemarck which rejoiced in the name of Pig -and Whistle. Five days of peaceful trench work here were succeeded by -an uneventful tour in the front line positions, and on the 8th January -the Battalion handed over its trenches to the 17th Lancashire Fusiliers -preparatory to the withdrawal of the whole Division. Concentrating on -relief at Bridge No. 1 Camp the Battalion moved the following day to -School Camp, Proven, where a few days' rest was obtained. The G.O.C. II -Corps here presented ribands to those who had recently been decorated. - -Officer reinforcements at this period were: - - 27th December--2/Lieuts. P. J. Payne, N. A. Brown and - V. C. Prince. - - 10th January--2/Lieuts. S. F. G. Mears, E. M. - Cuthbertson, S. C. Geering and G. C. Ewing. - -Early in January Lieut. D. C. Cooke went to hospital and the medical -officer, Lieut. Altounyan, M.C. (wounded), was replaced by Lieut. C. E. -Dunaway, U.S. Army. - -On the 21st January the 2/4th Londons finally left the Ypres area -after nearly five months of hard work in it, and the 58th Division was -transferred to the III Corps (Pulteney) in the Fifth Army which had now -removed to the extreme south of the British lines. - -In recognition of their good work in these actions, all "other ranks" -of the Battalion were subsequently granted permission to wear a small -grenade--similar to that worn as a cap badge, but smaller--on the -corners of the tunic collar. - -This closes the regiment's connection with the Ypres Salient, the -scene of so much hardship and suffering, but at the same time of so -much gallantry and devotion to duty. Ypres occupies a position in the -estimation of the Empire which is challenged by no place in which -British troops served in the War; and it must be for ever a source of -pride to the regiment that it was privileged to take part in the second -and third battles for its liberation from the Germans. - - - - -CHAPTER XVIII - -THE 1/4TH BATTALION IN THE BATTLE OF CAMBRAI, 1917 - - -The 30th August 1917 found the 1/4th Battalion much reduced in strength -moving from Arques to Bapaume, to the great satisfaction of all ranks, -for all had been expecting a return to the unhealthy conditions of the -Ypres Salient. On detrainment at Bapaume an evening march was made to -Beaulencourt, where quarters were allotted in a concentration camp. -This march was not without interest as it was the Battalion's first -introduction to the "devastated area," the appalling lifeless and -ruined belt of country left behind him by the Bosche in his retirement -from the Ancre-Scarpe salient to the Hindenburg line. Beaulencourt -lies between Bapaume and Le Transloy, and is thus on the ridge which -lay beyond the old Lesbœufs lines and which had proved the final check -to the Battalion's advances in the Somme battles of 1916. From the -village the Lesbœufs-Morval Ridge was visible, though of those two -ill-fated villages no ruins were discernible. The whole area was a -vast waste of rank vegetation which was rapidly covering the scars -of the previous year's battles without healing them. Shell fire had -contributed comparatively little to the desolation, but villages had -been completely demolished and trees felled, and the British troops -themselves provided the only relief to the awful silence of this -strange land from which the life of the fields had vanished. - -The Battalion was now attached to the IV Corps (Woollcombe), and the -first few days were spent in very necessary reorganisation of its -slender resources in personnel. The casualties of the Ypres action were -not replaced by drafts, and each company was reduced to two platoons. -That such work as was possible was done to good purpose was shown on -the 4th September, when the Corps commander inspected the Battalion -and expressed himself gratified at the completeness and good order -of its clothing and equipment in view of its recent withdrawal from -the Flanders battlefield. This day was the third anniversary of the -Battalion's departure from England. - -Between the 5th and 8th September the 56th Division took over from the -3rd the left sector of the IV Corps front. The new sector was held -with all three Brigades in line, each Brigade area being occupied with -two battalions in front trenches, one in Brigade support and one in -Divisional reserve, in positions facing the Hindenburg line from the -neighbourhood of Lagnicourt on the left to south of the Bapaume-Cambrai -Road in the vicinity of Demicourt on the right. Activity on the enemy's -part was evidently not anticipated in this area, for by this relief the -56th Division became responsible for a front of approximately 10,500 -yards. - -Of this front the 168th Brigade took over the left or Lagnicourt -sector, with Headquarters in dugouts about half a mile in rear of -Lagnicourt, the Headquarters of the Division being in Frémicourt. This -sector faced the village of Quéant, which was within the defences of -the Hindenburg line. The front line of the left subsector consisted of -a series of platoon posts which were not yet connected up, numbered -respectively C 18/5, C 18/6, C 12/1, C 12/2, C 12/3 and C 12/4. -These posts were the original battle outpost positions which had -been constructed earlier in the year during the advance towards the -Hindenburg line. No Man's Land here averaged 1000 yards wide, and -though from most of these posts the enemy front line was invisible -owing to the lie of the ground, they were all, except on the left, -unapproachable from our side, except under cover of darkness. Some -500 yards in rear of this chain of defences ran a continuous trench -known as the intermediate line, well constructed, with deep dugouts, -moderately strong wire and a good field of fire. Battalion Headquarters -were in dugouts in the sunken road on the left of Lagnicourt, and were -connected with the intermediate line by a communication trench called -Dunelm Avenue. Forward of the intermediate line there was but one -trench leading to the advanced positions and this, Wakefield Avenue, -connected with Post C 18/6. - -In this area the Battalion settled down very comfortably to a period -of two months' routine work in and out of the trenches, unbroken by -operations of any interest, and happily almost entirely free from -casualties. In order to avoid the tedium of following closely the -common round of duty we propose to deal with these months by means of a -few general remarks on the life of the Battalion. - -During this period the Battalion was joined by the following officers: - - Capt. E. E. Spicer, Lieuts. A. Bath and A. M. Duthie, and 2/Lieut. - E. L. Mills. - -and by the following attached officers: - - 2/Lieuts. W. Shand, E. Petrie, C. W. Rowlands, and E. A. Ratcliffe - (1st Londons). - - 2/Lieut. A. Franks (6th Londons). - - 2/Lieut. W. H. Eastoe (7th Londons). - - 2/Lieuts. E. L. Stuckey, C. S. Richards and A. B. Creighton (17th - Londons). - - 2/Lieuts. F. Barnes, F. S. C. Taylor, R. S. B. Simmonds, J. L. - Backhouse and E. D. Buckland (20th Londons). - -Tours of duty were six-day periods as follows: - - 6 days in Lagnicourt } 2 companies in posts. - left subsector } 2 " intermediate line. - 6 days in Brigade support--either side of Lagnicourt village. - 6 days in Lagnicourt } Dispositions as before but companies - left subsector } changed over. - 6 days in Divisional reserve--at Frémicourt, and so on. - -The transport lines and Quartermaster's stores were at Frémicourt, -where permanent horse standings, kitchens, butcher's shop and stores -were erected on an elaborate scale, which appeared to suggest that all -ranks were quite prepared to settle down permanently in this unusually -pleasant sector. - -In the line a very considerable amount of work was got through during -September and October. The front line posts were linked up by a -continuous traversed trench, about 7 feet deep and 3 feet wide at the -bottom, and provided with "baby elephant" shelters for the garrison. -Two embryo trenches in which forward company headquarters were -situate--Whitley and York supports--were extended and strengthened and -the intermediate line was maintained. In addition a large amount of -additional wire was put out. - -While in Brigade support the Battalion always occupied shelters in the -sunken roads which ran parallel to the lines each side of Lagnicourt -village, B and D Companies being on the north side and A and C -Companies and Battalion Headquarters on the south. The dwellings here -were much improved, and fresh ones were constructed, of which the best -were one built under the supervision of Lieut. Bath and "Twin Villa" by -Headquarters. Not all the Battalion's time, however, was devoted to the -adornment of its own homes, for the support battalion was invariably -called upon to supply heavy working parties, the largest of which were -digging under the R.E.'s, while others were attached to tunnelling -companies for the construction of additional deep dugouts at trench -headquarters and in the intermediate line. - -Training was not overlooked, and a great deal of valuable work was -effected. In particular mention should be made of the signallers, who -attained a very high pitch of proficiency under Lieut. Gray, while -Sergt. Randall achieved much success with the Lewis gunners, and -Sergts. Oakely and Taylor did very good work with bombers and rifle -grenadiers. - -In the line the enemy's activity on the Battalion's front was slight -and confined to occasioned shelling and trench mortaring, of which the -bulk occurred at night. The sectors right and left of the Battalion -came in for a rather greater share of the enemy's hatred. The London -Scottish on the right were immediately opposed to a network of trenches -sapped out from the Hindenburg front line, known as the Quéant -Birdcage, and in this vicinity a certain degree of bickering was always -in progress, in the course of which IV Corps developed a pleasing -habit of discharging gas projectors--about 600 at a time--against the -Birdcage. The Bosche, however, did not retaliate. It should not, -however, be supposed that the Division had settled down for a prolonged -rest in this quiet sector. Day and night our excellent artillery were -searching for--and finding--the enemy's "weak spots," and up and down -the sector No Man's Land was every night the scene of very great -patrolling activity. In this direction really useful work was effected -by the Battalion Scouts under Lieut. O. D. Garratt, M.C., and Sergts. -Housden and Hayes. - -The great width of No Man's Land facilitated the operation of a novel -method of supplying the Battalion when in trenches with rations and -stores. The limbers came up nightly as usual from transport lines at -Frémicourt to trench headquarters at Lagnicourt, and from this point -the rations were sent up to company headquarters in half limbers and on -pack mules; whereby a considerable saving of troops for work elsewhere -was effected. On one of these nightly journeys a bridge over Wakefield -Avenue broke and precipitated an elderly transport horse, named Tommy, -on to his back in the trench. It was two hours' hard work to dig room -round him to get him up and make a ramp for him to walk out of the -trench! Tommy's mishap was commemorated in the new bridge which was -named Horsefall Bridge. - -A nasty accident in the line was averted by the coolness of Pte. -Bunker, A Company. While a section was cleaning some Mills bombs one -of the pins fell out and the bomb, with the fuse burning, fell among -the men. Bunker picked it up and threw it out of the trench, when it at -once exploded. For this action Bunker was awarded the M.S.M. - -In the first week of October, while the Battalion was in line, a series -of heavy explosions was heard behind the enemy line in the vicinity of -Quéant and Pronville and these, combined with the sudden disappearance -one night of Baralle chimney--a well-known observation point in the -enemy's country--conduced to the belief, which held sway for a few -days, that a further Bosche retirement was imminent. This, of course, -did not materialise. - -Although we are not recording the actions of the Divisional Artillery -we may, perhaps, be pardoned for quoting the following crisp little -record from the Divisional Intelligence Summary as illustrating how -well the infantry was served by its guns. The incident occurred on the -10th October: - - Movement was seen at an O.P. or sentry post about D.7.d.4.6. An - 18-pr. opened fire, but the first shot fell a few yards wide, - whereupon the German observer waved a "washout" signal with a piece - of white paper. The second shot, however, altered his opinion of - our artillery. - -His amended opinion has, unfortunately, not been recorded. - -The losses of the Battalion in personnel up to the end of October -were practically nil, this being accounted for by the vastness of the -terrain and the fact that about 450 men were occupying some 5000 yards -of firing and communication trench. On the 28th October, however, the -Battalion had the misfortune to lose two promising young officers, -2/Lieuts. Elders and Barnes, both of whom were killed by shells during -an enemy shoot on Posts C 12/3 and C 12/4. - -During this period also the Battalion sustained a great loss in -Regimental Sergt.-Major M. Harris, who took his discharge after nearly -twenty-three years of soldiering in the Royal Fusiliers and the 4th -Londons. Sergt.-Major Harris had served continuously with the 1/4th -Battalion since mobilisation, and had filled the position of Senior -Warrant Officer with conspicuous success since March 1915. The last -member of the pre-war permanent staff to remain on active service with -the Battalion, Harris' imperturbable geniality was the means of adding -enormous force to his disciplinary strictness. His share in achieving -the Battalion's efficiency can hardly be over-rated, while his kindly -personality was ever a factor in the social life of the Battalion. -Harris was gazetted Lieutenant and Quartermaster to the Battalion in -the reconstituted Territorial Army in July 1921. The duties of R.S.M. -in the 1/4th Battalion were taken by C.S.M. Jacques. - -At the end of October information was circulated among commanding -officers that active operations were imminent. The secrets of the -operations were jealously guarded, and only a vague idea was given as -to what would be the opening day. On the 10th November, however, orders -were issued for a feint attack to be delivered by the 56th Division, -which would be on the left of the main operation. This feint was to -be accompanied by a heavy bombardment by all available batteries, by -a smoke screen and the display of dummy figures over the parapet. -Dummy tanks were also to be erected in No Man's Land, and the illusion -completed--or anyway increased--by running motor cycle engines in the -front line trenches. Arrangements for this demonstration were pushed -on with vigour, and it was understood that Z day would fall during the -Battalion's occupancy of the line. - -On the evening of the 18th, however, the 167th Brigade extended to its -left, taking over the 168th sector, and thus holding a two-brigade -front. The 168th Brigade was concentrated in close billets in -Frémicourt and Beugny, the Battalion being in the former village. - - * * * * * - -The preparations for the offensive were conducted with the greatest -possible secrecy, and in order to secure the maximum surprise effect -it was arranged for the attack to be delivered without any preliminary -bombardment or even registration of batteries, the road into the -enemy's defences being cleared instead by a vast number of tanks. - -The attack was delivered by the IV (Woollcombe) III (Pulteney) and -VII (Snow) Corps, on a six-mile front, between Hermies and Gonnelieu, -a subsidiary operation being conducted north of Bullecourt by the VI -Corps (Haldane). The 56th Division was thus outside the actual area of -advance, but was to co-operate on the opening day by means of the feint -attack, for which it had already made preparations, and its further -action was to depend on the success gained in the main operation. The -left flank of the area of advance was intersected by the Canal du Nord, -running between Bourlon and Mœuvres. The frontage in this region was -taken up by the 36th (Ulster) Division, which adjoined the right flank -of the 56th and was the left of the whole attack. The 36th was to -attack with two brigades east of the Canal and one brigade west, the -Division moving northwards along the Hindenburg system towards Mœuvres. -The rôle of the 56th Division was to depend on the degree of success -attained by the 36th. If the latter's attack succeeded in forcing the -retirement of the enemy west of the Canal, this area would be occupied -by the brigade of the 36th Division which was on the west bank; if, -however, this success was not achieved the 56th Division was to attack -over the open with tanks, the 169th Brigade advancing on a front -between Mœuvres and Tadpole Copse, and the 167th forming a defensive -flank from the Copse to our present front line. - -The enormous success which attended the initial stages of the Cambrai -battle needs no elaboration here. At 6.30 a.m. on 30th November -the dead silence was suddenly broken by the roar of a very great -concentration of batteries of all calibres up to 15-inch, and preceded -by 380 tanks the assaulting divisions swept over the first and second -systems of the Hindenburg line. - -With the exception of a check due to the destruction of the Canal de -l'Escaut Bridge at Masnières, and of another at Flesquières (where -a most gallant resistance to the 51st Division was put up by a -single German officer, who continued to serve his gun after all the -team were killed and succeeded in knocking out several tanks), the -success of the day was considerable. The villages of Havrincourt, -Graincourt, Ribecourt, Marcoing and La Vacquerie were added to the -British territory, and it was obvious that the surprise effect had been -complete. - -On the left the 36th Division established itself north of the Cambrai -Road, astride the Hindenburg line, and the 169th Brigade swung its -right flank northward to conform to its neighbours' movements. - -The following day at an early hour the Flesquières obstacle was -overcome and the British line swept forward, the villages of Masnières, -Noyelles, Cantaing and Anneux being added to the bag, while on the -left Fontaine-Notre-Dame was entered and the line pushed up to the -southern edge of Bourlon Wood. On the left of the 36th the 169th -Brigade kept pace, one of their battalions occupying the first -Hindenburg trench about one of the roads forming the south-west exit of -Mœuvres, and beginning to bomb northwards. - -The 21st November witnessed a further deep inroad into the Hindenburg -system. The 36th Division succeeded during the morning in penetrating -into Mœuvres but were not able to maintain their position. On the -extreme left the 169th Brigade continued their bombing attacks along -the enemy trenches, and were reported in the late afternoon as having -captured Tadpole Copse and the first and second Hindenburg trenches -beyond it as far as the Inchy Road. - - * * * * * - -In the Battalion at Frémicourt the 20th November passed without -incident, but all ranks awaited anxiously news of the battle, and -for the expected orders to move forward and join in the success. No -movement was made, however, and the day passed slowly, as such days of -keen expectancy always do. - -The hour for general action by the 56th Division was approaching, and -the 1/4th Londons received orders at 3.30 p.m. on the 21st to move -forward with transport and stores to Lebucquière, which was reached at -8.15 p.m., accommodation being provided in Cinema Camp. The Battalion -was now prepared for action, and the nucleus personnel under Major -Phillips, the second in command (attached from Montgomery Yeomanry), -remained at Frémicourt. - -Next morning the Battalion made all preparations for an early -participation in the fight and, in order to save fatigue to the men, -all battle impedimenta such as Lewis guns and magazines, bombs, tools -and wire cutters were sent on limbers to an open space near Doignies. - -Shortly after midday the Battalion followed, arriving at Doignies -at 4 p.m., picking up its stores and bivouacking. In the meantime -Lieut.-Col. Marchment, M.C., accompanied by Capt. Maloney, the doctor, -rode forward to ascertain the situation from the London Scottish, who -were holding the old British front line opposite Tadpole Copse. - -The rain, which had started early in the day, was still falling when -the Battalion arrived at Doignies. The village was a good deal knocked -about, but shelter of a sort was found, and the Battalion was just -well off to sleep when it was turned out again to move nearer the line -for the purpose of taking over the British front line from the London -Scottish early next day. About midnight the Battalion got under way in -pitch darkness, and moving through Louverval reached its assembly area -near Piccadilly and about 500 yards in rear of the line by 4.10 a.m. on -the 23rd November. As soon as the growing daylight permitted, companies -resumed their advance and took over Rook, Rabbit and Herring Trenches -from the London Scottish, Headquarters occupying a sunken road north -of the wood surrounding Louverval Château. On relief the assaulting -companies of the London Scottish moved forward to continue the bombing -attack started by the 169th Brigade. - -News of the operation was slow in coming through, but by 10.17 a.m. -a report reached Brigade that the attackers had been checked on -endeavouring to emerge from Tadpole Copse. This check was due to a -peculiar omission in the British trench maps, which had shown Tadpole -Copse on the crest of a spur, and dominating all the ground in its -immediate vicinity. It was found that between the Copse and the Inchy -Road was a narrow and sharply marked depression bordered by the -declivitous banks which abound in this undulating countryside. Beyond -this unsuspected valley the Inchy Road was on an eminence just as -prominent as the Tadpole Copse hill; and this position, held by the -enemy in great strength, enabled them to overlook completely all the -northern exits from the Copse. This valley, which played an important -part in the course of the battle, was found subsequently to be -correctly marked on German maps which were captured during the action. - -After a stubborn fight the London Scottish overcame this obstacle -and pushed home their attack in the Hindenburg front trench almost as -far as Adelaide Street and in the support 100 yards beyond the Inchy -Road; while a subsidiary attempt was made, without success, to capture -the Factory between this point and Inchy. At these points the enemy -had constructed blocks which he held strongly against all attempts to -dislodge him. In the meantime the 169th Brigade had been bombing up -the communications leading back to the second system of the Hindenburg -lines, with the object of isolating Mœuvres, but the resistance met -with here was exceedingly stubborn. - -About 8 o'clock that night the enemy launched a heavy attack against -the London Scottish barricades, and in the support trench they -succeeded in forcing the Scottish back to the Inchy Road, though the -position in the front trench was held. The Scottish had now been -fighting for over twelve hours and had suffered rather serious losses, -and the German counter-attack caused two companies of the 1/4th Londons -to be drawn into the fight, A Company (Franks) and C (Barkworth) moving -forward to reinforce the Scottish at about 8.30 p.m. - -A Company, which advanced first, took up a position, acting under the -orders of Lieut.-Col. Jackson of the London Scottish, in the old German -outpost line outside Tadpole Copse, while No. 1 Platoon (Ballance) -went forward to reinforce the Scottish company in the front Hindenburg -trench. Affairs having quieted down the services of this platoon -were not immediately necessary, and it shortly afterwards rejoined -the company. In the meantime No. 2 Platoon (Creighton) was sent to -reinforce the Scottish at the bombing block in the support trench, and -while here Corpl. Johnson and Pte. Bendelow succeeded in beating off an -enemy attack. - -C Company, which also took up a preliminary position in the old -German outpost line, was first told off to replenish the supply of -bombs from the brigade dump in Houndsditch. The fresh supplies were -carried to London Scottish Headquarters; and this task completed, the -company occupied the rectangular work in the support trench to the -east of Tadpole Copse, a portion of the second Hindenburg trench in -rear of the Copse, and the communication trench connecting it with -the Hindenburg third line, 2/Lieut. Mills being responsible for this -communication trench and the advanced block about 250 yards along it. -2/Lieut. Stuckey occupied the main trench. These latter trenches were -taken over from the 2nd Londons early on the 24th. - -B and D Companies meanwhile had not been idle but had passed the night -providing a covering party to a company of the Cheshire Pioneers, by -whom a chain of redoubts had been dug in the line selected for the -defensive flank. - -At 5.30 a.m. on the 24th B Company (Beeby) moved forward, also coming -under the orders of the London Scottish, and at first took up a -position in support in the old outpost line outside the Hindenburg -system. Almost immediately the company was ordered forward to relieve -the 2nd Londons in the communication trench leading to the rear from -the Quadrilateral held by C Company. - -The morning passed comparatively quietly though the duty of keeping -wicket behind the bombing blocks was a trying one, which entailed -the constant alertness of all ranks in readiness to meet a sudden -emergency. At noon, however, the enemy put down a heavy barrage on the -captured portions of the Hindenburg trenches, and this was followed at -2 p.m. by a most determined attack on the advanced blocks held by the -London Scottish. This met with considerable success, and though the -Scottish fought with gallantry they were overcome by the weight of the -enemy's onslaught, and by 2.45 p.m. the German bombers had reached the -block held by Mills (C Company), who put up a stout resistance, under -orders from his company commander to hold his post failing further -orders. In this he was helped by the company's Lewis guns, which gave -covering fire to Mills' platoon and the London Scottish, and also -engaged the enemy at the Inchy Road Factory. Three of the guns were -destroyed by the enemy's shell fire. - -[Illustration: THE BATTLE OF CAMBRAI, 1917] - -The trench was already uncomfortably filled with casualties in addition -to the men who were keeping up the fight, but in a few moments the -congestion was greatly increased by the numbers of Scottish troops who -began to come back and file along the trench. At about 3 p.m. about -50 of the London Scottish were seen to leave the Hindenburg support -trench in the hidden valley referred to, with the object of making -their way over the open towards the front trench. Realising that -this vacation of the trench might enable the enemy to surge forward -along it and so cut off Mills, who was still holding his own up the -communication trench, Barkworth promptly ordered Stuckey to advance and -form a block beyond the side trench held by Mills. Stuckey's losses, -however, had been severe, and with only five men at his disposal he -was unable to cope with the task in view of the great congestion of -the trench. Rather than risk the sudden cutting off of his remaining -slender resources in men and the laying open to the enemy of the whole -Tadpole Copse position, which would inevitably result, Barkworth now -decided to withdraw his advanced positions and concentrate his company, -and accordingly Stuckey was ordered to block the support trench at the -west entrance to the Quadrilateral, Mills gradually withdrawing and -holding the enemy off till the new block was completed. In this retired -position the remnants of C Company were in touch with B Company and -also with the 2nd Londons, and here the enemy was finally held up. - -This gallant little defence in which C Company put up a really good -fight and inflicted considerable loss on the enemy, cost it about 40 -per cent. of its strength in casualties and, as already stated, three -of its Lewis guns. - -At the same time B Company had been heavily engaged in its -communication trench, of which it held a length of some 250 yards back -from the second trench. Here the enemy, who had a bombing block about -50 yards from B Company's forward block, began to attack at about 2.30 -p.m., but after a struggle his first attempt was thrown back. A little -later the Bosche returned to the charge, and this time was successful -in forcing B Company back for a short distance, but a determined -counter-attack re-established the position, which, after a third and -also abortive enemy assault, remained intact in the Company's hands. - -While the 1/4th Londons had been thus heavily engaged the London -Scottish had made a successful resistance in the front Hindenburg -trench which defied all the enemy's attempts. Towards the evening the -enemy's activity both in shell fire and bombing somewhat lessened, -and at 8.30 p.m. D Company (Duthie) was also sent forward relieving C -Company in the trenches. At the same time the Rangers took over from -the Scottish in the front trench. - -As the fighting on the 24th was somewhat involved, it seems desirable -to restate the positions now held by the companies of the Battalion in -the Hindenburg system: - - Front Line--D Company--Quadrilateral in support trench, and - communication leading up to front trench. - - B Company--Communication trench leading from the - Quadrilateral back to third trench. - - Support Line--A and C Companies and Headquarters--Front - trench from west edge of Tadpole Copse to - communication trench east of it and old German - outpost line in front of the Copse. - -The 25th November also witnessed very severe fighting in which the -1/4th Londons bore an important part and achieved considerable -success. The fighting this day fell to D Company who had not yet been -engaged, and the objective allotted to them was the recapture of the -lost portion of the Hindenburg support trench as far as its junction -with the communication trench, which had been defended by Mills the -previous day. At the same time the Rangers were to make good the two -communication trenches leading back from the front trench to the -support on the east side of the Inchy Road, and also the support trench -in prolongation of Duthie's attack. - -We propose to narrate this gallant little action of D Company in the -words of Duthie's report on the operation: - - Artillery preparation began at 12.30 p.m. It was reported to be - very short on our right. Our two blocks were removed at 12.45 p.m. - At Zero (1 p.m.) the attack commenced. The Company was disposed as - follows: - - 14 Platoon, 2/Lieut. E. Petrie, Bombers, Rifle Grenadiers, Riflemen - (carrying); 13 Platoon, 2/Lieut. C. W. Rowlands, with sections - in same order.[5] Lewis gun sections took up a position near our - blocks so as to fire along the trench and to prevent any movement - in the open. Company Headquarters moved with the leading platoon. - For about 50 yards very little opposition was met with but the - leading bombing section was then held up by stick bombs and - suffered eight casualties, which included the leading bombers. To - overcome this check fire was opened for several minutes with No. 23 - and No. 24 Rifle Grenades, and the trench was searched forward for - about 100 yards. The shooting was very accurate and the enemy were - driven back with the loss of about 5 men killed. The advance was - continued by bounds of from 20 to 40 yards under cover of salvoes - of rifle grenades. The first two deep dugouts were unoccupied. The - third and fourth were not immediately searched but sentries were - posted. It was thought that some of the C Company men who had been - wounded the previous day might still be down there. The small C.T. - (about 100 yards from the Quadrilateral) was blocked about 120 - yards up. At the entrance a good deal of bombing was overcome. This - is a shallow trench and the far end under water. Further delay was - caused by the third and fourth dugouts which were found to contain - 21 of the enemy. These were finally cleared. Several were killed - and the remainder badly wounded and captured. The company then - pushed forward to trench junction at E 13 c. 15.75 (objective) and - reached it about 2.45 p.m. The Lewis gun sections were brought up - and placed in suitable positions to protect a further advance and - also the blocking party in the small C.T. None of the Rangers were - encountered and the trench appeared unoccupied, but bombing was - thought to be heard about 300 yards further along. - - [5] Companies were still organised in two platoons owing to their -reduced strength, which had not been made good since the third battle -of Ypres. - - A small block was made in this trench about 30 yards from the - junction. The enemy was now observed leaving the trench and - crawling over the open towards the bank at D 18 d. 90.98 (in the - unsuspected valley). Heavy rifle fire was opened and at least - 30 of the enemy killed. Few, if any, got over the bank. As the - trench beyond the objective appeared to be unoccupied a party of - 12 including O.C. Company, 2/Lieut. Rowlands, Sergts. Norris and - Arklay, moved on up the trench. No fire was opened and silence was - maintained. In the next bay past the trench at E 13 c. 00.85 (50 - yards beyond the objective) two men were seen firing a machine-gun - which was mounted on the parapet and aimed down the bank (in the - valley). This was rushed.... The gun was dismounted and brought - in. Other guns were heard firing and two more were seen (at points - farther along the trench in the valley described in the report - by map reference). Two parties under Sergts. Norris and Arklay - moved round to a point from which fire could be brought to bear. - The crews of two men to each gun were killed and the guns brought - in. O.C. Company and Sergt. Norris continued to advance along the - trench and up to the top of the bank. Heavy bombing could be seen - in Tadpole Lane and in the front line towards the Inchy Road. - Further advance was prevented by the fire of our own guns firing - on the trench in response to S.O.S. signal which had been sent up - from the front line. The trench was very full of dead, both of - the London Scottish and of the enemy. It was impossible to walk - without treading on them. As our barrage continued the party moved - back to our original objective and blocks were made at this trench - junction. The remainder of the party carried back four wounded - London Scottish, who were found in the open near the bank. Later in - the evening when our barrage was discontinued an attack was made - on our block. The enemy was quickly silenced. At 11 p.m. D Company - were relieved by A Company. - -A very successful operation, and a modest account of it by Duthie, -whose personality and leadership was an important factor in the result -achieved. The two men in charge of the first gun captured were shot -by Duthie with his revolver. The resistance offered to the Rangers -was stubborn, and but for their inability to advance it is possible a -considerable success might have been achieved, since the barrage put -down by our guns, in response to the Rangers' S.O.S., had the effect of -shelling Duthie out of part of his gains. - -The remainder of the day was inactive, no further fighting taking place -till about 11.30 a.m. on the 26th, when once more the enemy attempted -to force B Company's position in the communication trench. The company, -however, repeated its gallantry of the former occasion, and the enemy -retired later without having gained any success. - -At 11.30 p.m. on the 26th the Battalion was relieved by the -Kensingtons, withdrawing on relief to its former position in the -Brigade support area behind the old British front line. This relief -brought to a close the Battalion's active participation in the British -offensive, which was now practically spent. During the very trying -three days spent behind the bombing blocks in circumstances which -required particular vigilance and fortitude, all ranks had behaved -splendidly, and it is difficult to mention individuals when all had -rendered such excellent service. A few names, however, call for -outstanding mention, among these being Capt. S. J. Barkworth, M.C., -M.M., and Capt. A. M. Duthie, the commanders of C and D Companies, on -whom the brunt of the work had fallen, and their subalterns Rowlands -and Mills. The Padre, the Rev. S. F. Leighton Green, did splendid -service throughout, being always about the Hindenburg lines and going -up to the advanced blocks. At night he was constantly visiting and -helping with casualties and administering the last rites to those who -had fallen. - -The whole action as far as the Division was concerned had developed on -lines completely opposed to the original plans; for whereas it had been -proposed to employ the Division in the open with tanks, its fighting -throughout had been hand-to-hand fighting in trenches. The regularity -and sufficiency with which bomb supplies found their way to the front -indicated excellent organisation. At no time did supplies fall short of -the demand. - -It was a surprise to a good many to find the much vaunted Hindenburg -line inferior to our own defences. The outpost line which the companies -first occupied was a gross delusion, for it was only six inches deep, -while the main line was poor and not over well maintained, and the -Bosche ideas of sanitation could only be described as a scandal. - -The casualties sustained during the three days' fighting were light in -view of the close contact with the enemy. Two officers, 2/Lieuts. R. S. -B. Simmonds and E. Petrie, were wounded, and the total losses in other -ranks amounted to about 60, including two valuable N.C.O.'s killed, -viz.: Sergts. Barker and Gooch, and one, Sergt. Lintott, M.M., wounded -and captured. - -At midnight on the 24th November the 56th Division had passed from the -IV to the VI Corps. Its position at the conclusion of the offensive -operations was one of almost dangerous extension. It had captured and -was holding over a mile of the Hindenburg line. Its right flank was -not secure so long as Mœuvres remained in the enemy's hands; its left -flank on the Tadpole Copse spur was exposed and subject to constant -counter-attacks. Two of its brigades were involved in this fighting -and in holding a defensive flank of 2000 yards, while the remaining -brigade, the 167th, was responsible for a frontage in the old British -line of 5500 yards, and had in addition to supply a battalion each -night for consolidation of the captured position. It was thus unable -to provide relief for the troops who had been fighting, and was -without any reserve for use in case of emergency. Representations -made by General Dudgeon to the Corps Commander as to the weakness of -his position resulted in a battalion of the 3rd Division being at -once placed at the disposal of the 167th Brigade for counter-attack -purposes. This temporary relief was extended a few days later, and by -the 29th the whole of the 167th Brigade had been relieved by troops of -the 3rd Division and was withdrawn at Frémicourt in Divisional reserve, -with two of its battalions lent temporarily to the 168th Brigade. - -The three days following relief were spent by the Battalion in support -in providing carrying and working parties in the front line and burying -parties for the fallen. On the 29th a slight side step to the left -was made so that the Battalion's right flank rested on Piccadilly and -it became responsible for the defensive flank. A considerable amount -of work had been done in this quarter, and the flank was now provided -with a continuous belt of wire and a chain of inter-supporting posts. -A communication trench had been dug from the old line across No Man's -Land to the Hindenburg line parallel to Piccadilly, a distance of some -1300 yards, and from this T-head trenches had been sapped forward -facing north. The defensive flank positions were only occupied at -night, the trench garrison taking two companies, A and B, while C and -D Companies provided patrols along the wire to prevent any attempts of -the enemy to turn the position. - -The 29th November passed quietly though a good deal of movement was -observable in rear of the enemy's lines, so that his serious attack of -the following day was not entirely unexpected. - -From the Battalion's position an extensive view was obtainable over the -whole terrain as far as Bourlon Wood, and early on the 30th a strong -concentration of the enemy's forces was clearly visible north and east -of Mœuvres. - -At 10.45 a.m. the S.O.S. signal went up all along the line and the -enemy attacked in dense formation under a heavy barrage. The Battalion -stood to arms all day but was not required, for the gallant defence of -the units in the line this day was one of the greatest achievements of -the 56th Division. The enemy's attack was pressed with vigour and at -one time he had driven a wedge into the Hindenburg lines and divided -the London Scottish, who were still in the line, from the 2nd Londons. -The position, however, was defended tenaciously and at the end of the -day the whole of the Division's gains in the Hindenburg front line -were maintained, while the heaps of enemy dead outside the trenches -testified to the severity of the check which he had suffered. - -That night the Battalion was called on for particularly active -patrolling as it was anticipated that the enemy would renew his attempt -on the Divisional front. The whole resources of the Division were -drawn upon to meet any renewed enemy action, and Lieut.-Col. Marchment -had under him for defensive purposes, in addition to the Battalion, -a company of the 5th Cheshires, a company of the 7th Middlesex, the -512th Field Company, R.E., and two sections of the 416th Field Company, -R.E. The Engineers were employed in digging fresh redoubts in dead -ground to the rear of the defensive flank line, while the infantry -companies were kept as a reserve at Battalion Headquarters. No further -action occurred until the afternoon of the 1st December when a fresh -concentration of enemy forces about 3.30 p.m. was crushed by our guns. - -The Division had now well earned a rest, and warning was received -on the 1st December that it would be relieved by the 51st Division -immediately. The relief began at 7 p.m. that evening, the Battalion -handing over its lines to the 6th Black Watch. It was evident that the -incoming troops had been pushed forward hurriedly, for the relieving -battalion arrived without Lewis guns or shrapnel helmets, and with -the officers wearing slacks, just as they had risen from dinner. The -relief took a long while to effect, and it was not until 4 a.m. on -the 2nd that Lieut.-Col. Marchment handed over command of the sector. -On relief the Battalion withdrew to billets in Beugny, but at 11 a.m. -the rearward march was continued to Beaulencourt which was reached by -4 p.m., quarters being allotted in the camp that the Battalion had -occupied on the 30th August. - -While at Beaulencourt the Battalion received congratulatory messages -which had been issued to Brigade by the Corps and Divisional commanders -on the part played in the battle. - -The following day the Battalion entrained at Frémicourt for the Arras -area, reaching Beaumetz-les-Loges at 12.30 p.m., whence it marched to -billets in Simencourt. - -The honours awarded for services rendered in the Battle of Cambrai were -as follows: - - D.S.O.--Capt. A. M. Duthie. - - M.C.--2/Lieuts. C. W. Rowlands and E. L. Mills. - - D.C.M.--Sergt. G. Norris and L.-Corpls. E. S. Brown and T. H. - Sankey. - - Bar to M.M.--Pte. C. S. Ruel. - - M.M.--Sergts. F. Arklay, A. E. Haynes and G. J. Grant, Corpls. T. - J. Court, J. W. Johnson and H. W. Wallder. L.-Corpl. T. - Hodgkins and Ptes. B. M. J. Barnett, H. Evans, W. J. - Hutchin, F. G. Senyard, G. Tyrell, J. Wickens and W. A. - Willmott. - - - - -CHAPTER XIX - -THE 1/4TH BATTALION, WINTER 1917/18--THE RESERVE BATTALION, 1916/17 - - -The closing days of 1917 were full of anxiety for the Allies. The -operations at Cambrai had been undertaken by the British forces at the -termination of the prolonged and unusually trying offensive on the -northern ridges at Ypres, with the object of affording some relief to -our Italian Allies. The secession of Russia from the Allied cause had -had a most serious effect in all theatres of war. In the East it had -afforded the tottering Austrian Empire the respite it so badly needed -and had wrought the utter downfall of isolated Roumania, besides giving -a severe check to the Allies' aspirations in the Balkans and Palestine. -In the West it had entailed a complete reversal of the numerical -position, and from the end of November onwards the German strength -was being continually augmented by the arrival of divisions from the -Russian front, while the Allies became subjected to an ever-increasing -strain. The growing requirements of all the battlefields of the -world on which the Empire's soldiers were playing their part made it -impossible to maintain the British forces in France at the strength -necessary to combat the threat of a very serious German offensive. Only -from the Far West was any relief for the Allies to be expected. The -American Army which had been about ten months in training was already -being transferred to France, but it would still be some time before it -would be sufficiently numerous or experienced to turn the scale against -the enemy. As the winter wore on the threat of an enemy attack on a -grand scale developed into a probability, which as all the world now -knows, materialised on the 21st March 1918. - -For some weeks, however, prior to the launching of this final effort -of the Central Powers the Allies had definitely passed to the defensive -in preparation for the German onslaught, and our present task is to -bridge rapidly the gulf between the close of active operations at -the end of 1917 and the point, which we will fix in the early days -of March 1918, at which we can conveniently take up the story of the -regiment in the offensive itself. We propose, therefore, to devote a -few pages to bringing up to date the record of the various activities -of the regiment, dealing first with the 1/4th Battalion in France, and -afterwards with the Reserve Battalion at home. - - -I. _The 1/4th Battalion in Artois_ - -After three months in the devastated area around Lagnicourt, where -the Battalion had been entirely removed from French civilisation, -and where scarcely any had had the opportunity of sleeping under a -proper roof, the billets allotted to the troops at Simencourt on the -3rd December were a great treat, and it was hoped that for at least -a few days the Battalion would be permitted to enjoy its well-earned -rest. On this occasion as on most others, however, the Divisional -rest proved a delusion, and after two days occupied in cleaning and -reorganisation the Battalion found itself once more on the road, for on -the 5th it marched from Simencourt at 9.30 a.m. to Wakefield Camp, near -Roclincourt (three miles north of Arras) in the First Army area. - -The Division was now allotted to the XIII Corps (McCracken), which -formed the right flank of Horne's First Army and comprised in addition -to the 56th, the 31st and 62nd Divisions. - -The following day Lieut.-Col. Marchment and the Works Officer (Lieut. -Lorden) reconnoitred the sector to be taken over, and on the 7th and -8th the relief of the 94th Brigade (31st Division) by the 168th Brigade -took place, the 1/4th Londons moving on the first day of relief to -Brigade support and on the second day into the left subsection of the -centre Brigade section facing Oppy, in trenches which it took over -from the 12th York and Lancaster Regiment. - -The whole area had seen a great deal of heavy fighting since the -early days of the War. In May and June 1915 during Sir John French's -offensive at Festubert, the French troops had attacked Notre Dame de -Lorette, Ablain St Nazaire, La Targette and Neuville St Vaast. Early -in 1916 the Allied positions on the Vimy Ridge, by then held by the -British, had been heavily attacked by the enemy; while in the spring of -1917, in conjunction with the Third Army's operations east of Arras, -the Canadian Corps had swept over the Vimy Ridge and down the slopes -beyond towards the broad plains of Douai, carrying the line in front -of Gavrelle and Arleux-en-Gohelle. The British front line at the end -of 1917 was therefore deep in what had originally been a rear German -system of defence; trenches were numerous, but poor and in bad repair, -and the whole ground under numerous intense bombardments had been badly -"crumped." - -The Battalion's sector lay between Arleux and Gavrelle and passed -through Oppy Wood, a leafless spectre of what had once been a copse, -through whose shattered trunks the remains of Oppy and Neuvireuil were -visible. The forward line was held in three posts, known from right -to left as Beatty, Wood and Oppy. Each post took a company, with one -platoon of each company in the Marquis-Earl line, a continuous trench -some four hundred yards in rear. The fourth company was held in reserve -in Bow Trench about 1700 yards back from the line of posts, while -Battalion Headquarters occupied a dugout in South Duke Street, close to -the Marquis line, which was the line of resistance. - -The second defensive system consisted of the Red line, a continuous -trench in front of Bailleul and Willerval, while a third system, the -Green line, followed the crest of the Vimy Ridge. The observation -throughout the area was excellent owing to the regular slope eastwards -from the Vimy Ridge, and brigade and battalion commanders could -overlook the whole of their sectors from their respective Headquarters. - -The Battalion's sector was served by one main communication trench, -Ouse Alley, which started from the Green line no less than 5300 yards -from the front line. The administrative arrangements were distinctly -good. Steam trains ran to daylight railhead in rear of the Green -line, and this was connected with the Red line by a night service of -petrol-electric trains. From the Red line forwards rations and stores -were moved by truck. Battalion Headquarters also enjoyed the luxury -of having water laid on by pipe line. Having said so much, however, -we have almost exhausted the good points of the sector. The defences -themselves left much to be desired. An early reconnaissance of the wire -in front of the three company posts revealed an alarming weakness, for -the single lines of concertina wire afforded but little obstacle to an -enterprising enemy, and were placed out much too close to our parapets. -The trenches, with the exception of the Red line, which was of good -construction, were shallow and much knocked about. - -The Battalion's first tour in this sector passed without incident, the -enemy being rather surprisingly inactive, and the Battalion was able to -make much progress towards remedying the defects in its defences. On -the 13th December it handed over its lines to the Rangers and withdrew -to Divisional reserve in Springvale Camp at Ecurie, a pleasant camp, -but one of the filthiest the Battalion had ever had to occupy. - -A few days were spent in training here, and on Sunday, the 16th, -Major-Gen. Dudgeon attended the Battalion's Church Parade, and -presented medal ribands to all available N.C.O.'s and men who had been -decorated for their services at Cambrai. The Division was now expecting -relief by the 31st, and, as this relief would have ensured a Christmas -out of the line, considerable disappointment was caused to all ranks -by the announcement on the 17th December that the relief was cancelled -temporarily, and that the Battalion was to return to the trenches. The -change took place the following day, and the 1/4th Londons took over -the Oppy sector from the Rangers. - -Five uneventful days passed in the Oppy trenches. On the whole the -enemy displayed little activity beyond occasional retaliation to our -continuous and systematic bombardments, which were by day and night -directed against the enemy's "weak spots." At night the Bosche showed -signs of considerable nervousness. A good deal of progress was made -with the Brigade programme of trench and wiring work, which was carried -on in intensely cold weather, and on the 23rd the Battalion once more -exchanged with the Rangers and withdrew to Brigade support. - -In the support area Headquarters and B Company (Spicer) were in a -30-foot railway cutting in rear of Bailleul, while A (H. N. Williams), -C (Barkworth) and D (Cooper) were in the Red line. Christmas day, -which was fortunately not marked by hostile activity, was spent in -these positions and by means of numerous small parties in the Red -line the troops were able to get as much enjoyment out of it as the -circumstances permitted, but the festivity was rather damped by the -death of 2/Lieut. E. L. Stuckey, a keen and promising officer, who was -killed by a stray shell in the Red line. - -Late on Christmas evening the enemy carried out a hurricane bombardment -on the front line posts, and during the last day of the year showed -some disposition to increase his harassing fire on our back areas. - -On the 28th December the 167th Brigade relieved the 168th, which -withdrew in Divisional reserve to the Marœuil area, the Battalion being -billeted at St Aubin, where five days of training and refitting were -obtained. The New Year was celebrated by carrying out the arrangements -which had originally been made for Christmas, and after a quite -pleasant interlude the Battalion moved on the 3rd January 1918, into -the right sector of the Divisional front at Gavrelle, relieving the -Queen's Westminsters. The weather was now intensely cold and the ground -was covered with snow, which effectively stopped any attempts at active -work. The tour of duty passed quietly and without any casualties, -though the enemy's artillery and trench mortar fire continued to show -an increase in volume, and on both sides aircraft activity developed. - -The 62nd Division now took over the Division's sector, and on the 6th -January the 56th Division passed into G.H.Q. reserve at forty-eight -hours' notice to move. The Battalion handed over its trenches to the -2/4th K.O.Y.L.I. and moved to billets at Marœuil, continuing its route -on the 7th to Monchy-Breton (near St Pol), where it arrived in billets -at 4 p.m. - -A great deal of useful training was carried out at Monchy-Breton, -but the incident which probably did as much good to the Battalion -as any, was the formation by Lieut. Faulkner, the quartermaster, of -an orchestra which was an enormous success from its inception, and -maintained its reputation until the end of the War. The orchestra -included the following: - - 'Cellos Ptes. Montague and Stone. - Violins Ptes. Barton, Fairman, Perrin and Cornell. - Cornets Sergt. Fulford and Pte. Stevens. - Trombones Sergt. Grimston and Pte. Westerman. - Clarionets Sergt.-Dr Ingham and Pte. Spooner. - Horn Pte. Cuffe. - Drum Pte. Smith. - Harmonium L.-Corpl. Weekes. - -The numerous concerts given by this excellent band, which was really -well trained by the quartermaster, afforded real pleasure, not only -to the Battalion and to other units of the Division, but also to the -French inhabitants of the various villages in which the Battalion found -temporary homes. - -During December and January the Battalion was joined by 2/Lieuts. H. T. -Hannay and H. O. Morris, and by 2/Lieut. A. E. Hanks (13th Londons), -while Capt. G. E. Stanbridge was granted an exchange to England for six -months' duty at home, after having been in France since March 1916. - -By this time the possibilities of a German offensive had developed into -a practical certainty, and all training was directed towards methods -of defence and counter-attack. Much attention was paid to musketry and -Lewis gun training. The importance of the rifle and bayonet as the -infantry weapon _par excellence_ was once more being realised, and the -bomb and rifle grenade, which in 1916 and 1917 had to a large extent -ousted the rifle from its proper function, were again recognised to be -only subsidiary aids in certain circumstances, so that full advantage -was eagerly taken of the chance to ensure that all ranks were "handy" -with their rifles. - -The defensive systems in the area lately occupied by the Division -still needed a vast amount of work to bring them to a condition to -resist a serious attack, and accordingly throughout the period spent -in G.H.Q. reserve each brigade of the Division supplied one battalion -for work in the forward area under the Chief Engineer XIII Corps. The -Battalion's turn for this duty came after seventeen days of training at -Monchy-Breton, and on the 24th January it moved forward, railing from -Tincques to Ecurie, and was accommodated at Stewart Camp, Roclincourt, -the transport lines being stationed at Marœuil. Every available man -was now put to work in one or other of the large parties which were -supplied daily for the R.E.'s, the principal tasks which fell to the -Battalion's lot being the wiring of the Green line and the construction -of cable trenches (_i.e._ narrow deep trenches in which telegraph -cables were buried to minimise the risk of their destruction by shell -fire) in the forward area by night. The severity of the winter had now -given place to thaw; the weather was warm for the time of year and a -good deal of rain fell. - -This duty continued till the end of January, when the Battalion was -relieved and returned to the reserve area by train from Ecurie to -Tincques, marching thence to billets at Magnicourt, which were reached -on the 1st February. - -An extensive reorganisation was now effected throughout the British -armies in France. The ever-dwindling supply of reinforcements from -home, due in part to failing resources in man-power and partly to -the retention in England of large defence forces which were held in -readiness against a possible German invasion, had caused the numbers -in infantry battalions throughout the Army to sink dangerously below -full strength. In the 1/4th Londons the casualties of Ypres and -Cambrai in 1917 had never been balanced by reinforcements, and this -was typical of the condition of affairs in every unit which had been -heavily engaged in the preceding six months. The decision arrived at, -therefore, was to reduce all Brigades to a three, instead of a four, -battalion establishment, and this was carried out by disbanding one -battalion per brigade and dividing out its strength among the three -battalions which were retained. Inevitably such drastic action caused -bitter disappointment among the battalions which had the misfortune to -be selected for disbandment, and _esprit de corps_ received temporarily -a severe check. In the 56th Division the 3rd (Royal Fusiliers), 9th -(Queen Victoria's) and 12th (Rangers) Battalions were reduced to -cadre strength and transferred to the 58th Division, so that from the -beginning of the month of February 1918 the infantry of the Division -consisted of: - - 167TH BRIGADE--1st London Regiment (Royal Fusiliers). - 1/7th Middlesex Regiment. - 1/8th do. - - 168TH BRIGADE--1/4th London Regiment (Royal Fusiliers). - 1/13th do. (Kensingtons). - 1/14th do. (London Scottish). - - 169TH BRIGADE--1/2nd London Regiment (Royal Fusiliers). - 5th do. (London Rifle Brigade). - 1/16th do. (Queen's Westminster Rifles). - -The Battalion received through these changes about 150 N.C.O.'s and -men from the 9th Londons, 50 from the 3rd Londons and 60 from the -2/1st Londons, who had been disbanded from the 58th Division. Four -subalterns also came to the Battalion as follows: Lieuts. G. G. Lewis -and F. G. Athey from 2/1st Londons, H. F. Dade from 3rd Londons and -W. G. Hook from 9th Londons. The new arrivals naturally felt sore at -first at the disappearance of their own units, but, being all good -sportsmen, accepted the inevitable, and rapidly settled down in the -1/4th Battalion. This acquisition of strength enabled the Battalion -organisation of companies to be expanded to a three-platoon basis -instead of the two-platoon system which had been in force since August -1917. - -At Magnicourt a week's useful training was effected, in which the -reorganisation necessary in consequence of the above changes figured -largely. The Battalion was joined by 2/Lieuts. R. E. Campkin, C. H. -Board, T. H. Mawby and G. R. Pitman. - -The morale of the Battalion--as indeed of all units of the -Division--was now splendid. All ranks were perfectly confident as to -the outcome of the approaching offensive and the competitive spirit -between companies, always strong, was fostered in every possible -way. The Battalion transport under Lieut. G. V. Lawrie, M.C., also -maintained high efficiency, and received special commendation from -Gen. Dudgeon for the smartness of its turn-out. Amid strenuous work -amusements were not overlooked and the pleasures of the lighter side of -life were much added to by the extraordinarily good concert given one -evening by the Quartermaster's band. - -At the end of the first week of February the 56th Division's period -in reserve was brought to a close and its relief of the 62nd Division -began. On the 9th the Battalion left Magnicourt and marched to Marœuil, -moving forward again the next day to its old trenches at Oppy, where it -relieved the 2/5th West Yorkshires. In addition to its old sector the -Battalion had to take over, as a temporary measure, Bird Post on the -right. The front line posts were not approachable by daylight at this -date as Boyne and Bedford Streets, the communication trenches leading -forward from the Marquis line, had fallen in as a result of the severe -weather, and had not been repaired. Other parts of the trench system -also needed much repair. - -This tour of duty was remarkably quiet, and with the exception of -sporadic shelling the enemy was inactive. The Bosche had apparently -been permitted to contract a habit of walking about in the open in rear -of his lines, but B and C Companies in Bird and Beatty posts were soon -able to bring home to him the unwisdom of exposing himself in daylight. -The Headquarter Scouts under Sergt. Hayes also did good work in this -direction from a useful fire position on a big mound near Beatty Post, -whence by good marksmanship they secured six head one evening. At this -period also the close liaison which the Battalion always maintained -with the Divisional artillery stood it in good stead. A battery of the -281st Brigade R.F.A. had a section of 18-pr. guns in Bailleul, and the -Battalion signallers having run a wire to the guns from Bird Post, the -gunners settled down to a little sniping. The gunner officer in charge, -Lieut. J. Powell, M.C., registered the guns on a small cart standing in -Bosche ground and it was easy to switch and elevate the guns roughly on -to any party of Bosche moving about. The results were most successful -and the Bosche was finally cured of his desire for walking exercise -outside his trenches. - -On the evening of the 14th February the Battalion handed over its -trenches to the London Scottish and withdrew to billets in Roclincourt -in Divisional reserve. Here nine days were spent, during which the -Battalion supplied working parties for the further improvement of the -trenches. - -From the 22nd to the 27th the Battalion was once more in the trenches -for another quiet tour of duty, and on the latter date it withdrew to -Roclincourt West Camp in Divisional reserve. The lack of activity at -this period is evidenced by the fact that only two men were wounded -during the month of February. - -Attention was now fixed solely on the coming offensive, to meet which -preparations were being pushed forward with thoroughness. Additional -firesteps were constructed in the trenches and the already formidable -wire was further strengthened. - -From this date forward every tour in the trenches or in Brigade support -was passed by platoons in exactly the same position, so that every man -might, whenever the offensive should be launched, be well acquainted -with his position. - -The five days at Roclincourt West Camp were succeeded by a short period -in Brigade support, in which position the Battalion relieved the -Kensingtons on the 5th March. The tour of duty passed quietly with the -exception of a somewhat severe enemy bombardment with gas shell on the -evening of the 8th. Early on the morning of the 9th the Kensingtons -carried out an excellent raid on the enemy lines north of Oppy, in -the course of which about 20 Germans were killed and 4 brought back -as prisoners. The raiding party was under Lieut. Lester, M.C. (since -killed), commissioned from the 4th Londons. The identification obtained -was normal, that is, the prisoners belonged to the German regiment -which was believed to be opposed to us. These captures elicited -information that the offensive was imminent, and this, combined with -unmistakable signs of enemy activity, such as extensive road repairs, -clearing and repairing enemy trenches formerly derelict, and so forth, -left no room for doubt that the Germans' great effort could not be long -delayed. Thenceforward extreme vigilance was exercised all along the -line. - - -II. _The Reserve Battalion_ - -Shortly after the reconstruction of the 1st London (Reserve) Brigade, -which resulted in the 3rd (Reserve) Battalion being made the -draft-finding unit for both the 3rd and the 4th London Regiments, the -Brigade was moved from its camps at Hurdcott and Fovant to billets in -various watering places on the South Devon coast. The 3rd Battalion -was fortunate enough to be allotted to Torquay, where it took up -its new quarters in December 1916. As a military station Torquay -was, of course, not so desirable as Hurdcott. In the first place, -the scattering of untrained troops in billets greatly increased the -difficulty of disciplinary control, while training grounds were -farther removed and somewhat inadequate. In spite of these undoubted -disadvantages, however, the change from the bitter searching winds of -"The Plain" in winter time to the more genial climate of South Devon -was universally welcomed, and the Battalion lived for some weeks in -considerable comfort. - -The Brigade was now under command of Brig.-Gen. Howell, who at the -outbreak of war had commanded the l/3rd Londons, Col. Godman having -returned to the Scots Guards on the Somme. - -Life in the Reserve Battalion at Torquay proceeded on very much the -same routine as had obtained at Hurdcott, and an attempt at describing -it in detail would only be wearisome. Once again the instructional -staff had to face the "spade work" of training raw recruits, since the -drain on the Battalion's resources during the Somme battles had denuded -it of trained soldiers, and a fresh batch of recruits now filled its -ranks. - -A further modification in training organisation took place about -this time, and we may refer shortly to this as it affected the -functions of training battalions considerably. This modification lay -in the establishment of "Command Depôts" which were formed for the -reception from hospital of officers, N.C.O.'s and men returned from -the Expeditionary Force who were not yet physically fit to return to -their respective units. At a stage in their convalescence, in which -their retention in hospital as in-patients was no longer required, -such men were sent to their Command Depôt for light exercise in -walking, physical training and so on, and for such local treatment as -their individual cases necessitated. N.C.O.'s and men remained in the -Depôt until their recovery was complete, when they were despatched to -their training reserve units for a short "smartening-up" course of -instruction before being once more sent overseas. The Command Depôts -thus relieved training battalions of a great deal of medical and -convalescent work for which they were neither equipped nor suitable, -and also ensured that the staff of instructors in the training -battalions were engaged for the minimum of time in "brushing-up" the -trained men prior to their return to France, whereby they were enabled -to devote the maximum of attention to the recruits. The Guards and the -London Regiment were amalgamated for the purpose of a Command Depôt, -and this was located at Shoreham-by-Sea, Sussex. Shortly after its -formation, Major G. H. M. Vine was appointed from the Reserve Battalion -to the Permanent Staff of the Depôt. - -In January 1917, Major L. T. Burnett joined the Reserve Battalion from -sick leave and was appointed second in command, a position which he -continued to fill until the following July, when he was transferred to -the War Office. - -The South Devon station was retained for only a comparatively short -period and in April the Brigade moved again, this time to Blackdown, -in the Aldershot Command. Blackdown is some seven miles north of -Aldershot, and is one of the many pine-and heather-covered hills in -which the district abounds. Most of the barracks at this Station were -hutted camps, but the 3rd Battalion was fortunate in being sent to -Dettingen, a pre-war permanent barracks in which it was exceedingly -comfortable. - -The advantage of having the Battalion compacted in one camp became -almost at once exemplified, and the desirable tightening of discipline -rapidly effected a great increase of efficiency. The unsurpassed -facilities for training afforded by the Aldershot Command also proved -of incalculable value, and enabled the keen and efficient training -staff of the Battalion to raise the unit to the position of one of the -best organised battalions of a Brigade whose reputation for training -was second to none. - -At Blackdown, moreover, the facilities provided for the recreation -of the troops were really excellent, and among these mention should -be made first of the Y.M.C.A. and the Church Army, whose excellent -institutions were of the greatest value. Each battalion also was -provided with a sports ground, and among the pleasant memories of -men trained in this Station not the least is the Blackdown Garrison -Theatre, which was visited weekly by capable companies. The Sunday -evening concerts in the theatre were also a very notable and valuable -feature of the social life of the garrison. - -Training here proceeded on the same lines, but a further modification -was now introduced for the benefit of the large numbers of lads under -military age who were now joining. Under the Military Service Acts -no men might be sent overseas till the age of nineteen, and in order -to ensure that their training should not be unnecessarily hurried a -special syllabus of work was evolved for them, the original scheme -being so enlarged and lengthened as to provide for such young soldiers -becoming "trained" not earlier than the age at which they might be sent -to the front. To ensure the smooth working of this amended scheme -the young soldiers, or "A IV's" as they were called, were grouped -in special companies, and in addition a number of "young soldier -battalions" were added to the Coastal Defence Forces. - -In January 1918 Lieut.-Col. Montgomerie Webb vacated command of the -Battalion on attachment to the Royal Air Force, and the Battalion -was taken over by Lieut.-Col. Hanbury Sparrow, D.S.O., M.C., Royal -Berkshire Regiment, who had come to England under the six months -exchange system. Under Lieut.-Col. Sparrow the Battalion continued -to make great strides, and his striking personality was the means of -winning every ounce of willing and devoted service from all who had -the honour to be under his command. The work of the Reserve Battalion -during the early part of 1918 is so much bound up with the movements of -the overseas battalions under the stress of the German offensive that -we may conveniently break off here and take up the story of the Second -Battle of the Somme. - - - - -CHAPTER XX - -THE 2/4TH BATTALION IN THE SECOND BATTLE OF THE SOMME, 1918 - - -I. _Preparations for the German Offensive_ - -The southward move of Gough's Fifth Army was for the purpose of -extending the British lines into an area hitherto occupied by -the French. Between the 10th January and the 3rd February 1918 a -considerable sector, extending from the River Omignon north of St -Quentin to Barisis, in the Forêt de St Gobain south of La Fère, was -taken over from the French. The responsibility for the whole of this -line, some thirty miles long, in addition to about twelve miles from -Gouzeaucourt to the Omignon, hitherto held by Byng's Third Army, fell -upon Gough. - -The 58th Division was at first in reserve and was billeted in the -Amiens area, the 2/4th Londons being quartered on the evening of the -22nd January at Thézy-Glimont, a pleasant village near the confluence -of the Avre with the Noye, about eight miles south-east of Amiens, -where French pre-war civilisation was still almost untouched. It is -needless to remark how delightful to all ranks were these peaceful -surroundings after the ghastly shell-torn swamps of Poelcapelle. About -a fortnight passed at Thézy-Glimont in the usual routine of training, -during which one or two small drafts joined the Battalion. Lieut. B. -Rivers Smith left the Battalion on the 1st February for six months' -duty in England. - -The most important feature of the rest period was the reorganisation of -Divisions on a ten-battalion basis,[6] of which a note has been given -in the preceding chapter. In the 58th Division, as in the 56th, the 4th -London Battalion was selected for continued existence, and at the end -of January the 2/4th Battalion was strengthened by the transference -from the disbanded 2/1st Londons of 10 officers and 221 other ranks. -The officers who joined from the 2/1st Londons were Capt. W. D. Ramsey; -Lieuts. W. C. Morton, G. J. L. Menges, W. B. Evans; 2/Lieuts. R. H. J. -Mendl, A. Woodington, C. J. C. Wildman, W. H. Parslow, S. H. E. Crane -and H. W. Durlacher. After the reorganisation the infantry of the -Division comprised the following units: - -[6] Three Brigades of three battalions each, and one pioneer battalion. - - 173RD BRIGADE--2/2nd London Regiment (Royal Fusiliers). - 3rd " " " " - 2/4th " " " " - - 174TH BRIGADE--2/6th London Regiment (Rifles). - 7th " " - 8th " " (Post Office). - - 175TH BRIGADE--9th London Regiment (Queen Victoria's Rifles). - 10th " " (Hackney). - 12th " " (Rangers). - -Before the Division left the Amiens area the imminence of a German -offensive was a matter of common knowledge to all ranks, and so -impressed with the seriousness of the situation was the High Command, -that on the 5th February a most inspiring message from General Gough -was conveyed in a lecture by the Brigadier, to all officers, warrant -officers and sergeants of the Brigade. - -The state of affairs was indeed critical and a grave crisis in the -War was approaching. Some slight account of the general conditions -which had brought this about has already been attempted, and there is -no occasion now to recapitulate the main factors of the situation in -which the Allies found themselves. We must, however, point to one or -two conditions especially attaching to the British front which had a -pre-eminent influence on what followed. - -The gradual and ever-increasing numerical preponderance of the Germans -on the British front has been referred to; translated into numbers the -position may be better appreciated. During the period from the 1st -November 1917 to the 21st March 1918, the number of German divisions -on the Western front rose steadily from 146 to 192, an increase of -46, against which the total number of British divisions in France -was but 58, and these sadly depleted in numbers. The question of the -falling off in the numbers of reinforcements sent to France at this -period has become the subject of an embittered controversy to which we -do not propose to offer any contribution. We are, however, concerned -in pointing to the result, whatever the cause, of this growing -numerical disparity, which was to confront G.H.Q. with a most anxious -problem. The British front was now some 125 miles long, and a glance -at any war map will show that the general trend of the front was in a -north-westerly direction, _i.e._ near its northern extremity the line -ran comparatively close to the sea. In other words, the space available -for manœuvre in the event of a considerable break-through by enemy -forces was dangerously small in the vital neighbourhood of the Channel -Ports; and a successful German offensive in this region might have the -effect of rolling up our forces against the sea. In the south the space -between the lines and the sea was greater, but a large enemy success in -the southern area also had serious possibilities as it might entail the -complete isolation of the British Armies from the French. - -These were very briefly the two alternative possibilities which G.H.Q. -had to face, and the problem awaiting solution was how to provide with -the inadequate force at its disposal for the efficient defence of its -lines no matter where the blow might fall. The matter was further -complicated. The French were equally nervous of a sudden blow against -their weak spots in Champagne and at Rheims, which might lay open the -German road to Paris, and this fear rendered it impossible for them -to place at the disposal of British G.H.Q. sufficient forces to make -up the very grave inequality of strength which existed on the British -front. The grouping of forces was, moreover, rendered more difficult -by the fact that, so great were the available German reserves, it -might well prove that the first enemy blow, although serious and -energetic, might in reality not be the main effort. This doubt would -inevitably, whatever the Allies' dispositions might be, have the effect -of sterilising the British and French reserves for some days until it -was quite certain that the first blow was not a feint, to be succeeded -later by a still greater effort elsewhere. - -Such was the problem, and surely never has a military commander been -faced by a more difficult situation; for on the wisdom of G.H.Q.'s -dispositions would probably rest the fortunes of the whole British -Empire. - -Before stating the solution adopted by G.H.Q. in especial relation -to the doings of the 2/4th Battalion, we may perhaps be pardoned for -glancing at one or two aspects of Ludendorff's problem which, as is now -known from his own book, was by no means free from difficulty. - -The vital necessity of a stern British defence of the Channel Ports -was appreciated by Ludendorff as fully as by the British G.H.Q., -and he was therefore alive to the possibility--knowing the British -inferiority in numbers--that the overwhelming importance of the north -might lead to a concentration of British divisions in the north at the -expense of the southern area. But could he be certain that this course -would be adopted? He might, after staking his all in the south, find -that British G.H.Q. had outwitted him and anticipated his intention -to attack at St Quentin. It was clearly essential that, to achieve -the sweeping victory which alone could save Germany, Ludendorff must -endeavour to encompass the temporary sterilisation of the Allied -reserves which has been alluded to. To ensure this his plans must -be shrouded in secrecy till the last moment; and the organisation -of so vast an attack as was ultimately launched without disclosing -its location to a vigilant enemy must have caused Ludendorff acute -anxiety. That it was in fact accomplished can only beget admiration -on our side for a most skilful opponent. And failure to Ludendorff, -moreover, was fraught with consequences quite as awful from his point -of view as his success would be to the British. Austria had gained a -temporary respite in its victory over the Italians, but its army was -becoming disintegrated and lacking in supplies; and no one realised -more keenly than Ludendorff that the Dual Monarchy itself could not -outlive a collapse of its army. In Germany the revolutionary ideas -from Russia were beginning to have a weakening effect on the loyalty -and steadfastness of an increasing section of the population; hunger -was becoming intensified, for the comparative failure of the U-boat -campaign resulted in an ever-tightening Allied blockade. And ever in -front of Ludendorff loomed the spectre of gigantic American forces on -their way to France, which the U-boats were powerless to stop. How many -Americans had landed? How soon could they be thrown into the battle -line to turn the scale against the Central Powers? These were questions -to which Ludendorff must earnestly have sought an answer, and which -must have brought home to him the realisation that this gigantic bid -for victory he was preparing would for good or evil be the last effort -which Germany could make. - -The decision of G.H.Q. on these questions was that the Channel Ports -must be adequately defended at all costs, and that if any sector of -the line must be left weakly defended, that sector must be in the -southern area, which the Fifth Army had now taken over. The depth of -the space available for retirement in rear of the lines in this area -no doubt had its influence in this decision; and in addition, the fact -that, in the event of a considerable withdrawal of our forces under the -pressure of the German attack, a natural line of defence in rear of -the forward positions seemed to be offered in the line of the Somme, -which at Péronne makes a wide sweep southwards, thus forming a natural -barrier more or less parallel with the British front in the St Quentin -district. Possibly a further factor was the apparent natural strength -of the extreme south of the front between Moy and La Fère, where the -Oise Canal and marshes formed a wide and difficult obstacle between the -Germans and our own troops. In the southern area, moreover, it would in -case of need be more easy to make use quickly of such reserves as the -French might be able to place at G.H.Q.'s disposal. - - -II. _The Retreat from La Fère_ - -The Fifth Army was allotted a front of 42 miles, which was held by -17 divisions in line and 3 infantry and 3 cavalry divisions in -reserve. The sector was held by four Corps, from left to right the VII -(Congreve), the XIX (Watts), the XVIII (Maxse), and the III (Butler). - -The III Corps, with which alone we are concerned, comprised at the -date of battle the 14th, 18th and 58th Divisions on a front of 30,000 -yards, a gigantic sector for 27 battalions, not one of which was at war -strength. In reserve were the 2nd and 3rd Cavalry Divisions. The sector -allotted to the 58th Division, in which it relieved the 30th between -the 7th and 9th February 1918, was the extreme right of the British -Armies and extended from north of Travécy, where it touched the 18th -Division on the left, to south of Barisis, where it linked up with the -French on its right. This enormous front of nearly 9½ miles was held -by two brigades, the two subsectors finding their natural division in -the Oise marshes and the Canal de St Quentin, which at La Fère take a -sudden turn westward, thus running at right angles into the British -positions. North of the Canal the country is comparatively open and -gently undulating, while south of it the lines plunge through the hilly -and densely wooded district of the Forêt de St Gobain. - -The marsh area at La Fère is about a mile and a half wide, so that -the frontage which needed active defence by each Brigade was roughly -four miles. On so vast a frontage a defence by continuous trench lines -was clearly out of the question, and the British defence was designed -to be in great depth. It was divided into three zones of defence. -The Forward Zone, about 1000 yards in depth, relied for its defence -on small company redoubts with the space between taken up by hidden -machine-guns. This zone was intended to act as a "shock-absorber" in -which the first intensity of the enemy's onslaught might be met and -checked. The main defence was to be offered in the Battle Zone, about -1500 yards in rear of the Forward Zone. The Battle Zone occupied a -depth of about 2000 yards and was to consist of isolated and wired -forts, again strengthened by inter-supporting machine-guns. It was -hoped that a final check might be administered to the enemy's attempts -in this zone, but in rear of it a further defensive system, in this -case a continuous line, was to be created as a Rear Zone. Beyond this -again the Somme line was to be put into a state of defence. - -At the date of taking over this area from the French the defensive -organisation on the lines above indicated was practically non-existent. -Very little depth was provided for in the defence and in rear of the -Forward Zone practically all was yet to be done. The Battle Zone -redoubts were inadequate and insufficiently wired, while the Rear Zone -line was merely spit-locked. - -For weeks, therefore, the whole energies of every available formation, -infantry holding the line, engineers, pioneers and labour corps units -from all parts of the world, were concentrated on the enormous task of -converting the G.H.Q. scheme into a reality. Valuable time which could -have been well spent in training the infantry in defensive measures -and counter-attack, and in assimilating the new personnel which had -been brought into battalions by the reorganisation of January, was -inevitably devoted to entrenching and wiring work, wearying in itself -and trying as only work done against time can become. All ranks, -however, were sufficiently impressed by the need, and all were working -with the zeal born of a grim determination to prove themselves equal to -the demands which would be made upon them. - -The 173rd Brigade moved forward to take over the left or north -brigade sector on the 7th February. The 2/4th Battalion railed from -Villers-Bretonneux to Appilly, whence it marched to billets at Quierzy -on the south bank of the Oise. Here it was joined the following day by -the transport which had moved by road. On the evening of the 8th the -Battalion was attached temporarily to the 174th Brigade south of the -Canal, and on the 9th moved to the Forward Zone, where it relieved the -7th Londons. As was to be expected from the conditions under which the -line was held, the Battalion was now rather scattered, Headquarters -and C and D Companies being stationed at Amigny-Rouy, while A and B -Companies were at Sinceny and the stores and transport at Autreville. -Enemy activity in this area was almost non-existent and the whole -energies of the Battalion were devoted to entrenching work, which was -carried out under Royal Engineer supervision. Large working parties, -totalling on some occasions 12 officers and 400 other ranks, were -called for daily for a variety of tasks to which the only relief was a -periodical exchange of companies for bathing at Sinceny. On the 24th -February the Battalion completed the Divisional relief and moved to the -extremity of the British lines, where it relieved the 8th East Surreys, -Headquarters, C and D Companies occupying Bernagousse Quarries, while -A and B Companies were billeted in Pierremande. In this area the -Battalion spent a few quiet days, occupied in strengthening the battle -positions under the Royal Engineers. On the 27th it was relieved by the -7th Londons, and returned to the 173rd Brigade, going into Divisional -reserve in rear of the northern brigade subsector. In this area the -Battalion was again much split up, Headquarters, A and B Companies -being at Viry Noureuil, and C and D Companies at Tergnier. This day -the Battalion was joined by three more officers of the 2/1st Londons, -2/Lieuts. L. F. Wardle, C. B. Francis and C. W. Cumner. - -The situation on the 173rd Brigade front during February had been -remarkably quiet. The policy adopted had been purely defensive, and -our artillery had shown but little activity. The distance separating -the British lines from the enemy's and the nature of the terrain had -rendered observation a matter of some difficulty; but the enemy's -energies appeared to be devoted to strengthening his own defences of -La Fère rather than to the preparation of an offensive operation. The -general impression gained from the Brigade Intelligence Summary for -this month is indeed that the idea of any attack being launched in -the La Fère area was rather ridiculous, and that everyone was quite -prepared to settle down at Fargniers for life. General Gough, however, -as is well known, did not share this comfortable optimism, for almost a -month earlier at a conference of his Corps Commanders at Catelet he had -made what later proved to be an accurate forecast of the location of -the German attack. - -The Battalion's work during the three weeks immediately preceding -the battle calls for little comment. After two days in Divisional -reserve it moved forward to the Battle Zone, in which it relieved the -3rd Londons on the 2nd March, and this position it continued to hold -until the offensive was launched, providing daily working parties for -the improvement of the defences. The early days of March saw a slight -increase of artillery and trench mortar activity on both sides, but the -area was still comparatively quiet with but little outward indication -of the storm which was shortly to burst over it. - -On the 7th March 2/Lieut. D. F. Crawford joined the Battalion. - -The skill with which the Germans continued to conceal their intentions -was indeed marvellous. For some time past the withdrawal of divisions -from the line had taken place, but so widely disseminated had this -process been that it had attracted comparatively little notice. The -attack divisions had been assembled well in rear of the lines, beyond -the reach of our prying aeroplanes, and had there been put through a -very thorough course of training, which extended to the smallest detail -of what was expected of each division. Finally, about the middle of -March this gigantic force had begun to move towards the line, marching -by night and closely concealed by day, and by the evening of the -20th the enormous concentration was complete. Von Hutier, commanding -the Eighteenth German Army, had now between the Omignon and Vendeuil -11 divisions in line, 8 in close support and 2 in reserve; Von Gayl -opposite La Fère had 4 divisions and Von Boehn at St Gobain another 2; -making a total of 27 divisions. Opposed to this colossal strength were -Butler's 5 and Maxse's 4 weak divisions. Such were the odds on the 21st -March 1918. - -Before proceeding to the battle itself there is one further point to -which we desire to refer, and that is the thick fog which lay over -the marshes of the Oise early on the morning of the 21st and the -succeeding days. The effect of this fog on what transpired had been -variously estimated. The general consensus of opinion of officers and -men who took part in the battle is that it was a great disadvantage -to the defence. In many ways this was undoubtedly the case. The -complete blotting out of all landmarks beyond a few yards' radius -rendered any sort of co-operation with adjoining units impossible; the -inter-supporting machine-guns between the redoubts were comparatively -useless for they could not see when and where to fire. The artillery -was also handicapped for it knew not where to lay its barrages to trap -the advancing enemy. Many times in the course of the battle, redoubts -which thought themselves not yet attacked suddenly realised that in -the fog they had been surrounded and cut off. The general result was -that the defence degenerated into a series of isolated battles in which -companies and platoons made individual stands, unsupported by their -comrades and in ignorance of what was occurring on their flanks. - -But there is another side to the picture, and the German opinion is -equally strong, that but for the fog their success would have been -more far-reaching than it actually proved to be. The inevitable -loss of direction and touch between attacking columns, the feeling -of uncertainty born of drifting forwards without seeing one's -surroundings, the strange tricks which fog always plays in the matters -of distance and sound--all these could not but affect detrimentally -the speed and cohesion of the attack--and speed was of all things the -essential for complete German success. Swiftly though the attack came, -from the very first day the advances were made far behind schedule, -and to this extent the German attack failed. How far it failed through -the fog we will not venture to estimate; but that the fog was a -contributory factor there can be no doubt. - -On the afternoon of the 20th March the order "Prepare for attack" -was received from III Corps, and by 3.30 p.m. all companies of the -Battalion were ready to man their battle positions. - -The scheme of defence has already been alluded to in general terms, -and it has been indicated that both the Forward and Battle Zones were -divided into a series of defended localities each held by a company. -These localities comprised a main keep, supported by two or more -subsidiary redoubts, while the space intervening between adjoining -localities was covered by the guns of the Brigade Machine-Gun Company. - -[Illustration: THE RETREAT FROM LA FÈRE, MARCH 1918] - -Map No. 15 shows the relative positions of the various localities in -the scheme of defence, and in the Northern Brigade area, with which -alone we are henceforward concerned, the disposition of troops on the -night 20th/21st March was as follows: - - FORWARD ZONE--2/2nd London Regiment. - Main Keep Locality: Headquarters and 1 company. - Jappy Locality: 1 company with a standing patrol at Beautor. - Brickstack Locality: 1 company. - Travécy Locality: 1 company. - - BATTLE ZONE--2/4th London Regiment. - Headquarters on the Crozat Canal, Fargniers. - Fargniers South Locality: A Company (Lieut. H. J. M. Williams). - Fargniers North Locality: B Company less 2 platoons - (Capt. S. G. Askham). - Farm Rouge Locality: D Company (Capt. C. A. Clarke). - Triangle Locality: C Company (Lieut. G. E. Lester). - - The two remaining platoons of B Company were detached as follows: - - 1 platoon (2/Lieut. D. F. Crawford) at the junction of the St - Quentin and Crozat Canals. - - 1 platoon (Lieut. W. F. Brown) at Condren, where there was also - a squadron of the Oxfordshire Hussars. - - Quessy Locality: 1 company 1/4th Suffolks (Pioneers). - - Brigade Headquarters were at Quessy Château near Crozat Canal, and - the 3rd Londons were in Divisional reserve at Viry Noureuil. - -It will be seen that the bulk of the defensive force was -concentrated--if such a word may be applied to so attenuated a -defence--on the right flank, where the line of the Oise marshes, by -now practically no obstacle owing to the unusually dry spring, laid -open the road to Chauny and Noyon. It was quite evident that should the -Germans succeed in breaking through on the St Firmin-Vendeuil front -they would almost certainly endeavour to expand the breach behind -the British lines and make a south-westerly dash towards Noyon and -Compiègne in order to complete the isolation of the British armies from -the French. The Oise flank therefore was vitally important. - -At 4.20 a.m. on the 21st March the enemy barrage opened with terrific -intensity. The messages to man battle positions were already written -in Brigade Headquarters, but delay was caused in conveying them to -the various units concerned, for during the first few minutes of the -bombardment Brigade Signal Headquarters were knocked out by a direct -hit, so that this and subsequent messages had to be sent by runner. -Lieut.-Col. Dann, in fact, did not receive any orders to move until -long after he had, on his own initiative, despatched his companies to -their posts. - -It is rather difficult to understand why the companies were kept in -billets such as cellars under the ruins of Fargniers and Quessy until -the last moment, especially as warning of the attack had been received -the previous afternoon. Most platoons had several hundred yards, and -some as much as a mile and a half, to traverse to their trenches; and -under the intense and accurate barrage many casualties were sustained -during this forward move. By about 7.30 a.m., however, the companies -were all reported in position. - -The actual time of the attack is not known, but it probably occurred -between 6.30 and 7 a.m., for at 7.10 a.m. a message was received from -Lieut.-Col. Richardson (2/2nd Londons) that the enemy was in Jappy -Keep, and about the same time the bombardment of the Battle Zone -positions became still more intense. It must be borne in mind that fog -hung over the whole area like a thick curtain, completely cutting off -the Forward Zone from the observation, which it had been reasonably -anticipated would be obtained over it. The Battle Zone troops and -Brigade Headquarters were thus in the dark as to what was going on in -the forward positions. - -By 9 a.m. the enemy was reported in possession of Main Keep Locality, -which meant a serious incursion into the defences on the vital flank. -Steps were at once taken to employ the 3rd Londons (in reserve), one -company being directed on Fargniers, while artillery and machine-gun -barrages were laid on the Canal crossings at St Firmin and Beautor and -on the area west of the captured positions. - -Lieut.-Col. Dann now ordered forward patrols from each of the companies -to endeavour to keep in touch with the situation, but it seems that -if these orders ever reached the companies--they certainly were not -received by the left company--the patrols themselves were destroyed by -the enemy shell fire, for no information of value was obtained. - -All this time no word had been received from the Travécy Locality -though attempts were made to communicate from the 2/4th Londons and -from the 18th Division on the left, and it is probable that the fog -enabled the enemy to surround the garrison before its commander was -able to communicate with his Headquarters. - -During the morning Lieut.-Col. Richardson asked for counter-attack -troops to be sent forward to him in the hope that the enemy in the St -Firmin area might be ejected, but this request was refused by Division -on the ground that the Battle Zone garrisons must be maintained intact. -In consequence, therefore, of the extreme pressure on his front, -Lieut.-Col. Richardson was compelled to order a withdrawal of the few -remaining details of his shattered battalion on to the Fargniers area -occupied by the 2/4th Londons, and by midday the fall of the Forward -Zone was complete. - -Shortly after midday the fog lifted slightly, and the 2/4th Londons -in the Battle Zone became engaged with the enemy, who began to exert -pressure on the extreme right flank. At about 2 p.m. the platoon of A -Company holding Distillery Post next the Oise Canal was driven in and -Lieut.-Col. Dann ordered the company of the 3rd Londons in Fargniers to -launch a counter-attack. This effort was only partly successful, and -Distillery Post remained in German hands. - -About the same time the enemy advanced in large numbers all along -the line, especially against the Farm Rouge and Triangle Localities. -The former of these had always been regarded as a weak spot in the -defences, and two reserve machine-guns were at once turned on to the -enemy advancing against it. By 3.45 p.m., after a stubborn resistance -against overwhelming numbers, Clarke's weak company was ejected from -the Farm Rouge itself, and its grip on the remainder of the Locality -much weakened. The assaulting columns continued to press on in the -direction of the Quessy Locality, thus isolating the Fargniers position -in the corner between the two Canals and completely cutting off Lester, -who was still hanging on to his position in the Triangle against -impossible odds. - -A prompt endeavour to counter this very serious turn of events was -taken by Brigade, who sent forward two platoons of the Suffolks to -reinforce Clarke and fill the gap between him and Askham. The 3rd -Londons also were drawn on again, and a second company was sent forward -through Quessy to strengthen the Farm Rouge Locality. Of this company, -however, only two platoons ever reached their objective, the others -being destroyed by the enemy's fire at the crossing of the Crozat Canal. - -At about 6.50 p.m. the Battle Zone, in spite of repeated and heavy -enemy attacks, was still intact with the exceptions of the penetrations -next the Canal on the extreme right and in the Farm Rouge Locality, and -it was decided to lay down a provisional S.O.S. line on the forward -edge of the Battle Zone. The enemy, however, was continuing his attacks -with great persistence, and the gradual infiltration of his storm -troops between our scattered positions was constantly altering the -situation. By 7.15 p.m. he had already overrun the new S.O.S. line -in the vicinity of the Distillery, and was beginning to close in on -Fargniers from the south. - -In the 18th Division area on the left the struggle was also raging -in the Battle Zone, though one or two posts in the Forward Zone were -continuing their glorious yet hopeless struggle. Beyond the 18th -Division the 14th had received a severe blow and the Germans had -penetrated some miles into the British positions. It appeared by no -means improbable that if the enemy's progress in this region were -unchecked the left flank of the III Corps would be entirely rolled up. -A general withdrawal was therefore inevitable to prevent the line being -broken. To conform with these movements it was decided by Division to -effect a withdrawal to the line of the Crozat Canal from its junction -with the St Quentin Canal as far north as a line running due west -between the Farm Rouge and Triangle Localities, which latter was to be -held. - -Instructions to this end were immediately issued, and Lieut.-Col. -Dann was ordered to conduct the withdrawal of the whole of the mixed -details now in the Fargniers corner, and all troops in the Battle Zone -were placed under his orders. This withdrawal was really a stubborn -rearguard action, for the enemy was unrelenting in his efforts to drive -in the Farm Rouge gap and reach the Canal. But a stern resistance -was offered in which gallant service was rendered by the Suffolks at -Quessy, and by midnight Lieut.-Col. Dann was enabled to report his -heterogeneous command in position on the west bank of the Canal, with -all iron rations, S.A.A., stores and Orderly Room records intact. - -The defence of the Triangle Locality must now be referred to as it -comprises, owing to the wedge driven into the Farm Rouge Locality early -in the day, an isolated battle, and is a magnificent example of stern -courage against overwhelming numbers. The casualties suffered from -gas shell in this area had been numerous, but apart from the accurate -shooting of the Bosche gunners, C Company had been, like the rest of -the Battalion, not closely engaged until the Forward Zone was overrun. -The lifting of the fog about midday disclosed a large force of the -enemy, which is estimated at about a battalion, advancing against -Lester's thinly held positions. From this time onwards no orders or -messages of any kind reached Lester from Battalion Headquarters or -the adjoining companies, and he was left to fight his own battle. The -advancing enemy were hotly engaged by rifle and Lewis gun fire, and -large numbers were killed. Already D Company were losing their grip on -the Farm Rouge, but Lester decided that the only course open to him was -to await reinforcements. These never came, and probably, owing to the -utter severance of communications, it was never realised how urgent -his need was. The only support to this gallant company was one 18-pr. -gun firing over open sights from near Quessy. All the afternoon the -unequal fight was maintained, though the defenders were much harassed -by low-flying German 'planes. With the approach of dusk the mist came -down again, surrounding the company with an impenetrable curtain. Again -and again Lester sent out runners and patrols to seek connection with -the adjoining troops but these never returned. "I still hoped against -hope," he writes, "that we should be reinforced, as the Colonel had -kept rubbing it in at conferences before the battle that we had to -stand fast at all costs." At last it became clear that the flanks were -in the air and that the rear of the Company was being encircled, and it -was decided to fight back to the Crozat Canal. On the left the remains -of two platoons under Blair managed to get back, but of the others but -two men got away, and Lester, Wardle and the remainder of the company, -nearly all wounded, were captured. - -This splendid fight, maintained till nearly 10 p.m. against hopeless -odds, was without doubt of enormous value in holding up the enemy and -inflicting severe loss on his picked troops. It also formed a strong -buttress to the flank of the 18th Division, without which they would -have found the right of their Battle Zone turned; and it gave time for -the withdrawal of the 2/4th Londons to the Canal line. - -Lieut.-Col. Dann's mixed force on the Canal was of necessity in need -of organisation, and the 8th Londons, who had been in reserve at -Pierremande, were on their way to relieve the troops who had borne the -day's fighting. By 6 a.m. the relief was complete and the 8th Londons -were established on the Canal line, while Lieut.-Col. Dann's force, -consisting of the remains of the 2/2nd, 3rd and 2/4th Battalions, the -Suffolks, and elements of the 503rd Field Company R.E. and of the -182nd Tunnelling Company, who had also been thrown into the fight, -were assembled on a line west of Vouel, with Headquarters on the Butte -de Vouel. This position was an unfinished work, in parts not more -than a foot deep, and extended from the Butte almost due south to the -Chauny-Tergnier Road. Brigade Headquarters had withdrawn overnight to -Le Bas de Viry. - -The Condren position, which had not been attacked on the 21st, -remained intact but was reinforced by a company of the Suffolks. - -The results of the first day's fighting were tolerably serious. The -Forward and Battle Zones had been lost, and thus the greater part of -the defences which had been brought to a stage in any way approaching -completion were in the enemy's hands. The whole of the available -reserves were already inextricably in the fight, and should the attack -extend to the Southern Brigade area from Amigny-Rouy to Barisis there -would be no means of assisting the defence in that vicinity. Serious -losses of personnel had been sustained, and the swiftness and weight -of the blow had had their effect, though the morale of the troops were -still high. On the other hand the enemy had by no means gained the -success which he had anticipated. On the Brigade front of some 5000 -yards, held by two weak battalions reinforced by parts of one other -battalion, he had employed nearly four divisions, and in spite of these -ridiculous odds had only advanced an average of about 5000 yards to -find that the defence had successfully withdrawn behind an obstacle -of much natural strength. The defence was shaken, but it was not in -the least broken, and a break through was the only means of ultimate -success to the Germans. - -On arrival in the Vouel line in the early hours of the 22nd March, the -Battalion, which occupied the north end of the position near the Butte, -was reorganised in three companies, with A Company under 2/Lieut. F. G. -Williams on the right, B under Capt. Askham in the centre and D under -Capt. Clarke on the left. As on the 21st, a dense mist appeared with -the early hours, and until it rose, shortly after midday, no infantry -movement took place. Under cover of the mist the Battalion was able to -do a good deal of work on the Vouel line, and in this they were not -much interfered with, as most of the German shells were falling on the -road in front. - -About 1.15 p.m. the enemy attack opened with great vigour and immense -weight on the Canal line and Tergnier. The crossing of the Canal was -rendered easier to the enemy by reason of the unfortunate fact that one -or two bridges had not been entirely demolished after our withdrawal. -All had long before been prepared for demolition, but for some reason -the charges did not explode in every case. A certain bewilderment was -caused to the defenders at first as the Germans appear to have gained -their first footing west of the Canal disguised in British uniforms -stolen from the fallen men of the 2/2nd Londons. But as soon as the -8th Londons appreciated what was happening they put up a very stubborn -resistance. After getting across the Canal the Bosche seems to have -tried to extend north and south along the western bank, and in this -he was successful in the northern area. In the south, however, the -magnificent fight made by the two companies in Tergnier checked his -progress, and time after time his attacks were stopped. - -During the afternoon the German 'planes were seeking for the next -position held by us, and in spite of the hasty efforts of the Battalion -to camouflage its trench, the Vouel line was soon discovered, and -ranging on it by the German batteries rapidly ensued. No infantry -attack was delivered on the Vouel line, probably on account of the -enemy's lack of success at Tergnier. - -Late in the afternoon the enemy's pressure on the 8th Londons grew -almost intolerable, and little by little he was working his way -into Tergnier. It was therefore decided to vacate the position, and -after dusk the 8th Londons fell back on to the Vouel line, which -they extended to the right from the Viry-Tergnier Road as far as -the railway. The two companies in Tergnier were ably extricated by -their commander and managed to get clear across the Oise, joining the -garrison at Condren, which had not been attacked. - -The Vouel line was now the most advanced position, and at 6.30 p.m. -the Headquarters of the 3rd, 2/4th and 8th Londons were withdrawn from -it to Noureuil. The night passed without any further attempt on the -enemy's part to advance, and on our side a good deal of patrolling -activity took place. This led to several encounters with small parties -of enemy, and resulted in the collection of a quite useful bag of -German prisoners as well as a machine-gun and team. Under cover of -darkness also touch was regained with the Condren garrison. - -Information was received on the evening of the 22nd that French troops -were rapidly advancing to our assistance, and that they would be ready -to counter-attack the next morning with the object of retaking the -Crozat Canal line. - -On the 23rd March mist appeared yet once more, considerably hampering -our defence and giving the enemy an opportunity of massing for attack. -Shortly after 8 a.m. the French attack was launched by two battalions -of the 125th French Infantry which passed forward through the Vouel -line. The result of the attack is not definitely known as it was -impossible to see beyond a radius of about 15 yards. It is certain, -however, that it failed to reach Tergnier, and by 11 a.m. the French -advance was broken and the troops beginning to drift back into our -lines. It should be pointed out in fairness to our Allies that they had -been rushed up into the line, incomplete in equipment and transport, -and that they were called on to operate without previous reconnaissance -over ground which was shrouded in mist and unknown to them. On the -extreme left the withdrawal was conducted in some disorder, and it was -reported that the 18th Division on our left was also being forced back -through Frières Wood. The Vouel line, unfinished and shallow as it was, -was already occupied to its fullest capacity, and the French falling -back on it caused considerable congestion in the well-dug parts. About -the same time the German artillery, which had been plastering the Vouel -line fairly steadily all the morning, lifted, and was at once succeeded -by an accurate and intense machine-gun barrage. This further tended to -create difficulty in the position, for in view of the congestion of the -trench it became very hard to get orders along, while work on the gaps -between the well dug portions was almost impossible. - -Shortly afterwards the mist cleared and the awkwardness of the -situation became more apparent. The 18th Division were being pressed -back towards Villequier-Aumont, and the left flank was entirely in -the air, while the constant pushing of small highly trained bodies of -the enemy was enabling them to progress along the Oise marshes on the -right. Vouel itself was strongly occupied, and troops were massing for -attack. By 12 noon the position was no longer tenable. The enemy was -advancing frontally and from both flanks, and Lieut.-Col. Dann ordered -a withdrawal on to the Green line. This was a partly dug position which -formed a portion of the Rear Zone and was held by troops of the 6th -Dismounted Cavalry Brigade and the 18th Entrenching Battalion, on a -line east of Noureuil and Viry-Noureuil from the St Quentin Canal to -the Vouel-Villequier Road. The withdrawal to the Green line from the -Vouel position averaged about 1500 yards, and so hard were the enemy -pressing that some platoons had to fight their way back. An attempt -was made by the French machine-gunners in the Vouel line to cover the -Battalion's withdrawal, but this was not effective and, together with -several of our own men, they were captured. - -The situation was now critical. The falling back of the 18th Division -on the left revealed a gap between the Vouel-Villequier Road and -Frières Wood of which the enemy was not slow to take advantage, and -there appeared every likelihood that the 173rd Brigade would be cut off -from the 18th Division and rolled up against the St Quentin Canal. To -meet this threat the left flank of the Green line position, consisting -of troops of the Dismounted Brigade and details of the 8th Londons, -was thrown back and extended towards Villequier-Aumont in an attempt -to gain touch once more with the 18th Division. This line was thin, -and under the continued German pressure it suffered severely. During -the afternoon the enemy thrust south again and entered Noureuil, thus -driving a wedge behind the flank of the Green line troops. A glance -at the map will show that a further withdrawal was inevitable if the -whole Brigade was not to be rounded up. This began about 6 p.m. and the -troops, including all that was left of the fighting ranks of the 2/4th -Londons, about 120 all told under Capt. Askham, fell back to a position -west of Viry-Noureuil, which village was yielded to the enemy. - -During the afternoon, while the fate of the bulk of the Brigade was -still in the balance, and it was obviously imperative to check the -enemy's advance into Chauny by all available means, the Brigadier -ordered Major Grover of the 2/4th Londons, who was at Chauny with -battle surplus, to organise all available details for the defence of -the town. With remarkable skill and despatch Major Grover collected a -heterogeneous force of clerks, cooks, officers' servants, transport -drivers--anyone who could hold a rifle--and by dusk reported himself in -position on the eastern outskirts of Chauny with a force of 10 officers -and 270 other ranks at his command. Of these, 2 officers and 54 other -ranks were of the 2/4th Londons. This very brilliant piece of work -no doubt did much to save the situation, and "Grover's Force" beyond -question deserves to rank high among the various similar "scarecrow -armies" which these critical days produced. - -During the afternoon Lieut.-Col. Dann was attached for duty to Brigade -Headquarters, and the remains of the 2/4th and 8th Londons came under -command of Lieut.-Col. Derviche-Jones of the latter Battalion. - -The withdrawal from the Green line to the River Helot position was -considerably impeded by the French troops who were streaming in a -westerly direction, and Brigade therefore endeavoured to ascertain what -the intentions of the French Commander were. These were found to be to -hold a line from Viry-Noureuil to Villequier-Aumont, and accordingly -it was decided that the whole of the 173rd Brigade Group should be -withdrawn and reorganised in positions to support the French. This -reorganisation was successfully carried out. In view of the rapid and -confusing moves which had followed each other in such quick succession, -it may be well to state in detail the Brigade positions at dawn on the -24th March: - - BRIGADE HEADQUARTERS AT ABBÉCOURT - - GROVER'S FORCE--Covering the eastern exits of Chauny from - the St Quentin Canal to north of the - Chauny--Viry-Noureuil Road. - - 18TH ENTRENCHING BATTALION--Astride the St Quentin Canal - on the right of Grover's Force. - - 6TH DISMOUNTED CAVALRY BRIGADE--On the left of Grover's - Force east of the Chauny--Villequier-Aumont Road. - - DETAILS OF THE 2/4TH AND 8TH LONDONS--On the left - of Grover's Force west of the - Chauny--Villequier-Aumont Road. - -The Condren garrison substantially maintained its original positions -and was in touch by means of patrols with the 18th Entrenching -Battalion, while on the extreme right the 174th Brigade, which had not -been attacked, continued to hold the Amigny-Rouy--Barisis front. - -On the left of the conglomerate force which now formed the 173rd -Brigade Group the line was continued by the 18th and 14th Divisions, -with whom French troops were interspersed in the direction of Cugny. - -The whole line was strained to breaking-point under the unceasing -enemy pressure. Every available man was in the firing line, and -the Battalion, which had been now fighting and marching without -intermission for three days, was getting worn. But in spite of the -enormous odds the Battalion clung on with determination, for it knew -that the saving of the situation rested with itself, and attack after -attack had failed to give the German masses the break-through which was -essential for them. - -For the fourth day in succession the Germans were favoured with a thick -fog which enshrouded their movements, and under cover of which they -were able to prepare a further heavy blow. Early in the morning they -attacked and broke through the French outpost line on the River Helot, -and about 11 a.m. the lifting of the mist revealed them attacking -Grover's Force east of Chauny, and also endeavouring to work round the -south of the position next the Canal. This was serious, for a wedge -driven in between the Chauny line and the Condren bridgehead, which was -also under great pressure from the enemy, might possibly involve the -loss of the Oise line, the retention of which was vital for us. - -Arrangements were at once made by Brigade for a further withdrawal, and -this was rendered the more imperative by the rapid advance made on the -left of the Corps front during the day. In this region the enemy were -already threatening Guiscard, eight miles north-west of Chauny, and the -security of Noyon itself was seriously in doubt. - -For several hours Grover's details and the tiny Condren force -maintained their fight, but in the afternoon the withdrawal began in -accordance with the orders already issued. Under Grover's command the -mixed force was skilfully withdrawn, fighting a stubborn rearguard -action, to a prepared position about 1000 yards east of Abbécourt, -while the detached portion of the 2/4th Londons on Grover's left, now -about 60 strong, fell back to Ognes, and marched into Besme across the -Oise about midnight. Early in the afternoon Major Grover was wounded -and Capt. Askham took over his command. By 4.30 p.m. the Abbécourt -position, being no longer tenable, was vacated and the whole of the -173rd Group, including 2/4th and 8th Londons, 503rd Field Company, -R.E. and the 6th Dismounted Cavalry Brigade, had crossed the Oise at -Manicamp. About the same time the Condren garrison which had held -manfully to its positions since the opening of the battle got clear -across the river. - -Before this withdrawal was completed the whole of the Oise bridges, and -also the R.E. Dump at Chauny, were demolished, and it may be remarked -that during the four days of fighting not a single gun had been lost -except those destroyed by enemy shell fire. - -With the withdrawal across the Oise the hardest of the Battalion's -fighting in this great battle was finished, though it remained in -contact with the enemy with very little rest. The Division now held -a river front of over nine miles on the south bank of the Oise from -Quierzy to Servais, in addition to the original four miles held by -the 174th Brigade in the Forêt de St Gobain. With this enormous front -in contact with an enterprising enemy no rest was yet to be expected. -The early hours of the 25th March were devoted to sorting out the -hopeless tangle of units which the battle had caused, and at 11.30 -a.m. Lieut.-Col. Dann became responsible (in conjunction with the 6th -Dismounted Cavalry Brigade) for the defence of the river crossings at -Quierzy, with a composite force comprising details of four battalions, -reorganised in companies as follows: - - 1 Coy. representing 2/2nd Londons guarding Quierzy bridge. - 1 " " 3rd Londons on its right. - 1 " " 8th Londons on its left. - 1 " " 2/4th Londons in support. - -This company of the 2/4th Londons was the party of 60 which had reached -Besme the previous evening, and was now under 2/Lieut. Griffiths. - -The same night (25th/26th March) this composite force was relieved by -the 246th French Regiment and withdrew to Besme to refit, Lieut.-Col. -Dann taking charge of another composite force of troops of the 175th -Brigade. In the meantime the remainder of the 2/4th Londons, which had -formed part of Grover's Force and were now under Askham, took up a -defensive position under orders of Lieut.-Col. Chart, 18th Entrenching -Battalion, east of Manicamp, on the south side of the Canal and the -Ailette River. At night this party was also relieved by Lieut.-Col. -Dann's force and joined the remainder of the Battalion at Besme. - -The 173rd Brigade was now entirely extricated from the line, and a day -of reorganisation and collection of scattered details from the various -composite forces, which the needs of the moment had created, was of -urgent necessity. This respite was obtained on the 26th March when the -three original units were reorganised as one battalion, known as the -Fusilier Battalion as follows: - - No. 1 Coy.--117 other ranks 2/4th Londons under Capt. Askham. - No. 2 Coy.-- 88 other ranks 2/4th " " 2/Lieut. Blair. - No. 3 Coy.--179 " " 2/2nd " " Capt. Wright. - No. 4 Coy.--189 " " 3rd " " 2/Lieut. Curtis. - -Lieut.-Col. Dann returned from the 175th Brigade to command this newly -constituted force. In addition to the Fusilier Battalion, the Brigade -included temporarily the 12th Londons under Lieut.-Col. Bayliffe, -C.M.G., and the 18th Entrenching Battalion under Lieut.-Col. Chart. - -The whole of the III Corps had now been brought south of the Oise, -and Noyon fell into the enemy's hands on the 26th. The main weight -of the German offensive continued to sweep westward in the direction -of Amiens, but with the details of this part of the fight we are not -concerned. The 58th Division, however, was not yet out of the fight, -and the enemy made repeated efforts to force a breach in the long river -line which it held, but without success. The French troops were now -numerous in this area, and though General Butler continued to command -his own Corps, the supreme command of the area was taken by the French. - -In this battle the Battalion had the extraordinary experience of being -driven entirely out of the battle area. It had lost severely and borne -several days of the most terrific ordeal that it had yet been called on -to face, but with the exception of a deep indentation in its positions -at Farm Rouge on the first day there had never been any semblance of -a break-through on its front. Frequently hard pressed, often almost -surrounded, it had been forced back day after day, stubbornly fighting -but never broken. - -Constituted as described above the 173rd Brigade took over the Manicamp -sector from the 175th on the evening of the 27th March, the 12th -Londons occupying the right subsector, with the Fusilier Battalion on -the left adjoining Manicamp village. The two 2/4th London Companies -were stationed on the Ailette River and in the village. The Brigade -remained in these positions strengthening the defences until the night -of 2nd/3rd April, when it was relieved by the French, the Fusilier -Battalion reaching Blérancourt at midnight. The daylight hours of the -3rd April were occupied in resting and cleaning up, and after dark -the Battalion moved to Andignicourt, where it was accommodated in an -enormous cave probably large enough to hold a brigade at full strength. - -The following afternoon the route was continued and the Battalion -reached Amblèny at 8 p.m. Here the Fusilier Battalion broke up, its -component companies being once more organised as three battalions under -their respective commanders. The 12th Londons returned to their own -brigade, being replaced in the 173rd Brigade by the 16th Entrenching -Battalion (Lieut.-Col. Nicholls). - -The 2/4th Londons were joined on the 3rd April by Major F. G. -Tollworthy, 1st Londons, as second in command vice Major Grover wounded. - -On the 5th April another evening march was made to Dommiers, and the -next day after a very trying march the Battalion reached Villers -Cotterets at 8 p.m. Here it entrained with the remainder of the -Division for an area further north to which the III Corps had been -transferred. The total casualties sustained by the 2/4th Battalion -in the second battle of the Somme between 21st March and 3rd April -amounted to: - - Officers--Lieut. J. Cairns, missing, believed killed; 2/Lieut. F. - G. Williams, died of wounds; Major A. Grover, M.C., - Capt. C. A. Clarke, M.C., Lieut, H. J. M. Williams, - 2/Lieuts. R. W. Chamberlain, C. C. H. Clifford, A. - Woodington, E. M. Cuthbertson and C. B. Francis, - wounded; Lieut. W. F. Brown, gassed; Lieuts. G. E. - Lester, H. W. Durlacher, M.C., 2/Lieuts. D. F. Crawford - and L. F. Wardle, captured. - - N.C.O.'s and men: 37 killed, 125 wounded and 217 missing. - -The total losses of the Division for the same period were 2204, of whom -57 officers and 1606 other ranks were missing. - - -III. _The Action at Villers-Bretonneux_ - -In the first portion of this chapter we have endeavoured to give some -account of the manner in which the 2/4th Battalion, with the 58th -Division and the whole of Butler's III Corps, had been literally pushed -aside by the main force of the German onslaught and had been extricated -from the fight due southwards through French territory, while the -advancing enemy had swept on in a westerly direction towards Amiens. - -By the evening of the 28th March, that is to say, a week after the -opening of the battle, the Fifth and Third Armies had been forced back -from the line of the Somme and over the old Somme battlefields, and had -reached the Amiens defence line south of the Somme, while on the north -bank the enemy had occupied Albert. - -On the 28th March a further attack was delivered on a wide front from -north of Arras to Puisieux which resulted in a severe defeat for the -Germans; but as only the 1/4th Battalion is concerned in the fighting -on this day we propose to defer the account of it to another chapter, -and to pursue for the moment the fortunes of the 2/4th Battalion until -the final stabilisation of the line in front of Amiens. - -The German offensive on the Somme front was now showing signs of -weakening, though owing to the enormous losses incurred by our -divisions in personnel and material the enemy was still able to make -progress. The defences of Amiens in particular were threatened, -and Gen. Gough had been entrusted by G.H.Q. with the task of -extending and strengthening them. The last days of March saw fierce -fighting in this area, and by the 31st of the month the Fifth -Army south of the Amiens-Péronne Road had fallen back to the line -Villers-Bretonneux-Hangard, both villages inclusive to the British, -while on the right the French were holding a small corner of the angle -between the Luce and Avre Rivers on the line Hangard-Moreuil Station. -The German attacks finally exhausted themselves by April 5th, after -which date there was a short period of trench warfare. - -It was to this area, still on the extreme right of the British Armies, -that the 58th Division was now directed. From Villers Cotterets, which -it left on 6th April, the 2/4th Battalion was railed to Longueau, -a suburb of Amiens. The battle line was now quite close to the -Amiens-Paris line, a lateral railroad of vital importance to us, and as -the Battalion passed Boves the British field guns were in action within -a quarter of a mile of the train. - -On detrainment the Battalion marched to a reserve position in the -Bois de Gentelles, where a long day was devoted to reorganisation. -The losses of the latter end of March had not yet been made good by -reinforcements, and it was therefore decided to make use of the 16th -Entrenching Battalion for this purpose. Accordingly on the 7th April -two companies of this unit were transferred to the 2/4th Battalion, -making an increase of strength of 4 officers (Capt. B. H. C. Hettler, -M.C., and 2/Lieuts. J. W. Bocking, E. V. Grimsdell and W. T. Millar) -and 344 other ranks. With this valuable reinforcement it was possible -once again to organise four companies as follows: - - No. 1 Coy. under Capt. G. H. Hetley} 2/4th London men. - No. 2 " " Capt. S. G. Askham} - No. 3 " " Capt. B. H. C. Hettler } 16th Entrenching - No. 4 " " 2/Lieut. E. V. Grimsdell} Battalion men. - -It should be remarked in passing that the Entrenching Battalions had -no connection with the Labour Corps. They were trained and combatant -troops whose existence as Entrenching Battalions only dated from -the Divisional reorganisations of the preceding January, and they -represented in effect the troops which had been "left over" after the -reorganisation was completed. The bulk of the reinforcement which thus -came to the 2/4th Battalion were enlisted in the 6th K.O.Y.L.I., and -were undoubtedly some of the finest reinforcements the Battalion ever -received: although young they were very keen, and included some most -reliable non-commissioned officers. - -At 7.45 p.m. on the 7th April the Battalion relieved the 12th Londons -in the Reserve system between the village of Gentelles and the -Amiens-Roye Road, Nos. 3 and 4 Companies occupying the front line -with Nos. 1 and 2 in support to them and Headquarters in the Bois -de Gentelles. For ten days the Battalion continued to occupy these -positions, constantly employed in working parties on its own defences -and on elaborately wiring the lines in conjunction with the R.E.'s. -This wire was strengthened to form a considerable obstacle for the -Gentelles line, which was the final line of the Amiens defences and was -to be held at all costs. During this tour of duty the 2/4th Battalion -suffered somewhat from German shell fire, for the British batteries -were close behind the Gentelles line. - -It was confidently anticipated that the enemy would endeavour once -more to break the Amiens defences in this area. The village of -Villers-Bretonneux stands on a somewhat prominent hill seven miles -east of Amiens, and its possession would have enabled the Germans to -play havoc by their artillery with the city itself and our important -road and railway communications which radiate from it. Its value to -the Germans rendered it a matter of the highest importance to us to -defend it stubbornly. In anticipation of an attack, therefore, the -battle surplus was sent out of the trenches on the 10th and the work of -strengthening the defences pressed on with vigour. - -Further reinforcements were received from the Base, numbering in all -127 other ranks. These were mostly young lads under nineteen years -of age whose despatch overseas had been rendered necessary by the -impossibility of otherwise replacing the deficiencies in the ranks. -They were all extremely keen and had received a good groundwork of -training at home. But they reached the Battalion at a time when it had -just been shaken by one battle and was about to become involved in -another, and it can only be deplored that circumstances prevented any -opportunity for assimilating them into the Battalion and for giving -them some preliminary experience of warfare under quieter conditions. -The whole Battalion was indeed rather conglomerate, for of a total of -some 650 rifles about 450 were strange to the Battalion and called upon -to go into action under a command unknown to them: this important point -should be borne in mind in considering the battle which followed. - -On the evening of the 18th April the 58th Division took over from -the 5th Australian Brigade the front line east of Cachy, the 173rd -Brigade occupying the whole sector. This sector extended from the -immediate left of Hangard, through the Bois de Hangard to the -Villers-Bretonneux-Demuin Road, the 3rd Londons on the right, the -2/2nd in the centre and the 2/4th on the left. The 2/4th Battalion's -subsector, in which it relieved the 19th Australian Battalion, about -1500 yards frontage, was held with three companies (Nos. 1, 2 and 4) -in the front line and one (No. 3) in support, Headquarters occupying a -quarry east of Cachy. The 175th Brigade took over the Blue line while -the 174th was in reserve in Cagny. - -The Battalion was now straining every nerve to complete the defences. -Much work was still to be done. The front line had originally existed -as a line of isolated posts, and these were not yet completely -connected up nor were they adequately wired. A great deal was to be -done in providing efficient fire positions throughout the line in order -that if lateral movement should become necessary the defence of the -position might not be impaired. - -Orders were received that the front line would be held till the last. -The support company would be employed for counter-attack purposes -in the event of the enemy gaining a footing in our positions; and -the success of the defence would clearly depend on the rapidity and -skill with which this local reserve was used. The right flank of the -Brigade front was further strengthened by the 10th Londons, who were -temporarily attached in Brigade reserve. - -On the 21st the Battalion suffered a severe loss in the adjutant, -Capt. F. W. Walker, D.S.O., who was wounded, his duties being taken by -Lieut. S. A. Seys, the assistant adjutant. On the 23rd Capt. Hetley -was attached to the 131st French Divisional Headquarters as liaison -officer, and his company was handed over temporarily to Capt. W. C. -Morton. - -The same day information was obtained from Alsatian deserters that the -enemy attack would take place at dawn the following morning. - -We may restate the distribution of companies in the trenches as follows: - - In Front-- No. 2 (Askham) on the right. - No. 1 (Morton) in the centre. - No. 4 (Grimsdell) on the left. - In Support--No. 3 (Hettler). - -By an extraordinary chance the enemy was yet once more favoured by -the weather, for, when his barrage dropped on our lines at 4 a.m. on -the 24th April with bitter intensity and great accuracy, the day was -dawning on a dense mist which impeded observation beyond a radius of -about 50 yards. The bombardment was severe, and in the area of forward -battery positions included gas shell. - -The attack appears to have developed at widely different hours in -different parts of the line: the S.O.S. was received from the 8th -Division on the left as early as 5.40 a.m., and from Hangard at 6 a.m., -but it was not until 6.20 a.m. that reports indicated that the 173rd -Brigade front was generally engaged. On the 2/4th Battalion front all -was ready to receive the advancing waves of German infantry, but it -must be admitted that some of the stoutest hearts were filled with -something approaching dismay when out of the fog, at a distance of 40 -to 50 yards, loomed the weird forms of German tanks. So far as can -be ascertained about six tanks were directed on the 2/4th Battalion's -sector, and it was the only Battalion of the Brigade against which -they advanced. The tanks seem to have been uncertain of their bearings -in the mist and not too skilfully handled. One at least devoted its -energies to describing small circles, firing wildly into the ground -where none of our troops were posted. - -In spite of this unskilful manœuvring, however, there is no doubt that -the sudden appearance of these monsters shook our defence for a moment, -and the men fell back a short distance. They remained perfectly under -control, and were rapidly rallied by their officers a short distance in -rear of the front trench, after which the German infantry, advancing -in three waves close behind the tanks, were hotly engaged with rifle -and Lewis gun fire, which inflicted heavy loss on them. Askham was hit -about twenty minutes after the attack began, and after his departure to -the Aid Post charge of affairs in the firing line, so far as control -was possible over a wide front in the mist, was assumed by Morton -of No. 1 Company. The first news of what was occurring in front was -received at Battalion Headquarters from Morton in a message timed 6.30 -a.m.: "Tanks have crossed front line trenches, front line has fallen -back, have rallied them at Coy. H.Q. line." - -Steadily the tanks pressed our line back though our retirement was -carried out gradually and at ghastly loss to the German infantry; and -finally Morton was able to collect all available men of the 2/4th -Battalion in the Cachy Switch. - -The support company put up a good fight--Hettler was hit early--and -eventually was nearly surrounded; but it cut its way out and managed -also to gain the Cachy Switch. The Divisional records time our -retirement to the Cachy Switch at 7.40 a.m., but there seems no doubt -that the Battalion's resistance was much more prolonged than this would -indicate. Certainly Morton was not able to report the organisation of -his new position till 10.15 a.m. By this time only about one hundred -men of the Battalion with three subalterns, Prince, Sheppard and -Ewing, were under Morton's hand, though others rejoined later. The -2/4th Battalion's retirement had involved the risk of leaving the left -flank of the 2/2nd Londons on its right in the air, but this Battalion -conformed to our movement, though a gap ensued between the two units. -This was promptly filled by Brigade, who sent forward a company of the -2/10th Londons. By midday our line was more or less stabilised on a -line from the Cachy Switch immediately in front of Cachy village along -the Hangard Road. This meant that Hangard Wood was lost, and from the -left flank the bad news was also received that Villers-Bretonneux had -fallen into the enemy's hands. - -Beyond artillery activity no further action of importance occurred on -the Battalion's front during the afternoon, which was busily occupied -in forming a line of shell hole defences in the new position and in -feeling out to the flanks to gain touch with adjoining units. - -This was the only occasion on which either Battalion of the regiment -was called on to face tanks. There can be no question as to the -tremendous moral effect of these machines, though their actual -destructiveness--handled as they were--was not great. Under the -conditions of mist which prevented any warning of their approach, -and the conglomerate composition of the Battalion, a little initial -unsteadiness on the part of the less trained elements of the Battalion -was almost to be expected in face of such an ordeal. The rapid recovery -and steady rearguard fight back to the Cachy line, however, showed that -after the first shock the innate discipline of the Londoner asserted -itself and the number of enemy dead counted on the field was evidence -of the heavy cost to the Germans of their success. - -2/Lieut. Ewing should be mentioned. "His behaviour was splendid -throughout. During the preliminary bombardment he was constantly up -and down his sector encouraging his men, and when the enemy ultimately -appeared his fire orders were clear and effective." He was awarded the -M.C., as was also Capt. Morton, who displayed throughout the day marked -qualities of leadership and coolness. Pte. Petrie, a stretcher-bearer -who gained the M.M., exhibited an utter disregard of personal danger in -pursuing his work of bringing in and tending wounded. - -The heavy casualties sustained this day in "missing" were due to the -fact that in retirement the Battalion was forced to leave many men, who -might otherwise have been saved, in the enemy's hands. But the R.A.M.C. -staff under Lieut. Dunaway worked magnificently under heavy shell fire -till the last moment, thereby retrieving many wounded men who must -otherwise have been captured. - -We have already pointed to the great importance of Villers-Bretonneux -in the defence of Amiens, and it is not surprising therefore that its -loss was followed by an immediate order from Army Headquarters that it -must be recaptured at all costs. - -The counter-attack was delivered at 10 p.m. on the 24th April by the -9th Londons, the 54th Brigade and the Australians. Villers-Bretonneux -again passed into our hands, while on the 58th Division's front the -line was advanced about half-way forward from the Cachy Switch to the -original front line. - -During the 25th April the 2/4th Battalion was not engaged, though it -was all day long subjected to severe artillery fire, which inflicted a -good many casualties. On the evening of the 25th the 2/4th Battalion -was relieved by troops of the French Moroccan Division, and withdrew on -relief to bivouacs in open country east of Boves. - -The casualties of the two days' action were: - - 2/Lieut. J. W. Booking, killed; Capts. S. G. Askham, M.C., B. H. C. - Hettler, M.C., 2/Lieuts. S. F. G. Mears, P. J. Payne and L. H. - Sheppard, wounded; 2/Lieuts. S. C. Geering and C. W. Cumner, - missing; and in N.C.O.'s and men 23 killed, 108 wounded and 203 - missing. - -During the 26th April the Moroccan Division continued the -counter-attack, and at the end of the day the line was substantially -restored to its position prior to the German attack. - -This was the last serious German attempt to reach Amiens. The line had -bent perilously, but the offensive in this area had been fought to a -standstill. At this point, therefore, we may leave the 2/4th Battalion -and deal with the defence of Arras, in which the 1/4th Battalion bore a -part. - - - - -CHAPTER XXI - -THE 1/4TH BATTALION IN THE DEFENCE OF ARRAS, 1918 - - -On the 11th March 1918 the 1/4th Londons took over the Oppy Trenches -from the Kensingtons. - -There was no room for doubt now that the Germans intended sooner or -later to launch a big attack in this area, and the only thing was to -ensure that the troops holding the line should be ready whenever the -storm might burst. The dispositions now taken up were, therefore, those -which had been finally decided on for the scheme of defence, and it -was arranged that companies should henceforth always occupy the same -positions in order the better to know their ground. These positions -will be stated in detail later. - -So far as the infantry in the line were concerned the period of -suspense was mainly characterised by very hard work on the defences and -by particularly active patrolling. Each front line post nightly pushed -forward to the enemy wire a listening patrol to give early warning of -signs of the enemy's assembly for attack. On the evening of the 12th -March 2/Lieut. G. G. Lewis took a patrol into the German trenches near -Crucifix Corner, but found them unoccupied. The tour of duty passed -quietly, with the exception of a very severe bombardment with mustard -gas shells, which began at about 7 p.m. on the 15th March and continued -till about 8 a.m. the following morning. At the time this caused -little damage, but the heat of the sun later in the day accentuated -the effects of the gas, and Lieuts. A. Bath and O. D. Garratt, M.C., -2/Lieuts. G. W. Fisher, E. A. Ratcliffe and 109 other ranks became -casualties. - -Intelligence reports pointed to the probability of the attack -developing on the 12th March; but although nothing occurred, from this -date onwards the whole Division daily stood to arms from one hour -before dawn till 8.30 a.m., while the Divisional and Corps artillery -put a slow barrage on the enemy lines at daybreak. The "stand-to" -order was strictly enforced as far back as the transport lines and the -Quartermaster. - -On the 18th the 1/4th Londons were relieved by the Kensingtons and -withdrew in Brigade reserve to Roclincourt, leaving two platoons in -support attached to the Kensingtons, and one in front trenches attached -to the London Scottish. A rearrangement of the method of holding the -line was now ordered by Corps, and the necessary changes which were -effected on the night of 21st/22nd March resulted in each division -holding its sector with two brigades in line and one in reserve. Each -front line brigade had two battalions in trenches and one in support. -The effect of this in the 56th Division was to leave the 169th and -168th Brigades in the line, while the 167th was withdrawn to the -support area. - -The 21st March saw the opening of the great German offensive on the -Fifth Army front, but no attack developed opposite the 56th Division. -The day was marked by very greatly increased artillery activity on the -enemy's part, gas shell being freely used on the Bailleul-Willerval -line. This indication of the imminence of active operations caused the -cancellation of the relief of the 56th Division by the 62nd. The next -day warning was received that the 2nd Canadian Division would take over -the line, but this order was also subsequently cancelled. - -No definite news of the offensive was received during the 21st March, -though it was reported that the enemy had gained the high ground -near Wancourt Tower, and was likely by his assault on Monchy to lay -the Corps right flank open to attack. Arras was heavily shelled, and -all the civilians were cleared out. St Pol also was bombarded by a -long-range gun, while low-flying Bosche aeroplanes were over the lines -and at night dropped bombs on Thélus. - -On the evening of the 24th the 1/4th Londons returned to the front -line. Aerial reports of great activity behind the German lines now -made it clear that the attack was imminent, and final preparations for -the struggle were completed. All spare Lewis guns and magazines were -brought up from the transport lines. The men were in splendid fettle, -and the high probability that the long weeks of suspense would shortly -be over increased their good humour. All were absolutely confident in -themselves and each other, and their only anxiety was as to whether -they would have the good fortune to be in front trenches to meet the -enemy. - -At this time Gen. Loch and Lieut.-Col. Marchment made strong -representations that the three front line posts ought to be much more -lightly held, and that the Company Headquarters in Beatty should be -withdrawn to the Marquis line, on the grounds that it was useless to -pack men into posts only 100 yards from the enemy, where they were -certain to suffer severely from the hostile bombardment and where -they had no room to fight. These representations were not received -favourably by Corps though the event showed they were well founded. As -it was Lieut.-Col. Marchment moved one platoon from Oppy Post, but even -with this alteration the Marquis line was too lightly held. - -News from the area of battle in the south was still vague, though it -was known that the Fifth Army had been forced to give a great deal of -ground, and that the Third Army on its left had also retreated, though -to a less degree, and to conform to the movements of its neighbour. -As the day wore on, however, the enemy's pressure on the Third -Army south of the Scarpe increased and by the 27th he had captured -Monchy-le-Preux. It became evident that he was aiming at a movement -to envelop Arras from the south. A reasonable deduction from this -situation was that the blow at Arras would shortly develop also on the -north of the Scarpe, by means of an assault on the Vimy Ridge. - -In the early hours of the 25th March, shortly after the 1/4th Londons -had taken over the line, 2/Lieut. C. H. Board and Coy. Sergt.-Major -Matthews of B Company were visiting the sentry groups in Beatty Post -when two of the enemy, who had entered the trench by stealth, tried to -drag the Coy. Sergt.-Major out of it. A scuffle ensued in which another -officer and an N.C.O. joined. The two Germans unfortunately got away -after slightly wounding both Board and Matthews. - -During the day the artillery on both sides became more active, though -no infantry action occurred, and the men were kept busy in constructing -trench blocks and improving firesteps. The right flank of the 1/4th -Londons' sector had always been regarded as a rather weak spot in the -defence, and in view of the expectation that the enemy would assault -the Vimy Ridge from the south, it was desirable to provide for the -formation by the Battalion of a defensive flank facing south should -this area become threatened. To this end work was pushed forward in -constructing and improving firesteps in Ouse Alley for its possible use -as a "switch line." This precaution, as will be seen, was justified by -events. - -During the evening a report was received of the examination of a -prisoner of the 471st Infantry Regiment, who had been taken near -Mill Post on the previous evening. This was to the effect that the -attack was to be made on the morning of the 26th, and that the 219th -and 23rd Reserve Divisions had been brought forward for the purpose. -These troops were accommodated in the Drocourt-Quéant line. They -had just arrived from Riga and would attack in conjunction with the -240th and 5th Bavarian Reserve Divisions. They would assemble in -the front line system and would advance to a depth of four miles -with their right flank on Oppy, then swing round towards Vimy. Three -special divisions would capture the Vimy Ridge the next day. The 471st -Regiment had already 60 trench mortars in position, and 8 more trench -mortar companies were to arrive on the night of the 25th; most of the -ammunition was already in the line. - -This message, bringing as it did a hope that the wearisome suspense was -at last at an end, was received with satisfaction, and instructions to -prepare for battle were issued. All night our artillery maintained a -heavy fire on the enemy's supposed assembly positions, while No Man's -Land was occupied by our listening patrols. At 4 a.m. these came in and -the heavy artillery placed a slow barrage on the German front lines. -At 4.45 a.m. the Battalion stood to arms, blocks were lowered in the -communication trenches and all made ready. No attack developed, and -at 7.30 a.m. the order to stand down was received from Brigade, the -remainder of the day passing comparatively quietly. - -In the evening, in response to urgent appeals from Corps for an -identification, all battalions in the line sent patrols to the enemy -trenches to try to get prisoners. From the 1/4th Londons two parties -went forward at 10.30 p.m. after wire-cutting preparations by the field -artillery. 2/Lieut. G. G. Lewis with a platoon of A Company entered the -enemy line opposite Oppy Post, but the sentry group was heard running -away and no bag was obtained. From C Company 2/Lieut. R. E. Campkin -took two men to the German trenches near Crucifix Corner, and had a -lively little scrap in the dark with the sentry group. In this case -also the Bosche took to their heels, and, in spite of a good set to -with fists, managed to get away pursued by Campkin. After remaining -two hours in the enemy line both patrols returned bringing some trench -notice boards. - -The 27th March passed remarkably quietly, nothing of interest occurring -beyond the movements of a low-flying Bosche 'plane which appeared to -be particularly interested in our trenches. A relief of the German -division opposite the Battalion was suspected, but the report was -incorrect. - -On the night 27th/28th March orders were received that the XIII Corps -boundary was to be extended northwards as far as the Souchez River, and -that the 56th Division would "side-step" northwards. The side-step was -effected by transferring the Kensingtons from the right flank of the -1/4th Londons to the left flank, the Kensingtons taking over two new -posts north of the 1/4th Londons from the 8th Canadian Brigade. The gap -thus created on the right flank of the Battalion was filled by the -169th Brigade, which extended its left flank. Why this redistribution -was effected at the eleventh hour we do not know: obviously it must -have been for some very important reason. But whatever the cause, -the result was distinctly weakening to the defence. We have already -alluded to the well-recognised risk of the 1/4th Londons' right flank -being laid open, and now at the last moment the area was occupied by a -Battalion entirely strange to the ground. The relief in fact was not -completed before the battle opened, for when the Bosche barrage fell on -the morning of the 28th March the L.R.B. had not taken over Bailleul -East Post, while a company of the 1st Canadian Rifles in the Brown line -was still awaiting relief. By the courtesy of the Canadian Brigadier -this company was placed under the orders of Brig.-Gen. Loch. - -In addition to this eleventh hour change of dispositions a certain -difficulty appears to have beset the High Command in reconciling the -rôles of the three divisions composing the Corps, and this resulted in -a stream of orders each of which altered its predecessor. The Corps -order, under which the extension of the 56th Division's line was -carried out, laid down that the Bailleul-Willerval line (Red line) was -to be the line of resistance, and that the front line system would be -regarded as outposts. Later in the evening the front line system was -ordered to be held at all costs to conform with the 4th Division on our -right; but still later a modification of this was made on the left of -the line in order to conform to the defensive line of the 3rd Canadian -Division on our left, and the garrison of Arleux Post was ordered, if -heavily attacked, to withdraw to the Arleux Loop. - -The final dispositions therefore provided five lines of defence, -each to be defended at all costs in default of a Divisional order to -withdraw. There were: - - 1. Front line system. - 2. Red line (Bailleul-Willerval). - 3. Brown line (Farbus-Vimy). - 4. Green line (Thélus). - 5. La Targette line. - -The order of battle of Brigade was as follows: - - 169TH BRIGADE (RIGHT): - - Front line system: Queen's Westminsters in Towy Post on the right. - London Rifle Brigade in Mill, - Bradford and Bird Posts on the left. - Red line: 1/2nd Londons. - Brown line: 1 coy. 1/5th Cheshire Pioneers. - Reserve: 2 coys. 1st Londons (attd. from 167th Brigade). - - 168TH BRIGADE (LEFT): - - Front line system: 1/4th Londons in Beatty, Wood and Oppy Posts - on the right. - Kensingtons in Tommy and Arleux Posts - on the left. - Red line: London Scottish. - Brown line: 2 platoons 1/5th Cheshire Pioneers. - Green line: 2 coys. 1st Londons, 1½ coys. - 1/5th Cheshire Pioneers. - - DIVISIONAL RESERVE: - - 167th Brigade (less 1st Londons) and 3 field coys. R.E. - -The companies of the 1/4th Londons were disposed as follows: - - Right: B Company (Spicer) H.Q. and 2 platoons in Beatty - Post. 1 platoon in Marquis and Earl line. - Centre: C Company (Duthie) 1 platoon in Wood Post. 1 - platoon in Marquis line. H.Q. and 1 platoon in - South Duke St. - Left: A Company (H. N. Williams) 1 platoon in Oppy Post. - 1 platoon between Oppy Post and Marquis line. - H.Q. and 1 platoon in Marquis line. - Advanced Battalion H.Q.: (Major F. A. Phillips) in South Duke - St. (with C Coy.) - Support: D Company (Cooper) in Bow Trench. - Battalion H.Q.: (Lieut.-Col. Marchment) in Ouse Alley west of - Bow Trench. - -During the night 2/Lieut. R. E. Campkin with two men of C Company again -crossed No Man's Land and returned shortly before 3 a.m. on the 28th -March reporting that he had seen long lines of men carrying up to the -enemy front line what appeared to be large biscuit tins--doubtless the -trench mortar ammunition coming in. Evidently this was The Day! - -At 3 a.m. on the 28th March the enemy opened an intense high explosive -shell fire on Bow Trench, Ouse Alley and Rear Battalion Headquarters, -as well as on all the rearward defensive posts. This bombardment, which -continued throughout the day, was at first mingled with mustard gas. -The forward area was hardly affected by this shelling except for the -fact that the wind carried the gas eastward over the front line posts, -the garrisons of which had to wear masks for over an hour. - -At 5.40 a.m. a terrific trench mortar fire fell on the forward posts -doing very severe damage, and causing many casualties. Ouse Alley and -the Earl-Marquis line at first escaped this, though later the area of -bombardment was extended and they received a full share of it. - -A strictly chronological account of an action such as this, in which -different parts of the Battalion became involved in the fight at -varying hours, is almost an impossibility if the reader is to glean -anything but the most confused impression of what occurred. We propose, -therefore, to deal first of all with the fight for the front line posts -gradually working our narrative westward. - -The S.O.S. signal was received in Battalion Headquarters from Oppy -Post by wire at 7.15 a.m., and a few moments later flares were sent -up from Wood and Beatty. The signal was repeated backwards to Brigade -by Battalion Headquarters. "We stood on top," writes Lieut.-Col. -Marchment, "to have a look round but could see very little as it was -not fully light. We could, however, hear a pleasant noise--very heavy -rifle fire!" - -Oppy Post on the left had been very badly knocked about by the -trench mortaring and the garrison seriously reduced before the enemy -came over. A gallant attempt at resistance was put up and rifle and -Lewis gun fire were opened as soon as the attacking lines made their -appearance. One Lewis gun team was seen from the rear to have climbed -on to the parapet, and the gun was being fired from the hip. But it was -hopeless from the first. The enemy lines were very close, and by sheer -weight of numbers the Post was quickly swamped. Of a garrison of 2 -officers and 48 other ranks but 1 officer (2/Lieut. Athey) and 5 other -ranks were able to make their way back to the Marquis line which they -did by way of Boyne Trench. - -On the right Beatty Post had suffered from the trench mortar fire more -severely than any, and by the time the Germans appeared its trenches -were practically effaced. The attackers appeared in fairly close -formation, and in considerable depth, some of the leading wave firing -rifle grenades from the hip. Apparently the enemy's trench mortar -preparation, severe as it had been, had not dealt effectively with -our wire, for the leading wave of attackers was delayed in getting -through it, causing those following to bunch up to it. The rapid rifle -and Lewis gun fire opened by the garrison of the post was thus able -to inflict very severe loss. For about fifteen minutes the garrison -stoutly held its own, but at the end of that time it was found that the -enemy had already swept over the posts to the right held by the L.R.B., -and was working into Marine Trench and Ouse Alley in great numbers. -Again sheer weight of numbers made further resistance impossible, and -2/Lieut. G. R. Pitman brought the six surviving men back to the Marquis -line over the open, leaving 2 officers (Capt. E. E. Spicer and 2/Lieut. -Coombes) and 78 other ranks fallen at their posts. - -In the centre a magnificent stand was made by the garrison of Wood -Post under Lieut. H. F. Dade and 2/Lieut. H. O. Morris. The night -position of the post had been changed a few days before the battle, -and the German trench mortar preparation therefore fell harmlessly on -the former position. When the trench mortar fire ceased the enemy was -seen advancing in an extended line over the open ground left of the -Wood and coming through the Wood in groups of about 10 men 50 yards -apart. This line was followed by groups of about 30 men some 200 yards -in rear. The whole garrison (2 officers, 45 other ranks and 2 Lewis -guns) at once opened a heavy fire which undoubtedly caused very severe -loss to the enemy. A party of Germans tried to force the block in the -trench leading from the new post to the old, but they were effectively -disposed of with rifle grenades. For a full hour this gallant garrison -held their own, completely checking the enemy in the wood. On the -right, however, the enemy had, as already recounted, swept over Beatty -Post and was now working his way round Wood Post from the south. -Ammunition and bombs were beginning to run short. After a consultation -Dade and Morris decided that the position was no longer tenable, and -they withdrew their men along Bedford Row and Boyne Trench to the -Marquis line. This withdrawal was skilfully executed, the move of the -riflemen down Boyne Trench being covered by Lewis guns in Bedford Row. -That the garrison held their own to the last is evidenced by the fact -that before the post was finally evacuated the Headquarters dugout was -in the hands of the enemy, while our own artillery was already shelling -the post. The defence of Wood Post cost 25 casualties in other ranks. - -[Illustration: THE DEFENCE OF ARRAS, MARCH 1918] - -The value of the defence of Wood Post can hardly be overestimated. -Apart from the heavy losses which the fire of its garrison undoubtedly -inflicted on the enemy, it is certain that its prolonged resistance -saved the Marquis line from being overrun in the vicinity of Advanced -Battalion Headquarters. - -As soon as Williams reported the men back from Oppy Post Lieut.-Col. -Marchment had a 6-inch howitzer battery turned on to Oppy Wood. - -The forward posts having fallen, the Marquis line became almost -immediately engaged, and Capt. H. N. Williams (A Company) displayed -great qualities of leadership in his defence of the position. We cannot -do better than to relate this phase of the battle in the words of the -official account of the action submitted by Lieut.-Col. Marchment: - - The Marquis line easily held up the advancing enemy after the posts - had gone. On the right the enemy was strongly established in the - Earl line and Viscount Street about fifteen minutes after zero. - Major F. A. Phillips at once gave orders to 2/Lieut. O. C. Hudson, - whose platoon was in the Marquis line astride Ouse Alley, to form - the defensive flank at once. This had been rehearsed previously and - consisted not only in manning the block in Ouse Alley to the front, - but also in Earl to the right, and manning firesteps facing to the - right along Ouse Alley. 2/Lieut. Hudson maintained this position - with great gallantry and inflicted heavy casualties on the enemy, - whom he caught in enfilade as they broke through over Earl to - Viscount Street. The defensive flank was prolonged by Headquarter - details who continued on the firestep in Ouse Alley and held a - block near the Aid Post in South Duke Street. - - At about 9.30 a.m. a strong party was seen working up Ouse Alley - from Viscount Street towards Forward Battalion Headquarters. - Major F. A. Phillips at once attacked over the open with about - 20 Headquarter details, the men following most gallantly under - heavy fire. The enemy were ejected and a block established in Ouse - Alley towards Viscount Street. A block was established here and - successfully defended with grenades by a party under Sergt. Udall. - - In the centre of the Marquis line the attack was not pressed - until the Wood Post Garrison had withdrawn. After this the enemy - gradually built up a large volume of rifle fire from Oppy Wood, but - was prevented from debouching by well-directed rifle and Lewis gun - fire from the Marquis line. Rifle grenades were also used on New - Cut and Baker Street where the enemy had established himself. - - On the left of the Marquis line excellent targets were presented on - the left of the Wood, the Lewis gun in the bank (near the junction - of Clarence Trench and Kent Road) doing most excellent work. - - During the next three hours the enemy twice broke into the line - near Boyne, but was thrown out, leaving a good many dead in the - trench. Rifle and Lewis gun fire was opened whenever a good target - presented itself, and a large number of dead were seen between Wood - and Beale Trenches. - - Later on the enemy broke in on the left from Clarence Trench. The - Lewis gun on the left had finished its ammunition, but reinforced - by a few men, the team ejected the enemy with rifle fire and - grenades. - - Thus, at about 11 a.m., the forward troops were holding the Marquis - line beating off attacks to the front and holding a block on the - left. On the right, although the enemy pressure was considerable, - he was held up splendidly in Earl and South Duke Street and in - front and behind in Ouse Alley; the enemy holding Viscount Street - on the right and pushing on towards the Red line. - -During the whole of this fight information as to the situation came -in to Rear Battalion Headquarters rapidly, thanks to a buried cable, -and throughout the battle communication was maintained with the troops -in front and with Brigade Headquarters and the artillery in rear. -Advantage of this was taken when definite news of the fall of the post -line was received, and the artillery barrage was dropped to conform to -the situation, Earl Trench being shelled with good effect. - -We must now turn for a moment to the course of events in the rearward -area. The enemy's preparatory bombardment had fallen heavily on Bow -Trench, but the garrison (D Company, Cooper) was kept in dugouts, -sentries being changed each half-hour, and few casualties were -sustained. At 5 a.m. the blocks in Ouse Alley were lowered, and rum and -extra S.A.A. issued to the men. On the S.O.S. signal being received -the trench was manned; and at the same time Lieut.-Col. Marchment sent -the Headquarter Company round to join D Company, retaining with him -only a few signallers to work the line, two clerks and a few scouts, in -addition to Boutall (Adjutant), Lorden (Works Officer) and Padre Green -"to create a calm atmosphere." Lorden was hit here at about 7.45 a.m. - -From about 8 a.m. the Headquarters area was quite in the air. The front -line system in the adjoining sector on the right (169th Brigade) had -gone, with the exception of Towy Post held by the Queen's Westminsters; -and the Bosche had worked up the valley on the left and was also for a -time in Ouse Alley, and attacking Bailleul East Post in the Red line -(held by the London Scottish). - -For a time trouble was caused by low-flying enemy aeroplanes, but these -went back as soon as our own R.E. 8's appeared. Good contact work was -done throughout the day with these machines which called at intervals -for flares. Luckily all flares were carried on the men, and they were -thus available to show our positions to the aeroplanes. At one time -the Battalion code and position call, Q.J.B., was sent to the contact -aeroplane by Lucas Lamp worked by Sergt. Hurst, and satisfactorily -received. - -At about 9 a.m. the enemy was in Viscount Trench, and as stragglers -from the L.R.B. reported that he was also working down Ouse Alley, D -Company was ordered to despatch one platoon to man Ouse Alley forward -of Bow Trench. This was quickly done, and the men, taking up positions -on the firesteps facing south-east, were able to engage small parties -of the enemy who appeared over the crest in front of Bailleul East Post. - -Later in the morning when news was received of the severe odds against -which the gallant Marquis line garrison was struggling, the remainder -of D Company was ordered to bomb up Ouse Alley to try to join hands -with Major Phillips and thus complete the defensive flank. At the same -time a carrying party was detailed from Headquarters to carry S.A.A. -to the front line should D Company succeed. The place of D Company in -Bow Trench was taken by two platoons of the London Scottish placed at -Lieut.-Col. Marchment's disposal. - -The bombing attack was pushed forward for some 400 yards. Enemy -opposition was not very severe and about a dozen were killed. The -Germans were, however, continuing to press forward over the open from -the right and it seemed likely that D Company would get cut off. A -block was therefore made in Ouse Alley which was held by a few men, -while another small party manned the firesteps to the right to engage -the advancing enemy. The remainder of D Company moved over the open in -the valley north of Ouse Alley towards Boyne Dump to carry S.A.A. to -the Marquis line, taking full advantage of the ground. - -By 11.30 a.m. the situation of the Marquis line troops had become -precarious in the extreme. The Germans in Oppy Wood were being -reinforced and were developing a considerable volume of fire from -that direction. The right and right rear of the position were almost -enveloped and an attack was being launched against the left flank. -Bombs and ammunition were giving out. It seemed clear that further -resistance could only lead to useless loss of life. Influenced by -these weighty considerations Major Phillips, after a consultation -with his senior officers, decided to try to save the remnants of the -garrison by a withdrawal to the Red line. The only available trench -for withdrawal, Ouse Alley, was, however, already occupied by the -enemy in rear of the position, and the valley from Boyne Dump on the -left offered the only loophole of escape from the closing pincers. -Lieut.-Col. Marchment writes of this withdrawal: - - The withdrawal was witnessed by myself from my headquarters. I - watched it through my glasses. It was carried out in a very steady - and orderly way, the men leaving in groups of about a dozen. - Although exposed to heavy fire from the front and flanks, they made - excellent use of the ground and had few casualties. - -The men of D Company, who were meanwhile carrying S.A.A. up to the -Marquis line, met the survivors returning and covered their withdrawal. - -It is hard to find adequate words in praise of this gallant defence and -skilful and well-timed withdrawal. All ranks alike behaved with the -greatest spirit under very trying circumstances. - -A great loss was suffered in this defence in the capture by the enemy -of the Regimental Aid Post. Capt. Maloney, the M.O. was a most popular -man in the Battalion, and Sergt. Rossington and the two orderlies, -Palmer and Simpson, had all done excellent work. By an irony of fate -2/Lieut. Morris, who had done such good work in the defence of Wood -Post earlier in the morning, was hit later, and was having his wounds -dressed in the Aid Post when it was captured. - -Major F. A. Phillips who, at Forward Headquarters, was in charge of -the whole defence of the forward system, did excellent work. He was -continually up and down the lines encouraging the men, and was able to -keep Rear Battalion Headquarters constantly in touch with the rapid -changes in the situation. - -The enemy was now in great force in Viscount Street and was beginning -to bomb heavily down Ouse Alley, while he showed increasing signs of -strength on the ridge to the right of that trench. The party of D -Company in Ouse Alley was therefore withdrawn as soon as the survivors -of the Marquis line garrison had reached Bow Trench, to avoid the risk -of being cut off. Later the enemy appeared in great strength against -the block in Ouse Alley forward of Bow Trench. This block was defended -by a "slit" cut in the side of Ouse Alley which was covered by a Lewis -gun post in Bow Trench and seven of the enemy were killed by Lewis gun -fire. - -As soon as the Battalion was concentrated in Bow Trench and the Red -line, the artillery barrage was dropped to a line about 400 yards in -front of Bow Trench, and arrangements were made to increase it to -intense should the S.O.S. signal be sent up from Battalion Headquarters. - -The enemy skirmishers having been definitely checked the situation now -became quieter, and for the next hour there was a distinct lull in the -battle. - -The Kensingtons on the left had not been attacked but had withdrawn to -the Red line to conform to the 1/4th Londons' new position. - -In Towy Post, the extreme right of the Divisional front, the Queen's -Westminsters had put up a most gallant fight, but the remainder of -the 169th Brigade front had rapidly been swamped by weight of enemy -numbers, and in this sector the 169th Brigade troops were thrown back -to the Red line while the Wood Post garrison was still holding its -ground. - -The development of this great German attack was a remarkable -confirmation of the statement which had been made by the prisoner -captured on the 24th March. All the troops mentioned by him were -identified in the course of the fighting. On the 1/4th Londons' front -two German regiments were identified: the 249th I. Regt. at Oppy Post, -and the 10th R.I. Regt. in the shape of a gentleman who broke into -Sergt. Plumbley's canteen in Ouse Alley. But having armed himself with -a tin of pineapple this luckless marauder fell into the arms of D -Company bombing up the trench! - -Eleven German divisions took part in this great battle, but they -were all checked by the divisions holding the line, the 56th and 4th -north of the Scarpe and the 3rd and 15th south of it. That the almost -complete failure of the enemy on the 28th March was a severe blow to -the German High Command there can be no doubt, and Ludendorff says, -"It was an established fact that the enemy's resistance was beyond our -strength." - -The regiment has every reason to be proud of its defence this day. For -over four hours it retained the front line system under the weight -of heavy shell fire and repeated attacks by vastly superior numbers, -and, when finally it was forced to give ground to avoid extinction, -it withdrew fighting. The casualties were heavy, but considering the -enormous service rendered the price paid was not unduly great. - -At about 4 p.m. the enemy began to shell the Red line rather heavily, -but no infantry attack matured. Shortly afterwards the 1/4th Londons -were withdrawn, and by 6 p.m. were under cover of the Railway -Embankment north-east of Bailleul, reorganised in two companies (Cooper -and Williams), S.A.A. was replenished and arrangements made to man the -Brown line and posts south of the Bailleul Road should the enemy break -through the Red line. Bow Trench had been handed over to the London -Scottish. - -The experience of this battle showed the need for holding front line -posts lightly, and purely for observation purposes. The uselessness -of locking up large garrisons in them--unless they can be effectively -concealed as in the case of Wood Post--was clearly demonstrated. The -system of trench blocks to which much thought had previously been -devoted fully proved its value, while the advantage of rehearsing -companies in the rôles they may be expected to play, and especially of -acquainting all ranks with the "overland" routes within the area was -much in evidence. - -The casualties sustained by the 1/4th Londons in this action were: - - Officers: Capt. E. E. Spicer, 2/Lieuts. R. E. Campkin, H. T. - Hannay and H. V. Coombes, killed; Capt. A. M. Duthie, - D.S.O., and Lieut. H. M. Lorden, wounded; Capt. - Maloney, 2/Lieuts. C. W. Denning (attached to 168th - L.T.M. Battery), H. O. Morris and C. S. Richards, - captured. - - N.C.O.'s and men: 15 killed, 43 wounded and 168 missing. - -Decorations were awarded to the following: - - Lieut.-Col. A. F. Marchment, M.C., and Major F. A. Phillips, the - D.S.O.; Capts. A. M. Duthie, D.S.O., T. B. Cooper, M.M., and - H. N. Williams, the M.C.; C.S.M. T. Lock, M.M., the D.C.M.; - L.-Corpl. W. J. Hutchin, M.M., Bar to M.M.; Sergts. F. G. - Udall, H. V. R. Randall and C. J. Gibbs, Corpls. G. Hayes - and A. Parker, L.-Corpls. S. G. Coates, C. L. Husk and A. J. - Deadman, and Ptes. W. A. G. Battershall, P. C. Swinchatt, A. J. - Sellars and J. R. Phillips, the M.M. - -During the 29th March the 1/4th Londons remained in Brigade support. -Much movement was observed in the enemy's lines during the morning, and -our artillery was active in anticipation of a renewal of the attack, -but as the day wore on it became evident that the enemy was engaged in -relieving the attacking divisions. That evening at 7 p.m. the Battalion -handed over its trenches to the 87th Canadian Battalion (4th Canadian -Division) and marched out to billets at Mont St Eloy, arriving there at -2 a.m. on the 30th March. - - - - -CHAPTER XXII - -THE 1/4TH AND 2/4TH BATTALIONS DURING THE SUMMER MONTHS OF 1918--THE -RESERVE BATTALION, 1918 - - -In the preceding chapters we have endeavoured to describe the part -played by each of the battalions in resisting the mighty German -offensive. - -As we have seen this gigantic thrust was finally brought to a -standstill in front of Amiens at the end of April, while the enemy's -hopes in the Arras area had been finally shattered by the magnificent -resistance of the 28th March. The German offensive capabilities were, -however, by no means exhausted; and in the north the enemy once more -taxed the British resources to the uttermost in the Battle of the Lys, -which raged from the 7th to the 30th April and bent our lines back to -Hazebrouck. With this action, or rather series of actions, we are not -directly concerned as the 4th London Regiment had no part in it, and -we may therefore turn at once to consider the situation in which the -British Armies found themselves when the German attacks were finally -spent. - -The enormous weight of the German attacks of March and April had -involved practically the whole of the British divisions in France, and -all were in consequence seriously reduced in numbers and sorely in need -of rest and reorganisation. The magnificent efforts which were made -at home to replace the lost guns and other material are well known -and were of immediate effect; but the task of filling up the gaps in -personnel was necessarily a longer one, especially having regard to the -waning man-power of the Empire and its commitments in other theatres -of war. Moreover, after their arrival in France it was necessary for -reinforcements to be thoroughly assimilated into their new units before -active work could be expected of them. The serious depletion of force -at this time is illustrated by the fact that after temporarily writing -off as fighting units no fewer than 8 divisions, and handing over to -the French a further 5 at the urgent request of Marshal Foch, there -remained but 45--and most of these much reduced in numbers--available -for service on the British front. - -The enemy's successes had, of course, cost him dear, but it was -believed to be by no means beyond the bounds of possibility that he -would make yet another effort to achieve a decisive victory, and the -position was thus full of anxiety for G.H.Q. - -In the meantime the American Army was being poured into France as -rapidly as the whole available mercantile marine of the British Empire -could bring it across the Atlantic, but here again it was a question -of time before these well-trained but inexperienced troops would be -sufficiently valuable and numerous to turn the scale against Germany. - -The story of the months of May, June and July 1918 is one of -preparation, in which the British Armies were being gradually -reorganised and used in active defence of the new positions until an -equilibrium of strength between the Allies and the enemy was attained, -and it was possible once more for the Allies to take the offensive -and roll back the tide of invasion in the most remarkable series of -victories which the world has ever seen. - -We propose, therefore, to deal in this chapter, as briefly as possible, -with the operations during this period of reorganisation of each -Battalion in turn, until the opening of the Allied offensive in August -1918. - - -_The 1/4th Battalion_ - -Arriving at Mont St Eloy early in the morning of the 31st March 1918 -the 1/4th Londons settled down to a few days of so-called rest, days -which, for officers at least, are usually quite as hard work as -those spent in battle. Companies have to be reorganised and fresh -"specialists" trained to their duties, the completion of the men's -clothing and equipment, and replenishment of all company stores have -to be looked to, in addition to a large amount of clerical work in -writing up the official account of the battle and in submitting names -for awards, mention in despatches and promotion. The Battalion on this -occasion was fortunate in getting the gaps in its ranks rapidly filled. -On the 2nd and 3rd April two drafts arrived numbering together 420 -fully trained N.C.O.'s and men. Fine drafts which later did gallant -service, but which transformed the camp into a mild imitation of the -Tower of Babel, for among them could be traced the accents of London, -Kent, Surrey, Berkshire, the broader dialects of Yorkshire, Cheshire, -Lancashire and Wiltshire, and even the unmistakable tones of Scotland -and South Wales. Regulars, Territorials and New Armies were all -represented, and the rejuvenated Battalion provided a living example of -the unity of the Motherland in a great cause. - -This great accession enabled an immediate reconstruction of the four -companies to take place, and they were accordingly reformed and the -reinforcements absorbed, A Company under Capt. H. N. Williams, M.C., -B under Capt. R. S. B. Simmonds, C under Capt. S. J. Barkworth, M.C., -M.M., and D under Capt. T. B. Cooper, M.C., M.M. - -The troops were largely kept busy in digging new lines of defence round -Haut Avesnes, and all were much encouraged by the congratulations -received from G.H.Q., Army and Corps on their recent great stand. - -Divisional rests, however, have ever proved a snare and a delusion, -and those who count on prolonged peace in billets are invariably -disappointed. In spite of its so recent gruelling the morale of the -Division was high, and on the 6th April it was called upon again to go -into the line, this time in the XVII Corps (Fergusson), but still in -the First Army, which now extended as far south as Neuville-Vitasse. -After spending the night 5th/6th April at Villers au Bois the 1/4th -Londons marched on the afternoon of the 6th to Agnez lez Duisans, and -proceeded the following afternoon to Ronville Caves. The march through -the streets of Arras in the dusk was a great surprise to those who had -known this pleasant little city even as recently as the late summer -of 1917. The civilians were now all gone, hotels and shops were shut -and scarcely a house had escaped the German shell fire. The beautiful -Cathedral had met the same ghastly fate as that of Albert, and the -Levis and Schramm barracks were but ghosts of their former selves. - -In Ronville Caves, a remarkable series of underground chalk quarries, -the Battalion found dry and adequate quarters. The caves are of -considerable extent, the limits east and west being a crater in old -No Man's Land and Levis barracks; but, lighted by electricity and -tolerably ventilated, they formed quite healthy billets and, in the wet -weather then prevalent, far superior to bivouacs or trenches. - -The trenches now to be taken over by the 56th from the 1st Canadian -Division lay south of the Arras-Cambrai Road just in front of the -village of Tilloy, for as far as this had the German offensive bent our -lines back. The front line, Tilloy Trench, ran between Tilloy and the -Bois des Bœufs and then southwards towards Neuville-Vitasse, roughly -following what had formerly been the east side of the famous German -redoubt, The Harp. In rear of the front trench were successively Tilloy -Support, View Trench and Tilloy Reserve. Communication trenches were -Scottish Avenue, Stokes Lane, Fusilier Lane and Wye Lane, the last -named forming the right boundary of the sector. The front and support -trenches lay on the forward slope of the hill well under observation -from the enemy lines. View Trench was on the reverse slope of the -hill, and probably acquired its name in the days when its defenders -wore field-grey and looked in the other direction: for us it was well -sited with a good field of fire of about 200 yards. Trenches, wire and -dugouts were fair. The fact that but a few days earlier this had been -a back area was forced on one's attention, for the line ran through -ruined Nissen hut camps and horse standings, while in the German front -line opposite stood the remains of a Y.M.C.A. hut. - -After four days of working parties at Ronville, in which the Battalion -was digging a new line, Telegraph Hill Switch, the 1/4th Londons -relieved the 8th Middlesex in the line. This tour of duty lasted six -days during which the enemy remained inactive on this front, but which -saw the outbreak of the Battle of the Lys to which we have already -alluded. To those who knew the Neuve Chapelle area it seemed strange -to hear of "fighting in Riez Bailleul and Laventie," "the struggle for -Estaires," "the fall of Merville." Ruined though some of these places -had been in 1916, they had afforded shelter to many hundreds of 1/4th -London men, and it was now impossible to refrain from wondering what -had become of the villagers who had hitherto clung to their homes, and -especially of the little children. - -On the last day in the line, the 19th, a raid on a large scale was -carried out by one company of the London Scottish on the right, and one -platoon of the 1/4th Londons on the left, with the object of advancing -the outpost line on the whole sector, and establishing it an average -of 500 yards in front of Tilloy Trench. The assaulting platoon was -drawn from C Company under 2/Lieut. E. L. Mills, M.C., and afterwards -(Mills having been hit) under 2/Lieut. J. L. Backhouse. Zero was at -4.30 a.m., and eight minutes later the 1/4th London platoon rushed -their objective after Stokes Mortar preparation. Unfortunately the -enemy garrison bolted and no identification was obtained, though they -left a machine-gun and many documents and maps in our hands. The -London Scottish also reached their objective and touch was gained with -them. This advanced line was held all day under German artillery fire, -which steadily increased until the Battalion was compelled to call for -protective fire from our guns in retaliation. - -After 7 p.m. the enemy launched some heavy bombing attacks against the -new positions. These were vigorously resisted. A withdrawal to the -original line was, however, ordered by Brigade, and by 8 p.m. all the -assaulting platoons were back. A good deal of loss was undoubtedly -inflicted on the enemy, and the effect of this minor operation on the -spirit of the men fully justified its execution. Five N.C.O.'s and men -of the Battalion were killed and 24 wounded. - -Late that night the Battalion handed over its trenches to the 1/2nd -Londons and withdrew in support to Ronville Caves, moving in the -evening of the 20th April to Dainville in Divisional reserve. - -About this period the 1/4th Londons were unfortunate in losing Major F. -A. Phillips, D.S.O., who had been an able second in command for nearly -eight months. He was much out of health principally through having -swallowed rather too much mustard gas at Oppy, and he did not rejoin -the Battalion. His place was taken by Major R. B. Marshall, 8th East -Surrey Regiment, whose battalion had been disbanded in January. Capt. -Maloney's duties as Medical Officer had been taken for a few weeks by -Capt. J. Ridley, M.C., and subsequently by Capt. E. Woodyeat, a retired -naval surgeon, who had served in 1915 and 1916 with the Coldstream -Guards. - -Casualties in April were light beyond those sustained during the raid -of the 19th. Lieut. L. E. Ballance was wounded this month. On the 24th -April a draft of officers joined as follows: - - Lieut. J. W. Price, 2/Lieuts. H. W. Attenborrow, C. L. Henstridge, - A. Holloway, C. R. Mason, J. D. Miller, A. H. Millstead, W. P. - Humphrey and F. S. Wise. - - 2/Lieut. R. T. Stevenson (5th Londons); 2/Lieuts. S. Blackhurst, - M.C., A. F. Potter, J. A. Voskule, W. Roughton (7th Londons); - 2/Lieut. A. M. Bullock (15th Londons). - -On the 24th April Major-Gen. Dudgeon fell sick and went to hospital. -He had commanded the Division since August 1917 and brought it through -two of its most successful actions. A few days later Major-Gen. Hull -resumed the command. - -On the night 3rd/4th May the Divisional front was extended northwards -as far as the Arras-Douai railway, the additional frontage being taken -over from the 1st Canadian Division. Thereafter the sector was held -with two brigades in line (each with two battalions in trenches and -one in support), and one brigade in reserve. Of the reserve brigade two -battalions were billeted at Dainville and one at Berneville. - -The 1/4th Londons now settled down to their share of the routine of -working this sector, and through May and June were in and out of the -trenches, in line, in support and in reserve alternately, the tours of -duty varying between six and nine days. These summer weeks form on the -whole a pleasant memory for all who passed through them. The general -situation was indeed grave, and though for G.H.Q. the summer months -of 1918 must have been a period of unceasing anxiety, the infantryman -in the line saw life from a different angle. The trenches were -comfortable, the weather good, the men well fed and clothed. Mornings -in the trenches were spent in hard work on the defences, afternoons -in resting, evenings under a summer moon divided between digging and -wiring. With the added spice of patrolling and raiding, in which a lot -of useful work was achieved, and the enemy kept well on the alert, and -wishing he was not opposite to the 56th Division, the tours of duty in -line passed pleasantly enough with very few casualties. The Battalion -was in fine fettle and in good conceit with itself, a wholesome feeling -which scored heavily when the time came for the final advance. - -The enemy's chief activity was shell fire, and at times this developed -to great intensity. On the 27th May in particular, when the 1/4th -Londons were in trenches, a very heavy bombardment, high explosive -and mustard gas together, burst on the area in the early morning. The -Battalion stood to and prepared to receive an attack, but no infantry -movement occurred, and it subsequently transpired that the disturbance -was to cover an enemy raid on the division on our right. For a time -most of the Battalion had made up their minds that they were about to -fight. The Londoner is full of superstition, and this day the Battalion -was to have boiled rabbit for dinner. Boiled rabbit had figured in -the menu on the 28th March!... Throughout the day the enemy artillery -carried out hurricane bombardments of various parts of the sector, and -it was no surprise to learn later that his offensive against Rheims had -broken out. - -During the period under review the Battalion paid five visits to the -trenches at Tilloy, with one tour of three days in Arras, spent in -heavy working parties carrying wire to Telegraph Hill and digging, and -six days in support at St Sauveur similarly occupied. - -Rests in Divisional reserve were spent at Dainville, in which much good -training work was carried out and the routine broken occasionally by -excellent sports meetings, shooting matches and concerts. In connection -with the concerts we must again refer to the Quartermaster's string -band. This excellent orchestra had given its first public performance -at St Aubin in January 1918. Receiving every encouragement from the -Colonel and the keenest support from the Padre, this band had had an -unbroken career of success and given the greatest pleasure to all -ranks of the Battalion. At Church Parades when out of the line the -band always played the hymns and voluntaries, and many a shattered -barn in the villages behind the trenches has re-echoed with the -strains of the 1/4th London string band. The keenness and pride of the -Quartermaster in his band were as delightful to observe as his remarks -when a cornet player was put out of action at Oppy were startling. -A portable harmonium was purchased to complete the equipment, and -when demobilisation broke the band up early in 1919, this harmonium, -decorated with the names of all the villages of France and Belgium in -which the orchestra had performed, was presented to the Padre for use -in his parish at home. - -The general efficiency of the Battalion at this period reached a -remarkably high pitch, of which everyone associated with it had -reason to be thoroughly proud. It was well equipped, well drilled and -disciplined, and a fine fighting unit. This efficiency was not confined -to the fighting ranks. At an inspection of the Battalion Transport -(Lieut. G. V. Lawrie), the Divisional Commander was so impressed -with its turn-out that his remarks were circulated to other units -as an example. A fine fighting battalion cannot exist without fine -administration, and this was supplied in full measure by the Adjutant -(Boutall), and by the rear Headquarters under Mosely, Stanbridge, -Faulkner, the Quartermaster, and Lawrie, whose unceasing service to the -fighting ranks were of immeasurable value. - -[Illustration: _Arras Cathedral_] - -Faulkner was a man of peculiarly lovable disposition. "Le gros papa," -as he was known to the little children in Dainville, forms in the minds -of many French peasants a picture of all that is kind and chivalrous -in the British soldier. Mosely writes: "Many is the night when the -Huns were dropping bombs on the village"--by no means an infrequent -occurrence--"that Faulkner has deliberately set himself to amuse a -family of youngsters and keep them screaming with laughter so that -their merriment should drown the noise of the explosions." - -The following officers joined the Battalion during May, June and July: - - Capt. H. A. T. Hewlett; Lieut. G. E. Stanbridge (recalled from six - months' home duty "on exchange"); 2/Lieuts. A. W. Chignell, T. - Yoxall and G. H. Sylvester. - -In the early days of June the influenza epidemic began to make its -ravages, but the Battalion suffered comparatively little. No men -were allowed to rejoin in the line from back areas, but were kept at -Berneville until the Battalion came out of the trenches. Casualties -for May, June and July were very light. 2/Lieuts. W. P. Humphrey and -T. H. Mawby were killed, 2/Lieut. A. W. Chignell wounded, and about 12 -N.C.O.'s and men killed and 40 wounded. - -Early in July Capt. and Adjt. W. J. Boutall, M.C., was appointed to -168th Brigade Headquarters as Assistant Staff Captain, and his duties -in the Battalion were assumed by Capt. S. J. Barkworth, M.C., M.M. -Boutall had filled the appointment of Adjutant since September 1916 -with conspicuous success. His organising ability was high and the -standard of his work throughout had been excellent. C Company was taken -over about the same time by Capt. H. A. T. Hewlett. 2/Lieut. F. S. Wise -was seconded to the Machine-gun Corps. - -On the 13th July the 56th Division was relieved in the line by the 1st -Canadian Division, and passed into Corps reserve. The 1/4th Londons, -who had already been in billets at Dainville for a week, moved to -Lattre St Quentin, and during the ensuing fortnight further changes of -stations followed each other with rapidity. The Battalion was quartered -successively at Grand Rullecourt, Tincques and Marqueffles Farm, the -days being occupied with training interspersed with sports and games. -While the Battalion was at Tinques the railway station was visited -on the night of the 17th July by enemy aircraft, which dropped eight -bombs, but caused no loss of personnel. - -The last night of July found the Division once more taking over the -Tilloy trenches from the Canadians, the 1/4th Londons being at St -Sauveur in Brigade support until the 4th August, when they relieved the -Kensingtons in the front trenches. On the 8th August, the opening day -of the great British advance, the Battalion was relieved by the London -Scottish and withdrew to billets in Arras. At this point, therefore, -we may leave the 1/4th Battalion until the time comes to deal with its -rôle in the great battles of August and September 1918. - - -_The 2/4th Battalion_ - -The experience of the 2/4th Battalion during the summer months was very -similar to that of the 1/4th Battalion. - -The Battalion spent the whole period in the area of the Amiens -defences, where the Germans had penetrated most deeply into our -positions. The Amiens defences were now far in rear of the old 1916 -line, and the work involved in constructing new defences in what, -up to five weeks earlier, had been a line of communication area was -immense. Shell hole defences had to be linked into continuous trench -lines, provided with support and reserve lines and communication -trenches, furnished with dugouts and shelters, and defended with wire -entanglements. This formed the greater part of the Battalion's work -when in the line; but it certainly laboured during these months under -disadvantages which the 1/4th Battalion did not suffer. The upheaval -of the British organisation had been much more widely extended in -the Amiens area than it had been in the vicinity of Arras, where the -withdrawal of our forces had been comparatively shallow, and for a time -"back-of-the-line" organisation was inevitably weak. Billets were few -and bad, and for the most part the Battalion bivouacked when out of the -line. The same opportunities of resting during periods spent in reserve -did not, therefore, occur. - -We have also recorded that the casualties suffered by the 1/4th -Battalion at Oppy were made good promptly by a veteran draft which was -thoroughly absorbed into the unit during the period of waiting for -the final advance. The 2/4th Battalion, which had been more knocked -about in the great battles of March and April, was reinforced very -slowly, and indeed its losses of the early part of the year were never -completely replaced. Such reinforcements as it did receive consisted -chiefly of immature youths from home--all endowed with magnificent -spirit and courage, but by the nature of the case, less valuable -soldiers until they had had a good deal of training in the line. The -recuperation of the 2/4th Battalion was thus effected under not the -most favourable conditions: a consideration which should count in their -favour when we come later to consider the victories they helped to gain -in August and September. - -A few days of rest in the St Riquier area were allowed the 58th -Division after relief from the action at Cachy. The 2/4th Londons were -billeted at Le Plessiel between the 27th April and the 6th May, and -though no large drafts were received, the accessions of strength were -sufficient to allow of a four-company organisation being retained. -These were organised: A under Capt. F. J. Griffiths, B under Capt. -G. H. Hetley, C under Capt. W. C. Morton, M.C., and D under 2/Lieut. -E. V. Grimsdell. Ribands were awarded to those who had recently been -decorated, by the Divisional Commander, who also inspected the -Battalion Transport and commended it most highly on its turn-out. - -The III Corps, which comprised the 18th and 47th (London) Divisions, -besides the 58th, was now responsible for the Amiens defences on the -line west of Albert from the Ancre to Aveluy Wood. - -On the 7th May 1918 the 58th Division came from Corps reserve into -the line, and from this date until the 8th August, the beginning of -the final advance, was continually in action. The 2/4th Battalion's -tours of duty were somewhat irregular owing to the constant changes of -position which occurred during this period. The first sector for which -the Division was responsible was almost due west of Albert, in front of -the ruined village of Bouzincourt. For a fortnight the 2/4th Battalion -was in reserve positions, either bivouacked at Molliens au Bois or -Warloy or in astonishingly bad billets in Mirvaux, and was given a -rôle as counter-attack battalion to be employed as occasion should -arise in the event of a renewed enemy offensive. This involved constant -readiness and much reconnaissance work by officers. The last ten days -of May were spent in trenches, at first in support and afterwards in -the front system. Working parties formed the principal item of routine, -but a great deal of very valuable patrolling work was carried out. -Over the whole Corps front No Man's Land was indeed nightly occupied -by our patrols, who were always ready for a scrap with the enemy and -endeavouring to pick up an identification. This was partly to train -up the young soldiers in the way they should go and partly for the -essential purpose of ascertaining the enemy's intentions as to a -further attack. - -On the last night of May 2/Lieut. George took a fighting patrol across -to the enemy front line after heavy trench mortar preparation. It -was found that much damage had been done, but though the trench was -searched for 200 yards no enemy were met and the patrol withdrew -without having suffered loss. - -At this period the enemy was comparatively quiet, confining his -activity to shell fire in which gas shell figured prominently. - -Reinforcements received in May were: - - Lieut. B. Rivers Smith (recalled from six months' duty "on - exchange"); 2/Lieuts. H. G. A. Leach and J. W. George (4th - Londons); Lieut. H. C. Platts and 2/Lieut. A. L. D. Bold (7th - Londons); 2/Lieuts. A. J. N. Sievwright and J. Horsfield (12th - Londons); 2/Lieut. A. R. Armfield (20th Londons); 2/Lieuts. H. - M. Bradley and W. N. M. Girling (21st Londons). At the end of - the month 2/Lieut. Sievwright rejoined his own regiment. Drafts - of N.C.O.'s and men totalled 142. - -The casualties in May were comparatively light. 2/Lieut. H. M. Bradley -and 1 man were killed by the falling in of the dugout they were -occupying, and in addition 2 men were killed and 12 wounded. - -At the beginning of June the 2/4th Battalion moved back to Contay in -Divisional reserve, and resumed its counter-attack duties. Here a -severe loss was sustained in Lieut.-Col. W. R. H. Dann, D.S.O., who was -appointed to command the 60th Infantry Brigade with the temporary rank -of Brigadier-General. Lieut.-Col. Dann had been in continuous command -of the 2/4th Londons since November 1916, and during the Battalion's -seventeen months of active service he had held the confidence -and affection of all ranks. His great skill as a commander, his -imperturbable coolness in action, his unfailing care for the welfare -of his men, had endeared him to all, and the Battalion said good-bye -to him with genuine sorrow. The command was taken temporarily by Major -Tollworthy, but on the 8th June Major Grover, D.S.O., M.C., who had -been hit at Cachy, rejoined and assumed command with the acting rank of -Lieut.-Col. - -On the 5th June the Battalion moved to tents and shelters at Mirvaux, -where attempts were made to carry out a few days' training. Standing -crops, which might on no account be damaged, interfered sadly, and but -little was accomplished. The plaint of the Divisional Staff made at the -time is rather pathetic: "Training areas have not yet been allotted. As -is usually the case the hiring of these is a very lengthy procedure, -and is not likely to be completed before the Division leaves the area." -Apparently even the full tide of the German offensive had beat in vain -against the massive structure of regulations. - -The end of May had witnessed the recrudescence of fighting on the -French front on the Chemin des Dames. Once again the weight of the -enemy's assault had overtaxed our Allies' resources in defence, and by -the 4th June the Germans had reached their 1914 line on the Marne at -Chateau-Thierry, and were threatening Paris. It was firmly anticipated -that this fresh German success would mean another blow against the -British front at its junction with the French, and to meet this new -menace the XXII Corps was reconstituted under Sir A. J. Godley, in -G.H.Q. reserve. To this new formation were posted the 12th, 37th and -58th Divisions, the whole of which were held in readiness to move at -two hours' notice. In accordance with this scheme the 173rd Brigade was -moved to the Amiens area, the 2/4th Londons being billeted--this time -in comfortable quarters--at Guignemicourt on the 10th June. - -The German attack between Montdidier and Noyon did in fact develop, and -the 37th Division was moved southwards. The 58th Division was, however, -not called upon, and, the danger being passed, returned to the line -after a week, the 2/4th Battalion moving on the 17th June to Molliens -au Bois. - -For the remainder of June and the whole of July the 2/4th Battalion -remained in forward areas. At first the 173rd Brigade was in line -astride the Amiens-Albert Road and the Battalion successively occupied -positions in reserve in the La Houssoye line, in support in the -Dodo-Hill-Darling system, and in front trenches in the Ethel-Dandy -system. - -The work on defences and the patrolling activity of the previous month -were here continued without abatement, but with very little incident -of interest. During the last week of June the weather, which had -been uniformly good, was broken by some heavy showers, which at once -developed the extraordinary propensity of French mud for turning into -glue on the least provocation. This hampered work on the defences -but had no effect on the spirit of the Battalion, which with careful -training was now developing once more into a well-knit and disciplined -fighting unit full of good cheer and confidence. - -On the 25th June Capt. F. W. Walker, D.S.O., who had been wounded at -Cachy, rejoined and resumed his duties as Adjutant. - -The following officers joined in June: - - Lieut. A. R. Muddell (4th Londons); Lieut. G. de G. Barkas, M.C. - (to Intelligence Officer) and 2/Lieuts. T. G. Owen and S. T. - Morris (1st Londons); 2/Lieut. H. Slater (3rd Londons); Lieut. - J. D. Morrison and 2/Lieuts. G. H. Main, R. D. Cotton and K. - W. Gauld (14th Londons); 2/Lieut. F. Bidgood (16th Londons); - Lieut. C. I. Mansel-Howe (23rd Londons); and Lieut. C. C. - Brissenden (A.S.C.). - - Reinforcements of 181 N.C.O.'s and men--mostly young soldiers--were - also received. - -A few days spent in reserve at Baizieux in the first week of July -brought the 2/4th Battalion for the first time into contact with -American troops, a battalion of whom were bivouacked here. - -The month of July was passed in similar fashion to those which had -preceded it. From the 6th to the 18th the Battalion was in the -Ethel-Dandy system, astride the Amiens-Albert Road, at first in front -trenches and subsequently in support. On the 18th a withdrawal to -reserve lines at Baizieux and Laviéville was effected, and here the -Battalion remained for nine days. After one day spent in cleaning up -in Behencourt the Battalion moved into line again on the 27th July, -relieving the 30th Australian Battalion in support trenches around -Ribemont, between that village and Buire-sur-Ancre. - -Life in the Ribemont sector was comparatively peaceful. As before the -men were principally occupied in working parties on the defences and -the officers in reconnoitring lines of approach to the front trenches. -On the whole the enemy was quiet, though he frequently added insult to -injury by dropping on the Battalion gas shells evidently intended for -the batteries which were in action just in rear of it. The trenches -were comfortable, for all these months of hard work had been to some -purpose; and the presence of ruined villages in the near vicinity was -the means of adding touches of home life in the shape of a few odd -sticks of broken furniture which had formerly graced a cottage home in -Buire. An inter-platoon boundary in one of the trenches was marked -by what had once been a handsome perambulator, while a little further -on a basket-work dressmaker's model stood sentry over a shell hole in -ludicrous isolation. - -The ravages of the influenza epidemic of June and July were severe, and -casualties from this cause far exceeded those inflicted by the enemy. -Between the battle at Cachy and the end of July no fewer than 427 other -ranks of the Battalion were sent to hospital, though most of these -rejoined after a week or two of absence. - -On the 19th July the Battalion lost Lieut. S. A. Seys (15th Londons -attached), the assistant adjutant, who had served with it since -February 1917, and who left for attachment to the staff of the 60th -Brigade. An able administrator, Seys, who, though not a 4th London -officer, had loyally made the regiment his own during his service with -it, left behind him many friends who sincerely regretted his departure. - -During July Lieut. A. G. Croll and drafts of 92 other ranks joined the -Battalion. 2/Lieuts. Gauld and Cotton rejoined their own regiment. -While the Battalion was at Baizieux the medical officer, Lieut. -Dunaway, U.S. Army, was presented by the Corps Commander with the -Military Cross, awarded him for services in March and April. It is -believed that Dunaway was one of the first American officers to receive -a British decoration for gallantry in the field. - -At the end of July companies were commanded as follows: A by Lieut. C. -C. Brissenden, B. by Capt. A. G. Croll, C by Capt. W. H. Parslow and D -by Capt. B. Rivers Smith. - -All who served in the Albert sector during the summer of 1918 will -remember the Albert Road. This was very largely used at night by -incoming and outgoing troops who used to join it somewhere in the -neighbourhood of Pont Noyelles. The journey up it was an experience -which it would indeed be hard to forget. On both sides of the road -was ranged battery after battery; it seemed impossible that so many -guns could be massed in so small a compass. "A succession of blinding -flashes alternated with inky blackness. The road itself was encumbered -with ammunition lorries, ration limbers and field ambulances. -Thundering detonations from the guns and a continued grating roar from -the traffic made the journey a nightmare." So writes Croll. The picture -is indeed sufficiently disturbing. But in spite of the noisy horror a -Battalion such as the 2/4th Londons, who had made close acquaintance -with the seamy side of war in the retreat from La Fère, could not but -be heartened by the realisation that already past losses had been made -good, and that night by night the roar of the British guns was becoming -louder and yet louder, till at last they were ready to roar forth the -barrage which was to lead our troops to final victory. - -The whole experience of July 1918 indeed, though devoid of exciting -incident, was such as to impress the Battalion with the realisation -that the time of waiting was nearly at an end, and that the -equilibrium, to gain which we had been straining every nerve for three -months, was almost attained. Heavy as the German bombardments had been -from time to time, our guns with increasing frequency demonstrated -their power to silence the enemy artillery. The results achieved by -patrolling had shown that in growing measure we were becoming masters -of No Man's Land, and encounters with enemy patrols afforded conclusive -proof of the individual prowess and courage of our men as well as their -superior morale. - -Relieved from the trenches at Ribemont by the 1/1st Cambridgeshire -Regiment, the 2/4th Londons concentrated at Behencourt on the evening -of the 2nd August, and, embussing at once, reached Pernois, in the -Domart area, in the early morning of the 3rd. Here it remained till -brought back to the line to take part in the great battle of the 8th -August. - - -_The Reserve Battalion_ - -In April 1918 the 3rd (Reserve) Battalion moved from Blackdown Camp to -Maida Barracks, Aldershot. The reason for this move was primarily to -provide troops for use in tactical schemes by students at the Senior -Officers' School, then stationed at Oudenarde Barracks. - -While carrying out this duty the Battalion was called upon to supply -large parties daily for the School where they were commanded by Student -Officers. It cannot be said that this duty, which fell largely on -the "A IV" platoons, was beneficial to training. The regular course -of instruction was interfered with, and a large amount of field work -was carried out before the recruits engaged in it were sufficiently -advanced to appreciate what they were supposed to be doing. The -individual training was thus delayed and its resumption rendered -proportionately difficult when at last the attachment to the School -ceased. During the period spent at Maida the Expeditionary Company -practically ceased to exist, as all N.C.O.'s and men who rejoined -from hospital or the Command Depôt were posted temporarily to the 1st -(Reserve) Battalion, which remained at Blackdown. - -The German offensive of March completely revolutionised the Reserve -Battalion. The frightful losses at the front had to be made good -immediately at all costs. Training staffs were reduced to a minimum, -and every fit officer and N.C.O. as well as every recruit, whose -training was advanced enough to lend colourable justification to it, -was at once sent overseas. The call for men did not cease here. The -General Order forbidding the despatch of "young soldiers" overseas -was, under pressure of circumstances, revoked, and volunteers were -called for from the "A IV" boys. The response was, as may be expected, -magnificent. Under age, under-trained, these gallant boys had but one -thought--to join their overseas battalions in the fighting line. At -the end of a week the Battalion was almost denuded of recruits under -training, while the orderly room and training staffs were on the point -of breakdown from almost continuous work and strain. - -Among the first to answer the call was Lieut.-Col. Hanbury Sparrow, the -Commanding Officer, who rejoined his regiment. His place in command -was taken by Lieut.-Col. Sir Hugh Lacon, D.S.O., the Warwickshire -Regiment, who retained the appointment till shortly before the -Armistice. - -So reduced in numbers was the Battalion that it was no longer useful -to the Senior Officer's School, and it was accordingly relieved by a -stronger battalion and returned to Blackdown early in August, being -quartered in Frith Hill Hutments. At the end of August the duties -of second in command were assumed by Major H. J. Duncan-Teape, who -rejoined from hospital. - -Training was resumed on the usual routine at Frith Hill, and at the -end of August the emergency order as to despatching "A IV" boys on -draft was rescinded. The young soldiers, therefore, reverted to the -former scheme of more gradual training. The staff was, however, busily -employed with 400 coal-miners, enlisted into the Welsh Regiment, and -sent to the 3rd (Reserve) Battalion for training. These miners were -excellent material, but their training was not completed until the week -following the Armistice, so that they were deprived of the opportunity -of seeing active service and were rapidly demobilised. These Welshmen -were endowed in large measure with the national gift for part-singing, -and were thus enabled to contribute materially to the social life of -the Battalion. - -During Armistice week a further reduction of Home Cadres involved the -amalgamation of the 1st and 3rd (Reserve) Battalions, under the title -of 1st (Reserve) Battalion, so that the one reserve unit was made -responsible for supply of drafts (few of course were needed) to the -whole Fusilier Brigade. The combined unit was commanded by Col. Vickers -Dunfee, V.D., until his demobilisation early in December, when command -was given to Lieut.-Col. A. Mather (Leinster Regiment). - -Shortly after Christmas 1918 demobilisation began to thin the ranks of -the Battalion, while further ravages were made by the transfer of most -of the "A IV" boys to Young Soldier Battalions, preparatory to their -despatch to join the Army of the Rhine. In February 1919 the Battalion -moved to Shoreham-by-Sea, and by the end of the month its disbandment -was completed. - - - - -CHAPTER XXIII - -THE FINAL ADVANCE - - -I. _The 2/4th Battalion in the Battles of Amiens and Bapaume, 1918_ - -The middle of 1918 witnessed the veritable low watermark of the Allied -fortunes. All the protracted sledgehammer offensives of 1916 and 1917, -which had indented the enemy's line at such ghastly cost of life, had -within a few short weeks been swept aside as if they had never been, -and the advancing tide of the Germans' offensive had carried their -eagles forward to the furthest positions they had ever reached in 1914. -In Italy the laborious advance of our Allies towards Trieste had been -turned, when the coveted goal seemed almost within their grasp, into -a defeat which was almost decisive. Roumania had long been utterly -overrun, Austria given a new lease of life, and Russia's debacle -completed. Scarcely anywhere was there a ray of light on this very -gloomy horizon. - -We have endeavoured to show that, bad as the situation was, the Allies -by no means accepted the crushing blows which had been inflicted -on them as decisive, and week by week the position was gradually -improving, and the numerical superiority of the enemy was being -overcome. In July so great was the British recovery that offensive -operations on a small scale were undertaken with a view to local -improvement of our positions. Among these the capture of Hamel and -Meteren may be mentioned. - -The bulk of the fighting, however, was on the French front, where the -enemy was endeavouring to enlarge the salient which he had driven down -to the Marne. On the east side at Rheims and on the west in the Forêt -de Compiègne his pressure was great but weakening. The French powers -of resistance were gradually becoming more equal to their task and the -German progress correspondingly slower till at last, on the 15th July, -the enemy received a definite check. Three days later Marshal Foch had -brought forward the reserves which he had jealously conserved through -these trying days, and the enemy was in retreat on a front of 27 miles -from the Oise to the Marne. Of the French offensive we can say nothing, -for our task lies with the British Fourth Army under Rawlinson. - -Immediately Marshal Foch had set his own armies in forward motion he -ordered the British and American armies to open the offensives they had -prepared. The first object of British G.H.Q. was to disengage Amiens, -and the vast offensive movement therefore began in Rawlinson's army, -which was on the right of the British line from its junction with the -French near Moreuil to the north of Albert. - -In this part of the great series of victories we have to follow the -operations of the 2/4th Battalion, and we shall deal with them in the -first instance from the opening of the offensive on August 8th until -their final disbandment on September 12th. We shall then proceed to -follow the unrolling of the battle northwards and the engagement in -it successively of the Third and First Armies, with both of which the -1/4th Battalion fought until the Armistice. - - * * * * * - -The date fixed for the great attack was 8th August, and on that day -Rawlinson's Fourth Army, comprising from left to right the III, -Australian and Canadian Corps, would combine with Débeney's First -French Army in a supreme effort to relieve Amiens from the menace of -the Huns. With the details of the battle beyond the 58th Division's -area we are not concerned but we must, in order to understand the rôle -which the Division was expected to play, offer some brief description -of the terrain and its effect on the Australian advance on the right. - -The main advance was to be made on the south bank of the Somme by the -Canadians and the Australians, while the III Corps, including the 18th -and 58th Divisions in line, operating solely on the north bank of -the river, would secure the left flank of the attack as far north as -Morlancourt. The establishment of this defensive flank entailed the -capture of a very strong naturally defended position, the possession of -which was vital to the success of the troops south of the Somme. - -The Somme, like the Oise, is a winding canalised river running through -a marshy valley. Its south bank, though undulating, has no specially -marked hill features, but on the north the adjoining land rises to -a considerable height on the spur which traverses the narrow wedge -between the Somme and the Ancre. This plateau is furrowed by a number -of deep gullies running northward from the river, and the sharp hills -between these valleys, falling in places by abrupt chalk cliffs to the -Somme, form very commanding features from which it would be possible -for a determined enemy to play havoc with any attempt to advance -south of the river, for they completely dominate the south bank. The -most marked of these spurs is the long saddle immediately east of the -village of Chipilly. This feature is almost girdled by the Somme (which -makes a narrow sweep round the east, south and west sides of it), and -projects almost a mile south of the general line of the river. It thus -forms a barrier across the ground for which the Australians would be -made responsible. - -The capture of the Chipilly Ridge was the task allotted to the 58th -Division, while the 18th would complete the defensive flank from the -north end of the Ridge at Gressaire Wood to Morlancourt. - -The line of advance from the British front trenches was full of -obstacles. Immediately in front of the line, and on the river bank -was the village of Sailly Laurette, the garrison of which, if not -immediately overcome, would be able to enfilade the whole advance -as the troops crossed No Man's Land. A mile and a half east of -Sailly Laurette lay Malard Wood, covering both slopes of one of the -declivitous gullies already alluded to; while half-way between the -Malard Wood valley and the final objective on the cliff of Chipilly -Ridge, lay a second gully, badly enfiladed from Chipilly village and -completely overlooked from the Ridge itself. Heavy going all the way, -up hill and down dale, through features eminently suited to machine-gun -defence, culminating in a breathless scramble up a steep slope to meet -an enemy who would probably defend it to the last; a total advance -of about two and a half miles; altogether no light task for a single -division. - -In view of the obvious difficulty of carrying so strong a position -by frontal attack alone it was arranged that the Australians should -advance ahead of the 58th Division and occupy the high ground near -Méricourt south-east of the Ridge, by the time the 58th was due to -deliver its final assault. By this means it was hoped to squeeze the -enemy off the Ridge in the direction of Bray without making a fight for -it, in order to avoid complete envelopment. - -Such was the general idea: and we must now return to the 2/4th -Battalion which we left in the preceding chapter at Pernois on the -morning of 2nd August, in order to trace how the idea worked out. - -The 2nd and 3rd August were spent in resting and cleaning, and on -Sunday, the 4th, after company commanders had been admitted to the -rumour that large operations were imminent, sudden orders to move were -received. At 9.30 p.m. that night the Battalion again embussed to La -Houssoye on the Amiens-Albert Road, whence it marched to bivouacs in a -wood near Bonnay (two miles north of Corbie, on the Ancre). Fortunately -the weather was fine and warm, for the only shelter provided was one -bell tent per company. - -The 5th August was passed in close cover in the wood in order that -our intentions might not be revealed to prying Bosche aeroplanes, and -in the afternoon Lieut.-Col. Grover explained the plan of attack to -the company commanders. At zero (4.20 a.m.) the 174th Brigade would -advance from Assembly line (see Map No. 17) and dig in on the Green -line 200 yards east of Malard Wood. The 2/10th Londons (175th Brigade) -were especially attached for the capture of Sailly Laurette. The 173rd -Brigade would follow close on the 174th in artillery formation, halt -in Malard Wood for one hour and adopt attack formation, and then -passing through the Green line would take Chipilly Ridge, Red line. The -18th Division would advance on the left of the 58th, the 54th Brigade -going as far as the Green line, when the 53rd would leap-frog through -it to the Red line. The advance would be made under a creeping field -artillery barrage provided by ninety 18-prs. and thirty 4·5 howitzers, -while the deep valleys would be dealt with by a heavy howitzer barrage -jumping from valley to valley. Twelve tanks were to cover the advance, -two of which were allotted to the 2/10th Londons, for Sailly Laurette, -the remainder leading the 174th Brigade to Malard Wood, where the 173rd -would pick up one per company for the final assault. The 4th Suffolks -(Pioneers) would consolidate a position slightly in rear of the final -objective. - -The order of battle in the 173rd Brigade was: 3rd Londons on the right, -2/4th Londons on the left, leading battalions; 2/2nd Londons, reserve -battalion. In the 2/4th Battalion the order of advance was: leading D -(Rivers Smith) on the right and C (Parslow) on the left; supporting -B (Croll) on the right, A (Brissenden) on the left, with Battalion -Headquarters in rear. - -Another conference followed on the morning of the 6th, after which -company commanders went forward to reconnoitre the point of assembly. -On arrival at the 54th Brigade Headquarters it was found, however, -that the enemy had just delivered a sharp attack and possessed himself -of the very trenches from which we were to "jump-off" the following -morning: rather disconcerting and possibly very serious for the whole -attack, for the Huns had reached some of the dumps and gun positions -prepared for the 8th, and it might be that they would guess our -intentions. To guard against any possibility of failure on this score -the barrage lines were completely rearranged. Prisoners subsequently -captured stated that the British intention to attack had not been -discovered, but the extraordinary defence which the Bosche made on -8th, combined with the fact that his field guns were withdrawn east of -Gressaire Wood throws some doubt on this. - -[Illustration: THE BATTLE OF AMIENS, 1918 (2/4TH BATTALION). ACTION AT -CHIPILLY RIDGE, AUGUST 8-10, 1918] - -At all events the company commanders were forced to return without -seeing anything of their assembly position or of the ground over which -they were to advance, and reported accordingly. The attack, however, -could not be postponed as the remainder of the Army and the French also -were involved, and final preparations were therefore made for a plunge -in the dark. - -Battle surplus in charge of Capt. Hetley, who that day returned from -hospital, was sent back to Mirvaux, and at 9.30 p.m. the Battalion -moved forward to a gully half a mile north-east of Vaux-sur-Somme. - -The 18th Division was able to re-establish its position during the -7th, though after such losses that the 36th Brigade (12th Division) -had to be put into the attack on the first objective in place of the -54th Brigade. The recovery was too late for reconnaissance, which had -therefore to be limited to viewing the approaches to the assembly, and -at dusk, laden with all the usual impedimenta of battle, the companies -set out on their two and a half mile trudge to the starting-point. The -move was made "overland," but alongside a communication trench known -as Cootamundra. The advance was not easy; gas masks had to be worn for -some distance; intermittent shelling caused delays; tanks now and then -drifted through the columns, breaking them up; and as usual shell holes -in the dark proved a fruitful source of annoyance; but with all these -drawbacks it was a cheerful and optimistic, if blasphemous, Battalion -that arrived in the front line well up to time. - -Dawn broke at last and the company commanders, eagerly expecting to see -the positions which they had never yet viewed, were dismayed to find -the sun rising on a dense fog which enshrouded the whole landscape and -limited vision to about 20 yards! However, there was nothing for it but -to get up and try to keep touch with the assaulting troops. The enemy's -barrage came down quickly and heavily, and the companies moved forward -rapidly over No Man's Land, though a good many fell. By bad luck most -of the Battalion Headquarters, including Lieut.-Col. Grover and Capt. -Walker the Adjutant, both severely hit, were knocked out within a few -minutes, and this misfortune dogged the Battalion through the day. -Moving forward slowly, trusting to a compass bearing to bring them to -the north edge of Malard Wood, the companies pushed on, our barrage -roaring on far ahead and no troops in sight right or left of them. - -Adverse comments have been made on the Division for a serious loss of -direction this day. As a matter of fact it was not so serious as has -been stated by some writers, but it is true that the 2/4th Battalion -at first drifted about 500 yards over its left boundary into the 18th -Division territory. This divergence was also followed by the 2/2nd -Londons, who encroached on what should properly have been our right -company front. This is regrettable, but comprehensible if a close -study be made of a contoured map. The gullies which had to be crossed -ran obliquely across the line of advance. If anyone cares to try hill -climbing in a fog he will realise the extreme difficulty of maintaining -a sidelong direction. - -Another cause of divergence from the correct direction lay in the -numerous small pockets of enemy who had to be mopped up by the -companies on route. These small parties offered comparatively little -opposition, but they necessitated a cautious advance. Moreover, as -they were not all in the exact path of the advancing platoons, it was -inevitable to make a deliberate deflection to deal with them, after -which the idea of direction in the fog became still more nebulous. - -After some time Croll and Parslow, whose companies were in touch, -reached a trench lately occupied by the enemy, badly smashed and full -of dead Huns. Here a parley was held, and they decided that they were -off the line. The advance was resumed in a south-easterly direction, -extended order being used owing to the very severe machine-gun fire at -this point. Parslow, having received news of the Colonel's casualty, -assumed command. During this second advance the enemy's fire began to -slacken and the mist showed some signs of lifting. After about 200 -yards these companies found one of the tanks which was due to meet them -at Malard Wood roaming about disconsolately, having completely lost -its bearings, but this was put on the right track and began to follow -the companies, though it soon vanished again in the mist: a passing -ship! - -At about 8.30 the mist began to thin rapidly and B and C Companies -reached the hedge at the north end of Malard Wood, where they gained -touch with Rivers Smith (D Company), and Parslow pushed out to the -right to link up with Brissenden (A Company), who had gained the west -edge of the Wood. The 174th Brigade were still in the Wood and had not -yet reached the Green line, and the lifting mist disclosed no troops -east of it. A company of 8th Royal Berkshires (53rd Brigade) were -strung out in a north-easterly direction on the left of the Battalion, -while immediately in front was the head of the Malard Wood Gully, about -40 yards wide, and beyond it a cornfield breast high with crops which -stretched as far as Gressaire Wood. Sharp bursts of machine-gun fire -from Malard Wood and shrapnel bursts from Gressaire Wood took a steady -toll of our men and rendered further advance without artillery support -impossible. But our artillery had carried its barrage forward to the -final objective, believing that the infantry were following it, and was -now silent. - -At about 9.30 a.m. the Berkshires informed Croll, who had taken charge -of the left half of the Battalion, that they were going to attack -Gressaire Wood, and asking the 2/4th Battalion to advance with them. -Croll immediately sent runners to Parslow and Brissenden in the Wood -warning them of this intention; and, swinging half right to conform to -the Berkshires, the advance began, but was brought to a standstill on -the east edge of the gully by parties of the enemy working forward with -machine-guns from Gressaire Wood. - -Further advance was out of the question, and leaving three Lewis -gun posts east of the gully, Croll withdrew his troops to the hedge -previously occupied; there the Battalion began to dig in. After a -conference of the few remaining officers it was decided to send -2/Lieut. E. P. Higgs back to Brigade to explain the position and ask -for fresh orders and for artillery support to a further advance. -Almost immediately after this parley broke up poor Rivers Smith was -killed by a piece of shell which hit him in the neck. In the meantime, -runners sent out to the right flank returned with the information -that the 2/4th and 3rd Battalions were mixed up in Malard Wood, that -the 2/2nd had come up and that Lieut.-Col. Miller of the 2/2nd was -reorganising the troops. - -A gap of 300 yards between the two halves of the Battalion had occurred -in the last attempt to get forward, and the position at noon was that -Brissenden (Parslow had been hit) was in charge of the right half -Battalion on the east edge of Malard Wood, and Croll with the left half -lined along the hedge north of the Wood. The Wood was now completely -cleared of enemy, but egress from the east edge of it was impossible. -Barkas (Intelligence Officer) now came forward from Headquarters to -take over command, being cognisant of the position on the right and -acquainted with the H.Q. Staffs of the other Battalions. He agreed -with Croll that further attempts to push forward were useless without -further support. Col. Urquart (L.T.M. Battery) was reported on his way -up to take over from Barkas. - -While this was happening the barrage had, as already stated, moved -forward from the Green line at the scheduled hour on to Chipilly -Ridge, but owing to the loss of direction only a few small parties -were available to follow it and of these probably none reached the -Ridge. The Huns on the Ridge were holding up by machine-gun fire the -Australians on the south of the river, and they failed to reach the -high ground from which the position was to be outflanked. Unfortunately -aerial reports to Divisional Headquarters persisted that the Ridge -was in our hands, and this mistake led to serious casualties in the -afternoon. The 2/2nd Londons were ordered to advance at 3 p.m., but -owing to the false report artillery support was refused them. In these -circumstances the attack, though pushed forward by the 2/2nd with great -gallantry, was inevitably withered by enemy machine-gun fire from -Gressaire Wood. - -No further move was attempted that day. At about 4 p.m. Major Sutcliffe -of the 2/2nd took over the 2/4th Battalion--the fifth C.O. within -twelve hours!--and the positions already occupied were consolidated, -Lewis gun posts being pushed forward across the gully. The night -positions of the Battalion are shown on the map. - -South of the Somme the day had been--except in the area next the river -swept from Chipilly Ridge--one of immense success, an advance of about -seven miles being made by the Canadians. On the left of the 58th -Division the 12th had reached the Green line but had been unable to -progress beyond it. - -An immediate resumption of the attack to reduce the Chipilly stronghold -and so remove the one remaining obstacle to an important advance was -obviously necessary, but in view of the restricted success on the -previous day a modification of the original intention was essential. - -The main object of the attack of the 9th August was to gain the line -Bray-sur-Somme--Dernancourt. To ensure that the assault should have -sufficient weight to carry it through successfully, and in view of the -serious losses of the Division on the previous day, the 133rd American -Regiment (Col. Samborn) then in Army reserve some miles in rear was -attached for the operation. The main attack on the Divisional front was -to be carried out by the 175th Brigade on the left and the Americans on -the right; while in conjunction with it the capture of Chipilly and the -Ridge was to be entrusted to the 174th and 173rd Brigades. - -The distance which the Americans had to advance to reach their starting -line necessarily caused a postponement of the operation till late -in the afternoon, the earlier hours of the day being employed in -side-stepping the 173rd Brigade to face its new objective, and to leave -room for the Americans to come into line. - -At 6 a.m. Major Sutcliffe issued orders to the Battalion to reorganise -and prepare for a further advance, and these orders were followed -later, as a result of reports received by aerial reconnaissance, by -instructions to push forward fighting patrols to ascertain whether -Gressaire Wood were still occupied. The sharp machine-gun fire -with which these patrols were met left no room for doubt as to the -situation. Brigade received orders for the afternoon attack at 1 p.m., -but owing to the lack of telephone communication it was two hours later -when Lieut.-Col. Miller, who was in charge of the whole of the advanced -troops, sent for Croll. The grim humour of the situation was succinctly -summed up in Lieut.-Col. Miller's greeting. "Hullo, Croll, aren't you -dead yet?" "No sir!" replied Croll. "Then you damned soon will be!" And -orders for the attack were issued: "You will withdraw all patrols and -posts at once, move your men under cover of Malard Wood and take up a -position as soon as possible in a line of trenches extending for about -400 yards southward from the Quarry. Lieut. Brissenden has similar -orders. You will occupy this position and be prepared to advance at -5.30 and capture the original objective, Chipilly Ridge. You will -advance in two waves, Brissenden with his half Battalion in the first -wave, and you with the remainder of the Battalion in the second wave. -The position must be taken at all costs." - -This assembly position south of the Quarry was that occupied by the -9th Londons on the previous night, but on arrival it was found to be -only a line of shell holes. The 173rd Brigade was to attack with the -3rd Londons on the right, the 2/4th in the centre and the 2/2nd on -the left, with the 2/10th attached in reserve. The assembly proceeded -as rapidly as possible, though time was short and the barrage could -not open until all patrols were in. The Americans, who were rushed up -from the rear, had to double nearly a mile to reach their assembly -position at Malard Wood, but by a few minutes after zero every unit -was moving forward. The side-step of the 2/4th Battalion was carried -out under very heavy machine-gun fire from Celestin Wood, the enemy -having doubtless seen the movement, and delay was caused by searching -for the trench (non-existent) which had been fixed as the start line. -Our barrage opened well up to time but the shells fell harmlessly in -Chipilly Valley instead of on the Ridge, which again became a hornet's -nest of Hun machine-gunners. - -Under this heavy fire the Battalion began the advance, much harassed -also from Celestin Wood on their right flank. Brissenden was seriously -hit early, and Mansel-Howe (B Company) killed. Croll took over the -whole remnants of the Battalion and pushed forward, the men behaving -with magnificent coolness and advancing by rushes. Every party which -rushed forward, however, lost men, and Croll himself was hit in the -knee though he bravely struggled on in the endeavour to get his men -into some sort of cover. The Americans on the left were not yet up in -line, and the fire from the right flank continued. Casualties were -now so numerous that it was clear the Battalion could never reach the -Ridge in anything approaching assaulting strength, and Croll decided -to dig in in the shelter of the Chipilly gully, sending back a runner -to Lieut.-Col. Miller with a report of the situation. In this position -the Battalion was badly enfiladed from Chipilly village, and to make -matters worse groups of Bosche could be seen running down from the -crest of the Ridge, evidently in preparation for a counter-attack. This -attack, however, was never delivered, for a change of the situation, -almost miraculous in its suddenness, occurred. On the right the 2/10th -Londons had been fighting stubbornly, and before dark managed to clear -Chipilly village and began to work up the south end of the Ridge. Here -they were held up by a nest of Bosche machine-gunners firing southwards -from the head of Chipilly Valley, but the Americans, advancing on the -left with magnificent dash towards Gressaire Wood, mopped up this -position. A glance at the map will show the result. Further tenure of -the Ridge was impossible for the Bosche, who promptly retreated to -avoid being caught by the pincers which were closing on them. - -By 11 p.m. the Brigade was firmly established on the Ridge, while the -main operation had proved completely successful. - -The casualties of the two days' fighting were as follows: - - Officers: Capt. B. Rivers Smith and Lieut. C. I. Mansel-Howe, - killed; Lieut.-Col. A. Grover, D.S.O., M.C., Capts. - W. H. Parslow, F. W. Walker, D.S.O., and A. G. Croll, - Lieuts. G. de G. Barkas, M.C., and C. C. Brissenden, - 2/Lieuts. W. N. M. Girling, H. G. A. Leach, J. W. - George, A. L. D. Bold, H. Slater, S. T. Morris and J. - Horsfield, wounded. - - N.C.O.'s and men: 38 killed, 228 wounded and 20 missing, a total - of all ranks of 301. - -For his excellent work in this action Capt. A. G. Croll was awarded the -M.C. - -The experience of these two days' fighting had demonstrated clearly -that the River Somme was an unsatisfactory boundary between the III and -Australian Corps. The hill slopes on each bank formed tactical features -so inter-supporting that it was deemed essential to bring both banks -into the area of one command; and accordingly on the 10th August the -Australian Corps took over with the 3rd Australian Division a sector -immediately adjacent to the north bank. This redistribution involved -a shortening of the 58th Divisional sector, and the 173rd Brigade, -handing over its line to the Australians at about 2 p.m., withdrew to -the reserve area, the 2/4th Londons concentrating in bivouacs near -Bonnay. - -During the 10th an enemy counter-attack set back slightly the -positions gained by us the preceding day, but the situation was soon -re-established and strong patrols pushed forward by the Division -brought them to the line of the outer Amiens defences. - -The following day the III Corps was taken over temporarily by Sir A. J. -Godley. - -This practically brought to a close the first phase of the Fourth -Army's great advance, which is officially known as the Battle of -Amiens, 1918. Amiens, for so long threatened by a victorious enemy, was -now liberated, and, important as was this result of the three days' -struggle, other results accruing from the battle were still more vital. -The actual loss inflicted on the Huns--upwards of 23,000 prisoners and -400 guns were captured--were in themselves a matter of great moment; -but the captures themselves showed that already the Germans were -flinging their reserves into the fight. This undoubtedly had the effect -of paving the way for the successful French advance which began south -of Montdidier on the 10th August. Perhaps the most cheering moral of -all was the establishment of the fact that three anxious months of -constant strain, following on a retreat of unprecedented rapidity and -loss, had left the fighting qualities of our troops unimpaired--perhaps -to the surprise of some gloomy folks at home--while evidence was -already abundant that the enemy was not standing to it as he had done -in former British offensives. His morale was beginning to crack. This -is evidenced by actual numbers: 13 British divisions and 3 cavalry -divisions had defeated 20 German divisions and secured an advance of 12 -miles in 5 days' fighting. To enable us to judge of the enormous effect -of this great victory we have the evidence of Ludendorff himself: - - "The Emperor told me that after the failure of the July offensive - and after the 8th August, he knew the war could no longer be won." - -A good deal of severe criticism has been levelled at the III Corps -in general, and at the 58th Division in particular, for the lack of -success attained on the first day of battle. It is undoubtedly a -fact that the failure to eject the Bosche from Chipilly Ridge on the -8th August caused the infliction of severe loss on our Australian -neighbours on the right flank. We do not pose as apologists for the -Division or for the 2/4th Londons, and are satisfied that no excuses -for them are needed. But we feel justified, in view of what has -been said, in pointing to certain circumstances of the battle as -contributing towards the restriction of their success. We propose not -to argue these circumstances but merely to state them: - -1. The enemy attack on the 18th Division on the 6th August not only -deprived our company commanders of any opportunity of reconnoitring -their ground, but also entirely disposed of the surprise effect -gained south of the Somme, for undoubtedly the Bosche expected a -counter-attack from us. - -2. The mist of 8th August, which made success depend largely on a -correct compass march over unseen and shell-torn ground. - -3. The fact that no tanks arrived on the Green line to lead the -Battalion forward to the second objective, whereby the enemy -machine-gun defence was not impeded. We do not wish to pass the blame -on to the tanks; their difficulties in reaching the start-line were as -acute as our own, and the ground much more difficult for them than it -was south of the river. - -4. The startling rapidity with which the Battalion command changed -during the battle. - -These are not excuses for failure. We are prepared to leave to the -judgment of impartial critics the decision as to whether the Battalion, -and the Division as a whole, did all in its power to perform its duty. -That the operations of the Division during these two days' fighting -were not altogether unfruitful is evidenced by the fact that their -total captures amounted to 1925 prisoners, 68 guns, 190 machine-guns -and 36 trench mortars, while the whole area of advance was littered -with enemy dead. - -A lull in the active operations now occurred while heavy batteries, -dumps and all necessary material were advanced in preparation for the -next phase of the struggle, which would involve the ejection of the Hun -from a strongly defended system of trenches. - -After a night's rest the Battalion marched on the 11th August to a -wood at Heilly (near Ribemont), where it was joined by the first line -transport and the battle surplus, returning on the afternoon of the -13th to Pont Noyelles. Here it was accommodated in billets, the most -comfortable quarters since the few days at Guignemicourt. - -A few days' rest at Pont Noyelles, now some eleven miles in rear of -the battle line, were devoted to reorganisation and to assimilation of -several reinforcements of officers, N.C.O.'s and men. On his return -from short leave on the 14th August Major Tollworthy assumed temporary -command of the Battalion, but a week later Major W. McC. Crosbie, -M.C., Royal Munster Fusiliers, arrived and took over the command. The -adjutancy of the Battalion was taken over by Lieut. H. J. King, M.C. - -During this period the Battalion was inspected successively by the -Brigadier and by the Corps Commander, who saw the troops at training. - -The reinforcements received between the 10th and 22nd August were: - - 2/Lieuts. R. E. Glover, L. A. Still, W. J. Till and F. J. Paterson - (4th Londons); - -and officers of other units attached as follows: - - 2/Lieuts. C. C. W. Goodale, L. A. Palmer and A. W. Tucker (1st - Londons); - - 2/Lieuts. P. F. Royce, W. C. B. Hall and T. R. A. Maynard (2nd - Londons); - - 2/Lieuts. J. C. Wood and H. Irvine (3rd Londons); - - 2/Lieuts. G. Gilson, H. Lelyveld, J. Slattery, M. F. Giles and H. - B. Bartleet (5th Londons); - - 2/Lieuts. J. T. Spencer and E. S. McKittrick (8th Londons); - - 2/Lieut. W. A. Davies (9th Londons); - - and 480 N.C.O.'s and men. - -The majority of this large reinforcement consisted of men from the 14th -Division, which had suffered very severely in the battles of March -1918. The drafts of young soldiers on which the Battalion had been -depending of late, though of excellent material, were obviously not so -desirable as fully seasoned soldiers; and the 14th Division men were -therefore particularly welcome. With a seasoning of old 2/4th London -men and the remnants of the K.O.Y.L.I., who had come from the 16th -Entrenching Battalion, they helped to make up once again a really fine -Battalion. - -On the 21st August the offensive was resumed and though, as we have -stated, we propose to continue the record of the 2/4th Battalion's -operations in the Fourth Army, it should be borne in mind that -henceforth the Army instead of having an inert neighbour on its left -flank had an active one in the Third Army, which was now also on the -move. - -This new great battle (21st August to 1st September), known as -the Battle of Bapaume, 1918, extended the area of fighting to the -Somme-Scarpe salient. - -The increasing enemy resistance at the termination of the Battle of -Amiens had drawn G.H.Q. to the decision to break off the battle and -transfer their attention to another part of the front; a method which -throughout the closing period of the war proved its value. The Germans -were kept always in doubt--as the British had been in March 1918--as -to whether each fresh offensive was in reality only a feint, in doubt -as to where to place their already dwindling reserves. Moreover, the -British Armies were now no longer faced by line upon line of almost -impregnable trenches as they had been in 1916, and frontal attacks were -not the only possibility open to them. - -G.H.Q. therefore decided on a vast turning movement. An attack in a -south-easterly direction between Albert and Arras would turn the flank -of the Somme line of defence about Péronne, and would constitute a -distinct forward step towards the further objectives of Cambrai and St -Quentin. - -The immediate object of the III Corps was to free Albert and to oust -the Bosche from the strong defensive system which he had built up -round the town during the summer months. On the first day of the III -Corps battle, 22nd August, the 58th Division was in Corps reserve, the -divisions in line being from right to left, the 47th, 12th and 18th. - -The 2/4th Battalion remained at training on the 22nd August, but an -early move was made the following morning, when it marched at 4 a.m. -to a sheltered valley half a mile south of Méricourt-l'Abbé. In this -position it remained all day together with the rest of the Brigade; -the 174th Brigade being in the old British line at Morlancourt, at the -disposal of the 18th Division. In the centre the 47th Division carried -the line forward to the high ground east of the Happy Valley, while on -the right the Australians occupied the high ground immediately north of -Bray. - -The exploitation of this success was ordered by Army H.Q. for the -following day, but the situation was altered by a strong German -counter-attack, which late in the afternoon drove the 142nd Brigade -(47th Division) almost back to their start-line, leaving the -Australians at Bray in an awkward salient. That night the 175th Brigade -moved from its reserve area near Tailles Wood and took over the line -from the 142nd. The following day was occupied in reorganisation, -though the advance was continued south of the river, and orders were -received for the pressure to be continued on the whole army front on -the 24th August. - -At 1 a.m. that morning the attack was prosecuted by the 47th Division, -in conjunction with the 3rd Australians on the right and the 12th -on the left. The 47th Division attack was carried out by the 175th -(attached) and 140th Brigades, the battalions of the 173rd Brigade -being ordered to support the 175th. For this purpose the 2/4th -Battalion was turned out at midnight on the 23rd/24th August and -reached a position of assembly in the old Amiens defence line east of -Morlancourt at 4 a.m. on the 24th. The attack was entirely successful. -The Happy Valley once more passed into our hands, and the 47th Division -established itself finally on the farther crest. The Australians -occupied Bray, while on the left the 12th Division pressed forward in -the direction of Fricourt. The enemy opposition was not severe though -between 3 a.m. and 8 a.m. a large amount of high explosive and gas -shelling was experienced. The day brought forth further evidence of -the increasing demoralisation of the enemy troops, and intelligence -reports pointing strongly to the probability that the enemy was -fighting a delaying action preparatory to a big retreat, the immediate -exploitation of the success was ordered. - -This day the 175th Brigade remained in line but came once more under -orders of the 58th Division which took over the Divisional sector, the -174th Brigade going into line on the right of the 175th. - -During the morning a conference of commanding officers in the 173rd -Brigade was held and orders were issued for the further advance. The -attack was to be made with two brigades in line, the 175th on the -right and the 140th on the left, supported by the 173rd Brigade. This -latter was to be led by the 2/2nd and 3rd Londons with the 2/4th -Londons in support, the last-named with the rôle of being prepared to -support any part of the front and carry it on to the final objective. -Owing, however, to the situation remaining obscure on the left flank -this operation was postponed till 2.30 a.m. on the 25th, when rapid -developments took place. - -In accordance with the orders already issued the 2/4th Londons moved -from their Assembly position near Tailles Wood, the order of march -being A, B, C, D Companies with Headquarters and one section Brigade -Machine-Gun Company bringing up the rear, and with 100 yard intervals -between companies. In this order it reached a position in the Happy -Valley under cover of a dense mist at 4 a.m. on the 25th August. Here -it was to stand fast awaiting further orders from the Brigadier. - -But in the meantime the Division, evidently still bearing in mind the -experience of February 1917, had issued instructions to the effect that -should the leading battalions lose touch with the enemy an advanced -guard should at once be formed to push forward rapidly and regain -contact. This was the contingency which materialised. - -At 6.30 a.m. the attacking units reported themselves on their -objectives, but in the mist touch with the enemy seemed to be lost, and -all units of the 173rd Brigade were ordered to advance. The Brigadier -at once issued orders for the formation of the advanced guard, and the -2/4th Battalion, which was more or less definitely located in the Happy -Valley and was thus the battalion most easily to be reached in the -mist, was selected for this duty. - -The advanced guard troops were: - - No. 2 Troop Northumberland Hussars, - 2/4th Londons, - 1 Section 86th Brigade R.F.A., - 1 Section M.G.C., - -the whole under Major Crosbie. - -The line of advance ordered was cross-country as far as Bronfay Farm -and thence along the Bray-Maricourt Road. The Battalion was to advance -in column of route until ordered to deploy. At 8.30 a.m. the guard -was formed and the advance began, A Company under Lieut. V. C. Prince -forming the Vanguard with Headquarters, B, C and D Companies following -as Main Guard. This was an entirely new role for the 2/4th Battalion, -and the sudden development of open warfare conditions, the realisation -that the Battalion was in close formation on a road with cavalry -operating ahead and the guns following, raised everyone's hopes and -expectations to the highest pitch. The move was of course made without -artillery support, and until Bronfay Farm was nearly reached very -little sign of his existence was vouchsafed by the Bosche, beyond a -little desultory shell-fire. - -About this time the mist dispersed and the cavalry were checked by -severe machine-gun fire from Billon Wood and the high ground to the -north of it. The company commanders showed great initiative and dash, -and a valuable reconnaissance was made by 2/Lieut. Prince and Cooke, -his Sergt.-Major, to ascertain where the bulk of the firing was coming -from. Quickly grasping the situation, Prince deployed his company and -led it against the south-west edge of the Wood. The rear companies -deploying in turn, the whole Battalion became committed to the attack, -which, owing to the conditions under which it started, developed a -little raggedly as regards the frontages occupied by companies, but -still with good discipline and plenty of dash. Hetley (B Company) -made for the left or north edge of the Wood along the Maricourt Road, -while the gap between him and Prince was promptly taken up by C and D -Companies. Observing the action taken by the 2/4th Londons, Brigade -promptly pushed forward the 2/2nd Londons to the left flank to deal -with the high ground north of Billon Wood, and ordered the 3rd Londons -to support the attack. - -The enemy shelling had now assumed very severe proportions, and though -little resistance was met with by the 2/4th Battalion in Billon Wood, -which it cleared without much difficulty, the Bosche gunners were able -effectually to prevent it from emerging from the east edge of the Wood. -Hetley says about this bombardment, "The shelling of Billon Wood was -one of the heaviest I have ever undergone, being quite comparable to -Bullecourt or the Salient in 1917." The line in the Wood was rather -patchy and Hetley, leaving Grimsdell in charge, returned to Battalion -Headquarters where Major Crosbie provided him with a couple of Lewis -guns and about twenty-five men. With these he returned, and having got -the Battalion into a deep trench, put out observation posts on the east -edge of the Wood. The Battalion is credited by Division with having -gained a line this day some 200 yards east of the Wood, but it seems -doubtful whether this conclusion can be supported. - -On the left flank, however, the 2/2nd and 3rd Londons made a good deal -of progress up the long spur leading to Maricourt, and at the end of -the day had established themselves in a chain of small copses about 500 -yards west of the village. Their further progress was here arrested, -owing to the fact that the 12th Division on the left was held up before -Carnoy, which remained for the time in the enemy's hands. - -At midnight the 2/4th Battalion was relieved by the 7th Londons of -the 174th Brigade, which side-stepped to the left, and on relief was -concentrated at Great Bear Wood north-east of the Happy Valley. - -The casualties of the day, due almost entirely to shell-fire, were: - - 2/Lieuts. H. Lelyveld, J. C. Wood, A. Irvine and C. C. W. Goodale, - wounded, and in N.C.O.'s and men 15 killed, 166 wounded and 14 - missing. - -The good work of 2/Lieut. Prince and C.S.M. Cooke has already been -referred to. Prince was rewarded with the M.C. Cooke was killed in the -Wood, and a few days after his death notification was received that -he had been awarded the M.C. for his work on the 8th August. Mention -must also be made of Pte. Campion, a battalion runner, who performed -invaluable work in locating the scattered parties of the Battalion -in the Wood, thereby enabling Hetley to assume proper control of the -firing line. - -On the 26th August the following congratulatory message was issued by -the Brigadier (Brig.-Gen. Charles Corkoran): - - "The Major-General commanding the Division in congratulating you - all wishes me to tell you that Sir Douglas Haig, the Army Commander - and the Corps Commander have all expressed the highest praise for - the way in which the Brigade is fighting. For myself I cannot say - how proud I am to be in command of such a brigade as the Fusilier - Brigade." - -[Illustration: THE BATTLE OF BAPAUME, 1918 (2/4TH BATTALION)] - -Orders were issued on the night of the 25th/26th August for the -prosecution of the attack on the following day, but the 26th proved a -day of check. The 3rd Londons, who led the attack, reached Maricourt, -but, the flanking brigades being held up, they were unsupported and had -to fall back. A threatened German counter-attack south of Maricourt -having failed to materialise, the remainder of the day was occupied in -consolidation on a line about 500 yards west of the village. - -The 2/4th Battalion was moved from Great Bear Wood at 9 a.m. on the -26th in anticipation of a successful attack, and took up a position -in considerable depth in the vicinity of Bronfay Farm, where it was -occupied in preparations for the battle of the 27th August. This day -the Battalion was joined by Lieut. H. P. Lawrence and 2/Lieut. R. Grey, -attached from the 10th Londons, and two days later by 2/Lieuts. H. H. -Gant (2nd Londons), H. Hearnshaw (7th Londons) and C Brandram (9th -Londons). - -The objectives of the projected attack of the 27th August were the -capture of Maricourt and the establishment of our line in the old -British trenches of July 1916 on the eastern fringe of Maricourt Wood, -east of the village. Exploitation of the success into the old German -trenches as opportunity should allow was also arranged for. The leading -battalion of the Brigade was the 3rd Londons, with the 2/4th Londons in -close support and the 2/2nd Londons in reserve. Simultaneous attacks -were to be made by the 3rd Australians in the direction of Vaux on the -right and by the 12th Division towards Maltzhorn Farm on the left. - -Early in the morning the 2/4th Battalion was assembled in artillery -formation on the line consolidated the previous day, and twenty minutes -after zero (4.55 a.m.) it followed the 3rd Londons towards Maricourt. -The greater part of the advance was through the village itself and the -Battalion soon got rather mixed up with the 3rd Londons in the course -of mopping up the numerous dugouts in its ruins. The defence put up -by the Germans, at least on the 2/4th Battalion's front, this day -showed marked deterioration. It was sporadic and on the whole poor, -and with comparatively little difficulty and remarkably small loss to -itself, the Battalion gained its final objective east of the Wood, a -message from Capt. Hetley to this effect being received in Battalion -Headquarters at 7.30 a.m. - -The inevitable breaking up of attack formations consequent on passing -through a ruined village resulted in a good deal of disorganisation, -and on arrival on the objective, which the 2/4th Battalion reached -on the extreme left of the Brigade sector, no touch was found with -either the 3rd Londons on the right or the 12th Division on the left. -Hetley, however, who again assumed control on the spot, soon set -this to rights, and leaving C.S.M. Bonser, D.C.M., to reorganise the -platoons immediately available, sent C.S.M. Cowland to pick up the -12th Division on the left, while he himself pushed out to the right -flank with a patrol. These efforts were entirely successful, and both -the neighbouring battalions being found to be well up and the flanks -thus secured, Hetley returned and established his headquarters in the -railway cutting. - -The rapidity of this advance and the completeness of its success leave -one breathless after the weary and sanguinary struggles with which this -ground had been hardly wrung from the enemy's grip in 1916. Maricourt -Wood was full of German dugouts, and evidently these had not been quite -completely dealt with during the advance, for later in the morning -a couple of German gentlemen, feeling a desire to take the morning -air, came quietly strolling down the hill from the Wood to Hetley's -headquarters, where his unexpected presence caused them painful -surprise. - -During the morning C.S.M. Bonser was entrusted with the task of -collecting isolated groups of men and with them filling up gaps and -forming a support line in case of counter-attack. At this work he -proved invaluable. Hetley writes: "He led party after party round -dugouts in Maricourt clearing out Bosche, and was later perfectly -splendid in organising the men and fetching up reinforcements, that is, -rallying isolated parties in the town and Wood, all this under heavy -if somewhat wild shell fire." Bonser received a bar to his D.C.M. for -this day's work, and later, after the disbandment of the Battalion, -when attached to the 2/2nd Londons gained a second bar on September -18th at Epéhy. - -On our flanks the day was equally successful, Vaux falling to the -Australians, and the high ground at Maltzhorn Farm passing into the -12th Division's hands. No counter-attack was delivered by the Bosche -and we were left in undisputed possession of our gains which amounted -to some 1700 yards of ground. Orders were issued during the day that -the advance should be pressed on to Maurepas Station, but these were -subsequently cancelled, as the enemy were found to be holding their old -1916 line in strength with three fresh divisions. - -At 8 p.m. Major Crosbie made a reconnaissance of the line and organised -the Battalion in two companies; A and B being placed under Capt. Hetley -and C and D under 2/Lieut. Grimsdell, the Battalion's right flank -resting on the point at which the railway crossed the front trench. -Throughout the night the position was heavily shelled, but with very -little loss to us. - -In spite of the fatigue of the troops Army H.Q. was fixed in its -determination to allow the Bosche no breathing space, and at 1 a.m. -28th August orders were received in the line that the attack was to be -continued that day. The 3rd Londons were to lead the Brigade again, -while the 2/2nd and 2/4th Londons were to remain in reserve in the -old British front line. At 4.45 a.m. the attack was launched. The day -resolved itself into a series of patrol encounters, in the course of -which some very stubborn opposition was met with, notably in the Bois -d'en Haut. By the evening the Divisional line had been established -another 1000 yards further east, in front of the Bois d'en Haut and -in touch on the left with the 12th Division, who had taken Hardecourt -after stiff resistance, while the Australians had possessed themselves -of Curlu. - -That evening the Battalion was relieved, the 175th Brigade taking -over the sector, and withdrew to reserve in a valley north of -Bray-sur-Somme, a few hundred yards from the site of the old Citadel -Camp, a spot well known to the Somme veterans of the 1/4th Battalion. - -During the whole of these days in fact the 2/4th Battalion, though a -little distance south of the Guillemont heights, had been crossing the -tracks of the 1/4th Battalion in the earlier battles of this historic -district, but under what extraordinarily different conditions! The -painful steps of 1916, which gained perhaps a few hundred yards a week -at appalling cost of life, amid the wretchedness of mud and rain, were -now victorious strides which had carried our lines forward like an -irresistible tide. Since the 2/4th Battalion had moved into the Happy -Valley on the 24th August it had advanced some 8000 yards and already -half the devastation of the old Somme battlefields was left behind. - -The losses of the two days' fighting at Maricourt were, considering -the extent of the gains, remarkably light. Lieut A. R. Muddell and -2/Lieuts. E. C. McKittrick and R. Grey were wounded, while Lieut. and -Adjt. H. J. King, M.C., and Lieut. H. P. Lawrence were also hit but -remained at duty. 114 N.C.O.'s and men became casualties, 9 being -killed, 74 wounded and 29 missing. - -For their splendid leadership Capt. G. H. Hetley and 2/Lieut. E. V. -Grimsdell were rewarded with the M.C. - -After the 173rd Brigade came out of the line the 58th Division remained -in action and on the 29th August it carried the line forward, against -an ever-increasing opposition, to the east of Maurepas. The following -day, the 47th Division having taken over from the 12th on our left, the -two divisions of Londoners again pressed on shoulder to shoulder. The -enemy resistance this day was as stubborn as had been experienced for -some time and the advance was eventually checked with the 58th facing -the west edge of Marrières Wood, and the 47th extending the line to -Priez Farm. - -The 29th August was occupied by the 2/4th Battalion in cleaning and -resting, and the necessary reorganisation consequent on its losses in -the battle were effected. This day Major Crosbie left to take charge -of the Battle Surplus Camp and Major F. G. Tollworthy, M.C., once -more assumed command of the Battalion. On the 30th August Lieut. A. B. -Carpenter (25th Londons) with 29 other ranks joined the Battalion. - -The Fourth Army Line was now approaching Péronne, and from Cléry to St -Christ the Australian Corps had reached the west bank of the Somme. The -stiffening of the enemy resistance which had been so noticeable during -the last two days' fighting, and the natural strength of the Somme as -an obstacle, made it clear that the enemy was determined to hold out at -Péronne as long as possible; and true to its scheme of allowing the Hun -no respite, the Army at once made its plans for forcing a bridgehead -over the river, with the object of reducing Péronne and the Somme line -of defence. - -The most favourable point of attack appeared to be the river between -Péronne and Cléry, and the capture of the eminence of Mont St Quentin, -though likely to be arduous, would give us complete command of Péronne -itself and enable us to enfilade the whole of the enemy positions south -of the city on the east of the river. The actual capture of Mont St -Quentin was entrusted to the Australians in whose path it lay, and the -movements of the III Corps to their north formed a part of the scheme -for widening the bridgehead once gained. The two days' fighting of the -31st August and the 1st September may therefore be described as the -Battle of Mont St Quentin, and our task is now to deal with the part -taken in it by the 2/4th Battalion. - -The 31st August saw a good deal of heavy fighting by the 175th -Brigade, which was still in line, the chief feature of the enemy's -resistance being the severity of the shell fire with which his heavy -guns plastered the whole Brigade area. Marrières Wood was captured and -the line pushed on to a position west of the Péronne-Rancourt Road and -overlooking the slope leading down to Bouchavesnes. - -At 7 p.m. that night unexpected orders were received by the 173rd -Brigade to return to the line and deliver an attack at 5.30 a.m. the -following morning. From Bronfay Farm the battalions were conveyed by -bus to Hem Wood, whence they marched to assembly in the line, taking -it over from the 175th Brigade. - -The immediate objective of the attack was the village of Bouchavesnes, -after which the line was to be pushed forward to a position overlooking -the valley of the Tortille River and the Canal du Nord. The order of -battle was: 2/4th Londons on the right, 3rd Londons on the left, with -the 2/2nd Londons following in close support. In spite of the short -notice for the operation the Battalion was duly assembled without delay -on a line 300 yards west of the Péronne-Rancourt Road, and at zero, -5.30 a.m., 1st September, moved forward under a creeping barrage. -The advance was made with two companies (A and B, under Capt. F. J. -Griffiths and 2/Lieut. C. C. Gibbs) in front and two in support (C and -D, under 2/Lieuts, Y. C. Prince, M. C., and G. C. Ewing, M.C.). Each -company moved in artillery formation with three platoons in front and -one in support. - -For once we were favoured with good weather conditions, and though cold -the morning was fine with good visibility. On the western outskirts -of Bouchavesnes the enemy put up a rather stiff fight, but on being -tackled with determination, he once again showed signs of weakening -morale, and the remainder of the village was occupied and mopped up -with very little opposition. - -Although the Bosche infantry showed weakness his artillery work was, -as usual, excellent. His counter-barrage came down promptly and -heavily, and the bulk of our casualties this day were caused by his -shell fire. On several occasions, indeed, during these successful -days of August and September the enemy displayed prodigious skill in -handling his guns. Field guns remained in action in the copses which -are scattered all over this countryside, firing over open sights till -the last possible moment; and when these were forced to limber up the -fire was promptly taken up by high velocity guns firing at extreme -ranges in the rear. On the 1st September, however, the advance was -particularly rapid, and several field guns were unable to get away, -and fell into our hands. After passing the village the Battalion -pressed forward rapidly up the hill to the east of it, collecting a -good many machine-gun posts on the way, and by 10.45 a.m. was on its -final objective, organised and established on a definite line under -the personal control of Major Tollworthy. This line was on the western -crest of the Tortille Valley overlooking Moislains, and about 1000 -yards short of that village. Some little difficulty was experienced by -the divisions on the flanks, but touch was soon gained, the Australians -being still on the right and the 47th Division (who captured Rancourt -and gained the western edge of St Pierre Vaast Wood) on the left. - -No counter-attack developed during the day, and the Bosche seemed to -resign himself to the loss of ground. His acquiescence in our success -was doubtless partly due to the fact that this day the Australians, -after three days' magnificent fighting, captured Mont St Quentin and -entered Péronne. - -The casualties of the 2/4th Battalion were again extremely light when -compared with the importance of the success achieved, but unfortunately -they included the loss of two company commanders (Capt. F. J. Griffiths -and 2/Lieut. V. C. Prince) killed. Both of these officers had done -splendid work and shown themselves capable leaders, and in them the -Battalion sustained a serious loss. In addition to these, 2/Lieuts. H. -H. Gant and G. Gilson were killed, Lieut. H. P. Lawrence and 2/Lieuts. -F. E. Rogers, C. Brandram and R. E. Glover wounded; while 11 N.C.O.'s -and men were killed, 49 wounded and 30 missing, making a total list for -the day of 99 all ranks. - -The captures of the Brigade amounted to 325 prisoners, 40 machine-guns, -8 field guns and one motor ambulance, and once again the prisoners -showed that reserves were being flung wholesale into the enemy fighting -line. Measured solely by the depth of ground taken, the 1st September -was the most successful action ever fought by the 2/4th Battalion, the -advance being over 3000 yards, and the achievement was the subject of a -congratulatory message from the Brigadier. - -The same evening the 58th Division was relieved by the 74th[7] and -passed into Corps reserve after a week of hard fighting. The 2/4th -Battalion withdrew, after handing over its objectives intact to the -14th Black Watch, to a valley a mile west of Marrières Wood. The -Battalion remained in this valley for five days, employed in resting -and training, fortunately under weather conditions which were fine and -warm except on the 5th September. During this period 2/Lieut. D. A. S. -Manning and drafts of 21 other ranks joined the Battalion. 2/Lieut. -Bidgood was appointed Intelligence Officer (vice 2/Lieut. Davies, sick). - -[7] The 74th Division (Girdwood) was a Yeomanry Division which had -been employed in the East. This was its first appearance in the French -theatre of war. The 14th Black Watch was formerly the Fife and Forfar -Yeomanry. - -The days succeeding the relief of the 58th Division were marked by hard -fighting, but by the evening of the 4th September the 47th and 74th -Divisions had advanced the line east of Moislains and well up the long -slope leading to Nurlu. As was to be expected now that the line of the -Somme had been turned the enemy began to fall back towards the next -defensive position, the outposts of the Hindenburg line, and on the -5th September the pursuit began in earnest, though it was met at many -points with stubborn resistance. - -At 7 a.m. on the 7th September the 2/4th Battalion embussed at Hem -Wood and were conveyed to St Pierre Farm on the Péronne-Nurlu Road, -the whole Division being on its way back to the fighting line. The -spectacle of the roads during this forward move was most impressive. -Packed with troops, guns and stores of every description moving -eastward, it seemed to convey to the troops a greater realisation of -the importance of their victories than the actual advances they had -made in action. - -The Battalion lay in Villa Wood, south-west of Nurlu, during the day, -and at 6 p.m. marched to a bivouac area immediately north of Liéramont, -where it arrived at 9.30 p.m. - -On the 8th September the fine weather of the preceding week gave way to -heavy rainstorms, and the Battalion moved into shelters in Liéramont, -and in this position it remained resting until a late hour in the -evening of the 9th. - -During the 8th September troops of the 58th Division endeavoured to -advance against the large and strongly defended villages of Epéhy -and Peizières, but the position was stubbornly held by the Alpine -Corps, and the line became stabilised in trenches on the south and -west slopes of the hill on which the villages stand. The following -morning determined counter-attacks by the Alpine Corps drove back the -Divisional line a short distance. - -This stiffening of the defence made it essential for Army H.Q. to be -informed as to whether the enemy rearguards were fighting a delaying -action, or whether the defence was organised in depth; and to test this -an attack by the III Corps was ordered for the 10th September. - -The 58th Division was directed on Epéhy-Peizières while the 74th was -given Ronnssoy Wood as its objective. - -The 173rd Brigade was detailed for this attack with the 3rd Londons on -the right, the 2/2nd on the left and the 2/4th in close support. The -great frontage of the two villages, which topographically are really -one, and the high state of their defences made the operation one of -great difficulty, and the plan of action was to deal with it in two -stages. For the first objective the two leading battalions were to gain -the line of the eastern road of the villages, the 3rd Londons in Epéhy -and the 2/2nd in Peizières. The 2/4th Londons were to follow the 2/2nd -closely in the initial stages and then, turning southwards, were to -mop up the area between the inner flanks of the leading battalions and -establish themselves in Fishers Keep as a link between the two. - -In the second stage the leading battalions were to gain the line of the -railway east of the villages where they would join hands, the 2/4th -Battalion remaining in the villages. On the left the 21st Division was -to push forward immediately after the villages were captured and secure -the position by occupying the high ground which dominated them a mile -to the north. - -This very complicated operation was to be carried out under two -creeping barrages, one for each leading battalion, and a machine-gun -barrage, while the heavy batteries would engage distant targets. - -At 11 p.m., 9th August, the 2/4th Battalion left its position in -Liéramont and moved forward to assembly, which, considering the -vileness of the weather, the lack of reconnaissance and the extreme -darkness, was completed satisfactorily; and at 5.15 a.m. the Battalion -advanced to the attack. - -The leading battalions met with a good deal of opposition, which on -the left flank was centred on Wood Farm. In the 2/4th Battalion A and -B Companies, respectively under 2/Lieuts. C. C. Gibbs and G. C. Ewing, -M.C., gained their objective at Tottenham Post on the western outskirts -of Peizières with comparatively little difficulty. B Company under -Capt. Hetley, whose rôle was to penetrate the villages to Fishers Keep, -had a much more difficult task. The fighting through ruined streets -inevitably led to some disorganisation of platoons, and the villages, -moreover, were stiff with Bosche machine-gun posts, which, once the -barrage had passed over them, were free to do their worst on the -attackers. Severe casualties were sustained, among whom were numbered -two platoon commanders, 2/Lieuts. H. B. Bartleet and P. F. Royce, -killed. Finding progress impossible among the cunningly concealed -Bosche machine-gunners Hetley collected and organised his company on -the west edge of the village. A similar fate met D Company (2/Lieut. -D. A. S. Manning) which endeavoured to enter Peizières from the west. -After gallantly struggling against impossible odds Manning withdrew his -men to swell the garrison of Tottenham Post. - -The 2/2nd Londons under Capt. Wright made a magnificent attempt to -carry out their task, and did in fact reach the railway embankment, but -a sharp counter-attack drove them back to the fringe of the village. -Unfortunately the flanking movement of the 21st Division on the left -failed to materialise, and this doubtless contributed to the failure -of the 173rd Brigade. The fact, however, was clearly established that -the resistance of the enemy was organised and deliberate, and it became -patent that an attack with tank co-operation would be necessary to -reduce it. The rifle strength of the three battalions set against these -villages on the 10th September was only about 900 in all, and their -attack, therefore, lacked the weight essential to success. - -In spite of the lack of success, however, the day was not entirely -fruitless, for the captures amounted to 80 prisoners, 20 machine-guns -and 3 anti-tank guns. - -The 2/4th Battalion's losses were: 2/Lieuts. F. Bidgood, P. F. Royce -and H. B. Bartleet, killed; 2/Lieut. F. J. Paterson, wounded; 5 -N.C.O.'s and men killed, 19 wounded and 3 missing. - -During the night following the battle the 2/4th Battalion was relieved -by the 12th Londons, and was concentrated in trenches at Guyencourt. -Here it remained till 8 p.m. on the 11th September, when it withdrew to -shelters in Liéramont. - -We may here remark that on the 18th September the 173rd Brigade -captured Epéhy and Peizières and thus helped clear the road for the -advance to the Hindenburg line. - -We have now come to the end of the 2/4th Battalion's story. Owing to -the increasing difficulties of maintaining units at fighting strength -it had been decided by G.H.Q. to make still further reductions in the -number of formations, and to swell the ranks of those remaining with -the personnel of those disbanded. This dismal fate befell the 2/4th -Londons, and on the 12th September 1918 the whole of its personnel -was transferred to the 2/2nd Londons, and the Battalion as a separate -entity ceased to exist, after twenty-one months of active service life. -Its place in the Brigade was taken by the 2/24th Londons from the 32nd -Division. - -The last action in which the Battalion fought was admittedly a -"feeler," and as such undoubtedly served a useful purpose in the -scheme of the Fourth Army's great advance; but perhaps we may be -pardoned for regretting that it was not a more successful close to the -Battalion's history. It was bad luck. Yet there was a certain degree -of poetic justice in the fact that the Battalion had helped fight the -Germans back to what had been on 21st March 1918 the British line of -resistance, and it can, therefore, justly claim to have redeemed in -full its losses in the awful battles of the retreat. - - - - -CHAPTER XXIV - -THE FINAL ADVANCE - - -II. _The 1/4th Battalion in the Battle of Bapaume, 1918_ - -The extension northward of the battle line, which marked the opening of -the Battle of Bapaume on the 21st August 1918, involved Byng's Third -Army, comprising from right to left the V, IV and VI Corps. As we have -indicated in the preceding chapter, the object of the Third Army was to -conduct a vast enveloping movement which should turn the flank of the -German defence of the Somme line, and throw open the road to Cambrai -and St Quentin. - -Already the enemy had shown signs of nervousness in the area of the -Somme-Scarpe salient and had withdrawn from his most advanced positions -at Serre; and it was clear, therefore, that any attack on this front -by the British must be prosecuted rapidly to avoid a repetition of the -skilful German retreat of February 1917. For an offensive in this area -the British troops were far more favourably placed in August 1918 than -they had been on the former occasion. They possessed the Bucquoy Ridge, -with the consequent advantages of observation which had formerly been -denied to them; and the terrain over which the battle would be fought, -though certainly devastated and a mass of trenches, did not present the -colossal system of inter-supporting fortresses which it had in 1916. -The time for a big attack had come, and G.H.Q. decided to strike. The -23rd August saw the Fourth and Third Armies advancing on a front of 33 -miles from Lihons to Mercatel. - -The suddenness of the German collapse in these latter days of the War -is probably unique in the annals of military history. At the beginning -of June their star was still in the ascendant. They were occupying -ground which they had never previously held during the whole War; -their successes of March and April had shaken the Allied defence to -its very foundations; and it seemed still doubtful whether they had -reached the limit of their capabilities of offence. Yet by the middle -of August the whole face of the War had changed. On a wide front -the Germans were in retreat; vast masses of material, thousands of -prisoners had fallen into our hands; the British morale had been proved -stronger than ever, while that of the enemy was giving indications of a -serious break. - -Whether the High Command anticipated the completeness of this lightning -change we cannot say; that the vast bulk of regimental officers and -men scarcely contemplated it, is almost certain. Early in July General -Hull, in a conversation with Lieut.-Col. Marchment, expressed the -opinion that very little would be done in 1918 by way of retrieving the -losses suffered during the spring! - - * * * * * - -The 8th August found the 1/4th Londons at a strength of 42 officers and -892 other ranks withdrawn in Brigade reserve to billets at Arras. Here -a quite pleasant week was spent in which the routine of training was -varied by a Battalion sports meeting, and a most successful swimming -gala--a new feature of recreation--for which purpose the moat at the -Citadel formed a splendid bath. - -Between the 16th and 18th August the 56th Division was relieved from -the Tilloy trenches and passed into Corps reserve, the 1/4th Londons -handing over their Brigade reserve billets to the 1/9th Royal Scots -and moving to Berneville on the 17th August. For a few days changes of -station followed on each others' heels with startling rapidity, and -after having been quartered successively at Houvin-Houvigneuil and -Magnicourt-sur-Canche, the Battalion reached Grand Rullecourt at 11.30 -p.m. on the 20th August. - -On the 19th orders had been issued to the Division to take part in an -attack with the XVII Corps in the area of the Scarpe, but these were -subsequently replaced on the 21st August by a transfer of the Division -to Haldane's VI Corps, and orders to join with it in the Third Army -attack. - -A day of rest at Grand Rullecourt was occupied by the Battalion, in -the absence of attack orders, with speculations as to its chances -of soon being called upon to fight. Preliminary arrangements were -made to march into battle at short notice, and the same evening, the -21st August, the Battalion marched thirteen miles to Berles-au-Bois, -arriving at 2 a.m. on the 22nd. - -About 10 o'clock that morning Lieut.-Col. Marchment and the company -commanders were ordered to Humbercamp to receive battle orders, but -after an hour's fruitless waiting the company commanders returned to -prepare their companies for action, and the Colonel went to try and -get what orders he could at Brigade Headquarters. Here he was informed -that the attack would take place in sixteen hours' time--early on the -23rd August! The general idea of the Battalion's rôle was explained -to Lieut.-Col. Marchment to be the capture of the village of Boyelles -and the Marc system of trenches immediately north of it, the attack to -commence at 4.55 a.m. on the 23rd August, two companies in line, one in -support and one in reserve. Artillery support would be provided by 6 -brigades of field guns firing an unregistered barrage, while 21 tanks -would take part in the attack. A section of the Divisional Machine-gun -Company would be attached to the Battalion. With this somewhat sketchy -information Lieut.-Col. Marchment hurried back to the Battalion to set -it in motion, and by 5 p.m. it was on its way to the first assembly -position at Blairville. Here it occupied the old German trenches -exactly opposite the first trench sector ever held by the 2/4th -Battalion in February 1917. - -The line facing Boyelles was at this time occupied by the 59th -Division, and the 168th Brigade was detailed to attack through them, -with the Guards Division opposite Hamelincourt on its right, and the -52nd Division north of the north branch of the Cojeul River on its -left. The Brigade order of battle from right to left was Kensingtons -(south of Boyelles); 1/4th Londons (Boyelles); and London Scottish -(Boiry-Becquerelle); the 1st Londons being attached in Brigade reserve -for the operation. - -Leaving the Battalion on the march Lieut.-Col. Marchment hurried on to -Blairville by car to see the Brigadier of the brigade in line (59th -Division) and was at once faced by another difficulty in finding that -the 59th Division had themselves taken over the front trenches only -the preceding night! Clearly not much possibility of assistance from -them; but they arranged to provide guides to lead our platoons to the -positions of final assembly. - -The sudden transfer of the 56th Division from the XVII to the VI Corps, -and the subsequent difficulty in obtaining orders must have been -caused by some reason of great importance: we are not aware what it -was. Certainly the effect was not to make things easier. Indeed, when -the Divisional attack order was issued by Gen. Hull at 3 p.m. on the -22nd August he had not received the written instructions of VI Corps. -But, starting under such inauspicious circumstances, all the more -credit is due to the battalions, and in particular to the commanding -officers, for the signal successes which were ultimately achieved. -Reconnaissance of the ground by officers and N.C.O.'s was obviously out -of the question, and Lieut.-Col. Marchment had to content himself with -explaining the situation to them while battle stores were issued to the -men. - -At 10.30 p.m. the Battalion moved off by platoons in charge of the -59th Division guides, who, considering their own scanty acquaintance -with the ground, did well, for they brought almost the whole Battalion -to its assembly positions in Falcon Trench well on time, though one -platoon of A Company and the Headquarter details went sadly astray and -did not turn up till long after zero hour. The Padre believes he was -taken for a long walk somewhere round Albert! During the march up the -enemy was using gas shell freely, and masks had to be worn at times, -but little loss was caused. - -The Battalion was drawn up as follows: - - Right front--B Company, Capt. R. S. B. Simmonds. - Left front --D Company, Capt. C. W. Rowlands, M.C. - Support --C Company, Capt. H. A. T. Hewlett. - Reserve --A Company, Capt. H. N. Williams, M.C. - -The hour or two of darkness before zero was spent in cutting lanes -through our wire, and at 4.55 a.m. the barrage opened, intense and -well distributed. Lieut.-Col. Marchment describes it as the best and -most tremendous he had ever seen. The scene from Headquarters was -extraordinary: the intense shrapnel barrage and smoke on the German -front line, the medium howitzers firing on Boyelles village beyond, and -the heavies cutting up the distant landscape in dense black clouds; and -behind it all the sun just rising. - -At 5.7 a.m. the companies moved forward. The right company (B) made -good use of the railway embankment, and following the line on its south -side advanced on a one-platoon frontage to Boyelles Station, while -three tanks entered the village. Here the railway was crossed and a -good deal of opposition was met with from enemy machine-guns, heavy -and light, firing from the eastern half of the village. These were, -however, skilfully outflanked and rounded up to the number of 3 heavy -and 8 light guns, after which the company pushed forward and caught up -the barrage. - -Two platoons halted approximately on the Blue line (first objective) on -the eastern edge of Boyelles, while two pressed on to Boyelles Trench -500 yards further east. But few enemy were encountered in this advanced -position. B Company being now well distributed in depth, the work of -consolidation was put in hand. The right flank was not yet in touch -with the Kensingtons and was therefore rounded off by pushing two Lewis -gun sections and one subsection M.G.C. southwards towards the railway. - -D Company on the left met with more stubborn resistance in the Marc -system, and the leading platoons were temporarily held up in No Man's -Land by enemy firing from the Marc saps. Moreover, the tank allotted -to this part of the front failed to reach the Marc front system at -all, having apparently lost its way. The support company (C), however, -pushed a platoon forward into the sunken road leading northwards from -Boyelles, whence it was able to enfilade the Marc trenches, while the -right platoon of the London Scottish advancing on our left managed -to turn the position similarly from the north. Being practically -surrounded the enemy surrendered _en masse_, the bag amounting -to 2 officers and 80 other ranks. Little further opposition was -encountered, and D company continued the advance to Boyelles Trench, -where touch was gained with C Company on the right and the London -Scottish on the left. The dugouts in this line were energetically -mopped up and many Germans sent marching westward. Two patrols were -sent forward towards Boyelles Reserve. - -In the meantime the support company mopped up the neighbourhood of -the cemetery and the sunken roads in its vicinity, while A Company in -reserve occupied the Marc system. This latter proved a very sound move -as our start-line was heavily shelled all the morning. - -The first news of the attack at Battalion Headquarters was received -in the shape of Private Cohen, who appeared wounded but carrying a -German light machine-gun--a good omen of success! At about 9 a.m. -the lost platoons turned up and their arrival, including as they did -the Padre and the Medical Officer, was extremely welcome, for by now -the wounded were beginning to filter through, and the small band of -five under Lieut.-Col. Marchment were encumbered with some 200 Bosche -prisoners--not to speak of their duties of conducting the battle. -Communication by wire was rapidly established with brigade and also -forward to the companies, a report centre being formed north of -Boyelles. - -At 9.15 a.m. 56th Division issued orders that the attack would be -pressed at 11.30 a.m. into Boyelles Reserve, but owing to temporary -dislocation of the signal service these orders did not reach the 1/4th -Londons until 11.15 a.m. To start at the scheduled hour was out of the -question, but arrangements were made at once for the further advance, -which ultimately began at about 5 p.m. - -The advance was made by the left front and support companies, the -right front company extending to its left to cover the area vacated by -them. This second attack met with complete success. The two attacking -companies were led by a line of scouts followed by one platoon in -extended formation. The remaining platoons followed in artillery -formation by sections. Some resistance was offered by light machine-gun -teams in Boyelles Reserve, but the widely extended formation saved -the attackers from severe loss. The enemy artillery was also active -during the advance, but again the formation adopted enabled the rear -platoons to pick their way with but few casualties. The whole of the -allotted portion of Boyelles Reserve was captured, and patrols pushed -forward 500 yards to the east of it. The enemy shell fire now became -more intense, but a protective barrage was put down by our guns, and -no counter-attack developed. After a while activity on the whole area -subsided. - -The same evening the 168th Brigade handed over the captured positions -to the 167th and passed into Divisional reserve, the 1/4th Londons -concentrating north of Hendecourt. By noon on that day the Battalion -was back at Blairville. - -It is impossible to speak too highly of the men by whom this great -success had been gained. The long approach marches in exceptionally -hot weather brought the Battalion to the point of battle in an already -tired condition; the hurried orders and the total lack of previous -reconnaissance created difficulties which were surmounted by the -splendid response made by all ranks to the demands imposed on them. -The rapid appreciation of the situation by company commanders and the -careful dispositions of the commanding officer all contributed in full -measure to this important victory, while the skilful use of ground and -of suitable formations was the means of securing the gains at a minimum -of loss. The excellent work performed by signallers and runners, all -of whom had a hard day's work, were of incalculable value to Battalion -Headquarters, and enabled Lieut.-Col. Marchment at all times to keep a -firm grip of the situation of the moment. - -The casualties of the Battalion were extremely light, only 18 being -killed, but by ill luck it lost three company commanders, Capts. C. W. -Rowlands, M.C., and H. A. T. Hewlett being killed, and Capt. R. S. B. -Simmonds, wounded. 2/Lieuts. A. W. Chignell, T. Yoxall and F. S. C. -Taylor were wounded. The captures made by the Battalion amounted to 3 -officers and 240 other ranks, of the 1st and 2nd Battalions 87th R.I. -Regiment, 24 light and 8 heavy machine-guns, 6 light, 1 medium and 1 -heavy trench mortar. - -After the relief of the 168th Brigade the offensive was continued by -the 167th, at first with considerable success, the Division being once -again attached to the XVII Corps. An advance in the northern area of -the Divisional front of some 2500 yards was made into Summit and Fooley -Trenches, but on the south flank the most strenuous efforts of the -56th and Guards Divisions failed to eject the enemy from Croisilles, -which was held in great force by machine-gunners. South of the Cojeul -River the enemy resistance was increasing, and information was obtained -from prisoners to the effect that three fresh German divisions had -been brought into the Bullecourt-Hendecourt area. North of the Cojeul, -however, the 52nd and Canadian Divisions had registered important -successes. The old Wancourt line fell to them on the 26th, and this -advance was rapidly followed up by the recapture of Monchy-le-Preux, -and a penetration into quite new ground at St Rohart Factory--hardly -fought for by the 56th Division in May 1917--and at Boiry Notre Dame. -By the evening of the 26th August the 52nd Division had cleared the -Hindenburg line from Henin to the Sensée River, and was reported to be -east of Fontaine-lez-Croisilles. - -Croisilles, however, still held out and the Guards had been pressed -back slightly towards St Leger. The result of this fighting was to -swing the Corps line round facing roughly south-east astride the -Hindenburg line, with a strong pocket of most stubborn Bosche in the -ramification of trenches around Croisilles itself, and on both banks of -the Sensée River to the north-east. - -The 169th Brigade which had now taken over the Divisional front was -getting worn by its constant fighting and losses, and reinforcement -was needed. After a few hours' rest at Blairville the 1/4th Londons -marched at 7.45 a.m. on the 25th August to trenches in front of -Boisleux St Marc, moving the following evening to the trenches east of -Boiry-Becquerelle, which had been captured by the London Scottish on -the 23rd. - -A good deal of gas shelling occurred here during the night. A signaller -was killed and several men were wounded, among whom the Battalion was -unfortunate in losing Sergt. Johnson, the excellent orderly-room clerk, -and Corpl. Coates, M.M., of the Scouts. - -On the afternoon of the 27th the Battalion moved forward in close -support to the 169th Brigade, and occupied Summit Trench immediately -north of its junction with Hill, and on the extreme left of the -Divisional sector. - -It is rather curious to note that in these fights and marches the -1/4th Battalion was in an area which had been traversed by the 2/4th -Battalion during the actions of March 1917, while at the same time the -2/4th Battalion in the Fourth Army was bearing its share in recapturing -spots familiar to the 1/4th Battalion during the 1916 Somme battles! - -The 1/4th Battalion had settled down in Summit Trench to make the best -of a very wet evening, when, after dark, orders were received to move -at once into the Hindenburg line and to concentrate at River Road, near -the banks of the Sensée River for an attack the following morning on -Bullecourt. It had been determined, owing to the prolonged resistance -of the enemy at Croisilles and the resultant holding back of the -right flank, to pursue the operation by an advance towards Bullecourt -straight down the Hindenburg line. This would have the effect of -completely enveloping and "squeezing-out" the pocket of Germans in the -Croisilles-Guardian Trench area. - -The concentration of the Battalion was effected successfully, but not -altogether without difficulty. A and B Companies moved direct to the -point of assembly, while C, D and Headquarters proceeded by way of -the Henin-Fontaine Road, and then down the Hindenburg trenches. The -whole area was horribly congested. Two brigades of the 56th Division -(the 168th and 169th) were moving up for attack, while at the same -time a relief was proceeding on the left flank between the 52nd and -57th Divisions. For a time the confusion was rather distressing, and -Lieut.-Col. Marchment writes, "It seemed to me that the battalions -were forming up to attack north-east, south-east and south-west." - -The plan of attack was as follows:--The advance was to be led over the -open by the 169th Brigade, the Queen's Westminsters in the van with the -line Queen's Lane-Jove Lane, as a first objective, and the trenches -south-east of Bullecourt as a final objective. - -The 168th Brigade was to follow the 169th in the order 1/4th Londons, -Kensingtons and London Scottish, advancing by bounds at a distance of -about 1000 yards in rear of the rear battalion of the 169th Brigade. -The particular duties of the 168th Brigade were to support the 169th -and mop up in rear of their advance, and to protect the right flank -should Croisilles remain untaken--a rather difficult and quite -unsatisfactory job. - -The 1/4th Londons were disposed as follows:-- - - D Company (2/Lieut. J. L. Backhouse) on the right--to advance - over the area west of the Hindenburg line by way of Sensée - Avenue, Nelly Avenue and Queen's Lane. - - B Company (2/Lieut. G. G. Lewis) to advance down Burg Support, - the old Hindenburg front trench. - - A Company (Capt. H. N. Williams, M.C.) and C Company (Capt. J. - W. Price), Headquarters and 1 section M.G.C. attached, to - advance down Tunnel Trench, the old Hindenburg support trench. - -The attack was to be launched at 12.30 p.m. on the 24th August under a -creeping barrage. - -The fight throughout the day proved a laborious and confused affair. -Trouble developed which doubtless originated on the previous evening -when the Queen's Westminsters, relieved by the London Scottish in the -Summit area, had moved forward to assembly. This gallant regiment -had been fighting already for a couple of days and was getting -worn--Lieut.-Col. Savill describes his men as "dead beat"--and it had -to move up to assembly positions in Burg Support, where it occupied -a trench at right angles to the line of its advance. A change of -front during an advance had been proved on the Somme in 1916 to be an -operation extremely difficult of accomplishment, and so it proved here. -True, the attack did not start till 12.30 p.m., but even the hours -of morning daylight gave little chance to the Queen's Westminsters -to get their bearings. Our map shows the villages of Bullecourt and -Hendecourt, but it must be borne in mind that the whole terrain was -actually a featureless waste. The ground everywhere was "crumped" to -pieces and covered with high grass and rank weeds, while the existence -of a village was not suspected till one found oneself stumbling -among the heaps of bricks which had formerly been its cottages. As a -consequence of all this, two companies of the Queen's Westminsters, -followed by a part of the 1/2nd Londons, went hopelessly astray and -became entangled in the 57th Division troops near Hendecourt. To add -to the confusion the company commander sent back word to 169th Brigade -that he was in Bullecourt. - -Meanwhile, Lieut.-Col. Savill of the Queen's Westminsters advanced -along the Hindenburg line, and having fallen in with the Headquarters -of the 1/2nd Londons and the London Rifle Brigade, soon came in touch -with strong enemy forces, believing that his companies were ahead of -him, and that mopping-up had not been well done. The weak force at his -disposal was unable to shift the stubborn Germans opposed to him, and -the attack was held up. - -The 1/4th Londons moved off from assembly as ordered in rear of the -169th Brigade. - -On the right D Company was held up badly at Nelly Avenue where it -closed on to a party of the London Rifle Brigade. Several efforts -to shift the enemy proved abortive, and it was not until about 7.30 -p.m. that, with the help of two Stokes Mortars brought up by the -Kensingtons, further progress could be made. By this hour, however, -the opposition was overcome, and, with 40 prisoners and 4 light -machine-guns to its credit, the company pursued the advance after dark -to Queen's Lane. - -B Company in Burg Support overtook the Headquarters of the three 169th -Brigade battalions, held up as already described, about 200 yards short -of the Hump, and a platoon was at once placed at Lieut.-Col. Savill's -disposal to help clear the trench. We must remark parenthetically that -B Company's fight began almost precisely in the sector of trench which -had been first captured by A Company of the 2/4th Battalion on the 15th -June 1917: how often, we wonder, has such a coincidence occurred? - -The Germans in Burg Support were of a remarkably obstinate variety -and progress by bombing was slow. The trench was very full of men, -and the congestion was later increased by the arrival from nowhere in -particular of a company of the Royal Munster Fusiliers (57th Division), -who had quite lost their direction. By 6.30 p.m. the enemy's resistance -was overcome by hard fighting, and B Company advanced down Burg Support -to the Knuckle, where it established itself in touch with D Company on -its right. - -A and C Companies on the left, in the Hindenburg Support line, also -overtook the 169th Brigade, the remnants of the 1/2nd Londons being -held up about Juno Lane. The enemy was in strength in this trench also. -At the time it was presumed that by zealous use of his dugouts he had -escaped the moppers-up of the leading battalion, but probably, owing -to the deflection of the greater part of the 1/2nd Londons, he had -not been previously attacked. Progress was slow and the 1/4th London -Companies pushed through and engaged the enemy. The resistance at Juno -was soon overcome, and the enemy retired leaving us a few prisoners and -two light machine-guns. A second check was experienced at the Hump but -the enemy was driven back, strenuously debating every inch of ground, -till at last by 9.30 p.m. the two 1/4th London Companies reached Jove -Lane and the remainder of the Battalion. Attempts were made to gain -touch with the 57th Division on the left but without success. - -The stubbornness of the enemy resistance in the Hindenburg line this -day was remarkable, and we cannot deny a brave enemy an acknowledgment -of his valour. Croisilles had been reported vacant by 8 o'clock in the -morning but the occupants of the Guardian pocket put up a day-long -fight. It was not till late in the evening that the whole area was -cleared. Probably the need to the enemy of gradually evacuating this -area was the cause of the opposition offered to our advance down the -Hindenburg line. - -This was a hard day's work for everyone. The 1/4th Londons had bombed -their way down about 2000 yards of the Hindenburg line, excellent -leadership to the bombing parties being provided by Lieut. V. R. Oldrey -and by Capts. H. N. Williams and J. W. Price. The great difficulty -throughout the day was for local commanders to get any sort of grip as -to what was going on, as so often occurs in trench fighting. The mass -of trenches, nearly all stubbornly defended, with which the whole area -was pitted, in effect broke up the brigade attack into a series of -numerous and more or less isolated scraps in which no one knew much of -how his neighbour was faring. And all the time Division believed that -the Hindenburg line was clear, and that Bullecourt was in our hands. - -The night of the 28th and the morning of the 29th August were occupied -in clearing up the situation, and assembling the Brigades on the line -Pelican Avenue-Pelican Lane for a continuance of the attack, which was -pursued by the 168th Brigade on the right and the 169th on the left. - -The 1/4th Londons remained on the 29th August in support with the 1st -Londons (attached), the attacking battalions being the Kensingtons -on the right and the London Scottish on the left. The Battalion -was disposed in Queen's Lane, Burg Support and Borderer Trench. -The objective allotted to the Brigade roughly coincided with the -Riencourt-Quéant Road, and the whole of the village of Bullecourt, -inclusive to the Brigade, was allotted to the London Scottish. - -The attack, which was launched at 1 p.m. on the 29th August, met with -stubborn resistance, especially on the right where the Kensingtons were -held up at Bullecourt Station. After hard fighting the London Scottish -managed to capture the village, and by dusk the Divisional line -formed a sharp salient, with its horns on Bullecourt Station and the -high ground west of the Factory on the Hendecourt Road, and its apex -following Tower Reserve and Gordon Reserve Trenches. - -[Illustration: THE BATTLE OF BAPAUME, 1918 (1/4TH BATTALION)] - -The 1/4th Londons were not called upon as a Battalion, but D Company -was sent forward to reinforce the London Scottish, and later to fill -a gap in the forward positions between that Battalion and the 169th -Brigade on the left. - -The enemy resistance this day was extremely stubborn and Tank Reserve -was strongly held by the enemy, who resisted effectually the most -gallant attempts of the Scottish to emerge from Gordon Reserve. - -Late at night the 167th Brigade took over the whole Divisional front, -and the 1/4th Londons moved back at 5.30 a.m. to positions in Queen's -Lane, Knuckle Avenue, Stray Reserve and Burg Support, where they -remained throughout the 30th August. During the withdrawal to these -positions the whole area was intensely bombarded with high explosives -and gas shell, and it was no surprise to the Battalion to learn that -the enemy had delivered a sharp counter-attack in the early morning -and driven the 167th Brigade out of Bullecourt back to the Pelican -Avenue-Pelican Lane line. The posts north of the village stood firm. -This counter-attack was a big affair which affected the divisions right -and left, both of them being pushed back a certain distance. - -The immediate recapture of Bullecourt was promptly ordered by XVII -Corps, and no one in the Battalion was especially delighted to learn -that the 1/4th Londons were detailed for the duty. - -After a day spent in obtaining such rest as was possible, the Battalion -wearily crept off after dark to assembly in Pelican Lane and Borderer -Trench in readiness to assault Bullecourt at dawn on the 31st August. -The 168th Brigade was drawn up for battle with the London Scottish on -the right, the 1/4th Londons in the centre and the 7th Middlesex (167th -Brigade attached) on the left, each battalion having a section M.G.C. -and a section L.T.M. Battery at its disposal. The Kensingtons were in -Brigade reserve. - -The morning of the 31st August was dark, and at 5 a.m. the assaulting -battalions moved forward under an excellent barrage to which the enemy -gave a quick and heavy reply. - -On the right, C Company, on a two-platoon front, reached the -cross-roads at the extreme western edge of Bullecourt, but was here -held up for some time by machine-guns in the village. At the same time -D Company, on the left, advancing on the north side of the village -penetrated about half-way across it and almost reached the cross-roads -on the northern edge, but here they also were checked by machine-gun -fire, principally from their right flank. - -The support company (B) now entered the village, or rather advanced -against the site of the village (for no single building was visible), -and began to mop up in the endeavour to form a link between the two -leading companies. Progress was slow owing to the overgrown nature -of the ground, but by 8.40 a.m. touch was gained between B and C -Companies, and together they slowly fought their way forward till C -Company was able to join hands with the 7th Middlesex on the Hendecourt -Road. In the course of this fighting B Company managed to take 15 -prisoners and put 5 machine-guns out of action. - -At about 9 a.m. the reserve company (A) was put into the fight to -endeavour to fill in the gap across the village between the leading -companies. - -The right company was still held up on the southern fringe of -Bullecourt by two machine-guns mounted in a derelict tank east of the -village, and it was not until after noon that, with the aid of two -Stokes Mortars, progress was made by bombing up Tower Reserve as far -as a point level with the east edge of the village. Here all further -advance was definitely checked. Gordon Reserve was strongly held and -stubbornly defended, and, moreover, no touch could be gained with the -London Scottish on the right. - -By 3.30 p.m. the village of Bullecourt was reported clear of the enemy -and a line of Lewis gun posts was established on its eastern fringe -from Tower Reserve to the Hendecourt Road on the left. During the -remainder of the day no material change in the situation occurred. -Three several attempts were made by the leading companies to get -into Gordon Reserve but the position was too strongly held, and, the -trenches leading to it having been flattened out by shell fire, an -advance by bombing was impracticable. Shortly after midday aerial -reports were received that the enemy was assembling in Tank Avenue and -Tank Support. All field guns and heavies at once turned on to this -target and the projected counter-attack was promptly broken up. The -activity of the enemy in this region continued till late at night, and -it was evident that any attempt at further advance would be strenuously -disputed. - -After nightfall arrangements were made for one company of the -Kensingtons to rush Gordon Reserve under cover of Stokes Mortar fire, -but the situation remaining somewhat obscure the attempt was abandoned. - -Very little progress was made anywhere this day. On the right the -London Scottish gained Bullecourt Avenue and the 7th Middlesex on the -left captured the factory on the Hendecourt Road. But all along the -line the enemy's resistance was stiffening, evidently in view of the -near approach of our positions to the junction of the Hindenburg line -with the Drocourt-Quéant Switch. - -Moreover the country was difficult for the attackers; it had been -fought over many times and was utterly broken up, and the assaulting -companies were all tired. In the circumstances it was a good day's -work, and a day of peculiar satisfaction to the 4th London Regiment, -which has a special claim to association with the village of -Bullecourt. Here in 1917 the 2/4th Battalion occupied Gordon Reserve -in the successful defence of Bullecourt against a heavy German attack -after it had first fallen into British hands, and in August 1918 it -fell to the lot of the 1/4th Battalion, after the village had been -recaptured and again lost, to capture it for ever. - -Casualties in officers this day were: Lieut. V. R. Oldrey and 2/Lieut. -R. T. Stevenson, killed; 2/Lieuts. W. G. Hook, A. Holloway and A. -F. Potter, wounded. 2/Lieut. E. H. Garner was killed on the night -27th/28th August, after having been ten days only with the Battalion. -In the ranks the total casualties for the period 23rd to 31st August -were 30 killed, 150 wounded and 12 missing. Having regard to the -enormous importance of the successes achieved and the depth of the -advances, these comparatively light figures are a matter for much -congratulation. One shudders to think of what the losses would have -been for equal results in the hard slogging of the Somme in 1916 or at -Ypres in 1917. - -Late at night on the 31st August the 56th Division handed over its -positions to the 52nd and withdrew into Corps reserve, the 1/4th -Londons reaching the Boyelles Reserve area at Boiry-Becquerelle at 7 -a.m. on the 1st September, with a strength of 32 officers and 710 other -ranks. - -In view of the gallant share which the 1/4th Londons had borne in this -splendid series of victories we may perhaps be permitted to quote -an extract from an article on the subject of the 56th Division's -achievements which appeared in _The Times_ of the 16th September 1918: -" ... This year it was one of the divisions which beat off the German -attack towards Arras on March 28th when the enemy suffered one of the -bloodiest defeats of the whole War; so that with this fighting and that -at Cambrai to its credit it has probably killed as many Germans as any -division in the British Army. Now to this proud record is to be added -the splendid advance of which the Commander-in-Chief has told. The 56th -Division has proved itself a great fighting division." - -The Divisional record in the Battle of Bapaume 1918 may be summarised -as advancing through 6 miles of very strongly fortified country in nine -days; meeting and defeating three German divisions, and capturing 29 -officers, 1047 other ranks, 3 guns, 210 machine-guns and over 50 trench -mortars. Of this large booty the share of the 1/4th Londons amounted to -3 officers and 390 other ranks prisoners, 70 machine-guns and 10 trench -mortars--a very fair proportion of the whole! - -With this action the share of the Battalion in the great envelopment of -the Somme line closes. - -The following were decorated for services during the period 23rd-31st -August: - - 2/Lieuts. C. L. Henstridge and A. Holloway, the M.C. - - Pte. E. Clark, the D.C.M. - - Sergt. F. G. Udall, M.M., Bar to M.M. - - Sergts. F. A. Dove, J. T. Norris, F. C. Nickless, Corpls. W. Frost, - F. Nash, C. Robbins, Lance-Corpls. J. T. Couchman, J. R. - Greenwood, Ptes. G. H. Andrews, G. A. Allen, W. W. Boulstridge, - A. C. Barnes, J. Eccles, A. E. Dickerson, G. J. Grant, W. H. - Hart, H. H. Mills and W. Ryan, the M.M. - - * * * * * - -This great battle as a whole resulted in the defeat by 23 British -divisions of 35 German divisions, and the capture of 34,000 prisoners -and 270 guns. Its importance lay in the ever-increasing signs of -the enemy's failing morale; while the captures bore witness to his -indiscriminate throwing-in of reserves. - -The following day Péronne fell to troops of the Third Army, and two -days later the enemy's general retirement from the east bank of the -Somme began. - -We have already alluded to extensive captures of ground made in -the area of the Scarpe at Monchy-le-Preux and other places. These -important victories constituted the Battle of the Scarpe, 1918, in -which, beginning on the 26th August, the battle front was still further -widened and the British First Army also became involved. By the 3rd -September the Canadian Corps of the First Army and the XVII Corps of -the Third Army had carried the battle line forward through the famous -Drocourt-Quéant line, and the enemy had fallen back to the general line -of the Canal du Nord from its junction with the Sensée River, east of -Lécluse to Péronne. - -During this hasty retirement large numbers of prisoners and vast -quantities of stores fell into our hands. In the extreme south the -French armies also continued to advance, and by the 6th September had -regained the line of the Crozat Canal at La Fère. - -In the meantime the gradual relinquishment by the enemy of his advanced -positions in the Lys salient had begun on the 18th August, and the -retirement rapidly becoming general, he had been driven back by the 6th -September to the line Givenchy-Neuve Chapelle-Ploegsteert. - - - - -CHAPTER XXV - -THE FINAL ADVANCE - - -III. _The 1/4th Battalion in the Battles of Cambrai and The Sambre, -1918_ - -The changes which the Battalion found at Boiry-Becquerelle in the -few days which had elapsed since its last rest there were truly -astonishing. The rapidity of the advance had released Boiry from risk -of bombardment by all except long range guns, and the necessity for -the supply services to keep pace with the fighting troops in their -progress eastward had already resulted in a complete metamorphosis -of the Boyelles-Boiry area. Already Boyelles Station was a hive of -industry, and trains were daily entering it from Arras with supplies. -In Boiry-Becquerelle itself, which had been in German hands till the -23rd August, the 1/4th Londons were able to enjoy the luxury of baths -and clean clothing on the 2nd September. - -The few days' rest obtained here were passed pleasantly amid fine -weather in refitting and reorganisation; and the Battalion was -fortunately able on the 4th September to commemorate the fourth -anniversary of its departure from England. Companies were now commanded -as follows: A by Capt. H. N. Williams, M.C.; B by Capt. L. L. Watts, -M.M.; C by Capt. C. L. Henstridge, M.C.; and D by Capt. T. B. Cooper, -M.C., M.M. - -About this time the Battalion Transport, which had been stationed at -Boisleux St Marc, was divided into two echelons, of which A was the -fighting and B the supply portion. These two echelons were respectively -commanded by Lieut. G. V. Lawrie, M.C., and Lieut. G. E. Stanbridge. -Although as a rule the two portions moved together, they were each -self-contained and ready to operate separately in case of a sudden and -rapid advance. - -In the meantime the remainder of the XVII Corps was busily chasing -the enemy through Quéant, Pronville and down the Arras-Cambrai Road -to a point between Villers-lez-Cagnicourt and Buissy. After a warning -order to the 56th Division to move forward again into the Corps area -of battle, arrangements were suddenly changed--as on numerous other -occasions--and on the 5th September the Division was transferred to the -XXII Corps (Godley) of the First Army, with orders to relieve the 1st -Division in the line. - -East of Vis-en-Artois and south of Douai is a stretch of country well -watered by numerous streams, and intersected by many ponds and marshes. -At Eterpigny the Cojeul and Sensée Rivers join, and thus augmented the -Sensée expands at Etaing into what is practically a chain of lakes. -Augmented by the Trinquis River and connected by it to the Scarpe, the -Sensée flows eastward past Lécluse, Palluel and Aubigny-au-Bac. At -Palluel it receives on its right, or south, bank the equally marshy -streams of the Agache and the Hirondelle and is intersected by the -northern extremity of the Canal du Nord, which here links up with the -Canal de la Sensée. This last-named Canal runs southward from Douai to -Arleux and then turning eastward down the river valley joins the Canal -de l'Escaut. The whole area thus constitutes a thoroughly complicated -system of waterways and marshes which form barriers of very great -natural strength to an advance. - -The Sensée marshes from Etaing to Palluel had formed the left flank of -the Canadian Corps advance in its break through the Drocourt-Quéant -line during the Battle of the Scarpe, and now formed a natural -defensive flank, facing northwards, to our advanced positions on -the Canal du Nord. In this area the 56th Division relieved the 1st -Division. On the evening of the 7th September, after a a halt of one -night at Vis-en-Artois, the 1/4th Londons took over the positions of -the 2nd Royal Sussex on a front from Eterpigny Wood to a point east of -Etaing. The line was continued to Lécluse by the Kensingtons and thence -by the 169th Brigade. - -The Battalion was now in country which hitherto had been in German -hands for the whole of the War, and the devastated area was left -behind. Villages were still standing and houses furnished. Indeed, -the civilians had still been in occupation of them during the battle -but had now been moved to the rear by the French Mission. Trenches in -the ordinary sense were here non-existent and the front was held by -a series of outposts along the line of the Sensée with sentry posts -dug in small pits behind the cover of trees and bushes. D, B, and C -Companies were in line, with A and Headquarters on the hill above -Etaing. - -Life in this sector was comparatively uneventful. The defences were -improved and a great deal of useful patrolling work carried out in -the endeavour to locate fords or other means of crossing the swamps -in front. For his excellent reconnaissances and reports Sergt. Heyes, -M.M., received commendation. - -The previous occupants of the line had evidently been cautious in the -use of their transport in forward areas, for rations and stores were -dumped each night at a cross-road about 2000 yards in rear of the line; -a course involving the nightly labours of some 70 men for carrying -duties. The 1/4th Londons altered this and had limbers at night up to -the front line without any mishap, thus saving an immense amount of -fatigue and trouble to everyone. - -After reorganising the outpost line to a strength of two companies -the Battalion handed over its positions on the evening of the 12th -September to the 1st Londons (167th Brigade), and concentrating at St -Rohart Factory on the Arras-Cambrai Road were 'bussed back to Feuchy -where they occupied shelters in Battery Valley, an area which a month -previously they had held as a front line! - -In this area a good deal of useful training with rifle and Lewis gun -was put in, and a friendly boxing tournament with the London Scottish -one evening afforded a pleasant relaxation. The Battalion was here -joined by a large draft of officers, including Lieuts. A. Bath and T. -R. Fletcher, and 2/Lieuts. Bradley, R. D. Bushell, J. Coley, P. W. -Green and S. P. Ferdinando; and 2/Lieut. S. W. Neville (7th Londons) -attached. - -Lieut. E. P. M. Mosely's diary for this period affords an excellent -illustration of the care taken to maintain the discipline of the -Battalion at a high standard by the application of "peace-time" methods -whenever the situation allowed: - - ... This sound principle was the means of preventing officers - and men from degenerating into the "Ole Bill" type--a type which - probably existed nowhere except in caricature. At Feuchy the - Battalion was resting. The enemy had been swept back and had - left just a desolate landscape, a smashed railway bridge and a - collection of shell holes. The accommodation for officers and - men consisted of holes in the ground roofed with tarpaulins and - cuttings in the embankment which carried what was left of the - railway line. - - Notwithstanding the entire lack of civilised comforts, at 7.30 in - the evenings, standing on the battered arch of the bridge which - once carried the line over Spider Corner, a Battalion bugler would - sound "Dress for Mess." Officers would then scurry into their - holes and half an hour later emerge in slacks, well-groomed, and - enter the mess, a white-washed elephant shelter, and partake of a - five-course dinner with all customary mess etiquette. - -On the 19th September the 168th Brigade returned to the line. The Corps -boundaries were being now rearranged and the 56th Division was being -side-stepped to its right, a change which was effected by handing over -a portion of its left to the 4th Division and extending its right over -the front hitherto held by the 3rd Canadian Division. The additional -frontage on the right was allotted to the 168th Brigade, which, after -the relief, held a sector east of Ecourt St Quentin, with the London -Scottish on the right and the 1/4th Londons on the left. The Brigade's -left flank was secured by the 167th Brigade, which, facing north-east, -held the area from Ecourt St Quentin to Lécluse. - -The 1/4th Londons' sector consisted of a line of outposts some 500 -yards west of the Canal du Nord, of which both banks were held in -force by the Germans, from the Sauchy-Cauchy Road on the right, as far -as Mill Copse (inclusive to the enemy), where the line bent back and -facing north-east lay astride the Hirondelle River, the village of -Ecourt St Quentin being inclusive to us. This line of outposts was held -by two companies with Headquarters in a cottage east of Osvillers Lake, -while two companies were in support in front of Rumaucourt. - -The Battalion was unfortunate on the night of the relief in losing -2/Lieut. A. Cartmell, wounded, while 2/Lieut. S. W. Neville was killed -early the following morning. - -Like the Etaing area, this sector was marshy and intersected in all -directions by dykes and streams. On the opposite bank of the Canal, the -right flank around Sauchy-Cauchy was equally swampy; but opposite the -centre and left the whole of our area was well under observation from a -considerable hill on which stood Oisy-le-Verger--looking like a second -Monchy--and the Bois de Quesnoy. - -In this sector the artillery on both sides was continually active, -though on the enemy's part activity was chiefly confined to -counter-battery work. The Battalion was especially active at night in -conducting reconnaissances of the ground in front, and some useful -information was obtained. Very little was seen of the enemy's infantry, -though on two nights he succeeded by stealth in stealing the garrison -of one of our advanced posts, his second attempt being rendered -successful by the artifice of approaching the post in the guise of -deserters. - -We must now turn for a moment to the general situation and must briefly -consider once more the results achieved by the Battles of Bapaume and -of the Scarpe in order to appreciate the further development of the -offensive. - -In commenting on the achievements of the British Armies in the Battle -of Bapaume Sir Douglas Haig in his despatches draws attention to the -steady deterioration of the enemy's morale and the increasing lack of -organisation in his defence: - - The urgent needs of the moment, the wide extent of front attacked - and consequent uncertainty as to where the next blow would fall, - and the extent of his losses, had forced the enemy to throw in - his reserves piecemeal as they arrived on the battle front. On - many occasions in the course of the fighting elements of the same - German division had been identified on widely separated parts of - the battle front. - - In such circumstances a sudden and successful blow, of weight - sufficient to break through the northern hinge of the defences - on which he was to fall back, might produce results of great - importance. - -This anticipation of the Commander-in-Chief was amply fulfilled by the -rapid retreat of the enemy towards the Hindenburg line during the first -week of September after the close of the Battle of the Scarpe. - -After hard fighting at Havrincourt and Epéhy during the third week of -September the enemy was definitely within his Hindenburg defences as -far north as Havrincourt, north of which he had been pushed beyond them -to the line of the Canal du Nord. On the 12th September the Americans -drove the enemy out of the St Mihiel salient, and it was decided in -discussion between Sir Douglas Haig and Marshal Foch that as soon as -possible four vigorous and simultaneous attacks should be launched: by -the Americans in the direction of Mézières; by the French in Argonne -with the same general objectives; by the British in the direction of -Maubeuge; and by Belgian and Allied Forces in Flanders towards Ghent. - - By these attacks, says Sir Douglas Haig, it was expected that the - important German forces opposite the French and Americans would be - pressed back upon the difficult country of the Ardennes while the - British thrust at their main communications. - -The long continued blows delivered by the British Armies, although -enormously successful, had placed a great strain on the troops, and -their losses, though small in proportion to the enemy's and to the -results achieved, were in the aggregate considerable. The Hindenburg -positions were known to be strongly defended, and an unsuccessful -attack on them would have a serious political effect and inevitably -revive the declining German morale. An important crisis in the War -had been reached and it was essential that the success of the British -in this new attack should be decisive. After weighing the various -considerations involved Sir Douglas Haig states: - - ... I was convinced that the British attack was the essential - part of the general scheme and that the moment was favourable. - Accordingly I decided to proceed with the attack.... - -The battle, which opened on the British front on the 27th September -(Battle of Cambrai, 1918), culminated on the 5th October in the capture -of all the Hindenburg trenches and of such isolated trench systems as -lay in rear of it. - -The part of the 56th Division in this great battle was the crossing -of the Canal du Nord. This strong natural obstacle was considered to -be too stubbornly held to yield to frontal attack on a wide area; and -the general plan was therefore for the Canadian Corps to cross it on a -narrow front north of Mœuvres and then spreading out fanwise to extend -the gains north and south on the east bank. - -The 1st Canadian Division, on the left of the Canadian Corps and -adjoining the right of the 56th Division, was to cross the Canal south -of the Arras-Cambrai Road and carry the line forward to Haynecourt. -After this the 56th Division, astride the Canal on a front as far east -as Sauchicourt Farm, with the 11th Division on its right, would attack -northwards towards Oisy-le-Verger and the Sensée River at Palluel. - -The 56th Division attack was entrusted east of the Canal to the 169th -Brigade and west of it to the Kensingtons of the 168th Brigade. The -London Scottish and 1/4th Londons in line had thus the peculiar -experience of the attack actually crossing their front from right to -left. - -At 5.30 a.m. on the 27th September the crash of the barrage announced -the opening of the Canadian Corps attack. The enemy's retaliation -was slight and had practically ceased by 6 a.m. The 1/4th Londons' -area was occupied by eight brigades of field guns engaged in firing -a flank barrage to the main attack until 2.48 p.m., when they were -to switch on a creeping barrage for the attack northwards along the -Canal. Additional flank protection was furnished by six companies of -machine-guns also in our area. In view of this heavy barrage and the -possibility of severe retaliation the 1/4th Londons' outpost line -was thinned out to two platoons in charge of Lieut. T. R. Fletcher, -the remainder of the front companies being withdrawn to the support -position. - -The Canadian attack went well, but very stiff opposition was -encountered in Marquion, so that the 56th Division attack from the Blue -line had to be postponed from 2.48 p.m. to 3.28 p.m. Excellent work was -done by the 512th and 513th Field Companies, R.E. (56th Division), in -bridging the Canal at Marquion. - -During the morning the 1/4th Londons' front seemed to be clear, and -an officer's patrol under 2/Lieut. O. C. Hudson was sent forward to -reconnoitre the enemy positions along the Agache River, which were -found to be unoccupied. - -At 3.28 p.m. the Kensingtons commenced their attack and progressed -without difficulty as far as their first objective, the east and west -road through Sauchy-Cauchy. North of this, however, they were met with -stubborn resistance from machine-guns in Mill Copse and the marshes -east of the Canal. Owing to the restricted avenues of advance through -the marsh--there were only two possible routes to Mill Copse--the -Kensingtons' attack was checked at about 6.30 p.m. some 500 yards south -of the Copse. Excellent information was brought to Headquarters by -2/Lieut. A. M. Bullock as to the situation not only of the Kensingtons -but also of the 169th Brigade east of the Canal. - -About 5.50 p.m. C and D Companies began to re-establish the almost -vacated outpost line, and later in the evening D Company was ordered to -endeavour to assist the Kensingtons by pushing through to the Agache -River and if possible by working round the Copse. By shortly after 11 -p.m. reports were received that D Company had established four posts in -touch with the Kensingtons. Mill Copse, however, was still in the enemy -hands. - -On the right of the Canal the 169th Brigade was also held up by -stubborn machine-guns, and it was not till 8 a.m. the following morning -that they were fully in possession of their final objective. - -In view of the check on both banks the reserve company of the -Kensingtons was ordered to clear up the situation as soon as the moon -rose, and at 2 a.m. this company advanced astride the Canal as far as -Mill Copse, which it found unoccupied. The Kensingtons then organised -in depth, having reached their final objective at the surprisingly -small cost of nine other ranks wounded. - -The prosecution of the advance was ordered for the 28th September, and -the 1/4th Londons were detailed to carry the 168th Brigade line forward -on the west bank of the Canal towards Palluel, while on the east the -169th Brigade was to advance to the Sensée River. - -During the night Battalion Headquarters was persistently shelled from -its left rear by guns across the Sensée, with mustard gas. - -At 9.30 a.m. D Company, with one platoon of A Company attached, began -the advance northward to Palluel in the narrow gut of land between the -Canal and the marshes and ponds of the Hirondelle River. Lieut.-Col. -Marchment, 2/Lieut. Bullock, Sergts. Randall and Heyes and a few -signallers followed in the attack, communication with Headquarters -being maintained by a running wire all the way. Very little opposition -was met with, and Capt. Cooper, with Lieut. Fletcher and 2/Lieut. -Millstead, was soon established on the bridges at Palluel, where touch -was gained with C Company and with patrols of the 8th Middlesex (167th -Brigade) which occupied the village and advanced beyond it towards -Arleux. - -The whole 168th Brigade front being now confined to this narrow tongue -of land its area was handed over to the 167th Brigade, and the 1/4th -Londons withdrew to reserve positions at Rumaucourt. This move was -completed by 9.15 p.m. on the 28th September. - -This successful operation had been effected at very slight loss, the -total casualties of the Division having been only 341 all ranks, while -the 1/4th London losses for the whole of September were the happily -small total of 30 other ranks in addition to the two officers already -mentioned. - -During these two days' fighting the 11th Division on the right had -also met with considerable success, and on the evening of the 30th -September the 168th Brigade was ordered back to the line to take -over the positions gained by the left Brigade (the 34th) of the 11th -Division. The advanced positions, which extended from the sharp bend -in the Sensée Canal south of Brunemont on the left to a point opposite -Aubencheul-au-Bac on the right, were occupied by the London Scottish -and the Kensingtons. - -The 1/4th Londons, who marched from Rumaucourt at 9 p.m. on the 30th -September, relieved the 2nd Manchester in the support area, on the high -ground south of Oisy-le-Verger and east of Sauchy-Lestrée. - -The dispositions in this area were far from good, all the companies -being rather mixed up in the railway cutting near the Bois des -Puits; and on the following day Lieut.-Col. Marchment effected a -redistribution of the Battalion, moving C and D Companies to Cemetery -Wood and B Company to Battalion Headquarters near the Aubencheul Road, -while A Company remained at the Bois des Puits. For five days the -Battalion was busily employed in nightly working parties, digging a -line of support posts across the ridge south of Oisy-le-Verger as far -east as the old German dump at the cross-roads towards Epinoy. This -dump proved to be a rather popular spot for it was found to be amply -supplied with large bottles of Seltzer water. Probably a good number of -these was taken on unofficial charge of the Battalion. - -On the evening of the 5th October the 1/4th Londons took over the -right subsection from the London Scottish, on the slope of the hill -overlooking Aubencheul and the railway triangle. Hostile activity was -slight on the 6th October, and from observation it seemed that the -enemy was holding Aubencheul very lightly; in the afternoon orders -were received to test the situation with patrols and if possible -to penetrate the village and occupy the Canal bank north of it. -Considerable fires observed during the morning in Aubigny-au-Bac -contributed to the supposition that the vacation by the enemy of -Aubencheul, if not already accomplished, was at least imminent. - -B Company (Lieut. H. F. Dade) was detailed for the work, and at 7 p.m. -No. 7 Platoon, with Lieut. A. M. Bullock, Intelligence Officer, and 4 -Headquarters scouts attached, left advanced Battalion Headquarters to -try to enter the village and reach the railway bridge over the Canal. -The other platoons stood in readiness to move forward if required. By -10.15 p.m. information was received that the platoon was in the village -without having met with any of the enemy, and accordingly Nos. 5 and -8 Platoons were at once ordered to move forward to form posts at the -railway crossing and the Aubigny-au-Bac Road bridge and to find touch -with the 11th Division on the right. These operations were successfully -accomplished, though the enemy gave evidence of his occupation of the -north end of the bridges. - -By 4 a.m. on the 7th October the occupation of the village was complete -with two platoons which were in touch with the 2nd Yorkshires (4th -Division) on the right, one platoon in the railway cutting south of the -village and one still in the old outpost line. No casualties had been -sustained. - -The following day the 1/4th Londons took over the whole Brigade front, -C Company (Capt. C. L. Henstridge, M.C.) on the right, A Company (Capt. -L. L. Watts, M.M.) in the centre and D Company (Lieut. T. R. Fletcher) -on the left. B Company (Lieut. H. F. Dade) was withdrawn to support. -The outposts consisted of a line of sentry posts on the Canal with a -line of resistance about 400 yards in rear. A reserve line was occupied -on the spurs overlooking the Canal north and east of Oisy-le-Verger. -Company Headquarters were located in captured German battery positions, -and D Company became the possessors of a complete battery of 8-inch -German howitzers which had been taken on the 27th September. - - * * * * * - -[Illustration: THE BATTLE OF CAMBRAI, 1918. THE CANAL DU NORD] - -The first phase of the great British offensive may now be said to have -been brought to a conclusion. In the nine days' fighting between the -27th September and the 5th October, the First, Third and Fourth Armies -had shattered the enemy's last prepared lines of defence. The line -of the Canal du Nord had been crossed and left far behind, and the -whole of the main Hindenburg defences were in our hands. "The effect -of the victory," writes Sir Douglas Haig in his despatches, "on the -subsequent course of the campaign was decisive." The threat to the -enemy's communications was now direct and instant, for nothing but the -natural obstacles of a wooded and well-watered countryside lay between -our Armies and Maubeuge. - -In this fighting 30 British and 2 American infantry divisions and 1 -British cavalry division had met and defeated 39 German divisions at a -loss to the enemy of 36,000 prisoners and 380 guns! - -The effect of the advance of our Armies on this front now rendered -the enemy's positions in the Lys area precarious. Already on the 28th -September the Second Army, attacking on a wide front about Ypres, had -carried forward our positions in one day a greater distance than had -been gained in the whole of the dreary struggles for Passchendaele -in 1917. By the 1st October Messines had again been liberated and -our troops were approaching Gheluve and Werwicq. On the 2nd October -the enemy initiated a general withdrawal on the front from Lens to -Armentières. - -We have now to follow the course of the second phase of the British -advance--the final phase of the War. In this great operation the Fourth -and Third Armies and the right of the First Army advanced with their -left flank on the Canal from Cambrai to Mons and their right flank -covered by our French Allies. - - * * * * * - -The first stage of this series of battles opened on the 8th October -with a vast drive by the Third and Fourth Armies in the direction of -Le Cateau. The success of the operation was complete, but we are only -concerned with the point that it involved the fall of Cambrai on the -9th October. - -This continued advance of the British in the south exposed in -increasing measure the flank of the enemy north of the Sensée, and -great developments were therefore to be expected shortly in the XXII -Corps area. Already the enemy was reported to be withdrawing from his -positions in the corner between the Canal de la Sensée and the Canal -de l'Escaut, which had been crossed by the Canadians as far north as -Ramillies; and to relieve the 11th Division to pursue this movement -the 168th Brigade extended its right with the Kensingtons as far as -Fressies, which village was to be occupied immediately after the -completion of the relief. This was on the 9th October. - -The possibility of an early German retirement north of the Sensée also -called for great vigilance, and the 1/4th Londons were ordered to probe -the situation towards Brunemont and Aubigny-au-Bac, while units of the -167th Brigade were feeling towards Arleux. - -The only way to cross the Canal, short of swimming or using a boat, -was to use the ruined iron bridges at Aubencheul and Abbaye-du-Verger -Farm, and accordingly small patrols, covered by parties on the south -bank, began to cross the bridges at about 5 p.m. on the 9th October. -Results were soon obtained. At Aubencheul the enemy was alert and the -patrol was driven back. At the Farm crossing A Company obtained more -success. A post of the enemy about 12 strong was discovered on the -Brunemont Road north of the Canal, and these, after firing a few shots, -fled, though one of them was captured by Sergt. R. C. Clammer, D.C.M., -M.M., after which the patrol returned. The prisoner was from the 103rd -I Regiment, and was a destitute wretch, wearing cap, jacket, trousers -and boots--and nothing else. Unfortunately, Capt. Watts was killed by a -stray bullet while returning to his company headquarters. - -The same evening the 1/4th Londons were relieved by the 8th Middlesex -(167th Brigade) and withdrew to Brigade support in shelters west of -Epinoy. At the same time the Kensingtons and London Scottish effected -the extension to the right of the Divisional line above referred to. - -Early on the morning of the 11th October the Kensingtons launched a -completely successful attack on Fressies and advanced the Brigade -line to the Canal at a loss to themselves of only 10 casualties. In -the meantime the advance of the VIII Corps north of the Sensée River -had driven the enemy from Vitry-en-Artois and was now being directed -towards Douai. To assist in this development the 56th Division -artillery was ordered to keep under fire the crossings over the -northern arm of the Sensée Canal, while the infantry made persistent -endeavours to establish themselves beyond the Canal de la Sensée with -a view to exerting pressure on the retiring enemy's left flank. On -the 12th the 167th Brigade completed the clearance of Arleux which -had been initiated by the Canadians, and occupied the Canal triangle -south-east of the village. The following day the 169th Brigade occupied -Aubigny-au-Bac after a sharp fight, but a vigorous counter-attack -later threw them back to the Canal bank. In this fighting magnificent -devotion was displayed by the Royal Engineers in bridging the Canal -under heavy fire. - -By the 16th October the 4th Canadian Division had taken over the -Divisional line and the 56th Division withdrew into Army reserve. - -The 1/4th Londons were relieved in the Brigade support area by the -1/2nd Londons on the 11th October and passed into Divisional reserve at -Rumaucourt, where several days of very welcome rest were obtained. - -Both Rumaucourt and Ecourt-St Quentin were still comparatively unharmed -and partly furnished. Everywhere were signs of the German occupation. -The chief anxiety of the enemy occupants seems to have been fear of -British aeroplanes, for every cellar had its capacity plainly written -on the door, while large warning bells or "Flieger Alarum" were fixed -in all prominent places. In Ecourt-St Quentin were three German field -hospitals which afforded unmistakable evidence that the enemy was -hard up for bandages, for in place of these he seemed to have used -old curtains and paper. An abundant quantity of old civilian clothing -was also found here, and rumour has it that the doctor was seen one -day sporting an excellent top hat. B Company lived in one of these -hospitals and had an excellent time with a grand piano. These good -Bosche institutions afforded an opportunity of bathing, of which -advantage was taken by the whole Battalion. - -During the foregoing spell of active work the Battalion transport had -been located near Wancourt. "One day in October," writes Lieut.-Col. -Marchment, "a deputation of Company Q.M.-Sergts. appeared at Orders -with a request that they might take it in turns to come up with -the rations, A and C one night, B and D the next. To this I gladly -consented when, looking at the map, I found that they were walking and -riding some twenty-six miles a night!" - -On the afternoon of the 14th October the Battalion marched to -Marquion--till the 27th September in German hands--to entrain for a -rest at Arras. The train was due out at 3 p.m., but as things turned -out there was no occasion for hurry, since owing to a smash at Boisleux -the train did not reach Marquion till 11 p.m. A weary but happy -Battalion entrained, confidently expecting to wake up in Arras, but the -advent of morning brought no change of scene. The train had not moved -an inch! However, in due course the line was cleared and the train -gaily rattled over the battlefields of Quéant, Croisilles and Boyelles, -and reached Arras by 11.30 a.m. on the 15th. The 1/4th Londons were -quartered in comfortable billets in the Rue d'Amiens. - -The rest in Arras, with which charming little city the Battalion had -been so frequently associated, was probably the most enjoyable that -fell to its lot in the whole War. To start with, everyone was in the -highest spirits born of the knowledge of their own recent successes in -action and of their confidence for the battles to come. Food was good -and plentiful. The civilians were returning and shops were beginning to -open once again. - -Here the Battalion experienced the first visible effects of what the -liberation of France meant to the French. Refugees from the liberated -villages towards Cambrai were being sent back for safety to Arras, -where they were housed in the Schramm Barracks till the French Mission -was able to arrange to settle them in other parts of France. Streams of -homeless women and children drifted through the streets, clinging to a -few treasured objects of their personal belongings, and our men stood -at the street corners deeply impressed by such heartrending scenes. -Shamefacedly, as if fearful of disclosing the depth of their emotion to -their comrades, the men would beg the refugees to be allowed to carry -their parcels for them. Three men of one company took complete charge -of a distressed family and piloted them to a house where they settled -the poor folks, lit a fire for them, bought eggs with their own money, -scrounged some bully beef, and then fled to avoid the thanks of their -grateful charges. - -The average Cockney is not in the habit of wearing his heart on his -sleeve. Rather does he conceal his emotion beneath the cloak of -"grousing," but scenes of desolation such as these--far more affecting -than the sight of a ruined countryside--brought out all the wonderful -chivalry which has endeared the simple British soldier to the hearts of -the French. "It was only in censoring letters home," writes an officer, -"that one realised how deeply touched our men were by the sufferings -of the civilians." Of all these saddening sights probably the most -dreadful was at the Hôpital St Jean, where little mites of French -children were dying of gas poisoning, and old people lying demented -by the horrors through which they had passed. To alleviate these -sufferings everything possible was done, and our own R.A.M.C. orderlies -worked side by side with the French Sisters of Mercy. - -One afternoon the Commanding Officer gave permission for the drums to -play to the refugees. The performance concluded with the Marseillaise, -the glorious strains of which, not heard for four long years, so -overcame the audience that in the intensity of their emotion old men, -women and children fell upon the drummers and kissed them--much to the -embarrassment of those good-natured fellows. - -Some excellent training meanwhile was being obtained on the racecourse -at Dainville, and several rifle competitions were introduced to add to -the keenness of the men. The Battalion was largely reclothed and much -done to improve its excellent parade discipline. On the 21st October -a Guard of Honour was provided, consisting of 100 all ranks under -Capt. H. N. Williams, M.C., for President Poincaré, who was visiting -Arras--"the finest Guard the Division ever turned out," as Faulkner -described it. The identity of this distinguished visitor remained for a -long time shrouded in mystery, and curiosity reached fever-pitch. The -Mess decided that the only way to deal with the problem was to have a -sweepstake, in which the names of the Prince of Wales, M. Clemenceau, -General Smuts, Marshal Foch and the Lord Nozoo (representing The Field) -were included. Captain Williams' return was awaited with breathless -anxiety, but, alas, in the dark he had failed to solve the mystery. The -Mess paid out on M. Clemenceau--he being apparently the nearest to the -distinguished visitor who actually arrived. - -During this rest at Arras the Battalion was joined by Capts. H. -W. Spiers and D. S. Boorman, M.C. (to command B and C Companies -respectively), and by Lieuts. E. G. Dew and H. D. Rees, the latter -being appointed Assistant-Adjutant. Regimental Sergt.-Major Jacques, -who was returning to England in training for Quartermaster, was -replaced by Sergt.-Major Wilson, who had been wounded at Ypres in 1917. -The strength of the Battalion was now 38 officers and 721 other ranks. - - * * * * * - -The latter half of October had seen most rapid and important changes -on the British battle front, to which we must refer briefly. The -success of the attack towards Le Cateau in the early days of the month -had been complete and had driven the enemy back to the line of the -Selle River. This enabled G.H.Q. to initiate the second stage of this -last phase of the War, which was to force the enemy from the Selle -River back to the general line Sambre Canal--western edge of Forêt de -Mormal--Valenciennes. The occupation of this line would enable the -British Armies to launch their final attack on Maubeuge. - -The Battle of the Selle was opened by the Fourth Army on the 17th -October, the fight gradually involving the Third and First Armies in -succession. By the 20th October the enemy had been driven across the -Sambre as far north as Catillon, Le Cateau was occupied, and the Selle -River left two miles behind our advanced positions. The main attack -developed on the 23rd October, and by the end of the following day -the enemy was driven on to the western edge of the Forêt de Mormal, -the outskirts of Le Quesnoy had been reached, and the lateral railway -connecting Le Quesnoy with Valenciennes had been crossed on a front -of about four miles. This latter portion of the success was on the -front of the XXII and Canadian Corps of the First Army. The Selle -River Battle resulted in the capture of 20,000 prisoners and 475 guns, -and in the defeat of 31 German divisions by 25 British and 2 American -divisions. - -On other parts of the front successes had been equally striking. Laon -had fallen to the French on the 13th October. In Belgium, Menin, -Thorout and Ostend had been occupied in rapid succession, and by the -20th October the Allied line rested on the Dutch frontier. This advance -in the extreme north had the effect of turning the defences of Lille, -which was encircled and occupied on the 18th October, after which a -steady advance brought our troops to the line of the Scheldt north of -Valenciennes to Avelghem. - -The critical condition of the Germans is summed up by Sir Douglas Haig -in his despatches:-- - - By this time the rapid succession of heavy blows dealt by the - British forces had had a cumulative effect, both moral and material - upon the German Armies.... His reserves of men were exhausted.... - The capitulation of Turkey and Bulgaria and the imminent collapse - of Austria--consequent upon Allied successes which the desperate - position of her own armies in the western front had rendered - her powerless to prevent--had made Germany's military situation - impossible. If her armies were now to be allowed to withdraw - undisturbed to shorter lines the struggle might still be protracted - over the winter. The British Armies, however, were now in a - position to prevent this by a direct attack upon a vital centre - which should anticipate the enemy withdrawal and force an immediate - conclusion. - -A necessary preliminary to the final attack was the capture of -Valenciennes itself, and this was accomplished on the 1st November. -The XXII Corps, advancing on a front of six miles to the south of -the city, crossed the Rhonelle River, and occupied the high ground -overlooking the valley of the Aunelle River, while the Canadians -entered Valenciennes and pushed on to the east of it. - - * * * * * - -On the 31st October the 56th Division rejoined the XXII Corps in the -battle area, and the battalions of the 168th Brigade embussed from -Arras to Douchy (two miles south of Denain). For a couple of days the -1/4th Londons remained here in very fair billets, receiving a most -hearty welcome from the inhabitants, who had been for four years under -the heel of the enemy. - -At 8 a.m. on the 2nd November the Battalion marched about five miles -forward to the staging area at Maing, which it reached at about 11.30 -a.m., and that evening advanced again at short notice and relieved the -4th K.O.Y.L.I. (49th Division) in advanced positions facing Saultain, -the relief being completed by 2 a.m. on the 3rd November. The advance -was led by D Company, which came under heavy shell fire when passing -through Famars, and lost 4 men killed and 14 wounded. - -The 168th Brigade section which was the left of the Divisional front, -the 169th being on the right, was held with the Kensingtons and 1/4th -Londons in the line. D Company occupied small sections of trenches in -the front line some 500 yards west of the Château de Saultain, while A, -B and C Companies were held back in a sunken road south-east of Aulnoy. - -Lieut.-Col. Marchment was now in command of the 168th Brigade, General -Loch having gone to hospital, and the Battalion was temporarily under -Major R. B. Marshall, with Captain T. B. Cooper, M.C., M.M., acting as -second in command. Battalion Headquarters opened in Aulnoy. - -[Illustration: THE BATTLE OF THE SAMBRE, 1918] - -About the time of the relief it became apparent that the enemy had -retired again opposite the Canadians on our left and was about to do so -on our own front. At 10.35 a.m. a wire was received in the Battalion -stating that the Canadians had entered Estreux, and ordering the -Battalion to push strongly supported patrols through Saultain as far as -the Ferme du Moulin. D Company moved forward at 11.15 a.m., supported -by A Company, and entered Saultain which was found to be unoccupied -except for four men of the 109th Infantry Regiment who were taken -prisoners. By two o'clock the Ferme du Moulin was occupied with very -little opposition and Battalion Headquarters advanced to the Château de -Saultain. On the right the Kensingtons had also pressed forward towards -the cemetery of Curgies, and touch was obtained with them and with the -4th Canadian Division on the left. This advance--over 2000 yards--was -consolidated by the 1/4th Londons, while two squadrons of Australian -Light Horse and a company of New Zealand cyclists endeavoured to -push forward during the evening to secure the crossings of the River -Aunelle. Their attempt, however, was checked about 1000 yards in -front of the infantry by enemy machine-gun fire, and in this position -the progress for the day was concluded, the Kensingtons occupying -with the cavalry and cyclists the advanced line, which extended in a -north-westerly direction from the cross-roads at Le Talandier. That -night the 1/4th Londons' position was held with D and A Companies in -front and B and C Companies in support. - -The immediate resumption of the advance being ordered by XXII Corps, -arrangements were made by 56th Division with the adjoining divisions -to pursue the attack at 6 a.m. the following morning, 4th November, -each division operating independently. Orders for this advance did not -reach the 1/4th Londons, who were detailed for the attack on the 168th -Brigade front, till 1 a.m., and there was thus no more than enough -time to assemble the companies close in rear of the line held by the -Kensingtons. For reconnaissance there was no time at all. The attack -was delivered on a two-company front by B Company on the right and A -Company on the left, each moving in square formation of platoons with -a screen of scouts and cavalry patrols in front. C and D Companies -followed in diamond formation at a distance of about 200 yards. The -objective was given as the high ground across the River Aunelle about -500 yards east of Sebourquiaux. - -The morning dawned mistily, but in this case the mist was not -altogether a disadvantage. The whole of this countryside was a swelling -waste of stubble fields with practically no landmarks, but fortunately -a line of telegraph poles going due east which was visible through the -mist enabled the leading companies to keep their direction well--a -great stroke of luck, as the advance lay up hill and down dale over -this barren land for some 2000 yards before the crest of the Aunelle -Valley was reached, and the objective was for a long time out of sight. -The mist thus served to conceal the advance from the enemy till the -leading companies breasted the hill overlooking Sebourquiaux itself, -and started descending the slope to the village. - -The Aunelle River is hereabouts spanned by three bridges, one at -Sebourg, one at Sebourquiaux, and one at Le Pissot, north of the latter -village. These had already been secured by the cavalry patrols who -had, however, been unable to make progress across the river. As the -leading companies began to drop down the hill towards the village the -mist partly cleared, and the German machine-gunners opened a heavy -fire. The leading companies at once dashed down the hill into the -cover of the scattered houses and streets which form the outskirts of -Sebourquiaux on the west bank of the river; but here they seemed to -have fallen into a trap for the enemy at once dropped a barrage of -considerable intensity, shells of all calibres falling thick and fast. -Forward progress was impossible, and B Company on the right therefore -promptly worked round the right flank, crossing the river at Sebourg, -and then, turning northward toward Sebourquiaux, cleared the village of -the enemy machine-gunners. In the meantime A Company had been heavily -machine-gunned from the direction of Rombies, which continued to resist -the Canadian attack, and touch with the Canadians was lost. - -B Company having cleared the way through the village, A Company was -able to cross the river, and together the two companies attempted -to force their way up the slope to the east of Sebourquiaux. The -machine-gun fire was too intense, and the companies had to fall back -to a line on the eastern outskirts of the village, where, joined by C -Company (in support), they began to consolidate their position. Touch -was obtained with the Queen's Westminsters of the 169th Brigade who had -cleared Sebourg on the right, but no connection could be obtained with -the Canadians who were still held up before Rombies on the left, and -A Company therefore threw a defensive flank astride the Aunelle River -facing northwards. The Battalion was now organised on the line which -had been gained, all companies having platoons on the forward positions -and finding their own supports. All day the village of Sebourquiaux -remained under heavy German shell fire, but at about 5.30 p.m. the -intensity of the enemy's fire increased and the work of destruction was -completed, hardly a house being left standing. A variegated display of -Véry lights which accompanied this barrage led to the expectation that -the enemy was organising a counter-attack, but no infantry movement on -the part of the Germans materialised. - -The stiffness of the enemy resistance this day made it abundantly clear -that further progress could be made only by means of an organised -attack in co-operation with the divisions on either flank, and -arrangements for a further advance were promptly made. - -That night the 1/4th Londons were relieved by the London Scottish -and withdrew in Brigade reserve to the high ground east of Estreux, -Headquarters remaining at the Ferme du Moulin. This relief was -completed at 3 a.m. on the 5th November, and at 5.30 a.m. the attack -was pursued by the London Scottish, with the Kensingtons in support and -the 1/4th Londons in reserve. By 6 a.m. the crest east of Sebourquiaux -had been gained and the enemy was retiring in the direction of Angre. - -On the 169th Brigade front the enemy resistance was not severe, and by -7.30 a.m. the London Rifle Brigade had captured Angreau. The Canadians -had also occupied Rombies, but on the ridge between this village and -Angre the Germans continued to hold out in great force and to bring -very heavy machine-gun fire to bear on the left flank of the 168th -Brigade. - -At 8 a.m. the 1/4th Londons were ordered forward, and by 11 a.m. the -companies, A, B, C and D in line from right to left, were in position -in the old German trenches east of Sebourquiaux, with Battalion -Headquarters in a farmhouse in the village. In this position the -Battalion was practically on the frontier of France and Belgium. - -The advance was resumed by the London Scottish under a barrage at 4.15 -p.m., and the line was advanced to within about 500 yards of Angre. -The enemy machine-gun fire again precluded the possibility of further -advance, and eventually a line was consolidated facing north-east in -touch with the 169th Brigade on the right and the Canadians on the left. - -On the 6th November the attack was pursued by the London Scottish on -the right and the Kensingtons on the left, the 1/4th Londons again -being in support. Fierce fighting took place, particularly on the left -flank where the Kensingtons crossed the Grande Honnelle River, were -thrown back, and crossed it again. At the end of the day the leading -battalions were in possession of Angre, on the east bank of the Grand -Honnelle. The 1/4th Londons moved forward slightly from their positions -of the previous day but did not come into action. - -The whole of these days were extremely wet, and not a man in the -Battalion had a scrap of dry clothing. Trenches were embryonic, and -shelters almost entirely lacking--of dugouts there were, of course, -none. - -Shortly after midnight "Drake" Battalion of the 63rd (Royal Naval) -Division relieved the Battalion--the remainder of the Brigade also -being relieved--and it withdrew to tolerable billets in Sebourg. The -march to Sebourg was only about two miles, but every road was choked -with double and even treble lines of transport of all descriptions -waiting to follow up the advance. It had been waiting motionless since -the previous afternoon and did not get on the move again till 4 a.m. -the next morning. In these circumstances the march to Sebourg occupied -about four hours--a most unpleasant journey in which desultory shelling -by the enemy alternated with heated arguments with despairing transport -officers. Dawn, however, found the Battalion enjoying a good breakfast, -and drying its clothes, all its troubles forgotten, and every one -filled with justifiable satisfaction at the good work that had been -done. - -This, the last fight of the 1/4th Londons, produced nine prisoners -and cost in casualties: 2/Lieut. A. M. Bullock, killed; 2/Lieut. G. -H. Sylvester, died of wounds; 2/Lieut. H. W. Taylor, wounded; and in -N.C.O.'s and men, 11 killed, 55 wounded and 1 missing. - -From now onwards the 56th Division was fighting on a one-brigade -front, with the 167th leading, and the 1/4th Londons were engaged -in following up the advance by stages so as to be within supporting -distance of the leading troops. Nowhere was the enemy's opposition -more than trifling, and the advance proceeded rapidly, though under -conditions of some discomfort and difficulty. The line of the -Division's advance lay almost due east, roughly parallel to the -marshes about the Canal de Condé which connects the Canal de l'Escaut -with Mons, and the whole countryside is cut up by innumerable small -streams discharging northwards into the marsh area. The banks of these -streams are everywhere steep, and bridges had been systematically -destroyed by the retiring enemy who had also blown craters at almost -every road junction. It was an ideal country for a determined enemy to -fight a rearguard action, but the Germans' powers of resistance were -broken, and beyond the delays caused to the progress of our troops -by the wholesale destruction, opposition was negligible. The extreme -rapidity of the advance indeed made it almost impossible for the supply -services to keep pace, and the damage to the roads prevented lorries -from proceeding beyond the Grande Honnelle River till the necessary -repairs could be completed. The weather, moreover, had broken, and for -three days rain fell incessantly. But these discomforts were slight in -comparison with the enormous wave of enthusiasm which passed over all -the troops who had the good fortune to take part in this extraordinary -victory. - -On the 7th November the line of the Bavai-Hensies Road was crossed, -and the following day the leading troops had reached the line Petit -Moronfait-Rinchon-Ferlibray. The 9th November saw the Mons-Maubeuge -Road crossed, and on the 10th the 1st Londons, who were leading, -captured Harveng, and after slight opposition pushed forward to -Harmignies. - -The 1/4th Londons following up the advance moved on the 8th to Autreppe -and the following day to Blaugies. The band was now with the Battalion -and played on the march. This gave rise to most remarkable patriotic -demonstrations on the part of the liberated villagers who everywhere -greeted the Battalion with cries of "Vive l'Angleterre!" and showered -flowers on the troops, while crowds of children marched beside the band -cheering. The plight of these poor people was deplorable. The Germans -in their retirement had taken with them practically all food supplies -and utensils of every description. Scarcely the bare necessities of -life remained. All live stock had also been driven before them by the -retreating hordes of the enemy, but when the Battalion reached Blaugies -the presence of live stock in the village showed the ever-increasing -confusion and speed of the enemy's retirement. At this time the -Division was feeding some 16,000 civilians, on an allowance of one iron -ration to four people. - -On the morning of the 10th November the 1/4th Londons continued -their almost triumphal progress to La Dessoue, but there being no -accommodation here, found billets in Sars-la-Bruyère, where an -overwhelming welcome was accorded them. In this village Sir Horace -Smith-Dorrien (II Corps) had had his Headquarters on the 23rd August -1914. - -The Brigade Ammunition Column at this time was in charge of Lieut. -E. P. M. Mosely, whose diary illustrates the extraordinary spirit of -humour which carried the men through this period of hard work and -exposure. The Column reached Famars thoroughly tired out one wet -night at about midnight, and halted in rear of the advancing troops. -The civilians had been evacuated and the men rapidly made themselves -comfortable in some of the cottages. One of the transport drivers, -according to the immemorial custom of transport drivers, quickly began -to forage round, and attired himself in a top hat, white scarf and -frock coat, in which remarkable garb he put his head round the door and -said: "I've come for the rent!" This, after a hard night's work, shows -a spirit which takes a lot of damping. - -It was in this advance also that the Column arrived in a battered -village late at night, thoroughly worn out and drenched to the skin. -The place was muddy, shell torn and desolate, and its exact whereabouts -on the map far from certain. The men began to picket their horses -and spread tarpaulins over their heaped-up stores, and afterwards -disconsolately to search for odd bits of timber in the endeavour to -construct some sort of shelter. The O.C. Column produced from a waggon -an antique arm-chair, which had somehow attached itself to the Column -at an earlier stage of the advance, and in this very much improvised -headquarters took up his station in the mud, when suddenly--the post -arrived! The Army Postal Service had throughout been so efficient as -to become almost a matter of course--but in this effort it surely -surpassed itself! - -On the night of the 10th November the 56th Division was relieved by -the 63rd Division by whom the advance was to be pursued; but early -the following morning the news of the Armistice was received and the -troops stood fast. The record of this grand culmination of the years of -bloodshed is contained in the Battalion Official War Diary as follows: - - Sars-la-Bruyère. 08.30. Bde. Memo. B.M. 971 received - 11.11.1918. hostilities would cease at 1100. - The news had an unexpected - effect on the troops: everybody - appeared to be too dazed to - make any demonstration. Men - were much less cheerful than - they had been for some days. - - 11.00. Hostilities ceased. - Transport Personnel and - Nucleus rejoined Battn. - -The vast Forêt de Mormal had been passed, Mons and Maubeuge had fallen, -and the German Army was divided into two parts, one on each side of the -natural barrier of the Ardennes. - -In his Despatches Sir Douglas Haig sums up the situation on the morning -of the 11th November 1918 thus: - - In the fighting since November 1st, our troops had broken the - enemy's resistance beyond hope of recovery, and had forced on him - a disorderly retreat along the whole front of the British Armies. - Thereafter the enemy was capable neither of accepting nor refusing - battle.... The strategic plan of the Allies had been realised with - a completeness rarely seen in war. When the Armistice was signed - by the enemy his defensive powers had already been definitely - destroyed. A continuance of hostilities could only have meant - disaster to the German Armies and the armed invasion of Germany. - -A remarkable incident related by Lieut. Mosely occurred at -Sars-la-Bruyère the day following the Armistice. - - The Mess Corporal proceeded to Mons to see if any green vegetables - could be procured. Returning from his mission through the streets - of Mons he saw a soldier untidily dressed and without puttees, but - wearing on his jacket the red circles which were the distinguishing - mark of the 1/4th Londons. Said the Corporal, "What are you doing - here?" "Looking for my Battalion," replied the man. The Corporal - demanded to know why the man had wandered so far from billets and - what he meant by being so untidily turned out. To his surprise - the soldier informed him that he had come from Germany. A few - more words and the Corporal realised that this was one of our own - men who had walked out of a German prison when the Armistice was - declared. Whipping up the wanderer into the Mess cart, he brought - him home, washed him and gave him a big meal. The poor fellow was - almost hysterical at being amongst his own once more. He was a man - of B Company who had been captured on the 28th March 1918, at Oppy. - "We gave him a strong dose of rum," writes Mosely, "and wrapped him - in warm blankets. By the next morning he had quite recovered, and - was asking for his pay!" - -Thus ended the four years' war service of the 1/4th Londons, who at -the end of the campaign were within two miles of Malplaquet, where -Marlborough's great victory had been won two hundred years earlier. -It had the proud distinction of having finished its active service -within five miles of Mons, where the first British shot had been fired -in August 1914. Of the 1016 officers and men who had left England on -the 4th September 1914, only about 30 other ranks remained with the -Battalion which had done such glorious service on so many hard-fought -fields. - -As a tribute to the many unrewarded acts of heroism of which there -have been so many examples during the War, a letter, relating to the -circumstances attending the death of No. 280872 Pte. S. Greenfield of -D Company on the 23rd August 1918, is preserved among the Battalion -records. This letter was sent by the Medical Officer, 178th Brigade, -R.F.A., who found Greenfield's body, to his relatives, from whom it was -received by the Commanding Officer. The following is an extract from -this letter, which is dated 24th August 1918: - - ... On searching the battlefield (Boyelles) I discovered the - body of your son Private S. Greenfield, No. 280872. He had died - fighting, killed outright by a machine-gun. I found him lying on a - German machine-gun which I have no doubt he intended to capture. - As no more dead were there and no other signs of a fight about the - machine-gun nest, I expect he rushed the machine-gunners himself. I - may remark the machine-gunners are dead also. - -One of the survivors of the original Battalion was Flossie, a small, -brown Pomeranian dog. Flossie had served on the railway line in August -1914, had accompanied the Battalion to Malta and been successfully -smuggled into France in January 1915. Throughout the War she had -journeyed everywhere with the Battalion, and finally came home with -the Cadre in 1919. Her principal claim to distinction appears to be -that she succeeded in bringing a litter of puppies into a noisy and -muddy world in most of the leading towns and villages of Flanders. -Throughout she maintained a calm demeanour, and when her maternal -cares necessitated transport she rode with her young family in a basket -perched on one of the cookers. - -On the 15th November a party of the Battalion, under Capt. H. N. -Williams, M.C., took part in the triumphal march through Mons, where -the troops were received with a tumultuous welcome. - -There is little further to be said. The XXII Corps was excluded from -the Army of the Rhine and the Battalion remained in the Mons area, -training and indulging in educational experiments, while parties -visited the battlefields of Mons and Waterloo. Until the ravages of -demobilisation reduced the numbers too severely, the evenings were -enlightened by some of the Quartermaster's excellent orchestral -concerts, and by boxing tournaments in which the Battalion did -exceedingly well, Private Miller of the 1/4th Londons becoming XXII -Corps Feather-weight Champion. - -On the 27th November the Battalion moved to billets in -Villers-sire-Nicole, near Maubeuge, and on the 6th March 1919 to Givry -and on the 18th March to Cuesmes (both near Mons), in all of which -places the routine of training and education was continued. Early in -the New Year the arrangements for demobilisation were put into active -operation, and rapidly the strength of the Battalion dwindled. - -Among the first to leave was the padre, Rev. S. F. Leighton Green, -M.C., who had served continuously with the Battalion since December -1916. The padre left on the 13th February 1919, and his departure -was felt most keenly by every officer and man in the Battalion. His -constant selfless devotion to duty and his kindly personality had -made him a true friend to one and all, and the example of his simple -life and magnificent courage in action had been a real inspiration to -all--and that included the whole Battalion--who had been brought into -personal contact with him. - -The break-up of the Battalion was the saddest thing which ever happened -to it. After so many months and years of good and bad times, and of -life in circumstances of such intimacy as can be attained only on -active service, the joy of departure for home was severely tempered by -the deepest emotion at leaving the comradeship of regimental life, and -few said good-bye to the Battalion without genuine sorrow. - -By the beginning of May the Battalion was reduced to Cadre strength, -about 50 all ranks, Lieut.-Col. Marchment, D.S.O., M.C., remaining in -command, with Major T. B. Cooper, M.C., M.M., second in command. - -On the 14th May 1919 the Cadre left Cuesmes, entraining at Jemappes for -Antwerp. After a few days in the embarkation camp it was played down -to the quay by the pipes of the Liverpool Scottish and embarked for -Tilbury, where it entrained for Newhaven. On the 21st May the Cadre -returned to London by train and was received at London Bridge Station -by the Lord Mayor (the Rt. Hon. Sir Horace Marshall, now Lord Marshall -of Chipstead, P.C., K.C.V.O., Hon. Colonel of the Regiment), who also -took the salute as the Cadre passed the Mansion House _en route_ for -Headquarters in Hoxton. - -The Cadre was received at Headquarters by Lieut.-Col. H. Dade, V.D., -Major G. H. M. Vine, T.D., and other officers of the Regiment, and -by the Mayor of Shoreditch (Councillor W. Girling), after which its -dispersal speedily followed. - -Three weeks later the last remnants of the 1/4th Londons were scattered -to their homes, and the part played by the Regiment in the Great War -was at an end. - - - - -APPENDIX I - -MALTA - - -The Dependency of Malta consists of a chain of islands, Gozo, Comino -and Malta, stretching from north-west to south-east, about 60 miles -from Sicily and about 180 from Africa. Malta itself is about 17½ miles -long and 8¼ broad, and, owing to its magnificent natural harbours, it -has been the coveted possession of the strongest nations on the sea for -the time being, ever since the dawn of maritime trade. These anchorages -are nearly all on the east coast of the island, and include--besides -the famous harbours of Valetta (the Grand Harbour on the south of the -city and the Marsamuscetto Harbour on the north)--the bays of Melleha, -St Paul's and Marsa Scirocco. - -The population of Malta in 1907 was 206,690, and this phenomenal -congestion renders it largely dependent on imported foodstuffs. The -area under cultivation is comparatively small, and the fields are -composed of terraces by which the soil with enormous labour has been -walled up along the contours of the hills to prevent it from being -washed away. Viewed from the sea, therefore, the top of one wall -appearing above the next produces the barren effect to which reference -has been made in Chapter II; but the aspect of the land from the top -of the hills in winter and early spring is a beautiful contrast of a -profusion of greenness. The principal grain crops are maize, wheat and -barley. Vines are also cultivated though the fruit is sold as grapes -far more profitably than converted into wine. The chief industry is the -production of Maltese lace, which employs some 5000 women and children. -The principal resources of the island are derived from the fact of -its being an important military station and the Headquarters of the -Mediterranean fleet, the prolonged absence of which always produces -distress. - -The Maltese language is Phœnician in origin, the popular idea that it -is composed largely of Arabic being erroneous. Until recent years the -language of the courts was Italian, in spite of the fact that this -language is unknown to 86 per cent, of the population. - -Malta has had a most chequered history from the earliest times when -the Mediterranean was the centre of all civilisation and commerce. The -Phœnicians occupied the islands at a very early date, being followed -in the 6th century B.C. by the Carthaginians, and later by the Romans, -who regarded the Maltese not as conquered enemies but as allies. -On the final division of the Roman Dominions in A.D. 395, Malta was -assigned to the Empire of Constantinople, and during the next 500 years -suffered three Arab invasions, though these left little mark upon the -people either by language or by inter-marriage. In 1090 the Counts of -Normandy captured the island and finally expelled the Arabs, retaining -possession until 1265, when it passed into the hands of the Aragonese, -Kings of Sicily. - -It was in 1530 that the most interesting period of Maltese history -commenced, for in that year the islands were granted by the Emperor -Charles V to the Knights of St John, who had been expelled from -Rhodes by the Turks; and some thirty years later the Knights of the -Order and the Christian Maltese combined under de Valette, the Grand -Master, whose name survives in the town of Valetta, in resisting the -last effort of the Mohammedan power to gain the ascendancy in the -Mediterranean. The Siege of Malta, which was most gallantly resisted by -the Knights, proved successful, and they remained, although _de jure_ -owing allegiance to Sicily, _de facto_ masters of Malta, until they -were finally expelled in 1798 by the French under Napoleon, who used -the island as a base for his disastrous expedition to Egypt in that -year. - -The staunch allegiance of the Maltese to the Church of Rome soon -brought them into conflict with the French, whose plundering of the -churches provoked a revolution in which the Maltese invoked the aid -of Nelson. The Treaty of Amiens, 1802, provided for the return of the -island to the Knights of Malta, but the Maltese, realising that this -would entail a revival of French influence, protested vigorously, with -the result that in 1814 the Treaty of Paris finally secured Malta to -the British Empire. Since this date the story of Malta has on the whole -been one of advancement in every direction. - -The chief towns of the island are Valetta, the seat of government, and -Citta Vecchia (otherwise known as Notabile or Medina), the ancient -capital and stronghold; other places of importance being Musta, -Birchircara and Attard--all of which will be well remembered by all -ranks of the Regiment. - -The head of the Government and Commander-in-Chief and Governor-General -was in 1914 General Sir Leslie Rundle, G.C.B., G.C.M.G., G.C.V.O., -D.S.O. - -The garrison consisted of three battalions of British Infantry, two -companies of Fortress Engineers, together with detachments of Royal -Garrison Artillery, Royal Army Medical Corps, Royal Army Service Corps, -and in addition two battalions of Malta Militia (Infantry), and the -Malta Artillery. - - - - -APPENDIX II - -HONOURS AND DECORATIONS - - -NOTE.--This Honours List has been compiled from official sources, and -is believed to be accurate, but, owing to the manner in which honours -were announced in the _London Gazette_, its completeness cannot be -guaranteed. - -DISTINGUISHED SERVICE ORDER - - Capt. W. G. Clark _London Gazette_ 3. 7.15 - 2/Lieut. W. II. Webster " 12. 3.17 - 2/Lieut. (A/Capt.) G. E. A. Leake " 26. 7.17 - 2/Lieut. F. W. Walker. " 19.11.17 - Lieut. (A/Capt.) A. M. Duthie " 4. 2.18 - Lieut. (A/Capt.) C. J. Graham, M.C. " 11. 1.19 - -MOST EXCELLENT ORDER OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE (MILITARY DIVISION) - -_Companion_-- - - Lieut.-Col. (Hon. Col.) Vickers _London Gazette_ 3. 6.19 - Dunfee, V.D. - -_Officers_-- - - Major L. T. Burnett " " - Hon. Lieut. and Q.M. W. J. Gragg. " " - Major S. Elliott " " - Major W. Moore " " - Major (A/Lieut.-Col.) H. P. L. Cart " 1. 1.20 - de Lafontaine - -MILITARY CROSS - - 2/Lieut. A. R. Moore. _London Gazette_ 23. 6.15 - 2/Lieut. J. R. Pyper. " 14. 1.16 - 2/Lieut. (Temp. Lieut.) G. L. Goodes " 3. 6.16 - 2/Lieut. S. J. Barkworth, M.M. " 14.11.16 - 2/Lieut. E. McD. McCormick " " - Rev. R. Palmer (C.F.) " " - Lieut. (A/Capt.) W. J. Boutall " 1. 1.17 - 2/Lieut. O. D. Garratt. " 4. 6.17 - 2/Lieut. D. S. Boorman " 25. 8.17 - 2/Lieut. (A/Capt.) S. Davis. " 27.10.17 - Lieut. (Temp. Capt.) C. J. Graham " 1. 1.18 - 2/Lieut. E. L. Mills " 4. 2.18 - 2/Lieut. (A/Capt.) C. A. Clarke " 23. 4.18 - Lieut. (A/Capt.) T. B. Cooper, M.M. " 22. 6.18 - Lieut. (A/Capt.) A. M. Duthie, " " - D.S.O. - Lieut. (A/Capt.) S. G. Askham " 26. 7.18 - Lieut. H. S. Daw " " - 2/Lieut. W. Rosen " " - 2/Lieut. G. C. Ewing " 16. 9.18 - Lieut. (A/Capt.) A. G. Croll " 7.11.18 - Rev. S. F. Leighton Green (C. F.). " 11. 1.19 - 2/Lieut. C. L. Henstridge " " - Lieut. (A/Capt.) G. H. Hetley " " - 2/Lieut. A. Holloway. " " - 2/Lieut. V. C. Prince. " " - 2/Lieut. A. H. Millstead " 2. 4.19 - -BAR TO MILITARY CROSS - - 2/Lieut. (Temp. Capt.) G. L. _London Gazette_ 14.11.16 - Goodes, M.C. - Lieut. (A/Capt.) C. J. Graham, M.C. " 26. 7.18 - Lieut. (A/Capt.) J. R. Pyper, M.C. " 8. 3.19 - Lieut. (A/Capt.) T. B. Cooper, M.C., " 2. 4.19 - M.M. - -DISTINGUISHED CONDUCT MEDAL - - 2170 L/Cpl. G. L. Colomb _London Gazette_ 5. 8.15 - 217 L/Sergt. A. C. Ehren " " - 1153 Cpl. W. J. Knowles " 14. 1.16 - 487 C.S.M. E. H. Risley " " - 1054 C.S.M. R. Davis " 22. 9.16 - 4354 Pte. J. O'Brien " 14.11.16 - 3351 Pte. H. S. Payne " " - 2163 Sergt. T. Clark " 1. 1.17 - 281267 Sergt. E. P. G. Brand " 25. 8.17 - 281477 Pte. F. Anthony " 19.11.17 - 282450 L/Cpl. F. Austin " " - 282051 Pte. W. H. Bolton " " - 295070 Pte. H. C. Bull " " - 282496 Pte. J. Taylor " " - 282444 Sergt. B. A. Watson " " - 281972 L/Cpl. E. S. Brown. " 4. 3.18 - 280032 Sergt. G. Norris " " - 282706 Pte. C. H. W. Roberts " " - 280937 L/Cpl. T. H. Sankey " " - 7261 R.S.M. J. O'Brien " 17. 4.18 - 283138 Cpl. B. Vaughan " 3. 6.18 - 281613 Cpl. C. E. Freeman " 26. 6.18 - 280019 C.S.M. T. Lock, M.M. " 3. 9.18 - 281718 Cpl. A. Martin " " - 280079 Sergt. H. W. Moss " " - 282171 L/Cpl. (A/Sergt.) H. F. Watson " 30.10.18 - 280605 Sergt. R. C. Clammer " 1. 1.19 - -MILITARY MEDAL - - 2144 Cpl. C. T. Coates _London Gazette_ 1. 9.16 - 3261 Pte. H. E. Hyde " " - 3130 L/Cpl. H. Whitehead " " - 1174 Cpl. J. Castle " 11.11.16 - 1899 Pte. C. F. Collins " " - 2161 Pte. A. E. Colvin " " - 2202 C.Q.M.-Sgt. R. Forbes " " - 1854 Sergt. H. C. Gearle " " - 4786 Sergt. R. Hebberd " " - 2827 Pte. F. Hedger " " - 2272 Sergt. C. James " " - 1893 Pte. W. Lawrence " " - 280019 Sergt. T. Lock " " - 534 Sergt. H. H. Merrell " " - 3586 L/Cpl. A. J. Moger " " - 2216 L/Cpl. A. Sergeant " " - 3579 L/Cpl. L. R. Webb " " - 3662 Pte. W. Buckingham " 9.12.16 - 3113 Sergt. R. R. L. Hyde " 21.12.16 - 2105 Sergt. H. J. Cott " 19. 2.17 - 280102 Sergt. A. E. Gardiner " 17. 4.17 - 280308 Sergt. W. A. King " 11. 5.17 - 281020 Pte. C. H. Thomas " " - 281204 Cpl. G. L. Rossington " 1. 6.17 - 283725 Pte. J. G. Turner " 18. 6.17 - 283371 Pte. J. Grierson " 18. 7.17 - 281242 Cpl. A. W. Lintott " " - 282189 Sergt. H. S. Monk " " - 282490 Pte. P. J. Olinski " " - 282493 Pte. A. J. Selby " " - 282152 Pte. C. W. Spence. " " - 282344 L/Cpl. F. C. Spencer " " - 283708 Pte. A. Thurkettle. " " - 283836 L/Cpl. G. Coates " 21. 8.17 - 280930 Pte. W. Pratt " 18.10.17 - 283691 Pte. A. Robinson " " - 283530 Pte. C. S. Ruel " " - 280894 L/Cpl. H. G. Smith " " - 281270 Pte. A. G. Trayler " " - 283660 Cpl. W. H. V. Wilkins " " - 282537 Pte. J. P. Brooke " 12.12.17 - 283818 Cpl. W. A. Cooper " " - 283025 Pte. J. W. Ling " 12.12.17 - 295261 Pte. A. Westcott " " - 295248 Sergt. H. O. Wilderspin " " - 295152 Sergt. F. W. Yandle " " - 281390 L/Cpl. E. J. Bewsey " 17.12.17 - 282246 Pte. J. T. Ball " 4. 2.18 - 283082 Pte. A. Cohen " 23. 2.18 - 280301 Cpl. J. W. Johnson " " - 283148 Pte. F. G. Senyard " " - 280728 Pte. G. Tyrell " " - 280714 Cpl. H. W. Wallder " " - 280465 Sergt. F. Arklay " 13. 3.18 - 283813 Pte. B. M. J. Barnett " " - 298008 Cpl. T. J. Court " " - 282021 Pte. H. Evans " " - 280154 Sergt. G. J. Grant " " - 280472 Sergt. A. E. Haynes " " - 281734 L/Cpl. T. Hodgkins " " - 282737 Pte. W. J. Hutchin " " - 295177 Pte. J. Pritchard " " - 283652 Pte. R. Southern " " - 295223 Pte. J. Wickens " " - 283808 Pte. W. A. Willmott " " - 280389 Pte. W. A. G. Battershall " 12. 6.18 - 282916 Cpl. A. G. Beale " " - 280840 Pte. S. G. Coates " " - 283154 L/Cpl. A. J. Deadman " " - 281965 Sergt. C. J. Gibbs " " - 280967 Cpl. G. Heyes " " - 283623 L/Cpl. C. L. Husk " " - 283643 Cpl. A. J. Parker " " - 295122 Pte. J. R. Phillips " " - 281174 Sergt. H. V. Randall " " - 283193 Pte. P. C. Swinchatt " " - 280292 Sergt. F. G. Udall " " - 295096 Pte. R. H. Bryan " 27. 6.18 - 281472 Sergt. J. A. Kingston " " - 281130 L/Cpl. R. H. Pryor " " - 282607 Pte. F. A. Stewart " " - 281319 Pte. A. J. Zeeck " " - 283184 L/Cpl. F. F. Salter " 16. 7.18 - 283323 Pte. T. J. Sanders " " - 283570 Pte. J. W. Abbott " 6. 8.18 - 280922 Cpl. D. E. Davis " " - 282263 L/Cpl. G. Humphrey " 29. 8.18 - 295508 Pte. J. Nisbett " " - 280695 Sergt. T. Peters " " - 295475 Pte. M. Lemon " 11.12.18 - 298089 Pte. A. S. Adams " 24. 1.19 - 282029 Pte. A. C. Barnes " " - 282323 Pte J. Eccles " 24. 1.19 - 280534 Cpl. W. Frost " " - 283617 Pte. J. R. Greenwood " " - 281822 L/Cpl. W. H. Hart " " - 282198 Cpl. S. T. E. Norton " " - 283803 Pte. W. W. Boulstridge " 11. 2.19 - 283288 Sergt. F. A. Dove " " - 281741 Cpl. F. Nash " " - 282915 Sergt. F. C. Nickless " " - 295615 Sergt. J. T. Norris " " - 281043 Sergt. W. C. Bird " 14. 5.19 - 280605 Sergt. R. C. Clammer, D.C.M. " " - 280212 L/Cpl. P. McGregor " " - 280617 Sergt. (A/C.S.M.) W. Honig " 23. 7.19 - -BAR TO MILITARY MEDAL - - 283530 Pte. C. S. Ruel, M.M.. _London Gazette_ 13. 3.18 - 282737 L/Cpl. W. J. Hutchin, M.M. " 12. 6.18 - 280292 Sergt. F. G. Udall, M.M. " 24. 1.19 - 280489} - 2272}C.S.M. C. James, M.M. " 20. 8.19 - -MERITORIOUS SERVICE MEDAL - - 280846 Pte. J. W. Atkins _London Gazette_ 17. 9.17 - 280665 Pte. H. Bunker " 2.11.17 - 280505 Sergt. W. Bean " 17. 6.18 - 282237 Sergt. G. F. V. Bunyan " " - 280914 L/Sergt. S. A. Edwards " " - 280471 Cpl. L. C. Hawkins " " - 280435 Sergt. H. Hurst " " - 280555 R.Q.M.-Sergt. L. T. Davies " 18. 1.19 - 280128 C.S.M. A. D. McLaren " " - 281464 C.Q.M.-Sergt. P. C. Peters " " - 280646 L/Cpl. H. T. Giles " 3. 6.19 - 280420 Sergt. G. A. Richardson " " - -MENTION IN DESPATCHES - - 2/Lieut. A. R. Moore. _London Gazette_ 22. 6.15 - Major (Temp. Lieut.-Col.) L. T. " 1. 1.16 - Burnett - Capt. (A/Major) W. G. Clark, D.S.O. " " - 2/Lieut. (A/Capt.) J. R. Pyper " 14. 1.16 - Lieut.-Col. (Hon. Col.) Vickers " 13. 7.16 - Dunfee, V.D. - 280154} - 1151}Sergt. G. J. Grant " 4. 1.17 - 4798 R.S.M. M. Harris " " - 2/Lieut. H. Jones " " - 280128 C.Q.M.-Sergt. A. D. McLaren " " - 280171 Pte. H. V. Neal " 4. 1.17 - 280505 Sergt. W. Bean " 25. 5.17 - 280307 R.Q.M.-Sergt. W. Henley " " - Lieut. (A/Capt.) L. G. Rix " " - 2/Lieut. W. H. Webster " " - Lieut. (A/Capt.) C. A. Clarke " 24.12.17 - Lieut. (A/Capt.) T. B. Cooper, M.M. " " - Hon. Lieut. and Q.M. W. J. Cragg " " - Capt. (A/Major) W. A. Nunneley " " - 2/Lieut. R. E. Stavert " " - 280639 Sergt. A. Taylor " " - 2/Lieut. F. W. Walker, D.S.O. " " - Major V. H. Seyd " 16. 1.18 - Lieut. (A/Capt.) S. J. Barkworth, " 25. 5.18 - M.C., M.M. - Lieut. C. W. Denning, M.M. " " - Lieut. (A/Capt.) A. M. Duthie, D.S.O. " " - 281174 Sergt. H. V. Randall " " - 283264 Pte. G. E. Wright " 20.12.18 - Lieut. L. R. Chapman " 30.12.18 - Lieut. H. W. Dennis " " - Lieut. (A/Capt.) C. J. Graham, M.C. " " - Major (A/Lieut.-Col.) H. P. L. Cart " 10. 7.19 - de Lafontaine - -The names of the following were brought to the notice of the Secretary -of State for War for services rendered in connection with the War (not -gazetted):-- - - Lieut.-Col. (Hon. Col.) Vickers Dunfee, V.D. 24.12.17 - 280126 Cpl. W. Noquet 9. 8.18 - Major L. T. Burnett 13. 8.18 - 281197 Cpl. E. Brown {13. 8.18 - {15. 3.19 - Lieut. (A/Capt.) F. A. Coffin 13. 8.18 - -FOREIGN DECORATIONS - - _Médaille Militaire_ (_France_)-- - 280336 Sergt. D. Fulford _London Gazette_ 24. 2.16 - - _Croix de Guerre_ (_Belgium_)-- - 280802 C.S.M. F. W. Amos " 12. 7.18 - 281426 Sergt. A. V. Loveless " " - 282692 Sergt. J. R. Tibbott " " - 280713 Pte. C. W. Budgen " " - 295089 Cpl. W. Govan " " - -The following decorations were awarded to Officers, non-Commissioned -Officers, and Men of other regiments for services rendered while -attached to and serving with the 4th London Regiment:-- - -DISTINGUISHED SERVICE ORDER - - Major (Temp. Lieut.-Col.) W. R. H. _London Gazette_ 18. 7.17 - Dann (Bedfordshire Regiment) - Major F. A. Phillips (Montgomery " 22. 6.18 - Yeomanry) - Major A. Grover, M.C. (Bedfordshire " 26. 7.18 - Regiment) - Major (A/Lieut.-Col.) A. F. Marchment, " 26. 7.18 - M.C. (1st London Regiment) - -BAR TO DISTINGUISHED SERVICE ORDER - - Major (A/Lieut.-Col.) W. R. H. _London Gazette_ 26. 7.18 - Dann, D.S.O., (Bedfordshire - Regiment) - -MILITARY CROSS - - 2/Lieut. H. E. Jackman (21st _London Gazette_ 26. 9.17 - London Regiment) - Lieut. E. H. R. Altounyan (R.A.M.C.) " 1. 1.18 - 2/Lieut. C. W. Rowlands (1st London " 4. 2.18 - Regiment) - Capt. (A/Major) A. Grover (Bedfordshire " 18. 3.18 - Regiment) - Lieut. G. V. Lawrie (6th Scottish " 3. 6.18 - Rifles) - Lieut. (A/Capt.) H. N. Williams (4th " 22. 6.18 - Royal Welsh Fusiliers) - Lieut. (A/Captain) W. C. Morton " 16. 9.18 - (1st London Regiment) - G/95036 C.S.M. T. Cooke, D.C.M., " 7.11.18 - M.M. (K.O.Y.L.I.) - Lieut. C. E. Dunaway (Medical " --.--.18 - Officer, U.S. Army) - Lieut. (A/Capt.) E. V. Grimsdell " 11. 1.19 - (K.O.Y.L.I.) - Lieut. (A/Capt.) H. F. Dade (3rd " 2. 4.19 - London Regiment) - -DISTINGUISHED CONDUCT MEDAL - - G/95066 C.S.M. A. Bonser _London Gazette_ 22.10.17 - G/95036 C.S.M. T. Cooke, M.M. " " - 781426 L/Cpl. F. Goatcher " 3. 9.18 - G/76294 Pte. E. Clark " 5.12.18 - -BAR TO DISTINGUISHED CONDUCT MEDAL - - G/95066 C.S.M. A. Bonser, D.C.M. _London Gazette_ 5.12.18 - -SECOND BAR TO DISTINGUISHED CONDUCT MEDAL - - G/95066 C.S.M. A. Bonser, D.C.M. _London Gazette_ 18. 2.19 - -MILITARY MEDAL - - G/68176 Pte. J. F. Blair _London Gazette_ 27. 6.18 - 202684 Pte. A. E. Churchyard " " - 225485 Sergt. C. A. Cowland " " - 251439 Pte. W. A. Pasterful " " - G/76227 L/Cpl. F. Harding " 6. 8.18 - G/68259 Pte. L. Petrie " 29. 8.18 - G/76275 Pte. G. A. Allen " 24. 1.19 - G/80610 Pte. G. H. Andrews " " - 252254 L/Cpl. J. T. Couchman " " - G/95108 Sergt. J. Fanshaw " " - 225682 Pte. J. T. Freshwater " " - 228610 Pte J. C. Goree " " - G/75396 L/Cpl. G. J. Grant " " - G/95115 Pte. E. Stott " " - G/84057 Sergt. R. L. Addison " 11. 2.19 - G/95177 L/Cpl. W. Bradley " " - 251265 Pte. A. E. Dickerson " " - G/76243 Pte. H. H. Mills " " - 250439 Cpl. C. Robbins " " - G/80608 Pte. W. Ryan " " - G/71053 Pte. J. Anderson " 13. 3.19 - 233640 Cpl. G. F. Coleman " " - 204593 Pte. A. E. Pullen " " - G/90091 Pte. J. Upperton " " - 253803 Pte. T. H. A. Brown " 14. 5.19 - G/68177 Pte. W. Bunce " " - G/95143 Pte. H. Atkinson " " - -MENTION IN DESPATCHES - - Capt. and Adjt. G. B. Scott _London Gazette_ 1. 1.16 - (Leinster Regiment) - Lieut. G. V. Lawric (6th Scottish Rifles) " 18.12.17 - Major (A/Lieut.-Col.) A. F. Marchment, " 30.12.18 - D.S.O., M.C. (1st London Regiment) - 204527 Sergt. S. W. Childs " " - - - - -APPENDIX III - -THE RECONSTRUCTION OF THE 4th LONDON REGIMENT IN 1920 - - -After the return to England of the Cadres early in 1919, the -Territorial Force remained in abeyance for the remainder of the year, -and beyond the formation of an Old Comrades' Association, under the -Presidency of Lieut.-Col. Harry Dade, V.D., nothing could be done in -the 4th Londons to maintain _esprit de corps_ at the high standard -which it had reached during the War. - -When orders were issued early in 1920 for the reconstruction of the -auxiliary forces under the title of the Territorial Army, the effect of -eight months' inactivity became painfully apparent, and the 4th London -Regiment, which was revived in February 1920, experienced, in common -with most other units, great difficulty in recruiting, owing to the -rapidly cooling enthusiasm of the greater number of its former members. -By great good fortune a large number of old officers returned to the -Colours, and command was given to Lieut.-Col. L. T. Burnett, O.B.E., -T.D., while Major H. J. Duncan-Teape, T.D., was appointed Second in -Command, and Captain W. A. Trasenster, M.C., The Royal Fusiliers, -Adjutant. The Company Commanders and Headquarters Officers were:-- - - Major R. N. Arthur D Company. - Major W. Moore, O.B.E. A Company. - Major H. P. L. Cart de Lafontaine, O.B.E. C Company. - Major S. Elliott, O.B.E. B Company. - Captain F. C. Grimwade Assistant Adjutant. - Lieut. H. B. A. Balls Lewis Gun Officer. - 2/Lieut. E. P. Higgs Signalling Officer. - Lieut. C. F. Warren Transport Officer. - Lieut. E. S. Tomsett Quartermaster. - -A capable Permanent Staff was supplied from the Royal Fusiliers, -Regtl. Sergt.-Major W. Hunt becoming the senior Warrant Officer, while -ex-Regtl. Sergt.-Major M. Harris enlisted, and was appointed Regtl. -Q.M.-Sergt. - -The following old Warrant Officers and N.C.O.'s enlisted, and were -posted as stated:-- - - Coy. Sergt.-Major W. H. Edwards } - Coy. Q.M.-Sergt. J. C. Hibberd } to A Company. - - Regtl. Q.M.-Sergt. W. Henley } - Coy. Sergt.-Major G. L. Matthews } to B Company. - Coy. Q.M.-Sergt. B. A. Watson, D.C.M. } - - Coy. Sergt.-Major A. Mennie } - Coy. Q.M.-Sergt. E. J. T. Nash } to C Company. - - Coy. Sergt.-Major J. Lewis } - Coy. Q.M.-Sergt. F. McLaren } to D Company. - -With this excellent stiffening the Battalion soon began to make -progress, and rapidly took--and held--the lead in numbers in the 1st -London Brigade. - -The first Annual Training was held at Shoreham-by-Sea, the time being -devoted principally to musketry and recreational training. For the -first time in the Battalion's history, the winter following was marked -by the continuance without a break of the drill season; and throughout -the winter of 1920-21 attendances at the weekly drills at Headquarters -reached an unusually high percentage of the strength. The Battalion -appeared to be well on its feet, and making steady progress towards -efficiency, when, in April 1921, the Coal Strike completely dashed all -hopes of a successful summer training season. The Territorial Army -was temporarily in abeyance, and for three months its headquarters -were handed over to the Defence Force, to which was entrusted the -maintenance of peaceful conditions throughout the country. - -A Defence Force Unit was raised at the 4th Londons' Headquarters, and -joined by some of the members of the Battalion, command of it being -taken by Major R. N. Arthur, with the acting rank of Lieut.-Col. The -disbandment of the Defence Force was fortunately effected in time to -enable the Annual Training to be held at Shorncliffe in August, but -the serious delay already caused to the individual training of the men -rendered it less valuable than had been hoped; and a far too great -proportion of the training hours had to be spent on the range, in the -Musketry Practices, which should have been completed early in the year. - -During the spring of 1921 the Battalion suffered a severe loss in the -death, after a prolonged and painful illness, of the Quartermaster, -Lieut. E. S. Tomsett, to whose invaluable services reference has been -made in the preceding pages. After Lieut. Tomsett's death, Regtl. -Q.M.-Sergt. M. Harris was gazetted Lieut. and Quartermaster. - -The beginnings of the 4th London Regiment in the revived Territorial -Army have been small, but every step has been made secure by careful -organisation, and by applying the experience of Territorial soldiering -in peace and war; and there is every reason to suppose that the laurels -gained by the Regiment in the Campaigns in which it has taken part will -remain untarnished, and that its glorious traditions will be jealously -guarded as long as the Regiment remains in existence. - - - - -INDEX - - - _Appendices II and III are not indexed._ - - Abbécourt, 379, 381 - - Abbeville, 20, 175, 238 - - Acason, 2/Lieut., 249 - - Achi Baba, 91 _et seq._ - - Achicourt, 255-237, 271, 272 - - Achiet-le-Grand, 249, 289 - - Adinfer, 241-245 - - Agache River, 479, 485 - - Agnez lez Duisans, 411 - - Agny, 253, 256 - - Ailette River, 382, 383 - - Alexandria, 89 _et seq._ - - Allen, G. A., 477 - - Allen, L. A., 127 - - Allenby, Gen. Sir Edmund, 133, 149, 150, 156 - - Altounyan, E. H. R., 314, 315, 323 - - Amblèny, 383 - - Ambrines, 134 - - Amigny-Rouy, 365, 375, 380 - - Ancre River, 140, 177, 180, 239, 240, 252, 325, 420, 430, 431 - - Anderson, J., 242 - - Andignicourt, 383 - - Andrews, G. H., 477 - - Angel, A. J., 292, 315 - - Angle Wood Valley, 195 _et seq._ - - Angre, 499, 500 - - Angreau, 499 - - Anthony, F., 314, 315 - - Appilly, 365 - - Archer, L. W., 174, 193, 270, 304 - - Arklay, F., 340, 344 - - Arleux, 397, 398, 486, 490, 491 - - Arleux-en-Gohelle, 347 - - Armfield, A. R., 421 - - Arques, 305, 325 - - Arthur, R. N., 6, 17, 100, 104, 135, 149 - - Askham, S. G., 238, 276, 317, 369, 372, 375, 378, 381, 382, 385, 388, - 389, 391 - - Athey, F. G., 352, 399 - - Attenborrow, H. W., 414 - - Atterbury, L. J. R., 201, 214 - - Aubencheul-au-Bac, 487, 488, 490 - - Aubers Ridge, 26, 58 _et seq._, 219, 220 - - Aubigny-au-Bac, 479 _et seq._ - - Aulnoy, 496 - - Aunelle River, 496-499 - - Austin, F., 314, 315 - - Autreppe, 502 - - Autreville, 365 - - Ayub Khan, 65 - - - Backhouse, J. L., 327, 413, 469 - - Badham, C., 53 - - Baharia Oasis, 108-110 - - Bahr Yusef, 110 - - Bailleul, 347, 349, 354, 393, 397, 403, 404, 407 - - Bailleulmont, 239, 244 - - Bailleulval, 242 - - Baizieux, 423, 424 - - Ballance, L. E., 223, 228, 335, 414 - - Balls, H. B. A., 66, 148, 175, 215 - - Baluchis, 129th, 23, 34, 39, 46, 52, 54, 65 - - Bancourt, 290 - - Bapaume, 177, 194, 211, 239, 240, 290 _et seq._, 428 _et seq._, 482 - - Barisis, 359, 364, 375, 380 - - Barkas, G. de G., 423, 436, 440 - - Barker, Sergt., 342 - - Barkworth, S. J., 174, 194, 200, 216, 335, 337, 341, 349, 411, 417 - - Barnes, A. C., 477 - - Barnes, F., 270, 327, 330 - - Barnett, B. M. J., 344 - - Barter, Major-Gen. C. St L., 73 - - Bartleet, H. B., 443, 458, 459 - - Barton, Pte., 350 - - Bassett, L. J., 238 - - Basseux, 242 - - Bath, A., 201, 327, 328, 392, 480 - - Battershall, W. A. G., 408 - - Bayencourt, 143 _et seq._, 264 - - Bayliffe, Lt.-Col., 382 - - Bazentin-le-Grand, 177, 178 - - Bazentin-le-Petit, 177, 178 - - Beal, H. G., 81 - - Beaucamp, 290, 291, 292 - - Beaudricourt, 251, 253 - - Beaufort, 137, 141 - - Beaulencourt, 305, 325, 344 - - Beaumetz-les-Loges, 249, 253, 344 - - Beaumont-Hamel, 140, 239, 240 - - Beaurains, 253, 254, 258 - - Beautor, 369, 370 - - Bedfords, 7th, 298, 300, 301 - - Beeby, H. D., 223, 269, 336 - - Behencourt, 423, 425 - - Bell, T. J., 236, 238, 242, 282, 283, 287 - - Bellacourt, 241 - - Bellebrune, 321 - - Bench, Sergt., 75 - - Bendelow, Pte., 335 - - Beni Mazar, 107, 110-112 - - Beni Salama, 108 - - Beni Suef, 108 - - Bennet, E. J., 117 - - Berles-au-Bois, 244, 462 - - Bernafay Wood, 182, 209 - - Bernagousse Quarries, 366 - - Berneville, 270, 271, 415, 417, 461 - - Besme, 381, 382 - - Béthune, 24, 81, 85 - - Beugny, 331, 344 - - Bhopals, 9th, 23, 39, 46, 49, 52, 54, 59, 69 - - Bidgood, F., 423, 456, 459 - - Bienvillers-au-Bois, 243 - - Bihucourt, 279 - - Billon Farm, 192, 193 - - Billon Wood, 447 - - Birdwood, Lieut.-Gen. Sir Wm., 101, 280 - - Bishop, G. F., 113 - - Bixschoote, 40 - - Blackdown, 357, 425-427 - - Blackhurst, S., 414 - - Black Watch, 344, 456 - - Blair, W., 322, 374, 382 - - Blairville, 241, 462, 466, 467 - - Blaugies, 502 - - Blendecques, 21, 22, 47 - - Blérancourt, 383 - - Blight, Pte., 136 - - Blows, C. S. G., 103, 121, 149, 153, 193 - - Blunn, A. G., 137, 164 - - Board, C. H., 353, 394, 395 - - Bocking, J. W., 385, 391 - - Boesinghe, 42, 295 - - Boiry-Becquerelle, 245, 247, 462 _et seq._, 478 - - Boiry-St Martin, 247, 249 - - Boiry-St Rictrude, 246 - - Bois de Quesnoy, 482 - - Bois des Bœufs, 412 - - Bois des Puits, 487 - - Bois du Biez, 26 _et seq._, 59, 67, 225 - - Boisleux-au-Mont, 246 - - Boisleux-St Marc, 467, 478 - - Bold, A. L. D., 421, 440 - - Bolton, W. H., 311, 314, 315 - - Bonser, A., 450, 451 - - Boorman, D. S., 238, 242, 283, 284, 289, 315, 318, 320, 494 - - Borders, 5th, 272 - - Botterill, G. P., 3, 6, 27, 35, 36, 48 - - Botterill, W. R., 16, 149, 153 - - Bottomley, E. W., 7, 22, 238, 244, 275, 281, 285, 287 - - Bouchavesnes, 453, 454 - - Bouleaux Wood, 195 _et seq._ - - Boulstridge, W. W., 477 - - Boutall, W. J., 66, 151, 153, 180, 194, 207, 216, 403, 417 - - Bout Deville, 223, 234 - - Bouzincourt, 420 - - Boves, 385, 391 - - Bowater, Sir Vansittart, 14 - - Bowater, V. S., 16, 223, 257, 272 - - Boyelles, 246, 247, 462 _et seq._, 478, 492, 505 - - Bradford, F. R. C., 90, 100, 149, 165 - - Bradley, 2/Lieut., 223, 231, 480 - - Bradley, H. M., 421 - - Brandram, C., 449, 455 - - Bray-sur-Somme, 180, 431 _et seq._ - - Bretencourt, 244 - - Brielen, 307, 321, 323 - - Brissenden, C. C., 423, 424, 432, 435, 436, 438, 439 - - Brodie, C. J., 174, 187, 193 - - Bronfay Farm, 446, 447, 449, 453 - - Brown, E. S., 344 - - Brown, N. A., 323 - - Brown, W. F., 369, 384 - - Brunemont, 487, 490 - - Buckingham, W., 162, 163, 216 - - Buckland, E. D., 327 - - Bucquoy, 143, 144, 160, 241, 294, 460 - - Buire-sur-Ancre, 423 - - Buissy, 479 - - Bull, H. C., 314, 315 - - Bullecourt, 273 _et seq._, 331, 447, 467 _et seq._ - - Bullock, A. M., 414, 485, 486, 488, 501 - - Bundle, H. N., 292, 315 - - Bunker, H., 329 - - Burd, F. B., 292, 315 - - Burford, F. R. R., 174, 189 - - Burnell-Nugent, Brig.-Gen. F. H., 132 - - Burnett, L. T., 6, 28, 35, 48-50, 53, 56, 66, 71, 72, 81, 84, 137, 356 - - Burton, P. H., 238, 276 - - Bury St Edmunds, 117 - - Bushell, R. D., 480 - - Butler, Lieut.-Gen. Sir R. H. K., 364, 367, 383, 384 - - Byng, Gen. Lord, 260, 359, 460 - - - Cachy, 387-391, 419-424 - - Cairns, J., 322, 384 - - Cairo, 107, 108, 112 - - Calnan, W. H., 174, 199 - - Calonne-sur-Lys, 27, 30 - - Cambridgeshire Regt., 1st, 425 - - Campbell, H., 257, 261, 298, 299, 303, 304 - - Campion, Pte., 448 - - Campkin, R. E., 353, 396, 398, 407 - - Caparn, R. K., 127, 238, 242, 249 - - Carlisle, F. A., 292, 309 - - Carnoy, 192, 448 - - Carpenter, A. B., 453 - - Cart de Lafontaine, H. P. L., 6, 20, 34, 36, 65, 66 - - Cartmell, A., 482 - - Casey, Capt., 16, 17, 22 - - Castle, J., 216 - - Caudwell, T., 251, 267 - - Cavalry Farm, 266-270 - - Celestin Wood, 438, 439 - - Chamberlain, R. W., 223, 252, 322, 384 - - Chapman, J. W., 174, 197 - - Chapman, L. R., 16, 81, 159, 165 - - Chart, Lieut.-Col., 382 - - Chauny, 369, 374, 378-380 - - Chennels, C.S.M., 20, 55 - - Chérisy, 264 - - Cheshires, 5th, 134 _et seq._, 343 - - Chignell, A. W., 417, 466 - - Chipilly, 430-441 - - Cholmondely, H. C., 116 - - Citerne, 85, 132, 136, 217, 218 - - Clammer, R. C., 490 - - Clark, E., 476 - - Clark, T., 216 - - Clark, W. G., 6, 20, 47, 51, 53, 57, 66, 72, 81, 84, 137, 138 - - Clarke, C. A., 249, 291, 318, 320, 369, 372, 375, 384 - - Cléry-sur-Somme, 453 - - Clifford, C. C. H., 292, 317, 384 - - Clifford, W. H., 214 - - Coates, A. D., 24, 49, 53, 55 - - Coates, L. C., 16, 88, 94 - - Coates, S. G., 408, 468 - - Coates, L/Corpl., 289 - - Coffin, F. A., 24, 54, 55, 120, 130 - - Cohen, A., 465 - - Coigneux, 264 - - Cojeul River, 247, 253 _et seq._, 462, 467, 479 - - Coke, Brig.-Gen., E. S. D'Ewes, 133 - - Coleman, T., 223 - - Coley, J., 480 - - Collins, C. F., 216 - - Colomb, G. L., 57 - - Colvin, A. E., 216 - - Combles, 177 _et seq._ - - Condé, Canal de, 501 - - Condren, 369 _et seq._ - - Connaught Rangers, 23, 34, 36-39, 46-49, 52, 54, 60, 68, 69 - - Contay, 421 - - Cook, A. S., 292, 316 - - Cooke, D. C., 61, 120, 292, 323 - - Cooke, T., 447, 448 - - Cookson, P. S., 116 - - Coombe, Capt., 130 - - Coombes, H. V., 270, 400, 407 - - Cooper, Brig.-Gen. E. J., 117 - - Cooper, T. B., 174, 189, 190, 205, 349, 398, 403, 407, 408, 411, 478, - 486, 496, 507 - - Corbie, 180, 431 - - Corkoran, Brig.-Gen. Charles, 448 - - Cornelius-Wheeler, Capt., 4 - - Cornell, Pte., 350 - - Cornwall, C.S.M., 20 - - Cotton, E. N., 238, 275, 281-283, 287, 289 - - Cotton, R. D., 423, 424 - - Couchman, J. T., 477 - - Coulemby, 321 - - Courcelette, 194 _et seq._ - - Courcelles, 289, 290 - - Court, T. J., 344 - - Cowland, C.S.M., 450 - - Cragg, C. W., 81, 238 - - Crane, S. H. E., 360 - - Crawford, D. F., 367, 369, 384 - - Creighton, A. B., 327, 335 - - Creil, 19 - - Cremarest, 321 - - Croisilles, 246, 247, 253, 467-471, 492 - - Croix Barbée, 37, 38, 72, 229, 232 - - Croll, A. G., 127, 238, 242, 289, 291, 424, 425, 432, 434-436, 438-440 - - Crosbie, McC., 442, 446, 447, 451, 452 - - Crozat Canal, 369-377, 477 - - Cuesmes, 506, 507 - - Cuffe, Pte., 350 - - Cumner, C. W., 366, 391 - - Curgies, 497 - - Curlu, 140, 451 - - Curtis, 2/Lieut., 382 - - Cuthbert, Brig.-Gen. G., 73, 85 - - Cuthbertson, E. M., 323, 384 - - - Dade, H., 122 - - Dade, H. F., 352, 400, 401, 488 - - Dainville, 414-418, 493 - - Dakhla Oasis, 108 - - Dallas, Major-Gen. A. G., 107, 108, 111 - - Dann, W. R. H., 237, 238, 243, 279, 280, 288, 315, 370, 371, 373, 374, - 378, 379, 381, 382, 421 - - Darrington, C. P., 88, 99 - - Davey, W. H., 174, 193 - - Davies, S. N., 16, 104 - - Davies, W. A., 443, 456 - - Davis, A. G., 223, 304 - - Davis, G. H., 137, 159, 165, 185, 193 - - Davis, R., 165, 216 - - Davis, S., 100, 104, 121, 149, 289, 311, 313-315 - - Daw, H. S., 238 - - Deacon, Major, 48 - - Deadman, A. J., 408 - - Demicourt, 326 - - Demuin, 387 - - Denain, 496 - - Denier, 272, 292 - - Denning, C. W., 174, 272, 407 - - Dennis, H. W., 16, 90, 113, 119 - - de Pury, C. R. P., 81, 138 - - Dernancourt, 437 - - Derviche-Jones, Lieut.-Col., 379 - - Dessart Wood, 291, 292 - - Dettingen Barracks, 357 - - Devonshire Regt., 112, 119, 128 - - Dew, E. G., 127, 223, 304, 494 - - Dickebusch, 297, 299 - - Dickerson, A. E., 477 - - Dickens, Major, 189 - - Dickins, L. A., 16, 103 - - Dickins, R. C., 16, 101, 113, 315, 318, 320 - - Dodds, A. W., 315, 320 - - Dogras, 41st, 31-33 - - Doignies, 333, 334 - - Domart, 137, 425 - - Dommiers, 383 - - Donaldson, V. C., 75, 134, 165 - - Douai, 252, 347, 414, 479, 491 - - Douchy, 496 - - Doullens, 137, 150, 234, 248 - - Dove, F. A., 477 - - Dow, H., 128 - - Drocourt, 265, 395, 475, 477, 479 - - Drouvin, 81 - - Dudgeon, Major-Gen. F. A., 296, 297, 342, 348, 353, 414 - - Dudley, Sergt.-Major, 24 - - Duke of Wellington's Regt., 234 - - Dunaway, C. E., 323, 391, 424 - - Duncan-Teape, H. J. T., 3, 6, 20, 47, 51, 121, 123, 128, 142, 145, - 153, 211, 214, 215, 217, 427 - - Dunfee, Vickers, 14, 16, 17, 100, 110, 112, 113, 115, 129, 130, 427 - - Dunfee, Mrs, 103 - - Durlacher, H. W., 360, 384 - - Duthie, A. M., 238, 242, 249, 327, 338-341, 344, 407, 408 - - - Eastoe, W. H., 327 - - East Surrey Regt., 366 - - Eccles, J., 477 - - Ecourt-St Quentin, 481, 482, 491 - - Ecurie, 348, 351 - - Edwards, V. W., 6, 17, 89 - - Edwards, W. H., 20 - - Egerton, Brig.-Gen. R. G., 23, 32 - - Ehren, A. C., 53, 57 - - Elders, J. F., 251, 330 - - Eldred, Mr, 123 - - Elliott, J., 81 - - Elliott, L. B. J., 304 - - Elliott, S., 6, 11, 84, 146, 147 - - Elsom, C.S.M., 20 - - Elverdinghe, 323 - - English, C. F., 174, 193 - - English, H. E., 238, 317 - - Entrenching Battalions, 378 _et seq._ - - Epéhy, 290, 451, 457, 459, 483 - - Eperlecques, 296, 304 - - Epinoy, 487, 490 - - Ervillers, 249 - - Escaut, Canal de l', 290, 332, 379, 490, 495, 501 - - Estaires, 26, 71, 218, 413 - - Estreux, 497, 499 - - Etaing, 479, 480, 482 - - Etaples, 19-21 - - Eterpigny, 479 - - Evans, H., 344 - - Evans, W. B., 360 - - Ewing, G. C., 323, 389, 390, 454, 458 - - - Fabien, R. L., 128 - - Fairman, Pte., 350 - - Falfemont Farm, 178, 201 - - Famars, 496, 502 - - Fanhangel, F. C., 66, 164 - - Fanshawe, Major-Gen. H. D., 237, 290 - - Farafra Oasis, 108 - - Farfan, L., 128 - - Fargniers, 366-373 - - Faulkner, Lieut., 350, 417, 494 - - Fauquissart, 218, 219, 221 - - Fayoum, 108 - - Ferdinando, S. P., 238, 249, 480 - - Fergusson, Corpl., 190 - - Festubert, 26, 60, 61, 73, 347 - - Feuchy, 253, 266, 480, 481 - - Fisher, G. W., 392 - - Flers, 178, 194 _et seq._, 203, 209 - - Fletcher, T. R., 201, 213, 214, 480, 485, 486, 488 - - Foch, Marshal, 41, 410, 429, 483 - - Foden, F. J., 174, 193 - - Folly Farm, 120, 122 - - Fonquevillers, 170-174 - - Fontaine-lez-Croisilles, 253, 264, 274, 280, 467, 468 - - Forbes, R., 216 - - Ford, A. S., 66, 165, 270, 304 - - Fortel, 238 - - Fosse, 64, 229, 233 - - Fovant, 122, 128, 355 - - Francis, C. B., 366, 384 - - Franks, A., 327, 335 - - Frégicourt, 178, 206, 211 - - Frémicourt, 326 _et seq._ - - French, F.M. Earl, 24, 25, 41, 58, 59, 79, 128, 347 - - Frevent, 137, 141, 238 - - Freyberg, Brig.-Gen. B. C., 249, 290, 293, 314 - - Fricourt, 140, 166, 177, 445 - - Frières Wood, 377, 378 - - Frohen-le-Grand, 248 - - Frost, W., 477 - - Froy, W. A., 223 - - Fry, Major-Gen. W., 2, 6, 15 - - Fulford, D., 48, 57, 350 - - Fullalove, J. S., 119, 130 - - - Gallipoli, 87 _et seq._, 120 - - Gant, H. H., 449, 455 - - Gardiner, A. E., 230, 231 - - Gardner, E. G., 315 - - Garner, E. H., 475 - - Garratt, O. D., 174, 183, 188, 189, 194, 216, 218, 224, 265, 329, 392 - - Gaskin, C., 66, 71 - - Gathergood, J. S. B., 61, 117 - - Gaudiempré, 241 - - Gauld, K. W., 423, 424 - - Gavrelle, 347, 349 - - Gearle, H. C., 216 - - Geering, S. C., 323, 391 - - Gentelles, 385, 386 - - George, J. W., 420, 421, 440 - - Gery, R. V., 7, 66 - - Ghain Tuffieha, 9, 11, 17, 87, 89 - - Gibbs, C. C., 315, 454, 458 - - Gibbs, C. J., 408 - - Gifford, W. R., 201, 211, 213 - - Giles, E., 7, 53, 55, 66, 146, 152, 153 - - Giles, M. F., 443 - - Gilson, G., 443, 455 - - Ginchy, 178 _et seq._ - - Girling, W., 507 - - Girling, W. N. M., 421, 440 - - Givenchy, 23, 477 - - Givenchy-le-Noble, 134 - - Givry, 506 - - Glencorse Wood, 295 _et seq._ - - Gloucesters, 4th, 182 - - Glover, R. E., 443, 455 - - Godewaersvelde, 43 - - Godman, S. H., 123, 128, 355 - - Gommecourt, 129, 139 _et seq._, 240, 264 - - Gonnelieu, 331 - - Gooch, Sergt., 342 - - Goodale, C. C. W., 443, 448 - - Goodes, G. L., 66, 80 - - Gough, Gen. Sir H., 24, 249, 273, 279, 295, 359, 360, 366, 385 - - Gouy-en-Artois, 264 - - Gouzeaucourt, 290, 292, 359 - - Graddon, J. C., 173, 174, 193 - - Graham, C. J., 236, 238, 250 - - Grand Rullecourt, 418, 461 - - Grande Honnelle River, 500, 501 - - Grant, G. J., 344, 477 - - Gray, S. A., 270, 328 - - Green, P. W., 480 - - Green, Rev. S. F. Leighton, 223, 263, 341, 403, 506 - - Greenfield, S., 505 - - Greenwood, J. R., 477 - - Grenas, 142, 150, 248 - - Grenay, 82 - - Gressaire Wood, 430 _et seq._ - - Grey, R., 449, 452 - - Grierson, J., 279 - - Griffiths, F. J., 322, 382, 419, 454, 455 - - Grimsdell, E. V., 385, 388, 419, 447, 451, 452 - - Grimsdell, R. E., 174, 204, 205, 207 - - Grimston, Sergt., 350 - - Grimwade, F. C., 6, 11, 20, 47, 51, 53, 55, 120, 127, 130, 218, 252 - - Grosville, 241 - - Grover, A., 243, 310, 311, 315, 317, 379-384, 421, 431, 433, 440 - - Guémappe, 264, 265, 267 - - Gueudecourt, 178, 209 - - Guignemicourt, 422, 442 - - Guillemont, 177 _et seq._, 452 - - Gurkha Rifles, 22, 24, 49 - - Guyencourt, 459 - - - Haig, F.M. Earl, 24, 74, 139, 141, 263, 448, 482-484, 489, 495, 504 - - Haillicourt, 84, 85 - - Haine, A. A. N., 61, 116, 118 - - Haisnes, 77 - - Hallencourt, 85, 136, 217 - - Hall, W. C. B., 443 - - Hallett, H. W., 238, 249 - - Halloy, 142 _et seq._ - - Hamel, 140, 428 - - Hamelincourt, 246, 462 - - Ham-en-Artois, 22, 27 - - Hamilton, Gen. Sir Ian, 16, 91, 92, 96 - - Hamilton, W. H., 14, 49, 116, 117, 119, 129 - - Hampshire Regiment, 129 - - Hanebeek, 302, 306, 310, 313 - - Hangard, 385, 387, 388, 390 - - Hanks, A. E., 350 - - Hannay, H. T., 270, 304, 350, 407 - - Hardecourt, 451 - - Hardy, L/Corpl., 236 - - Harmignies, 502 - - Harper, A. L., 223, 231 - - Harper, Lieut., 162, 163 - - Harris, M., 24, 50, 207, 215, 330 - - Hart, W. H., 477 - - Harveng, 502 - - Haut Avesnes, 411 - - Havard, Capt., 262, 270 - - Havrincourt, 290, 332, 483 - - Haycraft, L. C., 127, 201, 213, 214 - - Hayes, E. C., 251 - - Hayes, G., 408 - - Hayes, Sergt., 329, 353 - - Haynecourt, 484 - - Haynes, A. E., 344 - - Hayward, W. G., 16, 17, 88, 119, 120 - - Hazebrouck, 409 - - Hearnshaw, H., 449 - - Heaver, C. H. T., 174, 193 - - Hebberd, R., 216 - - Hébuterne, 140 _et seq._, 180, 217, 264, 272 - - Hedger, F., 100, 216 - - Heilly, 442 - - Helfaut, 21 - - Helles, Cape, 90 _et seq._ - - Helot, River, 379, 380 - - Hem Wood, 454, 456 - - Hendecourt, 274, 276, 466 _et seq._ - - Heninel, 253, 260-262, 274, 281 - - Henin-sur-Cojeul, 246, 247, 259, 467, 468 - - Henstridge, C. L., 414, 476, 478, 488 - - Hénu, 142, 148 - - Hermies, 26, 331 - - Herring, R. L., 7, 20, 194 - - Hetley, G. H., 127, 249, 289, 310, 318, 321, 385, 388, 419, 433, 447, - 448, 450-452, 458 - - Hettler, B. H. C., 385, 388, 389, 391 - - Hewlett, H. A. T., 238, 281, 289, 311, 313, 315, 417, 463, 466 - - Heyes, Sergt., 480, 486 - - Hicklenton, H. G., 88, 149, 159, 165 - - Higgs, E. R, 280, 322, 435 - - Hirondelle River, 275, 479, 481, 486 - - Hodgkins, T., 344 - - Hohenzollern Redoubt, 76, 77, 80 - - Holloway, A., 414, 475, 476 - - Hook, W. G., 352, 475 - - Home, Gen. Lord, 156, 218, 346 - - Horsfield, J., 421, 440 - - Houlder, Capt., 184 - - Houlle, 296, 305 - - Housden, Pte., 95 - - Housden, Sergt., 329 - - Houthulst, 316, 322 - - Houvin-Houvigneuil, 461 - - Howden, E. R., 322 - - Howell, Brig.-Gen., 355 - - Hudson, O. C., 401, 485 - - Hull, Major-Gen. Sir C. P. A., 42, 132, 145, 149, 150, 175, 197, 252, - 271, 296, 414, 461, 463 - - Hulluch, 67, 76, 77, 81, 213 - - Humbercamp, 239, 242, 462 - - Humphrey, G., 513 - - Humphrey, W. P., 414, 417 - - Hunt, F. F., 36, 66 - - Hunt, G. G., 238, 249 - - Hunt, R. C., 127 - - Hurd, A., 22, 48, 165 - - Hurdcott, 122-124, 128, 129, 355, 356 - - Hurst, Brig.-Gen., 238 - - Hurst, H., 403 - - Husk, C. L., 408 - - Hutchin, W. J., 344, 408 - - Hutchins, F. H., 223, 268 - - Hyde, H. E., 162, 216 - - Hyde, R. R. L., 216 - - - Illies, 26 - - Imbros, 93, 99, 104, 105 - - Ingham, Sergt.-Dr., 350 - - Inniskilling Fusiliers, 184 - - Inverness Copse, 295 _et seq._ - - Ipswich, 117-119, 236 - - Irvine, H., 443, 448 - - Ivergny, 251 - - Izel-les-Hameau, 292, 306 - - - Jackman, H. E., 270, 301, 304 - - Jackson, R. J., 4, 6, 11 - - Jackson, Lieut.-Col., 335 - - Jacques, R.S.M., 330, 494 - - James, C., 213, 216 - - Jehu, S. H., 322, 323 - - Jemappes, 507 - - Johnson, F. B., 322 - - Johnson, J. W., 335, 344 - - Johnson, Sergt., 468 - - Johnstone, R., 66 - - Jones, F. J., 315, 320 - - Jones, H., 66, 75, 223, 272 - - Jones, L. W. N., 223, 263 - - - Keary, Major-Gen. H. D'U., 22, 72 - - Keen, R. N., 16, 104, 106, 201, 211, 214 - - Keerselare, 307 - - Kelly, R. C., 11 - - Kereves, Dere, 94, 101 - - King, H. J., 443, 452 - - King's Liverpools, 4th, 22, 71 - - K.O.S.B., 47, 101 - - K.O.Y.L.I., 241, 350, 386, 443, 496 - - K.R.R.C., 302 - - Kingwell, A., 122 - - Kitchener, Earl, 6, 13, 120 - - Klein Zillebeeke, 294 - - Knight, A. C., 194, 272, 307, 315 - - Krithia, 92, 94 - - - La Bassée, 23 _et seq._, 67, 68, 71, 76, 99 - - La Bassée Canal, 58, 66, 67, 75 - - La Brique, 44-46, 50, 56 - - La Cauchie, 239 - - La Dessoue, 502 - - La Fère, 359 _et seq._, 425, 477 - - La Gorgue, 69, 224, 228 - - La Houssoye, 422, 431 - - La Quinque Rue, 60 - - Labourse, 78 - - Lacon, Sir Hugh, 426 - - Lacouture, 30, 32 - - Lagnicourt, 273, 326-329, 346 - - Laies, Rivière des, 29, 220 - - Lambley, J. E. W., 16, 113 - - Lancashire Fus., 323 - - Lancers, 15th, 22 - - Langemarck, 40, 46, 52, 297, 306 _et seq._ - - Langton, H. G., 317, 320 - - Lattre St Quentin, 418 - - Laviéville, 423 - - Laventie, 218-221, 413 - - Lawrence, H. P., 449, 452, 455 - - Lawrence, W., 216 - - Lawrie, G. V., 174, 216, 353, 416, 417, 478 - - Le Bas de Viry, 374 - - Le Cauroy, 137, 234, 272 - - Le Philosophe, 78 - - L'Epinette, 64 - - Le Pissot, 498 - - Le Plessiel, 176-180, 419 - - Le Quesnoy, 495 - - Le Sars, 194 - - Le Sart, 223 - - Le Souich, 234, 239, 251 - - Le Talandier, 497 - - Le Transloy, 239, 325 - - Le Transloy Ridges, 208 _et seq._ - - Leach, H. G. A., 421, 440 - - Leake, G. E. A., 238, 275, 276, 279 - - Lear, Pte., 162 - - Lebucquière, 333 - - Lécluse, 477, 479 - - Legge, R. F., 4 - - Lekkerbotebeek, 317, 318, 322 - - Lelyveld, H., 443, 448 - - Lens, 76, 82, 260, 489 - - Leonard, D. J., 24, 53, 54, 66, 71 - - Lesbœufs, 178 _et seq._, 325 - - Les Brebis, 81 - - Les Huit Maisons, 37, 233 - - Lester, G. E., 249, 320, 322, 355, 369, 372-374, 384 - - Lestrem, 30 - - Leuze Wood, 181 _et seq._ - - Lewis, C. E., 174, 193 - - Lewis, G. G., 352, 392, 396, 469 - - Liéramont, 456, 458, 459 - - Ligny-le-Grand, 58 - - Lille, 58, 495 - - Lillers, 72-77 - - Limpenny, S. W. J., 116 - - Lincolns, 5th, 170 - - Ling, J. W., 315 - - Ling, Pipe-Major, 236 - - Lintott, A. W., 342 - - Lizerne, 41 - - Loch, Brig.-Gen. G. G., 149, 394, 397, 496 - - Lock, A. H., 122 - - Lock, T., 216, 408 - - Logeast Wood, 289, 290 - - Long, A. L., 7, 146, 153, 182 - - Long, H. C., 238, 279 - - Longpré, 218 - - Longueau, 385 - - Longueval, 178 - - Loos, 67, 73, 75, 81-83 - - Lorden, H. M., 24, 66, 223, 257, 269, 346, 403, 407 - - Louverval, 334 - - Lovell, E. G., 16 - - Lucan, Brig.-Gen. Earl of, 4, 13, 89 - - Luce, River, 385 - - Lucy, A. B., 7 - - Ludendorff, Gen., 362, 363, 407, 441 - - Lynch, P., 122 - - Lyons, S. E., 66 - - - McCormick, E. M'D., 174, 189, 191, 207, 216 - - McDonald, J., 128, 292, 316 - - McDowell, R., 238, 286, 287 - - McGlashan, Capt., 130 - - McKittrick, E. S., 443, 452 - - Maghaga, 111 - - Magnicourt-sur-Canche, 351-353, 461 - - Main, G. H., 423 - - Maing, 496 - - Maitland, A. E., 253, 261 - - Malard Wood, 430-438 - - Maloney, Capt., 270, 333, 405, 407, 414 - - Malplaquet, 505 - - Malta, 6, 8 _et seq._, 86 _et seq._, 112, 115, 121, 505, 508, 509 - - Maltzhorn Farm, 182, 184, 191, 449, 451 - - Manchester Regiment, 22, 48, 62, 263, 487 - - Manicamp, 381-383 - - Manning, D. A. S., 456, 458 - - Mansel-Howe, C. I., 423, 439, 440 - - Marchment, A. F., 299, 303, 343, 344, 346, 394, 398, 399, 401, - 403-405, 408, 461-466, 468, 486, 487, 492, 496, 507 - - Maricourt, 182, 446 _et seq._ - - Marlière Caves, 268 - - Maroc, 82, 84, 85 - - Maroc, South, 82, 83 - - Marœuil, 349-351, 353 - - Marqueffles Farm, 418 - - Marquion, 485, 492 - - Marrières Wood, 452, 453, 456 - - Marsh, F. S., 292 - - Marshall, Lord, 507 - - Marshall, R. B., 414, 496 - - Mason, C. R., 414 - - Mather, A., 427 - - Matthews, G. L., 394, 395 - - Mattison, O. H., 316 - - Maubeuge, 483 _et seq._ - - Maunder, Pte., 95 - - Mauquissart, 64, 67, 224-227 - - Maurepas, 177, 451, 452 - - Mawby, T. H., 353, 417 - - Maxwell, Gen. Sir J. G., 107, 108 - - Maynard, T. R. A., 443 - - Mears, S. F. G., 323, 391 - - Meerut, 129 - - Melleha, 9, 10, 12, 508 - - Mendl, R. H. J., 360 - - Menges, G. J. L., 360 - - Menin, 294 _et seq._, 495 - - Mercatel, 253, 460 - - Mercer, Brig.-Gen. David, 90 - - Méricourt-l'Abbé, 431, 444 - - Merrell, H. H., 216 - - Merville, 36, 43, 71, 218, 223, 228, 234, 413 - - Messines, 263, 294, 307, 489 - - Meteren, 57, 428 - - Methuen, F.M. Lord, 86 - - Michell, R., 292, 320. - - Middlemiss, 2/Lieut., 313 - - Middleton, J. T., 174, 193 - - Millar, W. T., 385 - - Mill Copse, 481, 485, 486 - - Miller, H. E., 119, 124 - - Miller, J. D., 414 - - Miller, Lieut.-Col., 436, 438, 439 - - Mills, E. L., 327, 336, 341, 344, 413 - - Mills, H. H., 477 - - Millstead, A. H., 414, 486 - - Milne, F., 119 - - Minear, S., 251 - - Minia, 108-111 - - Miraumont, 240 - - Mirvaux, 420, 421, 433 - - Mœuvres, 331 _et seq._, 484 - - Moger, A. J., 216 - - Moislains, 455, 456 - - Mole Post, 231 - - Molliens au Bois, 420, 422 - - Monchy-au-Bois, 241-245, 248 - - Monchy Breton, 350, 351 - - Monchy-le-Preux, 265, 393, 394, 467, 477 - - Moncrieff, Lieut.-Gen. G. H., 15 - - Mondicourt, 150, 151 - - Monk, E. W., 81, 194 - - Monk, S. G., 61 - - Monkman, E. A., 238, 287 - - Monro, Gen. Sir C. C., 96, 101 - - Mons, 5, 489 _et seq._ - - Mont St Eloy, 408, 410 - - Mont St Quentin, 453, 455 - - Montague, Pte., 350 - - Montenescourt, 271 - - Moody, T., 7, 165 - - Moore, A. R., 7, 33, 146, 152, 159, 162, 164 - - Moore, G. H., 16, 34, 38, 90 - - Moore, H., 130 - - Moore, W., 6, 20, 47, 119, 136-138, 152, 163, 165 - - Moreuil, 385, 429 - - Morlancourt, 430, 444, 445 - - Mormal, Forêt de, 494, 495, 504 - - Morris, H., 16, 95 - - Morris, H. O., 350, 400, 401, 407 - - Morris, S. T., 423, 440 - - Morris, 2/Lieut., 405 - - Morrison, J. D., 423 - - Mortleman, C. F., 174, 193 - - Morton, W. C., 360, 388-390, 419 - - Morval, 178 _et seq._, 240, 325 - - Mory, 280 - - Mosely, E. P. M., 36, 270, 417, 480, 502, 504 - - Mouchin, 81 - - Muddell, A. R., 238, 423, 452 - - Mudros, 90 _et seq._ - - Murray, Gen. Sir A., 111 - - Murray, Lieut.-Col., 66 - - - Nag Hamadi, 110 - - Nash, F., 477 - - Naylor, J. R., 317, 320 - - Neame, R. E., 200 - - Neuf Berquin, 218 - - Neuve Chapelle, 26 _et seq._, 58 _et seq._, 120, 218 _et seq._, 413, 477 - - Neuville-Borjonval, 291 - - Neuville-Vitasse, 253 _et seq._, 411, 412 - - Neuvireuil, 347 - - Neville, S. W., 480, 482 - - New Barnet, 14, 15, 115 _et seq._ - - Newman, W. H. G., 322 - - Nickless, F. C., 477 - - Nœux-les-Mines, 77, 81 - - Nonne Boschen, 297, 302 - - Nord, Canal du, 331, 332, 454, 477 _et seq._ - - Nordausques, 316 - - Noreuil, 275, 276, 278 - - Norris, G., 340, 344 - - Norris, J. T., 477 - - Norrish, F. E., 322 - - North Staffords, 243 - - Noureuil, 376, 378 - - Noye River, 359 - - Noyelles-les-Vermelles, 78 - - Noyon, 369, 380, 382, 422 - - Nunneley, W. A., 237, 238, 243, 249, 292, 317 - - Nunns, N., 270, 304 - - Nurlu, 456 - - - Oakely, Sergt., 328 - - O'Brien, J., 216, 511 - - O'Brien, Rev., 238 - - Oise, 369-382 - - Oise Canal, 363-371, 429, 430 - - Oisy-le-Verger, 482-488 - - Oldrey, V. R., 174, 183, 193, 281, 472, 475 - - Olinski, P. J., 279 - - Omignon, River, 359, 367 - - Oppy, 346 _et seq._, 392 _et seq._, 414, 416, 419, 504 - - Ormiston, N. A., 174, 193 - - Osborne, W. E., 173, 174, 185, 193 - - Osvillers Lake, 482 - - Ouderdom, 44, 56, 57, 303, 304 - - Owen, T. G., 423 - - Oxfordshire Hussars, 369 - - - Page, H. F., 213 - - Palluel, 479, 484, 486 - - Palmer, L. A., 443 - - Palmer, Rev. R., 136, 165, 216, 223 - - Palmer, Pte., 405 - - Paradis, 36-38, 57, 59 - - Paris, Major-Gen. A., 90, 106 - - Parker, A. J., 408 - - Parker, W. H., 238, 275, 281, 285, 287 - - Parkhouse, H., 14, 16, 90 - - Parr, J. F. F., 7, 12, 17, 86, 88 - - Parslow, W. H., 360, 424, 432, 434-436, 440 - - Pas, 141, 150 - - Passchendaele, 40, 294, 316 _et seq._, 489 - - Paterson, F. J., 443, 459 - - Paterson, J. R. K., 224 - - Pathans, 40th, 22 - - Payne, H. S., 216 - - Payne, P. J., 323, 391 - - Pearson, J., 119 - - Peizières, 457-459 - - Pentelow, H., 223 - - Pernois, 425 - - Péronne, 177, 194, 211, 363, 385, 444, 453-456, 477 - - Perrin, Pte., 350 - - Peryer, J. R., 322 - - Peselhoek, 320 - - Peters, Pte., 288, 289 - - Petit Houvin, 296 - - Petrie, E., 327, 339, 342 - - Petrie, L., 390 - - Phillips, F. A., 333, 398, 401, 402, 404, 405, 408, 414 - - Phillips, J. R., 408 - - Phillips, Sergt., 54 - - Pierremande, 366, 374 - - Pietre, 29-31, 37, 38 - - Pike, C. S., 292, 309 - - Pilckem, 322 - - Pitman, G. R., 353, 400 - - Platts, H. C., 421 - - Plumbley, Sergt., 136, 406 - - Plumer, F.M. Lord, 24, 55, 294 - - Poelcapelle, 40, 306 _et seq._, 359 - - Polygon Wood, 298, 302 - - Pommier, 244, 245, 248, 249 - - Pont du Hem, 64, 224, 226 - - Pont Logy, 72 - - Pont Noyelles, 424, 442 - - Pont Remy, 85 - - Poperinghe, 306, 307, 320 - - Port, W. G., 270 - - Potizje, 45 - - Potter, A. F., 414, 475 - - Potter, C., 201, 281, 316 - - Potton, A., 119, 174, 193 - - Powell, J., 354 - - Pratt, E. C., 238, 249, 278 - - Price, J. W., 100, 121, 149, 154, 174, 193, 414, 469, 472 - - Prince, V. C., 323, 389, 446-448, 454, 455 - - Pronville, 329, 479 - - Proven, 321, 323 - - Puisieux-au-Mont, 240, 241, 384 - - Punjabis, 27th, 71 - - Punjabis, 89th, 66, 69 - - Pyne, P., 218, 223, 263 - - Pyper, J. R., 7, 54, 81, 82, 137 - - Pys, 240 - - - Quéant, 265, 273-277, 326-329, 395, 472-479, 492 - - Quennell, W., 174, 189, 228 - - Quessy, 369, 370, 372-374 - - Quierzy, 365, 381 - - - Ramillies, 490 - - Ramsey, W. D., 360 - - Rancourt, 178, 453-455 - - Randall, H. V. R., 328, 408, 486 - - Ransart, 239, 241, 245, 246 - - Ratcliffe, E. A., 327, 392 - - Rawlinson, Gen. Lord, 24, 74, 79, 156, 429 - - Read, F. C. J., 16, 101, 174, 193 - - Reed, A., 119 - - Rees, H. D., 223, 269, 300, 494 - - Reid, C. J., 251, 267 - - Reigersburg, 307, 308 - - Reninghelst, 44, 57, 305 - - Rhonelle, River, 496 - - Ribecourt, 332 - - Ribemont, 290, 423, 425, 442 - - Richards, C. S., 327, 407 - - Richards, R. J., 317, 320 - - Richards, W., 174, 193 - - Richardson, Lieut.-Col., 282, 283, 285, 370, 371 - - Richardson, C. E. V., 218, 229 - - Richardson, S. A. G., 201, 213, 214 - - Richardson, S. J., 315 - - Richebourg L'Avoué, 26, 29, 219 - - Richebourg St Vaast, 29 _et seq._ - - Ridley, J., 414 - - Riencourt, 274-276, 472 - - Riez Bailleul, 59 _et seq._, 224, 226, 413 - - Rifles, 57th, 23, 34, 39, 46, 52, 54, 60, 68, 69 - - Riley, Sergt., 284 - - Ringrose, L/Corpl., 236 - - Risley, E. H., 66, 128 - - Rix, L. G., 56, 174, 215, 218, 231 - - Robbins, C., 477 - - Roberts, C. H. W., 320 - - Roclincourt, 346 _et seq._, 393 - - Rogers, F. E., 455 - - Rombies, 498, 499 - - Ronnssoy Wood, 457 - - Ronville Caves, 411-414 - - Rosenbloom, Pte., 236 - - Rossington, G. L., 405 - - Rouge Croix, 61, 224, 226 - - Rouges Bancs, 58, 219 - - Roughton, W., 414 - - Rowlands, C. W., 327, 339-341, 344, 463, 466 - - Royal Fusiliers, 24, 88, 98, 118, 128, 132, 133, 330 - - Royal Marines, 90 - - Royal Munster Fusiliers, 85, 471 - - Royal Scots, 292, 461 - - Royal Warwickshire Regt., 218, 219 - - Royal Welsh Fusiliers, 73 - - Royce, P. F., 443, 458, 459 - - Ruel, C. S., 344 - - Rumaucourt, 486, 487, 491 - - Rundle, Gen. Sir Leslie, 86, 509 - - Russell, C. P., 201 - - Ryan, W., 477 - - - Sailly-au-Bois, 150, 172-175 - - Sailly Labourse, 80 - - Sailly Laurette 430-432 - - Sailly-le-Sec, 180 - - Sailly Saillisel, 177, 194 - - St Amand, 142, 166 _et seq._ - - St Aubin, 349, 416 - - St Firmin, 369-371 - - St Gobain, Forêt de, 359 _et seq._ - - St Jans-ter-biezen, 320 - - St Jean, 45, 56 - - St Julien, 42, 45, 46, 295, 304, 306, 309-311, 318 - - St Leger, 246-249, 281, 467 - - St Martin-sur-Cojeul, 247, 253 - - St Omer, 20-24, 296, 307, 316, 321 - - St Paul's Bay, 9, 88, 508 - - St Pierre Vaast, 194, 455 - - St Pol, 350, 393 - - St Quentin, 242, 359 _et seq._, 444, 460 - - St Quentin Canal, 364 _et seq._ - - St Riquier, 175-180, 419 - - St Rohart Factory, 265, 467, 480 - - St Sauveur, 416, 418 - - St Vaast, 37 - - St Vaast-en-Chaussée, 215-218 - - Salisbury, 122, 123 - - Salter, F. F., 513 - - Sambre, River, 478 _et seq._ - - Sampson, C. A., 322 - - Sanctuary Wood, 299, 302 - - Sankey, T. H., 344 - - Sapignies, 290 - - Saqula, 110-112 - - Sari Bair Mountain, 91, 93 - - Sars-la-Bruyère, 502-504 - - Sassoon, Sir Philip, 15, 120 - - Sauchicourt Farm, 484 - - Sauchy-Cauchy, 481-485 - - Sauchy-Lestrée, 487 - - Saultain, 496, 497 - - Saulty, 292 - - Saunders, C. R., 6, 20, 47, 51, 53, 55 - - Savill, Lieut.-Col., 469, 470 - - Savy, Col., 54 - - Scarpe, River, 240, 252 _et seq._, 325, 394, 406, 443, 460 _et seq._, - 479 _et seq._ - - Scheldt Canal, _v._ Escaut, 290 - - Schuler Farm, 312, 313 - - Scinde Rifles, 59th, 22 - - Scott, G. B., 6, 66 - - Seabury, E. R., 292, 315 - - Sebourg, 498-501 - - Sebourquiaux, 498-500 - - Sedd-el-Bahr, 94 - - Selby, A. J., 279 - - Sellars, A. J., 408 - - Selle River, 494, 495 - - Selmun, 9, 10, 12, 14 - - Sensée, River, 260, 262, 467 _et seq._ - - Senussi, 107-109 - - Senyard, F. G., 344 - - Sergeant, A., 216 - - Serre, 140, 240, 460 - - Servais, 381 - - Seyd, V. H., 16, 100, 104, 110, 111 - - Seys, S. A., 249, 275, 289, 311, 388, 424 - - Shand, W., 327 - - Sharp, A. G., 66, 174, 182 - - Shelton, Sergt.-Major, 231 - - Sheppard, L. H., 322, 389, 391 - - Sherwood, Corpl., 283 - - Sherwood Foresters, 166 - - Shoreham-by-Sea, 356, 427 - - Siddall, T., 201, 263 - - Sidi Bishr, 112 - - Sidi Gaber, 112 - - Siege Camp, 317, 318, 320 - - Sievwright, A. J. N., 421 - - Sikhs, 15th, 22, 49 - - Sikhs, 34th, 22 - - Sikhs, 47th, 22 - - Simencourt, 264, 271, 344, 346 - - Simmonds, R. S. B., 327, 342, 411, 463, 466 - - Simpson, A. H., 16, 88 - - Simpson, Pte., 405 - - Sinceny, 365, 386 - - Slater, H., 423, 440 - - Slattery, J., 443 - - Smalley, P. F., 174, 270 - - Smith, L/Corpl., 236 - - Smith, Major-Gen. D., 296 - - Smith, Pte., 350 - - Snell, H. A., 317, 320 - - Snow, Lieut.-Gen. D'Oyly, 141, 169, 255, 331 - - Souastre, 141 _et seq._ - - South Staffords, 166, 244, 288 - - Sparks, H. C., 163 - - Sparrow, Hanbury, 358, 426 - - Spence, C. W., 279 - - Spencer, F. C., 279 - - Spencer, J. T., 443 - - Speyer, C. A., 201, 211, 304 - - Spicer, E. E., 116, 238, 243, 327, 349, 398, 400, 407 - - Spiers, H. W., 201, 214, 223, 257, 300, 304, 494 - - Spooner, Pte., 350 - - Spring, D. G., 315, 317 - - Springfield, 310, 312 - - Spurr, C. C., 66 - - Staden, 317 - - Stanbridge, G. E., 137, 174, 231, 257, 300, 350, 417, 478 - - Stanham, H. G., 14, 16, 111, 149, 153, 159, 162, 163, 193 - - Stark, W. A., 16, 149, 154, 289, 311, 313, 315 - - Stedman, P. B. K., 6, 53, 55 - - Stedman, S. H., 116, 238, 317 - - Steenvoorde, 296, 297 - - Stevens, Pte., 350 - - Stevens, W., 122 - - Stevens, W. H., 16 - - Stevens, W. H. S., 113 - - Stevenson, E. A., 287 - - Stevenson, R. T., 414, 475 - - Stickney, F., 238, 276 - - Stickney, W. J., 238 - - Still, L. A., 443 - - Stillwell, E. H., 4, 14, 36, 56, 115 - - Stoaling, T., 238, 279 - - Stone, Pte., 350 - - Stotter, S. P., 223, 231, 252 - - Strazeele, 43 - - Strickland, Brig.-Gen. E. P., 22 - - Stuckey, E. L., 327, 336, 337, 349 - - Suffolks, 4th, 22, 61, 71, 369 _et seq._, 432 - - Sus-St Leger, 239 - - Sutcliffe, Major, 437 - - Sutton Veny, 236, 237 - - Swinchatt, P. C., 408 - - Sykes, J. T., 7, 36, 152, 159, 165, 194 - - Sylvester, G. H., 417, 501 - - - Tadpole Copse, 332 _et seq._ - - Tadworth, 116, 117, 119 - - Tailles Wood, 445, 446 - - Taylor, C. M., 174, 212, 214 - - Taylor, F. S. C., 327, 466 - - Taylor, H. W., 501 - - Taylor, J., 288 - - Taylor, Sergt., 328 - - Telegraph Hill, 253 _et seq._, 413, 416 - - Tergnier, 366, 374-377 - - Thélus, 393, 397 - - Thézy-Glimont, 359 - - Thomas, N. L., 16, 88, 100, 121 - - Till, W. J., 443 - - Tilloy-les-Mofflaines, 253, 270, 412 _et seq._, 461 - - Tincques, 351, 418 - - Tollworthy, F. G., 383, 421, 442, 453, 455 - - Tomsett, E. S., 7, 81, 138, 174, 175 - - Torquay, 355 - - Tortille River, 454, 455 - - Towse, W. N., 16, 113 - - Towy Post, 398, 403, 406 - - Tracas Farm, 319 - - Travécy, 364, 369, 371 - - Trescault, 290 - - Trinidad Contingent, Second, 128 - - Trinquis, River, 479 - - Trones Wood, 182 _et seq._ - - Trotman, Brig.-Gen. C. N., 90 - - Tucker, A. W., 443 - - Turner, J. G., 259, 260 - - Tyrell, G., 344 - - - Udall, F. G., 188, 402, 408, 477 - - Urquhart, Lieut.-Col., 436 - - - Valenciennes, 494-496 - - Valetta, 9 _et seq._, 86-89, 508, 509 - - Vauchelles, 137 - - Vaulx-Vraucourt, 275 - - Vaux-sur-Somme, 180, 433, 449, 451 - - Vermelles, 76-81 - - Vernon, H. W., 16, 149, 153, 173, 185, 193 - - Vernon, W. H., 15, 119, 122, 201, 211, 214 - - Verquin, 81 - - Vickery, Pte., 242 - - Vieille Chapelle, 29, 32, 33 - - Vieux Berquin, 43 - - Ville-sur-Ancre, 208, 214 - - Villequier-Aumont, 377-379 - - Villers-Bretonneux, 365, 384 _et seq._ - - Villers Cotterets, 383, 385 - - Villers-lez-Cagnicourt, 479 - - Villers Plouich, 290 - - Villers-sire-Nicole, 506 - - Vimy Ridge, 247, 252, 254, 260, 294, 347, 394-397 - - Vine, G. H. M., 4, 6, 20, 34, 36, 66, 128-130, 356 - - Vines, W. F., 292, 315 - - Viry-Noureuil, 366 _et seq._ - - Vis-en-Artois, 479 - - Vitry-en-Artois, 491 - - Vitz Villeroy, 248 - - Vlamertinghe, 56, 306, 315-317 - - Volckeringhove, 306 - - Voskule, J. A., 414 - - Vouel, 374-378 - - - Wailly, 248 - - Wakefield, Sir Chas., 150 - - Walker, F. W., 106, 292, 312, 314, 315, 317, 388, 423, 433, 440 - - Walker, T. I., 7, 11, 54, 55 - - Walker, Brig.-Gen. W. R., 22 - - Wallace, Major-Gen. Sir A., 90, 107 - - Wallder, H. W., 344 - - Walmisley, S. E. H., 66, 81, 137 - - Wancourt, 253 _et seq._, 393, 467, 492 - - Wardan, 107 - - Wardle, L. F., 366, 374, 384 - - Warloy, 420 - - Warlus, 270 - - Warminster, 236 - - Warren, L/Corpl., 242 - - Warren, W. D., 307, 312, 315 - - Watson, B. A., 312-315 - - Watts, L. L., 478, 488, 490 - - Weathersbee, H. W., 7, 20, 66 - - Webb, L. R., 216 - - Webb, T. Montgomerie, 130, 358 - - Webster, J. R., 16, 94, 112, 152, 153, 185, 193 - - Webster, W. H., 154, 221, 227, 231 - - Wedge Wood, 178 _et seq._ - - Weekes, L/Corpl., 350 - - Wellby, E. V., 14, 116, 117 - - Welsh Regiment, 427 - - Westcott, A., 315 - - Westerman, Pte., 350 - - Westhoek, 295, 296 - - Westoutre, 44, 57 - - Westroosebeek, 317, 320 - - West Yorkshire Regiment, 353 - - Wheatley, J. H. L., 280, 282, 283, 287 - - Wheatley, L. L., 113, 138, 148, 161, 162, 180, 206, 211, 214, 217 - - Whitehead, H., 162, 163, 216 - - Whitworth, Corpl., 283 - - Wickens, J., 344 - - Wieltje, 45, 46 - - Wilde, E. T., Rodney, 122, 128 - - Wilderspin, H. O., 315 - - Wildman, C. J. C., 360 - - Wilkinson, Corpl., 236 - - Willcocks, Gen. Sir J., 22, 24, 60 - - Willerval, 347, 393, 397 - - Williams, F. G., 322, 375, 384 - - Williams, Col., 123 - - Williams, H. J. M., 66, 119, 223, 322, 369, 384 - - Williams, H. N., 223, 269, 300, 349, 398, 401, 407, 408, 411, 463, - 469, 472, 478, 494, 506 - - Williams, N. W., 88, 149, 153, 174 - - Williams, S. M., 249, 287 - - Willmott, W. A., 344 - - Wilson, E. D., 116, 118 - - Wilson, Sergt.-Major, 494 - - Wise, F. S., 414, 417 - - Wood, A. E., 116, 117 - - Wood, Col. Evelyn, 150 - - Wood, J. C., 443, 448 - - Woodington, A., 360, 384 - - Woodyeat, E., 414 - - Wreford, L. W., 223, 270, 272, 304 - - Wright, Capt., 382, 458 - - Wytschaete Ridge, 294 - - - Yeoman, B. F. L., 88, 149, 159, 165 - - York and Lanc. Regiment, 347 - - Yorkshires, 2nd, 488 - - Yoxall, T., 417, 466 - - Yser Canal and River, 40, 41, 229, 295, 307 _et seq._ - - Ytres, 290 - - - Zelobes, 27 - - Zillebeeke, 294, 295 - - Zonnebeeke, 40, 42, 297 - - Zouafques, 316, 317 - - - - - - TRANSCRIBER'S NOTES - - - Added missing page number to Scheldt Canal index listing on p. 540. - - Silently corrected simple spelling, grammar, and typographical - errors. - - Retained anachronistic and non-standard spellings as printed. - - Enclosed italics font in _underscores_. - - - - - -End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of The War History of the 4th Battalion -The London Regiment (Royal Fusiliers, by F. 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Clive Grimwade. - </title> - <link rel="coverpage" href="images/cover.jpg" /> - <style type="text/css"> - -body { - margin-left: 10%; - margin-right: 10%; -} - - h1,h2,h3 { - text-align: center; /* all headings centered */ - clear: both; -} - -p { - margin-top: .51em; - text-align: justify; - margin-bottom: .49em; -} - -.p4 {margin-top: 4em;} -.p6 {margin-top: 6em;} - -/* Easy Epub/HRs */ - -hr { - width: 33%; - margin-top: 2em; - margin-bottom: 2em; - margin-left: 33.5%; - margin-right: 33.5%; - clear: both; -} - -hr.tb {width: 45%; margin-left: 22.5%; margin-right: 22.5%;} -hr.chap {width: 65%; margin-left: 17.5%; margin-right: 17.5%;} - -ul, ul#index { list-style-type: none; display: inline-block;} -li.ifrst { margin-top: 1em; } -li.indx, dt { margin-top: .5em; } -li {text-align: left;} - -ol {display: inline-block;} -ol.RU { list-style-type: upper-roman; } - -dl {margin-left: 5%; - margin-right: 10%;} - -dd {margin-left: 8em; - text-indent: -4em;} - -/* Case Study: Tables */ - -table { - margin-left: auto; - margin-right: auto; - text-align: left; -} - - .tdr {text-align: right;} - .tdn {text-align: right; - width: 3em;} - .tdc {text-align: center;} - .tdc1 {text-align: center; - width: 8em;} - .tdp {text-indent: 2em;} - -th {text-align: center;} - -caption {font-weight: bold;} - -.pagenum { /* uncomment the next line for invisible page numbers */ - /* visibility: hidden; */ - position: absolute; - left: 92%; - font-size: smaller; - text-align: right; -} /* page numbers */ - -.blockquot { - margin-left: 2em; - margin-right: 10%; -} - -.hangindent { - text-indent: -3em; - margin-left: 5em; - margin-right: 10%; -} - -.hangindent8 { - text-indent: -6em; - margin-left: 8em; - margin-right: 10%; -} - -.bb {border-bottom: solid thin;} - -.bl {border-left: solid thin;} - -.bt {border-top: solid thin;} - -.br {border-right: solid thin;} - -.center {text-align: center;} - -.smcap {font-variant: small-caps;} - -.caption p {font-weight: bold; - text-align: center;} - -/* Images */ -.figcenter { - margin: auto; - text-align: center; -} - -/* Footnotes */ -.footnote {margin-left: 10%; margin-right: 10%; font-size: 0.9em;} - -.footnote .label {position: absolute; right: 84%; text-align: right;} - -.fnanchor { - vertical-align: super; - font-size: .8em; - text-decoration: - none; -} - -/* Transcriber's notes */ -#transnote {background-color: #E6E6FA; - color: black; - font-size: smaller; - padding: 0.5em; - margin-bottom: 5em; - font-family: Georgia, Times, Times New Roman, serif} - -/* Easy Epub/Headings */ - -.ph1 { text-align: center; text-indent: 0em; font-weight: bold; } -.ph1 { font-size: xx-large; margin: .67em auto; } - -.small {font-size: small;} -.large {font-size: large;} -.xlarge {font-size: x-large;} - -div#titlepage { - text-align: center; - page-break-before: always; - page-break-after: always; -} -div#titlepage p { - text-align: center; - text-indent: 0em; - font-weight: bold; - line-height: 1.5; - margin-top: 3em; -} - -div.chapter {page-break-before: always;} - -/* Case Study: Title Pages */ - -div#halftitle -{ - text-align: center; - page-break-before: always; - page-break-after: always; -} -@media screen -{ - #halftitle - { - margin: 6em 0; - } -} -@media print, handheld -{ - #halftitle - { - page-break-before: always; - page-break-after: always; - margin: 0; - padding-top: 6em; - } -} - -/* Easy Epub/Cover */ - -.covercaption {font-weight: bold; font-size: small;} -@media handheld { - .covercaption { display: none; } -} - -div.tnotes {background-color: #eeeeee; border: 1px solid black; padding: 1em;} -.covernote {visibility: hidden; display: none;} -@media handheld { - .covernote {visibility: visible; display: block;} -} - - </style> - </head> -<body> - - -<pre> - -The Project Gutenberg EBook of The War History of the 4th Battalion The -London Regiment (Royal Fusiliers) 1914-1, by F. Clive Grimwade - -This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and most -other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions -whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms of -the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online at -www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the United States, you'll have -to check the laws of the country where you are located before using this ebook. - -Title: The War History of the 4th Battalion The London Regiment (Royal Fusiliers) 1914-1919 - -Author: F. Clive Grimwade - -Release Date: September 30, 2015 [EBook #50098] - -Language: English - -Character set encoding: UTF-8 - -*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK WAR HISTORY--4TH BATTALION 1914-1919 *** - - - - -Produced by Richard Tonsing, Brian Coe and the Online -Distributed Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net (This -file was produced from images generously made available -by University of California libraries) - - - - - - -</pre> - -<div class="tnotes covernote"> - <p>The cover image was created by the transcriber and is placed in the public domain.</p> -</div> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_i" id="Page_i">[Pg i]</a></span></p> -<div id="halftitle"> - -<p class="ph1">THE WAR HISTORY<br /> -OF THE <span class="smcap">4TH</span> BATTALION<br /> -THE LONDON REGIMENT<br /> -<span class="large">(ROYAL FUSILIERS)<br /></span> -<span class="xlarge">1914-1919</span></p> -</div> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_ii" id="Page_ii">[Pg ii]</a></span></p> - -<div class="figcenter" style="width: 700px;"> -<img src="images/i_frontispiece.jpg" width="700" height="466" alt="" /> -<div class="caption"><p><em>Frontispiece</em></p> - -<p><em>Ypres Cathedral</em></p></div> -</div> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_iii" id="Page_iii">[Pg iii]</a></span></p> -<div id="titlepage"> - -<div class="chapter"></div> -<hr class="chap" /> - - - - -<h1>THE WAR HISTORY<br /> -OF THE <span class="smcap">4TH</span> BATTALION<br /> -THE LONDON REGIMENT<br /> -<span class="large">(ROYAL FUSILIERS)<br /></span> -<span class="xlarge">1914-1919</span></h1> - - -<p class="small p4">BY<br /> -<span class="large">CAPTAIN F. CLIVE GRIMWADE<br /></span> -4TH BATTALION, THE LONDON REGIMENT (ROYAL FUSILIERS)</p> - -<p class="p6">LONDON<br /> -HEADQUARTERS OF THE <span class="smcap">4TH</span> LONDON REGIMENT<br /> -112 SHAFTESBURY STREET, N.1<br /> -1922 -</p> -</div> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_iv" id="Page_iv">[Pg iv]</a></span></p> - -<hr class="tb" /> - -<p class="center p6"><em>Printed in Great Britain<br /> -by Turnbull & Spears, Edinburgh</em> -</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_v" id="Page_v">[Pg v]</a></span></p> - -<hr class="tb" /> - -<p class="center">THIS HISTORY IS DEDICATED<br /> -TO THE MEMORY OF<br /> -<span class="large"><span class="smcap">Colonel</span> E. T. RODNEY WILDE, V.D.,<br /></span> -WHO COMMANDED THE BATTALION<br /> -FROM 23RD NOVEMBER 1890 TO 24TH JANUARY 1903<br /> -AND COMPILED ITS HISTORICAL RECORDS<br /> -FROM 1643 TO 1908 -</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_vi" id="Page_vi">[Pg vi]</a><br /><a name="Page_vii" id="Page_vii">[Pg vii]</a></span></p> -<div class="chapter"></div> -<hr class="chap" /> - - - - -<h2>FOREWORD</h2> - - -<p>It was considered by the past and present members of -the 4th Battalion, The London Regiment (Royal Fusiliers), -that some permanent record of the part taken by the -Regiment in the European War should be compiled, and -a War History Committee was formed in February 1920 -to consider the preparation of such a record.</p> - -<p>At the unanimous request of the Committee Captain -F. Clive Grimwade undertook to write the Regiment's -War History.</p> - -<p>The Committee desire to express their keen appreciation -of the manner in which he has overcome the difficulties -of compiling such a History and of his devotion in carrying -out this long and arduous work.</p> - -<p>The Committee wish to express their thanks also to -Lieut.-Col. Marchment, to Captains Boutall, Garratt, -Croll and Hetley, and to other officers who have given -Captain Grimwade valuable assistance; to the author's -mother, Mrs Grimwade, for her assistance in arranging -information as to officers' personal services and in -correcting the drafts of the book; and to the Regiment's -Honorary Colonel, Lord Marshall, for facilitating the -publication of the book.</p> - -<p style="margin-left: 50%;"> -THE WAR HISTORY COMMITTEE,<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 2em;"><span class="smcap">4th Battalion, The London</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Regiment (Royal Fusiliers)</span>.</span><br /> -<br /> -LESLIE T. BURNETT, <span class="smcap">Lieut.-Col.</span> (<em>Chairman</em>).<br /> -G. H. M. VINE, <span class="smcap">Major</span> (<em>retired</em>).<br /> -H. J. DUNCAN-TEAPE, <span class="smcap">Major</span>.<br /> -S. J. ELLIOTT, <span class="smcap">Major</span>.<br /> -</p> - -<p> -<em>February 1922</em> -</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_viii" id="Page_viii">[Pg viii]</a><br /><a name="Page_ix" id="Page_ix">[Pg ix]</a></span></p> -<div class="chapter"></div> -<hr class="chap" /> - - - - -<h2>CONTENTS</h2> - - -<div class="center"> -<table border="0" cellpadding="4" cellspacing="0" summary="CONTENTS"> - <tr> - <th class="tdr">CHAP.</th> - <td></td> - <th class="tdr">PAGE</th> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdr">I.</td> - <td><span class="smcap">Mobilisation—Departure Overseas</span></td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_1">1</a></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdr">II.</td> - <td><span class="smcap">The 1/4th Battalion in Malta—Formation of the 2/4th Battalion</span></td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_8">8</a></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdr">III.</td> - <td><span class="smcap">The 1/4th Battalion in France—Operations at Neuve Chapelle</span></td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_18">18</a></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdr">IV.</td> - <td><span class="smcap">The 1/4th Battalion in the Second Battle of Ypres, 1915</span></td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_40">40</a></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdr">V.</td> - <td><span class="smcap">Operations during the Summer of 1915</span></td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_58">58</a></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdr">VI.</td> - <td><span class="smcap">The 1/4th Battalion in the 47th Division</span></td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_73">73</a></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdr">VII.</td> - <td><span class="smcap">The 2/4th Battalion in Malta, Gallipoli Peninsula and Southern Egypt</span></td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_86">86</a></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdr">VIII.</td> - <td><span class="smcap">The 3/4th and 4/4th Battalions at Home</span></td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_115">115</a></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdr">IX.</td> - <td><span class="smcap">The Formation of the 56th Division</span></td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_132">132</a></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdr">X.</td> - <td><span class="smcap">The 1/4th Battalion in the Battles of the Somme, 1916—I. The Attack on Gommecourt</span></td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_139">139</a></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdr">XI.</td> - <td><span class="smcap">The 1/4th Battalion in the Battles of the Somme, 1916—II. The Battles of September and October</span></td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_177">177</a></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdr">XII.</td> - <td><span class="smcap">The 1/4th Battalion during the Winter 1916/17</span></td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_217">217</a></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdr">XIII.</td> - <td><span class="smcap">The 2/4th Battalion in France—German Retirement from the Somme</span></td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_236">236</a></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdr">XIV.</td> - <td><span class="smcap">The 1/4th Battalion in the Battles of Arras, 1917</span></td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_251">251</a></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdr">XV.</td> - <td><span class="smcap">The 2/4th Battalion in the Battles for Bullecourt, 1917</span></td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_273">273</a><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_x" id="Page_x">[Pg x]</a></span></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdr">XVI.</td> - <td><span class="smcap">The Third Battle of Ypres, 1917—I. The 1/4 Battalion on the Menin Road.</span></td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_294">294</a></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdr">XVII.</td> - <td><span class="smcap">The Third Battle of Ypres, 1917—II. The 2/4 Battalion on the Northern Ridges</span></td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_306">306</a></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdr">XVIII.</td> - <td><span class="smcap">The 1/4th Battalion in the Battle of Cambrai, 1917</span></td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_325">325</a></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdr">XIX.</td> - <td><span class="smcap">The 1/4th Battalion, Winter 1917/18—The Reserve Battalion 1916/17</span></td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_345">345</a></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdr">XX.</td> - <td><span class="smcap">The 2/4th Battalion in the Second Battle of the Somme, 1918</span></td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_359">359</a></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdr">XXI.</td> - <td><span class="smcap">The 1/4th Battalion in the Defence of Arras, 1918</span></td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_392">392</a></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdr">XXII.</td> - <td><span class="smcap">The 1/4th and 2/4th Battalions during the Summer Months of 1918—The Reserve Battalion, 1918</span></td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_409">409</a></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdr">XXIII.</td> - <td><span class="smcap">The Final Advance—I. The 2/4th Battalion in the Battles of Amiens and Bapaume, 1918</span></td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_428">428</a></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdr">XXIV.</td> - <td><span class="smcap">The Final Advance—II. The 1/4th Battalion in the Battle of Bapaume, 1918</span></td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_460">460</a></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdr">XXV.</td> - <td><span class="smcap">The Final Advance—III. The 1/4th Battalion in the Battles of Cambrai and the Sambre, 1918</span></td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_478">478</a></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <th colspan="3">LIST OF APPENDICES</th> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdr">I.</td> - <td><span class="smcap">Malta</span></td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_508">508</a></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdr">II.</td> - <td><span class="smcap">Honours and Decorations</span></td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_510">510</a></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdr">III.</td> - <td><span class="smcap">The Reconstruction of the 4th London Regiment in 1920</span></td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_518">518</a></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td></td> - <td><span class="smcap">Index</span> <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xi" id="Page_xi">[Pg xi]</a></span></td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_521">521</a></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <th colspan="3">ILLUSTRATIONS</th> - </tr> - <tr> - <td></td> - <td><span class="smcap">Ypres Cathedral</span></td> - <td class="tdr"><em><a href="#Page_ii">Frontispiece</a></em></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td></td> - <td></td> - <th>TO FACE PAGE</th> - </tr> - <tr> - <td></td> - <td><span class="smcap">Ghain Tuffieha Camp—Melleha Camp—Selmun Palace</span></td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_9">8</a></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td></td> - <td><span class="smcap">Melleha—The Grand Harbour, Valetta</span></td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_17">16</a></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td></td> - <td><span class="smcap">St Jean Village in April 1920</span></td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_57">56</a></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td></td> - <td><span class="smcap">Rouge Croix, La Bassée Road—The Doll's House (Ferozepore Brigade Headquarters), La Bassée Road</span></td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_65">64</a></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td></td> - <td><span class="smcap">Signpost Lane, Neuve Chapelle—Ruined Farmhouse, Neuve Chapelle</span></td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_233">232</a></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td></td> - <td><span class="smcap">Inverness Copse</span></td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_305">304</a></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td></td> - <td><span class="smcap">Passchendaele Ridge</span></td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_321">320</a></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td></td> - <td><span class="smcap">Arras Cathedral</span></td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_417">416</a></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <th colspan="3">SKETCH MAPS</th> - </tr> - <tr> - <td colspan="3" class="tdc"><span class="smcap">By Captain F. Clive Grimwade</span></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <th>NO.</th> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdr">1.</td> - <td><span class="smcap">Neuve Chapelle—Richebourg l'Avoué</span></td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_32">32</a></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdr">2.</td> - <td><span class="smcap">The Second Battle of Ypres, 1915</span></td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_48">48</a></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdr">3.</td> - <td><span class="smcap">Gallipoli Peninsula—Cape Helles Trenches, 1915</span></td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_96">96</a></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdr">4.</td> - <td><span class="smcap">The Attack on Gommecourt, 1st July 1916</span></td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_144">144</a></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdr">5.</td> - <td><span class="smcap">The Battle of Ginchy, September 1916</span></td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_192">192</a></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdr">6.</td> - <td><span class="smcap">The Battle of Morval, September 1916</span> <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xii" id="Page_xii">[Pg xii]</a></span></td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_204">204</a></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdr">7.</td> - <td><span class="smcap">The Battle of the Le Transloy Ridges, October 1916</span></td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_208">208</a></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdr">8.</td> - <td><span class="smcap">Laventie, Winter 1916/17</span></td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_224">224</a></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdr">9.</td> - <td><span class="smcap">The German Retirement, February-March 1917</span></td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_240">240</a></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdr">10.</td> - <td><span class="smcap">Cavalry Farm, May 1917</span></td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_266">266</a></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdr">11.</td> - <td><span class="smcap">Bullecourt, May-June, 1917</span></td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_288">288</a></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdr">12.</td> - <td><span class="smcap">The Third Battle of Ypres, 1917 (1/4th Battalion)</span></td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_296">296</a></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdr">13.</td> - <td><span class="smcap">The Third Battle of Ypres, 1917 (2/4th Battalion)</span></td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_312">312</a></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdr">14.</td> - <td><span class="smcap">The Battle of Cambrai, 1917</span></td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_336">336</a></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdr">15.</td> - <td><span class="smcap">The Retreat from La Fère, March 1918</span></td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_368">368</a></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdr">16.</td> - <td><span class="smcap">The Defence of Arras, March 1918</span></td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_400">400</a></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdr">17.</td> - <td><span class="smcap">The Battle of Amiens, 1918 (2/4th Battalion)—The Action at Chipilly Ridge, 8th-10th August</span></td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_432">432</a></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdr">18.</td> - <td><span class="smcap">The Battle of Bapaume, 1918 (2/4th Battalion)</span></td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_448">448</a></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdr">19.</td> - <td><span class="smcap">The Battle of Bapaume, 1918 (1/4th Battalion)</span></td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_472">472</a></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdr">20.</td> - <td><span class="smcap">The Battle of Cambrai, 1918—The Canal du Nord</span></td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_488">488</a></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdr">21.</td> - <td><span class="smcap">The Battle of the Sambre, 1918</span></td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_496">496</a></td> - </tr> -</table><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_1" id="Page_1">[Pg 1]</a></span></div> -<div class="chapter"></div> -<hr class="chap" /> - - - - -<h2>CHAPTER I<br /> - -MOBILISATION—DEPARTURE OVERSEAS</h2> - - -<p>Of the London Volunteer Corps the unit now known as -the 4th (City of London) Battalion, The London Regiment -(Royal Fusiliers) is one of the most ancient. Called out -as a Trained Band in 1643 to share in repelling a threatened -Royalist invasion of the City during the Civil Wars, it has -had a practically unbroken history for nearly three -hundred years. After the regular constitution of the -Volunteer Forces in the middle of last century it achieved -some distinction as the 1st Tower Hamlets Rifle Brigade, -and despatched a machine-gun detachment to the fighting -in South Africa in 1900. In 1903 it became affiliated to -The Royal Fusiliers, as the 4th Volunteer Battalion of -that distinguished Regiment. On the reorganisation of -the auxiliary forces in 1908 by Lord Haldane, it acquired -its present designation, which we will abbreviate to the -more convenient title by which it became known in the -Great War, namely, The 4th London Regiment.</p> - -<p>Prior to the War the training provided for the Territorial -Force was only such as to furnish the nucleus of -a Second Line Army. Fourteen days in camp each -summer, an easy musketry course, and a few drills at -headquarters could not develop a soldier fit to meet fully -trained troops. That this was recognised by Lord Haldane -is evidenced by the fact that his scheme provided for a -period of six months' training at home for all Territorial -soldiers should war break out, prior to their despatch on -active service.</p> - -<p>But they were none the less given a definite rôle in the -defence of the Motherland. Possibly this was not always -realised to the full by all the officers and non-commissioned -officers of the Regiment; but it was unmistakably brought -home to them one evening in February 1914 when a<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_2" id="Page_2">[Pg 2]</a></span> -secret meeting of officers was convened at Headquarters -in Hoxton for the explanation of the scheme of mobilisation -and of the task which the Regiment would be called -upon to execute should war occur.</p> - -<p>At that date the scheme of Mobilisation was already -complete. Under it the 1st London Infantry Brigade, -of which the 4th London formed a part, was entrusted -with the supremely important task of guarding the -London and South Western Railway between London and -Southampton during the mobilisation and embarkation -of the Expeditionary Force from the latter port. The -section allotted to the 4th Battalion was the main line -from Waterloo Station to Farnborough (inclusive); the -Alton branch from its junction with the main line near -Brookwood to Bentley Station; and the branch from -the last-named station to Borden Camp. These dispositions -were worked out in the greatest detail, and -arrangements were made for the efficient guarding of all -railway stations, signal boxes, junctions, tunnels and -bridges, and for a system of constant patrolling of the -line.</p> - -<p>The Infantry of the Territorial Force not being supplied -during peace time with war scale of transport, ammunition, -etc., provision was made for this necessary equipment to -be drawn on mobilisation, and waggons and horses in -civilian employ were "earmarked" beforehand for this -purpose.</p> - -<p>The scheme having been explained, arrangements were -made to detail all guards, patrols, and requisitioning -parties in readiness.</p> - -<p>When the war cloud over South-eastern Europe began -to spread in July 1914 and threatened to envelop this -country in the storm, the finishing touches were put to -the scheme at a memorable secret meeting at Headquarters -on the evening of Thursday, 31st July 1914. After that -meeting few who attended it had any doubt as to what -was about to take place.</p> - -<p>The annual camp in 1914 for the 1st London Division -(Major-Gen. W. Fry, C.B., C.V.O.) had been arranged -for Sunday, 2nd August, and on that date, this country<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_3" id="Page_3">[Pg 3]</a></span> -still not having declared its intentions as to the war, the -4th London Regiment entrained for Wareham, in Dorsetshire, -where the camp was to be held, with a strength of -23 officers and about 650 other ranks under Lieut.-Col. -G. P. Botterill.</p> - -<p>Camp was reached shortly after noon, but scarcely -had the Battalion marched in when an order was received -recalling it to London. By 2.30 p.m. it was once again -entrained, quivering with excitement and well-nourished -on the journey to town with the most impossible rumours -of gigantic battles, most of which apocryphal happenings -it swallowed with gusto. At 2 a.m. on the 3rd August -the 4th Londons marched into Headquarters, and after a -few hours' rest began to put the wheels of the carefully -assembled machine of mobilisation into motion. All -went without a hitch. Field dressings, identity discs -and small books were issued: separation allowance and -next-of-kin rolls prepared. The "earmarked" horses -and vehicles were collected, and with the aid of these, -ammunition drawn from the Hyde Park Magazine.</p> - -<p>Blankets, lanterns and other stores sent up the River -from Woolwich were unloaded and conveyed direct to -the platform at Waterloo Station, ready for issue to the -Battalion on its arrival there. The machine was moving -steadily. During the day the Regimental Colours were -handed over to the Lord Mayor of London for safe -keeping.</p> - -<p>Shortly after midnight the 4th London Regiment -entrained at Waterloo in two trains, from which at each -stop the allotted platoons detrained: so that by the -time the end of the sector was reached in the early hours -of the 4th August 1914, the railway was already guarded. -Eighteen hours before the declaration of war the Battalion -was on its war station: a good lead from Territorial -troops to the rest of the country!</p> - -<p>The distribution of the Battalion was as follows:</p> - -<div class="hangindent"> - -<p>Battalion Headquarters, Lieut.-Col. G. P. Botterill, Surbiton.</p> - -<p>A and B Companies (forming No. 1 Double Company), Headquarters -at Clapham Junction, under Capt. H. J. Duncan-Teape.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_4" id="Page_4">[Pg 4]</a></span></p> - -<p>C and E Companies (forming No. 2 Double Company), Headquarters -at Woking, under Capt. G. H. M. Vine.</p> - -<p>D and F Companies (forming No. 3 Double Company), Headquarters -at North Camp, under Capt. R. J. Jackson.</p> - -<p>G and H Companies (forming No. 4 Double Company), Headquarters -at Bentley, under Capt. E. H. Stillwell.</p></div> - -<p>The Transport Section returned to Headquarters at -Hoxton to complete the formation of the Battalion -transport on a war footing.</p> - -<p>Brigade Headquarters were at Waterloo Station under -command of Brigadier-General the Earl of Lucan. The -Brigade Major was Major R. F. Legge (Leinster Regiment); -and the Staff Captain, Captain Cornelius-Wheeler (3rd -London Regiment, Royal Fusiliers).</p> - -<p>On the evening of the same day Lord Grey of Falloden -(then Sir Edward Grey), in the House of Commons, made -his never-to-be-forgotten indictment of the duplicity of -Germany's action in the pre-war negotiations and in her -violation of Belgian neutrality, and the formal declaration -of war followed.</p> - -<p>The order for General Mobilisation, which was applicable -to the Territorial Force equally with the Regular -Army, immediately ensued, and orders to report forthwith -were issued to all members of the Battalion who had not -paraded for the summer training two days previously. It -is to the credit of the Battalion that within twelve hours -no member had failed to reply. The N.C.O.'s and men -thus reporting for duty were as quickly as possible despatched -from peace headquarters and reported to their -respective companies on the line.</p> - -<p>As the N.C.O.'s and men of the Battalion reported for -duty they were subjected to medical examination, and a -certain number were unfortunately unable to pass fit at -the high standard required during the early days of the -war, so that the strength of the Battalion on the 6th -August was 24 officers and 785 N.C.O.'s and men.</p> - -<p>The early days of August on the railway line afforded -unmistakable proof, if such were needed, of the extraordinary -power of the London soldier to adapt himself -to circumstances. Men from offices, factories and docks, -suddenly taken from their occupations and their homes,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_5" id="Page_5">[Pg 5]</a></span> -settled down to patrols and guards, to cooking their food -and taking responsibility, as to the manner born. All -were swept forward on the high flood of a great enthusiasm, -and buoyed up amid minor discomforts with -intense pride that their country needed them and had -given them a job of work to carry out. This enthusiasm -certainly bid fair at times to show signs of excess of zeal. -But the zeal was tempered with an immense sense of the -dignity of each and every one as a soldier in the 4th -Londons: the days on railway guard thus formed the -basis of the <i lang="fr">esprit de corps</i> which is essential to military -success and which in pre-war days it had been difficult, -by the nature of things, to develop. Scattered though -the Battalion was over some 50 miles of railway, disciplinary -trouble of a serious nature was conspicuous by -its absence.</p> - -<p>By the middle of August the greater part of the Expeditionary -Force had been embarked to France, but -the Brigade remained at its war station. During the -dark days which ensued, when telegram after telegram -told always of withdrawal before overwhelming forces of -the German Army after the glorious resistance at Mons, -the Battalion continued to guard the railway, and was -busily occupied in recruiting to full strength and in completing -its equipment. The strength of the Battalion -rose steadily and rapidly, and by the end of August 941 -N.C.O.'s and men were at duty on the railway line.</p> - -<p>The duties on the railway were extremely heavy, and -no training was possible except the rudimentary instructions -of the recruits who were retained at peace headquarters.</p> - -<p>On the night of 31st August / 1st September orders -were issued to the Brigade to withdraw from the line -and return to peace headquarters. The move was satisfactorily -completed by 12 noon on the 1st September, -the duties of the Brigade on the railway being taken over -two days later by the 3rd London Infantry Brigade. On -return to headquarters the Commanding Officer informed -the Battalion that the whole Brigade would be despatched -on overseas garrison duty almost immediately, and called<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_6" id="Page_6">[Pg 6]</a></span> -for volunteers, a call which met with a favourable response -from all ranks.</p> - -<p>The two following days were actively occupied with -medical inspections, recruiting to fill the few remaining -vacancies, etc.</p> - -<p>On the afternoon of the 3rd September the Battalion -was paraded for inspection by Major-Gen. W. Fry, C.B., -C.V.O., commanding 1st London Division, who, in an -address to the troops, announced that the destination of -the Brigade was Malta; and conveyed to the Battalion, -to the great satisfaction of all ranks, the direct assurance -of Earl Kitchener that the Battalion would be retained -in Malta only until it should be passed fit to take the -field. This announcement was received with enthusiasm -as it served to allay the disquieting rumours of the -possibility of the Malta station proving to be a "sidetrack" -for the period of the war.</p> - -<p>Shortly after midnight on the 3/4th September 1914, -the Battalion (strength 29 officers and 976 other ranks, -fully armed and equipped) paraded and marched to -Waterloo amid scenes of enthusiasm and excitement in -Hoxton which will probably never be forgotten by those -who witnessed them, and entrained at 3.30 a.m. on the -4th September for Southampton, embarking on arrival in -H.T. <em>Galician</em> (Union Castle Line).</p> - -<p>The following officers proceeded overseas with the -Battalion:</p> - - -<div class="center"> -<table border="0" cellpadding="4" cellspacing="0" summary="officers proceeded overseas"> - <tr> - <td>Lieut.-Col.</td> - <td>G. P. Botterill,</td> - <td colspan="3">in command.</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td>Major</td> - <td>L. T. Burnett,</td> - <td colspan="3">second in command.</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td>Capt.</td> - <td>G. B. Scott, Adjutant</td> - <td colspan="3">(2nd Battalion The Leinster Regiment).</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td>Major</td> - <td>R. J. J. Jackson,</td> - <td>commanding</td> - <td class="tdc">F</td> - <td>Company.</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td>Capt.</td> - <td>G. H. M. Vine,</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdc">E</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td>H. J. T. Duncan-Teape,</td> - <td>commanding</td> - <td class="tdc">A</td> - <td>Company.</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td>R. N. Arthur,</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdc">H</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td>H. P. L. Cart de Lafontaine,</td> - <td>commanding</td> - <td class="tdc">D</td> - <td>Company.</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td>W. Moore,</td> - <td>commanding</td> - <td class="tdc">B</td> - <td>Company.</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td>W. G. Clark,</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdc">C</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td>Lieut.</td> - <td>C. R. Saunders,</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdc">G</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td>S. Elliott</td> - <td colspan="3">(Machine Gun Officer).</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td>V. W. Edwards.</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td>F. C. Grimwade</td> - <td colspan="3">(Signalling Officer).</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td>P. B. K. Stedman</td> - <td colspan="3">(Transport Officer).</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td>Lieut.</td> - <td>H. W. Weathersbee.</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td>2/Lieut.</td> - <td>A. L. Long.</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td>J. T. Sykes.</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td>R. L. Herring.</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td>R. V. Gery.</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td>E. W. Bottomley.</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td>T. I. Walker.</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td>A. B. Lucy.</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td>A. R. Moore.</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td>T. Moody.</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td>J. R. Pyper.</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td>E. Giles.</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td>Hon. Lieut.<br />and Q.M.,</td> - <td>E. S. Tomsett</td> - <td colspan="3">(Quartermaster).</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td>Major</td> - <td>J. F. F. Parr, R.A.M.C.T.,</td> - <td colspan="3">Medical Officer attached.</td> - </tr> -</table><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_7" id="Page_7">[Pg 7]</a></span></div> -<p>At 4 p.m. that afternoon anchor was weighed, and the -transport convoy, conveying the first Brigade of Territorial -troops to leave this country, dropped down Southampton -water.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_8" id="Page_8">[Pg 8]</a></span></p> -<div class="chapter"></div> -<hr class="chap" /> - - - - -<h2>CHAPTER II<br /> - -THE 1/4TH BATTALION IN MALTA--FORMATION OF THE -2/4TH BATTALION</h2> - - -<p>Under escort of H.M.S. <em>Amphitrite</em>, and accompanied by -four other transports conveying the remainder of the -1st London Infantry Brigade, the <em>Galician</em>, carrying, in -addition to the 1/4th Londons, two companies of the 1/3rd -Londons and a section of the 1/1st London Field Ambulance, -made a fair passage through the Bay and reached -Gibraltar without mishap. Here the convoy broke up, -and the transports proceeded independently to their -destination.</p> - -<p>Nine days of the comparative peace of ship's routine -formed a pleasant interlude for the 1/4th Battalion after -its recent trying duties on the railway line. The passage -to Malta was too short to allow the monotony of ship's -inspections, watches, and roll calls to pall, and the interest -of the troops was constantly quickened by the incidents -of a sea voyage—all so strange to Londoners whose -horizon hitherto had for the most part hardly extended -beyond Hampstead Heath or Chingford. Occasional -fleeting glimpses of France and Spain, the gambols of a -school of whales, the brilliant hues of the African shore, -and the indescribable blue of the Mediterranean all contributed -to render the Battalion happy and indifferent -to the discomforts of their quarters 'tween decks, where -the heat was certainly trying after the Gates of the -Mediterranean had been passed.</p> - -<p>The first glimpse of Malta on the morning of the 13th -September was uninspiring. From the sea no vegetation -can be seen owing to the system whereby the scanty soil -is walled up along the hillsides to prevent it from being -washed away; and the island presents to the passing -voyager an aspect of monotonous drab rock. No time -was allowed for despondency, however, for, with the -pilot on board, the <em>Galician</em> steamed into the Marsamuscetto -Harbour at Valetta where the Battalion could feast -on the riot of colour which unrolled before its eyes.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_9" id="Page_9">[Pg 9]</a></span></p> - -<div class="figcenter" style="width: 700px;"> -<img src="images/i_b_008fp_a.jpg" width="700" height="440" alt="" /> -<div class="caption"><p><em>Ghain Tuffieha Camp</em></p></div> -</div> - -<div class="figcenter" style="width: 700px;"> -<img src="images/i_b_008fp_b.jpg" width="700" height="458" alt="" /> -<div class="caption"><p><em>Melleha Camp</em></p></div> -</div> - -<div class="figcenter" style="width: 700px;"> -<img src="images/i_b_008fp_c.jpg" width="700" height="445" alt="" /> -<div class="caption"><p><em>Selmun Palace</em></p></div> -</div> - -<p>The responsibilities of the 1st London Brigade for the -defence of the Fortress of Malta began immediately, for -the day after its arrival the infantry of the regular garrison -left for the front.</p> - -<p>In the early hours of the 14th September the 1/4th -Londons disembarked, and being allotted quarters under -canvas in Ghain Tuffieha Camp, was introduced to the -ardours of a sub-tropical summer by undertaking the -longest march it is possible to make in the island—a very -trying experience indeed.</p> - -<p>Ghain Tuffieha is a summer station on the west coast -of the island about eleven miles from Valetta, and is an -important outpost of the main defences of the Fortress. -It lies in a broad, fertile valley known as the Wied Tal -Paules, which traverses the island from east to west, its -eastern limit being the coast at St Paul's Bay. To the -north of this valley lie the Melleha and the Marfa Ridges, -two of the northernmost barriers against invasion. The -coast round these two ranges of hills possesses a considerable -number of sandy landing-places in well-sheltered -bays, which, as they face Sicily at about three hours' -passage from that island, required special guarding at -this period.</p> - -<p>The Battalion now settled down seriously to its training, -and it was found necessary to deal with some 250 men -as recruits. These, however, were passed through the -Barrack Square stage of their training as expeditiously -as possible in view of the heavy duties which fell to the -Battalion in guarding the northern coast.</p> - -<p>The guards found from the main body of the Battalion -at Ghain Tuffieha were mostly night guards at the landing-places, -at St Paul's Bay on the east coast, and at Ghain -Tuffieha Bay, Karraba Ridge, and Gneina Bay on the -west coast. In addition to these, G and H companies -were immediately despatched on detachment, the former -to Selmun Palace (which commands the promontory<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_10" id="Page_10">[Pg 10]</a></span> -between the shores of Melleha and St Paul's Bays), the -latter to Melleha (which dominates the head of Melleha -Bay and the Marfa Ridge beyond it). The latter detachment -was subsequently moved down the ridge to the -coast near the head of Melleha Bay. The guards found -by these detached companies were at Cala Mistra Fort -(at the foot of Kalkara Ravine), Ir Razzet tal Blata, -L'Imgiebah, and Ghain Zeituna by the Selmun force; -and at Melleha Bay, Torri L'Ahmar cross roads, and Marfa -Palace by the Melleha force.</p> - -<p>The duties of the detached companies were found to -be particularly onerous, and the proportion of N.C.O.'s -and men employed not only on guards, but also on such -necessary duties as signals, look-outs, and water-carrying -fatigues, continuously totalled rather more than a third -of the total strength of the detachments. Arrangements -were therefore made for the relief of the detachment -companies every seven or eight days, and this procedure -was maintained throughout the Battalion's duty on the -island.</p> - -<p>The training of the Battalion proceeded smoothly -but under conditions of some difficulty, partly owing to -the number of men constantly engaged in coastal defence -duties, and partly owing to the unfavourable conditions of -terrain. Every square yard of the rocky hillsides which -is covered with soil is devoted to some sort of cultivation -by the thrifty inhabitants, and the walling up of the soil -on the hillsides, which has already been alluded to, converts -every hill into a series of steps, over which manœuvres -are both laborious and painful. In spite of these obstacles, -however, a good deal of useful work was achieved, and the -Battalion rapidly began to take shape as a useful and -well-disciplined unit. There can be no doubt that the -experience gained by all ranks in taking their share in -ordinary garrison duties at so early a stage in their embodied -career proved of infinite value later when the 1/4th -Londons ultimately took their place in the fighting line; -and, moreover, the knowledge that they were subject to -the critical—and at that period not always sympathetic—surveillance -of the regular staff of the Fortress provided<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_11" id="Page_11">[Pg 11]</a></span> -the strongest possible incentive to all ranks to conduct -themselves with credit to their Regiment and to the -Territorial Force.</p> - -<p>Early in October a very thorough course of musketry -instruction under Fortress arrangements was begun, firing -taking place on the Naval ranges of Ghain Tuffieha. The -companies were thus employed as follows:—2 on detachment, -2 on musketry course, 3 on company training, and -1 finding all the duties at Battalion Headquarters, the -whole being worked on a roster so that each company was -kept for training and detachment purposes at its greatest -possible strength.</p> - -<p>During the early days of the Battalion in Malta a -few changes of distribution took place among officers as -follows:</p> - -<p>Major R. J. J. Jackson was evacuated to Cottonera -Hospital sick. He unfortunately remained in hospital -until early in December 1914, when he was invalided to -England. Command of F Company was taken by Lieut. -F. C. Grimwade, and the Machine-Gun Section was taken -over by 2/Lieut. T. I. Walker, Lieut. S. Elliott transferring -to E Company. The Battalion was also joined by 2/Lieut. -R. C. Kelly who, however, remained with the unit for a -few weeks only, at the end of which time he was appointed -to the Secret Service, and with this he remained until the -end of the War.</p> - -<p>The middle of September, when the Battalion landed -in Malta, found the hot season waning, and although the -temperature remained high for some weeks the full intensity -of the sub-tropical summer was not experienced. -In the early part of October, however, the scirocco, a -warm south-westerly wind which originates in the Sahara, -followed, with all its usual enervating effects, which were -indeed quite as trying as the intense heat of the sun had -been. Towards the end of the same month the wet -season set in in earnest, and from that time until the early -part of December the camping ground at Ghain Tuffieha -was swept by tropical rains and sand storms of considerable -violence, which from time to time caused a certain -amount of material damage and not a little discomfort<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_12" id="Page_12">[Pg 12]</a></span> -to the troops. The memory of suddenly having to turn -out and clear blocked drainage trenches and lay on to -straining tent ropes in the—sometimes—vain endeavour -to prevent one's temporary home from vanishing into -thin air, and to rescue one's kit from a mud bath, is now -sufficiently remote to be contemplated without acute -distress, but the feelings which these encounters which -the elements evoked at the time were by no means so -calm!</p> - -<p>During the worst phase of the Malta climate the -Battalion remained under canvas, and it is of some -interest—though admittedly of little consolation—to -remark that no battalion had previously spent the winter -in Malta in other than permanent barracks.</p> - -<p>Thanks to the untiring efforts of the Battalion Medical -Officer, Major J. F. F. Parr, the bill of health during these -marked variations of climate remained extraordinarily -clean, and in spite of its exposed situation the Battalion -suffered less from sickness than the others of the Brigade -which were accommodated in modern barracks.</p> - -<p>The month of December, however, saw the beginning -of the most delightful season in the island's year. The -temperature was mild but the evenings cool; vegetation -began to spring up with almost startling rapidity, and the -prospect of the island, seen from the tops of the hills, -when looking down on to the terraced fields set in a sea -of the deepest azure, formed a most welcome and delightful -contrast to the sun-baked and drab view which had -greeted the Battalion on its arrival three months earlier.</p> - -<p>At the end of November the detachments were redistributed, -the defence duties on the northern coast -being dealt with by one company only, half at Selmun -Palace, which formed its headquarters, the other half at -Melleha Bay. A fresh detachment was formed by the -despatch of another company to Verdala Barracks (in -the Cottonera Lines, the Southern Fortress of Valetta), -for the duty of guarding prisoners of war, notably the -crew of the German raider <em>Emden</em> who had just been -landed on the island.</p> - -<p>But for these changes the routine of training proceeded<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_13" id="Page_13">[Pg 13]</a></span> -with little variation, and it began to be thought by some -that the Battalion would be condemned to continue its -duties in Malta until the end of the War; but on the -22nd December 1914 a warning order was issued that -the Brigade would leave the island at an early date.</p> - -<p>On the 23rd the Battalion (less E and F Companies on -detachment), marched to Valetta to be reviewed by His -Excellency the Governor on the Marsa, a sports ground -near the town. The review took place on the following -day and the Battalion returned the same evening, arriving -in camp at 6.30 p.m.</p> - -<p>The following Fortress Order was published on the -24th December:</p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p>The Commander-in-Chief, after having inspected the -units of Lord Lucan's Brigade this morning, desires to -place on record his great satisfaction at the evident -progress made by them to become efficient soldiers of the -King. His Excellency, who fully appreciates the patriotic -sentiments which have caused such a magnificent body of -men to respond to the call of the Empire in this hour of -national danger, has had much pleasure in telegraphing -to Lord Kitchener reporting the high state of efficiency -and fitness which the Brigade has reached. Such a result, -which must have been apparent to everyone who saw -them on parade this morning, could only have been -obtained by the whole-hearted devotion to their Country's -cause of every officer, N.C.O., and man, and the Commander-in-Chief -wishes to congratulate the Earl of Lucan -and the whole of his Brigade on achieving such highly -satisfactory results.</p></div> - -<p>No further preparations for departure were made -until after the Christmas festivities, which were rendered -very enjoyable by the arrival of many good things from -home and by special gifts from the Corporation of the -City of London and the Regimental Association, the -latter organisation providing a gift of a pipe and tobacco-box -for every officer, N.C.O., and man. Christmastide -over, however, the Battalion concentrated on its preparations -for leaving the island at short notice.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_14" id="Page_14">[Pg 14]</a></span></p> - -<p>On the 28th December the detachment at Selmun was -withdrawn, its place being taken by a company of the -Malta Militia; that at Verdala being relieved by the 1st -London Regiment, which for the time being was to remain -in the island.</p> - -<hr class="tb" /> - -<p>On the departure of the 1/4th Battalion overseas the -following officers had been detailed to remain at headquarters -to supervise the formation of a Reserve Battalion:</p> - -<div class="center"> -<ul> - <li>Captain E. H. Stillwell.</li> - <li>Captain W. H. Hamilton.</li> - <li>Lieutenant H. G. Stanham.</li> - <li>Lieutenant H. Parkhouse.</li> -</ul> -</div> - -<p>These officers were assisted by a small number of N.C.O.'s -and men of the 1/4th Battalion who had been found -medically unfit to proceed overseas. The intention in -raising the new battalion originally was to provide a unit -to supply reinforcements to the overseas battalion, but, -as will be seen, this intention was subsequently modified -to a large degree.</p> - -<p>Recruiting for the new battalion, which was at first -designated the 4th (1st Reserve) Battalion The London -Regiment, and later was known as the 2/4th London -Regiment, proceeded (as indeed for all the formations -then being raised) with unprecedented rapidity, and -within a fortnight over 400 men had been enrolled, while -the ranks continued to be swelled daily by the advent of -fresh recruits.</p> - -<p>Colonel Vickers Dunfee, V.D., was appointed with -effect from 6th September 1914 to command the new -battalion with Hon. Lieut. E. V. Wellby (late Lieut.-Col. -4th V.B. The Royal Fusiliers) as Captain and Adjutant.</p> - -<p>The available accommodation proving utterly inadequate -for the growing numbers, the 2/4th Battalion -moved on 23rd September, after inspection by the Lord -Mayor, Sir Vansittart Bowater, to quarters under canvas -at Folly Farm, New Barnet. The strength was now 6 -officers and 480 other ranks, and steadily increased from -this time until the establishment in all ranks was filled.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_15" id="Page_15">[Pg 15]</a></span> -Training now began in earnest—so far as the wills of every -officer, N.C.O., and man were concerned—but under the -most acute practical difficulties, such as were general among -the newly raised formations, owing to the lack of stores -of all kinds, including clothing, arms, and equipment. -Gradually, however, "wooden equivalents" gave place -to rifles, and mufti made its final disappearance from the -parade ground. During the following month the Battalion -moved into winter quarters, occupying as barracks two -vacant houses at Barnet, namely, "Littlegrove" and -"Beech Hill," and also some stabling and out-buildings -at "Oakhill."</p> - -<p>The Battalion owes a considerable debt of gratitude -to the owners of these houses and to other local residents, -notably to W. H. Vernon, Esq., and Sir Philip Sassoon, -for their generosity in providing accommodation and -training facilities and for extending hospitality to the -Battalion in various ways, generosity which was also -extended to the 4/4th (Reserve) Battalion when it was -formed in the following year. Facilities for musketry -training were also provided by the Enfield Rifle Club, -who very generously placed their range and the services -as instructors of several of their members at the disposal -of the Battalion.</p> - -<p>Training at Barnet continued until 14th December -1914, when, after inspection by Lieut.-Gen. G. H. Moncrieff, -Honorary Colonel of the Regiment, the Battalion, which -had now grown to a strength of 27 officers and 986 other -ranks, joined the Brigade in billets at Maidstone. Here -the Brigade received on the 17th a warning order to -proceed on foreign service at short notice. The necessary -preparation of equipment, medical inspection, inoculation, -etc., was at once put in hand, and the Battalion was -inspected by Major-General W. Fry, C.B., C.V.O., commanding -1st London Division, who addressed the troops.</p> - -<p>It was fortunately possible to grant forty-eight -hours' leave to all ranks before departure, destined to -be the last home leave for some nineteen months, and -on 23rd December the Battalion entrained at 10 a.m. -for Southampton, where it embarked on H.T. <em>Avon</em><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_16" id="Page_16">[Pg 16]</a></span> -(Royal Mail Steam Packet Company), the strength on -embarkation being 27 officers and 889 other ranks.</p> - -<p>The following officers proceeded overseas with the -Battalion:</p> - -<div class="center"> -<table border="0" cellpadding="4" cellspacing="0" summary="officers proceeded overseas"> - <tr> - <td>Colonel</td> - <td>Vickers Dunfee, V.D., in command.</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td>Major</td> - <td>V. H. Seyd, second in command.</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td>Captain</td> - <td>W. G. Hayward, Adjutant.</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td>G. H. Moore.</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td>H. Morris.</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td>F. C. Read.</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td>H. G. Stanham.</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td>H. Parkhouse.</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td>Lieut.</td> - <td>L. C. Coates.</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td>W. N. Towse.</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td>A. H. Simpson.</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td>2/Lieut. </td> - <td>R. N. Keen.</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td>W. A. Stark.</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td>W. R. Botterill.</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td>V. S. Bowater.</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td>S. N. Davies.</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td>R. C. Dickins.</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td>W. H. Stevens.</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td>N. L. Thomas.</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td>J. R. Webster.</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td>L. A. Dickins.</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td>L. R. Chapman.</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td>H. W. Dennis.</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td>E. G. Lovell.</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td>H. W. Vernon.</td> - </tr> -</table></div> - -<div class="hangindent"> - -<p>Hon. Lieut. and Quartermaster, J. E. W. Lambley (Quartermaster); -Lieut. Casey, R.A.M.C., Medical Officer attached.</p></div> - -<p>Just before departure the following telegram was -received by Colonel Dunfee from General Sir Ian Hamilton, -G.C.B., D.S.O.:</p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p>Had arranged to go down and see your Battalion. -Unfortunately situation renders imperative my presence -at Headquarters. Can only, therefore, wish you best of -good luck and hope we may meet again.</p></div> - -<p>At about 5 p.m. on the 23rd December H.T. <em>Avon</em> put -to sea, and the following day at daybreak the convoy -assembled, consisting of:—</p> - -<div class="hangindent8"> - -<p>H.T. <em>Avon</em>—2/4th London Regiment and two Companies -2/3rd London Regiment.</p> - -<p>H.T. <em>Euralia</em>—2/2nd London Regiment and 2/3rd London -Regiment, less two companies, under the escort -of H.M.S. <em>Eclipse</em>, which accompanied the -transports as far as Gibraltar.</p></div> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_17" id="Page_17">[Pg 17]</a></span></p> - -<div class="figcenter" style="width: 700px;"> -<img src="images/i_b_016fp_a.jpg" width="700" height="446" alt="" /> -<div class="caption"><p><em>Melleha</em></p></div> -</div> - -<div class="figcenter" style="width: 700px;"> -<img src="images/i_b_016fp_b.jpg" width="700" height="442" alt="" /> -<div class="caption"><p><em>Grand Harbour, Valetta</em></p></div> -</div> - -<div class="figcenter" style="width: 700px;"> -<img src="images/i_b_016fp_c.jpg" width="700" height="434" alt="" /> -<div class="caption"><p><em>Grand Harbour, Valetta</em></p></div> -</div> - -<p>The following appointments were made on H.T. <em>Avon</em>: -Colonel Vickers Dunfee to be O.C. Ship; Captain and -Adjutant W. G. Hayward to be Ship's Adjutant.</p> - -<p>Christmas was spent at sea with as much good cheer -as circumstances permitted, and after an uneventful -voyage Malta was reached and H.T. <em>Avon</em> dropped anchor -in the Grand Harbour at Valetta on 31st December 1914.</p> - -<hr class="tb" /> - -<p>On the 30th December the 1/4th Battalion marched -from Ghain Tuffieha to St George's Barracks and handed -over its arms and equipment, as it was understood that -these would be required for the relieving troops.</p> - -<p>The strength of the 1/4th Battalion on leaving the -Island was 24 officers and about 850 other ranks. Major -J. F. F. Parr remained on the Island and took over the -duties of Medical Officer to the 2/4th Battalion, his duties -in the 1/4th Battalion being assumed by Lieutenant -Casey, who had just arrived with the 2/4th Battalion. -In addition Captain R. N. Arthur and Lieut. V. W. -Edwards transferred to the 2/4th Battalion together with -about 85 N.C.O.'s and men who were found medically -unfit for active service. These officers, N.C.O.'s, and men -reported on the 3rd January to the 2/4th Battalion which -was thus brought to about war strength.</p> - -<p>On the 2nd January the 2/4th Battalion disembarked -and marched to quarters at St Andrew's barracks, and the -same day at 6.35 a.m. the 1/4th Battalion paraded for -the last time at Ghain Tuffieha, marched to Valetta and -embarked on the <em>Avon</em>. That afternoon the <em>Avon</em>, conveying -in addition to the 1/4th Battalion the 1/3rd Londons, -put to sea under sealed orders, which were subsequently -found to be for Marseilles.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_18" id="Page_18">[Pg 18]</a></span></p> -<div class="chapter"></div> -<hr class="chap" /> - - - - -<h2>CHAPTER III<br /> - -THE 1/4TH BATTALION IN FRANCE--OPERATIONS AT -NEUVE CHAPELLE</h2> - - -<p>The Gulf of Lyons has an evil reputation and in January -1915 its achievement did not belie its notoriety. The -<em>Avon</em> was a fine ship of some 12,000 tons but being in -ballast rolled unmercifully for three days; and the smooth -waters of Marseilles harbour, which were reached early on -the morning of the 5th January, were never more heartily -welcome than to the 1/4th Londons.</p> - -<p>Disembarkation took place the following afternoon at -about 4 p.m. and the Battalion, after forming up on the -quay, marched straight to the railway siding, where a -train stood in readiness to carry it into the war area. To -British soldiers who have served in the French theatre -of war there is, we imagine, no recollection more vivid -than that conveyed by the words "40 Hommes—Chevaux -en long!" The fourth class French railway -carriage, which is employed with fine impartiality for the -conveyance of men or horses as occasion demands, is now -too well known to call for lengthy comment; it is a -subject over which we prefer to pass hurriedly! Into -these abominations on wheels the Battalion was inserted -at the standard rate of 40 men to each truck and rations -for two days were issued. After a delay, which seemed -to the troops as interminable as it was certainly inexplicable -to them, the train at about 9.30 p.m. rumbled -sedately out of Marseilles in the leisurely manner of all -troop trains.</p> - -<p>Dawn next morning found the train at Avignon where -a five minutes' halt was made. The enthusiastic reception -accorded to the Battalion all along the line by the -French civilians and also by the military was most impressive; -and the obvious satisfaction with which the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_19" id="Page_19">[Pg 19]</a></span> -arrival of fresh British troops was hailed by one and all -in the Rhone Valley could not fail to impress the dullest -sense with the strength of the common cause which bound -us to our gallant allies.</p> - -<p>A "Halte Repas," that is a halt just not long enough -to enable the troops to detrain and cook dinners, was -made at Macon, after which the journey, which resolved -itself practically into a triumphal progress, was resumed. -At one wayside station, the name of which has, unfortunately, -passed from our recollection, a military guard -of honour saluted the arrival of the Battalion, while the -ladies of the district appeared with offerings of milk, -coffee, and bouquets. So great, in fact, was the enthusiasm -that M. le Maire sent for a cask of wine in which -to assert his faith in the Entente Cordiale! Unhappily -the French railway authorities were not stirred by such -intense emotion and the train moved on before the wine -arrived.</p> - -<p>By the morning of the 8th the train was skirting -Paris, and that day the first signs of war were reached. -Near Chantilly (the famous French racecourse) reserve -lines of trenches forming the outer ring of the Paris -Defences were passed, while at Creil some buildings -severely damaged by shell fire stood as stern remembrances -of the great retreat three months earlier.</p> - -<p>This amusing though very tedious railway journey -terminated at 9 p.m. on the 7th January, when the -Battalion detrained some ten miles south of Boulogne -at Etaples, at that date a small, muddy, and evil-smelling -fishing village. Etaples, which at a later stage of the war -became such an important base camp, with accommodation -for some thirty thousand men and many hospitals, was, -in January 1915, not used as a British military station, -and the 1st London Brigade were the first troops to be -quartered there. Accommodation was provided under -canvas in an exposed situation, and the severity of the -weather, which was intensely cold and windy with -occasional falls of snow, formed a contrast to the sub-tropical -climate in which the Battalion had been basking -ten days previously, which can only evoke surprise at<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_20" id="Page_20">[Pg 20]</a></span> -the comparatively small amount of sickness which -ensued.</p> - -<p>The Battalion had, it will be remembered, left its -rifles, equipment, and transport in Malta, and the refitting -and equipment of the troops was taken in hand at once. -The first step was the reorganisation of the Battalion in -four companies, as follows:</p> - -<dl> - <dt>New A Company—Old A and C Companies;</dt> - <dd>Captain H. J. Duncan-Teape in command.</dd> - <dd>Captain W. G. Clark second in command.</dd> - - <dt>New B Company—Old B and F Companies;</dt> - <dd>Captain W. Moore in command.</dd> - <dd>Captain F. C. Grimwade second in command.</dd> - - <dt>New C Company—Old D and E Companies;</dt> - <dd>Captain G. H. M. Vine in command.</dd> - <dd>2/Lieut. W. H. Weathersbee second in command.</dd> - - <dt>New D Company—Old G and H Companies;</dt> - <dd>Captain C. R. Saunders in command.</dd> - <dd>Captain H. P. L. Cart de Lafontaine second in command.</dd> -</dl> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p>The Company Sergeant-Majors were respectively Edwards, -Elsom, Chennels, and Cornwall.</p></div> - -<p>In addition to this reorganisation the Battalion was -issued with new rifles of the long charger-loading type, -with four Vickers guns, and with new equipment of the -1914 pattern (webbing); and a refit of clothing and -necessaries was effected. Steps were also taken to dispose -of the surplus baggage and personal belongings acquired -by all ranks in Malta, and to reduce all to the scales of -weight permissible in the field.</p> - -<p>Command of the Regimental Transport was assumed -by 2/Lieut. R. L. Herring, who proceeded with his section -to Abbeville, and returned by road with the full war -scale of 1st and 2nd Line Transport and the Battalion -chargers.</p> - -<p>These preparations which occupied the Battalion until -the 25th January were interspersed with such training as -the state of the weather permitted, the training being -carried out on the sand dunes north of Etaples. A -warning order was received on the 25th to proceed to -billets near St Omer to join G.H.Q. Reserve.</p> - -<p>The following day the Battalion moved by train from<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_21" id="Page_21">[Pg 21]</a></span> -Etaples to St Omer, and thence by march route to the -billeting area which had been allotted to it in two small -straggling villages called Helfaut and Bilques, where it -arrived about midnight. At this point the Battalions of -the 1st London Brigade parted company until once more -reassembled by the formation of the 56th Division a year -later.</p> - -<p>Billeting in the early days of the war was not the -simple matter which it became at a later stage. For one -thing, in most villages neither wire beds, cook-houses, nor -ablutions existed for the troops, and the accommodation -of barns and stables had not been tabulated by Town-Majors -ready for the use of billeting officers. All negotiations -for billets had therefore to be conducted by the -billeting officer direct with the communal authorities, -through whom also straw and fuel were drawn.</p> - -<p>After a few days in Helfaut and Bilques the Battalion -was driven from its billets by an epidemic of measles -which attacked the civilian inhabitants, and it found fresh -quarters slightly nearer St Omer in a more important -village called Blendecques.</p> - -<p>The 1/4th Londons now embarked on a course of very -severe training under the immediate supervision of the -Inspector of Infantry, Brigadier-General Oxley. This -was, indeed, a strenuous three weeks, with breakfasts at -7.30 a.m. and dinners at 5 p.m., the hours between being -occupied in tactical exercises. Usually a march of five -miles in each direction to and from the training ground -was involved and the exercise itself was almost invariably -the "Attack in Open Warfare." In every conceivable -formation, over every conceivable sort of ground, did the -Battalion attack every one of the villages within reach of -Blendecques, till at last it was entirely weary of the attack -in any shape or form! But the grounding in field work -thus obtained was excellent and so completely were the -lessons rubbed into the mind of every member of the -Battalion that this wearisome training bore excellent fruit -as we shall see later.</p> - -<p>Once or twice a slight variation of training was obtained -in work on a new reserve line of trenches then being<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_22" id="Page_22">[Pg 22]</a></span> -constructed east of St Omer. This work was carried out -under R.E. supervision. The design of these trenches -was strange. Their like was indeed never met with in -any sector of the line held by the Battalion in the whole -of its war service, and we can only be thankful that this -reserve line never came into active use.</p> - -<p>Throughout the training period the weather was -continuously wet and cold, and these adverse conditions, -added to the long hours without food, imposed a serious -physical strain on all, and the news that the Battalion -had been passed fit to join a brigade was therefore -received by all ranks with extreme satisfaction.</p> - -<p>At Blendecques the Battalion was joined by Lieut. A. -Hurd, R.A.M.C., medical officer, vice Captain Casey to -hospital. 2/Lieut. E. W. Bottomley was also evacuated -to hospital.</p> - -<p>On the 19th February the 1/4th Londons left the many -good friends they had made in Blendecques and marched -through Wittes, where it halted for the night, to Ham-en-Artois, -arriving at 12.30 p.m. on the 20th, and joined -the Ferozepore Brigade of the Lahore Division.</p> - -<p>The Indian Corps (Lieut.-Gen. Sir James Willcocks, -G.C.M.G., K.C.B., K.C.S.I., D.S.O.) had arrived in France -in the preceding October and comprised the 3rd (Lahore) -and 7th (Meerut) Divisions, the former including the -following units:</p> - -<dl> - <dt class="center">LAHORE DIVISION</dt> - - <dt class="center">Major General <span class="smcap">H. D'U. Keary, C.B., D.S.O.</span></dt> - - <dt><span class="smcap">Divisional Cavalry</span></dt> - <dd>15th Lancers.</dd> - <dt><span class="smcap">Engineers</span></dt> - <dd>20th and 21st Sappers and Miners.</dd> - <dd>34th Sikh Pioneers.</dd> - <dt><span class="smcap">Jullundur Brigade</span>—Brig.-Gen. E. P. Strickland, C.M.G., D.S.O.</dt> - <dd>1st Manchesters.</dd> - <dd>1/4th Suffolks.</dd> - <dd>40th Pathans.</dd> - <dd>47th Sikhs.</dd> - <dd>59th Scinde Rifles (F.F.).</dd> - <dt><span class="smcap">Sirhind Brigade</span>—Brig.-Gen. W. R. Walker, V.C.</dt> - <dd>1st Highland Light Infantry.</dd> - <dd>4th King's Liverpools.</dd> - <dd>15th Ludhiana Sikhs.</dd> - <dd>1/1st Gurkha Rifles. -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_23" id="Page_23">[Pg 23]</a></span></dd> - <dd>1/4th Gurkha Rifles.</dd> - <dt><span class="smcap">Ferozepore Brigade</span>—Brig.-Gen. R. G. Egerton, C.B.</dt> - <dd>1st Connaught Rangers.</dd> - <dd>1/4th Londons.</dd> - <dd>9th Bhopals.</dd> - <dd>57th Wilde's Rifles (F.F.).</dd> - <dd>129th Baluchis (Duke of Connaught's Own).</dd> -</dl> - -<p>During the months of December and January the -Indian Corps had been heavily engaged in a local operation -which had raged with terrific intensity between the small -village of Givenchy and the extreme right of our line; -but our struggles to press forward along the canal to -La Bassée had been checked by a particularly vigorous -defence on the part of the enemy. The casualties suffered -by the Brigades of the Indian Corps in the fighting had -been so severe that it was necessary to withdraw some of -them for a time from the line for the purpose of rest and -reorganisation.</p> - -<p>On joining its Brigade the strength of the 1/4th Londons -was 25 officers and 828 other ranks. The Battalion was -fortunate in being posted to the Division at this juncture -as it had an opportunity before going into action of -becoming acquainted with its neighbouring battalions -with whom it was destined to share the fortunes of war -during the ensuing eleven months, and of gaining some -insight into the ancient, but at that date recently revived, -sciences of bombing and trench mortar work. And here -let us remark for the benefit of those members of the -Battalion who joined the Service at a later stage and -found Mills Bombs and the Stokes Mortar ready for their -use, that in February 1915 the only bombs in use were -those of the "jam-tin" variety, that is to say, were -roughly constructed out of old tins by the troops who -were to use them, filled with explosives, plugged with clay, -and fused with ordinary time fuse which had to be ignited -before the bomb was thrown; while the trench mortar -of the day is perhaps best described as a glorified rainwater -pipe bound with copper wire, and which threw a -"jam-tin" bomb and was quite as dangerous to the -team which manned it as to the Germans.</p> - -<p>With their unfailing adaptability to circumstances the -men of the Battalion rapidly became friends with the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_24" id="Page_24">[Pg 24]</a></span> -Indian troops whom they held in the greatest admiration. -The Gurkhas in particular seemed to exercise an irresistible -attraction for the men of London, who were especially -impressed with the Gurkhas' playful way of throwing -their murderous Kukri knives. Indeed, to such lengths -did this admiration—which took the form of imitation—lead -them that a Battalion order was very quickly necessary -to the effect that "the game known as 'Gurkhas' -played with unsheathed bayonets must cease forthwith!"</p> - -<p>Throughout this period the weather was intensely cold -and several falls of snow occurred. The billets were -passably good, however, and the Battalion's bill of health -remained clean.</p> - -<p>The Battalion was unfortunate at this period in losing -Sergeant-Major Dudley, who had done excellent work -since mobilisation and now left for a commission in the -Royal Fusiliers. He was killed a fortnight after joining -his regiment. His duties were taken by Col.-Sergt. Instr. -M. Harris, who filled this important position with success -for nearly three years.</p> - -<p>On the 22nd February the undermentioned officers, -being the first reinforcement received by the Battalion, -joined as follows:</p> - -<div class="hangindent"> - -<p>Lieuts. F. A. Coffin, H. M. Lorden, D. J. Leonard, and A. D. -Coates.</p></div> - -<p>It is now necessary for a moment to look at the course -which events were taking on the wide field of the Western -Theatre.</p> - -<p>At the period with which we are dealing, the Front -held by the British troops extended from the Béthune-La -Bassée Road, on the right to just north of the Ypres -Salient on the left, and General Headquarters (Field-Marshal -Sir John French in command) were at St Omer. -The British troops were divided into two Armies, of which -the First Army under Sir Douglas Haig, consisting of the -I Corps (Gough), IV Corps (Rawlinson), and Indian Corps -(Willcocks), held the right or southern end of the line; the -left being entrusted to the Second Army (Sir H. Smith-Dorrien), -which comprised the II Corps (Fergusson), the -III Corps (Pulteney), and the V Corps (Plumer).</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_25" id="Page_25">[Pg 25]</a></span></p> - -<p>The moving warfare of the autumn of 1914, which had -ended by the opposing armies gradually extending their -flanks until the sea was reached and had culminated in -the First Battle of Ypres in October—November 1914, -had given way to a siege warfare in which the belligerents -were confined in continuous lines of trenches which were -gradually being more heavily fortified. After the force -of the German drive toward Ypres had exhausted itself, -a lull in active operations ensued, hostilities flaring up -here and there along the line in the shape of minor operations -of terrible intensity, in which the possession of a -few yards of ground was contested with ferocity by both -sides. In the intervals between these small struggles, -however, the battle line had been comparatively quiet -during the winter months, and not materially changed, -the nett result being perhaps a slight gain of ground to -the British at the southern end of the line, which was -balanced by a tendency to lose ground in the north.</p> - -<p>Since the bitter struggle at Ypres in November 1914, -the enemy had, in the opinion of Sir John French, shown -certain signs of weakening on the Western Front, and -this was attributed by him to the success which was -attending the Russian offensive in East Prussia, and to -the consequent withdrawal of German troops from the -West. In order to assist our Russian Allies as far as -possible it was necessary to have resort to active operations -with the main object of holding as many of the -German reserves as possible in the West, and efforts to -this end were already being made by the French at Arras -and in Champagne.</p> - -<p>The ravages caused during the winter trench warfare -by sickness and "trench-foot," which had had especially -disastrous effects on those regular divisions composed of -troops withdrawn from tropical garrisons, rendered necessary -the early cultivation of a vigorous offensive spirit, -and these combined considerations led Sir John French -to the decision to take the offensive as soon as the condition -of the ground in Flanders should afford such an -undertaking a reasonable prospect of success. By the -beginning of March the conditions were considered suffi<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_26" id="Page_26">[Pg 26]</a></span>ciently -favourable, and the terrain selected for the proposed -offensive was the German positions opposed to the First -Army and defending the lower slopes of the Aubers -Ridge.</p> - -<p>The objective of the First Army's attack was the -advancement of our line to the high ground about Illies and -Hermies as a prelude to the occupation of La Bassée, -and this involved as a first local objective the capture -of the village of Neuve Chapelle. The Aubers Ridge is -a strongly marked hill feature, which runs in a south-westerly -direction from Lille until it loses itself in the -marshlands in the neighbourhood of La Bassée. Neuve -Chapelle, which had already changed hands several times -in the fighting of the previous autumn, is a small village, -the immediate surroundings of which are much intersected -with orchards and fences, about 1000 yards from the lowest -slopes of the Ridge, which, immediately opposite to it, -are covered by a considerable wood called the Bois du -Biez.</p> - -<p>The German defensive position skirted in front (or -to the north-west) of Neuve Chapelle and then making a -sharp turn southwards, followed the line of the Estaires-La -Bassée Road, for some 600 yards, from its junction -with Foresters Lane (Rue des Berceaux) to its junction -with the Rue du Bois, where once more turning slightly -to the west it left the hamlet of Richebourg L'Avoué in -the British lines, and finally made a wide sweep once -more to the south in the direction of Festubert (see Map -No. 1). The front of attack allotted to the Indian Corps -was that part which followed the alignment of the La Bassée -road between Rue du Bois and Foresters Lane, the actual -capture of the greater part of Neuve Chapelle being -entrusted to the 8th Division.</p> - -<p>The attack was to be preceded by a heavy artillery -bombardment, which on the Corps front would be conducted -by the divisional artillery of both the Lahore and -Meerut Divisions and the Corps heavy artillery, and this -was to be directed towards destroying the enemy's front -trenches and entanglements and certain strong posts, -the searching of the Bois du Biez, in order to disperse the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_27" id="Page_27">[Pg 27]</a></span> -concentration of the enemy's counter-attack troops, and -finally the building up of a "curtain of fire" (subsequently -though less descriptively termed a "barrage") east of -the captured positions, with the object of assisting the -work of consolidating them.</p> - -<p>The direction of the Indian Corps' attack being almost -easterly converged towards that of the IV Corps on their -left (this being south-easterly), and it was, therefore, -necessary after the first German positions had been -carried and touch with the IV Corps secured, to swing the -direction of attack round more to the south, and to -establish a fire position facing south in order to guard -against the danger of a German flanking counter-attack -from that quarter. The position selected for this was a -German sap, which had been thrown out from the enemy -lines towards the British strong point, Port Arthur, at -the corner of La Bassée Road and Rue du Bois.</p> - -<p>The troops holding the line of the Rue du Bois front, -outside the limit of the general attack, would thus be -responsible for the defence of the Indian right flank. It -was hoped that the first bound would carry our line -forward to the old II Corps line first occupied by Smith-Dorrien's -troops in October 1914, east of Neuve Chapelle -village.</p> - -<p>The assaulting troops detailed for this task were the -Gharwal and Dehra Dun Brigades of the Meerut Division, -the Bareilly Brigade being in close support; while the -Lahore Division (less artillery) was placed in Corps reserve, -the Ferozepore Brigade being allotted to Army Reserve.</p> - -<p>In accordance with these orders the Ferozepore Brigade -moved forward from Ham-en-Artois to the Zelobes area -on the 7th March, the 4th Londons marching to Calonne-sur-Lys -about eight miles north-west of Neuve Chapelle, -where it remained in billets in a constant state of readiness -to move. On the eve of the outbreak of our offensive -the order was relaxed to one of readiness to move at -twelve hours' notice.</p> - -<p>On the 10th March Lieut.-Col. Botterill was granted -seven days' leave of absence on urgent private affairs, -and command of the Battalion devolved temporarily on<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_28" id="Page_28">[Pg 28]</a></span> -Major L. T. Burnett, who remained in command until -after the termination of the Neuve Chapelle operations.</p> - -<p>In addition to the Brigades of the Meerut Division -already mentioned, on the right of the line, the troops -detailed for the assault comprised the 25th Brigade of the -8th Division opposite Neuve Chapelle village, with the -23rd Brigade of the same Division on the extreme left.</p> - -<p>An enormous concentration of artillery had been -quietly effected on this front, including many of our newly -arrived heavy batteries, and at 7.30 a.m. on the 10th March, -some 300 guns opened a devastating bombardment on -the German trenches along the frontage of attack. The -severity of this bombardment was unprecedented. -Trenches were obliterated, machine-guns and Germans -were literally blown into the air, and so dazed were the -enemy by the appalling ordeal that our men were able -to stand on their parapets to watch the inferno in front -of them. At 8.5 a.m. the range of the guns was lengthened -on to the enemy's support trenches and our assaulting -columns dashed forward. The Indians and the 25th -Brigade met with little resistance, but the 23rd Brigade -on the left found itself faced with a practically unbroken -wire entanglement, from beyond which a deadly fire was -poured into it by the enemy machine-guns. By 8.35 a.m. -the right and centre brigades had effected a lodgment in -the village, but the 23rd, being still held up and suffering -terrible losses, the 25th Brigade swung to its left and -turned the flank of the German troops who were opposing -the 23rd. By this means our left was able to advance -and by 11 a.m. the village of Neuve Chapelle was completely -in our hands, and consolidation of the ground -won was begun under cover of our artillery barrage, which -effectually carried out its task of preventing the enemy -bringing forward reinforcements for a counter-attack.</p> - -<p>The street fighting, however, had resulted in considerable -disorganisation of units, so that valuable hours -were lost in the necessary reorganisation, and it was not -until 3.30 p.m. that the advance could be resumed. The -attack so far had proved—as was intended—a complete -surprise, and the enemy's resistance seems to have been<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_29" id="Page_29">[Pg 29]</a></span> -paralysed except on the extreme left where our troops -were still under heavy fire.</p> - -<p>The only local counter-attack which developed during -the morning of the 10th was on the extreme right of the -attack, where the enemy succeeded along the Rue du Bois -in temporarily ejecting the Indian troops from the -captured trenches, and in effecting a strong lodgment in -the Orchard Trench in front of Richebourg L'Avoué. -During the morning the Jullundur and Sirhind Brigades -moved forward to Richebourg St Vaast and Vieille -Chapelle respectively.</p> - -<p>The afternoon advance was made on the right by the -Dehra Dun Brigade, supported by the Jullundur Brigade -of the Lahore Division, and the objective assigned to it -was the Bois du Biez. Between Neuve Chapelle and the -wood runs the little Rivière des Layes, and at a point -where this stream is spanned by a road bridge the enemy -had established a strong machine-gun post. The Indians -made a gallant advance over 1000 yards of open country, -and succeeded in penetrating the wood, but their line -was enfiladed by the machine-guns on the bridge and they -were unable to hold the line of their furthest advance. -On the left the attack was renewed by the 25th and -24th Brigades, the hard-hit 23rd being held back, their -objective being the cluster of houses at Moulin de Pietre, -about a mile east of Neuve Chapelle; but their efforts -also were frustrated by the machine-guns on the bridge, -which our artillery was unable to dislodge. Further left -still the front of attack had been extended and the 21st -Brigade (Watts) of the 7th Division was also directed -on Pietre; but in its advance encountered a line of undamaged -German trenches which effectually barred its -efforts to progress.</p> - -<p>The position, therefore, when darkness intervened -was that an average advance of over a thousand yards had -been gained and held, while practically no effort had been -made by the enemy to regain possession of the lost ground.</p> - -<p>Preparations were made for a renewal of the advance -on the following day, but the 11th dawned misty and the -day proved to be one of equilibrium. A further advance<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_30" id="Page_30">[Pg 30]</a></span> -was, attempted but the mist rendered aircraft observation -impossible and artillery co-operation with the infantry -extremely difficult owing to the constant breaking of our -forward lines of communication by the enemy shell fire. -Our troops, therefore, clung to their positions opposite -the Bois du Biez and Pietre under a murderous shell fire -which caused many casualties; while the enemy, by a -stroke of ill fortune, was accorded a for him lucky respite, -in which he was able to prepare his counter-attack.</p> - -<p>On the evening of the 11th the exhaustion of the troops -after two days' fighting rendered a relief desirable, as it -was hoped that weather conditions would favour a prosecution -of the offensive on the next day. The Meerut -Division consequently handed over its newly won positions -to the Lahore Division, the Dehra Dun Brigade being -replaced by the Sirhind Brigade, while arrangements were -completed for relieving the Gharwal Brigade on the night -of the 12th/13th by the Ferozepore Brigade.</p> - -<p>The same evening the 4th London moved at 6 p.m. -from Calonne to Lestrem where it arrived at midnight -and went into billets. Its stay there, however, was short -as within two hours it was turned out in order to move -further forward to Lacouture, about four miles west of -Neuve Chapelle, reaching there about 7.30 a.m. on the -12th March. Similar forward moves were made by the -remainder of the Brigade in view of its impending -occupation of the line.</p> - -<p>When the 4th Londons reached Lacouture the village -was under shell fire from the enemy's heavy guns and the -behaviour of all ranks under fire for the first time was -highly commendable. But here also the hopes of rest -on which the thoughts of all had been centred far more than -on the German shells, were dashed, for almost immediately -on arrival the Battalion received fresh orders to move -forward to Richebourg St Vaast, in which village Brigade -headquarters were then operating. The exhaustion of -all ranks on arrival was considerable as the Battalion had -been almost continuously on the move in full marching -order for about eighteen hours. Richebourg was a village -of some importance and a considerable number of our<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_31" id="Page_31">[Pg 31]</a></span> -heavy batteries supporting the Neuve Chapelle attack -were stationed in its vicinity, with the result that it -received a generous share of the enemy's counter-battery -bombardment and also a good deal of attention due, -apparently, to the prominence of its church tower, to the -existence of which the Germans objected.</p> - -<p>Here at last the Battalion was allotted billets in which -it remained until about 7 p.m., being under heavy shell -fire the whole time and sustaining its first battle casualties -of seven men wounded.</p> - -<p>The mist continued during the 12th and our main -operation could not be pursued. The hostile shell fire -increased in intensity, but the Germans were equally -with ourselves embarrassed by the difficulties of accurate -observation and their bombardments were not very -disastrous to us. Local advances were attempted by -our troops in various parts of the line and the houses -at Pietre were actually reached by the Guards of the -20th Brigade, but the ground gained was heavily swept -by hostile fire and could not be retained. All day counter-attacks -in mass formation were attempted by the Germans, -and costly as the day was to us, our casualties must have -been far exceeded by theirs, their ranks being literally -mown down by our rifle, machine-gun and shrapnel fire. -By dusk the enemy's attempts had exhausted themselves -and for the first time in the war the Germans gave up -attempts to recapture ground they had lost.</p> - -<p>As it had been hoped that the 12th would witness the -continuance of our successes it had been impossible to -arrange beforehand the details of the relief of the Gharwal -Brigade by the Ferozepore Brigade until the result of the -intended operations should be known, and it was not, -therefore, until late in the afternoon that the Brigade -received orders to move forward at once in order to take -part in an attack that evening on the Bois du Biez, which -position it was proposed to carry at all costs. For this -operation the 41st Dogras of the Bareilly Brigade, then -in the trenches, were to be lent to the Brigade and relieved -in their position in line by the 4th Londons. This relief, -however, could not be effected in time to enable the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_32" id="Page_32">[Pg 32]</a></span> -41st Dogras to join the Ferozepore Brigade, which consequently -advanced short of one battalion.</p> - -<p>The Brigade was not assembled in front of Neuve -Chapelle until darkness had fallen, and in order to allow -time for the necessary dispositions to be made, General -Egerton, who for this operation commanded not only the -Ferozepore, but also the Jullundur and Sirhind Brigades, -arranged for the attack to commence at 10.30 p.m. At -9.30 p.m., however, orders were received cancelling the -attack and indicating that the offensive had closed, and -the Brigade returned to billets in Vieille Chapelle and -Lacouture.</p> - -<p>Meanwhile the 4th Londons proceeded with the relief -of the 41st Dogras, and although they occupied the line -only for a few hours, perhaps we may be pardoned for a -rather more detailed record of the night's work than the -importance of the operation warrants in view of the -fact that this was the first tour of duty done by the -Battalion in trenches. The sector to be occupied lay at -an interval of about 300 yards from the right limit of the -Neuve Chapelle attack as already described, and consisted -of a frontage of some 400 yards, in front of the Rue du -Bois. The line in this part did not consist of a continuous -line of trenches. In the first place, the ground -here, as for miles in each direction, was too waterlogged -to admit of a trench being dug, and the defences, therefore, -consisted of a breastwork built up above ground -level, and in most parts of this sector the breastwork did -not exceed three feet in height and was entirely without -parados. As a result, moreover, of the recent fighting -the defensive line consisted rather of a series of short -breastworks with gaps between them which could only -be crossed under cover of darkness. Communication -trenches to the rear were non-existent and the breastwork -had to be approached from the Rue du Bois, to which -it ran parallel at a distance of about fifty yards, "overland." -It may be of interest to those who served in this -area with the regiment in the winter of 1916/17 to state -that this feeble breastwork was almost in the position of -the support line subsequently known as Guards' Trench.</p> - -<div class="figcenter" style="width: 500px;"> -<img src="images/i_b_032fp.jpg" width="500" height="452" alt="" /> -<div class="caption"><p><span class="smcap">Neuve Chapelle—Richebourg l'Avoué</span></p></div> -</div> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_33" id="Page_33">[Pg 33]</a></span></p> - -<p>This position perhaps was not an ideal one for the -first introduction of a raw Battalion to trench warfare, -and the situation was not improved by the exhaustion of -the men or the fact that the Rue du Bois was subject -to a great deal of heavy shelling which had not died down -since the German counter-attacks of the day, but which -continued through the night. The Battalion moved -forward by platoons past Windy Corner, where it came -under a heavy burst of shrapnel, and Edward Road, -skirting behind the ruined factory at the corner of the -Rue du Bois, and led by Indian guides, whose vague acquaintance -with the language of London did not assist -matters to any appreciable extent. Be it remembered -also that no maps had been issued and no reconnaissance -of the line had been possible to any company officer. -However, the Battalion succeeded in occupying its breastwork -and remained there during the night, somewhat -isolated as touch with the units on its flanks was difficult -to maintain owing to the breaks in the line, and all ranks -acquitted themselves in an exemplary manner. The -shrapnel and machine-gun fire maintained by the Germans -during the night cost a few casualties, amounting to -14 N.C.O.'s and men wounded. In addition to these -was 2/Lieut. A. R. Moore, who was hit in the leg on -the way up to the line. This officer, however, stuck -to his duty and remained with his platoon until after -relief of the Battalion the next morning. He was awarded -the Military Cross for his gallant conduct.</p> - -<p>The Ferozepore Brigade attack not having materialised, -the 41st Dogras returned to the trenches, and before daybreak -the 4th Londons were relieved and withdrew to -billets in Vieille Chapelle.</p> - -<p>With these incidents ended the battle of Neuve -Chapelle in which, although the gain of ground was much -less than had been hoped for, yet some solid success -had been achieved. Our line had been carried forward -for about 1000 yards on a front of about two miles, -and the prisoners captured amounted to 1650 all ranks. -The British casualties had reached the serious total of -12,811, but the enemy's far exceeded this number. The<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_34" id="Page_34">[Pg 34]</a></span> -outstanding result of the action, however, was an immense -accession of moral strength to the British troops, for it -had been clearly established that where we could meet -the Germans on terms of equality in men and material, -we were able to beat them, and the confirmation of this, -supplied by the battle of Neuve Chapelle, sent a thrill -of triumph in the hearts of our men all along the line.</p> - -<p>On the night 13/14 March, the Ferozepore Brigade -relieved the Bareilly Brigade on the Rue du Bois, the -front line being occupied by the 57th Rifles, 129th -Baluchis and 1st Connaught Rangers, the 4th Londons -moving to Richebourg St Vaast in Brigade reserve.</p> - -<p>The sector now taken over extended from Chocolat -Menier Corner on the right to Port Arthur on the left, -and during the tour proved to be fairly quiet, except -in the left subsection held by the Connaughts, where two -strong points, Port Arthur and the Orchard Redoubt, -and also the Crescent Trench, a circular trench connecting -them, were daily subjected to heavy bombardments.</p> - -<p>The 4th Londons in reserve provided garrisons for -the forward area as follows:</p> - -<div class="hangindent"> - -<p>D Company (Cart de Lafontaine) to the Orchard Redoubt, which -it held in company with a party of the Connaughts.</p> - -<p>One Platoon of each of A, B and C Companies to the left -subsection, under instruction in trench warfare by the -Connaughts.</p> - -<p>Two Platoons each of B and C Companies (Moore and Vine) to -Redoubts D5 and D6 respectively. These redoubts were close -to Windy Corner on Forresters Lane, and were subsequently -known as Dogs and Edward Posts.</p> - -<p>Machine-Gun Detachment to Port Arthur Keep, and Trench -Mortar Section to the left subsection.</p></div> - -<p>The platoons under instruction were relieved every -forty-eight hours in order to ensure that during the tour -of duty the companies were all given a certain amount -of trench experience. The remaining platoons, not for -the moment employed in garrison duty, were billeted with -Battalion Headquarters in Richebourg, and provided -working and carrying parties each night for the line.</p> - -<p>The line was still not fully organised after the battle, -and the Crescent Trench was not properly connected either<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_35" id="Page_35">[Pg 35]</a></span> -to the Orchard on its right or to Port Arthur on the -farther side of the La Bassée Road on its left; and as -the construction of communication trenches in this area -had not yet been seriously undertaken, the various companies -holding those works were isolated during the hours -of daylight, as were also the detached listening posts -pushed forward in front of them into No Man's Land. -There was thus a very considerable amount of trench -work required to bring the defences to a proper state -of organisation and also in the completion of the wire -entanglements in front of the new advanced line, and -the 4th Londons were called upon for heavy duties -in this direction in conjunction with the Sappers and -Miners.</p> - -<p>The tower of Richebourg church still proved a great -attraction to the enemy's heavy guns, and the village -was daily subjected to severe shell fire during daytime. -On 21st March it became evident that the Germans were -determined to destroy the church tower, and a steady -bombardment with heavy shells began, which caused -infinite damage to the church itself and the surrounding -houses. During this bombardment a direct hit was -obtained on a billet occupied by a platoon of Highland -Light Infantry, causing casualties of 12 killed and 30 -wounded. Later three direct hits were registered on the -church tower, which fell about noon, and this achievement -was followed by a complete cessation of hostile fire, which -indicated sufficiently clearly what the intention of the -bombardment had been.</p> - -<p>All ranks of the Battalion were now settling down to -their duties in the trenches, showing great keenness to -increase their value as fighting troops and exhibiting the -greatest steadiness under the numerous heavy bombardments -to which they had been exposed, and it was, therefore, -gratifying to receive a word of appreciation as to -their behaviour from the Divisional Commander during a -visit which he paid to Battalion Headquarters on the 17th.</p> - -<p>The Battalion was now again under command of -Lieut.-Col. G. P. Botterill, and Major L. T. Burnett -resumed his duties as second in command.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_36" id="Page_36">[Pg 36]</a></span></p> - -<p>On the 17th also a further reinforcement of officers -was received as follows:</p> - -<div class="hangindent"> - -<p>Major E. H. Stillwell and 2/Lieuts. E. P. M. Mosely and F. F. -Hunt.</p></div> - -<p>The Machine-Gun and Trench Mortar Sections were -now carrying out their full duties in the front trenches, -and did exceedingly good work during this tour, which, -for the latter section, was their first experience of working -their mortars in action. During the bombardment of -the 19th, 2/Lieut. J. T. Sykes, in charge of the trench -mortars, was wounded by shrapnel while "spotting" for -a mortar shoot, and evacuated to hospital.</p> - -<p>On the night of the 23/24 March the relief of the -Ferozepore Brigade by the 2nd Brigade began, and the -forward garrisons of the 4th London being withdrawn, -the Battalion on the following evening marched back -to billets at Paradis, a small village near Merville. The -Connaughts were relieved in the line on the following -night, and the Brigade being concentrated in the Paradis -area came into Army Reserve at two hours' notice to -move.</p> - -<p>The total casualties sustained by the Battalion during -this tour of trench duty were 17, a very small number -having regard to the severity of the bombardments to -which it had been subjected.</p> - -<p>From the 26th March until the 2nd April, Lieut.-Col. -Botterill was in temporary command of the Brigade -during the absence on leave of the Brigadier; and command -of the Battalion for this period was assumed by -Major G. H. M. Vine.</p> - -<p>The rest billets at Paradis were retained until the -30th March, the six days being occupied in company -training and route marches, and viewing of arms by the -Brigade Armourer-Sergeant. On the 28th a parade -service was held by Captain Cart de Lafontaine, this -being the first Church Service which the Battalion had -had the opportunity of attending since the middle of -February.</p> - -<p>The Battalion was now firm friends with its Indian -comrades whose soldierly qualities it was learning to<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_37" id="Page_37">[Pg 37]</a></span> -appreciate from actual experience. Difficulties of language -formed a barrier to close intercourse, but a sort of war-cry -was evolved which, being exchanged between Indian -and Cockney, formed a guarantee of friendship. A shout -of "Anglais-bon! Indian-bon! Allemand-<span class="smcap">NO BON</span>!!" -exchanged in passing became a frequent form of greeting.</p> - -<p>On the night of the 31st March the Brigade returned -to the trenches, relieving the Sirhind Brigade in a sector -north of Neuve Chapelle village, the right boundary of -which was Sign Post Lane, a road running through the -lines in the direction of the Bois du Biez.</p> - -<p>The 4th London was again in Brigade Reserve, and -moved from Paradis at 7 a.m. to Les Huit Maisons, where -it remained in temporary billets until dusk when it advanced -to Croix Barbée, Battalion Headquarters occupying -a house at the corner of Loretto and Edward Roads. -This house will be in the recollection of those who served in -this area in 1917 as the site of St Vaast R.E. dump. Here -the Battalion was again under instruction in trench -duties with the Connaughts, who were in the right subsection -of the new Brigade sector, but on this occasion -companies went into the line in turn as a whole, the -companies not actually in trenches occupying reserve -posts at Loretto, Green Barn, and St Vaast.</p> - -<p>The right subsection was defended by breastworks and -was immediately facing Pietre, the hamlet which had stood -between our troops and success on the afternoon of the -10th March. It included the peculiar feature of the -Duck's Bill, in regard to which a word of description may -not be out of place. The name Duck's Bill brings to the -minds of most 4th London men the picture of a large -defended mine crater quite close to the German line, and -approached by a defended sap which was generally full -of water. Such it was in the winter of 1916/17, but in the -spring of 1915 the Duck's Bill was a ruined farmhouse -standing on a knoll just in front of the cross-road connecting -Sign Post Lane with Sunken Road. This ruin -was surrounded by a horseshoe trench, the points of the -horseshoe resting on the cross-road, which was barricaded -and connected with the front line by a rough breastwork.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_38" id="Page_38">[Pg 38]</a></span> -The defences here were still in an unfinished condition -as the farmhouse was the extreme point of our advance -in this sector in the battle, and the road barricades were -under the continual watch of German snipers in Pietre. -On the night of our entry into this sector the farmhouse -had just been demolished by German incendiary shells -and the ruins were still smouldering.</p> - -<p>"A Bosche had been buried," writes Captain Moore, -"in the hastily constructed parapet, face downward, and -with his booted feet sticking into our trench. They were -Bosche boots, so presumably were on Bosche feet, and -every time one passed in the dark one knocked them—a -truly gruesome spot."</p> - -<p>The Duck's Bill farmhouse was finally disposed of -when the mine crater was blown in 1916.</p> - -<p>The reserve posts to which the companies in reserve -were detailed were defended keeps forming with others -the Croix Barbée line of defence. The aftermath of the -battle, which had taken the form of such vigorous shelling -by the enemy, now exhausted itself and this tour proved -particularly quiet. The enemy's attention was paid -principally to the roads and communications in rear of -our trenches, but his shelling was sporadic and harmless.</p> - -<p>On the 11th April the Battalion moved out of Croix -Barbée, marching at 5 p.m. for Paradis, where it was -joined the following day by the remaining units of the -Brigade, now in Divisional reserve.</p> - -<p>Of the rest in Paradis little need be said. The twelve -days were spent in training under company arrangements -and in bathing, completing issues of deficiencies in clothing, -etc. On the 16th and 17th April, however, practice -attacks on trenches were carried out as a brigade exercise, -and although no definite information was, at the time, -conveyed to the units as regards the purpose of the -practice, the exercise was in preparation for the rôle which -the Brigade would be called upon to play during its next -tour in the line. It was, therefore, with the greater -satisfaction that the 4th Londons carried out the exercises -in leading the assaulting columns beside the Connaught -Rangers.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_39" id="Page_39">[Pg 39]</a></span></p> - -<p>The novitiate of the Battalion was now over, and it -was accepted as being in every way able to do its full -duty as a unit of the Ferozepore Brigade, and the knowledge -that it had "found itself" was in itself the best -possible incentive to all ranks to uphold worthily the -honour of their regiment. The weather was of the most -perfect spring type, and the ground and dykes were once -more in their normal condition for the time of year. -Speculation was rife, therefore, as to the task which was -destined to be set the Brigade on its return to the line.</p> - -<p>A warning order was received that the Brigade would -relieve the Dehra Dun Brigade on Saturday, the 26th April, -in a sector in front of Neuve Chapelle village, extending -from the La Bassée Road on the right to Sign Post Lane -on the left. The 4th Londons were to take over the left -centre subsection, the other front line battalions being -the Connaughts, the 9th Bhopals and the 57th Rifles, -with the 129th Baluchis in Brigade reserve. But this -relief was destined not to take place.</p> - -<p>During the day disquieting rumours went round—started -as inexplicably as such rumours always are—that -things were not well in the north near Ypres: -rumours of heavy fighting, of defeat, and of dastardly -crimes on the part of the enemy. That the incredible -brutality of the Germans was indeed an accomplished fact -all the world now knows, and we must now review the -tremendous happenings in the Ypres salient which caused -the outbreak of a storm destined to rage with ever-increasing -fury for the next three weeks.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_40" id="Page_40">[Pg 40]</a></span></p> -<div class="chapter"></div> -<hr class="chap" /> - - - - -<h2>CHAPTER IV<br /> - -THE 1/4TH BATTALION IN THE SECOND BATTLE -OF YPRES, 1915</h2> - - -<p>Since the exhaustion of the enemy's drive towards Ypres -in November 1914, the Ypres area had not been the -scene of any important operations, although from time to -time fierce struggles had raged here and there for the -possession of points of minor tactical importance. Early -in April 1915 the British lines had been extended slightly -northward, and a sector had been taken over from the -French troops on the left. On the 22nd of that month -the line from Steenstraate (near the Yser Canal) as far -as the Poelcapelle Road east of Langemarck was held by -a Moroccan Division of the French Army. Thence the -line took a south-easterly turn towards the Passchendaele-Becelaere -Road and was occupied by the Canadian -Division. On the right of the Canadians, British divisions -held the trenches which ran east of Zonnebeeke in the -direction of Hooge.</p> - -<p>On the afternoon of the 22nd the French lines were -subjected to a heavy bombardment, following which at -about 5 p.m. our aeroplanes reported that they had seen -thick clouds of yellow smoke issuing from the German -trenches between Langemarck and Bixschoote. These -arose, as is now well known, from poison gas, of which the -effect was so terrible as to render the troops exposed to -it practically incapable of action. The smoke and fumes -at first hid everything from sight, and hundreds of men -were immediately incapacitated. Within an hour the -whole position had to be abandoned with the loss of -fifty guns. This horrible and unlooked-for attack was -so overpowering in its moral effect that our gallant allies -were unable to combat it, and being totally unprovided -with means of defence against so diabolical a contrivance,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_41" id="Page_41">[Pg 41]</a></span> -were forced—as indeed any troops would probably have -been under the like conditions—to abandon their position -without offering resistance. The confusion and moral -effect were doubtless increased by the fact that the -trenches thus attacked were occupied by Africans whose -firm belief in the supernatural rendered it so much the more -difficult for them to withstand this assault.</p> - -<p>The immediate result of this gas attack was that the -left flank of the Canadian Division was in the air and -was in imminent danger of being entirely cut off. But -the Canadians stuck to their positions with magnificent -tenacity and during the night repulsed numerous German -attacks. In the disorganisation following the gas attack -the Germans had succeeded in establishing themselves -on the west side of the Yser Canal at Lizerne, thus -threatening to drive a wedge between the Canadians on -the right and the French and Belgian troops on the -left.</p> - -<p>By 10 o'clock the next morning the position, though -by no means re-established, was slightly easier, touch -being definitely ensured between the Canadians' left and -the French right, about 800 yards east of the Canal; but -in order to effect this junction so great an extension of the -British lines had been necessary that no reserves were -available for counter-attack. The enemy's artillery fire -was severe all day and the situation was rendered exceptionally -difficult by the loss of so many allied guns in the -gas attack.</p> - -<p>It was arranged between Sir John French and General -Foch, who was in command of the French Army on our -left, that the latter should make immediate arrangements -for the recapture of the original French Line, and for this -purpose it was necessary for the British to maintain their -present position without further retirement; but it was -clear that the British troops could not be allowed to -remain in the precarious position held by them during -the last twenty-four hours unless the French attack were -delivered within a reasonable time. In the meantime -such reinforcements as were immediately available from -neighbouring Corps were being rushed up into Ypres to<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_42" id="Page_42">[Pg 42]</a></span> -strengthen the temporary line between ourselves and -the French.</p> - -<p>On the 24th a heavy German attack breached our -lines at St Julien. This might have initiated an extremely -critical situation but for a powerful counter-attack -organised and launched by Brig.-Gen. Hull (afterwards -G.O.C. 56th Division), who, with his own Brigade and -parts of battalions belonging to six different divisions all -new to the ground, was successful in stemming the tide -of the enemy's advance, although attempts to recapture -St Julien were repulsed.</p> - -<p>Early in the morning of the 25th the left flank of the -Canadian division was driven back after two days' magnificent -fighting, and by the evening the allied line north -of Ypres ran practically east and west from the neighbourhood -of Boesinghe on the Canal to the south outskirts of -St Julien. The general tendency of this line was to bow -inwards towards Ypres. The seriousness of the threat to -the whole British position east of Ypres is obvious. It -was now possible for the enemy to shell any point in -our lines from both sides of the salient, while his positions -being about two miles farther to the south than they had -been prior to the gas attack of the 22nd, he was able to -keep the arterial road from Ypres to Zonnebeeke under -continuous and heavy shell fire from guns of all calibres.</p> - -<p>During the whole time considerable confusion was -created by the alteration of areas caused by the sudden -relinquishment of the forward positions; and by the fact -that fresh troops on arrival in the Ypres area had at once -to be absorbed into the firing line to prevent the enemy -from exploiting his initial success. This confusion was -heightened by our lack of artillery, which was inadequate -to keep down the heavy German fire, and our casualties -were in consequence continuously heavy. Ypres was -itself kept under very heavy shell fire which vastly increased -the difficulty of maintaining supplies of munitions -and food.</p> - -<p>The Lahore Division was ordered on the 23rd April -to move to the Ypres area, and on the morning of the 24th -orders were received by the 1/4th Londons that the con<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_43" id="Page_43">[Pg 43]</a></span>templated -relief of the Dehra Dun Brigade on the La -Bassée Road would not take place and that the Battalion -would be ready to move—possibly by train—at 1.30 p.m. -By 2 p.m. the Battalion had joined in the Ferozepore -Brigade column followed by the first line transport. In -ignorance of its destination, and quite unaware of the -bitter struggle then going on at Ypres, the Battalion -expected to entrain at Merville, and a great many packs -were filled with eatables and comforts for a long train -journey.</p> - -<p>However, when Merville, Indian Corps railhead, was -passed it became evident that whatever journey was -before the column would be made on foot. The march -was an exceedingly trying one and was made under -"forced" conditions. The roads were in a bad state -after the winter rains, and a good deal of opening out in -the column was inevitable, so that the five-minute halts -which took place each hour were mostly spent in "closing -up." Hour after hour the column moved on under the -burden of full marching order, now over uneven pavé, -now in deep ruts and thick mud. Merville, Vieux, -Berquin, Strazeele, were passed in succession. Daylight -gave place to dusk and dusk to darkness but still the -column struggled forward. From all battalions stragglers -now began to line the sides of the road, unable after the -physically weakening experience of trench life to keep up -the pace. At last about 10.30 p.m. a long halt was made -just outside Godewaersvelde, a small village at the foot of -the Mont des Cats. Here a rest of some forty minutes -was obtained on the roadside while double lines of guns, -ammunition columns, and transport blocked the road.</p> - -<p>Finally at about 10.45 p.m. the Battalion moved -forward into Godewaersvelde, but the village was packed -with troops, and the companies, therefore, had to content -themselves with such shelter as could be found beneath -the parked lorries in the streets.</p> - -<p>But the end of the march was not yet. After a hasty -breakfast the Battalion was again on parade before -6 o'clock on the morning of the 25th, and once more -joining the Brigade Column struggled up the steep hill<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_44" id="Page_44">[Pg 44]</a></span> -at Boescheppe, at the top of which another delay was -caused by a cross-current of vehicular traffic. The distress -of the troops was now so evident that orders were -received to lighten packs, and garments of all sorts, -principally gifts of knitted garments sent out from ladies -in England, were left by the roadside. Through Westoutre -and Reninghelst the column marched on to Ouderdom, -where it arrived at about 2.30 p.m. with orders to billet -in huts. Most of the huts were already fully occupied -and the greater part of the 1/4th Londons were compelled -to bivouac in the fields adjoining. Ouderdom is about -seven miles south-west of Ypres, and the object of the -forced march was at last clear. Some little idea of the -storm raging in the salient could be gathered from the -bivouacs, as throughout the afternoon and night the air -vibrated with the continuous thunder of artillery in which -the rapid and sharp rafales of the French "seventy-fives" -away to the north were plainly distinguishable.</p> - -<p>Shortly after midnight orders were received that the -Division would be pushed into the firing line that day, -the 26th April, and at dawn the Battalion was once more -formed up. Shovels and picks were issued alternately to -all the troops for the purpose of digging themselves into -such positions as they might be able to gain, and to each -platoon was issued a yellow flag for signalling its location -to the artillery. In these early days of the War no arrangements -were made for the formation of a "battle surplus," -and consequently the whole available strength of officers -and men prepared to move forward. Packs were now -stacked to relieve the troops of superfluous weight, and at -4.30 a.m. the companies began to move off at five minutes' -intervals.</p> - -<p>The exhaustion of the men made progress inevitably -slow. The roads traversed were fortunately not receiving -much attention from the enemy's artillery, though a -steady bombardment of Ypres with shells of the heaviest -calibre was proceeding. By about 9.30 a.m. the Battalion -was concentrated in a field adjoining Outskirt Farm at -La Brique, where it proceeded to dig itself into assembly -trenches (see map No. 3).</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_45" id="Page_45">[Pg 45]</a></span></p> - -<p>Meanwhile the Jullundur Brigade had concentrated -farther to the east, between St Jean and Wieltje, while -the Sirhind Brigade in Divisional Reserve had moved -round the south of Ypres to a position north-west of -Potizje.</p> - -<p>The 1/4th Londons' position<a name="FNanchor_1_1" id="FNanchor_1_1"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_1" class="fnanchor">[1]</a> during the hours of -waiting in the morning was behind the crest of the spur -which runs westward from St Jean, past La Brique towards -the Canal, and though out of view from the German trenches -was undoubtedly located by the enemy's Taubes, whose -reconnaissances over our lines were entirely unmolested. -This, combined with the close proximity of the Battalion's -position to several British and French batteries, brought -it a fair share of German shrapnel during the morning, -the shelling being from both the north and south sides of -the salient. Happily but few casualties were sustained.</p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_1_1" id="Footnote_1_1"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_1"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> It has been thought convenient in the account of this action to -designate buildings and other topographical features by the names by -which they afterwards became generally known, though they were not -in every case so named in April 1915.</p></div> - -<p>Below the hillside on which the Battalion lay concealed -and distant something more than half a mile the -gaunt ruins of Ypres stood out clearly in the morning -sunlight, the fast-crumbling tower of its wonderful Cloth -Hall still erect, a silent witness of the tragedy which was -being enacted. All the morning shells were falling into -the town, a steady and merciless bombardment without -the least cessation or abatement. From the centre of -the town dense columns of black smoke rose continuously, -and the crash of explosions and the clatter of falling -débris followed each other without respite. The cross-roads -at which the St Jean road left the town were in -particular a target for the German heavy guns. All the -morning the 50th (Northumberland) Division T.F. was -moving from Ypres along this road to St Julien, and as -each platoon passed the fatal cross-road at the double a -heavy shell fell close by thinning the ranks. It seemed -to every spectator of this horrible yet fascinating sight -that the German artillery fire must surely be directed -from some point within the British lines.</p> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_46" id="Page_46">[Pg 46]</a></span></p> -<p>At 12.40 p.m. the Brigade received orders to prepare -to take part in a divisional attack in conjunction with the -French in a due northerly direction, with the object of -relieving the pressure on the left of St Julien and of endeavouring -to push the enemy back. With this attack -the 50th Division would co-operate on the right of the -Lahore Division in an attempt to recapture St Julien -itself.</p> - -<p>The Ferozepore Brigade's frontage was on the right -of Boundary Road (the Ypres-Langemarck Road) and -extended as far as English Farm, beyond which the -Jullundur Brigade was responsible as far as Wieltje Farm -on the extreme right, and the general line of assembly -was on the forward slope of the spur some 600 yards -north of La Brique.</p> - -<p>The Brigade's advance was led by the Connaught -Rangers on the left, the 57th Rifles in the centre, with -the 129th Baluchis on the right. The 1/4th Londons -were to follow the Connaughts, while the 9th Bhopals -remained in reserve in La Brique.</p> - -<p>At 2 o'clock the attack was launched under a heavy -bombardment from all available British and French -batteries, but such was the shortage of ammunition that -this support died down for lack of supplies in about -five minutes, after which the German batteries were free -to search intensively the whole area of the Brigade -advance, causing a good many casualties in the assaulting -columns.</p> - -<p>From the line of assembly the ground subsided gently -to a shallow depression running across the direction of -advance, beyond which, at a distance of some 1000 yards -from the crest on the La Brique side, the hill swelled to a -second skyline which impeded further view. Just below -the crest of the further spur an unfenced lane, Buffs -Road, followed the contour running eastwards from -Boundary Road. None of this land was intersected by -trenches, the Allied trenches being several miles ahead -and to the rear of the German positions.</p> - -<p>The 1/4th Londons moved from their position of -waiting at about 2.30 p.m., and shaking out into four<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_47" id="Page_47">[Pg 47]</a></span> -lines of platoons in file with B Company (Moore) on the -left, and A (Duncan-Teape) on the right of the front line, -followed by D (Saunders) and C (Clark). The German -shrapnel was now searching both slopes of the spur pretty -severely and men began to drop, but the Battalion steadily -breasted the rise from which it could overlook the shallow -valley towards Buffs Road. The sight which met their -eyes defies description. The valley was covered with a -ragged crowd of agonised and nerve-racked men, both -Moroccans and Indians, who, having thrown down their -arms and everything which could impede them, were -streaming back from the front trenches suffering the -tortures of poison gas. It was a revolting sight. The -attack had clearly failed and our leading troops were -broken and in retirement. But the men of the 1/4th -Londons were splendid. Without wavering for a single -instant they trudged steadily forward, though indeed -almost completely exhausted, maintaining the intervals -and distances between platoons with the precision of the -parade ground. Never was there a more striking example -of the results of training and discipline. The "attack in -open warfare" which had been so roundly cursed by one -and all in the days of training at Blendecques had indeed -so sunk into the minds of everyone that instinctively the -troops remembering only their orders to "follow the -Connaughts at all costs" carried out under the most -trying ordeal the lessons which had been drilled into them.</p> - -<p>The Battalion continued to advance as far as Buffs -Road, where a halt, believed at first to be temporary, was -called. No trench line existed here but the ditch on the -near side of the road had been widened. This was already -filled with the remains of the 2nd K.O.S.B. (who had been -fighting continuously since the action at Hill 60 on the -17th April, and were now reduced to under 100 all ranks) -and by the reserve company of the Connaughts. The -majority of the Battalion were, therefore, unable to -obtain shelter in the ditch, and the digging of a fresh line -some fifteen yards in rear was at once put in hand.</p> - -<p>Early in the advance Moore (B Coy.) was hit in the -foot and his company was taken over by Grimwade.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_48" id="Page_48">[Pg 48]</a></span> -Considering the severity of the enemy's shrapnel fire the -advance was made with surprisingly few casualties, and -although owing to the massing of the whole Battalion -on one line of narrow frontage some intermingling of -platoons on halting was inevitable, this was rapidly set -to rights with little difficulty. The enemy's bombardment -soon died away considerably, though for a while he maintained -a steady machine-gun fire sweeping the crest of -the ridge ahead of Buffs Road.</p> - -<p>The troops leading the attack had moved forward -steadily at zero hour and had pushed over the crest line -in front of Buffs Road descending the further slope towards -Turco Farm. The front German trench north of the -Farm was reached and occupied, but before the position -was properly established dense yellow clouds of poison -gas issued from the enemy lines and, being gently wafted -by the breeze, bore down on our defenceless troops. -Under the horror of this ordeal the greater part of -the line broke and a general retirement ensued which -affected most severely the French and Indian Battalions, -as already described. About 100 of the Connaughts and -the Manchesters (Sirhind Brigade), however, managed to -cling gallantly to their ground under Major Deacon, -though they were shortly afterwards ejected by a strong -enemy counter-attack which followed the gas cloud. -They eventually succeeded in consolidating a line in the -immediate vicinity of Turco Farm.</p> - -<p>Shortly after the 1/4th Londons were established on -Buffs Road Lieut.-Col. Botterill became a casualty, and -Major L. T. Burnett assumed command of the Battalion. -It was decided by Major Burnett that the overcrowding -of the Buffs Road alignment was so great and wasteful -of fire power, quite half the Battalion being unable to get -into position to use their rifles, that a redisposition of -his forces was desirable, and accordingly C and D companies -withdrew to a position in support some 300 yards -in rear of Buffs Road, where they dug themselves in.</p> - -<p>During this time the Regimental Aid Post under -Lieut. Hurd, R.A.M.C., was established at Irish Farm -and the Battalion stretcher-bearers under Corpl. Fulford -worked with great coolness in evacuating the wounded -under heavy fire.</p> - -<div class="figcenter" style="width: 338px;"> -<img src="images/i_b_048fp.jpg" width="338" height="500" alt="" /> -<div class="caption"><p><span class="smcap">The Second Battle of Ypres, 1915</span></p></div> -</div> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_49" id="Page_49">[Pg 49]</a></span></p> - -<p>At about 4.30 p.m. orders were received that the -reserve company of the Connaughts was to push forward -and reinforce their two leading companies, supported by -the 1/4th Londons. But, after consultation with Major -Burnett, Major Hamilton of the Connaughts decided that -the severity of the enemy's fire was so great that there -was no reasonable probability of achieving a result commensurate -with the inevitable loss of life, and the orders -for the projected advance were cancelled. An attempt -to reinforce the advanced troops was, however, actually -made at about 7.30 p.m. by the 15th Sikhs and the 1/4th -Gurkhas of the Sirhind Brigade, supported by the 9th -Bhopals. This advance was carried out in good order, -the Indians passing through the 1/4th Londons and disappearing -over the ridge in front under a veritable hail -of fire; but although touch was obtained with the leading -companies of the Connaughts, the position of the German -trenches could not be ascertained in the gathering darkness, -and Lieut.-Col. Hills, who was in charge of the operation, -decided to dig in on the position gained.</p> - -<p>In conjunction with Bhopals' attempt an attack was -also delivered by the Turcos of the French Brigade -Moroccaine, who passed over the 1/4th Londons' trench -in the gathering dusk. They were met in the crest line -by a frightful machine-gun fire under which they advanced -steadily, suffering heavy losses. A young French officer -in charge of these Africans filled all who saw him with the -deepest admiration of his coolness. Smoking a cigarette -and lightly swinging a small rattan cane, he stood up on -the sky line with his loose blue cloak thrown negligently -over his shoulders, directing the advance of his men with -all the indifference to danger of which his wonderful -nation is capable. None of these gallant fellows were -seen again.</p> - -<p>During the whole of the 26th very good work was done -by 2/Lieut. A. D. Coates, who was employed as <em>liaison</em> -officer between Brigade Headquarters and the advanced -troops. This gallant young officer succeeded several<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_50" id="Page_50">[Pg 50]</a></span> -times in passing through the enemy's barrage and was -the means of providing Headquarters with valuable -information as to the course of events at Turco Farm.</p> - -<p>Meanwhile the 1/4th Londons remained in readiness -for action on Buffs Road, which was shelled heavily at -intervals, especially at about 6 p.m., when the German -shrapnel caused a great many casualties. The enemy's -fire, however, died down after the evening advance by -the Indians had been checked. The night was particularly -quiet, and Sergt.-Major Harris at La Brique was able to -get rations up to the Battalion and issue them.</p> - -<p>The 27th April broke grey and cold and the morning -was misty. During the early hours the enemy's artillery -was remarkably inactive and the work of strengthening -the Battalion's position was proceeded with without -molestation by the Germans. The signs of battle were -few indeed and it seemed almost impossible to realise the -critical position of the British troops. The sense of -detachment from the serious events of the preceding -afternoon was enhanced by the unbroken state of the -countryside in the immediate neighbourhood and the -presence of several cows, which by some marvellous chance -had escaped the enemy's shells and continued to graze -lazily in the field in rear of the Battalion's position, as they -had done during the battle on the previous afternoon.</p> - -<p>The lull, however, was only the calm which proverbially -precedes the storm, for about noon the enemy's guns -opened with intense violence on the British positions and -the 1/4th Londons received their full share of these hostile -attentions. Fortunately, however, its position behind -the crest secured it from heavy loss.</p> - -<p>During this bombardment Major Burnett was ordered -to report to Brigade Headquarters, where he received -orders for an attack to take place in half an hour's time. -When he got back to the Battalion under ten minutes -were left in which to explain the orders to his company -commanders and to make all preparations. The Battalion -was to execute a further advance in a north-easterly -direction on to Oblong Farm, which was given as the -objective. In order to reach the assembly position, it<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_51" id="Page_51">[Pg 51]</a></span> -was necessary for the Battalion to move about 200 yards -to the right flank in order to come up on the right of the -Sirhind Brigade, who, in the early hours of the morning, -had relieved the most advanced troops of the Ferozepore -Brigade.</p> - -<p>The hurried nature of the attack precluded any -possibility of reconnaissance of the ground by the officers -and allowed no time for the explanation of the work on -hand to the rank and file. The position of the German -trenches was unknown and the difficulties and obstacles -which might be met with during the advance were entirely -undisclosed.</p> - -<p>The movement of the Battalion toward its position -of assembly for this unpromising enterprise was carried -out steadily although with considerable loss. The British -and Canadian artillery, which were co-operating in giving -support to the attack, were again lamentably short of -ammunition, so that an intense bombardment of some -five minutes left them unable to render further assistance. -Thus as the Battalion in moving to its flank came near -the crest of the spur behind which it had hitherto been -concealed from direct observation by the enemy, it became -a very clear target for the hostile artillery, and the German -guns being no longer harassed by our artillery, were able -to pour a devastating fire upon the companies.</p> - -<p>The actual "jumping-off" position was the ditch on -the south side of Buffs Road which, at this point, was -bordered by a hedge. The Battalion advanced in two -lines of two companies in open order, each company formed -in three waves, and the leading companies were C (Clark) -on the left and D (Saunders) on the right, followed respectively -by B (Grimwade) and A (Duncan-Teape). -In order to ensure that the waves in each company should -move forward together, it was necessary to collect the -whole of each wave in the ditch before it moved; and -this could only be effected by "feeding" the men along -the ditch in single file, from the western end of the -Battalion's frontage, the hedge in rear being impenetrable. -The result of this slow progress was that the remainder -of the Battalion waiting its turn to go into the ditch was<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_52" id="Page_52">[Pg 52]</a></span> -compelled to wait on the hill, under a high explosive and -shrapnel fire which was both intense and accurate. The -result needs no description, but under this very trying -ordeal the Battalion was perfectly steady, each platoon -grouped together and waiting its order to move with the -greatest nonchalance.</p> - -<p>Before following the actual advance of the 1/4th -Londons it will be convenient to explain the object and -scope of the operation of which it formed part.</p> - -<p>During the morning arrangements had been made for -the Lahore Division to co-operate in an attack which -was projected by the French Brigade Moroccaine. The -general direction of the French attack was to be along -the Ypres-Langemarck Road, as on the previous day, -and the Lahore Division was to take all possible advantage -of the French advance to gain ground, but without -committing itself to the attack before the French troops -had secured its left flank. The Lahore Division's attack -was to conform to the French movement but on the east -side of the Langemarck Road; the Sirhind Brigade -occupying the left of the Divisional front next the French -with the Ferozepore Brigade on its right.</p> - -<p>The objective of the latter was, as already stated, -Oblong Farm, a moated farmstead some 1700 yards -from starting-point, the attack being led by the 1/4th -Londons on the left and the 9th Bhopals on the right. -The Connaughts followed in support at a distance of 400 -yards, while the 57th Rifles and the 129th Baluchis, both -of which regiments had been seriously weakened in the -action of the 26th, were in reserve.</p> - -<p>At 12.30 p.m. the leading waves of the two assaulting -battalions moved forward under a continued heavy shell -and machine-gun fire. The ground over which the -advance was to be made was for the first 700 yards an -unenclosed plateau which afforded the enemy good -observation of our movements, and then sloping gently -downwards to a somewhat more enclosed depression -rose beyond it once more towards the objective. The -objective itself was not visible from starting-point, and -it appears probable that in consequence of the very<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_53" id="Page_53">[Pg 53]</a></span> -hurried preparations for the attack, its position was not -fully appreciated by all concerned and thus it was not -recognised. However this may be, it is certain that the -general direction of the attack after crossing Admirals -Road became diverted too much towards the north and -thus some encroachment was made on the frontage for -which the Sirhind Brigade was responsible. This was -probably accentuated by the fact that the position selected -as starting-point lay at an acute angle to the direction of -advance, so that a change of direction was necessary -during the advance itself—always an operation of great -difficulty.</p> - -<p>As far as Admirals Road cover was non-existent. On -topping the crest of the hill the Battalion came under an -exceedingly severe rifle and machine-gun fire, and losses -were consequently heavy. The succeeding waves, however, -pushed on steadily as far as the near edge of the -depression described above, in the vicinity of Hampshire -Farm, when it became clearly impossible to get down -the forward slope of the valley under the raking fire of -the enemy, without incurring frightful losses. Half the -leading companies were already hit, as were also Saunders, -fatally wounded, Grimwade, Stedman, Leonard, and -Coates. It was, therefore, decided by Major Burnett to -hold the line gained and there to reorganise the Battalion -pending the arrival of reinforcements, when it might be -possible to carry the line forward.</p> - -<p>A small part of C Company under Clark and of B -Company under Giles, however, were successful in gaining -the bottom of the valley, but finding himself isolated and -further advance impossible without support, Clark, who -assumed command of the composite party, took up a -position to the right of Canadian Farm, where the men -dug themselves in with their entrenching tools and hung -on gallantly under a murderous fire. Splendid service -was rendered by two N.C.O.'s of this party, Sergeant -A. C. Ehren and Lance-Corporal C. Badham, both of B -Company, who passed through the barrage three times -unscathed with messages between Captain Clark and -Battalion Headquarters.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_54" id="Page_54">[Pg 54]</a></span></p> - -<p>Excellent work was also done by the Machine-Gun -Section under 2/Lieuts. Walker and Pyper, who skilfully -brought their guns into action on the left of Hampshire -Farm and assisted in no small measure to keep down -the hostile rifle fire from the enemy trenches on the further -side of the valley. Their position, however, was shortly -afterwards discovered, evidently by a Taube, which continued -its reconnaissance over our lines without let or -hindrance, and the section came under heavy shell fire and -was forced to fall back on the main position, with Walker -dangerously wounded, Sergt. Phillips killed, and several -other casualties.</p> - -<p>At about 2.30 p.m. the enemy's artillery fire abated -considerably, but by that time the advance of the whole -Division had been definitely checked on an alignment -generally corresponding with that occupied by the 1/4th -Londons, and reports were received that the French also -had failed to gain their objectives.</p> - -<p>Later in the evening the French attempted to renew -their offensive, but once more were met with clouds of -poison gas which definitely broke up their attack, and a -report having been received from Col. Savy, the French -Commander, that his losses were so heavy as to preclude -all further attempts, orders were received that the Brigade -would consolidate its position.</p> - -<p>During the evening before dusk the Ferozepore Brigade -was again subjected to violent shelling, which inflicted -considerable loss on all battalions. During this later -bombardment Lieut. Coffin was buried by a high explosive -shell.</p> - -<p>After darkness fell the 1/4th Londons were withdrawn -from their advanced line to Brigade Reserve in rear of -Cross Roads Farm where they set about digging fresh -trenches. The Connaughts and the Bhopals withdrew to -the line of Admirals Road near Cross Roads Farm, in -which Brigade Headquarters were now established, while -the Rifles and Baluchis took up a position to the rear.</p> - -<p>The night passed without incident and with very -little shelling, and the opportunity was taken to collect -the wounded whom it had been impossible to evacuate<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_55" id="Page_55">[Pg 55]</a></span> -under the heavy fire of the afternoon. 2/Lieut. E. Giles, -who from many volunteers was selected for this work, -set a splendid example of devotion to duty and worked -hard throughout the night in endeavouring to relieve the -sufferings of his men.</p> - -<p>The day's losses had been heavy and the gain of -ground nil, but the bearing of the Battalion under somewhat -disheartening circumstances had been worthy of the -highest traditions of regular troops. Something, however, -had been achieved as, in spite of his use of poison gas, the -enemy was no nearer Ypres and our line, though strained -almost to breaking point, was still holding. It appears -indeed that the gallant front shown by the Lahore -Division was successful in deceiving the Germans as -to the extent of our resources, and deterred him from -pressing the advantages he had already gained.</p> - -<p>The casualties of the afternoon of the 27th April were -in officers:</p> - -<div class="hangindent"> - -<p>Capt. C. R. Saunders and 2/Lieut. A. D. Coates, killed; Lieut. -P. B. K. Stedman, died of wounds; Capt. F. G. Grimwade, -Lieuts. F. A. Coffin and D. J. Leonard, and 2/Lieut. T. I. -Walker, wounded; and in N.C.O.'s and men, 32 killed (including -C. S. M. Chennels), 132 wounded, and 13 missing.</p></div> - -<p>During the 28th the 1/4th Londons remained in -position in rear of Cross Roads Farm, and beyond a good -deal of shelling in which gas shell was freely used by the -enemy the day passed without important incident. -Luckily the bombardment this day was not very costly -to the Battalion or, indeed, to the Brigade as a whole. -The Lahore Division was transferred from V Corps to a -special counter-attack force then formed under command -of Gen. Plumer, and it was arranged that the Sirhind -and Ferozepore Brigades should be prepared to co-operate -with an attack contemplated by the French who were -still on our left flank, making such advance as might be -justified by the results achieved by our Allies. The -French attack, however, did not materialise in consequence -of the very heavy losses of the preceding two days -and our Allies confined themselves to artillery action.</p> - -<p>During the evening the enemy turned a large number<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_56" id="Page_56">[Pg 56]</a></span> -of guns on to St Jean and in a few hours the work of -destruction, already far advanced, was almost completed. -In the darkness the church was clearly visible in flames, -the windows being lit up by the conflagration within: -before morning the tower had fallen, the roof had collapsed, -and nothing but smouldering ruins remained.</p> - -<p>The 29th April found the Ferozepore Brigade still -holding its trenches and orders were again issued to it -to be prepared to co-operate with the French. But -during the morning definite orders were received that -the French attack was postponed, the assault of the -enemy positions being a more formidable proposition -than could be tackled by the Allied troops in their then -exhausted and numerically weak condition.</p> - -<p>The German bombardment continued throughout the -29th, and the Battalion remained inactive beyond the -further strengthening of its trenches. It did, however, -have the satisfaction of seeing a Taube brought down -close to its lines by our anti-aircraft guns.</p> - -<p>Before daybreak on the 30th, the Ferozepore Brigade -was relieved and marched out of the salient, the 1/4th -Londons proceeding by way of Buffs Road and La Brique -to hutments at Ouderdom. While passing through La -Brique the Battalion was met by a reinforcement of -about fifty N.C.O.'s and men from the 3/4th Battalion -in England, conducted by Major E. H. Stillwell. Accompanying -this draft were 2/Lieuts. L. G. Rix and B. Rivers -Smith.</p> - -<p>The roads out of the salient were being very heavily -shelled during the relief, the cross roads at Vlamertinghe -being in particular accurately bombarded with heavy -shrapnel. But Major Burnett was able to save a great -many casualties by varying the route of some platoons.</p> - -<p>At about 7.30 a.m. on the same morning the Ferozepore -Brigade moved from the hutments to bivouacs close -by to avoid the effects of the continuous shelling to which -the concentration camp was subjected, but returned to -the huts at night. The day was spent in rest and reorganisation. -The Battalion was undoubtedly a little -shaken after its rough handling and very seriously reduced -in strength. Over 600 rifles had left Ouderdom on the -morning of the 26th, but at the roll call which took place -on return on the 30th only 235 names were answered, -apart from the newly arrived draft which had not been -in action.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_57" id="Page_57">[Pg 57]</a></span></p> - -<div class="figcenter" style="width: 700px;"> -<img src="images/i_b_056fp.jpg" width="700" height="510" alt="" /> -<div class="caption"><p><em>St Jean Village in April 1920</em></p></div> -</div> - -<p>The following awards were made for services -rendered:</p> - -<div class="hangindent"> - -<p>Capt. W. G. Clark, D.S.O.; Sergt. A. C. Ehren, D.C.M.; -de France.</p></div> - -<p>In this, its first serious action, the 1/4th Battalion had -firmly established its reputation by its remarkable steadiness -under unprecedented circumstances, and, though the -price paid was heavy, it had the satisfaction of having -contributed materially to the undying glory of the British -defence of Ypres.</p> - -<p>At 7.45 p.m. on the 1st May, the concentration of the -Division being now complete, the Ferozepore Brigade -marched from Ouderdom <em>via</em> Reninghelst, Westoutre, to -Meteren, arriving there at 12.30 a.m. on the 2nd. A rest -was made here until the afternoon when the route was -resumed, Doulieu being reached about 10 p.m. The -march was completed the following evening, when at -about 7 p.m. the Brigade returned to its former billets -in the Paradis area.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_58" id="Page_58">[Pg 58]</a></span></p> -<div class="chapter"></div> -<hr class="chap" /> - - - - -<h2>CHAPTER V<br /> - -OPERATIONS DURING THE SUMMER OF 1915</h2> - - -<p>In spite of the severe tax placed on his resources by the -ever-increasing weight of the enemy's assaults at Ypres, and -the consequent difficulty of finding sufficient reserves of men -and material to embark on a new attack on a large scale, -Sir John French decided early in May to adopt the bold -course of launching a fresh offensive at the southern -extremity of the British front. He was led to this resolve -partly by the hope of diverting the enemy's attention -towards the south and thereby easing the pressure -against Ypres, and partly by the desire to assist the -French who were launching an offensive south of the -La Bassée Canal.</p> - -<p>The ultimate objective of this new undertaking was -the opening of the road to Lille, and the necessary preliminary -to this was the expulsion of the enemy from -his defences on the Aubers Ridge and the establishment -of the British troops on the La Bassée-Lille Road.</p> - -<p>This attack was entrusted to the First Army, whose -operations were divided into two separate zones. In the -north the assault was to be made by the IV Corps at -Rouges Bancs with the object of turning the Aubers -defences from that flank; while farther south the I and -Indian Corps were to secure the line Ligny-le-Grand—La -Clicqueterie Farm.</p> - -<p>The Indian Corps attack was to be carried out by the -Meerut Division—the Lahore Division still being weak -after its recent fighting in the salient—on a front from -the right of the Corps sector near Chocolat Menier Corner -to Oxford Road (on the left of La Bassée Road). The -rôle of the Lahore Division, which would occupy the line -in front of Neuve Chapelle with the Jullundur Brigade, -was to support the Meerut Division's attack with artillery,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_59" id="Page_59">[Pg 59]</a></span> -machine-gun and rifle fire, and particularly to secure the -left flank of the assaulting columns during their advance -by being prepared to operate as occasion might arise -against the Bois du Biez.</p> - -<p>The attack was launched on the 9th May at 5.40 a.m. -after a forty minutes' bombardment of the enemy lines -by all available guns.</p> - -<p>The assaulting columns advanced with the greatest -valour, but were met by a murderous machine-gun and -rifle fire, under which they were literally mown down. -The survivors struggled on in spite of the frightful losses -they were suffering, but practically none of the 1st or -Meerut Divisions reached the enemy's front trench. -Farther north the 8th Division effected a lodgment in -the enemy's trenches, but after hanging on gallantly -throughout the day were forced at night to return to -their original positions after suffering appalling casualties. -From all along the line came reports of what amounted to -total failure. The surprise effect which had proved so -valuable at Neuve Chapelle in March was wanting this -day, and our artillery had been inadequately supplied -with high explosive shells to enable them to destroy the -German machine-gun emplacements.</p> - -<p>Meanwhile reports were received from the French of -some considerable degree of success. On the following -day Sir John French decided not to pursue his offensive -in the north, but to limit his further efforts to the area -south of the La Bassée Road, and accordingly preparations -were made for the resumption of operations on -the 12th.</p> - -<p>The Lahore Division had reached the Neuve Chapelle -area after its march back from Ypres on the evening of -the 4th May, the Ferozepore Brigade finding accommodation -in its former billets at Paradis, which it left the -following day for Riez Bailleul.</p> - -<p>On the evening of the 8th the Brigade moved forward -to take up its prearranged position of assembly in support -to the Jullundur Brigade.</p> - -<p>The position taken up by the 1/4th Londons and the -9th Bhopals was in shallow assembly trenches in the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_60" id="Page_60">[Pg 60]</a></span> -orchards about the junction of Sign Post Lane with Rue -Tilleloy. These trenches were hastily dug and very -shallow, without either traverses or any sort of shelter; -and it was therefore fortunate that the weather was unusually -warm and fine for the time of year. The -Connaughts and the 57th Rifles occupied the old British -front line (as it had been before the battle of Neuve -Chapelle) astride Sign Post Lane.</p> - -<p>During the whole of the 9th, 10th and 11th May the -1/4th London remained in these trenches under continual -heavy shell fire: though owing to the lack of -success with which the main operation had met it was -not called upon to advance.</p> - -<p>On the evening of the 11th it was withdrawn with -the rest of the Brigade to billets at Riez Bailleul. On -return to billets great discomfort was caused to all ranks -by the discovery that the billet in which the packs had -been deposited during the three days spent in trenches -had been burnt to the ground, involving the total destruction -of its contents together with a mail from home. -The following day the Indian Corps Commander (Sir -James Willcocks) visited the Battalion and expressed -his deep appreciation of its conduct at Ypres.</p> - -<p>The 12th May dawned dull and misty and artillery -observation was exceedingly difficult; and for this and -other causes the renewal of the attack was again postponed -until the 15th. The Meerut Division was again -responsible for the Indian Corps attack. The Lahore -Division adopted a role similar to that which it had -played on the 9th, and the Ferozepore Brigade moved -forward once more on the evening of the 15th May to -its former assembly positions about Sign Post Lane.</p> - -<p>In order to endeavour to secure the surprise effect -which had been lacking on the 9th it was decided this -time to deliver the attack at night, and after a preliminary -bombardment the assaulting columns dashed forward -at 11.30 p.m. on the 15th. On the right of the attack -in the region of Festubert and La Quinque Rue considerable -success was achieved by the 7th Division, -and some advance was also made by the 2nd Division<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_61" id="Page_61">[Pg 61]</a></span> -which was operating on the immediate right of the -Indians.</p> - -<p>The Meerut Division, however, was again faced with -a hail of lead from the enemy lines under which it was -impossible to live, and though the troops did all that -men could do, by 4 a.m. on the 16th, after two gallant -efforts, the attempts of the Indians to advance were -definitely checked and the remains of the assaulting -columns were once more back in their original trenches.</p> - -<p>From this date onwards operations were confined to -the southern area in the neighbourhood of Festubert, and -though the battle continued to rage until the 25th May, -the Indian Corps was no longer concerned in it beyond -the preparations necessary to enable it to conform to the -advance on its right flank.</p> - -<p>During the early part of the month the 1/4th Londons -received further officer reinforcements as follows:</p> - -<div class="center"> -<ul> - <li>Capt. A. A. N. Haine.</li> - <li>Lieut. S. G. Monk.</li> - <li>Lieut. D. C. Cooke.</li> - <li>2/Lieut. J. S. B. Gathergood.</li> -</ul> -</div> -<p>The Battalion remained in its shallow trenches until -the 18th May under less favourable conditions of weather -than previously, and the exposure caused a large number -of casualties through sickness, including Lieuts. Rivers, -Smith and Cooke, and 2/Lieut. Gathergood, who were -evacuated to hospital.</p> - -<p>On the evening of the 18th May the Ferozepore Brigade -took over the front line from the Jullundur Brigade, the -1/4th Londons relieving the 4th Suffolks on the right, -between the La Bassée Road and Oxford Road, the -subsection including Port Arthur Keep where Battalion -Headquarters were established. This tour of duty was -uneventful and the troops were occupied principally in -repairing the damage done to the entanglements and -defences by the enemy's shell fire during the days of the -battle. A certain amount of shell fire was, however, -experienced causing a few casualties, including Captain -Haine, who was hit on the 22nd. The enemy also paid -a good deal of attention to the back areas and the regimental -transport now established at Rouge Croix was<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_62" id="Page_62">[Pg 62]</a></span> -heavily shelled on the 25th, and again on the 26th, with -such severity that it was compelled to change position -to Riez Bailleul.</p> - -<p>During this period also the issue of gas masks to all -ranks was completed.</p> - -<p>On the 30th the Sirhind Brigade, which had been in -divisional reserve during the battle, came forward and -took over the line from the Ferozepore Brigade, the 1/4th -Londons handing over their trenches to the 1st Manchesters -and withdrawing to billets at Riez Bailleul.</p> - -<p>After the end of May no further attempt was made on -the Indian Corps front to conduct operations on a large -scale. The difficulties under which the Indian battalions -were labouring in the supply of reinforcements to replace -casualties were extreme. The Indian concentration camp -at Marseilles was continually receiving reinforcements -from India, but of these an increasing proportion was -found to be unfit for despatch to the front, and as the -summer wore on the native regiments of the Corps -gradually ebbed in numbers until amalgamations began -to be effected to maintain units at anything approaching -war strength. In these circumstances offensive operations -against so strongly defended a position as the Aubers -Ridge were out of the question, especially having regard -to the continued shortage in the supply of shells. At -the same time the general situation did not permit of the -Indian Corps being entirely withdrawn from the line for -a prolonged rest and reorganisation. The story of the -next three months is, therefore, one of unceasing hard work -in and out of the line without any of those opportunities -of distinction which are as necessary to the well-being of a -battalion—and especially a native battalion—as a regular -supply of rations.</p> - -<p>This increasing numerical weakness of the native -battalions threw a greater burden of work and responsibility -on the British units, both Regular and Territorial, -though even they experienced the greatest difficulty in -obtaining the regular supplies from home of that fresh -blood which was so earnestly desired. The 1/4th London -returned from Ypres in May at a strength well under 300<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_63" id="Page_63">[Pg 63]</a></span> -all ranks, and at no period during the remainder of its -attachment to the Indian Corps did its strength approach -even 450; in other words, for months on end, in sentry-go, -working and carrying parties, and patrols, every man was -doing two men's work; and this with a very scanty proportion -of rest behind the line. Out of 126 days from -the end of May to the beginning of October the 1/4th -Londons spent 92 days in trenches, and of the remaining -34 in billets not one was spent beyond the reach of the -enemy's guns.</p> - -<p>With the exception of one tour of duty in the Min -House Farm sector the 1/4th Londons spent this summer -on the right of the La Bassée Road either in the trenches -in front of the Rue du Bois, which included the well-remembered -positions of the Orchard Redoubt and -Crescent Trench, or in reserve, usually in Lansdowne Post, -a large redoubt on Forrester's Lane. The summer months -saw very great improvements in the Rue du Bois trenches. -The isolated listening posts, like grouse-butts, which had -formed the advanced positions in March were now joined -into a continuous line of breastwork, connected with the -Rue du Bois by numerous communication trenches. -Shelters for the trench garrisons were also constructed, -but these gave protection against nothing more serious -than rain—and not always that. In this waterlogged -area the sinking of a deep dugout was an impossibility, -and the shelters were in consequence mere "rabbit-hutches" -built into the breastwork and covered with -corrugated iron and a few sandbags, which imbued the -occupants with an entirely unjustified sense of security. -At the same time the wire entanglements in No Man's -Land were constantly extended and strengthened. With -all these defences steadily growing, the duties of the -Battalion on working parties, both when occupying the -line and when in reserve billets, were onerous and unceasing. -Patrolling work by night was vigorously prosecuted -as being practically the only available means of -fostering the growth of the "offensive spirit." Trench -routine in 1915 was marked by a feature which in subsequent -years almost entirely vanished—the constant em<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_64" id="Page_64">[Pg 64]</a></span>ployment -of rifle fire. At this period the infantryman -had not succumbed to the insensate craze for bombs -which later ruined his powers as a rifleman; and every -night, in one part of the trenches or another, saw something -in the nature of an organised shoot by the infantry, -bursts of rapid fire being directed on the enemy's parapet. -These practices were of great value, not only in keeping -the men skilful with their rifles, but also in maintaining -their moral superiority over the enemy which might -otherwise have become seriously impaired through their -knowledge of the inequality of our strength in artillery.</p> - -<p>The enemy's activity during this summer was for the -most part confined to artillery fire which at times attained -serious proportions and inflicted severe loss; indeed -throughout the period under review the toll of casualties -was steady and continuous.</p> - -<p>Out of the trenches the 1/4th Londons withdrew to -reserve billets either at Pont du Hem, L'Epinette, or La -Fosse, and while in reserve were invariably called upon -for working parties in the forward area, so that the opportunities -available for training and repairing the damage -inevitably caused to parade discipline by long-continued -trench life were almost entirely wanting. At this period, -moreover, "back-of-the-line" organisation had not -reached the high pitch attained in later years. Baths -were an infrequent luxury, concert parties—of an organised -type—unheard of, recreational training still without its -proper recognition. Such infrequent rests as were granted -to the troops were thus of comparatively small recuperative -value.</p> - -<p>But in spite of these numerous difficulties the Battalion -was steadily increasing its military efficiency and its -morale throughout the summer was high.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_65" id="Page_65">[Pg 65]</a></span></p> - -<div class="figcenter" style="width: 700px;"> -<img src="images/i_b_064fp_a.jpg" width="700" height="447" alt="" /> -<div class="caption"><p><em>Rouge Croix, La Bassée Road</em></p></div> -</div> - -<div class="figcenter" style="width: 700px;"> -<img src="images/i_b_064fp_b.jpg" width="700" height="440" alt="" /> -<div class="caption"><p><em>The Doll's House, La Bassée Road</em></p></div> -</div> - -<p>One of the most unpleasant tours of duty was at Min -House Farm, already alluded to, a sector on the left of -Neuve Chapelle, facing Mauquissart, which the Battalion -took over for a week in July as a temporary measure -during a readjustment of Brigade boundaries. The -breastworks here were especially weak and very much -overlooked from the Aubers Ridge. Wire was embryonic -and communication trenches poor. Moreover, the area -appeared to be the subject of particular hatred on the -part of the Bosche, who shelled it frequently and heavily. -Min House (or Moated Grange) Farm, where Headquarters -were established, was perched on the crest of a little knoll -which afforded the Headquarters staff a good view over -the sector, but, probably for this very reason, the Hun -objected to it. In fact before the tour of duty came to -an end the farm was totally destroyed by shell fire and -Battalion Headquarters had been forced to make a hasty -exit to Ebenezer Farm, which, being outside the sector -and unprovided with signal communications, was not -ideal for the purpose of a Headquarters.</p> - -<p>An extraordinary incident occurred during the last -week of June, which seems worth recording. One night -a patrol of the 129th Baluchis left the British lines to -investigate the condition of the enemy's wire. On its -return one man, Ayub Khan, was missing and all endeavours -to recover his body were fruitless. The following -evening Ayub turned up again, and being taken before -his company commander related how he had entered the -German trenches and passed himself off as a deserter. As -is well known the Germans were always anxious to secure -the defection of the native troops, and Ayub Khan's -arrival was therefore hailed with enthusiasm. He was -taken to the rear and examined carefully. Having kept -his eyes open and seen all he could, Ayub Khan persuaded -the Germans to let him return to our trenches in order -to bring more of his friends over. In a weak moment -the Germans agreed to let him go; but instead of greeting -Ayub and his party of fellow-deserters, they were faced -a few days later with a notice board which was displayed -on our parapet commenting on the incident in suitable -terms. Not being a humourist, the Hun lost his temper, -and it is at this point in the story that the 1/4th Londons -become concerned. The luckless notice board was displayed -on Crescent Trench then occupied by D Company. -At 8.30 a.m. on the 27th June the enemy opened on the -board with 5.9 howitzers, and almost the first shell hit -Capt. Cart de Lafontaine's Headquarters, causing him<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_66" id="Page_66">[Pg 66]</a></span> -a severe attack of shell-shock and killing his subaltern -2/Lieut. F. F. Hunt. All the morning the "hate" was -continued with great loss to D Company, and by midday -the Crescent Trench was practically obliterated. Company -Sergt.-Major Risley showed great coolness in controlling -his men and withdrawing them as far as was practicable -out of the zone of fire, and set an excellent example of -steadiness under a most trying ordeal. He was subsequently -awarded the D.C.M.</p> - -<p>On the 16th June Major L. T. Burnett, who had been -in temporary command of the 1/4th Londons since the -26th April, was promoted Lieut.-Colonel and appointed -to command, Major G. H. M. Vine assuming the duties -of second in command.</p> - -<p>At the beginning of September, however, the Battalion -was exceedingly unfortunate in losing Major Vine, who -was sent to hospital with eye trouble, and Lieut.-Col. -Burnett being on leave at the time the command of the -Battalion was assumed until his return by Lieut.-Col. -Murray of the 89th Punjabis.</p> - -<p>Early in August Capt. and Adjt. G. B. Scott also said -farewell to the Battalion on taking up an extra-regimental -employment, and the Adjutancy was given to Capt. -W. G. Clark, D.S.O., and subsequently to Capt. E. Giles.</p> - -<p>The following officers joined during August and -September:</p> - -<div class="hangindent"> - -<p>Lieuts. R. V. Gery, D. J. Leonard, C. Gaskin.</p> - -<p>2/Lieuts. S. E. Lyons, H. B. A. Balls, H. Jones, C. C. Spurr, A. G. -Sharp, R. Johnstone, W. J. Boutall, F. C. Fanhangel, S. E. H. -Walmisley, A. S. Ford, G. L. Goodes and H. J. M. Williams.</p></div> - -<p>In N.C.O.'s and men the Battalion was less fortunate, -and up to the end of September 3 N.C.O.'s and 14 men, -all veterans of Neuve Chapelle or Ypres, were the only -reinforcements from home.</p> - -<p>The casualties in officers for the same period were:</p> - -<div class="hangindent"> - -<p>2/Lieut. F. F. Hunt, killed.</p> - -<p>Capt. H. P. L. Cart de Lafontaine, wounded (shell-shock).</p> - -<p>Capts. H. W. Weathersbee and H. M. Lorden, and 2/Lieut. -A. G. Sharp, to hospital.</p></div> - -<p>Arrangements had now been completed for the launching -of an offensive on the high ground south of La Bassée<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_67" id="Page_67">[Pg 67]</a></span> -Canal in the direction of Loos and Hulluch. The opening -day of the offensive had been fixed for the 25th September, -and as the Indian Corps was not concerned with the main -action it will be needless for us here to review the course -of events south of the Canal.</p> - -<p>North of the Canal, however, a subsidiary operation -of some magnitude had been organised with the strategic -object of increasing the pressure on the German defences -north of La Bassée to such an extent that he would be -compelled under the strain of our main offensive in the -south to relinquish the La Bassée line altogether and -retire to the east of the Aubers Ridge.</p> - -<p>To this end an ambitious programme had been drawn -up for the Indian Corps which temporarily included the -newly arrived 19th Division. The preliminary attack -was to be made by the Meerut Division under cover of a -smoke and gas attack to the north of Neuve Chapelle, -with the object of establishing a new line in the first -instance along the road from the Ducks Bill to Mauquissart. -The experience of previous actions having clearly shown -that initial success had frequently been converted into -subsequent failure by a delay in following up the first -advance, it was arranged that the Jullundur and Ferozepore -Brigades and the 19th Division should be prepared immediately -to exploit whatever success should be gained -by the Meerut Division by pushing forward at once to the -line Moulin d'Eau—La Tourelle—east edge of Bois du -Biez, while the Sirhind Brigade "leap-frogged" through -them to Lorgies. It was hoped that considerable moral -effect might be obtained by the use of poison gas against -the Germans, and to magnify this as much as possible -arrangements were made for the building up of smoke -screens, one by the Meerut Division to cover the left -flank of its attack and one by the Jullundur Brigade on -the right of the attack; for the projection of a heavy -smoke cloud by the Ferozepore Brigade on the Rue du Bois -and by the 19th Division (holding the extreme Southern -Section, south of the Boar's Head salient); and for an -attempt simultaneously to set fire to the Bois du Biez -by means of incendiary bombs.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_68" id="Page_68">[Pg 68]</a></span></p> - -<p>Systematic wire cutting on either side of the La Bassée -Road was begun on the 21st September, and a feint -attack was conducted by the Ferozepore Brigade late -in the afternoon of the 22nd in conjunction with the -divisional artillery. This feint attack took the form of -a heavy bombardment of the enemy's front line by -all available guns, starting at about 5 p.m. After five -minutes the guns lifted on to the enemy's support line -and the infantry in the line (Connaughts and 57th Rifles) -by means of rifle fire, lifting dummies on to the parapet -and flashing their bayonets, endeavoured to produce an -impression among the Germans that an attack was -imminent. In the midst of the confusion caused to the -Germans by this demonstration our artillery once more -shortened its range, firing shrapnel on the enemy's front -line. It was believed that this feint attack had the -desired effect: the fire of our guns was certainly accurate -and well distributed, and elicited but little reply from the -enemy. The hostile machine-gun fire, moreover, betrayed -some perturbation inasmuch as it was extremely erratic, -the bullets passing high over the Rue du Bois and doing -no damage. The 1/4th Londons were at this period in -Lansdowne Post.</p> - -<p>On the 23rd the weather changed, and the favourable -dry season which had given such promise of success for -our schemes gave way to heavy rains. The wind, too, -veered round to the south-east so that it blew towards -our lines instead of towards the enemy's. This was -particularly disastrous as it would nullify the effect of -the smoke screens and render the use of gas impossible. -It was determined, however, to do all possible to carry -the offensive through to success, and the Lahore Division -was ordered to be completely ready to move forward by -6 a.m. on the 25th September.</p> - -<p>Once more, however, the attempt to advance on this -front was foiled. Possibly the feint attack on the 22nd -had been somewhat too theatrical to impress the enemy -and had merely indicated our intentions to him. Certain -it was, however, that on the 25th he was holding his -trenches in particular strength and there remained stolidly<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_69" id="Page_69">[Pg 69]</a></span> -throughout the day in spite of our smoke screens and -demonstrations, to which he replied with vigorous machine-gun -and shell fire. The attempt of the Meerut Division -to push forward proved abortive, and the Lahore Division -was unable to get forward, there being not the least sign -of weakening on the enemy's front opposite to them. -There is no doubt that this failure was in part at least -due to the treachery of the elements. The smoke screen -was utterly ineffective; gas could not be used at all.</p> - -<p>The 26th saw the general situation unchanged and -the enemy still sitting in his front line and showing not -the least disposition to leave it.</p> - -<p>On the evening of the 26th the 1/4th Londons relieved -the 57th Rifles in a line of reserve posts on the Rue du -Bois in the vicinity of Chocolat Menier Corner (Dog, -Cat, Pall Mall and "Z" Orchard Posts).</p> - -<p>The weather had now definitely broken and heavy -rains fell, reducing the trenches to veritable seas of mud. -The Battalion continued to occupy the Keeps until the -evening of the 30th, the duty having passed quietly with -the exception of a small amount of enemy shell fire; but -a large proportion of the shells being "blind" no casualties -were caused. On relief on the 30th the 1/4th Londons -once more withdrew to Lansdowne Post. On the 2nd -October the Ferozepore Brigade was relieved by the -19th Division and moved out to billets in the La Gorgue-Riez -Bailleul area. Here it remained resting and training -for a week, throughout which the weather remained vile -in the extreme.</p> - -<p>On the 11th October the Ferozepore Brigade once -more took over the Neuve Chapelle sector from the -Jullundur, the 1/4th Londons occupying the right subsector -with a detachment of the 89th Punjabis<a name="FNanchor_2_2" id="FNanchor_2_2"></a><a href="#Footnote_2_2" class="fnanchor">[2]</a> in Hills -Redoubt and Battalion Headquarters in Sandbag Alley. -On the left of the 1/4th Londons the Brigade sector was -taken up as far as Château Road by the 57th Rifles while -the Connaughts were on the extreme left as far as Sunken -Road.</p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_2_2" id="Footnote_2_2"></a><a href="#FNanchor_2_2"><span class="label">[2]</span></a> The 89th Punjabis reached France in June and replaced the 9th -Bhopals in the Ferozepore Brigade.</p></div> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_70" id="Page_70">[Pg 70]</a></span></p> -<p>Two days later the Ferozepore Brigade conducted a -second feint attack in conjunction with other operations -which it is not necessary to detail. On this occasion the -feint was timed to take place shortly after midday, the -morning being occupied by our guns in a systematic wire-cutting -shoot, which was followed by a heavy bombardment -of the enemy trenches during the projection of -the smoke screen. Following the smoke screen, smoke -barrages were formed on the flanks of the feint attack -at 1.45 p.m., and simultaneously with them the infantry -in the line operated with rifle fire and demonstrations -similar to those employed on the former occasion to give -the illusion of a pending attack. The wind again -was unfavourable, this time blowing the smoke along -No Man's Land between the lines instead of over the -enemy's trenches; and owing to the strength of the wind -the smoke screen never became dense enough to conceal -the bomb guns by which it was delivered. During the -whole period of the operation our front and rear lines -were subjected to a heavy fire from the enemy's artillery, -which caused very great damage to our breastworks and -wire, guns as heavy as 8-inch being employed with great -intensity between 12.45 and 1.30 p.m. This bombardment -caused large numbers of casualties in the 1/4th Londons, -it being impossible to clear, even temporarily, the bombarded -trenches owing to the necessity of maintaining -as intensely as possible the bursts of rifle fire in accordance -with the scheme. It is a matter of grave doubt as to -whether these demonstrations were worth the casualties -they cost; and it seems abundantly evident that no -useful purpose can have been served by carrying through -a prearranged scheme essentially dependent on the -weather when the conditions on the appointed day were -unfavourable. Perhaps the best comment on the undertaking -is to be found in the orders for the operation, which -included a warning to the effect that "dummies must not -be raised too high so as to show the sticks, as they were -before"!</p> - -<p>After the disturbance caused by this operation the -sector relaxed to a condition of remarkable calmness, which<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_71" id="Page_71">[Pg 71]</a></span> -was maintained during the remainder of the tour of duty. -This came to an end on the night of the 27th October -when the Ferozepore Brigade was relieved for the last -time in France by the Jullundur. The 1/4th Londons -were relieved by the 4th Suffolks and withdrew to billets -on the Merville Road at Estaires, the remainder of the -Brigade concentrating in the same area.</p> - -<p>The casualties for the month of October included -Lieuts. C. Gaskin and D. J. Leonard, both wounded, the -latter accidentally. During this rest a reinforcement of -about fifty N.C.O.'s and men joined the Battalion.</p> - -<p>Rumour had been active for some time as to the -possible transference of the Indian Corps to another -theatre of operations, and on the 31st notification was -received that the Lahore Division would embark at -Marseilles early in November, but that the Territorial units -would not accompany it. The gradual withdrawal of the -Division from the line had in fact begun, and when the -1/4th Londons returned to the reserve trenches in Loretto -Road on the 4th November it had said good-bye to its -good friends of the Ferozepore Brigade and was temporarily -attached to the Jullundur. The following day its -attachment was transferred to the Sirhind Brigade, the -Jullundur having also made its final withdrawal from -the line.</p> - -<p>On the 7th the Battalion relieved the 27th Punjabis -(Sirhind) at Ludhiana Lodge, and provided detachments -to hold Church and Hills Redoubts and Curzon Post, -the front line being held by the 4th King's. The three -Territorial battalions of the Division, the 4th Londons, -4th King's, and 4th Suffolks were all now unattached -and were handed over to XI Corps, who were taking -over the line from the Indians with the Guards and -46th Divisions, and a few days of constant change of -positions ensued during the progress of the relief.</p> - -<p>On the 8th the 1/4th Londons withdrew to Loretto -Road. This day the long connection of the Battalion -with the Indian Corps, with which it had passed through -pleasant and rough times alike on terms of the closest -friendship, was finally severed. Lieut.-Col. Burnett,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_72" id="Page_72">[Pg 72]</a></span> -Capt. W. G. Clark, D.S.O., and a detachment of the -Battalion marched to Croix Barbée to bid good-bye to -the divisional commander, Major-Gen. Keary. In the -course of an address to the detachment the General said -that on the occasion of the departure of the Indian Corps -from France and the consequent severance of the Battalion -from the Division, he wished to express his thanks to the -regiment for the good work they had done. Their loyalty -and devotion to duty had been worthy of all praise, their -bearing in action left nothing to be desired, and their -discipline had been excellent throughout. On conclusion -of this address the General handed Lieut.-Col. Burnett a -written Order of the Day.</p> - -<p>On the 10th the Battalion moved forward into Brigade -reserve at Pont Logy, and this day was attached to the -137th Brigade of the 46th Division. The weather was -still exceedingly wet, the trenches full of water, and the -conditions in the line owing to the lack of dugouts were -unusually uncomfortable. On the evening of the 14th -the Battalion finally left the Neuve Chapelle area, -billeting at Croix Barbée for the night and continuing its -journey the following day by motor-bus to Lillers, where -it became attached to the 140th Brigade of the 47th -(London) Division.</p> - -<p>This concludes the first phase of the 4th London -Regiment's service in France. The year 1915 all along -the line had been one of equilibrium after the defensive -battles of 1914.</p> - -<p>We have said enough of the Battalion's life in the -Indian Corps to indicate that the year 1915 was one of -very hard work and continued strain on all ranks. Out -of 255 days spent in the Lahore Division the Battalion -was actually in trenches for 142 days, in reserve billets -providing working parties for 76 days, and at rest only -for 37 days; and although it was worn out and weak -when it withdrew to Lillers in November it was a -thoroughly seasoned fighting battalion, every officer and -man of which was an experienced soldier.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_73" id="Page_73">[Pg 73]</a></span></p> -<div class="chapter"></div> -<hr class="chap" /> - - - - -<h2>CHAPTER VI<br /> - -THE 1/4TH BATTALION IN THE 47TH DIVISION</h2> - - -<p>The 47th (London) Division to which the 1/4th Londons -were now attached had just withdrawn for a period of -rest and reorganisation from the trenches around Loos -where they had seen a good deal of heavy fighting in the -battle of the 25th September. The Division had come -out from England in March 1915 and had first been -engaged as the extreme right Division of the British Army -at Festubert in May. Although serious losses had been -suffered in the attacks on Hill 70 in September, the -battalions of the Division had subsequently received -strong reinforcements from home, and the majority of -them were far larger than the 1/4th Londons who, at -the date of attachment to the Division, numbered only -24 officers and 435 other ranks.</p> - -<p>The Division, which was under command of Major-Gen. -C. St L. Barter, K.C.B., K.C.V.O., comprised the -following Infantry Brigades:</p> - -<div class="center"> -<table border="0" cellpadding="4" cellspacing="0" summary="Infantry Brigades"> - <tr> - <th colspan="4">140th Infantry Brigade—Brig.-Gen. G. Cuthbert, C.B.</th> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdr">1/4th</td> - <td>London </td> - <td>Regiment </td> - <td>(Royal Fusiliers).</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdr">1/6th</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td>(Rifles).</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdr">1/7th</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdr">1/8th</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td>(Post Office Rifles).</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdr">1/15th</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td>(Civil Service Rifles).</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <th colspan="4">141st Infantry Brigade</th> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdr">1/17th </td> - <td>London </td> - <td>Regiment </td> - <td>(Poplar and Stepney Rifles).</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdr">1/18th</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td>(London Irish Rifles).</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdr">1/19th</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td>(St Pancras).</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdr">1/20th</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td>(Blackheath and Woolwich).</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <th colspan="4">142nd Infantry Brigade</th> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdr">1/3rd</td> - <td>London </td> - <td>Regiment </td> - <td>(Royal Fusiliers).</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdr">1/21st</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td>(First Surrey Rifles).</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdr">1/22nd</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td>(The Queen's), Kennington.</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdr">1/23rd</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td>(East Surrey, Clapham Junction).</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdr">1/24th</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td>(The Queen's), Bermondsey.</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <th colspan="4">Pioneer Battalion</th> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdr">4th </td> - <td colspan="3">Royal Welsh Fusiliers.</td> - </tr> -</table></div> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_74" id="Page_74">[Pg 74]</a></span></p> - -<p>The Division was attached to the IV Corps (Rawlinson) -of the First Army (Haig).</p> - -<p>The first day after arrival at Lillers (16th November -1915) was devoted by the Battalion to cleaning up uniforms -and equipment which had, through the prolonged duty -in waterlogged trenches, become caked with weeks of mud. -The general discipline of the 47th Division and of the -140th Brigade in particular was exceedingly good; and -although the battle discipline of the Lahore Division had -been excellent, and the training and experience which the -1/4th Londons had gained while attached to it of the -highest order, yet it cannot be gainsaid that the parade -discipline among the Indian Brigades had not been given -that amount of attention which the long years of war -showed to be necessary, even in the field, to ensure the -best results in action. We have already indicated that -this weakness in the Indian Brigades arose through their -continual deficiency in numbers and the consequent long -periods of trench duty which had been imposed on them.</p> - -<p>The sudden change, therefore, from trench duty to a -period of rest, in which ceremonial mounting of guards and -drill were prominent features, created a totally new environment -for the Battalion which was entirely beneficial.</p> - -<p>The whole Battalion, from the Commanding Officer to -the most recently arrived draft, was determined to maintain -the reputation of the Battalion; and by dint of -hard work on and off parade the 4th Londons became -rapidly second to none in the Brigade in all the duties -they were called upon to carry out—and they were the -more impelled to this effort by the realisation that they -were the senior Battalion of the Brigade, not only in -precedence, but also in point of active service experience.</p> - -<p>At Lillers the Brigade spent about a month, passed -for the most part in very cold and wet weather, in a -thorough course of training, in which particular attention -was paid to drill and bombing. At this period the question -of the thorough organisation of bombing—or as they -were then called "grenadier"—sections with the proper -quota of bayonet men, throwers and carriers was attracting -a great deal of thought, and the time devoted to this<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_75" id="Page_75">[Pg 75]</a></span> -particular branch of the art of war was subsequently -found, as will be seen later, to have been well spent.</p> - -<p>Each Battalion mounted daily a quarter guard and an -inlying piquet of one officer, two sergeants, and thirty -rank and file, and the ceremonial mounting of these duties -was carried cut with all possible pomp on the Grande -Place at Retreat.</p> - -<p>In addition to this the peace-time system of "extra -drills" as a minor punishment was re-instituted—not -perhaps an altogether pleasant recollection for some—but -in spite of the disadvantages such a system must always -have in the eyes of those for whose particular benefit it -is devised, there can be no question that this tightening -of discipline had in the end a beneficial effect on all ranks, -the extent of which it is impossible to overestimate.</p> - -<p>The training period was varied by inter-battalion -sports and football matches in which the 1/4th Londons -achieved some success, beating the 7th Battalion 3-1, -and the 6th Battalion 3-1. On the whole the month -passed smoothly with very little incident worthy of -mention beyond a two-day divisional route march which -took place on the 1st and 2nd December.</p> - -<p>On the 6th December the 1/4th Londons suffered -a loss in the death of Sergt. Bench, who had very -efficiently carried out the duties of Transport Sergeant -since the Battalion's arrival in France, his death being -the result of injuries caused by a fall from his horse.</p> - -<p>During the training at Lillers a most gallant action was -performed by Lieut. H. Jones. While practising throwing -with live bombs one of the men dropped a bomb with the -fuse burning. At great risk Lieut. Jones picked up the -bomb and threw it out of the trench, where it at once -exploded. His bravery undoubtedly saved several lives.</p> - -<p>In January, the Battalion was joined by Lieut. V. C. -Donaldson.</p> - -<hr class="tb" /> - -<p>The front of attack in the Battle of Loos had extended -from the La Bassée Canal on the left, where our lines -were faced by the village of Auchy, to the village of Loos -on the extreme right. In this attack the first objective<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_76" id="Page_76">[Pg 76]</a></span> -was the line of the Lens-Hulluch-La Bassée Road, the -frontage being divided more or less equally by the -Vermelles-Hulluch Road, which ran directly out from our -trenches towards the Germans.</p> - -<p>North of this dividing line were three very serious -obstacles, namely, Auchy itself defended by impassable -wire entanglements; a work of large area and enormous -strength known as the Hohenzollern Redoubt; and a -group of Quarries close to the Lens-Hulluch Road.</p> - -<p>The 9th and 7th Divisions had met with great initial -success on the 25th September 1915, the former overrunning -the Hohenzollern Redoubt and gaining a position -beyond it on a large slag-heap known as Fosse 8, while -elements of the 7th Division sweeping the enemy's defence -of the Quarries before them had gained the outskirts of -Cité St Elie and Hulluch beyond the Lens-Hulluch Road. -The unfortunate check to the advance of the 2nd Division -at Auchy, however, had exposed the left flank of the -9th Division, who were afterwards ejected from Fosse 8, -while the 7th on their right had been unable to retain their -advanced positions across the main road.</p> - -<p>Desperate fighting ensued for the possession of these -strongholds until the conclusion of the battle about -13th October. At that date the Germans retained -possession of the whole of the Quarries and the greater -part of the Hohenzollern Redoubt. Between the two -the British had driven a wedge so that the part of -the Hohenzollern which remained in the enemy's hands -formed an abrupt salient, of which the west face was -formed by a trench irreverently named by the British -"Little Willie," and the south face by its obvious companion -"Big Willie." Connecting the eastern extremity -of Big Willie with the north-west corner of the Quarries -the Germans remained in possession of Potsdam Trench, -while the Quarries themselves formed another but smaller -salient in the enemy's lines, well flanked on the south-east -side by our positions, which caused a second abrupt -turn to the east in the enemy lines.</p> - -<p>The whole area between these confused positions was -a vast maze of earthworks, for they were in the midst of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_77" id="Page_77">[Pg 77]</a></span> -what had, prior to the battle, been a strong German -third system of defence and No Man's Land was -traversed by innumerable short communication trenches -and saps, held by the opposing garrisons by means of -barricades, for the possession of which an unceasing and -murderous struggle with bombs and trench mortars was -still proceeding. In addition to these deadly conflicts a -still more subtle warfare was being waged underground, -where our Tunnelling Companies were fighting a battle -of wits with the Germans by mining and counter-mining, -and the blowing of mines followed by fierce local infantry -fights for possession of the craters thus formed were of -frequent recurrence.</p> - -<p>A reference to a large map will render clear the extreme -importance to the enemy of the possession of these two -positions. Situate as they were, one on each of the -two lowest spurs of the Vermelles-Hulluch Ridge, their -capture by the British would have involved a very serious -threat to the German defences on the line Auchy-Haisnes, -and might easily have been a prelude to the outflanking -of La Bassée itself. The enemy was obviously alive to -these possibilities, and the daily intelligence reports gleaned -from our patrols and observers made it abundantly clear -that he was strengthening his trenches and wire, and -was burrowing strenuously in opposition to our mining -operations.</p> - -<hr class="tb" /> - -<p>This severely contested part of the front was taken -over by the 47th Division from the 9th between the 13th -and the 15th December, C Section opposite the Quarries -and D Section opposite the Hohenzollern Redoubt being -occupied by the 141st and 142nd Brigades, the 140th -Brigade remaining in reserve.</p> - -<p>For some time after the return to the line the 1/4th -Londons did not enter the trenches as a battalion, but -on account of its small numbers was retained in reserve, -where it performed a great deal of heavy labour in working -and carrying parties for the rest of the Brigade.</p> - -<p>On the 15th the 1/4th Londons moved from Lillers -at 8.30 a.m., entraining for Nœux-les-Mines, whence it<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_78" id="Page_78">[Pg 78]</a></span> -marched to billets at Labourse, training being continued -while the Brigade remained in reserve.</p> - -<p>This move was followed by a further approach to the -line which took place on the 19th December, when the -140th Brigade relieved the 141st in C 1 and C 2 Sections, -opposite the Quarries, the 6th and 15th Battalions occupying -the front trenches with the 7th Battalion in support -at Le Philosophe and the 4th and 8th Battalions in Brigade -reserve at Noyelles-les-Vermelles.</p> - -<p>Here the 1/4th Londons' duties in carrying and trench -working parties in the forward areas were severe as the -reserve billets were some three miles from the front -line trenches.</p> - -<p>The most active part of the Brigade's new front was -C 2, the subsection now garrisoned by the 15th Londons, -where on the left of the Quarries the continuous struggle -already referred to in sapping, bombing and mining was -proceeding with particular violence. The centre of this -fighting was a work held by the British, known as the -Hairpin, and two saps, Essex Trench and Shipka Pass, -which pushed forward from the Hairpin towards the -German lines. Essex Trench in particular was the scene -of much hard fighting, for the Germans were in occupation -of the further end of it and were separated from -our garrison by a double barricade. This trench and -Shipka Pass were coveted by the Germans, as it was -through them that they hoped to obtain a lodgment in -the Hairpin, the possession of which would secure the -right flank of their salient at the Quarries and render -their precarious tenure of that feature much more secure. -With this object they had on the night of the 17th launched -a determined bombing attack along Essex Trench and -Shipka Pass, the enemy bombers being well supported -by trench mortar and rifle grenade fire. Our garrisons, -however, were ready, and none of the enemy reached our -barricades, and their attack was finally dispersed by -our artillery.</p> - -<p>This attempt was renewed in the early hours of the -20th, when so vigorous an attack was delivered that the -15th London bombers in Essex Trench were forced back<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_79" id="Page_79">[Pg 79]</a></span> -from their barricade for some 20 yards, and were unable -for the moment to organise a counter-attack as the -Germans had constructed "arrow head" trenches flanking -his sap, so that he was able to bring fire to bear on our -garrison from three points simultaneously.</p> - -<p>After a personal reconnaissance the Brigadier decided -on making the same evening a bid for the recovery of the -lost trench. The 15th London bombers having already -suffered considerable loss, they were reinforced during -the day by the Battalion bombers of the 1/4th Londons, -who moved up to the Hairpin. The day passed quietly -but for some accurate shelling of our positions to the -right of the Quarries, which was stopped by our heavy -guns. At 9.45 p.m. our attack was delivered by three -parties of bombers simultaneously—one in Essex Trench, -one in a neighbouring sap, and one moving over the open, -flanking support being given by machine-guns posted in -Shipka Pass and west of the Quarries.</p> - -<p>The first attack failed, the Essex Trench party on -reaching our old barricade coming once more under a -shower of bombs from three directions, while the sap -party found progress impossible owing to the waterlogged -condition of the sap, and the party in the open were -brought to a standstill by machine-gun fire. Second -and third attempts proved equally unsuccessful, and -after the 23rd December attacks were discontinued -though the enemy portion of Essex Trench was kept -under constant trench mortar fire.</p> - -<p>Through all these days the 1/4th London bombers -remained in line, taking an active part in the unceasing -battle of bombs which was pursued between the barricades, -practically without intermission, and unhappily a large -number of casualties was caused.</p> - -<p>On the 22nd December a special Order of the Day -was received in which Sir John French said farewell to -the troops on the occasion of his relinquishment of the -Commander-in-Chief; and on the same day Sir Henry -Rawlinson handed over command of the IV Corps to -General Wilson.</p> - -<p>Orders were received on the 23rd that in consequence of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_80" id="Page_80">[Pg 80]</a></span> -certain signs of activity on the enemy's part, the line would -be held in greater strength for the ensuing forty-eight -hours, and in accordance with the prearranged defence -scheme the 1/4th Londons occupied the old British front -line in front of Vermelles early on the morning of the -24th. At 8 a.m. a mine near the Hohenzollern Redoubt was -blown by the British, the crater being successfully occupied -by troops of the 141st Brigade. The Artillery activity -caused by this operation dying down shortly afterwards, -the 1/4th Londons and other units in reserve returned -to their billets later in the day.</p> - -<p>During this tour of duty the Brigade Light Trench -Mortar Battery, which was in line in the Hairpin sector, -was joined by 2/Lieut. Goodes. The Battery did exceedingly -good work during the fighting in the Hairpin. -When the 1/4th Londons left the 47th Division Goodes -remained with 47/1 L.T.M. Battery, and was killed at -High Wood in September 1916, having been decorated, -for his consistently gallant service, with the Military -Cross and Bar.</p> - -<p>Christmas Day passed in the line without particular -incident beyond the daily "hates" of shells and bombs, -and this year, in consequence of special orders, no attempt -was permitted to indulge in the remarkable fraternisation -with the enemy which had occurred during the first -Christmas of the war.</p> - -<p>On the 26th the relief of the 140th Brigade by the -142nd in C Section commenced, and the following day -the 1/4th Londons withdrew to new billets at Sailly -Labourse.</p> - -<p>In Divisional reserve the Brigade devoted a few -days to the usual routine of baths, cleaning, refitting and -training, and on the last day of the year once more entered -the trenches, but on this occasion in D Section, the left -sector of the Divisional front, which it took over from -the 141st Brigade, the 6th and 15th Battalions once more -occupying the front system, the 8th Battalion in support -to them, while the 7th who joined the 4th at Sailly -Labourse were with the 4th in Brigade reserve. The new -sector included the trenches opposed to the Hohenzollern<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_81" id="Page_81">[Pg 81]</a></span> -Redoubt, and extended to the left to the vicinity of the -Vermelles-Auchy railway. During the Brigade's short -tenure of the sector the usual shelling and trench -mortar activity continued but without incident of any -particular interest. The 1/4th Londons continued in the -wearisome and unpicturesque task of supplying working -parties.</p> - -<p>During the 2nd, 3rd and 4th of January 1916, the -relief of the 47th Division by the Dismounted Division -took place, the 140th being relieved on the morning of -the 3rd by the 1st Dismounted Brigade, withdrawing on -relief to a group of villages some seven miles behind the -line in the Béthune area, the 1/4th Londons billeting at -Drouvin, and the remainder of the Brigade being distributed -between Verquin and Mouchin.</p> - -<p>This relief was merely the first stage of a "side-step" -which the Division was making towards the south, and -on the following day the Brigade moved <em>via</em> Nœux-les-Mines -to Les Brebis and made arrangements for the -taking over of a sector of the line south of Loos from -the French.</p> - -<p>The 1/4th Londons' service in the Hulluch area had -been arduous owing to the long marches imposed on the -working parties in addition to their tasks, but it had -fortunately, except among the bombers, not been a costly -one, and its strength had not very much decreased since -the date of its joining the Division.</p> - -<p>During December a few officer reinforcements were -received as follows: 2/Lieuts. H. G. Beal, C. W. Cragg, -J. Elliott and E. W. Monk, and during January the -Battalion was joined by 2/Lieut. C. F. P. de Pury (to -D Company).</p> - -<p>During December also the Quartermaster (Lieut. -E. S. Tomsett) went on leave during which he fell sick, -not returning to the Battalion until the 15th March -1916. In his absence his duties were carried out by -2/Lieut. S. E. H. Walmisley.</p> - -<p>In the New Year's Honours List the names of Lieut.-Col. -L. T. Burnett, Capt. W. G. Clark, D.S.O., and Capt. -J. R. Pyper were mentioned in despatches and a few<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_82" id="Page_82">[Pg 82]</a></span> -weeks later the award of the Military Cross to Captain -Pyper was announced.</p> - -<p>The new sector taken over by the 47th Division involved -relief of the 18th French Division, and a consequent -extension southwards of the British lines. This sector -roughly comprised the lines in front of the villages of -Maroc and Loos, and had first been taken over from the -French in June 1915. The 47th Division had fought in -this part of the line in the battle of Loos, and carried the -British positions forward through Loos village up to the -famous Double Crassier, and on to the lower slopes of -Hill 70. Subsequently the French had once more taken -the position over from them. This sector was divided -into two subsectors known respectively as Maroc and -Loos, the Maroc subsector on the right including some -1000 yards of trench extending from the vicinity of the -Grenay-Lens railway to the extreme southern limit of -the British advance in September 1915 and also about -1700 yards of the new positions then gained; while the -Loos sector comprised entirely new positions gained in -September and extended for some 1700 yards to the left -completely covering Loos village and the well-known -"Tower Bridge."</p> - -<p>On the night of the 5/6 January the 140th Brigade -entered the Maroc sector, the 141st occupying the Loos -sector with the 142nd in Divisional reserve. The difficulties -of the relief were somewhat increased owing to -the fact of taking over French troops, and the difference -of language was the inevitable cause of some delay, but -finally, however, matters were successfully adjusted and -the 140th Brigade was left in possession with the 1/4th -Londons occupying the right subsection, on a frontage -of some 800 yards opposite the "Fosse 16 de Lens"; -the 7th Londons in the right-centre subsection, the 15th -Londons in the left-centre subsection, which included -the Double Crassier, and the 6th Londons on the left. -The 8th Battalion were in reserve with two companies -in South Maroc, and two in the old British front line -just in rear of the Double Crassier, which was the danger -point of the Brigade sector, not only on account of the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_83" id="Page_83">[Pg 83]</a></span> -observation of our lines which it afforded the enemy but -also because it lay at the apex of an abrupt re-entrant -in the British front line.</p> - -<p>In this sector the 1/4th Londons found their own -supports which were billeted in cellars in South Maroc, -a mining village built on the unattractive "square" -plan of American cities, and consisting of innumerable -rows of artisans' dwellings, then unhappily in a state of -complete ruin. The cellars of these dwellings, however, -still afforded sufficient cover for the concentration unobserved -by the Germans of a considerable body of troops, -and the Germans were evidently somewhat disturbed -at the prospect of this for their artillery, both light and -heavy, paid continual attention to the village both day -and night.</p> - -<p>This sector having once more come into occupation -by British troops an enormous amount of work was -immediately necessary to complete the front line and -company supplies of small arms ammunition, bombs, -rifle grenades and trench stores of all sorts; and this -support and reserve companies were kept busily engaged -in this work throughout the tour of duty.</p> - -<p>In this sector also the steel shrapnel helmet first made -its appearance, so far as the 1/4th Londons were concerned. -It is amusing to look back on the distrust with which its -advent was first regarded by all ranks alike—although -afterwards, when once its efficiency and protective -qualities had been tested, it was as highly prized as it -had been previously shunned. The first issue was made -at the rate of one helmet per fire bay, the honour of -wearing it falling to the man on sentry duty for the time -being, and most remarkably disinclined the men were -to assume this undesired badge of office.</p> - -<p>On the 9th the 140th Brigade was relieved in the line -by the 142nd, moving on the 13th into the Loos sector, -where it took over the trenches of the 141st Brigade. -The 1/4th Londons did not take part in this relief but -remained in the right subsection, temporarily under the -orders of the 142nd Brigade, with the 22nd Londons on -their left. Here the Battalion remained until the 16th,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_84" id="Page_84">[Pg 84]</a></span> -when it was relieved by the 17th Battalion, rejoining the -140th Brigade in rest billets at Haillicourt.</p> - -<p>On the 19th January Lieut.-Col. L. T. Burnett left -the Battalion on short leave, and as it unfortunately -proved, permanently, for he fell seriously ill while on -leave and was unable to return to duty for nearly a year. -The command was assumed during his absence by Major -W. G. Clark, D.S.O., while Major S. Elliott became temporarily -second in command. The loss of Lieut.-Col. Burnett -was keenly felt. His nine months' command had been -marked by a striking advance in the Battalion's efficiency -and by the unswerving loyalty of all ranks under his -command. Later he joined the Reserve Battalion in -England, being subsequently transferred to employment -in the War Office.</p> - -<p>At Haillicourt the Battalion spent a few days in rest -and training and returned to the trenches on the 24th -January, occupying the same subsector as on the -previous occasion with the 7th Londons once more on -its left.</p> - -<p>This tour of duty was marked by particularly heavy -artillery activity on both sides, the Germans shelling our -trenches and Maroc daily with great accuracy and using -a good deal of gas shell. A certain number of casualties -inevitably occurred, but, having regard to the continued -intensity of the bombardment, the number was remarkably -small.</p> - -<p>On the 27th January the Kaiser's birthday was celebrated, -and it was somewhat confidently anticipated that, -as in 1915, the Germans would endeavour to score some -success against the British. It had been known for some -time that enemy mining operations in this area had been -proceeding apace, and it therefore appeared not improbable -that the Germans would endeavour to time the firing -of their mines for the 27th. Preparations to meet this -possibility were made. The Kaiser's birthday did indeed -prove to be a day of considerable activity, and though -the Germans delivered an abortive attack against the -15th Division on the left no infantry movement occurred -opposite the 140th Brigade; and their activity was con<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_85" id="Page_85">[Pg 85]</a></span>fined -to shell fire, which assumed serious proportions on -the 27th and again on the 28th. Our artillery, however, -was ready with heavy retaliatory fire and by the evening -of the 30th conditions in the Maroc sector had reverted -to something approaching quietness.</p> - -<p>During this period the newly arrived 16th (Irish) -Division of the New Army was attached to the 47th Division -for instruction in trench warfare, the 1/4th Londons taking -over the supervision of the 8th Munsters, among whom -unfortunately several casualties were caused by hostile shell -fire on the 30th. The 31st January was marked principally -by heavy British artillery fire, which elicited but little -response from the enemy and inflicted considerable damage -on his wire and defences generally.</p> - -<p>The following day the 140th Brigade handed over its -trenches to the 142nd, the 1/4th Londons being relieved -by the 21st Londons and proceeding to rest billets in -Haillicourt.</p> - -<p>This tour of duty really brought to a conclusion the -Battalion's service with the 47th Division, for though it -did not part from the Brigade until the 9th February, the -intervening days were spent in training, route-marching -and cleaning.</p> - -<p>On the 8th Brig.-Gen. Cuthbert—then in temporary -command of the Division—inspected the 1/4th Londons -prior to their departure, and addressed the troops; -and the following day the Battalion marched to Béthune, -entraining for Pont Remy (near Abbeville), and marched -via Hallencourt to Citerne, where it went into billets -attached to the 168th Brigade of the newly formed -56th (London) Division, an attachment which remained -unbroken to the end of the War.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_86" id="Page_86">[Pg 86]</a></span></p> -<div class="chapter"></div> -<hr class="chap" /> - - - - -<h2>CHAPTER VII<br /> - -THE 2/4TH BATTALION IN MALTA, GALLIPOLI PENINSULA -AND SOUTHERN EGYPT</h2> - - -<p>On the departure from Malta of the 1st London Infantry -Brigade on the 2nd January 1915, the 2/1st Brigade -became responsible in its place for the defence of the -Fortress.</p> - -<p>The 2/4th Londons settled down at St George's -Barracks to a vigorous course of training. A musketry -course under Fortress arrangements was begun and also -special classes for the Machine-Gun and Transport sections, -those for the latter being conducted by the A.S.C. at -Musta Fort. The Battalion also provided a detached -company to continue the duties of prisoner of war guard -at Verdala Barracks, which had formerly been carried out -by a company of the 1/4th Battalion.</p> - -<p>Shortly after the relief of the garrison, Major J. F. F. -Parr, R.A.M.C.T., who had been medical officer of the -1/4th Londons, was appointed to be M.O. in charge of -Imtarfa Hospital.</p> - -<p>During the 2/4th Londons' duty in Malta they were -frequently called on to find the "public duties" consisting -of an officer's guard at the Governor's Palace in Valetta, -and guards over various government depôts, the first -Palace Guard being found on the 9th February.</p> - -<p>The 10th February was celebrated as a festival on the -island, being the anniversary of St Paul's shipwreck, and -the usual religious procession took place.</p> - -<p>On the 11th February the Battalion moved from -St George's Barracks to Floriana Barracks, Valetta.</p> - -<p>The following day H.E. the Governor-General, General -Sir Leslie Rundle, G.C.B., G.C.V.O., K.C.M.G., D.S.O., -and staff left Malta for England, and on the 12th the new -Governor-General (Field-Marshal Lord Methuen, G.C.B.,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_87" id="Page_87">[Pg 87]</a></span> -G.C.V.O., C.M.G.) arrived and took up his residence at -the Palace.</p> - -<p>At this period occurred two events of paramount -importance which materially affected the part which the -Malta Station was destined to play in the War. The first -of these was the opening on the 25th April 1915 of combined -military and naval operations against the Gallipoli -Peninsula; the second being the decision to throw in -her lot with the Allies of Italy, who declared war on -Austria on the 22nd May 1915.</p> - -<p>The effect of the former of these events was to render -British naval supremacy in the Mediterranean, and consequently -the security of the Mediterranean Fleet Headquarters -at Malta, of vital importance; and of the second -to ensure both desiderata not only by the relief from the -menace of a potential enemy at no great distance from -the island, but also by the accession to the Allied strength -of the powerful Italian Navy, which formed an additional -protection to Malta against the possibility of a surprise -raid by Austria.</p> - -<p>From this date onwards, therefore, the function of Malta -became one not so much of a fortress as of a base of operations, -and a highly useful evacuating station for the casualties -from Gallipoli who now began to be drafted to the island -in great numbers. The accommodation on the island for -hospitals being limited to the normal service requirements -of peace time, the congestion rapidly became serious, and -the troops of the garrison vacated their barracks, going -under canvas in the barrack squares in order to provide accommodation -for the sick and wounded; the 2/4th Londons -moving to the parade ground at Ghain Tuffieha Camp.</p> - -<p>On the 26th July a warning order was issued to the -Battalion, which was still regarded as a draft-finding unit -to the 1/4th Battalion, to prepare a draft of 400 other -ranks to reinforce the 1/4th Battalion in France. The -resulting deficiency in the 2/4th Battalion was to have -been made up by a draft of equal size from the newly -formed 4/4th Battalion in England, and although this -latter draft actually embarked at Southampton, the order -was cancelled; and it appears that the decision was<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_88" id="Page_88">[Pg 88]</a></span> -made at this time, doubtless owing to the wastage of -personnel at Gallipoli, to treat the 2/4th Londons as a -service battalion and to leave the duty of provision of -drafts for both the 1/4th and 2/4th Battalions to the -3/4th and 4/4th Battalions at home.</p> - -<p>The following officers were invalided home from -Malta: Major J. F. F. Parr, R.A.M.C.T., Capt. W. G. -Hayward, 2/Lieuts. L. R. Chapman and N. L. Thomas. -The Battalion was joined on the 13th August by: -2/Lieuts. B. F. L. Yeoman, H. G. Hicklenton, C. P. -Darrington and N. W. Williams. Capt. Hayward's duties -as Adjutant were taken over by Capt. L. C. Coates.</p> - -<p>On the 12th July Lieut. Simpson was ordered to -join the 2nd Royal Fusiliers, then attached to the 29th -Division at the Dardanelles, and was posted to the -Machine-Gun Section of that Battalion.</p> - -<p>During this period training was proceeding to such -extent as was possible in view of the congested state of -the island, and detachments were supplied for fatigue -duties at St Andrew's and St Patrick's Camps, Imtarfa -Hospital, and for coast defence at 9th Mile Stone (between -St Paul's and Salina Bays).</p> - -<p>On the 12th August three signallers of the Battalion, -the first other ranks to proceed on active service, left -for the Dardanelles attached for duty to H.M.S. <em>Euryalus</em>. -Two days later a warning order was issued for the Battalion -to prepare for embarkation to Egypt.</p> - -<p>Before departure from Malta the 2/4th Londons were -inspected on the 14th August by H.E. the Governor, who -subsequently issued a Fortress Order to the following -effect:</p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p>It is a pleasure to His Excellency to say with truth -that it has been a source of satisfaction to him to have -had the four Territorial battalions of the City of London -Regiment under his command. Their conduct has been -excellent under trying conditions lately on account of the -heavy and unceasing fatigue work they have had to -perform. Their appearance in Valetta, the smart way in -which the men salute, the alacrity of the Main Guards in -turning out, all show the efficiency of the Battalions.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_89" id="Page_89">[Pg 89]</a></span> -His Excellency wishes Officers, Non-Commissioned Officers -and men "God Speed," and if from Egypt they go to the -Front he looks to them with confidence to uphold the -high reputation of the City of London Regiment.</p></div> - -<p>On August 19th camp at Ghain Tuffieha was struck -and the Battalion marched to Valetta, embarking next -day on H.T. <em>Southlands</em>—which sailed for Egypt on -the 21st, arriving at Alexandria on the 25th. The -Battalion disembarked and marched to quarters under -canvas at Sporting Club Camp on the seashore, where it -remained until October 6th.</p> - -<p>The strength on proceeding to Egypt was 30 officers -and 765 other ranks, the officers, N.C.O.'s and men who -were not passed fit for active service remaining under -Lieut. V. W. Edwards in Malta for garrison duty, until -September 1916, when they returned to the Reserve -Battalion in England.</p> - -<p>At Alexandria the Battalion provided duties, including -the Main and Ras-el-tin Guards and town pickets; and -also a detachment of 3 officers and 100 other ranks at -Keb-el-Dick Fort, from which further guards were supplied -for Chatty Cable Station, Supply Stores and other points -of importance.</p> - -<p>The Battalion was inspected by the Brigadier, the -Earl of Lucan, on the 6th October, who in an address to -the troops said:</p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p>I have come here to-day to do something which is -quite sad for me, and that is to say good-bye to you. I -wish you all every success, good luck, and a safe return -to England. I trust we shall all meet again.</p> - -<p>I am proud that I have been in command of the 1st -London Infantry Brigade and am exceedingly sorry that -I am not coming with you. I had hoped that the four -battalions of the London Regiment would have gone to -the Front as a Brigade.</p> - -<p>I much appreciate the hard work you all did at Malta -and I send you from here with every confidence that you -will acquit yourselves in the future as I know you have -done in the past, and you will uphold the great reputation -you have gained. I feel sure you will do great credit to<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_90" id="Page_90">[Pg 90]</a></span> -yourselves and to the City of London Regiment wherever -you go.</p></div> - -<p>The commanding officer also received a letter from -Major-Gen. Sir A. Wallace, C.B., commanding the -troops at Alexandria, expressing his appreciation of the -discipline and bearing of the Regiment and affirming his -conviction of the exemplary manner in which it would -carry out its duties on active service.</p> - -<p>The same day embarkation commenced on to H.T. -<em>Karroo</em> at Alexandria, and on the 9th, under escort of -two destroyers, the <em>Karroo</em> sailed for Mudros, arriving on -the evening of 12th October. The following officers did -not accompany the Battalion to Mudros:</p> - -<div class="hangindent"> - -<p>Capts. G. H. Moore and H. Parkhouse (seconded for duty, in the -Censor's Office, Cairo).</p> - -<p>Lieut. H. W. Dennis (granted leave to England) and 2/Lieut. -F. R. C. Bradford (in hospital).</p></div> - -<p>For two days the Battalion remained on board in -Mudros Harbour, but on the 15th was transhipped to -H.T. <em>Sarnia</em>, which put to sea about 3 p.m. At midnight -the transport anchored off Cape Helles and the -Battalion disembarked on to the Gallipoli Peninsula at -W. Beach and bivouacked in dugouts in the early hours -of the 16th October 1916.</p> - -<p>The Battalion was now attached to the Royal Naval -Division, the infantry of which consisted of the following -units:</p> - - -<div class="center"> -<table border="0" cellpadding="4" cellspacing="0" summary="ROYAL NAVAL DIVISION"> - <caption>ROYAL NAVAL DIVISION</caption> - <tr> - <td colspan="3" class="tdc">Major-Gen. A. <span class="smcap">Paris</span>, C.B.</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td colspan="3"><span class="smcap">1st Brigade</span>—Brig.-Gen. David Mercer, C.B.</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdp">"Hawke" </td> - <td>Battalion.</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdp">"Drake"</td> - <td class="tdp">"</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdp">"Hood"</td> - <td class="tdp">"</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdp">"Nelson"</td> - <td class="tdp">"</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td colspan="3" class="tdp">2/3rd London Regiment.</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td colspan="3" class="tdp">2/4th London Regiment.</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td colspan="3"><span class="smcap">2nd Brigade</span>—Brig.-Gen. C. N. Trotman, C.B.</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td colspan="3" class="tdp">1st Royal Marines.</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td colspan="3" class="tdp">2nd Royal Marines.</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdp">"Anson" </td> - <td>Battalion.</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdp">"Howe"</td> - <td class="tdp">"</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td colspan="3" class="tdp">2/1st London Regiment.</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td colspan="3" class="tdp">2/2nd London Regiment.</td> - </tr> -</table></div> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_91" id="Page_91">[Pg 91]</a></span></p> - -<p>The Division was attached with the 42nd (South -Lancashire) and 52nd (Lowland) Territorial Divisions to -the VIII Corps (Lieut.-Gen. Sir Francis Davies, K.C.B.).</p> - -<hr class="tb" /> - -<p>The 2/4th Londons landed on the Peninsula at a -critical period in the fortunes of the expedition, and in -order to render clear the position of affairs in the middle -of October, some reference is necessary to the course which -events had taken since the inception of the campaign.</p> - -<p>After witnessing the "amphibious battle" between -British battleships and the land forts of the Dardanelles, -which took place on the 18th March 1915, General Sir -Ian Hamilton had formed the conclusion that the Navy -would be unable to open the way to Constantinople -without the fullest co-operation of all the military forces -at his disposal.</p> - -<p>The Gallipoli Peninsula runs in a south-westerly -direction from its isthmus at Bulair, where it is spanned -by fortified lines, for some fifty-two miles to its extreme -point, Cape Helles, attaining in its centre a breadth of -nearly twelve miles.</p> - -<p>The northern coast of the northern portion slopes -abruptly towards the Gulf of Zeros in a chain of hills -extending as far as Cape Suvla, the declivitous nature -of the coastline precluding serious military landings. In -the southern half, which is more accessible from the sea, -the main features consist of Achi Baba, dominating the -extreme end of the Peninsula; Sari Bair Mountain, a -succession of almost perpendicular escarpments overlooking -Suvla Bay; and the Kilid Bahr plateau protecting -the forts of the Narrows against attacks from the -north coast.</p> - -<p>As a result of a reconnaissance of this unpromising -feature it became abundantly evident to Sir Ian Hamilton -that he could achieve success and overcome the difficulties -caused by the inadequacy of the landing places and the -improvements made by the Turks in their defences since -the 18th March, only by rapidly flinging ashore the -largest possible force at several landing places simultaneously. -The glorious achievement of the landings at<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_92" id="Page_92">[Pg 92]</a></span> -Cape Helles and Anzac on the 25th April are now matters -of history, and lack of space makes it impossible to repeat -the epic here. We can only record the fact that in face -of innumerable difficulties and a murderous fire from the -Turkish lines and forts, landings were in fact effected. -By the end of the month, by dint of furious and practically -continuous fighting, the French and British were definitely -though precariously established on the south-west extremity -of the Peninsula on a line running from sea to -sea about three miles north of Cape Helles.</p> - -<p>It was obviously essential to exploit the initial success -as quickly as possible in order to carry the Allied lines -forward before the Turkish reinforcements should arrive, -and in spite of the exhaustion of the troops, fighting of -the most desperate character continued on both the -Helles and the Anzac fronts throughout May. But so -enormously strong were the Turkish entanglements and -trenches, and so well placed their machine-guns, that the -Allied progress was slow and achieved only at appalling -cost.</p> - -<p>On the 6th-8th June a last attempt was made on the -Helles front to carry the village of Krithia and the slopes -of Achi Baba, but this attack met with a similar fate to -its predecessors, and the nett result after a severe struggle -was an advance of some 200 yards; the line thus gained -representing the most advanced position ever occupied -on this front.</p> - -<p>As a result of strong representations by the Commander-in-Chief, -fresh forces were concentrated by the end of June -consisting of the 10th, 11th and 13th Divisions of the New -Armies, and the 52nd (Lowland), 53rd (Wessex) and 54th -(East Anglian) Territorial Divisions, the two last-named -being represented by infantry only.</p> - -<p>The impossibility of attaining further success by -frontal attacks at Helles now being clear, Sir Ian Hamilton -determined to employ his fresh forces in endeavouring to -strangle the Turkish defence by an attack across the -Peninsula from Anzac, in a south-easterly direction -towards Maidos; supported by a fresh landing farther -up the coast at Suvla Bay.</p> - -<div class="figcenter" style="width: 700px;"> -<img src="images/i_b_092fp.jpg" width="700" height="276" alt="" /> -<div class="caption"><p><em>V Beach, Cape Helles</em></p></div> -</div> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_93" id="Page_93">[Pg 93]</a></span></p> - -<p>The new operation was launched on the 6th August. -The main attack from Anzac involved as a preliminary -objective the occupation of the heights of Sari Bair, the -possession of which would enable us to bring rifle fire to -bear on the enemy communications with Helles and, -moreover, bring the Narrows within field-gun range. -So nearly to success did this attack attain that had it -received the support which had been anticipated from -the Suvla Bay landing, with its consequent diversion of -Turkish reserves, there can be little doubt that the advance -would have developed into one of first-rate importance. -New Zealand troops did, in fact, scale the heights of -the main ridge, but in subsequent counter-attacks were -forced to yield to the enemy, and the few hundred yards -of ground which stood between us and decisive victory -were denied to us.</p> - -<p>The actual landing at Suvla on the 8th was effected, -as had been hoped, as a complete surprise to the enemy, -and met with little resistance. But the exhaustion of -the troops, caused by a failure in the water supply -arrangements, led to the waste of many valuable hours -of daylight in which no advance was possible and enabled -the enemy to prepare a stubborn resistance to our further -attacks, and the opportunity passed for ever.</p> - -<p>During August and September the supply of reinforcements -and munitions for the Dardanelles Army fell off -seriously, and in the middle of October the position had -become stabilised.</p> - -<p>The general situation had indeed changed most unfavourably -for our chances of ultimate success. The -wholesale retirement of our Russian Allies during the -summer had released large numbers of enemy reserves -for the Gallipoli theatre, and the recrudescence of enemy -submarine activity in the Ægean Sea increased the difficulties -of supply and transport from the bases at Mudros -and Imbros, so that whereas the Allied forces had indeed -shot their bolt, the enemy's strength was still increasing.</p> - -<p>Since the Suvla landing no further active operations -had been attempted, but constant pressure was maintained -on the Turkish lines by our trench garrisons in<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_94" id="Page_94">[Pg 94]</a></span> -mining and bombing, while our artillery continually -harassed him in his advanced and rearward positions.</p> - -<hr class="tb" /> - -<p>The 1st Brigade was out of the trenches on the arrival -of the 2/4th Londons and the first few days were therefore -spent by the Battalion in the rest camp at W. Beach -(Cape Helles) in providing working parties and unloading -stores, while the senior officers of the Battalion visited a -sector of the trenches. The fact should not be overlooked -in connection with the 2/4th Battalion's record that -owing to the narrowness of our foothold on the Peninsula -it was impossible to withdraw troops, even when "at -rest," beyond the shelled zone, and the beaches were -constantly under fire of heavy batteries on the Asiatic side.</p> - -<p>On the 19th Oct. the Adjutant, Capt. L. C. Coates, -was admitted to hospital suffering from pleurisy and his -duties were taken over by Capt. J. R. Webster.</p> - -<p>The Allied lines on the Helles front stretched from -sea to sea in a direction from south-east to north-west -about a thousand yards short of Krithia village. The -trench system was divided into two approximately equal -portions by the Krithia Road, which, connecting Krithia -with the village of Sedd-el-Bahr, near Cape Helles, -traversed a ridge which formed the backbone of this part -of the Peninsula. On the right of the road the lines were -held by the French, their right flank (nearest the Narrows) -being drawn back slightly on the near side of a deep gorge -called Kereves Dere, the waters of which discharged into -the Dardanelles. On the left of the road the lines were -in the occupation of the VIII Corps, and were divided -into three sections, of which at this date the right was -held by the 52nd, the centre by the Royal Naval and the -left, next the Ægean Sea, by the 42nd Division.</p> - -<p>The VIII Corps front was intersected by two deep -ravines respectively called Gully Ravine, near the Ægean -coast, and Krithia Nullah on the immediate left of the -Krithia Road, and both of these, originating in the slopes -of Achi Baba, formed deep furrows through the British -lines, running towards the sea in a direction roughly -parallel to the Krithia Road. The high ground between<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_95" id="Page_95">[Pg 95]</a></span> -the ravines formed a plateau covered with scrub and -gorse, and intersected in all directions by water courses -of less importance; the whole area being uncomfortably -exposed to direct observation from the Turkish defences -on Achi Baba. All along this front the British and -Turkish lines were close together—in some places only -about 30 yards apart—and a continual and deadly warfare, -in which bombs played a prominent part, was being waged -from sapheads pushed out from the main defensive -positions and held by barricades.</p> - -<p>The Royal Naval Division's subsector included several -of such centres of activity, notably at the Northern and -Southern Barricades, on the left, and at Worcester -Barricade, a sap pushed forward from the Rue de Paris, -in the centre.</p> - -<p>The exposure of the whole British area to observation -rendered necessary the use of very long communication -trenches, to afford cover to the mule transport whereby -the trench garrisons were supplied with rations and trench -stores. These wide mule tracks, doubled for upward and -downward traffic, were carried forward from the crest -of the plateau above the beaches at Cape Helles to within -a few hundred yards of the front trenches.</p> - -<p>On the 20th October the 1st R.N. Brigade relieved -the 2nd Brigade in the centre subsection, the forward -system of trenches being occupied by "Drake," "Nelson," -"Hood" and "Hawke," the 2/4th Londons relieving the -2/2nd Londons in the Eski line, a reserve line some 1500 -yards in rear of the most advanced trenches. The -Battalion occupied this line with two companies each -side of the Eastern Mule Trench. The relief was carried -out without difficulty, but during the move forward from -bivouacs the Battalion incurred its first battle casualties, -Capt. H. Morris and Privates Housden and Maunder -being wounded.</p> - -<p>At this time the Turkish Feast of Barram was proceeding, -and when it drew to a close on the evening of the -22nd it was anticipated with some confidence that the -enemy would attempt a demonstration against the Allied -positions. The only activity, however, was on our side<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_96" id="Page_96">[Pg 96]</a></span> -and our batteries both on land and sea gave the Turks -a particularly hot time during the evening. During this -tour the weather began to break and heavy rains fell, -but apart from the wet condition of the trenches and the -consequent additional work in keeping them in repair -the tour of duty passed without incident of an unusual -nature. On the 22nd half the company officers and non-commissioned -officers were attached for instruction in the -front line to the R.N. Battalions, their places being taken -after forty-eight hours by the other half.</p> - -<p>On the 27th the 2nd Brigade returned to the line -relieving the 1st Brigade, which withdrew on relief to the -Rest Camp, the 2/4th Londons handing over their positions -in the Eski line to the 2/2nd Londons.</p> - -<p>This day General Sir Ian Hamilton handed over -command-in-chief of the Dardanelles Army to General -Sir C. C. Monro, K.C.B. Sir Charles Monro's duty on -assuming command was in the first instance to report -as to the desirability, on purely military grounds, of -evacuating the Peninsula, and alternatively as to the -force required to bring the campaign to a successful issue. -A reconnaissance of the position led him to the conclusion -that evacuation should be taken in hand, and the adoption -of this course received official approval, with results which -will be recorded in their place.</p> - -<p>In the Rest Camp the Battalion spent six days, which -were occupied in work on new winter quarters and dugouts, -and which passed quietly but for heavy shelling -on the 29th October and the 1st November from enemy -batteries on the Asiatic shore; but fortunately no -casualties were suffered.</p> - -<p>The month of November was occupied in duty in and -out of the line, tours in the trenches being for seven days, -followed by seven days in the Rest Camp at Cape Helles. -For both the tours in line the 2/4th Londons were in -reserve in the Eski lines though on each occasion companies -were sent in turn to the front trenches for instruction -in trench warfare. For this purpose they were attached -to "Hawke," "Hood" and "Drake" Battalions.</p> - -<div class="figcenter" style="width: 500px;"> -<img src="images/i_b_096fp.jpg" width="500" height="313" alt="" /> -<div class="caption"><p><span class="smcap">Gallipoli Peninsula—Cape Helles Trenches</span>, 1915</p></div> -</div> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_97" id="Page_97">[Pg 97]</a></span></p> - -<p>The Turks at this period were comparatively quiet -beyond a certain amount of artillery fire, and for the -companies in the Eski line the time passed by no means -unpleasantly. Engaged in strengthening and improving -the defences during working hours, they were allowed -when off duty to go in small parties down to Gully Beach -on the Ægean coast. These small excursions were the -means of providing a change of diet, for the men seldom -returned without a good haul of fish, caught by a stratagem -in which, so rumour has it, the Mills Bomb figured -prominently.</p> - -<p>It was not long, however, before the Battalion discovered -that their worst enemy on the Peninsula was the -elements. The summer heat had now broken and the -autumn rains were beginning with all their sub-tropical -violence. The Battalion's first introduction to these -deluges occurred on the 10th November, when, having -just returned from the trenches to the Rest Camp, it was -treated to a violent rainstorm which flooded all the dugouts -and shelters.</p> - -<p>A week later when the 2/4th Londons had returned -to the line a thunderstorm burst over the lines and heavy -rain fell for about two hours, flooding many trenches and -rendering them almost untenable. This storm was followed -by several days of rain and high wind which inflicted considerable -hardship on the troops, not only while they were -actually in the trenches but also by reason of the serious -damage caused to the Rest Camp, so that on coming out -of the line when the tour of duty was over the conditions -of discomfort were unabated.</p> - -<p>This sort of incident, which recurred during the rainy -season with monotonous frequency, was far more productive -of discomfort and ill effects than it would have -been on the Western front; since owing to the restriction -of space it was impossible to attain on the Peninsula to -anything approaching the degree of "back-of-the-line" -organisation which was reached in France. Wet clothes, -therefore, remained wet until the sun dried them, and -the inevitable result was a constantly high proportion of -sickness, which during the last few months on the Peninsula -accounted for vastly more casualties than the enemy's<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_98" id="Page_98">[Pg 98]</a></span> -weapons. But under the most unpromising circumstances -the British soldier invariably manages to make himself -as comfortable as possible and to undergo severe privations -with a sort of fatalistic and stoical cheerfulness, -which he vainly endeavours to conceal by much "grousing." -And so on the Peninsula, a locality scarcely -associated as a rule with ideas of amusement, a certain -amount of recreation was obtained by football matches, -and by the efforts of the bands of the four London -battalions who played in different battalion areas each -evening when the Brigades were out of the trenches. The -officers also were able to obtain some exercise through -the kindness of the officers of the 2nd Royal Fusiliers -(29th Division) who lent their horses, on which a few -pleasant 'longshore excursions' were made.</p> - -<p>The few days out of the trenches were occupied in -supplying working parties for the construction of the -new winter quarters.</p> - -<p>On the 20th November the Battalion was issued with -gas masks, and received its first instruction in defensive -measures against gas attacks. It was believed at this -time that steps were being taken by the Turks to employ -poison gas against the Allies, but none was actually used -against the 2/4th Londons.</p> - -<p>Hitherto the Battalion had fortunately suffered but -few casualties at the hands of the enemy, the total in -all ranks amounting to 4 killed and 5 wounded. Sickness, -however, now began to take a heavy toll of all units, and -this became especially serious after the 26th November, -on which day a storm of unprecedented violence burst -over the Peninsula, accompanied by torrential rain, which -rapidly filled the trenches and forced the occupants on -both sides on to the parapets, where they crouched unable -to move for fear of falling into the trenches and being -swept away by the torrents which poured down them -and overflowed on to the land adjoining. In the Rest -Camps the dugouts were rapidly flooded out and the -troops spent a night of bitter exposure. In the afternoon -of the following day the wind suddenly shifted to the -north, and a biting frost ensued. The cold was agonising<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_99" id="Page_99">[Pg 99]</a></span> -and the water froze around the men's feet as they slept -from sheer exhaustion. Greatcoats which had been -drenched by the rains were so stiffened by the frost that -they stood up by themselves. So severe was the cold -that it was only by keeping the men constantly at work -with their shovels that many were kept alive at all. On -the 28th snow began to fall, and the blizzard continued -throughout the day and during the 29th. In the meantime -the sea had become very rough and the temporary -quays and breakwaters suffered great damage, both on -the Peninsula and at Mudros and Imbros, and this added -seriously to the difficulties of the already over-burdened -transport services.</p> - -<p>During the first few days of December over 200 deaths -occurred from exposure and over 10,000 sick were evacuated -from the Peninsula; and from the statements of -deserters it is probable that the Turks suffered even more -severely. A famous war correspondent who was at Cape -Helles at the time wrote: "Never probably since -Crimean days have British forces in the field had to endure -such cold as the last days of November brought to our men -at the Dardanelles."</p> - -<p>On the 29th 2/Lieut. P. C. Darrington was evacuated -to hospital.<a name="FNanchor_3_3" id="FNanchor_3_3"></a><a href="#Footnote_3_3" class="fnanchor">[3]</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_3_3" id="Footnote_3_3"></a><a href="#FNanchor_3_3"><span class="label">[3]</span></a> Darrington on recovery transferred to the 5th London Regiment -(L.R.B.) with whom he served till almost the end of the War, being -unhappily killed a few days before the Armistice.</p></div> - -<p>On the 1st December the 1st Brigade returned to the -trenches and this time the 2/4th Londons took over a -sector of the front line between "Drake" on the right, -and "Hood" on the left. The sector included a part of -the front line known as Rue de Paris, from Sap B to -Sap N, which was occupied by A and C Companies, while -D Company went into support in Worcester Flats with B -in reserve in Munster Terrace, the machine-guns being -in front line positions. This day the enemy's artillery -was more active than it had been for months, and for three -hours in the afternoon the British lines generally were -subjected to a violent bombardment by field guns and -howitzers; but although an attack was believed to be -imminent no infantry movements developed, and in the -evening the situation became quieter.</p> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_100" id="Page_100">[Pg 100]</a></span></p> - -<p>Although this tour of duty was not unusually active, -there were abundant signs of a considerable accession -of strength behind the Turkish lines, and daily his artillery -became a little more active, a good deal of shelling being -caused by the registering of fresh batteries on our lines. -The Turkish snipers also became particularly annoying, -and their efficiency reflected itself in our casualty list -which, though not large, was somewhat longer than usual. -On the evenings of the 9th and the 11th the Turks employed -a field searchlight from behind Achi Baba, but -the experiment was not repeated and led to no incident -of interest.</p> - -<p>Col. Dunfee was granted a month's leave of absence -on urgent private affairs, and left the Peninsula for England -on the 5th, the command of the Battalion devolving upon -Major V. H. Seyd who continued in command, with the -acting rank of Lieut.-Col., until after the final evacuation -of the Peninsula, the duties of second in command being -assumed by Capt. R. N. Arthur.</p> - -<p>During this tour a draft of 49 N.C.O.'s and men under -2/Lieuts. J. W. Price and S. Davis joined the 2/4th -Londons from England, and was posted to companies. -2/Lieuts. N. L. Thomas and F. R. C. Bradford rejoined -from hospital.</p> - -<p>The following is an extract from Battalion orders for -the 12th December:</p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p>The Commanding Officer would like to place on record -that whilst with the Grenade Section in the trenches last -week No. 2827 Pte. Hedger threw back a live grenade -which had fallen into the trench, thereby saving his comrades -and himself from injury.</p></div> - -<p>On the 9th December a relief was effected, combined -with a readjustment of the boundaries of the Divisional -sector on the arrival of the 29th Division from the Suvla -Bay front; and practically half the centre subsection -from Sap F (half-way along the 2/4th Londons' line) to -the left, occupied by two companies of the 2/4th Londons,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_101" id="Page_101">[Pg 101]</a></span> -"Hood" and "Hawke," was handed over to the King's -Own Scottish Borderers. On the following morning A, B -and C Companies and Battalion Headquarters withdrew -to the Rest Camp. D Company remained in line attached -to "Drake" until the 11th, when it rejoined the Battalion.</p> - -<p>This relief being, as already stated, carried out in the -course of a readjustment of the line, the Brigade spent only -four days out of the trenches, and on the 15th it took -over a fresh sector facing Kereves Dere on the right of -Achi Baba Nullah. Of this new sector about 750 yards -were taken over from the 2nd R.N. Brigade while the -French troops were relieved in about 250 yards of trench -adjoining on the right. The sector was occupied with -"Nelson" on the left, and "Drake" and A and B Companies, -2/4th Londons, on the right. Battalion Headquarters -and C and D Companies occupied the Eski -line in rear of the new sector, in this part called the -Tranchée d'Amade, with one company each side of the -junction with the main communication trench, the Avenue -de Constantinople.</p> - -<p>The days following the occupation of this sector were -marked by considerable activity on the part of the -enemy's bombers. The hostile trenches opposite the 2/4th -Londons were on an overage about 70 yards from the -British front line and numerous saps had been pushed -out toward them, from the heads of which the struggle -continued without cessation, the Grenadiers on each side -plying their objectionable trade without abatement.</p> - -<p>On the 17th B Company relieved A Company in the -front trenches. Capt. F. C. J. Read this day was -evacuated to hospital, being followed there next day by -Lieut. R. C. Dickins.</p> - -<p>On the 20th December the announcement was made -in Corps orders of the successful evacuation of the Suvla -and Anzac positions which had taken place during the -night of the 19th.</p> - -<p>The details of the scheme for this evacuation had been -carefully worked out by Sir William Birdwood who had -been appointed to command of the Dardanelles Army -on the formation of the Salonika Army (Sir C. C. Monro<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_102" id="Page_102">[Pg 102]</a></span> -assuming supreme command of the Mediterranean Forces). -The scheme provided for the completion of this difficult -operation in three stages, the first of which involved the -embarkation of all troops, animals and supplies not -required for a prolonged campaign; this was to be -followed by the evacuation of troops, guns, stores, etc., -not immediately required for the defence of our positions, -while the third and final stage consisted of the embarkation -of the rearguard troops and the destruction of all -guns, animals and stores which could not be removed.</p> - -<p>The actual evacuation had been fixed for as early a -date as possible owing to the improbability of the long -continuance of favourable weather; and at both Suvla -and Anzac the process was completed without a hitch -of any kind, only a small quantity of stores having to -be destroyed, and without any interference on the part -of the enemy.</p> - -<p>Almost immediately after this operation a marked -increase in the Turkish activity on the Helles front took -place, probably on account of the release of large numbers -of his batteries in the evacuated sectors.</p> - -<p>In announcing the completion of this operation, the -special order of the day affirmed that the Helles position -was not to be abandoned, but that on the contrary the -VIII Corps was entrusted with the task of holding to this -theatre of operations as large as possible a force of Turkish -troops in order to prevent their employment elsewhere. -To this end the battalions holding the line were urged to -maintain their pressure against the enemy at all points -while schemes were evolved for the construction of deep -dugouts, the improvement of reserve lines, and other -works, which would only be necessary in the event of a -long continued occupation of the Peninsula.</p> - -<p>Information was even disseminated that large reinforcements -totalling over 1600 all ranks were on the way, -and were expected shortly. But behind all these precautions -against the leakage of information among the -Turks as to our intentions, and under cover of the various -fictions above described, preparations were being pressed -forward for the evacuation of the Helles front also;<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_103" id="Page_103">[Pg 103]</a></span> -preparations which needed particular care not only by -reason of the greater activity of the enemy than at -Suvla and Anzac, but also because the enemy having -been successfully hoodwinked on the former occasion it -hardly appeared probable that we should be so successful -a second time in masking our intentions.</p> - -<p>Another very severe storm broke over Cape Helles -on the 21st December, accompanied by heavy rain, and -one of the 2/4th London machine-guns was struck by -lightning in the trenches. It became evident that with -the likelihood of an early complete break up in the weather -the final evacuation must not be delayed; and accordingly -it was fixed for the 8th January 1916, or the first -fine night after that date.</p> - -<p>On the 21st Lieut. L. A. Dickins was seriously wounded -and evacuated from the Peninsula. This tour of duty -indeed proved the most costly in personnel which the -Battalion had carried out, and among N.C.O.'s and men -4 were killed and 13 wounded.</p> - -<p>On the 22nd the 1st R.N. Brigade made a further -"side-step" to the right in the trenches, and in the course -of the readjustment A and B Companies of the 2/4th -Londons were relieved in the trenches and withdrew to a -fresh Rest Camp, called Cæsar's Camp. The rest of the -Battalion, however, remained in the Tranchée d'Amade -until after Christmas.</p> - -<p>On the 23rd December 2/Lieut. C. S. G. Blows joined -the Battalion from England.</p> - -<p>Owing to the kindness of Mrs Dunfee and other ladies -interested in the 2/4th Londons, Christmas gifts and cards -had been received for every member of the Battalion, -and these materially helped to infuse a little cheerfulness -into a somewhat depressing and comfortless Christmastide. -On Christmas Day the Battalion was practically complete -in the Tranchée d'Amade, B Company and two platoons -of A Company having moved forward once more from -Cæsar's Camp.</p> - -<p>The general scheme for the evacuation of the Helles -front was similar to that employed at Anzac and Suvla, -and in the course of the second stage of the operation,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_104" id="Page_104">[Pg 104]</a></span> -detachments of the 2/4th Londons, consisting of 63 other -ranks under Lieut. S. N. Davies and 50 other ranks under -2/Lieut. S. Davis were embarked for Mudros on the night -of the 31st December. These were followed the next -night by 5 officers and 147 other ranks under Capt. -R. N. Keen.</p> - -<p>On the 3rd January 1916, the machine-guns of the -Battalion, now increased to six, were evacuated in charge -of a N.C.O. and two men, and on the following day the -last battle casualties occurred, three men being slightly -wounded in the Rest Camp.</p> - -<p>The preparations for final evacuation were now -practically complete. A strong embarkation staff had -been formed to deal with the rapid embarkation of the -last troops as they should reach the beaches; and new -lines of defence guarding the beaches had been prepared -for occupation in case the enemy should become aware -of the operation and harass it.</p> - -<p>On the night of the 6th/7th January, a fourth detachment -of 4 officers and 118 other ranks of the Battalion -under Capt. Arthur left the Peninsula, and the next night -Major Seyd in command of the remainder of the Battalion -(8 officers and 155 other ranks) embarked at V Beach. -This completed the safe evacuation of the whole Battalion -with the exception of four men who were left behind -attached to the "Dumeszyl Battery" under Commander -Alan Campbell, R.N.D. (since killed), for demolition work. -After completion of their hazardous duties all the members -of this brave unit were also safely embarked.</p> - -<p>The total strength of the Battalion on evacuating the -Peninsula (including the transport and other details who -had remained at Mudros and Imbros) was 23 officers and -about 560 other ranks. The total casualties sustained -at the hands of the enemy had been 2 officers wounded, -16 N.C.O.'s and men killed and 38 wounded, the remaining -reduction of strength having been due to sickness and -exposure.</p> - -<p>On the 7th January the enemy opened an intense -bombardment, said to be the heaviest since the original -landing in April 1915, on our trenches; the shelling<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_105" id="Page_105">[Pg 105]</a></span> -lasting from noon till 3.30 p.m., at which time two Turkish -mines were sprung near Fusilier Bluff. No attack developed -except at this point, where a half-hearted advance -of the enemy was easily dispersed.</p> - -<p>The 8th January was calm and still, but at night the -weather became stormy, and a steady and increasing -swell did not tend to facilitate the task of rapid embarkation, -and indeed rendered it very doubtful whether it -would be possible to get the last troops away at all. This -caused considerable anxiety to the Embarkation Staff -whose task was not lightened by the knowledge of the -presence of an enemy submarine which (unsuccessfully) -torpedoed H.M.S. <em>Prince George</em>. Add to this the possibility -that the enemy might discover the retirement in -time to give trouble on the beaches; and it will be possible -in at least a small measure to appreciate the great skill -with which this apparently impracticable task was brought -to a successful issue. By 3.30 a.m. the evacuation was -completed and at 4 a.m. two of our magazines were blown -up. The conflagration caused by these appears to have -been the first intimation of our departure received by -the Turks who promptly shelled our vacated lines heavily -until 6.30 a.m.</p> - -<p>All material was removed except a few unserviceable -guns, some 500 animals and a large quantity of stores, -all of which were destroyed.</p> - -<p>It is impossible to refrain from remarking on the -excellent organisation and discipline with which the -evacuation was carried out, and also on the extraordinary -luck which was vouchsafed both at Anzac and Suvla in the -concealment of the moon.</p> - -<p>The Gallipoli expedition must live for ever in the -annals of the world's military history, as one of the most -remarkable exploits ever carried out. Although failure -ensued, it was indeed a glorious failure, and the wonder -is rather that success was so nearly attained. The base -of operations at Alexandria was 800 miles distant, and the -lines of communication possessed only two inadequate -and unprotected harbours at Mudros and Imbros respectively. -The whole occupied zone, and also the sea<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_106" id="Page_106">[Pg 106]</a></span> -in its vicinity, was all the time under hostile observation -and fire; there were no roads worthy of the name, no -storehouses or railways, and the activity of enemy -submarines made it impossible to send to the Peninsula -any store-ship over 1500 tons.</p> - -<p>Yet in the face of all these obstacles not only was the -landing effected, but our position maintained for nearly -nine months and the whole force safely re-embarked; -and the memory of it must live for ever as one of the -greatest pages of the history of the war.</p> - -<p>After the evacuation, an appreciative order was -published in R.N. Divisional Orders complimenting the -troops on the discipline and devotion which had sustained -them during the hardships of the campaign, and -which alone had rendered the task of evacuation possible -of accomplishment. General Paris, commanding the -Division, wrote personally to the Commanding Officer -a letter in which he said: "I must thank you and your -Battalion for the good work you did when with us on the -Peninsula, we all admired the cheerful spirit your men -showed under very trying circumstances."</p> - -<p>At Mudros the connection of the 2/4th Londons with -the Royal Naval Division was severed, and they became -temporarily attached to the 29th Division. A few days -were spent on the island in rest and reorganisation, and -during its stay there the Battalion was rejoined by the -Transport Section and other details who had been detached -from it during its duty at the Dardanelles; and -a great deal of satisfaction was caused by the distribution -of mails from home, the delivery of which had been -delayed by the evacuation.</p> - -<p>On the 11th January Capt. R. N. Keen was admitted -to hospital, and on the 14th Sergt. F. W. Walker left -the Battalion for England to take up a commission. The -record of this N.C.O. will be referred to again later in -connection with the 3/4th Battalion to which he was -subsequently attached.</p> - -<p>The Battalion embarked on H.T. <em>Ionian</em> for Alexandria -on the 18th, arriving there three days later. Disembarkation -took place on the following day, and the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_107" id="Page_107">[Pg 107]</a></span> -Battalion entrained to Wardan, a camping ground near -Cairo, where it took up quarters under canvas and became -attached with the other three London Battalions to the -53rd Division, Major-Gen. A. G. Dallas, C.B., in command. -At Wardan company training was carried out -until the 16th February, when the 2/4th Londons, with -two companies of the 2/2nd Londons attached, moved by -rail to Beni Mazar, where it became part of the Minia -Force.</p> - -<hr class="tb" /> - -<p>At the period of the 2/4th Londons' return to Egypt -the Eastern frontier, on which the Turks had attempted -to force the Suez Canal defences about a year previously, -had become quiet, and the principal cause of anxiety -centred in the Western Desert where the attitude of the -Senussi, a warlike tribe of Arabs, had created a situation -of some difficulty, which was rendered more complex by -the possibility of internal disorders and religious unrest -in the Nile Valley and the Delta district.</p> - -<p>On the outbreak of war between England and Turkey -the Senussi had not at first shown any disposition towards -hostile action, but under the influence of a Germanised -Turk named Gaafer Pasha they had become more truculent -as the summer of 1915 wore on. Several breaches of the -peace which occurred in the autumn left no room for -doubt that military operations would be necessary to -bring the Senussi to a due sense of their proper behaviour.</p> - -<p>In November 1915 Lieut.-Gen. Sir John Maxwell, -commanding in chief the forces in Egypt, concentrated -the Western Force at Mersa Matruh, a town on the Mediterranean -coast some 180 miles west of Alexandria. -Under Maj.-Gen. Wallace, C.B., to whom command of -the Mersa Matruh troops was given, several vigorous -little operations were successfully carried out against the -tribesmen; but the lack of camel transport and water -supply arrangements restricted the scope of his activities. -Preparations were therefore made to remedy these defects -and thus render possible the despatch of a serious punitive -expedition into the desert.</p> - -<p>On the 11th February a newly concentrated force of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_108" id="Page_108">[Pg 108]</a></span> -the Senussi occupied the Baharia Oasis, and on the 27th -of the same month they also seized the Farafra and -Dakhla Oases. To combat the serious menace to the -Nile Valley offered by these fresh signs of activity, Sir -John Maxwell formed a new command, known as the -Southern Force, under Maj.-Gen. J. Adye, C.B., with -Headquarters at Beni Suef, a township on the Nile some -175 miles south of Cairo. This Southern Force was -concentrated in four distinct areas for the protection of -the Nile Valley and the cultivated areas, the three northern -areas respectively concentrated at Wadi Natrun, Beni -Salama and the Fayoum, being grouped under command -of Maj.-Gen. Dallas; the fourth and southernmost being -located in the Minia and Assiut provinces under Brig.-Gen. -A. Stirling.</p> - -<p>General Stirling's Minia Force was being concentrated -at the period when the 2/4th Londons joined it, and -comprised the following formations:</p> - -<div class="center"> -<ul> - <li>Highland Mounted Brigade (dismounted).</li> - <li>1st Australian Light Horse Brigade.</li> - <li>One squadron of Cavalry (Egyptian Army).</li> - <li>Detachment of R.F.C. with two Aeroplanes.</li> - <li>Nos. 1 and 2 Armoured Trains.</li> - <li>1/4th Glamorgan Battery R.F.A.</li> - <li>One section Hong-Kong Mountain Battery.</li> - <li>2/1st Cheshire Field Company R.E.</li> - <li>2/4th London Regiment.</li> - <li>Two Companies 2/2nd London Regiment,</li> -</ul> -</div> -<p>and was subsequently increased by the arrival of further -units as follows:</p> - -<div class="center"> -<ul> - <li>One squadron Armoured Cars R.N. Division.</li> - <li>Half section Camel Transport Corps.</li> - <li>One Company Australian Camel Corps.</li> -</ul> -</div> -<p>In spite of the great strategic importance of the Oases -it was found impossible at the moment to undertake -active operations, and the activities of the Minia Force -were therefore confined to defensive measures. The -whole Nile Valley at this time was infected by powerful -religious and political influences which were at work to -endeavour to induce the native population to co-operate -with the enemy against the British, and although these<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_109" id="Page_109">[Pg 109]</a></span> -influences had not attained the success hoped for by -their instigators, they had taken a certain hold on all -classes of the civilian population. It was, therefore, -extremely important to counterbalance this smouldering -agitation by the presence of strong military forces in -provincial stations, primarily to prevent the occurrence -of disturbances which might be fomented in the absence -of troops, and to safeguard points of military importance, -such as railway stations, bridges and canals. The natives -of Egypt, though not of warlike character, are capable -of violent fanatical outbursts, and the continued presence -of the military, combined with frequent displays of their -force, was the best means of preventing altogether disturbances -which might assume very serious proportions.</p> - -<hr class="tb" /> - -<p>Such was briefly the position of affairs at the period -of the 2/4th Londons' attachment to the Minia Force, -but shortly after their arrival a distinct improvement in -the outlook was caused by the dispersal of the Senussi -forces in the battle of Agagia on the 26th February 1916. -This time it was possible to exploit the success, and the -desert column pushed forward to Sollum which was -occupied on the 14th March. The effect of this signal -success on British prestige throughout Egypt was marked, -and this effect was enhanced by the continued failure of -the Turks to make any impression in the East on the -Suez Canal defences. The Senussi forces were now -practically disposed of, only about 3000 remaining in the -field, and this remnant appeared to be disheartened, -while the reputation of their commander, Sayed Ahmed, -both as a temporal leader and a spiritual guide, had -waned.</p> - -<p>The danger, however, was by no means past, and the -occupation by the Senussi of the Baharia Oasis, which -followed soon after the battle of Agagia, created a serious -menace to the part of the Nile Valley for which the Minia -Force was responsible.</p> - -<p>The Minia District includes about 65 miles of a strip -of cultivated land running north and south along the -left bank of the Nile, varying in width from 7 to 14 miles.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_110" id="Page_110">[Pg 110]</a></span> -This area is intersected for irrigation purposes by numerous -canals of which the largest, Bahr Yusef, runs roughly -parallel to the Nile near the western edge of the cultivated -strip. Beyond it sand-dunes run for some two miles into -the desert. Minia itself is a town of some importance, -containing about 35,000 inhabitants. The loot to be -obtained from its banks and merchants, as well as the -possibility of obtaining recruits from the Bedouin population, -and the certainty of creating a strong anti-British -influence, seemed to offer considerable inducements to -raiding parties from the Baharia Oasis, and it was against -this danger that the protective measures of the Minia -Force were directed.</p> - -<p>The troops at Beni Mazar, which is on the main railway -line 26 miles north of Minia, comprised the following:</p> - -<div class="center"> -<ul> - <li>2/4th London Regiment.</li> - <li>Two Companies 2/2nd London Regiment.</li> - <li>One Camel Machine-Gun Section, Lovat's Scouts.</li> - <li>One Troop Australian Light Horse.</li> - <li>Detachment of Cheshire Field Company R.E.</li> - <li>No. 2 Armoured Train.</li> -</ul> -</div> -<p>A detached post of one company of infantry (supplied -by 2/4th Londons) was furnished from Beni Mazar to -guard a bridge at Saqula over the Bahr Yusef. The -whole of the troops at Beni Mazar came under command -of A/Lieut.-Col. V. H. Seyd.</p> - -<p>At Beni Mazar the 2/4th Londons settled down quickly -to their new surroundings and carried out company -training to the extent which the circumstances permitted. -The situation, however, placed a considerable restriction -on the activities of the Battalion in this direction, as it -was held at all times under instant readiness to move. -A good deal of attention was paid, nevertheless, to long -distance route marching with the deliberate intention of -hardening the troops in preparation for the possibility -of an advance against the Baharia Oasis.</p> - -<p>On the 26th February a detachment of the 2/2nd -Londons proceeded to Nag Hamadi to guard the Nile -bridgehead there. Col. Dunfee this day returned from -leave and took over once more the command of the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_111" id="Page_111">[Pg 111]</a></span> -Battalion and of the forces at Beni Mazar, A/Lieut.-Col. -Seyd reverting to his former duties as second in command -with the rank of Major.</p> - -<p>On the 28th and 29th trial runs were made on the -armoured train from Beni Mazar to Maghaga with the -double object of giving the troops practice in rapid entrainment -and of reminding the inhabitants of the presence -of British forces. A demonstration march was made -through the streets of Maghaga, but the demeanour of -the natives was found to be quite satisfactory. The -behaviour of the inhabitants of Beni Mazar also was so -peaceful at this time that it was found possible to relax -somewhat the strict orders as to permitting troops to -walk out in the town, and henceforth they were allowed -to walk in pairs instead of parties of six as had formerly -been the case, though side arms were still worn at all -times.</p> - -<p>On the 1st March Capt. H. G. Stanham was appointed -to command the Saqula detachment.</p> - -<p>The working hours of the Battalion at this period were -early in the day, owing to the advance of the hot season, -but in spite of the severe change from the trying conditions -to which it had been subjected at Cape Helles two months -earlier, the Battalion showed a remarkably good bill of -health.</p> - -<p>At the beginning of March the command in chief in -Egypt was assumed by Sir Archibald Murray, and in the -rearrangement of the defensive forces in the Nile Valley -which ensued, the Beni Mazar troops ceased to form part -of the Minia Force, which was extended farther to the -south, and became attached to the Northern Force -(Southern Area) under Maj.-Gen. Dallas.</p> - -<p>On the 3rd and 5th of March practice alarms took -place and the Beni Mazar Force moved tactically to -Tambu, taking up a position there for the defence of the -railway. The strength of the 2/4th Londons on parade -at the second alarm was 16 officers and 450 other ranks.</p> - -<p>Throughout the period of the 2/4th Londons' occupation -of Beni Mazar they received the greatest possible -attention and kindness from the local Egyptian residents,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_112" id="Page_112">[Pg 112]</a></span> -who overwhelmed them with presents of eggs, fowls, -turkeys, sheep, cigarettes, fruit and other "consumable -stores," which needless to say were gratefully received -as a pleasant alternative to rations. The officers of the -Battalion were constantly entertained by the local -dignitaries, who extended to them all the hospitality in -their power, and among whom must be mentioned -Mahomed Marzouk, Mamur Markaz, Merza Mohed Ali -F. Bey, Abdul Gawad, Mahomed Zubi Abd el Razech, -Ahmed H. el Keesz and H. Abd el Rezik.</p> - -<p>On the 6th April the Saqula detachment was withdrawn -and on the 12th the Battalion left Beni Mazar, -handing over duties to the 2/5th Devonshire Regiment. -The Battalion strength, 23 officers and 586 other ranks, -proceeded by train <em>via</em> Cairo and Alexandria, travelling -all night, and detrained the following day at Sidi Gaber, -marching to quarters under canvas at Sidi Bishr. Here -the 2/1st London Infantry Brigade came together again -as a Brigade for the first time since its occupation of -Malta, under the command of Col. Dunfee.</p> - -<p>On the 17th April the Brigade embarked at Alexandria -on H.T. <em>Transylvania</em> which carried in addition to the -Brigade, detachments of Colonial and Imperial troops, -totalling together 130 officers and about 3000 other ranks. -The following appointments were made on H.T. -<em>Transylvania</em>:</p> - -<div class="center"> -<table border="0" cellpadding="4" cellspacing="0" summary="appointments"> - <tr> - <td>O.C. Ship—Col. Vickers Dunfee, V.D.</td> - <td rowspan="2" class="bl">2/4th London Regiment.</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td>Ship's Adjutant—Capt. J. R. Webster</td> - </tr> -</table></div> - -<p>On the 18th the <em>Transylvania</em> left Alexandria and -during the passage all possible precautions were taken -against submarine attack. No untoward incident however -occurred, and on the 24th April the transport -arrived at Marseilles and disembarkation at once took -place.</p> - -<p>The Battalion entrained immediately for Rouen, -arriving on the 26th April, and was accommodated in -the Bruyères Camp.</p> - -<p>On arrival at Rouen the 2/1st London Infantry Brigade -was finally disbanded after having been in existence for<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_113" id="Page_113">[Pg 113]</a></span> -about nineteen months. Col. Dunfee, on the break-up -of the Brigade, once more assumed command of the -Battalion, but its remaining life as a separate unit proved -to be short.</p> - -<p>The wastage which had inevitably taken place in the -ranks of the 1/4th Battalion (which had now been in -France for over fifteen months) had been far beyond the -capacity of the Reserve Battalion at home to replace; -and with the certain prospect of being called on to fill -serious deficiencies to be caused by the large numbers of -additional casualties which were expected in the great -battle destined to open on 1st July, it was decided by the -War Office to disband finally all the units formerly comprising -the 2/1st London Infantry Brigade, and to use -these troops for the purpose of reinforcing their first -line battalions.</p> - -<p>The dispersal of the 2/4th Battalion at Rouen is therefore -the last incident to be recorded in its separate history.</p> - -<p>Owing to the exigencies of the campaign it was impossible -to grant leave to more than a very small proportion -of the Battalion in spite of its prolonged absence -from the United Kingdom, and drafts were quickly sent -up the line beginning on the 5th May. By the 20th June -the whole strength of the Battalion in officers, N.C.O.'s -and men, with a few exceptions, had been despatched -to the 1/4th Londons, in the history of which the arrival -of these drafts will be noted in detail in their place.</p> - -<p>The officers sent to other units were:</p> - -<p>Capts. W. H. S. Stevens and W. N. Towse, Lieut. R. C. -Dickins, and 2/Lieuts. G. F. Bishop and H. W. Dennis -to 1/21st London Regiment (47th Division).</p> - -<p>Hon. Lieut, and Q.M. J. E. W. Lambley to XV Corps, -A.C.C.</p> - -<p>A draft of 133 other ranks was sent to the Kensingtons -(13th London), but by the intervention of Lieut.-Col. -Wheatley they were subsequently secured for the 1/4th -Londons. Col. Vickers Dunfee was attached to 1/22nd -London Regiment (The Queens) for some two months, -after which he returned to England to command the -4th (Reserve) Battalion.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_114" id="Page_114">[Pg 114]</a></span></p> - -<p>Thus ends the separate record of the first reserve -Battalion raised by the 4th London Regiment during the -war. Although the 2/4th Battalion ceased to exist as -a unit, the services rendered by its personnel in the first -line battalion were of a very high order, and the reinforcements -composed by it were particularly welcome -inasmuch as they afforded a large number of much needed -non-commissioned officers, who were quickly given an -opportunity to prove their value in the battles on the -Somme later in the year.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_115" id="Page_115">[Pg 115]</a></span></p> -<div class="chapter"></div> -<hr class="chap" /> - - - - -<h2>CHAPTER VIII<br /> - -THE 3/4TH AND 4/4TH BATTALIONS AT HOME</h2> - - -<p>At home 1915 and 1916 were two years of hard work -in developing the organisation of the Regiment to enable -it to provide the reinforcements necessary for the maintenance -in the field of its overseas battalions.</p> - -<p>Prior to the war the 4th London Regiment—like all -other Territorial formations—had no reserve cadre which -was capable of being expanded into a reserve unit on -mobilisation; and when therefore the 2/4th Battalion -followed the 1/4th Battalion overseas in December 1914 -the need of providing means of "feeding" the fighting -battalions with fresh personnel became pressing. -The records of the home battalions are necessarily -lacking in the exciting incidents with which those of -the service battalions are crowded; but they represent an -enormous amount of labour carried out under conditions -of great difficulty, and as a rule with very little recognition -of their vital importance to the continued existence of the -Regiment during the War.</p> - -<p>Reference has already been made in Chapter II to -the steps taken to raise a third line battalion under Major -E. H. Stillwell on the departure of the 2/4th Battalion -for Malta. This new Battalion, the 3/4th London -Regiment, secured recruits rapidly, and, like its predecessor, -very quickly outgrew the limits of Headquarters -at Hoxton. It was therefore moved early in January -to Littlegrove and Beech Hill, the two houses at Barnet -which had previously been occupied by the battalion -raised by Col. Dunfee. A slight stiffening of the ranks -was supplied by a few members of the overseas battalions -who had received a good deal of training with them -but had been found medically unfit to accompany them -abroad; but the vast majority of the officers, non-commissioned -officers and men had but recently joined,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_116" id="Page_116">[Pg 116]</a></span> -most of them without any previous experience of soldiering. -No member of the new Battalion, moreover, had -seen service in the War, and the magnitude of the task -imposed on the officers and warrant officers of instilling -the rudiments of discipline into so unwieldy a mass of -men was no light one. The enthusiasm of the early days -of the War, had, however, by no means subsided, and all -ranks worked with a will; and before long the Battalion, -now about 600 strong, began to find its feet.</p> - -<p>On the 8th February 1915 Capt. P. S. Cookson (late -Royal Sussex Regiment) was appointed to command the -Battalion with the temporary rank of Lieut.-Col. with -Major W. H. Hamilton as second in command, and Major -E. V. Wellby as Adjutant. The company commanders -were Capts. A. A. N. Hayne, S. W. J. Limpenny, E. D. -Wilson and A. E. Wood.</p> - -<p>The training facilities which had been extended to -the 2/4th Battalion by local residents at Barnet were -accorded to the 3/4th Battalion also, and the training of -recruits under company arrangements proceeded as -rapidly as possible and as efficiently as the circumstances -permitted. No time indeed was to be lost for the 1/4th -Londons were now in France, and as already described -began to suffer battle casualties early in March 1915; -so that it was clear that the 3/4th Battalion might at any -time be called upon to make up its deficiencies. Towards -the end of April it was in fact called on to supply the -first reinforcement, and accordingly despatched 2 officers -and 50 other ranks who, as referred to in Chapter IV, -joined the 1/4th Londons in the Ypres Salient.</p> - -<p>Third line battalions had also been formed by the other -regiments of the 1st London Brigade, and hitherto these -had been distributed over a wide area on the outskirts -of London; but in the last week of April the four new -battalions were concentrated under canvas at Tadworth -(Surrey) as the 3/1st London Brigade, under the command -of Col. H. C. Cholmondely, C.B. The 3/4th Battalion -joined the Brigade on the 26th April.</p> - -<p>On the 5th May the Adjutancy was taken over by -Capt. E. E. Spicer with Lieut S. H. Stedman as Assistant<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_117" id="Page_117">[Pg 117]</a></span> -Adjutant, Major E. V. Wellby having transferred to the -1st London Regiment.</p> - -<p>Early in June 1915 a general reconstruction was -effected in the reserve and training cadres at home; and -a number of fresh battalions were formed composed -largely of personnel who were not medically fit to serve -overseas. To this end a composite Battalion, known as -the 100th Provisional Battalion, was formed of officers, -N.C.O.'s and men of the 3/1st London Brigade. On the -2nd June Capt. A. E. Wood, and 2/Lieuts. E. J. Bennet -and J. S. B. Gathergood and about 100 N.C.O.'s and men -left the 3/4th Battalion at Tadworth to join the 100th -Provisional Battalion which was stationed at Aldeburgh. -On the same day Major W. H. Hamilton was appointed -to raise, equip and train a new Battalion, to be known -as the 4/4th London Regiment.</p> - -<p>Concurrently with this development the 3/1st London -Brigade moved from Tadworth to billets at Bury St -Edmunds. Here training was proceeded with, and the -battalions of the Brigade were again opened for recruiting -to make good the gaps in their ranks caused by the formation -of the Provisional Battalion.</p> - -<p>In the following month a further move took place, -and the 3/1st London Brigade took over billets in Ipswich. -A further step was now made in the organisation of the -Home Forces and towards the end of August all personnel -of the Provisional Battalion except "home-service" men -were returned to their units. The 2/2nd and 2/3rd London -Infantry Brigades had also been concentrated in the -Ipswich area, and a new Division—the 58th—was now -formed as a Service Division; and the duty of "draft-finding" -for the whole Regiment henceforth devolved -solely on the 4/4th Battalion under Major Hamilton.</p> - -<p>The composition of the 58th Division was as follows:</p> - -<div class="center"> -<table border="0" cellpadding="4" cellspacing="0" summary="58th Division"> - <caption><span class="smcap">58TH</span> (LONDON) DIVISION</caption> - - <tr> - <td colspan="4" class="tdc">Brig.-Gen. E. J. <span class="smcap">Cooper</span>, C.B., M.V.O., D.S.O.</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td colspan="4"><span class="smcap">Divisional Cavalry.</span></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td colspan="3" class="tdp">Hampshire Yeomanry</td> - <td>(Carabineers).</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td colspan="4"><span class="smcap">Artillery.</span></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td colspan="4" class="tdp">290th, 291st, 292nd, 293rd Brigades, R.F.A.</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td colspan="4" class="tdp">58th Division Ammunition Column.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_118" id="Page_118">[Pg 118]</a></span></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td colspan="4"><span class="smcap">Royal Engineers.</span></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdp">2/1st </td> - <td>Wessex</td> - <td colspan="4" rowspan="3" class="bl">Field Companies.</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdp">2/2nd</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdp">1/5th </td> - <td>London</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdp">58th </td> - <td colspan="5">Divisional Signal Company.</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td colspan="4"><span class="smcap">173rd Infantry Brigade.</span></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdp">3/1st </td> - <td>London </td> - <td>Regiment</td> - <td colspan="3" rowspan="4" class="bl">(Royal Fusiliers).</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdp">3/2nd</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdp">3/3rd</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdp">3/4th</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td colspan="4"><span class="smcap">174th Infantry Brigade.</span></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdp">2/5th </td> - <td>London </td> - <td>Regiment</td> - <td>(London Rifle Brigade).</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdp">2/6th</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td>(Rifles).</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdp">2/7th</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdp">2/8th</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td>(Post Office Rifles).</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td colspan="4"><span class="smcap">175th Infantry Brigade.</span></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdp">2/9th </td> - <td>London </td> - <td>Regiment</td> - <td>(Queen Victoria Rifles).</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdp">2/10th</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td>(Hackney).</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdp">2/11th</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td>(Finsbury Rifles).</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdp">2/12th</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td>(Rangers).</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td colspan="4" class="tdp">1/1st Wessex Divisional Cyclists.</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td colspan="4" class="tdp">509th, 510th, 511th, 512th S. and T. Companies, A.S.C.</td> - </tr> -</table></div> - -<p>The duties of second in command were now taken by -Major E. D. Wilson, who continued to occupy this appointment -for some months till he was appointed to -Brigade Staff and subsequently to Southern Command -Headquarters. He was succeeded as second in command -by Capt. A. A. N. Hayne.</p> - -<p>The constant changes of station to which the 3/4th -Battalion had been subjected during its short existence -had, as will be readily appreciated, a somewhat deleterious -effect on its training and general discipline. Prolonged -life in billets is, moreover, highly unsuitable for young -troops under training, and the general effect of the -Division's stay in Ipswich was not altogether beneficial. -All units were similarly affected. The dispatch of the -Division overseas was in consequence delayed, and the -troops began to become stale with "over-training." -Throughout 1915 and the early months of 1916 this unsatisfactory -state of affairs continued, and the routine -of training, now become wearying through its monotonous -repetition, was broken only by the occasional passing -excitement of air raids, of which the eastern counties saw -a good deal.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_119" id="Page_119">[Pg 119]</a></span></p> - -<p>During February 1916, recruits called up under the -"Derby" scheme to the number of 359 were posted to -the Battalion and their training proceeded with all possible -speed. Owing, however, to the need for bringing them -into line with the remainder of the Battalion in view of -the possibility of its being sent to the front during 1916, -the training of these men was expedited by temporarily -attaching a part of the Battalion to the 4/4th Battalion -in order to ease the duties of the training staff.</p> - -<p>In June the billets in Ipswich were vacated, and the -Division removed to quarters under canvas at Blackrock -Camp outside the town, where the former routine was -resumed.</p> - -<p>In these somewhat unhappy circumstances we may -leave the 3/4th Battalion and return to trace the growth -of the 4/4th Battalion which had sprung from it at -Tadworth a year previously.</p> - -<p>The following officers accompanied Major Hamilton to -Headquarters and were posted to the 4/4th Battalion: -Capt. and Adjt. W. G. Hayward, Lieut. H. E. Miller, and -2/Lieuts. W. H. Vernon and H. J. M. Williams. Hon. -Lieut. J. S. Fullalove (late Devonshire Regiment) was -appointed Quartermaster, and Coy. Sergt.-Major Potton -(late 1/4th Londons) to be Regimental Sergt.-Major. The -Commanding Officer was fortunate in enlisting into the -Battalion as Warrant Officers and senior N.C.O.'s several -ex-Guardsmen and members of the City Police Force, -including Coy. Sergt.-Majors H. W. Dennis and J. Pearson, -and C.Q.M.-Sergts. A. Reed and F. Milne. These experienced -soldiers formed the nucleus of what afterwards -became a very fine staff of instructors.</p> - -<p>The new Battalion shortly after its inception became -the draft-finding unit for the first and second line battalions -in the field, and also the unit by which wounded and invalided -officers, N.C.O.'s and men of the regiment from -the front were re-equipped and passed through a "refresher" -course of training, pending their return to the -front as reinforcements.</p> - -<p>The Battalion was accordingly organised in three -Companies, A and B (respectively under Capts. W. Moore<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_120" id="Page_120">[Pg 120]</a></span> -and F. C. Grimwade) being for the reception and training -of recruits; and C (under Lieut. D. C. Cooke) being -the "expeditionary" Company, the personnel being all -N.C.O.'s and men returned from the B.E.F. Lieut. -F. A. Coffin succeeded Capt Hayward as Adjutant, the -latter taking over the duties of President of the Regimental -Institutes.</p> - -<p>Just previously to the formation of the Battalion the -forces in the field had suffered immense casualties at -Ypres and on the Gallipoli Peninsula; and the full weight -of the German offensive on the Eastern Front where the -Russians were steadily giving ground was making itself -felt. Earl Kitchener had issued his second call for more -men, and recruiting was proceeding rapidly for all branches -of the Service; and within a month of its formation some -600 recruits had been posted to the 4/4th Battalion, while -the ranks of the Expeditionary Company were rapidly -swelling with returning casualties from Neuve Chapelle -and Ypres.</p> - -<p>It being obviously impossible to cope with the task -of dealing with such great numbers in the cramped -accommodation at Headquarters arrangements were made -for taking over the billets at New Barnet, previously -occupied by the 2/4th and 3/4th Battalions; and the -Battalion moved to its new quarters on the 12th July, -Headquarters and A Company being billeted at Littlegrove -and B and C Companies at Beech Hill.</p> - -<p>A vigorous programme of training was at once put in -hand, the work being carried out at Folly Farm and, by -the kindness of Sir Philip Sassoon, in Trent Park. Through -the generosity of the Club Committee the full resources -of the Enfield Rifle Club were again placed at the disposal -of the Battalion, and it is hard to overestimate the value -of the assistance rendered in the musketry training of the -recruits by the many public-spirited members of the Club -who volunteered their services as instructors.</p> - -<p>Owing to the continued influx of recruits, the training -companies having now each a strength of about 380, it -was necessary to take over additional billets at Oakhill -which were allotted to the Expeditionary Company.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_121" id="Page_121">[Pg 121]</a></span></p> - -<p>Early in August, almost before the recruit training -was under way, orders were received to prepare a draft of -400 other ranks to proceed, at three days' notice, to Malta -to join the 2/4th Battalion. After considerable exertion the -draft was equipped, fitted with khaki drill uniforms and -sun-helmets, and in due course proceeded to Southampton, -where it actually embarked on the transport. The -orders for its departure were, however, cancelled, and -the draft returned to Barnet to resume its training in -the 4/4th Battalion, much to the disappointment of the -N.C.O.'s and men concerned.</p> - -<p>The supplies of webbing equipment having proved -inadequate, the troops were now being provided with -leather equipment of the 1915 pattern; and were armed -with the long pattern charger-loading Lee-Enfield rifle. -At this date the training of recruits proceeded under no -efficient system such as was evolved at a later date. No -set period was allowed for the preparation of the drafts, -and very few facilities were provided for improving or -speeding-up training beyond such as emanated from -the brains of the officers and N.C.O.'s immediately concerned, -with the inevitable result that a good deal of -unnecessary delay and a certain lack of uniformity in -the training ensued. Thanks, however, to the devoted -efforts of the instructors, the recruits soon passed the -initial stages and were passed as "trained" men on -a syllabus which included drill, musketry, marching, -physical training and bayonet fighting, entrenching, -field work and the rudiments of bomb-throwing. The -first draft of N.C.O.'s and men supplied by the Battalion -consisting of 40 other ranks under Lieut. N. L. Thomas -and 2/Lieuts. S. Davis, J. W. Price and C. S. G. Blows -proceeded to the Dardanelles to join the 2/4th Battalion -at the beginning of November 1915.</p> - -<p>Recruiting had continued at a great speed during -the months of July, August and September, and the -training companies had assumed such unmanageable -proportions that they were subdivided and a new training -company, C, under Major H. J. Duncan-Teape, was -formed, the Expeditionary Company being renamed D.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_122" id="Page_122">[Pg 122]</a></span></p> - -<p>On the 29th August 1915 the Battalion was visited -by the following ex-officers of the Regiment:</p> - -<div class="center"> -<ul> - <li>Lieut.-Col. E. T. Rodney Wilde, V.D.</li> - <li>Lieut.-Col. Harry Dade, V.D.</li> - <li>Lieut.-Col. A. H. Lock, V.D.</li> - <li>Major P. Lynch, and</li> - <li>Major W. Stevens.</li> -</ul> -</div> -<p>On this occasion Church Parade was held at Folly -Farm, after which the Battalion marched past the -ex-officers, the salute being taken by Lieut.-Col. -Dade.</p> - -<p>On the 13th November an inter-company relief took -place, A Company moving to Beech Hill, and its billets -at Littlegrove being occupied by B Company.</p> - -<p>At Christmas 48 hours' leave was granted to every -member of the Battalion, two leave parties being formed -for the purpose.</p> - -<p>During this period the Reserve Battalions of the 1st -London Division were stationed in all parts of the Home -Counties, and the supervision of training by those responsible -was naturally extremely difficult; and it was -consequently decided to bring together all these battalions -into one Divisional camp, the site selected being near -Salisbury Plain.</p> - -<p>The move to Salisbury took place in January 1916, -the 4/4th Battalion proceeding on the 11th to No. 7 Camp, -Hurdcott (between Salisbury and Shaftesbury), where it -found itself for the first time in company with the 4/1st, -4/2nd, and 4/3rd Battalions, the remainder of the Division -being quartered at Hurdcott and Fovant.</p> - -<p>No troops of the 4th London Regiment were after -this date quartered at Barnet, but before finally saying -farewell to this the first station of so many hundreds of -the members of the Regiment, we must once more express -the indebtedness of the Regiment not only to those -gentlemen who so generously afforded the Battalion the -use of such excellent training grounds, but also to Mr -Kingwell and Mr W. H. Vernon, the owners respectively -of Beech Hill and Littlegrove, for the pains taken by -them to render these houses comfortable for the troops,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_123" id="Page_123">[Pg 123]</a></span> -and to the many local residents who extended kindness -and hospitality to the Battalion, among whom Mr Eldred -of Cockfosters must not be forgotten.</p> - -<p>About this time the designation of the Battalion was -changed to the 4th (Reserve) Battalion London Regiment, -a corresponding alteration being made in the titles of -the other 4th and 3rd line battalions of the Division.</p> - -<p>Major H. J. Duncan-Teape assumed the duties of -second in command in January 1916.</p> - -<p>The immediate result of the move to Salisbury Plain -was an immense strengthening of the <em>esprit-de-corps</em> of -the Battalion which now found itself for the first time -together in one camp, and a considerable increase of -efficiency and improvement in discipline followed. The -Hurdcott camps were arranged on suitably designed -principles with well ventilated sleeping huts and roomy -messing and recreation rooms which contributed in no -small degree to the comfort and physical welfare of the -troops. The 4th (Reserve) Battalion was, moreover, -exceptionally fortunate in becoming the possessor of an -excellent training and sports ground some 5 acres in -extent. Work was immediately set in hand to construct -a bayonet fighting assault course and a bombing ground, -and considerable improvements were made in the practice -trenches which had been left in a half-completed condition -by the former occupants of the camp.</p> - -<p>The 3rd line Division now came under the command -of Col. Williams, C.B. (late Somerset Light Infantry), -who was succeeded in the command in May by Col. S. H. -Godman, D.S.O. (Scots Guards), whose kindly personality -will be held in grateful remembrance by all who came -into personal touch with him.</p> - -<p>Voluntary recruiting had come almost to a standstill -during the preceding December, and the training of -all the N.C.O.'s and men who had joined the Battalion -previously was now practically completed. Numerous -drafts had been sent out to the 1/4th Battalion in France, -and the activities of the training staff of the Battalion -were therefore somewhat restricted. But in March the -whole of the training reserve camps in England became<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_124" id="Page_124">[Pg 124]</a></span> -veritable hives of activity; for in that month the first -groups of men enlisted under the "Derby" scheme of -recruiting were called up, and were posted to their respective -home training battalions.</p> - -<p>The recruits allotted to the Regiment under this -scheme were clothed at Headquarters (though not equipped -or armed) and drafted straight to Hurdcott, and within -the space of a week no fewer than 650 were posted to the -4th (Reserve) Battalion. In the following week a party -of 220 N.C.O.'s and men of the 3/4th Battalion were -sent to the 4th (Reserve) Battalion for the completion of -their training, which was found on examination to be in -a variety of stages of advancement.</p> - -<p>It will be readily appreciated that the sudden advent -of so large a body of totally untrained men strained the -instructional facilities of the Battalion to the utmost, -and it was deemed advisable somewhat to modify the -system of training which had proved sufficient hitherto. -The recruits were posted to companies as usual, an extra -company, E (under Lieut. Miller), being now formed, -but the company staffs assumed responsibility only for -clothing, equipment, messing, pay and other administrative -and disciplinary duties, the whole of the training -being entrusted to a specially selected staff of officers -and N.C.O. instructors, who were as far as possible relieved -of company and battalion duties. It is believed -that the Battalions of the London Reserve Division were -among the first to adopt this system of coping with the -problem of draft-production which, in modified and improved -forms, gradually became recognised as the most -efficient and was generally adopted.</p> - -<p>It should be understood that the brief description -which follows of the work of the Reserve Battalion is -somewhat anticipatory. The scheme of training which -was in force in the last year of the War was obviously not -evolved in a day, but was the fruit of three years' experience. -But it is thought that the present is perhaps the -most suitable juncture for the inclusion in this history of -these notes, as the period now under review saw the -inception of the great training scheme whereby the country<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_125" id="Page_125">[Pg 125]</a></span> -produced its citizen soldiers who fought the great battles -of 1916, 1917 and 1918.</p> - -<p>The system as originally evolved in the 4th Battalion -was intended to apply to "barrack-square" instruction -in drill only, but as training proceeded, it was found -desirable not only to ensure uniformity of instruction, -but also for economy of instructors and the avoidance -of delay in the completion of training, to apply it to all -branches of training. "Specialist" officers and N.C.O.'s -were therefore appointed to take charge of each different -subject of instruction, such as drill, musketry, bombing, -Lewis Gun, physical training and bayonet fighting, entrenching -and wiring, and "anti-gas" measures; the -whole training school being under the executive control -of an "officer in charge of training."</p> - -<p>This development was made the more desirable inasmuch -as the War Office now was tightening up the whole -system of training, in view of the continued heavy -casualties at the front which rendered necessary not only -the fullest and quickest possible development of the -untrained man-power of the Empire, but also the regular -and rapid filling up of deficiencies in the ranks of the -fighting troops. Under the War Office scheme (the -wisdom of which is demonstrated by the fact that in -broad principle it remained unaltered until the Armistice, -modification only being found desirable in matters of -detail) the period allowed for the conversion of the recruit -into a trained soldier was fourteen weeks. This period -was subdivided with considerable skill and foresight, the -first two weeks being occupied in completing the equipment -of the recruit, coupled with light drill and physical -training, together with lectures on a few general subjects -with the object of gradually settling him into his new -conditions of life, and to allow for his complete recovery -from the effects of "anti-typhoid" inoculation. The -serious training of the recruit therefore lasted twelve -weeks, which in the 1st London (Reserve) Brigade were -subdivided into two distinct periods. The first of these -concerned the "individual" training of the recruit in -the subjects to which reference has been made above,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_126" id="Page_126">[Pg 126]</a></span> -and which lasted for ten weeks. It was proceeded with -in accordance with War Office instructions, which laid -down the number of hours to be devoted weekly to each -subject. During this period also the recruit was put -through a special table of musketry practices on the open -range, and it concluded with a series of tests of individual -proficiency in each subject, the passing of which decided -the recruit's claim to be classed as a trained soldier.</p> - -<p>Throughout these three months the training proceeded -by platoons, each platoon of recruits living, messing and -working together, with the object of impressing on them, -from the earliest days of their service, the importance -of the platoon as a unit in action. The latter part of -the "individual" training period saw the sub-division -of each platoon into Lewis Gun and bombing sections, -training being arranged for in accordance with the -particular requirements of each. The "individual" -training having been completed, the final fortnight was -devoted to platoon "combined training" in field work -as a properly organised platoon, the men working in full -marching order, loaded to the weight which they would -be called upon to carry in the field. The physical strain -of the last fourteen days was undoubtedly considerable, -but the results attained by it were amply justified, not -only from the point of actual instruction imparted, but -also from that of the highly important question of selection -of N.C.O.'s, for each section of the platoon in "combined -training" was in charge of a recruit N.C.O., the specialist -instructor being attached merely for the purpose of -supervision.</p> - -<p>On completion of this final and most interesting period -in the recruit's training, he proceeded on "draft-leave" -for four clear days, on return from which he was reported -as ready to proceed overseas, was medically inspected -and finally fitted out; and as a rule his departure overseas -ensued within a few days.</p> - -<p>Such was the course of life in a Reserve Battalion, and -it will not be disputed that the duties of an instructor -were both multifarious and exceedingly onerous, while -the degree of personal application and physical endurance<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_127" id="Page_127">[Pg 127]</a></span> -which the recruit himself was called upon to display was -severe to a degree. Owing to the frequent changes of -personnel among the N.C.O. instructors, it is impossible -to record the names of all those who were in turn employed -in this manner, but it would be unjust not to -acknowledge the splendid devotion of the training staffs -or to recognise with gratitude the extreme importance -of the rôle played by them in the War. Neither can we -refrain from remarking that, however complete the scheme -of training, and however efficient the instructors, it would -have been nearly impossible to carry it into effect in the -short period allowed but for the intense keenness and -willingness to learn displayed by the vast majority of the -many thousands of recruits who were trained in accordance -with it.</p> - -<p>The instructors themselves were drawn entirely from -N.C.O.'s who had served with the 1st or 2nd line battalions -overseas, and had either been invalided to the United -Kingdom or were sent home for six months "on exchange." -In order to avoid staleness no instructor who -was fit for overseas service was permitted to retain his -appointment for more than one year, at the end of which -period he himself returned to the front as a reinforcement, -his place on the training staff being taken by one more -recently returned to England.</p> - -<p>Officer instructors were selected and retained on a -similar principle, the period of appointment to the -establishment of a training reserve unit being (in the -case of physical fitness for service overseas) a maximum -of six months.</p> - -<p>The officers of the first training staff appointed in -the 4th (Reserve) Battalion were:</p> - -<div class="center"> -<table border="0" cellpadding="4" cellspacing="0" summary="4th (Reserve) Battalion"> - <tr> - <td class="tdr">Capt. </td> - <td colspan="3">F. C. Grimwade, in charge of training.</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdr">2/Lieut. </td> - <td colspan="3" >E. G. Dew, Assistant to Training Officer.</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdr">2/Lieut. </td> - <td>A. G. Croll;</td> - <td rowspan="2" class="bl">Musketry<br /> Instructors.</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdr">2/Lieut. </td> - <td>G. H. Hetley</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdr bt">2/Lieut. </td> - <td class="bt">R. K. Caparn, Physical Training </td> - <td rowspan="3" class="bl bt">Instructor.</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdr">2/Lieut. </td> - <td>L. A. Allen, Lewis Gun</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdr">2/Lieut. </td> - <td>L. C. Haycraft, Bombing and Anti-gas</td> - </tr> -</table></div> - -<p>Signalling instruction was provided under Brigade<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_128" id="Page_128">[Pg 128]</a></span> -arrangements, the first Brigade Signalling Officer, 2/Lieut. -R. C. Hunt, being supplied by the 4th (Reserve) Battalion.</p> - -<p>Early in February 1916 the 4th (Reserve) Battalion -received a very welcome reinforcement in the shape of -50 men of the Second Trinidad Contingent, and the honour -done to the Regiment in selecting it for the training of this -draft, representative of one of the smallest and yet most -ancient and loyal outposts of the Empire, was much -appreciated. About the same time four Trinidad officers, -2/Lieuts. L. Farfan, H. Dow, R. L. Fabien and J. MacDonald, -were gazetted to the Battalion. It was rapidly -realised that the difference of climate between the West -Indies and the snow-laden winds of the "Plain" was too -severe, and it became evident that this keen and efficient -platoon must be transferred to a more suitable environment. -After about six weeks with the 4th (Reserve) -Battalion, therefore, they were sent to complete their -training with the 7th Royal Fusiliers at Falmouth and -later attached to the 3/4th Devonshire Regiment in India.</p> - -<p>In April Major H. J. Duncan-Teape rejoined the 1/4th -Battalion in France, the duties of second in command -being assumed by Major G. H. M. Vine.</p> - -<p>During May the Battalion was inspected by Col. S. H. -Godman, D.S.O., commanding the Division, who presented -C. S. M. Risley, D.C.M., with his medal. The Battalion -also received a visit from Lieut.-Col. E. T. Rodney -Wilde, V.D. At the end of May the Division was reviewed -by Field-Marshal Earl French, commanding the Home -Forces.</p> - -<p>Although the whole of the Battalions at Hurdcott -and Fovant Camps existed for the training of recruits -and were in no way formations which were likely to be -sent overseas as units, they were included in the scheme -which had been prepared for the defence of Great Britain -in the event of an attempt at landing by the Germans.</p> - -<p>This scheme provided for the maintenance of a permanent -defence force on the East Coast and at other -points where it was deemed likely that any attempt at -invasion would be put into effect. In addition to this, -arrangements were made for the rapid concentration from<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_129" id="Page_129">[Pg 129]</a></span> -other sources of a mobile force for use, in the event of -active operations taking place, as a general reserve. To -this general reserve the units of the 3rd line groups of -the 1st London Division contributed a quota of officers, -N.C.O.'s and men varying from time to time with the -numbers of men who were sufficiently advanced in their -course of training to render their inclusion in the force -useful.</p> - -<p>During the period at Hurdcott frequent test concentrations -took place, in several instances the parade being -followed by a test route march. These parades were -always attended by the platoons of the 4th (Reserve) -Battalion detailed for the time being to this duty and -passed off satisfactorily.</p> - -<p>On the 2nd June 1916 Major W. H. Hamilton, who -had commanded the Battalion since its formation, was -gazetted to the 4th Battalion Duke of Cornwall's Light -Infantry and almost immediately proceeded to join his -new Battalion at Meerut.<a name="FNanchor_4_4" id="FNanchor_4_4"></a><a href="#Footnote_4_4" class="fnanchor">[4]</a> He was succeeded in temporary -command of the Battalion by Major G. H. M. Vine. -On the occasion of Major Hamilton's departure the troops -testified to their appreciation of his unfailing kindness and -sympathy with all ranks throughout the period of his -command by lining the camp road and heartily cheering -him as his car passed down it.</p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_4_4" id="Footnote_4_4"></a><a href="#FNanchor_4_4"><span class="label">[4]</span></a> Major Hamilton remained with the 4th D.C.L.I. until the following -year when he was attached to the 4th Hants Regiment. With this -Battalion he proceeded to Mesopotamia and took part in the victorious -advance which culminated in the occupation of Baghdad. He was later -appointed to command the detachment of the Hants Regiment which -accompanied the gallant little force led by General Dunsterville to -endeavour to secure the oilfield of Baku on the Caspian Sea.</p></div> - -<p>In the latter part of July command of the Battalion -was assumed by Col. Vickers Dunfee, Major Vine resuming -the duties of second in command.</p> - -<p>On the 1st July 1916 began the great series of battles -on the Somme, the Regiment's part in which will be -described, and almost immediately calls were made for -drafts of all ranks to fill the very serious gaps caused by -the heavy casualties sustained by the 1/4th Battalion -during the battle of Gommecourt; and between this date -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_130" id="Page_130">[Pg 130]</a></span>and the middle of October when the 56th Division was -finally withdrawn from the Somme battles a total of some -30 officers and 400 other ranks were despatched. These -very heavy calls naturally depleted the ranks of the home -Battalion very seriously and took nearly all the "Derby" -recruits who had joined in the previous March.</p> - -<p>With the object, apparently, of effecting an ultimate -economy in staff, a reorganisation of considerable importance -took place on the 1st September 1916 among the -whole of the 3rd line units of the Division. So far as -the Fusilier Brigade was concerned this took the form -of amalgamation of the four existing battalions into two, -the 1st and 2nd Battalions becoming the 1st (Reserve) -Battalion, and the 3rd and 4th Battalions becoming the -3rd (Reserve) Battalion. Each of these new battalions -for the time being retained a double establishment of -officers, warrant officers and N.C.O.'s and were organised -in eight companies till the despatch of personnel on -draft permitted a reduction to be made. The composite -battalion was made responsible for the provision of reinforcements -and for the reception of ranks returned from -overseas for each of the two Regiments of which it was -composed.</p> - -<p>These amalgamations of necessity involved extensive -repostings of officers, in particular among those of senior -rank. Command of the new 3rd (Reserve) Battalion was -assumed by Lieut.-Col. T. Montgomerie Webb, formerly -commanding the old 3rd (Reserve) Battalion, Major -G. H. M. Vine being appointed second in command. The -duties of Adjutant, Quartermaster and Training Officer -respectively were also assumed by officers of the old 3rd -(Reserve) Battalion (namely, Capt. McGlashan, Capt. -Coombe and Major H. Moore, M.C.), the officers who had -previously held the corresponding appointments in the -old 4th (Reserve) Battalion being posted as follows:—</p> - -<div class="hangindent"> - -<p>Capt, F. A. Coffin (Adjt.) to Brigade Staff.</p> - -<p>Lieut. Fullalove (Q.M.) to new 6th (Reserve) Battalion.</p> - -<p>Capt. F. C. Grimwade (Training Officer) to command A Company -new 3rd (Reserve) Battalion.</p></div> - -<p>Col. Vickers Dunfee was appointed to command the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_131" id="Page_131">[Pg 131]</a></span> -new 1st (Reserve) Battalion, an appointment which he -retained until his demobilisation in December 1918.</p> - -<p>It must be confessed that the immediate result of this -amalgamation, involving as it did the extinction as a -separate entity of the 4th (Reserve) Battalion, was a -heavy blow to the <i lang="fr">esprit de corps</i> of all ranks, which -was in the circumstances at least comprehensible. The -rank and file at a critical stage of their training came -under the command of officers and N.C.O. instructors -who were unknown to them, while the instructors of the -old 4th (Reserve) Battalion experienced a natural and -very keen disappointment at not being permitted to -complete the task to which they had applied themselves -with such devotion for many weeks past.</p> - -<p>A closer acquaintance with the new surroundings, -however, resulted in a gradual disappearance of these -feelings of regret, and in due course a new <i lang="fr">esprit de corps</i> -and a closer bond of union between the two Regiments -concerned took their place. At the end of its existence -in November 1918 the 3rd (Reserve) Battalion had become -an extremely happy one, in which no sort of distinction -existed between the 3rd and 4th London Regiments, -and each worked for the welfare of all.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_132" id="Page_132">[Pg 132]</a></span></p> -<div class="chapter"></div> -<hr class="chap" /> - - - - -<h2>CHAPTER IX<br /> - -THE FORMATION OF THE 56TH DIVISION</h2> - - -<p>From May onwards during the remainder of 1916 the -history of the Regiment in France is that of the 1/4th -Battalion, into which the 2/4th Battalion was merged; -and we may therefore proceed to follow its fortunes from -the date of its attachment to the newly formed 56th -Division.</p> - -<p>At the date of the 1/4th Battalion's arrival in billets -at Citerne on the 9th February 1916, the 56th Division -was just being concentrated. The 47th Division, which -comprised chiefly battalions of the 2nd London Division -of pre-war days and which the Battalion had just left, -had joined the British Armies in France as a Division; -but the units of the old 1st London Division, which had -been among the first Territorial units to leave England, -had hitherto been scattered throughout the Army attached -to different regular divisions. The 56th, therefore, though -junior in precedence, owing to its comparatively late -formation, to many other Territorial Divisions which had -left England as complete organisations, consisted entirely -of battalions which might fairly be described as veteran, -since all had seen a good deal of stiff work up and down -the lines.</p> - -<p>The infantry battalions were brigaded as follows:</p> - -<dl> - <dt><span class="smcap">56th (London) Division</span>—Major-Gen. Sir C. P. A. Hull, K.C.B.</dt> - - <dt><span class="smcap">167th Infantry Brigade</span>—Brig.-Gen. F. H. Burnell-Nugent, D.S.O.</dt> - <dd>1/1st London (Royal Fusiliers).</dd> - <dd>1/3rd London (Royal Fusiliers).</dd> - <dd>1/7th Middlesex.</dd> - <dd>1/8th Middlesex.</dd> - - <dt><span class="smcap">168th Infantry Brigade</span>—Brig.-Gen. G. G. Loch, C.M.G., D.S.O.</dt> - <dd>1/4th London (Royal Fusiliers).</dd> - <dd>1/12th London (Rangers).</dd> - <dd>1/13th London (Kensingtons). -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_133" id="Page_133">[Pg 133]</a></span></dd> - <dd>1/14th London (London Scottish).</dd> - - <dt><span class="smcap">169th Infantry Brigade</span>—Brig.-Gen. E. S. D'Ewes Coke, C.M.G., D.S.O.</dt> - <dd>1/2nd London (Royal Fusiliers).</dd> - <dd>1/5th London (London Rifle Brigade).</dd> - <dd>1/9th London (Queen Victoria Rifles).</dd> - <dd>1/16th London (Queen's Westminster Rifles).</dd> -</dl> - -<p>The Division was attached to the VI Corps (Keir) of -the Third Army (Allenby).</p> - -<p>The record of the next three months may be passed -over quickly as they were devoted solely to organising -and training the new Division in areas well to the rear -of the trenches, and it was not until the early days of -May 1916 that the various units came under fire as a -Division. This prolonged period of rest, which indeed -was the longest ever spent in this manner by the Battalion -in the whole course of its active service history, was of -considerable importance in order that staffs and units -might become thoroughly acquainted with each other, -and that the individual battalions of each Brigade might -have a sufficient opportunity of creating the divisional -<i lang="fr">esprit de corps</i> which experience has shown to be so -necessary in action.</p> - -<p>But the three months of routine work will provide us -with a useful respite in which to make some reference to -one or two developments in organisation which were -carried out before the British forces plunged into the -dreary and protracted struggles of the Somme, and which -affected the 1/4th Londons equally with other units.</p> - -<p>One of the developments which took place about this -period, and which had an effect on the general efficiency -of the Army so far-reaching that its value can hardly be -overestimated, was the formation of Army and Divisional -Schools, in which the lead was taken by the Third Army. -These schools, as is well known, were established under -selected bodies of instructors to achieve the double object -of keeping the fighting troops, through the medium of -the regimental officers and non-commissioned officers who -attended them for short courses of instruction, in touch -with the progress made from time to time in the art of -war, and particularly in the more technical branches, -such as gas, bombing, Lewis gunnery, etc., and also of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_134" id="Page_134">[Pg 134]</a></span> -assisting battalions to provide efficient courses of instruction -and training for their own personnel while out of the -trenches for short periods. The success which in general -attended these efforts was great and their influence on the -action of our troops in the great battles of the latter part -of the War was undoubtedly far-reaching.</p> - -<p>The 56th Divisional Schools were first established under -Major D. V. Smith, D.S.O., 1/1st Londons, at Givenchy-le-Noble -and Ambrines in April 1916.</p> - -<p>Attention was also directed at this time towards -training the infantry to assume greater responsibility for -the general maintenance and strengthening of the forward -trenches in their own occupation, and thereby releasing -the Royal Engineers for works requiring more technical -skill. To this end the early days of March saw the -formation in the Division of trench pioneer squads in -each battalion consisting of selected men under the supervision -of a subaltern officer. These squads were given -special training in erecting wire entanglements, constructing -strong points and consolidation of newly captured -positions. The first trench pioneer officer of the 1/4th -Londons was 2/Lieut. V. C. Donaldson, and under him -the trench pioneers began to shape well towards efficiency; -but the need for the existence of such squads was subsequently -modified to some extent by the attachment to -each Division of a specially trained Pioneer Battalion, -the 1/5th Cheshire Regiment joining the 56th Division -in this capacity. The Pioneer Battalions were fighting -units but, as their name implies, were employed more -particularly on constructional work rather beyond the -powers of the ordinary infantry officer to direct or of the -troops to execute, and in active operations their usefulness -in consolidating new trenches and similar duties was -established beyond a doubt. The advent of such highly -trained units had a tendency somewhat, perhaps not -altogether rightly, to depreciate the value of battalion -pioneer squads, and ultimately these were done away -with. The duty of trench working parties, whether in -active operations or in holding trenches, afterwards fell -equally on all the personnel of the companies, while in<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_135" id="Page_135">[Pg 135]</a></span> -the 56th Division if not in others, general direction was -given to the Battalion's activity in trench work by a -"Works" officer attached to Battalion Headquarters. -This appointment established early in June 1916 was first -filled in the 1/4th Londons by Capt. R. N. Arthur, and -remained in existence until the end of the War. The Works -officer became responsible for making arrangements between -company commanders and the Royal Engineers -for the supply of the material required for the trench work -undertaken by the companies in the line, for detailing -the working parties supplied by the Battalion while out -of the line, and in general forming a link between the -Commanding Officer and the company commanders in -the matter of trench work.</p> - -<p>A further development occurred in the formation of -a Headquarters Company, called in the 1/4th Londons -for ease of distinction K Company. The object of this -change was to separate so far as was reasonably possible -the fighting personnel of the Battalion from the administrative -personnel, such as transport, headquarters clerks -and telephone operators; and to relieve the company -commander of responsibility as regards clothing, pay -and accommodation, etc., of such administrative personnel -by bringing them under the direct control of a Headquarters -officer, usually the Assistant-Adjutant, to whom -as a rule such men were more accessible than to the -company officers. This left the companies more intact -as fighting units and much reduced the work of company -quartermaster-sergeants in looking after large numbers -of men who in practice were seldom with the company. -Upon the whole the system worked exceedingly well; -though, as was almost inevitable, K Company showed -from time to time a tendency to assume unreasonable -proportions and required a little "weeding out."</p> - -<p>At least a passing reference must be made to the 56th -Division's famous concert troop, the Bow Bells. The -uniform excellence of its entertainments from its inception -till the end of the war was the means of providing -all ranks of the Division from time to time with hours -of intense pleasure and mental rest of inestimable value.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_136" id="Page_136">[Pg 136]</a></span></p> - -<p>Lastly, mention must be made of an institution which -made its appearance in the Battalion about this time and -carried out exceedingly useful work, namely, the Regimental -Canteen. Thousands of 1/4th London men have -happy recollections of Sergt. Plumbley and his assistant -Pte. Blight, who, like the sutlers of former wars, followed -the Battalion in all its wanderings with their welcome -stocks of tobacco, chocolate, notepaper, newspapers and -other useful articles, and, fair times or foul, were always -to be found with their little shop neatly set out in a -dugout or a ruined cottage not very far in rear of the -most advanced troops of the Battalion.</p> - -<p>The Battalion occupied its comfortable quarters at -Citerne for about a fortnight amid conditions which -presented a total change from those amidst which it had -passed the previous year, and which brought a corresponding -benefit to the troops by way of mental as well -as physical recuperation. The Hallencourt area, lying -as it does on the broad rolling hills of Ponthieu on the -west bank of the Somme, formed a complete contrast to -the dreary flats and marches of Flanders not only in the -pretty variation of the landscape but also because this -part of the country was unscarred by the ravages of war. -At Citerne, moreover, the Battalion for the first time since -it joined the Ferozepore Brigade in February 1915 was -stationed beyond the range of heavy gun fire. Citerne -is but a small village, but its kindly and warm-hearted -folk, from M. le Maire downwards, will always be held -in grateful remembrance by those of the 1/4th Londons -who had the good fortune to enjoy their hospitality.</p> - -<p>The fortnight's sojourn here was devoted principally -to training, but the amusement of the Battalion was -not overlooked and football matches with other units -and concerts in the tiny village theatre made a welcome -break in the routine of parades.</p> - -<p>At Citerne the 1/4th Londons became possessed for -the first time in France of a Chaplain, the Rev. R. Palmer, -C.F., Brigade Chaplain, being attached to the Battalion -on the 19th February. The Battalion was also rejoined -at Citerne by Capt. W. Moore, who had been hit at Ypres<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_137" id="Page_137">[Pg 137]</a></span> -the previous April, and was further strengthened by -the arrival of a draft of 95 N.C.O.'s and men.</p> - -<p>On the 27th February the Division moved to a fresh -training area on the opposite bank of the Somme, Divisional -Headquarters opening at Domart, when the 168th Brigade -Headquarters and the Battalion were billeted in Vauchelles. -Here the programme of training was continued until the -12th March, on which day a second move was made, this -time to the Doullens area, all the battalions of the 168th -Brigade occupying billets in the town.</p> - -<p>On the 8th March a further reinforcement of 100 -N.C.O.'s and men arrived from the 4/4th Battalion and -was posted to companies. At this time also the bad -news was received that Lieut.-Col. L. T. Burnett, who -had gone on leave in January, was unfit to return overseas, -and Major W. G. Clark, D.S.O., therefore continued in -command of the Battalion, with Major W. Moore as second -in command.</p> - -<p>Doullens did not provide a refuge to the Brigade for -long for the 15th March saw the Division once more on -the move to the Le Cauroy area (east of Frevent), the -1/4th Londons taking over billets at Beaufort. In this -area the Division settled down steadily to a period of -training which continued without interruption and with -very little incident calling for notice for nearly seven -weeks, during which the strength of the Battalion, as of -all other units, gradually crept up, if not to war strength -at least to such size that it became abundantly evident -that the Division was not destined to remain for long in -billets behind the line. Drafts joined the Battalion -consisting of 2/Lieuts. G. E. Stanbridge, G. H. Davis -and A. G. Blunn, and also of 87 other ranks on the 22nd -March; of 12 other ranks on the 6th April; and a final -reinforcement of 33 other ranks arrived on the 20th -April; these additions bringing the Battalion to the -respectable strength of nearly 600 all ranks.</p> - -<p>During the same period the Battalion suffered losses -among officers in Capt. J. R. Pyper, M.C., who was -seconded to the 168th Brigade Machine-Gun Company; -Lieut. S. E. H. Walmisley, who after carrying out the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_138" id="Page_138">[Pg 138]</a></span> -duties of Quartermaster for nearly four months during -the absence on sick leave of Lieut. E. S. Tomsett, was -appointed to the Central Training School, Rouen; and -2/Lieut. C. R. P. de Pury who was seconded as R.T.O.</p> - -<p>On the 23rd March Major W. G. Clark, D.S.O., left the -Battalion on short leave and he also succumbed to a -severe breakdown while at home and was unable to return. -Command of the Battalion was carried on temporarily -by Major W. Moore until the 8th April, when Lieut.-Col. -L. L. Wheatley, D.S.O., Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, -Staff Captain 168th Infantry Brigade, took -command.</p> - -<p>It would be but tiresome to follow the daily routine -of the Battalion during this prolonged period of rest -where one day's work so much resembles that which -preceded it, and we may therefore be forgiven for passing -quickly over this part of the record. Enough has been -said to show how from the Battalion point of view the -Division came into being and was prepared for the work -allotted to it, and it remains therefore for us to pass on -and endeavour to recount the manner in which the 1/4th -Londons performed their task.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_139" id="Page_139">[Pg 139]</a></span></p> -<div class="chapter"></div> -<hr class="chap" /> - - - - -<h2>CHAPTER X<br /> - -THE 1/4TH BATTALION IN THE BATTLES OF THE -SOMME, 1916</h2> - - -<h3>I. <em>The Attack on Gommecourt</em></h3> - -<p>The spring of 1916 was marked by two enemy offensives, -at Verdun and on the Italian front, both of which tried -the resources of our Allies severely. In order to draw off -German troops to the East the Russian offensive against -the Austrians had been started in May, but in spite of -this the German pressure against Verdun continued to -increase.</p> - -<p>Sir Douglas Haig had for some time intended to -undertake an offensive operation on a large scale during -1916 in conjunction with the French, and in view of the -continual increase in the strength of the British Armies -it was clearly desirable that the launching of the battle -should be delayed as long as possible consistent with -the advance of the summer. But in view of the great -pressure at Verdun it was decided that the British attacks -should begin at the latest at the end of June, with the -objects of relieving our Allies and of pinning as many -enemies as possible to the front opposite the British -Armies, in addition to the tactical improvement of our -positions.</p> - -<p>The part of the enemy's lines selected for attack was -the right of the British front, opposite which the Germans -occupied high ground forming the watershed between -the River Somme and the rivers flowing north-east into -Belgium. The general direction of this watershed, which -consists of a chalk country of broad swelling downs and -deep well-wooded valleys, is roughly from east-south-east -to west-north-west. The aspect of this country bears -a general resemblance to parts of Wiltshire, and the -gentle undulations of the higher slopes of the hills, which<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_140" id="Page_140">[Pg 140]</a></span> -descend with unexpected abruptness into waterless valleys -lined with banks whose declivitous sides seem to have -been shaped by human agency, cause the resemblance -to be one also of detail. From this watershed a series -of long spurs runs south-westerly towards the Somme, -and on their lower slopes the German lines ran from -Curlu near the river at first north and then almost due -west to Fricourt, a distance of some 10,000 yards. At -Fricourt the lines took an abrupt turn northward for -a further 10,000 yards when they crossed the Ancre, -a tributary of the Somme, near Hamel. From this -point they continued in a generally northerly direction, -passing through Beaumont Hamel, west of Serre and -between Hébuterne and Gommecourt. In the neighbourhood -of the two last-named villages the lines crossed -the summit of the main watershed, and thence descended -gently in a north-easterly direction towards Arras.</p> - -<p>On the 20,000 yards between the Somme and the -Ancre the enemy had already prepared a strong second -system of defence about two miles in rear of the front -system; and on the whole front from Gommecourt to -the Somme he had spared no effort in the nearly two -years of his uninterrupted occupation to render these -positions impregnable. The strengthening of woods and -villages into fortresses, and the skilful use of the ground -in siting trenches and gun and machine-gun emplacements, -had in fact woven his successive lines of trenches into -one composite system. Yet further in rear he was still -at work improving existing defences and constructing new.</p> - -<p>The front of attack on which the British armies were -to operate covered the whole of the above described line -from Gommecourt to Curlu—a total of about 17 miles—while -the French were to co-operate on a wide front -immediately south of the River Somme.</p> - -<p>The story of the struggle which, lasting from the -beginning of July until the early part of November, gave -us possession, first of the forward trench systems, then -of the crest of the ridge, and finally of the whole plateau -and parts of the further slopes, divides itself into phases, -which can be dealt with in turn to such an extent as the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_141" id="Page_141">[Pg 141]</a></span> -record of the 1/4th Battalion is concerned with them. -For the present we are concerned with the enormous -preparations which preceded the opening of the struggle -and of the first phase of the battle which began on the -1st July 1916.</p> - -<p>Dealing with the preparations for the battle generally, -an enormous amount of work was required in improving -road and rail communications; in digging assembly -trenches and dugouts, for use not only as shelters but -also as aid posts and stores for ammunition for small -arms and trench mortars; and in constructing many -additional machine-gun and gun emplacements. The -water supply for the assaulting troops presented a serious -problem, and Sir Douglas Haig records in his Despatches -that in this connection over a hundred pumping plants -were installed and over 120 miles of water mains laid.</p> - -<p>During most of the period in which this preliminary -labour proceeded the troops were working under most -trying weather conditions and frequently were harassed -by heavy enemy fire.</p> - -<p>The particular tasks for which the 168th Brigade, and -in particular the 1/4th Londons, were called upon will -be referred to in their places at greater length.</p> - -<hr class="tb" /> - -<p>After remaining in training in the Frevent area for -the latter half of March and the whole of April the 56th -Division moved forward on the 3rd and 4th of May into -the VII Corps area (D'Oyly Snow) and took over from -the 46th Division a sector of the line in front of the village -of Hébuterne and facing Gommecourt.</p> - -<p>The line was occupied by the 167th Brigade, the -168th moving in reserve to Souastre, a small village some -three miles west of the front trenches. The Battalion -moved by march route from Beaufort on the 6th and -arrived at Souastre after a ten mile march at 9 p.m.</p> - -<p>Two or three days were occupied in training, and on -the 11th May the Battalion began to supply working -parties of considerable size. Of these, one of 200 all -ranks was despatched to Pas and employed in felling -and sawing trees to form props for gun pits and dugouts;<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_142" id="Page_142">[Pg 142]</a></span> -and another of 250 all ranks went to the chalk quarries -of Hénu, where they were given a task in digging road -material. These working parties, the first of many weary -tasks, constituted so far as the Battalion was concerned -the first direct active preparations in the area of battle -for the Somme offensive.</p> - -<p>The Battalion's duty at Souastre lasted a fortnight. -Work, however, did not take up the whole of the -Battalion's time, and opportunity was found for a football -match with the Kensingtons, which was played on the -12th May and resulted in a draw at one all. A few days -later the Battalion entered representatives at the London -Scottish sports at St. Amand, securing second and third -places in the "open" 200 yards.</p> - -<p>On the 15th Major H. J. Duncan-Teape rejoined the -Battalion and was appointed second in command. The -works programme was now beginning to be operated by -Brigade Headquarters to the fullest extent and the greatest -possible working strength was daily employed, the chief -tasks being the digging of cable trenches for the signal -services, the construction of new dugouts and the deepening -and strengthening of existing communication and fire -trenches.</p> - -<p>D Company and one platoon of B Company in fact -were despatched on the 18th to Hébuterne, where they -were billeted for night digging work; and every available -man of the remaining companies was detailed for work -of one sort or another. So insistent was the demand for -more labour that on the 20th May the band and every -available man of the transport section had to be put to -work on digging parties.</p> - -<p>On the 20th and 21st May a series of Brigade reliefs -took place, the trenches being occupied by the 169th -Brigade, who replaced the 167th; while the 168th withdrew -in Divisional reserve to Grenas, a hamlet near the -Doullens-Arras Road, where Brigade Headquarters opened -on the 21st. The Rangers and Scottish were billeted -close by at Halloy; but the 1/4th Londons and the -Kensingtons remained in the forward area attached to -the 169th Brigade, the latter battalion occupying W sector,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_143" id="Page_143">[Pg 143]</a></span> -on the right of the Divisional front. The 1/4th Londons -moved on the 21st in Brigade reserve to Bayencourt, -about a mile and a half south of Souastre and slightly -nearer the trenches.</p> - -<p>On the 22nd the detachments in Hébuterne were -relieved by C Company, who took over their tasks. Each -night of the period of duty in Bayencourt the Battalion -continued to supply large numbers of men for fatigues -of various sorts, the parties being small and divided -amongst a large number of tasks. These working parties -were equipped as lightly as possible, the men carrying -water-bottles and respirators over the left shoulder; a -bandolier of fifty rounds over the right shoulder; and -their rifles with bayonet in scabbard fixed. But although -the troops moved "light" the duties were onerous, partly -from the long hours of work and the strain induced by the -short available time in which to complete apparently -impossible tasks; and not least by the bad weather, the -season from the middle of May onwards being for the -most part wet. Hitherto practically no casualties had -been sustained, the first recorded casualties at the enemy's -hands during the Battalion's attachment to the 56th -Division occurring on the 24th May, when two men -were wounded at work in Hébuterne.</p> - -<p>On the afternoon of the 28th May the 1/4th Londons -relieved the Kensingtons in W subsector of the Divisional -front, the Battalion still being under the orders of the -169th Brigade. The Kensingtons took over on relief the -billets at Bayencourt.</p> - -<p>The Divisional sector as taken over from the 46th -Division early in May had consisted of the original line -taken up by the French troops in October 1914 during -the extension of the battle line from the Aisne to the sea. -This line the French had continued to hold until they -were finally relieved of responsibility for it in June 1915, -when the British extended their lines southward to the -Somme. The frontage of the sector extended as shown -on Map No. 4 from the Bucquoy Road on the right to a -point opposite the most westerly point of Gommecourt -Wood on the left, being divided into two subsectors,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_144" id="Page_144">[Pg 144]</a></span> -W and Y, by an imaginary line running roughly parallel -to, and 200 yards north of, the Hébuterne-Bucquoy Road. -Opposite the British lines the Germans held a position -of enormous strength bastioned by the enclosure of -Gommecourt Wood which marked an abrupt salient in -their line. As was only too frequently the case the -enemy possessed considerable advantages of observation -over the British lines, the ground rising steadily in rear -of his front trenches to the Gommecourt-Bucquoy ridge, -which, although not a hill of outstanding pre-eminence, -formed the summit of the Somme watershed described -earlier in this chapter.</p> - -<p>Except in the neighbourhood of villages such as -Hébuterne, which are surrounded by orchards and enclosed -in a ring fence, the Somme country is, like most -of Picardy and Artois, devoid of hedges, and from road -to road the swell of the hillside is unbroken by fence or -ditch. The roads themselves, however, are in many cases -"sunken," that is, contained in a deep cutting, the cover -afforded by the banks playing an important part in the -actions fought in this area.</p> - -<p>A glance at the map will help to make the position -clear. The trench line shown as a reserve position on -the map and marked as the WR and YR lines was at -the date of the 56th Division's advent the most advanced -trench, so that No Man's Land varied in width from -800 to 600 yards. This fact is most important and a -full realisation of it is essential to a correct understanding -of the enormous task performed by the 56th Division.</p> - -<p>In view of the impending attack the great width of -No Man's Land was clearly a great disadvantage, as the -time which must necessarily be occupied by assaulting -columns in advancing an average of distance of 700 yards -before reaching the German front line would expose them -to risk of very serious loss and possibly deprive the attack -completely of the weight necessary to enable it to be -driven home. Nothing daunted by this difficulty, however, -the 56th Division at once proceeded to make -arrangements to push the lines forward and roughly to -halve the width of No Man's Land. This audacious -scheme was put into operation, and before the end of May -the construction of the new front line—that shown as -the front line on the map—was begun.</p> - -<div class="figcenter" style="width: 429px;"> -<img src="images/i_b_144fp.jpg" width="429" height="500" alt="" /> -<div class="caption"><p><span class="smcap">The Attack on Gommecourt, 1st July 1916</span></p></div> -</div> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_145" id="Page_145">[Pg 145]</a></span></p> - -<p>The operation of digging a new front line at no great -distance from the enemy was one of considerable difficulty. -It was clearly essential to perform the work at night, -and in view of the importance of the work it was equally -clearly a matter of necessity to have the task set out with -tapes as a mark for the troops to dig to. It was further -reasonable to anticipate that as soon as the enemy became -aware of the existence of the new line he would shell it -violently, and therefore the new trench must be sunk -deeply enough in the first night's work to enable its completion -to be carried on from inside without the need for -moving troops about in the open. This aim postulated -a working party of great strength, for the front to be -covered was nearly 2000 yards, and the noise which must -inevitably arise from over a mile of shovels and picks -hard at work was likely to bring down a hail of machine-gun -bullets and cause very severe casualties, and even, -in the presence of an enterprising enemy, the probability -of a surprise attack in the middle of the work. The -attempt was clearly fraught with great risk, but with -characteristic boldness Gen. Hull determined to make the -attempt.</p> - -<p>On the night of the 25/26th May the setting out of -the work was safely accomplished by the Royal Engineers -under cover of a screen of scouts, and the following night -a working party of 3000 men got to work on the digging, -a line of outposts being established for their protection -within 200 yards of the German line.</p> - -<p>The Battalion responsible for W—the right or southern—sector -of the new line was the 1/4th Londons, the work -being under the control of Major Duncan-Teape, while -the L.R.B. undertook the work in Y sector. The night -luckily passed quietly, and all ranks working with a will -the new trench, shown on map as W 47, W 48, W 49 -and W 50, was opened and sunk to a depth sufficient to -provide cover.</p> - -<p>When the Battalion, therefore, took over W sector on<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_146" id="Page_146">[Pg 146]</a></span> -the night of the 28th May, the new front line was becoming -fit to occupy and had, moreover, reached the anticipated -stage in which, the Bosche being alive to what had been -done, it was becoming a favourite target for his shells -and trench mortar bombs of all calibres. From this time -onwards, in fact until the battle, the Divisional sector and -in particular the new trenches were daily harassed by the -enemy's fire, and constant repair work on the part of our -trench garrisons was called for in addition to the continuance -of new construction.</p> - -<p>The front line of W sector was taken up by A Company -(A. R. Moore) on the right with B Company (S. Elliott) -on the left, supports to both front line companies being -found by D Company (Giles), while C Company (Long) -was in reserve at Hébuterne. Battalion Headquarters -occupied dugouts beneath a roller flour mill in Hébuterne. -The move forward from Bayencourt for this relief being -made in daylight was carried out across country along -tracks, platoons moving separately at 300 yards distance.</p> - -<p>After relief the Kensingtons in Bayencourt remained -at the disposal of the 1/4th Londons for working parties, -for the construction of the new front line was but -a small beginning of the task which still remained to be -completed before the opening of the battle. In addition -to the first line there was to be dug a control trench -immediately in rear of it, and a new support line—the -WS line—and all these were to be connected up by the -advancement from the old WR line of Warrior, Welcome, -Whisky, Woman and Wood Street communication trenches. -These defensive works completed, there was also the -erection of the necessary wire entanglements in front, -the construction of dugouts for shelters, company headquarters, -ammunition stores, and signal offices; the laying -of armoured signal cable from all headquarters dugouts -back to battalion and brigade, the digging of cable trenches -for lines of particular importance, the collection of -the necessary supplies of small arms and trench mortar -ammunition and bombs in dumps; and other tasks of -varying importance and interest. Enough has been said, -however, to indicate that with only a month in which<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_147" id="Page_147">[Pg 147]</a></span> -to do all this work it was clear that the Battalion was -not likely to find time hanging heavily on its hands while -in the line,—and indeed it did not.</p> - -<p>The tour of duty proved somewhat unpleasant. The -works programme was, of course, the outstanding duty, -and all ranks put their shoulders to it with a will, but -the heavy rains which fell each day made it hard to keep -pace with the time-table set for the work, while the -remarkable aggressiveness of the enemy's guns added to -the digging scheme by providing much undesired practice -in trench repair work.</p> - -<p>During the night following the relief the Battalion's -positions were heavily bombarded by heavy guns and -trench mortars, which caused much damage and several -casualties, especially in the left company front. Capt. -Elliott had to be dug out of the trench which was -blown in on him, and he was sent to hospital suffering -from severe concussion; and 3 N.C.O.'s and men were -killed and 12 wounded. Capt. Elliott was unhappily -never able to return to France, and in him the -Battalion lost an officer of remarkably cool and sound -judgment and of wide sympathy with the welfare of -his men.</p> - -<p>The 30th May opened with a heavy bombardment of -our lines at 12.15 a.m., which was repeated half an hour -later. About 2.50 a.m., following further bombardment, -the S.O.S. signal was received from the Queen Victoria's -Rifles in Y subsector, who reported the enemy advancing. -A very quick response to the call was made by our -artillery, which laid down a barrage on S.O.S. lines; but -no infantry movement developed on our front. At -about 5 p.m. the enemy turned his attention to Battalion -Headquarters in Hébuterne, which were heavily shelled -and severely damaged. The sentry on duty was badly -wounded, as were also four other men of the Headquarters -staff and four of D Company billeted in an adjoining -dugout. The total casualties for the day amounted to -31, of whom 16 in B Company were cases of severe shell -shock following the previous day's bombardment.</p> - -<p>This unpleasant degree of Bosche activity continued<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_148" id="Page_148">[Pg 148]</a></span> -during the night, when our working parties were harassed -and seriously delayed; and the 31st May saw no abatement -of the shelling. Battalion Headquarters again received -a "hate" at about 5 p.m., and the casualties for -the day were Lieut. H. B. A. Balls, wounded at duty, -and in N.C.O.'s and men, 1 killed and 3 wounded.</p> - -<p>Throughout this tour of duty the promptness with -which the Divisional artillery responded to calls for -retaliatory fire against the enemy's activity was excellent -and did a great deal to inspire all ranks with confidence -in the gunners.</p> - -<p>Further heavy bombardments occurred on the 1st June, -which caused a very great deal of damage to the new -trenches. On the afternoon of the next day the 1/4th -Londons were relieved by the London Scottish, withdrawing -on relief to Bayencourt, where tea was served -and valises picked up from the stores. In the evening -the Battalion was concentrated in huts at Souastre. The -Kensingtons had also been relieved by the Rangers, who -with the Scottish now came under the orders of the -169th Brigade.</p> - -<p>A day was spent in Souastre by the Battalion in -cleaning trench mud from uniforms and equipment, and -in the evening it moved by march route <em>via</em> Hénu to -Halloy, where it came once more under the orders of the -168th Brigade in Divisional reserve.</p> - -<p>During this period of preparations for the battle the -strength of the Battalion had been steadily creeping up -with reinforcements from home and from the disbanded -2/4th Battalion. The drafts from the 2/4th Battalion -were particularly valuable; they had all seen active -service and, moreover, they were rich in potential N.C.O.'s. -Throughout the hard fighting which followed the Battalion -was fortunate in having so great an internal reserve of -strength in this respect. As already recorded the 2/4th -Battalion had been on overseas service for nearly eighteen -months without the grant of any home leave. Through -the special intervention of Lieut.-Col. Wheatley several -large allotments of leave were made to the 1/4th Londons, -and these were used chiefly for the benefit of the 2/4th<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_149" id="Page_149">[Pg 149]</a></span> -Battalion reinforcements, but it was of course inevitable -that large numbers of men should be unable to obtain -leave before the 1st July.</p> - -<p>The drafts received were:</p> - -<div class="hangindent8"> - -<p>7th May—2/Lieuts. F. R. C. Bradford, C. S. G. Blows, J. W. -Price and S. Davis, and 214 other ranks from the -2/4th Battalion.</p> - -<p>14th May—44 other ranks from the Reserve Battalion.</p> - -<p>24th May—130 other ranks from the 2/4th Battalion.</p></div> - -<p>When the last-noted draft joined, the Battalion was -treated to the annoying spectacle of watching a further -100 men of the 2/4th Battalion marching by <i lang="fr">en route</i> for -the Kensingtons.</p> - -<p>The day following arrival at Halloy being Sunday, -a parade service was held, the first since the 14th May; -and later in the day a further reinforcement, this time -composed entirely of officers, reported to the Battalion -from the disbanded 2/4th Battalion, as follows:</p> - -<div class="hangindent"> - -<p>Capts. R. N. Arthur and H. G. Stanham, Lieuts. W. R. -Botterill and W. A. Stark, and 2/Lieuts. H. W. Vernon, -B. F. L. Yeoman, H. G. Hicklenton and N. W. Williams.</p></div> - -<p>The two first-named officers had been mobilised with -the 1/4th Battalion in August 1914, and were thus -particularly welcome. The officers of this draft were -distributed among the companies, and Capt. Arthur took -over the duties of Works Officer as Major, an appointment -he continued to fill until the 27th June, when he was -evacuated to hospital seriously ill.</p> - -<p>The 5th, 6th and 7th June were spent in training, of -which the principal feature was a practice attack over -trenches constructed to represent those opposite the -sector of line which the Battalion had just left, in -preparation, of course, for the coming battle. Following -the last day's practice the Battalion was inspected by -the Third Army commander, Sir Edmund Allenby, who -was accompanied by Major-Gen. Hull and Brig.-Gen. -Loch, and expressed himself satisfied with all that he had -seen and also with what he had heard of the Battalion's -behaviour during its recent tour of duty. A report of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_150" id="Page_150">[Pg 150]</a></span> -this kind may read curiously at first in view of the fact -that the Battalion had been in France for eighteen months -and had proved its steadiness in the line on many occasions: -but remember that the 56th Division was brand new, and -commanders so far did not know how their troops would -shape in action. Praise from Allenby at this stage was -therefore praise indeed.</p> - -<p>The same day the Battalion was once more sent adrift -from its own Brigade and became attached for duty to -the 169th Brigade, though it retained its billets at Halloy, -and the 168th Brigade took over W and Y sectors, Headquarters -moving from Grenas to Sailly.</p> - -<p>The Battalion now became responsible for the various -works duties in the back area, relieving the L.R.B. in -this monotonous task; and from this date onwards remained -hard at work on various tasks until almost the -eve of battle. B Company was despatched to Mondicourt, -an important and vast R.E. dump on the Doullens-Arras -Road, for work under the R.E.'s. The remaining companies -were split up to supply parties for the daily work, -the total numbers found each day being 8 officers and -350 other ranks, employed on such varied tasks as digging -road material in Halloy quarries; carrying logs at Pas -for gun emplacements; shifting and loading timber at -Mondicourt; and working in the R.E. workshop at Pas. -This programme was pushed forward without a break -until the 12th June, the only intermission being an -inspection on Sunday the 11th, of such remnants of the -Battalion as were available, by Sir Charles Wakefield, -then Lord Mayor of London, who was accompanied by -Major-Gen. Hull and Col. Evelyn Wood, and addressed -the troops.</p> - -<p>On the 13th a further redistribution of Brigades took -place, the 168th remaining in line but retaining W sector -only; Y sector was handed over to the 169th Brigade; -while the 167th moved back into reserve. This move -placed the Brigades in the positions they were destined -to occupy on the day of battle. The same day the 1/4th -Londons moved forward, leaving Halloy at 5 p.m., and -marching <em>via</em> Authie, St Leger and Coigneux to Bayen<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_151" id="Page_151">[Pg 151]</a></span>court, -where it was joined in billets by B Company from -detachment at Mondicourt. A Company was pushed -straight on to Hébuterne, when in spite of its long march -and late arrival in billets it set to work on its share of the -Brigade works programme at 5 a.m. on the 14th June.</p> - -<p>The remaining companies were also set to work on the -14th in Hébuterne on parts of the Brigade scheme, working -hours being nightly from 9 p.m. to 5 a.m. The parties -were much split up, 280 being detailed to the 2/2nd Field -Company R.E., 140 to the 5th Cheshires and 140 to the -Brigade Signal Officer for digging cable trenches. The -tasks were various, but were all directed in one way or -another to the completion and repair of the new trench -system and the necessary dugouts for the impending -offensive. Night after night, for fourteen nights in succession, -did the Battalion continue these stiff working parties. -Each night there was a march of nearly three miles in -each direction between billets and work, each night the -Bosche was unpleasantly active with machine-guns, and -nearly every night it rained steadily. That the Battalion -carried out this depressing duty—for there is nothing -with which the average infantryman gets more quickly -"fed up" than continual working parties—with such -efficiency and keenness is all the more to its credit. Conditions -were not comfortable and the men were beginning -to be tired; but they stuck to it well for they knew the -urgency of the work and how much remained to be done -in an impossibly short time.</p> - -<p>On the 21st June the 167th Brigade took over the -whole Divisional sector for six days in order to give a -final rest to the 168th and 169th and to keep them as -fresh as possible for battle. The 168th withdrew to its -old rest billets at Halloy, but again the 1/4th Londons -were left behind as works battalion, remaining in Hébuterne -attached to the 167th Brigade and sticking to its works -programme.</p> - -<p>On the 23rd June Lieut. W. J. Boutall rejoined the -Battalion from home and was posted to D Company, but -almost immediately took up the duties of Assistant -Adjutant.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_152" id="Page_152">[Pg 152]</a></span></p> - -<p>A draft of the 2/4th Battalion arrived on the 24th, -consisting of Lieut. J. R. Webster and 40 other ranks.</p> - -<p>Affairs in the line had now begun to "tune up." -Some days previously the British 9·2 batteries in Bayencourt -had begun to register, while on the 24th the -preliminary bombardment of the enemy's lines began -systematically, with occasional intense periods, alternating -with intervals of quiet. This continued daily—and -nightly—much to the discomfort of those who were lucky -enough to occupy billets with more or less sound ceilings, -for their nights were continually disturbed by large pieces -of plaster falling on them at each concussion! The -attack had been originally projected for the 29th June, -and in preparation for this the 168th and 169th Brigades -returned to the line in the afternoon of the 27th, the 1/4th -Londons advancing from Bayencourt, taking over the -whole of W sector from the 8th Middlesex.</p> - -<p>The sector was occupied on a three-company frontage -as follows:</p> - -<div class="hangindent8"> - -<p>D Company—(Giles) with two platoons in W 47 and 48, one platoon -in W 47 S and one in billets in Hébuterne.</p> - -<p>A Company—(A. R. Moore) with two platoons in W 49, one in -W 49 S and one in billets in Hébuterne.</p> - -<p>C Company—(Sykes) with two platoons in W 49 and 50, one in -W 50 S and one in Napier Trench.</p> - -<p>B Company—(W. Moore) with two platoons in reserve dugouts in -Cross Street. The two remaining platoons of B -were detailed for special duties as Brigade -carrying parties respectively under the Bombing -and Machine-Gun Officers.</p></div> - -<p>The Somme Battle was the first important offensive -in which steps were taken to reduce the number of officers -actually taking part to the smallest possible limits, and -a "battle surplus" of officers and also of warrant officers, -N.C.O.'s and men was therefore left behind in bivouacs -near Souastre when the Battalion moved into the line. -This precaution, which was always afterwards adopted, -was the means of avoiding unnecessary casualties and of -providing an immediate reinforcement, as might be required, -of fresh officers who would be acquainted with the -men. The officers left in "battle surplus" were Capts.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_153" id="Page_153">[Pg 153]</a></span> -H. G. Stanham and A. L. Long, Lieuts. J. R. Webster -and H. W. Vernon, and 2/Lieuts. C. S. G. Blows and N. W. -Williams; and these were joined on the eve of battle by -Major H. J. Duncan-Teape and Lieut. W J. Boutall, -both of whom remained in the line until the last possible -minute. Lieut. W. R. Botterill also left the line before -the battle to proceed to Woolwich R.M. College.</p> - -<p>During the day of relief the British bombardment of -the German lines was still proceeding, occasional intensive -bursts being used. At about 7.45 p.m. on the cessation -of a burst the enemy put down a very heavy retaliatory -barrage on the W and WR lines, causing a good deal of -damage, especially to the latter. In the course of this -shelling D Company's headquarters were blown in and -Capt. Giles was seriously wounded, one of his company -staff killed and another wounded. Poor Giles, who had -done magnificent work as platoon commander, adjutant -and company commander, and had never missed a day's -duty since August 1914, died in hospital from his injuries -a few days later. He was a gallant and unselfish officer. -His place in command of D Company was taken by -Stanham, who came forward from surplus.</p> - -<p>During the evening two patrols were despatched from -New Woman Street to examine and report on the condition -of the enemy's wire and front line trenches. They -returned at 12.30 a.m. on the 28th, bringing samples of -German wire, which was reported as too thick to admit -of access to the front line. About the same time a rocket -signal was sent up from the Bosche line, a red light followed -by two more in quick succession, and this was the prelude to -a sharp bombardment of our lines for about fifteen minutes. -Somewhat later, about 3.45 a.m., a second barrage came -down, this time on Hébuterne, but the damage caused -was not great. As the day wore on the enemy's activity -became less intense though he exhibited great persistence -all day in his efforts to locate our batteries near Cross -Street and our trench mortar emplacements in W 47. At -night working parties were set on to the almost final -preparation of cutting gaps in our own wire at intervals -of about 50 to 70 yards to allow egress to the assaulting<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_154" id="Page_154">[Pg 154]</a></span> -columns. This work is naturally rather tricky, and the -gaps, the cutting of which was left till the last minute, -must be so concealed if possible as to avoid the risk of -the enemy marking them down and plastering them with -shell fire.</p> - -<p>The day's casualties amounted to 2 officers, Lieut. -W. A. Stark and J. W. Price wounded, and 2 men killed -and 11 wounded.</p> - -<p>During the evening patrols had again been despatched -to investigate the enemy's wire and trenches, and this -night greater success was achieved. The right patrol -which approached the Bosche line in front of Farm-Farmyard -was under 2/Lieut. W. H. Webster, who on -looking over the enemy's parapet found he had selected -a firebay containing a party of Bosche hard at work. -Unfortunately the alarm was given and the presence of -the patrol being disclosed by Véry lights it was forced -to withdraw.</p> - -<p>Late on the evening of the 29th the warning was -received that the attack was postponed for forty-eight -hours, until the 1st July.</p> - -<p>Throughout the 29th our preliminary bombardment -continued with gradually increasing intensity; but it -was noticeable that in spite of the damage it was clearly -doing to the enemy's defences it was not by any means -successful in silencing his batteries. The German artillery -was in fact unpleasantly lively, and from 6.30 a.m. until -about 4.30 p.m. W sector was subjected to intermittent -harassing fire from field and machine-guns. This more -or less desultory fire was followed at 6 p.m. by a sharp -enemy barrage. All the evening the enemy's activity -continued, and the remarkable number of Véry lights -which he put up indicated his growing nervousness. -There was indeed now every reason to believe that the -Bosche expected our attack. The long-continued British -bombardment of trenches, dumps, cross roads and battery -positions, the systematic wire-cutting, and the activity -of our air forces, could have left no room for doubt in the -enemy's mind that an important offensive was being -launched. In some parts of the battle front, indeed, the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_155" id="Page_155">[Pg 155]</a></span> -Germans had displayed notice boards inviting the British -to start their attack; and though probably these emanated -from individual bravado they formed some indication that -surprise effect was not to be expected, and that there was -good reason to believe that the Germans would with their -usual thoroughness have made preparations to offer the -most stubborn possible resistance to our projected advance.</p> - -<p>The 29th also demanded its toll of casualties from the -Battalion, and this day 28 N.C.O.'s and men were wounded.</p> - -<p>The 30th June opened with a heavy barrage on W -sector and Hébuterne at about midnight, but this subsided -after a few minutes and little further activity was -displayed by the enemy during the early morning hours. -As dawn approached the enemy's nervousness evidently -increased, and he maintained an almost continuous discharge -of Véry lights. From 7 a.m. onwards, however, -the enemy artillery once more began to show signs of -liveliness which increased as the day passed. The WR -line in the vicinity of Woman and Cross Streets was in -particular heavily shelled, and altogether a great amount -of damage was done to our trench system. This action -of the enemy did not call for any particular retaliatory -measures from our artillery, which proceeded with the -preliminary bombardment according to its programme. -The losses sustained by the Battalion on this day amounted -to 2 N.C.O.'s and men killed and 21 wounded, making a -total of 69 casualties during the three days the Battalion -had held the line.</p> - -<p>Little has been said of the actual occupation of the -Battalion during these three days; there is so much to -relate of the battle day itself that space does not permit -us to dwell overmuch on the preceding period. But be -it understood that all the time the works programme -was being pushed on with feverish haste, though progress -was slow owing to the continued rain and the great -delay caused in the projected new work by having -to divert from it a large proportion of the available -strength to repair the damage caused by the daily -German bombardments.</p> - -<p>During the evening the Battalion formed up in its<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_156" id="Page_156">[Pg 156]</a></span> -prearranged assembly areas in readiness for the attack -on the following morning.</p> - -<hr class="tb" /> - -<p>The part which the 56th Division was called on to -play in the offensive was that of a combined operation -on a comparatively small front in conjunction with the -46th Division, which was in line opposite the northern -flank of the Gommecourt Salient and adjoining the 56th. -These Divisions which, with the 37th (not engaged), -formed the VII Corps and were the right flank of Allenby's -Third Army, were the two most northern divisions -operating in the Somme offensive.</p> - -<p>Adjoining the 56th on the right lay Hunter-Weston's -VIII Corps, comprising from left to right the 31st, 4th -and 29th Divisions in line, with the 48th in support. -One Brigade of this last-named Division—the 143rd—was -in line between the 56th and the 31st, and its sector -formed a gap on which no forward move was attempted. -The Gommecourt operation was therefore entirely isolated, -though forming an inherent part of the one great offensive -plan.</p> - -<p>South of the VIII Corps the British battle front was -taken up by the X Corps (Morland), III Corps (Pulteney), -XV Corps (Horne) and XIII Corps (Congreve), these -forming with the VIII, Rawlinson's Fourth Army.</p> - -<p>The 56th Division's objectives, which will be easily -followed from the map, were to capture and consolidate -a line running almost due north from a strong point at -the south end of Farm-Farmyard, through Fame, Felon, -Fell, Fellow, and the Quadrilateral to the junction of -Fillet and Indus. From this point the line was to be -continued to the "little Z" (a point about 2000 yards -north of the apex of the Gommecourt Salient) by the -46th Division, who were to clear Gommecourt village and -park.</p> - -<p>The 168th Brigade on the right of the Divisional sector -attacked on a two-battalion front from the strong point -on the right to the junction of Felon and Epte on the left. -Strong points were to be consolidated on the extreme right -and also at the junctions of Felon with Elbe and Epte.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_157" id="Page_157">[Pg 157]</a></span> -From this point the 169th Brigade was to continue the -line to the junction of Fir and Firm and also to the point -of union with the 46th Division.</p> - -<p>The 167th Brigade was in Divisional reserve, and -one battalion, the 1st Londons, was detailed to supply -600 men to dig communication trenches across No Man's -Land after the attack.</p> - -<p>The 168th Brigade group was disposed as follows:</p> - - -<dl> - <dt class="center"><span class="smcap">Headquarters in Mardi Trench</span></dt> - - <dt><span class="smcap">Assaulting Battalions</span>—</dt> - <dd>Right—London Scottish.</dd> - <dd>Left—Rangers.</dd> - - <dt><span class="smcap">Supporting Battalions</span>—</dt> - <dd>Right—Kensingtons, with a special task of digging a - fire trench to form a defensive flank across - No Man's Land from the head of Welcome - Street.</dd> - <dd>Left—1/4th Londons.</dd> - <dd>168th M.G. Company—In tunnelled emplacements in the - WR line for overhead covering fire.</dd> - <dd>3-inch L.T.M. Battery (Stokes), (with half the 167th - Brigade Battery)—In emplacements in the - front line control trench.</dd> -</dl> - -<p>In addition the following troops were at the disposal -of the Brigadier for the operation:</p> - -<div class="center"> -<ul> - <li>One Company 5th Cheshires (Pioneers).</li> - <li>One Section 2/2nd London Field Company, R.E.</li> - <li>Y 56—2-inch Mortar Battery.</li> -</ul> -</div> -<p>The artillery affiliated to the Brigade consisted of four -18-pr. batteries and one 4·5-inch howitzer battery, comprising -the southern group.</p> - -<p>Similar attachments were made to the 167th Brigade, -and over and above these there remained at the disposal -of the Divisional artillery, a counter-battery group consisting -of two 18-pr. and one 4·5-inch howitzer batteries; -and two 18-pr. batteries in reserve; while of trench -mortars there were one 2-inch battery (X 56) and two -heavy (9½-inch) mortars.</p> - -<p>During the evening of the 30th June the other battalions -of the Brigade began to move into W sector to take up<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_158" id="Page_158">[Pg 158]</a></span> -their assembly positions. The assembly areas are marked -on the map in Roman numerals as follows:</p> - -<div class="center"> -<ol class="RU"> - <li>London Scottish (right front).</li> - <li>Rangers (left front).</li> - <li>Kensingtons (right support).</li> - <li>1/4th Londons (left support).</li> -</ol> -</div> -<p>As each battalion arrived and took over its area the -various companies of the 1/4th Londons withdrew to -No. IV area in rear of the Rangers. In order to avoid -congestion and cross traffic in the communication trenches -several platoons of the 1/4th Londons had to withdraw -to assembly position over the open, and by 10 p.m. this -operation was completed.</p> - -<p>The 1st July was a glorious summer day, and the light -haze which tells of great heat hung over the rolling hills -of this great plain which was destined to become the -scene of so great a struggle. With the earliest grey of -dawn the Germans opened an intense bombardment on all -our trenches, to which no reply was made by our artillery. -This severe shelling started at about 2.45 a.m. and lasted -for nearly an hour: in the course of it part of the Rangers -were blown out of their assembly trenches and compelled -to make a temporary withdrawal to our area, causing a -good deal of congestion and confusion.</p> - -<p>At 6.25 a.m. our week old bombardment increased to -"hurricane" intensity and every gun, trench mortar and -machine-gun on the British front from Gommecourt to -the Somme came into action, pouring a hail of shot and -shell into the enemy lines with merciless precision and -rapidity. Under such a colossal weight of metal it seemed -that nothing could live, and it was confidently hoped that -the bombardment would go far towards breaking down -the enemy's morale and power of resistance to our attack.</p> - -<p>At 7.25 a.m. a smoke barrage was raised along the whole -front of the attack by firing smoke bombs from the front -trenches, and under this at 7.30 a.m. the British battalions -moved to the assault under cover of a creeping barrage, -a moving curtain of fire.</p> - -<p>On the 168th Brigade front the attack was made by -each assaulting battalion on a four-company front, each<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_159" id="Page_159">[Pg 159]</a></span> -company in column of platoons in extended order. The -attack as a whole, therefore, moved in four "waves," and -following as a fifth wave moved a trench-clearing party consisting -of two platoons of B Company of the 1/4th Londons.</p> - -<p>These platoons under 2/Lieuts. L. R. Chapman and -H. G. Hicklenton had the duty of completing the capture -of each trench line by killing the remaining garrison, -clearing the dugouts, and collecting and sending back the -prisoners; thereby saving delay to the assaulting waves, -who would otherwise have had to perform these duties -themselves to avoid the risk of an attack from the rear -after they had passed the first objective. These platoons -were made up to a strength of 1 officer, 3 N.C.O.'s and -36 men organised in four sections (clearing, bombing, -blocking and communicating), but during the hours of -waiting after assembly had already lost 26 men hit.</p> - -<p>At the same time as the assaulting waves moved forward -the Battalion, less the two platoons of B Company -above, advanced and occupied battle positions in the area -vacated by the Rangers, as follows:</p> - -<div class="hangindent8"> - -<p>A Company—(A. R. Moore) two platoons in front line trench and -two platoons in Boyau de Service, Sector W 49, -between Whisky Street and Woman Street.</p> - -<p>C Company—(J. T. Sykes) two platoons in W 50 and two platoons -in the Boyau de Service, north and south of -Bucquoy Road.</p> - -<p>D Company—(H. G. Stanham) formed up in line in trench W 49 S -and W 50 S.</p></div> - -<p>The WS line occupied by D Company had been very -severely damaged by the German bombardment and -communication was therefore extremely difficult. The -company was inevitably much split up under the two -platoon commanders, G. H. Davis and B. F. L. Yeoman, -while Stanham took up a central position where he hoped -to keep in touch with both flanks.</p> - -<p>The two remaining platoons of B Company were employed -as follows:</p> - -<dl> - <dt>1 Platoon—Carrying party under Brigade Bombing Officer.</dt> - <dt>1 Platoon—1 Section—Carrying party to 168th M.G. Company.</dt> - <dd>3 Sections—In reserve in Napier Trench.</dd> -</dl> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_160" id="Page_160">[Pg 160]</a></span></p> - -<p>Battalion Headquarters (K Company) were disposed as -follows:</p> - -<div class="center"> -<table width="90%" border="0" cellpadding="4" cellspacing="0" summary="Battalion Headquarters (K Company) were disposed"> - - <tr> - <td>Clerks, signallers, pioneers, snipers, etc. (34 other ranks)</td> - <td>In dugout and control trench of Woman Street.</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td>Company runners (16 other</td> - <td>In a sap adjoining. ranks)</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td>Battalion Bombers</td> - <td>In a "crump" hole near the Woman Street Battalion H.Q. dugout.</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td>Battalion Trench Pioneers</td> - <td>W 50 R.</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td>M.O. and Staff</td> - <td>Aid Post (Junction of Wood Street and Cross Street).</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td>Band</td> - <td>Ditto.</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td>Reserve Lewis Gunners</td> - <td>Divided between A and B Companies.</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td>Regimental Police</td> - <td>In control posts, chiefly at intersection of fire trenches with communication trenches throughout the sector.</td> - </tr> -</table></div> - -<p>A runner from the right company (A) reporting it in -position arrived at Headquarters at 8.15 a.m., but no -report was received from any other company, and from -this time onwards throughout the day communication was -exceedingly difficult on account of the very heavy German -barrage which fell on all lines in W sector immediately -after zero. It was reported, however, by observers that -all had successfully formed up on their battle positions.</p> - -<p>We must now turn for a moment to the leading -battalions.</p> - -<p>On the right the London Scottish advanced under the -effective cover of the smoke barrage, which was in fact -so thick as to render the maintenance of the correct direction -a matter of difficulty, and occupied Farm, Fell and -Fate as far north as the Bucquoy Road, and also the greater -part of the strong point at the southern extremity of -attack. The blocking of the adjoining trenches and consolidation -of the captured lines was at once put in hand. -The left companies appear to have been drawn off somewhat -towards Nameless Farm but seem to have kept in -touch with the Rangers on their left.</p> - -<p>Shortly after 8 o'clock the Scottish were joined by a -company of Kensingtons, who did good work in the consolidation -of Farm-Farmyard.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_161" id="Page_161">[Pg 161]</a></span></p> - -<p>On the left four companies of the Rangers also crossed -No Man's Land, and although the position is obscure there -can be no doubt that parties of all companies succeeded -in reaching the final objectives in Felon, Elbe and Epte, -and gained touch on Nameless Farm Road with the 169th -Brigade on the left.</p> - -<p>At these advanced points bomb fighting in the communication -trenches began and the struggle was pursued -along the line with varying success. Realising the pressure -that was being brought to bear on his now dangerously -weak companies the O.C. Rangers asked for two companies -of the 1/4th Londons to lend the weight necessary -to carry forward his attack again.</p> - -<p>This order was received by Lieut.-Col. Wheatley at -8.45 a.m. and at once he ordered A and C Companies to -reinforce the Rangers in Fetter, and D Company to move -up to the W front line in their place. Telephone communication -having been cut by the enemy shell fire this -order was despatched by runner to the front companies; -but of six runners despatched by different routes, and -two additional runners sent after fifteen minutes' interval, -only one returned after an unsuccessful attempt to find the -left company. The others were all killed. We must pause -here to offer a tribute to the bravery of runners, a class of -soldier whose gallantry was only too seldom adequately -rewarded; their duties compelled them to attempt to pass -through impossible barrages without the moral support of -comradeship, and to face almost certain death in the -forlorn hope of getting through with a vital order. But -never once did they flinch from their duty.</p> - -<p>At 9.5 a.m. a report was received through the Rangers -that Rangers and 1/4th Londons were together in the -German front line, and this was followed at intervals by -other reports indicating their further progress, till at -10.25 a.m. a message from the Rangers reported parties -of both battalions in the second German trench. Following -the receipt of this information at 10.45 a.m. Lieut-Col. -Wheatley despatched the Battalion Trench Pioneers to -help consolidate the trenches gained.</p> - -<p>The above messages probably convey a substantially<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_162" id="Page_162">[Pg 162]</a></span> -correct idea of what occurred, but owing to the failure of -all means of communication on account of the intensity -of the German shell fire, the movements of A and C -Companies will probably never be known in detail. At -11.50 a.m. an untimed message was received from Capt. -A. R. Moore (A Company) reporting that he was still in -W 49, his battle position, though at 9.5 a.m., as we have -seen, he was reported to have crossed to the German line; -and probably this latter report is correct. The situation, -however, evidently required clearing up, and a patrol consisting -of L.-Corpl. Hyde and Pte. Lear despatched from -Battalion Headquarters succeeded in returning with the -information that A Company had gone forward. L.-Corpl. -Hyde was awarded the Military Medal for his good -work, and subsequently recommended for a commission -by Lieut.-Col. Wheatley; he was unfortunately killed in -action later in the Somme Battle whilst completing his -training with C Company.</p> - -<p>At 1 p.m. a message was received from Stanham (in -reserve) that his Company had suffered about fifty per cent. -casualties and that his position had become untenable. -He was ordered to maintain his position.</p> - -<p>By this time the situation on the other side of No Man's -Land was becoming desperate. The work of consolidation -was almost impossible owing to the German barrage, and -the sustained bomb fighting was rapidly becoming an -unequal struggle owing to the impossibility of replenishing -the dwindling supplies of bombs. Again and again with -unsurpassed devotion the carrying party endeavoured to -pass through the barrier of German shells with the coveted -supplies of bombs to our harassed troops—but passage was -impossible and the gallant carriers only added to the roll -of casualties.</p> - -<p>At 1.30 p.m. a patrol returned from the German lines -to Battalion Headquarters. This had been despatched at -11 o'clock on a demand from the Brigadier for information -as to the left of the Brigade in the German line, and Ptes. -Whitehead and Buckingham had volunteered for the duty. -According to this patrol a party of the Rangers under -Lieut. Harper were holding on to the junction of Et and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_163" id="Page_163">[Pg 163]</a></span> -Felt, but was urgently in need of bombs. Further, none -of the 168th Brigade were then in the German third line. -This report was passed on to Brigade and to the Rangers, -and a special bomb carrying party from the Battalion was -ordered across to relieve Harper's need. But none reached -the German line, all being killed or wounded in No Man's -Land. For their bravery and devotion to duty Ptes. -Whitehead and Buckingham were rewarded with the -Military Medal, and the former was subsequently granted -a commission.</p> - -<p>At 2.30 p.m. the front of the Battalion Headquarters -dugout was blown in by a shell, which killed seven -and wounded seven men. At the time the dugout was -occupied by a large number of Headquarters staff, including -the Colonel, the Adjutant, the Signalling Officer and -Major Moore, but of these luckily none was hit.</p> - -<p>All this time the German shell fire continued without -abatement, and at 3.30 p.m. further heavy casualties were -reported by D Company. At 3.45 p.m. Brigade Headquarters -ordered D Company to withdraw to the WR line, -and a report was received from Stanham at 4.45 p.m. that -his withdrawal with 1 officer and 20 men was complete.</p> - -<p>Meanwhile the Brigade was gradually being compelled -to give ground and, owing to its lack of bombs, to loose -its slender hold on the enemy's positions. At about 2 p.m. -the remnants of the Rangers, together with a few 1/4th -Londons and some Queen Victorias from the 169th -Brigade on the left, were driven into Fate, where they made -a last determined stand; but at 3.10 p.m. they were finally -ejected from the German lines and withdrew to the British -trenches.</p> - -<p>On the right the Scottish and Kensingtons met with a -similar fate. A gallant fight was put up by the remains -of the Battalion under Capt. H. C. Sparks in Farm-Farmyard, -but by 4 p.m., both his flanks being in the air and -his whole force being in imminent danger of extinction, -Sparks decided to withdraw, this operation being stubbornly -and successfully carried out after the removal of -as many wounded as possible.</p> - -<p>At 6.30 p.m. the 1/4th Londons reformed in the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_164" id="Page_164">[Pg 164]</a></span> -WR line between Wood Street and Woman Street, and -later in the evening moved into the trenches west of -Hébuterne.</p> - -<p>The other battalions of the 168th were also withdrawn -and the sector was taken over by the 167th Brigade.</p> - -<p>The story of the 169th Brigade attack is, like that of -the 168th, one of initial success which could not be maintained. -The line Fell-Feud was carried in the early hours -of the morning by the Queen Victorias and London Rifle -Brigade, but the intensity of the German shell fire and -the enfilading of the captured positions by machine-guns -in Gommecourt Park prevented the Queen's Westminsters -from carrying the Quadrilateral. Later in the day lack -of bombs, as in the case of the 168th Brigade, proved the -deciding factor, and resulted in a gradual loss of the -Brigade's grip on the enemy trenches, and after desperate -struggles the late afternoon hours found them also beaten -back to their original lines.</p> - -<p>So ended the first day on which the 56th Division had -been in battle, a day on which after the most stubborn -fighting and unsurpassed devotion the gain of ground was -nil, and which dealt London the severest blow in loss of -personnel that it ever suffered on any single day throughout -the War.</p> - -<p>The losses in the Division during the period 24th June -to 3rd July amounted to 4749 all ranks, of whom 35 officers -and 412 other ranks were killed, 107 officers and 2632 -other ranks wounded, and 40 officers and 1532 other ranks -missing. In the 1/4th Londons the losses for the same -period totalled the appalling number of 16 officers and -534 other ranks. These dreadful losses were borne fairly -equally by all companies, for all had been exposed to the -same deadly and unrelenting shell fire throughout the day.</p> - -<p>Of A Company, gallantly led to the second German -line by Capt. A. R. Moore, M.C., but 18 returned. Moore -himself and one of his subalterns, F. C. Fanhangel, were -killed, the other subaltern, A. G. Blunn, being captured -with 7 others. The rest of the company were killed. -Moore's end, like his life, was one of courageous devotion, -and has been simply told by one of his own sergeants:<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_165" id="Page_165">[Pg 165]</a></span> -"Capt. Moore was wounded in the wrist about thirty -minutes before we went over. Nevertheless he led the -company, revolver in hand, and on the sunken road at -the rear of Nameless Farm I saw blood flowing from his -back. He still pushed on, and then I was shot through -the leg and took shelter in a shell hole. The last I saw -of Capt. Moore he was still going ahead...."</p> - -<p>The two platoons of B Company which went forward -as clearing party were severely handled. Both the -subalterns, Chapman and Hicklenton, were hit and only -10 men got back from the German line. 2/Lieut. A. S. -Ford on carrying party duty was also hit.</p> - -<p>Of C Company only two platoons got forward as the -order to advance failed to reach Sykes, the company -commander. But its casualties under the terrific German -barrage were as heavy as in any company, and after Sykes -had been wounded and both his subalterns, T. Moody and -F. R. C. Bradford, killed, the remnants of the company -were brought steadily out of action by Company Sergt.-Major -Davis, who was rewarded with the D.C.M.</p> - -<p>D Company, which remained in reserve all day, had -perhaps the most trying time of all. From 2.30 a.m. -until withdrawn at 3.30 p.m. it sat still under the most -intense artillery bombardment, but was kept splendidly -in hand and ready to move by Stanham and his only -remaining subaltern, G. H. Davis. B. F. L. Yeoman -became a casualty early in the day.</p> - -<p>Of the Headquarters officers Major W. Moore and -2/Lieut. V. C. Donaldson were wounded.</p> - -<p>Magnificent work was done throughout the day by the -Medical Officer, Capt. Hurd, and his staff, who, though -the number of casualties far out-measured the facilities for -dealing with them, continued their work without a break -throughout the day and the night following. In this work -splendid help was rendered by the Padre, Rev. R. Palmer, -who organised and led search and carrying parties in -No Man's Land and brought in many wounded who were -unable to move.</p> - -<p>The morning of the 2nd July was spent in the dreary -duty of ascertaining the casualties and reorganising the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_166" id="Page_166">[Pg 166]</a></span> -companies, and in the afternoon the Battalion marched -to billets at St Amand.</p> - -<p>With the results of the day's fighting on other parts of the -front we are hardly concerned here. From Fricourt to the -Somme the day was successful and the bulk of the objectives -were captured and held. But from Fricourt northward -the tale throughout was one of complete check. Everywhere -our troops met with initial success which everywhere -was later changed into disaster with appalling losses.</p> - -<p>There is no doubt that in the northern half of attack -the British offensive was fully anticipated by the Germans. -It would indeed have been difficult to carry out such -immense preparations over a period of several weeks prior -to the battle without permitting indications of the impending -attempt to become visible to hostile aerial scouts. -But it had been hoped that the weight and long continuance -of the preliminary bombardment, even though it disclosed -its own purpose, would prove so intense as to nullify all -the German efforts to resist.</p> - -<p>We must here make some reference to the battle of the -46th Division on the northern face of the Gommecourt -salient. Against this ill-fated Division the German fire -was terrific. On the right the South Staffords were completely -shattered by the enemy's machine-guns before -they could cross No Man's Land; on the left the Sherwood -Foresters succeeded in gaining the German front line, and -isolated parties appear even to have struggled forward as -far as the second trench, but were rapidly ejected. Soon -after zero the whole of the 46th Division's assaulting -troops were back in their own line after suffering appalling -losses: their attack was a complete failure. At the time, -therefore, that the 56th Division was making headway -into the German positions, instead of the enemy feeling, as -had been hoped, the pincers closing on him from both -sides of his salient, he was relieved from all menace on his -right flank facing the 46th Division, and free to throw the -whole weight of his artillery and infantry against the 56th -Division.</p> - -<p>But the causes of the 56th Division's failure must be -looked for deeper than this.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_167" id="Page_167">[Pg 167]</a></span></p> - -<p>Primarily it may be said to have been due to the -shortage of bombs. The great distance which carrying -parties had to traverse over No Man's Land with fresh -supplies and the intensity of the German barrage through -which they had to pass were both such that the facilities -for getting bombs forward were inadequate. It should be -remembered that the 168th and 169th Brigades captured -three lines of German trenches and held them against all -attacks in spite of the gruelling enemy fire for many hours. -It was only when bomb supplies failed that they were -ejected.</p> - -<p>There are three other factors in this battle to which we -may refer as having contributed to the failure.</p> - -<p>First, the enormously strong deep dugouts in the -German lines, which were large enough to give shelter to -the whole trench garrison except the few necessary sentries, -had proved too strong for all except the heaviest guns; -and those of the heaviest calibre had not been directed -against them. The German garrisons were therefore able -to remain in safety until the last moment when our barrage -lifted off their front lines and they were able to man their -parapets. The strength of the German defences was -increased by the density and depth of their wire entanglements, -which had been most skilfully sited with the support -of machine-guns firing in enfilade.</p> - -<p>Secondly, the insufficient attention paid on our side to -counter-battery work. The batteries told off for counter-battery -fire were too few and of too light calibre. Throughout -the day the cry arose from all Headquarters to silence -the German guns, but the few batteries available, though -served magnificently by splendid gunners, could not cope -with so gigantic a task.</p> - -<p>The third and most important cause lay in the cunning -skill with which the German barrage was used. We have -referred above to the manning of the German parapets by -their garrisons after our barrage had passed over; but not -in every case did this happen. In many instances a -greater refinement of skill was exhibited. As the British -barrage lifted off the first objective and the leading waves -of the assault poured over it, down came the enemy<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_168" id="Page_168">[Pg 168]</a></span> -barrage like a dense curtain, cutting them off for ever -from their supports and their supplies. The barrage -having thus trapped them, the front trench filled with -Germans swarming up from their subterranean shelters, -and these poured a hail of machine-gun fire into the backs -of our waves which were pushing forward to the next line.</p> - -<p>After the experience of two more years of organised -trench to trench attacks, it may be that failure for the -reasons detailed above seems a little obvious; but it -would not be fair to pass them over without pointing out -that this was the first trench to trench attack of the whole -War which had been organised on so vast a scale, and it -was clearly impossible to provide against all eventualities -when there was no previous experience to act as a guide. -It should be remembered that in the south, where a greater -degree of surprise was attained, the arrangements for attack—which -were substantially the same as in the north—worked -splendidly and resulted in marked success. And -in subsequent attacks attention was paid to the experience -gained on this great opening day of the First Somme Battle -in increasing the strength of counter-battery artillery and -in making more efficient arrangements for "mopping-up" -captured lines.</p> - -<p>As regards the 168th Brigade attack, in addition to the -above general criticisms, it may be remarked that the -event showed that on the left of the Brigade at least there -was insufficient weight in the attack. The Scottish on the -right had to advance 250 yards and were able to carry -their objectives; but on the left the depth to be penetrated -was about 450 yards, and this proved too great for the -available strength of the Rangers, who were organised in -five waves, even when strengthened by two additional -waves supplied by the companies of the 1/4th Londons.</p> - -<p>A deal of congestion in the trenches and a great many -casualties were caused by the lack of those deep dugouts -with which the Germans were so well supplied, and in the -case of the 1/4th Londons at any rate it seems likely that -they might have been of more use when called upon had -they been able to obtain efficient shelter during the hours -of waiting.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_169" id="Page_169">[Pg 169]</a></span></p> - -<p>We have sufficiently elaborated the causes of failure. -It must not be forgotten that a very real and important -result was achieved by the Londoners this day. The -strategic object of their attack was not primarily the -capture of ground but the holding of German troops and -guns from the area of our main attack. This was an -unpleasant rôle, but a highly important one, and there -can be no manner of doubt that it was to a very large -degree fulfilled. The Division's achievement is summarised -concisely in the message of congratulation issued by Lieut.-Gen. -D'Oyly Snow on the 4th July:</p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p>The Corps Commander wishes to congratulate all ranks -of the 56th Division on the way in which they took the -German trenches and held them by pure grit and pluck -for so long in very adverse circumstances. Although -Gommecourt has not fallen into our hands, the purpose of -the attack, which was mainly to contain and kill Germans, -was accomplished, thanks to a great extent to the tenacity -of the 56th Division.</p></div> - -<p>A remarkable incident occurred on the Divisional front -on the 2nd July. At about 2.30 p.m. that day a number -of German stretcher-bearers were seen to issue from their -trenches and begin collecting the many British wounded -who were still lying round about their first three lines of -trenches. Prompt measures of precaution were taken by -the Division, and all guns were made ready to open fire -on barrage lines should any intention be shown by the -Germans to take advantage of the temporary truce. As, -however, the enemy stretcher-bearers continued their -humane work quietly, our own stretcher-bearers followed -their example and began collecting casualties from No -Man's Land. During this extraordinary armistice no -attempt was made by the Germans to come outside or by -our men to go beyond the line which had formerly been -the German wire entanglements. After about two hours -of this work, which was the means of saving many lives, -the stretcher-bearers returned by mutual and tacit consent -to their own lines and the War was resumed!</p> - -<hr class="tb" /> - -<p>The casualties suffered by the 46th Division were<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_170" id="Page_170">[Pg 170]</a></span> -exceedingly heavy, and the treatment it had received -was so severe that it was deemed necessary to withdraw -it from the line temporarily, and arrangements were made -for the 56th Division to assume responsibility at once for -the 46th sector as well as its own.</p> - -<p>This arrangement unfortunately deprived the 168th -Brigade of its well-earned rest. But though tired and in -need of reorganisation after the heavy losses it had -sustained the Brigade's morale was good, for it felt -justifiably proud of its effort of the previous day. The -relief of the 46th Division began on the evening of the -2nd July when the Scottish and the Kensingtons took -over the line from the left of the 56th sector of the -Fonquevillers-Gommecourt Road.</p> - -<p>The 1/4th Londons remained at St Amand during the -3rd July, busily engaged in reorganising its platoons and -making up as far as possible deficiencies in equipment -and ammunition. In the evening the 1/4th Londons and -Rangers took over from the 138th Brigade the remainder -of the 46th Divisional sector, the Battalion relieving the -5th Lincolns on a front adjoining that occupied by the -Kensingtons the previous night.</p> - -<p>The condition of the trenches was found to be shocking -and the material damage caused by shell and trench -mortar fire was severe, but the number of dead whose -bodies had not yet been removed, and of wounded who -still were lying out in No Man's Land provided a great -deal of work of the utmost urgency. Fortunately the -enemy did not interfere with this work of clearing up the -battlefield, and his lack of activity was doubtless due to -his being similarly employed. Reports were received at -night that enemy patrols were active in No Man's Land, -but no encounters took place and the Germans seen were -probably covering patrols for stretcher-bearing parties.</p> - -<p>The following day passed without unusual incident -except for a certain amount of enemy shelling during the -afternoon, which did considerable further damage to the -Battalion's trenches. During the night a storm of terrific -intensity burst over Fonquevillers, adding to the general -discomfort by filling the trenches with water.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_171" id="Page_171">[Pg 171]</a></span></p> - -<p>The two remaining days spent by the Battalion in this -sector were occupied in continuing the work of removing -the dead, baling out and clearing blocked trenches, -and generally attempting to reorganise the broken-down -defences as well as possible.</p> - -<p>On the evening of the 6th July the 168th Brigade was -relieved in Z sector, as the 46th Divisional line was called, -by the 169th, and the Battalion, handing over its trenches -to the Queen's Westminsters, moved by platoons into -billets at St Amand, a welcome issue of dry underclothing -being issued to the troops on arrival.</p> - -<p>At this point the Battalion may be said finally to have -finished its share in the battle of the 1st July. Although -not detailed as one of the assaulting battalions in the -attack, the strain to which it was subjected both in actual -hard work prior to the battle and by reason of the enemy -fire during the action, was as heavy as that borne by any -unit of the Division, while its casualties were among the -most severe. Starting at Bayencourt on the 13th June -the Battalion had supplied heavy working parties with -long hours of work and with a three-mile march in each -direction to and from work for fourteen nights in succession, -always harassed by the enemy fire and frequently wet -through. For three nights of unusual enemy activity -they had held the line prior to the battle, and this duty -was followed without respite by the day of battle itself. -After a brief interlude of two days in billets it had once -more returned to the trenches on the additional and -unexpected duty at Fonquevillers, and had there passed -a further four days in extreme discomfort—a record of -which we think any battalion might justly be proud.</p> - -<p>The extended front now held by the Division rendered -a prolonged rest for the Brigade out of the question, and -the Battalion's sojourn at St Amand was of only three -days' duration. Of these days the first two were occupied -in refitting the troops as far as possible, and in cleaning -up and drying clothing after the days spent in the line. -The last day, Sunday 9th July, was occupied with Church -Parade and, in the afternoon, a Brigade Parade at Souastre -for inspections by the Corps and Army Commanders,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_172" id="Page_172">[Pg 172]</a></span> -both of whom addressed the Brigade in congratulatory -terms.</p> - -<p>On the afternoon of the 10th the 168th Brigade returned -to the trenches at Hébuterne, there relieving the -167th. An adjustment of sectors was now effected as a -result of which the 168th Brigade held the right sector -of the Divisional front, comprising the old W sector and -the part of Y sector south of the Hébuterne-Gommecourt -Road; in the centre was the 167th Brigade between the -Hébuterne-Gommecourt and the Fonquevillers-Gommecourt -Roads; while the 169th Brigade held the left of -the Divisional front.</p> - -<p>The 168th front was occupied by the London Scottish -in the right subsector and the Kensingtons on the left. -The 1/4th Londons took over billets at Bayencourt, while -the Rangers moved to Sailly.</p> - -<p>On the 17th the Battalion relieved the London Scottish -in the right subsector of the Brigade front, the relief being -complete by 6 p.m. The same day the Rangers took over -the left subsector from the Kensingtons.</p> - -<p>The principal operation carried out by the Battalion -during this tour of duty was the filling in of the advanced -front line. This had been so seriously damaged during -the battle as to become almost untenable, and the labour -which would be involved in its repair and maintenance -did not appear to be justifiable. Accordingly the task of -filling it and the communication trenches as far back as -the WS line was carried out on the night 18/19th July. -The portion from Whisky Street southwards was dealt -with by 2 officers and 140 men of C Company, while the -part north of Whisky Street was filled in by 120 men of -the Kensingtons. A covering party in No Man's Land of 2 -platoons' strength secured the safety of the working party.</p> - -<p>This step clearly indicated that all ideas of an advance -on this front were—for the moment at any rate—given up, -but the rôle played by the Division during the remainder -of its duty at Hébuterne was such as to foster an offensive -spirit in the troops by means of constant patrolling -activity and a general policy of aggression against the -enemy's defences and working parties. This rôle was the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_173" id="Page_173">[Pg 173]</a></span> -more important on account of the striking developments -which were occurring in the British offensive operations -nearer the Somme, where the pressure which was being -brought to bear on the Germans was severe and continually -increasing. Gradually the enemy was being compelled -to push his reserves into the fight and limit as far -as possible his activities on other parts of the front. Any -action at Hébuterne, therefore, which could prevent the -withdrawal of the opposing garrison to the battle area -further south had a direct and important bearing on the -fortunes of the British arms.</p> - -<p>On the nights of the 20th, 21st and 22nd July strong -patrols were sent out from the Battalion under 2/Lieuts. -W. E. Osborne, H. W. Vernon and J. C. Graddon respectively, -with the object of securing a live prisoner captured -from a German patrol. No success, however, was achieved.</p> - -<p>On the 23rd July an inter-battalion relief again took -place and the Battalion was relieved by the London -Scottish withdrawing on relief to Brigade support billets -at Sailly, but leaving B Company in the Keep in Hébuterne -to furnish working parties.</p> - -<p>The Battalion remained in Sailly supplying working -parties in the forward area until the end of July. -Advantage was taken of this period out of the line to -straighten out some "cross-postings" which had occurred -among drafts of N.C.O.'s and men recently sent up from -the Base, and drafts of Queen's Westminsters and 3rd -London men were despatched from the Battalion to rejoin -their own units. At the same time the Battalion received -drafts of 4th London men from the Queen Victorias and -the Kensingtons, to whom they had been sent in error.</p> - -<p>On the last day of July the Battalion once more took -over from the London Scottish the right subsector of -W sector, B and C Companies occupying the WR line as -the most advanced position with A Company in support -and D in reserve.</p> - -<p>During the ensuing tour of duty the work of trench -repairing, wiring and patrolling was actively prosecuted, -but no incident worthy of record occurred. The enemy's -activity, both in artillery and trench mortar fire, became<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_174" id="Page_174">[Pg 174]</a></span> -rather more marked, and Hébuterne itself attracted more -attention than had been the case prior to the battle. The -enemy's shell fire produced, however, an ample measure -of retaliation from our guns, which bombarded his trenches -with good results.</p> - -<p>On the 4th August the Battalion withdrew again to -Brigade reserve at Bayencourt, handing over its trenches -to the London Scottish, and was employed in furnishing -working parties and in training.</p> - -<p>Since the 1st July the Battalion had received some -very valuable reinforcements of officers which repaired -the deficiencies caused by the battle, as follows:</p> - -<div class="hangindent8"> - -<p>13th July—Capt. F. C. J. Read from the 2/4th Battalion, -Lieut. A. G. Sharp, 2/Lieuts. P. F. Smalley, -J. C. Graddon, Y. R. Oldrey, W. H. Calnan, -C. E. Lewis, W. E. Osborne, J. W. Chapman, -F. J. Foden, C. F. English and J. T. Middleton -from the Reserve Battalion.</p> - -<p>16th July—2/Lieut. G. E. Stanbridge from the Reserve -Battalion.</p> - -<p>6th August—2/Lieut. F. R. R. Burford from the 3/4th Battalion, -2/Lieuts. C. J. Brodie, O. D. Garratt, C. H. T. -Heaver, A. Potton, W. Quennell and C. M. -Taylor from the Reserve Battalion.</p> - -<p>7th August—2/Lieuts. C. W. Denning, M.M., S. J. Barkworth, -M.M., E. McD. McCormick, T. B. Cooper, M.M., -W. H. Davey, D.C.M., C. F. Mortleman commissioned -direct from the 1/20th Londons.</p> - -<p>9th August—2/Lieuts. N. A. Ormiston, R. E. Grimsdell and -W. Richards from the Reserve Battalion.</p> - -<p>10th August—2/Lieut. J. W. Price from Hospital and 2/Lieut. -L. W. Archer, commissioned from the ranks -of the Battalion.</p></div> - -<p>On the 5th July a draft of 60, of whom 58 were -N.C.O.'s, arrived from the 2/4th Battalion, a particularly -welcome addition to the strength in view of the losses -which had been sustained. Early in July Lieut. L. G. -Rix, the Transport Officer, had been appointed Brigade -Transport Officer, and his place in the Battalion was filled -by Lieut. G. V. Lawrie, attached from the Scottish Rifles.</p> - -<p>2/Lieut. N. W. Williams was wounded at Fonquevillers -on the 6th July, and on the 18th the Battalion -suffered a further great loss in the Quartermaster, Lieut. -E. S. Tomsett, who completely broke down in health<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_175" id="Page_175">[Pg 175]</a></span> -and was invalided to England. Tomsett had filled the -appointment of Quartermaster with great credit since -November 1913, and had served over thirteen years with -the Battalion, his previous service having been with the -Rifle Brigade. On recovery from his illness Tomsett was -granted a combatant commission in recognition of his -services and appointed to command the depôt at Hoxton. -His duties as Quartermaster in the 1/4th Battalion were -taken over by Lieut. H. B. A. Balls.</p> - -<p>The 10th August found the Battalion once more—and -for the last time—resuming possession of W sector, the -relief of the London Scottish being completed by 4.45 p.m. -During the progress of the relief Hébuterne was intermittently -shelled and a direct hit was scored on Battalion -Headquarters, though fortunately without inflicting -casualties. A six-day tour of duty produced but little -of interest beyond the usual trench routine. Patrolling -in No Man's Land was actively pursued, and resulted in -establishing definitely the energy being displayed by the -Germans in repairing their defences, and also their -acquiescence in our possession of No Man's Land, which -seemed to be undisputed. The German artillery continued -to shell Hébuterne and the Orchard, near Cross Street, a -good deal, while his constant machine-gun fire at night -interfered seriously with our work of wiring in front of -W 48.</p> - -<p>On the 12th Major-Gen. Hull presented ribands to those -who had been decorated for their work on the 1st July, -the presentation being made on the football field at -Bayencourt.</p> - -<p>A warning order had now been received that the -Division was to be relieved by the 17th Division and to -withdraw for training in rear of the line, in the St Riquier -area near Abbeville.</p> - -<p>The 168th Brigade was to concentrate at Halloy before -proceeding to the new area, and the first step in this concentration -was the relief on the 16th August of the 1/4th -Londons and Rangers by the London Scottish and -Kensingtons respectively. On relief the 1/4th Londons -moved to billets in Sailly, leaving C Company at the Keep<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_176" id="Page_176">[Pg 176]</a></span> -in Hébuterne for working parties until the 18th, when the -whole Battalion marched at 7 p.m. to Halloy, arriving in -huts there at 11 p.m. By the 21st the whole Brigade -group was completely out of the line and the following -day moved to the new area, the Battalion entraining at -Doullens at 11.40 a.m. and, detraining at St Riquier -shortly before 6 p.m., marched thence to billets at Le -Plessiel.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_177" id="Page_177">[Pg 177]</a></span></p> -<div class="chapter"></div> -<hr class="chap" /> - - - - -<h2>CHAPTER XI<br /> - -THE 1/4TH BATTALION IN THE BATTLES OF THE SOMME, 1916</h2> - - -<h3>II. <em>The Battles of September and October</em></h3> - -<p>As we have pointed out in the preceding chapter, the -1st July was a day of almost complete check to the British -attack from Fricourt northwards. Between Fricourt and -the Somme, however, a certain measure of success had been -attained, while south of the river the French had made a -considerable advance.</p> - -<p>This limited success was exploited to the fullest extent -during the first half of July, and by the 14th, after very -fierce fighting, in which eleven British Divisions were -engaged, our lines were pressed forward through the series -of fortresses forming the first German system of defence.</p> - -<p>The Main Ridge of the Somme watershed runs east-south-east -from Thiepval, above the Ancre, across the -Albert-Bapaume Road, towards the Péronne-Bapaume -Road. About a mile and a half west of the latter road it -is completely severed by a narrow and deep ravine in which -lies the small township of Combles; and about half way -between Combles and Thiepval it is deeply indented by -a valley which separates the villages of Bazentin-le-Grand -and Bazentin-le-Petit, the head of this valley being -dominated by the high ground on which stands High -Wood. The ridge, therefore, divides itself into three -sections, all on the same general alignment, as follows: -In the west, from Thiepval, astride the Albert-Bapaume -Road to High Wood; in the centre, from High Wood to -the Combles Valley; in the east, the high ground about -Sailly Saillisel on the Péronne-Albert Road.</p> - -<p>The German second system of defences followed roughly -the near side of the crest of this Main Ridge, including the -villages (from east to west) of Maurepas, Guillemont,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_178" id="Page_178">[Pg 178]</a></span> -Longueval (with Delville Wood), the Bazentins and -Pozières. The third system lay on the further slope of -the ridge and included the villages of Morval, Lesbœufs, -Flers and Gueudecourt.</p> - -<p>On the 14th July the British attacked the second -system on a front from Bazentin-le-Petit to Longueval. -This attack, which was successful, was pressed forward -to High Wood, of which practically the whole was captured, -and thus secured for us a footing on the Main Ridge, -dividing the German forces on the west and centre portions -of it. The advance was consolidated and rounded off -locally in the direction of Guillemont; but the new -positions formed an abrupt and narrow salient in our line, -and before a further advance to the German third system -could be contemplated it was necessary for the British -hold on the Main Ridge to be widened. It was considered -by G.H.Q. that the Pozières-Thiepval series of fortresses -at the western extremity of the ridge was too powerful to -yield to frontal attack, and it was therefore decided to -extend the hold on the centre portion of the ridge. This -postulated the capture of Guillemont, Ginchy and Combles, -and a swinging-up of the British right flank which rested -on the Combles valley. The French were to co-operate -on the right of the Combles valley by the capture of -Frégicourt and Rancourt. Combles itself, immensely -fortified and strongly garrisoned, was too formidable an -obstacle to be likely to fall into our hands by direct attack, -except at an appalling cost of life; and it was therefore -to be enveloped, the British advancing on the heights west -of it and the French to its east.</p> - -<p>It is with this great outflanking movement for the -capture of Combles and the securing of the Main Ridge -immediately west of it that the 56th Division and the -Guillemont was first attacked on the 23rd July, but it -was not until after repeated attempts that it finally fell -into our hands on the 3rd September. On that day the -line was advanced to the outskirts of Ginchy and to the -Wedge Wood-Ginchy Road, Falfemont Farm falling to -us on the 5th.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_179" id="Page_179">[Pg 179]</a></span></p> - -<p>Meanwhile local improvements had been made in our -positions in various parts of the line, and the bitter fighting -of August, though productive of no very deep advance -was of the greatest value. It not only widened our hold -on the ridge, but also by a series of unrelenting sledgehammer -blows had a cumulative effect on the German -morale and thus paved the way for the greater successes -of September.</p> - -<hr class="tb" /> - -<p>The 168th Brigade continued training in the St Riquier -area until the end of August, the 1/4th Londons retaining -their billets at Le Plessiel. The training was rendered -peculiarly interesting by reason of the first appearance -of the "Heavy Section Machine-Gun Corps," better known -as Tanks. These engines of war, which were regarded at -first by the troops with a good deal of wonderment and -not a little misgiving, only arrived in France on the -25th August. No time was lost in testing them and -giving infantry troops an opportunity to co-operate with -them in practice prior to their employment in action.</p> - -<p>The 56th Division received the compliment of being -one of the units selected by G.H.Q. to co-operate with -Tanks on the occasion of their first appearance in battle, -and accordingly a series of practice schemes was begun on -the 26th August, the Brigades of the 56th Division being -employed in turn. Needless to say the interest aroused by -the strange appearance of these iron monsters was intense -and speculation was rife as to their potential value in -action, not only among the troops, but also among the -many staff officers who were present at the demonstrations. -Unfortunately the time allowed for "tuning up" the -engines was inadequate, the result being that during the -first practices the Tanks showed a most undesirable -predilection for breaking down—a habit not calculated to -inspire with confidence the infantry who were expected -to follow them. However, these difficulties were largely -overcome, and by the 2nd September, when the 168th -Brigade's turn for practising with them arrived, the Tanks -were working well.</p> - -<p>In spite of the misgivings as to the tactical value of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_180" id="Page_180">[Pg 180]</a></span> -the Tanks which presented themselves to the minds of -those inclined to pessimism, their arrival undoubtedly -gave enormous encouragement to the troops who were -enabled at last to realise that the enemy were not always -to be first in the field with new inventions; and the -anticipation of a great surprise effect when the Tanks -should first appear before the enemy trenches brought all -ranks to the tip-toe of expectation. The strict injunction -which was issued to avoid mention of the Tanks in correspondence -was most loyally obeyed.</p> - -<p>On the 2nd September a warning order was received -that the Division would move forward to the battle area, -and the following day the 168th and 169th Brigades moved -to the Corbie area. The Battalion left Le Plessiel in the -afternoon of the 3rd, marching to St Riquier, where it -entrained for Corbie, a town of some size at the confluence -of the Ancre and the Somme. Here the Battalion detrained -at 11.15 p.m., marching, with the Rangers, to -billets at Vaux-sur-Somme. The remainder of the Brigade -was accommodated a mile further forward at Sailly-le-Sec.</p> - -<p>The Division now came under the orders of the XIV -Corps (Cavan), the extreme right of the British Army, -consisting of the 5th, 16th and 20th Divisions, which had -this day been operating on the Guillemont front in the -action already alluded to.</p> - -<p>On the morning of the 4th orders were received, without -any previous intimation that they might be coming, for -the Battalion to move forward at once. The whole -Battalion, less personnel of the transport and vehicles, -marched out of Vaux-sur-Somme within one hour of the -receipt of these orders—a credit to the high state of -organisation to which the Battalion had been trained since -leaving the Hébuterne area. Boutall writes: "The -march was a long and tedious one and I think I am right -in asserting that not a single man fell out on the way. I -distinctly remember Lieut.-Col. Wheatley congratulating -himself on the fact."</p> - -<p>This march terminated at a large concentration camp -known as the Citadel about two miles north of Bray. At -the Citadel the Battalion was able to form a vague idea<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_181" id="Page_181">[Pg 181]</a></span> -for the first time of the enormous effort being put forth -by the British in this already long drawn-out struggle. -The concentration camp covered an enormous area on the -rolling hillsides above the Somme and presented an -astounding spectacle of numbers of units from every -arm of the Service—gunners, infantry, engineers—besides -vast stores of materials of all kinds. The roar of the guns -in the inferno of the battle line seemed to speak to the -troops of the great and yet increasing power of the British -Armies, and filled every heart with hope and confidence. -To many of those who remembered the lean days of 1915 -when the British battle line was starved for men and shells, -this first contact with the reality of the Empire's strength -was almost overpowering.</p> - -<p>On the 5th September the Division took the place in -Corps Reserve of the 20th Division, which had been withdrawn -from the fighting line, and in the evening of the -same day the relief of the 5th Division in the line began.</p> - -<p>The front taken over from the 5th Division was the -extreme right of the line from its junction with the -French, overlooking the Combles valley to the left of -Leuze Wood. The 169th Brigade (relieving the 15th) -took over the right sector and the 168th Brigade (relieving -the 95th) assumed responsibility in the left sector.</p> - -<p>September had set in with steady rain which had -already converted all the roads, tracks and camping -grounds into seas of liquid mud. The Battalion, which -since arrival at the Citadel had been held at short notice -to move, advanced during the afternoon of the 5th, in full -battle kit in the direction of the line. The state of the -ground made marching an impossibility, and after sliding -along for some time uncomfortably in the mud, orders -were received for the Battalion to return to the Citadel. -The change of plan was, as usual, received with philosophical -resignation, and the men turned in to take -advantage of the short respite only to be roused again a -few hours later the same evening when the advance to -the line began at 11.15 p.m.</p> - -<p>At this hour the Battalion, which with the Rangers -was in Brigade support, left the Citadel, arriving in its<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_182" id="Page_182">[Pg 182]</a></span> -allotted position in Casement Trench at 5.30 a.m. on the -6th September. This trench was now reduced to a series -of shell holes which the bad weather had rendered most -uncomfortable, and was a part of the original German -system opposite Maricourt.</p> - -<p>The departure from the Citadel was marked by a most -unfortunate accident. As the column began to move the -explosion of a bomb which had been left buried in the mud -occurred at the head of D Company, and this very seriously -wounded Capt. A. L. Long, the company commander, and -2/Lieut. A. G. Sharp, and caused casualties to 19 N.C.O.'s -and men.</p> - -<p>With the advent of daylight the Battalion first came -face to face with the ghastly desolation of the Somme -battlefield. In all directions every sort of landmark -seemed to be obliterated. A few torn stumps marked -what had been Bernafay and Trones Woods, the village -of Guillemont was practically effaced, and the only signs -of life in the neighbourhood of the Battalion were numerous -batteries of artillery in action. Here the nucleus personnel -left the Battalion and returned to the Citadel, where the -Q.M. stores were established. At 2 p.m. the Battalion -changed its position to Chimpanzee Trench in the neighbourhood -of the Brickfield, south of Bernafay Wood, and -here it received a foretaste of the German barrage. After -dark the forward move was resumed, and the Battalion -entered the support trenches in rear of Leuze Wood, -on the Wedge Wood-Ginchy Road, relieving the 4th -Gloucesters. This trench formed a "switch" in the -second German system which had fallen into our hands -on the 3rd September.</p> - - -<h3><em>The Battle of Ginchy, 5th-10th September</em></h3> - -<p>The disposition of the Brigade was now as follows:</p> - -<div class="center"> -<ul> - <li>In front line, Leuze Wood:—London Scottish.</li> - <li>In support, Wedge Wood-Ginchy Road:—1/4th Londons.</li> - <li>In reserve, Maltzhorn Farm:—Rangers.</li> -</ul> -</div> -<div class="hangindent"> - -<p>The Kensingtons were attached to the 169th Brigade, and were -in line to the south of Leuze Wood.</p></div> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_183" id="Page_183">[Pg 183]</a></span></p> - -<p>During the night the enemy's bombardment of the -front line and Wedge Wood Valley increased in intensity -and two platoons of the 1/4th Londons, under Lieuts. -Oldrey and Garratt, were ordered forward to reinforce -the Scottish in Leuze Wood. This advance was successfully -accomplished, the platoons managing to get through -an unpleasantly heavy barrage with only one casualty. -No enemy attack materialised, and towards dawn, the -hostile bombardment having subsided, the two platoons -rejoined the Battalion.</p> - -<p>Throughout the 7th September and far into the night -the enemy shelled Wedge Wood Valley and the support -line heavily, and the Battalion suffered a good many -casualties, chiefly among ration and water-carrying parties, -while communication with Battalion Headquarters was -exceedingly difficult. The Wedge Wood-Ginchy Road -which ran immediately in front of the trench was sunken -at this point, and the bank was honeycombed with German -dugouts, among them one which had been used as an -aid-post, and which produced an ample supply of bandages, -lint and field-dressings, and also cigars and tobacco—trench -stores which were promptly taken on charge by the -Battalion.</p> - -<p>The road itself was littered with German dead, the -remnants of the battle of the 3rd, who had apparently -been caught by our barrage, of the destructive nature of -which evidences were everywhere to be seen. "Unfortunately," -writes an eyewitness, "the sunken road was -an attraction to countless flies in the daytime. So -numerous were they that from the road arose a continuous -hum which was audible at a considerable distance. They -swarmed over into the trench and settled on our food in -such numbers that they often found their way into our -mouths at mealtimes."</p> - -<p>During the afternoon of the 7th orders were issued for -the 56th Division to extend its front to the left by taking -over the sector held by the right Brigade of the 16th -Division. This consisted of a trench following the Leuze -Wood-Guillemont Road, from near the north corner of -Leuze Wood, for about 500 yards to the left. This relief<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_184" id="Page_184">[Pg 184]</a></span> -was to be effected by "side-stepping" the 168th Brigade -to the left, its trenches in Leuze Wood being handed -over to the 169th Brigade. In pursuance of this -scheme the Battalion took over with A and D Companies -the advanced front line—about 200 yards' frontage -on the immediate left of Leuze Wood—from the 7th -Inniskilling Fusiliers. Immediately after relief these companies -began to dig assembly trenches for the impending -continuance of the offensive, and this task was completed -before dawn on the 8th September. The Rangers meanwhile -had come up in line on the left of the 1/4th Londons, -while the Scottish on relief in Leuze Wood by the 169th -Brigade had withdrawn into Brigade support, where they -were joined by the Kensingtons.</p> - -<p>The 8th September was occupied in improving the -assembly trenches, and in establishing an advanced report -centre in a German dugout at the south-west corner of -Leuze Wood—by now corrupted by the ever-ready wit of -the Cockney into "Lousy" Wood—while under cover of -darkness the Cheshire Pioneers connected the Wood with -Wedge Wood by a communication trench. In addition a -great deal of work was carried out in collecting advanced -dumps of tools, bombs, ammunition and water, in the -west edge of Leuze Wood. All this work was effected -under very heavy shell fire under which the Battalion -sustained some loss.</p> - -<p>Orders had now been received for the resumption of -the offensive on the 9th, and during the night the 1/4th -Londons and Rangers occupied their newly dug assembly -trenches, while the Kensingtons advanced to the Wedge -Wood support trench, the Scottish remaining at Maltzhorn -Farm. The advanced report centre in Leuze Wood was -taken over by the 1/4th Londons and placed under charge -of Capt. Houlder (17th Londons attached). Capt. Houlder, -who could speak German fluently, was instrumental during -the action in gaining from prisoners much useful first-hand -information which he was able to pass back to Battalion -and Brigade Headquarters. The terrifying aspect of this -huge British officer, coupled with the fact that he always -had a loaded revolver conspicuously displayed during his<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_185" id="Page_185">[Pg 185]</a></span> -investigations, no doubt increased the desire of his victims -to respond to his enquiries!</p> - -<p>The battle of the 9th September was an attack on the -whole front of the Fourth Army, the French co-operating -on our right. The object of the XIV Corps, of which the -56th and 16th Divisions were in line, was to advance the -British positions from the Combles valley on the extreme -right well to the east of Leuze Wood on a line running -from south-east to north-west as far as the Ginchy-Morval -Road, which formed the left of the 56th Division front. -From this point the 16th Division was to reach a line -which ran due west for some 800 yards along the road -towards Ginchy and then bent northwards to include the -whole of the village.</p> - -<p>Map No. 5 shows the objectives of the 56th Division, -the 169th Brigade on the right being responsible for forcing -our lines forward of Leuze Wood on its north and east -sides; and the 168th Brigade continuing the line as far as -Point 141·7 on the Ginchy-Morval Road. The map also -indicates that nearly every battalion taking part in the -assault would have to make a change of direction from its -starting point in order to advance to its objective.</p> - -<p>So far as the 168th Brigade was concerned the advance -was to be made in two stages, the first objective being a -line of German trenches, running from the north corner of -Leuze Wood towards Ginchy, and the final objective being -as above described. For this purpose the dispositions of -the Brigade remained as they had been on the eve of the -battle, that is:</p> - -<div class="center"> -<table border="0" cellpadding="4" cellspacing="0" summary="168th Brigade"> - <tr> - <td>Right </td> - <td class="tdc">Assaulting Battalion</td> - <td>—1/4th Londons.</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td>Left</td> - <td class="tdc">do.</td> - <td>—Rangers.</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td>Support</td> - <td class="tdc">Battalion</td> - <td>—Kensingtons.</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td>Reserve</td> - <td class="tdc">do.</td> - <td>—London Scottish.</td> - </tr> -</table></div> - -<p>The 1/4th Londons were disposed for attack as follows:</p> - - -<div class="center"> -<ul> - <li>Right—B Company (Lieut. H. W. Vernon).</li> - <li>Centre—D Company (Lieut. G. H. Davis).</li> - <li>Left—A Company (Capt. J. R. Webster).</li> - <li>Support—C Company (2/Lieut. W. E. Osborne).</li> -</ul> -</div> - -<p>Each company occupied a two-platoon frontage, so<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_186" id="Page_186">[Pg 186]</a></span> -that the whole Battalion was on a front of six platoons -and in a depth of four waves.</p> - -<p>The morning of the 9th September dawned mistily, -but by 10 o'clock the sun's rays had dispersed the haze -and disclosed to the enemy the new earth thrown up in -front of our hastily dug assembly trenches. A heavy -bombardment of the assembly areas on the whole Divisional -front followed, lasting all the morning and causing -a good many casualties. The assaulting companies having -already formed up over night, the trenches were crowded -with troops waiting for the hour of attack, and the experience -of having quietly to endure this remarkably -accurate and heavy shoot was one of the most trying of -the whole engagement.</p> - -<p>At 4 o'clock the enemy put down a heavy barrage on -our lines. A quarter of an hour later our preparatory -bombardment, which had opened at 10 a.m., increased to -"hurricane" intensity, and for half an hour the German -positions were subjected to a frightful ordeal under which -it seemed that nothing could live. At 4.45 p.m. the -British columns, on a front of several miles, moved to the -assault.</p> - -<p>The 1/4th Londons on getting out of their assembly -trenches had to make a change of direction, pivoting on -their right flank, and this accomplished, they moved -forward steadily, keeping well up to their barrage and -suffering comparatively little loss.</p> - -<p>In consequence of the conflicting reports which were -received during the action, the heavy toll of casualties -in all ranks, and the resultant intermingling of companies -in the positions gained, it has been a matter of considerable -difficulty to elucidate the position and to extract from -the mass of evidence a fair and impartial account of what -really occurred.</p> - -<p>It seems evident, however, that the position marked -as the 1/4th Londons' first objective was innocent of the -trench which it was expected to find there. At all events -if a trench had ever existed on the line of the Leuze Wood-Ginchy -track it had been so battered by shell fire as to be -no longer recognisable as such; and it appears that the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_187" id="Page_187">[Pg 187]</a></span> -greater part of the assaulting companies overshot the -mark and moved straight on to what was really the second -objective, which they occupied under the impression that -it was the first objective. It had been arranged that -A Company on the left should consolidate a strong point -on the left of the real first objective at its point of junction -with the sector to be captured by the Rangers. Evidently -2/Lieut. Brodie, to whom was allotted this task, in making -his change of direction to the right took a somewhat wide -sweep and struck the east end of the Rangers' first objective, -where a trench did actually exist, and here he formed -his block practically in the position where it was intended -to be. Subsequently Brodie, finding himself, no doubt, -out of touch with the remainder of the Battalion, who had -gone too far, came forward in the attempt to clear up the -situation, but unhappily was killed, together with all -his men.</p> - -<p>The too rapid advance of the Battalion naturally -brought them under the fire of our own barrage, and -during the forty minutes' pause which was ordered after -the capture of the first objective before the resumption -of the advance on to the second, a good many casualties -did in fact occur from our own shells which were dropping -in and uncomfortably close to the trench which was -occupied. This trench—the real second objective—was -subsequently known as Bully Trench. We will therefore -so refer to it in order to avoid confusion.</p> - -<p>At 5.25 p.m. the Battalion, now including elements -of all companies, once more advanced in a commendably -steady manner on to a trench just topping the rise of the -Main Ridge. This it occupied with very little opposition. -This advanced position—Beef Trench—was an isolated -trench about 150 yards ahead of Bully (the real second -objective) with both flanks in the air. It was shallow -and evidently only in course of construction. It afforded -magnificent observation over the rearward slopes of the -Main Ridge on to the German third line system in front -of Morval, and in this position the work of consolidation -was begun, two Lewis gun posts being pushed forward -overlooking the Morval-Lesbœufs Road. Middle Copse, a<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_188" id="Page_188">[Pg 188]</a></span> -small spinney about 200 yards to the front, was seen to be -teeming with Bosche who were effectively dealt with by -our Lewis guns.</p> - -<p>In the meantime the right platoon of B Company under -2/Lieut. Garratt, which, in keeping touch with the Queen -Victorias, had got ahead of the rest of the Battalion, had -evidently become deflected slightly to the right during -its advance and had dropped into the communication -trench connecting Leuze Wood with Bully Trench. Apparently -somewhat confusing his direction in the total -absence of landmarks, Garratt moved along this trench -and turned the corner to the left along Bully Trench. -Here he came in contact with a Bosche bombing party, -and attacking them vigorously pushed them back for some -considerable distance, and eventually constructed a temporary -block in the trench, probably about the centre of the -Battalion's sector, <em>i.e.</em> about 200 yards short of the Quadrilateral. -In this bomb fighting the men of B Company -displayed great courage and dash, and their accurate -throwing contributed largely to their success. Among these -gallant men Corpl. Udall was conspicuous, and for his -devotion to duty he was awarded the Military Medal.</p> - -<p>During the advance of the assaulting companies of -the Battalion from Bully Trench to the advanced position -in Beef, a somewhat determined attack was delivered -against B Company's block by a large party of the enemy -led by an officer. Fortunately the shallowness of the -trench exposed the enemy's advance and after a brisk -exchange of bombs, in the course of which some loss was -inflicted on the attacking party, including the officer who -was shot by Garratt, the survivors surrendered with the -exception of a few who fled pursued by the fire of our men -and the Rangers. Garratt was subsequently awarded -the Military Cross for his good work.</p> - -<p>On the Battalion's left the Rangers, whose line of -advance was dominated by the Quadrilateral and a small -spur running from it in a south-westerly direction, had -been faced with a withering machine-gun fire under which -advance was utterly impossible. Their left company was -unable to make progress, and by 8.30 p.m. was compelled<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_189" id="Page_189">[Pg 189]</a></span> -to withdraw to its assembly positions in conjunction with -the right Brigade of the 16th Division who had also been -unable to overcome the German resistance. The right -company of the Rangers pushed gallantly forward losing -heavily, but was finally brought to a stand in the vicinity -of the temporary block which was being held in Bully by -Garratt. Here they were forced to take such cover as shell -craters afforded them, and to reply to the Bosche fire, in -which they were assisted by the party of B Company at -the block. Under the gathering darkness a good many -of the Rangers were able to make their way into Bully -trench.</p> - -<p>While all this was taking place two companies of the -Kensingtons had occupied the assembly trenches vacated -by the 1/4th Londons, and the commanders of these, -appreciating the situation of the Rangers, at once made a -gallant attempt to fill the gap on the left. Their gallantry, -however, cost them dear, and the German barrage took a -heavy toll of casualties before they reached Bully Trench. -The bravery of Major Dickens was in particular remarkable. -Mortally wounded some time before he reached his -objective, he continued to advance at the head of his men, -cheering and encouraging them until he collapsed into -the trench. Later in the evening the two remaining companies -of the Kensingtons were also thrown into the fight -and became absorbed into the 1/4th Londons' position in -Bully Trench.</p> - -<p>Darkness had now fallen, and the position of the companies -in the advanced trench was far from happy. Both -flanks were in the air and heavy losses had been suffered; -of the officers who had started with these companies, only -four—Cooper, McCormick, Quennell and Burford—were still -standing. News from Garratt showed that he was doubtful -as to whether he could hold out against another attack.</p> - -<p>Fearing to lose the advantage already gained, Cooper, -who had assumed command of the force in Beef Trench, -decided to reoccupy Bully temporarily, and finally clear it -of the enemy. The withdrawal was successfully accomplished -in the dark, but the enemy was found to be firmly -established with an apparently ample supply of bombs on<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_190" id="Page_190">[Pg 190]</a></span> -his side of the block, which had now been completed with -the help of the Kensington and Ranger reinforcements; -and further attempts to extend our gains northward in -Bully were abandoned. Communication being now re-established -with Battalion Headquarters, orders were -received in Bully for the reoccupation of the advanced -positions in Beef; and the Bully position being now much -strengthened by Rangers and Kensingtons, the 1/4th -Londons moved forward alone to Beef Trench.</p> - -<p>During the remainder of the night a good deal of work -was necessary in reorganising the somewhat mixed force -by which the forward position was now occupied. One or -two enemy patrols approached the position but were fired -on and dispersed, and apart from continued shell fire and -sniping the night passed comparatively peacefully.</p> - -<p>Captain Cooper gives the following account of a remarkable -incident which occurred during the night:—</p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p>A glow was seen in a shell hole some distance to the -front and on investigation this proved to be from the -cigarette of a battalion N.C.O., a corporal (Fergusson), -who had formed part of one of the forward posts. He -had become separated from his men and wounded in the -back so that he was unable to walk. He stated that he -had been uncertain of his position and so had crawled -into a shell hole. A Bosche patrol had found him and -removed his shoulder badges and taken the contents of -his pockets, but had propped him up in a comfortable -position and had left him his water-bottle, cigarettes and -matches. He was calmly and coolly enjoying a cigarette -when found. He was sent on a stretcher to the Aid Post.</p></div> - -<p>While these events were taking place on the Battalion's -front, the Queen Victorias, the left of the 169th Brigade, -had occupied their objective, and were in touch on the -right of Bully. The enemy, however, had hitherto successfully -resisted all efforts of the London Rifle Brigade to -emerge from the east side of Leuze Wood. At about 7 p.m. -the Bosche at this part of the line had launched a vigorous -bomb attack along the sunken road leading from Combles, -and the L.R.B. had been forced back after a most stubborn -resistance which cost them heavily. During the night the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_191" id="Page_191">[Pg 191]</a></span> -Queen's Westminsters took over the extreme right of the -Division.</p> - -<p>The 16th Division on the left had also met with varied -fortunes. The 47th Brigade on its left had successfully -advanced through Ginchy and established itself on its -objective; but the right brigade, the 48th, whose objective -lay along the Ginchy-Morval Road, met with most stubborn -resistance from the spur already referred to. In spite of -the most gallant efforts the Brigade was unable to make -progress, and eventually fell back with the left wing of the -Rangers at about 8.30 p.m. and reoccupied their original -position on the Wedge Wood-Ginchy Road. About this -time the London Scottish were ordered into the fight in -order to endeavour to clear up the situation in this part of -the field. After the march forward from Maltzhorn their -preparations were completed at about midnight, and -shortly after they attacked from a position to the left of -the Rangers' assembly trenches towards the Quadrilateral. -The enemy was still vigorous in his defence, and after losing -their direction in the intense darkness, the Scottish were -ultimately withdrawn, having first rendered a good account -of themselves in a lively little hand-to-hand fight with a -party of the Bosche. During the night the 16th Division -was relieved by the 3rd Guards Brigade.</p> - -<p>Shortly after dawn on the 10th 2/Lieut. McCormick, -who had come back to Battalion Headquarters with a -report of the situation, returned to Beef Trench with -orders for the immediate evacuation of the advanced -position. Accordingly, after establishing two Lewis gun -positions in Beef Trench, the withdrawal was proceeded -with as rapidly as possible, the activity of the German -snipers in the growing daylight making movement difficult -except in the smallest parties. The return of the 1/4th -Londons to Bully Trench caused congestion which was -subsequently intensified by the arrival of a large reinforcement -of London Scottish. This Battalion made efforts -during the day to prolong the line in the direction of the -Quadrilateral, while the Guards, working eastward along -the Ginchy-Morval Road, sought to join hands with them, -but the Germans were well supplied with bombs and put<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_192" id="Page_192">[Pg 192]</a></span> -up a very gallant resistance. The continued occupation -of the spur—which on the previous day had stopped the -16th Division—moreover forced an unpleasantly deep re-entrant -in the British line, leaving the left flank of the -1/4th Londons dangerously exposed. An effort to rout -out the pertinacious defenders of this spur was made -during the afternoon by the 168th Stokes mortars, who -fired 35 rounds with good effect into the enemy trenches.</p> - -<p>The position on the right flank of the Battalion was -still less satisfactory than had been hoped for. At 7 a.m. -and again at 3 p.m. the Queen's Westminsters had made -local attempts to gain the previous day's objective, but -each time without success.</p> - -<p>Throughout the day the Battalion's position was kept -under heavy German shell fire which caused the already -heavy casualty roll to mount higher and higher, and it was -found necessary to relieve the congestion in Bully by withdrawing -the Rangers and Kensingtons to the rear. Communication -with Headquarters was rendered exceedingly -difficult, though, as always, there was no lack of brave -volunteers to try to pass through the German barrage, and -these in some cases succeeded in reaching the report centre -in Leuze Wood. Moreover the trench, only a shallow and -half-finished work to start with, was becoming badly -shattered and was filled with wounded men, whom there -was no means of evacuating, for all the stretcher-bearers -with companies had themselves become casualties. -Throughout this trying day all ranks displayed magnificent -spirit and clung to their hardly won gains with grim -determination. That night the 168th Brigade was relieved, -the 1/4th Londons handing over their objective -to the 8th Middlesex of the 167th Brigade. Following -the relief, which was complete by midnight, the Battalion -moved by companies—by now sadly reduced in numbers—to -Casement Trench, whence the Battalion moved as a -unit to Billon Farm, near Carnoy, arriving in bivouacs -there at 5.30 a.m. on the 11th September.</p> - -<div class="figcenter" style="width: 439px;"> -<img src="images/i_b_192fp.jpg" width="439" height="500" alt="" /> -<div class="caption"><p><span class="smcap">The Battle of Ginchy, September 1916</span></p></div> -</div> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_193" id="Page_193">[Pg 193]</a></span></p> - -<p>The five days' duty just completed were perhaps the -most strenuous the Battalion had yet experienced. Almost -all the time exposed to bad weather conditions and to -very heavy and accurate artillery fire, the spirit of the -men was magnificent; and their steadiness, after the loss -of 15 out of the 20 officers who led the companies into -action, as well as a large proportion of N.C.O.'s, was -unsurpassed. Their fighting qualities too were firmly -established, for they had taken their objectives up to -time-table and handed them over intact twenty-four -hours later. The total casualties during the five days -amounted to 22 officers and about 250 other ranks.</p> - -<p>The officer casualties were as follows:</p> - -<div class="hangindent8"> - -<p>7th and 8th September—Capts. F. O. J. Read and H. G. Stanham, -2/Lieuts. W. Richards, A. Potton, J. T. Middleton, C. H. T. -Heaver and L. W. Archer, wounded.</p> - -<p>9th and 10th September—Capt. J. R. Webster, 2/Lieuts. C. J. -Brodie, F. J. Foden, W. E. Osborne, C. E. Lewis, C. S. G. -Blows and C. F. Mortleman, killed; Lieuts. H. W. Vernon -and G. H. Davis, 2/Lieuts. J. W. Price, V. R. Oldrey, C. F. -English, N. A. Ormiston and J. C. Graddon, wounded; and -2/Lieut. W. H. Davey, D.C.M., missing, presumed killed.</p></div> - -<p>Throughout the 11th and 12th heavy fighting continued -in which the 167th Brigade co-operated with the Guards -on the left in numerous efforts to clear out the re-entrant -and reach the Ginchy Quadrilateral. This magnificently -defended position, however, held out against the most -gallant attempts of the attackers. During the night of -the 11/12th September the 167th Brigade was also relieved, -the line being taken over by the 16th Brigade of -the 6th Division.</p> - -<p>The Battalion remained at Billon Farm for three most -welcome days of rest and reorganisation during which the -weather, which now once more became fine and warm, -was of inestimable value in cheering the troops after their -somewhat trying experience. The relief to the men's -spirits on emerging even for a short spell from the -ghastly featureless waste of the battle area to surroundings -where trees still bore their leaves, roads still crossed the -hillsides, and houses were not completely effaced, was -immense; and by the time the period of rest was over -the Battalion was once more braced up to continue the -struggle.</p> - -<p>One or two changes occurred during this period among<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_194" id="Page_194">[Pg 194]</a></span> -the officers of the Battalion, of which the most important -was the assumption of the Adjutancy by Lieut. W. J. -Boutall on the evacuation to hospital of Capt. R. L. Herring, -who had occupied this trying position practically since -the Battalion joined the 56th Division. 2/Lieut. Garratt -assumed the duties of Assistant Adjutant almost immediately -afterwards. Capt. J. T. Sykes left the Battalion for -attachment to the Indian Army, and the signalling -officer, Lieut. E. W. Monk, to join the R.A.F. The latter's -duties were taken over by 2/Lieut. S. J. Barkworth, M.M. -In addition to these 2/Lieut. A. C. Knight was evacuated -to hospital.</p> - - -<h3><em>The Battle of Flers-Courcelette 15th-18th September</em></h3> - -<p>The renewal of the offensive was not long to be delayed. -The object of the High Command was to follow up the -blows delivered against the German positions as rapidly -as possible, and to leave the enemy little respite for -reorganisation and rest. The constant hammering on his -defences had already had an appreciable effect on his -morale, and it was hoped that before long the strain on -his resources would prove so great that the situation would -develop rapidly in favour of the Allies.</p> - -<p>The next general attack was arranged for the 15th -September, the assault being launched on the whole battle -front from Morval to Le Sars on the Albert-Bapaume Road. -The great pivoting movement by which the British right -flank was to be swung forward in line with the left on the -Main Ridge had now reached an important stage, and the -operations of the XIV Corps were now more than ever -bound up with the fortunes of the French south of Combles. -The French were aiming at establishing themselves astride -the Bapaume-Péronne Road at the village of Sailly Saillisel, -about two miles north-east of Combles; but the task presented -unusual difficulties owing to the restriction of the -lines of possible advance between the deep Combles ravine -on the one flank, and the extensive wood of St Pierre -Vaast on the other. The evils of this confinement were -aggravated by the fact that the enemy position about<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_195" id="Page_195">[Pg 195]</a></span> -Morval at the extreme east end of the Main Ridge -dominated the whole of our Allies' line of advance. It -was therefore essential to the success, not only of the -French in their ultimate object but also of the combined -"squeezing-out" process which was being applied to -Combles itself, that the British should at once possess -themselves of such portions of the Main Ridge as remained -in the enemy's hands. This entailed the breaking of the -Third German system on the line Morval-Lesbœufs-Flers, -and this was the task of the XIV and XV Corps on the -15th September.</p> - -<p>The positions held by the Division at the opening of -the battle were as follows:</p> - -<div class="hangindent8"> - -<p>167th Brigade—On the line north of Leuze Wood and intersecting -the south end of Bouleaux Wood which had -been captured on the 9th by the Queen Victorias, -and thence along the south-east edge of Leuze -Wood for about half its length.</p> - -<p>169th Brigade—On the right of Leuze Wood, in a line running due -north and south, between the 167th and the -French.</p> - -<p>168th Brigade—In reserve bivouacs in Angle Wood Valley, the -Battalion being at the head of the Valley near -Wedge Wood.</p></div> - -<p>The position which the Battalion had captured on the -9th September was now held by the 6th Division, who -formed the centre of the Corps while the Guards were on -the extreme left.</p> - -<p>The general idea of the attack was that the Guards and -6th Divisions should attack positions in the German third -line facing Lesbœufs, while the 56th Division was to form -a defensive flank facing the Combles ravine.</p> - -<p>To establish this defensive flank the 169th Brigade on -the right was to push forward of Leuze Wood and occupy -a position roughly north and south with its left flank -astride the sunken road from Combles, about 300 yards -east of the edge of Leuze Wood. The 167th was to clear -Bouleaux Wood in two stages and establish a line parallel -to and about 100 yards in front of its east edge. The -1/4th Londons were to follow up the advance of the 167th -Brigade and then "leapfrog" through it on to the German<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_196" id="Page_196">[Pg 196]</a></span> -third line immediately in front of Morval whence they -would connect up between the left of the 167th Brigade -and the right of the 6th Division.</p> - -<p>The 15th September was on the greater part of the -battle front a day of big successes. At an early hour -Flers fell before our assault, and by the afternoon the -British line had been pushed far beyond it; the whole of -High Wood was taken, and before nightfall Martinpuich -and Courcelette on the left had been added to the gains -of the day.</p> - -<p>On the extreme right, however, the advance suffered a -rather severe check. The Guards, who occupied the left -of the Corps front, were able to make solid advances -between Flers and Lesbœufs, but the 6th Division adjoining -them were held up by the Quadrilateral at Ginchy, whose -brave defenders still maintained their position most -stubbornly; and this failure naturally reacted on the 56th -Division who occupied a narrow wedge between the Quadrilateral -and the Combles ravine.</p> - -<p>At 5.50 a.m. the three tanks which were to make their -début with the Division left their departure points for the -first objective, and at 6.20 a.m. the infantry assault was -launched. Almost three hours later, at 9 a.m., the 1/4th -Londons left their bivouacs in Angle Wood Valley and -moved forward in artillery formation towards the battle -position on the crest between the north edge of Leuze -Wood and the west face of Bouleaux Wood. Progress -was not rapid owing to the heavy state of the ground, and -under the German shell fire a good many casualties were -sustained. The advance was made, however, in good -order, and with admirable steadiness.</p> - -<p>The 169th Brigade made very slight advances on the -south of Leuze Wood; while the 167th managed to secure -the part of its first objective which lay outside Bouleaux -Wood. The 8th Middlesex of the latter Brigade even -made a heroic attempt to reach the second objective, but -had to be brought back. The enemy barrage was heavy -and fell, as it so often had in the Somme battles, between -the assaulting columns and their starting-point, thus -cutting them off from supplies and reinforcement, while<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_197" id="Page_197">[Pg 197]</a></span> -the accurate intensity of their machine-gun fire from -their positions in the Quadrilateral made advance an utter -impossibility. After ten hours' fighting, during which the -assaulting Brigades did all that men could do, the Corps -Commander telephoned to Gen. Hull that the Division -would make no further attempt against Bouleaux Wood -that day.</p> - -<p>The 1/4th Londons luckily avoided the slaughter of the -battle line this day, for a few minutes prior to its advance -from Angle Wood Valley an order had been despatched to -Brigade Headquarters to the effect that in consequence of -the check of the 6th Division in front of the Quadrilateral -the 168th Brigade would not occupy its battle position. -This order was transmitted by Brigade and reached the -Battalion during its advance. Upon receipt of it the -Battalion was at once brought back to its assembly area -at Angle Wood Valley where, in common with the remainder -of the Brigade, it remained in bivouacs till the -early hours of the 18th September. This operation cost -the Battalion a large number of casualties among N.C.O.'s -and men from the German shell fire, and one officer, -2/Lieut. J. W. Chapman, wounded.</p> - -<p>During these days Angle Wood Valley was a distinctly -unhealthy locality. The German artillery maintained a -searching fire over the whole area, and exacted a fair toll -of casualties. The weather, which a few days previously -had shown signs of mending, had once more turned wet -and the shell holes, which formed the only available cover, -became not the most desirable resting-place for the troops. -The strain was great, but the situation was as usual not -only borne by all in the Battalion with an almost stoical -resignation, but enlivened occasionally with those rare -flashes of humour which have made the London soldiers -famous during the War in three continents.</p> - -<p>The story of the tanks on the 15th September is too -well-known to need elaboration here, and is, moreover, too -much outside the actual experience of the Battalion to -allow of more than a passing reference. The moral effect -on the Germans was immense, and considering that their -employment had scarcely passed the experimental stage,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_198" id="Page_198">[Pg 198]</a></span> -the success gained by them was conspicuous. As was -anticipated, however, the tanks promptly became a mark -for a tremendous concentration of enemy fire which made -their room far more desirable than their company. Of -the three attached to the 56th Division one did useful work -in the vicinity of the Quadrilateral, and after trampling -down a good deal of wire and putting an enemy machine-gun -team out of action returned to make a personal -report of its adventures. The careers of the other two -were sadly abbreviated, and the end of the day found -them derelict—one west of Bouleaux Wood, and one -south-east of Leuze Wood—though not before they had -dealt out a certain amount of destruction to the German -defences.</p> - -<p>Orders were received while the Battalion remained in -Angle Wood Valley for the resumption of the offensive on -the 18th September. The objectives on the XIV Corps -front were on this occasion very much more modest than -they had been three days earlier, and so far as the 56th -Division was concerned were as follows:</p> - -<div class="hangindent8"> - -<p>169th Brigade—The sunken road from Leuze Wood to Combles, -between the east edge of the wood and the -orchard west of Combles.</p> - -<p>67th Brigade—The east edge of Bouleaux Wood for a distance of -600 yards from its southern extremity, and -thence a line through the wood to Middle Copse. -From Middle Copse the objective was continued -in a northerly direction by the 6th Division.</p> - -<p>The 168th Brigade remained in reserve in Angle Wood Valley, -but the 1/4th Londons and the London Scottish -were attached to the 167th.</p></div> - -<p>For this operation the Battalion was detailed as the -left assaulting battalion of the 167th Brigade, its objective -being the portion between Middle Copse (which was held -by an advanced post of the 7th Middlesex) and the east -edge of Bouleaux Wood. For this purpose its assembly -position was the old German communication trench connecting -Bully Trench with the north corner of Leuze Wood. -The right of the Brigade frontage was taken up by the -3rd Londons.</p> - -<p>The hour of assault was fixed for 6.15 a.m. on the 18th,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_199" id="Page_199">[Pg 199]</a></span> -and to enable it to reach its assembly position by 5.15 a.m. -as ordered, the 1/4th Londons moved from Angle Wood -Valley at 3.30 a.m. But the ground was impossible. All -vestige of tracks had long since disappeared, and the -countryside in every direction was a vast slippery quagmire -in which so far from keeping any sort of march formation -it was next to impossible for the men, laden as they were -with battle equipment, to stand upright at all.</p> - -<p>Zero hour arrived, but the Battalion as well as the 3rd -Londons was still slipping and struggling a long way -short of its assembly area. The British barrage opened -and was at once replied to by a withering machine-gun -fire by the enemy. Seldom has the Battalion been exposed -to so accurate and devastating a fire. The only alternative -to complete destruction was to take cover in the waterlogged -shell holes, which movement was carried out with -alacrity by all ranks: in this unexpected position an order -reached the Battalion abandoning the attack and recalling -it to Angle Wood.</p> - -<p>On the right the much suffering 169th Brigade was -able to achieve a series of local bombing successes which -carried their line appreciably nearer Combles. From the -6th Division on the left, shortly after midday came the -cheering news that the Quadrilateral had at last fallen, -together with the trench to the north of it.</p> - -<p>This important success, which had so long eluded the -grasp of the successive Divisions who had sought it, paved -the way for the magnificent achievements of the 25th -September, which will be recounted later, its especial -importance being that it was practically the last heavily -fortified stronghold on the central portion of the Main -Ridge to resist the British attacks.</p> - -<p>The abortive operation of the 18th cost the Battalion -a good many casualties in N.C.O.'s and men, and one -officer, 2/Lieut. W. H. Calnan, wounded.</p> - -<p>The same evening the 168th Brigade relieved the 167th -in the Leuze Wood trenches, the London Scottish occupying -the front system, which comprised Beef and Bully Trenches. -The 1/4th Londons took over from the 3rd Londons the -support line, which ran diagonally through Leuze Wood<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_200" id="Page_200">[Pg 200]</a></span> -in a north and south direction. Leuze Wood was at all -times an unhealthy locality and formed an unfailing source -of attraction for every conceivable sort of German -projectile. The 3rd Londons had already suffered heavily -here, and the night of the relief proved to be no exception -to the rule. Throughout the evening the wood was -plastered with high explosive shell, and even the inadequate -shelter of the trenches hastily dug, damaged and waterlogged -as they were, was exceedingly welcome. The -position was, without exception, the muddiest that had -yet fallen to the lot of the Battalion. "To stand still," -writes a company commander, "was to sink gradually -until the whole of the legs to well above the knees were -immersed and movement was correspondingly difficult." -Lewis guns and rifles had become choked with mud so as -to render the Battalion practically defenceless, but with -much labour they were cleaned, and some rations which -were found in the trench distributed. Dawn broke on a -chilled but yet remarkably cheerful Battalion. The continued -strain of heavy shell fire and conditions of physical -misery were, however, beginning to have their effect, and -several men who in earlier actions had given ample proof -of their courage, collapsed. "One man of D Company who -had previously shown himself one of the stoutest-hearted, -lost his mental balance and suddenly became possessed -of the idea of killing all the Germans in the German Army, -and had to be forcibly restrained from mounting the -parapet. 2/Lieut. Barkworth, who came up from Battalion -Headquarters, succeeded by sheer strength of personality -in restraining him and getting him back to H.Q."</p> - -<p>The 19th September was a day of comparative quiet on -the battle front, though shelling and sniping continued in -a desultory fashion. Rain fell steadily and the condition -of the trenches, appallingly bad to start with, became so -wretched as to defy description.</p> - -<p>During the night of the 19th a large working party of -the 5th Cheshire Pioneers, under the supervision of the -Brigade Major (Capt. R. E. Neame, V.C., D.S.O., R.E.), -and covered by a screen of one and a half companies of -the Scottish, dug a new trench 800 yards long. This new<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_201" id="Page_201">[Pg 201]</a></span> -work, Gropi Trench, ran forward from Beef Trench towards -the German line, parallel to the west edge of Bouleaux -Wood, as far as the Morval tram-line. The task was -successfully completed before dawn, but with the advent -of daylight and the consequent exposure of the newly -turned-up earth, the whole brigade area was again subjected -to a heavy bombardment by the enemy's artillery. -The German snipers again became particularly active, and -every rash movement was promptly punished. Under -this gruelling there was nothing for the Battalion to do -but to keep quietly in its trenches and make the best of -an unpleasant state of affairs. That night the Kensingtons -came forward from Angle Wood Valley and took over the -support line from the Battalion, and also Bully Trench in -front of it. The relief was completed by 9.30 p.m., and -never was relief more welcome. The Rangers at the same -time took over the Beef and Gropi system from the London -Scottish. On withdrawal from the trenches the Battalion -moved by companies to bivouacs at Falfemont Farm, -arriving there at 10.45 p.m.</p> - -<p>No further movement was made during the 21st and -22nd September, and these two days were fairly quiet as -the principal target for the German guns was provided by -the numerous British batteries in Angle Wood Valley, -which received heavy punishment.</p> - -<p>Between the 20th September and the 2nd October the -following reinforcements joined:</p> - -<div class="hangindent"> - -<p>Capt. R. N. Keen, Lieuts. W. H. Vernon and A. Bath, 2/Lieuts. -C. A. Speyer, C. Potter, W. R. Gifford, H. W. Spiers, L. C. -Haycraft, L. J. R. Atterbury, C. P. Russell, T. R. Fletcher -and S. A. G. Richardson.</p> - -<p>2/Lieut. T. Siddall (25th Londons).</p> - -<p>100 N.C.O.'s and men.</p> - -<p>A few days after joining Lieut. A. Bath and 2/Lieut. C. P. -Russell were evacuated, the former with a broken ankle, -the latter sick.</p></div> - -<p>The men of this draft represented so far as the 1/4th -Battalion was concerned the firstfruits of the "Derby" -scheme, and it must always be a matter for regret that -the dreadful losses already incurred by the Battalion made -it inevitable to pitchfork this fine material straight into<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_202" id="Page_202">[Pg 202]</a></span> -the inferno of the Somme without any opportunity for it -to become previously assimilated into the ranks of the -Battalion. The Somme battles were a severe ordeal even -to the most veteran soldiers; and the bearing of these -young and inexperienced troops in the trials of the latter -half of the Battalion's Somme fighting stands to their -lasting credit.</p> - -<p>As we have already remarked, the Cockney soldier, -however wretched his conditions, is never so depressed by -his surroundings as to be unable to find humour in the -situation of the hour. The Battalion had now spent seven -consecutive days in the desolation of the battle area -practically without shelter from the pitiless torrents of -rain which combined with the German shells to churn the -whole surface of the ground into a disgusting glutinous -mass; the troops were soaked to the skin and plastered -with mud from head to foot; but the unconquerable -spirit of cheerfulness held them together, dirty and -dishevelled as they were, a well-knit and disciplined -fighting unit. The condition of the ground, which added -so vastly to the labours of the troops, is illustrated by a -story told by an officer who was present:</p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p>A man attempted to cross the valley and started to -plough his way through the mud, but rashly omitted -to lace up his boots, which he had previously removed. -His negligence was quickly visited upon him, for scarcely -had he begun his journey when the mud claimed one -of his boots, which became stuck fast. His powers of -balance were unequal to the task of putting his foot back -in the boot, and he toppled over, both his hands becoming -firmly embedded. His efforts to regain a standing -position were prolonged and violent, but after a time -successful, and finally, boots in hand, he proceeded on his -way amid the cheers of the onlookers, who accepted his -performance as being arranged for their especial amusement, -and were particularly interested in the man's lurid -observations on the subject of boots, mud and war -generally.</p></div> - -<p>There were a few occasions, however, when circumstances -seemed too strong even for the 1/4th Londons,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_203" id="Page_203">[Pg 203]</a></span> -and one of them occurred that night when the rum jars -which arrived with the rations were found, alas, to contain—lime -juice!</p> - -<p>On the evening of the 22nd September the 168th -Brigade was relieved in the left subsector by the 167th -and the Battalion moved back to the comparative peace -of Casement Trench, where it occupied bivouacs until the -afternoon of the 24th, making preparations for the next -bout in the battle line.</p> - - -<h3><em>The Battle of Morval, 25th September</em></h3> - -<p>The continuance of the offensive had been arranged -for the 21st, but the weather conditions placed such a -handicap on the chances of success that it was postponed, -first until the 23rd and again till the 25th September, when -once more the battle broke out on a front from the British -right at Combles to a point half-way between Flers and -Martinpuich. The French were to co-operate in this -attack on the right of Combles ravine. The objectives of -the XIV Corps included the villages of Lesbœufs and -Morval, and, as on the occasion of their earlier attempt on -the 15th, the 56th Division was to form a defensive flank -facing south-east over Combles.</p> - -<p>A series of local bombing operations was conducted on -the 24th by the 169th Brigade on the extreme right in -conjunction with the French, which gave them an increased -hold on Combles Trench immediately in front of -the village, and appreciably improved their jumping-off -positions for the following day. During the night also -the two tanks allotted to the Division moved forward to -their rendezvous in the quarry west of Leuze Wood.</p> - -<p>For the battle of the 25th the three Brigades of the -Division were all in line, the 169th on the right, with the -167th in the centre and the 168th on the left. The 1/4th -Londons were the right assaulting Battalion of the 168th, -their duty being to clear the northern end of Bouleaux -Wood and to establish a line of posts overlooking the -ravine, while the London Scottish on the left continued -the defensive flank in the direction of Morval (see -Map No. 6).</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_204" id="Page_204">[Pg 204]</a></span></p> - -<p>At 4.30 p.m. on the 24th the Battalion marched from -Casement Trench to occupy positions of assembly, relieving -the 7th Middlesex in the Gropi-Ranger system -as follows:</p> - -<div class="hangindent8"> - -<p>C Company—Left front, in Ranger Trench.</p> - -<p>B Company—Right front, in Gropi Trench, and the small communication -trench leading forward to Ranger -Trench.</p> - -<p>D Company—Support, in Gropi Trench.</p> - -<p>A Company—Reserve, in the southern part of Gropi Trench and -Middle Copse.</p></div> - -<div class="hangindent"> - -<p>Battalion Headquarters were established in a dugout west of the -north part of Gropi Trench and the Aid Post in the quarry -west of Leuze Wood.</p></div> - -<p>The evening of relief was fortunately fairly quiet, but -owing to the complete obliteration of all landmarks some -difficulty was experienced by the guides provided for the -companies in locating the positions to be occupied. However, -Middle Copse was eventually reached, and this point -being gained a little prospecting discovered Gropi Trench, -after which the relief proceeded smoothly and was completed -without unusual incident. Gropi Trench, which -had been dug by the Cheshires, was found to be very well -constructed, and the excellent cover it afforded was the -means of sparing the Battalion a good many casualties -from the enemy snipers, who were active from the direction -of Bouleaux Wood during the morning of the 25th.</p> - -<p>After a preliminary bombardment by all available -batteries the British attack opened at 12.35 p.m. on the -25th, but the 168th Brigade's positions being well in -advance of those occupied by the 5th Division on its left, -its attack was deferred until seven minutes later in order to -allow the 5th Division to come up into line. The creeping -barrage, under which the Brigade's advance was made, -was supplied by batteries firing from Angle Wood Valley, -and being thus in enfilade was particularly efficient and -accurate; and under its excellent protection the 1/4th -Londons and the London Scottish advanced steadily at -12.42 p.m.</p> - -<div class="figcenter" style="width: 424px;"> -<img src="images/i_b_204fp.jpg" width="424" height="500" alt="" /> -<div class="caption"><p><span class="smcap">The Battle of Morval, September 1916</span></p></div> -</div> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_205" id="Page_205">[Pg 205]</a></span></p> - -<p>The advance of the Battalion was led by C Company -(Grimsdell) in two waves at 50 paces distance, followed by -D Company (Cooper) in similar formation. B Company's -rôle was to conform to the advance and protect the -Brigade's right flank against any possible hostile action -from the southern half of Bouleaux Wood, while A -Company in reserve moved forward to occupy the positions -vacated by the assaulting companies.</p> - -<p>The Battalion reached its objectives in the northern -fringe of the Wood with little opposition, and with slight -loss, killing a large number of Germans in the western edge -of the Wood. A great many of the enemy were also put -to flight, and these were caught on the open hillside on -their way to Combles by the Lewis gunners of the Scottish -advancing on our left, who did great execution among -them. The consolidation of the strong posts allotted to -the Battalion at once began, but was considerably interfered -with by German snipers, who were still clinging to -their posts farther south in the Wood. Under their fire -Grimsdell (in charge of C Company) fell, shot through the -head. This harassing fire rendered communication with -Battalion Headquarters a matter of some difficulty, and -continued through the night, as the 167th Brigade on the -right had not been successful in pushing through the -southern extremity of Bouleaux Wood. By nightfall the -new posts were completed and occupied as follows:</p> - - -<div class="center"> -<ul> - <li>Post A—By 30 men and Lewis gun of C Company.</li> - <li>Post B1—By 25 men of D Company.</li> - <li>Post B2—By 30 men and 1 Lewis gun of D Company.</li> -</ul> -</div> - -<p>These posts were improved and wired by parties from -the Royal Engineers and the Cheshire Pioneers, while A -Company subsequently constructed an additional post in -the tram-line embankment north of the Wood.</p> - -<p>Meanwhile the London Scottish had been equally -successful on our left, and had taken possession of the -German trench running north-east from Bouleaux Wood -in the direction of Morval; and farther still to the north -the Guards Division had captured Lesbœufs, while the -5th Division were hammering at the western outskirts -of Morval.</p> - -<p>The positions now occupied by the Brigade were of -immense importance, as they secured excellent observation<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_206" id="Page_206">[Pg 206]</a></span> -over the northern exits of Combles; and information -received through the French from a German officer prisoner -being to the effect that the Combles garrison was making -preparations to fight its way out north-eastwards, the -further operations of the Brigade were directed towards -working round the north side of Combles and cutting off -its communication with Morval. This scheme naturally -affected the left flank of the Brigade more than the right -flank, on which the Battalion was posted.</p> - -<p>Shortly after midnight the 167th Brigade gained a -foothold in Bouleaux Wood on the right of the Battalion, -and a reconnaissance made by Lieut.-Col. Wheatley soon -after dawn on the 26th showed that the Wood was finally -cleared of the enemy. Touch was rapidly gained with the -1st Londons and the line established in front of the east -edge of the Wood.</p> - -<p>A few hours later definite information was received -that the enemy had evacuated Combles and that troops -of the 56th Division had entered it and had met in its -deserted streets patrols of the 56th French Division.</p> - -<p>The remainder of the day passed quietly for the -Battalion, and a distinct lull occurred in the enemy's shell -fire, while owing to the clearance of Bouleaux Wood -the ground west of it, which had been on the previous -afternoon so much swept by snipers, was now quite -peaceful.</p> - -<p>Combles having fallen into our hands the most immediate -need was to improve touch with the French and -carry the united line forward east of the village. Early on -the morning of the 26th Sept. the French captured Frégicourt -and succeeded in establishing themselves in touch -with the 169th Brigade south of Combles, thus securing -the whole of Combles Trench; while on the north of the -village they managed to push patrols forward towards the -sunken road leading to Morval. The road was occupied -by the Rangers who had orders to occupy if possible -the main German third line between Morval and Frégicourt. -This was found still to be strongly held and the -assistance of the Division's two tanks were requisitioned. -Unfortunately both these machines became badly<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_207" id="Page_207">[Pg 207]</a></span> -"ditched" before reaching their objective, and the -Rangers' attack was therefore abandoned.</p> - -<p>That evening the Battalion was relieved in Bouleaux -Wood by the Kensingtons, and withdrew to Bully and -Beef Trenches with feelings of immense elation at having -contributed materially to this striking and solid success.</p> - -<p>During the 27th September the trenches held by the -Battalion were heavily shelled, but no attempt was made -by the enemy to launch a counter-attack on the Brigade's -front, and the Germans were evidently content to accept -the loss of Combles as irretrievable. In the evening the -168th Brigade handed over its positions to the 2nd French -Division, and the Battalion, without relief in Bully and -Beef Trenches, withdrew to Casement Trench.</p> - -<p>The casualties sustained by the Battalion during this -highly successful operation were remarkably few, amounting -to 2 officers (2/Lieuts. R. E. Grimsdell, killed, and -E. McD. McCormick, wounded), and about 30 N.C.O.'s -and men killed and wounded.</p> - -<p>During the evening of relief reports of the full success -of the battle of the 25th September reached the Battalion, -including the splendid news of the fall of the famous series -of German redoubts on the Thiepval Ridge. This welcome -intelligence, combined with the knowledge of the Combles -success, put all ranks into the highest spirits, and created -the pardonable expectation that a "break-through" on a -large scale was imminent. How premature these high -hopes were the Battalion was to learn to its cost on the -7th October.</p> - -<p>Mention should be made here of the tasks performed -by R. S. M. Harris during the period the Battalion was -operating in the Leuze Wood and Bouleaux Wood area. -He was responsible for organising all carrying parties -up to advanced Battalion Headquarters with water, -rations and munitions. These duties he carried out in -a highly praiseworthy manner, both he and his small band -of carriers being continually called upon day and night -to tramp up the long Angle Wood Valley, often in the -rain, on practically impassable tracks and more often than -not under shell fire. "As Adjutant," writes Boutall, "I<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_208" id="Page_208">[Pg 208]</a></span> -highly appreciated the assistance he gave me in thus -relieving me of a considerable amount of additional work -and anxiety. I do not remember a single instance during -this whole period when he failed us, in spite of the difficult -and heavy tasks we were obliged to impose on him."</p> - - -<h3><em>The Battle of the Le Transloy Ridges 1st-18th October</em></h3> - -<p>Owing to the shortening of the line consequent upon -the fall of Combles, and the extension to their left of -the French, the 56th Division was now withdrawn and -moved out of the battle area, the Battalion marching -at 2 p.m. on the 28th Sept. from Casement to Ville-sur-Ancre, -where rough but welcome billets were occupied. -The Division's rest was destined to be short-lived, for the -following day a warning order was received that it would -take the place in the line of the 6th and Guards Divisions, -which had suffered considerably during a prolonged period -in action.</p> - -<p>The Battalion at this stage was unfortunate in -losing Lieut.-Col. Wheatley. The prolonged exposure had -already undermined his health, and at this period he was -recommended a rest by the Medical Authorities. He -refused to go to hospital, and compromised by going to -the Divisional Rest Station, Major H. J. Duncan-Teape -taking command, but so keen was the Colonel to be with -his unit, that without having sufficiently recovered he -returned on October 2nd.</p> - -<p>The sector to be occupied was about 2000 yards in -frontage, running in a north-west to south-east direction -through the eastern outskirts of Lesbœufs, and was taken -over on the evening of the 30th September with the -169th Brigade on the right, and the 167th on the left, the -dividing line being the Lesbœufs-Le Transloy Road. The -left subsector (or northern half of the line) lay just below -the crest of the ridge above Lesbœufs, and orders were -issued for the advancement of this part of the line to -positions from which direct observation could be obtained -over the German positions in front of Le Transloy, in -preparation for an early renewal of the offensive.</p> - -<div class="figcenter" style="width: 326px;"> -<img src="images/i_b_208fp.jpg" width="326" height="500" alt="" /> -<div class="caption"><p><span class="smcap">The Battle of the Le Transloy Ridge, October 1916</span></p></div> -</div> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_209" id="Page_209">[Pg 209]</a></span></p> - -<p>The 168th Brigade remained in Divisional reserve, and -on the morning of the 30th the Battalion, together with -the London Scottish, moved forward to their former -bivouac area between Trones and Bernafay Woods, the -Kensingtons and Rangers remaining at the Citadel.</p> - -<p>The Battalion remained in the Trones Wood area -during the 1st and 2nd October, and a Brigade relief -having been ordered for the following day, moved forward -at 4.30 p.m. to Lesbœufs, relieving the 2nd Londons. -The positions taken over by the Battalion formed the -left subsector of the Brigade front and extended from -the Lesbœufs-Le Transloy Road, which formed the left -boundary, for some 800 yards southwards to the junction -with the London Scottish, who were in line on the right, -the latter battalion being the right flank of the British -Army. The Kensingtons moved into Brigade support in -the old Morval-Flers line, and the Rangers occupied -bivouacs at Ginchy.</p> - -<p>The main position taken over by the Battalion was a -roughly constructed trench known as Shamrock, about -50 yards east of the sunken road leading from Lesbœufs -to Morval. In advance of this main position, which was -allotted to A and B Companies, were a number of embryo -trenches in varying stages of construction and quite -isolated from the main line. Of these isolated trenches -the chief was Rainy, which adjoined the Lesbœufs-Le -Transloy Road, about 300 yards ahead of Shamrock, and -Foggy, some distance farther south and separated from -Rainy by a gap of probably 300 yards. C and D Companies -and Battalion Headquarters took up positions in the old -Lesbœufs-Gueudecourt line west of the village.</p> - -<p>The resumption of the offensive was imminent; and -it was indeed first fixed for the 5th October, though subsequently -postponed till the 7th owing to the continuance -of adverse weather conditions.</p> - -<p>A great deal of constructional work was immediately -necessary in assembly and communication trenches, as -well as in the completion of the necessary advanced dumps -of munitions and stores of all kinds. Working parties -from the Battalion, of the greatest available strength,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_210" id="Page_210">[Pg 210]</a></span> -began work on part of these tasks on the night of the 4th, -the new trenches to be dug comprising communications -to join Rainy with Shamrock and with a small advanced -position on the crest of the ridge overlooking Le Transloy. -In addition the road at Rainy was barricaded. Large -working parties were also provided by the Kensingtons -to provide an advanced assembly position for the attack -by connecting Rainy and Foggy, and by the Cheshire -Pioneers and the R.E.'s on other tasks. This latter task, -however, could not be completed in one night and was -continued the following evening. The shocking state of -the ground prevented it from ever being finished, and on -the day of the attack only about 150 yards of trench -had been added to Foggy. On the night of the 6/7th -also a fresh assembly trench for the use of the centre -battalion was taped out by the Brigade Major, and dug -by the Kensingtons. This work was called New Trench.</p> - -<p>Although the weather once again had embarked on a -dry spell the long continued rains had rendered working -tasks immensely difficult of accomplishment, and the -tenacious character of the mud added incalculably to the -labour of digging and of reaching the site of the work. -The isolation of the various tasks in this appalling swamp, -from which every landmark had been swept out of existence, -and the constant harassing fire of the enemy's -machine-gunners, caused great delays to working parties -in even locating their work, and all these factors together -tended to reduce the work actually carried out far below -expectations.</p> - -<p>The Battalion, not being originally detailed for the -assault, was relieved in the trenches on the evening of the -5th by the Rangers and moved by companies on relief -to bivouacs between Ginchy and Guillemont, leaving A -and C Companies in line for the completion of their tasks -begun the previous night. The following day, however, -intimation was received of a change of orders, and the -Battalion returned to the trenches that night as the -centre assaulting battalion of the Brigade, its place in -brigade support being taken by the Kensingtons.</p> - -<p>So far as the 56th Division was concerned the attack<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_211" id="Page_211">[Pg 211]</a></span> -of the 7th October was for the purpose of advancing the -line some 1400 yards farther down the reverse slope of -the Main Ridge, in order to provide a suitable "jumping-off" -line for a further offensive to be launched later -against the fourth German line in front of Le Transloy, -which guarded the Bapaume-Péronne Road. The advance -was to be made under a creeping barrage, in two stages, -to objectives which were not marked by enemy trenches, -but on the farther of which the Division would dig itself -in. On the Division's right the French line would also -be advanced by the 56th French Division, with whom -touch was to be gained on the Frégicourt-Le Transloy -Road.</p> - -<p>The 168th Brigade's assault was entrusted to the -London Scottish (right), 1/4th Londons (centre) and -Rangers (left), the dispositions for attack of the Battalion -being as follows:</p> - -<div class="hangindent8"> - -<p>D Company—(W. H. Vernon) two platoons in New Trench and two -platoons in 25 Trench; in touch with London -Scottish.</p> - -<p>C Company—(Speyer) in Foggy Extension; in touch with Rangers.</p> - -<p>B Company—(Gifford) in Shamrock.</p> - -<p>A Company—(Keen) in support in the sunken road.</p></div> - -<div class="hangindent"> - -<p>Battalion Headquarters (Col. Wheatley) were in dugouts south-west -of Lesbœufs, and an advanced report centre (Major -Duncan-Teape) was established in the southern outskirts of -the village.</p></div> - -<p>The plan of attack was for D, C and B Companies to -advance at two minutes after zero to the first objective, -the two platoons of D in New Trench being especially -detailed to the task of "mopping up" some German gun -pits some 150 yards to the front which were believed to -be held by a few enemy snipers. At the same time -A Company was to occupy Foggy Extension. After about -fifteen minutes' pause on the first objective, the assault -on the second objective would be pursued by C and B -Companies only.</p> - -<p>Reference has already been made to the difficulty -experienced prior to the attack by working parties -in locating their tasks, and similar difficulty was met -with by all troops throughout the operations. The con<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_212" id="Page_212">[Pg 212]</a></span>sistently -bad atmospheric conditions had rendered aerial -photography almost impossible, and all through the -action the doubt which existed in the minds of commanders -as to the exact position of trenches, our own as well as -the enemy's, was a fruitful source of confusion and loss. -The assembly of the companies for attack was indeed only -accomplished after serious delay owing to the extraordinary -but largely justifiable bewilderment of the guides -detailed to the Battalion. C Company only reached its -position just before dawn after having been led several -hundred yards out of its way, to find on arrival that its -assembly trench was only knee deep and already filled -with wounded. Add to these obstacles to success, the -fact that, owing to the previous terrible losses in commissioned -ranks, it was impossible to avoid sending into -the battle as many as nine officers who had not been -previously in action with the Battalion at all, having -only a few days earlier arrived from England, and it will -be appreciated that the probabilities of success were not -great. Zero was fixed for 1.45 p.m., and at that hour the -barrage dropped. Two minutes later the Battalion rose -out of its trenches and made a gallant attempt to advance. -The story of the remainder of the day is a pitiful tragedy.</p> - -<p>The gun pits which had been allotted to the two -platoons of D Company in New Trench were found to be -alive with bravely-manned machine-guns, and under their -withering fire D Company simply melted out of existence. -C Company, following slightly to its right, was able to -avoid total extinction by taking cover in shell holes in -dead ground close by, but 2/Lieut. C. M. Taylor fell under -this fire at the head of the leading wave of the Company. -B Company, following on from Shamrock, met the full -blast of the enemy counter-barrage, and suffered heavy -losses, but pushed bravely on and eventually filtered into -the same general line as was already held by C Company -and the remains of D. Under the devastating fire from -the gun pits further advance was impossible, and the -troops continued to suffer loss where they lay. The afternoon -wore on and the Battalion remained clinging to its -position, about 50 yards from its starting-point, until<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_213" id="Page_213">[Pg 213]</a></span> -after dark. Sergt. H. F. Page of D Company displayed -magnificent coolness, and from his shell hole passed a busy -afternoon picking off the German gunners in the pits -with great deliberation. He was subsequently commissioned -to the King's Own Regiment (Royal Lancaster). -All ranks alike were exposed to the fire and all suffered -proportionately. L. C. Haycraft, a promising young -subaltern of D Company who had already proved his -worth with the bombers of the Civil Service Rifles in -the Hairpin at Hulluch, made an attempt after dark to -ascertain the enemy's position, but he never returned -from his reconnaissance.</p> - -<p>Gifford, in charge of B Company, also fell, as did his -platoon commanders, Fletcher and Richardson, the two -last wounded; and C.S.M. James, who received the -Military Medal for his good work, took charge of the -Company and brought it out of action at the end of the day.</p> - -<p>On the left the Rangers had met with a similar fate at -the hands of the machine-gunners in Dewdrop Trench, -before whose fire they had been stopped dead with ghastly -loss immediately they rose from the assembly trench.</p> - -<p>The London Scottish, on the right, gained a little -success, their right flank achieving a maximum advance -of about 400 yards, but their left felt the blast of the -deadly guns in the pits, and they were kept out of all -except the southern extremity of Hazy.</p> - -<p>At about 8.30 p.m. the enemy delivered a counter-attack -from Hazy and Dewdrop under heavy artillery -support, which had the effect of forcing the Brigade -definitely back to its starting trenches.</p> - -<p>In the meantime a company of the Kensingtons had -been brought up to Burnaby with the idea of forcing the -Dewdrop position by outflanking it from the north, but -the Germans being found still strongly in possession of -Spectrum, north of the road, the attack was cancelled.</p> - -<p>It having become obvious that the assaulting battalions -were dangerously weakened, immediate reliefs were arranged, -and the Battalion that night handed over its position to -the Queen Victorias, who were attached to the Brigade, and -withdrew to the bivouacs at Trones Wood. Here it was<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_214" id="Page_214">[Pg 214]</a></span> -joined by the London Rifle Brigade. The withdrawal of -the Battalion was supervised by Major Duncan-Teape, -who managed by great efforts to get the whole of the -remnants of the companies back over the Ridge just before -daylight broke. The roll call at Trones Wood was a -gloomy spectacle, for neither the 1/4th Londons nor the -London Scottish could muster more than the strength of -about one company.</p> - -<p>The total losses in all ranks sustained by the Battalion -on this unfortunate day amounted to about 300 all ranks, -the casualties among officers being:</p> - -<div class="hangindent"> - -<p>Killed—Lieut. W. H. Vernon, 2/Lieuts. C. M. Taylor, W. H. -Gilford, L. J. R. Atterbury and L. C. Haycraft.</p> - -<p>Wounded—Capt. R. N. Keen and 2/Lieuts. T. R. Fletcher, H. W. -Spiers and S. A. G. Richardson.</p></div> - -<p>Of this, the last of the Battalion's actions in the great -Somme battles, but little more need be said. The position -which it had been proposed to carry with three weak -battalions was attempted again the following day with -equal lack of success; and subsequently other Divisions -suffered heavy casualties in the unsuccessful endeavour. -Indeed the position never did fall into our possession until -the enemy deliberately gave it up in his retirement of the -succeeding February on to the Hindenburg line.</p> - -<p>Lieut.-Col. L. L. Wheatley, D.S.O., had led the Battalion -through many trying ordeals with the unfailing confidence -of all ranks who had the honour to be under his command; -but as already indicated, the strain of the long-protracted -struggle, especially of the last few days, combined with -continually wet clothes, had proved too much for him, -and he now contracted an acute attack of dysentery and -was evacuated to hospital on the 10th. He never returned -to the Battalion which his compelling personality had -made essentially his own.</p> - -<p>On the 11th October the Battalion moved to the -Citadel Camp, the gateway through which thirty-five days -earlier it had entered the inferno of the battle; and -the Division being concentrated here after relief by the -4th Division, it marched the following morning to Ville-sur-Ancre, -moving thence by motor-buses to a rest area<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_215" id="Page_215">[Pg 215]</a></span> -north-west of Amiens, billets being provided for it at -St Vaast-en-Chaussée.</p> - -<p>Of all the great series of actions of the War the battles -of the Somme in 1916 stand out perhaps in the public -memory as the most heroic, and at the same time the most -appalling, and we cannot leave the subject finally without -a few remarks generally reviewing the Battalion's experiences. -Of the thirty-five days spent in XIV Corps area -only four had been spent in rest bivouacs, and during the -remaining thirty-one the Battalion had taken part in active -operations five times. The losses incurred amounted to -the enormous total of nearly 700 in all ranks, of whom -40 were officers.</p> - -<p>It would be unfitting to close our account of the Somme -battles without paying some tribute to the magnificent -work performed throughout by Rear Headquarters under -Major H. J. Duncan-Teape. The administrative ranks of -a battalion in action are invariably worked to the limits -of human endurance, but usually with inadequate recognition -of their importance; for it is no exaggeration -to say that on the efficiency with which they maintain -the stream of supplies, whether of rations or munitions, -to the fighting ranks, depends not merely the success, but -the very existence of the troops in advanced positions. -On the Somme the consistently atrocious weather increased -tenfold the fatigue and strain of the administrative -portion of the Battalion: the mud swamps which -had to be traversed, the severe shell fire which plastered -all back areas, the wretched misery of the whole struggle, -and above all the vast responsibility which rested on them, -all combined to make the work of Rear Headquarters an -enormous strain both mental and physical. But throughout -the battles Major Duncan-Teape was constantly alert -and constantly at advanced Headquarters, ascertaining -exactly what was wanted, and getting it done. In Lieut. -H. B. A. Balls, the Acting Quartermaster, and in R.S.M. -Harris he found able and devoted lieutenants whose cool -handling of all difficulties was invaluable.</p> - -<p>The transport sections of all battalions were brigaded -under Capt. L. G. Rix at the Citadel, and the 1/4th<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_216" id="Page_216">[Pg 216]</a></span> -Londons' transport section under Lieut. G. V. Lawrie -worked throughout magnificently and never once failed to -deliver the day's supplies. Those who were present will -fully appreciate what this means. The work for horses -and men was exhausting and incessant; and oftentimes -the limbers returned from the forward area to the transport -lines only just in time to load up once more for the upward -journey. The results that were obtained could only have -been achieved by the whole-hearted devotion of all ranks.</p> - -<p>Of the men in the companies on whom day after day -fell the burden of physical discomfort and mental strain -it is impossible to speak adequately. The record of their -achievements speaks, and can be left to speak, for itself.</p> - -<p>The decorations awarded for services rendered between -the 1st July and the 7th October were:</p> - -<div class="hangindent8"> - -<p>M.C.—Lieut. W. J. Boutall, 2/Lieuts. O. D. Garratt, S. J. -Barkworth, M.M., E. McD. McCormick and Rev. -R. Palmer, C.F.</p> - -<p>D.C.M.—C.S.M. R. Davis, Sergt. T. Clark, Ptes. J. O'Brien -and H. S. Payne.</p> - -<p>M.M.—C.Q.M.-Sergt. R. Forbes, Sergts. H. C. Gearle, H. H. -Merrell, R. Hebberd, R. R. L. Hyde, C. James -and T. Lock, Corpl. J. Castle, L.-Corpls. H. -Whitehead, A. Sergeant, A. J. Moger and L. R. -Webb, Ptes. H. E. Hyde, W. Buckingham, A. E. -Colvin, F. Hedger, W. Lawrence and C. F. Collins.</p></div> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_217" id="Page_217">[Pg 217]</a></span></p> -<div class="chapter"></div> -<hr class="chap" /> - - - - -<h2>CHAPTER XII<br /> - -THE 1/4 BATTALION DURING THE WINTER 1916/17</h2> - - -<p>On arrival at St Vaast-en-Chaussée the 1/4th Londons were -reduced in strength to about 275 all ranks, and although -the morale of the troops was not impaired by their recent -experiences, the Battalion was seriously in need of rest, -reorganisation and reinforcement. A few days of light -training, which occupied the mornings only, with games -in the afternoon, went far towards recreating the troops -physically; but the reorganisation of the Battalion was -necessarily a more lengthy and difficult matter. No -company had more than two officers, and N.C.O.'s were very -few. Lewis gun teams and bombers were newly detailed -to their respective duties and untrained, and the building -up once more of the fine fighting battalion which had -entered the trenches at Hébuterne three and a half months -earlier, added to the proper assimilating of the reinforcements -which were expected from England, presented a -task the completion of which was likely to occupy the -greater part of the winter months.</p> - -<p>After Lieut.-Col. Wheatley had succumbed to sickness -the command of the Battalion devolved on Major H. J. T. -Duncan-Teape, who was appointed acting Lieut.-Colonel.</p> - -<p>The few days' rest at St Vaast were enlivened by an -entertainment given by the Bow Bells, which had an -excellent effect in cheering up the men.</p> - -<p>On the 20th October the Division moved to the Hallencourt -area, where it had originally been formed, the -Battalion arriving in billets at Citerne at about 5.30 p.m. -after a march which, in the reduced physical condition of -the troops, proved to be exceedingly trying. Probably -never has the Battalion been accorded a kindlier welcome -in billets than from the good people of Citerne, who, having -received it in February and sent it out to battle, took a<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_218" id="Page_218">[Pg 218]</a></span> -quite proprietary interest in the laurels which it brought -back to them.</p> - -<p>At St Vaast and Citerne the Battalion was joined by -Capt. F. C. Grimwade, who assumed the duties of second -in command with the acting rank of Major, 2/Lieuts. -C. E. V. Richardson and P. Pyne. Capt. L. G. Rix also -returned to the Battalion from Brigade Transport Officer, -and 2/Lieut. O. D. Garratt was appointed Assistant -Adjutant.</p> - -<p>A course of light training was continued for a few days -at Citerne under weather conditions which continued -bright and frosty until the evening of the 24th October, -when the Battalion marched at 8 p.m. in a veritable -deluge to Longpré Station to entrain for a fresh area. -The pitiless rain drenched all to the skin, but the men's -spirits remained completely undamped, for the rumour -had gone forth that the new area was far from the Somme, -among the marshes of Flanders. The move from Longpré -was made by tactical train shortly after midnight, and -about midday on the 25th the Battalion detrained at -Merville, whence it marched straight to billets between -Neuf Berquin and Estaires, being now attached to the -XI Corps (Haking) of the First Army (Horne).</p> - -<p>No prolonged rest was, however, in store, for although -the Battalions of the 56th Division were momentarily not -prepared for active operations, they were perfectly capable -of holding trenches. No surprise, therefore, was caused -by the receipt the day following arrival at Neuf Berquin -of orders to relieve the 61st Division in the Neuve Chapelle-Fauquissart -area.</p> - -<p>A preliminary reconnaissance of the trenches by officers -of Battalion Headquarters and company commanders took -place on the 26th, and on the 27th the 1/4th Londons and -London Scottish moved forward and took over reserve -billets in Laventie from the 2/7th and 2/8th Royal -Warwickshires.</p> - -<p>On the 28th October the 168th Brigade completed the -relief of the 182nd Brigade, the 1/4th Londons and Scottish -moving into the right and left subsections respectively -of the Fauquissart sector, there relieving the 2/6th<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_219" id="Page_219">[Pg 219]</a></span> -and 2/5th Royal Warwickshires, while the reserve billets in -Laventie were taken over by the Kensingtons and Rangers.</p> - -<p>The new Divisional frontage covered some 7000 yards -from the neighbourhood of Richebourg l'Avoué on the -right to a point opposite Rouges Bancs on the left, all the -Brigades being in line and each finding its own supports -and local reserves. The 168th Brigade held the extreme -left of the Divisional front, the 169th being on its right, -while the New Zealand Division was on its left. This -extreme deployment of a numerically weak Division was -justified by the quiet character of this area, and the fact -that the German divisions opposed to it were equally with -ourselves somewhat exhausted by recent efforts in the -Somme battles and not anxious to venture on active -operations. To such an extent indeed had our continued -pressure in the south drained the enemy's resources that -his lines opposite the 56th Division were but feebly held, -and at the moment not capable of being strongly reinforced; -and this area was therefore eminently suited -to the recuperation of a battle-worn Division and to the -training in active service conditions of the young troops -from home who were shortly to join it.</p> - -<p>The Fauquissart breastworks were in every way similar -to those in the Neuve Chapelle area already described in -connection with the Battalion's service in the Indian -Corps, though being opposite the village of Aubers, -which is on the highest part of the Ridge, were even -more seriously subject to observation from the enemy -lines than the Richebourg breastworks.</p> - -<p>The village of Fauquissart, at this period in a condition -of total ruin, consisted of a scattered collection of houses -extending for about half a mile along each side of the Rue -Tilleloy, which ran parallel with the British front breastworks -and about 200 yards in rear of them. A thousand -yards in rear of the Rue Tilleloy, and parallel to it, was -the Rue Bacquerot, these two roads forming good lateral -communication within the sector, though the former could -only be used under cover of darkness. The sector was -also served by three communication trenches starting -from the Bacquerot, Elgin Street, Masselot Street and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_220" id="Page_220">[Pg 220]</a></span> -the Strand, the last named during the winter months -usually consisting of a chain of unfordable lakes.</p> - -<p>This sector was held by the Battalion with three -companies in line and one in reserve, the reserve company -holding three keeps on the line of the Rue Bacquerot, -called Road Bend, Wangerie and Masselot Posts. Battalion -Headquarters was accommodated in shelters near Temple -Bar on the Rue Bacquerot.</p> - -<p>The German lines opposite were heavily wired, and -included two strongly marked salients, the Devil's Jump -and the Wick. But although the enemy had the advantage -in observation owing to his possession of the -Ridge, his front trenches were far from comfortable owing -to the presence behind his lines of the Rivière des Laies -which, as the winter wore on, became more and more -swollen, finally bursting its banks and rendering his -forward defences completely untenable.</p> - -<p>Our wire entanglements were exceedingly poor, and -immediate attention was directed to the improvement -of this important part of our defences; the parapets also -were thin, firebays sadly in need of revetment, and the -whole sector seriously lacking in shelter for the men. No -time was lost in evolving an extensive works programme, -which was promptly put into execution, the more important -work being carried out under Royal Engineer -supervision. The urgency of the Brigade works programme -rendered the supply of large working parties -necessary, and it was therefore arranged that of the two -battalions for the time being in Laventie one would act -as "Works Battalion" finding all working parties, while -the other would devote itself to training.</p> - -<p>The most peculiar feature of this sector lay in the -immunity from shell fire of Laventie behind the British -lines and of Aubers in the German territory. Each village -layabout 2000 yards in rear of the respective front trenches, -and both were used as reserve billets for the troops holding -the line. By mutual and tacit consent the artillery on -each side refrained from bombarding the other's billets; -any infringement of this unwritten law on one side being -met with immediate and severe retaliation by the other.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_221" id="Page_221">[Pg 221]</a></span> -During the period therefore spent in the Laventie area, -the Battalion on coming out of the line had the enjoyment -of occupying tolerably wind-and water-tight billets without -molestation, although they were distant little more -than a mile from the enemy lines. A considerable number -of civilians still clung to their battered homes in Laventie, -and it was strange to see French soldiers, whose divisions -were serving in Alsace or the Argonne, come to Laventie -"on leave from the front"!</p> - -<p>The 1/4th Londons now settled down to a regular -routine of four days in the right subsection breastworks -followed by four days in billets in Laventie, tours being -later extended to six days, and as this routine continued -until the middle of December we need not follow it in detail.</p> - -<p>The sector had been particularly quiet prior to the -56th Division's arrival, but almost from the day of its -taking over the line conditions began to change. Possibly -a certain undesirable aggressiveness on the part of the -Londoners began to annoy an enemy who, but for interference, -was content to conduct a perfectly peaceful -war; possibly the change was due to the recovery of both -sides from the fatigue and over-strain of the Somme. -Whatever the reason, certain it is that as the winter wore -on the whole Neuve Chapelle-Fauquissart area began to -become much more lively than it had been. On our side -the most vigorous system of patrolling, of daily organised -shoots by guns of all calibres, trench mortars and machine-guns, -and of an intensive course of sniping, quickly gave -us the ascendancy and caused the Germans a pardonable -irritation under which they showed themselves less and -less disposed to take their punishment quietly.</p> - -<p>In the line the Battalion was busily occupied with its -share of the works programme and in patrolling in which -the infrequency of encounters with the enemy in No Man's -Land gradually led to the belief that his front breastwork -was not occupied. This was probed further on the last -evening of November when a fighting patrol of twenty -men under 2/Lieut. W. H. Webster (Intelligence Officer) -entered the enemy lines at the Wick Salient and found it -untenanted, in a shocking condition of flood and affording<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_222" id="Page_222">[Pg 222]</a></span> -ample evidence that no attempt was being made to repair -the serious damage caused by our artillery fire.</p> - -<p>During the third week in November the Battalion's -frontage was extended to the right, involving the occupation -by the right company of an extra 400 yards of breastwork -and an additional supporting post, Erith, and by -the reserve company of a fourth keep on the Bacquerot -line called Lonely Post. This new piece of breastwork was -usually subjected to a good deal of enemy trench mortar -fire, especially about the point at which Erith Street communication -trench joined the front line. This was an -unpleasant spot. Erith Street sunk into a slight depression -so that all traffic using it was plainly visible to -the Germans; and as it came to an abrupt end some -fifteen yards short of the front line an undesirable gap -occurred which had to be traversed with more than -ordinary agility by those whose duty took them that way. -A good deal of extra trench repairing work was imposed -on us in consequence of the enemy's attentions at this -point, and unfortunately some casualties occurred.</p> - -<p>The enemy's activity was rather marked on the 26th -November, during the morning of which day over seventy -5·9-inch shells fell near the Convent observation post -but without a direct hit being obtained. The Convent, -together with two or three other posts along the line of -the Rue Tilleloy, used by the forward observation officers -of our supporting artillery, consisted of a substantial brick -tower some 25 feet in height, like an attenuated Martello -Tower. These had been erected behind the cover of the -houses of Fauquissart before the village had been destroyed. -But the subsequent demolition of the houses had exposed -the towers, which consequently stood up naked and unashamed -within 200 yards of our front line, and their -presence, possibly combined with his evident inability to -hit them, seemed to be a constant source of annoyance -to the enemy.</p> - -<p>All this time the Battalion strength was steadily increasing -with reinforcements from home and with the -return of many who had been wounded on the Somme, -till by Christmas it mustered some 700 all ranks. Officer<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_223" id="Page_223">[Pg 223]</a></span> -reinforcements followed on each other's heels with surprising -rapidity, and the following joined during November:</p> - -<div class="hangindent"> - -<p>Captains V. S. Bowater and H. M. Lorden, Lieuts. H. Jones -(appointed Brigade Bombing Officer) and H. J. M. Williams, -2/Lieuts. E. G. Dew, L. W. Wreford, S. P. Stotter, H. W. -Spiers, R. W. Chamberlain and W. A. Froy; 2/Lieuts. H. N. -Williams, L. W. N. Jones, H. D. Rees, Bradley (to 168th -L.T.M. Battery) and A. L. Harper (attached from 4th Royal -Welsh Fusiliers); 2/Lieuts. F. H. Hutchins, A. G. Davis and -L. E. Ballance (attached from 11th Londons); Captain H. -Pentelow and Lieuts. T. Coleman (Works Officer) and H. D. -Beeby (attached from Hunts Cyclist Battalion).</p></div> - -<p>Captain Pentelow was unluckily hit and sent to hospital -two days after his arrival.</p> - -<p>At the end of November the Rev. R. Palmer, M.C., left -the Battalion to take up the duties of Divisional Chaplain -in the 24th Division, his place being taken a few days -later by Rev. S. F. Leighton Green, who remained with -the Battalion until after the Armistice.</p> - -<p>About this period a Divisional Musketry Camp was -formed at Le Sart, near Merville, and 2/Lieuts. Wreford -and Pyne were appointed to it as instructors. 2/Lieut. -E. G. Dew was also appointed Battalion Bombing Officer.</p> - -<p>On the 21st December a readjustment of the Battalion -sector was effected, and in the afternoon the sector as -originally taken over from the 182nd Brigade was handed -over to the 1/3rd Londons, and the Battalion marched to -billets at Bout Deville.</p> - -<p>After three days occupied in cleaning up and training, -Christmas Day was celebrated as a holiday, and, the -billets being beyond the range of any but heavy guns, -with which the Germans were not well supplied on this -front, the rest of the Battalion was quite undisturbed. -But every effort was made to render the Germans' -Christmas as uncomfortable as possible. At 6.30 p.m. on -Christmas Eve a continuous steady bombardment of his -defences by all available batteries up to 6-inch guns began, -and lasted for forty-eight hours. This action was evidently -much resented by the enemy, and after Christmas the -trench warfare in this area was conducted with greater -fierceness than it had been previously.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_224" id="Page_224">[Pg 224]</a></span></p> - -<p>The Bow Bells were now established in the theatre at -La Gorgue, and it was found possible to provide a free -visit for every man in the Battalion to its splendid -Christmas pantomime "Aladdin," which was most heartily -appreciated.</p> - -<p>During the temporary absence of 2/Lieut. O. D. -Garratt, the duties of Intelligence Officer were taken by -2/Lieut. J. R. K. Paterson (Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, -attached), who remained with the Battalion for -about a month.</p> - -<p>On New Year's Day 1917 the 168th Brigade relieved -the 169th Brigade in Moated Grange sector, the Rangers -and Kensingtons occupying the trenches, with the London -Scottish in support, about Rouge Croix and Pont du Hem -on the La Bassée Road, while the 1/4th Londons remained -in Divisional reserve billets at Riez Bailleul.</p> - -<p>A week here was spent in supplying working parties, -of which the labour was considerable owing to the long -distance—about four miles—which had to be covered -each night in each direction by parties going up the line -for work. The weather, moreover, had taken a marked -change, and a very severe frost had set in which increased -tenfold the labour of digging. Towards the end of the -week snow fell adding further to the fatigue of the long -night marches.</p> - -<p>On the evening of the 9th January 1917 the Battalion -took over from the Kensingtons the right subsection of -the Moated Grange sector. This sector had seen a good -many changes both as regards defences and boundaries -since the Battalion's previous occupation of it in the -summer of 1915, and the lines now taken over extended -from Sign Post Lane on the right for a frontage of some -1400 yards to a point opposite the village of Mauquissart -which lay just within the German lines.</p> - -<div class="figcenter" style="width: 500px;"> -<img src="images/i_b_224fp.jpg" width="500" height="497" alt="" /> -<div class="caption"><p><span class="smcap">Laventie, Winter 1916-1917</span></p></div> -</div> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_225" id="Page_225">[Pg 225]</a></span></p> - -<p>The sector was held with three companies in the front -breastworks and supporting posts and one in reserve on -Cardiff Road. Battalion Headquarters occupied shelters -at Ebenezer Farm. These positions were far from ideal. -The strength of the Battalion was much scattered and -difficult of control in emergency, owing to the exceedingly -bad communications within the area. The supporting -platoons of the front line companies, at Bristol House, -Cornwall Siding and Pump House, occupied the only remaining -tenable portions of what had originally been the -German second line prior to the Battle of Neuve Chapelle, -and were separated from each other by about 100 yards -of broken down and almost impassably wet breastworks. -For communication from front to rear only one trench, -Tilleloy South, was passable with any degree of safety -in daylight. Between Pump House and the front line, a -distance of about 250 yards, it was seriously overlooked -from the German positions in the Bois du Biez, with the -result that traffic up and down it was frequently sniped -with trench mortar and 5·9 shells.</p> - -<p>Always an area of considerable activity, the Moated -Grange possessed several unpleasant features as a result -of the active mining operations which had begun in 1915, -and were still proceeding with unabated energy. The -Duck's Bill Farm had given place to an enormous crater -of the same name, linked with the British lines by a -defended sap which left the front line at Sunken Road. -The defence of this crater and sap took a platoon, whose -arduous duties of continual listening and constant preparedness -for an enemy raid were carried out under -exceedingly rough conditions, as both the crater and the -sap were full of water and shelters were conspicuous by -their absence.</p> - -<p>On the front occupied by the left company the German -lines were invisible from the British breastworks owing to -the lips thrown up round the Colvin craters, a series of -some thirty or more of immense size which covered half -the area of No Man's Land at this point. The largest of -this series, the Mauquissart crater, occupied the site of -what had once been our front line, and the breastwork -now ran round its nearer lip. This mined area was the -most uncomfortable part of the line, since the Germans -were continually searching with trench mortar fire for the -heads of our mine shafts while the cover afforded to enemy -patrols by the crater lips themselves necessitated constant -vigilance and counter-patrolling activity on the part of our<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_226" id="Page_226">[Pg 226]</a></span> -trench garrison. Add to this the extreme hardship which -the troops in this part of the line inevitably had to undergo -owing to the total lack of dugouts and the perishing cold. -The blowing of so many craters had, moreover, cut off -the ditches between fields which had formerly been used -for draining the trenches, with the result that there was -no means of getting rid of the water which in a large -number of firebays rose higher than the firestep. Under -these conditions cooking in the neighbourhood of the -front line was out of the question, and all cooked food had -to be carried by permanent headquarter carrying parties -from the Battalion cook-house near Ebenezer Farm; in -the case of rations destined for the flank platoons this -meant a trudge for the food carriers of over a mile in each -direction at each meal.</p> - -<p>The defences generally had suffered severely both from -the enemy's shell fire and the effects of the alternation -of sharp frost and heavy rain, and an immense amount -of labour was called for in working and carrying parties -for the breastworks as well as for the wire entanglements, -which were in a very weak condition. The single communication -trench, therefore, became frequently congested -with long lines of troops "humping" material and food -to the front line, and altogether the Moated Grange was a -hard sector to run efficiently and a remarkably unpleasant -one to live in.</p> - -<p>Two tours of six days each were spent in this sector, -broken by six days—not of rest, but of most exhausting -working parties—in Riez Bailleul. The days in line saw -a good deal of shelling and the Battalion suffered some -loss, but in spite of this and of exposure to intense cold -the men were probably more happy in the line than in -billets. Further heavy falls of snow had occurred. The -working parties supplied from Riez Bailleul were largely -engaged in drawing trench stores and material at a dump -on the La Bassée Road between Pont du Hem and Rouge -Croix, itself nearly two miles from billets; and thence -pushing it up to the front trenches on the tram-line dignified -with the title of Great Eastern Railway, a further distance -of upwards of 3000 yards. From railhead this material,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_227" id="Page_227">[Pg 227]</a></span> -consisting of trench boards, rolls of barbed wire, revetting -frames, hurdles and other heavy stuff had to be distributed -to companies in the line. These fatigues were obviously -exhausting, and seldom did a party leaving billets at -5.30 p.m. return before midnight.</p> - -<p>The most difficult task of all, however, which may not -yet have quite faded from the memories of many, was -connected with an ingenious scheme for draining the -craters with heavy cast-iron water mains each about -16 feet long. With infinite labour these were brought to -tram railhead, but at this point the difficulty of carrying -pipes, each weighing some 200 pounds, along 500 yards of -quagmire proved too much even for the stout hearts of -Cockneys; and the high hopes which the author of the -scheme had entertained of draining the craters vanished -as his pipes sank in the mud. A change from this routine -to the comparative peace of trench mortaring in the line -was not unwelcome.</p> - -<p>An act of gallantry occurred during the first tour which -must be recorded. During one of the enemy's midday -bombardments a time-fuzed medium trench mortar shell -fell on the parapet of our breastwork on the lip of Mauquissart -crater, and lodged in the revetting hurdle at the side -of the trench. The firebay happened to be crowded with -men working on the defences, and heavy casualties must -inevitably have been caused but for the bravery of 2/Lieut. -W. H. Webster, who rushed forward and, seizing the shell, -flung it over the parapet into the crater, where it immediately -exploded. For this gallant action 2/Lieut. Webster -was awarded the D.S.O.</p> - -<p>The enemy's artillery and trench mortars showed a -marked increase of activity during the second occupation -of Moated Grange, the craters, the Duck's Bill and Pump -House, coming in for most of the punishment. The 23rd -January was perhaps the most trying to the troops. -During the morning "hate" a well-placed minenwerfer -completely cut off the left platoon in the craters, the only -approach to them being by way of an exposed and little -used trench, Min Street, which involved a detour of about -3200 yards from Headquarters. Shortly after midday a<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_228" id="Page_228">[Pg 228]</a></span> -second lucky German shell lighted on a dump of medium -trench mortar shells which were lying within a few yards -of a shelter occupied by several men of the right company. -A terrific explosion took place and caused a large crater -which cut off the Battalion's right flank also, but, strange -to say, without inflicting so much as a scratch on any of -the men in the vicinity. These incidents are recounted -merely as instances of the constant annoyance caused to -the troops in line by the enemy's harassing tactics, as -every bit of damage caused in this way involved extra -work to the already over-burdened troops in repairing it.</p> - -<p>On the last evening in the line, the 25th, an attempt -was made by a fighting patrol of the reserve company (C) -under 2/Lieut. Ballance to obtain an identification from -the enemy. Wire-cutting shoots had taken place for two -days previously in preparation for this, and arrangements -were made to support the patrol with artillery fire as -occasion should arise. The enemy were found, however, to -have made efficient counter-preparations, and the surprise -effect of the patrol having failed, the project had to be -abandoned with the loss of 1 man killed and 2 wounded.</p> - -<p>During this tour the Battalion sustained 1 officer -casualty, 2/Lieut. W. Quennell, wounded.</p> - -<p>On the 26th January the Battalion was relieved by the -1/8th Middlesex at 10.5 p.m. and withdrew to rest billets -at La Gorgue, the 168th Brigade having passed into -Divisional reserve with Brigade Headquarters at Merville.</p> - -<p>The 168th Brigade in rest in the Merville area settled -down to such training as was possible, the ground being -covered with snow. One or two useful instructional -schemes with contact aeroplanes were carried out, but the -weather conditions prevented serious outdoor work, and -the training hours were, for the most part, devoted to -repolishing the parade discipline of the Brigade. According -to the usual custom of the Battalion when opportunity -offered itself, the drums beat Retreat daily and the -Regimental Quarter Guard and inlying picket mounted in -the Grande Place at La Gorgue.</p> - -<p>Two further drafts of about 70 N.C.O.'s and men -joined the Battalion in January.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_229" id="Page_229">[Pg 229]</a></span></p> - -<p>It had been the intention that the 168th Brigade should -pass fourteen days in rest, but this idea had to be unexpectedly -abandoned owing to a concentration of troops -near the frozen inundations of the Yser, where it was -feared that a sudden German advance over the ice might -have somewhat disturbing effects on the Allies' positions. -This caused the services of the 168th Brigade to be requisitioned -once more, and on the 1st and 2nd February -it relieved the 111th Brigade of the 37th Division in the -Neuve Chapelle sector, the Rangers and Kensingtons -occupying the line, while the Scottish moved as Works -Battalion to billets at Croix Barbée and the 1/4th Londons -as Training Battalion to Fosse.</p> - -<p>On the 1st February 2/Lieut. C. E. V. Richardson was -admitted to hospital.</p> - -<p>After training at Fosse for six days the 1/4th Londons -took over from the Kensingtons the right subsector of -Neuve Chapelle sector on the 8th February.</p> - -<p>The Battalion now found itself after a lapse of over a -year once more in the area in which it had passed so many -months with the Ferozepore Brigade. The sector taken -over comprised the old Rue du Bois (right, centre and left) -sections, and extended from a point opposite the German -Boar's Head Salient on the right to some 250 yards north -of the La Bassée Road on the left. Considerable changes -had now taken place in the method of holding the line; -old well-known trenches had fallen into disuse and fresh -ones had taken their places. Those who looked for the -Crescent, Orchard Redoubt, and other well-remembered -spots found them broken down and no longer occupied. -The front line breastwork was now occupied in isolated -posts at intervals of about 150 yards, each garrisoned by -a platoon. Each post was protected on its flanks as well -as in front by wire entanglements, while the intervening -firebays had been either filled in or choked with barbed wire.</p> - -<p>The communications within the sector were tolerably -good, but the breastwork was thin and in many places low, -a natural result of leaving long portions of it unoccupied -for several months.</p> - -<p>The main line of resistance was now in the reserve or<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_230" id="Page_230">[Pg 230]</a></span> -"B" line which, on the right of the sector, was represented -by Guards Trench in front of the Rue du Bois, and on the -left by the old British front line (as it had been before the -Battle of March 1915) in Edgware Road. Battalion -Headquarters in 1915 had occupied dugouts on the Rue -du Bois, but were now at Lansdowne Post, which formerly -had housed a whole battalion. The defence scheme provided -for holding the "B" line at all costs in the event of -serious attack, so that the front line became virtually a -line of outposts. This method of holding the line in -great depth was not only far sounder than the former -method of crowding the whole strength into the front -trench, but was also more economical, as the sector which -formerly had demanded a garrison of a whole brigade -was held by one battalion.</p> - -<p>The line was held with two companies in the front line -posts and two in support in the "B" line.</p> - -<p>On the right of the La Bassée Road the German trenches -were about 100 yards distant, and it was soon found that -the enemy snipers had been allowed to gain the ascendancy -over the British, a state of affairs which all battalions of -the Brigade promptly set to work to correct.</p> - -<p>The first day's occupation of this sector passed without -incident, but on the evening of the 9th February, at about -7 p.m., the enemy opened a heavy trench mortar and -machine-gun bombardment on the front line from Pioneer -to Pope Posts, astride the La Bassée Road. The trench -mortar fire was well directed, and the breastwork on the -right of Pope Post was badly breached. At about 7.30 p.m. -this preparatory shelling was followed by a heavy "box" -barrage, and an enemy raiding party entered our lines -between Pioneer and Pope Posts. An S.O.S. signal was -sent up from the left company Headquarters, and our -artillery responded promptly with a heavy barrage on the -German front line and communication trenches.</p> - -<p>The raiders, about twelve in number, divided into two -groups, of which one attacked Pope Post and the other -Pioneer Post. The attack on Pope Post was driven off by -the garrison, three of the raiding party being bayoneted -by Sergt. Gardiner, whereupon the others turned and fled,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_231" id="Page_231">[Pg 231]</a></span> -being followed back to the German lines by the second -group.</p> - -<p>Capt. Rix, commanding B Company, accompanied -by his Sergt.-Major (Shelton) and his runner, gallantly -endeavoured to pass through the barrage on Hun Street -in order to take control of affairs in the front line; but all -were unfortunately hit by the same shell, Shelton and the -runner being killed outright while Rix died in hospital a -few days later. The raiders were successful in capturing -2/Lieut. Webster, D.S.O., who was with the Lewis gun -post at Pioneer Post; he is believed to have been mortally -hit prior to his capture, and died in the enemy's hands -the following day. In addition to these regrettable -casualties about a dozen men were slightly wounded, the -bulk of the loss on our side being sustained by a carrying -party from the Rangers who were caught by the German -barrage at Edgware Road tram railhead. 2/Lieut. Stotter -(B Company) was also slightly wounded. He remained at -duty for some days, but was admitted to hospital about ten -days later. The reorganisation of the line was promptly -taken in hand by Capt. Stanbridge (A Company) in support, -who temporarily reinforced the front line with one of his -platoons under 2/Lieut. Harper, and subsequently took -over B Company vice Rix. The raiding party belonged, -as was found from the three enemy dead left in our hands, -to the 2nd Battalion, 13th Bavarian Regiment. For his -coolness and good work during the raid Sergt. Gardiner -was awarded the Military Medal.</p> - -<p>The remainder of the night passed without incident, -and the bright moonlight during the later hours enabled -our working parties to make considerable headway in -repairing the breaches in our breastwork.</p> - -<p>On the morning of the following day an observed shoot—which -caused very great material damage—was carried -out by our trench mortar batteries on the enemy first and -second lines. This shoot produced a certain amount of -trench mortar retaliation on Guards Trench, in the course -of which an unlucky shell destroyed a Stokes mortar -section under 2/Lieut. Bradley, and the whole of its team, -causing a block in our line at Mole Post.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_232" id="Page_232">[Pg 232]</a></span></p> - -<p>No further incident of importance occurred during the -remainder of this tour, though our lines were daily subjected -to heavy bombardments by the enemy medium -trench mortars, especially in the neighbourhood of Pioneer -Post, where very considerable damage was caused to our -breastworks and wire. On the evenings of the 12th and -13th, however, when this activity of the enemy began to -assume somewhat serious proportions, they were effectively -silenced by prearranged retaliatory shoots by our supporting -artillery on the German front and support lines.</p> - -<p>The following afternoon the Battalion handed over -the right subsection to the Kensingtons, and withdrew as -Works Battalion to billets at Croix Barbée. Here the -Battalion supplied large working parties nightly, the -principal tasks being the raising and thickening of the -weak portions of the breastwork and the wiring of the -new parts of the "B" line.</p> - -<p>Throughout this winter the prosecution of the works -programme placed a heavy strain on all ranks and totally -deprived the periods spent out of the line of any semblance -of rest. Even on the night of relief the working parties -were carried out, and many times during these months -companies which had held front line trenches for six days -marched back to reserve billets and within an hour were -paraded again for a working party from which they were -not dismissed till after midnight. The necessity for this -extreme pressure of work was doubtless real, but the -unceasing drudgery of it could not be conducive to good -work while the efficient recreation of the men by games -out of the line received so little attention.</p> - -<p>However, on this occasion it was found possible to -make progress with the Brigade boxing competition, a -good ring being available at the Brigade Lewis Gun School -at Croix Barbée, and in this competition the Battalion -gained several successes.</p> - -<p>On the 20th February the Battalion returned to the -trenches, taking over the right subsection from the -Kensingtons.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_233" id="Page_233">[Pg 233]</a></span></p> - -<div class="figcenter" style="width: 700px;"> -<img src="images/i_b_232fp_a.jpg" width="700" height="442" alt="" /> -<div class="caption"><p><em>Sign Post Lane, Neuve Chapelle</em></p></div> -</div> - -<div class="figcenter" style="width: 700px;"> -<img src="images/i_b_232fp_b.jpg" width="700" height="440" alt="" /> -<div class="caption"><p><em>Ruined Farmhouse near Neuve Chapelle</em></p></div> -</div> - -<p>This tour of duty was marked by an all round increase -of activity both in trench mortar and artillery fire on both -sides, the points which received the majority of the shelling -being the front line about the much battered Pope and -Pioneer Posts, Port Arthur and the "B" line in the -neighbourhood of the Rue du Bois. The enemy was also -active by day with rifle grenades, and at night with -machine-gun fire.</p> - -<p>Owing to the particular discomfort of living in Pope -and Pioneer Posts an inter-company relief between the -two left companies was effected on the 23rd February, -A Company withdrawing into support in favour of C -Company, which took over Port Arthur sector.</p> - -<p>An attempt was made on the evening of the 26th by -the 5th Division on the right to raid in force the enemy's -lines to the south of the Boar's Head Salient. The enemy -had exhibited numerous signs of nervousness, and it was -not altogether surprising to find him quite prepared for -the attempt by the 5th Division. The exact point against -which the raiding party was directed, however, did not -coincide with his anticipations, for the bulk of his rather -sharp counter-barrage came down on the sector held by -this Battalion. This barrage lasted with intensity for -twenty minutes, and, trench mortars being freely employed, -caused a good deal of further damage to our -already weak breastworks, but inflicted practically no -loss of personnel.</p> - -<p>The following morning the Kensingtons once more relieved -the 1/4th Londons, taking over the right subsection -and extending it to the left as far as the outskirts of Neuve -Chapelle village, the adjusted line being known as the left -subsection of Ferme du Bois sector.</p> - -<p>On relief the Battalion occupied billets as training -battalion at Fosse, C Company being detached in hutments -at Les Huit Maisons. Training was proceeded -with uninterruptedly though the weather remained intensely -cold and further falls of snow occurred. The -opportunity was taken to hold a Battalion cross-country -run, which passed off as satisfactorily as the arctic conditions -permitted. The frost, which had lasted for several -weeks, was indeed now becoming a little serious as it was -utterly impossible, owing to the hardness of the soil, to<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_234" id="Page_234">[Pg 234]</a></span> -carry out repairs to the trenches which were daily being -more knocked about by the enemy's fire. The appalling -destruction which must later be caused by the inevitable -thaw filled the hearts of those who would form part of -the subsequent working parties with feelings of misgiving, -mingled with resentment.</p> - -<p>On the 5th March the Battalion relieved the -Kensingtons in the left subsection of Ferme du Bois, -the order of battle in the front line being from the right, -B, D and A Companies, with C in support in the "B" -line. The additional frontage between La Bassée Road -and Neuve Chapelle was also held in isolated posts.</p> - -<p>As before the "B" line was the main line of resistance; -but the great length of the "B" line sector—some -2300 yards—which had to be held in eight separate posts, -with three additional posts at night, presented a difficult -problem in defence to one weak company of about 120 -fighting ranks. The solution of the problem was not, -however, actually called for as the enemy remained unusually -quiet for the whole of this tour of duty, during -which the snow fell thicker every day. After an -occupation of four uninteresting days the Battalion was -relieved in the left subsection on the afternoon of the -9th March by 1/6th Duke of Wellington's Regiment (49th -Division). On relief it withdrew to billets at Bout Deville, -marching the following morning at 8 a.m. to Merville, -where the Brigade entrained for the Le Cauroy area. -Detrainment took place at Doullens, and the Battalion -marched some six miles to billets at Le Souich, arriving -shortly before midnight.</p> - -<p>The Battalion, which had left the Somme battlefields -in an exhausted condition in the previous October, had -undergone a good schooling in the Flanders breastworks. -The strength had been increased to some 850 all ranks, -and all new drafts had become not only well assimilated, -but also well trained in a rather trying trench warfare. -The physical strain on the troops throughout the winter -had been exceptionally severe, owing to the terrible intensity -of the winter weather, and the very great amount -of trench work for which the Battalion had been called<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_235" id="Page_235">[Pg 235]</a></span> -upon; and of this side of the incidents of the winter -sufficient has already been said for it to be realised -without difficulty that, although the Battalion still had -a clean bill of health, the prospect of a rest before -embarking on active operations was welcomed by all.</p> - -<p>The great retirement of the Germans was now in -progress, and as the 1/4th Battalion was not actively concerned -in this we may turn for the moment to follow the -fortunes of the 2/4th Battalion, who had recently arrived -in France with the 58th Division and were now in action -in the Arras sector.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_236" id="Page_236">[Pg 236]</a></span></p> -<div class="chapter"></div> -<hr class="chap" /> - - - - -<h2>CHAPTER XIII<br /> - -THE 2/4TH BATTALION IN FRANCE--GERMAN RETIREMENT -FROM THE SOMME</h2> - - -<p>The 58th Division, of which the 2/4th Londons formed a -part, after remaining at Ipswich for about a month, was -transferred to the Southern Command in hutted camps -at Sutton Veny, near Warminster, on the 10th July 1916.</p> - -<p>Here the Division, being concentrated in an area which -provided excellent training facilities, had a chance to -become thoroughly welded together and to show the -material of which it was made in a manner which had -hitherto been impossible, for the influence of scattered -billets is invariably and inevitably unfavourable to strict -discipline. The fullest advantage was taken of this golden -opportunity, and the resultant tightening of discipline and -advancement of all ranks in technical efficiency rapidly -justified the change of station. A very great amount -of work still lay before the whole Division before it -would be fit to take its place in the line overseas, and -much reorganisation in various directions was effected -with entirely beneficial results soon after its arrival at -Warminster.</p> - -<p>Amidst all this work, which was carried out at fever-heat, -the amusement of the men was not overlooked. An -excellent Divisional band was formed, and their good -services were added to early in December by the creation -of a Divisional concert troop "The Goods." Not to be -left behind in these achievements the 2/4th Londons -formed their own concert party, called for some not too -obvious reason "The Tanks," which afforded excellent -entertainments under the able direction of 2/Lieuts. -T. J. Bell and C. J. Graham, who were assisted by Pipe-Major -Ling, Corpl. Wilkinson, L./Corpls. Smith, Ringrose -and Hardy, and Pte. Rosenbloom.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_237" id="Page_237">[Pg 237]</a></span></p> - -<p>The 2/4th Londons had already attained a position -which is believed to be unique in the annals of the British -Army inasmuch as they, a Battalion affiliated to an -English line regiment, had become the possessors of a -pipe band. This band had originally been formed for -recruiting purposes, but with the initiation of the "Derby -Scheme" its services were no longer necessary for the -enticement of recruits, and it had been secured for the -Battalion. The pipers wore the Glengarry cap and the -Royal Stuart tartan. They were without doubt an exceedingly -good band and lightened many a weary mile -of road both in England and France with their stirring -music.</p> - -<p>An attempt, which originated in the 2/4th Londons, -was also made to produce a Divisional magazine, and this -appeared in September under the title of <cite>The Direct -Hit</cite>. It was well received and attained the age of three -months, but was then discontinued.</p> - -<p>Shortly after arrival at Sutton Veny the Division came -under the command of Major-Gen. H. D. Fanshawe, C.B., -who ultimately took it to France where he remained in -command for some months.</p> - -<p>Various changes took place in the 2/4th Londons, and -in November 1916 command of the Battalion was assumed -by Lieut.-Col. W. R. H. Dann (Bedfordshire Regiment), -Capt. W. A. Nunneley becoming second in command with -the temporary rank of Major. The personnel was also -strengthened by the arrival of a large officer reinforcement -from the 4th (Reserve) Battalion, the majority of whom -had already seen service in France in the ranks of various -London Battalions.</p> - -<p>In the latter part of January 1917 the long awaited -order arrived for the 58th Division to proceed overseas. -On the 23rd of that month the 2/4th Battalion left Sutton -Veny with a strength of 32 officers and 976 other -ranks and proceeded to Southampton, where it embarked -on the <em>Viper</em>, and crossed to Havre, arriving -the following morning at daybreak. Disembarkation -took place at once and the Battalion, preceded by its -pipe band, marched to the Reinforcement Camp at<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_238" id="Page_238">[Pg 238]</a></span> -Sanvic. The following officers accompanied the Battalion -overseas:</p> - - -<div class="center"> -<table border="0" cellpadding="4" cellspacing="0" summary="Sanvic. officers accompanied the Battalion"> - <tr> - <td>Lieut.-Col. </td> - <td>W. R. H. Dann, </td> - <td colspan="3">in command.</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td>Major </td> - <td>W. A. Nunneley, </td> - <td colspan="3">second in command.</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td>Capt. </td> - <td>E. E. Spicer, </td> - <td colspan="3">Adjutant.</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td>E. N. Cotton, </td> - <td class="tdc">cmdg. </td> - <td class="tdc">A </td> - <td class="tdc">Co.</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td>E. W. Bottomley, </td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdc">B</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td>G. E. A. Leake,</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdc">C</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td>S. H. Stedman,</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdc">D</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td>H. A. T. Hewlett.</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td>H. C. Long.</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td>W. H. Parker.</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td>Lieut. </td> - <td>B. Rivers Smith </td> - <td colspan="3">(Bde. L.G.O.).</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td>2/Lieut. </td> - <td>R. K. Caparn.</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td>E. A. Monkman.</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td>L. J. Bassett </td> - <td colspan="3">(attd. L.T.M. Battery).</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td>T. Stoaling.</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td>A. M. Duthie </td> - <td colspan="3">(Bombing Officer).</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td>S. G. Askham.</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td>A. R. Muddell </td> - <td colspan="3">(attd. L.T.M. Battery).</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td>W. J. Stickney.</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td>A. G. Croll </td> - <td colspan="3">(Intelligence Officer).</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td>F. Stickney.</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td>H. W. Hallett </td> - <td colspan="3">(Signalling Officer).</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td>G. G. Hunt.</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td>T. J. Bell.</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td>R. McDowell.</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td>H. E. English.</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td>D. S. Boorman.</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td>H. S. Daw </td> - <td colspan="3">(Transport Officer).</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td>C. J. Graham.</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td>E. C. Pratt.</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td>S. P. Ferdinando.</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td>Hon. Lt. & Qm. </td> - <td>C. W. Cragg, </td> - <td colspan="3">(Quartermaster).</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td>Capt. </td> - <td>P. H. Burton, R.A.M.C., </td> - <td colspan="3">Medical Officer.</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td>Rev. O'Brien, </td> - <td colspan="3">Chaplain attached.</td> - </tr> -</table></div> - -<p>The next day the Battalion entrained for Abbeville, -but on arrival found its orders to stay there countermanded -and the journey was therefore continued to -Fortel, a small village about six miles south-west of -Frevent.</p> - -<p>The unusually hard frost which was general throughout -northern France in the winter of 1916/17 still held the -country in its grip, and the conditions for a raw battalion -even in billets were far from comfortable, but a ten days' -stay at Fortel, which was devoted to training and generally -acclimatising the Battalion to its new surroundings, -prepared it at least in a small degree for the rigours of a -winter campaign.</p> - -<p>By the 5th February the concentration of the 58th -Division was complete, and the 173rd Brigade under -Brig.-Gen. Hurst began to move by easy stages to the line,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_239" id="Page_239">[Pg 239]</a></span> -the 2/4th Londons lying at Le Souich on the 6th, and at -Sus-St Leger on the 7th and 8th.</p> - -<p>The following day the Brigade moved forward and -became attached to the 146th Brigade of the West Riding -(Territorial) Division, for instruction in trench warfare, -the 2/4th Londons being divided up between the battalions -of the 146th Brigade for this purpose, with two companies -in reserve at Bailleulmont and Humbercamp. The 146th -Brigade was at this time holding a sector south-west of -Arras facing Ransart. Ransart lies at the base of a small -spur between two watercourses, both of which are usually -dry, and the German trenches in front of the village were -dominated at an average distance of about 600 yards by -our own on the western side of the valley.</p> - -<p>This part of the front had the reputation of being -exceedingly quiet (and therefore suitable for the first tour -of duty of inexperienced troops), and was the defensive -position taken up by the French in October 1914 when, -after the Battle of the Aisne, the battle front had become -stabilised by the continued extension of the flanks of the -opposing forces until they reached the sea. The British -Army had taken over the area from the French in July 1915.</p> - -<p>After five uneventful days in this sector the Battalion -was relieved on the 14th by the 2/12th Londons, and -having rendezvoused at La Cauchie, about three miles in -rear of the line, embussed to Sus-St Leger where it went -into billets for a week's rest.</p> - -<hr class="tb" /> - -<p>The important changes which were to take place in -this area during the next six weeks are so material to the -development of the Campaign of 1917 that it is necessary -to review briefly the operations which were being conducted -further south. The termination of the battles of the -Somme in November 1916 had left the enemy in possession -of the whole of the Ancre Valley from Le Transloy to -Grandcourt and of excellent positions on the high ground -immediately north of Beaumont-Hamel; while in rear of -this position he had made great progress in the construction -of two more lines of defence running in a direction from -north-west to south-east about Bapaume.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_240" id="Page_240">[Pg 240]</a></span></p> - -<p>The advance of our troops over the Thiepval-Morval -Ridge had, however, left him confined in a marked salient, -of which the apex was Gommecourt Wood, between the -Ancre on the south and the Scarpe where it passes Arras -on the north; and conditions appeared very favourable -for improving our situation in the neighbourhood of -Beaumont-Hamel before the conditions of winter should -render active operations on a large scale impossible. -Accordingly operations which met with immediate success -were reopened on the 18th November on the left bank -of the Ancre between Grandcourt and Pys. These were -renewed in January in the Beaucourt valley on the opposite -side of the river with such marked success that the enemy -was compelled to relinquish his hold on the high ground -north of Beaumont-Hamel while his position in Grandcourt -became precarious in the extreme.</p> - -<p>On the night of the 5th/6th February 1917 Grandcourt -was evacuated and the enemy fell back to the line -Serre-Miraumont-Pys. Attacks with which these initial -successes were followed up on the 17th and 18th February -secured to the British complete command over the enemy's -defences of the upper Ancre and Miraumont village, while -they accentuated his salient west of Serre. The loss of -this would lay open for us a further advance on Puisieux-au-Mont -and render the defence of the Gommecourt -Salient exceedingly hazardous. It was therefore to be -expected that any further withdrawal on the part of the -enemy from in front of Miraumont would entail a withdrawal -on a large scale, and this actually occurred.</p> - -<p>By the 24th February British troops had occupied -Serre and all the enemy's defences on a line from that -village to Gueudecourt, a frontage of some nine miles. -On the 27th February patrols entered Gommecourt park -and village, the prize so desperately fought for and withheld -from the 1/4th Battalion six months earlier, and the -following morning the whole of Puisieux fell into our -hands. On the right the enemy's resistance was more -stubborn, but an assault on Irles on the 10th March, -which proved entirely successful, brought us face to face -with the first of the two lines of defence about Bapaume -to which reference has already been made. But even here -the enemy made no determined stand, and by the 13th -our pursuing columns were making preparations to assault -the rear line.</p> - -<div class="figcenter" style="width: 329px;"> -<img src="images/i_b_240fp.jpg" width="329" height="500" alt="" /> -<div class="caption"><p><span class="smcap">The German Retirement, February-March, 1917</span></p></div> -</div> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_241" id="Page_241">[Pg 241]</a></span></p> - -<hr class="tb" /> - -<p>The situation, therefore, when the 2/4th Battalion -returned to the line after its rest, the last two days of -which were spent at Gaudiempré, was that Corps and -Divisional staffs were eagerly seeking information as to -any indication of the enemy's expected retirement between -Arras and Monchy-au-Bois, this being the only sector -between Arras and the Somme now left in his possession, -which he had held at the end of the Somme operations. -This entailed a heavily increased burden of night patrolling -duties on all troops in the line.</p> - -<p>On the 24th February the 2/4th Battalion moved into -Bellacourt, relieving the 1/5th K.O.Y.L.I. in Brigade -reserve, taking over the front line from the 1/4th K.O.Y.L.I. -on the following day. The sector lay between Ransart and -Blairville to the left of that previously occupied, and was -held with three companies in front trenches and one in -support. Battalion Headquarters were in Grosville.</p> - -<p>The German lines opposite this sector possessed two -features of particular interest in the Blockhouse, a strongly -defended salient, and the Talus, a machine-gun post pushed -some 200 yards forward of their main line in a hillside -embankment. Two sunken roads and a watercourse in -No Man's Land added to the interest of life and provided -our patrols with some useful work.</p> - -<p>The advancing British troops in the south this day -were beginning to threaten Puisieux, the possession of -which would lay open to attack the Bucquoy Ridge to its -north. It was clear that with British forces on the -Bucquoy Ridge the German reserve lines of defence and -gun positions about Adinfer Wood (which supported the -lines now opposite the 173rd Brigade) must either retreat -precipitately or run a serious risk of being cut off. Requests -for information from Brigade consequently became -more and more insistent, and information was passed to -the Battalion that the lines opposite had actually been<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_242" id="Page_242">[Pg 242]</a></span> -evacuated. Officers' patrols under 2/Lieuts. A. G. Croll, -A. M. Duthie, T. J. Bell and D. S. Boorman, which -covered No Man's Land, especially in the vicinity of the -Blockhouse and the Talus on the nights of the 24th and -28th, however, elicited unmistakable signs of occupation -of the German defences. But the desultory nature of the -enemy's machine-gun fire, and of his shell fire from the -direction of Adinfer Wood, the marked decrease in the -number of Véry lights put up by him at night and the -constant sounds of transport moving on the roads in rear -of his lines all provided indications that his retirement -could not long be delayed. The patrols frequently heard -working parties hard at work in rear of the enemy's lines, -and it afterwards transpired that these were busily -engaged in mining the roads over which our advancing -troops must pursue the German retreat.</p> - -<p>It had long been known that the enemy was hard at -work on a highly fortified defensive line which left his -front defences at Arras and ran in a south-easterly direction -in front of Cambrai to near St Quentin. This line, -the famous "Hindenburg" line, was roughly parallel to -that now occupied by our advancing troops in the south -and some eight miles distant from it. Reports from -British airmen showed that the Hindenburg line was now -the scene of feverish activity on the part of the enemy, -and this information seemed to confirm the probability -indicated by the results of our patrolling that the relinquishment -of the Monchy-Arras line was imminent.</p> - -<p>A most unfortunate incident occurred on the night of -the 28th February, when a strong patrol under 2/Lieut. -R. K. Caparn returning to our lines was fired upon by the -sentries who apparently had failed to grasp the prearranged -signal, with the regrettable result that 2/Lieut. -Caparn was very seriously wounded and L./Corpl. Warren, -Ptes. Anderson and Vickery were killed.</p> - -<p>On the morning of the 2nd March the Battalion was -relieved by the 2/2nd Londons and withdrew to Divisional -reserve in billets at Basseux and Bailleulval. Three days' -training ensued, followed by a move on the 6th to -Humbercamp.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_243" id="Page_243">[Pg 243]</a></span></p> - -<p>The 173rd Brigade had now "side-stepped" to the -right, and on the 7th March the 2/4th Londons once more -entered the front line, relieving the 1/6th North Staffords -in a sector known as Z1 immediately opposite Monchy-au-Bois. -Battalion Headquarters opened in Bienvillers-au-Bois.</p> - -<p>This sector was about three miles south of that previously -occupied, and similar conditions prevailed both as -regards ground and the German retirement. No Man's -Land, which was here about 300 yards wide, fell gently -from our lines to the village of Monchy-au-Bois, which -had been made a network of defences by the enemy, his -first line passing immediately in front of the village. In -rear of the village the ground again rose gently to the -Adinfer Ridge.</p> - -<p>Bienvillers was almost daily given an unpleasantly -copious allowance of gas shells which caused numerous -casualties, principally to carrying parties from Battalion -Headquarters. Among these was Major Nunneley, who -was gassed on the 10th; his duties of second in command -were assumed by Capt. Spicer, the Adjutancy being filled -by Capt. A. Grover (1st Bedfordshire Regiment), who -had just been transferred to the 2/4th Battalion at the -request of Lieut.-Col. Dann.</p> - -<p>The long frost had now been succeeded by a remarkably -sudden thaw which created conditions of marked discomfort -in the trenches. The water pent up in the soil -for so long filled all the trenches to a depth of about two -feet, and the trench walls everywhere began to fall in, -throwing an enormous amount of work on the occupying -battalions in keeping them in a defensible condition.</p> - -<p>By night our patrols continued their activities, but -each night on approaching the enemy's lines were met -with brisk machine-gun fire, which showed increasing -activity each day. The Battalion observers also reported -daily columns of smoke in rear of the enemy's lines, -arising, as was found subsequently, from the systematic -orgy of destruction in which the Germans indulged prior -to their retirement. There was, moreover, during these -few days a very marked increase of shelling in our back<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_244" id="Page_244">[Pg 244]</a></span> -areas, the villages of Pommier, Berles, Bretencourt and -Bailleulmont all receiving an unusually large amount of -heavy fire.</p> - -<p>The 11th proved to be the most disturbed day of this -tour of duty, the enemy being exceedingly active in -machine-gun and trench mortar fire. About 100 light -shells, of which many were gas, fell in Bienvillers, fortunately -without inflicting loss on the Battalion. On the 12th -the 2/4th Londons were relieved by the 2/1st Londons and -moved in Brigade reserve to Pommier, where they continued -training. The XVIII Corps Commander inspected -the Battalion on the 16th.</p> - -<p>The Battalion Orderly Room now began to be inundated -by the Brigade Intelligence Staff with plans, -maps and all kinds of collated information as to the villages -which would lie in the line of the Division's expected -advance. All preparations were made for an immediate move. -Units in reserve were held in instant readiness to advance, -their first line transport wagons standing ready packed.</p> - -<p>The night of the 16th/17th March was unusually -quiet, and patrols pushed out by the 2/1st Londons about -daybreak on the 17th returned with the information -that the German trenches about Monchy were deserted. -A patrol sent forward from the 2/4th Battalion under -Capt. Bottomley was able to penetrate into Monchy itself -and returned about midday with the definite assurance -that the village was evacuated.</p> - -<p>The same day the order was given for a general advance -of the whole of the British forces from Arras to Roye.</p> - -<p>That afternoon the 173rd Brigade moved forward, the -2/1st Londons occupying the German front line at Monchy -and some high ground south of the village, while the 2/4th -Battalion was brought forward from Brigade reserve, -"leap-frogging" through the leading Battalion to the -German trenches east of the village. A Company pushed -ahead and reached a point about 300 yards west of Adinfer -Wood. Here the Battalion was in touch with the 6th -South Staffords on the right. North of Monchy village -the 2/2nd Londons continued the line with the 174th -Brigade on their left.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_245" id="Page_245">[Pg 245]</a></span></p> - -<p>The withdrawal of the Germans from the Monchy Salient -involved a continual shortening of our lines as the salient -became straightened out, and in order to effect this the -2/1st Londons were withdrawn on the night of the 17th -to Pommier, while the 2/4th Battalion continued its -advance, "squeezing-out" the 2/2nd Londons as it pushed -forward. By 5 p.m. the following day it had reached a -position near Rabbit Wood, a small copse on the North -side of Adinfer Wood, its left being now in touch with the -175th Brigade while the 46th Division kept pace with its -advance on the right.</p> - -<p>At midnight on the 18th/19th March the 2/4th Londons -were withdrawn in Brigade reserve to Ransart, which -village was now occupied by Brigade Headquarters. A -few hours later, at 4.30 a.m. on the 19th, the 2/1st Londons -once more took up the advance towards Boiry-Becquerelle.</p> - -<p>The advance of the 19th March covered a depth of -nearly 10,000 yards, and as it was achieved with very little -fighting it seems evident that the Germans' preparations -for withdrawal had been conducted with great skill. From -the time when they had left their original line at Monchy -they had almost entirely eluded close touch with our -pursuing columns, which were never able to harass their -retirement to any useful extent. Very little war material -fell into our hands, and it seems possible that valuable -hours were lost on the 17th before the order to follow up -the retirement reached battalions in the line.</p> - -<p>The pursuit of the Germans was rendered exceedingly -slow and arduous by the unspeakable destruction which -met our advancing columns at every step. Cross roads -had been mined and vast craters forced all wheeled traffic -to deviate on to the sodden fields adjoining. Trees had -been felled across the roads and added to the impediments -to the advance of our artillery. Everywhere the Germans -had committed wanton destruction—young fruit trees -were ringed, crops were burnt wholesale, and every sort -of live stock had been driven before them in their retreat. -The aspect of the villages was most peculiar. At a -distance they appeared to be untouched, and the red roofs -of the cottages showed nothing unusual. On a closer<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_246" id="Page_246">[Pg 246]</a></span> -approach, however, they were found to be ruined and the -walls knocked down so that the roofs had subsided intact to -the ground. Furniture, too heavy to be moved, had shared -in this destruction, and its débris was lying shattered among -the heaps of brick and stone. Yet further abominations -had been invented, and a series of ingenious "booby-traps" -were discovered in the shape of common articles -such as shovels and helmets. These were left lying about -in places where they were likely to be picked up by our -troops, and being connected with bombs and even large -mines caused explosions when they were touched.</p> - -<p>By noon on the 19th March the 2/1st Londons had -established themselves after some opposition from machine-gun -fire on the line between Boiry-Becquerelle and -Boyelles, in touch with the 46th Division in Hamelincourt; -but further efforts to advance from this position towards St -Leger, which was the objective for the day, were effectually -stopped by heavy enemy shell and machine-gun fire.</p> - -<p>Meanwhile the 2/4th Londons were once more moved -forward, leaving Ransart at about 3 p.m., and by 5.30 had -advanced to the line of the Boyelles-St Leger Railway -on the right of the 2/1st Londons.</p> - -<p>The 173rd Brigade now occupied the whole of the -58th Divisional front, being in touch with the Division -on its right and its left joining the 30th Division who were -facing Henin-sur-Cojeul. The line occupied by the 2/4th -and 2/1st Londons formed a marked re-entrant in the -British line, overlooking a valley which runs in a northerly -direction from St Leger to Henin-sur-Cojeul. The enemy -had apparently deployed on the further side of this valley -and was holding the line of the Henin-Croisilles Road. -Opposite the right flank of the 2/4th Londons he had for -the moment considerable advantage of ground over us, -as our line was dominated by a hill which protected -Croisilles from observation. The following day the Brigade -consolidated itself in this position, Brigade Headquarters -moving forward to Boiry-St Rictrude, which was also -occupied by the 2/3rd Londons in Brigade reserve, while -the 2/2nd Londons moved into close support in Boisleux-au-Mont.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_247" id="Page_247">[Pg 247]</a></span></p> - -<p>The line held by the Brigade extended from Judas -Farm near St Leger, where it was in close touch with the -Division on the right, in front of Boyelles and Boiry-Becquerelle -to the north branch of the Cojeul River. -North of the river the line was continued by the 30th -Division, who were endeavouring to force the villages -of St Martin and Henin.</p> - -<p>The Battalion had pushed outposts beyond its main -line on the railway to the Boiry-St Leger Road, but all -attempts to continue the general advance beyond this -line were frustrated by the heavy machine-gun and shell -fire with which the enemy sprayed the forward slopes of -the ridge down which the advance was to be made. At -the same time signs were not wanting that his withdrawal -had not reached its limit, for fires were observed in -Henin and Croisilles which indicated that the systematic -destruction which hitherto had been the prelude to his -retirement was proceeding with unabated vigour.</p> - -<p>On the 21st the 2/4th Londons were relieved by the -2/3rd in the right subsector and withdrew to Boiry-St -Martin in reserve. For three days the Battalion remained -here under conditions of extreme discomfort. The weather -was exceptionally severe and the ground was covered with -snow, while the open and bare hillsides were swept by -biting winds. Billets were non-existent owing to the total -destruction of the village, so that the change from the -front line to reserve brought very little of rest or easier -conditions. Indeed throughout this period of the advance -the terrible exposure proved a far more serious enemy -than the Germans themselves, and the casualties caused -through it were five times more numerous than those -caused by wounds.</p> - -<p>The Hindenburg line was now within measurable -distance, and the salient previously held by the enemy -being almost entirely flattened out it was found possible -to withdraw several divisions now in action. This was -the more desirable not only for the provision of as many -reserve divisions as possible for the impending offensive -against the Vimy Ridge, but also for the tasks of rendering -the devastated region covered by the advance habitable<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_248" id="Page_248">[Pg 248]</a></span> -to our forces, of repairing the ruined roads, and of bringing -forward the supplies of material necessary for further -operations. One of the important gains of the advance -was the reopening of direct lateral communication -between Arras and Albert. With their usual thoroughness -the Germans had completely destroyed the railway connecting -these two towns, the track being torn up and the -bridges demolished; and the complete reconstruction of -it presented one of the most pressing necessities in the -organisation of the new defences.</p> - -<p>The 58th Division, in accordance with this programme, -was now withdrawn, and on the 25th March the 173rd -Brigade handed over its sector to the 174th and withdrew -to Pommier, the 2/4th Londons being billeted at Monchy -and put to work on repairing the roads.</p> - -<p>Each Brigade of the Division now became split up and -battalions and companies were scattered far afield on one -or other of the necessary works, of which a few have been -enumerated above.</p> - -<p>On the 28th the 2/4th Londons moved further back -from the line to Grenas (on the Doullens-Arras Road) leaving -behind it two companies, A and C, which were attached to -VII Corps troops (C Company joining the 56th Division) -for road repairing at Wailly and Arras respectively.</p> - -<p>At the end of the month the Division, now attached -to XIX Corps, was concentrated, with the exception of -the detachments referred to, in the area of Frohen-le-Grand, -between Doullens and Auxi-le-Château, and on -the 1st April the 2/4th Battalion, less A and C Companies, -marched to fresh billets in Bonnières, continuing their -route the following day to Vitz Villeroy, some four miles -west of Auxi-le-Château.</p> - -<p>From the beginning of March the Battalion had experienced -continual rough handling, not only from enemy -machine-gun and shell fire, but also from the remarkable -amount of marching and counter-marching and exposure -to the elements which the pursuit of the Germans had -entailed. It must also be borne in mind that they had a -month previously been raw troops of whom practically -none had been under fire. The writer is, therefore, with<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_249" id="Page_249">[Pg 249]</a></span> -all the more pleasure able to testify to the excellent bearing -and strict march discipline of the Battalion as it swung -through Auxi-le-Château on the 2nd April. But if the -2/4th Battalion expected rest after its labours it was soon -to learn how illusive rest can be in modern war, for the -next day it returned to Auxi and embussed to Beaumetz-les-Loges -in the Arras area, when it once more took the -road and marched to Boiry-St Martin. Accommodation -here was provided for Headquarters and B Company in -old German dugouts, while D Company contented itself -with temporary and hastily constructed shelters in the -village.</p> - -<p>A week of hard work in laying new track on the Arras-Albert -Railway followed, and on the 12th the Battalion, -having been rejoined by A and C Companies, moved to -Pommier and thence to Achiet-le-Grand, where the remainder -of the 173rd, now under command of Brig.-Gen. -Freyberg, V.C., D.S.O., was concentrated.</p> - -<p>The Division was now in the Fifth Army area (Gough) -and attached to the V Corps.</p> - -<p>The remainder of April, with the exception of short -spells of training, was entirely devoted to working parties, -the principal tasks entrusted to the 2/4th Londons being -the formation of a large R.E. dump at Achiet-le-Grand, -the construction of a light railway at Ervillers and the -repair of the Ervillers-St Leger Road.</p> - -<p>During the period under review the Battalion received -one or two small reinforcements of N.C.O.'s and men, and -also the following officers:</p> - -<div class="hangindent8"> - -<p>18th March—2/Lieuts. G. H. Hetley, C. A. Clarke, S. M. Williams and -G. E. Lester, and 2/Lieut. Acason (18th Londons).</p> - -<p>27th April—2/Lieut. S. A. Seys (15th Londons).</p></div> - -<p>Casualties included Major W. A. Nunneley, gassed; -2/Lieut. R. K. Caparn, wounded; 2/Lieuts. A. M. Duthie -and S. P. Ferdinando, accidentally wounded; 2/Lieuts. -H. W. Hallett and G. G. Hunt, sick; and in N.C.O.'s and -men 10 killed, 25 wounded, and about 170 sick, chiefly -from exposure.</p> - -<p>The duties of signalling officer were taken by 2/Lieut. -E. C. Pratt.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_250" id="Page_250">[Pg 250]</a></span></p> - -<p>In February the Battalion was unfortunate in losing -2/Lieut. C. J. Graham, who joined Brigade Headquarters -as Intelligence Officer. He filled this appointment with -great success until March 1918, when he was appointed -Brigade Major in the 47th Division. He was decorated -with the D.S.O. and the M.C. with Bar.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_251" id="Page_251">[Pg 251]</a></span></p> -<div class="chapter"></div> -<hr class="chap" /> - - - - -<h2>CHAPTER XIV<br /> - -THE 1/4TH BATTALION IN THE BATTLES OF ARRAS, 1917</h2> - - -<p>Reverting now to the 1/4th Battalion, we have the task -of recording its part in the great battles of April and May -1917 which developed after the German retirement, some -account of which has been attempted in the preceding -chapter.</p> - -<p>On transfer from the First Army area the 1/4th -Battalion was billeted at Le Souich late on the evening -of the 10th March 1917. The following day was Sunday -and was observed as far as possible as a rest, and this day -the Battalion was joined by a reinforcement of officers, -2/Lieuts. J. F. Elders, T. Caudwell, S. Minear, C. J. Reid -and E. C. Hayes, all attached from the Queen's Westminsters. -On the 12th the Battalion marched in drenching -rain to Ivergny, the next village to Le Souich, but on arrival -the billets were found to be already occupied, and orders -were received to move a mile further on to Beaudricourt, -which village was reached about 4.30 p.m.</p> - -<p>At Beaudricourt the Battalion settled down to a steady -course of company training in preparation for active -operations. According to the Battalion custom, whenever -possible, the day's work was started by Commanding -Officer's parade, and the strictest attention was paid to -all points of parade discipline; while the drums beat -Retreat each evening in the village street. The training -included a good deal of route marching to harden the -troops after their long sojourn in trenches, practice attacks -from trench to trench, and "specialist" training, in the -course of which every man in the Battalion received the -rudiments of instruction in the Lewis gun. The opportunity -was also taken to reorganise the companies in -accordance with the then newly-evolved scheme, which -had the object of rendering the platoon a self-contained<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_252" id="Page_252">[Pg 252]</a></span> -fighting unit comprising only fighting ranks. The four -sections of the platoon were definitely organised as one -of Lewis gunners, one of riflemen, one of rifle-grenadiers -and one of bombers; and all administrative details in the -company, such as cooks, stretcher-bearers and company -runners, were collected into a "headquarter" section -under the immediate supervision of the company second -in command.</p> - -<p>The advantages of the new platoon organisation were -evidenced by practical demonstrations to the officers of -the division of methods of employing the various sections -in co-operation with each other in operations such as the -capture of a strong point. These demonstrations were -given by a selected platoon of the Rangers, and Gen. Hull -took the opportunity of announcing to the assembled -officers the rôle which it was expected the Division would -play in the coming attack.</p> - -<p>In the latter part of March the Battalion lost three -officers, 2/Lieuts. S. P. Stotter and R. W. Chamberlain to -hospital, and Capt. F. C. Grimwade seconded to VII Corps -School as Instructor.</p> - -<hr class="tb" /> - -<p>The intention of G.H.Q. for the offensive of 1917 was -to deliver a heavy blow against the German positions in -the Scarpe-Ancre Salient (see Map No. 9); and in conjunction -with this, and in order to secure the left flank -of the attack, to wrest from the enemy his commanding -positions on the Vimy Ridge, whence excellent observation -could be obtained over the Plains of Douai. This scheme -underwent considerable modifications before it was put -into operation, firstly to secure closer co-operation with -the French offensive on the Aisne; and secondly by -reason of the German Retirement of March 1917, which -altered the rôle of the Fifth Army and compelled them to -re-establish themselves in fresh positions facing the -Hindenburg line.</p> - -<p>The Hindenburg line in the vicinity of its junction -with the original German trench lines south-east of Arras -being the centre of the Battalion's operations in April and -May, a reference to the map will be of assistance to the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_253" id="Page_253">[Pg 253]</a></span> -reader in appreciating what follows. It will be seen that -the old trench systems (<em>i.e.</em> those held by the enemy until -March) crossed the valley of the Scarpe running southwards -through the eastern suburbs of Arras, as far as the Arras-Cambrai -Road, and then swinging south-westward followed -the valley of the Crinchon River. These trenches consisted -of two main systems about 2000 yards apart, the village -of Beaurains being incorporated into the first system and -that of Tilloy-les-Mofflaines into the second, with Mercatel -and Neuville-Vitasse in rear of the second system. About -three-quarters of a mile south of Tilloy was Telegraph -Hill, the line between being strengthened by the enormously -fortified redoubt known as The Harp. From the -southern extremity of The Harp the new Hindenburg line -(or rather system of trenches) struck off south-eastward, -including Neuville-Vitasse, crossing the valley of the -Cojeul River between St Martin and Heninel and passing -thence between Croisilles and Fontaine. Between the -west side of the Cojeul valley and the Scarpe at Fampoux -was a "switch" line known as the Wancourt line, which -crossed the Cambrai Road just east of Feuchy Chapel.</p> - -<p>The task originally allotted to the 56th Division was -the capture of Beaurains and Telegraph Hill.</p> - -<hr class="tb" /> - -<p>The 169th Brigade which had left the Neuve Chapelle -area in advance of the remainder of the Division had been -placed in line at Agny, opposite Beaurains, and to this -point the commanding officers of the 168th Brigade proceeded -on the 17th March to make the preliminary reconnaissance -for the attack. But the following day it was -found that Beaurains was clear of enemy and was already -occupied by the 169th Brigade who were following up -energetically. The reconnaissance being no longer required -the party returned to billets pending further orders.</p> - -<p>On the 18th Lieut.-Col. A. E. Maitland, M.C. (Essex -Regiment), was appointed to command the Battalion, and -on the 23rd the Division moved forward into a concentration -area in rear of Arras, the Battalion marching -from Beaudricourt at 9.30 a.m. and arriving in billets -at Beaumetz-les-Loges at 4.30 p.m. At Beaumetz the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_254" id="Page_254">[Pg 254]</a></span> -Battalion resumed its training programme though the -whole Brigade was held at short notice to move in view -of the possible further development of the enemy's withdrawal.</p> - -<p>It is worth while pausing for a moment to consider the -extraordinary achievement of G.H.Q. in delivering the -Arras-Vimy Ridge attack as it did on the 9th April. The -preparations were on similar lines to those for the Somme -offensive of the previous July, and were on an even vaster -scale owing to the increased number of the divisions -which it was proposed to employ and to the ever-growing -strength and weight of the British artillery. The preliminary -work of forming reinforcement and concentration -camps, laying fresh and increasing the capacity of existing -railway lines, arranging for water supply, dumps of -munitions and <em>matériel</em>, establishment of hospitals and the -hundred and one other essential tasks had been steadily -proceeding since the close of the Somme offensive in -November 1916.</p> - -<p>Imagine, then, the inevitable dislocation of the scheme -when, a comparatively few days before the attack was to -be delivered, the enemy suddenly withdrew on part of -the front from the positions it had been intended to -assault and betook himself within fortified lines of enormous -strength to the rear. Dumps, railheads, hospitals, water-supply, -concentration areas, guns, heavy siege and light, all -had to be pushed forward to fresh and rapidly selected -positions in an area which had been laid waste with all -the fiendish skill of which a resourceful enemy was capable, -and all the consequent modifications of objectives and -orders effected at the shortest possible notice. Not only -was this achieved, but it was achieved with such efficiency -as to produce on the 9th April the most striking single-day -success which had crowned the British Armies since the -outbreak of the War.</p> - -<p>The Battalion was soon called on for its share in this -"moving forward" process of the preparations for battle, -and on the 28th March it marched with the remainder of -the Brigade to positions in the old British trench system -opposite Beaurains, where for three days it was engaged in<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_255" id="Page_255">[Pg 255]</a></span> -supplying working parties. On the 1st April it was withdrawn -to Brigade reserve in Achicourt where it found -comfortable billets. A very large number of British -heavy batteries were in action here registering and wire-cutting -for the coming battle, and the continuous din of -our own guns was trying. The shells of one battery of -60-pounders firing from just in rear of the Headquarters -billet cleared the roof of the house by about 18 inches.</p> - -<p>In the meantime the pursuit of the Germans had been -maintained by the 56th Division, which with the 21st and -30th on its right and the 14th on its left comprised the -VII Corps (D'Oyly Snow). A relief had been effected on -the 1st April, the 168th and 167th Brigades taking over -the Divisional sector from the 169th which was withdrawn -to reserve. By the 2nd April, the Germans having reached -the Hindenburg system, the line became stabilised, and no -further important alteration occurred until the day of -battle. When the Battalion took over the advanced -trenches from the Rangers on the 3rd, therefore, the -positions which they occupied formed practically the -"start-line" for the 9th April.</p> - -<p>The 56th Division occupied a salient of which the -north-eastern face was on the Beaurains-Neuville-Vitasse -Road, and the south-eastern face lay opposite the north-west -corner of Neuville-Vitasse. On this side the British -positions had been pushed forward in the direction of -Neuville-Vitasse and posts were held in the old German -communication trenches leading back to the village.</p> - -<p>This sector was held by the Battalion with three companies -in the front line and one in reserve in a system -known as the Circular Work south-east of Beaurains. It -will be readily appreciated that as the advanced British -positions were outposts in different communication trenches -it was necessary in order to provide a good jumping-off line -for the battle to connect these up by continuous trenches -to form a front line, to supply that front line with support -lines and feed it with fresh communication trenches. -Clearly a good deal of digging was necessary in a very -short space of time, and the Battalion was heavily engaged -in this work during its tour of duty, which lasted until<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_256" id="Page_256">[Pg 256]</a></span> -the 7th April. The principal trenches dug were Deodar, -Poplar, Lime, Elm and Skin in the front system, and Gun, -How and New Battery as communication trenches.</p> - -<p>On the 4th April the British destructive bombardment -began and continued daily according to a prearranged -programme until the day of battle. This met with comparatively -little retaliation.</p> - -<p>On the 7th an inter-battalion relief was effected, the -Battalion vacating the line in favour of the Kensingtons -and Rangers who were respectively detailed as right and -left assaulting battalions. The London Scottish moved -to the old British line at Agny while the 1/4th Londons -returned to dugouts in the railway cutting at Achicourt. -The following day battle positions were occupied, the -London Scottish moving forward to close support in rear -of the Kensingtons, and the 1/4th Londons to Brigade -reserve in the Circular Work.</p> - -<p>The Division's objectives for the 9th April were as -follows:</p> - -<p>The 168th (left) and 167th (right) Brigades were to -advance through Neuville-Vitasse to the first objective -which was an arbitrary line (the Blue line) skirting the -east edge of the village and facing the Hindenburg system. -(<em>Note.</em>—The Hindenburg line between Telegraph Hill and -the Cojeul River was known as the Cojeul Switch.) This -first phase was entrusted in the 168th to the Kensingtons -and Rangers, the latter battalion on the left being prepared -to adopt special measures and form a defensive flank -facing north should the 14th Division be checked at -Telegraph Hill.</p> - -<p>After a pause on this objective of about four and a -half hours the London Scottish (168th) and 1st Londons -(167th) were to "leapfrog" through the leading troops -and carry the Cojeul Switch, the Scottish objectives being -Back, Card and Telegraph Hill trenches (north of the -Neuville-Vitasse-Wancourt Road). Here a further pause -was to be made, after which the third phase of the battle -would be taken up by the 167th Brigade, who would -advance, covering the whole Divisional frontage on to the -Wancourt line (Brown line).</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_257" id="Page_257">[Pg 257]</a></span></p> - -<p>To return to the 1/4th Battalion. The day spent in -Achicourt prior to manning battle positions produced the -first serious German retaliation to our bombardment. As -already remarked Achicourt was "stiff" with batteries -and also contained a very extensive and important -ammunition dump. Doubtless the Bosche decided that -the quickest way to silence our guns was to destroy their -supplies of shell, and from 11.30 a.m. until 5 p.m. he -bombarded the village, causing a good many casualties in -the Battalion and firing several houses which formed part -of the dump. The village square, moreover, was packed -with lorries loaded with shell waiting to move forward -with the batteries, and unluckily the enemy obtained some -direct hits on these. For some time the flying fragments -rendered the place remarkably unhealthy. Excellent work -was done in saving two lorries by Major H. Campbell of -the Kensingtons. He well earned his D.S.O. by driving -two of the blazing lorries out of the square into a place -of safety.</p> - -<p>The battle positions occupied that night by the -Battalion were as follows:</p> - -<div class="center"> -<table width="90%" border="0" cellpadding="4" cellspacing="0" summary="battle positions"> - <tr> - <td class="tdc">A </td> - <td>Company </td> - <td>(Lorden)—New Battery Trench.</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdc">C</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td>(Bowater)—Southend and Margate Trenches.</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdc">D</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td>(Spiers)—Astride the Neuville-Vitasse Road in Battery and New Battery Trenches.</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td colspan="3">Battalion Headquarters—In North End (Circular Work).</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdc">B </td> - <td>Company </td> - <td>(Stanbridge)—Attached as "moppers-up" to the Kensingtons.</td> - </tr> -</table></div> - -<p>The role of the Battalion was laid down to provide for -various eventualities that might arise according to the -degree of success achieved by the assaulting battalions, -and it was therefore held in readiness either to assist the -Rangers in forming a defensive flank in case of failure by -the division on the left, or to lend weight to the Scottish -attack on the Cojeul Switch.</p> - -<p>At 5.30 a.m. on the 9th April, after a hurricane bombardment -of the German lines, the British barrage lifted -and the attack began. The advance of the 56th Division -was deferred until two hours later to allow the 14th -Division, whose start-line was less advanced, to come into<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_258" id="Page_258">[Pg 258]</a></span> -line, and accordingly at 7.30 a.m. the Rangers and Kensingtons -moved to the assault, followed by B Company of -the 1/4th Londons who were equipped with Stokes mortar -shells for dealing with deep dugouts.</p> - -<p>B Company's job in mopping-up proved easier than had -been expected, for the German trench garrisons had been -confined to their deep dugouts for some days by the -intensity of our bombardment, and the resultant difficulties -with which they had been faced in getting their -rations and water up from the rear made them on the -whole not undisposed to surrender; and in a short time -the Battalion, in Brigade reserve, was cheered by the sight -of bodies of German prisoners marching in fours down the -road to Beaurains in a dazed and exhausted condition.</p> - -<p>By 9.30 a.m. the Blue line on the whole of the Brigade -front was in our hands, and its consolidation was at once -put in hand by the assaulting troops with assistance from -the 512th Company R.E. and a company of the Cheshire -Pioneers. At 11.20 a.m. the Scottish moved forward on -a three company front to attack the Cojeul Switch. Their -advance was met with heavy machine-gun fire, and -although one company succeeded in gaining Back Trench, -the furthest of the three lines forming the Cojeul Switch, -and in pushing patrols beyond it, the battalion was forced -ultimately to fall back to Telegraph Hill Trench, the front -line of the Switch System and that nearest to Neuville-Vitasse.</p> - -<p>At 12.30 p.m. the 1/4th Londons were ordered to -advance to fresh positions on the western edge of Neuville-Vitasse, -where they came under the orders of the 167th -Brigade. The move was completed by 4 p.m. with A -Company in Tree, C in Leaf and D in Pine; B Company -(still under the orders of the Kensingtons) having by now -withdrawn to reorganise in Deodar Lane after their fight.</p> - -<p>As reports of the attack on the Cojeul Switch came in -it became clear that a gap existed between the London -Scottish and the 7th Middlesex, who had advanced to the -assistance of the 1st Londons on their right, and at 5 p.m. -Brigade ordered the Battalion forward to fill this gap. -The three available companies moved forward at once, but<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_259" id="Page_259">[Pg 259]</a></span> -on emerging from Neuville-Vitasse it was found that touch -had been regained by the Scottish and the Middlesex, and -the companies therefore took up a position on the eastern -edge of the village in support to the Middlesex.</p> - -<p>In the meantime the third phase of the attack, namely, -the advance of the 167th Brigade to the Wancourt line, -had been definitely checked by machine-gun fire, as had -also that of the 14th Division on the left; so that the -day's fighting ended with the 14th Division in possession -of Telegraph Hill and The Harp, and the northern end of -the Cojeul Switch; the 56th occupying the Cojeul Switch -astride the Neuville-Vitasse-Wancourt Road; and the -30th on the right approaching the Wancourt line in -the vicinity of the Neuville-Vitasse-Henin Road—a very -substantial advance for the day.</p> - -<p>The 168th Brigade captures for the day amounted to -5 officers and 635 other ranks, all of the 163rd R. I. Regt., -9 machine-guns, 2 granatenwerfer, 1 minenwerfer, and 2 -heavy trench mortars, together with large quantities of -small arms and ammunition.</p> - -<p>In the evening the Battalion was rejoined by B Company, -and Battalion Headquarters advanced to a dugout -in rear of the start-line for the day. The night was marked -by bombing operations in the Cojeul Switch which had -the wholesome effect of clearing out the few remaining -pockets of Bosche, and by 7.30 a.m. on the 10th touch had -been gained with the 14th Division on the left, while the -56th Division's right had been extended further south and -the London Scottish had possessed themselves of the -whole of the Back-Card-Telegraph Hill system.</p> - -<p>A remarkable instance of initiative on the part of a -private soldier, which occurred on the night of the 9th April, -is worth recording. Pte. Turner, a runner of D Company, -lost his company and strayed into the German line. -Finding a dugout entrance he began to descend the stairs, -when he heard voices; and as the owners of the voices -were evidently Huns he announced his arrival by throwing -a Mills bomb down the dugout. The occupants apparently -thought they were outnumbered and promptly gave -themselves up to the number of 1 officer and 16 other<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_260" id="Page_260">[Pg 260]</a></span> -ranks. Turner marshalled his bag in a shell hole outside, -and the next morning was found with them, all apparently -quite content to be under the leadership of one British -private, outside Neuville-Vitasse. Turner's coolness was -rewarded with the Military Medal.</p> - -<p>Early on the 10th the weather, which had hitherto -been cold and wet, became yet worse and the landscape -was soon white with snow, from which trenches and shell -holes gave no protection.</p> - -<p>Immediate arrangements were made by VII Corps to -complete the previous day's objectives, and an attack on -the Wancourt line was delivered at noon, the 56th Division -attack being entrusted to the 167th Brigade. During -this attack the 1/4th Londons remained in support and -withdrew to their former position in the trenches on the -western edge of Neuville-Vitasse.</p> - -<p>The assault of the 10th April was only partly successful -on the Corps front, but the pressure was maintained on -the 11th. By noon on that day the 56th Division, whose -advance had developed into a flank attack along the -Hindenburg line, had cleared the Cojeul Switch as far -south as the Cojeul River and occupied the villages of -Wancourt and Heninel.</p> - -<p>While these successes had been gained south of the -Scarpe an equally striking victory had been gained north -of the river where the XVII Corps (Fergusson) of the -Third Army and the Canadians (Byng) and 1 Corps -(Holland) of the First Army had swept the enemy from -his long established positions on the Vimy Ridge to the -plain east of it, and had sensibly tightened our grip on -the mining area of Lens.</p> - -<p>Preparations were at once made to follow up this very -striking success, and VII Corps issued orders for the -advance to be resumed on the 14th over the watershed -dividing the Cojeul valley from that of the Sensée. The -13th was therefore devoted to preparations for this attack, -in forming advanced dumps and moving forward batteries, -and the 168th Brigade was placed under orders to advance -at short notice, though no actual move occurred during -the day.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_261" id="Page_261">[Pg 261]</a></span></p> - -<p>On the 14th April the enemy barrage was much heavier -than it had been on the 9th, and under a murderous fire -the 169th Brigade, which attacked on the 56th Division's -front, was forced after some initial success back to its -start-line. That night the 168th Brigade was ordered forward -to form a defensive flank in the Cojeul Switch facing -north-east, and accordingly the 1/4th Battalion moved -after dark from the Back-Card-Telegraph Hill area, which -they had occupied earlier in the day, to relieve the Queen's -Westminsters on the right of the advanced line, with the -London Scottish on their left and the Kensingtons and -Rangers respectively in support and reserve.</p> - -<p>The relief was completed by 4 a.m. on the 15th with -the exception of an advanced post pushed well down the -forward slope of the valley towards Heninel. This was -allotted to two platoons of B Company, but owing to the -complete devastation of the area, and the absence of landmarks, -the guides detailed to these platoons failed to find -the post, and its relief had to be postponed until the -following evening.</p> - -<p>The Battalion now experienced another change of -command, and Lieut.-Col. Maitland having fallen sick it -was taken over by Major H. Campbell, D.S.O., attached -from the Kensingtons to command with the acting rank -of Lieut.-Col. as from the 12th April.</p> - -<p>The 15th proved to be a day of inaction, though the -enemy's artillery was continuously active over the whole -Battalion area. No further advance was attempted on -the 16th and no action occurred during the early hours of -the day, with the exception of a local counter-attack by -the enemy, directed against the 50th Division on our left, -in the course of which he managed to re-establish himself -on the ridge in the vicinity of Wancourt Tower.</p> - -<p>During the afternoon the hostile shelling slackened -considerably, but at about 4.30 p.m. warning was received -that he was preparing a counter-attack in force, and at -7.30 a barrage of terrific intensity fell on the Battalion's -trenches. The front line companies in accordance with -the prearranged scheme of defence at once cleared the -advanced trenches and pushed forward Lewis gun sections<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_262" id="Page_262">[Pg 262]</a></span> -about 60 yards into No Man's Land in order to smash up -any attack that might be delivered. By this time darkness -was gathering and movement becoming hard to detect. -At about 8 o'clock, however, the enemy was observed -advancing in close formation to the attack. Our Lewis -guns at once opened fire and were magnificently supported -by the artillery. The attack was completely smashed and -no German reached our lines. The enemy barrage continued -without abatement for about an hour, during -which the whole Battalion area was effectively searched -and a great many casualties caused. By 9 p.m., however, -the bombardment slackened, and after a few hours of -desultory shelling died out altogether.</p> - -<p>During the evening the sector held by the London -Scottish was also subjected to severe shelling but no -infantry action occurred, and it was evident that the -whole weight of the attack had fallen on the 1/4th Londons' -sector. The heaps of German dead which were visible in -No Man's Land on the following day bore striking testimony -to the accuracy of the Battalion's Lewis gun fire.</p> - -<p>During the attack excellent work was done under -heavy fire by the medical officer, Capt. Havard, R.A.M.C., -and the medical orderlies. The Aid Post was merely a -corrugated iron shed built in the side of a sunken road -and afforded no cover from the shell splinters which were -flying in all directions.</p> - -<p>The 17th April passed without incident on the -Battalion's front, though on the left the 50th Division -recaptured Wancourt Tower, the possession of which gave -us complete command of the high ground between the -Cojeul and the Sensée. That evening an inter-battalion -relief took place, the Rangers relieving the 1/4th Londons -and the Kensingtons taking over from the London Scottish. -The relief of A Company had, however, to be postponed -until the following night owing to the approach of daylight.</p> - -<p>On relief the Battalion withdrew to deep dugouts in -the Cojeul Switch about 800 yards west of Heninel. These -were large and well constructed, and accommodated the -whole Battalion underground without overcrowding. The -strength of the position was enormous, and it seemed a<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_263" id="Page_263">[Pg 263]</a></span> -matter for congratulation that the British attack had -succeeded in dislodging the former occupants with comparatively -so little opposition. It pointed to the fact that -no well-defined earthwork defence is in the long-run proof -against an attack delivered by well-trained troops supported -by tanks and a sufficient weight of heavy artillery; and -indeed, as will be seen later, the capture of "pillboxes" -and scattered shell hole defences proved a greater obstacle -in the third Battle of Ypres later in the summer.</p> - -<p>The 56th Division was now withdrawn to Corps -reserve; and after spending a day in the dugouts the -Battalion was relieved on the afternoon of the 19th by -the 16th Manchesters (30th Division), withdrawing after -relief to billets in Arras.</p> - -<p>Although the opening phases of the offensive involved -the Battalion in comparatively little fighting, it had been -continuously engaged in the general rough-and-tumble -of shell holes and subjected to fairly continuous shell fire -since the opening of the battle. Its losses during this -period amounted in officers to: 2/Lieut. T. Siddall, killed; -2/Lieuts. P. Pyne and L. W. N. Jones, wounded; Rev. -S. F. Leighton Green, C.F., wounded at duty.</p> - -<p>The battle had now completely achieved its object -as originally conceived by G.H.Q. The enemy was dislodged -from the high ground on a wide front, and -the resultant change of positions afforded our troops -advantages of observation and drier foothold; and had -Sir Douglas Haig been a free agent he would at once -have transferred his intentions to the northern area, where -he was desirous of launching his Messines and Ypres -offensives. In deference to the needs of our Allies, however, -it was necessary to keep the Germans active without -respite on the Arras front to which they had already -drawn large reserves, and this was the more important -in view of the ghastly collapse of the Russian Empire -and the consequent liberation of enemy troops for the -Western Front. Active operations were, therefore, pursued -for some time longer on the Arras front, though -perhaps they should not strictly be regarded as part of -the Battle of Arras.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_264" id="Page_264">[Pg 264]</a></span></p> - -<p>After the withdrawal of the 56th Division from the -line, fighting broke out again on a wide front both sides -of the Scarpe on the 23rd April, and continued with bitterness -until the 26th though with comparatively little -success. Some progress was made on both sides of the -Cojeul River, and the village of Guémappe added to the -British gains.</p> - -<p>The 19th April was the occasion of the Battalion's -first visit to Arras, with which town it became so intimately -connected in the later stages of the War. At -this date the town was not seriously damaged although -it had lain a short two miles from the German lines for -over two years, and with the exception of the railway -station and its immediate vicinity was still quite healthy -for reserve billets. The Battalion was accommodated in -the barracks of the Citadel, which formed a welcome change -from sixteen days of shell holes and dugouts. On the 21st -the Battalion embussed for Bayencourt where it encamped -in the Coigneux valley. Two days were occupied here -in resting and reorganising, and advantage was taken -by all ranks during leisure hours of the opportunity to -revisit the Battalion's old haunts at Hébuterne and to -cross unmolested to Gommecourt Park. On the 24th the -Battalion moved at short notice to Gouy-en-Artois, arriving -in billets there at 8 p.m. While at Gouy the Battalion -was inspected by the Brigadier-General.</p> - -<p>The 56th Division was now once more placed under -orders for the line, this time in the VI Corps area, the -sector held by the 15th Division being taken over by the -167th Brigade on the 29th April. The 168th Brigade, -being once again in Divisional reserve, moved from Gouy -to Simencourt on the 27th April, and on the following -day into Arras, where preparations for further active -operations were made in billets. The few days in Arras -were much enlivened by the excellent show given by the -Bow Bells in Arras Theatre.</p> - -<p>The impending operation was to be an attempt to -break through the enemy's defences on a large scale, the -Fifth, Third and First Armies all being employed on a -front from Fontaine-lez-Croisilles through Chérisy and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_265" id="Page_265">[Pg 265]</a></span> -St Rohart Factory to a point north of Plouvain. The -VI Corps, consisting of the 3rd and 56th Divisions in line, -took up the frontage from the Scarpe to the Cojeul River, -the 56th Division's objective being on a line running -north and south between St Rohart Factory on the Arras-Cambrai -Road and the Bois du Vert.</p> - -<p>The sector now held by the Division was about 1000 -yards east of Guémappe and Monchy-le-Preux and lay -sidelong on the spurs and side valleys descending to the -Cojeul River. The enemy's defences were far more difficult -to cope with on this occasion than on the 9th April. -The Hindenburg and Wancourt lines had been passed; -the Drocourt-Quéant line was still far ahead; and the -intervening area which was now to be attacked was intersected -in all directions by short isolated trench lines in -the siting of which the enemy had displayed his usual skill -in the use of ground. His defences, disposed in great -depth, were strengthened by large numbers of machine-guns -cunningly placed for mutual support in sunken roads -and shell holes. It was known, however, that the deep -dugouts of the Hindenburg line did not exist in this area, -and it was hoped that a heavy and continuous bombardment -beforehand would sufficiently reduce his numbers -and morale to give success to the British infantry.</p> - -<p>The 56th Division attack was to be carried out by -the 167th and 169th Brigades, the 168th being relegated -to reserve, though available for the assistance of either -assaulting brigade as occasion might arise.</p> - -<p>The Battalion remained in Arras until the 2nd May -when, warning being received that "zero" for the attack -was fixed for 3.45 a.m., the following day it moved at -4 p.m. to assembly in The Harp. In order to secure close -co-operation between the Brigades, 2/Lieut. O. D. Garratt -was attached to the 169th Headquarters as liaison officer.</p> - -<p>The night of the 2nd May was fine and cold, though -the early hours were misty, and at 3.40 a.m. on the 3rd -when our bombardment increased to hurricane intensity it -was still almost dark. At this hour the Battalion stood to, -and the vivid flashes of the guns and the streams of S.O.S. -signals from the enemy lines showed that inferno had<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_266" id="Page_266">[Pg 266]</a></span> -broken loose, and the attack had begun. The British -barrage was good, but the enemy was evidently expecting -the attack as his counter-barrage was quick and his -machine-gun fire devastating in volume and accuracy.</p> - -<p>The 3rd May was a day of great disappointment all -along the line, and comparatively little success was -achieved. The 169th Brigade were held up by a German -strong post in Cavalry Farm and, after occupying a -precarious position between it and the river for some -hours, were forced back by a heavy counter-attack to -their original line. The 167th Brigade was also unable -to progress.</p> - -<p>It seems clear that zero hour was too early. In the -darkness it was impossible for the troops to see visual -signals of command, and the delay caused by having to -pass messages down the line owing to the din of the -bombardment resulted in the attacking waves moving off -zig-zag in shape with officers at the advanced points. In -such a formation they became an easy target for the -enemy machine-guns. Some greater success might, moreover, -have been achieved had the creeping barrage -moved forward more quickly, which would have been -quite possible in view of the comparatively unbroken -state of the ground.</p> - -<p>Early in the day the 1/4th Londons had moved forward -to positions in shell holes at Airy Corner, near Feuchy -Chapel, and at 8.30 p.m. the Battalion, now definitely at the -disposal of the 169th Brigade, received orders to advance -to positions in the Wancourt line just south of the Arras-Cambrai -Road. This move was followed by another at -11 p.m., which brought the Battalion into close support -of the front line in Tank Trench, apparently in anticipation -of a further German counter-attack. The forward -movement was made under a very heavy gas shell bombardment, -but gas helmets were worn and practically no -casualties were suffered. Shortly after arrival in the new -position the enemy shelling slackened, and as no further -action appeared imminent the Battalion was once more -withdrawn to the Wancourt line, the move again being -made in gas helmets. A move of 8000 yards in the dark -with respirators is no easy matter to troops laden with -battle equipment, and the men were somewhat exhausted -on regaining the reserve position. A few hours' rest, -however, put them to rights, and at 3 p.m. on the 4th the -Battalion was again under orders to move forward. The -losses of the 167th and 169th Brigades on the previous -day were so severe that immediate relief was necessary -for them, and the 168th Brigade therefore took over the -whole Divisional front; the Battalion relieving the Queen -Victorias and Queen's Westminsters in the subsector -between the Arras-Cambrai Road and the Cojeul River, -with the London Scottish on its left.</p> - -<div class="figcenter" style="width: 500px;"> -<img src="images/i_b_266fp.jpg" width="500" height="337" alt="" /> -<div class="caption"><p><span class="smcap">Cavalry Farm, May 1917</span></p></div> -</div> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_267" id="Page_267">[Pg 267]</a></span></p> - -<p>The sector was occupied with two companies (C and D) -in the front line and two (A and B) in support, Headquarters -occupying a dugout on the hillside between -Guémappe and Wancourt. The relief was completed without -incident at 2.30 a.m. on the 5th May. The enemy -evidently anticipated a renewal of our attack for throughout -the day the lines were subjected to heavy shelling. -Some doubt existed as to whether the enemy still remained -in occupation of Cavalry Farm and of Tool Trench to the -north of it, and as no movement was visible two daylight -patrols were sent out in the afternoon to investigate. -These patrols managed to gain the edge of Cavalry Farm, -where they drew sharp rifle fire from the enemy which -caused some loss; and their object being gained the patrols -withdrew bringing their casualties with them. At about -10 p.m. the enemy's bombardment increased to a heavy -barrage, which was especially severe on the sector held by -the 14th Division on the right of the river, and it seemed -likely that an enemy attack was in preparation. The -14th Division indeed called for artillery support, and this -was promptly supplied by our artillery, which opened a -terrific barrage on the enemy lines. After an artillery -duel of about two hours the shelling on both sides -slackened. The 6th and 7th May were both marked by -heavy shelling, which on the part of the enemy seemed -mostly to be directed towards searching for our battery -positions in rear, though some loss was caused to the -Battalion, and 2/Lieuts. Reid and Caudwell were killed,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_268" id="Page_268">[Pg 268]</a></span> -and 2/Lieut. Hutchins wounded, with several N.C.O.'s -and men killed and wounded by stray shells.</p> - -<p>On the night of the 7th May the Battalion handed -over its sector to the Rangers and withdrew to the old -German trench system north of Wancourt, Headquarters -being accommodated in Marlière Caves. In this position -the Battalion remained a couple of days, during which -the enemy's shell fire continued at intervals but without -causing serious damage.</p> - -<p>The attack of the 3rd May was the last general attack -on the Arras front, and subsequent operations were confined -to local enterprises up and down the line with the -object of improving and rounding off the positions gained. -On the Divisional front a minor operation of this sort was -immediately necessary in clearing up the situation at -Cavalry Farm and Tool Trench, and the 1/4th Londons -and London Scottish were detailed to capture these -positions.</p> - -<p>The Battalion moved into the line for this attack on -the evening of the 10th May.</p> - -<p>The objectives allotted to it were Cavalry Farm and -the trench south-east of it, and Tool Trench for a -frontage of 250 yards north of the Cambrai Road; while -the London Scottish were to extend the attack on Tool -Trench for a further 600 yards to the north and also -capture a small copse on the extreme left. The attack -was to be made in each battalion on a two company -front, each company advancing in two waves on a front of -two platoons. One company of the Rangers was attached -to the 1/4th Londons and one of Kensingtons to the -Scottish.</p> - -<p>For two days previous to the 11th, which was fixed -for the operation, the Divisional artillery had been carrying -out destructive bombardments with 4·5-inch howitzers on -the objectives as well as on the communication trenches -leading to the rear and on the portion of Tool Trench -outside the limits of attack. On the evening of the 10th -a practice 18-pr. barrage was placed on the objectives, -but the enemy reply was so efficient that it was decided -to conduct the assault without any increase in our normal<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_269" id="Page_269">[Pg 269]</a></span> -artillery activity and to endeavour to carry the operation -through as a surprise.</p> - -<p>At 8.30 p.m. on the 11th May the assaulting waves -moved forward, the 1/4th Londons' attack led by D -Company (H. N. Williams) on the right of the road and -A Company (Lorden) on the left, with B (Beeby) and C -(Rees) Companies in support. The surprise effect was -excellent, and was heightened by the fact that all the -objectives except the Farm itself were hidden from our -trenches by a slight spur which here drops down to the -Cojeul River. The enemy had thus, in the absence of a -barrage, no warning of the attack, and in a few minutes -the whole of the objectives were captured. Few prisoners -were taken, but a party of about fifty of the enemy, fleeing -from Cavalry Farm, were caught by our Lewis guns and -annihilated. Lewis gun posts were at once pushed forward -into No Man's Land, and the consolidation of the captured -trench begun. So quickly had all this happened that the -enemy artillery opening in response to an S.O.S. sent up -from their lines was harmless to the leading companies, -though it inflicted some loss on the support companies -which were moving up to our vacated front line.</p> - -<p>The consolidation of the captured position was aided -by the Cheshire Pioneers, who completed before dawn a -communication trench connecting Cavalry Trench with -the new front line.</p> - -<p>In the early hours of the 12th May the line was thinned -out and only a sufficient garrison left in the captured -position to hold it against counter-attack, the surplus -platoons being withdrawn to the old line. After some -hours the German barrage subsided and we were left in -undisputed possession of our capture. This neat little -operation cost but few casualties considering the advantages -gained, and the completeness of the surprise is -illustrated by an incident which occurred early the -following morning. One of our advanced Lewis gun posts, -hearing movement in front, challenged. A reply being -received in German, fire was opened. Two of the team -went forward to collect the bag and found a German -officer shot dead and a Sergt.-Major badly wounded. The<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_270" id="Page_270">[Pg 270]</a></span> -maps which were taken from the officer's case showed -some of our battery positions accurately, and it appears -that this luckless pair were coming forward to Cavalry -Farm to "spot" for a German artillery shoot, ignorant -of the fact that it was in our hands.</p> - -<p>The Battalion continued to occupy its new line until -the evening of the 13th May, when the 168th Brigade was -relieved by the 167th. The Battalion handed over its -sector to the 1/3rd Londons and withdrew to a reserve -position on the Cambrai Road near Tilloy, arriving there -in the early hours of the 14th May. The following day -a further move was made to billets in Arras.</p> - -<p>After the Brigade's withdrawal from the line its gains -were extended on the 18th and 19th by successful local -operations carried out by the 167th Brigade, who completed -the captures of the north end of Tool Trench and -also parts of Hook and Long Trenches adjoining it.</p> - -<p>On the 19th May the 168th Brigade moved still further -back to rest billets in Berneville, and two days later -the whole Division was withdrawn, with Divisional Headquarters -at Warlus.</p> - -<p>During May the Battalion received the following -officer reinforcements:</p> - -<div class="hangindent"> - -<p>Lieuts. E. P. M. Mosely and A. S. Ford.</p> - -<p>2/Lieuts. L. W. Archer and H. T. Hannay (commissioned from -the ranks of the Battalion).</p> - -<p>2/Lieut. F. Barnes (20th Londons).</p> - -<p>2/Lieuts. H. V. Coombes, N. Nunns, H. E. Jackman and W. G. -Port (21st Londons).</p> - -<p>2/Lieut. S. A. Gray (23rd Londons).</p> - -<p>Capt. Maloney, R.A.M.C., vice Havard to London Field -Ambulance.</p></div> - -<p>During the same period 2/Lieut. Wreford was wounded -and Lieut. P. F. Smalley evacuated to hospital.</p> - -<p>The Battalion remained in rest for about three weeks, -which were officially occupied in training and reorganisation. -The actual training was, however, reduced to the -minimum, and the Battalion's really serious duty became -that of training for Battalion and Brigade sports, and -the relaxation which these provided combined with the -determination with which all ranks strove to gain physical<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_271" id="Page_271">[Pg 271]</a></span> -fitness for the purpose of the sports was undoubtedly -quite as valuable as hours spent on the parade ground. -On the 23rd the Brigade was paraded for inspection by -Gen. Hull, who presented ribands to those who had been -decorated in the recent operations.</p> - -<p>The following day the Battalion moved from Berneville -to fresh billets in Simencourt, where the routine of training -and recreation proceeded. Early in June the 56th Division -returned to the line, the 168th Brigade moving to Montenescourt -on the 11th and to Achicourt on the following day.</p> - -<p>Eight days later the 168th Brigade relieved the 169th -in the line, the Battalion moving into left support positions -at Wancourt, where it relieved the 1/2nd Londons. Here -the Battalion remained for five days supplying working -parties chiefly in connection with the construction of new -communication trenches to connect up the recently gained -advance posts with the front line, and in connecting up -the posts themselves to form a new front line. These days -passed without incident beyond a certain amount of enemy -shelling and trench mortar fire, and on the evening of the -26th June the Battalion moved forward to relieve the -Kensingtons in the front line system, its right flank resting -on the Cojeul River, where it joined the London Scottish, -and its left flank about 800 yards north of the Arras-Cambrai -Road in Hook Trench. This relief was completed -by 1.30 a.m. on the 27th, and the sector was held with -three companies in front line and one in reserve.</p> - -<p>This tour of duty passed without important incident -though the enemy's artillery exhibited some activity, -principally against the back areas in the neighbourhood of -Wancourt. On the 1st July hostile aircraft were especially -active, making many unsuccessful attempts to pass the -barrage of the British anti-aircraft batteries. This unusual -anxiety of the German airmen to cross our lines was -possibly due to the presence in the Arras area of H.M. the -King, who was then visiting the troops in France and -staying at Bavencourt Château on the Arras-Doullens Road.</p> - -<p>That evening at 11 p.m. the 6th Queens of the 12th -Division took over the portion of the Battalion's sector -lying to the north of the Cambrai Road, and the following<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_272" id="Page_272">[Pg 272]</a></span> -evening the remainder of the sector was handed over to -the 5th Borders of the 50th Division, the Battalion withdrawing -on relief to billets in Achicourt, which it reached -at 5 a.m. on the 3rd July.</p> - -<p>The part of the 56th Division in the Arras fighting was -now finished, and the Division was withdrawn into Corps -reserve for a welcome rest. The fighting on the Hindenburg -line was practically over, though we shall have -further reference to make to it in connection with the -2/4th Battalion in another chapter.</p> - -<p>The weeks of battle had placed a great strain on the -Battalion. Long marches to and from the line, shell hole -bivouacs, heavy working parties, bad weather and severe -shelling had all had their effect, and a period of rest and -reorganisation was needed.</p> - -<p>At 9.30 a.m. on the 4th July the 168th Brigade embussed -for the Le Cauroy area, in which it had trained a -year previously prior to occupying the Hébuterne trenches. -The Battalion was allotted billets in Denier where it -entered on a short period of rest and reorganisation in -which the training was interspersed with the various -rounds of the Brigade boxing competition, the finals of -which were held on the 15th July.</p> - -<p>In June Lieut. H. Jones was seconded to VI Corps -School as Instructor; Capt. V. S. Bowater was evacuated -to hospital; and 2/Lieut. C. W. Denning joined the -Battalion, being posted to the 168th L.T.M. Battery early -in July; 2/Lieuts. L. W. Wreford and A. C. Knight rejoined -the Battalion in July.</p> - -<p>The Division was now warned of an impending move -to another theatre of activity, and this move occurred on -the 23rd, when the Division left the VII Corps to join the -Fifth Army in the Ypres Salient.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_273" id="Page_273">[Pg 273]</a></span></p> -<div class="chapter"></div> -<hr class="chap" /> - - - - -<h2>CHAPTER XV<br /> - -THE 2/4TH BATTALION IN THE BATTLES FOR -BULLECOURT, 1917</h2> - - -<p>We must now follow the battles which had been fought -during the latter part of the German retirement south of -the area covered by the battles of Arras.</p> - -<p>All along the line the German retreat had been conducted -steadily and with marked success on to the Hindenburg -line. Although on the whole the retreat in the south -had not been accompanied by heavy fighting, the attempts -of our troops to push forward and define rigidly the -Hindenburg system had met with resistance which had -developed here and there into fighting of the most -desperate character. Nowhere had these local conflagrations -been more fierce than in the line of retreat to -Bullecourt. In this sector the retiring enemy was opposed -by Australian troops, who together with the 7th and 62nd -(and later the 58th) Divisions composed Gough's Fifth -Army.</p> - -<p>A successful advance on 2nd April in this region was -followed by an attempt by the Australians on the 12th to -carry the line Bullecourt-Lagnicourt, but without success -owing to the inadequacy of the supporting artillery fire. -Severe fighting ensued, and a counter-attack of a serious -nature by the Germans on the 15th was ultimately held.</p> - -<p>On the 3rd May the Australians' efforts met with more -success, and they were able to penetrate the Hindenburg -system on the immediate right of Bullecourt. The 62nd -Division on their left, however, were unable to progress -in the village itself, with the result that the ground held -by the Australians formed a salient badly enfiladed both -from the village and from the direction of Quéant.</p> - -<p>The position of Bullecourt in the Hindenburg system -was peculiar. From Heninel the line ran in a generally<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_274" id="Page_274">[Pg 274]</a></span> -south-easterly direction towards Bullecourt in front of the -Fontaine-lez-Croisilles-Bullecourt Road. At Bullecourt the -line turned due east, passing some 500 yards in front -of Riencourt. Bullecourt itself was between the front -and support trenches of the first system, so that the front -line formed a very pronounced salient. East of Riencourt -the line once more took an abrupt turn, this time almost -due south, passing in front (or to the west) of Quéant.</p> - -<p>Bullecourt lies on a spur which falls northward into -the Hendecourt valley, and its exits on all sides form a -network of sunken roads. At the period under review the -majority of the houses were already in ruins, and these, -together with numerous fences enclosing orchards and -gardens, converted the space between the front and -support Hindenburg lines into a serious obstacle, of which -the strength was increased by an intermediate trench half-way -through the village. The Germans had, moreover, -tunnelled the village in such a way that they could bring -reinforcements rapidly and safely to bear on any threatened -point. The small salient gained by the Australians -straddling the Hindenburg trenches on the immediate east -of the village, uncomfortable as it was for the occupants, -was a serious menace to the enemy position; and it was -reasonable to anticipate that the Germans would not easily -acquiesce in this partial envelopment of their flank.</p> - -<p>During the early days of May the Australians in the -salient were subjected to numerous counter-attacks, while -by dint of hand-to-hand fighting the 62nd Division had -gained a firm footing in the village. On the 12th May -the assault was renewed by the 7th Division, and fighting -of a desperately severe character developed in the village -in which our troops met with varying fortunes. In the -eastern half of the village the 2nd Queen's made some -progress, but at the western end no advance was possible. -The situation at the sunken cross-roads at the north-east -corner of the village was obscure, and north of this point -no part of the enemy's support line was gained. Such -was the position in "Bloody Bullecourt" when the 58th -Division began to take over the line.</p> - -<p>On the afternoon of the 12th May the Company Com<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_275" id="Page_275">[Pg 275]</a></span>manders -and Intelligence Officer of the 2/4th Battalion, -together with their Platoon Sergeants, were sent forward -to reconnoitre the positions held by the 15th Australian -Infantry Brigade with a view to taking them over. From -Vaulx-Vraucourt to Noreuil the party followed the dried-up -bed of the Hirondelle River, the scene of many a -desperate struggle during the preceding month. The air -was oppressive with the heat of a premature burst of -summer weather; the stench from hundreds of unburied -bodies and the ominous silence of the guns prior to the -attack which was to be renewed the following day caused -the whole atmosphere to be heavy with the presage of -hard fighting to come. On arrival at the Australian -Headquarters the party was informed of the attack -organised for the following morning, so that further -reconnaissance that day was useless. After the barrage -had died down, however, on the 13th a fresh start was -made up the communication trench, which was really -the Noreuil-Riencourt Road, a bank on the east side -preventing observation from Quéant.</p> - -<p>The Australian attack was successful, although the -position was not entirely cleared up, and they were now -holding the first two lines of the Hindenburg system, the -support line being our front line, and the former front -line now forming our support. The intense artillery fire -to which this ground had many times been subjected had -resulted in the almost total obliteration of the trench -lines as such, and the position was really held in a line -of shell craters.</p> - -<p>The arrangements for relief being completed, the 2/4th -Battalion moved up on the night of the 13th/14th May to -take over the left sector of the Brigade front, from the -sunken cross-roads at the north-east corner of Bullecourt -to a small communication trench about 500 yards to the -east, C Company (Leake) and D Company (Parker) being -in the front line with A (Cotton) and B (Bottomley) -in support. Battalion Headquarters occupied a central -position in the support line. A detached post under -2/Lieut. S. A. Seys was established in a shell hole west of -the sunken cross-roads in order to secure touch with the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_276" id="Page_276">[Pg 276]</a></span> -7th Division in the village. From the right of the 2/4th -Battalion the Brigade sector as far as the Noreuil-Riencourt -Road was taken up by the 2/3rd Londons.</p> - -<p>The actual process of the relief, which was not completed -until 1.30 a.m. on the 14th May, was exceedingly -trying owing to the heavy shelling of the communication -trench. Amongst the casualties caused by this were -2/Lieut. F. Stickney (wounded) and Capt. P. H. Burton, -R.A.M.C. (killed).</p> - -<p>The Germans, having been ejected from their trench -system in this sector, were holding on in a system of unconnected -shell holes on the lower slopes of the spur, and -their main line of resistance appeared to be a sunken -road running laterally across our front, and distant about -300 yards. A new and evidently unfinished trench line -crossed the opposite hillside in front of Hendecourt.</p> - -<p>The heavy shelling which had interfered with the -relief continued throughout the night, our front and -support lines being heavily bombarded, while the back -areas were subjected to incessant searching with high -explosive and shrapnel.</p> - -<p>Shortly after the Battalion had taken up its position -a party of some 12 Germans with a machine-gun attempted -to attack C Company's line. The attack completely failed -owing principally to the great gallantry of Capt. Leake. -2/Lieut. S. G. Askham, who was in the trench with Leake -at the time, writes:</p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p>We were inspecting the sentry posts and our attention -was drawn to considerable movement near our front line. -Without a moment's hesitation Capt. Leake leapt over -the parapet and in a few seconds we heard revolver shots -being fired. He had single-handed attacked a German -machine-gun team who were on the point of establishing -a post in a position overlooking the whole of our front -line. He killed four of the team and the remainder -were wounded by our rifle fire. Leake returned with -three prisoners and their machine-gun, which he also -secured.... Leake was a tower of strength to both -officers and men in the Company and we all felt that he -richly deserved the V.C., for which he was afterwards -recommended.</p></div> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_277" id="Page_277">[Pg 277]</a></span></p> - -<p>The continued bombardment now began to cause -difficulty in controlling the situation, for early in the -morning a direct hit on the Brigade signal depôt -completely wrecked all the instruments and killed the -occupants of the dugout. Later, communication by power -buzzer was also cut, and for the remainder of the day all -communication between the Brigade and the battalions -in the line had to be effected by runners.</p> - -<p>This intermittent shelling continued until shortly after -midday on the 14th, when the enemy was observed from -our lines to be massing for attack in the neighbourhood -of a ruined factory some 500 yards to our front. A call -was made on our artillery, which immediately put down -a heavy barrage under which the enemy's troops melted -away. The hostile bombardment now increased in intensity -and a terrific barrage came down on our lines, -continuing with unabated violence all through the night. -This barrage was for the greater part in enfilade from -the direction of Quéant, and was therefore particularly -accurate and deadly; under the rain of shells our -trenches, or what little remained of them, were completely -obliterated, the greater part of our front line supplies of -rifle ammunition and bombs were blown up and several -Lewis guns with their teams were buried. Through this -appalling ordeal the Battalion stuck to their posts grimly, -though suffering severe losses. Shortly before midnight -the enemy launched an attack on the 7th Division in -Bullecourt village, in which by dint of fierce hand-to-hand -conflicts they wrested from the 7th Division some of its -gains of the previous two days.</p> - -<p>We have already pointed to the importance of the -salient now occupied by the 2/4th Londons, and, fully -alive to the position, the Battalion was not surprised by -the attack which broke upon it at dawn the next day. -The importance to the Germans of the possession of this -part of the line may be gauged by the fact that the troops -employed by them were the 3rd Prussian Guard.</p> - -<p>At 4 a.m. on the 15th the enemy were seen to be -massing for the attack. Our artillery once more responded -magnificently to the call made on them, and their barrage<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_278" id="Page_278">[Pg 278]</a></span> -caused severe disorganisation in the enemy's ranks. The -attack was stubbornly pushed home by the Germans, but -their barrage being lifted prematurely from our front line -an opportunity was afforded to our leading companies to -prepare for the shock. Advantage of this momentary -respite was taken to reinforce the front line, three platoons -of B Company filling the gaps of D Company, and C Company -being strengthened by a party of A Company. These -precautions cost the enemy dearly, and his assaulting -columns were met by a deadly rifle and Lewis gun fire -from the whole of our line, which completed the work of -the artillery. The German attack was broken and not a -single enemy reached our line. The remnants of the -assaulting battalions turned and fled down the hill, leaving -an appalling number of dead and wounded.</p> - -<p>Beyond the right of the Brigade front a small party -succeeded in effecting a lodgment in a portion of the front -line held by the Australians, but these were shortly afterwards -ejected with the assistance of a platoon of the -2/2nd Londons.</p> - -<p>By six o'clock the enemy counter-attack was definitely -and finally broken and small parties could be seen -doubling away from before Bullecourt; and a further -attempt to launch an attack on the Australians about -half an hour later was effectively stopped by our artillery.</p> - -<p>After the attack had failed the enemy settled down -to a slow but steady shelling of our line for the remainder -of the 15th, which was spent in endeavouring to reorganise -the battered remnants of the Battalion and to put the -lines once more in a defensible condition. Under cover -of darkness the 2/1st Londons took over the left subsector -from the 2/4th Londons, which withdrew to reserve dugouts -in the sunken road in front of Noreuil.</p> - -<p>The Battalion had found itself. In its first serious -action it had stood up to a frightful bombardment which -had lasted without abatement for nineteen hours, and at -the end of it had seen the backs of the Prussian Guard. -It had paid, however, a severe price. The total casualties -during the two days in the line were, in officers, in addition -to the two already mentioned, 2/Lieuts. E. C. Pratt and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_279" id="Page_279">[Pg 279]</a></span> -T. Stoaling (killed); Capts. G. E. A. Leake and H. C. -Long (wounded); and in N.C.O.'s and men 68 killed, -196 wounded and 2 missing.</p> - -<p>Capt. Leake had behaved with the utmost gallantry -throughout the attack. He was hit after the attack itself -was over by a shell which fell on his Company Headquarters, -wounding also his second in command, Capt. -Long, and several of his Company staff. While being -conveyed on a stretcher to the Aid Post, Leake was again -severely hit by a shell which burst almost under the -stretcher, killing two of the bearers. After the shelling -had subsided he was evacuated, but died in hospital a -fortnight later. For his magnificent behaviour he was -recommended by Lieut.-Col. Dann for the Victoria Cross, -and eventually was awarded the D.S.O. a few days before -his death. This was conferred on him by Gen. Gough, -who visited for the express purpose the C.C.S. in which -Leake was lying. Lieut.-Col. Dann was awarded the -D.S.O. for his excellent work in this action. Awards of -the Military Medal were made to L./Corpls. Spencer and -Selby, and Ptes. Grierson, Olinski and Spence.</p> - -<p>For three days the Battalion remained in the sunken -road supplying carrying parties to the front line. The -destruction caused by the hostile bombardment was such -that all the necessary trench supplies in munitions and -material had to be completely renewed, and, moreover, -the battalion in the line was dependent on its supporting -troops for their water supply. This imposed a very heavy -strain on the 2/4th Battalion for the back areas were still -continuously shelled, largely with gas shell, and particularly -during the hours of darkness when the carrying parties -were at work; and the relief of the 173rd Brigade by the -175th which ensued on the night of the 18th/19th May -was welcome.</p> - -<p>That night at 11 p.m. the Battalion handed over to the -2/12th Londons (175th Brigade) and marched to rest -billets in Bihucourt, where it remained until the 29th, -engaged in reorganisation and refitting and training. -During this period the gaps in the Battalion were partly -filled by reinforcements of two officers, 2/Lieuts. J. H. L.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_280" id="Page_280">[Pg 280]</a></span> -Wheatley and E. P. Higgs, and a large draft of N.C.O.'s -and men. The 2/4th Londons were visited on the -20th May by Lieut.-Gen. Birdwood, commanding the -Australians, who congratulated Lieut.-Col. Dann on the -Battalion's achievement.</p> - -<p>During the latter half of May the 58th Division extended -its left flank, taking over in succession from the -7th and 62nd Divisions both of which had suffered severely. -By the end of the month the Division was occupying a -front of 4000 yards with two brigades in line. The 173rd -Brigade took over the left subsector with the 2/1st and -2/2nd Londons in line, and the 2/3rd Londons in close -support, while the 2/4th Londons moved on the 31st -May in Brigade reserve to Mory, where they continued -training.</p> - -<p>Map No. 11 shows the position at this date. It will -be seen that north-west of Bullecourt the Hindenburg line -on the Divisional front was still not captured, though on -its left the 21st Division was in possession of the front -trench as far as the Croisilles-Fontaine Road. The 58th -Division sector consisted for the greater part of isolated -shell hole defences.</p> - -<p>There thus remained in this area a length of about -2500 yards of Hindenburg front and about 3500 yards -of Hindenburg support trench still to be captured from -the enemy in order to complete the allotted task.</p> - -<p>The first two days in the new sector passed without -incident beyond the usual artillery activity. Early on -the morning of the 3rd June a gas attack was carried out -on the enemy's lines opposite our left by a discharge of -197 gas projectors. The gas cloud formed appeared highly -satisfactory, and evidently caused the enemy some perturbation -as his artillery promptly put a barrage on our -forward posts. This, however, inflicted but little loss -owing to the previous withdrawal of the garrisons as a -precautionary measure.</p> - -<p>Various signs of nervousness exhibited by the enemy -about this time suggested that he expected the continuance -of our offensive, and indeed in view of the successes -already gained he might with reason anticipate that he<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_281" id="Page_281">[Pg 281]</a></span> -would not be left in unmolested possession of the remaining -sectors of the Hindenburg system.</p> - -<p>On the night of the 3rd/4th June the 2/4th Londons -relieved the 2/2nd Londons in the left subsector, A and B -Companies (Cotton and Bottomley) occupying the forward -posts with C and D Companies (Hewlett and Parker) in -support. The line opposed to the Battalion was entirely -in front of the Heninel-Bullecourt Road, with a support -line about 200 yards in rear of it. For the greater part -the line ran straight, but two small salients, the Knuckle -and the Hump, had been developed into strong points -of no mean order. The whole line was heavily wired, and -although the entanglements had suffered from our shell -fire they still presented a formidable obstacle, while the -patrols sent forward nightly from our posts obtained clear -evidence that the line was held in unusual strength.</p> - -<p>The most urgent work in this sector was the linking -up of our scattered shell hole posts to form a connected -line, and this was pushed on with all possible speed and -completed by the night of the 10th. Throughout this -tour of duty the enemy continued a fairly vigorous -bombardment of our trenches and back areas, which was -returned with interest by our artillery.</p> - -<p>On the night of the 11th/12th June the 2/1st Londons -took over from A, B and D Companies, while C Company -was relieved by the 2/7th Londons (174th Brigade). On -relief the Battalion withdrew in support to St Leger, -where Headquarters opened at the Château.</p> - -<p>During the days spent in support the Battalion was -reinforced by a large draft of N.C.O.'s and men, and by -two officers, 2/Lieuts. C. Potter and V. R. Oldrey. The -latter officer was most unfortunately hit by a stray bullet -on the following day.</p> - -<p>The principal duty of the three days following relief -was the organisation and special training of A, B and -D Companies to take part in an assault of the Hindenburg -system opposite the Brigade front.</p> - -<p>The front of attack extended from the sharp corner -just south of the Knuckle on the right to a point about -150 yards north of the Hump on the left. As the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_282" id="Page_282">[Pg 282]</a></span> -proposed operation included the capture of two lines of -trench it was decided by Corps to divide it into two days' -work in order to simplify the question of the co-operation -of the 21st Division on the left. Accordingly the plan was -that the first day the 173rd Brigade should capture the -allotted portion of the front line, while the second day -the area of operations should be extended and the 21st -Division on the left should join with the 173rd Brigade -in the assault of the support line.</p> - -<p>The troops detailed for the attack were in order from -right to left, 1 company 2/3rd, 1 company 2/1st, 1½ companies -2/2nd and 1 company 2/4th Londons. For the -purposes of the operation the companies of the 2/3rd and -2/4th Londons were respectively under command of the -officers commanding 2/1st and 2/2nd Londons. The -attack was to be delivered under a heavy barrage from -a strong concentration of guns of the 7th, 58th and -62nd Divisions and the Corps Heavy Artillery, together -with the massed guns of the three Brigade Machine-Gun -Companies. Arrangements were also made for the -provision of supporting rifle, Lewis gun and machine-gun -fire by the 21st Division.</p> - -<p>The 174th Brigade was to arrange for the establishment -of a line of posts along the sunken road in -prolongation to the right of the 173rd Brigade's objective.</p> - -<p>A Company (Cotton) was detailed for the first day's -attack, and the special task allotted to it by Lieut.-Col. -Richardson, commanding the 2/2nd Battalion, was the -capture of the sunken cross-roads to the left of the Hump -and of a German strong point in the front line about -100 yards north of them.</p> - -<p>The assembly was successfully carried out during the -night of 14th/15th June, and completed by about 2.15 a.m. -At 2.50 a.m. our barrage opened and the assaulting waves -moved forward to the attack in good order, keeping well -up to the barrage and suffering very little loss.</p> - -<p>The attack proved successful though it led to some -hard fighting. The actual advance was entrusted to two -platoons under 2/Lieut. Wheatley (right) and 2/Lieut. Bell -(left). The objective at this point was strengthened by<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_283" id="Page_283">[Pg 283]</a></span> -two "pillbox" machine-gun posts and was in line with -the trench already held on our left by the 21st Division, -from which it was divided by a double barricade; and -Lieut.-Col. Richardson took up his Battle Headquarters in -a dugout in their line, as did also Capt. Cotton. A third -platoon of A Company under 2/Lieut. Boorman assembled -in the 21st Division trench, and was formed as a bombing -party with others to rush the double barricade at zero hour -and to bomb the enemy out of their two pillboxes before -our barrage had lifted off the enemy trench in order to -clear it before the arrival of Bell and Wheatley with -their platoons. A good many casualties were therefore -inevitably caused to Boorman's platoon by our own shell -fire, and he reached the traverse next to the first pillbox -with only two corporals, Sherwood and Whitworth. Here -the two N.C.O.'s threw bombs, which landed neatly -outside the two doors of the pillbox, and directly they -exploded Boorman dashed round the traverse with a -bomb in each hand. Sheltering himself against the wall, -he threw his bombs into each door of the pillbox before -the Germans inside had recovered from the effects of -Sherwood and Whitworth's attack. This neat piece of -work secured the pillbox to us, but before Boorman could -reorganise his party for the further advance to the second -pillbox Bell's platoon had occupied the trench. A few -men of Wheatley's platoon were also found to be in -line. The greater number, including Wheatley himself, -apparently overshot the objective, not recognising it in -its battered condition, and must all have been killed or -captured.</p> - -<p>According to the prearranged scheme, Bell's platoon -was withdrawn shortly before dawn, and Boorman was -left in charge of the captured position with the remains -of his own and Wheatley's platoons. The 2/2nd Londons -were now in touch on our right, and by arrangement with -them the trench was divided between the two Battalions, -the 2/4th Londons being responsible from the 21st Division -on the left as far as the communication trench running -back from the Hump to the German support line. The -shelling now resumed more moderate proportions, although<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_284" id="Page_284">[Pg 284]</a></span> -it continued sporadically all day, and casualties were continually -being caused in our ranks. The Battalion suffered -a severe loss early in the day in Sergt. Riley, who was -acting C.S.M. for the attack. He had done very good -work indeed ever since the Battalion had been in France, -and had throughout shown complete indifference to -danger. He was shot through the chest while accompanying -Boorman on a reconnaissance to endeavour to -trace Wheatley's missing platoon.</p> - -<p>In the meantime arrangements had been made for -the further attack on the support Hindenburg line on -the following morning, and detailed orders had been -issued which provided for the assembly of the assaulting -troops in the front line—the first day's objective—by -2.10 a.m. on the 16th June. This intention could not, -however, be carried out, for at about 10.30 p.m. on the -15th a heavy counter-attack was launched against our -new positions which caused severe fighting, in the course -of which the enemy once more gained a hold on the centre -of his old front line and also at two other points.</p> - -<p>On the front held by the 2/4th Londons the counter-offensive -took the form of a bombing attack, the approach -of which along the communication trench opposite the -right of our sector was disclosed by the enemy's own star -shells, which rendered plainly visible the forms of the -attackers waist high above the battered sides of the -trench. A shower of Véry lights was at once put up, and -with the assistance of these the attack was driven off by -Lewis gun and rifle grenade fire, arrangements for which -had been made most skilfully by Boorman earlier in the -day. None of the enemy succeeded in penetrating our -position, but many of his dead were left on the ground.</p> - -<p>It was, however, so essential to our purpose that the -enemy should not have the advantage of a day's respite -before the attack on the support line, that immediate -arrangements were made for a counter-attack to eject -him once more from his old front line in order to leave -this clear as our jumping-off point. The recapture of the -line was entrusted to the 2/1st and 2/3rd Londons, who -succeeded by surprise in completely recovering the whole<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_285" id="Page_285">[Pg 285]</a></span> -of the front line at the point of the bayonet by 2.45 a.m. -on the 16th.</p> - -<p>At 3.10 a.m. the second day's attack opened. The -order of battle was the same as for the first day, but the -forces employed were larger, the 2/3rd Londons supplying -three companies, the 2/1st Londons three companies, -the 2/2nd Londons two companies and the 2/4th Londons -two companies (B under Bottomley and D under Parker).</p> - -<p>The attack, as for the first day, was made under a -creeping barrage supplied by the Divisional artillery and -the Brigade machine-gun companies, and the assault was -made in one wave with a "mopping-up" wave in rear -accompanied by a detachment of Royal Engineers for -consolidation work.</p> - -<p>This day again a good deal of difficulty seems to have -been experienced by the advancing troops in identifying -their objectives, which had become almost entirely -obliterated by our long-continued bombardments, while -the dust raised by the barrage rendered the recognition of -surrounding physical features almost impossible. The resistance -of the enemy all along the line was most stubborn, -and the unusual strength in which he was holding the -attacked position clearly indicated that the attack was -expected. The earliest reports which were received by -runner led to the belief that the objective on the two -flanks had been captured. No information from the -centre was forthcoming, and it gradually became evident -that the direction of the flank companies was at fault, -with the result that they had swung outwards leaving -in the centre a gap still occupied by the Germans, who -promptly began to bomb along the line against our unprotected -flanks. The attack of the 21st Division on the -left, moreover, failed throughout, and although a few -isolated parties succeeded in reaching a line of shell holes -in front of Tunnel Trench they were eventually forced -to withdraw.</p> - -<p>The orders issued to the assaulting wave were to capture -the Hindenburg support line and hold on to it until supports -should reach them, but all the attempts of Lieut.-Col. -Richardson to push forward his supporting troops were<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_286" id="Page_286">[Pg 286]</a></span> -frustrated by the intense rifle and machine-gun fire with -which the ground was continuously swept, and similar -efforts along the remainder of the front were stopped for -the same reason.</p> - -<p>At 11 a.m. the obscurity of the position induced the -Brigadier to make a personal reconnaissance in order, if -possible, to clear up the situation, but he found it -impossible to get along the captured German front line, -and therefore proceeded to the Battle Headquarters of -the 2/2nd Londons. The information obtained there led -to the belief that the 2/2nd and 2/4th Londons had carried -their objectives without difficulty and at comparatively -little loss, but that their flanks were in the air and in -danger of being turned by the bombing attacks of the -enemy. The support line was now entirely cut off as -runner communication was utterly impossible under the -enemy's devastating fire, and it was clear that our isolated -parties who were in the objective must be suffering heavy -losses.</p> - -<p>It has been difficult to establish what happened to the -two companies of the 2/4th Battalion owing to the heavy -casualties sustained, but it is evident that they also mistook -the objective and pushed on some 200 yards ahead -of it, where they came under intense fire from front and -flanks.</p> - -<p>The most advanced party appears to have been a -platoon of B Company under McDowell, who although -completely out of touch with the remainder of their company -held on most gallantly to the position they had -gained for some two hours, at the end of which time their -ammunition was exhausted and they were using a captured -German machine-gun. No sign of the promised supports -being visible, and the enemy evidently being about to -surround his little party, now reduced to a mere half-dozen, -McDowell determined to fight his way back to his -comrades, and began to withdraw steadily. During his -withdrawal he was hit, and on regaining consciousness -found himself alone. He continued his way back to our -lines, crawling from shell hole to shell hole, and managed -to collect four privates, all resolved to sell their lives<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_287" id="Page_287">[Pg 287]</a></span> -dearly. By this time he was completely surrounded, and -his little band was destroyed by rifle grenade fire; -McDowell himself was hit again and captured. To the -eternal shame of the enemy let it be recorded that he lay -for three days in the enemy trench before being sent to -their dressing-station, and not until six days after his -wounds were received were they dressed at all.</p> - -<p>A similar fate appears to have overtaken the remainder -of B and D Companies, and the probability is that having -overshot their objective they were outflanked and cut -off by parties of the enemy coming down the sunken -road from Fontaine-lez-Croisilles. Their mistake having -become evident to them, they endeavoured, like McDowell, -to fight their way back, but after making a gallant stand -were eventually killed or taken prisoners almost to a man. -It is believed from aeroplane reports subsequently received -that this gallant little body actually succeeded in maintaining -themselves against all attacks for nearly two days. -But all efforts to relieve them meeting with failure, they -at last fell gloriously rather than surrender.</p> - -<p>A similar lack of success attended the efforts of the -other battalions, and as a result of the two days' fighting -the Brigade held the front Hindenburg line and the sunken -road in rear of it, from the junction with the 21st Division -on the left to a point some 300 yards west of the Crucifix -cross-roads at Bullecourt.</p> - -<p>The casualties of the Brigade amounted to 48 officers -and 955 other ranks, those of the 2/4th Battalion for the -two days' fighting being:</p> - -<div class="hangindent"> - -<p>Capts. E. W. Bottomley and W. H. Parker, 2/Lieuts. S. M. -Williams and J. H. L. Wheatley, killed; Capt. E. N. Cotton -and 2/Lieut. T. J. Bell, wounded; 2/Lieuts. E. A. Monkman -and R. McDowell, wounded and missing, and 2/Lieut. -E. A. Stevenson, missing.</p> - -<p>In N.C.O.'s and men the losses totalled 7 killed, 53 wounded -and 139 missing, the majority being in B and D Companies.</p></div> - -<p>It became evident during the afternoon that the 173rd -Brigade, who were weak before they went into action, -would need relief that night, and arrangements were -therefore made for the 174th Brigade to take over the -line. In accordance with this arrangement the whole<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_288" id="Page_288">[Pg 288]</a></span> -Brigade front was taken over on the night 16th/17th June -by the 2/5th Londons, who pushed forward strong patrols -towards the Hindenburg support line. This, however, was -found to be held in strength by the enemy.</p> - -<p>With this somewhat disastrous day the idea of immediate -further offensive operations was postponed, and -the 174th Brigade settled down to consolidate itself in -the Hindenburg front line.</p> - -<p>The fighting spirit displayed throughout the operation -was splendid, and it is only to be regretted that the two -days' work had not been arranged for a one day battle. -As the event showed, the capture of the Hindenburg -front line on the 15th prepared the enemy for our attempt -to take the support line on the 16th, with the result that -on the second day severe casualties were inflicted on our -troops to no purpose.</p> - -<p>During the second action at Bullecourt an incident -occurred which is surely one of the most remarkable of -the whole War. We recount it in the words of the official -record, which appeared in the Battalion War Diary on -the 8th August:</p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p>No. 282496 Pte. Taylor J., of A Company, admitted -to 29th C.C.S. This man had been missing since Bullecourt -on the 15th June 1917, had been wounded and -crawled into a shell hole. He sustained a compound -fracture of the left thigh, and aided by Pte. Peters, -B Company, had lived on bully beef found on the bodies -of dead men. After being in the shell hole for over six -weeks Pte. Peters apparently was captured, for the -following day three Germans visited the shell hole and -shook Pte. Taylor's leg, but he feigned death. The following -day, not being able to obtain any food, he decided -to crawl back to our lines. His position was some distance -behind the German line. He dragged himself to the -parapet of the trench, threw himself over, crawled through -the wire across No Man's Land into the sector held by the -S. Staffords. Altogether he spent seven weeks and four -days behind the German lines.</p></div> - -<div class="figcenter" style="width: 500px;"> -<img src="images/i_b_288fp.jpg" width="500" height="337" alt="" /> -<div class="caption"><p><span class="smcap">Bullecourt, May-June, 1917</span></p></div> -</div> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_289" id="Page_289">[Pg 289]</a></span></p> - -<p>Pte. Taylor's story was subjected to severe scrutiny by -Lieut.-Col. Dann and by the Brigadier, and their opinion -of its truth is witnessed by the fact that he was awarded -the D.C. Medal. Pte. Peters' fate is unknown, and it is -regrettable that after his devotion to his comrade it was -not possible to make him a posthumous award for his -gallantry.</p> - -<p>On relief by the 2/5th Londons the 2/4th Battalion -marched to Divisional reserve camp in Mory Copse, where -it remained for four days in reorganising and training. -The month at Bullecourt had cost the Battalion 597 -casualties in all ranks, and a rest after the prolonged -operations was urgently needed.</p> - -<p>B and D Companies were for the moment practically -effaced, and the few remaining details were therefore -attached respectively to A and C Companies, these two -composite companies being placed under command of -Capts. E. N. Cotton and H. A. T. Hewlett.</p> - -<p>On the 24th June the 58th Division was finally withdrawn -from Bullecourt, its place being taken by the -7th Division, and Divisional Headquarters opened at -Courcelles on that day.</p> - -<p>The 2/4th Londons with the remainder of the 173rd -Brigade had moved on the 21st to Camp at Logeast Wood, -where a welcome fifteen days' rest was spent in training -and reorganising, working parties being supplied daily to -the R.E. dump at Achiet-le-Grand.</p> - -<p>During this period awards were made of the -Military Cross to 2/Lieut. D. S. Boorman, and of the -Military Medal to L.-Corpl. Coates, for their gallant conduct -on the 15th/16th June. The Battalion was joined on the -24th June by Capt. W. A. Stark and 2/Lieut. S. Davis, -and by drafts of 107 other ranks on the 21st June and -of 28 N.C.O.'s on the 4th July. This welcome accession -of strength, especially in N.C.O.'s, who had become very -few, rendered it possible once more to reorganise the -Battalion in four companies under Capts. E. N. Cotton (A), -G. H. Hetley (B), H. A. T. Hewlett (C), and A. G. Croll (D). -The duties of Intelligence Officer were taken over from -Capt. Croll by 2/Lieut. S. A. Seys, and on the 12th July, -Cotton having been evacuated to hospital, command of -A Company was assumed by Capt. D. S. Boorman, M.C.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_290" id="Page_290">[Pg 290]</a></span></p> - -<p>The period of rest at Logeast Wood was brought to a -close by a Battalion sports meeting, one of those quite -informal but very keenly followed affairs which always -have proved such an invaluable means of recuperation -for tired troops. The following day the reorganised -Battalion was inspected by the Colonel, and on the -8th July the Battalion marched through the devastated -region and the ruins of Courcelles, Sapignies and Bapaume -to Bancourt. Its route continued the following day to -Ytres, where six days in billets were occupied in parading -for inspection successively by the Divisional General -(Fanshawe), the Brigadier (Freyberg) and the IV Corps -Commander.</p> - -<p>The Brigade was now in Divisional reserve, the Division -having taken over a sector of line in front of Gouzeaucourt -and Havrincourt Wood. The British trenches here were -opposed once more to the Hindenburg system, which -had not been penetrated in this region. After severe -fighting in April round Epéhy our troops had established -themselves on high ground on the line Villers Plouich-Beaucamp-Trescault, -whence a series of spurs descend -gradually in a north-easterly direction towards Ribemont, -Marcoing and the Scheldt Canal—all destined to -witness bitter fighting in the Cambrai battle five months -later.</p> - -<p>The Gouzeaucourt-Havrincourt Wood sector was now -exceedingly quiet. This, to an extent, was of great -advantage to the Battalion, since nearly 40 per cent. of -its strength at the moment consisted of drafts newly -arrived who had not yet been under fire. It was possible, -therefore, for the new material to become properly -assimilated into the Battalion before further casualties -created deficiencies in the ranks.</p> - -<p>On the night 16th/17th July the 173rd Brigade took -over from the 174th Brigade the right of the Divisional -front from the neighbourhood of Villers Plouich to Queens -Lane, a communication trench 500 yards west of the -Beaucamp-Ribemont Road.</p> - -<p>The 2/4th Battalion remained in Brigade reserve for -a few days, Battalion Headquarters and A Company<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_291" id="Page_291">[Pg 291]</a></span> -being in huts in Dessart Wood, C and D Companies in -Gouzeaucourt Wood, and B Company attached to the -2/1st Battalion in a support trench south of Beaucamp. -Daily working parties were supplied by the Battalion for -trench repair and improvement work, but very little -incident worthy of record occurred. The principal excitement -was provided by the intelligence that a German -spy disguised as an officer of the R.F.A. was in hiding -in one of the numerous woods with which the countryside -is dotted, but the Battalion was not successful in tracking -him down.</p> - -<p>The only portion of the line in which there was any -degree of activity was in front of the left of the Brigade -sector, where an isolated spinney in the middle of No -Man's Land—here some 600 to 700 yards wide—was -always a target for the enemy's artillery. This spinney, -known as Boar Copse, was occupied by the Battalion in -the line as an advanced post, and it was decided to wire -round the edge of the Copse and connect it to our front -line by a communication trench. The duty of executing -the work fell to the 2/4th Londons, and a working party -of 4 officers and 180 N.C.O.'s and men was supplied under -Capt. A. G. Croll on the night 20th/21st July. As ill -luck would have it, the Germans selected this same evening -to endeavour to raid the outpost line occupied by the -2/9th Londons farther to the left. The raid was carried -out under an intense barrage, but our artillery answered -promptly to the call made on it and the raiders were -beaten off, leaving a prisoner in our hands. Unfortunately -the raid caused a certain amount of shelling on the Boar -Copse front resulting in a few casualties, among whom -was Capt. Croll. This was exceedingly bad luck and a -loss to the Battalion. Croll had done excellent work -since the arrival in France of the 2/4th Battalion and -had just received his company. His wound, though not -dangerous, was sufficiently severe to keep him in England -for almost a year. His company was taken over by -Capt. C. A. Clarke.</p> - -<p>The following night the Battalion relieved the 2/3rd -Battalion in the right subsector on a front of about<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_292" id="Page_292">[Pg 292]</a></span> -1500 yards, all the companies being in line and each -providing its own supports.</p> - -<p>The trenches were well sited and well dug, being -very deep and heavily traversed. Throughout this area -the communication trenches were of exceptional length, -Lincoln Lane in particular, which ran from Gouzeaucourt -Wood to Beaucamp, being over two miles long.</p> - -<p>Very little incident occurred during this tour of duty. -No Man's Land was patrolled nightly and appeared to -belong to us as no enemy were encountered.</p> - -<p>On the evening of the 30th July the Battalion was -relieved by the 11th Royal Scots and marched to the -light railway at Dessart Wood, whence it entrained to -Neuville-Borjonval, camping there for the night.</p> - -<p>The following day the Battalion moved by bus from -Neuville to Izel-les-Hameau, in the Arras area, the transport -under Major Nunneley moving by train from Bapaume -to Saulty and then by march route to Hameau.</p> - -<p>The whole Division was now put through a regular -course of re-equipment and training in preparation for -the heavy work it was to be called upon to do in the -offensive at Ypres. In this training particular attention -was paid to musketry, the necessity for this having been -clearly demonstrated in all recent actions, in which troops -had shown a tendency to use bombs or rifle grenades to -the exclusion of their rifles.</p> - -<p>During this period drafts of officers were received as -follows:</p> - -<div class="hangindent8"> - -<p>6th July—2/Lieut. F. A. Carlisle.</p> - -<p>20th July—Lieut. F. S. Marsh (7th Londons); 2/Lieuts. R. -Michell (6th Londons); and H. N. Bundle, -W. F. Vines, E. R. Seabury and C. C. H. -Clifford (13th Londons).</p> - -<p>25th July—Lieut. D. C. Cooke; 2/Lieuts. F. B. Burd and A. J. -Angel (13th Londons).</p> - -<p>1st August—2/Lieuts. J. McDonald and F. W. Walker; 2/Lieut. -C. S. Pike (7th Londons).</p> - -<p>9th August—2/Lieut. A. S. Cook (7th Londons).</p></div> - -<p>The Battalion changed its quarters on the 13th August, -leaving Izel for Denier, where it proceeded with its training. -Not all the time was devoted to work, but some<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_293" id="Page_293">[Pg 293]</a></span> -excellent sports meetings were held—and at the Brigade -Sports on the 20th the Battalion was successful in winning -the Cup presented by Brig.-Gen. B. C. Freyberg, V.C., -D.S.O. The importance of achievements of this nature -cannot be over-rated. The longer the War continued the -more obvious it became that if "rest" periods were to -do any good to the men at all they must be periods of -mental as well as physical rest, and games of all sorts -provide the required relaxation more than anything else. -On coming out of the trenches, weary, muddy, possibly -hungry, and almost certainly wet through, the men's first -moments of freedom were spent in a game of football.</p> - -<p>This was an aspect of the mentality of the -British soldier which we believe was never fathomed by -the French villagers. Their hospitality and devotion to -"les braves Tommys" was unfailing and genuine; but -we feel there was a lingering notion among our kind hosts -that this remarkable devotion to football was really a -confirmation of the time-honoured tradition that the -English are all at least a little mad.</p> - -<p>Reinforcements of N.C.O.'s and men were also being -fed into the Battalion during this period, and by the end -of August the strength in N.C.O.'s and men had increased -by about 240.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_294" id="Page_294">[Pg 294]</a></span></p> -<div class="chapter"></div> -<hr class="chap" /> - - - - -<h2>CHAPTER XVI<br /> - -THE THIRD BATTLE OF YPRES</h2> - - -<h3>I. <em>The 1/4th Battalion on the Menin Road</em></h3> - -<p>By the middle of May 1917 the British efforts on the -Arras front had achieved the success which had been -aimed at; and the offensive having been sufficiently -prolonged to assist the French in their operations on the -Chemin des Dames, the Commander-in-Chief was free to -turn his attention to the northern area of the British -lines.</p> - -<p>The first phase of the operation was opened on the -7th June, when a brilliant attack by the Second Army -(Plumer) carried the British line forward over the Messines -and Wytschaete Ridges, from which the Germans had -dominated our positions since October 1914. This operation, -which was one of the most completely successful -of the whole War, resulted by the 14th June in the -advancement of practically the whole Second Army front -from the River Warnave to Klein Zillebeeke.</p> - -<p>One by one the points of vantage held by the enemy -since the beginning of siege warfare were being wrested -from his grasp. In succession the Thiepval Ridge, the -Bucquoy Ridge, the Vimy Ridge and finally the Messines-Wytschaete -Ridge had fallen into our hands, and there -remained of this long series of heights only the series of -ridges which from Zillebeeke to Passchendaele dominate -Ypres on the east and north sides. It was towards these -hills that the British offensive efforts were now directed.</p> - -<p>The opening day of the offensive had originally been -fixed for the 25th July 1917, but owing to the intensity -of our bombardment the enemy in anticipation of attack -had withdrawn his guns, and the attack was therefore -postponed in order that the British guns might be corre<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_295" id="Page_295">[Pg 295]</a></span>spondingly -advanced. Combined with the systematic -bombardment of the enemy's trenches, strong points and -communications, a definite air offensive which ensured -our local supremacy in this respect, and also severe gas -shelling, were undertaken.</p> - -<p>The front of attack extended for some fifteen miles -from Deulemont on the right to Boesinghe on the Yser -Canal—the main attack being entrusted to the Fifth -Army (Gough) on a front of about seven miles from the -Zillebeeke-Zandvoorde Road to Boesinghe. The Second -Army on the right was to make only a limited advance -with the chief objects of widening the front of attack and -distributing the enemy's resistance. At the same time -the French on the extreme left (or north) would co-operate -in the marshes of the Yser.</p> - -<p>The offensive was finally launched on the 31st July -1917. The weather, which for a fortnight previously had -been fine and dry and had seemed to predict success, -broke on the day of the battle, and a merciless rain -which changed the whole area of operations to a sea -of mud fell without cessation for several days. The Corps -in line on the 31st July were from left to right the XIV -(Cavan), the XVIII (Maxse), the XIX (Watts), the II -(Jacob) and the X (Morland). On the whole the day -was one of marked success, the deepest advance being -made in the northern sector of the attack. From Westhoek -to St Julien the second German line was carried, -while north of the latter village the assaulting troops -passed the second line and gained the line of the Steenbeek -as far as the junction with the French, whose attack had -also met with complete success. South of Westhoek the -enemy's resistance had been more stubborn, and his positions -in Inverness Copse and Glencorse Wood which were -strongly held by machine-gun posts proved an impassable -obstacle. In this region, however, the German first line -was carried, and our troops managed to maintain themselves -far enough forward on the Westhoek Ridge to deny -the enemy observation over the Ypres plain; the position -gained running almost due south from Westhoek east -of the line Clapham Junction—Stirling Castle—Bodmin<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_296" id="Page_296">[Pg 296]</a></span> -Copse, and thence to Shrewsbury Forest, south of which -the German second line was occupied as far as the Ypres-Comines -Canal. South of the Canal also the Second Army -achieved considerable success.</p> - -<p>The rain, which began to fall in the afternoon, had a -most disastrous effect on the British plan of attack. -Movement over the shell-torn ground, which was transformed -into a series of bogs, rapidly became impossible -apart from a few well-defined tracks, and these naturally -became marks for the enemy's guns. The labour of -moving forward guns, relieving troops and completing -the forward dumps and other preparations for the next -bound was increased tenfold. The inevitable delay which -ensued was of the greatest service to the enemy, who -thereby gained a valuable respite in which he was able -to bring up reinforcements.</p> - -<p>The fighting of the next few days was, therefore, local -in character and consisted in clearing up the situation -and improving the British positions at various points in -the line, in the course of which operations the capture of -Westhoek was completed. Numerous counter-attacks by -the enemy were successfully resisted, and the line gained -on the 31st July was substantially held.</p> - -<hr class="tb" /> - -<p>The 56th Division moved from the Third Army area -on the 24th July to the St Omer area. The 1/4th Londons -entrained at Petit Houvin for St Omer and marched to -billets at Houlle, in the Eperlecques area, some five miles -north-west of St Omer. The Division was now attached -to the V Corps. Its training was continued during the -opening phase of the battle, after which the Division -moved on the 6th August to the II Corps area, the -Battalion occupying billets at Steenvoorde, where the -routine was resumed. On the 8th Major-Gen. D. Smith, -C.B. (who had commanded the Division since 24th -July, when Gen. Hull fell sick), left to command -the 20th Division and, two days later, command was -assumed by Major-Gen. F. A. Dudgeon, C.B.</p> - -<p>The same day a warning order was received that the -Division would shortly move into the line to take part -in the second phase of the battle, which was to be renewed -as soon as weather conditions should permit.</p> - -<div class="figcenter" style="width: 500px;"> -<img src="images/i_b_296fp.jpg" width="500" height="317" alt="" /> -<div class="caption"><p><span class="smcap">The Third Battle of Ypres, 1917 (1/4th Battalion)</span></p></div> -</div> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_297" id="Page_297">[Pg 297]</a></span></p> - -<p>On the night of the 12th/13th August the Division -moved forward into the line opposite Glencorse Wood, -which had been the centre of the enemy's resistance on -the first day of the battle, and took over from portions -of the 18th and 25th Divisions a sector between the -Menin Road at Clapham Junction and the cross-roads at -Westhoek, the 169th Brigade occupying the right of this -front with the 167th Brigade on its left. The 53rd Brigade -of the 18th Division remained in line on the right of -the 169th Brigade, between Clapham Junction and Green -Jacket Road, and came under the orders of Gen. Dudgeon.</p> - -<p>On the morning of the 12th the 168th Brigade in -Divisional reserve embussed at Steenvoorde for Canal -Reserve Camp, Dickebusch.</p> - -<p>The chain of machine-gun posts still held by the enemy -in Inverness Copse, Glencorse Wood and Nonne Boschen -was of immense importance to the Germans at this -juncture; as they screened the long Spur which, running -north-east from the Menin Road Ridge between the -Polderhoek-Gheluvelt Ridge and the Zonnebeeke Road, -formed an important <i lang="fr">point d'appui</i> in the Langemarck-Gheluvelt -line of defence. Their capture by the British -would, therefore, drive such a wedge towards the enemy -third line as to cause a serious menace to his communications -along the Menin and Zonnebeeke Roads. No one -was more keenly alive to the essential value of this position -than the Germans, who spared no efforts to frustrate -attempts to launch a further attack in this area. The -continual severity of his shell and machine-gun fire against -our outpost line served his purpose well, as it not only -inflicted severe loss on the trench garrisons of the divisions -in the line and seriously impeded the task of advancing -ammunition and other stores incidental to an attack—a -task already difficult enough by reason of the wet state -of the ground—but also precluded efficient reconnaissance -of the ground over which the attack was to be launched.</p> - -<p>The 56th Division was the extreme right of the attack. -The advance allotted to it was to be carried out by the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_298" id="Page_298">[Pg 298]</a></span> -167th and 169th Brigades, whose objective was a line -beyond the third German line of defence, and which may -be roughly described as running north and south through -Polygon Wood. The southernmost point of this advance -was to be Black Watch Corner, and from this point it -would be necessary to connect the southern extremity -of the final objective with the line on the Division's right, -on which no advance would be attempted. This meant -the formation of a defensive flank facing nearly south.</p> - -<p>This vital work of forming the flank was originally -entrusted to the 53rd Brigade, and the importance of -their rôle will be readily grasped, since on the manner in -which it was carried out would hang in large measure the -fortunes of the 169th and 167th and successive Brigades on -the left, for the German machine-guns in Inverness Copse, -if not silenced, would be free to enfilade the whole advance. -The 53rd Brigade which had been in the line since the -opening of the battle on the 31st July was, however, -now exhausted, and so seriously reduced in strength by -the tireless activity of the German machine-gunners that -it was not in a condition to renew the offensive. Its task -was therefore handed over to the 1/4th Londons, on whom -devolved the difficult operation above described of covering -the right flank of the whole attack. The only troops -of the 53rd Brigade who would be actively employed -would be a detachment of the 7th Bedfords, who were -made responsible for capturing the machine-gun nests -which, from the north-west corner of Inverness Copse, -dominated the whole situation.</p> - -<p>The 1/4th Londons were detailed for this attack on the -morning of the 14th August, and it is important in view -of what subsequently occurred to bear this date in mind. -It must also be remembered that at this time the Battalion -was some seven miles from the field of battle and that no -officer, N.C.O. or man belonging to it had ever set eyes -on the ground over which the battle was to be fought.</p> - -<p>During the morning Lieut.-Col. Campbell, the Adjutant -and the four company officers went forward to reconnoitre -the forward area, visiting in turn 169th Brigade Headquarters -at Dormy House, and Headquarters of the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_299" id="Page_299">[Pg 299]</a></span> -Battalion in line of the 53rd Brigade at Stirling Castle. -It had been intended also to reconnoitre the ground over -which the advance was to be made, but such was the intensity -of the enemy's artillery and machine-gun fire that -this was impossible, and the company commanders were -compelled to return to their companies in ignorance of -what lay before them. Later in the day Lieut.-Col. -Campbell was ordered to report to 53rd Brigade Headquarters, -but was unluckily hit on his way back, near -Zillebeeke Lake. Although badly hit he made his way -back to the Battalion, but being unable to carry on was -succeeded in the command by Major A. F. Marchment, -M.C. (1/1st Londons).</p> - -<p>At seven that night the Battalion moved forward from -Dickebusch to Château Segard, the move being completed -by 11 p.m. Shortly after dawn on the 15th the forward -move was continued to Railway Dugouts, in the cutting -between Shrapnel Corner and Zillebeeke Lake, and here -the Battalion remained during the day.</p> - -<p>The 15th August was occupied in issuing battle -equipment and rations to the companies, while Lieut.-Col. -Marchment took the opportunity of conducting a -reconnaissance of the forward area and communications, -and of issuing his operation orders. These were explained -to company commanders as adequately as time -permitted, but it must be borne in mind that when the -Battalion moved forward to the assault the following -morning no company or platoon officer had been able -to see the ground over which he was to lead his men. -At 6.30 p.m. the 1/4th Londons left Railway Dugouts -in battle order for the assembly area at Clapham Junction -with guides supplied from the 53rd Brigade. A great -deal of heavy shelling, in which four men of B Company -were hit, was experienced during the advance, and in -breasting a ridge near Sanctuary Wood the Battalion had -to pass through a barrage put down by the Germans. -Aided by the excellent discipline of the troops, however, -company commanders were able to split up their companies -within a few seconds, and no loss was sustained. -By ten o'clock the Battalion was concentrated with<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_300" id="Page_300">[Pg 300]</a></span> -A, B and C Companies in the tunnel under the Menin Road, -and D Company in the trench south of the road. -Battalion Headquarters and part of C Company were in -the trench on the north side of the tunnel. There was -no defined line of trenches in this area, the front being -held by isolated shell hole posts, and the assembly was -to be made on tape lines laid down under staff arrangements. -The lack of shelter thus made it necessary to -keep the Battalion under such cover as was obtainable -till the last possible moment. During the evening an -officer of each company reconnoitred the route from the -concentration area to the tape lines, assistance being -rendered by the 6th Royal Berkshires, and No Man's Land -in front of the line of assembly was patrolled until shortly -before zero hour.</p> - -<p>The intention was to advance in a practically due -east direction, while at stated points in the line of advance -platoons would halt one by one, each establishing itself -in a strong point, until finally, when the last platoon -reached its halting point, the whole Battalion would be -deployed in a line of outposts, all of which would turn -to their right and face south. This advance, being made -on a front of two companies, would result in a double line -of posts of which the left flank would rest on Black Watch -Corner in touch with the 169th Brigade, while the right -flank would join hands with the 7th Bedfords in the corner -of Inverness Copse.</p> - -<p>At 3.15 a.m. on the 16th August companies began to -form up on the tape lines, the assembly being completed -by 4.20 a.m., when the troops were lying down in the open -under a continuous and fairly heavy shell fire and a galling -machine-gun fire from the direction of Inverness Copse. -About 22 casualties occurred under this fire before zero -hour at 5.45 a.m. The order of battle was as follows: -A. Company (Spiers) on the right and B Company -(Stanbridge) on the left in front; with D Company (H. N. -Williams) on the right and C Company (Rees) on the left -in support.</p> - -<p>The attack was to be delivered along the whole battle -front at 5.45 a.m. under cover of a creeping barrage,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_301" id="Page_301">[Pg 301]</a></span> -supported by machine-gun barrage and heavy gun fire -on the enemy back areas. At zero hour the British barrage -came down, well distributed and of terrific intensity. It -was hoped that the danger points in Inverness Copse -would be put out of action by our artillery, so that the -task of the 7th Bedfords would be an easy one, but calculations -in this respect were soon found to have been mistaken. -The leading companies of the 1/4th Londons got away -from the mark at zero, in good order and well up to the -barrage, but almost immediately came under a hail of -lead from Inverness Copse. The attack of the 7th Bedfords, -of such vital importance to the success of the whole operation, -had failed. The artillery fire had not produced the -expected effect on the enormously strong enemy posts -over which the barrage had passed harmlessly, and the -7th Bedfords were repulsed with loss, thereby leaving the -1/4th Londons completely exposed to the full force of -the enemy's nest of machine-guns on their right flank.</p> - -<p>Within a few minutes 5 officers and 40 N.C.O.'s -and men of A and B Companies were casualties, but -the survivors pushed forward steadily, though a certain -amount of delay caused by the gaps so suddenly torn -in their ranks was inevitable. The gallantry displayed -by all ranks under this devastating machine-gun fire, to -which was added enemy shell fire of great intensity, -was unsurpassed, but under such a storm of bullets at -close range nothing could live, and the Battalion was -brought to a standstill about 200 yards from starting-point, -in an old German trench which skirted a ruined -farmhouse about midway between Inverness Copse and -Glencorse Wood.</p> - -<p>A party of some 60 men of all companies managed to -gain shelter in Jap Avenue. Here they were organised -by 2/Lieut. H. E. Jackman, under whom a strong post -was consolidated and an attempt made to push forward -along the trench. This proved unsuccessful owing to the -continued intensity of the enemy machine-gun fire and -the accuracy of his sniping. Further attempts by other -companies to advance were also fruitless, and the Battalion -was forced to content itself with hanging on to these small<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_302" id="Page_302">[Pg 302]</a></span> -gains, from which at intervals it was able to engage with -Lewis gun and rifle fire small bodies of the enemy in the -open near the east end of Glencorse Wood.</p> - -<p>An attempt was made to re-establish the situation -by an attack, for which the 53rd Brigade was called -upon, through Inverness Copse from south to north, but -so terribly reduced in numbers were its battalions that -Brigade reserve was limited to two weak platoons and -further action was found to be for the moment impossible.</p> - -<p>In the centre the leading waves of the 169th, after -some resistance in Glencorse Wood which they overcame, -succeeded in penetrating Polygon Wood, where they probably -gained their objective. The second waves on approaching -the Wood were, however, met with intense fire -from front and flanks, and a few minutes later a heavy -counter-attack developed which drove back the assaulting -troops to the middle of Glencorse Wood. A further -counter-attack in the evening forced the Brigade back to -its assembly line.</p> - -<p>On the left the 167th Brigade met with but little -greater success. The advance was steadily conducted as -far as a line level with the eastern edge of Nonne Boschen, -where trouble was first encountered by a sea of mud—an -extensive bog caused by the springs in the source of the -Hanebeek—which forced the attacking battalions to edge -away to their left and thus lose touch with the 169th -Brigade on their right. In this position they came under -heavy machine-gun fire, and the British barrage having -got far ahead, were forced to fall back. By 9 a.m. this -Brigade also was back in its assembly area.</p> - -<p>Early in the afternoon enemy artillery fire over the -1/4th Battalion's front became very heavy, and retaliatory -fire was directed by our artillery into Inverness Copse. -No infantry action developed, and during the night the -Battalion was relieved by the 12th Middlesex and withdrew, -in support, to the tunnel under Crab Crawl Trench -in the old British system south of Sanctuary Wood.</p> - -<p>Here the 1/4th Londons remained during the whole -of the 17th August, which passed uneventfully, and in the -evening was relieved by the 8th K.R.R.C. of the 14th<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_303" id="Page_303">[Pg 303]</a></span> -Division, which took over the 56th Division front. On -relief, the Battalion withdrew to Mic Mac Camp, Ouderdom.</p> - -<p>Reviewing the Battalion's work on the 16th August it -must be at once admitted that it, and indeed the whole -Division, failed completely to perform its allotted task. -That all ranks did all that was possible to achieve it -is reflected in the length of the casualty list, and it is -perhaps due to those who fell to comment briefly on what -appear to be the causes of failure.</p> - -<p>In the first place the operation itself was far from easy. -The sea of mud and ooze to which the line of advance -had been reduced must in any case have rendered the -recognition by platoon commanders of the spots at which -they were in turn to halt and form their post a matter -of some difficulty. But the circumstances in which the -Battalion became responsible for the attack effectually -precluded it from the preparations for the operation which -the difficulty of the task warranted. The change of -command was a further stroke of bad luck. Lieut.-Col. -Marchment was already known to the Battalion, but the -disadvantages under which he laboured in assuming command -on the eve of battle are obvious. The issue of orders -was inevitably delayed as Lieut.-Col. Campbell's reconnaissance -had to be repeated by Lieut.-Col. Marchment -on the morning of the 15th, and it was not till the evening -of that day that the scheme could be explained to companies, -and then only by officers, who themselves had -not seen the ground or even the assembly position. In -fact the operations of reconnaissance, issue of orders -and assembly of the Battalion had all to be disposed of -in twenty-two hours. In addition to these preliminary -difficulties the progress of the operation itself revealed -further circumstances, to which also a share of the responsibility -for failure may be attributed.</p> - -<p>The extraordinary strength of the German machine-gun -posts was such that the most intense barrage which -the excellent Corps and Divisional artillery was capable -of producing passed harmlessly over them, and only a -direct hit was sufficient to disturb the occupants.</p> - -<p>The very serious casualties at the outset of the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_304" id="Page_304">[Pg 304]</a></span> -attack—half an hour after zero, three company commanders -were the only officers left standing—produced -inevitably a certain degree of disorganisation, though the -fact that despite these heavy losses the Battalion was able -to establish and maintain itself throughout the day until -relief, speaks wonders for the discipline of the troops and -the efficiency and initiative of the N.C.O.'s. Further -causes of failure lay in the previous exhaustion of the men -owing to the bad state of the ground, which also made -extremely difficult the preparation beforehand of forward -supply dumps, and the reinforcement of the attacking -troops during the battle.</p> - -<p>Defeat is not always inglorious, and we feel that the -16th August may fairly be written down as a day on which -the 1/4th Londons failed without loss of reputation in any -single particular.</p> - -<p>The casualties sustained were as follows:</p> - -<div class="hangindent"> - -<p>In officers—Lieut.-Col. H. Campbell, D.S.O., wounded; Lieuts. -C. A. Speyer, L. B. J. Elliott, L. W. Wreford and A. G. Davis, -killed; Capt. H. W. Spiers, Lieuts. A. S. Ford and E. G. -Dew, and 2/Lieuts. L. W. Archer, H. T, Hannay, N. Nunns -and H. E. Jackman, wounded; and in N.C.O.'s and men 182 -killed and wounded.</p></div> - -<p>2/Lieut. H. E. Jackman was awarded the M.C. for his -excellent work and devotion to duty this day.</p> - -<p>Throughout the Division casualties were heavy and -6 commanding officers and nearly 4000 all ranks fell on -this unfortunate day.</p> - -<p>On the remainder of the battle front varying success -was obtained. In the north a considerable advance was -made and the German third line was broken on a -wide front. The French attack on the extreme left was -crowned with complete success. In the southern area, -however, the enemy resistance was everywhere more -stubborn, and south of St Julien the line remained unchanged -as a result of the day's fighting. The Division -being concentrated in the Ouderdom area remained there -training and reorganising for several days.</p> - -<p>On the 22nd August its move to the Eperlecques area -began, and on the 24th the 1/4th Londons entrained at -Reninghelst siding for Watten, where it detrained and -marched to Houlle.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_305" id="Page_305">[Pg 305]</a></span></p> - -<div class="figcenter" style="width: 700px;"> -<img src="images/i_b_304fp.jpg" width="700" height="497" alt="" /> -<div class="caption"><p><em>Inverness Copse</em></p></div> -</div> - -<p>The 56th Division had been so badly handled on the -16th August that its return to the battle area without -considerable reinforcement was out of the question and -it was, therefore, moved from the Ypres area to Bapaume. -The Battalion accordingly entrained at Arques in the early -hours of the 30th August and arrived in huts in the -Beaulencourt area at 8 p.m. the same day.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_306" id="Page_306">[Pg 306]</a></span></p> -<div class="chapter"></div> -<hr class="chap" /> - - - - -<h2>CHAPTER XVII<br /> - -THE THIRD BATTLE OF YPRES</h2> - - -<h3>II. <em>The 2/4th Battalion on the Northern Ridges</em></h3> - -<p>After the restricted success of the 16th August, the renewal -of operations on a large scale was inevitably postponed -for some time through the continuance of adverse -weather conditions; though in the north minor operations -had the effect of widening and deepening the breach in -the German defences in the neighbourhood of St Julien, -combined with the capture of a good many prisoners. -These local advances carried the British positions forward -east of the St Julien-Poelcapelle Road and gave them a -firm footing in the Gheluvelt-Langemarck line on both -sides of the Ypres-Staden Railway.</p> - -<p>The withdrawal of some of the divisions which had been -engaged in the battle since the end of July being now necessary, -the 58th Division was among the fresh divisions -which were sent north to take part in the next large attack.</p> - -<p>On the 24th August the 2/4th Londons marched -from Izel-les-Hameau to Aubigny entraining for Hopoutre -(Poperinghe), whence it marched to quarters in Dirty -Bucket Camp, one of a series of camps near Vlamertinghe. -The Division now became attached to the XVIII Corps -(Maxse). The Battalion continued its training in the new -area, paying a good deal of attention to intensive digging -and musketry, and during the days spent in Dirty Bucket -the company commanders and seconds in command -attended a course of instruction at the XVIII Corps -School at Volckeringhove.</p> - -<p>On the night of the 28th/29th August the 58th Division -entered the trenches, taking over with the 174th and 175th -Brigades, the sector occupied by the 48th Division east -of St Julien, the frontage extending from the Hanebeek<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_307" id="Page_307">[Pg 307]</a></span> -on the right to the vicinity of Keerselare on the left. The -sector was lightly held with one battalion of each brigade -in the outpost line, one battalion on the Canal Bank and -two in camps west of the Yser Canal.</p> - -<p>The 173rd Brigade remained in Divisional reserve and -continued training. The 2/4th Londons changed station -on the last day of the month, moving to Browne Camp, -about four miles north-east of Poperinghe. Here a -further week's training was obtained, after which the -whole of B Company spent four days at the Fifth Army -Musketry Camp near St Omer. Nothing worthy of record -occurred during this period except on the 1st September, -when the transport lines were heavily shelled causing -casualties to 26 N.C.O.'s and men, of whom 1 died of -wounds, and to 13 horses, 8 being killed.</p> - -<p>Reinforcements at this period included 2/Lieut. -A. C. Knight (4th Londons) and 2/Lieut. W. D. Warren -(19th Londons), and about 110 N.C.O.'s and men.</p> - -<p>On the 9th September the 2/4th Londons moved -forward to Reigersburg Camp, between Brielen and the -Canal, and on the 11th-13th August the 173rd Brigade -took over the whole Divisional sector.</p> - -<p>A warning order had now been issued as to the next -attack which in view of the markedly improved conditions -of weather had been arranged for the 20th September. -The front of attack was more extended than on the -16th August, the southern limit being the Ypres-Comines -Canal near Hollebeke, and the Ypres-Staden Railway -north of Langemarck marking the northern extremity.</p> - -<p>The success which had attended the enemy's resistance -to our efforts to advance in the Menin Road region had -pointed to the necessity of modifying the methods of -attack. The successes obtained by the British Army -on the Somme, at Arras and at Messines, had caused the -Germans to alter their mode of defence, and instead of -a strongly held trench line they now presented to our -attacks a system of concreted machine-gun posts ("pillboxes" -"or Mebus") disposed in great depth in front -of their main line of resistance. This system supplied -their defence with the elasticity which had hitherto been<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_308" id="Page_308">[Pg 308]</a></span> -lacking, and the pillboxes, being sited with remarkable -skill to develop the employment of enfilade fire to the -fullest extent, proved a very serious obstacle to British -assaulting columns, which frequently suffered severe -casualties at their hands after making a deep advance into -the enemy defensive system. The pillboxes were, moreover, -of such enormously strong construction that nothing -short of a direct hit by a heavy shell could put them out -of action. The effect of our severe artillery preparation -for attacks was therefore nullified, and the occupants of -the pillboxes could only be ejected as a rule by hand-to-hand -fighting with bombs.</p> - -<p>This new feature in the fighting called for prompt -measures on the part of the British, and henceforward -no attempt was made as a rule to penetrate the enemy's -pillbox system as long as any risk existed of leaving any -of these hornets' nests undisposed of in rear of the advancing -troops. In other words, the attacks were arranged -with objectives much more limited than formerly, while -the artillery paid more attention to the pillboxes, the -ultimate capture of which formed the task of special units -detailed for the purpose.</p> - -<p>The assault arranged for the 20th September was -prepared on these revised lines, and all ranks were impressed -beforehand with the importance, not only of -locating enemy strong points quickly and rushing them -before their occupants had recovered from the British -barrage, but also of methodical "mopping-up" and consolidation -of all ground gained.</p> - -<p>From the 9th September onwards the work of preparation -for the impending offensive was pushed forward -with all possible speed, the 2/4th Londons bearing a heavy -share of these necessary duties. For four of the five -nights spent at Reigersburg Camp a working party of the -strength of two companies was engaged in completing -the advanced cable line trench, while on the last night, -the 13th, the whole Battalion less B Company (still at the -Musketry Camp) was detailed for carrying various sorts -of R.E. material forward to advanced dumps in readiness -for consolidation of the position it was hoped to gain.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_309" id="Page_309">[Pg 309]</a></span></p> - -<p>On the 14th the 2/4th Londons moved to a fresh -position on the east side of the Yser Canal, and for four -nights following, the whole Battalion was engaged in the -desperate task of laying a duckboard track of double -width in front of St Julien, as far forward as possible in -the direction of the enemy positions, with the object -of providing a means of communication in the forward -area, and of reinforcing or relieving the advanced troops -after the assault should have been delivered.</p> - -<p>This week of continual working parties was most -exhausting to all concerned. The distance to be covered -each night to and from the scene of the work was about -three and a half miles in each direction, and the labour -of the march was increased tenfold by the shocking condition -of the ground, which was still waterlogged, and, -away from the defined tracks, nothing but a series of -lakes formed by shell craters full of water. Heavy as the -cable line duties were found, the laying of the duckboard -track during the latter half of the week proved still more -onerous. Not only had the troops to march to St Julien -from the Canal Bank, but the duckboards which were -drawn from a dump at Alberta Farm had to be carried -on the men's shoulders for some five hundred yards to -the starting-point of the track. Progress was slow through -the heavy going and the continual delays caused by -German Véry lights. Although some two hundred and -forty yards were laid during the four nights' work, and -the track was carried forty yards beyond our most -advanced positions, the task was never completed. -The work was obviously fraught with considerable risk -of serious casualties owing to the large numbers of -men employed, and in the circumstances the losses -incurred during the week were light; 11 men being hit -on the 11th, while on the 15th 2/Lieut. Carlisle was -killed and 2/Lieut. Pike wounded, with 2 men killed and -5 wounded.</p> - -<p>On the night of the 18th the 2/4th Londons relieved -the 2/3rd Londons in the line, which was still held by -isolated posts, and the following evening assembly for -the attack began at about 9 p.m.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_310" id="Page_310">[Pg 310]</a></span></p> - -<p>The 58th Division front of attack was entirely north -of the Hanebeek, a small stream which runs almost due -east from St Julien, the attack south of the stream being -undertaken by the 164th Brigade of the 55th Division. -The 58th Divisional front was taken up by the 173rd -Brigade on the right with the 174th on its left, the assaulting -columns of the 173rd Brigade consisting of four companies, -each 100 strong, of the 2/4th Londons. The 2/3rd -Londons were in reserve to make a dummy attack, with -one company on the waterlogged portions of the front -over which no advance was possible.</p> - -<p>The 2/4th Londons' assembly position which was -defined by tape lines laid down by the adjutant, -Capt. A. Grover, was on the line Janet Farm-Springfield, -and covered a front of some 800 yards. Almost in the -centre of this front and some 400 yards from starting-point, -lay a strongly fortified area around Winnipeg cross-roads. -To the right of the cross-roads the whole area -as far as the Hanebeek was waterlogged and impassable, -while to the left a series of enemy strong points, notably -at the Cemetery and Spot Farm seemed likely to cause a -good deal of trouble to the attackers. The objective of -the 2/4th Londons lay on an undefined line running -roughly north and south about 100 yards beyond -Winnipeg cross-roads. This marked the limit of the -173rd Brigade's task, though the objective of the day -lay about 500 yards further east, its principal feature -being a machine-gun nest in the Schuler Galleries in the -vicinity of the Hanebeek. The further advance to this -final objective was entrusted to the 164th and 174th -Brigades, who by a converging movement were to -"squeeze out" the 2/4th Londons leaving them in -occupation of what would become a line of supporting -posts at the end of the day.</p> - -<p>Before the assembly a preliminary reconnaissance of -the terrain was carried out by the company commanders, -and in connection with this Capt. Hetley writes:</p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p>I think all were impressed by the wonderful sight at -Admirals Road. This unsavoury road ran parallel to -the front about 1500 yards or more to the rear of St Julien<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_311" id="Page_311">[Pg 311]</a></span> -and when passing over it on the duckboard track, there -could be seen guns in such large quantities that there -seemed to be very little greater interval than 150-200 -yards between them in any direction—a really wonderful -contrast to April 1915, when the Lahore Division was on -exactly the same spot.</p></div> - -<p>On the evening of the 19th September Brigade Headquarters -were established at Cheddar Villa, while the 2/4th -Londons' Battle Headquarters opened in St Julien. The -assembly was conducted by Capt. Grover and Lieut. Seys -(Intelligence Officer) who were solely responsible for an -operation which proved exceedingly difficult owing to the -still heavy state of the ground. So bad was the mud that -men constantly sank to their knees, and in some cases touch -could only be maintained by tying the men of each section -together with tapes. In spite of these difficulties the 400 -men were in position by 3 a.m. on the 20th without a -hitch, and with practically no casualties, although the -most advanced platoons were within 150 yards of the -enemy positions. The assembly completed, the 2/3rd -Londons who were holding the line withdrew a short -distance to the rear.</p> - -<p>The assault was delivered at 5.40 a.m. under cover -of an intense creeping barrage which proved to be excellent, -and companies moved off in good order in the half -light close up to the barrage. The companies were disposed -as follows: on the right A Company (S. Davis) -with two platoons and Headquarters of D Company -(Stark) attached; in the centre B Company (Hetley); -and on the left C Company (Hewlett) with two platoons -of D Company attached.</p> - -<p>The principal resistance, as had been anticipated, was -encountered in the neighbourhood of Winnipeg cross-roads, -and at a pillbox which lay between them and -the cemetery. This was most gallantly captured single-handed -by Pte. Bolton, A Company, who bayonetted three -of the occupants and captured the remainder consisting -of an officer and three men. A slight check at the cross-roads -produced a further small bag of prisoners, sixteen in -number, of whom one was an officer. On the left the chief<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_312" id="Page_312">[Pg 312]</a></span> -opposition was encountered at a pillbox some 300 yards -east of Springfield which was holding up the advance of -C Company and of the 174th Brigade on the left. 2/Lieut. -F. W. Walker, quickly grasping the situation, outflanked -the position with six men, and succeeded in rushing it, -capturing two machine-guns and twenty men who were -sent back under escort, Walker and the rest of his party -at once pushing on to the objective where touch was gained -with the 174th Brigade. Within half an hour the 2/4th -Londons were established on their objective, the consolidation -of which was promptly put in hand, while the flank -brigades after a pause of half an hour pressed forward to -their final objectives in accordance with the plan of attack.</p> - -<p>The complete success of this operation was undoubtedly -due to the careful provision which had been made in -advance for the capture of strong points by specially -detailed units who thus ensured the efficient "mopping-up" -of all ground captured, while enabling the remainder -of the assaulting column to keep well up to the barrage.</p> - -<p>Owing to the known strength of Schuler Farm in the -final objective, special arrangements had been made for -the attack of this point, in conjunction with the 164th -Brigade, by a strong platoon of D Company 2/4th Londons -with which two tanks were to co-operate in an outflanking -movement from the north. The earliest reports from this -region indicated that the attack had been successful, -but subsequent information made it clear that the first -attack failed, partly owing to the non-arrival of the tanks -which stuck fast in the mud, and partly owing to unexpected -resistance met with at a machine-gun post some -150 yards in advance of the farm. The capture of this -post, which produced 16 prisoners and 2 guns, cost the lives -of 2/Lieut. Warren and the whole platoon except Sergt. -Watson and 6 men. The delay caused, moreover, was -serious, and by the time the survivors of the platoon were -able to continue their advance, the barrage had passed -beyond Schuler Farm. Sergt. Watson, being of opinion -that the strength of his party was insufficient to justify -an attack on the main position, sent back his prisoners and -established himself with the captured machine-guns at a -point about 250 yards south-east of Winnipeg cross-roads.</p> - -<div class="figcenter" style="width: 367px;"> -<img src="images/i_b_312fp.jpg" width="367" height="500" alt="" /> -<div class="caption"><p><span class="smcap">The Third Battle of Ypres, 1917 (2/4th Battalion)</span></p></div> -</div> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_313" id="Page_313">[Pg 313]</a></span></p> - -<p>The shell fire of the enemy during the advance and -subsequent to the Battalion reaching its objective had -been severe, and by this time not more than 100 rifles -of the 2/4th Londons remained effective. Arrangements -were therefore made to stiffen its line with one company -of the 2/3rd Londons. A further attack on Schuler Farm, -to be undertaken by the 2/3rd Londons, was organised for -daybreak on the 21st.</p> - -<p>At about three o'clock in the afternoon the enemy -was observed to be advancing in fours against the brigade -on our right, and the artillery was immediately called into -action. In spite of heavy losses, however, the enemy -continued to advance with praiseworthy courage until -they deployed, when their morale appeared to break -and their ranks rapidly melted under our shell fire.</p> - -<p>During the remainder of the day a good deal of annoyance -was caused by the continued sniping from Schuler -Farm, of which the Germans remained in possession, but -no further counter-attack developed on our front, and -night fell with the 2/4th Londons' position intact. The -casualties already suffered had been heavy, and three -company commanders, Hewlett, Stark and Davis, had -unluckily been hit, though the last was able to remain with -his company until after relief the following evening, when -having been wounded a second time he was evacuated.</p> - -<p>The attack of the platoon of the 2/3rd Londons -under 2/Lieut. Middlemiss on the 21st was postponed for -further reconnaissance, in the course of which Middlemiss -observed the garrison of Schuler Farm surrender to men -of the 164th Brigade. Believing the situation to be clear -he proceeded along the road, but was hit by fire from a -post by the Hanebeek near that established by Sergt. -Watson. Middlemiss' report, which was the first information -obtained of the fall of Schuler Farm, caused the -alteration of his platoon's objective to the pillbox from -which he had been hit, but in the evening this was found -to have been evacuated by its garrison, so that the whole -position was now in our hands.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_314" id="Page_314">[Pg 314]</a></span></p> - -<p>During the evening of the 21st violent counter-attacks -under cover of intense bombardments were delivered -against the 164th and 174th Brigade sectors, but these -were dispersed, and the 2/4th Londons did not come into -action though their newly-dug trenches were almost -obliterated by the German shell fire and many more -casualties occurred.</p> - -<p>At 9 p.m. on the 21st, the 2/4th Londons handed over -their position, intact at all points, to the 2/9th Londons, and -withdrew across the Yser Canal to Dambre Camp, where -they remained training and reorganising for some days.</p> - -<p>This was the most completely successful operation in -which the 2/4th Battalion had hitherto taken part, and -indeed all along the line of the Fifth Army attack the new -methods which have been described met with marked -success.</p> - -<p>The outstanding achievements of the day were those -of 2/Lieut. Walker, Sergt. Watson and Pte. Bolton, of -which some description has already been given, but reference -should also be made to the excellent work of -Capt. S. Davis, whose clear grasp of situations and the -accurate and complete information with which he kept -Headquarters constantly supplied, were of great value; -of Pte. Austin, runner of A Company, who passed backwards -and forwards several times with important messages -through intense barrages; of Pte. Bull, the only surviving -stretcher-bearer of A Company, who displayed the greatest -coolness and devotion in tending wounded men under -heavy fire; and Lieut. Altounyan, the medical officer, -whose services were of the utmost value and carried out -under exceedingly trying conditions.</p> - -<p>Mention should also be made of Pte. Anthony of the -Battalion Signallers who from an advanced point in the -line established visual communication with Brigade Headquarters, -his station subsequently proving of great value -to the supporting artillery.</p> - -<p>On the evening of the 19th Brig.-Gen. Freyberg, V.C., -D.S.O., was seriously hit on his way to Battle Headquarters -at Cheddar Villa; but he insisted on remaining at -duty, and directed operations from his stretcher, though<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_315" id="Page_315">[Pg 315]</a></span> -wounded in ten places, until after news of the complete -capture of the objective was received the next day, when -his removal was insisted upon by the A.D.M.S. who came -forward to fetch him. Command of the Brigade was taken -temporarily by Lieut.-Col. Dann, D.S.O.</p> - -<p>The following decorations were awarded after this -action: 2/Lieut. F. W. Walker, the D.S.O.; Capts. A. -Grover and S. Davis, and Lieut. E. H. R. Altounyan, -the M.C.; Sergt. Watson, Ptes. Bolton, Austin, Anthony -and Bull, the D.C.M.; and Sergts. H. O. Wilderspin and -F. W. Yandle, Ptes. J. W. Ling and A. Westcott, the M.M.</p> - -<p>The casualties sustained during the action included: -2/Lieuts. H. N. Bundle, E. R. Seabury and W. D. Warren, -killed; 2/Lieut. F. B. Burd, died of wounds; Capts. W. A. -Stark, H. A. T. Hewlett and S. Davis, M.C., 2/Lieuts. -D. S. Boorman, M. C. (at duty), A. J. Angel, W. F. Vines -and A. C. Knight, wounded; and 60 N.C.O.'s and men -killed, 176 wounded and 29 missing.</p> - -<p>The 58th Division remained in line after this attack, -and on the 26th September took part in the third general -attack which was delivered by the Second and Fifth -Armies on a front of some six miles, of which the northern -limit was the Divisional sector. The attack was delivered -by the 175th Brigade and a further considerable success -gained, the Divisional front having been carried forward -in the operations since the 19th a total distance of about -1600 yards.</p> - -<p>On the 27th September, the 2/4th Londons moved to -Brake Camp, in the Vlamertinghe area. Two days were -occupied in training here, during which the area in which -the Battalion was located suffered on the night of the -28th/29th September the most prolonged and serious -bombing by enemy aircraft it ever experienced, the bombardment -lasting without cessation from 9 p.m. to 2 a.m. -Fortunately no casualties were sustained.</p> - -<p>At Brake Camp the following joined the Battalion:</p> - -<div class="hangindent"> - -<p>Capt. R. C. Dickins.</p> - -<p>2/Lieuts. C. C. Gibbs, D. G. Spring, F. J. Jones, E. G. Gardner -and A. W. Dodds (21st Londons); and 2/Lieut. S. J. -Richardson (7th Londons).</p> - -<p>250 N.C.O.'s and men.</p></div> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_316" id="Page_316">[Pg 316]</a></span></p> - -<p>Further casualties during September included Lieut., -C. Potter and 2/Lieuts. O. H. Mattison and J. McDonald, -to hospital.</p> - -<p>2/Lieut. Cook was appointed to the 173rd L.T.M. -Battery.</p> - -<p>On the 30th September the 58th Division was withdrawn -from the line and concentrated as Corps reserve -for rest in the Nordausques area (eight miles north-west -of St Omer), and the 2/4th Londons moved by rail from -Vlamertinghe to Zouafques where they went into billets -on the 1st October. The train was followed and bombed -during the journey by German airmen, 1 sergeant and -2 men being killed.</p> - -<p>During the period of the 58th Division's withdrawal -from the line the offensive was pressed forward under -adverse conditions of weather. The season was now -becoming advanced and the condition of the ground offered -a far greater obstacle to our progress than the enemy's -resistance. Probably no series of battles of the whole war -was waged under such persistently adverse conditions, -or imposed a greater physical strain on the attacking -troops. In every direction the salient was by now a -series of "shell hole lakes" the ground being waterlogged -and the mud more glutinous than ever. An increasing -number of casualties to men and beasts occurred through -drowning in the shell holes of this ghastly shell-battered -inferno, but though the whole forces of the elements -seemed to be arrayed against us, advances of enormous -importance were achieved during the early part of October, -as a result of which the Allied positions were pushed -forward to the outskirts of Houthulst Forest, to the east -of Poelcapelle and to within 2000 yards of Passchendaele.</p> - -<p>The prolonged continuance of active operations was -obviously becoming increasingly difficult, but G.H.Q. was -impelled to pursue the course of this dreary offensive -partly by reason of the serious situation caused on the -Italian front by the defeat of Caporetto at the end of -October, and partly by the need of containing as many -German divisions as possible during the preparations for -the Cambrai battle, which were not yet complete.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_317" id="Page_317">[Pg 317]</a></span></p> - -<p>The 2/4th Londons remained at Zouafques training -and reorganising for over three weeks. Several drafts -were received from the Base, which together made the -considerable addition of 244 N.C.O.'s and men to the -Battalion strength, thus bringing it above its numbers -prior to the action of the 20th September.</p> - -<p>On the 15th October the Battalion was joined by -2/Lieut. H. G. Langton; and by 2/Lieuts. H. A. Snell, -J. R. Naylor and R. J. Richards (1st Londons). During -this period also 2/Lieuts. H. E. English and C. C. H. -Clifford were evacuated sick. Capt. S. H. Stedman was -posted to the 173rd Brigade Labour Company at Louches.</p> - -<p>On the 23rd October the 2/4th Londons returned by -train to the Vlamertinghe area and took over quarters -in Siege Camp, moving the following day to the concentration -area on the canal bank, whence the battle surplus -under 2/Lieut. Askham left the Battalion for the Divisional -Depôt Battalion.</p> - -<p>On the 25th October, Major W. A. Nunneley, second -in command of the Battalion since July 1916, fell sick -and was evacuated to hospital, his duties being taken -over by the adjutant, Capt. A. Grover, M.C. Major -Nunneley was subsequently appointed to command the -German officers' Prisoners of War Camp at Donington -Hall. Capt. Grover, M.C., was succeeded in the Adjutancy -by Lieut. F. W. Walker, D.S.O. On the 22nd 2/Lieut -D. G. Spring was seconded to the XX Corps School as -Instructor.</p> - -<p>The operation in which the 173rd Brigade was detailed -to take part was arranged for the 26th October, and consisted -of an attack on a frontage from the Ypres-Roulers -Railway (south of Passchendaele) to beyond Poelcapelle. -The task of the 173rd Brigade, who were flanked on the -right by the 63rd (Royal Naval) Division and on the left -by the 57th Division, was to carry forward the British -line east of Poelcapelle for some 700 yards in a due -easterly direction astride the Poelcapelle-Westroosebeeke -Road. The Divisional frontage was some 1800 yards in -length, and bounded on the north by the Poelcapelle-Staden -Road and on the south by the Lekkerbotebeek.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_318" id="Page_318">[Pg 318]</a></span> -The assaulting troops were provided by the 2/2nd, 2/3rd -and 2/4th Londons, while the 2/1st Londons were in -Brigade reserve, with two battalions of the 174th Brigade -concentrated in the old German trench system near -St Julien, also at the disposal of the 173rd Brigade.</p> - -<p>The first objective, which was on the line Spider Crossroads-Moray -House, was to be taken by the 2/2nd and -2/3rd Battalions, while after a pause of 45 minutes, the -2/4th Londons were to "leapfrog" through them on to -the second and final objective.</p> - -<p>As in the September action, particular preparation -was made for the assault of all known pillboxes by special -parties, and the system of posts to be established by each -company was carefully and definitely decided beforehand. -The whole strength of the Battalion was necessary to -cover the wide frontage allotted to it, the order of battle -from the right being D Company (C. A. Clarke), C Company -(Boorman), B Company (Hetley) and A Company -(Dickins). In addition to the stipulated frontage the -Battalion was also held responsible for some 200 yards -of waterlogged ground near the Lekkerbotebeek on its -right, over which touch with the 63rd Division could not -be actively maintained.</p> - -<p>The attack was to be delivered under a creeping -barrage supported by heavy guns, machine-guns and -smoke barrages, while look-out for enemy counter-attacks -was to be maintained by aeroplanes.</p> - -<p>On the morning of the 25th the 2/4th Londons left -Siege Camp in battle order and moved forward to positions -in the original front German system where they remained -until the afternoon. At 3 p.m. the forward move was -resumed, and the Battalion was completely assembled -in its allotted area immediately east of Poelcapelle by -10.15 p.m., Battalion Headquarters being established at -Gloster Farm.</p> - -<p>The weather had for some days past shown a marked -improvement, and the ground over which the advance -was to be made was reported to be drying fast. But -our much-tried troops could not escape their usual fate -in the matter of weather, for on the night of the 25th<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_319" id="Page_319">[Pg 319]</a></span> -rain fell pitilessly once more, filling up the shell holes, -liquefying the mud and drenching everyone to the skin. -All movement was rendered a matter of extraordinary -difficulty, and when the time for the attack arrived the -assaulting columns could scarcely drag themselves forward.</p> - -<p>The British front line being composed of a line of -unconnected posts, the actual "jumping-off " line was -defined by tapes which made it essential to attack before -daybreak. At 5.30 a.m. the British barrage came down, -and the 2/2nd and 2/3rd Battalions followed by the 2/4th -began their laborious advance. The barrage was disappointing, -for not only was it not as well distributed as -on former occasions, but, having regard to the state of the -ground, it advanced far too quickly so that the assaulting -troops were soon left far behind.</p> - -<p>The 2/2nd Londons were successful in capturing four -pillboxes of which three were at Cameron Houses, about -half-way to the first objective, while the 2/3rd Londons -on the left pushed forward to what was at the time believed -to be Spider cross-roads, but was probably a less important -road junction some 250 yards short of it. The -line of this cross-road and Cameron Houses was, however, -the limit of the advance, which was unsupported on the -left owing to the adjoining division on that flank having -been held up. The only post taken by the 2/4th Londons -was Tracas Farm on the extreme right.</p> - -<p>The men were now thoroughly exhausted by their -efforts, and were practically defenceless as the mud had -choked rifles and Lewis guns, and rendered them temporarily -useless. Indeed, for over half an hour the Battalion -possessed hardly a single rifle which could be fired. At -this juncture the enemy counter-attacked in great force -both at Cameron Houses and on the unsupported left -flank, and his attack, as was to be expected in the circumstances, -was successful, and our troops were driven back -with severe loss to the assembly line where the enemy's -advance was finally held.</p> - -<p>After their rough handling of the morning it was clear -that the attacking battalions could not pursue the offensive -or remain in the line, and arrangements were accordingly<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_320" id="Page_320">[Pg 320]</a></span> -made for their relief, on the south of the Poelcapelle-Westroosebeeke -Road by the 2/1st Londons and on the -north of it by the 2/7th Londons. The relief was completed -by 10.15 p.m., and the 2/4th Londons returned to -Siege Camp.</p> - -<p>In other parts of the line greater success was achieved -this day, notably in the vicinity of Passchendaele where -the Canadians captured all their objectives, and on the -extreme left in the area held by the French.</p> - -<p>The 26th October must be regarded as one of the most -unfortunate days ever experienced by the 2/4th Londons. -The gallantry of officers, N.C.O.'s and men alike left -nothing to be desired, and their defeat was at the hands -of the elements far more than of the Germans. So bad -indeed was the state of the ground that not a few men, -becoming stuck in the mud and exhausted by their efforts -to extricate themselves, met their death by drowning in -the flooded shell holes.</p> - -<p>For their good work on this day decorations were -awarded to Capt. C. A. Clarke (the M.C.) and Pte C. H. W. -Roberts (the D.C.M.).</p> - -<p>The casualties sustained in this unfortunate affair were -in officers: 2/Lieuts. F. J. Jones, H. G. Langton and -J. R. Naylor, killed; 2/Lieut. R. J. Richards, died of -wounds; Capts. R. C. Dickins and D. S. Boorman, M.C., -2/Lieuts. G. E. Lester, R. Michell, H. A. Snell and A. W. -Dodds, wounded; and in N.C.O.'s and men 25 killed, -214 wounded and 109 missing—a total of 359 all ranks. -This was the most costly single day in the history of the -2/4th Battalion.</p> - -<p>The 2/4th Londons spent five days at Brake Camp -cleaning up, resting and reorganising, moving on the 1st -November to Roads Camp, and on the following day to St -Jans-ter-biezen, about four miles west of Poperinghe. The -Battalion was now reduced to an organisation of one company -for fighting purposes, pending the arrival of further -reinforcements to fill the gaps created on the 26th October.</p> - -<p>On the 6th November a further move was made to -P Camp near Peselhoek, north of Poperinghe, and here -the Battalion remained for eight days, all of which were -occupied in training except for three working parties of -100 N.C.O.'s and men under Capt. Hetley who proceeded -to Gwent Farm for stretcher-bearing duties.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_321" id="Page_321">[Pg 321]</a></span></p> - -<div class="figcenter" style="width: 700px;"> -<img src="images/i_b_320fp.jpg" width="700" height="453" alt="" /> -<div class="caption"><p><em>Passchendaele Ridge</em></p></div> -</div> - -<p>A further attempt was made by the 175th Brigade on -the 30th October to complete the unfulfilled task of the -26th, but again the state of the ground rendered the operation -abortive. On the higher ground, however, Canadian -troops again achieved some success, and by the 6th -November had captured Passchendaele.</p> - -<p>Thus was this stupendous offensive brought to a close. -It had been maintained for three and a half months under -conditions of unprecedented difficulty, and at enormous -cost in personnel. Having regard to the obstacles which -were encountered at every step the achievement was -magnificent, and had served a definite purpose in the -War, not only by securing positions on the high ground -for the winter, but also by assisting our French and Italian -Allies at a period when, especially in the case of the -latter, any operation which could relieve the pressure on -their front was of vital importance.</p> - -<p>On the 15th November the Division was concentrated -in Corps reserve, and the 2/4th Londons moved to -Piccadilly Camp in the Proven area.</p> - -<p>The 2/4th Londons now spent a prolonged period -out of the battle area; occupying billets successively, -after leaving Piccadilly Camp, at Coulemby on the -26th November, at Bellebrune and Cremarest (about -twelve miles west of St Omer) from the 27th November -to the 9th December, and at Soult Camp near Brielen, -to which the Battalion moved on the last-mentioned date -in anticipation of returning to the trenches.</p> - -<p>This period of training passed with the usual routine -of "back-of-the-line" training in drill, musketry, bombing, -route marching and games, interspersed with highly -welcome entertainments given by the Divisional concert -troop "The Goods." Advantage was taken of the time -spent in rest to refill the gaps in the Battalion's ranks, -and an excellent opportunity was afforded of assimilating -the newly-received drafts as they arrived and before they -were called upon to go into action. These drafts totalled<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_322" id="Page_322">[Pg 322]</a></span> -213 N.C.O.'s and men, but even with this accession of -strength the 2/4th Londons still remained considerably -weaker than prior to the recent action.</p> - -<p>Officer reinforcements were more numerous in proportion, -and included:</p> - -<div class="hangindent"> - -<p>Lieuts. H. J. M. Williams and G. E. Lester.</p> - -<p>2/Lieuts. R. W. Chamberlain, E. P. Higgs and L. H. Sheppard.</p> - -<p>2/Lieut. F. B. Johnson (13th Londons).</p> - -<p>Lieut. F. J. Griffiths, 2/Lieuts. F. E. Norrish, F. G. Williams, -W. H. G. Newman and W. Blair (20th Londons).</p> - -<p>2/Lieuts. S. H. Jehu and J. R. Peryer (21st Londons).</p> - -<p>Lieut. C. A. Sampson (25th Londons).</p> - -<p>Lieuts. E. R. Howden and J. Cairns (A.S.C.).</p></div> - -<p>On the 16th/17th December the 173rd Brigade took -over the whole Divisional sector, which constituted the left -of the II Corps front, from the Lekkerbotebeeke on the -right to the Broembeek, a small stream close to the -Ypres-Staden Railway on the left. The Corps line was -in practically the same position as on the occasion of the -Battalion's last visit to this area, and ran roughly north -and south in front of Poelcapelle, and about 500 yards -east of the Poelcapelle-Houthulst Road. The front line, -which was occupied in a series of isolated shell hole -posts, which were being strengthened and linked up to -each other as opportunity offered, was held by two -battalions, with support battalions in the captured German -trenches around Langemarck and Pilckem.</p> - -<p>The 2/4th Battalion took over from the 2/10th Londons -the left support position in Eagle and Candle Trenches on -the 16th December, thus covering a depth of about 3500 -yards. The ground between the forward and rear companies -was a quagmire of battered trenches, and work -was immediately necessary to attempt to reduce the chaos -of the defensive system to something approaching cohesion. -After five quiet days in these positions the Battalion moved -forward to the left front positions, relieving the 2/3rd -Londons on the 20th December with three companies in line -and one in support. Headquarters were at Louis Farm.</p> - -<p>With the exception of an attack against our left company -which was attempted under a severe barrage on the -afternoon of the 22nd, and which was effectually dispersed,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_323" id="Page_323">[Pg 323]</a></span> -the tour passed quietly and the Battalion was relieved -on the 24th December by the 2/10th Londons, and -concentrated at Battle Siding (Brielen), entraining there -for Elverdinghe. Casualties were 2/Lieut. Jehu and 10 -N.C.O.'s and men wounded and shell-shocked.</p> - -<p>A week at Bridge No. 1 Camp, occupied for the -most part in training and bathing, was enlivened by the -Christmas festivities, for which such provision as was -possible had been made, the outstanding feature being the -production by "The Goods" of their famous pantomime, -"The Babes in the Wood," which proved an immediate -and enormous success.</p> - -<p>New Year's Day 1918 found the Battalion once more -in left support positions in Whitemill, Eagle, Bear and -Candle Trenches, with Headquarters in dugouts at Langemarck -which rejoiced in the name of Pig and Whistle. -Five days of peaceful trench work here were succeeded by -an uneventful tour in the front line positions, and on the -8th January the Battalion handed over its trenches to -the 17th Lancashire Fusiliers preparatory to the withdrawal -of the whole Division. Concentrating on relief -at Bridge No. 1 Camp the Battalion moved the following -day to School Camp, Proven, where a few days' rest was -obtained. The G.O.C. II Corps here presented ribands -to those who had recently been decorated.</p> - -<p>Officer reinforcements at this period were:</p> - -<div class="hangindent8"> - -<p>27th December—2/Lieuts. P. J. Payne, N. A. Brown and V. C. -Prince.</p> - -<p>10th January—2/Lieuts. S. F. G. Mears, E. M. Cuthbertson, -S. C. Geering and G. C. Ewing.</p></div> - -<p>Early in January Lieut. D. C. Cooke went to hospital -and the medical officer, Lieut. Altounyan, M.C. (wounded), -was replaced by Lieut. C. E. Dunaway, U.S. Army.</p> - -<p>On the 21st January the 2/4th Londons finally left the -Ypres area after nearly five months of hard work in it, -and the 58th Division was transferred to the III Corps -(Pulteney) in the Fifth Army which had now removed to -the extreme south of the British lines.</p> - -<p>In recognition of their good work in these actions, all -"other ranks" of the Battalion were subsequently granted<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_324" id="Page_324">[Pg 324]</a></span> -permission to wear a small grenade—similar to that worn -as a cap badge, but smaller—on the corners of the tunic -collar.</p> - -<p>This closes the regiment's connection with the Ypres -Salient, the scene of so much hardship and suffering, but -at the same time of so much gallantry and devotion to duty. -Ypres occupies a position in the estimation of the Empire -which is challenged by no place in which British troops -served in the War; and it must be for ever a source of -pride to the regiment that it was privileged to take part -in the second and third battles for its liberation from the -Germans.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_325" id="Page_325">[Pg 325]</a></span></p> -<div class="chapter"></div> -<hr class="chap" /> - - - - -<h2>CHAPTER XVIII<br /> - -THE 1/4TH BATTALION IN THE BATTLE OF CAMBRAI, 1917</h2> - - -<p>The 30th August 1917 found the 1/4th Battalion much -reduced in strength moving from Arques to Bapaume, to -the great satisfaction of all ranks, for all had been expecting -a return to the unhealthy conditions of the Ypres -Salient. On detrainment at Bapaume an evening march -was made to Beaulencourt, where quarters were allotted -in a concentration camp. This march was not without -interest as it was the Battalion's first introduction to the -"devastated area," the appalling lifeless and ruined belt -of country left behind him by the Bosche in his retirement -from the Ancre-Scarpe salient to the Hindenburg line. -Beaulencourt lies between Bapaume and Le Transloy, and -is thus on the ridge which lay beyond the old Lesbœufs lines -and which had proved the final check to the Battalion's -advances in the Somme battles of 1916. From the village -the Lesbœufs-Morval Ridge was visible, though of those -two ill-fated villages no ruins were discernible. The whole -area was a vast waste of rank vegetation which was -rapidly covering the scars of the previous year's battles -without healing them. Shell fire had contributed comparatively -little to the desolation, but villages had been -completely demolished and trees felled, and the British -troops themselves provided the only relief to the awful -silence of this strange land from which the life of the fields -had vanished.</p> - -<p>The Battalion was now attached to the IV Corps -(Woollcombe), and the first few days were spent in -very necessary reorganisation of its slender resources in -personnel. The casualties of the Ypres action were not -replaced by drafts, and each company was reduced to two -platoons. That such work as was possible was done to -good purpose was shown on the 4th September, when the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_326" id="Page_326">[Pg 326]</a></span> -Corps commander inspected the Battalion and expressed -himself gratified at the completeness and good order of -its clothing and equipment in view of its recent withdrawal -from the Flanders battlefield. This day was -the third anniversary of the Battalion's departure from -England.</p> - -<p>Between the 5th and 8th September the 56th Division -took over from the 3rd the left sector of the IV Corps front. -The new sector was held with all three Brigades in line, -each Brigade area being occupied with two battalions in -front trenches, one in Brigade support and one in -Divisional reserve, in positions facing the Hindenburg -line from the neighbourhood of Lagnicourt on the left -to south of the Bapaume-Cambrai Road in the vicinity -of Demicourt on the right. Activity on the enemy's -part was evidently not anticipated in this area, for by this -relief the 56th Division became responsible for a front -of approximately 10,500 yards.</p> - -<p>Of this front the 168th Brigade took over the left or -Lagnicourt sector, with Headquarters in dugouts about -half a mile in rear of Lagnicourt, the Headquarters of -the Division being in Frémicourt. This sector faced the -village of Quéant, which was within the defences of the -Hindenburg line. The front line of the left subsector -consisted of a series of platoon posts which were not yet -connected up, numbered respectively C 18/5, C 18/6, C 12/1, -C 12/2, C 12/3 and C 12/4. These posts were the original -battle outpost positions which had been constructed -earlier in the year during the advance towards the Hindenburg -line. No Man's Land here averaged 1000 yards wide, -and though from most of these posts the enemy front line -was invisible owing to the lie of the ground, they were all, -except on the left, unapproachable from our side, except -under cover of darkness. Some 500 yards in rear of this -chain of defences ran a continuous trench known as the -intermediate line, well constructed, with deep dugouts, -moderately strong wire and a good field of fire. Battalion -Headquarters were in dugouts in the sunken road on the -left of Lagnicourt, and were connected with the intermediate -line by a communication trench called Dunelm<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_327" id="Page_327">[Pg 327]</a></span> -Avenue. Forward of the intermediate line there was but -one trench leading to the advanced positions and this, -Wakefield Avenue, connected with Post C 18/6.</p> - -<p>In this area the Battalion settled down very comfortably -to a period of two months' routine work in and out -of the trenches, unbroken by operations of any interest, -and happily almost entirely free from casualties. In order -to avoid the tedium of following closely the common round -of duty we propose to deal with these months by means -of a few general remarks on the life of the Battalion.</p> - -<p>During this period the Battalion was joined by the -following officers:</p> - -<div class="hangindent"> - -<p>Capt. E. E. Spicer, Lieuts. A. Bath and A. M. Duthie, and -2/Lieut. E. L. Mills.</p></div> - -<p>and by the following attached officers:</p> - -<div class="hangindent"> - -<p>2/Lieuts. W. Shand, E. Petrie, C. W. Rowlands, and E. A. -Ratcliffe (1st Londons).</p> - -<p>2/Lieut. A. Franks (6th Londons).</p> - -<p>2/Lieut. W. H. Eastoe (7th Londons).</p> - -<p>2/Lieuts. E. L. Stuckey, C. S. Richards and A. B. Creighton -(17th Londons).</p> - -<p>2/Lieuts. F. Barnes, F. S. C. Taylor, R. S. B. Simmonds, J. L. -Backhouse and E. D. Buckland (20th Londons).</p></div> - -<p>Tours of duty were six-day periods as follows:</p> - -<div class="center"> -<table width="90%" border="0" cellpadding="4" cellspacing="0" summary="Tours of duty were six-day periods"> - <tr> - <td rowspan="2" class="br">6 days in Lagnicourt left subsector</td> - <td>2 </td> - <td>companies </td> - <td>in posts.</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td>2</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td>intermediate line.</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td colspan="4">6 days in Brigade support—either side of Lagnicourt village.</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="br">6 days in Lagnicourt left subsector</td> - <td colspan="3">Dispositions as before but companies changed over.</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td colspan="4">6 days in Divisional reserve—at Frémicourt, and so on.</td> - </tr> -</table></div> - -<p>The transport lines and Quartermaster's stores were -at Frémicourt, where permanent horse standings, kitchens, -butcher's shop and stores were erected on an elaborate -scale, which appeared to suggest that all ranks were quite -prepared to settle down permanently in this unusually -pleasant sector.</p> - -<p>In the line a very considerable amount of work was -got through during September and October. The front -line posts were linked up by a continuous traversed trench, -about 7 feet deep and 3 feet wide at the bottom, and pro<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_328" id="Page_328">[Pg 328]</a></span>vided -with "baby elephant" shelters for the garrison. -Two embryo trenches in which forward company headquarters -were situate—Whitley and York supports—were -extended and strengthened and the intermediate line was -maintained. In addition a large amount of additional -wire was put out.</p> - -<p>While in Brigade support the Battalion always occupied -shelters in the sunken roads which ran parallel to the -lines each side of Lagnicourt village, B and D Companies -being on the north side and A and C Companies and -Battalion Headquarters on the south. The dwellings here -were much improved, and fresh ones were constructed, -of which the best were one built under the supervision of -Lieut. Bath and "Twin Villa" by Headquarters. Not all -the Battalion's time, however, was devoted to the adornment -of its own homes, for the support battalion was -invariably called upon to supply heavy working parties, -the largest of which were digging under the R.E.'s, while -others were attached to tunnelling companies for the -construction of additional deep dugouts at trench headquarters -and in the intermediate line.</p> - -<p>Training was not overlooked, and a great deal of valuable -work was effected. In particular mention should be -made of the signallers, who attained a very high pitch -of proficiency under Lieut. Gray, while Sergt. Randall -achieved much success with the Lewis gunners, and -Sergts. Oakely and Taylor did very good work with -bombers and rifle grenadiers.</p> - -<p>In the line the enemy's activity on the Battalion's -front was slight and confined to occasioned shelling and -trench mortaring, of which the bulk occurred at night. -The sectors right and left of the Battalion came in for a -rather greater share of the enemy's hatred. The London -Scottish on the right were immediately opposed to a -network of trenches sapped out from the Hindenburg -front line, known as the Quéant Birdcage, and in this -vicinity a certain degree of bickering was always in progress, -in the course of which IV Corps developed a pleasing -habit of discharging gas projectors—about 600 at a time—against -the Birdcage. The Bosche, however, did not<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_329" id="Page_329">[Pg 329]</a></span> -retaliate. It should not, however, be supposed that the -Division had settled down for a prolonged rest in this -quiet sector. Day and night our excellent artillery were -searching for—and finding—the enemy's "weak spots," -and up and down the sector No Man's Land was every -night the scene of very great patrolling activity. In this -direction really useful work was effected by the Battalion -Scouts under Lieut. O. D. Garratt, M.C., and Sergts. -Housden and Hayes.</p> - -<p>The great width of No Man's Land facilitated the -operation of a novel method of supplying the Battalion -when in trenches with rations and stores. The limbers -came up nightly as usual from transport lines at Frémicourt -to trench headquarters at Lagnicourt, and from -this point the rations were sent up to company headquarters -in half limbers and on pack mules; whereby a -considerable saving of troops for work elsewhere was -effected. On one of these nightly journeys a bridge over -Wakefield Avenue broke and precipitated an elderly -transport horse, named Tommy, on to his back in the -trench. It was two hours' hard work to dig room round -him to get him up and make a ramp for him to walk out -of the trench! Tommy's mishap was commemorated -in the new bridge which was named Horsefall Bridge.</p> - -<p>A nasty accident in the line was averted by the -coolness of Pte. Bunker, A Company. While a section -was cleaning some Mills bombs one of the pins fell out -and the bomb, with the fuse burning, fell among the men. -Bunker picked it up and threw it out of the trench, when it -at once exploded. For this action Bunker was awarded -the M.S.M.</p> - -<p>In the first week of October, while the Battalion was -in line, a series of heavy explosions was heard behind the -enemy line in the vicinity of Quéant and Pronville and -these, combined with the sudden disappearance one night -of Baralle chimney—a well-known observation point in -the enemy's country—conduced to the belief, which held -sway for a few days, that a further Bosche retirement -was imminent. This, of course, did not materialise.</p> - -<p>Although we are not recording the actions of the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_330" id="Page_330">[Pg 330]</a></span> -Divisional Artillery we may, perhaps, be pardoned for -quoting the following crisp little record from the Divisional -Intelligence Summary as illustrating how well the infantry -was served by its guns. The incident occurred on the -10th October:</p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p>Movement was seen at an O.P. or sentry post about -D.7.d.4.6. An 18-pr. opened fire, but the first shot -fell a few yards wide, whereupon the German observer -waved a "washout" signal with a piece of white paper. -The second shot, however, altered his opinion of our -artillery.</p></div> - -<p>His amended opinion has, unfortunately, not been recorded.</p> - -<p>The losses of the Battalion in personnel up to the end -of October were practically nil, this being accounted for -by the vastness of the terrain and the fact that about -450 men were occupying some 5000 yards of firing and -communication trench. On the 28th October, however, -the Battalion had the misfortune to lose two promising -young officers, 2/Lieuts. Elders and Barnes, both of whom -were killed by shells during an enemy shoot on Posts C 12/3 -and C 12/4.</p> - -<p>During this period also the Battalion sustained a great -loss in Regimental Sergt.-Major M. Harris, who took his -discharge after nearly twenty-three years of soldiering -in the Royal Fusiliers and the 4th Londons. Sergt.-Major -Harris had served continuously with the 1/4th -Battalion since mobilisation, and had filled the position -of Senior Warrant Officer with conspicuous success since -March 1915. The last member of the pre-war permanent -staff to remain on active service with the Battalion, -Harris' imperturbable geniality was the means of adding -enormous force to his disciplinary strictness. His share -in achieving the Battalion's efficiency can hardly be over-rated, -while his kindly personality was ever a factor in -the social life of the Battalion. Harris was gazetted -Lieutenant and Quartermaster to the Battalion in the -reconstituted Territorial Army in July 1921. The duties -of R.S.M. in the 1/4th Battalion were taken by C.S.M. -Jacques.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_331" id="Page_331">[Pg 331]</a></span></p> - -<p>At the end of October information was circulated -among commanding officers that active operations were -imminent. The secrets of the operations were jealously -guarded, and only a vague idea was given as to what -would be the opening day. On the 10th November, -however, orders were issued for a feint attack to be delivered -by the 56th Division, which would be on the left -of the main operation. This feint was to be accompanied -by a heavy bombardment by all available batteries, by -a smoke screen and the display of dummy figures over -the parapet. Dummy tanks were also to be erected in -No Man's Land, and the illusion completed—or anyway -increased—by running motor cycle engines in the front -line trenches. Arrangements for this demonstration were -pushed on with vigour, and it was understood that Z day -would fall during the Battalion's occupancy of the line.</p> - -<p>On the evening of the 18th, however, the 167th Brigade -extended to its left, taking over the 168th sector, and thus -holding a two-brigade front. The 168th Brigade was -concentrated in close billets in Frémicourt and Beugny, -the Battalion being in the former village.</p> - -<hr class="tb" /> - -<p>The preparations for the offensive were conducted -with the greatest possible secrecy, and in order to secure -the maximum surprise effect it was arranged for the -attack to be delivered without any preliminary bombardment -or even registration of batteries, the road into the -enemy's defences being cleared instead by a vast number -of tanks.</p> - -<p>The attack was delivered by the IV (Woollcombe) -III (Pulteney) and VII (Snow) Corps, on a six-mile front, -between Hermies and Gonnelieu, a subsidiary operation -being conducted north of Bullecourt by the VI Corps -(Haldane). The 56th Division was thus outside the -actual area of advance, but was to co-operate on the -opening day by means of the feint attack, for which it had -already made preparations, and its further action was to -depend on the success gained in the main operation. The -left flank of the area of advance was intersected by the -Canal du Nord, running between Bourlon and Mœuvres.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_332" id="Page_332">[Pg 332]</a></span> -The frontage in this region was taken up by the 36th -(Ulster) Division, which adjoined the right flank of the -56th and was the left of the whole attack. The 36th -was to attack with two brigades east of the Canal and one -brigade west, the Division moving northwards along the -Hindenburg system towards Mœuvres. The rôle of the -56th Division was to depend on the degree of success -attained by the 36th. If the latter's attack succeeded -in forcing the retirement of the enemy west of the Canal, -this area would be occupied by the brigade of the 36th -Division which was on the west bank; if, however, this -success was not achieved the 56th Division was to attack -over the open with tanks, the 169th Brigade advancing -on a front between Mœuvres and Tadpole Copse, and the -167th forming a defensive flank from the Copse to our -present front line.</p> - -<p>The enormous success which attended the initial stages -of the Cambrai battle needs no elaboration here. At -6.30 a.m. on 30th November the dead silence was suddenly -broken by the roar of a very great concentration of -batteries of all calibres up to 15-inch, and preceded by -380 tanks the assaulting divisions swept over the first -and second systems of the Hindenburg line.</p> - -<p>With the exception of a check due to the destruction -of the Canal de l'Escaut Bridge at Masnières, and of -another at Flesquières (where a most gallant resistance -to the 51st Division was put up by a single German -officer, who continued to serve his gun after all the team -were killed and succeeded in knocking out several tanks), -the success of the day was considerable. The villages -of Havrincourt, Graincourt, Ribecourt, Marcoing and La -Vacquerie were added to the British territory, and it was -obvious that the surprise effect had been complete.</p> - -<p>On the left the 36th Division established itself north -of the Cambrai Road, astride the Hindenburg line, and the -169th Brigade swung its right flank northward to conform -to its neighbours' movements.</p> - -<p>The following day at an early hour the Flesquières -obstacle was overcome and the British line swept forward, -the villages of Masnières, Noyelles, Cantaing and Anneux<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_333" id="Page_333">[Pg 333]</a></span> -being added to the bag, while on the left Fontaine-Notre-Dame -was entered and the line pushed up to the southern -edge of Bourlon Wood. On the left of the 36th the 169th -Brigade kept pace, one of their battalions occupying the -first Hindenburg trench about one of the roads forming -the south-west exit of Mœuvres, and beginning to bomb -northwards.</p> - -<p>The 21st November witnessed a further deep inroad into -the Hindenburg system. The 36th Division succeeded -during the morning in penetrating into Mœuvres but were -not able to maintain their position. On the extreme left -the 169th Brigade continued their bombing attacks along -the enemy trenches, and were reported in the late afternoon -as having captured Tadpole Copse and the first and second -Hindenburg trenches beyond it as far as the Inchy Road.</p> - -<hr class="tb" /> - -<p>In the Battalion at Frémicourt the 20th November -passed without incident, but all ranks awaited anxiously -news of the battle, and for the expected orders to move -forward and join in the success. No movement was made, -however, and the day passed slowly, as such days of keen -expectancy always do.</p> - -<p>The hour for general action by the 56th Division was -approaching, and the 1/4th Londons received orders at -3.30 p.m. on the 21st to move forward with transport and -stores to Lebucquière, which was reached at 8.15 p.m., -accommodation being provided in Cinema Camp. The -Battalion was now prepared for action, and the nucleus -personnel under Major Phillips, the second in command -(attached from Montgomery Yeomanry), remained at -Frémicourt.</p> - -<p>Next morning the Battalion made all preparations for -an early participation in the fight and, in order to save -fatigue to the men, all battle impedimenta such as Lewis -guns and magazines, bombs, tools and wire cutters were -sent on limbers to an open space near Doignies.</p> - -<p>Shortly after midday the Battalion followed, arriving -at Doignies at 4 p.m., picking up its stores and bivouacking. -In the meantime Lieut.-Col. Marchment, M.C., accompanied -by Capt. Maloney, the doctor, rode forward to<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_334" id="Page_334">[Pg 334]</a></span> -ascertain the situation from the London Scottish, who -were holding the old British front line opposite Tadpole -Copse.</p> - -<p>The rain, which had started early in the day, was -still falling when the Battalion arrived at Doignies. The -village was a good deal knocked about, but shelter of a -sort was found, and the Battalion was just well off to -sleep when it was turned out again to move nearer the -line for the purpose of taking over the British front line -from the London Scottish early next day. About midnight -the Battalion got under way in pitch darkness, and -moving through Louverval reached its assembly area -near Piccadilly and about 500 yards in rear of the line by -4.10 a.m. on the 23rd November. As soon as the growing -daylight permitted, companies resumed their advance and -took over Rook, Rabbit and Herring Trenches from the -London Scottish, Headquarters occupying a sunken road -north of the wood surrounding Louverval Château. On -relief the assaulting companies of the London Scottish -moved forward to continue the bombing attack started -by the 169th Brigade.</p> - -<p>News of the operation was slow in coming through, but -by 10.17 a.m. a report reached Brigade that the attackers -had been checked on endeavouring to emerge from -Tadpole Copse. This check was due to a peculiar omission -in the British trench maps, which had shown Tadpole Copse -on the crest of a spur, and dominating all the ground in -its immediate vicinity. It was found that between the -Copse and the Inchy Road was a narrow and sharply -marked depression bordered by the declivitous banks -which abound in this undulating countryside. Beyond -this unsuspected valley the Inchy Road was on an eminence -just as prominent as the Tadpole Copse hill; and this -position, held by the enemy in great strength, enabled -them to overlook completely all the northern exits from -the Copse. This valley, which played an important part -in the course of the battle, was found subsequently to be -correctly marked on German maps which were captured -during the action.</p> - -<p>After a stubborn fight the London Scottish overcame<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_335" id="Page_335">[Pg 335]</a></span> -this obstacle and pushed home their attack in the Hindenburg -front trench almost as far as Adelaide Street and -in the support 100 yards beyond the Inchy Road; -while a subsidiary attempt was made, without success, to -capture the Factory between this point and Inchy. At -these points the enemy had constructed blocks which he -held strongly against all attempts to dislodge him. In -the meantime the 169th Brigade had been bombing up the -communications leading back to the second system of the -Hindenburg lines, with the object of isolating Mœuvres, -but the resistance met with here was exceedingly stubborn.</p> - -<p>About 8 o'clock that night the enemy launched a -heavy attack against the London Scottish barricades, and -in the support trench they succeeded in forcing the -Scottish back to the Inchy Road, though the position in -the front trench was held. The Scottish had now been -fighting for over twelve hours and had suffered rather -serious losses, and the German counter-attack caused two -companies of the 1/4th Londons to be drawn into the fight, -A Company (Franks) and C (Barkworth) moving forward -to reinforce the Scottish at about 8.30 p.m.</p> - -<p>A Company, which advanced first, took up a position, -acting under the orders of Lieut.-Col. Jackson of the -London Scottish, in the old German outpost line outside -Tadpole Copse, while No. 1 Platoon (Ballance) went -forward to reinforce the Scottish company in the front -Hindenburg trench. Affairs having quieted down the -services of this platoon were not immediately necessary, -and it shortly afterwards rejoined the company. In the -meantime No. 2 Platoon (Creighton) was sent to reinforce -the Scottish at the bombing block in the support trench, -and while here Corpl. Johnson and Pte. Bendelow succeeded -in beating off an enemy attack.</p> - -<p>C Company, which also took up a preliminary position -in the old German outpost line, was first told off to -replenish the supply of bombs from the brigade dump in -Houndsditch. The fresh supplies were carried to London -Scottish Headquarters; and this task completed, the -company occupied the rectangular work in the support -trench to the east of Tadpole Copse, a portion of the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_336" id="Page_336">[Pg 336]</a></span> -second Hindenburg trench in rear of the Copse, and the -communication trench connecting it with the Hindenburg -third line, 2/Lieut. Mills being responsible for this communication -trench and the advanced block about 250 -yards along it. 2/Lieut. Stuckey occupied the main -trench. These latter trenches were taken over from the -2nd Londons early on the 24th.</p> - -<p>B and D Companies meanwhile had not been idle but -had passed the night providing a covering party to a -company of the Cheshire Pioneers, by whom a chain of -redoubts had been dug in the line selected for the defensive -flank.</p> - -<p>At 5.30 a.m. on the 24th B Company (Beeby) moved -forward, also coming under the orders of the London -Scottish, and at first took up a position in support in the -old outpost line outside the Hindenburg system. Almost -immediately the company was ordered forward to relieve -the 2nd Londons in the communication trench leading to -the rear from the Quadrilateral held by C Company.</p> - -<p>The morning passed comparatively quietly though the -duty of keeping wicket behind the bombing blocks was a -trying one, which entailed the constant alertness of all -ranks in readiness to meet a sudden emergency. At noon, -however, the enemy put down a heavy barrage on the -captured portions of the Hindenburg trenches, and this -was followed at 2 p.m. by a most determined attack on -the advanced blocks held by the London Scottish. This -met with considerable success, and though the Scottish -fought with gallantry they were overcome by the weight -of the enemy's onslaught, and by 2.45 p.m. the German -bombers had reached the block held by Mills (C Company), -who put up a stout resistance, under orders from his company -commander to hold his post failing further orders. -In this he was helped by the company's Lewis guns, which -gave covering fire to Mills' platoon and the London -Scottish, and also engaged the enemy at the Inchy Road -Factory. Three of the guns were destroyed by the -enemy's shell fire.</p> - -<div class="figcenter" style="width: 500px;"> -<img src="images/i_b_336fp.jpg" width="500" height="378" alt="" /> -<div class="caption"><p><span class="smcap">The Battle of Cambrai</span>, 1917</p></div> -</div> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_337" id="Page_337">[Pg 337]</a></span></p> - -<p>The trench was already uncomfortably filled with -casualties in addition to the men who were keeping up -the fight, but in a few moments the congestion was greatly -increased by the numbers of Scottish troops who began -to come back and file along the trench. At about 3 p.m. -about 50 of the London Scottish were seen to leave the -Hindenburg support trench in the hidden valley referred -to, with the object of making their way over the open -towards the front trench. Realising that this vacation -of the trench might enable the enemy to surge forward -along it and so cut off Mills, who was still holding his -own up the communication trench, Barkworth promptly -ordered Stuckey to advance and form a block beyond the -side trench held by Mills. Stuckey's losses, however, had -been severe, and with only five men at his disposal he was -unable to cope with the task in view of the great congestion -of the trench. Rather than risk the sudden -cutting off of his remaining slender resources in men and -the laying open to the enemy of the whole Tadpole Copse -position, which would inevitably result, Barkworth now -decided to withdraw his advanced positions and concentrate -his company, and accordingly Stuckey was ordered -to block the support trench at the west entrance to the -Quadrilateral, Mills gradually withdrawing and holding -the enemy off till the new block was completed. In this -retired position the remnants of C Company were in -touch with B Company and also with the 2nd Londons, -and here the enemy was finally held up.</p> - -<p>This gallant little defence in which C Company put -up a really good fight and inflicted considerable loss on -the enemy, cost it about 40 per cent. of its strength in -casualties and, as already stated, three of its Lewis guns.</p> - -<p>At the same time B Company had been heavily engaged -in its communication trench, of which it held a length of -some 250 yards back from the second trench. Here the -enemy, who had a bombing block about 50 yards from -B Company's forward block, began to attack at about -2.30 p.m., but after a struggle his first attempt was thrown -back. A little later the Bosche returned to the charge, -and this time was successful in forcing B Company back -for a short distance, but a determined counter-attack -re-established the position, which, after a third and also<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_338" id="Page_338">[Pg 338]</a></span> -abortive enemy assault, remained intact in the Company's -hands.</p> - -<p>While the 1/4th Londons had been thus heavily engaged -the London Scottish had made a successful resistance -in the front Hindenburg trench which defied all the -enemy's attempts. Towards the evening the enemy's -activity both in shell fire and bombing somewhat lessened, -and at 8.30 p.m. D Company (Duthie) was also sent -forward relieving C Company in the trenches. At the -same time the Rangers took over from the Scottish in -the front trench.</p> - -<p>As the fighting on the 24th was somewhat involved, it -seems desirable to restate the positions now held by the -companies of the Battalion in the Hindenburg system:</p> - -<div class="hangindent8"> - -<p>Front Line—D Company—Quadrilateral in support trench, and -communication leading up to front trench.</p></div> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p>B Company—Communication trench leading from -the Quadrilateral back to third trench.</p></div> - -<div class="hangindent8"> - -<p>Support Line—A and C Companies and Headquarters—Front -trench from west edge of Tadpole Copse to -communication trench east of it and old German -outpost line in front of the Copse.</p></div> - -<p>The 25th November also witnessed very severe fighting -in which the 1/4th Londons bore an important part and -achieved considerable success. The fighting this day fell -to D Company who had not yet been engaged, and the -objective allotted to them was the recapture of the lost -portion of the Hindenburg support trench as far as its -junction with the communication trench, which had been -defended by Mills the previous day. At the same time -the Rangers were to make good the two communication -trenches leading back from the front trench to the support -on the east side of the Inchy Road, and also the support -trench in prolongation of Duthie's attack.</p> - -<p>We propose to narrate this gallant little action of D -Company in the words of Duthie's report on the operation:</p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p>Artillery preparation began at 12.30 p.m. It was -reported to be very short on our right. Our two -blocks were removed at 12.45 p.m. At Zero (1 p.m.) -the attack commenced. The Company was disposed -as follows:</p> -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_339" id="Page_339">[Pg 339]</a></span> -<p>14 Platoon, 2/Lieut. E. Petrie, Bombers, Rifle -Grenadiers, Riflemen (carrying); 13 Platoon, 2/Lieut. -C. W. Rowlands, with sections in same order.<a name="FNanchor_5_5" id="FNanchor_5_5"></a><a href="#Footnote_5_5" class="fnanchor">[5]</a> Lewis -gun sections took up a position near our blocks so as -to fire along the trench and to prevent any movement -in the open. Company Headquarters moved with the -leading platoon. For about 50 yards very little opposition -was met with but the leading bombing section was -then held up by stick bombs and suffered eight casualties, -which included the leading bombers. To overcome -this check fire was opened for several minutes -with No. 23 and No. 24 Rifle Grenades, and the trench -was searched forward for about 100 yards. The -shooting was very accurate and the enemy were driven -back with the loss of about 5 men killed. The advance -was continued by bounds of from 20 to 40 yards under -cover of salvoes of rifle grenades. The first two deep -dugouts were unoccupied. The third and fourth were -not immediately searched but sentries were posted. -It was thought that some of the C Company men who -had been wounded the previous day might still be -down there. The small C.T. (about 100 yards from -the Quadrilateral) was blocked about 120 yards up. -At the entrance a good deal of bombing was overcome. -This is a shallow trench and the far end under water. -Further delay was caused by the third and fourth -dugouts which were found to contain 21 of the enemy. -These were finally cleared. Several were killed and -the remainder badly wounded and captured. The -company then pushed forward to trench junction at -E 13 c. 15.75 (objective) and reached it about 2.45 p.m. -The Lewis gun sections were brought up and placed -in suitable positions to protect a further advance -and also the blocking party in the small C.T. None -of the Rangers were encountered and the trench -appeared unoccupied, but bombing was thought to -be heard about 300 yards further along.</p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_5_5" id="Footnote_5_5"></a><a href="#FNanchor_5_5"><span class="label">[5]</span></a> Companies were still organised in two platoons owing to their -reduced strength, which had not been made good since the third battle -of Ypres.</p></div> - -<p>A small block was made in this trench about -30 yards from the junction. The enemy was now -observed leaving the trench and crawling over the -open towards the bank at D 18 d. 90.98 (in the unsuspected -valley). Heavy rifle fire was opened and -at least 30 of the enemy killed. Few, if any, got over -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_340" id="Page_340">[Pg 340]</a></span>the bank. As the trench beyond the objective -appeared to be unoccupied a party of 12 including -O.C. Company, 2/Lieut. Rowlands, Sergts. Norris -and Arklay, moved on up the trench. No fire was -opened and silence was maintained. In the next bay -past the trench at E 13 c. 00.85 (50 yards beyond the -objective) two men were seen firing a machine-gun -which was mounted on the parapet and aimed down -the bank (in the valley). This was rushed.... The -gun was dismounted and brought in. Other guns -were heard firing and two more were seen (at points -farther along the trench in the valley described in -the report by map reference). Two parties under -Sergts. Norris and Arklay moved round to a point -from which fire could be brought to bear. The crews -of two men to each gun were killed and the guns -brought in. O.C. Company and Sergt. Norris continued -to advance along the trench and up to the -top of the bank. Heavy bombing could be seen in -Tadpole Lane and in the front line towards the Inchy -Road. Further advance was prevented by the fire of -our own guns firing on the trench in response to S.O.S. -signal which had been sent up from the front line. -The trench was very full of dead, both of the London -Scottish and of the enemy. It was impossible to -walk without treading on them. As our barrage -continued the party moved back to our original -objective and blocks were made at this trench -junction. The remainder of the party carried back -four wounded London Scottish, who were found in the -open near the bank. Later in the evening when -our barrage was discontinued an attack was made on -our block. The enemy was quickly silenced. At -11 p.m. D Company were relieved by A Company.</p></div> - -<p>A very successful operation, and a modest account of -it by Duthie, whose personality and leadership was an -important factor in the result achieved. The two men -in charge of the first gun captured were shot by Duthie -with his revolver. The resistance offered to the Rangers -was stubborn, and but for their inability to advance it is -possible a considerable success might have been achieved, -since the barrage put down by our guns, in response to -the Rangers' S.O.S., had the effect of shelling Duthie out -of part of his gains.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_341" id="Page_341">[Pg 341]</a></span></p> - -<p>The remainder of the day was inactive, no further -fighting taking place till about 11.30 a.m. on the 26th, -when once more the enemy attempted to force B Company's -position in the communication trench. The company, -however, repeated its gallantry of the former occasion, and -the enemy retired later without having gained any success.</p> - -<p>At 11.30 p.m. on the 26th the Battalion was relieved -by the Kensingtons, withdrawing on relief to its former -position in the Brigade support area behind the old British -front line. This relief brought to a close the Battalion's -active participation in the British offensive, which was -now practically spent. During the very trying three -days spent behind the bombing blocks in circumstances -which required particular vigilance and fortitude, all ranks -had behaved splendidly, and it is difficult to mention -individuals when all had rendered such excellent service. -A few names, however, call for outstanding mention, -among these being Capt. S. J. Barkworth, M.C., M.M., and -Capt. A. M. Duthie, the commanders of C and D Companies, -on whom the brunt of the work had fallen, and -their subalterns Rowlands and Mills. The Padre, the -Rev. S. F. Leighton Green, did splendid service throughout, -being always about the Hindenburg lines and going up to -the advanced blocks. At night he was constantly visiting -and helping with casualties and administering the last -rites to those who had fallen.</p> - -<p>The whole action as far as the Division was concerned -had developed on lines completely opposed to the original -plans; for whereas it had been proposed to employ the -Division in the open with tanks, its fighting throughout -had been hand-to-hand fighting in trenches. The -regularity and sufficiency with which bomb supplies found -their way to the front indicated excellent organisation. -At no time did supplies fall short of the demand.</p> - -<p>It was a surprise to a good many to find the much -vaunted Hindenburg line inferior to our own defences. The -outpost line which the companies first occupied was a gross -delusion, for it was only six inches deep, while the main -line was poor and not over well maintained, and the Bosche -ideas of sanitation could only be described as a scandal.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_342" id="Page_342">[Pg 342]</a></span></p> - -<p>The casualties sustained during the three days' fighting -were light in view of the close contact with the enemy. -Two officers, 2/Lieuts. R. S. B. Simmonds and E. Petrie, -were wounded, and the total losses in other ranks amounted -to about 60, including two valuable N.C.O.'s killed, viz.: -Sergts. Barker and Gooch, and one, Sergt. Lintott, M.M., -wounded and captured.</p> - -<p>At midnight on the 24th November the 56th Division -had passed from the IV to the VI Corps. Its position at -the conclusion of the offensive operations was one of -almost dangerous extension. It had captured and was -holding over a mile of the Hindenburg line. Its right -flank was not secure so long as Mœuvres remained in the -enemy's hands; its left flank on the Tadpole Copse spur -was exposed and subject to constant counter-attacks. -Two of its brigades were involved in this fighting and in -holding a defensive flank of 2000 yards, while the remaining -brigade, the 167th, was responsible for a frontage in -the old British line of 5500 yards, and had in addition to -supply a battalion each night for consolidation of the -captured position. It was thus unable to provide relief -for the troops who had been fighting, and was without any -reserve for use in case of emergency. Representations -made by General Dudgeon to the Corps Commander as to -the weakness of his position resulted in a battalion of the -3rd Division being at once placed at the disposal of the -167th Brigade for counter-attack purposes. This temporary -relief was extended a few days later, and by the -29th the whole of the 167th Brigade had been relieved by -troops of the 3rd Division and was withdrawn at Frémicourt -in Divisional reserve, with two of its battalions lent -temporarily to the 168th Brigade.</p> - -<p>The three days following relief were spent by the -Battalion in support in providing carrying and working -parties in the front line and burying parties for the fallen. -On the 29th a slight side step to the left was made so -that the Battalion's right flank rested on Piccadilly and it -became responsible for the defensive flank. A considerable -amount of work had been done in this quarter, and the flank -was now provided with a continuous belt of wire and a<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_343" id="Page_343">[Pg 343]</a></span> -chain of inter-supporting posts. A communication trench -had been dug from the old line across No Man's Land -to the Hindenburg line parallel to Piccadilly, a distance -of some 1300 yards, and from this T-head trenches had -been sapped forward facing north. The defensive flank -positions were only occupied at night, the trench garrison -taking two companies, A and B, while C and D Companies -provided patrols along the wire to prevent any attempts -of the enemy to turn the position.</p> - -<p>The 29th November passed quietly though a good deal -of movement was observable in rear of the enemy's lines, -so that his serious attack of the following day was not -entirely unexpected.</p> - -<p>From the Battalion's position an extensive view was -obtainable over the whole terrain as far as Bourlon Wood, -and early on the 30th a strong concentration of the enemy's -forces was clearly visible north and east of Mœuvres.</p> - -<p>At 10.45 a.m. the S.O.S. signal went up all along the -line and the enemy attacked in dense formation under a -heavy barrage. The Battalion stood to arms all day but -was not required, for the gallant defence of the units in -the line this day was one of the greatest achievements of -the 56th Division. The enemy's attack was pressed with -vigour and at one time he had driven a wedge into the -Hindenburg lines and divided the London Scottish, who -were still in the line, from the 2nd Londons. The position, -however, was defended tenaciously and at the end of the -day the whole of the Division's gains in the Hindenburg -front line were maintained, while the heaps of enemy -dead outside the trenches testified to the severity of the -check which he had suffered.</p> - -<p>That night the Battalion was called on for particularly -active patrolling as it was anticipated that the enemy would -renew his attempt on the Divisional front. The whole -resources of the Division were drawn upon to meet any -renewed enemy action, and Lieut.-Col. Marchment had -under him for defensive purposes, in addition to the -Battalion, a company of the 5th Cheshires, a company of -the 7th Middlesex, the 512th Field Company, R.E., and two -sections of the 416th Field Company, R.E. The Engineers<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_344" id="Page_344">[Pg 344]</a></span> -were employed in digging fresh redoubts in dead ground -to the rear of the defensive flank line, while the infantry -companies were kept as a reserve at Battalion Headquarters. -No further action occurred until the afternoon -of the 1st December when a fresh concentration of enemy -forces about 3.30 p.m. was crushed by our guns.</p> - -<p>The Division had now well earned a rest, and warning -was received on the 1st December that it would be relieved -by the 51st Division immediately. The relief began at -7 p.m. that evening, the Battalion handing over its lines -to the 6th Black Watch. It was evident that the incoming -troops had been pushed forward hurriedly, for -the relieving battalion arrived without Lewis guns or -shrapnel helmets, and with the officers wearing slacks, -just as they had risen from dinner. The relief took a -long while to effect, and it was not until 4 a.m. on the 2nd -that Lieut.-Col. Marchment handed over command of the -sector. On relief the Battalion withdrew to billets in -Beugny, but at 11 a.m. the rearward march was continued -to Beaulencourt which was reached by 4 p.m., quarters -being allotted in the camp that the Battalion had occupied -on the 30th August.</p> - -<p>While at Beaulencourt the Battalion received congratulatory -messages which had been issued to Brigade -by the Corps and Divisional commanders on the part -played in the battle.</p> - -<p>The following day the Battalion entrained at Frémicourt -for the Arras area, reaching Beaumetz-les-Loges at -12.30 p.m., whence it marched to billets in Simencourt.</p> - -<p>The honours awarded for services rendered in the -Battle of Cambrai were as follows:</p> - -<div class="hangindent8"> - -<p>D.S.O.—Capt. A. M. Duthie.</p> - -<p>M.C.—2/Lieuts. C. W. Rowlands and E. L. Mills.</p> - -<p>D.C.M.—Sergt. G. Norris and L.-Corpls. E. S. Brown and -T. H. Sankey.</p> - -<p>Bar to M.M.—Pte. C. S. Ruel.</p> - -<p>M.M.—Sergts. F. Arklay, A. E. Haynes and G. J. Grant, -Corpls. T. J. Court, J. W. Johnson and H. W. -Wallder. L.-Corpl. T. Hodgkins and Ptes. -B. M. J. Barnett, H. Evans, W. J. Hutchin, -F. G. Senyard, G. Tyrell, J. Wickens and W. A. -Willmott.</p></div> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_345" id="Page_345">[Pg 345]</a></span></p> -<div class="chapter"></div> -<hr class="chap" /> - - - - -<h2>CHAPTER XIX<br /> - -THE 1/4TH BATTALION, WINTER 1917/18--THE -RESERVE BATTALION, 1916/17</h2> - - -<p>The closing days of 1917 were full of anxiety for the -Allies. The operations at Cambrai had been undertaken -by the British forces at the termination of the prolonged -and unusually trying offensive on the northern ridges at -Ypres, with the object of affording some relief to our -Italian Allies. The secession of Russia from the Allied -cause had had a most serious effect in all theatres of war. -In the East it had afforded the tottering Austrian Empire -the respite it so badly needed and had wrought the utter -downfall of isolated Roumania, besides giving a severe -check to the Allies' aspirations in the Balkans and Palestine. -In the West it had entailed a complete reversal of the -numerical position, and from the end of November -onwards the German strength was being continually -augmented by the arrival of divisions from the Russian -front, while the Allies became subjected to an ever-increasing -strain. The growing requirements of all the -battlefields of the world on which the Empire's soldiers -were playing their part made it impossible to maintain -the British forces in France at the strength necessary to -combat the threat of a very serious German offensive. -Only from the Far West was any relief for the Allies to be -expected. The American Army which had been about -ten months in training was already being transferred to -France, but it would still be some time before it would -be sufficiently numerous or experienced to turn the scale -against the enemy. As the winter wore on the threat of -an enemy attack on a grand scale developed into a -probability, which as all the world now knows, materialised -on the 21st March 1918.</p> - -<p>For some weeks, however, prior to the launching of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_346" id="Page_346">[Pg 346]</a></span> -this final effort of the Central Powers the Allies had -definitely passed to the defensive in preparation for the -German onslaught, and our present task is to bridge -rapidly the gulf between the close of active operations at -the end of 1917 and the point, which we will fix in the -early days of March 1918, at which we can conveniently -take up the story of the regiment in the offensive -itself. We propose, therefore, to devote a few pages to -bringing up to date the record of the various activities -of the regiment, dealing first with the 1/4th Battalion -in France, and afterwards with the Reserve Battalion -at home.</p> - - -<h3>I. <em>The 1/4th Battalion in Artois</em></h3> - -<p>After three months in the devastated area around -Lagnicourt, where the Battalion had been entirely removed -from French civilisation, and where scarcely any had -had the opportunity of sleeping under a proper roof, the -billets allotted to the troops at Simencourt on the 3rd -December were a great treat, and it was hoped that for -at least a few days the Battalion would be permitted to -enjoy its well-earned rest. On this occasion as on most -others, however, the Divisional rest proved a delusion, -and after two days occupied in cleaning and reorganisation -the Battalion found itself once more on the road, for -on the 5th it marched from Simencourt at 9.30 a.m. to -Wakefield Camp, near Roclincourt (three miles north of -Arras) in the First Army area.</p> - -<p>The Division was now allotted to the XIII Corps -(McCracken), which formed the right flank of Horne's -First Army and comprised in addition to the 56th, the -31st and 62nd Divisions.</p> - -<p>The following day Lieut.-Col. Marchment and the -Works Officer (Lieut. Lorden) reconnoitred the sector to -be taken over, and on the 7th and 8th the relief of the -94th Brigade (31st Division) by the 168th Brigade took -place, the 1/4th Londons moving on the first day of relief -to Brigade support and on the second day into the left -subsection of the centre Brigade section facing Oppy, in<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_347" id="Page_347">[Pg 347]</a></span> -trenches which it took over from the 12th York and -Lancaster Regiment.</p> - -<p>The whole area had seen a great deal of heavy fighting -since the early days of the War. In May and June 1915 -during Sir John French's offensive at Festubert, the -French troops had attacked Notre Dame de Lorette, -Ablain St Nazaire, La Targette and Neuville St Vaast. -Early in 1916 the Allied positions on the Vimy Ridge, by -then held by the British, had been heavily attacked by -the enemy; while in the spring of 1917, in conjunction -with the Third Army's operations east of Arras, the -Canadian Corps had swept over the Vimy Ridge and down -the slopes beyond towards the broad plains of Douai, -carrying the line in front of Gavrelle and Arleux-en-Gohelle. -The British front line at the end of 1917 was -therefore deep in what had originally been a rear German -system of defence; trenches were numerous, but poor and -in bad repair, and the whole ground under numerous -intense bombardments had been badly "crumped."</p> - -<p>The Battalion's sector lay between Arleux and Gavrelle -and passed through Oppy Wood, a leafless spectre of what -had once been a copse, through whose shattered trunks -the remains of Oppy and Neuvireuil were visible. The -forward line was held in three posts, known from right to -left as Beatty, Wood and Oppy. Each post took a -company, with one platoon of each company in the -Marquis-Earl line, a continuous trench some four hundred -yards in rear. The fourth company was held in reserve -in Bow Trench about 1700 yards back from the line of -posts, while Battalion Headquarters occupied a dugout -in South Duke Street, close to the Marquis line, which -was the line of resistance.</p> - -<p>The second defensive system consisted of the Red line, -a continuous trench in front of Bailleul and Willerval, -while a third system, the Green line, followed the crest of -the Vimy Ridge. The observation throughout the area -was excellent owing to the regular slope eastwards from -the Vimy Ridge, and brigade and battalion commanders -could overlook the whole of their sectors from their -respective Headquarters.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_348" id="Page_348">[Pg 348]</a></span></p> - -<p>The Battalion's sector was served by one main communication -trench, Ouse Alley, which started from the -Green line no less than 5300 yards from the front line. -The administrative arrangements were distinctly good. -Steam trains ran to daylight railhead in rear of the Green -line, and this was connected with the Red line by a -night service of petrol-electric trains. From the Red -line forwards rations and stores were moved by truck. -Battalion Headquarters also enjoyed the luxury of having -water laid on by pipe line. Having said so much, however, -we have almost exhausted the good points of the sector. -The defences themselves left much to be desired. An -early reconnaissance of the wire in front of the three -company posts revealed an alarming weakness, for the -single lines of concertina wire afforded but little obstacle -to an enterprising enemy, and were placed out much too -close to our parapets. The trenches, with the exception -of the Red line, which was of good construction, were -shallow and much knocked about.</p> - -<p>The Battalion's first tour in this sector passed without -incident, the enemy being rather surprisingly inactive, -and the Battalion was able to make much progress -towards remedying the defects in its defences. On the -13th December it handed over its lines to the Rangers -and withdrew to Divisional reserve in Springvale Camp -at Ecurie, a pleasant camp, but one of the filthiest the -Battalion had ever had to occupy.</p> - -<p>A few days were spent in training here, and on Sunday, -the 16th, Major-Gen. Dudgeon attended the Battalion's -Church Parade, and presented medal ribands to all available -N.C.O.'s and men who had been decorated for their services -at Cambrai. The Division was now expecting relief by -the 31st, and, as this relief would have ensured a Christmas -out of the line, considerable disappointment was caused to -all ranks by the announcement on the 17th December that -the relief was cancelled temporarily, and that the Battalion -was to return to the trenches. The change took place the -following day, and the 1/4th Londons took over the Oppy -sector from the Rangers.</p> - -<p>Five uneventful days passed in the Oppy trenches.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_349" id="Page_349">[Pg 349]</a></span> -On the whole the enemy displayed little activity beyond -occasional retaliation to our continuous and systematic -bombardments, which were by day and night directed -against the enemy's "weak spots." At night the Bosche -showed signs of considerable nervousness. A good deal -of progress was made with the Brigade programme of -trench and wiring work, which was carried on in intensely -cold weather, and on the 23rd the Battalion once more -exchanged with the Rangers and withdrew to Brigade -support.</p> - -<p>In the support area Headquarters and B Company -(Spicer) were in a 30-foot railway cutting in rear of Bailleul, -while A (H. N. Williams), C (Barkworth) and D (Cooper) -were in the Red line. Christmas day, which was fortunately -not marked by hostile activity, was spent in -these positions and by means of numerous small parties -in the Red line the troops were able to get as much -enjoyment out of it as the circumstances permitted, but -the festivity was rather damped by the death of 2/Lieut. -E. L. Stuckey, a keen and promising officer, who was -killed by a stray shell in the Red line.</p> - -<p>Late on Christmas evening the enemy carried out a -hurricane bombardment on the front line posts, and -during the last day of the year showed some disposition -to increase his harassing fire on our back areas.</p> - -<p>On the 28th December the 167th Brigade relieved the -168th, which withdrew in Divisional reserve to the Marœuil -area, the Battalion being billeted at St Aubin, where five -days of training and refitting were obtained. The New -Year was celebrated by carrying out the arrangements -which had originally been made for Christmas, and after -a quite pleasant interlude the Battalion moved on the -3rd January 1918, into the right sector of the Divisional -front at Gavrelle, relieving the Queen's Westminsters. -The weather was now intensely cold and the ground was -covered with snow, which effectively stopped any attempts -at active work. The tour of duty passed quietly and -without any casualties, though the enemy's artillery and -trench mortar fire continued to show an increase in -volume, and on both sides aircraft activity developed.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_350" id="Page_350">[Pg 350]</a></span></p> - -<p>The 62nd Division now took over the Division's sector, -and on the 6th January the 56th Division passed into -G.H.Q. reserve at forty-eight hours' notice to move. -The Battalion handed over its trenches to the 2/4th -K.O.Y.L.I. and moved to billets at Marœuil, continuing -its route on the 7th to Monchy-Breton (near St Pol), -where it arrived in billets at 4 p.m.</p> - -<p>A great deal of useful training was carried out at -Monchy-Breton, but the incident which probably did as -much good to the Battalion as any, was the formation by -Lieut. Faulkner, the quartermaster, of an orchestra which -was an enormous success from its inception, and maintained -its reputation until the end of the War. The -orchestra included the following:</p> - -<div class="center"> -<table border="0" cellpadding="4" cellspacing="0" summary="orchestra"> - <tr> - <td>'Cellos</td> - <td>Ptes. Montague and Stone.</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td>Violins</td> - <td>Ptes. Barton, Fairman, Perrin and Cornell.</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td>Cornets</td> - <td>Sergt. Fulford and Pte. Stevens.</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td>Trombones</td> - <td>Sergt. Grimston and Pte. Westerman.</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td>Clarionets</td> - <td>Sergt.-Dr Ingham and Pte. Spooner.</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td>Horn</td> - <td>Pte. Cuffe.</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td>Drum</td> - <td>Pte. Smith.</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td>Harmonium</td> - <td>L.-Corpl. Weekes.</td> - </tr> -</table></div> - -<p>The numerous concerts given by this excellent band, -which was really well trained by the quartermaster, -afforded real pleasure, not only to the Battalion and to -other units of the Division, but also to the French inhabitants -of the various villages in which the Battalion -found temporary homes.</p> - -<p>During December and January the Battalion was -joined by 2/Lieuts. H. T. Hannay and H. O. Morris, and -by 2/Lieut. A. E. Hanks (13th Londons), while Capt. -G. E. Stanbridge was granted an exchange to England -for six months' duty at home, after having been in -France since March 1916.</p> - -<p>By this time the possibilities of a German offensive -had developed into a practical certainty, and all training -was directed towards methods of defence and counter-attack. -Much attention was paid to musketry and Lewis -gun training. The importance of the rifle and bayonet -as the infantry weapon <i lang="fr">par excellence</i> was once more -being realised, and the bomb and rifle grenade, which in<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_351" id="Page_351">[Pg 351]</a></span> -1916 and 1917 had to a large extent ousted the rifle from -its proper function, were again recognised to be only -subsidiary aids in certain circumstances, so that full -advantage was eagerly taken of the chance to ensure -that all ranks were "handy" with their rifles.</p> - -<p>The defensive systems in the area lately occupied by -the Division still needed a vast amount of work to bring -them to a condition to resist a serious attack, and accordingly -throughout the period spent in G.H.Q. reserve each -brigade of the Division supplied one battalion for work -in the forward area under the Chief Engineer XIII Corps. -The Battalion's turn for this duty came after seventeen -days of training at Monchy-Breton, and on the 24th -January it moved forward, railing from Tincques to -Ecurie, and was accommodated at Stewart Camp, Roclincourt, -the transport lines being stationed at Marœuil. -Every available man was now put to work in one or other -of the large parties which were supplied daily for the -R.E.'s, the principal tasks which fell to the Battalion's -lot being the wiring of the Green line and the construction -of cable trenches (<em>i.e.</em> narrow deep trenches in which -telegraph cables were buried to minimise the risk of their -destruction by shell fire) in the forward area by night. -The severity of the winter had now given place to thaw; -the weather was warm for the time of year and a good -deal of rain fell.</p> - -<p>This duty continued till the end of January, when -the Battalion was relieved and returned to the reserve -area by train from Ecurie to Tincques, marching thence -to billets at Magnicourt, which were reached on the -1st February.</p> - -<p>An extensive reorganisation was now effected throughout -the British armies in France. The ever-dwindling -supply of reinforcements from home, due in part to failing -resources in man-power and partly to the retention in -England of large defence forces which were held in readiness -against a possible German invasion, had caused the -numbers in infantry battalions throughout the Army to -sink dangerously below full strength. In the 1/4th -Londons the casualties of Ypres and Cambrai in 1917 had<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_352" id="Page_352">[Pg 352]</a></span> -never been balanced by reinforcements, and this was -typical of the condition of affairs in every unit which had -been heavily engaged in the preceding six months. The -decision arrived at, therefore, was to reduce all Brigades -to a three, instead of a four, battalion establishment, -and this was carried out by disbanding one battalion per -brigade and dividing out its strength among the three -battalions which were retained. Inevitably such drastic -action caused bitter disappointment among the battalions -which had the misfortune to be selected for disbandment, -and <i lang="fr">esprit de corps</i> received temporarily a severe check. -In the 56th Division the 3rd (Royal Fusiliers), 9th (Queen -Victoria's) and 12th (Rangers) Battalions were reduced -to cadre strength and transferred to the 58th Division, so -that from the beginning of the month of February 1918 -the infantry of the Division consisted of:</p> - -<div class="center"> -<table border="0" cellpadding="4" cellspacing="0" summary="58th Division"> - <tr> - <td><span class="smcap">167th Brigade</span>—</td> - <td class="tdr">1st</td> - <td>London Regiment</td> - <td>(Royal Fusiliers).</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td></td> - <td class="tdr">1/7th</td> - <td>Middlesex Regiment.</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td></td> - <td class="tdr">1/8th</td> - <td class="tdc">do.</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td><span class="smcap">168th Brigade</span>—</td> - <td class="tdr">1/4th</td> - <td>London Regiment</td> - <td>(Royal Fusiliers).</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td></td> - <td class="tdr">1/13th</td> - <td class="tdc">do.</td> - <td>(Kensingtons).</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td></td> - <td class="tdr">1/14th</td> - <td class="tdc">do.</td> - <td>(London Scottish).</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td><span class="smcap">169th Brigade</span>—</td> - <td class="tdr">1/2nd</td> - <td>London Regiment</td> - <td>(Royal Fusiliers).</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td></td> - <td class="tdr">5th</td> - <td class="tdc">do.</td> - <td>(London Rifle Brigade).</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td></td> - <td class="tdr">1/16th</td> - <td class="tdc">do.</td> - <td>(Queen's Westminster Rifles).</td> - </tr> -</table></div> - -<p>The Battalion received through these changes about -150 N.C.O.'s and men from the 9th Londons, 50 from the -3rd Londons and 60 from the 2/1st Londons, who had -been disbanded from the 58th Division. Four subalterns -also came to the Battalion as follows: Lieuts. G. G. Lewis -and F. G. Athey from 2/1st Londons, H. F. Dade from -3rd Londons and W. G. Hook from 9th Londons. The -new arrivals naturally felt sore at first at the disappearance -of their own units, but, being all good sportsmen, accepted -the inevitable, and rapidly settled down in the 1/4th -Battalion. This acquisition of strength enabled the -Battalion organisation of companies to be expanded to -a three-platoon basis instead of the two-platoon system -which had been in force since August 1917.</p> - -<p>At Magnicourt a week's useful training was effected,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_353" id="Page_353">[Pg 353]</a></span> -in which the reorganisation necessary in consequence of -the above changes figured largely. The Battalion was -joined by 2/Lieuts. R. E. Campkin, C. H. Board, T. H. -Mawby and G. R. Pitman.</p> - -<p>The morale of the Battalion—as indeed of all units -of the Division—was now splendid. All ranks were perfectly -confident as to the outcome of the approaching -offensive and the competitive spirit between companies, -always strong, was fostered in every possible way. The -Battalion transport under Lieut. G. V. Lawrie, M.C., also -maintained high efficiency, and received special commendation -from Gen. Dudgeon for the smartness of its -turn-out. Amid strenuous work amusements were not -overlooked and the pleasures of the lighter side of life were -much added to by the extraordinarily good concert given -one evening by the Quartermaster's band.</p> - -<p>At the end of the first week of February the 56th -Division's period in reserve was brought to a close and -its relief of the 62nd Division began. On the 9th the -Battalion left Magnicourt and marched to Marœuil, moving -forward again the next day to its old trenches at Oppy, -where it relieved the 2/5th West Yorkshires. In addition -to its old sector the Battalion had to take over, as a -temporary measure, Bird Post on the right. The front -line posts were not approachable by daylight at this date -as Boyne and Bedford Streets, the communication trenches -leading forward from the Marquis line, had fallen in as -a result of the severe weather, and had not been repaired. -Other parts of the trench system also needed much repair.</p> - -<p>This tour of duty was remarkably quiet, and with the -exception of sporadic shelling the enemy was inactive. -The Bosche had apparently been permitted to contract a -habit of walking about in the open in rear of his lines, -but B and C Companies in Bird and Beatty posts were -soon able to bring home to him the unwisdom of exposing -himself in daylight. The Headquarter Scouts under Sergt. -Hayes also did good work in this direction from a useful -fire position on a big mound near Beatty Post, whence -by good marksmanship they secured six head one evening. -At this period also the close liaison which the Battalion<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_354" id="Page_354">[Pg 354]</a></span> -always maintained with the Divisional artillery stood it -in good stead. A battery of the 281st Brigade R.F.A. had -a section of 18-pr. guns in Bailleul, and the Battalion -signallers having run a wire to the guns from Bird Post, -the gunners settled down to a little sniping. The gunner -officer in charge, Lieut. J. Powell, M.C., registered the -guns on a small cart standing in Bosche ground and it was -easy to switch and elevate the guns roughly on to any -party of Bosche moving about. The results were most -successful and the Bosche was finally cured of his desire -for walking exercise outside his trenches.</p> - -<p>On the evening of the 14th February the Battalion -handed over its trenches to the London Scottish and withdrew -to billets in Roclincourt in Divisional reserve. Here -nine days were spent, during which the Battalion supplied -working parties for the further improvement of the -trenches.</p> - -<p>From the 22nd to the 27th the Battalion was once more -in the trenches for another quiet tour of duty, and on the -latter date it withdrew to Roclincourt West Camp in -Divisional reserve. The lack of activity at this period -is evidenced by the fact that only two men were wounded -during the month of February.</p> - -<p>Attention was now fixed solely on the coming offensive, -to meet which preparations were being pushed forward -with thoroughness. Additional firesteps were constructed -in the trenches and the already formidable wire was -further strengthened.</p> - -<p>From this date forward every tour in the trenches or -in Brigade support was passed by platoons in exactly the -same position, so that every man might, whenever the -offensive should be launched, be well acquainted with his -position.</p> - -<p>The five days at Roclincourt West Camp were succeeded -by a short period in Brigade support, in which -position the Battalion relieved the Kensingtons on the -5th March. The tour of duty passed quietly with the -exception of a somewhat severe enemy bombardment with -gas shell on the evening of the 8th. Early on the morning -of the 9th the Kensingtons carried out an excellent raid on<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_355" id="Page_355">[Pg 355]</a></span> -the enemy lines north of Oppy, in the course of which -about 20 Germans were killed and 4 brought back as -prisoners. The raiding party was under Lieut. Lester, -M.C. (since killed), commissioned from the 4th Londons. -The identification obtained was normal, that is, the -prisoners belonged to the German regiment which was -believed to be opposed to us. These captures elicited -information that the offensive was imminent, and this, -combined with unmistakable signs of enemy activity, such -as extensive road repairs, clearing and repairing enemy -trenches formerly derelict, and so forth, left no room for -doubt that the Germans' great effort could not be long -delayed. Thenceforward extreme vigilance was exercised -all along the line.</p> - - -<h3>II. <em>The Reserve Battalion</em></h3> - -<p>Shortly after the reconstruction of the 1st London -(Reserve) Brigade, which resulted in the 3rd (Reserve) -Battalion being made the draft-finding unit for both the -3rd and the 4th London Regiments, the Brigade was -moved from its camps at Hurdcott and Fovant to billets -in various watering places on the South Devon coast. -The 3rd Battalion was fortunate enough to be allotted to -Torquay, where it took up its new quarters in December -1916. As a military station Torquay was, of course, not -so desirable as Hurdcott. In the first place, the scattering -of untrained troops in billets greatly increased the difficulty -of disciplinary control, while training grounds were farther -removed and somewhat inadequate. In spite of these -undoubted disadvantages, however, the change from the -bitter searching winds of "The Plain" in winter time to -the more genial climate of South Devon was universally -welcomed, and the Battalion lived for some weeks in -considerable comfort.</p> - -<p>The Brigade was now under command of Brig.-Gen. -Howell, who at the outbreak of war had commanded the -Guards on the Somme.</p> - -<p>Life in the Reserve Battalion at Torquay proceeded -on very much the same routine as had obtained at<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_356" id="Page_356">[Pg 356]</a></span> -Hurdcott, and an attempt at describing it in detail would -only be wearisome. Once again the instructional staff -had to face the "spade work" of training raw recruits, -since the drain on the Battalion's resources during the -Somme battles had denuded it of trained soldiers, and a -fresh batch of recruits now filled its ranks.</p> - -<p>A further modification in training organisation took -place about this time, and we may refer shortly to this -as it affected the functions of training battalions considerably. -This modification lay in the establishment of -"Command Depôts" which were formed for the reception -from hospital of officers, N.C.O.'s and men returned from -the Expeditionary Force who were not yet physically fit -to return to their respective units. At a stage in their -convalescence, in which their retention in hospital as -in-patients was no longer required, such men were sent to -their Command Depôt for light exercise in walking, -physical training and so on, and for such local treatment -as their individual cases necessitated. N.C.O.'s and men -remained in the Depôt until their recovery was complete, -when they were despatched to their training reserve units -for a short "smartening-up" course of instruction before -being once more sent overseas. The Command Depôts -thus relieved training battalions of a great deal of medical -and convalescent work for which they were neither -equipped nor suitable, and also ensured that the staff of -instructors in the training battalions were engaged for the -minimum of time in "brushing-up" the trained men -prior to their return to France, whereby they were enabled -to devote the maximum of attention to the recruits. -The Guards and the London Regiment were amalgamated -for the purpose of a Command Depôt, and this was located -at Shoreham-by-Sea, Sussex. Shortly after its formation, -Major G. H. M. Vine was appointed from the Reserve -Battalion to the Permanent Staff of the Depôt.</p> - -<p>In January 1917, Major L. T. Burnett joined the -Reserve Battalion from sick leave and was appointed -second in command, a position which he continued to -fill until the following July, when he was transferred to -the War Office.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_357" id="Page_357">[Pg 357]</a></span></p> - -<p>The South Devon station was retained for only a comparatively -short period and in April the Brigade moved -again, this time to Blackdown, in the Aldershot Command. -Blackdown is some seven miles north of Aldershot, and -is one of the many pine-and heather-covered hills in -which the district abounds. Most of the barracks at this -Station were hutted camps, but the 3rd Battalion was -fortunate in being sent to Dettingen, a pre-war permanent -barracks in which it was exceedingly comfortable.</p> - -<p>The advantage of having the Battalion compacted in -one camp became almost at once exemplified, and the -desirable tightening of discipline rapidly effected a great -increase of efficiency. The unsurpassed facilities for -training afforded by the Aldershot Command also proved -of incalculable value, and enabled the keen and efficient -training staff of the Battalion to raise the unit to the -position of one of the best organised battalions of a -Brigade whose reputation for training was second to none.</p> - -<p>At Blackdown, moreover, the facilities provided for -the recreation of the troops were really excellent, and -among these mention should be made first of the Y.M.C.A. -and the Church Army, whose excellent institutions were -of the greatest value. Each battalion also was provided -with a sports ground, and among the pleasant memories -of men trained in this Station not the least is the Blackdown -Garrison Theatre, which was visited weekly by -capable companies. The Sunday evening concerts in the -theatre were also a very notable and valuable feature of -the social life of the garrison.</p> - -<p>Training here proceeded on the same lines, but a -further modification was now introduced for the benefit -of the large numbers of lads under military age who were -now joining. Under the Military Service Acts no men -might be sent overseas till the age of nineteen, and in -order to ensure that their training should not be unnecessarily -hurried a special syllabus of work was evolved for -them, the original scheme being so enlarged and lengthened -as to provide for such young soldiers becoming "trained" -not earlier than the age at which they might be sent to -the front. To ensure the smooth working of this amended<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_358" id="Page_358">[Pg 358]</a></span> -scheme the young soldiers, or "A IV's" as they were -called, were grouped in special companies, and in addition -a number of "young soldier battalions" were added to -the Coastal Defence Forces.</p> - -<p>In January 1918 Lieut.-Col. Montgomerie Webb -vacated command of the Battalion on attachment to the -Royal Air Force, and the Battalion was taken over by -Lieut.-Col. Hanbury Sparrow, D.S.O., M.C., Royal Berkshire -Regiment, who had come to England under the six -months exchange system. Under Lieut.-Col. Sparrow -the Battalion continued to make great strides, and his -striking personality was the means of winning every -ounce of willing and devoted service from all who had the -honour to be under his command. The work of the -Reserve Battalion during the early part of 1918 is so much -bound up with the movements of the overseas battalions -under the stress of the German offensive that we may -conveniently break off here and take up the story of the -Second Battle of the Somme.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_359" id="Page_359">[Pg 359]</a></span></p> -<div class="chapter"></div> -<hr class="chap" /> - - - - -<h2>CHAPTER XX<br /> - -THE 2/4TH BATTALION IN THE SECOND BATTLE OF -THE SOMME, 1918</h2> - - -<h3>I. <em>Preparations for the German Offensive</em></h3> - -<p>The southward move of Gough's Fifth Army was for the -purpose of extending the British lines into an area hitherto -occupied by the French. Between the 10th January and -the 3rd February 1918 a considerable sector, extending -from the River Omignon north of St Quentin to Barisis, -in the Forêt de St Gobain south of La Fère, was taken -over from the French. The responsibility for the whole -of this line, some thirty miles long, in addition to about -twelve miles from Gouzeaucourt to the Omignon, hitherto -held by Byng's Third Army, fell upon Gough.</p> - -<p>The 58th Division was at first in reserve and was -billeted in the Amiens area, the 2/4th Londons being -quartered on the evening of the 22nd January at Thézy-Glimont, -a pleasant village near the confluence of the -Avre with the Noye, about eight miles south-east of -Amiens, where French pre-war civilisation was still almost -untouched. It is needless to remark how delightful to -all ranks were these peaceful surroundings after the -ghastly shell-torn swamps of Poelcapelle. About a fortnight -passed at Thézy-Glimont in the usual routine of -training, during which one or two small drafts joined the -Battalion. Lieut. B. Rivers Smith left the Battalion on -the 1st February for six months' duty in England.</p> - -<p>The most important feature of the rest period was -the reorganisation of Divisions on a ten-battalion basis,<a name="FNanchor_6_6" id="FNanchor_6_6"></a><a href="#Footnote_6_6" class="fnanchor">[6]</a> -of which a note has been given in the preceding chapter. -In the 58th Division, as in the 56th, the 4th London -Battalion was selected for continued existence, and at -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_360" id="Page_360">[Pg 360]</a></span>the end of January the 2/4th Battalion was strengthened -by the transference from the disbanded 2/1st Londons of -10 officers and 221 other ranks. The officers who joined -from the 2/1st Londons were Capt. W. D. Ramsey; -Lieuts. W. C. Morton, G. J. L. Menges, W. B. Evans; -2/Lieuts. R. H. J. Mendl, A. Woodington, C. J. C. Wildman, -W. H. Parslow, S. H. E. Crane and H. W. Durlacher. -After the reorganisation the infantry of the Division -comprised the following units:</p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_6_6" id="Footnote_6_6"></a><a href="#FNanchor_6_6"><span class="label">[6]</span></a> Three Brigades of three battalions each, and one pioneer battalion.</p></div> - -<div class="center"> -<table border="0" cellpadding="4" cellspacing="0" summary="infantry of the Division"> - <tr> - <td><span class="smcap">173rd Brigade</span>—</td> - <td class="tdr">2/2nd</td> - <td>London</td> - <td>Regiment</td> - <td>(Royal </td> - <td>Fusiliers).</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td></td> - <td class="tdr">3rd</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td></td> - <td class="tdr">2/4th</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td><span class="smcap">174th Brigade</span>—</td> - <td class="tdr">2/6th</td> - <td>London</td> - <td>Regiment</td> - <td colspan="2">(Rifles).</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td></td> - <td class="tdr">7th</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td></td> - <td class="tdr">8th</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td colspan="2">(Post Office).</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td><span class="smcap">175th Brigade</span>—</td> - <td class="tdr">9th</td> - <td>London</td> - <td>Regiment</td> - <td colspan="2">(Queen Victoria's Rifles).</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td></td> - <td class="tdr">10th</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td colspan="2">(Hackney).</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td></td> - <td class="tdr">12th</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td colspan="2">(Rangers).</td> - </tr> -</table></div> - -<p>Before the Division left the Amiens area the imminence -of a German offensive was a matter of common knowledge -to all ranks, and so impressed with the seriousness of the -situation was the High Command, that on the 5th February -a most inspiring message from General Gough was conveyed -in a lecture by the Brigadier, to all officers, warrant -officers and sergeants of the Brigade.</p> - -<p>The state of affairs was indeed critical and a grave -crisis in the War was approaching. Some slight account -of the general conditions which had brought this about -has already been attempted, and there is no occasion now -to recapitulate the main factors of the situation in which -the Allies found themselves. We must, however, point -to one or two conditions especially attaching to the British -front which had a pre-eminent influence on what followed.</p> - -<p>The gradual and ever-increasing numerical preponderance -of the Germans on the British front has been -referred to; translated into numbers the position may be -better appreciated. During the period from the 1st -November 1917 to the 21st March 1918, the number of -German divisions on the Western front rose steadily from -146 to 192, an increase of 46, against which the total<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_361" id="Page_361">[Pg 361]</a></span> -number of British divisions in France was but 58, and -these sadly depleted in numbers. The question of the -falling off in the numbers of reinforcements sent to France -at this period has become the subject of an embittered -controversy to which we do not propose to offer any -contribution. We are, however, concerned in pointing -to the result, whatever the cause, of this growing numerical -disparity, which was to confront G.H.Q. with a most -anxious problem. The British front was now some 125 -miles long, and a glance at any war map will show that -the general trend of the front was in a north-westerly -direction, <em>i.e.</em> near its northern extremity the line ran -comparatively close to the sea. In other words, the -space available for manœuvre in the event of a considerable -break-through by enemy forces was dangerously -small in the vital neighbourhood of the Channel Ports; -and a successful German offensive in this region might -have the effect of rolling up our forces against the sea. -In the south the space between the lines and the sea was -greater, but a large enemy success in the southern area -also had serious possibilities as it might entail the complete -isolation of the British Armies from the French.</p> - -<p>These were very briefly the two alternative possibilities -which G.H.Q. had to face, and the problem awaiting -solution was how to provide with the inadequate force at -its disposal for the efficient defence of its lines no matter -where the blow might fall. The matter was further complicated. -The French were equally nervous of a sudden -blow against their weak spots in Champagne and at -Rheims, which might lay open the German road to Paris, -and this fear rendered it impossible for them to place -at the disposal of British G.H.Q. sufficient forces to -make up the very grave inequality of strength which -existed on the British front. The grouping of forces was, -moreover, rendered more difficult by the fact that, so -great were the available German reserves, it might well -prove that the first enemy blow, although serious and -energetic, might in reality not be the main effort. This -doubt would inevitably, whatever the Allies' dispositions -might be, have the effect of sterilising the British and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_362" id="Page_362">[Pg 362]</a></span> -French reserves for some days until it was quite certain -that the first blow was not a feint, to be succeeded later by -a still greater effort elsewhere.</p> - -<p>Such was the problem, and surely never has a military -commander been faced by a more difficult situation; for -on the wisdom of G.H.Q.'s dispositions would probably -rest the fortunes of the whole British Empire.</p> - -<p>Before stating the solution adopted by G.H.Q. in -especial relation to the doings of the 2/4th Battalion, we -may perhaps be pardoned for glancing at one or two -aspects of Ludendorff's problem which, as is now known -from his own book, was by no means free from difficulty.</p> - -<p>The vital necessity of a stern British defence of the -Channel Ports was appreciated by Ludendorff as fully as -by the British G.H.Q., and he was therefore alive to the -possibility—knowing the British inferiority in numbers—that -the overwhelming importance of the north might -lead to a concentration of British divisions in the north at -the expense of the southern area. But could he be certain -that this course would be adopted? He might, after -staking his all in the south, find that British G.H.Q. had -outwitted him and anticipated his intention to attack -at St Quentin. It was clearly essential that, to achieve -the sweeping victory which alone could save Germany, -Ludendorff must endeavour to encompass the temporary -sterilisation of the Allied reserves which has been alluded -to. To ensure this his plans must be shrouded in secrecy -till the last moment; and the organisation of so vast an -attack as was ultimately launched without disclosing its -location to a vigilant enemy must have caused Ludendorff -acute anxiety. That it was in fact accomplished can only -beget admiration on our side for a most skilful opponent. -And failure to Ludendorff, moreover, was fraught with -consequences quite as awful from his point of view as his -success would be to the British. Austria had gained a -temporary respite in its victory over the Italians, but its -army was becoming disintegrated and lacking in supplies; -and no one realised more keenly than Ludendorff that -the Dual Monarchy itself could not outlive a collapse of -its army. In Germany the revolutionary ideas from<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_363" id="Page_363">[Pg 363]</a></span> -Russia were beginning to have a weakening effect on the -loyalty and steadfastness of an increasing section of the -population; hunger was becoming intensified, for the -comparative failure of the U-boat campaign resulted in -an ever-tightening Allied blockade. And ever in front of -Ludendorff loomed the spectre of gigantic American forces -on their way to France, which the U-boats were powerless -to stop. How many Americans had landed? How soon -could they be thrown into the battle line to turn the scale -against the Central Powers? These were questions to -which Ludendorff must earnestly have sought an answer, -and which must have brought home to him the realisation -that this gigantic bid for victory he was preparing would -for good or evil be the last effort which Germany -could make.</p> - -<p>The decision of G.H.Q. on these questions was that -the Channel Ports must be adequately defended at all -costs, and that if any sector of the line must be left weakly -defended, that sector must be in the southern area, which -the Fifth Army had now taken over. The depth of the -space available for retirement in rear of the lines in this -area no doubt had its influence in this decision; and in -addition, the fact that, in the event of a considerable withdrawal -of our forces under the pressure of the German -attack, a natural line of defence in rear of the forward -positions seemed to be offered in the line of the Somme, -which at Péronne makes a wide sweep southwards, thus -forming a natural barrier more or less parallel with the -British front in the St Quentin district. Possibly a further -factor was the apparent natural strength of the extreme -south of the front between Moy and La Fère, where the -Oise Canal and marshes formed a wide and difficult -obstacle between the Germans and our own troops. In -the southern area, moreover, it would in case of need be -more easy to make use quickly of such reserves as the -French might be able to place at G.H.Q.'s disposal.</p> - - -<h3>II. <em>The Retreat from La Fère</em></h3> - -<p>The Fifth Army was allotted a front of 42 miles, which -was held by 17 divisions in line and 3 infantry and 3<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_364" id="Page_364">[Pg 364]</a></span> -cavalry divisions in reserve. The sector was held by -four Corps, from left to right the VII (Congreve), the -XIX (Watts), the XVIII (Maxse), and the III (Butler).</p> - -<p>The III Corps, with which alone we are concerned, -comprised at the date of battle the 14th, 18th and 58th -Divisions on a front of 30,000 yards, a gigantic sector for -27 battalions, not one of which was at war strength. In -reserve were the 2nd and 3rd Cavalry Divisions. The -sector allotted to the 58th Division, in which it relieved the -30th between the 7th and 9th February 1918, was the -extreme right of the British Armies and extended from -north of Travécy, where it touched the 18th Division on -the left, to south of Barisis, where it linked up with the -French on its right. This enormous front of nearly 9½ miles -was held by two brigades, the two subsectors finding their -natural division in the Oise marshes and the Canal de St -Quentin, which at La Fère take a sudden turn westward, -thus running at right angles into the British positions. North -of the Canal the country is comparatively open and gently -undulating, while south of it the lines plunge through the -hilly and densely wooded district of the Forêt de St Gobain.</p> - -<p>The marsh area at La Fère is about a mile and a half -wide, so that the frontage which needed active defence -by each Brigade was roughly four miles. On so vast a -frontage a defence by continuous trench lines was clearly -out of the question, and the British defence was designed -to be in great depth. It was divided into three zones of -defence. The Forward Zone, about 1000 yards in depth, -relied for its defence on small company redoubts with the -space between taken up by hidden machine-guns. This -zone was intended to act as a "shock-absorber" in which -the first intensity of the enemy's onslaught might be met -and checked. The main defence was to be offered in the -Battle Zone, about 1500 yards in rear of the Forward Zone. -The Battle Zone occupied a depth of about 2000 yards -and was to consist of isolated and wired forts, again -strengthened by inter-supporting machine-guns. It was -hoped that a final check might be administered to the -enemy's attempts in this zone, but in rear of it a further -defensive system, in this case a continuous line, was to<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_365" id="Page_365">[Pg 365]</a></span> -be created as a Rear Zone. Beyond this again the Somme -line was to be put into a state of defence.</p> - -<p>At the date of taking over this area from the French -the defensive organisation on the lines above indicated -was practically non-existent. Very little depth was provided -for in the defence and in rear of the Forward Zone -practically all was yet to be done. The Battle Zone -redoubts were inadequate and insufficiently wired, while -the Rear Zone line was merely spit-locked.</p> - -<p>For weeks, therefore, the whole energies of every -available formation, infantry holding the line, engineers, -pioneers and labour corps units from all parts of the -world, were concentrated on the enormous task of converting -the G.H.Q. scheme into a reality. Valuable time -which could have been well spent in training the infantry -in defensive measures and counter-attack, and in assimilating -the new personnel which had been brought into -battalions by the reorganisation of January, was inevitably -devoted to entrenching and wiring work, wearying -in itself and trying as only work done against time can -become. All ranks, however, were sufficiently impressed -by the need, and all were working with the zeal born of -a grim determination to prove themselves equal to the -demands which would be made upon them.</p> - -<p>The 173rd Brigade moved forward to take over the left -or north brigade sector on the 7th February. The 2/4th -Battalion railed from Villers-Bretonneux to Appilly, -whence it marched to billets at Quierzy on the south bank -of the Oise. Here it was joined the following day by the -transport which had moved by road. On the evening of -the 8th the Battalion was attached temporarily to the -174th Brigade south of the Canal, and on the 9th moved -to the Forward Zone, where it relieved the 7th Londons. -As was to be expected from the conditions under which -the line was held, the Battalion was now rather scattered, -Headquarters and C and D Companies being stationed at -Amigny-Rouy, while A and B Companies were at Sinceny -and the stores and transport at Autreville. Enemy -activity in this area was almost non-existent and the -whole energies of the Battalion were devoted to entrench<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_366" id="Page_366">[Pg 366]</a></span>ing -work, which was carried out under Royal Engineer -supervision. Large working parties, totalling on some -occasions 12 officers and 400 other ranks, were called -for daily for a variety of tasks to which the only relief -was a periodical exchange of companies for bathing at -Sinceny. On the 24th February the Battalion completed -the Divisional relief and moved to the extremity of the -British lines, where it relieved the 8th East Surreys, -Headquarters, C and D Companies occupying Bernagousse -Quarries, while A and B Companies were billeted in -Pierremande. In this area the Battalion spent a few quiet -days, occupied in strengthening the battle positions under -the Royal Engineers. On the 27th it was relieved by the -7th Londons, and returned to the 173rd Brigade, going into -Divisional reserve in rear of the northern brigade subsector. -In this area the Battalion was again much split up, Headquarters, -A and B Companies being at Viry Noureuil, and -C and D Companies at Tergnier. This day the Battalion -was joined by three more officers of the 2/1st Londons, -2/Lieuts. L. F. Wardle, C. B. Francis and C. W. Cumner.</p> - -<p>The situation on the 173rd Brigade front during -February had been remarkably quiet. The policy adopted -had been purely defensive, and our artillery had shown -but little activity. The distance separating the British -lines from the enemy's and the nature of the terrain had -rendered observation a matter of some difficulty; but -the enemy's energies appeared to be devoted to strengthening -his own defences of La Fère rather than to the preparation -of an offensive operation. The general impression -gained from the Brigade Intelligence Summary for this -month is indeed that the idea of any attack being launched -in the La Fère area was rather ridiculous, and that everyone -was quite prepared to settle down at Fargniers for -life. General Gough, however, as is well known, did not -share this comfortable optimism, for almost a month -earlier at a conference of his Corps Commanders at -Catelet he had made what later proved to be an accurate -forecast of the location of the German attack.</p> - -<p>The Battalion's work during the three weeks immediately -preceding the battle calls for little comment.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_367" id="Page_367">[Pg 367]</a></span> -After two days in Divisional reserve it moved forward -to the Battle Zone, in which it relieved the 3rd Londons -on the 2nd March, and this position it continued to hold -until the offensive was launched, providing daily working -parties for the improvement of the defences. The early -days of March saw a slight increase of artillery and trench -mortar activity on both sides, but the area was still comparatively -quiet with but little outward indication of the -storm which was shortly to burst over it.</p> - -<p>On the 7th March 2/Lieut. D. F. Crawford joined the -Battalion.</p> - -<p>The skill with which the Germans continued to conceal -their intentions was indeed marvellous. For some time -past the withdrawal of divisions from the line had taken -place, but so widely disseminated had this process been -that it had attracted comparatively little notice. The -attack divisions had been assembled well in rear of the -lines, beyond the reach of our prying aeroplanes, and had -there been put through a very thorough course of training, -which extended to the smallest detail of what was expected -of each division. Finally, about the middle of March this -gigantic force had begun to move towards the line, marching -by night and closely concealed by day, and by the -evening of the 20th the enormous concentration was complete. -Von Hutier, commanding the Eighteenth German -Army, had now between the Omignon and Vendeuil 11 -divisions in line, 8 in close support and 2 in reserve; Von -Gayl opposite La Fère had 4 divisions and Von Boehn -at St Gobain another 2; making a total of 27 divisions. -Opposed to this colossal strength were Butler's 5 and -Maxse's 4 weak divisions. Such were the odds on the -21st March 1918.</p> - -<p>Before proceeding to the battle itself there is one -further point to which we desire to refer, and that is the -thick fog which lay over the marshes of the Oise early on -the morning of the 21st and the succeeding days. The -effect of this fog on what transpired had been variously -estimated. The general consensus of opinion of officers -and men who took part in the battle is that it was a -great disadvantage to the defence. In many ways this<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_368" id="Page_368">[Pg 368]</a></span> -was undoubtedly the case. The complete blotting out -of all landmarks beyond a few yards' radius rendered any -sort of co-operation with adjoining units impossible; the -inter-supporting machine-guns between the redoubts were -comparatively useless for they could not see when and where -to fire. The artillery was also handicapped for it knew not -where to lay its barrages to trap the advancing enemy. -Many times in the course of the battle, redoubts which -thought themselves not yet attacked suddenly realised -that in the fog they had been surrounded and cut off. -The general result was that the defence degenerated into -a series of isolated battles in which companies and platoons -made individual stands, unsupported by their comrades -and in ignorance of what was occurring on their flanks.</p> - -<p>But there is another side to the picture, and the -German opinion is equally strong, that but for the fog -their success would have been more far-reaching than it -actually proved to be. The inevitable loss of direction -and touch between attacking columns, the feeling of uncertainty -born of drifting forwards without seeing one's -surroundings, the strange tricks which fog always plays -in the matters of distance and sound—all these could not -but affect detrimentally the speed and cohesion of the -attack—and speed was of all things the essential for complete -German success. Swiftly though the attack came, -from the very first day the advances were made far -behind schedule, and to this extent the German attack -failed. How far it failed through the fog we will not -venture to estimate; but that the fog was a contributory -factor there can be no doubt.</p> - -<p>On the afternoon of the 20th March the order "Prepare -for attack" was received from III Corps, and by 3.30 p.m. -all companies of the Battalion were ready to man their -battle positions.</p> - -<p>The scheme of defence has already been alluded to in -general terms, and it has been indicated that both the -Forward and Battle Zones were divided into a series of -defended localities each held by a company. These -localities comprised a main keep, supported by two or -more subsidiary redoubts, while the space intervening -between adjoining localities was covered by the guns of -the Brigade Machine-Gun Company.</p> - -<div class="figcenter" style="width: 500px;"> -<img src="images/i_b_368fp.jpg" width="500" height="389" alt="" /> -<div class="caption"><p><span class="smcap">The Retreat from La Fère, March 1918</span></p></div> -</div> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_369" id="Page_369">[Pg 369]</a></span></p> - -<p>Map No. 15 shows the relative positions of the various -localities in the scheme of defence, and in the Northern -Brigade area, with which alone we are henceforward concerned, -the disposition of troops on the night 20th/21st -March was as follows:</p> - -<div class="center"> -<table border="0" cellpadding="4" cellspacing="0" summary="disposition of troops"> - <tr> - <td><span class="smcap">Forward Zone</span>—2/2nd London Regiment.</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdp">Main Keep Locality:</td> - <td>Headquarters and 1 company.</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdp">Jappy Locality:</td> - <td>1 company with a standing patrol at Beautor.</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdp">Brickstack Locality:</td> - <td>1 company.</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdp">Travécy Locality:</td> - <td>1 company.</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td><span class="smcap">Battle Zone</span>—2/4th London Regiment.</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdp">Headquarters on the Crozat Canal, Fargniers.</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdp">Fargniers South Locality: A Company (Lieut. H. J. M. Williams).</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdp">Fargniers North Locality: B Company less 2 platoons (Capt. S. G. Askham).</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdp">Farm Rouge Locality:</td> - <td>D Company (Capt. C. A. Clarke).</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdp">Triangle Locality:</td> - <td>C Company (Lieut. G. E. Lester).</td> - </tr> -</table></div> - -<p>The two remaining platoons of B Company were detached as -follows:</p> - -<div class="hangindent"> - -<p>1 platoon (2/Lieut. D. F. Crawford) at the junction of the -St Quentin and Crozat Canals.</p> - -<p>1 platoon (Lieut. W. F. Brown) at Condren, where there -was also a squadron of the Oxfordshire Hussars.</p> - -<p>Quessy Locality: 1 company 1/4th Suffolks (Pioneers).</p></div> - -<div class="hangindent"> - -<p>Brigade Headquarters were at Quessy Château near Crozat -Canal, and the 3rd Londons were in Divisional reserve -at Viry Noureuil.</p></div> - -<p>It will be seen that the bulk of the defensive force -was concentrated—if such a word may be applied to so -attenuated a defence—on the right flank, where the line -of the Oise marshes, by now practically no obstacle owing -to the unusually dry spring, laid open the road to Chauny -and Noyon. It was quite evident that should the Germans -succeed in breaking through on the St Firmin-Vendeuil -front they would almost certainly endeavour to expand -the breach behind the British lines and make a south-westerly -dash towards Noyon and Compiègne in order -to complete the isolation of the British armies from the -French. The Oise flank therefore was vitally important.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_370" id="Page_370">[Pg 370]</a></span></p> - -<p>At 4.20 a.m. on the 21st March the enemy barrage -opened with terrific intensity. The messages to man -battle positions were already written in Brigade Headquarters, -but delay was caused in conveying them to the -various units concerned, for during the first few minutes -of the bombardment Brigade Signal Headquarters were -knocked out by a direct hit, so that this and subsequent -messages had to be sent by runner. Lieut.-Col. Dann, in -fact, did not receive any orders to move until long after -he had, on his own initiative, despatched his companies -to their posts.</p> - -<p>It is rather difficult to understand why the companies -were kept in billets such as cellars under the ruins of -Fargniers and Quessy until the last moment, especially -as warning of the attack had been received the previous -afternoon. Most platoons had several hundred yards, and -some as much as a mile and a half, to traverse to their -trenches; and under the intense and accurate barrage -many casualties were sustained during this forward move. -By about 7.30 a.m., however, the companies were all -reported in position.</p> - -<p>The actual time of the attack is not known, but it -probably occurred between 6.30 and 7 a.m., for at 7.10 a.m. -a message was received from Lieut.-Col. Richardson -(2/2nd Londons) that the enemy was in Jappy Keep, and -about the same time the bombardment of the Battle Zone -positions became still more intense. It must be borne in -mind that fog hung over the whole area like a thick curtain, -completely cutting off the Forward Zone from the observation, -which it had been reasonably anticipated would be -obtained over it. The Battle Zone troops and Brigade -Headquarters were thus in the dark as to what was going -on in the forward positions.</p> - -<p>By 9 a.m. the enemy was reported in possession of Main -Keep Locality, which meant a serious incursion into the -defences on the vital flank. Steps were at once taken to -employ the 3rd Londons (in reserve), one company being -directed on Fargniers, while artillery and machine-gun -barrages were laid on the Canal crossings at St Firmin -and Beautor and on the area west of the captured positions.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_371" id="Page_371">[Pg 371]</a></span></p> - -<p>Lieut.-Col. Dann now ordered forward patrols from each -of the companies to endeavour to keep in touch with the -situation, but it seems that if these orders ever reached -the companies—they certainly were not received by the -left company—the patrols themselves were destroyed by -the enemy shell fire, for no information of value was -obtained.</p> - -<p>All this time no word had been received from the -Travécy Locality though attempts were made to communicate -from the 2/4th Londons and from the 18th -Division on the left, and it is probable that the fog enabled -the enemy to surround the garrison before its commander -was able to communicate with his Headquarters.</p> - -<p>During the morning Lieut.-Col. Richardson asked for -counter-attack troops to be sent forward to him in the -hope that the enemy in the St Firmin area might be -ejected, but this request was refused by Division on the -ground that the Battle Zone garrisons must be maintained -intact. In consequence, therefore, of the extreme pressure -on his front, Lieut.-Col. Richardson was compelled to -order a withdrawal of the few remaining details of his -shattered battalion on to the Fargniers area occupied by -the 2/4th Londons, and by midday the fall of the Forward -Zone was complete.</p> - -<p>Shortly after midday the fog lifted slightly, and the -2/4th Londons in the Battle Zone became engaged with -the enemy, who began to exert pressure on the extreme -right flank. At about 2 p.m. the platoon of A Company -holding Distillery Post next the Oise Canal was driven in -and Lieut.-Col. Dann ordered the company of the 3rd -Londons in Fargniers to launch a counter-attack. This -effort was only partly successful, and Distillery Post -remained in German hands.</p> - -<p>About the same time the enemy advanced in large -numbers all along the line, especially against the Farm -Rouge and Triangle Localities. The former of these had -always been regarded as a weak spot in the defences, -and two reserve machine-guns were at once turned on to -the enemy advancing against it. By 3.45 p.m., after -a stubborn resistance against overwhelming numbers,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_372" id="Page_372">[Pg 372]</a></span> -Clarke's weak company was ejected from the Farm Rouge -itself, and its grip on the remainder of the Locality much -weakened. The assaulting columns continued to press -on in the direction of the Quessy Locality, thus isolating -the Fargniers position in the corner between the two -Canals and completely cutting off Lester, who was still -hanging on to his position in the Triangle against impossible -odds.</p> - -<p>A prompt endeavour to counter this very serious turn -of events was taken by Brigade, who sent forward two -platoons of the Suffolks to reinforce Clarke and fill the -gap between him and Askham. The 3rd Londons also -were drawn on again, and a second company was sent -forward through Quessy to strengthen the Farm Rouge -Locality. Of this company, however, only two platoons -ever reached their objective, the others being destroyed -by the enemy's fire at the crossing of the Crozat Canal.</p> - -<p>At about 6.50 p.m. the Battle Zone, in spite of repeated -and heavy enemy attacks, was still intact with the -exceptions of the penetrations next the Canal on the -extreme right and in the Farm Rouge Locality, and it -was decided to lay down a provisional S.O.S. line on the -forward edge of the Battle Zone. The enemy, however, -was continuing his attacks with great persistence, and the -gradual infiltration of his storm troops between our -scattered positions was constantly altering the situation. -By 7.15 p.m. he had already overrun the new S.O.S. line -in the vicinity of the Distillery, and was beginning to -close in on Fargniers from the south.</p> - -<p>In the 18th Division area on the left the struggle was -also raging in the Battle Zone, though one or two posts -in the Forward Zone were continuing their glorious yet -hopeless struggle. Beyond the 18th Division the 14th -had received a severe blow and the Germans had penetrated -some miles into the British positions. It appeared by no -means improbable that if the enemy's progress in this -region were unchecked the left flank of the III Corps -would be entirely rolled up. A general withdrawal was -therefore inevitable to prevent the line being broken. -To conform with these movements it was decided by<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_373" id="Page_373">[Pg 373]</a></span> -Division to effect a withdrawal to the line of the Crozat -Canal from its junction with the St Quentin Canal as far -north as a line running due west between the Farm Rouge -and Triangle Localities, which latter was to be held.</p> - -<p>Instructions to this end were immediately issued, and -Lieut.-Col. Dann was ordered to conduct the withdrawal -of the whole of the mixed details now in the Fargniers -corner, and all troops in the Battle Zone were placed -under his orders. This withdrawal was really a stubborn -rearguard action, for the enemy was unrelenting in his -efforts to drive in the Farm Rouge gap and reach the -Canal. But a stern resistance was offered in which gallant -service was rendered by the Suffolks at Quessy, and by -midnight Lieut.-Col. Dann was enabled to report his -heterogeneous command in position on the west bank of -the Canal, with all iron rations, S.A.A., stores and Orderly -Room records intact.</p> - -<p>The defence of the Triangle Locality must now be -referred to as it comprises, owing to the wedge driven into -the Farm Rouge Locality early in the day, an isolated -battle, and is a magnificent example of stern courage -against overwhelming numbers. The casualties suffered -from gas shell in this area had been numerous, but apart -from the accurate shooting of the Bosche gunners, C -Company had been, like the rest of the Battalion, not -closely engaged until the Forward Zone was overrun. -The lifting of the fog about midday disclosed a large -force of the enemy, which is estimated at about a -battalion, advancing against Lester's thinly held positions. -From this time onwards no orders or messages of any -kind reached Lester from Battalion Headquarters or the -adjoining companies, and he was left to fight his own -battle. The advancing enemy were hotly engaged by -rifle and Lewis gun fire, and large numbers were killed. -Already D Company were losing their grip on the Farm -Rouge, but Lester decided that the only course open to -him was to await reinforcements. These never came, and -probably, owing to the utter severance of communications, -it was never realised how urgent his need was. The only -support to this gallant company was one 18-pr. gun firing<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_374" id="Page_374">[Pg 374]</a></span> -over open sights from near Quessy. All the afternoon -the unequal fight was maintained, though the defenders -were much harassed by low-flying German 'planes. With -the approach of dusk the mist came down again, surrounding -the company with an impenetrable curtain. Again and -again Lester sent out runners and patrols to seek connection -with the adjoining troops but these never returned. -"I still hoped against hope," he writes, "that we should -be reinforced, as the Colonel had kept rubbing it in at -conferences before the battle that we had to stand fast -at all costs." At last it became clear that the flanks were -in the air and that the rear of the Company was being -encircled, and it was decided to fight back to the Crozat -Canal. On the left the remains of two platoons under -Blair managed to get back, but of the others but two men -got away, and Lester, Wardle and the remainder of the -company, nearly all wounded, were captured.</p> - -<p>This splendid fight, maintained till nearly 10 p.m. -against hopeless odds, was without doubt of enormous value -in holding up the enemy and inflicting severe loss on his -picked troops. It also formed a strong buttress to the flank -of the 18th Division, without which they would have found -the right of their Battle Zone turned; and it gave time -for the withdrawal of the 2/4th Londons to the Canal line.</p> - -<p>Lieut.-Col. Dann's mixed force on the Canal was of -necessity in need of organisation, and the 8th Londons, -who had been in reserve at Pierremande, were on their -way to relieve the troops who had borne the day's fighting. -By 6 a.m. the relief was complete and the 8th Londons -were established on the Canal line, while Lieut.-Col. Dann's -force, consisting of the remains of the 2/2nd, 3rd and 2/4th -Battalions, the Suffolks, and elements of the 503rd Field -Company R.E. and of the 182nd Tunnelling Company, -who had also been thrown into the fight, were assembled -on a line west of Vouel, with Headquarters on the Butte -de Vouel. This position was an unfinished work, in parts -not more than a foot deep, and extended from the Butte -almost due south to the Chauny-Tergnier Road. Brigade -Headquarters had withdrawn overnight to Le Bas de Viry.</p> - -<p>The Condren position, which had not been attacked on<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_375" id="Page_375">[Pg 375]</a></span> -the 21st, remained intact but was reinforced by a company -of the Suffolks.</p> - -<p>The results of the first day's fighting were tolerably -serious. The Forward and Battle Zones had been lost, -and thus the greater part of the defences which had been -brought to a stage in any way approaching completion -were in the enemy's hands. The whole of the available -reserves were already inextricably in the fight, and should -the attack extend to the Southern Brigade area from -Amigny-Rouy to Barisis there would be no means of -assisting the defence in that vicinity. Serious losses of -personnel had been sustained, and the swiftness and -weight of the blow had had their effect, though the morale -of the troops were still high. On the other hand the -enemy had by no means gained the success which he had -anticipated. On the Brigade front of some 5000 yards, -held by two weak battalions reinforced by parts of one -other battalion, he had employed nearly four divisions, -and in spite of these ridiculous odds had only advanced -an average of about 5000 yards to find that the defence -had successfully withdrawn behind an obstacle of much -natural strength. The defence was shaken, but it was -not in the least broken, and a break through was the only -means of ultimate success to the Germans.</p> - -<p>On arrival in the Vouel line in the early hours of the -22nd March, the Battalion, which occupied the north end -of the position near the Butte, was reorganised in three -companies, with A Company under 2/Lieut. F. G. Williams -on the right, B under Capt. Askham in the centre and D -under Capt. Clarke on the left. As on the 21st, a dense -mist appeared with the early hours, and until it rose, -shortly after midday, no infantry movement took place. -Under cover of the mist the Battalion was able to do a -good deal of work on the Vouel line, and in this they were -not much interfered with, as most of the German shells -were falling on the road in front.</p> - -<p>About 1.15 p.m. the enemy attack opened with great -vigour and immense weight on the Canal line and Tergnier. -The crossing of the Canal was rendered easier to the enemy -by reason of the unfortunate fact that one or two bridges<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_376" id="Page_376">[Pg 376]</a></span> -had not been entirely demolished after our withdrawal. -All had long before been prepared for demolition, but for -some reason the charges did not explode in every case. A -certain bewilderment was caused to the defenders at first -as the Germans appear to have gained their first footing -west of the Canal disguised in British uniforms stolen from -the fallen men of the 2/2nd Londons. But as soon as -the 8th Londons appreciated what was happening they put -up a very stubborn resistance. After getting across the -Canal the Bosche seems to have tried to extend north and -south along the western bank, and in this he was successful -in the northern area. In the south, however, the magnificent -fight made by the two companies in Tergnier checked -his progress, and time after time his attacks were stopped.</p> - -<p>During the afternoon the German 'planes were seeking -for the next position held by us, and in spite of the hasty -efforts of the Battalion to camouflage its trench, the Vouel -line was soon discovered, and ranging on it by the German -batteries rapidly ensued. No infantry attack was delivered -on the Vouel line, probably on account of the enemy's -lack of success at Tergnier.</p> - -<p>Late in the afternoon the enemy's pressure on the 8th -Londons grew almost intolerable, and little by little he was -working his way into Tergnier. It was therefore decided -to vacate the position, and after dusk the 8th Londons fell -back on to the Vouel line, which they extended to the right -from the Viry-Tergnier Road as far as the railway. The -two companies in Tergnier were ably extricated by their -commander and managed to get clear across the Oise, joining -the garrison at Condren, which had not been attacked.</p> - -<p>The Vouel line was now the most advanced position, -and at 6.30 p.m. the Headquarters of the 3rd, 2/4th and -8th Londons were withdrawn from it to Noureuil. The -night passed without any further attempt on the enemy's -part to advance, and on our side a good deal of patrolling -activity took place. This led to several encounters with -small parties of enemy, and resulted in the collection of -a quite useful bag of German prisoners as well as a machine-gun -and team. Under cover of darkness also touch was -regained with the Condren garrison.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_377" id="Page_377">[Pg 377]</a></span></p> - -<p>Information was received on the evening of the 22nd -that French troops were rapidly advancing to our assistance, -and that they would be ready to counter-attack the next -morning with the object of retaking the Crozat Canal line.</p> - -<p>On the 23rd March mist appeared yet once more, -considerably hampering our defence and giving the enemy -an opportunity of massing for attack. Shortly after -8 a.m. the French attack was launched by two battalions -of the 125th French Infantry which passed forward through -the Vouel line. The result of the attack is not definitely -known as it was impossible to see beyond a radius of about -15 yards. It is certain, however, that it failed to reach -Tergnier, and by 11 a.m. the French advance was broken -and the troops beginning to drift back into our lines. It -should be pointed out in fairness to our Allies that they -had been rushed up into the line, incomplete in equipment -and transport, and that they were called on to operate -without previous reconnaissance over ground which was -shrouded in mist and unknown to them. On the extreme -left the withdrawal was conducted in some disorder, and -it was reported that the 18th Division on our left was also -being forced back through Frières Wood. The Vouel line, -unfinished and shallow as it was, was already occupied -to its fullest capacity, and the French falling back on -it caused considerable congestion in the well-dug parts. -About the same time the German artillery, which had been -plastering the Vouel line fairly steadily all the morning, -lifted, and was at once succeeded by an accurate and -intense machine-gun barrage. This further tended to -create difficulty in the position, for in view of the congestion -of the trench it became very hard to get orders -along, while work on the gaps between the well dug -portions was almost impossible.</p> - -<p>Shortly afterwards the mist cleared and the awkwardness -of the situation became more apparent. The 18th -Division were being pressed back towards Villequier-Aumont, -and the left flank was entirely in the air, while -the constant pushing of small highly trained bodies of -the enemy was enabling them to progress along the Oise -marshes on the right. Vouel itself was strongly occupied,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_378" id="Page_378">[Pg 378]</a></span> -and troops were massing for attack. By 12 noon the -position was no longer tenable. The enemy was advancing -frontally and from both flanks, and Lieut.-Col. Dann -ordered a withdrawal on to the Green line. This was a -partly dug position which formed a portion of the Rear -Zone and was held by troops of the 6th Dismounted -Cavalry Brigade and the 18th Entrenching Battalion, on a -line east of Noureuil and Viry-Noureuil from the St Quentin -Canal to the Vouel-Villequier Road. The withdrawal to -the Green line from the Vouel position averaged about 1500 -yards, and so hard were the enemy pressing that some -platoons had to fight their way back. An attempt was made -by the French machine-gunners in the Vouel line to cover -the Battalion's withdrawal, but this was not effective and, -together with several of our own men, they were captured.</p> - -<p>The situation was now critical. The falling back of -the 18th Division on the left revealed a gap between -the Vouel-Villequier Road and Frières Wood of which -the enemy was not slow to take advantage, and there -appeared every likelihood that the 173rd Brigade would -be cut off from the 18th Division and rolled up against the -St Quentin Canal. To meet this threat the left flank -of the Green line position, consisting of troops of the -Dismounted Brigade and details of the 8th Londons, was -thrown back and extended towards Villequier-Aumont -in an attempt to gain touch once more with the 18th -Division. This line was thin, and under the continued -German pressure it suffered severely. During the afternoon -the enemy thrust south again and entered Noureuil, -thus driving a wedge behind the flank of the Green line -troops. A glance at the map will show that a further -withdrawal was inevitable if the whole Brigade was not -to be rounded up. This began about 6 p.m. and the -troops, including all that was left of the fighting ranks -of the 2/4th Londons, about 120 all told under Capt. -Askham, fell back to a position west of Viry-Noureuil, -which village was yielded to the enemy.</p> - -<p>During the afternoon, while the fate of the bulk of the -Brigade was still in the balance, and it was obviously -imperative to check the enemy's advance into Chauny<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_379" id="Page_379">[Pg 379]</a></span> -by all available means, the Brigadier ordered Major Grover -of the 2/4th Londons, who was at Chauny with battle -surplus, to organise all available details for the defence -of the town. With remarkable skill and despatch Major -Grover collected a heterogeneous force of clerks, cooks, -officers' servants, transport drivers—anyone who could -hold a rifle—and by dusk reported himself in position on -the eastern outskirts of Chauny with a force of 10 officers -and 270 other ranks at his command. Of these, 2 officers -and 54 other ranks were of the 2/4th Londons. This very -brilliant piece of work no doubt did much to save the -situation, and "Grover's Force" beyond question deserves -to rank high among the various similar "scarecrow -armies" which these critical days produced.</p> - -<p>During the afternoon Lieut.-Col. Dann was attached -for duty to Brigade Headquarters, and the remains of the -2/4th and 8th Londons came under command of Lieut.-Col. -Derviche-Jones of the latter Battalion.</p> - -<p>The withdrawal from the Green line to the River -Helot position was considerably impeded by the French -troops who were streaming in a westerly direction, and -Brigade therefore endeavoured to ascertain what the -intentions of the French Commander were. These were -found to be to hold a line from Viry-Noureuil to Villequier-Aumont, -and accordingly it was decided that the whole -of the 173rd Brigade Group should be withdrawn and -reorganised in positions to support the French. This reorganisation -was successfully carried out. In view of the -rapid and confusing moves which had followed each other -in such quick succession, it may be well to state in detail -the Brigade positions at dawn on the 24th March:</p> - -<p class="center"><span class="smcap">Brigade Headquarters at Abbécourt</span> -</p> - -<div class="hangindent8"> - -<p><span class="smcap">Grover's Force</span>—Covering the eastern exits of Chauny from the -St Quentin Canal to north of the Chauny—Viry-Noureuil -Road.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">18th Entrenching Battalion</span>—Astride the St Quentin Canal on -the right of Grover's Force.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">6th Dismounted Cavalry Brigade</span>—On the left of Grover's Force -east of the Chauny—Villequier-Aumont Road.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Details of the 2/4th and 8th Londons</span>—On the left of Grover's -Force west of the Chauny—Villequier-Aumont -Road.</p></div> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_380" id="Page_380">[Pg 380]</a></span></p> - -<p>The Condren garrison substantially maintained its -original positions and was in touch by means of patrols -with the 18th Entrenching Battalion, while on the extreme -right the 174th Brigade, which had not been attacked, -continued to hold the Amigny-Rouy—Barisis front.</p> - -<p>On the left of the conglomerate force which now -formed the 173rd Brigade Group the line was continued -by the 18th and 14th Divisions, with whom French troops -were interspersed in the direction of Cugny.</p> - -<p>The whole line was strained to breaking-point under -the unceasing enemy pressure. Every available man was -in the firing line, and the Battalion, which had been now -fighting and marching without intermission for three days, -was getting worn. But in spite of the enormous odds the -Battalion clung on with determination, for it knew that -the saving of the situation rested with itself, and attack -after attack had failed to give the German masses the -break-through which was essential for them.</p> - -<p>For the fourth day in succession the Germans were -favoured with a thick fog which enshrouded their movements, -and under cover of which they were able to prepare -a further heavy blow. Early in the morning they -attacked and broke through the French outpost line on -the River Helot, and about 11 a.m. the lifting of the mist -revealed them attacking Grover's Force east of Chauny, -and also endeavouring to work round the south of the -position next the Canal. This was serious, for a wedge -driven in between the Chauny line and the Condren -bridgehead, which was also under great pressure from the -enemy, might possibly involve the loss of the Oise line, the -retention of which was vital for us.</p> - -<p>Arrangements were at once made by Brigade for a -further withdrawal, and this was rendered the more -imperative by the rapid advance made on the left of the -Corps front during the day. In this region the enemy -were already threatening Guiscard, eight miles north-west -of Chauny, and the security of Noyon itself was seriously -in doubt.</p> - -<p>For several hours Grover's details and the tiny Condren -force maintained their fight, but in the afternoon the with<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_381" id="Page_381">[Pg 381]</a></span>drawal -began in accordance with the orders already issued. -Under Grover's command the mixed force was skilfully -withdrawn, fighting a stubborn rearguard action, to a -prepared position about 1000 yards east of Abbécourt, -while the detached portion of the 2/4th Londons on -Grover's left, now about 60 strong, fell back to Ognes, -and marched into Besme across the Oise about midnight. -Early in the afternoon Major Grover was wounded and -Capt. Askham took over his command. By 4.30 p.m. -the Abbécourt position, being no longer tenable, was -vacated and the whole of the 173rd Group, including -2/4th and 8th Londons, 503rd Field Company, R.E. and the -6th Dismounted Cavalry Brigade, had crossed the Oise at -Manicamp. About the same time the Condren garrison -which had held manfully to its positions since the opening -of the battle got clear across the river.</p> - -<p>Before this withdrawal was completed the whole of -the Oise bridges, and also the R.E. Dump at Chauny, were -demolished, and it may be remarked that during the four -days of fighting not a single gun had been lost except those -destroyed by enemy shell fire.</p> - -<p>With the withdrawal across the Oise the hardest of -the Battalion's fighting in this great battle was finished, -though it remained in contact with the enemy with very -little rest. The Division now held a river front of over -nine miles on the south bank of the Oise from Quierzy to -Servais, in addition to the original four miles held by the -174th Brigade in the Forêt de St Gobain. With this -enormous front in contact with an enterprising enemy no -rest was yet to be expected. The early hours of the -25th March were devoted to sorting out the hopeless tangle -of units which the battle had caused, and at 11.30 a.m. -Lieut.-Col. Dann became responsible (in conjunction with -the 6th Dismounted Cavalry Brigade) for the defence of the -river crossings at Quierzy, with a composite force comprising -details of four battalions, reorganised in companies -as follows:</p> - -<div class="center"> -<table border="0" cellpadding="4" cellspacing="0" summary="four battalions"> - <tr> - <td>1 </td> - <td>Coy. </td> - <td>representing </td> - <td>2/2nd Londons guarding Quierzy bridge.</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td>1</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td>8th Londons on its left.</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td>1</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td>2/4th Londons in support.</td> - </tr> -</table></div><p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_382" id="Page_382">[Pg 382]</a></span></p> - -<p>This company of the 2/4th Londons was the party of -60 which had reached Besme the previous evening, and -was now under 2/Lieut. Griffiths.</p> - -<p>The same night (25th/26th March) this composite -force was relieved by the 246th French Regiment and -withdrew to Besme to refit, Lieut.-Col. Dann taking -charge of another composite force of troops of the 175th -Brigade. In the meantime the remainder of the 2/4th -Londons, which had formed part of Grover's Force and -were now under Askham, took up a defensive position -under orders of Lieut.-Col. Chart, 18th Entrenching -Battalion, east of Manicamp, on the south side of the -Canal and the Ailette River. At night this party was -also relieved by Lieut.-Col. Dann's force and joined the -remainder of the Battalion at Besme.</p> - -<p>The 173rd Brigade was now entirely extricated from -the line, and a day of reorganisation and collection of -scattered details from the various composite forces, which -the needs of the moment had created, was of urgent -necessity. This respite was obtained on the 26th March -when the three original units were reorganised as one -battalion, known as the Fusilier Battalion as follows:</p> - -<div class="center"> -<table border="0" cellpadding="4" cellspacing="0" summary="Fusilier Battalion"> - <tr> - <td>No. 1 Coy.—117</td> - <td>other</td> - <td>ranks</td> - <td class="tdr">2/4th</td> - <td>Londons</td> - <td>under</td> - <td>Capt. Askham.</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td>No. 2 Coy.— 88</td> - <td>other</td> - <td>ranks</td> - <td class="tdr">2/4th</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td>2/Lieut. Blair.</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td>No. 3 Coy.—179</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdr">2/2nd</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td>Capt. Wright.</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td>No. 4 Coy.—189</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdr">3rd</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td>2/Lieut. Curtis.</td> - </tr> -</table></div> - -<p>Lieut.-Col. Dann returned from the 175th Brigade to -command this newly constituted force. In addition to -the Fusilier Battalion, the Brigade included temporarily -the 12th Londons under Lieut.-Col. Bayliffe, C.M.G., and -the 18th Entrenching Battalion under Lieut.-Col. Chart.</p> - -<p>The whole of the III Corps had now been brought south -of the Oise, and Noyon fell into the enemy's hands on the -26th. The main weight of the German offensive continued -to sweep westward in the direction of Amiens, but with -the details of this part of the fight we are not concerned. -The 58th Division, however, was not yet out of the fight, -and the enemy made repeated efforts to force a breach -in the long river line which it held, but without success. -The French troops were now numerous in this area, and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_383" id="Page_383">[Pg 383]</a></span> -though General Butler continued to command his own -Corps, the supreme command of the area was taken by -the French.</p> - -<p>In this battle the Battalion had the extraordinary -experience of being driven entirely out of the battle area. -It had lost severely and borne several days of the most -terrific ordeal that it had yet been called on to face, but -with the exception of a deep indentation in its positions at -Farm Rouge on the first day there had never been any -semblance of a break-through on its front. Frequently -hard pressed, often almost surrounded, it had been forced -back day after day, stubbornly fighting but never broken.</p> - -<p>Constituted as described above the 173rd Brigade took -over the Manicamp sector from the 175th on the evening -of the 27th March, the 12th Londons occupying the right -subsector, with the Fusilier Battalion on the left adjoining -Manicamp village. The two 2/4th London Companies -were stationed on the Ailette River and in the village. -The Brigade remained in these positions strengthening the -defences until the night of 2nd/3rd April, when it was -relieved by the French, the Fusilier Battalion reaching -Blérancourt at midnight. The daylight hours of the -3rd April were occupied in resting and cleaning up, and -after dark the Battalion moved to Andignicourt, where it -was accommodated in an enormous cave probably large -enough to hold a brigade at full strength.</p> - -<p>The following afternoon the route was continued and -the Battalion reached Amblèny at 8 p.m. Here the -Fusilier Battalion broke up, its component companies -being once more organised as three battalions under their -respective commanders. The 12th Londons returned to -their own brigade, being replaced in the 173rd Brigade -by the 16th Entrenching Battalion (Lieut.-Col. Nicholls).</p> - -<p>The 2/4th Londons were joined on the 3rd April by -Major F. G. Tollworthy, 1st Londons, as second in -command vice Major Grover wounded.</p> - -<p>On the 5th April another evening march was made to -Dommiers, and the next day after a very trying march -the Battalion reached Villers Cotterets at 8 p.m. Here -it entrained with the remainder of the Division for an area<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_384" id="Page_384">[Pg 384]</a></span> -further north to which the III Corps had been transferred. -The total casualties sustained by the 2/4th Battalion in -the second battle of the Somme between 21st March and -3rd April amounted to:</p> - -<div class="hangindent8"> - -<p>Officers—Lieut. J. Cairns, missing, believed killed; 2/Lieut. -F. G. Williams, died of wounds; Major A. Grover, -M.C., Capt. C. A. Clarke, M.C., Lieut, H. J. M. -Williams, 2/Lieuts. R. W. Chamberlain, C. C. H. -Clifford, A. Woodington, E. M. Cuthbertson and -C. B. Francis, wounded; Lieut. W. F. Brown, gassed; -Lieuts. G. E. Lester, H. W. Durlacher, M.C., 2/Lieuts. -D. F. Crawford and L. F. Wardle, captured.</p> - -<p>N.C.O.'s and men: 37 killed, 125 wounded and 217 missing.</p></div> - -<p>The total losses of the Division for the same period -were 2204, of whom 57 officers and 1606 other ranks -were missing.</p> - - -<h3>III. <em>The Action at Villers-Bretonneux</em></h3> - -<p>In the first portion of this chapter we have endeavoured -to give some account of the manner in which the 2/4th -Battalion, with the 58th Division and the whole of Butler's -III Corps, had been literally pushed aside by the main -force of the German onslaught and had been extricated -from the fight due southwards through French territory, -while the advancing enemy had swept on in a westerly -direction towards Amiens.</p> - -<p>By the evening of the 28th March, that is to say, a -week after the opening of the battle, the Fifth and Third -Armies had been forced back from the line of the Somme -and over the old Somme battlefields, and had reached the -Amiens defence line south of the Somme, while on the -north bank the enemy had occupied Albert.</p> - -<p>On the 28th March a further attack was delivered on -a wide front from north of Arras to Puisieux which resulted -in a severe defeat for the Germans; but as only the 1/4th -Battalion is concerned in the fighting on this day we -propose to defer the account of it to another chapter, and -to pursue for the moment the fortunes of the 2/4th Battalion -until the final stabilisation of the line in front of Amiens.</p> - -<p>The German offensive on the Somme front was now<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_385" id="Page_385">[Pg 385]</a></span> -showing signs of weakening, though owing to the enormous -losses incurred by our divisions in personnel and material -the enemy was still able to make progress. The defences -of Amiens in particular were threatened, and Gen. -Gough had been entrusted by G.H.Q. with the task of -extending and strengthening them. The last days of -March saw fierce fighting in this area, and by the 31st of -the month the Fifth Army south of the Amiens-Péronne -Road had fallen back to the line Villers-Bretonneux-Hangard, -both villages inclusive to the British, while on -the right the French were holding a small corner of the -angle between the Luce and Avre Rivers on the line -Hangard-Moreuil Station. The German attacks finally -exhausted themselves by April 5th, after which date -there was a short period of trench warfare.</p> - -<p>It was to this area, still on the extreme right of the -British Armies, that the 58th Division was now directed. -From Villers Cotterets, which it left on 6th April, the -2/4th Battalion was railed to Longueau, a suburb of -Amiens. The battle line was now quite close to the -Amiens-Paris line, a lateral railroad of vital importance -to us, and as the Battalion passed Boves the British field -guns were in action within a quarter of a mile of the train.</p> - -<p>On detrainment the Battalion marched to a reserve -position in the Bois de Gentelles, where a long day was -devoted to reorganisation. The losses of the latter end -of March had not yet been made good by reinforcements, -and it was therefore decided to make use of the 16th -Entrenching Battalion for this purpose. Accordingly on -the 7th April two companies of this unit were transferred -to the 2/4th Battalion, making an increase of strength -of 4 officers (Capt. B. H. C. Hettler, M.C., and 2/Lieuts. -J. W. Bocking, E. V. Grimsdell and W. T. Millar) and -344 other ranks. With this valuable reinforcement it was -possible once again to organise four companies as follows:</p> - -<div class="center"> -<table border="0" cellpadding="4" cellspacing="0" summary="organise four companies"> - <tr> - <td>No. 1</td> - <td>Coy.</td> - <td>under</td> - <td>Capt. G. H. Hetley</td> - <td rowspan="2" class="bl bb">2/4th London men.</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td>No. 2</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td>Capt. S. G. Askham</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td>No. 3</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td>Capt. B. H. C. Hettler</td> - <td rowspan="2" class="bl">16th Entrenching Battalion men.</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td>No. 4</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdr">2/Lieut. E. V. Grimsdell</td> - </tr> -</table></div> - -<p>It should be remarked in passing that the Entrenching<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_386" id="Page_386">[Pg 386]</a></span> -Battalions had no connection with the Labour Corps. -They were trained and combatant troops whose existence -as Entrenching Battalions only dated from the Divisional -reorganisations of the preceding January, and they represented -in effect the troops which had been "left over" -after the reorganisation was completed. The bulk of the -reinforcement which thus came to the 2/4th Battalion -were enlisted in the 6th K.O.Y.L.I., and were undoubtedly -some of the finest reinforcements the Battalion ever -received: although young they were very keen, and -included some most reliable non-commissioned officers.</p> - -<p>At 7.45 p.m. on the 7th April the Battalion relieved -the 12th Londons in the Reserve system between the -village of Gentelles and the Amiens-Roye Road, Nos. 3 -and 4 Companies occupying the front line with Nos. 1 and -2 in support to them and Headquarters in the Bois de -Gentelles. For ten days the Battalion continued to -occupy these positions, constantly employed in working -parties on its own defences and on elaborately wiring the -lines in conjunction with the R.E.'s. This wire was -strengthened to form a considerable obstacle for the -Gentelles line, which was the final line of the Amiens -defences and was to be held at all costs. During this -tour of duty the 2/4th Battalion suffered somewhat from -German shell fire, for the British batteries were close -behind the Gentelles line.</p> - -<p>It was confidently anticipated that the enemy would -endeavour once more to break the Amiens defences in -this area. The village of Villers-Bretonneux stands on a -somewhat prominent hill seven miles east of Amiens, and -its possession would have enabled the Germans to play -havoc by their artillery with the city itself and our important -road and railway communications which radiate -from it. Its value to the Germans rendered it a matter -of the highest importance to us to defend it stubbornly. -In anticipation of an attack, therefore, the battle surplus -was sent out of the trenches on the 10th and the work of -strengthening the defences pressed on with vigour.</p> - -<p>Further reinforcements were received from the Base, -numbering in all 127 other ranks. These were mostly<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_387" id="Page_387">[Pg 387]</a></span> -young lads under nineteen years of age whose despatch -overseas had been rendered necessary by the impossibility -of otherwise replacing the deficiencies in the ranks. They -were all extremely keen and had received a good groundwork -of training at home. But they reached the Battalion -at a time when it had just been shaken by one battle -and was about to become involved in another, and it -can only be deplored that circumstances prevented any -opportunity for assimilating them into the Battalion and -for giving them some preliminary experience of warfare -under quieter conditions. The whole Battalion was -indeed rather conglomerate, for of a total of some 650 -rifles about 450 were strange to the Battalion and called -upon to go into action under a command unknown to -them: this important point should be borne in mind in -considering the battle which followed.</p> - -<p>On the evening of the 18th April the 58th Division -took over from the 5th Australian Brigade the front line -east of Cachy, the 173rd Brigade occupying the whole -sector. This sector extended from the immediate left of -Hangard, through the Bois de Hangard to the Villers-Bretonneux-Demuin -Road, the 3rd Londons on the -right, the 2/2nd in the centre and the 2/4th on the left. -The 2/4th Battalion's subsector, in which it relieved the -19th Australian Battalion, about 1500 yards frontage, was -held with three companies (Nos. 1, 2 and 4) in the front -line and one (No. 3) in support, Headquarters occupying -a quarry east of Cachy. The 175th Brigade took over -the Blue line while the 174th was in reserve in Cagny.</p> - -<p>The Battalion was now straining every nerve to complete -the defences. Much work was still to be done. The -front line had originally existed as a line of isolated posts, -and these were not yet completely connected up nor were -they adequately wired. A great deal was to be done in -providing efficient fire positions throughout the line in -order that if lateral movement should become necessary -the defence of the position might not be impaired.</p> - -<p>Orders were received that the front line would be held -till the last. The support company would be employed -for counter-attack purposes in the event of the enemy<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_388" id="Page_388">[Pg 388]</a></span> -gaining a footing in our positions; and the success of the -defence would clearly depend on the rapidity and skill -with which this local reserve was used. The right flank -of the Brigade front was further strengthened by the 10th -Londons, who were temporarily attached in Brigade reserve.</p> - -<p>On the 21st the Battalion suffered a severe loss in the -adjutant, Capt. F. W. Walker, D.S.O., who was wounded, -his duties being taken by Lieut. S. A. Seys, the assistant -adjutant. On the 23rd Capt. Hetley was attached to the -131st French Divisional Headquarters as liaison officer, -and his company was handed over temporarily to Capt. -W. C. Morton.</p> - -<p>The same day information was obtained from Alsatian -deserters that the enemy attack would take place at dawn -the following morning.</p> - -<p>We may restate the distribution of companies in the -trenches as follows:</p> - -<dl> - <dt>In Front— No. 2 (Askham) on the right.</dt> - <dd>No. 1 (Morton) in the centre.</dd> - <dd>No. 4 (Grimsdell) on the left.</dd> - <dt>In Support—No. 3 (Hettler).</dt> -</dl> - -<p>By an extraordinary chance the enemy was yet once -more favoured by the weather, for, when his barrage -dropped on our lines at 4 a.m. on the 24th April with -bitter intensity and great accuracy, the day was dawning -on a dense mist which impeded observation beyond a -radius of about 50 yards. The bombardment was severe, -and in the area of forward battery positions included -gas shell.</p> - -<p>The attack appears to have developed at widely -different hours in different parts of the line: the S.O.S. -was received from the 8th Division on the left as early as -5.40 a.m., and from Hangard at 6 a.m., but it was not -until 6.20 a.m. that reports indicated that the 173rd -Brigade front was generally engaged. On the 2/4th -Battalion front all was ready to receive the advancing -waves of German infantry, but it must be admitted that -some of the stoutest hearts were filled with something -approaching dismay when out of the fog, at a distance of -40 to 50 yards, loomed the weird forms of German tanks.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_389" id="Page_389">[Pg 389]</a></span> -So far as can be ascertained about six tanks were directed -on the 2/4th Battalion's sector, and it was the only -Battalion of the Brigade against which they advanced. -The tanks seem to have been uncertain of their bearings -in the mist and not too skilfully handled. One at least -devoted its energies to describing small circles, firing wildly -into the ground where none of our troops were posted.</p> - -<p>In spite of this unskilful manœuvring, however, there -is no doubt that the sudden appearance of these monsters -shook our defence for a moment, and the men fell back -a short distance. They remained perfectly under control, -and were rapidly rallied by their officers a short distance -in rear of the front trench, after which the German infantry, -advancing in three waves close behind the tanks, were -hotly engaged with rifle and Lewis gun fire, which inflicted -heavy loss on them. Askham was hit about twenty -minutes after the attack began, and after his departure -to the Aid Post charge of affairs in the firing line, so far -as control was possible over a wide front in the mist, was -assumed by Morton of No. 1 Company. The first news -of what was occurring in front was received at Battalion -Headquarters from Morton in a message timed 6.30 a.m.: -"Tanks have crossed front line trenches, front line has -fallen back, have rallied them at Coy. H.Q. line."</p> - -<p>Steadily the tanks pressed our line back though our -retirement was carried out gradually and at ghastly loss -to the German infantry; and finally Morton was able to -collect all available men of the 2/4th Battalion in the -Cachy Switch.</p> - -<p>The support company put up a good fight—Hettler -was hit early—and eventually was nearly surrounded; -but it cut its way out and managed also to gain the Cachy -Switch. The Divisional records time our retirement to -the Cachy Switch at 7.40 a.m., but there seems no doubt -that the Battalion's resistance was much more prolonged -than this would indicate. Certainly Morton was not able -to report the organisation of his new position till 10.15 a.m. -By this time only about one hundred men of the Battalion -with three subalterns, Prince, Sheppard and Ewing, were -under Morton's hand, though others rejoined later. The<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_390" id="Page_390">[Pg 390]</a></span> -2/4th Battalion's retirement had involved the risk of -leaving the left flank of the 2/2nd Londons on its right -in the air, but this Battalion conformed to our movement, -though a gap ensued between the two units. This was -promptly filled by Brigade, who sent forward a company -of the 2/10th Londons. By midday our line was more -or less stabilised on a line from the Cachy Switch immediately -in front of Cachy village along the Hangard Road. -This meant that Hangard Wood was lost, and from the -left flank the bad news was also received that Villers-Bretonneux -had fallen into the enemy's hands.</p> - -<p>Beyond artillery activity no further action of importance -occurred on the Battalion's front during the afternoon, -which was busily occupied in forming a line of shell hole -defences in the new position and in feeling out to the flanks -to gain touch with adjoining units.</p> - -<p>This was the only occasion on which either Battalion -of the regiment was called on to face tanks. There can -be no question as to the tremendous moral effect of these -machines, though their actual destructiveness—handled -as they were—was not great. Under the conditions of -mist which prevented any warning of their approach, and -the conglomerate composition of the Battalion, a little -initial unsteadiness on the part of the less trained elements -of the Battalion was almost to be expected in face of such -an ordeal. The rapid recovery and steady rearguard fight -back to the Cachy line, however, showed that after the first -shock the innate discipline of the Londoner asserted itself -and the number of enemy dead counted on the field was -evidence of the heavy cost to the Germans of their success.</p> - -<p>2/Lieut. Ewing should be mentioned. "His behaviour -was splendid throughout. During the preliminary bombardment -he was constantly up and down his sector -encouraging his men, and when the enemy ultimately -appeared his fire orders were clear and effective." He -was awarded the M.C., as was also Capt. Morton, who displayed -throughout the day marked qualities of leadership -and coolness. Pte. Petrie, a stretcher-bearer who gained -the M.M., exhibited an utter disregard of personal danger -in pursuing his work of bringing in and tending wounded.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_391" id="Page_391">[Pg 391]</a></span></p> - -<p>The heavy casualties sustained this day in "missing" -were due to the fact that in retirement the Battalion was -forced to leave many men, who might otherwise have been -saved, in the enemy's hands. But the R.A.M.C. staff -under Lieut. Dunaway worked magnificently under heavy -shell fire till the last moment, thereby retrieving many -wounded men who must otherwise have been captured.</p> - -<p>We have already pointed to the great importance of -Villers-Bretonneux in the defence of Amiens, and it is -not surprising therefore that its loss was followed by an -immediate order from Army Headquarters that it must -be recaptured at all costs.</p> - -<p>The counter-attack was delivered at 10 p.m. on the -24th April by the 9th Londons, the 54th Brigade and the -Australians. Villers-Bretonneux again passed into our -hands, while on the 58th Division's front the line was -advanced about half-way forward from the Cachy Switch -to the original front line.</p> - -<p>During the 25th April the 2/4th Battalion was not -engaged, though it was all day long subjected to severe -artillery fire, which inflicted a good many casualties. On -the evening of the 25th the 2/4th Battalion was relieved -by troops of the French Moroccan Division, and withdrew -on relief to bivouacs in open country east of Boves.</p> - -<p>The casualties of the two days' action were:</p> - -<div class="hangindent"> - -<p>2/Lieut. J. W. Booking, killed; Capts. S. G. Askham, M.C., -B. H. C. Hettler, M.C., 2/Lieuts. S. F. G. Mears, P. J. Payne -and L. H. Sheppard, wounded; 2/Lieuts. S. C. Geering and -C. W. Cumner, missing; and in N.C.O.'s and men 23 killed, -108 wounded and 203 missing.</p></div> - -<p>During the 26th April the Moroccan Division continued -the counter-attack, and at the end of the day the line -was substantially restored to its position prior to the -German attack.</p> - -<p>This was the last serious German attempt to reach -Amiens. The line had bent perilously, but the offensive -in this area had been fought to a standstill. At this point, -therefore, we may leave the 2/4th Battalion and deal with the -defence of Arras, in which the 1/4th Battalion bore a part.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_392" id="Page_392">[Pg 392]</a></span></p> -<div class="chapter"></div> -<hr class="chap" /> - - - - -<h2>CHAPTER XXI<br /> - -THE 1/4TH BATTALION IN THE DEFENCE OF ARRAS, 1918</h2> - - -<p>On the 11th March 1918 the 1/4th Londons took over the -Oppy Trenches from the Kensingtons.</p> - -<p>There was no room for doubt now that the Germans -intended sooner or later to launch a big attack in this -area, and the only thing was to ensure that the troops -holding the line should be ready whenever the storm might -burst. The dispositions now taken up were, therefore, -those which had been finally decided on for the scheme -of defence, and it was arranged that companies should -henceforth always occupy the same positions in order -the better to know their ground. These positions will be -stated in detail later.</p> - -<p>So far as the infantry in the line were concerned the -period of suspense was mainly characterised by very hard -work on the defences and by particularly active patrolling. -Each front line post nightly pushed forward to the enemy -wire a listening patrol to give early warning of signs of -the enemy's assembly for attack. On the evening of the -12th March 2/Lieut. G. G. Lewis took a patrol into the -German trenches near Crucifix Corner, but found them -unoccupied. The tour of duty passed quietly, with the -exception of a very severe bombardment with mustard gas -shells, which began at about 7 p.m. on the 15th March and -continued till about 8 a.m. the following morning. At -the time this caused little damage, but the heat of the sun -later in the day accentuated the effects of the gas, and -Lieuts. A. Bath and O. D. Garratt, M.C., 2/Lieuts. G. W. -Fisher, E. A. Ratcliffe and 109 other ranks became -casualties.</p> - -<p>Intelligence reports pointed to the probability of the -attack developing on the 12th March; but although -nothing occurred, from this date onwards the whole<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_393" id="Page_393">[Pg 393]</a></span> -Division daily stood to arms from one hour before dawn -till 8.30 a.m., while the Divisional and Corps artillery -put a slow barrage on the enemy lines at daybreak. The -"stand-to" order was strictly enforced as far back as the -transport lines and the Quartermaster.</p> - -<p>On the 18th the 1/4th Londons were relieved by the -Kensingtons and withdrew in Brigade reserve to Roclincourt, -leaving two platoons in support attached to the -Kensingtons, and one in front trenches attached to the -London Scottish. A rearrangement of the method of -holding the line was now ordered by Corps, and the -necessary changes which were effected on the night of -21st/22nd March resulted in each division holding its -sector with two brigades in line and one in reserve. -Each front line brigade had two battalions in trenches -and one in support. The effect of this in the 56th -Division was to leave the 169th and 168th Brigades -in the line, while the 167th was withdrawn to the support -area.</p> - -<p>The 21st March saw the opening of the great German -offensive on the Fifth Army front, but no attack developed -opposite the 56th Division. The day was marked -by very greatly increased artillery activity on the enemy's -part, gas shell being freely used on the Bailleul-Willerval -line. This indication of the imminence of active operations -caused the cancellation of the relief of the 56th Division -by the 62nd. The next day warning was received that -the 2nd Canadian Division would take over the line, but -this order was also subsequently cancelled.</p> - -<p>No definite news of the offensive was received during -the 21st March, though it was reported that the enemy -had gained the high ground near Wancourt Tower, and -was likely by his assault on Monchy to lay the Corps -right flank open to attack. Arras was heavily shelled, -and all the civilians were cleared out. St Pol also was -bombarded by a long-range gun, while low-flying Bosche -aeroplanes were over the lines and at night dropped -bombs on Thélus.</p> - -<p>On the evening of the 24th the 1/4th Londons returned -to the front line. Aerial reports of great activity behind<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_394" id="Page_394">[Pg 394]</a></span> -the German lines now made it clear that the attack was -imminent, and final preparations for the struggle were -completed. All spare Lewis guns and magazines were -brought up from the transport lines. The men were in -splendid fettle, and the high probability that the long -weeks of suspense would shortly be over increased their -good humour. All were absolutely confident in themselves -and each other, and their only anxiety was as to whether -they would have the good fortune to be in front trenches -to meet the enemy.</p> - -<p>At this time Gen. Loch and Lieut.-Col. Marchment -made strong representations that the three front line -posts ought to be much more lightly held, and that the -Company Headquarters in Beatty should be withdrawn -to the Marquis line, on the grounds that it was useless -to pack men into posts only 100 yards from the enemy, -where they were certain to suffer severely from the hostile -bombardment and where they had no room to fight. -These representations were not received favourably by -Corps though the event showed they were well founded. -As it was Lieut.-Col. Marchment moved one platoon from -Oppy Post, but even with this alteration the Marquis line -was too lightly held.</p> - -<p>News from the area of battle in the south was still -vague, though it was known that the Fifth Army had been -forced to give a great deal of ground, and that the Third -Army on its left had also retreated, though to a less -degree, and to conform to the movements of its neighbour. -As the day wore on, however, the enemy's pressure on -the Third Army south of the Scarpe increased and by -the 27th he had captured Monchy-le-Preux. It became -evident that he was aiming at a movement to envelop -Arras from the south. A reasonable deduction from -this situation was that the blow at Arras would shortly -develop also on the north of the Scarpe, by means of -an assault on the Vimy Ridge.</p> - -<p>In the early hours of the 25th March, shortly after the -1/4th Londons had taken over the line, 2/Lieut. C. H. -Board and Coy. Sergt.-Major Matthews of B Company -were visiting the sentry groups in Beatty Post when two<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_395" id="Page_395">[Pg 395]</a></span> -of the enemy, who had entered the trench by stealth, tried -to drag the Coy. Sergt.-Major out of it. A scuffle ensued -in which another officer and an N.C.O. joined. The two -Germans unfortunately got away after slightly wounding -both Board and Matthews.</p> - -<p>During the day the artillery on both sides became -more active, though no infantry action occurred, and the -men were kept busy in constructing trench blocks and -improving firesteps. The right flank of the 1/4th Londons' -sector had always been regarded as a rather weak spot -in the defence, and in view of the expectation that the -enemy would assault the Vimy Ridge from the south, it -was desirable to provide for the formation by the Battalion -of a defensive flank facing south should this area become -threatened. To this end work was pushed forward in -constructing and improving firesteps in Ouse Alley for -its possible use as a "switch line." This precaution, as -will be seen, was justified by events.</p> - -<p>During the evening a report was received of the examination -of a prisoner of the 471st Infantry Regiment, -who had been taken near Mill Post on the previous evening. -This was to the effect that the attack was to be made -on the morning of the 26th, and that the 219th and -23rd Reserve Divisions had been brought forward for the -purpose. These troops were accommodated in the Drocourt-Quéant -line. They had just arrived from Riga and would -attack in conjunction with the 240th and 5th Bavarian -Reserve Divisions. They would assemble in the front -line system and would advance to a depth of four miles -with their right flank on Oppy, then swing round -towards Vimy. Three special divisions would capture -the Vimy Ridge the next day. The 471st Regiment -had already 60 trench mortars in position, and 8 more -trench mortar companies were to arrive on the night -of the 25th; most of the ammunition was already in -the line.</p> - -<p>This message, bringing as it did a hope that the wearisome -suspense was at last at an end, was received with -satisfaction, and instructions to prepare for battle were -issued. All night our artillery maintained a heavy fire<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_396" id="Page_396">[Pg 396]</a></span> -on the enemy's supposed assembly positions, while No -Man's Land was occupied by our listening patrols. At -4 a.m. these came in and the heavy artillery placed a slow -barrage on the German front lines. At 4.45 a.m. the -Battalion stood to arms, blocks were lowered in the -communication trenches and all made ready. No attack -developed, and at 7.30 a.m. the order to stand down was -received from Brigade, the remainder of the day passing -comparatively quietly.</p> - -<p>In the evening, in response to urgent appeals from -Corps for an identification, all battalions in the line sent -patrols to the enemy trenches to try to get prisoners. -From the 1/4th Londons two parties went forward at -10.30 p.m. after wire-cutting preparations by the field -artillery. 2/Lieut. G. G. Lewis with a platoon of A Company -entered the enemy line opposite Oppy Post, but the -sentry group was heard running away and no bag was -obtained. From C Company 2/Lieut. R. E. Campkin -took two men to the German trenches near Crucifix Corner, -and had a lively little scrap in the dark with the sentry -group. In this case also the Bosche took to their heels, -and, in spite of a good set to with fists, managed to get -away pursued by Campkin. After remaining two hours -in the enemy line both patrols returned bringing some -trench notice boards.</p> - -<p>The 27th March passed remarkably quietly, nothing -of interest occurring beyond the movements of a low-flying -Bosche 'plane which appeared to be particularly -interested in our trenches. A relief of the German -division opposite the Battalion was suspected, but the -report was incorrect.</p> - -<p>On the night 27th/28th March orders were received -that the XIII Corps boundary was to be extended northwards -as far as the Souchez River, and that the 56th -Division would "side-step" northwards. The side-step -was effected by transferring the Kensingtons from the -right flank of the 1/4th Londons to the left flank, the -Kensingtons taking over two new posts north of the -1/4th Londons from the 8th Canadian Brigade. The gap -thus created on the right flank of the Battalion was filled<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_397" id="Page_397">[Pg 397]</a></span> -by the 169th Brigade, which extended its left flank. Why -this redistribution was effected at the eleventh hour we -do not know: obviously it must have been for some very -important reason. But whatever the cause, the result -was distinctly weakening to the defence. We have already -alluded to the well-recognised risk of the 1/4th Londons' -right flank being laid open, and now at the last moment -the area was occupied by a Battalion entirely strange -to the ground. The relief in fact was not completed -before the battle opened, for when the Bosche barrage -fell on the morning of the 28th March the L.R.B. had not -taken over Bailleul East Post, while a company of the -1st Canadian Rifles in the Brown line was still awaiting -relief. By the courtesy of the Canadian Brigadier this -company was placed under the orders of Brig.-Gen. -Loch.</p> - -<p>In addition to this eleventh hour change of dispositions -a certain difficulty appears to have beset the High -Command in reconciling the rôles of the three divisions -composing the Corps, and this resulted in a stream of -orders each of which altered its predecessor. The Corps -order, under which the extension of the 56th Division's -line was carried out, laid down that the Bailleul-Willerval -line (Red line) was to be the line of resistance, and that -the front line system would be regarded as outposts. -Later in the evening the front line system was ordered -to be held at all costs to conform with the 4th Division -on our right; but still later a modification of this -was made on the left of the line in order to conform -to the defensive line of the 3rd Canadian Division -on our left, and the garrison of Arleux Post was -ordered, if heavily attacked, to withdraw to the Arleux -Loop.</p> - -<p>The final dispositions therefore provided five lines of -defence, each to be defended at all costs in default of a -Divisional order to withdraw. There were:</p> -<div class="center"> -<ol> - <li>Front line system.</li> - <li>Red line (Bailleul-Willerval).</li> - <li>Brown line (Farbus-Vimy).</li> - <li>Green line (Thélus).</li> - <li>La Targette line.</li> -</ol> -</div> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_398" id="Page_398">[Pg 398]</a></span></p> - -<p>The order of battle of Brigade was as follows:</p> - -<div class="center"> -<table border="0" cellpadding="4" cellspacing="0" summary="order of battle of Brigade"> - <tr> - <td><span class="smcap">169th Brigade (right)</span>:</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdp">Front line system:</td> - <td>Queen's Westminsters in Towy Post on the right.</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td></td> - <td>London Rifle Brigade in Mill,</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td></td> - <td>Bradford and Bird Posts on the left.</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdp">Red line:</td> - <td>1/2nd Londons.</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdp">Brown line:</td> - <td>1 coy. 1/5th Cheshire Pioneers.</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdp">Reserve:</td> - <td>2 coys. 1st Londons (attd. from 167th Brigade).</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td><span class="smcap">168th Brigade (left)</span>:</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdp">Front line system:</td> - <td>1/4th Londons in Beatty, Wood and Oppy Posts on the right.</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td></td> - <td>Kensingtons in Tommy and Arleux Posts on the left.</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdp">Red line:</td> - <td>London Scottish.</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdp">Brown line:</td> - <td>2 platoons 1/5th Cheshire Pioneers.</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdp">Green line:</td> - <td>2 coys. 1st Londons, 1½ coys. 1/5th Cheshire Pioneers.</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td><span class="smcap">Divisional Reserve</span>:</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td colspan="2" class="tdp">167th Brigade (less 1st Londons) and 3 field coys. R.E.</td> - </tr> -</table></div> - -<p>The companies of the 1/4th Londons were disposed as -follows:</p> - -<div class="center"> -<table width="90%" border="0" cellpadding="4" cellspacing="0" summary="companies of the 1/4th Londons were disposed "> - <tr> - <td>Right:</td> - <td>B Company (Spicer) H.Q. and 2 platoons in Beatty Post. 1 platoon in Marquis and Earl line.</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td>Centre:</td> - <td>C Company (Duthie) 1 platoon in Wood Post. 1 platoon in Marquis line. H.Q. and 1 platoon in South Duke St.</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td>Left:</td> - <td>A Company (H. N. Williams) 1 platoon in Oppy Post. 1 platoon between Oppy Post and Marquis line. H.Q. and 1 platoon in Marquis line.</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td>Advanced Battalion H.Q.:</td> - <td>(Major F. A. Phillips) in South Duke St. (with C Coy.)</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td>Support:</td> - <td>D Company (Cooper) in Bow Trench.</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td>Battalion H.Q.:</td> - <td>(Lieut.-Col. Marchment) in Ouse Alley west of Bow Trench.</td> - </tr> -</table></div> - -<p>During the night 2/Lieut. R. E. Campkin with two men -of C Company again crossed No Man's Land and returned -shortly before 3 a.m. on the 28th March reporting that -he had seen long lines of men carrying up to the enemy -front line what appeared to be large biscuit tins—doubtless -the trench mortar ammunition coming in. Evidently this -was The Day!</p> - -<p>At 3 a.m. on the 28th March the enemy opened an<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_399" id="Page_399">[Pg 399]</a></span> -intense high explosive shell fire on Bow Trench, Ouse -Alley and Rear Battalion Headquarters, as well as on all -the rearward defensive posts. This bombardment, which -continued throughout the day, was at first mingled with -mustard gas. The forward area was hardly affected by -this shelling except for the fact that the wind carried the -gas eastward over the front line posts, the garrisons of -which had to wear masks for over an hour.</p> - -<p>At 5.40 a.m. a terrific trench mortar fire fell on the -forward posts doing very severe damage, and causing -many casualties. Ouse Alley and the Earl-Marquis line -at first escaped this, though later the area of bombardment -was extended and they received a full share of it.</p> - -<p>A strictly chronological account of an action such as -this, in which different parts of the Battalion became -involved in the fight at varying hours, is almost an impossibility -if the reader is to glean anything but the -most confused impression of what occurred. We propose, -therefore, to deal first of all with the fight for the front -line posts gradually working our narrative westward.</p> - -<p>The S.O.S. signal was received in Battalion Headquarters -from Oppy Post by wire at 7.15 a.m., and a few -moments later flares were sent up from Wood and Beatty. -The signal was repeated backwards to Brigade by Battalion -Headquarters. "We stood on top," writes Lieut.-Col. -Marchment, "to have a look round but could see very -little as it was not fully light. We could, however, hear -a pleasant noise—very heavy rifle fire!"</p> - -<p>Oppy Post on the left had been very badly knocked -about by the trench mortaring and the garrison seriously -reduced before the enemy came over. A gallant attempt -at resistance was put up and rifle and Lewis gun fire were -opened as soon as the attacking lines made their appearance. -One Lewis gun team was seen from the rear to -have climbed on to the parapet, and the gun was being -fired from the hip. But it was hopeless from the first. -The enemy lines were very close, and by sheer weight of -numbers the Post was quickly swamped. Of a garrison -of 2 officers and 48 other ranks but 1 officer (2/Lieut. -Athey) and 5 other ranks were able to make their way<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_400" id="Page_400">[Pg 400]</a></span> -back to the Marquis line which they did by way of Boyne -Trench.</p> - -<p>On the right Beatty Post had suffered from the -trench mortar fire more severely than any, and by the -time the Germans appeared its trenches were practically -effaced. The attackers appeared in fairly close formation, -and in considerable depth, some of the leading wave firing -rifle grenades from the hip. Apparently the enemy's -trench mortar preparation, severe as it had been, had not -dealt effectively with our wire, for the leading wave of -attackers was delayed in getting through it, causing those -following to bunch up to it. The rapid rifle and Lewis -gun fire opened by the garrison of the post was thus able -to inflict very severe loss. For about fifteen minutes the -garrison stoutly held its own, but at the end of that time -it was found that the enemy had already swept over the -posts to the right held by the L.R.B., and was working -into Marine Trench and Ouse Alley in great numbers. -Again sheer weight of numbers made further resistance -impossible, and 2/Lieut. G. R. Pitman brought the six -surviving men back to the Marquis line over the open, -leaving 2 officers (Capt. E. E. Spicer and 2/Lieut. -Coombes) and 78 other ranks fallen at their posts.</p> - -<p>In the centre a magnificent stand was made by the -garrison of Wood Post under Lieut. H. F. Dade and -2/Lieut. H. O. Morris. The night position of the post -had been changed a few days before the battle, and the -German trench mortar preparation therefore fell harmlessly -on the former position. When the trench mortar -fire ceased the enemy was seen advancing in an extended -line over the open ground left of the Wood and coming -through the Wood in groups of about 10 men 50 yards -apart. This line was followed by groups of about 30 men -some 200 yards in rear. The whole garrison (2 officers, 45 -other ranks and 2 Lewis guns) at once opened a heavy -fire which undoubtedly caused very severe loss to the -enemy. A party of Germans tried to force the block in -the trench leading from the new post to the old, but they -were effectively disposed of with rifle grenades. For a -full hour this gallant garrison held their own, completely -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_401" id="Page_401">[Pg 401]</a></span>checking the enemy in the wood. On the right, however, -the enemy had, as already recounted, swept over Beatty -Post and was now working his way round Wood Post from -the south. Ammunition and bombs were beginning to -run short. After a consultation Dade and Morris decided -that the position was no longer tenable, and they withdrew -their men along Bedford Row and Boyne Trench to -the Marquis line. This withdrawal was skilfully executed, -the move of the riflemen down Boyne Trench being covered -by Lewis guns in Bedford Row. That the garrison held -their own to the last is evidenced by the fact that before -the post was finally evacuated the Headquarters dugout -was in the hands of the enemy, while our own artillery -was already shelling the post. The defence of Wood Post -cost 25 casualties in other ranks.</p> - -<div class="figcenter" style="width: 500px;"> -<img src="images/i_b_400fp.jpg" width="500" height="363" alt="" /> -<div class="caption"><p><span class="smcap">The Defence of Arras, March 1918</span></p></div> -</div> - -<p>The value of the defence of Wood Post can hardly be -overestimated. Apart from the heavy losses which the -fire of its garrison undoubtedly inflicted on the enemy, it -is certain that its prolonged resistance saved the Marquis -line from being overrun in the vicinity of Advanced -Battalion Headquarters.</p> - -<p>As soon as Williams reported the men back from Oppy -Post Lieut.-Col. Marchment had a 6-inch howitzer battery -turned on to Oppy Wood.</p> - -<p>The forward posts having fallen, the Marquis line became -almost immediately engaged, and Capt. H. N. Williams -(A Company) displayed great qualities of leadership in his -defence of the position. We cannot do better than to relate -this phase of the battle in the words of the official account -of the action submitted by Lieut.-Col. Marchment:</p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p>The Marquis line easily held up the advancing -enemy after the posts had gone. On the right the -enemy was strongly established in the Earl line and -Viscount Street about fifteen minutes after zero. -Major F. A. Phillips at once gave orders to 2/Lieut. -O. C. Hudson, whose platoon was in the Marquis line -astride Ouse Alley, to form the defensive flank at once. -This had been rehearsed previously and consisted not -only in manning the block in Ouse Alley to the front, -but also in Earl to the right, and manning firesteps -facing to the right along Ouse Alley. 2/Lieut. Hudson<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_402" id="Page_402">[Pg 402]</a></span> -maintained this position with great gallantry and -inflicted heavy casualties on the enemy, whom he -caught in enfilade as they broke through over Earl -to Viscount Street. The defensive flank was prolonged -by Headquarter details who continued on the -firestep in Ouse Alley and held a block near the Aid -Post in South Duke Street.</p> - -<p>At about 9.30 a.m. a strong party was seen working -up Ouse Alley from Viscount Street towards Forward -Battalion Headquarters. Major F. A. Phillips at once -attacked over the open with about 20 Headquarter -details, the men following most gallantly under heavy -fire. The enemy were ejected and a block established -in Ouse Alley towards Viscount Street. A block -was established here and successfully defended with -grenades by a party under Sergt. Udall.</p> - -<p>In the centre of the Marquis line the attack was not -pressed until the Wood Post Garrison had withdrawn. -After this the enemy gradually built up a large volume -of rifle fire from Oppy Wood, but was prevented from -debouching by well-directed rifle and Lewis gun fire -from the Marquis line. Rifle grenades were also -used on New Cut and Baker Street where the enemy -had established himself.</p> - -<p>On the left of the Marquis line excellent targets -were presented on the left of the Wood, the Lewis -gun in the bank (near the junction of Clarence Trench -and Kent Road) doing most excellent work.</p> - -<p>During the next three hours the enemy twice broke -into the line near Boyne, but was thrown out, leaving -a good many dead in the trench. Rifle and Lewis -gun fire was opened whenever a good target presented -itself, and a large number of dead were seen between -Wood and Beale Trenches.</p> - -<p>Later on the enemy broke in on the left from -Clarence Trench. The Lewis gun on the left had -finished its ammunition, but reinforced by a few men, -the team ejected the enemy with rifle fire and grenades.</p> - -<p>Thus, at about 11 a.m., the forward troops were -holding the Marquis line beating off attacks to the -front and holding a block on the left. On the right, -although the enemy pressure was considerable, he was -held up splendidly in Earl and South Duke Street -and in front and behind in Ouse Alley; the enemy -holding Viscount Street on the right and pushing on -towards the Red line.</p></div> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_403" id="Page_403">[Pg 403]</a></span></p> - -<p>During the whole of this fight information as to the -situation came in to Rear Battalion Headquarters rapidly, -thanks to a buried cable, and throughout the battle -communication was maintained with the troops in front -and with Brigade Headquarters and the artillery in rear. -Advantage of this was taken when definite news of the -fall of the post line was received, and the artillery barrage -was dropped to conform to the situation, Earl Trench -being shelled with good effect.</p> - -<p>We must now turn for a moment to the course of events -in the rearward area. The enemy's preparatory bombardment -had fallen heavily on Bow Trench, but the -garrison (D Company, Cooper) was kept in dugouts, -sentries being changed each half-hour, and few casualties -were sustained. At 5 a.m. the blocks in Ouse Alley were -lowered, and rum and extra S.A.A. issued to the men. -On the S.O.S. signal being received the trench was manned; -and at the same time Lieut.-Col. Marchment sent the -Headquarter Company round to join D Company, retaining -with him only a few signallers to work the line, two clerks -and a few scouts, in addition to Boutall (Adjutant), Lorden -(Works Officer) and Padre Green "to create a calm atmosphere." -Lorden was hit here at about 7.45 a.m.</p> - -<p>From about 8 a.m. the Headquarters area was quite -in the air. The front line system in the adjoining sector -on the right (169th Brigade) had gone, with the exception -of Towy Post held by the Queen's Westminsters; and the -Bosche had worked up the valley on the left and was also -for a time in Ouse Alley, and attacking Bailleul East Post -in the Red line (held by the London Scottish).</p> - -<p>For a time trouble was caused by low-flying enemy -aeroplanes, but these went back as soon as our own R.E. 8's -appeared. Good contact work was done throughout the -day with these machines which called at intervals for -flares. Luckily all flares were carried on the men, and -they were thus available to show our positions to the -aeroplanes. At one time the Battalion code and position -call, Q.J.B., was sent to the contact aeroplane by Lucas -Lamp worked by Sergt. Hurst, and satisfactorily received.</p> - -<p>At about 9 a.m. the enemy was in Viscount Trench,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_404" id="Page_404">[Pg 404]</a></span> -and as stragglers from the L.R.B. reported that he was -also working down Ouse Alley, D Company was ordered -to despatch one platoon to man Ouse Alley forward of -Bow Trench. This was quickly done, and the men, taking -up positions on the firesteps facing south-east, were able -to engage small parties of the enemy who appeared over -the crest in front of Bailleul East Post.</p> - -<p>Later in the morning when news was received of the -severe odds against which the gallant Marquis line garrison -was struggling, the remainder of D Company was ordered -to bomb up Ouse Alley to try to join hands with Major -Phillips and thus complete the defensive flank. At the -same time a carrying party was detailed from Headquarters -to carry S.A.A. to the front line should D Company -succeed. The place of D Company in Bow Trench was -taken by two platoons of the London Scottish placed at -Lieut.-Col. Marchment's disposal.</p> - -<p>The bombing attack was pushed forward for some 400 -yards. Enemy opposition was not very severe and about a -dozen were killed. The Germans were, however, continuing -to press forward over the open from the right and it seemed -likely that D Company would get cut off. A block was -therefore made in Ouse Alley which was held by a few -men, while another small party manned the firesteps to -the right to engage the advancing enemy. The remainder -of D Company moved over the open in the valley north -of Ouse Alley towards Boyne Dump to carry S.A.A. to -the Marquis line, taking full advantage of the ground.</p> - -<p>By 11.30 a.m. the situation of the Marquis line troops -had become precarious in the extreme. The Germans in -Oppy Wood were being reinforced and were developing -a considerable volume of fire from that direction. The -right and right rear of the position were almost enveloped -and an attack was being launched against the left flank. -Bombs and ammunition were giving out. It seemed -clear that further resistance could only lead to useless loss -of life. Influenced by these weighty considerations Major -Phillips, after a consultation with his senior officers, -decided to try to save the remnants of the garrison by a -withdrawal to the Red line. The only available trench<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_405" id="Page_405">[Pg 405]</a></span> -for withdrawal, Ouse Alley, was, however, already occupied -by the enemy in rear of the position, and the valley from -Boyne Dump on the left offered the only loophole of -escape from the closing pincers. Lieut.-Col. Marchment -writes of this withdrawal:</p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p>The withdrawal was witnessed by myself from my -headquarters. I watched it through my glasses. It was -carried out in a very steady and orderly way, the men -leaving in groups of about a dozen. Although exposed to -heavy fire from the front and flanks, they made excellent -use of the ground and had few casualties.</p></div> - -<p>The men of D Company, who were meanwhile carrying -S.A.A. up to the Marquis line, met the survivors -returning and covered their withdrawal.</p> - -<p>It is hard to find adequate words in praise of this -gallant defence and skilful and well-timed withdrawal. -All ranks alike behaved with the greatest spirit under -very trying circumstances.</p> - -<p>A great loss was suffered in this defence in the capture -by the enemy of the Regimental Aid Post. Capt. -Maloney, the M.O. was a most popular man in the -Battalion, and Sergt. Rossington and the two orderlies, -Palmer and Simpson, had all done excellent work. By -an irony of fate 2/Lieut. Morris, who had done such good -work in the defence of Wood Post earlier in the morning, -was hit later, and was having his wounds dressed in the -Aid Post when it was captured.</p> - -<p>Major F. A. Phillips who, at Forward Headquarters, -was in charge of the whole defence of the forward system, -did excellent work. He was continually up and down -the lines encouraging the men, and was able to keep -Rear Battalion Headquarters constantly in touch with -the rapid changes in the situation.</p> - -<p>The enemy was now in great force in Viscount Street -and was beginning to bomb heavily down Ouse Alley, -while he showed increasing signs of strength on the ridge -to the right of that trench. The party of D Company in -Ouse Alley was therefore withdrawn as soon as the survivors -of the Marquis line garrison had reached Bow<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_406" id="Page_406">[Pg 406]</a></span> -Trench, to avoid the risk of being cut off. Later the -enemy appeared in great strength against the block in -Ouse Alley forward of Bow Trench. This block was defended -by a "slit" cut in the side of Ouse Alley which -was covered by a Lewis gun post in Bow Trench and -seven of the enemy were killed by Lewis gun fire.</p> - -<p>As soon as the Battalion was concentrated in Bow -Trench and the Red line, the artillery barrage was dropped -to a line about 400 yards in front of Bow Trench, and -arrangements were made to increase it to intense should -the S.O.S. signal be sent up from Battalion Headquarters.</p> - -<p>The enemy skirmishers having been definitely checked -the situation now became quieter, and for the next hour -there was a distinct lull in the battle.</p> - -<p>The Kensingtons on the left had not been attacked -but had withdrawn to the Red line to conform to the -1/4th Londons' new position.</p> - -<p>In Towy Post, the extreme right of the Divisional -front, the Queen's Westminsters had put up a most -gallant fight, but the remainder of the 169th Brigade front -had rapidly been swamped by weight of enemy numbers, -and in this sector the 169th Brigade troops were thrown -back to the Red line while the Wood Post garrison was -still holding its ground.</p> - -<p>The development of this great German attack was a -remarkable confirmation of the statement which had been -made by the prisoner captured on the 24th March. All -the troops mentioned by him were identified in the course -of the fighting. On the 1/4th Londons' front two German -regiments were identified: the 249th I. Regt. at Oppy -Post, and the 10th R.I. Regt. in the shape of a gentleman -who broke into Sergt. Plumbley's canteen in Ouse Alley. -But having armed himself with a tin of pineapple this -luckless marauder fell into the arms of D Company -bombing up the trench!</p> - -<p>Eleven German divisions took part in this great battle, -but they were all checked by the divisions holding the -line, the 56th and 4th north of the Scarpe and the 3rd -and 15th south of it. That the almost complete failure -of the enemy on the 28th March was a severe blow to the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_407" id="Page_407">[Pg 407]</a></span> -German High Command there can be no doubt, and -Ludendorff says, "It was an established fact that the -enemy's resistance was beyond our strength."</p> - -<p>The regiment has every reason to be proud of its -defence this day. For over four hours it retained the -front line system under the weight of heavy shell fire and -repeated attacks by vastly superior numbers, and, when -finally it was forced to give ground to avoid extinction, -it withdrew fighting. The casualties were heavy, but -considering the enormous service rendered the price paid -was not unduly great.</p> - -<p>At about 4 p.m. the enemy began to shell the Red line -rather heavily, but no infantry attack matured. Shortly -afterwards the 1/4th Londons were withdrawn, and by -6 p.m. were under cover of the Railway Embankment -north-east of Bailleul, reorganised in two companies -(Cooper and Williams), S.A.A. was replenished and -arrangements made to man the Brown line and posts -south of the Bailleul Road should the enemy break -through the Red line. Bow Trench had been handed -over to the London Scottish.</p> - -<p>The experience of this battle showed the need for -holding front line posts lightly, and purely for observation -purposes. The uselessness of locking up large garrisons -in them—unless they can be effectively concealed as in -the case of Wood Post—was clearly demonstrated. The -system of trench blocks to which much thought had -previously been devoted fully proved its value, while the -advantage of rehearsing companies in the rôles they may -be expected to play, and especially of acquainting all -ranks with the "overland" routes within the area was -much in evidence.</p> - -<p>The casualties sustained by the 1/4th Londons in this -action were:</p> - -<div class="hangindent8"> - -<p>Officers: Capt. E. E. Spicer, 2/Lieuts. R. E. Campkin, H. T. -Hannay and H. V. Coombes, killed; Capt. A. M. -Duthie, D.S.O., and Lieut. H. M. Lorden, wounded; -Capt. Maloney, 2/Lieuts. C. W. Denning (attached -to 168th L.T.M. Battery), H. O. Morris and C. S. -Richards, captured.</p> - -<p>N.C.O.'s and men: 15 killed, 43 wounded and 168 missing.</p></div> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_408" id="Page_408">[Pg 408]</a></span></p> - -<p>Decorations were awarded to the following:</p> - -<div class="hangindent"> - -<p>Lieut.-Col. A. F. Marchment, M.C., and Major F. A. Phillips, the -D.S.O.; Capts. A. M. Duthie, D.S.O., T. B. Cooper, M.M., -and H. N. Williams, the M.C.; C.S.M. T. Lock, M.M., the -D.C.M.; L.-Corpl. W. J. Hutchin, M.M., Bar to M.M.; -Sergts. F. G. Udall, H. V. R. Randall and C. J. Gibbs, Corpls. -G. Hayes and A. Parker, L.-Corpls. S. G. Coates, C. L. Husk -and A. J. Deadman, and Ptes. W. A. G. Battershall, P. C. -Swinchatt, A. J. Sellars and J. R. Phillips, the M.M.</p></div> - -<p>During the 29th March the 1/4th Londons remained in -Brigade support. Much movement was observed in the -enemy's lines during the morning, and our artillery was -active in anticipation of a renewal of the attack, but as -the day wore on it became evident that the enemy was -engaged in relieving the attacking divisions. That evening -at 7 p.m. the Battalion handed over its trenches to the -87th Canadian Battalion (4th Canadian Division) and -marched out to billets at Mont St Eloy, arriving there -at 2 a.m. on the 30th March.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_409" id="Page_409">[Pg 409]</a></span></p> -<div class="chapter"></div> -<hr class="chap" /> - - - - -<h2>CHAPTER XXII<br /> - -THE 1/4TH AND 2/4TH BATTALIONS DURING THE SUMMER -MONTHS OF 1918--THE RESERVE BATTALION, 1918</h2> - - -<p>In the preceding chapters we have endeavoured to describe -the part played by each of the battalions in resisting the -mighty German offensive.</p> - -<p>As we have seen this gigantic thrust was finally brought -to a standstill in front of Amiens at the end of April, -while the enemy's hopes in the Arras area had been finally -shattered by the magnificent resistance of the 28th March. -The German offensive capabilities were, however, by no -means exhausted; and in the north the enemy once more -taxed the British resources to the uttermost in the Battle -of the Lys, which raged from the 7th to the 30th April -and bent our lines back to Hazebrouck. With this action, -or rather series of actions, we are not directly concerned -as the 4th London Regiment had no part in it, and we -may therefore turn at once to consider the situation in -which the British Armies found themselves when the -German attacks were finally spent.</p> - -<p>The enormous weight of the German attacks of March -and April had involved practically the whole of the British -divisions in France, and all were in consequence seriously -reduced in numbers and sorely in need of rest and reorganisation. -The magnificent efforts which were made -at home to replace the lost guns and other material are -well known and were of immediate effect; but the task -of filling up the gaps in personnel was necessarily a longer -one, especially having regard to the waning man-power of -the Empire and its commitments in other theatres of war. -Moreover, after their arrival in France it was necessary -for reinforcements to be thoroughly assimilated into their -new units before active work could be expected of them. -The serious depletion of force at this time is illustrated<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_410" id="Page_410">[Pg 410]</a></span> -by the fact that after temporarily writing off as fighting -units no fewer than 8 divisions, and handing over to -the French a further 5 at the urgent request of Marshal -Foch, there remained but 45—and most of these much -reduced in numbers—available for service on the British -front.</p> - -<p>The enemy's successes had, of course, cost him dear, -but it was believed to be by no means beyond the bounds -of possibility that he would make yet another effort to -achieve a decisive victory, and the position was thus full -of anxiety for G.H.Q.</p> - -<p>In the meantime the American Army was being -poured into France as rapidly as the whole available -mercantile marine of the British Empire could bring it -across the Atlantic, but here again it was a question of -time before these well-trained but inexperienced troops -would be sufficiently valuable and numerous to turn the -scale against Germany.</p> - -<p>The story of the months of May, June and July 1918 -is one of preparation, in which the British Armies were -being gradually reorganised and used in active defence -of the new positions until an equilibrium of strength -between the Allies and the enemy was attained, and it was -possible once more for the Allies to take the offensive and -roll back the tide of invasion in the most remarkable series -of victories which the world has ever seen.</p> - -<p>We propose, therefore, to deal in this chapter, as -briefly as possible, with the operations during this period -of reorganisation of each Battalion in turn, until the -opening of the Allied offensive in August 1918.</p> - - -<h3><em>The 1/4th Battalion</em></h3> - -<p>Arriving at Mont St Eloy early in the morning of the -31st March 1918 the 1/4th Londons settled down to a -few days of so-called rest, days which, for officers at least, -are usually quite as hard work as those spent in battle. -Companies have to be reorganised and fresh "specialists" -trained to their duties, the completion of the men's<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_411" id="Page_411">[Pg 411]</a></span> -clothing and equipment, and replenishment of all company -stores have to be looked to, in addition to a large -amount of clerical work in writing up the official account -of the battle and in submitting names for awards, mention -in despatches and promotion. The Battalion on this -occasion was fortunate in getting the gaps in its ranks -rapidly filled. On the 2nd and 3rd April two drafts -arrived numbering together 420 fully trained N.C.O.'s -and men. Fine drafts which later did gallant service, -but which transformed the camp into a mild imitation -of the Tower of Babel, for among them could be traced -the accents of London, Kent, Surrey, Berkshire, the -broader dialects of Yorkshire, Cheshire, Lancashire and -Wiltshire, and even the unmistakable tones of Scotland -and South Wales. Regulars, Territorials and New Armies -were all represented, and the rejuvenated Battalion provided -a living example of the unity of the Motherland in -a great cause.</p> - -<p>This great accession enabled an immediate reconstruction -of the four companies to take place, and -they were accordingly reformed and the reinforcements -absorbed, A Company under Capt. H. N. Williams, M.C., -B under Capt. R. S. B. Simmonds, C under Capt. S. J. -Barkworth, M.C., M.M., and D under Capt. T. B. Cooper, -M.C., M.M.</p> - -<p>The troops were largely kept busy in digging new lines -of defence round Haut Avesnes, and all were much -encouraged by the congratulations received from G.H.Q., -Army and Corps on their recent great stand.</p> - -<p>Divisional rests, however, have ever proved a snare -and a delusion, and those who count on prolonged peace -in billets are invariably disappointed. In spite of its so -recent gruelling the morale of the Division was high, and -on the 6th April it was called upon again to go into the line, -this time in the XVII Corps (Fergusson), but still in the -First Army, which now extended as far south as Neuville-Vitasse. -After spending the night 5th/6th April at Villers -au Bois the 1/4th Londons marched on the afternoon of -the 6th to Agnez lez Duisans, and proceeded the following -afternoon to Ronville Caves. The march through the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_412" id="Page_412">[Pg 412]</a></span> -streets of Arras in the dusk was a great surprise to -those who had known this pleasant little city even as -recently as the late summer of 1917. The civilians were -now all gone, hotels and shops were shut and scarcely a -house had escaped the German shell fire. The beautiful -Cathedral had met the same ghastly fate as that of -Albert, and the Levis and Schramm barracks were but -ghosts of their former selves.</p> - -<p>In Ronville Caves, a remarkable series of underground -chalk quarries, the Battalion found dry and adequate -quarters. The caves are of considerable extent, the limits -east and west being a crater in old No Man's Land and -Levis barracks; but, lighted by electricity and tolerably -ventilated, they formed quite healthy billets and, in the -wet weather then prevalent, far superior to bivouacs -or trenches.</p> - -<p>The trenches now to be taken over by the 56th from -the 1st Canadian Division lay south of the Arras-Cambrai -Road just in front of the village of Tilloy, for as far as this -had the German offensive bent our lines back. The front -line, Tilloy Trench, ran between Tilloy and the Bois des -Bœufs and then southwards towards Neuville-Vitasse, -roughly following what had formerly been the east side -of the famous German redoubt, The Harp. In rear of -the front trench were successively Tilloy Support, View -Trench and Tilloy Reserve. Communication trenches -were Scottish Avenue, Stokes Lane, Fusilier Lane and -Wye Lane, the last named forming the right boundary -of the sector. The front and support trenches lay on the -forward slope of the hill well under observation from the -enemy lines. View Trench was on the reverse slope of the -hill, and probably acquired its name in the days when its -defenders wore field-grey and looked in the other direction: -for us it was well sited with a good field of fire of about -200 yards. Trenches, wire and dugouts were fair. The -fact that but a few days earlier this had been a back area -was forced on one's attention, for the line ran through -ruined Nissen hut camps and horse standings, while in -the German front line opposite stood the remains of a -Y.M.C.A. hut.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_413" id="Page_413">[Pg 413]</a></span></p> - -<p>After four days of working parties at Ronville, in which -the Battalion was digging a new line, Telegraph Hill -Switch, the 1/4th Londons relieved the 8th Middlesex in -the line. This tour of duty lasted six days during which -the enemy remained inactive on this front, but which saw -the outbreak of the Battle of the Lys to which we have -already alluded. To those who knew the Neuve Chapelle -area it seemed strange to hear of "fighting in Riez Bailleul -and Laventie," "the struggle for Estaires," "the fall of -Merville." Ruined though some of these places had been -in 1916, they had afforded shelter to many hundreds of -1/4th London men, and it was now impossible to refrain -from wondering what had become of the villagers who had -hitherto clung to their homes, and especially of the little -children.</p> - -<p>On the last day in the line, the 19th, a raid on a large -scale was carried out by one company of the London -Scottish on the right, and one platoon of the 1/4th Londons -on the left, with the object of advancing the outpost line -on the whole sector, and establishing it an average of 500 -yards in front of Tilloy Trench. The assaulting platoon -was drawn from C Company under 2/Lieut. E. L. Mills, -M.C., and afterwards (Mills having been hit) under -2/Lieut. J. L. Backhouse. Zero was at 4.30 a.m., and -eight minutes later the 1/4th London platoon rushed -their objective after Stokes Mortar preparation. Unfortunately -the enemy garrison bolted and no identification -was obtained, though they left a machine-gun and -many documents and maps in our hands. The London -Scottish also reached their objective and touch was -gained with them. This advanced line was held all day -under German artillery fire, which steadily increased until -the Battalion was compelled to call for protective fire -from our guns in retaliation.</p> - -<p>After 7 p.m. the enemy launched some heavy bombing -attacks against the new positions. These were vigorously -resisted. A withdrawal to the original line was, however, -ordered by Brigade, and by 8 p.m. all the assaulting -platoons were back. A good deal of loss was undoubtedly -inflicted on the enemy, and the effect of this minor opera<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_414" id="Page_414">[Pg 414]</a></span>tion -on the spirit of the men fully justified its execution. -Five N.C.O.'s and men of the Battalion were killed and -24 wounded.</p> - -<p>Late that night the Battalion handed over its trenches -to the 1/2nd Londons and withdrew in support to Ronville -Caves, moving in the evening of the 20th April to Dainville -in Divisional reserve.</p> - -<p>About this period the 1/4th Londons were unfortunate -in losing Major F. A. Phillips, D.S.O., who had been an -able second in command for nearly eight months. He -was much out of health principally through having -swallowed rather too much mustard gas at Oppy, and -he did not rejoin the Battalion. His place was taken -by Major R. B. Marshall, 8th East Surrey Regiment, -whose battalion had been disbanded in January. Capt. -Maloney's duties as Medical Officer had been taken for -a few weeks by Capt. J. Ridley, M.C., and subsequently -by Capt. E. Woodyeat, a retired naval surgeon, -who had served in 1915 and 1916 with the Coldstream -Guards.</p> - -<p>Casualties in April were light beyond those sustained -during the raid of the 19th. Lieut. L. E. Ballance was -wounded this month. On the 24th April a draft of officers -joined as follows:</p> - -<div class="hangindent"> - -<p>Lieut. J. W. Price, 2/Lieuts. H. W. Attenborrow, C. L. -Henstridge, A. Holloway, C. R. Mason, J. D. Miller, A. H. -Millstead, W. P. Humphrey and F. S. Wise.</p> - -<p>2/Lieut. R. T. Stevenson (5th Londons); 2/Lieuts. S. Blackhurst, -M.C., A. F. Potter, J. A. Voskule, W. Roughton (7th -Londons); 2/Lieut. A. M. Bullock (15th Londons).</p></div> - -<p>On the 24th April Major-Gen. Dudgeon fell sick and -went to hospital. He had commanded the Division since -August 1917 and brought it through two of its most -successful actions. A few days later Major-Gen. Hull -resumed the command.</p> - -<p>On the night 3rd/4th May the Divisional front was -extended northwards as far as the Arras-Douai railway, -the additional frontage being taken over from the 1st -Canadian Division. Thereafter the sector was held with -two brigades in line (each with two battalions in trenches<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_415" id="Page_415">[Pg 415]</a></span> -and one in support), and one brigade in reserve. Of the -reserve brigade two battalions were billeted at Dainville -and one at Berneville.</p> - -<p>The 1/4th Londons now settled down to their share of -the routine of working this sector, and through May and -June were in and out of the trenches, in line, in support -and in reserve alternately, the tours of duty varying -between six and nine days. These summer weeks form -on the whole a pleasant memory for all who passed through -them. The general situation was indeed grave, and -though for G.H.Q. the summer months of 1918 must -have been a period of unceasing anxiety, the infantryman -in the line saw life from a different angle. The trenches -were comfortable, the weather good, the men well fed -and clothed. Mornings in the trenches were spent in -hard work on the defences, afternoons in resting, evenings -under a summer moon divided between digging and -wiring. With the added spice of patrolling and raiding, -in which a lot of useful work was achieved, and the enemy -kept well on the alert, and wishing he was not opposite -to the 56th Division, the tours of duty in line passed -pleasantly enough with very few casualties. The Battalion -was in fine fettle and in good conceit with itself, a wholesome -feeling which scored heavily when the time came -for the final advance.</p> - -<p>The enemy's chief activity was shell fire, and at times -this developed to great intensity. On the 27th May in -particular, when the 1/4th Londons were in trenches, a -very heavy bombardment, high explosive and mustard -gas together, burst on the area in the early morning. The -Battalion stood to and prepared to receive an attack, but -no infantry movement occurred, and it subsequently -transpired that the disturbance was to cover an enemy -raid on the division on our right. For a time most of the -Battalion had made up their minds that they were about -to fight. The Londoner is full of superstition, and this -day the Battalion was to have boiled rabbit for dinner. -Boiled rabbit had figured in the menu on the 28th March!... -Throughout the day the enemy artillery carried out -hurricane bombardments of various parts of the sector,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_416" id="Page_416">[Pg 416]</a></span> -and it was no surprise to learn later that his offensive -against Rheims had broken out.</p> - -<p>During the period under review the Battalion paid five -visits to the trenches at Tilloy, with one tour of three days -in Arras, spent in heavy working parties carrying wire -to Telegraph Hill and digging, and six days in support at -St Sauveur similarly occupied.</p> - -<p>Rests in Divisional reserve were spent at Dainville, in -which much good training work was carried out and the -routine broken occasionally by excellent sports meetings, -shooting matches and concerts. In connection with the -concerts we must again refer to the Quartermaster's string -band. This excellent orchestra had given its first public -performance at St Aubin in January 1918. Receiving -every encouragement from the Colonel and the keenest -support from the Padre, this band had had an unbroken -career of success and given the greatest pleasure to all -ranks of the Battalion. At Church Parades when out -of the line the band always played the hymns and -voluntaries, and many a shattered barn in the villages -behind the trenches has re-echoed with the strains of the -1/4th London string band. The keenness and pride of -the Quartermaster in his band were as delightful to observe -as his remarks when a cornet player was put out of action -at Oppy were startling. A portable harmonium was -purchased to complete the equipment, and when demobilisation -broke the band up early in 1919, this harmonium, -decorated with the names of all the villages of France -and Belgium in which the orchestra had performed, was -presented to the Padre for use in his parish at home.</p> - -<p>The general efficiency of the Battalion at this period -reached a remarkably high pitch, of which everyone -associated with it had reason to be thoroughly proud. -It was well equipped, well drilled and disciplined, and a -fine fighting unit. This efficiency was not confined to the -fighting ranks. At an inspection of the Battalion Transport -(Lieut. G. V. Lawrie), the Divisional Commander -was so impressed with its turn-out that his remarks were -circulated to other units as an example. A fine fighting -battalion cannot exist without fine administration, and -this was supplied in full measure by the Adjutant (Boutall), -and by the rear Headquarters under Mosely, Stanbridge, -Faulkner, the Quartermaster, and Lawrie, whose unceasing -service to the fighting ranks were of immeasurable -value.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_417" id="Page_417">[Pg 417]</a></span></p> - -<div class="figcenter" style="width: 700px;"> -<img src="images/i_b_416fp.jpg" width="700" height="513" alt="" /> -<div class="caption"><p><em>Arras Cathedral</em></p></div> -</div> - -<p>Faulkner was a man of peculiarly lovable disposition. -"Le gros papa," as he was known to the little children in -Dainville, forms in the minds of many French peasants a -picture of all that is kind and chivalrous in the British -soldier. Mosely writes: "Many is the night when the -Huns were dropping bombs on the village"—by no means -an infrequent occurrence—"that Faulkner has deliberately -set himself to amuse a family of youngsters and keep them -screaming with laughter so that their merriment should -drown the noise of the explosions."</p> - -<p>The following officers joined the Battalion during May, -June and July:</p> - -<div class="hangindent"> - -<p>Capt. H. A. T. Hewlett; Lieut. G. E. Stanbridge (recalled from -six months' home duty "on exchange"); 2/Lieuts. A. W. -Chignell, T. Yoxall and G. H. Sylvester.</p></div> - -<p>In the early days of June the influenza epidemic began -to make its ravages, but the Battalion suffered comparatively -little. No men were allowed to rejoin in the line -from back areas, but were kept at Berneville until the -Battalion came out of the trenches. Casualties for May, -June and July were very light. 2/Lieuts. W. P. Humphrey -and T. H. Mawby were killed, 2/Lieut. A. W. Chignell -wounded, and about 12 N.C.O.'s and men killed and 40 -wounded.</p> - -<p>Early in July Capt. and Adjt. W. J. Boutall, M.C., -was appointed to 168th Brigade Headquarters as Assistant -Staff Captain, and his duties in the Battalion were assumed -by Capt. S. J. Barkworth, M.C., M.M. Boutall had filled -the appointment of Adjutant since September 1916 with -conspicuous success. His organising ability was high -and the standard of his work throughout had been excellent. -C Company was taken over about the same time -by Capt. H. A. T. Hewlett. 2/Lieut. F. S. Wise was -seconded to the Machine-gun Corps.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_418" id="Page_418">[Pg 418]</a></span></p> - -<p>On the 13th July the 56th Division was relieved in the -line by the 1st Canadian Division, and passed into Corps -reserve. The 1/4th Londons, who had already been in -billets at Dainville for a week, moved to Lattre St Quentin, -and during the ensuing fortnight further changes of -stations followed each other with rapidity. The Battalion -was quartered successively at Grand Rullecourt, Tincques -and Marqueffles Farm, the days being occupied with -training interspersed with sports and games. While -the Battalion was at Tinques the railway station was -visited on the night of the 17th July by enemy aircraft, -which dropped eight bombs, but caused no loss of -personnel.</p> - -<p>The last night of July found the Division once more -taking over the Tilloy trenches from the Canadians, -the 1/4th Londons being at St Sauveur in Brigade -support until the 4th August, when they relieved the -Kensingtons in the front trenches. On the 8th August, -the opening day of the great British advance, the -Battalion was relieved by the London Scottish and -withdrew to billets in Arras. At this point, therefore, we -may leave the 1/4th Battalion until the time comes -to deal with its rôle in the great battles of August -and September 1918.</p> - - -<h3><em>The 2/4th Battalion</em></h3> - -<p>The experience of the 2/4th Battalion during the -summer months was very similar to that of the 1/4th -Battalion.</p> - -<p>The Battalion spent the whole period in the area of -the Amiens defences, where the Germans had penetrated -most deeply into our positions. The Amiens defences -were now far in rear of the old 1916 line, and the work -involved in constructing new defences in what, up to five -weeks earlier, had been a line of communication area was -immense. Shell hole defences had to be linked into continuous -trench lines, provided with support and reserve -lines and communication trenches, furnished with dugouts -and shelters, and defended with wire entanglements.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_419" id="Page_419">[Pg 419]</a></span> -This formed the greater part of the Battalion's work when -in the line; but it certainly laboured during these months -under disadvantages which the 1/4th Battalion did not -suffer. The upheaval of the British organisation had been -much more widely extended in the Amiens area than it -had been in the vicinity of Arras, where the withdrawal of -our forces had been comparatively shallow, and for a -time "back-of-the-line" organisation was inevitably weak. -Billets were few and bad, and for the most part the -Battalion bivouacked when out of the line. The same -opportunities of resting during periods spent in reserve -did not, therefore, occur.</p> - -<p>We have also recorded that the casualties suffered by -the 1/4th Battalion at Oppy were made good promptly by -a veteran draft which was thoroughly absorbed into the -unit during the period of waiting for the final advance. -The 2/4th Battalion, which had been more knocked about -in the great battles of March and April, was reinforced -very slowly, and indeed its losses of the early part of -the year were never completely replaced. Such reinforcements -as it did receive consisted chiefly of immature -youths from home—all endowed with magnificent spirit -and courage, but by the nature of the case, less valuable -soldiers until they had had a good deal of training in the -line. The recuperation of the 2/4th Battalion was thus -effected under not the most favourable conditions: a -consideration which should count in their favour when we -come later to consider the victories they helped to gain in -August and September.</p> - -<p>A few days of rest in the St Riquier area were allowed -the 58th Division after relief from the action at Cachy. -The 2/4th Londons were billeted at Le Plessiel between -the 27th April and the 6th May, and though no large -drafts were received, the accessions of strength were -sufficient to allow of a four-company organisation being -retained. These were organised: A under Capt. F. J. -Griffiths, B under Capt. G. H. Hetley, C under Capt. -W. C. Morton, M.C., and D under 2/Lieut. E. V. Grimsdell. -Ribands were awarded to those who had recently been -decorated, by the Divisional Commander, who also in<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_420" id="Page_420">[Pg 420]</a></span>spected -the Battalion Transport and commended it most -highly on its turn-out.</p> - -<p>The III Corps, which comprised the 18th and 47th -(London) Divisions, besides the 58th, was now responsible -for the Amiens defences on the line west of Albert from -the Ancre to Aveluy Wood.</p> - -<p>On the 7th May 1918 the 58th Division came from -Corps reserve into the line, and from this date until the -8th August, the beginning of the final advance, was continually -in action. The 2/4th Battalion's tours of duty -were somewhat irregular owing to the constant changes -of position which occurred during this period. The first -sector for which the Division was responsible was almost -due west of Albert, in front of the ruined village of Bouzincourt. -For a fortnight the 2/4th Battalion was in reserve -positions, either bivouacked at Molliens au Bois or Warloy -or in astonishingly bad billets in Mirvaux, and was given -a rôle as counter-attack battalion to be employed as -occasion should arise in the event of a renewed enemy -offensive. This involved constant readiness and much -reconnaissance work by officers. The last ten days of -May were spent in trenches, at first in support and afterwards -in the front system. Working parties formed the -principal item of routine, but a great deal of very valuable -patrolling work was carried out. Over the whole Corps -front No Man's Land was indeed nightly occupied by our -patrols, who were always ready for a scrap with the enemy -and endeavouring to pick up an identification. This was -partly to train up the young soldiers in the way they -should go and partly for the essential purpose of ascertaining -the enemy's intentions as to a further attack.</p> - -<p>On the last night of May 2/Lieut. George took a -fighting patrol across to the enemy front line after heavy -trench mortar preparation. It was found that much -damage had been done, but though the trench was searched -for 200 yards no enemy were met and the patrol withdrew -without having suffered loss.</p> - -<p>At this period the enemy was comparatively quiet, -confining his activity to shell fire in which gas shell figured -prominently.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_421" id="Page_421">[Pg 421]</a></span></p> - -<div class="hangindent"> - -<p>Lieut. B. Rivers Smith (recalled from six months' duty "on -exchange"); 2/Lieuts. H. G. A. Leach and J. W. George -(4th Londons); Lieut. H. C. Platts and 2/Lieut. A. L. D. Bold -(7th Londons); 2/Lieuts. A. J. N. Sievwright and J. Horsfield -(12th Londons); 2/Lieut. A. R. Armfield (20th Londons); -2/Lieuts. H. M. Bradley and W. N. M. Girling (21st Londons). -At the end of the month 2/Lieut. Sievwright rejoined his -own regiment. Drafts of N.C.O.'s and men totalled 142.</p></div> - -<p>The casualties in May were comparatively light. -2/Lieut. H. M. Bradley and 1 man were killed by the -falling in of the dugout they were occupying, and in -addition 2 men were killed and 12 wounded.</p> - -<p>At the beginning of June the 2/4th Battalion moved -back to Contay in Divisional reserve, and resumed its -counter-attack duties. Here a severe loss was sustained -in Lieut.-Col. W. R. H. Dann, D.S.O., who was appointed -to command the 60th Infantry Brigade with the temporary -rank of Brigadier-General. Lieut.-Col. Dann had been in -continuous command of the 2/4th Londons since November -1916, and during the Battalion's seventeen months of -active service he had held the confidence and affection of -all ranks. His great skill as a commander, his imperturbable -coolness in action, his unfailing care for the welfare -of his men, had endeared him to all, and the Battalion -said good-bye to him with genuine sorrow. The command -was taken temporarily by Major Tollworthy, but on the -8th June Major Grover, D.S.O., M.C., who had been hit -at Cachy, rejoined and assumed command with the acting -rank of Lieut.-Col.</p> - -<p>On the 5th June the Battalion moved to tents and -shelters at Mirvaux, where attempts were made to carry -out a few days' training. Standing crops, which might on -no account be damaged, interfered sadly, and but little -was accomplished. The plaint of the Divisional Staff made -at the time is rather pathetic: "Training areas have not -yet been allotted. As is usually the case the hiring of -these is a very lengthy procedure, and is not likely -to be completed before the Division leaves the area." -Apparently even the full tide of the German offensive had -beat in vain against the massive structure of regulations.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_422" id="Page_422">[Pg 422]</a></span></p> - -<p>The end of May had witnessed the recrudescence of -fighting on the French front on the Chemin des Dames. -Once again the weight of the enemy's assault had overtaxed -our Allies' resources in defence, and by the 4th June -the Germans had reached their 1914 line on the Marne -at Chateau-Thierry, and were threatening Paris. It was -firmly anticipated that this fresh German success would -mean another blow against the British front at its junction -with the French, and to meet this new menace the XXII -Corps was reconstituted under Sir A. J. Godley, in G.H.Q. -reserve. To this new formation were posted the 12th, -37th and 58th Divisions, the whole of which were held in -readiness to move at two hours' notice. In accordance -with this scheme the 173rd Brigade was moved to the -Amiens area, the 2/4th Londons being billeted—this time in -comfortable quarters—at Guignemicourt on the 10th June.</p> - -<p>The German attack between Montdidier and Noyon -did in fact develop, and the 37th Division was moved -southwards. The 58th Division was, however, not called -upon, and, the danger being passed, returned to the line -after a week, the 2/4th Battalion moving on the 17th June -to Molliens au Bois.</p> - -<p>For the remainder of June and the whole of July -the 2/4th Battalion remained in forward areas. At first -the 173rd Brigade was in line astride the Amiens-Albert -Road and the Battalion successively occupied positions -in reserve in the La Houssoye line, in support in the -Dodo-Hill-Darling system, and in front trenches in the -Ethel-Dandy system.</p> - -<p>The work on defences and the patrolling activity of -the previous month were here continued without abatement, -but with very little incident of interest. During -the last week of June the weather, which had been uniformly -good, was broken by some heavy showers, which -at once developed the extraordinary propensity of French -mud for turning into glue on the least provocation. This -hampered work on the defences but had no effect on the -spirit of the Battalion, which with careful training was -now developing once more into a well-knit and disciplined -fighting unit full of good cheer and confidence.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_423" id="Page_423">[Pg 423]</a></span></p> - -<p>On the 25th June Capt. F. W. Walker, D.S.O., who -had been wounded at Cachy, rejoined and resumed his -duties as Adjutant.</p> - -<p>The following officers joined in June:</p> - -<div class="hangindent"> - -<p>Lieut. A. R. Muddell (4th Londons); Lieut. G. de G. Barkas, M.C. -(to Intelligence Officer) and 2/Lieuts. T. G. Owen and S. T. -Morris (1st Londons); 2/Lieut. H. Slater (3rd Londons); Lieut. -J. D. Morrison and 2/Lieuts. G. H. Main, R. D. Cotton and -K. W. Gauld (14th Londons); 2/Lieut. F. Bidgood (16th -Londons); Lieut. C. I. Mansel-Howe (23rd Londons); and -Lieut. C. C. Brissenden (A.S.C.).</p> - -<p>Reinforcements of 181 N.C.O.'s and men—mostly young soldiers—were -also received.</p></div> - -<p>A few days spent in reserve at Baizieux in the first -week of July brought the 2/4th Battalion for the first -time into contact with American troops, a battalion of -whom were bivouacked here.</p> - -<p>The month of July was passed in similar fashion to -those which had preceded it. From the 6th to the 18th -the Battalion was in the Ethel-Dandy system, astride the -Amiens-Albert Road, at first in front trenches and subsequently -in support. On the 18th a withdrawal to reserve -lines at Baizieux and Laviéville was effected, and here the -Battalion remained for nine days. After one day spent -in cleaning up in Behencourt the Battalion moved into -line again on the 27th July, relieving the 30th Australian -Battalion in support trenches around Ribemont, between -that village and Buire-sur-Ancre.</p> - -<p>Life in the Ribemont sector was comparatively peaceful. -As before the men were principally occupied in working -parties on the defences and the officers in reconnoitring -lines of approach to the front trenches. On the whole -the enemy was quiet, though he frequently added insult -to injury by dropping on the Battalion gas shells evidently -intended for the batteries which were in action just in rear -of it. The trenches were comfortable, for all these months -of hard work had been to some purpose; and the presence -of ruined villages in the near vicinity was the means of -adding touches of home life in the shape of a few odd -sticks of broken furniture which had formerly graced -a cottage home in Buire. An inter-platoon boundary<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_424" id="Page_424">[Pg 424]</a></span> -in one of the trenches was marked by what had once -been a handsome perambulator, while a little further on -a basket-work dressmaker's model stood sentry over a -shell hole in ludicrous isolation.</p> - -<p>The ravages of the influenza epidemic of June and -July were severe, and casualties from this cause far exceeded -those inflicted by the enemy. Between the battle at -Cachy and the end of July no fewer than 427 other ranks -of the Battalion were sent to hospital, though most of -these rejoined after a week or two of absence.</p> - -<p>On the 19th July the Battalion lost Lieut. S. A. Seys -(15th Londons attached), the assistant adjutant, who had -served with it since February 1917, and who left for attachment -to the staff of the 60th Brigade. An able administrator, -Seys, who, though not a 4th London officer, had -loyally made the regiment his own during his service -with it, left behind him many friends who sincerely -regretted his departure.</p> - -<p>During July Lieut. A. G. Croll and drafts of 92 other -ranks joined the Battalion. 2/Lieuts. Gauld and Cotton -rejoined their own regiment. While the Battalion was -at Baizieux the medical officer, Lieut. Dunaway, U.S. -Army, was presented by the Corps Commander with the -Military Cross, awarded him for services in March and -April. It is believed that Dunaway was one of the first -American officers to receive a British decoration for -gallantry in the field.</p> - -<p>At the end of July companies were commanded as -follows: A by Lieut. C. C. Brissenden, B. by Capt. A. G. -Croll, C by Capt. W. H. Parslow and D by Capt. B. Rivers -Smith.</p> - -<p>All who served in the Albert sector during the summer -of 1918 will remember the Albert Road. This was very -largely used at night by incoming and outgoing troops -who used to join it somewhere in the neighbourhood of -Pont Noyelles. The journey up it was an experience -which it would indeed be hard to forget. On both sides -of the road was ranged battery after battery; it seemed -impossible that so many guns could be massed in so small -a compass. "A succession of blinding flashes alternated<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_425" id="Page_425">[Pg 425]</a></span> -with inky blackness. The road itself was encumbered with -ammunition lorries, ration limbers and field ambulances. -Thundering detonations from the guns and a continued -grating roar from the traffic made the journey a nightmare." -So writes Croll. The picture is indeed sufficiently -disturbing. But in spite of the noisy horror a Battalion -such as the 2/4th Londons, who had made close acquaintance -with the seamy side of war in the retreat from -La Fère, could not but be heartened by the realisation that -already past losses had been made good, and that night by -night the roar of the British guns was becoming louder -and yet louder, till at last they were ready to roar -forth the barrage which was to lead our troops to final -victory.</p> - -<p>The whole experience of July 1918 indeed, though -devoid of exciting incident, was such as to impress the -Battalion with the realisation that the time of waiting -was nearly at an end, and that the equilibrium, to gain -which we had been straining every nerve for three months, -was almost attained. Heavy as the German bombardments -had been from time to time, our guns with increasing -frequency demonstrated their power to silence the -enemy artillery. The results achieved by patrolling had -shown that in growing measure we were becoming masters -of No Man's Land, and encounters with enemy patrols -afforded conclusive proof of the individual prowess and -courage of our men as well as their superior morale.</p> - -<p>Relieved from the trenches at Ribemont by the 1/1st -Cambridgeshire Regiment, the 2/4th Londons concentrated -at Behencourt on the evening of the 2nd August, and, -embussing at once, reached Pernois, in the Domart area, -in the early morning of the 3rd. Here it remained till -brought back to the line to take part in the great battle -of the 8th August.</p> - - -<h3><em>The Reserve Battalion</em></h3> - -<p>In April 1918 the 3rd (Reserve) Battalion moved from -Blackdown Camp to Maida Barracks, Aldershot. The -reason for this move was primarily to provide troops for<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_426" id="Page_426">[Pg 426]</a></span> -use in tactical schemes by students at the Senior Officers' -School, then stationed at Oudenarde Barracks.</p> - -<p>While carrying out this duty the Battalion was called -upon to supply large parties daily for the School where -they were commanded by Student Officers. It cannot be -said that this duty, which fell largely on the "A IV" -platoons, was beneficial to training. The regular course -of instruction was interfered with, and a large amount of -field work was carried out before the recruits engaged in -it were sufficiently advanced to appreciate what they were -supposed to be doing. The individual training was thus -delayed and its resumption rendered proportionately difficult -when at last the attachment to the School ceased. -During the period spent at Maida the Expeditionary -Company practically ceased to exist, as all N.C.O.'s and -men who rejoined from hospital or the Command Depôt -were posted temporarily to the 1st (Reserve) Battalion, -which remained at Blackdown.</p> - -<p>The German offensive of March completely revolutionised -the Reserve Battalion. The frightful losses at the -front had to be made good immediately at all costs. -Training staffs were reduced to a minimum, and every fit -officer and N.C.O. as well as every recruit, whose training -was advanced enough to lend colourable justification to it, -was at once sent overseas. The call for men did not -cease here. The General Order forbidding the despatch -of "young soldiers" overseas was, under pressure of -circumstances, revoked, and volunteers were called for -from the "A IV" boys. The response was, as may be -expected, magnificent. Under age, under-trained, these -gallant boys had but one thought—to join their overseas -battalions in the fighting line. At the end of a week the -Battalion was almost denuded of recruits under training, -while the orderly room and training staffs were on the -point of breakdown from almost continuous work and -strain.</p> - -<p>Among the first to answer the call was Lieut.-Col. -Hanbury Sparrow, the Commanding Officer, who rejoined -his regiment. His place in command was taken by -Lieut.-Col. Sir Hugh Lacon, D.S.O., the Warwickshire<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_427" id="Page_427">[Pg 427]</a></span> -Regiment, who retained the appointment till shortly -before the Armistice.</p> - -<p>So reduced in numbers was the Battalion that it was -no longer useful to the Senior Officer's School, and it was -accordingly relieved by a stronger battalion and returned -to Blackdown early in August, being quartered in Frith -Hill Hutments. At the end of August the duties of second -in command were assumed by Major H. J. Duncan-Teape, -who rejoined from hospital.</p> - -<p>Training was resumed on the usual routine at Frith -Hill, and at the end of August the emergency order as to -despatching "A IV" boys on draft was rescinded. The -young soldiers, therefore, reverted to the former scheme -of more gradual training. The staff was, however, busily -employed with 400 coal-miners, enlisted into the Welsh -Regiment, and sent to the 3rd (Reserve) Battalion for -training. These miners were excellent material, but their -training was not completed until the week following the -Armistice, so that they were deprived of the opportunity -of seeing active service and were rapidly demobilised. -These Welshmen were endowed in large measure with the -national gift for part-singing, and were thus enabled to -contribute materially to the social life of the Battalion.</p> - -<p>During Armistice week a further reduction of Home -Cadres involved the amalgamation of the 1st and 3rd -(Reserve) Battalions, under the title of 1st (Reserve) -Battalion, so that the one reserve unit was made responsible -for supply of drafts (few of course were needed) to the -whole Fusilier Brigade. The combined unit was commanded -by Col. Vickers Dunfee, V.D., until his demobilisation -early in December, when command was given to -Lieut.-Col. A. Mather (Leinster Regiment).</p> - -<p>Shortly after Christmas 1918 demobilisation began to -thin the ranks of the Battalion, while further ravages -were made by the transfer of most of the "A IV" boys -to Young Soldier Battalions, preparatory to their despatch -to join the Army of the Rhine. In February 1919 the -Battalion moved to Shoreham-by-Sea, and by the end of -the month its disbandment was completed.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_428" id="Page_428">[Pg 428]</a></span></p> -<div class="chapter"></div> -<hr class="chap" /> - - - - -<h2>CHAPTER XXIII<br /> - -THE FINAL ADVANCE</h2> - - -<h3>I. <em>The 2/4th Battalion in the Battles of Amiens -and Bapaume, 1918</em></h3> - -<p>The middle of 1918 witnessed the veritable low watermark -of the Allied fortunes. All the protracted sledgehammer -offensives of 1916 and 1917, which had indented -the enemy's line at such ghastly cost of life, had within -a few short weeks been swept aside as if they had never -been, and the advancing tide of the Germans' offensive -had carried their eagles forward to the furthest positions -they had ever reached in 1914. In Italy the laborious -advance of our Allies towards Trieste had been turned, -when the coveted goal seemed almost within their grasp, -into a defeat which was almost decisive. Roumania had -long been utterly overrun, Austria given a new lease of -life, and Russia's debacle completed. Scarcely anywhere -was there a ray of light on this very gloomy horizon.</p> - -<p>We have endeavoured to show that, bad as the situation -was, the Allies by no means accepted the crushing blows -which had been inflicted on them as decisive, and week -by week the position was gradually improving, and the -numerical superiority of the enemy was being overcome. -In July so great was the British recovery that offensive -operations on a small scale were undertaken with a view -to local improvement of our positions. Among these -the capture of Hamel and Meteren may be mentioned.</p> - -<p>The bulk of the fighting, however, was on the French -front, where the enemy was endeavouring to enlarge the -salient which he had driven down to the Marne. On the -east side at Rheims and on the west in the Forêt de -Compiègne his pressure was great but weakening. The -French powers of resistance were gradually becoming more -equal to their task and the German progress corre<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_429" id="Page_429">[Pg 429]</a></span>spondingly -slower till at last, on the 15th July, the enemy -received a definite check. Three days later Marshal Foch -had brought forward the reserves which he had jealously -conserved through these trying days, and the enemy was -in retreat on a front of 27 miles from the Oise to the -Marne. Of the French offensive we can say nothing, -for our task lies with the British Fourth Army under -Rawlinson.</p> - -<p>Immediately Marshal Foch had set his own armies in -forward motion he ordered the British and American -armies to open the offensives they had prepared. The -first object of British G.H.Q. was to disengage Amiens, -and the vast offensive movement therefore began in -Rawlinson's army, which was on the right of the British -line from its junction with the French near Moreuil to -the north of Albert.</p> - -<p>In this part of the great series of victories we have to -follow the operations of the 2/4th Battalion, and we shall -deal with them in the first instance from the opening of -the offensive on August 8th until their final disbandment -on September 12th. We shall then proceed to follow the -unrolling of the battle northwards and the engagement in -it successively of the Third and First Armies, with both -of which the 1/4th Battalion fought until the Armistice.</p> - -<hr class="tb" /> - -<p>The date fixed for the great attack was 8th August, -and on that day Rawlinson's Fourth Army, comprising -from left to right the III, Australian and Canadian Corps, -would combine with Débeney's First French Army in a -supreme effort to relieve Amiens from the menace of the -Huns. With the details of the battle beyond the 58th -Division's area we are not concerned but we must, in -order to understand the rôle which the Division was -expected to play, offer some brief description of the -terrain and its effect on the Australian advance on the -right.</p> - -<p>The main advance was to be made on the south bank -of the Somme by the Canadians and the Australians, -while the III Corps, including the 18th and 58th -Divisions in line, operating solely on the north bank of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_430" id="Page_430">[Pg 430]</a></span> -the river, would secure the left flank of the attack as far -north as Morlancourt. The establishment of this defensive -flank entailed the capture of a very strong naturally -defended position, the possession of which was vital to -the success of the troops south of the Somme.</p> - -<p>The Somme, like the Oise, is a winding canalised -river running through a marshy valley. Its south bank, -though undulating, has no specially marked hill features, -but on the north the adjoining land rises to a considerable -height on the spur which traverses the narrow wedge -between the Somme and the Ancre. This plateau is -furrowed by a number of deep gullies running northward -from the river, and the sharp hills between these valleys, -falling in places by abrupt chalk cliffs to the Somme, -form very commanding features from which it would be -possible for a determined enemy to play havoc with any -attempt to advance south of the river, for they completely -dominate the south bank. The most marked of -these spurs is the long saddle immediately east of the -village of Chipilly. This feature is almost girdled by the -Somme (which makes a narrow sweep round the east, -south and west sides of it), and projects almost a mile -south of the general line of the river. It thus forms a -barrier across the ground for which the Australians would -be made responsible.</p> - -<p>The capture of the Chipilly Ridge was the task allotted -to the 58th Division, while the 18th would complete the -defensive flank from the north end of the Ridge at Gressaire -Wood to Morlancourt.</p> - -<p>The line of advance from the British front trenches -was full of obstacles. Immediately in front of the line, -and on the river bank was the village of Sailly Laurette, -the garrison of which, if not immediately overcome, -would be able to enfilade the whole advance as the troops -crossed No Man's Land. A mile and a half east of Sailly -Laurette lay Malard Wood, covering both slopes of one -of the declivitous gullies already alluded to; while half-way -between the Malard Wood valley and the final -objective on the cliff of Chipilly Ridge, lay a second -gully, badly enfiladed from Chipilly village and completely<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_431" id="Page_431">[Pg 431]</a></span> -overlooked from the Ridge itself. Heavy going all the -way, up hill and down dale, through features eminently -suited to machine-gun defence, culminating in a breathless -scramble up a steep slope to meet an enemy who would -probably defend it to the last; a total advance of about -two and a half miles; altogether no light task for a single -division.</p> - -<p>In view of the obvious difficulty of carrying so strong -a position by frontal attack alone it was arranged that -the Australians should advance ahead of the 58th Division -and occupy the high ground near Méricourt south-east of -the Ridge, by the time the 58th was due to deliver its -final assault. By this means it was hoped to squeeze -the enemy off the Ridge in the direction of Bray without -making a fight for it, in order to avoid complete -envelopment.</p> - -<p>Such was the general idea: and we must now return -to the 2/4th Battalion which we left in the preceding -chapter at Pernois on the morning of 2nd August, in -order to trace how the idea worked out.</p> - -<p>The 2nd and 3rd August were spent in resting and -cleaning, and on Sunday, the 4th, after company commanders -had been admitted to the rumour that large -operations were imminent, sudden orders to move were -received. At 9.30 p.m. that night the Battalion again -embussed to La Houssoye on the Amiens-Albert Road, -whence it marched to bivouacs in a wood near Bonnay -(two miles north of Corbie, on the Ancre). Fortunately -the weather was fine and warm, for the only shelter provided -was one bell tent per company.</p> - -<p>The 5th August was passed in close cover in the wood -in order that our intentions might not be revealed to -prying Bosche aeroplanes, and in the afternoon Lieut.-Col. -Grover explained the plan of attack to the company -commanders. At zero (4.20 a.m.) the 174th Brigade -would advance from Assembly line (see Map No. 17) and -dig in on the Green line 200 yards east of Malard Wood. -The 2/10th Londons (175th Brigade) were especially -attached for the capture of Sailly Laurette. The 173rd -Brigade would follow close on the 174th in artillery forma<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_432" id="Page_432">[Pg 432]</a></span>tion, -halt in Malard Wood for one hour and adopt attack -formation, and then passing through the Green line -would take Chipilly Ridge, Red line. The 18th Division -would advance on the left of the 58th, the 54th Brigade -going as far as the Green line, when the 53rd would leap-frog -through it to the Red line. The advance would be made -under a creeping field artillery barrage provided by ninety -18-prs. and thirty 4·5 howitzers, while the deep valleys -would be dealt with by a heavy howitzer barrage jumping -from valley to valley. Twelve tanks were to cover the -advance, two of which were allotted to the 2/10th Londons, -for Sailly Laurette, the remainder leading the 174th -Brigade to Malard Wood, where the 173rd would pick up -one per company for the final assault. The 4th Suffolks -(Pioneers) would consolidate a position slightly in rear -of the final objective.</p> - -<p>The order of battle in the 173rd Brigade was: 3rd -Londons on the right, 2/4th Londons on the left, leading -battalions; 2/2nd Londons, reserve battalion. In the -2/4th Battalion the order of advance was: leading D -(Rivers Smith) on the right and C (Parslow) on the left; -supporting B (Croll) on the right, A (Brissenden) on the -left, with Battalion Headquarters in rear.</p> - -<p>Another conference followed on the morning of the -6th, after which company commanders went forward to -reconnoitre the point of assembly. On arrival at the 54th -Brigade Headquarters it was found, however, that the -enemy had just delivered a sharp attack and possessed -himself of the very trenches from which we were to -"jump-off" the following morning: rather disconcerting -and possibly very serious for the whole attack, for the -Huns had reached some of the dumps and gun positions -prepared for the 8th, and it might be that they would -guess our intentions. To guard against any possibility -of failure on this score the barrage lines were completely -rearranged. Prisoners subsequently captured stated that -the British intention to attack had not been discovered, -but the extraordinary defence which the Bosche made on -8th, combined with the fact that his field guns were withdrawn -east of Gressaire Wood throws some doubt on this.</p> - -<div class="figcenter" style="width: 500px;"> -<img src="images/i_b_432fp.jpg" width="500" height="321" alt="" /> -<div class="caption"><p><span class="smcap">The Battle of Amiens, 1918 (2/4th Battalion). Action at Chipilly Ridge, August 8-10, 1918</span></p></div> -</div> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_433" id="Page_433">[Pg 433]</a></span></p> - -<p>At all events the company commanders were forced to -return without seeing anything of their assembly position -or of the ground over which they were to advance, and -reported accordingly. The attack, however, could not be -postponed as the remainder of the Army and the French -also were involved, and final preparations were therefore -made for a plunge in the dark.</p> - -<p>Battle surplus in charge of Capt. Hetley, who that day -returned from hospital, was sent back to Mirvaux, and at -9.30 p.m. the Battalion moved forward to a gully half a -mile north-east of Vaux-sur-Somme.</p> - -<p>The 18th Division was able to re-establish its position -during the 7th, though after such losses that the 36th -Brigade (12th Division) had to be put into the attack on -the first objective in place of the 54th Brigade. The -recovery was too late for reconnaissance, which had -therefore to be limited to viewing the approaches to the -assembly, and at dusk, laden with all the usual impedimenta -of battle, the companies set out on their two and -a half mile trudge to the starting-point. The move was -made "overland," but alongside a communication trench -known as Cootamundra. The advance was not easy; -gas masks had to be worn for some distance; intermittent -shelling caused delays; tanks now and then drifted -through the columns, breaking them up; and as usual -shell holes in the dark proved a fruitful source of annoyance; -but with all these drawbacks it was a cheerful and -optimistic, if blasphemous, Battalion that arrived in the -front line well up to time.</p> - -<p>Dawn broke at last and the company commanders, -eagerly expecting to see the positions which they had -never yet viewed, were dismayed to find the sun rising -on a dense fog which enshrouded the whole landscape -and limited vision to about 20 yards! However, there -was nothing for it but to get up and try to keep touch with -the assaulting troops. The enemy's barrage came down -quickly and heavily, and the companies moved forward -rapidly over No Man's Land, though a good many fell. -By bad luck most of the Battalion Headquarters, including -Lieut.-Col. Grover and Capt. Walker the Adjutant,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_434" id="Page_434">[Pg 434]</a></span> -both severely hit, were knocked out within a few minutes, -and this misfortune dogged the Battalion through the day. -Moving forward slowly, trusting to a compass bearing to -bring them to the north edge of Malard Wood, the companies -pushed on, our barrage roaring on far ahead and -no troops in sight right or left of them.</p> - -<p>Adverse comments have been made on the Division -for a serious loss of direction this day. As a matter of -fact it was not so serious as has been stated by some -writers, but it is true that the 2/4th Battalion at first -drifted about 500 yards over its left boundary into the -18th Division territory. This divergence was also followed -by the 2/2nd Londons, who encroached on what should -properly have been our right company front. This is -regrettable, but comprehensible if a close study be made -of a contoured map. The gullies which had to be crossed -ran obliquely across the line of advance. If anyone -cares to try hill climbing in a fog he will realise the -extreme difficulty of maintaining a sidelong direction.</p> - -<p>Another cause of divergence from the correct direction -lay in the numerous small pockets of enemy who had to -be mopped up by the companies on route. These small -parties offered comparatively little opposition, but they -necessitated a cautious advance. Moreover, as they were -not all in the exact path of the advancing platoons, it -was inevitable to make a deliberate deflection to deal -with them, after which the idea of direction in the fog -became still more nebulous.</p> - -<p>After some time Croll and Parslow, whose companies -were in touch, reached a trench lately occupied by the -enemy, badly smashed and full of dead Huns. Here a -parley was held, and they decided that they were off the -line. The advance was resumed in a south-easterly -direction, extended order being used owing to the very -severe machine-gun fire at this point. Parslow, having -received news of the Colonel's casualty, assumed command. -During this second advance the enemy's fire began to -slacken and the mist showed some signs of lifting. After -about 200 yards these companies found one of the tanks -which was due to meet them at Malard Wood roaming<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_435" id="Page_435">[Pg 435]</a></span> -about disconsolately, having completely lost its bearings, -but this was put on the right track and began to follow -the companies, though it soon vanished again in the mist: -a passing ship!</p> - -<p>At about 8.30 the mist began to thin rapidly and B -and C Companies reached the hedge at the north end of -Malard Wood, where they gained touch with Rivers -Smith (D Company), and Parslow pushed out to the right -to link up with Brissenden (A Company), who had gained -the west edge of the Wood. The 174th Brigade were still -in the Wood and had not yet reached the Green line, -and the lifting mist disclosed no troops east of it. A -company of 8th Royal Berkshires (53rd Brigade) were -strung out in a north-easterly direction on the left of the -Battalion, while immediately in front was the head of -the Malard Wood Gully, about 40 yards wide, and -beyond it a cornfield breast high with crops which -stretched as far as Gressaire Wood. Sharp bursts of -machine-gun fire from Malard Wood and shrapnel bursts -from Gressaire Wood took a steady toll of our men and -rendered further advance without artillery support impossible. -But our artillery had carried its barrage forward -to the final objective, believing that the infantry were -following it, and was now silent.</p> - -<p>At about 9.30 a.m. the Berkshires informed Croll, who -had taken charge of the left half of the Battalion, that they -were going to attack Gressaire Wood, and asking the -2/4th Battalion to advance with them. Croll immediately -sent runners to Parslow and Brissenden in the Wood -warning them of this intention; and, swinging half right -to conform to the Berkshires, the advance began, but was -brought to a standstill on the east edge of the gully by -parties of the enemy working forward with machine-guns -from Gressaire Wood.</p> - -<p>Further advance was out of the question, and leaving -three Lewis gun posts east of the gully, Croll withdrew -his troops to the hedge previously occupied; there the -Battalion began to dig in. After a conference of the few -remaining officers it was decided to send 2/Lieut. E. P. -Higgs back to Brigade to explain the position and ask for<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_436" id="Page_436">[Pg 436]</a></span> -fresh orders and for artillery support to a further advance. -Almost immediately after this parley broke up poor -Rivers Smith was killed by a piece of shell which hit him -in the neck. In the meantime, runners sent out to the -right flank returned with the information that the 2/4th -and 3rd Battalions were mixed up in Malard Wood, that -the 2/2nd had come up and that Lieut.-Col. Miller of the -2/2nd was reorganising the troops.</p> - -<p>A gap of 300 yards between the two halves of the -Battalion had occurred in the last attempt to get forward, -and the position at noon was that Brissenden (Parslow -had been hit) was in charge of the right half Battalion -on the east edge of Malard Wood, and Croll with the -left half lined along the hedge north of the Wood. The -Wood was now completely cleared of enemy, but egress -from the east edge of it was impossible. Barkas (Intelligence -Officer) now came forward from Headquarters -to take over command, being cognisant of the position -on the right and acquainted with the H.Q. Staffs of the -other Battalions. He agreed with Croll that further -attempts to push forward were useless without further -support. Col. Urquart (L.T.M. Battery) was reported -on his way up to take over from Barkas.</p> - -<p>While this was happening the barrage had, as already -stated, moved forward from the Green line at the -scheduled hour on to Chipilly Ridge, but owing to the loss -of direction only a few small parties were available to -follow it and of these probably none reached the Ridge. -The Huns on the Ridge were holding up by machine-gun -fire the Australians on the south of the river, and they -failed to reach the high ground from which the position -was to be outflanked. Unfortunately aerial reports to -Divisional Headquarters persisted that the Ridge was in -our hands, and this mistake led to serious casualties in -the afternoon. The 2/2nd Londons were ordered to -advance at 3 p.m., but owing to the false report artillery -support was refused them. In these circumstances the -attack, though pushed forward by the 2/2nd with great -gallantry, was inevitably withered by enemy machine-gun -fire from Gressaire Wood.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_437" id="Page_437">[Pg 437]</a></span></p> - -<p>No further move was attempted that day. At about -4 p.m. Major Sutcliffe of the 2/2nd took over the 2/4th -Battalion—the fifth C.O. within twelve hours!—and -the positions already occupied were consolidated, Lewis -gun posts being pushed forward across the gully. The -night positions of the Battalion are shown on the -map.</p> - -<p>South of the Somme the day had been—except in the -area next the river swept from Chipilly Ridge—one of -immense success, an advance of about seven miles being -made by the Canadians. On the left of the 58th Division -the 12th had reached the Green line but had been unable -to progress beyond it.</p> - -<p>An immediate resumption of the attack to reduce the -Chipilly stronghold and so remove the one remaining -obstacle to an important advance was obviously necessary, -but in view of the restricted success on the previous -day a modification of the original intention was -essential.</p> - -<p>The main object of the attack of the 9th August -was to gain the line Bray-sur-Somme—Dernancourt. To -ensure that the assault should have sufficient weight to -carry it through successfully, and in view of the serious -losses of the Division on the previous day, the 133rd -American Regiment (Col. Samborn) then in Army reserve -some miles in rear was attached for the operation. The -main attack on the Divisional front was to be carried out -by the 175th Brigade on the left and the Americans on -the right; while in conjunction with it the capture of -Chipilly and the Ridge was to be entrusted to the 174th -and 173rd Brigades.</p> - -<p>The distance which the Americans had to advance to -reach their starting line necessarily caused a postponement -of the operation till late in the afternoon, the earlier -hours of the day being employed in side-stepping the -173rd Brigade to face its new objective, and to leave -room for the Americans to come into line.</p> - -<p>At 6 a.m. Major Sutcliffe issued orders to the Battalion -to reorganise and prepare for a further advance, and -these orders were followed later, as a result of reports<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_438" id="Page_438">[Pg 438]</a></span> -received by aerial reconnaissance, by instructions to -push forward fighting patrols to ascertain whether -Gressaire Wood were still occupied. The sharp machine-gun -fire with which these patrols were met left no room -for doubt as to the situation. Brigade received orders -for the afternoon attack at 1 p.m., but owing to the lack -of telephone communication it was two hours later when -Lieut.-Col. Miller, who was in charge of the whole of the -advanced troops, sent for Croll. The grim humour of -the situation was succinctly summed up in Lieut.-Col. -Miller's greeting. "Hullo, Croll, aren't you dead yet?" -"No sir!" replied Croll. "Then you damned soon will -be!" And orders for the attack were issued: "You will -withdraw all patrols and posts at once, move your men -under cover of Malard Wood and take up a position as -soon as possible in a line of trenches extending for about -400 yards southward from the Quarry. Lieut. Brissenden -has similar orders. You will occupy this position and be -prepared to advance at 5.30 and capture the original -objective, Chipilly Ridge. You will advance in two -waves, Brissenden with his half Battalion in the first -wave, and you with the remainder of the Battalion in -the second wave. The position must be taken at all -costs."</p> - -<p>This assembly position south of the Quarry was that -occupied by the 9th Londons on the previous night, -but on arrival it was found to be only a line of shell holes. -The 173rd Brigade was to attack with the 3rd Londons -on the right, the 2/4th in the centre and the 2/2nd on the -left, with the 2/10th attached in reserve. The assembly -proceeded as rapidly as possible, though time was short -and the barrage could not open until all patrols were in. -The Americans, who were rushed up from the rear, had -to double nearly a mile to reach their assembly position -at Malard Wood, but by a few minutes after zero every -unit was moving forward. The side-step of the 2/4th -Battalion was carried out under very heavy machine-gun -fire from Celestin Wood, the enemy having doubtless seen -the movement, and delay was caused by searching for the -trench (non-existent) which had been fixed as the start<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_439" id="Page_439">[Pg 439]</a></span> -line. Our barrage opened well up to time but the shells -fell harmlessly in Chipilly Valley instead of on the Ridge, -which again became a hornet's nest of Hun machine-gunners.</p> - -<p>Under this heavy fire the Battalion began the advance, -much harassed also from Celestin Wood on their right -flank. Brissenden was seriously hit early, and Mansel-Howe -(B Company) killed. Croll took over the whole -remnants of the Battalion and pushed forward, the men -behaving with magnificent coolness and advancing by -rushes. Every party which rushed forward, however, -lost men, and Croll himself was hit in the knee though he -bravely struggled on in the endeavour to get his men -into some sort of cover. The Americans on the left were -not yet up in line, and the fire from the right flank continued. -Casualties were now so numerous that it was -clear the Battalion could never reach the Ridge in anything -approaching assaulting strength, and Croll decided -to dig in in the shelter of the Chipilly gully, sending back -a runner to Lieut.-Col. Miller with a report of the situation. -In this position the Battalion was badly enfiladed from -Chipilly village, and to make matters worse groups of -Bosche could be seen running down from the crest of -the Ridge, evidently in preparation for a counter-attack. -This attack, however, was never delivered, for a change -of the situation, almost miraculous in its suddenness, -occurred. On the right the 2/10th Londons had been -fighting stubbornly, and before dark managed to clear -Chipilly village and began to work up the south end of -the Ridge. Here they were held up by a nest of Bosche -machine-gunners firing southwards from the head of -Chipilly Valley, but the Americans, advancing on the left -with magnificent dash towards Gressaire Wood, mopped -up this position. A glance at the map will show the -result. Further tenure of the Ridge was impossible for -the Bosche, who promptly retreated to avoid being caught -by the pincers which were closing on them.</p> - -<p>By 11 p.m. the Brigade was firmly established on the -Ridge, while the main operation had proved completely -successful.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_440" id="Page_440">[Pg 440]</a></span></p> - -<div class="hangindent8"> - -<p>Officers: Capt. B. Rivers Smith and Lieut. C. I. Mansel-Howe, -killed; Lieut.-Col. A. Grover, D.S.O., M.C., Capts. -W. H. Parslow, F. W. Walker, D.S.O., and A. G. -Croll, Lieuts. G. de G. Barkas, M.C., and C. C. -Brissenden, 2/Lieuts. W. N. M. Girling, H. G. A. -Leach, J. W. George, A. L. D. Bold, H. Slater, -S. T. Morris and J. Horsfield, wounded.</p> - -<p>N.C.O.'s and men: 38 killed, 228 wounded and 20 missing, a -total of all ranks of 301.</p></div> - -<p>For his excellent work in this action Capt. A. G. Croll -was awarded the M.C.</p> - -<p>The experience of these two days' fighting had demonstrated -clearly that the River Somme was an unsatisfactory -boundary between the III and Australian -Corps. The hill slopes on each bank formed tactical -features so inter-supporting that it was deemed essential -to bring both banks into the area of one command; and -accordingly on the 10th August the Australian Corps took -over with the 3rd Australian Division a sector immediately -adjacent to the north bank. This redistribution involved -a shortening of the 58th Divisional sector, and the 173rd -Brigade, handing over its line to the Australians at about -2 p.m., withdrew to the reserve area, the 2/4th Londons -concentrating in bivouacs near Bonnay.</p> - -<p>During the 10th an enemy counter-attack set back -slightly the positions gained by us the preceding day, but -the situation was soon re-established and strong patrols -pushed forward by the Division brought them to the line -of the outer Amiens defences.</p> - -<p>The following day the III Corps was taken over -temporarily by Sir A. J. Godley.</p> - -<p>This practically brought to a close the first phase of -the Fourth Army's great advance, which is officially -known as the Battle of Amiens, 1918. Amiens, for so -long threatened by a victorious enemy, was now liberated, -and, important as was this result of the three days' struggle, -other results accruing from the battle were still more vital. -The actual loss inflicted on the Huns—upwards of 23,000 -prisoners and 400 guns were captured—were in themselves -a matter of great moment; but the captures themselves<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_441" id="Page_441">[Pg 441]</a></span> -showed that already the Germans were flinging their -reserves into the fight. This undoubtedly had the effect -of paving the way for the successful French advance which -began south of Montdidier on the 10th August. Perhaps -the most cheering moral of all was the establishment of -the fact that three anxious months of constant strain, -following on a retreat of unprecedented rapidity and loss, -had left the fighting qualities of our troops unimpaired—perhaps -to the surprise of some gloomy folks at home—while -evidence was already abundant that the enemy was -not standing to it as he had done in former British offensives. -His morale was beginning to crack. This is evidenced by -actual numbers: 13 British divisions and 3 cavalry -divisions had defeated 20 German divisions and secured -an advance of 12 miles in 5 days' fighting. To enable us -to judge of the enormous effect of this great victory we -have the evidence of Ludendorff himself:</p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p>"The Emperor told me that after the failure of the -July offensive and after the 8th August, he knew the -war could no longer be won."</p></div> - -<p>A good deal of severe criticism has been levelled at the -III Corps in general, and at the 58th Division in particular, -for the lack of success attained on the first day of battle. -It is undoubtedly a fact that the failure to eject the Bosche -from Chipilly Ridge on the 8th August caused the infliction -of severe loss on our Australian neighbours on the -right flank. We do not pose as apologists for the Division -or for the 2/4th Londons, and are satisfied that no excuses -for them are needed. But we feel justified, in view of what -has been said, in pointing to certain circumstances of the -battle as contributing towards the restriction of their -success. We propose not to argue these circumstances -but merely to state them:</p> - -<p>1. The enemy attack on the 18th Division on the 6th -August not only deprived our company commanders of -any opportunity of reconnoitring their ground, but also -entirely disposed of the surprise effect gained south of the -Somme, for undoubtedly the Bosche expected a counter-attack -from us.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_442" id="Page_442">[Pg 442]</a></span></p> - -<p>2. The mist of 8th August, which made success depend -largely on a correct compass march over unseen and shell-torn -ground.</p> - -<p>3. The fact that no tanks arrived on the Green line to -lead the Battalion forward to the second objective, whereby -the enemy machine-gun defence was not impeded. We -do not wish to pass the blame on to the tanks; their -difficulties in reaching the start-line were as acute as our -own, and the ground much more difficult for them than -it was south of the river.</p> - -<p>4. The startling rapidity with which the Battalion -command changed during the battle.</p> - -<p>These are not excuses for failure. We are prepared to -leave to the judgment of impartial critics the decision as -to whether the Battalion, and the Division as a whole, did -all in its power to perform its duty. That the operations -of the Division during these two days' fighting were not -altogether unfruitful is evidenced by the fact that their -total captures amounted to 1925 prisoners, 68 guns, 190 -machine-guns and 36 trench mortars, while the whole -area of advance was littered with enemy dead.</p> - -<p>A lull in the active operations now occurred while -heavy batteries, dumps and all necessary material were -advanced in preparation for the next phase of the struggle, -which would involve the ejection of the Hun from a -strongly defended system of trenches.</p> - -<p>After a night's rest the Battalion marched on the -11th August to a wood at Heilly (near Ribemont), -where it was joined by the first line transport and the -battle surplus, returning on the afternoon of the 13th -to Pont Noyelles. Here it was accommodated in billets, -the most comfortable quarters since the few days at -Guignemicourt.</p> - -<p>A few days' rest at Pont Noyelles, now some eleven -miles in rear of the battle line, were devoted to reorganisation -and to assimilation of several reinforcements of -officers, N.C.O.'s and men. On his return from short leave -on the 14th August Major Tollworthy assumed temporary -command of the Battalion, but a week later Major W. -McC. Crosbie, M.C., Royal Munster Fusiliers, arrived and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_443" id="Page_443">[Pg 443]</a></span> -took over the command. The adjutancy of the Battalion -was taken over by Lieut. H. J. King, M.C.</p> - -<p>During this period the Battalion was inspected successively -by the Brigadier and by the Corps Commander, who -saw the troops at training.</p> - -<p>The reinforcements received between the 10th and -22nd August were:</p> - -<div class="hangindent"> - -<p>2/Lieuts. R. E. Glover, L. A. Still, W. J. Till and F. J. Paterson -(4th Londons);</p></div> - -<p>and officers of other units attached as follows:</p> - -<div class="hangindent"> - -<p>2/Lieuts. C. C. W. Goodale, L. A. Palmer and A. W. Tucker -(1st Londons);</p> - -<p>2/Lieuts. P. F. Royce, W. C. B. Hall and T. R. A. Maynard -(2nd Londons);</p> - -<p>2/Lieuts. J. C. Wood and H. Irvine (3rd Londons);</p> - -<p>2/Lieuts. G. Gilson, H. Lelyveld, J. Slattery, M. F. Giles and -H. B. Bartleet (5th Londons);</p> - -<p>2/Lieuts. J. T. Spencer and E. S. McKittrick (8th Londons);</p> - -<p>2/Lieut. W. A. Davies (9th Londons);</p> - -<p>and 480 N.C.O.'s and men.</p></div> - -<p>The majority of this large reinforcement consisted of -men from the 14th Division, which had suffered very -severely in the battles of March 1918. The drafts of -young soldiers on which the Battalion had been depending -of late, though of excellent material, were obviously not -so desirable as fully seasoned soldiers; and the 14th -Division men were therefore particularly welcome. With -a seasoning of old 2/4th London men and the remnants -of the K.O.Y.L.I., who had come from the 16th Entrenching -Battalion, they helped to make up once again a really fine -Battalion.</p> - -<p>On the 21st August the offensive was resumed and -though, as we have stated, we propose to continue the -record of the 2/4th Battalion's operations in the Fourth -Army, it should be borne in mind that henceforth the Army -instead of having an inert neighbour on its left flank had -an active one in the Third Army, which was now also on -the move.</p> - -<p>This new great battle (21st August to 1st September), -known as the Battle of Bapaume, 1918, extended the area -of fighting to the Somme-Scarpe salient.</p> - -<p>The increasing enemy resistance at the termination of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_444" id="Page_444">[Pg 444]</a></span> -the Battle of Amiens had drawn G.H.Q. to the decision to -break off the battle and transfer their attention to another -part of the front; a method which throughout the closing -period of the war proved its value. The Germans were -kept always in doubt—as the British had been in March -1918—as to whether each fresh offensive was in reality -only a feint, in doubt as to where to place their already -dwindling reserves. Moreover, the British Armies were -now no longer faced by line upon line of almost impregnable -trenches as they had been in 1916, and frontal attacks -were not the only possibility open to them.</p> - -<p>G.H.Q. therefore decided on a vast turning movement. -An attack in a south-easterly direction between Albert -and Arras would turn the flank of the Somme line of -defence about Péronne, and would constitute a distinct -forward step towards the further objectives of Cambrai -and St Quentin.</p> - -<p>The immediate object of the III Corps was to free -Albert and to oust the Bosche from the strong defensive -system which he had built up round the town during the -summer months. On the first day of the III Corps battle, -22nd August, the 58th Division was in Corps reserve, the -divisions in line being from right to left, the 47th, 12th -and 18th.</p> - -<p>The 2/4th Battalion remained at training on the 22nd -August, but an early move was made the following morning, -when it marched at 4 a.m. to a sheltered valley half a mile -south of Méricourt-l'Abbé. In this position it remained -all day together with the rest of the Brigade; the 174th -Brigade being in the old British line at Morlancourt, at -the disposal of the 18th Division. In the centre the 47th -Division carried the line forward to the high ground east -of the Happy Valley, while on the right the Australians -occupied the high ground immediately north of Bray.</p> - -<p>The exploitation of this success was ordered by Army -H.Q. for the following day, but the situation was altered -by a strong German counter-attack, which late in the -afternoon drove the 142nd Brigade (47th Division) almost -back to their start-line, leaving the Australians at Bray in -an awkward salient. That night the 175th Brigade moved<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_445" id="Page_445">[Pg 445]</a></span> -from its reserve area near Tailles Wood and took over the -line from the 142nd. The following day was occupied in -reorganisation, though the advance was continued south -of the river, and orders were received for the pressure to -be continued on the whole army front on the 24th August.</p> - -<p>At 1 a.m. that morning the attack was prosecuted by -the 47th Division, in conjunction with the 3rd Australians -on the right and the 12th on the left. The 47th Division -attack was carried out by the 175th (attached) and -140th Brigades, the battalions of the 173rd Brigade being -ordered to support the 175th. For this purpose the 2/4th -Battalion was turned out at midnight on the 23rd/24th -August and reached a position of assembly in the old -Amiens defence line east of Morlancourt at 4 a.m. on the -24th. The attack was entirely successful. The Happy -Valley once more passed into our hands, and the 47th -Division established itself finally on the farther crest. -The Australians occupied Bray, while on the left the 12th -Division pressed forward in the direction of Fricourt. -The enemy opposition was not severe though between -3 a.m. and 8 a.m. a large amount of high explosive and -gas shelling was experienced. The day brought forth -further evidence of the increasing demoralisation of the -enemy troops, and intelligence reports pointing strongly -to the probability that the enemy was fighting a delaying -action preparatory to a big retreat, the immediate exploitation -of the success was ordered.</p> - -<p>This day the 175th Brigade remained in line but came -once more under orders of the 58th Division which took -over the Divisional sector, the 174th Brigade going into -line on the right of the 175th.</p> - -<p>During the morning a conference of commanding -officers in the 173rd Brigade was held and orders were -issued for the further advance. The attack was to be -made with two brigades in line, the 175th on the right and -the 140th on the left, supported by the 173rd Brigade. -This latter was to be led by the 2/2nd and 3rd Londons -with the 2/4th Londons in support, the last-named with -the rôle of being prepared to support any part of the front -and carry it on to the final objective. Owing, however,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_446" id="Page_446">[Pg 446]</a></span> -to the situation remaining obscure on the left flank this -operation was postponed till 2.30 a.m. on the 25th, when -rapid developments took place.</p> - -<p>In accordance with the orders already issued the 2/4th -Londons moved from their Assembly position near Tailles -Wood, the order of march being A, B, C, D Companies -with Headquarters and one section Brigade Machine-Gun -Company bringing up the rear, and with 100 yard intervals -between companies. In this order it reached a position -in the Happy Valley under cover of a dense mist at 4 a.m. -on the 25th August. Here it was to stand fast awaiting -further orders from the Brigadier.</p> - -<p>But in the meantime the Division, evidently still -bearing in mind the experience of February 1917, had -issued instructions to the effect that should the leading -battalions lose touch with the enemy an advanced guard -should at once be formed to push forward rapidly and regain -contact. This was the contingency which materialised.</p> - -<p>At 6.30 a.m. the attacking units reported themselves -on their objectives, but in the mist touch with the enemy -seemed to be lost, and all units of the 173rd Brigade were -ordered to advance. The Brigadier at once issued orders -for the formation of the advanced guard, and the 2/4th -Battalion, which was more or less definitely located in -the Happy Valley and was thus the battalion most easily -to be reached in the mist, was selected for this duty.</p> - -<p>The advanced guard troops were:</p> - -<div class="center"> -<ul> - <li>No. 2 Troop Northumberland Hussars,</li> - <li>2/4th Londons,</li> - <li>1 Section 86th Brigade R.F.A.,</li> - <li>1 Section M.G.C.,</li> -</ul> -</div> -<p>the whole under Major Crosbie.</p> - -<p>The line of advance ordered was cross-country as far -as Bronfay Farm and thence along the Bray-Maricourt -Road. The Battalion was to advance in column of route -until ordered to deploy. At 8.30 a.m. the guard was -formed and the advance began, A Company under Lieut. -V. C. Prince forming the Vanguard with Headquarters, -B, C and D Companies following as Main Guard. This -was an entirely new role for the 2/4th Battalion, and the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_447" id="Page_447">[Pg 447]</a></span> -sudden development of open warfare conditions, the -realisation that the Battalion was in close formation on a -road with cavalry operating ahead and the guns following, -raised everyone's hopes and expectations to the highest -pitch. The move was of course made without artillery -support, and until Bronfay Farm was nearly reached very -little sign of his existence was vouchsafed by the Bosche, -beyond a little desultory shell-fire.</p> - -<p>About this time the mist dispersed and the cavalry -were checked by severe machine-gun fire from Billon Wood -and the high ground to the north of it. The company -commanders showed great initiative and dash, and a -valuable reconnaissance was made by 2/Lieut. Prince and -Cooke, his Sergt.-Major, to ascertain where the bulk of -the firing was coming from. Quickly grasping the situation, -Prince deployed his company and led it against the -south-west edge of the Wood. The rear companies deploying -in turn, the whole Battalion became committed -to the attack, which, owing to the conditions under which -it started, developed a little raggedly as regards the -frontages occupied by companies, but still with good -discipline and plenty of dash. Hetley (B Company) made -for the left or north edge of the Wood along the Maricourt -Road, while the gap between him and Prince was promptly -taken up by C and D Companies. Observing the action -taken by the 2/4th Londons, Brigade promptly pushed -forward the 2/2nd Londons to the left flank to deal with -the high ground north of Billon Wood, and ordered the -3rd Londons to support the attack.</p> - -<p>The enemy shelling had now assumed very severe -proportions, and though little resistance was met with -by the 2/4th Battalion in Billon Wood, which it cleared -without much difficulty, the Bosche gunners were able -effectually to prevent it from emerging from the east -edge of the Wood. Hetley says about this bombardment, -"The shelling of Billon Wood was one of the heaviest I -have ever undergone, being quite comparable to Bullecourt -or the Salient in 1917." The line in the Wood was -rather patchy and Hetley, leaving Grimsdell in charge, -returned to Battalion Headquarters where Major Crosbie<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_448" id="Page_448">[Pg 448]</a></span> -provided him with a couple of Lewis guns and about -twenty-five men. With these he returned, and having got -the Battalion into a deep trench, put out observation posts -on the east edge of the Wood. The Battalion is credited -by Division with having gained a line this day some 200 -yards east of the Wood, but it seems doubtful whether -this conclusion can be supported.</p> - -<p>On the left flank, however, the 2/2nd and 3rd Londons -made a good deal of progress up the long spur leading -to Maricourt, and at the end of the day had established -themselves in a chain of small copses about 500 yards -west of the village. Their further progress was here -arrested, owing to the fact that the 12th Division on the -left was held up before Carnoy, which remained for the -time in the enemy's hands.</p> - -<p>At midnight the 2/4th Battalion was relieved by the -7th Londons of the 174th Brigade, which side-stepped -to the left, and on relief was concentrated at Great Bear -Wood north-east of the Happy Valley.</p> - -<p>The casualties of the day, due almost entirely to -shell-fire, were:</p> - -<div class="hangindent"> - -<p>2/Lieuts. H. Lelyveld, J. C. Wood, A. Irvine and C. C. W. Goodale, -wounded, and in N.C.O.'s and men 15 killed, 166 wounded -and 14 missing.</p></div> - -<p>The good work of 2/Lieut. Prince and C.S.M. Cooke -has already been referred to. Prince was rewarded with -the M.C. Cooke was killed in the Wood, and a few -days after his death notification was received that he had -been awarded the M.C. for his work on the 8th August. -Mention must also be made of Pte. Campion, a battalion -runner, who performed invaluable work in locating the -scattered parties of the Battalion in the Wood, thereby -enabling Hetley to assume proper control of the firing line.</p> - -<p>On the 26th August the following congratulatory -message was issued by the Brigadier (Brig.-Gen. Charles -Corkoran):</p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p>"The Major-General commanding the Division in congratulating -you all wishes me to tell you that Sir Douglas -Haig, the Army Commander and the Corps Commander -have all expressed the highest praise for the way in which -the Brigade is fighting. For myself I cannot say how -proud I am to be in command of such a brigade as the -Fusilier Brigade."</p></div> - -<div class="figcenter" style="width: 500px;"> -<img src="images/i_b_448fp.jpg" width="500" height="266" alt="" /> -<div class="caption"><p><span class="smcap">The Battle of Bapaume, 1918 (2/4th Battalion)</span></p></div> -</div> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_449" id="Page_449">[Pg 449]</a></span></p> - -<p>Orders were issued on the night of the 25th/26th -August for the prosecution of the attack on the following -day, but the 26th proved a day of check. The 3rd -Londons, who led the attack, reached Maricourt, but, -the flanking brigades being held up, they were unsupported -and had to fall back. A threatened German counter-attack -south of Maricourt having failed to materialise, -the remainder of the day was occupied in consolidation -on a line about 500 yards west of the village.</p> - -<p>The 2/4th Battalion was moved from Great Bear Wood -at 9 a.m. on the 26th in anticipation of a successful attack, -and took up a position in considerable depth in the -vicinity of Bronfay Farm, where it was occupied in preparations -for the battle of the 27th August. This day the -Battalion was joined by Lieut. H. P. Lawrence and 2/Lieut. -R. Grey, attached from the 10th Londons, and two days -later by 2/Lieuts. H. H. Gant (2nd Londons), H. Hearnshaw -(7th Londons) and C Brandram (9th Londons).</p> - -<p>The objectives of the projected attack of the 27th -August were the capture of Maricourt and the establishment -of our line in the old British trenches of July 1916 on -the eastern fringe of Maricourt Wood, east of the village. -Exploitation of the success into the old German trenches -as opportunity should allow was also arranged for. The -leading battalion of the Brigade was the 3rd Londons, with -the 2/4th Londons in close support and the 2/2nd Londons -in reserve. Simultaneous attacks were to be made by the -3rd Australians in the direction of Vaux on the right and -by the 12th Division towards Maltzhorn Farm on the left.</p> - -<p>Early in the morning the 2/4th Battalion was assembled -in artillery formation on the line consolidated the previous -day, and twenty minutes after zero (4.55 a.m.) it followed -the 3rd Londons towards Maricourt. The greater part -of the advance was through the village itself and the -Battalion soon got rather mixed up with the 3rd Londons -in the course of mopping up the numerous dugouts in -its ruins. The defence put up by the Germans, at least<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_450" id="Page_450">[Pg 450]</a></span> -on the 2/4th Battalion's front, this day showed marked -deterioration. It was sporadic and on the whole poor, -and with comparatively little difficulty and remarkably -small loss to itself, the Battalion gained its final objective -east of the Wood, a message from Capt. Hetley to this -effect being received in Battalion Headquarters at 7.30 a.m.</p> - -<p>The inevitable breaking up of attack formations consequent -on passing through a ruined village resulted in -a good deal of disorganisation, and on arrival on the -objective, which the 2/4th Battalion reached on the -extreme left of the Brigade sector, no touch was found -with either the 3rd Londons on the right or the 12th -Division on the left. Hetley, however, who again assumed -control on the spot, soon set this to rights, and leaving -C.S.M. Bonser, D.C.M., to reorganise the platoons immediately -available, sent C.S.M. Cowland to pick up the -12th Division on the left, while he himself pushed out to -the right flank with a patrol. These efforts were entirely -successful, and both the neighbouring battalions being found -to be well up and the flanks thus secured, Hetley returned -and established his headquarters in the railway cutting.</p> - -<p>The rapidity of this advance and the completeness of -its success leave one breathless after the weary and -sanguinary struggles with which this ground had been -hardly wrung from the enemy's grip in 1916. Maricourt -Wood was full of German dugouts, and evidently these -had not been quite completely dealt with during the -advance, for later in the morning a couple of German -gentlemen, feeling a desire to take the morning air, came -quietly strolling down the hill from the Wood to Hetley's -headquarters, where his unexpected presence caused them -painful surprise.</p> - -<p>During the morning C.S.M. Bonser was entrusted with -the task of collecting isolated groups of men and with -them filling up gaps and forming a support line in case -of counter-attack. At this work he proved invaluable. -Hetley writes: "He led party after party round dugouts -in Maricourt clearing out Bosche, and was later perfectly -splendid in organising the men and fetching up reinforcements, -that is, rallying isolated parties in the town and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_451" id="Page_451">[Pg 451]</a></span> -Wood, all this under heavy if somewhat wild shell fire." -Bonser received a bar to his D.C.M. for this day's work, -and later, after the disbandment of the Battalion, when -attached to the 2/2nd Londons gained a second bar on -September 18th at Epéhy.</p> - -<p>On our flanks the day was equally successful, Vaux -falling to the Australians, and the high ground at Maltzhorn -Farm passing into the 12th Division's hands. No counter-attack -was delivered by the Bosche and we were left in -undisputed possession of our gains which amounted to -some 1700 yards of ground. Orders were issued during -the day that the advance should be pressed on to Maurepas -Station, but these were subsequently cancelled, as the -enemy were found to be holding their old 1916 line in -strength with three fresh divisions.</p> - -<p>At 8 p.m. Major Crosbie made a reconnaissance of the -line and organised the Battalion in two companies; A and -B being placed under Capt. Hetley and C and D under -2/Lieut. Grimsdell, the Battalion's right flank resting on -the point at which the railway crossed the front trench. -Throughout the night the position was heavily shelled, -but with very little loss to us.</p> - -<p>In spite of the fatigue of the troops Army H.Q. was -fixed in its determination to allow the Bosche no breathing -space, and at 1 a.m. 28th August orders were received -in the line that the attack was to be continued that -day. The 3rd Londons were to lead the Brigade again, -while the 2/2nd and 2/4th Londons were to remain -in reserve in the old British front line. At 4.45 a.m. -the attack was launched. The day resolved itself into -a series of patrol encounters, in the course of which some -very stubborn opposition was met with, notably in the -Bois d'en Haut. By the evening the Divisional line had -been established another 1000 yards further east, in front -of the Bois d'en Haut and in touch on the left with the -12th Division, who had taken Hardecourt after stiff -resistance, while the Australians had possessed themselves -of Curlu.</p> - -<p>That evening the Battalion was relieved, the 175th -Brigade taking over the sector, and withdrew to reserve<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_452" id="Page_452">[Pg 452]</a></span> -in a valley north of Bray-sur-Somme, a few hundred -yards from the site of the old Citadel Camp, a spot well -known to the Somme veterans of the 1/4th Battalion.</p> - -<p>During the whole of these days in fact the 2/4th -Battalion, though a little distance south of the Guillemont -heights, had been crossing the tracks of the 1/4th -Battalion in the earlier battles of this historic district, -but under what extraordinarily different conditions! The -painful steps of 1916, which gained perhaps a few hundred -yards a week at appalling cost of life, amid the wretchedness -of mud and rain, were now victorious strides which -had carried our lines forward like an irresistible tide. -Since the 2/4th Battalion had moved into the Happy -Valley on the 24th August it had advanced some 8000 -yards and already half the devastation of the old Somme -battlefields was left behind.</p> - -<p>The losses of the two days' fighting at Maricourt were, -considering the extent of the gains, remarkably light. -Lieut A. R. Muddell and 2/Lieuts. E. C. McKittrick and -R. Grey were wounded, while Lieut. and Adjt. H. J. King, -M.C., and Lieut. H. P. Lawrence were also hit but remained -at duty. 114 N.C.O.'s and men became casualties, -9 being killed, 74 wounded and 29 missing.</p> - -<p>For their splendid leadership Capt. G. H. Hetley and -2/Lieut. E. V. Grimsdell were rewarded with the M.C.</p> - -<p>After the 173rd Brigade came out of the line the -58th Division remained in action and on the 29th August -it carried the line forward, against an ever-increasing -opposition, to the east of Maurepas. The following day, -the 47th Division having taken over from the 12th on our -left, the two divisions of Londoners again pressed on -shoulder to shoulder. The enemy resistance this day was -as stubborn as had been experienced for some time and -the advance was eventually checked with the 58th facing -the west edge of Marrières Wood, and the 47th extending -the line to Priez Farm.</p> - -<p>The 29th August was occupied by the 2/4th Battalion -in cleaning and resting, and the necessary reorganisation -consequent on its losses in the battle were effected. This -day Major Crosbie left to take charge of the Battle Surplus<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_453" id="Page_453">[Pg 453]</a></span> -Camp and Major F. G. Tollworthy, M.C., once more -assumed command of the Battalion. On the 30th August -Lieut. A. B. Carpenter (25th Londons) with 29 other ranks -joined the Battalion.</p> - -<p>The Fourth Army Line was now approaching Péronne, -and from Cléry to St Christ the Australian Corps had -reached the west bank of the Somme. The stiffening -of the enemy resistance which had been so noticeable -during the last two days' fighting, and the natural strength -of the Somme as an obstacle, made it clear that the enemy -was determined to hold out at Péronne as long as possible; -and true to its scheme of allowing the Hun no respite, -the Army at once made its plans for forcing a bridgehead -over the river, with the object of reducing Péronne and -the Somme line of defence.</p> - -<p>The most favourable point of attack appeared to be -the river between Péronne and Cléry, and the capture -of the eminence of Mont St Quentin, though likely to -be arduous, would give us complete command of Péronne -itself and enable us to enfilade the whole of the enemy -positions south of the city on the east of the river. The -actual capture of Mont St Quentin was entrusted to -the Australians in whose path it lay, and the movements -of the III Corps to their north formed a part of the scheme -for widening the bridgehead once gained. The two days' -fighting of the 31st August and the 1st September may -therefore be described as the Battle of Mont St Quentin, -and our task is now to deal with the part taken in it by -the 2/4th Battalion.</p> - -<p>The 31st August saw a good deal of heavy fighting by -the 175th Brigade, which was still in line, the chief feature -of the enemy's resistance being the severity of the shell fire -with which his heavy guns plastered the whole Brigade -area. Marrières Wood was captured and the line pushed -on to a position west of the Péronne-Rancourt Road -and overlooking the slope leading down to Bouchavesnes.</p> - -<p>At 7 p.m. that night unexpected orders were received -by the 173rd Brigade to return to the line and deliver -an attack at 5.30 a.m. the following morning. From -Bronfay Farm the battalions were conveyed by bus to<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_454" id="Page_454">[Pg 454]</a></span> -Hem Wood, whence they marched to assembly in the line, -taking it over from the 175th Brigade.</p> - -<p>The immediate objective of the attack was the village -of Bouchavesnes, after which the line was to be pushed -forward to a position overlooking the valley of the Tortille -River and the Canal du Nord. The order of battle was: -2/4th Londons on the right, 3rd Londons on the left, with -the 2/2nd Londons following in close support. In spite -of the short notice for the operation the Battalion was -duly assembled without delay on a line 300 yards west -of the Péronne-Rancourt Road, and at zero, 5.30 a.m., -1st September, moved forward under a creeping barrage. -The advance was made with two companies (A and B, -under Capt. F. J. Griffiths and 2/Lieut. C. C. Gibbs) in -front and two in support (C and D, under 2/Lieuts, -Y. C. Prince, M. C., and G. C. Ewing, M.C.). Each company -moved in artillery formation with three platoons -in front and one in support.</p> - -<p>For once we were favoured with good weather conditions, -and though cold the morning was fine with good -visibility. On the western outskirts of Bouchavesnes the -enemy put up a rather stiff fight, but on being tackled -with determination, he once again showed signs of weakening -morale, and the remainder of the village was occupied -and mopped up with very little opposition.</p> - -<p>Although the Bosche infantry showed weakness his -artillery work was, as usual, excellent. His counter-barrage -came down promptly and heavily, and the bulk -of our casualties this day were caused by his shell fire. -On several occasions, indeed, during these successful days -of August and September the enemy displayed prodigious -skill in handling his guns. Field guns remained in action -in the copses which are scattered all over this countryside, -firing over open sights till the last possible moment; and -when these were forced to limber up the fire was promptly -taken up by high velocity guns firing at extreme ranges in -the rear. On the 1st September, however, the advance -was particularly rapid, and several field guns were unable -to get away, and fell into our hands. After passing the -village the Battalion pressed forward rapidly up the hill<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_455" id="Page_455">[Pg 455]</a></span> -to the east of it, collecting a good many machine-gun posts -on the way, and by 10.45 a.m. was on its final objective, -organised and established on a definite line under the -personal control of Major Tollworthy. This line was on -the western crest of the Tortille Valley overlooking -Moislains, and about 1000 yards short of that village. -Some little difficulty was experienced by the divisions on -the flanks, but touch was soon gained, the Australians -being still on the right and the 47th Division (who captured -Rancourt and gained the western edge of St Pierre Vaast -Wood) on the left.</p> - -<p>No counter-attack developed during the day, and the -Bosche seemed to resign himself to the loss of ground. His -acquiescence in our success was doubtless partly due to -the fact that this day the Australians, after three days' -magnificent fighting, captured Mont St Quentin and entered -Péronne.</p> - -<p>The casualties of the 2/4th Battalion were again -extremely light when compared with the importance of -the success achieved, but unfortunately they included the -loss of two company commanders (Capt. F. J. Griffiths -and 2/Lieut. V. C. Prince) killed. Both of these officers -had done splendid work and shown themselves capable -leaders, and in them the Battalion sustained a serious loss. -In addition to these, 2/Lieuts. H. H. Gant and G. Gilson -were killed, Lieut. H. P. Lawrence and 2/Lieuts. F. E. -Rogers, C. Brandram and R. E. Glover wounded; while -11 N.C.O.'s and men were killed, 49 wounded and 30 -missing, making a total list for the day of 99 all -ranks.</p> - -<p>The captures of the Brigade amounted to 325 prisoners, -40 machine-guns, 8 field guns and one motor ambulance, -and once again the prisoners showed that reserves were -being flung wholesale into the enemy fighting line. -Measured solely by the depth of ground taken, the 1st -September was the most successful action ever fought by -the 2/4th Battalion, the advance being over 3000 yards, -and the achievement was the subject of a congratulatory -message from the Brigadier.</p> - -<p>The same evening the 58th Division was relieved by<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_456" id="Page_456">[Pg 456]</a></span> -the 74th<a name="FNanchor_7_7" id="FNanchor_7_7"></a><a href="#Footnote_7_7" class="fnanchor">[7]</a> and passed into Corps reserve after a week of -hard fighting. The 2/4th Battalion withdrew, after -handing over its objectives intact to the 14th Black Watch, -to a valley a mile west of Marrières Wood. The Battalion -remained in this valley for five days, employed in resting -and training, fortunately under weather conditions which -were fine and warm except on the 5th September. During -this period 2/Lieut. D. A. S. Manning and drafts of 21 -other ranks joined the Battalion. 2/Lieut. Bidgood was -appointed Intelligence Officer (vice 2/Lieut. Davies, sick).</p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_7_7" id="Footnote_7_7"></a><a href="#FNanchor_7_7"><span class="label">[7]</span></a> The 74th Division (Girdwood) was a Yeomanry Division which had -been employed in the East. This was its first appearance in the French -theatre of war. The 14th Black Watch was formerly the Fife and Forfar -Yeomanry.</p></div> - -<p>The days succeeding the relief of the 58th Division were -marked by hard fighting, but by the evening of the 4th -September the 47th and 74th Divisions had advanced the line -east of Moislains and well up the long slope leading to Nurlu. -As was to be expected now that the line of the Somme had -been turned the enemy began to fall back towards the next -defensive position, the outposts of the Hindenburg line, -and on the 5th September the pursuit began in earnest, -though it was met at many points with stubborn resistance.</p> - -<p>At 7 a.m. on the 7th September the 2/4th Battalion -embussed at Hem Wood and were conveyed to St Pierre -Farm on the Péronne-Nurlu Road, the whole Division -being on its way back to the fighting line. The spectacle -of the roads during this forward move was most impressive. -Packed with troops, guns and stores of every description -moving eastward, it seemed to convey to the troops a -greater realisation of the importance of their victories -than the actual advances they had made in action.</p> - -<p>The Battalion lay in Villa Wood, south-west of Nurlu, -during the day, and at 6 p.m. marched to a bivouac area -immediately north of Liéramont, where it arrived at -9.30 p.m.</p> - -<p>On the 8th September the fine weather of the preceding -week gave way to heavy rainstorms, and the Battalion -moved into shelters in Liéramont, and in this position it -remained resting until a late hour in the evening of the 9th.</p> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_457" id="Page_457">[Pg 457]</a></span></p> -<p>During the 8th September troops of the 58th Division -endeavoured to advance against the large and strongly -defended villages of Epéhy and Peizières, but the position -was stubbornly held by the Alpine Corps, and the line -became stabilised in trenches on the south and west slopes -of the hill on which the villages stand. The following -morning determined counter-attacks by the Alpine Corps -drove back the Divisional line a short distance.</p> - -<p>This stiffening of the defence made it essential for -Army H.Q. to be informed as to whether the enemy rearguards -were fighting a delaying action, or whether the -defence was organised in depth; and to test this an attack -by the III Corps was ordered for the 10th September.</p> - -<p>The 58th Division was directed on Epéhy-Peizières -while the 74th was given Ronnssoy Wood as its objective.</p> - -<p>The 173rd Brigade was detailed for this attack with -the 3rd Londons on the right, the 2/2nd on the left and the -2/4th in close support. The great frontage of the two -villages, which topographically are really one, and the -high state of their defences made the operation one of -great difficulty, and the plan of action was to deal with it -in two stages. For the first objective the two leading -battalions were to gain the line of the eastern road of the -villages, the 3rd Londons in Epéhy and the 2/2nd in -Peizières. The 2/4th Londons were to follow the 2/2nd -closely in the initial stages and then, turning southwards, -were to mop up the area between the inner flanks of the -leading battalions and establish themselves in Fishers -Keep as a link between the two.</p> - -<p>In the second stage the leading battalions were to gain -the line of the railway east of the villages where they would -join hands, the 2/4th Battalion remaining in the villages. -On the left the 21st Division was to push forward immediately -after the villages were captured and secure the -position by occupying the high ground which dominated -them a mile to the north.</p> - -<p>This very complicated operation was to be carried out -under two creeping barrages, one for each leading battalion, -and a machine-gun barrage, while the heavy batteries -would engage distant targets.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_458" id="Page_458">[Pg 458]</a></span></p> - -<p>At 11 p.m., 9th August, the 2/4th Battalion left its -position in Liéramont and moved forward to assembly, -which, considering the vileness of the weather, the lack -of reconnaissance and the extreme darkness, was completed -satisfactorily; and at 5.15 a.m. the Battalion advanced -to the attack.</p> - -<p>The leading battalions met with a good deal of -opposition, which on the left flank was centred on Wood -Farm. In the 2/4th Battalion A and B Companies, -respectively under 2/Lieuts. C. C. Gibbs and G. C. Ewing, -M.C., gained their objective at Tottenham Post on the -western outskirts of Peizières with comparatively little -difficulty. B Company under Capt. Hetley, whose rôle -was to penetrate the villages to Fishers Keep, had a much -more difficult task. The fighting through ruined streets -inevitably led to some disorganisation of platoons, and -the villages, moreover, were stiff with Bosche machine-gun -posts, which, once the barrage had passed over them, were -free to do their worst on the attackers. Severe casualties -were sustained, among whom were numbered two platoon -commanders, 2/Lieuts. H. B. Bartleet and P. F. Royce, -killed. Finding progress impossible among the cunningly -concealed Bosche machine-gunners Hetley collected and -organised his company on the west edge of the village. -A similar fate met D Company (2/Lieut. D. A. S. Manning) -which endeavoured to enter Peizières from the west. -After gallantly struggling against impossible odds Manning -withdrew his men to swell the garrison of Tottenham Post.</p> - -<p>The 2/2nd Londons under Capt. Wright made a -magnificent attempt to carry out their task, and did in -fact reach the railway embankment, but a sharp counter-attack -drove them back to the fringe of the village. Unfortunately -the flanking movement of the 21st Division -on the left failed to materialise, and this doubtless contributed -to the failure of the 173rd Brigade. The fact, -however, was clearly established that the resistance of -the enemy was organised and deliberate, and it became -patent that an attack with tank co-operation would be -necessary to reduce it. The rifle strength of the three -battalions set against these villages on the 10th September<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_459" id="Page_459">[Pg 459]</a></span> -was only about 900 in all, and their attack, therefore, -lacked the weight essential to success.</p> - -<p>In spite of the lack of success, however, the day was -not entirely fruitless, for the captures amounted to 80 -prisoners, 20 machine-guns and 3 anti-tank guns.</p> - -<p>The 2/4th Battalion's losses were: 2/Lieuts. F. Bidgood, -P. F. Royce and H. B. Bartleet, killed; 2/Lieut. F. J. -Paterson, wounded; 5 N.C.O.'s and men killed, 19 -wounded and 3 missing.</p> - -<p>During the night following the battle the 2/4th Battalion -was relieved by the 12th Londons, and was concentrated -in trenches at Guyencourt. Here it remained till 8 p.m. -on the 11th September, when it withdrew to shelters in -Liéramont.</p> - -<p>We may here remark that on the 18th September the -173rd Brigade captured Epéhy and Peizières and thus helped -clear the road for the advance to the Hindenburg line.</p> - -<p>We have now come to the end of the 2/4th Battalion's -story. Owing to the increasing difficulties of maintaining -units at fighting strength it had been decided by G.H.Q. -to make still further reductions in the number of formations, -and to swell the ranks of those remaining with the -personnel of those disbanded. This dismal fate befell -the 2/4th Londons, and on the 12th September 1918 the -whole of its personnel was transferred to the 2/2nd -Londons, and the Battalion as a separate entity ceased -to exist, after twenty-one months of active service life. -Its place in the Brigade was taken by the 2/24th Londons -from the 32nd Division.</p> - -<p>The last action in which the Battalion fought was -admittedly a "feeler," and as such undoubtedly served -a useful purpose in the scheme of the Fourth Army's great -advance; but perhaps we may be pardoned for regretting -that it was not a more successful close to the Battalion's -history. It was bad luck. Yet there was a certain degree -of poetic justice in the fact that the Battalion had helped -fight the Germans back to what had been on 21st March -1918 the British line of resistance, and it can, therefore, -justly claim to have redeemed in full its losses in the awful -battles of the retreat.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_460" id="Page_460">[Pg 460]</a></span></p> -<div class="chapter"></div> -<hr class="chap" /> - - - - -<h2>CHAPTER XXIV<br /> - -THE FINAL ADVANCE</h2> - - -<h3>II. <em>The 1/4th Battalion in the Battle of Bapaume, 1918</em></h3> - -<p>The extension northward of the battle line, which marked -the opening of the Battle of Bapaume on the 21st August -1918, involved Byng's Third Army, comprising from right -to left the V, IV and VI Corps. As we have indicated in -the preceding chapter, the object of the Third Army was -to conduct a vast enveloping movement which should turn -the flank of the German defence of the Somme line, and -throw open the road to Cambrai and St Quentin.</p> - -<p>Already the enemy had shown signs of nervousness in -the area of the Somme-Scarpe salient and had withdrawn -from his most advanced positions at Serre; and it was -clear, therefore, that any attack on this front by the -British must be prosecuted rapidly to avoid a repetition -of the skilful German retreat of February 1917. For an -offensive in this area the British troops were far more -favourably placed in August 1918 than they had been on -the former occasion. They possessed the Bucquoy Ridge, -with the consequent advantages of observation which had -formerly been denied to them; and the terrain over which -the battle would be fought, though certainly devastated -and a mass of trenches, did not present the colossal system -of inter-supporting fortresses which it had in 1916. The -time for a big attack had come, and G.H.Q. decided to -strike. The 23rd August saw the Fourth and Third Armies -advancing on a front of 33 miles from Lihons to Mercatel.</p> - -<p>The suddenness of the German collapse in these latter -days of the War is probably unique in the annals of military -history. At the beginning of June their star was still in -the ascendant. They were occupying ground which they -had never previously held during the whole War; their<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_461" id="Page_461">[Pg 461]</a></span> -successes of March and April had shaken the Allied defence -to its very foundations; and it seemed still doubtful -whether they had reached the limit of their capabilities of -offence. Yet by the middle of August the whole face of -the War had changed. On a wide front the Germans were -in retreat; vast masses of material, thousands of prisoners -had fallen into our hands; the British morale had been -proved stronger than ever, while that of the enemy was -giving indications of a serious break.</p> - -<p>Whether the High Command anticipated the completeness -of this lightning change we cannot say; that the -vast bulk of regimental officers and men scarcely contemplated -it, is almost certain. Early in July General -Hull, in a conversation with Lieut.-Col. Marchment, expressed -the opinion that very little would be done in 1918 -by way of retrieving the losses suffered during the spring!</p> - -<hr class="tb" /> - -<p>The 8th August found the 1/4th Londons at a strength -of 42 officers and 892 other ranks withdrawn in Brigade -reserve to billets at Arras. Here a quite pleasant week -was spent in which the routine of training was varied by a -Battalion sports meeting, and a most successful swimming -gala—a new feature of recreation—for which purpose the -moat at the Citadel formed a splendid bath.</p> - -<p>Between the 16th and 18th August the 56th Division -was relieved from the Tilloy trenches and passed into -Corps reserve, the 1/4th Londons handing over their -Brigade reserve billets to the 1/9th Royal Scots and -moving to Berneville on the 17th August. For a few days -changes of station followed on each others' heels with -startling rapidity, and after having been quartered successively -at Houvin-Houvigneuil and Magnicourt-sur-Canche, -the Battalion reached Grand Rullecourt at 11.30 -p.m. on the 20th August.</p> - -<p>On the 19th orders had been issued to the Division to -take part in an attack with the XVII Corps in the area of -the Scarpe, but these were subsequently replaced on the -21st August by a transfer of the Division to Haldane's -VI Corps, and orders to join with it in the Third Army attack.</p> - -<p>A day of rest at Grand Rullecourt was occupied by the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_462" id="Page_462">[Pg 462]</a></span> -Battalion, in the absence of attack orders, with speculations -as to its chances of soon being called upon to fight. -Preliminary arrangements were made to march into battle -at short notice, and the same evening, the 21st August, -the Battalion marched thirteen miles to Berles-au-Bois, -arriving at 2 a.m. on the 22nd.</p> - -<p>About 10 o'clock that morning Lieut.-Col. Marchment -and the company commanders were ordered to Humbercamp -to receive battle orders, but after an hour's fruitless -waiting the company commanders returned to prepare -their companies for action, and the Colonel went to try -and get what orders he could at Brigade Headquarters. -Here he was informed that the attack would take place in -sixteen hours' time—early on the 23rd August! The -general idea of the Battalion's rôle was explained to -Lieut.-Col. Marchment to be the capture of the village of -Boyelles and the Marc system of trenches immediately -north of it, the attack to commence at 4.55 a.m. on the -23rd August, two companies in line, one in support and -one in reserve. Artillery support would be provided by -6 brigades of field guns firing an unregistered barrage, -while 21 tanks would take part in the attack. A section -of the Divisional Machine-gun Company would be attached -to the Battalion. With this somewhat sketchy information -Lieut.-Col. Marchment hurried back to the Battalion -to set it in motion, and by 5 p.m. it was on its way to the -first assembly position at Blairville. Here it occupied -the old German trenches exactly opposite the first trench -sector ever held by the 2/4th Battalion in February 1917.</p> - -<p>The line facing Boyelles was at this time occupied by -the 59th Division, and the 168th Brigade was detailed to -attack through them, with the Guards Division opposite -Hamelincourt on its right, and the 52nd Division north -of the north branch of the Cojeul River on its left. The -Brigade order of battle from right to left was Kensingtons -(south of Boyelles); 1/4th Londons (Boyelles); and -London Scottish (Boiry-Becquerelle); the 1st Londons -being attached in Brigade reserve for the operation.</p> - -<p>Leaving the Battalion on the march Lieut.-Col. -Marchment hurried on to Blairville by car to see the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_463" id="Page_463">[Pg 463]</a></span> -Brigadier of the brigade in line (59th Division) and was -at once faced by another difficulty in finding that the -59th Division had themselves taken over the front trenches -only the preceding night! Clearly not much possibility -of assistance from them; but they arranged to provide -guides to lead our platoons to the positions of final assembly.</p> - -<p>The sudden transfer of the 56th Division from the XVII -to the VI Corps, and the subsequent difficulty in obtaining -orders must have been caused by some reason of great -importance: we are not aware what it was. Certainly -the effect was not to make things easier. Indeed, when -the Divisional attack order was issued by Gen. Hull at -3 p.m. on the 22nd August he had not received the written -instructions of VI Corps. But, starting under such -inauspicious circumstances, all the more credit is due to -the battalions, and in particular to the commanding -officers, for the signal successes which were ultimately -achieved. Reconnaissance of the ground by officers and -N.C.O.'s was obviously out of the question, and Lieut.-Col. -Marchment had to content himself with explaining the -situation to them while battle stores were issued to the men.</p> - -<p>At 10.30 p.m. the Battalion moved off by platoons in -charge of the 59th Division guides, who, considering their -own scanty acquaintance with the ground, did well, for -they brought almost the whole Battalion to its assembly -positions in Falcon Trench well on time, though one -platoon of A Company and the Headquarter details went -sadly astray and did not turn up till long after zero hour. -The Padre believes he was taken for a long walk somewhere -round Albert! During the march up the enemy -was using gas shell freely, and masks had to be worn at -times, but little loss was caused.</p> - -<p>The Battalion was drawn up as follows:</p> - -<div class="center"> -<table border="0" cellpadding="4" cellspacing="0" summary="Battalion was drawn up as follows"> - <tr> - <td>Right front</td> - <td>—B Company, Capt. R. S. B. Simmonds.</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td>Left front</td> - <td>—D Company, Capt. C. W. Rowlands, M.C.</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td>Support</td> - <td>—C Company, Capt. H. A. T. Hewlett.</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td>Reserve</td> - <td>—A Company, Capt. H. N. Williams, M.C.</td> - </tr> -</table></div> - -<p>The hour or two of darkness before zero was spent -in cutting lanes through our wire, and at 4.55 a.m. the -barrage opened, intense and well distributed. Lieut.-Col.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_464" id="Page_464">[Pg 464]</a></span> -Marchment describes it as the best and most tremendous -he had ever seen. The scene from Headquarters was -extraordinary: the intense shrapnel barrage and smoke -on the German front line, the medium howitzers firing on -Boyelles village beyond, and the heavies cutting up the -distant landscape in dense black clouds; and behind it -all the sun just rising.</p> - -<p>At 5.7 a.m. the companies moved forward. The right -company (B) made good use of the railway embankment, -and following the line on its south side advanced on a -one-platoon frontage to Boyelles Station, while three tanks -entered the village. Here the railway was crossed and a -good deal of opposition was met with from enemy machine-guns, -heavy and light, firing from the eastern half of the -village. These were, however, skilfully outflanked and -rounded up to the number of 3 heavy and 8 light guns, -after which the company pushed forward and caught up -the barrage.</p> - -<p>Two platoons halted approximately on the Blue line -(first objective) on the eastern edge of Boyelles, while two -pressed on to Boyelles Trench 500 yards further east. But -few enemy were encountered in this advanced position. -B Company being now well distributed in depth, the work -of consolidation was put in hand. The right flank was not -yet in touch with the Kensingtons and was therefore -rounded off by pushing two Lewis gun sections and one -subsection M.G.C. southwards towards the railway.</p> - -<p>D Company on the left met with more stubborn resistance -in the Marc system, and the leading platoons were -temporarily held up in No Man's Land by enemy firing from -the Marc saps. Moreover, the tank allotted to this part -of the front failed to reach the Marc front system at all, -having apparently lost its way. The support company -(C), however, pushed a platoon forward into the sunken -road leading northwards from Boyelles, whence it was -able to enfilade the Marc trenches, while the right platoon -of the London Scottish advancing on our left managed to -turn the position similarly from the north. Being practically -surrounded the enemy surrendered <i lang="fr">en masse</i>, the -bag amounting to 2 officers and 80 other ranks. Little<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_465" id="Page_465">[Pg 465]</a></span> -further opposition was encountered, and D company -continued the advance to Boyelles Trench, where touch -was gained with C Company on the right and the London -Scottish on the left. The dugouts in this line were -energetically mopped up and many Germans sent marching -westward. Two patrols were sent forward towards -Boyelles Reserve.</p> - -<p>In the meantime the support company mopped up -the neighbourhood of the cemetery and the sunken roads -in its vicinity, while A Company in reserve occupied the -Marc system. This latter proved a very sound move as -our start-line was heavily shelled all the morning.</p> - -<p>The first news of the attack at Battalion Headquarters -was received in the shape of Private Cohen, who appeared -wounded but carrying a German light machine-gun—a -good omen of success! At about 9 a.m. the lost platoons -turned up and their arrival, including as they did the Padre -and the Medical Officer, was extremely welcome, for by -now the wounded were beginning to filter through, and -the small band of five under Lieut.-Col. Marchment were -encumbered with some 200 Bosche prisoners—not to -speak of their duties of conducting the battle. Communication -by wire was rapidly established with brigade -and also forward to the companies, a report centre being -formed north of Boyelles.</p> - -<p>At 9.15 a.m. 56th Division issued orders that the -attack would be pressed at 11.30 a.m. into Boyelles -Reserve, but owing to temporary dislocation of the signal -service these orders did not reach the 1/4th Londons until -11.15 a.m. To start at the scheduled hour was out of -the question, but arrangements were made at once for the -further advance, which ultimately began at about 5 p.m.</p> - -<p>The advance was made by the left front and support -companies, the right front company extending to its left -to cover the area vacated by them. This second attack -met with complete success. The two attacking companies -were led by a line of scouts followed by one platoon -in extended formation. The remaining platoons followed -in artillery formation by sections. Some resistance was -offered by light machine-gun teams in Boyelles Reserve,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_466" id="Page_466">[Pg 466]</a></span> -but the widely extended formation saved the attackers -from severe loss. The enemy artillery was also active -during the advance, but again the formation adopted -enabled the rear platoons to pick their way with but few -casualties. The whole of the allotted portion of Boyelles -Reserve was captured, and patrols pushed forward 500 -yards to the east of it. The enemy shell fire now became -more intense, but a protective barrage was put down by -our guns, and no counter-attack developed. After a -while activity on the whole area subsided.</p> - -<p>The same evening the 168th Brigade handed over the -captured positions to the 167th and passed into Divisional -reserve, the 1/4th Londons concentrating north of Hendecourt. -By noon on that day the Battalion was back at -Blairville.</p> - -<p>It is impossible to speak too highly of the men -by whom this great success had been gained. The long -approach marches in exceptionally hot weather brought -the Battalion to the point of battle in an already tired -condition; the hurried orders and the total lack of previous -reconnaissance created difficulties which were surmounted -by the splendid response made by all ranks to the demands -imposed on them. The rapid appreciation of the situation -by company commanders and the careful dispositions of -the commanding officer all contributed in full measure to -this important victory, while the skilful use of ground -and of suitable formations was the means of securing the -gains at a minimum of loss. The excellent work performed -by signallers and runners, all of whom had a hard -day's work, were of incalculable value to Battalion Headquarters, -and enabled Lieut.-Col. Marchment at all times -to keep a firm grip of the situation of the moment.</p> - -<p>The casualties of the Battalion were extremely light, -only 18 being killed, but by ill luck it lost three company -commanders, Capts. C. W. Rowlands, M.C., and H. A. T. -Hewlett being killed, and Capt. R. S. B. Simmonds, -wounded. 2/Lieuts. A. W. Chignell, T. Yoxall and -F. S. C. Taylor were wounded. The captures made by -the Battalion amounted to 3 officers and 240 other -ranks, of the 1st and 2nd Battalions 87th R.I. Regiment,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_467" id="Page_467">[Pg 467]</a></span> -24 light and 8 heavy machine-guns, 6 light, 1 medium -and 1 heavy trench mortar.</p> - -<p>After the relief of the 168th Brigade the offensive was -continued by the 167th, at first with considerable success, -the Division being once again attached to the XVII Corps. -An advance in the northern area of the Divisional front -of some 2500 yards was made into Summit and Fooley -Trenches, but on the south flank the most strenuous -efforts of the 56th and Guards Divisions failed to eject -the enemy from Croisilles, which was held in great force -by machine-gunners. South of the Cojeul River the -enemy resistance was increasing, and information was -obtained from prisoners to the effect that three fresh -German divisions had been brought into the Bullecourt-Hendecourt -area. North of the Cojeul, however, the -52nd and Canadian Divisions had registered important -successes. The old Wancourt line fell to them on the -26th, and this advance was rapidly followed up by the -recapture of Monchy-le-Preux, and a penetration into -quite new ground at St Rohart Factory—hardly fought -for by the 56th Division in May 1917—and at Boiry -Notre Dame. By the evening of the 26th August the -52nd Division had cleared the Hindenburg line from -Henin to the Sensée River, and was reported to be east -of Fontaine-lez-Croisilles.</p> - -<p>Croisilles, however, still held out and the Guards had -been pressed back slightly towards St Leger. The result -of this fighting was to swing the Corps line round facing -roughly south-east astride the Hindenburg line, with a -strong pocket of most stubborn Bosche in the ramification -of trenches around Croisilles itself, and on both banks of -the Sensée River to the north-east.</p> - -<p>The 169th Brigade which had now taken over the -Divisional front was getting worn by its constant fighting -and losses, and reinforcement was needed. After a few -hours' rest at Blairville the 1/4th Londons marched at -7.45 a.m. on the 25th August to trenches in front of -Boisleux St Marc, moving the following evening to the -trenches east of Boiry-Becquerelle, which had been captured -by the London Scottish on the 23rd.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_468" id="Page_468">[Pg 468]</a></span></p> - -<p>A good deal of gas shelling occurred here during the -night. A signaller was killed and several men were -wounded, among whom the Battalion was unfortunate -in losing Sergt. Johnson, the excellent orderly-room clerk, -and Corpl. Coates, M.M., of the Scouts.</p> - -<p>On the afternoon of the 27th the Battalion moved -forward in close support to the 169th Brigade, and occupied -Summit Trench immediately north of its junction with Hill, -and on the extreme left of the Divisional sector.</p> - -<p>It is rather curious to note that in these fights and -marches the 1/4th Battalion was in an area which had -been traversed by the 2/4th Battalion during the actions -of March 1917, while at the same time the 2/4th Battalion -in the Fourth Army was bearing its share in recapturing -spots familiar to the 1/4th Battalion during the 1916 -Somme battles!</p> - -<p>The 1/4th Battalion had settled down in Summit -Trench to make the best of a very wet evening, when, -after dark, orders were received to move at once into the -Hindenburg line and to concentrate at River Road, near -the banks of the Sensée River for an attack the following -morning on Bullecourt. It had been determined, owing -to the prolonged resistance of the enemy at Croisilles -and the resultant holding back of the right flank, to -pursue the operation by an advance towards Bullecourt -straight down the Hindenburg line. This would have -the effect of completely enveloping and "squeezing-out" -the pocket of Germans in the Croisilles-Guardian Trench -area.</p> - -<p>The concentration of the Battalion was effected successfully, -but not altogether without difficulty. A and -B Companies moved direct to the point of assembly, while -C, D and Headquarters proceeded by way of the Henin-Fontaine -Road, and then down the Hindenburg trenches. -The whole area was horribly congested. Two brigades -of the 56th Division (the 168th and 169th) were moving -up for attack, while at the same time a relief was proceeding -on the left flank between the 52nd and 57th -Divisions. For a time the confusion was rather distressing, -and Lieut.-Col. Marchment writes, "It seemed<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_469" id="Page_469">[Pg 469]</a></span> -to me that the battalions were forming up to attack -north-east, south-east and south-west."</p> - -<p>The plan of attack was as follows:—The advance was -to be led over the open by the 169th Brigade, the Queen's -Westminsters in the van with the line Queen's Lane-Jove -Lane, as a first objective, and the trenches south-east of -Bullecourt as a final objective.</p> - -<p>The 168th Brigade was to follow the 169th in the -order 1/4th Londons, Kensingtons and London Scottish, -advancing by bounds at a distance of about 1000 yards -in rear of the rear battalion of the 169th Brigade. The -particular duties of the 168th Brigade were to support the -169th and mop up in rear of their advance, and to protect -the right flank should Croisilles remain untaken—a rather -difficult and quite unsatisfactory job.</p> - -<p>The 1/4th Londons were disposed as follows:—</p> - -<div class="hangindent8"> - -<p>D Company (2/Lieut. J. L. Backhouse) on the right—to advance -over the area west of the Hindenburg line by way of -Sensée Avenue, Nelly Avenue and Queen's Lane.</p> - -<p>B Company (2/Lieut. G. G. Lewis) to advance down Burg -Support, the old Hindenburg front trench.</p> - -<p>A Company (Capt. H. N. Williams, M.C.) and C Company -(Capt. J. W. Price), Headquarters and 1 section M.G.C. -attached, to advance down Tunnel Trench, the old -Hindenburg support trench.</p></div> - -<p>The attack was to be launched at 12.30 p.m. on the -24th August under a creeping barrage.</p> - -<p>The fight throughout the day proved a laborious -and confused affair. Trouble developed which doubtless -originated on the previous evening when the Queen's -Westminsters, relieved by the London Scottish in the -Summit area, had moved forward to assembly. This -gallant regiment had been fighting already for a couple -of days and was getting worn—Lieut.-Col. Savill describes -his men as "dead beat"—and it had to move up to -assembly positions in Burg Support, where it occupied a -trench at right angles to the line of its advance. A change -of front during an advance had been proved on the Somme -in 1916 to be an operation extremely difficult of accomplishment, -and so it proved here. True, the attack did -not start till 12.30 p.m., but even the hours of morning<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_470" id="Page_470">[Pg 470]</a></span> -daylight gave little chance to the Queen's Westminsters -to get their bearings. Our map shows the villages of -Bullecourt and Hendecourt, but it must be borne in mind -that the whole terrain was actually a featureless waste. -The ground everywhere was "crumped" to pieces and -covered with high grass and rank weeds, while the existence -of a village was not suspected till one found oneself -stumbling among the heaps of bricks which had formerly -been its cottages. As a consequence of all this, two -companies of the Queen's Westminsters, followed by a -part of the 1/2nd Londons, went hopelessly astray and -became entangled in the 57th Division troops near -Hendecourt. To add to the confusion the company -commander sent back word to 169th Brigade that he -was in Bullecourt.</p> - -<p>Meanwhile, Lieut.-Col. Savill of the Queen's Westminsters -advanced along the Hindenburg line, and having -fallen in with the Headquarters of the 1/2nd Londons and -the London Rifle Brigade, soon came in touch with strong -enemy forces, believing that his companies were ahead of -him, and that mopping-up had not been well done. The -weak force at his disposal was unable to shift the stubborn -Germans opposed to him, and the attack was held up.</p> - -<p>The 1/4th Londons moved off from assembly as ordered -in rear of the 169th Brigade.</p> - -<p>On the right D Company was held up badly at Nelly -Avenue where it closed on to a party of the London Rifle -Brigade. Several efforts to shift the enemy proved -abortive, and it was not until about 7.30 p.m. that, with -the help of two Stokes Mortars brought up by the -Kensingtons, further progress could be made. By this -hour, however, the opposition was overcome, and, with -40 prisoners and 4 light machine-guns to its credit, the -company pursued the advance after dark to Queen's Lane.</p> - -<p>B Company in Burg Support overtook the Headquarters -of the three 169th Brigade battalions, held up as already -described, about 200 yards short of the Hump, and a -platoon was at once placed at Lieut.-Col. Savill's disposal -to help clear the trench. We must remark parenthetically -that B Company's fight began almost precisely in the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_471" id="Page_471">[Pg 471]</a></span> -sector of trench which had been first captured by A -Company of the 2/4th Battalion on the 15th June 1917: -how often, we wonder, has such a coincidence occurred?</p> - -<p>The Germans in Burg Support were of a remarkably -obstinate variety and progress by bombing was slow. -The trench was very full of men, and the congestion was -later increased by the arrival from nowhere in particular -of a company of the Royal Munster Fusiliers (57th Division), -who had quite lost their direction. By 6.30 p.m. the -enemy's resistance was overcome by hard fighting, and B -Company advanced down Burg Support to the Knuckle, -where it established itself in touch with D Company on its -right.</p> - -<p>A and C Companies on the left, in the Hindenburg -Support line, also overtook the 169th Brigade, the -remnants of the 1/2nd Londons being held up about Juno -Lane. The enemy was in strength in this trench also. -At the time it was presumed that by zealous use of his -dugouts he had escaped the moppers-up of the leading -battalion, but probably, owing to the deflection of the -greater part of the 1/2nd Londons, he had not been previously -attacked. Progress was slow and the 1/4th -London Companies pushed through and engaged the -enemy. The resistance at Juno was soon overcome, and -the enemy retired leaving us a few prisoners and two -light machine-guns. A second check was experienced at -the Hump but the enemy was driven back, strenuously -debating every inch of ground, till at last by 9.30 p.m. -the two 1/4th London Companies reached Jove Lane and -the remainder of the Battalion. Attempts were made to -gain touch with the 57th Division on the left but without -success.</p> - -<p>The stubbornness of the enemy resistance in the -Hindenburg line this day was remarkable, and we cannot -deny a brave enemy an acknowledgment of his valour. -Croisilles had been reported vacant by 8 o'clock in the -morning but the occupants of the Guardian pocket put -up a day-long fight. It was not till late in the evening -that the whole area was cleared. Probably the need to -the enemy of gradually evacuating this area was the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_472" id="Page_472">[Pg 472]</a></span> -cause of the opposition offered to our advance down the -Hindenburg line.</p> - -<p>This was a hard day's work for everyone. The 1/4th -Londons had bombed their way down about 2000 yards -of the Hindenburg line, excellent leadership to the -bombing parties being provided by Lieut. V. R. Oldrey and -by Capts. H. N. Williams and J. W. Price. The great -difficulty throughout the day was for local commanders -to get any sort of grip as to what was going on, as so often -occurs in trench fighting. The mass of trenches, nearly -all stubbornly defended, with which the whole area was -pitted, in effect broke up the brigade attack into a series -of numerous and more or less isolated scraps in which no -one knew much of how his neighbour was faring. And -all the time Division believed that the Hindenburg line -was clear, and that Bullecourt was in our hands.</p> - -<p>The night of the 28th and the morning of the 29th -August were occupied in clearing up the situation, and -assembling the Brigades on the line Pelican Avenue-Pelican -Lane for a continuance of the attack, which was -pursued by the 168th Brigade on the right and the 169th -on the left.</p> - -<p>The 1/4th Londons remained on the 29th August in -support with the 1st Londons (attached), the attacking -battalions being the Kensingtons on the right and the -London Scottish on the left. The Battalion was disposed -in Queen's Lane, Burg Support and Borderer Trench. -The objective allotted to the Brigade roughly coincided -with the Riencourt-Quéant Road, and the whole of the -village of Bullecourt, inclusive to the Brigade, was allotted -to the London Scottish.</p> - -<p>The attack, which was launched at 1 p.m. on the 29th -August, met with stubborn resistance, especially on the -right where the Kensingtons were held up at Bullecourt -Station. After hard fighting the London Scottish managed -to capture the village, and by dusk the Divisional line -formed a sharp salient, with its horns on Bullecourt -Station and the high ground west of the Factory on the -Hendecourt Road, and its apex following Tower Reserve -and Gordon Reserve Trenches.</p> - -<div class="figcenter" style="width: 500px;"> -<img src="images/i_b_472fp.jpg" width="500" height="218" alt="" /> -<div class="caption"><p><span class="smcap">The Battle of Bapaume, 1918 (1/4th Battalion)</span></p></div> -</div> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_473" id="Page_473">[Pg 473]</a></span></p> - -<p>The 1/4th Londons were not called upon as a Battalion, -but D Company was sent forward to reinforce the London -Scottish, and later to fill a gap in the forward positions -between that Battalion and the 169th Brigade on the left.</p> - -<p>The enemy resistance this day was extremely stubborn -and Tank Reserve was strongly held by the enemy, who -resisted effectually the most gallant attempts of the -Scottish to emerge from Gordon Reserve.</p> - -<p>Late at night the 167th Brigade took over the whole -Divisional front, and the 1/4th Londons moved back at -5.30 a.m. to positions in Queen's Lane, Knuckle Avenue, -Stray Reserve and Burg Support, where they remained -throughout the 30th August. During the withdrawal to -these positions the whole area was intensely bombarded -with high explosives and gas shell, and it was no surprise -to the Battalion to learn that the enemy had delivered -a sharp counter-attack in the early morning and driven -the 167th Brigade out of Bullecourt back to the Pelican -Avenue-Pelican Lane line. The posts north of the village -stood firm. This counter-attack was a big affair which -affected the divisions right and left, both of them being -pushed back a certain distance.</p> - -<p>The immediate recapture of Bullecourt was promptly -ordered by XVII Corps, and no one in the Battalion was -especially delighted to learn that the 1/4th Londons were -detailed for the duty.</p> - -<p>After a day spent in obtaining such rest as was possible, -the Battalion wearily crept off after dark to assembly in -Pelican Lane and Borderer Trench in readiness to assault -Bullecourt at dawn on the 31st August. The 168th -Brigade was drawn up for battle with the London Scottish -on the right, the 1/4th Londons in the centre and the -7th Middlesex (167th Brigade attached) on the left, each -battalion having a section M.G.C. and a section L.T.M. -Battery at its disposal. The Kensingtons were in Brigade -reserve.</p> - -<p>The morning of the 31st August was dark, and at -5 a.m. the assaulting battalions moved forward under an -excellent barrage to which the enemy gave a quick and -heavy reply.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_474" id="Page_474">[Pg 474]</a></span></p> - -<p>On the right, C Company, on a two-platoon front, -reached the cross-roads at the extreme western edge of -Bullecourt, but was here held up for some time by machine-guns -in the village. At the same time D Company, on the -left, advancing on the north side of the village penetrated -about half-way across it and almost reached the cross-roads -on the northern edge, but here they also were checked -by machine-gun fire, principally from their right flank.</p> - -<p>The support company (B) now entered the village, or -rather advanced against the site of the village (for no -single building was visible), and began to mop up in -the endeavour to form a link between the two leading -companies. Progress was slow owing to the overgrown -nature of the ground, but by 8.40 a.m. touch was gained -between B and C Companies, and together they slowly -fought their way forward till C Company was able to join -hands with the 7th Middlesex on the Hendecourt Road. -In the course of this fighting B Company managed to take -15 prisoners and put 5 machine-guns out of action.</p> - -<p>At about 9 a.m. the reserve company (A) was put into -the fight to endeavour to fill in the gap across the village -between the leading companies.</p> - -<p>The right company was still held up on the southern -fringe of Bullecourt by two machine-guns mounted in a -derelict tank east of the village, and it was not until after -noon that, with the aid of two Stokes Mortars, progress -was made by bombing up Tower Reserve as far as a point -level with the east edge of the village. Here all further -advance was definitely checked. Gordon Reserve was -strongly held and stubbornly defended, and, moreover, -no touch could be gained with the London Scottish on -the right.</p> - -<p>By 3.30 p.m. the village of Bullecourt was reported -clear of the enemy and a line of Lewis gun posts was -established on its eastern fringe from Tower Reserve to -the Hendecourt Road on the left. During the remainder -of the day no material change in the situation occurred. -Three several attempts were made by the leading companies -to get into Gordon Reserve but the position was -too strongly held, and, the trenches leading to it having<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_475" id="Page_475">[Pg 475]</a></span> -been flattened out by shell fire, an advance by bombing -was impracticable. Shortly after midday aerial reports -were received that the enemy was assembling in Tank -Avenue and Tank Support. All field guns and heavies -at once turned on to this target and the projected counter-attack -was promptly broken up. The activity of the enemy -in this region continued till late at night, and it was evident -that any attempt at further advance would be strenuously -disputed.</p> - -<p>After nightfall arrangements were made for one company -of the Kensingtons to rush Gordon Reserve under -cover of Stokes Mortar fire, but the situation remaining -somewhat obscure the attempt was abandoned.</p> - -<p>Very little progress was made anywhere this day. On -the right the London Scottish gained Bullecourt Avenue -and the 7th Middlesex on the left captured the factory on -the Hendecourt Road. But all along the line the enemy's -resistance was stiffening, evidently in view of the near -approach of our positions to the junction of the Hindenburg -line with the Drocourt-Quéant Switch.</p> - -<p>Moreover the country was difficult for the attackers; -it had been fought over many times and was utterly -broken up, and the assaulting companies were all tired. -In the circumstances it was a good day's work, and a day -of peculiar satisfaction to the 4th London Regiment, -which has a special claim to association with the village of -Bullecourt. Here in 1917 the 2/4th Battalion occupied -Gordon Reserve in the successful defence of Bullecourt -against a heavy German attack after it had first fallen into -British hands, and in August 1918 it fell to the lot of the -1/4th Battalion, after the village had been recaptured and -again lost, to capture it for ever.</p> - -<p>Casualties in officers this day were: Lieut. V. R. -Oldrey and 2/Lieut. R. T. Stevenson, killed; 2/Lieuts. -W. G. Hook, A. Holloway and A. F. Potter, wounded. -2/Lieut. E. H. Garner was killed on the night 27th/28th -August, after having been ten days only with the Battalion. -In the ranks the total casualties for the period 23rd to 31st -August were 30 killed, 150 wounded and 12 missing. -Having regard to the enormous importance of the successes<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_476" id="Page_476">[Pg 476]</a></span> -achieved and the depth of the advances, these comparatively -light figures are a matter for much congratulation. -One shudders to think of what the losses would have been -for equal results in the hard slogging of the Somme in -1916 or at Ypres in 1917.</p> - -<p>Late at night on the 31st August the 56th Division -handed over its positions to the 52nd and withdrew into -Corps reserve, the 1/4th Londons reaching the Boyelles -Reserve area at Boiry-Becquerelle at 7 a.m. on the 1st -September, with a strength of 32 officers and 710 other -ranks.</p> - -<p>In view of the gallant share which the 1/4th Londons -had borne in this splendid series of victories we may -perhaps be permitted to quote an extract from an article -on the subject of the 56th Division's achievements which -appeared in <cite>The Times</cite> of the 16th September 1918: -" ... This year it was one of the divisions which beat -off the German attack towards Arras on March 28th when -the enemy suffered one of the bloodiest defeats of the -whole War; so that with this fighting and that at Cambrai -to its credit it has probably killed as many Germans as any -division in the British Army. Now to this proud record -is to be added the splendid advance of which the Commander-in-Chief -has told. The 56th Division has proved -itself a great fighting division."</p> - -<p>The Divisional record in the Battle of Bapaume 1918 -may be summarised as advancing through 6 miles of very -strongly fortified country in nine days; meeting and defeating -three German divisions, and capturing 29 officers, -1047 other ranks, 3 guns, 210 machine-guns and over 50 -trench mortars. Of this large booty the share of the -1/4th Londons amounted to 3 officers and 390 other ranks -prisoners, 70 machine-guns and 10 trench mortars—a very -fair proportion of the whole!</p> - -<p>With this action the share of the Battalion in the -great envelopment of the Somme line closes.</p> - -<p>The following were decorated for services during the -period 23rd-31st August:</p> - -<div class="hangindent"> - -<p>2/Lieuts. C. L. Henstridge and A. Holloway, the M.C.</p> - -<p>Pte. E. Clark, the D.C.M.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_477" id="Page_477">[Pg 477]</a></span></p> - -<p>Sergt. F. G. Udall, M.M., Bar to M.M.</p> - -<p>Sergts. F. A. Dove, J. T. Norris, F. C. Nickless, Corpls. W. -Frost, F. Nash, C. Robbins, Lance-Corpls. J. T. Couchman, -J. R. Greenwood, Ptes. G. H. Andrews, G. A. Allen, W. W. -Boulstridge, A. C. Barnes, J. Eccles, A. E. Dickerson, G. J. -Grant, W. H. Hart, H. H. Mills and W. Ryan, the M.M.</p></div> - -<hr class="tb" /> - -<p>This great battle as a whole resulted in the defeat by -23 British divisions of 35 German divisions, and the -capture of 34,000 prisoners and 270 guns. Its importance -lay in the ever-increasing signs of the enemy's failing -morale; while the captures bore witness to his indiscriminate -throwing-in of reserves.</p> - -<p>The following day Péronne fell to troops of the Third -Army, and two days later the enemy's general retirement -from the east bank of the Somme began.</p> - -<p>We have already alluded to extensive captures of -ground made in the area of the Scarpe at Monchy-le-Preux -and other places. These important victories constituted -the Battle of the Scarpe, 1918, in which, beginning on the -26th August, the battle front was still further widened and -the British First Army also became involved. By the 3rd -September the Canadian Corps of the First Army and the -XVII Corps of the Third Army had carried the battle line -forward through the famous Drocourt-Quéant line, and -the enemy had fallen back to the general line of the Canal -du Nord from its junction with the Sensée River, east of -Lécluse to Péronne.</p> - -<p>During this hasty retirement large numbers of prisoners -and vast quantities of stores fell into our hands. In the -extreme south the French armies also continued to advance, -and by the 6th September had regained the line of the -Crozat Canal at La Fère.</p> - -<p>In the meantime the gradual relinquishment by the -enemy of his advanced positions in the Lys salient had -begun on the 18th August, and the retirement rapidly -becoming general, he had been driven back by the 6th -September to the line Givenchy-Neuve Chapelle-Ploegsteert.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_478" id="Page_478">[Pg 478]</a></span></p> -<div class="chapter"></div> -<hr class="chap" /> - - - - -<h2>CHAPTER XXV<br /> - -THE FINAL ADVANCE</h2> - - -<h3>III. <i>The 1/4th Battalion in the Battles of Cambrai and -The Sambre, 1918</i></h3> - -<p>The changes which the Battalion found at Boiry-Becquerelle -in the few days which had elapsed since its last rest -there were truly astonishing. The rapidity of the advance -had released Boiry from risk of bombardment by all except -long range guns, and the necessity for the supply services -to keep pace with the fighting troops in their progress -eastward had already resulted in a complete metamorphosis -of the Boyelles-Boiry area. Already Boyelles -Station was a hive of industry, and trains were daily -entering it from Arras with supplies. In Boiry-Becquerelle -itself, which had been in German hands till the 23rd August, -the 1/4th Londons were able to enjoy the luxury of baths -and clean clothing on the 2nd September.</p> - -<p>The few days' rest obtained here were passed pleasantly -amid fine weather in refitting and reorganisation; and the -Battalion was fortunately able on the 4th September to -commemorate the fourth anniversary of its departure from -England. Companies were now commanded as follows: -A by Capt. H. N. Williams, M.C.; B by Capt. L. L. Watts, -M.M.; C by Capt. C. L. Henstridge, M.C.; and D by Capt. -T. B. Cooper, M.C., M.M.</p> - -<p>About this time the Battalion Transport, which had -been stationed at Boisleux St Marc, was divided into two -echelons, of which A was the fighting and B the supply -portion. These two echelons were respectively commanded -by Lieut. G. V. Lawrie, M.C., and Lieut. G. E. Stanbridge. -Although as a rule the two portions moved together, they -were each self-contained and ready to operate separately -in case of a sudden and rapid advance.</p> - -<p>In the meantime the remainder of the XVII Corps was<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_479" id="Page_479">[Pg 479]</a></span> -busily chasing the enemy through Quéant, Pronville and -down the Arras-Cambrai Road to a point between Villers-lez-Cagnicourt -and Buissy. After a warning order to the -56th Division to move forward again into the Corps area -of battle, arrangements were suddenly changed—as on -numerous other occasions—and on the 5th September -the Division was transferred to the XXII Corps (Godley) -of the First Army, with orders to relieve the 1st Division -in the line.</p> - -<p>East of Vis-en-Artois and south of Douai is a stretch -of country well watered by numerous streams, and intersected -by many ponds and marshes. At Eterpigny the -Cojeul and Sensée Rivers join, and thus augmented the -Sensée expands at Etaing into what is practically a chain -of lakes. Augmented by the Trinquis River and connected -by it to the Scarpe, the Sensée flows eastward past Lécluse, -Palluel and Aubigny-au-Bac. At Palluel it receives on -its right, or south, bank the equally marshy streams of -the Agache and the Hirondelle and is intersected by the -northern extremity of the Canal du Nord, which here links -up with the Canal de la Sensée. This last-named Canal -runs southward from Douai to Arleux and then turning -eastward down the river valley joins the Canal de l'Escaut. -The whole area thus constitutes a thoroughly complicated -system of waterways and marshes which form barriers of -very great natural strength to an advance.</p> - -<p>The Sensée marshes from Etaing to Palluel had formed -the left flank of the Canadian Corps advance in its break -through the Drocourt-Quéant line during the Battle of the -Scarpe, and now formed a natural defensive flank, facing -northwards, to our advanced positions on the Canal du -Nord. In this area the 56th Division relieved the 1st -Division. On the evening of the 7th September, after a -a halt of one night at Vis-en-Artois, the 1/4th Londons -took over the positions of the 2nd Royal Sussex on a front -from Eterpigny Wood to a point east of Etaing. The line -was continued to Lécluse by the Kensingtons and thence -by the 169th Brigade.</p> - -<p>The Battalion was now in country which hitherto had -been in German hands for the whole of the War, and the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_480" id="Page_480">[Pg 480]</a></span> -devastated area was left behind. Villages were still standing -and houses furnished. Indeed, the civilians had still been -in occupation of them during the battle but had now been -moved to the rear by the French Mission. Trenches in -the ordinary sense were here non-existent and the front -was held by a series of outposts along the line of the -Sensée with sentry posts dug in small pits behind the -cover of trees and bushes. D, B, and C Companies were -in line, with A and Headquarters on the hill above Etaing.</p> - -<p>Life in this sector was comparatively uneventful. The -defences were improved and a great deal of useful patrolling -work carried out in the endeavour to locate fords or other -means of crossing the swamps in front. For his excellent -reconnaissances and reports Sergt. Heyes, M.M., received -commendation.</p> - -<p>The previous occupants of the line had evidently been -cautious in the use of their transport in forward areas, for -rations and stores were dumped each night at a cross-road -about 2000 yards in rear of the line; a course involving -the nightly labours of some 70 men for carrying duties. -The 1/4th Londons altered this and had limbers at night -up to the front line without any mishap, thus saving an -immense amount of fatigue and trouble to everyone.</p> - -<p>After reorganising the outpost line to a strength of two -companies the Battalion handed over its positions on the -evening of the 12th September to the 1st Londons (167th -Brigade), and concentrating at St Rohart Factory on the -Arras-Cambrai Road were 'bussed back to Feuchy where -they occupied shelters in Battery Valley, an area which a -month previously they had held as a front line!</p> - -<p>In this area a good deal of useful training with rifle and -Lewis gun was put in, and a friendly boxing tournament -with the London Scottish one evening afforded a pleasant -relaxation. The Battalion was here joined by a large -draft of officers, including Lieuts. A. Bath and T. R. -Fletcher, and 2/Lieuts. Bradley, R. D. Bushell, J. Coley, -P. W. Green and S. P. Ferdinando; and 2/Lieut. S. W. -Neville (7th Londons) attached.</p> - -<p>Lieut. E. P. M. Mosely's diary for this period affords -an excellent illustration of the care taken to maintain the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_481" id="Page_481">[Pg 481]</a></span> -discipline of the Battalion at a high standard by the -application of "peace-time" methods whenever the -situation allowed:</p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p>... This sound principle was the means of preventing -officers and men from degenerating into the "Ole Bill" -type—a type which probably existed nowhere except in -caricature. At Feuchy the Battalion was resting. The -enemy had been swept back and had left just a desolate -landscape, a smashed railway bridge and a collection of -shell holes. The accommodation for officers and men -consisted of holes in the ground roofed with tarpaulins -and cuttings in the embankment which carried what was -left of the railway line.</p> - -<p>Notwithstanding the entire lack of civilised comforts, -at 7.30 in the evenings, standing on the battered arch of -the bridge which once carried the line over Spider Corner, -a Battalion bugler would sound "Dress for Mess." -Officers would then scurry into their holes and half an hour -later emerge in slacks, well-groomed, and enter the mess, -a white-washed elephant shelter, and partake of a five-course -dinner with all customary mess etiquette.</p></div> - -<p>On the 19th September the 168th Brigade returned to -the line. The Corps boundaries were being now rearranged -and the 56th Division was being side-stepped -to its right, a change which was effected by handing over -a portion of its left to the 4th Division and extending its -right over the front hitherto held by the 3rd Canadian -Division. The additional frontage on the right was allotted -to the 168th Brigade, which, after the relief, held a sector -east of Ecourt St Quentin, with the London Scottish on -the right and the 1/4th Londons on the left. The Brigade's -left flank was secured by the 167th Brigade, which, facing -north-east, held the area from Ecourt St Quentin to -Lécluse.</p> - -<p>The 1/4th Londons' sector consisted of a line of outposts -some 500 yards west of the Canal du Nord, of which -both banks were held in force by the Germans, from the -Sauchy-Cauchy Road on the right, as far as Mill Copse -(inclusive to the enemy), where the line bent back and -facing north-east lay astride the Hirondelle River, the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_482" id="Page_482">[Pg 482]</a></span> -village of Ecourt St Quentin being inclusive to us. This -line of outposts was held by two companies with Headquarters -in a cottage east of Osvillers Lake, while two -companies were in support in front of Rumaucourt.</p> - -<p>The Battalion was unfortunate on the night of the -relief in losing 2/Lieut. A. Cartmell, wounded, while -2/Lieut. S. W. Neville was killed early the following -morning.</p> - -<p>Like the Etaing area, this sector was marshy and intersected -in all directions by dykes and streams. On the -opposite bank of the Canal, the right flank around -Sauchy-Cauchy was equally swampy; but opposite the -centre and left the whole of our area was well under -observation from a considerable hill on which stood -Oisy-le-Verger—looking like a second Monchy—and the -Bois de Quesnoy.</p> - -<p>In this sector the artillery on both sides was continually -active, though on the enemy's part activity was chiefly -confined to counter-battery work. The Battalion was -especially active at night in conducting reconnaissances of -the ground in front, and some useful information was -obtained. Very little was seen of the enemy's infantry, -though on two nights he succeeded by stealth in stealing -the garrison of one of our advanced posts, his second -attempt being rendered successful by the artifice of -approaching the post in the guise of deserters.</p> - -<p>We must now turn for a moment to the general situation -and must briefly consider once more the results achieved -by the Battles of Bapaume and of the Scarpe in order to -appreciate the further development of the offensive.</p> - -<p>In commenting on the achievements of the British -Armies in the Battle of Bapaume Sir Douglas Haig in his -despatches draws attention to the steady deterioration of -the enemy's morale and the increasing lack of organisation -in his defence:</p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p>The urgent needs of the moment, the wide extent of -front attacked and consequent uncertainty as to where -the next blow would fall, and the extent of his losses, had -forced the enemy to throw in his reserves piecemeal as they -arrived on the battle front. On many occasions in the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_483" id="Page_483">[Pg 483]</a></span> -course of the fighting elements of the same German -division had been identified on widely separated parts -of the battle front.</p> - -<p>In such circumstances a sudden and successful blow, -of weight sufficient to break through the northern hinge -of the defences on which he was to fall back, might produce -results of great importance.</p></div> - -<p>This anticipation of the Commander-in-Chief was amply -fulfilled by the rapid retreat of the enemy towards the -Hindenburg line during the first week of September after -the close of the Battle of the Scarpe.</p> - -<p>After hard fighting at Havrincourt and Epéhy during -the third week of September the enemy was definitely -within his Hindenburg defences as far north as Havrincourt, -north of which he had been pushed beyond them -to the line of the Canal du Nord. On the 12th September -the Americans drove the enemy out of the St Mihiel salient, -and it was decided in discussion between Sir Douglas Haig -and Marshal Foch that as soon as possible four vigorous -and simultaneous attacks should be launched: by the -Americans in the direction of Mézières; by the French in -Argonne with the same general objectives; by the British -in the direction of Maubeuge; and by Belgian and Allied -Forces in Flanders towards Ghent.</p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p>By these attacks, says Sir Douglas Haig, it was expected -that the important German forces opposite the French -and Americans would be pressed back upon the difficult -country of the Ardennes while the British thrust at their -main communications.</p></div> - -<p>The long continued blows delivered by the British -Armies, although enormously successful, had placed a -great strain on the troops, and their losses, though small -in proportion to the enemy's and to the results achieved, -were in the aggregate considerable. The Hindenburg -positions were known to be strongly defended, and an -unsuccessful attack on them would have a serious political -effect and inevitably revive the declining German morale. -An important crisis in the War had been reached and it -was essential that the success of the British in this new<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_484" id="Page_484">[Pg 484]</a></span> -attack should be decisive. After weighing the various -considerations involved Sir Douglas Haig states:</p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p>... I was convinced that the British attack was -the essential part of the general scheme and that the -moment was favourable. Accordingly I decided to proceed -with the attack....</p></div> - -<p>The battle, which opened on the British front on the -27th September (Battle of Cambrai, 1918), culminated on -the 5th October in the capture of all the Hindenburg -trenches and of such isolated trench systems as lay in -rear of it.</p> - -<p>The part of the 56th Division in this great battle was -the crossing of the Canal du Nord. This strong natural -obstacle was considered to be too stubbornly held to yield -to frontal attack on a wide area; and the general plan -was therefore for the Canadian Corps to cross it on a -narrow front north of Mœuvres and then spreading out -fanwise to extend the gains north and south on the east -bank.</p> - -<p>The 1st Canadian Division, on the left of the Canadian -Corps and adjoining the right of the 56th Division, was to -cross the Canal south of the Arras-Cambrai Road and -carry the line forward to Haynecourt. After this the 56th -Division, astride the Canal on a front as far east as Sauchicourt -Farm, with the 11th Division on its right, would -attack northwards towards Oisy-le-Verger and the Sensée -River at Palluel.</p> - -<p>The 56th Division attack was entrusted east of the -Canal to the 169th Brigade and west of it to the Kensingtons -of the 168th Brigade. The London Scottish and 1/4th -Londons in line had thus the peculiar experience of the -attack actually crossing their front from right to left.</p> - -<p>At 5.30 a.m. on the 27th September the crash of the -barrage announced the opening of the Canadian Corps -attack. The enemy's retaliation was slight and had -practically ceased by 6 a.m. The 1/4th Londons' area -was occupied by eight brigades of field guns engaged in -firing a flank barrage to the main attack until 2.48 p.m., -when they were to switch on a creeping barrage for the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_485" id="Page_485">[Pg 485]</a></span> -attack northwards along the Canal. Additional flank -protection was furnished by six companies of machine-guns -also in our area. In view of this heavy barrage and -the possibility of severe retaliation the 1/4th Londons' -outpost line was thinned out to two platoons in charge of -Lieut. T. R. Fletcher, the remainder of the front companies -being withdrawn to the support position.</p> - -<p>The Canadian attack went well, but very stiff opposition -was encountered in Marquion, so that the 56th Division -attack from the Blue line had to be postponed from -2.48 p.m. to 3.28 p.m. Excellent work was done by the -512th and 513th Field Companies, R.E. (56th Division), -in bridging the Canal at Marquion.</p> - -<p>During the morning the 1/4th Londons' front seemed -to be clear, and an officer's patrol under 2/Lieut. O. C. -Hudson was sent forward to reconnoitre the enemy -positions along the Agache River, which were found to be -unoccupied.</p> - -<p>At 3.28 p.m. the Kensingtons commenced their attack -and progressed without difficulty as far as their first -objective, the east and west road through Sauchy-Cauchy. -North of this, however, they were met with stubborn -resistance from machine-guns in Mill Copse and the marshes -east of the Canal. Owing to the restricted avenues of -advance through the marsh—there were only two possible -routes to Mill Copse—the Kensingtons' attack was checked -at about 6.30 p.m. some 500 yards south of the Copse. -Excellent information was brought to Headquarters by -2/Lieut. A. M. Bullock as to the situation not only of the -Kensingtons but also of the 169th Brigade east of the -Canal.</p> - -<p>About 5.50 p.m. C and D Companies began to re-establish -the almost vacated outpost line, and later in the -evening D Company was ordered to endeavour to assist -the Kensingtons by pushing through to the Agache River -and if possible by working round the Copse. By shortly -after 11 p.m. reports were received that D Company had -established four posts in touch with the Kensingtons. -Mill Copse, however, was still in the enemy hands.</p> - -<p>On the right of the Canal the 169th Brigade was also<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_486" id="Page_486">[Pg 486]</a></span> -held up by stubborn machine-guns, and it was not till -8 a.m. the following morning that they were fully in -possession of their final objective.</p> - -<p>In view of the check on both banks the reserve company -of the Kensingtons was ordered to clear up the -situation as soon as the moon rose, and at 2 a.m. this -company advanced astride the Canal as far as Mill Copse, -which it found unoccupied. The Kensingtons then -organised in depth, having reached their final objective -at the surprisingly small cost of nine other ranks wounded.</p> - -<p>The prosecution of the advance was ordered for the 28th -September, and the 1/4th Londons were detailed to carry -the 168th Brigade line forward on the west bank of the -Canal towards Palluel, while on the east the 169th Brigade -was to advance to the Sensée River.</p> - -<p>During the night Battalion Headquarters was persistently -shelled from its left rear by guns across the -Sensée, with mustard gas.</p> - -<p>At 9.30 a.m. D Company, with one platoon of A Company -attached, began the advance northward to Palluel -in the narrow gut of land between the Canal and the -marshes and ponds of the Hirondelle River. Lieut.-Col. -Marchment, 2/Lieut. Bullock, Sergts. Randall and Heyes -and a few signallers followed in the attack, communication -with Headquarters being maintained by a running wire -all the way. Very little opposition was met with, and -Capt. Cooper, with Lieut. Fletcher and 2/Lieut. Millstead, -was soon established on the bridges at Palluel, where -touch was gained with C Company and with patrols of -the 8th Middlesex (167th Brigade) which occupied the -village and advanced beyond it towards Arleux.</p> - -<p>The whole 168th Brigade front being now confined to -this narrow tongue of land its area was handed over to -the 167th Brigade, and the 1/4th Londons withdrew to -reserve positions at Rumaucourt. This move was completed -by 9.15 p.m. on the 28th September.</p> - -<p>This successful operation had been effected at very -slight loss, the total casualties of the Division having been -only 341 all ranks, while the 1/4th London losses for the -whole of September were the happily small total of 30<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_487" id="Page_487">[Pg 487]</a></span> -other ranks in addition to the two officers already mentioned.</p> - -<p>During these two days' fighting the 11th Division on -the right had also met with considerable success, and on -the evening of the 30th September the 168th Brigade was -ordered back to the line to take over the positions gained -by the left Brigade (the 34th) of the 11th Division. The -advanced positions, which extended from the sharp bend -in the Sensée Canal south of Brunemont on the left to -a point opposite Aubencheul-au-Bac on the right, were -occupied by the London Scottish and the Kensingtons.</p> - -<p>The 1/4th Londons, who marched from Rumaucourt -at 9 p.m. on the 30th September, relieved the 2nd Manchester -in the support area, on the high ground south -of Oisy-le-Verger and east of Sauchy-Lestrée.</p> - -<p>The dispositions in this area were far from good, all -the companies being rather mixed up in the railway cutting -near the Bois des Puits; and on the following day Lieut.-Col. -Marchment effected a redistribution of the Battalion, -moving C and D Companies to Cemetery Wood and B -Company to Battalion Headquarters near the Aubencheul -Road, while A Company remained at the Bois des Puits. -For five days the Battalion was busily employed in nightly -working parties, digging a line of support posts across the -ridge south of Oisy-le-Verger as far east as the old German -dump at the cross-roads towards Epinoy. This dump -proved to be a rather popular spot for it was found -to be amply supplied with large bottles of Seltzer water. -Probably a good number of these was taken on unofficial -charge of the Battalion.</p> - -<p>On the evening of the 5th October the 1/4th Londons -took over the right subsection from the London Scottish, -on the slope of the hill overlooking Aubencheul and the -railway triangle. Hostile activity was slight on the 6th -October, and from observation it seemed that the enemy -was holding Aubencheul very lightly; in the afternoon -orders were received to test the situation with patrols -and if possible to penetrate the village and occupy the -Canal bank north of it. Considerable fires observed -during the morning in Aubigny-au-Bac contributed to<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_488" id="Page_488">[Pg 488]</a></span> -the supposition that the vacation by the enemy of Aubencheul, -if not already accomplished, was at least imminent.</p> - -<p>B Company (Lieut. H. F. Dade) was detailed for the -work, and at 7 p.m. No. 7 Platoon, with Lieut. A. M. -Bullock, Intelligence Officer, and 4 Headquarters scouts -attached, left advanced Battalion Headquarters to try to -enter the village and reach the railway bridge over the -Canal. The other platoons stood in readiness to move -forward if required. By 10.15 p.m. information was received -that the platoon was in the village without having -met with any of the enemy, and accordingly Nos. 5 and 8 -Platoons were at once ordered to move forward to form -posts at the railway crossing and the Aubigny-au-Bac Road -bridge and to find touch with the 11th Division on the -right. These operations were successfully accomplished, -though the enemy gave evidence of his occupation of the -north end of the bridges.</p> - -<p>By 4 a.m. on the 7th October the occupation of the -village was complete with two platoons which were in -touch with the 2nd Yorkshires (4th Division) on the right, -one platoon in the railway cutting south of the village and -one still in the old outpost line. No casualties had been -sustained.</p> - -<p>The following day the 1/4th Londons took over the -whole Brigade front, C Company (Capt. C. L. Henstridge, -M.C.) on the right, A Company (Capt. L. L. Watts, M.M.) -in the centre and D Company (Lieut. T. R. Fletcher) on -the left. B Company (Lieut. H. F. Dade) was withdrawn -to support. The outposts consisted of a line of sentry -posts on the Canal with a line of resistance about 400 -yards in rear. A reserve line was occupied on the spurs -overlooking the Canal north and east of Oisy-le-Verger. -Company Headquarters were located in captured German -battery positions, and D Company became the possessors -of a complete battery of 8-inch German howitzers which -had been taken on the 27th September.</p> - -<hr class="tb" /> - -<div class="figcenter" style="width: 500px;"> -<img src="images/i_b_488fp.jpg" width="500" height="464" alt="" /> -<div class="caption"><p><span class="smcap">The Battle of Cambrai, 1918. The Canal du Nord</span></p></div> -</div> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_489" id="Page_489">[Pg 489]</a></span></p> - -<p>The first phase of the great British offensive may now -be said to have been brought to a conclusion. In the -nine days' fighting between the 27th September and the -5th October, the First, Third and Fourth Armies had -shattered the enemy's last prepared lines of defence. The -line of the Canal du Nord had been crossed and left far -behind, and the whole of the main Hindenburg defences -were in our hands. "The effect of the victory," writes -Sir Douglas Haig in his despatches, "on the subsequent -course of the campaign was decisive." The threat to the -enemy's communications was now direct and instant, for -nothing but the natural obstacles of a wooded and well-watered -countryside lay between our Armies and Maubeuge.</p> - -<p>In this fighting 30 British and 2 American infantry -divisions and 1 British cavalry division had met and defeated -39 German divisions at a loss to the enemy of 36,000 -prisoners and 380 guns!</p> - -<p>The effect of the advance of our Armies on this front -now rendered the enemy's positions in the Lys area -precarious. Already on the 28th September the Second -Army, attacking on a wide front about Ypres, had carried -forward our positions in one day a greater distance than -had been gained in the whole of the dreary struggles for -Passchendaele in 1917. By the 1st October Messines had -again been liberated and our troops were approaching -Gheluve and Werwicq. On the 2nd October the enemy -initiated a general withdrawal on the front from Lens to -Armentières.</p> - -<p>We have now to follow the course of the second phase -of the British advance—the final phase of the War. In -this great operation the Fourth and Third Armies and the -right of the First Army advanced with their left flank on -the Canal from Cambrai to Mons and their right flank -covered by our French Allies.</p> - -<hr class="tb" /> - -<p>The first stage of this series of battles opened on the -8th October with a vast drive by the Third and Fourth -Armies in the direction of Le Cateau. The success of the -operation was complete, but we are only concerned with -the point that it involved the fall of Cambrai on the 9th -October.</p> - -<p>This continued advance of the British in the south -exposed in increasing measure the flank of the enemy<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_490" id="Page_490">[Pg 490]</a></span> -north of the Sensée, and great developments were therefore -to be expected shortly in the XXII Corps area. -Already the enemy was reported to be withdrawing from -his positions in the corner between the Canal de la Sensée -and the Canal de l'Escaut, which had been crossed by the -Canadians as far north as Ramillies; and to relieve the -11th Division to pursue this movement the 168th Brigade -extended its right with the Kensingtons as far as Fressies, -which village was to be occupied immediately after the -completion of the relief. This was on the 9th October.</p> - -<p>The possibility of an early German retirement north -of the Sensée also called for great vigilance, and the 1/4th -Londons were ordered to probe the situation towards -Brunemont and Aubigny-au-Bac, while units of the 167th -Brigade were feeling towards Arleux.</p> - -<p>The only way to cross the Canal, short of swimming -or using a boat, was to use the ruined iron bridges at -Aubencheul and Abbaye-du-Verger Farm, and accordingly -small patrols, covered by parties on the south bank, began -to cross the bridges at about 5 p.m. on the 9th October. -Results were soon obtained. At Aubencheul the enemy -was alert and the patrol was driven back. At the Farm -crossing A Company obtained more success. A post of -the enemy about 12 strong was discovered on the Brunemont -Road north of the Canal, and these, after firing a few -shots, fled, though one of them was captured by Sergt. -R. C. Clammer, D.C.M., M.M., after which the patrol -returned. The prisoner was from the 103rd I Regiment, -and was a destitute wretch, wearing cap, jacket, trousers -and boots—and nothing else. Unfortunately, Capt. Watts -was killed by a stray bullet while returning to his company -headquarters.</p> - -<p>The same evening the 1/4th Londons were relieved by -the 8th Middlesex (167th Brigade) and withdrew to Brigade -support in shelters west of Epinoy. At the same time the -Kensingtons and London Scottish effected the extension -to the right of the Divisional line above referred to.</p> - -<p>Early on the morning of the 11th October the Kensingtons -launched a completely successful attack on -Fressies and advanced the Brigade line to the Canal at a<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_491" id="Page_491">[Pg 491]</a></span> -loss to themselves of only 10 casualties. In the meantime -the advance of the VIII Corps north of the Sensée River -had driven the enemy from Vitry-en-Artois and was now -being directed towards Douai. To assist in this development -the 56th Division artillery was ordered to keep under -fire the crossings over the northern arm of the Sensée Canal, -while the infantry made persistent endeavours to establish -themselves beyond the Canal de la Sensée with a view to -exerting pressure on the retiring enemy's left flank. On -the 12th the 167th Brigade completed the clearance of -Arleux which had been initiated by the Canadians, and -occupied the Canal triangle south-east of the village. The -following day the 169th Brigade occupied Aubigny-au-Bac -after a sharp fight, but a vigorous counter-attack later -threw them back to the Canal bank. In this fighting -magnificent devotion was displayed by the Royal Engineers -in bridging the Canal under heavy fire.</p> - -<p>By the 16th October the 4th Canadian Division had -taken over the Divisional line and the 56th Division withdrew -into Army reserve.</p> - -<p>The 1/4th Londons were relieved in the Brigade support -area by the 1/2nd Londons on the 11th October and passed -into Divisional reserve at Rumaucourt, where several days -of very welcome rest were obtained.</p> - -<p>Both Rumaucourt and Ecourt-St Quentin were still -comparatively unharmed and partly furnished. Everywhere -were signs of the German occupation. The chief -anxiety of the enemy occupants seems to have been fear -of British aeroplanes, for every cellar had its capacity -plainly written on the door, while large warning bells or -"Flieger Alarum" were fixed in all prominent places. In -Ecourt-St Quentin were three German field hospitals -which afforded unmistakable evidence that the enemy -was hard up for bandages, for in place of these he seemed -to have used old curtains and paper. An abundant -quantity of old civilian clothing was also found here, and -rumour has it that the doctor was seen one day sporting an -excellent top hat. B Company lived in one of these -hospitals and had an excellent time with a grand piano. -These good Bosche institutions afforded an opportunity<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_492" id="Page_492">[Pg 492]</a></span> -of bathing, of which advantage was taken by the whole -Battalion.</p> - -<p>During the foregoing spell of active work the Battalion -transport had been located near Wancourt. "One day -in October," writes Lieut.-Col. Marchment, "a deputation -of Company Q.M.-Sergts. appeared at Orders with a request -that they might take it in turns to come up with the -rations, A and C one night, B and D the next. To this I -gladly consented when, looking at the map, I found that -they were walking and riding some twenty-six miles a -night!"</p> - -<p>On the afternoon of the 14th October the Battalion -marched to Marquion—till the 27th September in German -hands—to entrain for a rest at Arras. The train was due -out at 3 p.m., but as things turned out there was no occasion -for hurry, since owing to a smash at Boisleux the train did -not reach Marquion till 11 p.m. A weary but happy -Battalion entrained, confidently expecting to wake up in -Arras, but the advent of morning brought no change of -scene. The train had not moved an inch! However, in -due course the line was cleared and the train gaily rattled -over the battlefields of Quéant, Croisilles and Boyelles, and -reached Arras by 11.30 a.m. on the 15th. The 1/4th -Londons were quartered in comfortable billets in the Rue -d'Amiens.</p> - -<p>The rest in Arras, with which charming little city -the Battalion had been so frequently associated, was -probably the most enjoyable that fell to its lot in the -whole War. To start with, everyone was in the highest -spirits born of the knowledge of their own recent successes -in action and of their confidence for the battles to come. -Food was good and plentiful. The civilians were returning -and shops were beginning to open once again.</p> - -<p>Here the Battalion experienced the first visible effects -of what the liberation of France meant to the French. -Refugees from the liberated villages towards Cambrai -were being sent back for safety to Arras, where they were -housed in the Schramm Barracks till the French Mission -was able to arrange to settle them in other parts of France. -Streams of homeless women and children drifted through<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_493" id="Page_493">[Pg 493]</a></span> -the streets, clinging to a few treasured objects of their -personal belongings, and our men stood at the street -corners deeply impressed by such heartrending scenes. -Shamefacedly, as if fearful of disclosing the depth of their -emotion to their comrades, the men would beg the refugees -to be allowed to carry their parcels for them. Three men -of one company took complete charge of a distressed -family and piloted them to a house where they settled -the poor folks, lit a fire for them, bought eggs with their -own money, scrounged some bully beef, and then fled to -avoid the thanks of their grateful charges.</p> - -<p>The average Cockney is not in the habit of wearing his -heart on his sleeve. Rather does he conceal his emotion -beneath the cloak of "grousing," but scenes of desolation -such as these—far more affecting than the sight of a -ruined countryside—brought out all the wonderful chivalry -which has endeared the simple British soldier to the hearts -of the French. "It was only in censoring letters home," -writes an officer, "that one realised how deeply touched -our men were by the sufferings of the civilians." Of all -these saddening sights probably the most dreadful was at -the Hôpital St Jean, where little mites of French children -were dying of gas poisoning, and old people lying demented -by the horrors through which they had passed. To -alleviate these sufferings everything possible was done, and -our own R.A.M.C. orderlies worked side by side with the -French Sisters of Mercy.</p> - -<p>One afternoon the Commanding Officer gave permission -for the drums to play to the refugees. The performance -concluded with the Marseillaise, the glorious strains of -which, not heard for four long years, so overcame the -audience that in the intensity of their emotion old men, -women and children fell upon the drummers and kissed -them—much to the embarrassment of those good-natured -fellows.</p> - -<p>Some excellent training meanwhile was being obtained -on the racecourse at Dainville, and several rifle competitions -were introduced to add to the keenness of the men. -The Battalion was largely reclothed and much done to -improve its excellent parade discipline. On the 21st<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_494" id="Page_494">[Pg 494]</a></span> -October a Guard of Honour was provided, consisting of -100 all ranks under Capt. H. N. Williams, M.C., for -President Poincaré, who was visiting Arras—"the finest -Guard the Division ever turned out," as Faulkner described -it. The identity of this distinguished visitor -remained for a long time shrouded in mystery, and curiosity -reached fever-pitch. The Mess decided that the only way -to deal with the problem was to have a sweepstake, in -which the names of the Prince of Wales, M. Clemenceau, -General Smuts, Marshal Foch and the Lord Nozoo (representing -The Field) were included. Captain Williams' -return was awaited with breathless anxiety, but, alas, in -the dark he had failed to solve the mystery. The Mess -paid out on M. Clemenceau—he being apparently the -nearest to the distinguished visitor who actually arrived.</p> - -<p>During this rest at Arras the Battalion was joined by -Capts. H. W. Spiers and D. S. Boorman, M.C. (to command -B and C Companies respectively), and by Lieuts. E. G. Dew -and H. D. Rees, the latter being appointed Assistant-Adjutant. -Regimental Sergt.-Major Jacques, who was -returning to England in training for Quartermaster, was -replaced by Sergt.-Major Wilson, who had been wounded -at Ypres in 1917. The strength of the Battalion was now -38 officers and 721 other ranks.</p> - -<hr class="tb" /> - -<p>The latter half of October had seen most rapid and -important changes on the British battle front, to which -we must refer briefly. The success of the attack towards -Le Cateau in the early days of the month had been complete -and had driven the enemy back to the line of the -Selle River. This enabled G.H.Q. to initiate the second -stage of this last phase of the War, which was to force the -enemy from the Selle River back to the general line Sambre -Canal—western edge of Forêt de Mormal—Valenciennes. -The occupation of this line would enable the British Armies -to launch their final attack on Maubeuge.</p> - -<p>The Battle of the Selle was opened by the Fourth Army -on the 17th October, the fight gradually involving the -Third and First Armies in succession. By the 20th October -the enemy had been driven across the Sambre as far north<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_495" id="Page_495">[Pg 495]</a></span> -as Catillon, Le Cateau was occupied, and the Selle River -left two miles behind our advanced positions. The main -attack developed on the 23rd October, and by the end of -the following day the enemy was driven on to the western -edge of the Forêt de Mormal, the outskirts of Le Quesnoy -had been reached, and the lateral railway connecting Le -Quesnoy with Valenciennes had been crossed on a front -of about four miles. This latter portion of the success -was on the front of the XXII and Canadian Corps of the -First Army. The Selle River Battle resulted in the -capture of 20,000 prisoners and 475 guns, and in the defeat -of 31 German divisions by 25 British and 2 American -divisions.</p> - -<p>On other parts of the front successes had been equally -striking. Laon had fallen to the French on the 13th -October. In Belgium, Menin, Thorout and Ostend had -been occupied in rapid succession, and by the 20th October -the Allied line rested on the Dutch frontier. This advance -in the extreme north had the effect of turning the defences -of Lille, which was encircled and occupied on the 18th -October, after which a steady advance brought our troops -to the line of the Scheldt north of Valenciennes to Avelghem.</p> - -<p>The critical condition of the Germans is summed up by -Sir Douglas Haig in his despatches:—</p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p>By this time the rapid succession of heavy blows dealt -by the British forces had had a cumulative effect, both -moral and material upon the German Armies.... His -reserves of men were exhausted.... The capitulation -of Turkey and Bulgaria and the imminent collapse of -Austria—consequent upon Allied successes which the -desperate position of her own armies in the western front -had rendered her powerless to prevent—had made -Germany's military situation impossible. If her armies -were now to be allowed to withdraw undisturbed to shorter -lines the struggle might still be protracted over the winter. -The British Armies, however, were now in a position to -prevent this by a direct attack upon a vital centre which -should anticipate the enemy withdrawal and force an -immediate conclusion.</p></div> - -<p>A necessary preliminary to the final attack was the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_496" id="Page_496">[Pg 496]</a></span> -capture of Valenciennes itself, and this was accomplished -on the 1st November. The XXII Corps, advancing on a -front of six miles to the south of the city, crossed the -Rhonelle River, and occupied the high ground overlooking -the valley of the Aunelle River, while the Canadians -entered Valenciennes and pushed on to the east of it.</p> - -<hr class="tb" /> - -<p>On the 31st October the 56th Division rejoined the -XXII Corps in the battle area, and the battalions of the -168th Brigade embussed from Arras to Douchy (two miles -south of Denain). For a couple of days the 1/4th Londons -remained here in very fair billets, receiving a most hearty -welcome from the inhabitants, who had been for four years -under the heel of the enemy.</p> - -<p>At 8 a.m. on the 2nd November the Battalion marched -about five miles forward to the staging area at Maing, -which it reached at about 11.30 a.m., and that evening -advanced again at short notice and relieved the 4th -K.O.Y.L.I. (49th Division) in advanced positions facing -Saultain, the relief being completed by 2 a.m. on the 3rd -November. The advance was led by D Company, which -came under heavy shell fire when passing through Famars, -and lost 4 men killed and 14 wounded.</p> - -<p>The 168th Brigade section which was the left of the -Divisional front, the 169th being on the right, was held -with the Kensingtons and 1/4th Londons in the line. D -Company occupied small sections of trenches in the front -line some 500 yards west of the Château de Saultain, -while A, B and C Companies were held back in a sunken -road south-east of Aulnoy.</p> - -<p>Lieut.-Col. Marchment was now in command of the -168th Brigade, General Loch having gone to hospital, -and the Battalion was temporarily under Major R. B. -Marshall, with Captain T. B. Cooper, M.C., M.M., acting -as second in command. Battalion Headquarters opened -in Aulnoy.</p> - -<div class="figcenter" style="width: 500px;"> -<img src="images/i_b_496fp.jpg" width="500" height="179" alt="" /> -<div class="caption"><p><span class="smcap">The Battle of the Sambre, 1918</span></p></div> -</div> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_497" id="Page_497">[Pg 497]</a></span></p> - -<p>About the time of the relief it became apparent that -the enemy had retired again opposite the Canadians on -our left and was about to do so on our own front. At -10.35 a.m. a wire was received in the Battalion stating -that the Canadians had entered Estreux, and ordering -the Battalion to push strongly supported patrols through -Saultain as far as the Ferme du Moulin. D Company -moved forward at 11.15 a.m., supported by A Company, -and entered Saultain which was found to be unoccupied -except for four men of the 109th Infantry Regiment who -were taken prisoners. By two o'clock the Ferme du -Moulin was occupied with very little opposition and -Battalion Headquarters advanced to the Château de -Saultain. On the right the Kensingtons had also pressed -forward towards the cemetery of Curgies, and touch was -obtained with them and with the 4th Canadian Division -on the left. This advance—over 2000 yards—was consolidated -by the 1/4th Londons, while two squadrons of -Australian Light Horse and a company of New Zealand -cyclists endeavoured to push forward during the evening -to secure the crossings of the River Aunelle. Their -attempt, however, was checked about 1000 yards in -front of the infantry by enemy machine-gun fire, and in -this position the progress for the day was concluded, the -Kensingtons occupying with the cavalry and cyclists the -advanced line, which extended in a north-westerly direction -from the cross-roads at Le Talandier. That night the -1/4th Londons' position was held with D and A Companies -in front and B and C Companies in support.</p> - -<p>The immediate resumption of the advance being -ordered by XXII Corps, arrangements were made by 56th -Division with the adjoining divisions to pursue the attack -at 6 a.m. the following morning, 4th November, each -division operating independently. Orders for this advance -did not reach the 1/4th Londons, who were detailed for the -attack on the 168th Brigade front, till 1 a.m., and there -was thus no more than enough time to assemble the companies -close in rear of the line held by the Kensingtons. -For reconnaissance there was no time at all. The attack -was delivered on a two-company front by B Company on -the right and A Company on the left, each moving in -square formation of platoons with a screen of scouts and -cavalry patrols in front. C and D Companies followed in -diamond formation at a distance of about 200 yards. The<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_498" id="Page_498">[Pg 498]</a></span> -objective was given as the high ground across the River -Aunelle about 500 yards east of Sebourquiaux.</p> - -<p>The morning dawned mistily, but in this case the mist -was not altogether a disadvantage. The whole of this -countryside was a swelling waste of stubble fields with -practically no landmarks, but fortunately a line of telegraph -poles going due east which was visible through the mist -enabled the leading companies to keep their direction well—a -great stroke of luck, as the advance lay up hill and -down dale over this barren land for some 2000 yards -before the crest of the Aunelle Valley was reached, and -the objective was for a long time out of sight. The mist -thus served to conceal the advance from the enemy till -the leading companies breasted the hill overlooking -Sebourquiaux itself, and started descending the slope to -the village.</p> - -<p>The Aunelle River is hereabouts spanned by three -bridges, one at Sebourg, one at Sebourquiaux, and one at -Le Pissot, north of the latter village. These had already -been secured by the cavalry patrols who had, however, -been unable to make progress across the river. As the -leading companies began to drop down the hill towards -the village the mist partly cleared, and the German -machine-gunners opened a heavy fire. The leading companies -at once dashed down the hill into the cover of the -scattered houses and streets which form the outskirts of -Sebourquiaux on the west bank of the river; but here -they seemed to have fallen into a trap for the enemy at -once dropped a barrage of considerable intensity, shells of -all calibres falling thick and fast. Forward progress was -impossible, and B Company on the right therefore promptly -worked round the right flank, crossing the river at Sebourg, -and then, turning northward toward Sebourquiaux, -cleared the village of the enemy machine-gunners. In -the meantime A Company had been heavily machine-gunned -from the direction of Rombies, which continued -to resist the Canadian attack, and touch with the Canadians -was lost.</p> - -<p>B Company having cleared the way through the village, -A Company was able to cross the river, and together the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_499" id="Page_499">[Pg 499]</a></span> -two companies attempted to force their way up the slope -to the east of Sebourquiaux. The machine-gun fire was -too intense, and the companies had to fall back to a line on -the eastern outskirts of the village, where, joined by C -Company (in support), they began to consolidate their -position. Touch was obtained with the Queen's Westminsters -of the 169th Brigade who had cleared Sebourg -on the right, but no connection could be obtained with the -Canadians who were still held up before Rombies on the -left, and A Company therefore threw a defensive flank -astride the Aunelle River facing northwards. The Battalion -was now organised on the line which had been gained, all -companies having platoons on the forward positions and -finding their own supports. All day the village of Sebourquiaux -remained under heavy German shell fire, but at -about 5.30 p.m. the intensity of the enemy's fire increased -and the work of destruction was completed, hardly a -house being left standing. A variegated display of Véry -lights which accompanied this barrage led to the expectation -that the enemy was organising a counter-attack, -but no infantry movement on the part of the Germans -materialised.</p> - -<p>The stiffness of the enemy resistance this day made it -abundantly clear that further progress could be made only -by means of an organised attack in co-operation with the -divisions on either flank, and arrangements for a further -advance were promptly made.</p> - -<p>That night the 1/4th Londons were relieved by the -London Scottish and withdrew in Brigade reserve to the -high ground east of Estreux, Headquarters remaining at -the Ferme du Moulin. This relief was completed at 3 a.m. -on the 5th November, and at 5.30 a.m. the attack was -pursued by the London Scottish, with the Kensingtons in -support and the 1/4th Londons in reserve. By 6 a.m. -the crest east of Sebourquiaux had been gained and the -enemy was retiring in the direction of Angre.</p> - -<p>On the 169th Brigade front the enemy resistance was -not severe, and by 7.30 a.m. the London Rifle Brigade had -captured Angreau. The Canadians had also occupied -Rombies, but on the ridge between this village and Angre<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_500" id="Page_500">[Pg 500]</a></span> -the Germans continued to hold out in great force and to -bring very heavy machine-gun fire to bear on the left flank -of the 168th Brigade.</p> - -<p>At 8 a.m. the 1/4th Londons were ordered forward, and -by 11 a.m. the companies, A, B, C and D in line from -right to left, were in position in the old German trenches -east of Sebourquiaux, with Battalion Headquarters -in a farmhouse in the village. In this position the -Battalion was practically on the frontier of France and -Belgium.</p> - -<p>The advance was resumed by the London Scottish -under a barrage at 4.15 p.m., and the line was advanced -to within about 500 yards of Angre. The enemy machine-gun -fire again precluded the possibility of further advance, -and eventually a line was consolidated facing north-east -in touch with the 169th Brigade on the right and the -Canadians on the left.</p> - -<p>On the 6th November the attack was pursued by the -London Scottish on the right and the Kensingtons on the -left, the 1/4th Londons again being in support. Fierce -fighting took place, particularly on the left flank where -the Kensingtons crossed the Grande Honnelle River, were -thrown back, and crossed it again. At the end of the day -the leading battalions were in possession of Angre, on the -east bank of the Grand Honnelle. The 1/4th Londons -moved forward slightly from their positions of the previous -day but did not come into action.</p> - -<p>The whole of these days were extremely wet, and not a -man in the Battalion had a scrap of dry clothing. Trenches -were embryonic, and shelters almost entirely lacking—of -dugouts there were, of course, none.</p> - -<p>Shortly after midnight "Drake" Battalion of the -63rd (Royal Naval) Division relieved the Battalion—the -remainder of the Brigade also being relieved—and it -withdrew to tolerable billets in Sebourg. The march to -Sebourg was only about two miles, but every road was -choked with double and even treble lines of transport of -all descriptions waiting to follow up the advance. It had -been waiting motionless since the previous afternoon and -did not get on the move again till 4 a.m. the next morning.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_501" id="Page_501">[Pg 501]</a></span> -In these circumstances the march to Sebourg occupied -about four hours—a most unpleasant journey in which -desultory shelling by the enemy alternated with heated -arguments with despairing transport officers. Dawn, -however, found the Battalion enjoying a good breakfast, -and drying its clothes, all its troubles forgotten, and -every one filled with justifiable satisfaction at the good -work that had been done.</p> - -<p>This, the last fight of the 1/4th Londons, produced -nine prisoners and cost in casualties: 2/Lieut. A. M. -Bullock, killed; 2/Lieut. G. H. Sylvester, died of wounds; -2/Lieut. H. W. Taylor, wounded; and in N.C.O.'s and -men, 11 killed, 55 wounded and 1 missing.</p> - -<p>From now onwards the 56th Division was fighting on -a one-brigade front, with the 167th leading, and the 1/4th -Londons were engaged in following up the advance by -stages so as to be within supporting distance of the leading -troops. Nowhere was the enemy's opposition more than -trifling, and the advance proceeded rapidly, though under -conditions of some discomfort and difficulty. The line of -the Division's advance lay almost due east, roughly -parallel to the marshes about the Canal de Condé which -connects the Canal de l'Escaut with Mons, and the whole -countryside is cut up by innumerable small streams discharging -northwards into the marsh area. The banks of -these streams are everywhere steep, and bridges had been -systematically destroyed by the retiring enemy who had -also blown craters at almost every road junction. It was -an ideal country for a determined enemy to fight a rearguard -action, but the Germans' powers of resistance were -broken, and beyond the delays caused to the progress of -our troops by the wholesale destruction, opposition was -negligible. The extreme rapidity of the advance indeed -made it almost impossible for the supply services to keep -pace, and the damage to the roads prevented lorries from -proceeding beyond the Grande Honnelle River till the -necessary repairs could be completed. The weather, -moreover, had broken, and for three days rain fell incessantly. -But these discomforts were slight in comparison -with the enormous wave of enthusiasm which<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_502" id="Page_502">[Pg 502]</a></span> -passed over all the troops who had the good fortune to -take part in this extraordinary victory.</p> - -<p>On the 7th November the line of the Bavai-Hensies -Road was crossed, and the following day the leading -troops had reached the line Petit Moronfait-Rinchon-Ferlibray. -The 9th November saw the Mons-Maubeuge -Road crossed, and on the 10th the 1st Londons, who were -leading, captured Harveng, and after slight opposition -pushed forward to Harmignies.</p> - -<p>The 1/4th Londons following up the advance moved -on the 8th to Autreppe and the following day to Blaugies. -The band was now with the Battalion and played on the -march. This gave rise to most remarkable patriotic -demonstrations on the part of the liberated villagers who -everywhere greeted the Battalion with cries of "Vive -l'Angleterre!" and showered flowers on the troops, while -crowds of children marched beside the band cheering. The -plight of these poor people was deplorable. The Germans -in their retirement had taken with them practically all -food supplies and utensils of every description. Scarcely -the bare necessities of life remained. All live stock had -also been driven before them by the retreating hordes of -the enemy, but when the Battalion reached Blaugies the -presence of live stock in the village showed the ever-increasing -confusion and speed of the enemy's retirement. -At this time the Division was feeding some 16,000 civilians, -on an allowance of one iron ration to four people.</p> - -<p>On the morning of the 10th November the 1/4th -Londons continued their almost triumphal progress to -La Dessoue, but there being no accommodation here, found -billets in Sars-la-Bruyère, where an overwhelming welcome -was accorded them. In this village Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien -(II Corps) had had his Headquarters on the 23rd -August 1914.</p> - -<p>The Brigade Ammunition Column at this time was in -charge of Lieut. E. P. M. Mosely, whose diary illustrates -the extraordinary spirit of humour which carried the men -through this period of hard work and exposure. The -Column reached Famars thoroughly tired out one wet -night at about midnight, and halted in rear of the advancing<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_503" id="Page_503">[Pg 503]</a></span> -troops. The civilians had been evacuated and the men -rapidly made themselves comfortable in some of the -cottages. One of the transport drivers, according to the -immemorial custom of transport drivers, quickly began -to forage round, and attired himself in a top hat, white -scarf and frock coat, in which remarkable garb he put his -head round the door and said: "I've come for the rent!" -This, after a hard night's work, shows a spirit which takes -a lot of damping.</p> - -<p>It was in this advance also that the Column arrived in -a battered village late at night, thoroughly worn out and -drenched to the skin. The place was muddy, shell torn -and desolate, and its exact whereabouts on the map far -from certain. The men began to picket their horses and -spread tarpaulins over their heaped-up stores, and afterwards -disconsolately to search for odd bits of timber in -the endeavour to construct some sort of shelter. The O.C. -Column produced from a waggon an antique arm-chair, -which had somehow attached itself to the Column at an -earlier stage of the advance, and in this very much improvised -headquarters took up his station in the mud, when -suddenly—the post arrived! The Army Postal Service had -throughout been so efficient as to become almost a matter -of course—but in this effort it surely surpassed itself!</p> - -<p>On the night of the 10th November the 56th Division -was relieved by the 63rd Division by whom the advance -was to be pursued; but early the following morning the -news of the Armistice was received and the troops stood -fast. The record of this grand culmination of the years -of bloodshed is contained in the Battalion Official War -Diary as follows:</p> - -<div class="center"> -<table width="90%" border="0" cellpadding="4" cellspacing="0" summary="Battalion Official War Diary"> -<col width="20%"></col> -<col width="10%"></col> -<col width="60%"></col> - - <tr> - <td class="tdc">Sars-la-Bruyère.<br />11.11.1918.</td> - <td class="tdr">08.30.</td> - <td>Bde. Memo. B.M. 971 received hostilities would cease at 1100.</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td></td> - <td></td> - <td>The news had an unexpected - effect on the troops: everybody - appeared to be too dazed to - make any demonstration. Men - were much less cheerful than - they had been for some days.</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td></td> - <td class="tdr">11.00.</td> - <td>Hostilities ceased.</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td></td> - <td></td> - <td>Transport Personnel and Nucleus rejoined Battn.</td> - </tr> -</table><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_504" id="Page_504">[Pg 504]</a></span></div> - -<p>The vast Forêt de Mormal had been passed, Mons and -Maubeuge had fallen, and the German Army was divided -into two parts, one on each side of the natural barrier of -the Ardennes.</p> - -<p>In his Despatches Sir Douglas Haig sums up the situation -on the morning of the 11th November 1918 thus:</p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p>In the fighting since November 1st, our troops had -broken the enemy's resistance beyond hope of recovery, -and had forced on him a disorderly retreat along the -whole front of the British Armies. Thereafter the enemy -was capable neither of accepting nor refusing battle.... -The strategic plan of the Allies had been realised with a -completeness rarely seen in war. When the Armistice -was signed by the enemy his defensive powers had already -been definitely destroyed. A continuance of hostilities -could only have meant disaster to the German Armies and -the armed invasion of Germany.</p></div> - -<p>A remarkable incident related by Lieut. Mosely occurred -at Sars-la-Bruyère the day following the Armistice.</p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p>The Mess Corporal proceeded to Mons to see if any -green vegetables could be procured. Returning from his -mission through the streets of Mons he saw a soldier -untidily dressed and without puttees, but wearing on his -jacket the red circles which were the distinguishing mark -of the 1/4th Londons. Said the Corporal, "What are you -doing here?" "Looking for my Battalion," replied the -man. The Corporal demanded to know why the man -had wandered so far from billets and what he meant by -being so untidily turned out. To his surprise the soldier -informed him that he had come from Germany. A few -more words and the Corporal realised that this was one -of our own men who had walked out of a German prison -when the Armistice was declared. Whipping up the -wanderer into the Mess cart, he brought him home, washed -him and gave him a big meal. The poor fellow was -almost hysterical at being amongst his own once more. -He was a man of B Company who had been captured -on the 28th March 1918, at Oppy. "We gave him a -strong dose of rum," writes Mosely, "and wrapped him -in warm blankets. By the next morning he had quite -recovered, and was asking for his pay!"</p></div> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_505" id="Page_505">[Pg 505]</a></span></p> - -<p>Thus ended the four years' war service of the 1/4th -Londons, who at the end of the campaign were within -two miles of Malplaquet, where Marlborough's great -victory had been won two hundred years earlier. It had -the proud distinction of having finished its active service -within five miles of Mons, where the first British shot -had been fired in August 1914. Of the 1016 officers -and men who had left England on the 4th September -1914, only about 30 other ranks remained with the -Battalion which had done such glorious service on so -many hard-fought fields.</p> - -<p>As a tribute to the many unrewarded acts of heroism -of which there have been so many examples during the -War, a letter, relating to the circumstances attending the -death of No. 280872 Pte. S. Greenfield of D Company on -the 23rd August 1918, is preserved among the Battalion -records. This letter was sent by the Medical Officer, -178th Brigade, R.F.A., who found Greenfield's body, to -his relatives, from whom it was received by the Commanding -Officer. The following is an extract from this -letter, which is dated 24th August 1918:</p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p>... On searching the battlefield (Boyelles) I discovered -the body of your son Private S. Greenfield, No. 280872. -He had died fighting, killed outright by a machine-gun. -I found him lying on a German machine-gun which I -have no doubt he intended to capture. As no more -dead were there and no other signs of a fight about the -machine-gun nest, I expect he rushed the machine-gunners -himself. I may remark the machine-gunners are dead -also.</p></div> - -<p>One of the survivors of the original Battalion was -Flossie, a small, brown Pomeranian dog. Flossie had served -on the railway line in August 1914, had accompanied the -Battalion to Malta and been successfully smuggled into -France in January 1915. Throughout the War she had -journeyed everywhere with the Battalion, and finally -came home with the Cadre in 1919. Her principal claim -to distinction appears to be that she succeeded in bringing -a litter of puppies into a noisy and muddy world in most -of the leading towns and villages of Flanders. Throughout<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_506" id="Page_506">[Pg 506]</a></span> -she maintained a calm demeanour, and when her maternal -cares necessitated transport she rode with her young -family in a basket perched on one of the cookers.</p> - -<p>On the 15th November a party of the Battalion, -under Capt. H. N. Williams, M.C., took part in the -triumphal march through Mons, where the troops were -received with a tumultuous welcome.</p> - -<p>There is little further to be said. The XXII Corps -was excluded from the Army of the Rhine and the Battalion -remained in the Mons area, training and indulging in -educational experiments, while parties visited the battlefields -of Mons and Waterloo. Until the ravages of -demobilisation reduced the numbers too severely, the -evenings were enlightened by some of the Quartermaster's -excellent orchestral concerts, and by boxing tournaments -in which the Battalion did exceedingly well, Private -Miller of the 1/4th Londons becoming XXII Corps -Feather-weight Champion.</p> - -<p>On the 27th November the Battalion moved to billets -in Villers-sire-Nicole, near Maubeuge, and on the 6th -March 1919 to Givry and on the 18th March to Cuesmes -(both near Mons), in all of which places the routine of -training and education was continued. Early in the New -Year the arrangements for demobilisation were put into -active operation, and rapidly the strength of the Battalion -dwindled.</p> - -<p>Among the first to leave was the padre, Rev. S. F. -Leighton Green, M.C., who had served continuously with -the Battalion since December 1916. The padre left on -the 13th February 1919, and his departure was felt most -keenly by every officer and man in the Battalion. His -constant selfless devotion to duty and his kindly personality -had made him a true friend to one and all, and the example -of his simple life and magnificent courage in action had -been a real inspiration to all—and that included the whole -Battalion—who had been brought into personal contact -with him.</p> - -<p>The break-up of the Battalion was the saddest thing -which ever happened to it. After so many months and -years of good and bad times, and of life in circumstances<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_507" id="Page_507">[Pg 507]</a></span> -of such intimacy as can be attained only on active service, -the joy of departure for home was severely tempered by -the deepest emotion at leaving the comradeship of -regimental life, and few said good-bye to the Battalion -without genuine sorrow.</p> - -<p>By the beginning of May the Battalion was reduced to -Cadre strength, about 50 all ranks, Lieut.-Col. Marchment, -D.S.O., M.C., remaining in command, with Major T. B. -Cooper, M.C., M.M., second in command.</p> - -<p>On the 14th May 1919 the Cadre left Cuesmes, entraining -at Jemappes for Antwerp. After a few days in the embarkation -camp it was played down to the quay by the -pipes of the Liverpool Scottish and embarked for Tilbury, -where it entrained for Newhaven. On the 21st May the -Cadre returned to London by train and was received at -London Bridge Station by the Lord Mayor (the Rt. Hon. -Sir Horace Marshall, now Lord Marshall of Chipstead, -P.C., K.C.V.O., Hon. Colonel of the Regiment), who also -took the salute as the Cadre passed the Mansion House -<i lang="fr">en route</i> for Headquarters in Hoxton.</p> - -<p>The Cadre was received at Headquarters by Lieut.-Col. -H. Dade, V.D., Major G. H. M. Vine, T.D., and other -officers of the Regiment, and by the Mayor of Shoreditch -(Councillor W. Girling), after which its dispersal speedily -followed.</p> - -<p>Three weeks later the last remnants of the 1/4th -Londons were scattered to their homes, and the part -played by the Regiment in the Great War was at an -end.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_508" id="Page_508">[Pg 508]</a></span></p> -<div class="chapter"></div> -<hr class="chap" /> - - - - -<h2>APPENDIX I<br /> - -MALTA</h2> - - -<p>The Dependency of Malta consists of a chain of islands, Gozo, -Comino and Malta, stretching from north-west to south-east, -about 60 miles from Sicily and about 180 from Africa. Malta -itself is about 17½ miles long and 8¼ broad, and, owing to its -magnificent natural harbours, it has been the coveted possession -of the strongest nations on the sea for the time being, ever -since the dawn of maritime trade. These anchorages are nearly -all on the east coast of the island, and include—besides the -famous harbours of Valetta (the Grand Harbour on the south -of the city and the Marsamuscetto Harbour on the north)—the -bays of Melleha, St Paul's and Marsa Scirocco.</p> - -<p>The population of Malta in 1907 was 206,690, and this -phenomenal congestion renders it largely dependent on imported -foodstuffs. The area under cultivation is comparatively small, -and the fields are composed of terraces by which the soil with -enormous labour has been walled up along the contours of -the hills to prevent it from being washed away. Viewed from -the sea, therefore, the top of one wall appearing above the next -produces the barren effect to which reference has been made -in Chapter II; but the aspect of the land from the top of the -hills in winter and early spring is a beautiful contrast of a -profusion of greenness. The principal grain crops are maize, -wheat and barley. Vines are also cultivated though the fruit -is sold as grapes far more profitably than converted into wine. -The chief industry is the production of Maltese lace, which -employs some 5000 women and children. The principal -resources of the island are derived from the fact of its being -an important military station and the Headquarters of the -Mediterranean fleet, the prolonged absence of which always -produces distress.</p> - -<p>The Maltese language is Phœnician in origin, the popular -idea that it is composed largely of Arabic being erroneous. -Until recent years the language of the courts was Italian, in -spite of the fact that this language is unknown to 86 per cent, -of the population.</p> - -<p>Malta has had a most chequered history from the earliest times -when the Mediterranean was the centre of all civilisation and -commerce. The Phœnicians occupied the islands at a very -early date, being followed in the 6th century B.C. by the Carthaginians, -and later by the Romans, who regarded the Maltese<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_509" id="Page_509">[Pg 509]</a></span> -not as conquered enemies but as allies. On the final division -of the Roman Dominions in <span class="smcap">A.D.</span> 395, Malta was assigned to -the Empire of Constantinople, and during the next 500 years -suffered three Arab invasions, though these left little mark -upon the people either by language or by inter-marriage. -In 1090 the Counts of Normandy captured the island and -finally expelled the Arabs, retaining possession until 1265, -when it passed into the hands of the Aragonese, Kings of Sicily.</p> - -<p>It was in 1530 that the most interesting period of Maltese -history commenced, for in that year the islands were granted -by the Emperor Charles V to the Knights of St John, who had -been expelled from Rhodes by the Turks; and some thirty -years later the Knights of the Order and the Christian Maltese -combined under de Valette, the Grand Master, whose name -survives in the town of Valetta, in resisting the last effort of -the Mohammedan power to gain the ascendancy in the -Mediterranean. The Siege of Malta, which was most gallantly -resisted by the Knights, proved successful, and they remained, -although <i lang="la">de jure</i> owing allegiance to Sicily, <i lang="la">de facto</i> masters of -Malta, until they were finally expelled in 1798 by the French -under Napoleon, who used the island as a base for his disastrous -expedition to Egypt in that year.</p> - -<p>The staunch allegiance of the Maltese to the Church of -Rome soon brought them into conflict with the French, whose -plundering of the churches provoked a revolution in which the -Maltese invoked the aid of Nelson. The Treaty of Amiens, -1802, provided for the return of the island to the Knights of -Malta, but the Maltese, realising that this would entail a revival -of French influence, protested vigorously, with the result that -in 1814 the Treaty of Paris finally secured Malta to the British -Empire. Since this date the story of Malta has on the whole -been one of advancement in every direction.</p> - -<p>The chief towns of the island are Valetta, the seat of government, -and Citta Vecchia (otherwise known as Notabile or -Medina), the ancient capital and stronghold; other places of -importance being Musta, Birchircara and Attard—all of which -will be well remembered by all ranks of the Regiment.</p> - -<p>The head of the Government and Commander-in-Chief and -Governor-General was in 1914 General Sir Leslie Rundle, -G.C.B., G.C.M.G., G.C.V.O., D.S.O.</p> - -<p>The garrison consisted of three battalions of British Infantry, -two companies of Fortress Engineers, together with detachments -of Royal Garrison Artillery, Royal Army Medical Corps, -Royal Army Service Corps, and in addition two battalions of -Malta Militia (Infantry), and the Malta Artillery.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_510" id="Page_510">[Pg 510]</a></span></p> -<div class="chapter"></div> -<hr class="chap" /> - - - - -<h2>APPENDIX II<br /> - -HONOURS AND DECORATIONS</h2> - - -<p><span class="smcap">Note.</span>—This Honours List has been compiled from official -sources, and is believed to be accurate, but, owing to the -manner in which honours were announced in the <cite>London -Gazette</cite>, its completeness cannot be guaranteed.</p> - -<div class="center"> -<table border="0" cellpadding="4" cellspacing="0" summary="HONOURS AND DECORATIONS"> - - <tr> - <th colspan="4"><span class="smcap">Distinguished Service Order</span></th> - </tr> - <tr> - <td colspan="2">Capt. W. G. Clark</td> - <td class="tdc1"><cite>London Gazette</cite></td> - <td class="tdn">3. 7.15</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td colspan="2">2/Lieut. W. II. Webster</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdn">12. 3.17</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td colspan="2">2/Lieut. (A/Capt.) G. E. A. Leake</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdn">26. 7.17</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td colspan="2">2/Lieut. F. W. Walker.</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdn">19.11.17</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td colspan="2">Lieut. (A/Capt.) A. M. Duthie</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdn">4. 2.18</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td colspan="2">Lieut. (A/Capt.) C. J. Graham, M.C.</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdn">11. 1.19</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <th colspan="4"><span class="smcap">Most Excellent Order of the British Empire - (Military Division)</span></th> - </tr> - <tr> - <td colspan="4" class="tdp"><em>Companion</em>—</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td colspan="2">Lieut.-Col. (Hon. Col.) Vickers Dunfee, V.D.</td> - <td class="tdc1"><cite>London Gazette</cite></td> - <td class="tdn">3. 6.19</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td colspan="4" class="tdp"><em>Officers</em>—</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td colspan="2">Major L. T. Burnett</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td colspan="2">Hon. Lieut. and Q.M. W. J. Gragg.</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td colspan="2">Major S. Elliott</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td colspan="2">Major W. Moore</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td colspan="2">Major (A/Lieut.-Col.) H. P. L. Cart de Lafontaine</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdn">1. 1.20</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <th colspan="4"><span class="smcap">Military Cross</span></th> - </tr> - <tr> - <td colspan="2">2/Lieut. A. R. Moore.</td> - <td class="tdc1"><cite>London Gazette</cite></td> - <td class="tdn">23. 6.15</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td colspan="2">2/Lieut. J. R. Pyper.</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdn">14. 1.16</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td colspan="2">2/Lieut. (Temp. Lieut.) G. L. Goodes</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdn">3. 6.16</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td colspan="2">2/Lieut. S. J. Barkworth, M.M.</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdn">14.11.16</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td colspan="2">2/Lieut. E. McD. McCormick</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td colspan="2">Rev. R. Palmer (C.F.)</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td colspan="2">Lieut. (A/Capt.) W. J. Boutall</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdn">1. 1.17</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td colspan="2">2/Lieut. O. D. Garratt.</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdn">4. 6.17</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td colspan="2">2/Lieut. D. S. Boorman</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdn">25. 8.17</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td colspan="2">2/Lieut. (A/Capt.) S. Davis.</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdn">27.10.17<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_511" id="Page_511">[Pg 511]</a></span></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td colspan="2">Lieut. (Temp. Capt.) C. J. Graham</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdn">1. 1.18</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td colspan="2">2/Lieut. E. L. Mills</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdn">4. 2.18</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td colspan="2">2/Lieut. (A/Capt.) C. A. Clarke</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdn">23. 4.18</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td colspan="2">Lieut. (A/Capt.) T. B. Cooper, M.M.</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdn">22. 6.18</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td colspan="2">Lieut. (A/Capt.) A. M. Duthie, D.S.O.</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td colspan="2">Lieut. (A/Capt.) S. G. Askham</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdn">26. 7.18</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td colspan="2">Lieut. H. S. Daw</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td colspan="2">2/Lieut. W. Rosen</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td colspan="2">2/Lieut. G. C. Ewing</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdn">16. 9.18</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td colspan="2">Lieut. (A/Capt.) A. G. Croll</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdn">7.11.18</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td colspan="2">Rev. S. F. Leighton Green (C. F.).</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdn">11. 1.19</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td colspan="2">2/Lieut. C. L. Henstridge</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td colspan="2">Lieut. (A/Capt.) G. H. Hetley</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td colspan="2">2/Lieut. A. Holloway.</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td colspan="2">2/Lieut. V. C. Prince.</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td colspan="2">2/Lieut. A. H. Millstead</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdn">2. 4.19</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <th colspan="4"><span class="smcap">Bar to Military Cross</span></th> - </tr> - <tr> - <td colspan="2">2/Lieut. (Temp. Capt.) G. L. Goodes, M.C.</td> - <td class="tdc1"><cite>London Gazette</cite></td> - <td class="tdn">14.11.16</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td colspan="2">Lieut. (A/Capt.) C. J. Graham, M.C.</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdn">26. 7.18</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td colspan="2">Lieut. (A/Capt.) J. R. Pyper, M.C.</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdn">8. 3.19</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td colspan="2">Lieut. (A/Capt.) T. B. Cooper, M.C., M.M.</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdn">2. 4.19</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <th colspan="4"><span class="smcap">Distinguished Conduct Medal</span></th> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdn">2170</td> - <td>L/Cpl. G. L. Colomb</td> - <td class="tdc1"><cite>London Gazette</cite></td> - <td class="tdn">5. 8.15</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdn">217</td> - <td>L/Sergt. A. C. Ehren</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdn">1153</td> - <td>Cpl. W. J. Knowles</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdn">14. 1.16</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdn">487</td> - <td>C.S.M. E. H. Risley</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdn">1054</td> - <td>C.S.M. R. Davis</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdn">22. 9.16</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdn">4354</td> - <td>Pte. J. O'Brien</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdn">14.11.16</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdn">3351</td> - <td>Pte. H. S. Payne</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdn">2163</td> - <td>Sergt. T. Clark</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdn">1. 1.17</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdn">281267</td> - <td>Sergt. E. P. G. Brand</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdn">25. 8.17</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdn">281477</td> - <td>Pte. F. Anthony</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdn">19.11.17</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdn">282450</td> - <td>L/Cpl. F. Austin</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdn">282051</td> - <td>Pte. W. H. Bolton</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdn">295070</td> - <td>Pte. H. C. Bull</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdn">282496</td> - <td>Pte. J. Taylor</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdn">282444</td> - <td>Sergt. B. A. Watson</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdn">281972</td> - <td>L/Cpl. E. S. Brown.</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdn">4. 3.18</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdn">280032</td> - <td>Sergt. G. Norris</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdn">282706</td> - <td>Pte. C. H. W. Roberts</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdn">280937</td> - <td>L/Cpl. T. H. Sankey</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdn">7261</td> - <td>R.S.M. J. O'Brien</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdn">17. 4.18</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdn">283138</td> - <td>Cpl. B. Vaughan</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdn">3. 6.18</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdn">281613</td> - <td>Cpl. C. E. Freeman</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdn">26. 6.18<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_512" id="Page_512">[Pg 512]</a></span></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdn">280019</td> - <td>C.S.M. T. Lock, M.M.</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdn">3. 9.18</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdn">281718</td> - <td>Cpl. A. Martin</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdn">280079</td> - <td>Sergt. H. W. Moss</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdn">282171</td> - <td>L/Cpl. (A/Sergt.) H. F. Watson</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdn">30.10.18</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdn">280605</td> - <td>Sergt. R. C. Clammer</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdn">1. 1.19</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <th colspan="4"><span class="smcap">Military Medal</span></th> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdn">2144</td> - <td>Cpl. C. T. Coates</td> - <td class="tdc1"><cite>London Gazette</cite></td> - <td class="tdn">1. 9.16</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdn">3261</td> - <td>Pte. H. E. Hyde</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdn">3130</td> - <td>L/Cpl. H. Whitehead</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdn">1174</td> - <td>Cpl. J. Castle</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdn">11.11.16</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdn">1899</td> - <td>Pte. C. F. Collins</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdn">2161</td> - <td>Pte. A. E. Colvin</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdn">2202</td> - <td>C.Q.M.-Sgt. R. Forbes</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdn">1854</td> - <td>Sergt. H. C. Gearle</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdn">4786</td> - <td>Sergt. R. Hebberd</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdn">2827</td> - <td>Pte. F. Hedger</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdn">2272</td> - <td>Sergt. C. James</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdn">1893</td> - <td>Pte. W. Lawrence</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdn">280019</td> - <td>Sergt. T. Lock</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdn">534</td> - <td>Sergt. H. H. Merrell</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdn">3586</td> - <td>L/Cpl. A. J. Moger</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdn">2216</td> - <td>L/Cpl. A. Sergeant</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdn">3579</td> - <td>L/Cpl. L. R. Webb</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdn">3662</td> - <td>Pte. W. Buckingham</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdn">9.12.16</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdn">3113</td> - <td>Sergt. R. R. L. Hyde</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdn">21.12.16</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdn">2105</td> - <td>Sergt. H. J. Cott</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdn">19. 2.17</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdn">280102</td> - <td>Sergt. A. E. Gardiner</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdn">17. 4.17</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdn">280308</td> - <td>Sergt. W. A. King</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdn">11. 5.17</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdn">281020</td> - <td>Pte. C. H. Thomas</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdn">281204</td> - <td>Cpl. G. L. Rossington</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdn">1. 6.17</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdn">283725</td> - <td>Pte. J. G. Turner</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdn">18. 6.17</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdn">283371</td> - <td>Pte. J. Grierson</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdn">18. 7.17</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdn">281242</td> - <td>Cpl. A. W. Lintott</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdn">282189</td> - <td>Sergt. H. S. Monk</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdn">282490</td> - <td>Pte. P. J. Olinski</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdn">282493</td> - <td>Pte. A. J. Selby</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdn">282152</td> - <td>Pte. C. W. Spence.</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdn">282344</td> - <td>L/Cpl. F. C. Spencer</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdn">283708</td> - <td>Pte. A. Thurkettle.</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdn">283836</td> - <td>L/Cpl. G. Coates</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdn">21. 8.17</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdn">280930</td> - <td>Pte. W. Pratt</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdn">18.10.17</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdn">283691</td> - <td>Pte. A. Robinson</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdn">283530</td> - <td>Pte. C. S. Ruel</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdn">280894</td> - <td>L/Cpl. H. G. Smith</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdn">281270</td> - <td>Pte. A. G. Trayler</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdn">283660</td> - <td>Cpl. W. H. V. Wilkins</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdn">282537</td> - <td>Pte. J. P. Brooke</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdn">12.12.17</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdn">283818</td> - <td>Cpl. W. A. Cooper</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdc">"<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_513" id="Page_513">[Pg 513]</a></span></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdn">283025</td> - <td>Pte. J. W. Ling</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdn">12.12.17</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdn">295261</td> - <td>Pte. A. Westcott</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdn">295248</td> - <td>Sergt. H. O. Wilderspin</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdn">295152</td> - <td>Sergt. F. W. Yandle</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdn">281390</td> - <td>L/Cpl. E. J. Bewsey</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdn">17.12.17</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdn">282246</td> - <td>Pte. J. T. Ball</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdn">4. 2.18</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdn">283082</td> - <td>Pte. A. Cohen</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdn">23. 2.18</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdn">280301</td> - <td>Cpl. J. W. Johnson</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdn">283148</td> - <td>Pte. F. G. Senyard</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdn">280728</td> - <td>Pte. G. Tyrell</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdn">280714</td> - <td>Cpl. H. W. Wallder</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdn">280465</td> - <td>Sergt. F. Arklay</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdn">13. 3.18</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdn">283813</td> - <td>Pte. B. M. J. Barnett</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdn">298008</td> - <td>Cpl. T. J. Court</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdn">282021</td> - <td>Pte. H. Evans</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdn">280154</td> - <td>Sergt. G. J. Grant</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdn">280472</td> - <td>Sergt. A. E. Haynes</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdn">281734</td> - <td>L/Cpl. T. Hodgkins</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdn">282737</td> - <td>Pte. W. J. Hutchin</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdn">295177</td> - <td>Pte. J. Pritchard</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdn">283652</td> - <td>Pte. R. Southern</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdn">295223</td> - <td>Pte. J. Wickens</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdn">283808</td> - <td>Pte. W. A. Willmott</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdn">280389</td> - <td>Pte. W. A. G. Battershall</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdn">12. 6.18</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdn">282916</td> - <td>Cpl. A. G. Beale</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdn">280840</td> - <td>Pte. S. G. Coates</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdn">283154</td> - <td>L/Cpl. A. J. Deadman</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdn">281965</td> - <td>Sergt. C. J. Gibbs</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdn">280967</td> - <td>Cpl. G. Heyes</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdn">283623</td> - <td>L/Cpl. C. L. Husk</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdn">283643</td> - <td>Cpl. A. J. Parker</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdn">295122</td> - <td>Pte. J. R. Phillips</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdn">281174</td> - <td>Sergt. H. V. Randall</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdn">283193</td> - <td>Pte. P. C. Swinchatt</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdn">280292</td> - <td>Sergt. F. G. Udall</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdn">295096</td> - <td>Pte. R. H. Bryan</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdn">27. 6.18</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdn">281472</td> - <td>Sergt. J. A. Kingston</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdn">281130</td> - <td>L/Cpl. R. H. Pryor</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdn">282607</td> - <td>Pte. F. A. Stewart</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdn">281319</td> - <td>Pte. A. J. Zeeck</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdn">283184</td> - <td>L/Cpl. F. F. Salter</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdn">16. 7.18</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdn">283323</td> - <td>Pte. T. J. Sanders</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdn">283570</td> - <td>Pte. J. W. Abbott</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdn">6. 8.18</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdn">280922</td> - <td>Cpl. D. E. Davis</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdn">282263</td> - <td>L/Cpl. G. Humphrey</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdn">29. 8.18</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdn">295508</td> - <td>Pte. J. Nisbett</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdn">280695</td> - <td>Sergt. T. Peters</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdn">295475</td> - <td>Pte. M. Lemon</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdn">11.12.18</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdn">298089</td> - <td>Pte. A. S. Adams</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdn">24. 1.19</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdn">282029</td> - <td>Pte. A. C. Barnes</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdc">"<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_514" id="Page_514">[Pg 514]</a></span></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdn">282323</td> - <td>Pte J. Eccles</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdn">24. 1.19</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdn">280534</td> - <td>Cpl. W. Frost</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdn">283617</td> - <td>Pte. J. R. Greenwood</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdn">281822</td> - <td>L/Cpl. W. H. Hart</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdn">282198</td> - <td>Cpl. S. T. E. Norton</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdn">283803</td> - <td>Pte. W. W. Boulstridge</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdn">11. 2.19</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdn">283288</td> - <td>Sergt. F. A. Dove</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdn">281741</td> - <td>Cpl. F. Nash</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdn">282915</td> - <td>Sergt. F. C. Nickless</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdn">295615</td> - <td>Sergt. J. T. Norris</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdn">281043</td> - <td>Sergt. W. C. Bird</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdn">14. 5.19</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdn">280605</td> - <td>Sergt. R. C. Clammer, D.C.M.</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdn">280212</td> - <td>L/Cpl. P. McGregor</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdn">280617</td> - <td>Sergt. (A/C.S.M.) W. Honig</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdn">23. 7.19</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <th colspan="4"><span class="smcap">Bar to Military Medal</span></th> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdn">283530</td> - <td>Pte. C. S. Ruel, M.M..</td> - <td class="tdc1"><cite>London Gazette</cite></td> - <td class="tdn">13. 3.18</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdn">282737</td> - <td>L/Cpl. W. J. Hutchin, M.M.</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdn">12. 6.18</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdn">280292</td> - <td>Sergt. F. G. Udall, M.M.</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdn">24. 1.19</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdn br">280489<br />2272</td> - <td>C.S.M. C. James, M.M.</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdn">20. 8.19</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <th colspan="4"><span class="smcap">Meritorious Service Medal</span></th> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdn">280846</td> - <td>Pte. J. W. Atkins</td> - <td class="tdc1"><cite>London Gazette</cite></td> - <td class="tdn">17. 9.17</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdn">280665</td> - <td>Pte. H. Bunker</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdn">2.11.17</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdn">280505</td> - <td>Sergt. W. Bean</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdn">17. 6.18</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdn">282237</td> - <td>Sergt. G. F. V. Bunyan</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdn">280914</td> - <td>L/Sergt. S. A. Edwards</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdn">280471</td> - <td>Cpl. L. C. Hawkins</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdn">280435</td> - <td>Sergt. H. Hurst</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdn">280555</td> - <td>R.Q.M.-Sergt. L. T. Davies</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdn">18. 1.19</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdn">280128</td> - <td>C.S.M. A. D. McLaren</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdn">281464</td> - <td>C.Q.M.-Sergt. P. C. Peters</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdn">280646</td> - <td>L/Cpl. H. T. Giles</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdn">3. 6.19</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdn">280420</td> - <td>Sergt. G. A. Richardson</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <th colspan="4"><span class="smcap">Mention in Despatches</span></th> - </tr> - <tr> - <td colspan="2">2/Lieut. A. R. Moore.</td> - <td class="tdc1"><cite>London Gazette</cite></td> - <td class="tdn">22. 6.15</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td colspan="2">Major (Temp. Lieut.-Col.) L. T. Burnett</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdn">1. 1.16</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td colspan="2">Capt. (A/Major) W. G. Clark, D.S.O.</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td colspan="2">2/Lieut. (A/Capt.) J. R. Pyper</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdn">14. 1.16</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td colspan="2">Lieut.-Col. (Hon. Col.) Vickers Dunfee, V.D.</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdn">13. 7.16</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdn br">280154<br />1151</td> - <td>Sergt. G. J. Grant</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdn">4. 1.17</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdn">4798</td> - <td>R.S.M. M. Harris</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td colspan="2">2/Lieut. H. Jones</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdn">280128</td> - <td>C.Q.M.-Sergt. A. D. McLaren</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdc">"<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_515" id="Page_515">[Pg 515]</a></span></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdn">280171</td> - <td>Pte. H. V. Neal</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdn">4. 1.17</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdn">280505</td> - <td>Sergt. W. Bean</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdn">25. 5.17</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdn">280307</td> - <td>R.Q.M.-Sergt. W. Henley</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td colspan="2">Lieut. (A/Capt.) L. G. Rix</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td colspan="2">2/Lieut. W. H. Webster</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td colspan="2">Lieut. (A/Capt.) C. A. Clarke</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdn">24.12.17</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td colspan="2">Lieut. (A/Capt.) T. B. Cooper, M.M.</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td colspan="2">Hon. Lieut. and Q.M. W. J. Cragg</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td colspan="2">Capt. (A/Major) W. A. Nunneley</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td colspan="2">2/Lieut. R. E. Stavert</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdn">280639</td> - <td>Sergt. A. Taylor</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td colspan="2">2/Lieut. F. W. Walker, D.S.O.</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td colspan="2">Major V. H. Seyd</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdn">16. 1.18</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td colspan="2">Lieut. (A/Capt.) S. J. Barkworth, M.C., M.M.</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdn">25. 5.18</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td colspan="2">Lieut. C. W. Denning, M.M.</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td colspan="2">Lieut. (A/Capt.) A. M. Duthie, D.S.O.</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdn">281174</td> - <td>Sergt. H. V. Randall</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdn">283264</td> - <td>Pte. G. E. Wright</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdn">20.12.18</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td colspan="2">Lieut. L. R. Chapman</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdn">30.12.18</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td colspan="2">Lieut. H. W. Dennis</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td colspan="2">Lieut. (A/Capt.) C. J. Graham, M.C.</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td colspan="2">Major (A/Lieut.-Col.) H. P. L. Cart de Lafontaine</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdn">10. 7.19</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td colspan="4">The names of the following were brought to the notice of the - Secretary of State for War for services rendered in connection - with the War (not gazetted):—</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td colspan="3">Lieut.-Col. (Hon. Col.) Vickers Dunfee, V.D.</td> - <td class="tdn">24.12.17</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdn">280126</td> - <td colspan="2">Cpl. W. Noquet</td> - <td class="tdn">9. 8.18</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td colspan="3">Major L. T. Burnett</td> - <td class="tdn">13. 8.18</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdn">281197</td> - <td colspan="2">Cpl. E. Brown</td> - <td class="tdn bl">13. 8.18<br />15. 3.19</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td colspan="3">Lieut. (A/Capt.) F. A. Coffin</td> - <td class="tdn">13. 8.18</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <th colspan="4"><span class="smcap">Foreign Decorations</span></th> - </tr> - <tr> - <th colspan="4"><i lang="fr">Médaille Militaire</i> (<em>France</em>)—</th> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdn">280336</td> - <td>Sergt. D. Fulford</td> - <td class="tdc1"><cite>London Gazette</cite></td> - <td class="tdn">24. 2.16</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <th colspan="4"><i lang="fr">Croix de Guerre</i> (<em>Belgium</em>)—</th> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdn">280802</td> - <td>C.S.M. F. W. Amos</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdn">12. 7.18</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdn">281426</td> - <td>Sergt. A. V. Loveless</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdn">282692</td> - <td>Sergt. J. R. Tibbott</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdn">280713</td> - <td>Pte. C. W. Budgen</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdn">295089</td> - <td>Cpl. W. Govan</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td colspan="4">The following decorations were awarded to Officers, non<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_516" id="Page_516">[Pg 516]</a></span>-Commissioned - Officers, and Men of other regiments for services - rendered while attached to and serving with the 4th London - Regiment:—</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <th colspan="4"><span class="smcap">Distinguished Service Order</span></th> - </tr> - <tr> - <td colspan="2">Major (Temp. Lieut.-Col.) W. R. H. Dann (Bedfordshire Regiment)</td> - <td class="tdc1"><cite>London Gazette</cite></td> - <td class="tdn">18. 7.17</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td colspan="2">Major F. A. Phillips (Montgomery Yeomanry)</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdn">22. 6.18</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td colspan="2">Major A. Grover, M.C. (Bedfordshire Regiment)</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdn">26. 7.18</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td colspan="2">Major (A/Lieut.-Col.) A. F. Marchment, M.C. (1st London Regiment)</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdn">26. 7.18</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <th colspan="4"><span class="smcap">Bar to Distinguished Service Order</span></th> - </tr> - <tr> - <td colspan="2">Major (A/Lieut.-Col.) W. R. H. Dann, D.S.O., (Bedfordshire Regiment)</td> - <td class="tdc1"><cite>London Gazette</cite></td> - <td class="tdn">26. 7.18</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <th colspan="4"><span class="smcap">Military Cross</span></th> - </tr> - <tr> - <td colspan="2">2/Lieut. H. E. Jackman (21st London Regiment)</td> - <td class="tdc1"><cite>London Gazette</cite></td> - <td class="tdn">26. 9.17</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td colspan="2">Lieut. E. H. R. Altounyan (R.A.M.C.)</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdn">1. 1.18</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td colspan="2">2/Lieut. C. W. Rowlands (1st London Regiment)</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdn">4. 2.18</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td colspan="2">Capt. (A/Major) A. Grover (Bedfordshire Regiment)</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdn">18. 3.18</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td colspan="2">Lieut. G. V. Lawrie (6th Scottish Rifles)</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdn">3. 6.18</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td colspan="2">Lieut. (A/Capt.) H. N. Williams (4th Royal Welsh Fusiliers)</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdn">22. 6.18</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td colspan="2">Lieut. (A/Captain) W. C. Morton (1st London Regiment)</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdn">16. 9.18</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdn">G/95036</td> - <td>C.S.M. T. Cooke, D.C.M., M.M. (K.O.Y.L.I.)</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdn">7.11.18</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td colspan="2">Lieut. C. E. Dunaway (Medical Officer, U.S. Army)</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdn">—.—.18</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td colspan="2">Lieut. (A/Capt.) E. V. Grimsdell (K.O.Y.L.I.)</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdn">11. 1.19</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td colspan="2">Lieut. (A/Capt.) H. F. Dade (3rd London Regiment)</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdn">2. 4.19</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <th colspan="4"><span class="smcap">Distinguished Conduct Medal</span></th> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdn">G/95066</td> - <td>C.S.M. A. Bonser</td> - <td class="tdc1"><cite>London Gazette</cite></td> - <td class="tdn">22.10.17</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdn">G/95036</td> - <td>C.S.M. T. Cooke, M.M.</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdn">781426</td> - <td>L/Cpl. F. Goatcher</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdn">3. 9.18</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdn">G/76294</td> - <td>Pte. E. Clark</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdn">5.12.18 <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_517" id="Page_517">[Pg 517]</a></span></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <th colspan="4"><span class="smcap">Bar to Distinguished Conduct Medal</span></th> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdn">G/95066</td> - <td>C.S.M. A. Bonser, D.C.M.</td> - <td class="tdc1"><cite>London Gazette</cite></td> - <td class="tdn">5.12.18</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <th colspan="4"><span class="smcap">Second Bar to Distinguished Conduct Medal</span></th> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdn">G/95066</td> - <td>C.S.M. A. Bonser, D.C.M.</td> - <td class="tdc1"><cite>London Gazette</cite></td> - <td class="tdn">18. 2.19</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <th colspan="4"><span class="smcap">Military Medal</span></th> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdn">G/68176</td> - <td>Pte. J. F. Blair</td> - <td class="tdc1"><cite>London Gazette</cite></td> - <td class="tdn">27. 6.18</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdn">202684</td> - <td>Pte. A. E. Churchyard</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdn">225485</td> - <td>Sergt. C. A. Cowland</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdn">251439</td> - <td>Pte. W. A. Pasterful</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdn">G/76227</td> - <td>L/Cpl. F. Harding</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdn">6. 8.18</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdn">G/68259</td> - <td>Pte. L. Petrie</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdn">29. 8.18</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdn">G/76275</td> - <td>Pte. G. A. Allen</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdn">24. 1.19</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdn">G/80610</td> - <td>Pte. G. H. Andrews</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdn">252254</td> - <td>L/Cpl. J. T. Couchman</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdn">G/95108</td> - <td>Sergt. J. Fanshaw</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdn">225682</td> - <td>Pte. J. T. Freshwater</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdn">228610</td> - <td>Pte J. C. Goree</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdn">G/75396</td> - <td>L/Cpl. G. J. Grant</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdn">G/95115</td> - <td>Pte. E. Stott</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdn">G/84057</td> - <td>Sergt. R. L. Addison</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdn">11. 2.19</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdn">G/95177</td> - <td>L/Cpl. W. Bradley</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdn">251265</td> - <td>Pte. A. E. Dickerson</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdn">G/76243</td> - <td>Pte. H. H. Mills</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdn">250439</td> - <td>Cpl. C. Robbins</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdn">G/80608</td> - <td>Pte. W. Ryan</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdn">G/71053</td> - <td>Pte. J. Anderson</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdn">13. 3.19</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdn">233640</td> - <td>Cpl. G. F. Coleman</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdn">204593</td> - <td>Pte. A. E. Pullen</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdn">G/90091</td> - <td>Pte. J. Upperton</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdn">253803</td> - <td>Pte. T. H. A. Brown</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdn">14. 5.19</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdn">G/68177</td> - <td>Pte. W. Bunce</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdn">G/95143</td> - <td>Pte. H. Atkinson</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <th colspan="4"><span class="smcap">Mention in Despatches</span></th> - </tr> - <tr> - <td colspan="2">Capt. and Adjt. G. B. Scott (Leinster Regiment)</td> - <td class="tdc1"><cite>London Gazette</cite></td> - <td class="tdn">1. 1.16</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td colspan="2">Lieut. G. V. Lawric (6th Scottish Rifles)</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdn">18.12.17</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td colspan="2">Major (A/Lieut.-Col.) A. F. Marchment, D.S.O., M.C. (1st London Regiment)</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdn">30.12.18</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdn">204527</td> - <td>Sergt. S. W. Childs</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - <td class="tdc">"</td> - </tr> -</table> -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_518" id="Page_518">[Pg 518]</a></span></div> -<div class="chapter"></div> -<hr class="chap" /> - - - - -<h2>APPENDIX III<br /> - -THE RECONSTRUCTION OF THE <span class="smcap">4TH</span> LONDON REGIMENT IN 1920</h2> - - -<p>After the return to England of the Cadres early in 1919, -the Territorial Force remained in abeyance for the remainder -of the year, and beyond the formation of an Old Comrades' -Association, under the Presidency of Lieut.-Col. Harry Dade, -V.D., nothing could be done in the 4th Londons to maintain -<i lang="fr">esprit de corps</i> at the high standard which it had reached -during the War.</p> - -<p>When orders were issued early in 1920 for the reconstruction -of the auxiliary forces under the title of the Territorial Army, -the effect of eight months' inactivity became painfully apparent, -and the 4th London Regiment, which was revived in February -1920, experienced, in common with most other units, great -difficulty in recruiting, owing to the rapidly cooling enthusiasm -of the greater number of its former members. By great good -fortune a large number of old officers returned to the Colours, -and command was given to Lieut.-Col. L. T. Burnett, O.B.E., -T.D., while Major H. J. Duncan-Teape, T.D., was appointed -Second in Command, and Captain W. A. Trasenster, M.C., The -Royal Fusiliers, Adjutant. The Company Commanders and -Headquarters Officers were:—</p> - -<div class="center"> -<table border="0" cellpadding="4" cellspacing="0" summary="Company Commanders and Headquarters Officers"> - <tr> - <td colspan="2">Major R. N. Arthur</td> - <td>D Company.</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td colspan="2">Major W. Moore, O.B.E.</td> - <td>A Company.</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td colspan="2">Major H. P. L. Cart de Lafontaine, O.B.E.</td> - <td>C Company.</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td colspan="2">Major S. Elliott, O.B.E.</td> - <td>B Company.</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td colspan="2">Captain F. C. Grimwade</td> - <td>Assistant Adjutant.</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td colspan="2">Lieut. H. B. A. Balls</td> - <td>Lewis Gun Officer.</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td colspan="2">2/Lieut. E. P. Higgs</td> - <td>Signalling Officer.</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td colspan="2">Lieut. C. F. Warren</td> - <td>Transport Officer.</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td colspan="2">Lieut. E. S. Tomsett</td> - <td>Quartermaster.</td> - </tr> -</table></div> - -<p>A capable Permanent Staff was supplied from the Royal -Fusiliers, Regtl. Sergt.-Major W. Hunt becoming the senior -Warrant Officer, while ex-Regtl. Sergt.-Major M. Harris enlisted, -and was appointed Regtl. Q.M.-Sergt.</p> - -<p>The following old Warrant Officers and N.C.O.'s enlisted, -and were posted as stated:—</p> - -<div class="center"> -<table border="0" cellpadding="4" cellspacing="0" summary="old Warrant Officers and N.C.O.'s enlisted"> - <tr> - <td>Coy. Sergt.-Major W. H. Edwards</td> - <td rowspan="2" class="bl">to A Company.</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td>Coy. Q.M.-Sergt. J. C. Hibberd <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_519" id="Page_519">[Pg 519]</a></span></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="bt">Regtl. Q.M.-Sergt. W. Henley</td> - <td rowspan="3" class="bl bt">to B Company.</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td>Coy. Sergt.-Major G. L. Matthews</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td>Coy. Q.M.-Sergt. B. A. Watson, D.C.M.</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="bt">Coy. Sergt.-Major A. Mennie</td> - <td rowspan="2" class="bl bt">to C Company.</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td>Coy. Q.M.-Sergt. E. J. T. Nash</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="bt">Coy. Sergt.-Major J. Lewis</td> - <td rowspan="2" class="bl bt">to D Company.</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td>Coy. Q.M.-Sergt. F. McLaren</td> - </tr> -</table></div> - -<p>With this excellent stiffening the Battalion soon began to -make progress, and rapidly took—and held—the lead in -numbers in the 1st London Brigade.</p> - -<p>The first Annual Training was held at Shoreham-by-Sea, -the time being devoted principally to musketry and recreational -training. For the first time in the Battalion's history, the -winter following was marked by the continuance without a -break of the drill season; and throughout the winter of 1920-21 -attendances at the weekly drills at Headquarters reached an -unusually high percentage of the strength. The Battalion -appeared to be well on its feet, and making steady progress -towards efficiency, when, in April 1921, the Coal Strike completely -dashed all hopes of a successful summer training season. -The Territorial Army was temporarily in abeyance, and for -three months its headquarters were handed over to the Defence -Force, to which was entrusted the maintenance of peaceful -conditions throughout the country.</p> - -<p>A Defence Force Unit was raised at the 4th Londons' Headquarters, -and joined by some of the members of the Battalion, -command of it being taken by Major R. N. Arthur, with the -acting rank of Lieut.-Col. The disbandment of the Defence -Force was fortunately effected in time to enable the Annual -Training to be held at Shorncliffe in August, but the serious -delay already caused to the individual training of the men -rendered it less valuable than had been hoped; and a far -too great proportion of the training hours had to be spent on the -range, in the Musketry Practices, which should have been -completed early in the year.</p> - -<p>During the spring of 1921 the Battalion suffered a severe loss -in the death, after a prolonged and painful illness, of the Quartermaster, -Lieut. E. S. Tomsett, to whose invaluable services -reference has been made in the preceding pages. After Lieut. -Tomsett's death, Regtl. Q.M.-Sergt. M. Harris was gazetted -Lieut. and Quartermaster.</p> - -<p>The beginnings of the 4th London Regiment in the revived -Territorial Army have been small, but every step has been made -secure by careful organisation, and by applying the experience -of Territorial soldiering in peace and war; and there is every -reason to suppose that the laurels gained by the Regiment in -the Campaigns in which it has taken part will remain untarnished, -and that its glorious traditions will be jealously -guarded as long as the Regiment remains in existence.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_520" id="Page_520">[Pg 520]</a><br /><a name="Page_521" id="Page_521">[Pg 521]</a></span></p> -<div class="chapter"></div> -<hr class="chap" /> - - - - -<h2>INDEX</h2> - - -<p class="center"><em>Appendices II and III are not indexed.</em> -</p> - - -<ul id="index"><li class="ifrst">Abbécourt, <a href="#Page_379">379</a>, <a href="#Page_381">381</a></li> - - <li>Abbeville, <a href="#Page_20">20</a>, <a href="#Page_175">175</a>, <a href="#Page_238">238</a></li> - - <li>Acason, <a href="#Page_2">2</a>/Lieut., <a href="#Page_249">249</a></li> - - <li>Achi Baba, <a href="#Page_91">91</a> <i lang="la">et seq.</i></li> - - <li>Achicourt, <a href="#Page_255">255</a>-237, <a href="#Page_271">271</a>, <a href="#Page_272">272</a></li> - - <li>Achiet-le-Grand, <a href="#Page_249">249</a>, <a href="#Page_289">289</a></li> - - <li>Adinfer, <a href="#Page_241">241</a>-<a href="#Page_245">245</a></li> - - <li>Agache River, <a href="#Page_479">479</a>, <a href="#Page_485">485</a></li> - - <li>Agnez lez Duisans, <a href="#Page_411">411</a></li> - - <li>Agny, <a href="#Page_253">253</a>, <a href="#Page_256">256</a></li> - - <li>Ailette River, <a href="#Page_382">382</a>, <a href="#Page_383">383</a></li> - - <li>Alexandria, <a href="#Page_89">89</a> <i lang="la">et seq.</i></li> - - <li>Allen, G. A., <a href="#Page_477">477</a></li> - - <li>Allen, L. A., <a href="#Page_127">127</a></li> - - <li>Allenby, Gen. Sir Edmund, <a href="#Page_133">133</a>, <a href="#Page_149">149</a>, <a href="#Page_150">150</a>, <a href="#Page_156">156</a></li> - - <li>Altounyan, E. H. R., <a href="#Page_314">314</a>, <a href="#Page_315">315</a>, <a href="#Page_323">323</a></li> - - <li>Amblèny, <a href="#Page_383">383</a></li> - - <li>Ambrines, <a href="#Page_134">134</a></li> - - <li>Amigny-Rouy, <a href="#Page_365">365</a>, <a href="#Page_375">375</a>, <a href="#Page_380">380</a></li> - - <li>Ancre River, <a href="#Page_140">140</a>, <a href="#Page_177">177</a>, <a href="#Page_180">180</a>, <a href="#Page_239">239</a>, <a href="#Page_240">240</a>, <a href="#Page_252">252</a>, <a href="#Page_325">325</a>, <a href="#Page_420">420</a>, <a href="#Page_430">430</a>, <a href="#Page_431">431</a></li> - - <li>Anderson, J., <a href="#Page_242">242</a></li> - - <li>Andignicourt, <a href="#Page_383">383</a></li> - - <li>Andrews, G. H., <a href="#Page_477">477</a></li> - - <li>Angel, A. J., <a href="#Page_292">292</a>, <a href="#Page_315">315</a></li> - - <li>Angle Wood Valley, <a href="#Page_195">195</a> <i lang="la">et seq.</i></li> - - <li>Angre, <a href="#Page_499">499</a>, <a href="#Page_500">500</a></li> - - <li>Angreau, <a href="#Page_499">499</a></li> - - <li>Anthony, F., <a href="#Page_314">314</a>, <a href="#Page_315">315</a></li> - - <li>Appilly, <a href="#Page_365">365</a></li> - - <li>Archer, L. W., <a href="#Page_174">174</a>, <a href="#Page_193">193</a>, <a href="#Page_270">270</a>, <a href="#Page_304">304</a></li> - - <li>Arklay, F., <a href="#Page_340">340</a>, <a href="#Page_344">344</a></li> - - <li>Arleux, <a href="#Page_397">397</a>, <a href="#Page_398">398</a>, <a href="#Page_486">486</a>, <a href="#Page_490">490</a>, <a href="#Page_491">491</a></li> - - <li>Arleux-en-Gohelle, <a href="#Page_347">347</a></li> - - <li>Armfield, A. R., <a href="#Page_421">421</a></li> - - <li>Arques, <a href="#Page_305">305</a>, <a href="#Page_325">325</a></li> - - <li>Arthur, R. N., <a href="#Page_6">6</a>, <a href="#Page_17">17</a>, <a href="#Page_100">100</a>, <a href="#Page_104">104</a>, <a href="#Page_135">135</a>, <a href="#Page_149">149</a></li> - - <li>Askham, S. G., <a href="#Page_238">238</a>, <a href="#Page_276">276</a>, <a href="#Page_317">317</a>, <a href="#Page_369">369</a>, <a href="#Page_372">372</a>, <a href="#Page_375">375</a>, <a href="#Page_378">378</a>, <a href="#Page_381">381</a>, <a href="#Page_382">382</a>, <a href="#Page_385">385</a>, <a href="#Page_388">388</a>, <a href="#Page_389">389</a>, <a href="#Page_391">391</a></li> - - <li>Athey, F. G., <a href="#Page_352">352</a>, <a href="#Page_399">399</a></li> - - <li>Attenborrow, H. W., <a href="#Page_414">414</a></li> - - <li>Atterbury, L. J. R., <a href="#Page_201">201</a>, <a href="#Page_214">214</a></li> - - <li>Aubencheul-au-Bac, <a href="#Page_487">487</a>, <a href="#Page_488">488</a>, <a href="#Page_490">490</a></li> - - <li>Aubers Ridge, <a href="#Page_26">26</a>, <a href="#Page_58">58</a> <i lang="la">et seq.</i>, <a href="#Page_219">219</a>, <a href="#Page_220">220</a></li> - - <li>Aubigny-au-Bac, <a href="#Page_479">479</a> <i lang="la">et seq.</i></li> - - <li>Aulnoy, <a href="#Page_496">496</a></li> - - <li>Aunelle River, <a href="#Page_496">496</a>-499 -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_522" id="Page_522">[Pg 522]</a></span></li> - <li>Austin, F., <a href="#Page_314">314</a>, <a href="#Page_315">315</a></li> - - <li>Autreppe, <a href="#Page_502">502</a></li> - - <li>Autreville, <a href="#Page_365">365</a></li> - - <li>Ayub Khan, <a href="#Page_65">65</a></li> - - - <li class="indx">Backhouse, J. L., <a href="#Page_327">327</a>, <a href="#Page_413">413</a>, <a href="#Page_469">469</a></li> - - <li>Badham, C., <a href="#Page_53">53</a></li> - - <li>Baharia Oasis, <a href="#Page_108">108</a>-<a href="#Page_110">110</a></li> - - <li>Bahr Yusef, <a href="#Page_110">110</a></li> - - <li>Bailleul, <a href="#Page_347">347</a>, <a href="#Page_349">349</a>, <a href="#Page_354">354</a>, <a href="#Page_393">393</a>, <a href="#Page_397">397</a>, <a href="#Page_403">403</a>, <a href="#Page_404">404</a>, <a href="#Page_407">407</a></li> - - <li>Bailleulmont, <a href="#Page_239">239</a>, <a href="#Page_244">244</a></li> - - <li>Bailleulval, <a href="#Page_242">242</a></li> - - <li>Baizieux, <a href="#Page_423">423</a>, <a href="#Page_424">424</a></li> - - <li>Ballance, L. E., <a href="#Page_223">223</a>, <a href="#Page_228">228</a>, <a href="#Page_335">335</a>, <a href="#Page_414">414</a></li> - - <li>Balls, H. B. A., <a href="#Page_66">66</a>, <a href="#Page_148">148</a>, <a href="#Page_175">175</a>, <a href="#Page_215">215</a></li> - - <li>Baluchis, <a href="#Page_129">129</a>th, <a href="#Page_23">23</a>, <a href="#Page_34">34</a>, <a href="#Page_39">39</a>, <a href="#Page_46">46</a>, <a href="#Page_52">52</a>, <a href="#Page_54">54</a>, <a href="#Page_65">65</a></li> - - <li>Bancourt, <a href="#Page_290">290</a></li> - - <li>Bapaume, <a href="#Page_177">177</a>, <a href="#Page_194">194</a>, <a href="#Page_211">211</a>, <a href="#Page_239">239</a>, <a href="#Page_240">240</a>, <a href="#Page_290">290</a> <i lang="la">et seq.</i>, <a href="#Page_428">428</a> <i lang="la">et seq.</i>, <a href="#Page_482">482</a></li> - - <li>Barisis, <a href="#Page_359">359</a>, <a href="#Page_364">364</a>, <a href="#Page_375">375</a>, <a href="#Page_380">380</a></li> - - <li>Barkas, G. de G., <a href="#Page_423">423</a>, <a href="#Page_436">436</a>, <a href="#Page_440">440</a></li> - - <li>Barker, Sergt., <a href="#Page_342">342</a></li> - - <li>Barkworth, S. J., <a href="#Page_174">174</a>, <a href="#Page_194">194</a>, <a href="#Page_200">200</a>, <a href="#Page_216">216</a>, <a href="#Page_335">335</a>, <a href="#Page_337">337</a>, <a href="#Page_341">341</a>, <a href="#Page_349">349</a>, <a href="#Page_411">411</a>, <a href="#Page_417">417</a></li> - - <li>Barnes, A. C., <a href="#Page_477">477</a></li> - - <li>Barnes, F., <a href="#Page_270">270</a>, <a href="#Page_327">327</a>, <a href="#Page_330">330</a></li> - - <li>Barnett, B. M. J., <a href="#Page_344">344</a></li> - - <li>Barter, Major-Gen. C. St L., <a href="#Page_73">73</a></li> - - <li>Bartleet, H. B., <a href="#Page_443">443</a>, <a href="#Page_458">458</a>, <a href="#Page_459">459</a></li> - - <li>Barton, Pte., <a href="#Page_350">350</a></li> - - <li>Bassett, L. J., <a href="#Page_238">238</a></li> - - <li>Basseux, <a href="#Page_242">242</a></li> - - <li>Bath, A., <a href="#Page_201">201</a>, <a href="#Page_327">327</a>, <a href="#Page_328">328</a>, <a href="#Page_392">392</a>, <a href="#Page_480">480</a></li> - - <li>Battershall, W. A. G., <a href="#Page_408">408</a></li> - - <li>Bayencourt, <a href="#Page_143">143</a> <i lang="la">et seq.</i>, <a href="#Page_264">264</a></li> - - <li>Bayliffe, Lt.-Col., <a href="#Page_382">382</a></li> - - <li>Bazentin-le-Grand, <a href="#Page_177">177</a>, <a href="#Page_178">178</a></li> - - <li>Bazentin-le-Petit, <a href="#Page_177">177</a>, <a href="#Page_178">178</a></li> - - <li>Beal, H. G., <a href="#Page_81">81</a></li> - - <li>Beaucamp, <a href="#Page_290">290</a>, <a href="#Page_291">291</a>, <a href="#Page_292">292</a></li> - - <li>Beaudricourt, <a href="#Page_251">251</a>, <a href="#Page_253">253</a></li> - - <li>Beaufort, <a href="#Page_137">137</a>, <a href="#Page_141">141</a></li> - - <li>Beaulencourt, <a href="#Page_305">305</a>, <a href="#Page_325">325</a>, <a href="#Page_344">344</a></li> - - <li>Beaumetz-les-Loges, <a href="#Page_249">249</a>, <a href="#Page_253">253</a>, <a href="#Page_344">344</a></li> - - <li>Beaumont-Hamel, <a href="#Page_140">140</a>, <a href="#Page_239">239</a>, <a href="#Page_240">240</a></li> - - <li>Beaurains, <a href="#Page_253">253</a>, <a href="#Page_254">254</a>, <a href="#Page_258">258</a></li> - - <li>Beautor, <a href="#Page_369">369</a>, <a href="#Page_370">370</a></li> - - <li>Bedfords, <a href="#Page_7">7</a>th, <a href="#Page_298">298</a>, <a href="#Page_300">300</a>, <a href="#Page_301">301</a> -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_523" id="Page_523">[Pg 523]</a></span></li> - <li>Beeby, H. D., <a href="#Page_223">223</a>, <a href="#Page_269">269</a>, <a href="#Page_336">336</a></li> - - <li>Behencourt, <a href="#Page_423">423</a>, <a href="#Page_425">425</a></li> - - <li>Bell, T. J., <a href="#Page_236">236</a>, <a href="#Page_238">238</a>, <a href="#Page_242">242</a>, <a href="#Page_282">282</a>, <a href="#Page_283">283</a>, <a href="#Page_287">287</a></li> - - <li>Bellacourt, <a href="#Page_241">241</a></li> - - <li>Bellebrune, <a href="#Page_321">321</a></li> - - <li>Bench, Sergt., <a href="#Page_75">75</a></li> - - <li>Bendelow, Pte., <a href="#Page_335">335</a></li> - - <li>Beni Mazar, <a href="#Page_107">107</a>, <a href="#Page_110">110</a>-<a href="#Page_112">112</a></li> - - <li>Beni Salama, <a href="#Page_108">108</a></li> - - <li>Beni Suef, <a href="#Page_108">108</a></li> - - <li>Bennet, E. J., <a href="#Page_117">117</a></li> - - <li>Berles-au-Bois, <a href="#Page_244">244</a>, <a href="#Page_462">462</a></li> - - <li>Bernafay Wood, <a href="#Page_182">182</a>, <a href="#Page_209">209</a></li> - - <li>Bernagousse Quarries, <a href="#Page_366">366</a></li> - - <li>Berneville, <a href="#Page_270">270</a>, <a href="#Page_271">271</a>, <a href="#Page_415">415</a>, <a href="#Page_417">417</a>, <a href="#Page_461">461</a></li> - - <li>Besme, <a href="#Page_381">381</a>, <a href="#Page_382">382</a></li> - - <li>Béthune, <a href="#Page_24">24</a>, <a href="#Page_81">81</a>, <a href="#Page_85">85</a></li> - - <li>Beugny, <a href="#Page_331">331</a>, <a href="#Page_344">344</a></li> - - <li>Bhopals, <a href="#Page_9">9</a>th, <a href="#Page_23">23</a>, <a href="#Page_39">39</a>, <a href="#Page_46">46</a>, <a href="#Page_49">49</a>, <a href="#Page_52">52</a>, <a href="#Page_54">54</a>, <a href="#Page_59">59</a>, <a href="#Page_69">69</a></li> - - <li>Bidgood, F., <a href="#Page_423">423</a>, <a href="#Page_456">456</a>, <a href="#Page_459">459</a></li> - - <li>Bienvillers-au-Bois, <a href="#Page_243">243</a></li> - - <li>Bihucourt, <a href="#Page_279">279</a></li> - - <li>Billon Farm, <a href="#Page_192">192</a>, <a href="#Page_193">193</a></li> - - <li>Billon Wood, <a href="#Page_447">447</a></li> - - <li>Birdwood, Lieut.-Gen. Sir Wm., <a href="#Page_101">101</a>, <a href="#Page_280">280</a></li> - - <li>Bishop, G. F., <a href="#Page_113">113</a></li> - - <li>Bixschoote, <a href="#Page_40">40</a></li> - - <li>Blackdown, <a href="#Page_357">357</a>, <a href="#Page_425">425</a>-<a href="#Page_427">427</a></li> - - <li>Blackhurst, S., <a href="#Page_414">414</a></li> - - <li>Black Watch, <a href="#Page_344">344</a>, <a href="#Page_456">456</a></li> - - <li>Blair, W., <a href="#Page_322">322</a>, <a href="#Page_374">374</a>, <a href="#Page_382">382</a></li> - - <li>Blairville, <a href="#Page_241">241</a>, <a href="#Page_462">462</a>, <a href="#Page_466">466</a>, <a href="#Page_467">467</a></li> - - <li>Blaugies, <a href="#Page_502">502</a></li> - - <li>Blendecques, <a href="#Page_21">21</a>, <a href="#Page_22">22</a>, <a href="#Page_47">47</a></li> - - <li>Blérancourt, <a href="#Page_383">383</a></li> - - <li>Blight, Pte., <a href="#Page_136">136</a></li> - - <li>Blows, C. S. G., <a href="#Page_103">103</a>, <a href="#Page_121">121</a>, <a href="#Page_149">149</a>, <a href="#Page_153">153</a>, <a href="#Page_193">193</a></li> - - <li>Blunn, A. G., <a href="#Page_137">137</a>, <a href="#Page_164">164</a></li> - - <li>Board, C. H., <a href="#Page_353">353</a>, <a href="#Page_394">394</a>, <a href="#Page_395">395</a></li> - - <li>Bocking, J. W., <a href="#Page_385">385</a>, <a href="#Page_391">391</a></li> - - <li>Boesinghe, <a href="#Page_42">42</a>, <a href="#Page_295">295</a></li> - - <li>Boiry-Becquerelle, <a href="#Page_245">245</a>, <a href="#Page_247">247</a>, <a href="#Page_462">462</a> <i lang="la">et seq.</i>, <a href="#Page_478">478</a></li> - - <li>Boiry-St Martin, <a href="#Page_247">247</a>, <a href="#Page_249">249</a></li> - - <li>Boiry-St Rictrude, <a href="#Page_246">246</a></li> - - <li>Bois de Quesnoy, <a href="#Page_482">482</a></li> - - <li>Bois des Bœufs, <a href="#Page_412">412</a></li> - - <li>Bois des Puits, <a href="#Page_487">487</a></li> - - <li>Bois du Biez, <a href="#Page_26">26</a> <i lang="la">et seq.</i>, <a href="#Page_59">59</a>, <a href="#Page_67">67</a>, <a href="#Page_225">225</a></li> - - <li>Boisleux-au-Mont, <a href="#Page_246">246</a></li> - - <li>Boisleux-St Marc, <a href="#Page_467">467</a>, <a href="#Page_478">478</a></li> - - <li>Bold, A. L. D., <a href="#Page_421">421</a>, <a href="#Page_440">440</a></li> - - <li>Bolton, W. H., <a href="#Page_311">311</a>, <a href="#Page_314">314</a>, <a href="#Page_315">315</a></li> - - <li>Bonser, A., <a href="#Page_450">450</a>, <a href="#Page_451">451</a></li> - - <li>Boorman, D. S., <a href="#Page_238">238</a>, <a href="#Page_242">242</a>, <a href="#Page_283">283</a>, <a href="#Page_284">284</a>, <a href="#Page_289">289</a>, <a href="#Page_315">315</a>, <a href="#Page_318">318</a>, <a href="#Page_320">320</a>, <a href="#Page_494">494</a></li> - - <li>Borders, <a href="#Page_5">5</a>th, <a href="#Page_272">272</a></li> - - <li>Botterill, G. P., <a href="#Page_3">3</a>, <a href="#Page_6">6</a>, <a href="#Page_27">27</a>, <a href="#Page_35">35</a>, <a href="#Page_36">36</a>, <a href="#Page_48">48</a></li> - - <li>Botterill, W. R., <a href="#Page_16">16</a>, <a href="#Page_149">149</a>, <a href="#Page_153">153</a> -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_524" id="Page_524">[Pg 524]</a></span></li> - <li>Bottomley, E. W., <a href="#Page_7">7</a>, <a href="#Page_22">22</a>, <a href="#Page_238">238</a>, <a href="#Page_244">244</a>, <a href="#Page_275">275</a>, <a href="#Page_281">281</a>, <a href="#Page_285">285</a>, <a href="#Page_287">287</a></li> - - <li>Bouchavesnes, <a href="#Page_453">453</a>, <a href="#Page_454">454</a></li> - - <li>Bouleaux Wood, <a href="#Page_195">195</a> <i lang="la">et seq.</i></li> - - <li>Boulstridge, W. W., <a href="#Page_477">477</a></li> - - <li>Boutall, W. J., <a href="#Page_66">66</a>, <a href="#Page_151">151</a>, <a href="#Page_153">153</a>, <a href="#Page_180">180</a>, <a href="#Page_194">194</a>, <a href="#Page_207">207</a>, <a href="#Page_216">216</a>, <a href="#Page_403">403</a>, <a href="#Page_417">417</a></li> - - <li>Bout Deville, <a href="#Page_223">223</a>, <a href="#Page_234">234</a></li> - - <li>Bouzincourt, <a href="#Page_420">420</a></li> - - <li>Boves, <a href="#Page_385">385</a>, <a href="#Page_391">391</a></li> - - <li>Bowater, Sir Vansittart, <a href="#Page_14">14</a></li> - - <li>Bowater, V. S., <a href="#Page_16">16</a>, <a href="#Page_223">223</a>, <a href="#Page_257">257</a>, <a href="#Page_272">272</a></li> - - <li>Boyelles, <a href="#Page_246">246</a>, <a href="#Page_247">247</a>, <a href="#Page_462">462</a> <i lang="la">et seq.</i>, <a href="#Page_478">478</a>, <a href="#Page_492">492</a>, <a href="#Page_505">505</a></li> - - <li>Bradford, F. R. C., <a href="#Page_90">90</a>, <a href="#Page_100">100</a>, <a href="#Page_149">149</a>, <a href="#Page_165">165</a></li> - - <li>Bradley, <a href="#Page_2">2</a>/Lieut., <a href="#Page_223">223</a>, <a href="#Page_231">231</a>, <a href="#Page_480">480</a></li> - - <li>Bradley, H. M., <a href="#Page_421">421</a></li> - - <li>Brandram, C., <a href="#Page_449">449</a>, <a href="#Page_455">455</a></li> - - <li>Bray-sur-Somme, <a href="#Page_180">180</a>, <a href="#Page_431">431</a> <i lang="la">et seq.</i></li> - - <li>Bretencourt, <a href="#Page_244">244</a></li> - - <li>Brielen, <a href="#Page_307">307</a>, <a href="#Page_321">321</a>, <a href="#Page_323">323</a></li> - - <li>Brissenden, C. C., <a href="#Page_423">423</a>, <a href="#Page_424">424</a>, <a href="#Page_432">432</a>, <a href="#Page_435">435</a>, <a href="#Page_436">436</a>, <a href="#Page_438">438</a>, <a href="#Page_439">439</a></li> - - <li>Brodie, C. J., <a href="#Page_174">174</a>, <a href="#Page_187">187</a>, <a href="#Page_193">193</a></li> - - <li>Bronfay Farm, <a href="#Page_446">446</a>, <a href="#Page_447">447</a>, <a href="#Page_449">449</a>, <a href="#Page_453">453</a></li> - - <li>Brown, E. S., <a href="#Page_344">344</a></li> - - <li>Brown, N. A., <a href="#Page_323">323</a></li> - - <li>Brown, W. F., <a href="#Page_369">369</a>, <a href="#Page_384">384</a></li> - - <li>Brunemont, <a href="#Page_487">487</a>, <a href="#Page_490">490</a></li> - - <li>Buckingham, W., <a href="#Page_162">162</a>, <a href="#Page_163">163</a>, <a href="#Page_216">216</a></li> - - <li>Buckland, E. D., <a href="#Page_327">327</a></li> - - <li>Bucquoy, <a href="#Page_143">143</a>, <a href="#Page_144">144</a>, <a href="#Page_160">160</a>, <a href="#Page_241">241</a>, <a href="#Page_294">294</a>, <a href="#Page_460">460</a></li> - - <li>Buire-sur-Ancre, <a href="#Page_423">423</a></li> - - <li>Buissy, <a href="#Page_479">479</a></li> - - <li>Bull, H. C., <a href="#Page_314">314</a>, <a href="#Page_315">315</a></li> - - <li>Bullecourt, <a href="#Page_273">273</a> <i lang="la">et seq.</i>, <a href="#Page_331">331</a>, <a href="#Page_447">447</a>, <a href="#Page_467">467</a> <i lang="la">et seq.</i></li> - - <li>Bullock, A. M., <a href="#Page_414">414</a>, <a href="#Page_485">485</a>, <a href="#Page_486">486</a>, <a href="#Page_488">488</a>, <a href="#Page_501">501</a></li> - - <li>Bundle, H. N., <a href="#Page_292">292</a>, <a href="#Page_315">315</a></li> - - <li>Bunker, H., <a href="#Page_329">329</a></li> - - <li>Burd, F. B., <a href="#Page_292">292</a>, <a href="#Page_315">315</a></li> - - <li>Burford, F. R. R., <a href="#Page_174">174</a>, <a href="#Page_189">189</a></li> - - <li>Burnell-Nugent, Brig.-Gen. F. H., <a href="#Page_132">132</a></li> - - <li>Burnett, L. T., <a href="#Page_6">6</a>, <a href="#Page_28">28</a>, <a href="#Page_35">35</a>, <a href="#Page_48">48</a>-50, <a href="#Page_53">53</a>, <a href="#Page_56">56</a>, <a href="#Page_66">66</a>, <a href="#Page_71">71</a>, <a href="#Page_72">72</a>, <a href="#Page_81">81</a>, <a href="#Page_84">84</a>, <a href="#Page_137">137</a>, <a href="#Page_356">356</a></li> - - <li>Burton, P. H., <a href="#Page_238">238</a>, <a href="#Page_276">276</a></li> - - <li>Bury St Edmunds, <a href="#Page_117">117</a></li> - - <li>Bushell, R. D., <a href="#Page_480">480</a></li> - - <li>Butler, Lieut.-Gen. Sir R. H. K., <a href="#Page_364">364</a>, <a href="#Page_367">367</a>, <a href="#Page_383">383</a>, <a href="#Page_384">384</a></li> - - <li>Byng, Gen. Lord, <a href="#Page_260">260</a>, <a href="#Page_359">359</a>, <a href="#Page_460">460</a></li> - - - <li class="indx">Cachy, <a href="#Page_387">387</a>-391, <a href="#Page_419">419</a>-<a href="#Page_424">424</a></li> - - <li>Cairns, J., <a href="#Page_322">322</a>, <a href="#Page_384">384</a></li> - - <li>Cairo, <a href="#Page_107">107</a>, <a href="#Page_108">108</a>, <a href="#Page_112">112</a></li> - - <li>Calnan, W. H., <a href="#Page_174">174</a>, <a href="#Page_199">199</a></li> - - <li>Calonne-sur-Lys, <a href="#Page_27">27</a>, <a href="#Page_30">30</a></li> - - <li>Cambridgeshire Regt., <a href="#Page_1">1</a>st, <a href="#Page_425">425</a></li> - - <li>Campbell, H., <a href="#Page_257">257</a>, <a href="#Page_261">261</a>, <a href="#Page_298">298</a>, <a href="#Page_299">299</a>, <a href="#Page_303">303</a>, <a href="#Page_304">304</a></li> - - <li>Campion, Pte., <a href="#Page_448">448</a> -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_525" id="Page_525">[Pg 525]</a></span></li> - <li>Campkin, R. E., <a href="#Page_353">353</a>, <a href="#Page_396">396</a>, <a href="#Page_398">398</a>, <a href="#Page_407">407</a></li> - - <li>Caparn, R. K., <a href="#Page_127">127</a>, <a href="#Page_238">238</a>, <a href="#Page_242">242</a>, <a href="#Page_249">249</a></li> - - <li>Carlisle, F. A., <a href="#Page_292">292</a>, <a href="#Page_309">309</a></li> - - <li>Carnoy, <a href="#Page_192">192</a>, <a href="#Page_448">448</a></li> - - <li>Carpenter, A. B., <a href="#Page_453">453</a></li> - - <li>Cart de Lafontaine, H. P. L., <a href="#Page_6">6</a>, <a href="#Page_20">20</a>, <a href="#Page_34">34</a>, <a href="#Page_36">36</a>, <a href="#Page_65">65</a>, <a href="#Page_66">66</a></li> - - <li>Cartmell, A., <a href="#Page_482">482</a></li> - - <li>Casey, Capt., <a href="#Page_16">16</a>, <a href="#Page_17">17</a>, <a href="#Page_22">22</a></li> - - <li>Castle, J., <a href="#Page_216">216</a></li> - - <li>Caudwell, T., <a href="#Page_251">251</a>, <a href="#Page_267">267</a></li> - - <li>Cavalry Farm, <a href="#Page_266">266</a>-<a href="#Page_270">270</a></li> - - <li>Celestin Wood, <a href="#Page_438">438</a>, <a href="#Page_439">439</a></li> - - <li>Chamberlain, R. W., <a href="#Page_223">223</a>, <a href="#Page_252">252</a>, <a href="#Page_322">322</a>, <a href="#Page_384">384</a></li> - - <li>Chapman, J. W., <a href="#Page_174">174</a>, <a href="#Page_197">197</a></li> - - <li>Chapman, L. R., <a href="#Page_16">16</a>, <a href="#Page_81">81</a>, <a href="#Page_159">159</a>, <a href="#Page_165">165</a></li> - - <li>Chart, Lieut.-Col., <a href="#Page_382">382</a></li> - - <li>Chauny, <a href="#Page_369">369</a>, <a href="#Page_374">374</a>, <a href="#Page_378">378</a>-<a href="#Page_380">380</a></li> - - <li>Chennels, C.S.M., <a href="#Page_20">20</a>, <a href="#Page_55">55</a></li> - - <li>Chérisy, <a href="#Page_264">264</a></li> - - <li>Cheshires, <a href="#Page_5">5</a>th, <a href="#Page_134">134</a> <i lang="la">et seq.</i>, <a href="#Page_343">343</a></li> - - <li>Chignell, A. W., <a href="#Page_417">417</a>, <a href="#Page_466">466</a></li> - - <li>Chipilly, <a href="#Page_430">430</a>-<a href="#Page_441">441</a></li> - - <li>Cholmondely, H. C., <a href="#Page_116">116</a></li> - - <li>Citerne, <a href="#Page_85">85</a>, <a href="#Page_132">132</a>, <a href="#Page_136">136</a>, <a href="#Page_217">217</a>, <a href="#Page_218">218</a></li> - - <li>Clammer, R. C., <a href="#Page_490">490</a></li> - - <li>Clark, E., <a href="#Page_476">476</a></li> - - <li>Clark, T., <a href="#Page_216">216</a></li> - - <li>Clark, W. G., <a href="#Page_6">6</a>, <a href="#Page_20">20</a>, <a href="#Page_47">47</a>, <a href="#Page_51">51</a>, <a href="#Page_53">53</a>, <a href="#Page_57">57</a>, <a href="#Page_66">66</a>, <a href="#Page_72">72</a>, <a href="#Page_81">81</a>, <a href="#Page_84">84</a>, <a href="#Page_137">137</a>, <a href="#Page_138">138</a></li> - - <li>Clarke, C. A., <a href="#Page_249">249</a>, <a href="#Page_291">291</a>, <a href="#Page_318">318</a>, <a href="#Page_320">320</a>, <a href="#Page_369">369</a>, <a href="#Page_372">372</a>, <a href="#Page_375">375</a>, <a href="#Page_384">384</a></li> - - <li>Cléry-sur-Somme, <a href="#Page_453">453</a></li> - - <li>Clifford, C. C. H., <a href="#Page_292">292</a>, <a href="#Page_317">317</a>, <a href="#Page_384">384</a></li> - - <li>Clifford, W. H., <a href="#Page_214">214</a></li> - - <li>Coates, A. D., <a href="#Page_24">24</a>, <a href="#Page_49">49</a>, <a href="#Page_53">53</a>, <a href="#Page_55">55</a></li> - - <li>Coates, L. C., <a href="#Page_16">16</a>, <a href="#Page_88">88</a>, <a href="#Page_94">94</a></li> - - <li>Coates, S. G., <a href="#Page_408">408</a>, <a href="#Page_468">468</a></li> - - <li>Coates, L/Corpl., <a href="#Page_289">289</a></li> - - <li>Coffin, F. A., <a href="#Page_24">24</a>, <a href="#Page_54">54</a>, <a href="#Page_55">55</a>, <a href="#Page_120">120</a>, <a href="#Page_130">130</a></li> - - <li>Cohen, A., <a href="#Page_465">465</a></li> - - <li>Coigneux, <a href="#Page_264">264</a></li> - - <li>Cojeul River, <a href="#Page_247">247</a>, <a href="#Page_253">253</a> <i lang="la">et seq.</i>, <a href="#Page_462">462</a>, <a href="#Page_467">467</a>, <a href="#Page_479">479</a></li> - - <li>Coke, Brig.-Gen., E. S. D'Ewes, <a href="#Page_133">133</a></li> - - <li>Coleman, T., <a href="#Page_223">223</a></li> - - <li>Coley, J., <a href="#Page_480">480</a></li> - - <li>Collins, C. F., <a href="#Page_216">216</a></li> - - <li>Colomb, G. L., <a href="#Page_57">57</a></li> - - <li>Colvin, A. E., <a href="#Page_216">216</a></li> - - <li>Combles, <a href="#Page_177">177</a> <i lang="la">et seq.</i></li> - - <li>Condé, Canal de, <a href="#Page_501">501</a></li> - - <li>Condren, <a href="#Page_369">369</a> <i lang="la">et seq.</i></li> - - <li>Connaught Rangers, <a href="#Page_23">23</a>, <a href="#Page_34">34</a>, <a href="#Page_36">36</a>-39, <a href="#Page_46">46</a>-49, <a href="#Page_52">52</a>, <a href="#Page_54">54</a>, <a href="#Page_60">60</a>, <a href="#Page_68">68</a>, <a href="#Page_69">69</a></li> - - <li>Contay, <a href="#Page_421">421</a></li> - - <li>Cook, A. S., <a href="#Page_292">292</a>, <a href="#Page_316">316</a></li> - - <li>Cooke, D. C., <a href="#Page_61">61</a>, <a href="#Page_120">120</a>, <a href="#Page_292">292</a>, <a href="#Page_323">323</a></li> - - <li>Cooke, T., <a href="#Page_447">447</a>, <a href="#Page_448">448</a></li> - - <li>Cookson, P. S., <a href="#Page_116">116</a></li> - - <li>Coombe, Capt., <a href="#Page_130">130</a> -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_526" id="Page_526">[Pg 526]</a></span></li> - <li>Coombes, H. V., <a href="#Page_270">270</a>, <a href="#Page_400">400</a>, <a href="#Page_407">407</a></li> - - <li>Cooper, Brig.-Gen. E. J., <a href="#Page_117">117</a></li> - - <li>Cooper, T. B., <a href="#Page_174">174</a>, <a href="#Page_189">189</a>, <a href="#Page_190">190</a>, <a href="#Page_205">205</a>, <a href="#Page_349">349</a>, <a href="#Page_398">398</a>, <a href="#Page_403">403</a>, <a href="#Page_407">407</a>, <a href="#Page_408">408</a>, <a href="#Page_411">411</a>, <a href="#Page_478">478</a>, <a href="#Page_486">486</a>, <a href="#Page_496">496</a>, <a href="#Page_507">507</a></li> - - <li>Corbie, <a href="#Page_180">180</a>, <a href="#Page_431">431</a></li> - - <li>Corkoran, Brig.-Gen. Charles, <a href="#Page_448">448</a></li> - - <li>Cornelius-Wheeler, Capt., <a href="#Page_4">4</a></li> - - <li>Cornell, Pte., <a href="#Page_350">350</a></li> - - <li>Cornwall, C.S.M., <a href="#Page_20">20</a></li> - - <li>Cotton, E. N., <a href="#Page_238">238</a>, <a href="#Page_275">275</a>, <a href="#Page_281">281</a>-283, <a href="#Page_287">287</a>, <a href="#Page_289">289</a></li> - - <li>Cotton, R. D., <a href="#Page_423">423</a>, <a href="#Page_424">424</a></li> - - <li>Couchman, J. T., <a href="#Page_477">477</a></li> - - <li>Coulemby, <a href="#Page_321">321</a></li> - - <li>Courcelette, <a href="#Page_194">194</a> <i lang="la">et seq.</i></li> - - <li>Courcelles, <a href="#Page_289">289</a>, <a href="#Page_290">290</a></li> - - <li>Court, T. J., <a href="#Page_344">344</a></li> - - <li>Cowland, C.S.M., <a href="#Page_450">450</a></li> - - <li>Cragg, C. W., <a href="#Page_81">81</a>, <a href="#Page_238">238</a></li> - - <li>Crane, S. H. E., <a href="#Page_360">360</a></li> - - <li>Crawford, D. F., <a href="#Page_367">367</a>, <a href="#Page_369">369</a>, <a href="#Page_384">384</a></li> - - <li>Creighton, A. B., <a href="#Page_327">327</a>, <a href="#Page_335">335</a></li> - - <li>Creil, <a href="#Page_19">19</a></li> - - <li>Cremarest, <a href="#Page_321">321</a></li> - - <li>Croisilles, <a href="#Page_246">246</a>, <a href="#Page_247">247</a>, <a href="#Page_253">253</a>, <a href="#Page_467">467</a>-471, <a href="#Page_492">492</a></li> - - <li>Croix Barbée, <a href="#Page_37">37</a>, <a href="#Page_38">38</a>, <a href="#Page_72">72</a>, <a href="#Page_229">229</a>, <a href="#Page_232">232</a></li> - - <li>Croll, A. G., <a href="#Page_127">127</a>, <a href="#Page_238">238</a>, <a href="#Page_242">242</a>, <a href="#Page_289">289</a>, <a href="#Page_291">291</a>, <a href="#Page_424">424</a>, <a href="#Page_425">425</a>, <a href="#Page_432">432</a>, <a href="#Page_434">434</a>-436, <a href="#Page_438">438</a>-<a href="#Page_440">440</a></li> - - <li>Crosbie, McC., <a href="#Page_442">442</a>, <a href="#Page_446">446</a>, <a href="#Page_447">447</a>, <a href="#Page_451">451</a>, <a href="#Page_452">452</a></li> - - <li>Crozat Canal, <a href="#Page_369">369</a>-377, <a href="#Page_477">477</a></li> - - <li>Cuesmes, <a href="#Page_506">506</a>, <a href="#Page_507">507</a></li> - - <li>Cuffe, Pte., <a href="#Page_350">350</a></li> - - <li>Cumner, C. W., <a href="#Page_366">366</a>, <a href="#Page_391">391</a></li> - - <li>Curgies, <a href="#Page_497">497</a></li> - - <li>Curlu, <a href="#Page_140">140</a>, <a href="#Page_451">451</a></li> - - <li>Curtis, <a href="#Page_2">2</a>/Lieut., <a href="#Page_382">382</a></li> - - <li>Cuthbert, Brig.-Gen. G., <a href="#Page_73">73</a>, <a href="#Page_85">85</a></li> - - <li>Cuthbertson, E. M., <a href="#Page_323">323</a>, <a href="#Page_384">384</a></li> - - - <li class="indx">Dade, H., <a href="#Page_122">122</a></li> - - <li>Dade, H. F., <a href="#Page_352">352</a>, <a href="#Page_400">400</a>, <a href="#Page_401">401</a>, <a href="#Page_488">488</a></li> - - <li>Dainville, <a href="#Page_414">414</a>-418, <a href="#Page_493">493</a></li> - - <li>Dakhla Oasis, <a href="#Page_108">108</a></li> - - <li>Dallas, Major-Gen. A. G., <a href="#Page_107">107</a>, <a href="#Page_108">108</a>, <a href="#Page_111">111</a></li> - - <li>Dann, W. R. H., <a href="#Page_237">237</a>, <a href="#Page_238">238</a>, <a href="#Page_243">243</a>, <a href="#Page_279">279</a>, <a href="#Page_280">280</a>, <a href="#Page_288">288</a>, <a href="#Page_315">315</a>, <a href="#Page_370">370</a>, <a href="#Page_371">371</a>, <a href="#Page_373">373</a>, <a href="#Page_374">374</a>, <a href="#Page_378">378</a>, <a href="#Page_379">379</a>, <a href="#Page_381">381</a>, <a href="#Page_382">382</a>, <a href="#Page_421">421</a></li> - - <li>Darrington, C. P., <a href="#Page_88">88</a>, <a href="#Page_99">99</a></li> - - <li>Davey, W. H., <a href="#Page_174">174</a>, <a href="#Page_193">193</a></li> - - <li>Davies, S. N., <a href="#Page_16">16</a>, <a href="#Page_104">104</a></li> - - <li>Davies, W. A., <a href="#Page_443">443</a>, <a href="#Page_456">456</a></li> - - <li>Davis, A. G., <a href="#Page_223">223</a>, <a href="#Page_304">304</a></li> - - <li>Davis, G. H., <a href="#Page_137">137</a>, <a href="#Page_159">159</a>, <a href="#Page_165">165</a>, <a href="#Page_185">185</a>, <a href="#Page_193">193</a></li> - - <li>Davis, R., <a href="#Page_165">165</a>, <a href="#Page_216">216</a></li> - - <li>Davis, S., <a href="#Page_100">100</a>, <a href="#Page_104">104</a>, <a href="#Page_121">121</a>, <a href="#Page_149">149</a>, <a href="#Page_289">289</a>, <a href="#Page_311">311</a>, <a href="#Page_313">313</a>-<a href="#Page_315">315</a></li> - - <li>Daw, H. S., <a href="#Page_238">238</a></li> - - <li>Deacon, Major, <a href="#Page_48">48</a></li> - - <li>Deadman, A. J., <a href="#Page_408">408</a></li> - - <li>Demicourt, <a href="#Page_326">326</a> -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_527" id="Page_527">[Pg 527]</a></span></li> - <li>Demuin, <a href="#Page_387">387</a></li> - - <li>Denain, <a href="#Page_496">496</a></li> - - <li>Denier, <a href="#Page_272">272</a>, <a href="#Page_292">292</a></li> - - <li>Denning, C. W., <a href="#Page_174">174</a>, <a href="#Page_272">272</a>, <a href="#Page_407">407</a></li> - - <li>Dennis, H. W., <a href="#Page_16">16</a>, <a href="#Page_90">90</a>, <a href="#Page_113">113</a>, <a href="#Page_119">119</a></li> - - <li>de Pury, C. R. P., <a href="#Page_81">81</a>, <a href="#Page_138">138</a></li> - - <li>Dernancourt, <a href="#Page_437">437</a></li> - - <li>Derviche-Jones, Lieut.-Col., <a href="#Page_379">379</a></li> - - <li>Dessart Wood, <a href="#Page_291">291</a>, <a href="#Page_292">292</a></li> - - <li>Dettingen Barracks, <a href="#Page_357">357</a></li> - - <li>Devonshire Regt., <a href="#Page_112">112</a>, <a href="#Page_119">119</a>, <a href="#Page_128">128</a></li> - - <li>Dew, E. G., <a href="#Page_127">127</a>, <a href="#Page_223">223</a>, <a href="#Page_304">304</a>, <a href="#Page_494">494</a></li> - - <li>Dickebusch, <a href="#Page_297">297</a>, <a href="#Page_299">299</a></li> - - <li>Dickerson, A. E., <a href="#Page_477">477</a></li> - - <li>Dickens, Major, <a href="#Page_189">189</a></li> - - <li>Dickins, L. A., <a href="#Page_16">16</a>, <a href="#Page_103">103</a></li> - - <li>Dickins, R. C., <a href="#Page_16">16</a>, <a href="#Page_101">101</a>, <a href="#Page_113">113</a>, <a href="#Page_315">315</a>, <a href="#Page_318">318</a>, <a href="#Page_320">320</a></li> - - <li>Dodds, A. W., <a href="#Page_315">315</a>, <a href="#Page_320">320</a></li> - - <li>Dogras, <a href="#Page_41">41</a>st, <a href="#Page_31">31</a>-<a href="#Page_33">33</a></li> - - <li>Doignies, <a href="#Page_333">333</a>, <a href="#Page_334">334</a></li> - - <li>Domart, <a href="#Page_137">137</a>, <a href="#Page_425">425</a></li> - - <li>Dommiers, <a href="#Page_383">383</a></li> - - <li>Donaldson, V. C., <a href="#Page_75">75</a>, <a href="#Page_134">134</a>, <a href="#Page_165">165</a></li> - - <li>Douai, <a href="#Page_252">252</a>, <a href="#Page_347">347</a>, <a href="#Page_414">414</a>, <a href="#Page_479">479</a>, <a href="#Page_491">491</a></li> - - <li>Douchy, <a href="#Page_496">496</a></li> - - <li>Doullens, <a href="#Page_137">137</a>, <a href="#Page_150">150</a>, <a href="#Page_234">234</a>, <a href="#Page_248">248</a></li> - - <li>Dove, F. A., <a href="#Page_477">477</a></li> - - <li>Dow, H., <a href="#Page_128">128</a></li> - - <li>Drocourt, <a href="#Page_265">265</a>, <a href="#Page_395">395</a>, <a href="#Page_475">475</a>, <a href="#Page_477">477</a>, <a href="#Page_479">479</a></li> - - <li>Drouvin, <a href="#Page_81">81</a></li> - - <li>Dudgeon, Major-Gen. F. A., <a href="#Page_296">296</a>, <a href="#Page_297">297</a>, <a href="#Page_342">342</a>, <a href="#Page_348">348</a>, <a href="#Page_353">353</a>, <a href="#Page_414">414</a></li> - - <li>Dudley, Sergt.-Major, <a href="#Page_24">24</a></li> - - <li>Duke of Wellington's Regt., <a href="#Page_234">234</a></li> - - <li>Dunaway, C. E., <a href="#Page_323">323</a>, <a href="#Page_391">391</a>, <a href="#Page_424">424</a></li> - - <li>Duncan-Teape, H. J. T., <a href="#Page_3">3</a>, <a href="#Page_6">6</a>, <a href="#Page_20">20</a>, <a href="#Page_47">47</a>, <a href="#Page_51">51</a>, <a href="#Page_121">121</a>, <a href="#Page_123">123</a>, <a href="#Page_128">128</a>, <a href="#Page_142">142</a>, <a href="#Page_145">145</a>, <a href="#Page_153">153</a>, <a href="#Page_211">211</a>, <a href="#Page_214">214</a>, <a href="#Page_215">215</a>, <a href="#Page_217">217</a>, <a href="#Page_427">427</a></li> - - <li>Dunfee, Vickers, <a href="#Page_14">14</a>, <a href="#Page_16">16</a>, <a href="#Page_17">17</a>, <a href="#Page_100">100</a>, <a href="#Page_110">110</a>, <a href="#Page_112">112</a>, <a href="#Page_113">113</a>, <a href="#Page_115">115</a>, <a href="#Page_129">129</a>, <a href="#Page_130">130</a>, <a href="#Page_427">427</a></li> - - <li>Dunfee, Mrs, <a href="#Page_103">103</a></li> - - <li>Durlacher, H. W., <a href="#Page_360">360</a>, <a href="#Page_384">384</a></li> - - <li>Duthie, A. M., <a href="#Page_238">238</a>, <a href="#Page_242">242</a>, <a href="#Page_249">249</a>, <a href="#Page_327">327</a>, <a href="#Page_338">338</a>-341, <a href="#Page_344">344</a>, <a href="#Page_407">407</a>, <a href="#Page_408">408</a></li> - - - <li class="indx">Eastoe, W. H., <a href="#Page_327">327</a></li> - - <li>East Surrey Regt., <a href="#Page_366">366</a></li> - - <li>Eccles, J., <a href="#Page_477">477</a></li> - - <li>Ecourt-St Quentin, <a href="#Page_481">481</a>, <a href="#Page_482">482</a>, <a href="#Page_491">491</a></li> - - <li>Ecurie, <a href="#Page_348">348</a>, <a href="#Page_351">351</a></li> - - <li>Edwards, V. W., <a href="#Page_6">6</a>, <a href="#Page_17">17</a>, <a href="#Page_89">89</a></li> - - <li>Edwards, W. H., <a href="#Page_20">20</a></li> - - <li>Egerton, Brig.-Gen. R. G., <a href="#Page_23">23</a>, <a href="#Page_32">32</a></li> - - <li>Ehren, A. C., <a href="#Page_53">53</a>, <a href="#Page_57">57</a></li> - - <li>Elders, J. F., <a href="#Page_251">251</a>, <a href="#Page_330">330</a></li> - - <li>Eldred, Mr, <a href="#Page_123">123</a></li> - - <li>Elliott, J., <a href="#Page_81">81</a></li> - - <li>Elliott, L. B. J., <a href="#Page_304">304</a></li> - - <li>Elliott, S., <a href="#Page_6">6</a>, <a href="#Page_11">11</a>, <a href="#Page_84">84</a>, <a href="#Page_146">146</a>, <a href="#Page_147">147</a></li> - - <li>Elsom, C.S.M., <a href="#Page_20">20</a></li> - - <li>Elverdinghe, <a href="#Page_323">323</a> -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_528" id="Page_528">[Pg 528]</a></span></li> - <li>English, C. F., <a href="#Page_174">174</a>, <a href="#Page_193">193</a></li> - - <li>English, H. E., <a href="#Page_238">238</a>, <a href="#Page_317">317</a></li> - - <li>Entrenching Battalions, <a href="#Page_378">378</a> <i lang="la">et seq.</i></li> - - <li>Epéhy, <a href="#Page_290">290</a>, <a href="#Page_451">451</a>, <a href="#Page_457">457</a>, <a href="#Page_459">459</a>, <a href="#Page_483">483</a></li> - - <li>Eperlecques, <a href="#Page_296">296</a>, <a href="#Page_304">304</a></li> - - <li>Epinoy, <a href="#Page_487">487</a>, <a href="#Page_490">490</a></li> - - <li>Ervillers, <a href="#Page_249">249</a></li> - - <li>Escaut, Canal de l', <a href="#Page_290">290</a>, <a href="#Page_332">332</a>, <a href="#Page_379">379</a>, <a href="#Page_490">490</a>, <a href="#Page_495">495</a>, <a href="#Page_501">501</a></li> - - <li>Estaires, <a href="#Page_26">26</a>, <a href="#Page_71">71</a>, <a href="#Page_218">218</a>, <a href="#Page_413">413</a></li> - - <li>Estreux, <a href="#Page_497">497</a>, <a href="#Page_499">499</a></li> - - <li>Etaing, <a href="#Page_479">479</a>, <a href="#Page_480">480</a>, <a href="#Page_482">482</a></li> - - <li>Etaples, <a href="#Page_19">19</a>-<a href="#Page_21">21</a></li> - - <li>Eterpigny, <a href="#Page_479">479</a></li> - - <li>Evans, H., <a href="#Page_344">344</a></li> - - <li>Evans, W. B., <a href="#Page_360">360</a></li> - - <li>Ewing, G. C., <a href="#Page_323">323</a>, <a href="#Page_389">389</a>, <a href="#Page_390">390</a>, <a href="#Page_454">454</a>, <a href="#Page_458">458</a></li> - - - <li class="indx">Fabien, R. L., <a href="#Page_128">128</a></li> - - <li>Fairman, Pte., <a href="#Page_350">350</a></li> - - <li>Falfemont Farm, <a href="#Page_178">178</a>, <a href="#Page_201">201</a></li> - - <li>Famars, <a href="#Page_496">496</a>, <a href="#Page_502">502</a></li> - - <li>Fanhangel, F. C., <a href="#Page_66">66</a>, <a href="#Page_164">164</a></li> - - <li>Fanshawe, Major-Gen. H. D., <a href="#Page_237">237</a>, <a href="#Page_290">290</a></li> - - <li>Farafra Oasis, <a href="#Page_108">108</a></li> - - <li>Farfan, L., <a href="#Page_128">128</a></li> - - <li>Fargniers, <a href="#Page_366">366</a>-<a href="#Page_373">373</a></li> - - <li>Faulkner, Lieut., <a href="#Page_350">350</a>, <a href="#Page_417">417</a>, <a href="#Page_494">494</a></li> - - <li>Fauquissart, <a href="#Page_218">218</a>, <a href="#Page_219">219</a>, <a href="#Page_221">221</a></li> - - <li>Fayoum, <a href="#Page_108">108</a></li> - - <li>Ferdinando, S. P., <a href="#Page_238">238</a>, <a href="#Page_249">249</a>, <a href="#Page_480">480</a></li> - - <li>Fergusson, Corpl., <a href="#Page_190">190</a></li> - - <li>Festubert, <a href="#Page_26">26</a>, <a href="#Page_60">60</a>, <a href="#Page_61">61</a>, <a href="#Page_73">73</a>, <a href="#Page_347">347</a></li> - - <li>Feuchy, <a href="#Page_253">253</a>, <a href="#Page_266">266</a>, <a href="#Page_480">480</a>, <a href="#Page_481">481</a></li> - - <li>Fisher, G. W., <a href="#Page_392">392</a></li> - - <li>Flers, <a href="#Page_178">178</a>, <a href="#Page_194">194</a> <i lang="la">et seq.</i>, <a href="#Page_203">203</a>, <a href="#Page_209">209</a></li> - - <li>Fletcher, T. R., <a href="#Page_201">201</a>, <a href="#Page_213">213</a>, <a href="#Page_214">214</a>, <a href="#Page_480">480</a>, <a href="#Page_485">485</a>, <a href="#Page_486">486</a>, <a href="#Page_488">488</a></li> - - <li>Foch, Marshal, <a href="#Page_41">41</a>, <a href="#Page_410">410</a>, <a href="#Page_429">429</a>, <a href="#Page_483">483</a></li> - - <li>Foden, F. J., <a href="#Page_174">174</a>, <a href="#Page_193">193</a></li> - - <li>Folly Farm, <a href="#Page_120">120</a>, <a href="#Page_122">122</a></li> - - <li>Fonquevillers, <a href="#Page_170">170</a>-<a href="#Page_174">174</a></li> - - <li>Fontaine-lez-Croisilles, <a href="#Page_253">253</a>, <a href="#Page_264">264</a>, <a href="#Page_274">274</a>, <a href="#Page_280">280</a>, <a href="#Page_467">467</a>, <a href="#Page_468">468</a></li> - - <li>Forbes, R., <a href="#Page_216">216</a></li> - - <li>Ford, A. S., <a href="#Page_66">66</a>, <a href="#Page_165">165</a>, <a href="#Page_270">270</a>, <a href="#Page_304">304</a></li> - - <li>Fortel, <a href="#Page_238">238</a></li> - - <li>Fosse, <a href="#Page_64">64</a>, <a href="#Page_229">229</a>, <a href="#Page_233">233</a></li> - - <li>Fovant, <a href="#Page_122">122</a>, <a href="#Page_128">128</a>, <a href="#Page_355">355</a></li> - - <li>Francis, C. B., <a href="#Page_366">366</a>, <a href="#Page_384">384</a></li> - - <li>Franks, A., <a href="#Page_327">327</a>, <a href="#Page_335">335</a></li> - - <li>Frégicourt, <a href="#Page_178">178</a>, <a href="#Page_206">206</a>, <a href="#Page_211">211</a></li> - - <li>Frémicourt, <a href="#Page_326">326</a> <i lang="la">et seq.</i></li> - - <li>French, F.M. Earl, <a href="#Page_24">24</a>, <a href="#Page_25">25</a>, <a href="#Page_41">41</a>, <a href="#Page_58">58</a>, <a href="#Page_59">59</a>, <a href="#Page_79">79</a>, <a href="#Page_128">128</a>, <a href="#Page_347">347</a></li> - - <li>Frevent, <a href="#Page_137">137</a>, <a href="#Page_141">141</a>, <a href="#Page_238">238</a></li> - - <li>Freyberg, Brig.-Gen. B. C., <a href="#Page_249">249</a>, <a href="#Page_290">290</a>, <a href="#Page_293">293</a>, <a href="#Page_314">314</a></li> - - <li>Fricourt, <a href="#Page_140">140</a>, <a href="#Page_166">166</a>, <a href="#Page_177">177</a>, <a href="#Page_445">445</a></li> - - <li>Frières Wood, <a href="#Page_377">377</a>, <a href="#Page_378">378</a></li> - - <li>Frohen-le-Grand, <a href="#Page_248">248</a></li> - - <li>Frost, W., <a href="#Page_477">477</a> -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_529" id="Page_529">[Pg 529]</a></span></li> - <li>Froy, W. A., <a href="#Page_223">223</a></li> - - <li>Fry, Major-Gen. W., <a href="#Page_2">2</a>, <a href="#Page_6">6</a>, <a href="#Page_15">15</a></li> - - <li>Fulford, D., <a href="#Page_48">48</a>, <a href="#Page_57">57</a>, <a href="#Page_350">350</a></li> - - <li>Fullalove, J. S., <a href="#Page_119">119</a>, <a href="#Page_130">130</a></li> - - - <li class="indx">Gallipoli, <a href="#Page_87">87</a> <i lang="la">et seq.</i>, <a href="#Page_120">120</a></li> - - <li>Gant, H. H., <a href="#Page_449">449</a>, <a href="#Page_455">455</a></li> - - <li>Gardiner, A. E., <a href="#Page_230">230</a>, <a href="#Page_231">231</a></li> - - <li>Gardner, E. G., <a href="#Page_315">315</a></li> - - <li>Garner, E. H., <a href="#Page_475">475</a></li> - - <li>Garratt, O. D., <a href="#Page_174">174</a>, <a href="#Page_183">183</a>, <a href="#Page_188">188</a>, <a href="#Page_189">189</a>, <a href="#Page_194">194</a>, <a href="#Page_216">216</a>, <a href="#Page_218">218</a>, <a href="#Page_224">224</a>, <a href="#Page_265">265</a>, <a href="#Page_329">329</a>, <a href="#Page_392">392</a></li> - - <li>Gaskin, C., <a href="#Page_66">66</a>, <a href="#Page_71">71</a></li> - - <li>Gathergood, J. S. B., <a href="#Page_61">61</a>, <a href="#Page_117">117</a></li> - - <li>Gaudiempré, <a href="#Page_241">241</a></li> - - <li>Gauld, K. W., <a href="#Page_423">423</a>, <a href="#Page_424">424</a></li> - - <li>Gavrelle, <a href="#Page_347">347</a>, <a href="#Page_349">349</a></li> - - <li>Gearle, H. C., <a href="#Page_216">216</a></li> - - <li>Geering, S. C., <a href="#Page_323">323</a>, <a href="#Page_391">391</a></li> - - <li>Gentelles, <a href="#Page_385">385</a>, <a href="#Page_386">386</a></li> - - <li>George, J. W., <a href="#Page_420">420</a>, <a href="#Page_421">421</a>, <a href="#Page_440">440</a></li> - - <li>Gery, R. V., <a href="#Page_7">7</a>, <a href="#Page_66">66</a></li> - - <li>Ghain Tuffieha, <a href="#Page_9">9</a>, <a href="#Page_11">11</a>, <a href="#Page_17">17</a>, <a href="#Page_87">87</a>, <a href="#Page_89">89</a></li> - - <li>Gibbs, C. C., <a href="#Page_315">315</a>, <a href="#Page_454">454</a>, <a href="#Page_458">458</a></li> - - <li>Gibbs, C. J., <a href="#Page_408">408</a></li> - - <li>Gifford, W. R., <a href="#Page_201">201</a>, <a href="#Page_211">211</a>, <a href="#Page_213">213</a></li> - - <li>Giles, E., <a href="#Page_7">7</a>, <a href="#Page_53">53</a>, <a href="#Page_55">55</a>, <a href="#Page_66">66</a>, <a href="#Page_146">146</a>, <a href="#Page_152">152</a>, <a href="#Page_153">153</a></li> - - <li>Giles, M. F., <a href="#Page_443">443</a></li> - - <li>Gilson, G., <a href="#Page_443">443</a>, <a href="#Page_455">455</a></li> - - <li>Ginchy, <a href="#Page_178">178</a> <i lang="la">et seq.</i></li> - - <li>Girling, W., <a href="#Page_507">507</a></li> - - <li>Girling, W. N. M., <a href="#Page_421">421</a>, <a href="#Page_440">440</a></li> - - <li>Givenchy, <a href="#Page_23">23</a>, <a href="#Page_477">477</a></li> - - <li>Givenchy-le-Noble, <a href="#Page_134">134</a></li> - - <li>Givry, <a href="#Page_506">506</a></li> - - <li>Glencorse Wood, <a href="#Page_295">295</a> <i lang="la">et seq.</i></li> - - <li>Gloucesters, <a href="#Page_4">4</a>th, <a href="#Page_182">182</a></li> - - <li>Glover, R. E., <a href="#Page_443">443</a>, <a href="#Page_455">455</a></li> - - <li>Godewaersvelde, <a href="#Page_43">43</a></li> - - <li>Godman, S. H., <a href="#Page_123">123</a>, <a href="#Page_128">128</a>, <a href="#Page_355">355</a></li> - - <li>Gommecourt, <a href="#Page_129">129</a>, <a href="#Page_139">139</a> <i lang="la">et seq.</i>, <a href="#Page_240">240</a>, <a href="#Page_264">264</a></li> - - <li>Gonnelieu, <a href="#Page_331">331</a></li> - - <li>Gooch, Sergt., <a href="#Page_342">342</a></li> - - <li>Goodale, C. C. W., <a href="#Page_443">443</a>, <a href="#Page_448">448</a></li> - - <li>Goodes, G. L., <a href="#Page_66">66</a>, <a href="#Page_80">80</a></li> - - <li>Gough, Gen. Sir H., <a href="#Page_24">24</a>, <a href="#Page_249">249</a>, <a href="#Page_273">273</a>, <a href="#Page_279">279</a>, <a href="#Page_295">295</a>, <a href="#Page_359">359</a>, <a href="#Page_360">360</a>, <a href="#Page_366">366</a>, <a href="#Page_385">385</a></li> - - <li>Gouy-en-Artois, <a href="#Page_264">264</a></li> - - <li>Gouzeaucourt, <a href="#Page_290">290</a>, <a href="#Page_292">292</a>, <a href="#Page_359">359</a></li> - - <li>Graddon, J. C., <a href="#Page_173">173</a>, <a href="#Page_174">174</a>, <a href="#Page_193">193</a></li> - - <li>Graham, C. J., <a href="#Page_236">236</a>, <a href="#Page_238">238</a>, <a href="#Page_250">250</a></li> - - <li>Grand Rullecourt, <a href="#Page_418">418</a>, <a href="#Page_461">461</a></li> - - <li>Grande Honnelle River, <a href="#Page_500">500</a>, <a href="#Page_501">501</a></li> - - <li>Grant, G. J., <a href="#Page_344">344</a>, <a href="#Page_477">477</a></li> - - <li>Gray, S. A., <a href="#Page_270">270</a>, <a href="#Page_328">328</a></li> - - <li>Green, P. W., <a href="#Page_480">480</a></li> - - <li>Green, Rev. S. F. Leighton, <a href="#Page_223">223</a>, <a href="#Page_263">263</a>, <a href="#Page_341">341</a>, <a href="#Page_403">403</a>, <a href="#Page_506">506</a></li> - - <li>Greenfield, S., <a href="#Page_505">505</a></li> - - <li>Greenwood, J. R., <a href="#Page_477">477</a></li> - - <li>Grenas, <a href="#Page_142">142</a>, <a href="#Page_150">150</a>, <a href="#Page_248">248</a> -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_530" id="Page_530">[Pg 530]</a></span></li> - <li>Grenay, <a href="#Page_82">82</a></li> - - <li>Gressaire Wood, <a href="#Page_430">430</a> <i lang="la">et seq.</i></li> - - <li>Grey, R., <a href="#Page_449">449</a>, <a href="#Page_452">452</a></li> - - <li>Grierson, J., <a href="#Page_279">279</a></li> - - <li>Griffiths, F. J., <a href="#Page_322">322</a>, <a href="#Page_382">382</a>, <a href="#Page_419">419</a>, <a href="#Page_454">454</a>, <a href="#Page_455">455</a></li> - - <li>Grimsdell, E. V., <a href="#Page_385">385</a>, <a href="#Page_388">388</a>, <a href="#Page_419">419</a>, <a href="#Page_447">447</a>, <a href="#Page_451">451</a>, <a href="#Page_452">452</a></li> - - <li>Grimsdell, R. E., <a href="#Page_174">174</a>, <a href="#Page_204">204</a>, <a href="#Page_205">205</a>, <a href="#Page_207">207</a></li> - - <li>Grimston, Sergt., <a href="#Page_350">350</a></li> - - <li>Grimwade, F. C., <a href="#Page_6">6</a>, <a href="#Page_11">11</a>, <a href="#Page_20">20</a>, <a href="#Page_47">47</a>, <a href="#Page_51">51</a>, <a href="#Page_53">53</a>, <a href="#Page_55">55</a>, <a href="#Page_120">120</a>, <a href="#Page_127">127</a>, <a href="#Page_130">130</a>, <a href="#Page_218">218</a>, <a href="#Page_252">252</a></li> - - <li>Grosville, <a href="#Page_241">241</a></li> - - <li>Grover, A., <a href="#Page_243">243</a>, <a href="#Page_310">310</a>, <a href="#Page_311">311</a>, <a href="#Page_315">315</a>, <a href="#Page_317">317</a>, <a href="#Page_379">379</a>-384, <a href="#Page_421">421</a>, <a href="#Page_431">431</a>, <a href="#Page_433">433</a>, <a href="#Page_440">440</a></li> - - <li>Guémappe, <a href="#Page_264">264</a>, <a href="#Page_265">265</a>, <a href="#Page_267">267</a></li> - - <li>Gueudecourt, <a href="#Page_178">178</a>, <a href="#Page_209">209</a></li> - - <li>Guignemicourt, <a href="#Page_422">422</a>, <a href="#Page_442">442</a></li> - - <li>Guillemont, <a href="#Page_177">177</a> <i lang="la">et seq.</i>, <a href="#Page_452">452</a></li> - - <li>Gurkha Rifles, <a href="#Page_22">22</a>, <a href="#Page_24">24</a>, <a href="#Page_49">49</a></li> - - <li>Guyencourt, <a href="#Page_459">459</a></li> - - - <li class="indx">Haig, F.M. Earl, <a href="#Page_24">24</a>, <a href="#Page_74">74</a>, <a href="#Page_139">139</a>, <a href="#Page_141">141</a>, <a href="#Page_263">263</a>, <a href="#Page_448">448</a>, <a href="#Page_482">482</a>-484, <a href="#Page_489">489</a>, <a href="#Page_495">495</a>, <a href="#Page_504">504</a></li> - - <li>Haillicourt, <a href="#Page_84">84</a>, <a href="#Page_85">85</a></li> - - <li>Haine, A. A. N., <a href="#Page_61">61</a>, <a href="#Page_116">116</a>, <a href="#Page_118">118</a></li> - - <li>Haisnes, <a href="#Page_77">77</a></li> - - <li>Hallencourt, <a href="#Page_85">85</a>, <a href="#Page_136">136</a>, <a href="#Page_217">217</a></li> - - <li>Hall, W. C. B., <a href="#Page_443">443</a></li> - - <li>Hallett, H. W., <a href="#Page_238">238</a>, <a href="#Page_249">249</a></li> - - <li>Halloy, <a href="#Page_142">142</a> <i lang="la">et seq.</i></li> - - <li>Hamel, <a href="#Page_140">140</a>, <a href="#Page_428">428</a></li> - - <li>Hamelincourt, <a href="#Page_246">246</a>, <a href="#Page_462">462</a></li> - - <li>Ham-en-Artois, <a href="#Page_22">22</a>, <a href="#Page_27">27</a></li> - - <li>Hamilton, Gen. Sir Ian, <a href="#Page_16">16</a>, <a href="#Page_91">91</a>, <a href="#Page_92">92</a>, <a href="#Page_96">96</a></li> - - <li>Hamilton, W. H., <a href="#Page_14">14</a>, <a href="#Page_49">49</a>, <a href="#Page_116">116</a>, <a href="#Page_117">117</a>, <a href="#Page_119">119</a>, <a href="#Page_129">129</a></li> - - <li>Hampshire Regiment, <a href="#Page_129">129</a></li> - - <li>Hanebeek, <a href="#Page_302">302</a>, <a href="#Page_306">306</a>, <a href="#Page_310">310</a>, <a href="#Page_313">313</a></li> - - <li>Hangard, <a href="#Page_385">385</a>, <a href="#Page_387">387</a>, <a href="#Page_388">388</a>, <a href="#Page_390">390</a></li> - - <li>Hanks, A. E., <a href="#Page_350">350</a></li> - - <li>Hannay, H. T., <a href="#Page_270">270</a>, <a href="#Page_304">304</a>, <a href="#Page_350">350</a>, <a href="#Page_407">407</a></li> - - <li>Hardecourt, <a href="#Page_451">451</a></li> - - <li>Hardy, L/Corpl., <a href="#Page_236">236</a></li> - - <li>Harmignies, <a href="#Page_502">502</a></li> - - <li>Harper, A. L., <a href="#Page_223">223</a>, <a href="#Page_231">231</a></li> - - <li>Harper, Lieut., <a href="#Page_162">162</a>, <a href="#Page_163">163</a></li> - - <li>Harris, M., <a href="#Page_24">24</a>, <a href="#Page_50">50</a>, <a href="#Page_207">207</a>, <a href="#Page_215">215</a>, <a href="#Page_330">330</a></li> - - <li>Hart, W. H., <a href="#Page_477">477</a></li> - - <li>Harveng, <a href="#Page_502">502</a></li> - - <li>Haut Avesnes, <a href="#Page_411">411</a></li> - - <li>Havard, Capt., <a href="#Page_262">262</a>, <a href="#Page_270">270</a></li> - - <li>Havrincourt, <a href="#Page_290">290</a>, <a href="#Page_332">332</a>, <a href="#Page_483">483</a></li> - - <li>Haycraft, L. C., <a href="#Page_127">127</a>, <a href="#Page_201">201</a>, <a href="#Page_213">213</a>, <a href="#Page_214">214</a></li> - - <li>Hayes, E. C., <a href="#Page_251">251</a></li> - - <li>Hayes, G., <a href="#Page_408">408</a></li> - - <li>Hayes, Sergt., <a href="#Page_329">329</a>, <a href="#Page_353">353</a></li> - - <li>Haynecourt, <a href="#Page_484">484</a></li> - - <li>Haynes, A. E., <a href="#Page_344">344</a></li> - - <li>Hayward, W. G., <a href="#Page_16">16</a>, <a href="#Page_17">17</a>, <a href="#Page_88">88</a>, <a href="#Page_119">119</a>, <a href="#Page_120">120</a></li> - - <li>Hazebrouck, <a href="#Page_409">409</a></li> - - <li>Hearnshaw, H., <a href="#Page_449">449</a> -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_531" id="Page_531">[Pg 531]</a></span></li> - <li>Heaver, C. H. T., <a href="#Page_174">174</a>, <a href="#Page_193">193</a></li> - - <li>Hebberd, R., <a href="#Page_216">216</a></li> - - <li>Hébuterne, <a href="#Page_140">140</a> <i lang="la">et seq.</i>, <a href="#Page_180">180</a>, <a href="#Page_217">217</a>, <a href="#Page_264">264</a>, <a href="#Page_272">272</a></li> - - <li>Hedger, F., <a href="#Page_100">100</a>, <a href="#Page_216">216</a></li> - - <li>Heilly, <a href="#Page_442">442</a></li> - - <li>Helfaut, <a href="#Page_21">21</a></li> - - <li>Helles, Cape, <a href="#Page_90">90</a> <i lang="la">et seq.</i></li> - - <li>Helot, River, <a href="#Page_379">379</a>, <a href="#Page_380">380</a></li> - - <li>Hem Wood, <a href="#Page_454">454</a>, <a href="#Page_456">456</a></li> - - <li>Hendecourt, <a href="#Page_274">274</a>, <a href="#Page_276">276</a>, <a href="#Page_466">466</a> <i lang="la">et seq.</i></li> - - <li>Heninel, <a href="#Page_253">253</a>, <a href="#Page_260">260</a>-262, <a href="#Page_274">274</a>, <a href="#Page_281">281</a></li> - - <li>Henin-sur-Cojeul, <a href="#Page_246">246</a>, <a href="#Page_247">247</a>, <a href="#Page_259">259</a>, <a href="#Page_467">467</a>, <a href="#Page_468">468</a></li> - - <li>Henstridge, C. L., <a href="#Page_414">414</a>, <a href="#Page_476">476</a>, <a href="#Page_478">478</a>, <a href="#Page_488">488</a></li> - - <li>Hénu, <a href="#Page_142">142</a>, <a href="#Page_148">148</a></li> - - <li>Hermies, <a href="#Page_26">26</a>, <a href="#Page_331">331</a></li> - - <li>Herring, R. L., <a href="#Page_7">7</a>, <a href="#Page_20">20</a>, <a href="#Page_194">194</a></li> - - <li>Hetley, G. H., <a href="#Page_127">127</a>, <a href="#Page_249">249</a>, <a href="#Page_289">289</a>, <a href="#Page_310">310</a>, <a href="#Page_318">318</a>, <a href="#Page_321">321</a>, <a href="#Page_385">385</a>, <a href="#Page_388">388</a>, <a href="#Page_419">419</a>, <a href="#Page_433">433</a>, <a href="#Page_447">447</a>, <a href="#Page_448">448</a>, <a href="#Page_450">450</a>-452, <a href="#Page_458">458</a></li> - - <li>Hettler, B. H. C., <a href="#Page_385">385</a>, <a href="#Page_388">388</a>, <a href="#Page_389">389</a>, <a href="#Page_391">391</a></li> - - <li>Hewlett, H. A. T., <a href="#Page_238">238</a>, <a href="#Page_281">281</a>, <a href="#Page_289">289</a>, <a href="#Page_311">311</a>, <a href="#Page_313">313</a>, <a href="#Page_315">315</a>, <a href="#Page_417">417</a>, <a href="#Page_463">463</a>, <a href="#Page_466">466</a></li> - - <li>Heyes, Sergt., <a href="#Page_480">480</a>, <a href="#Page_486">486</a></li> - - <li>Hicklenton, H. G., <a href="#Page_88">88</a>, <a href="#Page_149">149</a>, <a href="#Page_159">159</a>, <a href="#Page_165">165</a></li> - - <li>Higgs, E. R, <a href="#Page_280">280</a>, <a href="#Page_322">322</a>, <a href="#Page_435">435</a></li> - - <li>Hirondelle River, <a href="#Page_275">275</a>, <a href="#Page_479">479</a>, <a href="#Page_481">481</a>, <a href="#Page_486">486</a></li> - - <li>Hodgkins, T., <a href="#Page_344">344</a></li> - - <li>Hohenzollern Redoubt, <a href="#Page_76">76</a>, <a href="#Page_77">77</a>, <a href="#Page_80">80</a></li> - - <li>Holloway, A., <a href="#Page_414">414</a>, <a href="#Page_475">475</a>, <a href="#Page_476">476</a></li> - - <li>Hook, W. G., <a href="#Page_352">352</a>, <a href="#Page_475">475</a></li> - - <li>Home, Gen. Lord, <a href="#Page_156">156</a>, <a href="#Page_218">218</a>, <a href="#Page_346">346</a></li> - - <li>Horsfield, J., <a href="#Page_421">421</a>, <a href="#Page_440">440</a></li> - - <li>Houlder, Capt., <a href="#Page_184">184</a></li> - - <li>Houlle, <a href="#Page_296">296</a>, <a href="#Page_305">305</a></li> - - <li>Housden, Pte., <a href="#Page_95">95</a></li> - - <li>Housden, Sergt., <a href="#Page_329">329</a></li> - - <li>Houthulst, <a href="#Page_316">316</a>, <a href="#Page_322">322</a></li> - - <li>Houvin-Houvigneuil, <a href="#Page_461">461</a></li> - - <li>Howden, E. R., <a href="#Page_322">322</a></li> - - <li>Howell, Brig.-Gen., <a href="#Page_355">355</a></li> - - <li>Hudson, O. C., <a href="#Page_401">401</a>, <a href="#Page_485">485</a></li> - - <li>Hull, Major-Gen. Sir C. P. A., <a href="#Page_42">42</a>, <a href="#Page_132">132</a>, <a href="#Page_145">145</a>, <a href="#Page_149">149</a>, <a href="#Page_150">150</a>, <a href="#Page_175">175</a>, <a href="#Page_197">197</a>, <a href="#Page_252">252</a>, <a href="#Page_271">271</a>, <a href="#Page_296">296</a>, <a href="#Page_414">414</a>, <a href="#Page_461">461</a>, <a href="#Page_463">463</a></li> - - <li>Hulluch, <a href="#Page_67">67</a>, <a href="#Page_76">76</a>, <a href="#Page_77">77</a>, <a href="#Page_81">81</a>, <a href="#Page_213">213</a></li> - - <li>Humbercamp, <a href="#Page_239">239</a>, <a href="#Page_242">242</a>, <a href="#Page_462">462</a></li> - - <li>Humphrey, G., <a href="#Page_513">513</a></li> - - <li>Humphrey, W. P., <a href="#Page_414">414</a>, <a href="#Page_417">417</a></li> - - <li>Hunt, F. F., <a href="#Page_36">36</a>, <a href="#Page_66">66</a></li> - - <li>Hunt, G. G., <a href="#Page_238">238</a>, <a href="#Page_249">249</a></li> - - <li>Hunt, R. C., <a href="#Page_127">127</a></li> - - <li>Hurd, A., <a href="#Page_22">22</a>, <a href="#Page_48">48</a>, <a href="#Page_165">165</a></li> - - <li>Hurdcott, <a href="#Page_122">122</a>-124, <a href="#Page_128">128</a>, <a href="#Page_129">129</a>, <a href="#Page_355">355</a>, <a href="#Page_356">356</a></li> - - <li>Hurst, Brig.-Gen., <a href="#Page_238">238</a></li> - - <li>Hurst, H., <a href="#Page_403">403</a></li> - - <li>Husk, C. L., <a href="#Page_408">408</a></li> - - <li>Hutchin, W. J., <a href="#Page_344">344</a>, <a href="#Page_408">408</a></li> - - <li>Hutchins, F. H., <a href="#Page_223">223</a>, <a href="#Page_268">268</a></li> - - <li>Hyde, H. E., <a href="#Page_162">162</a>, <a href="#Page_216">216</a> -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_532" id="Page_532">[Pg 532]</a></span></li> - <li>Hyde, R. R. L., <a href="#Page_216">216</a></li> - - - <li class="indx">Illies, <a href="#Page_26">26</a></li> - - <li>Imbros, <a href="#Page_93">93</a>, <a href="#Page_99">99</a>, <a href="#Page_104">104</a>, <a href="#Page_105">105</a></li> - - <li>Ingham, Sergt.-Dr., <a href="#Page_350">350</a></li> - - <li>Inniskilling Fusiliers, <a href="#Page_184">184</a></li> - - <li>Inverness Copse, <a href="#Page_295">295</a> <i lang="la">et seq.</i></li> - - <li>Ipswich, <a href="#Page_117">117</a>-119, <a href="#Page_236">236</a></li> - - <li>Irvine, H., <a href="#Page_443">443</a>, <a href="#Page_448">448</a></li> - - <li>Ivergny, <a href="#Page_251">251</a></li> - - <li>Izel-les-Hameau, <a href="#Page_292">292</a>, <a href="#Page_306">306</a></li> - - - <li class="indx">Jackman, H. E., <a href="#Page_270">270</a>, <a href="#Page_301">301</a>, <a href="#Page_304">304</a></li> - - <li>Jackson, R. J., <a href="#Page_4">4</a>, <a href="#Page_6">6</a>, <a href="#Page_11">11</a></li> - - <li>Jackson, Lieut.-Col., <a href="#Page_335">335</a></li> - - <li>Jacques, R.S.M., <a href="#Page_330">330</a>, <a href="#Page_494">494</a></li> - - <li>James, C., <a href="#Page_213">213</a>, <a href="#Page_216">216</a></li> - - <li>Jehu, S. H., <a href="#Page_322">322</a>, <a href="#Page_323">323</a></li> - - <li>Jemappes, <a href="#Page_507">507</a></li> - - <li>Johnson, F. B., <a href="#Page_322">322</a></li> - - <li>Johnson, J. W., <a href="#Page_335">335</a>, <a href="#Page_344">344</a></li> - - <li>Johnson, Sergt., <a href="#Page_468">468</a></li> - - <li>Johnstone, R., <a href="#Page_66">66</a></li> - - <li>Jones, F. J., <a href="#Page_315">315</a>, <a href="#Page_320">320</a></li> - - <li>Jones, H., <a href="#Page_66">66</a>, <a href="#Page_75">75</a>, <a href="#Page_223">223</a>, <a href="#Page_272">272</a></li> - - <li>Jones, L. W. N., <a href="#Page_223">223</a>, <a href="#Page_263">263</a></li> - - - <li class="indx">Keary, Major-Gen. H. D'U., <a href="#Page_22">22</a>, <a href="#Page_72">72</a></li> - - <li>Keen, R. N., <a href="#Page_16">16</a>, <a href="#Page_104">104</a>, <a href="#Page_106">106</a>, <a href="#Page_201">201</a>, <a href="#Page_211">211</a>, <a href="#Page_214">214</a></li> - - <li>Keerselare, <a href="#Page_307">307</a></li> - - <li>Kelly, R. C., <a href="#Page_11">11</a></li> - - <li>Kereves, Dere, <a href="#Page_94">94</a>, <a href="#Page_101">101</a></li> - - <li>King, H. J., <a href="#Page_443">443</a>, <a href="#Page_452">452</a></li> - - <li>King's Liverpools, <a href="#Page_4">4</a>th, <a href="#Page_22">22</a>, <a href="#Page_71">71</a></li> - - <li>K.O.S.B., <a href="#Page_47">47</a>, <a href="#Page_101">101</a></li> - - <li>K.O.Y.L.I., <a href="#Page_241">241</a>, <a href="#Page_350">350</a>, <a href="#Page_386">386</a>, <a href="#Page_443">443</a>, <a href="#Page_496">496</a></li> - - <li>K.R.R.C., <a href="#Page_302">302</a></li> - - <li>Kingwell, A., <a href="#Page_122">122</a></li> - - <li>Kitchener, Earl, <a href="#Page_6">6</a>, <a href="#Page_13">13</a>, <a href="#Page_120">120</a></li> - - <li>Klein Zillebeeke, <a href="#Page_294">294</a></li> - - <li>Knight, A. C., <a href="#Page_194">194</a>, <a href="#Page_272">272</a>, <a href="#Page_307">307</a>, <a href="#Page_315">315</a></li> - - <li>Krithia, <a href="#Page_92">92</a>, <a href="#Page_94">94</a></li> - - - <li class="indx">La Bassée, <a href="#Page_23">23</a> <i lang="la">et seq.</i>, <a href="#Page_67">67</a>, <a href="#Page_68">68</a>, <a href="#Page_71">71</a>, <a href="#Page_76">76</a>, <a href="#Page_99">99</a></li> - - <li>La Bassée Canal, <a href="#Page_58">58</a>, <a href="#Page_66">66</a>, <a href="#Page_67">67</a>, <a href="#Page_75">75</a></li> - - <li>La Brique, <a href="#Page_44">44</a>-46, <a href="#Page_50">50</a>, <a href="#Page_56">56</a></li> - - <li>La Cauchie, <a href="#Page_239">239</a></li> - - <li>La Dessoue, <a href="#Page_502">502</a></li> - - <li>La Fère, <a href="#Page_359">359</a> <i lang="la">et seq.</i>, <a href="#Page_425">425</a>, <a href="#Page_477">477</a></li> - - <li>La Gorgue, <a href="#Page_69">69</a>, <a href="#Page_224">224</a>, <a href="#Page_228">228</a></li> - - <li>La Houssoye, <a href="#Page_422">422</a>, <a href="#Page_431">431</a></li> - - <li>La Quinque Rue, <a href="#Page_60">60</a></li> - - <li>Labourse, <a href="#Page_78">78</a></li> - - <li>Lacon, Sir Hugh, <a href="#Page_426">426</a></li> - - <li>Lacouture, <a href="#Page_30">30</a>, <a href="#Page_32">32</a></li> - - <li>Lagnicourt, <a href="#Page_273">273</a>, <a href="#Page_326">326</a>-329, <a href="#Page_346">346</a></li> - - <li>Laies, Rivière des, <a href="#Page_29">29</a>, <a href="#Page_220">220</a></li> - - <li>Lambley, J. E. W., <a href="#Page_16">16</a>, <a href="#Page_113">113</a></li> - - <li>Lancashire Fus., <a href="#Page_323">323</a></li> - - <li>Lancers, <a href="#Page_15">15</a>th, <a href="#Page_22">22</a></li> - - <li>Langemarck, <a href="#Page_40">40</a>, <a href="#Page_46">46</a>, <a href="#Page_52">52</a>, <a href="#Page_297">297</a>, <a href="#Page_306">306</a> <i lang="la">et seq.</i></li> - - <li>Langton, H. G., <a href="#Page_317">317</a>, <a href="#Page_320">320</a> -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_533" id="Page_533">[Pg 533]</a></span></li> - <li>Lattre St Quentin, <a href="#Page_418">418</a></li> - - <li>Laviéville, <a href="#Page_423">423</a></li> - - <li>Laventie, <a href="#Page_218">218</a>-221, <a href="#Page_413">413</a></li> - - <li>Lawrence, H. P., <a href="#Page_449">449</a>, <a href="#Page_452">452</a>, <a href="#Page_455">455</a></li> - - <li>Lawrence, W., <a href="#Page_216">216</a></li> - - <li>Lawrie, G. V., <a href="#Page_174">174</a>, <a href="#Page_216">216</a>, <a href="#Page_353">353</a>, <a href="#Page_416">416</a>, <a href="#Page_417">417</a>, <a href="#Page_478">478</a></li> - - <li>Le Bas de Viry, <a href="#Page_374">374</a></li> - - <li>Le Cauroy, <a href="#Page_137">137</a>, <a href="#Page_234">234</a>, <a href="#Page_272">272</a></li> - - <li>Le Philosophe, <a href="#Page_78">78</a></li> - - <li>L'Epinette, <a href="#Page_64">64</a></li> - - <li>Le Pissot, <a href="#Page_498">498</a></li> - - <li>Le Plessiel, <a href="#Page_176">176</a>-180, <a href="#Page_419">419</a></li> - - <li>Le Quesnoy, <a href="#Page_495">495</a></li> - - <li>Le Sars, <a href="#Page_194">194</a></li> - - <li>Le Sart, <a href="#Page_223">223</a></li> - - <li>Le Souich, <a href="#Page_234">234</a>, <a href="#Page_239">239</a>, <a href="#Page_251">251</a></li> - - <li>Le Talandier, <a href="#Page_497">497</a></li> - - <li>Le Transloy, <a href="#Page_239">239</a>, <a href="#Page_325">325</a></li> - - <li>Le Transloy Ridges, <a href="#Page_208">208</a> <i lang="la">et seq.</i></li> - - <li>Leach, H. G. A., <a href="#Page_421">421</a>, <a href="#Page_440">440</a></li> - - <li>Leake, G. E. A., <a href="#Page_238">238</a>, <a href="#Page_275">275</a>, <a href="#Page_276">276</a>, <a href="#Page_279">279</a></li> - - <li>Lear, Pte., <a href="#Page_162">162</a></li> - - <li>Lebucquière, <a href="#Page_333">333</a></li> - - <li>Lécluse, <a href="#Page_477">477</a>, <a href="#Page_479">479</a></li> - - <li>Legge, R. F., <a href="#Page_4">4</a></li> - - <li>Lekkerbotebeek, <a href="#Page_317">317</a>, <a href="#Page_318">318</a>, <a href="#Page_322">322</a></li> - - <li>Lelyveld, H., <a href="#Page_443">443</a>, <a href="#Page_448">448</a></li> - - <li>Lens, <a href="#Page_76">76</a>, <a href="#Page_82">82</a>, <a href="#Page_260">260</a>, <a href="#Page_489">489</a></li> - - <li>Leonard, D. J., <a href="#Page_24">24</a>, <a href="#Page_53">53</a>, <a href="#Page_54">54</a>, <a href="#Page_66">66</a>, <a href="#Page_71">71</a></li> - - <li>Lesbœufs, <a href="#Page_178">178</a> <i lang="la">et seq.</i>, <a href="#Page_325">325</a></li> - - <li>Les Brebis, <a href="#Page_81">81</a></li> - - <li>Les Huit Maisons, <a href="#Page_37">37</a>, <a href="#Page_233">233</a></li> - - <li>Lester, G. E., <a href="#Page_249">249</a>, <a href="#Page_320">320</a>, <a href="#Page_322">322</a>, <a href="#Page_355">355</a>, <a href="#Page_369">369</a>, <a href="#Page_372">372</a>-374, <a href="#Page_384">384</a></li> - - <li>Lestrem, <a href="#Page_30">30</a></li> - - <li>Leuze Wood, <a href="#Page_181">181</a> <i lang="la">et seq.</i></li> - - <li>Lewis, C. E., <a href="#Page_174">174</a>, <a href="#Page_193">193</a></li> - - <li>Lewis, G. G., <a href="#Page_352">352</a>, <a href="#Page_392">392</a>, <a href="#Page_396">396</a>, <a href="#Page_469">469</a></li> - - <li>Liéramont, <a href="#Page_456">456</a>, <a href="#Page_458">458</a>, <a href="#Page_459">459</a></li> - - <li>Ligny-le-Grand, <a href="#Page_58">58</a></li> - - <li>Lille, <a href="#Page_58">58</a>, <a href="#Page_495">495</a></li> - - <li>Lillers, <a href="#Page_72">72</a>-<a href="#Page_77">77</a></li> - - <li>Limpenny, S. W. J., <a href="#Page_116">116</a></li> - - <li>Lincolns, <a href="#Page_5">5</a>th, <a href="#Page_170">170</a></li> - - <li>Ling, J. W., <a href="#Page_315">315</a></li> - - <li>Ling, Pipe-Major, <a href="#Page_236">236</a></li> - - <li>Lintott, A. W., <a href="#Page_342">342</a></li> - - <li>Lizerne, <a href="#Page_41">41</a></li> - - <li>Loch, Brig.-Gen. G. G., <a href="#Page_149">149</a>, <a href="#Page_394">394</a>, <a href="#Page_397">397</a>, <a href="#Page_496">496</a></li> - - <li>Lock, A. H., <a href="#Page_122">122</a></li> - - <li>Lock, T., <a href="#Page_216">216</a>, <a href="#Page_408">408</a></li> - - <li>Logeast Wood, <a href="#Page_289">289</a>, <a href="#Page_290">290</a></li> - - <li>Long, A. L., <a href="#Page_7">7</a>, <a href="#Page_146">146</a>, <a href="#Page_153">153</a>, <a href="#Page_182">182</a></li> - - <li>Long, H. C., <a href="#Page_238">238</a>, <a href="#Page_279">279</a></li> - - <li>Longpré, <a href="#Page_218">218</a></li> - - <li>Longueau, <a href="#Page_385">385</a></li> - - <li>Longueval, <a href="#Page_178">178</a></li> - - <li>Loos, <a href="#Page_67">67</a>, <a href="#Page_73">73</a>, <a href="#Page_75">75</a>, <a href="#Page_81">81</a>-<a href="#Page_83">83</a></li> - - <li>Lorden, H. M., <a href="#Page_24">24</a>, <a href="#Page_66">66</a>, <a href="#Page_223">223</a>, <a href="#Page_257">257</a>, <a href="#Page_269">269</a>, <a href="#Page_346">346</a>, <a href="#Page_403">403</a>, <a href="#Page_407">407</a> -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_534" id="Page_534">[Pg 534]</a></span></li> - <li>Louverval, <a href="#Page_334">334</a></li> - - <li>Lovell, E. G., <a href="#Page_16">16</a></li> - - <li>Lucan, Brig.-Gen. Earl of, <a href="#Page_4">4</a>, <a href="#Page_13">13</a>, <a href="#Page_89">89</a></li> - - <li>Luce, River, <a href="#Page_385">385</a></li> - - <li>Lucy, A. B., <a href="#Page_7">7</a></li> - - <li>Ludendorff, Gen., <a href="#Page_362">362</a>, <a href="#Page_363">363</a>, <a href="#Page_407">407</a>, <a href="#Page_441">441</a></li> - - <li>Lynch, P., <a href="#Page_122">122</a></li> - - <li>Lyons, S. E., <a href="#Page_66">66</a></li> - - - <li class="indx">McCormick, E. M'D., <a href="#Page_174">174</a>, <a href="#Page_189">189</a>, <a href="#Page_191">191</a>, <a href="#Page_207">207</a>, <a href="#Page_216">216</a></li> - - <li>McDonald, J., <a href="#Page_128">128</a>, <a href="#Page_292">292</a>, <a href="#Page_316">316</a></li> - - <li>McDowell, R., <a href="#Page_238">238</a>, <a href="#Page_286">286</a>, <a href="#Page_287">287</a></li> - - <li>McGlashan, Capt., <a href="#Page_130">130</a></li> - - <li>McKittrick, E. S., <a href="#Page_443">443</a>, <a href="#Page_452">452</a></li> - - <li>Maghaga, <a href="#Page_111">111</a></li> - - <li>Magnicourt-sur-Canche, <a href="#Page_351">351</a>-353, <a href="#Page_461">461</a></li> - - <li>Main, G. H., <a href="#Page_423">423</a></li> - - <li>Maing, <a href="#Page_496">496</a></li> - - <li>Maitland, A. E., <a href="#Page_253">253</a>, <a href="#Page_261">261</a></li> - - <li>Malard Wood, <a href="#Page_430">430</a>-<a href="#Page_438">438</a></li> - - <li>Maloney, Capt., <a href="#Page_270">270</a>, <a href="#Page_333">333</a>, <a href="#Page_405">405</a>, <a href="#Page_407">407</a>, <a href="#Page_414">414</a></li> - - <li>Malplaquet, <a href="#Page_505">505</a></li> - - <li>Malta, <a href="#Page_6">6</a>, <a href="#Page_8">8</a> <i lang="la">et seq.</i>, <a href="#Page_86">86</a> <i lang="la">et seq.</i>, <a href="#Page_112">112</a>, <a href="#Page_115">115</a>, <a href="#Page_121">121</a>, <a href="#Page_505">505</a>, <a href="#Page_508">508</a>, <a href="#Page_509">509</a></li> - - <li>Maltzhorn Farm, <a href="#Page_182">182</a>, <a href="#Page_184">184</a>, <a href="#Page_191">191</a>, <a href="#Page_449">449</a>, <a href="#Page_451">451</a></li> - - <li>Manchester Regiment, <a href="#Page_22">22</a>, <a href="#Page_48">48</a>, <a href="#Page_62">62</a>, <a href="#Page_263">263</a>, <a href="#Page_487">487</a></li> - - <li>Manicamp, <a href="#Page_381">381</a>-<a href="#Page_383">383</a></li> - - <li>Manning, D. A. S., <a href="#Page_456">456</a>, <a href="#Page_458">458</a></li> - - <li>Mansel-Howe, C. I., <a href="#Page_423">423</a>, <a href="#Page_439">439</a>, <a href="#Page_440">440</a></li> - - <li>Marchment, A. F., <a href="#Page_299">299</a>, <a href="#Page_303">303</a>, <a href="#Page_343">343</a>, <a href="#Page_344">344</a>, <a href="#Page_346">346</a>, <a href="#Page_394">394</a>, <a href="#Page_398">398</a>, <a href="#Page_399">399</a>, <a href="#Page_401">401</a>, <a href="#Page_403">403</a>-405, <a href="#Page_408">408</a>, <a href="#Page_461">461</a>-466, <a href="#Page_468">468</a>, <a href="#Page_486">486</a>, <a href="#Page_487">487</a>, <a href="#Page_492">492</a>, <a href="#Page_496">496</a>, <a href="#Page_507">507</a></li> - - <li>Maricourt, <a href="#Page_182">182</a>, <a href="#Page_446">446</a> <i lang="la">et seq.</i></li> - - <li>Marlière Caves, <a href="#Page_268">268</a></li> - - <li>Maroc, <a href="#Page_82">82</a>, <a href="#Page_84">84</a>, <a href="#Page_85">85</a></li> - - <li>Maroc, South, <a href="#Page_82">82</a>, <a href="#Page_83">83</a></li> - - <li>Marœuil, <a href="#Page_349">349</a>-351, <a href="#Page_353">353</a></li> - - <li>Marqueffles Farm, <a href="#Page_418">418</a></li> - - <li>Marquion, <a href="#Page_485">485</a>, <a href="#Page_492">492</a></li> - - <li>Marrières Wood, <a href="#Page_452">452</a>, <a href="#Page_453">453</a>, <a href="#Page_456">456</a></li> - - <li>Marsh, F. S., <a href="#Page_292">292</a></li> - - <li>Marshall, Lord, <a href="#Page_507">507</a></li> - - <li>Marshall, R. B., <a href="#Page_414">414</a>, <a href="#Page_496">496</a></li> - - <li>Mason, C. R., <a href="#Page_414">414</a></li> - - <li>Mather, A., <a href="#Page_427">427</a></li> - - <li>Matthews, G. L., <a href="#Page_394">394</a>, <a href="#Page_395">395</a></li> - - <li>Mattison, O. H., <a href="#Page_316">316</a></li> - - <li>Maubeuge, <a href="#Page_483">483</a> <i lang="la">et seq.</i></li> - - <li>Maunder, Pte., <a href="#Page_95">95</a></li> - - <li>Mauquissart, <a href="#Page_64">64</a>, <a href="#Page_67">67</a>, <a href="#Page_224">224</a>-<a href="#Page_227">227</a></li> - - <li>Maurepas, <a href="#Page_177">177</a>, <a href="#Page_451">451</a>, <a href="#Page_452">452</a></li> - - <li>Mawby, T. H., <a href="#Page_353">353</a>, <a href="#Page_417">417</a></li> - - <li>Maxwell, Gen. Sir J. G., <a href="#Page_107">107</a>, <a href="#Page_108">108</a></li> - - <li>Maynard, T. R. A., <a href="#Page_443">443</a></li> - - <li>Mears, S. F. G., <a href="#Page_323">323</a>, <a href="#Page_391">391</a></li> - - <li>Meerut, <a href="#Page_129">129</a></li> - - <li>Melleha, <a href="#Page_9">9</a>, <a href="#Page_10">10</a>, <a href="#Page_12">12</a>, <a href="#Page_508">508</a> -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_535" id="Page_535">[Pg 535]</a></span></li> - <li>Mendl, R. H. J., <a href="#Page_360">360</a></li> - - <li>Menges, G. J. L., <a href="#Page_360">360</a></li> - - <li>Menin, <a href="#Page_294">294</a> <i lang="la">et seq.</i>, <a href="#Page_495">495</a></li> - - <li>Mercatel, <a href="#Page_253">253</a>, <a href="#Page_460">460</a></li> - - <li>Mercer, Brig.-Gen. David, <a href="#Page_90">90</a></li> - - <li>Méricourt-l'Abbé, <a href="#Page_431">431</a>, <a href="#Page_444">444</a></li> - - <li>Merrell, H. H., <a href="#Page_216">216</a></li> - - <li>Merville, <a href="#Page_36">36</a>, <a href="#Page_43">43</a>, <a href="#Page_71">71</a>, <a href="#Page_218">218</a>, <a href="#Page_223">223</a>, <a href="#Page_228">228</a>, <a href="#Page_234">234</a>, <a href="#Page_413">413</a></li> - - <li>Messines, <a href="#Page_263">263</a>, <a href="#Page_294">294</a>, <a href="#Page_307">307</a>, <a href="#Page_489">489</a></li> - - <li>Meteren, <a href="#Page_57">57</a>, <a href="#Page_428">428</a></li> - - <li>Methuen, F.M. Lord, <a href="#Page_86">86</a></li> - - <li>Michell, R., <a href="#Page_292">292</a>, <a href="#Page_320">320</a>.</li> - - <li>Middlemiss, <a href="#Page_2">2</a>/Lieut., <a href="#Page_313">313</a></li> - - <li>Middleton, J. T., <a href="#Page_174">174</a>, <a href="#Page_193">193</a></li> - - <li>Millar, W. T., <a href="#Page_385">385</a></li> - - <li>Mill Copse, <a href="#Page_481">481</a>, <a href="#Page_485">485</a>, <a href="#Page_486">486</a></li> - - <li>Miller, H. E., <a href="#Page_119">119</a>, <a href="#Page_124">124</a></li> - - <li>Miller, J. D., <a href="#Page_414">414</a></li> - - <li>Miller, Lieut.-Col., <a href="#Page_436">436</a>, <a href="#Page_438">438</a>, <a href="#Page_439">439</a></li> - - <li>Mills, E. L., <a href="#Page_327">327</a>, <a href="#Page_336">336</a>, <a href="#Page_341">341</a>, <a href="#Page_344">344</a>, <a href="#Page_413">413</a></li> - - <li>Mills, H. H., <a href="#Page_477">477</a></li> - - <li>Millstead, A. H., <a href="#Page_414">414</a>, <a href="#Page_486">486</a></li> - - <li>Milne, F., <a href="#Page_119">119</a></li> - - <li>Minear, S., <a href="#Page_251">251</a></li> - - <li>Minia, <a href="#Page_108">108</a>-<a href="#Page_111">111</a></li> - - <li>Miraumont, <a href="#Page_240">240</a></li> - - <li>Mirvaux, <a href="#Page_420">420</a>, <a href="#Page_421">421</a>, <a href="#Page_433">433</a></li> - - <li>Mœuvres, <a href="#Page_331">331</a> <i lang="la">et seq.</i>, <a href="#Page_484">484</a></li> - - <li>Moger, A. J., <a href="#Page_216">216</a></li> - - <li>Moislains, <a href="#Page_455">455</a>, <a href="#Page_456">456</a></li> - - <li>Mole Post, <a href="#Page_231">231</a></li> - - <li>Molliens au Bois, <a href="#Page_420">420</a>, <a href="#Page_422">422</a></li> - - <li>Monchy-au-Bois, <a href="#Page_241">241</a>-245, <a href="#Page_248">248</a></li> - - <li>Monchy Breton, <a href="#Page_350">350</a>, <a href="#Page_351">351</a></li> - - <li>Monchy-le-Preux, <a href="#Page_265">265</a>, <a href="#Page_393">393</a>, <a href="#Page_394">394</a>, <a href="#Page_467">467</a>, <a href="#Page_477">477</a></li> - - <li>Moncrieff, Lieut.-Gen. G. H., <a href="#Page_15">15</a></li> - - <li>Mondicourt, <a href="#Page_150">150</a>, <a href="#Page_151">151</a></li> - - <li>Monk, E. W., <a href="#Page_81">81</a>, <a href="#Page_194">194</a></li> - - <li>Monk, S. G., <a href="#Page_61">61</a></li> - - <li>Monkman, E. A., <a href="#Page_238">238</a>, <a href="#Page_287">287</a></li> - - <li>Monro, Gen. Sir C. C., <a href="#Page_96">96</a>, <a href="#Page_101">101</a></li> - - <li>Mons, <a href="#Page_5">5</a>, <a href="#Page_489">489</a> <i lang="la">et seq.</i></li> - - <li>Mont St Eloy, <a href="#Page_408">408</a>, <a href="#Page_410">410</a></li> - - <li>Mont St Quentin, <a href="#Page_453">453</a>, <a href="#Page_455">455</a></li> - - <li>Montague, Pte., <a href="#Page_350">350</a></li> - - <li>Montenescourt, <a href="#Page_271">271</a></li> - - <li>Moody, T., <a href="#Page_7">7</a>, <a href="#Page_165">165</a></li> - - <li>Moore, A. R., <a href="#Page_7">7</a>, <a href="#Page_33">33</a>, <a href="#Page_146">146</a>, <a href="#Page_152">152</a>, <a href="#Page_159">159</a>, <a href="#Page_162">162</a>, <a href="#Page_164">164</a></li> - - <li>Moore, G. H., <a href="#Page_16">16</a>, <a href="#Page_34">34</a>, <a href="#Page_38">38</a>, <a href="#Page_90">90</a></li> - - <li>Moore, H., <a href="#Page_130">130</a></li> - - <li>Moore, W., <a href="#Page_6">6</a>, <a href="#Page_20">20</a>, <a href="#Page_47">47</a>, <a href="#Page_119">119</a>, <a href="#Page_136">136</a>-138, <a href="#Page_152">152</a>, <a href="#Page_163">163</a>, <a href="#Page_165">165</a></li> - - <li>Moreuil, <a href="#Page_385">385</a>, <a href="#Page_429">429</a></li> - - <li>Morlancourt, <a href="#Page_430">430</a>, <a href="#Page_444">444</a>, <a href="#Page_445">445</a></li> - - <li>Mormal, Forêt de, <a href="#Page_494">494</a>, <a href="#Page_495">495</a>, <a href="#Page_504">504</a></li> - - <li>Morris, H., <a href="#Page_16">16</a>, <a href="#Page_95">95</a></li> - - <li>Morris, H. O., <a href="#Page_350">350</a>, <a href="#Page_400">400</a>, <a href="#Page_401">401</a>, <a href="#Page_407">407</a></li> - - <li>Morris, S. T., <a href="#Page_423">423</a>, <a href="#Page_440">440</a></li> - - <li>Morris, <a href="#Page_2">2</a>/Lieut., <a href="#Page_405">405</a> -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_536" id="Page_536">[Pg 536]</a></span></li> - <li>Morrison, J. D., <a href="#Page_423">423</a></li> - - <li>Mortleman, C. F., <a href="#Page_174">174</a>, <a href="#Page_193">193</a></li> - - <li>Morton, W. C., <a href="#Page_360">360</a>, <a href="#Page_388">388</a>-390, <a href="#Page_419">419</a></li> - - <li>Morval, <a href="#Page_178">178</a> <i lang="la">et seq.</i>, <a href="#Page_240">240</a>, <a href="#Page_325">325</a></li> - - <li>Mory, <a href="#Page_280">280</a></li> - - <li>Mosely, E. P. M., <a href="#Page_36">36</a>, <a href="#Page_270">270</a>, <a href="#Page_417">417</a>, <a href="#Page_480">480</a>, <a href="#Page_502">502</a>, <a href="#Page_504">504</a></li> - - <li>Mouchin, <a href="#Page_81">81</a></li> - - <li>Muddell, A. R., <a href="#Page_238">238</a>, <a href="#Page_423">423</a>, <a href="#Page_452">452</a></li> - - <li>Mudros, <a href="#Page_90">90</a> <i lang="la">et seq.</i></li> - - <li>Murray, Gen. Sir A., <a href="#Page_111">111</a></li> - - <li>Murray, Lieut.-Col., <a href="#Page_66">66</a></li> - - - <li class="indx">Nag Hamadi, <a href="#Page_110">110</a></li> - - <li>Nash, F., <a href="#Page_477">477</a></li> - - <li>Naylor, J. R., <a href="#Page_317">317</a>, <a href="#Page_320">320</a></li> - - <li>Neame, R. E., <a href="#Page_200">200</a></li> - - <li>Neuf Berquin, <a href="#Page_218">218</a></li> - - <li>Neuve Chapelle, <a href="#Page_26">26</a> <i lang="la">et seq.</i>, <a href="#Page_58">58</a> <i lang="la">et seq.</i>, <a href="#Page_120">120</a>, <a href="#Page_218">218</a> <i lang="la">et seq.</i>, <a href="#Page_413">413</a>, <a href="#Page_477">477</a></li> - - <li>Neuville-Borjonval, <a href="#Page_291">291</a></li> - - <li>Neuville-Vitasse, <a href="#Page_253">253</a> <i lang="la">et seq.</i>, <a href="#Page_411">411</a>, <a href="#Page_412">412</a></li> - - <li>Neuvireuil, <a href="#Page_347">347</a></li> - - <li>Neville, S. W., <a href="#Page_480">480</a>, <a href="#Page_482">482</a></li> - - <li>New Barnet, <a href="#Page_14">14</a>, <a href="#Page_15">15</a>, <a href="#Page_115">115</a> <i lang="la">et seq.</i></li> - - <li>Newman, W. H. G., <a href="#Page_322">322</a></li> - - <li>Nickless, F. C., <a href="#Page_477">477</a></li> - - <li>Nœux-les-Mines, <a href="#Page_77">77</a>, <a href="#Page_81">81</a></li> - - <li>Nonne Boschen, <a href="#Page_297">297</a>, <a href="#Page_302">302</a></li> - - <li>Nord, Canal du, <a href="#Page_331">331</a>, <a href="#Page_332">332</a>, <a href="#Page_454">454</a>, <a href="#Page_477">477</a> <i lang="la">et seq.</i></li> - - <li>Nordausques, <a href="#Page_316">316</a></li> - - <li>Noreuil, <a href="#Page_275">275</a>, <a href="#Page_276">276</a>, <a href="#Page_278">278</a></li> - - <li>Norris, G., <a href="#Page_340">340</a>, <a href="#Page_344">344</a></li> - - <li>Norris, J. T., <a href="#Page_477">477</a></li> - - <li>Norrish, F. E., <a href="#Page_322">322</a></li> - - <li>North Staffords, <a href="#Page_243">243</a></li> - - <li>Noureuil, <a href="#Page_376">376</a>, <a href="#Page_378">378</a></li> - - <li>Noye River, <a href="#Page_359">359</a></li> - - <li>Noyelles-les-Vermelles, <a href="#Page_78">78</a></li> - - <li>Noyon, <a href="#Page_369">369</a>, <a href="#Page_380">380</a>, <a href="#Page_382">382</a>, <a href="#Page_422">422</a></li> - - <li>Nunneley, W. A., <a href="#Page_237">237</a>, <a href="#Page_238">238</a>, <a href="#Page_243">243</a>, <a href="#Page_249">249</a>, <a href="#Page_292">292</a>, <a href="#Page_317">317</a></li> - - <li>Nunns, N., <a href="#Page_270">270</a>, <a href="#Page_304">304</a></li> - - <li>Nurlu, <a href="#Page_456">456</a></li> - - - <li class="indx">Oakely, Sergt., <a href="#Page_328">328</a></li> - - <li>O'Brien, J., <a href="#Page_216">216</a>, <a href="#Page_511">511</a></li> - - <li>O'Brien, Rev., <a href="#Page_238">238</a></li> - - <li>Oise, <a href="#Page_369">369</a>-<a href="#Page_382">382</a></li> - - <li>Oise Canal, <a href="#Page_363">363</a>-371, <a href="#Page_429">429</a>, <a href="#Page_430">430</a></li> - - <li>Oisy-le-Verger, <a href="#Page_482">482</a>-<a href="#Page_488">488</a></li> - - <li>Oldrey, V. R., <a href="#Page_174">174</a>, <a href="#Page_183">183</a>, <a href="#Page_193">193</a>, <a href="#Page_281">281</a>, <a href="#Page_472">472</a>, <a href="#Page_475">475</a></li> - - <li>Olinski, P. J., <a href="#Page_279">279</a></li> - - <li>Omignon, River, <a href="#Page_359">359</a>, <a href="#Page_367">367</a></li> - - <li>Oppy, <a href="#Page_346">346</a> <i lang="la">et seq.</i>, <a href="#Page_392">392</a> <i lang="la">et seq.</i>, <a href="#Page_414">414</a>, <a href="#Page_416">416</a>, <a href="#Page_419">419</a>, <a href="#Page_504">504</a></li> - - <li>Ormiston, N. A., <a href="#Page_174">174</a>, <a href="#Page_193">193</a></li> - - <li>Osborne, W. E., <a href="#Page_173">173</a>, <a href="#Page_174">174</a>, <a href="#Page_185">185</a>, <a href="#Page_193">193</a></li> - - <li>Osvillers Lake, <a href="#Page_482">482</a> -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_537" id="Page_537">[Pg 537]</a></span></li> - <li>Ouderdom, <a href="#Page_44">44</a>, <a href="#Page_56">56</a>, <a href="#Page_57">57</a>, <a href="#Page_303">303</a>, <a href="#Page_304">304</a></li> - - <li>Owen, T. G., <a href="#Page_423">423</a></li> - - <li>Oxfordshire Hussars, <a href="#Page_369">369</a></li> - - - <li class="indx">Page, H. F., <a href="#Page_213">213</a></li> - - <li>Palluel, <a href="#Page_479">479</a>, <a href="#Page_484">484</a>, <a href="#Page_486">486</a></li> - - <li>Palmer, L. A., <a href="#Page_443">443</a></li> - - <li>Palmer, Rev. R., <a href="#Page_136">136</a>, <a href="#Page_165">165</a>, <a href="#Page_216">216</a>, <a href="#Page_223">223</a></li> - - <li>Palmer, Pte., <a href="#Page_405">405</a></li> - - <li>Paradis, <a href="#Page_36">36</a>-38, <a href="#Page_57">57</a>, <a href="#Page_59">59</a></li> - - <li>Paris, Major-Gen. A., <a href="#Page_90">90</a>, <a href="#Page_106">106</a></li> - - <li>Parker, A. J., <a href="#Page_408">408</a></li> - - <li>Parker, W. H., <a href="#Page_238">238</a>, <a href="#Page_275">275</a>, <a href="#Page_281">281</a>, <a href="#Page_285">285</a>, <a href="#Page_287">287</a></li> - - <li>Parkhouse, H., <a href="#Page_14">14</a>, <a href="#Page_16">16</a>, <a href="#Page_90">90</a></li> - - <li>Parr, J. F. F., <a href="#Page_7">7</a>, <a href="#Page_12">12</a>, <a href="#Page_17">17</a>, <a href="#Page_86">86</a>, <a href="#Page_88">88</a></li> - - <li>Parslow, W. H., <a href="#Page_360">360</a>, <a href="#Page_424">424</a>, <a href="#Page_432">432</a>, <a href="#Page_434">434</a>-436, <a href="#Page_440">440</a></li> - - <li>Pas, <a href="#Page_141">141</a>, <a href="#Page_150">150</a></li> - - <li>Passchendaele, <a href="#Page_40">40</a>, <a href="#Page_294">294</a>, <a href="#Page_316">316</a> <i lang="la">et seq.</i>, <a href="#Page_489">489</a></li> - - <li>Paterson, F. J., <a href="#Page_443">443</a>, <a href="#Page_459">459</a></li> - - <li>Paterson, J. R. K., <a href="#Page_224">224</a></li> - - <li>Pathans, <a href="#Page_40">40</a>th, <a href="#Page_22">22</a></li> - - <li>Payne, H. S., <a href="#Page_216">216</a></li> - - <li>Payne, P. J., <a href="#Page_323">323</a>, <a href="#Page_391">391</a></li> - - <li>Pearson, J., <a href="#Page_119">119</a></li> - - <li>Peizières, <a href="#Page_457">457</a>-<a href="#Page_459">459</a></li> - - <li>Pentelow, H., <a href="#Page_223">223</a></li> - - <li>Pernois, <a href="#Page_425">425</a></li> - - <li>Péronne, <a href="#Page_177">177</a>, <a href="#Page_194">194</a>, <a href="#Page_211">211</a>, <a href="#Page_363">363</a>, <a href="#Page_385">385</a>, <a href="#Page_444">444</a>, <a href="#Page_453">453</a>-456, <a href="#Page_477">477</a></li> - - <li>Perrin, Pte., <a href="#Page_350">350</a></li> - - <li>Peryer, J. R., <a href="#Page_322">322</a></li> - - <li>Peselhoek, <a href="#Page_320">320</a></li> - - <li>Peters, Pte., <a href="#Page_288">288</a>, <a href="#Page_289">289</a></li> - - <li>Petit Houvin, <a href="#Page_296">296</a></li> - - <li>Petrie, E., <a href="#Page_327">327</a>, <a href="#Page_339">339</a>, <a href="#Page_342">342</a></li> - - <li>Petrie, L., <a href="#Page_390">390</a></li> - - <li>Phillips, F. A., <a href="#Page_333">333</a>, <a href="#Page_398">398</a>, <a href="#Page_401">401</a>, <a href="#Page_402">402</a>, <a href="#Page_404">404</a>, <a href="#Page_405">405</a>, <a href="#Page_408">408</a>, <a href="#Page_414">414</a></li> - - <li>Phillips, J. R., <a href="#Page_408">408</a></li> - - <li>Phillips, Sergt., <a href="#Page_54">54</a></li> - - <li>Pierremande, <a href="#Page_366">366</a>, <a href="#Page_374">374</a></li> - - <li>Pietre, <a href="#Page_29">29</a>-31, <a href="#Page_37">37</a>, <a href="#Page_38">38</a></li> - - <li>Pike, C. S., <a href="#Page_292">292</a>, <a href="#Page_309">309</a></li> - - <li>Pilckem, <a href="#Page_322">322</a></li> - - <li>Pitman, G. R., <a href="#Page_353">353</a>, <a href="#Page_400">400</a></li> - - <li>Platts, H. C., <a href="#Page_421">421</a></li> - - <li>Plumbley, Sergt., <a href="#Page_136">136</a>, <a href="#Page_406">406</a></li> - - <li>Plumer, F.M. Lord, <a href="#Page_24">24</a>, <a href="#Page_55">55</a>, <a href="#Page_294">294</a></li> - - <li>Poelcapelle, <a href="#Page_40">40</a>, <a href="#Page_306">306</a> <i lang="la">et seq.</i>, <a href="#Page_359">359</a></li> - - <li>Polygon Wood, <a href="#Page_298">298</a>, <a href="#Page_302">302</a></li> - - <li>Pommier, <a href="#Page_244">244</a>, <a href="#Page_245">245</a>, <a href="#Page_248">248</a>, <a href="#Page_249">249</a></li> - - <li>Pont du Hem, <a href="#Page_64">64</a>, <a href="#Page_224">224</a>, <a href="#Page_226">226</a></li> - - <li>Pont Logy, <a href="#Page_72">72</a></li> - - <li>Pont Noyelles, <a href="#Page_424">424</a>, <a href="#Page_442">442</a></li> - - <li>Pont Remy, <a href="#Page_85">85</a></li> - - <li>Poperinghe, <a href="#Page_306">306</a>, <a href="#Page_307">307</a>, <a href="#Page_320">320</a></li> - - <li>Port, W. G., <a href="#Page_270">270</a></li> - - <li>Potizje, <a href="#Page_45">45</a></li> - - <li>Potter, A. F., <a href="#Page_414">414</a>, <a href="#Page_475">475</a> -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_538" id="Page_538">[Pg 538]</a></span></li> - <li>Potter, C., <a href="#Page_201">201</a>, <a href="#Page_281">281</a>, <a href="#Page_316">316</a></li> - - <li>Potton, A., <a href="#Page_119">119</a>, <a href="#Page_174">174</a>, <a href="#Page_193">193</a></li> - - <li>Powell, J., <a href="#Page_354">354</a></li> - - <li>Pratt, E. C., <a href="#Page_238">238</a>, <a href="#Page_249">249</a>, <a href="#Page_278">278</a></li> - - <li>Price, J. W., <a href="#Page_100">100</a>, <a href="#Page_121">121</a>, <a href="#Page_149">149</a>, <a href="#Page_154">154</a>, <a href="#Page_174">174</a>, <a href="#Page_193">193</a>, <a href="#Page_414">414</a>, <a href="#Page_469">469</a>, <a href="#Page_472">472</a></li> - - <li>Prince, V. C., <a href="#Page_323">323</a>, <a href="#Page_389">389</a>, <a href="#Page_446">446</a>-448, <a href="#Page_454">454</a>, <a href="#Page_455">455</a></li> - - <li>Pronville, <a href="#Page_329">329</a>, <a href="#Page_479">479</a></li> - - <li>Proven, <a href="#Page_321">321</a>, <a href="#Page_323">323</a></li> - - <li>Puisieux-au-Mont, <a href="#Page_240">240</a>, <a href="#Page_241">241</a>, <a href="#Page_384">384</a></li> - - <li>Punjabis, <a href="#Page_27">27</a>th, <a href="#Page_71">71</a></li> - - <li>Punjabis, <a href="#Page_89">89</a>th, <a href="#Page_66">66</a>, <a href="#Page_69">69</a></li> - - <li>Pyne, P., <a href="#Page_218">218</a>, <a href="#Page_223">223</a>, <a href="#Page_263">263</a></li> - - <li>Pyper, J. R., <a href="#Page_7">7</a>, <a href="#Page_54">54</a>, <a href="#Page_81">81</a>, <a href="#Page_82">82</a>, <a href="#Page_137">137</a></li> - - <li>Pys, <a href="#Page_240">240</a></li> - - - <li class="indx">Quéant, <a href="#Page_265">265</a>, <a href="#Page_273">273</a>-277, <a href="#Page_326">326</a>-329, <a href="#Page_395">395</a>, <a href="#Page_472">472</a>-479, <a href="#Page_492">492</a></li> - - <li>Quennell, W., <a href="#Page_174">174</a>, <a href="#Page_189">189</a>, <a href="#Page_228">228</a></li> - - <li>Quessy, <a href="#Page_369">369</a>, <a href="#Page_370">370</a>, <a href="#Page_372">372</a>-<a href="#Page_374">374</a></li> - - <li>Quierzy, <a href="#Page_365">365</a>, <a href="#Page_381">381</a></li> - - - <li class="indx">Ramillies, <a href="#Page_490">490</a></li> - - <li>Ramsey, W. D., <a href="#Page_360">360</a></li> - - <li>Rancourt, <a href="#Page_178">178</a>, <a href="#Page_453">453</a>-<a href="#Page_455">455</a></li> - - <li>Randall, H. V. R., <a href="#Page_328">328</a>, <a href="#Page_408">408</a>, <a href="#Page_486">486</a></li> - - <li>Ransart, <a href="#Page_239">239</a>, <a href="#Page_241">241</a>, <a href="#Page_245">245</a>, <a href="#Page_246">246</a></li> - - <li>Ratcliffe, E. A., <a href="#Page_327">327</a>, <a href="#Page_392">392</a></li> - - <li>Rawlinson, Gen. Lord, <a href="#Page_24">24</a>, <a href="#Page_74">74</a>, <a href="#Page_79">79</a>, <a href="#Page_156">156</a>, <a href="#Page_429">429</a></li> - - <li>Read, F. C. J., <a href="#Page_16">16</a>, <a href="#Page_101">101</a>, <a href="#Page_174">174</a>, <a href="#Page_193">193</a></li> - - <li>Reed, A., <a href="#Page_119">119</a></li> - - <li>Rees, H. D., <a href="#Page_223">223</a>, <a href="#Page_269">269</a>, <a href="#Page_300">300</a>, <a href="#Page_494">494</a></li> - - <li>Reid, C. J., <a href="#Page_251">251</a>, <a href="#Page_267">267</a></li> - - <li>Reigersburg, <a href="#Page_307">307</a>, <a href="#Page_308">308</a></li> - - <li>Reninghelst, <a href="#Page_44">44</a>, <a href="#Page_57">57</a>, <a href="#Page_305">305</a></li> - - <li>Rhonelle, River, <a href="#Page_496">496</a></li> - - <li>Ribecourt, <a href="#Page_332">332</a></li> - - <li>Ribemont, <a href="#Page_290">290</a>, <a href="#Page_423">423</a>, <a href="#Page_425">425</a>, <a href="#Page_442">442</a></li> - - <li>Richards, C. S., <a href="#Page_327">327</a>, <a href="#Page_407">407</a></li> - - <li>Richards, R. J., <a href="#Page_317">317</a>, <a href="#Page_320">320</a></li> - - <li>Richards, W., <a href="#Page_174">174</a>, <a href="#Page_193">193</a></li> - - <li>Richardson, Lieut.-Col., <a href="#Page_282">282</a>, <a href="#Page_283">283</a>, <a href="#Page_285">285</a>, <a href="#Page_370">370</a>, <a href="#Page_371">371</a></li> - - <li>Richardson, C. E. V., <a href="#Page_218">218</a>, <a href="#Page_229">229</a></li> - - <li>Richardson, S. A. G., <a href="#Page_201">201</a>, <a href="#Page_213">213</a>, <a href="#Page_214">214</a></li> - - <li>Richardson, S. J., <a href="#Page_315">315</a></li> - - <li>Richebourg L'Avoué, <a href="#Page_26">26</a>, <a href="#Page_29">29</a>, <a href="#Page_219">219</a></li> - - <li>Richebourg St Vaast, <a href="#Page_29">29</a> <i lang="la">et seq.</i></li> - - <li>Ridley, J., <a href="#Page_414">414</a></li> - - <li>Riencourt, <a href="#Page_274">274</a>-276, <a href="#Page_472">472</a></li> - - <li>Riez Bailleul, <a href="#Page_59">59</a> <i lang="la">et seq.</i>, <a href="#Page_224">224</a>, <a href="#Page_226">226</a>, <a href="#Page_413">413</a></li> - - <li>Rifles, <a href="#Page_57">57</a>th, <a href="#Page_23">23</a>, <a href="#Page_34">34</a>, <a href="#Page_39">39</a>, <a href="#Page_46">46</a>, <a href="#Page_52">52</a>, <a href="#Page_54">54</a>, <a href="#Page_60">60</a>, <a href="#Page_68">68</a>, <a href="#Page_69">69</a></li> - - <li>Riley, Sergt., <a href="#Page_284">284</a></li> - - <li>Ringrose, L/Corpl., <a href="#Page_236">236</a></li> - - <li>Risley, E. H., <a href="#Page_66">66</a>, <a href="#Page_128">128</a></li> - - <li>Rix, L. G., <a href="#Page_56">56</a>, <a href="#Page_174">174</a>, <a href="#Page_215">215</a>, <a href="#Page_218">218</a>, <a href="#Page_231">231</a></li> - - <li>Robbins, C., <a href="#Page_477">477</a></li> - - <li>Roberts, C. H. W., <a href="#Page_320">320</a></li> - - <li>Roclincourt, <a href="#Page_346">346</a> <i lang="la">et seq.</i>, <a href="#Page_393">393</a> -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_539" id="Page_539">[Pg 539]</a></span></li> - <li>Rogers, F. E., <a href="#Page_455">455</a></li> - - <li>Rombies, <a href="#Page_498">498</a>, <a href="#Page_499">499</a></li> - - <li>Ronnssoy Wood, <a href="#Page_457">457</a></li> - - <li>Ronville Caves, <a href="#Page_411">411</a>-<a href="#Page_414">414</a></li> - - <li>Rosenbloom, Pte., <a href="#Page_236">236</a></li> - - <li>Rossington, G. L., <a href="#Page_405">405</a></li> - - <li>Rouge Croix, <a href="#Page_61">61</a>, <a href="#Page_224">224</a>, <a href="#Page_226">226</a></li> - - <li>Rouges Bancs, <a href="#Page_58">58</a>, <a href="#Page_219">219</a></li> - - <li>Roughton, W., <a href="#Page_414">414</a></li> - - <li>Rowlands, C. W., <a href="#Page_327">327</a>, <a href="#Page_339">339</a>-341, <a href="#Page_344">344</a>, <a href="#Page_463">463</a>, <a href="#Page_466">466</a></li> - - <li>Royal Fusiliers, <a href="#Page_24">24</a>, <a href="#Page_88">88</a>, <a href="#Page_98">98</a>, <a href="#Page_118">118</a>, <a href="#Page_128">128</a>, <a href="#Page_132">132</a>, <a href="#Page_133">133</a>, <a href="#Page_330">330</a></li> - - <li>Royal Marines, <a href="#Page_90">90</a></li> - - <li>Royal Munster Fusiliers, <a href="#Page_85">85</a>, <a href="#Page_471">471</a></li> - - <li>Royal Scots, <a href="#Page_292">292</a>, <a href="#Page_461">461</a></li> - - <li>Royal Warwickshire Regt., <a href="#Page_218">218</a>, <a href="#Page_219">219</a></li> - - <li>Royal Welsh Fusiliers, <a href="#Page_73">73</a></li> - - <li>Royce, P. F., <a href="#Page_443">443</a>, <a href="#Page_458">458</a>, <a href="#Page_459">459</a></li> - - <li>Ruel, C. S., <a href="#Page_344">344</a></li> - - <li>Rumaucourt, <a href="#Page_486">486</a>, <a href="#Page_487">487</a>, <a href="#Page_491">491</a></li> - - <li>Rundle, Gen. Sir Leslie, <a href="#Page_86">86</a>, <a href="#Page_509">509</a></li> - - <li>Russell, C. P., <a href="#Page_201">201</a></li> - - <li>Ryan, W., <a href="#Page_477">477</a></li> - - - <li class="indx">Sailly-au-Bois, <a href="#Page_150">150</a>, <a href="#Page_172">172</a>-<a href="#Page_175">175</a></li> - - <li>Sailly Labourse, <a href="#Page_80">80</a></li> - - <li>Sailly Laurette 430-<a href="#Page_432">432</a></li> - - <li>Sailly-le-Sec, <a href="#Page_180">180</a></li> - - <li>Sailly Saillisel, <a href="#Page_177">177</a>, <a href="#Page_194">194</a></li> - - <li>St Amand, <a href="#Page_142">142</a>, <a href="#Page_166">166</a> <i lang="la">et seq.</i></li> - - <li>St Aubin, <a href="#Page_349">349</a>, <a href="#Page_416">416</a></li> - - <li>St Firmin, <a href="#Page_369">369</a>-<a href="#Page_371">371</a></li> - - <li>St Gobain, Forêt de, <a href="#Page_359">359</a> <i lang="la">et seq.</i></li> - - <li>St Jans-ter-biezen, <a href="#Page_320">320</a></li> - - <li>St Jean, <a href="#Page_45">45</a>, <a href="#Page_56">56</a></li> - - <li>St Julien, <a href="#Page_42">42</a>, <a href="#Page_45">45</a>, <a href="#Page_46">46</a>, <a href="#Page_295">295</a>, <a href="#Page_304">304</a>, <a href="#Page_306">306</a>, <a href="#Page_309">309</a>-311, <a href="#Page_318">318</a></li> - - <li>St Leger, <a href="#Page_246">246</a>-249, <a href="#Page_281">281</a>, <a href="#Page_467">467</a></li> - - <li>St Martin-sur-Cojeul, <a href="#Page_247">247</a>, <a href="#Page_253">253</a></li> - - <li>St Omer, <a href="#Page_20">20</a>-24, <a href="#Page_296">296</a>, <a href="#Page_307">307</a>, <a href="#Page_316">316</a>, <a href="#Page_321">321</a></li> - - <li>St Paul's Bay, <a href="#Page_9">9</a>, <a href="#Page_88">88</a>, <a href="#Page_508">508</a></li> - - <li>St Pierre Vaast, <a href="#Page_194">194</a>, <a href="#Page_455">455</a></li> - - <li>St Pol, <a href="#Page_350">350</a>, <a href="#Page_393">393</a></li> - - <li>St Quentin, <a href="#Page_242">242</a>, <a href="#Page_359">359</a> <i lang="la">et seq.</i>, <a href="#Page_444">444</a>, <a href="#Page_460">460</a></li> - - <li>St Quentin Canal, <a href="#Page_364">364</a> <i lang="la">et seq.</i></li> - - <li>St Riquier, <a href="#Page_175">175</a>-180, <a href="#Page_419">419</a></li> - - <li>St Rohart Factory, <a href="#Page_265">265</a>, <a href="#Page_467">467</a>, <a href="#Page_480">480</a></li> - - <li>St Sauveur, <a href="#Page_416">416</a>, <a href="#Page_418">418</a></li> - - <li>St Vaast, <a href="#Page_37">37</a></li> - - <li>St Vaast-en-Chaussée, <a href="#Page_215">215</a>-<a href="#Page_218">218</a></li> - - <li>Salisbury, <a href="#Page_122">122</a>, <a href="#Page_123">123</a></li> - - <li>Salter, F. F., <a href="#Page_513">513</a></li> - - <li>Sambre, River, <a href="#Page_478">478</a> <i lang="la">et seq.</i></li> - - <li>Sampson, C. A., <a href="#Page_322">322</a></li> - - <li>Sanctuary Wood, <a href="#Page_299">299</a>, <a href="#Page_302">302</a></li> - - <li>Sankey, T. H., <a href="#Page_344">344</a></li> - - <li>Sapignies, <a href="#Page_290">290</a></li> - - <li>Saqula, <a href="#Page_110">110</a>-<a href="#Page_112">112</a></li> - - <li>Sari Bair Mountain, <a href="#Page_91">91</a>, <a href="#Page_93">93</a></li> - - <li>Sars-la-Bruyère, <a href="#Page_502">502</a>-<a href="#Page_504">504</a></li> - - <li>Sassoon, Sir Philip, <a href="#Page_15">15</a>, <a href="#Page_120">120</a> -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_540" id="Page_540">[Pg 540]</a></span></li> - <li>Sauchicourt Farm, <a href="#Page_484">484</a></li> - - <li>Sauchy-Cauchy, <a href="#Page_481">481</a>-<a href="#Page_485">485</a></li> - - <li>Sauchy-Lestrée, <a href="#Page_487">487</a></li> - - <li>Saultain, <a href="#Page_496">496</a>, <a href="#Page_497">497</a></li> - - <li>Saulty, <a href="#Page_292">292</a></li> - - <li>Saunders, C. R., <a href="#Page_6">6</a>, <a href="#Page_20">20</a>, <a href="#Page_47">47</a>, <a href="#Page_51">51</a>, <a href="#Page_53">53</a>, <a href="#Page_55">55</a></li> - - <li>Savill, Lieut.-Col., <a href="#Page_469">469</a>, <a href="#Page_470">470</a></li> - - <li>Savy, Col., <a href="#Page_54">54</a></li> - - <li>Scarpe, River, <a href="#Page_240">240</a>, <a href="#Page_252">252</a> <i lang="la">et seq.</i>, <a href="#Page_325">325</a>, <a href="#Page_394">394</a>, <a href="#Page_406">406</a>, <a href="#Page_443">443</a>, <a href="#Page_460">460</a> <i lang="la">et seq.</i>, <a href="#Page_479">479</a> <i lang="la">et seq.</i></li> - - <li>Scheldt Canal, <em>v.</em> Escaut, <a href="#Page_290">290</a></li> - - <li>Schuler Farm, <a href="#Page_312">312</a>, <a href="#Page_313">313</a></li> - - <li>Scinde Rifles, <a href="#Page_59">59</a>th, <a href="#Page_22">22</a></li> - - <li>Scott, G. B., <a href="#Page_6">6</a>, <a href="#Page_66">66</a></li> - - <li>Seabury, E. R., <a href="#Page_292">292</a>, <a href="#Page_315">315</a></li> - - <li>Sebourg, <a href="#Page_498">498</a>-<a href="#Page_501">501</a></li> - - <li>Sebourquiaux, <a href="#Page_498">498</a>-<a href="#Page_500">500</a></li> - - <li>Sedd-el-Bahr, <a href="#Page_94">94</a></li> - - <li>Selby, A. J., <a href="#Page_279">279</a></li> - - <li>Sellars, A. J., <a href="#Page_408">408</a></li> - - <li>Selle River, <a href="#Page_494">494</a>, <a href="#Page_495">495</a></li> - - <li>Selmun, <a href="#Page_9">9</a>, <a href="#Page_10">10</a>, <a href="#Page_12">12</a>, <a href="#Page_14">14</a></li> - - <li>Sensée, River, <a href="#Page_260">260</a>, <a href="#Page_262">262</a>, <a href="#Page_467">467</a> <i lang="la">et seq.</i></li> - - <li>Senussi, <a href="#Page_107">107</a>-<a href="#Page_109">109</a></li> - - <li>Senyard, F. G., <a href="#Page_344">344</a></li> - - <li>Sergeant, A., <a href="#Page_216">216</a></li> - - <li>Serre, <a href="#Page_140">140</a>, <a href="#Page_240">240</a>, <a href="#Page_460">460</a></li> - - <li>Servais, <a href="#Page_381">381</a></li> - - <li>Seyd, V. H., <a href="#Page_16">16</a>, <a href="#Page_100">100</a>, <a href="#Page_104">104</a>, <a href="#Page_110">110</a>, <a href="#Page_111">111</a></li> - - <li>Seys, S. A., <a href="#Page_249">249</a>, <a href="#Page_275">275</a>, <a href="#Page_289">289</a>, <a href="#Page_311">311</a>, <a href="#Page_388">388</a>, <a href="#Page_424">424</a></li> - - <li>Shand, W., <a href="#Page_327">327</a></li> - - <li>Sharp, A. G., <a href="#Page_66">66</a>, <a href="#Page_174">174</a>, <a href="#Page_182">182</a></li> - - <li>Shelton, Sergt.-Major, <a href="#Page_231">231</a></li> - - <li>Sheppard, L. H., <a href="#Page_322">322</a>, <a href="#Page_389">389</a>, <a href="#Page_391">391</a></li> - - <li>Sherwood, Corpl., <a href="#Page_283">283</a></li> - - <li>Sherwood Foresters, <a href="#Page_166">166</a></li> - - <li>Shoreham-by-Sea, <a href="#Page_356">356</a>, <a href="#Page_427">427</a></li> - - <li>Siddall, T., <a href="#Page_201">201</a>, <a href="#Page_263">263</a></li> - - <li>Sidi Bishr, <a href="#Page_112">112</a></li> - - <li>Sidi Gaber, <a href="#Page_112">112</a></li> - - <li>Siege Camp, <a href="#Page_317">317</a>, <a href="#Page_318">318</a>, <a href="#Page_320">320</a></li> - - <li>Sievwright, A. J. N., <a href="#Page_421">421</a></li> - - <li>Sikhs, <a href="#Page_15">15</a>th, <a href="#Page_22">22</a>, <a href="#Page_49">49</a></li> - - <li>Sikhs, <a href="#Page_34">34</a>th, <a href="#Page_22">22</a></li> - - <li>Sikhs, <a href="#Page_47">47</a>th, <a href="#Page_22">22</a></li> - - <li>Simencourt, <a href="#Page_264">264</a>, <a href="#Page_271">271</a>, <a href="#Page_344">344</a>, <a href="#Page_346">346</a></li> - - <li>Simmonds, R. S. B., <a href="#Page_327">327</a>, <a href="#Page_342">342</a>, <a href="#Page_411">411</a>, <a href="#Page_463">463</a>, <a href="#Page_466">466</a></li> - - <li>Simpson, A. H., <a href="#Page_16">16</a>, <a href="#Page_88">88</a></li> - - <li>Simpson, Pte., <a href="#Page_405">405</a></li> - - <li>Sinceny, <a href="#Page_365">365</a>, <a href="#Page_386">386</a></li> - - <li>Slater, H., <a href="#Page_423">423</a>, <a href="#Page_440">440</a></li> - - <li>Slattery, J., <a href="#Page_443">443</a></li> - - <li>Smalley, P. F., <a href="#Page_174">174</a>, <a href="#Page_270">270</a></li> - - <li>Smith, L/Corpl., <a href="#Page_236">236</a></li> - - <li>Smith, Major-Gen. D., <a href="#Page_296">296</a></li> - - <li>Smith, Pte., <a href="#Page_350">350</a></li> - - <li>Snell, H. A., <a href="#Page_317">317</a>, <a href="#Page_320">320</a></li> - - <li>Snow, Lieut.-Gen. D'Oyly, <a href="#Page_141">141</a>, <a href="#Page_169">169</a>, <a href="#Page_255">255</a>, <a href="#Page_331">331</a> -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_541" id="Page_541">[Pg 541]</a></span></li> - <li>Souastre, <a href="#Page_141">141</a> <i lang="la">et seq.</i></li> - - <li>South Staffords, <a href="#Page_166">166</a>, <a href="#Page_244">244</a>, <a href="#Page_288">288</a></li> - - <li>Sparks, H. C., <a href="#Page_163">163</a></li> - - <li>Sparrow, Hanbury, <a href="#Page_358">358</a>, <a href="#Page_426">426</a></li> - - <li>Spence, C. W., <a href="#Page_279">279</a></li> - - <li>Spencer, F. C., <a href="#Page_279">279</a></li> - - <li>Spencer, J. T., <a href="#Page_443">443</a></li> - - <li>Speyer, C. A., <a href="#Page_201">201</a>, <a href="#Page_211">211</a>, <a href="#Page_304">304</a></li> - - <li>Spicer, E. E., <a href="#Page_116">116</a>, <a href="#Page_238">238</a>, <a href="#Page_243">243</a>, <a href="#Page_327">327</a>, <a href="#Page_349">349</a>, <a href="#Page_398">398</a>, <a href="#Page_400">400</a>, <a href="#Page_407">407</a></li> - - <li>Spiers, H. W., <a href="#Page_201">201</a>, <a href="#Page_214">214</a>, <a href="#Page_223">223</a>, <a href="#Page_257">257</a>, <a href="#Page_300">300</a>, <a href="#Page_304">304</a>, <a href="#Page_494">494</a></li> - - <li>Spooner, Pte., <a href="#Page_350">350</a></li> - - <li>Spring, D. G., <a href="#Page_315">315</a>, <a href="#Page_317">317</a></li> - - <li>Springfield, <a href="#Page_310">310</a>, <a href="#Page_312">312</a></li> - - <li>Spurr, C. C., <a href="#Page_66">66</a></li> - - <li>Staden, <a href="#Page_317">317</a></li> - - <li>Stanbridge, G. E., <a href="#Page_137">137</a>, <a href="#Page_174">174</a>, <a href="#Page_231">231</a>, <a href="#Page_257">257</a>, <a href="#Page_300">300</a>, <a href="#Page_350">350</a>, <a href="#Page_417">417</a>, <a href="#Page_478">478</a></li> - - <li>Stanham, H. G., <a href="#Page_14">14</a>, <a href="#Page_16">16</a>, <a href="#Page_111">111</a>, <a href="#Page_149">149</a>, <a href="#Page_153">153</a>, <a href="#Page_159">159</a>, <a href="#Page_162">162</a>, <a href="#Page_163">163</a>, <a href="#Page_193">193</a></li> - - <li>Stark, W. A., <a href="#Page_16">16</a>, <a href="#Page_149">149</a>, <a href="#Page_154">154</a>, <a href="#Page_289">289</a>, <a href="#Page_311">311</a>, <a href="#Page_313">313</a>, <a href="#Page_315">315</a></li> - - <li>Stedman, P. B. K., <a href="#Page_6">6</a>, <a href="#Page_53">53</a>, <a href="#Page_55">55</a></li> - - <li>Stedman, S. H., <a href="#Page_116">116</a>, <a href="#Page_238">238</a>, <a href="#Page_317">317</a></li> - - <li>Steenvoorde, <a href="#Page_296">296</a>, <a href="#Page_297">297</a></li> - - <li>Stevens, Pte., <a href="#Page_350">350</a></li> - - <li>Stevens, W., <a href="#Page_122">122</a></li> - - <li>Stevens, W. H., <a href="#Page_16">16</a></li> - - <li>Stevens, W. H. S., <a href="#Page_113">113</a></li> - - <li>Stevenson, E. A., <a href="#Page_287">287</a></li> - - <li>Stevenson, R. T., <a href="#Page_414">414</a>, <a href="#Page_475">475</a></li> - - <li>Stickney, F., <a href="#Page_238">238</a>, <a href="#Page_276">276</a></li> - - <li>Stickney, W. J., <a href="#Page_238">238</a></li> - - <li>Still, L. A., <a href="#Page_443">443</a></li> - - <li>Stillwell, E. H., <a href="#Page_4">4</a>, <a href="#Page_14">14</a>, <a href="#Page_36">36</a>, <a href="#Page_56">56</a>, <a href="#Page_115">115</a></li> - - <li>Stoaling, T., <a href="#Page_238">238</a>, <a href="#Page_279">279</a></li> - - <li>Stone, Pte., <a href="#Page_350">350</a></li> - - <li>Stotter, S. P., <a href="#Page_223">223</a>, <a href="#Page_231">231</a>, <a href="#Page_252">252</a></li> - - <li>Strazeele, <a href="#Page_43">43</a></li> - - <li>Strickland, Brig.-Gen. E. P., <a href="#Page_22">22</a></li> - - <li>Stuckey, E. L., <a href="#Page_327">327</a>, <a href="#Page_336">336</a>, <a href="#Page_337">337</a>, <a href="#Page_349">349</a></li> - - <li>Suffolks, <a href="#Page_4">4</a>th, <a href="#Page_22">22</a>, <a href="#Page_61">61</a>, <a href="#Page_71">71</a>, <a href="#Page_369">369</a> <i lang="la">et seq.</i>, <a href="#Page_432">432</a></li> - - <li>Sus-St Leger, <a href="#Page_239">239</a></li> - - <li>Sutcliffe, Major, <a href="#Page_437">437</a></li> - - <li>Sutton Veny, <a href="#Page_236">236</a>, <a href="#Page_237">237</a></li> - - <li>Swinchatt, P. C., <a href="#Page_408">408</a></li> - - <li>Sykes, J. T., <a href="#Page_7">7</a>, <a href="#Page_36">36</a>, <a href="#Page_152">152</a>, <a href="#Page_159">159</a>, <a href="#Page_165">165</a>, <a href="#Page_194">194</a></li> - - <li>Sylvester, G. H., <a href="#Page_417">417</a>, <a href="#Page_501">501</a></li> - - - <li class="indx">Tadpole Copse, <a href="#Page_332">332</a> <i lang="la">et seq.</i></li> - - <li>Tadworth, <a href="#Page_116">116</a>, <a href="#Page_117">117</a>, <a href="#Page_119">119</a></li> - - <li>Tailles Wood, <a href="#Page_445">445</a>, <a href="#Page_446">446</a></li> - - <li>Taylor, C. M., <a href="#Page_174">174</a>, <a href="#Page_212">212</a>, <a href="#Page_214">214</a></li> - - <li>Taylor, F. S. C., <a href="#Page_327">327</a>, <a href="#Page_466">466</a></li> - - <li>Taylor, H. W., <a href="#Page_501">501</a></li> - - <li>Taylor, J., <a href="#Page_288">288</a></li> - - <li>Taylor, Sergt., <a href="#Page_328">328</a></li> - - <li>Telegraph Hill, <a href="#Page_253">253</a> <i lang="la">et seq.</i>, <a href="#Page_413">413</a>, <a href="#Page_416">416</a></li> - - <li>Tergnier, <a href="#Page_366">366</a>, <a href="#Page_374">374</a>-377 -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_542" id="Page_542">[Pg 542]</a></span></li> - <li>Thélus, <a href="#Page_393">393</a>, <a href="#Page_397">397</a></li> - - <li>Thézy-Glimont, <a href="#Page_359">359</a></li> - - <li>Thomas, N. L., <a href="#Page_16">16</a>, <a href="#Page_88">88</a>, <a href="#Page_100">100</a>, <a href="#Page_121">121</a></li> - - <li>Till, W. J., <a href="#Page_443">443</a></li> - - <li>Tilloy-les-Mofflaines, <a href="#Page_253">253</a>, <a href="#Page_270">270</a>, <a href="#Page_412">412</a> <i lang="la">et seq.</i>, <a href="#Page_461">461</a></li> - - <li>Tincques, <a href="#Page_351">351</a>, <a href="#Page_418">418</a></li> - - <li>Tollworthy, F. G., <a href="#Page_383">383</a>, <a href="#Page_421">421</a>, <a href="#Page_442">442</a>, <a href="#Page_453">453</a>, <a href="#Page_455">455</a></li> - - <li>Tomsett, E. S., <a href="#Page_7">7</a>, <a href="#Page_81">81</a>, <a href="#Page_138">138</a>, <a href="#Page_174">174</a>, <a href="#Page_175">175</a></li> - - <li>Torquay, <a href="#Page_355">355</a></li> - - <li>Tortille River, <a href="#Page_454">454</a>, <a href="#Page_455">455</a></li> - - <li>Towse, W. N., <a href="#Page_16">16</a>, <a href="#Page_113">113</a></li> - - <li>Towy Post, <a href="#Page_398">398</a>, <a href="#Page_403">403</a>, <a href="#Page_406">406</a></li> - - <li>Tracas Farm, <a href="#Page_319">319</a></li> - - <li>Travécy, <a href="#Page_364">364</a>, <a href="#Page_369">369</a>, <a href="#Page_371">371</a></li> - - <li>Trescault, <a href="#Page_290">290</a></li> - - <li>Trinidad Contingent, Second, <a href="#Page_128">128</a></li> - - <li>Trinquis, River, <a href="#Page_479">479</a></li> - - <li>Trones Wood, <a href="#Page_182">182</a> <i lang="la">et seq.</i></li> - - <li>Trotman, Brig.-Gen. C. N., <a href="#Page_90">90</a></li> - - <li>Tucker, A. W., <a href="#Page_443">443</a></li> - - <li>Turner, J. G., <a href="#Page_259">259</a>, <a href="#Page_260">260</a></li> - - <li>Tyrell, G., <a href="#Page_344">344</a></li> - - - <li class="indx">Udall, F. G., <a href="#Page_188">188</a>, <a href="#Page_402">402</a>, <a href="#Page_408">408</a>, <a href="#Page_477">477</a></li> - - <li>Urquhart, Lieut.-Col., <a href="#Page_436">436</a></li> - - - <li class="indx">Valenciennes, <a href="#Page_494">494</a>-<a href="#Page_496">496</a></li> - - <li>Valetta, <a href="#Page_9">9</a> <i lang="la">et seq.</i>, <a href="#Page_86">86</a>-89, <a href="#Page_508">508</a>, <a href="#Page_509">509</a></li> - - <li>Vauchelles, <a href="#Page_137">137</a></li> - - <li>Vaulx-Vraucourt, <a href="#Page_275">275</a></li> - - <li>Vaux-sur-Somme, <a href="#Page_180">180</a>, <a href="#Page_433">433</a>, <a href="#Page_449">449</a>, <a href="#Page_451">451</a></li> - - <li>Vermelles, <a href="#Page_76">76</a>-<a href="#Page_81">81</a></li> - - <li>Vernon, H. W., <a href="#Page_16">16</a>, <a href="#Page_149">149</a>, <a href="#Page_153">153</a>, <a href="#Page_173">173</a>, <a href="#Page_185">185</a>, <a href="#Page_193">193</a></li> - - <li>Vernon, W. H., <a href="#Page_15">15</a>, <a href="#Page_119">119</a>, <a href="#Page_122">122</a>, <a href="#Page_201">201</a>, <a href="#Page_211">211</a>, <a href="#Page_214">214</a></li> - - <li>Verquin, <a href="#Page_81">81</a></li> - - <li>Vickery, Pte., <a href="#Page_242">242</a></li> - - <li>Vieille Chapelle, <a href="#Page_29">29</a>, <a href="#Page_32">32</a>, <a href="#Page_33">33</a></li> - - <li>Vieux Berquin, <a href="#Page_43">43</a></li> - - <li>Ville-sur-Ancre, <a href="#Page_208">208</a>, <a href="#Page_214">214</a></li> - - <li>Villequier-Aumont, <a href="#Page_377">377</a>-<a href="#Page_379">379</a></li> - - <li>Villers-Bretonneux, <a href="#Page_365">365</a>, <a href="#Page_384">384</a> <i lang="la">et seq.</i></li> - - <li>Villers Cotterets, <a href="#Page_383">383</a>, <a href="#Page_385">385</a></li> - - <li>Villers-lez-Cagnicourt, <a href="#Page_479">479</a></li> - - <li>Villers Plouich, <a href="#Page_290">290</a></li> - - <li>Villers-sire-Nicole, <a href="#Page_506">506</a></li> - - <li>Vimy Ridge, <a href="#Page_247">247</a>, <a href="#Page_252">252</a>, <a href="#Page_254">254</a>, <a href="#Page_260">260</a>, <a href="#Page_294">294</a>, <a href="#Page_347">347</a>, <a href="#Page_394">394</a>-<a href="#Page_397">397</a></li> - - <li>Vine, G. H. M., <a href="#Page_4">4</a>, <a href="#Page_6">6</a>, <a href="#Page_20">20</a>, <a href="#Page_34">34</a>, <a href="#Page_36">36</a>, <a href="#Page_66">66</a>, <a href="#Page_128">128</a>-130, <a href="#Page_356">356</a></li> - - <li>Vines, W. F., <a href="#Page_292">292</a>, <a href="#Page_315">315</a></li> - - <li>Viry-Noureuil, <a href="#Page_366">366</a> <i lang="la">et seq.</i></li> - - <li>Vis-en-Artois, <a href="#Page_479">479</a></li> - - <li>Vitry-en-Artois, <a href="#Page_491">491</a></li> - - <li>Vitz Villeroy, <a href="#Page_248">248</a></li> - - <li>Vlamertinghe, <a href="#Page_56">56</a>, <a href="#Page_306">306</a>, <a href="#Page_315">315</a>-<a href="#Page_317">317</a></li> - - <li>Volckeringhove, <a href="#Page_306">306</a></li> - - <li>Voskule, J. A., <a href="#Page_414">414</a> -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_543" id="Page_543">[Pg 543]</a></span></li> - <li>Vouel, <a href="#Page_374">374</a>-<a href="#Page_378">378</a></li> - - - <li class="indx">Wailly, <a href="#Page_248">248</a></li> - - <li>Wakefield, Sir Chas., <a href="#Page_150">150</a></li> - - <li>Walker, F. W., <a href="#Page_106">106</a>, <a href="#Page_292">292</a>, <a href="#Page_312">312</a>, <a href="#Page_314">314</a>, <a href="#Page_315">315</a>, <a href="#Page_317">317</a>, <a href="#Page_388">388</a>, <a href="#Page_423">423</a>, <a href="#Page_433">433</a>, <a href="#Page_440">440</a></li> - - <li>Walker, T. I., <a href="#Page_7">7</a>, <a href="#Page_11">11</a>, <a href="#Page_54">54</a>, <a href="#Page_55">55</a></li> - - <li>Walker, Brig.-Gen. W. R., <a href="#Page_22">22</a></li> - - <li>Wallace, Major-Gen. Sir A., <a href="#Page_90">90</a>, <a href="#Page_107">107</a></li> - - <li>Wallder, H. W., <a href="#Page_344">344</a></li> - - <li>Walmisley, S. E. H., <a href="#Page_66">66</a>, <a href="#Page_81">81</a>, <a href="#Page_137">137</a></li> - - <li>Wancourt, <a href="#Page_253">253</a> <i lang="la">et seq.</i>, <a href="#Page_393">393</a>, <a href="#Page_467">467</a>, <a href="#Page_492">492</a></li> - - <li>Wardan, <a href="#Page_107">107</a></li> - - <li>Wardle, L. F., <a href="#Page_366">366</a>, <a href="#Page_374">374</a>, <a href="#Page_384">384</a></li> - - <li>Warloy, <a href="#Page_420">420</a></li> - - <li>Warlus, <a href="#Page_270">270</a></li> - - <li>Warminster, <a href="#Page_236">236</a></li> - - <li>Warren, L/Corpl., <a href="#Page_242">242</a></li> - - <li>Warren, W. D., <a href="#Page_307">307</a>, <a href="#Page_312">312</a>, <a href="#Page_315">315</a></li> - - <li>Watson, B. A., <a href="#Page_312">312</a>-<a href="#Page_315">315</a></li> - - <li>Watts, L. L., <a href="#Page_478">478</a>, <a href="#Page_488">488</a>, <a href="#Page_490">490</a></li> - - <li>Weathersbee, H. W., <a href="#Page_7">7</a>, <a href="#Page_20">20</a>, <a href="#Page_66">66</a></li> - - <li>Webb, L. R., <a href="#Page_216">216</a></li> - - <li>Webb, T. Montgomerie, <a href="#Page_130">130</a>, <a href="#Page_358">358</a></li> - - <li>Webster, J. R., <a href="#Page_16">16</a>, <a href="#Page_94">94</a>, <a href="#Page_112">112</a>, <a href="#Page_152">152</a>, <a href="#Page_153">153</a>, <a href="#Page_185">185</a>, <a href="#Page_193">193</a></li> - - <li>Webster, W. H., <a href="#Page_154">154</a>, <a href="#Page_221">221</a>, <a href="#Page_227">227</a>, <a href="#Page_231">231</a></li> - - <li>Wedge Wood, <a href="#Page_178">178</a> <i lang="la">et seq.</i></li> - - <li>Weekes, L/Corpl., <a href="#Page_350">350</a></li> - - <li>Wellby, E. V., <a href="#Page_14">14</a>, <a href="#Page_116">116</a>, <a href="#Page_117">117</a></li> - - <li>Welsh Regiment, <a href="#Page_427">427</a></li> - - <li>Westcott, A., <a href="#Page_315">315</a></li> - - <li>Westerman, Pte., <a href="#Page_350">350</a></li> - - <li>Westhoek, <a href="#Page_295">295</a>, <a href="#Page_296">296</a></li> - - <li>Westoutre, <a href="#Page_44">44</a>, <a href="#Page_57">57</a></li> - - <li>Westroosebeek, <a href="#Page_317">317</a>, <a href="#Page_320">320</a></li> - - <li>West Yorkshire Regiment, <a href="#Page_353">353</a></li> - - <li>Wheatley, J. H. L., <a href="#Page_280">280</a>, <a href="#Page_282">282</a>, <a href="#Page_283">283</a>, <a href="#Page_287">287</a></li> - - <li>Wheatley, L. L., <a href="#Page_113">113</a>, <a href="#Page_138">138</a>, <a href="#Page_148">148</a>, <a href="#Page_161">161</a>, <a href="#Page_162">162</a>, <a href="#Page_180">180</a>, <a href="#Page_206">206</a>, <a href="#Page_211">211</a>, <a href="#Page_214">214</a>, <a href="#Page_217">217</a></li> - - <li>Whitehead, H., <a href="#Page_162">162</a>, <a href="#Page_163">163</a>, <a href="#Page_216">216</a></li> - - <li>Whitworth, Corpl., <a href="#Page_283">283</a></li> - - <li>Wickens, J., <a href="#Page_344">344</a> -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_544" id="Page_544">[Pg 544]</a></span></li> - <li>Wieltje, <a href="#Page_45">45</a>, <a href="#Page_46">46</a></li> - - <li>Wilde, E. T., Rodney, <a href="#Page_122">122</a>, <a href="#Page_128">128</a></li> - - <li>Wilderspin, H. O., <a href="#Page_315">315</a></li> - - <li>Wildman, C. J. C., <a href="#Page_360">360</a></li> - - <li>Wilkinson, Corpl., <a href="#Page_236">236</a></li> - - <li>Willcocks, Gen. Sir J., <a href="#Page_22">22</a>, <a href="#Page_24">24</a>, <a href="#Page_60">60</a></li> - - <li>Willerval, <a href="#Page_347">347</a>, <a href="#Page_393">393</a>, <a href="#Page_397">397</a></li> - - <li>Williams, F. G., <a href="#Page_322">322</a>, <a href="#Page_375">375</a>, <a href="#Page_384">384</a></li> - - <li>Williams, Col., <a href="#Page_123">123</a></li> - - <li>Williams, H. J. M., <a href="#Page_66">66</a>, <a href="#Page_119">119</a>, <a href="#Page_223">223</a>, <a href="#Page_322">322</a>, <a href="#Page_369">369</a>, <a href="#Page_384">384</a></li> - - <li>Williams, H. N., <a href="#Page_223">223</a>, <a href="#Page_269">269</a>, <a href="#Page_300">300</a>, <a href="#Page_349">349</a>, <a href="#Page_398">398</a>, <a href="#Page_401">401</a>, <a href="#Page_407">407</a>, <a href="#Page_408">408</a>, <a href="#Page_411">411</a>, <a href="#Page_463">463</a>, <a href="#Page_469">469</a>, <a href="#Page_472">472</a>, <a href="#Page_478">478</a>, <a href="#Page_494">494</a>, <a href="#Page_506">506</a></li> - - <li>Williams, N. W., <a href="#Page_88">88</a>, <a href="#Page_149">149</a>, <a href="#Page_153">153</a>, <a href="#Page_174">174</a></li> - - <li>Williams, S. M., <a href="#Page_249">249</a>, <a href="#Page_287">287</a></li> - - <li>Willmott, W. A., <a href="#Page_344">344</a></li> - - <li>Wilson, E. D., <a href="#Page_116">116</a>, <a href="#Page_118">118</a></li> - - <li>Wilson, Sergt.-Major, <a href="#Page_494">494</a></li> - - <li>Wise, F. S., <a href="#Page_414">414</a>, <a href="#Page_417">417</a></li> - - <li>Wood, A. E., <a href="#Page_116">116</a>, <a href="#Page_117">117</a></li> - - <li>Wood, Col. Evelyn, <a href="#Page_150">150</a></li> - - <li>Wood, J. C., <a href="#Page_443">443</a>, <a href="#Page_448">448</a></li> - - <li>Woodington, A., <a href="#Page_360">360</a>, <a href="#Page_384">384</a></li> - - <li>Woodyeat, E., <a href="#Page_414">414</a></li> - - <li>Wreford, L. W., <a href="#Page_223">223</a>, <a href="#Page_270">270</a>, <a href="#Page_272">272</a>, <a href="#Page_304">304</a></li> - - <li>Wright, Capt., <a href="#Page_382">382</a>, <a href="#Page_458">458</a></li> - - <li>Wytschaete Ridge, <a href="#Page_294">294</a></li> - - - <li class="indx">Yeoman, B. F. L., <a href="#Page_88">88</a>, <a href="#Page_149">149</a>, <a href="#Page_159">159</a>, <a href="#Page_165">165</a></li> - - <li>York and Lanc. Regiment, <a href="#Page_347">347</a></li> - - <li>Yorkshires, 2nd, <a href="#Page_488">488</a></li> - - <li>Yoxall, T., <a href="#Page_417">417</a>, <a href="#Page_466">466</a></li> - - <li>Yser Canal and River, <a href="#Page_40">40</a>, <a href="#Page_41">41</a>, <a href="#Page_229">229</a>, <a href="#Page_295">295</a>, <a href="#Page_307">307</a> <i lang="la">et seq.</i></li> - - <li>Ytres, <a href="#Page_290">290</a></li> - - - <li class="indx">Zelobes, <a href="#Page_27">27</a></li> - - <li>Zillebeeke, <a href="#Page_294">294</a>, <a href="#Page_295">295</a></li> - - <li>Zonnebeeke, <a href="#Page_40">40</a>, <a href="#Page_42">42</a>, <a href="#Page_297">297</a></li> - - <li>Zouafques, <a href="#Page_316">316</a>, <a href="#Page_317">317</a></li> -</ul> - -<div id="transnote"> - -<div class="chapter"></div> -<hr class="chap" /> - - - - -<h2>TRANSCRIBER'S NOTES</h2> - - -<p>Added missing page number to Scheldt Canal index listing on p. <a href="#Page_540">540</a>.</p> - -<p>Silently corrected simple spelling, grammar, and typographical errors.</p> - -<p>Retained anachronistic and non-standard spellings as printed.</p> - -<p>Enclosed italics font in <em>underscores</em>.</p></div> - - - - - - - - -<pre> - - - - - -End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of The War History of the 4th Battalion -The London Regiment (Royal Fusiliers, by F. 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