diff options
| -rw-r--r-- | 41707-0.txt | 396 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | 41707-0.zip | bin | 92600 -> 0 bytes | |||
| -rw-r--r-- | 41707-8.txt | 4764 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | 41707-8.zip | bin | 91115 -> 0 bytes | |||
| -rw-r--r-- | 41707-h.zip | bin | 6404807 -> 0 bytes | |||
| -rw-r--r-- | 41707-h/41707-h.htm | 426 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | 41707.txt | 4764 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | 41707.zip | bin | 91093 -> 0 bytes | |||
| -rw-r--r-- | old/41707-0.txt | 4785 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | old/41707-0.zip | bin | 92600 -> 0 bytes | |||
| -rw-r--r-- | old/41707-8.txt | 4764 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | old/41707-8.zip | bin | 91115 -> 0 bytes | |||
| -rw-r--r-- | old/41707-h.zip | bin | 6404807 -> 0 bytes | |||
| -rw-r--r-- | old/41707.txt | 4764 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | old/41707.zip | bin | 91093 -> 0 bytes |
15 files changed, 5 insertions, 24658 deletions
diff --git a/41707-0.txt b/41707-0.txt index 32d3621..cbeeeb8 100644 --- a/41707-0.txt +++ b/41707-0.txt @@ -1,37 +1,4 @@ -The Project Gutenberg EBook of The Development of Metaphysics in Persia, by -Muhammad Iqbal - -This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with -almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or -re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included -with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org - - -Title: The Development of Metaphysics in Persia - A Contribution to the History of Muslim Philosophy - -Author: Muhammad Iqbal - -Release Date: December 26, 2012 [EBook #41707] - -Language: English - -Character set encoding: UTF-8 - -*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK METAPHYSICS IN PERSIA *** - - - - -Produced by Fritz Ohrenschall, Sania Ali Mirza, Asad Razzaki -and the Online Distributed Proofreading Team at -http://www.pgdp.net (This book was produced from scanned -images of public domain material from the Google Print -project.) - - - - +*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 41707 *** Transcriber's note: @@ -4423,363 +4390,4 @@ The following corrections have been made to the text: End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of The Development of Metaphysics in Persia, by Muhammad Iqbal -*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK METAPHYSICS IN PERSIA *** - -***** This file should be named 41707-0.txt or 41707-0.zip ***** -This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: - http://www.gutenberg.org/4/1/7/0/41707/ - -Produced by Fritz Ohrenschall, Sania Ali Mirza, Asad Razzaki -and the Online Distributed Proofreading Team at -http://www.pgdp.net (This book was produced from scanned -images of public domain material from the Google Print -project.) - - -Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions -will be renamed. - -Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no -one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation -(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without -permission and without paying copyright royalties. Special rules, -set forth in the General Terms of Use part of this license, apply to -copying and distributing Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works to -protect the PROJECT GUTENBERG-tm concept and trademark. Project -Gutenberg is a registered trademark, and may not be used if you -charge for the eBooks, unless you receive specific permission. If you -do not charge anything for copies of this eBook, complying with the -rules is very easy. You may use this eBook for nearly any purpose -such as creation of derivative works, reports, performances and -research. They may be modified and printed and given away--you may do -practically ANYTHING with public domain eBooks. Redistribution is -subject to the trademark license, especially commercial -redistribution. - - - -*** START: FULL LICENSE *** - -THE FULL PROJECT GUTENBERG LICENSE -PLEASE READ THIS BEFORE YOU DISTRIBUTE OR USE THIS WORK - -To protect the Project Gutenberg-tm mission of promoting the free -distribution of electronic works, by using or distributing this work -(or any other work associated in any way with the phrase "Project -Gutenberg"), you agree to comply with all the terms of the Full Project -Gutenberg-tm License available with this file or online at - www.gutenberg.org/license. - - -Section 1. General Terms of Use and Redistributing Project Gutenberg-tm -electronic works - -1.A. By reading or using any part of this Project Gutenberg-tm -electronic work, you indicate that you have read, understand, agree to -and accept all the terms of this license and intellectual property -(trademark/copyright) agreement. If you do not agree to abide by all -the terms of this agreement, you must cease using and return or destroy -all copies of Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works in your possession. -If you paid a fee for obtaining a copy of or access to a Project -Gutenberg-tm electronic work and you do not agree to be bound by the -terms of this agreement, you may obtain a refund from the person or -entity to whom you paid the fee as set forth in paragraph 1.E.8. - -1.B. "Project Gutenberg" is a registered trademark. It may only be -used on or associated in any way with an electronic work by people who -agree to be bound by the terms of this agreement. There are a few -things that you can do with most Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works -even without complying with the full terms of this agreement. See -paragraph 1.C below. There are a lot of things you can do with Project -Gutenberg-tm electronic works if you follow the terms of this agreement -and help preserve free future access to Project Gutenberg-tm electronic -works. See paragraph 1.E below. - -1.C. The Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation ("the Foundation" -or PGLAF), owns a compilation copyright in the collection of Project -Gutenberg-tm electronic works. Nearly all the individual works in the -collection are in the public domain in the United States. If an -individual work is in the public domain in the United States and you are -located in the United States, we do not claim a right to prevent you from -copying, distributing, performing, displaying or creating derivative -works based on the work as long as all references to Project Gutenberg -are removed. Of course, we hope that you will support the Project -Gutenberg-tm mission of promoting free access to electronic works by -freely sharing Project Gutenberg-tm works in compliance with the terms of -this agreement for keeping the Project Gutenberg-tm name associated with -the work. You can easily comply with the terms of this agreement by -keeping this work in the same format with its attached full Project -Gutenberg-tm License when you share it without charge with others. - -1.D. The copyright laws of the place where you are located also govern -what you can do with this work. Copyright laws in most countries are in -a constant state of change. If you are outside the United States, check -the laws of your country in addition to the terms of this agreement -before downloading, copying, displaying, performing, distributing or -creating derivative works based on this work or any other Project -Gutenberg-tm work. The Foundation makes no representations concerning -the copyright status of any work in any country outside the United -States. - -1.E. Unless you have removed all references to Project Gutenberg: - -1.E.1. The following sentence, with active links to, or other immediate -access to, the full Project Gutenberg-tm License must appear prominently -whenever any copy of a Project Gutenberg-tm work (any work on which the -phrase "Project Gutenberg" appears, or with which the phrase "Project -Gutenberg" is associated) is accessed, displayed, performed, viewed, -copied or distributed: - -This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with -almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or -re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included -with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org - -1.E.2. If an individual Project Gutenberg-tm electronic work is derived -from the public domain (does not contain a notice indicating that it is -posted with permission of the copyright holder), the work can be copied -and distributed to anyone in the United States without paying any fees -or charges. If you are redistributing or providing access to a work -with the phrase "Project Gutenberg" associated with or appearing on the -work, you must comply either with the requirements of paragraphs 1.E.1 -through 1.E.7 or obtain permission for the use of the work and the -Project Gutenberg-tm trademark as set forth in paragraphs 1.E.8 or -1.E.9. - -1.E.3. If an individual Project Gutenberg-tm electronic work is posted -with the permission of the copyright holder, your use and distribution -must comply with both paragraphs 1.E.1 through 1.E.7 and any additional -terms imposed by the copyright holder. Additional terms will be linked -to the Project Gutenberg-tm License for all works posted with the -permission of the copyright holder found at the beginning of this work. - -1.E.4. Do not unlink or detach or remove the full Project Gutenberg-tm -License terms from this work, or any files containing a part of this -work or any other work associated with Project Gutenberg-tm. - -1.E.5. Do not copy, display, perform, distribute or redistribute this -electronic work, or any part of this electronic work, without -prominently displaying the sentence set forth in paragraph 1.E.1 with -active links or immediate access to the full terms of the Project -Gutenberg-tm License. - -1.E.6. You may convert to and distribute this work in any binary, -compressed, marked up, nonproprietary or proprietary form, including any -word processing or hypertext form. However, if you provide access to or -distribute copies of a Project Gutenberg-tm work in a format other than -"Plain Vanilla ASCII" or other format used in the official version -posted on the official Project Gutenberg-tm web site (www.gutenberg.org), -you must, at no additional cost, fee or expense to the user, provide a -copy, a means of exporting a copy, or a means of obtaining a copy upon -request, of the work in its original "Plain Vanilla ASCII" or other -form. Any alternate format must include the full Project Gutenberg-tm -License as specified in paragraph 1.E.1. - -1.E.7. Do not charge a fee for access to, viewing, displaying, -performing, copying or distributing any Project Gutenberg-tm works -unless you comply with paragraph 1.E.8 or 1.E.9. - -1.E.8. You may charge a reasonable fee for copies of or providing -access to or distributing Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works provided -that - -- You pay a royalty fee of 20% of the gross profits you derive from - the use of Project Gutenberg-tm works calculated using the method - you already use to calculate your applicable taxes. The fee is - owed to the owner of the Project Gutenberg-tm trademark, but he - has agreed to donate royalties under this paragraph to the - Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation. Royalty payments - must be paid within 60 days following each date on which you - prepare (or are legally required to prepare) your periodic tax - returns. Royalty payments should be clearly marked as such and - sent to the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation at the - address specified in Section 4, "Information about donations to - the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation." - -- You provide a full refund of any money paid by a user who notifies - you in writing (or by e-mail) within 30 days of receipt that s/he - does not agree to the terms of the full Project Gutenberg-tm - License. You must require such a user to return or - destroy all copies of the works possessed in a physical medium - and discontinue all use of and all access to other copies of - Project Gutenberg-tm works. - -- You provide, in accordance with paragraph 1.F.3, a full refund of any - money paid for a work or a replacement copy, if a defect in the - electronic work is discovered and reported to you within 90 days - of receipt of the work. - -- You comply with all other terms of this agreement for free - distribution of Project Gutenberg-tm works. - -1.E.9. If you wish to charge a fee or distribute a Project Gutenberg-tm -electronic work or group of works on different terms than are set -forth in this agreement, you must obtain permission in writing from -both the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation and Michael -Hart, the owner of the Project Gutenberg-tm trademark. Contact the -Foundation as set forth in Section 3 below. - -1.F. - -1.F.1. Project Gutenberg volunteers and employees expend considerable -effort to identify, do copyright research on, transcribe and proofread -public domain works in creating the Project Gutenberg-tm -collection. Despite these efforts, Project Gutenberg-tm electronic -works, and the medium on which they may be stored, may contain -"Defects," such as, but not limited to, incomplete, inaccurate or -corrupt data, transcription errors, a copyright or other intellectual -property infringement, a defective or damaged disk or other medium, a -computer virus, or computer codes that damage or cannot be read by -your equipment. - -1.F.2. LIMITED WARRANTY, DISCLAIMER OF DAMAGES - Except for the "Right -of Replacement or Refund" described in paragraph 1.F.3, the Project -Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation, the owner of the Project -Gutenberg-tm trademark, and any other party distributing a Project -Gutenberg-tm electronic work under this agreement, disclaim all -liability to you for damages, costs and expenses, including legal -fees. YOU AGREE THAT YOU HAVE NO REMEDIES FOR NEGLIGENCE, STRICT -LIABILITY, BREACH OF WARRANTY OR BREACH OF CONTRACT EXCEPT THOSE -PROVIDED IN PARAGRAPH 1.F.3. YOU AGREE THAT THE FOUNDATION, THE -TRADEMARK OWNER, AND ANY DISTRIBUTOR UNDER THIS AGREEMENT WILL NOT BE -LIABLE TO YOU FOR ACTUAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, CONSEQUENTIAL, PUNITIVE OR -INCIDENTAL DAMAGES EVEN IF YOU GIVE NOTICE OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH -DAMAGE. - -1.F.3. LIMITED RIGHT OF REPLACEMENT OR REFUND - If you discover a -defect in this electronic work within 90 days of receiving it, you can -receive a refund of the money (if any) you paid for it by sending a -written explanation to the person you received the work from. If you -received the work on a physical medium, you must return the medium with -your written explanation. The person or entity that provided you with -the defective work may elect to provide a replacement copy in lieu of a -refund. If you received the work electronically, the person or entity -providing it to you may choose to give you a second opportunity to -receive the work electronically in lieu of a refund. If the second copy -is also defective, you may demand a refund in writing without further -opportunities to fix the problem. - -1.F.4. Except for the limited right of replacement or refund set forth -in paragraph 1.F.3, this work is provided to you 'AS-IS', WITH NO OTHER -WARRANTIES OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO -WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR ANY PURPOSE. - -1.F.5. Some states do not allow disclaimers of certain implied -warranties or the exclusion or limitation of certain types of damages. -If any disclaimer or limitation set forth in this agreement violates the -law of the state applicable to this agreement, the agreement shall be -interpreted to make the maximum disclaimer or limitation permitted by -the applicable state law. The invalidity or unenforceability of any -provision of this agreement shall not void the remaining provisions. - -1.F.6. INDEMNITY - You agree to indemnify and hold the Foundation, the -trademark owner, any agent or employee of the Foundation, anyone -providing copies of Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works in accordance -with this agreement, and any volunteers associated with the production, -promotion and distribution of Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works, -harmless from all liability, costs and expenses, including legal fees, -that arise directly or indirectly from any of the following which you do -or cause to occur: (a) distribution of this or any Project Gutenberg-tm -work, (b) alteration, modification, or additions or deletions to any -Project Gutenberg-tm work, and (c) any Defect you cause. - - -Section 2. Information about the Mission of Project Gutenberg-tm - -Project Gutenberg-tm is synonymous with the free distribution of -electronic works in formats readable by the widest variety of computers -including obsolete, old, middle-aged and new computers. It exists -because of the efforts of hundreds of volunteers and donations from -people in all walks of life. - -Volunteers and financial support to provide volunteers with the -assistance they need are critical to reaching Project Gutenberg-tm's -goals and ensuring that the Project Gutenberg-tm collection will -remain freely available for generations to come. In 2001, the Project -Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation was created to provide a secure -and permanent future for Project Gutenberg-tm and future generations. -To learn more about the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation -and how your efforts and donations can help, see Sections 3 and 4 -and the Foundation information page at www.gutenberg.org - - -Section 3. Information about the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive -Foundation - -The Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation is a non profit -501(c)(3) educational corporation organized under the laws of the -state of Mississippi and granted tax exempt status by the Internal -Revenue Service. The Foundation's EIN or federal tax identification -number is 64-6221541. Contributions to the Project Gutenberg -Literary Archive Foundation are tax deductible to the full extent -permitted by U.S. federal laws and your state's laws. - -The Foundation's principal office is located at 4557 Melan Dr. S. -Fairbanks, AK, 99712., but its volunteers and employees are scattered -throughout numerous locations. Its business office is located at 809 -North 1500 West, Salt Lake City, UT 84116, (801) 596-1887. Email -contact links and up to date contact information can be found at the -Foundation's web site and official page at www.gutenberg.org/contact - -For additional contact information: - Dr. Gregory B. Newby - Chief Executive and Director - gbnewby@pglaf.org - -Section 4. Information about Donations to the Project Gutenberg -Literary Archive Foundation - -Project Gutenberg-tm depends upon and cannot survive without wide -spread public support and donations to carry out its mission of -increasing the number of public domain and licensed works that can be -freely distributed in machine readable form accessible by the widest -array of equipment including outdated equipment. Many small donations -($1 to $5,000) are particularly important to maintaining tax exempt -status with the IRS. - -The Foundation is committed to complying with the laws regulating -charities and charitable donations in all 50 states of the United -States. Compliance requirements are not uniform and it takes a -considerable effort, much paperwork and many fees to meet and keep up -with these requirements. We do not solicit donations in locations -where we have not received written confirmation of compliance. To -SEND DONATIONS or determine the status of compliance for any -particular state visit www.gutenberg.org/donate - -While we cannot and do not solicit contributions from states where we -have not met the solicitation requirements, we know of no prohibition -against accepting unsolicited donations from donors in such states who -approach us with offers to donate. - -International donations are gratefully accepted, but we cannot make -any statements concerning tax treatment of donations received from -outside the United States. U.S. laws alone swamp our small staff. - -Please check the Project Gutenberg Web pages for current donation -methods and addresses. Donations are accepted in a number of other -ways including checks, online payments and credit card donations. -To donate, please visit: www.gutenberg.org/donate - - -Section 5. General Information About Project Gutenberg-tm electronic -works. - -Professor Michael S. Hart was the originator of the Project Gutenberg-tm -concept of a library of electronic works that could be freely shared -with anyone. For forty years, he produced and distributed Project -Gutenberg-tm eBooks with only a loose network of volunteer support. - -Project Gutenberg-tm eBooks are often created from several printed -editions, all of which are confirmed as Public Domain in the U.S. -unless a copyright notice is included. Thus, we do not necessarily -keep eBooks in compliance with any particular paper edition. - -Most people start at our Web site which has the main PG search facility: - - www.gutenberg.org - -This Web site includes information about Project Gutenberg-tm, -including how to make donations to the Project Gutenberg Literary -Archive Foundation, how to help produce our new eBooks, and how to -subscribe to our email newsletter to hear about new eBooks. - +*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 41707 *** diff --git a/41707-0.zip b/41707-0.zip Binary files differdeleted file mode 100644 index fbe138b..0000000 --- a/41707-0.zip +++ /dev/null diff --git a/41707-8.txt b/41707-8.txt deleted file mode 100644 index 1b61bde..0000000 --- a/41707-8.txt +++ /dev/null @@ -1,4764 +0,0 @@ -The Project Gutenberg EBook of The Development of Metaphysics in Persia, by -Muhammad Iqbal - -This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with -almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or -re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included -with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org - - -Title: The Development of Metaphysics in Persia - A Contribution to the History of Muslim Philosophy - -Author: Muhammad Iqbal - -Release Date: December 26, 2012 [EBook #41707] - -Language: English - -Character set encoding: ISO-8859-1 - -*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK METAPHYSICS IN PERSIA *** - - - - -Produced by Fritz Ohrenschall, Sania Ali Mirza, Asad Razzaki -and the Online Distributed Proofreading Team at -http://www.pgdp.net (This book was produced from scanned -images of public domain material from the Google Print -project.) - - - - - -Transcriber's note: - - Some typographical and punctuation errors have been corrected. - A complete list follows the text. - - Words italicized in the original are surrounded by - _underscores_. - - Letters superscripted in the original have been placed in {} - brackets. - - The Arabic letter Ain is represented by the grave accent `, - the Arabic letter Hamza is represented by the single quote ' - and the asterism sign is represented as .*. in the text. - - - - - THE - DEVELOPMENT OF METAPHYSICS - IN - PERSIA: - - A CONTRIBUTION TO THE HISTORY - OF MUSLIM PHILOSOPHY - - BY - - SHAIKH MUHAMMAD IQBAL - B. A. (Cantab) M. A. (Pb.) Ph. D. (Munich). - - - LONDON - LUZAC & Co. 46, Great Russell Street W. C. - 1908 - - - Printed by E. J. BRILL. — LEIDEN (Holland). - - - - - DEDICATION - TO - Professor T. W. ARNOLD M. A. - - - My dear MR. ARNOLD, - -This little book is the first-fruit of that literary and philosophical -training which I have been receiving from you for the last ten years, -and as an expression of gratitude I beg to dedicate it to your name. You -have always judged me liberally; I hope you will judge these pages in -the same spirit. - - Your affectionate pupil - - IQBAL. - - - - -INTRODUCTION. - - -The most remarkable feature of the character of the Persian people is -their love of Metaphysical speculation. Yet the inquirer who approaches -the extant literature of Persia expecting to find any comprehensive -systems of thought, like those of Kapila or Kant, will have to turn back -disappointed, though deeply impressed by the wonderful intellectual -subtlety displayed therein. It seems to me that the Persian mind is -rather impatient of detail, and consequently destitute of that -organising faculty which gradually works out a system of ideas, by -interpreting the fundamental principles with reference to the ordinary -facts of observation. The subtle Brahman sees the inner unity of things; -so does the Persian. But while the former endeavours to discover it in -all the aspects of human experience, and illustrates its hidden presence -in the concrete in various ways, the latter appears to be satisfied -with a bare universality, and does not attempt to verify the richness of -its inner content. The butterfly imagination of the Persian flies, -half-inebriated as it were, from flower to flower, and seems to be -incapable of reviewing the garden as a whole. For this reason his -deepest thoughts and emotions find expression mostly in disconnected -verses (Ghazal) which reveal all the subtlety of his artistic soul. -The Hindu, while admitting, like the Persian, the necessity of a higher -source of knowledge, yet calmly moves from experience to experience, -mercilessly dissecting them, and forcing them to yield their underlying -universality. In fact the Persian is only half-conscious of Metaphysics -as a _system_ of thought; his Brahman brother, on the other hand, is -fully alive to the need of presenting his theory in the form of a -thoroughly reasoned out system. And the result of this mental difference -between the two nations is clear. In the one case we have only partially -worked out systems of thought; in the other case, the awful sublimity of -the searching Vedanta. The student of Islamic Mysticism who is anxious -to see an all-embracing exposition of the principle of Unity, must look -up the heavy volumes of the Andalusian Ibn al-`Arabi, whose profound -teaching stands in strange contrast with the dry-as-dust Islam of his -countrymen. - -The results, however, of the intellectual activity of the different -branches of the great Aryan family are strikingly similar. The outcome -of all Idealistic speculation in India is Buddha, in Persia Bahaullah, -and in the west Schopenhauer whose system, in Hegelian language, is the -marriage of free oriental universality with occidental determinateness. - -But the history of Persian thought presents a phenomenon peculiar to -itself. In Persia, due perhaps to semitic influences, philosophical -speculation has indissolubly associated itself with religion, and -thinkers in new lines of thought have almost always been founders of new -religious movements. After the Arab conquest, however, we see pure -Philosophy severed from religion by the Neo-Platonic Aristotelians of -Islam, but the severance was only a transient phenomenon. Greek -philosophy, though an exotic plant in the soil of Persia, eventually -became an integral part of Persian thought; and later thinkers, critics -as well as advocates of Greek wisdom, talked in the philosophical -language of Aristotle and Plato, and were mostly influenced by religious -presuppositions. It is necessary to bear this fact in mind in order to -gain a thorough understanding of post-Islamic Persian thought. - -The object of this investigation is, as will appear, to prepare a -ground-work for a future history of Persian Metaphysics. Original -thought cannot be expected in a review, the object of which is purely -historical; yet I venture to claim some consideration for the following -two points:-- - -(a) I have endeavoured to trace the logical continuity of Persian -thought, which I have tried to interpret in the language of modern -Philosophy. This, as far as I know, has not yet been done. - -(b) I have discussed the subject of Sufiism in a more scientific manner, -and have attempted to bring out the intellectual conditions which -necessitated such a phenomenon. In opposition, therefore, to the -generally accepted view I have tried to maintain that Sufiism is a -necessary product of the play of various intellectual and moral forces -which would necessarily awaken the slumbering soul to a higher ideal of -life. - -Owing to my ignorance of Zend, my knowledge of Zoroaster is merely -second-hand. As regards the second part of my work, I have been able to -look up the original Persian and Arabic manuscripts as well as many -printed works connected with my investigation. I give below the names of -Arabic and Persian manuscripts from which I have drawn most of the -material utilized here. The method of transliteration adopted is the one -recognised by the Royal Asiatic Society. - - 1. Tarikh al-Hukama, by Al-Baihaqi.--Royal Library of Berlin. - - 2. Sharhi Anwariyya, (with the original text) by Muhammad - Sharif of Herat. Royal Library of Berlin. - - 3. Hikmat al-`Ain, by al-Katibi. Royal Library of Berlin. - - 4. Commentary on Hikmat al-`Ain, by Muhammad ibn Mubarak - al-Bukhari. India Office Library. - - 5. Commentary on Hikmat al-`Ain by Husaini. India Office - Library. - - 6. `Awarif al-Ma`arif, by Shahab al-Din. India Office Library. - - - 7. Mishkat al-Anwar, by Al-Ghazali. India Office Library. - - - 8. Kashf al-Mahjub, by `Ali Hajveri. India Office Library. - - 9. Risalahi Nafs translated from Aristotle, by Afdal Kashi. - India Office Library. - - 10. Risalahi Mir Sayyid Sharif. India Office Library. - - 11. Khatima, by Sayyid Muhammad Gisudaraz. India Office - Library. - - 12. Manazilal-sa'rin, by `Abdullah Ismai'l of Herat. India - Office Library. - - 13. Jawidan Nama, by Afdal Kashi. India Office Library. - - 14. Tarikh al-Hukama, by Shahrzuri. British Museum Library. - - 15. Collected works of Avicenna. British Museum Library. - - 16. Risalah fi'l-Wujud, by Mir Jurjani. British Museum Library. - - 17. Jawidani Kabir. Cambridge University Library. - - 18. Jami Jahan Numa. Cambridge University Library. - - 19. Majmu`ai Farsi Risalah No: 1, 2, of Al-Nasafi. Trinity - College Library. - - S. M. IQBAL. - - - - -CONTENTS. - - - PART I. - Pre-Islamic Persian Philosophy. - Page - Chapter I. Persian Dualism 1 - Sec: I. Zoroaster 1 - Sec: II. Mani and Mazdak 12 - Sec: III. Retrospect 20 - - PART II. - Greek Dualism. - - Chapter II. Neo-Platonic Aristotelians of Persia 22 - Sec: I. Ibn Maskawaih 26 - Sec: II. Avicenna 38 - - Chapter III. Islamic Rationalism 45 - Sec: I. Metaphysics of Rationalism--Materialism 45 - Sec: II. Contemporary movements of thought 55 - Sec: III. Reaction against Rationalism--The Ash`arite 65 - - Chapter IV. Controversy between Realism and Idealism 81 - - Chapter V. Sufiism. - Sec: I. The origin and Quranic justification of Sufiism 96 - Sec: II. Aspects of Sufi Metaphysics 111 - A. Reality as Self-conscious Will 112 - B. Reality as Beauty 112 - C. (1) Reality as Light 120 - (Return to Persian Dualism--Al-Ishraqi). - (2) Reality as Thought--Al-Jili 121 - - Chapter VI. Later Persian Thought 174 - - Conclusion 192 - - - - -PART I. - -Pre-Islamic Persian Philosophy. - - - - -CHAP. I. - -PERSIAN DUALISM. - - -§ I. - -Zoroaster. - -To Zoroaster--the ancient sage of Iran--must always be assigned the -first place in the intellectual history of Iranian Aryans who, wearied -of constant roaming, settled down to an agricultural life at a time when -the Vedic Hymns were still being composed in the plains of Central Asia. -This new mode of life and the consequent stability of the institution of -property among the settlers, made them hated by other Aryan tribes who -had not yet shaken off their original nomadic habits, and occasionally -plundered their more civilised kinsmen. Thus grew up the conflict -between the two modes of life which found its earliest expression in the -denunciation of the deities of each other--the Devas and the Ahuras. It -was really the beginning of a long individualising process which -gradually severed the Iranian branch from other Aryan tribes, and -finally manifested itself in the religious system of Zoroaster[2:1]--the -great prophet of Iran who lived and taught in the age of Solon and -Thales. In the dim light of modern oriental research we see ancient -Iranians divided between two camps--partisans of the powers of good, and -partisans of the powers of evil--when the great sage joins their furious -contest, and with his moral enthusiasm stamps out once for all the -worship of demons as well as the intolerable ritual of the Magian -priesthood. - - [2:1] Some European Scholars have held Zoroaster to be nothing - more than a mythical personage. But since the publication of - Professor Jackson's admirable Life of Zoroaster, the Iranian - Prophet has, I believe, finally got out of the ordeal of modern - criticism. - -It is, however, beside our purpose to trace the origin and growth of -Zoroaster's religious system. Our object, in so far as the present -investigation is concerned, is to glance at the metaphysical side of -his revelation. We, therefore, wish to fix our attention on the sacred -trinity of philosophy--God, Man and Nature. - -Geiger, in his "Civilisation of Eastern Iranians in Ancient Times", -points out that Zoroaster inherited two fundamental principles from his -Aryan ancestry.--(1) There is law in Nature. (2) There is conflict in -Nature. It is the observation of law and conflict in the vast panorama -of being that constitutes the philosophical foundation of his system. -The problem before him was to reconcile the existence of evil with the -eternal goodness of God. His predecessors worshipped a plurality of good -spirits all of which he reduced to a unity and called it Ahuramazda. On -the other hand he reduced all the powers of evil to a similar unity and -called it Druj-Ahriman. Thus by a process of unification he arrived at -two fundamental principles which, as Haug shows, he looked upon not as -two independent activities, but as two parts or rather aspects of the -same Primary Being. Dr. Haug, therefore, holds that the Prophet of -ancient Iran was theologically a monotheist and philosophically a -dualist.[4:1] But to maintain that there are "twin"[4:2] -spirits--creators of reality and nonreality--and at the same time to -hold that these two spirits are united in the Supreme Being,[4:3] is -virtually to say that the principle of evil constitutes a part of the -very essence of God; and the conflict between good and evil is nothing -more than the struggle of God against Himself. There is, therefore, an -inherent weakness in his attempt to reconcile theological monotheism -with philosophical dualism, and the result was a schism among the -prophet's followers. The Zendiks[4:4] whom Dr. Haug calls heretics, but -who were, I believe, decidedly more consistent than their opponents, -maintained the independence of the two original spirits from each other, -while the Magi upheld their unity. The upholders of unity endeavoured, -in various ways, to meet the Zendiks; but the very fact that they tried -different phrases and expressions to express the unity of the "Primal -Twins", indicates dissatisfaction with their own philosophical -explanations, and the strength of their opponent's position. -Shahrastani[5:1] describes briefly the different explanations of the -Magi. The Zarwanians look upon Light and Darkness as the sons of -Infinite Time. The Kiyumarthiyya hold that the original principle was -Light which was afraid of a hostile power, and it was this thought of an -adversary mixed with fear that led to the birth of Darkness. Another -branch of Zarwanians maintain that the original principle doubted -concerning something and this doubt produced Ahriman. Ibn Hazm[5:2] -speaks of another sect who explained the principle of Darkness as the -obscuration of a part of the fundamental principle of Light itself. - - [4:1] Essays, p. 303. - - [4:2] "In the beginning there was a pair of twins, two spirits, - each of a peculiar activity". Yas. XXX. 1. - - [4:3] "The more beneficial of my spirits has produced, by - speaking it, the whole rightful creation". Yas. XIX. 9. - - [4:4] The following verse from Buudahish Chap. I. will indicate - the Zendik view:-- "And between them (the two principles) there - was empty space, that is what they call "air" in which is now - their meeting". - - [5:1] Shahrastani; ed. Cureton, London, 1846, pp. 182-185. - - [5:2] Ibn Hazm--Kitab al-Milal w'al-Nihal. Ed. Cairo. Vol. II, - p. 34. - -Whether the philosophical dualism of Zoroaster can be reconciled with -his monotheism or not, it is unquestionable that, from a metaphysical -standpoint, he has made a profound suggestion in regard to the ultimate -nature of reality. The idea seems to have influenced ancient Greek -Philosophy[6:1] as well as early Christian Gnostic speculation, and -through the latter, some aspects of modern western thought.[6:2] As a -thinker he is worthy of great respect not only because he approached the -problem of objective multiplicity in a philosophical spirit; but also -because he endeavoured, having been led to metaphysical dualism, to -reduce his Primary Duality to a higher unity. He seems to have -perceived, what the mystic shoemaker of Germany perceived long after -him, that the diversity of nature could not be explained without -postulating a principle of negativity or self-differentiation in the -very nature of God. His immediate successors did not, however, quite -realise the deep significance of their master's suggestions; but we -shall see, as we advance, how Zoroaster's idea finds a more -spiritualised expression in some of the aspects of later Persian -thought. - - [6:1] In connection with the influence of Zoroastrian ideas on - Ancient Greek thought, the following statement made by Erdmann - is noteworthy, though Lawrence Mills (American Journal of - Philology Vol. 22) regards such influence as improbable:--"The - fact that the handmaids of this force, which he (Heraclitus) - calls the seed of all that happens and the measure of all order, - are entitled the "tongues" has probably been slightly ascribed - to the influence of the Persian Magi. On the other hand he - connects himself with his country's mythology, not indeed - without a change of exegesis when he places Apollo and Dionysus - beside Zeus, i.e. The ultimate fire, as the two aspects of his - nature". History of Philosophy Vol. I, p. 50. - - It is, perhaps, owing to this doubtful influence of - Zoroastrianism on Heraclitus that Lassalle (quoted by Paul Janet - in his History of the Problems of Philosophy Vol. II, p. 147) - looks upon Zoroaster as a precursor of Hegel. - - Of Zoroastrian influence on Pythagoras Erdmann says:-- - - "The fact that the odd numbers are put above the even has been - emphasised by Gladisch in his comparison of the Pythagorian with - the Chinese doctrine, and the fact, moreover, that among the - oppositions we find those of light and darkness, good and evil, - has induced many, in ancient and modern times, to suppose that - they were borrowed from Zoroastrianism." Vol. I, p. 33. - - [6:2] Among modern English thinkers Mr. Bradley arrives at a - conclusion similar to that of Zoroaster. Discussing the ethical - significance of Bradley's Philosophy, Prof. Sorley says:--"Mr. - Bradley, like Green, has faith in an eternal reality which might - be called spiritual, inasmuch as it is not material; like Green - he looks upon man's moral activity as an appearance--what Green - calls a reproduction--of this eternal reality. But under this - general agreement there lies a world of difference. He refuses - by the use of the term self-conscious, to liken his Absolute to - the personality of man, and he brings out the consequence which - in Green is more or less concealed, that the evil equally with - the good in man and in the world are appearances of the - Absolute". Recent tendencies in Ethics, pp. 100-101. - -Turning now to his Cosmology, his dualism leads him to bifurcate, as it -were, the whole universe into two departments of being--reality i.e. -the sum of all good creations flowing from the creative activity of the -beneficial spirit, and non-reality[8:1] i.e. the sum of all evil -creations proceeding from the hostile spirit. The original conflict of -the two spirits is manifested in the opposing forces of nature, which, -therefore, presents a continual struggle between the powers of Good and -the powers of Evil. But it should be remembered that nothing intervenes -between the original spirits and their respective creations. Things are -good and bad because they proceed from good or bad creative agencies, in -their own nature they are quite indifferent. Zoroaster's conception of -creation is fundamentally different from that of Plato and Schopenhauer -to whom spheres of empirical reality reflect non-temporal or temporal -ideas which, so to speak, mediate between Reality and Appearance. There -are, according to Zoroaster, only two categories of existence, and the -history of the universe is nothing more than a progressive conflict -between the forces falling respectively under these categories. We are, -like other things, partakers of this struggle, and it is our duty to -range ourselves on the side of Light which will eventually prevail and -completely vanquish the spirit of Darkness. The metaphysics of the -Iranian Prophet, like that of Plato, passes on into Ethics, and it is in -the peculiarity of the Ethical aspect of his thought that the influence -of his social environment is most apparent. - - [8:1] This should not be confounded with Plato's non-being. To - Zoroaster all forms of existence proceeding from the creative - agency of the spirit of darkness are unreal; because, - considering the final triumph of the spirit of Light, they have - a temporary existence only. - -Zoroaster's view of the destiny of the soul is very simple. The soul, -according to him, is a creation, not a part of God as the votaries of -Mithra[9:1] afterwards maintained. It had a beginning in time, but can -attain to everlasting life by fighting against Evil in the earthly scene -of its activity. It is free to choose between the only two courses of -action--good and evil; and besides the power of choice the spirit of -Light has endowed it with the following faculties:-- - - 1. Conscience[10:1]. - - 2. Vital force. - - 3. The Soul--The Mind. - - 4. The Spirit--Reason. - - 5. The Farawashi[10:2].--A kind of tutelary spirit which acts - as a protection of man in his voyage towards God. - -The last three[10:3] faculties are united together after death, and form -an indissoluble whole. The virtuous soul, leaving its home of flesh, is -borne up into higher regions, and has to pass through the following -planes of existence:-- - - 1. The Place of good thoughts. - - 2. The Place of good words. - - 3. The Place of good works. - - 4. The Place of Eternal Glory[11:1].--Where the individual soul - unites with the principle of Light without losing its - personality. - - [9:1] Mithraism was a phase of Zoroastrianism which spread over - the Roman world in the second century. The partisans of Mithra - worshipped the sun whom they looked upon as the great advocate - of Light. They held the human soul to be a part of God, and - maintained that the observance of a mysterious cult could bring - about the souls' union with God. Their doctrine of the soul, its - ascent towards God by torturing the body and finally passing - through the sphere of Aether and becoming pure fire, offers some - resemblance with views entertained by some schools of Persian - Sufiism. - - [10:1] Geiger's Civilisation of Eastern Iranians, Vol. I, - p. 124. - - [10:2] Dr. Haug (Essays p. 206) compares these protecting - spirits with the ideas of Plato. They, however, are not to be - understood as models according to which things are fashioned. - Plato's ideas, moreover, are eternal, non-temporal and - non-spatial. The doctrine that everything created by the spirit - of Light is protected by a subordinate spirit has only an - outward resemblance with the view that every spirit is fashioned - according to a perfect supersensible model. - - [10:3] The Sufi conception of the soul is also tripartite. - According to them the soul is a combination of Mind, heart and - spirit (Nafs, Qalb, Ruh). The "heart" is to them both material - and immaterial or, more properly, neither--standing midway - between soul and mind (Nafs and Ruh), and acting as the organ of - higher knowledge. Perhaps Dr. Schenkel's use of the word - "conscience" would approach the sufi idea of "heart". - - [11:1] Geiger Vol. I, p. 104. (The sufi Cosmology has a similar - doctrine concerning the different stages of existence through - which the soul has to pass in its journey heavenward. They - enumerate the following five Planes; but their definition of the - character of each plane is slightly different:-- - - 1. The world of body. (Nasut). - - 2. The world of pure intelligence. (Malakut). - - 3. The world of power. (Jabrut). - - 4. The world of negation. (Lahut). - - 5. The world of Absolute Silence. (Hahut). - - The sufis probably borrowed this idea from the Indian Yogis who - recognise the following seven Planes:--(Annie Besant: - Reincarnation, p. 30). - - 1. The Plane of Physical Body. - - 2. The Plane of Etherial double. - - 3. The Plane of Vitality. - - 4. The Plane of Emotional Nature. - - 5. The Plane of Thought. - - 6. The Plane of Spiritual soul--Reason. - - 7. The Plane of Pure Spirit.) - - - - -§ II. - -Mani[12:1] and Mazdak[12:2]. - -We have seen Zoroaster's solution of the problem of diversity, and the -theological or rather philosophical controversy which split up the -Zoroastrian Church. The half-Persian Mani--"the founder of Godless -community" as Christians styled him afterwards--agrees with those -Zoroastrians who held the Prophet's doctrine in its naked form, and -approaches the question in a spirit thoroughly materialistic. -Originally Persian his father emigrated from Hamadan to Babylonia where -Mani was born in 215 or 216 A.D.--the time when Buddhistic Missionaries -were beginning to preach Nirvana to the country of Zoroaster. The -eclectic character of the religious system of Mani, its bold extension -of the Christian idea of redemption, and its logical consistency in -holding, as a true ground for an ascetic life, that the world is -essentially evil, made it a real power which influenced not only Eastern -and Western Christian thought[13:1], but has also left some dim marks on -the development of metaphysical speculation in Persia. Leaving the -discussion of the sources[13:2] of Mani's religious system to the -orientalist, we proceed to describe and finally to determine the -philosophical value of his doctrine of the origin of the Phenomenal -Universe. - - [12:1] Sources used:-- - - (a) The text of Muhammad ibn Ishaq, edited by Flugel, pp. - 52-56. - - (b) Al-Ya`qubi: ed. Houtsma, 1883, Vol. I, pp. 180-181. - - (c) Ibn Hazm: Kitab al-Milal w'al-Nihal: ed. Cairo, Vol. II, - p. 36. - - (d) Shahrastani: ed. Cureton, London, 1846, pp. 188-192. - - (e) Encyclopaedia Britannica, Article on Mani. - - (f) Salemann: Bulletin de l'Academie des Sciences de St. - Petersburg Series IV, 15 April 1907, pp. 175--184. F. W. - K. Muller: Handschriften--Reste in Estrangelo--Schrift - aus Turfan, Chinesisch--Turkistan, Teil I, II; Sitzungen - der Koniglich Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, - 11 Feb. 1904, pp. 348-352; und Abhandlungen etc. 1904. - - [12:2] Sources used:-- - - (a) Siyasat Namah Nizam al-Mulk: ed. Charles Schefer, - Paris, 1897, pp. 166-181. - - (b) Shahrastani: ed. Cureton, pp. 192-194. - - (c) Al-Ya`qubi: ed. Houtsma, 1883, Vol. I, p. 186. - - (d) Al-Biruni: Chronology of Ancient Nations: tr. E. Sachau, - London, 1879, p. 192. - - [13:1] "If I see aright, five different conceptions can be - distinguished for the period about 400 A.D. First we have the - Manichaean which insinuated its way in the darkness, but was - widely extended even among the clergy". (Harnack's History of - Christian Dogma, Vol. V, p. 56). "From the anti-Manichaean - controversy sprang the desire to conceive all God's attributes - as identical i.e. the interest in the indivisibility of God", - (Harnack's History of Christian Dogma, Vol V, p. 120). - - [13:2] Some Eastern sources of information about Mani's - Philosophy (e.g. Ephraim Syrus mentioned by Prof. A. A. Bevan in - his Introduction to the Hymn of the Soul) tell us that he was a - disciple of Bardesanes, the Syrian gnostic. The learned author - of "al-Fihrist", however, mentions some books which Mani wrote - against the followers of the Syrian gnostic. Burkitt, in his - lectures on Early Eastern Christianity, gives a free translation - of Bardesanes' De Fato, the spirit of which I understand, is - fully Christian, and thoroughly opposed to the teaching of Mani. - Ibn Hazm, however, in his Kitab al-Milal w'al-Nihal (Vol. II, p. - 36) says, "Both agreed in other respects, except that Mani - believed darkness to be a living principle." - -The Paganising gnostic, as Erdmann calls him, teaches that the variety -of things springs from the mixture of two eternal Principles--Light and -Darkness--which are separate from and independent of each other. The -Principle of Light connotes ten ideas--Gentleness, Knowledge, -Understanding, Mystery, Insight, Love, Conviction, Faith, Benevolence -and Wisdom. Similarly the Principle of Darkness connotes five eternal -ideas--Mistiness, Heat, Fire, Venom, Darkness. Along with these two -primordial principles and connected with each, Mani recognises the -eternity of space and earth, each connoting respectively the ideas of -knowledge, understanding, mystery, insight, breath, air, water, light -and fire. In darkness--the feminine Principle in Nature--were hidden -the elements of evil which, in course of time, concentrated and resulted -in the composition, so to speak, of the hideous looking Devil--the -principle of activity. This first born child of the fiery womb of -darkness, attacked the domain of the King of Light who, in order to ward -off his malicious onslaught, created the Primal man. A serious conflict -ensued between the two creatures, and resulted in the complete -vanquishment of the Primal Man. The evil one, then, succeeded in mixing -together the five elements of darkness with the five elements of light. -Thereupon the ruler of the domain of light ordered some of his angels to -construct the Universe out of these mixed elements with a view to free -the atoms of light from their imprisonment. But the reason why darkness -was the first to attack light, is that the latter, being in its essence -good, could not proceed to start the process of admixture which was -essentially harmful to itself. The attitude of Mani's Cosmology, -therefore, to the Christian doctrine of Redemption is similar to that of -Hegelian Cosmology to the doctrine of the Trinity. To him redemption is -a physical process, and all procreation, because it protracts the -imprisonment of light, is contrary to the aim and object of the -Universe. The imprisoned atoms of light are continually set free from -darkness which is thrown down in the unfathomable ditch round the -Universe. The liberated light, however, passes on to the sun and the -moon whence it is carried by angels to the region of light--the eternal -home of the King of Paradise--"Pid i vazargii"--Father of greatness. - -This is a brief account of Mani's fantastic Cosmology.[16:1] He rejects -the Zoroastrian hypothesis of creative agencies to explain the problem -of objective existence. Taking a thoroughly materialistic view of the -question, he ascribes the phenomenal universe to the _mixture_ of two -independent, eternal principles, one of which (darkness) is not only a -part of the universe--stuff, but also the source wherein activity -resides, as it were, slumbering, and starts up into being when the -favourable moment arrives. The essential idea of his cosmology, -therefore, has a curious resemblance with that of the great Hindu -thinker Kapila, who accounts for the production of the universe by the -hypothesis of three gunas, i.e. Sattwa (goodness), Tamas (darkness), and -Rajas (motion or passion) which mix together to form Nature, when the -equilibrium of the primordial matter (Prakriti) is upset. Of the various -solutions[17:1] of the problem of diversity which the Vedantist solved -by postulating the mysterious power of "Maya", and Leibniz, long -afterwards, explained by his doctrine of the Identity of Indiscernibles, -Mani's solution, though childish, must find a place in the historical -development of philosophical ideas. Its philosophical value may be -insignificant; but one thing is certain, i.e. Mani was the first to -venture the suggestion that the Universe is due to the activity of the -Devil, and hence essentially evil--a proposition which seems to me to be -the only logical justification of a system which preaches renunciation -as the guiding principle of life. In our own times Schopenhauer has been -led to the same conclusion; though, unlike Mani, he supposes the -principle of objectification or individuation--"the sinful bent" of the -will to life--to exist in the very nature of the Primal Will and not -independent of it. - - [16:1] It is interesting to compare Mani's Philosophy of Nature - with the Chinese notion of Creation, according to which all that - exists flows from the Union of Yin and Yang. But the Chinese - reduced these two principles to a higher unity:--Tai Keih. To - Mani such a reduction was not possible; since he could not - conceive that things of opposite nature could proceed from the - same principle. - - [17:1] Thomas Aquinas states and criticises Mani's contrariety - of Primal agents in the following manner:-- - - (a) What all things seek even a principle of evil would seek. - But all things seek their own self-preservation. - .*. Even a principle of evil would seek its own self-preservation. - - (b) What all things seek is good. - But self-preservation is what all things seek. - .*. Self-preservation is good. - But a principle of evil would seek its own self-preservation. - .*. A principle of evil would seek some good--which shows that it - is self-contradictory. - - God and His Creatures, Book II, p. 105. Rickaby's Tr. - -Turning now to the remarkable socialist of ancient Persia--_Mazdak_. -This early prophet of communism appeared during the reign of -Anushirwan the Just (531-578 A.D.), and marked another dualistic -reaction against the prevailing Zarwanian doctrine[18:1]. Mazdak, like -Mani, taught that the diversity of things springs from the mixture of -two independent, eternal principles which he called Shid (Light) and -Tar (Darkness). But he differs from his predecessor in holding that the -fact of their mixture as well as their final separation, are quite -accidental, and not at all the result of choice. Mazdak's God is endowed -with sensation, and has four principal energies in his eternal -presence--power of discrimination, memory, understanding and bliss. -These four energies have four personal manifestations who, assisted by -four other persons, superintend the course of the Universe. Variety in -things and men is due to the various combinations of the original -principles. - - [18:1] The Zarwanian doctrine prevailed in Persia in the 5th - century B.C. (See Z. D. M. G., Vol. LVII, p. 562). - -But the most characteristic feature of the Mazdakite teaching is its -communism, which is evidently an inference from the cosmopolitan spirit -of Mani's Philosophy. All men, said Mazdak, are equal; and the notion of -individual property was introduced by the hostile demons whose object is -to turn God's Universe into a scene of endless misery. It is chiefly -this aspect of Mazdak's teaching that was most shocking to the -Zoroastrian conscience, and finally brought about the destruction of his -enormous following, even though the master was supposed to have -miraculously made the sacred Fire talk, and bear witness to the truth of -his mission. - - -§ III. - -Retrospect. - -We have seen some of the aspects of Pre-Islamic Persian thought; though, -owing to our ignorance of the tendencies of Sassanide thought, and of -the political, social, and intellectual conditions that determined its -evolution, we have not been able fully to trace the continuity of ideas. -Nations as well as individuals, in their intellectual history, begin -with the objective. Although the moral fervour of Zoroaster gave a -spiritual tone to his theory of the origin of things, yet the net result -of this period of Persian speculation is nothing more than a -materialistic dualism. The principle of Unity as a philosophical ground -of all that exists, is but dimly perceived at this stage of intellectual -evolution in Persia. The controversy among the followers of Zoroaster -indicates that the movement towards a monistic conception of the -Universe had begun; but we have unfortunately no evidence to make a -positive statement concerning the pantheistic tendencies of Pre-Islamic -Persian thought. We know that in the 6{th} century A.D., Diogenes, -Simplicius and other Neo-Platonic thinkers, were driven by the -persecution of Justinian, to take refuge in the court of the tolerant -Anushirwan. This great monarch, moreover, had several works translated -for him from Sanskrit and Greek, but we have no historical evidence to -show how far these events actually influenced the course of Persian -thought. Let us, therefore, pass on to the advent of Islam in Persia, -which completely shattered the old order of things, and brought to the -thinking mind the new concept of an uncompromising monotheism as well as -the Greek dualism of God and matter, as distinguished from the purely -Persian dualism of God and Devil. - - - - -PART II. - -Greek Dualism. - - - - -CHAP. II. - -THE NEO-PLATONIC ARISTOTELIANS OF PERSIA. - - -With the Arab conquest of Persia, a new era begins in the history of -Persian thought. But the warlike sons of sandy Arabia whose swords -terminated, at Nahawand, the political independence of this ancient -people, could hardly touch the intellectual freedom of the converted -Zoroastrian. - -The political revolution brought about by the Arab conquest marks the -beginning of interaction between the Aryan and the Semitic, and we find -that the Persian, though he lets the surface of his life become largely -semitised, quietly converts Islam to his own Aryan habits of thought. In -the west the sober Hellenic intellect interpreted another Semitic -religion--Christianity; and the results of interpretation in both cases -are strikingly similar. In each case the aim of the interpreting -intellect is to soften the extreme rigidity of an absolute law imposed -on the individual from without; in one word it is an endeavour to -internalise the external. This process of transformation began with the -study of Greek thought which, though combined with other causes, -hindered the growth of native speculation, yet marked a transition from -the purely objective attitude of Pre-Islamic Persian Philosophy to the -subjective attitude of later thinkers. It is, I believe, largely due to -the influence of foreign thought that the old monistic tendency when it -reasserted itself about the end of the 8{th} century, assumed a much -more spiritual aspect; and, in its later development, revivified and -spiritualised the old Iranian dualism of Light and Darkness. The fact, -therefore, that Greek thought roused into fresh life the subtle Persian -intellect, and largely contributed to, and was finally assimilated by -the general course of intellectual evolution in Persia, justifies us in -briefly running over, even though at the risk of repetition, the systems -of the Persian Neo-Platonists who, as such, deserve very little -attention in a history of purely Persian thought. - -It must, however, be remembered that Greek wisdom flowed towards the -Moslem east through Harran and Syria. The Syrians took up the latest -Greek speculation i.e. Neo-Platonism and transmitted to the Moslem what -they believed to be the real philosophy of Aristotle. It is surprising -that Mohammedan Philosophers, Arabs as well as Persians, continued -wrangling over what they believed to be the real teaching of Aristotle -and Plato, and it never occurred to them that for a thorough -comprehension of their Philosophies, the knowledge of Greek language was -absolutely necessary. So great was their ignorance that an epitomised -translation of the Enneads of Plotinus was accepted as "Theology of -Aristotle". It took them centuries to arrive at a clear conception of -the two great masters of Greek thought; and it is doubtful whether they -ever completely understood them. Avicenna is certainly clearer and more -original than Al-Farabi and Ibn Maskawaih; and the Andelusian Averroes, -though he is nearer to Aristotle than any of his predecessors, is yet -far from a complete grasp of Aristotle's Philosophy. It would, however, -be unjust to accuse them of servile imitation. The history of their -speculation is one continuous attempt to wade through a hopeless mass of -absurdities that careless translators of Greek Philosophy had -introduced. They had largely to rethink the Philosophies of Aristotle -and Plato. Their commentaries constitute, so to speak, an effort at -discovery, not exposition. The very circumstances which left them no -time to think out independent systems of thought, point to a subtle -mind, unfortunately cabined and cribbed by a heap of obstructing -nonsense that patient industry had gradually to eliminate, and thus to -winnow out truth from falsehood. With these preliminary remarks we -proceed to consider Persian students of Greek Philosophy individually. - - -§ I. - -Ibn Maskawaih[26:1] (d. 1030). - -Passing over the names of Sarakhsi[26:2], Farabi who was a Turk, and -the Physician Razi (d. 932 A.D.) who, true to his Persian habits of -thought, looked upon light as the first creation, and admitted the -eternity of matter, space and time, we come to the illustrious name of -Abu `Ali Muhammad ibn Muhammad ibn Ya`qub, commonly known as _Ibn -Maskawaih_--the treasurer of the Buwaihid Sultan `Adaduddaula--one of -the most eminent theistic thinkers, physicians, moralists and historians -of Persia. I give below a brief account of his system from his well -known work Al-Fauz al-Asghar, published in Beirut. - - [26:1] Dr. Boer, in his Philosophy of Islam, gives a full - account of the Philosophy of Al-Farabi and Avicenna; but his - account of Ibn Maskawaih's Philosophy is restricted to the - Ethical teaching of that Philosopher. I have given here his - metaphysical views which are decidedly more systematic than - those of Al-Farabi. Instead of repeating Avicenna's - Neo-Platonism I have briefly stated what I believe to be his - original contribution to the thought of his country. - - [26:2] Sarakhsi died in 899 A.D. He was a disciple of the - Arabian Philosopher Al-Kindi. His works, unfortunately, have not - reached us. - -1. _The existence of the ultimate principle._ - -Here Ibn Maskawaih follows Aristotle, and reproduces his argument based -on the fact of physical motion. All bodies have the inseparable property -of motion which covers all forms of change, and does not proceed from -the nature of bodies themselves. Motion, therefore, demands an external -source or prime mover. The supposition that motion may constitute the -very essence of bodies, is contradicted by experience. Man, for -instance, has the power of free movement; but, on the supposition, -different parts of his body must continue to move even after they are -severed from one another. The series of moving causes, therefore, must -stop at a cause which, itself immovable, moves everything else. The -immobility of the Primal cause is essential; for the supposition of -motion in the Primal cause would necessitate infinite regress, which is -absurd. - -The immovable mover is one. A multiplicity of original movers must imply -something common in their nature, so that they might be brought under -the same category. It must also imply some point of difference in order -to distinguish them from each other. But this partial identity and -difference necessitate composition in their respective essences; and -composition, being a form of motion, cannot, as we have shown, exist in -the first cause of motion. The prime mover again is eternal and -immaterial. Since transition from non-existence to existence is a form -of motion; and since matter is always subject to some kind of motion, it -follows that a thing which is not eternal, or is, in any way, associated -with matter, must be in motion. - -2. _The Knowledge of the Ultimate._ - -All human knowledge begins from sensations which are gradually -transformed into perceptions. The earlier stages of intellection are -completely conditioned by the presence of external reality. But the -progress of knowledge means to be able to think without being -conditioned by matter. Thought begins with matter, but its object is to -gradually free itself from the primary condition of its own -possibility. A higher stage, therefore, is reached in imagination--the -power to reproduce and retain in the mind the copy or image of a thing -without reference to the external objectivity of the thing itself. In -the formation of concepts thought reaches a still higher stage in point -of freedom from materiality; though the concept, in so far as it is the -result of comparison and assimilation of percepts, cannot be regarded as -having completely freed itself from the gross cause of sensations. But -the fact that conception is based on perception, should not lead us to -ignore the great difference between the nature of the concept and the -percept. The individual (percept) is undergoing constant change which -affects the character of the knowledge founded on mere perception. The -knowledge of individuals, therefore, lacks the element of permanence. -The universal (concept), on the other hand, is not affected by the law -of change. Individuals change; the universal remains intact. It is the -essence of matter to submit to the law of change: the freer a thing is -from matter, the less liable it is to change. God, therefore, being -absolutely free from matter, is absolutely changeless; and it is His -complete freedom from materiality that makes our conception of Him -difficult or impossible. The object of all philosophical training is to -develop the power of "ideation" or contemplation on pure concepts, in -order that constant practice might make possible the conception of the -absolutely immaterial. - -3. _How the one creates the many._ - -In this connection it is necessary, for the sake of clearness, to divide -Ibn Maskawaih's investigations into two parts:-- - -(a) _That the ultimate agent or cause created the Universe out of -nothing._ Materialists, he says, hold the eternity of matter, and -attribute form to the creative activity of God. It is, however, admitted -that when matter passes from one form into another form, the previous -form becomes absolutely non-existent. For if it does not become -absolutely non-existent, it must either pass off into some other body, -or continue to exist in the same body. The first alternative is -contradicted by every day experience. If we transform a ball of wax -into a solid square, the original rotundity of the ball does not pass -off into some other body. The second alternative is also impossible; for -it would necessitate the conclusion that two contradictory forms e.g. -circularity and length, can exist in the same body. It, therefore, -follows that the original form passes into absolute non-existence, when -the new form comes into being. This argument proves conclusively that -attributes i.e., form, color, etc., come into being from pure nothing. -In order to understand that the substance is also non-eternal like the -attribute, we should grasp the truth of the following propositions:-- - -1. The analysis of matter results in a number of different elements, the -diversity of which is reduced to one simple element. - -2. Form and matter are inseparable: no change in matter can annihilate -form. - -From these two propositions, Ibn Maskawaih concludes that the substance -had a beginning in time. Matter like form must have begun to exist; -since the eternity of matter necessitates the eternity of form which, -as we have seen, cannot be regarded as eternal. - -(b) _The process of creation._ What is the cause of this immense -diversity which meets us on all sides? How could the many be created by -one? When, says the Philosopher, one cause produces a number of -different effects, their multiplicity may depend on any of the following -reasons:-- - -1. The cause may have various powers. Man, for instance, being a -combination of various elements and powers, may be the cause of various -actions. - -2. The cause may use various means to produce a variety of effects. - -3. The cause may work upon a variety of material. - -None of these propositions can be true of the nature of the ultimate -cause--God. That he possesses various powers, distinct from one another, -is manifestly absurd; since his nature does not admit of composition. If -he is supposed to have employed different means to produce diversity, -who is the creator of these means? If these means are due to the -creative agency of some cause other than the ultimate cause, there -would be a plurality of ultimate causes. If, on the other hand, the -Ultimate Cause himself created these means, he must have required other -means to create these means. The third proposition is also inadmissible -as a conception of the creative act. The many cannot flow from the -causal action of one agent. It, therefore, follows that we have only one -way out of the difficulty--that the ultimate cause created only one -thing which led to the creation of another. Ibn Maskawaih here -enumerates the usual Neo-Platonic emanations gradually growing grosser -and grosser until we reach the primordial elements, which combine and -recombine to evolve higher and higher forms of life. Shibli thus sums -up Ibn Maskawaih's theory of evolution[33:1]:-- - -"The combination of primary substances produced the mineral kingdom, the -lowest form of life. A higher stage of evolution is reached in the -vegetable kingdom. The first to appear is spontaneous grass; then plants -and various kinds of trees, some of which touch the border-land of -animal kingdom, in so far as they manifest certain animal -characteristics. Intermediary between the vegetable kingdom and the -animal kingdom there is a certain form of life which is neither animal -nor vegetable, but shares the characteristics of both (e.g. coral). The -first step beyond this intermediary stage of life, is the development of -the power of movement, and the sense of touch in tiny worms which crawl -upon the earth. The sense of touch, owing to the process of -differentiation, develops other forms of sense, until we reach the plane -of higher animals in which intelligence begins to manifest itself in an -ascending scale. Humanity is touched in the ape which undergoes further -development, and gradually develops erect stature and power of -understanding similar to man. Here animality ends and humanity begins". - - [33:1] Maulana Shibli `Ilm al-Kalam, p. 141. (Haidarabad). - -4. _The soul._ - -In order to understand whether the soul has an independent existence, we -should examine the nature of human knowledge. It is the essential -property of matter that it cannot assume two different forms -simultaneously. To transform a silver spoon into a silver glass, it is -necessary that the spoon-form as such, should cease to exist. This -property is common to all bodies, and a body that lacks it cannot be -regarded as a body. Now when we examine the nature of perception, we see -that there is a principle in man which, in so far as it is able to know -more than one thing at a time, can assume, so to say, many different -forms simultaneously. This principle cannot be matter, since it lacks -the fundamental property of matter. The essence of the soul consists in -the power of perceiving a number of objects at one and the same moment -of time. But it may be objected that the soul-principle may be either -material in its essence, or a function of matter. There are, however, -reasons to show that the soul cannot be a function of matter. - -(a). A thing which assumes different forms and states, cannot itself be -one of those forms and states. A body which receives different colors -should be, in its own nature, colorless. The soul, in its perception of -external objects, assumes, as it were, various forms and states; it, -therefore, cannot be regarded as one of those forms. Ibn Maskawaih -seems to give no countenance to the contemporary Faculty-Psychology; to -him different mental states are various transformations of the soul -itself. - -(b). The attributes are constantly changing; there must be beyond the -sphere of change, some permanent substratum which is the foundation of -personal identity. - -Having shown that the soul cannot be regarded as a function of matter, -Ibn Maskawaih proceeds to prove that it is essentially immaterial. Some -of his arguments may be noticed:-- - -1. The senses, after they have perceived a strong stimulus, cannot, for -a certain amount of time, perceive a weaker stimulus. It is, however, -quite different with the mental act of cognition. - -2. When we reflect on an abstruse subject, we endeavour to completely -shut our eyes to the objects around us, which we regard as so many -hindrances in the way of spiritual activity. If the soul is material in -its essence, it need not, in order to secure unimpeded activity, escape -from the world of matter. - -3. The perception of a strong stimulus weakens and sometimes injures the -sense. The intellect, on the other hand, grows in strength with the -knowledge of ideas and general notions. - -4. Physical weakness due to old age, does not affect mental vigour. - -5. The soul can conceive certain propositions which have no connection -with the sense-data. The senses, for instance, cannot perceive that two -contradictories cannot exist together. - -6. There is a certain power in us which rules over physical organs, -corrects sense-errors, and unifies all knowledge. This unifying -principle which reflects over the material brought before it through the -sense-channel, and, weighing the evidence of each sense, decides the -character of rival statements, must itself stand above the sphere of -matter. - -The combined force of these considerations, says Ibn Maskawaih, -conclusively establishes the truth of the proposition--that the soul is -essentially immaterial. The immateriality of the soul signifies its -immortality; since mortality is a characteristic of the material. - - -§ II. - -Avicenna (d. 1037). - -Among the early Persian Philosophers, Avicenna alone attempted to -construct his own system of thought. His work, called "Eastern -Philosophy" is still extant; and there has also come down to us a -fragment[38:1] in which the Philosopher has expressed his views on the -universal operation of the force of love in nature. It is something like -the contour of a system, and it is quite probable that ideas expressed -therein were afterwards fully worked out. - - [38:1] This fragment on love is preserved in the collected works - of Avicenna in the British Museum Library and has been edited by - N. A. F. Mehren. (Leiden, 1894.) - -Avicenna defines "Love" as the appreciation of Beauty; and from the -standpoint of this definition he explains that there are three -categories of being:-- - -1. Things that are at the highest point of perfection. - -2. Things that are at the lowest point of perfection. - -3. Things that stand between the two poles of perfection. But the third -category has no real existence; since there are things that have already -attained the acme of perfection, and there are others still progressing -towards perfection. This striving for the ideal is love's movement -towards beauty which, according to Avicenna, is identical with -perfection. Beneath the visible evolution of forms is the force of love -which actualises all striving, movement, progress. Things are so -constituted that they hate non-existence, and love the joy of -individuality in various forms. The indeterminate matter, dead in -itself, assumes, or more properly, is made to assume by the inner force -of love, various forms, and rises higher and higher in the scale of -beauty. The operation of this ultimate force, in the physical plane, can -be thus indicated:-- - -1. Inanimate objects are combinations of form, matter and quality. Owing -to the working of this mysterious power, quality sticks to its subject -or substance; and form embraces indeterminate matter which, impelled by -the mighty force of love, rises from form to form. - -2. The tendency of the force of love is to centralise itself. In the -vegetable kingdom it attains a higher degree of unity or centralisation; -though the soul still lacks that unity of action which it attains -afterwards. The processes of the vegetative soul are:-- - -(a) Assimilation. - -(b) Growth. - -(c) Reproduction. - -These processes, however, are nothing more than so many manifestations -of love. Assimilation indicates attraction and transformation of what is -external into what is internal. Growth is love of achieving more and -more harmony of parts; and reproduction means perpetuation of the kind, -which is only another phase of love. - -3. In the animal kingdom, the various operations of the force of love -are still more unified. It does preserve the vegetable instinct of -acting in different directions; but there is also the development of -temperament which is a step towards more unified activity. In man this -tendency towards unification manifests itself in self-consciousness. The -same force of "natural or constitutional love", is working in the life -of beings higher than man. All things are moving towards the first -Beloved--the Eternal Beauty. The worth of a thing is decided by its -nearness to or distance from, this ultimate principle. - -As a physician, however, Avicenna is especially interested in the nature -of the Soul. In his times, moreover, the doctrine of metempsychosis was -getting more and more popular. He, therefore, discusses the nature of -the soul, with a view to show the falsity of this doctrine. It is -difficult, he says, to define the soul; since it manifests different -powers and tendencies in different planes of being. His view of the -various powers of the soul can be thus represented:-- - -1. Manifestation as unconscious activity-- - - (a). Working in different directions + 1. Assimilation. - (Vegetative soul) | 2. Growth. - + 3. Reproduction. - -(b). Working in one direction and securing uniformity of action--growth -of temperament. - -2. Manifestation as conscious activity-- - -(a). As directed to more than one object-- - - Animal soul. - | - +------------+--------------------+ - | | - Lower Animals. Man. - - A. Perceptive powers. A. Perceptive powers. - B. Motive powers (desire (a) Five external senses. - of pleasure and avoidance (b) Five internal senses-- - of pain). 1. Sensorium. - 2. Retention of images. - 3. Conception. - 4. Imagination. - 5. Memory. - - These constitute the five internal - senses of the soul which, in man, - manifests itself as progressive - reason, developing from human to - angelic and prophetic reason. - - B. Motive powers--will. - -(b). As directed to one object--The soul of the spheres which continue -in one uniform motion. - -In his fragment on "Nafs" (soul) Avicenna endeavours to show that a -material accompaniment is not necessary to the soul. It is not through -the instrumentality of the body, or some power of the body, that the -soul conceives or imagines; since if the soul necessarily requires a -physical medium in conceiving other things, it must require a different -body in order to conceive the body attached to itself. Moreover, the -fact that the soul is immediately self conscious--conscious of itself -through itself--conclusively shows that in its essence the soul is quite -independent of any physical accompaniment. The doctrine of -metempsychosis implies, also, individual pre-existence. But supposing -that the soul did exist before the body, it must have existed either as -one or as many. The multiplicity of bodies is due to the multiplicity of -material forms, and does not indicate the multiplicity of souls. On the -other hand, if it existed as one, the ignorance or knowledge of A must -mean the ignorance or knowledge of B; since the soul is one in both. -These categories, therefore, cannot be applied to the soul. The truth -is, says Avicenna, that body and soul are contiguous to each other, but -quite opposite in their respective essences. The disintegration of the -body does not necessitate the annihilation of the soul. Dissolution or -decay is a property of compounds, and not of simple, indivisible, ideal -substances. Avicenna, then denies pre-existence, and endeavours to show -the possibility of disembodied conscious life beyond the grave. - -We have run over the work of the early Persian Neo-Platonists among -whom, as we have seen, Avicenna alone learned to think for himself. Of -the generations of his disciples--Behmenyar, Ab u'l-Ma'mum of Isfahan, -Ma`sumi, Ab u'l-`Abbas, Ibn Tahir[44:1]--who carried on their master's -Philosophy, we need not speak. So powerful was the spell of Avicenna's -personality that, even long after it had been removed, any amplification -or modification of his views was considered to be an unpardonable crime. -The old Iranian idea of the dualism of Light and Darkness, does not act -as a determining factor in the progress of Neo-Platonic ideas in Persia, -which borrowed independent life for a time, and eventually merged their -separate existence in the general current of Persian speculation. They -are, therefore, connected with the course of indigenous thought only in -so far as they contributed to the strength and expansion of that -monistic tendency, which manifested itself early in the Church of -Zoroaster; and, though for a time hindered by the Theological -controversies of Islam, burst out with redoubled force in later times, -to extend its titanic grasp to all the previous intellectual -achievements of the land of its birth. - - [44:1] Al-Baihaqi; fol. 28a et seqq. - - - - -CHAP. III. - -THE RISE AND FALL OF RATIONALISM IN ISLAM. - - -§ I. - -The Metaphysics of Rationalism--Materialism. - -The Persian mind, having adjusted itself to the new political -environment, soon reasserts its innate freedom, and begins to retire -from the field of objectivity, in order that it may come back to itself, -and reflect upon the material achieved in its journey out of its own -inwardness. With the study of Greek thought, the spirit which was almost -lost in the concrete, begins to reflect and realise itself as the -arbiter of truth. Subjectivity asserts itself, and endeavours to -supplant all outward authority. Such a period, in the intellectual -history of a people, must be the epoch of rationalism, scepticism, -mysticism, heresy--forms in which the human mind, swayed by the growing -force of subjectivity, rejects all external standards of truth. And so -we find the epoch under consideration. - -The period of Umayyad dominance is taken up with the process of -co-mingling and adjustment to new conditions of life; but with the rise -of the `Abbasid Dynasty and the study of Greek Philosophy, the pent-up -intellectual force of Persia bursts out again, and exhibits wonderful -activity in all the departments of thought and action. The fresh -intellectual vigour imparted by the assimilation of Greek Philosophy -which was studied with great avidity, led immediately to a critical -examination of Islamic Monotheism. Theology, enlivened by religious -fervour, learned to talk the language of Philosophy earlier than cold -reason began to seek a retired corner, away from the noise of -controversy, in order to construct a consistent theory of things. In the -first half of the 8{th} century we find Wasil Ibn `Ata--a Persian -disciple of the famous theologian Hasan of Basra--starting Mu`tazilaism -(Rationalism)--that most interesting movement which engaged some of the -subtlest minds of Persia, and finally exhausted its force in the keen -metaphysical controversies of Baghdad and Basra. The famous city of -Basra had become, owing to its commercial situation, the playground of -various forces--Greek Philosophy, Scepticism, Christianity, Buddhistic -ideas, Manichaeism[47:1]--which furnished ample spiritual food to the -inquiring mind of the time, and formed the intellectual environment of -Islamic Rationalism. What Spitta calls the Syrian period of Muhammadan -History is not characterised with metaphysical subtleties. With the -advent of the Persian Period, however, Muhammadan students of Greek -Philosophy began properly to reflect on their religion; and the -Mu`tazila thinkers[47:2], gradually drifted into metaphysics with which -alone we are concerned here. It is not our object to trace the history -of the Mu`tazila Kalam; for present purposes it will be sufficient if we -briefly reveal the metaphysical implications of the Mu`tazila view of -Islam. The conception of God, and the theory of matter, therefore, are -the only aspects of Rationalism which we propose to discuss here. - - [47:1] During the `Abbasid Period there were many who secretly - held Manichaean opinions. See Fihrist, Leipsig 1871, p. 338; See - also Al-Mu`tazila, ed. by T. W. Arnold, Leipsig 1902, p. 27, - where the author speaks of a controversy between Abu - 'l-Hudhail and Salih, the Dualist. See also Macdonald's Muslim - Theology, p. 133. - - [47:2] The Mu`tazilas belonged to various nationalities, and - many of them were Persians either by descent or domicile. Wasil - Ibn `Ata--the reported founder of the sect--was a Persian - (Browne, Lit. His., Vol I, p. 281). Von Kremer, however, traces - their origin to the theological controversies of the Umayyad - period. Mu`tazilaism was not an essentially Persian movement; - but it is true, as Prof. Browne observes (Lit. His., Vol. I, p. - 283) that Shi`ite and Qadari tenets, indeed, often went - together, and the Shi`ite doctrine current in Persia at the - present day is in many respects Mu`tazilite, while Hasan - Al-Ash`ari, the great opponent of the Mu`tazilite, is by the - Shi`ites held in horror. It may also be added that some of the - greater representatives of the Mu`tazila opinion were Shi`as - by religion, e.g. Abu 'l-Hudhail (Al-Mu`tazila, ed. by T. W. - Arnold, p. 28). On the other hand many of the followers of - Al-Ash`ari were Persians (See extracts from Ibn `Asakir ed. - Mehren), so that it does not seem to be quite justifiable to - describe the Ash`arite mode of thought as a purely semitic - movement. - -His conception of the unity of God at which the Mu`tazila eventually -arrived by a subtle dialectic is one of the fundamental points in which -he differs from the Orthodox Muhammadan. God's attributes, according to -his view, cannot be said to inhere in him; they form the very essence of -His nature. The Mu`tazila, therefore, denies the separate reality of -divine attributes, and declares their absolute identity with the -abstract divine Principle. "God", says Abu'l-Hudhail, "is knowing, -all-powerful, living; and his knowledge, power and life constitute His -very essence (dhat)"[49:1]. In order to explain the pure unity of God -Joseph Al-Basir[49:2] lays down the following five principles:-- - -(1). The necessary supposition of atom and accident. - -(2). The necessary supposition of a creator. - -(3). The necessary supposition of the conditions (Ahwal) of God. - -(4). The rejection of those attributes which do not befit God. - -(5). The unity of God in spite of the plurality of His attributes. - - [49:1] Shahrastani: Cureton's ed., p. 34. - - [49:2] Dr. Frankl: Ein Mu`tazilitischer Kalam--Wien 1872, p. 13. - -This conception of unity underwent further modifications; until in the -hands of Mu`ammar and Abu Hashim it became a mere abstract possibility -about which nothing could be predicated. We cannot, he says, predicate -knowledge of God[50:1], for His knowledge must be of something in -Himself. The first necessitates the identity of subject and object which -is absurd; the second implicates duality in the nature of God which is -equally impossible. Ahmad and Fadl[50:2]--disciples of Nazzam, however, -recognised this duality in holding that the original creators are -two--God--the eternal principle; and the word of God--Jesus Christ--the -contingent principle. But more fully to bring out the element of truth -in the second alternative suggested by Mu`ammar, was reserved, as we -shall see, for later Sufi thinkers of Persia. It is, therefore, clear -that some of the rationalists almost unconsciously touched the outer -fringe of later pantheism for which, in a sense, they prepared the way, -not only by their definition of God, but also by their common effort to -internalise the rigid externality of an absolute law. - - [50:1] Shahrastani: Cureton's ed., p. 48. See also - Steiner--Die Mutaziliten, p. 59. - - [50:2] Ibn Hazm (Cairo, ed. I) Vol. IV, p. 197. See also - Shahrastani: Cureton's ed., p. 42. - -But the most important contribution of the advocates of Rationalism to -purely metaphysical speculation, is their explanation of matter, which -their opponents--the Ash`arite--afterwards modified to fit in with their -own views of the nature of God. The interest of Nazzam chiefly consisted -in the exclusion of all arbitrariness from the orderly course of -nature[51:1]. The same interest in naturalism led Al-Jahiz to define -Will in a purely negative manner[51:2]. Though the Rationalist thinkers -did not want to abandon the idea of a Personal Will, yet they -endeavoured to find a deeper ground for the independence of individual -natural phenomena. And this ground they found in matter itself. Nazzam -taught the infinite divisibility of matter, and obliterated the -distinction between substance and accident[51:3]. Existence was regarded -as a quality superimposed by God on the pre-existing material atoms -which would have been incapable of perception without this quality. -Muhammad Ibn `Uthman, one of the Mu`tazila Shaikhs, says Ibn -Hazm,[51:4] maintained that the non-existent (atom in its -pre-existential state) is a body in that state; only that in its -pre-existential condition it is neither in motion, nor at rest, nor is -it said to be created. Substance, then, is a collection of -qualities--taste, odour, colour--which, in themselves, are nothing more -than material potentialities. The soul, too, is a finer kind of matter; -and the processes of knowledge are mere mental motions. Creation is only -the actualisation of pre-existing potentialities[52:1] (Tafra). The -individuality of a thing which is defined as "that of which something -can be predicated"[52:2] is not an essential factor in its notion. The -collection of things we call the Universe, is externalised or -perceptible reality which could, so to speak, exist independent of all -perceptibility. The object of these metaphysical subtleties is purely -theological. God, to the Rationalist, is an absolute unity which can, in -no sense, admit of plurality, and could thus exist without the -perceptible plurality--the Universe. - - [51:1] Steiner: Die Mu`taziliten; Leipzig, 1865, p. 57. - - [51:2] Steiner: Die Mu`taziliten; Leipzig, 1865, p. 59. - - [51:3] Shahrastani: Cureton's ed., p. 38. - - [51:4] Ibn Hazm (ed. Cairo): Vol. V, p. 42. - - [52:1] Shahrastani: Cureton's ed, p. 38. - - [52:2] Steiner: Die Mu`taziliten, p. 80. - -The activity of God, then, consists only in making the atom perceptible. -The properties of the atom flow from its own nature. A stone thrown up -falls down on account of its own indwelling property[53:1]. God, says -Al-`Attar of Basra and Bishr ibn al Mu`tamir, did not create colour, -length, breadth, taste or smell--all these are activities of bodies -themselves[53:2]. Even the number of things in the Universe is not known -to God[53:3]. Bishr ibn al-Mu`tamir further explained the properties of -bodies by what he called "Tawallud"--interaction of bodies[53:4]. Thus -it is clear that the Rationalists were philosophically materialists, and -theologically deists. - - [53:1] Shahrastani: Cureton's ed., p. 38. - - [53:2] Ibn Hazm (ed. Cairo): Vol. IV, pp. 194, 197. - - [53:3] Ibn Hazm (ed. Cairo): Vol. IV, p. 194. - - [53:4] Shahrastani: Cureton's ed., p. 44. - -To them substance and atom are identical, and they define substance as a -space-filling atom which, besides the quality of filling space, has a -certain direction, force and existence forming its very essence as an -actuality. In shape it is squarelike; for if it is supposed to be -circular, combination of different atoms would not be possible[53:5]. -There is, however, great difference of opinion among the exponents of -atomism in regard to the nature of the atom. Some hold that atoms are -all similar to each other; while Abu'l-Qasim of Balkh regards them as -similar as well as dissimilar. When we say that two things are similar -to each other, we do not necessarily mean that they are similar in all -their attributes. Abu'l-Qasim further differs from Nazzam in advocating -the indestructibility of the atom. He holds that the atom had a -beginning in time; but that it cannot be completely annihilated. The -attribute of "Baqa" (continued existence), he says, does not give to its -subject a new attribute other than existence; and the continuity of -existence is not an additional attribute at all. The divine activity -created the atom as well as its continued existence. Abu'l-Qasim, -however, admits that some atoms may not have been created for continued -existence. He denies also the existence of any intervening space between -different atoms, and holds, unlike other representatives of the school, -that the essence or atom (Mahiyyat) could not remain essence in a state -of non-existence. To advocate the opposite is a contradiction in terms. -To say that the essence (which is essence because of the attribute of -existence) could remain essence in a state of non-existence, is to say -that the existent could remain existent in a state of non-existence. It -is obvious that Abu'l-Qasim here approaches the Ash`arite theory of -knowledge which dealt a serious blow to the Rationalist theory of -matter. - - [53:5] In my treatment of the atomism of Islamic Rationalists, I - am indebted to Arthur Biram's publication: "Kitabul Masa'il fil - khilaf beyn al-Basriyyin wal Baghdadiyyin". - - -§ II. - -Contemporary Movements of Thought. - -Side by side with the development of Mu`tazilaism we see, as is natural -in a period of great intellectual activity, many other tendencies of -thought manifesting themselves in the philosophical and religious -circles of Islam. Let us notice them briefly:-- - -1. Scepticism. The tendency towards scepticism was the natural -consequence of the purely dialectic method of Rationalism. Men such as -Ibn Ashras and Al-Jahiz who apparently belonged to the Rationalist -camp, were really sceptics. The standpoint of Al-Jahiz who inclined to -deistic naturalism[55:1], is that of a cultured man of the time, and -not of a professional theologian. In him is noticeable also a reaction -against the metaphysical hairsplitting of his predecessors, and a desire -to widen the pale of theology for the sake of the illiterate who are -incapable of reflecting on articles of faith. - - [55:1] Macdonald's Muslim Theology, p. 161. - -2. Sufiism--an appeal to a higher source of knowledge which was first -systematised by Dhu'l-Nun, and became more and more deepened and -antischolastic in contrast to the dry intellectualism of the -Ash`arite. We shall consider this interesting movement in the -following chapter. - -3. The revival of authority--Isma`ilianism--a movement -characteristically Persian which, instead of repudiating freethought, -endeavours to come to an understanding with it. Though this movement -seems to have no connection with the theological controversies of the -time, yet its connection with freethought is fundamental. The similarity -between the methods practised by the Isma`ilian missionaries and those -of the partisans of the association called Ikhwan al-Safa--Brethren of -Purity--suggests some sort of secret relation between the two -institutions. Whatever may be the motive of those who started this -movement, its significance as an intellectual phenomenon should not be -lost sight of. The multiplicity of philosophical and religious views--a -necessary consequence of speculative activity--is apt to invoke forces -which operate against this, religiously speaking, dangerous -multiplicity. In the 18th century history of European thought we see -Fichte, starting with a sceptical inquiry concerning the nature of -matter, and finding its last word in Pantheism. Schleiermacher appeals -to Faith as opposed to Reason, Jacobi points to a source of knowledge -higher than reason, while Comte abandons all metaphysical inquiry, and -limits all knowledge to sensuous perception. De Maistre and Schlegel, on -the other hand, find a resting place in the authority of an absolutely -infallible Pope. The advocates of the doctrine of Imamat think in the -same strain as De Maistre; but it is curious that the Isma`ilians, while -making this doctrine the basis of their Church, permitted free play to -all sorts of thinking. - -The Isma`ilia movement then is one aspect of the persistent -battle[57:1] which the intellectually independent Persian waged against -the religious and political ideals of Islam. Originally a branch of the -Shi`ite religion, the Isma`ilia sect assumed quite a cosmopolitan -character with `Abdulla ibn Maimun--the probable progenitor of the -Fatimid Caliphs of Egypt--who died about the same time when -Al-Ash`ari, the great opponent of Freethought, was born. This curious -man imagined a vast scheme in which he weaved together innumerable -threads of various hues, resulting in a cleverly constructed -equivocation, charming to the Persian mind for its mysterious character -and misty Pythagorean Philosophy. Like the Association of the Brethren -of Purity, he made an attempt, under the pious cloak of the doctrine of -Imamat (Authority), to synthesise all the dominating ideas of the time. -Greek Philosophy, Christianity, Rationalism, Sufiism, Manichaeism, -Persian heresies, and above all the idea of reincarnation, all came -forward to contribute their respective shares to the boldly conceived -Isma`ilian whole, the various aspects of which were to be gradually -revealed to the initiated, by the "Leader"--the ever Incarnating -Universal Reason--according to the intellectual development of the age -in which he incarnated himself. In the Isma`ilian movement, Freethought, -apprehending the collapse of its ever widening structure, seeks to rest -upon a stable basis, and, by a strange irony of fate, is led to find it -in the very idea which is revolting to its whole being. Barren -authority, though still apt to reassert herself at times, adopts this -unclaimed child, and thus permits herself to assimilate all knowledge -past, present and future. - - [57:1] Ibn Hazm in his Kitab al-Milal, looks upon the heretical - sects of Persia as a continuous struggle against the Arab power - which the cunning Persian attempted to shake off by these - peaceful means. See Von Kremer's Geschichte der herrschenden - Ideen des Islams, pp. 10, 11, where this learned Arab historian - of Cordova is quoted at length. - -The unfortunate connection, however, of this movement with the politics -of the time, has misled many a scholar. They see in it (Macdonald, for -instance) nothing more than a powerful conspiracy to uproot the -political power of the Arab from Persia. They have denounced the -Isma`ilian Church which counted among its followers some of the best -heads and sincerest hearts, as a mere clique of dark murderers who were -ever watching for a possible victim. We must always remember, while -estimating the character of these people, the most barbarous -persecutions which drove them to pay red-handed fanaticism in the same -coin. Assassinations for religious purposes were considered -unobjectionable, and even perhaps lawful, among the whole Semite race. -As late as the latter half of the 16th century, the Pope of Rome could -approve such a dreadful slaughter as the massacre of St. Bartholomew. -That assassination, even though actuated by religious zeal, is still a -crime, is a purely modern idea; and justice demands that we should not -judge older generations with our own standards of right and wrong. A -great religious movement which shook to its very foundations the -structure of a vast empire, and, having successfully passed through the -varied ordeals of moral reproach, calumny and persecution, stood up for -centuries as a champion of Science and Philosophy, could not have -entirely rested on the frail basis of a political conspiracy of a mere -local and temporary character. Isma`ilianism, in spite of its almost -entire loss of original vitality, still dominates the ethical ideal of -not an insignificant number in India, Persia, Central Asia, Syria and -Africa; while the last expression of Persian thought--Babism--is -essentially Isma`ilian in its character. - -To return, however, to the Philosophy of the sect. From the later -Rationalists they borrowed their conception of Divinity. God, or the -ultimate principle of existence, they teach, has no attribute. His -nature admits of no predication. When we predicate the attribute of -power to him, we only mean that He is the giver of power; when we -predicate eternity, we indicate the eternity of what the Qur'an calls -"Amr" (word of God) as distinguished from the "Khalq" (creation of -God) which is contingent. In His nature all contradictions melt away, -and from Him flow all opposites. Thus they considered themselves to have -solved the problem which had troubled the mind of Zoroaster and his -followers. - -In order to find an answer to the question, "What is plurality?" the -Isma`ilia refer to what they consider a metaphysical axiom--"that from -one only one can proceed". But the one which proceeds, is not something -completely different from which it proceeds. It is really the Primal one -transformed. The Primal Unity, therefore, transformed itself into the -First Intellect (Universal Reason); and then, by means of this -transformation of itself, created the Universal soul which, impelled by -its nature to perfectly identify itself with the original source, felt -the necessity of motion, and consequently of a body possessing the power -of motion. In order to achieve its end, the soul created the heavens -moving in circular motion according to its direction. It also created -the elements which mixed together, and formed the visible Universe--the -scene of plurality through which it endeavours to pass with a view to -come back to the original source. The individual soul is an epitome of -the whole Universe which exists only for its progressive education. The -Universal Reason incarnates itself from time to time, in the personality -of the "Leader" who illuminates the soul in proportion to its experience -and understanding, and gradually guides it through the scene of -plurality to the world of eternal unity. When the Universal soul -reaches its goal, or rather returns to its own deep being, the process -of disintegration ensues. "Particles constituting the Universe fall off -from each other--those of goodness go to truth (God) which symbolises -unity; those of evil go to untruth (Devil) which symbolises -diversity"[63:1]. This is but briefly the Isma`ilian Philosophy--a -mixture, as Sharastani remarks, of Philosophical and Manichaean -ideas--which, by gradually arousing the slumbering spirit of scepticism, -they administered, as it were, in doses to the initiated, and finally -brought them to that stage of spiritual emancipation where solemn ritual -drops off, and dogmatic religion appears to be nothing more than a -systematic arrangement of useful falsehoods. - - [63:1] Sharastani: Cureton's ed: p. 149. - -The Isma`ilian doctrine is the first attempt to amalgamate contemporary -Philosophy with a really Persian view of the Universe, and to restate -Islam, in reference to this synthesis, by allegorical interpretation of -the Qur'an--a method which was afterwards adopted by Sufiism. With them -the Zoroastrian Ahriman (Devil) is not the malignant creator of evil -things but it is a principle which violates the eternal unity, and -breaks it up into visible diversity. The idea that some principle of -difference in the nature of the ultimate existence must be postulated in -order to account for empirical diversity, underwent further -modifications; until in the Hurufi sect (an offshoot of the Isma`ilia), -in the fourteenth century, it touched contemporary Sufiism on the one -hand, and Christian Trinity on the other. The "Be", maintained the -Hurufis, is the eternal word of God, which, itself uncreated, leads to -further creation--the word externalised. "But for the 'word' the -recognition of the essence of Divinity would have been impossible; since -Divinity is beyond the reach of sense--perception"[64:1]. The 'word', -therefore, became flesh in the womb of Mary[64:2] in order to manifest -the Father. The whole Universe is the manifestation of God's 'word', in -which He is immanent[64:3]. Every sound in the Universe is within God; -every atom is singing the song of eternity[64:4]; all is life. Those -who want to discover the ultimate reality of things, let them seek "the -named" through the Name[65:1], which at once conceals and reveals its -subject. - - [64:1] Jawidan Kabir, fol. 149a. - - [64:2] Jawidan Kabir, fol. 280a. - - [64:3] Jawidan Kabir, fol. 366b. - - [64:4] Jawidan Kabir, fol. 155b. - - [65:1] Jawidan Kabir, fol. 382a. - - -§ III. - -Reaction against Rationalism. - -The Ash`arite. - -Patronised by the early Caliphs of the House of `Abbas, Rationalism -continued to flourish in the intellectual centres of the Islamic world; -until, in the first half of the 9th century, it met the powerful -orthodox reaction which found a very energetic leader in Al-Ash`ari -(b, 873 A.D.) who studied under Rationalist teachers only to demolish, -by their own methods, the edifice they had so laboriously built. He was -a pupil of Al-Jubba'i[65:2]--the representative of the younger school of -Mu`tazilaism in Basra--with whom he had many controversies[65:3] which -eventually terminated their friendly relations, and led the pupil to bid -farewell to the Mu`tazila camp. "The fact", says Spitta, "that -Al-Ash`ari was so thoroughly a child of his time with the successive -currents of which he let himself go, makes him, in another relation, an -important figure to us. In him, as in any other, are clearly reflected -the various tendencies of this politically as well as religiously -interesting period; and we seldom find ourselves in a position to weigh -the power of the orthodox confession and the Mu`tazilite speculation, -the child-like helpless manner of the one, the immaturity and -imperfection of the other, so completely as in the life of this man who -was orthodox as a boy and a Mu`tazila as a young man"[66:1]. The -Mu`tazila speculation (e.g. Al-Jahiz) tended to be absolutely -unfettered, and in some cases led to a merely negative attitude of -thought. The movement initiated by Al-Ash`ari was an attempt not only -to purge Islam of all non-Islamic elements which had quietly crept into -it, but also to harmonize the religious consciousness with the -religious thought of Islam. Rationalism was an attempt to measure -reality by reason alone; it implied the identity of the spheres of -religion and philosophy, and strove to express faith in the form of -concepts or terms of pure thought. It ignored the facts of human nature, -and tended to disintegrate the solidarity of the Islamic Church. Hence -the reaction. - - [65:2] Extracts from Ibn `Asakir (Mehren)--Travaux de la - troisieme session du Congres International des Orientalistes--p. - 261. - - [65:3] Spitta: Zur Geschichte Abul-Hasan Al-Ash`ari, pp. 42, - 43. See also Ibn Khallikan (Gottingen 1839)--Al-Jubba'i, where - the story of their controversy is given. - - [66:1] Spitta: Vorwort, p. VII. - -The orthodox reaction led by the Ash`arite then was, in reality, -nothing more than the transfer of dialectic method to the defence of the -authority of Divine Revelation. In opposition to the Rationalists, they -maintained the doctrine of the Attributes of God; and, as regards the -Free Will controversy, they adopted a course lying midway between the -extreme fatalism of the old school, and the extreme libertarianism of -the Rationalists. They teach that the power of choice as well as all -human actions are created by God; and that man has been given the power -of acquiring[67:1] the different modes of activity. But Fakhral-Din -Razi, who in his violent attack on philosophy was strenuously opposed by -Tusi and Qutbal-Din, does away with the idea of "acquisition", and -openly maintains the doctrine of necessity in his commentary on the -Qur'an. The Mataridiyya--another school of anti-rationalist theology, -founded by Abu Mansur Mataridi a native of Matarid in the environs of -Samarqand--went back to the old rationalist position, and taught in -opposition to the Ash`arite, that man has absolute control over his -activity; and that his power affects the very nature of his actions. -Al-Ash`ari's interest was purely theological; but it was impossible to -harmonise reason and revelation without making reference to the ultimate -nature of reality. Baqilani[68:1] therefore, made use of some purely -metaphysical propositions (that substance is an individual unity; that -quality cannot exist in quality; that perfect vacuum is possible.) in -his Theological investigation, and thus gave the school a metaphysical -foundation which it is our main object to bring out. We shall not, -therefore, dwell upon their defence of orthodox beliefs (e.g. that the -Qur'an is uncreated; that the visibility of God is possible etc.); but -we shall endeavour to pick up the elements of metaphysical thought in -their theological controversies. In order to meet contemporary -philosophers on their own ground, they could not dispense with -philosophising; hence willingly or unwillingly they had to develop a -theory of knowledge peculiar to themselves. - - [67:1] Shahrastani--ed. Cureton, p. 69. - - [68:1] Martin Schreiner: Zur Geschichte des Ash`aritenthums. - (Huitieme Congres International des Orientalistes 1889, p. 82). - -God, according to the Ash`arite, is the ultimate necessary existence -which "carries its attributes in its own being"[69:1]; and whose -existence (wujud) and essence (Mahiyyat) are identical. Besides the -argument from the contingent character of motion they used the following -arguments to prove the existence of this ultimate principle:-- - -(1). All bodies, they argue, are one in so far as the phenomenal fact of -their existence is concerned. But in spite of this unity, their -qualities are different and even opposed to each other. We are, -therefore, driven to postulate an ultimate cause in order to account for -their empirical divergence. - - [69:1] Martin Schreiner: Zur Geschichte des Ash`aritenthums. - (Huitieme Congres International des Orientalistes II{me} Partie - 1893, p. 113). - -(2). Every contingent being needs a cause to account for its existence. -The Universe is contingent; therefore it must have a cause; and that -cause is God. That the Universe is contingent, they proved in the -following manner. All that exists in the Universe, is either substance -or quality. The contingence of quality is evident, and the contingence -of substance follows from the fact that no substance could exist apart -from qualities. The contingence of quality necessitates the contingence -of substance; otherwise the eternity of substance would necessitate the -eternity of quality. In order fully to appreciate the value of this -argument, it is necessary to understand the Ash`arite theory of -knowledge. To answer the question, "What is a thing?" they subjected to -a searching criticism the Aristotelian categories of thought, and -arrived at the conclusion that bodies have no properties in -themselves[70:1]. They made no distinction of secondary and primary -qualities of a body, and reduced all of them to purely subjective -relations. Quality too became with them a mere accident without which -the substance could not exist. They used the word substance or atom with -a vague implication of externality; but their criticism, actuated by a -pious desire to defend the idea of divine creation, reduced the Universe -to a mere show of ordered subjectivities which, as they maintained like -Berkeley, found their ultimate explanation in the Will of God. In his -examination of human knowledge regarded as a product and not merely a -process, Kant stopped at the idea of "Ding an sich", but the Ash`arite -endeavoured to penetrate further, and maintained, against the -contemporary Agnostic-Realism, that the so called underlying essence -existed only in so far as it was brought in relation to the knowing -subject. Their atomism, therefore, approaches that of Lotze[71:1] who, -in spite of his desire to save external reality, ended in its complete -reduction to ideality. But like Lotze they could not believe their atoms -to be the inner working of the Infinite Primal Being. The interest of -pure monotheism was too strong for them. The necessary consequence of -their analysis of matter is a thorough going idealism like that of -Berkeley; but perhaps their instinctive realism combined with the force -of atomistic tradition, still compels them to use the word "atom" by -which they endeavour to give something like a realistic coloring to -their idealism. The interest of dogmatic theology drove them to maintain -towards pure Philosophy an attitude of criticism which taught her -unwilling advocates how to philosophise and build a metaphysics of their -own. - - [70:1] See Macdonald's admirable account of the Ash`arite - Metaphysics: Muslim Theology p. 201 sq. See also Maulana - Shibli `Ilmal Kalam pp. 60, 72. - - [71:1] "Lotze is an atomist, but he does not conceive the atoms - themselves as material; for extension, like all other sensuous - qualities is explained through the reciprocal action of atoms; - they themselves, therefore, cannot possess this quality. Like - life and like all empirical qualities, the sensuous fact of - extension is due to the cooperation of points of force, which, - in time, must be conceived as starting points of the inner - workings of the Infinite Primal Being." Hoffding Vol. II, p. - 516. - -But a more important and philosophically more significant aspect of the -Ash`arite Metaphysics, is their attitude towards the Law of -Causation[72:1]. Just as they repudiated all the principles of -optics[72:2] in order to show, in opposition to the Rationalists, that -God could be visible in spite of His being unextended, so with a view -to defend the possibility of miracles, they rejected the idea of -causation altogether. The orthodox believed in miracles as well as in -the Universal Law of Causation; but they maintained that, at the time of -manifesting a miracle, God suspended the operation of this law. The -Ash`arite, however, starting with the supposition that cause and -effect must be similar, could not share the orthodox view, and taught -that the idea of power is meaningless, and that we know nothing but -floating impressions, the phenomenal order of which is determined by -God. - - [72:1] Shibli `Ilmal-Kalam pp. 64, 72. - - [72:2] Shahrastani, ed. Cureton, p. 82. - -Any account of the Ash`arite metaphysics would be incomplete without a -notice of the work of Al-Ghazali (d. 1111 A.D.) who though -misunderstood by many orthodox theologians, will always be looked upon -as one of the greatest personalities of Islam. This sceptic of powerful -ability anticipated Descartes[73:1] in his philosophical method; and, -"seven hundred years before Hume cut the bond of causality with the -edge of his dialectic"[73:2]. He was the first to write a systematic -refutation of philosophy, and completely to annihilate that dread of -intellectualism which had characterised the orthodox. It was chiefly his -influence that made men study dogma and metaphysics together, and -eventually led to a system of education which produced such men as -Shahrastani, Al-Razi and Al-Ishraqi. The following passage indicates -his attitude as a thinker:-- - -"From my childhood I was inclined to think out things for myself. The -result of this attitude was that I revolted against authority; and all -the beliefs that had fixed themselves in my mind from childhood lost -their original importance. I thought that such beliefs based on mere -authority were equally entertained by Jews, Christians, and followers of -other religions. Real knowledge must eradicate all doubt. For instance, -it is self-evident that ten is greater than three. If a person, however, -endeavours to prove the contrary by an appeal to his power of turning a -stick into a snake, the performance would indeed be wonderful, though -it cannot touch the certainty of the proposition in question"[75:1]. He -examined afterwards, all the various claimants of "Certain Knowledge" -and finally found it in Sufiism. - - [73:1] "It (Al-Ghazali's work on the Revivication of the - sciences of religion) has so remarkable a resemblance to the - _Discourse sur la methode_ of Descartes, that had any - translation of it existed in the days of Descartes everyone - would have cried against the plagiarism". (Lewes's History of - Philosophy: Vol. II. p. 50). - - [73:2] Journal of the American Oriental Society, Vol. 20, p. - 103. - - [75:1] Al-Munqidh p. 3. - -With their view of the nature of substance, the Ash`arite, rigid -monotheists as they were, could not safely discuss the nature of the -human soul. Al-Ghazali alone seriously took up the problem, and to -this day it is difficult to define, with accuracy, his view of the -nature of God. In him, like Borger and Solger in Germany, Sufi pantheism -and the Ash`arite dogma of personality appear to harmonise together, a -reconciliation which makes it difficult to say whether he was a -Pantheist, or a Personal Pantheist of the type of Lotze. The soul, -according to Al-Ghazali, perceives things. But perception as an -attribute can exist only in a substance or essence which is absolutely -free from all the attributes of body. In his Al-Madnun[75:2], he -explains why the prophet declined to reveal the nature of the soul. -There are, he says, two kinds of men; ordinary men and thinkers. The -former who look upon materiality as a condition of existence, cannot -conceive an immaterial substance. The latter are led, by their logic, to -a conception of the soul which sweeps away all difference between God -and the individual soul. Al-Ghazali, therefore, realised the -Pantheistic drift of his own inquiry, and preferred silence as to the -ultimate nature of the soul. - - [75:2] See Sir Sayyid Ahmad's criticism of Al-Ghazali's view - of the soul, Al-Nazrufi ba'di Masaili-l Imami-l humam Abu Hamid - Al-Ghazali; No. 4, p. 3 sq. (ed. Agra). - -He is generally included among the Ash`arite. But strictly speaking he -is not an Ash`arite; though he admitted that the Ash`arite mode of -thought was excellent for the masses. "He held", says Shibli -(`Ilmal-Kalam, p. 66.), "that the secret of faith could not be revealed; -for this reason he encouraged exposition of the Ash`arite theology, -and took good care in persuading his immediate disciples not to publish -the results of his private reflection". Such an attitude towards the -Ash`arite theology, combined with his constant use of philosophical -language, could not but lead to suspicion. Ibn Jauzi, Qadi `Iyad, and -other famous theologians of the orthodox school, publicly denounced him -as one of the "misguided"; and `Iyad went even so far as to order the -destruction of all his philosophical and theological writings that -existed in Spain. - -It is, therefore, clear that while the dialectic of Rationalism -destroyed the personality of God, and reduced divinity to a bare -indefinable universality, the antirationalist movement, though it -preserved the dogma of personality, destroyed the external reality of -nature. In spite of Nazzam's theory of "Atomic objectification"[77:1], -the atom of the Rationalist possesses an independent objective reality; -that of the Ash`arite is a fleeting moment of Divine Will. The one -saves nature, and tends to do away with the God of Theology; the other -sacrifices nature to save God as conceived by the orthodox. The -God-intoxicated Sufi who stands aloof from the Theological controversies -of the age, saves and spiritualises both the aspects of existence, and -looks upon the whole Universe as the self-revelation of God--a higher -notion which synthesises the opposite extremes of his predecessors. -"Wooden-legged" Rationalism, as the Sufi called it, speaks its last word -in the sceptic Al-Ghazali, whose restless soul, after long and -hopeless wanderings in the desolate sands of dry intellectualism, found -its final halting place in the still deep of human emotion. His -scepticism is directed more to substantiate the necessity of a higher -source of knowledge than merely to defend the dogma of Islamic Theology, -and, therefore, marks the quiet victory of Sufiism over all the rival -speculative tendencies of the time. - - [77:1] Ibn Hazm, Vol. V, p. 63, 64, where the author states and - criticises this theory. - -Al-Ghazali's positive contribution to the Philosophy of his country, -however, is found in his little book--Mishkatal-Anwar--where he starts -with the Quranic verse, "God is the light of heavens and earth", and -instinctively returns to the Iranian idea, which was soon to find a -vigorous expounder in Al-Ishraqi. Light, he teaches in this book, is -the only real existence; and there is no darkness greater than -non-existence. But the essence of Light is manifestation: "it is -attributed to manifestation which is a relation"[78:1]. The Universe -was created out of darkness on which God sprinkled[79:1] his own light, -and made its different parts more or less visible according as they -received more or less light. As bodies differ from one another in being -dark, obscure, illuminated or illuminating, so men are differentiated -from one another. There are some who illuminate other human beings; and, -for this reason, the Prophet is named "The Burning Lamp" in the Qur'an. - - [78:1] Mishkatal-Anwar, fol. 3a. - - [79:1] In support of this view Al-Ghazali quotes a tradition - of the prophet. Mishkatal-Anwar, fol. 10a. - -The physical eye sees only the external manifestation of the Absolute or -Real Light. There is an internal eye in the heart of man which, unlike -the physical eye, sees itself as other things, an eye which goes beyond -the finite, and pierces the veil of manifestation. These thoughts are -merely germs, which developed and fructified in Al-Ishraqi's -"Philosophy of Illumination"--Hikmatal-Ishraq. - -Such is the Ash`arite philosophy. - -One great theological result of this reaction was that it checked the -growth of freethought which tended to dissolve the solidarity of the -Church. We are, however, concerned more with the purely intellectual -results of the Ash`arite mode of thought, and these are mainly two:-- - -(1). It led to an independent criticism of Greek philosophy as we shall -see presently. - -(2). In the beginning of the 10th century when the Ash`arite had -almost completely demolished the stronghold of Rationalism, we see a -tendency towards what may be called Persian Positivism. Al-Biruni[80:1] -(d. 1048) and Ibn Haitham[80:2] (d. 1038) who anticipated modern -empirical Psychology in recognising what is called reaction-time, gave -up all inquiry concerning the nature of the supersensual, and maintained -a prudent silence about religious matters. Such a state of things could -have existed, but could not have been logically justified before -Al-Ash`ari. - - [80:1] He (Al-Biruni) quotes with approval the following, as the - teaching of the adherents of Aryabhatta: It is enough for us to - know that which is lighted up by the sun's rays. Whatever lies - beyond, though it should be of immeasurable extent, we cannot - make use of; for what the sunbeam does not reach, the senses do - not perceive, and what the senses do not perceive we cannot - know. From this we gather what Al-Biruni's Philosophy was: only - sense-perceptions, knit together by a logical intelligence, - yield sure knowledge. (Boer's Philosophy in Islam, p. 146). - - [80:2] "Moreover truth for him (Ibn Haitham) was only that - which was presented as material for the faculties of - sense-perception, and which received it from the understanding, - being thus the logically elaborated perception". (Boer's - Philosophy in Islam, p. 150). - - [80:2] "Moreover truth for him (Ibn Haitham) was only that - which was presented as material for the faculties of - sense-perception, and which received it from the understanding, - being thus the logically elaborated perception". (Boer's - Philosophy in Islam, p. 150). - - - - -CHAP. IV. - -CONTROVERSY BETWEEN IDEALISM AND REALISM. - - -The Ash`arite denial of Aristotle's Prima Materia, and their views -concerning the nature of space, time and causation, awakened that -irrepressible spirit of controversy which, for centuries, divided the -camp of Muhammedan thinkers, and eventually exhausted its vigor in the -merely verbal subtleties of schools. The publication of Najm al-Din -Al-Katibi's (a follower of Aristotle whose disciples were called -Philosophers as distinguished from scholastic theologians) Hikmat -al-`Ain--"Philosophy of Essence", greatly intensified the intellectual -conflict, and invoked keen criticism from a host of Ash`arite as well -as other idealist thinkers. I shall consider in order the principal -points on which the two schools differed from each other. - - -A. _The Nature of the Essence._ - -We have seen that the Ash`arite theory of knowledge drove them to -hold that individual essences of various things are quite different from -each other, and are determined in each case by the ultimate cause--God. -They denied the existence of an everchanging primary stuff common to all -things, and maintained against the Rationalists that existence -constitutes the very being of the essence. To them, therefore, essence -and existence are identical. They argued that the Judgment, "Man is -animal", is possible only on the ground of a fundamental difference -between the subject and the predicate; since their identity would make -the Judgment nugatory, and complete difference would make the -predication false. It is, therefore, necessary to postulate an external -cause to determine the various forms of existence. Their opponents, -however, admit the determination or limitation of existence, but they -maintain that all the various forms of existence, in so far as their -essence is concerned, are identical--all being limitations of one -Primary substance. The followers of Aristotle met the difficulty -suggested by the possibility of synthetic predication, by advocating the -possibility of compound essences. Such a judgment as "Man is animal", -they maintained, is true; because man is an essence composed of two -essences, animality and humanity. This, retorted the Ash`arite, cannot -stand criticism. If you say that the essence of man and animal is the -same, you in other words hold that the essence of the whole is the same -as that of the part. But this proposition is absurd; since if the -essence of the compound is the same as that of its constituents, the -compound will have to be regarded as one being having two essences or -existences. - -It is obvious that the whole controversy turns on the question whether -existence is a mere idea or something objectively real. When we say that -a certain thing exists, do we mean that it exists only in relation to us -(Ash`arite position); or that it is an essence existing quite -independently of us (Realist position)? We shall briefly indicate the -arguments of either side. The Realist argued as follows:-- - -(1). The conception of my existence is something immediate or intuitive. -The thought "I exist" is a "concept", and my body being an element of -this "concept", it follows that my body is intuitively known as -something real. If the knowledge of the existent is not immediate, the -fact of its perception would require a process of thought which, as we -know, it does not. The Ash`arite Al-Razi admits that the concept of -existence is immediate; but he regards the judgment--"The concept of -existence is immediate"--as merely a matter of acquisition. Muhammad ibn -Mubarak Bukhari, on the other hand, says that the whole argument of -the realist proceeds on the assumption that the concept of my existence -is something immediate--a position which can be controverted.[84:1] If, -says he, we admit that the concept of my existence is immediate, -abstract existence cannot be regarded as a constitutive element of this -conception. And if the realist maintains that the perception of a -particular object is immediate, we admit the truth of what he says; but -it would not follow, as he is anxious to establish, that the so called -underlying essence is immediately known as objectively real. The -realist argument, moreover, demands that the mind ought not to be able -to conceive the predication of qualities to things. We cannot conceive, -"snow is white", because whiteness, being a part of this immediate -judgment, must also be immediately known without any predication. Mulla -Muhammad Hashim Husaini remarks[85:1] that this reasoning is -erroneous. The mind in the act of predicating whiteness of snow is -working on a purely ideal existence--the quality of whiteness--and not -on an objectively real essence of which the qualities are mere facets or -aspects. Husaini, moreover, anticipates Hamilton, and differs from other -realists in holding that the so-called unknowable essence of the object -is also immediately known. The object, he says, is immediately perceived -as one.[85:2] We do not successively perceive the various aspects of -what happens to be the objects of our perception. - - [84:1] Muhammad ibn Mubarak's commentary on Hikmat al-`Ain, - fol. 5a. - - [85:1] Husaini's commentary on Hikmat al-`Ain, fol. 13a. - - [85:2] Husaini's commentary on Hikmat al-`Ain, fol. 14b. - -(2) The idealist, says the realist, reduces all quality to mere -subjective relations. His argument leads him to deny the underlying -essence of things, and to look upon them as entirely heterogeneous -collections of qualities, the essence of which consists merely in the -phenomenal fact of their perception. In spite of his belief in the -complete heterogeneity of things, he applies the word existence to all -things--a tacit admission that there is some essence common to all the -various forms of existence. Abu'l-Hasan al-Ash`ari replies that this -application is only a verbal convenience, and is not meant to indicate -the so-called internal homogeneity of things. But the universal -application of the word existence by the idealist, must mean, according -to the realist, that the existence of a thing either constitutes its -very essence, or it is something superadded to the underlying essence of -the thing. The first supposition is a virtual admission as to the -homogeneity of things; since we cannot maintain that existence peculiar -to one thing is fundamentally different from existence peculiar to -another. The supposition that existence is something superadded to the -essence of a thing leads to an absurdity; since in this case the essence -will have to be regarded as something distinct from existence; and the -denial of essence (with the Ash`arite) would blot out the distinction -between existence and non-existence. Moreover, what was the essence -before existence was superadded to it? We must not say that the essence -was ready to receive existence before it actually did receive it; since -this statement would imply that the essence was non-existence before it -received existence. Likewise the statement that the essence has the -power of receiving the quality of non-existence, implies the absurdity -that it does already exist. Existence, therefore, must be regarded as -forming a part of the essence. But if it forms a part of the essence, -the latter will have to be regarded as a compound. If, on the other -hand, existence is external to the essence, it must be something -contingent because of its dependence on something other than itself. Now -everything contingent must have a cause. If this cause is the essence -itself, it would follow that the essence existed before it existed; -since the cause must precede the effect in the fact of existence. If, -however, the cause of existence is something other than the essence, it -follows that the existence of God also must be explained by some cause -other than the essence of God--an absurd conclusion which turns the -necessary into the contingent.[88:1] This argument of the realist is -based on a complete misunderstanding of the idealist position. He does -not see that the idealist never regarded the fact of existence as -something superadded to the essence of a thing; but always held it to be -identical with the essence. The essence, says ibn Mubarak,[88:2] is the -cause of existence without being chronologically before it. The -existence of the essence constitutes its very being; it is not dependent -for it on something other than itself. - - [88:1] Ibn Mubarak's Commentary, fol. 8b. - - [88:2] Ibn Mubarak's Commentary, fol. 9a. - -The truth is that both sides are far from a true theory of knowledge. -The agnostic realist who holds that behind the phenomenal qualities of a -thing, there is an essence operating as their cause, is guilty of a -glaring contradiction. He holds that underlying the thing there is an -_unknowable_ essence or substratum which is _known_ to exist. The -Ash`arite idealist, on the other hand, misunderstands the process of -knowledge. He ignores the mental activity involved in the act of -knowledge; and looks upon perceptions as mere presentations which are -determined, as he says, by God. But if the order of presentations -requires a cause to account for it, why should not that cause be sought -in the original constitution of matter as Locke did? Moreover, the -theory that knowledge is a mere passive perception or awareness of what -is presented, leads to certain inadmissible conclusions which the -Ash`arite never thought of:-- - -(a). They did not see that their purely subjective conception of -knowledge swept away all possibility of error. If the existence of a -thing is merely the fact of its being presented, there is no reason why -it should be cognised as different from what it actually is. - -(b). They did not see that on their theory of knowledge, our -fellow-beings like other elements of the physical order, would have no -higher reality than mere states of my consciousness. - -(c). If knowledge is a mere receptivity of presentations, God who, as -cause of presentations, is active in regard to the act of our knowledge, -must not be aware of our presentations. From the Ash`arite point of -view this conclusion is fatal to their whole position. They cannot say -that presentations on their ceasing to be my presentations, continue to -be presentations to God's consciousness. - -Another question connected with the nature of the essence is, whether it -is caused or uncaused. The followers of Aristotle, or philosophers as -they are generally called by their opponents, hold that the underlying -essence of things is uncaused. The Ash`arite hold the opposite view. -Essence, says the Aristotelian, cannot be acted upon by any external -agent.[90:1] Al-Katibi argues that if, for instance, the essence of -humanity had resulted from the operation of an external activity, doubt -as to its being the real essence of humanity would have been possible. -As a matter of fact we never entertain such a doubt; it follows, -therefore, that the essence is not due to the activity of an agency -external to itself. The idealist starts with the realist distinction of -essence and existence, and argues that the realist line of argument -would lead to the absurd proposition--that man is uncaused; since he -must be regarded, according to the realist, as a combination of two -uncaused essences--existence and humanity. - - [90:1] Ibn Mubarak's Commentary, fol. 20a. - - -B. _The Nature of Knowledge._ - -The followers of Aristotle, true to their position as to the independent -objective reality of the essence, define knowledge as "receiving images -of external things".[91:1] It is possible to conceive, they argue, an -object which is externally unreal, and to which other qualities can be -attributed. But when we attribute to it the quality of existence, actual -existence is necessitated; since the affirmation of the quality of a -thing is a part of the affirmation of that thing. If, therefore, the -predication of existence does not necessitate actual objective existence -of the thing, we are driven to deny externality altogether, and to hold -that the thing exists in the mind as a mere idea. But the affirmation -of a thing, says Ibn Mubarak, constitutes the very existence of the -thing. The idealist makes no such distinction as affirmation and -existence. To infer from the above argument that the thing must be -regarded as existing in the mind, is unjustifiable. "Ideal" existence -follows only from the denial of externality which the Ash`arite do not -deny; since they hold that knowledge is a relation between the knower -and the known which is known as external. Al-Katibi's proposition that -if the thing does not exist as external existence, it must exist as -ideal or mental existence, is self-contradictory; since, on his -principles, everything that exists in idea exists in externality.[92:1] - - [91:1] Ibn Mubarak, fol. 11a. - - [92:1] Ibn Mubarak, fol. 11b. - - -C. _The Nature of Non-existence._ - -Al-Katibi explains and criticises the proposition, maintained by -contemporary philosophers generally--"That the existent is good, and the -non-existent is evil".[92:2] The fact of murder, he says, is not evil -because the murderer had the power of committing such a thing; or -because the instrument of murder had the power of cutting; or because -the neck of the murdered had the capacity of being cut asunder. It is -evil because it signifies the negation of life--a condition which is -non-existential, and not existential like the conditions indicated -above. But in order to show that evil is non-existence, we should make -an inductive inquiry, and examine all the various cases of evil. A -perfect induction, however, is impossible, and an incomplete induction -cannot prove the point. Al-Katibi, therefore, rejects this proposition, -and holds that "non-existence is absolute nothing".[93:1] The possible -'_essences_', according to him, are not lying fixed in space waiting for -the attribute of existence; otherwise fixity in space would have to be -regarded as possessing no existence. But his critics hold that this -argument is true only on the supposition that fixity in space and -existence are identical. Fixity in externality, says Ibn Mubarak, is a -conception wider than existence. All existence is external, but all that -is external is not necessarily existent. - - [92:2] Ibn Mubarak, fol. 14a. - - [93:1] Ibn Mubarak's Commentary, fol. 14b. - -The interest of the Ash`arite in the dogma of the Resurrection--the -possibility of the reappearance of the non-existent as existent--led -them to advocate the apparently absurd proposition that "non-existence -or nothing _is_ something". They argued that, since we make judgments -about the non-existent, it is, therefore, known; and the fact of its -knowability indicates that "the nothing" is not absolutely nothing. The -knowable is a case of affirmation and the non-existent being knowable, -is a case of affirmation.[94:1] Al-Katibi denies the truth of the Major. -Impossible things, he says, are known, yet they do not externally exist. -Al-Razi criticises this argument accusing Al-Katibi of the ignorance of -the fact that the '_essence_' exists in the mind, and yet is known as -external. Al-Katibi supposes that the knowledge of a thing necessitates -its existence as an independent objective reality. Moreover it should be -remembered that the Ash`arite discriminate between positive and -existent on the one hand, and non-existent and negative on the other. -They say that all existent is positive, but the converse of this -proposition is not true. There is certainly a relation between the -existent and the non-existent, but there is absolutely no relation -between the positive and the negative. We do not say, as Al-Katibi -holds, that the impossible is non-existent; we say that the impossible -is only negative. Substances which do exist are something positive. As -regards the attribute which cannot be conceived as existing apart from -the substance, it is neither existent nor non-existent, but something -between the two. Briefly the Ash`arite position is as follows:-- - -"A thing has a proof of its existence or not. If not, it is called -negative. If it has a proof of its existence, it is either substance or -attribute. If it is substance and has the attribute of existence or -non-existence, (i.e. it is perceived or not) it is existent or -non-existent accordingly. If it is attribute, it is neither existent nor -non-existent".[95:1] - - [94:1] Ibn Mubarak's Commentary, fol. 15a. - - [95:1] Ibn Mubarak's Commentary, fol. 15b. - - - - -CHAP. V. - -SUFIISM. - - -§ I. - -The origin and Quranic Justification of Sufiism. - -It has become quite a fashion with modern oriental scholarship to trace -the chain of influences. Such a procedure has certainly great historical -value, provided it does not make us ignore the fundamental fact, that -the human mind possesses an independent individuality, and, acting on -its own initiative, can gradually evolve out of itself, truths which may -have been anticipated by other minds ages ago. No idea can seize a -people's soul unless, in some sense, it is the people's own. External -influences may wake it up from its deep unconscious slumber; but they -cannot, so to speak, create it out of nothing. - -Much has been written about the origin of Persian Sufiism; and, in -almost all cases, explorers of this most interesting field of research -have exercised their ingenuity in discovering the various channels -through which the basic ideas of Sufiism might have travelled from one -place to another. They seem completely to have ignored the principle, -that the full significance of a phenomenon in the intellectual evolution -of a people, can only be comprehended in the light of those pre-existing -intellectual, political, and social conditions which alone make its -existence inevitable. Von Kremer and Dozy derive Persian Sufiism from -the Indian Vedanta; Merx and Mr. Nicholson derive it from Neo-Platonism; -while Professor Browne once regarded it as Aryan reaction against an -unemotional semitic religion. It appears to me, however, that these -theories have been worked out under the influence of a notion of -causation which is essentially false. That a fixed quantity A is the -cause of, or produces another fixed quantity B, is a proposition which, -though convenient for scientific purposes, is apt to damage all inquiry, -in so far as it leads us completely to ignore the innumerable conditions -lying at the back of a phenomenon. It would, for instance, be an -historical error to say that the dissolution of the Roman Empire was due -to the barbarian invasions. The statement completely ignores other -forces of a different character that tended to split up the political -unity of the Empire. To describe the advent of barbarian invasions as -the cause of the dissolution of the Roman Empire which could have -assimilated, as it actually did to a certain extent, the so-called -cause, is a procedure that no logic would justify. Let us, therefore, in -the light of a truer theory of causation, enumerate the principal -political, social, and intellectual conditions of Islamic life about the -end of the 8{th} and the first half of the 9{th} century when, properly -speaking, the Sufi ideal of life came into existence, to be soon -followed by a philosophical justification of that ideal.-- - -(1). When we study the history of the time, we find it to be a time of -more or less political unrest. The latter half of the 8{th} century -presents, besides the political revolution which resulted in the -overthrow of the Umayyads (749 A.D.), persecutions of Zendiks, and -revolts of Persian heretics (Sindbah 755-6; Ustadhis 766-8; the veiled -prophet of Khurasan 777-80) who, working on the credulity of the -people, cloaked, like Lamennais in our own times, political projects -under the guise of religious ideas. Later on in the beginning of the -9{th} century we find the sons of Harun (Ma'mun and Amin) engaged in a -terrible conflict for political supremacy; and still later, we see the -Golden Age of Islamic literature seriously disturbed by the persistent -revolt of the Mazdakite Babak (816-838). The early years of Ma'mun's -reign present another social phenomenon of great political -significance--the Shu`ubiyya controversy (815), which progresses with -the rise and establishment of independent Persian families, the Tahirid -(820), the Saffarid (868), and the Samanid Dynasty (874). It is, -therefore, the combined force of these and other conditions of a similar -nature that contributed to drive away spirits of devotional character -from the scene of continual unrest to the blissful peace of an -ever-deepening contemplative life. The semitic character of the life and -thought of these early Muhammadan ascetics is gradually followed by a -large hearted pantheism of a more or less Aryan stamp, the development -of which, in fact, runs parallel to the slowly progressing political -independence of Persia. - -(2). _The Sceptical tendencies of Islamic Rationalism_ which found an -early expression in the poems of Bashshar ibn Burd--the blind -Persian Sceptic who deified fire, and scoffed at all non-Persian modes -of thought. The germs of Scepticism latent in Rationalism ultimately -necessitated an appeal to a super-intellectual source of knowledge which -asserted itself in the Risala of Al-Qushairi (986). In our own times -the negative results of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason drove Jacobi and -Schleiermacher to base faith on the feeling of the reality of the ideal; -and to the 19{th} century sceptic Wordsworth uncovered that mysterious -state of mind "in which we grow all spirit and see into the life of -things". - -(3). The unemotional piety of the various schools of Islam--the Hanafite -(Abu Hanifa d. 767), the Shafiite (Al-Shafi`i d. 820), the Malikite -(Al-Malik d. 795), and the anthropomorphic Hambalite (Ibn Hambal d. -855)--the bitterest enemy of independent thought--which ruled the masses -after the death of Al-Ma'mun. - -(4). The religious discussions among the representatives of various -creeds encouraged by Al-Ma'mun, and especially the bitter theological -controversy between the Ash`arites, and the advocates of Rationalism -which tended not only to confine religion within the narrow limits of -schools, but also stirred up the spirit to rise above all petty -sectarian wrangling. - -(5). The gradual softening of religious fervency due to the -rationalistic tendency of the early `Abbasid period, and the rapid -growth of wealth which tended to produce moral laxity and indifference -to religious life in the upper circles of Islam. - -(6). The presence of Christianity as a working ideal of life. It was, -however, principally the actual life of the Christian hermit rather than -his religious ideas, that exercised the greatest fascination over the -minds of early Islamic Saints whose complete unworldliness, though -extremely charming in itself, is, I believe, quite contrary to the -spirit of Islam. - -Such was principally the environment of Sufiism, and it is to the -combined action of the above condition that we should look for the -origin and development of Sufiistic ideas. Given these condition and the -Persian mind with an almost innate tendency towards monism, the whole -phenomenon of the birth and growth of Sufiism is explained. If we now -study the principal pre-existing conditions of Neo-Platonism, we find -that similar conditions produced similar results. The barbarian raids -which were soon to reduce Emperors of the Palace to Emperors of the -Camp, assumed a more serious aspect about the middle of the third -century. Plotinus himself speaks of the political unrest of his time in -one of his letters to Flaccus.[102:1] When he looked round himself in -Alexandria, his birth place, he noticed signs of growing toleration and -indifferentism towards religious life. Later on in Rome which had -become, so to say, a pantheon of different nations, he found a similar -want of seriousness in life, a similar laxity of character in the upper -classes of society. In more learned circles philosophy was studied as a -branch of literature rather than for its own sake; and Sextus Empiricus, -provoked by Antiochus's tendency to fuse scepticism and Stoicism was -teaching the old unmixed scepticism of Pyrrho--that intellectual despair -which drove Plotinus to find truth in a revelation above thought itself. -Above all, the hard unsentimental character of Stoic morality, and the -loving piety of the followers of Christ who, undaunted by long and -fierce persecutions, were preaching the message of peace and love to the -whole Roman world, necessitated a restatement of Pagan thought in a way -that might revivify the older ideals of life, and suit the new spiritual -requirements of the people. But the ethical force of Christianity was -too great for Neo-Platonism which, on account of its more -metaphysical[103:1] character, had no message for the people at large, -and was consequently inaccessible to the rude barbarian who, being -influenced by the actual life of the persecuted Christian adopted -Christianity, and settled down to construct new empires out of the ruins -of the old. In Persia the influence of culture-contacts and -cross-fertilisation of ideas created in certain minds a vague desire to -realise a similar restatement of Islam, which gradually assimilated -Christian ideals as well as Christian Gnostic speculation, and found a -firm foundation in the Qur'an. The flower of Greek Thought faded away -before the breath of Christianity; but the burning simoon of Ibn -Taimiyya's invective could not touch the freshness of the Persian rose. -The one was completely swept away by the flood of barbarian invasions; -the other, unaffected by the Tartar revolution, still holds its own. - - [102:1] "Tidings have reached us that Valerian has been - defeated, and is now in the hands of Sapor. The threats of - Franks and Allemanni, of Goths and Persians, are alike terrible - by turns to our _degenerate_ Rome." (Plotinus to Flaccus; quoted - by Vaughan in his Half hours with Mystics, p. 63.) - - [103:1] The element of ecstacy which could have appealed to some - minds was thrown into the background by the later teachers of - Neo-Platonism, so that it became a mere system of thought having - no human interest. Says Whittaker:--"The mystical ecstacy was - not found by the later teachers of the school easier to attain, - but more difficult; and the tendency became more and more to - regard it as all but unattainable on earth." Neo-Platonism, p. - 101. - -This extraordinary vitality of the Sufi restatement of Islam, however, -is explained when we reflect on the all-embracing structure of Sufiism. -The semitic formula of salvation can be briefly stated in the words, -"Transform your will",--which signifies that the Semite looks upon will -as the essence of the human soul. The Indian Vedantist, on the other -hand, teaches that all pain is due to our mistaken attitude towards -the Universe. He, therefore, commands us to transform our -understanding--implying thereby that the essential nature of man -consists in thought, not activity or will. But the Sufi holds that the -mere transformation of will or understanding will not bring peace; we -should bring about the transformation of both by a complete -transformation of feeling, of which will and understanding are only -specialised forms. His message to the individual is--"Love all, and -forget your own individuality in doing good to others." Says Rumi:--"To -win other people's hearts is the greatest pilgrimage; and one heart is -worth more than a thousand Ka`bahs. Ka`bah is a mere cottage of Abraham; -but the heart is the very home of God." But this formula demands a _why_ -and a _how_--a metaphysical justification of the ideal in order to -satisfy the understanding; and rules of action in order to guide the -will. Sufiism furnishes both. Semitic religion is a code of strict rules -of conduct; the Indian Vedanta, on the other hand, is a cold system of -thought. Sufiism avoids their incomplete Psychology, and attempts to -synthesise both the Semitic and the Aryan formulas in the higher -category of Love. On the one hand it assimilates the Buddhistic idea of -Nirwana (Fana-Annihilation), and seeks to build a metaphysical system in -the light of this idea; on the other hand it does not disconnect itself -from Islam, and finds the justification of its view of the Universe in -the Qur'an. Like the geographical position of its home, it stands midway -between the Semitic and the Aryan, assimilating ideas from both sides, -and giving them the stamp of its own individuality which, on the whole, -is more Aryan than Semitic in character. It would, therefore, be evident -that the secret of the vitality of Sufiism is the complete view of human -nature upon which it is based. It has survived orthodox persecutions and -political revolutions, because it appeals to human nature in its -entirety; and, while it concentrates its interest chiefly in a _life_ of -self-denial, it allows free play to the speculative tendency as well. - -I will now briefly indicate how Sufi writers justify their views from -the Quranic standpoint. There is no historical evidence to show that the -Prophet of Arabia actually communicated certain esoteric doctrines to -`Ali or Abu Bakr. The Sufi, however, contends that the Prophet had an -esoteric teaching--"wisdom"--as distinguished from the teaching -contained in the Book, and he brings forward the following verse to -substantiate his case:--"As we have sent a prophet to you from among -yourselves who reads our verses to you, purifies you, teaches you the -Book and the _Wisdom_, and teaches you _what you did not know -before_."[107:1] He holds that "the wisdom" spoken of in the verse, is -something not incorporated in the teaching of the Book which, as the -Prophet repeatedly declared, had been taught by several prophets before -him. If, he says, the wisdom is included in the Book, the word "Wisdom" -in the verse would be redundant. It can, I think, be easily shown that -in the Qur'an as well as in the authenticated traditions, there are -germs of Sufi doctrine which, owing to the thoroughly practical genius -of the Arabs, could not develop and fructify in Arabia, but which grew -up into a distinct doctrine when they found favourable circumstances in -alien soils. The Qur'an thus defines the Muslims:--"Those who believe in -the Unseen, establish daily prayer, and spend out of what We have given -them."[108:1] But the question arises as to the _what_ and the _where_ -of the Unseen. The Qur'an replies that the Unseen is in your own -soul--"And in the earth there are signs to those who believe, and in -yourself,--what! do you not then see!"[108:2] And again--"We are nigher -to him (man) than his own jugular vein."[108:3] Similarly the Holy Book -teaches that the essential nature of the Unseen is pure light--"God is -the light of heavens and earth."[108:4] As regards the question whether -this Primal Light is personal, the Qur'an, in spite of many expressions -signifying personality, declares in a few words--"There is nothing like -him."[108:5] - - [107:1] Sura 2, v. 146. - - [108:1] Sura 2, v. 2. - - [108:2] Sura 51, v. 20, 21. - - [108:3] Sura 50, v. 15. - - [108:4] Sura 24, v. 35. - - [108:5] Sura 42, v. 9. - -These are some of the chief verses out of which the various Sufi -commentators develop pantheistic views of the Universe. They enumerate -the following four stages of spiritual training through which the -soul--the order or reason of the Primal Light--("Say that the soul is -the order or reason of God.")[109:1] has to pass, if it desires to rise -above the common herd, and realise its union or identity with the -ultimate source of all things:-- - -(1). Belief in the Unseen. - -(2). Search after the Unseen. The spirit of inquiry leaves its slumber -by observing the marvellous phenomena of nature. "Look at the camel how -it is created; the skies how they are exalted; the mountains how they -are unshakeably fixed."[109:2] - -(3). The knowledge of the Unseen. This comes, as we have indicated -above, by looking into the depths of our own soul. - -(4). The Realisation--This results, according to the higher Sufiism -from the constant practice of Justice and Charity--"Verily God bids you -do justice and good, and give to kindred (their due), and He forbids you -to sin, and do wrong, and oppress".[110:1] - - [109:1] Sura 17; v. 87. - - [109:2] Sura 88; v. 20. - - [110:1] Sura 16; v. 92. - -It must, however, be remembered that some later Sufi fraternities (e.g. -Naqshbandi) devised, or rather borrowed[110:2] from the Indian -Vedantist, other means of bringing about this Realisation. They taught, -imitating the Hindu doctrine of Kundalini, that there are six great -centres of light of various colours in the body of man. It is the object -of the Sufi to make them move, or to use the technical word, "current" -by certain methods of meditation, and eventually to realise, amidst the -apparent diversity of colours, the fundamental colourless light which -makes everything visible, and is itself invisible. The continual -movement of these centres of light through the body, and the final -realisation of their identity, which results from putting the atoms of -the body into definite courses of motion by slow repetition of the -various names of God and other mysterious expressions, illuminates the -whole body of the Sufi; and the perception of the same illumination in -the external world completely extinguishes the sense of "otherness." The -fact that these methods were known to the Persian Sufis misled Von -Kremer who ascribed the whole phenomenon of Sufiism to the influence of -Vedantic ideas. Such methods of contemplation are quite unislamic in -character, and the higher Sufis do not attach any importance to them. - - [110:2] Weber makes the following statement on the authority of - Lassen:--"Al-Biruni translated Patanjali's work into Arabic at - the beginning of the 11th century, and also, it would appear, - the Sankhya sutra, though the information we have as to the - contents of these works does not harmonise with the Sanskrit - originals." History of Indian Literature, p. 239. - - -§ II. - -Aspects of Sufi-Metaphysics. - -Let us now return to the various schools or rather the various aspects -of Sufi Metaphysics. A careful investigation of Sufi literature shows -that Sufiism has looked at the Ultimate Reality from three standpoints -which, in fact, do not exclude but complement each other. Some Sufis -conceive the essential nature of reality as self-conscious will, others -beauty; others again hold that Reality is essentially Thought, Light or -Knowledge. There are, therefore, three aspects of Sufi thought:-- - -A. _Reality as Self-conscious Will._ - -The first in historical order is that represented by Shaqiq Balkhi, -Ibrahim Adham, Rabi`a, and others. This school conceives the ultimate -reality as "Will", and the Universe a finite activity of that will. It -is essentially monotheistic and consequently more semitic in character. -It is not the desire of Knowledge which dominates the ideal of the Sufis -of this school, but the characteristic features of their life are piety, -unworldliness, and an intense longing for God due to the consciousness -of sin. Their object is not to philosophise, but principally to work out -a certain ideal of life. From our standpoint, therefore, they are not of -much importance. - -B. _Reality as Beauty._ - -In the beginning of the 9{th} century Ma`ruf Karkhi defined Sufiism -as "Apprehension of Divine realities"[113:1]--a definition which marks -the movement from Faith to Knowledge. But the method of apprehending the -ultimate reality was formally stated by Al-Qushairi about the end of -the 10{th} century. The teachers of this school adopted the Neo-Platonic -idea of creation by intermediary agencies; and though this idea lingered -in the minds of Sufi writers for a long time, yet their Pantheism led -them to abandon the Emanation theory altogether. Like Avicenna they -looked upon the ultimate Reality as "Eternal Beauty" whose very nature -consists in seeing its own "face" reflected in the Universe-mirror. The -Universe, therefore, became to them a reflected image of the "Eternal -Beauty", and not an emanation as the Neo-Platonists had taught. The -cause of creation, says Mir Sayyid Sharif, is the manifestation of -Beauty, and the first creation is Love. The realisation of this Beauty, -is brought about by universal love, which the innate Zoroastrian -instinct of the Persian Sufi loved to define as "the Sacred Fire which -burns up everything other than God." Says Rumi:-- - - "O thou pleasant madness, Love! - Thou Physician of all our ills! - Thou healer of pride, - Thou Plato and Galen of our souls!"[114:1] - - [113:1] Mr. Nicholson has collected the various definitions of - Sufiism. See J. R. A. S. April, 1906. - - [114:1] Mathnawi, Jalal al Din Rumi, with Bahral `ulum's - Commentary. Lucknow (India), 1877, p. 9. - -As a direct consequence of such a view of the Universe, we have the idea -of impersonal absorption which first appears in Bayazid of Bistam, and -which constitutes the characteristic feature of the later development of -this school. The growth of this idea may have been influenced by Hindu -pilgrims travelling through Persia to the Buddhistic temple still -existing at Baku.[114:2] The school became wildly pantheistic in Husain -Mansur who, in the true spirit of the Indian Vedantist, cried out, "I am -God"--Aham Brahma asmi. - - [114:2] As regards the progress of Buddhism Geiger says:--"We - know that in the period after Alexander, Buddhism was powerful - in Eastern Iran, and that it counted its confessors as far as - Tabaristan. It is especially certain that many Buddhistic - priests were found in Bactria. This state of things, which began - perhaps in the first century before Christ, lasted till the - 7{th} century A.D., when the appearance of Islamism alone cut - short the development of Buddhism in Kabul and Bactria, and it - is in that period that we will have to place the rise of the - Zarathushtra legend in the form in which it is presented to us - by Daqiqi." - - Civilisation of Eastern Iranians - Vol. II, p. 170. - -The ultimate Reality or Eternal Beauty, according to the Sufis of this -school, is infinite in the sense that "it is absolutely free from the -limitations of beginning, end, right, left, above, and below."[115:1] -The distinction of essence and attribute does not exist in the -Infinite--"Substance and quality are really identical."[115:2] We have -indicated above that nature is the mirror of the Absolute Existence. But -according to Nasafi, there are two kinds of mirrors[115:3]-- - -(a). That which shows merely a reflected image--this is external nature. - -(b). That which shows the real Essence--this is man who is a limitation -of the Absolute, and erroneously thinks himself to be an independent -entity. - - [115:1] Nasafi's Maqsadi Aqsa: fol. 8b. - - [115:2] Nasafi's Maqsadi Aqsa: fol. 10b. - - [115:3] Nasafi's Maqsadi Aqsa: fol. 23b. - -"O Derwish!" says Nasafi "dost thou think that thy existence is -independent of God? This is a great error."[116:1] Nasafi explains his -meaning by a beautiful parable.[116:2] The fishes in a certain tank -realised that they lived, moved, and had their being in water, but felt -that they were quite ignorant of the real nature of what constituted the -very source of their life. They resorted to a wiser fish in a great -river, and the Philosopher-fish addressed them thus:-- - -"O you who endeavour to untie the knot (of being)! You are born in -union, yet die in the thought of an unreal separation. Thirsty on the -sea-shore! Dying penniless while master of the treasure!" - - [116:1] Nasafi's Maqsadi Aqsa: fol. 3b. - - [116:2] Nasafi's Maqsadi Aqsa: fol. 15b. - -All feeling of separation, therefore, is ignorance; and all "otherness" -is a mere appearance, a dream, a shadow--a differentiation born of -relation essential to the self-recognition of the Absolute. The great -prophet of this school is "The excellent Rumi" as Hegel calls him. He -took up the old Neo-Platonic idea of the Universal soul working through -the various spheres of being, and expressed it in a way so modern in -spirit that Clodd introduces the passage in his "Story of Creation". I -venture to quote this famous passage in order to show how successfully -the poet anticipates the modern concept of evolution, which he regarded -as the realistic side of his Idealism. - - First man appeared in the clan of inorganic things, - Next he passed therefrom into that of plants. - For years he lived as one of the plants, - Remembering nought of his inorganic state so different; - And when he passed from the vegetive to the animal state, - He had no remembrance of his state as a plant, - Except the inclination he felt to the world of plants, - Especially at the time of spring and sweet flowers; - Like the inclination of infants towards their mothers, - Which know not the cause of their inclination to the breast. - Again the great creator as you know, - Drew man out of the animal into the human state. - Thus man passed from one order of nature to another, - Till he became wise and knowing and strong as he is now. - Of his first soul he has now no remembrance, - And he will be again changed from his present soul. - - (Mathnawi Book IV). - -It would now be instructive if we compare this aspect of Sufi thought -with the fundamental ideas of Neo-Platonism. The God of Neo-Platonism is -immanent as well as transcendant. "As being the cause of all things, it -is everywhere. As being other than all things, it is nowhere. If it were -only "everywhere", and not also "nowhere", it would _be_ all -things."[118:1] The Sufi, however, tersely says that God _is_ all -things. The Neo-Platonist allows a certain permanence or fixity to -matter;[118:2] but the Sufis of the school in question, regard all -empirical experience as a kind of dreaming. Life in limitation, they -say, is sleep; death brings the awakening. It is, however, the doctrine -of Impersonal immortality--"genuinely eastern in spirit"--which -distinguishes this school from Neo-Platonism. "Its (Arabian Philosophy) -distinctive doctrine", says Whittaker, "of an Impersonal immortality of -the general human intellect is, however, as contrasted with -Aristotelianism and Neo-Platonism, essentially original." - - [118:1] Whittaker's Neo-Platonism, p. 58. - - [118:2] Whittaker's Neo-Platonism, p. 57. - -The above brief exposition shows that there are three basic ideas of -this mode of thought:-- - -(a). That the ultimate Reality is knowable through a supersensual state -of consciousness. - -(b). That the ultimate Reality is impersonal. - -(c). That the ultimate Reality is one. - -Corresponding to these ideas we have: - -(I). The Agnostic reaction as manifested in the Poet `Umar Khayyam -(12{th} century) who cried out in his intellectual despair:-- - - The joyous souls who quaff potations deep, - And saints who in the mosque sad vigils keep, - Are lost at sea alike, and find no shore, - One only wakes, all others are asleep. - -(II). The monotheistic reaction of Ibn Taimiyya and his followers in the -13{th} century. - -(III). The Pluralistic reaction of Wahid Mahmud[119:1] in the 13{th} -century. - - [119:1] Dabistan, Chap: 8. - -Speaking from a purely philosophical standpoint, the last movement is -most interesting. The history of Thought illustrates the operation of -certain general laws of progress which are true of the intellectual -annals of different peoples. The German systems of monistic thought -invoked the pluralism of Herbart; while the pantheism of Spinoza called -forth the monadism of Leibniz. The operation of the same law led Wahid -Mahmud to deny the truth of contemporary monism, and declare that -Reality is not one but many. Long before Leibniz he taught that the -Universe is a combination of what he called "Afrad"--essential units, or -simple atoms which have existed from all eternity, and are endowed with -life. The law of the Universe is an ascending perfection of elemental -matter, continually passing from lower to higher forms determined by the -kind of food which the fundamental units assimilate. Each period of his -cosmogony comprises 8,000 years, and after eight such periods the world -is decomposed, and the units re-combine to construct a new universe. -Wahid Mahmud succeeded in founding a sect which was cruelly persecuted, -and finally stamped out of existence by Shah `Abbas. It is said that -the poet Hafiz of Shiraz believed in the tenets of this sect. - - -C. _Reality as Light or Thought._ - -The third great school of Sufiism conceives Reality as essentially Light -or Thought, the very nature of which demands something to be thought or -illuminated. While the preceding school abandoned Neo-Platonism, this -school transformed it into new systems. There are, however, two aspects -of the metaphysics of this school. The one is genuinely Persian in -spirit, the other is chiefly influenced by Christian modes of thought. -Both agree in holding that the fact of empirical diversity necessitates -a principle of difference in the nature of the ultimate Reality. I now -proceed to consider them in their historical order. - - -I. Reality as Light--Al-Ishraqi. - -Return to Persian Dualism. - -The application of Greek dialectic to Islamic Theology aroused that -spirit of critical examination which began with Al-Ash`ari, and found -its completest expression in the scepticism of Al-Ghazali. Even among -the Rationalists there were some more critical minds--such as -Nazzam--whose attitude towards Greek Philosophy was not one of servile -submission, but of independent criticism. The defenders of -dogma--Al-Ghazali, Al-Razi, Abul Barakat, and Al-Amidi, carried on a -persistent attack on the whole fabric of Greek Philosophy; while Abu -Sa`id Sairafi, Qadi `Abdal Jabbar, Abul Ma`ali, Abul Qasim, and finally -the acute Ibn Taimiyya, actuated by similar theological motives, -continued to expose the inherent weakness of Greek Logic. In their -criticism of Greek Philosophy, these thinkers were supplemented by some -of the more learned Sufis, such as Shahabal Din Suhrawardi, who -endeavoured to substantiate the helplessness of pure reason by his -refutation of Greek thought in a work entitled, "The unveiling of Greek -absurdities". The Ash`arite reaction against Rationalism resulted not -only in the development of a system of metaphysics most modern in some -of its aspects, but also in completely breaking asunder the worn out -fetters of intellectual thraldom. Erdmann[122:1] seems to think that the -speculative spirit among the Muslims exhausted itself with Al-Farabi and -Avicenna, and that after them Philosophy became bankrupt in passing over -into scepticism and mysticism. Evidently he ignores the Muslim criticism -of Greek Philosophy which led to the Ash`arite Idealism on the one -hand, and a genuine Persian reconstruction on the other. That a system -of thoroughly Persian character might be possible, the destruction of -foreign thought, or rather the weakening of its hold on the mind, was -indispensable. The Ash`arite and other defenders of Islamic Dogma -completed the destruction; Al-Ishraqi--the child of emancipation--came -forward to build a new edifice of thought; though, in his process of -reconstruction, he did not entirely repudiate the older material. His is -the genuine Persian brain which, undaunted by the threats of narrow -minded authority, asserts its right of free independent speculation. In -his philosophy the old Iranian tradition, which had found only a partial -expression in the writings of the Physician Al-Razi, Al-Ghazali, and -the Isma`ilia sect, endeavours to come to a final understanding with the -philosophy of his predecessors and the theology of Islam. - - [122:1] Vol. I, p. 367. - -Shaikh Shahabal Din Suhrawardi, known as Shaikhal Ishraq Maqtul -was born about the middle of the 12{th} century. He studied philosophy -with Majd Jili--the teacher of the commentator Al-Razi--and, while -still a youth, stood unrivalled as a thinker in the whole Islamic world. -His great admirer Al-Malik-al-Zahir--the son of Sultan Salah-al -Din--invited him to Aleppo, where the youthful philosopher expounded his -independent opinions in a way that aroused the bitter jealousy of -contemporary theologians. These hired slaves of bloodthirsty Dogmatism -which, conscious of its inherent weakness, has always managed to keep -brute force behind its back, wrote to Sultan Salah-al Din, that the -Shaikh's teaching was a danger to Islam, and that it was necessary, -in the interest of the Faith, to nip the evil in the bud. The Sultan -consented; and there, at the early age of 36, the young Persian thinker -calmly met the blow which made him a martyr of truth, and immortalised -his name for ever. Murderers have passed away, but the philosophy, the -price of which was paid in blood, still lives, and attracts many an -earnest seeker after truth. - -The principal features of the founder of the Ishraqi Philosophy are -his intellectual independence, the skill with which he weaves his -materials into a systematic whole, and above all his faithfulness to -the philosophic traditions of his country. In many fundamental points he -differs from Plato, and freely criticises Aristotle whose philosophy he -looks upon as a mere preparation for his own system of thought. Nothing -escapes his criticism. Even the logic of Aristotle, he subjects to a -searching examination, and shows the hollowness of some of its -doctrines. Definition, for instance, is genus plus differentia, -according to Aristotle. But Al-Ishraqi holds that the distinctive -attribute of the thing defined, which cannot be predicated of any other -thing, will bring us no knowledge of the thing. We define "horse" as a -neighing animal. Now we understand animality, because we know many -animals in which this attribute exists; but it is impossible to -understand the attribute "neighing", since it is found nowhere except in -the thing defined. The ordinary definition of horse, therefore, would be -meaningless to a man who has never seen a horse. Aristotelian -definition, as a scientific principle is quite useless. This criticism -leads the Shaikh, to a standpoint very similar to that of Bosanquet -who defines definition, as "Summation of qualities". The Shaikh -holds that a true definition would enumerate all the essential -attributes which, taken collectively, exist nowhere except the thing -defined, though they may individually exist in other things. - -But let us turn to his system of metaphysics, and estimate the worth of -his contribution to the thought of his country. In order fully to -comprehend the purely intellectual side of Transcendental philosophy, -the student, says the Shaikh, must be thoroughly acquainted with -Aristotelian philosophy, Logic, Mathematics, and Sufiism. His mind -should be completely free from the taint of prejudice and sin, so that -he may gradually develop that inner sense, which verifies and corrects -what intellect understands only as theory. Unaided reason is -untrustworthy; it must always be supplemented by "Dhauq"--the -mysterious perception of the essence of things--which brings knowledge -and peace to the restless soul, and disarms Scepticism for ever. We are, -however, concerned with the purely speculative side of this spiritual -experience--the results of the inner perception as formulated and -systematised by discursive thought. Let us, therefore, examine the -various aspects of the Ishraqi Philosophy--Ontology, Cosmology, and -Psychology. - - -Ontology. - -The ultimate principle of all existence is "Nur-i-Qahir"--the Primal -Absolute Light whose essential nature consists in perpetual -illumination. "Nothing is more visible than light, and visibility does -not stand in need of any definition."[127:1] The essence of Light, -therefore, is manifestation. For if manifestation is an attribute -superadded to light, it would follow that in itself light possesses no -visibility, and becomes visible only through something else visible in -itself; and from this again follows the absurd consequence, that -something other than light is more visible than light. The Primal Light, -therefore, has no reason of its existence beyond itself. All that is -other than this original principle is dependent, contingent, possible. -The "not-light" (darkness) is not something distinct proceeding from an -independent source. It is an error of the representatives of the Magian -religion to suppose that Light and Darkness are two distinct realities -created by two distinct creative agencies. The ancient Philosophers of -Persia were not dualists like the Zoroastrian priests who, on the ground -of the principle that the one cannot cause to emanate from itself more -than one, assigned two independent sources to Light and Darkness. The -relation between them is not that of contrariety, but of existence and -non-existence. The affirmation of Light necessarily posits its own -negation--Darkness which it must illuminate in order to be itself. This -Primordial Light is the source of all motion. But its motion is not -change of place; it is due to the _love_ of illumination which -constitutes its very essence, and stirs it up, as it were, to quicken -all things into life, by pouring out its own rays into their being. The -number of illuminations which proceed from it is infinite. Illuminations -of intenser brightness become, in their turn, the sources of other -illuminations; and the scale of brightness gradually descends to -illuminations too faint to beget other illuminations. All these -illuminations are mediums, or in the language of Theology, angels -through whom the infinite varieties of being receive life and sustenance -from the Primal Light. The followers of Aristotle erroneously restricted -the number of original Intellects to ten. They likewise erred in -enumerating the categories of thought. The possibilities of the Primal -Light are infinite; and the Universe, with all its variety, is only a -partial expression of the infinitude behind it. The categories of -Aristotle, therefore, are only relatively true. It is impossible for -human thought to comprehend within its tiny grasp, all the infinite -variety of ideas according to which the Primal Light does or may -illuminate that which is not light. We can, however, discriminate -between the following two illuminations of the original Light:-- - - [127:1] Sharh Anwariyya--Al-Harawi's commentary on - Al-Ishraqi's Hikmat al-Ishraq, fol. 10a. - -(1). The Abstract Light (e.g. Intellect Universal as well as -individual). It has no form, and never becomes the attribute of anything -other than itself (Substance). From it proceed all the various forms of -partly-conscious, conscious, or self-conscious light, differing from one -another in the amount of lustre, which is determined by their -comparative nearness or distance from the ultimate source of their -being. The individual intellect or soul is only a fainter copy, or a -more distant reflection of the Primal Light. The Abstract Light knows -itself through itself, and does not stand in need of a non-ego to reveal -its own existence to itself. Consciousness or self-knowledge, therefore, -is the very essense of Abstract light, as distinguished from the -negation of light. - -(2). The Accidental light (Attribute)--the light that has a form, and is -capable of becoming an attribute of something other than itself (e.g. -the light of the stars, or the visibility of other bodies). The -Accidental light, or more properly sensible light, is a distant -reflection of the Abstract light, which, because of its distance, has -lost the intensity, or substance-character of its parent. The process of -continuous reflection is really a softening process; successive -illuminations gradually lose their intensity until, in the chain of -reflections, we reach certain less intense illuminations which entirely -lose their independent character, and cannot exist except in -association with something else. These illuminations form the Accidental -light--the attribute which has no independent existence. The relation, -therefore, between the Accidental and the Abstract light is that of -cause and effect. The effect, however, is not something quite distinct -from its cause; it is a transformation, or a weaker form of the supposed -cause itself. Anything other than the Abstract light (e.g. the nature of -the illuminated body itself) cannot be the cause of the Accidental -light; since the latter, being merely contingent and consequently -capable of being negatived, can be taken away from bodies, without -affecting their character. If the essence or nature of the illuminated -body, had been the cause of the Accidental light, such a process of -disillumination could not have been possible. We cannot conceive an -inactive cause.[131:1] - - [131:1] Sharh Anwariyya fol. 11b. - -It is now obvious that the Shaikh al-Ishraq agrees with the -Ash`arite thinkers in holding that there is no such thing as the Prima -Materia of Aristotle; though he recognises the existence of a necessary -negation of Light--darkness, the object of illumination. He further -agrees with them in teaching the relativity of all categories except -Substance and Quality. But he corrects their theory of knowledge, in so -far as he recognises an active element in human knowledge. Our relation -with the objects of our knowledge is not merely a passive relation; the -individual soul, being itself an illumination, illuminates the object in -the act of knowledge. The Universe to him is one great process of active -illumination; but, from a purely intellectual standpoint, this -illumination is only a partial expression of the infinitude of the -Primal Light, which may illuminate according to other laws not known to -us. The categories of thought are infinite; our intellect works with a -few only. The Shaikh, therefore, from the standpoint of discursive -thought, is not far from modern Humanism. - - -Cosmology. - -All that is "not-light" is, what the Ishraqi thinkers call, "Absolute -quantity", or "Absolute matter". It is only another aspect of the -affirmation of light, and not an independent principle, as the -followers of Aristotle erroneously hold. The experimental fact of the -transformation of the primary elements into one another, points to this -fundamental Absolute matter which, with its various degrees of -grossness, constitutes the various spheres of material being. The -absolute ground of all things, then, is divided into two kinds:-- - -(1). That which is beyond space--the obscure substance or atoms -(essences of the Ash`arite). - -(2). That which is necessarily in space--forms of darkness, e.g. weight, -smell, taste, etc. - -The combination of these two particularises the Absolute matter. A -material body is forms of darkness plus obscure substance, made visible -or illuminated by the Abstract light. But what is the cause of the -various forms of darkness? These, like the forms of light, owe their -existence to the Abstract light, the different illuminations of which -cause diversity in the spheres of being. The forms which make bodies -differ from one another, do not exist in the nature of the Absolute -matter. The Absolute quantity and the Absolute matter being identical, -if these forms do exist in the essence of the Absolute matter, all -bodies would be identical in regard to the forms of darkness. This, -however, is contradicted by daily experience. The cause of the forms of -darkness, therefore, is not the Absolute matter. And as the difference -of forms cannot be assigned to any other cause, it follows that they are -due to the various illuminations of the Abstract light. Forms of light -and darkness both owe their existence to the Abstract Light. The third -element of a material body--the obscure atom or essence--is nothing but -a necessary aspect of the affirmation of light. The body as a whole, -therefore, is completely dependent on the Primal Light. The whole -Universe is really a continuous series of circles of existence, all -depending on the original Light. Those nearer to the source receive more -illumination than those more distant. All varieties of existence in each -circle, and the circles themselves, are illuminated through an infinite -number of medium-illuminations, which preserve some forms of existence -by the help of "conscious light" (as in the case of man, animal and -plant), and some without it (as in the case of minerals and primary -elements). The immense panorama of diversity which we call the Universe, -is, therefore, a vast shadow of the infinite variety in intensity of -direct or indirect illuminations and rays of the Primary Light. Things -are, so to speak, fed by their respective illuminations to which they -constantly move, with a lover's passion, in order to drink more and more -of the original fountain of Light. The world is an eternal drama of -love. The different planes of being are as follow:-- - - The Plane + 1. The Plane of Intellects--the - of Primal | parent of the heavens, - Light. | 2. The Plane of the Soul. - + 3. The Plane of Form. - | - | + 1. The Plane + 1. The Plane of - | | of ideal | the heavens. - +----+ form. ------------+ - | 2. The Plane | 2. The Plane of - | of material + the elements:-- - + forms:-- - - (a). The heavens (a). Simple elements. - (b). The elements:-- (b). Compounds:-- - 1. Simple elements I. Mineral kingdom. - 2. Compounds:-- II. Vegetable kingdom. - I. Mineral kingdom. III. Animal kingdom. - II. Vegetable kingdom. - III. Animal kingdom. - -Having briefly indicated the general nature of Being, we now proceed to -a more detailed examination of the world-process. All that is not-light -is divided into:-- - -(1). Eternal e.g., Intellects, Souls of heavenly bodies, heavens, simple -elements, time, motion. - -(2). Contingent e.g., Compounds of various elements. The motion of the -heavens is eternal, and makes up the various cycles of the Universe. It -is due to the intense longing of the heaven-soul to receive illumination -from the source of all light. The matter of which the heavens are -constructed, is completely free from the operation of chemical -processes, incidental to the grosser forms of the not-light. Every -heaven has its own matter peculiar to it alone. Likewise the heavens -differ from one another in the direction of their motion; and the -difference is explained by the fact that the beloved, or the sustaining -illumination, is different in each case. Motion is only an aspect of -time. It is the summing up of the elements of time, which, as -externalised, is motion. The distinction of past, present, and future -is made only for the sake of convenience, and does not exist in the -nature of time.[137:1] We cannot conceive the beginning of time; for the -supposed beginning would be a point of time itself. Time and motion, -therefore, are both eternal. - - [137:1] Sharh Anwariyya fol. 34a. - -There are three primordial elements--water, earth, and wind. Fire, -according to the Ishraqis, is only burning wind. The combinations of -these elements, under various heavenly influences, assume various -forms--fluidity, gaseousness, solidity. This transformation of the -original elements, constitutes the process of "making and unmaking" -which pervades the entire sphere of the not-light, raising the different -forms of existence higher and higher, and bringing them nearer and -nearer to the illuminating forces. All the phenomena of nature--rain, -clouds, thunder, meteor--are the various workings of this immanent -principle of motion, and are explained by the direct or indirect -operation of the Primal Light on things, which differ from one another -in their capacity of receiving more or less illumination. The Universe, -in one word, is a petrified desire; a crystallised longing after light. - -But is it eternal? The Universe is a manifestation of the illuminative -Power which constitutes the essential nature of the Primal Light. In so -far, therefore, as it is a manifestation, it is only a dependent being, -and consequently not eternal. But in another sense it is eternal. All -the different spheres of being exist by the illuminations and rays of -the Eternal light. There are some illuminations which are directly -eternal; while there are other fainter ones, the appearance of which -depends on the combination of other illuminations and rays. The -existence of these is not eternal in the same sense as the existence of -the pre-existing parent illuminations. The existence of colour, for -instance, is contingent in comparison to that of the ray, which -manifests colour when a dark body is brought before an illuminating -body. The Universe, therefore, though contingent as manifestation, is -eternal by the eternal character of its source. Those who hold the -non-eternity of the Universe argue on the assumption of the possibility -of a complete induction. Their argument proceeds in the following -manner:-- - -(1). Everyone of the Abyssinians is black. - -.*. All Abyssinians are black. - -(2). Every motion began at a definite moment. - -.*. All motion must begin so. - -But this mode of argumentation is vicious. It is quite impossible to -state the major. One cannot collect all the Abyssinians past, present, -and future, at one particular moment of time. Such a Universal, -therefore, is impossible. Hence from the examination of individual -Abyssinians, or particular instances of motion which fall within the -pale of our experience, it is rash to infer, that all Abyssinians are -black, or all motion had a beginning in time. - - -Psychology. - -Motion and light are not concomitant in the case of bodies of a lower -order. A piece of stone, for instance, though illuminated and hence -visible, is not endowed with self-initiated movement. As we rise, -however, in the scale of being, we find higher bodies, or organisms in -which motion and light are associated together. The abstract -illumination finds its best dwelling place in man. But the question -arises whether the individual abstract illumination which we call the -human soul, did or did not exist before its physical accompaniment. The -founder of Ishraqi Philosophy follows Avicenna in connection with this -question, and uses the same arguments to show, that the individual -abstract illuminations cannot be held to have pre-existed, as so many -units of light. The material categories of one and many cannot be -applied to the abstract illumination which, in its essential nature, is -neither one nor many; though it appears as many owing to the various -degrees of illuminational receptivity in its material accompaniments. -The relation between the abstract illumination, or soul and body, is not -that of cause and effect; the bond of union between them is love. The -body which longs for illumination, receives it through the soul; since -its nature does not permit a direct communication between the source of -light and itself. But the soul cannot transmit the directly received -light to the dark solid body which, considering its attributes, stands -on the opposite pole of being. In order to be related to each other, -they require a medium between them, something standing midway between -light and darkness. This medium is the animal soul--a hot, fine, -transparent vapour which has its principal seat in the left cavity of -the heart, but also circulates in all parts of the body. It is because -of the partial identity of the animal soul with light that, in dark -nights, land-animals run towards the burning fire; while sea-animals -leave their aquatic abodes in order to enjoy the beautiful sight of the -moon. The ideal of man, therefore, is to rise higher and higher in the -scale of being, and to receive more and more illumination which -gradually brings complete freedom from the world of forms. But how is -this ideal to be realised? By knowledge and action. It is the -transformation of both understanding and will, the union of action and -contemplation, that actualizes the highest ideal of man. Change your -attitude towards the Universe, and adopt the line of conduct -necessitated by the change. Let us briefly consider these means of -realisation:-- - -A. _Knowledge._ When the Abstract illumination associates itself with a -higher organism, it works out its development by the operation of -certain faculties--the powers of light, and the powers of darkness. The -former are the five external senses, and the five internal -senses--sensorium, conception, imagination, understanding, and memory; -the latter are the powers of growth, digestion, etc. But such a division -of faculties is only convenient. "One faculty can be the source of all -operations."[142:1] There is only one power in the middle of the brain, -though it receives different names from different standpoints. The mind -is a unity which, for the sake of convenience, is regarded as -multiplicity. The power residing in the middle of the brain must be -distinguished from the abstract illumination which constitutes the real -essence of man. The Philosopher of illumination appears to draw a -distinction between the active mind and the essentially inactive soul; -yet he teaches that in some mysterious way, all the various faculties -are connected with the soul. - - [142:1] Sharh Anwariyya fol. 57b. - -The most original point in his psychology of intellection, however, is -his theory of vision.[142:2] The ray of light which is supposed to come -out of the eye must be either substance or quality. If quality, it -cannot be transmitted from one substance (eye) to another substance -(visible body). If, on the other hand, it is a substance, it moves -either consciously, or impelled by its inherent nature. Conscious -movement would make it an animal perceiving other things. The perceiver -in this case would be the ray, not man. If the movement of the ray is an -attribute of its nature, there is no reason why its movement should be -peculiar to one direction, and not to all. The ray of light, therefore, -cannot be regarded as coming out of the eye. The followers of Aristotle -hold that in the process of vision images of objects are printed on the -eye. This view is also erroneous; since images of big things cannot be -printed on a small space. The truth is that when a thing comes before -the eye, an illumination takes place, and the mind sees the object -through that illumination. When there is no veil between the object and -the normal sight, and the mind is ready to perceive, the act of vision -must take place; since this is the law of things. "All vision is -illumination; and we see things in God". Berkley explained the -relativity of our sight-perceptions with a view to show that the -ultimate ground of all ideas is God. The Ishraqi Philosopher has the -same object in view, though his theory of vision is not so much an -explanation of the sight-process as a new way of looking at the fact of -vision. - - [142:2] Sharh Anwariyya fol. 60b. - -Besides sense and reason, however, there is another source of knowledge -called "Dhauq"--the inner perception which reveals non-temporal and -non-spatial planes of being. The study of philosophy, or the habit of -reflecting on pure concepts, combined with the practice of virtue, leads -to the upbringing of this mysterious sense, which corroborates and -corrects the conclusions of intellect. - -B. _Action._ Man as an active being has the following motive powers: - -(a). Reason or the Angelic soul--the source of intelligence, -discrimination, and love of knowledge. - -(b). The beast-soul which is the source of anger, courage, dominance, -and ambition. - -(c). The animal soul which is the source of lust, hunger, and sexual -passion. - -The first leads to wisdom; the second and third, if controlled by -reason, lead respectively to bravery and chastity. The harmonious use of -all results in the virtue of justice. The possibility of spiritual -progress by virtue, shows that this world is the best possible world. -Things as existent are neither good nor bad. It is misuse or limited -standpoint that makes them so. Still the fact of evil cannot be denied. -Evil does exist; but it is far less in amount than good. It is peculiar -only to a part of the world of darkness; while there are other parts of -the Universe which are quite free from the taint of evil. The sceptic -who attributes the existence of evil to the creative agency of God, -presupposes resemblance between human and divine action, and does not -see that nothing existent is free in his sense of the word. Divine -activity cannot be regarded as the creator of evil in the same sense as -we regard some forms of human activity as the cause of evil.[145:1] - - [145:1] Sharh Anwariyya fol. 92b. - -It is, then, by the union of knowledge and virtue that the soul frees -itself from the world of darkness. As we know more and more of the -nature of things, we are brought closer and closer to the world of -light; and the love of that world becomes more and more intense. The -stages of spiritual development are infinite, since the degrees of love -are infinite. The principal stages, however, are as follows:-- - -(1). The stage of "_I_". In this stage the feeling of personality is -most predominant, and the spring of human action is generally -selfishness. - -(2). The stage of "_Thou art not_". Complete absorption in one's own -deep self to the entire forgetfulness of everything external. - -(3). The stage of "_I am not_". This stage is the necessary result of -the second. - -(4). The stage of "_Thou art_". The absolute negation of "_I_", and the -affirmation of "_Thou_", which means complete resignation to the will of -God. - -(5). The stage of "_I am not; and thou art not_". The complete negation -of both the terms of thought--the state of cosmic consciousness. - -Each stage is marked by more or less intense illuminations, which are -accompanied by some indescribable sounds. Death does not put an end to -the spiritual progress of the soul. The individual souls, after death, -are not unified into one soul, but continue different from each other in -proportion to the illumination they received during their companionship -with physical organisms. The Philosopher of illumination anticipates -Leibniz's doctrine of the Identity of Indiscernibles, and holds that no -two souls can be completely similar to each other.[147:1] When the -material machinery which it adopts for the purpose of acquiring gradual -illumination, is exhausted, the soul probably takes up another body -determined by the experiences of the previous life; and rises higher and -higher in the different spheres of being, adopting forms peculiar to -those spheres, until it reaches its destination--the state of absolute -negation. Some souls probably come back to this world in order to make -up their deficiencies.[147:2] The doctrine of trans-migration cannot be -proved or disproved from a purely logical standpoint; though it is a -probable hypothesis to account for the future destiny of the soul. All -souls are thus constantly journeying towards their common source, which -calls back the whole Universe when this journey is over, and starts -another cycle of being to reproduce, in almost all respects, the history -of the preceding cycles. - - [147:1] Sharh Anwariyya fol. 82. - - [147:2] Sharh Anwariyya fol. 87b. - -Such is the philosophy of the great Persian martyr. He is, properly -speaking, the first Persian systematiser who recognises the elements of -truth in all the aspects of Persian speculation, and skilfully -synthesises them in his own system. He is a pantheist in so far as he -defines God as the sum total of all sensible and ideal existence.[148:1] -To him, unlike some of his Sufi predecessors, the world is something -real, and the human soul a distinct individuality. With the orthodox -theologian, he maintains that the ultimate cause of every phenomenon, -is the absolute light whose illumination forms the very essence of the -Universe. In his psychology he follows Avicenna, but his treatment of -this branch of study is more systematic and more empirical. As an -ethical philosopher, he is a follower of Aristotle whose doctrine of the -mean he explains and illustrates with great thoroughness. Above all he -modifies and transforms the traditional Neo-Platonism, into a thoroughly -Persian system of thought which, not only approaches Plato, but also -spiritualises the old Persian Dualism. No Persian thinker is more alive -to the necessity of explaining all the aspects of objective existence in -reference to his fundamental principles. He constantly appeals to -experience, and endeavours to explain even the physical phenomena in the -light of his theory of illumination. In his system objectivity, which -was completely swallowed up by the exceedingly subjective character of -extreme pantheism, claims its due again, and, having been subjected to a -detailed examination, finds a comprehensive explanation. No wonder then -that this acute thinker succeeded in founding a system of thought, -which has always exercised the greatest fascination over minds--uniting -speculation and emotion in perfect harmony. The narrow-mindedness of his -contemporaries gave him the title of "Maqtul" (the killed one), -signifying that he was not to be regarded as "Shahid" (Martyr); but -succeeding generations of Sufis and philosophers have always given him -the profoundest veneration. - - [148:1] Sharh Anwariyya fol. 81b. - -I may here notice a less spiritual form of the Ishraqi mode of -thought. Nasafi[150:1] describes a phase of Sufi thought which reverted -to the old materialistic dualism of Mani. The advocates of this view -hold, that light and darkness are essential to each other. They are, in -reality, two rivers which mix with each other like oil and milk,[150:2] -out of which arises the diversity of things. The ideal of human action -is freedom from the taint of darkness; and the freedom of light from -darkness means the self-consciousness of light as light. - - [150:1] Maqsadi Aqsa; fol. 21a. - - [150:2] Maqsadi Aqsa; fol. 21a. - - -II. Reality as Thought--Al-Jili. - -Al-Jili was born in 767 A.H., as he himself says in one of his verses, -and died in 811 A.H. He was not a prolific writer like Shaikh Muhy -al-Din ibn `Arabi whose mode of thought seems to have greatly influenced -his teaching. He combined in himself poetical imagination and -philosophical genius, but his poetry is no more than a vehicle for his -mystical and metaphysical doctrines. Among other books he wrote a -commentary on Shaikh Muhy al-Din ibn `Arabi's al-Futuhat al-Makkiya, -a commentary on Bismillah, and the famous work Insan al-Kamil (printed -in Cairo). - -Essence pure and simple, he says, is the thing to which names and -attributes are given, whether it is existent actually or ideally. The -existent is of two species:-- - -(1). The Existent in Absoluteness or Pure existence--Pure Being--God. - -(2). The existence joined with non-existence--Creation--Nature. - -The Essence of God or Pure Thought cannot be understood; no words can -express it, for it is beyond all relation and knowledge is relation. The -intellect flying through the fathomless empty space pierces through the -veil of names and attributes, traverses the vasty sphere of time, enters -the domain of the non-existent and finds the Essence of Pure Thought to -be an existence which is non-existence--a sum of contradictions.[152:1] -It has two (accidents); eternal life in all past time and eternal life -in all future time. It has two (qualities), God and creation. It has two -(definitions), uncreatableness and creatableness. It has two names, God -and man. It has two faces, the manifested (this world) and the -unmanifested (the next world). It has two effects, necessity and -possibility. It has two points of view; from the first it is -non-existent for itself but existent for what is not itself; from the -second it is existent for itself and non-existent for what is not -itself. - - [152:1] Insan al-Kamil, Vol. I, p. 10. - -Name, he says, fixes the named in the understanding, pictures it in the -mind, presents it in the imagination and keeps it in the memory. It is -the outside or the husk, as it were, of the named; while the named is -the inside or the pith. Some names do not exist in reality but exist in -name only as "`Anqa" (a fabulous bird). It is a name the object of which -does not exist in reality. Just as "`Anqa" is absolutely non-existent, -so God is absolutely present, although He cannot be touched and seen. -The "`Anqa" exists only in idea while the object of the name "Allah" -exists in reality and can be known like "`Anqa" only through its names -and attributes. The name is a mirror which reveals all the secrets of -the Absolute Being; it is a light through the agency of which God sees -Himself. Al-Jili here approaches the Isma`ilia view that we should seek -the Named through the Name. - -In order to understand this passage we should bear in mind the three -stages of the development of Pure Being, enumerated by him. He holds -that the Absolute existence or Pure Being when it leaves its -absoluteness undergoes three stages:--(1) Oneness. (2) He-ness. (3) -I-ness. In the first stage there is an absence of all attributes and -relations, yet it is called one, and therefore oneness marks one step -away from the absoluteness. In the second stage Pure Being is yet free -from all manifestation, while the third stage, I-ness, is nothing but an -external manifestation of the He-ness; or, as Hegel would say, it is the -self-diremption of God. This third stage is the sphere of the name -Allah; here the darkness of Pure Being is illuminated, nature comes to -the front, the Absolute Being has become conscious. He says further that -the name Allah is the stuff of all the perfections of the different -phases of Divinity, and in the second stage of the progress of Pure -Being, all that is the result of Divine self-diremption was potentially -contained within the titanic grasp of this name which, in the third -stage of the development, objectified itself, became a mirror in which -God reflected Himself, and thus by its crystallisation dispelled all the -gloom of the Absolute Being. - -In correspondence with these three stages of the absolute development, -the perfect man has three stages of spiritual training. But in his case -the process of development must be the reverse; because his is the -process of ascent, while the Absolute Being had undergone essentially a -process of descent. In the first stage of his spiritual progress he -meditates on the name, studies nature on which it is sealed; in the -second stage he steps into the sphere of the Attribute, and in the third -stage enters the sphere of the Essence. It is here that he becomes the -Perfect Man; his eye becomes the eye of God, his word the word of God -and his life the life of God--participates in the general life of Nature -and "sees into the life of things". - -To turn now to the nature of the attribute. His views on this most -interesting question are very important, because it is here that his -doctrine fundamentally differs from Hindu Idealism. He defines attribute -as an agency which gives us a knowledge of the state of things.[155:1] -Elsewhere he says that this distinction of attribute from the underlying -reality is tenable only in the sphere of the manifested, because here -every attribute is regarded as the other of the reality in which it is -supposed to inhere. This otherness is due to the existence of -combination and disintegration in the sphere of the manifested. But the -distinction is untenable in the domain of the unmanifested, because -there is no combination or disintegration there. It should be observed -how widely he differs from the advocates of the Doctrine of "Maya". He -believes that the material world has real existence; it is the outward -husk of the real being, no doubt, but this outward husk is not the less -real. The cause of the phenomenal world, according to him, is not a real -entity hidden behind the sum of attributes, but it is a conception -furnished by the mind so that there may be no difficulty in -understanding the material world. Berkeley and Fichte will so far agree -with our author, but his view leads him to the most characteristically -Hegelian doctrine--identity of thought and being. In the 37{th} chapter -of the 2{nd} volume of Insan al-Kamil, he clearly says that idea is the -stuff of which this universe is made; thought, idea, notion is the -material of the structure of nature. While laying stress on this -doctrine he says, "Dost thou not look to thine own belief? Where is the -reality in which the so-called Divine attributes inhere? It is but the -idea."[157:1] Hence nature is nothing but a crystallised idea. He gives -his hearty assent to the results of Kant's _Critique of Pure Reason_; -but, unlike him, he makes this very idea the essence of the Universe. -Kant's _Ding an sich_ to him is a pure nonentity; there is nothing -behind the collection of attributes. The attributes are the real things, -the material world is but the objectification of the Absolute Being; it -is the other self of the Absolute--another which owes its existence to -the principle of difference in the nature of the Absolute itself. Nature -is the idea of God, a something necessary for His knowledge of Himself. -While Hegel calls his doctrine the identity of thought and being, -Al-Jili calls it the identity of attribute and reality. It should be -noted that the author's phrase, "world of attributes", which he uses for -the material world is slightly misleading. What he really holds is that -the distinction of attribute and reality is merely phenomenal, and does -not at all exist in the nature of things. It is useful, because it -facilitates our understanding of the world around us, but it is not at -all real. It will be understood that Al-Jili recognises the truth of -Empirical Idealism only tentatively, and does not admit the absoluteness -of the distinction. These remarks should not lead us to understand that -Al-Jili does not believe in the objective reality of the thing in -itself. He does believe in it, but then he advocates its unity, and says -that the material world is the thing in itself; it is the "other", the -external expression of the thing in itself. The _Ding an sich_ and its -external expression or the production of its self-diremption, are really -identical, though we discriminate between them in order to facilitate -our understanding of the universe. If they are not identical, he says, -how could one manifest the other? In one word, he means by _Ding an -sich_, the Pure, the Absolute Being, and seeks it through its -manifestation or external expression. He says that as long as we do not -realise the identity of attribute and reality, the material world or the -world of attributes seems to be a veil; but when the doctrine is -brought home to us the veil is removed; we see the Essence itself -everywhere, and find that all the attributes are but ourselves. Nature -then appears in her true light; all otherness is removed and we are one -with her. The aching prick of curiosity ceases, and the inquisitive -attitude of our minds is replaced by a state of philosophic calm. To the -person who has realised this identity, discoveries of science bring no -new information, and religion with her _role_ of supernatural authority -has nothing to say. This is the spiritual emancipation. - - [155:1] Insan al-Kamil; Vol. I, p. 22. - - [157:1] Insan al-Kamil, Vol. II, p. 26. - -Let us now see how he classifies the different divine names and -attributes which have received expression in nature or crystallised -Divinity. His classification is as follows:-- - -(1). The names and attributes of God as He is in Himself (Allah, The -One, The Odd, The Light, The Truth, The Pure, The Living.) - -(2). The names and attributes of God as the source of all glory (The -Great and High, The All-powerful). - -(3). The names and attributes of God as all Perfection (The Creator, The -Benefactor, The First, The Last). - -(4). The names and attributes of God as all Beauty (The Uncreatable, The -Painter, The Merciful, The Origin of all). Each of these names and -attributes has its own particular effect by which it illuminates the -soul of the perfect man and Nature. How these illuminations take place, -and how they reach the soul is not explained by Al-Jili. His silence -about these matters throws into more relief the mystical portion of his -views and implies the necessity of spiritual Directorship. - -Before considering Al-Jili's views of particular Divine Names and -Attributes, we should note that his conception of God, implied in the -above classification, is very similar to that of Schleiermacher. While -the German theologian reduces all the divine attributes to one single -attribute of Power, our author sees the danger of advancing a God free -from all attributes, yet recognises with Schleiermacher that in Himself -God is an unchangeable unity, and that His attributes "are nothing more -than views of Him from different human standpoints, the various -appearances which the one changeless cause presents to our finite -intelligence according as we look at it from different sides of the -spiritual landscape."[161:1] In His absolute existence He is beyond the -limitation of names and attributes, but when He externalises Himself, -when He leaves His absoluteness, when nature is born, names and -attributes appear sealed on her very fabric. - - [161:1] Matheson's _Aids to the Study of German Theology_, p. - 43. - -We now proceed to consider what he teaches about particular Divine Names -and Attributes. The first Essential Name is Allah (Divinity) which means -the sum of all the realities of existence with their respective order in -that sum. This name is applied to God as the only necessary existence. -Divinity being the highest manifestation of Pure Being, the difference -between them is that the latter is visible to the eye, but its _where_ -is invisible; while the traces of the former are visible, itself is -invisible. By the very fact of her being crystallised divinity, Nature -is not the real divinity; hence Divinity is invisible, and its traces in -the form of Nature are visible to the eye. Divinity, as the author -illustrates, is water; nature is crystallised water or ice; but ice is -not water. The Essence is visible to the eye, (another proof of our -author's Natural Realism or Absolute Idealism) although all its -attributes are not known to us. Even its attributes are not known as -they are in themselves, their shadows or effects only are known. For -instance, charity itself is unknown, only its effect or the fact of -giving to the poor, is known and seen. This is due to the attributes -being incorporated in the very nature of the Essence. If the expression -of the attributes in its real nature had been possible, its separation -from the Essence would have been possible also. But there are some other -Essential Names of God--The Absolute Oneness and Simple Oneness. The -Absolute Oneness marks the first step of Pure Thought from the darkness -of Cecity (the internal or the original Maya of the Vedanta) to the -light of manifestation. Although this movement is not attended with any -external manifestations, yet it sums up all of them under its hollow -universality. Look at a wall, says the author, you see the whole wall; -but you cannot see the individual pieces of the material that -contribute to its formation. The wall is a unity--but a unity which -comprehends diversity, so Pure Being is a unity but a unity which is the -soul of diversity. - -The third movement of the Absolute Being is Simple Oneness--a step -attended with external manifestation. The Absolute Oneness is free from -all particular names and attributes. The Oneness Simple takes on names -and attributes, but there is no distinction between these attributes, -one is the essence of the other. Divinity is similar to Simple Oneness, -but its names and attributes are distinguished from one another and even -contradictory, as generous is contradictory to revengeful.[163:1] The -third step, or as Hegel would say, Voyage of the Being, has another -appellation (Mercy). The First Mercy, the author says, is the evolution -of the Universe from Himself and the manifestation of His own Self in -every atom of the result of His own self-diremption. Al-Jili makes this -point clearer by an instance. He says that nature is frozen water and -God is water. The real name of nature is God (Allah); ice or condensed -water is merely a borrowed appellation. Elsewhere he calls water the -origin of knowledge, intellect, understanding, thought and idea. This -instance leads him to guard against the error of looking upon God as -immanent in nature, or running through the sphere of material existence. -He says that immanence implies disparity of being; God is not immanent -because He is Himself the existence. Eternal existence is the other self -of God, it is the light through which He sees Himself. As the originator -of an idea is existent in that idea, so God is present in nature. The -difference between God and man, as one may say, is that His ideas -materialise themselves, ours do not. It will be remembered here that -Hegel would use the same line of argument in freeing himself from the -accusation of Pantheism. - - [163:1] This would seem very much like the idea of the - phenomenal Brahma of the Vedanta. The Personal Creator or the - Prajapati of the Vedanta makes the third step of the Absolute - Being or the Noumenal Brahma. Al-Jili seems to admit two kinds - of Brahma--with or without qualities like the Samkara and - Badarayana. To him the process of creation is essentially a - lowering of the Absolute Thought, which is Asat, in so far as it - is absolute, and Sat, in so far as it is manifested and hence - limited. Notwithstanding this Absolute Monism, he inclines to a - view similar to that of Ramanuja. He seems to admit the reality - of the individual soul and seems to imply, unlike Samkara, that - Iswara and His worship are necessary even after the attainment - of the Higher Knowledge. - -The attribute of Mercy is closely connected with the attribute of -Providence. He defines it as the sum of all that existence stands in -need of. Plants are supplied with water through the force of this name. -The natural philosopher would express the same thing differently; he -would speak of the same phenomena as resulting from the activity of a -certain force of nature; Al-Jili would call it a manifestation of -Providence; but, unlike the natural philosopher, he would not advocate -the unknowability of that force. He would say that there is nothing -behind it, it is the Absolute Being itself. - -We have now finished all the essential names and attributes of God, and -proceed to examine the nature of what existed before all things. The -Arabian Prophet, says Al-Jili, was once questioned about the place of -God before creation. He said that God, before the creation, existed in -"`Ama" (Blindness). It is the nature of this Blindness or primal -darkness which we now proceed to examine. The investigation is -particularly interesting, because the word translated into modern -phraseology would be "_The Unconsciousness_". This single word impresses -upon us the foresightedness with which he anticipates metaphysical -doctrines of modern Germany. He says that the Unconsciousness is the -reality of all realities; it is the Pure Being without any descending -movement; it is free from the attributes of God and creation; it does -not stand in need of any name or quality, because it is beyond the -sphere of relation. It is distinguished from the Absolute Oneness -because the latter name is applied to the Pure Being in its process of -coming down towards manifestation. It should, however, be remembered -that when we speak of the priority of God and posteriority of creation, -our words must not be understood as implying time; for there can be no -duration of time or separateness between God and His creation. Time, -continuity in space and time, are themselves creations, and how can -piece of creation intervene between God and His creation. Hence our -words before, after, where, whence, etc., in this sphere of thought, -should not be construed to imply time or space. The real thing is beyond -the grasp of human conceptions; no category of material existence can be -applicable to it; because, as Kant would say, the laws of phenomena -cannot be spoken of as obtaining in the sphere of noumena. - -We have already noticed that man in his progress towards perfection has -three stages: the first is the meditation of the name which the author -calls the illumination of names. He remarks that "When God illuminates a -certain man by the light of His names, the man is destroyed under the -dazzling splendour of that name; and "when thou calleth God, the call is -responded to by the man". The effect of this illumination would be, in -Schopenhauer's language, the destruction of the individual will, yet it -must not be confounded with physical death; because the individual goes -on living and moving like the spinning wheel, as Kapila would say, after -he has become one with Prakriti. It is here that the individual cries -out in pantheistic mood:--She was I and I was she and there was none to -separate us."[167:1] - - [167:1] Insan al-Kamil, Vol. I, p. 40. - -The second stage of the spiritual training is what he calls the -illumination of the Attribute. This illumination makes the perfect man -receive the attributes of God in their real nature in proportion to the -power of receptivity possessed by him--a fact which classifies men -according to the magnitude of this light resulting from the -illumination. Some men receive illumination from the divine attribute of -Life, and thus participate in the soul of the Universe. The effect of -this light is soaring in the air, walking on water, changing the -magnitude of things (as Christ so often did). In this wise the perfect -man receives illumination from all the Divine attributes, crosses the -sphere of the name and the attribute, and steps into the domain of the -Essence--Absolute Existence. - -As we have already seen, the Absolute Being, when it leaves its -absoluteness, has three voyages to undergo, each voyage being a process -of particularisation of the bare universality of the Absolute Essence. -Each of these three movements appears under a new Essential Name which -has its own peculiar illuminating effect upon the human soul. Here is -the end of our author's spiritual ethics; _man has become perfect_, -he has amalgamated himself with the Absolute Being, or _has learnt -what Hegel calls The Absolute Philosophy_. "He becomes the paragon -of perfection, the object of worship, the preserver of the -Universe".[169:1] He is the point where Man-ness and God-ness become -one, and result in the birth of the god-man. - - [169:1] Insan al-Kamil, Vol. I, p. 48. - -How the perfect man reaches this height of spiritual development, the -author does not tell us; but he says that at every stage he has a -peculiar experience in which there is not even a trace of doubt or -agitation. The instrument of this experience is what he calls the _Qalb_ -(heart), a word very difficult of definition. He gives a very mystical -diagram of the Qalb, and explains it by saying that it is the eye which -sees the names, the attributes and the Absolute Being successively. It -owes its existence to a mysterious combination of soul and mind; and -becomes by its very nature the organ for the recognition of the -ultimate realities of existence. All that the "heart", or the source of -what the Vedanta calls the Higher Knowledge, reveals is not seen by the -individual as something separate from and heterogeneous to himself; what -is shown to him through this agency is his own reality, his own deep -being. This characteristic of the agency differentiates it from the -intellect, the object of which is always different and separate from the -individual exercising that faculty. But the spiritual experience, -according to the Sufis of this school, is not permanent; moments of -spiritual vision, says Matthew Arnold,[170:1] cannot be at our command. -The god-man is he who has known the mystery of his own being, who has -realised himself as god-man; but when that particular spiritual -realisation is over man is man and God is God. Had the experience been -permanent, a great moral force would have been lost and society -overturned. - - [170:1] "We cannot kindle when we will - The fire which in the heart resides". - -Let us now sum up Al-Jili's _Doctrine of the Trinity_. We have seen the -three movements of the Absolute Being, or the first three categories of -Pure Being; we have also seen that the third movement is attended with -external manifestation, which is the self-diremption of the Essence into -God and man. This separation makes a gap which is filled by the perfect -man, who shares in both the Divine and the human attributes. He holds -that the perfect man is the preserver of the Universe; hence in his -view, the appearance of the perfect man is a necessary condition for the -continuation of nature. It is easy, therefore, to understand that in the -god-man, the Absolute Being which has left its absoluteness, returns -into itself; and, but for the god-man, it could not have done so; for -then there would have been no nature, and consequently no light through -which God could have seen Himself. The light through the agency of which -God sees Himself is due to the principle of difference in the nature of -the Absolute Being itself. He recognises this principle in the following -verses:-- - - If you say that God is one, you are right; but if you say that He - is two, this is also true. - - If you say no, but He is three, you are right, for this is the - real nature of man.[171:1] - - [171:1] Insan al-Kamil, Vol. I, p. 8. - -The _perfect man_, then, is the joining link. On the one hand he -receives illumination from all the Essential names, on the other hand -all Divine attributes reappear in him. These attributes are:-- - -1. Independent life or existence. - -2. Knowledge which is a form of life, as he proves from a verse from the -Qur'an. - -3. Will--the principle of particularisation, or the manifestation of -Being. He defines it as the illumination of the knowledge of God -according to the requirements of the Essence; hence it is a particular -form of knowledge. It has nine manifestations, all of which are -different names for love; the last is the love in which the lover and -the beloved, the knower and the known merge into each other, and become -identical. This form of love, he says, is the Absolute Essence; as -Christianity teaches, God is love. He guards, here, against the error of -looking upon the individual act of will as uncaused. Only the act of the -universal will is uncaused; hence he implies the Hegelian Doctrine of -Freedom, and holds that the acts of man are both free and determined. - -4. Power, which expresses itself in self-diremption i.e. creation. He -controverts Shaikh Muhy al-Din ibn `Arabi's position that the -Universe existed before the creation in the knowledge of God. He says, -this would imply that God did not create it out of nothing, and holds -that the Universe, before its existence as an idea, existed in the self -of God. - -5. The word or the reflected being. Every possibility is the word of -God; hence nature is the materialisation of the word of God. It has -different names--The tangible word, The sum of the realities of man, The -arrangement of the Divinity, The spread of Oneness, The expression of -the Unknown, The phases of Beauty, The trace of names and attributes, -and the object of God's knowledge. - -6. The Power of hearing the inaudible. - -7. The Power of seeing the invisible. - -8. Beauty--that which seems least beautiful in nature (the reflected -beauty) is in its real existence, beauty. Evil is only relative, it has -no real existence; sin is merely a relative deformity. - -9. Glory or beauty in its intensity. - -10. Perfection, which is the unknowable essence of God and therefore -Unlimited and Infinite. - - - - -CHAP. VI. - -LATER PERSIAN THOUGHT. - - -Under the rude Tartar invaders of Persia, who could have no sympathy -with independent thought, there could be no progress of ideas. Sufiism, -owing to its association with religion, went on systematising old and -evolving new ideas. But philosophy proper was distasteful to the Tartar. -Even the development of Islamic law suffered a check; since the Hanafite -law was the acme of human reason to the Tartar, and further subtleties -of legal interpretation were disagreeable to his brain. Old schools of -thought lost their solidarity, and many thinkers left their native -country to find more favourable conditions elsewhere. In the 16{th} -century we find Persian Aristotelians--Dastur Isfahani, Hir Bud, Munir, -and Kamran--travelling in India, where the Emperor Akbar was drawing -upon Zoroastrianism to form a new faith for himself and his courtiers, -who were mostly Persians. No great thinker, however, appeared in Persia -until the 17{th} century, when the acute Mulla Sadra of Shiraz upheld -his philosophical system with all the vigour of his powerful logic. With -Mulla Sadra Reality is all things yet is none of them, and true -knowledge consists in the identity of the subject and the object. De -Gobineau thinks that the philosophy of Sadra is a mere revival of -Avicennaism. He, however, ignores the fact that Mulla Sadra's doctrine -of the identity of subject and object constitutes the final step which -the Persian intellect took towards complete monism. It is moreover the -Philosophy of Sadra which is the source of the metaphysics of early -Babism. - -But the movement towards Platonism is best illustrated in Mulla Hadi of -Sabzwar who flourished in the 18{th} century, and is believed by his -countrymen to be the greatest of modern Persian thinkers. As a specimen -of comparatively recent Persian speculation, I may briefly notice here -the views of this great thinker, as set forth in his Asrar al-Hikam -(published in Persia). A glance at his philosophical teaching reveals -three fundamental conceptions which are indissolubly associated with the -Post-Islamic Persian thought:-- - -1. The idea of the Absolute Unity of the Real which is described as -"Light". - -2. The idea of evolution which is dimly visible in Zoroaster's doctrine -of the destiny of the human soul, and receives further expansion and -systematisation by Persian Neo-Platonists and Sufi thinkers. - -3. The idea of a medium between the Absolute Real and the Not-real. - -It is highly interesting to note how the Persian mind gradually got rid -of the Emanation theory of Neo-Platonism, and reached a purer notion of -Plato's Philosophy. The Arab Muhammadans of Spain, by a similar process -of elimination reached, through the same medium (Neo-Platonism) a truer -conception of the Philosophy of Aristotle--a fact which illustrates the -genius of the two races. Lewes in his Biographical History of Philosophy -remarks that the Arabs eagerly took up the study of Aristotle simply -because Plato was not presented to them. I am, however, inclined to -think that the Arab genius was thoroughly practical; hence Plato's -philosophy would have been distasteful to them even if it had been -presented in its true light. Of the systems of Greek philosophy -Neo-Platonism, I believe, was the only one which was presented in its -completeness to the Muslim world; yet patient critical research led the -Arab from Plotinus to Aristotle, and the Persian to Plato. This is -singularly illustrated in the Philosophy of Mulla Hadi, who recognises -no Emanations, and approaches the Platonic conception of the Real. He -illustrates, moreover, how philosophical speculation in Persia, as in -all countries where Physical science either does not exist or is not -studied, is finally absorbed by religion. The "Essence", i.e. the -metaphysical cause as distinguished from the scientific cause, which -means the sum of antecedent conditions, must gradually be transformed -into "Personal Will" (cause, in a religious sense) in the absence of any -other notion of cause. And this is perhaps the deeper reason why -Persian philosophies have always ended in religion. - -Let us now turn to Mulla Hadi's system of thought. He teaches that -Reason has two aspects:--(a) Theoretical, the object of which is -Philosophy and Mathematics, (b) Practical, the object of which is -Domestic Economy, Politics, etc. Philosophy proper comprises the -knowledge of the beginning of things, the end of things, and the -knowledge of the Self. It also includes the knowledge of the law of -God--which is identical with religion. In order to understand the origin -of things, we should subject to a searching analysis the various -phenomena of the Universe. Such an analysis reveals that there are three -original principles.[178:1] - -(1). The Real--Light. - -(2). The Shadow. - -(3). The not-Real--Darkness. - - [178:1] Asrar al-Hikam; p. 6. - -The Real is absolute, and necessary as distinguished from the "Shadow", -which is relative and contingent. In its nature it is absolutely good; -and the proposition that it is good, is self-evident.[178:2] All forms -of potential existence, before they are actualised by the Real, are open -to both existence or non-existence, and the possibilities of their -existence or non-existence are exactly equal. It, therefore, follows -that the Real which actualises the potential is not itself -non-existence; since non-existence operating on non-existence cannot -produce actuality.[179:1] Mulla Hadi, in his conception of the Real as -the operator, modifies Plato's statical conception of the Universe, and, -following Aristotle, looks upon his Real as the immovable source and the -object of all motion. "All things in the Universe," he says, "love -perfection, and are moving towards their final ends--minerals towards -vegetables, vegetables towards animals, and animals towards man. And -observe how man passes through all these stages in the mother's -womb."[179:2] The mover as mover is either the source or the object of -motion or both. In any case the mover must be either movable or -immovable. The proposition that all movers must be themselves movable, -leads to infinite regress--which must stop at the immovable mover, the -source and the final object of all motion. The Real, moreover, is a pure -unity; for if there is a plurality of Reals, one would limit the other. -The Real as creator also cannot be conceived as more than one; since a -plurality of creators would mean a plurality of worlds which must be -circular touching one another, and this again implies vacuum which is -impossible.[180:1] Regarded as an essence, therefore, the Real is one. -But it is also many, from a different standpoint. It is life, power, -love; though we cannot say that these qualities inhere in it--they are -it, and it is them. Unity does not mean oneness, its essence consists in -the "dropping of all relations." Unlike the Sufis and other thinkers, -Mulla Hadi holds and tries to show that belief in multiplicity is not -inconsistent with belief in unity; since the visible "many" is nothing -more than a manifestation of the names and attributes of the Real. -These attributes are the various forms of a "Knowledge" which -constitutes the very essence of the Real. To speak, however, of the -attributes of the Real is only a verbal convenience; since "defining the -Real is applying the category of number to it"--an absurd process which -endeavours to bring the unrelated into the sphere of the related. The -Universe, with all its variety, is the shadow of the various names and -attributes of the Real or the Absolute Light. It is Reality unfolded, -the "Be", or the word of Light.[181:1] Visible multiplicity is the -illumination of Darkness, or the actualisation of Nothing. Things are -different because we see them, as it were, through glasses of different -colours--the Ideas. In this connection Hadi approvingly quotes the poet -Jami who has given the most beautiful poetic expression to Plato's -Doctrine of Ideas in verses which can be thus translated:-- - -"The ideas are glasses of various colours in which the Sun of Reality -reflects itself, and makes itself visible through them according as they -are red, yellow or blue."[181:2] - - [178:2] Asrar al-Hikam; p. 8. - - [179:1] Asrar al-Hikam; p. 8. - - [179:2] Asrar al-Hikam; p. 10. - - [180:1] Asrar al-Hikam; pp. 28, 29. - - [181:1] Asrar al-Hikam; p. 151. - - [181:2] Asrar al-Hikam; p. 6. - -In his Psychology he mostly follows Avicenna, but his treatment of the -subject is more thorough and systematic. He classifies the soul in the -following manner:-- - - The Soul - | - +---------+-----+ - | | - Heavenly Earthly - | - +--------+----------+ - | | | - Human Animal Vegetative - - Powers:-- - - 1. Preserving the individual. - 2. Perfecting the individual. - 3. Perpetuating the species. - -The animal soul has three powers:-- - - 1. External senses} Perception. - 2. Internal senses} - 3. Power of motion which includes. - (a) Voluntary motion. - (b) Involuntary motion. - -The external senses are taste, touch, smell, hearing and sight. The -sound exists outside the ear, and not inside as some thinkers have held. -For if it does not exist outside the ear, it is not possible to perceive -its direction and distance. Hearing and sight are superior to other -senses, and sight is superior to hearing; since:-- - - I. The eye can perceive distant things. - - II. Its perception is light, which is the best of all - attributes. - - III. The construction of the eye is more complicated and - delicate than that of the ear. - - IV. The perceptions of sight are things which actually exist, - while those of hearing resemble non-existence. - -The internal senses are as follow:-- - -(1). The Common Sense--the tablet of the mind. It is like the Prime -Minister of the mind sending out five spies (external senses) to bring -in news from the external world. When we say "this white thing is -sweet", we perceive whiteness and sweetness by sight and taste -respectively, but that both the attributes exist in the same thing is -decided by the Common Sense. The line made by a falling drop, so far as -the eye is concerned, is nothing but the drop. But what is the line -which we see? To account for such a phenomenon, says Hadi, it is -necessary to postulate another sense which perceives the lengthening of -the falling drop into a line. - -(2). The faculty which preserves the perceptions of the Common -Sense--images and not ideas like the memory. The judgment that whiteness -and sweetness exist in the same thing is completed by this faculty; -since, if it does not preserve the image of the subject, Common Sense -cannot perceive the predicate. - -(3). The power which perceives individual ideas. The sheep thinks of the -enmity of the wolf, and runs away from him. Some forms of life lack this -power, e.g. the moth which hurls itself against the candle-flame. - -(4). Memory--the preserver of ideas. - -(5). The power of combining images and ideas, e.g. the winged man. When -this faculty works under the guidance of the power which perceives -individual ideas, it is called Imagination; when it works under the -control of Intellect, it is called Conception. - -But it is the spirit which distinguishes man from other animals. This -essence of humanity is a "unity", not oneness. It perceives the -Universal by itself, and the particular through the external and the -internal senses. It is the shadow of the Absolute Light, and like it -manifests itself in various ways--comprehending multiplicity in its -unity. There is no necessary relation between the spirit and the body. -The former is non-temporal and non-spatial; hence it is changeless, and -has the power of judging the visible multiplicity. In sleep the spirit -uses the "ideal body" which functions like the physical body; in waking -life it uses the ordinary physical body. It follows, therefore, that the -spirit stands in need of neither, and uses both at will. Hadi does not -follow Plato in his doctrine of transmigration, the different forms of -which he refutes at length. The spirit to him is immortal, and reaches -its original home--Absolute Light--by the gradual perfection of its -faculties. The various stages of the development of reason are as -follows:-- - - A. Theoretical or Pure Reason-- - - 1{st} Potential Reason. - 2{nd} Perception of self-evident propositions. - 3{rd} Actual Reason. - 4{th} Perception of Universal concepts. - - B. Practical Reason-- - - 1{st} External Purification. - 2{nd} Internal Purification. - 3{rd} Formation of virtuous habits. - 4{th} Union with God. - -Thus the spirit rises higher and higher in the scale of being, and -finally shares in the eternity of the Absolute Light by losing itself in -its universality. "In itself non-existent, but existent in the eternal -Friend: how wonderful that it _is_ and _is not_ at the same time". But -is the spirit free to choose its course? Hadi criticises the -Rationalists for their setting up man as an independent creator of evil, -and accuses them of what he calls "veiled dualism". He holds that every -object has two sides--"bright" side, and "dark" side. Things are -combinations of light and darkness. All good flows from the side of -light; evil proceeds from darkness. Man, therefore, is both free and -determined. - -But all the various lines of Persian thought once more find a synthesis -in that great religious movement of Modern Persia--Babism or Bahaism, -which began as a Shi`ah sect, with Mirza `Ali Muhammad Bab of Shiraz (b. -1820), and became less and less Islamic in character with the progress -of orthodox persecutions. The origin of the philosophy of this wonderful -sect must be sought in the Shi`ah sect of the Shaikhis, the founder of -which, Shaikh Ahmad, was an enthusiastic student of Mulla Sadra's -Philosophy, on which he had written several commentaries. This sect -differed from the ordinary Shi`ahs in holding that belief in an ever -present Medium between the absent Imam (the 12{th} Head of the Church, -whose manifestation is anxiously expected by the Shi`ahs), and the -church is a fundamental principle of the Shi`ah religion. Shaikh Ahmad -claimed to be such a Medium; and when, after the death of the second -Shaikhi Medium--Haji Kazim, the Shaikhis were anxiously expecting the -manifestation of the new Medium, Mirza `Ali Muhammad Bab, who had -attended the lectures of Haji Kazim at Karbala, proclaimed himself the -expected Medium, and many Shaikhis accepted him. - -The young Persian seer looks upon Reality as an essence which brooks no -distinction of substance and attribute. The first bounty or -self-expansion of the Ultimate Essence, he says, is Existence. -"Existence" is the "known", the "known" is the essence of "knowledge"; -"knowledge" is "will"; and "will" is "love". Thus from Mulla Sadra's -identity of the known and the knower, he passes to his conception of the -Real as Will and Love. This Primal Love, which he regards as the essence -of the Real, is the cause of the manifestation of the Universe which is -nothing more than the self-expansion of Love. The word creation, with -him, does not mean creation out of nothing; since, as the Shaikhis -maintain, the word creator is not peculiarly applicable to God alone. -The Quranic verse, that "God is the best of creators",[188:1] implies -that there are other self-manifesting beings like God. - - [188:1] Sura 23; v. 14. - -After the execution of `Ali Muhammad Bab, Bahaullah, one of his -principal disciples who were collectively called "The First Unity", took -up the mission, and proclaimed himself the originator of the new -dispensation, the absent Imam whose manifestation the Bab had foretold. -He freed the doctrine of his master from its literalistic mysticism, and -presented it in a more perfected and systematised form. The Absolute -Reality, according to him, is not a person; it is an eternal living -Essence, to which we apply the epithets Truth and Love only because -these are the highest conceptions known to us. The Living Essence -manifests itself through the Univere with the object of creating in -itself atoms or centres of consciousness, which as Dr. McTaggart would -say, constitute a further determination of the Hegelian Absolute. In -each of these undifferentiated, simple centres of consciousness, there -is hidden a ray of the Absolute Light itself, and the perfection of the -spirit consists in gradually actualising, by contact with the -individualising principle--matter, its emotional and intellectual -possibilities, and thus discovering its own deep being--the ray of -eternal Love which is concealed by its union with consciousness. The -essence of man, therefore, is not reason or consciousness; it is this -ray of Love--the source of all impulse to noble and unselfish action, -which constitutes the real man. The influence of Mulla Sadra's doctrine -of the incorporeality of Imagination is here apparent. Reason, which -stands higher than Imagination in the scale of evolution, is not a -necessary condition, according to Mulla Sadra, of immortality. In all -forms of life there is an immortal spiritual part, the ray of Eternal -Love, which has no necessary connection with self-consciousness or -reason, and survives after the death of the body. Salvation, then, which -to Buddha consists in the starving out of the mind-atoms by -extinguishing desire, to Bahaullah lies in the discovery of the essence -of love which is hidden in the atoms of consciousness themselves.[190:1] -Both, however, agree that after death thoughts and characters of men -remain, subject to other forces of a similar character, in the spiritual -world, waiting for another opportunity to find a suitable physical -accompaniment in order to continue the process of discovery (Bahaullah) -or destruction (Buddha). To Bahaullah the conception of Love is higher -than the conception of Will. Schopenhauer conceived reality as Will -which was driven to objectification by a sinful bent eternally existing -in its nature. Love or Will, according to both, is present in every atom -of life; but the cause of its being there is the joy of self-expansion -in the one case, and the inexplicable evil inclination in the other. But -Schopenhauer postulates certain temporal ideas in order to account for -the objectification of the Primordial Will; Bahaullah, as far as I can -see, does not explain the principle according to which the -self-manifestation of the Eternal Love is realised in the Universe. - - [190:1] See Phelp's `Abbas Effendi, chapter, "Philosophy and - Psychology". - - - - -CONCLUSION. - - -Let us now briefly sum up the results of our survey. We have seen that -the Persian mind had to struggle against two different kinds of -Dualism--pre-Islamic Magian Dualism, and post-Islamic Greek Dualism, -though the fundamental problem of the diversity of things remains -essentially the same. The attitude of the pre-Islamic Persian thinkers -is thoroughly objective, and hence the results of their intellectual -efforts are more or less materialistic. The Pre-Islamic thinkers, -however, clearly perceived that the original Principle must be -dynamically conceived. With Zoroaster both the primary spirits are -"active", with Mani the principle of Light is passive, and the principle -of Darkness is aggressive. But their analysis of the various elements -which constitute the Universe is ridiculously meagre; their conception -of the Universe is most defective on its statical side. There are, -therefore, two weak points in their systems:-- - - 1. Naked Dualism. - - 2. Lack of analysis. - -The first was remedied by Islam; the second by the introduction of Greek -Philosophy. The advent of Islam and the study of Greek philosophy, -however, checked the indigenous tendency towards monistic thought; but -these two forces contributed to change the objective attitude -characteristic of early thinkers, and aroused the slumbering -subjectivity, which eventually reached its climax in the extreme -Pantheism of some of the Sufi schools. Al-Farabi endeavoured to get rid -of the dualism between God and matter, by reducing matter to a mere -confused perception of the spirit; the Ash`arite denied it altogether, -and maintained a thoroughgoing Idealism. The followers of Aristotle -continued to stick to their master's Prima Materia; the Sufis looked -upon the material universe as a mere illusion, or a necessary "other," -for the self-knowledge of God. It can, however, be safely stated that -with the Ash`arite Idealism, the Persian mind got over the foreign -dualism of God and matter, and, fortified with new philosophical -ideas, returned to the old dualism of light and darkness. The -Shaikh-al-Ishraq combines the objective attitude of Pre-Islamic -Persian thinkers with the subjective attitude of his immediate -predecessors, and restates the Dualism of Zoroaster in a much more -philosophical and spiritualised form. His system recognises the claims -of both the subject and the object. But all these monistic systems of -thought were met by the Pluralism of Wahid Mahmud, who taught that -reality is not one, but many--primary living units which combine in -various ways, and gradually rise to perfection by passing through an -ascending scale of forms. The reaction of Wahid Mahmud was, however, an -ephemeral phenomenon. The later Sufis as well as philosophers proper -gradually transformed or abandoned the Neo-Platonic theory of Emanation, -and in later thinkers we see a movement through Neo-Platonism towards -real Platonism which is approached by Mulla Hadi's Philosophy. But pure -speculation and dreamy mysticism undergo a powerful check in Babism -which, unmindful of persecution, synthesises all the inherited -philosophical and religious tendencies, and rouses the spirit to a -consciousness of the stern reality of things. Though extremely -cosmopolitan and hence quite unpatriotic in character, it has yet had a -great influence over the Persian mind. The unmystic character and the -practical tone of Babism may have been a remote cause of the -progress of recent political reform in Persia. - - - - -ERRATA - - P. 4, Note 4, l. 1, read Buudahish for Buudadish. - - P. 9, l. 10, read environment for environments. - - P. 56, l. 1, read reaction for reation. - - P. 61, l. 18, read considered for consided. - - P. 73, l. 21, read full stop after dialectic. - - P. 102, l. 1, read conditions for condition. - - P. 123, l. 19, read predecessors for precessor. - - P. 153, l. 21, read He-ness for an He-ness. - - P. 166, l. 21, read a piece for pieee. - - - - -Transcriber's Notes: - -Many words appear in the text with different transcription or mark-up. -They have been left as in the original. - -All occurrences of e. g., i. e., B. C., A. D. and A. H. have been -replaced with e.g., i.e., B.C., A.D. and A.H. Other initials have been -left as in the original. - -All ditto marks, ibid. and Sh. An. (Sharh Anwariyya) entries replaced -with their full references. - -Printed Errata has been moved to the end of the text. - -The following corrections have been made to the text: - - Page IX--due perhaps to semitic [original has samitic] influences, - - Page CONTENTS--Reality as [original has as as] Beauty - - Page 25--introduced [original has intruduced] - - Page 54--necessarily [original has necssarily] - - Page 54--Nazzam [original has Nazzan] - - Page 57--Isma`ilians [original has Isma`iliams] - - Page 61--metaphysical [original has netaphysical] - - Page 63--which,[original has period] by gradually - - Page 68, footnote 68:1--Ash`aritenthums [original has - Ash'aritenthums] - - Page 69--philosophising [original has plilosophising] - - Page 69, footnote 69:1--Ash`aritenthums [original has As`aritenthums] - - Page 75--Ash`arite [original has Ash'arite] - - Page 81--seem to [original has the letter t missing] be - - Page 81--Hikmat al-`Ain--"Philosophy of Essence", - [original has single hyphen] - - Page 85--objectively [original has objectivily] - - Page 95, footnote 95:1--Commentary [original has Comentary] - - Page 104--restatement [original has restatemet] - - Page 111--self-conscious [original has self-consious] - - Page 124--the son of Sultan Salah [original has Sala-Salah]-al Din - - Page 127--visible [original has visibile] - - Page 136--is motion.[original has comma] The distinction of past, - - Page 142--theory of [original has theoryof] - - Page 148--maintains [original has mantains] - - Page 152, footnote 152:1--Insan al-Kamil [original has Insanul Kamul] - - Page 158--identical [original has indentical] - - Page 162--marks the [original has the the] first step - - Page 163, footnote 163:1--Notwithstanding [original has - Nowithstanding] - - Page 171, footnote 171:1--Insan al-Kamil [original has Insanul Kamil] - - Page 180--standpoint [original has staindpoint] - - Page 187--Shi`ahs [original has Shi'ahs] - - - - - -End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of The Development of Metaphysics in -Persia, by Muhammad Iqbal - -*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK METAPHYSICS IN PERSIA *** - -***** This file should be named 41707-8.txt or 41707-8.zip ***** -This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: - http://www.gutenberg.org/4/1/7/0/41707/ - -Produced by Fritz Ohrenschall, Sania Ali Mirza, Asad Razzaki -and the Online Distributed Proofreading Team at -http://www.pgdp.net (This book was produced from scanned -images of public domain material from the Google Print -project.) - - -Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions -will be renamed. - -Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no -one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation -(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without -permission and without paying copyright royalties. Special rules, -set forth in the General Terms of Use part of this license, apply to -copying and distributing Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works to -protect the PROJECT GUTENBERG-tm concept and trademark. Project -Gutenberg is a registered trademark, and may not be used if you -charge for the eBooks, unless you receive specific permission. If you -do not charge anything for copies of this eBook, complying with the -rules is very easy. You may use this eBook for nearly any purpose -such as creation of derivative works, reports, performances and -research. They may be modified and printed and given away--you may do -practically ANYTHING with public domain eBooks. Redistribution is -subject to the trademark license, especially commercial -redistribution. - - - -*** START: FULL LICENSE *** - -THE FULL PROJECT GUTENBERG LICENSE -PLEASE READ THIS BEFORE YOU DISTRIBUTE OR USE THIS WORK - -To protect the Project Gutenberg-tm mission of promoting the free -distribution of electronic works, by using or distributing this work -(or any other work associated in any way with the phrase "Project -Gutenberg"), you agree to comply with all the terms of the Full Project -Gutenberg-tm License available with this file or online at - www.gutenberg.org/license. - - -Section 1. General Terms of Use and Redistributing Project Gutenberg-tm -electronic works - -1.A. By reading or using any part of this Project Gutenberg-tm -electronic work, you indicate that you have read, understand, agree to -and accept all the terms of this license and intellectual property -(trademark/copyright) agreement. If you do not agree to abide by all -the terms of this agreement, you must cease using and return or destroy -all copies of Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works in your possession. -If you paid a fee for obtaining a copy of or access to a Project -Gutenberg-tm electronic work and you do not agree to be bound by the -terms of this agreement, you may obtain a refund from the person or -entity to whom you paid the fee as set forth in paragraph 1.E.8. - -1.B. "Project Gutenberg" is a registered trademark. It may only be -used on or associated in any way with an electronic work by people who -agree to be bound by the terms of this agreement. There are a few -things that you can do with most Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works -even without complying with the full terms of this agreement. See -paragraph 1.C below. There are a lot of things you can do with Project -Gutenberg-tm electronic works if you follow the terms of this agreement -and help preserve free future access to Project Gutenberg-tm electronic -works. See paragraph 1.E below. - -1.C. The Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation ("the Foundation" -or PGLAF), owns a compilation copyright in the collection of Project -Gutenberg-tm electronic works. Nearly all the individual works in the -collection are in the public domain in the United States. If an -individual work is in the public domain in the United States and you are -located in the United States, we do not claim a right to prevent you from -copying, distributing, performing, displaying or creating derivative -works based on the work as long as all references to Project Gutenberg -are removed. Of course, we hope that you will support the Project -Gutenberg-tm mission of promoting free access to electronic works by -freely sharing Project Gutenberg-tm works in compliance with the terms of -this agreement for keeping the Project Gutenberg-tm name associated with -the work. You can easily comply with the terms of this agreement by -keeping this work in the same format with its attached full Project -Gutenberg-tm License when you share it without charge with others. - -1.D. The copyright laws of the place where you are located also govern -what you can do with this work. Copyright laws in most countries are in -a constant state of change. If you are outside the United States, check -the laws of your country in addition to the terms of this agreement -before downloading, copying, displaying, performing, distributing or -creating derivative works based on this work or any other Project -Gutenberg-tm work. The Foundation makes no representations concerning -the copyright status of any work in any country outside the United -States. - -1.E. Unless you have removed all references to Project Gutenberg: - -1.E.1. The following sentence, with active links to, or other immediate -access to, the full Project Gutenberg-tm License must appear prominently -whenever any copy of a Project Gutenberg-tm work (any work on which the -phrase "Project Gutenberg" appears, or with which the phrase "Project -Gutenberg" is associated) is accessed, displayed, performed, viewed, -copied or distributed: - -This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with -almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or -re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included -with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org - -1.E.2. If an individual Project Gutenberg-tm electronic work is derived -from the public domain (does not contain a notice indicating that it is -posted with permission of the copyright holder), the work can be copied -and distributed to anyone in the United States without paying any fees -or charges. If you are redistributing or providing access to a work -with the phrase "Project Gutenberg" associated with or appearing on the -work, you must comply either with the requirements of paragraphs 1.E.1 -through 1.E.7 or obtain permission for the use of the work and the -Project Gutenberg-tm trademark as set forth in paragraphs 1.E.8 or -1.E.9. - -1.E.3. If an individual Project Gutenberg-tm electronic work is posted -with the permission of the copyright holder, your use and distribution -must comply with both paragraphs 1.E.1 through 1.E.7 and any additional -terms imposed by the copyright holder. Additional terms will be linked -to the Project Gutenberg-tm License for all works posted with the -permission of the copyright holder found at the beginning of this work. - -1.E.4. Do not unlink or detach or remove the full Project Gutenberg-tm -License terms from this work, or any files containing a part of this -work or any other work associated with Project Gutenberg-tm. - -1.E.5. Do not copy, display, perform, distribute or redistribute this -electronic work, or any part of this electronic work, without -prominently displaying the sentence set forth in paragraph 1.E.1 with -active links or immediate access to the full terms of the Project -Gutenberg-tm License. - -1.E.6. You may convert to and distribute this work in any binary, -compressed, marked up, nonproprietary or proprietary form, including any -word processing or hypertext form. However, if you provide access to or -distribute copies of a Project Gutenberg-tm work in a format other than -"Plain Vanilla ASCII" or other format used in the official version -posted on the official Project Gutenberg-tm web site (www.gutenberg.org), -you must, at no additional cost, fee or expense to the user, provide a -copy, a means of exporting a copy, or a means of obtaining a copy upon -request, of the work in its original "Plain Vanilla ASCII" or other -form. Any alternate format must include the full Project Gutenberg-tm -License as specified in paragraph 1.E.1. - -1.E.7. Do not charge a fee for access to, viewing, displaying, -performing, copying or distributing any Project Gutenberg-tm works -unless you comply with paragraph 1.E.8 or 1.E.9. - -1.E.8. You may charge a reasonable fee for copies of or providing -access to or distributing Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works provided -that - -- You pay a royalty fee of 20% of the gross profits you derive from - the use of Project Gutenberg-tm works calculated using the method - you already use to calculate your applicable taxes. The fee is - owed to the owner of the Project Gutenberg-tm trademark, but he - has agreed to donate royalties under this paragraph to the - Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation. Royalty payments - must be paid within 60 days following each date on which you - prepare (or are legally required to prepare) your periodic tax - returns. Royalty payments should be clearly marked as such and - sent to the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation at the - address specified in Section 4, "Information about donations to - the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation." - -- You provide a full refund of any money paid by a user who notifies - you in writing (or by e-mail) within 30 days of receipt that s/he - does not agree to the terms of the full Project Gutenberg-tm - License. You must require such a user to return or - destroy all copies of the works possessed in a physical medium - and discontinue all use of and all access to other copies of - Project Gutenberg-tm works. - -- You provide, in accordance with paragraph 1.F.3, a full refund of any - money paid for a work or a replacement copy, if a defect in the - electronic work is discovered and reported to you within 90 days - of receipt of the work. - -- You comply with all other terms of this agreement for free - distribution of Project Gutenberg-tm works. - -1.E.9. If you wish to charge a fee or distribute a Project Gutenberg-tm -electronic work or group of works on different terms than are set -forth in this agreement, you must obtain permission in writing from -both the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation and Michael -Hart, the owner of the Project Gutenberg-tm trademark. Contact the -Foundation as set forth in Section 3 below. - -1.F. - -1.F.1. Project Gutenberg volunteers and employees expend considerable -effort to identify, do copyright research on, transcribe and proofread -public domain works in creating the Project Gutenberg-tm -collection. Despite these efforts, Project Gutenberg-tm electronic -works, and the medium on which they may be stored, may contain -"Defects," such as, but not limited to, incomplete, inaccurate or -corrupt data, transcription errors, a copyright or other intellectual -property infringement, a defective or damaged disk or other medium, a -computer virus, or computer codes that damage or cannot be read by -your equipment. - -1.F.2. LIMITED WARRANTY, DISCLAIMER OF DAMAGES - Except for the "Right -of Replacement or Refund" described in paragraph 1.F.3, the Project -Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation, the owner of the Project -Gutenberg-tm trademark, and any other party distributing a Project -Gutenberg-tm electronic work under this agreement, disclaim all -liability to you for damages, costs and expenses, including legal -fees. YOU AGREE THAT YOU HAVE NO REMEDIES FOR NEGLIGENCE, STRICT -LIABILITY, BREACH OF WARRANTY OR BREACH OF CONTRACT EXCEPT THOSE -PROVIDED IN PARAGRAPH 1.F.3. YOU AGREE THAT THE FOUNDATION, THE -TRADEMARK OWNER, AND ANY DISTRIBUTOR UNDER THIS AGREEMENT WILL NOT BE -LIABLE TO YOU FOR ACTUAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, CONSEQUENTIAL, PUNITIVE OR -INCIDENTAL DAMAGES EVEN IF YOU GIVE NOTICE OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH -DAMAGE. - -1.F.3. LIMITED RIGHT OF REPLACEMENT OR REFUND - If you discover a -defect in this electronic work within 90 days of receiving it, you can -receive a refund of the money (if any) you paid for it by sending a -written explanation to the person you received the work from. If you -received the work on a physical medium, you must return the medium with -your written explanation. The person or entity that provided you with -the defective work may elect to provide a replacement copy in lieu of a -refund. If you received the work electronically, the person or entity -providing it to you may choose to give you a second opportunity to -receive the work electronically in lieu of a refund. If the second copy -is also defective, you may demand a refund in writing without further -opportunities to fix the problem. - -1.F.4. Except for the limited right of replacement or refund set forth -in paragraph 1.F.3, this work is provided to you 'AS-IS', WITH NO OTHER -WARRANTIES OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO -WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR ANY PURPOSE. - -1.F.5. Some states do not allow disclaimers of certain implied -warranties or the exclusion or limitation of certain types of damages. -If any disclaimer or limitation set forth in this agreement violates the -law of the state applicable to this agreement, the agreement shall be -interpreted to make the maximum disclaimer or limitation permitted by -the applicable state law. The invalidity or unenforceability of any -provision of this agreement shall not void the remaining provisions. - -1.F.6. INDEMNITY - You agree to indemnify and hold the Foundation, the -trademark owner, any agent or employee of the Foundation, anyone -providing copies of Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works in accordance -with this agreement, and any volunteers associated with the production, -promotion and distribution of Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works, -harmless from all liability, costs and expenses, including legal fees, -that arise directly or indirectly from any of the following which you do -or cause to occur: (a) distribution of this or any Project Gutenberg-tm -work, (b) alteration, modification, or additions or deletions to any -Project Gutenberg-tm work, and (c) any Defect you cause. - - -Section 2. Information about the Mission of Project Gutenberg-tm - -Project Gutenberg-tm is synonymous with the free distribution of -electronic works in formats readable by the widest variety of computers -including obsolete, old, middle-aged and new computers. It exists -because of the efforts of hundreds of volunteers and donations from -people in all walks of life. - -Volunteers and financial support to provide volunteers with the -assistance they need are critical to reaching Project Gutenberg-tm's -goals and ensuring that the Project Gutenberg-tm collection will -remain freely available for generations to come. In 2001, the Project -Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation was created to provide a secure -and permanent future for Project Gutenberg-tm and future generations. -To learn more about the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation -and how your efforts and donations can help, see Sections 3 and 4 -and the Foundation information page at www.gutenberg.org - - -Section 3. Information about the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive -Foundation - -The Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation is a non profit -501(c)(3) educational corporation organized under the laws of the -state of Mississippi and granted tax exempt status by the Internal -Revenue Service. The Foundation's EIN or federal tax identification -number is 64-6221541. Contributions to the Project Gutenberg -Literary Archive Foundation are tax deductible to the full extent -permitted by U.S. federal laws and your state's laws. - -The Foundation's principal office is located at 4557 Melan Dr. S. -Fairbanks, AK, 99712., but its volunteers and employees are scattered -throughout numerous locations. Its business office is located at 809 -North 1500 West, Salt Lake City, UT 84116, (801) 596-1887. Email -contact links and up to date contact information can be found at the -Foundation's web site and official page at www.gutenberg.org/contact - -For additional contact information: - Dr. Gregory B. Newby - Chief Executive and Director - gbnewby@pglaf.org - -Section 4. Information about Donations to the Project Gutenberg -Literary Archive Foundation - -Project Gutenberg-tm depends upon and cannot survive without wide -spread public support and donations to carry out its mission of -increasing the number of public domain and licensed works that can be -freely distributed in machine readable form accessible by the widest -array of equipment including outdated equipment. Many small donations -($1 to $5,000) are particularly important to maintaining tax exempt -status with the IRS. - -The Foundation is committed to complying with the laws regulating -charities and charitable donations in all 50 states of the United -States. Compliance requirements are not uniform and it takes a -considerable effort, much paperwork and many fees to meet and keep up -with these requirements. We do not solicit donations in locations -where we have not received written confirmation of compliance. To -SEND DONATIONS or determine the status of compliance for any -particular state visit www.gutenberg.org/donate - -While we cannot and do not solicit contributions from states where we -have not met the solicitation requirements, we know of no prohibition -against accepting unsolicited donations from donors in such states who -approach us with offers to donate. - -International donations are gratefully accepted, but we cannot make -any statements concerning tax treatment of donations received from -outside the United States. U.S. laws alone swamp our small staff. - -Please check the Project Gutenberg Web pages for current donation -methods and addresses. Donations are accepted in a number of other -ways including checks, online payments and credit card donations. -To donate, please visit: www.gutenberg.org/donate - - -Section 5. General Information About Project Gutenberg-tm electronic -works. - -Professor Michael S. Hart was the originator of the Project Gutenberg-tm -concept of a library of electronic works that could be freely shared -with anyone. For forty years, he produced and distributed Project -Gutenberg-tm eBooks with only a loose network of volunteer support. - -Project Gutenberg-tm eBooks are often created from several printed -editions, all of which are confirmed as Public Domain in the U.S. -unless a copyright notice is included. Thus, we do not necessarily -keep eBooks in compliance with any particular paper edition. - -Most people start at our Web site which has the main PG search facility: - - www.gutenberg.org - -This Web site includes information about Project Gutenberg-tm, -including how to make donations to the Project Gutenberg Literary -Archive Foundation, how to help produce our new eBooks, and how to -subscribe to our email newsletter to hear about new eBooks. - diff --git a/41707-8.zip b/41707-8.zip Binary files differdeleted file mode 100644 index 989aa34..0000000 --- a/41707-8.zip +++ /dev/null diff --git a/41707-h.zip b/41707-h.zip Binary files differdeleted file mode 100644 index 11781d1..0000000 --- a/41707-h.zip +++ /dev/null diff --git a/41707-h/41707-h.htm b/41707-h/41707-h.htm index 60509db..4983ac2 100644 --- a/41707-h/41707-h.htm +++ b/41707-h/41707-h.htm @@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml11/DTD/xhtml11.dtd"> <html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xml:lang="en"> <head> -<meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html;charset=utf-8" /> +<meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html;charset=UTF-8" /> <meta http-equiv="Content-Style-Type" content="text/css" /> <title> The Development of Metaphysics in Persia, @@ -87,48 +87,7 @@ ins.mycorr { text-decoration: none; border-bottom: thin dashed;} </head> <body> - - -<pre> - -The Project Gutenberg EBook of The Development of Metaphysics in Persia, by -Muhammad Iqbal - -This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with -almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or -re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included -with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org - - -Title: The Development of Metaphysics in Persia - A Contribution to the History of Muslim Philosophy - -Author: Muhammad Iqbal - -Release Date: December 26, 2012 [EBook #41707] - -Language: English - -Character set encoding: UTF-8 - -*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK METAPHYSICS IN PERSIA *** - - - - -Produced by Fritz Ohrenschall, Sania Ali Mirza, Asad Razzaki -and the Online Distributed Proofreading Team at -http://www.pgdp.net (This book was produced from scanned -images of public domain material from the Google Print -project.) - - - - - - -</pre> - +<div>*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 41707 ***</div> <div class="notebox"> <p>Transcriber's Notes:</p> @@ -6225,385 +6184,6 @@ moved to the end of the text.</p> </div> </div> - - - - - - - -<pre> - - - - - -End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of The Development of Metaphysics in -Persia, by Muhammad Iqbal - -*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK METAPHYSICS IN PERSIA *** - -***** This file should be named 41707-h.htm or 41707-h.zip ***** -This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: - http://www.gutenberg.org/4/1/7/0/41707/ - -Produced by Fritz Ohrenschall, Sania Ali Mirza, Asad Razzaki -and the Online Distributed Proofreading Team at -http://www.pgdp.net (This book was produced from scanned -images of public domain material from the Google Print -project.) - - -Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions -will be renamed. - -Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no -one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation -(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without -permission and without paying copyright royalties. Special rules, -set forth in the General Terms of Use part of this license, apply to -copying and distributing Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works to -protect the PROJECT GUTENBERG-tm concept and trademark. Project -Gutenberg is a registered trademark, and may not be used if you -charge for the eBooks, unless you receive specific permission. If you -do not charge anything for copies of this eBook, complying with the -rules is very easy. You may use this eBook for nearly any purpose -such as creation of derivative works, reports, performances and -research. They may be modified and printed and given away--you may do -practically ANYTHING with public domain eBooks. Redistribution is -subject to the trademark license, especially commercial -redistribution. - - - -*** START: FULL LICENSE *** - -THE FULL PROJECT GUTENBERG LICENSE -PLEASE READ THIS BEFORE YOU DISTRIBUTE OR USE THIS WORK - -To protect the Project Gutenberg-tm mission of promoting the free -distribution of electronic works, by using or distributing this work -(or any other work associated in any way with the phrase "Project -Gutenberg"), you agree to comply with all the terms of the Full Project -Gutenberg-tm License available with this file or online at - www.gutenberg.org/license. - - -Section 1. General Terms of Use and Redistributing Project Gutenberg-tm -electronic works - -1.A. By reading or using any part of this Project Gutenberg-tm -electronic work, you indicate that you have read, understand, agree to -and accept all the terms of this license and intellectual property -(trademark/copyright) agreement. If you do not agree to abide by all -the terms of this agreement, you must cease using and return or destroy -all copies of Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works in your possession. -If you paid a fee for obtaining a copy of or access to a Project -Gutenberg-tm electronic work and you do not agree to be bound by the -terms of this agreement, you may obtain a refund from the person or -entity to whom you paid the fee as set forth in paragraph 1.E.8. - -1.B. "Project Gutenberg" is a registered trademark. It may only be -used on or associated in any way with an electronic work by people who -agree to be bound by the terms of this agreement. There are a few -things that you can do with most Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works -even without complying with the full terms of this agreement. See -paragraph 1.C below. There are a lot of things you can do with Project -Gutenberg-tm electronic works if you follow the terms of this agreement -and help preserve free future access to Project Gutenberg-tm electronic -works. See paragraph 1.E below. - -1.C. The Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation ("the Foundation" -or PGLAF), owns a compilation copyright in the collection of Project -Gutenberg-tm electronic works. Nearly all the individual works in the -collection are in the public domain in the United States. If an -individual work is in the public domain in the United States and you are -located in the United States, we do not claim a right to prevent you from -copying, distributing, performing, displaying or creating derivative -works based on the work as long as all references to Project Gutenberg -are removed. Of course, we hope that you will support the Project -Gutenberg-tm mission of promoting free access to electronic works by -freely sharing Project Gutenberg-tm works in compliance with the terms of -this agreement for keeping the Project Gutenberg-tm name associated with -the work. You can easily comply with the terms of this agreement by -keeping this work in the same format with its attached full Project -Gutenberg-tm License when you share it without charge with others. - -1.D. The copyright laws of the place where you are located also govern -what you can do with this work. Copyright laws in most countries are in -a constant state of change. If you are outside the United States, check -the laws of your country in addition to the terms of this agreement -before downloading, copying, displaying, performing, distributing or -creating derivative works based on this work or any other Project -Gutenberg-tm work. The Foundation makes no representations concerning -the copyright status of any work in any country outside the United -States. - -1.E. Unless you have removed all references to Project Gutenberg: - -1.E.1. The following sentence, with active links to, or other immediate -access to, the full Project Gutenberg-tm License must appear prominently -whenever any copy of a Project Gutenberg-tm work (any work on which the -phrase "Project Gutenberg" appears, or with which the phrase "Project -Gutenberg" is associated) is accessed, displayed, performed, viewed, -copied or distributed: - -This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with -almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or -re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included -with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org - -1.E.2. If an individual Project Gutenberg-tm electronic work is derived -from the public domain (does not contain a notice indicating that it is -posted with permission of the copyright holder), the work can be copied -and distributed to anyone in the United States without paying any fees -or charges. If you are redistributing or providing access to a work -with the phrase "Project Gutenberg" associated with or appearing on the -work, you must comply either with the requirements of paragraphs 1.E.1 -through 1.E.7 or obtain permission for the use of the work and the -Project Gutenberg-tm trademark as set forth in paragraphs 1.E.8 or -1.E.9. - -1.E.3. If an individual Project Gutenberg-tm electronic work is posted -with the permission of the copyright holder, your use and distribution -must comply with both paragraphs 1.E.1 through 1.E.7 and any additional -terms imposed by the copyright holder. Additional terms will be linked -to the Project Gutenberg-tm License for all works posted with the -permission of the copyright holder found at the beginning of this work. - -1.E.4. Do not unlink or detach or remove the full Project Gutenberg-tm -License terms from this work, or any files containing a part of this -work or any other work associated with Project Gutenberg-tm. - -1.E.5. Do not copy, display, perform, distribute or redistribute this -electronic work, or any part of this electronic work, without -prominently displaying the sentence set forth in paragraph 1.E.1 with -active links or immediate access to the full terms of the Project -Gutenberg-tm License. - -1.E.6. You may convert to and distribute this work in any binary, -compressed, marked up, nonproprietary or proprietary form, including any -word processing or hypertext form. However, if you provide access to or -distribute copies of a Project Gutenberg-tm work in a format other than -"Plain Vanilla ASCII" or other format used in the official version -posted on the official Project Gutenberg-tm web site (www.gutenberg.org), -you must, at no additional cost, fee or expense to the user, provide a -copy, a means of exporting a copy, or a means of obtaining a copy upon -request, of the work in its original "Plain Vanilla ASCII" or other -form. Any alternate format must include the full Project Gutenberg-tm -License as specified in paragraph 1.E.1. - -1.E.7. Do not charge a fee for access to, viewing, displaying, -performing, copying or distributing any Project Gutenberg-tm works -unless you comply with paragraph 1.E.8 or 1.E.9. - -1.E.8. You may charge a reasonable fee for copies of or providing -access to or distributing Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works provided -that - -- You pay a royalty fee of 20% of the gross profits you derive from - the use of Project Gutenberg-tm works calculated using the method - you already use to calculate your applicable taxes. The fee is - owed to the owner of the Project Gutenberg-tm trademark, but he - has agreed to donate royalties under this paragraph to the - Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation. Royalty payments - must be paid within 60 days following each date on which you - prepare (or are legally required to prepare) your periodic tax - returns. Royalty payments should be clearly marked as such and - sent to the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation at the - address specified in Section 4, "Information about donations to - the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation." - -- You provide a full refund of any money paid by a user who notifies - you in writing (or by e-mail) within 30 days of receipt that s/he - does not agree to the terms of the full Project Gutenberg-tm - License. You must require such a user to return or - destroy all copies of the works possessed in a physical medium - and discontinue all use of and all access to other copies of - Project Gutenberg-tm works. - -- You provide, in accordance with paragraph 1.F.3, a full refund of any - money paid for a work or a replacement copy, if a defect in the - electronic work is discovered and reported to you within 90 days - of receipt of the work. - -- You comply with all other terms of this agreement for free - distribution of Project Gutenberg-tm works. - -1.E.9. If you wish to charge a fee or distribute a Project Gutenberg-tm -electronic work or group of works on different terms than are set -forth in this agreement, you must obtain permission in writing from -both the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation and Michael -Hart, the owner of the Project Gutenberg-tm trademark. Contact the -Foundation as set forth in Section 3 below. - -1.F. - -1.F.1. Project Gutenberg volunteers and employees expend considerable -effort to identify, do copyright research on, transcribe and proofread -public domain works in creating the Project Gutenberg-tm -collection. Despite these efforts, Project Gutenberg-tm electronic -works, and the medium on which they may be stored, may contain -"Defects," such as, but not limited to, incomplete, inaccurate or -corrupt data, transcription errors, a copyright or other intellectual -property infringement, a defective or damaged disk or other medium, a -computer virus, or computer codes that damage or cannot be read by -your equipment. - -1.F.2. LIMITED WARRANTY, DISCLAIMER OF DAMAGES - Except for the "Right -of Replacement or Refund" described in paragraph 1.F.3, the Project -Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation, the owner of the Project -Gutenberg-tm trademark, and any other party distributing a Project -Gutenberg-tm electronic work under this agreement, disclaim all -liability to you for damages, costs and expenses, including legal -fees. YOU AGREE THAT YOU HAVE NO REMEDIES FOR NEGLIGENCE, STRICT -LIABILITY, BREACH OF WARRANTY OR BREACH OF CONTRACT EXCEPT THOSE -PROVIDED IN PARAGRAPH 1.F.3. YOU AGREE THAT THE FOUNDATION, THE -TRADEMARK OWNER, AND ANY DISTRIBUTOR UNDER THIS AGREEMENT WILL NOT BE -LIABLE TO YOU FOR ACTUAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, CONSEQUENTIAL, PUNITIVE OR -INCIDENTAL DAMAGES EVEN IF YOU GIVE NOTICE OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH -DAMAGE. - -1.F.3. LIMITED RIGHT OF REPLACEMENT OR REFUND - If you discover a -defect in this electronic work within 90 days of receiving it, you can -receive a refund of the money (if any) you paid for it by sending a -written explanation to the person you received the work from. If you -received the work on a physical medium, you must return the medium with -your written explanation. The person or entity that provided you with -the defective work may elect to provide a replacement copy in lieu of a -refund. If you received the work electronically, the person or entity -providing it to you may choose to give you a second opportunity to -receive the work electronically in lieu of a refund. If the second copy -is also defective, you may demand a refund in writing without further -opportunities to fix the problem. - -1.F.4. Except for the limited right of replacement or refund set forth -in paragraph 1.F.3, this work is provided to you 'AS-IS', WITH NO OTHER -WARRANTIES OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO -WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR ANY PURPOSE. - -1.F.5. Some states do not allow disclaimers of certain implied -warranties or the exclusion or limitation of certain types of damages. -If any disclaimer or limitation set forth in this agreement violates the -law of the state applicable to this agreement, the agreement shall be -interpreted to make the maximum disclaimer or limitation permitted by -the applicable state law. The invalidity or unenforceability of any -provision of this agreement shall not void the remaining provisions. - -1.F.6. INDEMNITY - You agree to indemnify and hold the Foundation, the -trademark owner, any agent or employee of the Foundation, anyone -providing copies of Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works in accordance -with this agreement, and any volunteers associated with the production, -promotion and distribution of Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works, -harmless from all liability, costs and expenses, including legal fees, -that arise directly or indirectly from any of the following which you do -or cause to occur: (a) distribution of this or any Project Gutenberg-tm -work, (b) alteration, modification, or additions or deletions to any -Project Gutenberg-tm work, and (c) any Defect you cause. - - -Section 2. Information about the Mission of Project Gutenberg-tm - -Project Gutenberg-tm is synonymous with the free distribution of -electronic works in formats readable by the widest variety of computers -including obsolete, old, middle-aged and new computers. It exists -because of the efforts of hundreds of volunteers and donations from -people in all walks of life. - -Volunteers and financial support to provide volunteers with the -assistance they need are critical to reaching Project Gutenberg-tm's -goals and ensuring that the Project Gutenberg-tm collection will -remain freely available for generations to come. In 2001, the Project -Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation was created to provide a secure -and permanent future for Project Gutenberg-tm and future generations. -To learn more about the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation -and how your efforts and donations can help, see Sections 3 and 4 -and the Foundation information page at www.gutenberg.org - - -Section 3. Information about the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive -Foundation - -The Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation is a non profit -501(c)(3) educational corporation organized under the laws of the -state of Mississippi and granted tax exempt status by the Internal -Revenue Service. The Foundation's EIN or federal tax identification -number is 64-6221541. Contributions to the Project Gutenberg -Literary Archive Foundation are tax deductible to the full extent -permitted by U.S. federal laws and your state's laws. - -The Foundation's principal office is located at 4557 Melan Dr. S. -Fairbanks, AK, 99712., but its volunteers and employees are scattered -throughout numerous locations. Its business office is located at 809 -North 1500 West, Salt Lake City, UT 84116, (801) 596-1887. Email -contact links and up to date contact information can be found at the -Foundation's web site and official page at www.gutenberg.org/contact - -For additional contact information: - Dr. Gregory B. Newby - Chief Executive and Director - gbnewby@pglaf.org - -Section 4. Information about Donations to the Project Gutenberg -Literary Archive Foundation - -Project Gutenberg-tm depends upon and cannot survive without wide -spread public support and donations to carry out its mission of -increasing the number of public domain and licensed works that can be -freely distributed in machine readable form accessible by the widest -array of equipment including outdated equipment. Many small donations -($1 to $5,000) are particularly important to maintaining tax exempt -status with the IRS. - -The Foundation is committed to complying with the laws regulating -charities and charitable donations in all 50 states of the United -States. Compliance requirements are not uniform and it takes a -considerable effort, much paperwork and many fees to meet and keep up -with these requirements. We do not solicit donations in locations -where we have not received written confirmation of compliance. To -SEND DONATIONS or determine the status of compliance for any -particular state visit www.gutenberg.org/donate - -While we cannot and do not solicit contributions from states where we -have not met the solicitation requirements, we know of no prohibition -against accepting unsolicited donations from donors in such states who -approach us with offers to donate. - -International donations are gratefully accepted, but we cannot make -any statements concerning tax treatment of donations received from -outside the United States. U.S. laws alone swamp our small staff. - -Please check the Project Gutenberg Web pages for current donation -methods and addresses. Donations are accepted in a number of other -ways including checks, online payments and credit card donations. -To donate, please visit: www.gutenberg.org/donate - - -Section 5. General Information About Project Gutenberg-tm electronic -works. - -Professor Michael S. Hart was the originator of the Project Gutenberg-tm -concept of a library of electronic works that could be freely shared -with anyone. For forty years, he produced and distributed Project -Gutenberg-tm eBooks with only a loose network of volunteer support. - -Project Gutenberg-tm eBooks are often created from several printed -editions, all of which are confirmed as Public Domain in the U.S. -unless a copyright notice is included. Thus, we do not necessarily -keep eBooks in compliance with any particular paper edition. - -Most people start at our Web site which has the main PG search facility: - - www.gutenberg.org - -This Web site includes information about Project Gutenberg-tm, -including how to make donations to the Project Gutenberg Literary -Archive Foundation, how to help produce our new eBooks, and how to -subscribe to our email newsletter to hear about new eBooks. - - - -</pre> - +<div>*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 41707 ***</div> </body> </html> diff --git a/41707.txt b/41707.txt deleted file mode 100644 index 665ca17..0000000 --- a/41707.txt +++ /dev/null @@ -1,4764 +0,0 @@ -The Project Gutenberg EBook of The Development of Metaphysics in Persia, by -Muhammad Iqbal - -This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with -almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or -re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included -with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org - - -Title: The Development of Metaphysics in Persia - A Contribution to the History of Muslim Philosophy - -Author: Muhammad Iqbal - -Release Date: December 26, 2012 [EBook #41707] - -Language: English - -Character set encoding: ASCII - -*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK METAPHYSICS IN PERSIA *** - - - - -Produced by Fritz Ohrenschall, Sania Ali Mirza, Asad Razzaki -and the Online Distributed Proofreading Team at -http://www.pgdp.net (This book was produced from scanned -images of public domain material from the Google Print -project.) - - - - - -Transcriber's note: - - Some typographical and punctuation errors have been corrected. - A complete list follows the text. - - Words italicized in the original are surrounded by - _underscores_. - - Letters superscripted in the original have been placed in {} - brackets. - - The Arabic letter Ain is represented by the grave accent `, - the Arabic letter Hamza is represented by the single quote ' - and the asterism sign is represented as .*. in the text. - - - - - THE - DEVELOPMENT OF METAPHYSICS - IN - PERSIA: - - A CONTRIBUTION TO THE HISTORY - OF MUSLIM PHILOSOPHY - - BY - - SHAIKH MUHAMMAD IQBAL - B. A. (Cantab) M. A. (Pb.) Ph. D. (Munich). - - - LONDON - LUZAC & Co. 46, Great Russell Street W. C. - 1908 - - - Printed by E. J. BRILL. aEuro" LEIDEN (Holland). - - - - - DEDICATION - TO - Professor T. W. ARNOLD M. A. - - - My dear MR. ARNOLD, - -This little book is the first-fruit of that literary and philosophical -training which I have been receiving from you for the last ten years, -and as an expression of gratitude I beg to dedicate it to your name. You -have always judged me liberally; I hope you will judge these pages in -the same spirit. - - Your affectionate pupil - - IQBAL. - - - - -INTRODUCTION. - - -The most remarkable feature of the character of the Persian people is -their love of Metaphysical speculation. Yet the inquirer who approaches -the extant literature of Persia expecting to find any comprehensive -systems of thought, like those of Kapila or Kant, will have to turn back -disappointed, though deeply impressed by the wonderful intellectual -subtlety displayed therein. It seems to me that the Persian mind is -rather impatient of detail, and consequently destitute of that -organising faculty which gradually works out a system of ideas, by -interpreting the fundamental principles with reference to the ordinary -facts of observation. The subtle Brahman sees the inner unity of things; -so does the Persian. But while the former endeavours to discover it in -all the aspects of human experience, and illustrates its hidden presence -in the concrete in various ways, the latter appears to be satisfied -with a bare universality, and does not attempt to verify the richness of -its inner content. The butterfly imagination of the Persian flies, -half-inebriated as it were, from flower to flower, and seems to be -incapable of reviewing the garden as a whole. For this reason his -deepest thoughts and emotions find expression mostly in disconnected -verses (Ghazal) which reveal all the subtlety of his artistic soul. -The Hindu, while admitting, like the Persian, the necessity of a higher -source of knowledge, yet calmly moves from experience to experience, -mercilessly dissecting them, and forcing them to yield their underlying -universality. In fact the Persian is only half-conscious of Metaphysics -as a _system_ of thought; his Brahman brother, on the other hand, is -fully alive to the need of presenting his theory in the form of a -thoroughly reasoned out system. And the result of this mental difference -between the two nations is clear. In the one case we have only partially -worked out systems of thought; in the other case, the awful sublimity of -the searching Vedanta. The student of Islamic Mysticism who is anxious -to see an all-embracing exposition of the principle of Unity, must look -up the heavy volumes of the Andalusian Ibn al-`Arabi, whose profound -teaching stands in strange contrast with the dry-as-dust Islam of his -countrymen. - -The results, however, of the intellectual activity of the different -branches of the great Aryan family are strikingly similar. The outcome -of all Idealistic speculation in India is Buddha, in Persia Bahaullah, -and in the west Schopenhauer whose system, in Hegelian language, is the -marriage of free oriental universality with occidental determinateness. - -But the history of Persian thought presents a phenomenon peculiar to -itself. In Persia, due perhaps to semitic influences, philosophical -speculation has indissolubly associated itself with religion, and -thinkers in new lines of thought have almost always been founders of new -religious movements. After the Arab conquest, however, we see pure -Philosophy severed from religion by the Neo-Platonic Aristotelians of -Islam, but the severance was only a transient phenomenon. Greek -philosophy, though an exotic plant in the soil of Persia, eventually -became an integral part of Persian thought; and later thinkers, critics -as well as advocates of Greek wisdom, talked in the philosophical -language of Aristotle and Plato, and were mostly influenced by religious -presuppositions. It is necessary to bear this fact in mind in order to -gain a thorough understanding of post-Islamic Persian thought. - -The object of this investigation is, as will appear, to prepare a -ground-work for a future history of Persian Metaphysics. Original -thought cannot be expected in a review, the object of which is purely -historical; yet I venture to claim some consideration for the following -two points:-- - -(a) I have endeavoured to trace the logical continuity of Persian -thought, which I have tried to interpret in the language of modern -Philosophy. This, as far as I know, has not yet been done. - -(b) I have discussed the subject of Sufiism in a more scientific manner, -and have attempted to bring out the intellectual conditions which -necessitated such a phenomenon. In opposition, therefore, to the -generally accepted view I have tried to maintain that Sufiism is a -necessary product of the play of various intellectual and moral forces -which would necessarily awaken the slumbering soul to a higher ideal of -life. - -Owing to my ignorance of Zend, my knowledge of Zoroaster is merely -second-hand. As regards the second part of my work, I have been able to -look up the original Persian and Arabic manuscripts as well as many -printed works connected with my investigation. I give below the names of -Arabic and Persian manuscripts from which I have drawn most of the -material utilized here. The method of transliteration adopted is the one -recognised by the Royal Asiatic Society. - - 1. Tarikh al-Hukama, by Al-Baihaqi.--Royal Library of Berlin. - - 2. Sharhi Anwariyya, (with the original text) by Muhammad - Sharif of Herat. Royal Library of Berlin. - - 3. Hikmat al-`Ain, by al-Katibi. Royal Library of Berlin. - - 4. Commentary on Hikmat al-`Ain, by Muhammad ibn Mubarak - al-Bukhari. India Office Library. - - 5. Commentary on Hikmat al-`Ain by Husaini. India Office - Library. - - 6. `Awarif al-Ma`arif, by Shahab al-Din. India Office Library. - - - 7. Mishkat al-Anwar, by Al-Ghazali. India Office Library. - - - 8. Kashf al-Mahjub, by `Ali Hajveri. India Office Library. - - 9. Risalahi Nafs translated from Aristotle, by Afdal Kashi. - India Office Library. - - 10. Risalahi Mir Sayyid Sharif. India Office Library. - - 11. Khatima, by Sayyid Muhammad Gisudaraz. India Office - Library. - - 12. Manazilal-sa'rin, by `Abdullah Ismai'l of Herat. India - Office Library. - - 13. Jawidan Nama, by Afdal Kashi. India Office Library. - - 14. Tarikh al-Hukama, by Shahrzuri. British Museum Library. - - 15. Collected works of Avicenna. British Museum Library. - - 16. Risalah fi'l-Wujud, by Mir Jurjani. British Museum Library. - - 17. Jawidani Kabir. Cambridge University Library. - - 18. Jami Jahan Numa. Cambridge University Library. - - 19. Majmu`ai Farsi Risalah No: 1, 2, of Al-Nasafi. Trinity - College Library. - - S. M. IQBAL. - - - - -CONTENTS. - - - PART I. - Pre-Islamic Persian Philosophy. - Page - Chapter I. Persian Dualism 1 - Sec: I. Zoroaster 1 - Sec: II. Mani and Mazdak 12 - Sec: III. Retrospect 20 - - PART II. - Greek Dualism. - - Chapter II. Neo-Platonic Aristotelians of Persia 22 - Sec: I. Ibn Maskawaih 26 - Sec: II. Avicenna 38 - - Chapter III. Islamic Rationalism 45 - Sec: I. Metaphysics of Rationalism--Materialism 45 - Sec: II. Contemporary movements of thought 55 - Sec: III. Reaction against Rationalism--The Ash`arite 65 - - Chapter IV. Controversy between Realism and Idealism 81 - - Chapter V. Sufiism. - Sec: I. The origin and Quranic justification of Sufiism 96 - Sec: II. Aspects of Sufi Metaphysics 111 - A. Reality as Self-conscious Will 112 - B. Reality as Beauty 112 - C. (1) Reality as Light 120 - (Return to Persian Dualism--Al-Ishraqi). - (2) Reality as Thought--Al-Jili 121 - - Chapter VI. Later Persian Thought 174 - - Conclusion 192 - - - - -PART I. - -Pre-Islamic Persian Philosophy. - - - - -CHAP. I. - -PERSIAN DUALISM. - - -ASec. I. - -Zoroaster. - -To Zoroaster--the ancient sage of Iran--must always be assigned the -first place in the intellectual history of Iranian Aryans who, wearied -of constant roaming, settled down to an agricultural life at a time when -the Vedic Hymns were still being composed in the plains of Central Asia. -This new mode of life and the consequent stability of the institution of -property among the settlers, made them hated by other Aryan tribes who -had not yet shaken off their original nomadic habits, and occasionally -plundered their more civilised kinsmen. Thus grew up the conflict -between the two modes of life which found its earliest expression in the -denunciation of the deities of each other--the Devas and the Ahuras. It -was really the beginning of a long individualising process which -gradually severed the Iranian branch from other Aryan tribes, and -finally manifested itself in the religious system of Zoroaster[2:1]--the -great prophet of Iran who lived and taught in the age of Solon and -Thales. In the dim light of modern oriental research we see ancient -Iranians divided between two camps--partisans of the powers of good, and -partisans of the powers of evil--when the great sage joins their furious -contest, and with his moral enthusiasm stamps out once for all the -worship of demons as well as the intolerable ritual of the Magian -priesthood. - - [2:1] Some European Scholars have held Zoroaster to be nothing - more than a mythical personage. But since the publication of - Professor Jackson's admirable Life of Zoroaster, the Iranian - Prophet has, I believe, finally got out of the ordeal of modern - criticism. - -It is, however, beside our purpose to trace the origin and growth of -Zoroaster's religious system. Our object, in so far as the present -investigation is concerned, is to glance at the metaphysical side of -his revelation. We, therefore, wish to fix our attention on the sacred -trinity of philosophy--God, Man and Nature. - -Geiger, in his "Civilisation of Eastern Iranians in Ancient Times", -points out that Zoroaster inherited two fundamental principles from his -Aryan ancestry.--(1) There is law in Nature. (2) There is conflict in -Nature. It is the observation of law and conflict in the vast panorama -of being that constitutes the philosophical foundation of his system. -The problem before him was to reconcile the existence of evil with the -eternal goodness of God. His predecessors worshipped a plurality of good -spirits all of which he reduced to a unity and called it Ahuramazda. On -the other hand he reduced all the powers of evil to a similar unity and -called it Druj-Ahriman. Thus by a process of unification he arrived at -two fundamental principles which, as Haug shows, he looked upon not as -two independent activities, but as two parts or rather aspects of the -same Primary Being. Dr. Haug, therefore, holds that the Prophet of -ancient Iran was theologically a monotheist and philosophically a -dualist.[4:1] But to maintain that there are "twin"[4:2] -spirits--creators of reality and nonreality--and at the same time to -hold that these two spirits are united in the Supreme Being,[4:3] is -virtually to say that the principle of evil constitutes a part of the -very essence of God; and the conflict between good and evil is nothing -more than the struggle of God against Himself. There is, therefore, an -inherent weakness in his attempt to reconcile theological monotheism -with philosophical dualism, and the result was a schism among the -prophet's followers. The Zendiks[4:4] whom Dr. Haug calls heretics, but -who were, I believe, decidedly more consistent than their opponents, -maintained the independence of the two original spirits from each other, -while the Magi upheld their unity. The upholders of unity endeavoured, -in various ways, to meet the Zendiks; but the very fact that they tried -different phrases and expressions to express the unity of the "Primal -Twins", indicates dissatisfaction with their own philosophical -explanations, and the strength of their opponent's position. -Shahrastani[5:1] describes briefly the different explanations of the -Magi. The Zarwanians look upon Light and Darkness as the sons of -Infinite Time. The Kiyumarthiyya hold that the original principle was -Light which was afraid of a hostile power, and it was this thought of an -adversary mixed with fear that led to the birth of Darkness. Another -branch of Zarwanians maintain that the original principle doubted -concerning something and this doubt produced Ahriman. Ibn Hazm[5:2] -speaks of another sect who explained the principle of Darkness as the -obscuration of a part of the fundamental principle of Light itself. - - [4:1] Essays, p. 303. - - [4:2] "In the beginning there was a pair of twins, two spirits, - each of a peculiar activity". Yas. XXX. 1. - - [4:3] "The more beneficial of my spirits has produced, by - speaking it, the whole rightful creation". Yas. XIX. 9. - - [4:4] The following verse from Buudahish Chap. I. will indicate - the Zendik view:-- "And between them (the two principles) there - was empty space, that is what they call "air" in which is now - their meeting". - - [5:1] Shahrastani; ed. Cureton, London, 1846, pp. 182-185. - - [5:2] Ibn Hazm--Kitab al-Milal w'al-Nihal. Ed. Cairo. Vol. II, - p. 34. - -Whether the philosophical dualism of Zoroaster can be reconciled with -his monotheism or not, it is unquestionable that, from a metaphysical -standpoint, he has made a profound suggestion in regard to the ultimate -nature of reality. The idea seems to have influenced ancient Greek -Philosophy[6:1] as well as early Christian Gnostic speculation, and -through the latter, some aspects of modern western thought.[6:2] As a -thinker he is worthy of great respect not only because he approached the -problem of objective multiplicity in a philosophical spirit; but also -because he endeavoured, having been led to metaphysical dualism, to -reduce his Primary Duality to a higher unity. He seems to have -perceived, what the mystic shoemaker of Germany perceived long after -him, that the diversity of nature could not be explained without -postulating a principle of negativity or self-differentiation in the -very nature of God. His immediate successors did not, however, quite -realise the deep significance of their master's suggestions; but we -shall see, as we advance, how Zoroaster's idea finds a more -spiritualised expression in some of the aspects of later Persian -thought. - - [6:1] In connection with the influence of Zoroastrian ideas on - Ancient Greek thought, the following statement made by Erdmann - is noteworthy, though Lawrence Mills (American Journal of - Philology Vol. 22) regards such influence as improbable:--"The - fact that the handmaids of this force, which he (Heraclitus) - calls the seed of all that happens and the measure of all order, - are entitled the "tongues" has probably been slightly ascribed - to the influence of the Persian Magi. On the other hand he - connects himself with his country's mythology, not indeed - without a change of exegesis when he places Apollo and Dionysus - beside Zeus, i.e. The ultimate fire, as the two aspects of his - nature". History of Philosophy Vol. I, p. 50. - - It is, perhaps, owing to this doubtful influence of - Zoroastrianism on Heraclitus that Lassalle (quoted by Paul Janet - in his History of the Problems of Philosophy Vol. II, p. 147) - looks upon Zoroaster as a precursor of Hegel. - - Of Zoroastrian influence on Pythagoras Erdmann says:-- - - "The fact that the odd numbers are put above the even has been - emphasised by Gladisch in his comparison of the Pythagorian with - the Chinese doctrine, and the fact, moreover, that among the - oppositions we find those of light and darkness, good and evil, - has induced many, in ancient and modern times, to suppose that - they were borrowed from Zoroastrianism." Vol. I, p. 33. - - [6:2] Among modern English thinkers Mr. Bradley arrives at a - conclusion similar to that of Zoroaster. Discussing the ethical - significance of Bradley's Philosophy, Prof. Sorley says:--"Mr. - Bradley, like Green, has faith in an eternal reality which might - be called spiritual, inasmuch as it is not material; like Green - he looks upon man's moral activity as an appearance--what Green - calls a reproduction--of this eternal reality. But under this - general agreement there lies a world of difference. He refuses - by the use of the term self-conscious, to liken his Absolute to - the personality of man, and he brings out the consequence which - in Green is more or less concealed, that the evil equally with - the good in man and in the world are appearances of the - Absolute". Recent tendencies in Ethics, pp. 100-101. - -Turning now to his Cosmology, his dualism leads him to bifurcate, as it -were, the whole universe into two departments of being--reality i.e. -the sum of all good creations flowing from the creative activity of the -beneficial spirit, and non-reality[8:1] i.e. the sum of all evil -creations proceeding from the hostile spirit. The original conflict of -the two spirits is manifested in the opposing forces of nature, which, -therefore, presents a continual struggle between the powers of Good and -the powers of Evil. But it should be remembered that nothing intervenes -between the original spirits and their respective creations. Things are -good and bad because they proceed from good or bad creative agencies, in -their own nature they are quite indifferent. Zoroaster's conception of -creation is fundamentally different from that of Plato and Schopenhauer -to whom spheres of empirical reality reflect non-temporal or temporal -ideas which, so to speak, mediate between Reality and Appearance. There -are, according to Zoroaster, only two categories of existence, and the -history of the universe is nothing more than a progressive conflict -between the forces falling respectively under these categories. We are, -like other things, partakers of this struggle, and it is our duty to -range ourselves on the side of Light which will eventually prevail and -completely vanquish the spirit of Darkness. The metaphysics of the -Iranian Prophet, like that of Plato, passes on into Ethics, and it is in -the peculiarity of the Ethical aspect of his thought that the influence -of his social environment is most apparent. - - [8:1] This should not be confounded with Plato's non-being. To - Zoroaster all forms of existence proceeding from the creative - agency of the spirit of darkness are unreal; because, - considering the final triumph of the spirit of Light, they have - a temporary existence only. - -Zoroaster's view of the destiny of the soul is very simple. The soul, -according to him, is a creation, not a part of God as the votaries of -Mithra[9:1] afterwards maintained. It had a beginning in time, but can -attain to everlasting life by fighting against Evil in the earthly scene -of its activity. It is free to choose between the only two courses of -action--good and evil; and besides the power of choice the spirit of -Light has endowed it with the following faculties:-- - - 1. Conscience[10:1]. - - 2. Vital force. - - 3. The Soul--The Mind. - - 4. The Spirit--Reason. - - 5. The Farawashi[10:2].--A kind of tutelary spirit which acts - as a protection of man in his voyage towards God. - -The last three[10:3] faculties are united together after death, and form -an indissoluble whole. The virtuous soul, leaving its home of flesh, is -borne up into higher regions, and has to pass through the following -planes of existence:-- - - 1. The Place of good thoughts. - - 2. The Place of good words. - - 3. The Place of good works. - - 4. The Place of Eternal Glory[11:1].--Where the individual soul - unites with the principle of Light without losing its - personality. - - [9:1] Mithraism was a phase of Zoroastrianism which spread over - the Roman world in the second century. The partisans of Mithra - worshipped the sun whom they looked upon as the great advocate - of Light. They held the human soul to be a part of God, and - maintained that the observance of a mysterious cult could bring - about the souls' union with God. Their doctrine of the soul, its - ascent towards God by torturing the body and finally passing - through the sphere of Aether and becoming pure fire, offers some - resemblance with views entertained by some schools of Persian - Sufiism. - - [10:1] Geiger's Civilisation of Eastern Iranians, Vol. I, - p. 124. - - [10:2] Dr. Haug (Essays p. 206) compares these protecting - spirits with the ideas of Plato. They, however, are not to be - understood as models according to which things are fashioned. - Plato's ideas, moreover, are eternal, non-temporal and - non-spatial. The doctrine that everything created by the spirit - of Light is protected by a subordinate spirit has only an - outward resemblance with the view that every spirit is fashioned - according to a perfect supersensible model. - - [10:3] The Sufi conception of the soul is also tripartite. - According to them the soul is a combination of Mind, heart and - spirit (Nafs, Qalb, Ruh). The "heart" is to them both material - and immaterial or, more properly, neither--standing midway - between soul and mind (Nafs and Ruh), and acting as the organ of - higher knowledge. Perhaps Dr. Schenkel's use of the word - "conscience" would approach the sufi idea of "heart". - - [11:1] Geiger Vol. I, p. 104. (The sufi Cosmology has a similar - doctrine concerning the different stages of existence through - which the soul has to pass in its journey heavenward. They - enumerate the following five Planes; but their definition of the - character of each plane is slightly different:-- - - 1. The world of body. (Nasut). - - 2. The world of pure intelligence. (Malakut). - - 3. The world of power. (Jabrut). - - 4. The world of negation. (Lahut). - - 5. The world of Absolute Silence. (Hahut). - - The sufis probably borrowed this idea from the Indian Yogis who - recognise the following seven Planes:--(Annie Besant: - Reincarnation, p. 30). - - 1. The Plane of Physical Body. - - 2. The Plane of Etherial double. - - 3. The Plane of Vitality. - - 4. The Plane of Emotional Nature. - - 5. The Plane of Thought. - - 6. The Plane of Spiritual soul--Reason. - - 7. The Plane of Pure Spirit.) - - - - -ASec. II. - -Mani[12:1] and Mazdak[12:2]. - -We have seen Zoroaster's solution of the problem of diversity, and the -theological or rather philosophical controversy which split up the -Zoroastrian Church. The half-Persian Mani--"the founder of Godless -community" as Christians styled him afterwards--agrees with those -Zoroastrians who held the Prophet's doctrine in its naked form, and -approaches the question in a spirit thoroughly materialistic. -Originally Persian his father emigrated from Hamadan to Babylonia where -Mani was born in 215 or 216 A.D.--the time when Buddhistic Missionaries -were beginning to preach Nirvana to the country of Zoroaster. The -eclectic character of the religious system of Mani, its bold extension -of the Christian idea of redemption, and its logical consistency in -holding, as a true ground for an ascetic life, that the world is -essentially evil, made it a real power which influenced not only Eastern -and Western Christian thought[13:1], but has also left some dim marks on -the development of metaphysical speculation in Persia. Leaving the -discussion of the sources[13:2] of Mani's religious system to the -orientalist, we proceed to describe and finally to determine the -philosophical value of his doctrine of the origin of the Phenomenal -Universe. - - [12:1] Sources used:-- - - (a) The text of Muhammad ibn Ishaq, edited by Flugel, pp. - 52-56. - - (b) Al-Ya`qubi: ed. Houtsma, 1883, Vol. I, pp. 180-181. - - (c) Ibn Hazm: Kitab al-Milal w'al-Nihal: ed. Cairo, Vol. II, - p. 36. - - (d) Shahrastani: ed. Cureton, London, 1846, pp. 188-192. - - (e) Encyclopaedia Britannica, Article on Mani. - - (f) Salemann: Bulletin de l'Academie des Sciences de St. - Petersburg Series IV, 15 April 1907, pp. 175--184. F. W. - K. Muller: Handschriften--Reste in Estrangelo--Schrift - aus Turfan, Chinesisch--Turkistan, Teil I, II; Sitzungen - der Koniglich Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, - 11 Feb. 1904, pp. 348-352; und Abhandlungen etc. 1904. - - [12:2] Sources used:-- - - (a) Siyasat Namah Nizam al-Mulk: ed. Charles Schefer, - Paris, 1897, pp. 166-181. - - (b) Shahrastani: ed. Cureton, pp. 192-194. - - (c) Al-Ya`qubi: ed. Houtsma, 1883, Vol. I, p. 186. - - (d) Al-Biruni: Chronology of Ancient Nations: tr. E. Sachau, - London, 1879, p. 192. - - [13:1] "If I see aright, five different conceptions can be - distinguished for the period about 400 A.D. First we have the - Manichaean which insinuated its way in the darkness, but was - widely extended even among the clergy". (Harnack's History of - Christian Dogma, Vol. V, p. 56). "From the anti-Manichaean - controversy sprang the desire to conceive all God's attributes - as identical i.e. the interest in the indivisibility of God", - (Harnack's History of Christian Dogma, Vol V, p. 120). - - [13:2] Some Eastern sources of information about Mani's - Philosophy (e.g. Ephraim Syrus mentioned by Prof. A. A. Bevan in - his Introduction to the Hymn of the Soul) tell us that he was a - disciple of Bardesanes, the Syrian gnostic. The learned author - of "al-Fihrist", however, mentions some books which Mani wrote - against the followers of the Syrian gnostic. Burkitt, in his - lectures on Early Eastern Christianity, gives a free translation - of Bardesanes' De Fato, the spirit of which I understand, is - fully Christian, and thoroughly opposed to the teaching of Mani. - Ibn Hazm, however, in his Kitab al-Milal w'al-Nihal (Vol. II, p. - 36) says, "Both agreed in other respects, except that Mani - believed darkness to be a living principle." - -The Paganising gnostic, as Erdmann calls him, teaches that the variety -of things springs from the mixture of two eternal Principles--Light and -Darkness--which are separate from and independent of each other. The -Principle of Light connotes ten ideas--Gentleness, Knowledge, -Understanding, Mystery, Insight, Love, Conviction, Faith, Benevolence -and Wisdom. Similarly the Principle of Darkness connotes five eternal -ideas--Mistiness, Heat, Fire, Venom, Darkness. Along with these two -primordial principles and connected with each, Mani recognises the -eternity of space and earth, each connoting respectively the ideas of -knowledge, understanding, mystery, insight, breath, air, water, light -and fire. In darkness--the feminine Principle in Nature--were hidden -the elements of evil which, in course of time, concentrated and resulted -in the composition, so to speak, of the hideous looking Devil--the -principle of activity. This first born child of the fiery womb of -darkness, attacked the domain of the King of Light who, in order to ward -off his malicious onslaught, created the Primal man. A serious conflict -ensued between the two creatures, and resulted in the complete -vanquishment of the Primal Man. The evil one, then, succeeded in mixing -together the five elements of darkness with the five elements of light. -Thereupon the ruler of the domain of light ordered some of his angels to -construct the Universe out of these mixed elements with a view to free -the atoms of light from their imprisonment. But the reason why darkness -was the first to attack light, is that the latter, being in its essence -good, could not proceed to start the process of admixture which was -essentially harmful to itself. The attitude of Mani's Cosmology, -therefore, to the Christian doctrine of Redemption is similar to that of -Hegelian Cosmology to the doctrine of the Trinity. To him redemption is -a physical process, and all procreation, because it protracts the -imprisonment of light, is contrary to the aim and object of the -Universe. The imprisoned atoms of light are continually set free from -darkness which is thrown down in the unfathomable ditch round the -Universe. The liberated light, however, passes on to the sun and the -moon whence it is carried by angels to the region of light--the eternal -home of the King of Paradise--"Pid i vazargii"--Father of greatness. - -This is a brief account of Mani's fantastic Cosmology.[16:1] He rejects -the Zoroastrian hypothesis of creative agencies to explain the problem -of objective existence. Taking a thoroughly materialistic view of the -question, he ascribes the phenomenal universe to the _mixture_ of two -independent, eternal principles, one of which (darkness) is not only a -part of the universe--stuff, but also the source wherein activity -resides, as it were, slumbering, and starts up into being when the -favourable moment arrives. The essential idea of his cosmology, -therefore, has a curious resemblance with that of the great Hindu -thinker Kapila, who accounts for the production of the universe by the -hypothesis of three gunas, i.e. Sattwa (goodness), Tamas (darkness), and -Rajas (motion or passion) which mix together to form Nature, when the -equilibrium of the primordial matter (Prakriti) is upset. Of the various -solutions[17:1] of the problem of diversity which the Vedantist solved -by postulating the mysterious power of "Maya", and Leibniz, long -afterwards, explained by his doctrine of the Identity of Indiscernibles, -Mani's solution, though childish, must find a place in the historical -development of philosophical ideas. Its philosophical value may be -insignificant; but one thing is certain, i.e. Mani was the first to -venture the suggestion that the Universe is due to the activity of the -Devil, and hence essentially evil--a proposition which seems to me to be -the only logical justification of a system which preaches renunciation -as the guiding principle of life. In our own times Schopenhauer has been -led to the same conclusion; though, unlike Mani, he supposes the -principle of objectification or individuation--"the sinful bent" of the -will to life--to exist in the very nature of the Primal Will and not -independent of it. - - [16:1] It is interesting to compare Mani's Philosophy of Nature - with the Chinese notion of Creation, according to which all that - exists flows from the Union of Yin and Yang. But the Chinese - reduced these two principles to a higher unity:--Tai Keih. To - Mani such a reduction was not possible; since he could not - conceive that things of opposite nature could proceed from the - same principle. - - [17:1] Thomas Aquinas states and criticises Mani's contrariety - of Primal agents in the following manner:-- - - (a) What all things seek even a principle of evil would seek. - But all things seek their own self-preservation. - .*. Even a principle of evil would seek its own self-preservation. - - (b) What all things seek is good. - But self-preservation is what all things seek. - .*. Self-preservation is good. - But a principle of evil would seek its own self-preservation. - .*. A principle of evil would seek some good--which shows that it - is self-contradictory. - - God and His Creatures, Book II, p. 105. Rickaby's Tr. - -Turning now to the remarkable socialist of ancient Persia--_Mazdak_. -This early prophet of communism appeared during the reign of -Anushirwan the Just (531-578 A.D.), and marked another dualistic -reaction against the prevailing Zarwanian doctrine[18:1]. Mazdak, like -Mani, taught that the diversity of things springs from the mixture of -two independent, eternal principles which he called Shid (Light) and -Tar (Darkness). But he differs from his predecessor in holding that the -fact of their mixture as well as their final separation, are quite -accidental, and not at all the result of choice. Mazdak's God is endowed -with sensation, and has four principal energies in his eternal -presence--power of discrimination, memory, understanding and bliss. -These four energies have four personal manifestations who, assisted by -four other persons, superintend the course of the Universe. Variety in -things and men is due to the various combinations of the original -principles. - - [18:1] The Zarwanian doctrine prevailed in Persia in the 5th - century B.C. (See Z. D. M. G., Vol. LVII, p. 562). - -But the most characteristic feature of the Mazdakite teaching is its -communism, which is evidently an inference from the cosmopolitan spirit -of Mani's Philosophy. All men, said Mazdak, are equal; and the notion of -individual property was introduced by the hostile demons whose object is -to turn God's Universe into a scene of endless misery. It is chiefly -this aspect of Mazdak's teaching that was most shocking to the -Zoroastrian conscience, and finally brought about the destruction of his -enormous following, even though the master was supposed to have -miraculously made the sacred Fire talk, and bear witness to the truth of -his mission. - - -ASec. III. - -Retrospect. - -We have seen some of the aspects of Pre-Islamic Persian thought; though, -owing to our ignorance of the tendencies of Sassanide thought, and of -the political, social, and intellectual conditions that determined its -evolution, we have not been able fully to trace the continuity of ideas. -Nations as well as individuals, in their intellectual history, begin -with the objective. Although the moral fervour of Zoroaster gave a -spiritual tone to his theory of the origin of things, yet the net result -of this period of Persian speculation is nothing more than a -materialistic dualism. The principle of Unity as a philosophical ground -of all that exists, is but dimly perceived at this stage of intellectual -evolution in Persia. The controversy among the followers of Zoroaster -indicates that the movement towards a monistic conception of the -Universe had begun; but we have unfortunately no evidence to make a -positive statement concerning the pantheistic tendencies of Pre-Islamic -Persian thought. We know that in the 6{th} century A.D., Diogenes, -Simplicius and other Neo-Platonic thinkers, were driven by the -persecution of Justinian, to take refuge in the court of the tolerant -Anushirwan. This great monarch, moreover, had several works translated -for him from Sanskrit and Greek, but we have no historical evidence to -show how far these events actually influenced the course of Persian -thought. Let us, therefore, pass on to the advent of Islam in Persia, -which completely shattered the old order of things, and brought to the -thinking mind the new concept of an uncompromising monotheism as well as -the Greek dualism of God and matter, as distinguished from the purely -Persian dualism of God and Devil. - - - - -PART II. - -Greek Dualism. - - - - -CHAP. II. - -THE NEO-PLATONIC ARISTOTELIANS OF PERSIA. - - -With the Arab conquest of Persia, a new era begins in the history of -Persian thought. But the warlike sons of sandy Arabia whose swords -terminated, at Nahawand, the political independence of this ancient -people, could hardly touch the intellectual freedom of the converted -Zoroastrian. - -The political revolution brought about by the Arab conquest marks the -beginning of interaction between the Aryan and the Semitic, and we find -that the Persian, though he lets the surface of his life become largely -semitised, quietly converts Islam to his own Aryan habits of thought. In -the west the sober Hellenic intellect interpreted another Semitic -religion--Christianity; and the results of interpretation in both cases -are strikingly similar. In each case the aim of the interpreting -intellect is to soften the extreme rigidity of an absolute law imposed -on the individual from without; in one word it is an endeavour to -internalise the external. This process of transformation began with the -study of Greek thought which, though combined with other causes, -hindered the growth of native speculation, yet marked a transition from -the purely objective attitude of Pre-Islamic Persian Philosophy to the -subjective attitude of later thinkers. It is, I believe, largely due to -the influence of foreign thought that the old monistic tendency when it -reasserted itself about the end of the 8{th} century, assumed a much -more spiritual aspect; and, in its later development, revivified and -spiritualised the old Iranian dualism of Light and Darkness. The fact, -therefore, that Greek thought roused into fresh life the subtle Persian -intellect, and largely contributed to, and was finally assimilated by -the general course of intellectual evolution in Persia, justifies us in -briefly running over, even though at the risk of repetition, the systems -of the Persian Neo-Platonists who, as such, deserve very little -attention in a history of purely Persian thought. - -It must, however, be remembered that Greek wisdom flowed towards the -Moslem east through Harran and Syria. The Syrians took up the latest -Greek speculation i.e. Neo-Platonism and transmitted to the Moslem what -they believed to be the real philosophy of Aristotle. It is surprising -that Mohammedan Philosophers, Arabs as well as Persians, continued -wrangling over what they believed to be the real teaching of Aristotle -and Plato, and it never occurred to them that for a thorough -comprehension of their Philosophies, the knowledge of Greek language was -absolutely necessary. So great was their ignorance that an epitomised -translation of the Enneads of Plotinus was accepted as "Theology of -Aristotle". It took them centuries to arrive at a clear conception of -the two great masters of Greek thought; and it is doubtful whether they -ever completely understood them. Avicenna is certainly clearer and more -original than Al-Farabi and Ibn Maskawaih; and the Andelusian Averroes, -though he is nearer to Aristotle than any of his predecessors, is yet -far from a complete grasp of Aristotle's Philosophy. It would, however, -be unjust to accuse them of servile imitation. The history of their -speculation is one continuous attempt to wade through a hopeless mass of -absurdities that careless translators of Greek Philosophy had -introduced. They had largely to rethink the Philosophies of Aristotle -and Plato. Their commentaries constitute, so to speak, an effort at -discovery, not exposition. The very circumstances which left them no -time to think out independent systems of thought, point to a subtle -mind, unfortunately cabined and cribbed by a heap of obstructing -nonsense that patient industry had gradually to eliminate, and thus to -winnow out truth from falsehood. With these preliminary remarks we -proceed to consider Persian students of Greek Philosophy individually. - - -ASec. I. - -Ibn Maskawaih[26:1] (d. 1030). - -Passing over the names of Sarakhsi[26:2], Farabi who was a Turk, and -the Physician Razi (d. 932 A.D.) who, true to his Persian habits of -thought, looked upon light as the first creation, and admitted the -eternity of matter, space and time, we come to the illustrious name of -Abu `Ali Muhammad ibn Muhammad ibn Ya`qub, commonly known as _Ibn -Maskawaih_--the treasurer of the Buwaihid Sultan `Adaduddaula--one of -the most eminent theistic thinkers, physicians, moralists and historians -of Persia. I give below a brief account of his system from his well -known work Al-Fauz al-Asghar, published in Beirut. - - [26:1] Dr. Boer, in his Philosophy of Islam, gives a full - account of the Philosophy of Al-Farabi and Avicenna; but his - account of Ibn Maskawaih's Philosophy is restricted to the - Ethical teaching of that Philosopher. I have given here his - metaphysical views which are decidedly more systematic than - those of Al-Farabi. Instead of repeating Avicenna's - Neo-Platonism I have briefly stated what I believe to be his - original contribution to the thought of his country. - - [26:2] Sarakhsi died in 899 A.D. He was a disciple of the - Arabian Philosopher Al-Kindi. His works, unfortunately, have not - reached us. - -1. _The existence of the ultimate principle._ - -Here Ibn Maskawaih follows Aristotle, and reproduces his argument based -on the fact of physical motion. All bodies have the inseparable property -of motion which covers all forms of change, and does not proceed from -the nature of bodies themselves. Motion, therefore, demands an external -source or prime mover. The supposition that motion may constitute the -very essence of bodies, is contradicted by experience. Man, for -instance, has the power of free movement; but, on the supposition, -different parts of his body must continue to move even after they are -severed from one another. The series of moving causes, therefore, must -stop at a cause which, itself immovable, moves everything else. The -immobility of the Primal cause is essential; for the supposition of -motion in the Primal cause would necessitate infinite regress, which is -absurd. - -The immovable mover is one. A multiplicity of original movers must imply -something common in their nature, so that they might be brought under -the same category. It must also imply some point of difference in order -to distinguish them from each other. But this partial identity and -difference necessitate composition in their respective essences; and -composition, being a form of motion, cannot, as we have shown, exist in -the first cause of motion. The prime mover again is eternal and -immaterial. Since transition from non-existence to existence is a form -of motion; and since matter is always subject to some kind of motion, it -follows that a thing which is not eternal, or is, in any way, associated -with matter, must be in motion. - -2. _The Knowledge of the Ultimate._ - -All human knowledge begins from sensations which are gradually -transformed into perceptions. The earlier stages of intellection are -completely conditioned by the presence of external reality. But the -progress of knowledge means to be able to think without being -conditioned by matter. Thought begins with matter, but its object is to -gradually free itself from the primary condition of its own -possibility. A higher stage, therefore, is reached in imagination--the -power to reproduce and retain in the mind the copy or image of a thing -without reference to the external objectivity of the thing itself. In -the formation of concepts thought reaches a still higher stage in point -of freedom from materiality; though the concept, in so far as it is the -result of comparison and assimilation of percepts, cannot be regarded as -having completely freed itself from the gross cause of sensations. But -the fact that conception is based on perception, should not lead us to -ignore the great difference between the nature of the concept and the -percept. The individual (percept) is undergoing constant change which -affects the character of the knowledge founded on mere perception. The -knowledge of individuals, therefore, lacks the element of permanence. -The universal (concept), on the other hand, is not affected by the law -of change. Individuals change; the universal remains intact. It is the -essence of matter to submit to the law of change: the freer a thing is -from matter, the less liable it is to change. God, therefore, being -absolutely free from matter, is absolutely changeless; and it is His -complete freedom from materiality that makes our conception of Him -difficult or impossible. The object of all philosophical training is to -develop the power of "ideation" or contemplation on pure concepts, in -order that constant practice might make possible the conception of the -absolutely immaterial. - -3. _How the one creates the many._ - -In this connection it is necessary, for the sake of clearness, to divide -Ibn Maskawaih's investigations into two parts:-- - -(a) _That the ultimate agent or cause created the Universe out of -nothing._ Materialists, he says, hold the eternity of matter, and -attribute form to the creative activity of God. It is, however, admitted -that when matter passes from one form into another form, the previous -form becomes absolutely non-existent. For if it does not become -absolutely non-existent, it must either pass off into some other body, -or continue to exist in the same body. The first alternative is -contradicted by every day experience. If we transform a ball of wax -into a solid square, the original rotundity of the ball does not pass -off into some other body. The second alternative is also impossible; for -it would necessitate the conclusion that two contradictory forms e.g. -circularity and length, can exist in the same body. It, therefore, -follows that the original form passes into absolute non-existence, when -the new form comes into being. This argument proves conclusively that -attributes i.e., form, color, etc., come into being from pure nothing. -In order to understand that the substance is also non-eternal like the -attribute, we should grasp the truth of the following propositions:-- - -1. The analysis of matter results in a number of different elements, the -diversity of which is reduced to one simple element. - -2. Form and matter are inseparable: no change in matter can annihilate -form. - -From these two propositions, Ibn Maskawaih concludes that the substance -had a beginning in time. Matter like form must have begun to exist; -since the eternity of matter necessitates the eternity of form which, -as we have seen, cannot be regarded as eternal. - -(b) _The process of creation._ What is the cause of this immense -diversity which meets us on all sides? How could the many be created by -one? When, says the Philosopher, one cause produces a number of -different effects, their multiplicity may depend on any of the following -reasons:-- - -1. The cause may have various powers. Man, for instance, being a -combination of various elements and powers, may be the cause of various -actions. - -2. The cause may use various means to produce a variety of effects. - -3. The cause may work upon a variety of material. - -None of these propositions can be true of the nature of the ultimate -cause--God. That he possesses various powers, distinct from one another, -is manifestly absurd; since his nature does not admit of composition. If -he is supposed to have employed different means to produce diversity, -who is the creator of these means? If these means are due to the -creative agency of some cause other than the ultimate cause, there -would be a plurality of ultimate causes. If, on the other hand, the -Ultimate Cause himself created these means, he must have required other -means to create these means. The third proposition is also inadmissible -as a conception of the creative act. The many cannot flow from the -causal action of one agent. It, therefore, follows that we have only one -way out of the difficulty--that the ultimate cause created only one -thing which led to the creation of another. Ibn Maskawaih here -enumerates the usual Neo-Platonic emanations gradually growing grosser -and grosser until we reach the primordial elements, which combine and -recombine to evolve higher and higher forms of life. Shibli thus sums -up Ibn Maskawaih's theory of evolution[33:1]:-- - -"The combination of primary substances produced the mineral kingdom, the -lowest form of life. A higher stage of evolution is reached in the -vegetable kingdom. The first to appear is spontaneous grass; then plants -and various kinds of trees, some of which touch the border-land of -animal kingdom, in so far as they manifest certain animal -characteristics. Intermediary between the vegetable kingdom and the -animal kingdom there is a certain form of life which is neither animal -nor vegetable, but shares the characteristics of both (e.g. coral). The -first step beyond this intermediary stage of life, is the development of -the power of movement, and the sense of touch in tiny worms which crawl -upon the earth. The sense of touch, owing to the process of -differentiation, develops other forms of sense, until we reach the plane -of higher animals in which intelligence begins to manifest itself in an -ascending scale. Humanity is touched in the ape which undergoes further -development, and gradually develops erect stature and power of -understanding similar to man. Here animality ends and humanity begins". - - [33:1] Maulana Shibli `Ilm al-Kalam, p. 141. (Haidarabad). - -4. _The soul._ - -In order to understand whether the soul has an independent existence, we -should examine the nature of human knowledge. It is the essential -property of matter that it cannot assume two different forms -simultaneously. To transform a silver spoon into a silver glass, it is -necessary that the spoon-form as such, should cease to exist. This -property is common to all bodies, and a body that lacks it cannot be -regarded as a body. Now when we examine the nature of perception, we see -that there is a principle in man which, in so far as it is able to know -more than one thing at a time, can assume, so to say, many different -forms simultaneously. This principle cannot be matter, since it lacks -the fundamental property of matter. The essence of the soul consists in -the power of perceiving a number of objects at one and the same moment -of time. But it may be objected that the soul-principle may be either -material in its essence, or a function of matter. There are, however, -reasons to show that the soul cannot be a function of matter. - -(a). A thing which assumes different forms and states, cannot itself be -one of those forms and states. A body which receives different colors -should be, in its own nature, colorless. The soul, in its perception of -external objects, assumes, as it were, various forms and states; it, -therefore, cannot be regarded as one of those forms. Ibn Maskawaih -seems to give no countenance to the contemporary Faculty-Psychology; to -him different mental states are various transformations of the soul -itself. - -(b). The attributes are constantly changing; there must be beyond the -sphere of change, some permanent substratum which is the foundation of -personal identity. - -Having shown that the soul cannot be regarded as a function of matter, -Ibn Maskawaih proceeds to prove that it is essentially immaterial. Some -of his arguments may be noticed:-- - -1. The senses, after they have perceived a strong stimulus, cannot, for -a certain amount of time, perceive a weaker stimulus. It is, however, -quite different with the mental act of cognition. - -2. When we reflect on an abstruse subject, we endeavour to completely -shut our eyes to the objects around us, which we regard as so many -hindrances in the way of spiritual activity. If the soul is material in -its essence, it need not, in order to secure unimpeded activity, escape -from the world of matter. - -3. The perception of a strong stimulus weakens and sometimes injures the -sense. The intellect, on the other hand, grows in strength with the -knowledge of ideas and general notions. - -4. Physical weakness due to old age, does not affect mental vigour. - -5. The soul can conceive certain propositions which have no connection -with the sense-data. The senses, for instance, cannot perceive that two -contradictories cannot exist together. - -6. There is a certain power in us which rules over physical organs, -corrects sense-errors, and unifies all knowledge. This unifying -principle which reflects over the material brought before it through the -sense-channel, and, weighing the evidence of each sense, decides the -character of rival statements, must itself stand above the sphere of -matter. - -The combined force of these considerations, says Ibn Maskawaih, -conclusively establishes the truth of the proposition--that the soul is -essentially immaterial. The immateriality of the soul signifies its -immortality; since mortality is a characteristic of the material. - - -ASec. II. - -Avicenna (d. 1037). - -Among the early Persian Philosophers, Avicenna alone attempted to -construct his own system of thought. His work, called "Eastern -Philosophy" is still extant; and there has also come down to us a -fragment[38:1] in which the Philosopher has expressed his views on the -universal operation of the force of love in nature. It is something like -the contour of a system, and it is quite probable that ideas expressed -therein were afterwards fully worked out. - - [38:1] This fragment on love is preserved in the collected works - of Avicenna in the British Museum Library and has been edited by - N. A. F. Mehren. (Leiden, 1894.) - -Avicenna defines "Love" as the appreciation of Beauty; and from the -standpoint of this definition he explains that there are three -categories of being:-- - -1. Things that are at the highest point of perfection. - -2. Things that are at the lowest point of perfection. - -3. Things that stand between the two poles of perfection. But the third -category has no real existence; since there are things that have already -attained the acme of perfection, and there are others still progressing -towards perfection. This striving for the ideal is love's movement -towards beauty which, according to Avicenna, is identical with -perfection. Beneath the visible evolution of forms is the force of love -which actualises all striving, movement, progress. Things are so -constituted that they hate non-existence, and love the joy of -individuality in various forms. The indeterminate matter, dead in -itself, assumes, or more properly, is made to assume by the inner force -of love, various forms, and rises higher and higher in the scale of -beauty. The operation of this ultimate force, in the physical plane, can -be thus indicated:-- - -1. Inanimate objects are combinations of form, matter and quality. Owing -to the working of this mysterious power, quality sticks to its subject -or substance; and form embraces indeterminate matter which, impelled by -the mighty force of love, rises from form to form. - -2. The tendency of the force of love is to centralise itself. In the -vegetable kingdom it attains a higher degree of unity or centralisation; -though the soul still lacks that unity of action which it attains -afterwards. The processes of the vegetative soul are:-- - -(a) Assimilation. - -(b) Growth. - -(c) Reproduction. - -These processes, however, are nothing more than so many manifestations -of love. Assimilation indicates attraction and transformation of what is -external into what is internal. Growth is love of achieving more and -more harmony of parts; and reproduction means perpetuation of the kind, -which is only another phase of love. - -3. In the animal kingdom, the various operations of the force of love -are still more unified. It does preserve the vegetable instinct of -acting in different directions; but there is also the development of -temperament which is a step towards more unified activity. In man this -tendency towards unification manifests itself in self-consciousness. The -same force of "natural or constitutional love", is working in the life -of beings higher than man. All things are moving towards the first -Beloved--the Eternal Beauty. The worth of a thing is decided by its -nearness to or distance from, this ultimate principle. - -As a physician, however, Avicenna is especially interested in the nature -of the Soul. In his times, moreover, the doctrine of metempsychosis was -getting more and more popular. He, therefore, discusses the nature of -the soul, with a view to show the falsity of this doctrine. It is -difficult, he says, to define the soul; since it manifests different -powers and tendencies in different planes of being. His view of the -various powers of the soul can be thus represented:-- - -1. Manifestation as unconscious activity-- - - (a). Working in different directions + 1. Assimilation. - (Vegetative soul) | 2. Growth. - + 3. Reproduction. - -(b). Working in one direction and securing uniformity of action--growth -of temperament. - -2. Manifestation as conscious activity-- - -(a). As directed to more than one object-- - - Animal soul. - | - +------------+--------------------+ - | | - Lower Animals. Man. - - A. Perceptive powers. A. Perceptive powers. - B. Motive powers (desire (a) Five external senses. - of pleasure and avoidance (b) Five internal senses-- - of pain). 1. Sensorium. - 2. Retention of images. - 3. Conception. - 4. Imagination. - 5. Memory. - - These constitute the five internal - senses of the soul which, in man, - manifests itself as progressive - reason, developing from human to - angelic and prophetic reason. - - B. Motive powers--will. - -(b). As directed to one object--The soul of the spheres which continue -in one uniform motion. - -In his fragment on "Nafs" (soul) Avicenna endeavours to show that a -material accompaniment is not necessary to the soul. It is not through -the instrumentality of the body, or some power of the body, that the -soul conceives or imagines; since if the soul necessarily requires a -physical medium in conceiving other things, it must require a different -body in order to conceive the body attached to itself. Moreover, the -fact that the soul is immediately self conscious--conscious of itself -through itself--conclusively shows that in its essence the soul is quite -independent of any physical accompaniment. The doctrine of -metempsychosis implies, also, individual pre-existence. But supposing -that the soul did exist before the body, it must have existed either as -one or as many. The multiplicity of bodies is due to the multiplicity of -material forms, and does not indicate the multiplicity of souls. On the -other hand, if it existed as one, the ignorance or knowledge of A must -mean the ignorance or knowledge of B; since the soul is one in both. -These categories, therefore, cannot be applied to the soul. The truth -is, says Avicenna, that body and soul are contiguous to each other, but -quite opposite in their respective essences. The disintegration of the -body does not necessitate the annihilation of the soul. Dissolution or -decay is a property of compounds, and not of simple, indivisible, ideal -substances. Avicenna, then denies pre-existence, and endeavours to show -the possibility of disembodied conscious life beyond the grave. - -We have run over the work of the early Persian Neo-Platonists among -whom, as we have seen, Avicenna alone learned to think for himself. Of -the generations of his disciples--Behmenyar, Ab u'l-Ma'mum of Isfahan, -Ma`sumi, Ab u'l-`Abbas, Ibn Tahir[44:1]--who carried on their master's -Philosophy, we need not speak. So powerful was the spell of Avicenna's -personality that, even long after it had been removed, any amplification -or modification of his views was considered to be an unpardonable crime. -The old Iranian idea of the dualism of Light and Darkness, does not act -as a determining factor in the progress of Neo-Platonic ideas in Persia, -which borrowed independent life for a time, and eventually merged their -separate existence in the general current of Persian speculation. They -are, therefore, connected with the course of indigenous thought only in -so far as they contributed to the strength and expansion of that -monistic tendency, which manifested itself early in the Church of -Zoroaster; and, though for a time hindered by the Theological -controversies of Islam, burst out with redoubled force in later times, -to extend its titanic grasp to all the previous intellectual -achievements of the land of its birth. - - [44:1] Al-Baihaqi; fol. 28a et seqq. - - - - -CHAP. III. - -THE RISE AND FALL OF RATIONALISM IN ISLAM. - - -ASec. I. - -The Metaphysics of Rationalism--Materialism. - -The Persian mind, having adjusted itself to the new political -environment, soon reasserts its innate freedom, and begins to retire -from the field of objectivity, in order that it may come back to itself, -and reflect upon the material achieved in its journey out of its own -inwardness. With the study of Greek thought, the spirit which was almost -lost in the concrete, begins to reflect and realise itself as the -arbiter of truth. Subjectivity asserts itself, and endeavours to -supplant all outward authority. Such a period, in the intellectual -history of a people, must be the epoch of rationalism, scepticism, -mysticism, heresy--forms in which the human mind, swayed by the growing -force of subjectivity, rejects all external standards of truth. And so -we find the epoch under consideration. - -The period of Umayyad dominance is taken up with the process of -co-mingling and adjustment to new conditions of life; but with the rise -of the `Abbasid Dynasty and the study of Greek Philosophy, the pent-up -intellectual force of Persia bursts out again, and exhibits wonderful -activity in all the departments of thought and action. The fresh -intellectual vigour imparted by the assimilation of Greek Philosophy -which was studied with great avidity, led immediately to a critical -examination of Islamic Monotheism. Theology, enlivened by religious -fervour, learned to talk the language of Philosophy earlier than cold -reason began to seek a retired corner, away from the noise of -controversy, in order to construct a consistent theory of things. In the -first half of the 8{th} century we find Wasil Ibn `Ata--a Persian -disciple of the famous theologian Hasan of Basra--starting Mu`tazilaism -(Rationalism)--that most interesting movement which engaged some of the -subtlest minds of Persia, and finally exhausted its force in the keen -metaphysical controversies of Baghdad and Basra. The famous city of -Basra had become, owing to its commercial situation, the playground of -various forces--Greek Philosophy, Scepticism, Christianity, Buddhistic -ideas, Manichaeism[47:1]--which furnished ample spiritual food to the -inquiring mind of the time, and formed the intellectual environment of -Islamic Rationalism. What Spitta calls the Syrian period of Muhammadan -History is not characterised with metaphysical subtleties. With the -advent of the Persian Period, however, Muhammadan students of Greek -Philosophy began properly to reflect on their religion; and the -Mu`tazila thinkers[47:2], gradually drifted into metaphysics with which -alone we are concerned here. It is not our object to trace the history -of the Mu`tazila Kalam; for present purposes it will be sufficient if we -briefly reveal the metaphysical implications of the Mu`tazila view of -Islam. The conception of God, and the theory of matter, therefore, are -the only aspects of Rationalism which we propose to discuss here. - - [47:1] During the `Abbasid Period there were many who secretly - held Manichaean opinions. See Fihrist, Leipsig 1871, p. 338; See - also Al-Mu`tazila, ed. by T. W. Arnold, Leipsig 1902, p. 27, - where the author speaks of a controversy between Abu - 'l-Hudhail and Salih, the Dualist. See also Macdonald's Muslim - Theology, p. 133. - - [47:2] The Mu`tazilas belonged to various nationalities, and - many of them were Persians either by descent or domicile. Wasil - Ibn `Ata--the reported founder of the sect--was a Persian - (Browne, Lit. His., Vol I, p. 281). Von Kremer, however, traces - their origin to the theological controversies of the Umayyad - period. Mu`tazilaism was not an essentially Persian movement; - but it is true, as Prof. Browne observes (Lit. His., Vol. I, p. - 283) that Shi`ite and Qadari tenets, indeed, often went - together, and the Shi`ite doctrine current in Persia at the - present day is in many respects Mu`tazilite, while Hasan - Al-Ash`ari, the great opponent of the Mu`tazilite, is by the - Shi`ites held in horror. It may also be added that some of the - greater representatives of the Mu`tazila opinion were Shi`as - by religion, e.g. Abu 'l-Hudhail (Al-Mu`tazila, ed. by T. W. - Arnold, p. 28). On the other hand many of the followers of - Al-Ash`ari were Persians (See extracts from Ibn `Asakir ed. - Mehren), so that it does not seem to be quite justifiable to - describe the Ash`arite mode of thought as a purely semitic - movement. - -His conception of the unity of God at which the Mu`tazila eventually -arrived by a subtle dialectic is one of the fundamental points in which -he differs from the Orthodox Muhammadan. God's attributes, according to -his view, cannot be said to inhere in him; they form the very essence of -His nature. The Mu`tazila, therefore, denies the separate reality of -divine attributes, and declares their absolute identity with the -abstract divine Principle. "God", says Abu'l-Hudhail, "is knowing, -all-powerful, living; and his knowledge, power and life constitute His -very essence (dhat)"[49:1]. In order to explain the pure unity of God -Joseph Al-Basir[49:2] lays down the following five principles:-- - -(1). The necessary supposition of atom and accident. - -(2). The necessary supposition of a creator. - -(3). The necessary supposition of the conditions (Ahwal) of God. - -(4). The rejection of those attributes which do not befit God. - -(5). The unity of God in spite of the plurality of His attributes. - - [49:1] Shahrastani: Cureton's ed., p. 34. - - [49:2] Dr. Frankl: Ein Mu`tazilitischer Kalam--Wien 1872, p. 13. - -This conception of unity underwent further modifications; until in the -hands of Mu`ammar and Abu Hashim it became a mere abstract possibility -about which nothing could be predicated. We cannot, he says, predicate -knowledge of God[50:1], for His knowledge must be of something in -Himself. The first necessitates the identity of subject and object which -is absurd; the second implicates duality in the nature of God which is -equally impossible. Ahmad and Fadl[50:2]--disciples of Nazzam, however, -recognised this duality in holding that the original creators are -two--God--the eternal principle; and the word of God--Jesus Christ--the -contingent principle. But more fully to bring out the element of truth -in the second alternative suggested by Mu`ammar, was reserved, as we -shall see, for later Sufi thinkers of Persia. It is, therefore, clear -that some of the rationalists almost unconsciously touched the outer -fringe of later pantheism for which, in a sense, they prepared the way, -not only by their definition of God, but also by their common effort to -internalise the rigid externality of an absolute law. - - [50:1] Shahrastani: Cureton's ed., p. 48. See also - Steiner--Die Mutaziliten, p. 59. - - [50:2] Ibn Hazm (Cairo, ed. I) Vol. IV, p. 197. See also - Shahrastani: Cureton's ed., p. 42. - -But the most important contribution of the advocates of Rationalism to -purely metaphysical speculation, is their explanation of matter, which -their opponents--the Ash`arite--afterwards modified to fit in with their -own views of the nature of God. The interest of Nazzam chiefly consisted -in the exclusion of all arbitrariness from the orderly course of -nature[51:1]. The same interest in naturalism led Al-Jahiz to define -Will in a purely negative manner[51:2]. Though the Rationalist thinkers -did not want to abandon the idea of a Personal Will, yet they -endeavoured to find a deeper ground for the independence of individual -natural phenomena. And this ground they found in matter itself. Nazzam -taught the infinite divisibility of matter, and obliterated the -distinction between substance and accident[51:3]. Existence was regarded -as a quality superimposed by God on the pre-existing material atoms -which would have been incapable of perception without this quality. -Muhammad Ibn `Uthman, one of the Mu`tazila Shaikhs, says Ibn -Hazm,[51:4] maintained that the non-existent (atom in its -pre-existential state) is a body in that state; only that in its -pre-existential condition it is neither in motion, nor at rest, nor is -it said to be created. Substance, then, is a collection of -qualities--taste, odour, colour--which, in themselves, are nothing more -than material potentialities. The soul, too, is a finer kind of matter; -and the processes of knowledge are mere mental motions. Creation is only -the actualisation of pre-existing potentialities[52:1] (Tafra). The -individuality of a thing which is defined as "that of which something -can be predicated"[52:2] is not an essential factor in its notion. The -collection of things we call the Universe, is externalised or -perceptible reality which could, so to speak, exist independent of all -perceptibility. The object of these metaphysical subtleties is purely -theological. God, to the Rationalist, is an absolute unity which can, in -no sense, admit of plurality, and could thus exist without the -perceptible plurality--the Universe. - - [51:1] Steiner: Die Mu`taziliten; Leipzig, 1865, p. 57. - - [51:2] Steiner: Die Mu`taziliten; Leipzig, 1865, p. 59. - - [51:3] Shahrastani: Cureton's ed., p. 38. - - [51:4] Ibn Hazm (ed. Cairo): Vol. V, p. 42. - - [52:1] Shahrastani: Cureton's ed, p. 38. - - [52:2] Steiner: Die Mu`taziliten, p. 80. - -The activity of God, then, consists only in making the atom perceptible. -The properties of the atom flow from its own nature. A stone thrown up -falls down on account of its own indwelling property[53:1]. God, says -Al-`Attar of Basra and Bishr ibn al Mu`tamir, did not create colour, -length, breadth, taste or smell--all these are activities of bodies -themselves[53:2]. Even the number of things in the Universe is not known -to God[53:3]. Bishr ibn al-Mu`tamir further explained the properties of -bodies by what he called "Tawallud"--interaction of bodies[53:4]. Thus -it is clear that the Rationalists were philosophically materialists, and -theologically deists. - - [53:1] Shahrastani: Cureton's ed., p. 38. - - [53:2] Ibn Hazm (ed. Cairo): Vol. IV, pp. 194, 197. - - [53:3] Ibn Hazm (ed. Cairo): Vol. IV, p. 194. - - [53:4] Shahrastani: Cureton's ed., p. 44. - -To them substance and atom are identical, and they define substance as a -space-filling atom which, besides the quality of filling space, has a -certain direction, force and existence forming its very essence as an -actuality. In shape it is squarelike; for if it is supposed to be -circular, combination of different atoms would not be possible[53:5]. -There is, however, great difference of opinion among the exponents of -atomism in regard to the nature of the atom. Some hold that atoms are -all similar to each other; while Abu'l-Qasim of Balkh regards them as -similar as well as dissimilar. When we say that two things are similar -to each other, we do not necessarily mean that they are similar in all -their attributes. Abu'l-Qasim further differs from Nazzam in advocating -the indestructibility of the atom. He holds that the atom had a -beginning in time; but that it cannot be completely annihilated. The -attribute of "Baqa" (continued existence), he says, does not give to its -subject a new attribute other than existence; and the continuity of -existence is not an additional attribute at all. The divine activity -created the atom as well as its continued existence. Abu'l-Qasim, -however, admits that some atoms may not have been created for continued -existence. He denies also the existence of any intervening space between -different atoms, and holds, unlike other representatives of the school, -that the essence or atom (Mahiyyat) could not remain essence in a state -of non-existence. To advocate the opposite is a contradiction in terms. -To say that the essence (which is essence because of the attribute of -existence) could remain essence in a state of non-existence, is to say -that the existent could remain existent in a state of non-existence. It -is obvious that Abu'l-Qasim here approaches the Ash`arite theory of -knowledge which dealt a serious blow to the Rationalist theory of -matter. - - [53:5] In my treatment of the atomism of Islamic Rationalists, I - am indebted to Arthur Biram's publication: "Kitabul Masa'il fil - khilaf beyn al-Basriyyin wal Baghdadiyyin". - - -ASec. II. - -Contemporary Movements of Thought. - -Side by side with the development of Mu`tazilaism we see, as is natural -in a period of great intellectual activity, many other tendencies of -thought manifesting themselves in the philosophical and religious -circles of Islam. Let us notice them briefly:-- - -1. Scepticism. The tendency towards scepticism was the natural -consequence of the purely dialectic method of Rationalism. Men such as -Ibn Ashras and Al-Jahiz who apparently belonged to the Rationalist -camp, were really sceptics. The standpoint of Al-Jahiz who inclined to -deistic naturalism[55:1], is that of a cultured man of the time, and -not of a professional theologian. In him is noticeable also a reaction -against the metaphysical hairsplitting of his predecessors, and a desire -to widen the pale of theology for the sake of the illiterate who are -incapable of reflecting on articles of faith. - - [55:1] Macdonald's Muslim Theology, p. 161. - -2. Sufiism--an appeal to a higher source of knowledge which was first -systematised by Dhu'l-Nun, and became more and more deepened and -antischolastic in contrast to the dry intellectualism of the -Ash`arite. We shall consider this interesting movement in the -following chapter. - -3. The revival of authority--Isma`ilianism--a movement -characteristically Persian which, instead of repudiating freethought, -endeavours to come to an understanding with it. Though this movement -seems to have no connection with the theological controversies of the -time, yet its connection with freethought is fundamental. The similarity -between the methods practised by the Isma`ilian missionaries and those -of the partisans of the association called Ikhwan al-Safa--Brethren of -Purity--suggests some sort of secret relation between the two -institutions. Whatever may be the motive of those who started this -movement, its significance as an intellectual phenomenon should not be -lost sight of. The multiplicity of philosophical and religious views--a -necessary consequence of speculative activity--is apt to invoke forces -which operate against this, religiously speaking, dangerous -multiplicity. In the 18th century history of European thought we see -Fichte, starting with a sceptical inquiry concerning the nature of -matter, and finding its last word in Pantheism. Schleiermacher appeals -to Faith as opposed to Reason, Jacobi points to a source of knowledge -higher than reason, while Comte abandons all metaphysical inquiry, and -limits all knowledge to sensuous perception. De Maistre and Schlegel, on -the other hand, find a resting place in the authority of an absolutely -infallible Pope. The advocates of the doctrine of Imamat think in the -same strain as De Maistre; but it is curious that the Isma`ilians, while -making this doctrine the basis of their Church, permitted free play to -all sorts of thinking. - -The Isma`ilia movement then is one aspect of the persistent -battle[57:1] which the intellectually independent Persian waged against -the religious and political ideals of Islam. Originally a branch of the -Shi`ite religion, the Isma`ilia sect assumed quite a cosmopolitan -character with `Abdulla ibn Maimun--the probable progenitor of the -Fatimid Caliphs of Egypt--who died about the same time when -Al-Ash`ari, the great opponent of Freethought, was born. This curious -man imagined a vast scheme in which he weaved together innumerable -threads of various hues, resulting in a cleverly constructed -equivocation, charming to the Persian mind for its mysterious character -and misty Pythagorean Philosophy. Like the Association of the Brethren -of Purity, he made an attempt, under the pious cloak of the doctrine of -Imamat (Authority), to synthesise all the dominating ideas of the time. -Greek Philosophy, Christianity, Rationalism, Sufiism, Manichaeism, -Persian heresies, and above all the idea of reincarnation, all came -forward to contribute their respective shares to the boldly conceived -Isma`ilian whole, the various aspects of which were to be gradually -revealed to the initiated, by the "Leader"--the ever Incarnating -Universal Reason--according to the intellectual development of the age -in which he incarnated himself. In the Isma`ilian movement, Freethought, -apprehending the collapse of its ever widening structure, seeks to rest -upon a stable basis, and, by a strange irony of fate, is led to find it -in the very idea which is revolting to its whole being. Barren -authority, though still apt to reassert herself at times, adopts this -unclaimed child, and thus permits herself to assimilate all knowledge -past, present and future. - - [57:1] Ibn Hazm in his Kitab al-Milal, looks upon the heretical - sects of Persia as a continuous struggle against the Arab power - which the cunning Persian attempted to shake off by these - peaceful means. See Von Kremer's Geschichte der herrschenden - Ideen des Islams, pp. 10, 11, where this learned Arab historian - of Cordova is quoted at length. - -The unfortunate connection, however, of this movement with the politics -of the time, has misled many a scholar. They see in it (Macdonald, for -instance) nothing more than a powerful conspiracy to uproot the -political power of the Arab from Persia. They have denounced the -Isma`ilian Church which counted among its followers some of the best -heads and sincerest hearts, as a mere clique of dark murderers who were -ever watching for a possible victim. We must always remember, while -estimating the character of these people, the most barbarous -persecutions which drove them to pay red-handed fanaticism in the same -coin. Assassinations for religious purposes were considered -unobjectionable, and even perhaps lawful, among the whole Semite race. -As late as the latter half of the 16th century, the Pope of Rome could -approve such a dreadful slaughter as the massacre of St. Bartholomew. -That assassination, even though actuated by religious zeal, is still a -crime, is a purely modern idea; and justice demands that we should not -judge older generations with our own standards of right and wrong. A -great religious movement which shook to its very foundations the -structure of a vast empire, and, having successfully passed through the -varied ordeals of moral reproach, calumny and persecution, stood up for -centuries as a champion of Science and Philosophy, could not have -entirely rested on the frail basis of a political conspiracy of a mere -local and temporary character. Isma`ilianism, in spite of its almost -entire loss of original vitality, still dominates the ethical ideal of -not an insignificant number in India, Persia, Central Asia, Syria and -Africa; while the last expression of Persian thought--Babism--is -essentially Isma`ilian in its character. - -To return, however, to the Philosophy of the sect. From the later -Rationalists they borrowed their conception of Divinity. God, or the -ultimate principle of existence, they teach, has no attribute. His -nature admits of no predication. When we predicate the attribute of -power to him, we only mean that He is the giver of power; when we -predicate eternity, we indicate the eternity of what the Qur'an calls -"Amr" (word of God) as distinguished from the "Khalq" (creation of -God) which is contingent. In His nature all contradictions melt away, -and from Him flow all opposites. Thus they considered themselves to have -solved the problem which had troubled the mind of Zoroaster and his -followers. - -In order to find an answer to the question, "What is plurality?" the -Isma`ilia refer to what they consider a metaphysical axiom--"that from -one only one can proceed". But the one which proceeds, is not something -completely different from which it proceeds. It is really the Primal one -transformed. The Primal Unity, therefore, transformed itself into the -First Intellect (Universal Reason); and then, by means of this -transformation of itself, created the Universal soul which, impelled by -its nature to perfectly identify itself with the original source, felt -the necessity of motion, and consequently of a body possessing the power -of motion. In order to achieve its end, the soul created the heavens -moving in circular motion according to its direction. It also created -the elements which mixed together, and formed the visible Universe--the -scene of plurality through which it endeavours to pass with a view to -come back to the original source. The individual soul is an epitome of -the whole Universe which exists only for its progressive education. The -Universal Reason incarnates itself from time to time, in the personality -of the "Leader" who illuminates the soul in proportion to its experience -and understanding, and gradually guides it through the scene of -plurality to the world of eternal unity. When the Universal soul -reaches its goal, or rather returns to its own deep being, the process -of disintegration ensues. "Particles constituting the Universe fall off -from each other--those of goodness go to truth (God) which symbolises -unity; those of evil go to untruth (Devil) which symbolises -diversity"[63:1]. This is but briefly the Isma`ilian Philosophy--a -mixture, as Sharastani remarks, of Philosophical and Manichaean -ideas--which, by gradually arousing the slumbering spirit of scepticism, -they administered, as it were, in doses to the initiated, and finally -brought them to that stage of spiritual emancipation where solemn ritual -drops off, and dogmatic religion appears to be nothing more than a -systematic arrangement of useful falsehoods. - - [63:1] Sharastani: Cureton's ed: p. 149. - -The Isma`ilian doctrine is the first attempt to amalgamate contemporary -Philosophy with a really Persian view of the Universe, and to restate -Islam, in reference to this synthesis, by allegorical interpretation of -the Qur'an--a method which was afterwards adopted by Sufiism. With them -the Zoroastrian Ahriman (Devil) is not the malignant creator of evil -things but it is a principle which violates the eternal unity, and -breaks it up into visible diversity. The idea that some principle of -difference in the nature of the ultimate existence must be postulated in -order to account for empirical diversity, underwent further -modifications; until in the Hurufi sect (an offshoot of the Isma`ilia), -in the fourteenth century, it touched contemporary Sufiism on the one -hand, and Christian Trinity on the other. The "Be", maintained the -Hurufis, is the eternal word of God, which, itself uncreated, leads to -further creation--the word externalised. "But for the 'word' the -recognition of the essence of Divinity would have been impossible; since -Divinity is beyond the reach of sense--perception"[64:1]. The 'word', -therefore, became flesh in the womb of Mary[64:2] in order to manifest -the Father. The whole Universe is the manifestation of God's 'word', in -which He is immanent[64:3]. Every sound in the Universe is within God; -every atom is singing the song of eternity[64:4]; all is life. Those -who want to discover the ultimate reality of things, let them seek "the -named" through the Name[65:1], which at once conceals and reveals its -subject. - - [64:1] Jawidan Kabir, fol. 149a. - - [64:2] Jawidan Kabir, fol. 280a. - - [64:3] Jawidan Kabir, fol. 366b. - - [64:4] Jawidan Kabir, fol. 155b. - - [65:1] Jawidan Kabir, fol. 382a. - - -ASec. III. - -Reaction against Rationalism. - -The Ash`arite. - -Patronised by the early Caliphs of the House of `Abbas, Rationalism -continued to flourish in the intellectual centres of the Islamic world; -until, in the first half of the 9th century, it met the powerful -orthodox reaction which found a very energetic leader in Al-Ash`ari -(b, 873 A.D.) who studied under Rationalist teachers only to demolish, -by their own methods, the edifice they had so laboriously built. He was -a pupil of Al-Jubba'i[65:2]--the representative of the younger school of -Mu`tazilaism in Basra--with whom he had many controversies[65:3] which -eventually terminated their friendly relations, and led the pupil to bid -farewell to the Mu`tazila camp. "The fact", says Spitta, "that -Al-Ash`ari was so thoroughly a child of his time with the successive -currents of which he let himself go, makes him, in another relation, an -important figure to us. In him, as in any other, are clearly reflected -the various tendencies of this politically as well as religiously -interesting period; and we seldom find ourselves in a position to weigh -the power of the orthodox confession and the Mu`tazilite speculation, -the child-like helpless manner of the one, the immaturity and -imperfection of the other, so completely as in the life of this man who -was orthodox as a boy and a Mu`tazila as a young man"[66:1]. The -Mu`tazila speculation (e.g. Al-Jahiz) tended to be absolutely -unfettered, and in some cases led to a merely negative attitude of -thought. The movement initiated by Al-Ash`ari was an attempt not only -to purge Islam of all non-Islamic elements which had quietly crept into -it, but also to harmonize the religious consciousness with the -religious thought of Islam. Rationalism was an attempt to measure -reality by reason alone; it implied the identity of the spheres of -religion and philosophy, and strove to express faith in the form of -concepts or terms of pure thought. It ignored the facts of human nature, -and tended to disintegrate the solidarity of the Islamic Church. Hence -the reaction. - - [65:2] Extracts from Ibn `Asakir (Mehren)--Travaux de la - troisieme session du Congres International des Orientalistes--p. - 261. - - [65:3] Spitta: Zur Geschichte Abul-Hasan Al-Ash`ari, pp. 42, - 43. See also Ibn Khallikan (Gottingen 1839)--Al-Jubba'i, where - the story of their controversy is given. - - [66:1] Spitta: Vorwort, p. VII. - -The orthodox reaction led by the Ash`arite then was, in reality, -nothing more than the transfer of dialectic method to the defence of the -authority of Divine Revelation. In opposition to the Rationalists, they -maintained the doctrine of the Attributes of God; and, as regards the -Free Will controversy, they adopted a course lying midway between the -extreme fatalism of the old school, and the extreme libertarianism of -the Rationalists. They teach that the power of choice as well as all -human actions are created by God; and that man has been given the power -of acquiring[67:1] the different modes of activity. But Fakhral-Din -Razi, who in his violent attack on philosophy was strenuously opposed by -Tusi and Qutbal-Din, does away with the idea of "acquisition", and -openly maintains the doctrine of necessity in his commentary on the -Qur'an. The Mataridiyya--another school of anti-rationalist theology, -founded by Abu Mansur Mataridi a native of Matarid in the environs of -Samarqand--went back to the old rationalist position, and taught in -opposition to the Ash`arite, that man has absolute control over his -activity; and that his power affects the very nature of his actions. -Al-Ash`ari's interest was purely theological; but it was impossible to -harmonise reason and revelation without making reference to the ultimate -nature of reality. Baqilani[68:1] therefore, made use of some purely -metaphysical propositions (that substance is an individual unity; that -quality cannot exist in quality; that perfect vacuum is possible.) in -his Theological investigation, and thus gave the school a metaphysical -foundation which it is our main object to bring out. We shall not, -therefore, dwell upon their defence of orthodox beliefs (e.g. that the -Qur'an is uncreated; that the visibility of God is possible etc.); but -we shall endeavour to pick up the elements of metaphysical thought in -their theological controversies. In order to meet contemporary -philosophers on their own ground, they could not dispense with -philosophising; hence willingly or unwillingly they had to develop a -theory of knowledge peculiar to themselves. - - [67:1] Shahrastani--ed. Cureton, p. 69. - - [68:1] Martin Schreiner: Zur Geschichte des Ash`aritenthums. - (Huitieme Congres International des Orientalistes 1889, p. 82). - -God, according to the Ash`arite, is the ultimate necessary existence -which "carries its attributes in its own being"[69:1]; and whose -existence (wujud) and essence (Mahiyyat) are identical. Besides the -argument from the contingent character of motion they used the following -arguments to prove the existence of this ultimate principle:-- - -(1). All bodies, they argue, are one in so far as the phenomenal fact of -their existence is concerned. But in spite of this unity, their -qualities are different and even opposed to each other. We are, -therefore, driven to postulate an ultimate cause in order to account for -their empirical divergence. - - [69:1] Martin Schreiner: Zur Geschichte des Ash`aritenthums. - (Huitieme Congres International des Orientalistes II{me} Partie - 1893, p. 113). - -(2). Every contingent being needs a cause to account for its existence. -The Universe is contingent; therefore it must have a cause; and that -cause is God. That the Universe is contingent, they proved in the -following manner. All that exists in the Universe, is either substance -or quality. The contingence of quality is evident, and the contingence -of substance follows from the fact that no substance could exist apart -from qualities. The contingence of quality necessitates the contingence -of substance; otherwise the eternity of substance would necessitate the -eternity of quality. In order fully to appreciate the value of this -argument, it is necessary to understand the Ash`arite theory of -knowledge. To answer the question, "What is a thing?" they subjected to -a searching criticism the Aristotelian categories of thought, and -arrived at the conclusion that bodies have no properties in -themselves[70:1]. They made no distinction of secondary and primary -qualities of a body, and reduced all of them to purely subjective -relations. Quality too became with them a mere accident without which -the substance could not exist. They used the word substance or atom with -a vague implication of externality; but their criticism, actuated by a -pious desire to defend the idea of divine creation, reduced the Universe -to a mere show of ordered subjectivities which, as they maintained like -Berkeley, found their ultimate explanation in the Will of God. In his -examination of human knowledge regarded as a product and not merely a -process, Kant stopped at the idea of "Ding an sich", but the Ash`arite -endeavoured to penetrate further, and maintained, against the -contemporary Agnostic-Realism, that the so called underlying essence -existed only in so far as it was brought in relation to the knowing -subject. Their atomism, therefore, approaches that of Lotze[71:1] who, -in spite of his desire to save external reality, ended in its complete -reduction to ideality. But like Lotze they could not believe their atoms -to be the inner working of the Infinite Primal Being. The interest of -pure monotheism was too strong for them. The necessary consequence of -their analysis of matter is a thorough going idealism like that of -Berkeley; but perhaps their instinctive realism combined with the force -of atomistic tradition, still compels them to use the word "atom" by -which they endeavour to give something like a realistic coloring to -their idealism. The interest of dogmatic theology drove them to maintain -towards pure Philosophy an attitude of criticism which taught her -unwilling advocates how to philosophise and build a metaphysics of their -own. - - [70:1] See Macdonald's admirable account of the Ash`arite - Metaphysics: Muslim Theology p. 201 sq. See also Maulana - Shibli `Ilmal Kalam pp. 60, 72. - - [71:1] "Lotze is an atomist, but he does not conceive the atoms - themselves as material; for extension, like all other sensuous - qualities is explained through the reciprocal action of atoms; - they themselves, therefore, cannot possess this quality. Like - life and like all empirical qualities, the sensuous fact of - extension is due to the cooperation of points of force, which, - in time, must be conceived as starting points of the inner - workings of the Infinite Primal Being." Hoffding Vol. II, p. - 516. - -But a more important and philosophically more significant aspect of the -Ash`arite Metaphysics, is their attitude towards the Law of -Causation[72:1]. Just as they repudiated all the principles of -optics[72:2] in order to show, in opposition to the Rationalists, that -God could be visible in spite of His being unextended, so with a view -to defend the possibility of miracles, they rejected the idea of -causation altogether. The orthodox believed in miracles as well as in -the Universal Law of Causation; but they maintained that, at the time of -manifesting a miracle, God suspended the operation of this law. The -Ash`arite, however, starting with the supposition that cause and -effect must be similar, could not share the orthodox view, and taught -that the idea of power is meaningless, and that we know nothing but -floating impressions, the phenomenal order of which is determined by -God. - - [72:1] Shibli `Ilmal-Kalam pp. 64, 72. - - [72:2] Shahrastani, ed. Cureton, p. 82. - -Any account of the Ash`arite metaphysics would be incomplete without a -notice of the work of Al-Ghazali (d. 1111 A.D.) who though -misunderstood by many orthodox theologians, will always be looked upon -as one of the greatest personalities of Islam. This sceptic of powerful -ability anticipated Descartes[73:1] in his philosophical method; and, -"seven hundred years before Hume cut the bond of causality with the -edge of his dialectic"[73:2]. He was the first to write a systematic -refutation of philosophy, and completely to annihilate that dread of -intellectualism which had characterised the orthodox. It was chiefly his -influence that made men study dogma and metaphysics together, and -eventually led to a system of education which produced such men as -Shahrastani, Al-Razi and Al-Ishraqi. The following passage indicates -his attitude as a thinker:-- - -"From my childhood I was inclined to think out things for myself. The -result of this attitude was that I revolted against authority; and all -the beliefs that had fixed themselves in my mind from childhood lost -their original importance. I thought that such beliefs based on mere -authority were equally entertained by Jews, Christians, and followers of -other religions. Real knowledge must eradicate all doubt. For instance, -it is self-evident that ten is greater than three. If a person, however, -endeavours to prove the contrary by an appeal to his power of turning a -stick into a snake, the performance would indeed be wonderful, though -it cannot touch the certainty of the proposition in question"[75:1]. He -examined afterwards, all the various claimants of "Certain Knowledge" -and finally found it in Sufiism. - - [73:1] "It (Al-Ghazali's work on the Revivication of the - sciences of religion) has so remarkable a resemblance to the - _Discourse sur la methode_ of Descartes, that had any - translation of it existed in the days of Descartes everyone - would have cried against the plagiarism". (Lewes's History of - Philosophy: Vol. II. p. 50). - - [73:2] Journal of the American Oriental Society, Vol. 20, p. - 103. - - [75:1] Al-Munqidh p. 3. - -With their view of the nature of substance, the Ash`arite, rigid -monotheists as they were, could not safely discuss the nature of the -human soul. Al-Ghazali alone seriously took up the problem, and to -this day it is difficult to define, with accuracy, his view of the -nature of God. In him, like Borger and Solger in Germany, Sufi pantheism -and the Ash`arite dogma of personality appear to harmonise together, a -reconciliation which makes it difficult to say whether he was a -Pantheist, or a Personal Pantheist of the type of Lotze. The soul, -according to Al-Ghazali, perceives things. But perception as an -attribute can exist only in a substance or essence which is absolutely -free from all the attributes of body. In his Al-Madnun[75:2], he -explains why the prophet declined to reveal the nature of the soul. -There are, he says, two kinds of men; ordinary men and thinkers. The -former who look upon materiality as a condition of existence, cannot -conceive an immaterial substance. The latter are led, by their logic, to -a conception of the soul which sweeps away all difference between God -and the individual soul. Al-Ghazali, therefore, realised the -Pantheistic drift of his own inquiry, and preferred silence as to the -ultimate nature of the soul. - - [75:2] See Sir Sayyid Ahmad's criticism of Al-Ghazali's view - of the soul, Al-Nazrufi ba'di Masaili-l Imami-l humam Abu Hamid - Al-Ghazali; No. 4, p. 3 sq. (ed. Agra). - -He is generally included among the Ash`arite. But strictly speaking he -is not an Ash`arite; though he admitted that the Ash`arite mode of -thought was excellent for the masses. "He held", says Shibli -(`Ilmal-Kalam, p. 66.), "that the secret of faith could not be revealed; -for this reason he encouraged exposition of the Ash`arite theology, -and took good care in persuading his immediate disciples not to publish -the results of his private reflection". Such an attitude towards the -Ash`arite theology, combined with his constant use of philosophical -language, could not but lead to suspicion. Ibn Jauzi, Qadi `Iyad, and -other famous theologians of the orthodox school, publicly denounced him -as one of the "misguided"; and `Iyad went even so far as to order the -destruction of all his philosophical and theological writings that -existed in Spain. - -It is, therefore, clear that while the dialectic of Rationalism -destroyed the personality of God, and reduced divinity to a bare -indefinable universality, the antirationalist movement, though it -preserved the dogma of personality, destroyed the external reality of -nature. In spite of Nazzam's theory of "Atomic objectification"[77:1], -the atom of the Rationalist possesses an independent objective reality; -that of the Ash`arite is a fleeting moment of Divine Will. The one -saves nature, and tends to do away with the God of Theology; the other -sacrifices nature to save God as conceived by the orthodox. The -God-intoxicated Sufi who stands aloof from the Theological controversies -of the age, saves and spiritualises both the aspects of existence, and -looks upon the whole Universe as the self-revelation of God--a higher -notion which synthesises the opposite extremes of his predecessors. -"Wooden-legged" Rationalism, as the Sufi called it, speaks its last word -in the sceptic Al-Ghazali, whose restless soul, after long and -hopeless wanderings in the desolate sands of dry intellectualism, found -its final halting place in the still deep of human emotion. His -scepticism is directed more to substantiate the necessity of a higher -source of knowledge than merely to defend the dogma of Islamic Theology, -and, therefore, marks the quiet victory of Sufiism over all the rival -speculative tendencies of the time. - - [77:1] Ibn Hazm, Vol. V, p. 63, 64, where the author states and - criticises this theory. - -Al-Ghazali's positive contribution to the Philosophy of his country, -however, is found in his little book--Mishkatal-Anwar--where he starts -with the Quranic verse, "God is the light of heavens and earth", and -instinctively returns to the Iranian idea, which was soon to find a -vigorous expounder in Al-Ishraqi. Light, he teaches in this book, is -the only real existence; and there is no darkness greater than -non-existence. But the essence of Light is manifestation: "it is -attributed to manifestation which is a relation"[78:1]. The Universe -was created out of darkness on which God sprinkled[79:1] his own light, -and made its different parts more or less visible according as they -received more or less light. As bodies differ from one another in being -dark, obscure, illuminated or illuminating, so men are differentiated -from one another. There are some who illuminate other human beings; and, -for this reason, the Prophet is named "The Burning Lamp" in the Qur'an. - - [78:1] Mishkatal-Anwar, fol. 3a. - - [79:1] In support of this view Al-Ghazali quotes a tradition - of the prophet. Mishkatal-Anwar, fol. 10a. - -The physical eye sees only the external manifestation of the Absolute or -Real Light. There is an internal eye in the heart of man which, unlike -the physical eye, sees itself as other things, an eye which goes beyond -the finite, and pierces the veil of manifestation. These thoughts are -merely germs, which developed and fructified in Al-Ishraqi's -"Philosophy of Illumination"--Hikmatal-Ishraq. - -Such is the Ash`arite philosophy. - -One great theological result of this reaction was that it checked the -growth of freethought which tended to dissolve the solidarity of the -Church. We are, however, concerned more with the purely intellectual -results of the Ash`arite mode of thought, and these are mainly two:-- - -(1). It led to an independent criticism of Greek philosophy as we shall -see presently. - -(2). In the beginning of the 10th century when the Ash`arite had -almost completely demolished the stronghold of Rationalism, we see a -tendency towards what may be called Persian Positivism. Al-Biruni[80:1] -(d. 1048) and Ibn Haitham[80:2] (d. 1038) who anticipated modern -empirical Psychology in recognising what is called reaction-time, gave -up all inquiry concerning the nature of the supersensual, and maintained -a prudent silence about religious matters. Such a state of things could -have existed, but could not have been logically justified before -Al-Ash`ari. - - [80:1] He (Al-Biruni) quotes with approval the following, as the - teaching of the adherents of Aryabhatta: It is enough for us to - know that which is lighted up by the sun's rays. Whatever lies - beyond, though it should be of immeasurable extent, we cannot - make use of; for what the sunbeam does not reach, the senses do - not perceive, and what the senses do not perceive we cannot - know. From this we gather what Al-Biruni's Philosophy was: only - sense-perceptions, knit together by a logical intelligence, - yield sure knowledge. (Boer's Philosophy in Islam, p. 146). - - [80:2] "Moreover truth for him (Ibn Haitham) was only that - which was presented as material for the faculties of - sense-perception, and which received it from the understanding, - being thus the logically elaborated perception". (Boer's - Philosophy in Islam, p. 150). - - [80:2] "Moreover truth for him (Ibn Haitham) was only that - which was presented as material for the faculties of - sense-perception, and which received it from the understanding, - being thus the logically elaborated perception". (Boer's - Philosophy in Islam, p. 150). - - - - -CHAP. IV. - -CONTROVERSY BETWEEN IDEALISM AND REALISM. - - -The Ash`arite denial of Aristotle's Prima Materia, and their views -concerning the nature of space, time and causation, awakened that -irrepressible spirit of controversy which, for centuries, divided the -camp of Muhammedan thinkers, and eventually exhausted its vigor in the -merely verbal subtleties of schools. The publication of Najm al-Din -Al-Katibi's (a follower of Aristotle whose disciples were called -Philosophers as distinguished from scholastic theologians) Hikmat -al-`Ain--"Philosophy of Essence", greatly intensified the intellectual -conflict, and invoked keen criticism from a host of Ash`arite as well -as other idealist thinkers. I shall consider in order the principal -points on which the two schools differed from each other. - - -A. _The Nature of the Essence._ - -We have seen that the Ash`arite theory of knowledge drove them to -hold that individual essences of various things are quite different from -each other, and are determined in each case by the ultimate cause--God. -They denied the existence of an everchanging primary stuff common to all -things, and maintained against the Rationalists that existence -constitutes the very being of the essence. To them, therefore, essence -and existence are identical. They argued that the Judgment, "Man is -animal", is possible only on the ground of a fundamental difference -between the subject and the predicate; since their identity would make -the Judgment nugatory, and complete difference would make the -predication false. It is, therefore, necessary to postulate an external -cause to determine the various forms of existence. Their opponents, -however, admit the determination or limitation of existence, but they -maintain that all the various forms of existence, in so far as their -essence is concerned, are identical--all being limitations of one -Primary substance. The followers of Aristotle met the difficulty -suggested by the possibility of synthetic predication, by advocating the -possibility of compound essences. Such a judgment as "Man is animal", -they maintained, is true; because man is an essence composed of two -essences, animality and humanity. This, retorted the Ash`arite, cannot -stand criticism. If you say that the essence of man and animal is the -same, you in other words hold that the essence of the whole is the same -as that of the part. But this proposition is absurd; since if the -essence of the compound is the same as that of its constituents, the -compound will have to be regarded as one being having two essences or -existences. - -It is obvious that the whole controversy turns on the question whether -existence is a mere idea or something objectively real. When we say that -a certain thing exists, do we mean that it exists only in relation to us -(Ash`arite position); or that it is an essence existing quite -independently of us (Realist position)? We shall briefly indicate the -arguments of either side. The Realist argued as follows:-- - -(1). The conception of my existence is something immediate or intuitive. -The thought "I exist" is a "concept", and my body being an element of -this "concept", it follows that my body is intuitively known as -something real. If the knowledge of the existent is not immediate, the -fact of its perception would require a process of thought which, as we -know, it does not. The Ash`arite Al-Razi admits that the concept of -existence is immediate; but he regards the judgment--"The concept of -existence is immediate"--as merely a matter of acquisition. Muhammad ibn -Mubarak Bukhari, on the other hand, says that the whole argument of -the realist proceeds on the assumption that the concept of my existence -is something immediate--a position which can be controverted.[84:1] If, -says he, we admit that the concept of my existence is immediate, -abstract existence cannot be regarded as a constitutive element of this -conception. And if the realist maintains that the perception of a -particular object is immediate, we admit the truth of what he says; but -it would not follow, as he is anxious to establish, that the so called -underlying essence is immediately known as objectively real. The -realist argument, moreover, demands that the mind ought not to be able -to conceive the predication of qualities to things. We cannot conceive, -"snow is white", because whiteness, being a part of this immediate -judgment, must also be immediately known without any predication. Mulla -Muhammad Hashim Husaini remarks[85:1] that this reasoning is -erroneous. The mind in the act of predicating whiteness of snow is -working on a purely ideal existence--the quality of whiteness--and not -on an objectively real essence of which the qualities are mere facets or -aspects. Husaini, moreover, anticipates Hamilton, and differs from other -realists in holding that the so-called unknowable essence of the object -is also immediately known. The object, he says, is immediately perceived -as one.[85:2] We do not successively perceive the various aspects of -what happens to be the objects of our perception. - - [84:1] Muhammad ibn Mubarak's commentary on Hikmat al-`Ain, - fol. 5a. - - [85:1] Husaini's commentary on Hikmat al-`Ain, fol. 13a. - - [85:2] Husaini's commentary on Hikmat al-`Ain, fol. 14b. - -(2) The idealist, says the realist, reduces all quality to mere -subjective relations. His argument leads him to deny the underlying -essence of things, and to look upon them as entirely heterogeneous -collections of qualities, the essence of which consists merely in the -phenomenal fact of their perception. In spite of his belief in the -complete heterogeneity of things, he applies the word existence to all -things--a tacit admission that there is some essence common to all the -various forms of existence. Abu'l-Hasan al-Ash`ari replies that this -application is only a verbal convenience, and is not meant to indicate -the so-called internal homogeneity of things. But the universal -application of the word existence by the idealist, must mean, according -to the realist, that the existence of a thing either constitutes its -very essence, or it is something superadded to the underlying essence of -the thing. The first supposition is a virtual admission as to the -homogeneity of things; since we cannot maintain that existence peculiar -to one thing is fundamentally different from existence peculiar to -another. The supposition that existence is something superadded to the -essence of a thing leads to an absurdity; since in this case the essence -will have to be regarded as something distinct from existence; and the -denial of essence (with the Ash`arite) would blot out the distinction -between existence and non-existence. Moreover, what was the essence -before existence was superadded to it? We must not say that the essence -was ready to receive existence before it actually did receive it; since -this statement would imply that the essence was non-existence before it -received existence. Likewise the statement that the essence has the -power of receiving the quality of non-existence, implies the absurdity -that it does already exist. Existence, therefore, must be regarded as -forming a part of the essence. But if it forms a part of the essence, -the latter will have to be regarded as a compound. If, on the other -hand, existence is external to the essence, it must be something -contingent because of its dependence on something other than itself. Now -everything contingent must have a cause. If this cause is the essence -itself, it would follow that the essence existed before it existed; -since the cause must precede the effect in the fact of existence. If, -however, the cause of existence is something other than the essence, it -follows that the existence of God also must be explained by some cause -other than the essence of God--an absurd conclusion which turns the -necessary into the contingent.[88:1] This argument of the realist is -based on a complete misunderstanding of the idealist position. He does -not see that the idealist never regarded the fact of existence as -something superadded to the essence of a thing; but always held it to be -identical with the essence. The essence, says ibn Mubarak,[88:2] is the -cause of existence without being chronologically before it. The -existence of the essence constitutes its very being; it is not dependent -for it on something other than itself. - - [88:1] Ibn Mubarak's Commentary, fol. 8b. - - [88:2] Ibn Mubarak's Commentary, fol. 9a. - -The truth is that both sides are far from a true theory of knowledge. -The agnostic realist who holds that behind the phenomenal qualities of a -thing, there is an essence operating as their cause, is guilty of a -glaring contradiction. He holds that underlying the thing there is an -_unknowable_ essence or substratum which is _known_ to exist. The -Ash`arite idealist, on the other hand, misunderstands the process of -knowledge. He ignores the mental activity involved in the act of -knowledge; and looks upon perceptions as mere presentations which are -determined, as he says, by God. But if the order of presentations -requires a cause to account for it, why should not that cause be sought -in the original constitution of matter as Locke did? Moreover, the -theory that knowledge is a mere passive perception or awareness of what -is presented, leads to certain inadmissible conclusions which the -Ash`arite never thought of:-- - -(a). They did not see that their purely subjective conception of -knowledge swept away all possibility of error. If the existence of a -thing is merely the fact of its being presented, there is no reason why -it should be cognised as different from what it actually is. - -(b). They did not see that on their theory of knowledge, our -fellow-beings like other elements of the physical order, would have no -higher reality than mere states of my consciousness. - -(c). If knowledge is a mere receptivity of presentations, God who, as -cause of presentations, is active in regard to the act of our knowledge, -must not be aware of our presentations. From the Ash`arite point of -view this conclusion is fatal to their whole position. They cannot say -that presentations on their ceasing to be my presentations, continue to -be presentations to God's consciousness. - -Another question connected with the nature of the essence is, whether it -is caused or uncaused. The followers of Aristotle, or philosophers as -they are generally called by their opponents, hold that the underlying -essence of things is uncaused. The Ash`arite hold the opposite view. -Essence, says the Aristotelian, cannot be acted upon by any external -agent.[90:1] Al-Katibi argues that if, for instance, the essence of -humanity had resulted from the operation of an external activity, doubt -as to its being the real essence of humanity would have been possible. -As a matter of fact we never entertain such a doubt; it follows, -therefore, that the essence is not due to the activity of an agency -external to itself. The idealist starts with the realist distinction of -essence and existence, and argues that the realist line of argument -would lead to the absurd proposition--that man is uncaused; since he -must be regarded, according to the realist, as a combination of two -uncaused essences--existence and humanity. - - [90:1] Ibn Mubarak's Commentary, fol. 20a. - - -B. _The Nature of Knowledge._ - -The followers of Aristotle, true to their position as to the independent -objective reality of the essence, define knowledge as "receiving images -of external things".[91:1] It is possible to conceive, they argue, an -object which is externally unreal, and to which other qualities can be -attributed. But when we attribute to it the quality of existence, actual -existence is necessitated; since the affirmation of the quality of a -thing is a part of the affirmation of that thing. If, therefore, the -predication of existence does not necessitate actual objective existence -of the thing, we are driven to deny externality altogether, and to hold -that the thing exists in the mind as a mere idea. But the affirmation -of a thing, says Ibn Mubarak, constitutes the very existence of the -thing. The idealist makes no such distinction as affirmation and -existence. To infer from the above argument that the thing must be -regarded as existing in the mind, is unjustifiable. "Ideal" existence -follows only from the denial of externality which the Ash`arite do not -deny; since they hold that knowledge is a relation between the knower -and the known which is known as external. Al-Katibi's proposition that -if the thing does not exist as external existence, it must exist as -ideal or mental existence, is self-contradictory; since, on his -principles, everything that exists in idea exists in externality.[92:1] - - [91:1] Ibn Mubarak, fol. 11a. - - [92:1] Ibn Mubarak, fol. 11b. - - -C. _The Nature of Non-existence._ - -Al-Katibi explains and criticises the proposition, maintained by -contemporary philosophers generally--"That the existent is good, and the -non-existent is evil".[92:2] The fact of murder, he says, is not evil -because the murderer had the power of committing such a thing; or -because the instrument of murder had the power of cutting; or because -the neck of the murdered had the capacity of being cut asunder. It is -evil because it signifies the negation of life--a condition which is -non-existential, and not existential like the conditions indicated -above. But in order to show that evil is non-existence, we should make -an inductive inquiry, and examine all the various cases of evil. A -perfect induction, however, is impossible, and an incomplete induction -cannot prove the point. Al-Katibi, therefore, rejects this proposition, -and holds that "non-existence is absolute nothing".[93:1] The possible -'_essences_', according to him, are not lying fixed in space waiting for -the attribute of existence; otherwise fixity in space would have to be -regarded as possessing no existence. But his critics hold that this -argument is true only on the supposition that fixity in space and -existence are identical. Fixity in externality, says Ibn Mubarak, is a -conception wider than existence. All existence is external, but all that -is external is not necessarily existent. - - [92:2] Ibn Mubarak, fol. 14a. - - [93:1] Ibn Mubarak's Commentary, fol. 14b. - -The interest of the Ash`arite in the dogma of the Resurrection--the -possibility of the reappearance of the non-existent as existent--led -them to advocate the apparently absurd proposition that "non-existence -or nothing _is_ something". They argued that, since we make judgments -about the non-existent, it is, therefore, known; and the fact of its -knowability indicates that "the nothing" is not absolutely nothing. The -knowable is a case of affirmation and the non-existent being knowable, -is a case of affirmation.[94:1] Al-Katibi denies the truth of the Major. -Impossible things, he says, are known, yet they do not externally exist. -Al-Razi criticises this argument accusing Al-Katibi of the ignorance of -the fact that the '_essence_' exists in the mind, and yet is known as -external. Al-Katibi supposes that the knowledge of a thing necessitates -its existence as an independent objective reality. Moreover it should be -remembered that the Ash`arite discriminate between positive and -existent on the one hand, and non-existent and negative on the other. -They say that all existent is positive, but the converse of this -proposition is not true. There is certainly a relation between the -existent and the non-existent, but there is absolutely no relation -between the positive and the negative. We do not say, as Al-Katibi -holds, that the impossible is non-existent; we say that the impossible -is only negative. Substances which do exist are something positive. As -regards the attribute which cannot be conceived as existing apart from -the substance, it is neither existent nor non-existent, but something -between the two. Briefly the Ash`arite position is as follows:-- - -"A thing has a proof of its existence or not. If not, it is called -negative. If it has a proof of its existence, it is either substance or -attribute. If it is substance and has the attribute of existence or -non-existence, (i.e. it is perceived or not) it is existent or -non-existent accordingly. If it is attribute, it is neither existent nor -non-existent".[95:1] - - [94:1] Ibn Mubarak's Commentary, fol. 15a. - - [95:1] Ibn Mubarak's Commentary, fol. 15b. - - - - -CHAP. V. - -SUFIISM. - - -ASec. I. - -The origin and Quranic Justification of Sufiism. - -It has become quite a fashion with modern oriental scholarship to trace -the chain of influences. Such a procedure has certainly great historical -value, provided it does not make us ignore the fundamental fact, that -the human mind possesses an independent individuality, and, acting on -its own initiative, can gradually evolve out of itself, truths which may -have been anticipated by other minds ages ago. No idea can seize a -people's soul unless, in some sense, it is the people's own. External -influences may wake it up from its deep unconscious slumber; but they -cannot, so to speak, create it out of nothing. - -Much has been written about the origin of Persian Sufiism; and, in -almost all cases, explorers of this most interesting field of research -have exercised their ingenuity in discovering the various channels -through which the basic ideas of Sufiism might have travelled from one -place to another. They seem completely to have ignored the principle, -that the full significance of a phenomenon in the intellectual evolution -of a people, can only be comprehended in the light of those pre-existing -intellectual, political, and social conditions which alone make its -existence inevitable. Von Kremer and Dozy derive Persian Sufiism from -the Indian Vedanta; Merx and Mr. Nicholson derive it from Neo-Platonism; -while Professor Browne once regarded it as Aryan reaction against an -unemotional semitic religion. It appears to me, however, that these -theories have been worked out under the influence of a notion of -causation which is essentially false. That a fixed quantity A is the -cause of, or produces another fixed quantity B, is a proposition which, -though convenient for scientific purposes, is apt to damage all inquiry, -in so far as it leads us completely to ignore the innumerable conditions -lying at the back of a phenomenon. It would, for instance, be an -historical error to say that the dissolution of the Roman Empire was due -to the barbarian invasions. The statement completely ignores other -forces of a different character that tended to split up the political -unity of the Empire. To describe the advent of barbarian invasions as -the cause of the dissolution of the Roman Empire which could have -assimilated, as it actually did to a certain extent, the so-called -cause, is a procedure that no logic would justify. Let us, therefore, in -the light of a truer theory of causation, enumerate the principal -political, social, and intellectual conditions of Islamic life about the -end of the 8{th} and the first half of the 9{th} century when, properly -speaking, the Sufi ideal of life came into existence, to be soon -followed by a philosophical justification of that ideal.-- - -(1). When we study the history of the time, we find it to be a time of -more or less political unrest. The latter half of the 8{th} century -presents, besides the political revolution which resulted in the -overthrow of the Umayyads (749 A.D.), persecutions of Zendiks, and -revolts of Persian heretics (Sindbah 755-6; Ustadhis 766-8; the veiled -prophet of Khurasan 777-80) who, working on the credulity of the -people, cloaked, like Lamennais in our own times, political projects -under the guise of religious ideas. Later on in the beginning of the -9{th} century we find the sons of Harun (Ma'mun and Amin) engaged in a -terrible conflict for political supremacy; and still later, we see the -Golden Age of Islamic literature seriously disturbed by the persistent -revolt of the Mazdakite Babak (816-838). The early years of Ma'mun's -reign present another social phenomenon of great political -significance--the Shu`ubiyya controversy (815), which progresses with -the rise and establishment of independent Persian families, the Tahirid -(820), the Saffarid (868), and the Samanid Dynasty (874). It is, -therefore, the combined force of these and other conditions of a similar -nature that contributed to drive away spirits of devotional character -from the scene of continual unrest to the blissful peace of an -ever-deepening contemplative life. The semitic character of the life and -thought of these early Muhammadan ascetics is gradually followed by a -large hearted pantheism of a more or less Aryan stamp, the development -of which, in fact, runs parallel to the slowly progressing political -independence of Persia. - -(2). _The Sceptical tendencies of Islamic Rationalism_ which found an -early expression in the poems of Bashshar ibn Burd--the blind -Persian Sceptic who deified fire, and scoffed at all non-Persian modes -of thought. The germs of Scepticism latent in Rationalism ultimately -necessitated an appeal to a super-intellectual source of knowledge which -asserted itself in the Risala of Al-Qushairi (986). In our own times -the negative results of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason drove Jacobi and -Schleiermacher to base faith on the feeling of the reality of the ideal; -and to the 19{th} century sceptic Wordsworth uncovered that mysterious -state of mind "in which we grow all spirit and see into the life of -things". - -(3). The unemotional piety of the various schools of Islam--the Hanafite -(Abu Hanifa d. 767), the Shafiite (Al-Shafi`i d. 820), the Malikite -(Al-Malik d. 795), and the anthropomorphic Hambalite (Ibn Hambal d. -855)--the bitterest enemy of independent thought--which ruled the masses -after the death of Al-Ma'mun. - -(4). The religious discussions among the representatives of various -creeds encouraged by Al-Ma'mun, and especially the bitter theological -controversy between the Ash`arites, and the advocates of Rationalism -which tended not only to confine religion within the narrow limits of -schools, but also stirred up the spirit to rise above all petty -sectarian wrangling. - -(5). The gradual softening of religious fervency due to the -rationalistic tendency of the early `Abbasid period, and the rapid -growth of wealth which tended to produce moral laxity and indifference -to religious life in the upper circles of Islam. - -(6). The presence of Christianity as a working ideal of life. It was, -however, principally the actual life of the Christian hermit rather than -his religious ideas, that exercised the greatest fascination over the -minds of early Islamic Saints whose complete unworldliness, though -extremely charming in itself, is, I believe, quite contrary to the -spirit of Islam. - -Such was principally the environment of Sufiism, and it is to the -combined action of the above condition that we should look for the -origin and development of Sufiistic ideas. Given these condition and the -Persian mind with an almost innate tendency towards monism, the whole -phenomenon of the birth and growth of Sufiism is explained. If we now -study the principal pre-existing conditions of Neo-Platonism, we find -that similar conditions produced similar results. The barbarian raids -which were soon to reduce Emperors of the Palace to Emperors of the -Camp, assumed a more serious aspect about the middle of the third -century. Plotinus himself speaks of the political unrest of his time in -one of his letters to Flaccus.[102:1] When he looked round himself in -Alexandria, his birth place, he noticed signs of growing toleration and -indifferentism towards religious life. Later on in Rome which had -become, so to say, a pantheon of different nations, he found a similar -want of seriousness in life, a similar laxity of character in the upper -classes of society. In more learned circles philosophy was studied as a -branch of literature rather than for its own sake; and Sextus Empiricus, -provoked by Antiochus's tendency to fuse scepticism and Stoicism was -teaching the old unmixed scepticism of Pyrrho--that intellectual despair -which drove Plotinus to find truth in a revelation above thought itself. -Above all, the hard unsentimental character of Stoic morality, and the -loving piety of the followers of Christ who, undaunted by long and -fierce persecutions, were preaching the message of peace and love to the -whole Roman world, necessitated a restatement of Pagan thought in a way -that might revivify the older ideals of life, and suit the new spiritual -requirements of the people. But the ethical force of Christianity was -too great for Neo-Platonism which, on account of its more -metaphysical[103:1] character, had no message for the people at large, -and was consequently inaccessible to the rude barbarian who, being -influenced by the actual life of the persecuted Christian adopted -Christianity, and settled down to construct new empires out of the ruins -of the old. In Persia the influence of culture-contacts and -cross-fertilisation of ideas created in certain minds a vague desire to -realise a similar restatement of Islam, which gradually assimilated -Christian ideals as well as Christian Gnostic speculation, and found a -firm foundation in the Qur'an. The flower of Greek Thought faded away -before the breath of Christianity; but the burning simoon of Ibn -Taimiyya's invective could not touch the freshness of the Persian rose. -The one was completely swept away by the flood of barbarian invasions; -the other, unaffected by the Tartar revolution, still holds its own. - - [102:1] "Tidings have reached us that Valerian has been - defeated, and is now in the hands of Sapor. The threats of - Franks and Allemanni, of Goths and Persians, are alike terrible - by turns to our _degenerate_ Rome." (Plotinus to Flaccus; quoted - by Vaughan in his Half hours with Mystics, p. 63.) - - [103:1] The element of ecstacy which could have appealed to some - minds was thrown into the background by the later teachers of - Neo-Platonism, so that it became a mere system of thought having - no human interest. Says Whittaker:--"The mystical ecstacy was - not found by the later teachers of the school easier to attain, - but more difficult; and the tendency became more and more to - regard it as all but unattainable on earth." Neo-Platonism, p. - 101. - -This extraordinary vitality of the Sufi restatement of Islam, however, -is explained when we reflect on the all-embracing structure of Sufiism. -The semitic formula of salvation can be briefly stated in the words, -"Transform your will",--which signifies that the Semite looks upon will -as the essence of the human soul. The Indian Vedantist, on the other -hand, teaches that all pain is due to our mistaken attitude towards -the Universe. He, therefore, commands us to transform our -understanding--implying thereby that the essential nature of man -consists in thought, not activity or will. But the Sufi holds that the -mere transformation of will or understanding will not bring peace; we -should bring about the transformation of both by a complete -transformation of feeling, of which will and understanding are only -specialised forms. His message to the individual is--"Love all, and -forget your own individuality in doing good to others." Says Rumi:--"To -win other people's hearts is the greatest pilgrimage; and one heart is -worth more than a thousand Ka`bahs. Ka`bah is a mere cottage of Abraham; -but the heart is the very home of God." But this formula demands a _why_ -and a _how_--a metaphysical justification of the ideal in order to -satisfy the understanding; and rules of action in order to guide the -will. Sufiism furnishes both. Semitic religion is a code of strict rules -of conduct; the Indian Vedanta, on the other hand, is a cold system of -thought. Sufiism avoids their incomplete Psychology, and attempts to -synthesise both the Semitic and the Aryan formulas in the higher -category of Love. On the one hand it assimilates the Buddhistic idea of -Nirwana (Fana-Annihilation), and seeks to build a metaphysical system in -the light of this idea; on the other hand it does not disconnect itself -from Islam, and finds the justification of its view of the Universe in -the Qur'an. Like the geographical position of its home, it stands midway -between the Semitic and the Aryan, assimilating ideas from both sides, -and giving them the stamp of its own individuality which, on the whole, -is more Aryan than Semitic in character. It would, therefore, be evident -that the secret of the vitality of Sufiism is the complete view of human -nature upon which it is based. It has survived orthodox persecutions and -political revolutions, because it appeals to human nature in its -entirety; and, while it concentrates its interest chiefly in a _life_ of -self-denial, it allows free play to the speculative tendency as well. - -I will now briefly indicate how Sufi writers justify their views from -the Quranic standpoint. There is no historical evidence to show that the -Prophet of Arabia actually communicated certain esoteric doctrines to -`Ali or Abu Bakr. The Sufi, however, contends that the Prophet had an -esoteric teaching--"wisdom"--as distinguished from the teaching -contained in the Book, and he brings forward the following verse to -substantiate his case:--"As we have sent a prophet to you from among -yourselves who reads our verses to you, purifies you, teaches you the -Book and the _Wisdom_, and teaches you _what you did not know -before_."[107:1] He holds that "the wisdom" spoken of in the verse, is -something not incorporated in the teaching of the Book which, as the -Prophet repeatedly declared, had been taught by several prophets before -him. If, he says, the wisdom is included in the Book, the word "Wisdom" -in the verse would be redundant. It can, I think, be easily shown that -in the Qur'an as well as in the authenticated traditions, there are -germs of Sufi doctrine which, owing to the thoroughly practical genius -of the Arabs, could not develop and fructify in Arabia, but which grew -up into a distinct doctrine when they found favourable circumstances in -alien soils. The Qur'an thus defines the Muslims:--"Those who believe in -the Unseen, establish daily prayer, and spend out of what We have given -them."[108:1] But the question arises as to the _what_ and the _where_ -of the Unseen. The Qur'an replies that the Unseen is in your own -soul--"And in the earth there are signs to those who believe, and in -yourself,--what! do you not then see!"[108:2] And again--"We are nigher -to him (man) than his own jugular vein."[108:3] Similarly the Holy Book -teaches that the essential nature of the Unseen is pure light--"God is -the light of heavens and earth."[108:4] As regards the question whether -this Primal Light is personal, the Qur'an, in spite of many expressions -signifying personality, declares in a few words--"There is nothing like -him."[108:5] - - [107:1] Sura 2, v. 146. - - [108:1] Sura 2, v. 2. - - [108:2] Sura 51, v. 20, 21. - - [108:3] Sura 50, v. 15. - - [108:4] Sura 24, v. 35. - - [108:5] Sura 42, v. 9. - -These are some of the chief verses out of which the various Sufi -commentators develop pantheistic views of the Universe. They enumerate -the following four stages of spiritual training through which the -soul--the order or reason of the Primal Light--("Say that the soul is -the order or reason of God.")[109:1] has to pass, if it desires to rise -above the common herd, and realise its union or identity with the -ultimate source of all things:-- - -(1). Belief in the Unseen. - -(2). Search after the Unseen. The spirit of inquiry leaves its slumber -by observing the marvellous phenomena of nature. "Look at the camel how -it is created; the skies how they are exalted; the mountains how they -are unshakeably fixed."[109:2] - -(3). The knowledge of the Unseen. This comes, as we have indicated -above, by looking into the depths of our own soul. - -(4). The Realisation--This results, according to the higher Sufiism -from the constant practice of Justice and Charity--"Verily God bids you -do justice and good, and give to kindred (their due), and He forbids you -to sin, and do wrong, and oppress".[110:1] - - [109:1] Sura 17; v. 87. - - [109:2] Sura 88; v. 20. - - [110:1] Sura 16; v. 92. - -It must, however, be remembered that some later Sufi fraternities (e.g. -Naqshbandi) devised, or rather borrowed[110:2] from the Indian -Vedantist, other means of bringing about this Realisation. They taught, -imitating the Hindu doctrine of Kundalini, that there are six great -centres of light of various colours in the body of man. It is the object -of the Sufi to make them move, or to use the technical word, "current" -by certain methods of meditation, and eventually to realise, amidst the -apparent diversity of colours, the fundamental colourless light which -makes everything visible, and is itself invisible. The continual -movement of these centres of light through the body, and the final -realisation of their identity, which results from putting the atoms of -the body into definite courses of motion by slow repetition of the -various names of God and other mysterious expressions, illuminates the -whole body of the Sufi; and the perception of the same illumination in -the external world completely extinguishes the sense of "otherness." The -fact that these methods were known to the Persian Sufis misled Von -Kremer who ascribed the whole phenomenon of Sufiism to the influence of -Vedantic ideas. Such methods of contemplation are quite unislamic in -character, and the higher Sufis do not attach any importance to them. - - [110:2] Weber makes the following statement on the authority of - Lassen:--"Al-Biruni translated Patanjali's work into Arabic at - the beginning of the 11th century, and also, it would appear, - the Sankhya sutra, though the information we have as to the - contents of these works does not harmonise with the Sanskrit - originals." History of Indian Literature, p. 239. - - -ASec. II. - -Aspects of Sufi-Metaphysics. - -Let us now return to the various schools or rather the various aspects -of Sufi Metaphysics. A careful investigation of Sufi literature shows -that Sufiism has looked at the Ultimate Reality from three standpoints -which, in fact, do not exclude but complement each other. Some Sufis -conceive the essential nature of reality as self-conscious will, others -beauty; others again hold that Reality is essentially Thought, Light or -Knowledge. There are, therefore, three aspects of Sufi thought:-- - -A. _Reality as Self-conscious Will._ - -The first in historical order is that represented by Shaqiq Balkhi, -Ibrahim Adham, Rabi`a, and others. This school conceives the ultimate -reality as "Will", and the Universe a finite activity of that will. It -is essentially monotheistic and consequently more semitic in character. -It is not the desire of Knowledge which dominates the ideal of the Sufis -of this school, but the characteristic features of their life are piety, -unworldliness, and an intense longing for God due to the consciousness -of sin. Their object is not to philosophise, but principally to work out -a certain ideal of life. From our standpoint, therefore, they are not of -much importance. - -B. _Reality as Beauty._ - -In the beginning of the 9{th} century Ma`ruf Karkhi defined Sufiism -as "Apprehension of Divine realities"[113:1]--a definition which marks -the movement from Faith to Knowledge. But the method of apprehending the -ultimate reality was formally stated by Al-Qushairi about the end of -the 10{th} century. The teachers of this school adopted the Neo-Platonic -idea of creation by intermediary agencies; and though this idea lingered -in the minds of Sufi writers for a long time, yet their Pantheism led -them to abandon the Emanation theory altogether. Like Avicenna they -looked upon the ultimate Reality as "Eternal Beauty" whose very nature -consists in seeing its own "face" reflected in the Universe-mirror. The -Universe, therefore, became to them a reflected image of the "Eternal -Beauty", and not an emanation as the Neo-Platonists had taught. The -cause of creation, says Mir Sayyid Sharif, is the manifestation of -Beauty, and the first creation is Love. The realisation of this Beauty, -is brought about by universal love, which the innate Zoroastrian -instinct of the Persian Sufi loved to define as "the Sacred Fire which -burns up everything other than God." Says Rumi:-- - - "O thou pleasant madness, Love! - Thou Physician of all our ills! - Thou healer of pride, - Thou Plato and Galen of our souls!"[114:1] - - [113:1] Mr. Nicholson has collected the various definitions of - Sufiism. See J. R. A. S. April, 1906. - - [114:1] Mathnawi, Jalal al Din Rumi, with Bahral `ulum's - Commentary. Lucknow (India), 1877, p. 9. - -As a direct consequence of such a view of the Universe, we have the idea -of impersonal absorption which first appears in Bayazid of Bistam, and -which constitutes the characteristic feature of the later development of -this school. The growth of this idea may have been influenced by Hindu -pilgrims travelling through Persia to the Buddhistic temple still -existing at Baku.[114:2] The school became wildly pantheistic in Husain -Mansur who, in the true spirit of the Indian Vedantist, cried out, "I am -God"--Aham Brahma asmi. - - [114:2] As regards the progress of Buddhism Geiger says:--"We - know that in the period after Alexander, Buddhism was powerful - in Eastern Iran, and that it counted its confessors as far as - Tabaristan. It is especially certain that many Buddhistic - priests were found in Bactria. This state of things, which began - perhaps in the first century before Christ, lasted till the - 7{th} century A.D., when the appearance of Islamism alone cut - short the development of Buddhism in Kabul and Bactria, and it - is in that period that we will have to place the rise of the - Zarathushtra legend in the form in which it is presented to us - by Daqiqi." - - Civilisation of Eastern Iranians - Vol. II, p. 170. - -The ultimate Reality or Eternal Beauty, according to the Sufis of this -school, is infinite in the sense that "it is absolutely free from the -limitations of beginning, end, right, left, above, and below."[115:1] -The distinction of essence and attribute does not exist in the -Infinite--"Substance and quality are really identical."[115:2] We have -indicated above that nature is the mirror of the Absolute Existence. But -according to Nasafi, there are two kinds of mirrors[115:3]-- - -(a). That which shows merely a reflected image--this is external nature. - -(b). That which shows the real Essence--this is man who is a limitation -of the Absolute, and erroneously thinks himself to be an independent -entity. - - [115:1] Nasafi's Maqsadi Aqsa: fol. 8b. - - [115:2] Nasafi's Maqsadi Aqsa: fol. 10b. - - [115:3] Nasafi's Maqsadi Aqsa: fol. 23b. - -"O Derwish!" says Nasafi "dost thou think that thy existence is -independent of God? This is a great error."[116:1] Nasafi explains his -meaning by a beautiful parable.[116:2] The fishes in a certain tank -realised that they lived, moved, and had their being in water, but felt -that they were quite ignorant of the real nature of what constituted the -very source of their life. They resorted to a wiser fish in a great -river, and the Philosopher-fish addressed them thus:-- - -"O you who endeavour to untie the knot (of being)! You are born in -union, yet die in the thought of an unreal separation. Thirsty on the -sea-shore! Dying penniless while master of the treasure!" - - [116:1] Nasafi's Maqsadi Aqsa: fol. 3b. - - [116:2] Nasafi's Maqsadi Aqsa: fol. 15b. - -All feeling of separation, therefore, is ignorance; and all "otherness" -is a mere appearance, a dream, a shadow--a differentiation born of -relation essential to the self-recognition of the Absolute. The great -prophet of this school is "The excellent Rumi" as Hegel calls him. He -took up the old Neo-Platonic idea of the Universal soul working through -the various spheres of being, and expressed it in a way so modern in -spirit that Clodd introduces the passage in his "Story of Creation". I -venture to quote this famous passage in order to show how successfully -the poet anticipates the modern concept of evolution, which he regarded -as the realistic side of his Idealism. - - First man appeared in the clan of inorganic things, - Next he passed therefrom into that of plants. - For years he lived as one of the plants, - Remembering nought of his inorganic state so different; - And when he passed from the vegetive to the animal state, - He had no remembrance of his state as a plant, - Except the inclination he felt to the world of plants, - Especially at the time of spring and sweet flowers; - Like the inclination of infants towards their mothers, - Which know not the cause of their inclination to the breast. - Again the great creator as you know, - Drew man out of the animal into the human state. - Thus man passed from one order of nature to another, - Till he became wise and knowing and strong as he is now. - Of his first soul he has now no remembrance, - And he will be again changed from his present soul. - - (Mathnawi Book IV). - -It would now be instructive if we compare this aspect of Sufi thought -with the fundamental ideas of Neo-Platonism. The God of Neo-Platonism is -immanent as well as transcendant. "As being the cause of all things, it -is everywhere. As being other than all things, it is nowhere. If it were -only "everywhere", and not also "nowhere", it would _be_ all -things."[118:1] The Sufi, however, tersely says that God _is_ all -things. The Neo-Platonist allows a certain permanence or fixity to -matter;[118:2] but the Sufis of the school in question, regard all -empirical experience as a kind of dreaming. Life in limitation, they -say, is sleep; death brings the awakening. It is, however, the doctrine -of Impersonal immortality--"genuinely eastern in spirit"--which -distinguishes this school from Neo-Platonism. "Its (Arabian Philosophy) -distinctive doctrine", says Whittaker, "of an Impersonal immortality of -the general human intellect is, however, as contrasted with -Aristotelianism and Neo-Platonism, essentially original." - - [118:1] Whittaker's Neo-Platonism, p. 58. - - [118:2] Whittaker's Neo-Platonism, p. 57. - -The above brief exposition shows that there are three basic ideas of -this mode of thought:-- - -(a). That the ultimate Reality is knowable through a supersensual state -of consciousness. - -(b). That the ultimate Reality is impersonal. - -(c). That the ultimate Reality is one. - -Corresponding to these ideas we have: - -(I). The Agnostic reaction as manifested in the Poet `Umar Khayyam -(12{th} century) who cried out in his intellectual despair:-- - - The joyous souls who quaff potations deep, - And saints who in the mosque sad vigils keep, - Are lost at sea alike, and find no shore, - One only wakes, all others are asleep. - -(II). The monotheistic reaction of Ibn Taimiyya and his followers in the -13{th} century. - -(III). The Pluralistic reaction of Wahid Mahmud[119:1] in the 13{th} -century. - - [119:1] Dabistan, Chap: 8. - -Speaking from a purely philosophical standpoint, the last movement is -most interesting. The history of Thought illustrates the operation of -certain general laws of progress which are true of the intellectual -annals of different peoples. The German systems of monistic thought -invoked the pluralism of Herbart; while the pantheism of Spinoza called -forth the monadism of Leibniz. The operation of the same law led Wahid -Mahmud to deny the truth of contemporary monism, and declare that -Reality is not one but many. Long before Leibniz he taught that the -Universe is a combination of what he called "Afrad"--essential units, or -simple atoms which have existed from all eternity, and are endowed with -life. The law of the Universe is an ascending perfection of elemental -matter, continually passing from lower to higher forms determined by the -kind of food which the fundamental units assimilate. Each period of his -cosmogony comprises 8,000 years, and after eight such periods the world -is decomposed, and the units re-combine to construct a new universe. -Wahid Mahmud succeeded in founding a sect which was cruelly persecuted, -and finally stamped out of existence by Shah `Abbas. It is said that -the poet Hafiz of Shiraz believed in the tenets of this sect. - - -C. _Reality as Light or Thought._ - -The third great school of Sufiism conceives Reality as essentially Light -or Thought, the very nature of which demands something to be thought or -illuminated. While the preceding school abandoned Neo-Platonism, this -school transformed it into new systems. There are, however, two aspects -of the metaphysics of this school. The one is genuinely Persian in -spirit, the other is chiefly influenced by Christian modes of thought. -Both agree in holding that the fact of empirical diversity necessitates -a principle of difference in the nature of the ultimate Reality. I now -proceed to consider them in their historical order. - - -I. Reality as Light--Al-Ishraqi. - -Return to Persian Dualism. - -The application of Greek dialectic to Islamic Theology aroused that -spirit of critical examination which began with Al-Ash`ari, and found -its completest expression in the scepticism of Al-Ghazali. Even among -the Rationalists there were some more critical minds--such as -Nazzam--whose attitude towards Greek Philosophy was not one of servile -submission, but of independent criticism. The defenders of -dogma--Al-Ghazali, Al-Razi, Abul Barakat, and Al-Amidi, carried on a -persistent attack on the whole fabric of Greek Philosophy; while Abu -Sa`id Sairafi, Qadi `Abdal Jabbar, Abul Ma`ali, Abul Qasim, and finally -the acute Ibn Taimiyya, actuated by similar theological motives, -continued to expose the inherent weakness of Greek Logic. In their -criticism of Greek Philosophy, these thinkers were supplemented by some -of the more learned Sufis, such as Shahabal Din Suhrawardi, who -endeavoured to substantiate the helplessness of pure reason by his -refutation of Greek thought in a work entitled, "The unveiling of Greek -absurdities". The Ash`arite reaction against Rationalism resulted not -only in the development of a system of metaphysics most modern in some -of its aspects, but also in completely breaking asunder the worn out -fetters of intellectual thraldom. Erdmann[122:1] seems to think that the -speculative spirit among the Muslims exhausted itself with Al-Farabi and -Avicenna, and that after them Philosophy became bankrupt in passing over -into scepticism and mysticism. Evidently he ignores the Muslim criticism -of Greek Philosophy which led to the Ash`arite Idealism on the one -hand, and a genuine Persian reconstruction on the other. That a system -of thoroughly Persian character might be possible, the destruction of -foreign thought, or rather the weakening of its hold on the mind, was -indispensable. The Ash`arite and other defenders of Islamic Dogma -completed the destruction; Al-Ishraqi--the child of emancipation--came -forward to build a new edifice of thought; though, in his process of -reconstruction, he did not entirely repudiate the older material. His is -the genuine Persian brain which, undaunted by the threats of narrow -minded authority, asserts its right of free independent speculation. In -his philosophy the old Iranian tradition, which had found only a partial -expression in the writings of the Physician Al-Razi, Al-Ghazali, and -the Isma`ilia sect, endeavours to come to a final understanding with the -philosophy of his predecessors and the theology of Islam. - - [122:1] Vol. I, p. 367. - -Shaikh Shahabal Din Suhrawardi, known as Shaikhal Ishraq Maqtul -was born about the middle of the 12{th} century. He studied philosophy -with Majd Jili--the teacher of the commentator Al-Razi--and, while -still a youth, stood unrivalled as a thinker in the whole Islamic world. -His great admirer Al-Malik-al-Zahir--the son of Sultan Salah-al -Din--invited him to Aleppo, where the youthful philosopher expounded his -independent opinions in a way that aroused the bitter jealousy of -contemporary theologians. These hired slaves of bloodthirsty Dogmatism -which, conscious of its inherent weakness, has always managed to keep -brute force behind its back, wrote to Sultan Salah-al Din, that the -Shaikh's teaching was a danger to Islam, and that it was necessary, -in the interest of the Faith, to nip the evil in the bud. The Sultan -consented; and there, at the early age of 36, the young Persian thinker -calmly met the blow which made him a martyr of truth, and immortalised -his name for ever. Murderers have passed away, but the philosophy, the -price of which was paid in blood, still lives, and attracts many an -earnest seeker after truth. - -The principal features of the founder of the Ishraqi Philosophy are -his intellectual independence, the skill with which he weaves his -materials into a systematic whole, and above all his faithfulness to -the philosophic traditions of his country. In many fundamental points he -differs from Plato, and freely criticises Aristotle whose philosophy he -looks upon as a mere preparation for his own system of thought. Nothing -escapes his criticism. Even the logic of Aristotle, he subjects to a -searching examination, and shows the hollowness of some of its -doctrines. Definition, for instance, is genus plus differentia, -according to Aristotle. But Al-Ishraqi holds that the distinctive -attribute of the thing defined, which cannot be predicated of any other -thing, will bring us no knowledge of the thing. We define "horse" as a -neighing animal. Now we understand animality, because we know many -animals in which this attribute exists; but it is impossible to -understand the attribute "neighing", since it is found nowhere except in -the thing defined. The ordinary definition of horse, therefore, would be -meaningless to a man who has never seen a horse. Aristotelian -definition, as a scientific principle is quite useless. This criticism -leads the Shaikh, to a standpoint very similar to that of Bosanquet -who defines definition, as "Summation of qualities". The Shaikh -holds that a true definition would enumerate all the essential -attributes which, taken collectively, exist nowhere except the thing -defined, though they may individually exist in other things. - -But let us turn to his system of metaphysics, and estimate the worth of -his contribution to the thought of his country. In order fully to -comprehend the purely intellectual side of Transcendental philosophy, -the student, says the Shaikh, must be thoroughly acquainted with -Aristotelian philosophy, Logic, Mathematics, and Sufiism. His mind -should be completely free from the taint of prejudice and sin, so that -he may gradually develop that inner sense, which verifies and corrects -what intellect understands only as theory. Unaided reason is -untrustworthy; it must always be supplemented by "Dhauq"--the -mysterious perception of the essence of things--which brings knowledge -and peace to the restless soul, and disarms Scepticism for ever. We are, -however, concerned with the purely speculative side of this spiritual -experience--the results of the inner perception as formulated and -systematised by discursive thought. Let us, therefore, examine the -various aspects of the Ishraqi Philosophy--Ontology, Cosmology, and -Psychology. - - -Ontology. - -The ultimate principle of all existence is "Nur-i-Qahir"--the Primal -Absolute Light whose essential nature consists in perpetual -illumination. "Nothing is more visible than light, and visibility does -not stand in need of any definition."[127:1] The essence of Light, -therefore, is manifestation. For if manifestation is an attribute -superadded to light, it would follow that in itself light possesses no -visibility, and becomes visible only through something else visible in -itself; and from this again follows the absurd consequence, that -something other than light is more visible than light. The Primal Light, -therefore, has no reason of its existence beyond itself. All that is -other than this original principle is dependent, contingent, possible. -The "not-light" (darkness) is not something distinct proceeding from an -independent source. It is an error of the representatives of the Magian -religion to suppose that Light and Darkness are two distinct realities -created by two distinct creative agencies. The ancient Philosophers of -Persia were not dualists like the Zoroastrian priests who, on the ground -of the principle that the one cannot cause to emanate from itself more -than one, assigned two independent sources to Light and Darkness. The -relation between them is not that of contrariety, but of existence and -non-existence. The affirmation of Light necessarily posits its own -negation--Darkness which it must illuminate in order to be itself. This -Primordial Light is the source of all motion. But its motion is not -change of place; it is due to the _love_ of illumination which -constitutes its very essence, and stirs it up, as it were, to quicken -all things into life, by pouring out its own rays into their being. The -number of illuminations which proceed from it is infinite. Illuminations -of intenser brightness become, in their turn, the sources of other -illuminations; and the scale of brightness gradually descends to -illuminations too faint to beget other illuminations. All these -illuminations are mediums, or in the language of Theology, angels -through whom the infinite varieties of being receive life and sustenance -from the Primal Light. The followers of Aristotle erroneously restricted -the number of original Intellects to ten. They likewise erred in -enumerating the categories of thought. The possibilities of the Primal -Light are infinite; and the Universe, with all its variety, is only a -partial expression of the infinitude behind it. The categories of -Aristotle, therefore, are only relatively true. It is impossible for -human thought to comprehend within its tiny grasp, all the infinite -variety of ideas according to which the Primal Light does or may -illuminate that which is not light. We can, however, discriminate -between the following two illuminations of the original Light:-- - - [127:1] Sharh Anwariyya--Al-Harawi's commentary on - Al-Ishraqi's Hikmat al-Ishraq, fol. 10a. - -(1). The Abstract Light (e.g. Intellect Universal as well as -individual). It has no form, and never becomes the attribute of anything -other than itself (Substance). From it proceed all the various forms of -partly-conscious, conscious, or self-conscious light, differing from one -another in the amount of lustre, which is determined by their -comparative nearness or distance from the ultimate source of their -being. The individual intellect or soul is only a fainter copy, or a -more distant reflection of the Primal Light. The Abstract Light knows -itself through itself, and does not stand in need of a non-ego to reveal -its own existence to itself. Consciousness or self-knowledge, therefore, -is the very essense of Abstract light, as distinguished from the -negation of light. - -(2). The Accidental light (Attribute)--the light that has a form, and is -capable of becoming an attribute of something other than itself (e.g. -the light of the stars, or the visibility of other bodies). The -Accidental light, or more properly sensible light, is a distant -reflection of the Abstract light, which, because of its distance, has -lost the intensity, or substance-character of its parent. The process of -continuous reflection is really a softening process; successive -illuminations gradually lose their intensity until, in the chain of -reflections, we reach certain less intense illuminations which entirely -lose their independent character, and cannot exist except in -association with something else. These illuminations form the Accidental -light--the attribute which has no independent existence. The relation, -therefore, between the Accidental and the Abstract light is that of -cause and effect. The effect, however, is not something quite distinct -from its cause; it is a transformation, or a weaker form of the supposed -cause itself. Anything other than the Abstract light (e.g. the nature of -the illuminated body itself) cannot be the cause of the Accidental -light; since the latter, being merely contingent and consequently -capable of being negatived, can be taken away from bodies, without -affecting their character. If the essence or nature of the illuminated -body, had been the cause of the Accidental light, such a process of -disillumination could not have been possible. We cannot conceive an -inactive cause.[131:1] - - [131:1] Sharh Anwariyya fol. 11b. - -It is now obvious that the Shaikh al-Ishraq agrees with the -Ash`arite thinkers in holding that there is no such thing as the Prima -Materia of Aristotle; though he recognises the existence of a necessary -negation of Light--darkness, the object of illumination. He further -agrees with them in teaching the relativity of all categories except -Substance and Quality. But he corrects their theory of knowledge, in so -far as he recognises an active element in human knowledge. Our relation -with the objects of our knowledge is not merely a passive relation; the -individual soul, being itself an illumination, illuminates the object in -the act of knowledge. The Universe to him is one great process of active -illumination; but, from a purely intellectual standpoint, this -illumination is only a partial expression of the infinitude of the -Primal Light, which may illuminate according to other laws not known to -us. The categories of thought are infinite; our intellect works with a -few only. The Shaikh, therefore, from the standpoint of discursive -thought, is not far from modern Humanism. - - -Cosmology. - -All that is "not-light" is, what the Ishraqi thinkers call, "Absolute -quantity", or "Absolute matter". It is only another aspect of the -affirmation of light, and not an independent principle, as the -followers of Aristotle erroneously hold. The experimental fact of the -transformation of the primary elements into one another, points to this -fundamental Absolute matter which, with its various degrees of -grossness, constitutes the various spheres of material being. The -absolute ground of all things, then, is divided into two kinds:-- - -(1). That which is beyond space--the obscure substance or atoms -(essences of the Ash`arite). - -(2). That which is necessarily in space--forms of darkness, e.g. weight, -smell, taste, etc. - -The combination of these two particularises the Absolute matter. A -material body is forms of darkness plus obscure substance, made visible -or illuminated by the Abstract light. But what is the cause of the -various forms of darkness? These, like the forms of light, owe their -existence to the Abstract light, the different illuminations of which -cause diversity in the spheres of being. The forms which make bodies -differ from one another, do not exist in the nature of the Absolute -matter. The Absolute quantity and the Absolute matter being identical, -if these forms do exist in the essence of the Absolute matter, all -bodies would be identical in regard to the forms of darkness. This, -however, is contradicted by daily experience. The cause of the forms of -darkness, therefore, is not the Absolute matter. And as the difference -of forms cannot be assigned to any other cause, it follows that they are -due to the various illuminations of the Abstract light. Forms of light -and darkness both owe their existence to the Abstract Light. The third -element of a material body--the obscure atom or essence--is nothing but -a necessary aspect of the affirmation of light. The body as a whole, -therefore, is completely dependent on the Primal Light. The whole -Universe is really a continuous series of circles of existence, all -depending on the original Light. Those nearer to the source receive more -illumination than those more distant. All varieties of existence in each -circle, and the circles themselves, are illuminated through an infinite -number of medium-illuminations, which preserve some forms of existence -by the help of "conscious light" (as in the case of man, animal and -plant), and some without it (as in the case of minerals and primary -elements). The immense panorama of diversity which we call the Universe, -is, therefore, a vast shadow of the infinite variety in intensity of -direct or indirect illuminations and rays of the Primary Light. Things -are, so to speak, fed by their respective illuminations to which they -constantly move, with a lover's passion, in order to drink more and more -of the original fountain of Light. The world is an eternal drama of -love. The different planes of being are as follow:-- - - The Plane + 1. The Plane of Intellects--the - of Primal | parent of the heavens, - Light. | 2. The Plane of the Soul. - + 3. The Plane of Form. - | - | + 1. The Plane + 1. The Plane of - | | of ideal | the heavens. - +----+ form. ------------+ - | 2. The Plane | 2. The Plane of - | of material + the elements:-- - + forms:-- - - (a). The heavens (a). Simple elements. - (b). The elements:-- (b). Compounds:-- - 1. Simple elements I. Mineral kingdom. - 2. Compounds:-- II. Vegetable kingdom. - I. Mineral kingdom. III. Animal kingdom. - II. Vegetable kingdom. - III. Animal kingdom. - -Having briefly indicated the general nature of Being, we now proceed to -a more detailed examination of the world-process. All that is not-light -is divided into:-- - -(1). Eternal e.g., Intellects, Souls of heavenly bodies, heavens, simple -elements, time, motion. - -(2). Contingent e.g., Compounds of various elements. The motion of the -heavens is eternal, and makes up the various cycles of the Universe. It -is due to the intense longing of the heaven-soul to receive illumination -from the source of all light. The matter of which the heavens are -constructed, is completely free from the operation of chemical -processes, incidental to the grosser forms of the not-light. Every -heaven has its own matter peculiar to it alone. Likewise the heavens -differ from one another in the direction of their motion; and the -difference is explained by the fact that the beloved, or the sustaining -illumination, is different in each case. Motion is only an aspect of -time. It is the summing up of the elements of time, which, as -externalised, is motion. The distinction of past, present, and future -is made only for the sake of convenience, and does not exist in the -nature of time.[137:1] We cannot conceive the beginning of time; for the -supposed beginning would be a point of time itself. Time and motion, -therefore, are both eternal. - - [137:1] Sharh Anwariyya fol. 34a. - -There are three primordial elements--water, earth, and wind. Fire, -according to the Ishraqis, is only burning wind. The combinations of -these elements, under various heavenly influences, assume various -forms--fluidity, gaseousness, solidity. This transformation of the -original elements, constitutes the process of "making and unmaking" -which pervades the entire sphere of the not-light, raising the different -forms of existence higher and higher, and bringing them nearer and -nearer to the illuminating forces. All the phenomena of nature--rain, -clouds, thunder, meteor--are the various workings of this immanent -principle of motion, and are explained by the direct or indirect -operation of the Primal Light on things, which differ from one another -in their capacity of receiving more or less illumination. The Universe, -in one word, is a petrified desire; a crystallised longing after light. - -But is it eternal? The Universe is a manifestation of the illuminative -Power which constitutes the essential nature of the Primal Light. In so -far, therefore, as it is a manifestation, it is only a dependent being, -and consequently not eternal. But in another sense it is eternal. All -the different spheres of being exist by the illuminations and rays of -the Eternal light. There are some illuminations which are directly -eternal; while there are other fainter ones, the appearance of which -depends on the combination of other illuminations and rays. The -existence of these is not eternal in the same sense as the existence of -the pre-existing parent illuminations. The existence of colour, for -instance, is contingent in comparison to that of the ray, which -manifests colour when a dark body is brought before an illuminating -body. The Universe, therefore, though contingent as manifestation, is -eternal by the eternal character of its source. Those who hold the -non-eternity of the Universe argue on the assumption of the possibility -of a complete induction. Their argument proceeds in the following -manner:-- - -(1). Everyone of the Abyssinians is black. - -.*. All Abyssinians are black. - -(2). Every motion began at a definite moment. - -.*. All motion must begin so. - -But this mode of argumentation is vicious. It is quite impossible to -state the major. One cannot collect all the Abyssinians past, present, -and future, at one particular moment of time. Such a Universal, -therefore, is impossible. Hence from the examination of individual -Abyssinians, or particular instances of motion which fall within the -pale of our experience, it is rash to infer, that all Abyssinians are -black, or all motion had a beginning in time. - - -Psychology. - -Motion and light are not concomitant in the case of bodies of a lower -order. A piece of stone, for instance, though illuminated and hence -visible, is not endowed with self-initiated movement. As we rise, -however, in the scale of being, we find higher bodies, or organisms in -which motion and light are associated together. The abstract -illumination finds its best dwelling place in man. But the question -arises whether the individual abstract illumination which we call the -human soul, did or did not exist before its physical accompaniment. The -founder of Ishraqi Philosophy follows Avicenna in connection with this -question, and uses the same arguments to show, that the individual -abstract illuminations cannot be held to have pre-existed, as so many -units of light. The material categories of one and many cannot be -applied to the abstract illumination which, in its essential nature, is -neither one nor many; though it appears as many owing to the various -degrees of illuminational receptivity in its material accompaniments. -The relation between the abstract illumination, or soul and body, is not -that of cause and effect; the bond of union between them is love. The -body which longs for illumination, receives it through the soul; since -its nature does not permit a direct communication between the source of -light and itself. But the soul cannot transmit the directly received -light to the dark solid body which, considering its attributes, stands -on the opposite pole of being. In order to be related to each other, -they require a medium between them, something standing midway between -light and darkness. This medium is the animal soul--a hot, fine, -transparent vapour which has its principal seat in the left cavity of -the heart, but also circulates in all parts of the body. It is because -of the partial identity of the animal soul with light that, in dark -nights, land-animals run towards the burning fire; while sea-animals -leave their aquatic abodes in order to enjoy the beautiful sight of the -moon. The ideal of man, therefore, is to rise higher and higher in the -scale of being, and to receive more and more illumination which -gradually brings complete freedom from the world of forms. But how is -this ideal to be realised? By knowledge and action. It is the -transformation of both understanding and will, the union of action and -contemplation, that actualizes the highest ideal of man. Change your -attitude towards the Universe, and adopt the line of conduct -necessitated by the change. Let us briefly consider these means of -realisation:-- - -A. _Knowledge._ When the Abstract illumination associates itself with a -higher organism, it works out its development by the operation of -certain faculties--the powers of light, and the powers of darkness. The -former are the five external senses, and the five internal -senses--sensorium, conception, imagination, understanding, and memory; -the latter are the powers of growth, digestion, etc. But such a division -of faculties is only convenient. "One faculty can be the source of all -operations."[142:1] There is only one power in the middle of the brain, -though it receives different names from different standpoints. The mind -is a unity which, for the sake of convenience, is regarded as -multiplicity. The power residing in the middle of the brain must be -distinguished from the abstract illumination which constitutes the real -essence of man. The Philosopher of illumination appears to draw a -distinction between the active mind and the essentially inactive soul; -yet he teaches that in some mysterious way, all the various faculties -are connected with the soul. - - [142:1] Sharh Anwariyya fol. 57b. - -The most original point in his psychology of intellection, however, is -his theory of vision.[142:2] The ray of light which is supposed to come -out of the eye must be either substance or quality. If quality, it -cannot be transmitted from one substance (eye) to another substance -(visible body). If, on the other hand, it is a substance, it moves -either consciously, or impelled by its inherent nature. Conscious -movement would make it an animal perceiving other things. The perceiver -in this case would be the ray, not man. If the movement of the ray is an -attribute of its nature, there is no reason why its movement should be -peculiar to one direction, and not to all. The ray of light, therefore, -cannot be regarded as coming out of the eye. The followers of Aristotle -hold that in the process of vision images of objects are printed on the -eye. This view is also erroneous; since images of big things cannot be -printed on a small space. The truth is that when a thing comes before -the eye, an illumination takes place, and the mind sees the object -through that illumination. When there is no veil between the object and -the normal sight, and the mind is ready to perceive, the act of vision -must take place; since this is the law of things. "All vision is -illumination; and we see things in God". Berkley explained the -relativity of our sight-perceptions with a view to show that the -ultimate ground of all ideas is God. The Ishraqi Philosopher has the -same object in view, though his theory of vision is not so much an -explanation of the sight-process as a new way of looking at the fact of -vision. - - [142:2] Sharh Anwariyya fol. 60b. - -Besides sense and reason, however, there is another source of knowledge -called "Dhauq"--the inner perception which reveals non-temporal and -non-spatial planes of being. The study of philosophy, or the habit of -reflecting on pure concepts, combined with the practice of virtue, leads -to the upbringing of this mysterious sense, which corroborates and -corrects the conclusions of intellect. - -B. _Action._ Man as an active being has the following motive powers: - -(a). Reason or the Angelic soul--the source of intelligence, -discrimination, and love of knowledge. - -(b). The beast-soul which is the source of anger, courage, dominance, -and ambition. - -(c). The animal soul which is the source of lust, hunger, and sexual -passion. - -The first leads to wisdom; the second and third, if controlled by -reason, lead respectively to bravery and chastity. The harmonious use of -all results in the virtue of justice. The possibility of spiritual -progress by virtue, shows that this world is the best possible world. -Things as existent are neither good nor bad. It is misuse or limited -standpoint that makes them so. Still the fact of evil cannot be denied. -Evil does exist; but it is far less in amount than good. It is peculiar -only to a part of the world of darkness; while there are other parts of -the Universe which are quite free from the taint of evil. The sceptic -who attributes the existence of evil to the creative agency of God, -presupposes resemblance between human and divine action, and does not -see that nothing existent is free in his sense of the word. Divine -activity cannot be regarded as the creator of evil in the same sense as -we regard some forms of human activity as the cause of evil.[145:1] - - [145:1] Sharh Anwariyya fol. 92b. - -It is, then, by the union of knowledge and virtue that the soul frees -itself from the world of darkness. As we know more and more of the -nature of things, we are brought closer and closer to the world of -light; and the love of that world becomes more and more intense. The -stages of spiritual development are infinite, since the degrees of love -are infinite. The principal stages, however, are as follows:-- - -(1). The stage of "_I_". In this stage the feeling of personality is -most predominant, and the spring of human action is generally -selfishness. - -(2). The stage of "_Thou art not_". Complete absorption in one's own -deep self to the entire forgetfulness of everything external. - -(3). The stage of "_I am not_". This stage is the necessary result of -the second. - -(4). The stage of "_Thou art_". The absolute negation of "_I_", and the -affirmation of "_Thou_", which means complete resignation to the will of -God. - -(5). The stage of "_I am not; and thou art not_". The complete negation -of both the terms of thought--the state of cosmic consciousness. - -Each stage is marked by more or less intense illuminations, which are -accompanied by some indescribable sounds. Death does not put an end to -the spiritual progress of the soul. The individual souls, after death, -are not unified into one soul, but continue different from each other in -proportion to the illumination they received during their companionship -with physical organisms. The Philosopher of illumination anticipates -Leibniz's doctrine of the Identity of Indiscernibles, and holds that no -two souls can be completely similar to each other.[147:1] When the -material machinery which it adopts for the purpose of acquiring gradual -illumination, is exhausted, the soul probably takes up another body -determined by the experiences of the previous life; and rises higher and -higher in the different spheres of being, adopting forms peculiar to -those spheres, until it reaches its destination--the state of absolute -negation. Some souls probably come back to this world in order to make -up their deficiencies.[147:2] The doctrine of trans-migration cannot be -proved or disproved from a purely logical standpoint; though it is a -probable hypothesis to account for the future destiny of the soul. All -souls are thus constantly journeying towards their common source, which -calls back the whole Universe when this journey is over, and starts -another cycle of being to reproduce, in almost all respects, the history -of the preceding cycles. - - [147:1] Sharh Anwariyya fol. 82. - - [147:2] Sharh Anwariyya fol. 87b. - -Such is the philosophy of the great Persian martyr. He is, properly -speaking, the first Persian systematiser who recognises the elements of -truth in all the aspects of Persian speculation, and skilfully -synthesises them in his own system. He is a pantheist in so far as he -defines God as the sum total of all sensible and ideal existence.[148:1] -To him, unlike some of his Sufi predecessors, the world is something -real, and the human soul a distinct individuality. With the orthodox -theologian, he maintains that the ultimate cause of every phenomenon, -is the absolute light whose illumination forms the very essence of the -Universe. In his psychology he follows Avicenna, but his treatment of -this branch of study is more systematic and more empirical. As an -ethical philosopher, he is a follower of Aristotle whose doctrine of the -mean he explains and illustrates with great thoroughness. Above all he -modifies and transforms the traditional Neo-Platonism, into a thoroughly -Persian system of thought which, not only approaches Plato, but also -spiritualises the old Persian Dualism. No Persian thinker is more alive -to the necessity of explaining all the aspects of objective existence in -reference to his fundamental principles. He constantly appeals to -experience, and endeavours to explain even the physical phenomena in the -light of his theory of illumination. In his system objectivity, which -was completely swallowed up by the exceedingly subjective character of -extreme pantheism, claims its due again, and, having been subjected to a -detailed examination, finds a comprehensive explanation. No wonder then -that this acute thinker succeeded in founding a system of thought, -which has always exercised the greatest fascination over minds--uniting -speculation and emotion in perfect harmony. The narrow-mindedness of his -contemporaries gave him the title of "Maqtul" (the killed one), -signifying that he was not to be regarded as "Shahid" (Martyr); but -succeeding generations of Sufis and philosophers have always given him -the profoundest veneration. - - [148:1] Sharh Anwariyya fol. 81b. - -I may here notice a less spiritual form of the Ishraqi mode of -thought. Nasafi[150:1] describes a phase of Sufi thought which reverted -to the old materialistic dualism of Mani. The advocates of this view -hold, that light and darkness are essential to each other. They are, in -reality, two rivers which mix with each other like oil and milk,[150:2] -out of which arises the diversity of things. The ideal of human action -is freedom from the taint of darkness; and the freedom of light from -darkness means the self-consciousness of light as light. - - [150:1] Maqsadi Aqsa; fol. 21a. - - [150:2] Maqsadi Aqsa; fol. 21a. - - -II. Reality as Thought--Al-Jili. - -Al-Jili was born in 767 A.H., as he himself says in one of his verses, -and died in 811 A.H. He was not a prolific writer like Shaikh Muhy -al-Din ibn `Arabi whose mode of thought seems to have greatly influenced -his teaching. He combined in himself poetical imagination and -philosophical genius, but his poetry is no more than a vehicle for his -mystical and metaphysical doctrines. Among other books he wrote a -commentary on Shaikh Muhy al-Din ibn `Arabi's al-Futuhat al-Makkiya, -a commentary on Bismillah, and the famous work Insan al-Kamil (printed -in Cairo). - -Essence pure and simple, he says, is the thing to which names and -attributes are given, whether it is existent actually or ideally. The -existent is of two species:-- - -(1). The Existent in Absoluteness or Pure existence--Pure Being--God. - -(2). The existence joined with non-existence--Creation--Nature. - -The Essence of God or Pure Thought cannot be understood; no words can -express it, for it is beyond all relation and knowledge is relation. The -intellect flying through the fathomless empty space pierces through the -veil of names and attributes, traverses the vasty sphere of time, enters -the domain of the non-existent and finds the Essence of Pure Thought to -be an existence which is non-existence--a sum of contradictions.[152:1] -It has two (accidents); eternal life in all past time and eternal life -in all future time. It has two (qualities), God and creation. It has two -(definitions), uncreatableness and creatableness. It has two names, God -and man. It has two faces, the manifested (this world) and the -unmanifested (the next world). It has two effects, necessity and -possibility. It has two points of view; from the first it is -non-existent for itself but existent for what is not itself; from the -second it is existent for itself and non-existent for what is not -itself. - - [152:1] Insan al-Kamil, Vol. I, p. 10. - -Name, he says, fixes the named in the understanding, pictures it in the -mind, presents it in the imagination and keeps it in the memory. It is -the outside or the husk, as it were, of the named; while the named is -the inside or the pith. Some names do not exist in reality but exist in -name only as "`Anqa" (a fabulous bird). It is a name the object of which -does not exist in reality. Just as "`Anqa" is absolutely non-existent, -so God is absolutely present, although He cannot be touched and seen. -The "`Anqa" exists only in idea while the object of the name "Allah" -exists in reality and can be known like "`Anqa" only through its names -and attributes. The name is a mirror which reveals all the secrets of -the Absolute Being; it is a light through the agency of which God sees -Himself. Al-Jili here approaches the Isma`ilia view that we should seek -the Named through the Name. - -In order to understand this passage we should bear in mind the three -stages of the development of Pure Being, enumerated by him. He holds -that the Absolute existence or Pure Being when it leaves its -absoluteness undergoes three stages:--(1) Oneness. (2) He-ness. (3) -I-ness. In the first stage there is an absence of all attributes and -relations, yet it is called one, and therefore oneness marks one step -away from the absoluteness. In the second stage Pure Being is yet free -from all manifestation, while the third stage, I-ness, is nothing but an -external manifestation of the He-ness; or, as Hegel would say, it is the -self-diremption of God. This third stage is the sphere of the name -Allah; here the darkness of Pure Being is illuminated, nature comes to -the front, the Absolute Being has become conscious. He says further that -the name Allah is the stuff of all the perfections of the different -phases of Divinity, and in the second stage of the progress of Pure -Being, all that is the result of Divine self-diremption was potentially -contained within the titanic grasp of this name which, in the third -stage of the development, objectified itself, became a mirror in which -God reflected Himself, and thus by its crystallisation dispelled all the -gloom of the Absolute Being. - -In correspondence with these three stages of the absolute development, -the perfect man has three stages of spiritual training. But in his case -the process of development must be the reverse; because his is the -process of ascent, while the Absolute Being had undergone essentially a -process of descent. In the first stage of his spiritual progress he -meditates on the name, studies nature on which it is sealed; in the -second stage he steps into the sphere of the Attribute, and in the third -stage enters the sphere of the Essence. It is here that he becomes the -Perfect Man; his eye becomes the eye of God, his word the word of God -and his life the life of God--participates in the general life of Nature -and "sees into the life of things". - -To turn now to the nature of the attribute. His views on this most -interesting question are very important, because it is here that his -doctrine fundamentally differs from Hindu Idealism. He defines attribute -as an agency which gives us a knowledge of the state of things.[155:1] -Elsewhere he says that this distinction of attribute from the underlying -reality is tenable only in the sphere of the manifested, because here -every attribute is regarded as the other of the reality in which it is -supposed to inhere. This otherness is due to the existence of -combination and disintegration in the sphere of the manifested. But the -distinction is untenable in the domain of the unmanifested, because -there is no combination or disintegration there. It should be observed -how widely he differs from the advocates of the Doctrine of "Maya". He -believes that the material world has real existence; it is the outward -husk of the real being, no doubt, but this outward husk is not the less -real. The cause of the phenomenal world, according to him, is not a real -entity hidden behind the sum of attributes, but it is a conception -furnished by the mind so that there may be no difficulty in -understanding the material world. Berkeley and Fichte will so far agree -with our author, but his view leads him to the most characteristically -Hegelian doctrine--identity of thought and being. In the 37{th} chapter -of the 2{nd} volume of Insan al-Kamil, he clearly says that idea is the -stuff of which this universe is made; thought, idea, notion is the -material of the structure of nature. While laying stress on this -doctrine he says, "Dost thou not look to thine own belief? Where is the -reality in which the so-called Divine attributes inhere? It is but the -idea."[157:1] Hence nature is nothing but a crystallised idea. He gives -his hearty assent to the results of Kant's _Critique of Pure Reason_; -but, unlike him, he makes this very idea the essence of the Universe. -Kant's _Ding an sich_ to him is a pure nonentity; there is nothing -behind the collection of attributes. The attributes are the real things, -the material world is but the objectification of the Absolute Being; it -is the other self of the Absolute--another which owes its existence to -the principle of difference in the nature of the Absolute itself. Nature -is the idea of God, a something necessary for His knowledge of Himself. -While Hegel calls his doctrine the identity of thought and being, -Al-Jili calls it the identity of attribute and reality. It should be -noted that the author's phrase, "world of attributes", which he uses for -the material world is slightly misleading. What he really holds is that -the distinction of attribute and reality is merely phenomenal, and does -not at all exist in the nature of things. It is useful, because it -facilitates our understanding of the world around us, but it is not at -all real. It will be understood that Al-Jili recognises the truth of -Empirical Idealism only tentatively, and does not admit the absoluteness -of the distinction. These remarks should not lead us to understand that -Al-Jili does not believe in the objective reality of the thing in -itself. He does believe in it, but then he advocates its unity, and says -that the material world is the thing in itself; it is the "other", the -external expression of the thing in itself. The _Ding an sich_ and its -external expression or the production of its self-diremption, are really -identical, though we discriminate between them in order to facilitate -our understanding of the universe. If they are not identical, he says, -how could one manifest the other? In one word, he means by _Ding an -sich_, the Pure, the Absolute Being, and seeks it through its -manifestation or external expression. He says that as long as we do not -realise the identity of attribute and reality, the material world or the -world of attributes seems to be a veil; but when the doctrine is -brought home to us the veil is removed; we see the Essence itself -everywhere, and find that all the attributes are but ourselves. Nature -then appears in her true light; all otherness is removed and we are one -with her. The aching prick of curiosity ceases, and the inquisitive -attitude of our minds is replaced by a state of philosophic calm. To the -person who has realised this identity, discoveries of science bring no -new information, and religion with her _role_ of supernatural authority -has nothing to say. This is the spiritual emancipation. - - [155:1] Insan al-Kamil; Vol. I, p. 22. - - [157:1] Insan al-Kamil, Vol. II, p. 26. - -Let us now see how he classifies the different divine names and -attributes which have received expression in nature or crystallised -Divinity. His classification is as follows:-- - -(1). The names and attributes of God as He is in Himself (Allah, The -One, The Odd, The Light, The Truth, The Pure, The Living.) - -(2). The names and attributes of God as the source of all glory (The -Great and High, The All-powerful). - -(3). The names and attributes of God as all Perfection (The Creator, The -Benefactor, The First, The Last). - -(4). The names and attributes of God as all Beauty (The Uncreatable, The -Painter, The Merciful, The Origin of all). Each of these names and -attributes has its own particular effect by which it illuminates the -soul of the perfect man and Nature. How these illuminations take place, -and how they reach the soul is not explained by Al-Jili. His silence -about these matters throws into more relief the mystical portion of his -views and implies the necessity of spiritual Directorship. - -Before considering Al-Jili's views of particular Divine Names and -Attributes, we should note that his conception of God, implied in the -above classification, is very similar to that of Schleiermacher. While -the German theologian reduces all the divine attributes to one single -attribute of Power, our author sees the danger of advancing a God free -from all attributes, yet recognises with Schleiermacher that in Himself -God is an unchangeable unity, and that His attributes "are nothing more -than views of Him from different human standpoints, the various -appearances which the one changeless cause presents to our finite -intelligence according as we look at it from different sides of the -spiritual landscape."[161:1] In His absolute existence He is beyond the -limitation of names and attributes, but when He externalises Himself, -when He leaves His absoluteness, when nature is born, names and -attributes appear sealed on her very fabric. - - [161:1] Matheson's _Aids to the Study of German Theology_, p. - 43. - -We now proceed to consider what he teaches about particular Divine Names -and Attributes. The first Essential Name is Allah (Divinity) which means -the sum of all the realities of existence with their respective order in -that sum. This name is applied to God as the only necessary existence. -Divinity being the highest manifestation of Pure Being, the difference -between them is that the latter is visible to the eye, but its _where_ -is invisible; while the traces of the former are visible, itself is -invisible. By the very fact of her being crystallised divinity, Nature -is not the real divinity; hence Divinity is invisible, and its traces in -the form of Nature are visible to the eye. Divinity, as the author -illustrates, is water; nature is crystallised water or ice; but ice is -not water. The Essence is visible to the eye, (another proof of our -author's Natural Realism or Absolute Idealism) although all its -attributes are not known to us. Even its attributes are not known as -they are in themselves, their shadows or effects only are known. For -instance, charity itself is unknown, only its effect or the fact of -giving to the poor, is known and seen. This is due to the attributes -being incorporated in the very nature of the Essence. If the expression -of the attributes in its real nature had been possible, its separation -from the Essence would have been possible also. But there are some other -Essential Names of God--The Absolute Oneness and Simple Oneness. The -Absolute Oneness marks the first step of Pure Thought from the darkness -of Cecity (the internal or the original Maya of the Vedanta) to the -light of manifestation. Although this movement is not attended with any -external manifestations, yet it sums up all of them under its hollow -universality. Look at a wall, says the author, you see the whole wall; -but you cannot see the individual pieces of the material that -contribute to its formation. The wall is a unity--but a unity which -comprehends diversity, so Pure Being is a unity but a unity which is the -soul of diversity. - -The third movement of the Absolute Being is Simple Oneness--a step -attended with external manifestation. The Absolute Oneness is free from -all particular names and attributes. The Oneness Simple takes on names -and attributes, but there is no distinction between these attributes, -one is the essence of the other. Divinity is similar to Simple Oneness, -but its names and attributes are distinguished from one another and even -contradictory, as generous is contradictory to revengeful.[163:1] The -third step, or as Hegel would say, Voyage of the Being, has another -appellation (Mercy). The First Mercy, the author says, is the evolution -of the Universe from Himself and the manifestation of His own Self in -every atom of the result of His own self-diremption. Al-Jili makes this -point clearer by an instance. He says that nature is frozen water and -God is water. The real name of nature is God (Allah); ice or condensed -water is merely a borrowed appellation. Elsewhere he calls water the -origin of knowledge, intellect, understanding, thought and idea. This -instance leads him to guard against the error of looking upon God as -immanent in nature, or running through the sphere of material existence. -He says that immanence implies disparity of being; God is not immanent -because He is Himself the existence. Eternal existence is the other self -of God, it is the light through which He sees Himself. As the originator -of an idea is existent in that idea, so God is present in nature. The -difference between God and man, as one may say, is that His ideas -materialise themselves, ours do not. It will be remembered here that -Hegel would use the same line of argument in freeing himself from the -accusation of Pantheism. - - [163:1] This would seem very much like the idea of the - phenomenal Brahma of the Vedanta. The Personal Creator or the - Prajapati of the Vedanta makes the third step of the Absolute - Being or the Noumenal Brahma. Al-Jili seems to admit two kinds - of Brahma--with or without qualities like the Samkara and - Badarayana. To him the process of creation is essentially a - lowering of the Absolute Thought, which is Asat, in so far as it - is absolute, and Sat, in so far as it is manifested and hence - limited. Notwithstanding this Absolute Monism, he inclines to a - view similar to that of Ramanuja. He seems to admit the reality - of the individual soul and seems to imply, unlike Samkara, that - Iswara and His worship are necessary even after the attainment - of the Higher Knowledge. - -The attribute of Mercy is closely connected with the attribute of -Providence. He defines it as the sum of all that existence stands in -need of. Plants are supplied with water through the force of this name. -The natural philosopher would express the same thing differently; he -would speak of the same phenomena as resulting from the activity of a -certain force of nature; Al-Jili would call it a manifestation of -Providence; but, unlike the natural philosopher, he would not advocate -the unknowability of that force. He would say that there is nothing -behind it, it is the Absolute Being itself. - -We have now finished all the essential names and attributes of God, and -proceed to examine the nature of what existed before all things. The -Arabian Prophet, says Al-Jili, was once questioned about the place of -God before creation. He said that God, before the creation, existed in -"`Ama" (Blindness). It is the nature of this Blindness or primal -darkness which we now proceed to examine. The investigation is -particularly interesting, because the word translated into modern -phraseology would be "_The Unconsciousness_". This single word impresses -upon us the foresightedness with which he anticipates metaphysical -doctrines of modern Germany. He says that the Unconsciousness is the -reality of all realities; it is the Pure Being without any descending -movement; it is free from the attributes of God and creation; it does -not stand in need of any name or quality, because it is beyond the -sphere of relation. It is distinguished from the Absolute Oneness -because the latter name is applied to the Pure Being in its process of -coming down towards manifestation. It should, however, be remembered -that when we speak of the priority of God and posteriority of creation, -our words must not be understood as implying time; for there can be no -duration of time or separateness between God and His creation. Time, -continuity in space and time, are themselves creations, and how can -piece of creation intervene between God and His creation. Hence our -words before, after, where, whence, etc., in this sphere of thought, -should not be construed to imply time or space. The real thing is beyond -the grasp of human conceptions; no category of material existence can be -applicable to it; because, as Kant would say, the laws of phenomena -cannot be spoken of as obtaining in the sphere of noumena. - -We have already noticed that man in his progress towards perfection has -three stages: the first is the meditation of the name which the author -calls the illumination of names. He remarks that "When God illuminates a -certain man by the light of His names, the man is destroyed under the -dazzling splendour of that name; and "when thou calleth God, the call is -responded to by the man". The effect of this illumination would be, in -Schopenhauer's language, the destruction of the individual will, yet it -must not be confounded with physical death; because the individual goes -on living and moving like the spinning wheel, as Kapila would say, after -he has become one with Prakriti. It is here that the individual cries -out in pantheistic mood:--She was I and I was she and there was none to -separate us."[167:1] - - [167:1] Insan al-Kamil, Vol. I, p. 40. - -The second stage of the spiritual training is what he calls the -illumination of the Attribute. This illumination makes the perfect man -receive the attributes of God in their real nature in proportion to the -power of receptivity possessed by him--a fact which classifies men -according to the magnitude of this light resulting from the -illumination. Some men receive illumination from the divine attribute of -Life, and thus participate in the soul of the Universe. The effect of -this light is soaring in the air, walking on water, changing the -magnitude of things (as Christ so often did). In this wise the perfect -man receives illumination from all the Divine attributes, crosses the -sphere of the name and the attribute, and steps into the domain of the -Essence--Absolute Existence. - -As we have already seen, the Absolute Being, when it leaves its -absoluteness, has three voyages to undergo, each voyage being a process -of particularisation of the bare universality of the Absolute Essence. -Each of these three movements appears under a new Essential Name which -has its own peculiar illuminating effect upon the human soul. Here is -the end of our author's spiritual ethics; _man has become perfect_, -he has amalgamated himself with the Absolute Being, or _has learnt -what Hegel calls The Absolute Philosophy_. "He becomes the paragon -of perfection, the object of worship, the preserver of the -Universe".[169:1] He is the point where Man-ness and God-ness become -one, and result in the birth of the god-man. - - [169:1] Insan al-Kamil, Vol. I, p. 48. - -How the perfect man reaches this height of spiritual development, the -author does not tell us; but he says that at every stage he has a -peculiar experience in which there is not even a trace of doubt or -agitation. The instrument of this experience is what he calls the _Qalb_ -(heart), a word very difficult of definition. He gives a very mystical -diagram of the Qalb, and explains it by saying that it is the eye which -sees the names, the attributes and the Absolute Being successively. It -owes its existence to a mysterious combination of soul and mind; and -becomes by its very nature the organ for the recognition of the -ultimate realities of existence. All that the "heart", or the source of -what the Vedanta calls the Higher Knowledge, reveals is not seen by the -individual as something separate from and heterogeneous to himself; what -is shown to him through this agency is his own reality, his own deep -being. This characteristic of the agency differentiates it from the -intellect, the object of which is always different and separate from the -individual exercising that faculty. But the spiritual experience, -according to the Sufis of this school, is not permanent; moments of -spiritual vision, says Matthew Arnold,[170:1] cannot be at our command. -The god-man is he who has known the mystery of his own being, who has -realised himself as god-man; but when that particular spiritual -realisation is over man is man and God is God. Had the experience been -permanent, a great moral force would have been lost and society -overturned. - - [170:1] "We cannot kindle when we will - The fire which in the heart resides". - -Let us now sum up Al-Jili's _Doctrine of the Trinity_. We have seen the -three movements of the Absolute Being, or the first three categories of -Pure Being; we have also seen that the third movement is attended with -external manifestation, which is the self-diremption of the Essence into -God and man. This separation makes a gap which is filled by the perfect -man, who shares in both the Divine and the human attributes. He holds -that the perfect man is the preserver of the Universe; hence in his -view, the appearance of the perfect man is a necessary condition for the -continuation of nature. It is easy, therefore, to understand that in the -god-man, the Absolute Being which has left its absoluteness, returns -into itself; and, but for the god-man, it could not have done so; for -then there would have been no nature, and consequently no light through -which God could have seen Himself. The light through the agency of which -God sees Himself is due to the principle of difference in the nature of -the Absolute Being itself. He recognises this principle in the following -verses:-- - - If you say that God is one, you are right; but if you say that He - is two, this is also true. - - If you say no, but He is three, you are right, for this is the - real nature of man.[171:1] - - [171:1] Insan al-Kamil, Vol. I, p. 8. - -The _perfect man_, then, is the joining link. On the one hand he -receives illumination from all the Essential names, on the other hand -all Divine attributes reappear in him. These attributes are:-- - -1. Independent life or existence. - -2. Knowledge which is a form of life, as he proves from a verse from the -Qur'an. - -3. Will--the principle of particularisation, or the manifestation of -Being. He defines it as the illumination of the knowledge of God -according to the requirements of the Essence; hence it is a particular -form of knowledge. It has nine manifestations, all of which are -different names for love; the last is the love in which the lover and -the beloved, the knower and the known merge into each other, and become -identical. This form of love, he says, is the Absolute Essence; as -Christianity teaches, God is love. He guards, here, against the error of -looking upon the individual act of will as uncaused. Only the act of the -universal will is uncaused; hence he implies the Hegelian Doctrine of -Freedom, and holds that the acts of man are both free and determined. - -4. Power, which expresses itself in self-diremption i.e. creation. He -controverts Shaikh Muhy al-Din ibn `Arabi's position that the -Universe existed before the creation in the knowledge of God. He says, -this would imply that God did not create it out of nothing, and holds -that the Universe, before its existence as an idea, existed in the self -of God. - -5. The word or the reflected being. Every possibility is the word of -God; hence nature is the materialisation of the word of God. It has -different names--The tangible word, The sum of the realities of man, The -arrangement of the Divinity, The spread of Oneness, The expression of -the Unknown, The phases of Beauty, The trace of names and attributes, -and the object of God's knowledge. - -6. The Power of hearing the inaudible. - -7. The Power of seeing the invisible. - -8. Beauty--that which seems least beautiful in nature (the reflected -beauty) is in its real existence, beauty. Evil is only relative, it has -no real existence; sin is merely a relative deformity. - -9. Glory or beauty in its intensity. - -10. Perfection, which is the unknowable essence of God and therefore -Unlimited and Infinite. - - - - -CHAP. VI. - -LATER PERSIAN THOUGHT. - - -Under the rude Tartar invaders of Persia, who could have no sympathy -with independent thought, there could be no progress of ideas. Sufiism, -owing to its association with religion, went on systematising old and -evolving new ideas. But philosophy proper was distasteful to the Tartar. -Even the development of Islamic law suffered a check; since the Hanafite -law was the acme of human reason to the Tartar, and further subtleties -of legal interpretation were disagreeable to his brain. Old schools of -thought lost their solidarity, and many thinkers left their native -country to find more favourable conditions elsewhere. In the 16{th} -century we find Persian Aristotelians--Dastur Isfahani, Hir Bud, Munir, -and Kamran--travelling in India, where the Emperor Akbar was drawing -upon Zoroastrianism to form a new faith for himself and his courtiers, -who were mostly Persians. No great thinker, however, appeared in Persia -until the 17{th} century, when the acute Mulla Sadra of Shiraz upheld -his philosophical system with all the vigour of his powerful logic. With -Mulla Sadra Reality is all things yet is none of them, and true -knowledge consists in the identity of the subject and the object. De -Gobineau thinks that the philosophy of Sadra is a mere revival of -Avicennaism. He, however, ignores the fact that Mulla Sadra's doctrine -of the identity of subject and object constitutes the final step which -the Persian intellect took towards complete monism. It is moreover the -Philosophy of Sadra which is the source of the metaphysics of early -Babism. - -But the movement towards Platonism is best illustrated in Mulla Hadi of -Sabzwar who flourished in the 18{th} century, and is believed by his -countrymen to be the greatest of modern Persian thinkers. As a specimen -of comparatively recent Persian speculation, I may briefly notice here -the views of this great thinker, as set forth in his Asrar al-Hikam -(published in Persia). A glance at his philosophical teaching reveals -three fundamental conceptions which are indissolubly associated with the -Post-Islamic Persian thought:-- - -1. The idea of the Absolute Unity of the Real which is described as -"Light". - -2. The idea of evolution which is dimly visible in Zoroaster's doctrine -of the destiny of the human soul, and receives further expansion and -systematisation by Persian Neo-Platonists and Sufi thinkers. - -3. The idea of a medium between the Absolute Real and the Not-real. - -It is highly interesting to note how the Persian mind gradually got rid -of the Emanation theory of Neo-Platonism, and reached a purer notion of -Plato's Philosophy. The Arab Muhammadans of Spain, by a similar process -of elimination reached, through the same medium (Neo-Platonism) a truer -conception of the Philosophy of Aristotle--a fact which illustrates the -genius of the two races. Lewes in his Biographical History of Philosophy -remarks that the Arabs eagerly took up the study of Aristotle simply -because Plato was not presented to them. I am, however, inclined to -think that the Arab genius was thoroughly practical; hence Plato's -philosophy would have been distasteful to them even if it had been -presented in its true light. Of the systems of Greek philosophy -Neo-Platonism, I believe, was the only one which was presented in its -completeness to the Muslim world; yet patient critical research led the -Arab from Plotinus to Aristotle, and the Persian to Plato. This is -singularly illustrated in the Philosophy of Mulla Hadi, who recognises -no Emanations, and approaches the Platonic conception of the Real. He -illustrates, moreover, how philosophical speculation in Persia, as in -all countries where Physical science either does not exist or is not -studied, is finally absorbed by religion. The "Essence", i.e. the -metaphysical cause as distinguished from the scientific cause, which -means the sum of antecedent conditions, must gradually be transformed -into "Personal Will" (cause, in a religious sense) in the absence of any -other notion of cause. And this is perhaps the deeper reason why -Persian philosophies have always ended in religion. - -Let us now turn to Mulla Hadi's system of thought. He teaches that -Reason has two aspects:--(a) Theoretical, the object of which is -Philosophy and Mathematics, (b) Practical, the object of which is -Domestic Economy, Politics, etc. Philosophy proper comprises the -knowledge of the beginning of things, the end of things, and the -knowledge of the Self. It also includes the knowledge of the law of -God--which is identical with religion. In order to understand the origin -of things, we should subject to a searching analysis the various -phenomena of the Universe. Such an analysis reveals that there are three -original principles.[178:1] - -(1). The Real--Light. - -(2). The Shadow. - -(3). The not-Real--Darkness. - - [178:1] Asrar al-Hikam; p. 6. - -The Real is absolute, and necessary as distinguished from the "Shadow", -which is relative and contingent. In its nature it is absolutely good; -and the proposition that it is good, is self-evident.[178:2] All forms -of potential existence, before they are actualised by the Real, are open -to both existence or non-existence, and the possibilities of their -existence or non-existence are exactly equal. It, therefore, follows -that the Real which actualises the potential is not itself -non-existence; since non-existence operating on non-existence cannot -produce actuality.[179:1] Mulla Hadi, in his conception of the Real as -the operator, modifies Plato's statical conception of the Universe, and, -following Aristotle, looks upon his Real as the immovable source and the -object of all motion. "All things in the Universe," he says, "love -perfection, and are moving towards their final ends--minerals towards -vegetables, vegetables towards animals, and animals towards man. And -observe how man passes through all these stages in the mother's -womb."[179:2] The mover as mover is either the source or the object of -motion or both. In any case the mover must be either movable or -immovable. The proposition that all movers must be themselves movable, -leads to infinite regress--which must stop at the immovable mover, the -source and the final object of all motion. The Real, moreover, is a pure -unity; for if there is a plurality of Reals, one would limit the other. -The Real as creator also cannot be conceived as more than one; since a -plurality of creators would mean a plurality of worlds which must be -circular touching one another, and this again implies vacuum which is -impossible.[180:1] Regarded as an essence, therefore, the Real is one. -But it is also many, from a different standpoint. It is life, power, -love; though we cannot say that these qualities inhere in it--they are -it, and it is them. Unity does not mean oneness, its essence consists in -the "dropping of all relations." Unlike the Sufis and other thinkers, -Mulla Hadi holds and tries to show that belief in multiplicity is not -inconsistent with belief in unity; since the visible "many" is nothing -more than a manifestation of the names and attributes of the Real. -These attributes are the various forms of a "Knowledge" which -constitutes the very essence of the Real. To speak, however, of the -attributes of the Real is only a verbal convenience; since "defining the -Real is applying the category of number to it"--an absurd process which -endeavours to bring the unrelated into the sphere of the related. The -Universe, with all its variety, is the shadow of the various names and -attributes of the Real or the Absolute Light. It is Reality unfolded, -the "Be", or the word of Light.[181:1] Visible multiplicity is the -illumination of Darkness, or the actualisation of Nothing. Things are -different because we see them, as it were, through glasses of different -colours--the Ideas. In this connection Hadi approvingly quotes the poet -Jami who has given the most beautiful poetic expression to Plato's -Doctrine of Ideas in verses which can be thus translated:-- - -"The ideas are glasses of various colours in which the Sun of Reality -reflects itself, and makes itself visible through them according as they -are red, yellow or blue."[181:2] - - [178:2] Asrar al-Hikam; p. 8. - - [179:1] Asrar al-Hikam; p. 8. - - [179:2] Asrar al-Hikam; p. 10. - - [180:1] Asrar al-Hikam; pp. 28, 29. - - [181:1] Asrar al-Hikam; p. 151. - - [181:2] Asrar al-Hikam; p. 6. - -In his Psychology he mostly follows Avicenna, but his treatment of the -subject is more thorough and systematic. He classifies the soul in the -following manner:-- - - The Soul - | - +---------+-----+ - | | - Heavenly Earthly - | - +--------+----------+ - | | | - Human Animal Vegetative - - Powers:-- - - 1. Preserving the individual. - 2. Perfecting the individual. - 3. Perpetuating the species. - -The animal soul has three powers:-- - - 1. External senses} Perception. - 2. Internal senses} - 3. Power of motion which includes. - (a) Voluntary motion. - (b) Involuntary motion. - -The external senses are taste, touch, smell, hearing and sight. The -sound exists outside the ear, and not inside as some thinkers have held. -For if it does not exist outside the ear, it is not possible to perceive -its direction and distance. Hearing and sight are superior to other -senses, and sight is superior to hearing; since:-- - - I. The eye can perceive distant things. - - II. Its perception is light, which is the best of all - attributes. - - III. The construction of the eye is more complicated and - delicate than that of the ear. - - IV. The perceptions of sight are things which actually exist, - while those of hearing resemble non-existence. - -The internal senses are as follow:-- - -(1). The Common Sense--the tablet of the mind. It is like the Prime -Minister of the mind sending out five spies (external senses) to bring -in news from the external world. When we say "this white thing is -sweet", we perceive whiteness and sweetness by sight and taste -respectively, but that both the attributes exist in the same thing is -decided by the Common Sense. The line made by a falling drop, so far as -the eye is concerned, is nothing but the drop. But what is the line -which we see? To account for such a phenomenon, says Hadi, it is -necessary to postulate another sense which perceives the lengthening of -the falling drop into a line. - -(2). The faculty which preserves the perceptions of the Common -Sense--images and not ideas like the memory. The judgment that whiteness -and sweetness exist in the same thing is completed by this faculty; -since, if it does not preserve the image of the subject, Common Sense -cannot perceive the predicate. - -(3). The power which perceives individual ideas. The sheep thinks of the -enmity of the wolf, and runs away from him. Some forms of life lack this -power, e.g. the moth which hurls itself against the candle-flame. - -(4). Memory--the preserver of ideas. - -(5). The power of combining images and ideas, e.g. the winged man. When -this faculty works under the guidance of the power which perceives -individual ideas, it is called Imagination; when it works under the -control of Intellect, it is called Conception. - -But it is the spirit which distinguishes man from other animals. This -essence of humanity is a "unity", not oneness. It perceives the -Universal by itself, and the particular through the external and the -internal senses. It is the shadow of the Absolute Light, and like it -manifests itself in various ways--comprehending multiplicity in its -unity. There is no necessary relation between the spirit and the body. -The former is non-temporal and non-spatial; hence it is changeless, and -has the power of judging the visible multiplicity. In sleep the spirit -uses the "ideal body" which functions like the physical body; in waking -life it uses the ordinary physical body. It follows, therefore, that the -spirit stands in need of neither, and uses both at will. Hadi does not -follow Plato in his doctrine of transmigration, the different forms of -which he refutes at length. The spirit to him is immortal, and reaches -its original home--Absolute Light--by the gradual perfection of its -faculties. The various stages of the development of reason are as -follows:-- - - A. Theoretical or Pure Reason-- - - 1{st} Potential Reason. - 2{nd} Perception of self-evident propositions. - 3{rd} Actual Reason. - 4{th} Perception of Universal concepts. - - B. Practical Reason-- - - 1{st} External Purification. - 2{nd} Internal Purification. - 3{rd} Formation of virtuous habits. - 4{th} Union with God. - -Thus the spirit rises higher and higher in the scale of being, and -finally shares in the eternity of the Absolute Light by losing itself in -its universality. "In itself non-existent, but existent in the eternal -Friend: how wonderful that it _is_ and _is not_ at the same time". But -is the spirit free to choose its course? Hadi criticises the -Rationalists for their setting up man as an independent creator of evil, -and accuses them of what he calls "veiled dualism". He holds that every -object has two sides--"bright" side, and "dark" side. Things are -combinations of light and darkness. All good flows from the side of -light; evil proceeds from darkness. Man, therefore, is both free and -determined. - -But all the various lines of Persian thought once more find a synthesis -in that great religious movement of Modern Persia--Babism or Bahaism, -which began as a Shi`ah sect, with Mirza `Ali Muhammad Bab of Shiraz (b. -1820), and became less and less Islamic in character with the progress -of orthodox persecutions. The origin of the philosophy of this wonderful -sect must be sought in the Shi`ah sect of the Shaikhis, the founder of -which, Shaikh Ahmad, was an enthusiastic student of Mulla Sadra's -Philosophy, on which he had written several commentaries. This sect -differed from the ordinary Shi`ahs in holding that belief in an ever -present Medium between the absent Imam (the 12{th} Head of the Church, -whose manifestation is anxiously expected by the Shi`ahs), and the -church is a fundamental principle of the Shi`ah religion. Shaikh Ahmad -claimed to be such a Medium; and when, after the death of the second -Shaikhi Medium--Haji Kazim, the Shaikhis were anxiously expecting the -manifestation of the new Medium, Mirza `Ali Muhammad Bab, who had -attended the lectures of Haji Kazim at Karbala, proclaimed himself the -expected Medium, and many Shaikhis accepted him. - -The young Persian seer looks upon Reality as an essence which brooks no -distinction of substance and attribute. The first bounty or -self-expansion of the Ultimate Essence, he says, is Existence. -"Existence" is the "known", the "known" is the essence of "knowledge"; -"knowledge" is "will"; and "will" is "love". Thus from Mulla Sadra's -identity of the known and the knower, he passes to his conception of the -Real as Will and Love. This Primal Love, which he regards as the essence -of the Real, is the cause of the manifestation of the Universe which is -nothing more than the self-expansion of Love. The word creation, with -him, does not mean creation out of nothing; since, as the Shaikhis -maintain, the word creator is not peculiarly applicable to God alone. -The Quranic verse, that "God is the best of creators",[188:1] implies -that there are other self-manifesting beings like God. - - [188:1] Sura 23; v. 14. - -After the execution of `Ali Muhammad Bab, Bahaullah, one of his -principal disciples who were collectively called "The First Unity", took -up the mission, and proclaimed himself the originator of the new -dispensation, the absent Imam whose manifestation the Bab had foretold. -He freed the doctrine of his master from its literalistic mysticism, and -presented it in a more perfected and systematised form. The Absolute -Reality, according to him, is not a person; it is an eternal living -Essence, to which we apply the epithets Truth and Love only because -these are the highest conceptions known to us. The Living Essence -manifests itself through the Univere with the object of creating in -itself atoms or centres of consciousness, which as Dr. McTaggart would -say, constitute a further determination of the Hegelian Absolute. In -each of these undifferentiated, simple centres of consciousness, there -is hidden a ray of the Absolute Light itself, and the perfection of the -spirit consists in gradually actualising, by contact with the -individualising principle--matter, its emotional and intellectual -possibilities, and thus discovering its own deep being--the ray of -eternal Love which is concealed by its union with consciousness. The -essence of man, therefore, is not reason or consciousness; it is this -ray of Love--the source of all impulse to noble and unselfish action, -which constitutes the real man. The influence of Mulla Sadra's doctrine -of the incorporeality of Imagination is here apparent. Reason, which -stands higher than Imagination in the scale of evolution, is not a -necessary condition, according to Mulla Sadra, of immortality. In all -forms of life there is an immortal spiritual part, the ray of Eternal -Love, which has no necessary connection with self-consciousness or -reason, and survives after the death of the body. Salvation, then, which -to Buddha consists in the starving out of the mind-atoms by -extinguishing desire, to Bahaullah lies in the discovery of the essence -of love which is hidden in the atoms of consciousness themselves.[190:1] -Both, however, agree that after death thoughts and characters of men -remain, subject to other forces of a similar character, in the spiritual -world, waiting for another opportunity to find a suitable physical -accompaniment in order to continue the process of discovery (Bahaullah) -or destruction (Buddha). To Bahaullah the conception of Love is higher -than the conception of Will. Schopenhauer conceived reality as Will -which was driven to objectification by a sinful bent eternally existing -in its nature. Love or Will, according to both, is present in every atom -of life; but the cause of its being there is the joy of self-expansion -in the one case, and the inexplicable evil inclination in the other. But -Schopenhauer postulates certain temporal ideas in order to account for -the objectification of the Primordial Will; Bahaullah, as far as I can -see, does not explain the principle according to which the -self-manifestation of the Eternal Love is realised in the Universe. - - [190:1] See Phelp's `Abbas Effendi, chapter, "Philosophy and - Psychology". - - - - -CONCLUSION. - - -Let us now briefly sum up the results of our survey. We have seen that -the Persian mind had to struggle against two different kinds of -Dualism--pre-Islamic Magian Dualism, and post-Islamic Greek Dualism, -though the fundamental problem of the diversity of things remains -essentially the same. The attitude of the pre-Islamic Persian thinkers -is thoroughly objective, and hence the results of their intellectual -efforts are more or less materialistic. The Pre-Islamic thinkers, -however, clearly perceived that the original Principle must be -dynamically conceived. With Zoroaster both the primary spirits are -"active", with Mani the principle of Light is passive, and the principle -of Darkness is aggressive. But their analysis of the various elements -which constitute the Universe is ridiculously meagre; their conception -of the Universe is most defective on its statical side. There are, -therefore, two weak points in their systems:-- - - 1. Naked Dualism. - - 2. Lack of analysis. - -The first was remedied by Islam; the second by the introduction of Greek -Philosophy. The advent of Islam and the study of Greek philosophy, -however, checked the indigenous tendency towards monistic thought; but -these two forces contributed to change the objective attitude -characteristic of early thinkers, and aroused the slumbering -subjectivity, which eventually reached its climax in the extreme -Pantheism of some of the Sufi schools. Al-Farabi endeavoured to get rid -of the dualism between God and matter, by reducing matter to a mere -confused perception of the spirit; the Ash`arite denied it altogether, -and maintained a thoroughgoing Idealism. The followers of Aristotle -continued to stick to their master's Prima Materia; the Sufis looked -upon the material universe as a mere illusion, or a necessary "other," -for the self-knowledge of God. It can, however, be safely stated that -with the Ash`arite Idealism, the Persian mind got over the foreign -dualism of God and matter, and, fortified with new philosophical -ideas, returned to the old dualism of light and darkness. The -Shaikh-al-Ishraq combines the objective attitude of Pre-Islamic -Persian thinkers with the subjective attitude of his immediate -predecessors, and restates the Dualism of Zoroaster in a much more -philosophical and spiritualised form. His system recognises the claims -of both the subject and the object. But all these monistic systems of -thought were met by the Pluralism of Wahid Mahmud, who taught that -reality is not one, but many--primary living units which combine in -various ways, and gradually rise to perfection by passing through an -ascending scale of forms. The reaction of Wahid Mahmud was, however, an -ephemeral phenomenon. The later Sufis as well as philosophers proper -gradually transformed or abandoned the Neo-Platonic theory of Emanation, -and in later thinkers we see a movement through Neo-Platonism towards -real Platonism which is approached by Mulla Hadi's Philosophy. But pure -speculation and dreamy mysticism undergo a powerful check in Babism -which, unmindful of persecution, synthesises all the inherited -philosophical and religious tendencies, and rouses the spirit to a -consciousness of the stern reality of things. Though extremely -cosmopolitan and hence quite unpatriotic in character, it has yet had a -great influence over the Persian mind. The unmystic character and the -practical tone of Babism may have been a remote cause of the -progress of recent political reform in Persia. - - - - -ERRATA - - P. 4, Note 4, l. 1, read Buudahish for Buudadish. - - P. 9, l. 10, read environment for environments. - - P. 56, l. 1, read reaction for reation. - - P. 61, l. 18, read considered for consided. - - P. 73, l. 21, read full stop after dialectic. - - P. 102, l. 1, read conditions for condition. - - P. 123, l. 19, read predecessors for precessor. - - P. 153, l. 21, read He-ness for an He-ness. - - P. 166, l. 21, read a piece for pieee. - - - - -Transcriber's Notes: - -Many words appear in the text with different transcription or mark-up. -They have been left as in the original. - -All occurrences of e. g., i. e., B. C., A. D. and A. H. have been -replaced with e.g., i.e., B.C., A.D. and A.H. Other initials have been -left as in the original. - -All ditto marks, ibid. and Sh. An. (Sharh Anwariyya) entries replaced -with their full references. - -Printed Errata has been moved to the end of the text. - -The following corrections have been made to the text: - - Page IX--due perhaps to semitic [original has samitic] influences, - - Page CONTENTS--Reality as [original has as as] Beauty - - Page 25--introduced [original has intruduced] - - Page 54--necessarily [original has necssarily] - - Page 54--Nazzam [original has Nazzan] - - Page 57--Isma`ilians [original has Isma`iliams] - - Page 61--metaphysical [original has netaphysical] - - Page 63--which,[original has period] by gradually - - Page 68, footnote 68:1--Ash`aritenthums [original has - Ash'aritenthums] - - Page 69--philosophising [original has plilosophising] - - Page 69, footnote 69:1--Ash`aritenthums [original has As`aritenthums] - - Page 75--Ash`arite [original has Ash'arite] - - Page 81--seem to [original has the letter t missing] be - - Page 81--Hikmat al-`Ain--"Philosophy of Essence", - [original has single hyphen] - - Page 85--objectively [original has objectivily] - - Page 95, footnote 95:1--Commentary [original has Comentary] - - Page 104--restatement [original has restatemet] - - Page 111--self-conscious [original has self-consious] - - Page 124--the son of Sultan Salah [original has Sala-Salah]-al Din - - Page 127--visible [original has visibile] - - Page 136--is motion.[original has comma] The distinction of past, - - Page 142--theory of [original has theoryof] - - Page 148--maintains [original has mantains] - - Page 152, footnote 152:1--Insan al-Kamil [original has Insanul Kamul] - - Page 158--identical [original has indentical] - - Page 162--marks the [original has the the] first step - - Page 163, footnote 163:1--Notwithstanding [original has - Nowithstanding] - - Page 171, footnote 171:1--Insan al-Kamil [original has Insanul Kamil] - - Page 180--standpoint [original has staindpoint] - - Page 187--Shi`ahs [original has Shi'ahs] - - - - - -End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of The Development of Metaphysics in -Persia, by Muhammad Iqbal - -*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK METAPHYSICS IN PERSIA *** - -***** This file should be named 41707.txt or 41707.zip ***** -This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: - http://www.gutenberg.org/4/1/7/0/41707/ - -Produced by Fritz Ohrenschall, Sania Ali Mirza, Asad Razzaki -and the Online Distributed Proofreading Team at -http://www.pgdp.net (This book was produced from scanned -images of public domain material from the Google Print -project.) - - -Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions -will be renamed. - -Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no -one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation -(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without -permission and without paying copyright royalties. Special rules, -set forth in the General Terms of Use part of this license, apply to -copying and distributing Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works to -protect the PROJECT GUTENBERG-tm concept and trademark. Project -Gutenberg is a registered trademark, and may not be used if you -charge for the eBooks, unless you receive specific permission. If you -do not charge anything for copies of this eBook, complying with the -rules is very easy. You may use this eBook for nearly any purpose -such as creation of derivative works, reports, performances and -research. They may be modified and printed and given away--you may do -practically ANYTHING with public domain eBooks. Redistribution is -subject to the trademark license, especially commercial -redistribution. - - - -*** START: FULL LICENSE *** - -THE FULL PROJECT GUTENBERG LICENSE -PLEASE READ THIS BEFORE YOU DISTRIBUTE OR USE THIS WORK - -To protect the Project Gutenberg-tm mission of promoting the free -distribution of electronic works, by using or distributing this work -(or any other work associated in any way with the phrase "Project -Gutenberg"), you agree to comply with all the terms of the Full Project -Gutenberg-tm License available with this file or online at - www.gutenberg.org/license. - - -Section 1. General Terms of Use and Redistributing Project Gutenberg-tm -electronic works - -1.A. By reading or using any part of this Project Gutenberg-tm -electronic work, you indicate that you have read, understand, agree to -and accept all the terms of this license and intellectual property -(trademark/copyright) agreement. If you do not agree to abide by all -the terms of this agreement, you must cease using and return or destroy -all copies of Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works in your possession. -If you paid a fee for obtaining a copy of or access to a Project -Gutenberg-tm electronic work and you do not agree to be bound by the -terms of this agreement, you may obtain a refund from the person or -entity to whom you paid the fee as set forth in paragraph 1.E.8. - -1.B. "Project Gutenberg" is a registered trademark. It may only be -used on or associated in any way with an electronic work by people who -agree to be bound by the terms of this agreement. There are a few -things that you can do with most Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works -even without complying with the full terms of this agreement. See -paragraph 1.C below. There are a lot of things you can do with Project -Gutenberg-tm electronic works if you follow the terms of this agreement -and help preserve free future access to Project Gutenberg-tm electronic -works. See paragraph 1.E below. - -1.C. The Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation ("the Foundation" -or PGLAF), owns a compilation copyright in the collection of Project -Gutenberg-tm electronic works. Nearly all the individual works in the -collection are in the public domain in the United States. If an -individual work is in the public domain in the United States and you are -located in the United States, we do not claim a right to prevent you from -copying, distributing, performing, displaying or creating derivative -works based on the work as long as all references to Project Gutenberg -are removed. Of course, we hope that you will support the Project -Gutenberg-tm mission of promoting free access to electronic works by -freely sharing Project Gutenberg-tm works in compliance with the terms of -this agreement for keeping the Project Gutenberg-tm name associated with -the work. You can easily comply with the terms of this agreement by -keeping this work in the same format with its attached full Project -Gutenberg-tm License when you share it without charge with others. - -1.D. The copyright laws of the place where you are located also govern -what you can do with this work. Copyright laws in most countries are in -a constant state of change. If you are outside the United States, check -the laws of your country in addition to the terms of this agreement -before downloading, copying, displaying, performing, distributing or -creating derivative works based on this work or any other Project -Gutenberg-tm work. The Foundation makes no representations concerning -the copyright status of any work in any country outside the United -States. - -1.E. Unless you have removed all references to Project Gutenberg: - -1.E.1. The following sentence, with active links to, or other immediate -access to, the full Project Gutenberg-tm License must appear prominently -whenever any copy of a Project Gutenberg-tm work (any work on which the -phrase "Project Gutenberg" appears, or with which the phrase "Project -Gutenberg" is associated) is accessed, displayed, performed, viewed, -copied or distributed: - -This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with -almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or -re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included -with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org - -1.E.2. If an individual Project Gutenberg-tm electronic work is derived -from the public domain (does not contain a notice indicating that it is -posted with permission of the copyright holder), the work can be copied -and distributed to anyone in the United States without paying any fees -or charges. If you are redistributing or providing access to a work -with the phrase "Project Gutenberg" associated with or appearing on the -work, you must comply either with the requirements of paragraphs 1.E.1 -through 1.E.7 or obtain permission for the use of the work and the -Project Gutenberg-tm trademark as set forth in paragraphs 1.E.8 or -1.E.9. - -1.E.3. If an individual Project Gutenberg-tm electronic work is posted -with the permission of the copyright holder, your use and distribution -must comply with both paragraphs 1.E.1 through 1.E.7 and any additional -terms imposed by the copyright holder. Additional terms will be linked -to the Project Gutenberg-tm License for all works posted with the -permission of the copyright holder found at the beginning of this work. - -1.E.4. Do not unlink or detach or remove the full Project Gutenberg-tm -License terms from this work, or any files containing a part of this -work or any other work associated with Project Gutenberg-tm. - -1.E.5. Do not copy, display, perform, distribute or redistribute this -electronic work, or any part of this electronic work, without -prominently displaying the sentence set forth in paragraph 1.E.1 with -active links or immediate access to the full terms of the Project -Gutenberg-tm License. - -1.E.6. You may convert to and distribute this work in any binary, -compressed, marked up, nonproprietary or proprietary form, including any -word processing or hypertext form. However, if you provide access to or -distribute copies of a Project Gutenberg-tm work in a format other than -"Plain Vanilla ASCII" or other format used in the official version -posted on the official Project Gutenberg-tm web site (www.gutenberg.org), -you must, at no additional cost, fee or expense to the user, provide a -copy, a means of exporting a copy, or a means of obtaining a copy upon -request, of the work in its original "Plain Vanilla ASCII" or other -form. Any alternate format must include the full Project Gutenberg-tm -License as specified in paragraph 1.E.1. - -1.E.7. Do not charge a fee for access to, viewing, displaying, -performing, copying or distributing any Project Gutenberg-tm works -unless you comply with paragraph 1.E.8 or 1.E.9. - -1.E.8. You may charge a reasonable fee for copies of or providing -access to or distributing Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works provided -that - -- You pay a royalty fee of 20% of the gross profits you derive from - the use of Project Gutenberg-tm works calculated using the method - you already use to calculate your applicable taxes. The fee is - owed to the owner of the Project Gutenberg-tm trademark, but he - has agreed to donate royalties under this paragraph to the - Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation. Royalty payments - must be paid within 60 days following each date on which you - prepare (or are legally required to prepare) your periodic tax - returns. Royalty payments should be clearly marked as such and - sent to the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation at the - address specified in Section 4, "Information about donations to - the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation." - -- You provide a full refund of any money paid by a user who notifies - you in writing (or by e-mail) within 30 days of receipt that s/he - does not agree to the terms of the full Project Gutenberg-tm - License. You must require such a user to return or - destroy all copies of the works possessed in a physical medium - and discontinue all use of and all access to other copies of - Project Gutenberg-tm works. - -- You provide, in accordance with paragraph 1.F.3, a full refund of any - money paid for a work or a replacement copy, if a defect in the - electronic work is discovered and reported to you within 90 days - of receipt of the work. - -- You comply with all other terms of this agreement for free - distribution of Project Gutenberg-tm works. - -1.E.9. If you wish to charge a fee or distribute a Project Gutenberg-tm -electronic work or group of works on different terms than are set -forth in this agreement, you must obtain permission in writing from -both the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation and Michael -Hart, the owner of the Project Gutenberg-tm trademark. Contact the -Foundation as set forth in Section 3 below. - -1.F. - -1.F.1. Project Gutenberg volunteers and employees expend considerable -effort to identify, do copyright research on, transcribe and proofread -public domain works in creating the Project Gutenberg-tm -collection. Despite these efforts, Project Gutenberg-tm electronic -works, and the medium on which they may be stored, may contain -"Defects," such as, but not limited to, incomplete, inaccurate or -corrupt data, transcription errors, a copyright or other intellectual -property infringement, a defective or damaged disk or other medium, a -computer virus, or computer codes that damage or cannot be read by -your equipment. - -1.F.2. LIMITED WARRANTY, DISCLAIMER OF DAMAGES - Except for the "Right -of Replacement or Refund" described in paragraph 1.F.3, the Project -Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation, the owner of the Project -Gutenberg-tm trademark, and any other party distributing a Project -Gutenberg-tm electronic work under this agreement, disclaim all -liability to you for damages, costs and expenses, including legal -fees. YOU AGREE THAT YOU HAVE NO REMEDIES FOR NEGLIGENCE, STRICT -LIABILITY, BREACH OF WARRANTY OR BREACH OF CONTRACT EXCEPT THOSE -PROVIDED IN PARAGRAPH 1.F.3. YOU AGREE THAT THE FOUNDATION, THE -TRADEMARK OWNER, AND ANY DISTRIBUTOR UNDER THIS AGREEMENT WILL NOT BE -LIABLE TO YOU FOR ACTUAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, CONSEQUENTIAL, PUNITIVE OR -INCIDENTAL DAMAGES EVEN IF YOU GIVE NOTICE OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH -DAMAGE. - -1.F.3. LIMITED RIGHT OF REPLACEMENT OR REFUND - If you discover a -defect in this electronic work within 90 days of receiving it, you can -receive a refund of the money (if any) you paid for it by sending a -written explanation to the person you received the work from. If you -received the work on a physical medium, you must return the medium with -your written explanation. The person or entity that provided you with -the defective work may elect to provide a replacement copy in lieu of a -refund. If you received the work electronically, the person or entity -providing it to you may choose to give you a second opportunity to -receive the work electronically in lieu of a refund. If the second copy -is also defective, you may demand a refund in writing without further -opportunities to fix the problem. - -1.F.4. Except for the limited right of replacement or refund set forth -in paragraph 1.F.3, this work is provided to you 'AS-IS', WITH NO OTHER -WARRANTIES OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO -WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR ANY PURPOSE. - -1.F.5. Some states do not allow disclaimers of certain implied -warranties or the exclusion or limitation of certain types of damages. -If any disclaimer or limitation set forth in this agreement violates the -law of the state applicable to this agreement, the agreement shall be -interpreted to make the maximum disclaimer or limitation permitted by -the applicable state law. The invalidity or unenforceability of any -provision of this agreement shall not void the remaining provisions. - -1.F.6. INDEMNITY - You agree to indemnify and hold the Foundation, the -trademark owner, any agent or employee of the Foundation, anyone -providing copies of Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works in accordance -with this agreement, and any volunteers associated with the production, -promotion and distribution of Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works, -harmless from all liability, costs and expenses, including legal fees, -that arise directly or indirectly from any of the following which you do -or cause to occur: (a) distribution of this or any Project Gutenberg-tm -work, (b) alteration, modification, or additions or deletions to any -Project Gutenberg-tm work, and (c) any Defect you cause. - - -Section 2. Information about the Mission of Project Gutenberg-tm - -Project Gutenberg-tm is synonymous with the free distribution of -electronic works in formats readable by the widest variety of computers -including obsolete, old, middle-aged and new computers. It exists -because of the efforts of hundreds of volunteers and donations from -people in all walks of life. - -Volunteers and financial support to provide volunteers with the -assistance they need are critical to reaching Project Gutenberg-tm's -goals and ensuring that the Project Gutenberg-tm collection will -remain freely available for generations to come. In 2001, the Project -Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation was created to provide a secure -and permanent future for Project Gutenberg-tm and future generations. -To learn more about the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation -and how your efforts and donations can help, see Sections 3 and 4 -and the Foundation information page at www.gutenberg.org - - -Section 3. Information about the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive -Foundation - -The Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation is a non profit -501(c)(3) educational corporation organized under the laws of the -state of Mississippi and granted tax exempt status by the Internal -Revenue Service. The Foundation's EIN or federal tax identification -number is 64-6221541. Contributions to the Project Gutenberg -Literary Archive Foundation are tax deductible to the full extent -permitted by U.S. federal laws and your state's laws. - -The Foundation's principal office is located at 4557 Melan Dr. S. -Fairbanks, AK, 99712., but its volunteers and employees are scattered -throughout numerous locations. Its business office is located at 809 -North 1500 West, Salt Lake City, UT 84116, (801) 596-1887. Email -contact links and up to date contact information can be found at the -Foundation's web site and official page at www.gutenberg.org/contact - -For additional contact information: - Dr. Gregory B. Newby - Chief Executive and Director - gbnewby@pglaf.org - -Section 4. Information about Donations to the Project Gutenberg -Literary Archive Foundation - -Project Gutenberg-tm depends upon and cannot survive without wide -spread public support and donations to carry out its mission of -increasing the number of public domain and licensed works that can be -freely distributed in machine readable form accessible by the widest -array of equipment including outdated equipment. Many small donations -($1 to $5,000) are particularly important to maintaining tax exempt -status with the IRS. - -The Foundation is committed to complying with the laws regulating -charities and charitable donations in all 50 states of the United -States. Compliance requirements are not uniform and it takes a -considerable effort, much paperwork and many fees to meet and keep up -with these requirements. We do not solicit donations in locations -where we have not received written confirmation of compliance. To -SEND DONATIONS or determine the status of compliance for any -particular state visit www.gutenberg.org/donate - -While we cannot and do not solicit contributions from states where we -have not met the solicitation requirements, we know of no prohibition -against accepting unsolicited donations from donors in such states who -approach us with offers to donate. - -International donations are gratefully accepted, but we cannot make -any statements concerning tax treatment of donations received from -outside the United States. U.S. laws alone swamp our small staff. - -Please check the Project Gutenberg Web pages for current donation -methods and addresses. Donations are accepted in a number of other -ways including checks, online payments and credit card donations. -To donate, please visit: www.gutenberg.org/donate - - -Section 5. General Information About Project Gutenberg-tm electronic -works. - -Professor Michael S. Hart was the originator of the Project Gutenberg-tm -concept of a library of electronic works that could be freely shared -with anyone. For forty years, he produced and distributed Project -Gutenberg-tm eBooks with only a loose network of volunteer support. - -Project Gutenberg-tm eBooks are often created from several printed -editions, all of which are confirmed as Public Domain in the U.S. -unless a copyright notice is included. Thus, we do not necessarily -keep eBooks in compliance with any particular paper edition. - -Most people start at our Web site which has the main PG search facility: - - www.gutenberg.org - -This Web site includes information about Project Gutenberg-tm, -including how to make donations to the Project Gutenberg Literary -Archive Foundation, how to help produce our new eBooks, and how to -subscribe to our email newsletter to hear about new eBooks. - diff --git a/41707.zip b/41707.zip Binary files differdeleted file mode 100644 index dcd220d..0000000 --- a/41707.zip +++ /dev/null diff --git a/old/41707-0.txt b/old/41707-0.txt deleted file mode 100644 index 32d3621..0000000 --- a/old/41707-0.txt +++ /dev/null @@ -1,4785 +0,0 @@ -The Project Gutenberg EBook of The Development of Metaphysics in Persia, by -Muhammad Iqbal - -This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with -almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or -re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included -with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org - - -Title: The Development of Metaphysics in Persia - A Contribution to the History of Muslim Philosophy - -Author: Muhammad Iqbal - -Release Date: December 26, 2012 [EBook #41707] - -Language: English - -Character set encoding: UTF-8 - -*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK METAPHYSICS IN PERSIA *** - - - - -Produced by Fritz Ohrenschall, Sania Ali Mirza, Asad Razzaki -and the Online Distributed Proofreading Team at -http://www.pgdp.net (This book was produced from scanned -images of public domain material from the Google Print -project.) - - - - - -Transcriber's note: - - Some typographical and punctuation errors have been corrected. - A complete list follows the text. - - Words italicized in the original are surrounded by - _underscores_. - - Letters superscripted in the original have been placed in {} - brackets. - - The Arabic letter Ain is represented by ‘ and the Arabic letter - Hamza is represented by ’. - - This text has a lot of Unicode characters, many fonts do not - provide support for them. A list of these characters follows, - separated by commas, if you do not see them properly please - use a different font. - - Single letters: ā, Ā, ī, Ī, ū, Ū, ṣ, Ṣ, ḥ, Ḥ, ṭ, Ṭ, ẓ, Ẓ, ḍ, ś, - Ś, ‘, ’, ⁂. - - Combined Letters (macron or two dots below): ḏ, Ḏ, g̱, G̱, ẖ, - ḵ, Ḵ, s̱, S̱, d̤. - - - - - THE - DEVELOPMENT OF METAPHYSICS - IN - PERSIA: - - A CONTRIBUTION TO THE HISTORY - OF MUSLIM PHILOSOPHY - - BY - - SHAIKH MUHAMMAD IQBAL - B. A. (Cantab) M. A. (Pb.) Ph. D. (Munich). - - LONDON - LUZAC & Co. 46, Great Russell Street W. C. - 1908 - - Printed by E. J. BRILL. — LEIDEN (Holland). - - - - - DEDICATION - TO - Professor T. W. ARNOLD M. A. - - - My dear MR. ARNOLD, - -This little book is the first-fruit of that literary and philosophical -training which I have been receiving from you for the last ten years, -and as an expression of gratitude I beg to dedicate it to your name. You -have always judged me liberally; I hope you will judge these pages in -the same spirit. - - Your affectionate pupil - - IQBAL. - - - - -INTRODUCTION. - - -The most remarkable feature of the character of the Persian people is -their love of Metaphysical speculation. Yet the inquirer who approaches -the extant literature of Persia expecting to find any comprehensive -systems of thought, like those of Kapila or Kant, will have to turn back -disappointed, though deeply impressed by the wonderful intellectual -subtlety displayed therein. It seems to me that the Persian mind is -rather impatient of detail, and consequently destitute of that -organising faculty which gradually works out a system of ideas, by -interpreting the fundamental principles with reference to the ordinary -facts of observation. The subtle Brahman sees the inner unity of things; -so does the Persian. But while the former endeavours to discover it in -all the aspects of human experience, and illustrates its hidden presence -in the concrete in various ways, the latter appears to be satisfied -with a bare universality, and does not attempt to verify the richness of -its inner content. The butterfly imagination of the Persian flies, -half-inebriated as it were, from flower to flower, and seems to be -incapable of reviewing the garden as a whole. For this reason his -deepest thoughts and emotions find expression mostly in disconnected -verses (G̱ẖazal) which reveal all the subtlety of his artistic soul. -The Hindū, while admitting, like the Persian, the necessity of a higher -source of knowledge, yet calmly moves from experience to experience, -mercilessly dissecting them, and forcing them to yield their underlying -universality. In fact the Persian is only half-conscious of Metaphysics -as a _system_ of thought; his Brahman brother, on the other hand, is -fully alive to the need of presenting his theory in the form of a -thoroughly reasoned out system. And the result of this mental difference -between the two nations is clear. In the one case we have only partially -worked out systems of thought; in the other case, the awful sublimity of -the searching Vedānta. The student of Islamic Mysticism who is anxious -to see an all-embracing exposition of the principle of Unity, must look -up the heavy volumes of the Andalūsian Ibn al-‘Arabī, whose profound -teaching stands in strange contrast with the dry-as-dust Islam of his -countrymen. - -The results, however, of the intellectual activity of the different -branches of the great Aryan family are strikingly similar. The outcome -of all Idealistic speculation in India is Buddha, in Persia Bahāullah, -and in the west Schopenhauer whose system, in Hegelian language, is the -marriage of free oriental universality with occidental determinateness. - -But the history of Persian thought presents a phenomenon peculiar to -itself. In Persia, due perhaps to semitic influences, philosophical -speculation has indissolubly associated itself with religion, and -thinkers in new lines of thought have almost always been founders of new -religious movements. After the Arab conquest, however, we see pure -Philosophy severed from religion by the Neo-Platonic Aristotelians of -Islam, but the severance was only a transient phenomenon. Greek -philosophy, though an exotic plant in the soil of Persia, eventually -became an integral part of Persian thought; and later thinkers, critics -as well as advocates of Greek wisdom, talked in the philosophical -language of Aristotle and Plato, and were mostly influenced by religious -presuppositions. It is necessary to bear this fact in mind in order to -gain a thorough understanding of post-Islamic Persian thought. - -The object of this investigation is, as will appear, to prepare a -ground-work for a future history of Persian Metaphysics. Original -thought cannot be expected in a review, the object of which is purely -historical; yet I venture to claim some consideration for the following -two points:-- - -(a) I have endeavoured to trace the logical continuity of Persian -thought, which I have tried to interpret in the language of modern -Philosophy. This, as far as I know, has not yet been done. - -(b) I have discussed the subject of Ṣūfīism in a more scientific manner, -and have attempted to bring out the intellectual conditions which -necessitated such a phenomenon. In opposition, therefore, to the -generally accepted view I have tried to maintain that Ṣūfīism is a -necessary product of the play of various intellectual and moral forces -which would necessarily awaken the slumbering soul to a higher ideal of -life. - -Owing to my ignorance of Zend, my knowledge of Zoroaster is merely -second-hand. As regards the second part of my work, I have been able to -look up the original Persian and Arabic manuscripts as well as many -printed works connected with my investigation. I give below the names of -Arabic and Persian manuscripts from which I have drawn most of the -material utilized here. The method of transliteration adopted is the one -recognised by the Royal Asiatic Society. - - 1. Tārīḵẖ al-Ḥukamā, by Al-Baihaqī.--Royal Library of Berlin. - - 2. S̱ẖarḥi Anwāriyya, (with the original text) by Muḥammad - S̱ẖarīf of Herāt. Royal Library of Berlin. - - 3. Ḥikmat al-‘Ain, by al-Kātibī. Royal Library of Berlin. - - 4. Commentary on Ḥikmat al-‘Ain, by Muḥammad ibn Mubārak - al-Buḵẖārī. India Office Library. - - 5. Commentary on Ḥikmat al-‘Ain by Ḥusainī. India Office - Library. - - 6. ‘Awārif al-Ma‘ārif, by S̱ẖahāb al-Dīn. India Office Library. - - - 7. Mis̱ẖkāt al-Anwār, by Al-G̱ẖazālī. India Office Library. - - - 8. Kas̱ẖf al-Maḥjūb, by ‘Alī Hajverī. India Office Library. - - 9. Risālahi Nafs translated from Aristotle, by Afḍal Kāshī. - India Office Library. - - 10. Risālahi Mīr Sayyid S̱ẖarīf. India Office Library. - - 11. Ḵẖātima, by Sayyid Muḥammad Gisūdarāz. India Office - Library. - - 12. Manāzilal-sā’rīn, by ‘Abdullah Ismāi’l of Herāt. India - Office Library. - - 13. Jāwidān Nāma, by Afḍal Kās̱ẖī. India Office Library. - - 14. Tārīḵẖ al-Ḥukamā, by S̱ẖahrzūrī. British Museum Library. - - 15. Collected works of Avicenna. British Museum Library. - - 16. Risalah fi’l-Wujūd, by Mīr Jurjānī. British Museum Library. - - 17. Jāwidāni Kabīr. Cambridge University Library. - - 18. Jāmi Jahān Numā. Cambridge University Library. - - 19. Majmu‘ai Fārsī Risālah No: 1, 2, of Al-Nasafī. Trinity - College Library. - - S. M. IQBAL. - - - - -CONTENTS. - - - PART I. - Pre-Islamic Persian Philosophy. - Page - Chapter I. Persian Dualism 1 - Sec: I. Zoroaster 1 - Sec: II. Mānī and Mazdak 12 - Sec: III. Retrospect 20 - - PART II. - Greek Dualism. - - Chapter II. Neo-Platonic Aristotelians of Persia 22 - Sec: I. Ibn Maskawaih 26 - Sec: II. Avicenna 38 - - Chapter III. Islamic Rationalism 45 - Sec: I. Metaphysics of Rationalism--Materialism 45 - Sec: II. Contemporary movements of thought 55 - Sec: III. Reaction against Rationalism--The As̱ẖ‘arite 65 - - Chapter IV. Controversy between Realism and Idealism 81 - - Chapter V. Ṣūfīism. - Sec: I. The origin and Quranic justification of Ṣūfīism 96 - Sec: II. Aspects of Ṣūfī Metaphysics 111 - A. Reality as Self-conscious Will 112 - B. Reality as Beauty 112 - C. (1) Reality as Light 120 - (Return to Persian Dualism--Al-Is̱ẖrāqī). - (2) Reality as Thought--Al-Jīlī 121 - - Chapter VI. Later Persian Thought 174 - - Conclusion 192 - - - - -PART I. - -Pre-Islamic Persian Philosophy. - - - - -CHAP. I. - -PERSIAN DUALISM. - - -§ I. - -Zoroaster. - -To Zoroaster--the ancient sage of Iran--must always be assigned the -first place in the intellectual history of Iranian Aryans who, wearied -of constant roaming, settled down to an agricultural life at a time when -the Vedic Hymns were still being composed in the plains of Central Asia. -This new mode of life and the consequent stability of the institution of -property among the settlers, made them hated by other Aryan tribes who -had not yet shaken off their original nomadic habits, and occasionally -plundered their more civilised kinsmen. Thus grew up the conflict -between the two modes of life which found its earliest expression in the -denunciation of the deities of each other--the Devas and the Ahuras. It -was really the beginning of a long individualising process which -gradually severed the Iranian branch from other Aryan tribes, and -finally manifested itself in the religious system of Zoroaster[2:1]--the -great prophet of Iran who lived and taught in the age of Solon and -Thales. In the dim light of modern oriental research we see ancient -Iranians divided between two camps--partisans of the powers of good, and -partisans of the powers of evil--when the great sage joins their furious -contest, and with his moral enthusiasm stamps out once for all the -worship of demons as well as the intolerable ritual of the Magian -priesthood. - - [2:1] Some European Scholars have held Zoroaster to be nothing - more than a mythical personage. But since the publication of - Professor Jackson's admirable Life of Zoroaster, the Iranian - Prophet has, I believe, finally got out of the ordeal of modern - criticism. - -It is, however, beside our purpose to trace the origin and growth of -Zoroaster's religious system. Our object, in so far as the present -investigation is concerned, is to glance at the metaphysical side of -his revelation. We, therefore, wish to fix our attention on the sacred -trinity of philosophy--God, Man and Nature. - -Geiger, in his "Civilisation of Eastern Iranians in Ancient Times", -points out that Zoroaster inherited two fundamental principles from his -Aryan ancestry.--(1) There is law in Nature. (2) There is conflict in -Nature. It is the observation of law and conflict in the vast panorama -of being that constitutes the philosophical foundation of his system. -The problem before him was to reconcile the existence of evil with the -eternal goodness of God. His predecessors worshipped a plurality of good -spirits all of which he reduced to a unity and called it Ahuramazda. On -the other hand he reduced all the powers of evil to a similar unity and -called it Druj-Ahriman. Thus by a process of unification he arrived at -two fundamental principles which, as Haug shows, he looked upon not as -two independent activities, but as two parts or rather aspects of the -same Primary Being. Dr. Haug, therefore, holds that the Prophet of -ancient Iran was theologically a monotheist and philosophically a -dualist.[4:1] But to maintain that there are "twin"[4:2] -spirits--creators of reality and nonreality--and at the same time to -hold that these two spirits are united in the Supreme Being,[4:3] is -virtually to say that the principle of evil constitutes a part of the -very essence of God; and the conflict between good and evil is nothing -more than the struggle of God against Himself. There is, therefore, an -inherent weakness in his attempt to reconcile theological monotheism -with philosophical dualism, and the result was a schism among the -prophet's followers. The Zendiks[4:4] whom Dr. Haug calls heretics, but -who were, I believe, decidedly more consistent than their opponents, -maintained the independence of the two original spirits from each other, -while the Magi upheld their unity. The upholders of unity endeavoured, -in various ways, to meet the Zendiks; but the very fact that they tried -different phrases and expressions to express the unity of the "Primal -Twins", indicates dissatisfaction with their own philosophical -explanations, and the strength of their opponent's position. -S̱ẖahrastānī[5:1] describes briefly the different explanations of the -Magi. The Zarwānians look upon Light and Darkness as the sons of -Infinite Time. The Kiyūmarṯẖiyya hold that the original principle was -Light which was afraid of a hostile power, and it was this thought of an -adversary mixed with fear that led to the birth of Darkness. Another -branch of Zarwānians maintain that the original principle doubted -concerning something and this doubt produced Ahriman. Ibn Ḥazm[5:2] -speaks of another sect who explained the principle of Darkness as the -obscuration of a part of the fundamental principle of Light itself. - - [4:1] Essays, p. 303. - - [4:2] "In the beginning there was a pair of twins, two spirits, - each of a peculiar activity". Yas. XXX. 1. - - [4:3] "The more beneficial of my spirits has produced, by - speaking it, the whole rightful creation". Yas. XIX. 9. - - [4:4] The following verse from Buudahish Chap. I. will indicate - the Zendik view:-- "And between them (the two principles) there - was empty space, that is what they call "air" in which is now - their meeting". - - [5:1] S̱ẖahrastānī; ed. Cureton, London, 1846, pp. 182–185. - - [5:2] Ibn Ḥazm--Kitāb al-Milal w’al-Niḥal. Ed. Cairo. Vol. II, - p. 34. - -Whether the philosophical dualism of Zoroaster can be reconciled with -his monotheism or not, it is unquestionable that, from a metaphysical -standpoint, he has made a profound suggestion in regard to the ultimate -nature of reality. The idea seems to have influenced ancient Greek -Philosophy[6:1] as well as early Christian Gnostic speculation, and -through the latter, some aspects of modern western thought.[6:2] As a -thinker he is worthy of great respect not only because he approached the -problem of objective multiplicity in a philosophical spirit; but also -because he endeavoured, having been led to metaphysical dualism, to -reduce his Primary Duality to a higher unity. He seems to have -perceived, what the mystic shoemaker of Germany perceived long after -him, that the diversity of nature could not be explained without -postulating a principle of negativity or self-differentiation in the -very nature of God. His immediate successors did not, however, quite -realise the deep significance of their master's suggestions; but we -shall see, as we advance, how Zoroaster's idea finds a more -spiritualised expression in some of the aspects of later Persian -thought. - - [6:1] In connection with the influence of Zoroastrian ideas on - Ancient Greek thought, the following statement made by Erdmann - is noteworthy, though Lawrence Mills (American Journal of - Philology Vol. 22) regards such influence as improbable:--"The - fact that the handmaids of this force, which he (Heraclitus) - calls the seed of all that happens and the measure of all order, - are entitled the "tongues" has probably been slightly ascribed - to the influence of the Persian Magi. On the other hand he - connects himself with his country's mythology, not indeed - without a change of exegesis when he places Apollo and Dionysus - beside Zeus, i.e. The ultimate fire, as the two aspects of his - nature". History of Philosophy Vol. I, p. 50. - - It is, perhaps, owing to this doubtful influence of - Zoroastrianism on Heraclitus that Lassalle (quoted by Paul Janet - in his History of the Problems of Philosophy Vol. II, p. 147) - looks upon Zoroaster as a precursor of Hegel. - - Of Zoroastrian influence on Pythagoras Erdmann says:-- - - "The fact that the odd numbers are put above the even has been - emphasised by Gladisch in his comparison of the Pythagorian with - the Chinese doctrine, and the fact, moreover, that among the - oppositions we find those of light and darkness, good and evil, - has induced many, in ancient and modern times, to suppose that - they were borrowed from Zoroastrianism." Vol. I, p. 33. - - [6:2] Among modern English thinkers Mr. Bradley arrives at a - conclusion similar to that of Zoroaster. Discussing the ethical - significance of Bradley's Philosophy, Prof. Sorley says:--"Mr. - Bradley, like Green, has faith in an eternal reality which might - be called spiritual, inasmuch as it is not material; like Green - he looks upon man's moral activity as an appearance--what Green - calls a reproduction--of this eternal reality. But under this - general agreement there lies a world of difference. He refuses - by the use of the term self-conscious, to liken his Absolute to - the personality of man, and he brings out the consequence which - in Green is more or less concealed, that the evil equally with - the good in man and in the world are appearances of the - Absolute". Recent tendencies in Ethics, pp. 100–101. - -Turning now to his Cosmology, his dualism leads him to bifurcate, as it -were, the whole universe into two departments of being--reality i.e. -the sum of all good creations flowing from the creative activity of the -beneficial spirit, and non-reality[8:1] i.e. the sum of all evil -creations proceeding from the hostile spirit. The original conflict of -the two spirits is manifested in the opposing forces of nature, which, -therefore, presents a continual struggle between the powers of Good and -the powers of Evil. But it should be remembered that nothing intervenes -between the original spirits and their respective creations. Things are -good and bad because they proceed from good or bad creative agencies, in -their own nature they are quite indifferent. Zoroaster's conception of -creation is fundamentally different from that of Plato and Schopenhauer -to whom spheres of empirical reality reflect non-temporal or temporal -ideas which, so to speak, mediate between Reality and Appearance. There -are, according to Zoroaster, only two categories of existence, and the -history of the universe is nothing more than a progressive conflict -between the forces falling respectively under these categories. We are, -like other things, partakers of this struggle, and it is our duty to -range ourselves on the side of Light which will eventually prevail and -completely vanquish the spirit of Darkness. The metaphysics of the -Iranian Prophet, like that of Plato, passes on into Ethics, and it is in -the peculiarity of the Ethical aspect of his thought that the influence -of his social environment is most apparent. - - [8:1] This should not be confounded with Plato's non-being. To - Zoroaster all forms of existence proceeding from the creative - agency of the spirit of darkness are unreal; because, - considering the final triumph of the spirit of Light, they have - a temporary existence only. - -Zoroaster's view of the destiny of the soul is very simple. The soul, -according to him, is a creation, not a part of God as the votaries of -Mithra[9:1] afterwards maintained. It had a beginning in time, but can -attain to everlasting life by fighting against Evil in the earthly scene -of its activity. It is free to choose between the only two courses of -action--good and evil; and besides the power of choice the spirit of -Light has endowed it with the following faculties:-- - - 1. Conscience[10:1]. - - 2. Vital force. - - 3. The Soul--The Mind. - - 4. The Spirit--Reason. - - 5. The Farāwas̱ẖi[10:2].--A kind of tutelary spirit which acts - as a protection of man in his voyage towards God. - -The last three[10:3] faculties are united together after death, and form -an indissoluble whole. The virtuous soul, leaving its home of flesh, is -borne up into higher regions, and has to pass through the following -planes of existence:-- - - 1. The Place of good thoughts. - - 2. The Place of good words. - - 3. The Place of good works. - - 4. The Place of Eternal Glory[11:1].--Where the individual soul - unites with the principle of Light without losing its - personality. - - [9:1] Mithraism was a phase of Zoroastrianism which spread over - the Roman world in the second century. The partisans of Mithra - worshipped the sun whom they looked upon as the great advocate - of Light. They held the human soul to be a part of God, and - maintained that the observance of a mysterious cult could bring - about the souls' union with God. Their doctrine of the soul, its - ascent towards God by torturing the body and finally passing - through the sphere of Aether and becoming pure fire, offers some - resemblance with views entertained by some schools of Persian - Ṣūfīism. - - [10:1] Geiger's Civilisation of Eastern Iranians, Vol. I, - p. 124. - - [10:2] Dr. Haug (Essays p. 206) compares these protecting - spirits with the ideas of Plato. They, however, are not to be - understood as models according to which things are fashioned. - Plato's ideas, moreover, are eternal, non-temporal and - non-spatial. The doctrine that everything created by the spirit - of Light is protected by a subordinate spirit has only an - outward resemblance with the view that every spirit is fashioned - according to a perfect supersensible model. - - [10:3] The Ṣūfī conception of the soul is also tripartite. - According to them the soul is a combination of Mind, heart and - spirit (Nafs, Qalb, Rūḥ). The "heart" is to them both material - and immaterial or, more properly, neither--standing midway - between soul and mind (Nafs and Rūḥ), and acting as the organ of - higher knowledge. Perhaps Dr. Schenkel's use of the word - "conscience" would approach the ṣūfī idea of "heart". - - [11:1] Geiger Vol. I, p. 104. (The ṣūfī Cosmology has a similar - doctrine concerning the different stages of existence through - which the soul has to pass in its journey heavenward. They - enumerate the following five Planes; but their definition of the - character of each plane is slightly different:-- - - 1. The world of body. (Nāsūt). - - 2. The world of pure intelligence. (Malakūt). - - 3. The world of power. (Jabrūt). - - 4. The world of negation. (Lāhūt). - - 5. The world of Absolute Silence. (Hāhūt). - - The ṣūfīs probably borrowed this idea from the Indian Yogīs who - recognise the following seven Planes:--(Annie Besant: - Reincarnation, p. 30). - - 1. The Plane of Physical Body. - - 2. The Plane of Etherial double. - - 3. The Plane of Vitality. - - 4. The Plane of Emotional Nature. - - 5. The Plane of Thought. - - 6. The Plane of Spiritual soul--Reason. - - 7. The Plane of Pure Spirit.) - - - - -§ II. - -Mānī[12:1] and Mazdak[12:2]. - -We have seen Zoroaster's solution of the problem of diversity, and the -theological or rather philosophical controversy which split up the -Zoroastrian Church. The half-Persian Mānī--"the founder of Godless -community" as Christians styled him afterwards--agrees with those -Zoroastrians who held the Prophet's doctrine in its naked form, and -approaches the question in a spirit thoroughly materialistic. -Originally Persian his father emigrated from Hamadān to Babylonia where -Mānī was born in 215 or 216 A.D.--the time when Buddhistic Missionaries -were beginning to preach Nirvāna to the country of Zoroaster. The -eclectic character of the religious system of Mānī, its bold extension -of the Christian idea of redemption, and its logical consistency in -holding, as a true ground for an ascetic life, that the world is -essentially evil, made it a real power which influenced not only Eastern -and Western Christian thought[13:1], but has also left some dim marks on -the development of metaphysical speculation in Persia. Leaving the -discussion of the sources[13:2] of Mānī's religious system to the -orientalist, we proceed to describe and finally to determine the -philosophical value of his doctrine of the origin of the Phenomenal -Universe. - - [12:1] Sources used:-- - - (a) The text of Muḥammad ibn Isḥāq, edited by Flügel, pp. - 52–56. - - (b) Al-Ya‘qūbī: ed. Houtsma, 1883, Vol. I, pp. 180–181. - - (c) Ibn Ḥazm: Kitāb al-Milal w’al-Niḥal: ed. Cairo, Vol. II, - p. 36. - - (d) S̱ẖahrastānī: ed. Cureton, London, 1846, pp. 188–192. - - (e) Encyclopaedia Britannica, Article on Mānī. - - (f) Salemann: Bulletin de l'Académie des Sciences de St. - Petersburg Series IV, 15 April 1907, pp. 175--184. F. W. - K. Müller: Handschriften--Reste in Estrangelo--Schrift - aus Turfan, Chinesisch--Turkistan, Teil I, II; Sitzungen - der Königlich Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, - 11 Feb. 1904, pp. 348–352; und Abhandlungen etc. 1904. - - [12:2] Sources used:-- - - (a) Siyāsat Nāmah Nizām al-Mulk: ed. Charles Schefer, - Paris, 1897, pp. 166–181. - - (b) S̱ẖahrastānī: ed. Cureton, pp. 192–194. - - (c) Al-Ya‘qūbī: ed. Houtsma, 1883, Vol. I, p. 186. - - (d) Al-Bīrūnī: Chronology of Ancient Nations: tr. E. Sachau, - London, 1879, p. 192. - - [13:1] "If I see aright, five different conceptions can be - distinguished for the period about 400 A.D. First we have the - Manichaean which insinuated its way in the darkness, but was - widely extended even among the clergy". (Harnack's History of - Christian Dogma, Vol. V, p. 56). "From the anti-Manichaean - controversy sprang the desire to conceive all God's attributes - as identical i.e. the interest in the indivisibility of God", - (Harnack's History of Christian Dogma, Vol V, p. 120). - - [13:2] Some Eastern sources of information about Mānī's - Philosophy (e.g. Ephraim Syrus mentioned by Prof. A. A. Bevan in - his Introduction to the Hymn of the Soul) tell us that he was a - disciple of Bardesanes, the Syrian gnostic. The learned author - of "al-Fihrist", however, mentions some books which Mānī wrote - against the followers of the Syrian gnostic. Burkitt, in his - lectures on Early Eastern Christianity, gives a free translation - of Bardesanes' De Fato, the spirit of which I understand, is - fully Christian, and thoroughly opposed to the teaching of Mānī. - Ibn Ḥazm, however, in his Kitāb al-Milal w’al-Niḥal (Vol. II, p. - 36) says, "Both agreed in other respects, except that Mānī - believed darkness to be a living principle." - -The Paganising gnostic, as Erdmann calls him, teaches that the variety -of things springs from the mixture of two eternal Principles--Light and -Darkness--which are separate from and independent of each other. The -Principle of Light connotes ten ideas--Gentleness, Knowledge, -Understanding, Mystery, Insight, Love, Conviction, Faith, Benevolence -and Wisdom. Similarly the Principle of Darkness connotes five eternal -ideas--Mistiness, Heat, Fire, Venom, Darkness. Along with these two -primordial principles and connected with each, Mānī recognises the -eternity of space and earth, each connoting respectively the ideas of -knowledge, understanding, mystery, insight, breath, air, water, light -and fire. In darkness--the feminine Principle in Nature--were hidden -the elements of evil which, in course of time, concentrated and resulted -in the composition, so to speak, of the hideous looking Devil--the -principle of activity. This first born child of the fiery womb of -darkness, attacked the domain of the King of Light who, in order to ward -off his malicious onslaught, created the Primal man. A serious conflict -ensued between the two creatures, and resulted in the complete -vanquishment of the Primal Man. The evil one, then, succeeded in mixing -together the five elements of darkness with the five elements of light. -Thereupon the ruler of the domain of light ordered some of his angels to -construct the Universe out of these mixed elements with a view to free -the atoms of light from their imprisonment. But the reason why darkness -was the first to attack light, is that the latter, being in its essence -good, could not proceed to start the process of admixture which was -essentially harmful to itself. The attitude of Mānī's Cosmology, -therefore, to the Christian doctrine of Redemption is similar to that of -Hegelian Cosmology to the doctrine of the Trinity. To him redemption is -a physical process, and all procreation, because it protracts the -imprisonment of light, is contrary to the aim and object of the -Universe. The imprisoned atoms of light are continually set free from -darkness which is thrown down in the unfathomable ditch round the -Universe. The liberated light, however, passes on to the sun and the -moon whence it is carried by angels to the region of light--the eternal -home of the King of Paradise--"Pîd i vazargîî"--Father of greatness. - -This is a brief account of Mānī's fantastic Cosmology.[16:1] He rejects -the Zoroastrian hypothesis of creative agencies to explain the problem -of objective existence. Taking a thoroughly materialistic view of the -question, he ascribes the phenomenal universe to the _mixture_ of two -independent, eternal principles, one of which (darkness) is not only a -part of the universe--stuff, but also the source wherein activity -resides, as it were, slumbering, and starts up into being when the -favourable moment arrives. The essential idea of his cosmology, -therefore, has a curious resemblance with that of the great Hindū -thinker Kapila, who accounts for the production of the universe by the -hypothesis of three gunas, i.e. Sattwa (goodness), Tamas (darkness), and -Rajas (motion or passion) which mix together to form Nature, when the -equilibrium of the primordial matter (Prakritī) is upset. Of the various -solutions[17:1] of the problem of diversity which the Vedāntist solved -by postulating the mysterious power of "Māyā", and Leibniz, long -afterwards, explained by his doctrine of the Identity of Indiscernibles, -Mānī's solution, though childish, must find a place in the historical -development of philosophical ideas. Its philosophical value may be -insignificant; but one thing is certain, i.e. Mānī was the first to -venture the suggestion that the Universe is due to the activity of the -Devil, and hence essentially evil--a proposition which seems to me to be -the only logical justification of a system which preaches renunciation -as the guiding principle of life. In our own times Schopenhauer has been -led to the same conclusion; though, unlike Mānī, he supposes the -principle of objectification or individuation--"the sinful bent" of the -will to life--to exist in the very nature of the Primal Will and not -independent of it. - - [16:1] It is interesting to compare Mānī's Philosophy of Nature - with the Chinese notion of Creation, according to which all that - exists flows from the Union of Yin and Yang. But the Chinese - reduced these two principles to a higher unity:--Tai Keih. To - Mānī such a reduction was not possible; since he could not - conceive that things of opposite nature could proceed from the - same principle. - - [17:1] Thomas Aquinas states and criticises Mānī's contrariety - of Primal agents in the following manner:-- - - (a) What all things seek even a principle of evil would seek. - But all things seek their own self-preservation. - ⁂ Even a principle of evil would seek its own self-preservation. - - (b) What all things seek is good. - But self-preservation is what all things seek. - ⁂ Self-preservation is good. - But a principle of evil would seek its own self-preservation. - ⁂ A principle of evil would seek some good--which shows that it - is self-contradictory. - - God and His Creatures, Book II, p. 105. Rickaby's Tr. - -Turning now to the remarkable socialist of ancient Persia--_Mazdak_. -This early prophet of communism appeared during the reign of -Anūs̱ẖīrwān the Just (531–578 A.D.), and marked another dualistic -reaction against the prevailing Zarwānian doctrine[18:1]. Mazdak, like -Mānī, taught that the diversity of things springs from the mixture of -two independent, eternal principles which he called S̱ẖīd (Light) and -Tār (Darkness). But he differs from his predecessor in holding that the -fact of their mixture as well as their final separation, are quite -accidental, and not at all the result of choice. Mazdak's God is endowed -with sensation, and has four principal energies in his eternal -presence--power of discrimination, memory, understanding and bliss. -These four energies have four personal manifestations who, assisted by -four other persons, superintend the course of the Universe. Variety in -things and men is due to the various combinations of the original -principles. - - [18:1] The Zarwānian doctrine prevailed in Persia in the 5th - century B.C. (See Z. D. M. G., Vol. LVII, p. 562). - -But the most characteristic feature of the Mazdakite teaching is its -communism, which is evidently an inference from the cosmopolitan spirit -of Mānī's Philosophy. All men, said Mazdak, are equal; and the notion of -individual property was introduced by the hostile demons whose object is -to turn God's Universe into a scene of endless misery. It is chiefly -this aspect of Mazdak's teaching that was most shocking to the -Zoroastrian conscience, and finally brought about the destruction of his -enormous following, even though the master was supposed to have -miraculously made the sacred Fire talk, and bear witness to the truth of -his mission. - - -§ III. - -Retrospect. - -We have seen some of the aspects of Pre-Islamic Persian thought; though, -owing to our ignorance of the tendencies of Sāssānīde thought, and of -the political, social, and intellectual conditions that determined its -evolution, we have not been able fully to trace the continuity of ideas. -Nations as well as individuals, in their intellectual history, begin -with the objective. Although the moral fervour of Zoroaster gave a -spiritual tone to his theory of the origin of things, yet the net result -of this period of Persian speculation is nothing more than a -materialistic dualism. The principle of Unity as a philosophical ground -of all that exists, is but dimly perceived at this stage of intellectual -evolution in Persia. The controversy among the followers of Zoroaster -indicates that the movement towards a monistic conception of the -Universe had begun; but we have unfortunately no evidence to make a -positive statement concerning the pantheistic tendencies of Pre-Islamic -Persian thought. We know that in the 6{th} century A.D., Diogenes, -Simplicius and other Neo-Platonic thinkers, were driven by the -persecution of Justinian, to take refuge in the court of the tolerant -Anūs̱ẖīrwān. This great monarch, moreover, had several works translated -for him from Sanskrit and Greek, but we have no historical evidence to -show how far these events actually influenced the course of Persian -thought. Let us, therefore, pass on to the advent of Islām in Persia, -which completely shattered the old order of things, and brought to the -thinking mind the new concept of an uncompromising monotheism as well as -the Greek dualism of God and matter, as distinguished from the purely -Persian dualism of God and Devil. - - - - -PART II. - -Greek Dualism. - - - - -CHAP. II. - -THE NEO-PLATONIC ARISTOTELIANS OF PERSIA. - - -With the Arab conquest of Persia, a new era begins in the history of -Persian thought. But the warlike sons of sandy Arabia whose swords -terminated, at Nahāwand, the political independence of this ancient -people, could hardly touch the intellectual freedom of the converted -Zoroastrian. - -The political revolution brought about by the Arab conquest marks the -beginning of interaction between the Aryan and the Semitic, and we find -that the Persian, though he lets the surface of his life become largely -semitised, quietly converts Islām to his own Aryan habits of thought. In -the west the sober Hellenic intellect interpreted another Semitic -religion--Christianity; and the results of interpretation in both cases -are strikingly similar. In each case the aim of the interpreting -intellect is to soften the extreme rigidity of an absolute law imposed -on the individual from without; in one word it is an endeavour to -internalise the external. This process of transformation began with the -study of Greek thought which, though combined with other causes, -hindered the growth of native speculation, yet marked a transition from -the purely objective attitude of Pre-Islamic Persian Philosophy to the -subjective attitude of later thinkers. It is, I believe, largely due to -the influence of foreign thought that the old monistic tendency when it -reasserted itself about the end of the 8{th} century, assumed a much -more spiritual aspect; and, in its later development, revivified and -spiritualised the old Iranian dualism of Light and Darkness. The fact, -therefore, that Greek thought roused into fresh life the subtle Persian -intellect, and largely contributed to, and was finally assimilated by -the general course of intellectual evolution in Persia, justifies us in -briefly running over, even though at the risk of repetition, the systems -of the Persian Neo-Platonists who, as such, deserve very little -attention in a history of purely Persian thought. - -It must, however, be remembered that Greek wisdom flowed towards the -Moslem east through Ḥarrān and Syria. The Syrians took up the latest -Greek speculation i.e. Neo-Platonism and transmitted to the Moslem what -they believed to be the real philosophy of Aristotle. It is surprising -that Mohammedan Philosophers, Arabs as well as Persians, continued -wrangling over what they believed to be the real teaching of Aristotle -and Plato, and it never occurred to them that for a thorough -comprehension of their Philosophies, the knowledge of Greek language was -absolutely necessary. So great was their ignorance that an epitomised -translation of the Enneads of Plotinus was accepted as "Theology of -Aristotle". It took them centuries to arrive at a clear conception of -the two great masters of Greek thought; and it is doubtful whether they -ever completely understood them. Avicenna is certainly clearer and more -original than Al-Fārābī and Ibn Maskawaih; and the Andelusian Averroes, -though he is nearer to Aristotle than any of his predecessors, is yet -far from a complete grasp of Aristotle's Philosophy. It would, however, -be unjust to accuse them of servile imitation. The history of their -speculation is one continuous attempt to wade through a hopeless mass of -absurdities that careless translators of Greek Philosophy had -introduced. They had largely to rethink the Philosophies of Aristotle -and Plato. Their commentaries constitute, so to speak, an effort at -discovery, not exposition. The very circumstances which left them no -time to think out independent systems of thought, point to a subtle -mind, unfortunately cabined and cribbed by a heap of obstructing -nonsense that patient industry had gradually to eliminate, and thus to -winnow out truth from falsehood. With these preliminary remarks we -proceed to consider Persian students of Greek Philosophy individually. - - -§ I. - -Ibn Maskawaih[26:1] (d. 1030). - -Passing over the names of Saraḵẖsī[26:2], Fārābī who was a Turk, and -the Physician Rāzī (d. 932 A.D.) who, true to his Persian habits of -thought, looked upon light as the first creation, and admitted the -eternity of matter, space and time, we come to the illustrious name of -Abu ‘Alī Muhammad ibn Muhammad ibn Ya‘qūb, commonly known as _Ibn -Maskawaih_--the treasurer of the Buwaihid Sultān ‘Ad̤aduddaula--one of -the most eminent theistic thinkers, physicians, moralists and historians -of Persia. I give below a brief account of his system from his well -known work Al-Fauz al-Aṣg̱ẖar, published in Beirūt. - - [26:1] Dr. Boer, in his Philosophy of Islām, gives a full - account of the Philosophy of Al-Fārābī and Avicenna; but his - account of Ibn Maskawaih's Philosophy is restricted to the - Ethical teaching of that Philosopher. I have given here his - metaphysical views which are decidedly more systematic than - those of Al-Fārābī. Instead of repeating Avicenna's - Neo-Platonism I have briefly stated what I believe to be his - original contribution to the thought of his country. - - [26:2] Saraḵẖsī died in 899 A.D. He was a disciple of the - Arabian Philosopher Al-Kindī. His works, unfortunately, have not - reached us. - -1. _The existence of the ultimate principle._ - -Here Ibn Maskawaih follows Aristotle, and reproduces his argument based -on the fact of physical motion. All bodies have the inseparable property -of motion which covers all forms of change, and does not proceed from -the nature of bodies themselves. Motion, therefore, demands an external -source or prime mover. The supposition that motion may constitute the -very essence of bodies, is contradicted by experience. Man, for -instance, has the power of free movement; but, on the supposition, -different parts of his body must continue to move even after they are -severed from one another. The series of moving causes, therefore, must -stop at a cause which, itself immovable, moves everything else. The -immobility of the Primal cause is essential; for the supposition of -motion in the Primal cause would necessitate infinite regress, which is -absurd. - -The immovable mover is one. A multiplicity of original movers must imply -something common in their nature, so that they might be brought under -the same category. It must also imply some point of difference in order -to distinguish them from each other. But this partial identity and -difference necessitate composition in their respective essences; and -composition, being a form of motion, cannot, as we have shown, exist in -the first cause of motion. The prime mover again is eternal and -immaterial. Since transition from non-existence to existence is a form -of motion; and since matter is always subject to some kind of motion, it -follows that a thing which is not eternal, or is, in any way, associated -with matter, must be in motion. - -2. _The Knowledge of the Ultimate._ - -All human knowledge begins from sensations which are gradually -transformed into perceptions. The earlier stages of intellection are -completely conditioned by the presence of external reality. But the -progress of knowledge means to be able to think without being -conditioned by matter. Thought begins with matter, but its object is to -gradually free itself from the primary condition of its own -possibility. A higher stage, therefore, is reached in imagination--the -power to reproduce and retain in the mind the copy or image of a thing -without reference to the external objectivity of the thing itself. In -the formation of concepts thought reaches a still higher stage in point -of freedom from materiality; though the concept, in so far as it is the -result of comparison and assimilation of percepts, cannot be regarded as -having completely freed itself from the gross cause of sensations. But -the fact that conception is based on perception, should not lead us to -ignore the great difference between the nature of the concept and the -percept. The individual (percept) is undergoing constant change which -affects the character of the knowledge founded on mere perception. The -knowledge of individuals, therefore, lacks the element of permanence. -The universal (concept), on the other hand, is not affected by the law -of change. Individuals change; the universal remains intact. It is the -essence of matter to submit to the law of change: the freer a thing is -from matter, the less liable it is to change. God, therefore, being -absolutely free from matter, is absolutely changeless; and it is His -complete freedom from materiality that makes our conception of Him -difficult or impossible. The object of all philosophical training is to -develop the power of "ideation" or contemplation on pure concepts, in -order that constant practice might make possible the conception of the -absolutely immaterial. - -3. _How the one creates the many._ - -In this connection it is necessary, for the sake of clearness, to divide -Ibn Maskawaih's investigations into two parts:-- - -(a) _That the ultimate agent or cause created the Universe out of -nothing._ Materialists, he says, hold the eternity of matter, and -attribute form to the creative activity of God. It is, however, admitted -that when matter passes from one form into another form, the previous -form becomes absolutely non-existent. For if it does not become -absolutely non-existent, it must either pass off into some other body, -or continue to exist in the same body. The first alternative is -contradicted by every day experience. If we transform a ball of wax -into a solid square, the original rotundity of the ball does not pass -off into some other body. The second alternative is also impossible; for -it would necessitate the conclusion that two contradictory forms e.g. -circularity and length, can exist in the same body. It, therefore, -follows that the original form passes into absolute non-existence, when -the new form comes into being. This argument proves conclusively that -attributes i.e., form, color, etc., come into being from pure nothing. -In order to understand that the substance is also non-eternal like the -attribute, we should grasp the truth of the following propositions:-- - -1. The analysis of matter results in a number of different elements, the -diversity of which is reduced to one simple element. - -2. Form and matter are inseparable: no change in matter can annihilate -form. - -From these two propositions, Ibn Maskawaih concludes that the substance -had a beginning in time. Matter like form must have begun to exist; -since the eternity of matter necessitates the eternity of form which, -as we have seen, cannot be regarded as eternal. - -(b) _The process of creation._ What is the cause of this immense -diversity which meets us on all sides? How could the many be created by -one? When, says the Philosopher, one cause produces a number of -different effects, their multiplicity may depend on any of the following -reasons:-- - -1. The cause may have various powers. Man, for instance, being a -combination of various elements and powers, may be the cause of various -actions. - -2. The cause may use various means to produce a variety of effects. - -3. The cause may work upon a variety of material. - -None of these propositions can be true of the nature of the ultimate -cause--God. That he possesses various powers, distinct from one another, -is manifestly absurd; since his nature does not admit of composition. If -he is supposed to have employed different means to produce diversity, -who is the creator of these means? If these means are due to the -creative agency of some cause other than the ultimate cause, there -would be a plurality of ultimate causes. If, on the other hand, the -Ultimate Cause himself created these means, he must have required other -means to create these means. The third proposition is also inadmissible -as a conception of the creative act. The many cannot flow from the -causal action of one agent. It, therefore, follows that we have only one -way out of the difficulty--that the ultimate cause created only one -thing which led to the creation of another. Ibn Maskawaih here -enumerates the usual Neo-Platonic emanations gradually growing grosser -and grosser until we reach the primordial elements, which combine and -recombine to evolve higher and higher forms of life. S̱ẖiblī thus sums -up Ibn Maskawaih's theory of evolution[33:1]:-- - -"The combination of primary substances produced the mineral kingdom, the -lowest form of life. A higher stage of evolution is reached in the -vegetable kingdom. The first to appear is spontaneous grass; then plants -and various kinds of trees, some of which touch the border-land of -animal kingdom, in so far as they manifest certain animal -characteristics. Intermediary between the vegetable kingdom and the -animal kingdom there is a certain form of life which is neither animal -nor vegetable, but shares the characteristics of both (e.g. coral). The -first step beyond this intermediary stage of life, is the development of -the power of movement, and the sense of touch in tiny worms which crawl -upon the earth. The sense of touch, owing to the process of -differentiation, develops other forms of sense, until we reach the plane -of higher animals in which intelligence begins to manifest itself in an -ascending scale. Humanity is touched in the ape which undergoes further -development, and gradually develops erect stature and power of -understanding similar to man. Here animality ends and humanity begins". - - [33:1] Maulānā S̱ẖiblī ‘Ilm al-Kalām, p. 141. (Haidarābād). - -4. _The soul._ - -In order to understand whether the soul has an independent existence, we -should examine the nature of human knowledge. It is the essential -property of matter that it cannot assume two different forms -simultaneously. To transform a silver spoon into a silver glass, it is -necessary that the spoon-form as such, should cease to exist. This -property is common to all bodies, and a body that lacks it cannot be -regarded as a body. Now when we examine the nature of perception, we see -that there is a principle in man which, in so far as it is able to know -more than one thing at a time, can assume, so to say, many different -forms simultaneously. This principle cannot be matter, since it lacks -the fundamental property of matter. The essence of the soul consists in -the power of perceiving a number of objects at one and the same moment -of time. But it may be objected that the soul-principle may be either -material in its essence, or a function of matter. There are, however, -reasons to show that the soul cannot be a function of matter. - -(a). A thing which assumes different forms and states, cannot itself be -one of those forms and states. A body which receives different colors -should be, in its own nature, colorless. The soul, in its perception of -external objects, assumes, as it were, various forms and states; it, -therefore, cannot be regarded as one of those forms. Ibn Maskawaih -seems to give no countenance to the contemporary Faculty-Psychology; to -him different mental states are various transformations of the soul -itself. - -(b). The attributes are constantly changing; there must be beyond the -sphere of change, some permanent substratum which is the foundation of -personal identity. - -Having shown that the soul cannot be regarded as a function of matter, -Ibn Maskawaih proceeds to prove that it is essentially immaterial. Some -of his arguments may be noticed:-- - -1. The senses, after they have perceived a strong stimulus, cannot, for -a certain amount of time, perceive a weaker stimulus. It is, however, -quite different with the mental act of cognition. - -2. When we reflect on an abstruse subject, we endeavour to completely -shut our eyes to the objects around us, which we regard as so many -hindrances in the way of spiritual activity. If the soul is material in -its essence, it need not, in order to secure unimpeded activity, escape -from the world of matter. - -3. The perception of a strong stimulus weakens and sometimes injures the -sense. The intellect, on the other hand, grows in strength with the -knowledge of ideas and general notions. - -4. Physical weakness due to old age, does not affect mental vigour. - -5. The soul can conceive certain propositions which have no connection -with the sense-data. The senses, for instance, cannot perceive that two -contradictories cannot exist together. - -6. There is a certain power in us which rules over physical organs, -corrects sense-errors, and unifies all knowledge. This unifying -principle which reflects over the material brought before it through the -sense-channel, and, weighing the evidence of each sense, decides the -character of rival statements, must itself stand above the sphere of -matter. - -The combined force of these considerations, says Ibn Maskawaih, -conclusively establishes the truth of the proposition--that the soul is -essentially immaterial. The immateriality of the soul signifies its -immortality; since mortality is a characteristic of the material. - - -§ II. - -Avicenna (d. 1037). - -Among the early Persian Philosophers, Avicenna alone attempted to -construct his own system of thought. His work, called "Eastern -Philosophy" is still extant; and there has also come down to us a -fragment[38:1] in which the Philosopher has expressed his views on the -universal operation of the force of love in nature. It is something like -the contour of a system, and it is quite probable that ideas expressed -therein were afterwards fully worked out. - - [38:1] This fragment on love is preserved in the collected works - of Avicenna in the British Museum Library and has been edited by - N. A. F. Mehren. (Leiden, 1894.) - -Avicenna defines "Love" as the appreciation of Beauty; and from the -standpoint of this definition he explains that there are three -categories of being:-- - -1. Things that are at the highest point of perfection. - -2. Things that are at the lowest point of perfection. - -3. Things that stand between the two poles of perfection. But the third -category has no real existence; since there are things that have already -attained the acme of perfection, and there are others still progressing -towards perfection. This striving for the ideal is love's movement -towards beauty which, according to Avicenna, is identical with -perfection. Beneath the visible evolution of forms is the force of love -which actualises all striving, movement, progress. Things are so -constituted that they hate non-existence, and love the joy of -individuality in various forms. The indeterminate matter, dead in -itself, assumes, or more properly, is made to assume by the inner force -of love, various forms, and rises higher and higher in the scale of -beauty. The operation of this ultimate force, in the physical plane, can -be thus indicated:-- - -1. Inanimate objects are combinations of form, matter and quality. Owing -to the working of this mysterious power, quality sticks to its subject -or substance; and form embraces indeterminate matter which, impelled by -the mighty force of love, rises from form to form. - -2. The tendency of the force of love is to centralise itself. In the -vegetable kingdom it attains a higher degree of unity or centralisation; -though the soul still lacks that unity of action which it attains -afterwards. The processes of the vegetative soul are:-- - -(a) Assimilation. - -(b) Growth. - -(c) Reproduction. - -These processes, however, are nothing more than so many manifestations -of love. Assimilation indicates attraction and transformation of what is -external into what is internal. Growth is love of achieving more and -more harmony of parts; and reproduction means perpetuation of the kind, -which is only another phase of love. - -3. In the animal kingdom, the various operations of the force of love -are still more unified. It does preserve the vegetable instinct of -acting in different directions; but there is also the development of -temperament which is a step towards more unified activity. In man this -tendency towards unification manifests itself in self-consciousness. The -same force of "natural or constitutional love", is working in the life -of beings higher than man. All things are moving towards the first -Beloved--the Eternal Beauty. The worth of a thing is decided by its -nearness to or distance from, this ultimate principle. - -As a physician, however, Avicenna is especially interested in the nature -of the Soul. In his times, moreover, the doctrine of metempsychosis was -getting more and more popular. He, therefore, discusses the nature of -the soul, with a view to show the falsity of this doctrine. It is -difficult, he says, to define the soul; since it manifests different -powers and tendencies in different planes of being. His view of the -various powers of the soul can be thus represented:-- - -1. Manifestation as unconscious activity-- - - (a). Working in different directions ┌ 1. Assimilation. - (Vegetative soul) │ 2. Growth. - └ 3. Reproduction. - -(b). Working in one direction and securing uniformity of action--growth -of temperament. - -2. Manifestation as conscious activity-- - -(a). As directed to more than one object-- - - Animal soul. - │ - ┌────────────┴────────────────────┐ - │ │ - Lower Animals. Man. - - A. Perceptive powers. A. Perceptive powers. - B. Motive powers (desire (a) Five external senses. - of pleasure and avoidance (b) Five internal senses-- - of pain). 1. Sensorium. - 2. Retention of images. - 3. Conception. - 4. Imagination. - 5. Memory. - - These constitute the five internal - senses of the soul which, in man, - manifests itself as progressive - reason, developing from human to - angelic and prophetic reason. - - B. Motive powers--will. - -(b). As directed to one object--The soul of the spheres which continue -in one uniform motion. - -In his fragment on "Nafs" (soul) Avicenna endeavours to show that a -material accompaniment is not necessary to the soul. It is not through -the instrumentality of the body, or some power of the body, that the -soul conceives or imagines; since if the soul necessarily requires a -physical medium in conceiving other things, it must require a different -body in order to conceive the body attached to itself. Moreover, the -fact that the soul is immediately self conscious--conscious of itself -through itself--conclusively shows that in its essence the soul is quite -independent of any physical accompaniment. The doctrine of -metempsychosis implies, also, individual pre-existence. But supposing -that the soul did exist before the body, it must have existed either as -one or as many. The multiplicity of bodies is due to the multiplicity of -material forms, and does not indicate the multiplicity of souls. On the -other hand, if it existed as one, the ignorance or knowledge of A must -mean the ignorance or knowledge of B; since the soul is one in both. -These categories, therefore, cannot be applied to the soul. The truth -is, says Avicenna, that body and soul are contiguous to each other, but -quite opposite in their respective essences. The disintegration of the -body does not necessitate the annihilation of the soul. Dissolution or -decay is a property of compounds, and not of simple, indivisible, ideal -substances. Avicenna, then denies pre-existence, and endeavours to show -the possibility of disembodied conscious life beyond the grave. - -We have run over the work of the early Persian Neo-Platonists among -whom, as we have seen, Avicenna alone learned to think for himself. Of -the generations of his disciples--Behmenyār, Ab u’l-Ma’mūm of Isfahān, -Ma‘ṣūmī, Ab u’l-‘Abbās, Ibn Tāhir[44:1]--who carried on their master's -Philosophy, we need not speak. So powerful was the spell of Avicenna's -personality that, even long after it had been removed, any amplification -or modification of his views was considered to be an unpardonable crime. -The old Iranian idea of the dualism of Light and Darkness, does not act -as a determining factor in the progress of Neo-Platonic ideas in Persia, -which borrowed independent life for a time, and eventually merged their -separate existence in the general current of Persian speculation. They -are, therefore, connected with the course of indigenous thought only in -so far as they contributed to the strength and expansion of that -monistic tendency, which manifested itself early in the Church of -Zoroaster; and, though for a time hindered by the Theological -controversies of Islām, burst out with redoubled force in later times, -to extend its titanic grasp to all the previous intellectual -achievements of the land of its birth. - - [44:1] Al-Baihaqi; fol. 28a et seqq. - - - - -CHAP. III. - -THE RISE AND FALL OF RATIONALISM IN ISLĀM. - - -§ I. - -The Metaphysics of Rationalism--Materialism. - -The Persian mind, having adjusted itself to the new political -environment, soon reasserts its innate freedom, and begins to retire -from the field of objectivity, in order that it may come back to itself, -and reflect upon the material achieved in its journey out of its own -inwardness. With the study of Greek thought, the spirit which was almost -lost in the concrete, begins to reflect and realise itself as the -arbiter of truth. Subjectivity asserts itself, and endeavours to -supplant all outward authority. Such a period, in the intellectual -history of a people, must be the epoch of rationalism, scepticism, -mysticism, heresy--forms in which the human mind, swayed by the growing -force of subjectivity, rejects all external standards of truth. And so -we find the epoch under consideration. - -The period of Umayyad dominance is taken up with the process of -co-mingling and adjustment to new conditions of life; but with the rise -of the ‘Abbāsid Dynasty and the study of Greek Philosophy, the pent-up -intellectual force of Persia bursts out again, and exhibits wonderful -activity in all the departments of thought and action. The fresh -intellectual vigour imparted by the assimilation of Greek Philosophy -which was studied with great avidity, led immediately to a critical -examination of Islamic Monotheism. Theology, enlivened by religious -fervour, learned to talk the language of Philosophy earlier than cold -reason began to seek a retired corner, away from the noise of -controversy, in order to construct a consistent theory of things. In the -first half of the 8{th} century we find Wāṣil Ibn ‘Atā--a Persian -disciple of the famous theologian Ḥasan of Baṣra--starting Mu‘tazilaism -(Rationalism)--that most interesting movement which engaged some of the -subtlest minds of Persia, and finally exhausted its force in the keen -metaphysical controversies of Bag̱ẖdād and Baṣra. The famous city of -Baṣra had become, owing to its commercial situation, the playground of -various forces--Greek Philosophy, Scepticism, Christianity, Buddhistic -ideas, Manichaeism[47:1]--which furnished ample spiritual food to the -inquiring mind of the time, and formed the intellectual environment of -Islamic Rationalism. What Spitta calls the Syrian period of Muhammadan -History is not characterised with metaphysical subtleties. With the -advent of the Persian Period, however, Muhammadan students of Greek -Philosophy began properly to reflect on their religion; and the -Mu‘tazila thinkers[47:2], gradually drifted into metaphysics with which -alone we are concerned here. It is not our object to trace the history -of the Mu‘tazila Kalām; for present purposes it will be sufficient if we -briefly reveal the metaphysical implications of the Mu‘tazila view of -Islām. The conception of God, and the theory of matter, therefore, are -the only aspects of Rationalism which we propose to discuss here. - - [47:1] During the ‘Abbāsid Period there were many who secretly - held Manichaean opinions. See Fihrist, Leipsig 1871, p. 338; See - also Al-Mu‘tazila, ed. by T. W. Arnold, Leipsig 1902, p. 27, - where the author speaks of a controversy between Abu - ’l-Huḏẖail and Ṣālih, the Dualist. See also Macdonald's Muslim - Theology, p. 133. - - [47:2] The Mu‘tazilas belonged to various nationalities, and - many of them were Persians either by descent or domicile. Wāṣil - Ibn ‘Atā--the reported founder of the sect--was a Persian - (Browne, Lit. His., Vol I, p. 281). Von Kremer, however, traces - their origin to the theological controversies of the Umayyad - period. Mu‘tazilaism was not an essentially Persian movement; - but it is true, as Prof. Browne observes (Lit. His., Vol. I, p. - 283) that S̱ẖi‘ite and Qādarī tenets, indeed, often went - together, and the S̱ẖi‘ite doctrine current in Persia at the - present day is in many respects Mu‘tazilite, while Ḥasan - Al-As̱ẖ‘arī, the great opponent of the Mu‘tazilite, is by the - S̱ẖi‘ites held in horror. It may also be added that some of the - greater representatives of the Mu‘tazila opinion were S̱ẖi‘as - by religion, e.g. Abu ’l-Huḏẖail (Al-Mu‘tazila, ed. by T. W. - Arnold, p. 28). On the other hand many of the followers of - Al-As̱ẖ‘ari were Persians (See extracts from Ibn ‘Asākir ed. - Mehren), so that it does not seem to be quite justifiable to - describe the As̱ẖ‘arite mode of thought as a purely semitic - movement. - -His conception of the unity of God at which the Mu‘tazila eventually -arrived by a subtle dialectic is one of the fundamental points in which -he differs from the Orthodox Muhammadan. God's attributes, according to -his view, cannot be said to inhere in him; they form the very essence of -His nature. The Mu‘tazila, therefore, denies the separate reality of -divine attributes, and declares their absolute identity with the -abstract divine Principle. "God", says Abu’l-Huḏẖail, "is knowing, -all-powerful, living; and his knowledge, power and life constitute His -very essence (ḏẖāt)"[49:1]. In order to explain the pure unity of God -Joseph Al-Baṣīr[49:2] lays down the following five principles:-- - -(1). The necessary supposition of atom and accident. - -(2). The necessary supposition of a creator. - -(3). The necessary supposition of the conditions (Aḥwāl) of God. - -(4). The rejection of those attributes which do not befit God. - -(5). The unity of God in spite of the plurality of His attributes. - - [49:1] S̱ẖahrastānī: Cureton's ed., p. 34. - - [49:2] Dr. Frankl: Ein Mu‘tazilitischer Kalām--Wien 1872, p. 13. - -This conception of unity underwent further modifications; until in the -hands of Mu‘ammar and Abu Hās̱ẖim it became a mere abstract possibility -about which nothing could be predicated. We cannot, he says, predicate -knowledge of God[50:1], for His knowledge must be of something in -Himself. The first necessitates the identity of subject and object which -is absurd; the second implicates duality in the nature of God which is -equally impossible. Aḥmad and Faḍl[50:2]--disciples of Nazzām, however, -recognised this duality in holding that the original creators are -two--God--the eternal principle; and the word of God--Jesus Christ--the -contingent principle. But more fully to bring out the element of truth -in the second alternative suggested by Mu‘ammar, was reserved, as we -shall see, for later Ṣūfī thinkers of Persia. It is, therefore, clear -that some of the rationalists almost unconsciously touched the outer -fringe of later pantheism for which, in a sense, they prepared the way, -not only by their definition of God, but also by their common effort to -internalise the rigid externality of an absolute law. - - [50:1] S̱ẖahrastānī: Cureton's ed., p. 48. See also - Steiner--Die Mutaziliten, p. 59. - - [50:2] Ibn Ḥazm (Cairo, ed. I) Vol. IV, p. 197. See also - S̱ẖahrastānī: Cureton's ed., p. 42. - -But the most important contribution of the advocates of Rationalism to -purely metaphysical speculation, is their explanation of matter, which -their opponents--the Ash‘arite--afterwards modified to fit in with their -own views of the nature of God. The interest of Nazzām chiefly consisted -in the exclusion of all arbitrariness from the orderly course of -nature[51:1]. The same interest in naturalism led Al-Jāḥiẓ to define -Will in a purely negative manner[51:2]. Though the Rationalist thinkers -did not want to abandon the idea of a Personal Will, yet they -endeavoured to find a deeper ground for the independence of individual -natural phenomena. And this ground they found in matter itself. Nazzām -taught the infinite divisibility of matter, and obliterated the -distinction between substance and accident[51:3]. Existence was regarded -as a quality superimposed by God on the pre-existing material atoms -which would have been incapable of perception without this quality. -Muḥammad Ibn ‘Uṯẖmān, one of the Mu‘tazila S̱ẖaiḵẖs, says Ibn -Ḥazm,[51:4] maintained that the non-existent (atom in its -pre-existential state) is a body in that state; only that in its -pre-existential condition it is neither in motion, nor at rest, nor is -it said to be created. Substance, then, is a collection of -qualities--taste, odour, colour--which, in themselves, are nothing more -than material potentialities. The soul, too, is a finer kind of matter; -and the processes of knowledge are mere mental motions. Creation is only -the actualisation of pre-existing potentialities[52:1] (Ṭafra). The -individuality of a thing which is defined as "that of which something -can be predicated"[52:2] is not an essential factor in its notion. The -collection of things we call the Universe, is externalised or -perceptible reality which could, so to speak, exist independent of all -perceptibility. The object of these metaphysical subtleties is purely -theological. God, to the Rationalist, is an absolute unity which can, in -no sense, admit of plurality, and could thus exist without the -perceptible plurality--the Universe. - - [51:1] Steiner: Die Mu‘taziliten; Leipzig, 1865, p. 57. - - [51:2] Steiner: Die Mu‘taziliten; Leipzig, 1865, p. 59. - - [51:3] S̱ẖahrastānī: Cureton's ed., p. 38. - - [51:4] Ibn Ḥazm (ed. Cairo): Vol. V, p. 42. - - [52:1] S̱ẖahrastānī: Cureton's ed, p. 38. - - [52:2] Steiner: Die Mu‘taziliten, p. 80. - -The activity of God, then, consists only in making the atom perceptible. -The properties of the atom flow from its own nature. A stone thrown up -falls down on account of its own indwelling property[53:1]. God, says -Al-‘Aṭṭār of Baṣra and Bis̱ẖr ibn al Mu‘tamir, did not create colour, -length, breadth, taste or smell--all these are activities of bodies -themselves[53:2]. Even the number of things in the Universe is not known -to God[53:3]. Bishr ibn al-Mu‘tamir further explained the properties of -bodies by what he called "Tawallud"--interaction of bodies[53:4]. Thus -it is clear that the Rationalists were philosophically materialists, and -theologically deists. - - [53:1] S̱ẖahrastānī: Cureton's ed., p. 38. - - [53:2] Ibn Ḥazm (ed. Cairo): Vol. IV, pp. 194, 197. - - [53:3] Ibn Ḥazm (ed. Cairo): Vol. IV, p. 194. - - [53:4] S̱ẖahrastānī: Cureton's ed., p. 44. - -To them substance and atom are identical, and they define substance as a -space-filling atom which, besides the quality of filling space, has a -certain direction, force and existence forming its very essence as an -actuality. In shape it is squarelike; for if it is supposed to be -circular, combination of different atoms would not be possible[53:5]. -There is, however, great difference of opinion among the exponents of -atomism in regard to the nature of the atom. Some hold that atoms are -all similar to each other; while Abu’l-Qāsim of Balḵẖ regards them as -similar as well as dissimilar. When we say that two things are similar -to each other, we do not necessarily mean that they are similar in all -their attributes. Abu’l-Qāsim further differs from Nazzām in advocating -the indestructibility of the atom. He holds that the atom had a -beginning in time; but that it cannot be completely annihilated. The -attribute of "Baqā" (continued existence), he says, does not give to its -subject a new attribute other than existence; and the continuity of -existence is not an additional attribute at all. The divine activity -created the atom as well as its continued existence. Abu’l-Qāsim, -however, admits that some atoms may not have been created for continued -existence. He denies also the existence of any intervening space between -different atoms, and holds, unlike other representatives of the school, -that the essence or atom (Māhiyyat) could not remain essence in a state -of non-existence. To advocate the opposite is a contradiction in terms. -To say that the essence (which is essence because of the attribute of -existence) could remain essence in a state of non-existence, is to say -that the existent could remain existent in a state of non-existence. It -is obvious that Abu’l-Qāsim here approaches the As̱ẖ‘arite theory of -knowledge which dealt a serious blow to the Rationalist theory of -matter. - - [53:5] In my treatment of the atomism of Islamic Rationalists, I - am indebted to Arthur Biram's publication: "Kitābul Masā’il fil - ḵẖilāf beyn al-Baṣriyyīn wal Bag̱ẖdādiyyīn". - - -§ II. - -Contemporary Movements of Thought. - -Side by side with the development of Mu‘tazilaism we see, as is natural -in a period of great intellectual activity, many other tendencies of -thought manifesting themselves in the philosophical and religious -circles of Islam. Let us notice them briefly:-- - -1. Scepticism. The tendency towards scepticism was the natural -consequence of the purely dialectic method of Rationalism. Men such as -Ibn As̱ẖras and Al-Jāhiz who apparently belonged to the Rationalist -camp, were really sceptics. The standpoint of Al-Jāhiz who inclined to -deistic naturalism[55:1], is that of a cultured man of the time, and -not of a professional theologian. In him is noticeable also a reaction -against the metaphysical hairsplitting of his predecessors, and a desire -to widen the pale of theology for the sake of the illiterate who are -incapable of reflecting on articles of faith. - - [55:1] Macdonald's Muslim Theology, p. 161. - -2. Ṣūfīism--an appeal to a higher source of knowledge which was first -systematised by Ḏẖu’l-Nūn, and became more and more deepened and -antischolastic in contrast to the dry intellectualism of the -As̱ẖ‘arite. We shall consider this interesting movement in the -following chapter. - -3. The revival of authority--Ismā‘īlianism--a movement -characteristically Persian which, instead of repudiating freethought, -endeavours to come to an understanding with it. Though this movement -seems to have no connection with the theological controversies of the -time, yet its connection with freethought is fundamental. The similarity -between the methods practised by the Ismā‘īlian missionaries and those -of the partisans of the association called Iḵẖwān al-Safā--Brethren of -Purity--suggests some sort of secret relation between the two -institutions. Whatever may be the motive of those who started this -movement, its significance as an intellectual phenomenon should not be -lost sight of. The multiplicity of philosophical and religious views--a -necessary consequence of speculative activity--is apt to invoke forces -which operate against this, religiously speaking, dangerous -multiplicity. In the 18th century history of European thought we see -Fichte, starting with a sceptical inquiry concerning the nature of -matter, and finding its last word in Pantheism. Schleiermacher appeals -to Faith as opposed to Reason, Jacobi points to a source of knowledge -higher than reason, while Comte abandons all metaphysical inquiry, and -limits all knowledge to sensuous perception. De Maistre and Schlegel, on -the other hand, find a resting place in the authority of an absolutely -infallible Pope. The advocates of the doctrine of Imāmat think in the -same strain as De Maistre; but it is curious that the Ismā‘īlians, while -making this doctrine the basis of their Church, permitted free play to -all sorts of thinking. - -The Ismā‘īlia movement then is one aspect of the persistent -battle[57:1] which the intellectually independent Persian waged against -the religious and political ideals of Islam. Originally a branch of the -Shī‘ite religion, the Ismā‘īlia sect assumed quite a cosmopolitan -character with ‘Abdulla ibn Maimūn--the probable progenitor of the -Fātimid Caliphs of Egypt--who died about the same time when -Al-As̱ẖ‘arī, the great opponent of Freethought, was born. This curious -man imagined a vast scheme in which he weaved together innumerable -threads of various hues, resulting in a cleverly constructed -equivocation, charming to the Persian mind for its mysterious character -and misty Pythagorean Philosophy. Like the Association of the Brethren -of Purity, he made an attempt, under the pious cloak of the doctrine of -Imāmat (Authority), to synthesise all the dominating ideas of the time. -Greek Philosophy, Christianity, Rationalism, Sūfīism, Manichaeism, -Persian heresies, and above all the idea of reincarnation, all came -forward to contribute their respective shares to the boldly conceived -Ismā‘īlian whole, the various aspects of which were to be gradually -revealed to the initiated, by the "Leader"--the ever Incarnating -Universal Reason--according to the intellectual development of the age -in which he incarnated himself. In the Ismā‘īlian movement, Freethought, -apprehending the collapse of its ever widening structure, seeks to rest -upon a stable basis, and, by a strange irony of fate, is led to find it -in the very idea which is revolting to its whole being. Barren -authority, though still apt to reassert herself at times, adopts this -unclaimed child, and thus permits herself to assimilate all knowledge -past, present and future. - - [57:1] Ibn Ḥazm in his Kitāb al-Milal, looks upon the heretical - sects of Persia as a continuous struggle against the Arab power - which the cunning Persian attempted to shake off by these - peaceful means. See Von Kremer's Geschichte der herrschenden - Ideen des Islams, pp. 10, 11, where this learned Arab historian - of Cordova is quoted at length. - -The unfortunate connection, however, of this movement with the politics -of the time, has misled many a scholar. They see in it (Macdonald, for -instance) nothing more than a powerful conspiracy to uproot the -political power of the Arab from Persia. They have denounced the -Ismā‘īlian Church which counted among its followers some of the best -heads and sincerest hearts, as a mere clique of dark murderers who were -ever watching for a possible victim. We must always remember, while -estimating the character of these people, the most barbarous -persecutions which drove them to pay red-handed fanaticism in the same -coin. Assassinations for religious purposes were considered -unobjectionable, and even perhaps lawful, among the whole Semite race. -As late as the latter half of the 16th century, the Pope of Rome could -approve such a dreadful slaughter as the massacre of St. Bartholomew. -That assassination, even though actuated by religious zeal, is still a -crime, is a purely modern idea; and justice demands that we should not -judge older generations with our own standards of right and wrong. A -great religious movement which shook to its very foundations the -structure of a vast empire, and, having successfully passed through the -varied ordeals of moral reproach, calumny and persecution, stood up for -centuries as a champion of Science and Philosophy, could not have -entirely rested on the frail basis of a political conspiracy of a mere -local and temporary character. Ismā‘īlianism, in spite of its almost -entire loss of original vitality, still dominates the ethical ideal of -not an insignificant number in India, Persia, Central Asia, Syria and -Africa; while the last expression of Persian thought--Bābism--is -essentially Ismā‘īlian in its character. - -To return, however, to the Philosophy of the sect. From the later -Rationalists they borrowed their conception of Divinity. God, or the -ultimate principle of existence, they teach, has no attribute. His -nature admits of no predication. When we predicate the attribute of -power to him, we only mean that He is the giver of power; when we -predicate eternity, we indicate the eternity of what the Qur’ān calls -"Amr" (word of God) as distinguished from the "Ḵẖalq" (creation of -God) which is contingent. In His nature all contradictions melt away, -and from Him flow all opposites. Thus they considered themselves to have -solved the problem which had troubled the mind of Zoroaster and his -followers. - -In order to find an answer to the question, "What is plurality?" the -Ismā‘īlia refer to what they consider a metaphysical axiom--"that from -one only one can proceed". But the one which proceeds, is not something -completely different from which it proceeds. It is really the Primal one -transformed. The Primal Unity, therefore, transformed itself into the -First Intellect (Universal Reason); and then, by means of this -transformation of itself, created the Universal soul which, impelled by -its nature to perfectly identify itself with the original source, felt -the necessity of motion, and consequently of a body possessing the power -of motion. In order to achieve its end, the soul created the heavens -moving in circular motion according to its direction. It also created -the elements which mixed together, and formed the visible Universe--the -scene of plurality through which it endeavours to pass with a view to -come back to the original source. The individual soul is an epitome of -the whole Universe which exists only for its progressive education. The -Universal Reason incarnates itself from time to time, in the personality -of the "Leader" who illuminates the soul in proportion to its experience -and understanding, and gradually guides it through the scene of -plurality to the world of eternal unity. When the Universal soul -reaches its goal, or rather returns to its own deep being, the process -of disintegration ensues. "Particles constituting the Universe fall off -from each other--those of goodness go to truth (God) which symbolises -unity; those of evil go to untruth (Devil) which symbolises -diversity"[63:1]. This is but briefly the Ismā‘īlian Philosophy--a -mixture, as S̱ẖarastānī remarks, of Philosophical and Manichaean -ideas--which, by gradually arousing the slumbering spirit of scepticism, -they administered, as it were, in doses to the initiated, and finally -brought them to that stage of spiritual emancipation where solemn ritual -drops off, and dogmatic religion appears to be nothing more than a -systematic arrangement of useful falsehoods. - - [63:1] S̱ẖarastānī: Cureton's ed: p. 149. - -The Ismā‘īlian doctrine is the first attempt to amalgamate contemporary -Philosophy with a really Persian view of the Universe, and to restate -Islam, in reference to this synthesis, by allegorical interpretation of -the Qur’ān--a method which was afterwards adopted by Ṣūfīism. With them -the Zoroastrian Ahriman (Devil) is not the malignant creator of evil -things but it is a principle which violates the eternal unity, and -breaks it up into visible diversity. The idea that some principle of -difference in the nature of the ultimate existence must be postulated in -order to account for empirical diversity, underwent further -modifications; until in the Ḥurūfī sect (an offshoot of the Ismā‘īlia), -in the fourteenth century, it touched contemporary Ṣūfīism on the one -hand, and Christian Trinity on the other. The "Be", maintained the -Ḥurūfīs, is the eternal word of God, which, itself uncreated, leads to -further creation--the word externalised. "But for the 'word' the -recognition of the essence of Divinity would have been impossible; since -Divinity is beyond the reach of sense--perception"[64:1]. The 'word', -therefore, became flesh in the womb of Mary[64:2] in order to manifest -the Father. The whole Universe is the manifestation of God's 'word', in -which He is immanent[64:3]. Every sound in the Universe is within God; -every atom is singing the song of eternity[64:4]; all is life. Those -who want to discover the ultimate reality of things, let them seek "the -named" through the Name[65:1], which at once conceals and reveals its -subject. - - [64:1] Jāwidān Kabīr, fol. 149a. - - [64:2] Jāwidān Kabīr, fol. 280a. - - [64:3] Jāwidān Kabīr, fol. 366b. - - [64:4] Jāwidān Kabīr, fol. 155b. - - [65:1] Jāwidān Kabīr, fol. 382a. - - -§ III. - -Reaction against Rationalism. - -The As̱ẖ‘arite. - -Patronised by the early Caliphs of the House of ‘Abbās, Rationalism -continued to flourish in the intellectual centres of the Islamic world; -until, in the first half of the 9th century, it met the powerful -orthodox reaction which found a very energetic leader in Al-As̱ẖ‘arī -(b, 873 A.D.) who studied under Rationalist teachers only to demolish, -by their own methods, the edifice they had so laboriously built. He was -a pupil of Al-Jubbā’ī[65:2]--the representative of the younger school of -Mu‘tazilaism in Baṣra--with whom he had many controversies[65:3] which -eventually terminated their friendly relations, and led the pupil to bid -farewell to the Mu‘tazila camp. "The fact", says Spitta, "that -Al-As̱ẖ‘arī was so thoroughly a child of his time with the successive -currents of which he let himself go, makes him, in another relation, an -important figure to us. In him, as in any other, are clearly reflected -the various tendencies of this politically as well as religiously -interesting period; and we seldom find ourselves in a position to weigh -the power of the orthodox confession and the Mu‘tazilite speculation, -the child-like helpless manner of the one, the immaturity and -imperfection of the other, so completely as in the life of this man who -was orthodox as a boy and a Mu‘tazila as a young man"[66:1]. The -Mu‘tazila speculation (e.g. Al-Jāḥiz) tended to be absolutely -unfettered, and in some cases led to a merely negative attitude of -thought. The movement initiated by Al-As̱ẖ‘arī was an attempt not only -to purge Islām of all non-Islamic elements which had quietly crept into -it, but also to harmonize the religious consciousness with the -religious thought of Islam. Rationalism was an attempt to measure -reality by reason alone; it implied the identity of the spheres of -religion and philosophy, and strove to express faith in the form of -concepts or terms of pure thought. It ignored the facts of human nature, -and tended to disintegrate the solidarity of the Islamic Church. Hence -the reaction. - - [65:2] Extracts from Ibn ‘Asākir (Mehren)--Travaux de la - troisième session du Congrès International des Orientalistes--p. - 261. - - [65:3] Spitta: Zur Geschichte Abul-Ḥasan Al-As̱ẖ‘arī, pp. 42, - 43. See also Ibn Ḵẖallikān (Gottingen 1839)--Al-Jubbā’ī, where - the story of their controversy is given. - - [66:1] Spitta: Vorwort, p. VII. - -The orthodox reaction led by the As̱ẖ‘arite then was, in reality, -nothing more than the transfer of dialectic method to the defence of the -authority of Divine Revelation. In opposition to the Rationalists, they -maintained the doctrine of the Attributes of God; and, as regards the -Free Will controversy, they adopted a course lying midway between the -extreme fatalism of the old school, and the extreme libertarianism of -the Rationalists. They teach that the power of choice as well as all -human actions are created by God; and that man has been given the power -of acquiring[67:1] the different modes of activity. But Faḵẖral-Dīn -Rāzī, who in his violent attack on philosophy was strenuously opposed by -Tūsī and Qutbal-Dīn, does away with the idea of "acquisition", and -openly maintains the doctrine of necessity in his commentary on the -Qur’ān. The Mātarīdiyya--another school of anti-rationalist theology, -founded by Abu Manṣūr Mātarīdī a native of Mātarīd in the environs of -Samarqand--went back to the old rationalist position, and taught in -opposition to the As̱ẖ‘arite, that man has absolute control over his -activity; and that his power affects the very nature of his actions. -Al-As̱ẖ‘arī's interest was purely theological; but it was impossible to -harmonise reason and revelation without making reference to the ultimate -nature of reality. Bāqilānī[68:1] therefore, made use of some purely -metaphysical propositions (that substance is an individual unity; that -quality cannot exist in quality; that perfect vacuum is possible.) in -his Theological investigation, and thus gave the school a metaphysical -foundation which it is our main object to bring out. We shall not, -therefore, dwell upon their defence of orthodox beliefs (e.g. that the -Qur’ān is uncreated; that the visibility of God is possible etc.); but -we shall endeavour to pick up the elements of metaphysical thought in -their theological controversies. In order to meet contemporary -philosophers on their own ground, they could not dispense with -philosophising; hence willingly or unwillingly they had to develop a -theory of knowledge peculiar to themselves. - - [67:1] S̱ẖahrastānī--ed. Cureton, p. 69. - - [68:1] Martin Schreiner: Zur Geschichte des Ash‘aritenthums. - (Huitième Congrès International des Orientalistes 1889, p. 82). - -God, according to the As̱ẖ‘arite, is the ultimate necessary existence -which "carries its attributes in its own being"[69:1]; and whose -existence (wujūd) and essence (Māhiyyat) are identical. Besides the -argument from the contingent character of motion they used the following -arguments to prove the existence of this ultimate principle:-- - -(1). All bodies, they argue, are one in so far as the phenomenal fact of -their existence is concerned. But in spite of this unity, their -qualities are different and even opposed to each other. We are, -therefore, driven to postulate an ultimate cause in order to account for -their empirical divergence. - - [69:1] Martin Schreiner: Zur Geschichte des Ash‘aritenthums. - (Huitième Congrès International des Orientalistes II{me} Partie - 1893, p. 113). - -(2). Every contingent being needs a cause to account for its existence. -The Universe is contingent; therefore it must have a cause; and that -cause is God. That the Universe is contingent, they proved in the -following manner. All that exists in the Universe, is either substance -or quality. The contingence of quality is evident, and the contingence -of substance follows from the fact that no substance could exist apart -from qualities. The contingence of quality necessitates the contingence -of substance; otherwise the eternity of substance would necessitate the -eternity of quality. In order fully to appreciate the value of this -argument, it is necessary to understand the As̱ẖ‘arite theory of -knowledge. To answer the question, "What is a thing?" they subjected to -a searching criticism the Aristotelian categories of thought, and -arrived at the conclusion that bodies have no properties in -themselves[70:1]. They made no distinction of secondary and primary -qualities of a body, and reduced all of them to purely subjective -relations. Quality too became with them a mere accident without which -the substance could not exist. They used the word substance or atom with -a vague implication of externality; but their criticism, actuated by a -pious desire to defend the idea of divine creation, reduced the Universe -to a mere show of ordered subjectivities which, as they maintained like -Berkeley, found their ultimate explanation in the Will of God. In his -examination of human knowledge regarded as a product and not merely a -process, Kant stopped at the idea of "Ding an sich", but the As̱ẖ‘arite -endeavoured to penetrate further, and maintained, against the -contemporary Agnostic-Realism, that the so called underlying essence -existed only in so far as it was brought in relation to the knowing -subject. Their atomism, therefore, approaches that of Lotze[71:1] who, -in spite of his desire to save external reality, ended in its complete -reduction to ideality. But like Lotze they could not believe their atoms -to be the inner working of the Infinite Primal Being. The interest of -pure monotheism was too strong for them. The necessary consequence of -their analysis of matter is a thorough going idealism like that of -Berkeley; but perhaps their instinctive realism combined with the force -of atomistic tradition, still compels them to use the word "atom" by -which they endeavour to give something like a realistic coloring to -their idealism. The interest of dogmatic theology drove them to maintain -towards pure Philosophy an attitude of criticism which taught her -unwilling advocates how to philosophise and build a metaphysics of their -own. - - [70:1] See Macdonald's admirable account of the As̱ẖ‘arite - Metaphysics: Muslim Theology p. 201 sq. See also Maulānā - S̱ẖiblī ‘Ilmal Kalām pp. 60, 72. - - [71:1] "Lotze is an atomist, but he does not conceive the atoms - themselves as material; for extension, like all other sensuous - qualities is explained through the reciprocal action of atoms; - they themselves, therefore, cannot possess this quality. Like - life and like all empirical qualities, the sensuous fact of - extension is due to the cooperation of points of force, which, - in time, must be conceived as starting points of the inner - workings of the Infinite Primal Being." Höffding Vol. II, p. - 516. - -But a more important and philosophically more significant aspect of the -As̱ẖ‘arite Metaphysics, is their attitude towards the Law of -Causation[72:1]. Just as they repudiated all the principles of -optics[72:2] in order to show, in opposition to the Rationalists, that -God could be visible in spite of His being unextended, so with a view -to defend the possibility of miracles, they rejected the idea of -causation altogether. The orthodox believed in miracles as well as in -the Universal Law of Causation; but they maintained that, at the time of -manifesting a miracle, God suspended the operation of this law. The -As̱ẖ‘arite, however, starting with the supposition that cause and -effect must be similar, could not share the orthodox view, and taught -that the idea of power is meaningless, and that we know nothing but -floating impressions, the phenomenal order of which is determined by -God. - - [72:1] S̱ẖiblī ‘Ilmal-Kalām pp. 64, 72. - - [72:2] S̱ẖahrastānī, ed. Cureton, p. 82. - -Any account of the As̱ẖ‘arite metaphysics would be incomplete without a -notice of the work of Al-G̱ẖazālī (d. 1111 A.D.) who though -misunderstood by many orthodox theologians, will always be looked upon -as one of the greatest personalities of Islam. This sceptic of powerful -ability anticipated Descartes[73:1] in his philosophical method; and, -"seven hundred years before Hume cut the bond of causality with the -edge of his dialectic"[73:2]. He was the first to write a systematic -refutation of philosophy, and completely to annihilate that dread of -intellectualism which had characterised the orthodox. It was chiefly his -influence that made men study dogma and metaphysics together, and -eventually led to a system of education which produced such men as -S̱ẖahrastānī, Al-Rāzī and Al-Is̱ẖrāqī. The following passage indicates -his attitude as a thinker:-- - -"From my childhood I was inclined to think out things for myself. The -result of this attitude was that I revolted against authority; and all -the beliefs that had fixed themselves in my mind from childhood lost -their original importance. I thought that such beliefs based on mere -authority were equally entertained by Jews, Christians, and followers of -other religions. Real knowledge must eradicate all doubt. For instance, -it is self-evident that ten is greater than three. If a person, however, -endeavours to prove the contrary by an appeal to his power of turning a -stick into a snake, the performance would indeed be wonderful, though -it cannot touch the certainty of the proposition in question"[75:1]. He -examined afterwards, all the various claimants of "Certain Knowledge" -and finally found it in Ṣūfīism. - - [73:1] "It (Al-Ghazālī's work on the Revivication of the - sciences of religion) has so remarkable a resemblance to the - _Discourse sur la methode_ of Descartes, that had any - translation of it existed in the days of Descartes everyone - would have cried against the plagiarism". (Lewes's History of - Philosophy: Vol. II. p. 50). - - [73:2] Journal of the American Oriental Society, Vol. 20, p. - 103. - - [75:1] Al-Munqiḏẖ p. 3. - -With their view of the nature of substance, the As̱ẖ‘arite, rigid -monotheists as they were, could not safely discuss the nature of the -human soul. Al-G̱ẖazālī alone seriously took up the problem, and to -this day it is difficult to define, with accuracy, his view of the -nature of God. In him, like Borger and Solger in Germany, Ṣūfī pantheism -and the As̱ẖ‘arite dogma of personality appear to harmonise together, a -reconciliation which makes it difficult to say whether he was a -Pantheist, or a Personal Pantheist of the type of Lotze. The soul, -according to Al-G̱ẖazālī, perceives things. But perception as an -attribute can exist only in a substance or essence which is absolutely -free from all the attributes of body. In his Al-Madnūn[75:2], he -explains why the prophet declined to reveal the nature of the soul. -There are, he says, two kinds of men; ordinary men and thinkers. The -former who look upon materiality as a condition of existence, cannot -conceive an immaterial substance. The latter are led, by their logic, to -a conception of the soul which sweeps away all difference between God -and the individual soul. Al-G̱ẖazālī, therefore, realised the -Pantheistic drift of his own inquiry, and preferred silence as to the -ultimate nature of the soul. - - [75:2] See Sir Sayyid Aḥmad's criticism of Al-G̱ẖazālī's view - of the soul, Al-Nazrufī ba’di Masāili-l Imāmi-l humām Abū Ḥāmid - Al-G̱ẖazālī; No. 4, p. 3 sq. (ed. Agra). - -He is generally included among the As̱ẖ‘arite. But strictly speaking he -is not an As̱ẖ‘arite; though he admitted that the As̱ẖ‘arite mode of -thought was excellent for the masses. "He held", says S̱ẖiblī -(‘Ilmal-Kalām, p. 66.), "that the secret of faith could not be revealed; -for this reason he encouraged exposition of the As̱ẖ‘arite theology, -and took good care in persuading his immediate disciples not to publish -the results of his private reflection". Such an attitude towards the -As̱ẖ‘arite theology, combined with his constant use of philosophical -language, could not but lead to suspicion. Ibn Jauzī, Qāḍī ‘Iyāḍ, and -other famous theologians of the orthodox school, publicly denounced him -as one of the "misguided"; and ‘Iyāḍ went even so far as to order the -destruction of all his philosophical and theological writings that -existed in Spain. - -It is, therefore, clear that while the dialectic of Rationalism -destroyed the personality of God, and reduced divinity to a bare -indefinable universality, the antirationalist movement, though it -preserved the dogma of personality, destroyed the external reality of -nature. In spite of Nazzām's theory of "Atomic objectification"[77:1], -the atom of the Rationalist possesses an independent objective reality; -that of the As̱ẖ‘arite is a fleeting moment of Divine Will. The one -saves nature, and tends to do away with the God of Theology; the other -sacrifices nature to save God as conceived by the orthodox. The -God-intoxicated Ṣūfī who stands aloof from the Theological controversies -of the age, saves and spiritualises both the aspects of existence, and -looks upon the whole Universe as the self-revelation of God--a higher -notion which synthesises the opposite extremes of his predecessors. -"Wooden-legged" Rationalism, as the Ṣūfī called it, speaks its last word -in the sceptic Al-G̱ẖazālī, whose restless soul, after long and -hopeless wanderings in the desolate sands of dry intellectualism, found -its final halting place in the still deep of human emotion. His -scepticism is directed more to substantiate the necessity of a higher -source of knowledge than merely to defend the dogma of Islamic Theology, -and, therefore, marks the quiet victory of Ṣūfīism over all the rival -speculative tendencies of the time. - - [77:1] Ibn Ḥazm, Vol. V, p. 63, 64, where the author states and - criticises this theory. - -Al-G̱ẖazālī's positive contribution to the Philosophy of his country, -however, is found in his little book--Mis̱ẖkātal-Anwār--where he starts -with the Quranic verse, "God is the light of heavens and earth", and -instinctively returns to the Iranian idea, which was soon to find a -vigorous expounder in Al-Is̱ẖrāqī. Light, he teaches in this book, is -the only real existence; and there is no darkness greater than -non-existence. But the essence of Light is manifestation: "it is -attributed to manifestation which is a relation"[78:1]. The Universe -was created out of darkness on which God sprinkled[79:1] his own light, -and made its different parts more or less visible according as they -received more or less light. As bodies differ from one another in being -dark, obscure, illuminated or illuminating, so men are differentiated -from one another. There are some who illuminate other human beings; and, -for this reason, the Prophet is named "The Burning Lamp" in the Qur’ān. - - [78:1] Mis̱ẖkātal-Anwār, fol. 3a. - - [79:1] In support of this view Al-G̱ẖazālī quotes a tradition - of the prophet. Mis̱ẖkātal-Anwār, fol. 10a. - -The physical eye sees only the external manifestation of the Absolute or -Real Light. There is an internal eye in the heart of man which, unlike -the physical eye, sees itself as other things, an eye which goes beyond -the finite, and pierces the veil of manifestation. These thoughts are -merely germs, which developed and fructified in Al-Is̱ẖrāqī's -"Philosophy of Illumination"--Ḥikmatal-Is̱ẖrāq. - -Such is the As̱ẖ‘arite philosophy. - -One great theological result of this reaction was that it checked the -growth of freethought which tended to dissolve the solidarity of the -Church. We are, however, concerned more with the purely intellectual -results of the As̱ẖ‘arite mode of thought, and these are mainly two:-- - -(1). It led to an independent criticism of Greek philosophy as we shall -see presently. - -(2). In the beginning of the 10th century when the As̱ẖ‘arite had -almost completely demolished the stronghold of Rationalism, we see a -tendency towards what may be called Persian Positivism. Al-Birūnī[80:1] -(d. 1048) and Ibn Haiṯẖam[80:2] (d. 1038) who anticipated modern -empirical Psychology in recognising what is called reaction-time, gave -up all inquiry concerning the nature of the supersensual, and maintained -a prudent silence about religious matters. Such a state of things could -have existed, but could not have been logically justified before -Al-As̱ẖ‘arī. - - [80:1] He (Al-Birūnī) quotes with approval the following, as the - teaching of the adherents of Aryabhatta: It is enough for us to - know that which is lighted up by the sun's rays. Whatever lies - beyond, though it should be of immeasurable extent, we cannot - make use of; for what the sunbeam does not reach, the senses do - not perceive, and what the senses do not perceive we cannot - know. From this we gather what Al-Birūnī's Philosophy was: only - sense-perceptions, knit together by a logical intelligence, - yield sure knowledge. (Boer's Philosophy in Islām, p. 146). - - [80:2] "Moreover truth for him (Ibn Haiṯẖam) was only that - which was presented as material for the faculties of - sense-perception, and which received it from the understanding, - being thus the logically elaborated perception". (Boer's - Philosophy in Islām, p. 150). - - [80:2] "Moreover truth for him (Ibn Haiṯẖam) was only that - which was presented as material for the faculties of - sense-perception, and which received it from the understanding, - being thus the logically elaborated perception". (Boer's - Philosophy in Islām, p. 150). - - - - -CHAP. IV. - -CONTROVERSY BETWEEN IDEALISM AND REALISM. - - -The As̱ẖ‘arite denial of Aristotle's Prima Materia, and their views -concerning the nature of space, time and causation, awakened that -irrepressible spirit of controversy which, for centuries, divided the -camp of Muhammedan thinkers, and eventually exhausted its vigor in the -merely verbal subtleties of schools. The publication of Najm al-Dīn -Al-Kātibī's (a follower of Aristotle whose disciples were called -Philosophers as distinguished from scholastic theologians) Ḥikmat -al-‘Ain--"Philosophy of Essence", greatly intensified the intellectual -conflict, and invoked keen criticism from a host of As̱ẖ‘arite as well -as other idealist thinkers. I shall consider in order the principal -points on which the two schools differed from each other. - - -A. _The Nature of the Essence._ - -We have seen that the As̱ẖ‘arite theory of knowledge drove them to -hold that individual essences of various things are quite different from -each other, and are determined in each case by the ultimate cause--God. -They denied the existence of an everchanging primary stuff common to all -things, and maintained against the Rationalists that existence -constitutes the very being of the essence. To them, therefore, essence -and existence are identical. They argued that the Judgment, "Man is -animal", is possible only on the ground of a fundamental difference -between the subject and the predicate; since their identity would make -the Judgment nugatory, and complete difference would make the -predication false. It is, therefore, necessary to postulate an external -cause to determine the various forms of existence. Their opponents, -however, admit the determination or limitation of existence, but they -maintain that all the various forms of existence, in so far as their -essence is concerned, are identical--all being limitations of one -Primary substance. The followers of Aristotle met the difficulty -suggested by the possibility of synthetic predication, by advocating the -possibility of compound essences. Such a judgment as "Man is animal", -they maintained, is true; because man is an essence composed of two -essences, animality and humanity. This, retorted the As̱ẖ‘arite, cannot -stand criticism. If you say that the essence of man and animal is the -same, you in other words hold that the essence of the whole is the same -as that of the part. But this proposition is absurd; since if the -essence of the compound is the same as that of its constituents, the -compound will have to be regarded as one being having two essences or -existences. - -It is obvious that the whole controversy turns on the question whether -existence is a mere idea or something objectively real. When we say that -a certain thing exists, do we mean that it exists only in relation to us -(As̱ẖ‘arite position); or that it is an essence existing quite -independently of us (Realist position)? We shall briefly indicate the -arguments of either side. The Realist argued as follows:-- - -(1). The conception of my existence is something immediate or intuitive. -The thought "I exist" is a "concept", and my body being an element of -this "concept", it follows that my body is intuitively known as -something real. If the knowledge of the existent is not immediate, the -fact of its perception would require a process of thought which, as we -know, it does not. The As̱ẖ‘arite Al-Rāzī admits that the concept of -existence is immediate; but he regards the judgment--"The concept of -existence is immediate"--as merely a matter of acquisition. Muḥammad ibn -Mubārak Buḵẖārī, on the other hand, says that the whole argument of -the realist proceeds on the assumption that the concept of my existence -is something immediate--a position which can be controverted.[84:1] If, -says he, we admit that the concept of my existence is immediate, -abstract existence cannot be regarded as a constitutive element of this -conception. And if the realist maintains that the perception of a -particular object is immediate, we admit the truth of what he says; but -it would not follow, as he is anxious to establish, that the so called -underlying essence is immediately known as objectively real. The -realist argument, moreover, demands that the mind ought not to be able -to conceive the predication of qualities to things. We cannot conceive, -"snow is white", because whiteness, being a part of this immediate -judgment, must also be immediately known without any predication. Mulla -Muḥammad Hās̱ẖim Ḥusainī remarks[85:1] that this reasoning is -erroneous. The mind in the act of predicating whiteness of snow is -working on a purely ideal existence--the quality of whiteness--and not -on an objectively real essence of which the qualities are mere facets or -aspects. Ḥusainī, moreover, anticipates Hamilton, and differs from other -realists in holding that the so-called unknowable essence of the object -is also immediately known. The object, he says, is immediately perceived -as one.[85:2] We do not successively perceive the various aspects of -what happens to be the objects of our perception. - - [84:1] Muḥammad ibn Mubārak's commentary on Ḥikmat al-‘Ain, - fol. 5a. - - [85:1] Ḥusainī's commentary on Ḥikmat al-‘Ain, fol. 13a. - - [85:2] Ḥusainī's commentary on Ḥikmat al-‘Ain, fol. 14b. - -(2) The idealist, says the realist, reduces all quality to mere -subjective relations. His argument leads him to deny the underlying -essence of things, and to look upon them as entirely heterogeneous -collections of qualities, the essence of which consists merely in the -phenomenal fact of their perception. In spite of his belief in the -complete heterogeneity of things, he applies the word existence to all -things--a tacit admission that there is some essence common to all the -various forms of existence. Abu’l-Ḥasan al-As̱ẖ‘arī replies that this -application is only a verbal convenience, and is not meant to indicate -the so-called internal homogeneity of things. But the universal -application of the word existence by the idealist, must mean, according -to the realist, that the existence of a thing either constitutes its -very essence, or it is something superadded to the underlying essence of -the thing. The first supposition is a virtual admission as to the -homogeneity of things; since we cannot maintain that existence peculiar -to one thing is fundamentally different from existence peculiar to -another. The supposition that existence is something superadded to the -essence of a thing leads to an absurdity; since in this case the essence -will have to be regarded as something distinct from existence; and the -denial of essence (with the As̱ẖ‘arite) would blot out the distinction -between existence and non-existence. Moreover, what was the essence -before existence was superadded to it? We must not say that the essence -was ready to receive existence before it actually did receive it; since -this statement would imply that the essence was non-existence before it -received existence. Likewise the statement that the essence has the -power of receiving the quality of non-existence, implies the absurdity -that it does already exist. Existence, therefore, must be regarded as -forming a part of the essence. But if it forms a part of the essence, -the latter will have to be regarded as a compound. If, on the other -hand, existence is external to the essence, it must be something -contingent because of its dependence on something other than itself. Now -everything contingent must have a cause. If this cause is the essence -itself, it would follow that the essence existed before it existed; -since the cause must precede the effect in the fact of existence. If, -however, the cause of existence is something other than the essence, it -follows that the existence of God also must be explained by some cause -other than the essence of God--an absurd conclusion which turns the -necessary into the contingent.[88:1] This argument of the realist is -based on a complete misunderstanding of the idealist position. He does -not see that the idealist never regarded the fact of existence as -something superadded to the essence of a thing; but always held it to be -identical with the essence. The essence, says ibn Mubārak,[88:2] is the -cause of existence without being chronologically before it. The -existence of the essence constitutes its very being; it is not dependent -for it on something other than itself. - - [88:1] Ibn Mubārak's Commentary, fol. 8b. - - [88:2] Ibn Mubārak's Commentary, fol. 9a. - -The truth is that both sides are far from a true theory of knowledge. -The agnostic realist who holds that behind the phenomenal qualities of a -thing, there is an essence operating as their cause, is guilty of a -glaring contradiction. He holds that underlying the thing there is an -_unknowable_ essence or substratum which is _known_ to exist. The -As̱ẖ‘arite idealist, on the other hand, misunderstands the process of -knowledge. He ignores the mental activity involved in the act of -knowledge; and looks upon perceptions as mere presentations which are -determined, as he says, by God. But if the order of presentations -requires a cause to account for it, why should not that cause be sought -in the original constitution of matter as Locke did? Moreover, the -theory that knowledge is a mere passive perception or awareness of what -is presented, leads to certain inadmissible conclusions which the -As̱ẖ‘arite never thought of:-- - -(a). They did not see that their purely subjective conception of -knowledge swept away all possibility of error. If the existence of a -thing is merely the fact of its being presented, there is no reason why -it should be cognised as different from what it actually is. - -(b). They did not see that on their theory of knowledge, our -fellow-beings like other elements of the physical order, would have no -higher reality than mere states of my consciousness. - -(c). If knowledge is a mere receptivity of presentations, God who, as -cause of presentations, is active in regard to the act of our knowledge, -must not be aware of our presentations. From the As̱ẖ‘arite point of -view this conclusion is fatal to their whole position. They cannot say -that presentations on their ceasing to be my presentations, continue to -be presentations to God's consciousness. - -Another question connected with the nature of the essence is, whether it -is caused or uncaused. The followers of Aristotle, or philosophers as -they are generally called by their opponents, hold that the underlying -essence of things is uncaused. The As̱ẖ‘arite hold the opposite view. -Essence, says the Aristotelian, cannot be acted upon by any external -agent.[90:1] Al-Kātibī argues that if, for instance, the essence of -humanity had resulted from the operation of an external activity, doubt -as to its being the real essence of humanity would have been possible. -As a matter of fact we never entertain such a doubt; it follows, -therefore, that the essence is not due to the activity of an agency -external to itself. The idealist starts with the realist distinction of -essence and existence, and argues that the realist line of argument -would lead to the absurd proposition--that man is uncaused; since he -must be regarded, according to the realist, as a combination of two -uncaused essences--existence and humanity. - - [90:1] Ibn Mubārak's Commentary, fol. 20a. - - -B. _The Nature of Knowledge._ - -The followers of Aristotle, true to their position as to the independent -objective reality of the essence, define knowledge as "receiving images -of external things".[91:1] It is possible to conceive, they argue, an -object which is externally unreal, and to which other qualities can be -attributed. But when we attribute to it the quality of existence, actual -existence is necessitated; since the affirmation of the quality of a -thing is a part of the affirmation of that thing. If, therefore, the -predication of existence does not necessitate actual objective existence -of the thing, we are driven to deny externality altogether, and to hold -that the thing exists in the mind as a mere idea. But the affirmation -of a thing, says Ibn Mubārak, constitutes the very existence of the -thing. The idealist makes no such distinction as affirmation and -existence. To infer from the above argument that the thing must be -regarded as existing in the mind, is unjustifiable. "Ideal" existence -follows only from the denial of externality which the As̱ẖ‘arite do not -deny; since they hold that knowledge is a relation between the knower -and the known which is known as external. Al-Kātibī's proposition that -if the thing does not exist as external existence, it must exist as -ideal or mental existence, is self-contradictory; since, on his -principles, everything that exists in idea exists in externality.[92:1] - - [91:1] Ibn Mubārak, fol. 11a. - - [92:1] Ibn Mubārak, fol. 11b. - - -C. _The Nature of Non-existence._ - -Al-Kātibī explains and criticises the proposition, maintained by -contemporary philosophers generally--"That the existent is good, and the -non-existent is evil".[92:2] The fact of murder, he says, is not evil -because the murderer had the power of committing such a thing; or -because the instrument of murder had the power of cutting; or because -the neck of the murdered had the capacity of being cut asunder. It is -evil because it signifies the negation of life--a condition which is -non-existential, and not existential like the conditions indicated -above. But in order to show that evil is non-existence, we should make -an inductive inquiry, and examine all the various cases of evil. A -perfect induction, however, is impossible, and an incomplete induction -cannot prove the point. Al-Kātibī, therefore, rejects this proposition, -and holds that "non-existence is absolute nothing".[93:1] The possible -'_essences_', according to him, are not lying fixed in space waiting for -the attribute of existence; otherwise fixity in space would have to be -regarded as possessing no existence. But his critics hold that this -argument is true only on the supposition that fixity in space and -existence are identical. Fixity in externality, says Ibn Mubārak, is a -conception wider than existence. All existence is external, but all that -is external is not necessarily existent. - - [92:2] Ibn Mubārak, fol. 14a. - - [93:1] Ibn Mubārak's Commentary, fol. 14b. - -The interest of the As̱ẖ‘arite in the dogma of the Resurrection--the -possibility of the reappearance of the non-existent as existent--led -them to advocate the apparently absurd proposition that "non-existence -or nothing _is_ something". They argued that, since we make judgments -about the non-existent, it is, therefore, known; and the fact of its -knowability indicates that "the nothing" is not absolutely nothing. The -knowable is a case of affirmation and the non-existent being knowable, -is a case of affirmation.[94:1] Al-Kātibī denies the truth of the Major. -Impossible things, he says, are known, yet they do not externally exist. -Al-Rāzī criticises this argument accusing Al-Kātibī of the ignorance of -the fact that the '_essence_' exists in the mind, and yet is known as -external. Al-Kātibī supposes that the knowledge of a thing necessitates -its existence as an independent objective reality. Moreover it should be -remembered that the As̱ẖ‘arite discriminate between positive and -existent on the one hand, and non-existent and negative on the other. -They say that all existent is positive, but the converse of this -proposition is not true. There is certainly a relation between the -existent and the non-existent, but there is absolutely no relation -between the positive and the negative. We do not say, as Al-Kātibī -holds, that the impossible is non-existent; we say that the impossible -is only negative. Substances which do exist are something positive. As -regards the attribute which cannot be conceived as existing apart from -the substance, it is neither existent nor non-existent, but something -between the two. Briefly the As̱ẖ‘arite position is as follows:-- - -"A thing has a proof of its existence or not. If not, it is called -negative. If it has a proof of its existence, it is either substance or -attribute. If it is substance and has the attribute of existence or -non-existence, (i.e. it is perceived or not) it is existent or -non-existent accordingly. If it is attribute, it is neither existent nor -non-existent".[95:1] - - [94:1] Ibn Mubārak's Commentary, fol. 15a. - - [95:1] Ibn Mubārak's Commentary, fol. 15b. - - - - -CHAP. V. - -ṢŪFĪISM. - - -§ I. - -The origin and Qurānic Justification of Ṣūfīism. - -It has become quite a fashion with modern oriental scholarship to trace -the chain of influences. Such a procedure has certainly great historical -value, provided it does not make us ignore the fundamental fact, that -the human mind possesses an independent individuality, and, acting on -its own initiative, can gradually evolve out of itself, truths which may -have been anticipated by other minds ages ago. No idea can seize a -people's soul unless, in some sense, it is the people's own. External -influences may wake it up from its deep unconscious slumber; but they -cannot, so to speak, create it out of nothing. - -Much has been written about the origin of Persian Ṣūfīism; and, in -almost all cases, explorers of this most interesting field of research -have exercised their ingenuity in discovering the various channels -through which the basic ideas of Ṣūfīism might have travelled from one -place to another. They seem completely to have ignored the principle, -that the full significance of a phenomenon in the intellectual evolution -of a people, can only be comprehended in the light of those pre-existing -intellectual, political, and social conditions which alone make its -existence inevitable. Von Kremer and Dozy derive Persian Ṣūfīism from -the Indian Vedanta; Merx and Mr. Nicholson derive it from Neo-Platonism; -while Professor Browne once regarded it as Aryan reaction against an -unemotional semitic religion. It appears to me, however, that these -theories have been worked out under the influence of a notion of -causation which is essentially false. That a fixed quantity A is the -cause of, or produces another fixed quantity B, is a proposition which, -though convenient for scientific purposes, is apt to damage all inquiry, -in so far as it leads us completely to ignore the innumerable conditions -lying at the back of a phenomenon. It would, for instance, be an -historical error to say that the dissolution of the Roman Empire was due -to the barbarian invasions. The statement completely ignores other -forces of a different character that tended to split up the political -unity of the Empire. To describe the advent of barbarian invasions as -the cause of the dissolution of the Roman Empire which could have -assimilated, as it actually did to a certain extent, the so-called -cause, is a procedure that no logic would justify. Let us, therefore, in -the light of a truer theory of causation, enumerate the principal -political, social, and intellectual conditions of Islamic life about the -end of the 8{th} and the first half of the 9{th} century when, properly -speaking, the Ṣūfī ideal of life came into existence, to be soon -followed by a philosophical justification of that ideal.-- - -(1). When we study the history of the time, we find it to be a time of -more or less political unrest. The latter half of the 8{th} century -presents, besides the political revolution which resulted in the -overthrow of the Umayyads (749 A.D.), persecutions of Zendīks, and -revolts of Persian heretics (Sindbāh 755–6; Ustādhīs 766–8; the veiled -prophet of Ḵẖurāsān 777–80) who, working on the credulity of the -people, cloaked, like Lamennais in our own times, political projects -under the guise of religious ideas. Later on in the beginning of the -9{th} century we find the sons of Hārūn (Ma’mūn and Amīn) engaged in a -terrible conflict for political supremacy; and still later, we see the -Golden Age of Islamic literature seriously disturbed by the persistent -revolt of the Mazdakite Bābak (816–838). The early years of Ma’mun's -reign present another social phenomenon of great political -significance--the S̱ẖu‘ūbiyya controversy (815), which progresses with -the rise and establishment of independent Persian families, the Tāhirīd -(820), the Ṣaffārīd (868), and the Sāmānīd Dynasty (874). It is, -therefore, the combined force of these and other conditions of a similar -nature that contributed to drive away spirits of devotional character -from the scene of continual unrest to the blissful peace of an -ever-deepening contemplative life. The semitic character of the life and -thought of these early Muhammadan ascetics is gradually followed by a -large hearted pantheism of a more or less Aryan stamp, the development -of which, in fact, runs parallel to the slowly progressing political -independence of Persia. - -(2). _The Sceptical tendencies of Islamic Rationalism_ which found an -early expression in the poems of Bas̱ẖs̱ẖār ibn Burd--the blind -Persian Sceptic who deified fire, and scoffed at all non-Persian modes -of thought. The germs of Scepticism latent in Rationalism ultimately -necessitated an appeal to a super-intellectual source of knowledge which -asserted itself in the Risāla of Al-Qus̱ẖairī (986). In our own times -the negative results of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason drove Jacobi and -Schleiermacher to base faith on the feeling of the reality of the ideal; -and to the 19{th} century sceptic Wordsworth uncovered that mysterious -state of mind "in which we grow all spirit and see into the life of -things". - -(3). The unemotional piety of the various schools of Islam--the Ḥanafite -(Abu Ḥanīfa d. 767), the S̱ẖāfiite (Al-S̱ẖāfi‘ī d. 820), the Mālikite -(Al-Mālik d. 795), and the anthropomorphic Ḥambalite (Ibn Ḥambal d. -855)--the bitterest enemy of independent thought--which ruled the masses -after the death of Al-Ma’mūn. - -(4). The religious discussions among the representatives of various -creeds encouraged by Al-Ma’mūn, and especially the bitter theological -controversy between the As̱ẖ‘arites, and the advocates of Rationalism -which tended not only to confine religion within the narrow limits of -schools, but also stirred up the spirit to rise above all petty -sectarian wrangling. - -(5). The gradual softening of religious fervency due to the -rationalistic tendency of the early ‘Abbāsid period, and the rapid -growth of wealth which tended to produce moral laxity and indifference -to religious life in the upper circles of Islam. - -(6). The presence of Christianity as a working ideal of life. It was, -however, principally the actual life of the Christian hermit rather than -his religious ideas, that exercised the greatest fascination over the -minds of early Islamic Saints whose complete unworldliness, though -extremely charming in itself, is, I believe, quite contrary to the -spirit of Islam. - -Such was principally the environment of Ṣūfīism, and it is to the -combined action of the above condition that we should look for the -origin and development of Ṣūfīistic ideas. Given these condition and the -Persian mind with an almost innate tendency towards monism, the whole -phenomenon of the birth and growth of Ṣūfīism is explained. If we now -study the principal pre-existing conditions of Neo-Platonism, we find -that similar conditions produced similar results. The barbarian raids -which were soon to reduce Emperors of the Palace to Emperors of the -Camp, assumed a more serious aspect about the middle of the third -century. Plotinus himself speaks of the political unrest of his time in -one of his letters to Flaccus.[102:1] When he looked round himself in -Alexandria, his birth place, he noticed signs of growing toleration and -indifferentism towards religious life. Later on in Rome which had -become, so to say, a pantheon of different nations, he found a similar -want of seriousness in life, a similar laxity of character in the upper -classes of society. In more learned circles philosophy was studied as a -branch of literature rather than for its own sake; and Sextus Empiricus, -provoked by Antiochus's tendency to fuse scepticism and Stoicism was -teaching the old unmixed scepticism of Pyrrho--that intellectual despair -which drove Plotinus to find truth in a revelation above thought itself. -Above all, the hard unsentimental character of Stoic morality, and the -loving piety of the followers of Christ who, undaunted by long and -fierce persecutions, were preaching the message of peace and love to the -whole Roman world, necessitated a restatement of Pagan thought in a way -that might revivify the older ideals of life, and suit the new spiritual -requirements of the people. But the ethical force of Christianity was -too great for Neo-Platonism which, on account of its more -metaphysical[103:1] character, had no message for the people at large, -and was consequently inaccessible to the rude barbarian who, being -influenced by the actual life of the persecuted Christian adopted -Christianity, and settled down to construct new empires out of the ruins -of the old. In Persia the influence of culture-contacts and -cross-fertilisation of ideas created in certain minds a vague desire to -realise a similar restatement of Islam, which gradually assimilated -Christian ideals as well as Christian Gnostic speculation, and found a -firm foundation in the Qur’ān. The flower of Greek Thought faded away -before the breath of Christianity; but the burning simoon of Ibn -Taimiyya's invective could not touch the freshness of the Persian rose. -The one was completely swept away by the flood of barbarian invasions; -the other, unaffected by the Tartar revolution, still holds its own. - - [102:1] "Tidings have reached us that Valerian has been - defeated, and is now in the hands of Sapor. The threats of - Franks and Allemanni, of Goths and Persians, are alike terrible - by turns to our _degenerate_ Rome." (Plotinus to Flaccus; quoted - by Vaughan in his Half hours with Mystics, p. 63.) - - [103:1] The element of ecstacy which could have appealed to some - minds was thrown into the background by the later teachers of - Neo-Platonism, so that it became a mere system of thought having - no human interest. Says Whittaker:--"The mystical ecstacy was - not found by the later teachers of the school easier to attain, - but more difficult; and the tendency became more and more to - regard it as all but unattainable on earth." Neo-Platonism, p. - 101. - -This extraordinary vitality of the Ṣūfī restatement of Islam, however, -is explained when we reflect on the all-embracing structure of Ṣūfīism. -The semitic formula of salvation can be briefly stated in the words, -"Transform your will",--which signifies that the Semite looks upon will -as the essence of the human soul. The Indian Vedantist, on the other -hand, teaches that all pain is due to our mistaken attitude towards -the Universe. He, therefore, commands us to transform our -understanding--implying thereby that the essential nature of man -consists in thought, not activity or will. But the Ṣūfī holds that the -mere transformation of will or understanding will not bring peace; we -should bring about the transformation of both by a complete -transformation of feeling, of which will and understanding are only -specialised forms. His message to the individual is--"Love all, and -forget your own individuality in doing good to others." Says Rūmī:--"To -win other people's hearts is the greatest pilgrimage; and one heart is -worth more than a thousand Ka‘bahs. Ka‘bah is a mere cottage of Abraham; -but the heart is the very home of God." But this formula demands a _why_ -and a _how_--a metaphysical justification of the ideal in order to -satisfy the understanding; and rules of action in order to guide the -will. Ṣūfīism furnishes both. Semitic religion is a code of strict rules -of conduct; the Indian Vedanta, on the other hand, is a cold system of -thought. Ṣūfīism avoids their incomplete Psychology, and attempts to -synthesise both the Semitic and the Aryan formulas in the higher -category of Love. On the one hand it assimilates the Buddhistic idea of -Nirwāna (Fanā-Annihilation), and seeks to build a metaphysical system in -the light of this idea; on the other hand it does not disconnect itself -from Islam, and finds the justification of its view of the Universe in -the Qur’ān. Like the geographical position of its home, it stands midway -between the Semitic and the Aryan, assimilating ideas from both sides, -and giving them the stamp of its own individuality which, on the whole, -is more Aryan than Semitic in character. It would, therefore, be evident -that the secret of the vitality of Ṣūfīism is the complete view of human -nature upon which it is based. It has survived orthodox persecutions and -political revolutions, because it appeals to human nature in its -entirety; and, while it concentrates its interest chiefly in a _life_ of -self-denial, it allows free play to the speculative tendency as well. - -I will now briefly indicate how Ṣūfī writers justify their views from -the Quranic standpoint. There is no historical evidence to show that the -Prophet of Arabia actually communicated certain esoteric doctrines to -‘Alī or Abū Bakr. The Ṣūfī, however, contends that the Prophet had an -esoteric teaching--"wisdom"--as distinguished from the teaching -contained in the Book, and he brings forward the following verse to -substantiate his case:--"As we have sent a prophet to you from among -yourselves who reads our verses to you, purifies you, teaches you the -Book and the _Wisdom_, and teaches you _what you did not know -before_."[107:1] He holds that "the wisdom" spoken of in the verse, is -something not incorporated in the teaching of the Book which, as the -Prophet repeatedly declared, had been taught by several prophets before -him. If, he says, the wisdom is included in the Book, the word "Wisdom" -in the verse would be redundant. It can, I think, be easily shown that -in the Qur’ān as well as in the authenticated traditions, there are -germs of Ṣūfī doctrine which, owing to the thoroughly practical genius -of the Arabs, could not develop and fructify in Arabia, but which grew -up into a distinct doctrine when they found favourable circumstances in -alien soils. The Qur’ān thus defines the Muslims:--"Those who believe in -the Unseen, establish daily prayer, and spend out of what We have given -them."[108:1] But the question arises as to the _what_ and the _where_ -of the Unseen. The Qur’ān replies that the Unseen is in your own -soul--"And in the earth there are signs to those who believe, and in -yourself,--what! do you not then see!"[108:2] And again--"We are nigher -to him (man) than his own jugular vein."[108:3] Similarly the Holy Book -teaches that the essential nature of the Unseen is pure light--"God is -the light of heavens and earth."[108:4] As regards the question whether -this Primal Light is personal, the Qur’ān, in spite of many expressions -signifying personality, declares in a few words--"There is nothing like -him."[108:5] - - [107:1] Sura 2, v. 146. - - [108:1] Sura 2, v. 2. - - [108:2] Sura 51, v. 20, 21. - - [108:3] Sura 50, v. 15. - - [108:4] Sura 24, v. 35. - - [108:5] Sura 42, v. 9. - -These are some of the chief verses out of which the various Ṣūfī -commentators develop pantheistic views of the Universe. They enumerate -the following four stages of spiritual training through which the -soul--the order or reason of the Primal Light--("Say that the soul is -the order or reason of God.")[109:1] has to pass, if it desires to rise -above the common herd, and realise its union or identity with the -ultimate source of all things:-- - -(1). Belief in the Unseen. - -(2). Search after the Unseen. The spirit of inquiry leaves its slumber -by observing the marvellous phenomena of nature. "Look at the camel how -it is created; the skies how they are exalted; the mountains how they -are unshakeably fixed."[109:2] - -(3). The knowledge of the Unseen. This comes, as we have indicated -above, by looking into the depths of our own soul. - -(4). The Realisation--This results, according to the higher Ṣūfīism -from the constant practice of Justice and Charity--"Verily God bids you -do justice and good, and give to kindred (their due), and He forbids you -to sin, and do wrong, and oppress".[110:1] - - [109:1] Sura 17; v. 87. - - [109:2] Sura 88; v. 20. - - [110:1] Sura 16; v. 92. - -It must, however, be remembered that some later Ṣūfī fraternities (e.g. -Naqs̱ẖbandī) devised, or rather borrowed[110:2] from the Indian -Vedantist, other means of bringing about this Realisation. They taught, -imitating the Hindu doctrine of Kundalīnī, that there are six great -centres of light of various colours in the body of man. It is the object -of the Ṣūfī to make them move, or to use the technical word, "current" -by certain methods of meditation, and eventually to realise, amidst the -apparent diversity of colours, the fundamental colourless light which -makes everything visible, and is itself invisible. The continual -movement of these centres of light through the body, and the final -realisation of their identity, which results from putting the atoms of -the body into definite courses of motion by slow repetition of the -various names of God and other mysterious expressions, illuminates the -whole body of the Ṣūfī; and the perception of the same illumination in -the external world completely extinguishes the sense of "otherness." The -fact that these methods were known to the Persian Ṣūfīs misled Von -Kremer who ascribed the whole phenomenon of Ṣūfīism to the influence of -Vedantic ideas. Such methods of contemplation are quite unislamic in -character, and the higher Ṣūfīs do not attach any importance to them. - - [110:2] Weber makes the following statement on the authority of - Lassen:--"Al-Birūnī translated Patañjalī's work into Arabic at - the beginning of the 11th century, and also, it would appear, - the Sānkhya sūtra, though the information we have as to the - contents of these works does not harmonise with the Sanskrit - originals." History of Indian Literature, p. 239. - - -§ II. - -Aspects of Ṣūfī-Metaphysics. - -Let us now return to the various schools or rather the various aspects -of Ṣūfī Metaphysics. A careful investigation of Ṣūfī literature shows -that Ṣūfīism has looked at the Ultimate Reality from three standpoints -which, in fact, do not exclude but complement each other. Some Ṣūfīs -conceive the essential nature of reality as self-conscious will, others -beauty; others again hold that Reality is essentially Thought, Light or -Knowledge. There are, therefore, three aspects of Ṣūfī thought:-- - -A. _Reality as Self-conscious Will._ - -The first in historical order is that represented by S̱ẖaqīq Balḵẖī, -Ibrāhim Adham, Rābi‘a, and others. This school conceives the ultimate -reality as "Will", and the Universe a finite activity of that will. It -is essentially monotheistic and consequently more semitic in character. -It is not the desire of Knowledge which dominates the ideal of the Ṣūfīs -of this school, but the characteristic features of their life are piety, -unworldliness, and an intense longing for God due to the consciousness -of sin. Their object is not to philosophise, but principally to work out -a certain ideal of life. From our standpoint, therefore, they are not of -much importance. - -B. _Reality as Beauty._ - -In the beginning of the 9{th} century Ma‘rūf Karḵẖī defined Ṣūfīism -as "Apprehension of Divine realities"[113:1]--a definition which marks -the movement from Faith to Knowledge. But the method of apprehending the -ultimate reality was formally stated by Al-Qus̱ẖairī about the end of -the 10{th} century. The teachers of this school adopted the Neo-Platonic -idea of creation by intermediary agencies; and though this idea lingered -in the minds of Ṣūfī writers for a long time, yet their Pantheism led -them to abandon the Emanation theory altogether. Like Avicenna they -looked upon the ultimate Reality as "Eternal Beauty" whose very nature -consists in seeing its own "face" reflected in the Universe-mirror. The -Universe, therefore, became to them a reflected image of the "Eternal -Beauty", and not an emanation as the Neo-Platonists had taught. The -cause of creation, says Mīr Sayyid S̱ẖarīf, is the manifestation of -Beauty, and the first creation is Love. The realisation of this Beauty, -is brought about by universal love, which the innate Zoroastrian -instinct of the Persian Ṣūfī loved to define as "the Sacred Fire which -burns up everything other than God." Says Rūmī:-- - - "O thou pleasant madness, Love! - Thou Physician of all our ills! - Thou healer of pride, - Thou Plato and Galen of our souls!"[114:1] - - [113:1] Mr. Nicholson has collected the various definitions of - Ṣūfīism. See J. R. A. S. April, 1906. - - [114:1] Maṯẖnawī, Jalāl al Dīn Rūmī, with Baḥral ‘ulūm's - Commentary. Lucknow (India), 1877, p. 9. - -As a direct consequence of such a view of the Universe, we have the idea -of impersonal absorption which first appears in Bāyazīd of Bistām, and -which constitutes the characteristic feature of the later development of -this school. The growth of this idea may have been influenced by Hindu -pilgrims travelling through Persia to the Buddhistic temple still -existing at Bāku.[114:2] The school became wildly pantheistic in Ḥusain -Manṣūr who, in the true spirit of the Indian Vedantist, cried out, "I am -God"--Aham Brahma asmi. - - [114:2] As regards the progress of Buddhism Geiger says:--"We - know that in the period after Alexander, Buddhism was powerful - in Eastern Iran, and that it counted its confessors as far as - Tabaristan. It is especially certain that many Buddhistic - priests were found in Bactria. This state of things, which began - perhaps in the first century before Christ, lasted till the - 7{th} century A.D., when the appearance of Islamism alone cut - short the development of Buddhism in Kabul and Bactria, and it - is in that period that we will have to place the rise of the - Zarathushtra legend in the form in which it is presented to us - by Daqīqī." - - Civilisation of Eastern Iranians - Vol. II, p. 170. - -The ultimate Reality or Eternal Beauty, according to the Ṣūfīs of this -school, is infinite in the sense that "it is absolutely free from the -limitations of beginning, end, right, left, above, and below."[115:1] -The distinction of essence and attribute does not exist in the -Infinite--"Substance and quality are really identical."[115:2] We have -indicated above that nature is the mirror of the Absolute Existence. But -according to Nasafī, there are two kinds of mirrors[115:3]-- - -(a). That which shows merely a reflected image--this is external nature. - -(b). That which shows the real Essence--this is man who is a limitation -of the Absolute, and erroneously thinks himself to be an independent -entity. - - [115:1] Nasafī's Maqṣadi Aqṣā: fol. 8b. - - [115:2] Nasafī's Maqṣadi Aqṣā: fol. 10b. - - [115:3] Nasafī's Maqṣadi Aqṣā: fol. 23b. - -"O Derwish!" says Nasafī "dost thou think that thy existence is -independent of God? This is a great error."[116:1] Nasafī explains his -meaning by a beautiful parable.[116:2] The fishes in a certain tank -realised that they lived, moved, and had their being in water, but felt -that they were quite ignorant of the real nature of what constituted the -very source of their life. They resorted to a wiser fish in a great -river, and the Philosopher-fish addressed them thus:-- - -"O you who endeavour to untie the knot (of being)! You are born in -union, yet die in the thought of an unreal separation. Thirsty on the -sea-shore! Dying penniless while master of the treasure!" - - [116:1] Nasafī's Maqṣadi Aqṣā: fol. 3b. - - [116:2] Nasafī's Maqṣadi Aqṣā: fol. 15b. - -All feeling of separation, therefore, is ignorance; and all "otherness" -is a mere appearance, a dream, a shadow--a differentiation born of -relation essential to the self-recognition of the Absolute. The great -prophet of this school is "The excellent Rūmī" as Hegel calls him. He -took up the old Neo-Platonic idea of the Universal soul working through -the various spheres of being, and expressed it in a way so modern in -spirit that Clodd introduces the passage in his "Story of Creation". I -venture to quote this famous passage in order to show how successfully -the poet anticipates the modern concept of evolution, which he regarded -as the realistic side of his Idealism. - - First man appeared in the clan of inorganic things, - Next he passed therefrom into that of plants. - For years he lived as one of the plants, - Remembering nought of his inorganic state so different; - And when he passed from the vegetive to the animal state, - He had no remembrance of his state as a plant, - Except the inclination he felt to the world of plants, - Especially at the time of spring and sweet flowers; - Like the inclination of infants towards their mothers, - Which know not the cause of their inclination to the breast. - Again the great creator as you know, - Drew man out of the animal into the human state. - Thus man passed from one order of nature to another, - Till he became wise and knowing and strong as he is now. - Of his first soul he has now no remembrance, - And he will be again changed from his present soul. - - (Maṯẖnawī Book IV). - -It would now be instructive if we compare this aspect of Ṣūfī thought -with the fundamental ideas of Neo-Platonism. The God of Neo-Platonism is -immanent as well as transcendant. "As being the cause of all things, it -is everywhere. As being other than all things, it is nowhere. If it -were only "everywhere", and not also "nowhere", it would _be_ all -things."[118:1] The Ṣūfī, however, tersely says that God _is_ all things. -The Neo-Platonist allows a certain permanence or fixity to -matter;[118:2] but the Ṣūfīs of the school in question, regard all -empirical experience as a kind of dreaming. Life in limitation, they -say, is sleep; death brings the awakening. It is, however, the doctrine -of Impersonal immortality--"genuinely eastern in spirit"--which -distinguishes this school from Neo-Platonism. "Its (Arabian Philosophy) -distinctive doctrine", says Whittaker, "of an Impersonal immortality of -the general human intellect is, however, as contrasted with -Aristotelianism and Neo-Platonism, essentially original." - - [118:1] Whittaker's Neo-Platonism, p. 58. - - [118:2] Whittaker's Neo-Platonism, p. 57. - -The above brief exposition shows that there are three basic ideas of -this mode of thought:-- - -(a). That the ultimate Reality is knowable through a supersensual state -of consciousness. - -(b). That the ultimate Reality is impersonal. - -(c). That the ultimate Reality is one. - -Corresponding to these ideas we have: - -(I). The Agnostic reaction as manifested in the Poet ‘Umar Ḵẖayyām -(12{th} century) who cried out in his intellectual despair:-- - - The joyous souls who quaff potations deep, - And saints who in the mosque sad vigils keep, - Are lost at sea alike, and find no shore, - One only wakes, all others are asleep. - -(II). The monotheistic reaction of Ibn Taimiyya and his followers in the -13{th} century. - -(III). The Pluralistic reaction of Wāḥid Maḥmūd[119:1] in the 13{th} -century. - - [119:1] Dabistān, Chap: 8. - -Speaking from a purely philosophical standpoint, the last movement is -most interesting. The history of Thought illustrates the operation of -certain general laws of progress which are true of the intellectual -annals of different peoples. The German systems of monistic thought -invoked the pluralism of Herbart; while the pantheism of Spinoza called -forth the monadism of Leibniz. The operation of the same law led Wāḥid -Maḥmūd to deny the truth of contemporary monism, and declare that -Reality is not one but many. Long before Leibniz he taught that the -Universe is a combination of what he called "Afrād"--essential units, or -simple atoms which have existed from all eternity, and are endowed with -life. The law of the Universe is an ascending perfection of elemental -matter, continually passing from lower to higher forms determined by the -kind of food which the fundamental units assimilate. Each period of his -cosmogony comprises 8,000 years, and after eight such periods the world -is decomposed, and the units re-combine to construct a new universe. -Wāḥid Maḥmūd succeeded in founding a sect which was cruelly persecuted, -and finally stamped out of existence by S̱ẖāh ‘Abbās. It is said that -the poet Ḥāfiz of S̱ẖīrāz believed in the tenets of this sect. - - -C. _Reality as Light or Thought._ - -The third great school of Ṣūfīism conceives Reality as essentially Light -or Thought, the very nature of which demands something to be thought or -illuminated. While the preceding school abandoned Neo-Platonism, this -school transformed it into new systems. There are, however, two aspects -of the metaphysics of this school. The one is genuinely Persian in -spirit, the other is chiefly influenced by Christian modes of thought. -Both agree in holding that the fact of empirical diversity necessitates -a principle of difference in the nature of the ultimate Reality. I now -proceed to consider them in their historical order. - - -I. Reality as Light--Al-Is̱ẖrāqī. - -Return to Persian Dualism. - -The application of Greek dialectic to Islamic Theology aroused that -spirit of critical examination which began with Al-As̱ẖ‘arī, and found -its completest expression in the scepticism of Al-G̱ẖazālī. Even among -the Rationalists there were some more critical minds--such as -Nazzām--whose attitude towards Greek Philosophy was not one of servile -submission, but of independent criticism. The defenders of -dogma--Al-G̱ẖazālī, Al-Rāzī, Abul Barakāt, and Al-Āmidī, carried on a -persistent attack on the whole fabric of Greek Philosophy; while Abu -Sa‘īd Ṣairāfī, Qaḍī ‘Abdal Jabbār, Abul Ma‘ālī, Abul Qāsim, and finally -the acute Ibn Taimiyya, actuated by similar theological motives, -continued to expose the inherent weakness of Greek Logic. In their -criticism of Greek Philosophy, these thinkers were supplemented by some -of the more learned Ṣūfīs, such as Shahābal Dīn Suhrawardī, who -endeavoured to substantiate the helplessness of pure reason by his -refutation of Greek thought in a work entitled, "The unveiling of Greek -absurdities". The As̱ẖ‘arite reaction against Rationalism resulted not -only in the development of a system of metaphysics most modern in some -of its aspects, but also in completely breaking asunder the worn out -fetters of intellectual thraldom. Erdmann[122:1] seems to think that the -speculative spirit among the Muslims exhausted itself with Al-Fārābī and -Avicenna, and that after them Philosophy became bankrupt in passing over -into scepticism and mysticism. Evidently he ignores the Muslim criticism -of Greek Philosophy which led to the As̱ẖ‘arite Idealism on the one -hand, and a genuine Persian reconstruction on the other. That a system -of thoroughly Persian character might be possible, the destruction of -foreign thought, or rather the weakening of its hold on the mind, was -indispensable. The As̱ẖ‘arite and other defenders of Islamic Dogma -completed the destruction; Al-Is̱ẖrāqī--the child of emancipation--came -forward to build a new edifice of thought; though, in his process of -reconstruction, he did not entirely repudiate the older material. His is -the genuine Persian brain which, undaunted by the threats of narrow -minded authority, asserts its right of free independent speculation. In -his philosophy the old Iranian tradition, which had found only a partial -expression in the writings of the Physician Al-Rāzī, Al-G̱ẖazālī, and -the Ismā‘īlia sect, endeavours to come to a final understanding with the -philosophy of his predecessors and the theology of Islam. - - [122:1] Vol. I, p. 367. - -Shaikh S̱ẖahābal Dīn Suhrawardī, known as S̱ẖaiḵẖal Is̱ẖrāq Maqtūl -was born about the middle of the 12{th} century. He studied philosophy -with Majd Jīlī--the teacher of the commentator Al-Rāzī--and, while -still a youth, stood unrivalled as a thinker in the whole Islamic world. -His great admirer Al-Malik-al-Zāhir--the son of Sultan Ṣalāḥ-al -Dīn--invited him to Aleppo, where the youthful philosopher expounded his -independent opinions in a way that aroused the bitter jealousy of -contemporary theologians. These hired slaves of bloodthirsty Dogmatism -which, conscious of its inherent weakness, has always managed to keep -brute force behind its back, wrote to Sultan Ṣalāḥ-al Dīn, that the -S̱ẖaiḵẖ's teaching was a danger to Islam, and that it was necessary, -in the interest of the Faith, to nip the evil in the bud. The Sultan -consented; and there, at the early age of 36, the young Persian thinker -calmly met the blow which made him a martyr of truth, and immortalised -his name for ever. Murderers have passed away, but the philosophy, the -price of which was paid in blood, still lives, and attracts many an -earnest seeker after truth. - -The principal features of the founder of the Is̱ẖrāqī Philosophy are -his intellectual independence, the skill with which he weaves his -materials into a systematic whole, and above all his faithfulness to -the philosophic traditions of his country. In many fundamental points he -differs from Plato, and freely criticises Aristotle whose philosophy he -looks upon as a mere preparation for his own system of thought. Nothing -escapes his criticism. Even the logic of Aristotle, he subjects to a -searching examination, and shows the hollowness of some of its -doctrines. Definition, for instance, is genus plus differentia, -according to Aristotle. But Al-Is̱ẖrāqī holds that the distinctive -attribute of the thing defined, which cannot be predicated of any other -thing, will bring us no knowledge of the thing. We define "horse" as a -neighing animal. Now we understand animality, because we know many -animals in which this attribute exists; but it is impossible to -understand the attribute "neighing", since it is found nowhere except in -the thing defined. The ordinary definition of horse, therefore, would be -meaningless to a man who has never seen a horse. Aristotelian -definition, as a scientific principle is quite useless. This criticism -leads the S̱ẖaiḵẖ, to a standpoint very similar to that of Bosanquet -who defines definition, as "Summation of qualities". The S̱ẖaiḵẖ -holds that a true definition would enumerate all the essential -attributes which, taken collectively, exist nowhere except the thing -defined, though they may individually exist in other things. - -But let us turn to his system of metaphysics, and estimate the worth of -his contribution to the thought of his country. In order fully to -comprehend the purely intellectual side of Transcendental philosophy, -the student, says the S̱ẖaiḵẖ, must be thoroughly acquainted with -Aristotelian philosophy, Logic, Mathematics, and Ṣūfīism. His mind -should be completely free from the taint of prejudice and sin, so that -he may gradually develop that inner sense, which verifies and corrects -what intellect understands only as theory. Unaided reason is -untrustworthy; it must always be supplemented by "Ḏẖauq"--the -mysterious perception of the essence of things--which brings knowledge -and peace to the restless soul, and disarms Scepticism for ever. We are, -however, concerned with the purely speculative side of this spiritual -experience--the results of the inner perception as formulated and -systematised by discursive thought. Let us, therefore, examine the -various aspects of the Is̱ẖrāqī Philosophy--Ontology, Cosmology, and -Psychology. - - -Ontology. - -The ultimate principle of all existence is "Nūr-i-Qāhir"--the Primal -Absolute Light whose essential nature consists in perpetual -illumination. "Nothing is more visible than light, and visibility does -not stand in need of any definition."[127:1] The essence of Light, -therefore, is manifestation. For if manifestation is an attribute -superadded to light, it would follow that in itself light possesses no -visibility, and becomes visible only through something else visible in -itself; and from this again follows the absurd consequence, that -something other than light is more visible than light. The Primal Light, -therefore, has no reason of its existence beyond itself. All that is -other than this original principle is dependent, contingent, possible. -The "not-light" (darkness) is not something distinct proceeding from an -independent source. It is an error of the representatives of the Magian -religion to suppose that Light and Darkness are two distinct realities -created by two distinct creative agencies. The ancient Philosophers of -Persia were not dualists like the Zoroastrian priests who, on the ground -of the principle that the one cannot cause to emanate from itself more -than one, assigned two independent sources to Light and Darkness. The -relation between them is not that of contrariety, but of existence and -non-existence. The affirmation of Light necessarily posits its own -negation--Darkness which it must illuminate in order to be itself. This -Primordial Light is the source of all motion. But its motion is not -change of place; it is due to the _love_ of illumination which -constitutes its very essence, and stirs it up, as it were, to quicken -all things into life, by pouring out its own rays into their being. The -number of illuminations which proceed from it is infinite. Illuminations -of intenser brightness become, in their turn, the sources of other -illuminations; and the scale of brightness gradually descends to -illuminations too faint to beget other illuminations. All these -illuminations are mediums, or in the language of Theology, angels -through whom the infinite varieties of being receive life and sustenance -from the Primal Light. The followers of Aristotle erroneously restricted -the number of original Intellects to ten. They likewise erred in -enumerating the categories of thought. The possibilities of the Primal -Light are infinite; and the Universe, with all its variety, is only a -partial expression of the infinitude behind it. The categories of -Aristotle, therefore, are only relatively true. It is impossible for -human thought to comprehend within its tiny grasp, all the infinite -variety of ideas according to which the Primal Light does or may -illuminate that which is not light. We can, however, discriminate -between the following two illuminations of the original Light:-- - - [127:1] S̱ẖarh Anwāriyya--Al-Harawī's commentary on - Al-Is̱ẖrāqī's Hikmat al-Is̱ẖrāq, fol. 10a. - -(1). The Abstract Light (e.g. Intellect Universal as well as -individual). It has no form, and never becomes the attribute of anything -other than itself (Substance). From it proceed all the various forms of -partly-conscious, conscious, or self-conscious light, differing from one -another in the amount of lustre, which is determined by their -comparative nearness or distance from the ultimate source of their -being. The individual intellect or soul is only a fainter copy, or a -more distant reflection of the Primal Light. The Abstract Light knows -itself through itself, and does not stand in need of a non-ego to reveal -its own existence to itself. Consciousness or self-knowledge, therefore, -is the very essense of Abstract light, as distinguished from the -negation of light. - -(2). The Accidental light (Attribute)--the light that has a form, and is -capable of becoming an attribute of something other than itself (e.g. -the light of the stars, or the visibility of other bodies). The -Accidental light, or more properly sensible light, is a distant -reflection of the Abstract light, which, because of its distance, has -lost the intensity, or substance-character of its parent. The process of -continuous reflection is really a softening process; successive -illuminations gradually lose their intensity until, in the chain of -reflections, we reach certain less intense illuminations which entirely -lose their independent character, and cannot exist except in -association with something else. These illuminations form the Accidental -light--the attribute which has no independent existence. The relation, -therefore, between the Accidental and the Abstract light is that of -cause and effect. The effect, however, is not something quite distinct -from its cause; it is a transformation, or a weaker form of the supposed -cause itself. Anything other than the Abstract light (e.g. the nature of -the illuminated body itself) cannot be the cause of the Accidental -light; since the latter, being merely contingent and consequently -capable of being negatived, can be taken away from bodies, without -affecting their character. If the essence or nature of the illuminated -body, had been the cause of the Accidental light, such a process of -disillumination could not have been possible. We cannot conceive an -inactive cause.[131:1] - - [131:1] S̱ẖarh Anwāriyya fol. 11b. - -It is now obvious that the S̱ẖaiḵẖ al-Is̱ẖrāq agrees with the -As̱ẖ‘arite thinkers in holding that there is no such thing as the Prima -Materia of Aristotle; though he recognises the existence of a necessary -negation of Light--darkness, the object of illumination. He further -agrees with them in teaching the relativity of all categories except -Substance and Quality. But he corrects their theory of knowledge, in so -far as he recognises an active element in human knowledge. Our relation -with the objects of our knowledge is not merely a passive relation; the -individual soul, being itself an illumination, illuminates the object in -the act of knowledge. The Universe to him is one great process of active -illumination; but, from a purely intellectual standpoint, this -illumination is only a partial expression of the infinitude of the -Primal Light, which may illuminate according to other laws not known to -us. The categories of thought are infinite; our intellect works with a -few only. The S̱ẖaiḵẖ, therefore, from the standpoint of discursive -thought, is not far from modern Humanism. - - -Cosmology. - -All that is "not-light" is, what the Is̱ẖrāqī thinkers call, "Absolute -quantity", or "Absolute matter". It is only another aspect of the -affirmation of light, and not an independent principle, as the -followers of Aristotle erroneously hold. The experimental fact of the -transformation of the primary elements into one another, points to this -fundamental Absolute matter which, with its various degrees of -grossness, constitutes the various spheres of material being. The -absolute ground of all things, then, is divided into two kinds:-- - -(1). That which is beyond space--the obscure substance or atoms -(essences of the As̱ẖ‘arite). - -(2). That which is necessarily in space--forms of darkness, e.g. weight, -smell, taste, etc. - -The combination of these two particularises the Absolute matter. A -material body is forms of darkness plus obscure substance, made visible -or illuminated by the Abstract light. But what is the cause of the -various forms of darkness? These, like the forms of light, owe their -existence to the Abstract light, the different illuminations of which -cause diversity in the spheres of being. The forms which make bodies -differ from one another, do not exist in the nature of the Absolute -matter. The Absolute quantity and the Absolute matter being identical, -if these forms do exist in the essence of the Absolute matter, all -bodies would be identical in regard to the forms of darkness. This, -however, is contradicted by daily experience. The cause of the forms of -darkness, therefore, is not the Absolute matter. And as the difference -of forms cannot be assigned to any other cause, it follows that they are -due to the various illuminations of the Abstract light. Forms of light -and darkness both owe their existence to the Abstract Light. The third -element of a material body--the obscure atom or essence--is nothing but -a necessary aspect of the affirmation of light. The body as a whole, -therefore, is completely dependent on the Primal Light. The whole -Universe is really a continuous series of circles of existence, all -depending on the original Light. Those nearer to the source receive more -illumination than those more distant. All varieties of existence in each -circle, and the circles themselves, are illuminated through an infinite -number of medium-illuminations, which preserve some forms of existence -by the help of "conscious light" (as in the case of man, animal and -plant), and some without it (as in the case of minerals and primary -elements). The immense panorama of diversity which we call the Universe, -is, therefore, a vast shadow of the infinite variety in intensity of -direct or indirect illuminations and rays of the Primary Light. Things -are, so to speak, fed by their respective illuminations to which they -constantly move, with a lover's passion, in order to drink more and more -of the original fountain of Light. The world is an eternal drama of -love. The different planes of being are as follow:-- - - The Plane ┌ 1. The Plane of Intellects--the - of Primal │ parent of the heavens, - Light. │ 2. The Plane of the Soul. - └ 3. The Plane of Form. - │ - │ ┌ 1. The Plane ┌ 1. The Plane of - │ │ of ideal │ the heavens. - └────┤ form. ────────────┤ - │ 2. The Plane │ 2. The Plane of - │ of material └ the elements:-- - └ forms:-- - - (a). The heavens (a). Simple elements. - (b). The elements:-- (b). Compounds:-- - 1. Simple elements I. Mineral kingdom. - 2. Compounds:-- II. Vegetable kingdom. - I. Mineral kingdom. III. Animal kingdom. - II. Vegetable kingdom. - III. Animal kingdom. - -Having briefly indicated the general nature of Being, we now proceed to -a more detailed examination of the world-process. All that is not-light -is divided into:-- - -(1). Eternal e.g., Intellects, Souls of heavenly bodies, heavens, simple -elements, time, motion. - -(2). Contingent e.g., Compounds of various elements. The motion of the -heavens is eternal, and makes up the various cycles of the Universe. It -is due to the intense longing of the heaven-soul to receive illumination -from the source of all light. The matter of which the heavens are -constructed, is completely free from the operation of chemical -processes, incidental to the grosser forms of the not-light. Every -heaven has its own matter peculiar to it alone. Likewise the heavens -differ from one another in the direction of their motion; and the -difference is explained by the fact that the beloved, or the sustaining -illumination, is different in each case. Motion is only an aspect of -time. It is the summing up of the elements of time, which, as -externalised, is motion. The distinction of past, present, and future -is made only for the sake of convenience, and does not exist in the -nature of time.[137:1] We cannot conceive the beginning of time; for the -supposed beginning would be a point of time itself. Time and motion, -therefore, are both eternal. - - [137:1] S̱ẖarh Anwāriyya fol. 34a. - -There are three primordial elements--water, earth, and wind. Fire, -according to the Is̱ẖrāqīs, is only burning wind. The combinations of -these elements, under various heavenly influences, assume various -forms--fluidity, gaseousness, solidity. This transformation of the -original elements, constitutes the process of "making and unmaking" -which pervades the entire sphere of the not-light, raising the different -forms of existence higher and higher, and bringing them nearer and -nearer to the illuminating forces. All the phenomena of nature--rain, -clouds, thunder, meteor--are the various workings of this immanent -principle of motion, and are explained by the direct or indirect -operation of the Primal Light on things, which differ from one another -in their capacity of receiving more or less illumination. The Universe, -in one word, is a petrified desire; a crystallised longing after light. - -But is it eternal? The Universe is a manifestation of the illuminative -Power which constitutes the essential nature of the Primal Light. In so -far, therefore, as it is a manifestation, it is only a dependent being, -and consequently not eternal. But in another sense it is eternal. All -the different spheres of being exist by the illuminations and rays of -the Eternal light. There are some illuminations which are directly -eternal; while there are other fainter ones, the appearance of which -depends on the combination of other illuminations and rays. The -existence of these is not eternal in the same sense as the existence of -the pre-existing parent illuminations. The existence of colour, for -instance, is contingent in comparison to that of the ray, which -manifests colour when a dark body is brought before an illuminating -body. The Universe, therefore, though contingent as manifestation, is -eternal by the eternal character of its source. Those who hold the -non-eternity of the Universe argue on the assumption of the possibility -of a complete induction. Their argument proceeds in the following -manner:-- - -(1). Everyone of the Abyssinians is black. - -⁂ All Abyssinians are black. - -(2). Every motion began at a definite moment. - -⁂ All motion must begin so. - -But this mode of argumentation is vicious. It is quite impossible to -state the major. One cannot collect all the Abyssinians past, present, -and future, at one particular moment of time. Such a Universal, -therefore, is impossible. Hence from the examination of individual -Abyssinians, or particular instances of motion which fall within the -pale of our experience, it is rash to infer, that all Abyssinians are -black, or all motion had a beginning in time. - - -Psychology. - -Motion and light are not concomitant in the case of bodies of a lower -order. A piece of stone, for instance, though illuminated and hence -visible, is not endowed with self-initiated movement. As we rise, -however, in the scale of being, we find higher bodies, or organisms in -which motion and light are associated together. The abstract -illumination finds its best dwelling place in man. But the question -arises whether the individual abstract illumination which we call the -human soul, did or did not exist before its physical accompaniment. The -founder of Is̱ẖrāqī Philosophy follows Avicenna in connection with this -question, and uses the same arguments to show, that the individual -abstract illuminations cannot be held to have pre-existed, as so many -units of light. The material categories of one and many cannot be -applied to the abstract illumination which, in its essential nature, is -neither one nor many; though it appears as many owing to the various -degrees of illuminational receptivity in its material accompaniments. -The relation between the abstract illumination, or soul and body, is not -that of cause and effect; the bond of union between them is love. The -body which longs for illumination, receives it through the soul; since -its nature does not permit a direct communication between the source of -light and itself. But the soul cannot transmit the directly received -light to the dark solid body which, considering its attributes, stands -on the opposite pole of being. In order to be related to each other, -they require a medium between them, something standing midway between -light and darkness. This medium is the animal soul--a hot, fine, -transparent vapour which has its principal seat in the left cavity of -the heart, but also circulates in all parts of the body. It is because -of the partial identity of the animal soul with light that, in dark -nights, land-animals run towards the burning fire; while sea-animals -leave their aquatic abodes in order to enjoy the beautiful sight of the -moon. The ideal of man, therefore, is to rise higher and higher in the -scale of being, and to receive more and more illumination which -gradually brings complete freedom from the world of forms. But how is -this ideal to be realised? By knowledge and action. It is the -transformation of both understanding and will, the union of action and -contemplation, that actualizes the highest ideal of man. Change your -attitude towards the Universe, and adopt the line of conduct -necessitated by the change. Let us briefly consider these means of -realisation:-- - -A. _Knowledge._ When the Abstract illumination associates itself with a -higher organism, it works out its development by the operation of -certain faculties--the powers of light, and the powers of darkness. The -former are the five external senses, and the five internal -senses--sensorium, conception, imagination, understanding, and memory; -the latter are the powers of growth, digestion, etc. But such a division -of faculties is only convenient. "One faculty can be the source of all -operations."[142:1] There is only one power in the middle of the brain, -though it receives different names from different standpoints. The mind -is a unity which, for the sake of convenience, is regarded as -multiplicity. The power residing in the middle of the brain must be -distinguished from the abstract illumination which constitutes the real -essence of man. The Philosopher of illumination appears to draw a -distinction between the active mind and the essentially inactive soul; -yet he teaches that in some mysterious way, all the various faculties -are connected with the soul. - - [142:1] S̱ẖarh Anwāriyya fol. 57b. - -The most original point in his psychology of intellection, however, is -his theory of vision.[142:2] The ray of light which is supposed to come -out of the eye must be either substance or quality. If quality, it -cannot be transmitted from one substance (eye) to another substance -(visible body). If, on the other hand, it is a substance, it moves -either consciously, or impelled by its inherent nature. Conscious -movement would make it an animal perceiving other things. The perceiver -in this case would be the ray, not man. If the movement of the ray is an -attribute of its nature, there is no reason why its movement should be -peculiar to one direction, and not to all. The ray of light, therefore, -cannot be regarded as coming out of the eye. The followers of Aristotle -hold that in the process of vision images of objects are printed on the -eye. This view is also erroneous; since images of big things cannot be -printed on a small space. The truth is that when a thing comes before -the eye, an illumination takes place, and the mind sees the object -through that illumination. When there is no veil between the object and -the normal sight, and the mind is ready to perceive, the act of vision -must take place; since this is the law of things. "All vision is -illumination; and we see things in God". Berkley explained the -relativity of our sight-perceptions with a view to show that the -ultimate ground of all ideas is God. The Is̱ẖrāqī Philosopher has the -same object in view, though his theory of vision is not so much an -explanation of the sight-process as a new way of looking at the fact of -vision. - - [142:2] S̱ẖarh Anwāriyya fol. 60b. - -Besides sense and reason, however, there is another source of knowledge -called "Ḏẖauq"--the inner perception which reveals non-temporal and -non-spatial planes of being. The study of philosophy, or the habit of -reflecting on pure concepts, combined with the practice of virtue, leads -to the upbringing of this mysterious sense, which corroborates and -corrects the conclusions of intellect. - -B. _Action._ Man as an active being has the following motive powers: - -(a). Reason or the Angelic soul--the source of intelligence, -discrimination, and love of knowledge. - -(b). The beast-soul which is the source of anger, courage, dominance, -and ambition. - -(c). The animal soul which is the source of lust, hunger, and sexual -passion. - -The first leads to wisdom; the second and third, if controlled by -reason, lead respectively to bravery and chastity. The harmonious use of -all results in the virtue of justice. The possibility of spiritual -progress by virtue, shows that this world is the best possible world. -Things as existent are neither good nor bad. It is misuse or limited -standpoint that makes them so. Still the fact of evil cannot be denied. -Evil does exist; but it is far less in amount than good. It is peculiar -only to a part of the world of darkness; while there are other parts of -the Universe which are quite free from the taint of evil. The sceptic -who attributes the existence of evil to the creative agency of God, -presupposes resemblance between human and divine action, and does not -see that nothing existent is free in his sense of the word. Divine -activity cannot be regarded as the creator of evil in the same sense as -we regard some forms of human activity as the cause of evil.[145:1] - - [145:1] S̱ẖarh Anwāriyya fol. 92b. - -It is, then, by the union of knowledge and virtue that the soul frees -itself from the world of darkness. As we know more and more of the -nature of things, we are brought closer and closer to the world of -light; and the love of that world becomes more and more intense. The -stages of spiritual development are infinite, since the degrees of love -are infinite. The principal stages, however, are as follows:-- - -(1). The stage of "_I_". In this stage the feeling of personality is -most predominant, and the spring of human action is generally -selfishness. - -(2). The stage of "_Thou art not_". Complete absorption in one's own -deep self to the entire forgetfulness of everything external. - -(3). The stage of "_I am not_". This stage is the necessary result of -the second. - -(4). The stage of "_Thou art_". The absolute negation of "_I_", and the -affirmation of "_Thou_", which means complete resignation to the will of -God. - -(5). The stage of "_I am not; and thou art not_". The complete negation -of both the terms of thought--the state of cosmic consciousness. - -Each stage is marked by more or less intense illuminations, which are -accompanied by some indescribable sounds. Death does not put an end to -the spiritual progress of the soul. The individual souls, after death, -are not unified into one soul, but continue different from each other in -proportion to the illumination they received during their companionship -with physical organisms. The Philosopher of illumination anticipates -Leibniz's doctrine of the Identity of Indiscernibles, and holds that no -two souls can be completely similar to each other.[147:1] When the -material machinery which it adopts for the purpose of acquiring gradual -illumination, is exhausted, the soul probably takes up another body -determined by the experiences of the previous life; and rises higher and -higher in the different spheres of being, adopting forms peculiar to -those spheres, until it reaches its destination--the state of absolute -negation. Some souls probably come back to this world in order to make -up their deficiencies.[147:2] The doctrine of trans-migration cannot be -proved or disproved from a purely logical standpoint; though it is a -probable hypothesis to account for the future destiny of the soul. All -souls are thus constantly journeying towards their common source, which -calls back the whole Universe when this journey is over, and starts -another cycle of being to reproduce, in almost all respects, the history -of the preceding cycles. - - [147:1] S̱ẖarh Anwāriyya fol. 82. - - [147:2] S̱ẖarh Anwāriyya fol. 87b. - -Such is the philosophy of the great Persian martyr. He is, properly -speaking, the first Persian systematiser who recognises the elements of -truth in all the aspects of Persian speculation, and skilfully -synthesises them in his own system. He is a pantheist in so far as he -defines God as the sum total of all sensible and ideal existence.[148:1] -To him, unlike some of his Ṣūfī predecessors, the world is something -real, and the human soul a distinct individuality. With the orthodox -theologian, he maintains that the ultimate cause of every phenomenon, -is the absolute light whose illumination forms the very essence of the -Universe. In his psychology he follows Avicenna, but his treatment of -this branch of study is more systematic and more empirical. As an -ethical philosopher, he is a follower of Aristotle whose doctrine of the -mean he explains and illustrates with great thoroughness. Above all he -modifies and transforms the traditional Neo-Platonism, into a thoroughly -Persian system of thought which, not only approaches Plato, but also -spiritualises the old Persian Dualism. No Persian thinker is more alive -to the necessity of explaining all the aspects of objective existence in -reference to his fundamental principles. He constantly appeals to -experience, and endeavours to explain even the physical phenomena in the -light of his theory of illumination. In his system objectivity, which -was completely swallowed up by the exceedingly subjective character of -extreme pantheism, claims its due again, and, having been subjected to a -detailed examination, finds a comprehensive explanation. No wonder then -that this acute thinker succeeded in founding a system of thought, -which has always exercised the greatest fascination over minds--uniting -speculation and emotion in perfect harmony. The narrow-mindedness of his -contemporaries gave him the title of "Maqtūl" (the killed one), -signifying that he was not to be regarded as "S̱ẖahīd" (Martyr); but -succeeding generations of Ṣūfīs and philosophers have always given him -the profoundest veneration. - - [148:1] S̱ẖarh Anwāriyya fol. 81b. - -I may here notice a less spiritual form of the Is̱ẖrāqī mode of -thought. Nasafī[150:1] describes a phase of Ṣūfī thought which reverted -to the old materialistic dualism of Mānī. The advocates of this view -hold, that light and darkness are essential to each other. They are, in -reality, two rivers which mix with each other like oil and milk,[150:2] -out of which arises the diversity of things. The ideal of human action -is freedom from the taint of darkness; and the freedom of light from -darkness means the self-consciousness of light as light. - - [150:1] Maqsadi Aqsā; fol. 21a. - - [150:2] Maqsadi Aqsā; fol. 21a. - - -II. Reality as Thought--Al-Jīlī. - -Al-Jīlī was born in 767 A.H., as he himself says in one of his verses, -and died in 811 A.H. He was not a prolific writer like S̱ẖaiḵẖ Muḥy -al-Dīn ibn ‘Arabī whose mode of thought seems to have greatly influenced -his teaching. He combined in himself poetical imagination and -philosophical genius, but his poetry is no more than a vehicle for his -mystical and metaphysical doctrines. Among other books he wrote a -commentary on S̱ẖaiḵẖ Muḥy al-Dīn ibn ‘Arabī's al-Futūḥāt al-Makkiya, -a commentary on Bismillāh, and the famous work Insān al-Kāmil (printed -in Cairo). - -Essence pure and simple, he says, is the thing to which names and -attributes are given, whether it is existent actually or ideally. The -existent is of two species:-- - -(1). The Existent in Absoluteness or Pure existence--Pure Being--God. - -(2). The existence joined with non-existence--Creation--Nature. - -The Essence of God or Pure Thought cannot be understood; no words can -express it, for it is beyond all relation and knowledge is relation. The -intellect flying through the fathomless empty space pierces through the -veil of names and attributes, traverses the vasty sphere of time, enters -the domain of the non-existent and finds the Essence of Pure Thought to -be an existence which is non-existence--a sum of contradictions.[152:1] -It has two (accidents); eternal life in all past time and eternal life -in all future time. It has two (qualities), God and creation. It has two -(definitions), uncreatableness and creatableness. It has two names, God -and man. It has two faces, the manifested (this world) and the -unmanifested (the next world). It has two effects, necessity and -possibility. It has two points of view; from the first it is -non-existent for itself but existent for what is not itself; from the -second it is existent for itself and non-existent for what is not -itself. - - [152:1] Insān al-Kāmil, Vol. I, p. 10. - -Name, he says, fixes the named in the understanding, pictures it in the -mind, presents it in the imagination and keeps it in the memory. It is -the outside or the husk, as it were, of the named; while the named is -the inside or the pith. Some names do not exist in reality but exist in -name only as "‘Anqā" (a fabulous bird). It is a name the object of which -does not exist in reality. Just as "‘Anqā" is absolutely non-existent, -so God is absolutely present, although He cannot be touched and seen. -The "‘Anqā" exists only in idea while the object of the name "Allāh" -exists in reality and can be known like "‘Anqā" only through its names -and attributes. The name is a mirror which reveals all the secrets of -the Absolute Being; it is a light through the agency of which God sees -Himself. Al-Jīlī here approaches the Isma‘īlia view that we should seek -the Named through the Name. - -In order to understand this passage we should bear in mind the three -stages of the development of Pure Being, enumerated by him. He holds -that the Absolute existence or Pure Being when it leaves its -absoluteness undergoes three stages:--(1) Oneness. (2) He-ness. (3) -I-ness. In the first stage there is an absence of all attributes and -relations, yet it is called one, and therefore oneness marks one step -away from the absoluteness. In the second stage Pure Being is yet free -from all manifestation, while the third stage, I-ness, is nothing but an -external manifestation of the He-ness; or, as Hegel would say, it is the -self-diremption of God. This third stage is the sphere of the name -Allāh; here the darkness of Pure Being is illuminated, nature comes to -the front, the Absolute Being has become conscious. He says further that -the name Allāh is the stuff of all the perfections of the different -phases of Divinity, and in the second stage of the progress of Pure -Being, all that is the result of Divine self-diremption was potentially -contained within the titanic grasp of this name which, in the third -stage of the development, objectified itself, became a mirror in which -God reflected Himself, and thus by its crystallisation dispelled all the -gloom of the Absolute Being. - -In correspondence with these three stages of the absolute development, -the perfect man has three stages of spiritual training. But in his case -the process of development must be the reverse; because his is the -process of ascent, while the Absolute Being had undergone essentially a -process of descent. In the first stage of his spiritual progress he -meditates on the name, studies nature on which it is sealed; in the -second stage he steps into the sphere of the Attribute, and in the third -stage enters the sphere of the Essence. It is here that he becomes the -Perfect Man; his eye becomes the eye of God, his word the word of God -and his life the life of God--participates in the general life of Nature -and "sees into the life of things". - -To turn now to the nature of the attribute. His views on this most -interesting question are very important, because it is here that his -doctrine fundamentally differs from Hindu Idealism. He defines attribute -as an agency which gives us a knowledge of the state of things.[155:1] -Elsewhere he says that this distinction of attribute from the underlying -reality is tenable only in the sphere of the manifested, because here -every attribute is regarded as the other of the reality in which it is -supposed to inhere. This otherness is due to the existence of -combination and disintegration in the sphere of the manifested. But the -distinction is untenable in the domain of the unmanifested, because -there is no combination or disintegration there. It should be observed -how widely he differs from the advocates of the Doctrine of "Māyā". He -believes that the material world has real existence; it is the outward -husk of the real being, no doubt, but this outward husk is not the less -real. The cause of the phenomenal world, according to him, is not a real -entity hidden behind the sum of attributes, but it is a conception -furnished by the mind so that there may be no difficulty in -understanding the material world. Berkeley and Fichte will so far agree -with our author, but his view leads him to the most characteristically -Hegelian doctrine--identity of thought and being. In the 37{th} chapter -of the 2{nd} volume of Insān al-Kāmil, he clearly says that idea is the -stuff of which this universe is made; thought, idea, notion is the -material of the structure of nature. While laying stress on this -doctrine he says, "Dost thou not look to thine own belief? Where is the -reality in which the so-called Divine attributes inhere? It is but the -idea."[157:1] Hence nature is nothing but a crystallised idea. He gives -his hearty assent to the results of Kant's _Critique of Pure Reason_; -but, unlike him, he makes this very idea the essence of the Universe. -Kant's _Ding an sich_ to him is a pure nonentity; there is nothing -behind the collection of attributes. The attributes are the real things, -the material world is but the objectification of the Absolute Being; it -is the other self of the Absolute--another which owes its existence to -the principle of difference in the nature of the Absolute itself. Nature -is the idea of God, a something necessary for His knowledge of Himself. -While Hegel calls his doctrine the identity of thought and being, -Al-Jīlī calls it the identity of attribute and reality. It should be -noted that the author's phrase, "world of attributes", which he uses for -the material world is slightly misleading. What he really holds is that -the distinction of attribute and reality is merely phenomenal, and does -not at all exist in the nature of things. It is useful, because it -facilitates our understanding of the world around us, but it is not at -all real. It will be understood that Al-Jīlī recognises the truth of -Empirical Idealism only tentatively, and does not admit the absoluteness -of the distinction. These remarks should not lead us to understand that -Al-Jīlī does not believe in the objective reality of the thing in -itself. He does believe in it, but then he advocates its unity, and says -that the material world is the thing in itself; it is the "other", the -external expression of the thing in itself. The _Ding an sich_ and its -external expression or the production of its self-diremption, are really -identical, though we discriminate between them in order to facilitate -our understanding of the universe. If they are not identical, he says, -how could one manifest the other? In one word, he means by _Ding an -sich_, the Pure, the Absolute Being, and seeks it through its -manifestation or external expression. He says that as long as we do not -realise the identity of attribute and reality, the material world or the -world of attributes seems to be a veil; but when the doctrine is -brought home to us the veil is removed; we see the Essence itself -everywhere, and find that all the attributes are but ourselves. Nature -then appears in her true light; all otherness is removed and we are one -with her. The aching prick of curiosity ceases, and the inquisitive -attitude of our minds is replaced by a state of philosophic calm. To the -person who has realised this identity, discoveries of science bring no -new information, and religion with her _role_ of supernatural authority -has nothing to say. This is the spiritual emancipation. - - [155:1] Insān al-Kāmil; Vol. I, p. 22. - - [157:1] Insān al-Kāmil, Vol. II, p. 26. - -Let us now see how he classifies the different divine names and -attributes which have received expression in nature or crystallised -Divinity. His classification is as follows:-- - -(1). The names and attributes of God as He is in Himself (Allāh, The -One, The Odd, The Light, The Truth, The Pure, The Living.) - -(2). The names and attributes of God as the source of all glory (The -Great and High, The All-powerful). - -(3). The names and attributes of God as all Perfection (The Creator, The -Benefactor, The First, The Last). - -(4). The names and attributes of God as all Beauty (The Uncreatable, The -Painter, The Merciful, The Origin of all). Each of these names and -attributes has its own particular effect by which it illuminates the -soul of the perfect man and Nature. How these illuminations take place, -and how they reach the soul is not explained by Al-Jīlī. His silence -about these matters throws into more relief the mystical portion of his -views and implies the necessity of spiritual Directorship. - -Before considering Al-Jīlī's views of particular Divine Names and -Attributes, we should note that his conception of God, implied in the -above classification, is very similar to that of Schleiermacher. While -the German theologian reduces all the divine attributes to one single -attribute of Power, our author sees the danger of advancing a God free -from all attributes, yet recognises with Schleiermacher that in Himself -God is an unchangeable unity, and that His attributes "are nothing more -than views of Him from different human standpoints, the various -appearances which the one changeless cause presents to our finite -intelligence according as we look at it from different sides of the -spiritual landscape."[161:1] In His absolute existence He is beyond the -limitation of names and attributes, but when He externalises Himself, -when He leaves His absoluteness, when nature is born, names and -attributes appear sealed on her very fabric. - - [161:1] Matheson's _Aids to the Study of German Theology_, p. - 43. - -We now proceed to consider what he teaches about particular Divine Names -and Attributes. The first Essential Name is Allāh (Divinity) which means -the sum of all the realities of existence with their respective order in -that sum. This name is applied to God as the only necessary existence. -Divinity being the highest manifestation of Pure Being, the difference -between them is that the latter is visible to the eye, but its _where_ -is invisible; while the traces of the former are visible, itself is -invisible. By the very fact of her being crystallised divinity, Nature -is not the real divinity; hence Divinity is invisible, and its traces in -the form of Nature are visible to the eye. Divinity, as the author -illustrates, is water; nature is crystallised water or ice; but ice is -not water. The Essence is visible to the eye, (another proof of our -author's Natural Realism or Absolute Idealism) although all its -attributes are not known to us. Even its attributes are not known as -they are in themselves, their shadows or effects only are known. For -instance, charity itself is unknown, only its effect or the fact of -giving to the poor, is known and seen. This is due to the attributes -being incorporated in the very nature of the Essence. If the expression -of the attributes in its real nature had been possible, its separation -from the Essence would have been possible also. But there are some other -Essential Names of God--The Absolute Oneness and Simple Oneness. The -Absolute Oneness marks the first step of Pure Thought from the darkness -of Cecity (the internal or the original Māyā of the Vedānta) to the -light of manifestation. Although this movement is not attended with any -external manifestations, yet it sums up all of them under its hollow -universality. Look at a wall, says the author, you see the whole wall; -but you cannot see the individual pieces of the material that -contribute to its formation. The wall is a unity--but a unity which -comprehends diversity, so Pure Being is a unity but a unity which is the -soul of diversity. - -The third movement of the Absolute Being is Simple Oneness--a step -attended with external manifestation. The Absolute Oneness is free from -all particular names and attributes. The Oneness Simple takes on names -and attributes, but there is no distinction between these attributes, -one is the essence of the other. Divinity is similar to Simple Oneness, -but its names and attributes are distinguished from one another and even -contradictory, as generous is contradictory to revengeful.[163:1] The -third step, or as Hegel would say, Voyage of the Being, has another -appellation (Mercy). The First Mercy, the author says, is the evolution -of the Universe from Himself and the manifestation of His own Self in -every atom of the result of His own self-diremption. Al-Jīlī makes this -point clearer by an instance. He says that nature is frozen water and -God is water. The real name of nature is God (Allāh); ice or condensed -water is merely a borrowed appellation. Elsewhere he calls water the -origin of knowledge, intellect, understanding, thought and idea. This -instance leads him to guard against the error of looking upon God as -immanent in nature, or running through the sphere of material existence. -He says that immanence implies disparity of being; God is not immanent -because He is Himself the existence. Eternal existence is the other self -of God, it is the light through which He sees Himself. As the originator -of an idea is existent in that idea, so God is present in nature. The -difference between God and man, as one may say, is that His ideas -materialise themselves, ours do not. It will be remembered here that -Hegel would use the same line of argument in freeing himself from the -accusation of Pantheism. - - [163:1] This would seem very much like the idea of the - phenomenal Brahma of the Vedānta. The Personal Creator or the - Prajāpati of the Vedānta makes the third step of the Absolute - Being or the Noumenal Brahma. Al-Jīlī seems to admit two kinds - of Brahma--with or without qualities like the Śamkara and - Bādarayana. To him the process of creation is essentially a - lowering of the Absolute Thought, which is Asat, in so far as it - is absolute, and Sat, in so far as it is manifested and hence - limited. Notwithstanding this Absolute Monism, he inclines to a - view similar to that of Rāmānuja. He seems to admit the reality - of the individual soul and seems to imply, unlike Śamkara, that - Īśwara and His worship are necessary even after the attainment - of the Higher Knowledge. - -The attribute of Mercy is closely connected with the attribute of -Providence. He defines it as the sum of all that existence stands in -need of. Plants are supplied with water through the force of this name. -The natural philosopher would express the same thing differently; he -would speak of the same phenomena as resulting from the activity of a -certain force of nature; Al-Jīlī would call it a manifestation of -Providence; but, unlike the natural philosopher, he would not advocate -the unknowability of that force. He would say that there is nothing -behind it, it is the Absolute Being itself. - -We have now finished all the essential names and attributes of God, and -proceed to examine the nature of what existed before all things. The -Arabian Prophet, says Al-Jīlī, was once questioned about the place of -God before creation. He said that God, before the creation, existed in -"‘Amā" (Blindness). It is the nature of this Blindness or primal -darkness which we now proceed to examine. The investigation is -particularly interesting, because the word translated into modern -phraseology would be "_The Unconsciousness_". This single word impresses -upon us the foresightedness with which he anticipates metaphysical -doctrines of modern Germany. He says that the Unconsciousness is the -reality of all realities; it is the Pure Being without any descending -movement; it is free from the attributes of God and creation; it does -not stand in need of any name or quality, because it is beyond the -sphere of relation. It is distinguished from the Absolute Oneness -because the latter name is applied to the Pure Being in its process of -coming down towards manifestation. It should, however, be remembered -that when we speak of the priority of God and posteriority of creation, -our words must not be understood as implying time; for there can be no -duration of time or separateness between God and His creation. Time, -continuity in space and time, are themselves creations, and how can -piece of creation intervene between God and His creation. Hence our -words before, after, where, whence, etc., in this sphere of thought, -should not be construed to imply time or space. The real thing is beyond -the grasp of human conceptions; no category of material existence can be -applicable to it; because, as Kant would say, the laws of phenomena -cannot be spoken of as obtaining in the sphere of noumena. - -We have already noticed that man in his progress towards perfection has -three stages: the first is the meditation of the name which the author -calls the illumination of names. He remarks that "When God illuminates a -certain man by the light of His names, the man is destroyed under the -dazzling splendour of that name; and "when thou calleth God, the call is -responded to by the man". The effect of this illumination would be, in -Schopenhauer's language, the destruction of the individual will, yet it -must not be confounded with physical death; because the individual goes -on living and moving like the spinning wheel, as Kapila would say, after -he has become one with Prakriti. It is here that the individual cries -out in pantheistic mood:--She was I and I was she and there was none to -separate us."[167:1] - - [167:1] Insān al-Kāmil, Vol. I, p. 40. - -The second stage of the spiritual training is what he calls the -illumination of the Attribute. This illumination makes the perfect man -receive the attributes of God in their real nature in proportion to the -power of receptivity possessed by him--a fact which classifies men -according to the magnitude of this light resulting from the -illumination. Some men receive illumination from the divine attribute of -Life, and thus participate in the soul of the Universe. The effect of -this light is soaring in the air, walking on water, changing the -magnitude of things (as Christ so often did). In this wise the perfect -man receives illumination from all the Divine attributes, crosses the -sphere of the name and the attribute, and steps into the domain of the -Essence--Absolute Existence. - -As we have already seen, the Absolute Being, when it leaves its -absoluteness, has three voyages to undergo, each voyage being a process -of particularisation of the bare universality of the Absolute Essence. -Each of these three movements appears under a new Essential Name which -has its own peculiar illuminating effect upon the human soul. Here is -the end of our author's spiritual ethics; _man has become perfect_, he -has amalgamated himself with the Absolute Being, or _has learnt what -Hegel calls The Absolute Philosophy_. "He becomes the paragon of -perfection, the object of worship, the preserver of the -Universe".[169:1] He is the point where Man-ness and God-ness become -one, and result in the birth of the god-man. - - [169:1] Insān al-Kāmil, Vol. I, p. 48. - -How the perfect man reaches this height of spiritual development, the -author does not tell us; but he says that at every stage he has a -peculiar experience in which there is not even a trace of doubt or -agitation. The instrument of this experience is what he calls the _Qalb_ -(heart), a word very difficult of definition. He gives a very mystical -diagram of the Qalb, and explains it by saying that it is the eye which -sees the names, the attributes and the Absolute Being successively. It -owes its existence to a mysterious combination of soul and mind; and -becomes by its very nature the organ for the recognition of the -ultimate realities of existence. All that the "heart", or the source of -what the Vedānta calls the Higher Knowledge, reveals is not seen by the -individual as something separate from and heterogeneous to himself; what -is shown to him through this agency is his own reality, his own deep -being. This characteristic of the agency differentiates it from the -intellect, the object of which is always different and separate from the -individual exercising that faculty. But the spiritual experience, -according to the Ṣūfīs of this school, is not permanent; moments of -spiritual vision, says Matthew Arnold,[170:1] cannot be at our command. -The god-man is he who has known the mystery of his own being, who has -realised himself as god-man; but when that particular spiritual -realisation is over man is man and God is God. Had the experience been -permanent, a great moral force would have been lost and society -overturned. - - [170:1] "We cannot kindle when we will - The fire which in the heart resides". - -Let us now sum up Al-Jīlī's _Doctrine of the Trinity_. We have seen the -three movements of the Absolute Being, or the first three categories of -Pure Being; we have also seen that the third movement is attended with -external manifestation, which is the self-diremption of the Essence into -God and man. This separation makes a gap which is filled by the perfect -man, who shares in both the Divine and the human attributes. He holds -that the perfect man is the preserver of the Universe; hence in his -view, the appearance of the perfect man is a necessary condition for the -continuation of nature. It is easy, therefore, to understand that in the -god-man, the Absolute Being which has left its absoluteness, returns -into itself; and, but for the god-man, it could not have done so; for -then there would have been no nature, and consequently no light through -which God could have seen Himself. The light through the agency of which -God sees Himself is due to the principle of difference in the nature of -the Absolute Being itself. He recognises this principle in the following -verses:-- - - If you say that God is one, you are right; but if you say that He - is two, this is also true. - - If you say no, but He is three, you are right, for this is the - real nature of man.[171:1] - - [171:1] Insān al-Kāmil, Vol. I, p. 8. - -The _perfect man_, then, is the joining link. On the one hand he -receives illumination from all the Essential names, on the other hand -all Divine attributes reappear in him. These attributes are:-- - -1. Independent life or existence. - -2. Knowledge which is a form of life, as he proves from a verse from the -Qur’an. - -3. Will--the principle of particularisation, or the manifestation of -Being. He defines it as the illumination of the knowledge of God -according to the requirements of the Essence; hence it is a particular -form of knowledge. It has nine manifestations, all of which are -different names for love; the last is the love in which the lover and -the beloved, the knower and the known merge into each other, and become -identical. This form of love, he says, is the Absolute Essence; as -Christianity teaches, God is love. He guards, here, against the error of -looking upon the individual act of will as uncaused. Only the act of the -universal will is uncaused; hence he implies the Hegelian Doctrine of -Freedom, and holds that the acts of man are both free and determined. - -4. Power, which expresses itself in self-diremption i.e. creation. He -controverts S̱ẖaiḵẖ Muḥy al-Dīn ibn ‘Arabī's position that the -Universe existed before the creation in the knowledge of God. He says, -this would imply that God did not create it out of nothing, and holds -that the Universe, before its existence as an idea, existed in the self -of God. - -5. The word or the reflected being. Every possibility is the word of -God; hence nature is the materialisation of the word of God. It has -different names--The tangible word, The sum of the realities of man, The -arrangement of the Divinity, The spread of Oneness, The expression of -the Unknown, The phases of Beauty, The trace of names and attributes, -and the object of God's knowledge. - -6. The Power of hearing the inaudible. - -7. The Power of seeing the invisible. - -8. Beauty--that which seems least beautiful in nature (the reflected -beauty) is in its real existence, beauty. Evil is only relative, it has -no real existence; sin is merely a relative deformity. - -9. Glory or beauty in its intensity. - -10. Perfection, which is the unknowable essence of God and therefore -Unlimited and Infinite. - - - - -CHAP. VI. - -LATER PERSIAN THOUGHT. - - -Under the rude Tartar invaders of Persia, who could have no sympathy -with independent thought, there could be no progress of ideas. Ṣūfīism, -owing to its association with religion, went on systematising old and -evolving new ideas. But philosophy proper was distasteful to the Tartar. -Even the development of Islamic law suffered a check; since the Ḥanafite -law was the acme of human reason to the Tartar, and further subtleties -of legal interpretation were disagreeable to his brain. Old schools of -thought lost their solidarity, and many thinkers left their native -country to find more favourable conditions elsewhere. In the 16{th} -century we find Persian Aristotelians--Dastūr Isfahānī, Hīr Bud, Munīr, -and Kāmrān--travelling in India, where the Emperor Akbar was drawing -upon Zoroastrianism to form a new faith for himself and his courtiers, -who were mostly Persians. No great thinker, however, appeared in Persia -until the 17{th} century, when the acute Mulla Ṣadra of S̱ẖīrāz upheld -his philosophical system with all the vigour of his powerful logic. With -Mulla Ṣadra Reality is all things yet is none of them, and true -knowledge consists in the identity of the subject and the object. De -Gobineau thinks that the philosophy of Ṣadra is a mere revival of -Avicennaism. He, however, ignores the fact that Mulla Ṣadra's doctrine -of the identity of subject and object constitutes the final step which -the Persian intellect took towards complete monism. It is moreover the -Philosophy of Ṣadra which is the source of the metaphysics of early -Bābism. - -But the movement towards Platonism is best illustrated in Mulla Hādī of -Sabzwār who flourished in the 18{th} century, and is believed by his -countrymen to be the greatest of modern Persian thinkers. As a specimen -of comparatively recent Persian speculation, I may briefly notice here -the views of this great thinker, as set forth in his Asrār al-Ḥikam -(published in Persia). A glance at his philosophical teaching reveals -three fundamental conceptions which are indissolubly associated with the -Post-Islamic Persian thought:-- - -1. The idea of the Absolute Unity of the Real which is described as -"Light". - -2. The idea of evolution which is dimly visible in Zoroaster's doctrine -of the destiny of the human soul, and receives further expansion and -systematisation by Persian Neo-Platonists and Ṣūfī thinkers. - -3. The idea of a medium between the Absolute Real and the Not-real. - -It is highly interesting to note how the Persian mind gradually got rid -of the Emanation theory of Neo-Platonism, and reached a purer notion of -Plato's Philosophy. The Arab Muhammadans of Spain, by a similar process -of elimination reached, through the same medium (Neo-Platonism) a truer -conception of the Philosophy of Aristotle--a fact which illustrates the -genius of the two races. Lewes in his Biographical History of Philosophy -remarks that the Arabs eagerly took up the study of Aristotle simply -because Plato was not presented to them. I am, however, inclined to -think that the Arab genius was thoroughly practical; hence Plato's -philosophy would have been distasteful to them even if it had been -presented in its true light. Of the systems of Greek philosophy -Neo-Platonism, I believe, was the only one which was presented in its -completeness to the Muslim world; yet patient critical research led the -Arab from Plotinus to Aristotle, and the Persian to Plato. This is -singularly illustrated in the Philosophy of Mulla Hādī, who recognises -no Emanations, and approaches the Platonic conception of the Real. He -illustrates, moreover, how philosophical speculation in Persia, as in -all countries where Physical science either does not exist or is not -studied, is finally absorbed by religion. The "Essence", i.e. the -metaphysical cause as distinguished from the scientific cause, which -means the sum of antecedent conditions, must gradually be transformed -into "Personal Will" (cause, in a religious sense) in the absence of any -other notion of cause. And this is perhaps the deeper reason why -Persian philosophies have always ended in religion. - -Let us now turn to Mulla Hādī's system of thought. He teaches that -Reason has two aspects:--(a) Theoretical, the object of which is -Philosophy and Mathematics, (b) Practical, the object of which is -Domestic Economy, Politics, etc. Philosophy proper comprises the -knowledge of the beginning of things, the end of things, and the -knowledge of the Self. It also includes the knowledge of the law of -God--which is identical with religion. In order to understand the origin -of things, we should subject to a searching analysis the various -phenomena of the Universe. Such an analysis reveals that there are three -original principles.[178:1] - -(1). The Real--Light. - -(2). The Shadow. - -(3). The not-Real--Darkness. - - [178:1] Asrār al-Ḥikam; p. 6. - -The Real is absolute, and necessary as distinguished from the "Shadow", -which is relative and contingent. In its nature it is absolutely good; -and the proposition that it is good, is self-evident.[178:2] All forms -of potential existence, before they are actualised by the Real, are open -to both existence or non-existence, and the possibilities of their -existence or non-existence are exactly equal. It, therefore, follows -that the Real which actualises the potential is not itself -non-existence; since non-existence operating on non-existence cannot -produce actuality.[179:1] Mulla Hādī, in his conception of the Real as -the operator, modifies Plato's statical conception of the Universe, and, -following Aristotle, looks upon his Real as the immovable source and the -object of all motion. "All things in the Universe," he says, "love -perfection, and are moving towards their final ends--minerals towards -vegetables, vegetables towards animals, and animals towards man. And -observe how man passes through all these stages in the mother's -womb."[179:2] The mover as mover is either the source or the object of -motion or both. In any case the mover must be either movable or -immovable. The proposition that all movers must be themselves movable, -leads to infinite regress--which must stop at the immovable mover, the -source and the final object of all motion. The Real, moreover, is a pure -unity; for if there is a plurality of Reals, one would limit the other. -The Real as creator also cannot be conceived as more than one; since a -plurality of creators would mean a plurality of worlds which must be -circular touching one another, and this again implies vacuum which is -impossible.[180:1] Regarded as an essence, therefore, the Real is one. -But it is also many, from a different standpoint. It is life, power, -love; though we cannot say that these qualities inhere in it--they are -it, and it is them. Unity does not mean oneness, its essence consists in -the "dropping of all relations." Unlike the Ṣūfīs and other thinkers, -Mulla Hādī holds and tries to show that belief in multiplicity is not -inconsistent with belief in unity; since the visible "many" is nothing -more than a manifestation of the names and attributes of the Real. -These attributes are the various forms of a "Knowledge" which -constitutes the very essence of the Real. To speak, however, of the -attributes of the Real is only a verbal convenience; since "defining the -Real is applying the category of number to it"--an absurd process which -endeavours to bring the unrelated into the sphere of the related. The -Universe, with all its variety, is the shadow of the various names and -attributes of the Real or the Absolute Light. It is Reality unfolded, -the "Be", or the word of Light.[181:1] Visible multiplicity is the -illumination of Darkness, or the actualisation of Nothing. Things are -different because we see them, as it were, through glasses of different -colours--the Ideas. In this connection Hādī approvingly quotes the poet -Jāmī who has given the most beautiful poetic expression to Plato's -Doctrine of Ideas in verses which can be thus translated:-- - -"The ideas are glasses of various colours in which the Sun of Reality -reflects itself, and makes itself visible through them according as they -are red, yellow or blue."[181:2] - - [178:2] Asrār al-Ḥikam; p. 8. - - [179:1] Asrār al-Ḥikam; p. 8. - - [179:2] Asrār al-Ḥikam; p. 10. - - [180:1] Asrār al-Ḥikam; pp. 28, 29. - - [181:1] Asrār al-Ḥikam; p. 151. - - [181:2] Asrār al-Ḥikam; p. 6. - -In his Psychology he mostly follows Avicenna, but his treatment of the -subject is more thorough and systematic. He classifies the soul in the -following manner:-- - - The Soul - │ - ┌─────────┴─────┐ - │ │ - Heavenly Earthly - │ - ┌────────┼──────────┐ - │ │ │ - Human Animal Vegetative - - Powers:-- - - 1. Preserving the individual. - 2. Perfecting the individual. - 3. Perpetuating the species. - -The animal soul has three powers:-- - - 1. External senses┐ Perception. - 2. Internal senses┘ - 3. Power of motion which includes. - (a) Voluntary motion. - (b) Involuntary motion. - -The external senses are taste, touch, smell, hearing and sight. The -sound exists outside the ear, and not inside as some thinkers have held. -For if it does not exist outside the ear, it is not possible to perceive -its direction and distance. Hearing and sight are superior to other -senses, and sight is superior to hearing; since:-- - - I. The eye can perceive distant things. - - II. Its perception is light, which is the best of all - attributes. - - III. The construction of the eye is more complicated and - delicate than that of the ear. - - IV. The perceptions of sight are things which actually exist, - while those of hearing resemble non-existence. - -The internal senses are as follow:-- - -(1). The Common Sense--the tablet of the mind. It is like the Prime -Minister of the mind sending out five spies (external senses) to bring -in news from the external world. When we say "this white thing is -sweet", we perceive whiteness and sweetness by sight and taste -respectively, but that both the attributes exist in the same thing is -decided by the Common Sense. The line made by a falling drop, so far as -the eye is concerned, is nothing but the drop. But what is the line -which we see? To account for such a phenomenon, says Hādī, it is -necessary to postulate another sense which perceives the lengthening of -the falling drop into a line. - -(2). The faculty which preserves the perceptions of the Common -Sense--images and not ideas like the memory. The judgment that whiteness -and sweetness exist in the same thing is completed by this faculty; -since, if it does not preserve the image of the subject, Common Sense -cannot perceive the predicate. - -(3). The power which perceives individual ideas. The sheep thinks of the -enmity of the wolf, and runs away from him. Some forms of life lack this -power, e.g. the moth which hurls itself against the candle-flame. - -(4). Memory--the preserver of ideas. - -(5). The power of combining images and ideas, e.g. the winged man. When -this faculty works under the guidance of the power which perceives -individual ideas, it is called Imagination; when it works under the -control of Intellect, it is called Conception. - -But it is the spirit which distinguishes man from other animals. This -essence of humanity is a "unity", not oneness. It perceives the -Universal by itself, and the particular through the external and the -internal senses. It is the shadow of the Absolute Light, and like it -manifests itself in various ways--comprehending multiplicity in its -unity. There is no necessary relation between the spirit and the body. -The former is non-temporal and non-spatial; hence it is changeless, and -has the power of judging the visible multiplicity. In sleep the spirit -uses the "ideal body" which functions like the physical body; in waking -life it uses the ordinary physical body. It follows, therefore, that the -spirit stands in need of neither, and uses both at will. Hādī does not -follow Plato in his doctrine of transmigration, the different forms of -which he refutes at length. The spirit to him is immortal, and reaches -its original home--Absolute Light--by the gradual perfection of its -faculties. The various stages of the development of reason are as -follows:-- - - A. Theoretical or Pure Reason-- - - 1{st} Potential Reason. - 2{nd} Perception of self-evident propositions. - 3{rd} Actual Reason. - 4{th} Perception of Universal concepts. - - B. Practical Reason-- - - 1{st} External Purification. - 2{nd} Internal Purification. - 3{rd} Formation of virtuous habits. - 4{th} Union with God. - -Thus the spirit rises higher and higher in the scale of being, and -finally shares in the eternity of the Absolute Light by losing itself in -its universality. "In itself non-existent, but existent in the eternal -Friend: how wonderful that it _is_ and _is not_ at the same time". But -is the spirit free to choose its course? Hādī criticises the -Rationalists for their setting up man as an independent creator of evil, -and accuses them of what he calls "veiled dualism". He holds that every -object has two sides--"bright" side, and "dark" side. Things are -combinations of light and darkness. All good flows from the side of -light; evil proceeds from darkness. Man, therefore, is both free and -determined. - -But all the various lines of Persian thought once more find a synthesis -in that great religious movement of Modern Persia--Bābism or Bahāism, -which began as a S̱ẖī‘ah sect, with Mirzā ‘Alī Muḥammad Bāb of S̱ẖīrāz -(b. 1820), and became less and less Islamic in character with the -progress of orthodox persecutions. The origin of the philosophy of this -wonderful sect must be sought in the S̱ẖī‘ah sect of the S̱ẖaiḵẖīs, -the founder of which, S̱ẖaiḵẖ Aḥmad, was an enthusiastic student of -Mulla Ṣadrā's Philosophy, on which he had written several commentaries. -This sect differed from the ordinary S̱ẖī‘ahs in holding that belief in -an ever present Medium between the absent Imām (the 12{th} Head of the -Church, whose manifestation is anxiously expected by the S̱ẖī‘ahs), and -the church is a fundamental principle of the S̱ẖī‘ah religion. -S̱ẖaiḵẖ Aḥmad claimed to be such a Medium; and when, after the death -of the second S̱ẖaiḵẖī Medium--Ḥājī Kāzim, the S̱ẖaiḵẖīs were anxiously -expecting the manifestation of the new Medium, Mirzā ‘Alī Muḥammad Bāb, -who had attended the lectures of Ḥājī Kāzim at Karbalā, proclaimed -himself the expected Medium, and many S̱ẖaiḵẖīs accepted him. - -The young Persian seer looks upon Reality as an essence which brooks no -distinction of substance and attribute. The first bounty or -self-expansion of the Ultimate Essence, he says, is Existence. -"Existence" is the "known", the "known" is the essence of "knowledge"; -"knowledge" is "will"; and "will" is "love". Thus from Mulla Ṣadrā's -identity of the known and the knower, he passes to his conception of the -Real as Will and Love. This Primal Love, which he regards as the essence -of the Real, is the cause of the manifestation of the Universe which is -nothing more than the self-expansion of Love. The word creation, with -him, does not mean creation out of nothing; since, as the S̱ẖaiḵẖīs -maintain, the word creator is not peculiarly applicable to God alone. -The Quranic verse, that "God is the best of creators",[188:1] implies -that there are other self-manifesting beings like God. - - [188:1] Sūra 23; v. 14. - -After the execution of ‘Alī Muḥammad Bāb, Bahāullāh, one of his -principal disciples who were collectively called "The First Unity", took -up the mission, and proclaimed himself the originator of the new -dispensation, the absent Imām whose manifestation the Bāb had foretold. -He freed the doctrine of his master from its literalistic mysticism, and -presented it in a more perfected and systematised form. The Absolute -Reality, according to him, is not a person; it is an eternal living -Essence, to which we apply the epithets Truth and Love only because -these are the highest conceptions known to us. The Living Essence -manifests itself through the Univere with the object of creating in -itself atoms or centres of consciousness, which as Dr. McTaggart would -say, constitute a further determination of the Hegelian Absolute. In -each of these undifferentiated, simple centres of consciousness, there -is hidden a ray of the Absolute Light itself, and the perfection of the -spirit consists in gradually actualising, by contact with the -individualising principle--matter, its emotional and intellectual -possibilities, and thus discovering its own deep being--the ray of -eternal Love which is concealed by its union with consciousness. The -essence of man, therefore, is not reason or consciousness; it is this -ray of Love--the source of all impulse to noble and unselfish action, -which constitutes the real man. The influence of Mulla Ṣadrā's doctrine -of the incorporeality of Imagination is here apparent. Reason, which -stands higher than Imagination in the scale of evolution, is not a -necessary condition, according to Mulla Ṣadrā, of immortality. In all -forms of life there is an immortal spiritual part, the ray of Eternal -Love, which has no necessary connection with self-consciousness or -reason, and survives after the death of the body. Salvation, then, which -to Buddha consists in the starving out of the mind-atoms by -extinguishing desire, to Bahāullāh lies in the discovery of the essence -of love which is hidden in the atoms of consciousness themselves.[190:1] -Both, however, agree that after death thoughts and characters of men -remain, subject to other forces of a similar character, in the spiritual -world, waiting for another opportunity to find a suitable physical -accompaniment in order to continue the process of discovery (Bahāullāh) -or destruction (Buddha). To Bahāullāh the conception of Love is higher -than the conception of Will. Schopenhauer conceived reality as Will -which was driven to objectification by a sinful bent eternally existing -in its nature. Love or Will, according to both, is present in every atom -of life; but the cause of its being there is the joy of self-expansion -in the one case, and the inexplicable evil inclination in the other. But -Schopenhauer postulates certain temporal ideas in order to account for -the objectification of the Primordial Will; Bahāullāh, as far as I can -see, does not explain the principle according to which the -self-manifestation of the Eternal Love is realised in the Universe. - - [190:1] See Phelp's ‘Abbās Effendī, chapter, "Philosophy and - Psychology". - - - - -CONCLUSION. - - -Let us now briefly sum up the results of our survey. We have seen that -the Persian mind had to struggle against two different kinds of -Dualism--pre-Islamic Magian Dualism, and post-Islamic Greek Dualism, -though the fundamental problem of the diversity of things remains -essentially the same. The attitude of the pre-Islamic Persian thinkers -is thoroughly objective, and hence the results of their intellectual -efforts are more or less materialistic. The Pre-Islamic thinkers, -however, clearly perceived that the original Principle must be -dynamically conceived. With Zoroaster both the primary spirits are -"active", with Mānī the principle of Light is passive, and the principle -of Darkness is aggressive. But their analysis of the various elements -which constitute the Universe is ridiculously meagre; their conception -of the Universe is most defective on its statical side. There are, -therefore, two weak points in their systems:-- - - 1. Naked Dualism. - - 2. Lack of analysis. - -The first was remedied by Islām; the second by the introduction of Greek -Philosophy. The advent of Islām and the study of Greek philosophy, -however, checked the indigenous tendency towards monistic thought; but -these two forces contributed to change the objective attitude -characteristic of early thinkers, and aroused the slumbering -subjectivity, which eventually reached its climax in the extreme -Pantheism of some of the Ṣūfī schools. Al-Fārābī endeavoured to get rid -of the dualism between God and matter, by reducing matter to a mere -confused perception of the spirit; the As̱ẖ‘arite denied it altogether, -and maintained a thoroughgoing Idealism. The followers of Aristotle -continued to stick to their master's Prima Materia; the Ṣūfīs looked -upon the material universe as a mere illusion, or a necessary "other," -for the self-knowledge of God. It can, however, be safely stated that -with the As̱ẖ‘arite Idealism, the Persian mind got over the foreign -dualism of God and matter, and, fortified with new philosophical -ideas, returned to the old dualism of light and darkness. The -S̱ẖaiḵẖ-al-Is̱ẖrāq combines the objective attitude of Pre-Islamic -Persian thinkers with the subjective attitude of his immediate -predecessors, and restates the Dualism of Zoroaster in a much more -philosophical and spiritualised form. His system recognises the claims -of both the subject and the object. But all these monistic systems of -thought were met by the Pluralism of Wāḥid Maḥmūd, who taught that -reality is not one, but many--primary living units which combine in -various ways, and gradually rise to perfection by passing through an -ascending scale of forms. The reaction of Wāḥid Maḥmūd was, however, an -ephemeral phenomenon. The later Sūfīs as well as philosophers proper -gradually transformed or abandoned the Neo-Platonic theory of Emanation, -and in later thinkers we see a movement through Neo-Platonism towards -real Platonism which is approached by Mulla Hādī's Philosophy. But pure -speculation and dreamy mysticism undergo a powerful check in Bābism -which, unmindful of persecution, synthesises all the inherited -philosophical and religious tendencies, and rouses the spirit to a -consciousness of the stern reality of things. Though extremely -cosmopolitan and hence quite unpatriotic in character, it has yet had a -great influence over the Persian mind. The unmystic character and the -practical tone of Bābism may have been a remote cause of the -progress of recent political reform in Persia. - - - - -ERRATA - - P. 4, Note 4, l. 1, read Buudahish for Buudadisḥ. - - P. 9, l. 10, read environment for environments. - - P. 56, l. 1, read reaction for reation. - - P. 61, l. 18, read considered for consided. - - P. 73, l. 21, read full stop after dialectic. - - P. 102, l. 1, read conditions for condition. - - P. 123, l. 19, read predecessors for precessor. - - P. 153, l. 21, read He-ness for an He-ness. - - P. 166, l. 21, read a piece for pieee. - - - - -Transcriber's Notes: - -Many words appear in the text with different transcription or mark-up. -They have been left as in the original. - -All occurrences of e. g., i. e., B. C., A. D. and A. H. have been -replaced with e.g., i.e., B.C., A.D. and A.H. Other initials have been -left as in the original. - -All ditto marks, ibid. and Sh. An. (S̱ẖarh Anwāriyya) entries replaced -with their full references. - -Printed Errata has been moved to the end of the text. - -The underlined letter pairs (Dh, dh, Gh, Gh, Kh, kh, Sh and sh) have -been transcribed with a macron below each letter. - -The following corrections have been made to the text: - - Page IX--due perhaps to semitic [original has samitic] influences, - - Page CONTENTS--Reality as [original has as as] Beauty - - Page 25--introduced [original has intruduced] - - Page 33, footnote 33:1--Maulānā [original has Maulāna] - - Page 54--necessarily [original has necssarily] - - Page 54--Nazzām [original has Nazzān] - - Page 57--Ismā‘īlians [original has Ismā‘īliams] - - Page 61--metaphysical [original has netaphysical] - - Page 63--which,[original has period] by gradually - - Page 65--As̱ẖ‘arite.[original has As̱ẖ‘arīte] - - Page 68, footnote 68:1--Ash‘aritenthums [original has - Ash’aritenthums] - - Page 69--philosophising [original has plilosophising] - - Page 69, footnote 69:1--Ash‘aritenthums [original has As‘aritenthums] - - Page 74--S̱ẖahrastānī [original has Sẖahrastānī] - - Page 75--As̱ẖ‘arite [original has As̱ẖ’arite] - - Page 76--As̱ẖ‘arite [original has As̱ẖ‘ārite] - - Page 81--seem to [original has the letter t missing] be - - Page 81--Ḥikmat al-‘Ain--"Philosophy of Essence", - [original has single hyphen] - - Page 85--objectively [original has objectivily] - - Page 95, footnote 95:1--Commentary [original has Comentary] - - Page 104--restatement [original has restatemet] - - Page 105--Ka‘bahs [original has Ka‘bāhs] - - Page 111--self-conscious [original has self-consious] - - Page 124--the son of Sultan Ṣalāḥ [original has Ṣalā-Ṣalāḥ]-al Dīn - - Page 127--visible [original has visibile] - - Page 136--is motion.[original has comma] The distinction of past, - - Page 142--theory of [original has theoryof] - - Page 148--maintains [original has mantains] - - Page 152, footnote 152:1--Insān al-Kāmil [original has Insānul Kāmul] - - Page 158--identical [original has indentical] - - Page 162--marks the [original has the the] first step - - Page 163, footnote 163:1--Notwithstanding [original has - Nowithstanding] - - Page 171, footnote 171:1--Insān al-Kāmil [original has Insānul Kāmil] - - Page 180--standpoint [original has staindpoint] - - Page 187--S̱ẖī‘ahs [original has S̱ẖī’ahs] - - - - - -End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of The Development of Metaphysics in -Persia, by Muhammad Iqbal - -*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK METAPHYSICS IN PERSIA *** - -***** This file should be named 41707-0.txt or 41707-0.zip ***** -This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: - http://www.gutenberg.org/4/1/7/0/41707/ - -Produced by Fritz Ohrenschall, Sania Ali Mirza, Asad Razzaki -and the Online Distributed Proofreading Team at -http://www.pgdp.net (This book was produced from scanned -images of public domain material from the Google Print -project.) - - -Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions -will be renamed. - -Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no -one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation -(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without -permission and without paying copyright royalties. Special rules, -set forth in the General Terms of Use part of this license, apply to -copying and distributing Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works to -protect the PROJECT GUTENBERG-tm concept and trademark. Project -Gutenberg is a registered trademark, and may not be used if you -charge for the eBooks, unless you receive specific permission. If you -do not charge anything for copies of this eBook, complying with the -rules is very easy. You may use this eBook for nearly any purpose -such as creation of derivative works, reports, performances and -research. They may be modified and printed and given away--you may do -practically ANYTHING with public domain eBooks. Redistribution is -subject to the trademark license, especially commercial -redistribution. - - - -*** START: FULL LICENSE *** - -THE FULL PROJECT GUTENBERG LICENSE -PLEASE READ THIS BEFORE YOU DISTRIBUTE OR USE THIS WORK - -To protect the Project Gutenberg-tm mission of promoting the free -distribution of electronic works, by using or distributing this work -(or any other work associated in any way with the phrase "Project -Gutenberg"), you agree to comply with all the terms of the Full Project -Gutenberg-tm License available with this file or online at - www.gutenberg.org/license. - - -Section 1. General Terms of Use and Redistributing Project Gutenberg-tm -electronic works - -1.A. By reading or using any part of this Project Gutenberg-tm -electronic work, you indicate that you have read, understand, agree to -and accept all the terms of this license and intellectual property -(trademark/copyright) agreement. If you do not agree to abide by all -the terms of this agreement, you must cease using and return or destroy -all copies of Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works in your possession. -If you paid a fee for obtaining a copy of or access to a Project -Gutenberg-tm electronic work and you do not agree to be bound by the -terms of this agreement, you may obtain a refund from the person or -entity to whom you paid the fee as set forth in paragraph 1.E.8. - -1.B. "Project Gutenberg" is a registered trademark. It may only be -used on or associated in any way with an electronic work by people who -agree to be bound by the terms of this agreement. There are a few -things that you can do with most Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works -even without complying with the full terms of this agreement. See -paragraph 1.C below. There are a lot of things you can do with Project -Gutenberg-tm electronic works if you follow the terms of this agreement -and help preserve free future access to Project Gutenberg-tm electronic -works. See paragraph 1.E below. - -1.C. The Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation ("the Foundation" -or PGLAF), owns a compilation copyright in the collection of Project -Gutenberg-tm electronic works. Nearly all the individual works in the -collection are in the public domain in the United States. If an -individual work is in the public domain in the United States and you are -located in the United States, we do not claim a right to prevent you from -copying, distributing, performing, displaying or creating derivative -works based on the work as long as all references to Project Gutenberg -are removed. Of course, we hope that you will support the Project -Gutenberg-tm mission of promoting free access to electronic works by -freely sharing Project Gutenberg-tm works in compliance with the terms of -this agreement for keeping the Project Gutenberg-tm name associated with -the work. You can easily comply with the terms of this agreement by -keeping this work in the same format with its attached full Project -Gutenberg-tm License when you share it without charge with others. - -1.D. The copyright laws of the place where you are located also govern -what you can do with this work. Copyright laws in most countries are in -a constant state of change. If you are outside the United States, check -the laws of your country in addition to the terms of this agreement -before downloading, copying, displaying, performing, distributing or -creating derivative works based on this work or any other Project -Gutenberg-tm work. The Foundation makes no representations concerning -the copyright status of any work in any country outside the United -States. - -1.E. Unless you have removed all references to Project Gutenberg: - -1.E.1. The following sentence, with active links to, or other immediate -access to, the full Project Gutenberg-tm License must appear prominently -whenever any copy of a Project Gutenberg-tm work (any work on which the -phrase "Project Gutenberg" appears, or with which the phrase "Project -Gutenberg" is associated) is accessed, displayed, performed, viewed, -copied or distributed: - -This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with -almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or -re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included -with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org - -1.E.2. If an individual Project Gutenberg-tm electronic work is derived -from the public domain (does not contain a notice indicating that it is -posted with permission of the copyright holder), the work can be copied -and distributed to anyone in the United States without paying any fees -or charges. If you are redistributing or providing access to a work -with the phrase "Project Gutenberg" associated with or appearing on the -work, you must comply either with the requirements of paragraphs 1.E.1 -through 1.E.7 or obtain permission for the use of the work and the -Project Gutenberg-tm trademark as set forth in paragraphs 1.E.8 or -1.E.9. - -1.E.3. If an individual Project Gutenberg-tm electronic work is posted -with the permission of the copyright holder, your use and distribution -must comply with both paragraphs 1.E.1 through 1.E.7 and any additional -terms imposed by the copyright holder. Additional terms will be linked -to the Project Gutenberg-tm License for all works posted with the -permission of the copyright holder found at the beginning of this work. - -1.E.4. Do not unlink or detach or remove the full Project Gutenberg-tm -License terms from this work, or any files containing a part of this -work or any other work associated with Project Gutenberg-tm. - -1.E.5. Do not copy, display, perform, distribute or redistribute this -electronic work, or any part of this electronic work, without -prominently displaying the sentence set forth in paragraph 1.E.1 with -active links or immediate access to the full terms of the Project -Gutenberg-tm License. - -1.E.6. You may convert to and distribute this work in any binary, -compressed, marked up, nonproprietary or proprietary form, including any -word processing or hypertext form. However, if you provide access to or -distribute copies of a Project Gutenberg-tm work in a format other than -"Plain Vanilla ASCII" or other format used in the official version -posted on the official Project Gutenberg-tm web site (www.gutenberg.org), -you must, at no additional cost, fee or expense to the user, provide a -copy, a means of exporting a copy, or a means of obtaining a copy upon -request, of the work in its original "Plain Vanilla ASCII" or other -form. Any alternate format must include the full Project Gutenberg-tm -License as specified in paragraph 1.E.1. - -1.E.7. Do not charge a fee for access to, viewing, displaying, -performing, copying or distributing any Project Gutenberg-tm works -unless you comply with paragraph 1.E.8 or 1.E.9. - -1.E.8. You may charge a reasonable fee for copies of or providing -access to or distributing Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works provided -that - -- You pay a royalty fee of 20% of the gross profits you derive from - the use of Project Gutenberg-tm works calculated using the method - you already use to calculate your applicable taxes. The fee is - owed to the owner of the Project Gutenberg-tm trademark, but he - has agreed to donate royalties under this paragraph to the - Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation. Royalty payments - must be paid within 60 days following each date on which you - prepare (or are legally required to prepare) your periodic tax - returns. Royalty payments should be clearly marked as such and - sent to the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation at the - address specified in Section 4, "Information about donations to - the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation." - -- You provide a full refund of any money paid by a user who notifies - you in writing (or by e-mail) within 30 days of receipt that s/he - does not agree to the terms of the full Project Gutenberg-tm - License. You must require such a user to return or - destroy all copies of the works possessed in a physical medium - and discontinue all use of and all access to other copies of - Project Gutenberg-tm works. - -- You provide, in accordance with paragraph 1.F.3, a full refund of any - money paid for a work or a replacement copy, if a defect in the - electronic work is discovered and reported to you within 90 days - of receipt of the work. - -- You comply with all other terms of this agreement for free - distribution of Project Gutenberg-tm works. - -1.E.9. If you wish to charge a fee or distribute a Project Gutenberg-tm -electronic work or group of works on different terms than are set -forth in this agreement, you must obtain permission in writing from -both the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation and Michael -Hart, the owner of the Project Gutenberg-tm trademark. Contact the -Foundation as set forth in Section 3 below. - -1.F. - -1.F.1. Project Gutenberg volunteers and employees expend considerable -effort to identify, do copyright research on, transcribe and proofread -public domain works in creating the Project Gutenberg-tm -collection. Despite these efforts, Project Gutenberg-tm electronic -works, and the medium on which they may be stored, may contain -"Defects," such as, but not limited to, incomplete, inaccurate or -corrupt data, transcription errors, a copyright or other intellectual -property infringement, a defective or damaged disk or other medium, a -computer virus, or computer codes that damage or cannot be read by -your equipment. - -1.F.2. LIMITED WARRANTY, DISCLAIMER OF DAMAGES - Except for the "Right -of Replacement or Refund" described in paragraph 1.F.3, the Project -Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation, the owner of the Project -Gutenberg-tm trademark, and any other party distributing a Project -Gutenberg-tm electronic work under this agreement, disclaim all -liability to you for damages, costs and expenses, including legal -fees. YOU AGREE THAT YOU HAVE NO REMEDIES FOR NEGLIGENCE, STRICT -LIABILITY, BREACH OF WARRANTY OR BREACH OF CONTRACT EXCEPT THOSE -PROVIDED IN PARAGRAPH 1.F.3. YOU AGREE THAT THE FOUNDATION, THE -TRADEMARK OWNER, AND ANY DISTRIBUTOR UNDER THIS AGREEMENT WILL NOT BE -LIABLE TO YOU FOR ACTUAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, CONSEQUENTIAL, PUNITIVE OR -INCIDENTAL DAMAGES EVEN IF YOU GIVE NOTICE OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH -DAMAGE. - -1.F.3. LIMITED RIGHT OF REPLACEMENT OR REFUND - If you discover a -defect in this electronic work within 90 days of receiving it, you can -receive a refund of the money (if any) you paid for it by sending a -written explanation to the person you received the work from. If you -received the work on a physical medium, you must return the medium with -your written explanation. The person or entity that provided you with -the defective work may elect to provide a replacement copy in lieu of a -refund. If you received the work electronically, the person or entity -providing it to you may choose to give you a second opportunity to -receive the work electronically in lieu of a refund. If the second copy -is also defective, you may demand a refund in writing without further -opportunities to fix the problem. - -1.F.4. Except for the limited right of replacement or refund set forth -in paragraph 1.F.3, this work is provided to you 'AS-IS', WITH NO OTHER -WARRANTIES OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO -WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR ANY PURPOSE. - -1.F.5. Some states do not allow disclaimers of certain implied -warranties or the exclusion or limitation of certain types of damages. -If any disclaimer or limitation set forth in this agreement violates the -law of the state applicable to this agreement, the agreement shall be -interpreted to make the maximum disclaimer or limitation permitted by -the applicable state law. The invalidity or unenforceability of any -provision of this agreement shall not void the remaining provisions. - -1.F.6. INDEMNITY - You agree to indemnify and hold the Foundation, the -trademark owner, any agent or employee of the Foundation, anyone -providing copies of Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works in accordance -with this agreement, and any volunteers associated with the production, -promotion and distribution of Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works, -harmless from all liability, costs and expenses, including legal fees, -that arise directly or indirectly from any of the following which you do -or cause to occur: (a) distribution of this or any Project Gutenberg-tm -work, (b) alteration, modification, or additions or deletions to any -Project Gutenberg-tm work, and (c) any Defect you cause. - - -Section 2. Information about the Mission of Project Gutenberg-tm - -Project Gutenberg-tm is synonymous with the free distribution of -electronic works in formats readable by the widest variety of computers -including obsolete, old, middle-aged and new computers. It exists -because of the efforts of hundreds of volunteers and donations from -people in all walks of life. - -Volunteers and financial support to provide volunteers with the -assistance they need are critical to reaching Project Gutenberg-tm's -goals and ensuring that the Project Gutenberg-tm collection will -remain freely available for generations to come. In 2001, the Project -Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation was created to provide a secure -and permanent future for Project Gutenberg-tm and future generations. -To learn more about the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation -and how your efforts and donations can help, see Sections 3 and 4 -and the Foundation information page at www.gutenberg.org - - -Section 3. Information about the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive -Foundation - -The Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation is a non profit -501(c)(3) educational corporation organized under the laws of the -state of Mississippi and granted tax exempt status by the Internal -Revenue Service. The Foundation's EIN or federal tax identification -number is 64-6221541. Contributions to the Project Gutenberg -Literary Archive Foundation are tax deductible to the full extent -permitted by U.S. federal laws and your state's laws. - -The Foundation's principal office is located at 4557 Melan Dr. S. -Fairbanks, AK, 99712., but its volunteers and employees are scattered -throughout numerous locations. Its business office is located at 809 -North 1500 West, Salt Lake City, UT 84116, (801) 596-1887. Email -contact links and up to date contact information can be found at the -Foundation's web site and official page at www.gutenberg.org/contact - -For additional contact information: - Dr. Gregory B. Newby - Chief Executive and Director - gbnewby@pglaf.org - -Section 4. Information about Donations to the Project Gutenberg -Literary Archive Foundation - -Project Gutenberg-tm depends upon and cannot survive without wide -spread public support and donations to carry out its mission of -increasing the number of public domain and licensed works that can be -freely distributed in machine readable form accessible by the widest -array of equipment including outdated equipment. Many small donations -($1 to $5,000) are particularly important to maintaining tax exempt -status with the IRS. - -The Foundation is committed to complying with the laws regulating -charities and charitable donations in all 50 states of the United -States. Compliance requirements are not uniform and it takes a -considerable effort, much paperwork and many fees to meet and keep up -with these requirements. We do not solicit donations in locations -where we have not received written confirmation of compliance. To -SEND DONATIONS or determine the status of compliance for any -particular state visit www.gutenberg.org/donate - -While we cannot and do not solicit contributions from states where we -have not met the solicitation requirements, we know of no prohibition -against accepting unsolicited donations from donors in such states who -approach us with offers to donate. - -International donations are gratefully accepted, but we cannot make -any statements concerning tax treatment of donations received from -outside the United States. U.S. laws alone swamp our small staff. - -Please check the Project Gutenberg Web pages for current donation -methods and addresses. Donations are accepted in a number of other -ways including checks, online payments and credit card donations. -To donate, please visit: www.gutenberg.org/donate - - -Section 5. General Information About Project Gutenberg-tm electronic -works. - -Professor Michael S. Hart was the originator of the Project Gutenberg-tm -concept of a library of electronic works that could be freely shared -with anyone. For forty years, he produced and distributed Project -Gutenberg-tm eBooks with only a loose network of volunteer support. - -Project Gutenberg-tm eBooks are often created from several printed -editions, all of which are confirmed as Public Domain in the U.S. -unless a copyright notice is included. Thus, we do not necessarily -keep eBooks in compliance with any particular paper edition. - -Most people start at our Web site which has the main PG search facility: - - www.gutenberg.org - -This Web site includes information about Project Gutenberg-tm, -including how to make donations to the Project Gutenberg Literary -Archive Foundation, how to help produce our new eBooks, and how to -subscribe to our email newsletter to hear about new eBooks. - diff --git a/old/41707-0.zip b/old/41707-0.zip Binary files differdeleted file mode 100644 index fbe138b..0000000 --- a/old/41707-0.zip +++ /dev/null diff --git a/old/41707-8.txt b/old/41707-8.txt deleted file mode 100644 index 1b61bde..0000000 --- a/old/41707-8.txt +++ /dev/null @@ -1,4764 +0,0 @@ -The Project Gutenberg EBook of The Development of Metaphysics in Persia, by -Muhammad Iqbal - -This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with -almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or -re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included -with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org - - -Title: The Development of Metaphysics in Persia - A Contribution to the History of Muslim Philosophy - -Author: Muhammad Iqbal - -Release Date: December 26, 2012 [EBook #41707] - -Language: English - -Character set encoding: ISO-8859-1 - -*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK METAPHYSICS IN PERSIA *** - - - - -Produced by Fritz Ohrenschall, Sania Ali Mirza, Asad Razzaki -and the Online Distributed Proofreading Team at -http://www.pgdp.net (This book was produced from scanned -images of public domain material from the Google Print -project.) - - - - - -Transcriber's note: - - Some typographical and punctuation errors have been corrected. - A complete list follows the text. - - Words italicized in the original are surrounded by - _underscores_. - - Letters superscripted in the original have been placed in {} - brackets. - - The Arabic letter Ain is represented by the grave accent `, - the Arabic letter Hamza is represented by the single quote ' - and the asterism sign is represented as .*. in the text. - - - - - THE - DEVELOPMENT OF METAPHYSICS - IN - PERSIA: - - A CONTRIBUTION TO THE HISTORY - OF MUSLIM PHILOSOPHY - - BY - - SHAIKH MUHAMMAD IQBAL - B. A. (Cantab) M. A. (Pb.) Ph. D. (Munich). - - - LONDON - LUZAC & Co. 46, Great Russell Street W. C. - 1908 - - - Printed by E. J. BRILL. — LEIDEN (Holland). - - - - - DEDICATION - TO - Professor T. W. ARNOLD M. A. - - - My dear MR. ARNOLD, - -This little book is the first-fruit of that literary and philosophical -training which I have been receiving from you for the last ten years, -and as an expression of gratitude I beg to dedicate it to your name. You -have always judged me liberally; I hope you will judge these pages in -the same spirit. - - Your affectionate pupil - - IQBAL. - - - - -INTRODUCTION. - - -The most remarkable feature of the character of the Persian people is -their love of Metaphysical speculation. Yet the inquirer who approaches -the extant literature of Persia expecting to find any comprehensive -systems of thought, like those of Kapila or Kant, will have to turn back -disappointed, though deeply impressed by the wonderful intellectual -subtlety displayed therein. It seems to me that the Persian mind is -rather impatient of detail, and consequently destitute of that -organising faculty which gradually works out a system of ideas, by -interpreting the fundamental principles with reference to the ordinary -facts of observation. The subtle Brahman sees the inner unity of things; -so does the Persian. But while the former endeavours to discover it in -all the aspects of human experience, and illustrates its hidden presence -in the concrete in various ways, the latter appears to be satisfied -with a bare universality, and does not attempt to verify the richness of -its inner content. The butterfly imagination of the Persian flies, -half-inebriated as it were, from flower to flower, and seems to be -incapable of reviewing the garden as a whole. For this reason his -deepest thoughts and emotions find expression mostly in disconnected -verses (Ghazal) which reveal all the subtlety of his artistic soul. -The Hindu, while admitting, like the Persian, the necessity of a higher -source of knowledge, yet calmly moves from experience to experience, -mercilessly dissecting them, and forcing them to yield their underlying -universality. In fact the Persian is only half-conscious of Metaphysics -as a _system_ of thought; his Brahman brother, on the other hand, is -fully alive to the need of presenting his theory in the form of a -thoroughly reasoned out system. And the result of this mental difference -between the two nations is clear. In the one case we have only partially -worked out systems of thought; in the other case, the awful sublimity of -the searching Vedanta. The student of Islamic Mysticism who is anxious -to see an all-embracing exposition of the principle of Unity, must look -up the heavy volumes of the Andalusian Ibn al-`Arabi, whose profound -teaching stands in strange contrast with the dry-as-dust Islam of his -countrymen. - -The results, however, of the intellectual activity of the different -branches of the great Aryan family are strikingly similar. The outcome -of all Idealistic speculation in India is Buddha, in Persia Bahaullah, -and in the west Schopenhauer whose system, in Hegelian language, is the -marriage of free oriental universality with occidental determinateness. - -But the history of Persian thought presents a phenomenon peculiar to -itself. In Persia, due perhaps to semitic influences, philosophical -speculation has indissolubly associated itself with religion, and -thinkers in new lines of thought have almost always been founders of new -religious movements. After the Arab conquest, however, we see pure -Philosophy severed from religion by the Neo-Platonic Aristotelians of -Islam, but the severance was only a transient phenomenon. Greek -philosophy, though an exotic plant in the soil of Persia, eventually -became an integral part of Persian thought; and later thinkers, critics -as well as advocates of Greek wisdom, talked in the philosophical -language of Aristotle and Plato, and were mostly influenced by religious -presuppositions. It is necessary to bear this fact in mind in order to -gain a thorough understanding of post-Islamic Persian thought. - -The object of this investigation is, as will appear, to prepare a -ground-work for a future history of Persian Metaphysics. Original -thought cannot be expected in a review, the object of which is purely -historical; yet I venture to claim some consideration for the following -two points:-- - -(a) I have endeavoured to trace the logical continuity of Persian -thought, which I have tried to interpret in the language of modern -Philosophy. This, as far as I know, has not yet been done. - -(b) I have discussed the subject of Sufiism in a more scientific manner, -and have attempted to bring out the intellectual conditions which -necessitated such a phenomenon. In opposition, therefore, to the -generally accepted view I have tried to maintain that Sufiism is a -necessary product of the play of various intellectual and moral forces -which would necessarily awaken the slumbering soul to a higher ideal of -life. - -Owing to my ignorance of Zend, my knowledge of Zoroaster is merely -second-hand. As regards the second part of my work, I have been able to -look up the original Persian and Arabic manuscripts as well as many -printed works connected with my investigation. I give below the names of -Arabic and Persian manuscripts from which I have drawn most of the -material utilized here. The method of transliteration adopted is the one -recognised by the Royal Asiatic Society. - - 1. Tarikh al-Hukama, by Al-Baihaqi.--Royal Library of Berlin. - - 2. Sharhi Anwariyya, (with the original text) by Muhammad - Sharif of Herat. Royal Library of Berlin. - - 3. Hikmat al-`Ain, by al-Katibi. Royal Library of Berlin. - - 4. Commentary on Hikmat al-`Ain, by Muhammad ibn Mubarak - al-Bukhari. India Office Library. - - 5. Commentary on Hikmat al-`Ain by Husaini. India Office - Library. - - 6. `Awarif al-Ma`arif, by Shahab al-Din. India Office Library. - - - 7. Mishkat al-Anwar, by Al-Ghazali. India Office Library. - - - 8. Kashf al-Mahjub, by `Ali Hajveri. India Office Library. - - 9. Risalahi Nafs translated from Aristotle, by Afdal Kashi. - India Office Library. - - 10. Risalahi Mir Sayyid Sharif. India Office Library. - - 11. Khatima, by Sayyid Muhammad Gisudaraz. India Office - Library. - - 12. Manazilal-sa'rin, by `Abdullah Ismai'l of Herat. India - Office Library. - - 13. Jawidan Nama, by Afdal Kashi. India Office Library. - - 14. Tarikh al-Hukama, by Shahrzuri. British Museum Library. - - 15. Collected works of Avicenna. British Museum Library. - - 16. Risalah fi'l-Wujud, by Mir Jurjani. British Museum Library. - - 17. Jawidani Kabir. Cambridge University Library. - - 18. Jami Jahan Numa. Cambridge University Library. - - 19. Majmu`ai Farsi Risalah No: 1, 2, of Al-Nasafi. Trinity - College Library. - - S. M. IQBAL. - - - - -CONTENTS. - - - PART I. - Pre-Islamic Persian Philosophy. - Page - Chapter I. Persian Dualism 1 - Sec: I. Zoroaster 1 - Sec: II. Mani and Mazdak 12 - Sec: III. Retrospect 20 - - PART II. - Greek Dualism. - - Chapter II. Neo-Platonic Aristotelians of Persia 22 - Sec: I. Ibn Maskawaih 26 - Sec: II. Avicenna 38 - - Chapter III. Islamic Rationalism 45 - Sec: I. Metaphysics of Rationalism--Materialism 45 - Sec: II. Contemporary movements of thought 55 - Sec: III. Reaction against Rationalism--The Ash`arite 65 - - Chapter IV. Controversy between Realism and Idealism 81 - - Chapter V. Sufiism. - Sec: I. The origin and Quranic justification of Sufiism 96 - Sec: II. Aspects of Sufi Metaphysics 111 - A. Reality as Self-conscious Will 112 - B. Reality as Beauty 112 - C. (1) Reality as Light 120 - (Return to Persian Dualism--Al-Ishraqi). - (2) Reality as Thought--Al-Jili 121 - - Chapter VI. Later Persian Thought 174 - - Conclusion 192 - - - - -PART I. - -Pre-Islamic Persian Philosophy. - - - - -CHAP. I. - -PERSIAN DUALISM. - - -§ I. - -Zoroaster. - -To Zoroaster--the ancient sage of Iran--must always be assigned the -first place in the intellectual history of Iranian Aryans who, wearied -of constant roaming, settled down to an agricultural life at a time when -the Vedic Hymns were still being composed in the plains of Central Asia. -This new mode of life and the consequent stability of the institution of -property among the settlers, made them hated by other Aryan tribes who -had not yet shaken off their original nomadic habits, and occasionally -plundered their more civilised kinsmen. Thus grew up the conflict -between the two modes of life which found its earliest expression in the -denunciation of the deities of each other--the Devas and the Ahuras. It -was really the beginning of a long individualising process which -gradually severed the Iranian branch from other Aryan tribes, and -finally manifested itself in the religious system of Zoroaster[2:1]--the -great prophet of Iran who lived and taught in the age of Solon and -Thales. In the dim light of modern oriental research we see ancient -Iranians divided between two camps--partisans of the powers of good, and -partisans of the powers of evil--when the great sage joins their furious -contest, and with his moral enthusiasm stamps out once for all the -worship of demons as well as the intolerable ritual of the Magian -priesthood. - - [2:1] Some European Scholars have held Zoroaster to be nothing - more than a mythical personage. But since the publication of - Professor Jackson's admirable Life of Zoroaster, the Iranian - Prophet has, I believe, finally got out of the ordeal of modern - criticism. - -It is, however, beside our purpose to trace the origin and growth of -Zoroaster's religious system. Our object, in so far as the present -investigation is concerned, is to glance at the metaphysical side of -his revelation. We, therefore, wish to fix our attention on the sacred -trinity of philosophy--God, Man and Nature. - -Geiger, in his "Civilisation of Eastern Iranians in Ancient Times", -points out that Zoroaster inherited two fundamental principles from his -Aryan ancestry.--(1) There is law in Nature. (2) There is conflict in -Nature. It is the observation of law and conflict in the vast panorama -of being that constitutes the philosophical foundation of his system. -The problem before him was to reconcile the existence of evil with the -eternal goodness of God. His predecessors worshipped a plurality of good -spirits all of which he reduced to a unity and called it Ahuramazda. On -the other hand he reduced all the powers of evil to a similar unity and -called it Druj-Ahriman. Thus by a process of unification he arrived at -two fundamental principles which, as Haug shows, he looked upon not as -two independent activities, but as two parts or rather aspects of the -same Primary Being. Dr. Haug, therefore, holds that the Prophet of -ancient Iran was theologically a monotheist and philosophically a -dualist.[4:1] But to maintain that there are "twin"[4:2] -spirits--creators of reality and nonreality--and at the same time to -hold that these two spirits are united in the Supreme Being,[4:3] is -virtually to say that the principle of evil constitutes a part of the -very essence of God; and the conflict between good and evil is nothing -more than the struggle of God against Himself. There is, therefore, an -inherent weakness in his attempt to reconcile theological monotheism -with philosophical dualism, and the result was a schism among the -prophet's followers. The Zendiks[4:4] whom Dr. Haug calls heretics, but -who were, I believe, decidedly more consistent than their opponents, -maintained the independence of the two original spirits from each other, -while the Magi upheld their unity. The upholders of unity endeavoured, -in various ways, to meet the Zendiks; but the very fact that they tried -different phrases and expressions to express the unity of the "Primal -Twins", indicates dissatisfaction with their own philosophical -explanations, and the strength of their opponent's position. -Shahrastani[5:1] describes briefly the different explanations of the -Magi. The Zarwanians look upon Light and Darkness as the sons of -Infinite Time. The Kiyumarthiyya hold that the original principle was -Light which was afraid of a hostile power, and it was this thought of an -adversary mixed with fear that led to the birth of Darkness. Another -branch of Zarwanians maintain that the original principle doubted -concerning something and this doubt produced Ahriman. Ibn Hazm[5:2] -speaks of another sect who explained the principle of Darkness as the -obscuration of a part of the fundamental principle of Light itself. - - [4:1] Essays, p. 303. - - [4:2] "In the beginning there was a pair of twins, two spirits, - each of a peculiar activity". Yas. XXX. 1. - - [4:3] "The more beneficial of my spirits has produced, by - speaking it, the whole rightful creation". Yas. XIX. 9. - - [4:4] The following verse from Buudahish Chap. I. will indicate - the Zendik view:-- "And between them (the two principles) there - was empty space, that is what they call "air" in which is now - their meeting". - - [5:1] Shahrastani; ed. Cureton, London, 1846, pp. 182-185. - - [5:2] Ibn Hazm--Kitab al-Milal w'al-Nihal. Ed. Cairo. Vol. II, - p. 34. - -Whether the philosophical dualism of Zoroaster can be reconciled with -his monotheism or not, it is unquestionable that, from a metaphysical -standpoint, he has made a profound suggestion in regard to the ultimate -nature of reality. The idea seems to have influenced ancient Greek -Philosophy[6:1] as well as early Christian Gnostic speculation, and -through the latter, some aspects of modern western thought.[6:2] As a -thinker he is worthy of great respect not only because he approached the -problem of objective multiplicity in a philosophical spirit; but also -because he endeavoured, having been led to metaphysical dualism, to -reduce his Primary Duality to a higher unity. He seems to have -perceived, what the mystic shoemaker of Germany perceived long after -him, that the diversity of nature could not be explained without -postulating a principle of negativity or self-differentiation in the -very nature of God. His immediate successors did not, however, quite -realise the deep significance of their master's suggestions; but we -shall see, as we advance, how Zoroaster's idea finds a more -spiritualised expression in some of the aspects of later Persian -thought. - - [6:1] In connection with the influence of Zoroastrian ideas on - Ancient Greek thought, the following statement made by Erdmann - is noteworthy, though Lawrence Mills (American Journal of - Philology Vol. 22) regards such influence as improbable:--"The - fact that the handmaids of this force, which he (Heraclitus) - calls the seed of all that happens and the measure of all order, - are entitled the "tongues" has probably been slightly ascribed - to the influence of the Persian Magi. On the other hand he - connects himself with his country's mythology, not indeed - without a change of exegesis when he places Apollo and Dionysus - beside Zeus, i.e. The ultimate fire, as the two aspects of his - nature". History of Philosophy Vol. I, p. 50. - - It is, perhaps, owing to this doubtful influence of - Zoroastrianism on Heraclitus that Lassalle (quoted by Paul Janet - in his History of the Problems of Philosophy Vol. II, p. 147) - looks upon Zoroaster as a precursor of Hegel. - - Of Zoroastrian influence on Pythagoras Erdmann says:-- - - "The fact that the odd numbers are put above the even has been - emphasised by Gladisch in his comparison of the Pythagorian with - the Chinese doctrine, and the fact, moreover, that among the - oppositions we find those of light and darkness, good and evil, - has induced many, in ancient and modern times, to suppose that - they were borrowed from Zoroastrianism." Vol. I, p. 33. - - [6:2] Among modern English thinkers Mr. Bradley arrives at a - conclusion similar to that of Zoroaster. Discussing the ethical - significance of Bradley's Philosophy, Prof. Sorley says:--"Mr. - Bradley, like Green, has faith in an eternal reality which might - be called spiritual, inasmuch as it is not material; like Green - he looks upon man's moral activity as an appearance--what Green - calls a reproduction--of this eternal reality. But under this - general agreement there lies a world of difference. He refuses - by the use of the term self-conscious, to liken his Absolute to - the personality of man, and he brings out the consequence which - in Green is more or less concealed, that the evil equally with - the good in man and in the world are appearances of the - Absolute". Recent tendencies in Ethics, pp. 100-101. - -Turning now to his Cosmology, his dualism leads him to bifurcate, as it -were, the whole universe into two departments of being--reality i.e. -the sum of all good creations flowing from the creative activity of the -beneficial spirit, and non-reality[8:1] i.e. the sum of all evil -creations proceeding from the hostile spirit. The original conflict of -the two spirits is manifested in the opposing forces of nature, which, -therefore, presents a continual struggle between the powers of Good and -the powers of Evil. But it should be remembered that nothing intervenes -between the original spirits and their respective creations. Things are -good and bad because they proceed from good or bad creative agencies, in -their own nature they are quite indifferent. Zoroaster's conception of -creation is fundamentally different from that of Plato and Schopenhauer -to whom spheres of empirical reality reflect non-temporal or temporal -ideas which, so to speak, mediate between Reality and Appearance. There -are, according to Zoroaster, only two categories of existence, and the -history of the universe is nothing more than a progressive conflict -between the forces falling respectively under these categories. We are, -like other things, partakers of this struggle, and it is our duty to -range ourselves on the side of Light which will eventually prevail and -completely vanquish the spirit of Darkness. The metaphysics of the -Iranian Prophet, like that of Plato, passes on into Ethics, and it is in -the peculiarity of the Ethical aspect of his thought that the influence -of his social environment is most apparent. - - [8:1] This should not be confounded with Plato's non-being. To - Zoroaster all forms of existence proceeding from the creative - agency of the spirit of darkness are unreal; because, - considering the final triumph of the spirit of Light, they have - a temporary existence only. - -Zoroaster's view of the destiny of the soul is very simple. The soul, -according to him, is a creation, not a part of God as the votaries of -Mithra[9:1] afterwards maintained. It had a beginning in time, but can -attain to everlasting life by fighting against Evil in the earthly scene -of its activity. It is free to choose between the only two courses of -action--good and evil; and besides the power of choice the spirit of -Light has endowed it with the following faculties:-- - - 1. Conscience[10:1]. - - 2. Vital force. - - 3. The Soul--The Mind. - - 4. The Spirit--Reason. - - 5. The Farawashi[10:2].--A kind of tutelary spirit which acts - as a protection of man in his voyage towards God. - -The last three[10:3] faculties are united together after death, and form -an indissoluble whole. The virtuous soul, leaving its home of flesh, is -borne up into higher regions, and has to pass through the following -planes of existence:-- - - 1. The Place of good thoughts. - - 2. The Place of good words. - - 3. The Place of good works. - - 4. The Place of Eternal Glory[11:1].--Where the individual soul - unites with the principle of Light without losing its - personality. - - [9:1] Mithraism was a phase of Zoroastrianism which spread over - the Roman world in the second century. The partisans of Mithra - worshipped the sun whom they looked upon as the great advocate - of Light. They held the human soul to be a part of God, and - maintained that the observance of a mysterious cult could bring - about the souls' union with God. Their doctrine of the soul, its - ascent towards God by torturing the body and finally passing - through the sphere of Aether and becoming pure fire, offers some - resemblance with views entertained by some schools of Persian - Sufiism. - - [10:1] Geiger's Civilisation of Eastern Iranians, Vol. I, - p. 124. - - [10:2] Dr. Haug (Essays p. 206) compares these protecting - spirits with the ideas of Plato. They, however, are not to be - understood as models according to which things are fashioned. - Plato's ideas, moreover, are eternal, non-temporal and - non-spatial. The doctrine that everything created by the spirit - of Light is protected by a subordinate spirit has only an - outward resemblance with the view that every spirit is fashioned - according to a perfect supersensible model. - - [10:3] The Sufi conception of the soul is also tripartite. - According to them the soul is a combination of Mind, heart and - spirit (Nafs, Qalb, Ruh). The "heart" is to them both material - and immaterial or, more properly, neither--standing midway - between soul and mind (Nafs and Ruh), and acting as the organ of - higher knowledge. Perhaps Dr. Schenkel's use of the word - "conscience" would approach the sufi idea of "heart". - - [11:1] Geiger Vol. I, p. 104. (The sufi Cosmology has a similar - doctrine concerning the different stages of existence through - which the soul has to pass in its journey heavenward. They - enumerate the following five Planes; but their definition of the - character of each plane is slightly different:-- - - 1. The world of body. (Nasut). - - 2. The world of pure intelligence. (Malakut). - - 3. The world of power. (Jabrut). - - 4. The world of negation. (Lahut). - - 5. The world of Absolute Silence. (Hahut). - - The sufis probably borrowed this idea from the Indian Yogis who - recognise the following seven Planes:--(Annie Besant: - Reincarnation, p. 30). - - 1. The Plane of Physical Body. - - 2. The Plane of Etherial double. - - 3. The Plane of Vitality. - - 4. The Plane of Emotional Nature. - - 5. The Plane of Thought. - - 6. The Plane of Spiritual soul--Reason. - - 7. The Plane of Pure Spirit.) - - - - -§ II. - -Mani[12:1] and Mazdak[12:2]. - -We have seen Zoroaster's solution of the problem of diversity, and the -theological or rather philosophical controversy which split up the -Zoroastrian Church. The half-Persian Mani--"the founder of Godless -community" as Christians styled him afterwards--agrees with those -Zoroastrians who held the Prophet's doctrine in its naked form, and -approaches the question in a spirit thoroughly materialistic. -Originally Persian his father emigrated from Hamadan to Babylonia where -Mani was born in 215 or 216 A.D.--the time when Buddhistic Missionaries -were beginning to preach Nirvana to the country of Zoroaster. The -eclectic character of the religious system of Mani, its bold extension -of the Christian idea of redemption, and its logical consistency in -holding, as a true ground for an ascetic life, that the world is -essentially evil, made it a real power which influenced not only Eastern -and Western Christian thought[13:1], but has also left some dim marks on -the development of metaphysical speculation in Persia. Leaving the -discussion of the sources[13:2] of Mani's religious system to the -orientalist, we proceed to describe and finally to determine the -philosophical value of his doctrine of the origin of the Phenomenal -Universe. - - [12:1] Sources used:-- - - (a) The text of Muhammad ibn Ishaq, edited by Flugel, pp. - 52-56. - - (b) Al-Ya`qubi: ed. Houtsma, 1883, Vol. I, pp. 180-181. - - (c) Ibn Hazm: Kitab al-Milal w'al-Nihal: ed. Cairo, Vol. II, - p. 36. - - (d) Shahrastani: ed. Cureton, London, 1846, pp. 188-192. - - (e) Encyclopaedia Britannica, Article on Mani. - - (f) Salemann: Bulletin de l'Academie des Sciences de St. - Petersburg Series IV, 15 April 1907, pp. 175--184. F. W. - K. Muller: Handschriften--Reste in Estrangelo--Schrift - aus Turfan, Chinesisch--Turkistan, Teil I, II; Sitzungen - der Koniglich Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, - 11 Feb. 1904, pp. 348-352; und Abhandlungen etc. 1904. - - [12:2] Sources used:-- - - (a) Siyasat Namah Nizam al-Mulk: ed. Charles Schefer, - Paris, 1897, pp. 166-181. - - (b) Shahrastani: ed. Cureton, pp. 192-194. - - (c) Al-Ya`qubi: ed. Houtsma, 1883, Vol. I, p. 186. - - (d) Al-Biruni: Chronology of Ancient Nations: tr. E. Sachau, - London, 1879, p. 192. - - [13:1] "If I see aright, five different conceptions can be - distinguished for the period about 400 A.D. First we have the - Manichaean which insinuated its way in the darkness, but was - widely extended even among the clergy". (Harnack's History of - Christian Dogma, Vol. V, p. 56). "From the anti-Manichaean - controversy sprang the desire to conceive all God's attributes - as identical i.e. the interest in the indivisibility of God", - (Harnack's History of Christian Dogma, Vol V, p. 120). - - [13:2] Some Eastern sources of information about Mani's - Philosophy (e.g. Ephraim Syrus mentioned by Prof. A. A. Bevan in - his Introduction to the Hymn of the Soul) tell us that he was a - disciple of Bardesanes, the Syrian gnostic. The learned author - of "al-Fihrist", however, mentions some books which Mani wrote - against the followers of the Syrian gnostic. Burkitt, in his - lectures on Early Eastern Christianity, gives a free translation - of Bardesanes' De Fato, the spirit of which I understand, is - fully Christian, and thoroughly opposed to the teaching of Mani. - Ibn Hazm, however, in his Kitab al-Milal w'al-Nihal (Vol. II, p. - 36) says, "Both agreed in other respects, except that Mani - believed darkness to be a living principle." - -The Paganising gnostic, as Erdmann calls him, teaches that the variety -of things springs from the mixture of two eternal Principles--Light and -Darkness--which are separate from and independent of each other. The -Principle of Light connotes ten ideas--Gentleness, Knowledge, -Understanding, Mystery, Insight, Love, Conviction, Faith, Benevolence -and Wisdom. Similarly the Principle of Darkness connotes five eternal -ideas--Mistiness, Heat, Fire, Venom, Darkness. Along with these two -primordial principles and connected with each, Mani recognises the -eternity of space and earth, each connoting respectively the ideas of -knowledge, understanding, mystery, insight, breath, air, water, light -and fire. In darkness--the feminine Principle in Nature--were hidden -the elements of evil which, in course of time, concentrated and resulted -in the composition, so to speak, of the hideous looking Devil--the -principle of activity. This first born child of the fiery womb of -darkness, attacked the domain of the King of Light who, in order to ward -off his malicious onslaught, created the Primal man. A serious conflict -ensued between the two creatures, and resulted in the complete -vanquishment of the Primal Man. The evil one, then, succeeded in mixing -together the five elements of darkness with the five elements of light. -Thereupon the ruler of the domain of light ordered some of his angels to -construct the Universe out of these mixed elements with a view to free -the atoms of light from their imprisonment. But the reason why darkness -was the first to attack light, is that the latter, being in its essence -good, could not proceed to start the process of admixture which was -essentially harmful to itself. The attitude of Mani's Cosmology, -therefore, to the Christian doctrine of Redemption is similar to that of -Hegelian Cosmology to the doctrine of the Trinity. To him redemption is -a physical process, and all procreation, because it protracts the -imprisonment of light, is contrary to the aim and object of the -Universe. The imprisoned atoms of light are continually set free from -darkness which is thrown down in the unfathomable ditch round the -Universe. The liberated light, however, passes on to the sun and the -moon whence it is carried by angels to the region of light--the eternal -home of the King of Paradise--"Pid i vazargii"--Father of greatness. - -This is a brief account of Mani's fantastic Cosmology.[16:1] He rejects -the Zoroastrian hypothesis of creative agencies to explain the problem -of objective existence. Taking a thoroughly materialistic view of the -question, he ascribes the phenomenal universe to the _mixture_ of two -independent, eternal principles, one of which (darkness) is not only a -part of the universe--stuff, but also the source wherein activity -resides, as it were, slumbering, and starts up into being when the -favourable moment arrives. The essential idea of his cosmology, -therefore, has a curious resemblance with that of the great Hindu -thinker Kapila, who accounts for the production of the universe by the -hypothesis of three gunas, i.e. Sattwa (goodness), Tamas (darkness), and -Rajas (motion or passion) which mix together to form Nature, when the -equilibrium of the primordial matter (Prakriti) is upset. Of the various -solutions[17:1] of the problem of diversity which the Vedantist solved -by postulating the mysterious power of "Maya", and Leibniz, long -afterwards, explained by his doctrine of the Identity of Indiscernibles, -Mani's solution, though childish, must find a place in the historical -development of philosophical ideas. Its philosophical value may be -insignificant; but one thing is certain, i.e. Mani was the first to -venture the suggestion that the Universe is due to the activity of the -Devil, and hence essentially evil--a proposition which seems to me to be -the only logical justification of a system which preaches renunciation -as the guiding principle of life. In our own times Schopenhauer has been -led to the same conclusion; though, unlike Mani, he supposes the -principle of objectification or individuation--"the sinful bent" of the -will to life--to exist in the very nature of the Primal Will and not -independent of it. - - [16:1] It is interesting to compare Mani's Philosophy of Nature - with the Chinese notion of Creation, according to which all that - exists flows from the Union of Yin and Yang. But the Chinese - reduced these two principles to a higher unity:--Tai Keih. To - Mani such a reduction was not possible; since he could not - conceive that things of opposite nature could proceed from the - same principle. - - [17:1] Thomas Aquinas states and criticises Mani's contrariety - of Primal agents in the following manner:-- - - (a) What all things seek even a principle of evil would seek. - But all things seek their own self-preservation. - .*. Even a principle of evil would seek its own self-preservation. - - (b) What all things seek is good. - But self-preservation is what all things seek. - .*. Self-preservation is good. - But a principle of evil would seek its own self-preservation. - .*. A principle of evil would seek some good--which shows that it - is self-contradictory. - - God and His Creatures, Book II, p. 105. Rickaby's Tr. - -Turning now to the remarkable socialist of ancient Persia--_Mazdak_. -This early prophet of communism appeared during the reign of -Anushirwan the Just (531-578 A.D.), and marked another dualistic -reaction against the prevailing Zarwanian doctrine[18:1]. Mazdak, like -Mani, taught that the diversity of things springs from the mixture of -two independent, eternal principles which he called Shid (Light) and -Tar (Darkness). But he differs from his predecessor in holding that the -fact of their mixture as well as their final separation, are quite -accidental, and not at all the result of choice. Mazdak's God is endowed -with sensation, and has four principal energies in his eternal -presence--power of discrimination, memory, understanding and bliss. -These four energies have four personal manifestations who, assisted by -four other persons, superintend the course of the Universe. Variety in -things and men is due to the various combinations of the original -principles. - - [18:1] The Zarwanian doctrine prevailed in Persia in the 5th - century B.C. (See Z. D. M. G., Vol. LVII, p. 562). - -But the most characteristic feature of the Mazdakite teaching is its -communism, which is evidently an inference from the cosmopolitan spirit -of Mani's Philosophy. All men, said Mazdak, are equal; and the notion of -individual property was introduced by the hostile demons whose object is -to turn God's Universe into a scene of endless misery. It is chiefly -this aspect of Mazdak's teaching that was most shocking to the -Zoroastrian conscience, and finally brought about the destruction of his -enormous following, even though the master was supposed to have -miraculously made the sacred Fire talk, and bear witness to the truth of -his mission. - - -§ III. - -Retrospect. - -We have seen some of the aspects of Pre-Islamic Persian thought; though, -owing to our ignorance of the tendencies of Sassanide thought, and of -the political, social, and intellectual conditions that determined its -evolution, we have not been able fully to trace the continuity of ideas. -Nations as well as individuals, in their intellectual history, begin -with the objective. Although the moral fervour of Zoroaster gave a -spiritual tone to his theory of the origin of things, yet the net result -of this period of Persian speculation is nothing more than a -materialistic dualism. The principle of Unity as a philosophical ground -of all that exists, is but dimly perceived at this stage of intellectual -evolution in Persia. The controversy among the followers of Zoroaster -indicates that the movement towards a monistic conception of the -Universe had begun; but we have unfortunately no evidence to make a -positive statement concerning the pantheistic tendencies of Pre-Islamic -Persian thought. We know that in the 6{th} century A.D., Diogenes, -Simplicius and other Neo-Platonic thinkers, were driven by the -persecution of Justinian, to take refuge in the court of the tolerant -Anushirwan. This great monarch, moreover, had several works translated -for him from Sanskrit and Greek, but we have no historical evidence to -show how far these events actually influenced the course of Persian -thought. Let us, therefore, pass on to the advent of Islam in Persia, -which completely shattered the old order of things, and brought to the -thinking mind the new concept of an uncompromising monotheism as well as -the Greek dualism of God and matter, as distinguished from the purely -Persian dualism of God and Devil. - - - - -PART II. - -Greek Dualism. - - - - -CHAP. II. - -THE NEO-PLATONIC ARISTOTELIANS OF PERSIA. - - -With the Arab conquest of Persia, a new era begins in the history of -Persian thought. But the warlike sons of sandy Arabia whose swords -terminated, at Nahawand, the political independence of this ancient -people, could hardly touch the intellectual freedom of the converted -Zoroastrian. - -The political revolution brought about by the Arab conquest marks the -beginning of interaction between the Aryan and the Semitic, and we find -that the Persian, though he lets the surface of his life become largely -semitised, quietly converts Islam to his own Aryan habits of thought. In -the west the sober Hellenic intellect interpreted another Semitic -religion--Christianity; and the results of interpretation in both cases -are strikingly similar. In each case the aim of the interpreting -intellect is to soften the extreme rigidity of an absolute law imposed -on the individual from without; in one word it is an endeavour to -internalise the external. This process of transformation began with the -study of Greek thought which, though combined with other causes, -hindered the growth of native speculation, yet marked a transition from -the purely objective attitude of Pre-Islamic Persian Philosophy to the -subjective attitude of later thinkers. It is, I believe, largely due to -the influence of foreign thought that the old monistic tendency when it -reasserted itself about the end of the 8{th} century, assumed a much -more spiritual aspect; and, in its later development, revivified and -spiritualised the old Iranian dualism of Light and Darkness. The fact, -therefore, that Greek thought roused into fresh life the subtle Persian -intellect, and largely contributed to, and was finally assimilated by -the general course of intellectual evolution in Persia, justifies us in -briefly running over, even though at the risk of repetition, the systems -of the Persian Neo-Platonists who, as such, deserve very little -attention in a history of purely Persian thought. - -It must, however, be remembered that Greek wisdom flowed towards the -Moslem east through Harran and Syria. The Syrians took up the latest -Greek speculation i.e. Neo-Platonism and transmitted to the Moslem what -they believed to be the real philosophy of Aristotle. It is surprising -that Mohammedan Philosophers, Arabs as well as Persians, continued -wrangling over what they believed to be the real teaching of Aristotle -and Plato, and it never occurred to them that for a thorough -comprehension of their Philosophies, the knowledge of Greek language was -absolutely necessary. So great was their ignorance that an epitomised -translation of the Enneads of Plotinus was accepted as "Theology of -Aristotle". It took them centuries to arrive at a clear conception of -the two great masters of Greek thought; and it is doubtful whether they -ever completely understood them. Avicenna is certainly clearer and more -original than Al-Farabi and Ibn Maskawaih; and the Andelusian Averroes, -though he is nearer to Aristotle than any of his predecessors, is yet -far from a complete grasp of Aristotle's Philosophy. It would, however, -be unjust to accuse them of servile imitation. The history of their -speculation is one continuous attempt to wade through a hopeless mass of -absurdities that careless translators of Greek Philosophy had -introduced. They had largely to rethink the Philosophies of Aristotle -and Plato. Their commentaries constitute, so to speak, an effort at -discovery, not exposition. The very circumstances which left them no -time to think out independent systems of thought, point to a subtle -mind, unfortunately cabined and cribbed by a heap of obstructing -nonsense that patient industry had gradually to eliminate, and thus to -winnow out truth from falsehood. With these preliminary remarks we -proceed to consider Persian students of Greek Philosophy individually. - - -§ I. - -Ibn Maskawaih[26:1] (d. 1030). - -Passing over the names of Sarakhsi[26:2], Farabi who was a Turk, and -the Physician Razi (d. 932 A.D.) who, true to his Persian habits of -thought, looked upon light as the first creation, and admitted the -eternity of matter, space and time, we come to the illustrious name of -Abu `Ali Muhammad ibn Muhammad ibn Ya`qub, commonly known as _Ibn -Maskawaih_--the treasurer of the Buwaihid Sultan `Adaduddaula--one of -the most eminent theistic thinkers, physicians, moralists and historians -of Persia. I give below a brief account of his system from his well -known work Al-Fauz al-Asghar, published in Beirut. - - [26:1] Dr. Boer, in his Philosophy of Islam, gives a full - account of the Philosophy of Al-Farabi and Avicenna; but his - account of Ibn Maskawaih's Philosophy is restricted to the - Ethical teaching of that Philosopher. I have given here his - metaphysical views which are decidedly more systematic than - those of Al-Farabi. Instead of repeating Avicenna's - Neo-Platonism I have briefly stated what I believe to be his - original contribution to the thought of his country. - - [26:2] Sarakhsi died in 899 A.D. He was a disciple of the - Arabian Philosopher Al-Kindi. His works, unfortunately, have not - reached us. - -1. _The existence of the ultimate principle._ - -Here Ibn Maskawaih follows Aristotle, and reproduces his argument based -on the fact of physical motion. All bodies have the inseparable property -of motion which covers all forms of change, and does not proceed from -the nature of bodies themselves. Motion, therefore, demands an external -source or prime mover. The supposition that motion may constitute the -very essence of bodies, is contradicted by experience. Man, for -instance, has the power of free movement; but, on the supposition, -different parts of his body must continue to move even after they are -severed from one another. The series of moving causes, therefore, must -stop at a cause which, itself immovable, moves everything else. The -immobility of the Primal cause is essential; for the supposition of -motion in the Primal cause would necessitate infinite regress, which is -absurd. - -The immovable mover is one. A multiplicity of original movers must imply -something common in their nature, so that they might be brought under -the same category. It must also imply some point of difference in order -to distinguish them from each other. But this partial identity and -difference necessitate composition in their respective essences; and -composition, being a form of motion, cannot, as we have shown, exist in -the first cause of motion. The prime mover again is eternal and -immaterial. Since transition from non-existence to existence is a form -of motion; and since matter is always subject to some kind of motion, it -follows that a thing which is not eternal, or is, in any way, associated -with matter, must be in motion. - -2. _The Knowledge of the Ultimate._ - -All human knowledge begins from sensations which are gradually -transformed into perceptions. The earlier stages of intellection are -completely conditioned by the presence of external reality. But the -progress of knowledge means to be able to think without being -conditioned by matter. Thought begins with matter, but its object is to -gradually free itself from the primary condition of its own -possibility. A higher stage, therefore, is reached in imagination--the -power to reproduce and retain in the mind the copy or image of a thing -without reference to the external objectivity of the thing itself. In -the formation of concepts thought reaches a still higher stage in point -of freedom from materiality; though the concept, in so far as it is the -result of comparison and assimilation of percepts, cannot be regarded as -having completely freed itself from the gross cause of sensations. But -the fact that conception is based on perception, should not lead us to -ignore the great difference between the nature of the concept and the -percept. The individual (percept) is undergoing constant change which -affects the character of the knowledge founded on mere perception. The -knowledge of individuals, therefore, lacks the element of permanence. -The universal (concept), on the other hand, is not affected by the law -of change. Individuals change; the universal remains intact. It is the -essence of matter to submit to the law of change: the freer a thing is -from matter, the less liable it is to change. God, therefore, being -absolutely free from matter, is absolutely changeless; and it is His -complete freedom from materiality that makes our conception of Him -difficult or impossible. The object of all philosophical training is to -develop the power of "ideation" or contemplation on pure concepts, in -order that constant practice might make possible the conception of the -absolutely immaterial. - -3. _How the one creates the many._ - -In this connection it is necessary, for the sake of clearness, to divide -Ibn Maskawaih's investigations into two parts:-- - -(a) _That the ultimate agent or cause created the Universe out of -nothing._ Materialists, he says, hold the eternity of matter, and -attribute form to the creative activity of God. It is, however, admitted -that when matter passes from one form into another form, the previous -form becomes absolutely non-existent. For if it does not become -absolutely non-existent, it must either pass off into some other body, -or continue to exist in the same body. The first alternative is -contradicted by every day experience. If we transform a ball of wax -into a solid square, the original rotundity of the ball does not pass -off into some other body. The second alternative is also impossible; for -it would necessitate the conclusion that two contradictory forms e.g. -circularity and length, can exist in the same body. It, therefore, -follows that the original form passes into absolute non-existence, when -the new form comes into being. This argument proves conclusively that -attributes i.e., form, color, etc., come into being from pure nothing. -In order to understand that the substance is also non-eternal like the -attribute, we should grasp the truth of the following propositions:-- - -1. The analysis of matter results in a number of different elements, the -diversity of which is reduced to one simple element. - -2. Form and matter are inseparable: no change in matter can annihilate -form. - -From these two propositions, Ibn Maskawaih concludes that the substance -had a beginning in time. Matter like form must have begun to exist; -since the eternity of matter necessitates the eternity of form which, -as we have seen, cannot be regarded as eternal. - -(b) _The process of creation._ What is the cause of this immense -diversity which meets us on all sides? How could the many be created by -one? When, says the Philosopher, one cause produces a number of -different effects, their multiplicity may depend on any of the following -reasons:-- - -1. The cause may have various powers. Man, for instance, being a -combination of various elements and powers, may be the cause of various -actions. - -2. The cause may use various means to produce a variety of effects. - -3. The cause may work upon a variety of material. - -None of these propositions can be true of the nature of the ultimate -cause--God. That he possesses various powers, distinct from one another, -is manifestly absurd; since his nature does not admit of composition. If -he is supposed to have employed different means to produce diversity, -who is the creator of these means? If these means are due to the -creative agency of some cause other than the ultimate cause, there -would be a plurality of ultimate causes. If, on the other hand, the -Ultimate Cause himself created these means, he must have required other -means to create these means. The third proposition is also inadmissible -as a conception of the creative act. The many cannot flow from the -causal action of one agent. It, therefore, follows that we have only one -way out of the difficulty--that the ultimate cause created only one -thing which led to the creation of another. Ibn Maskawaih here -enumerates the usual Neo-Platonic emanations gradually growing grosser -and grosser until we reach the primordial elements, which combine and -recombine to evolve higher and higher forms of life. Shibli thus sums -up Ibn Maskawaih's theory of evolution[33:1]:-- - -"The combination of primary substances produced the mineral kingdom, the -lowest form of life. A higher stage of evolution is reached in the -vegetable kingdom. The first to appear is spontaneous grass; then plants -and various kinds of trees, some of which touch the border-land of -animal kingdom, in so far as they manifest certain animal -characteristics. Intermediary between the vegetable kingdom and the -animal kingdom there is a certain form of life which is neither animal -nor vegetable, but shares the characteristics of both (e.g. coral). The -first step beyond this intermediary stage of life, is the development of -the power of movement, and the sense of touch in tiny worms which crawl -upon the earth. The sense of touch, owing to the process of -differentiation, develops other forms of sense, until we reach the plane -of higher animals in which intelligence begins to manifest itself in an -ascending scale. Humanity is touched in the ape which undergoes further -development, and gradually develops erect stature and power of -understanding similar to man. Here animality ends and humanity begins". - - [33:1] Maulana Shibli `Ilm al-Kalam, p. 141. (Haidarabad). - -4. _The soul._ - -In order to understand whether the soul has an independent existence, we -should examine the nature of human knowledge. It is the essential -property of matter that it cannot assume two different forms -simultaneously. To transform a silver spoon into a silver glass, it is -necessary that the spoon-form as such, should cease to exist. This -property is common to all bodies, and a body that lacks it cannot be -regarded as a body. Now when we examine the nature of perception, we see -that there is a principle in man which, in so far as it is able to know -more than one thing at a time, can assume, so to say, many different -forms simultaneously. This principle cannot be matter, since it lacks -the fundamental property of matter. The essence of the soul consists in -the power of perceiving a number of objects at one and the same moment -of time. But it may be objected that the soul-principle may be either -material in its essence, or a function of matter. There are, however, -reasons to show that the soul cannot be a function of matter. - -(a). A thing which assumes different forms and states, cannot itself be -one of those forms and states. A body which receives different colors -should be, in its own nature, colorless. The soul, in its perception of -external objects, assumes, as it were, various forms and states; it, -therefore, cannot be regarded as one of those forms. Ibn Maskawaih -seems to give no countenance to the contemporary Faculty-Psychology; to -him different mental states are various transformations of the soul -itself. - -(b). The attributes are constantly changing; there must be beyond the -sphere of change, some permanent substratum which is the foundation of -personal identity. - -Having shown that the soul cannot be regarded as a function of matter, -Ibn Maskawaih proceeds to prove that it is essentially immaterial. Some -of his arguments may be noticed:-- - -1. The senses, after they have perceived a strong stimulus, cannot, for -a certain amount of time, perceive a weaker stimulus. It is, however, -quite different with the mental act of cognition. - -2. When we reflect on an abstruse subject, we endeavour to completely -shut our eyes to the objects around us, which we regard as so many -hindrances in the way of spiritual activity. If the soul is material in -its essence, it need not, in order to secure unimpeded activity, escape -from the world of matter. - -3. The perception of a strong stimulus weakens and sometimes injures the -sense. The intellect, on the other hand, grows in strength with the -knowledge of ideas and general notions. - -4. Physical weakness due to old age, does not affect mental vigour. - -5. The soul can conceive certain propositions which have no connection -with the sense-data. The senses, for instance, cannot perceive that two -contradictories cannot exist together. - -6. There is a certain power in us which rules over physical organs, -corrects sense-errors, and unifies all knowledge. This unifying -principle which reflects over the material brought before it through the -sense-channel, and, weighing the evidence of each sense, decides the -character of rival statements, must itself stand above the sphere of -matter. - -The combined force of these considerations, says Ibn Maskawaih, -conclusively establishes the truth of the proposition--that the soul is -essentially immaterial. The immateriality of the soul signifies its -immortality; since mortality is a characteristic of the material. - - -§ II. - -Avicenna (d. 1037). - -Among the early Persian Philosophers, Avicenna alone attempted to -construct his own system of thought. His work, called "Eastern -Philosophy" is still extant; and there has also come down to us a -fragment[38:1] in which the Philosopher has expressed his views on the -universal operation of the force of love in nature. It is something like -the contour of a system, and it is quite probable that ideas expressed -therein were afterwards fully worked out. - - [38:1] This fragment on love is preserved in the collected works - of Avicenna in the British Museum Library and has been edited by - N. A. F. Mehren. (Leiden, 1894.) - -Avicenna defines "Love" as the appreciation of Beauty; and from the -standpoint of this definition he explains that there are three -categories of being:-- - -1. Things that are at the highest point of perfection. - -2. Things that are at the lowest point of perfection. - -3. Things that stand between the two poles of perfection. But the third -category has no real existence; since there are things that have already -attained the acme of perfection, and there are others still progressing -towards perfection. This striving for the ideal is love's movement -towards beauty which, according to Avicenna, is identical with -perfection. Beneath the visible evolution of forms is the force of love -which actualises all striving, movement, progress. Things are so -constituted that they hate non-existence, and love the joy of -individuality in various forms. The indeterminate matter, dead in -itself, assumes, or more properly, is made to assume by the inner force -of love, various forms, and rises higher and higher in the scale of -beauty. The operation of this ultimate force, in the physical plane, can -be thus indicated:-- - -1. Inanimate objects are combinations of form, matter and quality. Owing -to the working of this mysterious power, quality sticks to its subject -or substance; and form embraces indeterminate matter which, impelled by -the mighty force of love, rises from form to form. - -2. The tendency of the force of love is to centralise itself. In the -vegetable kingdom it attains a higher degree of unity or centralisation; -though the soul still lacks that unity of action which it attains -afterwards. The processes of the vegetative soul are:-- - -(a) Assimilation. - -(b) Growth. - -(c) Reproduction. - -These processes, however, are nothing more than so many manifestations -of love. Assimilation indicates attraction and transformation of what is -external into what is internal. Growth is love of achieving more and -more harmony of parts; and reproduction means perpetuation of the kind, -which is only another phase of love. - -3. In the animal kingdom, the various operations of the force of love -are still more unified. It does preserve the vegetable instinct of -acting in different directions; but there is also the development of -temperament which is a step towards more unified activity. In man this -tendency towards unification manifests itself in self-consciousness. The -same force of "natural or constitutional love", is working in the life -of beings higher than man. All things are moving towards the first -Beloved--the Eternal Beauty. The worth of a thing is decided by its -nearness to or distance from, this ultimate principle. - -As a physician, however, Avicenna is especially interested in the nature -of the Soul. In his times, moreover, the doctrine of metempsychosis was -getting more and more popular. He, therefore, discusses the nature of -the soul, with a view to show the falsity of this doctrine. It is -difficult, he says, to define the soul; since it manifests different -powers and tendencies in different planes of being. His view of the -various powers of the soul can be thus represented:-- - -1. Manifestation as unconscious activity-- - - (a). Working in different directions + 1. Assimilation. - (Vegetative soul) | 2. Growth. - + 3. Reproduction. - -(b). Working in one direction and securing uniformity of action--growth -of temperament. - -2. Manifestation as conscious activity-- - -(a). As directed to more than one object-- - - Animal soul. - | - +------------+--------------------+ - | | - Lower Animals. Man. - - A. Perceptive powers. A. Perceptive powers. - B. Motive powers (desire (a) Five external senses. - of pleasure and avoidance (b) Five internal senses-- - of pain). 1. Sensorium. - 2. Retention of images. - 3. Conception. - 4. Imagination. - 5. Memory. - - These constitute the five internal - senses of the soul which, in man, - manifests itself as progressive - reason, developing from human to - angelic and prophetic reason. - - B. Motive powers--will. - -(b). As directed to one object--The soul of the spheres which continue -in one uniform motion. - -In his fragment on "Nafs" (soul) Avicenna endeavours to show that a -material accompaniment is not necessary to the soul. It is not through -the instrumentality of the body, or some power of the body, that the -soul conceives or imagines; since if the soul necessarily requires a -physical medium in conceiving other things, it must require a different -body in order to conceive the body attached to itself. Moreover, the -fact that the soul is immediately self conscious--conscious of itself -through itself--conclusively shows that in its essence the soul is quite -independent of any physical accompaniment. The doctrine of -metempsychosis implies, also, individual pre-existence. But supposing -that the soul did exist before the body, it must have existed either as -one or as many. The multiplicity of bodies is due to the multiplicity of -material forms, and does not indicate the multiplicity of souls. On the -other hand, if it existed as one, the ignorance or knowledge of A must -mean the ignorance or knowledge of B; since the soul is one in both. -These categories, therefore, cannot be applied to the soul. The truth -is, says Avicenna, that body and soul are contiguous to each other, but -quite opposite in their respective essences. The disintegration of the -body does not necessitate the annihilation of the soul. Dissolution or -decay is a property of compounds, and not of simple, indivisible, ideal -substances. Avicenna, then denies pre-existence, and endeavours to show -the possibility of disembodied conscious life beyond the grave. - -We have run over the work of the early Persian Neo-Platonists among -whom, as we have seen, Avicenna alone learned to think for himself. Of -the generations of his disciples--Behmenyar, Ab u'l-Ma'mum of Isfahan, -Ma`sumi, Ab u'l-`Abbas, Ibn Tahir[44:1]--who carried on their master's -Philosophy, we need not speak. So powerful was the spell of Avicenna's -personality that, even long after it had been removed, any amplification -or modification of his views was considered to be an unpardonable crime. -The old Iranian idea of the dualism of Light and Darkness, does not act -as a determining factor in the progress of Neo-Platonic ideas in Persia, -which borrowed independent life for a time, and eventually merged their -separate existence in the general current of Persian speculation. They -are, therefore, connected with the course of indigenous thought only in -so far as they contributed to the strength and expansion of that -monistic tendency, which manifested itself early in the Church of -Zoroaster; and, though for a time hindered by the Theological -controversies of Islam, burst out with redoubled force in later times, -to extend its titanic grasp to all the previous intellectual -achievements of the land of its birth. - - [44:1] Al-Baihaqi; fol. 28a et seqq. - - - - -CHAP. III. - -THE RISE AND FALL OF RATIONALISM IN ISLAM. - - -§ I. - -The Metaphysics of Rationalism--Materialism. - -The Persian mind, having adjusted itself to the new political -environment, soon reasserts its innate freedom, and begins to retire -from the field of objectivity, in order that it may come back to itself, -and reflect upon the material achieved in its journey out of its own -inwardness. With the study of Greek thought, the spirit which was almost -lost in the concrete, begins to reflect and realise itself as the -arbiter of truth. Subjectivity asserts itself, and endeavours to -supplant all outward authority. Such a period, in the intellectual -history of a people, must be the epoch of rationalism, scepticism, -mysticism, heresy--forms in which the human mind, swayed by the growing -force of subjectivity, rejects all external standards of truth. And so -we find the epoch under consideration. - -The period of Umayyad dominance is taken up with the process of -co-mingling and adjustment to new conditions of life; but with the rise -of the `Abbasid Dynasty and the study of Greek Philosophy, the pent-up -intellectual force of Persia bursts out again, and exhibits wonderful -activity in all the departments of thought and action. The fresh -intellectual vigour imparted by the assimilation of Greek Philosophy -which was studied with great avidity, led immediately to a critical -examination of Islamic Monotheism. Theology, enlivened by religious -fervour, learned to talk the language of Philosophy earlier than cold -reason began to seek a retired corner, away from the noise of -controversy, in order to construct a consistent theory of things. In the -first half of the 8{th} century we find Wasil Ibn `Ata--a Persian -disciple of the famous theologian Hasan of Basra--starting Mu`tazilaism -(Rationalism)--that most interesting movement which engaged some of the -subtlest minds of Persia, and finally exhausted its force in the keen -metaphysical controversies of Baghdad and Basra. The famous city of -Basra had become, owing to its commercial situation, the playground of -various forces--Greek Philosophy, Scepticism, Christianity, Buddhistic -ideas, Manichaeism[47:1]--which furnished ample spiritual food to the -inquiring mind of the time, and formed the intellectual environment of -Islamic Rationalism. What Spitta calls the Syrian period of Muhammadan -History is not characterised with metaphysical subtleties. With the -advent of the Persian Period, however, Muhammadan students of Greek -Philosophy began properly to reflect on their religion; and the -Mu`tazila thinkers[47:2], gradually drifted into metaphysics with which -alone we are concerned here. It is not our object to trace the history -of the Mu`tazila Kalam; for present purposes it will be sufficient if we -briefly reveal the metaphysical implications of the Mu`tazila view of -Islam. The conception of God, and the theory of matter, therefore, are -the only aspects of Rationalism which we propose to discuss here. - - [47:1] During the `Abbasid Period there were many who secretly - held Manichaean opinions. See Fihrist, Leipsig 1871, p. 338; See - also Al-Mu`tazila, ed. by T. W. Arnold, Leipsig 1902, p. 27, - where the author speaks of a controversy between Abu - 'l-Hudhail and Salih, the Dualist. See also Macdonald's Muslim - Theology, p. 133. - - [47:2] The Mu`tazilas belonged to various nationalities, and - many of them were Persians either by descent or domicile. Wasil - Ibn `Ata--the reported founder of the sect--was a Persian - (Browne, Lit. His., Vol I, p. 281). Von Kremer, however, traces - their origin to the theological controversies of the Umayyad - period. Mu`tazilaism was not an essentially Persian movement; - but it is true, as Prof. Browne observes (Lit. His., Vol. I, p. - 283) that Shi`ite and Qadari tenets, indeed, often went - together, and the Shi`ite doctrine current in Persia at the - present day is in many respects Mu`tazilite, while Hasan - Al-Ash`ari, the great opponent of the Mu`tazilite, is by the - Shi`ites held in horror. It may also be added that some of the - greater representatives of the Mu`tazila opinion were Shi`as - by religion, e.g. Abu 'l-Hudhail (Al-Mu`tazila, ed. by T. W. - Arnold, p. 28). On the other hand many of the followers of - Al-Ash`ari were Persians (See extracts from Ibn `Asakir ed. - Mehren), so that it does not seem to be quite justifiable to - describe the Ash`arite mode of thought as a purely semitic - movement. - -His conception of the unity of God at which the Mu`tazila eventually -arrived by a subtle dialectic is one of the fundamental points in which -he differs from the Orthodox Muhammadan. God's attributes, according to -his view, cannot be said to inhere in him; they form the very essence of -His nature. The Mu`tazila, therefore, denies the separate reality of -divine attributes, and declares their absolute identity with the -abstract divine Principle. "God", says Abu'l-Hudhail, "is knowing, -all-powerful, living; and his knowledge, power and life constitute His -very essence (dhat)"[49:1]. In order to explain the pure unity of God -Joseph Al-Basir[49:2] lays down the following five principles:-- - -(1). The necessary supposition of atom and accident. - -(2). The necessary supposition of a creator. - -(3). The necessary supposition of the conditions (Ahwal) of God. - -(4). The rejection of those attributes which do not befit God. - -(5). The unity of God in spite of the plurality of His attributes. - - [49:1] Shahrastani: Cureton's ed., p. 34. - - [49:2] Dr. Frankl: Ein Mu`tazilitischer Kalam--Wien 1872, p. 13. - -This conception of unity underwent further modifications; until in the -hands of Mu`ammar and Abu Hashim it became a mere abstract possibility -about which nothing could be predicated. We cannot, he says, predicate -knowledge of God[50:1], for His knowledge must be of something in -Himself. The first necessitates the identity of subject and object which -is absurd; the second implicates duality in the nature of God which is -equally impossible. Ahmad and Fadl[50:2]--disciples of Nazzam, however, -recognised this duality in holding that the original creators are -two--God--the eternal principle; and the word of God--Jesus Christ--the -contingent principle. But more fully to bring out the element of truth -in the second alternative suggested by Mu`ammar, was reserved, as we -shall see, for later Sufi thinkers of Persia. It is, therefore, clear -that some of the rationalists almost unconsciously touched the outer -fringe of later pantheism for which, in a sense, they prepared the way, -not only by their definition of God, but also by their common effort to -internalise the rigid externality of an absolute law. - - [50:1] Shahrastani: Cureton's ed., p. 48. See also - Steiner--Die Mutaziliten, p. 59. - - [50:2] Ibn Hazm (Cairo, ed. I) Vol. IV, p. 197. See also - Shahrastani: Cureton's ed., p. 42. - -But the most important contribution of the advocates of Rationalism to -purely metaphysical speculation, is their explanation of matter, which -their opponents--the Ash`arite--afterwards modified to fit in with their -own views of the nature of God. The interest of Nazzam chiefly consisted -in the exclusion of all arbitrariness from the orderly course of -nature[51:1]. The same interest in naturalism led Al-Jahiz to define -Will in a purely negative manner[51:2]. Though the Rationalist thinkers -did not want to abandon the idea of a Personal Will, yet they -endeavoured to find a deeper ground for the independence of individual -natural phenomena. And this ground they found in matter itself. Nazzam -taught the infinite divisibility of matter, and obliterated the -distinction between substance and accident[51:3]. Existence was regarded -as a quality superimposed by God on the pre-existing material atoms -which would have been incapable of perception without this quality. -Muhammad Ibn `Uthman, one of the Mu`tazila Shaikhs, says Ibn -Hazm,[51:4] maintained that the non-existent (atom in its -pre-existential state) is a body in that state; only that in its -pre-existential condition it is neither in motion, nor at rest, nor is -it said to be created. Substance, then, is a collection of -qualities--taste, odour, colour--which, in themselves, are nothing more -than material potentialities. The soul, too, is a finer kind of matter; -and the processes of knowledge are mere mental motions. Creation is only -the actualisation of pre-existing potentialities[52:1] (Tafra). The -individuality of a thing which is defined as "that of which something -can be predicated"[52:2] is not an essential factor in its notion. The -collection of things we call the Universe, is externalised or -perceptible reality which could, so to speak, exist independent of all -perceptibility. The object of these metaphysical subtleties is purely -theological. God, to the Rationalist, is an absolute unity which can, in -no sense, admit of plurality, and could thus exist without the -perceptible plurality--the Universe. - - [51:1] Steiner: Die Mu`taziliten; Leipzig, 1865, p. 57. - - [51:2] Steiner: Die Mu`taziliten; Leipzig, 1865, p. 59. - - [51:3] Shahrastani: Cureton's ed., p. 38. - - [51:4] Ibn Hazm (ed. Cairo): Vol. V, p. 42. - - [52:1] Shahrastani: Cureton's ed, p. 38. - - [52:2] Steiner: Die Mu`taziliten, p. 80. - -The activity of God, then, consists only in making the atom perceptible. -The properties of the atom flow from its own nature. A stone thrown up -falls down on account of its own indwelling property[53:1]. God, says -Al-`Attar of Basra and Bishr ibn al Mu`tamir, did not create colour, -length, breadth, taste or smell--all these are activities of bodies -themselves[53:2]. Even the number of things in the Universe is not known -to God[53:3]. Bishr ibn al-Mu`tamir further explained the properties of -bodies by what he called "Tawallud"--interaction of bodies[53:4]. Thus -it is clear that the Rationalists were philosophically materialists, and -theologically deists. - - [53:1] Shahrastani: Cureton's ed., p. 38. - - [53:2] Ibn Hazm (ed. Cairo): Vol. IV, pp. 194, 197. - - [53:3] Ibn Hazm (ed. Cairo): Vol. IV, p. 194. - - [53:4] Shahrastani: Cureton's ed., p. 44. - -To them substance and atom are identical, and they define substance as a -space-filling atom which, besides the quality of filling space, has a -certain direction, force and existence forming its very essence as an -actuality. In shape it is squarelike; for if it is supposed to be -circular, combination of different atoms would not be possible[53:5]. -There is, however, great difference of opinion among the exponents of -atomism in regard to the nature of the atom. Some hold that atoms are -all similar to each other; while Abu'l-Qasim of Balkh regards them as -similar as well as dissimilar. When we say that two things are similar -to each other, we do not necessarily mean that they are similar in all -their attributes. Abu'l-Qasim further differs from Nazzam in advocating -the indestructibility of the atom. He holds that the atom had a -beginning in time; but that it cannot be completely annihilated. The -attribute of "Baqa" (continued existence), he says, does not give to its -subject a new attribute other than existence; and the continuity of -existence is not an additional attribute at all. The divine activity -created the atom as well as its continued existence. Abu'l-Qasim, -however, admits that some atoms may not have been created for continued -existence. He denies also the existence of any intervening space between -different atoms, and holds, unlike other representatives of the school, -that the essence or atom (Mahiyyat) could not remain essence in a state -of non-existence. To advocate the opposite is a contradiction in terms. -To say that the essence (which is essence because of the attribute of -existence) could remain essence in a state of non-existence, is to say -that the existent could remain existent in a state of non-existence. It -is obvious that Abu'l-Qasim here approaches the Ash`arite theory of -knowledge which dealt a serious blow to the Rationalist theory of -matter. - - [53:5] In my treatment of the atomism of Islamic Rationalists, I - am indebted to Arthur Biram's publication: "Kitabul Masa'il fil - khilaf beyn al-Basriyyin wal Baghdadiyyin". - - -§ II. - -Contemporary Movements of Thought. - -Side by side with the development of Mu`tazilaism we see, as is natural -in a period of great intellectual activity, many other tendencies of -thought manifesting themselves in the philosophical and religious -circles of Islam. Let us notice them briefly:-- - -1. Scepticism. The tendency towards scepticism was the natural -consequence of the purely dialectic method of Rationalism. Men such as -Ibn Ashras and Al-Jahiz who apparently belonged to the Rationalist -camp, were really sceptics. The standpoint of Al-Jahiz who inclined to -deistic naturalism[55:1], is that of a cultured man of the time, and -not of a professional theologian. In him is noticeable also a reaction -against the metaphysical hairsplitting of his predecessors, and a desire -to widen the pale of theology for the sake of the illiterate who are -incapable of reflecting on articles of faith. - - [55:1] Macdonald's Muslim Theology, p. 161. - -2. Sufiism--an appeal to a higher source of knowledge which was first -systematised by Dhu'l-Nun, and became more and more deepened and -antischolastic in contrast to the dry intellectualism of the -Ash`arite. We shall consider this interesting movement in the -following chapter. - -3. The revival of authority--Isma`ilianism--a movement -characteristically Persian which, instead of repudiating freethought, -endeavours to come to an understanding with it. Though this movement -seems to have no connection with the theological controversies of the -time, yet its connection with freethought is fundamental. The similarity -between the methods practised by the Isma`ilian missionaries and those -of the partisans of the association called Ikhwan al-Safa--Brethren of -Purity--suggests some sort of secret relation between the two -institutions. Whatever may be the motive of those who started this -movement, its significance as an intellectual phenomenon should not be -lost sight of. The multiplicity of philosophical and religious views--a -necessary consequence of speculative activity--is apt to invoke forces -which operate against this, religiously speaking, dangerous -multiplicity. In the 18th century history of European thought we see -Fichte, starting with a sceptical inquiry concerning the nature of -matter, and finding its last word in Pantheism. Schleiermacher appeals -to Faith as opposed to Reason, Jacobi points to a source of knowledge -higher than reason, while Comte abandons all metaphysical inquiry, and -limits all knowledge to sensuous perception. De Maistre and Schlegel, on -the other hand, find a resting place in the authority of an absolutely -infallible Pope. The advocates of the doctrine of Imamat think in the -same strain as De Maistre; but it is curious that the Isma`ilians, while -making this doctrine the basis of their Church, permitted free play to -all sorts of thinking. - -The Isma`ilia movement then is one aspect of the persistent -battle[57:1] which the intellectually independent Persian waged against -the religious and political ideals of Islam. Originally a branch of the -Shi`ite religion, the Isma`ilia sect assumed quite a cosmopolitan -character with `Abdulla ibn Maimun--the probable progenitor of the -Fatimid Caliphs of Egypt--who died about the same time when -Al-Ash`ari, the great opponent of Freethought, was born. This curious -man imagined a vast scheme in which he weaved together innumerable -threads of various hues, resulting in a cleverly constructed -equivocation, charming to the Persian mind for its mysterious character -and misty Pythagorean Philosophy. Like the Association of the Brethren -of Purity, he made an attempt, under the pious cloak of the doctrine of -Imamat (Authority), to synthesise all the dominating ideas of the time. -Greek Philosophy, Christianity, Rationalism, Sufiism, Manichaeism, -Persian heresies, and above all the idea of reincarnation, all came -forward to contribute their respective shares to the boldly conceived -Isma`ilian whole, the various aspects of which were to be gradually -revealed to the initiated, by the "Leader"--the ever Incarnating -Universal Reason--according to the intellectual development of the age -in which he incarnated himself. In the Isma`ilian movement, Freethought, -apprehending the collapse of its ever widening structure, seeks to rest -upon a stable basis, and, by a strange irony of fate, is led to find it -in the very idea which is revolting to its whole being. Barren -authority, though still apt to reassert herself at times, adopts this -unclaimed child, and thus permits herself to assimilate all knowledge -past, present and future. - - [57:1] Ibn Hazm in his Kitab al-Milal, looks upon the heretical - sects of Persia as a continuous struggle against the Arab power - which the cunning Persian attempted to shake off by these - peaceful means. See Von Kremer's Geschichte der herrschenden - Ideen des Islams, pp. 10, 11, where this learned Arab historian - of Cordova is quoted at length. - -The unfortunate connection, however, of this movement with the politics -of the time, has misled many a scholar. They see in it (Macdonald, for -instance) nothing more than a powerful conspiracy to uproot the -political power of the Arab from Persia. They have denounced the -Isma`ilian Church which counted among its followers some of the best -heads and sincerest hearts, as a mere clique of dark murderers who were -ever watching for a possible victim. We must always remember, while -estimating the character of these people, the most barbarous -persecutions which drove them to pay red-handed fanaticism in the same -coin. Assassinations for religious purposes were considered -unobjectionable, and even perhaps lawful, among the whole Semite race. -As late as the latter half of the 16th century, the Pope of Rome could -approve such a dreadful slaughter as the massacre of St. Bartholomew. -That assassination, even though actuated by religious zeal, is still a -crime, is a purely modern idea; and justice demands that we should not -judge older generations with our own standards of right and wrong. A -great religious movement which shook to its very foundations the -structure of a vast empire, and, having successfully passed through the -varied ordeals of moral reproach, calumny and persecution, stood up for -centuries as a champion of Science and Philosophy, could not have -entirely rested on the frail basis of a political conspiracy of a mere -local and temporary character. Isma`ilianism, in spite of its almost -entire loss of original vitality, still dominates the ethical ideal of -not an insignificant number in India, Persia, Central Asia, Syria and -Africa; while the last expression of Persian thought--Babism--is -essentially Isma`ilian in its character. - -To return, however, to the Philosophy of the sect. From the later -Rationalists they borrowed their conception of Divinity. God, or the -ultimate principle of existence, they teach, has no attribute. His -nature admits of no predication. When we predicate the attribute of -power to him, we only mean that He is the giver of power; when we -predicate eternity, we indicate the eternity of what the Qur'an calls -"Amr" (word of God) as distinguished from the "Khalq" (creation of -God) which is contingent. In His nature all contradictions melt away, -and from Him flow all opposites. Thus they considered themselves to have -solved the problem which had troubled the mind of Zoroaster and his -followers. - -In order to find an answer to the question, "What is plurality?" the -Isma`ilia refer to what they consider a metaphysical axiom--"that from -one only one can proceed". But the one which proceeds, is not something -completely different from which it proceeds. It is really the Primal one -transformed. The Primal Unity, therefore, transformed itself into the -First Intellect (Universal Reason); and then, by means of this -transformation of itself, created the Universal soul which, impelled by -its nature to perfectly identify itself with the original source, felt -the necessity of motion, and consequently of a body possessing the power -of motion. In order to achieve its end, the soul created the heavens -moving in circular motion according to its direction. It also created -the elements which mixed together, and formed the visible Universe--the -scene of plurality through which it endeavours to pass with a view to -come back to the original source. The individual soul is an epitome of -the whole Universe which exists only for its progressive education. The -Universal Reason incarnates itself from time to time, in the personality -of the "Leader" who illuminates the soul in proportion to its experience -and understanding, and gradually guides it through the scene of -plurality to the world of eternal unity. When the Universal soul -reaches its goal, or rather returns to its own deep being, the process -of disintegration ensues. "Particles constituting the Universe fall off -from each other--those of goodness go to truth (God) which symbolises -unity; those of evil go to untruth (Devil) which symbolises -diversity"[63:1]. This is but briefly the Isma`ilian Philosophy--a -mixture, as Sharastani remarks, of Philosophical and Manichaean -ideas--which, by gradually arousing the slumbering spirit of scepticism, -they administered, as it were, in doses to the initiated, and finally -brought them to that stage of spiritual emancipation where solemn ritual -drops off, and dogmatic religion appears to be nothing more than a -systematic arrangement of useful falsehoods. - - [63:1] Sharastani: Cureton's ed: p. 149. - -The Isma`ilian doctrine is the first attempt to amalgamate contemporary -Philosophy with a really Persian view of the Universe, and to restate -Islam, in reference to this synthesis, by allegorical interpretation of -the Qur'an--a method which was afterwards adopted by Sufiism. With them -the Zoroastrian Ahriman (Devil) is not the malignant creator of evil -things but it is a principle which violates the eternal unity, and -breaks it up into visible diversity. The idea that some principle of -difference in the nature of the ultimate existence must be postulated in -order to account for empirical diversity, underwent further -modifications; until in the Hurufi sect (an offshoot of the Isma`ilia), -in the fourteenth century, it touched contemporary Sufiism on the one -hand, and Christian Trinity on the other. The "Be", maintained the -Hurufis, is the eternal word of God, which, itself uncreated, leads to -further creation--the word externalised. "But for the 'word' the -recognition of the essence of Divinity would have been impossible; since -Divinity is beyond the reach of sense--perception"[64:1]. The 'word', -therefore, became flesh in the womb of Mary[64:2] in order to manifest -the Father. The whole Universe is the manifestation of God's 'word', in -which He is immanent[64:3]. Every sound in the Universe is within God; -every atom is singing the song of eternity[64:4]; all is life. Those -who want to discover the ultimate reality of things, let them seek "the -named" through the Name[65:1], which at once conceals and reveals its -subject. - - [64:1] Jawidan Kabir, fol. 149a. - - [64:2] Jawidan Kabir, fol. 280a. - - [64:3] Jawidan Kabir, fol. 366b. - - [64:4] Jawidan Kabir, fol. 155b. - - [65:1] Jawidan Kabir, fol. 382a. - - -§ III. - -Reaction against Rationalism. - -The Ash`arite. - -Patronised by the early Caliphs of the House of `Abbas, Rationalism -continued to flourish in the intellectual centres of the Islamic world; -until, in the first half of the 9th century, it met the powerful -orthodox reaction which found a very energetic leader in Al-Ash`ari -(b, 873 A.D.) who studied under Rationalist teachers only to demolish, -by their own methods, the edifice they had so laboriously built. He was -a pupil of Al-Jubba'i[65:2]--the representative of the younger school of -Mu`tazilaism in Basra--with whom he had many controversies[65:3] which -eventually terminated their friendly relations, and led the pupil to bid -farewell to the Mu`tazila camp. "The fact", says Spitta, "that -Al-Ash`ari was so thoroughly a child of his time with the successive -currents of which he let himself go, makes him, in another relation, an -important figure to us. In him, as in any other, are clearly reflected -the various tendencies of this politically as well as religiously -interesting period; and we seldom find ourselves in a position to weigh -the power of the orthodox confession and the Mu`tazilite speculation, -the child-like helpless manner of the one, the immaturity and -imperfection of the other, so completely as in the life of this man who -was orthodox as a boy and a Mu`tazila as a young man"[66:1]. The -Mu`tazila speculation (e.g. Al-Jahiz) tended to be absolutely -unfettered, and in some cases led to a merely negative attitude of -thought. The movement initiated by Al-Ash`ari was an attempt not only -to purge Islam of all non-Islamic elements which had quietly crept into -it, but also to harmonize the religious consciousness with the -religious thought of Islam. Rationalism was an attempt to measure -reality by reason alone; it implied the identity of the spheres of -religion and philosophy, and strove to express faith in the form of -concepts or terms of pure thought. It ignored the facts of human nature, -and tended to disintegrate the solidarity of the Islamic Church. Hence -the reaction. - - [65:2] Extracts from Ibn `Asakir (Mehren)--Travaux de la - troisieme session du Congres International des Orientalistes--p. - 261. - - [65:3] Spitta: Zur Geschichte Abul-Hasan Al-Ash`ari, pp. 42, - 43. See also Ibn Khallikan (Gottingen 1839)--Al-Jubba'i, where - the story of their controversy is given. - - [66:1] Spitta: Vorwort, p. VII. - -The orthodox reaction led by the Ash`arite then was, in reality, -nothing more than the transfer of dialectic method to the defence of the -authority of Divine Revelation. In opposition to the Rationalists, they -maintained the doctrine of the Attributes of God; and, as regards the -Free Will controversy, they adopted a course lying midway between the -extreme fatalism of the old school, and the extreme libertarianism of -the Rationalists. They teach that the power of choice as well as all -human actions are created by God; and that man has been given the power -of acquiring[67:1] the different modes of activity. But Fakhral-Din -Razi, who in his violent attack on philosophy was strenuously opposed by -Tusi and Qutbal-Din, does away with the idea of "acquisition", and -openly maintains the doctrine of necessity in his commentary on the -Qur'an. The Mataridiyya--another school of anti-rationalist theology, -founded by Abu Mansur Mataridi a native of Matarid in the environs of -Samarqand--went back to the old rationalist position, and taught in -opposition to the Ash`arite, that man has absolute control over his -activity; and that his power affects the very nature of his actions. -Al-Ash`ari's interest was purely theological; but it was impossible to -harmonise reason and revelation without making reference to the ultimate -nature of reality. Baqilani[68:1] therefore, made use of some purely -metaphysical propositions (that substance is an individual unity; that -quality cannot exist in quality; that perfect vacuum is possible.) in -his Theological investigation, and thus gave the school a metaphysical -foundation which it is our main object to bring out. We shall not, -therefore, dwell upon their defence of orthodox beliefs (e.g. that the -Qur'an is uncreated; that the visibility of God is possible etc.); but -we shall endeavour to pick up the elements of metaphysical thought in -their theological controversies. In order to meet contemporary -philosophers on their own ground, they could not dispense with -philosophising; hence willingly or unwillingly they had to develop a -theory of knowledge peculiar to themselves. - - [67:1] Shahrastani--ed. Cureton, p. 69. - - [68:1] Martin Schreiner: Zur Geschichte des Ash`aritenthums. - (Huitieme Congres International des Orientalistes 1889, p. 82). - -God, according to the Ash`arite, is the ultimate necessary existence -which "carries its attributes in its own being"[69:1]; and whose -existence (wujud) and essence (Mahiyyat) are identical. Besides the -argument from the contingent character of motion they used the following -arguments to prove the existence of this ultimate principle:-- - -(1). All bodies, they argue, are one in so far as the phenomenal fact of -their existence is concerned. But in spite of this unity, their -qualities are different and even opposed to each other. We are, -therefore, driven to postulate an ultimate cause in order to account for -their empirical divergence. - - [69:1] Martin Schreiner: Zur Geschichte des Ash`aritenthums. - (Huitieme Congres International des Orientalistes II{me} Partie - 1893, p. 113). - -(2). Every contingent being needs a cause to account for its existence. -The Universe is contingent; therefore it must have a cause; and that -cause is God. That the Universe is contingent, they proved in the -following manner. All that exists in the Universe, is either substance -or quality. The contingence of quality is evident, and the contingence -of substance follows from the fact that no substance could exist apart -from qualities. The contingence of quality necessitates the contingence -of substance; otherwise the eternity of substance would necessitate the -eternity of quality. In order fully to appreciate the value of this -argument, it is necessary to understand the Ash`arite theory of -knowledge. To answer the question, "What is a thing?" they subjected to -a searching criticism the Aristotelian categories of thought, and -arrived at the conclusion that bodies have no properties in -themselves[70:1]. They made no distinction of secondary and primary -qualities of a body, and reduced all of them to purely subjective -relations. Quality too became with them a mere accident without which -the substance could not exist. They used the word substance or atom with -a vague implication of externality; but their criticism, actuated by a -pious desire to defend the idea of divine creation, reduced the Universe -to a mere show of ordered subjectivities which, as they maintained like -Berkeley, found their ultimate explanation in the Will of God. In his -examination of human knowledge regarded as a product and not merely a -process, Kant stopped at the idea of "Ding an sich", but the Ash`arite -endeavoured to penetrate further, and maintained, against the -contemporary Agnostic-Realism, that the so called underlying essence -existed only in so far as it was brought in relation to the knowing -subject. Their atomism, therefore, approaches that of Lotze[71:1] who, -in spite of his desire to save external reality, ended in its complete -reduction to ideality. But like Lotze they could not believe their atoms -to be the inner working of the Infinite Primal Being. The interest of -pure monotheism was too strong for them. The necessary consequence of -their analysis of matter is a thorough going idealism like that of -Berkeley; but perhaps their instinctive realism combined with the force -of atomistic tradition, still compels them to use the word "atom" by -which they endeavour to give something like a realistic coloring to -their idealism. The interest of dogmatic theology drove them to maintain -towards pure Philosophy an attitude of criticism which taught her -unwilling advocates how to philosophise and build a metaphysics of their -own. - - [70:1] See Macdonald's admirable account of the Ash`arite - Metaphysics: Muslim Theology p. 201 sq. See also Maulana - Shibli `Ilmal Kalam pp. 60, 72. - - [71:1] "Lotze is an atomist, but he does not conceive the atoms - themselves as material; for extension, like all other sensuous - qualities is explained through the reciprocal action of atoms; - they themselves, therefore, cannot possess this quality. Like - life and like all empirical qualities, the sensuous fact of - extension is due to the cooperation of points of force, which, - in time, must be conceived as starting points of the inner - workings of the Infinite Primal Being." Hoffding Vol. II, p. - 516. - -But a more important and philosophically more significant aspect of the -Ash`arite Metaphysics, is their attitude towards the Law of -Causation[72:1]. Just as they repudiated all the principles of -optics[72:2] in order to show, in opposition to the Rationalists, that -God could be visible in spite of His being unextended, so with a view -to defend the possibility of miracles, they rejected the idea of -causation altogether. The orthodox believed in miracles as well as in -the Universal Law of Causation; but they maintained that, at the time of -manifesting a miracle, God suspended the operation of this law. The -Ash`arite, however, starting with the supposition that cause and -effect must be similar, could not share the orthodox view, and taught -that the idea of power is meaningless, and that we know nothing but -floating impressions, the phenomenal order of which is determined by -God. - - [72:1] Shibli `Ilmal-Kalam pp. 64, 72. - - [72:2] Shahrastani, ed. Cureton, p. 82. - -Any account of the Ash`arite metaphysics would be incomplete without a -notice of the work of Al-Ghazali (d. 1111 A.D.) who though -misunderstood by many orthodox theologians, will always be looked upon -as one of the greatest personalities of Islam. This sceptic of powerful -ability anticipated Descartes[73:1] in his philosophical method; and, -"seven hundred years before Hume cut the bond of causality with the -edge of his dialectic"[73:2]. He was the first to write a systematic -refutation of philosophy, and completely to annihilate that dread of -intellectualism which had characterised the orthodox. It was chiefly his -influence that made men study dogma and metaphysics together, and -eventually led to a system of education which produced such men as -Shahrastani, Al-Razi and Al-Ishraqi. The following passage indicates -his attitude as a thinker:-- - -"From my childhood I was inclined to think out things for myself. The -result of this attitude was that I revolted against authority; and all -the beliefs that had fixed themselves in my mind from childhood lost -their original importance. I thought that such beliefs based on mere -authority were equally entertained by Jews, Christians, and followers of -other religions. Real knowledge must eradicate all doubt. For instance, -it is self-evident that ten is greater than three. If a person, however, -endeavours to prove the contrary by an appeal to his power of turning a -stick into a snake, the performance would indeed be wonderful, though -it cannot touch the certainty of the proposition in question"[75:1]. He -examined afterwards, all the various claimants of "Certain Knowledge" -and finally found it in Sufiism. - - [73:1] "It (Al-Ghazali's work on the Revivication of the - sciences of religion) has so remarkable a resemblance to the - _Discourse sur la methode_ of Descartes, that had any - translation of it existed in the days of Descartes everyone - would have cried against the plagiarism". (Lewes's History of - Philosophy: Vol. II. p. 50). - - [73:2] Journal of the American Oriental Society, Vol. 20, p. - 103. - - [75:1] Al-Munqidh p. 3. - -With their view of the nature of substance, the Ash`arite, rigid -monotheists as they were, could not safely discuss the nature of the -human soul. Al-Ghazali alone seriously took up the problem, and to -this day it is difficult to define, with accuracy, his view of the -nature of God. In him, like Borger and Solger in Germany, Sufi pantheism -and the Ash`arite dogma of personality appear to harmonise together, a -reconciliation which makes it difficult to say whether he was a -Pantheist, or a Personal Pantheist of the type of Lotze. The soul, -according to Al-Ghazali, perceives things. But perception as an -attribute can exist only in a substance or essence which is absolutely -free from all the attributes of body. In his Al-Madnun[75:2], he -explains why the prophet declined to reveal the nature of the soul. -There are, he says, two kinds of men; ordinary men and thinkers. The -former who look upon materiality as a condition of existence, cannot -conceive an immaterial substance. The latter are led, by their logic, to -a conception of the soul which sweeps away all difference between God -and the individual soul. Al-Ghazali, therefore, realised the -Pantheistic drift of his own inquiry, and preferred silence as to the -ultimate nature of the soul. - - [75:2] See Sir Sayyid Ahmad's criticism of Al-Ghazali's view - of the soul, Al-Nazrufi ba'di Masaili-l Imami-l humam Abu Hamid - Al-Ghazali; No. 4, p. 3 sq. (ed. Agra). - -He is generally included among the Ash`arite. But strictly speaking he -is not an Ash`arite; though he admitted that the Ash`arite mode of -thought was excellent for the masses. "He held", says Shibli -(`Ilmal-Kalam, p. 66.), "that the secret of faith could not be revealed; -for this reason he encouraged exposition of the Ash`arite theology, -and took good care in persuading his immediate disciples not to publish -the results of his private reflection". Such an attitude towards the -Ash`arite theology, combined with his constant use of philosophical -language, could not but lead to suspicion. Ibn Jauzi, Qadi `Iyad, and -other famous theologians of the orthodox school, publicly denounced him -as one of the "misguided"; and `Iyad went even so far as to order the -destruction of all his philosophical and theological writings that -existed in Spain. - -It is, therefore, clear that while the dialectic of Rationalism -destroyed the personality of God, and reduced divinity to a bare -indefinable universality, the antirationalist movement, though it -preserved the dogma of personality, destroyed the external reality of -nature. In spite of Nazzam's theory of "Atomic objectification"[77:1], -the atom of the Rationalist possesses an independent objective reality; -that of the Ash`arite is a fleeting moment of Divine Will. The one -saves nature, and tends to do away with the God of Theology; the other -sacrifices nature to save God as conceived by the orthodox. The -God-intoxicated Sufi who stands aloof from the Theological controversies -of the age, saves and spiritualises both the aspects of existence, and -looks upon the whole Universe as the self-revelation of God--a higher -notion which synthesises the opposite extremes of his predecessors. -"Wooden-legged" Rationalism, as the Sufi called it, speaks its last word -in the sceptic Al-Ghazali, whose restless soul, after long and -hopeless wanderings in the desolate sands of dry intellectualism, found -its final halting place in the still deep of human emotion. His -scepticism is directed more to substantiate the necessity of a higher -source of knowledge than merely to defend the dogma of Islamic Theology, -and, therefore, marks the quiet victory of Sufiism over all the rival -speculative tendencies of the time. - - [77:1] Ibn Hazm, Vol. V, p. 63, 64, where the author states and - criticises this theory. - -Al-Ghazali's positive contribution to the Philosophy of his country, -however, is found in his little book--Mishkatal-Anwar--where he starts -with the Quranic verse, "God is the light of heavens and earth", and -instinctively returns to the Iranian idea, which was soon to find a -vigorous expounder in Al-Ishraqi. Light, he teaches in this book, is -the only real existence; and there is no darkness greater than -non-existence. But the essence of Light is manifestation: "it is -attributed to manifestation which is a relation"[78:1]. The Universe -was created out of darkness on which God sprinkled[79:1] his own light, -and made its different parts more or less visible according as they -received more or less light. As bodies differ from one another in being -dark, obscure, illuminated or illuminating, so men are differentiated -from one another. There are some who illuminate other human beings; and, -for this reason, the Prophet is named "The Burning Lamp" in the Qur'an. - - [78:1] Mishkatal-Anwar, fol. 3a. - - [79:1] In support of this view Al-Ghazali quotes a tradition - of the prophet. Mishkatal-Anwar, fol. 10a. - -The physical eye sees only the external manifestation of the Absolute or -Real Light. There is an internal eye in the heart of man which, unlike -the physical eye, sees itself as other things, an eye which goes beyond -the finite, and pierces the veil of manifestation. These thoughts are -merely germs, which developed and fructified in Al-Ishraqi's -"Philosophy of Illumination"--Hikmatal-Ishraq. - -Such is the Ash`arite philosophy. - -One great theological result of this reaction was that it checked the -growth of freethought which tended to dissolve the solidarity of the -Church. We are, however, concerned more with the purely intellectual -results of the Ash`arite mode of thought, and these are mainly two:-- - -(1). It led to an independent criticism of Greek philosophy as we shall -see presently. - -(2). In the beginning of the 10th century when the Ash`arite had -almost completely demolished the stronghold of Rationalism, we see a -tendency towards what may be called Persian Positivism. Al-Biruni[80:1] -(d. 1048) and Ibn Haitham[80:2] (d. 1038) who anticipated modern -empirical Psychology in recognising what is called reaction-time, gave -up all inquiry concerning the nature of the supersensual, and maintained -a prudent silence about religious matters. Such a state of things could -have existed, but could not have been logically justified before -Al-Ash`ari. - - [80:1] He (Al-Biruni) quotes with approval the following, as the - teaching of the adherents of Aryabhatta: It is enough for us to - know that which is lighted up by the sun's rays. Whatever lies - beyond, though it should be of immeasurable extent, we cannot - make use of; for what the sunbeam does not reach, the senses do - not perceive, and what the senses do not perceive we cannot - know. From this we gather what Al-Biruni's Philosophy was: only - sense-perceptions, knit together by a logical intelligence, - yield sure knowledge. (Boer's Philosophy in Islam, p. 146). - - [80:2] "Moreover truth for him (Ibn Haitham) was only that - which was presented as material for the faculties of - sense-perception, and which received it from the understanding, - being thus the logically elaborated perception". (Boer's - Philosophy in Islam, p. 150). - - [80:2] "Moreover truth for him (Ibn Haitham) was only that - which was presented as material for the faculties of - sense-perception, and which received it from the understanding, - being thus the logically elaborated perception". (Boer's - Philosophy in Islam, p. 150). - - - - -CHAP. IV. - -CONTROVERSY BETWEEN IDEALISM AND REALISM. - - -The Ash`arite denial of Aristotle's Prima Materia, and their views -concerning the nature of space, time and causation, awakened that -irrepressible spirit of controversy which, for centuries, divided the -camp of Muhammedan thinkers, and eventually exhausted its vigor in the -merely verbal subtleties of schools. The publication of Najm al-Din -Al-Katibi's (a follower of Aristotle whose disciples were called -Philosophers as distinguished from scholastic theologians) Hikmat -al-`Ain--"Philosophy of Essence", greatly intensified the intellectual -conflict, and invoked keen criticism from a host of Ash`arite as well -as other idealist thinkers. I shall consider in order the principal -points on which the two schools differed from each other. - - -A. _The Nature of the Essence._ - -We have seen that the Ash`arite theory of knowledge drove them to -hold that individual essences of various things are quite different from -each other, and are determined in each case by the ultimate cause--God. -They denied the existence of an everchanging primary stuff common to all -things, and maintained against the Rationalists that existence -constitutes the very being of the essence. To them, therefore, essence -and existence are identical. They argued that the Judgment, "Man is -animal", is possible only on the ground of a fundamental difference -between the subject and the predicate; since their identity would make -the Judgment nugatory, and complete difference would make the -predication false. It is, therefore, necessary to postulate an external -cause to determine the various forms of existence. Their opponents, -however, admit the determination or limitation of existence, but they -maintain that all the various forms of existence, in so far as their -essence is concerned, are identical--all being limitations of one -Primary substance. The followers of Aristotle met the difficulty -suggested by the possibility of synthetic predication, by advocating the -possibility of compound essences. Such a judgment as "Man is animal", -they maintained, is true; because man is an essence composed of two -essences, animality and humanity. This, retorted the Ash`arite, cannot -stand criticism. If you say that the essence of man and animal is the -same, you in other words hold that the essence of the whole is the same -as that of the part. But this proposition is absurd; since if the -essence of the compound is the same as that of its constituents, the -compound will have to be regarded as one being having two essences or -existences. - -It is obvious that the whole controversy turns on the question whether -existence is a mere idea or something objectively real. When we say that -a certain thing exists, do we mean that it exists only in relation to us -(Ash`arite position); or that it is an essence existing quite -independently of us (Realist position)? We shall briefly indicate the -arguments of either side. The Realist argued as follows:-- - -(1). The conception of my existence is something immediate or intuitive. -The thought "I exist" is a "concept", and my body being an element of -this "concept", it follows that my body is intuitively known as -something real. If the knowledge of the existent is not immediate, the -fact of its perception would require a process of thought which, as we -know, it does not. The Ash`arite Al-Razi admits that the concept of -existence is immediate; but he regards the judgment--"The concept of -existence is immediate"--as merely a matter of acquisition. Muhammad ibn -Mubarak Bukhari, on the other hand, says that the whole argument of -the realist proceeds on the assumption that the concept of my existence -is something immediate--a position which can be controverted.[84:1] If, -says he, we admit that the concept of my existence is immediate, -abstract existence cannot be regarded as a constitutive element of this -conception. And if the realist maintains that the perception of a -particular object is immediate, we admit the truth of what he says; but -it would not follow, as he is anxious to establish, that the so called -underlying essence is immediately known as objectively real. The -realist argument, moreover, demands that the mind ought not to be able -to conceive the predication of qualities to things. We cannot conceive, -"snow is white", because whiteness, being a part of this immediate -judgment, must also be immediately known without any predication. Mulla -Muhammad Hashim Husaini remarks[85:1] that this reasoning is -erroneous. The mind in the act of predicating whiteness of snow is -working on a purely ideal existence--the quality of whiteness--and not -on an objectively real essence of which the qualities are mere facets or -aspects. Husaini, moreover, anticipates Hamilton, and differs from other -realists in holding that the so-called unknowable essence of the object -is also immediately known. The object, he says, is immediately perceived -as one.[85:2] We do not successively perceive the various aspects of -what happens to be the objects of our perception. - - [84:1] Muhammad ibn Mubarak's commentary on Hikmat al-`Ain, - fol. 5a. - - [85:1] Husaini's commentary on Hikmat al-`Ain, fol. 13a. - - [85:2] Husaini's commentary on Hikmat al-`Ain, fol. 14b. - -(2) The idealist, says the realist, reduces all quality to mere -subjective relations. His argument leads him to deny the underlying -essence of things, and to look upon them as entirely heterogeneous -collections of qualities, the essence of which consists merely in the -phenomenal fact of their perception. In spite of his belief in the -complete heterogeneity of things, he applies the word existence to all -things--a tacit admission that there is some essence common to all the -various forms of existence. Abu'l-Hasan al-Ash`ari replies that this -application is only a verbal convenience, and is not meant to indicate -the so-called internal homogeneity of things. But the universal -application of the word existence by the idealist, must mean, according -to the realist, that the existence of a thing either constitutes its -very essence, or it is something superadded to the underlying essence of -the thing. The first supposition is a virtual admission as to the -homogeneity of things; since we cannot maintain that existence peculiar -to one thing is fundamentally different from existence peculiar to -another. The supposition that existence is something superadded to the -essence of a thing leads to an absurdity; since in this case the essence -will have to be regarded as something distinct from existence; and the -denial of essence (with the Ash`arite) would blot out the distinction -between existence and non-existence. Moreover, what was the essence -before existence was superadded to it? We must not say that the essence -was ready to receive existence before it actually did receive it; since -this statement would imply that the essence was non-existence before it -received existence. Likewise the statement that the essence has the -power of receiving the quality of non-existence, implies the absurdity -that it does already exist. Existence, therefore, must be regarded as -forming a part of the essence. But if it forms a part of the essence, -the latter will have to be regarded as a compound. If, on the other -hand, existence is external to the essence, it must be something -contingent because of its dependence on something other than itself. Now -everything contingent must have a cause. If this cause is the essence -itself, it would follow that the essence existed before it existed; -since the cause must precede the effect in the fact of existence. If, -however, the cause of existence is something other than the essence, it -follows that the existence of God also must be explained by some cause -other than the essence of God--an absurd conclusion which turns the -necessary into the contingent.[88:1] This argument of the realist is -based on a complete misunderstanding of the idealist position. He does -not see that the idealist never regarded the fact of existence as -something superadded to the essence of a thing; but always held it to be -identical with the essence. The essence, says ibn Mubarak,[88:2] is the -cause of existence without being chronologically before it. The -existence of the essence constitutes its very being; it is not dependent -for it on something other than itself. - - [88:1] Ibn Mubarak's Commentary, fol. 8b. - - [88:2] Ibn Mubarak's Commentary, fol. 9a. - -The truth is that both sides are far from a true theory of knowledge. -The agnostic realist who holds that behind the phenomenal qualities of a -thing, there is an essence operating as their cause, is guilty of a -glaring contradiction. He holds that underlying the thing there is an -_unknowable_ essence or substratum which is _known_ to exist. The -Ash`arite idealist, on the other hand, misunderstands the process of -knowledge. He ignores the mental activity involved in the act of -knowledge; and looks upon perceptions as mere presentations which are -determined, as he says, by God. But if the order of presentations -requires a cause to account for it, why should not that cause be sought -in the original constitution of matter as Locke did? Moreover, the -theory that knowledge is a mere passive perception or awareness of what -is presented, leads to certain inadmissible conclusions which the -Ash`arite never thought of:-- - -(a). They did not see that their purely subjective conception of -knowledge swept away all possibility of error. If the existence of a -thing is merely the fact of its being presented, there is no reason why -it should be cognised as different from what it actually is. - -(b). They did not see that on their theory of knowledge, our -fellow-beings like other elements of the physical order, would have no -higher reality than mere states of my consciousness. - -(c). If knowledge is a mere receptivity of presentations, God who, as -cause of presentations, is active in regard to the act of our knowledge, -must not be aware of our presentations. From the Ash`arite point of -view this conclusion is fatal to their whole position. They cannot say -that presentations on their ceasing to be my presentations, continue to -be presentations to God's consciousness. - -Another question connected with the nature of the essence is, whether it -is caused or uncaused. The followers of Aristotle, or philosophers as -they are generally called by their opponents, hold that the underlying -essence of things is uncaused. The Ash`arite hold the opposite view. -Essence, says the Aristotelian, cannot be acted upon by any external -agent.[90:1] Al-Katibi argues that if, for instance, the essence of -humanity had resulted from the operation of an external activity, doubt -as to its being the real essence of humanity would have been possible. -As a matter of fact we never entertain such a doubt; it follows, -therefore, that the essence is not due to the activity of an agency -external to itself. The idealist starts with the realist distinction of -essence and existence, and argues that the realist line of argument -would lead to the absurd proposition--that man is uncaused; since he -must be regarded, according to the realist, as a combination of two -uncaused essences--existence and humanity. - - [90:1] Ibn Mubarak's Commentary, fol. 20a. - - -B. _The Nature of Knowledge._ - -The followers of Aristotle, true to their position as to the independent -objective reality of the essence, define knowledge as "receiving images -of external things".[91:1] It is possible to conceive, they argue, an -object which is externally unreal, and to which other qualities can be -attributed. But when we attribute to it the quality of existence, actual -existence is necessitated; since the affirmation of the quality of a -thing is a part of the affirmation of that thing. If, therefore, the -predication of existence does not necessitate actual objective existence -of the thing, we are driven to deny externality altogether, and to hold -that the thing exists in the mind as a mere idea. But the affirmation -of a thing, says Ibn Mubarak, constitutes the very existence of the -thing. The idealist makes no such distinction as affirmation and -existence. To infer from the above argument that the thing must be -regarded as existing in the mind, is unjustifiable. "Ideal" existence -follows only from the denial of externality which the Ash`arite do not -deny; since they hold that knowledge is a relation between the knower -and the known which is known as external. Al-Katibi's proposition that -if the thing does not exist as external existence, it must exist as -ideal or mental existence, is self-contradictory; since, on his -principles, everything that exists in idea exists in externality.[92:1] - - [91:1] Ibn Mubarak, fol. 11a. - - [92:1] Ibn Mubarak, fol. 11b. - - -C. _The Nature of Non-existence._ - -Al-Katibi explains and criticises the proposition, maintained by -contemporary philosophers generally--"That the existent is good, and the -non-existent is evil".[92:2] The fact of murder, he says, is not evil -because the murderer had the power of committing such a thing; or -because the instrument of murder had the power of cutting; or because -the neck of the murdered had the capacity of being cut asunder. It is -evil because it signifies the negation of life--a condition which is -non-existential, and not existential like the conditions indicated -above. But in order to show that evil is non-existence, we should make -an inductive inquiry, and examine all the various cases of evil. A -perfect induction, however, is impossible, and an incomplete induction -cannot prove the point. Al-Katibi, therefore, rejects this proposition, -and holds that "non-existence is absolute nothing".[93:1] The possible -'_essences_', according to him, are not lying fixed in space waiting for -the attribute of existence; otherwise fixity in space would have to be -regarded as possessing no existence. But his critics hold that this -argument is true only on the supposition that fixity in space and -existence are identical. Fixity in externality, says Ibn Mubarak, is a -conception wider than existence. All existence is external, but all that -is external is not necessarily existent. - - [92:2] Ibn Mubarak, fol. 14a. - - [93:1] Ibn Mubarak's Commentary, fol. 14b. - -The interest of the Ash`arite in the dogma of the Resurrection--the -possibility of the reappearance of the non-existent as existent--led -them to advocate the apparently absurd proposition that "non-existence -or nothing _is_ something". They argued that, since we make judgments -about the non-existent, it is, therefore, known; and the fact of its -knowability indicates that "the nothing" is not absolutely nothing. The -knowable is a case of affirmation and the non-existent being knowable, -is a case of affirmation.[94:1] Al-Katibi denies the truth of the Major. -Impossible things, he says, are known, yet they do not externally exist. -Al-Razi criticises this argument accusing Al-Katibi of the ignorance of -the fact that the '_essence_' exists in the mind, and yet is known as -external. Al-Katibi supposes that the knowledge of a thing necessitates -its existence as an independent objective reality. Moreover it should be -remembered that the Ash`arite discriminate between positive and -existent on the one hand, and non-existent and negative on the other. -They say that all existent is positive, but the converse of this -proposition is not true. There is certainly a relation between the -existent and the non-existent, but there is absolutely no relation -between the positive and the negative. We do not say, as Al-Katibi -holds, that the impossible is non-existent; we say that the impossible -is only negative. Substances which do exist are something positive. As -regards the attribute which cannot be conceived as existing apart from -the substance, it is neither existent nor non-existent, but something -between the two. Briefly the Ash`arite position is as follows:-- - -"A thing has a proof of its existence or not. If not, it is called -negative. If it has a proof of its existence, it is either substance or -attribute. If it is substance and has the attribute of existence or -non-existence, (i.e. it is perceived or not) it is existent or -non-existent accordingly. If it is attribute, it is neither existent nor -non-existent".[95:1] - - [94:1] Ibn Mubarak's Commentary, fol. 15a. - - [95:1] Ibn Mubarak's Commentary, fol. 15b. - - - - -CHAP. V. - -SUFIISM. - - -§ I. - -The origin and Quranic Justification of Sufiism. - -It has become quite a fashion with modern oriental scholarship to trace -the chain of influences. Such a procedure has certainly great historical -value, provided it does not make us ignore the fundamental fact, that -the human mind possesses an independent individuality, and, acting on -its own initiative, can gradually evolve out of itself, truths which may -have been anticipated by other minds ages ago. No idea can seize a -people's soul unless, in some sense, it is the people's own. External -influences may wake it up from its deep unconscious slumber; but they -cannot, so to speak, create it out of nothing. - -Much has been written about the origin of Persian Sufiism; and, in -almost all cases, explorers of this most interesting field of research -have exercised their ingenuity in discovering the various channels -through which the basic ideas of Sufiism might have travelled from one -place to another. They seem completely to have ignored the principle, -that the full significance of a phenomenon in the intellectual evolution -of a people, can only be comprehended in the light of those pre-existing -intellectual, political, and social conditions which alone make its -existence inevitable. Von Kremer and Dozy derive Persian Sufiism from -the Indian Vedanta; Merx and Mr. Nicholson derive it from Neo-Platonism; -while Professor Browne once regarded it as Aryan reaction against an -unemotional semitic religion. It appears to me, however, that these -theories have been worked out under the influence of a notion of -causation which is essentially false. That a fixed quantity A is the -cause of, or produces another fixed quantity B, is a proposition which, -though convenient for scientific purposes, is apt to damage all inquiry, -in so far as it leads us completely to ignore the innumerable conditions -lying at the back of a phenomenon. It would, for instance, be an -historical error to say that the dissolution of the Roman Empire was due -to the barbarian invasions. The statement completely ignores other -forces of a different character that tended to split up the political -unity of the Empire. To describe the advent of barbarian invasions as -the cause of the dissolution of the Roman Empire which could have -assimilated, as it actually did to a certain extent, the so-called -cause, is a procedure that no logic would justify. Let us, therefore, in -the light of a truer theory of causation, enumerate the principal -political, social, and intellectual conditions of Islamic life about the -end of the 8{th} and the first half of the 9{th} century when, properly -speaking, the Sufi ideal of life came into existence, to be soon -followed by a philosophical justification of that ideal.-- - -(1). When we study the history of the time, we find it to be a time of -more or less political unrest. The latter half of the 8{th} century -presents, besides the political revolution which resulted in the -overthrow of the Umayyads (749 A.D.), persecutions of Zendiks, and -revolts of Persian heretics (Sindbah 755-6; Ustadhis 766-8; the veiled -prophet of Khurasan 777-80) who, working on the credulity of the -people, cloaked, like Lamennais in our own times, political projects -under the guise of religious ideas. Later on in the beginning of the -9{th} century we find the sons of Harun (Ma'mun and Amin) engaged in a -terrible conflict for political supremacy; and still later, we see the -Golden Age of Islamic literature seriously disturbed by the persistent -revolt of the Mazdakite Babak (816-838). The early years of Ma'mun's -reign present another social phenomenon of great political -significance--the Shu`ubiyya controversy (815), which progresses with -the rise and establishment of independent Persian families, the Tahirid -(820), the Saffarid (868), and the Samanid Dynasty (874). It is, -therefore, the combined force of these and other conditions of a similar -nature that contributed to drive away spirits of devotional character -from the scene of continual unrest to the blissful peace of an -ever-deepening contemplative life. The semitic character of the life and -thought of these early Muhammadan ascetics is gradually followed by a -large hearted pantheism of a more or less Aryan stamp, the development -of which, in fact, runs parallel to the slowly progressing political -independence of Persia. - -(2). _The Sceptical tendencies of Islamic Rationalism_ which found an -early expression in the poems of Bashshar ibn Burd--the blind -Persian Sceptic who deified fire, and scoffed at all non-Persian modes -of thought. The germs of Scepticism latent in Rationalism ultimately -necessitated an appeal to a super-intellectual source of knowledge which -asserted itself in the Risala of Al-Qushairi (986). In our own times -the negative results of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason drove Jacobi and -Schleiermacher to base faith on the feeling of the reality of the ideal; -and to the 19{th} century sceptic Wordsworth uncovered that mysterious -state of mind "in which we grow all spirit and see into the life of -things". - -(3). The unemotional piety of the various schools of Islam--the Hanafite -(Abu Hanifa d. 767), the Shafiite (Al-Shafi`i d. 820), the Malikite -(Al-Malik d. 795), and the anthropomorphic Hambalite (Ibn Hambal d. -855)--the bitterest enemy of independent thought--which ruled the masses -after the death of Al-Ma'mun. - -(4). The religious discussions among the representatives of various -creeds encouraged by Al-Ma'mun, and especially the bitter theological -controversy between the Ash`arites, and the advocates of Rationalism -which tended not only to confine religion within the narrow limits of -schools, but also stirred up the spirit to rise above all petty -sectarian wrangling. - -(5). The gradual softening of religious fervency due to the -rationalistic tendency of the early `Abbasid period, and the rapid -growth of wealth which tended to produce moral laxity and indifference -to religious life in the upper circles of Islam. - -(6). The presence of Christianity as a working ideal of life. It was, -however, principally the actual life of the Christian hermit rather than -his religious ideas, that exercised the greatest fascination over the -minds of early Islamic Saints whose complete unworldliness, though -extremely charming in itself, is, I believe, quite contrary to the -spirit of Islam. - -Such was principally the environment of Sufiism, and it is to the -combined action of the above condition that we should look for the -origin and development of Sufiistic ideas. Given these condition and the -Persian mind with an almost innate tendency towards monism, the whole -phenomenon of the birth and growth of Sufiism is explained. If we now -study the principal pre-existing conditions of Neo-Platonism, we find -that similar conditions produced similar results. The barbarian raids -which were soon to reduce Emperors of the Palace to Emperors of the -Camp, assumed a more serious aspect about the middle of the third -century. Plotinus himself speaks of the political unrest of his time in -one of his letters to Flaccus.[102:1] When he looked round himself in -Alexandria, his birth place, he noticed signs of growing toleration and -indifferentism towards religious life. Later on in Rome which had -become, so to say, a pantheon of different nations, he found a similar -want of seriousness in life, a similar laxity of character in the upper -classes of society. In more learned circles philosophy was studied as a -branch of literature rather than for its own sake; and Sextus Empiricus, -provoked by Antiochus's tendency to fuse scepticism and Stoicism was -teaching the old unmixed scepticism of Pyrrho--that intellectual despair -which drove Plotinus to find truth in a revelation above thought itself. -Above all, the hard unsentimental character of Stoic morality, and the -loving piety of the followers of Christ who, undaunted by long and -fierce persecutions, were preaching the message of peace and love to the -whole Roman world, necessitated a restatement of Pagan thought in a way -that might revivify the older ideals of life, and suit the new spiritual -requirements of the people. But the ethical force of Christianity was -too great for Neo-Platonism which, on account of its more -metaphysical[103:1] character, had no message for the people at large, -and was consequently inaccessible to the rude barbarian who, being -influenced by the actual life of the persecuted Christian adopted -Christianity, and settled down to construct new empires out of the ruins -of the old. In Persia the influence of culture-contacts and -cross-fertilisation of ideas created in certain minds a vague desire to -realise a similar restatement of Islam, which gradually assimilated -Christian ideals as well as Christian Gnostic speculation, and found a -firm foundation in the Qur'an. The flower of Greek Thought faded away -before the breath of Christianity; but the burning simoon of Ibn -Taimiyya's invective could not touch the freshness of the Persian rose. -The one was completely swept away by the flood of barbarian invasions; -the other, unaffected by the Tartar revolution, still holds its own. - - [102:1] "Tidings have reached us that Valerian has been - defeated, and is now in the hands of Sapor. The threats of - Franks and Allemanni, of Goths and Persians, are alike terrible - by turns to our _degenerate_ Rome." (Plotinus to Flaccus; quoted - by Vaughan in his Half hours with Mystics, p. 63.) - - [103:1] The element of ecstacy which could have appealed to some - minds was thrown into the background by the later teachers of - Neo-Platonism, so that it became a mere system of thought having - no human interest. Says Whittaker:--"The mystical ecstacy was - not found by the later teachers of the school easier to attain, - but more difficult; and the tendency became more and more to - regard it as all but unattainable on earth." Neo-Platonism, p. - 101. - -This extraordinary vitality of the Sufi restatement of Islam, however, -is explained when we reflect on the all-embracing structure of Sufiism. -The semitic formula of salvation can be briefly stated in the words, -"Transform your will",--which signifies that the Semite looks upon will -as the essence of the human soul. The Indian Vedantist, on the other -hand, teaches that all pain is due to our mistaken attitude towards -the Universe. He, therefore, commands us to transform our -understanding--implying thereby that the essential nature of man -consists in thought, not activity or will. But the Sufi holds that the -mere transformation of will or understanding will not bring peace; we -should bring about the transformation of both by a complete -transformation of feeling, of which will and understanding are only -specialised forms. His message to the individual is--"Love all, and -forget your own individuality in doing good to others." Says Rumi:--"To -win other people's hearts is the greatest pilgrimage; and one heart is -worth more than a thousand Ka`bahs. Ka`bah is a mere cottage of Abraham; -but the heart is the very home of God." But this formula demands a _why_ -and a _how_--a metaphysical justification of the ideal in order to -satisfy the understanding; and rules of action in order to guide the -will. Sufiism furnishes both. Semitic religion is a code of strict rules -of conduct; the Indian Vedanta, on the other hand, is a cold system of -thought. Sufiism avoids their incomplete Psychology, and attempts to -synthesise both the Semitic and the Aryan formulas in the higher -category of Love. On the one hand it assimilates the Buddhistic idea of -Nirwana (Fana-Annihilation), and seeks to build a metaphysical system in -the light of this idea; on the other hand it does not disconnect itself -from Islam, and finds the justification of its view of the Universe in -the Qur'an. Like the geographical position of its home, it stands midway -between the Semitic and the Aryan, assimilating ideas from both sides, -and giving them the stamp of its own individuality which, on the whole, -is more Aryan than Semitic in character. It would, therefore, be evident -that the secret of the vitality of Sufiism is the complete view of human -nature upon which it is based. It has survived orthodox persecutions and -political revolutions, because it appeals to human nature in its -entirety; and, while it concentrates its interest chiefly in a _life_ of -self-denial, it allows free play to the speculative tendency as well. - -I will now briefly indicate how Sufi writers justify their views from -the Quranic standpoint. There is no historical evidence to show that the -Prophet of Arabia actually communicated certain esoteric doctrines to -`Ali or Abu Bakr. The Sufi, however, contends that the Prophet had an -esoteric teaching--"wisdom"--as distinguished from the teaching -contained in the Book, and he brings forward the following verse to -substantiate his case:--"As we have sent a prophet to you from among -yourselves who reads our verses to you, purifies you, teaches you the -Book and the _Wisdom_, and teaches you _what you did not know -before_."[107:1] He holds that "the wisdom" spoken of in the verse, is -something not incorporated in the teaching of the Book which, as the -Prophet repeatedly declared, had been taught by several prophets before -him. If, he says, the wisdom is included in the Book, the word "Wisdom" -in the verse would be redundant. It can, I think, be easily shown that -in the Qur'an as well as in the authenticated traditions, there are -germs of Sufi doctrine which, owing to the thoroughly practical genius -of the Arabs, could not develop and fructify in Arabia, but which grew -up into a distinct doctrine when they found favourable circumstances in -alien soils. The Qur'an thus defines the Muslims:--"Those who believe in -the Unseen, establish daily prayer, and spend out of what We have given -them."[108:1] But the question arises as to the _what_ and the _where_ -of the Unseen. The Qur'an replies that the Unseen is in your own -soul--"And in the earth there are signs to those who believe, and in -yourself,--what! do you not then see!"[108:2] And again--"We are nigher -to him (man) than his own jugular vein."[108:3] Similarly the Holy Book -teaches that the essential nature of the Unseen is pure light--"God is -the light of heavens and earth."[108:4] As regards the question whether -this Primal Light is personal, the Qur'an, in spite of many expressions -signifying personality, declares in a few words--"There is nothing like -him."[108:5] - - [107:1] Sura 2, v. 146. - - [108:1] Sura 2, v. 2. - - [108:2] Sura 51, v. 20, 21. - - [108:3] Sura 50, v. 15. - - [108:4] Sura 24, v. 35. - - [108:5] Sura 42, v. 9. - -These are some of the chief verses out of which the various Sufi -commentators develop pantheistic views of the Universe. They enumerate -the following four stages of spiritual training through which the -soul--the order or reason of the Primal Light--("Say that the soul is -the order or reason of God.")[109:1] has to pass, if it desires to rise -above the common herd, and realise its union or identity with the -ultimate source of all things:-- - -(1). Belief in the Unseen. - -(2). Search after the Unseen. The spirit of inquiry leaves its slumber -by observing the marvellous phenomena of nature. "Look at the camel how -it is created; the skies how they are exalted; the mountains how they -are unshakeably fixed."[109:2] - -(3). The knowledge of the Unseen. This comes, as we have indicated -above, by looking into the depths of our own soul. - -(4). The Realisation--This results, according to the higher Sufiism -from the constant practice of Justice and Charity--"Verily God bids you -do justice and good, and give to kindred (their due), and He forbids you -to sin, and do wrong, and oppress".[110:1] - - [109:1] Sura 17; v. 87. - - [109:2] Sura 88; v. 20. - - [110:1] Sura 16; v. 92. - -It must, however, be remembered that some later Sufi fraternities (e.g. -Naqshbandi) devised, or rather borrowed[110:2] from the Indian -Vedantist, other means of bringing about this Realisation. They taught, -imitating the Hindu doctrine of Kundalini, that there are six great -centres of light of various colours in the body of man. It is the object -of the Sufi to make them move, or to use the technical word, "current" -by certain methods of meditation, and eventually to realise, amidst the -apparent diversity of colours, the fundamental colourless light which -makes everything visible, and is itself invisible. The continual -movement of these centres of light through the body, and the final -realisation of their identity, which results from putting the atoms of -the body into definite courses of motion by slow repetition of the -various names of God and other mysterious expressions, illuminates the -whole body of the Sufi; and the perception of the same illumination in -the external world completely extinguishes the sense of "otherness." The -fact that these methods were known to the Persian Sufis misled Von -Kremer who ascribed the whole phenomenon of Sufiism to the influence of -Vedantic ideas. Such methods of contemplation are quite unislamic in -character, and the higher Sufis do not attach any importance to them. - - [110:2] Weber makes the following statement on the authority of - Lassen:--"Al-Biruni translated Patanjali's work into Arabic at - the beginning of the 11th century, and also, it would appear, - the Sankhya sutra, though the information we have as to the - contents of these works does not harmonise with the Sanskrit - originals." History of Indian Literature, p. 239. - - -§ II. - -Aspects of Sufi-Metaphysics. - -Let us now return to the various schools or rather the various aspects -of Sufi Metaphysics. A careful investigation of Sufi literature shows -that Sufiism has looked at the Ultimate Reality from three standpoints -which, in fact, do not exclude but complement each other. Some Sufis -conceive the essential nature of reality as self-conscious will, others -beauty; others again hold that Reality is essentially Thought, Light or -Knowledge. There are, therefore, three aspects of Sufi thought:-- - -A. _Reality as Self-conscious Will._ - -The first in historical order is that represented by Shaqiq Balkhi, -Ibrahim Adham, Rabi`a, and others. This school conceives the ultimate -reality as "Will", and the Universe a finite activity of that will. It -is essentially monotheistic and consequently more semitic in character. -It is not the desire of Knowledge which dominates the ideal of the Sufis -of this school, but the characteristic features of their life are piety, -unworldliness, and an intense longing for God due to the consciousness -of sin. Their object is not to philosophise, but principally to work out -a certain ideal of life. From our standpoint, therefore, they are not of -much importance. - -B. _Reality as Beauty._ - -In the beginning of the 9{th} century Ma`ruf Karkhi defined Sufiism -as "Apprehension of Divine realities"[113:1]--a definition which marks -the movement from Faith to Knowledge. But the method of apprehending the -ultimate reality was formally stated by Al-Qushairi about the end of -the 10{th} century. The teachers of this school adopted the Neo-Platonic -idea of creation by intermediary agencies; and though this idea lingered -in the minds of Sufi writers for a long time, yet their Pantheism led -them to abandon the Emanation theory altogether. Like Avicenna they -looked upon the ultimate Reality as "Eternal Beauty" whose very nature -consists in seeing its own "face" reflected in the Universe-mirror. The -Universe, therefore, became to them a reflected image of the "Eternal -Beauty", and not an emanation as the Neo-Platonists had taught. The -cause of creation, says Mir Sayyid Sharif, is the manifestation of -Beauty, and the first creation is Love. The realisation of this Beauty, -is brought about by universal love, which the innate Zoroastrian -instinct of the Persian Sufi loved to define as "the Sacred Fire which -burns up everything other than God." Says Rumi:-- - - "O thou pleasant madness, Love! - Thou Physician of all our ills! - Thou healer of pride, - Thou Plato and Galen of our souls!"[114:1] - - [113:1] Mr. Nicholson has collected the various definitions of - Sufiism. See J. R. A. S. April, 1906. - - [114:1] Mathnawi, Jalal al Din Rumi, with Bahral `ulum's - Commentary. Lucknow (India), 1877, p. 9. - -As a direct consequence of such a view of the Universe, we have the idea -of impersonal absorption which first appears in Bayazid of Bistam, and -which constitutes the characteristic feature of the later development of -this school. The growth of this idea may have been influenced by Hindu -pilgrims travelling through Persia to the Buddhistic temple still -existing at Baku.[114:2] The school became wildly pantheistic in Husain -Mansur who, in the true spirit of the Indian Vedantist, cried out, "I am -God"--Aham Brahma asmi. - - [114:2] As regards the progress of Buddhism Geiger says:--"We - know that in the period after Alexander, Buddhism was powerful - in Eastern Iran, and that it counted its confessors as far as - Tabaristan. It is especially certain that many Buddhistic - priests were found in Bactria. This state of things, which began - perhaps in the first century before Christ, lasted till the - 7{th} century A.D., when the appearance of Islamism alone cut - short the development of Buddhism in Kabul and Bactria, and it - is in that period that we will have to place the rise of the - Zarathushtra legend in the form in which it is presented to us - by Daqiqi." - - Civilisation of Eastern Iranians - Vol. II, p. 170. - -The ultimate Reality or Eternal Beauty, according to the Sufis of this -school, is infinite in the sense that "it is absolutely free from the -limitations of beginning, end, right, left, above, and below."[115:1] -The distinction of essence and attribute does not exist in the -Infinite--"Substance and quality are really identical."[115:2] We have -indicated above that nature is the mirror of the Absolute Existence. But -according to Nasafi, there are two kinds of mirrors[115:3]-- - -(a). That which shows merely a reflected image--this is external nature. - -(b). That which shows the real Essence--this is man who is a limitation -of the Absolute, and erroneously thinks himself to be an independent -entity. - - [115:1] Nasafi's Maqsadi Aqsa: fol. 8b. - - [115:2] Nasafi's Maqsadi Aqsa: fol. 10b. - - [115:3] Nasafi's Maqsadi Aqsa: fol. 23b. - -"O Derwish!" says Nasafi "dost thou think that thy existence is -independent of God? This is a great error."[116:1] Nasafi explains his -meaning by a beautiful parable.[116:2] The fishes in a certain tank -realised that they lived, moved, and had their being in water, but felt -that they were quite ignorant of the real nature of what constituted the -very source of their life. They resorted to a wiser fish in a great -river, and the Philosopher-fish addressed them thus:-- - -"O you who endeavour to untie the knot (of being)! You are born in -union, yet die in the thought of an unreal separation. Thirsty on the -sea-shore! Dying penniless while master of the treasure!" - - [116:1] Nasafi's Maqsadi Aqsa: fol. 3b. - - [116:2] Nasafi's Maqsadi Aqsa: fol. 15b. - -All feeling of separation, therefore, is ignorance; and all "otherness" -is a mere appearance, a dream, a shadow--a differentiation born of -relation essential to the self-recognition of the Absolute. The great -prophet of this school is "The excellent Rumi" as Hegel calls him. He -took up the old Neo-Platonic idea of the Universal soul working through -the various spheres of being, and expressed it in a way so modern in -spirit that Clodd introduces the passage in his "Story of Creation". I -venture to quote this famous passage in order to show how successfully -the poet anticipates the modern concept of evolution, which he regarded -as the realistic side of his Idealism. - - First man appeared in the clan of inorganic things, - Next he passed therefrom into that of plants. - For years he lived as one of the plants, - Remembering nought of his inorganic state so different; - And when he passed from the vegetive to the animal state, - He had no remembrance of his state as a plant, - Except the inclination he felt to the world of plants, - Especially at the time of spring and sweet flowers; - Like the inclination of infants towards their mothers, - Which know not the cause of their inclination to the breast. - Again the great creator as you know, - Drew man out of the animal into the human state. - Thus man passed from one order of nature to another, - Till he became wise and knowing and strong as he is now. - Of his first soul he has now no remembrance, - And he will be again changed from his present soul. - - (Mathnawi Book IV). - -It would now be instructive if we compare this aspect of Sufi thought -with the fundamental ideas of Neo-Platonism. The God of Neo-Platonism is -immanent as well as transcendant. "As being the cause of all things, it -is everywhere. As being other than all things, it is nowhere. If it were -only "everywhere", and not also "nowhere", it would _be_ all -things."[118:1] The Sufi, however, tersely says that God _is_ all -things. The Neo-Platonist allows a certain permanence or fixity to -matter;[118:2] but the Sufis of the school in question, regard all -empirical experience as a kind of dreaming. Life in limitation, they -say, is sleep; death brings the awakening. It is, however, the doctrine -of Impersonal immortality--"genuinely eastern in spirit"--which -distinguishes this school from Neo-Platonism. "Its (Arabian Philosophy) -distinctive doctrine", says Whittaker, "of an Impersonal immortality of -the general human intellect is, however, as contrasted with -Aristotelianism and Neo-Platonism, essentially original." - - [118:1] Whittaker's Neo-Platonism, p. 58. - - [118:2] Whittaker's Neo-Platonism, p. 57. - -The above brief exposition shows that there are three basic ideas of -this mode of thought:-- - -(a). That the ultimate Reality is knowable through a supersensual state -of consciousness. - -(b). That the ultimate Reality is impersonal. - -(c). That the ultimate Reality is one. - -Corresponding to these ideas we have: - -(I). The Agnostic reaction as manifested in the Poet `Umar Khayyam -(12{th} century) who cried out in his intellectual despair:-- - - The joyous souls who quaff potations deep, - And saints who in the mosque sad vigils keep, - Are lost at sea alike, and find no shore, - One only wakes, all others are asleep. - -(II). The monotheistic reaction of Ibn Taimiyya and his followers in the -13{th} century. - -(III). The Pluralistic reaction of Wahid Mahmud[119:1] in the 13{th} -century. - - [119:1] Dabistan, Chap: 8. - -Speaking from a purely philosophical standpoint, the last movement is -most interesting. The history of Thought illustrates the operation of -certain general laws of progress which are true of the intellectual -annals of different peoples. The German systems of monistic thought -invoked the pluralism of Herbart; while the pantheism of Spinoza called -forth the monadism of Leibniz. The operation of the same law led Wahid -Mahmud to deny the truth of contemporary monism, and declare that -Reality is not one but many. Long before Leibniz he taught that the -Universe is a combination of what he called "Afrad"--essential units, or -simple atoms which have existed from all eternity, and are endowed with -life. The law of the Universe is an ascending perfection of elemental -matter, continually passing from lower to higher forms determined by the -kind of food which the fundamental units assimilate. Each period of his -cosmogony comprises 8,000 years, and after eight such periods the world -is decomposed, and the units re-combine to construct a new universe. -Wahid Mahmud succeeded in founding a sect which was cruelly persecuted, -and finally stamped out of existence by Shah `Abbas. It is said that -the poet Hafiz of Shiraz believed in the tenets of this sect. - - -C. _Reality as Light or Thought._ - -The third great school of Sufiism conceives Reality as essentially Light -or Thought, the very nature of which demands something to be thought or -illuminated. While the preceding school abandoned Neo-Platonism, this -school transformed it into new systems. There are, however, two aspects -of the metaphysics of this school. The one is genuinely Persian in -spirit, the other is chiefly influenced by Christian modes of thought. -Both agree in holding that the fact of empirical diversity necessitates -a principle of difference in the nature of the ultimate Reality. I now -proceed to consider them in their historical order. - - -I. Reality as Light--Al-Ishraqi. - -Return to Persian Dualism. - -The application of Greek dialectic to Islamic Theology aroused that -spirit of critical examination which began with Al-Ash`ari, and found -its completest expression in the scepticism of Al-Ghazali. Even among -the Rationalists there were some more critical minds--such as -Nazzam--whose attitude towards Greek Philosophy was not one of servile -submission, but of independent criticism. The defenders of -dogma--Al-Ghazali, Al-Razi, Abul Barakat, and Al-Amidi, carried on a -persistent attack on the whole fabric of Greek Philosophy; while Abu -Sa`id Sairafi, Qadi `Abdal Jabbar, Abul Ma`ali, Abul Qasim, and finally -the acute Ibn Taimiyya, actuated by similar theological motives, -continued to expose the inherent weakness of Greek Logic. In their -criticism of Greek Philosophy, these thinkers were supplemented by some -of the more learned Sufis, such as Shahabal Din Suhrawardi, who -endeavoured to substantiate the helplessness of pure reason by his -refutation of Greek thought in a work entitled, "The unveiling of Greek -absurdities". The Ash`arite reaction against Rationalism resulted not -only in the development of a system of metaphysics most modern in some -of its aspects, but also in completely breaking asunder the worn out -fetters of intellectual thraldom. Erdmann[122:1] seems to think that the -speculative spirit among the Muslims exhausted itself with Al-Farabi and -Avicenna, and that after them Philosophy became bankrupt in passing over -into scepticism and mysticism. Evidently he ignores the Muslim criticism -of Greek Philosophy which led to the Ash`arite Idealism on the one -hand, and a genuine Persian reconstruction on the other. That a system -of thoroughly Persian character might be possible, the destruction of -foreign thought, or rather the weakening of its hold on the mind, was -indispensable. The Ash`arite and other defenders of Islamic Dogma -completed the destruction; Al-Ishraqi--the child of emancipation--came -forward to build a new edifice of thought; though, in his process of -reconstruction, he did not entirely repudiate the older material. His is -the genuine Persian brain which, undaunted by the threats of narrow -minded authority, asserts its right of free independent speculation. In -his philosophy the old Iranian tradition, which had found only a partial -expression in the writings of the Physician Al-Razi, Al-Ghazali, and -the Isma`ilia sect, endeavours to come to a final understanding with the -philosophy of his predecessors and the theology of Islam. - - [122:1] Vol. I, p. 367. - -Shaikh Shahabal Din Suhrawardi, known as Shaikhal Ishraq Maqtul -was born about the middle of the 12{th} century. He studied philosophy -with Majd Jili--the teacher of the commentator Al-Razi--and, while -still a youth, stood unrivalled as a thinker in the whole Islamic world. -His great admirer Al-Malik-al-Zahir--the son of Sultan Salah-al -Din--invited him to Aleppo, where the youthful philosopher expounded his -independent opinions in a way that aroused the bitter jealousy of -contemporary theologians. These hired slaves of bloodthirsty Dogmatism -which, conscious of its inherent weakness, has always managed to keep -brute force behind its back, wrote to Sultan Salah-al Din, that the -Shaikh's teaching was a danger to Islam, and that it was necessary, -in the interest of the Faith, to nip the evil in the bud. The Sultan -consented; and there, at the early age of 36, the young Persian thinker -calmly met the blow which made him a martyr of truth, and immortalised -his name for ever. Murderers have passed away, but the philosophy, the -price of which was paid in blood, still lives, and attracts many an -earnest seeker after truth. - -The principal features of the founder of the Ishraqi Philosophy are -his intellectual independence, the skill with which he weaves his -materials into a systematic whole, and above all his faithfulness to -the philosophic traditions of his country. In many fundamental points he -differs from Plato, and freely criticises Aristotle whose philosophy he -looks upon as a mere preparation for his own system of thought. Nothing -escapes his criticism. Even the logic of Aristotle, he subjects to a -searching examination, and shows the hollowness of some of its -doctrines. Definition, for instance, is genus plus differentia, -according to Aristotle. But Al-Ishraqi holds that the distinctive -attribute of the thing defined, which cannot be predicated of any other -thing, will bring us no knowledge of the thing. We define "horse" as a -neighing animal. Now we understand animality, because we know many -animals in which this attribute exists; but it is impossible to -understand the attribute "neighing", since it is found nowhere except in -the thing defined. The ordinary definition of horse, therefore, would be -meaningless to a man who has never seen a horse. Aristotelian -definition, as a scientific principle is quite useless. This criticism -leads the Shaikh, to a standpoint very similar to that of Bosanquet -who defines definition, as "Summation of qualities". The Shaikh -holds that a true definition would enumerate all the essential -attributes which, taken collectively, exist nowhere except the thing -defined, though they may individually exist in other things. - -But let us turn to his system of metaphysics, and estimate the worth of -his contribution to the thought of his country. In order fully to -comprehend the purely intellectual side of Transcendental philosophy, -the student, says the Shaikh, must be thoroughly acquainted with -Aristotelian philosophy, Logic, Mathematics, and Sufiism. His mind -should be completely free from the taint of prejudice and sin, so that -he may gradually develop that inner sense, which verifies and corrects -what intellect understands only as theory. Unaided reason is -untrustworthy; it must always be supplemented by "Dhauq"--the -mysterious perception of the essence of things--which brings knowledge -and peace to the restless soul, and disarms Scepticism for ever. We are, -however, concerned with the purely speculative side of this spiritual -experience--the results of the inner perception as formulated and -systematised by discursive thought. Let us, therefore, examine the -various aspects of the Ishraqi Philosophy--Ontology, Cosmology, and -Psychology. - - -Ontology. - -The ultimate principle of all existence is "Nur-i-Qahir"--the Primal -Absolute Light whose essential nature consists in perpetual -illumination. "Nothing is more visible than light, and visibility does -not stand in need of any definition."[127:1] The essence of Light, -therefore, is manifestation. For if manifestation is an attribute -superadded to light, it would follow that in itself light possesses no -visibility, and becomes visible only through something else visible in -itself; and from this again follows the absurd consequence, that -something other than light is more visible than light. The Primal Light, -therefore, has no reason of its existence beyond itself. All that is -other than this original principle is dependent, contingent, possible. -The "not-light" (darkness) is not something distinct proceeding from an -independent source. It is an error of the representatives of the Magian -religion to suppose that Light and Darkness are two distinct realities -created by two distinct creative agencies. The ancient Philosophers of -Persia were not dualists like the Zoroastrian priests who, on the ground -of the principle that the one cannot cause to emanate from itself more -than one, assigned two independent sources to Light and Darkness. The -relation between them is not that of contrariety, but of existence and -non-existence. The affirmation of Light necessarily posits its own -negation--Darkness which it must illuminate in order to be itself. This -Primordial Light is the source of all motion. But its motion is not -change of place; it is due to the _love_ of illumination which -constitutes its very essence, and stirs it up, as it were, to quicken -all things into life, by pouring out its own rays into their being. The -number of illuminations which proceed from it is infinite. Illuminations -of intenser brightness become, in their turn, the sources of other -illuminations; and the scale of brightness gradually descends to -illuminations too faint to beget other illuminations. All these -illuminations are mediums, or in the language of Theology, angels -through whom the infinite varieties of being receive life and sustenance -from the Primal Light. The followers of Aristotle erroneously restricted -the number of original Intellects to ten. They likewise erred in -enumerating the categories of thought. The possibilities of the Primal -Light are infinite; and the Universe, with all its variety, is only a -partial expression of the infinitude behind it. The categories of -Aristotle, therefore, are only relatively true. It is impossible for -human thought to comprehend within its tiny grasp, all the infinite -variety of ideas according to which the Primal Light does or may -illuminate that which is not light. We can, however, discriminate -between the following two illuminations of the original Light:-- - - [127:1] Sharh Anwariyya--Al-Harawi's commentary on - Al-Ishraqi's Hikmat al-Ishraq, fol. 10a. - -(1). The Abstract Light (e.g. Intellect Universal as well as -individual). It has no form, and never becomes the attribute of anything -other than itself (Substance). From it proceed all the various forms of -partly-conscious, conscious, or self-conscious light, differing from one -another in the amount of lustre, which is determined by their -comparative nearness or distance from the ultimate source of their -being. The individual intellect or soul is only a fainter copy, or a -more distant reflection of the Primal Light. The Abstract Light knows -itself through itself, and does not stand in need of a non-ego to reveal -its own existence to itself. Consciousness or self-knowledge, therefore, -is the very essense of Abstract light, as distinguished from the -negation of light. - -(2). The Accidental light (Attribute)--the light that has a form, and is -capable of becoming an attribute of something other than itself (e.g. -the light of the stars, or the visibility of other bodies). The -Accidental light, or more properly sensible light, is a distant -reflection of the Abstract light, which, because of its distance, has -lost the intensity, or substance-character of its parent. The process of -continuous reflection is really a softening process; successive -illuminations gradually lose their intensity until, in the chain of -reflections, we reach certain less intense illuminations which entirely -lose their independent character, and cannot exist except in -association with something else. These illuminations form the Accidental -light--the attribute which has no independent existence. The relation, -therefore, between the Accidental and the Abstract light is that of -cause and effect. The effect, however, is not something quite distinct -from its cause; it is a transformation, or a weaker form of the supposed -cause itself. Anything other than the Abstract light (e.g. the nature of -the illuminated body itself) cannot be the cause of the Accidental -light; since the latter, being merely contingent and consequently -capable of being negatived, can be taken away from bodies, without -affecting their character. If the essence or nature of the illuminated -body, had been the cause of the Accidental light, such a process of -disillumination could not have been possible. We cannot conceive an -inactive cause.[131:1] - - [131:1] Sharh Anwariyya fol. 11b. - -It is now obvious that the Shaikh al-Ishraq agrees with the -Ash`arite thinkers in holding that there is no such thing as the Prima -Materia of Aristotle; though he recognises the existence of a necessary -negation of Light--darkness, the object of illumination. He further -agrees with them in teaching the relativity of all categories except -Substance and Quality. But he corrects their theory of knowledge, in so -far as he recognises an active element in human knowledge. Our relation -with the objects of our knowledge is not merely a passive relation; the -individual soul, being itself an illumination, illuminates the object in -the act of knowledge. The Universe to him is one great process of active -illumination; but, from a purely intellectual standpoint, this -illumination is only a partial expression of the infinitude of the -Primal Light, which may illuminate according to other laws not known to -us. The categories of thought are infinite; our intellect works with a -few only. The Shaikh, therefore, from the standpoint of discursive -thought, is not far from modern Humanism. - - -Cosmology. - -All that is "not-light" is, what the Ishraqi thinkers call, "Absolute -quantity", or "Absolute matter". It is only another aspect of the -affirmation of light, and not an independent principle, as the -followers of Aristotle erroneously hold. The experimental fact of the -transformation of the primary elements into one another, points to this -fundamental Absolute matter which, with its various degrees of -grossness, constitutes the various spheres of material being. The -absolute ground of all things, then, is divided into two kinds:-- - -(1). That which is beyond space--the obscure substance or atoms -(essences of the Ash`arite). - -(2). That which is necessarily in space--forms of darkness, e.g. weight, -smell, taste, etc. - -The combination of these two particularises the Absolute matter. A -material body is forms of darkness plus obscure substance, made visible -or illuminated by the Abstract light. But what is the cause of the -various forms of darkness? These, like the forms of light, owe their -existence to the Abstract light, the different illuminations of which -cause diversity in the spheres of being. The forms which make bodies -differ from one another, do not exist in the nature of the Absolute -matter. The Absolute quantity and the Absolute matter being identical, -if these forms do exist in the essence of the Absolute matter, all -bodies would be identical in regard to the forms of darkness. This, -however, is contradicted by daily experience. The cause of the forms of -darkness, therefore, is not the Absolute matter. And as the difference -of forms cannot be assigned to any other cause, it follows that they are -due to the various illuminations of the Abstract light. Forms of light -and darkness both owe their existence to the Abstract Light. The third -element of a material body--the obscure atom or essence--is nothing but -a necessary aspect of the affirmation of light. The body as a whole, -therefore, is completely dependent on the Primal Light. The whole -Universe is really a continuous series of circles of existence, all -depending on the original Light. Those nearer to the source receive more -illumination than those more distant. All varieties of existence in each -circle, and the circles themselves, are illuminated through an infinite -number of medium-illuminations, which preserve some forms of existence -by the help of "conscious light" (as in the case of man, animal and -plant), and some without it (as in the case of minerals and primary -elements). The immense panorama of diversity which we call the Universe, -is, therefore, a vast shadow of the infinite variety in intensity of -direct or indirect illuminations and rays of the Primary Light. Things -are, so to speak, fed by their respective illuminations to which they -constantly move, with a lover's passion, in order to drink more and more -of the original fountain of Light. The world is an eternal drama of -love. The different planes of being are as follow:-- - - The Plane + 1. The Plane of Intellects--the - of Primal | parent of the heavens, - Light. | 2. The Plane of the Soul. - + 3. The Plane of Form. - | - | + 1. The Plane + 1. The Plane of - | | of ideal | the heavens. - +----+ form. ------------+ - | 2. The Plane | 2. The Plane of - | of material + the elements:-- - + forms:-- - - (a). The heavens (a). Simple elements. - (b). The elements:-- (b). Compounds:-- - 1. Simple elements I. Mineral kingdom. - 2. Compounds:-- II. Vegetable kingdom. - I. Mineral kingdom. III. Animal kingdom. - II. Vegetable kingdom. - III. Animal kingdom. - -Having briefly indicated the general nature of Being, we now proceed to -a more detailed examination of the world-process. All that is not-light -is divided into:-- - -(1). Eternal e.g., Intellects, Souls of heavenly bodies, heavens, simple -elements, time, motion. - -(2). Contingent e.g., Compounds of various elements. The motion of the -heavens is eternal, and makes up the various cycles of the Universe. It -is due to the intense longing of the heaven-soul to receive illumination -from the source of all light. The matter of which the heavens are -constructed, is completely free from the operation of chemical -processes, incidental to the grosser forms of the not-light. Every -heaven has its own matter peculiar to it alone. Likewise the heavens -differ from one another in the direction of their motion; and the -difference is explained by the fact that the beloved, or the sustaining -illumination, is different in each case. Motion is only an aspect of -time. It is the summing up of the elements of time, which, as -externalised, is motion. The distinction of past, present, and future -is made only for the sake of convenience, and does not exist in the -nature of time.[137:1] We cannot conceive the beginning of time; for the -supposed beginning would be a point of time itself. Time and motion, -therefore, are both eternal. - - [137:1] Sharh Anwariyya fol. 34a. - -There are three primordial elements--water, earth, and wind. Fire, -according to the Ishraqis, is only burning wind. The combinations of -these elements, under various heavenly influences, assume various -forms--fluidity, gaseousness, solidity. This transformation of the -original elements, constitutes the process of "making and unmaking" -which pervades the entire sphere of the not-light, raising the different -forms of existence higher and higher, and bringing them nearer and -nearer to the illuminating forces. All the phenomena of nature--rain, -clouds, thunder, meteor--are the various workings of this immanent -principle of motion, and are explained by the direct or indirect -operation of the Primal Light on things, which differ from one another -in their capacity of receiving more or less illumination. The Universe, -in one word, is a petrified desire; a crystallised longing after light. - -But is it eternal? The Universe is a manifestation of the illuminative -Power which constitutes the essential nature of the Primal Light. In so -far, therefore, as it is a manifestation, it is only a dependent being, -and consequently not eternal. But in another sense it is eternal. All -the different spheres of being exist by the illuminations and rays of -the Eternal light. There are some illuminations which are directly -eternal; while there are other fainter ones, the appearance of which -depends on the combination of other illuminations and rays. The -existence of these is not eternal in the same sense as the existence of -the pre-existing parent illuminations. The existence of colour, for -instance, is contingent in comparison to that of the ray, which -manifests colour when a dark body is brought before an illuminating -body. The Universe, therefore, though contingent as manifestation, is -eternal by the eternal character of its source. Those who hold the -non-eternity of the Universe argue on the assumption of the possibility -of a complete induction. Their argument proceeds in the following -manner:-- - -(1). Everyone of the Abyssinians is black. - -.*. All Abyssinians are black. - -(2). Every motion began at a definite moment. - -.*. All motion must begin so. - -But this mode of argumentation is vicious. It is quite impossible to -state the major. One cannot collect all the Abyssinians past, present, -and future, at one particular moment of time. Such a Universal, -therefore, is impossible. Hence from the examination of individual -Abyssinians, or particular instances of motion which fall within the -pale of our experience, it is rash to infer, that all Abyssinians are -black, or all motion had a beginning in time. - - -Psychology. - -Motion and light are not concomitant in the case of bodies of a lower -order. A piece of stone, for instance, though illuminated and hence -visible, is not endowed with self-initiated movement. As we rise, -however, in the scale of being, we find higher bodies, or organisms in -which motion and light are associated together. The abstract -illumination finds its best dwelling place in man. But the question -arises whether the individual abstract illumination which we call the -human soul, did or did not exist before its physical accompaniment. The -founder of Ishraqi Philosophy follows Avicenna in connection with this -question, and uses the same arguments to show, that the individual -abstract illuminations cannot be held to have pre-existed, as so many -units of light. The material categories of one and many cannot be -applied to the abstract illumination which, in its essential nature, is -neither one nor many; though it appears as many owing to the various -degrees of illuminational receptivity in its material accompaniments. -The relation between the abstract illumination, or soul and body, is not -that of cause and effect; the bond of union between them is love. The -body which longs for illumination, receives it through the soul; since -its nature does not permit a direct communication between the source of -light and itself. But the soul cannot transmit the directly received -light to the dark solid body which, considering its attributes, stands -on the opposite pole of being. In order to be related to each other, -they require a medium between them, something standing midway between -light and darkness. This medium is the animal soul--a hot, fine, -transparent vapour which has its principal seat in the left cavity of -the heart, but also circulates in all parts of the body. It is because -of the partial identity of the animal soul with light that, in dark -nights, land-animals run towards the burning fire; while sea-animals -leave their aquatic abodes in order to enjoy the beautiful sight of the -moon. The ideal of man, therefore, is to rise higher and higher in the -scale of being, and to receive more and more illumination which -gradually brings complete freedom from the world of forms. But how is -this ideal to be realised? By knowledge and action. It is the -transformation of both understanding and will, the union of action and -contemplation, that actualizes the highest ideal of man. Change your -attitude towards the Universe, and adopt the line of conduct -necessitated by the change. Let us briefly consider these means of -realisation:-- - -A. _Knowledge._ When the Abstract illumination associates itself with a -higher organism, it works out its development by the operation of -certain faculties--the powers of light, and the powers of darkness. The -former are the five external senses, and the five internal -senses--sensorium, conception, imagination, understanding, and memory; -the latter are the powers of growth, digestion, etc. But such a division -of faculties is only convenient. "One faculty can be the source of all -operations."[142:1] There is only one power in the middle of the brain, -though it receives different names from different standpoints. The mind -is a unity which, for the sake of convenience, is regarded as -multiplicity. The power residing in the middle of the brain must be -distinguished from the abstract illumination which constitutes the real -essence of man. The Philosopher of illumination appears to draw a -distinction between the active mind and the essentially inactive soul; -yet he teaches that in some mysterious way, all the various faculties -are connected with the soul. - - [142:1] Sharh Anwariyya fol. 57b. - -The most original point in his psychology of intellection, however, is -his theory of vision.[142:2] The ray of light which is supposed to come -out of the eye must be either substance or quality. If quality, it -cannot be transmitted from one substance (eye) to another substance -(visible body). If, on the other hand, it is a substance, it moves -either consciously, or impelled by its inherent nature. Conscious -movement would make it an animal perceiving other things. The perceiver -in this case would be the ray, not man. If the movement of the ray is an -attribute of its nature, there is no reason why its movement should be -peculiar to one direction, and not to all. The ray of light, therefore, -cannot be regarded as coming out of the eye. The followers of Aristotle -hold that in the process of vision images of objects are printed on the -eye. This view is also erroneous; since images of big things cannot be -printed on a small space. The truth is that when a thing comes before -the eye, an illumination takes place, and the mind sees the object -through that illumination. When there is no veil between the object and -the normal sight, and the mind is ready to perceive, the act of vision -must take place; since this is the law of things. "All vision is -illumination; and we see things in God". Berkley explained the -relativity of our sight-perceptions with a view to show that the -ultimate ground of all ideas is God. The Ishraqi Philosopher has the -same object in view, though his theory of vision is not so much an -explanation of the sight-process as a new way of looking at the fact of -vision. - - [142:2] Sharh Anwariyya fol. 60b. - -Besides sense and reason, however, there is another source of knowledge -called "Dhauq"--the inner perception which reveals non-temporal and -non-spatial planes of being. The study of philosophy, or the habit of -reflecting on pure concepts, combined with the practice of virtue, leads -to the upbringing of this mysterious sense, which corroborates and -corrects the conclusions of intellect. - -B. _Action._ Man as an active being has the following motive powers: - -(a). Reason or the Angelic soul--the source of intelligence, -discrimination, and love of knowledge. - -(b). The beast-soul which is the source of anger, courage, dominance, -and ambition. - -(c). The animal soul which is the source of lust, hunger, and sexual -passion. - -The first leads to wisdom; the second and third, if controlled by -reason, lead respectively to bravery and chastity. The harmonious use of -all results in the virtue of justice. The possibility of spiritual -progress by virtue, shows that this world is the best possible world. -Things as existent are neither good nor bad. It is misuse or limited -standpoint that makes them so. Still the fact of evil cannot be denied. -Evil does exist; but it is far less in amount than good. It is peculiar -only to a part of the world of darkness; while there are other parts of -the Universe which are quite free from the taint of evil. The sceptic -who attributes the existence of evil to the creative agency of God, -presupposes resemblance between human and divine action, and does not -see that nothing existent is free in his sense of the word. Divine -activity cannot be regarded as the creator of evil in the same sense as -we regard some forms of human activity as the cause of evil.[145:1] - - [145:1] Sharh Anwariyya fol. 92b. - -It is, then, by the union of knowledge and virtue that the soul frees -itself from the world of darkness. As we know more and more of the -nature of things, we are brought closer and closer to the world of -light; and the love of that world becomes more and more intense. The -stages of spiritual development are infinite, since the degrees of love -are infinite. The principal stages, however, are as follows:-- - -(1). The stage of "_I_". In this stage the feeling of personality is -most predominant, and the spring of human action is generally -selfishness. - -(2). The stage of "_Thou art not_". Complete absorption in one's own -deep self to the entire forgetfulness of everything external. - -(3). The stage of "_I am not_". This stage is the necessary result of -the second. - -(4). The stage of "_Thou art_". The absolute negation of "_I_", and the -affirmation of "_Thou_", which means complete resignation to the will of -God. - -(5). The stage of "_I am not; and thou art not_". The complete negation -of both the terms of thought--the state of cosmic consciousness. - -Each stage is marked by more or less intense illuminations, which are -accompanied by some indescribable sounds. Death does not put an end to -the spiritual progress of the soul. The individual souls, after death, -are not unified into one soul, but continue different from each other in -proportion to the illumination they received during their companionship -with physical organisms. The Philosopher of illumination anticipates -Leibniz's doctrine of the Identity of Indiscernibles, and holds that no -two souls can be completely similar to each other.[147:1] When the -material machinery which it adopts for the purpose of acquiring gradual -illumination, is exhausted, the soul probably takes up another body -determined by the experiences of the previous life; and rises higher and -higher in the different spheres of being, adopting forms peculiar to -those spheres, until it reaches its destination--the state of absolute -negation. Some souls probably come back to this world in order to make -up their deficiencies.[147:2] The doctrine of trans-migration cannot be -proved or disproved from a purely logical standpoint; though it is a -probable hypothesis to account for the future destiny of the soul. All -souls are thus constantly journeying towards their common source, which -calls back the whole Universe when this journey is over, and starts -another cycle of being to reproduce, in almost all respects, the history -of the preceding cycles. - - [147:1] Sharh Anwariyya fol. 82. - - [147:2] Sharh Anwariyya fol. 87b. - -Such is the philosophy of the great Persian martyr. He is, properly -speaking, the first Persian systematiser who recognises the elements of -truth in all the aspects of Persian speculation, and skilfully -synthesises them in his own system. He is a pantheist in so far as he -defines God as the sum total of all sensible and ideal existence.[148:1] -To him, unlike some of his Sufi predecessors, the world is something -real, and the human soul a distinct individuality. With the orthodox -theologian, he maintains that the ultimate cause of every phenomenon, -is the absolute light whose illumination forms the very essence of the -Universe. In his psychology he follows Avicenna, but his treatment of -this branch of study is more systematic and more empirical. As an -ethical philosopher, he is a follower of Aristotle whose doctrine of the -mean he explains and illustrates with great thoroughness. Above all he -modifies and transforms the traditional Neo-Platonism, into a thoroughly -Persian system of thought which, not only approaches Plato, but also -spiritualises the old Persian Dualism. No Persian thinker is more alive -to the necessity of explaining all the aspects of objective existence in -reference to his fundamental principles. He constantly appeals to -experience, and endeavours to explain even the physical phenomena in the -light of his theory of illumination. In his system objectivity, which -was completely swallowed up by the exceedingly subjective character of -extreme pantheism, claims its due again, and, having been subjected to a -detailed examination, finds a comprehensive explanation. No wonder then -that this acute thinker succeeded in founding a system of thought, -which has always exercised the greatest fascination over minds--uniting -speculation and emotion in perfect harmony. The narrow-mindedness of his -contemporaries gave him the title of "Maqtul" (the killed one), -signifying that he was not to be regarded as "Shahid" (Martyr); but -succeeding generations of Sufis and philosophers have always given him -the profoundest veneration. - - [148:1] Sharh Anwariyya fol. 81b. - -I may here notice a less spiritual form of the Ishraqi mode of -thought. Nasafi[150:1] describes a phase of Sufi thought which reverted -to the old materialistic dualism of Mani. The advocates of this view -hold, that light and darkness are essential to each other. They are, in -reality, two rivers which mix with each other like oil and milk,[150:2] -out of which arises the diversity of things. The ideal of human action -is freedom from the taint of darkness; and the freedom of light from -darkness means the self-consciousness of light as light. - - [150:1] Maqsadi Aqsa; fol. 21a. - - [150:2] Maqsadi Aqsa; fol. 21a. - - -II. Reality as Thought--Al-Jili. - -Al-Jili was born in 767 A.H., as he himself says in one of his verses, -and died in 811 A.H. He was not a prolific writer like Shaikh Muhy -al-Din ibn `Arabi whose mode of thought seems to have greatly influenced -his teaching. He combined in himself poetical imagination and -philosophical genius, but his poetry is no more than a vehicle for his -mystical and metaphysical doctrines. Among other books he wrote a -commentary on Shaikh Muhy al-Din ibn `Arabi's al-Futuhat al-Makkiya, -a commentary on Bismillah, and the famous work Insan al-Kamil (printed -in Cairo). - -Essence pure and simple, he says, is the thing to which names and -attributes are given, whether it is existent actually or ideally. The -existent is of two species:-- - -(1). The Existent in Absoluteness or Pure existence--Pure Being--God. - -(2). The existence joined with non-existence--Creation--Nature. - -The Essence of God or Pure Thought cannot be understood; no words can -express it, for it is beyond all relation and knowledge is relation. The -intellect flying through the fathomless empty space pierces through the -veil of names and attributes, traverses the vasty sphere of time, enters -the domain of the non-existent and finds the Essence of Pure Thought to -be an existence which is non-existence--a sum of contradictions.[152:1] -It has two (accidents); eternal life in all past time and eternal life -in all future time. It has two (qualities), God and creation. It has two -(definitions), uncreatableness and creatableness. It has two names, God -and man. It has two faces, the manifested (this world) and the -unmanifested (the next world). It has two effects, necessity and -possibility. It has two points of view; from the first it is -non-existent for itself but existent for what is not itself; from the -second it is existent for itself and non-existent for what is not -itself. - - [152:1] Insan al-Kamil, Vol. I, p. 10. - -Name, he says, fixes the named in the understanding, pictures it in the -mind, presents it in the imagination and keeps it in the memory. It is -the outside or the husk, as it were, of the named; while the named is -the inside or the pith. Some names do not exist in reality but exist in -name only as "`Anqa" (a fabulous bird). It is a name the object of which -does not exist in reality. Just as "`Anqa" is absolutely non-existent, -so God is absolutely present, although He cannot be touched and seen. -The "`Anqa" exists only in idea while the object of the name "Allah" -exists in reality and can be known like "`Anqa" only through its names -and attributes. The name is a mirror which reveals all the secrets of -the Absolute Being; it is a light through the agency of which God sees -Himself. Al-Jili here approaches the Isma`ilia view that we should seek -the Named through the Name. - -In order to understand this passage we should bear in mind the three -stages of the development of Pure Being, enumerated by him. He holds -that the Absolute existence or Pure Being when it leaves its -absoluteness undergoes three stages:--(1) Oneness. (2) He-ness. (3) -I-ness. In the first stage there is an absence of all attributes and -relations, yet it is called one, and therefore oneness marks one step -away from the absoluteness. In the second stage Pure Being is yet free -from all manifestation, while the third stage, I-ness, is nothing but an -external manifestation of the He-ness; or, as Hegel would say, it is the -self-diremption of God. This third stage is the sphere of the name -Allah; here the darkness of Pure Being is illuminated, nature comes to -the front, the Absolute Being has become conscious. He says further that -the name Allah is the stuff of all the perfections of the different -phases of Divinity, and in the second stage of the progress of Pure -Being, all that is the result of Divine self-diremption was potentially -contained within the titanic grasp of this name which, in the third -stage of the development, objectified itself, became a mirror in which -God reflected Himself, and thus by its crystallisation dispelled all the -gloom of the Absolute Being. - -In correspondence with these three stages of the absolute development, -the perfect man has three stages of spiritual training. But in his case -the process of development must be the reverse; because his is the -process of ascent, while the Absolute Being had undergone essentially a -process of descent. In the first stage of his spiritual progress he -meditates on the name, studies nature on which it is sealed; in the -second stage he steps into the sphere of the Attribute, and in the third -stage enters the sphere of the Essence. It is here that he becomes the -Perfect Man; his eye becomes the eye of God, his word the word of God -and his life the life of God--participates in the general life of Nature -and "sees into the life of things". - -To turn now to the nature of the attribute. His views on this most -interesting question are very important, because it is here that his -doctrine fundamentally differs from Hindu Idealism. He defines attribute -as an agency which gives us a knowledge of the state of things.[155:1] -Elsewhere he says that this distinction of attribute from the underlying -reality is tenable only in the sphere of the manifested, because here -every attribute is regarded as the other of the reality in which it is -supposed to inhere. This otherness is due to the existence of -combination and disintegration in the sphere of the manifested. But the -distinction is untenable in the domain of the unmanifested, because -there is no combination or disintegration there. It should be observed -how widely he differs from the advocates of the Doctrine of "Maya". He -believes that the material world has real existence; it is the outward -husk of the real being, no doubt, but this outward husk is not the less -real. The cause of the phenomenal world, according to him, is not a real -entity hidden behind the sum of attributes, but it is a conception -furnished by the mind so that there may be no difficulty in -understanding the material world. Berkeley and Fichte will so far agree -with our author, but his view leads him to the most characteristically -Hegelian doctrine--identity of thought and being. In the 37{th} chapter -of the 2{nd} volume of Insan al-Kamil, he clearly says that idea is the -stuff of which this universe is made; thought, idea, notion is the -material of the structure of nature. While laying stress on this -doctrine he says, "Dost thou not look to thine own belief? Where is the -reality in which the so-called Divine attributes inhere? It is but the -idea."[157:1] Hence nature is nothing but a crystallised idea. He gives -his hearty assent to the results of Kant's _Critique of Pure Reason_; -but, unlike him, he makes this very idea the essence of the Universe. -Kant's _Ding an sich_ to him is a pure nonentity; there is nothing -behind the collection of attributes. The attributes are the real things, -the material world is but the objectification of the Absolute Being; it -is the other self of the Absolute--another which owes its existence to -the principle of difference in the nature of the Absolute itself. Nature -is the idea of God, a something necessary for His knowledge of Himself. -While Hegel calls his doctrine the identity of thought and being, -Al-Jili calls it the identity of attribute and reality. It should be -noted that the author's phrase, "world of attributes", which he uses for -the material world is slightly misleading. What he really holds is that -the distinction of attribute and reality is merely phenomenal, and does -not at all exist in the nature of things. It is useful, because it -facilitates our understanding of the world around us, but it is not at -all real. It will be understood that Al-Jili recognises the truth of -Empirical Idealism only tentatively, and does not admit the absoluteness -of the distinction. These remarks should not lead us to understand that -Al-Jili does not believe in the objective reality of the thing in -itself. He does believe in it, but then he advocates its unity, and says -that the material world is the thing in itself; it is the "other", the -external expression of the thing in itself. The _Ding an sich_ and its -external expression or the production of its self-diremption, are really -identical, though we discriminate between them in order to facilitate -our understanding of the universe. If they are not identical, he says, -how could one manifest the other? In one word, he means by _Ding an -sich_, the Pure, the Absolute Being, and seeks it through its -manifestation or external expression. He says that as long as we do not -realise the identity of attribute and reality, the material world or the -world of attributes seems to be a veil; but when the doctrine is -brought home to us the veil is removed; we see the Essence itself -everywhere, and find that all the attributes are but ourselves. Nature -then appears in her true light; all otherness is removed and we are one -with her. The aching prick of curiosity ceases, and the inquisitive -attitude of our minds is replaced by a state of philosophic calm. To the -person who has realised this identity, discoveries of science bring no -new information, and religion with her _role_ of supernatural authority -has nothing to say. This is the spiritual emancipation. - - [155:1] Insan al-Kamil; Vol. I, p. 22. - - [157:1] Insan al-Kamil, Vol. II, p. 26. - -Let us now see how he classifies the different divine names and -attributes which have received expression in nature or crystallised -Divinity. His classification is as follows:-- - -(1). The names and attributes of God as He is in Himself (Allah, The -One, The Odd, The Light, The Truth, The Pure, The Living.) - -(2). The names and attributes of God as the source of all glory (The -Great and High, The All-powerful). - -(3). The names and attributes of God as all Perfection (The Creator, The -Benefactor, The First, The Last). - -(4). The names and attributes of God as all Beauty (The Uncreatable, The -Painter, The Merciful, The Origin of all). Each of these names and -attributes has its own particular effect by which it illuminates the -soul of the perfect man and Nature. How these illuminations take place, -and how they reach the soul is not explained by Al-Jili. His silence -about these matters throws into more relief the mystical portion of his -views and implies the necessity of spiritual Directorship. - -Before considering Al-Jili's views of particular Divine Names and -Attributes, we should note that his conception of God, implied in the -above classification, is very similar to that of Schleiermacher. While -the German theologian reduces all the divine attributes to one single -attribute of Power, our author sees the danger of advancing a God free -from all attributes, yet recognises with Schleiermacher that in Himself -God is an unchangeable unity, and that His attributes "are nothing more -than views of Him from different human standpoints, the various -appearances which the one changeless cause presents to our finite -intelligence according as we look at it from different sides of the -spiritual landscape."[161:1] In His absolute existence He is beyond the -limitation of names and attributes, but when He externalises Himself, -when He leaves His absoluteness, when nature is born, names and -attributes appear sealed on her very fabric. - - [161:1] Matheson's _Aids to the Study of German Theology_, p. - 43. - -We now proceed to consider what he teaches about particular Divine Names -and Attributes. The first Essential Name is Allah (Divinity) which means -the sum of all the realities of existence with their respective order in -that sum. This name is applied to God as the only necessary existence. -Divinity being the highest manifestation of Pure Being, the difference -between them is that the latter is visible to the eye, but its _where_ -is invisible; while the traces of the former are visible, itself is -invisible. By the very fact of her being crystallised divinity, Nature -is not the real divinity; hence Divinity is invisible, and its traces in -the form of Nature are visible to the eye. Divinity, as the author -illustrates, is water; nature is crystallised water or ice; but ice is -not water. The Essence is visible to the eye, (another proof of our -author's Natural Realism or Absolute Idealism) although all its -attributes are not known to us. Even its attributes are not known as -they are in themselves, their shadows or effects only are known. For -instance, charity itself is unknown, only its effect or the fact of -giving to the poor, is known and seen. This is due to the attributes -being incorporated in the very nature of the Essence. If the expression -of the attributes in its real nature had been possible, its separation -from the Essence would have been possible also. But there are some other -Essential Names of God--The Absolute Oneness and Simple Oneness. The -Absolute Oneness marks the first step of Pure Thought from the darkness -of Cecity (the internal or the original Maya of the Vedanta) to the -light of manifestation. Although this movement is not attended with any -external manifestations, yet it sums up all of them under its hollow -universality. Look at a wall, says the author, you see the whole wall; -but you cannot see the individual pieces of the material that -contribute to its formation. The wall is a unity--but a unity which -comprehends diversity, so Pure Being is a unity but a unity which is the -soul of diversity. - -The third movement of the Absolute Being is Simple Oneness--a step -attended with external manifestation. The Absolute Oneness is free from -all particular names and attributes. The Oneness Simple takes on names -and attributes, but there is no distinction between these attributes, -one is the essence of the other. Divinity is similar to Simple Oneness, -but its names and attributes are distinguished from one another and even -contradictory, as generous is contradictory to revengeful.[163:1] The -third step, or as Hegel would say, Voyage of the Being, has another -appellation (Mercy). The First Mercy, the author says, is the evolution -of the Universe from Himself and the manifestation of His own Self in -every atom of the result of His own self-diremption. Al-Jili makes this -point clearer by an instance. He says that nature is frozen water and -God is water. The real name of nature is God (Allah); ice or condensed -water is merely a borrowed appellation. Elsewhere he calls water the -origin of knowledge, intellect, understanding, thought and idea. This -instance leads him to guard against the error of looking upon God as -immanent in nature, or running through the sphere of material existence. -He says that immanence implies disparity of being; God is not immanent -because He is Himself the existence. Eternal existence is the other self -of God, it is the light through which He sees Himself. As the originator -of an idea is existent in that idea, so God is present in nature. The -difference between God and man, as one may say, is that His ideas -materialise themselves, ours do not. It will be remembered here that -Hegel would use the same line of argument in freeing himself from the -accusation of Pantheism. - - [163:1] This would seem very much like the idea of the - phenomenal Brahma of the Vedanta. The Personal Creator or the - Prajapati of the Vedanta makes the third step of the Absolute - Being or the Noumenal Brahma. Al-Jili seems to admit two kinds - of Brahma--with or without qualities like the Samkara and - Badarayana. To him the process of creation is essentially a - lowering of the Absolute Thought, which is Asat, in so far as it - is absolute, and Sat, in so far as it is manifested and hence - limited. Notwithstanding this Absolute Monism, he inclines to a - view similar to that of Ramanuja. He seems to admit the reality - of the individual soul and seems to imply, unlike Samkara, that - Iswara and His worship are necessary even after the attainment - of the Higher Knowledge. - -The attribute of Mercy is closely connected with the attribute of -Providence. He defines it as the sum of all that existence stands in -need of. Plants are supplied with water through the force of this name. -The natural philosopher would express the same thing differently; he -would speak of the same phenomena as resulting from the activity of a -certain force of nature; Al-Jili would call it a manifestation of -Providence; but, unlike the natural philosopher, he would not advocate -the unknowability of that force. He would say that there is nothing -behind it, it is the Absolute Being itself. - -We have now finished all the essential names and attributes of God, and -proceed to examine the nature of what existed before all things. The -Arabian Prophet, says Al-Jili, was once questioned about the place of -God before creation. He said that God, before the creation, existed in -"`Ama" (Blindness). It is the nature of this Blindness or primal -darkness which we now proceed to examine. The investigation is -particularly interesting, because the word translated into modern -phraseology would be "_The Unconsciousness_". This single word impresses -upon us the foresightedness with which he anticipates metaphysical -doctrines of modern Germany. He says that the Unconsciousness is the -reality of all realities; it is the Pure Being without any descending -movement; it is free from the attributes of God and creation; it does -not stand in need of any name or quality, because it is beyond the -sphere of relation. It is distinguished from the Absolute Oneness -because the latter name is applied to the Pure Being in its process of -coming down towards manifestation. It should, however, be remembered -that when we speak of the priority of God and posteriority of creation, -our words must not be understood as implying time; for there can be no -duration of time or separateness between God and His creation. Time, -continuity in space and time, are themselves creations, and how can -piece of creation intervene between God and His creation. Hence our -words before, after, where, whence, etc., in this sphere of thought, -should not be construed to imply time or space. The real thing is beyond -the grasp of human conceptions; no category of material existence can be -applicable to it; because, as Kant would say, the laws of phenomena -cannot be spoken of as obtaining in the sphere of noumena. - -We have already noticed that man in his progress towards perfection has -three stages: the first is the meditation of the name which the author -calls the illumination of names. He remarks that "When God illuminates a -certain man by the light of His names, the man is destroyed under the -dazzling splendour of that name; and "when thou calleth God, the call is -responded to by the man". The effect of this illumination would be, in -Schopenhauer's language, the destruction of the individual will, yet it -must not be confounded with physical death; because the individual goes -on living and moving like the spinning wheel, as Kapila would say, after -he has become one with Prakriti. It is here that the individual cries -out in pantheistic mood:--She was I and I was she and there was none to -separate us."[167:1] - - [167:1] Insan al-Kamil, Vol. I, p. 40. - -The second stage of the spiritual training is what he calls the -illumination of the Attribute. This illumination makes the perfect man -receive the attributes of God in their real nature in proportion to the -power of receptivity possessed by him--a fact which classifies men -according to the magnitude of this light resulting from the -illumination. Some men receive illumination from the divine attribute of -Life, and thus participate in the soul of the Universe. The effect of -this light is soaring in the air, walking on water, changing the -magnitude of things (as Christ so often did). In this wise the perfect -man receives illumination from all the Divine attributes, crosses the -sphere of the name and the attribute, and steps into the domain of the -Essence--Absolute Existence. - -As we have already seen, the Absolute Being, when it leaves its -absoluteness, has three voyages to undergo, each voyage being a process -of particularisation of the bare universality of the Absolute Essence. -Each of these three movements appears under a new Essential Name which -has its own peculiar illuminating effect upon the human soul. Here is -the end of our author's spiritual ethics; _man has become perfect_, -he has amalgamated himself with the Absolute Being, or _has learnt -what Hegel calls The Absolute Philosophy_. "He becomes the paragon -of perfection, the object of worship, the preserver of the -Universe".[169:1] He is the point where Man-ness and God-ness become -one, and result in the birth of the god-man. - - [169:1] Insan al-Kamil, Vol. I, p. 48. - -How the perfect man reaches this height of spiritual development, the -author does not tell us; but he says that at every stage he has a -peculiar experience in which there is not even a trace of doubt or -agitation. The instrument of this experience is what he calls the _Qalb_ -(heart), a word very difficult of definition. He gives a very mystical -diagram of the Qalb, and explains it by saying that it is the eye which -sees the names, the attributes and the Absolute Being successively. It -owes its existence to a mysterious combination of soul and mind; and -becomes by its very nature the organ for the recognition of the -ultimate realities of existence. All that the "heart", or the source of -what the Vedanta calls the Higher Knowledge, reveals is not seen by the -individual as something separate from and heterogeneous to himself; what -is shown to him through this agency is his own reality, his own deep -being. This characteristic of the agency differentiates it from the -intellect, the object of which is always different and separate from the -individual exercising that faculty. But the spiritual experience, -according to the Sufis of this school, is not permanent; moments of -spiritual vision, says Matthew Arnold,[170:1] cannot be at our command. -The god-man is he who has known the mystery of his own being, who has -realised himself as god-man; but when that particular spiritual -realisation is over man is man and God is God. Had the experience been -permanent, a great moral force would have been lost and society -overturned. - - [170:1] "We cannot kindle when we will - The fire which in the heart resides". - -Let us now sum up Al-Jili's _Doctrine of the Trinity_. We have seen the -three movements of the Absolute Being, or the first three categories of -Pure Being; we have also seen that the third movement is attended with -external manifestation, which is the self-diremption of the Essence into -God and man. This separation makes a gap which is filled by the perfect -man, who shares in both the Divine and the human attributes. He holds -that the perfect man is the preserver of the Universe; hence in his -view, the appearance of the perfect man is a necessary condition for the -continuation of nature. It is easy, therefore, to understand that in the -god-man, the Absolute Being which has left its absoluteness, returns -into itself; and, but for the god-man, it could not have done so; for -then there would have been no nature, and consequently no light through -which God could have seen Himself. The light through the agency of which -God sees Himself is due to the principle of difference in the nature of -the Absolute Being itself. He recognises this principle in the following -verses:-- - - If you say that God is one, you are right; but if you say that He - is two, this is also true. - - If you say no, but He is three, you are right, for this is the - real nature of man.[171:1] - - [171:1] Insan al-Kamil, Vol. I, p. 8. - -The _perfect man_, then, is the joining link. On the one hand he -receives illumination from all the Essential names, on the other hand -all Divine attributes reappear in him. These attributes are:-- - -1. Independent life or existence. - -2. Knowledge which is a form of life, as he proves from a verse from the -Qur'an. - -3. Will--the principle of particularisation, or the manifestation of -Being. He defines it as the illumination of the knowledge of God -according to the requirements of the Essence; hence it is a particular -form of knowledge. It has nine manifestations, all of which are -different names for love; the last is the love in which the lover and -the beloved, the knower and the known merge into each other, and become -identical. This form of love, he says, is the Absolute Essence; as -Christianity teaches, God is love. He guards, here, against the error of -looking upon the individual act of will as uncaused. Only the act of the -universal will is uncaused; hence he implies the Hegelian Doctrine of -Freedom, and holds that the acts of man are both free and determined. - -4. Power, which expresses itself in self-diremption i.e. creation. He -controverts Shaikh Muhy al-Din ibn `Arabi's position that the -Universe existed before the creation in the knowledge of God. He says, -this would imply that God did not create it out of nothing, and holds -that the Universe, before its existence as an idea, existed in the self -of God. - -5. The word or the reflected being. Every possibility is the word of -God; hence nature is the materialisation of the word of God. It has -different names--The tangible word, The sum of the realities of man, The -arrangement of the Divinity, The spread of Oneness, The expression of -the Unknown, The phases of Beauty, The trace of names and attributes, -and the object of God's knowledge. - -6. The Power of hearing the inaudible. - -7. The Power of seeing the invisible. - -8. Beauty--that which seems least beautiful in nature (the reflected -beauty) is in its real existence, beauty. Evil is only relative, it has -no real existence; sin is merely a relative deformity. - -9. Glory or beauty in its intensity. - -10. Perfection, which is the unknowable essence of God and therefore -Unlimited and Infinite. - - - - -CHAP. VI. - -LATER PERSIAN THOUGHT. - - -Under the rude Tartar invaders of Persia, who could have no sympathy -with independent thought, there could be no progress of ideas. Sufiism, -owing to its association with religion, went on systematising old and -evolving new ideas. But philosophy proper was distasteful to the Tartar. -Even the development of Islamic law suffered a check; since the Hanafite -law was the acme of human reason to the Tartar, and further subtleties -of legal interpretation were disagreeable to his brain. Old schools of -thought lost their solidarity, and many thinkers left their native -country to find more favourable conditions elsewhere. In the 16{th} -century we find Persian Aristotelians--Dastur Isfahani, Hir Bud, Munir, -and Kamran--travelling in India, where the Emperor Akbar was drawing -upon Zoroastrianism to form a new faith for himself and his courtiers, -who were mostly Persians. No great thinker, however, appeared in Persia -until the 17{th} century, when the acute Mulla Sadra of Shiraz upheld -his philosophical system with all the vigour of his powerful logic. With -Mulla Sadra Reality is all things yet is none of them, and true -knowledge consists in the identity of the subject and the object. De -Gobineau thinks that the philosophy of Sadra is a mere revival of -Avicennaism. He, however, ignores the fact that Mulla Sadra's doctrine -of the identity of subject and object constitutes the final step which -the Persian intellect took towards complete monism. It is moreover the -Philosophy of Sadra which is the source of the metaphysics of early -Babism. - -But the movement towards Platonism is best illustrated in Mulla Hadi of -Sabzwar who flourished in the 18{th} century, and is believed by his -countrymen to be the greatest of modern Persian thinkers. As a specimen -of comparatively recent Persian speculation, I may briefly notice here -the views of this great thinker, as set forth in his Asrar al-Hikam -(published in Persia). A glance at his philosophical teaching reveals -three fundamental conceptions which are indissolubly associated with the -Post-Islamic Persian thought:-- - -1. The idea of the Absolute Unity of the Real which is described as -"Light". - -2. The idea of evolution which is dimly visible in Zoroaster's doctrine -of the destiny of the human soul, and receives further expansion and -systematisation by Persian Neo-Platonists and Sufi thinkers. - -3. The idea of a medium between the Absolute Real and the Not-real. - -It is highly interesting to note how the Persian mind gradually got rid -of the Emanation theory of Neo-Platonism, and reached a purer notion of -Plato's Philosophy. The Arab Muhammadans of Spain, by a similar process -of elimination reached, through the same medium (Neo-Platonism) a truer -conception of the Philosophy of Aristotle--a fact which illustrates the -genius of the two races. Lewes in his Biographical History of Philosophy -remarks that the Arabs eagerly took up the study of Aristotle simply -because Plato was not presented to them. I am, however, inclined to -think that the Arab genius was thoroughly practical; hence Plato's -philosophy would have been distasteful to them even if it had been -presented in its true light. Of the systems of Greek philosophy -Neo-Platonism, I believe, was the only one which was presented in its -completeness to the Muslim world; yet patient critical research led the -Arab from Plotinus to Aristotle, and the Persian to Plato. This is -singularly illustrated in the Philosophy of Mulla Hadi, who recognises -no Emanations, and approaches the Platonic conception of the Real. He -illustrates, moreover, how philosophical speculation in Persia, as in -all countries where Physical science either does not exist or is not -studied, is finally absorbed by religion. The "Essence", i.e. the -metaphysical cause as distinguished from the scientific cause, which -means the sum of antecedent conditions, must gradually be transformed -into "Personal Will" (cause, in a religious sense) in the absence of any -other notion of cause. And this is perhaps the deeper reason why -Persian philosophies have always ended in religion. - -Let us now turn to Mulla Hadi's system of thought. He teaches that -Reason has two aspects:--(a) Theoretical, the object of which is -Philosophy and Mathematics, (b) Practical, the object of which is -Domestic Economy, Politics, etc. Philosophy proper comprises the -knowledge of the beginning of things, the end of things, and the -knowledge of the Self. It also includes the knowledge of the law of -God--which is identical with religion. In order to understand the origin -of things, we should subject to a searching analysis the various -phenomena of the Universe. Such an analysis reveals that there are three -original principles.[178:1] - -(1). The Real--Light. - -(2). The Shadow. - -(3). The not-Real--Darkness. - - [178:1] Asrar al-Hikam; p. 6. - -The Real is absolute, and necessary as distinguished from the "Shadow", -which is relative and contingent. In its nature it is absolutely good; -and the proposition that it is good, is self-evident.[178:2] All forms -of potential existence, before they are actualised by the Real, are open -to both existence or non-existence, and the possibilities of their -existence or non-existence are exactly equal. It, therefore, follows -that the Real which actualises the potential is not itself -non-existence; since non-existence operating on non-existence cannot -produce actuality.[179:1] Mulla Hadi, in his conception of the Real as -the operator, modifies Plato's statical conception of the Universe, and, -following Aristotle, looks upon his Real as the immovable source and the -object of all motion. "All things in the Universe," he says, "love -perfection, and are moving towards their final ends--minerals towards -vegetables, vegetables towards animals, and animals towards man. And -observe how man passes through all these stages in the mother's -womb."[179:2] The mover as mover is either the source or the object of -motion or both. In any case the mover must be either movable or -immovable. The proposition that all movers must be themselves movable, -leads to infinite regress--which must stop at the immovable mover, the -source and the final object of all motion. The Real, moreover, is a pure -unity; for if there is a plurality of Reals, one would limit the other. -The Real as creator also cannot be conceived as more than one; since a -plurality of creators would mean a plurality of worlds which must be -circular touching one another, and this again implies vacuum which is -impossible.[180:1] Regarded as an essence, therefore, the Real is one. -But it is also many, from a different standpoint. It is life, power, -love; though we cannot say that these qualities inhere in it--they are -it, and it is them. Unity does not mean oneness, its essence consists in -the "dropping of all relations." Unlike the Sufis and other thinkers, -Mulla Hadi holds and tries to show that belief in multiplicity is not -inconsistent with belief in unity; since the visible "many" is nothing -more than a manifestation of the names and attributes of the Real. -These attributes are the various forms of a "Knowledge" which -constitutes the very essence of the Real. To speak, however, of the -attributes of the Real is only a verbal convenience; since "defining the -Real is applying the category of number to it"--an absurd process which -endeavours to bring the unrelated into the sphere of the related. The -Universe, with all its variety, is the shadow of the various names and -attributes of the Real or the Absolute Light. It is Reality unfolded, -the "Be", or the word of Light.[181:1] Visible multiplicity is the -illumination of Darkness, or the actualisation of Nothing. Things are -different because we see them, as it were, through glasses of different -colours--the Ideas. In this connection Hadi approvingly quotes the poet -Jami who has given the most beautiful poetic expression to Plato's -Doctrine of Ideas in verses which can be thus translated:-- - -"The ideas are glasses of various colours in which the Sun of Reality -reflects itself, and makes itself visible through them according as they -are red, yellow or blue."[181:2] - - [178:2] Asrar al-Hikam; p. 8. - - [179:1] Asrar al-Hikam; p. 8. - - [179:2] Asrar al-Hikam; p. 10. - - [180:1] Asrar al-Hikam; pp. 28, 29. - - [181:1] Asrar al-Hikam; p. 151. - - [181:2] Asrar al-Hikam; p. 6. - -In his Psychology he mostly follows Avicenna, but his treatment of the -subject is more thorough and systematic. He classifies the soul in the -following manner:-- - - The Soul - | - +---------+-----+ - | | - Heavenly Earthly - | - +--------+----------+ - | | | - Human Animal Vegetative - - Powers:-- - - 1. Preserving the individual. - 2. Perfecting the individual. - 3. Perpetuating the species. - -The animal soul has three powers:-- - - 1. External senses} Perception. - 2. Internal senses} - 3. Power of motion which includes. - (a) Voluntary motion. - (b) Involuntary motion. - -The external senses are taste, touch, smell, hearing and sight. The -sound exists outside the ear, and not inside as some thinkers have held. -For if it does not exist outside the ear, it is not possible to perceive -its direction and distance. Hearing and sight are superior to other -senses, and sight is superior to hearing; since:-- - - I. The eye can perceive distant things. - - II. Its perception is light, which is the best of all - attributes. - - III. The construction of the eye is more complicated and - delicate than that of the ear. - - IV. The perceptions of sight are things which actually exist, - while those of hearing resemble non-existence. - -The internal senses are as follow:-- - -(1). The Common Sense--the tablet of the mind. It is like the Prime -Minister of the mind sending out five spies (external senses) to bring -in news from the external world. When we say "this white thing is -sweet", we perceive whiteness and sweetness by sight and taste -respectively, but that both the attributes exist in the same thing is -decided by the Common Sense. The line made by a falling drop, so far as -the eye is concerned, is nothing but the drop. But what is the line -which we see? To account for such a phenomenon, says Hadi, it is -necessary to postulate another sense which perceives the lengthening of -the falling drop into a line. - -(2). The faculty which preserves the perceptions of the Common -Sense--images and not ideas like the memory. The judgment that whiteness -and sweetness exist in the same thing is completed by this faculty; -since, if it does not preserve the image of the subject, Common Sense -cannot perceive the predicate. - -(3). The power which perceives individual ideas. The sheep thinks of the -enmity of the wolf, and runs away from him. Some forms of life lack this -power, e.g. the moth which hurls itself against the candle-flame. - -(4). Memory--the preserver of ideas. - -(5). The power of combining images and ideas, e.g. the winged man. When -this faculty works under the guidance of the power which perceives -individual ideas, it is called Imagination; when it works under the -control of Intellect, it is called Conception. - -But it is the spirit which distinguishes man from other animals. This -essence of humanity is a "unity", not oneness. It perceives the -Universal by itself, and the particular through the external and the -internal senses. It is the shadow of the Absolute Light, and like it -manifests itself in various ways--comprehending multiplicity in its -unity. There is no necessary relation between the spirit and the body. -The former is non-temporal and non-spatial; hence it is changeless, and -has the power of judging the visible multiplicity. In sleep the spirit -uses the "ideal body" which functions like the physical body; in waking -life it uses the ordinary physical body. It follows, therefore, that the -spirit stands in need of neither, and uses both at will. Hadi does not -follow Plato in his doctrine of transmigration, the different forms of -which he refutes at length. The spirit to him is immortal, and reaches -its original home--Absolute Light--by the gradual perfection of its -faculties. The various stages of the development of reason are as -follows:-- - - A. Theoretical or Pure Reason-- - - 1{st} Potential Reason. - 2{nd} Perception of self-evident propositions. - 3{rd} Actual Reason. - 4{th} Perception of Universal concepts. - - B. Practical Reason-- - - 1{st} External Purification. - 2{nd} Internal Purification. - 3{rd} Formation of virtuous habits. - 4{th} Union with God. - -Thus the spirit rises higher and higher in the scale of being, and -finally shares in the eternity of the Absolute Light by losing itself in -its universality. "In itself non-existent, but existent in the eternal -Friend: how wonderful that it _is_ and _is not_ at the same time". But -is the spirit free to choose its course? Hadi criticises the -Rationalists for their setting up man as an independent creator of evil, -and accuses them of what he calls "veiled dualism". He holds that every -object has two sides--"bright" side, and "dark" side. Things are -combinations of light and darkness. All good flows from the side of -light; evil proceeds from darkness. Man, therefore, is both free and -determined. - -But all the various lines of Persian thought once more find a synthesis -in that great religious movement of Modern Persia--Babism or Bahaism, -which began as a Shi`ah sect, with Mirza `Ali Muhammad Bab of Shiraz (b. -1820), and became less and less Islamic in character with the progress -of orthodox persecutions. The origin of the philosophy of this wonderful -sect must be sought in the Shi`ah sect of the Shaikhis, the founder of -which, Shaikh Ahmad, was an enthusiastic student of Mulla Sadra's -Philosophy, on which he had written several commentaries. This sect -differed from the ordinary Shi`ahs in holding that belief in an ever -present Medium between the absent Imam (the 12{th} Head of the Church, -whose manifestation is anxiously expected by the Shi`ahs), and the -church is a fundamental principle of the Shi`ah religion. Shaikh Ahmad -claimed to be such a Medium; and when, after the death of the second -Shaikhi Medium--Haji Kazim, the Shaikhis were anxiously expecting the -manifestation of the new Medium, Mirza `Ali Muhammad Bab, who had -attended the lectures of Haji Kazim at Karbala, proclaimed himself the -expected Medium, and many Shaikhis accepted him. - -The young Persian seer looks upon Reality as an essence which brooks no -distinction of substance and attribute. The first bounty or -self-expansion of the Ultimate Essence, he says, is Existence. -"Existence" is the "known", the "known" is the essence of "knowledge"; -"knowledge" is "will"; and "will" is "love". Thus from Mulla Sadra's -identity of the known and the knower, he passes to his conception of the -Real as Will and Love. This Primal Love, which he regards as the essence -of the Real, is the cause of the manifestation of the Universe which is -nothing more than the self-expansion of Love. The word creation, with -him, does not mean creation out of nothing; since, as the Shaikhis -maintain, the word creator is not peculiarly applicable to God alone. -The Quranic verse, that "God is the best of creators",[188:1] implies -that there are other self-manifesting beings like God. - - [188:1] Sura 23; v. 14. - -After the execution of `Ali Muhammad Bab, Bahaullah, one of his -principal disciples who were collectively called "The First Unity", took -up the mission, and proclaimed himself the originator of the new -dispensation, the absent Imam whose manifestation the Bab had foretold. -He freed the doctrine of his master from its literalistic mysticism, and -presented it in a more perfected and systematised form. The Absolute -Reality, according to him, is not a person; it is an eternal living -Essence, to which we apply the epithets Truth and Love only because -these are the highest conceptions known to us. The Living Essence -manifests itself through the Univere with the object of creating in -itself atoms or centres of consciousness, which as Dr. McTaggart would -say, constitute a further determination of the Hegelian Absolute. In -each of these undifferentiated, simple centres of consciousness, there -is hidden a ray of the Absolute Light itself, and the perfection of the -spirit consists in gradually actualising, by contact with the -individualising principle--matter, its emotional and intellectual -possibilities, and thus discovering its own deep being--the ray of -eternal Love which is concealed by its union with consciousness. The -essence of man, therefore, is not reason or consciousness; it is this -ray of Love--the source of all impulse to noble and unselfish action, -which constitutes the real man. The influence of Mulla Sadra's doctrine -of the incorporeality of Imagination is here apparent. Reason, which -stands higher than Imagination in the scale of evolution, is not a -necessary condition, according to Mulla Sadra, of immortality. In all -forms of life there is an immortal spiritual part, the ray of Eternal -Love, which has no necessary connection with self-consciousness or -reason, and survives after the death of the body. Salvation, then, which -to Buddha consists in the starving out of the mind-atoms by -extinguishing desire, to Bahaullah lies in the discovery of the essence -of love which is hidden in the atoms of consciousness themselves.[190:1] -Both, however, agree that after death thoughts and characters of men -remain, subject to other forces of a similar character, in the spiritual -world, waiting for another opportunity to find a suitable physical -accompaniment in order to continue the process of discovery (Bahaullah) -or destruction (Buddha). To Bahaullah the conception of Love is higher -than the conception of Will. Schopenhauer conceived reality as Will -which was driven to objectification by a sinful bent eternally existing -in its nature. Love or Will, according to both, is present in every atom -of life; but the cause of its being there is the joy of self-expansion -in the one case, and the inexplicable evil inclination in the other. But -Schopenhauer postulates certain temporal ideas in order to account for -the objectification of the Primordial Will; Bahaullah, as far as I can -see, does not explain the principle according to which the -self-manifestation of the Eternal Love is realised in the Universe. - - [190:1] See Phelp's `Abbas Effendi, chapter, "Philosophy and - Psychology". - - - - -CONCLUSION. - - -Let us now briefly sum up the results of our survey. We have seen that -the Persian mind had to struggle against two different kinds of -Dualism--pre-Islamic Magian Dualism, and post-Islamic Greek Dualism, -though the fundamental problem of the diversity of things remains -essentially the same. The attitude of the pre-Islamic Persian thinkers -is thoroughly objective, and hence the results of their intellectual -efforts are more or less materialistic. The Pre-Islamic thinkers, -however, clearly perceived that the original Principle must be -dynamically conceived. With Zoroaster both the primary spirits are -"active", with Mani the principle of Light is passive, and the principle -of Darkness is aggressive. But their analysis of the various elements -which constitute the Universe is ridiculously meagre; their conception -of the Universe is most defective on its statical side. There are, -therefore, two weak points in their systems:-- - - 1. Naked Dualism. - - 2. Lack of analysis. - -The first was remedied by Islam; the second by the introduction of Greek -Philosophy. The advent of Islam and the study of Greek philosophy, -however, checked the indigenous tendency towards monistic thought; but -these two forces contributed to change the objective attitude -characteristic of early thinkers, and aroused the slumbering -subjectivity, which eventually reached its climax in the extreme -Pantheism of some of the Sufi schools. Al-Farabi endeavoured to get rid -of the dualism between God and matter, by reducing matter to a mere -confused perception of the spirit; the Ash`arite denied it altogether, -and maintained a thoroughgoing Idealism. The followers of Aristotle -continued to stick to their master's Prima Materia; the Sufis looked -upon the material universe as a mere illusion, or a necessary "other," -for the self-knowledge of God. It can, however, be safely stated that -with the Ash`arite Idealism, the Persian mind got over the foreign -dualism of God and matter, and, fortified with new philosophical -ideas, returned to the old dualism of light and darkness. The -Shaikh-al-Ishraq combines the objective attitude of Pre-Islamic -Persian thinkers with the subjective attitude of his immediate -predecessors, and restates the Dualism of Zoroaster in a much more -philosophical and spiritualised form. His system recognises the claims -of both the subject and the object. But all these monistic systems of -thought were met by the Pluralism of Wahid Mahmud, who taught that -reality is not one, but many--primary living units which combine in -various ways, and gradually rise to perfection by passing through an -ascending scale of forms. The reaction of Wahid Mahmud was, however, an -ephemeral phenomenon. The later Sufis as well as philosophers proper -gradually transformed or abandoned the Neo-Platonic theory of Emanation, -and in later thinkers we see a movement through Neo-Platonism towards -real Platonism which is approached by Mulla Hadi's Philosophy. But pure -speculation and dreamy mysticism undergo a powerful check in Babism -which, unmindful of persecution, synthesises all the inherited -philosophical and religious tendencies, and rouses the spirit to a -consciousness of the stern reality of things. Though extremely -cosmopolitan and hence quite unpatriotic in character, it has yet had a -great influence over the Persian mind. The unmystic character and the -practical tone of Babism may have been a remote cause of the -progress of recent political reform in Persia. - - - - -ERRATA - - P. 4, Note 4, l. 1, read Buudahish for Buudadish. - - P. 9, l. 10, read environment for environments. - - P. 56, l. 1, read reaction for reation. - - P. 61, l. 18, read considered for consided. - - P. 73, l. 21, read full stop after dialectic. - - P. 102, l. 1, read conditions for condition. - - P. 123, l. 19, read predecessors for precessor. - - P. 153, l. 21, read He-ness for an He-ness. - - P. 166, l. 21, read a piece for pieee. - - - - -Transcriber's Notes: - -Many words appear in the text with different transcription or mark-up. -They have been left as in the original. - -All occurrences of e. g., i. e., B. C., A. D. and A. H. have been -replaced with e.g., i.e., B.C., A.D. and A.H. Other initials have been -left as in the original. - -All ditto marks, ibid. and Sh. An. (Sharh Anwariyya) entries replaced -with their full references. - -Printed Errata has been moved to the end of the text. - -The following corrections have been made to the text: - - Page IX--due perhaps to semitic [original has samitic] influences, - - Page CONTENTS--Reality as [original has as as] Beauty - - Page 25--introduced [original has intruduced] - - Page 54--necessarily [original has necssarily] - - Page 54--Nazzam [original has Nazzan] - - Page 57--Isma`ilians [original has Isma`iliams] - - Page 61--metaphysical [original has netaphysical] - - Page 63--which,[original has period] by gradually - - Page 68, footnote 68:1--Ash`aritenthums [original has - Ash'aritenthums] - - Page 69--philosophising [original has plilosophising] - - Page 69, footnote 69:1--Ash`aritenthums [original has As`aritenthums] - - Page 75--Ash`arite [original has Ash'arite] - - Page 81--seem to [original has the letter t missing] be - - Page 81--Hikmat al-`Ain--"Philosophy of Essence", - [original has single hyphen] - - Page 85--objectively [original has objectivily] - - Page 95, footnote 95:1--Commentary [original has Comentary] - - Page 104--restatement [original has restatemet] - - Page 111--self-conscious [original has self-consious] - - Page 124--the son of Sultan Salah [original has Sala-Salah]-al Din - - Page 127--visible [original has visibile] - - Page 136--is motion.[original has comma] The distinction of past, - - Page 142--theory of [original has theoryof] - - Page 148--maintains [original has mantains] - - Page 152, footnote 152:1--Insan al-Kamil [original has Insanul Kamul] - - Page 158--identical [original has indentical] - - Page 162--marks the [original has the the] first step - - Page 163, footnote 163:1--Notwithstanding [original has - Nowithstanding] - - Page 171, footnote 171:1--Insan al-Kamil [original has Insanul Kamil] - - Page 180--standpoint [original has staindpoint] - - Page 187--Shi`ahs [original has Shi'ahs] - - - - - -End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of The Development of Metaphysics in -Persia, by Muhammad Iqbal - -*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK METAPHYSICS IN PERSIA *** - -***** This file should be named 41707-8.txt or 41707-8.zip ***** -This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: - http://www.gutenberg.org/4/1/7/0/41707/ - -Produced by Fritz Ohrenschall, Sania Ali Mirza, Asad Razzaki -and the Online Distributed Proofreading Team at -http://www.pgdp.net (This book was produced from scanned -images of public domain material from the Google Print -project.) - - -Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions -will be renamed. - -Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no -one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation -(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without -permission and without paying copyright royalties. Special rules, -set forth in the General Terms of Use part of this license, apply to -copying and distributing Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works to -protect the PROJECT GUTENBERG-tm concept and trademark. Project -Gutenberg is a registered trademark, and may not be used if you -charge for the eBooks, unless you receive specific permission. If you -do not charge anything for copies of this eBook, complying with the -rules is very easy. You may use this eBook for nearly any purpose -such as creation of derivative works, reports, performances and -research. They may be modified and printed and given away--you may do -practically ANYTHING with public domain eBooks. Redistribution is -subject to the trademark license, especially commercial -redistribution. - - - -*** START: FULL LICENSE *** - -THE FULL PROJECT GUTENBERG LICENSE -PLEASE READ THIS BEFORE YOU DISTRIBUTE OR USE THIS WORK - -To protect the Project Gutenberg-tm mission of promoting the free -distribution of electronic works, by using or distributing this work -(or any other work associated in any way with the phrase "Project -Gutenberg"), you agree to comply with all the terms of the Full Project -Gutenberg-tm License available with this file or online at - www.gutenberg.org/license. - - -Section 1. General Terms of Use and Redistributing Project Gutenberg-tm -electronic works - -1.A. By reading or using any part of this Project Gutenberg-tm -electronic work, you indicate that you have read, understand, agree to -and accept all the terms of this license and intellectual property -(trademark/copyright) agreement. If you do not agree to abide by all -the terms of this agreement, you must cease using and return or destroy -all copies of Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works in your possession. -If you paid a fee for obtaining a copy of or access to a Project -Gutenberg-tm electronic work and you do not agree to be bound by the -terms of this agreement, you may obtain a refund from the person or -entity to whom you paid the fee as set forth in paragraph 1.E.8. - -1.B. "Project Gutenberg" is a registered trademark. It may only be -used on or associated in any way with an electronic work by people who -agree to be bound by the terms of this agreement. There are a few -things that you can do with most Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works -even without complying with the full terms of this agreement. See -paragraph 1.C below. There are a lot of things you can do with Project -Gutenberg-tm electronic works if you follow the terms of this agreement -and help preserve free future access to Project Gutenberg-tm electronic -works. See paragraph 1.E below. - -1.C. The Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation ("the Foundation" -or PGLAF), owns a compilation copyright in the collection of Project -Gutenberg-tm electronic works. Nearly all the individual works in the -collection are in the public domain in the United States. If an -individual work is in the public domain in the United States and you are -located in the United States, we do not claim a right to prevent you from -copying, distributing, performing, displaying or creating derivative -works based on the work as long as all references to Project Gutenberg -are removed. Of course, we hope that you will support the Project -Gutenberg-tm mission of promoting free access to electronic works by -freely sharing Project Gutenberg-tm works in compliance with the terms of -this agreement for keeping the Project Gutenberg-tm name associated with -the work. You can easily comply with the terms of this agreement by -keeping this work in the same format with its attached full Project -Gutenberg-tm License when you share it without charge with others. - -1.D. The copyright laws of the place where you are located also govern -what you can do with this work. Copyright laws in most countries are in -a constant state of change. If you are outside the United States, check -the laws of your country in addition to the terms of this agreement -before downloading, copying, displaying, performing, distributing or -creating derivative works based on this work or any other Project -Gutenberg-tm work. The Foundation makes no representations concerning -the copyright status of any work in any country outside the United -States. - -1.E. Unless you have removed all references to Project Gutenberg: - -1.E.1. The following sentence, with active links to, or other immediate -access to, the full Project Gutenberg-tm License must appear prominently -whenever any copy of a Project Gutenberg-tm work (any work on which the -phrase "Project Gutenberg" appears, or with which the phrase "Project -Gutenberg" is associated) is accessed, displayed, performed, viewed, -copied or distributed: - -This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with -almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or -re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included -with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org - -1.E.2. If an individual Project Gutenberg-tm electronic work is derived -from the public domain (does not contain a notice indicating that it is -posted with permission of the copyright holder), the work can be copied -and distributed to anyone in the United States without paying any fees -or charges. If you are redistributing or providing access to a work -with the phrase "Project Gutenberg" associated with or appearing on the -work, you must comply either with the requirements of paragraphs 1.E.1 -through 1.E.7 or obtain permission for the use of the work and the -Project Gutenberg-tm trademark as set forth in paragraphs 1.E.8 or -1.E.9. - -1.E.3. If an individual Project Gutenberg-tm electronic work is posted -with the permission of the copyright holder, your use and distribution -must comply with both paragraphs 1.E.1 through 1.E.7 and any additional -terms imposed by the copyright holder. Additional terms will be linked -to the Project Gutenberg-tm License for all works posted with the -permission of the copyright holder found at the beginning of this work. - -1.E.4. Do not unlink or detach or remove the full Project Gutenberg-tm -License terms from this work, or any files containing a part of this -work or any other work associated with Project Gutenberg-tm. - -1.E.5. Do not copy, display, perform, distribute or redistribute this -electronic work, or any part of this electronic work, without -prominently displaying the sentence set forth in paragraph 1.E.1 with -active links or immediate access to the full terms of the Project -Gutenberg-tm License. - -1.E.6. You may convert to and distribute this work in any binary, -compressed, marked up, nonproprietary or proprietary form, including any -word processing or hypertext form. However, if you provide access to or -distribute copies of a Project Gutenberg-tm work in a format other than -"Plain Vanilla ASCII" or other format used in the official version -posted on the official Project Gutenberg-tm web site (www.gutenberg.org), -you must, at no additional cost, fee or expense to the user, provide a -copy, a means of exporting a copy, or a means of obtaining a copy upon -request, of the work in its original "Plain Vanilla ASCII" or other -form. Any alternate format must include the full Project Gutenberg-tm -License as specified in paragraph 1.E.1. - -1.E.7. Do not charge a fee for access to, viewing, displaying, -performing, copying or distributing any Project Gutenberg-tm works -unless you comply with paragraph 1.E.8 or 1.E.9. - -1.E.8. You may charge a reasonable fee for copies of or providing -access to or distributing Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works provided -that - -- You pay a royalty fee of 20% of the gross profits you derive from - the use of Project Gutenberg-tm works calculated using the method - you already use to calculate your applicable taxes. The fee is - owed to the owner of the Project Gutenberg-tm trademark, but he - has agreed to donate royalties under this paragraph to the - Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation. Royalty payments - must be paid within 60 days following each date on which you - prepare (or are legally required to prepare) your periodic tax - returns. Royalty payments should be clearly marked as such and - sent to the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation at the - address specified in Section 4, "Information about donations to - the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation." - -- You provide a full refund of any money paid by a user who notifies - you in writing (or by e-mail) within 30 days of receipt that s/he - does not agree to the terms of the full Project Gutenberg-tm - License. You must require such a user to return or - destroy all copies of the works possessed in a physical medium - and discontinue all use of and all access to other copies of - Project Gutenberg-tm works. - -- You provide, in accordance with paragraph 1.F.3, a full refund of any - money paid for a work or a replacement copy, if a defect in the - electronic work is discovered and reported to you within 90 days - of receipt of the work. - -- You comply with all other terms of this agreement for free - distribution of Project Gutenberg-tm works. - -1.E.9. If you wish to charge a fee or distribute a Project Gutenberg-tm -electronic work or group of works on different terms than are set -forth in this agreement, you must obtain permission in writing from -both the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation and Michael -Hart, the owner of the Project Gutenberg-tm trademark. Contact the -Foundation as set forth in Section 3 below. - -1.F. - -1.F.1. Project Gutenberg volunteers and employees expend considerable -effort to identify, do copyright research on, transcribe and proofread -public domain works in creating the Project Gutenberg-tm -collection. Despite these efforts, Project Gutenberg-tm electronic -works, and the medium on which they may be stored, may contain -"Defects," such as, but not limited to, incomplete, inaccurate or -corrupt data, transcription errors, a copyright or other intellectual -property infringement, a defective or damaged disk or other medium, a -computer virus, or computer codes that damage or cannot be read by -your equipment. - -1.F.2. LIMITED WARRANTY, DISCLAIMER OF DAMAGES - Except for the "Right -of Replacement or Refund" described in paragraph 1.F.3, the Project -Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation, the owner of the Project -Gutenberg-tm trademark, and any other party distributing a Project -Gutenberg-tm electronic work under this agreement, disclaim all -liability to you for damages, costs and expenses, including legal -fees. YOU AGREE THAT YOU HAVE NO REMEDIES FOR NEGLIGENCE, STRICT -LIABILITY, BREACH OF WARRANTY OR BREACH OF CONTRACT EXCEPT THOSE -PROVIDED IN PARAGRAPH 1.F.3. YOU AGREE THAT THE FOUNDATION, THE -TRADEMARK OWNER, AND ANY DISTRIBUTOR UNDER THIS AGREEMENT WILL NOT BE -LIABLE TO YOU FOR ACTUAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, CONSEQUENTIAL, PUNITIVE OR -INCIDENTAL DAMAGES EVEN IF YOU GIVE NOTICE OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH -DAMAGE. - -1.F.3. LIMITED RIGHT OF REPLACEMENT OR REFUND - If you discover a -defect in this electronic work within 90 days of receiving it, you can -receive a refund of the money (if any) you paid for it by sending a -written explanation to the person you received the work from. If you -received the work on a physical medium, you must return the medium with -your written explanation. The person or entity that provided you with -the defective work may elect to provide a replacement copy in lieu of a -refund. If you received the work electronically, the person or entity -providing it to you may choose to give you a second opportunity to -receive the work electronically in lieu of a refund. If the second copy -is also defective, you may demand a refund in writing without further -opportunities to fix the problem. - -1.F.4. Except for the limited right of replacement or refund set forth -in paragraph 1.F.3, this work is provided to you 'AS-IS', WITH NO OTHER -WARRANTIES OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO -WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR ANY PURPOSE. - -1.F.5. Some states do not allow disclaimers of certain implied -warranties or the exclusion or limitation of certain types of damages. -If any disclaimer or limitation set forth in this agreement violates the -law of the state applicable to this agreement, the agreement shall be -interpreted to make the maximum disclaimer or limitation permitted by -the applicable state law. The invalidity or unenforceability of any -provision of this agreement shall not void the remaining provisions. - -1.F.6. INDEMNITY - You agree to indemnify and hold the Foundation, the -trademark owner, any agent or employee of the Foundation, anyone -providing copies of Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works in accordance -with this agreement, and any volunteers associated with the production, -promotion and distribution of Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works, -harmless from all liability, costs and expenses, including legal fees, -that arise directly or indirectly from any of the following which you do -or cause to occur: (a) distribution of this or any Project Gutenberg-tm -work, (b) alteration, modification, or additions or deletions to any -Project Gutenberg-tm work, and (c) any Defect you cause. - - -Section 2. Information about the Mission of Project Gutenberg-tm - -Project Gutenberg-tm is synonymous with the free distribution of -electronic works in formats readable by the widest variety of computers -including obsolete, old, middle-aged and new computers. It exists -because of the efforts of hundreds of volunteers and donations from -people in all walks of life. - -Volunteers and financial support to provide volunteers with the -assistance they need are critical to reaching Project Gutenberg-tm's -goals and ensuring that the Project Gutenberg-tm collection will -remain freely available for generations to come. In 2001, the Project -Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation was created to provide a secure -and permanent future for Project Gutenberg-tm and future generations. -To learn more about the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation -and how your efforts and donations can help, see Sections 3 and 4 -and the Foundation information page at www.gutenberg.org - - -Section 3. Information about the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive -Foundation - -The Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation is a non profit -501(c)(3) educational corporation organized under the laws of the -state of Mississippi and granted tax exempt status by the Internal -Revenue Service. The Foundation's EIN or federal tax identification -number is 64-6221541. Contributions to the Project Gutenberg -Literary Archive Foundation are tax deductible to the full extent -permitted by U.S. federal laws and your state's laws. - -The Foundation's principal office is located at 4557 Melan Dr. S. -Fairbanks, AK, 99712., but its volunteers and employees are scattered -throughout numerous locations. Its business office is located at 809 -North 1500 West, Salt Lake City, UT 84116, (801) 596-1887. Email -contact links and up to date contact information can be found at the -Foundation's web site and official page at www.gutenberg.org/contact - -For additional contact information: - Dr. Gregory B. Newby - Chief Executive and Director - gbnewby@pglaf.org - -Section 4. Information about Donations to the Project Gutenberg -Literary Archive Foundation - -Project Gutenberg-tm depends upon and cannot survive without wide -spread public support and donations to carry out its mission of -increasing the number of public domain and licensed works that can be -freely distributed in machine readable form accessible by the widest -array of equipment including outdated equipment. Many small donations -($1 to $5,000) are particularly important to maintaining tax exempt -status with the IRS. - -The Foundation is committed to complying with the laws regulating -charities and charitable donations in all 50 states of the United -States. Compliance requirements are not uniform and it takes a -considerable effort, much paperwork and many fees to meet and keep up -with these requirements. We do not solicit donations in locations -where we have not received written confirmation of compliance. To -SEND DONATIONS or determine the status of compliance for any -particular state visit www.gutenberg.org/donate - -While we cannot and do not solicit contributions from states where we -have not met the solicitation requirements, we know of no prohibition -against accepting unsolicited donations from donors in such states who -approach us with offers to donate. - -International donations are gratefully accepted, but we cannot make -any statements concerning tax treatment of donations received from -outside the United States. U.S. laws alone swamp our small staff. - -Please check the Project Gutenberg Web pages for current donation -methods and addresses. Donations are accepted in a number of other -ways including checks, online payments and credit card donations. -To donate, please visit: www.gutenberg.org/donate - - -Section 5. General Information About Project Gutenberg-tm electronic -works. - -Professor Michael S. Hart was the originator of the Project Gutenberg-tm -concept of a library of electronic works that could be freely shared -with anyone. For forty years, he produced and distributed Project -Gutenberg-tm eBooks with only a loose network of volunteer support. - -Project Gutenberg-tm eBooks are often created from several printed -editions, all of which are confirmed as Public Domain in the U.S. -unless a copyright notice is included. Thus, we do not necessarily -keep eBooks in compliance with any particular paper edition. - -Most people start at our Web site which has the main PG search facility: - - www.gutenberg.org - -This Web site includes information about Project Gutenberg-tm, -including how to make donations to the Project Gutenberg Literary -Archive Foundation, how to help produce our new eBooks, and how to -subscribe to our email newsletter to hear about new eBooks. - diff --git a/old/41707-8.zip b/old/41707-8.zip Binary files differdeleted file mode 100644 index 989aa34..0000000 --- a/old/41707-8.zip +++ /dev/null diff --git a/old/41707-h.zip b/old/41707-h.zip Binary files differdeleted file mode 100644 index 11781d1..0000000 --- a/old/41707-h.zip +++ /dev/null diff --git a/old/41707.txt b/old/41707.txt deleted file mode 100644 index 665ca17..0000000 --- a/old/41707.txt +++ /dev/null @@ -1,4764 +0,0 @@ -The Project Gutenberg EBook of The Development of Metaphysics in Persia, by -Muhammad Iqbal - -This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with -almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or -re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included -with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org - - -Title: The Development of Metaphysics in Persia - A Contribution to the History of Muslim Philosophy - -Author: Muhammad Iqbal - -Release Date: December 26, 2012 [EBook #41707] - -Language: English - -Character set encoding: ASCII - -*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK METAPHYSICS IN PERSIA *** - - - - -Produced by Fritz Ohrenschall, Sania Ali Mirza, Asad Razzaki -and the Online Distributed Proofreading Team at -http://www.pgdp.net (This book was produced from scanned -images of public domain material from the Google Print -project.) - - - - - -Transcriber's note: - - Some typographical and punctuation errors have been corrected. - A complete list follows the text. - - Words italicized in the original are surrounded by - _underscores_. - - Letters superscripted in the original have been placed in {} - brackets. - - The Arabic letter Ain is represented by the grave accent `, - the Arabic letter Hamza is represented by the single quote ' - and the asterism sign is represented as .*. in the text. - - - - - THE - DEVELOPMENT OF METAPHYSICS - IN - PERSIA: - - A CONTRIBUTION TO THE HISTORY - OF MUSLIM PHILOSOPHY - - BY - - SHAIKH MUHAMMAD IQBAL - B. A. (Cantab) M. A. (Pb.) Ph. D. (Munich). - - - LONDON - LUZAC & Co. 46, Great Russell Street W. C. - 1908 - - - Printed by E. J. BRILL. aEuro" LEIDEN (Holland). - - - - - DEDICATION - TO - Professor T. W. ARNOLD M. A. - - - My dear MR. ARNOLD, - -This little book is the first-fruit of that literary and philosophical -training which I have been receiving from you for the last ten years, -and as an expression of gratitude I beg to dedicate it to your name. You -have always judged me liberally; I hope you will judge these pages in -the same spirit. - - Your affectionate pupil - - IQBAL. - - - - -INTRODUCTION. - - -The most remarkable feature of the character of the Persian people is -their love of Metaphysical speculation. Yet the inquirer who approaches -the extant literature of Persia expecting to find any comprehensive -systems of thought, like those of Kapila or Kant, will have to turn back -disappointed, though deeply impressed by the wonderful intellectual -subtlety displayed therein. It seems to me that the Persian mind is -rather impatient of detail, and consequently destitute of that -organising faculty which gradually works out a system of ideas, by -interpreting the fundamental principles with reference to the ordinary -facts of observation. The subtle Brahman sees the inner unity of things; -so does the Persian. But while the former endeavours to discover it in -all the aspects of human experience, and illustrates its hidden presence -in the concrete in various ways, the latter appears to be satisfied -with a bare universality, and does not attempt to verify the richness of -its inner content. The butterfly imagination of the Persian flies, -half-inebriated as it were, from flower to flower, and seems to be -incapable of reviewing the garden as a whole. For this reason his -deepest thoughts and emotions find expression mostly in disconnected -verses (Ghazal) which reveal all the subtlety of his artistic soul. -The Hindu, while admitting, like the Persian, the necessity of a higher -source of knowledge, yet calmly moves from experience to experience, -mercilessly dissecting them, and forcing them to yield their underlying -universality. In fact the Persian is only half-conscious of Metaphysics -as a _system_ of thought; his Brahman brother, on the other hand, is -fully alive to the need of presenting his theory in the form of a -thoroughly reasoned out system. And the result of this mental difference -between the two nations is clear. In the one case we have only partially -worked out systems of thought; in the other case, the awful sublimity of -the searching Vedanta. The student of Islamic Mysticism who is anxious -to see an all-embracing exposition of the principle of Unity, must look -up the heavy volumes of the Andalusian Ibn al-`Arabi, whose profound -teaching stands in strange contrast with the dry-as-dust Islam of his -countrymen. - -The results, however, of the intellectual activity of the different -branches of the great Aryan family are strikingly similar. The outcome -of all Idealistic speculation in India is Buddha, in Persia Bahaullah, -and in the west Schopenhauer whose system, in Hegelian language, is the -marriage of free oriental universality with occidental determinateness. - -But the history of Persian thought presents a phenomenon peculiar to -itself. In Persia, due perhaps to semitic influences, philosophical -speculation has indissolubly associated itself with religion, and -thinkers in new lines of thought have almost always been founders of new -religious movements. After the Arab conquest, however, we see pure -Philosophy severed from religion by the Neo-Platonic Aristotelians of -Islam, but the severance was only a transient phenomenon. Greek -philosophy, though an exotic plant in the soil of Persia, eventually -became an integral part of Persian thought; and later thinkers, critics -as well as advocates of Greek wisdom, talked in the philosophical -language of Aristotle and Plato, and were mostly influenced by religious -presuppositions. It is necessary to bear this fact in mind in order to -gain a thorough understanding of post-Islamic Persian thought. - -The object of this investigation is, as will appear, to prepare a -ground-work for a future history of Persian Metaphysics. Original -thought cannot be expected in a review, the object of which is purely -historical; yet I venture to claim some consideration for the following -two points:-- - -(a) I have endeavoured to trace the logical continuity of Persian -thought, which I have tried to interpret in the language of modern -Philosophy. This, as far as I know, has not yet been done. - -(b) I have discussed the subject of Sufiism in a more scientific manner, -and have attempted to bring out the intellectual conditions which -necessitated such a phenomenon. In opposition, therefore, to the -generally accepted view I have tried to maintain that Sufiism is a -necessary product of the play of various intellectual and moral forces -which would necessarily awaken the slumbering soul to a higher ideal of -life. - -Owing to my ignorance of Zend, my knowledge of Zoroaster is merely -second-hand. As regards the second part of my work, I have been able to -look up the original Persian and Arabic manuscripts as well as many -printed works connected with my investigation. I give below the names of -Arabic and Persian manuscripts from which I have drawn most of the -material utilized here. The method of transliteration adopted is the one -recognised by the Royal Asiatic Society. - - 1. Tarikh al-Hukama, by Al-Baihaqi.--Royal Library of Berlin. - - 2. Sharhi Anwariyya, (with the original text) by Muhammad - Sharif of Herat. Royal Library of Berlin. - - 3. Hikmat al-`Ain, by al-Katibi. Royal Library of Berlin. - - 4. Commentary on Hikmat al-`Ain, by Muhammad ibn Mubarak - al-Bukhari. India Office Library. - - 5. Commentary on Hikmat al-`Ain by Husaini. India Office - Library. - - 6. `Awarif al-Ma`arif, by Shahab al-Din. India Office Library. - - - 7. Mishkat al-Anwar, by Al-Ghazali. India Office Library. - - - 8. Kashf al-Mahjub, by `Ali Hajveri. India Office Library. - - 9. Risalahi Nafs translated from Aristotle, by Afdal Kashi. - India Office Library. - - 10. Risalahi Mir Sayyid Sharif. India Office Library. - - 11. Khatima, by Sayyid Muhammad Gisudaraz. India Office - Library. - - 12. Manazilal-sa'rin, by `Abdullah Ismai'l of Herat. India - Office Library. - - 13. Jawidan Nama, by Afdal Kashi. India Office Library. - - 14. Tarikh al-Hukama, by Shahrzuri. British Museum Library. - - 15. Collected works of Avicenna. British Museum Library. - - 16. Risalah fi'l-Wujud, by Mir Jurjani. British Museum Library. - - 17. Jawidani Kabir. Cambridge University Library. - - 18. Jami Jahan Numa. Cambridge University Library. - - 19. Majmu`ai Farsi Risalah No: 1, 2, of Al-Nasafi. Trinity - College Library. - - S. M. IQBAL. - - - - -CONTENTS. - - - PART I. - Pre-Islamic Persian Philosophy. - Page - Chapter I. Persian Dualism 1 - Sec: I. Zoroaster 1 - Sec: II. Mani and Mazdak 12 - Sec: III. Retrospect 20 - - PART II. - Greek Dualism. - - Chapter II. Neo-Platonic Aristotelians of Persia 22 - Sec: I. Ibn Maskawaih 26 - Sec: II. Avicenna 38 - - Chapter III. Islamic Rationalism 45 - Sec: I. Metaphysics of Rationalism--Materialism 45 - Sec: II. Contemporary movements of thought 55 - Sec: III. Reaction against Rationalism--The Ash`arite 65 - - Chapter IV. Controversy between Realism and Idealism 81 - - Chapter V. Sufiism. - Sec: I. The origin and Quranic justification of Sufiism 96 - Sec: II. Aspects of Sufi Metaphysics 111 - A. Reality as Self-conscious Will 112 - B. Reality as Beauty 112 - C. (1) Reality as Light 120 - (Return to Persian Dualism--Al-Ishraqi). - (2) Reality as Thought--Al-Jili 121 - - Chapter VI. Later Persian Thought 174 - - Conclusion 192 - - - - -PART I. - -Pre-Islamic Persian Philosophy. - - - - -CHAP. I. - -PERSIAN DUALISM. - - -ASec. I. - -Zoroaster. - -To Zoroaster--the ancient sage of Iran--must always be assigned the -first place in the intellectual history of Iranian Aryans who, wearied -of constant roaming, settled down to an agricultural life at a time when -the Vedic Hymns were still being composed in the plains of Central Asia. -This new mode of life and the consequent stability of the institution of -property among the settlers, made them hated by other Aryan tribes who -had not yet shaken off their original nomadic habits, and occasionally -plundered their more civilised kinsmen. Thus grew up the conflict -between the two modes of life which found its earliest expression in the -denunciation of the deities of each other--the Devas and the Ahuras. It -was really the beginning of a long individualising process which -gradually severed the Iranian branch from other Aryan tribes, and -finally manifested itself in the religious system of Zoroaster[2:1]--the -great prophet of Iran who lived and taught in the age of Solon and -Thales. In the dim light of modern oriental research we see ancient -Iranians divided between two camps--partisans of the powers of good, and -partisans of the powers of evil--when the great sage joins their furious -contest, and with his moral enthusiasm stamps out once for all the -worship of demons as well as the intolerable ritual of the Magian -priesthood. - - [2:1] Some European Scholars have held Zoroaster to be nothing - more than a mythical personage. But since the publication of - Professor Jackson's admirable Life of Zoroaster, the Iranian - Prophet has, I believe, finally got out of the ordeal of modern - criticism. - -It is, however, beside our purpose to trace the origin and growth of -Zoroaster's religious system. Our object, in so far as the present -investigation is concerned, is to glance at the metaphysical side of -his revelation. We, therefore, wish to fix our attention on the sacred -trinity of philosophy--God, Man and Nature. - -Geiger, in his "Civilisation of Eastern Iranians in Ancient Times", -points out that Zoroaster inherited two fundamental principles from his -Aryan ancestry.--(1) There is law in Nature. (2) There is conflict in -Nature. It is the observation of law and conflict in the vast panorama -of being that constitutes the philosophical foundation of his system. -The problem before him was to reconcile the existence of evil with the -eternal goodness of God. His predecessors worshipped a plurality of good -spirits all of which he reduced to a unity and called it Ahuramazda. On -the other hand he reduced all the powers of evil to a similar unity and -called it Druj-Ahriman. Thus by a process of unification he arrived at -two fundamental principles which, as Haug shows, he looked upon not as -two independent activities, but as two parts or rather aspects of the -same Primary Being. Dr. Haug, therefore, holds that the Prophet of -ancient Iran was theologically a monotheist and philosophically a -dualist.[4:1] But to maintain that there are "twin"[4:2] -spirits--creators of reality and nonreality--and at the same time to -hold that these two spirits are united in the Supreme Being,[4:3] is -virtually to say that the principle of evil constitutes a part of the -very essence of God; and the conflict between good and evil is nothing -more than the struggle of God against Himself. There is, therefore, an -inherent weakness in his attempt to reconcile theological monotheism -with philosophical dualism, and the result was a schism among the -prophet's followers. The Zendiks[4:4] whom Dr. Haug calls heretics, but -who were, I believe, decidedly more consistent than their opponents, -maintained the independence of the two original spirits from each other, -while the Magi upheld their unity. The upholders of unity endeavoured, -in various ways, to meet the Zendiks; but the very fact that they tried -different phrases and expressions to express the unity of the "Primal -Twins", indicates dissatisfaction with their own philosophical -explanations, and the strength of their opponent's position. -Shahrastani[5:1] describes briefly the different explanations of the -Magi. The Zarwanians look upon Light and Darkness as the sons of -Infinite Time. The Kiyumarthiyya hold that the original principle was -Light which was afraid of a hostile power, and it was this thought of an -adversary mixed with fear that led to the birth of Darkness. Another -branch of Zarwanians maintain that the original principle doubted -concerning something and this doubt produced Ahriman. Ibn Hazm[5:2] -speaks of another sect who explained the principle of Darkness as the -obscuration of a part of the fundamental principle of Light itself. - - [4:1] Essays, p. 303. - - [4:2] "In the beginning there was a pair of twins, two spirits, - each of a peculiar activity". Yas. XXX. 1. - - [4:3] "The more beneficial of my spirits has produced, by - speaking it, the whole rightful creation". Yas. XIX. 9. - - [4:4] The following verse from Buudahish Chap. I. will indicate - the Zendik view:-- "And between them (the two principles) there - was empty space, that is what they call "air" in which is now - their meeting". - - [5:1] Shahrastani; ed. Cureton, London, 1846, pp. 182-185. - - [5:2] Ibn Hazm--Kitab al-Milal w'al-Nihal. Ed. Cairo. Vol. II, - p. 34. - -Whether the philosophical dualism of Zoroaster can be reconciled with -his monotheism or not, it is unquestionable that, from a metaphysical -standpoint, he has made a profound suggestion in regard to the ultimate -nature of reality. The idea seems to have influenced ancient Greek -Philosophy[6:1] as well as early Christian Gnostic speculation, and -through the latter, some aspects of modern western thought.[6:2] As a -thinker he is worthy of great respect not only because he approached the -problem of objective multiplicity in a philosophical spirit; but also -because he endeavoured, having been led to metaphysical dualism, to -reduce his Primary Duality to a higher unity. He seems to have -perceived, what the mystic shoemaker of Germany perceived long after -him, that the diversity of nature could not be explained without -postulating a principle of negativity or self-differentiation in the -very nature of God. His immediate successors did not, however, quite -realise the deep significance of their master's suggestions; but we -shall see, as we advance, how Zoroaster's idea finds a more -spiritualised expression in some of the aspects of later Persian -thought. - - [6:1] In connection with the influence of Zoroastrian ideas on - Ancient Greek thought, the following statement made by Erdmann - is noteworthy, though Lawrence Mills (American Journal of - Philology Vol. 22) regards such influence as improbable:--"The - fact that the handmaids of this force, which he (Heraclitus) - calls the seed of all that happens and the measure of all order, - are entitled the "tongues" has probably been slightly ascribed - to the influence of the Persian Magi. On the other hand he - connects himself with his country's mythology, not indeed - without a change of exegesis when he places Apollo and Dionysus - beside Zeus, i.e. The ultimate fire, as the two aspects of his - nature". History of Philosophy Vol. I, p. 50. - - It is, perhaps, owing to this doubtful influence of - Zoroastrianism on Heraclitus that Lassalle (quoted by Paul Janet - in his History of the Problems of Philosophy Vol. II, p. 147) - looks upon Zoroaster as a precursor of Hegel. - - Of Zoroastrian influence on Pythagoras Erdmann says:-- - - "The fact that the odd numbers are put above the even has been - emphasised by Gladisch in his comparison of the Pythagorian with - the Chinese doctrine, and the fact, moreover, that among the - oppositions we find those of light and darkness, good and evil, - has induced many, in ancient and modern times, to suppose that - they were borrowed from Zoroastrianism." Vol. I, p. 33. - - [6:2] Among modern English thinkers Mr. Bradley arrives at a - conclusion similar to that of Zoroaster. Discussing the ethical - significance of Bradley's Philosophy, Prof. Sorley says:--"Mr. - Bradley, like Green, has faith in an eternal reality which might - be called spiritual, inasmuch as it is not material; like Green - he looks upon man's moral activity as an appearance--what Green - calls a reproduction--of this eternal reality. But under this - general agreement there lies a world of difference. He refuses - by the use of the term self-conscious, to liken his Absolute to - the personality of man, and he brings out the consequence which - in Green is more or less concealed, that the evil equally with - the good in man and in the world are appearances of the - Absolute". Recent tendencies in Ethics, pp. 100-101. - -Turning now to his Cosmology, his dualism leads him to bifurcate, as it -were, the whole universe into two departments of being--reality i.e. -the sum of all good creations flowing from the creative activity of the -beneficial spirit, and non-reality[8:1] i.e. the sum of all evil -creations proceeding from the hostile spirit. The original conflict of -the two spirits is manifested in the opposing forces of nature, which, -therefore, presents a continual struggle between the powers of Good and -the powers of Evil. But it should be remembered that nothing intervenes -between the original spirits and their respective creations. Things are -good and bad because they proceed from good or bad creative agencies, in -their own nature they are quite indifferent. Zoroaster's conception of -creation is fundamentally different from that of Plato and Schopenhauer -to whom spheres of empirical reality reflect non-temporal or temporal -ideas which, so to speak, mediate between Reality and Appearance. There -are, according to Zoroaster, only two categories of existence, and the -history of the universe is nothing more than a progressive conflict -between the forces falling respectively under these categories. We are, -like other things, partakers of this struggle, and it is our duty to -range ourselves on the side of Light which will eventually prevail and -completely vanquish the spirit of Darkness. The metaphysics of the -Iranian Prophet, like that of Plato, passes on into Ethics, and it is in -the peculiarity of the Ethical aspect of his thought that the influence -of his social environment is most apparent. - - [8:1] This should not be confounded with Plato's non-being. To - Zoroaster all forms of existence proceeding from the creative - agency of the spirit of darkness are unreal; because, - considering the final triumph of the spirit of Light, they have - a temporary existence only. - -Zoroaster's view of the destiny of the soul is very simple. The soul, -according to him, is a creation, not a part of God as the votaries of -Mithra[9:1] afterwards maintained. It had a beginning in time, but can -attain to everlasting life by fighting against Evil in the earthly scene -of its activity. It is free to choose between the only two courses of -action--good and evil; and besides the power of choice the spirit of -Light has endowed it with the following faculties:-- - - 1. Conscience[10:1]. - - 2. Vital force. - - 3. The Soul--The Mind. - - 4. The Spirit--Reason. - - 5. The Farawashi[10:2].--A kind of tutelary spirit which acts - as a protection of man in his voyage towards God. - -The last three[10:3] faculties are united together after death, and form -an indissoluble whole. The virtuous soul, leaving its home of flesh, is -borne up into higher regions, and has to pass through the following -planes of existence:-- - - 1. The Place of good thoughts. - - 2. The Place of good words. - - 3. The Place of good works. - - 4. The Place of Eternal Glory[11:1].--Where the individual soul - unites with the principle of Light without losing its - personality. - - [9:1] Mithraism was a phase of Zoroastrianism which spread over - the Roman world in the second century. The partisans of Mithra - worshipped the sun whom they looked upon as the great advocate - of Light. They held the human soul to be a part of God, and - maintained that the observance of a mysterious cult could bring - about the souls' union with God. Their doctrine of the soul, its - ascent towards God by torturing the body and finally passing - through the sphere of Aether and becoming pure fire, offers some - resemblance with views entertained by some schools of Persian - Sufiism. - - [10:1] Geiger's Civilisation of Eastern Iranians, Vol. I, - p. 124. - - [10:2] Dr. Haug (Essays p. 206) compares these protecting - spirits with the ideas of Plato. They, however, are not to be - understood as models according to which things are fashioned. - Plato's ideas, moreover, are eternal, non-temporal and - non-spatial. The doctrine that everything created by the spirit - of Light is protected by a subordinate spirit has only an - outward resemblance with the view that every spirit is fashioned - according to a perfect supersensible model. - - [10:3] The Sufi conception of the soul is also tripartite. - According to them the soul is a combination of Mind, heart and - spirit (Nafs, Qalb, Ruh). The "heart" is to them both material - and immaterial or, more properly, neither--standing midway - between soul and mind (Nafs and Ruh), and acting as the organ of - higher knowledge. Perhaps Dr. Schenkel's use of the word - "conscience" would approach the sufi idea of "heart". - - [11:1] Geiger Vol. I, p. 104. (The sufi Cosmology has a similar - doctrine concerning the different stages of existence through - which the soul has to pass in its journey heavenward. They - enumerate the following five Planes; but their definition of the - character of each plane is slightly different:-- - - 1. The world of body. (Nasut). - - 2. The world of pure intelligence. (Malakut). - - 3. The world of power. (Jabrut). - - 4. The world of negation. (Lahut). - - 5. The world of Absolute Silence. (Hahut). - - The sufis probably borrowed this idea from the Indian Yogis who - recognise the following seven Planes:--(Annie Besant: - Reincarnation, p. 30). - - 1. The Plane of Physical Body. - - 2. The Plane of Etherial double. - - 3. The Plane of Vitality. - - 4. The Plane of Emotional Nature. - - 5. The Plane of Thought. - - 6. The Plane of Spiritual soul--Reason. - - 7. The Plane of Pure Spirit.) - - - - -ASec. II. - -Mani[12:1] and Mazdak[12:2]. - -We have seen Zoroaster's solution of the problem of diversity, and the -theological or rather philosophical controversy which split up the -Zoroastrian Church. The half-Persian Mani--"the founder of Godless -community" as Christians styled him afterwards--agrees with those -Zoroastrians who held the Prophet's doctrine in its naked form, and -approaches the question in a spirit thoroughly materialistic. -Originally Persian his father emigrated from Hamadan to Babylonia where -Mani was born in 215 or 216 A.D.--the time when Buddhistic Missionaries -were beginning to preach Nirvana to the country of Zoroaster. The -eclectic character of the religious system of Mani, its bold extension -of the Christian idea of redemption, and its logical consistency in -holding, as a true ground for an ascetic life, that the world is -essentially evil, made it a real power which influenced not only Eastern -and Western Christian thought[13:1], but has also left some dim marks on -the development of metaphysical speculation in Persia. Leaving the -discussion of the sources[13:2] of Mani's religious system to the -orientalist, we proceed to describe and finally to determine the -philosophical value of his doctrine of the origin of the Phenomenal -Universe. - - [12:1] Sources used:-- - - (a) The text of Muhammad ibn Ishaq, edited by Flugel, pp. - 52-56. - - (b) Al-Ya`qubi: ed. Houtsma, 1883, Vol. I, pp. 180-181. - - (c) Ibn Hazm: Kitab al-Milal w'al-Nihal: ed. Cairo, Vol. II, - p. 36. - - (d) Shahrastani: ed. Cureton, London, 1846, pp. 188-192. - - (e) Encyclopaedia Britannica, Article on Mani. - - (f) Salemann: Bulletin de l'Academie des Sciences de St. - Petersburg Series IV, 15 April 1907, pp. 175--184. F. W. - K. Muller: Handschriften--Reste in Estrangelo--Schrift - aus Turfan, Chinesisch--Turkistan, Teil I, II; Sitzungen - der Koniglich Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, - 11 Feb. 1904, pp. 348-352; und Abhandlungen etc. 1904. - - [12:2] Sources used:-- - - (a) Siyasat Namah Nizam al-Mulk: ed. Charles Schefer, - Paris, 1897, pp. 166-181. - - (b) Shahrastani: ed. Cureton, pp. 192-194. - - (c) Al-Ya`qubi: ed. Houtsma, 1883, Vol. I, p. 186. - - (d) Al-Biruni: Chronology of Ancient Nations: tr. E. Sachau, - London, 1879, p. 192. - - [13:1] "If I see aright, five different conceptions can be - distinguished for the period about 400 A.D. First we have the - Manichaean which insinuated its way in the darkness, but was - widely extended even among the clergy". (Harnack's History of - Christian Dogma, Vol. V, p. 56). "From the anti-Manichaean - controversy sprang the desire to conceive all God's attributes - as identical i.e. the interest in the indivisibility of God", - (Harnack's History of Christian Dogma, Vol V, p. 120). - - [13:2] Some Eastern sources of information about Mani's - Philosophy (e.g. Ephraim Syrus mentioned by Prof. A. A. Bevan in - his Introduction to the Hymn of the Soul) tell us that he was a - disciple of Bardesanes, the Syrian gnostic. The learned author - of "al-Fihrist", however, mentions some books which Mani wrote - against the followers of the Syrian gnostic. Burkitt, in his - lectures on Early Eastern Christianity, gives a free translation - of Bardesanes' De Fato, the spirit of which I understand, is - fully Christian, and thoroughly opposed to the teaching of Mani. - Ibn Hazm, however, in his Kitab al-Milal w'al-Nihal (Vol. II, p. - 36) says, "Both agreed in other respects, except that Mani - believed darkness to be a living principle." - -The Paganising gnostic, as Erdmann calls him, teaches that the variety -of things springs from the mixture of two eternal Principles--Light and -Darkness--which are separate from and independent of each other. The -Principle of Light connotes ten ideas--Gentleness, Knowledge, -Understanding, Mystery, Insight, Love, Conviction, Faith, Benevolence -and Wisdom. Similarly the Principle of Darkness connotes five eternal -ideas--Mistiness, Heat, Fire, Venom, Darkness. Along with these two -primordial principles and connected with each, Mani recognises the -eternity of space and earth, each connoting respectively the ideas of -knowledge, understanding, mystery, insight, breath, air, water, light -and fire. In darkness--the feminine Principle in Nature--were hidden -the elements of evil which, in course of time, concentrated and resulted -in the composition, so to speak, of the hideous looking Devil--the -principle of activity. This first born child of the fiery womb of -darkness, attacked the domain of the King of Light who, in order to ward -off his malicious onslaught, created the Primal man. A serious conflict -ensued between the two creatures, and resulted in the complete -vanquishment of the Primal Man. The evil one, then, succeeded in mixing -together the five elements of darkness with the five elements of light. -Thereupon the ruler of the domain of light ordered some of his angels to -construct the Universe out of these mixed elements with a view to free -the atoms of light from their imprisonment. But the reason why darkness -was the first to attack light, is that the latter, being in its essence -good, could not proceed to start the process of admixture which was -essentially harmful to itself. The attitude of Mani's Cosmology, -therefore, to the Christian doctrine of Redemption is similar to that of -Hegelian Cosmology to the doctrine of the Trinity. To him redemption is -a physical process, and all procreation, because it protracts the -imprisonment of light, is contrary to the aim and object of the -Universe. The imprisoned atoms of light are continually set free from -darkness which is thrown down in the unfathomable ditch round the -Universe. The liberated light, however, passes on to the sun and the -moon whence it is carried by angels to the region of light--the eternal -home of the King of Paradise--"Pid i vazargii"--Father of greatness. - -This is a brief account of Mani's fantastic Cosmology.[16:1] He rejects -the Zoroastrian hypothesis of creative agencies to explain the problem -of objective existence. Taking a thoroughly materialistic view of the -question, he ascribes the phenomenal universe to the _mixture_ of two -independent, eternal principles, one of which (darkness) is not only a -part of the universe--stuff, but also the source wherein activity -resides, as it were, slumbering, and starts up into being when the -favourable moment arrives. The essential idea of his cosmology, -therefore, has a curious resemblance with that of the great Hindu -thinker Kapila, who accounts for the production of the universe by the -hypothesis of three gunas, i.e. Sattwa (goodness), Tamas (darkness), and -Rajas (motion or passion) which mix together to form Nature, when the -equilibrium of the primordial matter (Prakriti) is upset. Of the various -solutions[17:1] of the problem of diversity which the Vedantist solved -by postulating the mysterious power of "Maya", and Leibniz, long -afterwards, explained by his doctrine of the Identity of Indiscernibles, -Mani's solution, though childish, must find a place in the historical -development of philosophical ideas. Its philosophical value may be -insignificant; but one thing is certain, i.e. Mani was the first to -venture the suggestion that the Universe is due to the activity of the -Devil, and hence essentially evil--a proposition which seems to me to be -the only logical justification of a system which preaches renunciation -as the guiding principle of life. In our own times Schopenhauer has been -led to the same conclusion; though, unlike Mani, he supposes the -principle of objectification or individuation--"the sinful bent" of the -will to life--to exist in the very nature of the Primal Will and not -independent of it. - - [16:1] It is interesting to compare Mani's Philosophy of Nature - with the Chinese notion of Creation, according to which all that - exists flows from the Union of Yin and Yang. But the Chinese - reduced these two principles to a higher unity:--Tai Keih. To - Mani such a reduction was not possible; since he could not - conceive that things of opposite nature could proceed from the - same principle. - - [17:1] Thomas Aquinas states and criticises Mani's contrariety - of Primal agents in the following manner:-- - - (a) What all things seek even a principle of evil would seek. - But all things seek their own self-preservation. - .*. Even a principle of evil would seek its own self-preservation. - - (b) What all things seek is good. - But self-preservation is what all things seek. - .*. Self-preservation is good. - But a principle of evil would seek its own self-preservation. - .*. A principle of evil would seek some good--which shows that it - is self-contradictory. - - God and His Creatures, Book II, p. 105. Rickaby's Tr. - -Turning now to the remarkable socialist of ancient Persia--_Mazdak_. -This early prophet of communism appeared during the reign of -Anushirwan the Just (531-578 A.D.), and marked another dualistic -reaction against the prevailing Zarwanian doctrine[18:1]. Mazdak, like -Mani, taught that the diversity of things springs from the mixture of -two independent, eternal principles which he called Shid (Light) and -Tar (Darkness). But he differs from his predecessor in holding that the -fact of their mixture as well as their final separation, are quite -accidental, and not at all the result of choice. Mazdak's God is endowed -with sensation, and has four principal energies in his eternal -presence--power of discrimination, memory, understanding and bliss. -These four energies have four personal manifestations who, assisted by -four other persons, superintend the course of the Universe. Variety in -things and men is due to the various combinations of the original -principles. - - [18:1] The Zarwanian doctrine prevailed in Persia in the 5th - century B.C. (See Z. D. M. G., Vol. LVII, p. 562). - -But the most characteristic feature of the Mazdakite teaching is its -communism, which is evidently an inference from the cosmopolitan spirit -of Mani's Philosophy. All men, said Mazdak, are equal; and the notion of -individual property was introduced by the hostile demons whose object is -to turn God's Universe into a scene of endless misery. It is chiefly -this aspect of Mazdak's teaching that was most shocking to the -Zoroastrian conscience, and finally brought about the destruction of his -enormous following, even though the master was supposed to have -miraculously made the sacred Fire talk, and bear witness to the truth of -his mission. - - -ASec. III. - -Retrospect. - -We have seen some of the aspects of Pre-Islamic Persian thought; though, -owing to our ignorance of the tendencies of Sassanide thought, and of -the political, social, and intellectual conditions that determined its -evolution, we have not been able fully to trace the continuity of ideas. -Nations as well as individuals, in their intellectual history, begin -with the objective. Although the moral fervour of Zoroaster gave a -spiritual tone to his theory of the origin of things, yet the net result -of this period of Persian speculation is nothing more than a -materialistic dualism. The principle of Unity as a philosophical ground -of all that exists, is but dimly perceived at this stage of intellectual -evolution in Persia. The controversy among the followers of Zoroaster -indicates that the movement towards a monistic conception of the -Universe had begun; but we have unfortunately no evidence to make a -positive statement concerning the pantheistic tendencies of Pre-Islamic -Persian thought. We know that in the 6{th} century A.D., Diogenes, -Simplicius and other Neo-Platonic thinkers, were driven by the -persecution of Justinian, to take refuge in the court of the tolerant -Anushirwan. This great monarch, moreover, had several works translated -for him from Sanskrit and Greek, but we have no historical evidence to -show how far these events actually influenced the course of Persian -thought. Let us, therefore, pass on to the advent of Islam in Persia, -which completely shattered the old order of things, and brought to the -thinking mind the new concept of an uncompromising monotheism as well as -the Greek dualism of God and matter, as distinguished from the purely -Persian dualism of God and Devil. - - - - -PART II. - -Greek Dualism. - - - - -CHAP. II. - -THE NEO-PLATONIC ARISTOTELIANS OF PERSIA. - - -With the Arab conquest of Persia, a new era begins in the history of -Persian thought. But the warlike sons of sandy Arabia whose swords -terminated, at Nahawand, the political independence of this ancient -people, could hardly touch the intellectual freedom of the converted -Zoroastrian. - -The political revolution brought about by the Arab conquest marks the -beginning of interaction between the Aryan and the Semitic, and we find -that the Persian, though he lets the surface of his life become largely -semitised, quietly converts Islam to his own Aryan habits of thought. In -the west the sober Hellenic intellect interpreted another Semitic -religion--Christianity; and the results of interpretation in both cases -are strikingly similar. In each case the aim of the interpreting -intellect is to soften the extreme rigidity of an absolute law imposed -on the individual from without; in one word it is an endeavour to -internalise the external. This process of transformation began with the -study of Greek thought which, though combined with other causes, -hindered the growth of native speculation, yet marked a transition from -the purely objective attitude of Pre-Islamic Persian Philosophy to the -subjective attitude of later thinkers. It is, I believe, largely due to -the influence of foreign thought that the old monistic tendency when it -reasserted itself about the end of the 8{th} century, assumed a much -more spiritual aspect; and, in its later development, revivified and -spiritualised the old Iranian dualism of Light and Darkness. The fact, -therefore, that Greek thought roused into fresh life the subtle Persian -intellect, and largely contributed to, and was finally assimilated by -the general course of intellectual evolution in Persia, justifies us in -briefly running over, even though at the risk of repetition, the systems -of the Persian Neo-Platonists who, as such, deserve very little -attention in a history of purely Persian thought. - -It must, however, be remembered that Greek wisdom flowed towards the -Moslem east through Harran and Syria. The Syrians took up the latest -Greek speculation i.e. Neo-Platonism and transmitted to the Moslem what -they believed to be the real philosophy of Aristotle. It is surprising -that Mohammedan Philosophers, Arabs as well as Persians, continued -wrangling over what they believed to be the real teaching of Aristotle -and Plato, and it never occurred to them that for a thorough -comprehension of their Philosophies, the knowledge of Greek language was -absolutely necessary. So great was their ignorance that an epitomised -translation of the Enneads of Plotinus was accepted as "Theology of -Aristotle". It took them centuries to arrive at a clear conception of -the two great masters of Greek thought; and it is doubtful whether they -ever completely understood them. Avicenna is certainly clearer and more -original than Al-Farabi and Ibn Maskawaih; and the Andelusian Averroes, -though he is nearer to Aristotle than any of his predecessors, is yet -far from a complete grasp of Aristotle's Philosophy. It would, however, -be unjust to accuse them of servile imitation. The history of their -speculation is one continuous attempt to wade through a hopeless mass of -absurdities that careless translators of Greek Philosophy had -introduced. They had largely to rethink the Philosophies of Aristotle -and Plato. Their commentaries constitute, so to speak, an effort at -discovery, not exposition. The very circumstances which left them no -time to think out independent systems of thought, point to a subtle -mind, unfortunately cabined and cribbed by a heap of obstructing -nonsense that patient industry had gradually to eliminate, and thus to -winnow out truth from falsehood. With these preliminary remarks we -proceed to consider Persian students of Greek Philosophy individually. - - -ASec. I. - -Ibn Maskawaih[26:1] (d. 1030). - -Passing over the names of Sarakhsi[26:2], Farabi who was a Turk, and -the Physician Razi (d. 932 A.D.) who, true to his Persian habits of -thought, looked upon light as the first creation, and admitted the -eternity of matter, space and time, we come to the illustrious name of -Abu `Ali Muhammad ibn Muhammad ibn Ya`qub, commonly known as _Ibn -Maskawaih_--the treasurer of the Buwaihid Sultan `Adaduddaula--one of -the most eminent theistic thinkers, physicians, moralists and historians -of Persia. I give below a brief account of his system from his well -known work Al-Fauz al-Asghar, published in Beirut. - - [26:1] Dr. Boer, in his Philosophy of Islam, gives a full - account of the Philosophy of Al-Farabi and Avicenna; but his - account of Ibn Maskawaih's Philosophy is restricted to the - Ethical teaching of that Philosopher. I have given here his - metaphysical views which are decidedly more systematic than - those of Al-Farabi. Instead of repeating Avicenna's - Neo-Platonism I have briefly stated what I believe to be his - original contribution to the thought of his country. - - [26:2] Sarakhsi died in 899 A.D. He was a disciple of the - Arabian Philosopher Al-Kindi. His works, unfortunately, have not - reached us. - -1. _The existence of the ultimate principle._ - -Here Ibn Maskawaih follows Aristotle, and reproduces his argument based -on the fact of physical motion. All bodies have the inseparable property -of motion which covers all forms of change, and does not proceed from -the nature of bodies themselves. Motion, therefore, demands an external -source or prime mover. The supposition that motion may constitute the -very essence of bodies, is contradicted by experience. Man, for -instance, has the power of free movement; but, on the supposition, -different parts of his body must continue to move even after they are -severed from one another. The series of moving causes, therefore, must -stop at a cause which, itself immovable, moves everything else. The -immobility of the Primal cause is essential; for the supposition of -motion in the Primal cause would necessitate infinite regress, which is -absurd. - -The immovable mover is one. A multiplicity of original movers must imply -something common in their nature, so that they might be brought under -the same category. It must also imply some point of difference in order -to distinguish them from each other. But this partial identity and -difference necessitate composition in their respective essences; and -composition, being a form of motion, cannot, as we have shown, exist in -the first cause of motion. The prime mover again is eternal and -immaterial. Since transition from non-existence to existence is a form -of motion; and since matter is always subject to some kind of motion, it -follows that a thing which is not eternal, or is, in any way, associated -with matter, must be in motion. - -2. _The Knowledge of the Ultimate._ - -All human knowledge begins from sensations which are gradually -transformed into perceptions. The earlier stages of intellection are -completely conditioned by the presence of external reality. But the -progress of knowledge means to be able to think without being -conditioned by matter. Thought begins with matter, but its object is to -gradually free itself from the primary condition of its own -possibility. A higher stage, therefore, is reached in imagination--the -power to reproduce and retain in the mind the copy or image of a thing -without reference to the external objectivity of the thing itself. In -the formation of concepts thought reaches a still higher stage in point -of freedom from materiality; though the concept, in so far as it is the -result of comparison and assimilation of percepts, cannot be regarded as -having completely freed itself from the gross cause of sensations. But -the fact that conception is based on perception, should not lead us to -ignore the great difference between the nature of the concept and the -percept. The individual (percept) is undergoing constant change which -affects the character of the knowledge founded on mere perception. The -knowledge of individuals, therefore, lacks the element of permanence. -The universal (concept), on the other hand, is not affected by the law -of change. Individuals change; the universal remains intact. It is the -essence of matter to submit to the law of change: the freer a thing is -from matter, the less liable it is to change. God, therefore, being -absolutely free from matter, is absolutely changeless; and it is His -complete freedom from materiality that makes our conception of Him -difficult or impossible. The object of all philosophical training is to -develop the power of "ideation" or contemplation on pure concepts, in -order that constant practice might make possible the conception of the -absolutely immaterial. - -3. _How the one creates the many._ - -In this connection it is necessary, for the sake of clearness, to divide -Ibn Maskawaih's investigations into two parts:-- - -(a) _That the ultimate agent or cause created the Universe out of -nothing._ Materialists, he says, hold the eternity of matter, and -attribute form to the creative activity of God. It is, however, admitted -that when matter passes from one form into another form, the previous -form becomes absolutely non-existent. For if it does not become -absolutely non-existent, it must either pass off into some other body, -or continue to exist in the same body. The first alternative is -contradicted by every day experience. If we transform a ball of wax -into a solid square, the original rotundity of the ball does not pass -off into some other body. The second alternative is also impossible; for -it would necessitate the conclusion that two contradictory forms e.g. -circularity and length, can exist in the same body. It, therefore, -follows that the original form passes into absolute non-existence, when -the new form comes into being. This argument proves conclusively that -attributes i.e., form, color, etc., come into being from pure nothing. -In order to understand that the substance is also non-eternal like the -attribute, we should grasp the truth of the following propositions:-- - -1. The analysis of matter results in a number of different elements, the -diversity of which is reduced to one simple element. - -2. Form and matter are inseparable: no change in matter can annihilate -form. - -From these two propositions, Ibn Maskawaih concludes that the substance -had a beginning in time. Matter like form must have begun to exist; -since the eternity of matter necessitates the eternity of form which, -as we have seen, cannot be regarded as eternal. - -(b) _The process of creation._ What is the cause of this immense -diversity which meets us on all sides? How could the many be created by -one? When, says the Philosopher, one cause produces a number of -different effects, their multiplicity may depend on any of the following -reasons:-- - -1. The cause may have various powers. Man, for instance, being a -combination of various elements and powers, may be the cause of various -actions. - -2. The cause may use various means to produce a variety of effects. - -3. The cause may work upon a variety of material. - -None of these propositions can be true of the nature of the ultimate -cause--God. That he possesses various powers, distinct from one another, -is manifestly absurd; since his nature does not admit of composition. If -he is supposed to have employed different means to produce diversity, -who is the creator of these means? If these means are due to the -creative agency of some cause other than the ultimate cause, there -would be a plurality of ultimate causes. If, on the other hand, the -Ultimate Cause himself created these means, he must have required other -means to create these means. The third proposition is also inadmissible -as a conception of the creative act. The many cannot flow from the -causal action of one agent. It, therefore, follows that we have only one -way out of the difficulty--that the ultimate cause created only one -thing which led to the creation of another. Ibn Maskawaih here -enumerates the usual Neo-Platonic emanations gradually growing grosser -and grosser until we reach the primordial elements, which combine and -recombine to evolve higher and higher forms of life. Shibli thus sums -up Ibn Maskawaih's theory of evolution[33:1]:-- - -"The combination of primary substances produced the mineral kingdom, the -lowest form of life. A higher stage of evolution is reached in the -vegetable kingdom. The first to appear is spontaneous grass; then plants -and various kinds of trees, some of which touch the border-land of -animal kingdom, in so far as they manifest certain animal -characteristics. Intermediary between the vegetable kingdom and the -animal kingdom there is a certain form of life which is neither animal -nor vegetable, but shares the characteristics of both (e.g. coral). The -first step beyond this intermediary stage of life, is the development of -the power of movement, and the sense of touch in tiny worms which crawl -upon the earth. The sense of touch, owing to the process of -differentiation, develops other forms of sense, until we reach the plane -of higher animals in which intelligence begins to manifest itself in an -ascending scale. Humanity is touched in the ape which undergoes further -development, and gradually develops erect stature and power of -understanding similar to man. Here animality ends and humanity begins". - - [33:1] Maulana Shibli `Ilm al-Kalam, p. 141. (Haidarabad). - -4. _The soul._ - -In order to understand whether the soul has an independent existence, we -should examine the nature of human knowledge. It is the essential -property of matter that it cannot assume two different forms -simultaneously. To transform a silver spoon into a silver glass, it is -necessary that the spoon-form as such, should cease to exist. This -property is common to all bodies, and a body that lacks it cannot be -regarded as a body. Now when we examine the nature of perception, we see -that there is a principle in man which, in so far as it is able to know -more than one thing at a time, can assume, so to say, many different -forms simultaneously. This principle cannot be matter, since it lacks -the fundamental property of matter. The essence of the soul consists in -the power of perceiving a number of objects at one and the same moment -of time. But it may be objected that the soul-principle may be either -material in its essence, or a function of matter. There are, however, -reasons to show that the soul cannot be a function of matter. - -(a). A thing which assumes different forms and states, cannot itself be -one of those forms and states. A body which receives different colors -should be, in its own nature, colorless. The soul, in its perception of -external objects, assumes, as it were, various forms and states; it, -therefore, cannot be regarded as one of those forms. Ibn Maskawaih -seems to give no countenance to the contemporary Faculty-Psychology; to -him different mental states are various transformations of the soul -itself. - -(b). The attributes are constantly changing; there must be beyond the -sphere of change, some permanent substratum which is the foundation of -personal identity. - -Having shown that the soul cannot be regarded as a function of matter, -Ibn Maskawaih proceeds to prove that it is essentially immaterial. Some -of his arguments may be noticed:-- - -1. The senses, after they have perceived a strong stimulus, cannot, for -a certain amount of time, perceive a weaker stimulus. It is, however, -quite different with the mental act of cognition. - -2. When we reflect on an abstruse subject, we endeavour to completely -shut our eyes to the objects around us, which we regard as so many -hindrances in the way of spiritual activity. If the soul is material in -its essence, it need not, in order to secure unimpeded activity, escape -from the world of matter. - -3. The perception of a strong stimulus weakens and sometimes injures the -sense. The intellect, on the other hand, grows in strength with the -knowledge of ideas and general notions. - -4. Physical weakness due to old age, does not affect mental vigour. - -5. The soul can conceive certain propositions which have no connection -with the sense-data. The senses, for instance, cannot perceive that two -contradictories cannot exist together. - -6. There is a certain power in us which rules over physical organs, -corrects sense-errors, and unifies all knowledge. This unifying -principle which reflects over the material brought before it through the -sense-channel, and, weighing the evidence of each sense, decides the -character of rival statements, must itself stand above the sphere of -matter. - -The combined force of these considerations, says Ibn Maskawaih, -conclusively establishes the truth of the proposition--that the soul is -essentially immaterial. The immateriality of the soul signifies its -immortality; since mortality is a characteristic of the material. - - -ASec. II. - -Avicenna (d. 1037). - -Among the early Persian Philosophers, Avicenna alone attempted to -construct his own system of thought. His work, called "Eastern -Philosophy" is still extant; and there has also come down to us a -fragment[38:1] in which the Philosopher has expressed his views on the -universal operation of the force of love in nature. It is something like -the contour of a system, and it is quite probable that ideas expressed -therein were afterwards fully worked out. - - [38:1] This fragment on love is preserved in the collected works - of Avicenna in the British Museum Library and has been edited by - N. A. F. Mehren. (Leiden, 1894.) - -Avicenna defines "Love" as the appreciation of Beauty; and from the -standpoint of this definition he explains that there are three -categories of being:-- - -1. Things that are at the highest point of perfection. - -2. Things that are at the lowest point of perfection. - -3. Things that stand between the two poles of perfection. But the third -category has no real existence; since there are things that have already -attained the acme of perfection, and there are others still progressing -towards perfection. This striving for the ideal is love's movement -towards beauty which, according to Avicenna, is identical with -perfection. Beneath the visible evolution of forms is the force of love -which actualises all striving, movement, progress. Things are so -constituted that they hate non-existence, and love the joy of -individuality in various forms. The indeterminate matter, dead in -itself, assumes, or more properly, is made to assume by the inner force -of love, various forms, and rises higher and higher in the scale of -beauty. The operation of this ultimate force, in the physical plane, can -be thus indicated:-- - -1. Inanimate objects are combinations of form, matter and quality. Owing -to the working of this mysterious power, quality sticks to its subject -or substance; and form embraces indeterminate matter which, impelled by -the mighty force of love, rises from form to form. - -2. The tendency of the force of love is to centralise itself. In the -vegetable kingdom it attains a higher degree of unity or centralisation; -though the soul still lacks that unity of action which it attains -afterwards. The processes of the vegetative soul are:-- - -(a) Assimilation. - -(b) Growth. - -(c) Reproduction. - -These processes, however, are nothing more than so many manifestations -of love. Assimilation indicates attraction and transformation of what is -external into what is internal. Growth is love of achieving more and -more harmony of parts; and reproduction means perpetuation of the kind, -which is only another phase of love. - -3. In the animal kingdom, the various operations of the force of love -are still more unified. It does preserve the vegetable instinct of -acting in different directions; but there is also the development of -temperament which is a step towards more unified activity. In man this -tendency towards unification manifests itself in self-consciousness. The -same force of "natural or constitutional love", is working in the life -of beings higher than man. All things are moving towards the first -Beloved--the Eternal Beauty. The worth of a thing is decided by its -nearness to or distance from, this ultimate principle. - -As a physician, however, Avicenna is especially interested in the nature -of the Soul. In his times, moreover, the doctrine of metempsychosis was -getting more and more popular. He, therefore, discusses the nature of -the soul, with a view to show the falsity of this doctrine. It is -difficult, he says, to define the soul; since it manifests different -powers and tendencies in different planes of being. His view of the -various powers of the soul can be thus represented:-- - -1. Manifestation as unconscious activity-- - - (a). Working in different directions + 1. Assimilation. - (Vegetative soul) | 2. Growth. - + 3. Reproduction. - -(b). Working in one direction and securing uniformity of action--growth -of temperament. - -2. Manifestation as conscious activity-- - -(a). As directed to more than one object-- - - Animal soul. - | - +------------+--------------------+ - | | - Lower Animals. Man. - - A. Perceptive powers. A. Perceptive powers. - B. Motive powers (desire (a) Five external senses. - of pleasure and avoidance (b) Five internal senses-- - of pain). 1. Sensorium. - 2. Retention of images. - 3. Conception. - 4. Imagination. - 5. Memory. - - These constitute the five internal - senses of the soul which, in man, - manifests itself as progressive - reason, developing from human to - angelic and prophetic reason. - - B. Motive powers--will. - -(b). As directed to one object--The soul of the spheres which continue -in one uniform motion. - -In his fragment on "Nafs" (soul) Avicenna endeavours to show that a -material accompaniment is not necessary to the soul. It is not through -the instrumentality of the body, or some power of the body, that the -soul conceives or imagines; since if the soul necessarily requires a -physical medium in conceiving other things, it must require a different -body in order to conceive the body attached to itself. Moreover, the -fact that the soul is immediately self conscious--conscious of itself -through itself--conclusively shows that in its essence the soul is quite -independent of any physical accompaniment. The doctrine of -metempsychosis implies, also, individual pre-existence. But supposing -that the soul did exist before the body, it must have existed either as -one or as many. The multiplicity of bodies is due to the multiplicity of -material forms, and does not indicate the multiplicity of souls. On the -other hand, if it existed as one, the ignorance or knowledge of A must -mean the ignorance or knowledge of B; since the soul is one in both. -These categories, therefore, cannot be applied to the soul. The truth -is, says Avicenna, that body and soul are contiguous to each other, but -quite opposite in their respective essences. The disintegration of the -body does not necessitate the annihilation of the soul. Dissolution or -decay is a property of compounds, and not of simple, indivisible, ideal -substances. Avicenna, then denies pre-existence, and endeavours to show -the possibility of disembodied conscious life beyond the grave. - -We have run over the work of the early Persian Neo-Platonists among -whom, as we have seen, Avicenna alone learned to think for himself. Of -the generations of his disciples--Behmenyar, Ab u'l-Ma'mum of Isfahan, -Ma`sumi, Ab u'l-`Abbas, Ibn Tahir[44:1]--who carried on their master's -Philosophy, we need not speak. So powerful was the spell of Avicenna's -personality that, even long after it had been removed, any amplification -or modification of his views was considered to be an unpardonable crime. -The old Iranian idea of the dualism of Light and Darkness, does not act -as a determining factor in the progress of Neo-Platonic ideas in Persia, -which borrowed independent life for a time, and eventually merged their -separate existence in the general current of Persian speculation. They -are, therefore, connected with the course of indigenous thought only in -so far as they contributed to the strength and expansion of that -monistic tendency, which manifested itself early in the Church of -Zoroaster; and, though for a time hindered by the Theological -controversies of Islam, burst out with redoubled force in later times, -to extend its titanic grasp to all the previous intellectual -achievements of the land of its birth. - - [44:1] Al-Baihaqi; fol. 28a et seqq. - - - - -CHAP. III. - -THE RISE AND FALL OF RATIONALISM IN ISLAM. - - -ASec. I. - -The Metaphysics of Rationalism--Materialism. - -The Persian mind, having adjusted itself to the new political -environment, soon reasserts its innate freedom, and begins to retire -from the field of objectivity, in order that it may come back to itself, -and reflect upon the material achieved in its journey out of its own -inwardness. With the study of Greek thought, the spirit which was almost -lost in the concrete, begins to reflect and realise itself as the -arbiter of truth. Subjectivity asserts itself, and endeavours to -supplant all outward authority. Such a period, in the intellectual -history of a people, must be the epoch of rationalism, scepticism, -mysticism, heresy--forms in which the human mind, swayed by the growing -force of subjectivity, rejects all external standards of truth. And so -we find the epoch under consideration. - -The period of Umayyad dominance is taken up with the process of -co-mingling and adjustment to new conditions of life; but with the rise -of the `Abbasid Dynasty and the study of Greek Philosophy, the pent-up -intellectual force of Persia bursts out again, and exhibits wonderful -activity in all the departments of thought and action. The fresh -intellectual vigour imparted by the assimilation of Greek Philosophy -which was studied with great avidity, led immediately to a critical -examination of Islamic Monotheism. Theology, enlivened by religious -fervour, learned to talk the language of Philosophy earlier than cold -reason began to seek a retired corner, away from the noise of -controversy, in order to construct a consistent theory of things. In the -first half of the 8{th} century we find Wasil Ibn `Ata--a Persian -disciple of the famous theologian Hasan of Basra--starting Mu`tazilaism -(Rationalism)--that most interesting movement which engaged some of the -subtlest minds of Persia, and finally exhausted its force in the keen -metaphysical controversies of Baghdad and Basra. The famous city of -Basra had become, owing to its commercial situation, the playground of -various forces--Greek Philosophy, Scepticism, Christianity, Buddhistic -ideas, Manichaeism[47:1]--which furnished ample spiritual food to the -inquiring mind of the time, and formed the intellectual environment of -Islamic Rationalism. What Spitta calls the Syrian period of Muhammadan -History is not characterised with metaphysical subtleties. With the -advent of the Persian Period, however, Muhammadan students of Greek -Philosophy began properly to reflect on their religion; and the -Mu`tazila thinkers[47:2], gradually drifted into metaphysics with which -alone we are concerned here. It is not our object to trace the history -of the Mu`tazila Kalam; for present purposes it will be sufficient if we -briefly reveal the metaphysical implications of the Mu`tazila view of -Islam. The conception of God, and the theory of matter, therefore, are -the only aspects of Rationalism which we propose to discuss here. - - [47:1] During the `Abbasid Period there were many who secretly - held Manichaean opinions. See Fihrist, Leipsig 1871, p. 338; See - also Al-Mu`tazila, ed. by T. W. Arnold, Leipsig 1902, p. 27, - where the author speaks of a controversy between Abu - 'l-Hudhail and Salih, the Dualist. See also Macdonald's Muslim - Theology, p. 133. - - [47:2] The Mu`tazilas belonged to various nationalities, and - many of them were Persians either by descent or domicile. Wasil - Ibn `Ata--the reported founder of the sect--was a Persian - (Browne, Lit. His., Vol I, p. 281). Von Kremer, however, traces - their origin to the theological controversies of the Umayyad - period. Mu`tazilaism was not an essentially Persian movement; - but it is true, as Prof. Browne observes (Lit. His., Vol. I, p. - 283) that Shi`ite and Qadari tenets, indeed, often went - together, and the Shi`ite doctrine current in Persia at the - present day is in many respects Mu`tazilite, while Hasan - Al-Ash`ari, the great opponent of the Mu`tazilite, is by the - Shi`ites held in horror. It may also be added that some of the - greater representatives of the Mu`tazila opinion were Shi`as - by religion, e.g. Abu 'l-Hudhail (Al-Mu`tazila, ed. by T. W. - Arnold, p. 28). On the other hand many of the followers of - Al-Ash`ari were Persians (See extracts from Ibn `Asakir ed. - Mehren), so that it does not seem to be quite justifiable to - describe the Ash`arite mode of thought as a purely semitic - movement. - -His conception of the unity of God at which the Mu`tazila eventually -arrived by a subtle dialectic is one of the fundamental points in which -he differs from the Orthodox Muhammadan. God's attributes, according to -his view, cannot be said to inhere in him; they form the very essence of -His nature. The Mu`tazila, therefore, denies the separate reality of -divine attributes, and declares their absolute identity with the -abstract divine Principle. "God", says Abu'l-Hudhail, "is knowing, -all-powerful, living; and his knowledge, power and life constitute His -very essence (dhat)"[49:1]. In order to explain the pure unity of God -Joseph Al-Basir[49:2] lays down the following five principles:-- - -(1). The necessary supposition of atom and accident. - -(2). The necessary supposition of a creator. - -(3). The necessary supposition of the conditions (Ahwal) of God. - -(4). The rejection of those attributes which do not befit God. - -(5). The unity of God in spite of the plurality of His attributes. - - [49:1] Shahrastani: Cureton's ed., p. 34. - - [49:2] Dr. Frankl: Ein Mu`tazilitischer Kalam--Wien 1872, p. 13. - -This conception of unity underwent further modifications; until in the -hands of Mu`ammar and Abu Hashim it became a mere abstract possibility -about which nothing could be predicated. We cannot, he says, predicate -knowledge of God[50:1], for His knowledge must be of something in -Himself. The first necessitates the identity of subject and object which -is absurd; the second implicates duality in the nature of God which is -equally impossible. Ahmad and Fadl[50:2]--disciples of Nazzam, however, -recognised this duality in holding that the original creators are -two--God--the eternal principle; and the word of God--Jesus Christ--the -contingent principle. But more fully to bring out the element of truth -in the second alternative suggested by Mu`ammar, was reserved, as we -shall see, for later Sufi thinkers of Persia. It is, therefore, clear -that some of the rationalists almost unconsciously touched the outer -fringe of later pantheism for which, in a sense, they prepared the way, -not only by their definition of God, but also by their common effort to -internalise the rigid externality of an absolute law. - - [50:1] Shahrastani: Cureton's ed., p. 48. See also - Steiner--Die Mutaziliten, p. 59. - - [50:2] Ibn Hazm (Cairo, ed. I) Vol. IV, p. 197. See also - Shahrastani: Cureton's ed., p. 42. - -But the most important contribution of the advocates of Rationalism to -purely metaphysical speculation, is their explanation of matter, which -their opponents--the Ash`arite--afterwards modified to fit in with their -own views of the nature of God. The interest of Nazzam chiefly consisted -in the exclusion of all arbitrariness from the orderly course of -nature[51:1]. The same interest in naturalism led Al-Jahiz to define -Will in a purely negative manner[51:2]. Though the Rationalist thinkers -did not want to abandon the idea of a Personal Will, yet they -endeavoured to find a deeper ground for the independence of individual -natural phenomena. And this ground they found in matter itself. Nazzam -taught the infinite divisibility of matter, and obliterated the -distinction between substance and accident[51:3]. Existence was regarded -as a quality superimposed by God on the pre-existing material atoms -which would have been incapable of perception without this quality. -Muhammad Ibn `Uthman, one of the Mu`tazila Shaikhs, says Ibn -Hazm,[51:4] maintained that the non-existent (atom in its -pre-existential state) is a body in that state; only that in its -pre-existential condition it is neither in motion, nor at rest, nor is -it said to be created. Substance, then, is a collection of -qualities--taste, odour, colour--which, in themselves, are nothing more -than material potentialities. The soul, too, is a finer kind of matter; -and the processes of knowledge are mere mental motions. Creation is only -the actualisation of pre-existing potentialities[52:1] (Tafra). The -individuality of a thing which is defined as "that of which something -can be predicated"[52:2] is not an essential factor in its notion. The -collection of things we call the Universe, is externalised or -perceptible reality which could, so to speak, exist independent of all -perceptibility. The object of these metaphysical subtleties is purely -theological. God, to the Rationalist, is an absolute unity which can, in -no sense, admit of plurality, and could thus exist without the -perceptible plurality--the Universe. - - [51:1] Steiner: Die Mu`taziliten; Leipzig, 1865, p. 57. - - [51:2] Steiner: Die Mu`taziliten; Leipzig, 1865, p. 59. - - [51:3] Shahrastani: Cureton's ed., p. 38. - - [51:4] Ibn Hazm (ed. Cairo): Vol. V, p. 42. - - [52:1] Shahrastani: Cureton's ed, p. 38. - - [52:2] Steiner: Die Mu`taziliten, p. 80. - -The activity of God, then, consists only in making the atom perceptible. -The properties of the atom flow from its own nature. A stone thrown up -falls down on account of its own indwelling property[53:1]. God, says -Al-`Attar of Basra and Bishr ibn al Mu`tamir, did not create colour, -length, breadth, taste or smell--all these are activities of bodies -themselves[53:2]. Even the number of things in the Universe is not known -to God[53:3]. Bishr ibn al-Mu`tamir further explained the properties of -bodies by what he called "Tawallud"--interaction of bodies[53:4]. Thus -it is clear that the Rationalists were philosophically materialists, and -theologically deists. - - [53:1] Shahrastani: Cureton's ed., p. 38. - - [53:2] Ibn Hazm (ed. Cairo): Vol. IV, pp. 194, 197. - - [53:3] Ibn Hazm (ed. Cairo): Vol. IV, p. 194. - - [53:4] Shahrastani: Cureton's ed., p. 44. - -To them substance and atom are identical, and they define substance as a -space-filling atom which, besides the quality of filling space, has a -certain direction, force and existence forming its very essence as an -actuality. In shape it is squarelike; for if it is supposed to be -circular, combination of different atoms would not be possible[53:5]. -There is, however, great difference of opinion among the exponents of -atomism in regard to the nature of the atom. Some hold that atoms are -all similar to each other; while Abu'l-Qasim of Balkh regards them as -similar as well as dissimilar. When we say that two things are similar -to each other, we do not necessarily mean that they are similar in all -their attributes. Abu'l-Qasim further differs from Nazzam in advocating -the indestructibility of the atom. He holds that the atom had a -beginning in time; but that it cannot be completely annihilated. The -attribute of "Baqa" (continued existence), he says, does not give to its -subject a new attribute other than existence; and the continuity of -existence is not an additional attribute at all. The divine activity -created the atom as well as its continued existence. Abu'l-Qasim, -however, admits that some atoms may not have been created for continued -existence. He denies also the existence of any intervening space between -different atoms, and holds, unlike other representatives of the school, -that the essence or atom (Mahiyyat) could not remain essence in a state -of non-existence. To advocate the opposite is a contradiction in terms. -To say that the essence (which is essence because of the attribute of -existence) could remain essence in a state of non-existence, is to say -that the existent could remain existent in a state of non-existence. It -is obvious that Abu'l-Qasim here approaches the Ash`arite theory of -knowledge which dealt a serious blow to the Rationalist theory of -matter. - - [53:5] In my treatment of the atomism of Islamic Rationalists, I - am indebted to Arthur Biram's publication: "Kitabul Masa'il fil - khilaf beyn al-Basriyyin wal Baghdadiyyin". - - -ASec. II. - -Contemporary Movements of Thought. - -Side by side with the development of Mu`tazilaism we see, as is natural -in a period of great intellectual activity, many other tendencies of -thought manifesting themselves in the philosophical and religious -circles of Islam. Let us notice them briefly:-- - -1. Scepticism. The tendency towards scepticism was the natural -consequence of the purely dialectic method of Rationalism. Men such as -Ibn Ashras and Al-Jahiz who apparently belonged to the Rationalist -camp, were really sceptics. The standpoint of Al-Jahiz who inclined to -deistic naturalism[55:1], is that of a cultured man of the time, and -not of a professional theologian. In him is noticeable also a reaction -against the metaphysical hairsplitting of his predecessors, and a desire -to widen the pale of theology for the sake of the illiterate who are -incapable of reflecting on articles of faith. - - [55:1] Macdonald's Muslim Theology, p. 161. - -2. Sufiism--an appeal to a higher source of knowledge which was first -systematised by Dhu'l-Nun, and became more and more deepened and -antischolastic in contrast to the dry intellectualism of the -Ash`arite. We shall consider this interesting movement in the -following chapter. - -3. The revival of authority--Isma`ilianism--a movement -characteristically Persian which, instead of repudiating freethought, -endeavours to come to an understanding with it. Though this movement -seems to have no connection with the theological controversies of the -time, yet its connection with freethought is fundamental. The similarity -between the methods practised by the Isma`ilian missionaries and those -of the partisans of the association called Ikhwan al-Safa--Brethren of -Purity--suggests some sort of secret relation between the two -institutions. Whatever may be the motive of those who started this -movement, its significance as an intellectual phenomenon should not be -lost sight of. The multiplicity of philosophical and religious views--a -necessary consequence of speculative activity--is apt to invoke forces -which operate against this, religiously speaking, dangerous -multiplicity. In the 18th century history of European thought we see -Fichte, starting with a sceptical inquiry concerning the nature of -matter, and finding its last word in Pantheism. Schleiermacher appeals -to Faith as opposed to Reason, Jacobi points to a source of knowledge -higher than reason, while Comte abandons all metaphysical inquiry, and -limits all knowledge to sensuous perception. De Maistre and Schlegel, on -the other hand, find a resting place in the authority of an absolutely -infallible Pope. The advocates of the doctrine of Imamat think in the -same strain as De Maistre; but it is curious that the Isma`ilians, while -making this doctrine the basis of their Church, permitted free play to -all sorts of thinking. - -The Isma`ilia movement then is one aspect of the persistent -battle[57:1] which the intellectually independent Persian waged against -the religious and political ideals of Islam. Originally a branch of the -Shi`ite religion, the Isma`ilia sect assumed quite a cosmopolitan -character with `Abdulla ibn Maimun--the probable progenitor of the -Fatimid Caliphs of Egypt--who died about the same time when -Al-Ash`ari, the great opponent of Freethought, was born. This curious -man imagined a vast scheme in which he weaved together innumerable -threads of various hues, resulting in a cleverly constructed -equivocation, charming to the Persian mind for its mysterious character -and misty Pythagorean Philosophy. Like the Association of the Brethren -of Purity, he made an attempt, under the pious cloak of the doctrine of -Imamat (Authority), to synthesise all the dominating ideas of the time. -Greek Philosophy, Christianity, Rationalism, Sufiism, Manichaeism, -Persian heresies, and above all the idea of reincarnation, all came -forward to contribute their respective shares to the boldly conceived -Isma`ilian whole, the various aspects of which were to be gradually -revealed to the initiated, by the "Leader"--the ever Incarnating -Universal Reason--according to the intellectual development of the age -in which he incarnated himself. In the Isma`ilian movement, Freethought, -apprehending the collapse of its ever widening structure, seeks to rest -upon a stable basis, and, by a strange irony of fate, is led to find it -in the very idea which is revolting to its whole being. Barren -authority, though still apt to reassert herself at times, adopts this -unclaimed child, and thus permits herself to assimilate all knowledge -past, present and future. - - [57:1] Ibn Hazm in his Kitab al-Milal, looks upon the heretical - sects of Persia as a continuous struggle against the Arab power - which the cunning Persian attempted to shake off by these - peaceful means. See Von Kremer's Geschichte der herrschenden - Ideen des Islams, pp. 10, 11, where this learned Arab historian - of Cordova is quoted at length. - -The unfortunate connection, however, of this movement with the politics -of the time, has misled many a scholar. They see in it (Macdonald, for -instance) nothing more than a powerful conspiracy to uproot the -political power of the Arab from Persia. They have denounced the -Isma`ilian Church which counted among its followers some of the best -heads and sincerest hearts, as a mere clique of dark murderers who were -ever watching for a possible victim. We must always remember, while -estimating the character of these people, the most barbarous -persecutions which drove them to pay red-handed fanaticism in the same -coin. Assassinations for religious purposes were considered -unobjectionable, and even perhaps lawful, among the whole Semite race. -As late as the latter half of the 16th century, the Pope of Rome could -approve such a dreadful slaughter as the massacre of St. Bartholomew. -That assassination, even though actuated by religious zeal, is still a -crime, is a purely modern idea; and justice demands that we should not -judge older generations with our own standards of right and wrong. A -great religious movement which shook to its very foundations the -structure of a vast empire, and, having successfully passed through the -varied ordeals of moral reproach, calumny and persecution, stood up for -centuries as a champion of Science and Philosophy, could not have -entirely rested on the frail basis of a political conspiracy of a mere -local and temporary character. Isma`ilianism, in spite of its almost -entire loss of original vitality, still dominates the ethical ideal of -not an insignificant number in India, Persia, Central Asia, Syria and -Africa; while the last expression of Persian thought--Babism--is -essentially Isma`ilian in its character. - -To return, however, to the Philosophy of the sect. From the later -Rationalists they borrowed their conception of Divinity. God, or the -ultimate principle of existence, they teach, has no attribute. His -nature admits of no predication. When we predicate the attribute of -power to him, we only mean that He is the giver of power; when we -predicate eternity, we indicate the eternity of what the Qur'an calls -"Amr" (word of God) as distinguished from the "Khalq" (creation of -God) which is contingent. In His nature all contradictions melt away, -and from Him flow all opposites. Thus they considered themselves to have -solved the problem which had troubled the mind of Zoroaster and his -followers. - -In order to find an answer to the question, "What is plurality?" the -Isma`ilia refer to what they consider a metaphysical axiom--"that from -one only one can proceed". But the one which proceeds, is not something -completely different from which it proceeds. It is really the Primal one -transformed. The Primal Unity, therefore, transformed itself into the -First Intellect (Universal Reason); and then, by means of this -transformation of itself, created the Universal soul which, impelled by -its nature to perfectly identify itself with the original source, felt -the necessity of motion, and consequently of a body possessing the power -of motion. In order to achieve its end, the soul created the heavens -moving in circular motion according to its direction. It also created -the elements which mixed together, and formed the visible Universe--the -scene of plurality through which it endeavours to pass with a view to -come back to the original source. The individual soul is an epitome of -the whole Universe which exists only for its progressive education. The -Universal Reason incarnates itself from time to time, in the personality -of the "Leader" who illuminates the soul in proportion to its experience -and understanding, and gradually guides it through the scene of -plurality to the world of eternal unity. When the Universal soul -reaches its goal, or rather returns to its own deep being, the process -of disintegration ensues. "Particles constituting the Universe fall off -from each other--those of goodness go to truth (God) which symbolises -unity; those of evil go to untruth (Devil) which symbolises -diversity"[63:1]. This is but briefly the Isma`ilian Philosophy--a -mixture, as Sharastani remarks, of Philosophical and Manichaean -ideas--which, by gradually arousing the slumbering spirit of scepticism, -they administered, as it were, in doses to the initiated, and finally -brought them to that stage of spiritual emancipation where solemn ritual -drops off, and dogmatic religion appears to be nothing more than a -systematic arrangement of useful falsehoods. - - [63:1] Sharastani: Cureton's ed: p. 149. - -The Isma`ilian doctrine is the first attempt to amalgamate contemporary -Philosophy with a really Persian view of the Universe, and to restate -Islam, in reference to this synthesis, by allegorical interpretation of -the Qur'an--a method which was afterwards adopted by Sufiism. With them -the Zoroastrian Ahriman (Devil) is not the malignant creator of evil -things but it is a principle which violates the eternal unity, and -breaks it up into visible diversity. The idea that some principle of -difference in the nature of the ultimate existence must be postulated in -order to account for empirical diversity, underwent further -modifications; until in the Hurufi sect (an offshoot of the Isma`ilia), -in the fourteenth century, it touched contemporary Sufiism on the one -hand, and Christian Trinity on the other. The "Be", maintained the -Hurufis, is the eternal word of God, which, itself uncreated, leads to -further creation--the word externalised. "But for the 'word' the -recognition of the essence of Divinity would have been impossible; since -Divinity is beyond the reach of sense--perception"[64:1]. The 'word', -therefore, became flesh in the womb of Mary[64:2] in order to manifest -the Father. The whole Universe is the manifestation of God's 'word', in -which He is immanent[64:3]. Every sound in the Universe is within God; -every atom is singing the song of eternity[64:4]; all is life. Those -who want to discover the ultimate reality of things, let them seek "the -named" through the Name[65:1], which at once conceals and reveals its -subject. - - [64:1] Jawidan Kabir, fol. 149a. - - [64:2] Jawidan Kabir, fol. 280a. - - [64:3] Jawidan Kabir, fol. 366b. - - [64:4] Jawidan Kabir, fol. 155b. - - [65:1] Jawidan Kabir, fol. 382a. - - -ASec. III. - -Reaction against Rationalism. - -The Ash`arite. - -Patronised by the early Caliphs of the House of `Abbas, Rationalism -continued to flourish in the intellectual centres of the Islamic world; -until, in the first half of the 9th century, it met the powerful -orthodox reaction which found a very energetic leader in Al-Ash`ari -(b, 873 A.D.) who studied under Rationalist teachers only to demolish, -by their own methods, the edifice they had so laboriously built. He was -a pupil of Al-Jubba'i[65:2]--the representative of the younger school of -Mu`tazilaism in Basra--with whom he had many controversies[65:3] which -eventually terminated their friendly relations, and led the pupil to bid -farewell to the Mu`tazila camp. "The fact", says Spitta, "that -Al-Ash`ari was so thoroughly a child of his time with the successive -currents of which he let himself go, makes him, in another relation, an -important figure to us. In him, as in any other, are clearly reflected -the various tendencies of this politically as well as religiously -interesting period; and we seldom find ourselves in a position to weigh -the power of the orthodox confession and the Mu`tazilite speculation, -the child-like helpless manner of the one, the immaturity and -imperfection of the other, so completely as in the life of this man who -was orthodox as a boy and a Mu`tazila as a young man"[66:1]. The -Mu`tazila speculation (e.g. Al-Jahiz) tended to be absolutely -unfettered, and in some cases led to a merely negative attitude of -thought. The movement initiated by Al-Ash`ari was an attempt not only -to purge Islam of all non-Islamic elements which had quietly crept into -it, but also to harmonize the religious consciousness with the -religious thought of Islam. Rationalism was an attempt to measure -reality by reason alone; it implied the identity of the spheres of -religion and philosophy, and strove to express faith in the form of -concepts or terms of pure thought. It ignored the facts of human nature, -and tended to disintegrate the solidarity of the Islamic Church. Hence -the reaction. - - [65:2] Extracts from Ibn `Asakir (Mehren)--Travaux de la - troisieme session du Congres International des Orientalistes--p. - 261. - - [65:3] Spitta: Zur Geschichte Abul-Hasan Al-Ash`ari, pp. 42, - 43. See also Ibn Khallikan (Gottingen 1839)--Al-Jubba'i, where - the story of their controversy is given. - - [66:1] Spitta: Vorwort, p. VII. - -The orthodox reaction led by the Ash`arite then was, in reality, -nothing more than the transfer of dialectic method to the defence of the -authority of Divine Revelation. In opposition to the Rationalists, they -maintained the doctrine of the Attributes of God; and, as regards the -Free Will controversy, they adopted a course lying midway between the -extreme fatalism of the old school, and the extreme libertarianism of -the Rationalists. They teach that the power of choice as well as all -human actions are created by God; and that man has been given the power -of acquiring[67:1] the different modes of activity. But Fakhral-Din -Razi, who in his violent attack on philosophy was strenuously opposed by -Tusi and Qutbal-Din, does away with the idea of "acquisition", and -openly maintains the doctrine of necessity in his commentary on the -Qur'an. The Mataridiyya--another school of anti-rationalist theology, -founded by Abu Mansur Mataridi a native of Matarid in the environs of -Samarqand--went back to the old rationalist position, and taught in -opposition to the Ash`arite, that man has absolute control over his -activity; and that his power affects the very nature of his actions. -Al-Ash`ari's interest was purely theological; but it was impossible to -harmonise reason and revelation without making reference to the ultimate -nature of reality. Baqilani[68:1] therefore, made use of some purely -metaphysical propositions (that substance is an individual unity; that -quality cannot exist in quality; that perfect vacuum is possible.) in -his Theological investigation, and thus gave the school a metaphysical -foundation which it is our main object to bring out. We shall not, -therefore, dwell upon their defence of orthodox beliefs (e.g. that the -Qur'an is uncreated; that the visibility of God is possible etc.); but -we shall endeavour to pick up the elements of metaphysical thought in -their theological controversies. In order to meet contemporary -philosophers on their own ground, they could not dispense with -philosophising; hence willingly or unwillingly they had to develop a -theory of knowledge peculiar to themselves. - - [67:1] Shahrastani--ed. Cureton, p. 69. - - [68:1] Martin Schreiner: Zur Geschichte des Ash`aritenthums. - (Huitieme Congres International des Orientalistes 1889, p. 82). - -God, according to the Ash`arite, is the ultimate necessary existence -which "carries its attributes in its own being"[69:1]; and whose -existence (wujud) and essence (Mahiyyat) are identical. Besides the -argument from the contingent character of motion they used the following -arguments to prove the existence of this ultimate principle:-- - -(1). All bodies, they argue, are one in so far as the phenomenal fact of -their existence is concerned. But in spite of this unity, their -qualities are different and even opposed to each other. We are, -therefore, driven to postulate an ultimate cause in order to account for -their empirical divergence. - - [69:1] Martin Schreiner: Zur Geschichte des Ash`aritenthums. - (Huitieme Congres International des Orientalistes II{me} Partie - 1893, p. 113). - -(2). Every contingent being needs a cause to account for its existence. -The Universe is contingent; therefore it must have a cause; and that -cause is God. That the Universe is contingent, they proved in the -following manner. All that exists in the Universe, is either substance -or quality. The contingence of quality is evident, and the contingence -of substance follows from the fact that no substance could exist apart -from qualities. The contingence of quality necessitates the contingence -of substance; otherwise the eternity of substance would necessitate the -eternity of quality. In order fully to appreciate the value of this -argument, it is necessary to understand the Ash`arite theory of -knowledge. To answer the question, "What is a thing?" they subjected to -a searching criticism the Aristotelian categories of thought, and -arrived at the conclusion that bodies have no properties in -themselves[70:1]. They made no distinction of secondary and primary -qualities of a body, and reduced all of them to purely subjective -relations. Quality too became with them a mere accident without which -the substance could not exist. They used the word substance or atom with -a vague implication of externality; but their criticism, actuated by a -pious desire to defend the idea of divine creation, reduced the Universe -to a mere show of ordered subjectivities which, as they maintained like -Berkeley, found their ultimate explanation in the Will of God. In his -examination of human knowledge regarded as a product and not merely a -process, Kant stopped at the idea of "Ding an sich", but the Ash`arite -endeavoured to penetrate further, and maintained, against the -contemporary Agnostic-Realism, that the so called underlying essence -existed only in so far as it was brought in relation to the knowing -subject. Their atomism, therefore, approaches that of Lotze[71:1] who, -in spite of his desire to save external reality, ended in its complete -reduction to ideality. But like Lotze they could not believe their atoms -to be the inner working of the Infinite Primal Being. The interest of -pure monotheism was too strong for them. The necessary consequence of -their analysis of matter is a thorough going idealism like that of -Berkeley; but perhaps their instinctive realism combined with the force -of atomistic tradition, still compels them to use the word "atom" by -which they endeavour to give something like a realistic coloring to -their idealism. The interest of dogmatic theology drove them to maintain -towards pure Philosophy an attitude of criticism which taught her -unwilling advocates how to philosophise and build a metaphysics of their -own. - - [70:1] See Macdonald's admirable account of the Ash`arite - Metaphysics: Muslim Theology p. 201 sq. See also Maulana - Shibli `Ilmal Kalam pp. 60, 72. - - [71:1] "Lotze is an atomist, but he does not conceive the atoms - themselves as material; for extension, like all other sensuous - qualities is explained through the reciprocal action of atoms; - they themselves, therefore, cannot possess this quality. Like - life and like all empirical qualities, the sensuous fact of - extension is due to the cooperation of points of force, which, - in time, must be conceived as starting points of the inner - workings of the Infinite Primal Being." Hoffding Vol. II, p. - 516. - -But a more important and philosophically more significant aspect of the -Ash`arite Metaphysics, is their attitude towards the Law of -Causation[72:1]. Just as they repudiated all the principles of -optics[72:2] in order to show, in opposition to the Rationalists, that -God could be visible in spite of His being unextended, so with a view -to defend the possibility of miracles, they rejected the idea of -causation altogether. The orthodox believed in miracles as well as in -the Universal Law of Causation; but they maintained that, at the time of -manifesting a miracle, God suspended the operation of this law. The -Ash`arite, however, starting with the supposition that cause and -effect must be similar, could not share the orthodox view, and taught -that the idea of power is meaningless, and that we know nothing but -floating impressions, the phenomenal order of which is determined by -God. - - [72:1] Shibli `Ilmal-Kalam pp. 64, 72. - - [72:2] Shahrastani, ed. Cureton, p. 82. - -Any account of the Ash`arite metaphysics would be incomplete without a -notice of the work of Al-Ghazali (d. 1111 A.D.) who though -misunderstood by many orthodox theologians, will always be looked upon -as one of the greatest personalities of Islam. This sceptic of powerful -ability anticipated Descartes[73:1] in his philosophical method; and, -"seven hundred years before Hume cut the bond of causality with the -edge of his dialectic"[73:2]. He was the first to write a systematic -refutation of philosophy, and completely to annihilate that dread of -intellectualism which had characterised the orthodox. It was chiefly his -influence that made men study dogma and metaphysics together, and -eventually led to a system of education which produced such men as -Shahrastani, Al-Razi and Al-Ishraqi. The following passage indicates -his attitude as a thinker:-- - -"From my childhood I was inclined to think out things for myself. The -result of this attitude was that I revolted against authority; and all -the beliefs that had fixed themselves in my mind from childhood lost -their original importance. I thought that such beliefs based on mere -authority were equally entertained by Jews, Christians, and followers of -other religions. Real knowledge must eradicate all doubt. For instance, -it is self-evident that ten is greater than three. If a person, however, -endeavours to prove the contrary by an appeal to his power of turning a -stick into a snake, the performance would indeed be wonderful, though -it cannot touch the certainty of the proposition in question"[75:1]. He -examined afterwards, all the various claimants of "Certain Knowledge" -and finally found it in Sufiism. - - [73:1] "It (Al-Ghazali's work on the Revivication of the - sciences of religion) has so remarkable a resemblance to the - _Discourse sur la methode_ of Descartes, that had any - translation of it existed in the days of Descartes everyone - would have cried against the plagiarism". (Lewes's History of - Philosophy: Vol. II. p. 50). - - [73:2] Journal of the American Oriental Society, Vol. 20, p. - 103. - - [75:1] Al-Munqidh p. 3. - -With their view of the nature of substance, the Ash`arite, rigid -monotheists as they were, could not safely discuss the nature of the -human soul. Al-Ghazali alone seriously took up the problem, and to -this day it is difficult to define, with accuracy, his view of the -nature of God. In him, like Borger and Solger in Germany, Sufi pantheism -and the Ash`arite dogma of personality appear to harmonise together, a -reconciliation which makes it difficult to say whether he was a -Pantheist, or a Personal Pantheist of the type of Lotze. The soul, -according to Al-Ghazali, perceives things. But perception as an -attribute can exist only in a substance or essence which is absolutely -free from all the attributes of body. In his Al-Madnun[75:2], he -explains why the prophet declined to reveal the nature of the soul. -There are, he says, two kinds of men; ordinary men and thinkers. The -former who look upon materiality as a condition of existence, cannot -conceive an immaterial substance. The latter are led, by their logic, to -a conception of the soul which sweeps away all difference between God -and the individual soul. Al-Ghazali, therefore, realised the -Pantheistic drift of his own inquiry, and preferred silence as to the -ultimate nature of the soul. - - [75:2] See Sir Sayyid Ahmad's criticism of Al-Ghazali's view - of the soul, Al-Nazrufi ba'di Masaili-l Imami-l humam Abu Hamid - Al-Ghazali; No. 4, p. 3 sq. (ed. Agra). - -He is generally included among the Ash`arite. But strictly speaking he -is not an Ash`arite; though he admitted that the Ash`arite mode of -thought was excellent for the masses. "He held", says Shibli -(`Ilmal-Kalam, p. 66.), "that the secret of faith could not be revealed; -for this reason he encouraged exposition of the Ash`arite theology, -and took good care in persuading his immediate disciples not to publish -the results of his private reflection". Such an attitude towards the -Ash`arite theology, combined with his constant use of philosophical -language, could not but lead to suspicion. Ibn Jauzi, Qadi `Iyad, and -other famous theologians of the orthodox school, publicly denounced him -as one of the "misguided"; and `Iyad went even so far as to order the -destruction of all his philosophical and theological writings that -existed in Spain. - -It is, therefore, clear that while the dialectic of Rationalism -destroyed the personality of God, and reduced divinity to a bare -indefinable universality, the antirationalist movement, though it -preserved the dogma of personality, destroyed the external reality of -nature. In spite of Nazzam's theory of "Atomic objectification"[77:1], -the atom of the Rationalist possesses an independent objective reality; -that of the Ash`arite is a fleeting moment of Divine Will. The one -saves nature, and tends to do away with the God of Theology; the other -sacrifices nature to save God as conceived by the orthodox. The -God-intoxicated Sufi who stands aloof from the Theological controversies -of the age, saves and spiritualises both the aspects of existence, and -looks upon the whole Universe as the self-revelation of God--a higher -notion which synthesises the opposite extremes of his predecessors. -"Wooden-legged" Rationalism, as the Sufi called it, speaks its last word -in the sceptic Al-Ghazali, whose restless soul, after long and -hopeless wanderings in the desolate sands of dry intellectualism, found -its final halting place in the still deep of human emotion. His -scepticism is directed more to substantiate the necessity of a higher -source of knowledge than merely to defend the dogma of Islamic Theology, -and, therefore, marks the quiet victory of Sufiism over all the rival -speculative tendencies of the time. - - [77:1] Ibn Hazm, Vol. V, p. 63, 64, where the author states and - criticises this theory. - -Al-Ghazali's positive contribution to the Philosophy of his country, -however, is found in his little book--Mishkatal-Anwar--where he starts -with the Quranic verse, "God is the light of heavens and earth", and -instinctively returns to the Iranian idea, which was soon to find a -vigorous expounder in Al-Ishraqi. Light, he teaches in this book, is -the only real existence; and there is no darkness greater than -non-existence. But the essence of Light is manifestation: "it is -attributed to manifestation which is a relation"[78:1]. The Universe -was created out of darkness on which God sprinkled[79:1] his own light, -and made its different parts more or less visible according as they -received more or less light. As bodies differ from one another in being -dark, obscure, illuminated or illuminating, so men are differentiated -from one another. There are some who illuminate other human beings; and, -for this reason, the Prophet is named "The Burning Lamp" in the Qur'an. - - [78:1] Mishkatal-Anwar, fol. 3a. - - [79:1] In support of this view Al-Ghazali quotes a tradition - of the prophet. Mishkatal-Anwar, fol. 10a. - -The physical eye sees only the external manifestation of the Absolute or -Real Light. There is an internal eye in the heart of man which, unlike -the physical eye, sees itself as other things, an eye which goes beyond -the finite, and pierces the veil of manifestation. These thoughts are -merely germs, which developed and fructified in Al-Ishraqi's -"Philosophy of Illumination"--Hikmatal-Ishraq. - -Such is the Ash`arite philosophy. - -One great theological result of this reaction was that it checked the -growth of freethought which tended to dissolve the solidarity of the -Church. We are, however, concerned more with the purely intellectual -results of the Ash`arite mode of thought, and these are mainly two:-- - -(1). It led to an independent criticism of Greek philosophy as we shall -see presently. - -(2). In the beginning of the 10th century when the Ash`arite had -almost completely demolished the stronghold of Rationalism, we see a -tendency towards what may be called Persian Positivism. Al-Biruni[80:1] -(d. 1048) and Ibn Haitham[80:2] (d. 1038) who anticipated modern -empirical Psychology in recognising what is called reaction-time, gave -up all inquiry concerning the nature of the supersensual, and maintained -a prudent silence about religious matters. Such a state of things could -have existed, but could not have been logically justified before -Al-Ash`ari. - - [80:1] He (Al-Biruni) quotes with approval the following, as the - teaching of the adherents of Aryabhatta: It is enough for us to - know that which is lighted up by the sun's rays. Whatever lies - beyond, though it should be of immeasurable extent, we cannot - make use of; for what the sunbeam does not reach, the senses do - not perceive, and what the senses do not perceive we cannot - know. From this we gather what Al-Biruni's Philosophy was: only - sense-perceptions, knit together by a logical intelligence, - yield sure knowledge. (Boer's Philosophy in Islam, p. 146). - - [80:2] "Moreover truth for him (Ibn Haitham) was only that - which was presented as material for the faculties of - sense-perception, and which received it from the understanding, - being thus the logically elaborated perception". (Boer's - Philosophy in Islam, p. 150). - - [80:2] "Moreover truth for him (Ibn Haitham) was only that - which was presented as material for the faculties of - sense-perception, and which received it from the understanding, - being thus the logically elaborated perception". (Boer's - Philosophy in Islam, p. 150). - - - - -CHAP. IV. - -CONTROVERSY BETWEEN IDEALISM AND REALISM. - - -The Ash`arite denial of Aristotle's Prima Materia, and their views -concerning the nature of space, time and causation, awakened that -irrepressible spirit of controversy which, for centuries, divided the -camp of Muhammedan thinkers, and eventually exhausted its vigor in the -merely verbal subtleties of schools. The publication of Najm al-Din -Al-Katibi's (a follower of Aristotle whose disciples were called -Philosophers as distinguished from scholastic theologians) Hikmat -al-`Ain--"Philosophy of Essence", greatly intensified the intellectual -conflict, and invoked keen criticism from a host of Ash`arite as well -as other idealist thinkers. I shall consider in order the principal -points on which the two schools differed from each other. - - -A. _The Nature of the Essence._ - -We have seen that the Ash`arite theory of knowledge drove them to -hold that individual essences of various things are quite different from -each other, and are determined in each case by the ultimate cause--God. -They denied the existence of an everchanging primary stuff common to all -things, and maintained against the Rationalists that existence -constitutes the very being of the essence. To them, therefore, essence -and existence are identical. They argued that the Judgment, "Man is -animal", is possible only on the ground of a fundamental difference -between the subject and the predicate; since their identity would make -the Judgment nugatory, and complete difference would make the -predication false. It is, therefore, necessary to postulate an external -cause to determine the various forms of existence. Their opponents, -however, admit the determination or limitation of existence, but they -maintain that all the various forms of existence, in so far as their -essence is concerned, are identical--all being limitations of one -Primary substance. The followers of Aristotle met the difficulty -suggested by the possibility of synthetic predication, by advocating the -possibility of compound essences. Such a judgment as "Man is animal", -they maintained, is true; because man is an essence composed of two -essences, animality and humanity. This, retorted the Ash`arite, cannot -stand criticism. If you say that the essence of man and animal is the -same, you in other words hold that the essence of the whole is the same -as that of the part. But this proposition is absurd; since if the -essence of the compound is the same as that of its constituents, the -compound will have to be regarded as one being having two essences or -existences. - -It is obvious that the whole controversy turns on the question whether -existence is a mere idea or something objectively real. When we say that -a certain thing exists, do we mean that it exists only in relation to us -(Ash`arite position); or that it is an essence existing quite -independently of us (Realist position)? We shall briefly indicate the -arguments of either side. The Realist argued as follows:-- - -(1). The conception of my existence is something immediate or intuitive. -The thought "I exist" is a "concept", and my body being an element of -this "concept", it follows that my body is intuitively known as -something real. If the knowledge of the existent is not immediate, the -fact of its perception would require a process of thought which, as we -know, it does not. The Ash`arite Al-Razi admits that the concept of -existence is immediate; but he regards the judgment--"The concept of -existence is immediate"--as merely a matter of acquisition. Muhammad ibn -Mubarak Bukhari, on the other hand, says that the whole argument of -the realist proceeds on the assumption that the concept of my existence -is something immediate--a position which can be controverted.[84:1] If, -says he, we admit that the concept of my existence is immediate, -abstract existence cannot be regarded as a constitutive element of this -conception. And if the realist maintains that the perception of a -particular object is immediate, we admit the truth of what he says; but -it would not follow, as he is anxious to establish, that the so called -underlying essence is immediately known as objectively real. The -realist argument, moreover, demands that the mind ought not to be able -to conceive the predication of qualities to things. We cannot conceive, -"snow is white", because whiteness, being a part of this immediate -judgment, must also be immediately known without any predication. Mulla -Muhammad Hashim Husaini remarks[85:1] that this reasoning is -erroneous. The mind in the act of predicating whiteness of snow is -working on a purely ideal existence--the quality of whiteness--and not -on an objectively real essence of which the qualities are mere facets or -aspects. Husaini, moreover, anticipates Hamilton, and differs from other -realists in holding that the so-called unknowable essence of the object -is also immediately known. The object, he says, is immediately perceived -as one.[85:2] We do not successively perceive the various aspects of -what happens to be the objects of our perception. - - [84:1] Muhammad ibn Mubarak's commentary on Hikmat al-`Ain, - fol. 5a. - - [85:1] Husaini's commentary on Hikmat al-`Ain, fol. 13a. - - [85:2] Husaini's commentary on Hikmat al-`Ain, fol. 14b. - -(2) The idealist, says the realist, reduces all quality to mere -subjective relations. His argument leads him to deny the underlying -essence of things, and to look upon them as entirely heterogeneous -collections of qualities, the essence of which consists merely in the -phenomenal fact of their perception. In spite of his belief in the -complete heterogeneity of things, he applies the word existence to all -things--a tacit admission that there is some essence common to all the -various forms of existence. Abu'l-Hasan al-Ash`ari replies that this -application is only a verbal convenience, and is not meant to indicate -the so-called internal homogeneity of things. But the universal -application of the word existence by the idealist, must mean, according -to the realist, that the existence of a thing either constitutes its -very essence, or it is something superadded to the underlying essence of -the thing. The first supposition is a virtual admission as to the -homogeneity of things; since we cannot maintain that existence peculiar -to one thing is fundamentally different from existence peculiar to -another. The supposition that existence is something superadded to the -essence of a thing leads to an absurdity; since in this case the essence -will have to be regarded as something distinct from existence; and the -denial of essence (with the Ash`arite) would blot out the distinction -between existence and non-existence. Moreover, what was the essence -before existence was superadded to it? We must not say that the essence -was ready to receive existence before it actually did receive it; since -this statement would imply that the essence was non-existence before it -received existence. Likewise the statement that the essence has the -power of receiving the quality of non-existence, implies the absurdity -that it does already exist. Existence, therefore, must be regarded as -forming a part of the essence. But if it forms a part of the essence, -the latter will have to be regarded as a compound. If, on the other -hand, existence is external to the essence, it must be something -contingent because of its dependence on something other than itself. Now -everything contingent must have a cause. If this cause is the essence -itself, it would follow that the essence existed before it existed; -since the cause must precede the effect in the fact of existence. If, -however, the cause of existence is something other than the essence, it -follows that the existence of God also must be explained by some cause -other than the essence of God--an absurd conclusion which turns the -necessary into the contingent.[88:1] This argument of the realist is -based on a complete misunderstanding of the idealist position. He does -not see that the idealist never regarded the fact of existence as -something superadded to the essence of a thing; but always held it to be -identical with the essence. The essence, says ibn Mubarak,[88:2] is the -cause of existence without being chronologically before it. The -existence of the essence constitutes its very being; it is not dependent -for it on something other than itself. - - [88:1] Ibn Mubarak's Commentary, fol. 8b. - - [88:2] Ibn Mubarak's Commentary, fol. 9a. - -The truth is that both sides are far from a true theory of knowledge. -The agnostic realist who holds that behind the phenomenal qualities of a -thing, there is an essence operating as their cause, is guilty of a -glaring contradiction. He holds that underlying the thing there is an -_unknowable_ essence or substratum which is _known_ to exist. The -Ash`arite idealist, on the other hand, misunderstands the process of -knowledge. He ignores the mental activity involved in the act of -knowledge; and looks upon perceptions as mere presentations which are -determined, as he says, by God. But if the order of presentations -requires a cause to account for it, why should not that cause be sought -in the original constitution of matter as Locke did? Moreover, the -theory that knowledge is a mere passive perception or awareness of what -is presented, leads to certain inadmissible conclusions which the -Ash`arite never thought of:-- - -(a). They did not see that their purely subjective conception of -knowledge swept away all possibility of error. If the existence of a -thing is merely the fact of its being presented, there is no reason why -it should be cognised as different from what it actually is. - -(b). They did not see that on their theory of knowledge, our -fellow-beings like other elements of the physical order, would have no -higher reality than mere states of my consciousness. - -(c). If knowledge is a mere receptivity of presentations, God who, as -cause of presentations, is active in regard to the act of our knowledge, -must not be aware of our presentations. From the Ash`arite point of -view this conclusion is fatal to their whole position. They cannot say -that presentations on their ceasing to be my presentations, continue to -be presentations to God's consciousness. - -Another question connected with the nature of the essence is, whether it -is caused or uncaused. The followers of Aristotle, or philosophers as -they are generally called by their opponents, hold that the underlying -essence of things is uncaused. The Ash`arite hold the opposite view. -Essence, says the Aristotelian, cannot be acted upon by any external -agent.[90:1] Al-Katibi argues that if, for instance, the essence of -humanity had resulted from the operation of an external activity, doubt -as to its being the real essence of humanity would have been possible. -As a matter of fact we never entertain such a doubt; it follows, -therefore, that the essence is not due to the activity of an agency -external to itself. The idealist starts with the realist distinction of -essence and existence, and argues that the realist line of argument -would lead to the absurd proposition--that man is uncaused; since he -must be regarded, according to the realist, as a combination of two -uncaused essences--existence and humanity. - - [90:1] Ibn Mubarak's Commentary, fol. 20a. - - -B. _The Nature of Knowledge._ - -The followers of Aristotle, true to their position as to the independent -objective reality of the essence, define knowledge as "receiving images -of external things".[91:1] It is possible to conceive, they argue, an -object which is externally unreal, and to which other qualities can be -attributed. But when we attribute to it the quality of existence, actual -existence is necessitated; since the affirmation of the quality of a -thing is a part of the affirmation of that thing. If, therefore, the -predication of existence does not necessitate actual objective existence -of the thing, we are driven to deny externality altogether, and to hold -that the thing exists in the mind as a mere idea. But the affirmation -of a thing, says Ibn Mubarak, constitutes the very existence of the -thing. The idealist makes no such distinction as affirmation and -existence. To infer from the above argument that the thing must be -regarded as existing in the mind, is unjustifiable. "Ideal" existence -follows only from the denial of externality which the Ash`arite do not -deny; since they hold that knowledge is a relation between the knower -and the known which is known as external. Al-Katibi's proposition that -if the thing does not exist as external existence, it must exist as -ideal or mental existence, is self-contradictory; since, on his -principles, everything that exists in idea exists in externality.[92:1] - - [91:1] Ibn Mubarak, fol. 11a. - - [92:1] Ibn Mubarak, fol. 11b. - - -C. _The Nature of Non-existence._ - -Al-Katibi explains and criticises the proposition, maintained by -contemporary philosophers generally--"That the existent is good, and the -non-existent is evil".[92:2] The fact of murder, he says, is not evil -because the murderer had the power of committing such a thing; or -because the instrument of murder had the power of cutting; or because -the neck of the murdered had the capacity of being cut asunder. It is -evil because it signifies the negation of life--a condition which is -non-existential, and not existential like the conditions indicated -above. But in order to show that evil is non-existence, we should make -an inductive inquiry, and examine all the various cases of evil. A -perfect induction, however, is impossible, and an incomplete induction -cannot prove the point. Al-Katibi, therefore, rejects this proposition, -and holds that "non-existence is absolute nothing".[93:1] The possible -'_essences_', according to him, are not lying fixed in space waiting for -the attribute of existence; otherwise fixity in space would have to be -regarded as possessing no existence. But his critics hold that this -argument is true only on the supposition that fixity in space and -existence are identical. Fixity in externality, says Ibn Mubarak, is a -conception wider than existence. All existence is external, but all that -is external is not necessarily existent. - - [92:2] Ibn Mubarak, fol. 14a. - - [93:1] Ibn Mubarak's Commentary, fol. 14b. - -The interest of the Ash`arite in the dogma of the Resurrection--the -possibility of the reappearance of the non-existent as existent--led -them to advocate the apparently absurd proposition that "non-existence -or nothing _is_ something". They argued that, since we make judgments -about the non-existent, it is, therefore, known; and the fact of its -knowability indicates that "the nothing" is not absolutely nothing. The -knowable is a case of affirmation and the non-existent being knowable, -is a case of affirmation.[94:1] Al-Katibi denies the truth of the Major. -Impossible things, he says, are known, yet they do not externally exist. -Al-Razi criticises this argument accusing Al-Katibi of the ignorance of -the fact that the '_essence_' exists in the mind, and yet is known as -external. Al-Katibi supposes that the knowledge of a thing necessitates -its existence as an independent objective reality. Moreover it should be -remembered that the Ash`arite discriminate between positive and -existent on the one hand, and non-existent and negative on the other. -They say that all existent is positive, but the converse of this -proposition is not true. There is certainly a relation between the -existent and the non-existent, but there is absolutely no relation -between the positive and the negative. We do not say, as Al-Katibi -holds, that the impossible is non-existent; we say that the impossible -is only negative. Substances which do exist are something positive. As -regards the attribute which cannot be conceived as existing apart from -the substance, it is neither existent nor non-existent, but something -between the two. Briefly the Ash`arite position is as follows:-- - -"A thing has a proof of its existence or not. If not, it is called -negative. If it has a proof of its existence, it is either substance or -attribute. If it is substance and has the attribute of existence or -non-existence, (i.e. it is perceived or not) it is existent or -non-existent accordingly. If it is attribute, it is neither existent nor -non-existent".[95:1] - - [94:1] Ibn Mubarak's Commentary, fol. 15a. - - [95:1] Ibn Mubarak's Commentary, fol. 15b. - - - - -CHAP. V. - -SUFIISM. - - -ASec. I. - -The origin and Quranic Justification of Sufiism. - -It has become quite a fashion with modern oriental scholarship to trace -the chain of influences. Such a procedure has certainly great historical -value, provided it does not make us ignore the fundamental fact, that -the human mind possesses an independent individuality, and, acting on -its own initiative, can gradually evolve out of itself, truths which may -have been anticipated by other minds ages ago. No idea can seize a -people's soul unless, in some sense, it is the people's own. External -influences may wake it up from its deep unconscious slumber; but they -cannot, so to speak, create it out of nothing. - -Much has been written about the origin of Persian Sufiism; and, in -almost all cases, explorers of this most interesting field of research -have exercised their ingenuity in discovering the various channels -through which the basic ideas of Sufiism might have travelled from one -place to another. They seem completely to have ignored the principle, -that the full significance of a phenomenon in the intellectual evolution -of a people, can only be comprehended in the light of those pre-existing -intellectual, political, and social conditions which alone make its -existence inevitable. Von Kremer and Dozy derive Persian Sufiism from -the Indian Vedanta; Merx and Mr. Nicholson derive it from Neo-Platonism; -while Professor Browne once regarded it as Aryan reaction against an -unemotional semitic religion. It appears to me, however, that these -theories have been worked out under the influence of a notion of -causation which is essentially false. That a fixed quantity A is the -cause of, or produces another fixed quantity B, is a proposition which, -though convenient for scientific purposes, is apt to damage all inquiry, -in so far as it leads us completely to ignore the innumerable conditions -lying at the back of a phenomenon. It would, for instance, be an -historical error to say that the dissolution of the Roman Empire was due -to the barbarian invasions. The statement completely ignores other -forces of a different character that tended to split up the political -unity of the Empire. To describe the advent of barbarian invasions as -the cause of the dissolution of the Roman Empire which could have -assimilated, as it actually did to a certain extent, the so-called -cause, is a procedure that no logic would justify. Let us, therefore, in -the light of a truer theory of causation, enumerate the principal -political, social, and intellectual conditions of Islamic life about the -end of the 8{th} and the first half of the 9{th} century when, properly -speaking, the Sufi ideal of life came into existence, to be soon -followed by a philosophical justification of that ideal.-- - -(1). When we study the history of the time, we find it to be a time of -more or less political unrest. The latter half of the 8{th} century -presents, besides the political revolution which resulted in the -overthrow of the Umayyads (749 A.D.), persecutions of Zendiks, and -revolts of Persian heretics (Sindbah 755-6; Ustadhis 766-8; the veiled -prophet of Khurasan 777-80) who, working on the credulity of the -people, cloaked, like Lamennais in our own times, political projects -under the guise of religious ideas. Later on in the beginning of the -9{th} century we find the sons of Harun (Ma'mun and Amin) engaged in a -terrible conflict for political supremacy; and still later, we see the -Golden Age of Islamic literature seriously disturbed by the persistent -revolt of the Mazdakite Babak (816-838). The early years of Ma'mun's -reign present another social phenomenon of great political -significance--the Shu`ubiyya controversy (815), which progresses with -the rise and establishment of independent Persian families, the Tahirid -(820), the Saffarid (868), and the Samanid Dynasty (874). It is, -therefore, the combined force of these and other conditions of a similar -nature that contributed to drive away spirits of devotional character -from the scene of continual unrest to the blissful peace of an -ever-deepening contemplative life. The semitic character of the life and -thought of these early Muhammadan ascetics is gradually followed by a -large hearted pantheism of a more or less Aryan stamp, the development -of which, in fact, runs parallel to the slowly progressing political -independence of Persia. - -(2). _The Sceptical tendencies of Islamic Rationalism_ which found an -early expression in the poems of Bashshar ibn Burd--the blind -Persian Sceptic who deified fire, and scoffed at all non-Persian modes -of thought. The germs of Scepticism latent in Rationalism ultimately -necessitated an appeal to a super-intellectual source of knowledge which -asserted itself in the Risala of Al-Qushairi (986). In our own times -the negative results of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason drove Jacobi and -Schleiermacher to base faith on the feeling of the reality of the ideal; -and to the 19{th} century sceptic Wordsworth uncovered that mysterious -state of mind "in which we grow all spirit and see into the life of -things". - -(3). The unemotional piety of the various schools of Islam--the Hanafite -(Abu Hanifa d. 767), the Shafiite (Al-Shafi`i d. 820), the Malikite -(Al-Malik d. 795), and the anthropomorphic Hambalite (Ibn Hambal d. -855)--the bitterest enemy of independent thought--which ruled the masses -after the death of Al-Ma'mun. - -(4). The religious discussions among the representatives of various -creeds encouraged by Al-Ma'mun, and especially the bitter theological -controversy between the Ash`arites, and the advocates of Rationalism -which tended not only to confine religion within the narrow limits of -schools, but also stirred up the spirit to rise above all petty -sectarian wrangling. - -(5). The gradual softening of religious fervency due to the -rationalistic tendency of the early `Abbasid period, and the rapid -growth of wealth which tended to produce moral laxity and indifference -to religious life in the upper circles of Islam. - -(6). The presence of Christianity as a working ideal of life. It was, -however, principally the actual life of the Christian hermit rather than -his religious ideas, that exercised the greatest fascination over the -minds of early Islamic Saints whose complete unworldliness, though -extremely charming in itself, is, I believe, quite contrary to the -spirit of Islam. - -Such was principally the environment of Sufiism, and it is to the -combined action of the above condition that we should look for the -origin and development of Sufiistic ideas. Given these condition and the -Persian mind with an almost innate tendency towards monism, the whole -phenomenon of the birth and growth of Sufiism is explained. If we now -study the principal pre-existing conditions of Neo-Platonism, we find -that similar conditions produced similar results. The barbarian raids -which were soon to reduce Emperors of the Palace to Emperors of the -Camp, assumed a more serious aspect about the middle of the third -century. Plotinus himself speaks of the political unrest of his time in -one of his letters to Flaccus.[102:1] When he looked round himself in -Alexandria, his birth place, he noticed signs of growing toleration and -indifferentism towards religious life. Later on in Rome which had -become, so to say, a pantheon of different nations, he found a similar -want of seriousness in life, a similar laxity of character in the upper -classes of society. In more learned circles philosophy was studied as a -branch of literature rather than for its own sake; and Sextus Empiricus, -provoked by Antiochus's tendency to fuse scepticism and Stoicism was -teaching the old unmixed scepticism of Pyrrho--that intellectual despair -which drove Plotinus to find truth in a revelation above thought itself. -Above all, the hard unsentimental character of Stoic morality, and the -loving piety of the followers of Christ who, undaunted by long and -fierce persecutions, were preaching the message of peace and love to the -whole Roman world, necessitated a restatement of Pagan thought in a way -that might revivify the older ideals of life, and suit the new spiritual -requirements of the people. But the ethical force of Christianity was -too great for Neo-Platonism which, on account of its more -metaphysical[103:1] character, had no message for the people at large, -and was consequently inaccessible to the rude barbarian who, being -influenced by the actual life of the persecuted Christian adopted -Christianity, and settled down to construct new empires out of the ruins -of the old. In Persia the influence of culture-contacts and -cross-fertilisation of ideas created in certain minds a vague desire to -realise a similar restatement of Islam, which gradually assimilated -Christian ideals as well as Christian Gnostic speculation, and found a -firm foundation in the Qur'an. The flower of Greek Thought faded away -before the breath of Christianity; but the burning simoon of Ibn -Taimiyya's invective could not touch the freshness of the Persian rose. -The one was completely swept away by the flood of barbarian invasions; -the other, unaffected by the Tartar revolution, still holds its own. - - [102:1] "Tidings have reached us that Valerian has been - defeated, and is now in the hands of Sapor. The threats of - Franks and Allemanni, of Goths and Persians, are alike terrible - by turns to our _degenerate_ Rome." (Plotinus to Flaccus; quoted - by Vaughan in his Half hours with Mystics, p. 63.) - - [103:1] The element of ecstacy which could have appealed to some - minds was thrown into the background by the later teachers of - Neo-Platonism, so that it became a mere system of thought having - no human interest. Says Whittaker:--"The mystical ecstacy was - not found by the later teachers of the school easier to attain, - but more difficult; and the tendency became more and more to - regard it as all but unattainable on earth." Neo-Platonism, p. - 101. - -This extraordinary vitality of the Sufi restatement of Islam, however, -is explained when we reflect on the all-embracing structure of Sufiism. -The semitic formula of salvation can be briefly stated in the words, -"Transform your will",--which signifies that the Semite looks upon will -as the essence of the human soul. The Indian Vedantist, on the other -hand, teaches that all pain is due to our mistaken attitude towards -the Universe. He, therefore, commands us to transform our -understanding--implying thereby that the essential nature of man -consists in thought, not activity or will. But the Sufi holds that the -mere transformation of will or understanding will not bring peace; we -should bring about the transformation of both by a complete -transformation of feeling, of which will and understanding are only -specialised forms. His message to the individual is--"Love all, and -forget your own individuality in doing good to others." Says Rumi:--"To -win other people's hearts is the greatest pilgrimage; and one heart is -worth more than a thousand Ka`bahs. Ka`bah is a mere cottage of Abraham; -but the heart is the very home of God." But this formula demands a _why_ -and a _how_--a metaphysical justification of the ideal in order to -satisfy the understanding; and rules of action in order to guide the -will. Sufiism furnishes both. Semitic religion is a code of strict rules -of conduct; the Indian Vedanta, on the other hand, is a cold system of -thought. Sufiism avoids their incomplete Psychology, and attempts to -synthesise both the Semitic and the Aryan formulas in the higher -category of Love. On the one hand it assimilates the Buddhistic idea of -Nirwana (Fana-Annihilation), and seeks to build a metaphysical system in -the light of this idea; on the other hand it does not disconnect itself -from Islam, and finds the justification of its view of the Universe in -the Qur'an. Like the geographical position of its home, it stands midway -between the Semitic and the Aryan, assimilating ideas from both sides, -and giving them the stamp of its own individuality which, on the whole, -is more Aryan than Semitic in character. It would, therefore, be evident -that the secret of the vitality of Sufiism is the complete view of human -nature upon which it is based. It has survived orthodox persecutions and -political revolutions, because it appeals to human nature in its -entirety; and, while it concentrates its interest chiefly in a _life_ of -self-denial, it allows free play to the speculative tendency as well. - -I will now briefly indicate how Sufi writers justify their views from -the Quranic standpoint. There is no historical evidence to show that the -Prophet of Arabia actually communicated certain esoteric doctrines to -`Ali or Abu Bakr. The Sufi, however, contends that the Prophet had an -esoteric teaching--"wisdom"--as distinguished from the teaching -contained in the Book, and he brings forward the following verse to -substantiate his case:--"As we have sent a prophet to you from among -yourselves who reads our verses to you, purifies you, teaches you the -Book and the _Wisdom_, and teaches you _what you did not know -before_."[107:1] He holds that "the wisdom" spoken of in the verse, is -something not incorporated in the teaching of the Book which, as the -Prophet repeatedly declared, had been taught by several prophets before -him. If, he says, the wisdom is included in the Book, the word "Wisdom" -in the verse would be redundant. It can, I think, be easily shown that -in the Qur'an as well as in the authenticated traditions, there are -germs of Sufi doctrine which, owing to the thoroughly practical genius -of the Arabs, could not develop and fructify in Arabia, but which grew -up into a distinct doctrine when they found favourable circumstances in -alien soils. The Qur'an thus defines the Muslims:--"Those who believe in -the Unseen, establish daily prayer, and spend out of what We have given -them."[108:1] But the question arises as to the _what_ and the _where_ -of the Unseen. The Qur'an replies that the Unseen is in your own -soul--"And in the earth there are signs to those who believe, and in -yourself,--what! do you not then see!"[108:2] And again--"We are nigher -to him (man) than his own jugular vein."[108:3] Similarly the Holy Book -teaches that the essential nature of the Unseen is pure light--"God is -the light of heavens and earth."[108:4] As regards the question whether -this Primal Light is personal, the Qur'an, in spite of many expressions -signifying personality, declares in a few words--"There is nothing like -him."[108:5] - - [107:1] Sura 2, v. 146. - - [108:1] Sura 2, v. 2. - - [108:2] Sura 51, v. 20, 21. - - [108:3] Sura 50, v. 15. - - [108:4] Sura 24, v. 35. - - [108:5] Sura 42, v. 9. - -These are some of the chief verses out of which the various Sufi -commentators develop pantheistic views of the Universe. They enumerate -the following four stages of spiritual training through which the -soul--the order or reason of the Primal Light--("Say that the soul is -the order or reason of God.")[109:1] has to pass, if it desires to rise -above the common herd, and realise its union or identity with the -ultimate source of all things:-- - -(1). Belief in the Unseen. - -(2). Search after the Unseen. The spirit of inquiry leaves its slumber -by observing the marvellous phenomena of nature. "Look at the camel how -it is created; the skies how they are exalted; the mountains how they -are unshakeably fixed."[109:2] - -(3). The knowledge of the Unseen. This comes, as we have indicated -above, by looking into the depths of our own soul. - -(4). The Realisation--This results, according to the higher Sufiism -from the constant practice of Justice and Charity--"Verily God bids you -do justice and good, and give to kindred (their due), and He forbids you -to sin, and do wrong, and oppress".[110:1] - - [109:1] Sura 17; v. 87. - - [109:2] Sura 88; v. 20. - - [110:1] Sura 16; v. 92. - -It must, however, be remembered that some later Sufi fraternities (e.g. -Naqshbandi) devised, or rather borrowed[110:2] from the Indian -Vedantist, other means of bringing about this Realisation. They taught, -imitating the Hindu doctrine of Kundalini, that there are six great -centres of light of various colours in the body of man. It is the object -of the Sufi to make them move, or to use the technical word, "current" -by certain methods of meditation, and eventually to realise, amidst the -apparent diversity of colours, the fundamental colourless light which -makes everything visible, and is itself invisible. The continual -movement of these centres of light through the body, and the final -realisation of their identity, which results from putting the atoms of -the body into definite courses of motion by slow repetition of the -various names of God and other mysterious expressions, illuminates the -whole body of the Sufi; and the perception of the same illumination in -the external world completely extinguishes the sense of "otherness." The -fact that these methods were known to the Persian Sufis misled Von -Kremer who ascribed the whole phenomenon of Sufiism to the influence of -Vedantic ideas. Such methods of contemplation are quite unislamic in -character, and the higher Sufis do not attach any importance to them. - - [110:2] Weber makes the following statement on the authority of - Lassen:--"Al-Biruni translated Patanjali's work into Arabic at - the beginning of the 11th century, and also, it would appear, - the Sankhya sutra, though the information we have as to the - contents of these works does not harmonise with the Sanskrit - originals." History of Indian Literature, p. 239. - - -ASec. II. - -Aspects of Sufi-Metaphysics. - -Let us now return to the various schools or rather the various aspects -of Sufi Metaphysics. A careful investigation of Sufi literature shows -that Sufiism has looked at the Ultimate Reality from three standpoints -which, in fact, do not exclude but complement each other. Some Sufis -conceive the essential nature of reality as self-conscious will, others -beauty; others again hold that Reality is essentially Thought, Light or -Knowledge. There are, therefore, three aspects of Sufi thought:-- - -A. _Reality as Self-conscious Will._ - -The first in historical order is that represented by Shaqiq Balkhi, -Ibrahim Adham, Rabi`a, and others. This school conceives the ultimate -reality as "Will", and the Universe a finite activity of that will. It -is essentially monotheistic and consequently more semitic in character. -It is not the desire of Knowledge which dominates the ideal of the Sufis -of this school, but the characteristic features of their life are piety, -unworldliness, and an intense longing for God due to the consciousness -of sin. Their object is not to philosophise, but principally to work out -a certain ideal of life. From our standpoint, therefore, they are not of -much importance. - -B. _Reality as Beauty._ - -In the beginning of the 9{th} century Ma`ruf Karkhi defined Sufiism -as "Apprehension of Divine realities"[113:1]--a definition which marks -the movement from Faith to Knowledge. But the method of apprehending the -ultimate reality was formally stated by Al-Qushairi about the end of -the 10{th} century. The teachers of this school adopted the Neo-Platonic -idea of creation by intermediary agencies; and though this idea lingered -in the minds of Sufi writers for a long time, yet their Pantheism led -them to abandon the Emanation theory altogether. Like Avicenna they -looked upon the ultimate Reality as "Eternal Beauty" whose very nature -consists in seeing its own "face" reflected in the Universe-mirror. The -Universe, therefore, became to them a reflected image of the "Eternal -Beauty", and not an emanation as the Neo-Platonists had taught. The -cause of creation, says Mir Sayyid Sharif, is the manifestation of -Beauty, and the first creation is Love. The realisation of this Beauty, -is brought about by universal love, which the innate Zoroastrian -instinct of the Persian Sufi loved to define as "the Sacred Fire which -burns up everything other than God." Says Rumi:-- - - "O thou pleasant madness, Love! - Thou Physician of all our ills! - Thou healer of pride, - Thou Plato and Galen of our souls!"[114:1] - - [113:1] Mr. Nicholson has collected the various definitions of - Sufiism. See J. R. A. S. April, 1906. - - [114:1] Mathnawi, Jalal al Din Rumi, with Bahral `ulum's - Commentary. Lucknow (India), 1877, p. 9. - -As a direct consequence of such a view of the Universe, we have the idea -of impersonal absorption which first appears in Bayazid of Bistam, and -which constitutes the characteristic feature of the later development of -this school. The growth of this idea may have been influenced by Hindu -pilgrims travelling through Persia to the Buddhistic temple still -existing at Baku.[114:2] The school became wildly pantheistic in Husain -Mansur who, in the true spirit of the Indian Vedantist, cried out, "I am -God"--Aham Brahma asmi. - - [114:2] As regards the progress of Buddhism Geiger says:--"We - know that in the period after Alexander, Buddhism was powerful - in Eastern Iran, and that it counted its confessors as far as - Tabaristan. It is especially certain that many Buddhistic - priests were found in Bactria. This state of things, which began - perhaps in the first century before Christ, lasted till the - 7{th} century A.D., when the appearance of Islamism alone cut - short the development of Buddhism in Kabul and Bactria, and it - is in that period that we will have to place the rise of the - Zarathushtra legend in the form in which it is presented to us - by Daqiqi." - - Civilisation of Eastern Iranians - Vol. II, p. 170. - -The ultimate Reality or Eternal Beauty, according to the Sufis of this -school, is infinite in the sense that "it is absolutely free from the -limitations of beginning, end, right, left, above, and below."[115:1] -The distinction of essence and attribute does not exist in the -Infinite--"Substance and quality are really identical."[115:2] We have -indicated above that nature is the mirror of the Absolute Existence. But -according to Nasafi, there are two kinds of mirrors[115:3]-- - -(a). That which shows merely a reflected image--this is external nature. - -(b). That which shows the real Essence--this is man who is a limitation -of the Absolute, and erroneously thinks himself to be an independent -entity. - - [115:1] Nasafi's Maqsadi Aqsa: fol. 8b. - - [115:2] Nasafi's Maqsadi Aqsa: fol. 10b. - - [115:3] Nasafi's Maqsadi Aqsa: fol. 23b. - -"O Derwish!" says Nasafi "dost thou think that thy existence is -independent of God? This is a great error."[116:1] Nasafi explains his -meaning by a beautiful parable.[116:2] The fishes in a certain tank -realised that they lived, moved, and had their being in water, but felt -that they were quite ignorant of the real nature of what constituted the -very source of their life. They resorted to a wiser fish in a great -river, and the Philosopher-fish addressed them thus:-- - -"O you who endeavour to untie the knot (of being)! You are born in -union, yet die in the thought of an unreal separation. Thirsty on the -sea-shore! Dying penniless while master of the treasure!" - - [116:1] Nasafi's Maqsadi Aqsa: fol. 3b. - - [116:2] Nasafi's Maqsadi Aqsa: fol. 15b. - -All feeling of separation, therefore, is ignorance; and all "otherness" -is a mere appearance, a dream, a shadow--a differentiation born of -relation essential to the self-recognition of the Absolute. The great -prophet of this school is "The excellent Rumi" as Hegel calls him. He -took up the old Neo-Platonic idea of the Universal soul working through -the various spheres of being, and expressed it in a way so modern in -spirit that Clodd introduces the passage in his "Story of Creation". I -venture to quote this famous passage in order to show how successfully -the poet anticipates the modern concept of evolution, which he regarded -as the realistic side of his Idealism. - - First man appeared in the clan of inorganic things, - Next he passed therefrom into that of plants. - For years he lived as one of the plants, - Remembering nought of his inorganic state so different; - And when he passed from the vegetive to the animal state, - He had no remembrance of his state as a plant, - Except the inclination he felt to the world of plants, - Especially at the time of spring and sweet flowers; - Like the inclination of infants towards their mothers, - Which know not the cause of their inclination to the breast. - Again the great creator as you know, - Drew man out of the animal into the human state. - Thus man passed from one order of nature to another, - Till he became wise and knowing and strong as he is now. - Of his first soul he has now no remembrance, - And he will be again changed from his present soul. - - (Mathnawi Book IV). - -It would now be instructive if we compare this aspect of Sufi thought -with the fundamental ideas of Neo-Platonism. The God of Neo-Platonism is -immanent as well as transcendant. "As being the cause of all things, it -is everywhere. As being other than all things, it is nowhere. If it were -only "everywhere", and not also "nowhere", it would _be_ all -things."[118:1] The Sufi, however, tersely says that God _is_ all -things. The Neo-Platonist allows a certain permanence or fixity to -matter;[118:2] but the Sufis of the school in question, regard all -empirical experience as a kind of dreaming. Life in limitation, they -say, is sleep; death brings the awakening. It is, however, the doctrine -of Impersonal immortality--"genuinely eastern in spirit"--which -distinguishes this school from Neo-Platonism. "Its (Arabian Philosophy) -distinctive doctrine", says Whittaker, "of an Impersonal immortality of -the general human intellect is, however, as contrasted with -Aristotelianism and Neo-Platonism, essentially original." - - [118:1] Whittaker's Neo-Platonism, p. 58. - - [118:2] Whittaker's Neo-Platonism, p. 57. - -The above brief exposition shows that there are three basic ideas of -this mode of thought:-- - -(a). That the ultimate Reality is knowable through a supersensual state -of consciousness. - -(b). That the ultimate Reality is impersonal. - -(c). That the ultimate Reality is one. - -Corresponding to these ideas we have: - -(I). The Agnostic reaction as manifested in the Poet `Umar Khayyam -(12{th} century) who cried out in his intellectual despair:-- - - The joyous souls who quaff potations deep, - And saints who in the mosque sad vigils keep, - Are lost at sea alike, and find no shore, - One only wakes, all others are asleep. - -(II). The monotheistic reaction of Ibn Taimiyya and his followers in the -13{th} century. - -(III). The Pluralistic reaction of Wahid Mahmud[119:1] in the 13{th} -century. - - [119:1] Dabistan, Chap: 8. - -Speaking from a purely philosophical standpoint, the last movement is -most interesting. The history of Thought illustrates the operation of -certain general laws of progress which are true of the intellectual -annals of different peoples. The German systems of monistic thought -invoked the pluralism of Herbart; while the pantheism of Spinoza called -forth the monadism of Leibniz. The operation of the same law led Wahid -Mahmud to deny the truth of contemporary monism, and declare that -Reality is not one but many. Long before Leibniz he taught that the -Universe is a combination of what he called "Afrad"--essential units, or -simple atoms which have existed from all eternity, and are endowed with -life. The law of the Universe is an ascending perfection of elemental -matter, continually passing from lower to higher forms determined by the -kind of food which the fundamental units assimilate. Each period of his -cosmogony comprises 8,000 years, and after eight such periods the world -is decomposed, and the units re-combine to construct a new universe. -Wahid Mahmud succeeded in founding a sect which was cruelly persecuted, -and finally stamped out of existence by Shah `Abbas. It is said that -the poet Hafiz of Shiraz believed in the tenets of this sect. - - -C. _Reality as Light or Thought._ - -The third great school of Sufiism conceives Reality as essentially Light -or Thought, the very nature of which demands something to be thought or -illuminated. While the preceding school abandoned Neo-Platonism, this -school transformed it into new systems. There are, however, two aspects -of the metaphysics of this school. The one is genuinely Persian in -spirit, the other is chiefly influenced by Christian modes of thought. -Both agree in holding that the fact of empirical diversity necessitates -a principle of difference in the nature of the ultimate Reality. I now -proceed to consider them in their historical order. - - -I. Reality as Light--Al-Ishraqi. - -Return to Persian Dualism. - -The application of Greek dialectic to Islamic Theology aroused that -spirit of critical examination which began with Al-Ash`ari, and found -its completest expression in the scepticism of Al-Ghazali. Even among -the Rationalists there were some more critical minds--such as -Nazzam--whose attitude towards Greek Philosophy was not one of servile -submission, but of independent criticism. The defenders of -dogma--Al-Ghazali, Al-Razi, Abul Barakat, and Al-Amidi, carried on a -persistent attack on the whole fabric of Greek Philosophy; while Abu -Sa`id Sairafi, Qadi `Abdal Jabbar, Abul Ma`ali, Abul Qasim, and finally -the acute Ibn Taimiyya, actuated by similar theological motives, -continued to expose the inherent weakness of Greek Logic. In their -criticism of Greek Philosophy, these thinkers were supplemented by some -of the more learned Sufis, such as Shahabal Din Suhrawardi, who -endeavoured to substantiate the helplessness of pure reason by his -refutation of Greek thought in a work entitled, "The unveiling of Greek -absurdities". The Ash`arite reaction against Rationalism resulted not -only in the development of a system of metaphysics most modern in some -of its aspects, but also in completely breaking asunder the worn out -fetters of intellectual thraldom. Erdmann[122:1] seems to think that the -speculative spirit among the Muslims exhausted itself with Al-Farabi and -Avicenna, and that after them Philosophy became bankrupt in passing over -into scepticism and mysticism. Evidently he ignores the Muslim criticism -of Greek Philosophy which led to the Ash`arite Idealism on the one -hand, and a genuine Persian reconstruction on the other. That a system -of thoroughly Persian character might be possible, the destruction of -foreign thought, or rather the weakening of its hold on the mind, was -indispensable. The Ash`arite and other defenders of Islamic Dogma -completed the destruction; Al-Ishraqi--the child of emancipation--came -forward to build a new edifice of thought; though, in his process of -reconstruction, he did not entirely repudiate the older material. His is -the genuine Persian brain which, undaunted by the threats of narrow -minded authority, asserts its right of free independent speculation. In -his philosophy the old Iranian tradition, which had found only a partial -expression in the writings of the Physician Al-Razi, Al-Ghazali, and -the Isma`ilia sect, endeavours to come to a final understanding with the -philosophy of his predecessors and the theology of Islam. - - [122:1] Vol. I, p. 367. - -Shaikh Shahabal Din Suhrawardi, known as Shaikhal Ishraq Maqtul -was born about the middle of the 12{th} century. He studied philosophy -with Majd Jili--the teacher of the commentator Al-Razi--and, while -still a youth, stood unrivalled as a thinker in the whole Islamic world. -His great admirer Al-Malik-al-Zahir--the son of Sultan Salah-al -Din--invited him to Aleppo, where the youthful philosopher expounded his -independent opinions in a way that aroused the bitter jealousy of -contemporary theologians. These hired slaves of bloodthirsty Dogmatism -which, conscious of its inherent weakness, has always managed to keep -brute force behind its back, wrote to Sultan Salah-al Din, that the -Shaikh's teaching was a danger to Islam, and that it was necessary, -in the interest of the Faith, to nip the evil in the bud. The Sultan -consented; and there, at the early age of 36, the young Persian thinker -calmly met the blow which made him a martyr of truth, and immortalised -his name for ever. Murderers have passed away, but the philosophy, the -price of which was paid in blood, still lives, and attracts many an -earnest seeker after truth. - -The principal features of the founder of the Ishraqi Philosophy are -his intellectual independence, the skill with which he weaves his -materials into a systematic whole, and above all his faithfulness to -the philosophic traditions of his country. In many fundamental points he -differs from Plato, and freely criticises Aristotle whose philosophy he -looks upon as a mere preparation for his own system of thought. Nothing -escapes his criticism. Even the logic of Aristotle, he subjects to a -searching examination, and shows the hollowness of some of its -doctrines. Definition, for instance, is genus plus differentia, -according to Aristotle. But Al-Ishraqi holds that the distinctive -attribute of the thing defined, which cannot be predicated of any other -thing, will bring us no knowledge of the thing. We define "horse" as a -neighing animal. Now we understand animality, because we know many -animals in which this attribute exists; but it is impossible to -understand the attribute "neighing", since it is found nowhere except in -the thing defined. The ordinary definition of horse, therefore, would be -meaningless to a man who has never seen a horse. Aristotelian -definition, as a scientific principle is quite useless. This criticism -leads the Shaikh, to a standpoint very similar to that of Bosanquet -who defines definition, as "Summation of qualities". The Shaikh -holds that a true definition would enumerate all the essential -attributes which, taken collectively, exist nowhere except the thing -defined, though they may individually exist in other things. - -But let us turn to his system of metaphysics, and estimate the worth of -his contribution to the thought of his country. In order fully to -comprehend the purely intellectual side of Transcendental philosophy, -the student, says the Shaikh, must be thoroughly acquainted with -Aristotelian philosophy, Logic, Mathematics, and Sufiism. His mind -should be completely free from the taint of prejudice and sin, so that -he may gradually develop that inner sense, which verifies and corrects -what intellect understands only as theory. Unaided reason is -untrustworthy; it must always be supplemented by "Dhauq"--the -mysterious perception of the essence of things--which brings knowledge -and peace to the restless soul, and disarms Scepticism for ever. We are, -however, concerned with the purely speculative side of this spiritual -experience--the results of the inner perception as formulated and -systematised by discursive thought. Let us, therefore, examine the -various aspects of the Ishraqi Philosophy--Ontology, Cosmology, and -Psychology. - - -Ontology. - -The ultimate principle of all existence is "Nur-i-Qahir"--the Primal -Absolute Light whose essential nature consists in perpetual -illumination. "Nothing is more visible than light, and visibility does -not stand in need of any definition."[127:1] The essence of Light, -therefore, is manifestation. For if manifestation is an attribute -superadded to light, it would follow that in itself light possesses no -visibility, and becomes visible only through something else visible in -itself; and from this again follows the absurd consequence, that -something other than light is more visible than light. The Primal Light, -therefore, has no reason of its existence beyond itself. All that is -other than this original principle is dependent, contingent, possible. -The "not-light" (darkness) is not something distinct proceeding from an -independent source. It is an error of the representatives of the Magian -religion to suppose that Light and Darkness are two distinct realities -created by two distinct creative agencies. The ancient Philosophers of -Persia were not dualists like the Zoroastrian priests who, on the ground -of the principle that the one cannot cause to emanate from itself more -than one, assigned two independent sources to Light and Darkness. The -relation between them is not that of contrariety, but of existence and -non-existence. The affirmation of Light necessarily posits its own -negation--Darkness which it must illuminate in order to be itself. This -Primordial Light is the source of all motion. But its motion is not -change of place; it is due to the _love_ of illumination which -constitutes its very essence, and stirs it up, as it were, to quicken -all things into life, by pouring out its own rays into their being. The -number of illuminations which proceed from it is infinite. Illuminations -of intenser brightness become, in their turn, the sources of other -illuminations; and the scale of brightness gradually descends to -illuminations too faint to beget other illuminations. All these -illuminations are mediums, or in the language of Theology, angels -through whom the infinite varieties of being receive life and sustenance -from the Primal Light. The followers of Aristotle erroneously restricted -the number of original Intellects to ten. They likewise erred in -enumerating the categories of thought. The possibilities of the Primal -Light are infinite; and the Universe, with all its variety, is only a -partial expression of the infinitude behind it. The categories of -Aristotle, therefore, are only relatively true. It is impossible for -human thought to comprehend within its tiny grasp, all the infinite -variety of ideas according to which the Primal Light does or may -illuminate that which is not light. We can, however, discriminate -between the following two illuminations of the original Light:-- - - [127:1] Sharh Anwariyya--Al-Harawi's commentary on - Al-Ishraqi's Hikmat al-Ishraq, fol. 10a. - -(1). The Abstract Light (e.g. Intellect Universal as well as -individual). It has no form, and never becomes the attribute of anything -other than itself (Substance). From it proceed all the various forms of -partly-conscious, conscious, or self-conscious light, differing from one -another in the amount of lustre, which is determined by their -comparative nearness or distance from the ultimate source of their -being. The individual intellect or soul is only a fainter copy, or a -more distant reflection of the Primal Light. The Abstract Light knows -itself through itself, and does not stand in need of a non-ego to reveal -its own existence to itself. Consciousness or self-knowledge, therefore, -is the very essense of Abstract light, as distinguished from the -negation of light. - -(2). The Accidental light (Attribute)--the light that has a form, and is -capable of becoming an attribute of something other than itself (e.g. -the light of the stars, or the visibility of other bodies). The -Accidental light, or more properly sensible light, is a distant -reflection of the Abstract light, which, because of its distance, has -lost the intensity, or substance-character of its parent. The process of -continuous reflection is really a softening process; successive -illuminations gradually lose their intensity until, in the chain of -reflections, we reach certain less intense illuminations which entirely -lose their independent character, and cannot exist except in -association with something else. These illuminations form the Accidental -light--the attribute which has no independent existence. The relation, -therefore, between the Accidental and the Abstract light is that of -cause and effect. The effect, however, is not something quite distinct -from its cause; it is a transformation, or a weaker form of the supposed -cause itself. Anything other than the Abstract light (e.g. the nature of -the illuminated body itself) cannot be the cause of the Accidental -light; since the latter, being merely contingent and consequently -capable of being negatived, can be taken away from bodies, without -affecting their character. If the essence or nature of the illuminated -body, had been the cause of the Accidental light, such a process of -disillumination could not have been possible. We cannot conceive an -inactive cause.[131:1] - - [131:1] Sharh Anwariyya fol. 11b. - -It is now obvious that the Shaikh al-Ishraq agrees with the -Ash`arite thinkers in holding that there is no such thing as the Prima -Materia of Aristotle; though he recognises the existence of a necessary -negation of Light--darkness, the object of illumination. He further -agrees with them in teaching the relativity of all categories except -Substance and Quality. But he corrects their theory of knowledge, in so -far as he recognises an active element in human knowledge. Our relation -with the objects of our knowledge is not merely a passive relation; the -individual soul, being itself an illumination, illuminates the object in -the act of knowledge. The Universe to him is one great process of active -illumination; but, from a purely intellectual standpoint, this -illumination is only a partial expression of the infinitude of the -Primal Light, which may illuminate according to other laws not known to -us. The categories of thought are infinite; our intellect works with a -few only. The Shaikh, therefore, from the standpoint of discursive -thought, is not far from modern Humanism. - - -Cosmology. - -All that is "not-light" is, what the Ishraqi thinkers call, "Absolute -quantity", or "Absolute matter". It is only another aspect of the -affirmation of light, and not an independent principle, as the -followers of Aristotle erroneously hold. The experimental fact of the -transformation of the primary elements into one another, points to this -fundamental Absolute matter which, with its various degrees of -grossness, constitutes the various spheres of material being. The -absolute ground of all things, then, is divided into two kinds:-- - -(1). That which is beyond space--the obscure substance or atoms -(essences of the Ash`arite). - -(2). That which is necessarily in space--forms of darkness, e.g. weight, -smell, taste, etc. - -The combination of these two particularises the Absolute matter. A -material body is forms of darkness plus obscure substance, made visible -or illuminated by the Abstract light. But what is the cause of the -various forms of darkness? These, like the forms of light, owe their -existence to the Abstract light, the different illuminations of which -cause diversity in the spheres of being. The forms which make bodies -differ from one another, do not exist in the nature of the Absolute -matter. The Absolute quantity and the Absolute matter being identical, -if these forms do exist in the essence of the Absolute matter, all -bodies would be identical in regard to the forms of darkness. This, -however, is contradicted by daily experience. The cause of the forms of -darkness, therefore, is not the Absolute matter. And as the difference -of forms cannot be assigned to any other cause, it follows that they are -due to the various illuminations of the Abstract light. Forms of light -and darkness both owe their existence to the Abstract Light. The third -element of a material body--the obscure atom or essence--is nothing but -a necessary aspect of the affirmation of light. The body as a whole, -therefore, is completely dependent on the Primal Light. The whole -Universe is really a continuous series of circles of existence, all -depending on the original Light. Those nearer to the source receive more -illumination than those more distant. All varieties of existence in each -circle, and the circles themselves, are illuminated through an infinite -number of medium-illuminations, which preserve some forms of existence -by the help of "conscious light" (as in the case of man, animal and -plant), and some without it (as in the case of minerals and primary -elements). The immense panorama of diversity which we call the Universe, -is, therefore, a vast shadow of the infinite variety in intensity of -direct or indirect illuminations and rays of the Primary Light. Things -are, so to speak, fed by their respective illuminations to which they -constantly move, with a lover's passion, in order to drink more and more -of the original fountain of Light. The world is an eternal drama of -love. The different planes of being are as follow:-- - - The Plane + 1. The Plane of Intellects--the - of Primal | parent of the heavens, - Light. | 2. The Plane of the Soul. - + 3. The Plane of Form. - | - | + 1. The Plane + 1. The Plane of - | | of ideal | the heavens. - +----+ form. ------------+ - | 2. The Plane | 2. The Plane of - | of material + the elements:-- - + forms:-- - - (a). The heavens (a). Simple elements. - (b). The elements:-- (b). Compounds:-- - 1. Simple elements I. Mineral kingdom. - 2. Compounds:-- II. Vegetable kingdom. - I. Mineral kingdom. III. Animal kingdom. - II. Vegetable kingdom. - III. Animal kingdom. - -Having briefly indicated the general nature of Being, we now proceed to -a more detailed examination of the world-process. All that is not-light -is divided into:-- - -(1). Eternal e.g., Intellects, Souls of heavenly bodies, heavens, simple -elements, time, motion. - -(2). Contingent e.g., Compounds of various elements. The motion of the -heavens is eternal, and makes up the various cycles of the Universe. It -is due to the intense longing of the heaven-soul to receive illumination -from the source of all light. The matter of which the heavens are -constructed, is completely free from the operation of chemical -processes, incidental to the grosser forms of the not-light. Every -heaven has its own matter peculiar to it alone. Likewise the heavens -differ from one another in the direction of their motion; and the -difference is explained by the fact that the beloved, or the sustaining -illumination, is different in each case. Motion is only an aspect of -time. It is the summing up of the elements of time, which, as -externalised, is motion. The distinction of past, present, and future -is made only for the sake of convenience, and does not exist in the -nature of time.[137:1] We cannot conceive the beginning of time; for the -supposed beginning would be a point of time itself. Time and motion, -therefore, are both eternal. - - [137:1] Sharh Anwariyya fol. 34a. - -There are three primordial elements--water, earth, and wind. Fire, -according to the Ishraqis, is only burning wind. The combinations of -these elements, under various heavenly influences, assume various -forms--fluidity, gaseousness, solidity. This transformation of the -original elements, constitutes the process of "making and unmaking" -which pervades the entire sphere of the not-light, raising the different -forms of existence higher and higher, and bringing them nearer and -nearer to the illuminating forces. All the phenomena of nature--rain, -clouds, thunder, meteor--are the various workings of this immanent -principle of motion, and are explained by the direct or indirect -operation of the Primal Light on things, which differ from one another -in their capacity of receiving more or less illumination. The Universe, -in one word, is a petrified desire; a crystallised longing after light. - -But is it eternal? The Universe is a manifestation of the illuminative -Power which constitutes the essential nature of the Primal Light. In so -far, therefore, as it is a manifestation, it is only a dependent being, -and consequently not eternal. But in another sense it is eternal. All -the different spheres of being exist by the illuminations and rays of -the Eternal light. There are some illuminations which are directly -eternal; while there are other fainter ones, the appearance of which -depends on the combination of other illuminations and rays. The -existence of these is not eternal in the same sense as the existence of -the pre-existing parent illuminations. The existence of colour, for -instance, is contingent in comparison to that of the ray, which -manifests colour when a dark body is brought before an illuminating -body. The Universe, therefore, though contingent as manifestation, is -eternal by the eternal character of its source. Those who hold the -non-eternity of the Universe argue on the assumption of the possibility -of a complete induction. Their argument proceeds in the following -manner:-- - -(1). Everyone of the Abyssinians is black. - -.*. All Abyssinians are black. - -(2). Every motion began at a definite moment. - -.*. All motion must begin so. - -But this mode of argumentation is vicious. It is quite impossible to -state the major. One cannot collect all the Abyssinians past, present, -and future, at one particular moment of time. Such a Universal, -therefore, is impossible. Hence from the examination of individual -Abyssinians, or particular instances of motion which fall within the -pale of our experience, it is rash to infer, that all Abyssinians are -black, or all motion had a beginning in time. - - -Psychology. - -Motion and light are not concomitant in the case of bodies of a lower -order. A piece of stone, for instance, though illuminated and hence -visible, is not endowed with self-initiated movement. As we rise, -however, in the scale of being, we find higher bodies, or organisms in -which motion and light are associated together. The abstract -illumination finds its best dwelling place in man. But the question -arises whether the individual abstract illumination which we call the -human soul, did or did not exist before its physical accompaniment. The -founder of Ishraqi Philosophy follows Avicenna in connection with this -question, and uses the same arguments to show, that the individual -abstract illuminations cannot be held to have pre-existed, as so many -units of light. The material categories of one and many cannot be -applied to the abstract illumination which, in its essential nature, is -neither one nor many; though it appears as many owing to the various -degrees of illuminational receptivity in its material accompaniments. -The relation between the abstract illumination, or soul and body, is not -that of cause and effect; the bond of union between them is love. The -body which longs for illumination, receives it through the soul; since -its nature does not permit a direct communication between the source of -light and itself. But the soul cannot transmit the directly received -light to the dark solid body which, considering its attributes, stands -on the opposite pole of being. In order to be related to each other, -they require a medium between them, something standing midway between -light and darkness. This medium is the animal soul--a hot, fine, -transparent vapour which has its principal seat in the left cavity of -the heart, but also circulates in all parts of the body. It is because -of the partial identity of the animal soul with light that, in dark -nights, land-animals run towards the burning fire; while sea-animals -leave their aquatic abodes in order to enjoy the beautiful sight of the -moon. The ideal of man, therefore, is to rise higher and higher in the -scale of being, and to receive more and more illumination which -gradually brings complete freedom from the world of forms. But how is -this ideal to be realised? By knowledge and action. It is the -transformation of both understanding and will, the union of action and -contemplation, that actualizes the highest ideal of man. Change your -attitude towards the Universe, and adopt the line of conduct -necessitated by the change. Let us briefly consider these means of -realisation:-- - -A. _Knowledge._ When the Abstract illumination associates itself with a -higher organism, it works out its development by the operation of -certain faculties--the powers of light, and the powers of darkness. The -former are the five external senses, and the five internal -senses--sensorium, conception, imagination, understanding, and memory; -the latter are the powers of growth, digestion, etc. But such a division -of faculties is only convenient. "One faculty can be the source of all -operations."[142:1] There is only one power in the middle of the brain, -though it receives different names from different standpoints. The mind -is a unity which, for the sake of convenience, is regarded as -multiplicity. The power residing in the middle of the brain must be -distinguished from the abstract illumination which constitutes the real -essence of man. The Philosopher of illumination appears to draw a -distinction between the active mind and the essentially inactive soul; -yet he teaches that in some mysterious way, all the various faculties -are connected with the soul. - - [142:1] Sharh Anwariyya fol. 57b. - -The most original point in his psychology of intellection, however, is -his theory of vision.[142:2] The ray of light which is supposed to come -out of the eye must be either substance or quality. If quality, it -cannot be transmitted from one substance (eye) to another substance -(visible body). If, on the other hand, it is a substance, it moves -either consciously, or impelled by its inherent nature. Conscious -movement would make it an animal perceiving other things. The perceiver -in this case would be the ray, not man. If the movement of the ray is an -attribute of its nature, there is no reason why its movement should be -peculiar to one direction, and not to all. The ray of light, therefore, -cannot be regarded as coming out of the eye. The followers of Aristotle -hold that in the process of vision images of objects are printed on the -eye. This view is also erroneous; since images of big things cannot be -printed on a small space. The truth is that when a thing comes before -the eye, an illumination takes place, and the mind sees the object -through that illumination. When there is no veil between the object and -the normal sight, and the mind is ready to perceive, the act of vision -must take place; since this is the law of things. "All vision is -illumination; and we see things in God". Berkley explained the -relativity of our sight-perceptions with a view to show that the -ultimate ground of all ideas is God. The Ishraqi Philosopher has the -same object in view, though his theory of vision is not so much an -explanation of the sight-process as a new way of looking at the fact of -vision. - - [142:2] Sharh Anwariyya fol. 60b. - -Besides sense and reason, however, there is another source of knowledge -called "Dhauq"--the inner perception which reveals non-temporal and -non-spatial planes of being. The study of philosophy, or the habit of -reflecting on pure concepts, combined with the practice of virtue, leads -to the upbringing of this mysterious sense, which corroborates and -corrects the conclusions of intellect. - -B. _Action._ Man as an active being has the following motive powers: - -(a). Reason or the Angelic soul--the source of intelligence, -discrimination, and love of knowledge. - -(b). The beast-soul which is the source of anger, courage, dominance, -and ambition. - -(c). The animal soul which is the source of lust, hunger, and sexual -passion. - -The first leads to wisdom; the second and third, if controlled by -reason, lead respectively to bravery and chastity. The harmonious use of -all results in the virtue of justice. The possibility of spiritual -progress by virtue, shows that this world is the best possible world. -Things as existent are neither good nor bad. It is misuse or limited -standpoint that makes them so. Still the fact of evil cannot be denied. -Evil does exist; but it is far less in amount than good. It is peculiar -only to a part of the world of darkness; while there are other parts of -the Universe which are quite free from the taint of evil. The sceptic -who attributes the existence of evil to the creative agency of God, -presupposes resemblance between human and divine action, and does not -see that nothing existent is free in his sense of the word. Divine -activity cannot be regarded as the creator of evil in the same sense as -we regard some forms of human activity as the cause of evil.[145:1] - - [145:1] Sharh Anwariyya fol. 92b. - -It is, then, by the union of knowledge and virtue that the soul frees -itself from the world of darkness. As we know more and more of the -nature of things, we are brought closer and closer to the world of -light; and the love of that world becomes more and more intense. The -stages of spiritual development are infinite, since the degrees of love -are infinite. The principal stages, however, are as follows:-- - -(1). The stage of "_I_". In this stage the feeling of personality is -most predominant, and the spring of human action is generally -selfishness. - -(2). The stage of "_Thou art not_". Complete absorption in one's own -deep self to the entire forgetfulness of everything external. - -(3). The stage of "_I am not_". This stage is the necessary result of -the second. - -(4). The stage of "_Thou art_". The absolute negation of "_I_", and the -affirmation of "_Thou_", which means complete resignation to the will of -God. - -(5). The stage of "_I am not; and thou art not_". The complete negation -of both the terms of thought--the state of cosmic consciousness. - -Each stage is marked by more or less intense illuminations, which are -accompanied by some indescribable sounds. Death does not put an end to -the spiritual progress of the soul. The individual souls, after death, -are not unified into one soul, but continue different from each other in -proportion to the illumination they received during their companionship -with physical organisms. The Philosopher of illumination anticipates -Leibniz's doctrine of the Identity of Indiscernibles, and holds that no -two souls can be completely similar to each other.[147:1] When the -material machinery which it adopts for the purpose of acquiring gradual -illumination, is exhausted, the soul probably takes up another body -determined by the experiences of the previous life; and rises higher and -higher in the different spheres of being, adopting forms peculiar to -those spheres, until it reaches its destination--the state of absolute -negation. Some souls probably come back to this world in order to make -up their deficiencies.[147:2] The doctrine of trans-migration cannot be -proved or disproved from a purely logical standpoint; though it is a -probable hypothesis to account for the future destiny of the soul. All -souls are thus constantly journeying towards their common source, which -calls back the whole Universe when this journey is over, and starts -another cycle of being to reproduce, in almost all respects, the history -of the preceding cycles. - - [147:1] Sharh Anwariyya fol. 82. - - [147:2] Sharh Anwariyya fol. 87b. - -Such is the philosophy of the great Persian martyr. He is, properly -speaking, the first Persian systematiser who recognises the elements of -truth in all the aspects of Persian speculation, and skilfully -synthesises them in his own system. He is a pantheist in so far as he -defines God as the sum total of all sensible and ideal existence.[148:1] -To him, unlike some of his Sufi predecessors, the world is something -real, and the human soul a distinct individuality. With the orthodox -theologian, he maintains that the ultimate cause of every phenomenon, -is the absolute light whose illumination forms the very essence of the -Universe. In his psychology he follows Avicenna, but his treatment of -this branch of study is more systematic and more empirical. As an -ethical philosopher, he is a follower of Aristotle whose doctrine of the -mean he explains and illustrates with great thoroughness. Above all he -modifies and transforms the traditional Neo-Platonism, into a thoroughly -Persian system of thought which, not only approaches Plato, but also -spiritualises the old Persian Dualism. No Persian thinker is more alive -to the necessity of explaining all the aspects of objective existence in -reference to his fundamental principles. He constantly appeals to -experience, and endeavours to explain even the physical phenomena in the -light of his theory of illumination. In his system objectivity, which -was completely swallowed up by the exceedingly subjective character of -extreme pantheism, claims its due again, and, having been subjected to a -detailed examination, finds a comprehensive explanation. No wonder then -that this acute thinker succeeded in founding a system of thought, -which has always exercised the greatest fascination over minds--uniting -speculation and emotion in perfect harmony. The narrow-mindedness of his -contemporaries gave him the title of "Maqtul" (the killed one), -signifying that he was not to be regarded as "Shahid" (Martyr); but -succeeding generations of Sufis and philosophers have always given him -the profoundest veneration. - - [148:1] Sharh Anwariyya fol. 81b. - -I may here notice a less spiritual form of the Ishraqi mode of -thought. Nasafi[150:1] describes a phase of Sufi thought which reverted -to the old materialistic dualism of Mani. The advocates of this view -hold, that light and darkness are essential to each other. They are, in -reality, two rivers which mix with each other like oil and milk,[150:2] -out of which arises the diversity of things. The ideal of human action -is freedom from the taint of darkness; and the freedom of light from -darkness means the self-consciousness of light as light. - - [150:1] Maqsadi Aqsa; fol. 21a. - - [150:2] Maqsadi Aqsa; fol. 21a. - - -II. Reality as Thought--Al-Jili. - -Al-Jili was born in 767 A.H., as he himself says in one of his verses, -and died in 811 A.H. He was not a prolific writer like Shaikh Muhy -al-Din ibn `Arabi whose mode of thought seems to have greatly influenced -his teaching. He combined in himself poetical imagination and -philosophical genius, but his poetry is no more than a vehicle for his -mystical and metaphysical doctrines. Among other books he wrote a -commentary on Shaikh Muhy al-Din ibn `Arabi's al-Futuhat al-Makkiya, -a commentary on Bismillah, and the famous work Insan al-Kamil (printed -in Cairo). - -Essence pure and simple, he says, is the thing to which names and -attributes are given, whether it is existent actually or ideally. The -existent is of two species:-- - -(1). The Existent in Absoluteness or Pure existence--Pure Being--God. - -(2). The existence joined with non-existence--Creation--Nature. - -The Essence of God or Pure Thought cannot be understood; no words can -express it, for it is beyond all relation and knowledge is relation. The -intellect flying through the fathomless empty space pierces through the -veil of names and attributes, traverses the vasty sphere of time, enters -the domain of the non-existent and finds the Essence of Pure Thought to -be an existence which is non-existence--a sum of contradictions.[152:1] -It has two (accidents); eternal life in all past time and eternal life -in all future time. It has two (qualities), God and creation. It has two -(definitions), uncreatableness and creatableness. It has two names, God -and man. It has two faces, the manifested (this world) and the -unmanifested (the next world). It has two effects, necessity and -possibility. It has two points of view; from the first it is -non-existent for itself but existent for what is not itself; from the -second it is existent for itself and non-existent for what is not -itself. - - [152:1] Insan al-Kamil, Vol. I, p. 10. - -Name, he says, fixes the named in the understanding, pictures it in the -mind, presents it in the imagination and keeps it in the memory. It is -the outside or the husk, as it were, of the named; while the named is -the inside or the pith. Some names do not exist in reality but exist in -name only as "`Anqa" (a fabulous bird). It is a name the object of which -does not exist in reality. Just as "`Anqa" is absolutely non-existent, -so God is absolutely present, although He cannot be touched and seen. -The "`Anqa" exists only in idea while the object of the name "Allah" -exists in reality and can be known like "`Anqa" only through its names -and attributes. The name is a mirror which reveals all the secrets of -the Absolute Being; it is a light through the agency of which God sees -Himself. Al-Jili here approaches the Isma`ilia view that we should seek -the Named through the Name. - -In order to understand this passage we should bear in mind the three -stages of the development of Pure Being, enumerated by him. He holds -that the Absolute existence or Pure Being when it leaves its -absoluteness undergoes three stages:--(1) Oneness. (2) He-ness. (3) -I-ness. In the first stage there is an absence of all attributes and -relations, yet it is called one, and therefore oneness marks one step -away from the absoluteness. In the second stage Pure Being is yet free -from all manifestation, while the third stage, I-ness, is nothing but an -external manifestation of the He-ness; or, as Hegel would say, it is the -self-diremption of God. This third stage is the sphere of the name -Allah; here the darkness of Pure Being is illuminated, nature comes to -the front, the Absolute Being has become conscious. He says further that -the name Allah is the stuff of all the perfections of the different -phases of Divinity, and in the second stage of the progress of Pure -Being, all that is the result of Divine self-diremption was potentially -contained within the titanic grasp of this name which, in the third -stage of the development, objectified itself, became a mirror in which -God reflected Himself, and thus by its crystallisation dispelled all the -gloom of the Absolute Being. - -In correspondence with these three stages of the absolute development, -the perfect man has three stages of spiritual training. But in his case -the process of development must be the reverse; because his is the -process of ascent, while the Absolute Being had undergone essentially a -process of descent. In the first stage of his spiritual progress he -meditates on the name, studies nature on which it is sealed; in the -second stage he steps into the sphere of the Attribute, and in the third -stage enters the sphere of the Essence. It is here that he becomes the -Perfect Man; his eye becomes the eye of God, his word the word of God -and his life the life of God--participates in the general life of Nature -and "sees into the life of things". - -To turn now to the nature of the attribute. His views on this most -interesting question are very important, because it is here that his -doctrine fundamentally differs from Hindu Idealism. He defines attribute -as an agency which gives us a knowledge of the state of things.[155:1] -Elsewhere he says that this distinction of attribute from the underlying -reality is tenable only in the sphere of the manifested, because here -every attribute is regarded as the other of the reality in which it is -supposed to inhere. This otherness is due to the existence of -combination and disintegration in the sphere of the manifested. But the -distinction is untenable in the domain of the unmanifested, because -there is no combination or disintegration there. It should be observed -how widely he differs from the advocates of the Doctrine of "Maya". He -believes that the material world has real existence; it is the outward -husk of the real being, no doubt, but this outward husk is not the less -real. The cause of the phenomenal world, according to him, is not a real -entity hidden behind the sum of attributes, but it is a conception -furnished by the mind so that there may be no difficulty in -understanding the material world. Berkeley and Fichte will so far agree -with our author, but his view leads him to the most characteristically -Hegelian doctrine--identity of thought and being. In the 37{th} chapter -of the 2{nd} volume of Insan al-Kamil, he clearly says that idea is the -stuff of which this universe is made; thought, idea, notion is the -material of the structure of nature. While laying stress on this -doctrine he says, "Dost thou not look to thine own belief? Where is the -reality in which the so-called Divine attributes inhere? It is but the -idea."[157:1] Hence nature is nothing but a crystallised idea. He gives -his hearty assent to the results of Kant's _Critique of Pure Reason_; -but, unlike him, he makes this very idea the essence of the Universe. -Kant's _Ding an sich_ to him is a pure nonentity; there is nothing -behind the collection of attributes. The attributes are the real things, -the material world is but the objectification of the Absolute Being; it -is the other self of the Absolute--another which owes its existence to -the principle of difference in the nature of the Absolute itself. Nature -is the idea of God, a something necessary for His knowledge of Himself. -While Hegel calls his doctrine the identity of thought and being, -Al-Jili calls it the identity of attribute and reality. It should be -noted that the author's phrase, "world of attributes", which he uses for -the material world is slightly misleading. What he really holds is that -the distinction of attribute and reality is merely phenomenal, and does -not at all exist in the nature of things. It is useful, because it -facilitates our understanding of the world around us, but it is not at -all real. It will be understood that Al-Jili recognises the truth of -Empirical Idealism only tentatively, and does not admit the absoluteness -of the distinction. These remarks should not lead us to understand that -Al-Jili does not believe in the objective reality of the thing in -itself. He does believe in it, but then he advocates its unity, and says -that the material world is the thing in itself; it is the "other", the -external expression of the thing in itself. The _Ding an sich_ and its -external expression or the production of its self-diremption, are really -identical, though we discriminate between them in order to facilitate -our understanding of the universe. If they are not identical, he says, -how could one manifest the other? In one word, he means by _Ding an -sich_, the Pure, the Absolute Being, and seeks it through its -manifestation or external expression. He says that as long as we do not -realise the identity of attribute and reality, the material world or the -world of attributes seems to be a veil; but when the doctrine is -brought home to us the veil is removed; we see the Essence itself -everywhere, and find that all the attributes are but ourselves. Nature -then appears in her true light; all otherness is removed and we are one -with her. The aching prick of curiosity ceases, and the inquisitive -attitude of our minds is replaced by a state of philosophic calm. To the -person who has realised this identity, discoveries of science bring no -new information, and religion with her _role_ of supernatural authority -has nothing to say. This is the spiritual emancipation. - - [155:1] Insan al-Kamil; Vol. I, p. 22. - - [157:1] Insan al-Kamil, Vol. II, p. 26. - -Let us now see how he classifies the different divine names and -attributes which have received expression in nature or crystallised -Divinity. His classification is as follows:-- - -(1). The names and attributes of God as He is in Himself (Allah, The -One, The Odd, The Light, The Truth, The Pure, The Living.) - -(2). The names and attributes of God as the source of all glory (The -Great and High, The All-powerful). - -(3). The names and attributes of God as all Perfection (The Creator, The -Benefactor, The First, The Last). - -(4). The names and attributes of God as all Beauty (The Uncreatable, The -Painter, The Merciful, The Origin of all). Each of these names and -attributes has its own particular effect by which it illuminates the -soul of the perfect man and Nature. How these illuminations take place, -and how they reach the soul is not explained by Al-Jili. His silence -about these matters throws into more relief the mystical portion of his -views and implies the necessity of spiritual Directorship. - -Before considering Al-Jili's views of particular Divine Names and -Attributes, we should note that his conception of God, implied in the -above classification, is very similar to that of Schleiermacher. While -the German theologian reduces all the divine attributes to one single -attribute of Power, our author sees the danger of advancing a God free -from all attributes, yet recognises with Schleiermacher that in Himself -God is an unchangeable unity, and that His attributes "are nothing more -than views of Him from different human standpoints, the various -appearances which the one changeless cause presents to our finite -intelligence according as we look at it from different sides of the -spiritual landscape."[161:1] In His absolute existence He is beyond the -limitation of names and attributes, but when He externalises Himself, -when He leaves His absoluteness, when nature is born, names and -attributes appear sealed on her very fabric. - - [161:1] Matheson's _Aids to the Study of German Theology_, p. - 43. - -We now proceed to consider what he teaches about particular Divine Names -and Attributes. The first Essential Name is Allah (Divinity) which means -the sum of all the realities of existence with their respective order in -that sum. This name is applied to God as the only necessary existence. -Divinity being the highest manifestation of Pure Being, the difference -between them is that the latter is visible to the eye, but its _where_ -is invisible; while the traces of the former are visible, itself is -invisible. By the very fact of her being crystallised divinity, Nature -is not the real divinity; hence Divinity is invisible, and its traces in -the form of Nature are visible to the eye. Divinity, as the author -illustrates, is water; nature is crystallised water or ice; but ice is -not water. The Essence is visible to the eye, (another proof of our -author's Natural Realism or Absolute Idealism) although all its -attributes are not known to us. Even its attributes are not known as -they are in themselves, their shadows or effects only are known. For -instance, charity itself is unknown, only its effect or the fact of -giving to the poor, is known and seen. This is due to the attributes -being incorporated in the very nature of the Essence. If the expression -of the attributes in its real nature had been possible, its separation -from the Essence would have been possible also. But there are some other -Essential Names of God--The Absolute Oneness and Simple Oneness. The -Absolute Oneness marks the first step of Pure Thought from the darkness -of Cecity (the internal or the original Maya of the Vedanta) to the -light of manifestation. Although this movement is not attended with any -external manifestations, yet it sums up all of them under its hollow -universality. Look at a wall, says the author, you see the whole wall; -but you cannot see the individual pieces of the material that -contribute to its formation. The wall is a unity--but a unity which -comprehends diversity, so Pure Being is a unity but a unity which is the -soul of diversity. - -The third movement of the Absolute Being is Simple Oneness--a step -attended with external manifestation. The Absolute Oneness is free from -all particular names and attributes. The Oneness Simple takes on names -and attributes, but there is no distinction between these attributes, -one is the essence of the other. Divinity is similar to Simple Oneness, -but its names and attributes are distinguished from one another and even -contradictory, as generous is contradictory to revengeful.[163:1] The -third step, or as Hegel would say, Voyage of the Being, has another -appellation (Mercy). The First Mercy, the author says, is the evolution -of the Universe from Himself and the manifestation of His own Self in -every atom of the result of His own self-diremption. Al-Jili makes this -point clearer by an instance. He says that nature is frozen water and -God is water. The real name of nature is God (Allah); ice or condensed -water is merely a borrowed appellation. Elsewhere he calls water the -origin of knowledge, intellect, understanding, thought and idea. This -instance leads him to guard against the error of looking upon God as -immanent in nature, or running through the sphere of material existence. -He says that immanence implies disparity of being; God is not immanent -because He is Himself the existence. Eternal existence is the other self -of God, it is the light through which He sees Himself. As the originator -of an idea is existent in that idea, so God is present in nature. The -difference between God and man, as one may say, is that His ideas -materialise themselves, ours do not. It will be remembered here that -Hegel would use the same line of argument in freeing himself from the -accusation of Pantheism. - - [163:1] This would seem very much like the idea of the - phenomenal Brahma of the Vedanta. The Personal Creator or the - Prajapati of the Vedanta makes the third step of the Absolute - Being or the Noumenal Brahma. Al-Jili seems to admit two kinds - of Brahma--with or without qualities like the Samkara and - Badarayana. To him the process of creation is essentially a - lowering of the Absolute Thought, which is Asat, in so far as it - is absolute, and Sat, in so far as it is manifested and hence - limited. Notwithstanding this Absolute Monism, he inclines to a - view similar to that of Ramanuja. He seems to admit the reality - of the individual soul and seems to imply, unlike Samkara, that - Iswara and His worship are necessary even after the attainment - of the Higher Knowledge. - -The attribute of Mercy is closely connected with the attribute of -Providence. He defines it as the sum of all that existence stands in -need of. Plants are supplied with water through the force of this name. -The natural philosopher would express the same thing differently; he -would speak of the same phenomena as resulting from the activity of a -certain force of nature; Al-Jili would call it a manifestation of -Providence; but, unlike the natural philosopher, he would not advocate -the unknowability of that force. He would say that there is nothing -behind it, it is the Absolute Being itself. - -We have now finished all the essential names and attributes of God, and -proceed to examine the nature of what existed before all things. The -Arabian Prophet, says Al-Jili, was once questioned about the place of -God before creation. He said that God, before the creation, existed in -"`Ama" (Blindness). It is the nature of this Blindness or primal -darkness which we now proceed to examine. The investigation is -particularly interesting, because the word translated into modern -phraseology would be "_The Unconsciousness_". This single word impresses -upon us the foresightedness with which he anticipates metaphysical -doctrines of modern Germany. He says that the Unconsciousness is the -reality of all realities; it is the Pure Being without any descending -movement; it is free from the attributes of God and creation; it does -not stand in need of any name or quality, because it is beyond the -sphere of relation. It is distinguished from the Absolute Oneness -because the latter name is applied to the Pure Being in its process of -coming down towards manifestation. It should, however, be remembered -that when we speak of the priority of God and posteriority of creation, -our words must not be understood as implying time; for there can be no -duration of time or separateness between God and His creation. Time, -continuity in space and time, are themselves creations, and how can -piece of creation intervene between God and His creation. Hence our -words before, after, where, whence, etc., in this sphere of thought, -should not be construed to imply time or space. The real thing is beyond -the grasp of human conceptions; no category of material existence can be -applicable to it; because, as Kant would say, the laws of phenomena -cannot be spoken of as obtaining in the sphere of noumena. - -We have already noticed that man in his progress towards perfection has -three stages: the first is the meditation of the name which the author -calls the illumination of names. He remarks that "When God illuminates a -certain man by the light of His names, the man is destroyed under the -dazzling splendour of that name; and "when thou calleth God, the call is -responded to by the man". The effect of this illumination would be, in -Schopenhauer's language, the destruction of the individual will, yet it -must not be confounded with physical death; because the individual goes -on living and moving like the spinning wheel, as Kapila would say, after -he has become one with Prakriti. It is here that the individual cries -out in pantheistic mood:--She was I and I was she and there was none to -separate us."[167:1] - - [167:1] Insan al-Kamil, Vol. I, p. 40. - -The second stage of the spiritual training is what he calls the -illumination of the Attribute. This illumination makes the perfect man -receive the attributes of God in their real nature in proportion to the -power of receptivity possessed by him--a fact which classifies men -according to the magnitude of this light resulting from the -illumination. Some men receive illumination from the divine attribute of -Life, and thus participate in the soul of the Universe. The effect of -this light is soaring in the air, walking on water, changing the -magnitude of things (as Christ so often did). In this wise the perfect -man receives illumination from all the Divine attributes, crosses the -sphere of the name and the attribute, and steps into the domain of the -Essence--Absolute Existence. - -As we have already seen, the Absolute Being, when it leaves its -absoluteness, has three voyages to undergo, each voyage being a process -of particularisation of the bare universality of the Absolute Essence. -Each of these three movements appears under a new Essential Name which -has its own peculiar illuminating effect upon the human soul. Here is -the end of our author's spiritual ethics; _man has become perfect_, -he has amalgamated himself with the Absolute Being, or _has learnt -what Hegel calls The Absolute Philosophy_. "He becomes the paragon -of perfection, the object of worship, the preserver of the -Universe".[169:1] He is the point where Man-ness and God-ness become -one, and result in the birth of the god-man. - - [169:1] Insan al-Kamil, Vol. I, p. 48. - -How the perfect man reaches this height of spiritual development, the -author does not tell us; but he says that at every stage he has a -peculiar experience in which there is not even a trace of doubt or -agitation. The instrument of this experience is what he calls the _Qalb_ -(heart), a word very difficult of definition. He gives a very mystical -diagram of the Qalb, and explains it by saying that it is the eye which -sees the names, the attributes and the Absolute Being successively. It -owes its existence to a mysterious combination of soul and mind; and -becomes by its very nature the organ for the recognition of the -ultimate realities of existence. All that the "heart", or the source of -what the Vedanta calls the Higher Knowledge, reveals is not seen by the -individual as something separate from and heterogeneous to himself; what -is shown to him through this agency is his own reality, his own deep -being. This characteristic of the agency differentiates it from the -intellect, the object of which is always different and separate from the -individual exercising that faculty. But the spiritual experience, -according to the Sufis of this school, is not permanent; moments of -spiritual vision, says Matthew Arnold,[170:1] cannot be at our command. -The god-man is he who has known the mystery of his own being, who has -realised himself as god-man; but when that particular spiritual -realisation is over man is man and God is God. Had the experience been -permanent, a great moral force would have been lost and society -overturned. - - [170:1] "We cannot kindle when we will - The fire which in the heart resides". - -Let us now sum up Al-Jili's _Doctrine of the Trinity_. We have seen the -three movements of the Absolute Being, or the first three categories of -Pure Being; we have also seen that the third movement is attended with -external manifestation, which is the self-diremption of the Essence into -God and man. This separation makes a gap which is filled by the perfect -man, who shares in both the Divine and the human attributes. He holds -that the perfect man is the preserver of the Universe; hence in his -view, the appearance of the perfect man is a necessary condition for the -continuation of nature. It is easy, therefore, to understand that in the -god-man, the Absolute Being which has left its absoluteness, returns -into itself; and, but for the god-man, it could not have done so; for -then there would have been no nature, and consequently no light through -which God could have seen Himself. The light through the agency of which -God sees Himself is due to the principle of difference in the nature of -the Absolute Being itself. He recognises this principle in the following -verses:-- - - If you say that God is one, you are right; but if you say that He - is two, this is also true. - - If you say no, but He is three, you are right, for this is the - real nature of man.[171:1] - - [171:1] Insan al-Kamil, Vol. I, p. 8. - -The _perfect man_, then, is the joining link. On the one hand he -receives illumination from all the Essential names, on the other hand -all Divine attributes reappear in him. These attributes are:-- - -1. Independent life or existence. - -2. Knowledge which is a form of life, as he proves from a verse from the -Qur'an. - -3. Will--the principle of particularisation, or the manifestation of -Being. He defines it as the illumination of the knowledge of God -according to the requirements of the Essence; hence it is a particular -form of knowledge. It has nine manifestations, all of which are -different names for love; the last is the love in which the lover and -the beloved, the knower and the known merge into each other, and become -identical. This form of love, he says, is the Absolute Essence; as -Christianity teaches, God is love. He guards, here, against the error of -looking upon the individual act of will as uncaused. Only the act of the -universal will is uncaused; hence he implies the Hegelian Doctrine of -Freedom, and holds that the acts of man are both free and determined. - -4. Power, which expresses itself in self-diremption i.e. creation. He -controverts Shaikh Muhy al-Din ibn `Arabi's position that the -Universe existed before the creation in the knowledge of God. He says, -this would imply that God did not create it out of nothing, and holds -that the Universe, before its existence as an idea, existed in the self -of God. - -5. The word or the reflected being. Every possibility is the word of -God; hence nature is the materialisation of the word of God. It has -different names--The tangible word, The sum of the realities of man, The -arrangement of the Divinity, The spread of Oneness, The expression of -the Unknown, The phases of Beauty, The trace of names and attributes, -and the object of God's knowledge. - -6. The Power of hearing the inaudible. - -7. The Power of seeing the invisible. - -8. Beauty--that which seems least beautiful in nature (the reflected -beauty) is in its real existence, beauty. Evil is only relative, it has -no real existence; sin is merely a relative deformity. - -9. Glory or beauty in its intensity. - -10. Perfection, which is the unknowable essence of God and therefore -Unlimited and Infinite. - - - - -CHAP. VI. - -LATER PERSIAN THOUGHT. - - -Under the rude Tartar invaders of Persia, who could have no sympathy -with independent thought, there could be no progress of ideas. Sufiism, -owing to its association with religion, went on systematising old and -evolving new ideas. But philosophy proper was distasteful to the Tartar. -Even the development of Islamic law suffered a check; since the Hanafite -law was the acme of human reason to the Tartar, and further subtleties -of legal interpretation were disagreeable to his brain. Old schools of -thought lost their solidarity, and many thinkers left their native -country to find more favourable conditions elsewhere. In the 16{th} -century we find Persian Aristotelians--Dastur Isfahani, Hir Bud, Munir, -and Kamran--travelling in India, where the Emperor Akbar was drawing -upon Zoroastrianism to form a new faith for himself and his courtiers, -who were mostly Persians. No great thinker, however, appeared in Persia -until the 17{th} century, when the acute Mulla Sadra of Shiraz upheld -his philosophical system with all the vigour of his powerful logic. With -Mulla Sadra Reality is all things yet is none of them, and true -knowledge consists in the identity of the subject and the object. De -Gobineau thinks that the philosophy of Sadra is a mere revival of -Avicennaism. He, however, ignores the fact that Mulla Sadra's doctrine -of the identity of subject and object constitutes the final step which -the Persian intellect took towards complete monism. It is moreover the -Philosophy of Sadra which is the source of the metaphysics of early -Babism. - -But the movement towards Platonism is best illustrated in Mulla Hadi of -Sabzwar who flourished in the 18{th} century, and is believed by his -countrymen to be the greatest of modern Persian thinkers. As a specimen -of comparatively recent Persian speculation, I may briefly notice here -the views of this great thinker, as set forth in his Asrar al-Hikam -(published in Persia). A glance at his philosophical teaching reveals -three fundamental conceptions which are indissolubly associated with the -Post-Islamic Persian thought:-- - -1. The idea of the Absolute Unity of the Real which is described as -"Light". - -2. The idea of evolution which is dimly visible in Zoroaster's doctrine -of the destiny of the human soul, and receives further expansion and -systematisation by Persian Neo-Platonists and Sufi thinkers. - -3. The idea of a medium between the Absolute Real and the Not-real. - -It is highly interesting to note how the Persian mind gradually got rid -of the Emanation theory of Neo-Platonism, and reached a purer notion of -Plato's Philosophy. The Arab Muhammadans of Spain, by a similar process -of elimination reached, through the same medium (Neo-Platonism) a truer -conception of the Philosophy of Aristotle--a fact which illustrates the -genius of the two races. Lewes in his Biographical History of Philosophy -remarks that the Arabs eagerly took up the study of Aristotle simply -because Plato was not presented to them. I am, however, inclined to -think that the Arab genius was thoroughly practical; hence Plato's -philosophy would have been distasteful to them even if it had been -presented in its true light. Of the systems of Greek philosophy -Neo-Platonism, I believe, was the only one which was presented in its -completeness to the Muslim world; yet patient critical research led the -Arab from Plotinus to Aristotle, and the Persian to Plato. This is -singularly illustrated in the Philosophy of Mulla Hadi, who recognises -no Emanations, and approaches the Platonic conception of the Real. He -illustrates, moreover, how philosophical speculation in Persia, as in -all countries where Physical science either does not exist or is not -studied, is finally absorbed by religion. The "Essence", i.e. the -metaphysical cause as distinguished from the scientific cause, which -means the sum of antecedent conditions, must gradually be transformed -into "Personal Will" (cause, in a religious sense) in the absence of any -other notion of cause. And this is perhaps the deeper reason why -Persian philosophies have always ended in religion. - -Let us now turn to Mulla Hadi's system of thought. He teaches that -Reason has two aspects:--(a) Theoretical, the object of which is -Philosophy and Mathematics, (b) Practical, the object of which is -Domestic Economy, Politics, etc. Philosophy proper comprises the -knowledge of the beginning of things, the end of things, and the -knowledge of the Self. It also includes the knowledge of the law of -God--which is identical with religion. In order to understand the origin -of things, we should subject to a searching analysis the various -phenomena of the Universe. Such an analysis reveals that there are three -original principles.[178:1] - -(1). The Real--Light. - -(2). The Shadow. - -(3). The not-Real--Darkness. - - [178:1] Asrar al-Hikam; p. 6. - -The Real is absolute, and necessary as distinguished from the "Shadow", -which is relative and contingent. In its nature it is absolutely good; -and the proposition that it is good, is self-evident.[178:2] All forms -of potential existence, before they are actualised by the Real, are open -to both existence or non-existence, and the possibilities of their -existence or non-existence are exactly equal. It, therefore, follows -that the Real which actualises the potential is not itself -non-existence; since non-existence operating on non-existence cannot -produce actuality.[179:1] Mulla Hadi, in his conception of the Real as -the operator, modifies Plato's statical conception of the Universe, and, -following Aristotle, looks upon his Real as the immovable source and the -object of all motion. "All things in the Universe," he says, "love -perfection, and are moving towards their final ends--minerals towards -vegetables, vegetables towards animals, and animals towards man. And -observe how man passes through all these stages in the mother's -womb."[179:2] The mover as mover is either the source or the object of -motion or both. In any case the mover must be either movable or -immovable. The proposition that all movers must be themselves movable, -leads to infinite regress--which must stop at the immovable mover, the -source and the final object of all motion. The Real, moreover, is a pure -unity; for if there is a plurality of Reals, one would limit the other. -The Real as creator also cannot be conceived as more than one; since a -plurality of creators would mean a plurality of worlds which must be -circular touching one another, and this again implies vacuum which is -impossible.[180:1] Regarded as an essence, therefore, the Real is one. -But it is also many, from a different standpoint. It is life, power, -love; though we cannot say that these qualities inhere in it--they are -it, and it is them. Unity does not mean oneness, its essence consists in -the "dropping of all relations." Unlike the Sufis and other thinkers, -Mulla Hadi holds and tries to show that belief in multiplicity is not -inconsistent with belief in unity; since the visible "many" is nothing -more than a manifestation of the names and attributes of the Real. -These attributes are the various forms of a "Knowledge" which -constitutes the very essence of the Real. To speak, however, of the -attributes of the Real is only a verbal convenience; since "defining the -Real is applying the category of number to it"--an absurd process which -endeavours to bring the unrelated into the sphere of the related. The -Universe, with all its variety, is the shadow of the various names and -attributes of the Real or the Absolute Light. It is Reality unfolded, -the "Be", or the word of Light.[181:1] Visible multiplicity is the -illumination of Darkness, or the actualisation of Nothing. Things are -different because we see them, as it were, through glasses of different -colours--the Ideas. In this connection Hadi approvingly quotes the poet -Jami who has given the most beautiful poetic expression to Plato's -Doctrine of Ideas in verses which can be thus translated:-- - -"The ideas are glasses of various colours in which the Sun of Reality -reflects itself, and makes itself visible through them according as they -are red, yellow or blue."[181:2] - - [178:2] Asrar al-Hikam; p. 8. - - [179:1] Asrar al-Hikam; p. 8. - - [179:2] Asrar al-Hikam; p. 10. - - [180:1] Asrar al-Hikam; pp. 28, 29. - - [181:1] Asrar al-Hikam; p. 151. - - [181:2] Asrar al-Hikam; p. 6. - -In his Psychology he mostly follows Avicenna, but his treatment of the -subject is more thorough and systematic. He classifies the soul in the -following manner:-- - - The Soul - | - +---------+-----+ - | | - Heavenly Earthly - | - +--------+----------+ - | | | - Human Animal Vegetative - - Powers:-- - - 1. Preserving the individual. - 2. Perfecting the individual. - 3. Perpetuating the species. - -The animal soul has three powers:-- - - 1. External senses} Perception. - 2. Internal senses} - 3. Power of motion which includes. - (a) Voluntary motion. - (b) Involuntary motion. - -The external senses are taste, touch, smell, hearing and sight. The -sound exists outside the ear, and not inside as some thinkers have held. -For if it does not exist outside the ear, it is not possible to perceive -its direction and distance. Hearing and sight are superior to other -senses, and sight is superior to hearing; since:-- - - I. The eye can perceive distant things. - - II. Its perception is light, which is the best of all - attributes. - - III. The construction of the eye is more complicated and - delicate than that of the ear. - - IV. The perceptions of sight are things which actually exist, - while those of hearing resemble non-existence. - -The internal senses are as follow:-- - -(1). The Common Sense--the tablet of the mind. It is like the Prime -Minister of the mind sending out five spies (external senses) to bring -in news from the external world. When we say "this white thing is -sweet", we perceive whiteness and sweetness by sight and taste -respectively, but that both the attributes exist in the same thing is -decided by the Common Sense. The line made by a falling drop, so far as -the eye is concerned, is nothing but the drop. But what is the line -which we see? To account for such a phenomenon, says Hadi, it is -necessary to postulate another sense which perceives the lengthening of -the falling drop into a line. - -(2). The faculty which preserves the perceptions of the Common -Sense--images and not ideas like the memory. The judgment that whiteness -and sweetness exist in the same thing is completed by this faculty; -since, if it does not preserve the image of the subject, Common Sense -cannot perceive the predicate. - -(3). The power which perceives individual ideas. The sheep thinks of the -enmity of the wolf, and runs away from him. Some forms of life lack this -power, e.g. the moth which hurls itself against the candle-flame. - -(4). Memory--the preserver of ideas. - -(5). The power of combining images and ideas, e.g. the winged man. When -this faculty works under the guidance of the power which perceives -individual ideas, it is called Imagination; when it works under the -control of Intellect, it is called Conception. - -But it is the spirit which distinguishes man from other animals. This -essence of humanity is a "unity", not oneness. It perceives the -Universal by itself, and the particular through the external and the -internal senses. It is the shadow of the Absolute Light, and like it -manifests itself in various ways--comprehending multiplicity in its -unity. There is no necessary relation between the spirit and the body. -The former is non-temporal and non-spatial; hence it is changeless, and -has the power of judging the visible multiplicity. In sleep the spirit -uses the "ideal body" which functions like the physical body; in waking -life it uses the ordinary physical body. It follows, therefore, that the -spirit stands in need of neither, and uses both at will. Hadi does not -follow Plato in his doctrine of transmigration, the different forms of -which he refutes at length. The spirit to him is immortal, and reaches -its original home--Absolute Light--by the gradual perfection of its -faculties. The various stages of the development of reason are as -follows:-- - - A. Theoretical or Pure Reason-- - - 1{st} Potential Reason. - 2{nd} Perception of self-evident propositions. - 3{rd} Actual Reason. - 4{th} Perception of Universal concepts. - - B. Practical Reason-- - - 1{st} External Purification. - 2{nd} Internal Purification. - 3{rd} Formation of virtuous habits. - 4{th} Union with God. - -Thus the spirit rises higher and higher in the scale of being, and -finally shares in the eternity of the Absolute Light by losing itself in -its universality. "In itself non-existent, but existent in the eternal -Friend: how wonderful that it _is_ and _is not_ at the same time". But -is the spirit free to choose its course? Hadi criticises the -Rationalists for their setting up man as an independent creator of evil, -and accuses them of what he calls "veiled dualism". He holds that every -object has two sides--"bright" side, and "dark" side. Things are -combinations of light and darkness. All good flows from the side of -light; evil proceeds from darkness. Man, therefore, is both free and -determined. - -But all the various lines of Persian thought once more find a synthesis -in that great religious movement of Modern Persia--Babism or Bahaism, -which began as a Shi`ah sect, with Mirza `Ali Muhammad Bab of Shiraz (b. -1820), and became less and less Islamic in character with the progress -of orthodox persecutions. The origin of the philosophy of this wonderful -sect must be sought in the Shi`ah sect of the Shaikhis, the founder of -which, Shaikh Ahmad, was an enthusiastic student of Mulla Sadra's -Philosophy, on which he had written several commentaries. This sect -differed from the ordinary Shi`ahs in holding that belief in an ever -present Medium between the absent Imam (the 12{th} Head of the Church, -whose manifestation is anxiously expected by the Shi`ahs), and the -church is a fundamental principle of the Shi`ah religion. Shaikh Ahmad -claimed to be such a Medium; and when, after the death of the second -Shaikhi Medium--Haji Kazim, the Shaikhis were anxiously expecting the -manifestation of the new Medium, Mirza `Ali Muhammad Bab, who had -attended the lectures of Haji Kazim at Karbala, proclaimed himself the -expected Medium, and many Shaikhis accepted him. - -The young Persian seer looks upon Reality as an essence which brooks no -distinction of substance and attribute. The first bounty or -self-expansion of the Ultimate Essence, he says, is Existence. -"Existence" is the "known", the "known" is the essence of "knowledge"; -"knowledge" is "will"; and "will" is "love". Thus from Mulla Sadra's -identity of the known and the knower, he passes to his conception of the -Real as Will and Love. This Primal Love, which he regards as the essence -of the Real, is the cause of the manifestation of the Universe which is -nothing more than the self-expansion of Love. The word creation, with -him, does not mean creation out of nothing; since, as the Shaikhis -maintain, the word creator is not peculiarly applicable to God alone. -The Quranic verse, that "God is the best of creators",[188:1] implies -that there are other self-manifesting beings like God. - - [188:1] Sura 23; v. 14. - -After the execution of `Ali Muhammad Bab, Bahaullah, one of his -principal disciples who were collectively called "The First Unity", took -up the mission, and proclaimed himself the originator of the new -dispensation, the absent Imam whose manifestation the Bab had foretold. -He freed the doctrine of his master from its literalistic mysticism, and -presented it in a more perfected and systematised form. The Absolute -Reality, according to him, is not a person; it is an eternal living -Essence, to which we apply the epithets Truth and Love only because -these are the highest conceptions known to us. The Living Essence -manifests itself through the Univere with the object of creating in -itself atoms or centres of consciousness, which as Dr. McTaggart would -say, constitute a further determination of the Hegelian Absolute. In -each of these undifferentiated, simple centres of consciousness, there -is hidden a ray of the Absolute Light itself, and the perfection of the -spirit consists in gradually actualising, by contact with the -individualising principle--matter, its emotional and intellectual -possibilities, and thus discovering its own deep being--the ray of -eternal Love which is concealed by its union with consciousness. The -essence of man, therefore, is not reason or consciousness; it is this -ray of Love--the source of all impulse to noble and unselfish action, -which constitutes the real man. The influence of Mulla Sadra's doctrine -of the incorporeality of Imagination is here apparent. Reason, which -stands higher than Imagination in the scale of evolution, is not a -necessary condition, according to Mulla Sadra, of immortality. In all -forms of life there is an immortal spiritual part, the ray of Eternal -Love, which has no necessary connection with self-consciousness or -reason, and survives after the death of the body. Salvation, then, which -to Buddha consists in the starving out of the mind-atoms by -extinguishing desire, to Bahaullah lies in the discovery of the essence -of love which is hidden in the atoms of consciousness themselves.[190:1] -Both, however, agree that after death thoughts and characters of men -remain, subject to other forces of a similar character, in the spiritual -world, waiting for another opportunity to find a suitable physical -accompaniment in order to continue the process of discovery (Bahaullah) -or destruction (Buddha). To Bahaullah the conception of Love is higher -than the conception of Will. Schopenhauer conceived reality as Will -which was driven to objectification by a sinful bent eternally existing -in its nature. Love or Will, according to both, is present in every atom -of life; but the cause of its being there is the joy of self-expansion -in the one case, and the inexplicable evil inclination in the other. But -Schopenhauer postulates certain temporal ideas in order to account for -the objectification of the Primordial Will; Bahaullah, as far as I can -see, does not explain the principle according to which the -self-manifestation of the Eternal Love is realised in the Universe. - - [190:1] See Phelp's `Abbas Effendi, chapter, "Philosophy and - Psychology". - - - - -CONCLUSION. - - -Let us now briefly sum up the results of our survey. We have seen that -the Persian mind had to struggle against two different kinds of -Dualism--pre-Islamic Magian Dualism, and post-Islamic Greek Dualism, -though the fundamental problem of the diversity of things remains -essentially the same. The attitude of the pre-Islamic Persian thinkers -is thoroughly objective, and hence the results of their intellectual -efforts are more or less materialistic. The Pre-Islamic thinkers, -however, clearly perceived that the original Principle must be -dynamically conceived. With Zoroaster both the primary spirits are -"active", with Mani the principle of Light is passive, and the principle -of Darkness is aggressive. But their analysis of the various elements -which constitute the Universe is ridiculously meagre; their conception -of the Universe is most defective on its statical side. There are, -therefore, two weak points in their systems:-- - - 1. Naked Dualism. - - 2. Lack of analysis. - -The first was remedied by Islam; the second by the introduction of Greek -Philosophy. The advent of Islam and the study of Greek philosophy, -however, checked the indigenous tendency towards monistic thought; but -these two forces contributed to change the objective attitude -characteristic of early thinkers, and aroused the slumbering -subjectivity, which eventually reached its climax in the extreme -Pantheism of some of the Sufi schools. Al-Farabi endeavoured to get rid -of the dualism between God and matter, by reducing matter to a mere -confused perception of the spirit; the Ash`arite denied it altogether, -and maintained a thoroughgoing Idealism. The followers of Aristotle -continued to stick to their master's Prima Materia; the Sufis looked -upon the material universe as a mere illusion, or a necessary "other," -for the self-knowledge of God. It can, however, be safely stated that -with the Ash`arite Idealism, the Persian mind got over the foreign -dualism of God and matter, and, fortified with new philosophical -ideas, returned to the old dualism of light and darkness. The -Shaikh-al-Ishraq combines the objective attitude of Pre-Islamic -Persian thinkers with the subjective attitude of his immediate -predecessors, and restates the Dualism of Zoroaster in a much more -philosophical and spiritualised form. His system recognises the claims -of both the subject and the object. But all these monistic systems of -thought were met by the Pluralism of Wahid Mahmud, who taught that -reality is not one, but many--primary living units which combine in -various ways, and gradually rise to perfection by passing through an -ascending scale of forms. The reaction of Wahid Mahmud was, however, an -ephemeral phenomenon. The later Sufis as well as philosophers proper -gradually transformed or abandoned the Neo-Platonic theory of Emanation, -and in later thinkers we see a movement through Neo-Platonism towards -real Platonism which is approached by Mulla Hadi's Philosophy. But pure -speculation and dreamy mysticism undergo a powerful check in Babism -which, unmindful of persecution, synthesises all the inherited -philosophical and religious tendencies, and rouses the spirit to a -consciousness of the stern reality of things. Though extremely -cosmopolitan and hence quite unpatriotic in character, it has yet had a -great influence over the Persian mind. The unmystic character and the -practical tone of Babism may have been a remote cause of the -progress of recent political reform in Persia. - - - - -ERRATA - - P. 4, Note 4, l. 1, read Buudahish for Buudadish. - - P. 9, l. 10, read environment for environments. - - P. 56, l. 1, read reaction for reation. - - P. 61, l. 18, read considered for consided. - - P. 73, l. 21, read full stop after dialectic. - - P. 102, l. 1, read conditions for condition. - - P. 123, l. 19, read predecessors for precessor. - - P. 153, l. 21, read He-ness for an He-ness. - - P. 166, l. 21, read a piece for pieee. - - - - -Transcriber's Notes: - -Many words appear in the text with different transcription or mark-up. -They have been left as in the original. - -All occurrences of e. g., i. e., B. C., A. D. and A. H. have been -replaced with e.g., i.e., B.C., A.D. and A.H. Other initials have been -left as in the original. - -All ditto marks, ibid. and Sh. An. (Sharh Anwariyya) entries replaced -with their full references. - -Printed Errata has been moved to the end of the text. - -The following corrections have been made to the text: - - Page IX--due perhaps to semitic [original has samitic] influences, - - Page CONTENTS--Reality as [original has as as] Beauty - - Page 25--introduced [original has intruduced] - - Page 54--necessarily [original has necssarily] - - Page 54--Nazzam [original has Nazzan] - - Page 57--Isma`ilians [original has Isma`iliams] - - Page 61--metaphysical [original has netaphysical] - - Page 63--which,[original has period] by gradually - - Page 68, footnote 68:1--Ash`aritenthums [original has - Ash'aritenthums] - - Page 69--philosophising [original has plilosophising] - - Page 69, footnote 69:1--Ash`aritenthums [original has As`aritenthums] - - Page 75--Ash`arite [original has Ash'arite] - - Page 81--seem to [original has the letter t missing] be - - Page 81--Hikmat al-`Ain--"Philosophy of Essence", - [original has single hyphen] - - Page 85--objectively [original has objectivily] - - Page 95, footnote 95:1--Commentary [original has Comentary] - - Page 104--restatement [original has restatemet] - - Page 111--self-conscious [original has self-consious] - - Page 124--the son of Sultan Salah [original has Sala-Salah]-al Din - - Page 127--visible [original has visibile] - - Page 136--is motion.[original has comma] The distinction of past, - - Page 142--theory of [original has theoryof] - - Page 148--maintains [original has mantains] - - Page 152, footnote 152:1--Insan al-Kamil [original has Insanul Kamul] - - Page 158--identical [original has indentical] - - Page 162--marks the [original has the the] first step - - Page 163, footnote 163:1--Notwithstanding [original has - Nowithstanding] - - Page 171, footnote 171:1--Insan al-Kamil [original has Insanul Kamil] - - Page 180--standpoint [original has staindpoint] - - Page 187--Shi`ahs [original has Shi'ahs] - - - - - -End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of The Development of Metaphysics in -Persia, by Muhammad Iqbal - -*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK METAPHYSICS IN PERSIA *** - -***** This file should be named 41707.txt or 41707.zip ***** -This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: - http://www.gutenberg.org/4/1/7/0/41707/ - -Produced by Fritz Ohrenschall, Sania Ali Mirza, Asad Razzaki -and the Online Distributed Proofreading Team at -http://www.pgdp.net (This book was produced from scanned -images of public domain material from the Google Print -project.) - - -Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions -will be renamed. - -Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no -one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation -(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without -permission and without paying copyright royalties. Special rules, -set forth in the General Terms of Use part of this license, apply to -copying and distributing Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works to -protect the PROJECT GUTENBERG-tm concept and trademark. Project -Gutenberg is a registered trademark, and may not be used if you -charge for the eBooks, unless you receive specific permission. If you -do not charge anything for copies of this eBook, complying with the -rules is very easy. You may use this eBook for nearly any purpose -such as creation of derivative works, reports, performances and -research. They may be modified and printed and given away--you may do -practically ANYTHING with public domain eBooks. Redistribution is -subject to the trademark license, especially commercial -redistribution. - - - -*** START: FULL LICENSE *** - -THE FULL PROJECT GUTENBERG LICENSE -PLEASE READ THIS BEFORE YOU DISTRIBUTE OR USE THIS WORK - -To protect the Project Gutenberg-tm mission of promoting the free -distribution of electronic works, by using or distributing this work -(or any other work associated in any way with the phrase "Project -Gutenberg"), you agree to comply with all the terms of the Full Project -Gutenberg-tm License available with this file or online at - www.gutenberg.org/license. - - -Section 1. General Terms of Use and Redistributing Project Gutenberg-tm -electronic works - -1.A. By reading or using any part of this Project Gutenberg-tm -electronic work, you indicate that you have read, understand, agree to -and accept all the terms of this license and intellectual property -(trademark/copyright) agreement. If you do not agree to abide by all -the terms of this agreement, you must cease using and return or destroy -all copies of Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works in your possession. -If you paid a fee for obtaining a copy of or access to a Project -Gutenberg-tm electronic work and you do not agree to be bound by the -terms of this agreement, you may obtain a refund from the person or -entity to whom you paid the fee as set forth in paragraph 1.E.8. - -1.B. "Project Gutenberg" is a registered trademark. It may only be -used on or associated in any way with an electronic work by people who -agree to be bound by the terms of this agreement. There are a few -things that you can do with most Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works -even without complying with the full terms of this agreement. See -paragraph 1.C below. There are a lot of things you can do with Project -Gutenberg-tm electronic works if you follow the terms of this agreement -and help preserve free future access to Project Gutenberg-tm electronic -works. See paragraph 1.E below. - -1.C. The Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation ("the Foundation" -or PGLAF), owns a compilation copyright in the collection of Project -Gutenberg-tm electronic works. Nearly all the individual works in the -collection are in the public domain in the United States. If an -individual work is in the public domain in the United States and you are -located in the United States, we do not claim a right to prevent you from -copying, distributing, performing, displaying or creating derivative -works based on the work as long as all references to Project Gutenberg -are removed. Of course, we hope that you will support the Project -Gutenberg-tm mission of promoting free access to electronic works by -freely sharing Project Gutenberg-tm works in compliance with the terms of -this agreement for keeping the Project Gutenberg-tm name associated with -the work. You can easily comply with the terms of this agreement by -keeping this work in the same format with its attached full Project -Gutenberg-tm License when you share it without charge with others. - -1.D. The copyright laws of the place where you are located also govern -what you can do with this work. Copyright laws in most countries are in -a constant state of change. If you are outside the United States, check -the laws of your country in addition to the terms of this agreement -before downloading, copying, displaying, performing, distributing or -creating derivative works based on this work or any other Project -Gutenberg-tm work. The Foundation makes no representations concerning -the copyright status of any work in any country outside the United -States. - -1.E. Unless you have removed all references to Project Gutenberg: - -1.E.1. The following sentence, with active links to, or other immediate -access to, the full Project Gutenberg-tm License must appear prominently -whenever any copy of a Project Gutenberg-tm work (any work on which the -phrase "Project Gutenberg" appears, or with which the phrase "Project -Gutenberg" is associated) is accessed, displayed, performed, viewed, -copied or distributed: - -This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with -almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or -re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included -with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org - -1.E.2. If an individual Project Gutenberg-tm electronic work is derived -from the public domain (does not contain a notice indicating that it is -posted with permission of the copyright holder), the work can be copied -and distributed to anyone in the United States without paying any fees -or charges. If you are redistributing or providing access to a work -with the phrase "Project Gutenberg" associated with or appearing on the -work, you must comply either with the requirements of paragraphs 1.E.1 -through 1.E.7 or obtain permission for the use of the work and the -Project Gutenberg-tm trademark as set forth in paragraphs 1.E.8 or -1.E.9. - -1.E.3. If an individual Project Gutenberg-tm electronic work is posted -with the permission of the copyright holder, your use and distribution -must comply with both paragraphs 1.E.1 through 1.E.7 and any additional -terms imposed by the copyright holder. Additional terms will be linked -to the Project Gutenberg-tm License for all works posted with the -permission of the copyright holder found at the beginning of this work. - -1.E.4. Do not unlink or detach or remove the full Project Gutenberg-tm -License terms from this work, or any files containing a part of this -work or any other work associated with Project Gutenberg-tm. - -1.E.5. Do not copy, display, perform, distribute or redistribute this -electronic work, or any part of this electronic work, without -prominently displaying the sentence set forth in paragraph 1.E.1 with -active links or immediate access to the full terms of the Project -Gutenberg-tm License. - -1.E.6. You may convert to and distribute this work in any binary, -compressed, marked up, nonproprietary or proprietary form, including any -word processing or hypertext form. However, if you provide access to or -distribute copies of a Project Gutenberg-tm work in a format other than -"Plain Vanilla ASCII" or other format used in the official version -posted on the official Project Gutenberg-tm web site (www.gutenberg.org), -you must, at no additional cost, fee or expense to the user, provide a -copy, a means of exporting a copy, or a means of obtaining a copy upon -request, of the work in its original "Plain Vanilla ASCII" or other -form. Any alternate format must include the full Project Gutenberg-tm -License as specified in paragraph 1.E.1. - -1.E.7. Do not charge a fee for access to, viewing, displaying, -performing, copying or distributing any Project Gutenberg-tm works -unless you comply with paragraph 1.E.8 or 1.E.9. - -1.E.8. You may charge a reasonable fee for copies of or providing -access to or distributing Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works provided -that - -- You pay a royalty fee of 20% of the gross profits you derive from - the use of Project Gutenberg-tm works calculated using the method - you already use to calculate your applicable taxes. The fee is - owed to the owner of the Project Gutenberg-tm trademark, but he - has agreed to donate royalties under this paragraph to the - Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation. Royalty payments - must be paid within 60 days following each date on which you - prepare (or are legally required to prepare) your periodic tax - returns. Royalty payments should be clearly marked as such and - sent to the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation at the - address specified in Section 4, "Information about donations to - the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation." - -- You provide a full refund of any money paid by a user who notifies - you in writing (or by e-mail) within 30 days of receipt that s/he - does not agree to the terms of the full Project Gutenberg-tm - License. You must require such a user to return or - destroy all copies of the works possessed in a physical medium - and discontinue all use of and all access to other copies of - Project Gutenberg-tm works. - -- You provide, in accordance with paragraph 1.F.3, a full refund of any - money paid for a work or a replacement copy, if a defect in the - electronic work is discovered and reported to you within 90 days - of receipt of the work. - -- You comply with all other terms of this agreement for free - distribution of Project Gutenberg-tm works. - -1.E.9. If you wish to charge a fee or distribute a Project Gutenberg-tm -electronic work or group of works on different terms than are set -forth in this agreement, you must obtain permission in writing from -both the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation and Michael -Hart, the owner of the Project Gutenberg-tm trademark. Contact the -Foundation as set forth in Section 3 below. - -1.F. - -1.F.1. Project Gutenberg volunteers and employees expend considerable -effort to identify, do copyright research on, transcribe and proofread -public domain works in creating the Project Gutenberg-tm -collection. Despite these efforts, Project Gutenberg-tm electronic -works, and the medium on which they may be stored, may contain -"Defects," such as, but not limited to, incomplete, inaccurate or -corrupt data, transcription errors, a copyright or other intellectual -property infringement, a defective or damaged disk or other medium, a -computer virus, or computer codes that damage or cannot be read by -your equipment. - -1.F.2. LIMITED WARRANTY, DISCLAIMER OF DAMAGES - Except for the "Right -of Replacement or Refund" described in paragraph 1.F.3, the Project -Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation, the owner of the Project -Gutenberg-tm trademark, and any other party distributing a Project -Gutenberg-tm electronic work under this agreement, disclaim all -liability to you for damages, costs and expenses, including legal -fees. YOU AGREE THAT YOU HAVE NO REMEDIES FOR NEGLIGENCE, STRICT -LIABILITY, BREACH OF WARRANTY OR BREACH OF CONTRACT EXCEPT THOSE -PROVIDED IN PARAGRAPH 1.F.3. YOU AGREE THAT THE FOUNDATION, THE -TRADEMARK OWNER, AND ANY DISTRIBUTOR UNDER THIS AGREEMENT WILL NOT BE -LIABLE TO YOU FOR ACTUAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, CONSEQUENTIAL, PUNITIVE OR -INCIDENTAL DAMAGES EVEN IF YOU GIVE NOTICE OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH -DAMAGE. - -1.F.3. LIMITED RIGHT OF REPLACEMENT OR REFUND - If you discover a -defect in this electronic work within 90 days of receiving it, you can -receive a refund of the money (if any) you paid for it by sending a -written explanation to the person you received the work from. If you -received the work on a physical medium, you must return the medium with -your written explanation. The person or entity that provided you with -the defective work may elect to provide a replacement copy in lieu of a -refund. If you received the work electronically, the person or entity -providing it to you may choose to give you a second opportunity to -receive the work electronically in lieu of a refund. If the second copy -is also defective, you may demand a refund in writing without further -opportunities to fix the problem. - -1.F.4. Except for the limited right of replacement or refund set forth -in paragraph 1.F.3, this work is provided to you 'AS-IS', WITH NO OTHER -WARRANTIES OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO -WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR ANY PURPOSE. - -1.F.5. Some states do not allow disclaimers of certain implied -warranties or the exclusion or limitation of certain types of damages. -If any disclaimer or limitation set forth in this agreement violates the -law of the state applicable to this agreement, the agreement shall be -interpreted to make the maximum disclaimer or limitation permitted by -the applicable state law. The invalidity or unenforceability of any -provision of this agreement shall not void the remaining provisions. - -1.F.6. INDEMNITY - You agree to indemnify and hold the Foundation, the -trademark owner, any agent or employee of the Foundation, anyone -providing copies of Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works in accordance -with this agreement, and any volunteers associated with the production, -promotion and distribution of Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works, -harmless from all liability, costs and expenses, including legal fees, -that arise directly or indirectly from any of the following which you do -or cause to occur: (a) distribution of this or any Project Gutenberg-tm -work, (b) alteration, modification, or additions or deletions to any -Project Gutenberg-tm work, and (c) any Defect you cause. - - -Section 2. Information about the Mission of Project Gutenberg-tm - -Project Gutenberg-tm is synonymous with the free distribution of -electronic works in formats readable by the widest variety of computers -including obsolete, old, middle-aged and new computers. It exists -because of the efforts of hundreds of volunteers and donations from -people in all walks of life. - -Volunteers and financial support to provide volunteers with the -assistance they need are critical to reaching Project Gutenberg-tm's -goals and ensuring that the Project Gutenberg-tm collection will -remain freely available for generations to come. In 2001, the Project -Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation was created to provide a secure -and permanent future for Project Gutenberg-tm and future generations. -To learn more about the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation -and how your efforts and donations can help, see Sections 3 and 4 -and the Foundation information page at www.gutenberg.org - - -Section 3. Information about the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive -Foundation - -The Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation is a non profit -501(c)(3) educational corporation organized under the laws of the -state of Mississippi and granted tax exempt status by the Internal -Revenue Service. The Foundation's EIN or federal tax identification -number is 64-6221541. Contributions to the Project Gutenberg -Literary Archive Foundation are tax deductible to the full extent -permitted by U.S. federal laws and your state's laws. - -The Foundation's principal office is located at 4557 Melan Dr. S. -Fairbanks, AK, 99712., but its volunteers and employees are scattered -throughout numerous locations. Its business office is located at 809 -North 1500 West, Salt Lake City, UT 84116, (801) 596-1887. Email -contact links and up to date contact information can be found at the -Foundation's web site and official page at www.gutenberg.org/contact - -For additional contact information: - Dr. Gregory B. Newby - Chief Executive and Director - gbnewby@pglaf.org - -Section 4. Information about Donations to the Project Gutenberg -Literary Archive Foundation - -Project Gutenberg-tm depends upon and cannot survive without wide -spread public support and donations to carry out its mission of -increasing the number of public domain and licensed works that can be -freely distributed in machine readable form accessible by the widest -array of equipment including outdated equipment. Many small donations -($1 to $5,000) are particularly important to maintaining tax exempt -status with the IRS. - -The Foundation is committed to complying with the laws regulating -charities and charitable donations in all 50 states of the United -States. Compliance requirements are not uniform and it takes a -considerable effort, much paperwork and many fees to meet and keep up -with these requirements. We do not solicit donations in locations -where we have not received written confirmation of compliance. To -SEND DONATIONS or determine the status of compliance for any -particular state visit www.gutenberg.org/donate - -While we cannot and do not solicit contributions from states where we -have not met the solicitation requirements, we know of no prohibition -against accepting unsolicited donations from donors in such states who -approach us with offers to donate. - -International donations are gratefully accepted, but we cannot make -any statements concerning tax treatment of donations received from -outside the United States. U.S. laws alone swamp our small staff. - -Please check the Project Gutenberg Web pages for current donation -methods and addresses. Donations are accepted in a number of other -ways including checks, online payments and credit card donations. -To donate, please visit: www.gutenberg.org/donate - - -Section 5. General Information About Project Gutenberg-tm electronic -works. - -Professor Michael S. Hart was the originator of the Project Gutenberg-tm -concept of a library of electronic works that could be freely shared -with anyone. For forty years, he produced and distributed Project -Gutenberg-tm eBooks with only a loose network of volunteer support. - -Project Gutenberg-tm eBooks are often created from several printed -editions, all of which are confirmed as Public Domain in the U.S. -unless a copyright notice is included. Thus, we do not necessarily -keep eBooks in compliance with any particular paper edition. - -Most people start at our Web site which has the main PG search facility: - - www.gutenberg.org - -This Web site includes information about Project Gutenberg-tm, -including how to make donations to the Project Gutenberg Literary -Archive Foundation, how to help produce our new eBooks, and how to -subscribe to our email newsletter to hear about new eBooks. - diff --git a/old/41707.zip b/old/41707.zip Binary files differdeleted file mode 100644 index dcd220d..0000000 --- a/old/41707.zip +++ /dev/null |